Consociational Democracy and Peripheral Capitalism in Late-Modernising Societies: A Political Economy of Lebanon

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CONSOCIATIONAL DEMOCRACY AND PERIPHERAL CAPITALISM IN LATE-MODERNISING SOCIETIES

A POLITICAL ECONOMY OF LEBANON

Fouad Gehad Marei

THESIS SUBMITTED IN PARTIAL FULFILMENT OF THE REQUIREMENTS FOR THE DEGREE OF DOCTOR OF PHILOSOPHY

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ABSTRACT

CONSOCIATIONAL DEMOCRACY AND PERIPHERAL CAPITALISM
IN LATE-MODERNISING SOCIETIES: A POLITICAL ECONOMY OF LEBANON

Fouad Gehad Marei

Following the assassination of Prime Minister Hariri in 2005, Lebanon witnessed vigorous debate over the nature of its political system raising the question of whether it is based on consociation between confessions or consensus and balance of power between political factions. Lebanon has traditionally alternated between several extremes: from ‘the happy phenomenon’, a liberal example of self-perpetuating prosperity and ‘the only Arab democracy’ to a haven for warlords and the scene for recurring political impasses and violence. Underpinning these extremes, however, is the national myth that Lebanon is the ‘Switzerland of the East’. Whether this refers to its mountainous geography, freewheeling capitalism, salience of the tertiary sector or the politico-cultural cantonisation of the country is the subject matter of this research.

This study explores political economy and political culture in Lebanon by locating the confessional subcultures within the theoretical framework of ‘hybrid modernities’. The research presented in this study, hence, aims to make sense of the perennial cycles of conflict and political impasses which have scarred modern Lebanese history. This is done by critically examining the intersections between consociationalism as a political superstructure, peripheral capitalism as a political economy and confessionalism as a political paradigm. The theory of ‘hybrid modernities’ is utilised in an attempt to redefine ‘modernity’ as an inclusionary and dynamic process whereby multiple socio-cultural projects are continually constructed and reconstructed through negotiation and conflict, hence, producing a hybrid order. Conflict is, therefore, interpreted as a mechanism of redistribution and negotiation between multiple subnational centres as opposed to a modality of state-society relations.

Accordingly, the vulnerabilities of modernity and the unintelligibility of its constellations are mitigated not through bureaucratic universalism and the logics of the market, but through asymmetric relations of power between zu'ama (patrons) and their 'atbā' (clients). The pervasiveness of political patronage, therefore, is not a relic of pre-modernity but a ‘modern’ and adaptive response to the disarticulations of Lebanese capitalism. Patron-client dyads capitalise on and reinforce social relations within vertical segments, hence, modernising and instrumentalising ‘the confession’. Social change, therefore, emanates from the subnational periphery (the confession) and targets the subnational and, eventually, the national centre.

In responding to the aims and objectives of this study, ethnographic research was conducted to explore the intersections between the disarticulations of late developmentalism in Lebanon and the social construction of ‘imagined communities’. Focusing on the triangulation of consociationalism, peripheral capitalism and confessionalism as the political modus operandi in Lebanon and the Shi'a as a subnational ‘imagined community’, this research explores the intersections between political economy and political culture in the production of multiple hybrid modernities within the multi-centred Lebanese system. This is achieved by examining the political economy dynamics of the social construction of ‘the Shi’a’ as well as the ontological worldviews and modus vivendi which underpin its socio-cultural project. In this context, Hezbollah is conceptualised as the ‘cohesive core’ of a social movement which articulates its own authenticated modernity and produces social change through a dynamic and bidirectional process facilitated by the party’s monolithic non-state welfare sector, civil society, media and the ulema.
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NOTES ON TRANSLITERATION

All non-English words used in this thesis are italicised and all non-Latin words have been Romanised in accordance with a simplified version of the transliteration conventions used by the International Journal of Middle Eastern Studies (IJMES). Dialectic marks have been used when necessary: prolonged vowels are denoted ā, ī and ū; sād with š; dād with ẓ; tāʾ with ِ; hāʾ with ی; ʿayn is with right parenthesis (‘) and hamza with left parentheses (’).

Arabic words have been transliterated from the respective vernacular (Jnoub instead of Janūb) and proper names are referred to as commonly transliterated in either English or French (e.g. Chehab instead of Shihāb and Nasrallah instead of Naṣr Allah).
LIST OF ABBREVIATIONS


CCIAS Chamber of Commerce, Industry and Agriculture in Saida and the South

CDR Council for Development and Reconstruction

CfS Council for the South

CGTL Confédération Générale des Travailleurs Libanais (General Confederation of Lebanese Workers. Est. 1958).

FID Fund for the Displaced


GCC Gulf Cooperation Council

HCP Higher Commission for Privatisation


IDA Investment Development Authority

IDPs Internally Displaced Person(s); also referred to as muhajjarin

IHA al-hay’a al-sihiyat al-islamiya (Islamic Health Association)

JTDI Jam’iyyat al-talām ad-dīnī al-islāmi (Association of Islamic Religious Education)

LCP Lebanese Communist Party. (Est. 1924. Current leader: Khaled Hadadi)

LF Lebanese Forces (Est. 1977. Current leader: Samir Geagea)

LNM Lebanese National Movement (Dissolved: 1982)

March-14 Alliance of political parties and independent politicians established in the aftermath of PM Rafic Hariri’s assassination in 2005 in opposition to Syrian tutelage and in support of an international investigation. The coalition takes its name from the date of the large anti-Syria rally on March 14, 2005.

March-8 Alliance of political parties and independent politicians established in the aftermath of PM Rafic Hariri’s assassination in 2005. The loose coalition takes its name from a rally held in support of Syria and in condemnation of foreign intervention in Lebanon.

May-7 Clashes sparked by the government’s decision to shut down Hezbollah’s telecommunications networks and remove Beirut Airport’s security chief over alleged connections with Hezbollah. In retaliation, forces loyal to the March-8 coalition seized control of several areas in Lebanon, defeated Almustaqbal fighters and forced the government to revoke its decisions ending a seventeen-month standoff.
<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Abbreviation</th>
<th>Full Form</th>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td>MoP</td>
<td>Mode of Production (pl. MoPs)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>MP</td>
<td>Member of Parliament</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>PM</td>
<td>Prime Minister</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>QSG</td>
<td>Qornet Shehwan Gathering. A loose gathering of predominantly-Christian politicians, intellectuals and businessmen established in 2001 in opposition to Syrian tutelage. QSG gained the support and patronage of Maronite Patriarch Nasrallah Butros Sfeir and the archbishop of the Metn town of Qornet Shehwan.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>UN</td>
<td>United Nations</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>UNSC</td>
<td>United Nations Security Council</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Glossary Term</td>
<td>Description</td>
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<td>---------------------</td>
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</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Ashura</strong></td>
<td>Tenth day of the month of Muharram in the Islamic/Hijri calendar. For Shiites, Ashura marks the climax of the ten-day rememberance of Imam Hussayn’s martyrdom in the battle of Karbala.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Blue Line</strong></td>
<td>Border demarcation between Lebanon and Israel.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>caza</strong></td>
<td>Districts (Arabic). Lebanon’s governorates are subdivided into cazas.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Green Line</strong></td>
<td>Border demarcation between East and West Beirut during the Civil War.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>ḥussayniyya</strong></td>
<td>Shiite community centres dedicated to the rememberance of Imam Hussayn (pl. ḥussayniyyāt).</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Jnoub</strong></td>
<td>South (Arabic). A reference to South Lebanon.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>muhāfaزا</strong></td>
<td>Governorate (Arabic). Lebanon is divided into six governorates known, collectively, as muhāfazā.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>mujtahid</strong></td>
<td>Muslim scholars accepted as competent to exercise interpretation of the scripture and law through personal reasoning. Mujtahids are associated with Shiite Islam in particular (Arabic).</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>mukhtar</strong></td>
<td>Literally, ‘the chosen’ (Arabic). A reference to elected mayors performing local government functions (pl. makhtūr).</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>mutasarifīyya</strong></td>
<td>Autonomous administrative region established in Mount Lebanon in accordance with Ottoman reforms (Règlement organique) in 1861. The mutasarifīyya was ‘guaranteed’ by an international treaty and ruled by a mutasarif (governor).</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>qā‘im-maqāmiyyat</strong></td>
<td>Autonomous administrative region established in Mount Lebanon in 1840 comprising two subgovernorates.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>qabādāy</strong></td>
<td>Strongman or middle-level patron; often in reference to urban bosses, populist leaders and middle-level patrons (pl. qabādāyāt).</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>sayyid</strong></td>
<td>An honorific title denoting descent of the Prophet Muhammad</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>shaykh</strong></td>
<td>Honorific title literally meaning ‘elder’ (Arabic). Term is used to refer to community leaders as well as and (Muslim) clergymen.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>ṭā’efa</strong></td>
<td>Subgroup (Arabic). A reference to the ‘confession’ (pl. ṭawā’ef).</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>ulema</strong></td>
<td>Scholars (Arabic). A reference to the educated class of Muslim legal scholars and jurisprudents.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>wajih</strong></td>
<td>Notable (Arabic). A reference to rural strongmen (pl. wujaha).</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>wasta</strong></td>
<td>Intercession or intermediary (Arabic); often in reference to nepotism, connections and corruption.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>za‘im</strong></td>
<td>Leader or patron (Arabic). A reference to political bosses (pl. zu‘ama).</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS

This PhD is the result of an intellectual and spiritual odyssey which could not have been fulfilled without the support of many people to whom I am indebted. Firstly, I would like to thank Durham University Graduate School and Ustinov College for their funding and financial support without which this project would not have been possible.

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INTRODUCTION
0.1 Research Outline
Since the assassination of Prime Minister Hariri in 2005, Lebanon witnessed vigorous debate over the nature of its political system raising the question of whether it is based on consociation between confessions or consensus and balance of power between political factions. History evidences that this small Middle Eastern country has alternated between several extremes: from ‘the happy phenomenon’, a liberal example of self-perpetuating prosperity and ‘the only Arab democracy’ to a haven for warlords, a battlefield of narratives and the scene for recurring political impasses and violent breakdowns. Underpinning these extremes is the national myth that Lebanon is ‘Switzerland of the East’ – whether this myth refers to the country’s mountainous geography, freewheeling capitalism, salience of the tertiary sector or the politico-cultural cantonisation of the country is the subject matter of this research.

Theoretical Directions
The observational multi-centeredness of socio-political order in Lebanon is considered through the theory of hybrid modernities in this study, which redefines ‘modernity’ as an inclusionary and dynamic process whereby multiple civilisational projects are continually constructed, deconstructed and reconstructed rather than a monolithic, homogenising and mono-directional transformation informed by the monocivilisational experience of Western societies. ‘Hybrid modernities’, thus, liberates the study of modern society in Lebanon from the universalist claims and the logics of binary opposites inherent in modernist theory. Hybrid modernities, for instance, explores forms of modern government beyond the strict boundaries of the nation-state model and deconstructs or problematises the presupposition that ‘the secular’ is a hallmark of ‘the modern’ and that ‘religion’ is a ‘private matter’ with no bearing on the economy, law and politics. In other words, ‘hybrid modernities’ explains the coevality of seemingly-contradictory realities: ‘modern’ and ‘traditional’ epistemologies; legal-contractual and rational-cultural relations; secular and non-secular ontologies; the state and self-centred subcultures.

It is in this light that the ‘modern’ state and the equally modern substate units (confessions) can be understood: both are products of dynamic and continual processes of social construction and reconstruction. To undertake a meaningful discussion of confessional-consociationalism, thus, it is necessary to examine the political economy of social interactions at the micro, confessional and macro (national) levels emphasising the disarticulations of peripheral capitalism, the centrality of informal networks and the pervasiveness of patron-client relations. Moreover, it is necessary to examine the ‘confessional paradigm’ in terms of the identity, ontology and epistemology of subnational confessions and its relationship to the ‘modern’, the ‘centre’ and the ‘other’.
The theoretical duality of ‘hybrid modernities’ and ‘dependent capitalism’, therefore, explains the hybridity of socio-political order in modern Lebanon. Hybrid modernities explains not only the coevality of ‘modernity’, ‘tradition’ and ‘religion’, but also the coevality of multiple moderns attributing different meanings to the same realities by ‘authenticating’ these perceived realities through sectarian/religious ontologies. Dependency theory, on the other hand, explains the evolutionary nature of Lebanese capitalism and, thus, the hybridity of the dominant class.

Theoretical Intersections and the Case of Lebanon
Since this research aims to explore and examine the development of political economy and the confessional paradigm in Lebanon by interrelating the two theoretical frameworks, it contends that the pervasiveness of seemingly-unmodern clientelistic social relations is, in fact, a ‘modern’ response to the vulnerabilities of capitalism, the unintelligibility of the modern socio-cultural project and the inaccessibility of institutions imposed through late/incomplete transitions to modernity. The abundance of substate structures and subnational group solidarities performing integrative functions through clientelistic redistribution, hence, provides opportunity spaces for the development of subnational ‘imagined communities’ with distinct identity markers and ontological presuppositions.

In Lebanon, these modalities are accommodated within the consociational framework producing a bidirectional relationship between the state and substate domains: the consociational state acts as a distributor and interlocutor and, thus, contains rivalries and competition within the bounds of the establishment while ‘patronage democracy’ consolidates subnational ‘imagined communities’ by reinforcing the self-perpetuating relationship between public office, patrons and clients.

The research presented in this thesis critically examines the nature and dynamics of conflict in Lebanon emphasising two variables: the consociational political structure of the country and the political economy of inter- and intra-communal relations. The Lebanese state, it must be noted, is not the monolithic Hegelian state which pervades or seeks to pervade in much of the modern world. Accordingly, state-society relations are not conducted in accordance with the nation-state prototype. In other words, in contrast to other Middle Eastern states where conflict is a mechanism of ‘engineering’ society by the state, conflict in Lebanon should be interpreted as a mechanism of negotiation and redistribution. Moreover, whereas national ‘imagined communities’ are imposed by the authoritarian state in many late-modernising societies, social change in Lebanon emanates from the subnational pillar (the confession) and targets the subnational and, eventually, national centre. Conflict, thus, occurs between subnational pillars; not between state and society, as there is no ‘fierce’ and ‘engineering’ overarching state.
Underpinning these assumptions is an analysis of Lebanon’s multi-centred consociational order. Centre-periphery relations, thus, are not conducted solely between state and society, but between the multiple centres of society (confessions); between these multiple centres and the state as an interlocutor; and between these multiple centres and their members.

This research, therefore, locates clientelism and confessionalism within the theoretical context of ‘hybrid modernities’ and peripheral capitalism. Both, it is demonstrated in this study, contribute to the production of a hybrid socio-political order where patronage politics and confessionalism intersect as ‘transient constants’: transient by law; constant in practice. Patronage and the confessional ‘ethnie’, therefore, mitigate the effects of deficient socioeconomic modernisation; bridge the gap between the developed institutional structures and underdeveloped social formations; and, crucially, act as instruments of and alternatives to the social-struggle discourse.

Multiple ‘Imagined Communities’

The multi-centeredness of socio-political order in contemporary Lebanon, however, cannot be fully understood through political economy alone. Lebanon’s multi-centred consociational modernity provides an implicit social contract whereby confessional ‘pillars’ are entitled to articulate and adhere to their particularistic interpretations and worldviews. As such, it is important to examine the ontologies, narratives and worldviews (hence, hybrid modernities) which co-exist within modern, consociational Lebanon. In other words, whereas political economy and the study of legal-institutional constellations of consociationalism explains the micro and macro dynamics of social interactions in modern Lebanon, ‘the confessional paradigm’ must be examined to comprehend the bidirectional relationship between the national superstructure and the multiple subnational (confessional) subunits which comprise it.

It can, therefore, be argued that developments in the political economy and the confessional paradigm in Lebanon, in a casual manner, are a product of intersecting claims to everyday life and institutions through various ontologies. While the outcomes of the ‘modernity project’ are articulated, instituted and pursued in the everyday lives of individuals, groups and movements, and also of institutions these are justified through the particular ontology each confessional group adheres to. This is most evident in the case of Lebanon’s Shi’a – an ‘imagined community’ which is distinct from the perceptual particulars (Shiites) who constitute it.

The uniqueness of the Shi’a in Lebanon’s multi-centred modernity is twofold. Firstly, the collectivity is justified by and premised on a dynamic and continual process involving the construction and reconstruction of a hybrid ontology through a far-reaching transnational web of connections and, thus, extensive civilisational cross-fertilisation. This process is informed
by a myriad of factors: Islamic ontology; Shiites’ collective consciousness and the political history of Lebanon’s Shi’a. Shiites’ hybrid modernity in Lebanon, therefore, is the product of a process of ‘authentication’ whereby Islam is ‘modernised’ and modernity is ‘Islamised’.

Secondly, ‘Shiite modernity’ involves a coherent social movement which articulates and, thus, influences social change. Although the social-movement aspect of ‘Shiite modernity’ predates Hezbollah, the party performs a connective function coalescing the web of connections which constitutes the social movement. The coherence, centralism and all-pervasiveness of this modus vivendi, the Islamic milieu, constitutes the only ‘historical project’ in Lebanon today with the intellectual and organisational ability to challenge the dominant ontological narrative.

In this context and in acting within hybrid modernities, Hezbollah is singled out as the most ‘modern’ party in postwar Lebanon insofar as it adopts a highly-centralised Islamo-Leninist organisational structure; articulates a ‘modern’ modus vivendi; and produces social change through a dynamic and bidirectional process facilitated by the party’s monolithic non-state welfare sector, civil society and media. This focus runs contrary to mainstream academic discourse emphasising the militaristic, ‘terrorism’ or real politik aspects of the party.

In other words, whereas the party’s ‘Lebaneseness’ has been questioned in light of its monopoly over the resistance, recurring political impasses and region-wide speculations about the formation of a putative Shiite crescent, this study argues that Hezbollah is, in fact, ‘embedded’ in a ‘Lebanese modality’ – that is to say, the triangulation between patronage democracy, the multi-centred consociational order and the confessional paradigm. Hezbollah’s ‘historical project’ is, therefore, a ‘sectarian modern’ and a ‘confessional nationalism’ thriving not in spite of, but precisely because of this triangulation.

Aims and Objectives
This research explores political economy and the confessional paradigm in Lebanon by locating the confessional subcultures within the theoretical framework of hybrid modernities. In doing so, actors and institutions, as the building block of Lebanese political economy, in addition to historical dynamics are critically and discursively examined to give meaning to the socially constructed ‘realities’ and ‘modernities’ of the various confessional groups.

The research presented in this study, thus, examines and analyses the perennial cycles of conflict and political impasses which have scarred modern Lebanese history by examining the structure of cleavages in Lebanon; the weaknesses and fragilities of the cross-confessional public domain; and the parochial interests and intransigence of the ruling elite.
Beyond strict political economy, however, this study locates Lebanon’s consociational modernity within the ‘hybrid modernities’ framework and therefore, makes a contribution to both consociational theory and hybrid modernities theory. In doing so, the research presented here conceptualises the Lebanese political system constructed and articulated as a hybrid modernity and, crucially, acknowledges the multi-centeredness of socio-political order in modern Lebanon.

As such, political economy and the confessional paradigm in contemporary Lebanon are examined with the intention of highlighting the social, political and economic underpinnings of the multiple and, crucially, auto-centred value systems, narratives and *modus vivendi* which exist because of and within the national whole – albeit making contending claims the national ‘centre’. Sectarianism and ‘Shiite modernity’, therefore, are not opposed to modernism as articulated in Lebanon, but should be understood as a set of practices and paradigms aimed at ‘normalising’ the ‘authentic’ ontology of a particular confession (*i.e.* the Shi‘a) by promulgating the socio-cultural project articulated by ‘ethnic entrepreneurs’ and, thus, (re)defining the terms and content of such concepts as citizenship, nationalism, pluralism and modernity.

**0.2 Research Questions**

In responding to the aims and objectives of this research, the following questions pertaining to political economy and the confessional paradigm in modern Lebanon are developed:

(i) How does the modern state in Lebanon reconcile its role as an instrument of class dominance with its roles as a multi-centred forum for consociation and a platform for elite acquiescence and balance-of-power politics?

(ii) What impact do the disarticulations of peripheral capitalism in Lebanon have on consensus politics in Lebanon?

(iii) How do Lebanon’s hybrid modernity and peripheral capitalism create opportunity spaces for the development and accommodation of sub/transnational ‘hybrid modernities’?

(iv) How do multiple subnational modernities locate within the political superstructure and, thus, relate to one another and to the modern national ‘centre’?

(v) In light of these issues, how can conflict be reinterpreted within an organic understanding of political economy and the confessional paradigm in modern Lebanon?
0.3 RESEARCH METHODOLOGY: AN ETHNOGRAPHIC ODYSSEE

Initially, it was intended that the research presented in this study would be based on a mixture of qualitative and quantitative methods. However, due to limitations imposed by the political environment in Lebanon during the duration of this research, it was decided to utilise only qualitative methods in assembling primary data for reasons discussed later in this chapter.

During the course of this research, forty semi-structured interviews were conducted with a wide array of politicians, local-government officials, clergymen, local community leaders and political activists (especially youth and women) as well as specialists (economists, journalists and academics) and development experts. This research also involved content/discourse analysis of literature and audiovisual material as well as testimonials and participant observations as outlined in the following sections of this chapter.

The research conducted for the purpose of this study involved fourteen months of fieldwork in Lebanon between June and September 2008; October 2009 and June 2010; and in April/May 2011. The discussions presented, therefore, draw on a myriad of qualitative research methods informed by ethnomethodology including historical, archival, content/discourse analysis and ethnographic methods.

It is important to note that ethnomethodology entails a process of penetrating and decomposing the familiar objects of everyday life and is, therefore, praised for its ability to highlight the reflexive or co-constitutive relationship between particular objects of perception and environing contexts. Objects of everyday life are, thus, bracketed and decomposed: perceptual particulars are understood in relation to the context of which they are a part and the context is seen as neither independent nor stable as it is comprised of component elements (Garfinkel, 1967). The central ingredient in ethnomethodology, therefore, is the dynamic and inter-subjective relationship between ‘perceptual particulars’ and ‘contexts’. More importantly, ethnomethodology is distinctive in that it possesses a deconstructive impetus premised on the recognition that something is missing when academic analyses of the social world take the mundane intelligibility and inter-subjectivity of ‘society’ for granted (Clayman, 1995).

The most significant strength of relevance to this study, however, is that ethnomethodology broadens our understanding of the production of ‘facts’ and has a direct bearing on the analysis of rationality, practical reasoning, moral assessments and the achievement of everyday ‘realities’ (Atkinson, 1988). Ethnomethodology, therefore, seems to me to be the most appropriate approach when questioning the very essence of such concepts as ‘modernity’, ‘Enlightenment’ and their socio-political constellations.
It must be noted, however, that my own background played an important role in my research and must thus be examined in tandem with the methods and methodology adopted for the purpose of this study. Moreover, it is important to note that this research is based on an ‘ethnographic odyssey’ to use Belmonte’s (1989) expression: a fieldwork project of harnessing knowledge through a process of adventure and pathos grounded in meticulous theoretical preparation informed by secondary research, archival resources and a prolonged pilot study.

The following sections explain the ethnomethodological basis of this study and, thus, highlight the developments that this research has undergone and the methodological implications these developments have had on the findings presented in this study.

Why Lebanon? And, why the Shi‘a?
My initial interest in Lebanese politics was shaped by my own background as an Egyptian. The tiny Arab country presented a unique case – not only to me, but to many political activists as well. Lebanon was the scene of several seemingly-irreconcilable traits unknown or uncommon to many societies in the Middle East. Firstly, it appeared to be a ‘liberal’ society where human rights and personal freedoms are upheld. Secondly, it was home to a vibrant civil society where protest movements flourished; political parties competed in ‘heated’ elections; and the media was outspoken. Thirdly, Lebanon was home to Hezbollah which, for some, is an example of a ‘pious’ yet ‘moderate’ society engaged in resistance against occupation, oppression and imperialism and, for others, the antithesis of secularism, modernism and civilisation.

Between February 2005 and July 2006, I visited Lebanon on a number of professional and social trips during which I expanded my knowledge of the country and built connections. It was during this time that I was exposed to the disarticulations of Lebanese democracy and pluralism. Following the assassination of Prime Minister Hariri in February 2005, the country underwent a prolonged period of not only political, but also social polarisation.

My realisation of how ‘plural’ – that is to say, extremely divided – Lebanese society is and how different meanings are attached to the same social and political ‘realities’ was exacerbated in July 2006. The 33-day war with Israel highlighted how different subnational communities exist within parallel existences: each promulgating a different narrative, expressing a different grievance and aspiring a different end. The devastation the war inflicted was belittled by my realisation that each ‘segment’ lived within a different political economy; upheld a different worldview; and identified with a different *modus vivendi*.

This, it must be added, coincided with a region-wide interest in the putative ‘rise of the Shiites’ and speculations about the crystallisation of an Irano-centric ‘Shiite crescent’. Hezbollah, in
this discourse, was depicted as a malignant tentacle of a ‘Persian’ and ‘Shiite’ conspiracy to ‘corrupt’ Islam and penetrate the Arab world.

A political economy analysis of Hezbollah and its ability to fit into and dominate the clientelistic structure amongst Lebanon’s Shiites seemed like a plausible starting point for my research. My being Egyptian and a native Arabic-speaker and the wealth of cultural and behavioural mannerisms Egypt and Lebanon share seemed an initial advantage.

**Experiencing South Lebanon: Deconstructing the Myth**

During a pilot study trip to Lebanon in 2008, I expanded my knowledge of the country with a particular emphasis on South Lebanon. I was granted logistical support and institutional affiliation by a number of Lebanese and foreign institutions allowing me access to the border regions and access to local-government officials. My pilot study allowed me to forge a web of connections involving local-government officials, community leaders and development experts based in and working on South Lebanon as well as to explore several localities in the region.

As a result, I decided to focus my research on the four *cazas* which comprise the *muḥāfaza* of Nabatiyeh: Bint-Jbeil, Marjeyoun, Hasbaya and Nabatiyeh itself. The choice of these localities was influenced by various factors: Nabatiyeh is perceived as ‘the centre of Shiite learning’ and Bint-Jbeil as ‘the capital of the Resistance’ whereas Hasbaya is home to an interesting mix of Sunnis, Druzes and Shiites; while a sizeable Maronite minority inhabits Marjeyoun which was also home to the Israel-backed South Lebanon Army. The latter three, it must be noted, were under Israeli occupation until 2000 and, thus, their political economy was severely influenced by the occupation.

Crucially, however, my four-month-long pilot study revealed an important methodological aspect which had a bearing on this study both in terms of research methods as well as in terms of the research question itself. Firstly, I realised that people were not interested in me as an academic nor were they ‘comforted’ by my being affiliated to a UK institution of higher learning. Instead, if and when people were ‘comfortable’ with my presence it was a result of my own background: an inquisitive Egyptian. In other words, I quickly realised that, as an academic, I was an intruder, ‘yet another one of them’ and, even, a nuisance. But, as a ‘participant’, I was welcome – partly, out of etiquette and politeness, but also out of reciprocal interest in my inquisitiveness, a desire to explore our wealth of shared heritage and, perhaps, even, as a potential recruit. Only as such did I achieve a degree of embeddedness in a myriad of social relations within which I became a perceptual particular. This ‘embeddedness’ influenced my own experience during my research in South Lebanon. This ‘insider’ experience revealed to me the weaknesses of my initial hypothesis as I had, initially, set out to explain,
through political economy, Hezbollah’s control over the livelihood of Lebanon’s Shiites and, thus, its monopoly over the articulation of Shiite identity in Lebanon.

I was confronted, however, with a different reality: Hezbollah was only omnipresent insofar as it represented an overarching superstructure; a mafhūm (praxis). In reality, however, the party was neither dominant in the everyday life of the average jnoubi (southerner) nor did it exercise direct economic or coercive power in South Lebanon. In fact, the all-pervasiveness of the party’s praxis relies heavily on local-government officials, community leaders and the ulema. Even economically, the party was not as ‘patronising’ as it is sometimes portrayed.

I quickly realised that the ulema and ‘political families’ were the ‘centre’ of local communities in their intellectual and socio-cultural sense. It was around them that the community rallied and it was from them that ‘meaning’ was derived. As for the economy, various socioeconomic actors played an important role in the economic life of South Lebanon including Hezbollah and the ulema. However, it was remittances from relatives in such faraway lands as West Africa, North America and Germany which sustained life in the otherwise-impoverished region. Endless queues of jnoubis waiting to collect remittances sent by relatives in Africa through Western Union in Bint-Jbeil, for instance, were not an uncommon scene.

My pilot study, therefore, challenged both my research methods as well as my initial research focus. I came to realise that the advantage I possessed was not my being an academic based in a UK institution, but my being me. Moreover, the research question, it had become clear, needed to focus more on the bidirectionality, dynamism and ‘translocalism’ of the society and, thus, economy in South Lebanon rather than on the exaggerated role of Hezbollah.

Revisiting Shiites’ Social History: Qualitative and Historical Methods
My returning to Lebanon in 2009 was, therefore, informed by these preliminary conceptual and methodological findings with the aim of understanding the nature and dynamics of society and economy amongst Shiites through more ethnographic methods. Above all, it became clear that achieving this goal could only be done by understanding the shift which the community underwent in the mid-twentieth century transforming it from an isolated community of mountaineering people on the (social and economy) peripheries of Safad, Acre and Damascus to a periphery of the Beirut-based capitalist economy and its perplexed patronage democracy.

Historical and qualitative research methods were combined in an attempt to understand the shifting political economy of mid-twentieth century South Lebanon. In doing so, I conducted a number of semi-structured interviews with specialists (economists, journalists and academics), community leaders and local historians and ‘elders’. Moreover, I conducted archival research involving newspaper archives, mayoral records and voter registers in order to obtain data on
demographic and socioeconomic indicators pertaining to the political economy and migratory trends in the period between 1950 and 1980.

The data obtained through semi-structured interviews and archival research quickly revealed the need to explore the socioeconomic dynamics of the solidarity groups and social relations forged not in South Lebanon but in Beirut and the diaspora. This was confirmed by anecdotal data and informal conversations which indicated that the ‘modern’, ‘Lebanese’ Shiite identity was socially constructed amongst ‘Shiites in limbo’ – that is to say, migrants and emigrants who were neither fully integrated in their host societies nor were they actively involved with the feudalist Al-As‘ad family which dominated the region.

**Reliving an Experience from the Past: A Methodological Intrusion**

Any serious attempt to understand the political economy and social history of Lebanon’s Shiites, it became evident, requires ethnographic research which would start not from ‘the starting point’ of Shiites’ ‘Lebanese experience’ (*i.e.* South Lebanon), but from ‘the terminal point’ (*i.e.* Beirut). In other words, to understand the dynamics of migration, the forging of new identities and the ‘Lebanonisation’ of the Shiites (or, indeed, the Shi‘ification of the concept of ‘Lebanon’), it was necessary to conduct ethnographic research on the Shiites in Beirut and its suburbs. My contacts in South Lebanon were crucial in opening up many ‘doors’ and, thus, embedding me within various social networks in Dahiyeh, Beirut’s southern suburbs. This was complimented with friendships and contacts which allowed me access to the Shiite community in Zokak El-Blat, a central Beirut neighbourhood with a significant Shiite population dating back to the earliest waves of migration to the city as well as to wartime displacements.

Through focus groups, testimonials and participant observations, I ‘relived’ the experiences of migration to Beirut, exploitation by its unheeding capitalists and marginalisation by its *zu‘ama*. Research conducted in Zokak El-Blat and Dahiyeh revealed the nature of the then-emerging solidarity networks which underpinned the modern, Shiite ‘imagined community’. As a result, the inseparability between ‘Shiite identity’ and the political economy of Beirut’s Shiite newcomers became evident. Using ethnographic research revealed how survival in the city involved the forging of solidarities which consolidated asymmetric relationships of mutual obligation and, thus, reinforced bonds of kinship, ancestry and religious brotherhood. Moreover, my research in Ghobeiri and Zokak El-Blat revealed the role of the *hussayniyya*, the *mujtahids*, their transnational intellectual as well as financial connections and, thus, the sectarian paradigm in the dynamic process of constructing the ‘imagined community’.
Understanding the Narrative by Living the Praxis: al-ḥāla islāmiyya

The inseparable relationship between the ‘confessionalisation’ of the Shi’a was an outcome of a particular socio-political and historical experience shaped by the disarticulations of Lebanese modernity and peripheral capitalism. Identity, thus, is a complex social construct and a product of a dynamic process involving a great deal of civilisational cross-fertilisation.

In other words, ‘Lebanon’, ‘the Shi’a’ and ‘Shiite Lebanon’ were neither inbred ‘essentials’ nor were they ‘imposed’ or ‘imported’ from Iran. They, as my ethnographic research revealed, were the result of a dynamic social and intellectual process whereby ‘Islam is modernised’ and ‘modernity is Islamised’ in an attempt to ‘authenticate’ identity and give intelligible meaning to realities. In this process, ‘the Shi’a are Lebanonised’ and ‘Lebanon is Islamised/Shi’ified’.

The research question, therefore, had been transformed from one of pure political economy to an attempt at understanding the confessional paradigm which defines and characterises the ‘imagined community’. It became crucial to answer such questions as: ‘why do people partake in the Hezbollah counterculture?’; ‘what does the praxis entail?’; ‘what does it feel like to be an insider?’; ‘how muqāwim does a member of mujtama’ al-muqāwama need to be?’; ‘how Lebanese versus how Shiite/Islamic is the praxis?’; and, ‘who is ‘the other’?’ To understand all of this, expanding the ethnographic methods in this study to examine the praxis and explore the modus vivendi at the core of the ‘counterculture’ became imminent.

In this context, I adopted three main research methods. Firstly, I, again, conducted a number of elite interviews; this time, with the intention of exploring questions pertaining to al-ḥāla islāmiyya. Interviews were conducted with local wujaha, intellectuals and community leaders as well as with various ‘ethnic entrepreneurs’; junior clergymen, members of faith-based organisations and Hezbollah-affiliated local-government officials. Moreover, I conducted interviews with leftist activists and local youth in Dahiyeh as well as in South Lebanon who are critical of the pervading discourse of the ‘Islamic counterculture’ as well as with Shiite politicians and ulema from ‘the other’ camp. I also conducted a limited number of interviews with non-Shiite politicians and activists in order to survey outsiders’ perceptions of the Shiite counterculture including members of the FPM political bureau; Kataeb rank-and-file; student and youth activists loyal to the FPM, Kataeb and the LF; as well as Druze community leaders in Hasbaya and Sunni community leaders in Beirut and Tripoli.

Content and discourse analysis constituted the second method employed to understand the praxis in question. In this context, I undertook to familiarise myself with the politico-religious discourse articulated by such Shiite ‘ethnic entrepreneurs’ as Imam Moussa as-Sadr, Ayatollah

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1 The term was coined by Fredrick Barth (1969) in reference to leaders of projects aimed at constructing or organising differences; hence, erecting boundaries between ‘in-groups’ and ‘out-groups’.
Muhammad Hussein Fadlallah, *shaykh* Ali Kourani and Hezbollah’s Sayyid Hassan Nasrallah which is documented in written as well as audiovisual material. This included archival research in the religious seminaries in Beirut/Baalbek and personal/private archives and online sources. It was important to analyse not only their discourse, but their supporters’ interaction with and perception of the discourse; hence, it was necessary to ‘participate’ in events and gathering sponsored by Hezbollah and late Ayatollah Fadlallah including Friday prayers, *Ashura* rituals, periodic sermons and political rallies commemorating Martyrs’ Day, Al-Quds Day and others.

Combining content/discourse analysis with participant observations, this research also involved ‘consuming’ the popular-culture aspect of *al-ḥāla islāmiyya* by examining the most popular sermons, *anāshīd* (anthems) and *laṭmiyāt* (elegies) available ‘on the market’. As a regular customer of Dahiyeh’s high street icon, the Hezbollah-affiliated Bint Al-Hudda record store, I was introduced to the world of ‘pious music’ and given an idea of what sells and who buys what in this market. I was, therefore, able to access ‘the most popular’ material amongst Hezbollah’s supporters in an attempt to ‘consume’ the popular-culture aspect of the praxis as well as to compare the discourse it embodies with the ‘traditional’ discourse. Moreover, I was made aware of the transnationalisation of the expanding ‘pious’ consumer market discussed in Chapter Eight.

This was coupled with my participation in and comparative analysis of the ontological discourse propagated in *majālis ashura* and *nadbāt* held in Dahiyeh, Zokak El-Blat and Nabatiyeh as well as an everyday ‘consumption’ of the *modus vivendi* through the media, social interactions, nightlife, ‘pious entertainment’ and ‘resistance tourism’.

**Accessibility and Limitations**

It is evident, therefore, that the ‘ethnographic odyssey’ which this research entailed is a project of harnessing knowledge through processes of adventure and pathos, as the research aimed to understand social ‘realities’ as perceived and socially constructed by their participants. This project was facilitated by meticulous theoretical preparation informed by secondary research, archival resources and a prolonged pilot study.

The extent to which the multiple methods applied in the course of this research served the purpose of providing an understanding of the research question, however, was influenced by two important factors: the political context which prevailed during the period of the research; and my own situationality; my own background and others’ perceptions of my intrusion. It is, therefore, necessary to make a few remarks about the accessibility and limitations of the research methods applied *in limine* of these factors.
The Macro Setting: Political and Sectarian Polarisation in Post-2005 Lebanon

As eluded to previously, the research conducted for the purpose of this study took place between 2008 and 2011; a period of severe antagonisms and political polarisation in Lebanon. Inevitably, the political environment influenced the political and social context within which this research was carried out and, thus, had a bearing on the methodology and findings of this study. Four obstacles imposed by the political context are particularly noteworthy.

Firstly, responding to polarisation and a perceived sense of threat, Hezbollah – in its official sense – became off-limits: party officers and MPs were instructed not to talk to journalists and researchers; rank-and-file members could only be approached through the party’s Media Relations Office; and local-government officials and community leaders were unwelcoming of researchers unless they obtained a formal referral from the aforementioned office or through informal connections available only to someone with a relative degree of familiarity and embeddedness in the local community.

Similarly, entrepreneurs affiliated with Hezbollah became equally weary of researchers in limine of the global ‘war on terror’ which threatened their investments in the aftermath of 9/11. Any investigation of large-scale investments or the informal banking sector, for instance, was met with understandable suspicion. The sources of qualitative data, therefore, were restricted to anecdotal data, informal conversations, testimonials, participant observations and the media.

The third obstacle which the political context posed related to the unravelling of Israeli and CIA spy networks in Lebanon. Understandably, the ‘average’ person in South Lebanon and Dahiyeh was, therefore, suspicious of inquisitive researchers which necessitated a great deal of sensitivity and political awareness. Formal interviews and focus groups, therefore, became unfeasible and insufficient methods. This was mitigated by more informal research methods. Informal gatherings of the shabāb in the popular quarters of Beirut and the villages of South Lebanon, for instance, replaced the formal setting of a focus group. In a similar vein, social relations and friendships provided access to otherwise-unapproachable community leaders.

The fourth obstacle pertains to the nature of research methods. It was initially intended that this research would be based on a mixture of qualitative and quantitative research methods. In this vein, two surveys were developed with the aim of providing quantitative data of a statistical value: the first was designed to provide indicators pertaining to the political economy of local communities in South Lebanon whereas the second was designed to survey perceptions of the Shiite counterculture amongst university students. Recognising the logistical and social hurdles with which such methods were met, it was decided that surveys were an inappropriate research method and, thus, abandoned.
In short, the political environment in Lebanon during the period within which this research was conducted posed several challenges which vitalised ethnographic methods informed by secondary and archival research and ruled out quantitative methods. The weight of ethnographic methods in this research, it must be noted, was facilitated by a general keenness to ‘talk’ and ‘share’ amongst the local communities within which this research was conducted. In part, this can be attributed to a feeling of relative empowerment which is perceptible amongst younger-generation Shiites. Moreover, the eagerness to engage with questions of religion, identity and politics in social and informal contexts can also be attributed to a desire to rebuff the negative stereotypes of timid conservatism, backwardness and militancy which are often attributed to the Shi’a.

The Micro Setting: an Egyptian in Lebanon

The salience of ethnographic methods in this research poses several palpable questions with regards to the impact of my own background on the findings presented in this study. My being an Egyptian and the wealth of cultural and behavioural mannerisms Egypt and Lebanon share opened up many ‘doors’. This was facilitated by my ability to pick up the Lebanese dialect as well as ascriptive characteristics which mitigated the effects of my being an ‘outsider’. In the more informal contexts of ethnographic research, I was, prima facie, an in-group; hence, mitigating the ‘foreignness’ of my intrusion. It must be noted that I was vigilant in disclosing my background and research motives to my interviewees and informants who were presented with a research outline and letter of introduction from the institutions to which I am affiliated.

The initial advantage which my background provided contributed to the rigorousness of the research methodology applied for the purpose of this study allowing me to participate in, observe and analyse perceptual particulars (people, perceptions, ideas and institutions) within the context. In line with this, All interviews were conducted on the field and within the context rather than in a controlled environment. Similarly, informal focus groups were carried out not in artificial settings but on the cafés where the shabāb usually hang out.

That said, however, it must be noted that I was often met with an exaggerated sense of ‘tolerance’ and ‘openness’ which stressed on the ‘friendship’ and ‘similarities’ between Egypt and Lebanon; emphasised a common distaste for the Mubarak regime in Egypt; exaggerated anti-khaliji sentiments; and repeatedly asserted that ‘we are Arabs, not Iranians’ and ‘Shiites Muslims’. To what extent these sentiments were influenced by my own situationality is something I may never know. It has been my aim in this research, however, to minimise the impact of my own background on the findings and analysis presented in this study although I am aware that my own presence may have imposed certain subjectivities on the research.

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2 A reference to nationals of the GCC condemned as ‘uncultured’, ‘nouveau riches’ in Egypt and Lebanon.
0.4 ORGANISATION OF THE RESEARCH
The findings presented in this thesis are organised in a thematic rather than strict chronological order, as it does not aim to give a comprehensive socio-political history of modern Lebanon.

In the first part, an attempt is made at conceptualising and contextualising consociational theory and hybrid modernities in the Lebanese context. In Chapter One, a comparative approach is attempted in exploring the legal-institutional constellations of consociationalism. Chapter Two presents a critique of modernisation theory and revisits critical scholarship on modernity while attempting to contextualise the theory in the context of the late/incomplete Arab transition to modernity, the Nahda. In Chapter Three, this contextualisation is utilised in a study of early-modern Lebanon with the aim of conceptualising the country’s late transition to modernity and, thus, the peculiar hybridity of its modernity. In doing so, Chapter Three applies historical methods and draws on social constructivism and hybrid modernities in examining the articulation of ‘confessional ethnies’ in nineteenth-century Lebanon stressing on the functionalism, rationalism and modernism of confessional ‘imagined communities’.

The second part of this study examines the political economy of modern Lebanon in an attempt to explore the interconnections between late/incomplete modernity and peripheral capitalism. In doing so, it highlights the discrepancy between rapid institutional modernisation and deficient socioeconomic modernisation. In Chapter Four, the political economy of confessionalism and consociationalism is examined highlighting the disarticulations of Lebanese capitalism and, thus, the impact of socioeconomic disparities on the emergence of a hybrid dominant class.

In Chapter Five, the translation of these disarticulations into asymmetric, clientelistic structures of dominance is examined demonstrating that, despite the capitalist transformation, patronage continued to underpin socio-political order in Lebanon. Through an examination of the changing forms of za’imism in modern Lebanon, this chapter demonstrates that patronage performs an indispensable integrative function by mitigating the vulnerabilities of modernisation and unintelligibility of modern institutions. In doing so, it is argued that za’imism thwarted class consciousness amongst the dominated classes and emphasised vertically-delineated and hierarchical relations of clientelism and confessionalism.

In Chapter Five and Six, the limitations of Lebanon’s pre-war patronage democracy are explored emphasising the growing gap between ‘real’ and ‘electoral’ demographics and, thus, the emergence of a counter-elite performing crucial integrative functions through informal solidarity networks. These networks, it is demonstrated, undercut not only the class-struggle discourse but also the petty-zu’ama and, instead, revitalised the role of the confession as the
sole avenue for social struggle. The socioeconomic and politico-cultural implications of these new solidarities are explored through a myriad of historical methods as well as through fieldwork conducted in an ethnomethodological manner in Dahiye and Zokak El-Blat.

In Chapter Six, a particular emphasis is placed on the redistributive functions of the militia order and, thus, the framing of socioeconomic grievances within the sectarian paradigm. Moreover, the emergence of the militia as the omnipresent representative of the confession is examined *in limine* of militias’ endeavours to regulate the economy, administer their respective cantons and homogenise their ‘citizenry’; hence, confessionalising the public domain.

The final part of this study empirically investigates the interplay between confessionalism, the disarticulated postwar economy and the hybridisation of political culture in contemporary Lebanon. In this context, Chapter Seven investigates the changing dynamics of patronage *in limine* of the postwar political economy, the ‘negotiated’ integration of the wartime elite and the increasing reliance on rentier distribution and emigrant remittances. In doing so, three case studies are explored in an attempt to highlight the hybridity of the postwar authority and the multiplicity of modes of production and, thus, patterns of patronage. AMAL is presented as a militia-turned-party which relies on public-sector patronage; Almustaqbal is presented as a coterie of private sector business tycoons blurring the distinction between entrepreneurship and statesmanship within the context of the neoliberal global economy; and Hezbollah is presented as a case study of a centralised party relying on private-sector and non-state-sector patronage.

Complementing this study of the multi-centricity of the postwar economy, Chapter Eight explores the dynamics of party politics in postwar Lebanon emphasising the salience of the ‘extended’ confessional party. In doing so, the various mobilisational strategies adopted by postwar parties are highlighted. In particular, however, Chapter Eight examines Hezbollah as a unique case study insofar as it combines three simultaneous roles: armed resistance against Israel; a political party competing for representation in the consociational/national arena; and, vitally, a social movement articulating and disseminating a confessional hybrid modernity.

The party, it is demonstrated, locates itself within the consociational system in order to exploit a myriad of institutional, non-institutional and unconventional resources and platforms on behalf of the counterculture (*mujtama’ al-muqāwama*). Hezbollah, Chapter Eight contends, demonstrates the most coherent and serene attempt at articulating an authenticated (hence, multiple) modernity within the context of Lebanon’s multi-centred modernity and, thus, transform the cognitive praxis (*maḥfūm*) into a conceptual space that is filled by dynamic interactions between different groups and organisations (cognitive territory). Chapter Eight explores the *modus operandi* and the *modus vivendi* promulgated by Hezbollah and examines
the intersections between the party’s hybrid modernity, the opportunity spaces created by Lebanon’s consociational system and the dynamic process through which the party, the agents of change (mujtahids) and members of the counterculture interact in constructing and reconstructing the praxis.

Finally, this study concludes with an interpretative contextualisation of the findings on Lebanon’s clientelist-consociationalism. In this concluding chapter, the discussions on hybrid modernity, consociational government and peripheral capitalism are combined providing an integrated understanding of the issues examined. In doing so, this chapter highlights the triangulation between confessionalism, za’imism and consociationalism. In conclusion, the discussion presented explores the intersection between the consociational state and the ‘state of consociationalism’ – that is to say, the mutually-reinforcing relationship between the multi-centred consociational superstructure as a demonstration of hybrid modernities on the national level and the multitude of confessional narratives demonstrating hybrid modernities on the subnational level.
CHAPTER ONE

A COMPARATIVE CONCEPTUALISATION OF CONSOCIATIONAL DEMOCRACY
Modern scholarship and the conceptualisation of state-society relations emphasise the centrality of the omnipresent state, the relative homogeneity of the national collectivity and the unitary socio-political superstructure whereby ‘national culture’ is articulated by the elite and enforced by the state. Within the context of this nation-state prototype, a myriad of government structures have been developed in response to the realities of administration including, for instance, federal decentralism. The consociational model, however, is a significant divergence from the modernist conceptualisation of the nation-state prototype altogether. The divergence lies in the fact that consociationalism discards the Hegelian perception of the state.

This foundational chapter, hence, will survey literature and analyse the consociational model as a distinctly different form of government and, thus, a fundamentally distinct pattern of state-society relations. Accordingly, this chapter will illustrate that deeply divided societies require complex, asymmetric mechanisms of bargaining and consensual government providing evidence from longstanding consociational democracies in Switzerland, the Netherlands and Belgium. Moreover, this chapter examines the relationship between the social and economic structures of plural societies and the stability, sustainability and developmental trajectory of their political systems. Towards the end of this chapter, the impact of protracted civil conflict on plural societies is examined in order to understand the impact of traumatic war experiences, ethnic cleansing and the memory of blood-stained inter-communal relations on consensus regimes in post-conflict societies.

The chapter comes to an end with a brief outline of the international and domestic motives for the sustenance of consociational political systems and the reasons why plural societies do not disintegrate into homogenous unitary nation-states. Concluding remarks are also made with regards to the need for a more organic study of consociationalism which takes into account not only the institutional-organisational structures of government in deeply divided societies, but also the political economy and ‘political culture’ which underpins consensus regimes.

1.1 THE STUDY OF GOVERNMENT IN PLURAL SOCIETIES: AN INTRODUCTION
Despite the hegemony of the nation-state discourse in the study of modern government, the question of democracy in plural societies has featured in the works of consociational theorists since the mid-twentieth century. Interestingly, however, consociational theorists did not develop a philosophical-conceptual framework for the study of government in segmented societies nor did they attempt to conceptualise the moral standing and intrinsic salience of subnational units. Consociational theory, thus, conceptualises what political practitioners ‘invented’ independently of academic experts (Lijphart, 2004).
In other words, consociational theory developed into a grandiose theory limited, by and large, to the study of institutional structures and power-sharing arrangements. It has, so far, made only modest contributions to the conceptual understanding of pluralism. Consociationalism is, thus, theorised as a deviation from the prototypical nation-state model rather than an alternative – that is to say, consensus government was perceived as an exception to the nation-state model which presupposes the pervasiveness of the unitary state; a single overarching collective identity (the nation); and a politico-intellectual elite with a monopoly over the articulation of the ‘national culture’. According to this model, the state and its tentacles – especially the educational system, legal system and the media – are tools for the production of social change, dissemination of the national culture and, hence, the homogenisation of society through social engineering (Gellner, 1983). Moreover, classical modernisation theory and the nation-state model ascribes to individual citizens alone a moral standing and intrinsic equality within the national collectivity.

The study of vertically-divided societies, on the other hand, was confined to the realm of classical anthropology – the study of ‘exotic peoples’ whose social order resembles the pre-modern, pre-capitalist and pre-industrial order and, thus, involves such collectivities as tribe, ethnicity and religious brotherhoods rather than class. For modernisation theorists, only in such societies are subnational collective identities ascribed a moral standing and an intrinsic equality separate from that attributed to their individual members.

Consociational theory, on the other hand, neither conformed to the nation-state model nor did it limit its examination of divided-house polities to ‘exotic’ non-Western societies. In fact, the theory of consensus government focused on and was informed by four long-standing Western democracies: the Netherlands, Switzerland, Austria and Belgium. The theory of consociational government, therefore, possessed the potential to challenge the prevalent Anglo-Saxon map of comparative politics (Daalder, 1974; 2002).

Nonetheless, consociational theory confined itself to the study of legal-organisational structures, mechanisms of government and the macro-politics of managing inter-communal antagonisms; all of which are of particular relevance for scholars and political practitioners facing rapid transitions to democracy following the Cold War, the disintegration of multiethnic states such as Yugoslavia and the expansion of the fourth wave of democratisation to parts of Latin America, sub-Saharan Africa and Asia (Doorenspleet, 2007).

It must be noted that, since Arend Lijphard (1977) authored his seminal Democracy in Plural Societies, there existed two particularly important, yet under-studied, models of consensus government – Malaysia and Lebanon. The two models are of particular importance given that
they had not witnessed significant processes of industrialisation and, crucially both witnessed late transitions to modernity and capitalism; hence, exhibit social structures different to, say, the Netherlands.

Today, consociational government exists in markedly different societies: industrial, Western European democracies in the Netherlands, Belgium and Switzerland; dependent-capitalist and late-modern Lebanon and post-conflict/post-dictatorship Bosnia, Kosovo, Macedonia and Iraq. In light of this, the following section provides a foundational discussion of consociational government in plural societies.

1.1.1 Consensus versus Majoritarian Government

Consociational theory, as argued above, has paid little attention to the historical particularities of plural societies’ transitions to modernity, the political economy of micro-level leadership and the dynamics of social antagonisms. Instead, consociational theory focuses mainly on distinguishing majoritarian and consensus variants of democracy. In this vein, consociational theorists stress that the major difference between the two variants is the majority-opposition dyad. In majoritarian regimes, the majority of the people govern while minorities oppose. Consociational democracies, on the other hand, address the particularities of plural societies where majorities and minorities do not merely represent political camps but terminal communal collectivities.

Consociational theorists have gone to great lengths in questioning the democratic credentials of majoritarian democracies contending that the Westminster model, which excludes a segment of society (the opposition) from participating in decision-making, runs contrary to the democratic principle that all those affected by a decision should participate in the decision-making process. This ‘undemocratic’ shortcoming, however, is mitigated in societies where minority and majority status is temporal – in other words, “if today’s minority can become the majority in the next election instead of being condemned to permanent opposition” (Lijphart, 1984:21).

In societies where segmental cleavages are deep; reflect ‘terminal identities’; and some, or all, segments are doomed to eternal minority status, therefore, majoritarian democracy permanently excludes ‘the minority’. Regimes emphasising consensus and power-sharing are, thus, considered more suitable as they include rather than exclude minorities. Despite the fact that empirical evidence and trial-and-error experiences suggest that consociational government may not be the most efficient or effective way to run a country, consensus regimes are credited for avoiding the forceful homogenisation of society, preventing tyranny by the majority segment and providing an alternative to authoritarian minority rule (Lijphart, 1977:50; 1984:21; Messarra, 2009:52).
This is particularly relevant to plural societies where communities are of comparable size and influence; where segments are less likely to succumb to the hegemony of the majority segment; and where society is less likely to submit to the absolute authority of the state. In such societies, political systems are expected to provide subnational units with a significant level of autonomy, proportional representation in state institutions and mechanisms to veto decisions deemed threatening to their existence and ‘particularities’ (Lijphart, 1968; 1977; Stroschein, 2003).

Practically, the difference between majoritarian and consociational interpretations of democracy lies in the latters’ focus on power-sharing schemes. Unlike majoritarianism, consensus regimes uphold constitutional provisions and institutional designs aimed at ensuring the inclusion of all segments of society in the decision-making process (Angelov, 2004).

The earliest examples of modern consociational regimes date back to the mid-nineteenth century with the establishment of the Swiss Confederation and the mutaṣarifiyya3 of Mount Lebanon. Both political systems, it must be noted, evolved in stark contrast to political regimes in their regional milieu. In contrast to Germany, Italy and France, konkordanzdemokratie4 in Switzerland did not envisage a homogenous nation governed by a monolithic state. Similarly, the mutaṣarifiyya of Mount Lebanon did not allow any sectarian majority absolute dominion nor did it limit pluralism to the confines of the millet system. A century later, the emerging polities in the Netherlands and Belgium developed similar politico-structural constellations.

It should be noted that attempts to conceptualise consensus forms of government occurred in the 1960s. Studies of political regimes in the Low Countries, for instance, stressed on such notions as proportzdemokratie (proportional democracy), consociatio, concordant democracy, contractarian democracy and vertical/segmented pluralism (Dekmejian, 1978). Variations in terminology aside; consociational theorists converge on a core principle: unlike centripetal political systems suitable in relatively homogenous societies, consociationalism is suited to accommodate the centrifugal forces in plural societies insofar as it provides an overarching political structure under which different interests and multiple subnational centres converge. The following section, thus, delves into the interconnection between consociational forms of government and plural societies.

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3 Nineteenth-century autonomous administration in Mount Lebanon established in 1861.

4 Literally ‘democracy by mutual agreement’ (German)
1.1.2 Consociationalism in Plural Societies

Despite the commonly-held belief that consociationalism is better suited for plural societies and more capable of guaranteeing co-existence, it must be noted that consociationalism is not an inalienable companion to social pluralism. In fact, it is important to note that while every society demonstrates some degree of plurality, only a handful of states adopt consensus regimes. Furthermore, these regimes are far from uniform: some adopt selective instruments of consensus government; others uphold a comprehensive socio-political system based on consociation.

The extent to which a political system adheres to consociationalism, it can be argued, depends on the degree and structure of social pluralism. In this vein, Lijphart (1984) provides a useful guide. In *Democracies*, he notes that the exclusion of minorities in centripetal democracies is mitigated by the alternation of majority and minority (opposition) status through elections and, crucially, by the fact that voters’ interests determine voting patterns. In societies where divisions are not just an expression of voters’ interests but are dictated by belongingness to an ascriptive or terminal group, however, the alternation of majority/minority status is unlikely as Lijphart (1984:22) explains:

> In societies that are sharply divided along religious, ideological, linguistic, cultural, ethnic or racial lines into virtually separate subsocieties with their own political parties, interest groups and media of communication – the flexibility necessary for majoritarian democracy is absent.

Lijphart’s plural society corresponds to Erid Nordlinger’s (1972) ‘deeply divided society’ – a reference to societies with deep-rooted, structural fragmentation. This conceptualisation can be applied to societies where ascriptive ties generate antagonistic and mutually-exclusive social segmentation based on terminal communitarian belongingness; social segments enjoy political salience; and are sustained over a substantial period of time and a wide variety of issues. In short, a society is ‘deeply divided’ if “boundaries between rival groups [are] sharp enough so that membership is clear and, with few exceptions, unchangeable” (Lustick, 1979).

In such societies, centripetal democracy permanently excludes minorities and, as such, spells majority dictatorship and threatens the stability of the political system by alienating minority groups and permanently excluding them. Plural societies, therefore, require political systems emphasising consensus rather than government-opposition dyads. Consensus regimes emphasising inclusiveness in decision-making and balance-of-power politics as opposed to exclusionary majoritarianism are particularly paramount in societies without stable overarching national loyalties (Zürn, 2000; Lijphart, 2000).
It can, therefore, be argued that although every society is plural, consociationalism is pervasive where pluralism is translated into social pillarisation – that is to say, when segments are coherent, complex and organic subnational units. In other words, consociational regimes are ‘divided houses’ composed of a number of ‘imagined communities’ akin to the lagern (camps) in Switzerland, zuilen (pillars) in the Netherlands and familles spirituelles (spiritual families) in Belgium and Lebanon.

Typically, each ‘pillar’ consists of a sophisticated network of professional associations, interest groups, civil society organisations, youth groups and media of communication. These networks, moreover, usually revolve around one or a limited number of political parties confined within the bounds of the ‘pillar’ and held together by the “interlocking directorate of the [segmental] elite [...] formed through the widespread cumulation of leadership positions in different organisations” (Lehmbruch, 1993). Heterogeneity and social pillarisation in consociational regimes, therefore, is mitigated by the acquiescence of prudent and circumspect elites in contrast to majoritarian democracies which encourage conflictual elite attitudes.

1.2 INSTITUTIONALISING CONSOCIATIONALISM

1.2.1 Instruments of Consociationalism

The institutionalisation of social pillars and the politics of elite acquiescence are achieved through highly-integrated decision-making structures and power-sharing arrangements. These structures may be anchored in legal-constitutional documents or remain unwritten, even tacit, agreements between representatives of the different pillars of society. The following section will briefly highlight the most pervasive instruments of consociational government.

1.2.1.1 Mutual Veto

The first instrument of consociational democracy is ‘negative minority rule’ or the power to obstruct decisions unpopular within one or more pillars or deemed a threat to their autonomy and to the principle of pluralism. Quintessentially, this allows pillars a guarantee against majoritarian electoral defeats and majority tyranny. Mutual vetoes are, conventionally, limited to questions of a sensitive nature and are enshrined in documents of national unity or constitutions and are often attained through parliamentary provisions and laws governing electoral processes.

In Switzerland, for instance, constitutional amendments require not only a nation-wide majority, but also majorities in a majority of cantons (Lijphart, 1984:29). The two-thirds majority in both houses of parliament required to amend the Belgian constitution is another example of negative minority rule adopted in 1970 to protect the Walloon minority vis-à-vis
the Flemish majority (Deschouwer, 2002; Angelov, 2004). Similarly, the Dayton Accord guarantees Bosnia’s ethnic communities mutual vetoes in the three-member presidential council and in federal government (Bose, 2002:63; Stroschein, 2003).

1.2.1.2 Proportional Representation

The second instrument of consociationalism is proportional representation (PR), which entails the allocation of power and resources amongst the pillars of society in proportion to their size. In contrast to centripetal democracies which over-represent majority parties and under-represent minority/opposition parties, PR systems allocate all parties and segments a share of public office commensurate with their demographic, socioeconomic and electoral weight. Although PR is sometimes applied in majoritarian systems, it is particularly salient in consociational regimes. Crucially, this formalises social pillarisation, serves to over-represent minority groups and, thus, encourages broad enfranchisement of diverse groups in governing structures, appointments and subsidies (Lijphart, 1968:127-129; 1984:28; Stroschein, 2003).

1.2.1.3 Segmental Autonomy

Whereas mutual vetoes and proportional representation integrate all segments of society into the decision-making process on the national level, segmental autonomy entails assigning exclusive jurisdiction to subnational groups on matters of their specific and exclusive concern. In other words, by expanding the scope of administrative decentralism, consociational regimes delegate government to the subnational level with regards to affairs of the exclusive concern of each segment (Lijphart, 1977:41).

Segmental autonomy in plural societies does not only expand the limits of participatory democracy, but also avoids a situation of ‘all conflict all the time’ by channelling debates so that only essential issues of a cross-segmental nature are brought to the national domain (Stroschein, 2003). This allows pillars holding widely divergent interests and values to become self-contained reducing the incidence of overlapping affiliations and, thus, minimising the potential for conflict (Lijphart, 1968:200; 1977:42) in line with Quincy Wright’s (1951:196) assertion that the intensity of tensions is inversely proportional to social distance.

Decentralism within the context of segmental autonomy, however, must not be confused with territorial federalism. Indeed, plural societies where segmental and territorial cleavages overlap may opt for a federal system as is the case in Quebec. Nonetheless, in plural societies where social pillars are not geographically concentrated, autonomy is arranged on a non-territorial, functional basis whereby groups administer nation-wide segmental interests. This explains the ‘communitarianism’ of schools in India, Belgium and the Netherlands, for instance (Lijphart, 2004). In a similar vein, constitutional amendments adopted in 1970 introduced separate
cultural councils for the French and Flemish cultural-linguistic communities in Belgium which are only partially defined in territorial terms (Lijphart, 1984:28).

Similarly, Lebanon’s confessions can only be party defined in territorial terms. Although confessional groups are geographically concentrated in certain regions, proximity, cohabitation and territorial discontinuity necessitate non-territorial instruments of segmental autonomy. Accordingly, confessions hold sway over education, culture and personal status courts. It must be noted that scholars of the former Ottoman Empire have often attributed this autonomy to the Ottoman millet system (Melikian and Diab, 1959; Stroschein, 2003). Although partly valid, this research insists on conceptualising the autonomous administration of personal, communal and sectarian-cultural affairs in plural societies within the framework of consociational theory as the aforementioned assertion fails to explain the existence of segmental autonomy in Western democracies with no history of an Ottoman millet system. Moreover, Ottoman millets were granted autonomy over the administration of their exclusive affairs without gaining official recognition as subnational pillars in the politico-cultural sense.

1.2.1.4 Power-Sharing and Broad Coalition Government
The fourth instrument of consociational government pertains to the importance of acquiescence between prudent and circumspect elites. In this vein, broad coalition governments and power-sharing schemes are considered to be a measure of the extent to which a political system is consociational. According to this view, cabinets in consociational regimes are likely to include a larger number of political actors than is minimally required to attain a simple parliamentary majority. Empirical evidence shows that the percentage of time spent under majoritarian cabinets in such consociational democracies as Belgium and Switzerland, for instance, averaged at 28.8% and 8.7% respectively (Lijphart, 2002).

1.2.1.5 Summit Diplomacy: The Business of Politics
As essential to consociational democracies as they are, broad coalition and oversized cabinets are, plausibly, an impediment to efficient government rendering decision-making a tedious and slow process. Moreover, balance-of-power politics and the compromises they entail inevitably reduce cabinets’ ability to take ambitious and effective policy decisions.

Consequently, summit diplomacy or government by elite cartel is designed to circumvent the inefficiencies of power-sharing schemes. Summit diplomacy entails limiting decision-making and debate over thorny issues to the higher echelons of each segment. In other words, divisive and time-sensitive matters are debated in elite circles much less broad than coalition governments and proportionally-segmented parliaments (Lijphart, 1968:126).
Essentially, minimising the number of individuals and raising the level at which crucial issues are debated results in a businesslike determination within the ruling establishment and, thus, the convictions of each segment are tolerated while disagreements are not allowed to sprawl out of control (Daalder, 1955; Lijphart, 1968:123). It is, therefore, unsurprising that countries with a long tradition as ‘business nations’ with longstanding merchant middle-classes such as the Low Countries, Switzerland and Lebanon are more ‘successful’ at summit diplomacy.

1.2.2 Applications of Consociational Government

Practical applications of the instruments of consociational government discussed above, however, predate academic endeavours intended to conceptualise consensus regimes by almost a century. Since the birth of the Swiss Confederation, for instance, symmetrical or balanced bicameralism has embodied the principle of broad-coalition government as well as mutual vetoes: whereas the National Council (lower house) represents the Swiss people, the Council of States (upper house) represents cantons on an equal basis. Balanced bicameralism, therefore, guarantees all cantons representation in the legislature and over-represents smaller cantons in the upper house.

In the Netherlands, where the political system was officially consociational between 1917 and 1967, the Seniorenconvent (Senior’s Assembly) demonstrated the concept of summit diplomacy. The five-man committee was made up of the chairperson of the Parliament and the chairmen of the major parties representing the zuilen of Dutch society – the Calvinists, Catholics, socialists and liberals. Although the assembly had no formal status and operated only intermittently, it assumed political significance at times of crises and parliamentary or governmental deadlocks (Lijphart, 1968:127).

In a similar vein, the Bundesrat (Federal Council) is an ostensible case of summit diplomacy in Switzerland. The seven-person council constitutes the country’s government on the federal level, serves as the collective head of state and is ascribed decision-making prerogatives on crucial issues pertaining to the Federation. The summit-diplomacy aspect of the Bundesrat, however, does not counteract the inclusiveness of consociational government nor does it downplay the importance of proportional representation. Election to the Bundesrat, for instance, depends on broad alliances of cantonal parties forged through complex bargains. According to constitutional provisions and informal conventions, elected members of the Bundesrat come from different cantons. In other words, government on the federal level embodies a conventional zauberformel (magic formula) of 2:2:2:1 according to which the linguistic lagern are respectively represented (Lehmbruch, 1993).
In Belgium, proportional representation is even pervasive: customarily, cabinets include an equal number of Flemish- and French-speaking ministers. In 1970, this became an official requirement mandated by the Constitution (Lijphart, 1984:26).

In line with longstanding consociational democracies in Western Europe, post-Dayton Bosnia demonstrates similar power-sharing and PR arrangements. Seats in Parliament, for instance, are allocated amongst the country’s ethnic groups proportionally and each group retains veto rights in Parliament. Moreover, cantonal decentralism in the Bosnian-Croat Federation and the autonomy of Republika Srpska embody segmental autonomy. It must also be noted that federal governments since 1996 demonstrate the commitment to broad-coalition government while the three-person Presidential Council can be seen as an institution of summit diplomacy whereby the three elected representatives of the Bosniak, Serbian and Croat communities are expected to negotiate and decide on matters of crucial importance circumventing the inefficiencies of the broad-coalition governments and high levels of decentralism (Bose, 2002; Zahar, 2004; 2005, Morrow, 2005).

Government structures and the dynamics of decision-making in modern Lebanon are strikingly similar. Consociationalism in Lebanon, however, is discussed later in this research. It suffices to note here that proportional representation, segmental autonomy, power-sharing and summit diplomacy are enshrined in the Constitution and the political conventions that govern political life in Lebanon. Moreover, consociationalism is evident in the size and allocation of government portfolios and seats in the national legislature as well as in the limiting of debate over thorny issues of foreign policy and national security to such conventional (yet unofficial) institutions as the National Dialogue and extra-ordinary summits.

1.3 STRUCTURE AND MANAGEMENT OF CLEAVAGES

Important as they may be, however, consociational theory is as involved in the study of cleavage structures and the macro-politics of managing inter-segmental antagonisms as it is involved in analysing the legal-constitutional instruments of consociationalism. In this vein, it is important to examine the structure and intensity of social cleavages and their impact on social fragmentation in plural societies.

Consociational theory argues that mutually-reinforcing cleavages exacerbate grievances and may undermine allegiance to the state or country as a whole by one or more pillars as a result

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5 Consociational theorists continue to argue over whether power-sharing arrangements in former Yugoslavia were indeed informed by consociational theory or if they were simply 'invented' independently by political practitioners in the aftermath of protracted civil conflict. For more on this refer to Lijphart (2004); O'Flynn and Russel (2005).

6 Appendices 1, 2
of actual or perceived disenfranchisement. For instance, if socioeconomic and segmental cleavages coincide, communities allocated a meagre share of resources are likely to frame their socioeconomic grievance within the segmental paradigm. Crosscutting cleavages, on the other hand, moderate one another (Lijphart, 1968; 1977; Dekmejian, 1978). The geographic concentration of ‘pillars’, it must be noted, is likely to exacerbate the coincidence of cleavages. The territorialisation of segmental cleavages encourages the development of economically self-subsistential communities and, thus, the overlap between geography, class and segment.

It must be noted, however, that crosscutting cleavages do not provide a common bond or mitigate the effects of poor integration but, rather, increase social fragmentation. Crosscutting cleavages, in other words, prevent segmental cleavages from polarising society into encapsulated ‘pillars’. In evidencing this, Lijphart (1968:93) uses the ‘pie analogy’ to describe the structure of cleavages in the Netherlands:

When one cuts a pie crosswise one gets four separate pieces rather than a single whole pie! [...] This analogy is quite revealing in the case of Holland [...]. One might hypothesise that the twofold division of class (middle versus working class) cutting across the threefold religious division (Catholic, Calvinist, secular) would result in six separate segments. In some instances, these six are clearly discernible. In the labour-relations field six groups confront each other: three labour unions and three employers’ associations.

**1.3.1 Overarching Loyalties and the Management of Cleavages**

Whether mutually-reinforcing or crosscutting, the intensity and salience of cleavages in plural societies accentuate the role of overarching structures such as unifying national identities or patriotism which justify national unity. Monarchical institutions, nationalism and histories of struggle for independence, thus, often mitigate the effects of poor integration and provide myths of national unity which moderate the effects of poor integration and limit segmental isolation.

Overarching loyalty to and interest in the continued existence of Switzerland has bound together the lageren since 1848 (Lijphart, 1984:27). Similarly, the 1918 Pact of Loppem marked the birth of Belgian consociationalism and united the Dutch-speaking and French-speaking pillars in the aftermath of World War I (Deschouwer, 2002). In the Netherlands, the House of Orange developed into a symbol of Dutch resistance to German occupation and, thus, became a unifying overarching force binding together the zuilen since World War II (Lijphart, 1968:83-86). Likewise, the struggle against French colonialism in Lebanon provided a cohesive force uniting Muslim and Christian segments despite disagreements on the question of secession from Greater Syria.
Nonetheless, it must be noted that national sentiments could also have a divisive impact on plural societies: firstly, because it could be perceived as the creation of one pillar to the detriment of the others; and, secondly, because sub/transnational sentiments can adversely affect plural societies by attracting supporters and sympathisers from the country’s different pillars into cross-border ‘imagined communities’ not conterminous with the state (Lijphart, 1977:82).

German, French and Italian nationalisms for instance, threatened the cohesion of Swiss society at varying periods of modern history much as German nationalism challenged the unity of Austria. In a similar vein, pan-Arab and Syrian nationalisms contributed to the polarisation of Lebanese society; French and Dutch identities have had a negative impact on Belgium’s linguistic-cultural communities; and Serbian, Croatian and Bosniak nationalisms have threatened Bosnian unity.

1.4 CRITIQUE OF CONSOCIATIONALISM
The discussion so far has focused on the institutional aspects of consociationalism. It should be noted, however, that consociational democracies are not all about peaceful accommodation and democratic coexistence. In fact, consociational theorists outline a number of shortcomings, which will be briefly discussed in this section.

1.4.1 Inefficiency and Instability
First and foremost, consensus regimes are more concerned with managing segmental antagonisms and mitigating the effects of pluralism than they are with effective government. Empirical evidence shows that decision-making in broad coalition governments and PR legislatures can be tedious and require extensive negotiations and political bargains. Furthermore, mutual vetoes often threaten the processes of decision-making and impede the government from taking long-term and ambitious reforms. Moreover, deadlocks often cause complete paralysis and formation of governments can involve time-consuming negotiations and bargaining (Lijphart, 1977:50-51).

1.4.2 Segmental Isolation
Consociationalism is criticised for its divisive impact on the public domain. Arguably, segmental autonomy reinforces boundaries between in-groups and out-groups and, thus, reduces the non-segmented public domain. Segmental autonomy, therefore, ‘expands’ cleavages in plural societies such as Belgium where the cross-segmental public domain diminished to the extent that, today, one can no longer speak of a Belgian public, but Flemish and Walloon publics (Lauwers, 2010). It must be noted, however, that in the Netherlands, the ‘Dutch’ public domain expanded not in spite of but precisely because of consociationalism.
and, thus, contributing to *ontzuiling* (depillarisation). Moreover, consociationalism assigns decision-making prerogatives to ascriptive, often unelected ‘representatives’ within the pillar. This reduces the dynamism and fluidity of socially-constructed identities and may lead to intra-segmental conformism, even tyranny (Kornhauser, 1959:83).

### 1.4.3 The Elitist, Undemocratic Nature of Consociationalism

A third criticism of consociationalism questions its very democratic credentials and ability to reflect the aspirations of the general public given the salience of elite acquiescence and summit diplomacy in consensus regimes. In other words, consociational regimes adhering to structured elite predominance and restricting debate on ‘sensitive issues’ to the uppermost echelons of the ruling class cannot be said to uphold the principles of liberty, equality and fraternity as advocated by the French Revolution (Lijphart, 1977:49).

### 1.4.4 Inflexibility of Governing Formulas

Finally, consociational regimes are criticised for the inflexibility of preset political formulas according to which power is allocated amongst pillars of society. Naturally, these formulas capture and freeze social realities at a given point in time. Intended to accommodate pluralism at a given historical moment, therefore, these formulas fail in responding to social dynamism.

In countries where variables have not significantly changed, preset formulas become precursors of stability and coexistence as is evident in the Swiss case. In cases where rapid socioeconomic and geographical mobility are predominant, however, they stifled political evolution (Lijphart, 1977:175). In 1970s Lebanon, for instance, the political establishment’s adherence to the established formula prevented the integration of the parvenu-bourgeoisie and the lumpen-elite resulting in the collapse of the regime as demonstrated later in this thesis.

In short, consociational formulas become eternal and sacred mantras mummified at the heart of the socio-political order. The consensus regime, hence, reinforces ascriptive criteria as perceived constants (Sayigh, 2009:42). It can, therefore, be concluded that the stability of consociational democracies is a more likely outcome in longstanding industrial democracies with a developed class structure. In contrast, preset formulas are likely to destabilise social order in late-modern and dependent-capitalist societies where rapid social and geographical mobility are expected.

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7 The expression parvenu-bourgeoisie refers to an ascendant segment of the bourgeoisie comprising of relative newcomers whose rapid and sudden ascendance of the social ladder is commonly attributed to ‘new money’. They are, thus, considered bourgeois in the socioeconomic sense but, often, lack social acceptance by established segments of the bourgeoisie.

8 The expressions lumpen-elite (also lumpenbourgeoisie) and lumpen-proletariat refer to the lower echelons of both social classes: whereas the former refers to a segment of the upper and upper-middle class deprived of class dominance, the latter refers to most exploited dispossessed segments of the working class. The key supposition is that both are unlikely to achieve the class consciousness necessary to achieve class struggle.
1.5 Consociationalism in Western Europe

The discussion so far has focused almost entirely on legal-constitutional designs of consociational regimes. Important as they may be, however, analyses of consociational superstructures are too grandiose to capture the historical and socio-political context which underpins social order in plural societies. It is, therefore, important to understand the historical evolution and social order underpinning consociationalism in these societies. This is particularly useful given that consensus democracies vary not in institutional designs but in their outcomes.

Despite unmistakable institutional-organisational similarities, consociational regimes in Western Europe exhibit stark dissimilarities in the developmental trajectories and outcomes of their consociational experiences. In the Netherlands, for instance, consociationalism provided the necessary superstructure to mitigate deep-rooted social divisions but allowed and encouraged the evolution of a cross-segmental public domain and, thus, the gradual depillarisation of society and the abandonment of consociationalism in 1967. In contrast, Swiss *konkordanzdemokratie* provides the political superstructure for inter-segmental cooperation and safeguards the autonomy of linguistic-cantonal units. Consequently, consociationalism underpins stability and prosperity in Switzerland on the federal and cantonal levels. Consociationalism in Belgium, on the other hand, has become a euphemism for the slow decay and possible disintegration of the state.

In light of these discrepancies, the following section will briefly outline the historical evolution of consociationalism and the structure of cleavages in the three longstanding European democracies in order to understand the role of cleavage structures and intra-elite dynamics on the development and evolution of consensus regimes.

1.5.1 Historical Roots of Consociationalism in Modern Europe

Modern Switzerland is unarguably the earliest form of consociational democracy in Europe dating back to the 1847 civil war between the predominantly-Protestant progressives advocating political modernisation and institutional centralisation and predominantly-Catholic conservatives committed to cantonal decentralism. The conflict was largely a consequence of the shift from representative/parliamentary democracy to more direct forms of democracy in the 1830s – a stark contrast to the prevalent trend in Europe. *Konkordanzdemokratie* was, therefore, established in the 1860s as a compromise (Lehmbruch, 1993; Steiner, 2002).

Consociation between linguistic communities, however, was established a decade earlier in the immediate aftermath of the 1848 war. Since the first *Bundesrat*, therefore, government by elite cartel, power-sharing and proportional representation characterised the relationship between
the German, French and Italian-speaking communities on the federal level. Cantonal federalism, on the other hand, assigned cantonal-linguistic subunits jurisdiction over matters of their exclusive concern. Consociation between linguistic groups extended to the denominational and political cleavage with the gradual incorporation of the Catholic Conservative Party in the federal arena previously monopolised by the Free Democrats (Steiner, 2002).

In contrast to Switzerland, the transition to consensus government in the Low Countries occurred not during but after political-institutional modernisation. Essentially, the Netherlands, Belgium and Luxembourg adopted consociational forms of government in the interwar period in an acknowledgment of the necessity for consensus between vertically-delineated segments and, thus, shifted away from the majoritarian nation-state model.

Belgium, for instance, adopted a consociational superstructure in the aftermath of World War I in an attempt to ‘undo’ the historical hegemony of the French-speaking minority without allowing the Flemish-speaking majority to impose its will. Accordingly, the state acknowledged social pillarisation and introduced organisational structures aimed at accommodating the three *familles spirituelles* – the Dutch-speaking Catholics; the secular and predominantly-Francophile socialists; and the liberals representing the Brussels-Capital region. Nonetheless, although officially born in Loppem in 1918, Belgian consociationalism witnessed significant vicissitudes in 1970, 1993 and 2001. Essentially, each wave pacified one problem at a time and left room for competition on the others. In other words, Belgium’s problems were taken into the consociational logic one at a time – only after each caused enough tensions to render pacification imminent (Lijphart 1980; Deschouwer, 2002; Lauwers, 2010).

### 1.5.2 Structure of Cleavages

As mentioned previously, the extent to which social cleavages coincide with or crosscut one another has significant bearing on the nature and intensity of social grievances and, therefore, the unity and stability of the political system. Comparative analysis of the structure of cleavages in the consensus regimes discussed in this chapter evidences this claim.

#### 1.5.2.1 Switzerland and the Netherlands

The cleavage between the Catholic Conservatives and the Free Democrats in Switzerland, for instance, did not follow denominational lines exactly as anticlerical and secular Catholics tended to support the latter alongside Protestants. The linguistic cleavage, on the other hand, gained salience since integration of the Italian-speaking canton of Tocino and the trilingual canton of Graubünden (German/Italian/Romansh) into the Swiss Confederation and, crucially, since the emergence of French-speaking cantons following Napoléon’s invasion in 1798-1814.
Linguistic pluralism, however, was mitigated by the fact that, throughout the last 200 years, the demographic balance between the linguistic \textit{lagern} has remained more or less the same. The linguistic divide, moreover, was moderated by the fact that it cut across denominational lines (Lehmbruch, 1993; Steiner, 2002).

Linguistic and cantonal divides, in contrast, coincide almost perfectly and, therefore, cantonal federalism in Switzerland spells out a clear territorialisation of linguistic communities: twenty-two cantons are, by definition, unilingual autonomous regions while only four cantons are mixed. Crucially, the overlap between the linguistic and cantonal cleavages has revalorised the former in light of modern political issues with strong spatial dimensions such as environmental questions and issues of urban/regional development (Lehmbruch, 1993).

Similarly, in the Netherlands, the geographic concentration of the \textit{zuilen} did not result in administrative divides akin to Switzerland’s cantonal federalism. In fact, each \textit{zuilen} was well-represented throughout the country and, crucially, cross-segmental interdependence and the non-segmented public domain were developing. The socioeconomic cleavage, on the other hand, is salient, well-established and predates industrial-capitalism itself: there are clearly-discernable upper-middle, lower-middle and lower classes as well as a bourgeoisie dating back to the merchant republic and the struggle for Dutch independence in the seventeenth century. Consequently, questions of a socioeconomic nature have polarised Dutch society more than any other cleavage especially given the disproportionate amount of wealth accumulated by the top echelon of society. The salience of the socioeconomic cleavage is coupled by the fact that class divides cut across religious divides – hence, moderating the effects of the latter (Lijphart, 1968). As argued above, the crosscutting of cleavages in the Netherlands did not decrease social segmentation, but contributed to the development of cross-segmental interest groups and movements.

\textbf{1.5.2.2 Belgium}
Belgium, by contrast, demonstrates the negative impacts of mutually-reinforcing cleavages in plural societies. Since the inception of consociational government in 1918, Belgian society consisted of three pillars: Catholics, socialists and liberals. Linguistically, it is also divided into three linguistic-cultural communities: French-speakers, Flemish and Germans. Finally, Belgium is also divided into three territorial subunits: Flanders, Wallonia and Brussels-Capital.

Policy-making on educational, linguistic and cultural matters were delegated to linguistic-cultural subunits; whereas decision-making on modern political issues of a spatial dimension has been gradually devolved from national to regional government.
It must be noted that sectoral divides cut across territorial and segmental cleavages lopsidedly: the Catholic pillar prevailed in the more agricultural Flemish-speaking north; socialist in the industrial French-speaking south; and liberals in the bilingual service-sector Brussels-Capital. This overlapping of cleavages was exacerbated by a historic sense of ‘minoritisation’ amongst Flemings: since the Belgian Revolution in 1830, the country was defined as ‘Catholic, bourgeois and French-speaking’ versus a ‘Calvinist, despotic and Dutch-speaking’ Netherlands. Crucially, this sense of marginalisation conveyed a feeling that amongst Flemings that they are not quite at home in Belgium (Jones, 2002; Stroschein, 2003).

This historical division, however, was not translated into social pillarisation until after the Pact of Loppem. The Pact was signed by members of the elite who argued that the vertical integration of the two linguistic-cultural groups into self-enclosed subcultures with prudent and circumspect leadership was the only guarantor of the legitimacy and sustainability of a unified Belgian state (Deschouwer, 2002). Consequently, Belgian society was reorganised into linguistic-cultural familles spirituelles which incorporated a whole range of auxiliary organisations, political parties and educational institutions. The political fiction asserting that linguistic-cultural cleavages and territorial divides were separate could no longer be sustained.

As a result, 1971 reforms made provisions for linguistic-cultural communities irrespective of the territorial divide but, by 1980, it had become clear that was insufficient and unsustainable. Consequently, new reforms were introduced recognising that the Flemish-speaking community and Flanders are indiscernible much like the Francophiles and Wallonia (Jones, 2002). This left the issue of Brussels unresolved: for increasingly-radical Flemish politicians, it was a ‘Francophone oil stain’ within Flanders. For Walloon politicians, the ‘iron ring’ that surrounded the city stifled the natural expansion of the capital. To mitigate this problem, the autonomous Brussels Region was created in 1988 (Stroschein, 2003).

Essentially, the reforms of the 1980s served to harden the linkages and strengthen the correlation between language and territory culminating in the 1993 constitutional reforms which expanded regional autonomy and introduced direct regional-council elections. The federalisation of Belgium, it must be noted, did not substitute consociationalism, but complemented it as stipulated by the reforms adopted in 2001.

Belgium, therefore, is an example of federal-consociationalism whereby exclusive competencies are assigned to both territorial and non-territorial substate units. The effect of this dual system was twofold. First, it allowed each community to combine territorial claims with nation-wide segmental autonomies. Second, non-territorial autonomy mitigated concerns over the Flemish minority in Brussels and the French-speaking minority in Flanders. The
overlap between the three cleavages, thus, led to the slow death of the Catholic, socialist and liberal pillars and their replacement by the Flemish and Walloon movements – each consisting of a series of cultural, social and political organisations promoting a linguistic-cultural-regional identity (Fitzmaurice, 1983; Deschouwer, 2002; Jones, 2002; Stroschein, 2003).

1.5.3 Consensus Regimes and the Segmented Public Domain
As the discussion presented so far demonstrates, the development of a non-segmented public domain in consociational systems not only mitigates social pillarisation but also has the potential of depillarising society as is evident in the Dutch case. Consensus regimes’ emphasis on elite acquiescence as opposed to ‘opposition’ in the classic sense, however, substitutes competition in typically competitive and uncoordinated domains as the party domain and trade unions with coordinated, compromise-oriented arrangements (Lijphart, 1999).

Members of the Swiss Bundesrat, for instance, usually retain their positions until they decide to retire and are elected through complex bargains based on the subtle equilibrium between political parties, linguistic communities and cantons (Lehmbruch, 1993). Similarly, in Belgium, divergent political currents are co-opted into grand coalition governments, which internalise diversity. The failure to agree in parliament, for instance, is mitigated by constitutional provisions which refer legislative functions to the cabinet (Deschouwer, 2002).

The dynamics of elite acquiescence and the nature of the public domain, therefore, help explain the different outcomes of consociational systems. In this vein, it is empirically evident that one of the most salient characteristics of plural societies is limited cross-segmental collaboration on the political front.

In Belgium, for instance, the Catholic, socialist and liberal familles spirituelles developed their own subsocieties (Fitzmaurice, 1983); thus, exacerbating the regionalisation of segmental subunits and revalorising the linguistic-cultural cleavage. Today, there is a noticeable lack of cross-segmental/regional political actors (Deschouwer, 2002; Stroschein, 2003).

Similarly, cross-segmental voting was markedly low in the Netherlands until the gradual process of ontzuiling (depillarisation) in the 1960s. This was exacerbated by religious establishments: the Roman-Catholic Church and the Synod of the Reformed Church, for instance, discouraged their followers from joining organisations based on the class-struggle discourse especially the Socialist Union which was associated with the socialist zuilen. Roman-Catholic bishops even instructed ‘Catholic capitalists’ to employ professionals organised in all-Catholic associations and workers belonging to all-Catholic unions (Lijphart, 1968:38; 58).
In a similar vein, the media was markedly pillarised in the Netherlands in the 1950s: Catholics and Calvinists, for instance, demonstrated overwhelming preference for ‘their own newspapers’ in the mid-1950s (Lijphart, 1968:40). The segmentation of the media is salient in societies divided along linguistic lines for obvious reasons; hence, curtailing the emergence of a cross-segmental discourse.

1.5.3.1 Consociational-Corporatism

The paradoxical situation created by the segmentation of the public domain and the compromise-oriented socio-political order is, thus, mitigated by the coevality between consociationalism and corporatism. The subnational focus of Belgian trade unions and interest groups, for instance, is complemented by the so-called *partenaire sociaux* (social partnership) which allows the Belgian state to involve associations of the pillarised public domain in a symbiotic relationship between linguistic-cultural communities, the interlocking network of interest groups and the welfare state (Fitzmaurice, 1983; Jones, 2002).

In such consociational-corporatist systems, much of the bargaining process in economic and social policy takes place amongst interest groups and associational leaderships, not political parties. Interest groups may even be granted parliamentary mandates and government offices in order to prevent the arena of interest intermediation and the partisan domain from functioning at cross-purposes (Lehmbruch, 1993).

Consociational-corporatist regimes, thus, presuppose three foundations: (i) the organisation of interest groups into hierarchical, monopolistic peak organisations; (ii) accommodating national as well as segmental peak organisations; and (iii) incorporating these organisations in the process of policy formation.

The *partenaire sociaux* in Belgium, for instance, entails the centralisation of interest groups into peak organisations on the regional level (often, in symbiosis with parties) and, hence, allows them to jostle with their counterparts across the segmental divide (Fitzmaurice, 1983).

In the consociational-corporatist Swiss model, peak organisations are relatively cross-segmental. The reasons for this are threefold. First, the strength and cohesion of peak organisations in Switzerland is superior to that of political parties. Second, whereas politics is largely conducted through loose networks of traditional notables in the local arena in rural cantons, the federal arena is dominated by cross-segmental, nationwide organisations. Thirdly, *konkordanzdemokratie* is characterised by the absence of powerful individual leaders versus salient institutional structures (Lehmbruch, 1993).

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9 For more on ‘peak organisations’ and their incorporation in decision-making in corporatist systems, refer to Schmitter (1982).
Consequently, the Swiss system shares more with neo-corporatist political systems than it shares with Belgian consociational-corporatism. Unsurprisingly, thus, the federal government invests politically and financially in associations with nation-wide representational monopolies and the capacity to intervene in economic and political crises. In other words, whereas the interest group domain in Belgium reflects segmental-regional cleavages, peak organisations in Switzerland represent a crucial domain for cross-segmental political action and act as a substitute for the highly-segmented party system. Crucially, consociational-corporatism in Switzerland allows the federal state to penetrate and co-opt political actors on the periphery into the federal centre.

1.6 Trajectories of Consociational Government
It is evident from the case studies presented in this chapter that consociational democracy does not follow a uniform pattern nor does it produce prototypical results. It has been argued that, in fact, whereas consociationalism mitigated the effect of social divisions in the Netherlands and paved the way for the emergence of a national public domain, *konkordanzdemokratie* institutionalises social cleavages in Switzerland and allows for the development of a superstructure which is less segmented and, crucially, capable of co-opting actors into the federal establishment. In Belgium, by contrast, mutually-reinforcing cleavages polarised society into two pervasive and mutually-exclusive segments. Moreover, areas of cross-segmental interdependence and political action in Belgium are markedly limited.

It should be noted that the depillarisation of Dutch society and the shift to a majoritarian form of government in 1967 coincided with a general shift away from consensual politics in Europe. Grosse Koalition governments which characterised postwar Austria were abandoned in 1966 and a considerable decline in balance-of-power politics occurred in Germany and Luxembourg. What concerns us here, however, is that the zuilen which dominated Dutch politics for half a century lost their salience and have been replaced by a ‘Dutch society’ seen as ‘culturally homogenous’.

1.6.1 Consociationalism in the Netherlands: The Transitory Phenomenon
One way of conceptualising *ontzuiling* in the Netherlands is by stressing that consociationalism is merely a deviant and inherently-transitory phenomenon suitable only for specific and, crucially, temporal historical contexts. According to this argument, the ‘high fences make good neighbours’ principle is understood as a temporary mechanism which cannot survive the integrative impacts of modern technologies of communication and transportation. Another less deterministic/linear explanation argues that *ontzuiling* is not a result of demobilisation but, in fact, a result of *remobilisation*. In other words, subcultural collectivities lost their salience as a
result of an increasing emphasis on the individual. The residues of communalistic bonds are, thus, shaken off the nation-state/citizenship and globalisation/postmodernity paradigms due to individuation (Lehmbruch, 1993).

Both discourses converge in presupposing that consociationalism is a transitory phenomenon and that its ‘successful’ implementation will result in subcultures becoming less virulent and, hence, consociational arrangements become superfluous. Consequently, consensus politics will ultimately pave result in ‘political markets’ of the majoritarian variant (Lehmbruch, 1993; Angelov, 2004). It should be noted, however, that a number of crucial elements contributed to the depillarisation of Dutch society. Politically and economically, ontzuiling can be attributed to the crosscutting structure of cleavages which allowed modernisation and urbanity to produce a non-segmented and cross-segmental public domain. Socially, the weakening of church institutions effectively deprived the zuilen of their ecclesiastical backbone and strengthened the secular/cross-segmental public domain. In evidencing this, Koole and Daalder (2002) state that the daily newspaper, de Volkskrant, for instance, ceased to be ‘Catholic’ and turned into a ‘general’ left-wing newspaper in 1966. Similarly, the Catholic Trade Union and the Socialist Trade Unions merged into a national union. Paradoxically, the Netherlands today is the least religious Western Europe country and is characterised by a generally high degree of tolerance for ‘deviant’ behaviour. Put differently, the autonomy and moral standing ascribed to the individual expanded rapidly at the expense of the zuilen.

1.6.2 Sustaining Consensus Democracy: Switzerland and Belgium
Compelling as these arguments may be, however, ‘depillarisation’ is not an inevitable outcome of consensus regimes. Konkordanzdemokratie in Switzerland, for instance, has persisted for over 150 years despite the fact that segmental and class cleavages intersected at right angles. The persistence of balance-of-power politics in Switzerland can be attributed to two fundamental factors: firstly, the salience of the cantonal cleavage in light of an increasingly-spatial global agenda and the emergence of English as a language of global communication; and, secondly, the neo-corporatist system of interest intermediation (Steiner, 2002).

The consociational experience in Belgium, on the other hand, is a stark contrast to the stable model of Swiss consociationalism and the successful-transitory experience in the Netherlands. This can be attributed to (i) Belgium’s lack of historical depth as a nation; (ii) the salience of the Walloon and Flemish identities; and (iii) the weakness of overarching loyalties. Overlapping cleavages and weak overarching loyalties, thus, left the elite in Belgium struggling to negotiate solutions, avoid impasses and resolve conflicts despite the realisation that non-agreement would come at a high cost (Jones, 2002; Lauwers, 2010; Bieber, 2011).
Indeed, national integrity has been upheld for the past three decades in Belgium, largely, due to the crossover between the consociational-federal superstructure and the corporatist system of interest intermediation. This, however, is being undermined by the fact that, although unions and associations organise in both languages and in all three regions, widening differences in sectoral and socioeconomic structures have made it difficult for associations to function across linguistic-regional divides (Jones, 2002). Moreover, the decline of the welfare state has reduced the state’s ability to uphold a system of corporatist interest intermediation.

1.7 Consociationalism in Post-Conflict Societies
Demonstrative as Western European models of consociational government may be, it must be noted that applications of consociationalism in the early-1990s have, by and large, taken part in the context of transitions from protracted civil conflicts. Consequently, although consensus regimes in such countries as Bosnia, Kosovo and Macedonia resemble the Dutch, Swiss and Belgian models in much of their institutional structures, the salience of a recent, blood-stained history of inter-communal violence has resulted in socio-political dynamics particular to post-conflict power-sharing regimes. Forced displacement and ethnic cleansing, for instance, leads to the territorialisation of communal cleavages and erects a psychological boundary of trauma.

1.7.1 Bosnia as a Case Study
Bosnia-Herzegovina is a good example of consociational government in plural societies emerging from protracted civil conflict. Along with Lebanon, Bosnia is a contemporary reminder of the diversity that existed throughout the Ottoman Empire before it was levelled by the emergence of nation-states. Moreover, both countries went through prolonged periods of civil conflict and, thus, developed comparable social and political structures (Bieber, 2000).

Bosnian society is divided into three ethno-religious subunits: Bosniak-Muslims; Serb-Orthodox; and Croat-Catholics. Before the Bosnian War (1992-1995), the three subunits which comprised 44%, 31% and 17% of the total population respectively ‘intermingled’ insofar as they cohabited mixed towns and villages and enjoyed a relatively high rate of cross-ethnic marriages. Under the Yugoslav Federation, inter-communal antagonisms in Bosnia were suppressed by the charismatic leadership of the likes of Tito; overarching loyalty to a Yugoslav identity premised on the myth of 'brotherhood and unity' forged in the aftermath of World War II; and the relative stability which Yugoslav non-alignment generated in the Balkans during the Cold War (Morrow, 2005). This was altered during the war which divided the country into territorially-defined ethnic cantons, displaced half the population and severed inter-communal relations (Bose, 2002; Zahar, 2004).
The Dayton Agreement signed in the aftermath of Western intervention to end the Bosnian War established a federal Bosnia comprising two entities: Republika Srpska (RP) and the Federation of Bosnia-Herzegovina (BiH). Communal polarisation since the war can, in fact, be understood as a symptom of a deeper disagreement between proponents of the unitary state proponents of devolution, autonomy and the federal/decentralised system (Stroschein, 2003).

The political superstructure in Bosnia incorporates aspects of consociational decentralism and unitary centralism. On the federal level, a small bicameral parliament is allocated according to ethnic quotas (one third of the seats reserved for RS and two-thirds for BiH); veto rights for the Serb, Croat and Bosniak communities; and a three-member Presidential Council comprised of representatives of each group. On the sub-state level, government is centralised and legislative functions ascribed to the unicameral regional parliament in Republika Srpska whereas the BiH Federation is divided into ten sub-regional cantons: Croats constitute a majority in three cantons; Bosniaks in five; and two are mixed (Bose, 2002:33; Stroschein, 2003).

Subtle arrangements were made to discourage IDPs from returning to their hometowns in an attempt to preserve the consociational status quo. The representative of each ethnic community in the Presidential Council, for instance, is elected by voters in the respective sub-state/sub-regional territorial entities. Accordingly, individuals in the ‘wrong’ entity and those who identify as ‘mixed’, ‘Yugoslav’ or ‘other’ fall outside of this voting process (Bose, 2002:63).

The institutionalisation of segmental-territorial cleavages in postwar Bosnia is exacerbated by the pillarisation of the educational system. Less an issue of language as is the case in Switzerland and Belgium, schooling in contemporary Bosnia is administered by ethno-religious communities and, thus, promotes communal interpretations of history, politics and the war (Stroschein, 2003). The segmentation of the public domain is also reflected by political parties: Serb parties are popular almost exclusively in RS; Croat parties in Croat cantons; and Bosniak parties in the Bosniak cantons. Elections also demonstrate increasing polarisation with such ultra-nationalist parties as Radovan Karadžić’s Serbian Democratic Party winning landslide votes in RS. Conciliatory parties on the other hand remain marginal and political impasses on all levels of government frequent (ICG, 2000; 2009).

1.7.2 Blood-Stained Consensus

The salience of consociational arrangements in the context of postwar societies, it must be noted, aims to address a number of war-related issues including the mass displacement of population groups; ethnic cleansing; and the fresh memories of war and, thus, disdain and mutual distrust which taint collective consciousness in post-conflict societies. Moreover, post-conflict societies are scenes of socio-political turbulence especially if protracted conflict
resulted in a large refugee community abroad, significant demographic displacements within or across national boundaries exploiting the sanctuary of a common ethnic or religious bond (Bieber, 2004; Zahar, 2005).

Consociational regimes in post-conflict societies, as experience shows, thus, attempt to mitigate the effects of disdain and antagonisms; although ‘negotiated’ transitions to peace and the institutionalisation of societal divisions may have adverse effects on reconciliation, transitional justice and rehabilitation. The segmentation of the public domain and the devolution of decision-making prerogatives to the subnational level, for instance, allow communal leaders to articulate different historical and national narratives. Moreover, traumatic war experiences may encourage segmental elites to adopt radical, polarising positions as opposed to conciliatory and acquiescent behaviour as is evidenced by elections in postwar Bosnia, Kosovo and Macedonia.

1.8 WHY MAINTAIN A FRAGMENTED EXISTENCE?
In conclusion, it has been argued throughout this chapter that when society is ‘so plural’, a system based on sub-state autonomies may prove successful in mitigating the effects of poor integration, social antagonisms and, in post-conflict societies, a blood-stained history of communal violence. Consociational regimes may, indeed, result in the emergence of a cross-segmental public domain and, thus, render the superstructure superfluous. Alternatively, consensus regimes may provide a non-segmented federal/national establishment capable of absorbing and, hence, stabilising social cleavages. A third outcome of consociational democracy is the accentuation of social cleavages and, thus, the deepening of social polarisation.

The question remains, however, if subcultural tensions are so strong and fragmentation so deep, why do plural societies not disintegrate into smaller, more homogenous entities?

One way of answering this question stresses the role of the international order premised on the primacy and sanctity of national integrity, state sovereignty and national borders. This world order often discourages the disintegration of countries into subnational entities and, hence, promotes consociational, rather than integrative, political structures in deeply divided societies. An alternative explanation insists that the consociational choice draws on a socio-political context or ‘political culture’ of consensus politics in the pre- and early-modern eras. This is evident, for instance, in the Netherlands where the management of religious diversity is rooted in a long-standing political tradition dating back to the early-modern merchant republic much as Swiss consociationalism is rooted in the precarious balance-of-power politics of the early-
nineteenth century (Koole and Daalder, 2002). Likewise, consociationalism in Lebanon and, more recently, Bosnia are associated with the historical legacy of Ottoman rule (Bieber, 2000).

A political economy explanation, however, contends that consociational ‘political cultures’ are outcomes of the political economy characteristic of small and plural societies. It is no coincidence that consociational systems exist(ed) in countries with relatively small populations, freewheeling capitalist economies and, crucially, relative dependence on more advanced industrial economies. Given the size and vulnerability of these countries in the global economy, thus, elites have a stake in dampening internal antagonisms and developing consociational and neo-corporatist democratic regimes. This presupposition is not a modus operandi – it rests on the assumption that elites are prudent enough and capable of marketing inter-segmental compromises and that they are bound to their followers by networks of relations which transmit values downwards and circulate and socialise would-be elites upwards (Katzenstein, 1985; Koole and Daalder, 2002; Jones, 2002).

1.9 CONCLUDING REMARKS

It has been the aim of this chapter to contextualise the institutional structures and political economy of consociational government in Western Europe and post-conflict societies as political systems which diverge from the prototypical nation-state model.

The study of consensus regimes is, of course, relevant to innumerable political systems today as postmodernism, international migration and multiculturalism reinforce sub and transnational identities. In Britain, for instance, devolution has allowed greater autonomy for Wales and Scotland despite the fact that the country is the birthplace of the majoritarian Westminster model (Dekmejian, 1978). International migration and the rapid expansion of Islam in Europe, on the other hand, brought to the forefront issues of legal-judicial concern for immigrant communities as well as the need for more multicultural educational systems (Rex, 1996).

These issues, however, are beyond the scope of this study. What concerns us here is the methodological relevance of consociational theory in understanding the Lebanese political system which, since the mid-nineteenth century, has been characterised by balance-of-power politics as will be discussed in the following chapters. Therefore, this study aims to transcend the grandiose focus on legal-institutional instruments of consensus government in Lebanon in order to locate the consociational regime within the political economy of late developmentalist societies as demonstrated by the Lebanese case.

In doing so, this research transcends the realm of area studies and attempts to explain the Lebanese experience through an analysis of dependent-capitalism and patron-client relations
within the context of comparative consociational theory. This is justifiable not only because of the bleak differences between the political superstructures in Lebanon and neighbouring Arab countries which conform with the nation-state model, but also because the study of the political economy of consociationalism in Lebanon introduces aspects of particular relevance to late-modern and dependent-capitalist societies to the theory of consociational government.

It has been noted earlier in this chapter, however, that consociational theory has made modest contributions to the conceptualisation of pluralism in the modern context. In other words, whereas consociational theory pays too much attention to the institutional structures of consensus regimes, scholars of consociationalism make no serious attempt at problematising the philosophical-conceptual underpinnings of the modernist, nation-state discourse. Instead, consociational theorists take the existence and survival of subnational collective identities in spite of the integrative impacts of modernity, nationalism and capitalism for granted and make no attempt to justify their existence vis-à-vis the dyadic relationships articulated by proponents of the metatheories of modernisation. Consequently, although the consociational theory runs contrary to Eurocentric ideals of the unitary state and homogenous nation, it has not explained why subnational collectivities are ascribed a moral standing and an intrinsic equality distinct from that of their individual members.

In light of this shortcoming, chapter two proposes that, in fact, the theory of hybrid modernities is of particular relevance to the study of consociationalism in plural, late-modernising and dependent-capitalist societies such as Lebanon. The methodological relevance of modernity, it will be argued, lies in the fact that critical modernisation theories acknowledge the hybridity of ‘modernity’ and, thus, provide a conceptual framework which explains the perseverance of subnational collective identities. Moreover, the theory of hybrid modernities problematises the universalist presupposition that modernity, rationalisation of authority and differentiation of structures inherently entails individualism, nationalism and the demise of sub/transnational solidarities and non-secular ontologies. ‘Hybrid modernities’, thus, is better suited to explain transitions to modernity which occurred not in spite of religion and sub/transnational identities but precisely because of, or in harmony with them.
CHAPTER TWO

HYBRID MODERNITIES IN THE MIDDLE EAST
2.1 The Methodological Relevance of Hybrid Modernities

It has been argued in Chapter One that socio-political order in such deeply divided societies as Lebanon or, even, Switzerland cannot be fully understood through the prism of predetermined and rigid, yet controversial and ambivalent conceptualisations of modernity. The problematic arises from the ambivalence associated with the definition of the so-called ‘modernity project’. The Eurocentricity of the study of modernity leaves social scientists with the inescapable urge to compare modern societies with little regard to differences in their political, economic, social and intellectual histories.

Theoretical and conceptual debates on ‘modernity’, it must be noted, have oscillated between zealous modernists and postmodernists. Essentially, modernists can be seen as defenders of the Enlightenment project and, thus, continue to view modernity and the Eurocentric values upon which it is founded as a project for all of humanity. According to this view, ‘modernity’ aims to achieve an ahistorical homoginisation of the world by expanding and diffusing the values and socio-cultural project of the Enlightenment to the resilient and late-modernising societies of the non-Western world (Fukuyama, 1992; Huntington, 1996; Duara, 2002). In responding to this, postmodernists on the other hand believe that the modern project has reached its apex and is, thus, substituted with the notion of ‘cultural resistance’ to global standardisation as the ‘modernity project’ is no longer capable of explaining the social reality in different parts of the world as well as from within ‘the West’ itself (Anderson, 1998).

Notwithstanding this difference, modernists and postmodernists alike conceptualise modernity as a coherent whole, an all-encompassing, all-pervasive hisotirical project representing a single, uniform and consistent world. This perceived coherence of modernity as a specific way of life conceived during the Enlightenment render it a rigid and unilinear project; a set of absolute truths; and a standardisation of rational, secular knowledge – things even modern man himself is incapable of changing (Kaya, 2004). This is evidenced in the works of Michel Foucault who, through Kant, traces ‘the ontology of the present’ to the exemplary event of the 1789 French Revolution (Foucault, 2002). In doing so, modernisation theory confers a sense of spatiality and temporality upon ‘the modernity project’ as evidenced by the Hegelian-Marxist expressive totality (Bhabha, 1994: 31-32; 91; 243).

Modernisation theory, therefore, pays little attention to the context within which transitions to modernity occur; the agents carrying forth the socio-cultural project of modernity; and the role of ‘culture’ and ‘acculturation’ on the processes of modernisation. More importantly, classical modernisation theory presupposes the development of similar – if not identical – institutional designs and socio-political constellations of modernity. On the political level, for instance, it is
assumed that the pedagogical function of modernity is ‘the will to be a nation’ as Renan (in Bhabha, 1994:160) argues. These nations are governed by a unitary centre represented by the monolithic Hegelian state which is charged with the function of articulating ‘national culture’ and the shared behavioural and attitudinal value system. National society, on the other hand, is reorganised into a relatively homogenous, a deeply penetrated, malleable and conformist periphery. For modernists, this prototypical structure, the nation-state, is an inescapable and inevitable tenet of modern society. This prototypical order is upheld by modernisation theorists despite the fact that different societies may have undergone historical transformations in which sub/transnational identities were not replaced by the nation; or modern Hegelian states did not develop a monopoly over the monolithic task of producing social change.

It is the intention of this chapter, therefore, to address modernity as a state or a condition separable from the philosophical and institutional constellations produced by a particular historical experience. In other words, this chapter aims to liberate the concept of modernity from the historical and cultural baggage attributed to it by Eurocentric political theorists.

Such a position, indeed, runs contrary to the universalist and unilinear claims of modernisation theorists who perceive modernity as an all-encompassing civilisational transition – an assertion which categorically denies that the historical and cultural specificities of the instigators of the transition to modernity are of any relevance to the epistemological and ontological content of the modernity project itself. Instead, modernity is perceived as the inevitable, objective process of ‘thinking the unthought’; liberating man’s ‘cognito’ and, thus, ‘knowledge’ from the realm of transcendentalism through rational empiricism; and, as a result, ‘ending man’s alienation’ by ‘reconciling him with his own essense’ (Foucault, 2002:351). This, of course, is seen as an exemplary, revolutionary achievement which would, inevitably, transform human civilisation in its entirety – through ‘acculturation’, cultural dissemination or the ‘mission civilisatrice’ of the colonial modern (Tibi, 1988:12-18). As such, what critics of modernisation theory view as a self-imposing Eurocentrism project, modernists perceive an absolute and objective truth – a self-professed universality which leaves ‘modern man’ no choice but to ‘modernise’ or perish:

As a modern man in this modern world, one better welcome and celebrate [modernity] joyously [...] otherwise he is bound to be crushed, destroyed and annihilated. [...] This is the message of modernity as a universal project, the project that begad in the period of the Enlightenment (Kassim, 2005:19).

Despite its self-professed universality, however, modernity can be defined as a relatively long historical phase which involved a socio-intellectual shift in the fields of scientific research, knowledge and technology. Politically, it involved the restructuring of state-society relations, the birth of the nation-state and the expansion of its authorities to encompass the political,
civil, legal, economic and cultural spheres (Turkmani, 2004). In fact, political theorists often use the term *modern*, as a state of being, in reference to the structural changes which link a modern state with industrialisation, democratisation and nationalism suggesting that the *state of modernity* cannot exist unless a society undergoes these transformations (Riggs, 1998).

What concerns us here, however, is the fact that the ‘modernity project’ occurred against the backdrop of a unique form of cultural and civilisational contact and a corresponding cultural framework which exhibits a completely new quality. In other words, ‘modernity’ as articulated in Europe took place in a world society unknown and unimagined in classical history: the Industrial Revolution, as Bassam Tibi (1988:13) noted, “thrusted Europe into a heady position of dominance from which it could conquer and mold the entire world in its own image”.

This uniqueness of this ‘modern’ form of civilisational contact, Tibi (1988) explains, rests on the concept of ‘acculturation’: a concept which expresses the penetration of the entire world by a single culture. ‘Modernity’, thus, is a relationship between the global ‘centre’ and the global ‘periphery’. This relationship between ‘top-dogs’ and ‘underdogs’ – to use Tibi’s expression – is premised on the unequal distribution of opportunities rooted in the structure of world economy, the industrialism-capitalism nexus and the colonial encounter.

In light of this *unique* modality of civilisation and cultural contact – acculturation, the mere historical precedence of ‘modernity’, industrialism and capitalism in Europe allows European modernity to position itself at the ‘centre’ of World Society and ‘mold the world in its own image’. In other words, the presupposition that ‘Modernity’ is singular and capitalised – as is envisaged by modernisation theorists – underpins the ‘impregnation’ of the ‘underdogs’ with novel ontologies, epistemologies, aesthetic norms and institutional designs – either through ‘voluntary acculturation’ or through the colonial ‘mission civilatrice’ (Al-Azmeh, 1996:80).

The shortcomings of modernisation theory, hence, this chapter proposes, are, in fact, twofold. Firstly, modernisation theory fails to acknowledge that the socio-cultural project and the institutional designs of ‘modernity’ are, in fact, the product of a historical context: they are the outcome of particular social, cultural and intellectual dynamics of a relatively long historical phase and are carried forward by social actors/movements who are embedded within this context and, thus, act as the bearers of the antinomies of ‘modernity’. Secondly, social theory is so embedded in the study of Enlightenment that it fails to capture the underdogs’ transition to modernity – that is to say, the dynamics of intellectual and socio-political modernism in non-Western societies.
In light of this critique of modernisation theory, this chapter will engage with the concept of ‘hybrid modernities’ and ‘late modernities’ in an attempt to establish a conceptual framework within which institutional and ontological ‘deviations’ from the nation-state model and the socio-cultural presuppositions of the metatheories of modernism and postmodernism may be understood. It must be noted, however, that this chapter conceptualises modernity as a dynamic process which is neither monocivilisational nor unidirectional – as opposed to the authentic conceptualisations of modernity. The discussion presented in this study, however, interrogates ethnocentric forms of cultural modernity and contemporaris the notion of culture. In other words, inspired by Homi Bhabha’s *The Location of Culture* (1994), the arguments presented here oppose ‘cultural pluralism’ as well as ‘cultural relativism’ much as they question the Eurocentricity and ‘universalism’ of the logics of binary oppositions inherent in classical modernisation theory.

This chapter is divided into four sections. In the first section, some of the fundamental presuppositions of classical modernisation theory are discussed. The second section examines variations in the transition to modernity with a particular focus on the Arabo-Islamic world in an attempt to explain how pre-modern order may have had an influence on the social actors and the historical transition to modernity. In the third section, the concepts of ‘late’, ‘hybrid’ and ‘incomplete’ modernities are introduced exploring the nature and dynamics of transitions to modernity in societies where modernism and capitalism were triggered by direct or indirect; violent or peaceful encounter with ‘the modern other’ in light of the concept of acculturation. The final section examines the *Nahda* shedding light on the political-economy and sociology aspects of the Arab transition to modernity. The chapter comes to an end with some concluding remarks on the epistemology and ontology of modernity in the contemporary Middle East and the political superstructures which characterise the modern state in the Arab world today.

### 2.2 WHAT DOES IT MEAN TO BE ‘MODERN’?

#### 2.2.1 The Fundamental Presuppositions of Modernisation Theory

Before engaging in any critical problematisation of modernisation theory, it is important to define what the expressions *modern* and the *state of modernity* mean.

The ‘human escape to modernity’ – to use the holistic expressions of modernisation theorists – was essentially instigated by several social and philosophical antinomies in late-medieval and early-modern Europe: social conflicts between city and country; science and church; absolute monarchs and subjects. These conflicts underpinned the principled assumption that man is, or can be, in control of nature and environment. The promotion of secular reasoning and the stress on man’s genius and his unique competence in mastering the universe were fundamental to the
scientific and philosophical renaissance in early-modern Europe. In other words, ‘modernity’ is perceived as the outcome of the intellectual acumen of the Enlightenment in seventeenth-and-eighteenth-century Europe (Foucault, 2002; Turkmani, 2004; Huntington, 2006).

With man elevated to the position of supremacy vis-à-vis supernatural and transcendental forces through the rise of the paradigms of the Enlightenment, ‘traditional’, ‘irrational’ and ‘transcendental’ legitimations of knowledge and, by extension, authority were deconstructed. Instead, reason became the sole means upon which man’s authority was to be justified.

Of course, modernisation theorists were aware that the Middle Ages were far from anarchic as is evidenced by the sophisticated institutions of trade, commerce and science which prevailed in the medieval Arabo-Islamic and Chinese civilisations or, even in European city-states and the tribal states of Africa. What is unique about Western modernity, however, is that socio-political institutions exercised authority not in spite of but precisely because of the overarching political superstructure. ‘Modernity’, therefore, entailed the centralisation of authority within the institution(s) of the state (Migdal, 1988:16; Fukuyama, 2005:45).

This growth of rationality and the disenchantment of the world resulted in the disentanglement of spheres – that is to say, freeing the mind from obstacles created by impenetrable barriers of religion, kinship, superstition and, even, politics. Modernity, thus, entailed the separation of the economic from the political and social domains within the context of industrial-capitalism; as well as the the separation between religion and politics. This disentanglement, it must be noted, is founded upon a precarious and never-to-be-taken-for-granted balance which, effectively, holds the different spheres apart. In evidencing this, Alan Macfarlane (1992:130) argues that modernisation and the birth of the nation-state entailed the demise of such primary identities as religion, kinship and clan:

> In modern societies kinship regulates a small sphere, reproduction, but does not organise politics, economics or religion. Religion provides solutions to some philosophical problems and minimal ethical guidance, but is kept well back from important matters like politics or the market. Politics is restrained and should allow the citizens plenty of 'freedom' to carry on their economic, family or religious business secured only by the 'night-watchman' state. Even the market and economic activity should be held back in check and prevented from 'corrupting' emotional life, art, sport, leisure, nature, or buying its way too openly into politics and religion.

In light of this disentanglement, ‘modern society’ is constructed through the pedagogical function of modernity – that is to say, the non-naturalist will to nationhood (Bhabha, 1994:160) overcoming the ‘neurotic paralysis’ and ‘repetition compulsion’ of primordial identities and
tradition (Friedman, 1998). Of course, that is not to say that subnational collective identities ceased to exist altogether in modern societies, but that the volume and velocity of ethnic processes is superseded by the omnipresence and omnipotence of the nation-state (Riggs, 1998; Hall, 1998).

The rational authority of the state, it must be added, played an instrumental role in holding these spheres apart. The task of articulating modernity and disseminating uniform and all-encompassing national identities and coherent moral orders amongst a relatively homogenous population within a given territory became the monopoly of the unitary nation-state. Modern nations, therefore, grew accustomed to the law of the state and her ability to shape social behaviour – that is to say, the state became the primary and omnipresent force to which the individual looks for protection and comfort. In fact, in modern societies, it is within the nation-state framework of basic conformity that the controls of family, clique, association, religion or kin exist (Pospíšil, 1974:115). In evidencing this, Migdal (1988:16) adds:

> Although there have been few universals in processes of social and political change, one can generalise broadly on this issue: by the mid-twentieth century, in practically every society on earth, political leaders had adopted the end of creating a state organisation in a given territory, through which they could make a set of common rules that govern the details of people's lives and could authorise, if they choose, other organisations to make some of these rules.

The state’s assumption of such colossal functions as the shaping of social change, enforcing law and order and mediating historicism in its articulation of ‘national culture’, it must be noted, rested on its development from a meeting place of titled nobles in the pre-capitalist era to an independent entity. In other words, modernity entailed a new relationship between an activist and aggressive national ‘centre’ armed with institutional networks embodying and propounding the values and beliefs of the state and the dominant class and a penetrated, malleable national conforming to the socio-cultural project articulated by the ‘centre’ and imposed by the state (Shil, 1975). The modern state, thus, is a unitary entity performing a homogenising function through the use of a smorgasbord of rewards and sanctions invested in its institutions – hence, guaranteeing compliance and conformity (Migdal, 2006).

**2.2.2 The Universalist Claims and Particularistic Histories of Modernity**

Despite the fact that European modernity claims the universality of its own worldview and, by extension, socio-cultural project, intellectual acumen and socio-political institutional designs, the ‘human escape to modernity’ as articulated in seventeenth-and-eighteenth-century Europe is, in fact, (1) the product of a particular historical process; (2) an articulation of the particular antinomies of the socio-political context; (3) as interpreted by the social actors/movements bearing these antinomies and articulating the socio-cultural project of modernity.
Although a historicisation of the transition to modernity as it occurred in late-medieval and early-modern Europe is beyond the scope of this study, it is important to note that the central saga of ‘modernity’ in Europe – the de-parcellisation of sovereignty and the emergence of the nation-state – occurred against the backdrop of the emergence of town-based economies and urban patriciates disconnected from the natural economy and the feudal MoP in the late-twelfth century. Indeed, it was in such town-based political societies that notions of the social contract and the ‘community of equals’ emerged. The expansion of these urban communes, however, necessitated an undermining of the feudal MoP and, thus, the highly-decentralised, traditional state (Lestocquoy, 1952; Hibber, 1953; White, 1962; Anderson, 1974; Huntington, 2006).

The rift between the city and the country, thus, provided the momentum for radical praetorian modernisation: the city was developing into a locus for new economic activities, social classes and ‘modern’ culture. The transition to modernity in Europe, hence, was triggered by a conflict of interests between ‘city’ and ‘country’ resulting in a decisive departure from the pyramidal, parcellised sovereignties of medieval society and ushered in the centralised, coercive state (Marx and Engels, 1968:171). Crucially, the early-modern state – often manifest in an absolute monarch – monopolised the use of sanctions and rewards to the detriment of feudalists, the Church and other non-state actors (Anderson, 1979).

It was in light of this that the notion of ‘state sovereignty’ emerged. Whether ‘sovereignty’ is invested in the monarchical figurehead as Bodin (1606) advocated or in conciliar institutions as Hobbes (in King, 1974) argued, there existed a consensus over the totalising conceptualisation of sovereignty as a coherent whole, indivisible and invested in only one entity.

The central socio-political saga of modern history, therefore, has been the battle between the state and the agendas of other social formations over how society should be organised; which institutions are to exercise authority; the ways in which authority is exercised; and whose system of meaning people will adopt. Of course, individuals’ choice between the strategies for survival, meaning, worldview and social inclusion offered by the state and those offered by such institutions as the family, multinational corporations, tribes, political parties or patron-client dyads depends on the material incentives and coercion these organisations wield, the status the confer upon the individual as well as the intellectual and emotional value of the use of symbols, values and meaning (Migdal, 2006:50).

State sovereignty, therefore, entails an implicit compromise whereby societies relinquish their power to resist the sovereign: modern societies, for certain purposes, voluntarily abandon their native liberties and entrust the state with exceptional powers (Hume, 1975). The modern state, thus, entailed more than just a detente between ‘city’ and ‘country’ – the nation-state became
the bearer and diffuser of a socio-cultural project: modernity. In other words, the *modern* state, according to Huntington (2006:140), must be capable of promoting social change; replacing ‘traditional’ values and behavioural patterns; expanding education; substituting achievement criteria for ascriptive ones; and broaden loyalties from the primordial collectivity to the *nation*.

Undoubtedly, the norms and values of society are, to a certain extent, selectively incorporated into the ‘national’ value system. Nevertheless, ‘national culture’ is produced solely by the elite and promulgated, exclusively, by the state. In this vein, behavioural and attitudinal value systems that lie outside those boundaries are ‘moulded’ into conformity or outlawed altogether. In other words, as the political arm of the modernising elite, the state assumed colossal social-change functions. Its tentacles, therefore, expanded allowing it to diffuse the worldviews of ‘modernity’ and ontologies of ‘the present’ through education, law-enforcement, the media and the judiciary (Eisenstadt, 2000:6; Migdal, 2006:46).

Put differently, the state became the monolithic, overarching institution of ‘the centre’. It, thus, undertook to selectively historicising the past, ‘write the story of the nation’ (Bhabha, 1994:142) and ‘initiate’ members of society into the modern national community (Gellner, 1998:52). In evidencing this, Karl Marx argues that:

centralised state power with its ubiquitous organs of standing army, police, bureaucracy, clergy and judicature [are] organs wrought after the plan of a systematic and hierarchic division of labour [...] serving the nascent middle class society (Marx and Engels, 1968:289).

Consequently, the absence of the state in modern societies is inconceivable: it can be a little larger or a trifle smaller as conservatives or liberals will it, but its omnipresence and, indeed, omnipotence in fashioning the minutiae of individuals’ lives and its right to penetrate, extract, regulate and appropriate has become a given few will contest today (Migdal, 1988:15).

In the widest possible sense, therefore, the socio-political constellations of ‘modernity’ can be summed up in two concomitant transformations: the substitution of miniscule sovereignties and sub/transnational collective identities with the unitary nation-state; and a new modality of state-society relations characterised by the predominance of the former (Eisenstadt and Schluchter, 1998).

This Hegelian view of the *state* as the embodiment of the ideals and ethical life of the *nation* and the means to shaping the framework for all other societal interactions, including the economy, religion and the family has evidently shaped the patterns and constellations of contemporary European states and, thus, modernisation theory.
2.2.3 Variations of ‘Modernity’

It has been argued earlier in this chapter that, modernisation theory presupposes a hierarchical development towards a single, universal social prototype and envisages a mono-directional transition towards the ‘Modernity’, according to which ‘modern’ societies are, indiscriminately expected to ‘converge’ towards the state of modernity. Empirical evidence, however, shows us that the processes and constellations of ‘modernity’ are neither uniform in historical trajectory nor outcome. Even within the European experience, the timing, extent and outcome of such transitions were determined by the context – that is to say, the social, intellectual and political context of the society as well as the social actors/movements bringing about ‘modernity’.

This is evidenced by the diverging trends of modernity in Western Europe versus Europe-east-of-the-Elbe which can be traced back to the political economy of urban life in each of the two regions (Anderson, 1974; 1979). Even ‘nationalism’ as a modern ideology in Europe differed significantly between Western Europe, where the nation-state emerged in synchrony with the ‘cultural-nation’ and corresponded to vernacular culture; Germany and Italy, where unification under the nation-state did not occur until the late-nineteenth century despite the existence of cultural-nations; and Eastern Europe where cultural-nations lacked as much as nation-states lacked despite claims of cultural and political continuity (Gellner, 1998:52-55).

Moreover, Huntington (2006:93) shows that variations exist even within Western modernity as evidenced by the sequence and extent to which the rationalisation of authority, differentiation of structures and expansion of political participation occurred in continental Europe, Britain and North America. In supporting this, Heideking (2000:219-248) shows that in relation to the disentanglement of spheres: religion and family survived in North America where the struggle against feudalism and the papacy were only a distant memory from faraway lands.

Even within ‘European modernity’, the extent to which the ‘centre’ undertook to engineer society into ‘modernity’ and ‘nationhood’ differ: in contrast to tendencies of homogenisation and laicisation in France and Scandinavian countries, for instance, consociational arrangements developed in the Netherlands, Belgium and Switzerland to accommodate ‘pluralism’. Political modernisation in Britain can be located somewhere in between featuring a unique and enduring form of multiculturalism rooted in the legacies of imperialism (Eisenstadt, 2000:6-7).

It is in this vein that such political arrangements as consociationalism can be conceptualised: not as a deviation from modernity, but a contextualised modernity. This is particularly useful in understanding societies where ‘pluralism’ is not subdued by homogenisation; religion is not subdued by reason; and sub/transnational collectivites are not subdued by the nation.
2.3 PRE-MODERN ARABO-ISLAMIC CIVILISATION

If anything, the ‘variations’ of modernity discussed above demonstrate that modernity is much less uniform and coherent than modernisation theory would suggest *prima facie* demonstrating that the assumed universality of modernity is problematic and that a claim to the contrary is not a radical departure from theory. In fact, as the previous discussion demonstrates, the political history of societies in transition is methodologically relevant to the study of modernity.

The study of the Arab transition to modernity is a case in point. Essentially, it can be argued that the *Nahda*\(^\text{10}\) was triggered by the violent encounter between Europe and the Arab world – first in Egypt in 1798 and, more dramatically, in Algeria in 1830. It is because of this early and destructive encounter that the Arab transition to modernity predated its counterparts in China, Persia and Turkey by more than a century (Turkmání, 2004). It must be noted, however, that the context of the *Nahda* differed significantly to the European transition to modernity.

Firstly, the *Nahda* was triggered and largely influenced by the integration of Arab elites into the acculturated ‘World Society’ characterised by the dominance of the worldviews, lifestyle, culture, socio-political order and industrial-capitalism of the earlier modernising societies of Europe. This is in stark contrast to the European transition to modernity which took place in a relatively-isolated civilisational environment untampered by the ‘process of acculturation of World Society’ discussed by Tibi (1988) and Al-Azmeh (1993).

Unlike the *Nahda*, therefore, European modernity developed as a response to endogenous processes of social change and was articulated by ‘inward-oriented’ social actors/movements bearing and articulating the antinomies of modernism. In other words, European modernity reflected the endogenous antinomies of capitalism; urbanisation; industrialisation; and the rise of a monetary, capitalist economy. The *Nahda*, on the other hand, was largely motivated by the encroachment of the acculturated ‘World Society’ and, implicitly, Western dominance in both the cultural-intellectual as well as political-economic domains. In fact, it can be argued that the pre-modern system of politico-legal obligations and social relations were only seriously undermined in response to shocking defeats vis-à-vis the modern other.

Moreover, social actors/movements bearing the (exogenous) antinomies of modernity in limine of the acculturation of World Society are often driven by an spiration to be the modern other, to resist being crushed, destroyed and annihilated by the modernity project; or to react to the perceived loss of ‘authenticity’, ‘purity’ and ‘wholeness’ as evident in the works of modernists as Rifa’a al-Tahtawi; Jamāl-al-dīn Al-Afghānī and more recent ‘fundamentalist’ movements.

\(^{10}\) The *Nahda*, meaning awakening or revival, is a cultural movement triggered by Egyptian and pan-Arab intellectuals in the wake of Napoleon’s invasion (1798-1801).
2.3.1 Dividing Sovereignty: Caliphs, Sultans and Imams

Before discussing the implications of the acculturation of World Society on late-modernising societies’ transitions to ‘modernity’, however, a few remarks about the pre-modern era must be made to set the scene of the cultural-intellectual and socio-political backdrop against which the ‘break with the past’ occurred.

Interestingly, the most important contradiction between socio-political order in Europe and socio-political order in the Arabo-Islamic world at the onset of modernity relates to the very issue of statehood and nationhood. Indeed, whereas city-versus-country paradigm in most of Europe underpinned the emergence of ‘the state’ in its absolutist and, later, nation-state forms, the state underwent fundamental transformations to the opposite effect in the Islamicate world.

Until the ninth century, the Umayyad and early-Abbasid Caliphates monopolised sovereignty and inherited the states and cities of pre-Islamic antiquity. Despite politico-sectarian schisms, the Caliphs were sovereign wielders of coercive authority and commanders of the far-reaching agencies of the state. The role of the Caliphate, as an institution, was twofold. On the one hand, it embodied the successorship of Muhammad and, thus, united the jamā‘a (community) and, on the other hand, it exercised authority, implemented the law, maintained order and upheld justice as decreed by canonical text and interpreted by jurisprudents (Al-Azmeh, 1993).

Between the tenth and fourteenth centuries, however, the Caliph’s ability to exercise authority regressed and many of his prerogatives were delegated to sultans who, as their title suggests, were the de facto wielders of authority. This was a result of politico-sectarian schisms between competing Caliphal claimants; the expansion of the empire and the inevitable decentralisation of public administration; the usurpation of power by governors; and, the successive conquests of the seat of the Caliphate, Baghdad, by the Buwayhids and the Mongols (Crone, 2004:220). In light of thes, a number of non-Arab warrior-dynasties emerged fragmenting the caliphate into autonomous sultanates, albeit under the sovereignty and with the recognition and appointment of the sovereign Caliph. This is true of such Turkic and Kurdish warrior-dynasties as the Ghaznavids, Seljuks, Ayyubids and Mamluks.

Essentially, this gave rise to interdependent and mutually-reinforcing dyadic relationships between the Caliph and his sultans. It was no longer a requirement to be a man of probity (‘adala), scrupulous observance of the law (wara‘), and sufficient knowledge to practice independent reasoning (ijtihād) to become a Caliph. Crucially, late-medieval caliphs were not perceived as the most meritorious men of their time, nor were they models to be imitated as the theorists of al-imāma al-kubra (the major imamate) had argued in the early days of post-Muhammad state-building. Instead, the Caliph had now become the embodiment of the
theoretical and sentimental unity and legitimacy of the ummah. Effectively, however, power lay in the hands of sultans who had become ‘revivers of Islam’, ‘guardians of the faith’ and ‘deputies of the Imam.’ The secular-military background of the powerful warrior-sultans of the late-medieval era however meant that, irrespective of their religiosity, they were not jurisprudents, scholars or imams in any capacity. To overcome this existential obstacle, the legal prerogatives of the imamate were delegated to a class of scholars constituting the core of the judicial authority embedded within and intertwined with civil society.

In short, state-society relations entailed three fundamental pillars: a nominal sovereign, the Caliph; powerful sultans amongst whom caliphal authority is devolved; and a class of shaykhs, fuqahā’ (jurists) and qudāt (judges) who embodied al-imāma al-suğhra (the minor imamate) and exercised its duties (Crone, 2004).

Effectively, this meant that sovereignty, authority and government were trifurcated in the Muslim realm and, crucially, that the functions micro-level and social government invested in the ulema (scholars). Such tasks as the execution of the law; the promotion of virtue and prevention of vice; education; the collection and distribution of alms; and the supervision of charities fell upon the clergy. Taxes imposed by the sultan, in contrast, were almost exclusively used for military purposes. Infrastructural developments, education and social welfare on the other hand were financed through a complex network of awqaf (endowments) administered by civil society organisations and the religious establishment.

2.3.1.1 Non-Sunnis and Non-Muslims

Although premised on the philosophical presuppositions of Sunni scholarship, this disentanglement was mirrored on the communal sphere amongst non-Sunnis and non-Muslims in late-medieval Islamdom. For Imami Shiites, for instance, although the imamate remained an exclusive right to the descendents of the Prophet, the occultation of the Mahdi in 874CE opened the door for the innovation of a socio-political order not dissimilar from that of the Sunnis. Ismaili Shiites on the other hand embarked on empire-building with the rise and fall of the Fatimid Caliphate (909-1171) marking the zenith of proto-messianic Ismaili rule. But for both Imamis and Ismailis however, the fact remained: secular government in the absence of the Mahdi was indispensable for the management of the public and private spheres. Consequently, the juridical and religious functions of the imam were ascribed to a class of mujtahids while secular governments took on the civic and political functions of the imamate (Crone, 2004).

This allowed for the precarious inclusion of Shiite communities in the broader Muslim Caliphate whereby Shiites succumbed to the Sunni Caliph despite theological contestations of his right to the imamate. In return, the decentralisation and communalisation of justice and
social government allowed Shiite communities to preserve their distinct laws and communal systems and uphold the laws and value systems dictated by jurists of Shiite theology. This must not however conceal the fact that sultans often abused their authorities and coercive powers against non-Orthodox Muslims for strategic purposes – often exploiting non-Sunnis’ disputed allegiance to the Caliph.

The question of non-Muslim communities’ allegiance to the Caliph was not as problematic. An accommodative arrangement had been achieved under medieval understandings of *dhimmi* status. According to these arrangements, like their Muslim counterparts, Jews, Christians and other communities benefited from governmental and judicial decentralism. In this vein, *dhimmis* entrusted their own communal institutions and leaderships with the affairs of their communities. Such tasks as settling legal disputes, administering personal status courts, managing religious endowments and the provision of religious instruction and education were entrusted in institutions of the Church and other ecclesiastical superstructures.

2.3.2 Urbanity and Commerce in the Pre-Modern Era

Alongside these fundamental differences in political organisation between medieval Europe and the Arabo-Islamic world, there existed another crucial difference pertaining to social order and political economy in the pre-modern era.

Essentially, the subversion of the Roman Republic and Europe’s conversion to Christianity between the first and fifth centuries involved the de-urbanisation of the Roman Empire. Naturally, the questions of civil society and urban social order ceased to dominate the intellectual political debate on state-society relations as they had done during Greek and Latin antiquity. It was not until the twelfth century that new social actors, urban classes and non-agrarian economies emerged posing a threat to a predominantly-agrarian social order and a feudal political system (Anderson, 1974; 1979).

Islamdom on the other hand *inherited* Near Eastern antiquity: the nomadic Arab conquerors of Arabia quickly became the lords and rulers of the settled – agrarian and urban – civilisations of the Fertile Crescent and Nile Valley. This, as Ibn Khaldun argues in *Al-Muqaddima*, led to the substitution of the social order of unruly nomadic Arabs with the socio-political order of their subjects. Consequently, questions of state, society and government which prevailed in pre-Islamic Egypt, Byzantium, Persia and India influenced social order and political thought in the Islamic Middle Ages. Urbanity, civility and civil society were not issues that could be marginalised or deferred for centuries as they had been in medieval Europe.
Moreover, it must be noted that literacy amongst the urban middle classes in Arabo-Islamic cities in the Mashreq as well as the Maghreb and Al-Andalus was significantly higher than amongst medieval European elites. The ratio of kuttabs, madrassahs and public libraries to the average population of an Arabo-Islamic city, for instance, indicates the extent to which education and science were not as exclusive as they were in medieval Europe and explains the abundance of philosophers and scientists of modest backgrounds in the Arabo-Islamic world (Hanna, 2003:50).

Essentially, the existence of a large urban population engaged in mercantile commerce, banking and artisan industries as well as the existence of a considerable and erudite urban middle class engaged in scholarship and the production of knowledge throughout the pre-modern era underpinned the sophisticated political superstructure which entailed the trifurcation of sovereignty, authority and government.

In short, late-medieval Islamdom exhibited two seemingly-contradictory characteristics. On the one hand, a complex network of contractual relations underpinned the sophisticated social order and political economy of pre-modern Islamic society. These relations however did not exist within the overarching context of the state. Although warranted by a rational-religious system of courts and institutions of far-reaching reputation, contractual relations in the pre-modern realm of Islam were essentially rational-cultural relations rather than legal-contractual relations – that is to say, relations that are binding by force of cultural and social obligations, not legal arrangements enforced by the agencies of a modern state (Fukuyama, 2005:45).

2.3.3 The Civilisational Functions of Religion and Sub/Transnational Identities

Modernism in the Arabo-Islamic world ran contrary to the rational-developmental foundations of European modernity which assumed that man alone is capable of subduing nature. For modernists and proponents of the Enlightenment, primordial identities and religion are inherently irrational, naturalist and primitive. The metatheories of modernisation, therefore, not only pejoratively dismissed and trivialised ‘traditional’ notions of familialism, tribalism and confessionalism, but also perceived them as obstacles to modernity (Khalaf, 2003). Instead, the ‘modernity’ project emphasises national groups in a politico-territorial; and adopts rational-secular understanding of authority. Religion, modernists would argue, subordinates reason to transcendental wisdom; imposes itself on the individual, the economy and politics; prevents the disentanglement of spheres; and confines the human mind within impenetrable barriers.

Of course, much of this may be true in the European historical experience where the ‘learned mind’ witnessed a sweeping liberation from the influence of Christian theology since the Renaissance and the Enlightenment. Indeed, today, rational reasoning, experimentation and
empirical research methods are the only basis for contemporary Western knowledge. But, to what extent is this hostile view of religion universally accepted as ‘modern’? And why have rational-secularist epistemologies not replaced religion in the making of modernity in several non-Western societies? Why does the literature suggest that ‘reformists’ and ‘revivalists’ in the early-modern Arabo-Islamic societies not see a contradiction between ‘aql (rational) and naql (received/transcendental) knowledge?

It has often been argued that the fundamental difference between the philosophical foundations of European and Arabo-Islamic civilisation lies not in religion per se but in their prioritisation of man, nature and God: whereas the epistemology of European modernity emphasises the first two, priority is given to God and man in Islamic ontology (Dhaoudi, 2005; Al-Jabri, 2006).

This is evidenced by Ibn Khaldun’s Prolegomena, *Al-Mugaddimah*, for instance. In his seminal fourteenth-century universal history, he makes what would seem to be a paradoxical assertion for the Eurocentric modernist mind: ‘non-rational’ authority deteriorates and ‘traditionalism’ does not make it any stronger or more stable, he argued; however, rationalism and legalism are insufficient to stabilise and justify authority. Ibn Khaldun’s study of trends and transformations in the paradigm of collective solidarities draws on a wealth of empirical evidence from the Maghreb and Egypt – the former characterised by morphological severity and, thus, agnatic forms of solidarity (‘asabiya); the latter, by urbanity and, thus, civility (‘umran).

Ibn Khaldun’s theory of ‘umran and ‘ijtimā‘a, therefore, demonstrates a unique awareness of the inevitable demise of ‘traditional’ society and the rise of post-traditionalism where the city becomes the scene of the battle between social orders. Indeed, parallels can be drawn between Ibn Khaldun’s sociology and that of Durkheim insofar as they criticise forms of solidarity suitable for ‘simple societies.’ Unlike Durkheim however, Ibn Khaldun does not view religion as a form of solidarity for ‘simple societies’, but a catalyst for the transformation of nomadic Arabs into civilisation-builders; a ‘post-traditional’ form of solidarity capable of subduing primordial identities of clan/tribe and internalises the legal-moral value system underpinning the transition to ‘umran and civility (Spickard, 2001; Boukraa, 2008; Chabane, 2008).

The favourable position religion occupies in the socio-political thought of nineteenth-century reformers and revivalists of the *Nahda*, however, must not only be viewed in relation to the relationship between ‘religion’ and reason in the late-medieval period, but also in relation to the exogenous forces trigerring the transition to modernity.

For them, Islam was not simply ‘in harmony with reason’; it offered the only response to the weakness and destruction of the ummah which was made apparent by the encounter with the
modern other – Europe. The revival of the ‘pristine values’ of Islam, therefore, promised not only to thrust Muslim societies to civility and modernity, but also a guardian of ‘authenticity’ and the backbone for the struggle against colonialism and acculturation (Al-Azmeh, 1993). The anticolonial function of Islam in Muslim societies was not merely a ‘reaction’ to Western modernity, but also because it claims equally the universality of its own worldview as does Western modernity. The springboard of the confrontational claims of universality by Western and Islamic modernities, it must be noted, is their concept of knowledge and epistemology that is grounded in their ontology. Indeed, as Kassim (2005:20) notes, “it is not a confrontation between Islam and Christianity as it was in the past from the times of the Crusades”; instead, it is a confrontation rooted in their divergent worldviews and parallel claims of universality.

Confronted by the modern other, however, early-modern Islamist revivalists and reformists exhibited seemingly-contradictory traits: they condemned established orthodoxy and blamed it for backwardness vis-à-vis Europe; and, yet, resorted to ‘the pristine qualities of Islam in its purest form’. This is most evident in the works of such modernist-revivalists as Sayyid Jamāl al-dīn al-Afghānī, Muhammad Abdūh and their disciples (Al-Afghānī, 1968; Keddie, 1968; Tibi, 1988; Al-Azmeh, 1993; Al-Khisht, 1998; Al-Afghānī and Abdūh, 2002; Kohn, 2009).

Al-Afghānī, for instance, argued that ‘Islam in its purest form’ is central not only to intellectual authenticity, but also to the transformation from barbarism and superstition to civilization and reason. On its socio-political potential, he condemned ties of ethnicity and, even, language to the advantage of ‘religious orthodoxy’ which, he argued, provided social cohesion, identity and mobilisation versus the ‘colonial other’ (Al-Afghānī, 1968:9-12). Moreover, he contended that Islam was, in fact, superior to secular authority because it internalised law:

> religious orthodoxy, devoid of superstition and innovations, empowers nations with forces of cohesion and unity. It promotes a conciseness of honour over one of lust; encourages virtue; encourages scientific inquisition; and pushes societies to the apex of civility (Al-Afghānī and Abdūh, 2002:115)

In short, it is evident that, unlike Western modernity, Islam is attributed a crucial civilisational function by important social actors/movements which undertook to articulate the socio-cultural project of modernity in their respective societies. This can, in part, be attributed to a perceived harmony between Islam and reason; but, more importantly, can be understood in relation to the civilisational claim of universality rooted in the concept of knowledge, epistemology and ontology in Islam. In the context of the acculturation of world society and the ability and desire of ‘the modern other’ to ‘mold the entire world in its own modern ontology of the present’, the parallel claims of universality between Islam and ‘the West’ become all the more omnipresent in the mindset of the social actors/movements articulating Arabs’ ‘subaltern modernity’.
2.4 The Perplexed Transformations of Late Modernities

It has been argued so far that the cultural-intellectual and socio-political constellations at the onset of the transition to modernity do, in fact, have an impact on the dynamics and direction of modernisation. In other words, the trajectories and outcomes of ‘modernity’ are not uniform or universal – in contrast to the assertions of modernisation theorists.

A number of conclusions can, therefore, be extrapolated from the argument presented so far in this chapter. On the institutional-design level, it is evident that the nation-state model will not always bring about an end to non-state social formations and sub/transnational collectivities. Secondly, that non-national imagined communities and modes of socially-constructed identities are not merely residues of pre-modernity but are, in fact, distinct from their pre-modern ancestors even if they share a common outlook or reproduce similar status markers. Thirdly, that non-Enlightenment epistemologies and non-secular ontologies do not challenge the essence of modernity: they do not aim to bring about traditional society nor do they challenge rationality; instead, they are alternative tools to mobilisation and integration in the national and global centre. Finally, that late-modernising societies are integrated, or aspire to be integrated, in a modern, acculturated World Society dominated by the early-modernising societies of the global centre: although they may challenge the ontological premises of the world system, few, if any, challenge the essence of the global inter-state system.

These conclusions challenge the monocivilisational assumption that the basic cultural-institutional constellations of European modernity will inevitably emerge and take over in all other modernising societies. This, in fact, is the central hypothesis of critical modernisation theories which stress the inclusionary dynamics of modernity as a historical process entailing a great deal of civilisational cross-fertilisation (Göle, 2000:91).

In line with this discussion, as stated before, the aim of this study, therefore, is to question the logic of exclusionary and binary oppositions between ‘traditional’ and ‘modern’ and interrogate the underlying assertion that modernity involves the dismantling of non-Enlightenment epistemologies, non-secular ontologies and non-national collective identities. Instead, modernity is conceptualised as a general tendency towards structural differentiation and rationalisation of authority influenced by the cultural premises, traditions and historical experiences of modern societies: a culturally-constituted and institutionally-entrenched social transformation (Wittrock, 2000:38).

If that is so, why have the cultural-intellectual and socio-political traditions of non-Western modernising societies not produced a rival explanation to the paradigms of modernity? Why did modern societies in the Middle East, for instance, resist acculturation and colonialism
through ideologies of European provenance such as nationalism and communism? And, more importantly, why have notions of ‘religious authenticity’, the ‘Islamic milieu’ and the ‘Islamic solution’ replaced nationalism/communism as discourses of resistance and liberation?

2.4.1 Encounters with the Modern Other and Externally-Generated Modernity

In answering these questions, it is important to note that due to historical precedence, colonial intervention, technological superiority and the acculturation of world society within the context of globalisation, Western modernity developed into a reference point for non-Western societies aspiring towards ‘modernity’. It is impossible to speak of non-Western societies articulating an endogenous socio-cultural project generated entirely out of their own dynamics given the fact that their histories have been determined – directly or indirectly – by Western dominance since the advent of the ‘Western modernity project’ (Tibi, 1988; Al-Azmeh, 1993).

This is an especially important recognition given the role played by social actors/movements as modernising agents which play a central role in shaping the epistemological and ontological outcome of the modernity project as Eisenstadt (2000:2) points out:

Ongoing reconstructions of multiple institutional and ideological patterns are carried forward by social actors in close connection with social, political and intellectual activists and social movements pursuing different programs of modernity, holding very different views on what makes societies modern.

In light of the acculturation of World Society, it is only reasonable to expect that these social actors/movements will be integrated in the political economy and cultural-intellectual sphere of influence of the dominant modernity as articulated by the global centre. Johan Galtung (in Tibi, 1988:20) refers to these social actors/movements as ‘bridgehead elite’: elites which have internalised, in the course of their Westernisation, the norms and values of the dominant global modernity:

The centre of the principal nation has a bridgehead in the periphery and it is, to be sure, a well-chosen one: namely, in the centre of the peripheral nation. This bridgehead is established in such a way that the centre of the periphery is bound to the centre of the centre; the bond being a harmony of interests.

The centre-periphery nexus and embeddedness of bridgehead elites in the political economy and cultural-intellectual sphere of influence of the global centre, it must be noted, is rooted in the asymmetries of the global economy. To understand the perplexities of late-modernising societies, thus, it is necessary to outline the historical as well as the political-economy aspects of so-called ‘subaltern modernities’.

In fact, it is essential to acknowledge that the impetus for modernisation in late-modernising societies is often provided by the paradoxical relationship with the modern other – a relation of
resistance and bewilderment. As a result of the acculturation of World Society, as discussed above, it is impossible to speak of ‘modernity’ in any part of the world today without referring to Western modernity – as a benchmark; a trigger; a hinderance; or an inspiration. Colonialism and rapid expansion of the cultural-intellectual as well as political economy of Europe in the nineteenth and twentieth century further exacerbated this ensuring that European modernity encroached upon and collided with every other civilisation in the modern world. The outcome of this encounter, however, differed according to the ‘strength’ of their cultural-intellectual and socio-political propositions as Charbel Nahas (1998) notes:

‘Weak’ societies were morally, intellectually and sometimes even materially exterminated allowing for their colonisation by Europeans. By eventually gaining independence, these [colonial] societies broke off from the ‘mother’ society but developed along similar trajectories and value systems making them strong contenders. This can be said of the United States, Canada and Australia. ‘Stronger’ societies on the other hand were largely subdued by the preponderant modality. But without fully adopting this modality, these societies failed to develop into significant contenders. This was the case with the Arab World, India and China. A number of countries lie on the spectrum between these two outcomes: their civilisations were not weak enough to be eradicated, nor was it strong enough to resist the preponderant modality. Consequently, the Western element infiltrated these societies creating a blend, or a mishmash of the two modalities. This can be said to be the case in Latin America and Russia. Japan remains the only significant exception to these civilisational generalisations.

Similarly, the break between the modern European coloniser and the late-modernising society differed: the confrontation between the fully-Westernised ‘modern’ successors of the ‘weak societies’ of North America and European colonialism, for instance, was ‘a confrontation between equals’. The anti-colonial struggle in Latin America, on the other hand, was shaped by a feeling of inferiority vis-à-vis the European modality (Heideking, 2000).

However, what concerns us here are the ‘stronger’ societies which suffered economic, political and military defeat by the ‘modern’ coloniser but did not fully adopt its epistemology nor did they fully adhere to its cultural-intellectual proposition. While this will be discussed in the final section of this chapter, it suffices here to note that, multiple as they may be; late-modernities viewed Western modernity with a combination of bewilderment, estrangement and fascination. Their quest for modernity can, therefore, be explained as a subaltern, hybrid modernity: an attempt to resist, adopt and adapt the cultural-intellectual and socio-political constellations of earlier-modernities without fully abandoning their culturally-constituted epistemologies and ontologies.

Paradoxically, the anti-colonial struggle often entailed internalising the ‘modern’ cultural-intellectual propositions as well as the institutional designs of the coloniser by the ‘bridgehead
elites’. This, it was hoped, would not only liberate their nations from colonialism, but also from the perceived backwardness of their own societies (Tibi, 1988; Al-Azmeh, 1993; Oritz, 2000; Fukuyama, 2005:48; Kamrava, 2005; Migdal, 2006; Marei, 2007).

2.4.2 Incomplete Modernities and the Extroversion of Aspirations

Essentially, the perplexity of late and incomplete modernities is twofold. On the one hand, late-modernising societies did not witness an endogenous historical transformation. Consequently, non-Enlightenment epistemologies and non-secular ontologies were never fully deconstructed. In fact, these cultural-intellectual propositions, socio-political structures and ontological value systems progressed and ‘modernised’ according to a logic of their own – a logic imbedded in inbred social and intellectual struggles. On the other hand, the institutional and philosophical products of Western modernity imposed themselves upon an-increasingly acculturated World Society and, hence, imposed themselves upon late-modernising societies – the ‘underdogs’.

Non-Western societies’ response to modernity, therefore, was to adopt ideologies and cultural-intellectual propositions which, of course, had their social roots as well, but were, heavily, informed by the acculturated world culture – that is to say, Western modernity. Indeed, as Tibi (1988:41) argues, “untangling what comes from the national society itself from what has been assimilated from Europe within the colonial context is a complicated business”.

This is exacerbated by the central role performed by the social actors/movements articulating modernity in late-modernising societies – ‘bridgehead elites’ – whose adoption of the socio-political as well as the cultural-intellectual constellations of Western modernity is indicative of the fact that the ‘centre’ in the late-modernising (peripheral) society is tied to the centre in the early-modernising (centre) and not to its own periphery (Tibi, 1988:20).

‘Bridgehead elites’, it must be noted, are non-Western elites which have, in the course of their Westernisation, internalised the aesthetic norms of Western modernity although they remain the ‘centre’ of societies which lack ‘the actual sociological substratum’ of these norms. Oritz (2000:252) points out, for example, that the festivals and carnivals of Latin America were reoriented to resemble the street carnivals of Venice and other European cities whereas popular festivals, per contra, were looked down upon as regressive and backward phenomena. In a similar vein, the modernising elite in the Middle East disregarded the cultural-social content of popular Sufi festivals, mulids and Ashura and condemned them as regressive disturbances to modernism and a perpetuation of superstition. Meanwhile, Arab ‘bridgehead elites’ embraced the idea of Europeanised street carnivals and music festivals and promoted them as enlightened celebrations of culture and refinement (Abdel-Baqi, 2005:329-332).

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Similar trends characterised urban reforms in the Middle East as cities embarked on a rat race to become ‘the Paris of the Middle East’. By the late-nineteenth century, Beyoğlu in Istanbul, the Khedival quarter in Cairo and Tehran all claimed to be ‘Paris of the Middle East’ as other emerging cities, such as Beirut, joined the race. In the same vein, the importation of European school curricula with little or no modification to correspond to social circumstances, market dynamics and cultural-intellectual propositions in the Middle East, South/Southeast Asia and Latin America is another example of bridgehead elites’ ambivalent integration into the process of acculturation of World Society (Sayyid-Marsot, 1984; Reid, 1990; Abdel-Baqi, 2005).

Nevertheless, this feeling of cultural and social inferiority did not conceal the fact that the superficial imitation of European modalities and lifestyles was unconvincing. This left many late-modernising societies pessomistic and transformed modernity into an unreachable idol; a perpetual project; something to be achieved in the unforeseeable future (Oritz, 2000:254). The unreachable nature of modernity is, in part, explained by the fact that the transition was triggered by external impetus and motivated by a desire to be ‘the modern other’ rather than an endogenous process of social change. Moreover, the modernity in late-modernising societies occurred in spite of deficient infrastructural development. In other words, whereas Western modernity corresponded to endogenous social, cultural-intellectual, economic and political transformations; the final product was imposed upon late-modernising societies (Issawi, 1956).

2.4.3 Peripheral Capitalism and the Political Economy of Late Modernities

It has been argued so far that transitions to modernity in late-modernising societies were, in fact, triggered by asymmetric encounters with the modern other and, thus, driven by exogenous factors which does not necessarily endogenous transformations in the cultural-intellectual, social, political or economic domains.

The most significant aspect of this evolutionary – as opposed to revolutionary – transition to modernity is the coevality of multiple modes of production and, thus, the dominant classes’ inability to do with the social relations of the past. That is to say, unlike European bourgeoisies whose ascendency undermined the feudal MoP, Arab bourgeoisies emerged from within or, at least, coexisted with the pre-capitalist aristocracy. Modern Arab elites, as Arab Marxists have consistently argued, are, in fact, the product of intra-elite readjustments to the encroachment of Western capitalism rather than the product of a revolutionary class struggle (‘Āmil, 1974:168).

In other words, the dominant class in the early-modern Arab world is not the product of a principled rupture from pre-capitalist MoPs, nor is it interested in weakening the pre-capitalist elite. Instead, the propertied classes maintained their prestige and continued to constitute the critical mass in the socio-political order of late-modernising societies in spite of modernisation
(Lapie, 1898:48-52). Consequently, the modern state emerged not as a manifestation of the rise of a capitalist/urban elite to the detriment of the pre-capitalist nobility, but as a guarantor of the entente between the two classes and the coevality of multiple MoPs.

The contrast is evident if the radical transformation to modernity in the French Revolution is compared with the evolutionary dependent-capitalist transformations of late-modernising Arab societies. Unlike the revolutionary bourgeoisie of eighteenth-century France, Arab elites in the eighteenth and nineteenth centuries had no interest in producing principled revolutions as they continued to derive social prestige, political power and economic benefit from pre-capitalist social relations. In evidencing this, Mahdi ‘Āmil (1974:173) argues that:

[Dependent-capitalist bourgeoisies] are constituted by the transformation of aristocratic and feudal elements to bourgeois elements. [...] This social class is, therefore, not a product of a confrontational contradiction with the hegemonic class of a preceding epoch. That is to say, it is not borne out of a conflict between two contradictory hegemonic classes but an internal readjustment within the [pre-capitalist] elite itself. [...] Consequently, pre-modern ideologies had to undergo a similar process of adjustment: they had to be revived but this revival (Nahda) did not necessarily mean a principled rupture from their pre-modern roots.

In fact, pre-modern social relations continue to justify and legitimise authority not in spite of, but precisely because of late-modernising societies’ asymmetric integration into the world (capitalist) economy. Indeed, the predominance of the capitalist MoP in societies of the global periphery is not a product of an endogenous transformation in political economy as much as it is a product of the expansion of European capitalism and its infiltration of their socioeconomic fabric. Nonetheless, lacking any significant endogenous dynamic, the capitalist MoP can only dominate, but not eliminate pre-capitalist MoPs (‘Āmil, 1974:92; 1978:87). Multiple MoPs, thus, become mutually-reinforcing precursors of ‘incomplete modernities’ and, as a result, the dominant class in late-modernising societies incorporates feudalists, pre-capitalist merchants, artisans and other segments of the pre-modern elite alongside the hegemonic segment of the dominant class: bankers, financiers, industrialists and capitalist merchants (Ougaard, 1983).

2.5 THE NAHDÅ: ARABS’ INCOMPLETE MODERNITY

It is within this context that the Arab transition to modernity took place and it is precisely for this reason that Mahdi ‘Āmil (1974:166) discounts the Nahda as “a revival; not the birth of something new; the resurrection of something old after a recession; a renaissance, rebirth of an ageing class in the name of modernity and under the pretext of the intellectual enlightenment”.

This non-confrontational, generational transformation of the dominant class is evidenced by the fact that the direct descendants of feudalists received modern education, took up ‘new’
lifestyles in the city, engaged in post-feudal economic activities and, thus, became integrated into the global middle class. In economy as in the cultural-intellectual domain, the ‘bridgehead elite’ becomes more intertwined with global capitalism without necessarily basing their socio-political authority on the social relations of the capitalist MoP.

2.5.1 Asymmetric Integration in the Global Economy

The peripherality of Middle Eastern bourgeoisies, however, must not conceal that, until the early-nineteenth century, a dynamic and inbred progression towards capitalism was indeed taking place in a number of late-modernising societies. The emergence of internally-oriented national capitalisms is evidenced by analyses of early-modern Egypt.

It has been suggested that commercial-capitalism underpinned the social order and culture of the urban middle classes in Arabo-Ottoman cities since the sixteenth century – much as it had done in Venice and Mediterranean Europe. The agricultural sector in eighteenth-century Egypt, for instance, demonstrates that the conditions for the development of national capitalism existed since the mid-eighteenth century (‘Āmil, 1990a:262). Lawson’s study of the political economy of early-nineteenth century Egypt evidences this highlighting the expansion of the cash crop market (Lawson, 1999). Furthermore, Girgis (n.d.:74) argues that the disintegration of pre-modern social order had indeed started in Egypt due to the rise of national capitalism.

Nevertheless, industrialisation in northern Europe and the link to transatlantic trade led to the decline of commercial-capitalism in the mid-eighteenth century. This disrupted the relationship between city and country in the late-modernising Arab world as well as between Western Europe and commercial-capitalist economies of the Mediterranean. In evidencing this Nelly Hanna (2003:27) notes that:

> When conditions of commercial capitalism were favourable to the production of urban wealth, then they allowed wealth to filter down to other than merchants, notably tradesmen and producers, the culture of the urban middle class was given an impetus to emerge, develop and gain a level of legitimacy and prominence within the social body. Toward [...] the mid-eighteenth century, when conditions became less favourable, the adverse effects of the economy also had a negative impact on the dynamism of this culture.

This led the way to the infiltration of the Egyptian economy by European capitalism in the mid-nineteenth century, thus, disrupting the endogenous dynamics of the capitalist-modernist transformation. This was exacerbated by direct British intervention in Egypt in 1881. The failure of internally-oriented capitalism, infiltration by European industrial-capitalism and the strengthened linkages between the dominant classes and the European market disrupted inter-class relations and determined who survived the transition to modernity.
This disarticulated political economy can be compared to more contemporary theorisations of peripheral capitalism – a form of capitalism distinguishable from the capitalism of the centre by two fundamental features: the persistence of pre-capitalist MoPs; and, dependence on centre capitalism. Furthermore, in peripheral economies, inter-sectoral linkages are disrupted and the balance between the production of consumer-goods and the production of producer-goods is distorted to the detriment of economic development. Consequently, peripheral capitalisms are characterised by strong linkages between demand in centre-economies (hence, export) and the productive sectors of peripheral economies. Peripheral capitalisms, therefore, witness extravert accumulation of wealth and capital in contrast to introvert accumulation in centre capitalism.

Ougaard (1982) further argues that in auto-centred capitalist economies, production occurs on all three levels: the production of consumer goods; the production of the means of production for the consumer-goods industry (such as machinery, instruments of labour and raw materials); and the production of the means of production for the capital-goods or producer-goods industry. The latter levels of production are of particular importance to auto-centred capitalism as they qualitatively reduce dependency and peripherality and reinforce inter-sectoral linkages rather than external linkages. Peripheral economies, on the other hand, are more inclined to produce consumer goods and trade in raw materials needed in auto-centred economies.

The ‘peripheralisation’ of Arab capitalisms can be traced back to the late-medieval era when the then-emerging Ottoman Empire replaced the militaristic, interventionist Mamluk state by highly-decentralised bureaucratic structures. In doing so, the Ottoman Empire abandoned state monopolies and liberalised trade in the post-Tanzimat period. Although intended to appease the merchant class and allow trade profits to trickle down to a wider segment of society, this paved the way for the asymmetric incorporation of Arab economies into the Eurocentric global economy (Hanna, 2002).

Coupled with a noticeable delay in industrialisation, the liberalisation of Arabo-Ottoman economies resulted in economic peripherality as evidenced by trade patterns: by the eighteenth century, for instance, Egypt’s traditional specialisation in the export of luxury goods was substituted by the export of textiles, sugar and other primary products necessary for European industrial-capitalism (Hanna, 1998; 2002). Similarly, by the mid-nineteenth century, Mount Lebanon had replaced its trade partnerships with Egypt and Istanbul with more lucrative partnerships with European capitalists – hence, the overdevelopment of the foreign and tertiary sectors (Gates, 1998; Hallaq, 2009). This discouraged Arab capitalists from investing in the industrial and artisanal sectors and shepherded them towards the sector most associated with European industrial-capitalism – commercial-mercantilist (Raymond, 1973; 2002).
The socio-political transformations of the late-eighteenth to mid-twentieth century were, thus, propelled by European social, cultural, economic, political and military penetration as Mahdi ‘Āmil notes (1974:191):

the imperialist development of capitalism became the driving force behind our contemporary history into which we did not evolve in the Arab World. Instead, it is from our subordination to imperialist hegemony that our modern history and the modern history of our social order start.

It is important to note that disparities in economy, industry and military extended to include the entire globe by the mid-nineteenth century as Charbel Nahas (1998) explains:

The world, including [the Arab World], watched the Industrial Revolution and imperialist expansion while Europe was ‘dumping’ global markets with its products; and its ships roamed the seas reducing the impact of distance and discovering new trade routes. Meanwhile, European military capabilities swept all others; European patterns of consumption were being generalised unto non-European elites; its merchants and their agents controlled world trade; and world silver and gold reserves poured into European capital markets generating severe economic crises around the globe.

2.5.2 The ‘Great’ Transformation

It was against the backdrop of a general weakness of the Ottoman centre and decentralism that European expansion in the Arab world occurred. This was exacerbated by a set of agreements between the Sublime Porte and European powers known as the İmtiyazar-ı Ecnebiyênin or Capitulations whereby the Ottoman Empire granted European states rights and privileges and conferred upon their consuls the right to intercede on behalf of European nationals. Effectively, this rendered European merchants and capitalists ‘above the law’ and exempt from obligations to the governments – hence, more capable of conducting business according to the logics of freewheeling capitalism11.

Effectively, this led to the gradual disintegration of the Empire in the late-seventeenth century. Economic decentralism facilitated the emergence of multiple national economies in separate Ottoman provinces and tied these economies to the European centre in asymmetric relations of peripheral-capitalism. Politically, this was translated into the emergence of a number of semi-autonomous hereditary emirates and sheikhdoms. Moreover, this resulted in the consolidation of a perplexed social order in which the capitalist MoP coexisted with aristocratic-feudalism, military-feudalism, commercial-capitalism and pre-capitalist industries (Turkmani, 2004).

11 The first İmtiyazar-ı Ecnebiyênin (الامتيازات الأجنبية) was signed between Louis X of France and the Mamluk Sultanate in Egypt in 1500 and was honoured by the Ottoman conquerors in 1517. The İmtiyazat were officially abolished in 1914 leaving behind cultural-legal practices which persist to date.
Despite their rapid decline however, Ottoman authorities played an important role in laying the infrastructural foundations for the Nahda. Urban developments commissioned in the eighteenth century included government serails, an expanded system of public hospitals, military barracks, police forces, imperial schools and public gardens (Hallaq, 2009). More importantly, the Sublime Porte embarked on an ambitious project to bureaucratise the state in the nineteenth century. The bureaucratic centralisation of government by colonial/mandatory authorities in the late-nineteenth century further embedded the values of statehood, sovereignty, nationalism and central government in the intellectual-political discourse of the Nahda.

Nevertheless, society was only-marginally influenced by these transformations: the gradual decline of the Ottoman centre, the expansion and centralisation of local government and the infrastructural developments that ensued were not a product of organic social change but an imposed top-down civilisational project; an attempt to dictate social change. The detachment of the Ottoman centre from societies in the non-Turkish domains of the Empire and the militaristic nature of relations between colonial/mandatory authorities and Arab societies in the late-eighteenth to mid-twentieth century meant that political transformations had little or no effect on society (Hanna, 2002).

The inorganic relationship between the Ottoman state and its subjects led to the centre’s increased dependence on middlemen who developed into aristocratic and military fief-holders. The weakening of the Ottoman state and its inability to exercise authority shifted prerogatives of government towards provincial authorities and, ultimately, local chieftains. Eventually, this resulted in the establishment of semi-autonomous statelets – often, under European protection. Like their Ottoman predecessors, mandatory authorities established precarious alliances with fief-holders in an attempt to overcome popular resistance (Owen and Pamuk, 1998).

This gradual shift in power structures from the Ottoman conquest in the sixteenth century to the emergence of modern nation-states in the nineteenth century proved central in the quest for modernity for a number of reasons. Firstly, it legitimated vernacular culture-nations and, thus, constituted the nucleus of territorially-defined nation-states. Secondly, it allowed the various peripheries of the Ottoman centre to develop into their own centres. Moreover, the shift coincided with a period of economic prosperity for the middle class in several Arab provinces in the seventeenth and eighteenth century allowing them to express their thoughts, promulgate their culture and, thus, claim a place in emerging national centres (Hanna, 2003:104-105). The emergence of these new centres is evident in the expansion of semi-autonomous governments represented by the de facto Mamluk shaykh el-balad; the Al-Azm family in Syria; the Ma’ani and Chehabi emirs in Mount Lebanon and beylical patrimonies in the Maghreb.
The ‘great transformation’ of the late-eighteenth and early-nineteenth century, thus, marked a significant rupture with medieval legitimations of authority: the sovereign and the state would no longer be legitimated by adherence and servitude to Islam as Caliphal authority was, but by adherence to a social contract and a promise for a better future. It is in this light that we can understand the bureaucratisation of the Ottoman Empire and the usurpation of authority by beys and pashas with no claim to Islamically-sanctioned sovereignty or legitimacy.

Whether independent or autonomous, emerging polities throughout the Empire marked a fundamental transformation in the political history of the Arab provinces of the Ottoman Empire: local middle classes were now armed with state-like agencies and prerogatives which allowed them to produce and influence social change in their own communities. In other words, provincial elites no longer constituted an Ottoman periphery but, rather, a centre of their own. As a result, administrative centralism within the context of a monolithic nation-state became an interest of the elite rather than a threat to their dominance.

2.5.2.1 Modern Egypt: from Ottoman Province to a Nation-State

The study of the Egyptian modernity, of course, is beyond the scope of this thesis. However, due to historical precedence and the abundance of archival and secondary data, a brief examination of socio-political order in early-modern Egypt will contribute to the understanding of the perplexities of incomplete modernities.

It was in Egypt that the rupture from late-medieval socio-political order occurred setting the trend for other late-modernising Arab societies. This was a result of Egypt’s significant agricultural productivity; the existence of a commercial sector bypassing the bureaucratic purview of Istanbul (Mikhail, 2010); the country’s position as the fulcrum of world trade in the late-medieval era; and, crucially, the emergence of an crony-capitalist elite integrated in the increasingly-globalised world economy (Hanna, 1998). Although the shift from ‘Ottoman decentralism’ to ‘Egyptian centralism’ was initiated in the late-sixteenth century, it wasn’t until the French Expedition that the Egyptian urban middle class revolted against the Sublime Porte and instated a governor and hereditary ruling family of their own.

Mehmet Ali’s rise to power in turn-of-the-nineteenth-century Egypt marked the fruition of the alliance between the educated middle class, guild leaders, the clergy, merchants and Mamluk and Ottoman regiments. The strength and prosperity of the Egyptian elite and the weakness of the Ottoman centre left Sultan Selim III in no position to oppose Mehmet Ali’s ascension in 1805. This marked a philosophical and institutional rupture from the Ottoman system: a central state was conceived to govern a vernacular cultural-nation and perform the monolithic task of homogenising society and producing social change.
Crucially, the state in Cairo was founded upon a social contract: Egyptians supported Mehmet Ali’s usurpation of power and the latter promised to promote the economic interests and the prosperity of the middle class. According to this arrangement, Mehmet Ali gained the support needed to pursue ambitious reforms and economic developments which the Ottomans had promised but failed to deliver due to stiff opposition from local elites and the *ulema*. The most radical transformation of the early-nineteenth century was, in fact, the replacement of the omnipresent and pervasive educational, judicial and administrative networks of the *ulema*, religious brotherhoods and benevolent charities with the modern state (Sayyid-Marsot, 1984).

The substitution of non-state actors with state institutions is evident in the symbolic separation of the popular charitable fountains (*sabil*) that dotted Egyptian cities from the primary schools (*kotab*) traditionally built above them and the establishment of a ‘national’ system of collegiate education (Reid, 1990:5). Moreover, economic liberalism and administrative decentralism were replaced with ambitious land reforms and a tax system which, effectively, amounted to a state monopoly over trade and allowed state institutions to revitalise agriculture; lay the foundations for a modern industrial economy; bureaucratise administration; and sustain a modern standing army.

In short, since the rise of Mehmet Ali’s state in Egypt, the modern political establishment became the embodiment of the significant rupture from pre-modern socio-political order. On the one hand, the state no longer legitimised its authority through ‘traditional’ claims or a reverence for the past. Secondly, the political superstructure became a reflection of the delicate balance between the economic and social interests of different segments of society. Thirdly, the state developed into a strong contender for social influence and entered into confrontation with the non-state actors which dominated pre-modern socio-political order: it monopolised coercion; appropriated education and propaganda; infiltrated society and disseminated *national culture* and the ‘modernity project’ into the periphery.

### 2.5.3 Hybridity and the Perplexities of Arab Modernity

In other words, despite the peripherality of Arab capitalism and the exogenous impetus for modernisation, Mehmet Ali’s state in early-modern Egypt assumed monolithic roles similar to the early-modern European nation-state. Why, then, do critical theories of modernisation stress ‘differences’ between modernities and the ‘particularities’ of each? How do late-modernising Arab societies differ from their early-modernising European counterparts? Why is the *Nahda* a rebirth of the old elite and not the birth of a new social order? And, why is the Arab state ‘over stated’ – that is to say, why did its reforms and authority not trickle down into society?
To answer such questions, an understanding of the social actors/movements carrying forth the ‘modernity project’ as well as the cultural-intellectual, socio-political and political-economy contexts within which the transition to modernity occurred is necessary. This is particularly important given that the substitution of decentralism and the trifurcation of government with the centralism and interventionism of monolithic ‘developmentalist’ states indicates significant shifts in the paradigms of class struggle, social change and ‘the elite’ (Ougaard, 1983).

In this context, it is important to reiterate the fact that the state in late-modernising societies and the dominant class it represented were not the product of a revolutionary break with the past nor did they produce an epistemological and ontological break with the pre-modern past. In fact, failing to develop a unique modality of social relations based on the dominance of the capitalist MoP, the ‘centre of the periphery’ associated itself with the ‘centre of the centre’ by adopting its socio-cultural propositions and imitating its modus vivendi. In dealing with the ‘periphery of the periphery’, however, non-revolutionary elites capitalised on and emphasised the pre-modern social relations of power and dominance rooted in the pre-capitalist MoPs.

In evidencing this, we notice that the dominant class in late-modernising societies (centre of the periphery) adopts the ideologies, worldviews and lifestyle of the bourgeoisie at the centre (centre of the centre) without seriously challenging the epistemological and ontological foundations of the socio-cultural propositions and social relations of ‘pre-modernity’ (‘Āmil, 1974:169). In part, this can be attributed to the fact that ‘modernity’ was driven by an external impetus to ‘resist’ acculturation, cultural-intellectual dominance, economic colonisation and political subjugation by the industrial-capitalist West. The transition to modernity, therefore, can be understood as a reaction: an attempt to ‘modernise the interior’ in order to ‘confront the exterior’ (Nahas, 1998).

Coupled with an unprecedented acculturation of World Society, responding to the weaknesses, backwardness and threat of destruction posed by the encroaching modernity project depended on ‘voluntary acculturation’. In other words, the social actors/movements bearing the historic modernity project in late-modernising societies – the ‘underdogs’ to use Tibi’s expression – must voluntarily succumb to acculturation and, thus, retain the ability to select and reinterpret ‘foreign’ and ‘autochthonous’ cultural elements of Western modernity.

The cultural history of the subaltern moderns, therefore, can be periodised into three phases: (1) the ‘cultural revitalisation’ phase which ‘revives’ culturally-constituted values in response to acculturation and colonialism; (2) ‘self-resignation’ or ‘self-projection’ into global-modern culture as a result of the emergence of Europeanised bridgehead elites and, thus, the normative Westernisation of late-modern societies; and, (3) the ‘cultural retrospection’ phase emphasising
underdogs’ recognition that Westernisation is incapable of providing meaning or identity and, thus, embark on a ‘search for identity’ by invoking, reinterpreting and repoliticising culturally-constituted ontologies and epistemologies (Tibi, 1988:15-17).

Late modernities, therefore, can be conceptualised as ‘hybrid modernities’: they are neither perceived as ‘pure’, ‘whole’ and ‘authentic’ by proponents of puritan revivalism; nor do they adhere to the ‘universal’ standards of Western modernity. Instead, they are a hybrid: they are embedded in and affected by a world society characterised by acculturation and the dominance of Western modernity; and, yet, they are (or aspire to be) culturally-constituted and in harmony with the ‘pristine qualities’ of their ‘own’ epistemologies, ontologies and *modus vivendi* (Tibi, 1988; Al-Azmeh, 1993; Pieterse, 1995:54-55; Kassim, 2005:27).

The cultural-intellectual hybridity of the modernity project articulated by ‘bridgehead elites’ in late-modernising societies, it must be noted, is in tune with with the political economy of their own societies – the ‘underdogs’ of the global periphery. Indeed, as Sharabi (1988) notes, the emergence of ‘hybrid modernities’ that are ‘neither modern nor traditional’ is articulated by the ‘hybrid dominant class’ – the petty bourgeoisie – which can only attain class dominance within the context of a ‘hybrid political economy’ – outward-oriented dependent capitalism.

Stated simply, the inequalities of global capitalism and the centre-periphery paradigm in the global political economy underpin and reinforce a similar centre-periphery paradigm with respects to the cultural-intellectual project of modernity. A brief examination of the seminal works of the *Nahda* demonstrates the perplexities of the socio-political paradigms of the modernising Arab intelligentsia. This is evident in their unrelenting criticism of the materialism, individualism, corruption, violence and decadence attributed to ‘the West’, while, simultaneously abhorring the backwardness and weakness of their own societies: they are ‘hybrid modernities’ *suspended* between an acculturated World Society and self-essentialising cultural revitalisation and retrospection (Tibi, 1988; ‘Āmil, 1974; Turkmani, 2004).

These paradigms constituted the dominant cultural-intellectual saga in the works of nineteenth and twentieth century Arab political thinkers such as Rifā`a al-Tahtawi (d.1873); Jamāl-al-dīn Al-Afghānī (d.1897); Faris Al-Chidiac (d.1887); Khair-al-dīn al-Tunsi (d.1890); Muhammad ‘Abdūl (d.1905); Abdullah Al-Nadīm (d.1896); Abd-al-Rahman al-Kawakibi (d.1902); Farah Antoine (d.1922); Rashid Rida (d.1935); Ahmad Rida (d.1953); and Lotfi El-Sayed (d.1963).

More importantly, the advent of statehood and the centralising, integrative impacts of modern technologies and institutional designs allowed modernising elites in late-modernising societies to disseminate the paradigms of this perplexed ‘hybrid modernity’. This is most evident in the
educational reforms in nineteenth-century Egypt, for instance where the expansion of Khedival
colleges and European missionary schools resulted in the emergence of a class of effendiya.
The ‘modern’ (i.e European) education the effendiya received in imperial colleges was, often,
complemented by generous scholarships from the government to study abroad. Upon their
return, they themselves became the agents of social change occupying central positions in state
bureaus and the formal education system (Sayyid-Marsot, 1984:103; 168; Reid, 1990:5). This
‘bridgehead elite’, hence, acquired the means to influence social change and disseminate their
perplexed, yet ambitious, modernities (Abdel-Baqi, 2005). By the late-nineteenth century,
similar educational policies were in place in most Arab countries, Iran, Turkey and India.

In other words, ‘modernising reforms’ in the various sectors of government, the economy and
society in the late-modernising societies of the global periphery aimed at empowering an eite
with the cultural-intellectual as well as technical knowledge required to engineer society into
an ambiguous ‘modernity’ – a ‘hybrid’ socio-cultural project which was neither endogenously
culturally-constituted nor fully-acculturated.

These ‘reforms’, however, widened the gap between the effendiya and their societies. This, in
fact, had an adverse effect on the effendiya at the centre of the global periphery reducing their
ability to produce and disseminate social change. Moreover, Westernised elites suffered an
inexorable identity crisis: they were neither at home in Europe whose intellectual, scientific
and normative they had internalised, nor were they at home in the societies from which they
have been uprooted. In other words, ‘bridgehead elites’ shared more with the middle classes of
their colonisers (‘centre of the centre’) than they shared with their own societies (‘periphery of
the periphery’). It was becoming clear to the modernists of the Nahda that they cannot borrow
the technological and scientific knowledge of ‘the West’ without succumbing to the cultural-
intellectual constellations of Western modernity. In response to the colonial expansion of the
‘modernity project’, therefore, the ‘bridgehead elites’ adopted varying attitudes which, to use
Tibi’s categorisation, included ‘revivalism’ and ‘revitalisation’; civilisational ‘self-resignation’
and ‘cultural retrospection’ (Tibi, 1988; Al-Azmeh, 1993; Abdel-Baqi, 2005).

By the early-twentieth century, an entire generation of effendiya constituted the critical mass of
the modern centre and assumed leadership of the Nahda in the realms of culture, art, literature,
politics and the economy. Inclusion in this global, modern middle class required knowledge of
European languages, adoption of Western lifestyles, and immersion in ‘their’ refined musical,
literary and intellectual milieus. Crucially, integration in the Eurocentric ‘modernity project’
concerned ‘bridgehead elites’ than did the ever-growing gap between themselves and their own
‘traditional’ societies. For sure, the Westernised lifestyle of the elite allured and, even, tempted the ambitious laymen, but it failed to develop a convincing, coherent socio-cultural project.

Socioeconomically, the elite constituting the modern ‘centre’ included a precarious melange of pre-capitalist elites with preferential access to European education and markets alongside the emerging middle class of effendiya educated in Khedival and missionary schools. As such, the dominant class in the early-twentieth century was not the product of a revolution against the ways of the past, nor could it fully adopt and disseminate the ideologies and structures of the capitalist MoP and Western modernity. Moreover, the modernising elite quickly realised that its ability to engineer society into a state of modernity were futile. It became clear that, in fact, it was the ‘popular culture’ promulgated by ‘traditional’ social actors embedded within society which shaped social perceptions, dictated mainstream mannerisms and articulated vernacular culture in spite of étatist centralisation and ‘modernising’ reforms (Hanna, 2003:105).

This was exacerbated by the fact that dependent-capitalism widened the gap between the elite and the popular classes in late-modernising societies rather than reinforcing interdependence between social classes. Recognising this, modern effendiya abandoned the monolithic task of homogenising society and capitalised on social and material capital to reinforce their status in society, consolidate the social relations of pre-modernity and compete with the more organic and bureaucratised institutions of pre-modern civil society. Professional effendiya from feudal backgrounds, for instance, capitalised on their education to reinforce patron-client dyads while parvenu-effendiya capitalised on newfound bureaucratic powers to establish neo-patrimonial and neo-patriarchal enclaves of authority and prominence.

In short, modern and pre-modern social relations became intertwined and mutually-reinforcing – an outcome of the evolutionary emergence of the modern elite; its dependence on the global ‘centre’ rather than its own ‘periphery’ and, crucially, the hybridity of its own composition in terms of socioeconomic as well as cultural-intellectual foundations. It is in this vein that new and, arguably, ‘modern’ forms of patron-client dyads thrived in several ‘developing countries’ in the Middle East, Latin America and some European-Mediterranean countries.

In criticism of the Nahda, Mahdi ‘Āmil (1974:175) argues that nineteenth-century modernising elites had, in fact, laid the foundations for a perplexed modernity premised on a discourse of self-Orientalisation. For the ‘self-resigning’ effendiya, the Arab mind is inherently incapable of producing modernity and must, thus, adopt the ways of the modern other. The perplexities of incomplete modernities are most evident in the repeated attempts to import the institutional and cultural products of European modernity and presenting them to late-modernising societies as the only gateway to civilisation and modernity. This often entails a complete disregard, even
ridicule, of the social dynamics and modernising potential of a natural unfolding of traditions in non-Western societies (Eisenstadt and Schluchter, 1998). This fetishisation of the cultural-intellectual and institutional constellations of European modernity was only exacerbated by the asymmetric incorporation of the ‘centre of the periphery’ in the global economy.

2.6 MODERNITY, POSTMODERNITY AND HYBRID MODERNITIES

It has been argued in this chapter that ‘modernity’ presupposes the convergence of societies in a mono-directional transformation informed by a monocivilisational experience. It is in light of this that the metatheories of modernism conceptualised the universality of ‘modernity’ and its homogenising impacts on human civilisation. The ‘resistance’ of non-Western societies to these universalistic claims; the increasing recognition of the difference between ‘modernisation’ and ‘Westernisation’ in the collective psyche of non-Western societies; and the acknowledgment of the ‘hybridity’ of socio-cultural projects of modernity in late-modernising societies, however, constitute a starting point for postmodernist and poststructuralist discourse as well as critical theories of modernism (Tibi, 1988; Al-Azmeh, 1993; Nanda, 2001; Kassim, 2005).

Essentially, the realisation that there is no concrete, objective and universal truth unchangeable by man resulted in a significant shift in the epistemology of knowledge. Consequently, theories of cultural relativism and social constructivism challenge the positivist conceptualisations of modernity and deconstruct its ontological underpinnings – particularly, since the emergence of the theories of postmodernism and deconstructivism. As a result, non-Enlightenment ‘social constructs’ became viewed as rational socio-cultural ‘projects’ providing meaning to life and knowledge according to ‘modern’ modes of production. Postmodernists and poststructuralists, such projects are not ‘unmodern’; they are coherent contenders to the absolute realities, binary opposites and universalistic claims of Western modernity (Euben, 1997; Wittrock, 1998; 2000; Kassim, 2005).

It must be noted, however, that this thesis is not an attempt at ethnocentrism; nor does it argue that hybrid or syncretist non-Western modernities are postmodern or poststructuralist (Lowe, 1991). This is because non-Western socio-cultural projects neither embrace hybridity nor do they acknowledge heterogeneity, transcend the propositions of ‘modernity’ and conceptualise alternative modes of cultural-intellectual production. In fact, it has been contended throughout this chapter that late-modernising societies conquered the fissure in modern World Society not in spite of European modernity, but by selectively *internalising* and *integrating* its propositions and constellations into their own socio-cultural projects (Tibi, 1988:25-31). Nonetheless, it has also been shown that this ‘hybridity’ was acknowledged not as a positive trait, but, rather, as an anomaly as evidenced by the *Nahda*: for more Europeanised segments of the elite, it signified
an *incomplete* break with the past; but for those more averse to Westernisation, hybridity signified a loss of purity, wholeness and authenticity (Tibi, 1988; Al-Azmeh, 1993; Pieterse, 1995; Oritz, 2000; Vahdat, 2003).

Paradoxically, it can be argued that ‘modernity’ has indeed spread to most parts of the world *but* has not produced the single, coherent World Society its proponents had foreseen. In other words, modernity has failed to live up to its homogenising mission and, thus, to its claim to universality. Accordingly, globalism and the acculturation of World Society have resulted not in the convergence of modern societies nor have they paved the way for the emergence of an auto-centred postmodernism. Instead, they led to the expansion of multiple *hybrid* modernities.

In a nutshell, ‘modernity’ must be understood as a dynamic process of continual constitution and reconstitution of a multiplicity of hybrid socio-cultural projects. Moreover, it is crucial to understand that these ongoing reconstructions of multiple institutional and ideological patterns are carried forward by social actors/movements embedded within the cultural-intellectual and socio-political fabrics of their own societies as well as World Society and, thus, pursue varying programmes and hold different views on the questions and antinomies of ‘modernity’. As such, it is “through the engagement of these actors with broader sectors of their respective societies, unique expressions of modernity are realised” (Eisenstadt, 2000). This, to be sure, challenges the monocivilisational assumptions of modernisation theorists and stresses the inclusionary dynamic of modernity as a dynamic historical process which entails borrowing, blending and civilisational cross-fertilisation rather than logics of exclusionary divergence, binary opposites and ‘clash of civilisations’ (Göle, 2000).

### 2.6.1 Is the Middle East ‘Modern’, ‘Postmodern’ or ‘Hybrid-Modern’?

In light of this discussion, the question of whether Middle Eastern societies are ‘modern’, ‘postmodern’ or ‘hybrid-modern’ poses itself. It has been argued in this chapter that the *Nahda* is an ‘incomplete modernity’ *par excellence*. That is to say, it was a dedicated effort to replace one socio-political order with another; yet, it was not the result of an endogenous, culturally-constituted and revolutionary/principled break with the social relations and political economy of the past. As a result, the *Nahda* neither constructed a ‘modernity project’ of its own, nor did it fully deconstruct ‘tradition’.

It is our position, therefore, that the metatheories of modernism and postmodernism fail to capture the essence of ‘modernity’ in late-modernising societies – that is to say, non-Western societies of the global periphery. On the one hand, the socio-cultural projects these modernities propose challenges Western modernity’s claim to universality and undercut its homogenising mission. On the other hand, the perplexities of the learned mind in early-modern Arabo-Islamic
world did not produce ‘authentic’ institutions and cultural-intellectual paradigms which can be considered ‘postmodern’. Instead, Middle Eastern modernity can be considered a ‘hybrid’ or ‘reflexive’ modernity which blends multiple ontologies and epistemologies in its construction of the *modus vivendi* and the socio-political superstructure (Al-Azmeh, 1996; Göle, 2000).

The institutional designs and socio-political constellations of modernities in late-modernising societies provide ample evidence of the hybridist nature of modernity. Socio-political order in modern Arab societies is a demonstrative example of the extent to which the historical process of modernisation entails borrowing, blending and civilisational cross-fertilisation.

Firstly, the bifurcation of state (represented by sovereign Caliphs and authoritative Sultans) and society (governed, primarily, by non-state actors and rational-cultural relations) ceased to dominate state-society relations in the modern Arabo-Islamic world. Naturally, the extent to which the state expanded its authority into society varies from one experience to another and depended on (i) the strength of non-state social actors; and (ii) the commitment of the elite and the international community to the strengthening of the state in question. However, it is safe to argue that the modern state in the Middle East no longer exists within a vacuum. Indeed, even when sovereignty is challenged and the state is incapable of exercising authority in certain domains, the principle of state sovereignty itself is not renounced (Walker, 1990).

This is evident in the modernising theses of Arab political thinkers: Islamists and secularists alike, for example, agree that it is only through the state that religion may be upheld, justice attained, the law enforced and disputes settled. Tax-collection, infrastructural developments and social welfare could no longer be the sole responsibility of non-state actors. This marks a significant rupture from pre-modern order in which public works were largely funded through *awqāf*; justice administered by the clergy; and education provided by traditional institutions.

Secondly, the modern state has been liberated from preconditions of traditional legitimation. In fact, since the eighteenth century, notions of social contract, constitution and balance-of-power gradually replaced the traditional legitimations: Caliphs were no longer of Hashemite descent; and were increasingly judged on their administrative and developmental credentials – not on their adherence and service to Islam. This paved the way for the emergence of modern states representing territorially-defined vernacular communities – not a global *ummah* of the faithful.

Finally, the *implantation* of the institutional designs of Western modernity allowed societies of the global periphery to achieve significant levels of institutional modernity. This is evidenced by the substitution of decentralised *janissaries* and *mamluks* with standing armies; *madrassahs* and *kotabs* with a modern collegiate educational system; and *qazīs* with a judiciary. On the
political sphere, constitutionalism, parliamentarianism and the emergence of (Islamist, liberal, Marxist and nationalist) political parties, labour unions and professional syndicates reflected the modernisation of civil society and state-society relations.

2.6.2 Incomplete Modernities and the Unintelligibility of Modern Institutions

It must be noted, however, that the implantation of these modern institutions often means that they are modern insofar as their bylaws are concerned but may indeed coexist with pre-modern social and organisational patterns. The imposition of bureaucratic government, for instance, ‘from above’ (or, at least, ‘from without’) society resulted in a gap between socioeconomic and institutional modernism. ‘Modern’ institutions of the state, thus, became unintelligible to the layman – even, intimidating. Paradoxically, therefore, the expansion of the state in developing societies has often been contingent on middlemen bridging the gap between the layman and the unintelligible constellations of modernity (Scott, 1972; Gellner and Waterbury, 1977). Political parties in less developed political systems, for instance, are often instruments in the hands of prominent families and communal leaders: the modernising mission of ‘bringing the state’ to the locality, thus, overlaps with notables’ desire to gain social capital (Pappas, 2009).

It is in this vein that non-Western countries are often accused of rampant corruption, nepotism and inefficacy. It has been the aim of this chapter, however, to argue that it is more than an issue of bad versus good governance; weak versus strong states: an issue of perplexed modernity whereby modern institutions exist alongside social relations deemed pre-modern and irrational. In other words, incomplete modernities are hybrid modernities within which a number of seemingly-contradictory realities coexist: ‘modern’ and ‘traditional’ epistemologies; legal-contractual and rational-cultural relations; secular and non-secular ontologies.

Furthermore, non-Western societies are often condemned as ‘communal’ and the individual is seen as subjugated by and tied to primordial and subnational collectivities: they are not citizens of the nation nor are they individual members of interest groups (Pye, 1958:469). The assumed irrationality of these subnational collectivities, however, is empirically contested as recent studies of collective identity in the Middle East demonstrate. Indeed, it has become evident in recent decades that the strength, permeability and sustainability of group affiliations depends to a large extent on the needs which they satisfy and the status they confer upon individual members (Melikian and Diab, 1959). In other words, subnational collectivities are, arguably, more modern than we give them credit for. That is to say, although they reproduce seemingly-static status markers, they are rational social constructs insofar as they address the needs of their individual members and instrumental insofar as they act on behalf of their members vis-à-vis the state and the centre (Rex, 1996; Riggs, 1998).
2.6.3 Hybrid Modernities: Multiple Ontologies and Multiple Epistemologies

Beyond the evident institutional implications of late-modernising societies’ transitions to modernity, it must also be noted that the epistemology of modernity in non-Western societies differed to that of early-modernising Western societies. The cultural-intellectual Enlightenment principles which constitute the backbone of Western modernity were ‘alien’ or exogenous to late-modernising societies. Therefore, although bewildered by Western modernity, the elite in the non-Western societies of the global periphery did not share the same value systems nor did they necessarily concur with the Eurocentric Enlightenment underpinnings of the ‘modernity project’. Coupled with an urge to ‘resist’ colonial penetration, ‘subalten’ modernities embarked on conquering World Society through strategies of voluntary, selective acculturation. It is in this vein that such notions as ‘Islamic moderism’ can be explained as attempts to reinterpret, internalise and blend foreign cultural-intellectual elements with autochthonous ontological and epistemological elements by (re)politicising Islam. Modern acculturated Islam, therefore, can be conceptualised as a strategy of cultural retrospection and counter-acculturation (Tibi, 1988; Al-Azmeh, 1993; Eisenstadt, 2000; Göle, 2000).

The coexistence between multiple epistemologies as well as the coevality of secular and non-secular ontologies is not exclusive to Islam. In fact, social theorists highlight the role of the ‘Confucian work ethic’ in the making of modern China; the interconnection between Church and nation in the making of modern Greek and Armenian identities; the impact of Buddhism on morality in various Asian societies; and the centrality of Judaism in Israeli nation-building (Wittrock, 2000).

Whether this argumentation leads us to perceive ‘diversity’ and ‘heterogeneity’ as variations within the ‘modernity project’ as Schmidt (2006) suggests or a case of multiple modernities as theorists of ‘multiple modernities’ argue is beyond the scope of this study. However, it suffices to note that there exists today multiple socio-cultural projects the springboard of which is the concept of rationality of knowledge and authority and, thus, claim the universality of their own worldviews and ontologies (Kassim, 2005). Modernity must, therefore, be conceptualised as the dynamic and bidirectional process of constructing and reconstructing meaning by the social actors/movements which bear the antinomies of modernity. This conceptualisation, it has been argued, explains the impacts of cultural-intellectual as well as political-economic peripherality on the hybridity of ‘modernity’ in late-modernising societies: through direct imposition as well as through voluntary acculturation, ‘hybrid modernities’ are constituted by modernising elites suspended between the ‘centre of the centre’ and the ‘periphery of the periphery’. It is in this vein that we can understand such notions as Islamic economics and religious nationalism as well as such Jacobinist theories of modern governmentality as vilayat-e faqih.

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2.7 CONCLUSIONS: INSTITUTIONAL AND EPISTEMOLOGICAL ‘HYBRID MODERNITIES’

In conclusion, it has been the aim of this chapter to critically explore modernisation theory and expose its shortcoming in an attempt to conceptualise and rationalise political superstructures and epistemologies which do not conform to the nation-state model and the fundamental and universalist presuppositions of the Enlightenment.

In doing so, it has become clear that modernity is not as coherent as is often assumed and that its cultural-intellectual, political and social constellations are not as universal as is advocated. Instead, modernity must be seen as a process which (i) entails the construction, deconstruction and reconstruction of a multiplicity of cultural programs; (ii) reflects the subjectivities of the social actors articulating it and the (cultural-intellectual, political, economic) context within which ‘modernity’ is expressed; and, thus, (iii) entails the development of political systems and social orders which reflect social and historical dynamics. On the level of institutional-design, it is in this spirit that we can comprehend the emergence of non-unitary consociational states in Switzerland, Lebanon, the Netherlands and Belgium much as we can explain the coeality of secular and non-secular ontologies and worldviews.

Acknowledging heterogeneity, however, does not deny the fact that Western modernity has left its imposing imprint on World Society: it ‘triggered’ modernity in non-Western societies and developed into a benchmark; and, crucially, it shaped the process of acculturatation of World Society. The embededness of elites at the ‘centre of the periphery’ in the cultural-intellectual as well as economic sphere of influence of the global centre, therefore, led to a situation in which multiple epistemologies and multiple ontologies coexist within the ‘hybrid modernities’ of the global periphery.

The unintelligibility of some of the cultural-intellectual and institutional constellations of these ‘hybrid modernities’, it has been argued, resulted in the emergence of a class of middlemen and strongmen capitalising on their status and predominance in the pre-modern order in order to lessen the gap between the layman and ‘modernity’. As a result, the social relations of pre-modernity were not only perpetuated into modern era, but also came to constitute a pillar of the ‘modernity project’ in late-modernising societies.

In Chapter Three, this conceptualisation of ‘hybrid modernity’ will be explored further with particular emphasis on the political economy and history of Lebanon’s transition to modernity and the emergence of a modern state founded upon consociation between confessions.
CHAPTER THREE

TRANSITING TO MODERNITY: SOCIAL ORDER IN EARLY-MODERN LEBANON
The discussion in the previous chapter aimed at deconstructing the presupposed coherence of modernisation theory, problematising its universalist claims and, thus, arguing that modernity is a continual process of constructing, deconstructing and reconstructing dynamic and, crucially, multiple civilisational meanings and projects. Moreover, it has been argued that modernity is not a holistic and mono-directional transition informed by a monocivilisational (Western) historical experience but an organic process which entails civilisational cross-fertilisation and, thus, produces hybrid social and political orders – especially in late-modernising societies – leading to ‘hybrid modernities’.

Essentially, the central hypothesis of hybrid modernities theory is that transitions to modernity may indeed be informed or influenced by Western modernity due to historical precedence; however, modernity can only be understood as a product of the cultural and historical experiences of the social actors bringing about social change and ‘modernisation’ and, thus, reflects their epistemological, ontological as well as socioeconomic understandings of life and knowledge. This understanding of ‘modernity’ contradicts the self-professed universality of the European modernity project. ‘Hybrid modernities’ theory, therefore, explains the precarious coexistence between seemingly-contradictory epistemologies and ontologies as well as the coevality of ‘modern’ and ‘traditional’ relations and institutions. This is especially true in late-modernising societies where (i) ‘traditional’ constellations were not fully deconstructed; (ii) the emergence of authentic ‘modernity’ did not occur; and (iii) the implantation of ‘modern’ constellations allowed or depended on the persistence of ‘traditional’ relations and institutions as is demonstrated by the Nahda.

Consequently, socio-political order in late-modernising societies exhibits a number of paradoxes and reflects the perplexities of the social actors which brought about social change and modernity. For instance, it cannot be denied that late-modernising societies exist within the bounds of modern, territorially-defined, sovereign states; that an active centre has developed; and that state agencies act as the political arm of this centre allowing it to diffuse its cultural and ontological projects into society/periphery. On the other hand, national identities and moral systems articulated by modern centres are hybrids which incorporate elements of ‘traditional’, ‘modern’ and ‘Western-modern’ ontologies and epistemologies. Moreover, the expectations ascribed to the modern state in late-modernising societies often differ from those ascribed to the nation-state in early-modernising Western societies. This explains why the state in non-Western societies is not as omnipresent nor omnipotent as its Western counterpart. As a result, clientelistic relations and the politics of ‘middlemanship’ are more likely to persevere in the myriad of ‘weak’, ‘fierce’, ‘authoritarian’ and ‘deeply-fragmented’ states which exist in many non-Western societies.
In this vein, it becomes evident that one cannot simplify the differences between European and Arabo-Islamic modernities or claim that they are two coherent binary opposites. Indeed, although the Nahda constituted the common starting point of Arab modernities, the constellations and outcomes of this historical process are markedly different. It is therefore valid to talk of multiple Arab modernities – each, reflecting the political, cultural and historical experiences of a vernacular society; the impact of physical and geographic conditions on the transition to modernity; and the nature and intensity of the encounter with the modern ‘other’.

This chapter therefore focuses on the transition to modernity in Lebanon in light of the perennial tendencies and conceptualisations of ‘incomplete modernities’ and the historical experiences of the Nahda by locating the social formation experienced in Lebanon within the paradigm of hybrid modernities. In doing this, the first section examines the nature and historical context of the transition to modernity in Greater Syria. The particularities of the social and political dynamics of modernity in Lebanon are discussed in the second section. Furthermore, the third section outlines the social and institutional constellations of multi-centred, consociational modernity in Lebanon and the final section examines the implications of the Lebanese transition to modernity on political order in modern Lebanon.

### 3.1 Modernity in Greater Syria

It is the intention of this chapter to outline the nature and dynamics of ‘incomplete modernity’ and the implications of this transition on the social and political constellations of modernity in Lebanon. It is, therefore, important to make some brief remarks on the pre-modern order and the instigators of the transition to modernity in Greater Syria in order to understand the transformation experienced in the socio-political context and social formation in Lebanon.

It is important to note that, since the eighteenth century, Ottoman authority in Greater Syria gradually regressed allowing local elites to usurp power. Prominent families in Damascus, Aleppo and Tripoli capitalised on their feudal prerogatives to gain preferential access to the opportunities arising from the expansion of capitalism. This is especially true given that the port and market cities of Greater Syria were unevenly incorporated into the sphere of influence of more developed capitalist economies (Raymond, 2002). The incorporation of the so-called ‘Levantine’ elite in a regional economy in which Istanbul and Cairo were competing centres in the eighteenth century and in a global economy centred around European industrial-capitalism in the nineteenth century allowed notables to usurp power and establish autonomous neo-feudal regional governments corresponding to vernacular cultures and imagined communities. In the Syrian hinterland, for instance, notables combined their affluence with Ottoman recognition – hence, establishing themselves as hereditary governors.
The elite in Mount Lebanon resorted to a more complex socio-political arrangement whereby local chieftains usurped tax-farming rights (*iltizām*) over large mountainous districts (*muqāta‘a*). In return for the autonomous administration of their *iqtā‘* (fiefdom), *muqāta‘jis* paid fixed purses, supplied men to the imperial army and maintained order (Traboulsi, 2007:3). Crucially, *muqāta‘jis* were hereditary notables backed by religious establishments. Consequently, they rallied co-religionists into semi-autonomous fiefdoms and assured the relative sectarian homogeneity of their dominions in return for the support of their respective clergies.

This order was challenged by the disproportional increase in *muqāta‘jis’* economic power, social affluence and political aspirations *vis-à-vis* the ageing Ottoman Empire. This was exacerbated by the expansion of commercial-capitalism which connected various notables with the capitalist economies of Turkey, Egypt and Italian city-states. This led to the emergence of semi-autonomous emirates under Ma‘ani (1516-1635) and Chehabi (1697-1842) *emirs*. The *iqtā‘* system was also undermined by the expanding authority of the *pashas* in Sidon, Acre and Damascus. The Chehabis’ military victories against the *muqāta‘jis* of Jabal Amil12 in the south and Bechari, Batrun and Jbeil in the north however reinstated the autonomy of Mount Lebanon and restored its independence from the *pashas* of the city. Crucially, the Chehabis established themselves as hereditary middlemen interceding between the Sublime Porte and the *muqāta‘jis* (Traboulsi, 2007:9-10).

3.1.1 The Egyptian Invasion: Initiating Lebanese ‘Modernity’

The *muqāta‘ji* system continued to underpin socio-political order in late-medieval Mount Lebanon until the Egyptian invasion of 1831. Driven by the needs of a rapidly-industrialising Egypt, Mehmet Ali commissioned his son, Ibrahim Pasha, on a military campaign in Greater Syria. For Egypt’s *pasha*, the goals of the campaign were twofold: it secured Mehmet Ali’s position *vis-à-vis* the Sublime Porte and, crucially, provided Egypt’s nascent industrial sector with cheap raw materials and consumer markets (Lawson, 1999).

The Egyptian invasion coincided with and produced several socio-political transformations in Lebanon. Firstly, several prominent families were emerging as key actors within the Chehabi Emirate following the redistribution of *iltizām*. Secondly, chieftains emerged from within the Christian community which, hitherto, had lacked significant political representation. Thirdly, the administrative and tax reforms introduced by *emir* Bashir Chehab II (1788-1840) with the aim of centralising government deprived established Druze feudalists and, thus, empowered emerging Christian chieftains. Finally, the increasing weakness of Ottoman authority in Mount

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12 Jabal Amil (‘Āmil) is the traditional name of the mountainous regions extending between Mount Lebanon and the Galilee. Jabal Amil corresponds to modern-day South Lebanon.
Lebanon paved the way for the Maronite Church which emerged as a key political actor in the early-nineteenth century. This was exacerbated in the aftermath of the ‘ammiya (commoners’) rebellion in 1820 which the Church had supported (Harik, 1968:212; Sharara, 1975).

Driven by a similar aspiration to centralise authority and break away from the Sublime Porte, emir Bashir and Ibrahim Pasha joined forces to subdue Acre, Tyre, Saida, Beirut, Tripoli and Damascus and introduce ambitious reforms aimed at strengthening the administration, fighting corruption, setting up representative conciliar governments and abolishing the confessional-feudal (muqāṭa’ji) system. Moreover, Ibrahim Pasha encouraged commercial-capitalism and limited industrialisation (especially in sericulture), thus, boosting trade with Egypt (Makdisi, 2000:52; Traboulsi, 2007:12; Hallaq, 2009).

The Egyptian interregnum is also credited for its modernising urban reforms. In Saida, for instance, the Egyptian administration introduced large-scale infrastructural developments aimed at bolstering trade with Alexandria. Ibrahim Pasha also invested in Beirut, a nascent port city which, by the 1830s, had become merchants’ port of choice given its proximity to the Chehabi capital in Beitedinne and to the sericulture industry in Mount Lebanon. The Egyptian government under Mahmud Nami bey transformed Beirut from a “labyrinth of narrow streets and overhanging mansions with excessive filth [...] packed inside Crusader walls” to a cosmopolitan, commercial port-city akin to Alexandria. Significantly, a city council was established allowing affluent Sunni and Greek-Orthodox families to partake in the administration of early-modern Beirut (Mansel, 2010:91-93).

Nonetheless, excessive tax levies, forced labour in state monopolies and military conscription antagonised the population and resulted in widespread revolts against the predatory state in Jabal Amil, Tripoli, Acre and the Syrian hinterland. Former feudatories, popular rebel leaders and the clergy united in opposition to Ibrahim Pasha’s monolithic state. It must be noted here that a number of Christian muqāṭa’jis gained the support of the Maronite Church and its Patriarch who perceived the centralisation of sovereignty a threat to the Church’s growing role in the public sphere (anon., 1927; Sharara, 1975; Makdisi, 2000:53-54).

This coalition gained the support of European powers whose merchants’ business interests in Greater Syria were expanding. Egyptian influence in the dominions of the ageing Ottoman Empire, therefore, posed a direct threat to British and French economic interests (anon., 1927, vol.2:7-8; Farah, 2000:35). British intervention in 1840, however, was instrumental defeating Ibrahim Pasha in Greater Syria and limiting Mehmet Ali’s suzerainty to Egypt and Sudan.
3.1.2 Feudalism and Sectarianism in Late Modernising Lebanon

Although Ottoman authority over Greater Syria was reinstated in 1840, it was significantly diminished. The Egyptian interregnum, thus, caused significant socioeconomic and sectarian changes affecting the composition of the modern elite. The demise of the predominantly-Druze muqātā’jis in light of emir Bashir’s centralising reforms paved the way for new notable houses enjoying popular and foreign support (anon., 1927; Farah, 2000).

It must be noted that, despite the ‘modernising’ interventions of Ibrahim Pasha, ‘the family’ continued to act as the essential unit of political and economic participation. Endogamous practices, Chevallier notes, underpinned the emergence of the patronymic bayt or jubb. It was through these essential units that feudalist prerogatives were preserved, relations with the emir conducted and political representation confined. By the mid-nineteenth century, this had given rise to a number of ‘notable families’ or ‘political houses’ which would dominate the political economy of early-modern Lebanon (Chevallier, 1971:66-89). The interdependence between the emerging elite and the religious establishment translated the rise of such prominent families as the Khazins (Christian) and Jumblats (Druze) into a system of sectarian-feudalism whereby neo-muqātā’jis were not only fief-holders but also sectarian leaders (Traboulsi, 2007:10).

Moreover, Ibrahim Pasha’s economic interventions changed the political economy in Mount Lebanon and altered the sectarian balance of power. The rapid development of sericulture in Mount Lebanon, for instance, allowed Christian peasants and farmers to overcome the aridity of their land and break loose of their Druze overlords (anon., 1927).

Another repercussion of the 1840 defeat was the incorporation of the Lebanese economy into global capitalism. Capitalising on their victory, European powers forced the Sublime Porte to expand the 1838 Anglo-Ottoman treaty of goodwill13 to include Egypt and Greater Syria. According to the treaty the Ottoman Empire committed to abolishing state monopolies and expanded the Capitulations whereby European nationals gained preferential access to Arabo-Ottoman markets and enjoyed impunity (Farah, 2000:33).

In other words, the military defeat of 1840 was translated into an economic defeat depriving Egypt’s nascent industrial sector of the protection and intervention of a developmental state. Instead, the industrial-capitalist economies of Europe flooded Arab markets with manufactured goods slowing down Egypt’s industrialisation and subduing its agricultural sector to European industrialists’ demand for raw materials.

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13 The treaty was drafted by British diplomat in Istanbul, David Urquhar, and constituted an Anglo-Ottoman answer to Mehmet Ali’s growing strength in Egypt.
In Mount Lebanon, this contributed to the rapid rise of predominantly-Maronite peasant and artisan communities whose skills were more in line with European commercial/financial interests to the detriment of mountaineering-militaristic Druze feudalists and pre-capitalist commerce and industry in predominantly-Sunni coastal cities (Traboulsi, 2007:15-16). The integration of Maronite notables in Lebanon’s emerging outward-oriented/dependent-capitalist economy entrenched institutional sectarianism amongst the Maronite confession in the mid-nineteenth century. It is in this vein that the Maronite Patriarchate emerged as a political actor in an unprecedented fashion championing the cause of ‘Maronite nationalism’: a political movement aimed at preserving the autonomy of Mount Lebanon and placing the Maronite confession at its ‘centre’ (Harik, 1968:254).

The collapse of the Chehabi Emirate in 1842 epitomised the break with the pre-modern muqāṭa’ji system and the birth of a hybrid political order incorporating aspects of the ‘traditional’ system which had never been fully deconstructed and the ‘modern’ system which had never been fully internalised. The double qā’im-maqāmiyyat system (1843-1861) divided Mount Lebanon into two administrative regions, marked the demise of the predominantly-Druze feudal elite and the rise of neo-feudal sectarian chieftains supported by the religious establishment, claiming leadership over confessional constituencies and retaining titles.

In light of these transformations in mid-nineteenth century Lebanon, the political superstructure adopted elements of institutional sectarianism. The two qā’im-maqāmiyyat marked the emergence of a mixed Christian-Druze district in the south and a predominantly-Christian district in the north. Each qā’im-maqām (governor) delegated fiscal and judicial authorities to two wakils (deputies) – one Christian and one Druze. Each wakil exercised his authorities over co-religionists only (Traboulsi, 2007:24).

It is evident, therefore, that the post-1840 socio-political order in Lebanon was taking on a sectarian form. Before discussing the constellations of political sectarianism in modern Lebanon however, it must be noted that Ibrahim Pasha’s defeat and the replacement of the muqāṭa’ji system with the qā’im-maqāmiyyat symbolised the irredeemable failure of centralisation in Mount Lebanon. Essentially, the Egyptian interregnum failed to centralise authority, de-parcellise sovereignty or internalise the institutional constellations of modernity in the Lebanese body politic. Instead, the political system fragmented the polity – not only amongst neo-feudal families but also amongst confessions. The parcellisation of sovereignty in early-modern Lebanon distinguished the Lebanese transition to modernity from other Arab modernities despite perennial commonalities and their shared heritage and intellectual acumen as manifest in the Nahda. The following section, thus, will outline the key features which distinguish Lebanese modernity from other Arab modernities.
3.2 Lebanon: Diverging from Arab Modernity

It has been argued in Chapter Two that Arabs’ ‘incomplete modernities’ demonstrate the precarious co-existence between ‘traditional’ and ‘modern’ institutions and collectivities; rational-cultural and legal-contractual social relations; and multiple epistemologies and ontologies. The balance between these seemingly-contradictory elements of the Nahda however differed from one society to another. Modern Arab societies of the Middle East, for instance, are markedly different from their European counterparts in that the former are plural – that is to say, consisting of various ethnic collectivities, religious communities and linguistic-cultural groups. Nevertheless, different outcomes and trajectories of modernity in the Middle East can be attributed to differences in the nature and intensity of social cleavages and the extent to which they underpin epistemological dissimilarities and reinforce rational-cultural relations rather than state-sanctioned legal-contractual relations.

It is precisely because of the diverse forms and dynamics of social pluralism that the distinct patterns of Lebanese modernity led to the crystallisation of a political order incorporating elements of rational-conciliar government, neo-feudalism and political sectarianism.

In this vein, it must be noted that conceptualising modernity not as a coherent, hegemonic and monodirectional transformation but as a dynamic reconstruction of institutional and ideological patterns carried forward by social actors embedded within and connected to the social, political and economic dynamics of society lends credibility to and revalorises the view that political paradigms and, thus, political superstructures are determined not only by social conditions but also by the physical and geographic environment (Ballinger, 2011). Geographical determinism has often taken the form of racialist, imperialistic and deterministic essentialisations in the past. This is manifest, for instance, in the crude differentiation between the ‘desert-dwelling’ societies of the Arabian Peninsula and the settled societies of the Fertile Crescent.

While this study discounts such essentialist claims as a trail of disingenuous academia, the following section argues that physical and geographic environment had a mutually-reinforcing impact on the nature and dynamics of pluralism and social segmentation. In this light, we can identify at least two distinct patterns of ‘pluralism’ in the late-modernising societies of the Middle East. The first pre-supposes the existence of clearly-defined ‘majority’ and ‘minority’ communities ‘co-habiting’ a shared geographical space. The second pattern relates to self-centred and relatively isolated ‘sects’ which inhabit relatively-homogenous geographical territories on the peripheries of the state and exist within highly-segmented public domains. The following section explores this distinction further and identifies the modalities of pluralism underpinning consociational modernity in Lebanon vis-à-vis the centripetal ‘fierce state’ model characteristic of Arab modernity.
3.2.1 Communitarianism and Arab Modernity

It has been argued that the Middle East demonstrates a general and perennial tendency towards ‘erasive’ or ‘abusive’ unity – a situation where the social construction of modern national identities and the articulation of mainstream cultures is dominated by a particular segment of society. The hegemony of this segment may be a reflection of its majority status, a perpetuation of a historical claim to authenticity, social and economic privilege or, simply, a usurpation of power (Saab, 2007).

This is evident in a number of postcolonial nation-states in the Middle East. In Turkey, for instance, post-Ottoman secularism subjugated the communalistic order which had prevailed amongst Muslims and non-Muslims alike. Post-Ottoman identity and the nation-state placed, however, ‘Turkishness’ at the core of the modernist project to the detriment of the values, symbols, themes, worldviews and languages of non-Turkish ethnic groups. Egypt, on the other hand, demonstrates the majoritarian status of Muslims over Christians whereby the postcolonial state, albeit secular and nationalist-patriotic, adopted themes and values characteristic of vernacular Islam in the construction of national identity and the cultural mainstream. Iran presents another interesting case whereby national identity is a hybrid social construct incorporating values and themes from Persian antiquity, Aryan racism and Shiite Islam in a sober and determined attempt to differentiate Iran from its Arab, Semite and Sunni neighbours despite sectarian-religious and ethnic pluralism. The mere etymology of the names adopted by modern nation-states demonstrates this majoritarian constitution of the all-encompassing national mainstream: Turkey and Iran are stark examples.

Similar experiences can be observed in most postcolonial Middle Eastern societies where various forms of nationalism, national-patriotism, Islamism and tribalism were transformed into mainstream national cultures.

The struggle against colonialism in the early-twentieth century provided reasonable justification for ‘modern’ homogenising projects but prevented the development of bureaucratic universalism within the context of the administrative state. Instead, balance-of-power politics and accommodative strategies mitigated the conflict between minorities and state/majority culture in the postcolonial era. In this vein, states often conceded to subnational collectivities. In return, minorities succumbed to the centripetal state and developed strategies to adapt and influence (but not adopt) mainstream national cultures.

In Lebanon however, the majoritarian model of centre-formation was a trail of the impossible. Partly, this was a result of the fact that no subnational community constituted a clear majority. This was exacerbated by the physical and geographic environment which allowed confessions
to exist within relatively isolated spaces. In fact, limited technologies of communication and modest means of transportation in a mountainous Lebanon meant that society in early-modern Lebanon was an archipelago of isolated confessions living side by side, but separately. Poor integration was the norm as inter-communal contacts were kept to a minimum – often, limited to the market place. Even if spatial cohabitation occurred, subnational communities exercised social avoidance: “it is the strictest sense of a medley [of peoples], for they mix but do not combine” (Furnivall, 1948:304; Geertz, 1963).

Interestingly, however, Lebanon did not develop an inorganic superstructure. Instead, the state became an incubator or a meeting place for the actors constituting the multiple sectarian centres – each centre representing a subnational group solidarity and upholding a particular worldview. To differentiate between consociational, multi-centred modernity in Lebanon and unitary centre-formations in Arab modernities we must differentiate between ‘minorities’ and ‘sects’ as distinct social constructs and modes of collective identity.

3.2.2 Sects and Minorities in Pre-Modernity
The most important distinction between sects and minorities is the physical isolation and, thus, administrative autonomy of the former. Throughout history, ‘sects’ have achieved relative autonomy by inhabiting the geographic peripheries of the Middle East away from the authority of the state and hegemony of majority culture – in the mountains, deserts and remote valleys. This is in stark contrast to majority and minority communities co-habiting the city. In the pre-modern era, this allowed sects to develop distinct identities, ontologies and social institutions. This is evident in the physical and conceptual peripherality of the Ibadis in the mountains of North Africa and Oman; the Shiites in Jabal Amil; the Alawites in the mountains of Syria and Anatolia; and the Ismailis in Yemen, Afghanistan and the Indian Subcontinent. This was especially vital in light of Sunnis’ hegemony over the institutions of the medieval state and, thus, urban culture and economy. This is substantiated by the concentration of Sunni communities in administrative, commercial, agricultural and coastal cities. The geographical peripherality of ‘sects’, on the other hand, can be attributed to their rebellion against the dogma and hegemony of the Sunni state/majority (Khuri, 2006).

Of course, not all non-Sunni, non-Arab religious/ethnic communities in the Middle East developed into autonomous and self-subsistent ‘ethno-sects’. In fact, ‘minorities’ are differentiated from ‘sects’ by their geographic concentration within the spatial and conceptual dominion of the state: they inhabit the city and are subjugated to the authority of the state much like their Sunni counterparts. Furthermore, whereas ‘sects’ complemented their geographic isolation with economic autarky, minorities often adopted specialised economic activities and carved out niche markets and industries within the broader economy (Khuri, 2006:22).
To avoid essentialist claims, however, it must be noted that this classification is contextual and, thus, dynamic – that is to say, ‘sects’ can become ‘minorities’ and vice versa. Furthermore, it must be noted that the distinction between ‘sects’ and ‘minorities’ applies to non-Muslim as well as non-Sunni confessions alike. By and large, the various Churches of Eastern Christendom, for instance, demonstrate relative flexibility vis-à-vis the dominant Sunni dogma and can therefore be classified as ‘minorities’. The Maronite Church, however, is a noticeable exception insofar as it upheld religion as an instrument of collective identity; proclaimed communal sovereignty; defied the authority and sovereignty of the Sunni community/state; and entered into communion with the Vatican during the Crusades (Khuri, 2006). In other words, while most Eastern Churches adopted incorporative adaption strategies akin to their Sunni compatriots, the Maronite Church joined non-Sunni ‘heretic’ sects in challenging the authority of the state, expanded on the peripheries of the state and developed parallel administrative structures, social relations, economic activities and ontologies.

Unlike other Christian minorities in medieval Islamdom, the Maronite Church rejected dhimmi status. This stifled the development of unitary modernism and laid the foundations for a multi-centred consociational order. This ontological rejection was carried forward into the modern era as demonstrated by the uncompromising positions of Maronite warlords of the Civil War:

[this rejection of dhimmi status] explains why the Christian motto in the [...] Civil War was ‘fear’ whereas the Muslims, who were denied the presidency, adopted the charge of ‘injustice.’ Bashir [Gemayel], the founder of the Lebanese Forces, [...] repeatedly [...] insisted [that] ‘we shall not succumb to the position of [the] Copts in Egypt’ (Khuri, 2006:211).

The institutional-conceptual outcome of the distinction between Sunnis, ‘minorities’ and ‘sects’ is profound. For Sunnis and ‘minorities’, the state was the source of legitimacy for the collectivity and the superstructure under which autonomous religious judiciaries, clerical assemblies and communal councils existed. ‘Ethno-sects’, by contrast, perceived themselves as auto-centred collectivities legitimated by the leadership of an imam or a patriarch who represents their unity; upholds their sovereignty and independence; and, crucially, legitimates the existence of a communal order independent of the official political superstructure.

Put differently, religious communities in the pre-modern Middle East can be categorised into: majorities with access to the state and, thus, constituting the ‘centre’; minorities succumbing to the majority/state and constituting the ‘periphery’ in return for limited autonomy; and the autonomous, self-subsistent sects isolated from the state and constituting their own autarkic ‘centres’. Cohabitation and subjugation to the sovereignty of the state, therefore, characterises the majority-minority nexus, while Ibn Khaldun’s concept of ‘aṣabiya (social solidarity) offers a better explanation of the social organisation of the ‘sect’.
3.2.3 Sects, Minorities and Nations
This distinction between sects and minorities played an important role in shaping the transition to modernity and nationalism in the early-modern Middle East. In light of this, four general trends can be distinguished in the context of the transformation from traditional communitarianism to modern nationalism (Nahas, 1998).

The first trend applies to communities whose religious affiliations concurred with nationalist claims, ethno-linguistic distinctiveness, a territorial claim and historical continuity. This is evident in the case of the Greek and Armenian communities. Although both communities adapted to Ottoman rule throughout the Middle Ages and although their members often enjoyed socioeconomic prestige and occupied prominent positions in imperial courts and state bureaucracies, Greeks and Armenians developed national sentiments during the nineteenth century and, by the early-twentieth century, evolved into full-fledged secessionist movements.

Interestingly, Greater Syria’s Maronites, Druzes and Alawis enjoyed greater autonomy and isolation from the Ottoman centre than Greeks and Armenians. Nonetheless, their sectarian distinctiveness did not overlap with linguistic or ethnic distinctiveness and, therefore, did not produce a ‘modern’ national collectivity.

The third trend involves the Shiites and Alawis of Greater Syria whose communitarianism, isolation and disconnection from the Ottoman state did not develop into nationalist/secessionist sentiments nor did it aim to challenge their socioeconomic peripherality. It was not until these sizeable communities were integrated in the socioeconomic life and capitalist economies of modern national states in the mid-twentieth century that the Shiites and Alawis emerged as significant political contenders in Syria and Lebanon (Nahas, 1998).

Arab-Christian14 ‘minorities’ are demonstrative of the fourth trend. Lacking the ethno-linguistic distinctiveness of the Greeks and Armenians and the geographical concentration and isolation of Greater Syria’s numerous ‘sects’, Arab-Christians neither developed secessionist tendencies nor particularistic nationalisms. In part, this was driven by varying degree of discomfort with European interventionism and Catholic/Protestant missionary activity. Crucially however, ‘modernity’ provided ‘minorities’ with an unprecedented opportunity to influence and partake in the process of nation-building. As a result, Arab-Christians were noticeably engaged in modernisation, secularisation, the articulation of vernacular/national cultures and in the formation of patriotic, nationalist and leftist movements.

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14 These include Greek-Orthodox Arabs; Copts in Egypt; and Assyrians and Melkites in Syria/Iraq amongst others. Although these communities pre-date Islam and the Arab conquest, they have generally identified with Arabic culture/language and vernacular/national cultures.
3.2.4 The ‘Sect’ in Early-Modern Lebanon

The distinction between ‘sects’ and ‘minorities’ goes a long way in explaining the peculiarities of communitarianism and, thus, the institutional and cultural constellations of modernity in Lebanon. Unlike its neighbours, Lebanon emerged as an artificial creation consisting of a number of mutually-exclusive, relatively-homogenous and, crucially, self-centred and isolated ‘imagined communities’. Whereas the majority-minority nexus characterised social order in the coastal plains and towns where Sunnis constituted the majority and Christians the minority, the ‘centre’ of the emerging Lebanese polity was not the urban littoral but the mountain – homeland of the ‘sects’. Lubnān, as its name indicates, is a political entity for the inhabitants of the ‘milky-white snow-capped mountains’. To the Ottomans, these mountains were home to ‘villains’, ‘heretics’ and ‘outlaws’; for the ‘sects’, they were a refuge from the central state and a bastion of decentralism and autonomy (Sharara, 1975). The physical and geographic conditions of ‘Lubnān’ had an important impact on the ontological constructs of sectarian communities. The following section outlines some of these repercussions and their impact on Lebanon’s transition to modernity, nationalism and capitalism.

3.2.4.1 Territoriality and the Sanctification of the ‘Homeland’

Geographic peripherality exacerbated the ontological dissimilarities between the ‘sect’, the state and the majority-minority. Given the relative backwardness of technologies of communication and transportation in the mid-nineteenth century, sects’ geographic peripherality had an immense impact on state-society relations in the early-modern era as well as on the process of constructing national and subnational collective identities.

Crucially, the territorial peripherality and exclusivity of the ‘sect’ developed into a sentimental attachment to the land. The patria, therefore, became a contested arena over which intersecting claims of multiple subnational nationalisms compete. The national narrative, thus, emanates from the confession and targets the subnational and, eventually, national centre in contrast to the modernisational experiences of other Middle Eastern societies where national ‘imagined communities’ are imposed by an authoritarian state. The conflict of narratives, thus, occurs between subnational pillars; not between state and society.

This is demonstrated by the sentimental value sects attribute to their respective ‘homeland’; often, by erecting shrines symbolic of the collective consciousness of the confession (Khuri, 2006:71). Druze assemblies (majlis) and retreats (khalwa) scattered around the Chouf and Jabal El-Cheikh, for instance, bear testimony to this. Similarly, the monasteries and hermitages of Qadisha Valley serve not only as a pilgrimage site and the former seat of the Patriarchate, but also as a reminder of collective Maronite identity and an enshrinement of its romanticised history of persecution and resistance.
Likewise, Shiites have traditionally revered the shrines and graves of the sons of Jacob in South Lebanon and the granddaughters of Muhammad in the Bekaa. For the Shiites, these shrines symbolise the connection between their homeland and the Holy Land and serve as a reminder that Jabal Amil and the Bekaa offered Abraham and Muhammad’s grandchildren sanctuary from oppression. Shiite intellectuals have often drawn parallels between the flight of the grandchildren of Abraham and Muhammad to Lebanon’s mountains and the flight of the Shiites in fear of persecution.

The sanctification of the sect’s homeland and the personification of the territory found its way into the folklore and cultural production of sectarian communities. Poetry, zajal, music and literature in modern Lebanon bear witness to the elevated position which ‘holy valleys’ and ‘sacred mountains’ occupy in popular culture and collective conscience.

Beyond popular culture, the study and propagation of such narratives has often been at the core of epic works by reputable historians and clerics\(^\text{15}\) as well as political actors embedded within and championing the cause of a particular ‘sect’. Hezbollah’s Al-Manar TV, for instance, has produced a number of documentaries on the ‘sacred land of Jabal Amil’ in an attempt to embed the Resistance in popular culture and vice versa\(^\text{16}\). The sanctification of the sectarian homeland is also championed by sectarian/civil society associations.

3.2.4.2 Economic Self-Subsistence

The physical, conceptual and ontological self-centredness of Lebanon’s sectarian communities was accompanied by the emergence of auto-centred and self-subsistent regional economies centred around primate market towns of relative sectarian homogeneity. The multi-centeredness of the economy was exacerbated by the modesty of communication and transportation technologies in early-modern Lebanon. This is evidenced by the emergence of such inland market towns as Catholic-majority Zahlé; Shiite-majority Nabatiyeh and Baalbek; Druze-majority Baaqlin and Hasbaya; and Maronite-majority Marjeyoun and Bcharre (Khuri, 2006). In other words, ‘sectarian homelands’ developed into self-subsistent peripheral sub-economies centred around primate market towns; each, home to a coalition of urban patricians.

\(^{15}\) Sayyid Muhsin Al-Amine (2002) documented these shrines in his seminal work on the historiography of Jabal Amil, a classic of the Nahda. More recently, Saadun Hamadeh’s (2008) historiography of the Shi’a in Lebanon connects Jabal Amil to the Galilee and the Bekaa to Madina/Hijaz through migration.

\(^{16}\) Al-Manar TV, for instance, broadcast a series of documentaries in May 2010 drawing parallels between the piety, persecution and resilience of the Israelite prophets allegedly buried in Jabal Amil and Hezbollah’s ethos and value system. (Ḥikāyat ‘Arḍ. Part I: Baldat Sujjud. 2010).
3.2.5 The Confession as a ‘Modern’, ‘Rational’ Construct

In their capacity as collective identities, ‘sects’ played an important role in the construction and reconstruction of national identity and acted as subnational ‘centres’ within the context of Lebanese modernity. This is in stark contrast to the modernist assumption that religious and subnational collective identities are inherently primordial entities stressing ascribed identity markers rather than socially-constructed and instrumental/situational interests and aspirations. In other words, communal solidarities such as ‘sects’ have been conceptualised within the modernist logic of binary opposition between ‘primordial’ and ‘instrumental’.

It is conventionally assumed that primordial collectivities are premised on recurring bonds that are irrational and exploit emotional and sentimental solidarity (Geertz, 1963). Instrumentalists on the other hand, argue that collective solidarities arise in response to situational needs rather than inexplicable and essentialist ‘forces of nature.’ Radical and Marxist instrumentalists would even argue that ‘ethnicities’ are the invention of political elites and instruments of social manipulation, domination and control (Barth, 1969; Rex, 1996:98). In this vein, Oren Barak (2002) proposes a synthesis between the two approaches arguing that ‘ethnic’ groups possess both ‘primordial’ and ‘instrumental’ characteristics arguing that while each group has an inventory of shared myth, memories and values, these inventories are constantly adapted to changing circumstances by being accorded new meanings and functions. Lebanon’s ‘sects’, it can be argued, are dynamic and instrumental social constructs which capitalise on and revitalise perceived communal histories and faith-based codes of distinction. The ‘sect’ in Lebanon resembles Eisenstadt and Giesen’s (1995:74) analysis of social constructivism:

Membership of, and partaking in, a collective identity depends on special processes of induction, ranging from various rites of initiation to various collective rituals, in which the attribute of ‘similarity’ among its members, as against the strangers, the differences, the distinction of the other, is symbolically constructed and defined.

In other words, the ‘sect’ reinforces but also redefines symbolic codes of distinction and erects psychological, intellectual and, at times, physical boundaries between in-groups and outsiders. These barriers are constructed around the spatial, temporal and reflexive dimensions of the collectivity (Eisenstadt and Giesen, 1995).

It must be noted however that the construction of ‘sectarian’ identities transcend mere symbolism and sentimentality. Sectarian solidarities entail material consequences such as access to resources, power, public office, prestige and social mobility. In fact, empirical evidence shows us that the strength, permeability and sustainability of group affiliations depends to a large extent on the needs which they satisfy and the status they confer upon individual members (Melikian and Diab, 1959).
Moreover, the ‘sect’ is a form of communal solidarity which transcends (but does not necessarily deconstruct) micro solidarities such as kinship, patronymic groups and clans. In other words, it is an ‘ethnie’ to use John Rex’s expression: “a group constituted [...] by the fact that it has a name, shared symbols and a myth of origin” and is distinguishable from the micro solidarities which may or may not constitute it. Crucially, the role of individual members in an ‘ethnie’ is not defined with strict precision as it is in such primordial collectivities as family or clan (Rex, 1996:99). The construction of the ‘ethnie’ and the codes according to which it distinguishes itself from ‘the other’ can only be understood as social constructs patronised by ‘ethnic entrepreneurs’ who respond to communal tendencies, articulate a collective cognitive praxis and mobilise in-groups (Ruane and Todd, 2004).

In light of this, it is evident that Lebanese confessions cannot be fully understood using the logics of binary opposition between primordialism and instrumentalism. Instead, ‘sects’ must be understood as ‘confessional ethnies’ – in other words, rational social constructs premised on cognitive codes of distinction in response to the situational needs and aspirations of their individual members. The coexistence of various substate centres and their integration in a consociational superstructure is, effectively, a case of hybrid modernities within Lebanon’s ‘hybrid-modern’ consociational centre on the national level – a situation which is in stark contrast to the larger, less diverse Arab, Iranian and Turkish models which, by coercion, ‘engineered’ societies into nation-state-like modalities.

3.3 THE HISTORICAL ORIGINS OF LEBANESE CONSOCIATIONALISM

The self-centredness and isolationism of the ‘sect’ in the mountainous peripheries of Greater Syria is a historical legacy of the Mamluk and early-Ottoman Middle Ages (Messarra, 1994). Moreover, the millet system in the early-modern era allowed religiously-defined subnational communities to benefit from expanded autonomy sanctioned by the Ottoman state. In effect, this marked the institutionalisation of communitarianism and introduced non-national forms of collective identities into Arabo-Ottoman modernity (Furnivall, 1948; Reinkowski, 1997:4).

The emerging polity, however, undermined the self-containment of the autarkic confessions and forced them to coexist in an increasingly-integrative modern order. Modern transportation technologies in the early-nineteenth century were particularly threatening as roads facilitated travel and interaction between previously-isolated mountaineering communities. Moreover, technological and telecommunications breakthroughs, urbanism and rural migration to the city, modernisation theorists often stressed, would undercut ‘traditional’ collectivities and coalesce subnational ‘imagined communities’ into the ‘modern’ nation-state (Marx and Engels, 1968; Anderson, 1979; Huntington, 2006).
Moreover, Ibrahim Pasha’s economically-integrative reforms and the country’s newfound role as an intermediary between the industrial economies of Europe and the consumer markets of the Syrian/Arabian hinterland challenged the isolationist and pre-capitalist local economies upon which the self-subsistence of the ‘sect’ depended. In other words, the expansion of the capitalist mode of production led to the rise of a multi-confessional bourgeoisie.

Nonetheless, the ‘invasion’ of the coast/city by the inhabitants of the mountain in the mid-nineteenth century guaranteed that Lebanese ‘modernity’ consolidated and institutionalised subnational ‘sects’ as pillars of the national whole and not the opposite.

In their capacity as ‘the building blocks of the national whole’, subnational confessions became a means to access public office, wealth and power. The confessional ethnie, therefore, became a mechanism for social mobility and an arena for social struggle – functions ascribed to class and political parties in Western societies. In light of this, the following section examines the historical development of the modern political system in Lebanon and the mechanisms through which it accommodated the realities and social constructs of early-modern Lebanese society.

3.3.1 The ‘Sect’ in Modern Government: From the Qā’im-Maqāmiyyat to the Mutaṣarifiyat

It has been argued above that the defeat of the Egyptian administration in 1840 allowed for the emergence of a neo-muqāta’ji system whereby new notables claimed not only an entitlement to the fief, but also leadership of the confessions. Interlocked with the struggle between European consuls and the Sublime Porte, the emerging elite struggled to define the nature of ‘order’ and ‘social peace’ in Lebanon in light of the empire-wide Tanzimat reforms and in accordance with the principles of restoration. In pursuit of this, Lebanon embarked on ‘inventing tradition’: elite notables invoked the past to justify their role as ‘guardians of traditions’ and ‘guarantors of social order’ vis-à-vis ‘the other’ – the instigators of perennial perfidy. Consequently, Mount Lebanon was geographically reconfigured; communities reinvented and identities sectarianised (Makdisi, 2000:67; 75-78).

Administratively, the qā’im-maqāmiyyat system (1843-1861) divided Mount Lebanon into two regions: Maronite emir Haydar Abi-Lam’a governed the northern qā’im-maqāmiyya and Druze emir Ahmad Arslan the southern. The qā’im-maqāmiyyat did not only endorse the notion of segmental (confessional) autonomy on the macro level, but also endorsed political sectarianism and familialism on the micro (functional) level: each qā’im-maqām governed in consultation with the ‘a’yān (prelates) and delegated functional authority over co-religionists to deputy governors (Traboulsi, 2007:24). More importantly, governors were appointed by the pasha of Saida to preside over an elected council of twelve members – two members from each sects:
the Maronites, Melkite-Orthodox, Melkite-Catholic, Druzes, Sunnis and Shiites. The southern qāʾim-maqāmīyya was subdivided into fiefs, each administered by a Druze feudal clan – Imad, Jumblat, Imad, Talhuq and Nakad. Although the elected council exercised judicial and taxation functions, neo-muqātaʾjis retained expanded public administration prerogatives (Harik, 1968).

In other words, nineteenth-century Lebanon was a hybrid, multi-centred order incorporating feudal, sectarian and electoral/conciliar relations and, therefore, necessitating balance-of-power politics; a cornerstone of modern consociationalism. The significance of the qāʾim-maqāmīyyat system, therefore, is twofold. Firstly, it consolidated conciliar structures introduced by Ibrahim Pasha, introduced modern electoral processes (albeit confined to prelates and patricians) and reconciled institutional ‘modernity’ with the realities of the socially-constructed ‘confession’. Secondly, governing councils in the qāʾim-maqāmīyyat marked institutionalised sectarianism and introduced notions of power-sharing and proportional representation in government.

In light of this, the Sublime Porte initiated direct contacts with the ‘patriarchs’ of Lebanon’s ‘spiritual families’ acknowledging them as intermediaries between the state and the confession. An 1841 correspondence between an Ottoman Minister, Raouf Pasha, and Maronite Patriarch, Youssef Hobaish [sic.] bears witness to this:

As of now, we assign you as deputy of the Devlet. All matters pertaining to the Maronite millet and its interests are to be presented to [the deputy] and through him. This is the will of [the Sultan] (anon., 1927, vol. 2:69).

The qāʾim-maqāmīyyat system was undermined by the sectarian events of 1860 during which Druze muqātaʾjis ‘cleansed’ the Chouf of its Christian inhabitants pushing them north and to the city. Intertwined with the uncertainties of the struggle between the Ottomans and European powers, the violent bloodbath justified negotiations between Ottomans, Europeans and local Druze and Maronite leaders. Consequently, the Règlement organique envisaged a solution based on the notions of ‘age-old sectarian realities’ and stressing the immutability of sectarian identities. It was in this spirit that the mutaṣarifiyya was born and power-sharing arrangements between Druze and Christian notables devised (Makdisi, 2000:78-96; Traboulsi, 2007:41).

Essentially, the legal-institutional impacts of the qāʾim-maqāmīyyat and the mutaṣarifiyya on modern Lebanon were twofold. Firstly, ‘modern’ administrative arrangements integrated the ‘confession’ in a multi-confessional polity – hence, introducing ‘sects’ to the realm of modern statehood and the state to the dominion of the ‘sect’. Secondly, power-sharing arrangements institutionalised the autonomy of the ‘sect’ (Reinkowski, 1997:13). In other words, the early-modern state in mid-nineteenth century Lebanon performed two seemingly-contradictory tasks: it integrated ‘sects’ in a modern, multi-confessional order; and, yet, it enshrined the autonomy of the ‘ethnie’ in spite of the integrative impacts of modernity and capitalism.
3.3.2 Consociationalism in the Mutasherifiyya
It is important to note that, the expansion of the autonomous Mount Lebanon region in 1861 to include Zahlé (Bekaa) and the littoral from Batroun in the north to Jiyeh in the south tipped the demographic balance. Although the Sunni-majority port-cities of Tripoli, Beirut and Saida were excluded from the expanded mutasherifiyya, the new polity was now home to a number of sectarian communities. Moreover, although Christians constituted the majority, denominational divisions assured that no confession constituted a majority: Maronites constituted around half the population for most of the nineteenth century; ‘other’ Christians and Muslims constituted a quarter each (Spagnolo, 1977; Traboulsi, 2007). Within this ‘deeply divided’ political entity, however, each confession constituted an absolute majority on the subnational (caza) level. Put differently, whereas all confessions constituted minorities on the macro (national) level, each constituted a majority on the level of the caza.

This fragmentation of sovereignty and decentralisation of authority on the micro (caza) level was accompanied by complex power-sharing arrangements on the macro-level in an attempt to ‘reflect’ the immutable sectarian composition of the population and address ‘age-old sectarian rivalries’. In reality, however, the sectarianisation of the political landscape and the political institutionalisation of the ta’efa can be understood as a historical attempt by the elite to regain the initiative vis-à-vis the mobilised populace following the popular peasant revolts of 1820, 1840 and 1856 as Makdisi (2000:119-124) eloquently shows.

What concerns us here, however, is the consociational undertone the political system in Mount Lebanon assumed in the early-modern era. The governing council of the qā’im-maqāmiyya was devised to ‘reflect’ the numerical strength of the various sects. The Règlement organique of 1861, however, codified sectarian power-sharing formulas in an attempt to ‘modernise’ the administration. Accordingly, it was agreed that the mutaṣarif (governor) would be a non-Arab, Ottoman Catholic with extended executive powers limited only by the ‘negative rule’ (veto powers) granted to the twelve-member consultative council. In other words, the new political order was based on a balance of power between ‘spiritual families’, ‘political houses’ and the mutaṣarif whose nomination entailed an Ottoman-European entente.

3.3.3 Socioeconomic and Segmental Cleavages in the Mutasherifiyya
Alongside their demographic privilege, Maronites witnessed rapid socioeconomic mobility and benefited from preferential access to Eurocentric capitalism. Firstly, this was due to the gradual demise of the Druze muqāta’jis and the transfer of land to the emerging Christian nobility. Secondly, the nascent sericulture industry integrated Christian peasants and small landowners in the emerging and lucrative tertiary sector (Traboulsi, 2007:48). Thirdly, the proliferation of missionary schools equipped Christians with modern (ie. Westernised) education and increased
their access to economic opportunities in the Eurocentric capitalist economy (Sharara, 1975). This socio-cultural advantage was exacerbated by the introduction of the printing press by Orthodox priests in 1751 and American missionaries in 1834 (Mansel, 2010:149).

In this vein, Dominique Chevallier (1971) notes that ‘Maronite solidarity’ – that is to say, the institutionalisation of the Maronite confession and, thus, the birth of the ‘Maronite statelet’ – is rooted in the strength of the Maronite Church which became Europe’s strategic gateway to the Arab hinterland and the link between the European and Arabo-Ottoman markets. By the early-nineteenth century, Sharara (1975) adds, the Church had accumulated enough capital; forged solid ties with Europe; and harnessed the popular support necessary to institutionalise its autarky into the autonomous political arrangements which gave birth to the mutaṣarifīyya.

This is in contrast to Tripoli and Saida. The economies of the two coastal cities which had been excluded from the expanded boundaries of the mutaṣarifīyya witnessed a noticeable demise in the late-nineteenth century as European trade shifted to Beirut whose Sunni inhabitants found their pre-capitalist commercial and artisan economy threatened by the city’s newcomers. Maronite merchants from the mountain migrated to Beirut in significant numbers and, hence, quickly outnumbered Sunnis and dominated the lucrative import/export business with European merchants. Beirut’s population grew from 6,000 in 1800 to 46,000 in 1860 and 130,000 in 1914. The city had been transformed from a tiny Sunni-majority town to a thriving Christian-majority port. The uneven distribution of prosperity was exacerbated by a noticeable decline in trade with Turkey and Egypt vis-à-vis trade with Europe in the late-nineteenth century (Chevallier, 1971:292; Fawaz, 1983:44; 1994; Gates, 1998:15; Mansel, 2010:91).

The coincidence of confessional-segmental cleavages and socioeconomic inequalities coupled with the re-emergence of neo-feudalism was not unnoticed by the Ottomans. Veteran statesman and ethnic-Albanian mutaṣarif, Wassa Pasha17 (1883-1892), considered the situation a violation of the Ottoman policy of breaking up political feudalism:

> We must prove that no family or group will have any privilege or any social status higher than that of the others and that the nomination of the governing posts should depend, and depend solely, on the criteria of devotion, integrity and competence (in Traboulsi, 2007:48).

This indicates Ottoman concern over the fate of the consociational system. First and foremost, it demonstrates the Ottomans’ awareness that significant demographic and socioeconomic changes may threaten the stability of the consociational system. Although close to European statesmanship, Wass Pasha’s remarks indicate his recognition that the imbalanced and rapid social climb of Christian communities could aggravate grievances amongst their Muslim

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17 Better-known as Pashko Vassa in his native Albania.
compatriots and threaten the viability of the mutasarifiyya. Moreover, Wassa Pasha’s criticism of ‘privileged families’ reflected fears of the instabilities elite intransigence and socioeconomic imbalances may pose (Traboulsi, 2007:48).

In short, four perennial characteristics underpinned socio-political order in nineteenth-century Lebanon. Firstly, the coevality of ‘traditional’ and ‘modern’ legal-institutional constellations as manifest by the institutionalisation of the ‘sect’ in modern conciliar government. Secondly, the multi-centred, minimalist state committed to consociation between ‘spiritual families’. Thirdly, the persistence of ‘political familialism’ as evidenced by the continued hegemony of a class of neo-feudal quasi-capitalist ‘political houses’. Fourthly, a sectarian division of labour; hence, the relative coincidence of confessional and socioeconomic cleavages.

3.4 CONSOCIATIONALISM IN MODERN LEBANON

It is against this backdrop that fundamental institutional modernisation occurred in Lebanon in the early-twentieth century. This precarious balance however was severely disrupted by the collapse of the Ottoman Empire and the partitioning of the Empire’s Arab dominions by the French and British colonial administrations into artificial states irrespective of vernacular cultural-nations. In fact, the expansion of the mutasarifiyya in 1920 and the establishment of ‘Greater Lebanon’ reflected the intersection between the interests of the emerging mercantile-financial bourgeoisie in Lebanon and the French industrial-commercial bourgeoisie.

Essentially, French economic interests necessitated the division of Syria into two entities ascribing to ‘Lebanon’ the task of ‘connecting’ Europe’s industrial-capitalist economy with the consumer markets of the Syrian/Arab hinterland (Owen, 1976:24). This corresponded to the recommendations of a colonial expedition funded by the Chambers of Commerce in Lyon and Marseille during World War I which gave birth to two sets of French holding companies. The division of Syria into two entities allowed each holding company to monopolise lucrative economic sectors in Syria and Lebanon respectively (Traboulsi, 2007:91).

The gradual incorporation of the Lebanese bourgeoisie into the European politico-strategic sphere of influence gained the Maronite Patriarch’s stamp of approval with the aim of reconstituting the Lebanese ‘centre’. In a symbolic gesture, Baabda, a Christian village six miles from Beirut replaced Beitedinne as the capital of the mutasarifiyya indicating the political economy shift from ‘the mountain’ to the coast/city.

The diverging interests of the Beirut-based mercantile-financial bourgeoisie and its Damascene counterpart dictated their positions towards the creation of the Lebanese entity. For the former, the ‘Lebanon’ meant that Beirut would continue to enjoy economic domination and provide
them with economic opportunities and links to Europe. Although their mercantile interests depended on the demand of the Syrian consumer market, the inward-oriented Syrian economy needed to be kept at bay vis-à-vis Beirut’s outward-oriented trade/service economy.

Crucially, the Beirut-based bourgeoisie recognised that ‘Lebanon’ could not exist without annexing the arable plains of Akkar in the north, the Bekaa in the east and Jabal Amil in the south. The country would otherwise be too small to provide the minimum-required consumer base and agricultural produce to guarantee independence. It was in this vein that Greater Lebanon was established expanding the boundaries of the mutaṣarifiyya in all these directions as demonstrated in Figure 3.1. Essentially, ‘Greater Lebanon’ saved Beirut from the economic death of a ‘little Lebanon’ and the political death of a ‘Greater Syria’ (Traboulsi, 2007:75).

Moreover, the status and political power of the parvenu-bourgeoisie and their incorporation in the global middle class depended on their status as a landed-mercantile elite. This will be discussed further in Chapter Four, but it suffices to note that a considerable number of Beirut’s capitalists had not owned land before their rapid social rise in the nineteenth century. Consequently, many invested substantial shares of their trade profits in large domains of rural property in annexed regions, Palestine, Egypt and Syria (Owen, 1976:23; Fawaz, 1983:91-95).

![Figure 3.1: The Mutaṣarifiyya and Greater Lebanon](image)

Source: Traboulsi (2007:42)
3.4.1 Greater Lebanon: Shifting Demographics; Obstinate Polity

The expansion demonstrated in Figure 3.1, however, was not unproblematic: ‘Greater Lebanon’ introduced fundamentally different demographic realities to the rigid consociational system of the mutṣarifiyya. The inclusion of Sunni-majority Tripoli, Saida and Akkar and the Shiite-majority Bekaa and Jabal Amil problematised the demographic majority of the Maronite confession and upset the power-sharing formula of mutṣarifiyya consociationalism.

Essentially, the new demographic realities were not reflected in the political system of the mandatory period. The administration of French High-Commissioner, General Gourard (1918-1924), appointed Major Trabaud governor of Lebanon aided by a proportionally-divided ‘executive council’. Of the seven director-generals in the council however, only two were Muslim. Similarly, the fifteen-member Administrative Council appointed by Gouraud included five Muslims, roughly reflecting the same proportional weight allocated to Muslims in the executive. An expanded seventeen-member council reformed this ration and included six Maronites, three Greek-Orthodox, one Greek-Catholic, one Druze, four Sunnis and two Shiites (Traboulsi, 2007:88). The annexation of vast Muslim populations, it must be noted, was not met by a corresponding increase in their representation in government. Occupying less than a third of the seats on Trabaud’s executive council, and 40% of Gouraud’s Administrative Council failed to represent their demographic weight.

It must also be noted that, irrespective of confessional background, the vast majority of Lebanese councillors during the Mandate period were from the landowning and capitalist elite. This indicates the real function of conciliar government in modern Lebanon – the representation of confessional communities not in proportion to their demographic weight but to their socioeconomic influence.

The internalisation of confessional-consociationalism in the body politic of the Lebanese public was most ostensible during the tenure of Maurice Serrail (1924-1926) who represented “the republican exception in French policy toward Lebanon”. Motivated by his zealous adherence to the democratic trinity of French republicanism and driven by a desire to alleviate socioeconomic disparities between Beirut/Mount Lebanon and recently-annexed territories, Serrail appointed a number of Muslims in top administrative posts, unified the fiscal system and proposed a national, secular educational system. His administrative reforms included the division of Lebanon into eleven mixed muḥāfazāt (governorates) undermining the relative homogeneity of the cazas (Traboulsi, 2007:88).

Essentially, Serrail’s mandate abolished the principles of proportionality and decentralism in favour of ‘liberty, equality and fraternity.’ The elite and the Maronite Church however hurried
to rescue their confessional-consociational model by lobbying against Serrail and demanding his dismissal. Pressuring the Quai d’Orsay, the Maronite Church and its lobbyists in Paris were perhaps the most important actors in bringing an end to Serrail’s reforms (Traboulsi, 2007:88).

To prevent another setback and pre-empt such integrative and homogenising reforms as those introduced by Serrail, the Constitution of 1926 was drafted demonstrating unrelenting commitment to consociationalism. Articles 9, 10 and 95 guaranteed proportional representation and assigned exclusive jurisdiction to confessional groups on matters of their specific and exclusive concern – especially, personal status courts and communal schools. Furthermore, the ‘representatives’ of the various ‘spiritual families’ were granted the exclusive right to intermediate between the ‘sect’ and the Constitutional Council (Qabbani, 2009:25). In effect, the Constitution of 1926 enshrined the principle that Lebanon was not a society of equal individuals, but a mosaic of ‘spiritual families’.

3.4.2 The Consociational Republic

The entente between the Lebanese elite and French colonial interests however was short-lived. By the mid-1930s, anti-colonial sentiments soared. Driven by a conflict of interest with French companies in Lebanon, a coalition of businessmen-politicians developed from amongst the cross-confessional bourgeoisie. The new ‘power bloc’ capitalised on their connections with the monarchs of Egypt, the British and emerging Arab monarchies to consolidate their struggle for independence vis-à-vis France and Syria.

Mediated by Egyptian Prime Minister, Mustafa El-Nahhas Pasha in 1942, a series of meetings were arranged in Cairo between prominent Maronite lawyer, Bechara El-Khouri and Sunni leader, Riad El-Sulh as well as between them and nationalist Syrian leader, Jamil Mardam. As a result, a cross-confessional front crystallised with the blessing of the Syrian leadership and the support of the Anglo-Egyptian alliance seeking to replace French imperial interests in the region (Traboulsi, 2007:105).

It must be noted that an unwritten pact underpinned the Khouri-Sulh coalition. The ‘National Pact’ allowed the lumpen-bourgeoisie to replace the French-allied dominant segment of the bourgeoisie in constituting the ‘centre’ in the independent republic but assured that no fundamental change in the governing political superstructure would take place. The segmentation of the state, distribution of power between ‘spiritual families’ and principles of consociation were reaffirmed. Amendments to the 1926 Constitution were only symbolic and rhetorical.

The declaration of independence in 1943 reiterated the power-sharing formulas of the mandatory period: the presidency was confined to the Maronite community and the
premiership to the Sunnis – those being Bechara El-Khoury and Riad El-Sulh. Chairmanship of the Chamber of Deputies alternated between Shiite, Greek-Orthodox and Greek-Catholic speakers until the position was finally confined to the Shiites in the 1950s. Moreover, deputies to the ‘three presidencies’ are conventionally allocated to Greek-Orthodox and Greek-Catholics.

Crucially, the National Pact stipulated that government would cease to be legitimate if one or more ‘spiritual families’ are underrepresented. Moreover, the consociational system guaranteed that confessions were represented according to their numerical strength as indicated by the 1932 population census – the last census since.

3.5 CONCLUSIONS: POLITICAL FAMILIES, SPIRITUAL FAMILIES AND THE POLITICS OF CONSENSUS

It has been the aim of this chapter to outline the dynamics and particularities of the hybrid political system in modern Lebanon. It has, therefore, been important to examine the historical experience and social dynamics of the Lebanese transition to modernity in an attempt to conceptualise sociopolitical order in modern Lebanon. In light of this, it has been demonstrated that modernity in Greater Syria was triggered by the asymmetric encounter with Mehmet Ali’s modernising Egypt in the early-nineteenth century and modern-capitalist Europe in the mid-nineteenth century. Despite the common core of Arab modernities however, Lebanon exhibits a particular modernising experience given the impact of social and physical-geographic conditions on the ontologies of subnational collectivities.

Consisting of numerous, self-centred and relatively isolated ‘sects’, early-modern Lebanon did not develop the homogenising or ‘erasive’ unity characteristic of its Arab neighbours. Instead, political order in Lebanon entailed sophisticated power-sharing arrangements whereby rational ‘confessional ethnies’ were integrated in a modern, multi-centred, multi-confessional state. The state, on the other hand, was introduced to the previously-autonomous mountain dominions of the ‘sect’. The political system, therefore, is a hybrid system incorporating customary and conciliar forms of government; rational-cultural and legal-contractual relations; traditional and rational legitimations.

The transition to modern statehood in Lebanon, thus, did not produce a unitary nation-state in the Hegelian sense. Instead, the political paradigm was one of deep disarticulations: while it is a symbol of cultural backwardness and vulgarity to ‘be sectarian’, it is a symbol of patriotism and cultural refinement to acknowledge the ‘particularities’ of the ‘Lebanese mosaic’. Essentially, this demonstrates the perplexities of Lebanese modernity: on the one hand, it aspires to present Lebanon as modern nation-state with a claim to authenticity; on the other
hand, it acknowledges that there was no principled break with the ‘sectarian subnationalism’ or the social relations of confessional-feudalism.

Consequently, ‘Lebaneseness’ entailed a chauvinistic nationalism akin to modern nationalism aimed at differentiating ‘Lebanon’ from the world beyond. This ‘identity’, it was hoped, would bring together the Lebanese in an ‘imagined community’ which is founded more on notions of ‘who we are not’ rather than ‘who we are’. It was in this light that a loose national identity founded upon notions of neo-Phoenicianism and the ‘ancient’ merchant republic were articulated and disseminated by the modern state. Lebanon’s neo-Phoenician identity was founded on the national/historical myth that (i) Lebanon is a ‘mosaic’ of peoples; and (ii) a freewheeling merchant republic governed by a minimalist state. This state was far from the centralised, unitary and ‘modern’ state. Instead, it was a meeting place for the representatives of the ‘spiritual families’ constituting the ‘Lebanese mosaic’.

In light of this, it can be argued that modern Lebanon is a multi-centred socio-political order based on the politics of accommodation between the ‘pillars’ or ‘spiritual families’ of Lebanese society – a repercussion of the particular historical formation and political economy of micro-powers and subnational group solidarities sharing and competing for spatial, temporal and reflexive territories.

As a result, government in early-modern Lebanon entailed complex decision-making procedures and precarious power-sharing arrangements involving tedious bargains and compromises between competing neo-feudal houses. Essentially, the Lebanese state was minimalist and sovereignty was divided amongst neo-feudal ‘political families’ claiming representation of ‘spiritual families’ – that is to say, confessional communities. This was in stark contrast to the centralised monolithic state in Mehmet Ali’s Egypt and beylical Tunisia in the mid-nineteenth century.

Moreover, given the peripherality of Lebanese capitalism and the evolutionary transition to the capitalist mode of production, feudal elites have been able to survive the transition and constitute a proportionally-large segment of the capitalist bourgeoisie. As a result, hybrid modes of production and, crucially, economic and extra-economic relations of coercion coexist in modern Lebanon producing a medley of identities based on different ontologies and epistemologies. The multiplicity of economic and socio-political structures, thus, resulted in a multi-centred order in contrast to the homogenising presuppositions of modernisation theory.

In other words, not only is the Lebanese superstructure an example of ‘hybrid modernity’ insofar as it diverges from the prototypical nation-state model; it is also a political system
which accommodates multiple claims to the truth, worldviews and *modus vivendi* – that is to say, hybrid modernities coexisting within the ‘hybrid-modern’ consociational superstructure.

While the political economy of Lebanese modernity and consociationalism will be discussed in the next chapter, it suffices to note that the implications of the minimalist, multi-centred state in Lebanon are twofold. Firstly, it allowed for the integration of pre-capitalist elites in the context of the unrestrained, freewheeling capitalism subservient to the economic interests of the dominant sector of the financial-mercantile bourgeoisie. Secondly, the confessional-consociational order allowed members of the dominant class to capitalise on their pre-modern social relations, reinforce clientelistic dyads and consolidate the status of political dynasties based on traditional legitimations.

In concluding, the multi-centeredness of the political economy in early-modern Lebanon and the multiplicity of ethno-sectarian ontologies and collective identities cannot be explained by the unitary and monolithic presuppositions of modernisation theory. The ‘vertical pluralism’ and the relationship between the multi-centred state and multiple ‘sectarian ethnies’ indicates ‘hybrid modernities’ or, at least, a deviation from ‘modernity’. Moreover, social formations within each vertical segment have developed in a ‘modern’ and ‘rational’ manner but based on and justified through different ontologies and epistemologies. ‘Modernism’ in the periphery, therefore, has taken place as a *de facto* reality, but through different foundational reasoning – hence, substantiating ‘hybrid modernities’ theory. Thus, as discussed so far and as argued and articulated in the following chapters, Lebanese political economy, horizontally and vertically, should be conceptualised within the theory of ‘hybrid modernities’.
CHAPTER FOUR

PERIPHERAL CAPITALISM AND CONFESSIONAL-CONSOCIATIONAL DEMOCRACY IN LEBANON
It has been argued in the previous chapter that Lebanon witnessed a ‘late’ transition to modernity triggered by (i) an asymmetric encounter with the modern ‘other’ and (ii) unequal incorporation into global capitalism. Lebanese modernity was, therefore, driven by a perplexed modernising elite attempting a precarious balance between ‘authenticity’ and ‘traditionalism’ on the one hand and ‘modernity’ and ‘cosmopolitanism’ on the other. Significantly, however, Lebanese modernity differs from its Arab counterparts despite their common starting point – the Nahda. Unlike Egypt and Tunisia, for instance, Lebanon did not witness the development of a unitary state with the monolithic function of ‘modernising’ society, neither did the political system in Lebanon conform to the Syrian, Turkish or Iraqi models whereby the state ‘engineered’ society into a national ‘imagined community’; hence, shifting the identity paradigm from Arab, Kurd, Turk or Sunni, Shiite, Alawi to the ‘erasive equality’ of ‘Syrian’, ‘Turkish’ and ‘Iraqi’ identity.

Instead, Lebanon witnessed the emergence of a political superstructure unique to the region – a multi-centred state founded upon the presupposition that ‘the nation’ was, in fact, a ‘mosaic’ of subnational communities. The multi-centred state in early-modern Lebanon performed a dual function. Firstly, it facilitated the expansion of the modern state into the previously isolated and autonomous ‘homelands’ of self-centred sects. Secondly, it acted as a meeting place for political and neo-feudal leaderships (za‘uama) representing ‘ā’ilāt ṭūḥiya (spiritual families). Essentially, the ṭawā‘ef (sects) became the ‘pillars’ of the ‘deeply divided’ Lebanese house much like the lagern in Switzerland, the zuilen in the Netherlands and the familles spirituelles in Belgium.

It must be noted, however, that, although ‘balance-of-power politics’ in Lebanon are rooted in pre-modern social realities including the geographic concentration of ‘sectarian’ communities, their ontological self-centredness and economic self-subsistence, consociationalism as a modern form of government emerged in the mid-nineteenth century in response to (i) the imposition of ‘modern’ governing structures during the Egyptian interlude; (ii) Beirut’s uneven incorporation in the global capitalist market; and (iii) the integration of the socioeconomic elite in the geostrategic sphere of influence of an expanding industrial-capitalist Europe. These pivotal transformations forced the elite in Mount Lebanon to coalesce under the umbrella of a political superstructure which would serve the interests of the dominant class by (i) allowing them the autonomy to organise and dominate their respective subgroups, the ṭawā‘ef; (ii) providing a platform for elite acquiescence; and, crucially, (iii) establishing the mechanisms to moderate social antagonisms and contain conflict within the bounds of ‘order’.

It this light, it can be argued that the mutaṣarifiyya had, for the first time, ‘pillarised’ society in Mount Lebanon into political segments by introducing ‘institutionalised separatism’ in
governing councils, education and the judiciary (Hudson, 1969:251). In other words, Ottoman reforms in 1861 laid the foundation for a modern political system based on confessional-consociationalism and institutionalised sectarian separatism in spite of the state’s expansion, urbanisation and the modern technologies of communication and transportation.

The theoretical and conceptual significance of the study of confessional-consociationalism in Lebanon, therefore, transcends the mere contextualisation of consociational theory within the Lebanese experience. In fact, the significance of the study of Lebanon’s political superstructure is twofold. Firstly, consociationalism in Lebanon is rooted in the country’s ‘incomplete modernity’ and, thus, in a precarious balance between seemingly-contradictory ‘traditional’ and ‘modern’ legitimations, social relations and institutional arrangements. Secondly, the ruling elite cartel in Lebanon is deeply influenced by the nature and dynamics of Lebanon’s dependent-capitalist economy. This is especially evident in the mutually-reinforcing relationship between symbiotic patron-client relations, the consociational superstructure and the segmented public domain.

In this vein, this chapter examines the political economy of Lebanese modernity emphasising the salience of dependent capitalism. Lebanon’s ‘incomplete modernity’ and its peripheral form of capitalism, it will be shown, entail a precarious coexistence of multiple modes of productions (MoP) – hence, the persistence of symbiotic patron-client relations which underpin ‘modern’ and instrumental sectarianism. Before discussing the political economy of Lebanese modernity, however, it is useful to survey some of the established views on confessional-consociationalism in Lebanon highlighting the modern-capitalist roots of a social order which, *prima facie*, appears ‘traditional’.

### 4.1 A SECTARIAN STATE OR A STATE OF SECTARIANISM?

It is evident from the everyday politics of Lebanese society that public opinion is deeply polarised over the issue of ‘political sectarianism’. This discrepancy is even more evident in the political discourse of the country’s ruling class as well as in the highly-polarised corpus of literature produced by scholars of Lebanese studies and political practitioners throughout the twentieth century. This division demonstrates the perplexities of Lebanese modernity. On the one hand, Lebanon is presented a ‘modern’ nation-state with a historical legacy and a claim to authenticity and, thus, ‘being sectarian’ is perceived as a symbol of cultural backwardness and vulgarity. On the other hand, acknowledging the 'particularities' of the 'Lebanese mosaic' is seen as a symbol of patriotism and cultural refinement. It is in this vein that partisans of the Lebanese political system consider confessional-consociationalism an ‘appropriate alternative’
to such unpalatable options as class struggle; existing or potential tyranny by one segment of society; or ‘aggression’ by the majority or a dominant segment (UNDP, 2009a:92).

Lebanese Marxists, however, have repeatedly argued that political sectarianism is, effectively, an impediment to the revolutionary transition to capitalism and, thus, socialism. Less progressive opponents of confessional-consociationalism, on the other hand, emphasise the system’s repeated failure to produce stable government and attribute cyclical patterns of conflict to the rigidity of the ‘magical consociational formula’. Both, however, converge over the belief that political sectarianism exacerbates antagonisms; increases social isolation and prevents the emergence of a cross-segmental public domain. The following section outlines some of the fundamental arguments of the culturalist and economistic approaches to the question of confessional-consociationalism in modern Lebanon.

4.1.1 The Culturalist Approach and the ‘Lebanese Mosaic’

Since the mid-nineteenth century, a clique of Beirut-based entrepreneurs, lawyers and journalists embarked on articulating an overarching identity and a national myth of origin which would act as a cohesive force for the ‘medley of peoples’ constituting the emerging Lebanese polity. In this vein, such ‘national entrepreneurs’ as Naṣīf Naṣār (1983) described ‘Lebanon’ as a “unique and extremely complex dynamic” consisting of “clear, deep-rooted, historical and multidimensional collective identities.” This conceptualisation of the confessional order can be located within a political discourse founded by Michel Chiha (1891-1954) in the early decades of the twentieth century. For Chiha, Lebanon is a “country of adaptive sectarian minorities” whose “unity takes on a unique form”; Lebanon is a “whole” composed of “smaller building blocks” – the tawā’ef (‘Āmil, 2003:75). Chiha’s brother-in-law and business partner, Henri Pharaon (1959:12), developed this discourse arguing that:

Lebanon is a mosaic of minorities distinguishable according to their rites, denominations, religions, social values and political persuasions. [...] In fact, Lebanon loses its existential precondition the day it ceases to provide all those who inhabit it refuge from and assurances against discrimination.

Contemporary theoreticians of confessional-consociationalism echo similar convictions as evidenced by Antoine Messarra (1938:24):

In a plural society, we must acknowledge the presence of [...] intermediary collectivities between the state and the citizenry without which we may not speak of ‘pluralism’. [...] There is no doubt we must build the state, however that may not be achieved through majoritarianism.

According to this culturalist view, the confessional ‘pillar’ is a natural and inevitable attribute of modern Lebanon. In fact, confessions cannot exist in the absence of the modern state whereas the latter cannot exist without confessions acknowledged by and integrated in the
system. This essentialist discourse characterised ‘mainstream’ academic views and defined the official narrative for much of the twentieth century. It is in this vein that Lebanon was described as and ‘a house of many mansions’ to use Kamal Salibi’s (2005) expression.

Crucially, however, Chiha’s discourse gained a stamp of officialdom by President Charles Helou who, in his 1964 inaugural speech, referred to the confessions as ‘familles spirituelles’ and considered consociational democracy the only guarantee for a plural society capable of realising its full potential. Helou’s reference to the ṭawā‘ef as ‘spiritual families’ left little room for doubt: the ruling establishment was committed to institutionalising confessionalism:

I believe that the democratic system is an intrinsic necessity for our country [...] It assures a balance between powers and makes possible a fruitful meeting among the Lebanese spiritual families. Thus their energies are activated within the democratic foundations, and their needs are met within a framework of brotherly cooperation (in Hudson, 1969:245).

4.1.2 The Economistic Approach and the Marxist ‘Contrast’
For proponents of the economistic approach, however, sectarian ‘diversity’ is not a precursor for sociopolitical segmentation. In this vein, Clovis Maksoud’s (2009) critique of the Lebanese system stresses the distinction between ‘diversity’ and ‘pluralism’ arguing that the former is uniting insofar as it reaffirms equality between citizens whereas the latter is divisive because it consecrates myths of peculiarity and originality.

This, according to Jean Aziz (2010), is especially true in Lebanon where segmentation is based on (confessional and denominational) ‘sacreds’ in the anthropological sense as opposed to the less ‘emotional’ linguistic-cultural divisions. The Lebanese conundrum, according to this view, lies in the fact that ‘the sacred’ prevails over the ‘rational’ but does not fully replace it.

Marxists’ critique of the confessional-consociational system, however, transcends the question of ‘diversity’ or ‘pluralism’ arguing that, although all societies exhibit varying degrees of diversity, only a few adopt communitarian, multi-centred political systems. In his critique of Chiha’s culturalist claims, Mahdi ‘Āmil (2003:38) exclaims:

why is it that ‘diversity’ in Lebanon assumes a socio-political fashion and why does it dominate the realm of state-society relations in the form of what we now call ‘sectarianism’ or ‘confessionalism’ whereas ‘diversity’ in France or the United States does not project itself unto the political system?

The dynamics of social and political modernisation in nineteenth-century Lebanon and the self-centredness, self-subsistence and autonomy of ‘the sect’ explain, in part, the prevalence of a multi-centred rather than unitary, homogenising modernity akin to neighbouring Arab countries. In other words, Lebanon’s disarticulated multi-centred order is a ‘hybrid-modern’ order which developed in response to the particularities of the Lebanese transition.
Āmil’s rhetorical question, however, draws attention to the role of the modernising elite – that is to say, the social actors carrying forward the ‘modernity project’ and articulating its ontological and institutional ramifications. In this vein, the ‘confessional state’ is perceived not as a ‘disarticulated’ political superstructure, but as a ‘particular historical order’ which fulfils the same functions of the ‘modern’ state in modern societies – namely, allowing the elite to exercise class dominance (Sharara, 1975; Āmil, 2003:23; UNDP, 2009a:85; Traboulsi, 2010).

In other words, whereas Chiha’s discourse considers ‘Lebanon’, ‘pluralism’ and ‘the politics of accommodation’ inseparable, Lebanese Marxists argue that the political system is a product of the ‘problematic foundations’ of Lebanese capitalism. In fact, Marxist conceptualisations of confessional-consociationalism emphasise the fact that ‘sects’, in the political sense, did not exist until the mid-nineteenth century and that their ‘political existence’ and ‘institutional organisation’ was concomitant with the birth of the modern, bourgeois state. In this vein, it must be noted that, even under the Ottoman millet system and the Règlement organique, the autonomy ascribed to non-Muslim sects had no effect on the political superstructure. Ottoman archives, for instance, reveal that the imperial bureaucracy exercised universal functions as the only entity authorised to settle disputes of an administrative or commercial nature irrespective of sectarian affiliation (Hallaq, 2009). The decentralism of personal status courts in Ottoman Lebanon did not entail political or institutional sectarianism as Baalbaki (1985:102-104) notes:

> Although ‘sects’ have existed in some social form or another since the Fatimid era [...] the regulatory frameworks of allowing the sects (which predate Lebanese capitalism) had no impact on accessing authority, public office and wealth until the emergence of Lebanese capitalism.

The emergence of ‘the confession’ as a political unit in the early-nineteenth century, others contend, should be understood in light of the ‘colonial encounter’. On the one hand, the divide-and-conquer policies of Ibrahim Pasha in the 1930s and Europe thereafter politicised the sectarian cleavage exacerbating Maronite-Druze antagonisms. On the other hand, animosities between Muslims and Christians in Greater Syria mirrored (1) the struggle between Europe and the Sublime Porte over the direction of the Tanzimat reforms and (2) the struggle among elites over the meaning of ‘tradition’ (Sharara, 1975; Makdisi, 2000:3; 55; 59-69).

Whether they are merely instruments of economic domination or ramifications of the colonial encounter, both opinions agree that confessions are modern ‘political relationships’ which tie members of the ‘spiritual family’ to neo-patrimonial zu‘ama with an entitlement to leadership. According to this view, confessional-consociationalism is not an ‘essential’ but, rather, a historical form of political organisation. This historical form ‘evolved’ with such historical developments as the establishment of the Higher Islamic Shiite Council (HISC) in 1967 which ‘pillarised’ the Shiites (Āmil, 2003; Traboulsi, 2007).
4.1.3 State, Sect and Citizen: Shifting the Paradigms of State-Society Relations

The ‘particular historical form’ of government which Marxists attribute to the modern bourgeois state, that is to say, confessional-consociationalism, is, indeed, anchored in the 1926 Constitution which considers the confession an essential building block of the Lebanese whole and ascribes to it a moral standing and an intrinsic equality distinct from those ascribed to the individual citizen. In fact, the Constitution establishes the civic and political equality of the Lebanese citizen (muwāṭin) inasmuch as it establishes them as subjects of their respective confessions. The individual, therefore, is a member of a confession and only through that relationship does he/she gain citizen status (Traboulsi, 2007:109; UNDP, 2009a:172).

The triangulation between state, sect and citizen, critics often argue, drags society into ascriptive and primordial allegiances rooted in pre-modernity (Sayegh, 2009; Aziz, 2010). This, however, depicts an incomplete picture and is not completely true. It has been argued in Chapter Three that although the ṭawā‘īf capitalise on ascriptive membership and reinforce recurrent, overpowering and ‘irrational’ sentiments, they maintain little relationship to models of political organisation intrinsic to ‘traditional’ religion as such. In reality, therefore, confessions are modern-rational ‘imagined communities’, socially constructed by ‘ethnic entrepreneurs’ to address the instrumental interests of their members (Rex, 1996:99).

Empirical evidence, for instance, shows us that subnational group solidarities in modern Lebanon involve four concentric circles which are typically mutually-reinforcing: (extended) family; patronymic group; village; and sect (Hudson, 1969).

It must be noted, however, that the strength and sustainability of these solidarities rests on the needs which they satisfy and the status they confer upon individual and collective subcomponents. Interestingly, patronymic groups continue to act as the main source of security and status for their members despite modernisation and urbanisation (Melikian and Diab, 1959). Empirical evidence, however, shows us that patronymic groups are substituted by confessional solidarities as the primary source of security and status for their members in the more anonymous, mixed and ‘cosmopolitan’ urban context. In this vein, Fuad Khuri (1972) notes that sectarian solidarity amongst Beirut’s Shiite migrants in the early-twentieth century marked a break with village politics where familial alliances and petty struggles of spite and influence prevail. In other words, ‘civility’ was realised by expressing rather than suppressing sectarian/religious identity – a stark contrast to secular Eurocentric perceptions.

Arguably, the functional role of sectarian solidarities in modern Lebanon can be compared to the role attributed to religion in the political thought of Nahda intellectuals. Both religion and
confession provided society with the solidarity, civility and morality required to facilitate the transformation from ‘traditional’ and ‘simple’ societies to ‘modern’ and ‘complex’ ones.

The rational, functional role of the confession, however, must not conceal the fact that they construct symbolic ‘codes of distinction’ and initiate members through processes of induction which may involve certain rites of initiation or collective rituals. Boundaries are constructed to distinguish between inside and outside; strangers and familiars; kin and akin; friends and foes. These boundaries may or may not be purely symbolic: they may, indeed, translate into ‘ethnic specialisation’ or entail differential access to resources, power, public space and institutional markets (Eisenstadt and Giesen, 1995).

In short, the ṭawā’ef are ‘traditional’ insofar as they capitalise on and consolidate ascriptive bonds, religious sentiments and ritualistic practices. They are, however, modern-rational constructs insofar as they perform such functional roles as providing security and access to resources and opportunities as well as conferring status upon their members.

Rational as they may be, however, the fact remains that the triangulation between state, sect and citizen shifted the paradigm of state-society relations in Lebanon away from the Hegelian model of the omnipresent nation-state. In other words, the multi-centred social order, state minimalism and strong self-centred peripheries in modern Lebanon prevented the crystallisation of a single homogenising identity – a stark contrast to Western modernities where ‘national’ ideologies and mainstream modus vivendi are generated at the centre, disseminated by the monolithic state and imposed upon the nation (Gellner, 1983; Rex, 1996).

Instead, ‘Lebaneseness’ became a ‘negative identification’ with the non-Lebanese ‘other’ rather than a ‘positive identification’ with a set of national myths or historical narratives. Moreover, attitudinal and behavioural value systems and ‘mainstream’ worldviews in Lebanon are generated at the subnational/confessional centre; disseminated by the institutions of the confession and imposed upon the subnational collectivity. This is evident in public opinion especially amongst younger generations whose sense of belongingness reflects strong chauvinistic sentiments and, yet, a noticeable lack of consensus and clarity over national identity, shared values and historical narrative (UNDP, 2009a:87).

4.1.3.1 Political Confessionalism: The Transitory Constant

Interestingly, proponents of confessional-consociationalism have, historically, acknowledged the fragmenting effect of the political system and its adverse effects on ‘national unity’. As a result, consociationalism was advocated as a ‘transitory’ mechanism to mitigate the effects of political and institutional modernisation – especially, the expansion of the state into the previously-isolated domains of the sect. In other words, whereas Chiha’s discourse argued that
‘pluralism’ and the politics of accommodation were ‘essential’ attributes of the Lebanese polity, they perceived political confessionalism as a necessity ‘until society became ready’ for the abolition of the consociational political system. This is most evident in the perambulatory articles of the Lebanese Constitution which consider the abolition of confessionalism ‘a basic goal’ and a ‘moment of historical and national awakening’ towards which society must work (Qabbani, 2009). The ‘temporariness’ of political confessionalism was once again reiterated in the National Pact of 1943, the Ta’if Accord in 1989 and the Doha Agreement in 2008. Until then, consociationalists argued, proportional representation, power-sharing arrangements and mutual vetoes would mitigate the effects of poor integration, safeguard pluralism and prevent tyranny by one or more confessions (Owen 1976:27; Petran, 1987:33; El-Khazen, 1991:5-17).

In other words, proponents of ‘the confessional state’ demonstrated a deeply-perplexed view of the relationship between the state, sect and citizen. On the one hand, consociationalism was the only possible political answer to social pluralism which itself is an ‘essential’ attribute of ‘Lebanon’. Despite this essentialist claim, however, consociationalism is only a transient political phase responding to the dynamics of a ‘particular historical moment’ – that is to say, the precarious transition to modern-capitalism and the expansion of the state into the periphery and the periphery into the centre (Messara, 2009).

4.1.3.2 The Sectarian State: Between Balance-of-Power Politics and Class Dominance

The primary function of the confessional state in Lebanon, thus, is to balance the interests and powers of the various vertical segments of society – the ṭawā‘ef. The conciliatory function of the confessional state in Lebanon, however, is in contradiction to Engels’ (2010) conceptualisation of the state as an admission that society has become entangled in an insoluble contradiction and is cleft into irreconcilable antagonisms. Similarly, the politics of consociation appears to be, prima facie, in contradiction to the Marxist and Weberian view of the state as the political arm of the dominant class.

How does the confessional state in Lebanon reconcile its role as a ‘consociational’ superstructure and, simultaneously, an instrument of class dominance? Does the Lebanese state merely balance the interests of the ṭawā‘ef or does it also ‘contain’ social conflict within the bounds of ‘order’ as defined by the dominant class?

Chiha’s discourse itself provides an answer to this question. Although it has repeatedly reiterated the state’s neutrality in representing all confessions, Chiha’s conceptualisations of the sectarian state in Lebanon also admits that the state is not indifferent to the hegemony of particular confessions. In fact, Chiha himself admitted that the postcolonial state in Lebanon represented the dominance of a Maronite-Sunni elite. This explains why Sunni aspirants for the
premiership ‘coupled’ with Maronite presidential hopefuls – a phenomenon which Khalidi (1991) calls the ‘bisectarianism’ of the confessional system. In the mid-nineteenth century, a similar situation of ‘bisectarianism’ existed whereby the Druze aristocracy shared power with an increasingly-affluent Maronite middle class (Traboulsi, 2007).

The ‘bisectarianism’ of the confessional state, however, must not suggest political sectarianism in Lebanon substitutes structures of class dominance with structures of sectarian dominance. Instead, confessionalism must be understood as an instrument of class dominance. This is evidenced by the fact that the ‘bisectarianism’ of the Sunni-Maronite elite on the eve of independence, for instance, corresponded to the sectarian composition of the dominant class. In fact, the struggle for confessional dominance within the ruling class is, according to Marxist analysis, a struggle between different factions of the dominant class. In other words, the state in Lebanon is (i) an instrument of class dominance; and (ii) medium for intra-elite competition.

In other words, the consociational establishment contains class struggle within the bounds of the ‘confessional order’, limits inter-class conflict and organises intra-elite competition by shifting the paradigm towards the question of ‘equality’ between confessions rather than ‘inequality’ between social classes. Moreover, the state applies a number of consociational mechanisms to contain inter-segmental conflicts and mitigate the effects of poor integration. The Lebanese state, therefore, can be conceptualised as a modern-bourgeois state in the Marxist sense as well as a multi-centred, consociational state.

4.2 THE POLITICAL ECONOMY OF THE CAPITALIST TRANSFORMATION

Conceptualising the Lebanese confessional system as a hybrid between the Marxist-Weberian state and the balance-of-power consociational state necessitates an examination of the political economy of consociationalism in Lebanon. Examining the political economy of modernisation and the consociational system in Lebanon helps explain how the system provides the modernising elite with the necessary structures of dominance and why their class dominance takes on a multi-centred, confessional-consociational outlook.

In this vein, it is important to reiterate the theoretical underpinnings of hybrid modernities and peripheral capitalism. It must be noted, therefore, that ‘hybrid modernities’ presupposes the coexistence of ‘traditional’, ‘authentic-modern’ and ‘Western-modern’ constellations and social relations whereas dependency theory presupposes the coexistence of multiple MoPs. In other words, late/incomplete modernities produce hybrid socio-political systems through evolutionary transitions triggered and influenced by encounters with the modern ‘other’ – hence, incorporating pre-modern relations of an asymmetric nature and ‘traditional’ legitimations alongside modern-rational relations and universalist institutions/bureaucracies
(Oritz, 2000). Dependency theory, on the other hand, stresses the coevality of pre-capitalist (feudal, industrial and commercial) MoPs alongside modern capitalism (Ougaard, 1982).

Late/incomplete modernities and peripheral capitalisms, therefore, are extrovert transitions which respond to externally-generated impetus and, as the Arab Nahda demonstrates, attempt to mimic or match the social, economic and cultural constellations of the modern-capitalist ‘other’. The repercussion of this disarticulated socioeconomic transformation, therefore, is an extroversion of aspirations which fails to fully deconstruct the constellations of pre-modernity and pre-capitalism and, similarly, fails to fully adopt the presupposed universalist constellations of Eurocentric modernity. The result, therefore, is an unprincipled extroversion of aspirations which manifests itself in urban development, cultural influence, language and art (‘Āmil, 1974; Hanna, 2002; Abdel-Baqi, 2005; Hallaq, 2009). ‘Earlier modernities’, by contrast, are auto-centred transitions which develop, largely, in accordance to domestic processes of social and economic change.

Similarly, whereas capitalism in auto-centred modernities corresponds to technological advances, industrial demand and complex inter-sectoral linkages, peripheral capitalism involves the extroversion of production structures and economic orientation. As a result, sectoral linkages in peripheral-capitalist economies are severely disrupted and the economy is subordinated not to the demands and introvert logics of social and economic development but to the demand and supply dynamics of ‘centre’ economies.

More profoundly, the elite in late-modernising societies for whom this cultural hybridity becomes a lifestyle is hastily and unevenly integrated in the advanced economies of earlier modernities. In other words, underdeveloped capitalisms in late-modernising societies become peripheral to and dependent on earlier modernities’ advanced industrial-capitalist economies. The bourgeoisie in late-modernising societies, therefore, is a ‘comprador’ class unable to develop its own modern-capitalist structures and, instead, acts as an extension of the ‘centre’ bourgeoisie in the peripheral economy.

The essential presupposition of ‘hybrid modernities’ and dependency theory, therefore, is that late/incomplete modernities and developing economies depend on and are extroverted towards the ‘other’ – that is to say, earlier modernities and centre-capitalist economies. This allows us to locate socio-political order in Lebanon within the historical context of the country’s incorporation in the global capitalist system and, hence, highlight the evolution of its disarticulated peripheral-capitalist economy. The dynamics of political/institutional modernism in modern Lebanon cannot be fully understood without comprehending the political economy of the dominant class: the ‘comprador’ bourgeoisie.
4.2.1 The ‘Evolutionary’ Transition to Peripheral Capitalism

Interestingly, the cultural and economic extroversion of the dominant class in Mount Lebanon dates back to the seventeenth century. The dominance of the feudal and commercial sectors was reinforced by Fakhedinne II’s declaration of an autonomous emirate in Mount Lebanon. Fakhredinne eagerly integrated Mount Lebanon’s nascent sericulture into the economy of the Italian city-states, especially the Dutchy of Tuscany and, thus, invited Florentine artisans and architects and fostered a hybrid Arabo-Tuscan culture which manifests itself in the dress code and architecture characteristic of Mount Lebanon to date (Hourani, 1986).

It must be noted, however, that Lebanon’s integration into the politico-strategic sphere of influence of a modernising capitalist Europe did not correspond to a principled or fundamental change in the political economy in Lebanon. In other words, the challenge capitalism posed to the feudal relations and country-based economy in early-modern Europe was not matched by a similar process in the Lebanese case. Hence, the transition to modern capitalism in Lebanon failed to produce an urban, bourgeois revolution akin to the French Revolution. In fact, preferential access and selective exposure to modern Europe restricted the process of socioeconomic modernisation to the established, pre-capitalist elite.

Consequently, it was the upper classes which enjoyed exposure and access to the techniques and culture of the modern ‘other’ since the Egyptian invasion of Greater Syria. The lower classes, on the other hand, were only superficially exposed to global modernity and capitalism in the aftermath of World War II. Similarly, mandatory policies selectively integrated members of the established elite into the modern-capitalist world order and, in general, excluded the poor (Hudson, 1968; Fawaz, 1983; Gates, 1998).

In other words, peripheral capitalism in Lebanon did not produce a revolutionary bourgeoisie nor did it entail a principled rupture with pre-capitalist MoPs and social relations. Instead, peripheral capitalism marked the birth of a non-revolutionary, non-confrontational ‘comprador’ bourgeoisie which was, essentially, a hybrid class incorporating elements of the pre-capitalist elite alongside emerging capitalists. Lebanese peripheral capitalism, therefore, involved ‘surgical alterations’ in the ideologies and social relations of the dominant class rather than the overthrowing of an ancien regime (’Āmil, 1974).

Lebanon’s integration in the global economy and the expansion of the capitalist MoP, therefore, coexisted with pre-capitalist MoPs manifested in primitive urban/artisan industries, subsistence agriculture and pre-capitalist mercantilism. In fact, it can be argued that peripheral capitalism and the modern political system were established ‘outside’ the existing order and
were, therefore, uninterested in disrupting pre-capitalist social relations and MoPs (Daher, 1981:27-37; Hamdan, 1991:97-98). In evidencing this, Hany (1983:112) notes that:

the transformation from the feudal system to capitalist formations in Lebanon is closer to a ‘reformist’ route: pliant with feudalism, reluctant and indecisive. This perhaps explains [...] why the process consumed more than a century [and yet, a] decisive break with feudal relations has not yet been achieved.

4.2.1.1 Peripheral Capitalism and the ‘Comprador’ Bourgeoisie in Lebanon

The coexistence of capitalist and pre-capitalist MoPs in peripheral economies, Daher (1981:12) explains, can be attributed to the fact that ‘a bare minimum’ of capitalism is sufficient to sustain the economy and guarantee the interests of established (feudal landowners, confessional-religious establishments) and emerging (petty and financial-commercial bourgeoisies) segments of the socioeconomic elite. In other words, capitalism in its peripheral form expands not by challenging or deconstructing pre-capitalist social relations, but by the increased exposure to and penetration by ‘centre’ capitalism (‘Āmil, 1974:92; Gates, 1998:9).

This does not mean that pre-capitalist MoPs retain dominance but, rather, that they are allowed to exist within the capitalist economy. Saba (1976) and Gates (1998), for instance, note that regional specialisation in agriculture; the development of handicraft production for wider markets; the growth of coastal and inland towns into centres of trade and artisanship; and the expansion of monetary wealth independent of the traditional elite since the mid-nineteenth century are proof that capitalism dominated the Lebanese economy – although, without challenging pre-capitalism.

It must be noted, however, that the hegemonic segment of the dominant class – that is to say, the financial-commercial bourgeoisie – did not materialise through class struggle, but through the expansion of European capitalism and its infiltration of Lebanon. Paradoxically, its legitimacy depended on its role in the anti-colonial struggle much like ‘comprador’ dominant bourgeoisies elsewhere in the Middle East and Latin America (Ougaard, 1982).

In other words, the Lebanese bourgeoisie achieved socioeconomic dominance by ‘adjoining’ the bourgeoisie in the ‘centre’ without constructing its own auto-centred, inward-oriented MoP. It was, therefore, articulated and imposed ‘from outside’ and, thus, lacked the impetus or interest to challenge pre-capitalist relations. In fact, the legitimacy of the capitalist dominant class rested on a myriad of ‘traditional’, pre-capitalist and ‘patriotic’ legitimations and extra-economic coercive powers in contradiction to capitalism itself. Consequently, alliance and coexistence rather than confrontation and conflict characterises the relationship between capitalist and pre-capitalist elites in peripheral economies (Traboulsi, 1977; ‘Āmil, 1974; 1978; 1990a; 1990b; Ougaard, 1982).
4.2.1.2 Reproduction Structures, the State and Peripheral Capitalism

Before engaging any further with the political economy of Lebanese modernity and the historical evolution of peripheral capitalism in Lebanon, however, a few remarks regarding the nature of dependent capitalism and the peripheral state must be made.

In this vein, it must be noted that varying degrees of peripheral capitalism can be distinguished by the level of reproduction structures (Ougaard, 1982). Marx’s analysis of reproduction structures distinguishes between three levels of production: (i) the production of consumer goods; (ii) the production of means of production (such as machinery, instruments of labour and raw materials) for consumer goods; and (iii) the production of means of production for the production of means of production.

Given that economic auto-centeredness presupposes relative independence, ‘centre’ capitalism can be distinguished by (i) significant production at all three levels; (ii) the prevalence of organic inter-sectoral linkages determining the dynamics of production; and (iii) a high degree of integration within each branch of production. Of course, achieving absolute auto-centeredness would amount to autarky and complete isolation and is, at best, utopian. Nonetheless, economies are considered auto-centred if production takes place on all three levels and inter-sectoral links are stronger than links with sectors outside the economy. In other words, ‘centre’ capitalisms are characterised by the prevalence of inward-oriented inter-sectoral linkages over outward-oriented production dynamics.

Peripheral capitalisms, on the other hand, involve greater linkages between production structures and supply-and-demand dynamics in ‘centre’ economies vis-à-vis inward-oriented inter-sectoral linkages. Peripheral-capitalist economies can be divided into three subcategories discernable according to the extent to which they depend on ‘centre’ economies.

The first category (denoted p-1) represents the prototypical postcolonial economy where little/no introvert accumulation occurs. Instead, society is connected to and dominated by the economies of the ‘centre’ through circulation. P-1 economies are, therefore, integrated with the ‘centre’ as importers of consumer goods and exporters of raw materials. P-2 economies engage in a limited process of introvert capital accumulation through the production of consumer goods but remain dependent on the import of means of production. P-3 economies, on the other hand, produce the means of production for the production of consumer goods and, thus, possess a more compound process of introvert accumulation but remain dependent on the import of means of production for the production of means of production (Ougaard, 1982). According to this classification, Lebanon falls in the first category as it lacks introvert capital
accumulation; is integrated in the global ‘centre’ through circulation; and is dominated by the outward-oriented sector. In evidencing this, Gates (1998:8) notes that Lebanese capitalism is:

A disarticulated and dominated economy [which] features (i) external orientation promoted by European capital in alliance with the Lebanese bourgeoisie through trade and investment; (ii) overdevelopment of the foreign and tertiary sectors of the economy; [and] (iii) weak productive sectors. [...] Consequently, the share in national income shifted among the sectors, favouring externally-oriented production and services over internally-oriented agricultural and industrial production.

It must be noted, however, that the extent to which an economy is ‘peripheral’ is not a static or ascriptive ‘reality’. In fact, India, for instance, provides a demonstrative example of the shift from prototypical postcolonial peripheral capitalism to the highest stages of capitalist development. Similar transformations towards enhanced introvert capital accumulation and higher reproductive structures took place in much of the developing world in the postcolonial era – Egypt, Pakistan and Latin America are often cited as examples.

The tendency to shift from p-1 towards to p-3, however, is contingent on the extent to which the state is ‘developmental’ to use Shil’s (1975) expression. In this vein, such dependency theorists as Samir Amin (1976) argue that dependency will reproduce itself impeding movement towards higher reproduction structures or, even, expansion on the same level if the accumulation process is determined solely by capitalist competition. State interventionism, however, is a reflection of the interests of the hegemonic power bloc or the dominant class.

Comprehending the dynamics of peripheral capitalism in Lebanon and explaining why it has not shifted towards less-dependent reproduction structures, therefore, requires an investigation of the historical evolution of Lebanese capitalism, the role ascribed to the modern state in Lebanon and the nature of the Lebanese power bloc. This is discussed in the remainder of this chapter.

4.2.2 The Historical Evolution of Lebanese Capitalism

It has been argued so far that the most important implication of the organic dependence of Lebanese capitalism on the rapid expansion of trade and, hence, mercantile and usurious capital is the association of the bourgeoisie’s prosperity with the supply-and-demand dynamic in ‘centre’ economies since the mid-nineteenth century. Until the nineteenth century, the interests of the dominant financial-commercial bourgeoisie in Lebanon depended on the expansion of Egyptian and Ottoman capitalism. In light of rapid industrialisation and the advent of steam navigation in nineteenth-century Europe, however, the paradigms of economic dependence shifted towards European capitalism. This is evident in the patterns of trade and commerce in nineteenth century Lebanon: whereas Egypt and Turkey accounted for more than
half of the country’s trade in the 1830s, trade with France and England grew from 25% in 1833 to over 50% by 1910 (Saba, 1976; Fawaz, 1983:61-62; Gates, 1998; Hallaq, 2009).

The rapid expansion of European capitalism in Greater Syria can be attributed to (i) the substantial investments in industry and infrastructure during the Egyptian interlude; (ii) the expansion of the Capitulations system restricting state monopolies in the Ottoman Empire and granting European capitalists preferential access to Arabo-Ottoman markets; and (iii) Ottoman investments in infrastructure aimed at attracting foreign trade and investment (Gates, 1998:6-7; Hallaq, 2009).

The implications of the expansion of European capitalism in Greater Syria during the nineteenth century are manifold. Firstly, European industrial-capitalists expanded beyond Europe in pursuit of consumer markets and raw materials. As a result, Greater Syria’s imports grew at a faster rate than its exports as demonstrated in Figure 4.1. Secondly, European merchants’ interest in raw materials rather than industrial products discouraged the development of industries in Greater Syria and, instead, promoted the tertiary sector to the detriment of the agricultural and industrial sectors – hence, reinforcing the lowest reproductive structures.

Thirdly, diminished trade with Egypt and Turkey resulted in the demise of previously-affluent port cities such as Saida and Tripoli and the rise of new port cities associated with European trade such as Beirut. Similarly, as interest in Egyptian, Anatolian and Balkan commodities plummeted vis-à-vis manufactured European commodities, ‘traditional’ bazaars lost their glamour and the dominant class of pre-capitalist merchants receded. Instead, a commercial-financial elite emerged associated with European import/export activities. It was in this light that a dominant class of Mount Lebanon capitalists emerged in association with sericulture and, thus, engaged in lucrative business ventures with French capitalists based in Alexandria and representing established industrialists in Lyon and Marseilles (Fawaz, 1983; Gates, 1998).

This shifting balance of economic interests manifests itself in the ‘relocation’ of government prerogatives from the pashas of Acre, Saida and Tripoli to the mutasarif in Mount Lebanon. The seat of the mutasarifiyya itself shifted from Beitedinne in the Chouf to Baabda in the immediate vicinity of Beirut. The city itself was a booming capital city in the making: a number of Westernised neighbourhoods expanded in close proximity to the port and, inspired by Paris, the city was re-centred around Place de l’Étoile where a modern business quarter and a national legislature were inaugurated in 1912.

Under the French Mandate, European business interests in Lebanon outgrew trade in its classic import/export form. French investments, for instance, accounted for 50% of all foreign direct
investments (FDI) targeting Greater Syria. The majority of European capital in Greater Syria was invested in the communications, transportation, financial sectors (Gates, 1983).

Prior to the declaration of the French Mandate, however, FDI was regulated by Ottoman laws which necessitated partnerships between Ottoman and foreign nationals in large-scale projects of a strategic nature. European capitalists’ need for ‘partners’ to invest in Syria and Lebanon, thus, resulted in the emergence of a class of Lebanese crony capitalists (Hallaq, 2009). In return for providing their European counterparts with the legal requirements necessary to bypass Ottoman restrictions, crony capitalists amassed large fortunes and integrated themselves into a global bourgeoisie. Joseph Moutran, a Christian entrepreneur from Baalbek, is a case in point. In the 1880s, Moutran was granted Ottoman concessions to construct the Damascus-Muzayrib railway and expand the Beirut harbour. Moutran, however, ‘sold’ both concessions to French ‘business partners’ (Fawaz, 1983:72).

**Figure 4.1 - Balance of Trade in Nineteenth Century ‘Greater Syria’**

![Chart showing balance of trade](chart)

*Sources: Fawaz (1983:62); Gates (1998:16)*

### 4.2.2.1 Expansion of the Financial-Commercial Sector in Twentieth-Century Lebanon

Alongside crony capitalists, a class of Lebanese entrepreneurs was developing in association with the financial-commercial sector and, thus, on the periphery of expanding European capitalism in Mount Lebanon. Travellers and historians such as Father Louis Chaykhu and *shaykh* Muḥammad Al-Qāyāṭlī speak of the ‘merchant republic’ that had emerged in and around Beirut in the late-nineteenth century (Hallaq, 2009).

By the turn of the century, the financial-commercial bourgeoisie had achieved dominance and its class consciousness had crystallised. It is in light of this that the ‘New Phoenicians’, a group of Francophile, predominantly-Maronite bourgeois intellectuals revived the ancient Phoenician merchant republic as a cultural-national identity for the outward-oriented, capitalist ‘Lebanon’. For them, ‘Switzerland of the East’ would no longer refer to the country’s mountainous landscape alone but, crucially, to Lebanon’s role as regional banker, tourist destination and a federation of confessional cantons. The ‘New Phoenicians’ included such prominent figures as

Although the origins of Lebanese peripheral capitalism can be traced back to the mid-nineteenth century, the adoption of the most unrestrained form of capitalism and the minimisation of the state’s interventionist capacities occurred during the French Mandate and the postcolonial era. In part, the rapid expansion of the tertiary sector in Lebanon can be justified by the high profit rates, low risks and smaller investments required by financial-commercial business ventures compared to agriculture and industry (Gates, 1998).

Alongside commerce and finance, tourism witnessed a boom in turn-of-the-century Lebanon as the fortunes amassed by members of regional – especially Egyptian – bourgeoisies translated into demand for luxury estivage in Mount Lebanon and parts of Syria. As a result of this growing demand, Lebanon attracted as many as 30,000 tourists in 1937; 216,000 in 1951 and 544,000 in 1957 (Gates, 1998:16). This coincided with a recession in sericulture releasing labourers. Tourism, hoteliery and hospitality expanded in Beirut and Mount Lebanon and, thus, integrated previously-inopportunite regions into the capitalist economy.

Lebanon’s financial-commercial peripheral-capitalism benefited from regional developments including the discovery of oil in the Gulf. In an attempt to exploit the opportunities arising from expanding Anglo-American investments in Iraq and the Gulf emirates, the Beirut-based bourgeoisie expanded their investments to include a state-of-the-art airport in the Bir Hassan Airfield in 1938 as well as two rival airlines: AirLiban which benefited from connections with Saudi royals, and Middle East Airlines (MEA) which benefited from Saeb Salam’s Kuwaiti contacts. Moreover, Tripoli established itself as the Mediterranean export terminal for the Iraqi Oil Company and the construction of oil refineries in Saida and Tripoli commenced. By monopolising Western trade with the oil-rich Gulf emirates in the late-1940s, 30% of the world’s gold transited through Beirut (Traboulsi, 2007:118).

By the mid-twentieth century, therefore, Beirut had established itself as a liberal example of self-perpetuating prosperity and consolidated the dominance of the financial-commercial bourgeoisie. This was exacerbated by the creation of the State of Israel in 1948 which eliminated Beirut’s most important competitors: Haifa and Acre. Beirut’s seaport and airport became indispensable for Western interests in the Gulf. Furthermore, the influx of Palestinian refugees to Lebanon allowed for the integration of Palestinian capitalists into the Beirut-based Lebanese bourgeoisie as well as the exploitation of skilled labourers (Bickerton and Klausner, 2005; Trabousli, 2007).
In 1950, the Libano-Syrian customs union was annulled reflecting the divergence between the interests of the two bourgeoisies: the Beirut-based bourgeoisie embraced its role as a hotbed for transit trade and European investment whereas Syria sought to develop its reproductive structures and, thus, introvert capital accumulation (Owen, 1976; Traboulsi, 2007).

4.2.2.2 Disarticulated Capitalism and the Disruption of Inter-Sectoral Links

It must be noted that the implications of the rapid expansion of the tertiary sector in the first half of the twentieth century were manifold. One of the most important implications is that Lebanese capitalism failed to produce a ‘progressive’ economy where the ‘developmentalist’ interventions of the state are geared towards developing reproductive structures, introvert capital accumulation and inter-sectoral linkages. Instead, the expansion of the tertiary sector corresponded almost exclusively to the supply-and-demand dynamics of ‘centre’ economies and, thus, produced a disarticulated political economy.

The extrovert orientation of Lebanese capitalism, therefore, resulted in the overdevelopment of the commercial, financial and tourism sectors at the expense of agriculture and industry. It is in light of this realisation that we can understand the regional and socioeconomic disparities and developmental differentials which have characterised modern Lebanese history.

Agriculture, for instance, was heavily restructured following the birth of ‘the merchant republic’ in the early-twentieth century. Capitalist forms of share-cropping expanded forcing landowners to seek credit for machinery, grain and pesticides from the banking sector. Moreover, agribusiness monopolies dictated farmers’ production choices and, thus, transformed agriculture into a subservient sector attending to the needs of the import/export business. The Anjar sugar industry in the Bekaa, for instance, rendered beetroot farming the only viable activity for modest farmers. Similarly, the Régie Co-Intéressée Libano-Syrienne des Tabacs et des Tombacs established its monopoly over the tobacco crop in South Lebanon, Jbeil and Batroun (Traboulsi, 2007:158-159).

Similarly, the financial-commercial bourgeoisie subordinated the nascent industrial sector to the import/export business sector: since the mid-nineteenth century, merchants associated with European trade competed over raw materials in demand by the European cloth industry. As a result, more than half the cotton-producing looms in Syria and Lebanon went out of business (Sharara, 1975; Saba, 1976; Traboulsi, 2007:92).

Paradoxically, therefore, the subordination of the industrial sector occurred despite its positive prospects. In fact, the nascent industrial sector could have benefited from a number of favourable conditions: (i) domestically, ‘early’ (e.g. textiles, food-processing) and ‘middle’ (e.g. cement) industries provided a foundation for industrialisation; (ii) manufactured goods
were in-demand in Syria and oil-rich Gulf monarchies; (iii) industrialists had access to expatriates’ investments; and (iv) benefited from the support of a region-wide wave of industrialisation patronised by Egypt’s pan-Arab Nasserist regime (Gates, 1998:105; Traboulsi, 2007:158).

The subordination of agriculture and industry to the import/export dynamics of the outward-oriented tertiary sector, therefore, reflected the class dominance of the financial-commercial bourgeoisie and had little to do with economic planning or economies-of-scale considerations. This is exemplified by the pressure exerted by mandatory authorities on the Société Libanaise de Crédit Agricole et Industriel to divert financing away from agriculture and industry towards small business enterprises in finance, commerce and tourism since the 1920s.

The implications of the inaccessibility of credit and farmers’ and industrialists’ subordination to the supply-and-demand dictations of monopolistic enterprises were threefold: (i) it consolidated the sway of the agro-export bourgeoisie; (ii) forced small-and-medium landowners to sell their lands and, thus, reinforced the monopoly of large land-owning feudalists; and (iii) subordinated both sectors to the supply-and-demand dynamics of the financial-commercial bourgeoisie and, thus, preventing introvert capital accumulation and exacerbating the peripherality of Lebanese capitalism.

4.2.3 Lebanon’s Disarticulated Political Economy and Sectoral Disparities
The dominance of the financial-commercial sector, therefore, dates back to the early-twentieth century and has underpinned Lebanon’s most extreme form of capitalist dependence as discussed earlier in this chapter. The characteristics of this disarticulated capitalism crystallised into a weak industry; backward agriculture; investment of capital in non-productive sectors of the economy; the subordination of the economy to the interests of the financial-commercial bourgeoisie; and, thus, little (and diminishing) introvert capital accumulation (Saba, 1976).

Despite the historicity of this disarticulated political economy, however, its socioeconomic implications are omnipresent in contemporary Lebanon and are characteristic of socio-political order to date. The most important implication of peripheral capitalism on contemporary Lebanon is the salience of extrovert linkages to the detriment of introvert inter-sectoral linkages and, thus, a myriad of regional, socioeconomic, sectoral and developmental disparities – a situation not uncommon in less developed countries (LDCs).

Sectoral disparities in the second half of the twentieth century, for instance, are demonstrated by agriculture’s shrinking contribution to the national GDP; the reluctant growth of the industrial sector; and the rapid growth of the service sector as illustrated in Figure 4.2. Although patterns of sectoral growth in Lebanon conform to global tendencies, the wide
disparities which characterise the Lebanese economy are in stark contrast to postcolonial LDCs where import-substitution (ISI) and export-oriented industrialisation (EOI) geared towards economic development reduced the pace at which the agricultural sector shrunk and decreased the gap between industry and services. In Syria, for example, the agricultural sector shrunk from 50% of national income in 1950 to 24% in 2000 while the industrial sector grew from 30% to 46% in the same period (Owen, 1976:24; EarthTrends, 2003).

Economic indicators also reveal the extent to which the Lebanese economy demonstrates outward orientation and limits introvert capital accumulation. Historical records reveal the extent to which the economy in early-modern Lebanon depended on transit trade: importing manufactured goods from the more developed industrial-capitalist economies of the global ‘centre’ and exporting to the less developed economies of the Arab hinterland. Contemporary Lebanon demonstrates similar patterns as illustrated in Figures 4.3 and 4.4. In the postwar era, for instance, the majority of Lebanon’s imports originated from Western Europe, North America and China; the majority of the country’s manufactured exports were destined to Arab countries; and the majority of its raw material exports were destined to industrial economies (MOET 2009a; 2009b).

![Figure 4.2: GDP by Sector (1950-2010)](image)

**Figure 4.2: GDP by Sector (1950-2010)**

*Sources: Owen (1976:24); Johnson (1983:181); World Bank (2010a); Mottu and Nakhle (2011)*
Figure 4.3 - Imports by Origin (1996-2008)

Source: Ministry of Economy and Trade (MOET, 2009a)

Figure 4.4: Exports by Destination (1996-2008)

Source: Ministry of Economy and Trade (MOET, 2009a)
4.2.4 Peripheral Capitalism and Socioeconomic Disparities in Lebanon

Sectoral disparities produced by Lebanon’s disarticulated political economy, therefore, resulted in deep social imbalances and exacerbated income differentials and unemployment. This is evident in the wide gap between the income generated by various sectors of the economy and the size of the labour force employed in each sector. Moreover, inter-sectoral income disparities in the capitalist economies of the ‘periphery’ tend to be noticeably wider than in the economies of the ‘centre’.

Economic indicators reveal the exceptional extremity of socioeconomic imbalances in Lebanon which can be attributed to the unrestrained commitment to freewheeling capitalism and the severe restraining of the state’s interventionist capacities by the dominant class. Comparing 1949, 1957 and 1959 indicators, for instance, reveals that although employing more than half of the active population, the agricultural sector contributed between 16% and 20% of national income. The service sector, on the other hand, employed less than 18% in 1959 and yet accounted for more than 50% of the GDP (Owen, 1976; Gates, 1998:141).

The ramifications of these disparities are twofold. Firstly, the discrepancy between sectors’ shares in the GDP and their employment capacities results in an unrelenting inequality in income distribution. Accordingly, the top 5% of the population who own/control commercial, financial and industrial enterprises and large landholdings in real estate control more than a third of national income whereas the bottom 20% of the population (peasants, industrial workers and the urban lumpenproletariat) control less than 7%. Paradoxically, therefore, half of the population was under the national poverty line in the 1960s – a decade considered to be Beirut’s economic heyday and the zenith of its liberal-capitalist prosperity (Gates, 1998:143).

Income inequalities and sectoral disparities towards the mid-twentieth century were exacerbated by the state’s exceptionally limited job-creating capacity in light of the dominant class’ commitment to the laissez-faire economy. Moreover, the absence of state-sponsored ISI and EOI policies meant that economic growth only exacerbated problems of unemployment and income inequalities. Moreover, unrestrained market dynamics resulted in the expansion of small-scale, technically-backward and capital-intensive economic activities. As a result, economic growth failed to produce employment opportunities commensurate with population growth and, crucially, the workforce release by shrinking sectors. The rapidly-expanding tertiary sector, for instance, failed to absorb agricultural workers and rural migrants. This was mitigated by the economic boom associated with the interwar economy during the French Mandate. Following independence, however, rural migrants inflated unemployment, expanded the city’s poverty belts and underpinned latent instability.
4.2.5 Disarticulated Capitalism and Regional Development Differentials

The disarticulated political economy and income inequalities discussed in this chapter led to a crucial disparity between Beirut and *al-manāṭeq* (the regions) – a customary distinction which dominates daily politics in contemporary Lebanon. It is empirically evident that Beirut does not only generate immense economic opportunities but also absorbs a disproportionate segment of the country’s economic prosperity. In other words, while the financial-commercial bourgeoisie penetrated the country in search for economic opportunity, Beirut attracted notables seeking to retain and reinforce their prestige. This altered the nature of Lebanon’s elite: notables were no longer feudalists based in vast mountain estates administering large landholdings. Instead, Beirut became home to capitalist notables whose prestige rested on education; investments in commerce and finance; and, crucially, relations with foreign merchants. In light of this, Lebanon’s second city, Tripoli, became a distant second whereas outlying regions in the south and north experienced little material change (Hudson, 1969).

Regional disparities were exacerbated by the sectoral recessions discussed earlier which produced inopportunity and deprivation in *al-manāṭeq* and concentrated prosperity and affluence in Beirut and its immediate Mount Lebanon vicinity. The recession of agriculture and traditional industries since the 1920s, for instance, caused depression and economic inopportunity in the Bekaa, Jnoub and Akkar as well as Saida. The subordination of industry to the import/export dynamics of the financial-mercantile bourgeoisie, on the other hand, impeded growth in Tripoli. Meanwhile, the exponential growth of the financial, commercial, tourism and real estate sectors allowed Beirut and its environs to prosper. In evidencing this, Carolyn Gates (1998:35) notes that:

> Tripoli was far more dependent on the industrial sector for jobs and income. A decline in or stagnation of industry, which could be partially offset by a boom in commerce and services in Beirut, was a much larger threat to the welfare of Tripoli’s population. Furthermore, inhabitants of Beirut and Mount Lebanon who controlled a disproportionate amount of national wealth were by far the largest beneficiaries of the expansion of economic opportunities. [...] Hence, the Lebanese employed in agriculture in South Lebanon, for example, lived under conditions similar to very poor Third World countries, while the middle class of Beirut enjoyed a standard of living not so different from that in the less-developed European countries.

The service economy, therefore, dominated the country-based economy. Unlike inward-oriented capitalist economies, however, economic extroversion transformed early-twentieth-century Beirut into a ‘cosmopolitan’ city akin to Alexandria (Mansel, 2010). Beirut’s ‘cosmopolitanism’ and deep-rooted disparities between the city and ‘*al-manāṭeq*’ distinguished between the conservative *ahl al-jabal* (mountain) and *ahl al-sāḥil* (littoral) – a binary opposition proposed by Hourani (1976), Buheiry (1987) and Denoeux (1993).
4.3 THE HYBRID DOMINANT CLASS IN LEBANON

Crucially, the disarticulated political economy and the widening disparities discussed above had a number of important implications on the composition and dynamics of centre-periphery and state-society relations in modern Lebanon. Firstly, it is evident that the financial-commercial segment of the capitalist bourgeoisie located itself at the core of the ‘power bloc’. The hegemonic segment of the dominant class, therefore, is a peripheral bourgeoisie adjoined to capitalism at the global centre without constructing its own, internally-driven MoP. Consequently, the dominant class ‘penetrates’ society and ‘dominates’ the polity ‘from outside’ rather than through dynamic social struggle. In other words, the class dominance of the Lebanese bourgeoisie is dependent on (i) the economy’s outward orientation; and (ii) economic and cultural ties to the global centre.

Secondly, the ‘evolutionary’ transition to dependent capitalism in Lebanon provided a framework for the coexistence of multiple MoPs. As a result, Lebanon’s disarticulated political economy provided the controlled forum for a rapprochement between an expanding Beirut-based financial-commercial bourgeoisie and affluent rural notables. In other words, the class dominance of the capitalist financial-commercial bourgeoisie in Lebanon was not realised through conflict with the pre-capitalist elite but, in fact, in cooperation with feudalists and pre-capitalist urban bosses. The ‘power bloc’ in modern Lebanon, therefore, is a hybrid social class consisting of pre-capitalist industrialists, feudalists, bankers, merchants and capitalist entrepreneurs.

Thirdly, regional and income disparities resulted in mass migration to the city. Consequently, Beirut developed class structures and dynamics of social conflict typical of modern-capitalist cities: wealth differentials, increasing ostentation of wealth and an urban lumpenproletariat drawn mainly from (predominantly-Shiite) migrants and (Armenian, Kurdish and Palestinian) refugee communities (Hourani, 1976; 1986; Johnson, 1983; Mansel, 2010:316).

In other words, Lebanon’s capitalist transformation entailed the domination of the country-based economy by that of the city. Nonetheless, this did not materialise through social struggle akin to the struggle between the city and the country in early-modern Europe. Instead, the dominance of the capitalist MoP was achieved not through confrontation with but through coalescing with the pre-capitalist MoP. Crucially, this meant that Beirut economically dominated the country but that the country politically dominated the city (Traboulsi, 2007:93). This is evidenced by the central role which migrant notables from al-manāṭeq played in the constitution of the Beiruti elite as will be discussed in the following section.
4.3.1 Migration to Beirut and the ‘Lebanonisation’ of the City

To comprehend the hybridity of the dominant class in modern Lebanon and conceptualise the social agents of modernisation within the contexts of the country’s transition to modernity and peripheral capitalism, the dynamics of economic and demographic relations between ‘the city’ (Beirut) and ‘the mountain’ (Mount Lebanon) in the nineteenth and early-twentieth century should be explored since the birth of the autonomous statelet in Mount Lebanon in the mid-nineteenth century resulted in economic and financial independence from the paşalıks of Tripoli and Saida and, hence, tied ‘the city’ and ‘the mountain’ by inseparable and mutually-beneficial ties. For Beirut, European interest in raw materials, sericulture and the trade route to Syria which ran through the mountain underpinned the city’s ascent as an affluent Mediterranean port. For the mountain, Beirut was a lifeline for the inflow of capital investments and the outflow of raw materials and silk (Chevallier, 1971:291). This relationship shaped Lebanon’s transition to the capitalist MoP: the city depended on the elite in the mountain as much as their integration into the global capitalist economy depended on the city.

It is no surprise, therefore, that travellers’ accounts indicate that the ‘predominantly-Muslim city with several affluent Sunni and Greek-Orthodox families’ of the early-nineteenth century was becoming ‘the largest Christian colony on the otherwise-Sunni littoral’. Beirut’s newcomers were predominantly Maronites from Mount Lebanon. Within a century, the city’s population swelled twentyfold (Chevallier, 1971:292; Fawaz, 1983; Gates, 1998).

Rapid migration to Beirut occurred against the backdrop of its incorporation in the Eurocentric global economy. This goes a long way in explaining the spectacular social climb of a number of Christian capitalists in the late-nineteenth century. Unlike Beirut’s pre-capitalist merchants and artisans who suffered the decline of Turko-Egyptian trade, the city’s newcomers exploited lucrative avenues of trade and business with Europe.

Beirut’s newcomers became the biggest beneficiaries of outward-oriented capitalism. Its role as ‘point of entry’ to the Syrian hinterland, however, necessitated strong links not only with Europe, but also with the Syrian market and beyond. Consequently, by the late-nineteenth century, the Lebanese bourgeoisie had developed a precarious ‘sectarian division of labour’: Christian tradesmen dominated the import trade with Europe while their Muslim counterparts dominated the export trade with Damascus, Aleppo and Baghdad. Both were aware that, only through collaboration could Beirut fulfil its goal and, hence, guarantee their prosperity (Fawaz, 1983; Hallaq, 2009). The ‘sectarian division of labour’ was revitalised in the 1940s with the discovery of oil in the Gulf and the rise of the aviation industry.
By the early-twentieth century, however, Beirut ceased to be a land of economic opportunity for its newcomers. The bourgeoisie evolved into a deeply-interconnected and highly-endogamous oligarchy closely associated with the foreign-imperial bourgeoisie.

Furthermore, the economic extroversion of the dominant class was complemented by cultural extroversion. The small class of Francophile capitalists and professionals were detached from the popular classes and, thus, imposed its class dominance ‘from outside’ the pre-existing social order. As ‘business partners’ and ‘agents of modernisation’ (i.e. Westernisation), members of the Lebanese bourgeoisie were granted consular protection by foreign diplomatic missions. Protégés enjoyed the legal, financial and economic privileges of European nationals in accordance with the Capitulations and, thus, allowed them preferential access to economic opportunities and granted their monopolistic privileges and extra-economic coercive powers impunity. As early as 1840, a class of protégé-entrepreneurs had materialised consisting of some forty dragomen of the British consulate; ninety French protégés and a number of Greek-Orthodox notables under the protection of the Russian and Greek embassies.

Access to protégé status, however, was not indiscriminate. Christians and Jews, for instance, were the biggest beneficiaries of consular protection due to their close business partnerships with European dignitaries. Socially, the church, missionary schools and occasional intermarriages offered Christian notables access to European dignitaries and, thus, to protégé status. Muslim notables on the other hand, were restricted to lower echelons of consular service. In fact, all protégés known to us today were Christian entrepreneurs who capitalised on their connections with European merchants, dignitaries and consulates. These include such prominent families as Sursock, Bustros, Choucair and Bassoul (Fawaz, 1983:86).

It must be noted that protégé status developed into an inheritable family asset, hence, reinforcing the role of patrilinear groups to the detriment of bureaucratic universalism and the capitalist logic of market competition. Moreover, protégés often manipulated consular protection to gain preferential access to business opportunities in Egypt, England and France. The status conferred upon protégés by virtue of consular protection also encouraged members of the bourgeoisie to enter into strategic marriages with foreign aristocratic and bourgeois houses (Fawaz, 1983:86-95; El-Khazen, 1991; Hartman and Olsaretti, 2003).

In other words, capitalism and urbanisation in Lebanon did not produce conflict between the city and the country akin to the conflict which characterised early-modern Europe. Instead, the city was allowed to economically dominate the country insofar as it absorbed the pre-capitalist elite and incorporated pre-modern social relations. The dominant class, therefore, was a hybrid class par excellence: feudalists’ prerogatives in the country were sustained; the financial-
commercial sector expanded beyond Beirut; the capitalist MoP subordinated, but did not eliminate, pre-capitalist MoPs; and prominent families were incorporated or recreated in spite of bureaucratic universalism and the capitalist logics of the market economy. Solidarities based on sectarian affiliation, patronymic groups and ancestry as well as social relations premised on notions of ‘notability’, consular protection and strategic alliances between foreign-bourgeois, aristocratic and local-bourgeois families survived not in spite of the capitalist MoP but precisely because of the ‘evolutionary’ and extrovert dynamics of peripheral capitalism.

4.3.2 The Political Economy Shift: From the ‘Colonial’ to the ‘National’
Not only did the dynamics of peripheral capitalism in Lebanon produce a perplexed social order whereby ‘modern’ social relations based on the logics of the market economy and bureaucratic universalism and ‘traditional’ social relations premised on the centrality of the family, patronymic groups and neo-feudal za’imships coexist; Lebanon’s disarticulated political economy resulted in a hybrid dominant class consisting of at least three factions.

The first faction comprised of established families from the declining feudal elite and prominent entrepreneurs associated with the foreign-imperial bourgeoisie. Emile Eddé is a good example. The prominent lawyer, politician and founder of the Lebanese National Bloc (LNB) married into the affluent Sursock family and ran a law firm which represented the interests of several merchant-landowning families, French corporations and foreign consulates before his election to the presidency in 1936 (Traboulsi, 2007; El-Khazen, 1991).

The second faction comprised of personalities of the Bechara Khouri variety who, although hailing from the notable families of Al-Khoury and Al-Saad, represented the interests of the younger generation within the financial-commercial bourgeoisie. His marriage to Laure Chiha and his brother’s marriage to Renée Haddad symbolise the crystallisation of a new ‘power bloc’ with the Constitutional Bloc (CB) as its political/partisan arm. The Chiha-Pharaon family secured financing through their joint-venture bank, the Haddads were industrialists and owners of the cement factory established in Chekka in 1929 and Khouri provided the political and legal interface of the CB. The affluence of this faction coincided with the most opportune moment for bankers and financiers influenced by the emergence of Egyptian capitalism. Khouri’s law firm, for instance, represented the interests of Banque Misr, Syrie et Liban which was established in 1929 by Egyptian banker-industrialists, Midhat Pasha and Talaat Hard Pasha (Raafat, 1995; Traboulsi, 2007:94-95; El-Khazen, 1991:24-26).

The conflict of interests between the two factions of the bourgeoisie, therefore, translated into a political rivalry between LNB and CB – a rivalry which characterised the Mandate period. In the 1937 and 1943 legislative elections, for instance, the CB won a large number of seats in
parliament due to Khouri’s alliances with Muslim notables as well as the generous support of the Banque Pharaon-Chiha. Eddé, on the other hand, retained the unrivalled support of Christian notables integrated in the Franco-Lebanese economy – hence, held the presidency (El-Khazen, 1991:40; Traboulsi, 2007:103).

The third faction, therefore, was instrumental in settling the political rivalry between Khouri and Eddé. Crucially, this faction comprised a number of Muslim notables whose political convictions parted with mainstream Sunni leaderships advocating union with Syria. Al-Sulh cousins, Riad, Kazim and Taqi Al-Din, represented this faction. In 1936, they announced their ‘defection’ from the Congress of the Littoral and the Four Cazas, a Sunni council opposing the annexation of Muslim-majority coastal towns (Tripoli, Saida, Tyre) and the cazas of Baalbek, West-Bekaa, Rachaya and Hasbaya to ‘Greater Lebanon’ (Hallaq, 1983).

The Al-Sulhs shared za'īmship over the south with the Shiite Al-As'ads whereas Saeb Salam emerged as a ‘Lebanese’ face for Beirut’s Sunnis. Together, the three families replaced the traditional za’īmships of the Al-Jisr and Al-Ahdabs in Beirut and the Karameh and Muqaddams in Tripoli. Crucially, the three zu’ama marked the crystallisation of a Sunni faction within the ‘Lebanese’ dominant class – that is to say, a Sunni leadership uninterested in union with Syria and keen on the secessionist demands of the Lebanese bourgeoisie (Salamé, 1986; Johnson, 1986; El-Khazen, 1991; Barak, 2002; Traboulsi, 2007).

4.3.3 Political ‘Familialism’ and the Founding Fathers of Independence

With French capitalism shaken in the aftermath of World War II and the increased penetration of the region by British, American and Egyptian capitalism, the Khouri and Al-Sulh factions of the bourgeoisie converged posing a serious challenge not only to Eddé’s presidency but also to the mandatory authorities altogether. Khouri’s electoral victory in 1943, therefore, hinged on his alliance with Al-Sulh as well as prominent Muslim notables in the periphery including Majid Arslan in the Chouf, Abdel-Razzaq in Akkar, Sabri Hamadeh in the Bekaa, and Adel Osseiran in South Lebanon.

Underpinning this alliance was a feeling of exclusion and disfavour by the mandatory authority which favoured the foreign-imperial bourgeoisie and treated Lebanon as an exclusive monopoly of French and French-affiliated corporations. Khouri and Al-Sulh, therefore, struggled to build consensus within their respective communities and rally support for the ‘national’ cause. In light of this, Khouri embarked on ‘Arabising the Christians’ convincing them of the need to abandon French protection while Sulh ‘Lebanonised the Sunnis’ arguing that an independent Lebanon was imminent and that union with Syria was futile (El-Khazen, 1991:35-39). The alliance between Khouri and Al-Sulh gained the blessing of the Anglo-
Egyptian authorities and was finally sealed and given a stamp of approval by Syrian nationalist leader, Jamil Mardam, upon the mediation of Egyptian Prime Minister, Mostafa El-Nahhas Pasha, in 1942 (Traboulsi, 2007:105-108).

In marketing the National Pact of 1943, Al-Sulh appealed to the Christians as the partner capable of guaranteeing the ‘finality’ and ‘eternity’ of the new polity whereas Khouri appealed to the Muslims as the partner whose rejection of ‘European protection’ promised independence. Power was, therefore, divided between the Khouri and Al-Sulh factions of the dominant class and took on a sectarian colouration which allowed the bourgeoisie to market its inorganic political hegemony in spite of commoners’ interests. Three features characterised this class on the eve of Lebanon’s independence.

Firstly, the dominant class represented by the Khouri-Sulh alliance was a cross-confessional ‘consortium’ of entrepreneurial families: some nine Maronite families; seven Greek-Catholics; one Latin; one Protestant; four Greek-Orthodox; one Armenian; four Sunnis; one Shiite; and one Druze. Secondly, political and business ‘endogamy’ characterised the relationship between the various families of the ‘consortium’. Such Christian families as Pharaon, Chiha, Khouri, Haddad, Freige, Kettaneh, Bustros, Asayli and Doumit were all related through matrimonial bonds. The emergence of the Frangieh, Taqla, Toueini, Gemayel and Chamoun families entailed some form of business or familial ‘partnerships’ with established families. Similarly, politico-familial alliances underpinned the (re)emergence of such political dynasties as the Druze Arslans and Jumblatts or the Shia Osseiran, Hamadeh and Al-Zein families.

The ‘fathers of Lebanese independence’, therefore, were themselves the patriarchs of the political families at the core of the endogamous and self-perpetuating dominant class (Abbas, 2005). In fact, the familialism of the ‘consortium’ at the core of the dominant class in modern Lebanon was an ‘evolution’ of Beirut’s conciliar government during the Middle Ages represented by al-‘ā’ilāt al-sab’a (the ‘Seven Families’) and the ‘Republic of Zahlé’ (1825-1858) which was governed by a coalition of eight patrician families (Abu-Khater, 1978).

The third characteristic of the dominant class in Lebanon is the coexistence of multiple MoPs. Political families comprising the ‘consortium’, therefore, accumulated wealth and derived socio-political prestige from a myriad of sources including feudal or oligarchic pre-capitalist power structures as well as mutually-reinforcing and self-subsistent monopolies which prevented the translation of the logics of market competition into tangible practices.

It is no surprise, therefore, that the dominant class on the eve of independence was, essentially, a ‘consortium’ of ‘merchant princes’ with an interest in (i) securing independence from France and Syria; (ii) maintaining the dominance of the financial-commercial sector; and (iii)
legitimating the country’s role as a ‘link’ between the capitalisms of the postcolonial global ‘centre’ and the underdeveloped regional markets (Hourani, 1986; Fawaz, 1983; Gates, 1998; Traboulsi, 2007). The break from France, therefore, was not the result of a fundamental transformation in the political economy of the dominant class but an indication of a shift in the global capitalist ‘centre’ from Franco-British dominance to the Anglo-American hegemony. This shift in international political economy disfavoured the Franco-Lebanese ‘comprador’ bourgeoisie and allowed the ‘national-comprador’ bourgeoisie represented by the Khouri-Sulh alliance to achieve dominance and, replace Lebanon’s French-centred outward orientation with dependence on and orientation towards the Anglo-American global hegemony. In light of this, the Lebanese parliament elected Khouri as president, granted Al-Sulh’s premiership the vote of confidence and amended the Constitution – hence, unilaterally abolishing the French Mandate in November of 1943. After a brief struggle with the Mandatory Authorities, France yielded to augmenting diplomatic pressure and the independent Republic of Lebanon was declared.

4.3.4 Class Conflict and the Frailty of the Bourgeoisie

Lebanon’s ‘independence’, therefore, was the result of a struggle between the ‘comprador’ and the foreign-imperial bourgeoisies. Both, however, were interested in consolidating the outward orientation of Lebanese capitalism, uninterested in developing the reproductive structures and aloof to the concept of encouraging introvert capital accumulation. The ‘comprador’ bourgeoisie which had crystallised by the 1940s was more capable of incorporating feudal and oligarchic power structures alongside the dominant financial-commercial bourgeoisie. This was particularly important given Lebanon’s ‘evolutionary’ and externally-generated transition to modern capitalism (‘Āmil, 1974; Daher, 1981; Hany, 1983; Hamdan, 1991).

Capitalising on and in defence of their economic affluence, members of the Lebanese bourgeoisie undertook key political positions in the state. In the immediate postcolonial era, for instance, shareholders in the country’s most affluent 230 firms constituted more than half of the Parliament (Traboulsi, 2007:117). Moreover, almost two-thirds of the politicians and parliamentarians in the postcolonial era belonged to ‘political families’ and may be considered to have inherited their seat from a relative or in-law (Hamzeh, 2001).

Beirut-based capitalists, therefore, ‘invested’ in the pre-capitalist economies and ‘traditional’ za‘imships of the peripheral regions to buttress their domestic standing and consolidate their class dominance through political contestations. It is in this vein that such prominent families as the Sursocks and Bustruses whose spectacular ‘social climb’ in the late-nineteenth century involved large neo-feudal landholdings in the annexed regions as well as in Egypt, Syria and Palestine alongside expanding investments and joint ventures in commerce and insurance which involved prominent industrialists from Egypt, Italy and England (Fawaz, 1983:91-95).
Moreover, a number of bankers entered into strategic partnerships with aristocrats whereby the former provided credit facilities in return for status, political support and electoral mobilisation (Saba, 1976:10; Fawaz, 1983:91-97). Elias Traboulsi, a merchant from Deir El-Qamar, and industrialist Butrus Khouri are good examples: Traboulsi ran on Ahmad Al-As‘ad’s lists in the 1940s whereas Khouri financed the campaigns of northern zu‘ama (Traboulsi, 2007:117).

The opposite was also true: court records show that feudalists and clergymen from the country were acquiring real estate holdings in the city (Hallaq, 2009) indicating that ‘adaptive’ members of the aristocracy were slowly ‘evolving’ and ‘adapting’ to the logics of the dominant capitalist MoP by shifting their investments towards real estate, commerce and import/export activities as early as the mid-nineteenth century (Traboulsi, 2007:171).

This, of course, is in stark contrast to the classic assumptions of modernisation theory which presupposes a conflict between the capitalist and pre-capitalist elites. This is partly explicable by the theory of hybrid modernities and dependency theory which presuppose the development of a hybrid dominant class and modern structures incorporating seemingly-contradictory realities such as ‘traditional’ and ‘modern’ social relations; capitalist and pre-capitalist MoPs. In Lebanon, for instance, the social prominence of the established feudal elite rested on traditional legitimations, patron-client relations and notables’ role as washta (intermediaries) between laymen and an unintelligible state apparatus – functions which were never fully deconstructed in the course of Lebanon’s ‘evolutionary’ transformation.

The postcolonial order, therefore, expanded the economic interests of the bourgeoisie, spared it the confrontation with the country-based economy and allowed capitalists to benefit from the privileges and social standing of the pre-capitalist elite. The commitment to the laissez-faire economy and the minimalist state, however, resulted in the failure to build a bourgeois state with the capacity to monopolise coercive power, disseminate ‘national’ culture, homogenise society or influence social change. Moreover, the disarticulated political economy driven by short-sighted profiteering resulted in a recession in productive economic sectors capable of absorbing excess labour and integrating the socioeconomic classes produced by the capitalist transformation. The inequalities and regional disparities discussed in this chapter, therefore, threatened Lebanese capitalism with the inevitability of class conflicts beyond which the ‘comprador’ bourgeoisie was incapable of containing given that its dominance is imposed ‘from outside’. This was especially threatening given that the unifying effects of the struggle against colonialism had withered away and that socioeconomic disparities were on the rise in light of mass rural migration to the city and the influx of Palestinian refugees to Lebanon (Hourani, 1976:34-35; Deneoux, 1993:74).
4.4 Conclusions: The Confessional Alternative to Class Struggle

It is in light of the existential threats posed upon the modern-capitalist order in Lebanon by the potentiality of class struggle and the fragility of the bourgeoisie’s dominance that the strategic coexistence between the capitalist and pre-capitalist elites may be understood. The dominant financial-commercial bourgeoisie, thus, exploited the grey zone between capitalism and precapitalism and the hybridity of the ruling elite not in spite of capitalism but precisely to buttress its fragile dominance. Affluent merchants and bankers, for instance, invested in landholdings to gain prestige and exploited extra-economic means of coercion to bolster their electoral appeal.

In other words, it was by exploiting the prestige and status inherent in feudalism and political familialism that members of the Beirut-based bourgeoisie expanded their influence into the country and mobilised voters in peripheral regions. This, therefore, prevented the emergence of interest-driven democratic processes. Instead, voters mobilised in accordance with ‘traditional’ allegiances to neo-muqata’jī ‘political houses’ with a longstanding claim to the representation of confessionally-homogenous rural constituencies. This resulted in the crystallisation of a hybrid ruling class comprising of neo-feudalists alongside professional middle-class politicians and capitalists; hence, allowing the ‘comprador bourgeoisie’ to exercise class dominance despite the disarticulations of Lebanese capitalism. In other words, the state in Lebanon is a capitalist-bourgeois state in which the hegemony of the dominant class hinges on the survival of feudal fiefdoms (‘Āmil, 1990b:142-156). The ‘power bloc’ in this hybrid order, therefore, consists of three modes of political leaderships as Hourani (1976:35) explains:

First, there is the 'feudal' mode: that of the great lords of those parts of the countryside where large estates and traditional lordships exist (among Druzes and Shiites in the south, Shiites in the [Bekaa] and Sunnis in Akkar). [...] Secondly, there are the ‘populist’ politicians of the Christian regions in the north[...], where small holdings are common and leadership has less [reliant on] socioeconomic powers of protection and patronage [...]. Thirdly, there are the leaders of the Muslim populations of the coastal cities; they also obtain and retain leadership by ideological appeal and the exercise of patronage, but add to these a third source of power, the manipulation of the urban masses, mobilised by the 'strong arm' men, the qabadāy.

Consequently, the state became a complex microcosm of the families, regional patrons, sects and business interests. The non-traditional, unorganised, educated stratum of society, however, was generally unable to mobilise support to claim political participation through representative institutions of the state (Hudson, 1968:212). Instead, the ‘confessionalisation’ of politics on the micro and macro levels provided the ruling class with a solution to this unsustainable state of ‘political sclerosis’. In other words, despite the minimalist state and the inability of the economy to absorb excess labour and the educated, untraditional social classes produced by the
universalisation of modern education, the sectarian system allowed the ruling class to undercut class struggle and contain social antagonisms within the bounds of ‘order’ (Chit, 2010).

This was particularly crucial in the Lebanese case given the absence of the all-pervasive bourgeois state. Instead, the fragile ‘power bloc’ influenced social change, exercised class dominance and mobilised the popular classes not through the effective agencies of the state but through the non-state institutions of the ‘sect’. The influence and predominance of neo-mugata‘ji feudalists with a claim to represent ‘the confession’ along with clergymen and the religious establishment, therefore, became instrumental mechanisms through which the bourgeoisie exercised class dominance and influenced social change. This, as ‘Āmil (1990b:136-146) notes, explains the system’s emphasis on religious identities; sectarian particularities; and the ‘Lebanese mosaic’. In other words, the failure to construct a Lebanese ‘imagined community’ centred around the capitalist bourgeoisie was mitigated by the revival of confessional ‘imagined communities’. It must be noted that this did not rectify the failure of the ‘comprador’ bourgeoisie but, crucially, underpinned its political economy.

In conclusion, it can be argued that Lebanon’s hybrid modernity and ‘colonial MoP’ led to the crystallisation of a hybrid dominant class unable to shake the foundations of the pre-capitalist elite or deconstruct the ‘traditional’ relations and collective solidarities of the pre-modern era (‘Āmil, 1990b; 2003). As a result, socio-political order in Lebanon hinges on three fundamental underpinnings. Firstly, the reinterpretation of pre-modern group solidarities and social relations whereby self-centred, isolated and loose ‘sects’ are rationalised, modernised and reinvented as historical relationships fulfilling functional roles within the context of Lebanon’s disarticulated peripheral capitalism.

Secondly, the coexistence between multiple MoPs and, thus, the precarious alliance between the capitalist and pre-capitalist elites. This alliance, it has been shown, underpins the class dominance of the ‘comprador’ bourgeoisie in lieu of its failure to develop an omnipotent bourgeois state and allows members of the bourgeoisie to extend their influence beyond the immediate boundaries of Beirut’s capitalist economy. The third ‘pillar’ of the modern confessional-consociational system in Lebanon is the salience of patron-client dyads and clientelistic redistribution. The politics of patronage, the ‘modernisation’ of clientelistic redistribution in postcolonial Lebanon and the hierarchical organisation of zu’ama’s clientelistic networks will be the topic of Chapter Five. Nonetheless, it suffices to note that patron-client relations which are as institutionalised into Lebanon’s body politic as confessionalism underpins the popular appeal and reinforces the mobilisational capacities of members of the dominant class.
CHAPTER FIVE

ZU’AMA AND THE INTEGRATIVE FUNCTIONS OF PATRONAGE IN MODERN LEBANON
It has been argued in previous chapters that confessionalism as a political system in Lebanon embodies the hybridity of the modern order insofar as it reinvents pre-modern social relations which the late/incomplete transition to modernity failed to fully deconstruct, ‘rationalises’ their fundamental underpinnings and integrates them into ‘modernity’. Confessions, therefore, are ‘rational’ group solidarities performing functional roles which do not necessarily conform to ‘traditional’ forms of solidarity or adhere to ‘religious’ dogma. In other words, ‘confessions’ are not as ‘essential’ or ‘natural’ as is often argued. Instead, they are historical social relations which correspond to the particularities of the Lebanese transition to capitalism.

Confessionalism in Lebanon, therefore, must be understood as a political system which aspires to contain social conflict within the bounds of ‘order’ as defined by the dominant class. In fact, socially-constructed confessions performed a crucial role in light of Lebanon’s disarticulated political economy. The reinvention of pre-modern social relations and the coexistence between the modern bourgeois, bureaucratic state and the pre-capitalist feudal loyalties of the country, it has been argued, occurred not in spite of the class dominance of the financial-commercial bourgeoisie but precisely because of its fragility and disarticulated dependence on the outward-oriented economy (‘Āmil, 1990b:127).

Patronage and sectarianism, therefore, became mutually-reinforcing pillars underpinning the modern, bourgeois state in Lebanon (Denoeux, 1993). Whereas sectarianism allowed members of the ‘consortium’ to legitimate their social status and mitigate the effects of their economic fragility, patronage allowed them to exercise class dominance beyond their business empires. Moreover, it is through the dyadic and mutually-reinforcing relationship between patronage and sectarianism that the state exercises its authority and expands its sovereignty overcoming the fact that formal institutions in Lebanon have not acquired a reality of their own. In other words, the bourgeoisie’s disinterest in developing the institutions of an all-encompassing omnipotent state meant that political and socioeconomic dominance is primarily achieved through informal networks.

In light of the state’s curtailed ability to provide public goods and regulate the market, therefore, the welfare and regulatory functions of the state were decentralised and delegated to the non-state and private sector actors. The ‘modernisation’ of patronage structures, therefore, mitigated the effects of the disarticulated political economy and ‘linked’ the popular classes with the dominant class despite the fact that the latter’s dominance is imposed ‘from outside’ the productive and social relations of the domestic economy (‘Āmil, 1990a; 1990b).

Deficient socioeconomic and institutional modernisation, therefore, revalorised the informal networks connecting the zu’ama (bosses) and their atbā’ (followers). The pre-eminence of the
za‘im, therefore, depended not on ‘traditional’ legitimations as such but on the needs which his leadership satisfies and the status his followership confers. In other words, clients’ support hinged on their zua‘ama’s performance of intercessory and redistributive functions mitigating the unintelligibility of modern institutions to the layman.

The pervasiveness of clientelistic redistribution and patronage politics in Lebanon, therefore, can be understood in relation to the evolution of peripheral capitalism. Khalaf (1977:187) goes as far as to claim that Lebanon’s socio-political history can be understood as “the history of various groups and communities seeking to secure patronage: clients in search of protection, security and vital benefits and patrons seeking to extend the scope of their clientage”.

In fact, the ‘modernisation’ of patron-client relationships in Lebanon can be traced back to the mutasārifīyya (Hamzeh, 2001; Cammett and Issar, 2010). The nature of the Lebanese political structure, therefore, is not a product of social engineering but, rather, the sum of a delicate balance of power between competing patrons and vulnerable clients. Historical demographic and structural realities within the context of Lebanon’s ‘patronage democracy’, thus, allowed patrons to exploit the ‘us-versus-them’ paradigm to legitimate their leadership – hence, reinforcing confessionalism as a by-product. In other words, the causal relationship between patronage and confessional-consociationalism is somehow bi-directional to guess. The multi-centred superstructure prevented the emergence of a Hegelian state and, thus, decentralised authority and parcelised the formal domain. State minimalism and the multi-centricity of the superstructure can be attributed to the nature of peripheral capitalism in Lebanon and the dynamics within the dominant class.

This is evidenced by the political performance of Lebanon’s first two presidents, Bechara Khouri (1943-1953) and Camille Chamoun (1952-1958), who thrived on political manipulation and used their unofficial and informal powers to secure political victories and prolong their reigns. In return, they used their official and formal powers to dispense favours and expand their clientage; exclude their political rivals from office; and reward loyalists. Their successor, Fouad Chehab (1958-1964) had a distaste for political manipulation and the powers of prevalent zu‘ama. However, his self-righteous crusade replaced ‘professional’ zu‘ama with the Deuxième Bureau which possessed exceptional powers and used its tightly-controlled and subtle system of patron-client networks to undercut established patrons. The demise of ‘political Chehabism’ in 1970 restored traditional patterns of patronage in the few years leading up to the Civil War. The war itself ushered in new forms of patronage at the heart of which were militiamen and warlords.
It can be argued, therefore, that the politics of za’imism underpins the ‘stability’ of the political system in Lebanon in spite of dynamic transformations. This reveals the extent to which the system in Lebanon is not premised on an ideological liberal conviction that the state should be ‘minimal’ but, rather, on the interests of the elite. The central saga of modern Lebanese history, therefore, has been unlike any other in the Middle East: ‘stability’ and ‘conflict’ have hinged not on the balance of power between state and society, but on the balance of power between rival zu’ama whose survival means more to their clients than the survival of the state itself.

The political pervasiveness of patron-client relationships in Lebanon is complemented with astounding social acceptance. A 2008 survey of ninth-grade students, for instance, reveals that the majority considered the confession, zu’ama and clergymen as the point of reference for securing public services. The state, on the other hand, is or should consist of ‘areas of influence’ divided proportionally among confessions and zu’ama (UNDP, 2009a; 2009b).

The mutually-beneficial symbiotic relationship between patrons and clients, therefore, can be understood as ‘modern’ insofar as it is ‘rational’ and ‘functional’ as opposed to ‘irrational’ or ‘primordial’. In other words, patronage is a form of domination whereby modern, capitalist elites selectively channel resources for their benefit and clients enter into asymmetric relationships with patrons to secure access to and integration into an otherwise-unintelligible and inaccessible order. The instrumentalism of patronage, however, must not be concealed by the fact that it often (re)invents pre-modern social commitments such as ritual kinship, religion or neo-feudalism (White, 1980; Günes-Ayata, 1994; Warner, 1997; Pappas, 2009). It is important however to state that the Lebanese patronage system, as mentioned before, is not sustained through a state but rather in spite of the state – a fundamental distinguishing characteristic of the Lebanese political superstructure. This is evident in the endogenous and incestuous relations of power, wealth and prestige which tie together the ‘political families’ of the dominant class – the ‘consortium’ – in modern Lebanon.

Understanding the relationship between patronage, peripheral capitalism and confessionalism is, therefore, an inevitable part of any serious examination of consociationalism in Lebanon. In this chapter, an attempt is made to conceptualise the ‘modernisation’ of political za’imism in Lebanon in relation to the development of modern capitalism. This examination is undertaken in three complex historical contexts: the mutaṣarifiyya; the Mandate and the pre-war periods.

However, before engaging in a critical study of the political history and political economy of za’imsim in Lebanon, a few remarks must be made with regards to the nature and dynamics of patronage in modern-capitalist societies and multiparty democracies.
5.1 PATRONS AND CLIENTS IN MODERN CAPITALIST SOCIETIES

In light of this, it must be noted that scholars converge on defining patronage/clientelism as a gamut of social arrangements characterised by a certain logic of exchange. Patron-client relations, therefore, are ‘instrumental friendships’ which share a set of core analytical characteristics: they are hierarchical; built around asymmetric but mutually-beneficial and open-ended transactions; and are predicated on differential access to of resources by patrons. Patrons, thus, expand their clientage and increase their political and economic influence by selectively allocating the resources at their disposal (Scott, 1972; Waterbury, 1977; Eisenstadt and Roniger, 1994; Günes-Ayata, 1994; Roniger, 1994; Makhoul and Harrison, 2004).

Developmentalists have traditionally viewed clientelism as a transitory stage. Marxists amongst them predicted clientelism to be undermined by the development of class consciousness. Non-Marxists, on the other hand, expected interest-driven individualism and bureaucratic universalism to replace clientelism (Loizos, 1975; Mouzelis, 1978; White, 1980; Günes-Ayata, 1994).

The perseverance of patron-client relations, however, problematises developmentalists’ assumptions. The ubiquity of patronage in ‘modern’ societies backed by a myriad of empirical evidence resulted in a number of theoretical works contributing to a growing awareness that patron-client arrangements are not necessarily destined to fade away or remain on the margin as a result of modernisation, urbanisation or democratisation. Instead, scholarship on patron-client relations since the 1970s shows us that, while specific forms of clientelism may be undermined, a variety of ‘modern’ and capitalist forms of patronage crystallise cutting across levels of economic development and types of political regimes (Schmidt et al, 1977; Gellner and Waterbury, 1977; Eisenstadt and Lemarchand, 1972; 1981; Eisenstadt and Roniger, 1994; Roniger, 1994; Mattina, 2009).

Nonetheless, Weberian and Marxist philosophies continue to shape the symbols of legitimacy and intellectual discourse in much of the modern world and, as a result, patronage continues to be denied legitimacy and official recognition (Waterbury, 1977:334). For Marxists, patronage thwarts organisation along class lines, promotes privileges and perpetuates discriminatory access to goods. For Weberian theorists, it undermines universalistic criteria of resource allocation and access to opportunity: the penetration of the formal sphere by informal networks is seen to be an impediment to the development of democratic structures and, instead, leads to patrimonialism where tradition, privilege and interpersonal networks regulate society (Weber, 1999:102). For adherents to Foucault’s conceptualisation of power and authority, the diffusion of patronage is, in fact, a mechanism of domination rather than of democratic practice (Meagher, 2009).
In light of this, the survival and ubiquity of clientelist relations was explained from an essentialist or culturalist point of view. According to essentialists, ‘some societies’ are ‘better adapted’ to sustain disparities in status and opportunity. Critical approaches to clientelism, however, argue that patronage is not a ‘cultural’ issue but, rather, a political phenomenon created endogenously. As such, it can only be understood by analytically examining the main actors whose preferences and interests are better served by patron-client networks (Mattina, 2009; Pappas, 2009).

It is, therefore important to distinguish between patronage and hereditary-ascriptive models of social exchange: whereas both involve discriminatory resource-allocation, primordialists fail to capture the dynamics of clientelistic arrangements in societies where class antagonisms have not been consolidated although the role of ascriptive/primordial criteria may have been undermined. Kinship, for instance, cannot be equated with patronage although the latter may indeed borrow the language of kinship and utilise links within and between patronymic groups (Scott, 1972; Gellner, 1977; Garcia-Guadilla and Perez, 2002; Mattina, 2009).

Patronage is not only distinguishable from hereditary-ascriptive social exchange rooted in pre-modernity but also organically associated with modernisation (Gellner, 1977). Centralisation, for instance, can be seen as a reason for the shift from reliance on kinsmen to reliance on patrons. Furthermore, patronage flourishes when the modern state is unable to exercise authority over the resource allocation without intercessory brokers. In other words, for the weaker individuals and groups in society, access to modern bureaucracies and economic opportunities accompanying the formation of the modern state and the capitalist MoP are more readily secured through middlemen who compensate for the impersonal nature of government and the unintelligibility of its policies and agencies. This is particularly important in late/incomplete modernising societies where the modernity is ‘imposed from above’ rather than ‘generated from below’ (Knight, 1992; Makhoul and Harisson, 2004). In other words, patronage is not a perpetuated pre-modern relationship, but a ‘modern’ relationship in tandem with institutional and socioeconomic modernisation. Distinguishing between ‘modern’ and ‘traditional’ relations of an asymmetric nature is, therefore, essential.

In traditional relations of dominance, patrons are recognised on the basis of ascriptive criteria and acquire clienteles by virtue of traditional legitimacy or coercion. Moreover, although premised on a promise of mutual benefit, ‘traditional’ forms of patronage are often built around or augmented by a sense of belonging to a kinship, ethnic, religious or patronymic group. In contrast, ‘modern’ patronage is based on performance – that is to say, patrons’ ability to satisfy the needs of clients and confer status upon them. The distinction, however, is less clear-cut than we often assume: hierarchical patron-client relations in modern societies, for
instance, may be reinforced by shared membership in primordial frameworks such as religion, fraternities, kin and ethnicity. It is safe to argue, in fact, that clientelism is a social relationship which involves a material exchange and an organic, interpersonal relationship which may or may not be based on ascriptive criteria (Khalaf, 1968; Scott, 1972; Schmidt et al, 1977; Eisenstadt and Roniger, 1984; Günes-Ayata, 1994; Auyero, 1999; Makhoul and Harrison, 2004). Patrons’ ability to sustain and expand their clientage, therefore, relies on a number of resources. Lawyers, doctors and teachers, for instance, rely on their professional skills to discriminatingly favour their ‘followers’. Similarly, landlords and businessmen capitalise on material resources in asymmetric relationships of mutual benefit with tenants, credit-seekers and employees. Moreover, patrons can build a clientele by virtue of their strength and freedom to dispense rewards and alleviate sanctions they indirectly control as a result of an authority invested in them by a third party (Scott, 1972).

Patrons who rely on their own skills and knowledge or ownership/control of material resources are accused of promoting discriminatory access to opportunities and curtailing bureaucratic universalism, constitutional democracy and market rationality. Patrons whose affluence relies on resources and official prerogatives invested in them by the state, civil society and international organisations are often condemned as unscrupulous and corrupt and are blamed for the failures and inefficiencies of the state. Beneficiaries however, might view patrons as good, benevolent and sacrificing people whose ‘friendship’ is worth keeping (Auyero, 1999).

Regardless of perceptions, the fact remains: patronage networks entail an intersection between the formal and informal domains. Gellner and Waterbury (1977), Cunningham and Sarayrah (1993; 1994) and others have argued that wasṭa (intercession) is a common practice in Middle Eastern societies. Similarly, the penetration of formal institutions and modern bureaucracies by informal patron-client networks and the dependence of bureaucrats on their personal following and extra-bureaucratic connections rather than on their formal post are characteristic of societies throughout the developing world (Scott, 1972; White, 1980; Eisensdtadt and Roniger, 1984; Roniger and Günes-Ayata, 1994).

Similarly, the state’s attitude to the pervasiveness of patron-client relations varies: Nasser’s Egypt, for instance, was an authoritarian state with a professed enmity to informal networks of a clientelistic nature whereas Mubarak’s Egypt played off patrons against each other and Ben Ali’s Tunisia created and destroyed patrons through temporal alliances. Patrons, therefore, are either agents of the state or work under its auspices and are often co-opted by the ruling party or into the bureaucracy. Lebanon, however, is a notable exception where the state operates almost exclusively along clientelist lines and is, essentially, a meeting place for members of the pre-existing patron-class (Gellner and Waterbury, 1977; Denoeux, 1993; Marei, 2007).
5.1.1 Late Modernities, Peripheral Capitalisms and ‘Modern’ Clientelism

Paradoxically, therefore, patronage plays a limited role in socioeconomic contexts where social exchange is based on ascriptive models and pervades when markets are not controlled through primordial units. In other words, clientelistic redistribution can be associated with open flow of resources as much as it can be associated with unequal access to markets (Roniger, 1994). In other words, clientelism is a functional avenue for socioeconomic mobility in domains regulated by competition over power and resources. More importantly, clientelism allows patrons and clients to cope with the tensions and imbalances of deficient modernisation and, thus, can be considered an adaptive strategy serving a ‘rational’ purpose (Khalaf, 1968; 2002; Roniger, 1994). In fact, the shift from the reliance on kinsmen to the reliance on patrons can be associated with the centralisation of the politico-economic domain and scarcity of resources – problems of a ‘modern’, ‘rational’ and, even, capitalist nature (Gellner, 1977; Mattina, 2009).

But if clientelistic redistribution takes place in modern, capitalist contexts, why does empirical evidence show that clientelism is more pervasive and omnipresent in the developing capitalist economies in Southern Europe, the Middle East, Latin America and South/Southeast Asia?

This, René Lemarchand (1981:19) explains, is a result of the historical timing in which patronage emerges: societies where social change lagged behind political modernisation provide patrons with ample scope to pervade. Late/incomplete modernities and dependent capitalisms where institutional modernisation is imposed ‘from above’ irrespective of the socioeconomic dynamics of society are, therefore, more likely to witness the pervasiveness of patron-client dyads. Severe inequalities, socioeconomic disparities and the disarticulations of outward-oriented capitalisms combine with the unintelligibility of ‘imposed’ institutional modernisation – hence, revalorising the role of ‘intermediaries’ and ‘middlemen’.

With the state, the modern bureaucracy and the capitalist MoP dominating society ‘from outside’, the development of class consciousness lagged behind the political-institutional modernisation and, thus, failed to engage with the state. The intercessory functions of ‘middlemen’, therefore, become indispensable in bridging the gap between the formal aspects of public life and the ‘real’ workings of the society (Eisenstadt and Roniger, 1984; Roniger, 1994; Hamzeh, 2001).

For instance, Columbian peasants found relationships with hacendados (landowners) a suitable intermediary between the peones (people) and the state. Clientelistic practices developed into more institutionalised forms linking (and subordinating) the peasantry to national parties and the state (Powell, 1977; Escobar, 1994; 2002). In Morocco, Berber rural migrants capitalised on their monopolies to selectively integrate co-tribesmen. The city’s Berber newcomers,
therefore, gained preferential access to the city’s competitive economy and were ‘socialised’ into the urban fabric with the help of asymmetric patron-client dyads emphasising ascriptive Berber identity (Brown, 1977, Waterbury, 1977). In a similar vein, Cairo’s newcomers in the 1950s/1960s were largely illiterate and unskilled workers. Taxi-driving, therefore, became a step towards integration into the socioeconomic fabric of the city. Members of the urban lumpenproletariat aspiring to drive a taxi, however, were forced to seek wasta from army officers, bureaucrats and policemen for locally-produced cars, spare parts, bypass licensing procedures and escape inspection of meters and safety standards (Waterbury, 1977:339).

In other words, clientelism performs an ‘integrative function’ by mitigating class cleavages, reducing social conflict and linking the most vulnerable to an unheeding aristocracy and an unapproachable bureaucracy: patronage evokes the oblige of the powerful and the need to perform on the part of the bureaucrats’ (Waterbury, 1977:333). This is especially important in late/incomplete modernities and peripheral capitalisms where bureaucratic universalism and the logics of market competition have been incapable of deconstructing ‘traditional’ patterns of discriminatory access to desired goods and opportunities. Moreover, the disarticulations of the capitalist (especially peripheral-capitalist) MoP lead to the expansion of ‘intermediary’ classes (e.g. petty bourgeoisie) whose members are more likely to engage in clientelism than in class struggle (Chit, 2009a).

It must be noted that, although patron-client dyads are asymmetric relationships of power, they are mutually-beneficial. On the one hand, clientelism promotes mobility of certain strata of the working class and the petty bourgeoisie and mitigates the unintelligibility of formal domain. On the other hand, patronage consolidates the social position of certain sections of the middle class by allowing doctors, lawyers, shopkeepers, teachers and public servants to ‘patronise’ followers (Günes-Ayata, 1994:21; Mattina, 2009).

5.1.2 Clientelism in Democratic Political Systems
It has been argued, so far, that patronage thrives in modern and capitalist contexts as well where social exchange is based not on hereditary-ascriptive models but on competition and unequal access. It can be argued, therefore, that patron-client dyads are ‘rational’ relationships performing functional roles. It remains vital to examine the intersection between clientelism and democratic government as patron-client relationships are often erroneously associated with political systems frailed by manipulation, ambiguities, inequalities and the monopolisation of power and resources. Empirical evidence, however, shows us that patron-client networks often perform integrative and redistributive functions in longstanding democracies (Lemarchand, 1972; Zuckerman, 1975; Roniger, 1994; Auyero, 1999; Pappas, 2009).
Resources distributed by patrons in democratic systems, however, are less likely to be the sort of personal goods provided by patrons in ‘traditional’ systems. Patrons in democratic systems, for instance, are more likely to offer goods or act as intermediaries between their clients and the bureaucracy securing access to public sector jobs, social housing, pensions and subsidies (Mattina, 2009). Where the judiciary and law-enforcement agencies are compromised, clients’ desired good may include protection from the law as empirical evidence from Southern Europe evidences (Waterbury, 1977:332).

It must be noted that clients are not necessarily ‘poor’ nor are patrons monopolistic individuals. ‘Clients’ in contemporary Marseilles and Naples, for instance, are predominantly members of the middle class and the petty bourgeoisie seeking access to public resources, licences, housing and public sector jobs. Their ‘patrons’ are incumbent mayors, civil servants and party officers (Mattina, 2009). In other words, power differentials between patrons and clients are relative and depend on several factors such as the extent to which clientelistic redistribution is based on ascriptive criteria; the vitality of patrons’ services; competition amongst patrons; and the voluntary/coercive nature of the relationship. It is this differential and the unequal accessibility to resources which determines ‘patrons’ and ties ‘clients’ (Scott, 1972; Waterbury, 1977; Denoeux, 1993; Escobar, 1994; Günes-Ayata, 1994; Roniger, 1994; Auyero, 1999).

For instance, patrimonial forms of patronage emphasise ascriptive criteria of membership and are more structural, permanent and unquestioned. Monopolistic or oligopolistic patrons provide vital services such as protection, security, employment, arable land, education or, even food and basic government. In this context, the differential heavily favours patrons whereas clients are coerced into steep asymmetric relations and inelastic demand. ‘Democratic’ forms of patronage, by contrast, are less dependent on ascriptive criteria and are, instead, tempered by an emphasis on the reciprocity of the relationship. Competition between patrons whose affluence rests more on performance than on control betters clients’ terms of exchange. This is evident in urban patronage where clients have the luxury to ‘shop’ for the best transaction (Scott, 1972; Johnson, 1983; Denoeux, 1993; Günes-Ayata, 1994:23).

Lebanon, it will be demonstrated in the remainder of this chapter, is no exception: patron-client relations generated and absorbed new forms of loyalties which capitalised on but are distinct from the sectarian and feudal arrangements associated with pre-capitalist MoPs. Moreover, clientelism integrated the population into a modern-capitalist order imposed ‘from above’ – whether that entails imposition by a foreign, colonial power or by a national dominant class. The ‘modernisation’ of patronage in Lebanon, therefore, explains much of its modern history and underpins its confessional-consociational order (Khalaf, 1968; 1977; 2002; Johnson, 1977; 1983; 1986; Makhoul and Harrington, 2004).
5.2 THE CHANGING PATTERNS OF PATRONAGE IN LEBANON

Lebanon is not only symptomatic of the pervasiveness of patronage politics but also demonstrates the evolution of clientelism in accordance with its precarious transition to modernity and the disarticulations of peripheral capitalism. Scholarship on patronage in twentieth-century Lebanon provides compelling empirical and theoretical insights on ‘modern’ and urban forms of patronage and clientelistic redistribution. The following section will demonstrate that the changing patterns of patronage are crucial in understanding structures of power and dominance in modern Lebanon.

5.2.1 Feudalistic Patronage and Mutaṣarifīyya Patrons

Socio-political order in nineteenth-century Lebanon demonstrates the rise and institutionalisation of patronage politics and highlights the role of clientelistic relations in shaping the transition to modernity and capitalism in modern Lebanon. A detailed survey of patron-client dyads in early-modern Lebanon is beyond the scope of this chapter; however, a few remarks regarding the nature of patronage in Ottoman Lebanon are necessary.

The first remark concerns the nature of the feudal elite itself. Unlike their counterparts in Egypt and the Ottoman Empire, Mount Lebanon’s fief-holders did not perform military functions. In fact, the emirs of Lebanon maintained a minimal police force for strictly-administrative purposes. Their political legitimacy, therefore, depended on interpersonal relations rather than on coercion (Khalaf, 1977; Hamzeh, 2001).

Non-military iqtā‘ developed its own semi-formal hierarchy whereby fief-holding houses were distinguished in terms of titular prestige and feudal tenure. The relationship between increasingly-dominant feudal patrons and the Ottoman Empire was, at the best of times, precarious: although the Ottoman pashas of Tripoli and Saida refrained from interfering in the affairs of Mount Lebanon, they encouraged rivalry and conflict between fief-holders. In other words, the pashas played off patrons against each other to contain the growing influence of powerful vassals (Khalaf, 1977).

The second characteristic of clientelistic hierarchies in early-modern Lebanon is the salience of strong endogamous ties between patrons and clients based on patterns of landownership, strong village identities and relative sectarian homogeneity. Attachment to feudal families and patrons residing in the same village along with the communal-geographic isolation reinforced regional-confessional identities and blurred the distinction between primordial ties of kinship/sect and the instrumental patron-client dyads (Polk, 1963:70).

The familial and village loyalties central to patron-client relations in the early nineteenth century were further exacerbated by the administrative reforms introduced by the Ottomans in
the mid-nineteenth century. Instead of undermining the power of feudal families and their
capacity to patronise villagers, the administrative division of Mount Lebanon into two qa‘im-
maqāmiyyat led to the sectarian homogenisation of patron-client networks. By dividing
Lebanon into separate Druze and Maronite districts, localised patronage networks became not
only endogamous but also homogenous in terms of sectarian composition. In much the same
way, the Réglement organique reinforced the sectarian homogeneity of administrative districts
by dividing the mutašarifiyya into seven cazas and introducing the twelve-member
Administrative Council which incorporated the feudal patrons of these cazas according to
confessional quotas (Hamzeh, 2001; Traboulsi, 2007).

Although they demonstrated a break from narrow kinship ties and a challenge to feudal
patrons, the peasant revolts of 1820, 1840 and 1856 along with the sectarian conflicts of 1840
and 1860 further reinforced the confessional homogeneity of patron-client networks. In fact,
peasant seditions substituted allegiance to feudal patrons with the patronage of the Maronite
Church. The ‘āmmiyah (commoners’) revolt, for instance, remained an essentially Maronite
phenomenon confined to the northern cazas of Mount Lebanon. In other words, patronage in
early-modern Lebanon was shifting from the strict allegiance to feudal patrons to the less-
ascriptive ties of communal/confessional public interest. The focal point of patron-client dyads,
therefore, shifted from interpersonal, local and primordial solidarities to communal,
confessional criteria (Khalaf, 1977; Hamzeh, 2001).

5.2.2 Bureaucratic/Administrative Patronage
Political and institutional modernisation in the late-nineteenth century ushered in a ‘new breed’
of political patrons whereby a new ‘administrative aristocracy’ derived political power and
social prestige from bureaucratic rather than feudal prerogatives. In light of this, lawyers,
magistrates and civil servants became closer to the loci of power and in a better position to
benefit clients than neo-feudal landowners. This undermined the security and social standing of
feudal-patrons. Nonetheless, given that the mutašarifiyya undertook to absorb feudalists into
the confessionally-segmented Administrative Council and the rapidly-modernising state
bureaucracy, elements of the landed aristocracy ‘adapted’ to the bureaucratic/administrative

During the mutašarifiyyate of Dawud Pasha, for example, no less than sixteen feudal-patrons
were appointed to top government positions. Similarly, President Bechara Khouri (1960:30)
described high government positions as a ‘hereditary endowment’ of unheeding aristocratic
houses:
As a consequence of the perpetuated influence of feudal notables despite the abolition of feudalism by the Réglement organique, high government positions became a waqf for the country’s prominent families. Office in those days was everything: it was the object of ambition and the source of influence and prestige. Members of the same house and close friends would compete over it and would risk peril to secure a coveted government job. It became a cause for hostility and heavy expenditure.

The adaptation of politico-feudal families despite the shifting focus of patronage and the ascent of the capitalist MoP in Lebanon demonstrates the ‘evolutionary’ hybridity of the dominant class. This hybridity can be attributed to a number of factors: firstly, to the non-confrontational nature of the emerging bourgeoisie – a basic characteristic of dependent capitalism and late/incomplete modernity; and, secondly, to the preferential access which modern/Western education granted the descendents of feudalists.

The dominant class in fin de siècle Lebanon, therefore, included ‘adaptive’ members of such feudal families as the Maronite Khouris, the Druze Jumblatts and Arslans, the Shiite As‘ads, Hamadeh and Osseirans alongside post-feudal bureaucrat-patrons including the Taqla and Chiha families (Maronite/Beirut); Salam, Beyhum and Daoouq (Sunni/Beirut); Khalil (Shiite/Tyre); Al-Sulh (Sunni/Saida); Karameh (Sunni/Tripoli) and Eddé (Maronite/North). Moreover, bureaucrats and professionals ‘excluded’ by the mutaṣarifiyya authorities ‘returned’ to Lebanon to assume prominent political positions under the French Mandate. Damascus-born Greek-Orthodox lawyer Charles Debbas and Egypt-based Maronite financier, Auguste Adib Pasha, are demonstrative examples (El-Khazen, 1991:26-27).

It must be noted that the reforms of 1861 coincided with and reinforced the shifting focus of patronage from the local, personalistic to the confessional-communal domain. With confessional-consociational quotas determining access to government and public office in the mutaṣarifiyya, competition between patrons shifted from petty feuds of a familial nature to a the wider domain of the confession.

In a nutshell, the bureaucratisation of the state in late-nineteenth century Lebanon shifted the focus of patronage politics from the local/familial level to the confessional level and changed the terms of exchange from the more ascriptive feudalistic exchanges of pre-capitalism to the more competitive bureaucratic/administrative exchanges of modern capitalism. Although this meant that patrons’ affluence rested more on their performance than their ‘entitlement’, many patrons capitalised on (i) their ascriptive notability and historical claims in their respective localities; and (ii) their advantageous access to the state and the capitalist economy.
5.2.3 Confessional-Philanthropic Patronage

The third form of patronage coincided with and is a result of rapid economic growth in Beirut and the developmental gap between the city and the country. Seeking to establish themselves in the emerging dominant class, Beirut-based capitalists patronised benevolent and charitable projects which addressed the needs of the city’s unskilled newcomers and burgeoning lumpenproletariat. Although inspired, in part, by philanthropic motives, charitable largess was an instrument for intra- as well as inter-confessional competition consolidating and fostering confessional group solidarities and us-versus-them paradigms (Fawaz, 1983:116; Denoeux, 1993:79; Hallaq, 2009).

It must be noted that confessional-philanthropic patronage was complimentary to, rather than a substitute for, bureaucratic/administrative patronage: the mushrooming of charitable associations, schools, hospitals, colleges and clubs allowed feudalists and professionals alike to patronise the increasingly-eager population in light of expanding urbanisation, migration to the city and the spread of education.

Christian capitalists and clergymen, for example, were encouraged by the spread of missionary activity to patronise the establishment of the Greek-Catholic Patriarchal College in Zokak El-Blat in 1865, the Maronite Ecole de la Sagesse in 1874, the Greek-Orthodox Al-Thalathat Aqmar and Zahrat Al-Ihsan girls’ school in Achrafiyeh in 1880. In reaction, Muslim notables patronised the establishment of Jam‘iyyat Al-Maqāṣsid Al-Khayriyyah Al-Islāmiyyah in 1878 (Fawaz, 1983:117; Denoeux, 1993; Hallaq, 2009).

Al-Maqassid is a demonstrative example of the politicisation of charity for patronage purposes. Although established with the aim of overcoming the educational gap between Muslims and Christians, Al-Maqassid had so much patronage at its disposal it inevitably became an arena of competition between Sunni politicians. Throughout the twentieth century, Muslim notables from the Qabbani, Al-Yafi, Barbir, Beyhum, Traboulsi, Al-Hoss, Tarabieh, Sinno, Hamadeh, Daouq, Al-Hout, Baydoun, Chebaro and Salam families competed over Al-Maqassid (Johnson, 1978; Hallaq, 2009).

For political aspirants, confessional-charitable projects had a significant bearing on their political careers. Firstly, communal charities provided employment and offered valuable welfare services. Employment in and admission to charitable hospitals and schools, therefore, became a resource dispensed selectively for political purposes. Moreover, a za‘im acquired a veneer of piety and philanthropy for patronising philanthropic projects, especially when connected to the religious establishment.
Relentless competition over *Al-Maqassid*, for example, is understandable if we consider that its charitable hospitals and schools employed thousands; offered free or subsidised healthcare to hundreds of patients a day; and offered tens of thousands of students a reputable education of extremely high standards for modest or no fees. Gaining an upper hand in its Board of Directors (BoD), therefore, allowed rival patrons to dispense favours and expand their popularity amongst the Sunnis of Beirut and the littoral (Johnson, 1978).

*Al-Maqassid* was not only an invaluable asset for established politicians; it also socialised Sunni aspirants from modest backgrounds: several *Al-Maqassid* teachers and BoD members emerged as prominent politicians. Maaruf Saad who emerged as an insurgency leader, *za’im* and MP in Saida, for example, was an athletics teacher in the city’s *Al-Maqassid* college. Similarly, *mufti* Hassan Khaled taught at an *Al-Maqassid* college.

It is no surprise, therefore, that patrons were willing to go to war in defence of their ‘share’ of the *Al-Maqassid* charitable projects. Johnson (1978), for instance, demonstrates this in his study of Salim and Saeb Salam’s relentless efforts to fend off their opponents’ attempts to undermine their control over *Al-Maqassid*. For Saeb Salam who was denied public office for most of the twelve-year Chehabist era, the charity was an indispensable lifeline: it was the last resource Salamists possessed in competition with Rachid Karameh of Tripoli and Sunni rivals in Beirut, Abdullah Al-Yafi, Ahmad Daouq, Uthman Al-Dana and Rachid Al-Sulh. In fact, the *Al-Maqassid* BoD elections in 1970 witnessed violent confrontations between Salam and his rivals escalating into a national crisis which severely divided the government and brought Lebanon to the brink of civil war. Salam’s victory in the 1970 confrontation, therefore, had implications which reverberated far beyond the charity itself: Salam reinforced his *za’imship* over the Sunni community; president Charles Helou’s rival, Sleiman Frangieh was elected President of the Republic; and Parliamentary Speaker Sabri Hamadeh was replaced with his rival, Kamil Al-As‘ad (Johnson, 1978).

Much like the Salams, middle-class political aspirants recognised the strategic significance of charity. ‘Doctor’ Mohamed Khaled (1895-1981) is a good example. The son of a former *mufti* and descendent of the scholarly Khaled and Hout families, the ‘Doctor’ established the ‘Khaled Hospital’ in 1932 in an attempt to consolidate his family’s patronage in the Basta quarter of Beirut. Medic-notables under the leadership of Khaled established the ‘Islamic Hospital’ in 1945. Moreover, the ‘Doctor Mohamed Khaled Social Foundation’ established in 1958 oversaw several schools in Ouzaï as well as literacy classes, vocational training, the Khaled Hospital and a centre for continued learning (Hallaq, 2009).
As important as ‘charity’ was for political aspirants from the city’s Sunni community, it played an even more pivotal role amongst the city’s rural newcomers who had been disconnected from their feudal patrons in the country but were electorally-inconsequential for Beirut’s zu’ama. A post-feudal elite, therefore, emerged amongst the Shiites who constituted the bulk of Beirut’s rural newcomers. The goal of communal charities patronised by educated and relatively well-off Shiite patrons was twofold: firstly, to alleviate poverty and marginalisation; and, secondly, to draw Shiites away from Sunni-dominated establishment and consolidate the za’imist claims of such aspiring politicians as Rachid Baydoun.

Baydoun, who had become Al-As‘ad’s archrival in Beirut, patronised the first charitable Shiite school in Beirut, Al-’Āmiliyya, in 1923. In 1964, the Baydouns established a vocational training centre, Al-Ma’had Al-Mihani Al-’Āmilli. Baydoun’s charitable projects lay the foundations of a symbiotic and mutually-beneficial relationship. For Beirut’s Shiite newcomers Baydoun was the za’im Al-As‘ad had failed to become (Kobeissi, 2005). For Baydoun, confessional-philanthropy guaranteed the support of his co-religionists. Eventually, he was elected to the Parliament and appointed Minister of Defence thrice during the presidencies of Camille Chamoun, Fouad Chehab and Charles Helou.

In a nutshell, ‘charity’ in Lebanon served political functions as much as it served philanthropic ends. For political aspirants not backed by a historical legacy of feudalism, charities possessed material patronage and conferred a veneer of piety, communal obligation and status upon their patrons. Confessional philanthropy continues to play this dual function to date as is evident by the mushrooming of charities dedicated to or run by prominent political figures and confessional zu’ama. This is evidenced by former PM Rafic Hariri’s ‘charitable’ contributions to Al-Maqassid and the Rafic Hariri Foundation – both of which contributed immensely to the rapid political ascendency and popularity of the slain PM (Hallaq, 2009). Other demonstrative examples of the interconnection between charity and politics in contemporary Lebanon include prominent Shiite clerics such as the late Sayyid Muhammad Hussein Fadlallah and the Mabarrat Association he established in 1978, the Imam Moussa as-Sadr Foundation and the René Mouawwd Foundation.

5.2.4 Pseudo-Ideological Parties and the Politics of Za’imism
The shift from feudal to capitalistic, performance-driven patronage addressed the changing needs of the popular classes and corresponded to the fundamental changes in the political economy of the country. Bureaucratic and confessional-philanthropic patronage, however, depended on direct interpersonal relationships between patrons and clients. The population explosion and rapid social and geographic mobilisation, however, necessitated the articulation of new forms of patronage based more on hierarchical networks than on interpersonal dyadic
relationships. Moreover, with the emergence of new socioeconomic grievances and the politicisation characteristic of the urban environment in the mid-twentieth Middle East, patrons were forced to offer clients more than material gains. *Zu‘ama*, therefore, sought to appeal to and co-opt Baathist, Nasserist, nationalist and Palestinian resistance rhetoric. It is in light of this that pseudo-ideological patron-parties mushroomed (Owen, 1976:25; Khalaf, 1977).

**5.2.4.1 Political Parties, ‘Revolutionary’ Ideologies and the Institutionalised *Zu‘ama***

The functions of pseudo-ideological parties, therefore, included (i) institutionalising clientelistic relationships; (ii) providing loosely-defined hierarchies of power; (iii) organising the relationship between *zu‘ama* and their strongmen; and (iv) mobilising clients. Moreover, by co-opting middle-level patrons, or *qabadāyāt*, into their partisan organisations, *zu‘ama* absorbed ‘key’ family and neighbourhood ‘strongmen’ and transformed potential rivals into aides.

Saeb Salam’s *za‘imship* is a compelling example: during the turbulent Chehabist era, Salam’s patronage rested on a hierarchical alliance with family and neighbourhood ‘strongmen’. Hashim Itani, a strongman from the central Beirut Musaytibah quarter, for example, was the link between Salam and the sizeable Itani family. In return for his services, Salam helped Hashim expand his businesses in the fashionable Ras Beirut quarter (Johnson, 1977:216). Another *qabadāy*, Faruq Shihab-ad-Din, was Salam’s neighbourhood ‘strongman’ in Basta. Shihab-ad-Din also served as president of *Shabāb ʿAhyāʾ Bayrūt* (Beirut Neighbourhood Youth), a loose organisation of *shabab* (youth) whose services were invaluable during elections and ‘strategic’ confrontations.

Salam’s capacity to maintain a clientage, however, could not have survived the Chehabist era had it rested solely on transactional and personalistic relations especially as Salam lost access to state patronage for most of the 1960s. Salam, therefore, resorted to pseudo-ideological rhetoric. In the mid-1960s, for instance, he conducted a formidable public relations campaign highlighting his commitment to Nasserism and his alleged ‘friendship’ with Egypt’s President. The campaign was intended to rectify his image as an ally of ring-wing Christian *zu‘ama* and adversary of Chehab (Johnson, 1978).

The relatively loose organisation of Salam’s patronage network, however, was partly to blame for the divisions within the Salamist camp. This is demonstrated by the ‘defection’ of Mohammad Zakkariya Itani who established *Hizb Al-Talāʾi Al-Taqadumiyya* (Progressive Vanguard Party) and joined the Lebanese National Movement (LNM) during the Civil War (Shururu, 1981:160).
Rachid Baydoun, on the other hand, recognised the importance of institutionalising his za'imship. To break the monopolisation of Shiite representation by the As'ads and Hamadehs, he established *Hizb Al-Talā'ī Al-Lubnāniya* (Lebanese Vanguard Party) in 1937. In reaction, Ahmad Al-As'ad established *Hizb Al-Nahda* (Revival Party)\(^{18}\) (Shururu, 1981:424). Ironically, the feudal As'ads upheld the banner of socialism in an attempt to appeal to the growing Shiite lumpenproletariat. Baydoun, however, capitalised on a myriad of confessional-philanthropic patronage and pseudo-ideological fervour – a combination which proved to be more appealing.

Baydoun also capitalised on an extensive network of *qabadāyāt* including Hassan Al-Yatim and Hassan Kobeissi who emerged as indispensible *mafātīh intikhābiya* (election keys) in his struggle against the As'ads. The two men were charged with the task of transferring Shiites’ registers to the city in order to strengthen Baydoun’s electorate. The Baydoun clan soon became the primary representative of the Shiites as Rachid’s za'imship passed to his nephew, Mohammad Youssef Baydoun, in the 1970s and his grandson, Mohammad Abdulhamid Baydoun who joined AMAL in the 1980s.

The ideological fervour associated with Baydoun’s *Al-Talā’ī*, however, resulted in the ‘defection’ of a number of Marxists and Existentialists including Ahmad Abdelatif Baydoun – a descendent of the Baydoun (Bint-Jbeil) and El-Zein (Tyre) families. Educated in the Sunni *Al-Maqassid* school in Saida and the Mashmousha Monastery School in Jezzine, the radical Ahmad Baydoun eschewed the traditional politics of his hometown and joined Fawaz Traboulsi and Waddah Sharara in *ḥarakat Lubnan al-Ishtiraki* (Socialist Lebanon Movement) in 1965 which adjoined the Marxist-Leninist Lebanese Communist Action Organisation (OACL) in 1970 (Kiwan, 2004; Rawafed, 2006). Similarly, Hassan Kobeissi joined Ahmad Baydoun and his comrades in the Socialist Lebanon Movement in 1968 before retiring to ‘intellectualism’.

Kamal Jumblatt and the Progressive Socialist Party (PSP) are another example of pseudo-ideological parties. The rather interesting history of the PSP is beyond the scope of this study; it suffices to draw attention, however, to Jumblatt’s frequent alternation between a commitment to social justice and universalistic principles on the one hand, and neo-feudal clientelism in the Jumblatts’ traditional Chouf fiefdom on the other. Moreover, despite professed enmity for za'imist politics, Kamal Jumblatt entered into tactical alliances with the likes of Camille Chamoun and Saeb Salam during the ‘Al-Maqassid crisis’ and was granted access to state patronage necessary to weaken his rivals in the Chouf in return for supporting Frangieh’s presidency (Johnson, 1978).

\(^{18}\) Renamed *Al-Hizb Al-Dimūqrāṭī al-Ishtirākī* (Democratic Socialist Party) following the events of 1958.
Much like Baydoun’s *Al-Talā‘ī* and Jumblatt’s PSP most political parties in the pre-war years were associated with charismatic pseudo-ideological patrons: the National Liberal Party (NLP) with Camille Chamoun; the Najjadah with Adnan Hakim; and the Kataeb with Pierre Gemayel.

In short, it is evident that *zu‘ama* adapted to new socioeconomic realities as well as to new political structures of organisation and mobilisation. With the emergence of new needs, patrons developed new clientelistic practices which were not only performance-based but also institutionalised into less personalistic and more pseudo-ideological partisan structures. This form of political organisation led to the emergence of two contradictory forms of political leaders: pseudo-ideological *zu‘ama* and ideological partisans.

5.2.4.2 The Supply and Demand Logics of Party Patronage

It must be noted that, as the za‘imships of Salam and Baydoun illustrate, pseudo-ideological za‘imism coincided with bureaucratic/administrative and confessional-philanthropic patronage. It is, therefore, important to note that political parties’ attitude towards patronage may vary. This variation, Martin Shefter (1994:30-31) suggests, depends on the historical context in which a party is formed as well as the extent to which party officers have access to state and non-state resources of clientelistic significance. On the one hand, the *zu‘ama* in postcolonial Lebanon had exceptional access to state and non-state resources whereas, on the other hand, socioeconomic imbalances and the disarticulations of peripheral capitalism generated inelastic demand amongst clients.

Leadership in pseudo-ideological political parties can, therefore, be considered a prototype of ‘political oligarchy’ whereby the *zu‘ama* exploit the dependence and willing submission of their followers in order to perpetuate their leadership in closely-circumscribed communities. In other words, although contingent on performance, clients of Salam, Baydoun, Sulh, Karameh and other *zu‘ama* are not supporters of an ideologically-driven political agenda, but followers of a patron and clients of his patronage.

The logics of supply and demand also explain the rise and fall of the popularity of such political parties as the Communist Party (LCP) and the Syrian Social Nationalist Party (SSNP) amongst the most vulnerable classes.

Between 1943 and 1975, the ‘misery belt’ surrounding Beirut stretched from Karantina in the northeast to Raml al-Āli and Laylaki in the southwest. Palestinian refugee camps punctuated this belt with the more miserable urban ghettos of Tall al-Zaatar, Mar-Elías, Sabra, Chatilla and Bourj Al-Barajneh. Slightly better-off were the mushrooming working-class neighbourhoods of Chiyah, Ghobeiri, Haret-Hreik and Bourj Al-Barajneh in the south and Jdaideh, Sin al-Fil, an-Nabā‘ā, Bourj-Hammoud and Dikwaneh in the east. Postcolonial Beirut,
therefore, was the scene of an amorphous and heterogeneous urban mass of unskilled workers and rural migrants with increasingly-secular and ideological interests (Khalaf, 1977; Hourani, 1986:15; Salamé, 1986:11-12; Makhoul and Harrison, 2004). Even the more established Sunni quarters were fertile ground for patronage. The poorer neighbourhoods of Bachoura and Tariq al-Jadida; the port-workers and stevedores of Basta; the merchants and shaykhly families of Musaytibah; and the middle-class Mazra’ah struggled for employment, education and healthcare (Johnson, 1977:215).

With the majority of the population either unemployed or employed in the service sector, patrons with access to the state bureaucracy or the entrepreneurial class were more capable of providing such in-demand ‘goods’ as public and private sector jobs; government concessions; public work contracts; and affordable housing, education and healthcare (Eisenstadt and Roniger, 1984:92). In other words, patrons were better equipped to trade in the vulnerabilities of modernisation and urbanisation (Hamzeh, 2001). As self-made entrepreneurs, members of prominent families, civil servants, statesmen and populist leaders, zu’ama were more receptive to the short-term secular interests of the layman than ideological parties (Denoeux, 1993:100). Much like the peasant movement in Columbia (Escobar, 1994), the seemingly-paradoxical combination of pseudo-ideological activism and clientelism in Lebanon can be explained if they are seen as two sides of the same coin: both are avenues to escape social exclusion.

2.4.3 Patronage parties and the us-versus-them paradigm

It can be argued, therefore, that political parties in twentieth-century Lebanon were the loci of patronage despite seemingly-‘modern’ bylaws, elected officers and pseudo-ideological rhetoric. The main implication of the institutionalisation of patronage in its partisan form, however, was the ‘politicisation’ and ‘de-personalisation’ of the relationship between patrons and clients. In other words, competition over resources and the struggle against exclusion and marginalisation were liberated from the direct interpersonal logics of feudalistic and neo-feudalistic relationships allowing for the emergence of functional social solidarities – albeit not in the sense of Marxist class struggle. The logics of clientelistic redistribution, therefore, revalorised the ‘us-versus-them’ paradigm in the public arena and transformed za’imist parties into nuclei for new identities and ‘imagined communities’ (Günes-Ayata, 1994).

Unsurprisingly, therefore, confessional identities crystallised into political entities with the birth of the partisan domain in the 1930s. The competing collective identities represented by political parties were, thus, translated into paramilitary youth organisations which evoked violence against the ‘other’ for tactical purposes. Such bloody clashes as the shoot-out between residents of Sunni-majority Basta and Maronite-majority Gemayzeh in the 1930s, for example, are symptomatic of the confessional appeal of patron-parties (Traboulsi, 2007:102).
5.3 Chehab’s ‘Crusade’: Undermining Patrons; Not Patronage

The socioeconomic grievances resulting from Lebanon’s disarticulated capitalist economy and exacerbated by the petty feuds of political families, the parochial interests of the zu’ama and the unrestrained monopolistic practices of the dominant financial-commercial bourgeoisie, however, brought the political system to the brink of collapse in 1958. Taking on a sectarian intonation, violent confrontations exposed the fallacy of Lebanon’s ‘happy phenomenon’ and revealed the ugly disparities bottled up under the myth of the ‘self-perpetuating prosperity’. In remaining true to confessional-consociationalism, however, the crisis ended in a negotiated compromise under the slogan of ‘no victor, no loser’ and bringing a ‘consensus’ candidate to the presidency.

General Fouad Chehab, vowed to address regional and socioeconomic inequalities, achieve balanced development and reduce Beirut’s ‘marcocephalic domination’ of the economy (Johnson, 1978; Salti and Chaaban, 2010). In light of this, Chehab embarked on structural reforms on an unprecedented scale: state bureaucracy swelled; the public sector grew exponentially; and the exclusion of the predominantly-Muslim populations of the geographical and socioeconomic peripheries from civil service and public sector jobs was reversed. Moreover, Chehab extended potable water and electricity to previously-deprived regions and embarked on an ambitious reformation of public education expanding the Lebanese University and establishing a grant system allowing middle and lower-middle-income families to send their children to Egyptian, Soviet and Eastern European universities (Trabousli, 2007:138).

Politically, Chehab surrounded himself with foreign experts, young technocrats and army officers with little or no connection to the political establishment – hence, propelling his self-righteous crusade against corruption and the inefficiencies associated with confessionalism and za'imism (Denoeux, 1993:109; Khalaf, 1977).

To gain support for his reformist mission and channel its benefits to the most-needy peripheral regions, however, Chehab adopted three important policies of colossal impact on Lebanon’s body politic. Firstly, Chehab invested unprecedented authorities in the Deuxième Bureau (military intelligence) which played an important role in public life and was transformed into its own patron dispensing favours, controlling public sector employment and allocating public sector contracts (Johnson, 1983:217; Denoeux, 1993:110; Traboulsi, 2007:139).

Secondly, Chehab enacted electoral law reforms in 1960 which, although re-adopting small electoral districts based on the caza, increased the number of deputies in the parliament from 66 to 9919. In doing so, Chehab integrated a number of previously-excluded middle-level

19 Appendix 1
zu‘ama from the underrepresented peripheral regions (Traboulsi, 2007:139). Thirdly, agents of Chehab’s Deuxième Bureau dealt the zu‘ama a final blow by skilfully manipulating the state’s newfound patronage network to undercut established za‘imships. This, however, entailed the emboldening of defecting qabadāyāt.

The Chehabist interlude, therefore, remained a prisoner of the clientelist system: to weaken the zu‘ama, the state co-opted and emboldened the qabadāy component of clientelistic networks (Khalaf, 1977; Johnson, 1977; 1983; 1986; Denoeux, 1993). Chehab’s crusade against Salam, for instance, invested in his rivals, Ibrahim Qlailat, Abdallah Al-Yafi and Uthman Al-Dana in Beirut and Farouk Al-Moukaddem in Tripoli. In other words, Chehabism was a rebellion against the established patron class; not a principled departure from the politics of patronage. It ‘dried up’ the resources at the disposal of zu‘ama and centralised patronage in the state and the Deuxième Bureau alienating certain patrons from patron-qabadāy-client networks. Nonetheless, it was guided more by an animosity towards Salam than a commitment to bureaucratic universalism. The 1960s, therefore, witnessed the emergence of several counter-patrons co-opted by the state20.

The premiership, for instance, circulated between three previously-excluded zu‘ama: Rachid Karameh, Hussein Oueini and Abdallah Al-Yafi. Karameh was especially skilful at utilising state patronage and ministerial appointments to co-opt lesser zu‘ama and qabadāyāt. Beneficiaries of the Chehabist era, for instance, included Al-As‘ad, Arslan, Jumblatt as well as emerging notables Ali Bazzi, Sleiman Al-Zein, René Mouawwad, Michel Eddé and Joseph Skaff. For the duration of the twelve-year Chehabist interlude, therefore, a new class of younger and more energetic ‘rebel’ patrons served ‘the downtrodden’, integrated ‘the marginalised’ and adopted Nasserist, socialist and progressive rhetoric (Eisenstadt and Roniger, 1984:201).

Za‘imism as a political paradigm, however, was all but defeated. Saeb Salam’s comeback and Elias Sarkis’ defeated against Sleiman Frangieh in 1970 are symptomatic of Chehabism’s failure. Frangieh curtailed the Deuxième Bureau and transferred much of its prerogatives into his son, Toni. Frangieh’s own patrimonial practices in his northern hometown of Ehden were those of a feudal bey: Abou Toni, as he was known, held open Sunday receptions and ‘re-personalised’ the relationship between his family and his clients (Khalaf, 1977). Similarly, his successive premiers, the Al-Sulh cousins, announced major public sector reshuffles which reincorporated functionaries of old zu‘ama (Traboulsi, 2007:181).

20 This is evident in ministerial appointments between 1958 and 1970 (Appendix 2: Table 3).
5.4 The Dysfunctionalism of the Patronage Regime in the 1970s

The emergence of a new, hybrid political class consisting of ‘old’ and ‘new’ zu’ama during the presidency of Sleiman Frangieh revalorised the deep-rooted imbalances and dysfunctionalism of Lebanon’s patronage democracy and carved up the socioeconomic and confessional cleavages which divided Lebanese societies in the run-up to the Civil War.

Essentially, the ‘patronage regime’ proved incapable of absorbing the city’s new demographics: most of Beirut’s residents were ‘in the city’ but not ‘of the city’: they were registered voters, invested their earnings and were integrated in the social fabric of their ancestral hometowns (Khalaf, 1968). Moreover, the 1970s witnessed the undoing of Chehab’s ‘balanced development’ shifting the focus back to the chaotic growth of the capital and the sprawling poverty belts surrounding it (Salit and Chaaban, 2010). Moreover, sectoral disparities resulted in the expansion of the lumpenproletariat at the expense of the industrial working class.

The dysfunctionalism of the regime, therefore, was twofold. On the one hand, patrons became more interested in securing short-term profits than assimilating new social segments and, on the other hand, intra-class competition amongst the lower strata of society prevented the emergence of interest groups and unionist action (Johnson, 1977:221).

The exclusion of large segments of Beirut’s inhabitants was, partly, a ramification of the gap between the ‘real’ and ‘official’ demographics. Eric Verdeil’s (2005) study of rural migration to Beirut, for instance, reveals that (i) the number of registered voters in rural and mountain areas, especially those nearer the border with Israel, is much higher than the number of actual residents; (ii) registered voters in the coastal and inland towns and Palestinian refugee camps is markedly lower than the resident population; (iii) the number of residents exceeds the voting population by a considerable margin in Beirut suburbs; and that (iv) municipal Beirut is in deficit, largely due to emigration.

Beirut’s southern suburb (Dahiyeh), for instance, is a compelling example of the discrepancy between ‘real’ and ‘electoral’ demographics. A series of 1983 articles highlighting deprivation and building irregularities in the 28km² suburb claimed that Dahiyeh was home to some 800,000 inhabitants – a quarter of the population at the time (Assafir, 1983). Today, the population of Dahiyeh is estimated at one million – the overwhelming majority of which are Shiite. The greater caza of Baabda to which Dahiyeh belongs, however, is home to only

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22 The majority of Palestinians in Lebanon are not naturalised.
32,000 Shiite voters. In the informal slum of Ḥayy El-Sellom alone, only 1000 out of 200,000 inhabitants are registered voters.

Naturally, the discrepancy between ‘real’ and ‘electoral’ demographics has an adverse impact on democratic functionalism. This is exacerbated in ‘patronage democracies’ where voting, service provision and political office are intertwined as patrons are uninterested and unable to provide for electorally-inconsequential clients. As a result, politically-disenfranchised clients are denied patronage and told to approach ‘their own zu’ama.’ Socioeconomically, therefore, the ‘patronage regime’ failed in assimilating the social forces produced by and whose consciousness is a result of modernisation. This can be said of two particular social classes in pre-war Lebanon: the urban lumpenproletariat and the parvenu bourgeoisie.

5.4.1 Marginalising the Lumpenproletariat

Rural migrants inhabiting Beirut’s sprawling slums and working-class suburbs constituted the overwhelming majority of the ‘marginalised’ lumpenproletariat. Initially, patrons of the Rachid Baydoun variety assimilated the city’s newcomers through ‘charitable’ patronage in the form of affordable education and vocational training, the construction of community centres and protecting clients’ building and housing irregularities. Rapid migration to the city and the diminishing pool of resources at the disposal of zu’ama, however, necessitated strategic resource-allocation decisions – that is to say, restricting patronage to potential voters.

The urban poor, therefore, substituted loyalty to and dependence on unwilling zu’ama with increasingly complex migrants’ solidarity networks which controlled access to housing, credit facilities and employment. Although the monetised value of accessing land and housing through membership in these networks was well below that ascribed by the capitalist market, it entailed non-monetary obligations to the collectivity.

5.4.1.1 Migrants, Muhajjarin and the Marginalised Majority

Zokak El-Blat’s significant Shiite population provides ample empirical evidence of tightly-knit migrant solidarities dating back to the early-twentieth century. The neighbourhood, whose name is derived from the tiled walkways characteristic of the nineteenth-century Ottoman renaissance, coincided with the ascent of the financial-commercial bourgeoisie. The quarter was also home to prosperous Beiruti families and prominent intellectuals with significant contributions to the Arab Nahda (Bodenstein, 2005; Hanssen, 2005).

Zokak El-Blat’s strategic location in the immediate vicinity of the commercial centre, the port and the affluent Wadi Abu-Jamil and Bab-Idris quarters, made it a prime location for Beirut’s

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26 This was exacerbated by an influx of refugees: Palestinians in 1948; Kurds in the 1950s and Iraqis in 2003.
earliest newcomers. Numerous migratory waves targeted the quarter starting with the 1840-1920 migration of affluent merchants and statesmen from Mount Lebanon.

The monopolisation of agriculture in the South by the As'ads, Osseirans and Zeins; the tobacco monoculture; and mounting tensions with the newly-created State of Israel resulted in a second migratory wave (Mallat, 1987). Between 1920 and 1957, unskilled labourers from the peripheral regions of the South migrated to Zokak El-Blat in pursuit of economic opportunity. Many were employed by affluent families as porters, stewards, chauffeurs, gardeners, housekeepers and janitors. A third wave of migration to Zokak El-Blat took place following the events of 1958 and was accelerated by the influx of internally-displaced persons (muhajjarin) during the Civil War. Whereas, Christian militias emptied the working-class East Beirut suburbs of an-Nab’a and Bourj-Hammoud of their non-Christian inhabitants, Christians in West Beirut felt unwelcome and fled to neighbourhoods in East Beirut and on the coastal settlements of the Metn-Kesrouan coast.

Migration to Zokak El-Blat illustrates the dynamics of migration to the city and the centrality of solidarity networks in the integration of newcomers in the social and economic fabric of the city. One family investigated for the purpose of this study originated from the South Lebanon village of Ain-Qana. Hajja Umm-Jaafar, in her sixties, migrated to Beirut in 1972 with her husband. Although the newly-wed couple intended to migrate to Beirut in the mid-1960s, their decision to leave Jnoub was, largely, encouraged by Frangieh’s election in 1970 which renewed despair and hopelessness in the peripheral regions. The couple discussed the prospect of migration with Beirut-based relatives and co-villagers visiting Ain-Qana on religious and summer holidays. In 1972, the couple finally moved to Chiyah – then, a rural suburb of Beirut which promised newcomers economic opportunity and prosperity. An in-law of Umm-Jaafar, Abu-Mostafa, helped the couple secure housing in Chiyah. Abu-Mostafa gained prominence in his ancestral village of Ain-Qana as a middleman. Himself a migrant to Chiyah in the late-1940s, Abu-Mostafa was socialised into the community through the newly-established hussayniyya.

It was there that Abu-Mostafa met his ‘patron’, a member of the Al-Khansa family with whom he ‘did business’. The Al-Khansas were horse groomers from Baalbek brought to Chiyah in the 1920s before eventually buying land and establishing themselves as ‘patrons’ in what would become Ghobeiri. By the late-1930s, Al-Khansas were in a position to help newer

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27 Names given in this section are pseudonyms indicating the gender and age of informants.
migrants secure housing and employment. In 1956, Chiyah was divided along confessional lines: Shiite-majority Ghobeiri became the dominion of the Khansas (Khuri, 1972:202-204).

Abu-Mostafa’s son, a real estate tycoon in his fifties, claims that his father’s ‘business partnership’ with the Al-Khansas “allowed him to act as a go-between securing employment and housing for migrants.” Umm-Jaafar concurs explaining that her husband found a job within weeks with the help of Abu-Mostafa. Umm-Jaafar and her family, however, were forced to flee Chiyah as their house was destroyed and their neighbourhood descended into chaos: the ‘Green Line’ dividing Beirut ran through Chiyah. The couple took refuge in Zokak El-Blat where a cousin of Umm-Jaafar was living. Hussein was a second-generation migrant to Zokak El-Blat. He inherited his father’s job as housekeeper for an affluent bourgeois family. His wife, born to a migrant family from Arab-Salim, also in the South, earned a living serving the ‘notable family’ and lived in an annexe in their vast garden.

Following the outbreak of the Civil War in 1975, Hussein’s employers fled to Jounieh leaving him and his wife to ‘oversee’ their property and safeguard it from theft and looting. In return, he was allowed to host ‘guests’ —friends and relatives who had either fled ‘fault line’ quarters or the ‘frontline’ in South Lebanon. One of Hussein’s guests-turned-squatters was Umm-Jaafar and her family. “Quickly,” Umm-Jaafar narrates, “the ‘palace was ‘cut-up’ into tens of lodgements for the muhajjarin”. Each spacious salle was transformed into a one-room family home and the large reception hall converted into a communal courtyard.

Umm-Jaafar’s husband, along with Hussein, joined AMAL in the early 1980s. As rank-and-file members of the militia, they provided ‘security’ and addressed the needs of their families and ‘fellow muhajjarin’: the personalistic migration network was gradually being transformed into a militia form of patronage which will be discussed in Chapter Six. It suffices to note here, however, that affiliation to AMAL provided squatters and muhajjarin with physical protection during and prevented their eviction from the mansions they had appropriated even in the immediate postwar years. Not only did Umm-Jaafar’s family occupy ‘the master bedroom’, she turned the garage into a make-shift studio: “back in the day,” she explained, “I used to knit for a living. I even taught my daughters the trade and we had a small business here.” Today, the garage is a supermarket popular amongst students of a nearby school. Intercession by AMAL officers in 2003 prevented Umm-Jaafar’s legal eviction from ‘the house’ and guaranteed her a hefty compensation which she used to buy an apartment in one of the multi-storey apartment buildings which muhajjarin now inhabit in Zokak El-Blat.

30 Landlords deny allowing muhajjarin to squat their properties. It is impossible to know where the truth lies as housing irregularities overlap with a segmented war narrative and heightened sectarian antagonisms.
5.4.1.2 Kinship, Sectarianism and the Homogeneity of City-zens Solidarities

Umm-Jaafar is no exception. Innumerable families in Zokak El-Blat narrate similar histories of migration and displacement (Stolleis, 2005; Hillenkamp, 2005). Zokak El-Blat itself is only one of many neighbourhoods where empirical evidence of informal networks, interpersonal relations and migrants’ solidarity networks is abundant. It must be noted, however, that solidarity networks and the informal networks of migration reinforced kinship ties and, thus, confessional solidarities.

The aforementioned example is a case in point: Umm-Jaafar’s family migrated to Chiyah with the help of Abu-Mostafa, a fellow Shiite and an in-law from the same ancestral village who also helped land Abu-Jaafar a job. Abu-Mostafa himself was an agent of co-religionists from Baalbek, the Al-Khansas. Similarly, Umm-Jaafar’s migration to Zokak El-Blat was facilitated by a cousin who hosted a number of relatives, in-laws, co-villagers and co-religionists in what would become a small collectivity combining ascriptive and functional aspects of solidarity. Their connections with militiamen and politicians allowed Umm-Jaafar and cohabitants of the abandoned mansion to escape legal eviction and secure compensation. Inevitably, ‘key’ persons with instrumental roles such as Abu-Mostafa and Hussein earned the loyalty of a vulnerable clientele and acted as ‘middle-level patrons’ or strongmen.

Beyond Zokak El-Blat, Mona Fawaz explores similar patterns of migration and integration in the Shiite-majority enclaves of ḥayy El-Sellom31, Rouaysset and Zaaytriyeh32. Fawaz (2009) argues that, the struggle to regularise settlements and integrate into the social fabric in spite of building irregularities and violations of property rights evokes the concept of ‘claiming the right to the city’: in other words, Beirut’s newcomers were transformed from illegal occupants, squatters and marginalised slum-dwellers to homeowners and, sometimes, voters – ‘city-zens.’

5.4.2 Marginalising the Parvenu Bourgeoisie

Alongside rural migrants and the muhajjarin who constituted the bulk of the lumpenproletariat, the ‘patronage regime’ failed to assimilate another important social class which was produced by the expansion of capitalism in the socioeconomic and geographic periphery. A number of factors contributed to the rapid growth of the petty and parvenu bourgeoisie including the expansion of modern education, urbanisation and emigration – hence the emergence of the nouveau riche class whose members owned shops, restaurants and guest houses. This was exacerbated by the steep increase in emigration encouraged by the oil boom in the mid-1970s. Expatriates remitted large fortunes to their families who, in turn, inflated the swelling petty bourgeoisie – some even joined the bourgeoisie.

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31 ḥayy El-Sellom lies within the municipal boundaries of Choueifat.
32 Rouaysset and Zaatariyeh lie within the municipal boundaries of Jdaidet El-Metn and Bouchrieh.
This social class is of particular importance given that the emergence of hybrid social classes which are neither ‘bourgeois’ nor ‘proletarian’ in the strict sense is a characteristic phenomenon of the peripheral-capitalist MoP (Chit, 2009a). In such dependent economies, members of the financial-commercial bourgeoisie are driven not by the logics of domestic supply-and-demand but by the import/export dynamics. As a result, the economy fails to develop corporate capitalism and, therefore, the domestic consumer market is dominated by middle-class and petty-bourgeois capitalists.

This is empirically evident in modern Lebanon where supermarket chains, for instance, constitute a much smaller portion of the domestic market in contrast to self-employed shopowners with a minimum number of workers, usually, relatives or neighbours. Corporate capitalism, therefore, is noticeably underdeveloped in Lebanon leaving ample opportunity for tiny privately-owned and self-run businesses to dominate the domestic market living off the ‘leftovers’ of the transit trade. This had two implications on Lebanon’s political economy. Firstly, it prevents the crystallisation of binary opposite class structure – bourgeois and proletarian. Secondly, the hybridity and non-confrontationalism of the petty and parvenu bourgeoisie underpinned the hierarchical networks of clientelistic redistribution. It is not uncommon for local ‘strongmen’ to combine their ownership of wholesale/retail stores and coffee shops, for instance, with their positions as rayes (chiefs) or qabadāy in the hierarchical networks of a za’im.

By the mid-1970s, Lebanon had become a country in which middle- and high-income nouveaux riches constituted a large portion of the middle and upper classes. The scarcity of resources, however, diminished the zu’ama’s ability to assimilate members of this rapidly expanding social class in their hierarchical clientelistic networks and pseudo-ideological parties. Paradoxically, therefore, the parvenu bourgeoisie was ‘marginalised’ by the za’imist regime in much the same way as the urban lumpenproletariat.

5.5 THE RISE AND FALL OF LEBANON’S PATRONAGE DEMOCRACY

The discussion presented in this chapter demonstrates that ‘patronage’ in modern Lebanon is not a ‘leftover’ from the pre-capitalist era nor are patron-client dyads ‘essential’ or ‘primordial’ social relations. Instead, ‘patronage’ can only be understood in the context of late/incomplete modernity and peripheral capitalism. In other words, za’imism is a product of the gap between institutional and socioeconomic modernisation whereby patrons mitigated the uncertainties of capitalism, provided solutions to the vulnerabilities of modernity and interceding between clients and the unintelligible bureaucracy or the inaccessible economy. Given the ‘evolutionary’ nature of the transition to modern capitalism in Lebanon, zu’ama constituted a
hybrid social class of feudalists, civil servants, bureaucrats middle-class professionals and capitalist entrepreneurs. This is also related to the failure to develop a unitary state. It can be argued, therefore, that consociationalism expanded the opportunity spaces for patrons and underpinned Lebanon’s ‘patronage democracy’.

For Weberian critics, za‘imism undermined the universalistic criteria of resource allocation and ‘corrupted’ the formal sphere: ‘informal’ networks impeded the development of democratic structures, prevented interest-driven individualism and led to patrimonialism where ‘tradition’, privilege and personalistic relations regulate society. For Marxists, it thwarted organisation along class lines, promoted privileges, perpetuated discriminatory access to goods and constituted a mechanism for domination.

Despite their adverse impact on the formal sphere and on class consciousness, empirical evidence shows us that patron-client dyads perform an ‘integrative’ function by assimilating the social forces produced by and whose consciousness is a result of modernisation. Moreover, the informal networks of patronage and middle-level ‘strongmen’ became indispensible assets for the state and society alike, mitigating the effects of the ‘imposition’ of the formal domain and modern state institutions ‘from above’. Chehab’s ambitious reforms demonstrate this paradox: expanding the bureaucracy and narrowing socioeconomic disparities in spite of established zu‘ama involved the empowerment of and dependence on lesser patrons.

It must be noted that the relationship between patrons and clients in mid-twentieth-century Lebanon was ‘de-personalised’. In other words, patron-client dyads evolved from the ‘simplistic’ forms which dominate rural and pre-capitalist societies by acquiring ‘formal’ institutional constellations as demonstrated by a myriad of political parties in 1960s Lebanon. Crucially, the ‘de-personalisation’ of patron-client relations had two important implications on the political paradigm in Lebanon.

Firstly, it enhanced the performance-driven nature of modern/urban patronage and allowed for the crystallisation of collective solidarities amongst clients. Patron-client dyads, therefore, became less individualistic: a za‘im provided for a collective clientele-constituency within the context of a democratic system. Secondly, za‘imist networks and pseudo-ideological parties became nuclei for new identities and the backbone of ‘imagined communities’. Instead of theascriptive criteria of kin, for instance, social exchange became contingent on membership in modern, rational and socially-constructed solidarities. Party-patrons, therefore, promoted sectarian group solidarity in an attempt to shift the focus of competition over resources from the ‘simple’ personalistic forms of social relations to the ‘us-versus-them’ logics of the sectarian paradigm.
Lebanon’s patronage democracy in the 1960s, however, was becoming increasingly unable to perform these functions for a number of reasons. Firstly, socioeconomic and geographic mobility was too rapid for the feeble petty-za’imist partisan structures. Secondly, the scarcity of resources and the outward orientation of Lebanese capitalism diminished patrons’ ability to provide for their clientele. Thirdly, zu’ama became more inclined to restrict patronage to their voting clients. The country’s division into small electoral constituencies, rapid migration to the city and the continued dependence on the 1932 census highlighted the gap between ‘real’ and ‘electoral’ demographics and exacerbated the rift between the zu’ama and the social forces produced by modernisation and urbanisation.

By 1970, the overwhelming majority of Beirut’s inhabitants had become ‘inconsequential’ in the context of Lebanon’s patronage democracy. Patronage, therefore, ceased to perform its most important function: the integration and assimilation of the social actors produced by and whose consciousness is a result of modernisation. Beirut’s ‘city-zens’ were ‘in the city’ but not ‘of the city’ and, thus, developed into a marginalised majority consisting of (i) a lumpenproletariat inhabiting the city’s sprawling poverty belt; (ii) an immobile educated middle class; and (iii) a nouveau riche parvenu bourgeoisie.

This widening gap, it will be argued in the following chapter, shook the very foundations of the democratic system and lent popularity to progressive and radical forces as well as confessional populists of the Bachir Gemayel and Imam Moussa as-Sadr variety. Crucially, the failures of the ruling patron class unveiled the deep-rooted inequalities and revealed the fallacies underlying the myths of the successful, neo-Phoenician merchant republic. Lebanon, it became obvious, was not ‘a happy phenomenon’ nor was it a liberal example of self-perpetuating prosperity and political stability as Shils (1966) and Hourani (1986) had argued.
CHAPTER SIX

CONFESSIONALISM AND MILITIA PATRONAGE: LEBANON IN CIVIL WAR
As the discussion in the previous chapters demonstrates, ‘informal’ networks of patronage mitigated the effects of deficient socioeconomic modernisation, the unintelligibility of modern institutional constellations and the disparities produced by the capitalist economy. Moreover, as part of the socio-political context and social formation, asymmetric but mutually-beneficial dyadic relationships between zu’ama and atbā‘ performed a crucial ‘integrative function’ by assimilating the social forces produced by modernisation. Patronage, therefore, prevented the crystallisation of social classes in the Marxist sense, thwarted class conflict and, thus, underpinned the stability of Lebanon’s patronage democracy. In doing so, za‘imist political parties shifted the focus of social exchange from the direct interpersonal relationship between patrons and clients to the collective client-constituency – hence, laying the foundations for confessional solidarities which tie co-religionists to particular patrons.

By the 1960s, however, rapid socioeconomic and geographic mobility, the rigidity and fragility of the capitalist system and the growing gap between ‘real’ and ‘electoral’ demographics diminished patrons’ ability to and interest in serving politically-disenfranchised ‘city-zens’. This, it has been argued in the previous chapter, resulted in the emergence of a ‘marginalised majority’ consisting of the subaltern masses, immobile educated middle classes and the parvenu bourgeoisie. The city’s newcomers, therefore, reorganised into new solidarity networks patronised by a radical counter-elite promising to mitigate the effects of exclusion and marginalisation. In pursuit of their own interests and the interests of their clients, members of the counter-elite challenged the ruling establishment which denied them access to state resources and economic opportunities in spite of education and the fortunes they amassed.

The nature of the solidarity networks from within which the counter-elite emerged, however, had two important implications on its members. Firstly, migratory networks (re)emphasised kinship ties, patronymic groups and ancestral hometowns. Secondly, solidarity networks revalorised the principles of social struggle against exclusion not in a social-class sense but in a communitarian sense. In other words, members of a solidarity group did not perceive themselves as a subaltern class struggling against a hegemonic financial-commercial bourgeoisie but as ‘migrants from the Bekaa’, ‘southerners’ or ‘Shiites’. As a result, the clientelistic networks of the lesser patrons constituting the counter-elite were, by and large, homogenous in terms of sectarian composition and, often, reinforced patronymic groups and ancestral-hometown solidarities.

Building on the discussion presented so far, this chapter examines the nature and dynamics of the counter-elite in two complex historical contexts: the early 1970s and the Civil War. It must be noted, however, that the emerging counter-elite consisted of three distinct groups: (i) the ideologically-driven far-left; (ii) lesser patrons and middle-level qabādāyāt seeking to carve
for themselves a niche in the political sphere; and (iii) ‘communitarians’ translating followers’ grievances into demands for a *reformation* of the distribution of wealth.

The first section in this chapter sheds light on the counter-elite’s motivations for taking up arms and challenging the ruling establishment. Although the far-left dominated the political discourse, this chapter focuses solely on pseudo-ideological lesser patrons and ‘communitarians’. The second section demonstrates how the Civil War ceased to be a progressive ‘adventure’ to ‘reform by arms’ and, instead, reorganised society into neo-za’imist socio-confessional arrangements centred around militias and contained within sectarian cantons in what became the ‘war order’.

6.1 THE DISILLUSIONMENT AND RADICALISATION OF THE COUNTER-ELITE

The growing failures of Lebanon’s patronage democracy provided an opportunity for lesser *zu’ama* and middle-level *qabaḍayāt* to assume representation of the subaltern masses. This was exacerbated by their assimilation into the ruling establishment during the Chehabist era. The implications of representing the politically-disenfranchised were twofold. Firstly, self-styled populist leaders could not count on their clients’ votes to access state patronage and expand their largess in the ‘orderly’ fashion dictated by Lebanon’s patronage democracy. Secondly, their inability to access and, thus, dispense patronage was mitigated by the adoption of radical and populist ideologies ranging from socialism to fascism; from pan-Arab Nasserism to Syrian nationalism; and from revolutionary radicalism to communitarian reformism.

Ibrahim Qlailat and Farouk Al-Moukaddem are examples of *qabaḍayāt* encouraged by the socioeconomic failures of the system to ‘defect’ and establish their own populist movements. In 1969, Moukaddem established *ḥarakat 24-tishrīn* (24 October Movement) in Tripoli and, in 1970, Qlailat transformed the loosely-organised *Murābiṭūn* militia which had partaken in the clashes of 1958 into the Movement of Independent Nasserites. In the same year, populist Saida MP, Maaruf Saad, established *al-Tanẓīm al-Sha‘abī al-‘āmil* (Popular Nasserite Movement).

Populist patrons’ disillusionment with the ruling establishment and the rigid rules of the political game, however, reached an all-time high in the aftermath of the 1972 general election. With the exception of Najah Wakim and Maaruf Saad, none of the splinters and factions of the Nasserite, socialist and nationalist movements had been successful.

The disappointing results of the 1972 election exacerbated the frustration of unsuccessful political aspirants and highlighted the significant gap between ‘real’ and ‘electoral’

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33 Wakim was a founding member of Kamal Chatila’s Nasserite *Ithnā‘ī ḍawwa al-sha‘b al-‘āmil* (Union of the Toiling Peoples) in 1965. Today, he is the leader of the radical alter-globalist People’s Movement.

34 Saad was elected in 1957 and continued to serve as MP and President of Saida Municipality until 1973.
demographics. Less popular patrons, therefore, secured election whereas populist leaders appealing to the subaltern majority failed although they satisfied the traditional requisites for *za'imship* (AbuKhalil, 1988). Essentially, this highlighted the conundrum of patronage democracy: populists and progressives could only occupy public office through the strategic allocation of largess; but largess was only available to patrons with access to state officials and wealthy entrepreneurs.

In response to the political infertility of the ruling establishment, twelve progressive parties joined forces under the umbrella of the Lebanese National Movement (LNM). The amorphous union of Nasserite, nationalist, socialist and communist parties, was held together by the astute leadership, intellectualism and charisma of Kamal Jumblatt who combined feudal, hereditary and sectarian leadership of the Druze tenantry with strong social and democratic convictions (Kelidar and Burrel, 1976; Barbee, 1977; Hafez, 1977; Salkind and Saidi, 1977). The ideological hybridity of the LNM was mitigated not only by Jumblatt’s leadership but also by the ideological coherence of the Marxist-Leninist factions whose ideologues conceptualised the struggle against the political system and the Christian far-right. Under the ideological leadership of LCP and OCA, for instance, the LNM conceptualised its mission as a struggle to offset ‘the fascist and imperialist plan’, to ‘liberate’ Lebanon from ‘feudalism, confessionalism and political polygarchy’ and to unseat the dominant financial-commercial bourgeoisie (Salkind and Traboulsi, 1977).

Crucially, the LNM sought to defeat ‘isolationism’ – a reference to the fascist neo-Phoenicianist ideology of the far-right. For the progressives, Lebanon could no longer sustain a politico-economic system dependent on outward-oriented capitalism nor can ‘its strength lay in its weakness’ as the far-right was advocating. Dependence on transit trade, the LNM proclaimed, led Lebanon not to independence but to utter subjugation to the West (Salkind and Traboulsi, 1977; Hafez, 1977).

The role of frustrated patrons and disillusioned *qabadāyāt* of the Moukkadem and Qlailat variety in derailing the ‘revolutionary’ mission of the Civil War will be discussed later in this chapter. In the meantime, it suffices to note that populist leaders joined the LNM in protest against the exclusivity of the ruling establishment and in an attempt to ‘resist’ marginalisation. In doing so, they joined forces with the ideologically-driven far-left in an all-encompassing struggle against the political system and the hegemonic ruling class.

The second component of the emerging counter-elite consists of a number of ‘communitarians’ whose appeal rested more on a reformist message than a revolutionary one. Such confessional populists as Imam Moussa as-Sadr and Bachir Gemayel, for instance, advocated a restructuring
of the economic system, the substitution of traditional zu‘ama with more representative patrons able to assimilate the marginalised and a more equitable distribution of resources. The following section will examine the political economy and history of emerging communitarian radicals with a particular emphasis on as-Sadr and Gemayel.

6.2 COMMUNALISING SHIITES’ STRUGGLE AGAINST DEPRIVATION

Originating from the economically-deprived and war-torn peripheral regions of South Lebanon and Baalbeck-Hermel, Shiites constituted the majority of the subaltern masses and the urban poor inhabiting Beirut’s sprawling poverty belts. It has been demonstrated in Chapter Five that Shiites’ migration to the city socialised them into solidarity networks which reinvented kinship ties and reinforces group solidarities based on common ancestral roots. Moreover, compelling empirical evidence shows that hussayniyyāt (community centres) played a vital role in assimilating the city’s newcomers into the social fabric; thus, emphasising sectarian affiliation.

The implication of hussayniyyāt’s salience as institutions of civil society is twofold. Firstly, it tied newcomers to earlier migrants whose patronage of community centres allowed the crystallisation of communal solidarities. This is evidenced by the interconnection between Al-‘Āmiliyya school and Rachid Baydoun’s za‘imship as well as between the Ghobeiri hussayniyya and the pre-eminence of Al-Khansas. Secondly, the hussayniyya introduced Shiite clerics as pivotal actors in the struggle against marginalisation as exemplified by shaykh Ali Daamouche in Zokak El-Blat and Sayyid Muhammad Hussain Fadlallah in An-Nab’a.

Patterns of migration, habitation and the centrality of the hussayniyya resulted in the carving up of a Shiite public sphere amongst Beirut’s newcomers. In other words, their secular socioeconomic grievances were intertwined with their emerging collective identity not as a subaltern social class but as ‘Shiites’ and/or southerners and Bekais.

Patrons’ commitment to these emerging collectivities, however, was insufficient as Shiites’ geographic mobility exceeded their socioeconomic mobility. By the 1950s, solidarity networks’ capacity to assimilate newcomers and provide welfare, employment and housing was diminished. This was exacerbated by the electoral inconsequence of Shiite ‘city-zens’ who were unwelcomed by the city’s urban bosses. Feudal zu‘ama in the country, on the other hand, were perceived as an extension of the politico-economic system.

Paradoxically, the marginalisation of the Shiites coincided with the expansion of education and the accumulation of wealth in connection with emigration and repatriation. In fact, Shiites’ social mobility failed to correspond to the radicalising transformations in the political economy

35 Interview: Mohamed Obeid. AMAL Political Bureau (former); and journalist. Beirut. 30 March 2010.
of the community since the 1920s. These transformations can be summarised in three important stages. The first stage involved the release of agricultural labourers and, thus, migration to Beirut. This generation of migrants suffered occupational immobility and, thus, developed into a class of petty money-makers. The second generation, however, benefited from Chehab’s educational reforms. A significant segment of this generation, therefore, made an acute leap into the middle class. The third generation, however, struggled with economic recession – hence, accelerating emigration to Africa and oil-rich Arab countries in the 1970s.

Repatriated wealth, therefore, lifted a significant segment of the Shiite community out of poverty and underpinned the nascent Shiite parvenu bourgeoisie whose fortunes were deposited in such communal financial institutions as Rachid Baydoun’s ’Āmiliyya. By the mid-1960s, for instance, ‘Āmiliyya held more than LL150 million in repatriated deposits – the equivalent of half of the national budget.

Despite their educational and financial gains, however, three factors led to the marginalisation of the Shiites by the city’s established patrons: (i) the electoral inconsequence of the majority; (ii) the relative self-centredness and self-containment of Shiite migrants within relatively homogenous neighbourhoods and solidarity networks; and (iii) the fact that wealthy Shiites invested not in the lucrative financial-commercial sector but in communal banks, real estate and other auto-centred economic activities. Moreover, the economic slowdown of the 1960s and the shrinking public sector reduced middle-class Shiites’ opportunities (Al-Azmeh, 1976:62; Denoeux, 1993:121). Inevitably, these paradoxes aggravated the frustrations and sentiments of social injustice amongst the socioeconomically amorphous Shiites who became fertile ground for radicalisation. AbuKhalil (1988:172) notes, that Shiites were so involved in leftist parties that shi’i and shyu’i (communist) became synonymous in Lebanese jargon.

6.2.1 Clergymen and the Struggle against Dispossession amongst the Shiites

In light of their deprivation, however, such essential welfare services as education superseded ideology. Subsidised education in Najaf and employment in the Jaafari courts became the prime avenues for social mobility in the early-twentieth century. Consequently, clerics became the voice of the marginalised. Muhammad Jawad Mughniya (1904-1979) who was born into a petty money-making household, for instance, returned to Lebanon from Najaf in 1948 to assume the presidency of the Jaafari tribunal. Interestingly, Mughniya was inspired by the intellectuals of the Nahda. His political writings acquired a revolutionary tone. Protesting the indifference of Shiite deputies, Mughniya wrote:

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37 Interview: Waddah Sharara.
We do not want from the deputies of the South that they blindly serve a community against another community, a person against the other, or a region against another region. We do not ask them to make of Jabal Amil another America but we want Jabal Amil to be an integral part of Lebanon with its rights and its duties, so that [...] Jabal Amil compare[s] with [...] Lebanon (in Mallat, 1987:8).

Mughniya’s radical opinions, however, resulted in his dismissal from the Jaafari court in 1956 and his exclusion from the succesorship of Sayyid Abdul-Hussain Sharafeddine in 1960 despite his scholarly credentials. Instead, an Iran-born clergyman from the more militant hawza (seminary) of Qom assumed the politico-spiritual leadership of Lebanon’s Shiites.

Moussa as-Sadr embarked on redefining the functions of the clergy drawing inspiration from the ‘authenticated’ narrative of Imam Hussain’s martyrdom: the cleric, according to as-Sadr, was the ‘imam of a community’ and his role was not only to disseminate scholarship, but also to serve the community, protect its interests and undergo martyrdom on its behalf. As-Sadr represented Shiites in the public sphere, delivered speeches in Churches and universities never ventured by a Shiite cleric and called for general strikes in solidarity with the ‘neglected South’ (Ajami, 1986). His leadership marked the birth of a ‘radical-communitarian alternative’ which acquired state recognition in 1967 and was organised around the HISC; hence marking Shiites’ break with Sunni-dominated structures (Salamé, 1986; Traboulsi, 2007:178).

Essentially, as-Sadr ‘confessionalised’ Shiites’ grievances and lay the foundations for a new discourse which stressed notions of ‘cultural citizenship’ and placed the Shiites at the centre of a new national narrative (Shaery-Eisenlohr, 2008). This was exacerbated by the Baathist takeover in Iraq in 1968 which resulted in an exodus of Lebanese mujtahids who had studied under Muhsin Al-Hakim and Muhammad Baqer as-Sadr founders of Hizb ad-Da’wa. The likes of Ayatollah Fadlallah and Al-Sadeks established charitable educational centres modelled on the seminaries of Najaf, often, in collaboration with HISC (Shapira, 1988:116; Sankari, 2005).

6.2.2 Moussa as-Sadr: Imam of the Dispossessed

Mujtahids’ provision of social welfare, however, exacerbated Shiites’ grievances: although they acquired modern education and were occupationally mobile, the majority continued to suffer political disenfranchisement in Beirut and exclusion by the ruling establishment. In protest, as-Sadr established ʿharakat al-mahrūmīn (Movement of the Disinherited) in 1974 to lobby the state and assimilate the Shiites.

A common misconception, however, is that the movement appealed exclusively to the poor and voiced the concerns of the Shiite lumpenproletariat in Jnoub and the Bekaa. In reality, however, the movement was an urban phenomenon par excellence: dispossession was a

product of urban poverty belts, not village life where kinship ties and patronymic groups mitigated the effects of social immobility. Although ḥarakat al-mahrūmīn promised the downtrodden a better life, it was ambitious Shiite youth and educated university graduates who constituted its critical mass.

In other words, as-Sadr appealed more to pragmatists, not revolutionaries: men and women who were unable to convert newly-acquired wealth and hard-earned education into social status and political power (Denoeux, 1993:121). A former member of the AMAL political bureau, Mohammed Obeid, confirms this stating that:

As-Sadr never advocated overthrowing or changing the political system. Instead, he advocated ‘reform’. He defined his movement as revolutionary insofar as its struggle against Israel goes. But, domestically, it was reformist.

It can be argued, therefore, that as-Sadr represented the interests of an amorphous constituency consisting of middle-class professionals, wealthy expatriates, educated youth and public sector functionaries. Moreover, by the late-1960s, ḥarakat al-mahrūmīn became the party-of-choice for expatriates investing in real estate in Ras Beirut and Rue Verdun as well as agro-industries. The transnational diasporic parvenu bourgeoisie which ḥarakat al-mahrūmīn increasingly represented included the likes of Lebanese-Sierre Leonean diamond wholesaler and billionaire, Jamil Sa’id (Picard, 2000:315). As-Sadr’s ḥarakat al-mahrūmīn, therefore, represented those ‘dispossessed’ of political affluence commensurate to their riches as much as it represented the poor and deprived. Unsurprisingly, therefore, his alliance with the LNM was precarious: despite convergence on issues of social justice and enmity towards the established ruling polygarchy, as-Sadr was a self-professed anti-communist with a communitarian project.

6.2.3 As-Sadr’s Reformist Mission
Politically, as-Sadr advocated an ‘enlightened’ discourse – a third force between the polygarchy and the far-left. Members of the ruling class, he argued, were engrossed in parochial self-interests and uninterested in the common good whereas leftist parties prevented the crystallisation of Shiite solidarity (Salamé, 1986:16; Barak, 2002; Traboulsi, 2007:178). His movement, therefore, aspired to replace established feudalists as political representatives of the confession but not necessarily to challenge the foundational underpinnings of the confessional system or the patronage democracy.

Although his movement was an urban phenomenon addressing the grievances of social actors bearing the brunt of modernisation and suffering the vulnerabilities of urbanity, as-Sadr exploited the social relations of the country to radicalise inhabitants of the peripheral regions.

39 Interview: Waddah Sharara.
40 Interview: Mohammed Obeid.
The country, therefore, remained the focus of mobilisation and the scene of as-Sadr’s attempts
to unseat the feudal za‘ama. Militant supporters in such towns as Nabatiyeh and Tyre,
therefore, played a pivotal role in the struggle against Al-As‘ads and others (Picard, 1993:13).

As-Sadr’s speeches and sermons combined concrete demands with incantatory rhetoric aimed
at consolidating communitarian sentiments. In a 1974 rally in Bidnayil, for instance, as-Sadr
declared that “[Shiites] are matawila 41 no more! We are rejectionists! Avengers! A revolt
against injustice!” (Traboulsi, 2007:179). In another rally, he proclaimed that:

We do not want to clash with the regime or with those who neglect us. Today,
we shout out loud the wrong against us, that a cloud of injustice has followed
us since the dawn of history. Starting from today, we will no longer complain
or cry! Our name is al-rāfdūn 42. We are men of vengeance who refuse and
revolt against tyranny (in Picard, 1993:13).

As-Sadr’s rebellious rhetoric spells out the two components of his message: social justice and
confessional solidarity. In 1975, as-Sadr established ḥarakat al-maḥrūmīn’s armed branch
Afwāj al-Muqāwama al-Lubnāniyya (Lebanese Resistance Detachments), commonly
abbreviated as AMAL (‘hope’). In its seven-point Charter, AMAL reiterated the same message
emphasising the inevitability of economic reforms and stressing the autonomy and coherence
words, AMAL and HISC represented the political and communal arms of as-Sadr’s
communalistic project. Combined, they constituted the backbone of the Shiite ‘pillar’ and
represented the community’s socioeconomic grievances vis-à-vis the state (Norton, 1988:78).

6.2.4 ‘Hope’: Strengthening the Shiite Confession and Reshuffling Zu‘ama
AMAL, therefore, shared the socioeconomic views of progressive forces represented by
the LNM insofar as they protested the hegemony of the ruling polygarchy; the corruption of the
political system and its inability to assimilate social actors produced by modernisation; and the
dominance of the outward-oriented financial-commercial sector which failed to absorb excess
labour and educated youth. Moreover, AMAL and the LNM rejected the federalist and
confederalist solutions proposed by the predominantly-Christian right-wing Lebanese Front
although AMAL expressed willingness to discuss ‘any political settlement’. Crucially, AMAL
called for the jettisoning of the confessional system according to a ‘gradual’ plan and disagreed

The initial cross-confessional appeal of ḥarakat al-maḥrūmīn, however, began to wear thin as
AMAL adopted an increasingly-Shiite intonation aimed, in part, at undercutting leftist forces
amongst the community. As-Sadr, therefore, emphasised the confessional cleavage and sought

41 Derogatory term used in reference to Shiits and associates them with ‘Persia’.
42 Sectarian term used in reference to Shiites’ ‘rejection’ of the Rashidun Caliphs.
to maintain the cohesion of the new imagined community: the Shi’ā. To achieve this, he avoided the class-struggle discourse and emphasised the ‘us-versus-them’ paradigm although he continued to present his message as the ‘outray of the dispossessed of all sects’. To avoid splitting the Shi’ā, for instance, AMAL refrained from personal attacks on Shiite zu’ama. Instead, the Shi’ā were victimised and their grievances blamed on the ‘corrupt establishment’ (Picard, 1993:13).

AMAL’s communitarian rather than principled attack on the political system is evidenced by the movement’s precarious rapprochement with ‘political families’. Although criticising ‘political feudalists’ for siphoning off the wealth of South Lebanon and the Bekaa (Picard, 1993:14), AMAL cooperated with and, eventually, co-opted the Al-Khalil, Osseiran, Al-Zein, Baydoun (in Jnoub) and Hamadeh (in Baalbek-Hermel) feudal-patron families (Abbas, 2005).

For AMAL, the benefits of absorbing these patron-families into the movement was manifold. Firstly, it allowed the movement access to patronage resources necessary for the movement’s expansion. Secondly, assimilating these zu’ama provided the movement with the cadres and followers needed in the struggle against the more arrogant As‘ads. Thirdly, established political families allowed the movement to consolidate its position as the representative of the Shi’ā. Moreover, this reinforced the unity of the confession and undercut the class-struggle discourse of the leftist movement which enjoyed a substantial following amongst the Shi’ā.

More importantly, co-opting local notables allowed AMAL to decentralise the movement and overcome the geographical discontinuity of the Shiite confession which is divided between the South, the Bekaa and Beirut’s southern suburbs. The decentralisation of AMAL regional bureaus produced such regional ‘strongmen’ as Dawud Dawud in Tyre and Hassan Hashim in Nabatiyeh and Iqlim al-Tuffah (Deeb, 1988:688).

In other words, in pursuit of expanding its following vis-à-vis the As‘ads, AMAL co-opted lesser patrons and created new ones and was, thus, more successful in breaching the seeming impermeability of Lebanon’s patronage democracy than its populist counterparts in the LNM. As a result of its ‘adaptive’ strategies, AMAL co-founder, Hussein El-Husseini, was elected to parliament in Baalbeck-Hermel in 1972. In the 1974 by-election, the movement mobilised supporters in Tyre and Nabaityeh to vote for Lebanese-African businessman, Rafic Chahine, vis-à-vis a member of the As‘ad family (Picard, 1993:9; Traboulsi, 2007:180).

By the mid-1970s, the movement included within its ranks several co-opted notables as well as a number of middle-class and parvenu-bourgeois cadres. As-Sadr’s ‘disappearance’ during a Libya trip in 1978, therefore, left AMAL under the control of Hussein El-Husseini. Himself a member of the middle class, El-Husseini marked the transition from clerical guidance to the
middle-class leadership. In 1984, El-Husseini dealt Kamil Al-As‘ad the final blow breaking his uninterrupted fourteen-year tenure as Speaker (Salamé, 1986:19; Deeb, 1988:686).

Although he resigned from AMAL, El-Husseini’s election as Speaker crowned the movement’s struggle against the feudal As‘ads. Nonetheless, the movement became a meeting place for ‘old’ and ‘new’ party-patrons bringing together the likes of Nabih Berri with members of the Al-Zein, Baydoun, Osseiran and Al-Khalil notable houses. The movement, therefore, succeeded in shifting the focus from the personalistic relationship between the As‘ad patrons and individual Shiites to a more holistic relationship between AMAL (as an entity) and the Shi‘a (as a collectivity). In other words, the movement strengthened the cohesion of the confession and ‘reshuffled’ the community’s zu‘ama but did not challenge or attempt to change the confessional or clientelistic underpinnings of the Lebanese political system as such.

6.3 BACHIR GEMAYEL AND ‘THE MARONITE ALTERNATIVE’

Imam Moussa as-Sadr’s reform-minded communitarian mission can be compared to the message of Christian ‘communitarians’ as Bachir Gemayel. Admittedly, referring to Bachir’s quasi-fascist populism as ‘radical’ is rather unorthodox (even, heretical) given his commitment to isolationist and ultra-nationalist discourse premised on crudely ‘essentialist’ presuppositions of ‘Maronite supremacy’. Nonetheless, his socioeconomic views, commitment to ‘subaltern Maronites’ and distaste for Christian ‘political families’ demonstrate a stark resemblance to the ‘Movement of the Disinherited’.

Bachir Gemayel emerged as a young, enthusiastic member of the Kataeb Party established by his father, Pierre, in 1936 inspired by Spanish and German Fascist parties. Pierre’s ultranationalism appealed to middle-class Christians in the postcolonial era especially in light of the 1958 civil war. Pierre Gemayel’s appointment in consecutive cabinets, therefore, presented President Fouad Chehab with an opportunity to inject new blood in the political system and challenge established zu‘ama⁴³ (Khalaf, 1968). Crucially, Gemayel constituted the backbone of the emerging Lebanese Front, a coalition of right-wing Christian politicians including the likes of Camille Chamoun and Sleiman Frangieh organised to counterforce the progressive coalition represented by the LNM in the mid-1970s.

Bachir’s meteoric rise, however, threatened to undercut Maronite zu‘ama and their scions, including his father. With the outbreak of hostilities in 1975, Bachir’s loose coalition of ‘radical’ enthusiasts from modest backgrounds organised into what became the Lebanese Forces (LF). By 1980, the LF had absorbed all independent Christian militias and undertook to

⁴³ Appendix 2: Table 3.
undermine the Lebanese Front itself (Snider, 1984). Bachir described the LF’s enmity towards zu’ama of the Frangieh variety as an ‘insurrection’ against ‘injustice and feudalism’ (Traboulsi, 2007:209).

Bachir’s views on the Ehden massacre in which LF forces led by Samir Geagea killed Sleiman Frangieh’s son, for instance, reveal the deeper social meaning for which the LF stood. Although Bachir himself was from a well-to-do family, the LF claimed to represent the socially-immobile and provided political aspirants from relatively modest backgrounds with an avenue for social promotion as well as the organisational basis to undermine the politico-religious establishment. In other words, the LF represented social forces produced by modernisation and excluded by the ruling formula – namely, the educated youth, middle-class professionals, subaltern families and the salaried (Snider, 1984; Norton, 1987:10; Denoeux, 1993:122; Trabousli, 2007:208-209).

The LF, therefore, claimed to represent the ‘disempowered’ – not only the socioeconomically deprived but, crucially, those social forces whose socioeconomic mobility could not be translated into social status and political power. This is evidenced by the manifesto Bachir declared on May Day in 1982 in which he reiterated the commitment to the laissez-faire economy of the ‘merchant republic’ within the bounds of social justice and equal opportunity. Crucially, however, Bachir’s fascist message ascribed corporatist functions to the state: “the state”, he proclaimed, “must bring social classes together by purifying the economic system of its excesses and defects”. In doing so, however, the state must not ‘distribute’ welfare nor allow the ‘unproductive’ to ‘skive’ off the ‘hard-working masses’ – a reference to the ‘balanced development’ discourse advocating the redistribution of wealth away from the privileged Beirut/Mount Lebanon region towards the periphery (Trabousli, 2007:217).

In short, Bachir’s meteoric rise during the 1970s symbolised the failures of the patronage system in assimilating the social forces produced by modernisation and rapid socioeconomic mobility. By the mid-1970s, members of the middle class and the petty bourgeoisie replaced the political manipulation of the zu’ama constituting the Lebanese Front with loyalty to and armed struggle alongside Bachir. The ‘political Maronitism’ of the LF, therefore, depended on a combination of social and economic promises and, crucially, confessional communitarianism and isolationist fascism. In other words, the LF proposed that the ‘immobility’ of the increasingly-educated Christian masses lay not in undermining the confessional and clientelistic underpinnings of the political system but, rather, in consolidating the confession, ‘liberating’ it from the grip of petty zu’ama and replacing them with a ‘responsible’ and ‘representative’ communitarian leadership. This became more evident following Bachir’s assassination in 1982 which left the LF under the leadership of a new brand of populist
Maronite ‘communitarians’ of the Samir Geagea and Elie Hobeika variety. Interestingly, their
archrival, General Michel Aoun, came from a not-dissimilar socioeconomic background. Like
Geagea and Hobaiaka, Aoun was a young, populist leader from a modest background, shared
militiamen’s hostility towards traditional zu’ama and advocated a ‘communitarian’ solution
(Denoeux, 1993:123).

6.4 The Collapse of Lebanon’s Patronage Democracy
Historicising the Civil War is beyond the scope of this study. Nonetheless, it is necessary to
note that a number of events contributed to the sustenance of patronage politics and increased
the salience of the sectarian cleavage during the Civil War and, thus, laid the foundations for
the exacerbated confessionalism of Lebanon’s consociational democracy. The following
section will explore the effect of such events as Syrian military intervention in 1976; the
assassination of Kamal Jumblatt in 1977; as-Sadr’s ‘disappearance’ in 1978; the Israeli
invasion of 1982; and the assassination of Bachir Gemayel in the same year on transforming
the war from a ‘reformist adventure’ into a ‘redefinition’ of the clientelist-confessional system.

Initially, the progressive LNM appeared to be making substantial gains during the hostilities of
1975-1976. In an attempt to undercut the Palestinian Resistance, however, Syrian intervention
prevented the LNM from achieving a sweeping victory over the Lebanese Front. To counteract
the Syrians, the Palestinian Liberation Organisation (PLO) encouraged less-progressive forces
to join the PLO-allied LNM. With AMAL gaining autonomy and leverage under Syrian
tutelage and the LNM incorporating more Islamist and communitarian factions, the
progressive, secular and democratic aspirations of the leftist camp receded in favour of

This was exacerbated by the assassination of Kamal Jumblatt whose astute leadership provided
a cohesive force for the amorphous LNM. The leadership of his successor and son, Walid
Jumblatt, revitalised the feudal-communitarian nature of the PSP and revalorised the za’imist
claims of the Jumblatt clan amongst the Druze. Similarly, as-Sadr’s ‘disappearance’ shifted the
focus away from social justice and revitalised the communitarian aspect of AMAL’s message.
Paradoxically, however, AMAL’s increased communitarianism was concomitant with the rise
of secular leaders who lacked feudal as well as clerical credentials. Shiite clerics, on the other
hand, organised under what became ‘Islamic AMAL’ before establishing tajamm’u al-‘ulama’
al-muslimin fi Lubnan (The Association of Muslim Scholars in Lebanon), tajamm’u ‘ulama’
jabal ‘amil (Association of Jabal Amil Scholars) and, eventually, Hezbollah.

Moreover, it must be noted that the militarisation of society and the collapse of the state had
depth-rooted socioeconomic causes as well as repercussions. Militias developed from the
armed, citizen-based vigilante committees which dominated the scene amongst communities neglected and marginalised by established zu’ama. It is in this vein that militiamen and the communities they protected viewed the Civil War as an opportunity to ‘break into’ the exclusive social and economic fabric of the city. Unsurprisingly, therefore, militias recruited fighters from amongst the urban poor and drew financing from members of the parvenu bourgeoisie (Denoeux, 1993; Picard, 2000:297).

For the more disdainful intellectuals of the pre-war era, the Civil War signified the replacement of the intellectualism and fashionable cosmopolitanism of West Beirut with shoot-outs between gunmen of rural and lower-class backgrounds. According to one characterisation, Beirut had been overrun by “Shiite squatters and urban newcomers” (Ajami, 1986:204).

The archaism Ajami attributes to the Civil War, however, is far from true. By the early-1980s, it was clear that the militarisation of society and the cantonisation of the country were organised phenomena synchronous with sophisticated redistributive functions addressing the socioeconomic grievances of militiamen’s fighters, constituents and supporters (Hamzeh, 2001). The seemingly-anarchist sacking of the port and the commercial centre, for instance, represented an “orgiastic form of wealth redistribution” (Traboulsi, 2007:237). Similarly, the complete collapse of the state in 1976 ushered in stratified and negotiated militia patronage and regimented warlord za’imships. It was in the shadow of this ‘militia order’ that members of the parvenu bourgeoisie forged complex relationships with warlords marking the birth of a non-military elite (Picard, 2000:300).

6.4.1 The State: From an Active Interlocutor to an Absent Actor
It must be noted, however, that the collapse of the state in 1976 marked a pivotal transformation within the counter-elite. Until then, they had attempted to compete with established zu’ama for a place within the establishment. In other words, until 1975, the state was an active interlocutor of patrons. The excesses of freewheeling capitalism and the political system’s inability to assimilate new social forces as evidenced by the 1972 election, however, convinced political aspirants of the futility of confining their struggle to the bounds of ‘order’. By the late-1970s, therefore, the state had become an absent actor which militiamen replaced. The LF and AMAL are examples of this shift.

Bachir Gemayel’s initial mission, for instance, was to ensure the government performed its functions unaffected by petty feuds between rival patron-politicians. Paradoxically, however, the LF rebuffed the political establishment in an attempt to achieve a state of statehood. In other words, Bachir argued that if government officialdom cannot or will not do the job, ‘citizens’ must provide for themselves until the non-responsive bureaucracy is replaced. The
LF, therefore, presented itself as the enforcer of law, order and sovereignty (Snider, 1984; Denoeux, 1993:111).

Similarly, ḥarakat al-mahrūmīn was concerned with lobbying government agencies to improve living conditions and provide public services; expand state authority in peripheral regions; and introduce economic reforms (Ajami, 1986; Norton, 1987; Denoeux, 1993). The Ghandian struggle, however, proved futile and resulted in the birth of AMAL as an umbrella coalition of armed factions and vigilante committees loyal to the Imam (Traboulsi, 2007:192).

As the case study from Zokak El-Blat discussed in the previous chapter demonstrates, the armed citizen-based vigilante committees which sprung up in neglected Shiite slums reorganised under Moussa as-Sadr’s leadership. This was accelerated in the aftermath of the brutal displacement of Shiites from East Beirut suburbs as well as the emergence of a PLO statelet in the South (Picard, 1993:17). By 1978, AMAL had assumed many of the state’s essential functions amongst the Shiites including security, policing and economic planning.

AMAL’s expanding role amongst Shiites was complimented by the emergence of a confessional public sphere centred around the ḥussayniyyāt which dotted Shiite slums. It must be noted that although Sunni and Shiite Muslims do not worship in separate mosques as a matter of doctrine; ritualistic differences make separate spaces of worship desirable. Moreover, stigmatisation of the customs of the city’s newcomers by urban Sunnis often resulted in frictions. The ḥussayniyya, therefore, performed a crucial integrative function which predates ḥarakat al-mahrūmīn. In fact, Ashura and other rituals of a particular Shiite flavour were often held within the walled premises of Rachid Baydoun’s ‘Āmilīyya School. In 1961, as-Sadr patronised the establishment of a ḥussayniyya in Al-Khandaq Al-Ghamiq and, in 1971, he supported the establishment of another in Ḥayy Lijja/Musaytibah (Hillenkamp, 2005:225). The salience of the ḥussayniyya as an institution of civil society amongst Beirut’s Shiites had two important implications. Firstly, it blurred the distinction between the subaltern struggle and the question of identity. Secondly, it contributed to the emergence of an exclusively-Shiite public sphere and allowed AMAL, through HISC, to promulgate its communitarian discourse.

6.5 THE WAR ORDER AND THE TERRITORIALISATION OF THE CONFESSION

The role of militias in integrating marginalised communities in the city’s socioeconomic fabric was complimented by their sophisticated economic redistribution roles. Initially, militias adopted economic activities of a criminal nature to sustain their forces and arm their gunmen. However, mafia-like predation was replaced by the less archaic militia-driven sub-economies. In other words, the binary polarisation of LNM and the Lebanese Front ceased to explain the dynamics of the Civil War in the 1980s. Instead, Lebanon was divided into militia-regulated
cants ons centred around fifteen or so militia-controlled piers. The destruction of the Beirut Port and the looting of the commercial centre, thus, vitalised militias as the de facto governments regulating access to economic opportunities (Picard, 2000:203).

The LF, for instance, set up a souk around the fifth basin of the port which its gunmen controlled; the Murabitun traded in luxury furniture looted from affluent hotels; and AMAL militiamen seized merchandise from markets in the territories they controlled. A pre-war qabadāy from Zokak El-Blat, for instance, recounts stories of AMAL fighters confiscating Persian carpet stores, looting the gold market near Musaytibah and Zarif and seizing mansions abandoned by their owners. In the Bekaa and Baalbek-Hermel, another form of economic activity was flourishing in the shadow of the militias: hashish production quadrupled and poppy cultivation grew fiftyfold between 1976 and 1988 (Picard 2000:297; 305).

Crucially, the consolidation of militia cantons in the 1980s resulted in the emergence of articulate militia administrations. In the Maronite canton, for instance, militias developed a public service department which regulated consumer prices and provided public transportation, electricity, telephone services and a police force (Najem, 1997:20-21). In the AMAL-controlled canton, militiamen secured housing for the displaced, appropriated business establishments and provided the necessary cover for building irregularities and violations against property rights.

Moreover, militias competed in the provision of social welfare services within the increasingly homogenous sectarian cantons. In the Shiite canton, for instance, AMAL faced competition from its emerging archrival, Hezbollah. Unlike other militias, Hezbollah’s well-paid members did not prey on state resources nor collect royalties. Instead, Hezbollah exploited or, even, artificially created shortages in water and electricity – hence, vitalising its service amongst the urban poor (Norton, 1987; Harik, 1994; 2004; Denoeux, 1993 Picard, 2000).

The Israeli invasions of 1978 and 1982 complicated the dynamics of militia patronage in South Lebanon. Economic redistribution in the canton controlled by the South Lebanon Army (SLA) was heavily influenced by exploitative Israeli interventions exacerbating poverty and deprivation in the South. Zucchino (1984), for instance, notes that Israeli trucks ‘dumped’ the South Lebanon market with cheap Israeli produce and isolated the region from the consumer market in Beirut.

Militias’ redistributive functions, therefore, evolved into de facto cantonal governments which, following the collapse of the state, were untempered by the judiciary, religious establishment

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44 Appendix 4: Figure 5
or the media – in fact, all three were under militias’ direct control (Picard, 1993:26). The militias developed into mini-states where the relationship between ‘the authority’ and ‘the citizenry’ was based on patterns of clientelistic redistribution in return for tax-like royalties. In other words, warlords replaced the zuʿama and militiamen replaced the qabaḍâyāt.

The implications of the dissipation of state authority in the ‘war order’ were manifold. Firstly, it allowed for the crystallisation of confessionally-homogenous substate collectivities governed by confession-wide militias. Secondly, the war economy undermined the extremities of freewheeling capitalism and replaced the minimalist state with numerous interventionist mini-states. Thirdly, the ‘devolution’ of power allowed previously-excluded social actors to translate educational, economic and military might into political power. The following section examines the political economy of the war order and the increasingly-confessional dynamics of the militia system.

6.5.1 Economic Regulation and Militias’ Redistributive Functions
As militias’ redistributive functions shifted from petty criminality to less archaic forms of social and economic administration, warlords undertook to abolish the system of privileges which favoured a rigidly-defined dominant class and limited social mobility in the pre-war era. Beirut’s central and centralising role was being dismantled by the militias and the hegemony of the established bourgeoisie was being replaced by the ascendant parvenu bourgeoisie. This was evident in the shifting loci of economic influence and political power in the sectarian market towns of the countryside. Catholic-majority Zahleh, for instance, ceded its monopoly over the economy in the Bekaa to the Shiite town of Baalbek. Likewise, Maronite Deir Al-Qamar lost its importance in the Chouf to Druze-majority Baaqlin (Traboulsi, 2007:232).

Furthermore, militias imposed heavy taxes on the established tycoons of the financial-commercial bourgeoisie and imposed customs on foreign trade to the benefit of infant businesses. Trade and banking activities continued not only within but also across cantonal boundaries. Militiamen’s economic interventionism resulted in the emergence of a class of wartime entrepreneurs closely associated with prominent warlords. AMAL and the LF, for instance, reduced taxation on sand extraction as warlords associated with the two militias founded sand-extraction companies in partnership with emigrant capital (Barbee, 1977; Picard, 2000:293-300; Traboulsi, 2007:235).

Crucially, violations of state monopolies and import/export quotas underpinned the redistributive function of the militias. Since 1976, for instance, the PSP-controlled ports of Jiyeh and Khaldeh defied a monopoly over petroleum imports to decrease dependence on the inaccessible refineries in Zahrani, Tripoli and Dora. Similarly, petroleum products were
'smuggled’ into the Christian canton by a crony of Camille Chamoun through the LF-controlled port of Dbayeh. Interestingly, Amine Gemayel’s administration granted these violations a stamp of officialdom as the warlord-president appeased militiamen by ceding state monopolies over lucrative sectors to rival militias.

Militias’ *de facto* regulation of the economy, therefore, introduced dozens of importers associated with or members of militias into the market. Moreover, the transformation of state monopolies into militia oligopolies emphasised their redistributive functions and allowed for the integration of the previously-excluded parvenu bourgeoisie (Picard, 2000:298; 303; Traboulsi, 2007:236).

Under the presidency of Amine Gemayel, however, militias’ clientelistic functions expanded as warlords negotiated their way into the system and appropriated the remnants of the collapsed state. The ‘state of statelessness’ which characterised the Elias Sarkis presidency (1976-1982), therefore, came to an end as Amine Gemayel reintroduced the state as an active interlocutor over which warlords competed.

In 1984, for instance, Rachid Karameh’s ten-portfolio cabinet included pre-war notables with connections to the warring militias including Karameh himself, Adel Osseiran and Joseph Skaff as well as warlords Camille Chamoun, Pierre Gemayel, Walid Jumblatt and Nabih Berri. Amine Gemayel’s era, therefore, blurred the distinction between the formal/state domain and the militia order allowing militias to gain access to state patronage.

Nabih Berri, for instance, appointed his ally, Mohammed Abdulhamid Baydoun, as president of Majlis Al-Janoub (Council for the South, CfS). The CfS allowed AMAL to channel state funds towards public (and, even, private) infrastructural works in the movement’s southern strongholds and to supervise the compensation of Shiite *muhajjarin* (Picard, 2000:315; Traboulsi, 2007:225). Moreover, access to state patronage provided ‘political families’ co-opted by AMAL with the largess required to sustain their *za’imship* as evidenced by the Osseiran, Al-Khalil, Al-Zein and Bazzi families (Annahar, 2004).

The Civil War, therefore, must not be ‘romanticised’ as an archaic bloodbath. In fact, an estimated 90% of the civilian population remained outside the armed struggle. Daily life continued despite outbreaks of violence and destruction. Elizabeth Picard (1993:11) went as fas as arguing that “school children took exams; people went to the theatre; and families spent the summer at the beach”. It was amongst this civilian population, however, that the growing antiwar movement thrived. Mobilised by the Confédération Générale des Travailleurs Libanais

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46 Appendix 2: Tables 4–5
(CGTL) and various cross-confessional peace and unity movements, mothers, war cripples, workers and middle-class professionals expressed their disillusionment with the militias. Their symbolic marches demonstrated that the foundations of a ‘new consensus’ were being laid. In other words, a new ‘coexistence pact’ was being forged from below – hence, challenging the de facto authority of the militias. Theodor Hanf (1993:637-642) notes that, unlike the unwritten pact of 1943 which made economic sense to the socioeconomic elite, the new consensus emerged ‘from below’ and voiced the civilian population’s yearning for peace.

6.5.2 Militia Cantons and the Territorialisation of ‘Confessional’ Solidarities
Despite the growing challenge wartime civil society posed to the war order, however, militias’ regulatory and redistributive functions transformed civilians into ‘citizens’ of their respective militia-controlled cantons and, in latter stages of the conflict, furnished a reservoir for partisan mobilisation. The implications were threefold. Firstly, the omnipresence and interventionism of the militia replaced state minimalism. Secondly, a class of wartime entrepreneurs emerged consisting of members of the pre-war bourgeoisie as well as the previously-excluded parvenu bourgeoisie. Thirdly, socioeconomic relations across cantonal boundaries were reduced to a minimum – hence, reducing the cross-confessional public domain.

In other words, while the cross-confessional appeal of the antiwar movement was growing, the severing of socioeconomic relations across cantonal boundaries led to the emergence of confessionally-homogenous public spheres confined to the canton. Complimented by militias’ regulatory and redistributive functions, this transformed the canton into a locus of collective solidarities and socially-constructed identities. In the spirit of the ‘us-versus-them’ paradigm, individuals not belonging to the confessionally-delineated collectivity were expelled manu militari in what became known as al-farz al-ṭā’efī (sectarian assortment). This is evidenced by the notorious practice of al-qatl ‘ala al-hawiya (checkpoint ID murders). In evidencing this, Picard (1993:24-25) notes that:

Members of a community outside home territory were forced to return home, and community members were forbidden from leaving their home area. In short, the border was drawn between ‘us’ and ‘them.’ The remarkable stability of the territorial borders within Lebanon, from the first few months of the war that would last fifteen years, reveals the defensive nature of the strategies of communitarian groups, each loyal to its militia group and each communicating with other groups through a combination of threats and negotiations.

Force, therefore, was utilised within as opposed to across cantonal boundaries. Significantly, attempts to cross cantonal boundaries or violate the Green Line splitting Beirut were rare and ended in catastrophic defeats and undesired population exoduses in fear of reprisal (Picard, 1993:17). Instead, violence in the 1980s was a means to restructure cantonal administrations, resolve feuds within each canton and consolidate confessional solidarities.
Within the Maronite canton, for instance, violence was associated with the struggle for leadership of the Maronite community. It is in this vein that a series of insurrections jolted the LF between the Bachir Gemayel’s assassination 1982 and Samir Geagea’s ascent to the leadership in 1986. In a similar vein, the LF *intifada* in the spring of 1985 was a direct challenge to the Kataeb and to President Amine Gemayel (Norton, 1987:94). The most violent episode of the war, however, was the confrontation between Michel Aoun and Samir Geagea in 1989 reflecting their competing claims over the leadership of the Maronites on the eve of the transition to peace. Violence served a similar purpose within the Shiite canton. In the 1980s, the rival Hamadeh, Mughniyya and El-Husseini clans competed over leadership in Baalbek-Hermel. In the late-1980s, AMAL and its emerging rival, Hezbollah, fought to extend their control over the *Shi’a* in Beirut’s southern suburbs and Iqlim al-Tuffah (Picard, 1993:23).

Even violence across sectarian boundaries reflected intra-confessional rivalries and the desire to consolidate the confessional canton. The PSP-AMAL assault on the pro-PLO Sunni Nasserites (*Murabitun*) and the ‘War of the Camps’, for instance, subdued the ‘Palestinian enclaves’ of Sabra, Chatila and Bourj Al-Barajneh which existed within the Shiite canton.

The coercive prerogatives of the militias, therefore, were part of a process whereby cantons are homogenised and confessional identities forged. The symbolic and strategic use of violence for identity-construction purposes was complemented by the instrumental use of religion and the mobilisation of the *shabāb* (youth). Moreover, militias controlled the media and co-opted artists and intellectuals who contributed their knowledge of history, psychology and religion to the ‘communitarian cause’. This was achieved by the submission of the educational system to militias whose leaders patronised communal schools, influenced the appointment of teachers and censored the teaching of history and culture (Picard, 1993:27).

The cantonisation of the country during the Civil War, therefore, reduced social interaction across the confessional divide, actively sought to forge communitarian solidarities and invested in the articulation of confessionally-delineated collective identities. The ‘confessionalisation’ of society was exacerbated by the diminishing cross-confessional public domain and the increased salience of religious institutions and clergymen in the public sphere. Civilians, therefore, were becoming ‘citizens’ of militia-controlled cantons and ‘nationals’ of increasingly homogenised confessional communities. Crucially, the overlap between the confession and the canton as a result of militias’ strategic use of violence in the context of ‘sectarian assortment’ resulted in the territorialisation of confessional identities.
6.6 CONCLUSIONS: MILITIAMEN, STATESMEN AND BUSINESSMEN

This chapter aimed at exploring the implications of the collapse of the pre-war regime and the emergence of the ‘war order’ for the political paradigm and, thus, political superstructure in modern Lebanon. In light of the discussion presented in this chapter, it is evident that the developments of the 1970s and 1980s had three main implications on the political paradigm and, thus, on social relations in Lebanon.

The first repercussion has been the ‘de-personalisation’ of patron-client relations in contemporary Lebanon. In other words, the personalistic and transactional modality of patronage in the pre-war era witnessed a significant decline in the early-1970s. The demise of pre-war patronage politics can be attributed to a number of factors including (i) rapid socioeconomic and geographic mobility; (ii) the scarcity of resources; and (iii) the widening gap between ‘real’ and ‘electoral’ demographics. Combined, these factors diminished patrons’ ability to provide patronage for their clients and, crucially, limited zu'ama’s largess to politically-enfranchised voting clients given the nature of Lebanon’s patronage democracy – hence, excluding a large segment of the parvenu bourgeoisie and the lumpenproletariat. The failure of established zu'ama in assimilating the social forces produced by and whose consciousness is a result of modernisation led to the emergence of more informal solidarity networks characterised by relative homogeneity in terms of the sectarian and occupational as well as ancestral background of its participants.

Solidarity networks, therefore, revalorised the confessional component of participants’ social and collective identity. Moreover, these networks, developed into alternative social structures and hotbeds for the radicalisation of the counter-elite. The collapse of the patronage regime in the mid-1970s and the emergence of militias consisting of and championing the cause of the counter-elite and the educated but socially-immobile masses reinforced the sectarian discourse. The ‘sectarianisation’ of communal grievances, therefore, characterised the initial phase of the Civil War. In other words, socioeconomic grievances and, thus, the struggle against immobility and disenfranchisement were framed within the communitarian rather than the class-struggle discourse. As a result, the subaltern masses dealt with their grievances not as ‘subaltern’ classes but as communities – Shiites, southerners, Maronites and so on. As a result, cross-class communitarian identities were forged and resistance against social injustice and deprivation was framed within the confessional paradigm.

The third implication of the Civil War was the emergence of confession-wide political actors. Militias, thus, developed into meeting places for ‘old’ and ‘new’ patrons and replaced pre-war petty za'imism with ‘corporate za'imism’. In other words, militias capitalised on existing
clientelistic networks, forged new patron-client dyads and transformed localised zu'ama into members of a confessional superstructure. This was most salient during the Civil War as militias formed cantonal administrations, regulated the economy and, thus, controlled access to economic opportunities and avenues for socio-political mobility. It can be argued, therefore, that militia violence replaced state violence; warlords replaced the zu'ama and militiamen replaced the qabadāyāt. Crucially, as foci of power, economic regulation and redistribution, warlord-businessmen and wartime entrepreneurs thrived in the shadow of the militias.

Cantonal administrations and militia-regulated economies underpinned complex social relations whereby militias became collective or corporate sovereigns and civilian ‘in-groups’ became their citizenry. Militiamen, therefore, played an important role in forging new identities emphasising the confessional component. This was exacerbated by the strategic use of violence to homogenise cantonal populations through ‘sectarian assortment’. By censoring the media, influencing education, co-opting intellectuals and clergymen and regulating cross-cantonal interactions, militias played an active role in segmenting the public domain, ‘sectarianising’ the public sphere and articulating confessional identities which corresponded to the cantonal and the economic boundaries of their dominions.

The destruction of the pre-war economy and the demise of the established zu'ama, in other words, paved the way for the counter-elite to organise into militias, monopolise economic redistribution and, thus, become the foci of militarised and highly-centralised clientelistic networks. The Civil War, therefore, constituted a process of socioeconomic reshuffling: economic opportunities were redistributed; and previously-excluded social classes ‘socialised’ into the economic and political arena. Wartime entrepreneurs became accomplices of militias and lobbied or, even, entered into partnerships with militiamen whose interventions affected their access to economic opportunities and the value of their goods and services. The ‘war order’, therefore, was characterised by ‘strategic violence’ serving to redistribute wealth and reconstitute solidarities through the coercive hegemony of warlords and wartime entrepreneurs.

The implications of this new social order on the political structures and relations of the postwar regime will be discussed in the following chapters which explore the relationship between neo-za'imism and confessionalism. In extending the discussion, the following chapters focus on the role of warlords-turned-businessmen and militias-turned-parties on the political economy of postwar Lebanon arguing that clientelistic relationships between militias and their ‘citizens’ reinforced the role of political families and, thus, tied citizens’ livelihood more tightly to the destiny and whims of patrons (Ofeish, 1999; Makhoul and Harrington, 2004, Abbas, 2005).
CHAPTER SEVEN

THE NEOLIBERAL ECONOMY AND THE POLITICS OF NEO-ZA‘IMISM IN POSTWAR LEBANON
It has been argued in previous chapters that Lebanon’s patronage-based political economy failed to perform its essential ‘integrative’ functions as rapid geographic and socioeconomic mobility widened the gap between ‘real’ and ‘electoral’ demographics, but rather produced ‘inner-integrative’ political economies prevailing within marginalised sub-communities. Urban zu’ama in the 1960s, therefore, lost the ability and the whim to assimilate the social forces produced by modernisation, education and urbanisation. As a result, a counter-elite emerged representing the informal and increasingly-homogenous solidarity networks which provided for the city’s newcomers, mitigated the effects of deficient socioeconomic modernisation and addressed the vulnerabilities of migration.

Throughout the 1960s, however, members of the counter-elite recognised the self-perpetuating conundrum of Lebanon’s patronage democracy: political aspirants could not perform their integrative functions without gaining access to the state; and they could not gain access to the state without possessing the largess required to influence the voting population. It is in light of this that populist, pseudo-ideological and communitarian leaders radicalised their followers and undertook to challenge the ruling establishment itself. In other words, the counter-elite undertook to ‘liberate’ its struggle from the bounds of ‘order’ imposed by the self-perpetuating ruling class.

It has been demonstrated through the discussion of the ‘war order’ in Chapter Six, however, that political and social order during the 1980s was less archaic than is often assumed. That is to say, militias evolved from loose coalitions of petty-criminal gunmen and turmoil-creating fighters to sophisticated cantonal administrations with the coercive power necessary to perform critical redistributive functions and restructure the economy – hence, assimilating members of the previously-excluded parvenu bourgeoisie and lumpenproletariat. In evidencing this, El-Khazen (2002:54) notes that:

> In the 1980s, militias and wartime parties adopted organised, institutionalised forms of predation to protect and expand their economic interests. The four main militias developed a power-sharing scheme and a modus operandi to reap the fruits of the war. The LF dominated the Christian scene; AMAL and Hezbollah the Shi’í scene; and the [PSP] the Druze scene.

The ‘war order’, therefore, marked the birth of a new dominant class consisting of militiamen and their entrepreneur-protégés – an alliance between previously-excluded political aspirants and the parvenu bourgeoisie which had been denied political recognition and social status commensurate with its rapid social climb in the pre-war era. Civilian members of the lumpenproletariat and the middle class became ‘citizens’ of militia-controlled cantons and ‘nationals’ of the solidarities and collective identities forged within their respective cantons.
Furthermore, the discussion presented in Chapter Six highlighted the revalorised role of the sectarian component in the emerging collective identities forged during the war. Firstly, militias capitalised on pre-existing solidarity networks based on kinship and ancestry and, thus, brought together co-religionists. Secondly, faith-based institutions of a religious nature played an important role in mitigating the vulnerabilities of migration and, therefore, emphasised the ‘sect’ as an avenue for integration and a means to resist marginalisation and deprivation. This was most evident amongst Shiite migrants as demonstrated by the case study presented in Chapters Five and Six. Thirdly, the ‘sect’ provided ‘ethnic entrepreneurs’ with an alternative to the class-struggle discourse and allowed the crystallisation of vertically-delineated collective solidarities which stressed not class, but confession.

The ‘sectarianisation’ of the struggle against deprivation and socioeconomic immobility entailed four important developments which characterised the ‘war order’: (i) segmentation of the public domain; (ii) the sectarian homogenisation of militia cantons; (iii) the ‘de-parcellisation’ of power by confession-wide militia leaderships; and, crucially, (iv) the development of complex structures of dominance which allowed militias to control the media, influence the educational system and co-opt ‘ethnic entrepreneurs’ who contributed knowledge of history, psychology art and religion to the ‘communitarian cause’.

The implications of the transition from the pre-war patronage democracy to the militia-controlled ‘war order’, therefore, were fourfold. Firstly, it marked the demise of pre-war zu’ama and their replacement by previously-excluded political aspirants from modest backgrounds. Secondly, militias substituted individualistic and transactional clientelism with ‘constituency clientelism’. In other words, patrons and clients ceased to be individuals connected by asymmetric and symbiotic relationships: instead, ‘corporate-patrons’ (militias) patronised ‘clientele-constituencies’. Thirdly, rational and functional solidarities between militias and clients as well as between clients became increasingly ‘sectarian’ as cross-class confessional-cantonal identities crystallised. Fourthly, the ‘war order’ redefined ‘authority’ replacing state minimalism with the omnipresence of cantonal administrations and freewheeling capitalism with militia-regulated economies.

Despite the ‘orderly’ nature of the militia system and the socioeconomic benefits which warlords and their entrepreneur-protégés accrued, the system was becoming increasingly unsustainable and intolerable. This can be attributed to mounting popular disillusionment, apathy amongst the youth and, crucially, the reintroduction of the state as an active interlocutor for rival political aspirants. This was particularly evident during the presidency of Amine Gemayel whose administration granted warlords access to the spoils of public office. The
protagonists, therefore, recognised not only the inevitability but also the profitability of a negotiated transition to peace consolidating and transforming militias into political parties in the postwar authority (Messara, 1983; Hamdan, 1991; ‘Āmil, 1990b; 2003; Picard, 2000).

Negotiating peace demonstrated the precarious ‘business of politics’ in Lebanon: while some protagonists had more to gain from the transition to peace, others had more to gain from the perpetuation of hostilities. Lakhdar Ibrahimi, Algerian peace-broker and Arab League envoy, recounted the hardships of peace negotiations in Lebanon noting that:

The ‘war order’ produced its beneficiaries – from arms dealers to businessmen in breach of state monopolies and ‘smugglers’ in general. They were too closely associated to the militias making it impossible to convince militiamen to sign a peace deal unless the economic interests for which they stood were protected. Otherwise, they would not replace an order they mastered so well with another which makes them vulnerable [...] Indeed, warlords were afraid of the uncertain; and the uncertain was peace itself! Even more uncertain: returning to electoral democracy! (in Almustaqbal, 1999).

The easiest part of the transition to peace, therefore, was resorting to Syrian intervention to coerce a couple of ‘rogue’ warlords. The key to the transition, however, was negotiating an ‘integrative’ arrangement which promised warlords and wartime entrepreneurs not only impunity but also the perpetuation of their privileges in the postwar order. In other words, transiting to peace hinged on promising charismatic warlords, ‘political families’ and entrepreneur-protégés a place in the postwar authority and, thus, persuading them to ‘demobilise’ (Picard, 1999; El-Khazen, 2002; Barak, 2002).

The ‘accommodative’ and carefully-negotiated Ta’if Accord, signed by the surviving members of the 1972 Parliament, divided the wartime elite: warlords in agreement with its stipulations gained access to the peacetime order and the spoils of public office while its opponents were excluded from and ostracised by the Syrian-brokered postwar regime.

Based on this foundational discussion, this chapter capitalises on ethnographic research and empirical fieldwork in order to explore and examine the political economy of the postwar order through the case studies of three major political actors in the postwar period with the objective of examining the transformations that have taken place in the political economy of the country and, thus, demonstrating that, despite the changing nature of patronage as a functionalist tool, patronage remains a deterministic factor of Lebanese political economy.

47 The research methods and ethnographic fieldwork conducted in the context of this study and, in particular, informing the following sections is outlined in the Introduction to this thesis.
In order to fulfil such objectives, in the first section, the transition to peace and the ‘integration’ of the wartime economy and the militia elite in the postwar system is examined emphasising the structures of dominance enabling warlords-turned-statesmen to hold sway over the authority and wartime entrepreneurs’ role in the reconstruction economy. The second section highlights the neo-za’imist forms of clientelistic redistribution linking militiamen (in the form of patronage parties) to ‘sectarianised’ clientele-constituencies. In this context, the appropriation and dissemination of state patronage amongst members of the Shiite parvenu bourgeoisie by AMAL militiamen-turned-statesmen is highlighted. The expansion of the deregulated private sector economy is explored in the third section with particular emphasis on expatriate capital and émigré investors’ role in blurring the distinction between entrepreneurship and statesmanship. In this context, Almustaqbal is presented as a case study of a postwar ‘coalition of businessmen’ turned into a political alliance of colossal impact on the postwar era. Finally, the fourth section examines the case of Hezbollah as an ideologically-driven political party rooted in and adapted to the clientelist-confessional dynamics of the postwar order. This section sheds light on the parliamentary/governmental performance of the party in light of its relationship with the growing transnational Shiite bourgeoisie.

7.1 THE ‘NEGOTIATED’ TRANSITION: ‘INTEGRATING’ THE WARTIME ELITE
It can be argued that the most significant implication of the ‘negotiated’ transition in Lebanon has been the perpetuation of the economic gains and privileges of the militia elite and wartime entrepreneurs. In reality, the Taïf Accord created opportunity spaces allowing militiamen to reinvent themselves as business tycoons and statesmen and granted the violations of warlords-turned-businessmen and their capitalist cronies a stamp of officialdom.

This is evidenced by the fact that, as the war neared its final stages, militiamen and their protégés laundered much of their capital into private-sector holding companies duly registered in Lebanon. In fact, Traboulsi (2007:237) notes that three holding companies representing rival militias controlled much of the Lebanese economy on the eve of the Taïf Accord:

These Maronite, Shiite and Druze holdings came to own a number of companies operating in all economic sectors: private ports, import/export, cement factories, tourism, real estate agencies, FM radios, television companies, newspapers and publishing houses.

The integration of warlords in the postwar authority, therefore, allowed the war elite to perpetuate their business interests amidst the uncertainties of peace. This was exacerbated by the greed and opportunism of top Syrian officers in Lebanon. In light of this, the wartime elite developed into a class of neo-za’imist politicians and businessmen with unrivalled control over public and private sector jobs and reconstruction contracts. Such reconstruction projects as
‘Solidere’ and ‘Elyssar’ assimilated warlords and wartime entrepreneurs in the postwar economy and attracted capital accumulated by militiamen and émigré capitalists.

Lebanon’s Second Republic, thus, ‘reformed’ the system only insofar as it ‘reshuffled’ elites and assimilated previously-excluded social forces. Confession-wide militias-turned-parties replaced petty-zu’ama and their pseudo-ideological political parties whereas members of the parvenu bourgeoisie carved up their niche in the dominant class alongside members of the financial-commercial bourgeoisie. The clientelistic and confessionalistic underpinnings, however, remained unchallenged (Messara, 1983:471, Hamdan, 1991:93; ‘Āmil, 2003:40).

In fact, the tight labour market tied clients more firmly in their livelihood to the destiny and whims of neo-zu’ama. The clientelist system, therefore, became socioeconomically entrenched in the postwar era (Ofehish, 1999:112). This was exacerbated by a global transition towards the neoclassical economy in the post Washington Consensus within which Lebanon renewed its commitment to minimal state regulation. Although the delegation of the social component of public administration to non-state actors is no novelty to Lebanon, commitment to ‘economic deregulation’ by the postwar authority reinforced the regulatory and redistributive functions of non-state actors with a sectarian colouring – namely, militias-turned-parties. In evidencing this, Cammett and Issar (2010:390) state that:

Out of a total of about 3070 institutions, approximately 1660 qualify as non-state organizations [...] The state is most involved in schooling [...]: in 2005, 1399 out of 2792 schools were public. The state plays a negligible role in running healthcare institutions: in 2006, only about 5 out of 160 hospitals were government-run and about 10% of approximately 453 healthcare clinics were officially run by public agencies. Furthermore, many ostensibly public healthcare institutions are controlled by political parties or community groups.

It must be noted that the integration of the war elite in the postwar authority entailed an important restructuring of the political system which was transformed from a quasi-presidential system to multiparty parliamentarianism. Effectively, this reinforced the role of the state as an interlocutor: Parliament became an assembly of party-patrons and the Cabinet a ‘meeting place’ for the de facto wielders of authority and the representatives of economic interest groups (Tueni, 1991:19; Saad, 2011). It can be argued, therefore, that the Civil War was, in fact, a ‘white revolution’ as opposed to a principled rupture with the pre-war order:

The radical counter-elite of the 1970s replaced the then-ruling elite. They replaced one form of ‘political feudalism’ with another in a ‘white revolution’ but made no changes to the political superstructure nor did they consider the changing nature, modes and costs of production.

7.2 NEO-ZA‘IMISM: WARLORDS-TURNED-STATESMEN AND THE SPOILS OF PUBLIC OFFICE

The ‘negotiated’ transition to peace allowed militiamen and their business cronies to consolidate their wartime gains and revitalise their role in the postwar authority in spite of popular distaste evidenced by low voter turnout in the 1992 election (El-Khazen, 1994). Neo-za‘imist forms of clientelistic redistribution, thus, mitigated the unpopularity of the war elite.

Effectively, militiamen-turned-statesmen and wartime entrepreneurs controlled access to foreign aid, reconstruction contracts and the job market. As a result, emerging capitalists, middle-class professionals and the urban poor were all in need of the neo-zu’ama. This was exacerbated as such ad-hoc agencies as the Council for the South (CfS), Fund for the Displaced (FfD) and the Council for Development and Reconstruction (CDR) subcontracted large infrastructural projects and public expenditure expanded from $1.2bn in 1992 to $7bn in 2003 (Salti and Chaaban, 2010). In other words, militiamen in their newfound capacity as statesmen and government ministers performed similar redistributive functions to the functions their militias performed during the Civil War – hence, legitimising their role in the postwar authority (Picard, 2000; Dibeh, 2005).

It must also be noted that the ‘negotiated’ transition to peace replaced checks-and-balances with reciprocal intra-elite bargains. Foreign aid and public spending became not only tools for nepotism, favouritism and rent-seeking, but also strategic resources for patronage. Moreover, access to public/private sector jobs mitigated the effects of demobilisation on rank-and-file combatants and allowed former militiamen to expand their clienteles amongst the urban poor, rural populations and lower-middle-class youth. Given the strategic value of public sector jobs, al-muḥāṣasa was established whereby neo-zu’ama retained a pre-determined ‘quota’ of jobs in the civil service, security forces and government bureaucracy. Al-muḥāṣasa continues to frame political competition and public discourse to date (Assafir, 2010). This inseparable connection between the partisan domain and government bureaucracy resulted in the emergence of a cadre of low and middle-level civil servants demonstrating unmistakeable partisan and sectarian loyalties. Anecdotal data and personal experiences suggest that the partisan loyalties of civil servants revitalises the wasṭa of the neo-zu’ama in the everyday transactions of the average citizen. Abdallah Bitar, head of Nabatiyeh Merchants’ Association, confirms this:

Nowadays, you cannot approach any government agency or state bureau for a simple, lawful transaction without a wasṭa from this party or that za‘im. If you do, your transaction may take much longer than it should and you might lose what is rightfully yours to someone who has a wasṭa.49

It should be noted that the ability to dispense reconstruction contracts, public sector jobs and provide *wasta* revitalised the state’s role as an active interlocutor: neo-*zu’ama* competed relentlessly over parliamentary seats and cabinet positions reinstating the dynamics of patronage democracy albeit in a different political-economy setting.

Political parties constituting the four-party alliance (*al-tahāluf al-rubā’i*) which underpinned the postwar authority were particularly skilful at capitalising on their relationship with Syria to gain control over service-oriented ministerial portfolios. The Public Health, Electricity/Energy, Water Resources and Housing portfolios, for instance, alternated between AMAL, PSP and Almustaqbal candidates whereas the Ministry of the Displaced remained a PSP stronghold for most of the postwar era. Similarly, AMAL controlled the CfS; the PSP, the FfD and Almustaqbal, the CDR. Moreover, pre-war *zu’ama* with pro-Syrian persuasions such as Sleiman Frangieh also benefited from preferential access to service-oriented portfolios.

Following the assassination of Prime Minister Rafic Hariri and Syria’s humiliating withdrawal in 2005, previously-excluded political actors gained access to state patronage as the Fouad Siniora government attempted to strengthen its anti-Syria allies. Under Siniora’s premiership, a member of the Qornet Shehwan Gathering (QSG), Nayla Mouawwad, was appointed Minister of Social Affairs. Mouawwad’s tenure was instrumental in providing anti-Syria activists with a foothold in the new order after fifteen years of Syrian-imposed marginalisation.

As can be seen, the ‘negotiated’ transition to peace allowed members of the war elite to legitimise their role in the postwar authority. Crucially, the neoclassical state in postwar Lebanon allowed neo-*zu’ama* to revitalise their role by (i) retaining their redistributive, regulatory and service-provision functions; and, crucially, by (ii) appropriating and selectively dispensing public sector patronage. Competition between the factions constituting ‘the centre’ determined the dynamics of patronage and, thus, reinforced the rentier nature of distribution.

### 7.2.1 AMAL and the Appropriation and Dispensation of State Patronage

Under Syrian tutelage, the ‘centre’ was constituted through precarious alliances and bargains with Damascus. Arguably, Syria’s most consistent ally in Lebanon has been AMAL. It is no surprise, therefore, that the movement gained exceptional leverage in accessing state patronage. It must be noted, however, that AMAL embedded its officers in public institutions since the mid-1980s and, thus, channelled state resources to its constituency in a classic demonstration of patron-client dyads (Harb, 2008:215). Nabih Berri, for instance, was appointed Minister of the South in 1984 and was elected as the Speaker of the Parliament in 1992. His close ally, Mohamed Abdelhamid Baydoun presided over the CfS and was appointed

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minister several times. Capitalising on their newfound resources, Berri and Baydoun guaranteed their clients a generous share of public expenditure. Besides the misappropriation of state funds, Berri capitalised on his position to guarantee AMAL combatants impunity and employ a significant number in the army and the civil service (Picard, 2000:315). Moreover, AMAL’s influence transformed it into the party-of-choice for emigrant capitalists eager to support their families and to invest in their ancestral hometowns. The movement dominated the bidirectional ‘corridor’ of emigration and investment in the early-1990s (Wischnat, 2009).

The movement’s neo-za’imist practices, hence, can be divided into two phases distinguished by the transition to peace. The Shiite intifada of (February) 1984 ushered in the first phase forcing the Amine Gemayel administration to expand the movement’s representation in the government. AMAL’s access to state patronage and its extensive diasporic networks allowed the movement to fund developmental and infrastructural projects and provide welfare services. In the postwar era, however, expenditure on service provision receded. Instead, public sector employment underpinned AMAL’s za’imship amongst lower and middle-class Shiites (Mallat, 1987:17; Picard, 2000:314). This transformation revived direct forms of patronage and tainted the movement with a reputation for corruption, favouritism and nepotism51.

AMAL mitigated this by invoking the populist discourse of as-Sadr’s ḥarākat al-maḥrūmīn and ‘patronising’ the predominantly-Shiite muhajjarin. This was achieved through political bargains with the PSP-controlled FfD as well as through more informal lobbying. Anecdotal data provides evidence that Berri interceded on behalf of displaced Shiites preventing their forced eviction by landlords. Moreover, in such central-Beirut neighbourhoods as Zokak El-Blat, AMAL’s support guaranteed the muhajjarin hefty compensations from business tycoon and Prime Minister Rafic Hariri as his own business interests expanded into the quarter52. Although AMAL’s opponents accuse it of favouring loyalists through fraudulent compensation claims and ‘profiteering’ from the plight of the muhajjarin53, it is undeniable that Berri’s wasṭa supported IDPs vis-à-vis the notorious appropriation of public land by Solidere.

7.2.2 AMAL and its Private-Sector Clients
Alongside the ‘vulnerable’, AMAL’s legitimacy depended on its ability to provide political cover and economic opportunity for its parvenu-bourgeois clients whose businesses were vulnerable in the chaotic, confessionally-hostile postwar economy. This was put to the test in the mid-1990s as real estate in Beirut’s Shiite-majority southern suburb of Haret-Hreik expanded into the ‘hostile’ Maronite-majority municipality of Hadath.

53 Interview: mukhtār Mohamed Al-Kasti.
Abou-Kamel Shahrur and Rafic Barakat were amongst the first Shiite contractors to purchase land in Saqi-el-Hadath and Saint-Therese in 1993. “The war was still fresh in our memories and sectarian tensions ran high”, Barakat explained, which was further substantiated by Shahrur who added that “Maronites blocked the Old Saida Highway and considered the matter an attempt to occupy [the Presidential Palace in] Baabda through real estate developments”.54

Fearing for their investments, real estate contractors asked AMAL’s Nabih Berri to resolve the crisis. Capitalising on his position as newly-elected Speaker, Berri lobbied Sleiman Frangiyeh, then-Minister of Municipal Affairs and presidential hopeful. A compromise was reached: Shiite contractors were allowed to build on two conditions. First, they would commit to not purchase land east of the Old Saida Highway which had become a new ‘fault line’ between the southern (Shiite) and eastern (Maronite) suburbs. Second, they would conform to building regulations which effectively halved contractors’ return on their investments.

Berri’s negotiated solution prevented his loyalists from incurring massive losses. In 1996, Berri negotiated re-purchase deals which, according to another contractor, Atef Dagher, allowed Shiite contractors to sell their landholdings in Hadath back to Christians in order to reduce their losses. Municipal authorities in Hadath continue to mobilise against ‘Muslim encroachment’ despite the fact that this ‘encroachment’ is in line with population-growth and income differentials between their neighbourhood and Haret-Hreik. Even today, electoral contestants in Hadath evoke sectarian sentiments as they campaign under such slogans as ‘Lest Hadath fall’ and ‘Save Hadath! Do not sell your land’55.

AMAL’s relationship with the emerging Shiite private sector, however, is even more omnipresent in the South where petty-bourgeois investors struggled with scarce economic opportunity, state negligence and Israeli invasions. AMAL’s control of the service-oriented portfolios and ad-hoc government agencies such as CfS allowed Shiite investors preferential access to public sector contracts and permits56.

The relationship between AMAL and the Shiite parvenu bourgeoisie in the 1990s demonstrates the effect of deregulation and neoliberalism on the interplay between politics and business. It can be argued, therefore, that the postwar private sector economy revitalised the redistributive role of militias-turned-parties and their indispensability in mitigating the uncertainties and hostilities of the postwar economy.

54 Source: Audio interviews conducted by UMAM Documentation and Research (January-April 2007) as part of project Collecting Dahiyeh. UMAM granted the author access to and permission to cite these interviews.
56 Interview: Abdallah Bitar.
7.2.3 Economic (Neo)liberalisation and Non-State Patronage

Economic deregulation did not change the dynamics of patron-client relations on the ‘demand’ side alone: the postwar economy produced not only private-sector clients, but also private-sector patrons. This can be attributed to three factors. Firstly, the postwar authority adhered to the conviction that economic growth can only be achieved through efficient allocation of resources. Guided by the World Bank, IMF and donor states, the state in Lebanon championed the cause of free market principles, minimal state intervention and integration into the global capitalist market. The inflated public sector underwent processes of corporatisation and privatisation and the militia-regulated economy was rapidly liberalised. In a small country like Lebanon, this led to the emergence of private sector monopolies and dominant entrepreneurial families whose steep socioeconomic mobility was exacerbated by the influx of reconstruction aid, FDI and repatriated capital (Huybrechts, 1999). It should be noted that although this runs contrary to the Smithian ‘invisible hand’ theory of capitalism, the politico-strategic deficiency of privatisation in Lebanon is a common occurrence in developing countries, post-conflict and weak states. Secondly, the privatisation of the economy diminished the resources of the state and, thus, the ability to dispense public-sector patronage. Thirdly, the adverse effects of patronage on party discipline and cohesion resulted in the emergence of party-patrons whose allegiance to their private neo-za‘imist agendas undermined patronage parties’ ability to allocate patronage (Warner, 1997).

The diminished role of the state in the economy, therefore, had significant implications on party politics and neo-za‘imism in postwar Lebanon. In other words, economic neoliberalism brought an end to the heyday of the public sector and limited the size and appeal of state patronage. As a result, political actors with access to private-sector and non-state patronage became more appealing to clients. This partly explains the ascendance of Hezbollah and Rafic Hariri vis-à-vis neo-za‘imist militias-turned-parties embedded in public sector institutions.

7.3 NEOLIBERALISM AND THE OPPORTUNITY SPACES FOR PATRONAGE

The re-liberalisation of the economy and the emergence of private-sector and non-state patrons, thus, revitalised the relationship between the bourgeoisie and the political establishment. In order to understand the political implications of private-sector and non-state patronage, however, it is important to examine the political economy of the postwar era in order to identify the main actors and components of the socioeconomic and political elite.

As outlined earlier, neoliberalism did not introduce fundamental changes to the economy: free-wheeling capitalism, the ‘privatisation’ of the social component of public administration and the blurred distinction between entrepreneurship and statesmanship characterised Lebanon’s
laissez-faire system since the turn of the twentieth century as demonstrated in previous
chapters. Nonetheless, the reconstruction economy resulted in a particularly perplexed dyadic
relationship between the business and political elites for at least two reasons.

Firstly, the postwar recovery programme expressly targeted the private sector (Najem,
1997:34) – hence, reversing the legacies of Chehabism as well as the heavily regulated militia
economy. As a result, the postwar authority prioritised private sector growth over the
socioeconomic concerns of society, widened socioeconomic disparities and, thus, revitalised
the politics of patronage. Picard (2000:318), for instance, notes that:

> After the war, one-third of the population lived below the poverty line as a
direct consequence of wartime destruction [...] and the ongoing currency
crisis. In spite of this, the government refused to tax financial profits,
terminated the remaining subsidies on essential commodities [...] and gave up
[its] monopoly in strategic sectors such as communications and the
importation of petroleum products.

Secondly, the ‘negotiated’ transition to peace allowed for the integration of the wartime
economic elite in the postwar economy and granted militiamen’s regulatory and redistributive
functions a stamp of officialdom as demonstrated above. Moreover, the substitution of checks-
and-balances with balance-of-power business-politics, the occupation of the postwar authority
by members of the business elite and Syrian tutelage triangulated to produce a political system
that was all but accountable to its citizens. Consecutive postwar governments represented the
interests of the business elite and blurred the distinction between entrepreneurship and
statesmanship. Prime Minister Rafic Hariri is a good example as Picard (2000:318) notes:

> This is how [...] Hariri, who participated in the war by financing successively
or simultaneously each of the protagonists, became the symbolic figure of the
postwar private entrepreneur who took over the state while financing huge
reconstruction works, including a national telephone grid, road works, electric
power grid, and [Solidere], in which he was the most important investor.

In other words, the driving force between both government and the economy was not an
integral, independent political class, but an economic elite with vested interest and empowered
with direct or indirect political power. The postwar state in Lebanon, therefore, is in stark
contrast to the developmental state – partly, because the bureaucracy suffered extensive
political interference and lacked autonomy vis-à-vis political actors. This rendered the
Lebanese state incapable of strategically intervening in the economy to promote positive
growth as East Asian states had done (Najem, 1997:40).

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7.3.1 Emigrants, businessmen-protégés and the rentier economy

As discussed so far in this chapter, the cessation of hostilities and the transition to peace posed little challenge to militiamen and their businessmen-protégés. Interestingly, however, a pivotal aspect in explaining the close connection between the business and political elites lies not in Lebanon but in its diaspora. Since the outbreak of hostilities in 1975, populations and militiamen alike turned to expatriates for financial support. The effects of the 30% fall in GDP and the collapse of the national economy in 1975, for instance, were mitigated through remittances. The 1970s, therefore, witnessed a steep rise in emigration rates: the number of Lebanese expatriates in the GCC, for instance, increased from 98,000 in 1975 to 210,000 in 1979 and their remittances from $910m to $2.254bn (Johnson, 1977:221; Picard, 2000:295; Almughtarib, 2011b). Crucially, these waves of emigration coincided with global economic developments allowing Lebanese expatriates to amass large fortunes. This is especially true of emigrants in West Africa, Libya and the GCC who benefited immensely from the oil boom between 1975 and 1985.

The village of Jouaiyeh in South Lebanon, for instance, witnessed its economic heyday during the 1970s as emigration to Nigeria reached its peak. A decade later, the nearby village of Ansariyeh witnessed a similar economic boom in light of emigration to Saudi Arabia. Both Nigeria and the GCC experienced a sudden oil boom in the aftermath of the 1973 oil crisis (Wischnat, 2009). It must be noted that the generation of wartime emigrants developed a truly ‘translocal’ existence: they were never fully integrated in host societies nor did they go ‘back’ to Lebanon. Instead, an ‘emigration corridor’ linked the diaspora and the homeland through inescapable links of mutual social and economic obligations (Peleikis, 2003).

Much like migration to the city, access to these ‘emigration corridors’ depended on informal networks of family, village-of-origin and religious brotherhoods based around churches, Shaykhs and mujtahids. Militiamen’s connections and coercive powers on the ground, therefore, became an important asset for expatriates and aspiring emigrants alike: militiamen acted as gatekeepers securing jobs and connections for aspiring emigrants as well as guarantors and protectors for expatriates’ repatriated capital57. Expatriates, therefore, became part of the businessmen-protégés class and, at times, paired with militiamen-turned-statesmen in joint ventures58. Crucially, the interconnection between the political class and emigrant capital exacerbated the rentierism of the domestic economy and, thus, socio-political relations.

The Bazzi family from Bint-Jbeil, for instance, demonstrate the interconnection between politics and emigrant capital. Divided between Bint-Jbeil and Detroit, Michigan, since the

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early-twentieth century, the Bazzis’ translocalism predates the Lebanese Republic itself. Nonetheless, although *shaykh* Khalil Bazzi settled in Detroit in 1912, it was not until the 1970s that the family ventured into local politics in South Lebanon supporting Imam as-Sadr’s movement. The Bazzis became AMAL’s ‘strongmen’ in Bint-Jbeil since 1974 and continue to occupy its seat in Parliament to date. Connections between as-Sadr and emigrant *shaykhs* as well as between AMAL’s secular leadership and influential emigrant entrepreneurs, therefore, underpinned the movement’s growing transnational network. Similarly, the Kataeb targeted Lebanese Christian expatriates in Latin America and established branches amongst the diaspora since 1947. In fact, the Kataeb leadership owes its survival in the 1990s to the diaspora: marginalised by the Syrian-brokered postwar authority and suffering a leadership schism, the Gemayels appealed to the diaspora for support (Almughtareb, 2011a).

It must be noted, however, that recent migrants are unlike their nineteenth-century counterparts in their obvious ‘translocalism’: they maintain stronger links to their hometowns and play an active role in the political and economic life of the homeland. The concept of ‘linear detachment’, on the other hand, applies more to the relationship between earlier migrants and the homeland: obligations to the homeland recede as the community enters into the second generation; emigrants integrate and their remittances ebb (Amery, 1992; Lindley, 2008).

Owing to the accelerated rate of emigration since the 1970s and expatriates’ exceptionally strong ties to their villages-of-origin, therefore, the Lebanese diaspora has played a pivotal role in shaping the political economy of the postwar era. Remittances throughout the 1990s, for instance, constituted 25% of national GDP and, thus, underpin the national economy through rentier social relations and remittance-based subsistence (IMF, 2005; Hourani, 2005).

The cessation of hostilities, it must be noted, did not discourage emigration. In fact, driven by neoliberal structural adjustments, significant decline in public spending, privatisation and the failure to develop labour-intensive industries, Lebanon’s dwindling job market left the youth, educated professionals and manual workers little option but to emigrate. Paradoxically, more than 1.3 million people have emigrated since 1990 including 350,000 to the GCC and 250,000 to Africa (Almughtareb, 2011b). Emigration, thus, masks the disarticulations of Lebanon’s political economy and reinforces rentier redistribution by providing the finances required for privately-owned, family-run and, often, unprofitable businesses.

Empirical evidence shows that Lebanese expatriates invest fortunes amassed abroad in ‘dead assets’ such as saving accounts, land and buildings. Emigration and remittance-use in South

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59 Anecdotal data from members of the Bazzi family in Bint-Jbeil. 2008-2010.
60 Interview: Abdallah Bitar. Also, interview: Abbas Wahbe.
Lebanon, for instance, indicates that the majority of repatriated money is invested in housing developments, land purchases, personal savings and basic and consumer goods (Wischnat, 2009:111). In other words, emigrants make modest contributions to agriculture and industry and, instead, contribute to the inflation of the service and non-productive sectors at the expense of labour-intensive sectors which contribute to introvert capital accumulation61. Moreover, the bulk of expatriates’ investments are local, familial and petty-mercantile: local supermarkets, seasonal restaurants, beauty salons, boutiques selling smuggled merchandise and other enterprises which mask unemployment and offer immediate family members a lifeline62. Expatriates, therefore, exacerbate the peripherality of Lebanese capitalism and reinforce the rentier and clientelistic nature of redistribution preventing the development of corporate forms of capitalism (Chit, 2009a; 2009b). As a result, the nouveau riche petty bourgeoisie expanded constituting over one-third of the total population at the expense of the dwindling middle class, upper-bourgeoisie and proletariat (UNDP, 2008:105).

7.3.2 Blurring the distinction between entrepreneurship and statesmanship

Despite the expansion of the petty bourgeoisie in the postwar era, however, a clique of wealthy businessmen whose investments were bigger in size and generated large profits developed into a dominant upper-bourgeoisie rooted in the financial-commercial, mercantile and tourism sectors. Expectedly, members of this class combined the roles of entrepreneurship and statesmanship. A number of business tycoons occupied key positions in the postwar authority – deputies, ministers, prime ministers or cronies of prominent politicians.

Rafic Hariri is an illustrative example. His prominence is widely attributed to his investment in the construction sector in Saudi Arabia in the 1970s which brought him close to the Saudi royal family and business elite. Consequently, Hariri’s holding company, Oger International, benefitted from lucrative business deals throughout the GCC. In the 1980s, the multi-billionaire returned to Lebanon and entered the country’s wartime political life through philanthropy. Hariri’s ‘charitable’ contributions underpinned his relationship with wartime protagonists. Combined with his Saudi connections, the wartime tycoon became the Kingdom’s strongman and ‘envoy’ in Lebanon (Picard, 2000:318).

As the war neared its end, Hariri emerged as a self-styled za’im offering to replace the defeated and eradicated Sunni za’imships. Hariri’s election to the premiership in 1992 consolidated his claims of za’imship. Under Syria’s watchful eyes and Saudi Arabia’s ‘guidance’ the tycoon-za’im embarked on shaping the country’s postwar economy and the recovery programme

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emphasising structural adjustments, further economic liberalisation and championing the cause of the petty and upper-bourgeoisie.

Hariri’s premiership is praised for integrating the Lebanese economy into the global market and for restoring international confidence in the national economy – achievements attributed to his zealous commitment to structural adjustments, the stabilisation of the Lebanese Lira, tax cuts, the introduction of a value-added-tax (VAT) and a daring privatisation program (Nizameddin, 2006). Critics, however, accuse Hariri of transforming postwar reconstruction into a “fountainhead of influence and wealth from which the political class, many deputies included, have benefited” (Young, 1996:22). The derivation of influence and wealth from the corruption and favouritism was associated with Hariri’s postwar economy. In other words, the postwar economy was not driven by free market principles in the Smithian sense. Instead, for most of the 1990s, the administration of the economy, privatisation bids and public spending were negotiated between members of the ruling troika (Speaker Berri, Prime Minister Hariri and the President), deputies and ministers. This bargaining process entailed sharing the spoils of the postwar economy with partners in the postwar authority (Najem, 1997:402).

In other words, while Hariri and his protégés benefited from the reconstruction spending spree, kickbacks from public spending enriched all major government figures. For example, a contract to build a section of the coastal motorway was awarded to Nabih Berri’s wife, Randa Berri, at a price at least $100m in excess of construction costs whereas contracts to import petroleum were awarded to President Elias Hrawi’s sons (Fisk, 1998; Ciezadlo, 2007). Hariri, thus, could only benefit from his administration of the postwar economy as long as he made sure the interests of different stakeholders in Lebanon’s patronage democracy were met.

The political bargains and balance-of-power dynamics of the private sector economy, therefore, allowed neo-zu’ama to reinforce their positions and consolidate their protégés’ privileges in spite of free market principles. As a result, monopolistic practices and duopolies/oligopolies dominated at least sixteen sectors of the economy including banking, construction, real estate and the media (Al-Akhbar, 2011b).

It must be noted that, contrary to common misconceptions, the strategic alliance between the business and political elites cut across confessional cleavages and political divides demonstrating the class consciousness of the upper-bourgeoisie. Merhi Abou-Merhi, an affluent entrepreneur from Saida, is an illustrative example of the political versatility and cross-confessional nature of the alliance between the business and political elite.
Abou-Merhi relocated his Belgium-based business to Lebanon and established the Abou-Merhi Group – a consortium of companies including maritime charters, shipping services and trade in second-hand cars. Expectedly, the Sunni entrepreneur’s connections with Almustaqbal expanded in tandem with his business empire. Through his Almustaqbal connections as well as his contacts in the Chamber of Commerce, Industry and Agriculture in Saida and the South (CCIAS), the Saida Municipality and the charitable Hariri Foundation, Abou-Merhi secured contacts with key international partners, development agencies and intergovernmental organisations. Contacts with Almustaqbal also guaranteed him preferential access to public sector contracts and public-private sector partnerships during the Siniora premiership. In 2009, for instance, Siniora and Saida MP Bahiyya Hariri announced that Abou-Merhi would be granted a contract to build-transfer-operate (BOT) the Saida port (SaidaNet, 2009).

This, however, did not reflect a principled alignment with March-1463. In fact, Abou-Merhi was eager to demonstrate his political neutrality and, thus, patronised the ‘March-11 Movement’ – a folkloric coalition of ‘nonaligned’ South Lebanon businessmen aimed at reaching out to AMAL and the PSP whose leaders held sway over lucrative business opportunities. Moreover, several businessmen rallied around the consensus governor of Muhāfazat Al-Jnoub, General Malik Abdel-Khalek, who enjoyed the support of MPs, mayors and local community leaders aligned with rival political parties (SaidaNet, 2005).

Capitalising on their political versatility, therefore, nonaligned businessmen of the Abou-Merhi variety benefited from lucrative business deals irrespective of political persuasion and confession. In 2005, for instance, Berri supported Abou-Merhi’s bid to develop the commercial port of Saida and the touristic promenade in the AMAL stronghold of Tyre and, in 2009, offered Abou-Merhi a lucrative contract to develop the floating seaports in Zahrani and Jiyeh (SaidaNet, 2005; 2009).

63 The March-14 alliance is a loose coalition of political parties and non-partisan politicians established in the aftermath of Hariri’s assassination in 2005. The alliance is known for its position against Syrian tutelage and its support for an international investigation. The coalition takes its name from the date of the large anti-Syria rally on March 14, 2005. On the opposite side of the post-Hariri political spectrum is March-8: an alliance of political parties and independent politicians established in the aftermath of PM Rafic Hariri’s assassination in 2005. The loose coalition takes its name from a rally held in support of Syria and in condemnation of foreign intervention in Lebanon. Newcomers to the alliance (e.g. FPM) do not associate with this specific rally and, hence, maintain their reservations about the name of the alliance – although they are in tune with the alliance’s main persuasions and objectives.
7.4 Almustaqbal: A Coalition of Businessmen-Statesmen

The case of Merhi Abou-Merhi is a demonstrative example of the remarkable political versatility which characterised the relationship between entrepreneurs and politicians across the political spectrum and irrespective of the ‘confessional mosaic’. Almustaqbal, however, is a unique case not only because it dominated the postwar authority for the past twenty years, but also because it represents a business-clique-turned-political-party.

It must, hence, be noted that a number of factors underpinned Hariri’s political za‘imship and his ability to rejuvenate and stabilise the unpopular post-Taïf authority. Firstly, Hariri’s ability to ‘break into’ a political class dominated by former militiamen can be attributed to his substantial personal wealth and connections to Saudi and Western business interests. Secondly, his election in 1992 coincided with the Taïf-mandated reforms which invested vast powers in the premiership. Effectively, this allowed Hariri to appoint loyalists and representatives of corporate interests to vital ministerial portfolios and ad-hoc government agencies. ‘Mr. Lebanon’, therefore, combined his vast wealth, connections, charisma, charity and powers as Premier to strategically decentralise decision-making. Economic and fiscal policy, therefore, became prerogatives of such agencies as CDR, the Higher Council for Privatisation (HCP), the Investment Development Authority (IDA) and Banque du Liban which were controlled by Hariri loyalists and stakeholders (Najem, 1997). Almustaqbal, therefore, was not only representing corporate interests but also acted as an avenue to translate their riches into direct political authority and, crucially, an instrument to manipulate economic and fiscal policy-making. In fact, Almustaqbal was a loose gathering of ‘entrepreneur-friends’ until its official transformation into a political party in 2000 – eight years after Hariri’s first premiership.

It was no secret that several Almustaqbal members combined their entrepreneurial and political roles simultaneously. ‘Scandals’ featuring Almustaqbal entrepreneur-statesmen were often part of inter-factional feuds as opposed to a principled commitment to the separation of business and politics. The blurred distinction between the business and political classes is evident in the fact that a handful of Lebanese and international corporations in the banking, property development and telecommunications sectors acted as venues for the initiation, politicisation and recruitment of Almustaqbal officers of the Rafic Hariri, Fouad Siniora and Jihad Azour variety. Prime amongst these corporations was Hariri-owned Oger International as well as Mediterranné Group, MedGulf Insurance, BankMed, Saudi-Lebanese Bank, Saraya Holdings and McKinsey & Co.

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64 The debate of Ghazi Youssef, for instance, is a case in point: Youssef was Secretary-General of the Higher Commission for Privatisation; the Hariris’ economic advisor and business partner; and an MP (Saoud, 2010).
7.4.1 Political Harirism and the Neoliberalisation of the Postwar Economy

This precarious combination of entrepreneurship and statesmanship by Almustaqbal politicians characterised the administration of the postwar economy and the recovery programme. It is no surprise, therefore, that the $20bn reconstruction plan launched in 1993 was administered by ad-hoc agencies accountable only to the Prime Minister. It is also not surprising that ‘Horizon 2000’ explicitly targeted private-sector and foreign investors – especially Solidere in which Hariri was the most important stakeholder (Boustany, 1992; Najem, 1997).

Politico-economic Harirism, therefore, subscribed to global neoliberalism insofar as it prioritised private sector growth over socioeconomic concerns. In 1992, for instance, the Central Bank lifted its support of the war-affected Lebanese Lira (LL) which lost half its value overnight. In 1996, the stock exchange was reopened despite rampant unemployment allowing the private sector to attract public funds and multiply profits amidst insufficient regulation (Boustany, 1992:165; Nizameddin, 2006:102).

Another ‘Haririst triumph’ was the ambitious privatisation programme which capitalised on weak antitrust laws and non-existent government regulation. Liban Cell and Cellis, for instance, were awarded ten-year BOT contracts in 1994 laying the foundation of a duopoly which continues to dominate the telecommunications sector to date. The two companies fixed prices considerably higher than the European/US average, blocked outside competition and prevented regulatory watchdogs from assessing quality and pricing (Nizameddin, 2006:105).

The privatisation of the cell phone sector can be linked to the individual Almustaqbal officers and the corporate interests they represented. It is no coincidence, for instance, that Hariri aides such as Basil Yared and Ayman Hariri were stakeholders in the South African cell phone provider, 3C. This explains Almustaqbal’s prioritisation of the telecom and banking sectors and its decisions to invest in the former and bail out the latter in the immediate aftermath of the war (El-Khazen, 1985; Boustany, 1992:168).

The discrepancy between Almustaqbal’s prioritisation of private sector growth and its position on postwar socioeconomic concerns is starkly evident in ‘Horizon 2000’ which was aimed not at housing the poor and the displaced but at ‘repositioning Beirut’ as the ‘financial and commercial centre of the Middle East’. Plans were made to build an enormous airport and a network of roads aimed at bolstering trade between the Lebanese coast and the Arab hinterland although it was obvious the socioeconomic concerns of the war-torn Lebanese society were different to Hariri’s neo-Phoenician aspirations (Najem, 1997:406). Lebanon’s remarkably high 8% average growth in GDP, therefore, contributed not to the alleviation of poverty but to the widening sectoral and class disparities. Moreover, the private sector postwar economy...
reinforced economic dependence and strengthened the service sector’s economic dominance. Between 1997 and 2009, for instance, the retail/wholesale sector witnessed the largest growth accounting for a quarter of Lebanon’s economy as did the real estate and tourism sectors – thus, disproportionately inflated the petty bourgeoisie (UNDP, 2008; Mottu and Nakhle, 2011).

The private sector commitments of the Hariri administration were equally beneficial for foreign corporate investors and, thus, members of the upper-bourgeoisie as Hariri undertook to open up the country to Western and GCC investments. His attempts to revive Lebanon’s role as regional financial centre and a colony of Western franchises, however, faced competition from emerging peripheral capitalisms as the Middle East’s economic geography shifted to the GCC. Nevertheless, the relationship between Hariri and the international business community continued to underpin his za'īmsīh throughout the postwar era as demonstrated by Paris-2. The 2002 donor conference provided Lebanon with $2.5bn in soft loans which bolstered Hariri’s ability to service debt. In return, his administration promised further spending cuts and renewed its commitment to privatisation. It was revealed in 2002-2004 that a number of bidders for Lebanon’s public sector telecom and energy companies, for instance, were prominent corporate investors connected with incumbent governments in Western and GCC donor states (Najem, 1997; Nizameddin, 2006). Even government-assisted private sector urban development projects which constituted the only exception to the neoliberal recovery economy were monopolised by Hariri and his protégés as evidenced by Solidere and Linord.

Politico-economic Harirism, therefore, developed into a neoliberal economy where antitrust laws are ineffective, economic regulation lacked and the distinction between entrepreneurship and statesmanship is explicitly violated; a situation which goes against not only principles of social justice, but also of the market economy itself (Al-Akhbar, 2011b):

Economic Harirism ‘liberated’ the economy from any and all restrictions, even the restriction of capitalism itself! [...] There is a single law against monopolistic practices, enacted during the wartime presidency of Amine Gemayel and this law has never been put into practice. In fact, Harirism weakened regulatory agencies [...] and restrained the judiciary in the economic domain assuring the benefits of a select few are upheld.

Amid the disarticulated neoliberalisation of the economy, the increased salience of foreign and emigrant capital and, thus, distributional rentierism, the Hariri administration deprived the state of its ability to influence economic development or shape social policy. The reconstruction process, therefore, became a fountainhead of influence and wealth and allowed members of the upper-bourgeoisie and foreign corporate investors associated with Almustaqbal to derive enormous profits and amass large fortunes (Young, 1996:22; Najem, 1997:411).
7.4.2 Harirism without Hariri: Paris-3 as an Example

As a result of the institutionalisation of Hariri’s loose coalition of capitalists, politico-economic Harirism represented by Almustaqbal outlived its founder whose assassination in 2005 had reverberating effects: Syrian tutelage came to an end; Hezbollah’s weapons were called into question; and previously-marginalised political actors were (re)introduced. Almustaqbal’s social and economic policy, however, was not only sustained but reinforced capitalising on newfound popular support. Under the leadership of Fouad Siniora and Saad Hariri, Almustaqbal continued to demonstrate its commitment to the ‘politics of business’ and the ‘business of politics’ as the major unifying objective of party leaders.

This is most evident in the performance of the Fouad Siniora government following the July 2006 War. In an attempt to address the immediate economic consequences of the war, Siniora resorted to GCC investors to restore confidence in the Lebanese economy (Al-Hajj, 2007) – hence, reinforcing distributional rentierism and exacerbating the petty bourgeoisie’s parasitical dependence on foreign corporate investments and the upper-bourgeoisie. Moreover, Siniora secured the rescheduling of foreign debt and earned Lebanon large sums in aid and loans at the International Conference for Support to Lebanon (Paris-3).

It must be noted that Siniora’s visions for recovery in 2006 echoed Hariri’s visions in 1992: both men believed that the Lebanese economy must return to its pre-1975 state and that Beirut must regain its position as an international trade centre. Similarly, both men advocated the myth that war was ‘imposed on Lebanon’ rather than a reflection of socioeconomic disarticulations. In other words, Siniora saw no need to discuss such issues as political confessionalism; statesmen, patronage and corruption; the underdevelopment of the productive sectors; or the ‘division of labour’ between the business and ruling elites (Trabousli, 2006).

Instead, Siniora’s ‘Reform Plan’ reinvented Hariri’s controversial 2005 budget which proposed major cuts in public expenditure and reducing the size of the State Security Directorate and the military and the dissolution of FfD and CfS. Hariri’s budget angered his partners in the postwar authority whose patronage resources were at stake as well as the military establishment and then-President Emile Lahoud (Nizameddin, 2006). Siniora’s ‘Reform Plan’ in 2006 promised similar spending cuts affecting the Ministries of Social Affairs, Education and Public Health. Siniora also reiterated his administration’s commitment to corporatisation and privatisation. Siniora’s reforms, however, excluded the FfD, CfS and the military.

In other words, Siniora capitalised on the historical moment to marginalise opponents and bypass the tedious process of inter-factional bargains. Searching for ‘the truth’ behind the assassination of Hariri rallied enough popular support to push forward Siniora’s otherwise-
unpopular reforms. Implementation of the ‘Reform Plan’, therefore, was delegated to Hariri aides heading influential ad-hoc agencies including HCP, IDA, Ministry of Telecom, Electricité du Liban (EdL) and the Telecom Regulatory Authority (MoF, 2007). In other words, the Siniora ‘Reform Plan’ capitalised on the events of 2005-2006 to revitalise the private sector economy; ‘bail out’ the business class and, crucially, strengthen Siniora vis-à-vis Hezbollah (BCRI, 2006; Al-Hajj, 2007; MarxistFromLebanon, 2007).

Pledges made by Paris-3 donor states, however, reveals the sectoral and, thus, socioeconomic bias of the ‘Reform Plan’. Foreign corporate investors and the upper-bourgeoisie represented heavily in the telecom and banking sectors received aid disproportional to the damage inflicted upon them during the July War. The petty bourgeoisie whose members are heavily involved in trade and tourism were promised almost $1bn in soft loans. The industrial and agricultural sectors which suffered the brunt of the war, however, received only $50m in assistance (InfoPro, 2006; MarxistFromLebanon, 2007; MoF, 2007; Al-Hajj, 2007).

Moreover, capitalising on the popular carte blanche the Hariri assassination provided as well as electoral gerrymandering, Almustaqbal and its March-14 allies secured absolute majority in the Beirut Municipal Council (BMC), thus, appropriating local-government patronage and disrupting BMC regulatory functions (Saoud, 2011). Unsurprisingly, 82% of BMC contracts since 2005 were allocated to bidders affiliated with March-14. Moreover, Almustaqbal municipal councillors patronised NGOs through LL800m-worth of joint projects65.

7.4.3 Populist sectarianism and electoral bribery as mobilisational strategies
Almustaqbal’s commitment to the business interests of its corporate and upper-bourgeois officers and its petty-bourgeois clients, however, fails to explain the movement’s outstanding electoral performance. Almustaql and Almustaqbal-endorsed ‘independent’ candidates have not only constituted the largest parliamentary bloc but have also maintained a significant margin between themselves and all other party blocs as demonstrated in Table 7.1.

The movement’s outstanding electoral performance can be attributed to four factors. Firstly, several non-Sunni candidates have customarily ran on Almustaqbal’s electoral lists – hence, allowing the movement to expand its parliamentary bloc beyond the Sunni quota in Parliament. Secondly, the vast financial assets and private-sector patronage at the disposal of the movement allow it to fund costly election campaigns and influence voters’ choices both within as well as beyond the Sunni confession. Since 2005, for instance, patronage at the disposal of the movement and the Hariri Foundation has been used to bolster March-14 candidates in

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Christian-majority constituencies in an attempt to reintroduce political forces such as the QSG, Gemayel's Kataeb Party and the LF in the post-Syria order (Cammett and Issar, 2010).


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Sources: Nohlen et al (2001); www.elections.lb.com; www.elections.gov.lb

Thirdly, unlike the Shiite and Christian confessions, the Sunni community has had little legitimate alternative to Hariri since 1992. Unsurprisingly therefore, the Almustaqbal bloc has consistently claimed more than 50% of all Sunni seats in Parliament in consecutive postwar Parliaments. Tripoli has perhaps posed the single most serious challenge to Hariri: the city’s traditional Sunni zu’ama, the Karamehs, continue to hold sway over the city alongside postwar billionaires Najib Mikati and Mohamed Safadi. Fourthly, a significant segment of the Sunni confession is urban and engages in mercantile and service-sector activities. The political economy of the Sunni confession results in a situation whereby the expanding business interests of Almustaqbal tycoons create job opportunities for middle-class professionals and expands the opportunities for the parasitical dependence of the petty bourgeoisie.

It is empirically evident, however that foreign, upper-bourgeois and emigrant capital has not trickled down to rural Sunnis and the urban poor and, thus, provided the educated youth with near to nothing. Almustaqbal’s popularity amongst Sunnis in impoverished Tripoli, Akkar and such Beirut neighbourhoods as Tariq Jdideh, for instance, cannot be attributed to material gains but to its sophisticated networks of qabada’ayi and partisan youth (shabāb) as well as to its sectarian appeal. In other words, Almustaqbal resorts to classic instruments of clientelist-confessionalism to drum up the support of the lower and lower-middle classes.
In doing so, the Hariri za'imship capitalises on and exacerbates sectarian fervour; provides jobs in private sector and charitable associations; and dispenses cash and in-kind benefits to voters for short-term electoral gains. This has exacerbated distributional rentierism and, thus, clientelistic dependencies amongst the Sunni confession as Chit (2009a) notes:

Almustaqbal represents a large segment of the Sunni bourgeoisie – especially the personal interests of its leader, Saad Hariri [...] The movement’s class commitments and its poor political performance, have diminished its support base. Consequently, Hariri resorted to the overt use of ‘political money’ dispensed amongst an increasingly-desperate and unemployed youth. Moreover, Hariri employed a large number of people in foundations and institutions owned by himself and/or close allies. Combined, this resulted in a relationship of direct, explicit clientelism between Almustaqbal tycoons and the Sunni proletariat and petty bourgeoisie.

It must be noted that the movement’s revitalisation of prototypical clientelist-confessionalism ran contrary to its professed secularism and in spite of its cross-confessional electoral appeal. In light of this, Almustaqbal resorted to radicalising Sunni youth vis-à-vis the ‘other’ especially the Shi'a. Sectarian mobilisation during the 1990s involved low-ranking clerics and qabaḍāyāt due to the movement’s entente with Shiite political actors. Since 2005, however, the movement capitalised on region-wide Sunni-Shiite tensions upping its sectarian rhetoric.

This was demonstrated during the Danish cartoons’ controversy in September 2005 and gained unprecedented momentum in the aftermath of the May-7 events in 2008 (Gresh 2008; Itani, 2008; Abdel-Latif, 2008). In an attempt to save face, Almustaqbal politicians have increased their use of inflammatory rhetoric more liberally since 2008 and contributed to sporadic shoot-outs between pro-Hariri and pro-AMAL shabāb in underserviced neighbourhoods such as Aïcha Bakkar – often with the blessing of Almustaqbal rank-and-file members as well as the (then) pro-Hariri muftī.

In summary, Almustaqbal’s popular appeal amongst its socioeconomically amorphous social base depended on the movement’s strategic use of a myriad of resources including (i) its members’ personal fortunes and investments; (ii) global business and political connections; (iii) patronising the petty bourgeoisie; (iv) direct forms of clientelism including dispensing favours, employment and scholarships; (v) sectarian mobilisation including the tactical use of violence; and (vi) cash and in-kind vote-buying.
7.5 Hezbollah: From Revolution to the Politics of Business

The rampant corruption, socially-irresponsible economic policies and sectarianism associated with ‘politico-economic Harirism’, as discussed so far, however, must not suggest that the interdependence between entrepreneurship and statesmanship is exclusive to Almustaqbal. On the contrary: political parties and zu’ama have historically blurred the distinction between business and politics in Lebanon. Hezbollah is another example of the growing interconnection between the two domains although scholarship only emphasises the geostrategic and ideological aspects of the party. Domestically, however, Hezbollah is being increasingly associated with a young but expanding transnational business community.

It is important to note, however that, unlike Hariri, the ‘Party of God’ did not evolve from within the business community but from a mafhûm (worldview) adopted by a coterie of clerics educated, politicised and radicalised in the seminaries of Najaf and Qom. For independent mujtahids, Hezbollah provided the organisational basis for their philanthropic networks and rudimentary clientelistic infrastructure. Hezbollah’s appeal in the 1980s, therefore, depended on its radical worldviews, its armed struggle against Israel and its increasingly-sophisticated welfare services especially in Dahiyeh and Baalbek-Hermel (Norton, 1987; 1998; Pintak, 1988:255; Denoeux, 1993:187; Harik, 1994; 2004; Sankari, 2005; Alagha, 2006:33; Louër, 2008:204; Mervin, 2008:79; Shaery-Eisenlohr, 2008).

Not unlike other Islamist movements in the Middle East, Hezbollah’s social welfare system is communitarian in nature: it not only operates in the public arena, but also has strong private connotations (Hamzeh, 2001). It must be noted, however, that Hezbollah presented an exception to prevalent forms of predation and distribution since the 1980s. Unlike AMAL, for instance, Hezbollah depended almost entirely on non-state resources including the transnational networks of marāji‘; Iranian funding and the endowment of Lebanese mujtahids.

By 1990, the party had acquired formal structures and organisational capacities. Nonetheless, the party’s decision to retain its weapons and monopolise the struggle against Israel limited its desire to partake in the state. Thus, in contrast to AMAL’s dependence on the spoils of public office, Hezbollah distanced itself from the state and enhanced its autonomy (Picard, 2000:316; Marei, 2010b). Throughout the 1990s, Hezbollah prioritised the Resistance in its armed as well as in its social components over domestic politics. As a result, the party provided for the needy and fought on behalf of the oppressed. In the meantime, AMAL’s embeddedness in the state allowed it to represent the interests of the middle class and the bourgeoisie.

In other words, while AMAL entered into precarious alliances and negotiated business deals with the Hariri administration, Hezbollah allied itself with the Sunni Jama‘a Islamiyya voicing
popular distaste at the excesses of the neoliberal economy: in 1992 and 1995, they refused to pass a vote of confidence and, in 1996, rejected Hariri’s ‘anti-social’ budget. Moreover, Hezbollah MPs frequently denounced the political hegemony of the financial-commercial elite; criticised the government for neglecting peripheral regions; and accused the administration of corruption, favouritism and monopolistic practices (Chartouri-Bubarry, 1996:61; El-Bizri, 1999). Hezbollah, therefore, presented itself as the political mouthpiece of the oppressed.

7.5.1 Hezbollah and the Emerging Shiite Upper-Bourgeoisie
Towards the late-1990s, however, Hezbollah’s position amongst Shiites and, hence, its role in the political economy of Lebanon changed – partly, as a result of economic liberalisation as well as due to the Israeli withdrawal from South Lebanon in 2000. While AMAL leaders were consumed in appropriating and disseminating the spoils of public office, Hezbollah-affiliated mujtahids expanded their network of Sharia-compliant banking and social welfare services amongst Shiites in Lebanon, its diaspora and the seminaries.

Crucially, Hezbollah’s Iranian connection provided an alternative source of reconstruction aid independent of the state and its ad-hoc agencies. This was especially evident in the aftermath of the Grapes of Wrath (1996) and the July War (2006). The party’s reputation for social responsibility and transparency in allocating reconstruction aid was in stark contrast to public opinion regarding Hariri’s recovery plans. Moreover, Hezbollah undertook to minimise red tape, corruption and favouritism and was markedly efficient in targeting the most affected.

The party’s role in courting emigrant capital through Sharia-compliant banks, its ability to attract foreign aid and its reputation for integrity repositioned Hezbollah as the party-of-choice for the Shiite petty bourgeoisie as well as the expanding and increasingly-globalised upper-bourgeoisie. For members of this class, however, Hezbollah provided not only material benefits and political cover as AMAL did but also provided a sense of security. In evidencing this, Abdallah Bitar of the Nabatiyeh Merchants’ Association notes that:

Any political force seeking support in the South must address the security issue. A movement which cannot deter Israel against any intervention will not gain the support of the average southerner – especially those amongst us who have economic and business interests. Providing security for our investments is as important as providing infrastructure and wasta.

66 Hezbollah played an important role in attracting Iranian aid channelled through the Iranian Agency for the Reconstruction of Lebanon (IARL) which invested in reconstruction efforts in the South, Bekaa and Beirut. IARL contributed to the (re)construction or roads, public and non-state schools, hospitals and healthcare clinics and the electricity grid (Annahar, 2008). Hezbollah also acted as an intermediary between GCC donor states and the war-torn localities which they undertook to reconstruct.


68 Interview: Abdallah Bitar. Also, interviews: Abbas Wahbe; Mohamed Obeid.
The expansion of the Hezbollah-supporting upper-bourgeoisie in the late-1990s can be attributed to three global developments which encouraged the reverse migration of emigrant capital. Firstly, the noticeable drop in oil-economies coupled with the rising cost of living in such high-income economies as the GCC. Secondly, increased scrutiny over global financial transactions since 9/11 affected Lebanese expatriates not only because of their alleged relationship with Hezbollah/terrorism but also due to turmoil in host countries. Thirdly, the global financial crisis discouraged the wealthy from investing in the global North.69

Domestically, Hezbollah’s ascendance to at AMAL’s expense can be attributed to the party’s possession of three crucial ‘assets’ of relevance to businessmen and middle-class professionals: (i) international connections and, thus, foreign aid; (ii) extensive transnational networks with diasporic investors and clerics; and (iii) an increasingly-sophisticated social welfare system providing state-of-the-art education and healthcare. In addition to this, the party’s military might confers a sense of security vis-à-vis Israel while its disciplined police force (in dibāt) establishes a sense of law and order in the noticeable absence of the Lebanese state. In other words, the ‘Party of God’ provides all the necessary requirements for a prosperous private sector economy: security, order, resources and opportunities.

The noticeable shift in emigrant investment trends is perhaps a direct implication of the positive business environment which Hezbollah underpins. In contrast to their traditionally small-scale and petty-bourgeois investments in ‘dead assets’, Shiite capitalists are increasingly investing in large-scale industrial projects in the party’s stronghold of South Lebanon as local business expert Karim Hammoud explains:

> The liberation [of South Lebanon] in 2000 and the ‘equilibrium of deterrence’ which Hezbollah established vis-à-vis Israel [in 2006] combined with unrelenting financial scrutiny and the global financial crisis – all of this contributed to a noticeable influx of remittances and repatriated investments. This is most evident in the South and Nabatiyeh governorates where, for the first time since independence, large-scale private investments are expanding.70

The mining/quarrying industry in South Lebanon is an example of emigrant investment in large-scale businesses of an industrial nature. Al-Ahmadiyya, an industrial village in the caza of Hasbaya, for instance, includes a housing estate for some 300 industrial workers employed at the quarry owned by the Tajjedinnes, expatriate investors based in Africa. Hezbollah is credited for providing roads and infrastructure although the project was funded through IARL reconstruction aid. Al-Ahmadiyya is commonly referred to as ‘the village Hezbollah founded’.

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It was not possible to speak to Hezbollah officials or the Tajjedinnes about the project, but a resident of the near-by village of Delafeh connected to Hezbollah clarified that Al-Ahmadiyya is owned by the Tajjedinnes whose businesses enjoy the party’s support\textsuperscript{71}.

The Tajjedinnes’ investments in Lebanon gained media attention in 2006 when they bought out Shafiq Hariri and Fouad Siniora’s shares in the unprofitable Al-Massār Real Estate Company. Under the Tajjedinnes, Al-Massār reversed its losses as the Lebanese-African businessmen invested in land, quarries and medium-size industrial projects. In 2007/2008, the Tajjedinnes came under fire as Walid Jumblatt and Amine Gemayel accused them of “providing cover for suspicious Iranian-Hezbollah business” aimed at displacing “the Druzes and Maronites of South Lebanon and paving the way for the establishment of Hezbollah’s ‘Persian emirate’” (Blanford, 2007; Naharnet, 2008; Saoud, 2008).

The relationship between Hezbollah and the Tajjedinnes, however, was not publicised by either party until the funeral of Hassan Tajjedinne who died aboard the ill-fated Ethiopian Airline flight in January 2010. The funeral, held in their ancestral village of Hinawiyeh (Tyre) was attended by Hezbollah representatives including shaykh Ali Daamouche, shaykh Nabil Qaouq and MP Hassan Fadlallah. According to a relative of the deceased interviewed for this study, the connection between the Tajjedines and Hezbollah started in Africa and involved the ‘encouragement’ of a shaykh affiliated with the party. For the Tajjedines’ business interests, Hezbollah’s support was indispensible: the party secured permits, negotiated politically-sensitive deals, provided necessary infrastructure and, crucially, provided political cover\textsuperscript{72}.

Another example of the interconnection between members of the burgeoning Shiite bourgeoisie and the ‘Party of God’ is business magnate, Salah Ezzedine, the star of a Madoff-style financial scandal. Ezzedine was associated with Hezbollah’s Secretary-General and top party officials and was generally reputed for his piety. Moreover, he owned Dar Al-Hadi, a renowned publisher of Shiite books, ran a tourist agency specialising in pilgrimages and a TV station. Ezzedine also owned an asset-management firm, al-Mustathmir, managing investments in oil and the transit-trade in cement and iron with beneficiaries in Turkey, GCC and Africa.

For the public, however, al-Mustathmir, was known for its Sharia-compliant financial services providing expatriates and residents reputable, trusted and transnational banking services. Based more on interpersonal relations and trust than official banking regulations, Ezzedine attracted deposits from expatriates, families of expatriates, middle-class professionals and business tycoons from GCC, Iran and Africa. Al-Mustathmir promised its clients a remarkable 40% 

\textsuperscript{71} Anecdotal data. 2009/2010.  
\textsuperscript{72} Anecdotal data. 25 January 2010.
interest rate. In late 2009, however, Ezzedine’s $200,000 cheque to MP Hussein Hajj-Hassan bounced revealing the inexplicable collapse of the financial empire and the loss of an estimated $1.2bn in deposits (Harkous, 2009; Fisk, 2009; France24, 2009; Lee-Butters, 2009; Libération, 2009; Worth, 2009; ACAMS, 2010).

Although surrounded by ambiguity and speculation, the ‘Ezzedine Affair’ is significant for two reasons: firstly, it demonstrates the interconnection between Hezbollah and an emerging class of Sharia-compliant bankers; and, secondly, it provides empirical evidence indicating the size of fortunes amassed by expatriates and their families in Jnoub. In one village, for instance, more than $20m in personal savings were lost to al-Mustathmir. Claimants of seemingly-average backgrounds allege deposits between $50,000 and $300,000 (NewTV, 2009).

Tajjedine and Ezzedine are merely the tip of an iceberg – the two names have reverberated on the political and financial/security scenes for obvious reasons. However, the two men offer a brief insight into the complex and covert networks linking Hezbollah with the transnational business community. The secrecy with which these networks is embroiled is understandable given the risks businessmen associated with Hezbollah are subjected to (Harkous, 2009). However, the two names provide subtle evidence of Hezbollah’s growing role in attracting, patronising and providing the necessary support for the flourishing Shiite business class. In fact, Tajjedinne and Ezzedinne are symptomatic of an emerging transnational private sector of Shiite bankers and business tycoons connected to Hezbollah with outside the war economy.

7.5.2 Reconsidering AMAL and Hezbollah: state vs. non-state patronage
Emerging empirical evidence demonstrating the relationship between Hezbollah and the growing Shiite business class, thus, problematises the conventional assumption that the party represents the ‘disinherited’ and ‘dispossessed’. Moreover, this indicates that AMAL is no longer the party-of-choice for members of the Shiite bourgeoisie despite its unmatched access to the public sector and the spoils of public office.

In fact, it is more accurate to associate AMAL with the poor and the uneducated as opposed to the middle class and the bourgeoisie. By contrast, it is empirically evident that Hezbollah constitutes the ‘centre’ of a non-state economy where the inefficiencies, corruption and favouritism of the state bureaucracy are kept to a minimum. This economic cycle places a number of resources vital to the private sector economy at the party’s disposal including a state-of-the-art welfare system; transnational diasporic networks and, thus, emigrant capital; a network of privately-owned Sharia-compliant banks; and international connections.
Hezbollah’s non-state sector provides healthcare (al-hay’a al-sihiya al-islāmiya), construction (Jihad al-Binā’), microcredit facilities (al-qard al-hassan) and education. The sheer size and salience of the facilities and contracts this sector possesses allows Hezbollah to influence social policy in spite of the central state – hence, catering for the interests of the Shiite private sector and the salaried middle class. The party’s reconstruction project, Wa’ad, for instance, has provided tens of private construction firms with lucrative business opportunities in the grandiose project73 while hospitals and healthcare clinics run by al-hay’a al-sihiya al-islāmiya (Islamic Health Association, IHA) provide pharmaceutical manufacturers and import/export companies with lucrative long-term business contracts. Moreover, Hezbollah’s role in allocating Iranian aid following the July War vitalised the party’s redistributive role – often, allowing the party to selectively benefit loyalists74.

It must be noted that contracts offered by Hezbollah-affiliated associations are not only attractive because they provide high returns, but also due to the party’s reputation for swift payment, social responsibility, ‘piety’ and financial integrity in a country where favouritism and bureaucratic inefficiencies are rampant. Claiming that Hezbollah-affiliated associations depend only on universalistic criteria in resource allocation, however, may be misleading as, at the end of the day, it represents another patronage network with obvious political objectives75.

Anecdotal data provides evidence that, although party-affiliated associations apply scrupulous investigations into the economic and professional credentials of their contractors, access to business opportunities involves some degree of informality. For instance, a contract granted to a Dahiyeh-based company to import healthcare equipment for the Shahid Salah Ghandour Hospital in Bint-Jbeil76 depended, somehow, on the owner’s relationship with IHA officers:

[The IHA] scrutinised my history and financial credibility before granting me the contract. [...] But it helped that I was referred to them by an old friend who is a regional manager of their health clinics in the Bekaa77.

It is impossible to know the extent to which this ‘referral’ influenced IHA’s decision. However, although incomparable to rampant corruption associated with AMAL, for instance, anecdotal data suggests that networks of kin, diaspora and religious brotherhoods have an impact on the allocation of business opportunities at the disposal of Hezbollah-affiliated state-of-the-art non-state sector.

74 Riyad Al-As’ad, for instance, accused Hezbollah and AMAL of excluding his company from Iran-funded reconstruction projects in 2008 after expressing his intention to compete in the 2009 legislative elections (Bassam, 2008; 14March.Org, 2009).
76 Previously the Bint-Jbeil State Hospital fell into disuse during the Israeli occupation. In 2000, the hospital was reclaimed by IHO which reopened the hospital under the name of Shahid Salah Ghandour.
Private sector growth and sectoral development encouraged by Hezbollah investments do not only benefit the bourgeoisie but also the educated youth for whom public sector employment is no longer attractive. Middle-income households are increasingly inclined to send their children to Hezbollah-affiliated schools, approach IHA-run healthcare clinics and seek employment in the party’s various associations. Today, Hezbollah-affiliated associations employ some 50,000 people while its schools provide education to over 25,000 students (Le Thomas, 2010).

AMAL supporters, by contrast, tend to be less educated and, thus, seek modest public sector jobs. The main distinguishing factor between AMAL and Hezbollah constituencies today, therefore, is public employment as Mohammed Obeid explains:

> In this atmosphere of sectarian polarisation, the differences between AMAL and Hezbollah supporters dwindle. The main difference is that more desperate AMAL supporters seek employment in the public sector or seek state services. Hezbollah supporters, however, are much less interested in the public sector.

Hezbollah’s popularity amongst the Shiite middle and upper classes vis-à-vis AMAL’s popularity amongst the lower and lower-middle classes is evidenced by partisan iconography: AMAL slogans, flags and murals, for instance, are visible in the ‘Shiite poverty arc’ which surrounds stretches from El-Khandaq El-Ghamiq in the north to ḥayy El-Sellom in the south. Even amongst the urban poor, AMAL is losing ground as the state’s fiscal crises diminish state patronage and, thus, pose an existential threat for AMAL as a movement and its leaders as party patrons. Hezbollah, on the other hand, is evidently more popular amongst the better-off ‘core’ – Haret-Hreik, Bourj-Barajneh, Ghobeiri, Sfeir and Hadath. Despite its pledge to social justice and efficiency, therefore, Hezbollah has situated itself at the centre of the private sector economy by capitalising on changes in regional and global political economy.

7.5.3 Hezbollah, neoliberalism and neo-Harirism
The discussion so far demonstrates that a transformation in Hezbollah’s political discourse has taken place over the years responding to domestic and global developments transforming the party from a non-state actor espousing radical, anti-establishment worldviews and echoing the revolutionary rhetoric of Imam Moussa as-Sadr and Imam Khomeini to a political party with a stake in Lebanon’s patronage democracy. This shift is evident in its performance in Parliament. Veteran Hezbollah MP Mohammed Fneish, for instance, was known for his harsh criticism of the Hariri administration in the 1990s and a vocal critic of the excesses, favouritism and monopolistic privileges of the postwar economy. Crucially, Fneish led the ‘Islamic Bloc’ consisting of Islamist (Sunni and Shiite) MPs from the South, Bekaa and Akkar. The Bloc protested negligence of peripheral regions and unbalanced development (El-Bizri, 1999).

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78 Interview: Mohamed Obeid.
In 2005, however, Fneish became Hezbollah’s first-ever minister – Minister of Energy and Water Resources (MoEW). Of course, Fneish led the opposition to Siniora’s foreign policy during the July War. Nonetheless, he was instrumental in implementing Siniora’s neoliberal ‘Reform Plan’ as the Paris-3 Second Progress Report (MoF, 2007) demonstrates – a clear indication of the paradigm shift which transformed Hezbollah from a ‘radical outcast’ to a stakeholder and powerbroker.

Indeed, Hezbollah’s position towards Paris-3 demonstrated the limits of the party’s dispute with Siniora. Hezbollah questioned the consociational credentials of the government following the resignation of Shiite ministers; accused March-14 of marginalising the opposition; and vowed that foreign aid will not force Lebanon to make declinations to the “American and Zionist plan”. The party, however, had no reservations with regards to the socioeconomic content of the Paris-3 donor conference (Traboulsi, 2006).

This is evident in Fneish’s performance as acting MoEW and member of the Infrastructure and Privatisation Inter-Ministerial Committee (IPIMC). IPIMC’s tasks were particularly thorny given the sensitivities of the issue of corporatisation and privatisation of the telecom, transportation and energy sectors. Interestingly, IPIMC’s biggest ‘successes’ occurred in the energy sector reform plan which was administered by no other than Fneish himself.

In return for donor states’ financial support, Lebanon committed to enhance EdL’s operational efficiency and corporatise-then-privatise the company. The Second Progress Report published in July 2007 presented Fneish’s energy sector as its biggest achievement in the first six months: Electricité de France was hired to develop a sector-reform plan; operation and maintenance of the Zahrai and Beddawi power plants was subcontracted to private sector investors; a contract was signed with Egypt to provide natural gas; an international advisory committee was devised to help license Independent Power Producers in Lebanon within the context of the corporatisation and privatisation of EdL; and private companies were subcontracted to install and operate meters (MoF, 2007; Dick, 2010).

Although Fneish’s tenure as MoEW was not surrounded by allegations of corruption, the fact remains: he played a pivotal role in sectoral reforms, implemented ‘good governance’ policies and, thus, helped Lebanon meet its commitments to the IMF, World Bank and Paris-3 donor states. After his three-year tenure as MoEW, Fneish was appointed Labour Minister. Fneish’s most remarkable achievement as Labour Minister was ending the reign of notorious

79 Alongside Fneish, IPIMC included Telecom Minister and Hezbollah archrival Marwan Hamadeh; Tripoli billionaire, Minister of Transport Mohammed Safadi; and Hariri-appointed chairmen of HCP and CDR.
middlemen in the ministry. By tendering the job out to the privatised Liban Post, Fneish undercut several hundred bureaucrats infamous for corruption (Dick, 2010).

In short, it is evident from Fneish’s performance in consecutive governments that Hezbollah is much less ideologically opposed to the neoliberal economy than it is given credit for. In fact, the party’s veteran minister became a symbol of corporatisation, privatisation and ‘good governance’. This again indicates the paradigm shift in terms of political economy while revitalising the party and its ontological value system emphasising ‘good governance’, ‘efficacy’ and ‘honesty’. The overlap between Hezbollah’s Islamically-inspired ontology and the logics of the free market, therefore, underpinned Fneish’s outstanding successes.

Hezbollah’s commitment to the private sector economy is also evident in the party’s role in developing agriculture – a sector traditionally neglected by the Beirut-based political class. It is in this vein that Hezbollah’s most important ad-hoc agency, Jihad al-Binā’ (Construction Jihad), ventured beyond the real estate domain launching the annual ‘Arḍī exhibition. ‘Arḍī 2010, witnessed a phenomenal turnout: more than 800 SMEs partook in the exhibition; half a million people attended; and some 2500 seasonal jobs were created (Yaghi, 2010).

The party’s commitment to the agricultural sector is also demonstrated in its parliamentary and governmental performance. Another of the party’s veteran MPs, Hussein Hajj-Hassan, served as chairman of the Agriculture Committee in Parliament throughout the 1990s. Hajj-Hassan became Hezbollah’s second minister in 2009. As Minister of Agriculture, he launched an ambitious sectoral reform plan promising to liberate agriculture from cartels of pesticide merchants and promoters of low-value crops. His biggest achievement, however, has been securing the first-ever soft loan program for farmers, courtesy of the country’s private banks (Dick, 2010). In 2011, Hajj-Hassan vowed to increase the sector’s share of GDP from 5% to 8% despite the traditional service-oriented tendencies of the economy (Al-Akhbar, 2011a).

This commitment to the agricultural sector can be explained by the fact that, although agriculture makes minor contributions to national GDP (MOET, 2007), it employs a large number of people in the party’s strongholds in the South and Bekaa. In fact, half of all land used for agricultural purposes in 2001 was located in Shiite-majority cazas considered Hezbollah strongholds whereas more than a quarter of all arable land in these cazas was used for agricultural activities (MoA, 2001). Moreover, poverty and deprivation amongst the agrarian population of underserviced regions like Baalbek-Hermel (Hajj-Hassan’s hometown) posed a threat to the state as well as Hezbollah’s leadership as evidenced by shaykh Subhi Al-Tuffayli’s 1997 ‘Revolt of the Hungry’ and, recently, the tuffār insurrection of ‘out-laws’ from the Ja’afar clan (Norton, 1998:94; Marlin, 2010; Wood, 2010).
Hajj-Hassan’s commitment to sectoral (agricultural) development is echoed in other sectors. Hezbollah’s investments in ‘resistance tourism’, for instance, indicate the party’s intention to develop ‘alternative tourism’ in regions with little infrastructure or appeal to private-sector investors in tourism. Examples of this ‘alternative’ tourism sector include ‘Resistance Fairs’ developed by Jam‘iyya al-Lubnaniyya lil-Funun (Lebanese Arts Association, Risalat) in Dahiyeh and Nabatiyeh as well as the Khiyyam Prison Museum and the Mleita Theme Park which combine ‘tourism’, ‘piety’ and ‘resistance’ in a remarkable show of synchrony between the party’s ontological underpinnings and its free-market commitments (Deeb and Harb, 2010).

It can, therefore, be argued that Hezbollah utilises policy-making prerogatives and non-state patronage for the benefit of a growing private sector – hence creating avenues to express its ontological worldviews alongside free-market convictions. In doing so, the party demonstrates a form of ‘constituency patronage’ whereby largess is dispensed to ‘constituents’ rather than ‘friends’ and ‘followers’ in the classical clientelist sense where whereas ‘clients’ appeal to ‘patrons’ for ‘favours’ related to direct benefit.

7.6 COMPETITION AND OPPOSITION BETWEEN MARCH-8 AND MARCH-14

In light of this comparative analysis of patronage politics in the postwar era it is evident that Hezbollah and Almustaqbal do not differ on questions of political economy as much as they differ on the nature of the patron-client relationship: while Hezbollah demonstrates a form of ‘constituency patronage’ Almustaqbal is evidently a coalition of capitalists in pursuit of crude business interests. Interestingly, Hezbollah has constituted the backbone of March-8 alongside FPM whereas Almustaqbal constituted the backbone of March-14.

It is important to reiterate that the two parties – Hezbollah and Almustaqbal – converge in their commitment to the free market – hence, their cooperation on fiscal and economic questions despite their disagreements on foreign policy. It is, therefore, reasonable to question whether the political abyss that has characterised Lebanon since 2005 reflects conflicting visions or merely echoes the interests of rival patronage-parties. On this, an Arab diplomat notes that:

Siniora’s government was by far the most committed to the IMF-imposed agenda. And yet, [government] deliberations reveal that it was not Hezbollah or FPM that led the opposition in socioeconomic matters. It was Jumblatt and Berri – partly due to the former’s folkloric commitment to socialism and the latter’s token obligation to the revolutionary fervour of Imam Moussa as-Sadr. But at the heart of their opposition was the fact that their share in the spoils of public office was threatened by privatisation and neoliberal adjustments. Almustaqbal, Hezbollah and FPM often agreed on economic questions80.

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Hezbollah’s participation in government and the party’s free-market convictions have been amply discussed throughout this chapter. It is important to note, however, that the FPM’s participation in the 2008 Cabinet is equally unsurprising given that Michel Aoun’s support base lies not in the working classes but in the upper-middle class as evidenced by the party’s representation in student unions and professional syndicates. The FPM, therefore, supported economic and fiscal policies favouring the private sector, professional industries and middle-class vocations. This also explains Aoun’s insistence on appointing the telecom and energy ministers since 2008.

Paradoxically, therefore, opposition to Almustaqbal’s neoliberal policies has been led by AMAL and PSP – an embodiment of the conflict of interests between private and public sector patronage parties. The two parties’ reservations on Siniora’s commitments to Paris-3 donor states, therefore, reflected their discomfort with renewed pledges to cut public spending and privatise the public sector. Hezbollah and FPM, on the other hand, criticised Siniora for ‘marginalising’ March-8 but had no significant reservations on the free-market commitments of his ‘Reform Plan’.

Their convergence over the commitment to the private sector economy, however, does not mean that Hezbollah, the FPM and Almustaqbal do not disagree on socioeconomic issues. Their rivalry, however, can be attributed to the divergent interests of the respective segments of the bourgeoisie for which they stand. In other words, whereas Almustaqbal represents business magnates with an organic connection to the developed economies of the global ‘centre’, Hezbollah and the FPM represent a parvenu bourgeoisie and a middle class embedded with the national economy and the economies of the global ‘periphery’ (i.e. Africa, Latin America). This perhaps explains why the two parties are more likely to adopt nationalist discourse emphasising resistance, development and reform whereas Almustaqbal adopts a more pro-Western discourse and demonstrates affinity to the GCC.

In a nutshell, the March-8 and March-14 coalitions represent mirror images of one another: each is a coalition between a (i) ‘core’ consisting of parties committed to the private sector economy and non-state patronage with the interests of a particular segment of the bourgeoisie in mind; and (ii) public-sector patronage parties with a stake in public sector patronage. The political environment in post-2005 Lebanon, therefore, is dominated by two mutually-reinforcing conflicts which underpin political instability. Firstly: a conflict of interests between public and private-sector patronage parties; and, secondly: a conflict between private-sector patronage parties representing different segments of the bourgeoisie and the middle class.
In concluding, it has been the aim of this chapter to provide a comparative analysis of patronage politics in postwar Lebanon in light of the ‘negotiated’ transition to peace and the private sector economy. In doing so, this chapter has demonstrated that the postwar authority protracted the war economy insofar as it allowed militiamen-turned-statesmen to retain their redistributive functions in light of economic neoliberalism. As such, militias-turned-parties protracted their clientelistic networks in their neo-za’imist confessional-partisan forms.

It has also been demonstrated that clientelism has been entrenched in the postwar era as a result of (i) the tight labour market; (ii) neoliberalisation of the economy, the expansion of opportunity spaces and, thus, the delegation of the social component of public administration to non-state actors; (iii) the excesses of the neoliberal economy and, thus, increasing socioeconomic inequalities; as well as (iv) the reinforcement of distributional rentierism due to increased dependence on emigrant remittances, FDI and foreign aid. As a result, clients’ livelihood has been tied more firmly to the destiny and whims of postwar neo-zu’ama.

The case study of AMAL presented above serves to demonstrate the interplay between wartime militia organisations, the reconstruction economy and the spoils of public office in the postwar authority. The case study of Almustaqbal, on the other hand, highlights the blurred distinction between statesmanship and entrepreneurship. Almustaqbal, it has been shown, is a coalition of capitalists and representatives of corporate interests which, through the person and consecutive governments of Rafic Hariri, transformed the postwar economy into a ‘fountainhead of influence and wealth’ from which the politico-business class has benefited. The final case study presented in this chapter has been that of Hezbollah which demonstrates (i) a combination of ‘radical’ convictions and free-market commitments; (iii) adopts a form of ‘constituency patronage’ and, thus, depersonalises clientelism; and (iii) depends on non-state patronage. The party, therefore, developed from an ‘outcast’ on the periphery of the political system to a ‘core’ component of the regime.

Although the three case studies exhibit distinct patterns of patronage politics in postwar Lebanon, they demonstrate the salience of neo-za’imism in contemporary Lebanon. In other words, despite the seemingly-radical changes brought about by the Civil War, dyadic relations of a clientelistic nature continue to underpin socio-political order. That said, it is important to distinguish between ‘patrons’ dispensing largess through state bureaucracy, charitable associations, the private sector and the non-state sector. Moreover, it is equally important to distinguish between individual and constituency patronage – the former involves personalistic relationships between patrons and clients whereas the latter emphasises the collective (communalistic or sectoral) identity of the clientele. Such critical distinctions are crucial for
any political-economy analysis of patronage and, thus, the dynamics of political leadership in contemporary Lebanon. These distinctions also explain the nature and dynamics of inter-factional feuds between public-sector patronage parties and private-sector patronage parties as well as within the latter.

Despite these distinctions, however, it can be argued that patronage politics in postwar Lebanon revitalised the role of ‘political families’ and ‘spiritual families’ through different mechanism as opposed to the pre-1975 period. It is in this light that major postwar achievements have been attributed to particular patrons of particular confessional groups: economic ‘recovery’ and ‘reconstruction’ have been attributed to Hariri and, thus, the Sunnis; ‘resistance’ and ‘liberation’ to Hezbollah and, thus, the Shiites; opposition to Syria and ‘the battle for sovereignty’ to the Gemayels, the Lebanese Forces and the FPM and, thus, the Christians. To understand the interplay between identity (confessional), patronage and partisan mobilisation, however, it will be necessary to examine the political economy of intra-communal relations, the organisational structures of postwar parties and the extent to which they appeal to sectarianism for tactical mobilisational purposes, which, as essential aspects of Lebanese political economy, are discussed in Chapter Eight.
CHAPTER EIGHT

RETURNING TO POLITICAL PARTIES?
POLITICAL MOBILISATION AND SOCIAL CHANGE IN POSTWAR LEBANON
It has been amply evidenced in the discussion presented in previous chapters that patronage and the clientelistic/rentier nature of redistribution continue to underpin the political system in Lebanon despite the seemingly-radical changes brought about by the Civil War. The neoliberal postwar economy, however, resulted in the articulation of new forms of patronage alongside and, at times, in conflict with wartime forms of patronage. The distinction between public and private-sector patrons as well as between individual and constituency patronage has been discussed in the previous chapter. Crucially, though, patronage, as the main constant in the Lebanese body politic has been intertwined with political parties which have become the most essential unit of collective action and political mobilisation. This is evidenced by the noticeable increase in political parties’ representation in postwar parliaments and cabinets.

In the postwar era, by contrast, partisan candidates constitute an unprecedented 41% and 55% of 1992 and 1996 respectively indicating a significant shift in political practice. The establishment of new political parties such as Talal Arslan’s Lebanese Democratic Party (LDP) and the QSG in the 2000-2005 period increased this figure to almost 60%. Syrian withdrawal in 2005 and the reintegration of parties restricted under Syrian tutelage increased partisan representation in Parliament to 84% and 75% in the 2005 and 2009 parliaments respectively. Increased partisan representation since 2005 can also be attributed to the polarising effects of Rafic Hariri’s assassination and the July War. Petty-za‘imist parties, ad-hoc electoral coalitions and independent candidates, on the other hand, constituted 36% of the 2000 Parliament; 14% in 2005; and 22% in 2009. Furthermore, the polarisation of the political elite into two rival multi-party coalitions, March-8 and March-14, dominated Parliament in the post-2005 era.

Partisan representation in Parliament was reflected in government. In the pre-war era, political parties lacked the parliamentary majority required to govern. ‘Consensus’ presidents, premiers and cabinet ministers, thus, were ‘elected’ through inter-factional bargaining. State officials in the pre-war era, therefore, were often non-partisan za‘ama (El-Khazen, 2000; 2003). Since 1992, however, the size of Almustaqbal’s parliamentary bloc allowed it to dominate the premiership although this did not eliminate the need to reach ‘compromises’ with ‘partners’ in the context of broad-coalition governments.

81 Including members of political blocs which were later organised into parties (e.g. Almustaqbal bloc)
82 Appendix 1: Tables 6 – 8
The salience of party politics, therefore, is a dominant characteristic of the postwar authority with parties increasingly dominant in Parliament and, thus, in government – largely, legitimated and popularised through patronage in one form or another. The discussion presented in this chapter, therefore, examines the changing dynamics of party politics in postwar Lebanon through the use of qualitative data collected in an ethnomethodological manner through participant observation and interviews. In doing so, the first section of this chapter expands on the foundational remarks presented above and, hence, conceptualising Lebanon’s ‘extended’ confessional political parties emphasising the interplay between patronage and party politics. In the second section, parties’ mobilisational strategies are examined and the role of ‘political familialism’, leaders’ charisma and sectarian fervour in mobilising party supporters is highlighted. In light of this, parties’ hierarchical networks and contemporary forms of ‘middlemanship’ emphasising the role of qabadāyāt and shabāb in political mobilisation is examined. The third section singles out Hezbollah as the most modern and only political party in Lebanon with an interest in ‘social change’. In light of this, its highly-centralised organisational structure; highlights aspects of the ‘modern’ modus vivendi articulated by its mujtahids are examined and the dynamic and bidirectional process through which the Party influences social change is explored.

8.1 THE ‘EXTENDED’ CONFESSIONAL PARTY

It has been demonstrated in previous chapters that the demise of traditional, populist and pseudo-ideological forms of partisan organisation characteristic of pre-war Lebanon was a demonstration of popular disillusionment with the petty politics and parochial interests of petty-zu‘ama. Instead, new forms of collective solidarities revitalised the instrumental role of confessional identification. Militias, therefore, replaced petty-zu‘ama as alternative avenues of social mobility, redistributive mechanisms and crucibles of new solidarities centred around the confession and, thus, framing socioeconomic grievances within the sectarian paradigm. In light of this, previously-excluded and socially-immobile social groups turned to the Kataeb, the PLO and Imam Moussa as-Sadr in the 1970s and, in the 1980s, to the Lebanese Forces, AMAL, Hezbollah, the FPM and Rafic Hariri.

It must be noted that the ‘negotiated’ transition to peace allowed militiamen and entrepreneurs a ‘safe passage’ into the postwar era. Despite their competition over the spoils of public office in the postwar era, however, militias-turned-parties appealed to confessionally-delineated and, thus, relatively homogenous sectarian constituencies as Jihad El-Zein (2009:48) explains:

The resurgence of the Kataeb following the events of 1958 marked the birth of a new phenomenon which would define political life in Lebanon and dominate the Sunni, Shiite and Druze scenes after the collapse of the pre-war system:
the ‘extended’ confessional party. Although they may be short of the uncontested claim over the confession, they ‘extend’ on all levels of the community. This phenomenon characterised Kamal Jumblatt’s PSP amongst the Druzes; AMAL (and later Hezbollah) amongst the Shiites; and, since 2000, Almustaqbal amongst the Sunnis.

The substitution of petty-za‘imism with the more confessionalistic neo-za‘imism of the ‘extended party’ was a result of several factors. Firstly, the transition to parliamentarianism revitalised the interconnection between deputyship, public office and private wealth and blurred the distinction between entrepreneurship and statesmanship (Crow, 1980). In light of this, ‘extended’ parties and the surviving members of the pre-war elite converged forming alliances to consolidate their gains and expand their influence in the postwar authority. In 1992, for instance, traditional rivals in the south like Hezbollah, AMAL, Hariri and the Osseiran and Zein families joined forces in a Syria-endorsed electoral list. Similarly, candidates endorsed by Omar Karameh and Sleiman Frangieh were united in one list in the north (El-Khazen, 1994). Moreover, Syrian tutelage emboldened the ‘extended’ party by forcing petty-zu‘ama into coalescing with Damascus’ allies – especially the PSP, AMAL and the Hariri Bloc (El-Khazen, 2002; 2003).

It must be noted that parties with a cross-confessional appeal and strong ideological convictions were denied access to the spoils of public office. In light of Lebanon’s patronage democracy, this contributed to their consistent failure to achieve any significant victory in elections. As a result, non-confessional parties’ share in Parliament dwindled to as low as 2% in 200583. Such parties as the LCP, for instance, have been consistently excluded since 1992.

The second factor contributing to the confessionalisation of the political party domain in postwar Lebanon is the territorialism of the confession in the aftermath of the demographic shifts which accompanied the militia order. The confessionally-homogenous cantons created during the Civil War through al-farz al-ṭā’efi have been sustained in the postwar era through ‘extended’ parties’ use of tactical violence and sectarian iconography to demarcate the territorial boundaries between their respective cantons and, thus, symbolise the limits of their ‘sovereignties’ (Marei, 2010a).

It can, therefore, be argued that postwar Lebanon has become increasingly confessional insofar as political representation is monopolised by ‘extended’ parties with a confession-wide claim and socioeconomic grievances are expressed within the sectarian rather than class-struggle discourse. Crucially, socio-political confessionalisation and the salience of ‘extended’ parties capitalised on and protracted the clientelistic networks and cantonal administrations of the war order transforming militias into hierarchical parties. Although the ‘negotiated’ transition

83 Appendix 1: Tables 6 – 7
involved the assimilation of notables, militiamen, qabadāyāt and shabāb into formal and informal party structures emphasising the politics of patronage, however, the clientelistic relationship between ‘extended’ parties and their clients reflected the changing political economy in postwar Lebanon and capitalised on the opportunity spaces created by the private-sector reconstruction economy.

8.1.1 Bricks and Mortar: The ‘Confessionalisation’ of Clientelism
The revival of patronage politics in postwar Lebanon can be attributed to a number of factors including deficient socioeconomic modernisation; deficient economic regulation; the excesses of the disarticulated political economy; the weakness of the state; the large non-state sector; political ideologies stressing selective rather than collective incentives; and electoral systems promoting individualisation and localism of candidate competition (Kitschelt, 2000; Pappas, 2009). In other words, patronage does not necessarily gainsay democratic expansion but may, in fact, be at its core (Mattina, 2009). It is within this context that the tasks of servicing and representing local communities previously fulfilled by local zu’ama fell back on ‘extended’ political parties and the public authorities they appropriated in the postwar era (Fawaz, 2009).

The demise of petty-za’imism, therefore, did not result in Weberian bureaucratic universalism nor did it lay the foundations for free-market efficiency in the Smithian sense. Instead, the postwar economy revitalised political parties’ role as the loci of patronage and emphasised the confession as the avenue to social struggle. Cammett and Issar (2010) conceptualise this shift in what they call ‘bricks-and-mortar clientelism’ – a form of clientelistic redistribution which entails a commitment to ‘the community’ and, thus, fostering a sense of solidarity by constructing or reinforcing boundaries between in-groups and ‘the other.’ This is especially important in plural societies where ‘cultural communities’ are endowed with party organisations, religious charities and communalistic associations.

Lebanon’s changing political economy during and after the Civil War, therefore, underpinned the shift from petty-za’imism to bricks-and-mortar clientelism as demonstrated in previous chapters. The creation of ad-hoc government agencies, the development of non-state welfare sectors and the appropriation of communal charities by the ‘extended’ party in postwar Lebanon, therefore, consolidated the confession as the avenue for redistribution as opposed to social classes and income groups (Salti and Chaaban, 2010).

The geographic distribution of party-based welfare services provides evidence of the confessional and, thus, territorial ‘specialisation’ of ‘extended’ parties and demonstrates the cross-class nature of their constituencies. In metropolitan Beirut, for instance, an average Almustaqbal institution is located in areas that are 53% Sunni on average with 49% upper-
middle-income households; 33% lower-middle-income and only 15.4% poor households whereas Hezbollah welfare agencies are located in 77% Shiite-majority areas with, on average, 30% upper-middle-income households, 25% lower-middle-income households and 39% poor households (Cammett and Issar, 2010). In fact, the two parties’ distribution of welfare services reflects intra-communal dynamics as well as the parties’ distinct mobilisational strategies. Almustaqbal, for instance, is more likely to provide for a broader cross-confessional clientele for electoral considerations. Hezbollah, on the other hand, targets an overwhelmingly Shiite clientele even in areas with little apparent electoral return reflecting two germane factors in contemporary Shiite politics. First, the historical legacy of sectarian underrepresentation, dispossession and marginalisation compels Hezbollah to prioritise in-group mobilisation in an introvert capacity-building mentality. Second, Hezbollah’s allocation of welfare services reflects intra-communal competition between Hezbollah and AMAL whereas Almustaqbal faced little, if any, challenge to its confession-wide claim to za’imship.

Bricks-and-mortar clientelism, therefore, highlights an important aspect of the partisan domain in contemporary Lebanon. The ‘extended’ party institutionalises the supremacy of identity politics over the class-struggle discourse through its representation of confessionally-defined cross-class constituencies. Hezbollah is a compelling example: an ‘extended’ party which has simultaneously represented the ‘poor and dispossessed’, the middle class and the bourgeoisie (Chit, 2009a). The notions of struggle and resistance framed within a Shiite ontology, therefore, underpin the party’s cross-class appeal.

It must be noted, however, that bricks-and-mortar clientelism in postwar Lebanon has revived the interplay between party politics, the politics of patronage and the parochial interests of notables. Although the blurred distinction between entrepreneurship and statesmanship has been discussed in Chapter Seven, the discussion presented in the following section examines the implications of bricks-and-mortar clientelism on political parties.

8.1.2 Patronage Parties and Party Patrons
The discussion so far indicates that political parties in contemporary Lebanon can be categorised as ‘patronage-parties’ – parties which rely more heavily on patronage than ideology to attract and retain activists, rally supporters and mobilise voters. It must be noted that political aspirants and office-seekers in patronage-parties can be distinguished into two categories: those motivated by ideology (party-partisans) and those motivated by self-interest (party-patrons). The relationship between patronage-parties and party-patrons, however, is precarious at best. Centralised parties may force party-patrons to set aside rivalries and competition, emphasise the public-goods aspect of the party and pursue constituency-patronage strategies. Nonetheless, if able, party-patrons will focus on the private-goods aspect of their
parties, pursue individual patronage strategies and expand their own following in pursuit of self-interest (Geddes, 1994; Pappas, 2009). In either case, however, patronage-parties rely heavily on old patronage networks and build new ones. Its ranks will, therefore, include ‘old regime insiders’ as evidenced by AMAL’s co-option of such ‘political families’ of the El-Zein, Osseiran and El-Khalil variety whose *za’imships* pre-date the movement itself.

Moreover, it has been demonstrated in previous chapters that within the context of Lebanon’s patronage democracy, patronage-parties are more likely to be elected and, thus, gain access to the spoils of public office in a self-perpetuating cycle breakable only by Civil War. This explains the persistent failure of non-clientelist countervailing forces of the Marxist, nationalist and, even, fascist variants (Khalaf, 1977; Eisenstadt and Roniger, 1984). Parties’ reliance on patronage and the salience of party-patrons pursuing self interests and political careers, however, pose a serious challenge to discipline and coherence within the patronage-parties. It is empirically proven that patronage-parties’ reliance on patronage creates strong centrifugal forces within the party and becomes ammunition for intra-partisan rivalries and in-fighting. As a result, party cohesion is lost and defections are not uncommon (Morgenthau, 1964:337; Warner, 1997:536).

In postwar Lebanon, the opportunity cost of patronage to party cohesion is evident in the size and impact of defections within AMAL, the PSP, the Karameh family and others. AMAL, for instance, has struggled with the defection of such party-patrons as Mohammed Abdelhamid Baydoun in recent years. Similarly, schisms within the Karameh family created centrifugal forces within the Tripolitan family which reflected on national politics as evidenced by the dispute between the Karameh cousins – Faisal and Ahmad. The schism, which contributed to the six-month delay in the formation of the Mikati cabinet, is a demonstrative example of the opportunity costs of patronage on political parties and bloc. On the one hand, a seemingly-trivial familial dispute between the two branches of the Karameh family resulted in a political impasse on a national level. More importantly, however, it is demonstrative of the parochial nature of *za’imist* politics in Lebanon.

Cohesion and discipline in Lebanon’s patronage-parties, therefore, has rested more on the cohesive functions of ‘political families’, charismatic leaders and, crucially, parties’ confession-wide appeal than on bylaws. In other words, parties like AMAL mitigated the damaging effects of party-patrons’ defections by stressing the centrality of charismatic leaders and sectarian fervour as demonstrated in the following section.

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84 For more on this particular incident, for example, refer to Al-Samad (2011) and Al-Akhbar (2011c).
8.2 Family, Confession and Charisma: Party Politics and Political Mobilisation in Contemporary Lebanon

It has been demonstrated in previous chapters that Lebanese politicians have traditionally not been able to transcend their petty feuds and grapple with nation-wide socioeconomic and foreign policy issues. Politicians’ followers, on the other hand, pledged allegiance to the zu’tama not to their programmes. Lebanon, therefore, was not dominated by partisans of the Antoin Saadeh and Mustafa El-Aris variety but by ‘political families’ of the Salam, Jumblatt, Eddé, Gemayel and the Karameh variety (Khalaf, 1968; 1977).

As a result, two germane characteristics underpinned political life in pre-war Lebanon: political familialism and the intercessory functions of ‘middlemen’ (Khuri, 1972; Makhoul and Harrison, 2004). Although pre-war political families and their pseudo-partisan organisations withered away during the Civil War, wartime socio-political order revitalised the confession and the family and, thus, prevented a social revolution (Abbas, 2005). Political mobilisation has been largely based on ‘biological conscription’ despite the abundance of political parties in postwar Lebanon: party loyalists are born into the party’s support base by virtue of the interconnection between family, village, confession and locality (Ashti, 1997). This is evident across the political and confessional spectrum in contemporary Lebanon although the relationship between ‘family’ and ‘party’ differs from one party to another.

In analysing the confessional paradigm and political economy in Lebanon, it is obvious that the family plays a pivotal role in mobilisation in an electoral system which ties individuals to their ancestral hometowns irrespective of their residence. Electoral contestations are, thus, a showdown between rival families and patronymic groups rather than an informed and civil exercise of democratic prerogatives (Verdeil, 2005; 2007; Maghrabi, 2008; Muhsin, 2010).

The Inseparable Connection between the Gemayels and the Kataeb

As an example, for instance, the Kataeb party demonstrates that ‘the family’ plays a pivotal role not only in parties’ mobilisational strategies but also in mitigating the effects of exclusion and intra-partisan schisms. The schism the party witnessed in the 1990s was a result not of ideological disagreement but of disagreement over the role of the Gemayel family vis-à-vis the more accommodative leadership of Karim Pakradouni. The Gemayels’ marginalisation by Pakradouni and the Syrian-sponsored postwar authority was mitigated by the family’s support base amongst the diaspora (Almughtarib, 2011a). Whether the Gemayels are a ‘partisan family’ or the Kataeb is a ‘family party’ is a futile debate. However, the inseparable connection between the two resulted in the party’s ‘return’ to its ‘rightful leaders’ in 2005 to use the expression of Kataeb veteran, Sejaan Qazzi (Shokr, 2009).
Amine Gemayel’s reinstatement as leader of the Kataeb allowed the party’s ‘rightful leaders’ to introduce young-generation Gemayels to top positions in the party. Amine’s 33-year-old son, Pierre, was appointed secretary-general of the Council of Regional Offices (majlis al-aqālīm), for instance. Pierre’s new position, it was hoped, would introduce Amine’s heir-apparent to loyalists throughout the country. Following his assassination in 2006, Pierre was replaced by Amine’s son-in-law, Michel Maktaff (Shokr, 2009). In 2009, the Kataeb nominated Amine’s 29-year-old son, Samy, and Bachir Gemayel’s 27-year-old son, Nadim, on the party’s electoral lists in Metn and Achrafiyeh districts respectively. Nadim also served as Kataeb Vice-President in Achrafiyeh.

The inseparableness of the connection between the Gemayels as a political family and the Kataeb as an ‘extended’ confessional party demonstrates that Kataeb loyalists are, more or less, loyal not to a particular ideology but to the ‘political family’ and, crucially, to the ‘spiritual family’ which the confession claims to represent – *i.e.* the Christian and, particularly, Maronite confession.

**AMAL and its Neo-Feudal Za‘imist Families**

The Kataeb is no exception in terms of the relationship between ‘political families’, ‘spiritual families’ and ‘extended’ parties. AMAL, for instance, presents a different model. Despite the movement’s professed enmity towards ‘political feudalism’, AMAL has co-opted representatives of neo-feudal ‘political families’ with a traditional claim to za‘imship. This is evidenced by the role of such families as the Osseirans, El-Zeins, Bazzis and Baydouns as centrifugal forces within the party’s leadership. Co-opting established za‘ama into the movement’s leadership served two crucial functions: firstly, it allowed neo-feudalists to survive and consolidate their za‘imship over their respective localities in spite of the Civil War; and, secondly, it allowed AMAL to expand its za‘imship over the entire confession. AMAL’s heavy reliance on patronage, however, resulted in damaging schisms and, crucially, the total lack of party discipline.

**Mobilising the Sunnis: Almustaqbal and the Federation of Beirut Family Associations**

It must be noted that ‘political familialism’ is not only a phenomenon characteristic of pre-war parties and wartime militias-turned-parties. In fact, Almustaqbal is an interesting example insofar as it ‘created’ political familialism in its leadership (represented by the Hariris) and reinforced the role of ‘the family’ in the political mobilisation of urban Sunnis.

In pursuit of reinforcing ‘political familialism’ as a mobilisational strategy, Hariri supported the revival of a pre-war initiative to establish the Federation of Beirut Family Associations (FBFA) in 1998. The federation acted as a meeting place for several ‘family associations’
established in the early-twentieth century with the aim of consolidating the unity and affluence of Beirut’s major Sunni families.

Members of these ‘prominent families’, it must be noted, are traditionally associated with middle-class and petty-bourgeois vocations. The FBFA, therefore, pledged allegiance to Almustaqbal and was instrumental in such turbulent moments in Hariri’s political career. The FBFA, for instance, expressed strong support for Rafic Hariri in his standoff with President Lahoud in 2004; pledged allegiance to Saad Hariri following his father’s assassination and mobilised against Syria in 2005. The Federation also acted as a forum through which representatives of prominent Sunni families ‘socialised’ with Almustaqbal and pro-Hariri deputies including MPs Bahiya Hariri, Mohammed Qabbani, Ammar Houri, and Mohammed-Amine Itani, Imad Hout and Tammam Salam (Al-Liwa, 2010; Almustaqbal, 2010).

The relationship between Almustaqbal and FBFA was mutually-beneficial. For Hariri, the FBFA secured the support of Beirut’s Sunnis and mobilised entire patronymic groups in critical electoral contestations and political rallies. In return, Almustaqbal guaranteed affluent Sunni businessmen from these ‘prominent families’ access to state bureaucracies, the municipal council and, thus, lucrative business opportunities. Bankers and entrepreneurs from such families as the Chebaros, Sinnos and Itanis, therefore, alternated between membership of the FBFA’s Executive Council and membership of the Beirut Municipal Council (BMC) and ad-hoc government agencies.

It can be argued, therefore, that the za‘imship of the Sunni confession in the postwar era has not only revived the role of ‘political families’ in leadership positions but also revived ancient myths of ‘prominent Beiruti families’ in an attempt to regain access to the spoils of public office and the wealth and prestige associated with the postwar economy. In fact, family associations constituting the FBFA replaced the individual family qabādāyāt which characterised the patronage networks of pre-war Sunni zu‘ama in the late-1960s.

The Free Patriotic Movement: Inventing a Political Family?
Paradoxically, ‘political familialism’ has penetrated postwar parties whose very legitimacy rests on their ‘reformist’ appeal and their staunch criticism of ‘political families’. Michel Aoun’s FPM, for instance, has traditionally criticised the Gemayels for the familialism of their political appeal. Nonetheless, Aoun, has elevated a number of relatives and in-laws in prominent positions within the FPM as well as in government. The rise of party-patrons of the Alain Aoun and Gebran Bassil variety, for instance, indicates that the FPM may indeed be ‘inventing’ a political family centred around its charismatic leader.
8.2.1 Political Mobilisation and the Revival of the Qabaḍāy and the Shabāb

Postwar parties’ reliance on ‘political families’ and leaders’ charisma for mobilisational purposes, however, is only one aspect of party politics in contemporary Lebanon. The key to understand the relationship between ‘extended’ parties and their followers lies not in the leadership but in the hierarchical networks which emphasise the role of middlemen and middle-level patrons in linking parties with their followers.

Since the late-Middle Ages, middlemen interceding between ‘the people’ and ‘the authorities’ or the za‘im have been referred to as qabaḍāyāt – a class of middlemen whose function in Lebanese political history is often romanticised. Although urban legends acknowledge that qabaḍāyāt often engaged in illegal activities, these middlemen are revered for their honourable character and the services they perform for their clients especially in defending communities from the excesses of the Ottoman and French authorities. Moreover, qabaḍāyāt in turn-of-the-century Beirut were seen as ‘confessional champions’ who defended their communities’ from the advances of the sectarian other in contrast to bourgeois-notables consumed in their self-interests (Johnson, 1977:212; 1986; Denoeux, 1993:78).

Johnson (1977) distinguishes between three major types of qabaḍāyāt in modern Beirut: quarter bosses whose authority extends over territorially-defined localities; family qabaḍāyāt whose influence includes entire patronymic groups; and qabaḍāyāt with an appeal amongst Beirut’s politically-disenfranchised rural migrants.

Traditionally, urban qabaḍāyāt are locals of humble background engaged in modest occupations and trades: they were shop-keepers, taxi-drivers, port workers, contractors and bodyguards. The wealthier qabaḍāyāt who owed their riches to the za‘im’s financial assistance and political cover are often referred to as rayes (chief). Qabaḍāyāt, therefore, were ‘from the people’ and, thus, played a dual function. On the one hand, they recruited supporters, organised political rallies and, during elections, acted as mafātīḥ intikhābiya (election keys). On the other hand, they conveyed clients’ requests for wasta or services and organised clients’ access to largess. Furthermore, at times of crisis, qabaḍāyāt played an important role in recruiting and organising armed bands of young men (shabāb) to impose the za‘im’s will (Johnson, 1977; 1986; Eisenstadt and Roniger, 1984; Denoeux, 1993).

In the country, on the other hand, middlemen are traditionally middle-aged members of a prominent family and, thus, enjoy social status amongst villagers. They are, therefore, referred to as wujaha (notables). In addition to the usual roles ascribed to the qabaḍāy, a rural wajih links villagers and city-based zu’ama (Jabbra and Jabbra, 1978; Makhoul and Harrison, 2004).
Throughout its modern history, the middlemanship of *qabaḍāyāt* and *wujaha* has underpinned the relationship between the layman, the *za’im* and, thus, the state. Middlemen have, therefore, been eager and encouraged to run for low-level government positions including municipal and mayoral so as to gain the bureaucratic capacity to serve their clients and, crucially, increase their value to *zu’ama*. Although the romanticised *qabaḍāy* of the Ibrahim Qlailat, Ahmad Arnaqout, Farouk Al-Moukaddem, Hassan Al-Yatim and Hashim Itani variety is no longer as ubiquitous as they were in the early-to-mid-twentieth century, postwar political parties continue to depend on middlemen for mobilisational purposes. Contemporary forms of middlemanship, however, are more in touch with modern technology and institutional civil-society forms of organisation as demonstrated in the following section.

8.2.1.1 Contemporary Forms of Middlemanship
It must be noted that postwar ‘extended’ parties have relied on varying forms of middlemanship ranging from the wartime quarter bosses of the AMAL rank-and-file to the rural *wujaha* of the PSP. Other parties, however, rely on ‘modern’ forms of middlemanship which blur the distinction between the party and civil-society domains. Almustaqbal, for instance, has relied on the FBFA as an institutional form of the family *qabaḍāy*. The mushrooming of civil society associations in the 1990s, however, resulted in the emergence of a class of NGO activists from the middle class youth (Karam, 2005; 2006) whose mobilisation and social capital proved to be an important asset for political parties. Equipped with experience and technical skills acquired through activism, *shabāb* loyal to the LF and the FPM, for instance, were at the heart of the struggle against Syrian tutelage. These *shabāb* played an important role, alongside Almustaqbal’s ‘traditional’ *shabāb*, in mobilising for the March-14 rally and the tent-city (Freedom Camp) which protested Syrian tutelage (Chemaly, 2009).

Noteworthy, the mobilisational strategies of activists in 2005 were not confined to the traditional tactics ascribed to the *qabaḍāyāt* and the *shabāb*: they roamed the city flying partisan flags and blasting their anthems; others directed crowds to Martyr’s Square and distributed anti-Syria and pro-sovereignty memorabilia. Crucially, technologically-savvy *shabāb* blogged and developed audiovisual material to mobilise protesters and rally international support. Despite this seeming civility, however, the *shabāb*’s partisan allegiances manifest themselves in the ‘cantonisation’ of protesters into distinguishable groups in Martyr’s Square where slogans, flags and chants were noticeably partisan (Chemaly, 2009:92).

Similarly, mobilisation for and dynamics within the tent-city erected by partisans of Hezbollah, AMAL and the FPM in December 2006 reflected the blurred distinction between the political party domain and protest/social movements. The tent-city capitalised on unionist action preceding the July War as well as social movements including *Samidun* – a grassroots
initiative providing support for refugees displaced during the war. Both initiatives developed into a protest movement opposing Siniora’s socioeconomic policies and its use of postwar aid to intimidate opponents and expand Almustaqbal’s clientage. Partisan activists subtly transformed the movement into a show of support for the March-8 alliance leading up to the eighteen-month-long sit-in.

It is evident, therefore, that postwar political parties continue to depend on qabaḍāyāt and shabāb – albeit in new forms which respond to and reflect the substantial developments in education and traditional and social media in the postwar era. The ‘traditional’ image of the thug-like shabāb, for instance, has been replaced with the image of technologically-savvy bloggers and hippie-style partisan activists. In other instances, the likes of prominent family qabaḍāy, Hisham Itani, have been replaced by institutionalised civil-society-like family associations stressing kinship ties and serving to connect patronymic groups with established confessional zu’ama and parties. In other words, political parties in contemporary Lebanon rely on modern and not-so-modern forms of middlemanship which serve communal, clientelistic and mobilisational functions akin to their pre-war antecedents – hence, reflecting parties’ ability to transform their mobilisational strategies from individualistic to systematised forms in response to domestic and global developments.

8.2.1.2 Qabaḍāyāt, Shabāb and the Symbolic use of Violence
Alongside their mobilisational functions at times of elections, political impasses and in everyday life, qabaḍāyāt and shabāb have traditionally played an active role in sparking and containing ‘flashpoints’ of violence aimed at radicalising and, thus, rallying clients around the zu’ama. This strategic use of violence is, it can be argued, zu’ama’s way of replacing clientelistic and rentier redistribution with sectarianism in the poorer and more needy quarters and informal settlements. Although the symbolic use of violence for mobilisational purposes receded in the 1990s, it has become more omnipresent since the assassination of Rafic Hariri, the withdrawal of Syrian troops from Lebanon and, crucially, the heightened Sunni-Shiite tensions in the aftermath of the events of May 7, 2008 which left Shiite gunmen with a perceived sense of superiority over their Sunni counterparts. Almustaqbal and other Sunni political actors have, on the other hand, attempted to use limited and symbolic use of violence to regain legitimacy amongst Sunnis following their blowing defeat and retain their following vis-à-vis militant Islamists (Gresh 2008; Itani, 2008; Abdel-Latif, 2008; ICG, 2010).

In light of heightened sectarian (Sunni-Shiite) tensions concurring with partisan rivalries (AMAL, Hezbollah and Almustaqbal), local strongmen and shabāb regained their role in escalating as well as diffusing violence for tactical mobilisational purposes. Armed clashes between shabāb loyal to March-8 and March-14 in the impoverished, densely-populated and
underserved neighbourhoods of Bab El-Tebbaneh and Jabal Muhsin in Tripoli or Tariq Jdideh in Beirut are demonstrative of the mobilisational function of limited violence. Clashes in the underserviced Beirut quarters of Aïcha Bakkar in 2009 and Bourj Abi-Haydar in 2010, for instance, provide empirical evidence of political parties’ role in escalating violence for political purposes with the help of strongmen and militant shabāb in their rivalries over such politically-sensitive issues as the Special Tribunal for Lebanon (STL), relations with Syria and foreign policy in the aftermath of the July War. Violence is also tactically-used for electoral purposes by emphasising the us-versus-them paradigm in the run-up to crucial electoral contestations\(^5\).

The seemingly-accidental killing of a Sunni-Kurdish woman, Zeina Al-Miri, by AMAL loyalists sparked violent clashes in Aïcha Bakkar, a quarter on a ‘fault line’ between pro-Hariri Sunni-majority quarters and pro-AMAL mixed quarters. Aïcha Bakkar is also home to the headquarters of Jama’a Islamiyya and the official Sunni religious establishment, Dar Al-Fatwa. Pro-Hariri shabāb organised a symbolic funeral for Al-Miri whose coffin was wrapped in a Saudi-like ‘Islamic’ flag emblematic of the Sunni confession and an indication of its za‘im’s geostrategic allegiance. The funeral escalated into a shoot-out between the rival shabāb and qabāḍāyāt loyal to AMAL summoned gunmen from the neighbouring quarters of ḥayy Lijja and Ain Mraiseh while Almustaqbal strongmen called upon Jama’a Islamiyya for backup.

According to local shabāb who participated in the shoot-out, the crisis was diffused only when Saad Hariri and Nabih Berri, acting as chieftains, ‘made a few phone calls’ asking strongmen to ‘diffuse the crisis’, ‘establish law and order’ and ‘allow the army safe passage’. It was empirically evident, however, that the battles exacerbated sectarian tensions and, thus, rallied Sunnis around Almustaqbal and mufti Mohammed Rachid Qabbani and Shiites around Hezbollah-AMAL. In fact, promising to “uphold the rights of the Sunni confession” and “avenge the murder of Sunnis and the desecration of their sanctity”, the mufti played a direct role in radicalising and mobilising Sunni youth\(^6\).

The events of Bourj Abi-Haydar, on the other hand, took place between Hezbollah gunmen and loyalists of its Sunni/Sufi ally, the Association of Charitable Projects (Al-Ahbash). It is believed that the clashes were an unintended result of ‘a quarrel’ between local qabāḍāyāt. Nonetheless, given the heightened Sunni-Shiite sensitivities in recent years, the ‘quarrel’ quickly spilled over into other neighbourhoods of the Sunni-Shiite ‘frontline’ including Al-Basta Al-Fawqa and Ras El-Nabe’. Qabāḍāyāt loyal to both parties were summoned to diffuse the crisis before it tarnished the reputation of both parties and destabilised their alliance\(^7\).

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\(^{5}\) Observations made by author and anecdotral data collected in 2009/2010.

\(^{6}\) Observations made by author and anecdotal data collected in 2009.

\(^{7}\) Anecdotal data collected in 2010/2011.
It is evident from events such as Aïcha Bakkar, therefore, that political parties are willing to and capable of initiating violence on a limited scale in order to reinforce the ‘us-versus-them’ paradigm and, thus, rally supporters. *Shabāb*, therefore, are crucial insofar as they instigate and perpetuate violence against ‘the other’ whereas *qabadāyāt* ‘control’ violence summoning fighters when they are needed and ‘demobilising’ the *shabāb* before stand-offs spiral out of control and threaten the political regime itself. Party officers and religious leaders are then called into action to translate heightened antagonisms into partisan gains. Thus, while such incidents are instigated by political parties to rally support, they are also later controlled by the same political parties to show their controlling power, thus, using such intermediaries as a tool to substantiate their power.

**8.2.1.3 Christian Shabāb and Intra-Confessional Rivalries**

The mobilisational role of *shabāb* in postwar Lebanon has not been confined to inter-communal relations nor has their role in instigating strategic violence been confined to armed clashes with ‘the other’. In reality, *shabāb* loyal to Christian parties in contemporary Lebanon have played an instrumental role in intra-Christian rivalries especially between the LF and the FPM. The rivalry between the two parties, it must be noted, has often focused on the latter’s favourable position towards Hezbollah. Both parties have, therefore, competed over who is more representative of the Christians and more capable of defending their existence and expanding their gains.

In light of this rivalry, radicalised pro-LF *shabāb* have often incited anti-Muslim and anti-Shiite sentiments amongst Christian youth in an attempt to boost Samir Geagea’s popularity as the sole defender of Lebanon’s Christians and the ‘real face’ of the ‘Christian Resistance’ *vis-à-vis* Aoun who is depicted as a traitor and accused of ‘coalescing with the enemy’*. The role of pro-LF *shabāb* in electoral mobilisation during the 2010 municipal/mayoral elections is a good example. Pro-LF *shabāb* mobilised voters by using such slogans as ‘resisting the Islamist overtake’ and ‘reviving the Christian Resistance’ in local elections in neighbourhoods on the Shiite-Christian ‘frontline’, for instance.*

Beyond elections, the role of *shabāb* in the intra-Christian rivalry takes on a more militant form. Marian rosaries with photos of Hezbollah Secretary-General, Hassan Nasrallah, and Michel Aoun distributed by pro-FPM *shabāb* in a tokenistic celebration of the Hezbollah-FPM alliance, for instance, were considered an ‘act of sacrilege’ by pro-LF *shabāb*. It must be noted that it is not uncommon for partisan figures to be depicted on such religious items as rosaries.*

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89 Photographically-documented observations. Appendix 4: Figures 7–8.
90 Informal conversations and observations made by author. 2008; 2009.
More recently, LF shabāb claiming to ‘defend the faith’ mobilised against a bargain store, Big Sale, owned by Shiite entrepreneur Ali Fakih in Furn El-Chebak. The shabāb accused the shop of offending Christianity by selling Halloween-themed beach sandals depicting crosses, churches and tombstones. The shop which closed down in September 2011 in fear of reprisal was sprayed with graffiti representing cedar trees and crosses symbolic of right-wing parties alongside a mural of Bachir Gemayel and slogans such as ‘The Christian Resistance shall prevail’. Alongside acts of reprisal on the ground, technologically-savvy shabāb produced audiovisual material inflating the flimsy affair and priding the LF for ‘avenging Christianity’ in an implicit condemnation of ‘sell-outs’; i.e. the FPM (LFTV, 2011; MTV, 2011).

Although less eager to incite violence and, certainly, less keen on Islamophobic rhetoric, pro-FPM shabāb have applied similar tactics to discredit the LF in universities frequented by Christian students. In 2010, for instance, student union members loyal to FPM in a number of universities accused the LF-affiliated TV channel, MTV, of sacrilege for airing a Lebanonised version of a Lady Gaga Christmas-themed song with sexual innuendos over the 2009/2010 festive season.

The case of LF and FPM shabāb demonstrates the role of educated middle-class youth in intra-confessional partisan rivalries. Crucially, the shabāb in the case of both parties perform tactical and mobilisational tasks on the ground as well as through traditional and social media in order to portray their zu‘ama as ‘truly Christian’ and, thus, more representative of Christian’s frustrations (al-‘iḥbāṭ al-masīḥī) and concerns (al-hawājis al-masīhiya). In achieving this, the shabāb inflate the sentiments of fear and numerical decline which dominate political discourse among Christians in postwar Lebanon. For the FPM, online and student activism is a tactical strategy to undercut the LF by questioning its Christian credentials. Pro-LF shabāb, on the other hand, perform the crucial function of inciting anti-Muslim sentiments through limited acts of violence and more subtle media activism in order to undermine the popularity of the Hezbollah-allied FPM.

8.3 HezbolLah: Lebanon’s Only Political Party? – A Micro-Level Case in Hybrid Modernities

The discussion presented so far has demonstrated the interplay between sectarianism and the parochial self interests of neo-zu‘ama within the context of party politics in postwar Lebanon. In light of this discussion, it is evident that postwar political parties capitalised on and revitalised the role of ‘political families’, leaders’ charisma and sectarian sentiments in a variety of ways and to varying degrees in the context of intra- and inter-communal partisan

91 Informal conversations and observations made by author. 2009/2010.
mobilisation. Furthermore, political parties in contemporary Lebanon have been conspicuously unable to mobilise supporters without the use of direct and indirect forms of clientelism. Accordingly, postwar political parties have been unable to or uninterested in producing social change. Instead, ‘extended’ parties focus on consolidating the political dominance of the ruling elite. One postwar political party which stands out, however, is Hezbollah, which presents a unique case in understanding the micro-level dynamics of the confessional paradigm.

Hezbollah has demonstrated unmatched ability to mobilise the youth and engage with a wide segment of a generation disenchanted with politics. Hezbollah’s political performance in the postwar era is significant for various reasons. Firstly, it has proven remarkably capable of bringing the amorphous family blocs, clerical authorities and militant cells under the central command of the party. Secondly, it has been outstandingly vigilant in preventing the emergence of centrifugal forces undermining party discipline and cohesion despite the party’s reliance on patronage. Thirdly, although Hezbollah was the only political actor to retain its weapons following the demobilisation of militias in 1991, it has been most successful in making the transition from militia to political party (Chartouni-Dubarry, 1996).

Crucially, however, Hezbollah is the only party in postwar Lebanon which has made an attempt at producing social change. In other words, Hezbollah is the only ‘extended’ party in contemporary Lebanon which does not limit its role to redistribution. In fact, Hezbollah considers its economic as well as its military functions part of a greater ‘historical project’ which entails the articulation and dissemination of a coherent *modus vivendi*. It would, therefore, be a pure security-minded conjecture to reduce Hezbollah to a terrorist organisation or an extremist group representing the interests of Iran. Instead, the party can only be understood as a social movement with a coherent project aimed at producing social change through dynamic and bidirectional processes facilitated by Hezbollah’s monolithic non-state welfare sector, civil society and media.

8.3.1 The Party of the *Ummah* versus the *Ummah* of the Party
Hezbollah or the ‘Party of God’ is a sophisticated phenomenon which transcends the politics of mere clientelism and terrorism. The party, as will be argued in the remainder of this chapter, is an organisational embodiment of the *maṭḥūm* (worldview) developed and adopted by a coterie of junior mujtahids educated, politicised and radicalised in the seminaries of Najaf and Qom under the instruction of revolutionary clerics of the Muhsin Al-Hakim, Muhammad Baqir as-Sadr and Imam Ruhullah Khomeini variety (Norton, 1987:102; Pintak, 1988:255; Carre, 1991; Harik, 1994; 2004; Norton, 1998; Alagha, 2006; Louër, 2008:204; Mervin, 2008:79).
For these mujtahids, the banning of *Hizb ad-Da’wa* in Iraq provided a chance to contemplate the reasons behind the party’s failures, fine-tune its ideological and organisational message and develop an alternative model. It must be noted that the failure of *Hizb ad-Da’wa* was not blamed on deficiencies in its leadership or its revolutionary ideology but on its organisational structure. To survive Iraq’s brutal dictatorship, the party emphasised secrecy and clandestine networks. This rendered the party “too isolated from the masses” for partisans of the Khomeinist school of revolutionary Shi’ism (AbuKhalil, 1991). For such junior mujtahids as shaykh Ali Kourani (1406H:172), the party had become too timid in its fight against the oppressor. For shaykh Hussein Kourani, the political methods of such revolutionary ideologues and eminent scholars as Muhammad Baqir as-Sadr and Aboul-Hassan Al-Kho’i “lacked the vision and fine touches” of Imam Khomeini’s “more developed and more comprehensive” path (*khat al-imam al-khomeini*).92

The following section, hence, discusses Hezbollah’s organisational structure and the *modus vivendi* articulated by its mujtahids and disseminated by party officers in an attempt to extend the discussion on the confessional paradigm and political economy of Lebanon.

### 8.3.2 Hezbollah’s Islamo-Leninist Organisation

It is true that Lebanese scholars influenced by the revolutionary message of such ideologues as Imam Khomeini in the 1970s theorised alternative forms of organisation. Sayyid Mohammad Hussain Fadlallah, who influenced the earliest generation of Hezbollah ulema, argued that clerics dedicated to revolution and social change must shift their focus from “the party of the ummah” to the “ummah of the party” (in AbuKhalil, 1991). In other words, the party of the revolutionary vanguard must penetrate society in order to shape social change although there was no attempt to popularise the production of social change beyond the self-righteous elite circles. In Fadlallah’s political theology, social change emanates from and is articulated and disseminated by the ulema as ‘heirs of the prophets’. The ulema are, therefore, represented in an elected *Shura* Council akin to the Politburo of the Communist Party. Social change, thus, flows in a top-down fashion in an Islamo-Leninist form of democratic centralism based on a critical revision of *Hizb ad-Da’wa*’s experience. Hezbollah, therefore, is capitalised and singularised: it is commonly referred to as the Party (*al-hizb*) much like communist parties.

Typically, the party is driven by self-righteousness and an obligation; not social mood and public opinion. Hezbollah mujtahids in the 1980s, for instance, paid little attention to AMAL’s popular appeal amongst the Shi’a. Instead, the ‘Party of God’ expanded its appeal amongst the ulema and embarked on a top-down mission to establish a presence amongst Shiites. The

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92 Audio recordings obtained by the author. Lectures were delivered in the context of a debate over the issue of *vilayat-i faqih* between Kourani and Fadlallah.
obligation to bring about social change in Hezbollah’s ideology was eloquently articulated by Shaykh Ragheb Harb – a militant mujtahid and adherent of the Khomeinist line:

The muqawama (Resistance) has changed the world around it and altered the balance of power. But the most important change it has brought about affected its own people – mujtama’ al-muqawama (the Resistance society). It has brought about ḥāla islāmiyya without which the muqawama is meaningless.

8.3.2.1 The Ulema in the Hezbollah Ideology
It must be noted that, despite the centrality of the ulema in the early phases of the Party’s development, a class of partisan officers from outside the ranks of the clergy developed. Although the militant mujtahids of Hezbollah layed the foundations for the associations and civil society which would constitute the social-movement aspect of Hezbollah in the postwar era as will be discussed later in this chapter, their role became confined to influencing social mood through their limited executive functions and abundant consultative roles (Harik, 1996).

The role of the ulema in producing and disseminating social change, it must be noted, is consistent with Shiite ontology as well as with the political history of Lebanon’s Shi’a. In other words, the centrality of the ulema in Hezbollah’s ideology capitalises on the role of the clergy in the struggle against feudalist-politicians, state negligence and deprivation and builds on the political thought of Sayyid Abdul-Hassain Sharafeddine, Sayyid Muhsin Al-Amine, Shaykh Muhammad Jawad Mughniya, Imam Moussa as-Sadr and others.

Echoing the relationship between the muqalid (immolator) and the marji’i taqlid (immolated) in theological matters, Hezbollah’s partisan organisation is based on an attachment of the Muslim masses to the leadership of the ulema who are ‘the most capable of leading the ummah towards Islam’. This, of course, is in not only in line with the pivotal role attributed to the clergy in Shiite Islam but also in accordance with Khomeinist political theology which dispels the notion of the confinement of the ulema to the realm of theology; opposes the helplessness instilled in Shiites and dismisses the theological school of political passivity (AbuKhalil, 1991).

Rooted in both religion and political history, therefore, this Khomeini-inspired, Fadlallah-directed revolutionary brand of political Shi’ism reinforced the centrality of the clergy in the struggle for emancipation and liberation. Accordingly, the ‘ālim represents his community in the party and vice versa. In other words, whereas social change flows in a top-down fashion the production of social change is influenced by society via the ‘ālim who is not only an expert in jurisprudence and theology but, also, embedded in the local community.

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93 Harb initiated projects including orphanages (mabarāt) and microcredit (bayt-māl al-muslimin), upholding principles of takāful ijtīmā’i (social solidarity) and ta’āḍud (collaboration) in response to invasion in 1978.
94 Transcript obtained by author.
Ironically, therefore, despite the party’s professed enmity towards communism, its organisational structure and theological ideology resembles Leninism as AbuKhalil (1991) demonstrates. In this organisational structure, the *ulema* are equivalent to the Marxist-Leninist elite: the interpretation of the sources of the ideology is restricted to them as is representation of the oppressed, exploited masses. Moreover, in the Hezbollah ideology, the Muslim masses cannot attain ‘Islamic consciousness’ without the *ulema* just as the toiling masses cannot attain ‘class consciousness’ without communist agitators.

The *ulema* are, therefore, the cornerstone of the party and a benchmark of its ability to penetrate society and disseminate social change. For *shaykh* Ali Kourani, for instance, the mere quantity of *ulema* affiliated with the party in society is important in itself because it contributes to the creation and promulgation of *al-ḥāla al-islāmiyya*. This Islamic milieu makes the party’s members *unlimited*. In other words, for Hezbollah, the entire *ummah* is a framework for partisan mobilisation in contrast to *ad-Da’wa* which viewed itself as a framework for political mobilisation *within* the *ummah* (AbuKhalil, 1991).

Accordingly, the party emphasises the role of religious education and strict moral training for its non-clerical cadres and rank-and-file (Qassem, 2002:93). Fadlallah even stressed that the education and training of partisan cadres must extend to include low-ranking clerics confined to such traditional roles as ritualistic recitations in *majālis ashura*96 (Deeb, 2005).

### 8.3.2.2 Resistance and Revolution in the Hezbollah Ideology

Before discussing Hezbollah’s strategies and mechanisms of political mobilisation and the production and promulgation of social change, however, it is important to highlight two aspects of Khomeini-inspired revolutionary Shi’ism. Firstly, it is important to note that Hezbollah’s ideology incorporates key features of class analysis. According to the Khomeinist worldview, the world is bifurcated between oppressed, downtrodden and exploited masses (*al-mustaḍ‘afūn*) and the arrogant, exploiting oppressors (*al-mustakbirūn*). This, Hezbollah argues, applies to international relations as well as to domestic political economy: oppressors include the imperialist forces of the world and their regional manifestation, Israel, as well as the rich and wealthy exploiting classes. Combined, their jockeying for power and wealth has led to subjugation and oppression throughout the world. The ‘oppressed of the world’, on the other hand, include the underserviced and exploited classes as well as occupied and colonised nations of the developing world. This, evidently, converges in the case of Lebanon’s Shi’a who suffer both socioeconomic deprivation and ‘global imperialism’ in the form of Israeli occupation (Norton, 1987; 1998).

96 Mourning gatherings which take place during *Ashura*.  

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The bifurcation of the world into oppressed and oppressor is in line with Shiite heritage and derives from the experience of Imam Hussayn in Shiite collective consciousness. Khomeini’s unorthodoxy, however, lies in his belief that justice and equality can be achieved through human efforts and revolution and that injustice, oppression and misery are not destined to continue while the Imam is in occultation. Adherents of the Khomeinist School conceptualise human experience in much the same way as they historicise the battle of Karbala: a struggle between modesty, piety, charity and arrogance, oppression.

8.4 HEZBOLLAH: THE METHODS AND STRATEGIES OF SOCIAL CHANGE
Hezbollah’s Islamo-Leninist structure and ‘revolutionary’ message, therefore, render the ‘Party of God’ more than just a neo-za’imist political actor. The Party, thus, is a ‘historical project’ which serves three mutually-dependent functions: (i) it is an ‘extended’ confessional party insofar as it performs redistributive roles within the confessional patronage democracy; (ii) it is a ‘hybrid modernity’ insofar as it reinterprets, authenticates and, therefore, modernises the Shiite-Islamic ontology; and, crucially, (iii) it is a ‘party’ in the Leninist sense insofar as it aims to bring about social change and ‘engineer’ society into an ‘ideal’ mujtama‘ al-mugāwama (Resistance society).

To comprehend its social-change functions, however, it is useful to conceptualise Hezbollah not merely as a political party but also as a social movement. In other words, the Party can be better understood as a form of goal-oriented collective action based on a web of connections which, collectively, fosters change; involves people and associations (agents) working together; implies a degree of organisation; and exploits various institutional, non-institutional and unconventional resources and platforms (Chazel, 1992; McAdam and Snow, 1997; Tarrow, 1998; Meyer and Tarrow, 1998; Snow, Soule and Kriesi, 2004; Karam, 2005). To conceptualise Hezbollah within social movements theory, however, is not an unorthodoxy: social-movement theorists have made similar arguments in relation to Islamist movements throughout the Middle East (Clark, 2004; Wiktorowicz, 2004).

It is important to distinguish between Hezbollah as three distinct yet overlapping entities: a social movement; a political party; and a military organisation. The first two are particularly relevant in the discussion presented in the remainder of this chapter as Hezbollah’s dual political-party and social-movement roles blur the fuzzy and permeable boundary between the political party, social movements and interest groups domains.

In distinguishing between Hezbollah as a party and Hezbollah as a social movement, it must be noted that social movements are conventionally viewed as extra-institutional forms of political action in contrast to institutionalised, partisan forms of organisation. In fact, theorists associate

Hezbollah, however, performs both roles simultaneously: the Party partakes in elections and has been represented in Parliament since 1992 and in the Cabinet since 2005; and, yet, it is a social movement which predates the reinstatement of multiparty democracy in the postwar era. More importantly, if the political sphere is defined within the rigid boundaries of political science – *i.e.* the realm of state-society relations – then, clearly, the web of connections, the agents of change (the *ulema*) and the *mafhūm* underpinning Hezbollah’s organisational structure and ontological message transcend the strict realm of politics. Moreover, Hezbollah (as a non-state actor) must be distinguished from interest groups which, by and large, mobilise in relation to state policy. As a social movement, however, Hezbollah extends into the private, communal and ethical spheres.

Hezbollah’s non-state sector, therefore, constitutes a social movement in that it demonstrates a degree of informality and communalism and, yet, exhibits a certain degree of institutionalism, discipline and organisation. In other words, it is episodic insofar as it is not regulated in a strict periodic fashion and operates with some degree of temporal continuity (McAdam et al, 2001:5). The Party, thus, performs a connective function coalescing a web of connections which constitute the social movement and, as such, constitutes the cohesive core of the counterculture.

### 8.4.1 Hezbollah’s Counterculture: *Mujtama‘ Al-Muqāwama*

Hezbollah’s evolution from a coterie of loosely-organised *mujtahids* to a sophisticated network of associations affiliated to the party and its cadres, therefore, symbolises the transformation of the movement from a personalistic solidarity network of clientelistic significance in the early-1980s to an inter-organisational movement with wider social meaning. As a result, Hezbollah’s *mafhūm* evolved into a ‘cognitive territory’ to use Eyerman and Jamison’s (1996) term – a new conceptual space that is filled by dynamic interactions between different groups and organisations. This cognitive praxis, however, was not a made-in-Iran product. In fact, it is precisely in the articulation and formulation of new thoughts and worldviews (the *mafhūm*) that a social movement such as Hezbollah defines itself in society as a significant movement carrying forward a ‘historical project’ aimed at ‘redefining history’.

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97 Goldstone (2003) advances the argument that social movements constitute an essential element of ‘normal politics’ in modern societies and that the boundary between the institutional (political parties) and non-institutional (social movements) domains is permeable at best. Goldstone further argues that social movement theorists have often lost sight of the essential complementarity between social protest and electoral politics in modern democracies.
To comprehend how social movements formulate, consolidate and disseminate a cognitive praxis, however, such concepts as ‘political domain’, ‘public sphere’ and ‘civil society’ must be defined more liberally. For the purpose of this study, therefore, ‘political domain’ will be taken to mean not only collective action in relation to the state but also practices and representations linked to the choice and realisation of public aims. Similarly, a Habermasian conceptualisation is applied to the concept of ‘public sphere’ defining it as a realm of critical relationships between society and the state as well as within society itself (Müller and Neveu, 2002). In other words, civil society is understood not only as the realm of organised interest groups and associations but also other levels of co-operation and informal networks embedded in the local community (Hann, 1992:161).

In light of this, it becomes evident that Hezbollah is the institutional constellation of what Eyerman and Jamison (1996) call a “significant [social] movement”: the Party redefines history, theology and the concepts of piety, resistance and sacrifice through an ‘authenticated’ *maḥdūm*. Hezbollah’s agents of change, on the other hand, are bearers of an ambitious historical project. In her study of Hezbollah-affiliated schools, for instance, Catherine Le Thomas (2010:224) demonstrates that Hezbollah is best understood as a “global mission” aimed at “installing an alternative society” with its own agenda, set of values and mobilisation agencies. Hezbollah, thus, constitutes the core of a counterculture with a distinct cognitive praxis. Hezbollah’s spiritual leaders, therefore, speak of *muğāwama* a cohesive ‘society’ of pious men and women who constitute not only a collective solidarity but, also, the core of a more comprehensive historical project which late Ayatollah Muhammad Hussein Fadlallah referred to as *al-ḥāla al-islāmiyya*.

Grand as the project may be, however, rational choice theorists contend that collective solidarity is an individual announcement of affiliation and connection with others in a shared behavioural and attitudinal value system. In the case of a social movement, the value system is a cognitive praxis which changes or evolves over the course of the movement’s lifetime:

In the first stage, the new collective identity is planted in the soil of pre-existing collective identities and, to the extent it is embedded within them, it has a better chance to flower. In the second stage, the collective identities associated with the movement have typically been uncoupled from the established roles of the aggrieved community, so participants are no longer, say, church members or students but movement activists. This transformation puts pressure on the SMOs to fashion new collective identities to induce participation. In the final stage, the collective identity becomes a public good (Friedman and McAdam, 1992:157).

In the case of Hezbollah, for instance, the shift from the first to the second stage and, partly, to the final stage is evident not only in the party’s political versatility in parliament as well as in
its position vis-à-vis Israel but also in its rhetoric and literature. A comparison between the Party’s first (1985) and second (2009) congresses demonstrates its transformation from a closed circle of ulema muqāwamun (resistant scholars) to the all-encompassing counterculture which, according to the party’s 2009 manifesto, is a namuzaj (model) of social and military struggle. This is also evident in Sayyid Hassan Nasrallah’s speeches in which he consistently addresses a wide audience of muqāwimun (resisters) who are not necessarily guerrilla fighters but ‘members’ of the Party’s extended ummah who support the Resistance and share its ethos.

8.4.2 Articulating Al-ḥāla Al-Islāmiyya
The increasingly comprehensive interpretation of mujtama‘ al-muqāwama and its fluidity can be attributed to the all-encompassing experience of al-ḥāla al-Islāmiyya which is not merely a conceptual idea articulated in Fadlallah’s thought nor does it exclusively refer to Hezbollah fighters. Instead, it has evolved into a lifestyle determining and encompassing every aspect of its members’ existence as well as defining the public sphere in which they exist. The expansion of Hezbollah’s welfare system is, thus, pivotal in disseminating and expanding al-ḥāla al-Islāmiyya as an all-encompassing modus vivendi. Indeed, it is when members of mujtama‘ al-muqāwama share the routine of everyday life and exist in a public sphere dominated by al-ḥāla al-Islāmiyya that a spiral of mutual determinations develops and exerts more and more influence on individual members’ personal choices. The development of peer groups comprising of comrade-like ikhwān (brothers), akhawāt (sisters) and hajjis (elders) explains the speed with which members of the ummah are socialised into the behavioural and attitudinal obligations of its cognitive praxis.

The Party’s ‘historical project’, therefore, entails an entire redefinition of history, theology and, thus, society. For Hezbollah deputy Secretary-General, the struggle is not about the question of the muqāwama and its weapons but about the question of “which Lebanon we want”. For shaykh Naim Qassem (2007), the resistance is not only a reaction to oppression and occupation, but a socio-historical project of liberation and resilience:

The problem is that people misunderstand the muqāwama. It is not a temporal reaction or a rootless outburst of emotions. It is a conscious articulation of our historical, political and religious heritage influenced by the experiences of those [resistance movements] which preceded us. Al-muqāwama is a comprehensive social experience involving military, cultural, political and media resistance. [...] We never wanted a muqāwama of the ‘fighting few’, but a muqāwama of the whole ummah. Only then is it sustainable; not temporal.

Al-ḥāla al-Islāmiyya, therefore, embraces a comprehensive understanding of muqāwama rooted in the intellectual tradition of such scholars as Fadlallah, Shamseddine and Khomeini.

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98 Donatella della Porta (1995) explores the concept of social movements and political subcultures in relation to left-wing anarcho-trade unionists in Italy and Germany.
Ayatollah Fadlallah (1997; 1998), for instance, defines *jihad* as a “sacrifice of one’s self or financial assets” to uphold the faith, resist oppression, tyranny and exploitation; and support the persecuted and the downtrodden. Ayatollah Shamseeddine (1998; 2001), on the other hand, argues that Islam is a social revolution, a constant movement and a renewal of mankind. The fight against injustice becomes an obligation and a religious duty – although not a *jihad*.

Theologians of *al-ḥāla al-islāmiyya*, thus, engaged in a process of ‘authenticating’ the paradigm of Karbala and the tragic martyrdom (*musība*) of Imam Hussayn drawing on the experiences of the revolutionary *ulema* of 1970s Iran. Such eminent *ulema* as Imam Khomeini had utilised the religious symbols of the Karbala paradigm to mobilise against the Shah transforming the tragedy into a positive ingredient for revolution. The Karbala paradigm was as versatile in Lebanon as it was in Iran: the Shah, the United States, Israel and Saddam Hussein were all equated with Yazid; the revolutionary regime, the masses, the fighters and the oppressed were equated with Hussayn. In doing this, the reinterpreted, idealised characters of the battle of Karbala become role models for piety, modesty resistance and sacrifice. Hussayn becomes a source of immolation for the pious man; Zaynab for the woman; and Hussayn’s sons for the youth (Aghaie, 2004; Deeb, 2005; 2006; Enayat, 2005; El-Husseini, 2008).

In short, a generation of revolutionary *ulema* proposed an ‘authenticated’ interpretation of Shiite collective consciousness proposing that Karbala can no longer be commemorated by spectacles of mourning, remorse and self-flagellation. Instead, history was reinterpreted giving new meaning to sacrifice, resistance, *takāful* and *jihad* as Fadlallah (in Deeb, 2005) proclaims:

> The slogans of Karbala are the slogans of life in its entirety [...] Living *Ashura* is standing against oppression. Such a stance should fill our hearts and minds each time we face the oppressors and arrogant powers, whether in Muslim countries or in the whole world. It is not living in a tragedy of tears and hitting ourselves with swords or chains [...] for swords should be raised against the enemy as we were taught by the Imam.

This (re)interpretation informs Hezbollah which defines itself as a perpetual struggle between exploited and exploiters; justice and injustice; occupied and occupier; modesty and arrogance; piety and corruption. Most remarkably, this cognitive praxis problematises the essentialist presuppositions of Lebanon’s founding fathers: Hezbollah’s Lebanon does not derive power from weakness and passivity but from resistance and resilience (Qassem, 2007).

### 8.4.2.1 Ashura as a Demonstration of the ‘Authenticated’ Cognitive Praxis

It has been argued so far that the Party’s cognitive praxis and ontological message is a hybrid of Shiite collective consciousness, Islamic values and ‘modern’ concerns. *Al-ḥāla al-islāmiyya*, thus, entails a bidirectional process whereby ‘Islam’ is modernised and modern society is ‘Islamised’. In other words, Shiite Islam is redefined by the modern, rational man whereas the
modern rational man is subjugated to an ‘authenticated’ Shiite-Islamic ontology. This dynamic and bidirectional process is evident in the annual commemoration of *Ashura* where ‘mourning’ is transformed into ‘resistance’ and ‘traditional’ introvert human experiences are reflected unto ‘modern’ society.

It must be noted, however, that *Ashura* underwent fundamental transformations inspired by the revolutionary ideals of Imam Moussa as-Sadr and ḥarakat al-Maḥrūmīn which predate the Party itself. Under as-Sadr’s influence, *Ashura* acquired a mobilisational function and became a vehicle for building communal solidarity and political consciousness. The transformation of the most important Shiite religious occasion from a ritual focused on mourning and lamentation to one highlighting Islamic activism and the values of resistance echoed similar transformations in the seminaries in Iraq and Iran where revolutionary *ulema* contributed to a new *Ashura* discourse (Norton, 1987:41; Aghaie, 2004; Norton, 2004; Enayat, 2005; Deeb, 2005; El-Husseini, 2008).

In other words, partisans of the reformist and revolutionary schools of political Shi’ism not only presented an alternative reinterpretation of history but also transformed ‘traditional’ rituals in order to reflect and articulate their authenticated onology. In Lebanon, this resulted in a schism between ritualistic commemorations and the Party’s regimented, rationalised *Ashura*.

In the former, traditional *majālis* focused on grief and regret and centuries-old practices of self-flagellation continued to dominate the introvert ritual which emphatically reinforced individuals’ religious experiences of mourning embodied through tears and blood. The transformation of the ritual in recent decades, however, injected an omnipresent dose of political activism shifting the focus from Imam Hussayn’s *musība* to his dignity, piety and resistance. Authenticated *Ashura*, therefore, redirected the message outward transforming the ritual into a revolutionary lesson emphasising collective action against oppression.

This is evident in the *majālis* which, in the authenticated *Ashura* narrative, involve longer sermons conveying a religious and socio-political message; instructing the audience about the revolutionary meanings of *Ashura* and linking Karbala with present-day politics. The *majālis*, thus, convey a rational message comprehensible to the modern mind as Deeb (2005) shows:

> Those who have attended *majālis* over the past three decades articulate the shift as well. Contrasting the *majālis* they now attend with those they attended in the past, […] today’s *majālis* are often described as ‘more reasonable’ and ‘accepted by our minds’.

The worldviews of Hezbollah’s counterculture are also demonstrated in its *Ashura* processions (*masīrāt*) and the role ascribed to individual participants. Unlike traditional *masīrāt*, Hezbollah’s regimented processions exhibit a militaristic order and categorically condemn
self-flagellation. In these authenticated masīrāt, the Party’s Imam Mahdi boy scouts carry banners emphasising revolutionary Ashura slogans and floats depicting scenes from Karbala as well as the Resistance; organised groups of men-in-black perform a restrained form of latam (chest beating) providing the nadbāt (elegies); and groups of reformist clerics and elected officials provide the procession with a stamp of clerical and partisan approval (Deeb, 2005).

Furthermore, inspired by a reinterpreted, idealised understanding of Sayyidah Zaynab’s role in the Karbala paradigm, women are not relegated to an observational role. Instead, emphasising their role as ‘equal partners’ in the Resistance, the authenticated Ashura discourse mobilises women in an unprecedented fashion. Unsurprisingly, regimented, modestly-dressed women are an omnipresent characteristic of Hezbollah’s Ashura (Deeb, 2005; 2006).

The increased popularity of the authenticated Ashura discourse demonstrates the competition between ‘Shiite modernity’ and ‘Shiite traditionalism’ In Beirut, hussayniyyāt, mosques and tents erected in parking lots and public gardens to commemorate Ashura in accordance with the Party’s ‘authentication’ praxis are considered a contrast to ‘traditionalism’ as manifest by quietist brands of Shi’ism. Since the mid-1990s, for instance, the party has held ‘official’ Ashura commemorations aired on Al-Manar live from Mujama’ Sayid ash-Shuhadā’ where Hezbollah Secretary-General, Sayyid Hassan Nasrallah, speaks on alternate nights. In contrast to the ‘traditional’ Ashura narrative practiced in hussayniyyāt in the underserviced quarters of El-Khandaq El-Ghamiq, Ḥayy Lijja and Ain Mraisseh, the ‘authenticated’ Ashura sponsored by Hezbollah conforms to the reformist and revolutionary messages of al-ḥāla al-islāmiyya.

Although Zokak El-Blat’s hussayniyyāt al-Sayyida Fatima az-Zahra, for instance, is officially independent of Hezbollah, the hussayniyya hosts party officers on religious occasions and houses a Hezbollah-affiliated bookshop in a small shack behind the main building. Since the mid-1980s, the hussayniyya has been the starting point for Ashura processions sponsored by reformist mujtahids in agreement with Hezbollah (Stolleis, 2005:208; Hillenkamp, 2005:227). In recent years, it has become customary for Shiite youth from central Beirut neighbourhoods to congregate at hussayniyyāt az-Zahra. After attending the sermon delivered by the Fadlallah-inspired shaykh Ali Daamouche, participants proceed to Haret-Hreik to attend Nasrallah’s speech. Alternatively, they take part in masīrāt through poorer Shiite quarters condemning the ‘backwardness’ of their ‘unmodern’ form of Shi’ism99.

Nabatiyeh is another example of the rivalry between ‘traditional’ and ‘authenticated’ Ashura discourses. Although Hezbollah has been gaining popularity amongst its educated, middle-class inhabitants, Nabatiyeh continues to be an AMAL stronghold. Moreover, Nabatiyeh is the

birthplace of a centuries-old tradition of Ashura-inspired theatrical and musical heritage. The ‘authenticated’ discourse, therefore, is dwarfed by the ubiquitous rituals of self-flagellation and the spectacular passion plays in the town square. Pro-Hezbollah families, however, sponsor a growing ‘alternative scene’ appealing to middle-class Shiites.

Since 2004, Imam Mahdi boy scouts, for instance, have hosted theatrical performances where children re-enact the battle of Karbala highlighting values of resistance and sacrifice rather than mourning and misery. Moreover, Hezbollah sponsors a blood bank aimed at encouraging Shiite youth to donate rather than ‘waste’ their blood. Until 2005, Ashura in Nabatiyeh was often scarred by violent confrontations: Hezbollah-sponsored processions condemning the traditionalist form of Shi’ism practiced by the majority were often met with rage and violence. The intervention of the imam of Nabatiyeh and local community leaders was often necessary to diffuse tensions. Since the Hezbollah-AMAL alliance was consolidated in 2005, however, the Hezbollah-sponsored reformist trend has subtly targeted the town’s imam, Abdul-Hussein Sadek, as the promoter of ‘backwardness’.

Sadek, who belongs to a longstanding scholarly family, upholds ‘Shiite orthodoxy’ which, for adherent of the Khomeinist School, is ‘backward’, ‘passive’ and ‘quietist’. Hezbollah MPs from South Lebanon continue to pay homage to the city’s imam and attend majālis ‘azā hosted in hussayniyyāt an-Nabatiyeh as a traditional obligation and a matter of courtesy. Sadek’s imamate, however, is questioned by ‘followers of Imam Khomeini’s path’ and his insistence that partisan banners and flags be banned in the town centre during Ashura is interpreted as an attempt to ‘silence the revolutionary message’ of Hezbollah and its adherents.

Ashura, therefore, serves a dual function in the context of Hezbollah’s ‘historical project’. Firstly, it provides an opportunity space to disseminate authenticated Shiite modernity and, thus, expand of the counterculture. Secondly, Ashura acts as a negotiated space for competition between the Party’s cognitive praxis and the ‘traditional’ praxis it seeks to undercut. In other words, Ashura transcends ritual and performs a crucial social-change function as a symbolic articulation of the ontological and political ascendancy of the Party.

8.4.3 The Concentric Circles of Mujtama‘ Al-Muqāwama

Symbolic as they may be, however, Ashura commemorations are only the tip of the iceberg: they highlight the dynamics of the counterculture and are a blatant demonstration of the authenticated Shiite-Islamic ontology. Al-hāla al-islāmiyya, however, is an all-encompassing modus vivendi as well as an actual societal space. To understand its appeal and ability to

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101 Interview: shaykh Abdul-Hussein Sadek.
102 Anecdotal data and observations made by the author in 2009/2010.
‘absorb’ members of the *ummah*, therefore, we must examine the web of non-state organisations which comprise it as a social movement. These institutions, I propose, are divided in three concentric circles or ellipses organised according to their dependence on the Party and, thus, accessibility to the public.103

The first concentric circle includes institutions established in the 1980s by some of the *mujtahids* of the then-evolving Islamic milieu. Rooted in the political economy of the Civil War, the prime function of these institutions was to alleviate war-inflicted socioeconomic suffering and provide the infrastructure for resistance. Institutions such as *Jihad al-Binā’* (Construction Jihad); *al-hay’a al-sihiyā al-islāmiyya* (Islamic Health Association); and microfinance provider, *al-qard al-hassan* (Benevolent Loan) can be classified within this category alongside Hezbollah’s Al-Manar TV.

Complementing these Hezbollah-run associations is a number of non-partisan associations with close affiliation to the party constituting the second concentric circle. This category can be further subdivided into two subcategories: the first comprising of associations initiated by or affiliated to Iran-based mother organisations; the second of civil society organisations initiated by members of *mujtama’ al-muqāwama* under the patronage of Hezbollah leaders and cadres with the purpose of catering to the collective needs of the counterculture. The first subcategory, therefore, includes such institutions as *Mu’asasat ash-Shahid* (Martyr Foundation) and *Emdād Al-Khomeini Islamic Charitable Committee* (Al-Imdād)104.

The second subcategory comprises of such organisations as *Jam’iyyat al-tal’im ad-dīnī al-islāmī* (Association of Islamic Religious Education, JTDI) influenced by Hezbollah Deputy Secretary-General; the Islamic Institution for Education and Teaching headed by MP and Minister Hussein Hajj-Hassan; *al-Jam’iyya al-Lubnāniyya lil-Funun* (Lebanese Arts Association, *Risālat*); and *Jam’iyyat Qiyam* (‘Values’), an NGO initiating public awareness campaigns under the aegis of Nasrallah’s cousin, heir-apparent and chairman of the Party’s Executive Council, Sayyid Hashim Safieddine.

The third ellipse includes satellite institutions and faith-based organisations influenced by the Party’s ethos or coalesced into its sphere of influence. These include initiatives by *mujtahids* and self-professed members of *mujtama’ al-muqāwama*. One such initiative is *Jam’iyyat as-Sayyida Fatima az-Zahra*, a charitable association and *ḥussayniyya* established in Zokak El-Blat by the Fadlallah-inspired *shaykh* Youssef Daamouche in 1984. The An-Nour Educational

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103 Drawing on Wadah Sharara’s (1998) analogy of ‘concentric circles’ in his study of ‘Hezbollah’s state’. Similar analogies have been made in relation to European communist parties.  
104 Al-Imdād acquired a Lebanese identity under the directorship of Hezbollah-affiliated mayor of Khiyyam, Ali Zreik but continues to be loosely-affiliated with Emdād-e-Khomeini in Iran.
Association, a chain of Islamic schools in Dahiyeh, and *Tajamu‘ al-madāris al-islāmiyya al-fardīyya* (Gathering of Individual Islamic Schools) in Baalbek-Hermel are other examples of ‘independent’ institutions within the *al-ḥāla al-islāmiyya*. This category may also include the larger, more institutionalised network of schools, orphanages, hospitals and community centres associated with the Al-Mabarrat Association under the aegis of Ayatollah Fadlallah. Although independent of Hezbollah and, at times, competing with its claim to the representation of *al-ḥāla al-islāmiyya*, Al-Mabarrat has unquestionably contributed to the Islamic milieu articulated by and godfathered by none other than Fadlallah himself.

8.4.4 Experiencing *Al-ḥāla Al-Islāmiyya*

The web of connections between the concentric circles, thus, constitutes the social movement and creates an all-encompassing experience emphasising on complementarity in terms of geographic, socioeconomic and functional reach. This all-encompassing lifestyle is remarkably coherent despite its organisational complexity. This coherence can be attributed to the cohesive function of the Party as well as to the closely-knit community of *ulema*.

In other words, the party performs the crucial function of coalescing the various institutions that articulate and disseminate *al-ḥāla al-islāmiyya* and provides the associations which constitute the social movement with a unifying organisational superstructure. It is no surprise, therefore, that *mujtama‘ al-muqāwama* is organised around Hezbollah’s formal service-providing institutions, informal support networks and media apparatus.

This holistic approach aims to ‘install’ the alternative society (*mujtama‘ al-muqāwama*) through a slow process of initiation, socialisation and mobilisation into Hezbollah’s cognitive praxis. The expansion of *al-ḥāla al-islāmiyya*, therefore, relies on the Party’s far-reaching web of institutions which penetrate society, disseminate the counterculture’s ethos and cultivate a sense of grassroots solidarity\(^{105}\) (Harb, 2005; Deeb and Harb, 2007; Le Thomas, 2010).

The articulation of *al-ḥāla al-islāmiyya* in everyday life is discussed in the following sections.

8.4.4.1 Media and Civil Society

The ethos of the ‘Hezbollah counterculture’ which emphasises such values as resistance and piety is most omnipresent in the Party’s increasingly-popular media and cultural-production apparatus represented by Al-Manar TV. Al-Manar’s daily five-hour broadcast initiated in 1991 gradually increased to 24-hour-a-day in 2001. Under the aegis of its biggest stakeholder, MP Mohammed Raad, Al-Manar launched its satellite channel in May 2000 to cover Israel’s withdrawal from South Lebanon.

\(^{105}\) Janine Clark (2004) and Wiktorowicz (2004) examined how formal service-providing institutions and informal support networks play socialisational and mobilisational roles in Islamic social movements in the Middle East.
Al-Manar’s deontological charter published on the eve of the July War dubbed it “station of the *muqāwama*” and states that its objective is “to participate in building a better future for Arab and Muslim societies and for human society by focusing on the tolerant values of Islam”. In staying true to mujtama’ *al-muqāwama*, Al-Manar’s editorial matrix became “resisting occupation and oppression” by “generating support for and promoting adherence to the Resistance.” Moreover, guided by the Party’s cognitive praxis, Al-Manar focused on (i) displaying, in images and sounds, the vulnerability of the Israeli oppressor; and (ii) propagating the Resistance in its military and social forms (Lamloum, 2009).

In this vein, Al-Manar became famous for its dramatic footage of guerrilla attacks on occupation forces and for its foreknowledge of the attacks and coordination with the Party’s guerrilla units (Jorisch, 2004). Unsurprisingly, it rose from 83rd to 10th most-watched Arabic channel since the July War. Complementing its broadcast, Al-Manar launched its bilingual electronic portal ([almanar.com.lb](http://almanar.com.lb)) in 1999 and online livestreaming in 2006 (Lamloum, 2009).

Al-Manar’s ability to attract an amorphous audience estimated at ten million worldwide viewers and some thirty thousand online visitors a day (Jorisch, 2004; Lamloum, 2008) is complemented by a commitment to media production. As early as 1994, the station was producing 50% of its own material and, by 2003, almost two-thirds (Jorisch, 2004). Al-Manar productions include a corpus of documentary programmes and dramas portraying the plight of the Palestinian people; narrating the history of occupation in South Lebanon; recounting the victories of the Resistance; and documenting the history and discourse of the founding fathers of Hezbollah. The channel has also produced short films ‘exploring’ the history of South Lebanon and its people emphasising the ‘sanctity’ of Jabal Amil; the religiosity and resistance of its people; and its relationship with Palestine.

Al-Manar also played a crucial role in dubbing and tailoring Iranian religious dramas for a cross-confessional Arab audience. Its most seminal contribution to ‘Resistance drama’, however, was the production of Al-Manar’s first-ever Ramadan series in 2011. Titled *Al-Ghalibun* (Victors) in a Koranic reference to the ‘partisans of God’, the series does not only initiate Al-Manar into the world of pan-Arab Ramadan drama productions dominated by Egyptian and Syrian producers but also marks its first attempt at injecting the ethos of *al-ḥāla al-islāmiyya* into mainstream pan-Arab drama. The series recounts the horrors of the 1982 Israeli invasion, the Sabra and Chatilla massacres and the birth of the Islamic Resistance emphasising and idealising the heroism of the people of South Lebanon, the role of mujtahids like shaykh Ragheb Harb and the sacrifices of young men and women in the Resistance.
Alongside documentaries and dramas, Al-Manar produces propaganda material commissioned by institutions affiliated with Hezbollah. Its satellite channel, for instance, airs propaganda material encouraging donations for the orphanages, schools and social development programs affiliated with the Party. The terrestrial channel, on the other hand, airs advertisements with a more direct impact on social behaviour. For instance, Al-Manar airs material commissioned by Jam‘iyyat Qiyam with the aim of “promoting virtuous social values and combating social ills” as part of its public awareness campaigns al-nizām min al-‘īmān (Order is of the Faith) and ’usrati, sa‘ādati (My Family, My Happiness) under the aegis of Sayyid Hashim Saffieddine106.

Important as mass media may be, however, members of mujtama‘ al-muqāwama need not tune in to al-hāla al-islāmiyya – it is an all-pervading state of being with omnipresent aesthetics in the private and public spheres. Al-Jam‘iyya al-Lubnāniyya lil-Funun (Lebanese Arts Association), also known as Risālat (Messages), performs an essential role in producing audiovisual material for use in the public sphere. In this vein, Risālat produces and organises exhibitions, billboards and concerts celebrating the Resistance and promoting its values in an attempt to ‘normalise’ the ideals of the Islamic milieu in the everyday life of its adherents (Deeb and Harb, 2010). Certainly, one is inundated with the sheer omnipresence of Risālat’s billboards promoting the values of piety, justice and law and order when driving on such urban arteries as the Airport Road, Sayyid Hadi Nasrallah Autostrade or on highways to and from South Lebanon and the Bekaa. Risālat’s propaganda often crosscuts with civil society initiatives instigated by associations such as Qiyam as well as with Nasrallah’s appeals.

8.4.4.2 Education
Arguably, however, educational institutions associated with mujtama‘ al-muqāwama played the most critical role in the articulation and dissemination of al-hāla al-islāmiyya. This education sector, Le Thomas (2010) notes, is composed of three pillars: schools owing their existence to Hezbollah (Al-Mahdi Schools); schools influenced by Hezbollah leaders (Al-Mustapha Schools, administered by Jam‘iyyat al-ta‘līm ad-dīnī al-islāmi, JTDI) or branches of Iranian associations sympathetic to the Party (Al-Imdād Schools); and independently-run schools with a self-imposed commitment to al-hāla al-islāmiyya (Tajama‘ al-madāris al-islāmiyya al-fardīyya in Baalbek and An-Nour Schools in Dahiyeh). Combined, this non-state educational sector provides some 25,000 students with formal education and contributes not only to the socialisation of young Shiites into the Party’s cognitive praxis but also to the ‘social engineering’ of the cross-class ummah.

This is evidenced by the fact that most schools with a predominantly-Shiite student body use the same history and religion textbooks, observe major dates of the Shiite religious calendar,

106 Interview: Hajj Hussein Fadlallah.
display all the symbolic icons of *al-ḥāla al-islāmiyya* and commemorate the victories of the Resistance in much the same way. Moreover, faith-based schools are keen to incorporate propaganda material provided by such NGOs as *Qiyyam* and *Risālat* in their daily routine.

In addition, JTDI has run teacher training schemes since the late-1970s and, thus, contributed to the ‘production’ of teachers committed to *al-ḥāla al-islāmiyya* who are not employed in faith-based schools, but also state schools. Similarly, JTDI-commissioned textbooks including *al-Islām risālatunā* (Islam is our Message) are popular amongst schools (as mobilisational institutions) and teachers (as agents) affiliated with the Party (Le Thomas, 2010).

This network of ‘Shiite schools’, it must be noted, caters for a predominantly-Shiite clientele although they publically emphasise their openness to students from all communities. These schools are part of a fee-paying private school system which relies on students’ fees, charitable contributions and *zakat* and *khums* (religious almsgiving) and are justified in terms of filling a gap caused by the shortcomings of the official educational system. This non-state educational system does not only ‘fill a gap’, but also promulgates the worldviews of the authenticated praxis and *produce* social change by instilling the notions and symbols of *al-ḥāla al-islāmiyya* and ‘Shiite nationalism’. Artwork produced by students in faith-based schools, for instance, reveals the extent to which ‘*lubnan al-muqāwim*’ features highly in students’ understanding of nationalism and citizenship as demonstrated by Shaery-Eisenlohr (2008:50-86). Similarly, Le Tomas (2010) notes that such notions as piety and modesty are instilled in students’ everyday experiences in faith-based schools; hence, mobilising a generation of Shiites into the praxis.

8.4.4.3 Pious Entertainment and Resistance Tourism

Not all is sombre and solemn in *mujtama‘ al-muqāwama*, however. Indeed, overemphasising the institutional and formal sectors of Hezbollah reinforces the stereotype that members of the Party’s *ummah* are all bearded young men with Kalashnikovs or timid women dressed in black – a binary opposite of the ‘Paris of the Middle East’ stereotype (Deeb and Harb, 2007).

In fact, *al-ḥāla al-islāmiyya* has been materialising in new spaces of ‘pious entertainment’ – that is to say, entertainment emphasising an eclectic melange of Lebanese, Arab and Islamic traditions imbued with an educational message about the values of heritage, piety and resistance. It can be argued, in fact, that this domain discloses the extent to which the Islamic milieu has become an all-encompassing experience and exposes the extent to which *mujtama‘ al-muqāwama* is part of a transnational ‘pious public’. Moreover, ‘pious entertainment’ serves to ‘normalise’ the morality of the counterculture within the market logics of consumption and the popular-culture landscape (Al-Hamarneh and Steiner, 2004; Harb, 2006).
This explains the eagerness with which UAE-based real estate giant, Inmaa Group, was met when it decided to build an amusement park directed at a ‘pious clientele’ in Dahiyeh in 1998. Fantasy World received the blessing of the Hezbollah mayor of Ghobeiri who facilitated legal procedures. Similarly, Saudi investments in ‘pious malls’ such as Beirut Mall on the eastern edge of Dahiyeh received the blessing and support of the Hezbollah mayor. Mimicking malls throughout the GCC, Beirut Mall includes brand-name clothing shops and food courts with such American franchises as McDonal’s and Dunkin Donuts (Deeb and Harb, 2007; 2010).

Al-Saha Traditional Village, a 7,000m² complex of restaurants, cafés and shops, inaugurated in 2001 and managed by Ayatollah Fadlallah’s Al-Mabarrat Association is a compelling example of ‘pious entertainment’. Not only does Al-Saha comply with Islamic notions of piety, profits made by the establishment fund Al-Mabarrat orphanages, schools and hospitals. Al-Saha is also an articulate physical space imbued with subtle and informal educational experiences promoting the identity and values of mujtama’ al-mugāwama. On the one hand, it conveys a traditional village mood emphasising the hybridity of Lebanese, Arab and Muslim heritage. On the other hand, it hosts a library, a museum and regular folk-music performances emphasising values of honour, valour, nationalism, piety and resistance (Harb, 2006). Interestingly, a sombre Hezbollah received the project with suspicion. Recognising the project’s success and popularity amongst Shiites, however, Hezbollah cadres embraced Al-Saha: today, Al-Saha includes shops were one can purchase a myriad of party paraphernalia (Deeb and Harb, 2010).

Al-Saha’s popular appeal convinced the Party of the significance of ‘pious entertainment’ in producing social change. Since 2000, therefore, the Party has invested in ‘resistance tourism’. The Khiyyam Prison Museum is a good example. Following Israeli withdrawal in May 2000, the former detention centre was transformed into a tourist attraction by a committee of former detainees. The initiative was carried out in loose consultation with the pro-Hezbollah mayor of Khiyyam, Ali Zreik. With signs in both English and Arabic, the site narrated the story of civilians and Resistance fighters detained in the notorious prison. The museum sells Hezbollah memorabilia and documentary films about the Resistance (Deeb and Harb, 2010).

Following the July War, the party-affiliated Risālat proposed to expand the museum in an attempt to ‘codify’ the Resistance narrative. The project was abandoned for logistical considerations and substituted by the Mleita Theme Park – a state-of-the-art museum of Resistance. Mleita was built as a permanent and interactive exhibition of the Party’s ethos. In his speech inaugurating Mleita, Hezbollah Secretary-General outlined its rationale:

Proud nations preserve their history and recall it to renew their sense of pride and strength and to demonstrate their struggle against oppression. Proud nations preserve their history for their future generations. [...] In Lebanon,
however, history is a thorny business – you cannot speak of a Lebanese history because of sectarian, confessional and regionalist complexities. Each region, each political family and, indeed, each confession claims its own [version of] history. [...] For us, Mleita represents the ultimate sacrifice. Here, sacred blood was spilt building an ever-lasting connection between Heaven and Earth – a connection of light, hope, love, adoration, optimism and faith. 107

In a similar vein, MP Mohammed Raad, described Mleita as “evidence that, if nature has its powerful charm, power has its natural charm” 108. Within the first three months, Mleita attracted some 500,000 visitors and almost a million within a year. With the Hezbollah-endorsed Najib Mikati Cabinet in power, FPM tourism minister Fady Aboud launched the 2011 tourism season from none other than Mleita in a symbolic gesture indicating the extent to which Hezbollah’s ‘resistance tourism’ is becoming ‘mainstream’ (Dick, 2010; Al-Balad, 2011).

8.4.5 Al-ḥāla Al-Islāmiyya: A Democratic and Participatory Praxis?

It is evident from the preceding discussion that Hezbollah is not just a party in the representative sense of Western political parties nor is it merely neo-za'imist in the postwar Lebanese sense. The ‘Party of God’, it has been argued, is the institutional ‘core’ of a social movement and the political embodiment of a ‘historical project’. The capitalised, singularised ‘Party’ constitutes the cohesive core of the counterculture and performs a connective function coalescing the web of connections which constitutes the social movement.

Social movement theorists, however, note that social movements ‘succeed’ when the identity and praxis they uphold triumphs becoming a public good. As a result, however, it becomes harder to determine whether members identify with the praxis; are coerced into conformity to avoid negative sanction; or are attracted to its positive incentives. In other words, as mujtama‘ al-muqāwama grows into a publically consumable identity and lifestyle, it becomes impossible to determine whether members adhere to al-ḥāla al-islāmiyya out of principled commitment; because his/her interests are attached to its socially-organised pattern of behaviour; to avoid punishment and exclusion by ‘the ummah;’ or to benefit from the (material and social) incentives of membership in that ummah (Friedman and McAdam, 1992).

Moreover, if social movements are conceptualised as cognitive praxes, then the value system and identity they espouse are not a ‘discovery’ or determined outcome of systematic interactions within a confined R&D system. Instead, they are the product of a series of social encounters within the social movement, between movements and between the movement and its opponents (Eyerman and Jamison, 1996). Moreover, with the diffusion of the collective identities and cultural symbols associated with the social movement, the sharp distinction and

107 Nasrallah speech. 21 May 2010.
108 MP Mohammed Raad speech in Mleita. 30 June 2011.
division of roles between the organisations and associational networks that guide the movement and the general public progressively dissolves (Friedman and McAdam, 1992).

In Hezbollah’s case, however, the cognitive praxis is disseminated in a top-down fashion. In theory, al-ḥāla al-islāmiyya is defined by a closed circle of ulema, initiated party cadres and fighters and is disseminated through a web of Hezbollah-affiliated organisations. That is not to say that al-ḥāla al-islāmiyya has a static or rigidly-defined a priori meaning. In recent years, for instance, the ulema’s monopoly has been challenged by a new generation born and raised within mujtama’ al-muqāwama (Deeb and Harb, 2007). For these youth, al-ḥāla al-islāmiyya is not a ‘project’ articulated by the vanguard but an internalised modus vivendi.

This is evident amongst Lebanon’s Shi’a today: pious youth uninitiated into the closed circle of Hezbollah cadres and militant ulema are increasingly eager to contribute to the production and construction of al-ḥāla al-islāmiyya. Hezbollah and the established organisational framework, on the other hand, are reluctant to abandon their monopoly.

The limits and dynamics of the spiralling ‘pious entertainment’ domain seem to highlight this subtle struggle which is evident, for instance, along the banks of the road linking the residential neighbourhood of Sfeir with the Saint-Therese Hospital. The most remarkable aspect about this one-kilometre-long road is that the cafés and restaurants that have lined it since 2007 are not run by charitable associations or owned by mujtahids but by pious, middle-class Shiite youth. Along this road – dubbed ‘the Monot’ of Dahiyeh’ – the boundaries of al-ḥāla al-islāmiyya are being challenged and the bidirectionality of the praxis is being tested.

Inspired by Al-Saha and the nearby Beirut Mall, the first restaurants and cafés along this road, such as Bab Al-Hara Restaurant, embodied a hybrid of Lebanese, Arab and Muslim heritage and the pious lifestyle and value system of al-ḥāla al-islāmiyya. In a daring adventure, however, a young entrepreneur established a ‘non-alcoholic bar’ in late 2009. The owner, Ahmad, is a former bartender in some of Beirut’s most prestigious bars in Gemayzeh, Monot and Hamra. His business, he proudly declares, provides clients with the aesthetics and ambiance of a bar minus the alcohol. For Ahmad, this is an ‘alternative’ to an underground nightlife where alcohol and drugs are abundant. Instead, the ‘bar’ offers non-alcoholic beers and cocktails. Its customers – admittedly, few – are former bar-goers who repent their non-pious past and embrace Ahmad’s bar as an “overdue alternative”.

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109 A road in Achrafiyeh traditionally associated with its vibrant nightlife.
110 Inspired by a voluminous Syrian series set in early-twentieth century Damascus re-enacting life in the city’s old quarters and featuring the struggle against French colonialism.
111 Anecdotal data and observations made by author. December 2009.
Expectedly, the initiative took locals by surprise and left many in awe: although it does not serve alcohol, the ‘bar’ is a concept alien to mujtama’ al-muqāwama. Unsurprisingly, Hezbollah agents were quick to investigate. After deliberations, a Party envoy notified Ahmad that Hezbollah “sees no religious violation or social harm” in his initiative.

If anything, Ahmad’s ‘bar’ symbolises the subtle struggle between Shiite youth claiming the right to partake in articulating al-hāla al-islāmiyya and an established organisational hierarchy. Indeed, Hezbollah proved surprisingly tolerant to and accommodating of Ahmad’s daring initiative, which indicates that the praxis is undergoing a continual process of construction and reconstruction. Nonetheless, the extent to which al-hāla al-islāmiyya is participatory and democratic is yet to be seen as mujtama’ al-muqāwama becomes a public good.

Hezbollah’s ‘historical project’, however, is located within the confession. In other words, mujtama’ al-muqāwama is ‘open to all’ in theory but it is, inevitably, embedded within the epistemologies and ontological pre-suppositions of Shiite Islam. Sunnis and Christians are ‘welcome’ as spectators but cannot be expected to engage with paradigms with which they do not identify. Hezbollah, therefore, can be singled out as the only political party in postwar Lebanon insofar as it promotes social change and embodies a rational ‘historical project’. The Party, however, cannot be considered ‘national’ due to its confessional appeal – especially in terms of its social-movement aspect. In other words, Hezbollah is a ‘hybrid-modern’ project: it is the most ‘modern’ political party in contemporary Lebanon in the strict sense of modernity and yet it is embedded within the paradigms of Shiite-Islamic ontology and appeals to a subnational collectivity by appealing to ‘authenticity’.

8.5 CONCLUSIONS
As part of the grand narrative developed in this research, it has been the aim of the discussion presented in this chapter to examine the nature and dynamics of party politics in postwar Lebanon through the use of qualitative data collected through ethnomethodological fieldwork, participant observations and interviews. In doing so, it has been demonstrated that parties in contemporary Lebanon exhibit varying degrees and forms of reliance on patronage, strategies of mobilisation rooted in the pre-war and wartime order as well as sectarianism. It must be noted, however, that the political party domain in contemporary Lebanon is dominated by the ‘extended’ party – that is to say, political parties with a confession-wide appeal and claim to za’imship. In other words, political parties in contemporary Lebanon are not merely partisan manifestations of localised petty-zu’ama but subnational superstructures claiming or contending to represent an entire sect.
Given the nature of Lebanon’s patronage democracy in which elected officials have discretion in implementing the law and in allocating jobs, services and business opportunities (Chandra 2003), political parties in contemporary Lebanon have become the loci of patronage. In other words, the task of servicing and representing local communities has fallen back on ‘extended’ political parties and the public offices they appropriated in the ‘negotiated’ transition to peace.

As a result of their reliance on confessionalism and patronage, political parties in contemporary Lebanon revitalised the role of ‘political families’, ‘spiritual families’ (i.e. the confession) as well as varying forms of middlemanship ranging from the traditional qabāda'yāt to the institutional forms of middlemanship demonstrated by such associations as the FBFA as well as the more ‘civil’ form of technologically-savvy shabāb. Alongside these instrumental mobilisational tools, political parties in postwar Lebanon have initiated or capitalised on sectarian tensions within the context of partisan mobilisation in inter- and intra-confessional rivalries. Political parties in contemporary Lebanon, therefore, demonstrate a noticeable disinterest in the production and dissemination of social change. In other words, they are unable or unwilling to articulate or promulgate ‘historical projects’ beyond the sheer interests of the leaders and protégés they represent within the context of Lebanon’s confessional-consociational patronage democracy.

Hezbollah, however, stands out not only because of its remarkable ability to mobilise the youth and rejuvenate interest in politics but also because it represents an unprecedented example in party-driven social change in Lebanon. That is not to say that the ‘Party of God’ does not rely on patronage for mobilisational purposes nor is it a claim that the Party does not capitalise on and reinforce the role of the family, clan and patronymic group in political life. However, it would be entirely misleading to conceptualise Hezbollah as, merely, a patronage-party or a neo-za’imist form of political organisation. Rather, Hezbollah represents a unique example in that it embodies a mafhūm (worldview) articulated into a cognitive praxis, al-hāla al-islāmiyya, and constituting the cornerstone of a counterculture, mujtama‘ al-muqāwama.

Hezbollah’s uniqueness, therefore, lies in the fact that it is a social movement which articulates a comprehensive modus vivendi and carries forth a ‘historical project’ redefining the meaning of life by authenticating (i.e. modernising) an otherwise-irrational religious ontology and, crucially, disseminating social change. Hezbollah, therefore, is a unique example of hybrid modernities insofar as it is a hybrid praxis accommodating multiple ontologies in constructing the modus vivendi and the superstructure. The Hezbollah praxis, hence, involved ‘modernising’ Islam and ‘authenticating’ modernity through Shiite-Islamic ontology.
In other words, Hezbollah’s ‘historical project’ is rooted within Shiite-Islamic ontology and, thus, appeals to a confessionally-delineated segment of society. In other words, Hezbollah’s hybrid modernity owes its very existence to Lebanon’s confessionalistic (multi-centred) ‘hybrid-modern’ (i.e. consociational) superstructure. The relationship between al-ḥāla al-islāmiyya and the confessionalisation of politics, therefore, is bidirectional. On the one hand, politico-cultural confessionalism creates opportunity spaces for multiple claims to the truth and, thus, the multiplicity of subnational pillars. Hezbollah’s mujtama‘ al-muqāwama, on the other hand, demonstrates the crystallisation of a coherent Shiite pillar which, inevitably, entrenches political confessionalism amongst Shiites as well as ‘the other’.

It can, therefore, be concluded that developments in the political paradigm and political economy in Lebanon are a product of bidirectional, intersecting claims to everyday life and institutions through various ontologies. While the outcomes of the ‘modernity project’ are articulated, instituted and pursued in the everyday lives of individuals, groups and movements, and also of institutions, perhaps in a subaltern meaning, these are justified through the particular ontology each confessional group adheres to. A multitude of meanings are, therefore, attached to the same social realities; hence, providing the dynamism through which Lebanon sustains its plural existence, as this provides an implicit social contract whereby confessional ‘pillars’ are entitled to articulate and adhere to their particularistic interpretations and worldviews. Social change, therefore, emanates from the sect and targets the subnational centre in contrast to the modernisational experiences throughout the Middle East where national ‘imagined communities’ are imposed by the authoritarian state. Inter-communal violence in Lebanon, thus, should be interpreted as a mechanism of negotiation and redistribution rather than a mechanism of homogenising modernity. The social-change aspect of modernisation, on the other hand, is relegated to confessional (hence, subnational) actors so as to allow each confession to articulate and adhere to its own ‘authenticated’ version of modernity. Lebanon, thus, is a platform for the articulation of multiple subnational modernities contained by a multi-centred consociational state.
CHAPTER NINE

CONTEXTUALISING THE FINDINGS ON LEBANON’S CLIENTELIST-CONSOCIATIONALISM: AN INTERPRETATIVE APPROACH
The main aim of this study has been to examine the dynamics of democratic government in non-Western plural societies which witnessed a late/incomplete transition to modernity and, hence, a dependent form of capitalism. More specifically, the research is an attempt in political economy aimed at conceptualising consociationalism in the multi-confessional, late-modern Lebanese context with the objective of explaining the self-perpetuating cycles of civil conflict, instability of governing structures and the political impasses together with the patronage oriented political economy, which have characterised the country’s modern history.

In previous chapters, either through literature or through ethnomethodology-based research, an in-depth exploration, examination and critical analysis of the intersections between political economy and the confessional paradigm in Lebanon has been presented. This chapter aims to bring these discussion and individual conclusions together and develop a grand narrative or an integrated understanding.

This chapter, hence, will restate briefly the major conclusions reached in this study in an attempt to transcend consociational theorists’ conventional focus on the organisational and institutional aspects of political superstructures in plural societies. The first section examines the structure of cleavages in Lebanon in comparison to established consociational democracies in Western Europe. The second section, summarises discussions presented in previous chapters with regards to the political economy of Lebanon’s transition to modernity and the capitalist MoP demonstrating the interplay between confessionalism, consociationalism and za‘imism. In the third section, the legal-constitutional instruments of clientelist-consociationalism in Lebanon are examined with a particular emphasis on (i) the confessionalisation of the public domain; (ii) the institutionalisation of za‘imist-consociationalism in the political superstructure; and (iii) the embeddedness of clientelist-consociationalism in ‘democratic’ structures.

In conclusion, brief remarks about the nature and functions of the state in the consociational model will be made. Finally, this chapter will come to an end with a postscript regarding the coexistence of multiple moderns (i.e. multiple subcultures) within Lebanon’s multi-centred political superstructure which, itself, can be understood as a form of hybrid modernities.

9.1 ASSESSING THE THEORETICAL FRAMEWORK: CONSOCIATIONALISM AS A HYBRID MODERNITY

It has been important to explore the foundations of consociational theory and engage in a comparative study of consociationalism in established democracies as well as in more recent, post-conflict and post-Communist transitions to democracy to develop a comparative approach in relation to the nature of ‘divided-house’ democratic culture.
As noted earlier, the theory of consociational government was first articulated by scholars informed by four long-standing Western democracies: the Netherlands, Switzerland, Austria and Belgium. In recent years, however, interest in consociational government has increased triggered by the rapid transitions to democracy in the wake of the Cold War, the demise of Communism, the disintegration of multiethnic states such as Yugoslavia and the expansion of the fourth wave of democratisation to parts of Latin America, Asia and sub-Saharan Africa. This rejuvenated interest stems from the fact that three-quarters of recent democracies exist in countries with a religiously, linguistically or ethnically-divided society versus a third in established democracies (Doorenspleet, 2007).

To understand consociational democracy, as this research proposes, it is necessary to locate it within the conceptual and philosophical context of critical modernisation theories. Amongst other things, the notion of hybrid modernities can help explain socio-political order in societies divided along subnational cleavages by locating how the product of everyday life produced by modernity can be authenticated by a particular ontology beyond the capitalised, singularised ‘Modern’. Such socio-political order is in stark contrast to the nation-state prototype theorised by classical modernisation theorists presupposing the pervasiveness of the unitary state; a single overarching collectivity – the nation; and a politico-intellectual elite with a monopoly over the articulation of a ‘national culture’ imposed upon a whole population in a given territory (Gellner, 1983). Of course, this presupposes a historical transition from social divisions sustained by traditional legitimations and the ‘defragmentation’ of society – hence, the birth of nations governed by ‘integrative’ and rationalised states.

It is by liberating oneself from logics of binary oppositions and universalist claims associated with modernisation theory, this research contends, that we can comprehend socio-political order in plural societies comprising multiple subnational collectivities and, hence, multiple claims to legitimacy and conflicting worldviews. In other words, it is by problematising the assumptions of modernisation theory that we can conceptualise political systems which involve a multi-centred state (core and the multiple centres if the periphery), extensive decentralism and multiple ‘subnational cultures’ within the modern-capitalist context. This, indeed, runs contrary to the Eurocentric ideals of ‘unitary’ homogenisation which predict a convergence of national peripheries to their respective centres; and from peripheral states to the global centre.

In doing so, the theory of hybrid modernities acknowledges the civilisational cross-fertilisation aspect of societies’ transition to modernity as demonstrated in Chapter Two. In other words, it recognises modernity as a dynamic process of continual constitution and reconstitution of the socio-cultural project and, crucially, that these ongoing reconstructions of multiple institutional
and ideological patterns are carried forward by actors embedded within the social, political and intellectual fabrics of their respective societies. Late/incomplete modernities, therefore, are influenced by Eurocentric constellations of modernity by virtue of historical precedence but produce ‘hybrid modernities’ – that is to say, ‘modern’ socio-cultural projects which blend multiple epistemologies and ontologies.

The theory of ‘hybrid modernities’, thus, provides a framework through which consociational theory may be understood beyond the holistic emphasis on government structures. It is in this vein that we can attribute to subnational collectivities a moral standing separate from that attributed to their individual members and, thus, ascribe to them an intrinsic equality comparable to the intrinsic equality ascribed to the citizen in the nation-state model (Habermas, 1994; Jones, 1999; O'Flynn, 2005). Of course, it is important to note here that collective identities are not static sets of essential attributes that all members must inevitably possess but a relationship that members establish and re-establish among themselves – a dynamic cognitive praxis. Nonetheless, dynamic, fluid, crosscutting and permeable as they may be, the fact remains that, in plural and multicultural societies, collective identities and group solidarities are perceived to be intrinsically valuable by their members. Consequently, such instruments of power-sharing as mutual vetoes, proportional representation and segmental autonomy are inherent in consociational systems which adhere to the assumption that high fences make good neighbours.

The theory of hybrid modernities, moreover, problematises the belief that the rationalisation of authority and the differentiation of structures inherently entail a transition to secularism, nationalism and individuated notions of citizenship which replace value systems based on religious convictions, transcend primordial loyalties and subdue sub/transnational solidarities. In reality, transitions to modernity in non-Western societies have taken place not in spite of religion and sub/transnational solidarities, but precisely because of them.

For an influential segment of the nineteenth-century Arab avant-guard movement, Islam performs a central role in rationalising authority, legitimising superstructures and subduing primordial loyalties and, hence, paved the way for the development of a public domain governed by universalistic legal systems. As a result, religion for early-modern revivalists was at the heart of modernity. In fact, nineteenth-century political thinkers often viewed religion as an instrumental tool to subdue tribal chieftains; restrain the absolute sovereign; subjugate parochial solidarities (‘asabiya); confer a sense of law and order; and foment a state of ‘umrān (‘civility’) as opposed to badāwa (‘bedouinism’).
Hybrid modernities theory also provides an overture for the study of political economy in late and incomplete modernities – that is to say, transitions to modernity triggered not by endogenous socioeconomic dynamics but by encounters with the modern other. These modernities, it must be noted, entail non-revolutionary transitions to outward-oriented capitalism dominated by and tied to more advanced capitalisms and earlier modernities. Consequently, pre-capitalist elites in such late-modernising societies have often benefited from preferential access to economic opportunity and education – hence, their ability to restyle themselves avoiding a genuine break with the past.

This modality is particularly relevant in Lebanon where society is ‘pillarised’ into auto-centred, confessional collectivities within ‘parallel existencies’ as the discussion presented in Chapter Three demonstrates. Confessions, therefore, are socially-constructed subnational entities stressing on communal histories and faith-based codes of distinction which function by keeping their social processes latent. Moreover, in light of its outward-oriented, late-modernising experience and its transition to a dependent form of the capitalist MoP, Lebanon has demonstrated the resilience of such essential and patrimonial units as the ‘political family’ within the more inclusive ‘spiritual family’ (*i.e.* the confession).

It must be noted that, since the advent of modernity and capitalism in the mid-nineteenth century, the socio-political superstructure in Lebanon has emphasised two mutually-reinforcing tenets: confessional-consociationalism in government; and the leadership (*za'imship*) of prominent families whose pre-modern affluence persisted in spite of modern capitalism. The perseverance of ‘political familialism’, for instance, can be traced back to the 1351 ‘Pact of the Seven Families’ (*al-‘ā’ilāt al-sab‘a*) which defined government structures in Beirut until the early-twentieth century. Similarly, the Republic of Zahlé (1825-1858) was governed by a council comprising of eight families whose affluence depended on their role as ‘intermediaries’ between Egyptian and European capitalists and the less-developed Syrian and Iraqi markets (Abu-Khater, 1978).

Marxist historical materialism, therefore, is a useful tool insofar as it explains the interests and dynamics of the class-conscious financial-commercial bourgeoisie as the hegemonic segment of the hybrid dominant class. Nonetheless, as discussed, the class-struggle paradigm fails to capture the dynamics of inter-class relations in modern Lebanon for two reasons. Firstly, there is ample evidence that deficient socioeconomic modernisation and the historical particularities of Lebanon’s ‘problematic’ transition to capitalism impeded the development of class consciousness amongst the lower classes. Instead, vertically-delineated solidarities and hierarchical patron-client dyads mitigated the vulnerabilities of modernisation and performed
‘integrative’ functions, hence, limiting the prospect of class struggle as demonstrated in Chapters Four through Six. Secondly, the consociational political system creates opportunity spaces for the crystallisation of confessional solidarities and, hence, the forging of cross-class alliances within vertical segments.

As opposed to the shortcomings of Marxist theory in the case of Lebanon, the theory of hybrid modernities provides a useful theoretical framework for the study of Lebanon insofar as it performs two functions. Firstly, it conceptualises socio-political structures in vertically-segmented societies where majoritarian democracy is an insufficient mechanism for the representation and participation of subnational collectivities. Secondly, it deconstructs the universalist claims and logics of binary opposites inherent in modernisation theory and, instead, acknowledges the dynamism of ‘modernity’ and the epistemological and ontological hybridity of its historical project. This study, thus, demonstrates that historical and current socio-cultural order in Lebanon demonstrates a particular pattern explicable only through ‘hybrid modernities’.

Before engaging with the political economy of consociationalism in modern Lebanon, however, it must be noted that consociational theory has developed into a grandiose theory which pays too much attention to institutional power-sharing structures and the macro-politics of inter-communal relations. Conversely, it pays insufficient attention to the political economy and micro-politics of leadership. This is perhaps why consociationalists have yet to explain the significant differences in the developmental trajectories of different consociational systems.

As demonstrated in Chapter One, the comparative study of consociationalism demonstrates that consensual regimes do not produce uniform results. Even in established consensus democracies in Western Europe, consociationalism resulted in different outcomes: consociationalism mitigated linguistic divisions and resulted in the ‘depillarisation’ of Dutch society, for instance; while, in Switzerland, it became the precursor of unity, stability and prosperity. In Belgium, on the other hand, the politics of accommodation are a euphemism for the slow decay or disintegration of the state. Consensus regimes in Cyprus and Lebanon in the 1970s exhibited utter failure and, thus, the complete collapse of the state (Angelov, 2004; Morrow, 2005; Pilet, 2005).

The outcome of consociational arrangements, the discussion in Chapter One shows, depends on two factors: the structure of cleavages; and dynamics within the ruling elite cartel – that is to say, the extent to which the political elite is (i) committed to accommodative consensus; (ii) the way in which the political establishment is run; and (iii) their ability and willingness to accommodate and, crucially, market balance-of-power compromises.
In the context of examining consociational democracy in Lebanon, therefore, this research discusses the transition to modernity and dependent capitalism. In doing so, it has been the aim of this study to shed light on the nature and background of the elite as well as the politics of elite acquiescence. In other words, this thesis discusses the political economy of za‘imism and the impact of the country’s disarticulated dependent form of capitalism on sectoral, socioeconomic and regional imbalances and, thus, on the structure of cleavages.

9.2 THE STRUCTURE OF CLEAVAGES IN LEBANON’S DIVIDED HOUSE

9.2.1 Geography, Economy and Class
Owing to the historical particularities of its transition to the capitalist MoP in the mid-nineteenth century, Lebanon has been characterised by two mutually-reinforcing trends: the pervasiveness of a dependent form of capitalism articulated in the financial-commercial sector and, crucially, a disarticulated political economy producing and widening sectoral disparities (UNDP, 2008).

The political economy of the postcolonial era, it must be noted, translated sectoral disparities into deep-rooted regional and socioeconomic inequalities. In other words, the expansion of Lebanese capitalism subdued the auto-centred peripheral economies of Akkar, the Bekaa and Jabal Amil to the Beirut-centred bourgeoisie. In other words, the economy in geographically peripheral regions was subdued to the ‘centre’ economy in Beirut – itself, dependent on the economies of the global ‘centre’. Mount Lebanon, however, is a noticeable exception: given its close proximity to Beirut and its interconnections with European capitalism since the mid-nineteenth century, the region developed as an integral part of the Beirut-centred capitalist economy. By the 1950s, therefore, the city had developed into a metropolis engulfing the surrounding towns of Mount Lebanon.

Greater Beirut’s outward-oriented capitalist economy expanded reflecting and depending on the capitalist-industrial economies of the global ‘centre’. The tertiary sector, thus, witnessed rapid growth to the detriment of labour-intensive and capital-accumulating industries. These disparities led to severe income discrepancies whereby members of the Beirut-based bourgeoisie controlled a disproportionately large share of wealth (Hudson, 1969; Saba, 1976, Gates, 1989; 1998; Fawaz, 1983; 1994).

The overlap between the sectoral/socioeconomic and geographical cleavages became most visible in the late 1970s as the political system collapsed and Lebanon descended into civil war. For right-wing protagonists and members of the bourgeoisie, the answer to the problem of

\footnote{Figures 4.2 – 4.4, page 154}
‘deprived regions’ was federalism as it lessened ‘parasitical dependence’ on the prosperities of Beirut and Mount Lebanon. For progressive forces, on the other hand, the solution involved a fundamental restructuring of the country’s political economy and, thus, the redistribution of wealth. A third force emerged in the 1970s, ‘populist communitarians’, whose proposed solution emphasised the redistribution of wealth by force of arms without posing any serious reformist challenge to the system. Communitarians emerged from within and reinforced the vertically-delineated solidarity networks amongst the city’s politically-disenfranchised and, thus, vulnerable migrants. Populist communitarians, thus, emphasised the patronage aspect of solidarity and vehemently rejected the class-struggle discourse. Instead, they stressed the confession as the prime avenue for social struggle.

It must be noted that despite a century of geographic and socioeconomic mobility and, crucially, a fifteen-year Civil War, the two cleavages continue to crosscut lopsidedly. Disparities in wealth and education are unmistakable with the lowest levels recorded in the muhāfazāt of Nabatiyeh, the South, Bekaa and the North; and the highest in metropolitan Beirut and Mount Lebanon. Even within metropolitan Beirut, a proportionally-large number of high-income households reside in eastern/northeastern suburbs in comparison to West Beirut and its southern suburbs.¹¹³

Deeper and more micro-level sectoral dynamics underpin the overlap between the geographic and socioeconomic cleavages. In other words, the geographic concentration of respective economic sectors and industries reinforces the overlap of geography and class. It is empirically evident that the distribution of investments in tourism and commerce, for instance, contributes to the geographic concentration of the financial-commercial sector and, thus, the middle and high-middle-income households around metropolitan Beirut and Mount Lebanon. Tripoli and Saida, on the other hand, are a distant second followed by the inland market towns of Zahlé and Chtoura as a result of their proximity to the Beirut-Damascus road¹¹⁴ (Verdeil, 2007). The overlap between the geographic and the sectoral/socioeconomic cleavages explains why conflicts of a territorial nature have unequal impact on different population groups as evidenced by the uneven distribution of economic and human loss in the aftermath of the July War (InfoPro, 2006).

9.2.2 Geography, Class and Confession
This classical question of centre-periphery inequalities gains particular salience given Lebanon’s delicate sectarian demography. It is impossible to overlook the geographic concentration of the country’s confessional communities: with few exceptions, it is customary

¹¹³ Appendix 3: Figures 1 – 4
¹¹⁴ Appendix 3: Figures 5 – 7
to refer to the South as ‘home’ to the Shiites; the Chouf to the Druzes; Mount Lebanon to the Maronites; the littoral and Akkar to a Sunni majority and a Greek-Orthodox minority; and Bekaa to a mixed Sunni-Shiite rural population and urban Greek-Catholics. Even the country’s administrative muḥāfaẓāt overlap with the confessional divide as demonstrated in Appendix 4.

Of course, it is equally true that many villages and almost all cities in Lebanon are home to mixed populations. However, it is important to note the difference between collocation and cohabitation. Indeed, although many villages and cities are mixed, empirical and anecdotal evidence shows us that neighbours do not always live as friends and, crucially, living as friends does not necessarily entail the development of a civil public domain transcending the confessional/segmental divide. In fact, Lebanon demonstrates that the existence of a political space independent of confessional and patronymic solidarities in deeply-divided societies and political regimes which take diversity as the singular trait of society is problematic. Patterns of habitation and social interactions in Lebanese villages, for instance, emphasise the territoriality of moiety and, therefore, confession. In a typical village, quarters tend to be endogamous and marriages within the patronymic group are encouraged. Villages are, therefore, divided into concentrated conglomerations of dwellings divided along kin or confession (Barakat, 1993; Hamdan, 1996).

Inevitably, this kind of structure reinforces patronymic-confessional solidarities and prevents the emergence of cross-sectoral, civil or urban-cosmopolitan identities. Moreover, with nearly all farmers in Lebanon living in villages rather than isolated farmlands, kinship ties and confessional identities prevented the crystallisation of interest-driven nuclear-family identities (Tannous, 1949; Jabbra and Jabbra, 1978).

In short, kinship and confession not only persisted in spite of modernisation and urbanism but, in fact, shaped both processes. Much like cities in other late-modernising societies, neighbourhood distribution and patterns of habitation in Beirut, for instance, reflected vertical divides rather than class divides. Quarters in modern Beirut, thus, demonstrate the in-group dynamics of migration to and settlement in the city: the city’s newcomers reside in close proximity to relatives, co-villagers and co-religionists irrespective of socioeconomic backgrounds. The exception, it seems, occurred amongst the class-conscious bourgeoisie since the early-twentieth century. Such neighbourhoods as turn-of-the-century Zokak El-Blat bear witness to cross-confessional bourgeois cohabitation (Fawaz, 1983; Bodenstein, 2005; Hanssen, 2005). Similarly, luxury real estate developments in postwar Lebanon are home to a confessionally-mixed upper-bourgeoisie as evidenced by such compounds as the Cap-sûr-Ville, for instance.
The presence of a class-conscious upper-bourgeoisie, however, must not lead us to think that a civil-urban or class identity has or is likely to materialise. In fact, as much as the city, i.e. Beirut, had economically dominated the mountain, the mountain politically and culturally controlled the city. The traditional elite of the mountain, thus, constituted a large segment of the city’s dominant class in stark contrast to the conflict between city and country which characterised the transition to modernity and capitalism in Western Europe. Given their pre-modern and non-urban origins, therefore, the city’s elite has traditionally invested in ‘identity politics’ in an attempt to recreate the social relations of the country. In other words, reinventing ‘myths of origin’ underpinned the elite’s claim to authenticity and helped forge cross-class solidarities and asymmetric patron-client dyads which prevented class conflict and allowed the upper-bourgeoisie to exercise its dominance in spite of the disarticulations of Lebanese capitalism.

Even latter waves of migration to Beirut in the twentieth century which involved rural migrants escaping poverty, lack of economic opportunity and war in peripheral regions emphasised the vertical rather than class cleavage. Until the mid-twentieth century, a web of patron-client dyads served to absorb the city’s newcomers into the economic and social fabric of the city as discussed in Chapter Five. The failure of Lebanon’s patronage democracy in providing this essential role in the 1960s and 1970s, however, contributed to the rise of solidarity networks emphasising the sect as the avenue for social struggle amongst the politically-disenfranchised and, thus, socially and economically-marginalised lower classes as the discussion presented in Chapter Six shows.

Emphasising clientelistic and rentier redistribution of wealth, patron-client relations and solidarity networks helped frame questions of a socioeconomic nature within the confessional paradigm as opposed to class-class discourse and, thus, encouraged migrants to live, work and socialise within self-perpetuating circles of kinship and confession (Khuri, 1972; Fawaz, 2009). It must be noted that urbanisation altered the nature of patron-client dyads substituting reliance on kinsmen with a reliance on confessional solidarities and/or sectarian zu‘ama. In light of this, the ḥussayniyyāt, for instance, became a focal point for the city’s Shiite migrants whereas shaykhs and mujtahids emerged as communal leaders and ‘the voice of the dispossessed’ as demonstrated in the case of harakat al-mahrūmīn discussed in Chapter Seven. Ashura, for instance, provided newcomers with a sense of identity and collective strength mitigating their estrangement in the city whereas social and business relations were forged in and around the ḥussayniyya as a community centre.
In other words, confessional solidarities and, to a lesser extent, kinship ties were territorialised not in spite of urbanisation but precisely because of the patterns and networks of migration. The move from the country to the city, therefore, did not result in the crystallisation of a civil-urban identity but, rather, in the rationalisation of the social relations of the country. Solidarity between co-religionists, therefore, is ‘rational’ insofar as it performs instrumental roles within the context of the country’s disarticulated political economy. The confessionalisation of social and economic relations in the city, therefore, is a demonstration of ‘hybrid modernities’ in horizontal forms (between the communities) insofar as it is a hybrid between instrumental rationalism and the symbolic cultures, perceived communal histories and faith-based codes of distinction of the seemingly-primordial sect.

The breakdown of the pre-war patronage system and the collapse of the state during the Civil War consolidated the role of the confession as an instrument of social struggle and an avenue for socioeconomic mobility. Crucially, the patronage politics of petty-za‘imism was substituted by the ‘confession’ represented by the militia. The ‘militia order’ served two fundamental objectives: (i) performing redistributive and regulatory functions through articulate cantonal administrations and militia-regulated economies; and, (ii) replacing or co-opting pre-war zu‘ama into the militia as an institutional form of confession-wide za‘imship. In other words, the militia system replaced the personalism of patron-client dyads in the pre-war era with the confessionalism of za‘imism in the wartime order as amply demonstrated in Chapter Seven. The ‘boundaries’ separating militia cantons, moreover, were transformed into demographic divides through notorious processes of ‘sectarian assortment’ (al-farz al-tā‘efī) and, thus, contributed to the confessionalisation of social and political order during the Civil War. The territoriality of the confession and the segmentation of the public domain were perpetuated in the postwar era due to the nature of the ‘negotiated’ transition to peace and the absence of a genuine rehabilitation process. This is evidenced by the continued disconnection between the residents of neighbourhoods on either side of the Green Line which divided Beirut during the war. Similarly, the confessional-territorial divide is evident in the animosity with which mundane cross-border social interactions and urban developments are met by the antagonisms separating Dahiyeh from Hadath and Ḥayy El-Sellom from Choueifat.

As a result, modern-day metropolitan Beirut includes four ‘confessional suburbs’ whereas administrative Beirut is divided into neighbourhoods of a confessional colouring. Crucially, this overlap between social encapsulation, economic autarky and the confessional-territorial cleavages exacerbate ‘ethnic specialisation’ or ‘confessional division of labour’.

115 Appendix 4: Figure 6
116 Appendix 4: Figures 7 – 8
117 Appendix 4: Figures 9 – 10
The perpetuation of ‘confessional territorialism’ in postwar Lebanon can be attributed to various factors including the abruptness of the transition to peace; the ‘negotiated’ demobilisation of the militias; and the role of militias-turned-parties in consolidating this territoriality through the use of sectarian/partisan symbols and the tactical use of violence for mobilisational purposes in Beirut and beyond – hence, triggering military deployment on ‘sectarian fault lines’. Army tanks and anti-riot police, for instance, have been a permanent feature of such ‘fault line’ landmarks as the Bechara El-Khoury, Mar-Mikhael and Tayouneh roundabouts and ‘borderline quarters’ as Aïcha Bakkar, Mar Elias and Bourj Abi-Haydar.118

Crucially, these psychological and symbolic fault lines demonstrate the extent to which geographical and confessional cleavages overlap and, ultimately, the extent to which the sectoral/socioeconomic cleavage overlaps with the confessional. It is therefore no surprise that socioeconomic questions have often been framed in confessional terms. Riots protesting rising prices and state negligence by residents of Hayy El-Sellom, Chiyah or the Airport Road, for instance, were reported as ‘Shiite riots’ and their proximity to the Mar-Mikhael Church threatened to ‘undermine Muslim-Christian coexistence’.

Public discourse with regards to clashes in recent years, therefore, echoes popular conceptions of the 1958 and 1975 wars whereby the socioeconomic grievances of protagonists are framed within and, thus, exacerbate sectarian antagonisms and the confessional paradigm. Underpinning the perplexities of public discourse, however, is the fact that the socioeconomic and confessional cleavages crosscut lopsidedly as shown in Figure 9.1 (Dekmejian, 1978; Daher, 1981; Johnson, 1983; Salamé, 1986; ‘Āmil, 1990b; 2003; Traboulsi, 2007).

![Figure 9.1 The Structure of Cleavages in Lebanon](image)

*Source: Dekmeijan (1978)*

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118 Appendix 4: Figures 11 – 15
Class cleavages, thus, had the effect of reinforcing sectarian cleavages between the Muslim and Christian communities and between Sunnis and Shiites. Unsurprisingly, the Civil War occurred between a progressive Muslim-leftist-Palestinian coalition and the Maronite-led establishment backed by right-wing Christian forces. Indeed the changing structure of wealth distribution during and after the Civil War and the impact of emigration have had a profound impact on the socioeconomic cleavage. Significant as they may be however, class and confessional cleavages continue to crosscut lopsidedly although at a slightly less acute angle.

It must be noted that economic activities across confessional-territorial divides remain modest. In other words, subnational economies continue to be geographically and, hence, confessionally disconnected. Moreover, subnational economies are linked with other subnational economies through ties of kinship and sectarian affinity and, thus, reinforcing the economic confessionalism. The political economy of Dahiyeh, for instance, is more connected to that of South Lebanon and the Bekaa than it is to the political economy of Beirut’s eastern suburbs.

More importantly, the overlap between the sectoral and geographical cleavages has resulted in and reinforced ‘ethnic specialisation.’ The financial-commercial and tourism sectors, for instance, are geographically concentrated in metropolitan Beirut and, thus, provide its Sunni and Christian populations with investment and employment opportunities. Corporations’ reluctance to invest in commerce beyond metropolitan Beirut, on the other hand, resulted in the expansion of the petty-bourgeois commercial sector along the littoral and inland townships\(^{119}\). Unsurprising, therefore, the upper-bourgeoisie is largely comprised of Sunnis and Christians whereas agriculture and, of late, residential real estate are usually associated with the Shiites.

\subsection*{9.2.3 Overlapping Cleavages and Social ‘Pillarisation’}

The mutually-reinforcing structure of cleavages in Lebanon, as discussed, is in stark contrast to Switzerland and the Netherlands where cleavages mitigate rather than reinforce one another as demonstrated in the foundational chapter of this study. In Switzerland, for instance, linguistic, denominational and class cleavages crosscut at, almost, right angles although the overlap between linguistic and cantonal cleavages spells out a territorialisation of language groups (Lehmbruch, 1993; Steiner, 2002). Dutch society, on the other hand, is divided by salient and historical class cleavages with class consciousness predating capitalism itself and, thus, mitigating the Catholic/Calvinist divide especially that class and denomination crosscut at right angles (Lijphart, 1968).

\footnote{119} Appendix 3: Figures 5 – 6
It must be noted that crosscutting cleavages do not decrease segmentation but, in fact, fragment society even further preventing the overlapping of grievances. In other words, the consociational model is derived from a central hypothesis in pluralist theory: social cleavages are moderated if they are crosscutting, but are likely to generate conflict if they are mutually reinforcing (Daalder, 1974; Lijphart, 1977).

This is evident in Belgium where the geographic and class cleavages crosscut lopsidedly and the linguistic/segmental and geographical cleavages overlap almost perfectly: French-speaking Walloons are employed in industry; Flemish-speakers in Flanders are agriculturalists; and the bilingual Brussels-Capital region is home to the tertiary sector. As a result, Belgium gradually shifted from a nation-state to a federal-consociational system merging territorial decentralisation with linguistic-cultural autonomy. Belgian consociationalism, thus, became a euphemism for the slow decay, and possible break-up, of the state as evidenced by the decay of the cross-segmental public domain. Political discourse, thus, has become increasingly dominated by ‘the Flemish Movement’ and ‘the Walloon Movement’ and, as a result, the country has witnessed recurring political impasses (Fitzmaurice, 1983; Deschouwer, 2002; Jones, 2002; Stroschein, 2003).

A comparative analysis of the structure of cleavages as demonstrated in Table 9.1 explains why consociationalism in Belgium and Lebanon exacerbates social polarisation, resulted in prolonged periods of ‘governmentlessness’, repeated political impasses and, thus, inefficient government. A striking difference between Belgium and Lebanon, however, is the peacefulness of political decay in the former in contrast to inter-communal violence despite a commitment to national integrity in Lebanon. Understanding why Lebanon is uncomfortably struggling to maintain unity vitalises the importance of examining the politics of elite acquiescence and, thus, the dynamics of clientelism in Lebanon which are considered in the following section.

**Table 9.1: Comparative analysis of the structure of cleavages**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
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<th>Class/Segmental</th>
<th>Class/Territorial</th>
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<td>The Netherlands</td>
<td>Crosscut</td>
<td>Crosscut</td>
<td>Crosscut</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Switzerland (linguistic)</td>
<td>Crosscut</td>
<td>Crosscut</td>
<td>Overlap</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Switzerland (denomination)</td>
<td>Crosscut</td>
<td>Crosscut</td>
<td>Crosscut</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Belgium</td>
<td>Crosscut lopsidedly</td>
<td>Crosscut lopsidedly</td>
<td>Overlap</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Lebanon</td>
<td>Crosscut lopsidedly</td>
<td>Crosscut lopsidedly</td>
<td>Crosscut lopsidedly</td>
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</tbody>
</table>
9.3 THE ELITE IN LEBANON: ACQUIESCENCE AND CLIENTELISM

It should be noted that, in part, solutions akin to Belgium’s federal-consociationalism are inconceivable in Lebanon due to the structure of cleavages: the confessional and geographical cleavages do not perfectly overlap. The sizeable ‘minority’ communities in an otherwise-Shiite South Lebanon; ‘pockets of Shi’ism’ in Jbeil and Batroun; and the geographical discontinuity of the Sunnis community render territorial variants of segmental autonomy impracticable. However, the structure-of-cleavages discourse is insufficient in explaining the political commitment to a unified Lebanon.

Another way to answer the question as to why the Lebanese sustain their ‘divided house’ focuses on the historical importance of a consociational paradigm. It is true that each group adheres to a different narrative: for Christians, Lebanon is the bastion of Christendom in the East; for the Druze, it is a safe haven from a medieval-style witch hunt by mainstream Islam; for the Sunnis, it is an ‘unique’ part of the Arabo-Islamic world; for the Shi‘a, it is a fortress of scholarship and the land of resistance. Nonetheless, the different and, at times, conflicting narratives converge in their view that Lebanon is ‘a bridge between East and West’ – a function which survives on the myth that Lebanon is a mosaic of confessions which cannot lean too far East or West.

A rival explanation, on the other hand, emphasises political economy in explaining the elite’s commitment to a unified Lebanon. This explanation is relevant in small states so vulnerable in the global economy, hence, forcing elites to dampen internal antagonisms (Katzenstein, 1985; Koole and Daalder, 2002). This would explain the abundance of corporatist arrangements in small-size consociational polities such as Switzerland and Belgium as well as the prevalence of clientelism in Lebanon. This explanation suggests that, in fact, consociation may indeed be a pragmatic or rational choice rather than an ‘essential’ attribute. To attempt a political economy explanation to the conundrum of Lebanon’s ‘house of many mansions’, however, it is necessary to summarise some of the main arguments presented in this study with regards to the politics of patronage.

9.3.1 The Dominant Class in a Late Developmentalist Lebanon

Since the advent of modern government in mid-nineteenth century Lebanon and the adoption of a consociational political system, Lebanese capitalism developed dependent on and in relation to the economies of the global ‘centre’. The externally-triggered transition to modernity and the country’s outward-oriented capitalism resulted in the usurpation of power by prominent families of pre-modern and pre-capitalist origins – in part, due to their ability to restyle themselves and integrate in the global capitalist economy. In other words, the transition to modern capitalism did not entail a revolutionary overthrow of the pre-capitalist elite but,
rather, an evolutionary form of modern government assimilating ‘traditional’ elites into the hybrid dominant class as outlines in the discussion presented in Chapter Four.

The hybridity of the dominant class, therefore, did not challenge the established socio-political relations of power premised on the salience of patron-client relations. Instead, the paradigm shift focused on substituting feudalist-peasant dyads with new forms consistent with the political and economic realities of modern-capitalist society as evident in the bureaucratic, charity and partisan forms of za’imism discussed in Chapter Five. Moreover, it has been demonstrated in Chapter Six that the salience and pervasiveness of clientelistic redistribution can be attributed to the state’s unwillingness to assume such roles as economic regulation and redistribution; to administrative divisions emphasising the inescapable bonds between ‘clients’ and ‘patrons’; and, crucially, to deficient socioeconomic modernisation which renders the bureaucracy unintelligible to the population and, thus, providing opportunity spaces for patronage (Ocampo and Johnson, 1972; Gellner, 1977; Johnson, 1977; Pappas, 2009).

The ramifications of this are twofold: firstly, it rejuvenated the role of ‘prominent families’; and, crucially, the clientelistic networks of the zu’ama suppressed class consciousness and emphasised the role of the ‘spiritual family’ (i.e. the sect) as the most intrinsic unit of political action (Johnson, 1977; 1983; 1986; Denoeux, 1993; Hamzeh, 2001; ‘Āmil, 2003; Traboulsi, 2010). In line with the increasingly salient ‘consociational paradigm’ in Lebanon, these different actors constituted and, importantly, framed the political economy and socioeconomic discourse of the country: ‘prominent families’, ‘spiritual families’, ‘neo-zu’ama’ from within the parvenu bourgeoisie performed and dominated ‘confessionalised’ imagined communities.

9.3.2 From Petty-Zu’ama to ‘Extended’ Confessional Parties
Despite the collapse of the pre-war political system in the mid-1970s due to the intransigence of the clientelist-consociational system and the parochial interests of businessmen-zu’ama, however, clientelism did not cease to define political life in Lebanon. As demonstrated in Chapter Six, the substitution of petty-zu’ama by ‘radical’ actors during the war did not alter the dynamics of patronage politics. Instead, the militia system resulted in new forms of clientelistic redistribution emphasising the regulatory and redistributive roles of the ‘confessional militia’ which carved out canton over which they exercised absolute dominion. In doing so, neo-za’imist warlords and their entrepreneur-protégés substituted one form of clientelism with another while territorialising their clientelist-confessional clusters. As part of this process, by appropriating government functions and violating state monopolies, moreover, militias became the backbone of self-subsistent economies and, thus, reinforced the sectarian division of labour and confessions’ socioeconomic encapsulation.
Recognising that a ‘negotiated’ transition to peace promises expanded economic gains and grants their regulatory and redistributive functions a stamp of official and, thus, international approval, the militias demobilised transforming themselves into political parties in the postwar era. In doing so, ‘extended’ confessional parties ostracised or co-opted ‘political families’ into confession-wide patronage-parties and, thus, replaced petty-za’imism with clientelistic-confessionalism: a form of clientelism involving a commitment to a community and, thus, facilitating a sense of solidarity and reinforcing boundaries between in-groups and out-groups. Militias-turned-parties, therefore, substituted their redistributive role in the militia-regulated political economy with party patronage within the context of the deregulated neoliberal postwar reconstruction economy as the discussion presented in Chapter Seven demonstrates. To understand the interconnection between clientelism and the consociational superstructure, the remainder of this chapter examines the institutional structures of clientelist-consociationalism.

**9.4 INSTITUTIONAL STRUCTURES OF CLIENTELIST-CONSOCIATIONALISM**

The main argument of this research is that confessional-consociationalism in Lebanon cannot be conceptualised without understanding the politics of za’imism. In other words, the dynamics of government in modern Lebanon cannot be understood by simply applying grandiose analyses of government structures nor can we fully comprehend inter- and intra-communal conflicts without understanding the structures and functions of the confessional state. This research, therefore, proposes that one can only understand the nature and dynamics of conflict and consensus in Lebanon by combining the two aspects.

It must be noted that, for proponents of consociationalism, territorial decentralism and segmental autonomy accommodate pluralism, mitigate the effects of poor integration and, crucially, contain communal antagonisms within the bounds of ‘order’ and ‘legitimacy’. However, as this research demonstrates, the structure of cleavages and the pervasiveness of za’imism have determined the outcome of consociationalism in Lebanon: mutually-reinforcing cleavages and a ruling class of intransigent zu’ama driven by parochial self-interests, it has been argued, deepened confessional antipathy, aggravated mutual distrust and increased communal self-encapsulation.

This is reinforced by the legal-constitutional frameworks and democratic structures which institutionalise consensus government in the form of proportional representation, mutual vetoes, segmental autonomy and broad-coalition governments. In exploring this, the following section discusses the institutional and social applications of consociational democracy which not only embody confessionalism but also reinforce the politics of za’imism.
9.4.1 Segmental Autonomy and the Confessionalisation of the Public Domain

Concomitant with the emergence of a modern ‘central’ state in mid-nineteenth-century Lebanon, the political system endorsed a legal-constitutional structure whereby the confession is assigned exclusive jurisdiction on matters of specific and exclusive concern to its members. Segmental autonomy was explicitly enshrined in the Constitution which ascribes to the confession a moral standing separate from that of its individual members and, thus, attributes intrinsic equality to the confessional pillars. In this vein, the Constitution stipulates that confessional groups are entitled to uphold their separate personal status laws, enforce these laws through religious courts and maintain their separate educational systems ‘in accordance with public order and national unity’.

The following sections, hence, discusses the articulation of confessionalism in the various spheres of the public domain with a particular emphasis on education, the media, civil society and interest groups.

9.4.1.1 Education and the Media

It must be noted that education has been segmented as a de facto reality since the advent of missionary schools in the mid-nineteenth century. This was exacerbated by the establishment of charitable Sunni schools in turn-of-the-century Lebanon and, recently, the abundance of Shiite schools affiliated with the expanding Islamic milieu. Today, the state administers less than half of all schools in Lebanon whereas political parties, communal charities, individual ‘charitable’ zu’ama and religious establishments administer the rest (Cammet and Issar, 2010).

The media is similarly segmented along confessional-partisan lines. The majority of radio stations and TV channels are owned by or affiliated to confessional political parties – OTV to Michel Aoun; FutureTV to Almustaqbal; Al-Manar to Hezbollah; and LBC and MTV to the LF and the Kataeb. Although providing a larger space for ‘civil’ (i.e. non-confessional) voices, social media is, interestingly, demonstrating similar trends. The printed press, on the other hand, is a relatively non-segmented domain; however its capacity to shape public opinion and influence social change is markedly less than audiovisual media.

The segmentation of education and the media contributes to communalistic isolation, deepens the cleavage between in-groups and out-groups and reinforces subnational solidarities at the expense of the national. Profound disagreements between members of different confessions on fundamental questions pertaining to Lebanese history, identity and politics are, therefore, not uncommon (Kiwan, 2009; UNDP, 2009a; 2009b).
9.4.1.2 Civil Society

The segmentation of the public domain is exacerbated by the concurrence of the confessional, sectoral/socioeconomic and geographical cleavages. Modern political issues with strong spatial dimensions such as the environment, urban/regional development and traffic have inevitably revalorised the segmentation of Lebanese civil society and, as a result, faith-based associations and NGOs with a sectarian colouring have mushroomed in postwar Lebanon (Fawaz, 2005; Harb, 2008; Abou-Habib, 2009; UNDP, 2009a).

This is evident in the geographic distribution of NGOs as well as their mandate. A large number of Shiite NGOs, for example, are concentrated in the Bekaa and the South providing essential welfare services and alleviating poverty with a particular focus on issues concerning agriculture and rural life. A proportionally-large number of Christian NGOs, on the other hand, tackle issues such as environment and empowerment of women and are concentrated in the North and Mount Lebanon. The Hariri Foundation and Al-Maqassed typically locate in Sunni-majority towns, rural communities and Beirut neighbourhoods. The confessionalisation of the civil society domain has been exacerbated by the fact that such tasks as providing social welfare and promoting local development shifted from the militias to confessional political parties and, thus, reinforced the coinciding structure of cleavages120.

Undeniably, NGOs provide much-needed services in areas where they are lacking and mitigate the effects of state minimalism and economic neoliberalism. Nonetheless, it is abundantly evident that the ‘communal’ element of civil society organisations dominates over the ‘civil’. Barclay (2007), for instance, demonstrates that even such institutions as cafés and public houses which comprise the extended public sphere in the Habermasian sense have, since independence, come under the influence of notable-politicians and qabadāyāt and, hence, reinforced segmentation along confessional-za‘imid lines.

That said, it must be noted that a number of cross-confessional social movements played a crucial role in raising public awareness and influencing policymakers in the 1990s through forming the necessary institutions of civil society (Karam, 2005; 2006), although a number of those have been ‘courted’ by political parties in light of the polarisation of society between the rival camps: March-8 and March-14 since 2005.

9.4.1.3 Interest Groups, Syndicates and Trade Unions

It is known that interest groups, professional syndicates and trade unions are another crucial element of the public domain in modern capitalist societies. In relating to Lebanon, it should be noted that trade unionism is particularly iconic given its role in promoting a cross-confessional

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class-struggle discourse and mobilising against the war. In the postwar era, however, subnational (regional) syndicates have become abundant and, thus, reduced the confessional and political heterogeneity of their membership. Professional syndicates, for instance, have become spaces for partisan contestation: candidates affiliated with March-14, for instance, have dominated in Tripoli and the North since 2005 whereas Beirut-based syndicates act as a barometer of the political appeal and mobilisational capacities of such political actors as Michel Aoun and Saad Hariri amongst middle-class professionals.

Interest groups and employers’ associations, on the other hand, demonstrate the salience of class consciousness amongst the bourgeoisie. Three interest groups are of particular salience today: the Associations of Lebanese Industrialists, Beirut Traders’ Association and Association of Banks in Lebanon. The three associations incorporate aspects of consociational democracy in their bylaws. Despite occasional conflicts over proportional representation within each association, the interest group domain is renowned for its ability to lobby policymakers and influence policy reflecting the bourgeoisie’s interests (Baroudi, 2000a; 2000b).

The regional decentralisation of interest groups, however, encouraged subnational economies and, thus, contributed to the sectarian homogenisation of business partnerships. The fact that the business community in Saida and the South have a chamber of commerce separate from the chamber in Beirut and Mount Lebanon, for instance, reinforces the disconnection between the economies of South Lebanon and metropolitan Beirut. Similarly, the Association of Lebanese Industrialists is sub-divided into twenty regional associations. This limits the scope of the mother association and provides opportunity spaces for the crystallisation of confessionally-homogenous industrial-bourgeoisies.

Trade unions, on the other hand, maintained their commitment to the Marxist worldview and, thus, became into a hotbed of social movements challenging the confessional-consociational model in Lebanon. This was especially evident in the 1980s as the CGTL became a central actor in wartime civil society and a focal point for antiwar groups (Hanf, 1993:638-640). The postwar authority, therefore, sought to co-opt the trade union domain into consociational-corporatist arrangements akin to Switzerland and Belgium by encouraging the formation of state-controlled peak organisations.

Failing to do that, however, Minister Abdallah Al-Amine undertook to fragment the trade union domain undermining its cross-confessional, non-partisan appeals. The implications of this policy were twofold. Firstly, splinters and fissures resulted in abundant ink-on-paper unions and, thus, reduced the CGTL’s ability to mobilise. Secondly, unions affiliated with
postwar political parties allowed the state to manipulate CGTL elections as demonstrated by the orchestrated defeat labour leader Elias Abu-Rizk\textsuperscript{121} (Baroudi, 1998).

As a result, trade unions affiliated to political parties and, thus, appealing to a confessional following dominated trade unionism (Badran and Zbieb, 2000). Hezbollah-affiliated trade unionism, for instance, is demonstrated by Al-Wafaa Confederation – a peak organisation comprising several unions with a local focus on the South and Bekaa. The presence of civil society organisations and interest groups, therefore, does not imply that a cross-confessional public domain is expanding as they are often affiliated to or dominated by ‘the confession’ through its political party and/or the consociational political establishment.

It is, thus, evident that the regionalisation and confessionalisation of education, the NGO domain and interest groups has contributed to the segmentation of the public domain. Although this is a characteristic feature of consociational democracies, Lebanon’s highly-segmented public domain prevented the crystallisation of a ‘Lebanese public domain’, thwarted cross-confessional collaboration and reinforced the multi-centeredness of socio-political culture.

9.4.2 The Institutional Structures of Za’imist-Consociationalism

The aspect which most sharply differentiates the clientelist-consociational system in Lebanon from Western European consociational democracies, however, is the fact that institutions at the national level are dominated by intransigent local-level notables. Consociational democracies in Western Europe, on the other hand, limit traditional notables to the local/rural domain whereas the federal arena is traditionally dominated by national (\textit{i.e.} cross-segmental) organisations.

Consequently, Lebanon’s sophisticated and highly-integrated decision-making structures not only guarantee proportional representation of the various confessions but also provide a platform for the integration of notables into a ruling elite cartel of \textit{zu’ama}. This is in contrast to consociational structures in Switzerland, for instance, which allow the state to penetrate society, co-opt political actors into the federal centre and, thus, overcome segmental pillarisation and cantonisation. The clientelist-consociational system in Lebanon, on the other hand, reinforces the state’s role as an active interlocutor and ‘distributor’ granting members of the dominant class representation in national institutions and, thus, access to state patronage. In light of this, it is important to consider not only the confessional but also the socioeconomic composition of the Parliament and the Cabinet.

\textsuperscript{121} Interview: Abid Bou-Habib.
Confessionally, state institutions in Lebanon are required to uphold proportional representation by law, the Constitution and convention. Parliament, for instance, was divided between Christians and Muslims according to a 3:2 ratio until Christian-Muslim and Sunni-Shiite parity was instated in the aftermath of the Civil War. Cabinet portfolios, on the other hand, have conventionally been divided equally between Muslims and Christians since independence. In responding to the changing political opportunities since 1982, however, Sunni-Shiite parity was introduced in the Cabinet. Minority groups, moreover, gradually gained representation in state institutions: Protestants and Armenian-Catholics were allocated fixed quotas in Parliament in 1950 followed by Alawis in 1992. Armenians and Alawis gained representation in the Cabinet in 1969 and 2000 respectively.

Alongside proportional representation and autonomous jurisdiction on matters of their specific and exclusive concern, the political system grants confessions an indirect right to veto decisions deemed threatening to the intrinsic equality ascribed to them. The Constitution, for instance, stipulates that “legitimacy is lacking if the Covenant of Coexistence (National Pact) is violated.” The pact itself is an unwritten understanding that government cannot be upheld in the absence of consensus between the ‘components’ of Lebanese society.

As discussed before, the institutionalisation of confessional representation, constitutional proportionality and veto rights dates back to the 1861 reforms which introduced a consultative Administrative Council to govern the mutaṣarifīyya. The confessionalisation of government in mid-nineteenth-century Lebanon, however, was concomitant with the integration of ‘prominent notables’ and ‘political families’ in modern government allowing the established elite safe passage into the politics of the modern state. As the discussion presented in Chapter Three demonstrates, therefore, the modern state in Lebanon fulfils a dual function: firstly, it provides the institutional superstructure for confessional-consociationalism; and, secondly, it acts as a meeting place for members of the elite. In other words, the state combines the institutional structures of consociation with an elitism reminiscent of early-modern councils of patricians; hence, demonstrating the hybridity of the modernity project.

9.4.2.1 Parliament

In line with the discussion, it is evident, that the Chamber of Deputies has, paradoxically, played a nominal role in law-making. Instead, initiating legislation was assigned to the President and, in the postwar era, to the Council of Ministers represented by the Premier. Essentially, Parliament acts not as a legislature in the Westminster sense, but as a presidium of zu’tama and a forum for elite acquiescence. In other words, the legislative council provides the
state with the means to co-opt emerging notables into the establishment and, thus, undermining meaningful opposition of a radical/revolutionary nature.

It must be noted, therefore, that legal-constitutional reforms enlarging Parliament are, essentially, conscious attempts at expanding the broad coalition and, thus, enhancing the inclusiveness of the clientelist-consociational establishment. In fact, the correlation between reforms affecting the size of the Chamber of Deputies and the dynamics of za‘imism is unmistakable. In 1950, for instance, parliament was enlarged from 55 to 77 seats in order to expand the elite cartel and integrate zu‘ama from regions annexed to Greater Lebanon; hence ‘managing’ the relationship between ‘centre’ and ‘periphery’. Resisting incremental representational changes, however, the unpopular administration of Camille Chamoun downsized the Parliament; ultimately, resulting in the 1958 Civil War. In managing the crisis, Parliament was expanded to 99 seats; thus, allowing President Fouad Chehab to integrate urban bosses, populist leaders and parvenu-notables124.

Parliament, therefore, performed an integrative function by assimilating emerging patrons into the political establishment and, thus, containing dissent within the bounds of ‘order’. These patrons, then, performed a similar integrative role by integrating social actors produced by modernisation into the socioeconomic fabric through patron-client dyads.

The failure to recognise and, thus, integrate parvenu-zu‘ama from modest backgrounds in the early-1970s, however, resulted in the collapse of the fragile system. In other words, excluded by the 1972 general elections, parvenu-zu‘ama recognised the shortcomings of patronage democracy and, thus, undertook to ‘reform by arms’ as discussed in Chapters Five and Six. The ‘negotiated’ transition to peace, therefore, entailed yet another enlargement of the Chamber of Deputies with the intention of reintegrating remaining pre-war zu‘ama and co-opting the neo-zu‘ama of the war and postwar era. In doing so, the 1992 Parliament assimilated wartime protagonists, militiamen-turned-statesmen and postwar party-patrons. The legislature, thus, enlarged the ruling elite cartel and provided pre-war, wartime and postwar elites with a forum to acquiesce.

9.4.2.2 Cabinet
In line with Parliament, government is aligned within the same political paradigm stressing the politics of elite acquiescence and, thus, za‘imism. Governments in Lebanon are, therefore, less involved in executive functions and more concerned with achieving ‘equitable’ representation of confessional and political groups. As a presidium of confessional leaders and representatives of elite economic interests, the cabinet performs three functions: (i) allocating government

124 Appendix 1: Tables 1 – 4
portfolios between confessions; (ii) co-opting notables into the political establishment and, thus, allowing them access to the spoils of public office; and (iii) complimenting Parliament as a forum for elite acquiescence and broad-coalition power-sharing government (as opposed to minimal-winning and one-party governments characteristic of majoritarian democracies).

In light of this, the progressive increase in the average number of ministerial portfolios and the number of ministers without portfolio are an indication of the establishment’s commitment to broad coalition government. As illustrated in Appendix 2, average cabinet size increased from 5.75 portfolios in the Mandate period to 7.58 in the independence era; 12.43 in the 1958-1975 period; 10.25 during the war; and an all-time high of 25.4 in the postwar era. In part, this may be explained by the increased expectations and expanding roles of government in modern society. Cabinet sizes, however, contradict the economic persuasions and political commitments of the laissez-faire elite. The unprecedented size of postwar cabinets, for instance, occurred in spite of the commitment to the neoliberal private-sector economy. Moreover, irrespective of cabinet size, Christian-Muslim parity and, since 1980, Sunni-Shiite parity has been upheld. Cabinet size and the abundance of ministers-without-portfolio despite commitment to state minimalism and severe spending cuts, therefore, can only be justified if government is understood as a ‘meeting place’ for zu’ama. This is also evidenced by the tedious negotiations and political bargains underpinning government coalitions throughout Lebanon’s modern history.

Cabinet sizes in modern Lebanon, therefore, are an indication of the ‘real’ purpose of government as defined by the political opportunity structures and the negotiated and renegotiated balance of powers between factions and confessions. Cabinets in the post-Mandate period, for instance, were markedly larger than their predecessors in a conscious attempt to integrate members of previously-marginalised ‘nationalist’ bourgeoisie. Similarly, under the premiership of Saeb Salam, the 1960 Cabinet comprised of an unprecedented 18 portfolios in an attempt to (i) increase the Shiite, Greek-Orthodox, Catholic and Druze quotas; hence, breaking the Sunni-Maronite hegemony; (ii) co-opt emerging urban bosses, members of the parvenu-bourgeoisie and populist leaders; and (iii) integrating notables from the peripheral regions and, thus, managing centre-periphery relations through za’imist-consociational arrangements within the context of President Chaheb’s ‘balanced development’ initiative. The Saeb Salam government, therefore, included such notables as Ali Bazzi, Nazih Al-Bizri, Joseph Skaff, Kamal Jumblatt, Sleiman Al-Zein and René Mouawwad.

125 Appendix 2: Tables 1 – 5
Even during the Civil War, cabinets in the 1980s were enlarged in an attempt by Amine Gemayel to co-opt seemingly-radical warring protagonists into the clientelist-consociational establishment. In other words, the non-archaic nature of the militia system was translated into broad coalition governments reflecting the changing political economy through the unchanged instruments of the predominant political paradigms.

Government in its legislative and executive branches, therefore, performed minimal legislative and executive functions. Instead, they provided the framework for elite acquiescence: for the zu’ama, state institutions were an avenue to consolidate their social status and gain access to the spoils of public office; and, for the political establishment, they allowed the state to co-opt emerging notables into the national superstructure and confine rivalries to the bounds of ‘order’ by presenting the state as an interlocutor and, thus, an avenue for social mobility and economic redistribution.

**9.4.2.3 Summit Diplomacy**

Undeniably, the inclusiveness of expanded parliaments and broad coalition cabinets guaranteed the stability of the establishment and underpinned national unity and post-conflict reconciliation insofar as they integrated zu’ama and, thus, undercut radical opposition. Nonetheless, this inclusiveness reduced Parliament’s ability to legislate and government’s ability to govern. This is exacerbated by the matrix of za’imist rivalries and confessional-consociationalism which render decision-making a tedious and slow process involving carefully-negotiated political bargains.

Thorny issues and questions of a time-sensitive or strategic nature, therefore, are often limited to ‘summit diplomacy’. This has been especially important in Lebanon given the overlapping and complicated structure of cleavages, the parochial nature of the ruling class and the turbulent geostrategic environment. Summit diplomacy gained particular salience in the 1960s whereby the expansion of Parliament and Cabinet by President Chehab was mitigated by more effective ‘kitchen cabinets’ consisting of military and civilian aides. Similarly, minimal ‘crisis cabinets’ can be identified with some of the country’s most turbulent political moments such as the outbreak of the war in 1975 and the run-up to the Taïf Peace Conference in 1988/1989.

Moreover, despite a time-honoured commitment to civilian government and the elite’s traditional suspicion towards the military establishment, crisis governments appointed at times of civil unrest have often involved top army generals. To pre-empt civil conflict in 1952, for instance, army commander-in-chief, General Chehab, was appointed to the premiership. In 1958, Chehab was elected to the presidency in the aftermath of the brief civil war. Similarly, military governments were appointed in 1975 following the collapse of the state and in 1988 to
mitigate the precarious transition from a militia to a post-conflict order. More recently, a political settlement ending the deadlock of 2006-2008 and preventing the escalation of civil conflict in the aftermath of the events of May-7 involved the negotiated election of army commander-in-chief, Michel Sleiman.

Although more evident in situations of acute crises such as the 1958 Civil War, Genève-Lausanne Peace Conference in the 1980s, the Ta'if Accord and the Doha Agreement, summit diplomacy in the postwar era has been ‘institutionalised’ in the so-called National Dialogue – a semi-permanent council summoned to resolve political deadlocks. ‘National Dialogue’ has played a particularly important role following the Syrian withdrawal and the collapse of the quadripartite alliance. With Syrian tutelage brought to an end and the ruling class polarised into two unrelenting camps, debate over such thorny issues as the Special Tribunal for Lebanon, relations with Syria and the disarmament of Hezbollah have been limited to the National Dialogue.

Akin to the Swiss Bundesrat or the Seniorenconvent in the Netherlands, ‘National Dialogue’ in contemporary Lebanon fulfils a crucial function: the institution of summit diplomacy limits debate over thorny issues to a handful of ‘authoritative’, ‘responsible’ leaders; hence, mitigating the effects of the inclusiveness of broad-coalition cabinets and expanded parliaments. Combined, ‘broad coalition’ and ‘summit diplomacy’ complement one another and, therefore, underpin the clientelist-consociational paradigm.

9.4.3 Democratising Za'irism: Lebanon’s Engineered Democracy

In Lebanon’s consociational democracy, however, broad coalition governments and expanded Parliaments comprise of politicians elected in ‘free and fair’ elections. In other words, power is not usurped, but acquired ‘legitimately’ through democratic processes. That said, Lebanon’s democracy is notorious for the self-perpetuating relationship between largess and public office: politicians are elected because of their ability or perceived ability to render their constituencies a service or protect them from state negligence; politicians’ access to the spoils of public office, on the other hand, increases their ability to provide for clients and, thus, re-election.

For politicians and aspiring politicians, however, the strategic importance of public office cannot be guaranteed solely through the supply-and-demand dynamics of the ‘political market’. In this vein, two particular facets of Lebanon’s democracy are vital to zu’ama and are, thus, considered in the following section: the electoral system and local/municipal government.

9.4.3.1 Electoral Democracy or Za'irist Gerrymandering?

Insofar as consociational democracy and the politics of accommodation are concerned, Lebanon’s electoral system is an interesting example. In theory, the electoral law was
conceived to fulfil two seemingly-contradictory goals: uphold the principle of proportional/confessional representation; and compel candidates to appeal to a cross-confessional electorate. This, it was hoped, would enshrine the principles of consociationalism while mitigating the effects of poor integration. This is particularly evident in electoral laws enacted since 1960 which reduced the number of single-candidate and single-confession multi-candidate constituencies and, therefore, forced candidate to appeal to voters across the confessional divide (Khalaf, 1977:197).

Nonetheless, there is an unmistakable inconsistency between theory and practice in the electoral system. According to the Constitution, for instance, deputies are considered ‘representatives of the nation’ and not the confession or, even, the constituency. Small-size electoral constituencies, however, reinforced the clientelistic dynamics of electoral contestation and consolidated traditional za’imships in respective strongholds.

This inconsistency is particularly salient given the discrepancy between ‘real’ (resident) and ‘electoral’ (registered) demographics. It must be noted that the majority of Lebanese voters are registered in ancestral hometowns and family estivage rather than their places of actual residence. In other words, electoral constituencies and the ratio of voters to deputies reflect time-frozen demographics from the 1932 population census in spite of population shifts due to migration, emigration and forced displacement (Verdeil, 2005). Although more than two-thirds of the population reside in Greater Beirut, for instance, the metropolitan area is represented by no more than 25 deputies with the Shiites and Maronites represented by only four deputies each. Noteworthy, although the transfer of voter registration is an uncomplicated procedure, it requires the support of notaries (makhatīr) who are often middle-level patrons in zu’ama’s clientelistic hierarchies. The procedure is, therefore, motivated or, indeed, hampered by the political and electoral considerations of zu’ama and ‘extended’ parties (Denoeux, 1993; Verdeil, 2005; Maghrabi, 2008; Fawaz, 2009).

Voting, therefore, is an obligation to family, heritage and patrons rather than an informed, interest-driven and civil exercise of democratic prerogatives. This is exacerbated by electoral gerrymandering which tampers with the size and boundaries of constituencies with the aim of consolidating traditional za’imships.

Administratively, Lebanon is divided into six governorates (muḥāfazāt) consisting of 24 districts (caza) which are further subdivided into 1633 municipal zones126. Expectedly, electoral constituencies build on administrative divisions. Although lawmakers have repeatedly pledged to work towards a one-constituency proportional system, none of the eight laws

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126 Appendix 6: Figure 6
enacted since independence fulfil that pledge. In fact, electoral constituencies have alternated between the muḥāfaẓa, the caza or a combination of the two in spite of legal-constitutional requirements. The adoption of small constituencies in spite of legal-constitutional requirements is, essentially, a case of force majeure tantamount to a ‘perpetual exceptionalism’ reminiscent of emergency laws in authoritarian regimes (El-Husseini, 2008).

Constituencies, however, are defined in relation to politicians’ ability to patronise voters. In Mount Lebanon and the North, for instance, constituencies have been consistent with the caza in an attempt to consolidate the za‘imship of local-level Maronite and Druze patrons whose clientelistic networks are significantly weakened on the level of the muḥāfaẓa. Constituencies in Bekaa and the South, on the other hand, have corresponded with the muḥāfaẓa seeing as the more pervasive ‘extended’ confessional parties (AMAL, Hezbollah, Almustaqbal) are capable of patronising a larger constituency (Khalaf, 1977; El-Khazen, 1994; Verdeil, 2005).

Constituency size, therefore, undermines meaningful opposition to the pre-determined ‘true’ representatives of their communities. In Mount Lebanon, for instance, candidates are often faced with little more than nominal opposition; competition is limited with the established few. In the larger constituencies of South Lebanon and Bekaa, the ratio of candidates to voters is higher demonstrating a greater deal of ‘competition’. Nonetheless, given the uncontested hegemony of the AMAL-Hezbollah alliance over the Shiites and Almustaqa-bal over the Sunnis, ‘competition’ is almost non-existent.

The electoral system in Lebanon, therefore, serves an undemocratic function: it reinforces voters’ ties to myths of origin and ancestral heritage as opposed to their pursuit of interest and the exercise of a civil and democratic prerogative; and ties citizens’ livelihood more tightly to the destiny and whims of patron-politicians.

It must be noted that the justification for adopting smaller constituencies is often the repeatedly reiterated claim that they reduce sectarian tensions as they limit cross-confessional competition. In reality, however, this is a common fallacy: within the context of proportional representation, a candidate competes for a seat in a pre-determined quota; he/she does not compete with candidates from another confession. Moreover, empirical evidence suggests that smaller districts with a clear confessional majority tend to encourage candidates and voters to emphasise sectarian paradigms. This is evident in postwar electoral contestations in Mount Lebanon which have been scenes of sectarian mobilisation between Christian politicians; each claiming to represent the ‘Christian cause’ vis-à-vis ‘sell-outs’.

127 Appendix 1: Tables 1 – 2; Appendix 6: Figures 1 – 3
Carefully-negotiated election laws, in fact, reveal the true purpose of electoral gerrymandering in Lebanon. In the aftermath of the Doha Agreement, for instance, an election law was drawn up redefining constituency borders; hence, creating constituencies with predominant sectarian and, crucially, colouring. The *caza* of Saida, for example, was divided into two constituencies: the Hariri stronghold, Sunni-majority constituency of Saida (city) and the AMAL stronghold, Shiite-majority constituency of Zahrani. Similarly, the boundaries of Beirut’s three constituencies were redefined\(^\text{128}\) dividing into a Christian-majority constituency (Beirut-1); a constituency with a 50% Armenian electorate and a mixed (Sunni-Shiite) minority (Beirut-2); and a predominantly-Sunni constituency comprising of such Hariri strongholds as Tariq Jdideh (Beirut-3). This allowed protagonists to capitalise on sectarian tensions in the aftermath of the events of May-7. Consequently, March-14 candidates won all of the city’s Sunni and Christian seats as well as one Shiite seat; the March-8 coalition, on the other hand, secured an Armenian seat in Beirut-1 and a Shiite seat in Beirut-2.

The electoral law of 2005, by contrast, divided Beirut into three mixed constituencies bringing together Tariq Jdideh with the Christian bastion of Achrafiyeh (Beirut-1); the East Beirut quarter of Rmeil with the West Beirut neighbourhood of Musaytibah (Beirut-2); and Ras Beirut with the BCD and Medawwar (Beirut-3). According to this arrangement, Sunnis constituted the largest segment in all three constituencies allowing Hariri to influence the results. Essentially, this was a deliberate overture by Hariri towards Almustaqbal’s newfound Christian allies as Syrian troops withdrew and political alliances shifted.

As the discussion in this section evidences, the Lebanese electoral system is heavily influenced by the dynamics of *za‘imism*: electoral laws and gerrymandering ‘engineer’ the democratic process in a carefully-calculated manner to realise pre-determined goals, include ‘friends’ and exclude ‘foes’ according to temporal intra-elite balance-of-power politics. Elections, therefore, are not a civic duty but an obligation to family, village and confession on the voters’ side; and, on the state’s side, a tool to ‘democratically’ achieve ‘negotiated’ outcomes. In other words, elections are yet another tool in the service of Lebanon’s ‘patronage democracy’ serving to grant intra-elite bargains a stamp of democratic approval.

**9.4.3.2 Administrative Decentralism and the Municipalisation of *Za‘imism***

Much like the electoral system, municipalisation in Lebanon has contributed to the consolidation of *zu‘ama* and middle-level patrons by invoking notions of democracy and good governance. It must be noted that the theoretical objective of administrative decentralism is to extend democracy by transforming power relations between the state, the market and civil society. Nonetheless, the municipalisation of local government in weak-state countries has

\(^\text{128}\) Appendix 6: Figure 4
often been concomitant with the consolidation of clientelism. This is especially relevant in the context of the neoliberal economy where market and competition rather than participation and justice are the principal mechanisms of political decision-making (Garcia-Guadilla and Perez, 2002; Mattina, 2009).

In Lebanon, municipalisation has taken place against the backdrop of a weak state; a commitment to the laissez-faire economy; and, crucially, a disarticulated political economy emphasising the role of local-level patrons. Local government, therefore, is synonymous with neo-clientelism. In other words, municipalisation in Lebanon contributed not to a participatory form of democracy, but to the reinforcement of urban qabadāyāt and rural wujaha. Essentially, local government equips members of this class with a modern, formal and democratic form of wasta. This has been exacerbated by a global tendency towards developmental decentralism in the past decade which has placed government and foreign resources at the disposal of municipal authorities. Municipal officials, therefore, are more equipped to influence public spending, patronise local-level civil society and perform crucial redistributive functions (Makhoul and Harrison, 2004).

It is, therefore, no surprise that municipalisation flourished during the Chehabist era especially in such regions as the South, the Chouf, Bekaa and Akkar; hence, allowing the state to pursue his ambitious goal of narrowing socioeconomic-regional disparities by co-opting and emboldening local-level patrons in the periphery. Similarly, municipalisation flourished in the postwar era as a result of a long social-movement struggle in the 1990s (Karam, 2005). The reinstatement of municipal government, however, can be attributed, in part, to political parties’ desire to embolden party-patrons in their respective localities129

The ramification of this has been manifold. Firstly, municipalisation allowed parties to reward loyalists. Secondly, the emergence of municipalities as new loci of patronage enhances political parties’ ability to establish their patron-client dyads within more formal, democratic and micro-level institutions. Thirdly, municipalisation provides ‘extended’ parties with the tools to co-opt and contain local-level party-patrons within their hierarchical structures: the party is represented in national-level state institutions whereas party-patrons are represented on the local-government level in their respective localities.

Municipal elections, therefore, exhibit a mixture of local/family rivalries and national/partisan competition (Ghaddar, 2010). Local government also reflects the interplay between the civil society and partisan domains whereby political parties patronise and provide political support for NGOs within their sphere of influence in return for an enhanced capacity to mobilise and

129 Appendix 6: Figure 7
local-level politics. The case of Hezbollah-affiliated NGOs, for instance, is a compelling example (see Harb, 2001; 2009 and Fawaz, 2009).

It can, therefore, be argued that municipalisation performs two crucial functions within the context of the clientelist-consociational system: (i) it allows neo-za’imist parties to embed their local-level officers in local government; and (ii) expands the opportunity spaces for parties and party-patrons to expand the clientele, forge new bonds on the grassroots level and ties clients more firmly in their livelihood to the destiny and whims of neo-za’ama. It should also be noted that this enables the horizontal existence and survival of consociational groups, and therefore provide a basis for the articulation of ‘hybrid modernities’ in explaining the social formation of the society.

9.5 CONCEPTUALISING LEBANON’S CLIENTELIST-CONSOCIATIONALISM
Based on the discussion presented in previous chapters and, in particular, in this chapter, it can be argued that the consociational state is akin to the unitary state insofar as it is a product of society at a certain stage of its development and an admission that society has become entangled in an insoluble contradiction and is, thus, cleft into irreconcilable antagonisms. In other words, the state – whether unitary or consociational (multi-centred) – is an instrument of political dominance and a mechanism of moderating social antagonisms through the notion of ‘order’ (Engels, 2010).

The consociational state, however, differs in that it provides a platform of political representation for subnational collectivities ascribed a moral standing separate from the moral standing of the individual citizen. The state in the consociational model, therefore, is a fragmented domain and a ‘meeting place’ for subnational pillars. This is achieved by extensive administrative decentralism and highly-integrated decision-making structures. Crucially, however, the consociational state is a platform elite acquiescence and government by elite cartel which, together, underpin the stability and sustainability of the state itself.

The analysis presented in this study, thus, contextualises the Lebanese political system within the political theory of consociationalism transcending the grandiose study of government structures and power-sharing arrangements by examining the political economy dynamics of clientelist-consociationalism in the case of late developmentalist states, namely Lebanon. This, it has been argued, is an articulation of both ‘hybrid modernities’ and ‘peripheral capitalism’ as the following concluding sections demonstrate.
9.5.1 The Political Economy of the Clientelist-Consociational State in Lebanon

It is evident from the political economy analysis presented throughout this study that the state in Lebanon is neither ‘weak’ nor does it fail to perform its essential functions of containing social antagonisms in contrast to common wisdom and widely-held misconceptions. In other words, the clientelist-consociational state in Lebanon combines institutional structures, electoral designs and adopts confessional pillarisation as mechanisms to co-opt zu’ama and neo-za’imist political actors into the establishment and, thus, reinforce their ability to mitigate the vulnerabilities of modernity and capitalism in spite of the country’s late/incomplete transition to modernity and disarticulated political economy. In the meantime, ‘political sectarianism’ performs a crucial cohesive function allowing members of the class-conscious elite to prevent social antagonisms from developing into class struggle. This is especially crucial in the late developmentalist case of Lebanon where the class dominance of the capitalist bourgeoisie is dependent on the economies of the global ‘centre’ rather than on domestic inter-sectoral linkages and is, thus, ‘inorganic’ or ‘imposed from above’.

In other words, the salience of vertical segmentation capitalises on (i) the class consciousness of the dominant class; and (ii) deficient socioeconomic modernisation and, thus, underdevelopment of class consciousness amongst dominated classes. Combined, confessionalism and the politics of patronage substitute the class-struggle paradigm with the sectarian paradigm and, thus, establish asymmetric relations of power as the ‘integrative’ and ‘redistributive’ alternative to class conflict.

The salience of clientelist-confessionalism, it has been argued, is exacerbated by the overlapping and, thus, mutually-reinforcing structure of cleavages. The overlap between the confessional and sectoral cleavages, therefore, serves to reinforce the framing of socioeconomic grievances within the sectarian paradigm. Cantonisation of the country during the Civil War, the homogenisation of ‘sectarian cantons’ and the substitution of petty-zu’ama with ‘extended’ confession-wide parties, thus, territorialised the confession and, hence, increased social polarisation, fragmented the public sphere and normalised confessionalism\(^{130}\).

Despite episodic and tactical outbreaks of violence, however, the clientelist-consociational order is rooted in Lebanon’s ‘patronage democracy’. Whether rooted in the political economy of the Civil War or the postwar economy, zu’ama in contemporary Lebanon are ‘elected’ politicians. It has been demonstrated in the empirical chapters of this study, however, that Lebanon’s electoral democracy and the municipalisation of local government have had the

\(^{130}\) Marie-Joëlle Zahar (2004; 2005) discusses the effects of war elites and the territorialisation of militia-cantons on the polarisation of society and institutional segmentation in the context consociational democracy in Bosnia.
effect of ‘democratising’ pre-determined and ‘negotiated’ intra-elite power-sharing arrangements and, crucially, provided ‘extended’ political parties with the means to integrate local-level party patrons as demonstrated above. In other words, democratic practice in Lebanon blurs the distinction between the local and national domains as well as between ‘centre’ and ‘periphery’ in a self-perpetuating cycle of ‘democratic patronage’: electoral laws reinforce the relationship between local-level politics of patronage and government on the national level whereas municipalisation allows ‘extended’ confessional political parties to co-opt and/or embed party-patrons in local politics. Crucially, this blurs the distinction between ‘notable families’ on the local level, ‘political families’ on the party level and ‘spiritual families’ on the national level. This is especially relevant in postwar Lebanon given the salience of sectarian chauvinism and confessional polarisation131.

It is, therefore, no surprise that parochial squabbles between cousins and in-laws in established ‘political families’ as the Karamehs, for instance, can have a bearing on the formation of cabinets and contribute to a governmental impasse over the issue of ‘Sunni representation’ for more than six months as demonstrated by the tedious bargains involved in the formation of the Najib Mikati government in 2011132.

Beyond the parochial political economy of local zu‘ama, it must be noted, Lebanon’s clientelist-consociational system provides the opportunity space to absorb new social actors produced by the changing dynamics of global political economy and, therefore, clientelistic redistribution. This has been explored in Chapters Five through Seven demonstrating the hybridity of the dominant class of zu‘ama whereby a myriad of patronages co-exist exploiting a multitude of private sector, public sector, ‘charitable’ and non-state sector resources through various redistribution channels. Thus, although the substance and nature of patronage has changed, the structures of political opportunity based on clientelism are constant.

9.5.2 The Conceptual Underpinnings of the State of Consociationalism

As to the theoretical implications of the consociational model, it must be noted that the theory of consociational government has overemphasised the study of institutional superstructures and power-sharing arrangements in deeply divided societies. This research has aimed at transcending this limitation by exploring the political economy of clientelist-consociationalism in Lebanon and locating the micro-level politics of za‘imship within the macro-level superstructures of consensus democracy in Lebanon.

131 Duncan Morrow (2005) makes similar remarks demonstrating that ethnic separatists and chauvinists are more popular in postwar consociational democracies in the Balkans.

132 Appendix 2: Table 16
Beyond the micro and macro-level political economy of consociationalism, however, it must be noted that the consociational model is a ‘deviation’ from the nation-state model insofar as it does not adopt the unitary state structures or the homogenising historical project of the modern nation-state as conceptualised by modernisation theorists. Socio-political order in consensus regimes, therefore, does not attribute to the state such colossal tasks as the articulation of ‘national culture’ or the enforcement of a unified modus vivendi. In other words, unlike the Hegelian state, the state in the consociational model is not expected to perform the social engineering functions aimed at homogenising society. Crucially, therefore, the consociational state contains social antagonisms within the bounds of ‘order’ not by producing social change and, thus, affecting social behaviour, but by ‘pillarising’ the production of social change.

As a result, subnational ‘pillars’ enjoy (segmental) autonomy in the articulation of their particular value systems and modus vivendi. By ‘pillarising’ education and the public domain, for instance, consociationalism provides the institutional framework for the dissemination of multiple claims to the truth based on a multitude of dynamic ontologies and epistemologies. In other words, the consociational state as experienced in Lebanon and other cases is a manifestation of hybrid modernities. Its multi-centeredness, moreover, provides a crucible for the articulation of subnational hybrid modernities: each subculture is a ‘hybrid modernity’ in that it is a socio-cultural project produced through a dynamic and critical process of borrowing, blending and civilisational/segmental cross-fertilisation with the objective of authenticating the modernity project as articulated in everyday life with the particular ontology of the sub-groups.

9.5.3 Lebanon’s Subnational Hybrid Modernities: The Case of Hezbollah

As discussed so far, consociationalism provides the framework for Lebanon’s ‘house of many mansions’ to use Kamal Salibi’s (2005) expression by institutionalising multi-centeredness on the political and socio-cultural domains and, thus, accommodating multiple political economies and, crucially, multiple subnational socio-cultural projects. This multi-centeredness attributes to the subnational ‘pillar’ a moral standing and an intrinsic equality separate from those attributed to the citizens. Each ‘pillar’, it must be noted, is not static or essential, but a dynamic and hybrid cognitive praxis constituted through critical processes modernisation and authentication; hence, hybrid modernities.

This is most evident in the case of Hezbollah as the discussion of al-ḥāla al-islāmiyya presented in Chapter Eight demonstrates. The ‘Party of God’, it has been argued, is akin to other ‘extended’ parties in postwar Lebanon insofar as it partakes in and reinforces the multi-centeredness of the political system and, crucially, adopts similar modalities of partisan mobilisation emphasising the confessional paradigm, the political economy of patronage and rentier redistribution. Hezbollah, however, presents a unique case insofar as it combines its
roles as an armed resistance movement, political party and social movement in the production and articulation of the subculture: mujtama’ al-muqāwama.

The Party’s cognitive praxis, al-ḥāla al-islāmiyya, is the product of a critical process whereby Shiite-Islamic ontology is ‘authenticated’ by ‘modern man’. The articulation of the praxis, thus, is a dynamic process involving a transnational web of mujtahids whose role as ‘agents of change’ is to re-examine, redefine and, thus, rearticulate the modus vivendi. Given the cross-civilisational nature of the intellectual milieu in which mujtahids exist as demonstrated by the vibrancy of the ḥawza, the intellectual endeavour entailed extensive civilisational cross-fertilisation and, thus, produced a hybrid modernity blending multiple epistemologies and ontologies in order to ‘authenticate’ a seemingly-traditional ontology by and for modern man.

Hezbollah, in other words, does not only ‘modernise’ Islam but also ‘Islamises’ modernity. This is most evident in the Party’s modern modus operandi and organisational structure much as it is evident in the ontological modernism of its ‘Islamic’ modus vivendi. The Party is, thus, not postmodern as it does not discard ‘modern’ modes of production nor is it revolutionary as it is located within the clientelist-consociational regime. Instead, the Party’s ‘authenticated’ (i.e. modernised) Shiite-Islamic ontology makes intersecting claims over the modern centre.

This is discussed in the empirical chapters in this study which demonstrate the ‘modern’ nature of Hezbollah’s all-encompassing political economy and modus vivendi which injects values of piety, resistance and valour in the private, economic, social, political and military domains of its members’ lives. In doing so, it must be noted, Hezbollah capitalises on the segmental autonomy, administrative decentralism, economic deregulation and clientelistic social relations characteristic of Lebanon’s clientelist-consociational political system. This is evident in the omnipresence and omnipotence of the Hezbollah-affiliated welfare sector and civil society.

In short, Hezbollah is a subnational hybrid modernity exhibiting many of the characteristic of the nation-state: it is a social movement centred around a unitary political superstructure; engages in an active process of articulating and disseminating an articulate worldview based on a modern (but non-Western) ontology; and seeks to ‘socially engineer’ its ‘citizenry’. Paradoxically, however, this ‘historical mission’ and socio-cultural project is dependent on the multi-centeredness of Lebanon’s consociational modernity. It is precisely due to the segmental autonomy, high levels of decentralism and the fragmentation of the public domain inherent in Lebanese modernity that the Party can appropriate stately functions and co-opt civil society; hence, articulate its modus vivendi in ‘engineering’ the ummah.

In this, the political economy of Hezbollah is essential, which extends beyond the borders of the country, as the sources of patronage are derived from various sources such as remittances,
but also religious dues (khums), transnational networks of philanthropic mujtahids and a web of informal Shariah-compliant financial houses. Hezbollah’s extensive social networks and growing political power in Lebanon can only be understood through its authenticated ‘Islamic modernity’ which can be framed within ‘hybrid modernities’.

9.5.4 Conclusion
This study has aimed to demonstrate that government and social order in modern Lebanon cannot be understood solely through the study of the institutional structures and power-sharing arrangements of consociational democracy. Instead, it has been argued that consociational theory itself is better understood through hybrid modernities whereby divergence from the nation-state prototype is understood as a manifestation of the hybridity of the modern project and a reflection of the multiplicity of epistemologies, ontologies and organisational structures.

Political economy, structures of consociational government and hybrid modernities, therefore, triangulate producing a more comprehensive understanding of Lebanon as a hybrid modernity in a developing and deeply-disarticulated peripheral economy within the bounds of consociational ‘order’. The product, modern Lebanon, is a unique multi-centred socio-political order which substituted the social engineering roles of the Hegelian state with ‘consensus’.

Lebanon’s consociational modernity, therefore, is an example of the interplay between hybrid modernities (on the national as well as subnational level), peripheral capitalism and deficient socioeconomic modernisation. In other words, consociationalism in Lebanon intersects with patronage politics as well as the national, subnational and transnational dynamics of hybrid modernities and socio-cultural projects. The country’s consociational system, hence, underpins its sustainability as a unitary state despite civil and cross-border conflicts and political impasses. The confessional-consociational paradigm and, by extension, political economy have only been possible because of a, mostly, implicit acceptance of multiple hybrid modernities by the confessions and their zu’ama.
CONCLUDING REMARKS
10.1 CONCLUSION
Lebanon is a small Middle Eastern country which has been the scene of many struggles between domestic and regional rivals. In present times, while the country struggles to make sense of its consociational democracy at a time of severe social and political polarisation, a number of questions trouble the Lebanese political class.

The political environment in Lebanon since the assassination of Prime Minister Rafic Hariri and the July War has, indeed, shifted the balance of power in Lebanon and posed serious questions pertaining to the very nature of Lebanese democracy. Since 2005, Syrian troops withdrew from Lebanon ending Damascus’ fifteen-year tutelage of the postwar authority; the quadripartite alliance which underpinned political order in the postwar era crumbled; and the country witnessed prolonged political impasses. These developments raised the question of whether the democratic system is based on consociation between confessions or consensus and balance of power between political factions. Moreover, the putative ‘rise of the Shi’a’ problematised the very presupposition that Lebanon is a ‘mosaic’ of confessions governed by the Sunni-Maronite duopoly and dominated by a Maronite, Mount Lebanon national narrative.

But is the ‘rise of the Shi’a’ and the strength of Hezbollah challenging these very principles? How is the conflict between the rising confession and the established duopoly of the Sunni and Maronite confessions accommodated by the country’s confessional-consociational democracy?

By following the lead of critical studies on Lebanon, this study examines the political economy underpinning Lebanon’s ‘pluralism’ challenging the notion that confessionalism is an essential attribute. Similarly, Marxist assertions that confessions are merely a form of class dominance are challenged. In doing so, this study makes four propositions.

(i) In Chapter One, a comparative conceptualisation of consociational democracy is attempted highlighting the weaknesses of consociational theory and highlighting the importance of locating the grandiose study of consociational political structures within a suitable theoretical framework and a methodical understanding of political economy.

(ii) In Chapters Two and Three, hybrid modernities is proposed as a theoretical framework which not only explains consociationalism as a hybrid modernity, but also recognises the impact of social actors and modernising agents in the production of modernity through multiple epistemologies and ontologies. The second proposition, therefore, is that consociationalism is a form of ‘hybrid modernities’ and, thus, must be understood in light of the confessional paradigm and the disarticulated political economy which characterise Lebanon’s transition to modernity and capitalism as well as in relation to the agents articulating the confessional-consociational paradigm.
(iii) The third proposition is articulated in Chapters Four through Eight. Through an examination of the political economy in Lebanon, it is evident that the disarticulations of peripheral capitalism and the coevality of capitalist and pre-capitalist modes of production thwart the development of horizontal class-type solidarities. Instead, vertical solidarities and asymmetric relations of power characterise developing economies. Patron-client dyads and informal relations reinforcing the bonds of kinship and religion are, therefore, pervasive in modern, capitalist societies where socioeconomic modernisation lags behind institutional modernisation. Subnational (i.e. confessional) solidarities, therefore, perform instrumental socioeconomic functions and give meaning to the otherwise-unintelligible constellations of modernity.

(iv) Consequently, sectarianism and conflict in Lebanon must be understood not in contrast but in relation to modernity, nationalism and consociational democracy. In other words, conflict in Lebanon differs in its nature and dynamics to conflict in other developing countries, as it does not occur between the state and society nor is it a mechanism of engineering society at the periphery by the elite at the centre. Instead, conflict occurs between the multiple confessional centres with the aim of renegotiating the meaning attributed to social realities. Consociational democracy in Lebanon, thus, provides the institutional framework for the coevality of multiple confessional modernities; underpins the country’s existence as a multi-centred plural society; and, crucially, contains conflict within the bounds of the confessional order.

In light of this, this study contends that sectarianism in modern Lebanon must not be understood as a recreation of ‘religion’ in its primordial or ‘traditional’ sense, but as a rational answer to ‘modern’ problems. Focusing on the triangulation of consociationalism, peripheral capitalism and confessionalism as the political modus operandi in Lebanon and the Shi’a as a subnational ‘imagined community’, this study explores the intersections between political economy and the confessional paradigm in the production of multiple or hybrid modernities within the multi-centred Lebanese system.

The discussion presented in Chapter Nine argues that the social construction of the Shi’a, as an ‘imagined community’, and the production of al-ḥāla islāmiyya, as a cognitive praxis, is a demonstration of hybrid modernities in late developmentalist societies. The counterculture, mujtama‘ al-muqāwama, is conceptualised as the product of an inclusionary and dynamic process of constructing and reconstructing collective identity as well as defining and redefining the meanings attributed to social realities. As a result of the intersection between the political economy, the multi-centred consociational political system and the confessional paradigm in
Lebanon, Shiite ‘agents of modernity’ articulate and disseminate a distinct (*i.e.* confessional) ‘modernity’ authenticated through Shiite-Islamic ontology.

It is through the *modus vivendi* proposed by this ‘Shiite modernity’ that meaning is attributed to modernity and the concepts of nationalism, citizenship and consociational democracy. In other words, the Shi‘a subculture serves a dual function: it integrated members of the Shiite subaltern in an otherwise-imposed Lebanese entity; and, crucially, it redefines ‘Lebanon’ and authenticates modernity as a project.

### 10.2 STRENGTHS AND LIMITATIONS

#### 10.2.1 Strengths

This study is an attempt at bridging the gap between the study of political economy and the study of ‘political culture’ or ‘political paradigms’ – thus, exploring the intersections between two branches of social science which are often assumed to be at odds. In doing so, the discussion is grounded in a meticulous study of historical materialism, dependency theory, the theory of hybrid modernities and consociational theory. As such, it is a contribution to the study of peripheral capitalism in late developmentalist plural societies and locates the confessional, consociationalism regime within the framework of hybrid modernities.

The research conducted for the purpose of this study included a fourteen-month dynamic and ethnographic odyssey, as a primary research, grounded in meticulous theoretical preparation through secondary research, archival resources and a prolonged pilot study. The strengths of this study, therefore, include the use of ethnographic methods in an attempt to understand not only the dynamics of the confessional paradigm and civil conflict, but also the perceptions of individuals and groups of the context and political environment in which they exist. The use of ethnomethodology for the purpose of this research has allowed it to conceptualise the micro level dynamics of confessionalism and political economy. This study does not adhere to essentialist conceptualisations of ‘the confession’ as a set of static status markers with predetermined *a priori* meanings nor does it dismiss ‘the confession’ as a mere form of class dominance. Instead, the confession is understood as a rational social construct performing modern, instrumental functions as well as a dynamic and bidirectional cognitive praxis involving the continual construction and reconstruction of meaning and the authentication and internalisation of the otherwise unintelligible modernity project.

Through ethnographic methods and content and discourse analysis, the political economy aspect of confessionalism and inter-communal conflict in Lebanon has been expanded in an exploration of the intersections between identity politics and social struggle. The strength of
this study, therefore, lies in ethnomethodology itself as it broadens our understanding of the production of ‘facts’ and ‘realities’, acknowledges the co-constitutive relationship between perceptual particulars and the context within which they exist and, thus, recognises that the objects of everyday life are bracketed and decomposed.

Another particular strength of this study is its focus on Shiites in South Lebanon, Dahiyeh and Zokak El-Blat. The purposeful decision avoided concentrating on one community in an attempt to provide a more general understanding transcending the particularities of each single community. In doing so, this study based its findings on an examination of identity and political economy amongst an amorphous sample: rural and urban conglomerations; mixed as well as relatively homogenous communities; localities directly affected by Israeli occupation and others less affected; and communities with varying degrees and forms of relationship with Hezbollah and the ‘ethnic entrepreneurs’ of Shi’a modernity. This allowed the adoption of a comparative perspective, bearing in mind the different political economy and confessional dynamics in each of these localities and across socioeconomic and urban/rural divides.

An important strength of this research is that it is grounded in the theoretical framework of hybrid modernities. This gives new meaning to the political economy and confessional paradigm in Lebanon by acknowledging that confessions authenticate modernity and its constellations through their own ontologies and epistemologies, as opposed to being ‘engineered’ into perceiving social realities in a particular way imposed by a unitary ‘centre’ imposing a monocivilisational and homogenising socio-cultural project. Thus, the structure of the relationship between centre and periphery, the structure of intra-communal relationships (i.e. within the confession) and the structure of the relationship between various confessions demonstrate the validity of hybrid modernities theory.

Finally, as an axiological assumption, it must be noted that my own situationality as an Egyptian and a native Arabic speaker as well as the wealth of cultural and behavioural mannerisms which Egypt and Lebanon share played an important role in strengthening the findings presented in this study. Along with ascriptive characteristics which mitigated the effects of my being an ‘outsider’, these factors facilitated my research endeavour by allowing me to become a relative insider and, thus, experience aspects of the confessional paradigm and political economy which a complete outsider may have limited or no access to. In other words, this research is a product of a process in which a socially-constructed modus vivendi articulated as a culturally-constituted, ontologically-embedded and historically-rooted ‘modern’ project is observed on the field and understood through myriad ethnographic methods. These factors contributed to the accessibility of the subject matter and, therefore, enhanced the validity and reliability of the qualitative data informing this study.
10.2.2 Limitations

In interpreting the findings and discussions presented in this study, several limitations should be borne in mind.

It is important to note that in Lebanon people tend to live in kinship clusters in rural localities and tend to recreate clusters of kinsmen and co-religionists in the city although in different forms and intensities. Closely-knit clusters and neighbourhood solidarities may be restricted my manoeuvrability and highlighted my ‘foreignness’, hence, limiting my ability to conduct ethnographic research. Moreover, being associated with one family, patronymic group, sectarian community or political persuasion by virtue of the social circles within which I moved may have limited my ability to approach and intermingle with ‘the other’.

Another limitation relates to the nature and dynamics of ethnographic sojourns in which the subject dictates our mode of work. Moving between informants within the same locality, thus, may have had adverse effects on my embeddedness. It was, therefore, important to manoeuvre between different localities in pursuit of a comparative perspective and a richer qualitative sample. These limitations were relatively mitigated by the geographic scope of this study. Moving between different local communities and, thus, benefiting from relative anonymity allowed me to embed myself in varying social relations and different settings.

Another set of limitations relates to the political environment within which this research was conducted. Severe antagonisms, political polarisation and a regional and international focus on the issue of Hezbollah’s weapons, for instance, rendered the party, in its official sense, off limits: party officers and MPs were strictly forbidden from talking to researchers while its rank-and-file members were only approachable through its Media Relations Office. This has, inevitably, limited my access to information as I was repeatedly denied access to several party officers as well as mayors and entrepreneurs associated with the party.

That said, the Hezbollah Media Relations Office provided me with access to local government officials, community leaders and civil society activists associated with the party. This was particularly important for research conducted in Dahiyeh. In South Lebanon, on the other hand, access to community leaders and local government officials hinged on informal networks and social relations. My embeddedness in the local community and the support of informants and ‘gatekeepers’, therefore, was instrumental in conducting research in South Lebanon. Zokak El-Blat posed an interesting conundrum: the neighbourhood is home to a large Shiite population divided in terms of political persuasion between loyalists of Hezbollah and loyalists of AMAL. Conducting research in the neighbourhood, therefore, required a delicate balance between
obtaining a referral from the Hezbollah Media Relations Office, ‘negotiating’ with strongmen loyal to AMAL as well as capitalising on informal social relations.

Moreover, the fieldwork conducted for the purpose of this study must be seen in light of the political environment within which the research took place. Indeed, the eagerness to engage with questions of religion, identity and politics which I encountered in social and informal contexts must be seen not only as an advantage, but also as a product of a particular historical context. The keenness to ‘talk’, ‘share’ and ‘be heard’ amongst local communities examined in this study can be attributed to a feeling of relative empowerment as well as to a perceived need to rebuff the negative image with which the Shi’a are often portrayed.

Lastly, it must be noted that this research did not engage with the Shi’a community in the Bekaa and the Baalbek-Hermel regions and, thus, does not explore the dynamics of political economy and the confessional paradigm amongst these communities. It must be borne in mind when interpreting the findings and discussions presented in this study, that Shiite communities in Baalbek-Hermel remain the poorest in Lebanon and are characterised by the salience of the clan as the fundamental group solidarity.

10.3 Future Research Directions
Considering the strengths and limitations of this study, future research should aim to expand the findings presented in this study by examining the interplay between the particular political economy in such regions as the Bekaa and Baalbek-Hermel where socioeconomic disparities and disillusionment with the political establishment are particularly salient. Assessment of the extent to which individuals, clans and group solidarities are integrated in the authenticated modus vivendi promulgated by Hezbollah would also help understand the extent to which the cognitive praxis and counterculture are amorphous and inclusionary. It is known that Hezbollah provides essential welfare services to the underserviced local communities of the Baalbek-Hermel region; but to what extent the party and the mujtahids of the hawza in Baalbek provide meaning to the disarticulations of social realities in the region is an important question to be examined.

Moreover, with a new generation of Shiite youth born and raised into al-ḥāla al-islāmiyya, future research must focus on the changing dynamics of the cognitive praxis promulgated by the party and a coterie of ulema. It will be crucial for social scientists to expand their study of Shiite youth and popular culture in order to examine the extent to which young Shiites are keen on and able to influence the production of meaning and the articulation of the modus vivendi. Will the emerging generation succumb to the closely-knit coterie of ulema and Hezbollah’s unrivalled leadership or will the boundaries of al-ḥāla al-islāmiyya be challenged by a new
generation claiming ownership of mujtamaʿ al-mugāwama? Will the expansion of the Shiʿa subculture to include the overwhelming majority of Lebanon’s Shiites promote chauvinism and isolationism or will Shiite youth culture have a moderating effect on the cognitive praxis?

Finally, a future research should aim to examine the intersections between the consociational dynamics of the political system and the articulation of confessional subcultures. In particular, future research should examine the political economy and the political persuasions of the Shiite middle and upper classes as well as the intellectual and ideological discourse amongst the ‘power bloc’ to provide an understanding of the intra-communal dynamics of the Shiʿa praxis. Will the authenticated modernity promulgated by Hezbollah continue to uphold the state of consociationalism and, hence, continue to exist within the multi-centred Lebanese system? Or will its coherent organisational structure and homogenising socio-cultural project encourage its proponents to take over or, even, break away from the consociational Lebanese model?

10.4 EPILOGUE
As stated in the beginning, this research aims to explore the confessional paradigm and political economy in an intersecting manner in Lebanon by critically analysing the intersection of its consociationalism as a political superstructure, peripheral capitalism as a political economy and confessionalism as a political culture in producing the perceived political economy and political culture which we observe in Lebanon today. Thus, the political economy dynamics of the country are deconstructed and re-constructed in the research presented in this study.

The research presented in this study as articulated in the literature review chapter, critical theoretical chapters and ethnomethodology-based empirical chapters evidence that the aim and objectives of this study have been fulfilled, as the underlying dynamics of political economy, political culture and consociational superstructure in Lebanon are constructed through critical ethnomethodology after deconstructing the available material and generating discourse in the form of discursive evidence.
APPENDICES *

* Unless otherwise stated, the tables and figures presented in this section are compiled by the author. Permission has been obtained to use maps and illustrations realised by or compiled by Éric Verdeil.
Appendix 1

CONSOCIATIONALISM IN PARLIAMENT

Table 1: Summary of election laws enacted in the pre-war period

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>1950</th>
<th>1952</th>
<th>1957</th>
<th>1960</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Total Muslim deputies</td>
<td>35</td>
<td>19</td>
<td>29</td>
<td>45</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Total Christian deputies</td>
<td>41</td>
<td>24</td>
<td>36</td>
<td>53</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Other / Minorities</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Total number of deputies</strong></td>
<td>77</td>
<td>44</td>
<td>66</td>
<td>99</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Number of constituencies</td>
<td>9</td>
<td>33</td>
<td>28</td>
<td>26</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Single-Candidate const.</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>22</td>
<td>11</td>
<td>0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Multi-candidate const.</td>
<td>9</td>
<td>11</td>
<td>17</td>
<td>26</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Single-confession const.</td>
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<td>0</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>9</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Constituency size</strong></td>
<td>Muḥāfaṣa/Caza¹</td>
<td>Caza</td>
<td>Caza</td>
<td>Caza</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

¹ The muḥāfaṣāt of Beirut, South Lebanon and the Bekaa were considered one electoral constituency each. The muḥāfaṣāt of Mount Lebanon and the North were subdivided into caza-constituencies.

Table 2: Summary of election laws enacted in the postwar period

<table>
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<tr>
<th></th>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Total Muslim deputies</td>
<td>64</td>
<td>64</td>
<td>64</td>
<td>64</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Total Christian deputies</td>
<td>63</td>
<td>63</td>
<td>63</td>
<td>63</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Other / Minorities</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Total number of deputies</strong></td>
<td>128</td>
<td>128</td>
<td>128</td>
<td>128</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Number of constituencies</td>
<td>12</td>
<td>11</td>
<td>14</td>
<td>26</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Single-Candidate const.</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Multi-candidate const.</td>
<td>12</td>
<td>11</td>
<td>14</td>
<td>26</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Single-confession const.</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>10</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Constituency size</strong></td>
<td>Muḥāfaṣa/Caza¹</td>
<td>Muḥāfaṣa/Caza²</td>
<td>Sub-muḥāfaṣa³</td>
<td>Caza</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

¹ Constituencies were drawn-up by pre-war and wartime elite to establish the postwar authority and consolidate the gains of the new political class. Elections were held according to the muḥāfaṣa-constituency in Beirut and the North; muḥāfaṣāt of the South and Nabatiyeh were grouped into one constituency; and the caza-constituency was adopted in the Bekaa and Mount Lebanon. Moreover, two dual-caza-constituencies were drawn up in Rachaya-West Bekaa and Baalbeck-Hirmil.

² The muḥāfaṣa-constituency was adopted in all of Lebanon with the exception of Mount Lebanon where the caza-constituencies was adopted.

The muḥāfaṣāt of Beirut, the South and the Bekaa were considered one electoral constituency each whereas the muḥāfaṣāt of Mount Lebanon and the North were held on the basis of the caza constituency.

³ Each muḥāfaṣa was subdivided into several constituencies: Beirut (3); Mount Lebanon (4); the North (2); the South (2); and the Bekaa (3).

⁴ 2008 elections held according to the Doha Agreement reinstated the electoral law of 1960.
**Table 3: Distribution of parliament seats by confession**

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<td>Sunni</td>
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<tr>
<td>Druze</td>
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<td>4</td>
<td>6</td>
<td>8</td>
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<tr>
<td>Alawi</td>
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<td>2</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Total Muslims</strong></td>
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<td>29</td>
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<td>64</td>
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<tr>
<td>Maronite</td>
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<td>1</td>
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<td>1</td>
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<td><strong>Total Christians</strong></td>
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<td><strong>Total</strong></td>
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* Armenian-Catholics and Protestants gain representation in parliament according to the first electoral law (1950) enacted after independence. Both confessions lacked representation in Mandate-period parliaments.

† Alawis gain representation in parliament for the first time in accordance with the first postwar electoral law enacted in 1992.

**Table 4: Distribution of parliament seats by muḥāfaza**

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<td>Beirut</td>
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<td>7</td>
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<td>19</td>
<td>19</td>
<td>19</td>
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<td>35</td>
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<td>The North</td>
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<td>28</td>
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<td>23</td>
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<td>15</td>
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<td>23</td>
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<td><strong>Total number of seats</strong></td>
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343
Table 5: Distribution of 2008 parliament seats by political party and coalition

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<th>Party</th>
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<th>Confessional Base</th>
<th>Political Coalition</th>
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<td>Christian</td>
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<tr>
<td>Amal Movement</td>
<td>13</td>
<td>Quasi-Secular</td>
<td>Shiite Muslim</td>
<td>8 March</td>
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<tr>
<td>Hezbollah</td>
<td>12</td>
<td>Shi`a Muslim</td>
<td>Shiite Muslim</td>
<td>8 March</td>
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<tr>
<td>Lebanese Democratic Party</td>
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<td>Secular</td>
<td>Druze</td>
<td>8 March</td>
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<tr>
<td>El Marada Movement</td>
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<td>Christian (mainly Maronite)</td>
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<td>Sunni Muslim</td>
<td>8 March</td>
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<td>Armenian</td>
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<tr>
<td>Syrian Social Nationalist Party</td>
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<td>Cross-confessional</td>
<td>8 March</td>
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<td>Cross-confessional</td>
<td>8 March</td>
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<td>Solidarity Party</td>
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<td>Maronite Christians</td>
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<td>Skaff Bloc</td>
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<td>Greek Catholics</td>
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<td>Cross-confessional</td>
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<td>Popular Nasserites</td>
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<td>Sunni Muslims</td>
<td>8 March</td>
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<td>Alawi Muslims</td>
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<td>Druze</td>
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<td>14 March</td>
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<td>Lebanese Forces</td>
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<td>Christian (mainly Maronite)</td>
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<td>Social Democratic Party</td>
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<td>Christian (mainly Maronite)</td>
<td>14 March</td>
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<tr>
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<td>Sunni Muslim</td>
<td>Sunni Muslim</td>
<td>14 March</td>
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<td>Ramgavar (Armenian)</td>
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<td>Armenian</td>
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<td>Democratic Left Movement</td>
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<td>Cross-Confessional</td>
<td>14 March</td>
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<tr>
<td>National Liberal Party</td>
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<td>Secular</td>
<td>Christian</td>
<td>14 March</td>
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Table 6: Representation of political parties in parliament since 1992

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<td>Almustaqbal (previously, the Hariri Bloc)</td>
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<tr>
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<tr>
<td><strong>TOTAL</strong></td>
<td>52</td>
<td>41%</td>
<td>71</td>
<td>55%</td>
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<td>-</td>
<td>2</td>
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<td>Popular Nasserites</td>
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<td>1</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
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<td>1</td>
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<td>Toilers' League (Al-Shaghila)</td>
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<td>1</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
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<tr>
<td><strong>TOTAL</strong></td>
<td>10</td>
<td>8%</td>
<td>9</td>
<td>7%</td>
<td>8</td>
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<td>n/a</td>
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<td>Waad Party (Elie Hobeika)</td>
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<td>-</td>
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<td>Marada (Sleiman Frangieh)</td>
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<td>5</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>4</td>
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<tr>
<td>National Liberal (Dory Chamoun)</td>
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<td>-</td>
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<td>National Bloc (Carlos Eddé)</td>
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<td>Democratic Renewal (Nassib Lahoud)</td>
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<td><strong>TOTAL</strong></td>
<td>8</td>
<td>6%</td>
<td>6</td>
<td>5%</td>
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Table 7: Ad-hoc blocs and ‘independent’ candidates in Parliament since 1992

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<tr>
<td>Murr Bloc (Michel Murr)</td>
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<td>3</td>
<td>2</td>
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<td>Skaff Bloc (Elias Skaff)</td>
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<td>-</td>
<td>5</td>
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<td>Zahlé Bloc (Nicola Fattouch, Okab Sakr)</td>
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<td>Tripoli Bloc (Mohamed Safadi)</td>
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<td>Majd Movement (Najib Mikati)</td>
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<td>-</td>
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<td>Omar Karameh Bloc</td>
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<td>(Prime Minister) Selim Hoss Bloc</td>
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<td><strong>3</strong></td>
<td><strong>10</strong></td>
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<tr>
<td><strong>%</strong></td>
<td><strong>27%</strong></td>
<td><strong>11%</strong></td>
<td><strong>2%</strong></td>
<td><strong>8%</strong></td>
<td><strong>9%</strong></td>
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<td>n/a</td>
<td>-</td>
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<td><strong>TOTAL</strong></td>
<td><strong>24</strong></td>
<td><strong>19%</strong></td>
<td><strong>28</strong></td>
<td><strong>37</strong></td>
<td><strong>29%</strong></td>
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<tr>
<td><strong>%</strong></td>
<td><strong>19%</strong></td>
<td><strong>22%</strong></td>
<td><strong>29%</strong></td>
<td><strong>5%</strong></td>
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Table 8: Representation of multiparty alliances in Parliament since 2005

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<td>Until January 2011</td>
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<tr>
<td>March 8</td>
<td>57</td>
<td>57</td>
<td>60</td>
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<td>March 14</td>
<td>69</td>
<td>71</td>
<td>68</td>
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<tr>
<td><strong>Total</strong></td>
<td><strong>128</strong></td>
<td><strong>128</strong></td>
<td><strong>128</strong></td>
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## Appendix 2

### CONSOCIATIONALISM IN THE CABINET

Table 1: Premiership and cabinet size under the French Mandate

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<th>Year</th>
<th>Prime Minister</th>
<th>Confession of Prime Minister</th>
<th>Mūḥāfaza of Prime Minister</th>
<th>Cabinet Size¹</th>
<th>Ministers without Portfolio</th>
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<td>1926-1927</td>
<td>Augustus Adib</td>
<td>Maronite</td>
<td>Mount Lebanon</td>
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<td>0</td>
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<tr>
<td>1927-1928</td>
<td>Bechara Khoury</td>
<td>Maronite</td>
<td>Mount Lebanon</td>
<td>7</td>
<td>0</td>
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<tr>
<td>1928</td>
<td>Bechara Khoury</td>
<td>Maronite</td>
<td>Mount Lebanon</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1928-1929</td>
<td>Habib Saad Pasha</td>
<td>Maronite</td>
<td>Mount Lebanon</td>
<td>4</td>
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<td>Bechara Khoury</td>
<td>Maronite</td>
<td>Mount Lebanon</td>
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<tr>
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<td>1930-1932</td>
<td>Augustus Adib</td>
<td>Maronite</td>
<td>Mount Lebanon</td>
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<td>1937</td>
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<td>Sunni Muslim</td>
<td>North/Tripoli</td>
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<td>1937</td>
<td>Khayreddin Al-Ahdab</td>
<td>Sunni Muslim</td>
<td>North/Tripoli</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>0</td>
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<tr>
<td>1937</td>
<td>Khayreddin Al-Ahdab</td>
<td>Sunni Muslim</td>
<td>North/Tripoli</td>
<td>5</td>
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<td>Sunni Muslim</td>
<td>North/Tripoli</td>
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<tr>
<td>1938</td>
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<td>Sunni Muslim</td>
<td>North/Tripoli</td>
<td>7</td>
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<tr>
<td>1938</td>
<td>Amir Khalid</td>
<td>Sunni Muslim</td>
<td>The South</td>
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<td>1938-1939</td>
<td>Abdallah Al-Yafi</td>
<td>Sunni Muslim</td>
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</table>

Average Cabinet Size 5.75

¹ Cabinets are noticeably small in size comprising of a small number of notable-bureaucrats and emerging capitalists with connections to the French Mandate and the Franco-Lebanese bourgeoisie. Amongst the most prominent members of Mandate period governments are: Ayoub Thabet (Beirut/Protestant/1928); Hussein Al-Ahdab (Tripoli/Sunny/1928); Sobhi Haydar (Bekaa/Shiite/1928); Ahmad Al-Husseini (Mount Lebanon/Shiite/1929); Gebran Toueni (Beirut/Greek Orthodox/1930); Fouad Osseiran (South/Shiite/1941); Ahmad Al-As’ad (South/Shiite/1941); Hikmat Jumblatt (Mount Lebanon/Druze/1941); and Hamid Frangieh (North/Maronite/1941).
Table 2: Premiership and cabinet size in independence period (1943-1958)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Prime Minister</th>
<th>Confession of Prime Minister</th>
<th>Muḥāfaza of Prime Minister</th>
<th>Cabinet Size*</th>
<th>Ministers without Portfolio</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1943-1944</td>
<td>Riad Al-Sulh</td>
<td>Sunni Muslim</td>
<td>6</td>
<td>0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1944-1945</td>
<td>Riad Al-Sulh</td>
<td>Sunni Muslim</td>
<td>6</td>
<td>0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1945</td>
<td>Abd-Hamid Karameh</td>
<td>Sunni Muslim</td>
<td>6</td>
<td>0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1945-1946</td>
<td>Sami Al-Sulh</td>
<td>Sunni Muslim</td>
<td>8</td>
<td>0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1946</td>
<td>Saadi Munla</td>
<td>Sunni Muslim</td>
<td>8</td>
<td>0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1946-1947</td>
<td>Riad Al-Sulh</td>
<td>Sunni Muslim</td>
<td>9</td>
<td>0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1947-1948</td>
<td>Riad Al-Sulh</td>
<td>Sunni Muslim</td>
<td>8</td>
<td>0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1948-1949</td>
<td>Riad Al-Sulh</td>
<td>Sunni Muslim</td>
<td>8</td>
<td>0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1949-1951</td>
<td>Riad Al-Sulh</td>
<td>Sunni Muslim</td>
<td>10</td>
<td>0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1951</td>
<td>Hussein El-Oueini</td>
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<td>3</td>
<td>0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1951-1952</td>
<td>Abdallah Al-Yafi</td>
<td>Sunni Muslim</td>
<td>10</td>
<td>0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1952</td>
<td>Sami Al-Sulh</td>
<td>Sunni Muslim</td>
<td>10</td>
<td>0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1952</td>
<td>Sami Al-Sulh</td>
<td>Sunni Muslim</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1952</td>
<td>Fouad Chehab</td>
<td>Maronite</td>
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<tr>
<td>1952-1953</td>
<td>Amir Khalid Chehab</td>
<td>Sunni Muslim</td>
<td>4</td>
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<tr>
<td>1953</td>
<td>Saeb Salam</td>
<td>Sunni Muslim</td>
<td>8</td>
<td>0</td>
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<tr>
<td>1953-1954</td>
<td>Abdallah Al-Yafi</td>
<td>Sunni Muslim</td>
<td>8</td>
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</tr>
<tr>
<td>1954</td>
<td>Abdallah Al-Yafi</td>
<td>Sunni Muslim</td>
<td>8</td>
<td>0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1954-1955</td>
<td>Sami Al-Sulh</td>
<td>Sunni Muslim</td>
<td>10</td>
<td>0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1955-1956</td>
<td>Rachid Karameh</td>
<td>Sunni Muslim</td>
<td>10</td>
<td>0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1956</td>
<td>Abdallah Al-Yafi</td>
<td>Sunni Muslim</td>
<td>10</td>
<td>0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1956-1957</td>
<td>Sami Al-Sulh</td>
<td>Sunni Muslim</td>
<td>6</td>
<td>0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1957-1958</td>
<td>Sami Al-Sulh</td>
<td>Sunni Muslim</td>
<td>8</td>
<td>0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1958</td>
<td>Sami Al-Sulh</td>
<td>Sunni Muslim</td>
<td>12</td>
<td>0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Average Cabinet Size</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td><strong>7.58</strong></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

1 Average number of ministerial portfolios or cabinet size in the first fifteen years of independence increases noticeably. This is partly due to the growing responsibilities of the government in the post-mandate period but also to co-opt and integrate a larger number of zu`ama (feudalists as well as emerging capitalists).

2 First government in the post-mandate Lebanese Republic comprising of emerging capitalists and bureaucrat-patrons such as Riad Al-Sulh; Habib Abou Shahla; Camille Chamoun and Salim Taqla alongside Druze feudalist-prince Amir Majid Arslan and Shiite feudalist from the South, Adel Osseiran.

3 Prime Minister Riad Al-Sulh integrates feudalist notables into the cabinet – these include Shi`i feudalist from the Bekaa, Sabri Hamadeh; the Druze feudalist -socialist, Kamal Jumblatt. Government also expands to include a number of Beirut capitalists such as Abdallah Al-Yafi (Sunni); Henri Pharaon (Greek-Orthodox) and Elias Khouri and Gabriel Murr (Christian).

4 Beirut-based Shi`i za`im, Rachid Baydoun, is included in Abdallah Al-Yafi’s government (1951) allowing him access to state patronage. Baydoun played an instrumental role in mitigating the mass migration of rural Shites from the South and the Bekaa to Beirut and, through his patronage and philanthropy, contributed to their integration in the city’s social fabric and capitalist-tertiary economy. In 1953, Saeb Salam appointed Baydoun in his 1953 cabinet for the second time.

5 Maronite military General Fouad Chehab is appointed Prime Minister in an exceptionally-minimalist government of three persons in 1952 to mitigate risings conflicts amongst the ruling elite.
Table 3: Premiership and cabinet size between the two civil wars (1958-1975)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Year</th>
<th>Prime Minister</th>
<th>Confession of Prime Minister</th>
<th>Muṭḥafazat of Prime Minister</th>
<th>Cabinet Size</th>
<th>Ministers without Portfolio</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1958</td>
<td>Rachid Karameh</td>
<td>Sunni Muslim</td>
<td>North/Tripoli</td>
<td>8</td>
<td>0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1958-1960</td>
<td>Rachid Karameh</td>
<td>Sunni Muslim</td>
<td>North/Tripoli</td>
<td>8</td>
<td>0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1960</td>
<td>Ahmad Da’uq</td>
<td>Sunni Muslim</td>
<td>Beirut</td>
<td>8</td>
<td>0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1960-1961</td>
<td>Saeb Salam</td>
<td>Sunni Muslim</td>
<td>Beirut</td>
<td>18</td>
<td>0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1961</td>
<td>Saeb Salam</td>
<td>Sunni Muslim</td>
<td>Beirut</td>
<td>8</td>
<td>0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1961-1964</td>
<td>Rachid Karameh</td>
<td>Sunni Muslim</td>
<td>North/Tripoli</td>
<td>14</td>
<td>0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1964</td>
<td>Hussein Oueini</td>
<td>Sunni Muslim</td>
<td>Beirut</td>
<td>10</td>
<td>0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1964-1965</td>
<td>Hussein Oueini</td>
<td>Sunni Muslim</td>
<td>Beirut</td>
<td>14</td>
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</tr>
<tr>
<td>1965-1966</td>
<td>Rachid Karameh</td>
<td>Sunni Muslim</td>
<td>North/Tripoli</td>
<td>10</td>
<td>0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1966</td>
<td>Abdallah Al-Yafi</td>
<td>Sunni Muslim</td>
<td>Beirut</td>
<td>10</td>
<td>0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1966-1968</td>
<td>Rachid Karameh</td>
<td>Sunni Muslim</td>
<td>North/Tripoli</td>
<td>10</td>
<td>0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1968</td>
<td>Abdallah Al-Yafi</td>
<td>Sunni Muslim</td>
<td>Beirut</td>
<td>10</td>
<td>0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1968-1969</td>
<td>Abdallah Al-Yafi</td>
<td>Sunni Muslim</td>
<td>Beirut</td>
<td>8</td>
<td>0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1969</td>
<td>Rachid Karameh</td>
<td>Sunni Muslim</td>
<td>North/Tripoli</td>
<td>20</td>
<td>0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1969-1970</td>
<td>Rachid Karameh</td>
<td>Sunni Muslim</td>
<td>North/Tripoli</td>
<td>16</td>
<td>0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1970-1972</td>
<td>Saeb Salam</td>
<td>Sunni Muslim</td>
<td>Beirut</td>
<td>12</td>
<td>0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1972-1973</td>
<td>Saeb Salam</td>
<td>Sunni Muslim</td>
<td>Beirut</td>
<td>16</td>
<td>0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1973</td>
<td>Amine Hafez</td>
<td>Sunni Muslim</td>
<td>The North</td>
<td>17</td>
<td>0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1973-1974</td>
<td>Taqi El-Dine Al-Sulh</td>
<td>Sunni Muslim</td>
<td>Beirut</td>
<td>22</td>
<td>4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1974-1975</td>
<td>Rachid Al-Sulh</td>
<td>Sunni Muslim</td>
<td>Beirut</td>
<td>18</td>
<td>0</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Average Cabinet Size: 12.43

1 Average cabinet size expands even further in the 1958-1975 period. Under the presidencies of Fouad Chehab (1958-1964) and Charles Helou (1964-1970) expanded cabinets allowed the Chehabist regime to co-opt and consolidate emerging notables opposed to the old regime and, hence, to push forth Chehabist reforms. Under Sleiman Frangieh, government expanded further to include an unprecedented 22 portfolios intended to revive pre-1958 za’imshifs without challenging the new zu’ama of the Chehabist era.

2 Under the instruction of President Fouad Chehab and in light of the ambitious plan to reduce regional and sectoral disparities, Rachid Karameh’s consecutive governments served to integrate emerging zu’ama from peripheral and underserved regions into the regime – partly, in a conscious attempt to reduce disparities by allowing the emergence of new zu’ama. Examples include Ali Bazzi (Bint-Jbeil/Shi’i’a) in 1958; Joseph Skaff (Bekaa/Catholic) and René Mouawad (North/Maronite) in 1961; Sleiman El-Zein (South/Shi’a) and Fouad Rizk (Zahlé/Catholic) in 1966.

3 Prime Minister Saeb Salam expands the cabinet to an unprecedented 18-portfolio government co-opting a greater number of emerging Beirut capitalists including members of such prominent families as Majdalani (Greek-Orthodox), Mashnouk and Al-Dana (Suni).

4 Under the premiership of Rachid Karameh, the government expands to twenty portfolios – hence, co-opting capitalist and feudal notables as Majid Arslan (Mount Lebanon/Druze); Adel Osseiran (South/Shi’a); Pierre Gemmayel (Beirut/Maronite); Bahji Taqi El-din (Mount Lebanon/Druze); Nassim Majdalani (Beirut/Greek Orthodox); Uthman Al-Dana (Beirut/Suni); Raymond Eddé (Mount Lebanon/Maronite); René Mouawad (North/Maronite); Abdel-Latif Al-Zein (South/Shi’a); Khalil Khoury (Mount Lebanon/Maronite); Mohammad Safi Al-Din (South/Shi’a); Michel Murr (Mount Lebanon/Greek Orthodox); Chafiq Wazzan (Beirut/Suni).

5 Taqi El-Din Al-Sulh introduced Tony Frangieh (North/Maronite) and Shi’i feudalist Sabri Hamadeh (Bekaa/Shi’a) to the government. Moreover, the cabinet co-opted emerging Saida-based capitalist Nazih Al-Bizri (South/Suni).
Table 4: Premiership and size of wartime cabinets (1975-1989)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Year</th>
<th>Prime Minister</th>
<th>Confession of Prime Minister</th>
<th>Muḥāfaẓa of Prime Minister</th>
<th>Cabinet Size</th>
<th>Ministers without Portfolio</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1975</td>
<td>Noureddine Rifai²</td>
<td>Sunni Muslim</td>
<td>MILITARY</td>
<td>8</td>
<td>0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1975-1976</td>
<td>Rachid Karameh</td>
<td>Sunni Muslim</td>
<td>North/Tripoli</td>
<td>6</td>
<td>0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1976-1979</td>
<td>Salim Hoss</td>
<td>Sunni Muslim</td>
<td>Beirut</td>
<td>8</td>
<td>0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1979-1980</td>
<td>Salim Hoss</td>
<td>Sunni Muslim</td>
<td>Beirut</td>
<td>12</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1980-1982</td>
<td>Chafiq Wazzan³</td>
<td>Sunni Muslim</td>
<td>Beirut</td>
<td>22</td>
<td>5</td>
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<tr>
<td>1982-1984</td>
<td>Chafiq Wazzan</td>
<td>Sunni Muslim</td>
<td>Beirut</td>
<td>10</td>
<td>2</td>
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<tr>
<td>1984-1988</td>
<td>Rachid Karameh⁴</td>
<td>Sunni Muslim</td>
<td>North/Tripoli</td>
<td>10</td>
<td>0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1988-1989</td>
<td>Michel Aoun⁵</td>
<td>Maronite</td>
<td>MILITARY</td>
<td>6</td>
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<tr>
<td></td>
<td><strong>Average Cabinet Size</strong></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td><strong>10.25</strong></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

¹ In an attempt to co-opt warring patrons and zu’ama, the Salim Hoss cabinet of 1979 is expanded to 22 ministers including the first-ever ‘minister without portfolio’. These sinecure ministerial positions allowed the wartime regime to integrate militia protagonists into the cabinet granting them the right to debate and vote on key policy issues without allocating executive functions or heading particular ministries. In part, this can be attributed to state failure and the appropriation of executive functions by the militias. However, this practice persisted in the postwar era becoming an integral instrument of balance-of-power politics.

² The country’s first military government of eight army generals in a carefully-calculated confessional-consociational formula. The government was intended to mitigate military conflict between the wartime protagonists and, hence, the cabinet was reduced from eighteen ministerial portfolios to eight and, under Karameh, six.

³ Shiite notables co-opted by AMAL and allied to its new leader, Nabih Berri, such as Mohammed Abdulhamid Baydoun, Ali Al-Khalil, Mahmoud Ammar and Anwar Al-Sabbah are included in the Chafik Wazzan cabinet.

⁴ Under the presidency of Amine Gemayel and the Premiership of Rachid Karameh, militiamen and wartime entrepreneurs were integrated into the regime allowing them access to state patronage as well as granting their appropriation of state resources and coercive functions the required legitimacy. Nabih Berri (AMAL) and Walid Jumblatt (PSP) are examples.

⁵ Hours before his term as President ended, Amine Gemayel appointed Maronite army commander-in-chief, General Michel Aoun, to the premiership. Aoun’s military government comprised of only six portfolios – each, held by a general representing one of the major six confessions.
Table 5: Premiership and cabinet size in the postwar era (1989 –)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Prime Minister</th>
<th>Confession of Prime Minister</th>
<th>Muḥāfaza of Prime Minister</th>
<th>Cabinet Size</th>
<th>Ministers without Portfolio</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1989-1990</td>
<td>Salim Hoss</td>
<td>Sunni Muslim</td>
<td>Beirut</td>
<td>14</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1990-1992</td>
<td>Omar Karameh</td>
<td>Sunni Muslim</td>
<td>North/Tripoli</td>
<td>30</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1992</td>
<td>Rachid Al-Sulh²</td>
<td>Sunni Muslim</td>
<td>Beirut</td>
<td>21</td>
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</tbody>
</table>

Demobilisation of militias

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Year</th>
<th>Prime Minister</th>
<th>Confession of Prime Minister</th>
<th>Muḥāfaza of Prime Minister</th>
<th>Cabinet Size</th>
<th>Ministers without Portfolio</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1992-1995</td>
<td>Rafic Hariri³</td>
<td>Sunni Muslim</td>
<td>Beirut</td>
<td>30</td>
<td>3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1995-1996</td>
<td>Rafic Hariri</td>
<td>Sunni Muslim</td>
<td>Beirut</td>
<td>30</td>
<td>3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1996-1998</td>
<td>Rafic Hariri</td>
<td>Sunni Muslim</td>
<td>Beirut</td>
<td>30</td>
<td>5</td>
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<tr>
<td>1998-2000</td>
<td>Salim Hoss</td>
<td>Sunni Muslim</td>
<td>Beirut</td>
<td>16</td>
<td>2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2000-2003</td>
<td>Rafic Hariri</td>
<td>Sunni Muslim</td>
<td>Beirut</td>
<td>30</td>
<td>7</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2003-2004</td>
<td>Rafic Hariri⁴</td>
<td>Sunni Muslim</td>
<td>Beirut</td>
<td>30</td>
<td>7</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2004-2005</td>
<td>Omar Karameh</td>
<td>Sunni Muslim</td>
<td>North/Tripoli</td>
<td>30</td>
<td>7</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Assassination of former Prime Minister Rafic Hariri

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Year</th>
<th>Prime Minister</th>
<th>Confession of Prime Minister</th>
<th>Muḥāfaza of Prime Minister</th>
<th>Cabinet Size</th>
<th>Ministers without Portfolio</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>2005</td>
<td>Najib Mikati</td>
<td>Sunni Muslim</td>
<td>North/Tripoli</td>
<td>13</td>
<td>0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2005-2008</td>
<td>Fouad Siniora⁵</td>
<td>Sunni Muslim</td>
<td>South/Saida</td>
<td>24</td>
<td>2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2008-2009</td>
<td>Fouad Siniora⁵</td>
<td>Sunni Muslim</td>
<td>South/Saida</td>
<td>30</td>
<td>8</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2009-2011</td>
<td>Saad Hariri⁵</td>
<td>Sunni Muslim</td>
<td>Beirut</td>
<td>30</td>
<td>8</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2011-</td>
<td>Najib Mikati⁶</td>
<td>Sunni Muslim</td>
<td>North/Tripoli</td>
<td>30</td>
<td>7</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Average Cabinet Size 25.4

¹ Cabinet size increased to unprecedented sizes in order to co-opt remaining pre-war notables, wartime protagonists as well as emerging postwar zu’ama and party-patrons.

² Rachid Al-Sulh’s government included such wartime entrepreneurs as Michel Murr (Mount Lebanon/Greek Orthodox) as well as AMAL’s Mohammed Abdulhamid Baydoun. Moreover, amongst his Ministers without Portfolio, Al-Sulh appointed the leaders of prominent militias-turned-parties: Samir Geagea of the Lebanese Forces, Nabih Berri of AMAL and Walid Jumblatt of the PSP.

³ First government formed after the demobilisation of militias under the premiership of Saudi-backed Rafic Hariri. In his cabinet, Hariri included pre-war notables such as Ali Osseiran (South/Shi’a); wartime entrepreneurs and militiaen such as Michel Eddé (Beirut/Maronite), Sleiman Frangieh (North/Maronite), Marwan Hamadeh (Mount Lebanon/Druze), Michel Murr (Mount Lebanon/Greek Orthodox), Michel Samaha (Mount Lebanon/Catholic) and Anwar Al-Khalil (South/Druze). The government also included postwar capitalists including Hariri himself (Beirut/Sunni) and Fouad Siniora (South/Sunni).

⁴ Cabinet included controversial, Syria-backed leader of the Kataeb Party, Karim Pakradouni, in an attempt to consolidate his claim to leadership vis-à-vis the Gemayels.

⁵ Hezbollah is integrated for the first time in government. In 2005, MP Mohammed Fneish was appointed Minister of Energy and Water Resources while Hezbollah-endorsed leftist-turned-Islamist Trad Hamadeh was appointed Minister of Labour. Fneish succeeded Hamadeh as Minister of Labour in Siniora’s second government in 2008. Hezbollah gained a second ministerial portfolio in the Saad Hariri cabinet of 2009 and nominated Hussein Haji-Hassan to occupy the Ministry of Agriculture.

⁶ Although endorsed by Hezbollah, the Mikati government included the same number of Hezbollah ministers. Moreover, AMAL reduced its share from three to two portfolios allowing the appointment of Sunni allies from Tripoli in an attempts to undermine Hariri’s za’imship over the Sunni confession.
<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Year</th>
<th>Total</th>
<th>Christians</th>
<th>Muslims</th>
<th>Druze</th>
<th>Greek Orthodox</th>
<th>Catholic</th>
<th>Maronite</th>
<th>Total</th>
<th>Sunni</th>
<th>Total</th>
<th>Total</th>
<th>Total</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1926-1927</td>
<td>394</td>
<td>3</td>
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Table 7: Confessional distribution of ministerial portfolios (1943-1958)

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First Armenian appointed to a ministerial post marking the integration of the Armenian confession(s) in the confessional-consociational system.
Table 9: Confessional distribution of ministerial portfolios during the Civil War

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Table 11: Distribution of ministerial portfolios by *muḥāfaza* (Mandate Period)

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Table 12: Distribution of ministerial portfolios by muḥafaza (Independence Period)

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<th>Bekaa</th>
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### Table 13: Distribution of ministerial portfolios by *muḥāfaza* (1958-1975)

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<th>Bekaa</th>
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### Table 14: Distribution of ministerial portfolios by *muḥāfaza* (1975-1996)

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<th>Bekaa</th>
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<td>22</td>
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<td>4</td>
<td>3</td>
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<td>14</td>
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<td>4</td>
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<td>2</td>
<td>14</td>
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Table 15: Distribution of ministerial portfolios since 2005

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<th>March 14</th>
<th>Presidential Quota</th>
<th>Independent</th>
<th>Total</th>
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<tr>
<td></td>
<td>- Cabinet deemed illegitimate after Shiite ministers resign in November 2006</td>
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<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>- Government collapses following events of May 7, 2008. Crisis resolved following the Doha Agreement.</td>
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</tr>
<tr>
<td>2008-2009</td>
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<td>4</td>
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<tr>
<td>2009-2011</td>
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<td>19^3</td>
<td>-^4</td>
<td>11^5</td>
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</table>

1 Although constituting a Parliamentary minority, the March 8 coalition has been represented in cabinets formed by the March 14 parliamentary majority – an indication of both camps’ commitment to not only confessional but also za’imist consociation.

2 Three ‘independent’ ministers loyal to President Emile Lahoud (and, hence, to the March 8 coalition) were appointed to the government. Collectively, the nine-minister bloc constituted one-third of the cabinet – hence, retaining the ability to veto government decisions on foreign policy and other strategic issues. This is a clear indication of the commitment to consociation – between confessions as well as between rival political camps.

3 Michel Aoun nominated eleven ministers – hence, retaining, singularly, the power to veto government decisions. Aoun’s strong representation in Mikati’s cabinet marks his ‘comeback’ to political leadership since his exclusion from political office in 1990.

4 For the first time since 2005, one of the two political camps is unrepresented in the Mikati government of 2011 which can, therefore, be considered a majoritarian government – that is to say, a government formed by the political party (or coalition) with the required parliamentary majority. Nonetheless, in terms of confessional representation, the 2011 cabinet upholds parity between Muslims and Christians (parity between Sunnis and Shiites however has been violated voluntarily as AMAL ‘gave up’ one of its portfolios to Sunni ally, Faisal Karameh).

5 The government also includes eleven ministers considered non-aligned to March 8 – hence, retaining the power to veto its decisions. These ministers are divided into three subgroups allied to President Michel Sleiman, Prime Minister Najib Mikati and/or Walid Jumblatt respectively. Although unrepresented in the government, this bloc is considered to be a ‘guarantee’ for the March 14 opposition depriving the March 8 coalition of absolute power.
Table 16: Government of 2011 under the Premiership of Najib Mikati

<table>
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<th>Ministry</th>
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<th>Party</th>
<th>Quota</th>
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<td>Ali Hassan Khalil</td>
<td>Public Health</td>
<td>Shia</td>
<td>AMAL</td>
<td>8 March</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Adnan Mansour</td>
<td>Foreign Affairs &amp; Emigration</td>
<td>Shia</td>
<td>AMAL</td>
<td>8 March</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Charbel Nahas</td>
<td>Labour</td>
<td>Greek Catholic</td>
<td>FPM</td>
<td>8 March</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Nicola Sahnawi</td>
<td>Telecommunications</td>
<td>Greek Catholic</td>
<td>FPM</td>
<td>8 March</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Gaby Layyoun</td>
<td>Culture</td>
<td>Greek Orthodox</td>
<td>FPM</td>
<td>8 March</td>
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<td>Gebran Bassil</td>
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<td>FPM</td>
<td>8 March</td>
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<tr>
<td>Fady Aboud</td>
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<td>FPM</td>
<td>8 March</td>
</tr>
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<td>Chakib Qurtbawi</td>
<td>Justice</td>
<td>Maronite</td>
<td>FPM</td>
<td>8 March</td>
</tr>
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<td>Mohammad Fneish</td>
<td>Administrative Develop.</td>
<td>Shia</td>
<td>Hezbollah</td>
<td>8 March</td>
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Sources: [www.nowlebanon.com](http://www.nowlebanon.com); [www.naharnet.com](http://www.naharnet.com); [www.al-akhbar.com](http://www.al-akhbar.com); [forum.tayyar.com](http://forum.tayyar.com); [www.yalibnan.com](http://www.yalibnan.com);

¹ Familial disagreements between Karameh in-laws created a deadlock as Premier Mikati insisted on appointing his close ally, Faisal Karameh – a step deemed necessary to consolidate Mikati’s parliamentary bloc for electoral considerations pertaining to the 2013 general election. The patron of the Karameh family, Omar Karameh, insisted that his son, Ahmad, be appointed. The crisis was only resolved when AMAL decided to ‘give up’ one of its Shiite seats in the Cabinet to Ahmad Karameh.
Appendix 3

Mapping the Sectoral, Socioeconomic and Geographic Cleavages

Figure 1: Income distribution by muḥāfaza

Source: Éric Verdeil (2007:138)

Figure 2: Distribution of wealth and poverty in Greater Beirut

Source: Éric Verdeil (2007:141)
Figure 3 and 4: Mapping illiteracy and education in Lebanon

Source: Éric Verdeil (2007:144)
Figure 5 and 6: Mapping the Hospitality Industry

Source: Éric Verdeil (2007: 133-134)
Figure 7: Mapping commerce and wholesale/retail distribution

Source: Éric Verdeil (2007:132)
Table 1: Poverty rates (%) by governorate (*muḥāfaza*)

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*Source:* Salti and Chaaban (2010)
Appendix 4

MAPPING THE CONFESSIONAL AND GEOGRAPHIC CLEAVAGES

Figure 1: Distribution of main sectarian communities in Lebanon

Source: Illinois Institute of Technology, Paul V. Galvin Library [Online]
Figure 2: Distribution of Christian confessions in Lebanon

Source: Éric Verdeil (2007:85)
Figure 3: Distribution of Muslim confessions in Lebanon

Source: Éric Verdeil (2007:86)
Figure 4: Sectarian composition of each muḥāfaza

Source: Salti and Chaaban (2010)
Figure 5: Militia cantons during the Civil War

Source: Éric Verdeil (2007:14)
Figure 6: Travel within and between East and West Beirut in the postwar era (i.e. travel across the wartime fault line)

Source: Éric Verdeil (2007)
Figure 7: Expansion of real estate developments in Dahiyeh towards/into Hadath

Figure 8: Election propaganda in Hadath, May 2010

Photography by author
Figure 9: Beirut’s eastern suburbs and southern suburbs

Realised by author
Figure 10: Socioeconomic and confessional demographics of Dahiyeh

Mixed Neighbourhoods

Palestinian Refugee Camps

Shi’a-majority: middle and high-income
Shi’a-majority: low-income

Developed and realised by author
Figure 11: Partisan and religious symbols at inter-communal fault lines – Chiyah

Memorial dedicated to ‘the sacrifices of the Christian resistance’ during the Civil War (left) and a Marian shrine dedicated to the Maronite Saint Charbel (top) at a roundabout on the Old Saida Road separating the mixed (Shi’a/Christian) neighbourhood of Chiyah and predominantly-Maronite Furn El-Chebak.

Photography by author
Figure 12: Partisan and religious symbols at inter-communal fault lines – Zokak El-Blat

AMAL mural featuring logo, quotes from Imam Moussa as-Sadr and the bifurcated sword of Imam Ali

Hezbollah and AMAL flags and posters near the Zokak El-Blat police station

Source: Gebhardt et al (2005)
Figure 13: Flashpoints of sectarian violence since 2005 and the confessional-regional cleavage

Source: Lebanon Support
http://lebanon-support.org/
Figure 14: Security and military arrangements in Beirut in ‘interface’ zones (since 2008)

Source: Fawaz and Harb (2011)
Figure 15: Partisan (AMAL) symbols in the aftermath of the May-7 (2008) events

Mural on Spears Street demarcating boundaries of AMAL stronghold of Zokak El-Blat and Hariri stronghold of Qantari/Sanayeh

One of many AMAL logos hastily-sprayed in Hariri strongholds following May-7 events

(Photography by author)
Appendix 5

MAPPING PARTY-AFFILIATED WELFARE SERVICES

Figure 1: Mapping Almustaqbal welfare provision versus geographic concentration of Sunnis in Lebanon

Figure 2: Mapping Hezbollah Welfare Provision versus geographic concentration of Shiites in Lebanon

Source: Cammett and Issar (2010)
Figure 3: Distribution of services provided by *al-hay’a al-siḥiya al-islāmiyya* (IHA)

Source: [www.hayaa.org](http://www.hayaa.org)
Appendix 6

ELECTIONS, CONSTITUENCIES AND MUNICIPALITIES

Figure 1: Electoral districts (1992-2005)

Limites des circonscriptions

Source: Éric Verdeil (2007:17)
Figure 2 Confessional and regional distribution of Parliament (1992-2005)

Source: Éric Verdeil (2007:17)
Figure 3: Electoral districts (2008)

Source: ArabiaGIS
Figure 4: Electoral districts in Beirut in 2005 and 2008

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Source: www.jiehonline.com
Figure 5: Mapping the results of the 2005 general election

Source: Éric Verdeil (2007:19)
Figure 6: Administrative divisions in Lebanon

Administrative divisions in 1920

Administrative divisions in 1925

Administrative divisions in 1930

Administrative divisions between 1950 and 2003

Source: Éric Verdeil (2007:26)
Figure 7: The municipalisation of Lebanon

Source: Éric Verdeil (2007:26)
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