Abstract.

This study examines St. John Chrysostom's teaching on two strands of thought. The first relates to a modern Orthodox commonplace holding eastern Christian thought as fundamentally therapeutic, in contrast to a juridical western Christianity. It was hypothesized that 1) neither provides a strong fundamental paradigm because each can be variously interpreted based on one's answer to the question, “What is man?” and 2) the πολιτεία of heaven (the theme, according to Chrysostom, of all the evangelists), might provide a sufficient paradigm. The πολιτεία of heaven does provide a better major paradigm – seamlessly incorporating therapeutic and juridical language and the common Christian understanding of man as a communal being in relation firstly with God and then with creation. However, this paradigm requires fleshing out with various images to avoid being misconstrued. The second strand furthered earlier work on the Orthodox understanding of sanity, insanity, and demonic possession. Chrysostom allowed for non-demonic mental illness, but was far more concerned with the insanity of sin than with mental illness or possession. This view is common, but Chrysostom is remarkable for his enormous compassion for both groups and his vehement insistence that sin is far worse insanity. Both strands show man on a continuum – the lower limit case being the ἄλογος man who lives for himself and temporal things; the upper case, exemplified by the monk – the true member of the πολιτεία of heaven – who loves God and neighbor and seeks heavenly things. The thesis concludes by examining the consequences of these findings for modern Chrysostom scholarship. These include the necessity of 1) taking seriously Chrysostom’s accusations of insanity and demonic possession, 2) examining the effect of materialistic and democratic presuppositions on one’s understanding of Chrysostom’s work, and 3) addressing the question, “How does one study somebody who would consider one insane?”
Sanity, Insanity, and Man’s Being as Understood by St. John Chrysostom

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CHAPTER ONE: Introduction.

This thesis explores the limit cases in St. John Chrysostom’s understanding of what it means to be human. These limit cases can be understood in terms of sanity and insanity of soul. Alternatively, they can be understood in terms of the πολιτεία of heaven. In both cases, the upper limit case, epitomized by the monk, is the loving person who is in right relationship with God and neighbor and therefore is not enamored of transient things. The lower limit case is the self-centered person who, in his pursuit of earthly things, has separated himself from God and neighbor.

Chapter Two examines Chrysostom’s view on mental illness, demonic possession, and the insantiy of sin, drawing mostly from his Homilies on Matthew, but also including other Chrysostom writings and comparing them with those of his contemporaries. This chapter demonstrates that mental illness and demonic possession are milder forms of insanity than insanity of soul, i.e. sin, especially willful sin. The willful sinner is ἄλογος – insane because he has separated himself from the Λόγος and thus is subject to μανία, violent madness. All passions are ἄλογος, but covetousness, envy of others, and enmity towards God are pre-eminently insane. The more willfully one sins, the nearer he places himself to the lower limit case of humanity, which ironically is the subhuman, sub-bestial, and even demonic. Conversely, the one (epitomized by the monk) who draws close to the Λόγος becomes fully human.

Chapter Three focuses exclusively on the Homilies on Matthew. It was originally conceived as an examination of a commonplace in modern Orthodox thought, which sees West and East as operating from predominantly juridical and therapeutic paradigms, respectively. It was hypothesized that community (in particular, the πολιτεία of heaven, which Chrysostom considers to be the theme of St. Matthew’s Gospel) would provide a better paradigm, in that it could incorporate both juridical and therapeutic language and also provide a better idea of what it means to be human. It became apparent, though, that the true thrust of this section is on Chrysostom’s view of humanity. Thus, this chapter proceeds by studying how he uses the word ἄνθρωπος and then by examining his use of community, juridical, and therapeutic language and placing it all within the framework of the πολιτεία of heaven. The πολιτεία of heaven
is a better framework than the other two, although it must be supplemented with various images and it is not possible to fully explain humanity or men’s relationship to the Trinity. It also provided a view of humanity co-terminous with that of the sane and insane of soul. Here again, the monk is the model citizen of the πολιτεία – loving, unencumbered by worldly cares, and in proper relation with the Trinity and neighbor. His antithesis is the covetous man – self-centered, living for temporal things, at war with God and neighbor. Also important here are the necessity of the Incarnation and the sacraments.

Chapter Four attempted to corroborate and broaden the conclusions of Chapter Three by examining other writings of Chrysostom and also of the Cappadocian Fathers. The general lines of these conclusions were maintained, although none of the remaining Chrysostom writings nor of the Cappadocians so directly posited the πολιτεία of heaven as a major theme. Still, this πολιτεία continued to be a good framework for understanding Chrysostom’s thought and again showed the monk as the upper limit case and the covetous man as the lower.

Chapter Five concludes the thesis. First, it reiterates the main conclusions of Chapters Two through Four by showing how Chrysostom views man on a continuum of sorts. The upper limit case is epitomized by the monk. He is pre-eminently sane, in right relationship with the Λόγος (and the Father and the Spirit) and with all humanity, and unencumbered by temporal things. The lower limit case is epitomized by the covetous man. He is ἄλογος, at war with God and man, and utterly focused on temporal things. Second, it shows the extreme difficulty for modern scholars (at least native English speakers from materialistic, democratic political systems) of understanding Chrysotom’s thought due to an inherent distaste for hierarchically ordered society and to a primary (if not exclusive) focus on temporal life. Finally, it interprets contemporary Chrysostom studies in light of these findings.
CHAPTER TWO – Insanity, Sanity, and Demonic Possession

INTRODUCTION

A previous study indicated that the patristic conception of insanity or madness allows for mental illness distinct from demonic possession. In addition, in a cursory search through the Ante-Nicene Fathers (ANF) and the Nicene and Post-Nicene Fathers, Series I and II (NPNF-I and NPNF-II) for ‘mad’ and ‘insane’ (and their derivatives), most instances did not refer to the mentally ill, but to heretics, pagans, persecutors, and lackadaisical Christians. Furthermore, the mentally ill were considered less mad than the heretics, pagans, etc. These words were not hyperbole or gratuitous insult. Rather, the Fathers meant them quite sincerely, in the sense that not being in right relationship with God is a far worse madness than mental illness. This led to an examination of more terms, such as ‘beside oneself,’ ‘frenzy,’ ‘senseless,’ ‘irrational,’ ‘foolish,’ etc.

For the purposes of this paper, the term “mad” or “madness” when not referring to a passage that translates a certain Greek word in that way is to be understood to encompass all the above terms and the Greek words that they represent. This arbitrary usage does not assume that Chrysostom himself lumped all these terms together. However, some shorthand is necessary to avoid sentences such as “Chrysostom considers persecutors to be mad, foolish, frenzy-stricken, etc.” Where deemed necessary, the different words he uses will be remarked upon.

Also for the purposes of this paper, “mental illness” refers to aberrant behavior proceeding from physical or psychological causes, in contrast to demonic possession. Since Greek and Byzantine physicians clearly recognized certain types of mental illness, this term further refers to conditions that were medically recognized as such in Chrysostom’s own time.

This chapter will focus on Chrysostom’s homilies on the Gospel according to St. Matthew. The narrow scope allows for a detailed examination of the texts, including a close look at the actual words Chrysostom employed to discuss this subject. In addition, others of Chrysostom’s texts, mostly from the other NPNF Volumes, may be adduced to support or expand upon the findings from the Homilies on Matthew. The wider context

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1 Salem (2005), p. 100
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will be provided from appropriate secondary sources and from other Fathers. In addition to the Cappadocians (who will also be referenced in the next two chapters), Theodoret’s *History of the Monks of Syria* and Nemesius’ *On the Nature* (Φύσεως) of Man will be referenced. The History of the Monks of Syria gives a variety of instances of demonic possession and mental illness as understood in the milieu in which Chrysostom was raised and entered the ascetic life. *On the Nature of Man* “is a distillation of classical learning ... It influenced the Middle Ages, both in Byzantium and the West.” “Nemesius belongs to the same thought world as the Antiochenes, as one might expect from a bishop of Emesa (close to the southern border of Syria Secunda).”

Thus, his text should provide important information for understanding Chrysostom’s own context.

This chapter will demonstrate that Chrysostom understood mental illness, “classic” demonic possession and sin (which is also truly a type of demonic possession) all as types of insanity. Of the three, sin is clearly the most serious. The other two are usually cause for compassion and not, in themselves, of reviling. Although the mentally ill and the possessed act like beasts in some way, they are not as deeply inhuman as the willingly sinful, who is ἄλογος in the ultimate sense – having rejected the Λόγος of God.

**MENTAL ILLNESS**

Chrysostom accepts the premise of physically induced mental illness. Only for σεληνιασμός does he insist on demonic agency, denying a natural aetiology. He does not usually speak in unambiguously technical medical terms, but he is familiar with medical assumptions concerning mental illness. Nowhere does Chrysostom condemn the mentally ill. Rather, he assumes that pity is both a common and a proper attitude towards the mentally ill.

**Mental Illness as Distinct from Demonic Possession**

Chrysostom fairly often refers directly to the μανία of the δαιμονών. Such usage might be taken to suggest that he confounds the two states. However, evidence indicates

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2 Louth (2004b), p. 351
3 Hom. in Mt. 57.3; PG 58.562; NPNF I, 10, p. 355. Hom. in Mt. 28.4; PG 57.355; NPNF I, 10, p. 193. Hom. in Mt. 87.4; PG 58.773; NPNF I, 10, p. 518
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that Chrysostom does distinguish between the mentally ill and the demon-possessed. First, he often refers to insane behavior with no indication of possession. Second, at times he speaks of both the possessed and the mentally ill as separate groups. Third, in one case only (i.e. σεληνιασμός), he clearly denies a natural aetiology and insists on demonic agency. Finally, in at least one instance (not found in the homilies on Matthew), he recognizes a natural cause for a mental illness.

Chrysostom commonly uses words that mean “mad” with no reference at all to possession. For instance, he considers as μαινόμενος the man who, though not blind, thinks the sun is dark; those who devour each other and war against their own flesh; and the man who grabs a sword and destroys himself. Chrysostom also uses other terms whose context suggests reference to the mentally ill. Thus, he likens the man afflicted with arrogance (ἀπονοία) to one “being out of his senses” (ἀνοίας) who thinks himself to be higher than the mountains. Attempting to prove that Christ does know the time of the Last Day, Chrysostom points out that He asked “Who then is the faithful and just servant, whom his Lord shall set over His household?” yet “not even one of them that are frantic (ἐξεστηκότων)” would accuse Him of ignorance in this instance. In a similar instance, when John the Baptist sent his disciples to ask Christ if He were the One Who was to come, not only did John not doubt Christ’s identity, but not even “any ordinary person, nor ... one extremely foolish (ἀνοήτου) and frenzied (παραπαίοντος)” could doubt it. Nothing here remotely suggests that Chrysostom considers such people possessed.

The words Chrysostom uses above all imply that the person is not in his right mind. In addition, most imply agitation of some sort.

Once in the Matthew homilies, Chrysostom distinguishes between the mentally ill and possessed. He argues that, unless there is a judgment to come, God would not allow some people to suffer in this world while others (who have sinned as badly or worse) escape suffering. He adduces a list of sufferers that includes “the possessed (δαιμονῶντας), the frantic (παραπαίοντος), them that are struggling with incurable

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4 Hom. in Mt. 87.4; PG 58.774; NPNF I, 10, p. 519
5 Hom. in Mt. 79.5; PG 58.723; NPNF I, 10, p. 479
6 Hom. in Mt. 51.6; PG 58.518; NPNF I, 10, p.320
7 Hom. in Mt. 58.3; PG 58.570; NPNF I, 10, p. 361
8 Hom. in Mt. 77.3; PG 58.705; NPNF I, 10, p. 465
9 Hom. in Mt. 36.1; PG 57.414; NPNF I, 10, p. 239
diseases (νόσοις ἀνιάτοις), those that are fighting against continual poverty.” Clearly, he sees the possessed and the frantic as distinct groups.

Chrysostom makes this distinction elsewhere. “Mark the eyes of demoniacs (δαιμονώντων), and those of drunkards (μεθυόντων) and madmen (μαινομένων); in what do they differ from each other? Is not the whole madness (μανία)?” All these people suffer from μανία, but context suggests that they are distinct groups – all mad, yet not all mad with the same affliction.

The one case in which Chrysostom does insist that a purported mental illness is demonic in origin is lunacy (σεληνιασμός):

And if he call him “a lunatic” (σεληνιαζόμενον) ... it is the father of the possessed who speaks the word. How then saith the evangelist also, “He healed many that were lunatic?” (σεληνιαζομένους) Denominating them according to the impression of the multitude. For the evil spirit, to bring a reproach upon nature (στοιχείου), both attacks them that are seized … according to the courses of the moon ... And an erroneous opinion (πεπλανημένη) hath gotten ground among the simple (ἀνοήτοις), and by this name do they call such evil spirits, being deceived (ἀπατώμενοι). Here, the lunatic (σεληνιαζόμενον) is clearly possessed by a devil, who times his attacks with the phases of the moon “to bring a reproach on nature.” The identification of σεληνιασμός with epilepsy (ἐπίληψις) is not without problems, but this σεληνιασμός was certainly understood by the multitude to be naturally caused. Origen saw σεληνιασμός either as synonymous with ἐπίληψις or at least as being a condition that fit under the general term ἐπίληψις, meaning not so much a specific disease as any ailment manifesting itself in seizures.

Whatever Chrysostom and his contemporaries meant by σεληνιασμός, it is noteworthy that he strongly insists on its demonic origin while making no such comments for other types of mental illness or seizures that were commonly explained

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10 *Hom. in Mt. 76.5; PG 58.701-2; NPNF I, 10, pp. 461-2*
11 *Hom. in Acts 17.3; PG 60.139; NPNF I, 11, p. 110*
12 *Hom. in Mt. 57.3; PG 58.562; NPNF I, 10, p. 355*
13 Temkin (1971), pp. 92-3
14 Comm. in Mt. 13.3-6; GCS 40.1; ANF-10, pp. 477-9. Origen mostly uses versions of σεληνιασμός here, but also refers to the condition as ἐπίληψις and uses forms of λαμβάνω and ἐπιλαμβάνω to speak of being seized by the disease or its spiritual equivalent. This passage nicely illustrates how difficult it is to untangle the various meanings of these words. The translation sometimes uses lunatic and sometimes epilepsy for σεληνιασμός, and therefore any nuances in Origen’s meaning would be lost in this translation.
by natural causes. This is in conformity with general usage of early Christian and Byzantine writers.\textsuperscript{15}

Nowhere in the Matthew homilies does Chrysostom state unequivocally that a mental illness is natural in origin. However, he does do this in his homilies on II Corinthians, saying “frenzy (φρενίτιδος) indeed is an affection (πάθος) of the body.”\textsuperscript{16}

All these suggest that he did see the demoniacs and the mentally ill as two distinct (though not necessarily completely separate) groups, both of which were in some way insane. The use of μανία, then, to speak of the behavior of the possessed can be explained by its broad meaning, which it shared with the mentally ill.

\textit{The Wider Perspective}

The distinction between demon possession and mental illness (in this case, grossly excessive overeating) is clearly seen in a vignette concerning the monk Macedonius. “The wife of a nobleman fell ill of morbid gluttony; some called the illness a demonic attack, others thought it a sickness of the body.” Theodoret says, “Whether the former or the latter, it was like this” and then gives details, clearly showing that he considered both to be real possibilities.\textsuperscript{17} This also shows that it was not always easy to tell the difference.

Although the other writers make no such specific references, they straightforwardly refer to physiological causes of mental illness. As seen below, Gregory of Nyssa gives a medical explanation of φρενίτις with no hint of any demonic involvement. According to Nemesius, in those suffering from “inflammation of the brain (φρενίτιδος) … the mind (διανοίας) is deranged (βλαβείσης).” He gives an example from Galen of a man suffering from this disease who threw another man out the window. He gives no hint that the man was responsible for this or that demons were involved.\textsuperscript{18} Larchet states “the Fathers accepted the classification of the bodily illnesses used by the prevailing medicine of their time … the Hippocratico-Galenic system. They also adopted the principles and methods of treatment, with medications … baths and diet being the most important.”\textsuperscript{19}

\textsuperscript{15} Salem (2007)
\textsuperscript{16} Hom. in 2 Cor. 29.5; PG 61.604; NPNF I, 12, p. 416
\textsuperscript{17} Thdt, Hist. Relig. 13.9; SC 234; Price (1985), p. 103. See footnote #72 for a similar instance.
\textsuperscript{19} Larchet (2005), p. 40
Thus, Chrysostom’s acceptance of physiological or psychological mental illness was common in his time, as would be expected given contemporary medical beliefs. His belief that demons exist and have the ability to possess people may rightly be taken as a given.

Technical Medical Terms for Mental Illness

Greek and Byzantine medicine recognized various forms of mental illness. Of these, three – μανία, φρενῖτις, and ἐπίληψις – produced symptoms similar to demonic possession. Therefore they – along with μελαγχολία, which was closely related to μανία – will be mentioned briefly here.

All four of the above conditions had, at least in part, a humoral basis, and in all cases, one possible causal humor was yellow or black bile. All were chronic conditions except φρενῖτις. Μανία and φρενῖτις were symptomatically much the same except that φρενῖτις was acute, very dangerous and always accompanied by fever. Μανία and μελαγχολία were closely related and often considered poles of the same disorder. Perhaps the major difference between them was the ‘force’ of the μαινόμενος in comparison to the melancholic. Of the four, ἐπίληψις was the only one that was not unambiguously considered a mental illness and that did not always involve mental alienation.21

Nowhere in the Matthew homilies does Chrysostom speak unambiguously of mental illness in technical medical terms. He never mentions φρενῖτις, μελαγχολία, or ἐπίληψις22 in these homilies. He speaks often of μανία, but μανία also had much broader connotations, and nowhere in the Matthew homilies does Chrysostom clearly have the technical meaning in mind. Several above-mentioned passages (the man who, though not blind, thinks the sun is dark; those who devour each other and war against

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20 The question of whether psychological illness was or was not, by Galenic standards, fundamentally physical in origin is not investigated here. Larchet (2005) holds that Galenic medicine has a purely “naturalistic character” (p. 39, footnote #4). Nutton (2004) holds the question more open. His remark that Galen “in one of his last treatises … openly wondered whether the soul was not something physical, since it was so affected by changes within the body” implies that this was not a clear aspect of all Galenic writings. Either way, “the idea that one’s emotions affected one’s physical state had long been familiar in literature, at least since the sixth century BC” (pp. 235-6)

21 Trenchard-Smith (2006), pp. 40-57

22 As mentioned above, he does speak of σεληνιασμός, which was often confounded with ἐπίληψις.
their own flesh; and the man who grabs a sword and destroys himself describe possible afflictions of the μαινόμενος, but they are equally possible of the man with φρενίτις.

In an extensive passage, Chrysostom contrasts the μανία of φιλαργυρία of Judas (and other such men) with the far less serious μανία of the μαινόμενοι and of the δαιμονῶν.23 The μαινόμενος pours foam out of his mouth, distorts his hands, utters sounds without meaning, and cuts himself with stones. This description fits ἐπίληψις better than it does μανία, indicating that Chrysostom is not speaking of μανία in its technical sense. Thus, the Matthew homilies afford no hard evidence that Chrysostom ever spoke of mental illness in technical terms.

The situation is different in the larger corpus where Chrysostom uses φρενίτις in its technical sense several times. “Is not frenzy (φρενίτις) from an excess of fever?”24

The following previously quoted citation, now given at much greater length, refers to the pursuit of temporal things.

Let us everywhere pursue the reality ... For to pursue shadows is a madman’s (μαινομένου) part ... there is yet another madness (μανία), sorer than that caused by devils, than that from frenzy (φρενίτιδος). For that admits of forgiveness (συγγνώμην), but this is destitute of excuse (ἀπολογίας), seeing the soul itself is corrupted and its right judgment lost; and that of frenzy (φρενίτιδος) indeed is an affection of the body (σωματικὸν πάθος), but this madness (μανία) hath its seat in the artificer mind. As then of fevers those are sorer, yea incurable, which seize upon firm bodies and lurk in the recesses of the nerves and are hidden away in the veins, so truly is this madness (μανία) also, seeing it lurks in the recesses of the mind itself, perverting and destroying it.25

Chrysostom’s comments about types of fever suggest that he is thinking of φρενίτις’ technical sense. He clearly considers this malady to be natural and non-demonic in origin. Since συγγνώμην can mean fellow-feeling, forbearance, etc., its use does not necessarily imply culpability for one's actions. Also noteworthy in this passage is the broad usage of μανία. Chrysostom considers demon-possession, φρενίτις, and the pursuit of temporal things all forms of μανία.

Elsewhere, Chrysostom seems to use both φρενίτις and μανία in their technical senses. Below, Chrysostom is comparing the Greeks who exalted homosexuality with the insane:

23 Hom. in Mt. 81.3; PG 58.734; NPNF I, 10, pp. 487-90
24 Hom. in 1 Th. 9.4; PG 62.452; NPNF I, 13, p. 364
25 Hom. in 2 Cor. 29.5; PG 61.604; NPNF I, 12, p. 416
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But if they perceive it not, but are still pleased, be not amazed. For even they that are mad (μανίωμενοι), and are afflicted with frenzy (φρενίτιδι) ... while doing themselves much injury and making themselves such objects of compassion, that others weep over them themselves smile and revel over what has happened. Yet ... they are [not] quit of punishment, but for this very reason are under a more grievous vengeance, in that they are unconscious of the plight they are in.\textsuperscript{26}

The juxtaposition of these two terms suggests that Chrysostom is using the terms in their medical sense. No systematic attempt was made to discover whether μανία was used elsewhere in its technical sense. Many references certainly could bear the technical medical meaning. However, the great similarity of μανία and φρενίτις makes it nearly impossible to tell if Chrysostom had the technical illness in mind due to μανία’s prevalence as a general term for insanity.

Nowhere does Chrysostom seem to refer to ἐπίληψις either as seizures in general or the epileptic seizure in particular. This is only a tentative conclusion because the Thesaurus Linguae Graecae was searched only for ἐπίληψις and ἐπίληπτος, without attempting to include all forms of the verb ἐπιλαμβάνω, from which ἐπίληψις is derived and which can refer to epileptic seizures. However, it seems reasonable to assume that Chrysostom makes little or no mention of ἐπίληψις since the main form of the word does not appear in the corpus. As mentioned above, Chrysostom does refer to σεληνιασμός, which was at that time not a technical medical term but was seemingly widely used popularly to refer to an epileptic-type seizure that was associated with phases of the moon. As also mentioned earlier, Chrysostom rejects this aetiology, insisting that it is demonic.

Chrysostom mentions μελαγχολία only twice in the entire corpus. In neither case does context reveal whether he is using it in its technical sense. Interestingly, in one case, he includes it in a list of diseases of the soul that arise from an overindulgent lifestyle.

Now if the condition of wants is the mother of health, ... fullness is the mother of sickness and debility, and produces attacks which are beyond the skill even of physicians. For gout in the feet, apoplexy, dimness of sight, pains in the hands, tremors, paralytic attacks, jaundice, lingering and inflammatory fevers, and other diseases ... are the natural (πέφυκεν) offspring... of gluttony and repletion ... feelings of coveting (πλεονεξίαι), sloth (βλακείαι), melancholy (μελαγχολίαι), dullness

\textsuperscript{26} Hom. in Rom. 4.2; PG 60.418; NPNF I, 11, p. 357
Chrysostom’s inclusion of μελαγχολία in this list might suggest that he does not consider it a physical malady. However, it clearly has at least an indirect physical cause. In its only other occurrence, τοὺς μελαγχολόντας ἁπλῶς are among those whose madness deserves shame and reproach, as opposed to the demon-possessed who bear their affliction humbly. Depending on how one translates ἁπλῶς, this might mean those who are causelessly, completely, or simply melancholy. On the other hand, since Lampe also lists anger and foolishness as meanings of μελαγχολία, another possible rendering is those who are angry without cause. If Chrysostom is in fact using μελαγχολία in its technical sense or at least to mean despondency, perhaps the purport of τοὺς μελαγχολόντας ἁπλῶς is “those who have completely given themselves over to melancholy.” Interestingly, a search of the TLG revealed no other use of this term. Thus, its exact meaning remains unclear.

Chrysostom uses μελαγχολία too rarely to permit firm conclusions of his understanding of the term. However, in both instances, some culpability is implied. In the first instance, even though it has a physical basis, he sees it mainly as a spiritual malady. The person bears responsibility for his μελαγχολία, but there is no indication that the responsibility is any more or less than the responsibility involved in contracting the other maladies listed here.

In summary, only in the case of φρενῖτις does Chrysostom clearly refer to its technical sense. He agrees with the medical estimation that it is caused by fever. In at least one case, he probably uses μανία in its technical sense. He does not speak of ἐπίληψις. He rejects the natural aetiology of σεληνιασμός, attributing it to demons. His only two mentions of μελαγχολία do not clearly refer to its technical sense. In one instance, it does clearly have at least an indirect physical cause, but in both cases he assumes some culpability.

The Wider Perspective

Among the three Cappadocians, σεληνιασμός appears only in Basil. All the references are to the Matthew passage and do not appear to address the aetiology of the

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27 Hom. in Jn. 22.3; PG 59.138; NPNF I, 14, p. 79
28 Stag. 2.3; PG 47.451; See footnote #46 below for the Greek original
condition. However, Basil calls usurers “exactors by the month, like the demons (δαίμονες) who produce epilepsy (ἐπιληψίας), attacking the poor as the changes of the moon (σελήνης) come round.” It is unclear whether Basil would consider all ἐπιληψίας demonic, or only that which is associated with phases of the moon. However, he fits into the basic patristic pattern – accepting a natural aetiology for most mental illness but not for the epileptic type seize associated with the moon (and perhaps also not for any type of epilepsy).

Gregory of Nyssa clearly uses φρενίτις in its technical sense, giving a medical explanation for the condition, but he also uses it in passing (comparing Eunomius to a “frenzy-struck person ... grappling with an imaginary opponent”) in a manner indicating that it was a commonly understood term. Basil uses it similarly, arguing that the “fantasies and delusions” of those who consider the Son to sit below the Father “come from drunkenness (οἰνοπλήκτων) and insanity (φρενίτιδος).

Basil says that not even μελαγχολῶντες “could suggest such a notion” as to chop God “into subordinate pieces, and call this process subnumeration.” Gregory of Nyssa uses μελαγχολία to describe either Eunomius’ heretical doctrines or, more likely, the condition of his soul that led him to be a heresiarch and to resist correction “like one beside himself with fury (ὑπὸ φρενίτιδος παραπληγεὶς).” Interestingly, Gregory juxtaposes μελαγχολία with φρενίτις instead of with its own close relative μανία. Nemesius, on the other hand, mentions the two together when explaining the Stoic definition of φάντασμα “as something that precipitates us into the idle mustering of images in our imagination, but in the way that happens to people that have taken leave of their senses (μεμηνότων), or are suffering from an excess of black bile (μελαγχολώντων).”

That Gregory of Nyssa and Nemesius use medical terms in their technical senses is to be expected, given their philosophical bents (medicine being a branch of philosophy)

30 BtG, Hom. on Ps. xiv. (xv.) 2.5; PG 29.280; NPNF II, 8, p. xlvi
31 GNy, De Opif. Hom. 12; PG 44.157; NPNF II, 5, p. 397
32 GNy, Contr. Eunom. 1.1.487; Jaeger (1960a); NPNF II, 5, p. 80
33 BtG, De Spir. Sanc. 6.15; SC 17; Anderson (1980), p. 32
34 BtG, De Spir. Sanc. 17.41; SC 17; Anderson (1980), p. 68
35 GNy, Contr. Eunom. 1.1.5; Jaeger (1960a); NPNF II, 5, p. 35
and the philosophical nature of these specific treatises. The other references here mentioned indicate a broader usage of φρενῖτις and μελαγχολία, or at least the recognition that these were widely known conditions that could be used as metaphors for spiritual ills.

Thus far, it has been shown that, with the exception of σεληνιασμός, the Fathers here studied excepted a natural aetiology of mental illnesses. In Chrysostom’s case, it is further shown that he differentiated between mental illness, demonic possession and sin, all of which are types of insanity. Next, the attitude towards the mentally ill will be addressed.

Attitude towards the Mentally Ill

Chrysostom approves of medical care for the mentally ill. He assumes that pity was the appropriate and common attitude towards them. In general, the mentally ill were not responsible for what they did in their madness. At least sometimes, though, they bore responsibility for becoming mentally ill.

Since Chrysostom accepted the possibility of physically caused mental illness, it is no surprise that he approved of medical care of the mentally ill. The following passage contains several crucial points:

Physicians, when they are kicked, and shamefully handled (ὑβρίζωνται) by the insane (μαινομένων), then most of all pity them, and take measures for their perfect cure, knowing that the insult (ὕβρις) comes of the extremity of their disease (τῆς ύπερβολῆς τοῦ νοσήματος) ... do thou so treat them that are injuring thee. For it is they above all that are diseased ... who are undergoing all the violence. Deliver him then ... from that grievous demon, wrath (θυμοῦ). Yea, for if we see persons possessed by devils (δαιμονόντα), we weep for them; we do not seek to be ourselves also possessed (δαιμονόνα τάξις). ... the enraged (θυμούμενοι) are like the possessed (ἐκείνοις); yea rather, are more wretched than they, being mad (μαινόμενοι) with consciousness of it (μετὰ αἰσθήσεως). Wherefore also their frenzy (ναοπληρία) is without excuse. Trample not then on the fallen, but rather pity him. For so, should we see any one troubled with bile (χολῆς) ... straining to cast up this evil humor (χυμὸν) ... though we stain our garments, we ... seek one thing only, how we may set him free from this grievous distress.  

This passage probably alludes to bile’s putative role in the causation of mental illness. Nowhere here does Chrysostom suggest that medical treatment of the mentally ill is unavailing or inappropriate. The doctors do seem able to “take measure for their [the
μαίνομενοι's] perfect cure." Furthermore, he obviously approves of their compassion for the μαίνομενοι and assumes that his hearers would or should also pity both the mentally ill and the demoniacs.

The mentally ill being incapacitated, Christ does not require them to have faith for their own healing:

He doth not on all occasions require faith on the part of the sick only: as for instance, when they are insane (παραπαίωσιν), or in any other way, through their disease (νοσήματος), are out of their own control (ἐξεστηκότες).\(^{38}\)

The favorable contrast of the mentally ill with the passion-possessed, the assumption that they are commonly pitied, and Christ's not requiring faith of them due to their incapacity all suggest that the mentally ill bear little or no responsibility for their behavior in their mental illness.

However, at least sometimes, the mentally ill bear some responsibility for incurring their disease. The reference to μελαγχολία as an illness of the soul caused by an intemperate life suggests that such a person bears responsibility for his sickness. Of course, Chrysostom may not be using the word in its technical sense.

The passage below seems to imply that the mentally ill both do and do not bear responsibility for their illness.

He that is mad (μαινόμενος) is much allowed for ... for his disease is not from choice (προαιρέσεως), but from nature alone (φύσεως μόνης); but how shall he be pardoned, who lives in vice? Whence then is vice? ... whence is frenzy (φρενίτις)? whence is lethargy (ὕπνος βαρύς)? Is it not from carelessness (ἀπροσεξίας)? If physical disorders (φυσικὰ νοσήματα) have their origin in choice (προαιρέσεως), much more those which are voluntary (προαιρετικά). Whence is drunkenness? Is it not from intemperance of soul? Is not frenzy (φρενίτις) from excess of fever ... from the elements too abundant in us? And is not this superabundance of elements from our carelessness (ἀπροσεξίας)?\(^{39}\)

The μαινόμενος is easily tolerated because his disease is not from choice. However, even physical disorders have their origin in choice. Perhaps, the difference is the directness of the choice. The person with φρενίτις hasn't chosen his actions as directly as the drunkard has.

\(^{38}\) Hom. in Mt. 29.1; PG 57.358; NPNF I, 10, p. 195

\(^{39}\) Hom. in 1 Th. 9.4; PG 62.452; NPNF I, 13, p. 364

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The other works provide little direct light on the question of culpability for mental illness. Nemesius, however, talks at some length on culpability for physiologically based character weaknesses. He concedes that “certain vices and virtues come naturally (φυσικαί) to men,” proceeding “from their bodily temperament ... some are naturally (φυσικῶς) choleric, some proud, some craven, some lecherous. Nevertheless, some such persons master temperament.”40 It is safe to extrapolate that he would not consider the mentally ill responsible for such predispositions, but would hold them responsible for doing whatever legitimately lay in their power to avoid or counteract their disease. Larchet holds that “when psychic disorders are due to somatic problems, the soul itself is not defective, only its expression and and manifestation are affected.” He adduces as evidence a passage by Gregory of Nyssa including the following, “Although I am aware that the intellectual energies are blunted, or even made altogether ineffective in a certain condition of the body, I do not hold this a sufficient evidence for limiting the faculty of the mind by any particular place.”41 In this and the other passage (by St. Joseph the Solitary) adduced by Larchet, neither writer is talking specifically about mental illness. So, Larchet is extrapolating to conclude that “the Fathers” would consider the soul completely untouched by physical mental illness. It is thoroughly unlikely in any but a saint that a person takes a completely sinless attitude towards his mental illness. So, the soul, albeit indirectly, is most likely touched.

One does not readily find Chrysostom’s outspoken compassion for the mentally ill in the other works studied here. Basil mentions in passing that the man who has been bitten by a mad (λυσσόδηκτος) dog and sees a dish is to be pitied.42 As mentioned previously, Gregory of Nyssa finds even Eunomius pitiable (in fact, he finds him especially pitiable); so, surely, Gregory would feel compassion for the mentally ill, but does not appear to state this directly.

Perhaps the difference lies partly in the overwhelmingly homilectic nature of Chrysostom’s corpus. He was certainly trying to instill compassion in his hearers, as well as shock them into an awareness of their own far worse madness. Clearly, though,

41 GNy, De Opif. Hom. 12; PG 44.161; NPNF II, 5, p. 398; Larchet (2005), p. 38
42 BTG, Ep. 234.2; Courtonne 3.43; NPNF II, 8, p. 274
his compassion and admiration for the mentally ill and possessed were utterly sincere. He spoke so much about them because he loved them.

Summary

Chrysostom distinguished between the mentally ill and the demoniacs, but referred both to them and to certain sinners as μαινόμενοι. In referring to the mentally ill, he also uses several other terms (e.g. παραπαίοντος, ἐξεστηκότων, ἀνοίας) that imply not being in one’s right mind, the first two also implying agitation. The mentally ill could be miraculously healed without faith on their own part because of their incapacity. Chrysostom accepted the role of physicians in healing the mentally ill. He pitied the mentally ill and assumed that his hearers did or should do the same. In general, the mentally ill were not to blame for their actions in their insanity, but at least in some cases, they bore responsibility for becoming mentally ill.

The other Fathers here studied also accepted natural aetiologies for most mental illnesses, but only in the case of Theodoret was an explicit comparison found between the mentally ill and demoniacs. There are some hints that these Fathers might find the mentally ill pitiable, but nothing like Chrysostom’s outspoken compassion. It will be argued below that this compassion is a natural outgrowth of his view of humanity.

DEMONIC POSSESSION

As demonstrated above, Chrysostom did not confound demonic possession with mental illness despite often using μανία and other such terms to refer to the δαιμονών. As also shown above, Chrysostom, along with the majority of Church Fathers, did regard σεληνιασμός as a form of demonic possession. As with the mentally ill, the possessed are to be pitied and even admired, although they may have some culpability for their condition. Common symptoms of possession are similar to those of μανία. However, atypical cases also occur. Possession by passions is a true indwelling of demons.

Pity for the Possessed

Pity is appropriate to show the possessed. “If we see persons possessed by devils (δαιμονώντα), we weep for them.” The possessed are less grievously ill than those 20 of 233
enslaved by “that grievous demon wrath (θυμοῦ),” who are “mad (μαυνόμενοι) with consciousness (αἰσθήσεως) of it.”

Comparing the possessed to those living in luxury (τρυφή), Chrysostom says this:

Such an one is in no respect different from a demoniac (δαίμονώντος), for like him he is lost to shame (ἀναισχυντεί), and raves (μαίνεται). And the demoniac (δαίμονώντα) … we pity, but this man is the object of our aversion … Because he brings upon himself a self-chosen (αὐθαίρετον) madness (μανίαν).

Chrysostom seems to consider pity to be the common attitude to the possessed. Perhaps, this is a device to elicit more pity than was in fact commonly expressed. Obviously, though, he considers pity to be a thoroughly appropriate attitude towards the possessed, as also (as shown above) towards the mentally ill.

The Matthew homilies do not express outright admiration for the possessed, but other works of Chrysostom do. Demonic possession can produce two great virtues – humility and thankfulness:

It is not so great to free from a demon (Δαίμονος) as it is to rescue from sin. A demon (Δαίμων) hinders not to attain unto the kingdom (βασιλείας) of Heaven, nay, even cooperates, unwillingly … by making him that has the demon more sober-minded; but sin casts a man out … More grievous than a demon (Δαίμονος) is sin, for the demon makes men humble … great is the admiration it calls for … when struggling against such a spirit, they bear all thankfully: whereas our condition in very deed is a subject … for hell-fire; calling for no compassion whatever … those indeed, from the ills they suffer, reap a double profit: first, their being sobered and brought to more self-control; then, that having suffered here the chastisement of their own sins, they depart hence to their Master, purified.

Another such passage occurs in Chrysostom’s 2nd Book to Stagirius:

For if you wish to see those truly worthy of shame and reproach, … Look at those titillated by the beauty of women’s forms, those mad about money … those choosing to do and suffer all for these things, those wasting away by envy, those plotting against those who are in no way unrighteous, those completely depressed, those rabid concerning the vanities of life. These and such things are works of madness and worthy of chastisement, these are [worthy of] reproach, shame, and ridicule. But if anyone troubled by a demon should exhibit self-control – and very much [self-control] – in his life, not only would he be fit not to be reproached, but both marveled at and crowned because of all these things, thus running so painful a course with so many chains and climbing up the steep and jagged road of virtue.
Whether speaking to a congregation or counseling a demon-possessed monk, Chrysostom insists that demoniacs who accept their affliction with the right attitude deserve admiration.

**Demonics' Responsibility for their Condition and Actions**

Demoniacs at least some times bear responsibility for becoming possessed or relapsing, but they do not seem to be responsible for their actions once the demon has taken over. Below, demonic possession is one of a list of temporal punishments brought upon people for their sins:

But if any man disbelieve the judgments to come, let him look at the things here, at ... the possessed (δαιμονώντας), the frantic (παραπαίοντας), them that are struggling with incurable diseases (νόσοις ανιάτοις), those that are fighting against continual poverty ... For these persons would not suffer these things here, unless vengeance and punishments were to await all the others also that have committed such sins.47

Although the possessed here are punished for their sins, Chrysostom does not suggest that demonic possession is reserved for especially sinful people.

The swinish are particularly susceptible to demonic activity:

The swinish … are especially liable to the operations of the demons (εὐεπιχείρητοι ταῖς τῶν δαιμόνων ἐνεργείαις). And as long as they are men … they are often able yet to prevail; but if they are become altogether swine, they are not only possessed (δαιμονίζονται), but are also cast down the precipice.48

Chrysostom does not define “swinish” here. Elsewhere, he defines swine as “them that abide continually in an unchaste (ἀκολάστῳ) life.”49 He does not actually say that such men are liable to become possessed, rather that they are “especially liable to the operations of the demons.” The context, however, suggests that such people are likely to become demon-possessed. Chrysostom makes a distinction between swinish men

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47 Hom. in Mt. 76.5; PG 58.701-2; NPNF I, 10, pp. 461-2
48 Hom. in Mt. 28.4; PG 57.355; NPNF I, 10, pp. 192-3
49 Hom. in Mt. 23.3; PG 57.311; NPNF I, 10, p. 159

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and those who have become altogether swine. Perhaps, the latter's falling down the precipice refers to damnation or simply to great catastrophe.

Luxurious living makes deliverance from demonic possession impossible. The following passage concerns Christ's words to His apostles, who could not understand why they could not cast out the demon from the lunatic boy.

“Howbeit, this kind goeth not out, but by prayer and fasting;” meaning the whole kind of evil spirits (δαιμόνων), not that of lunatics (σεληνιαζόμενων) only.

... argue not with me from rare cases, that some even without fasting have cast them out. For although one might say this, in one or two instances ... yet for the patient it is a thing impossible, living luxuriously (τρυφῶντα) to be delivered from such madness (μανίας): this thing being especially necessary for him that is diseased (νοσοῦντι) in that way.\(^{50}\)

The swinish man and the man who lives in luxury have much in common. The man who lives in luxury, set on satisfying his own desires and oblivious to God and his fellow man, could certainly be called swinish.

Those delivered from demonic possession will relapse into an even worse state if they are not careful. Below Chrysostom is discussing the evil spirit who is cast out from a man, only to return with seven worse.

What then can the saying mean? As the possessed (δαιμονῶντες), saith He, when delivered from that infirmity (ἀῤῥωστίας), should they be at all remiss (ῥᾳθυμότεροι), draw upon themselves their delusion (φαντασία) more grievous than ever so is it with you.\(^{51}\)

Those who had been possessed either precipitated the possession and must be careful not repeat the mistake or are simply more susceptible now to possession and must carefully avoid certain behaviors. Chrysostom does not enumerate these behaviors, but from the foregoing passages, luxurious living is probably a major one.

Although demoniacs bear some responsibility for incurring or relapsing into their state, they are not required (at least in some cases) to have faith for their healing, nor are they responsible for the actions committed while under demonic control. In the aforementioned case of the dumb man possessed by a devil, “the evil spirit (δαίμονος) had bound his tongue, and ... fettered his soul. For this cause

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\(^{50}\) Hom. in Mt. 57.4; PG 58.563; NPNF I, 10, p. 355

\(^{51}\) Hom. in Mt. 43.3; PG 57.460; NPNF I, 10, p. 275

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neither doth He require faith of him, but straightway heals the disease (νόσημα).”

A similar situation existed with the man both blind and dumb:

“The then they brought unto Him one possessed with a devil (δαίμονιζόμενον), blind and dumb, and He healed (ἐθεράπευσεν) him, insomuch that the blind and dumb both spake and saw.”

O wickedness of the evil spirit (δαίμονος)! he had barred up both entrances, whereby that person should have believed, as well sight as hearing; nevertheless, both did Christ open.

This man was rendered unable to believe by demonic activity. Therefore, Christ opened up the entrances by which faith could come. As with the mentally ill, these men were not required to have faith, faith being yet impossible for them.

This inability of the possessed to believe does not give a total picture of Chrysostom’s views on the matter. The above-mentioned passages from Acts and the second book to Stagirius obviously imply ability to believe. Perhaps Chrysostom means that the possessed are unable to believe only when made physically unable to do so. More likely, he means that the possessed are unable to believe when the demon is active.

The possessed are not responsible for actions committed under demonic compulsion. Below, Chrysostom is discussing the gravity of communing unworthily of the Eucharist:

It is not so grievous a thing for the energumens (ἐνεργουμένους) to be within, as for such as these, whom Paul affirmst to trample Christ under foot … For he that hath fallen into sin and draws nigh, is worse than one possessed with a devil (Δαίμονώντος).

For they, because they are possessed (δαίμονωσιν) are not punished, but those, when they draw nigh unworthily, are delivered over to undying punishment.

Surely, given Chrysostom’s regard for the sanctity of the Eucharist, had he been inclined to judge the possessed harshly for any offense, it would be the violation of Christ’s Body and Blood. Thus, it seems safe to conclude that he generally did not hold the possessed responsible for deeds committed under the influence of the demon.

The Wider Perspective

In the History of the Monks of Syria, Theodoret details several cases of demonic possession with varying degrees of culpability for becoming possessed. Thus, a cook

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52 Hom. in Mt. 32.1; PG 57.378; NPNF I, 10, p. 211
53 Hom. in Mt. 40.2-3; PG 57.441 (β,γ); NPNF I, 10, p. 261
54 Hom. in Mt. 82.6; PG 58.745; NPNF I, 10, p. 496
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became possessed for acting the part of a monk exorcising a demon. Another man seems to have become possessed innocently – for drinking water from a spring on a mount that the demon was wont to haunt.” A demon was forced by magic to enter a certain girl. There is no indication whether she had done something to precipitate this.

According to Gregory Nazianzen, it would have been better for one who “will admit neither the equality nor the Godhead ... to have been either a Jew or a demoniac (δαιμονάν) (if I may utter an absurdity), than in uncircumcision and in sound health (ὑγιείᾳ) to be so wicked and ungodly in your attitude of mind.” Interestingly, Gregory contrasts demon possession with sound health and not great piety. At any rate, this text shows that being a heretic is worse than being a demoniac.

Concerning drunkards, Basil says “The demoniac is pitiable, but the drunkard who suffers these things is not worth being pitied because he wrestles with a self-chosen demon.” The implication is that the demoniac did not chose his demon and that he is in some sense not culpable. This is in great agreement with Chrysostom.

God’s Providential Care for the Possessed

In the above section, God’s care for the possessed is seen by Christ’s delivering them without requiring any faith on their part. But even in the midst of their afflictions, God ceaselessly cares for them.

“And wherefore did Christ fulfill the devils’ request, suffering them to depart into the herd of swine?” ... One, to teach them that are delivered from those wicked tyrants, how great the malice of their insidious enemies: another, that all might learn, how not even against swine are they bold, except He allow them; a third, that they would have treated those men more grievously than the swine, unless even in their calamity they had enjoyed much of God’s providential care (προνοίας) ... they that spared not the swine ... much more would they have done so to the men whom they possessed (ἐιργάσαντο) ... unless even in their very tyranny the guardian care of God had abounded ... Whence it is manifest that there is no one, who doth not enjoy the benefit of God’s providence ... these demoniacs (δαιμονώντων) ... would have been choked long before, if they had not enjoyed the benefit of much tender care.

55 Price (1985), p. 85
56 Ibid., p. 85
57 Ibid., p. 104
58 GNz, Or. 38.15; PG 36.329; NPNF II, 7, p. 350
59 BtG, In Ebriosos 4; PG 31.452– Ὁ δαιμονῶν ἐλεεινός· ὁ δὲ μεθύων, τὰ αὐτὰ πάσχων, οὐδὲ τοῦ ἐλεεῖσθαι ἄξιος, αὐθαιρετῶ δαίμονι προσπαλάιων.
from above ... the power of Christ was gloriously proclaimed, and the wickedness of the demons (πονηρία τῶν δαιμόνων), from which He delivered those possessed (κατεχομένους) by them, was more plainly indicated; and how they want power to touch even swine, without permission from the God of all.\(^{60}\)

Two things are clear from this passage. Demons cannot possess even swine (let alone people) without God’s permission, and God cares tenderly for the possessed in the midst of their affliction.

*The Wider Perspective*

Larchet quotes St. John Cassian as saying in regard to the possessed, “everything which is brought upon us by God, whether it appears sad or joyful at the time, is ordained as by a most tender father and a most merciful physician.”\(^{61}\) So, Chrysostom is not alone in this expressed concern. However, at this point, no passages have been found in the other authors here studied that explicitly state God’s care for the possessed. Of course, it seems reasonable to assume that these writers believed in God’s care and salvific action for everyone still alive on this earth. However, His care for the possessed does not seem to be as prominent in their thinking as it is in Chrysostom’s.

*Symptoms of Possession*

Nowhere in these homilies does Chrysostom set out to describe the symptoms of possession or differentiate between symptoms of mental illness and of possession. However, he does leave a few clues of what he considers to be behavior typical of the demoniac.

In an extensive passage, Chrysostom contrasts the covetousness (φιλαργυρία) of Judas (and other covetous men) with the far less serious μανία of the μαινόμενος and the demoniac.\(^{62}\) The μαινόμενος pours foam out of his mouth, distorts his hands, utters sounds without meaning, and cuts himself with stones. The demoniac is naked, cuts himself with stones, rushes over rough paths, tears off his clothes, aims blows at the face, and bites. Given that Chrysostom is not explicating a Scriptural passage in which such type of possession occurs, this list suggests that he considers these to be common symptoms of possession. It is not clear, however, whether the μαινόμενος described...

\(^{60}\) Hom. in Mt. 28.3; PG 57.354-5; NPNF I, 10, pp. 192-3

\(^{61}\) Cassian, Collat. 7.28; PL 49.707-8; NPNF 2, 11, p. 372; Larchet (2005), p. 58

\(^{62}\) Hom. in Mt. 81.3; PG 58.734; NPNF I, 10, pp. 487-90
above is simply mentally ill or also possessed. Most likely, Chrysostom is not trying to distinguish between the two states. Both states are characterized by loss of control over one's actions and by violence. Here, the violence of the μαινόμενος seems to be confined to himself, but in some of the above-mentioned passages, he clearly can be a threat to others.

The demoniac appears insensible of his condition, at least when the demon manifests himself. The following refers to the Canaanite woman and her demon-possessed daughter:

But having described both her calamity, and the intensity of the disease (νόσου), she pleads the Lord’s mercy … she saith not, “Have mercy on my daughter,” but, “Have mercy on me.” For she indeed is insensible (ἀνεπαίσθητός) of her disease (νόσου), but it is I that suffer her innumerable woes … my madness (μαινομένη) with perception of itself.63

Below, Chrysostom is talking of the covetous man (φιλάργυρος):

I for my part would sooner consent to dwell with ten thousand demoniacs (δαιμονώντων), than with one diseased in this way (ταύτην νοσοῦντος τὴν νόσον) … For these last account him an enemy that hath done them no wrong, and desire even to take him for a slave when he is free … but the demoniacs do no such thing, but toss their disease to and for within themselves. And while these … are a pest … to the whole earth; they that are troubled by evil spirits, deserve rather our pity and our tears. And the one for the more part act in insensibility (ἀναισθησίᾳ), but the others are frantic while they reason (μετὰ λογισμοῦ παραπαίουσιν), keeping their orgies (βακχευόμενοι) in the midst of cities, and maddened (μαινόμενοι) with some new kind of madness (μανίαν). For what do all the demoniacs (δαιμονώντες) so bad, as what Judas dared to do, when he showed forth that extremity of wickedness (ἐσχάτην παρανομίαν)? And all too that imitate him (ζηλοῦντες), like fierce wild beasts (θηρία) escaped from their cage, trouble their cities, no man restraining them. For these also have bonds upon them on every side; such as the fears of the judges (δικαστῶν), the threatening of the laws (νόμων), the condemnation (κατάγνωσις,) of the multitude … yet bursting asunder even these, they turn all things upside down. And should any one remove these altogether from them, then would he know assuredly the demon that is in them (ἐν αὐτοῖς δαίμονα) to be far fiercer, and more frantic (μανικώτερον) than he who is just now gone forth.64

The demoniac, unlike the covetous man, is generally insensible of his actions and is harmful mostly to himself. In other places, Chrysostom makes it clear that demoniacs may well do violence to others, but the demon is responsible – not the demoniac.

63 Hom. in Mt. 52.1; PG 58.519; NPNF I, 10, p. 321
64 Hom. in Mt. 28.4; PG 57.356; NPNF I, 10, p. 193
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The false prophet exhibits signs of demonic possession. The following passage concerns Christ's warning to the Jews who rejected Him:

For since He had said, “The men of Nineveh shall rise up in judgment, and shall condemn this generation,” lest, on account of the postponement of the time, they should despise and grow more careless (ῥᾳθυμότεροι), by this He brings His terror close upon them. Wherewith the prophet Hosea likewise threatening them said, that they should be “even as the prophet that is beside himself (παρεξεστηκὼς), the man that is carried away by a spirit (πνευματοφόρος);”, that is to say, as the madmen (μαινόμενοι), and distracted (βακχευόμενοι) by evil spirits, even the false prophets. For here, by “a prophet that is beside himself (παρεξεστηκότα),” he means the false prophet (ψευδοπροφήτην), such as are the augurs (μάντεις). Much to the same effect Christ also tells them, that they shall suffer the utmost evils.

Chrysostom does not give particulars, but the terms παρεξεστηκὼς, πνευματοφόρος, μαινόμενοι, and βακχευόμενοι sufficiently indicate the mad, uncontrolled actions of such prophets.

Not all demonic possession manifests itself in typical form. At times, the possessed is afflicted with a seemingly natural disease:

2. “And as they went out,” it is said, “behold, they brought unto Him a dumb man possessed with a devil (δαιμονιζόμενον).” For the affliction (πάθος) was not natural (φύσεως), but the device of the evil spirit (δαίμονος); wherefore also he needs others to bring him. For he could neither make entreaty himself, being speechless, nor supplicate others, when the evil spirit had bound his tongue, and together with his tongue had fettered his soul.

Clearly this is an atypical case of possession. Equally clearly, Chrysostom does not consider all dumbness to be indicative of demonic possession. He does not, however, indicate what signs, if any, revealed this dumbness to be demonic in origin.

In summary, the typical symptoms of demonic possession are similar to those of μανία – violent behavior and loss of self-control. In at least some cases, the possessed person is unaware of his condition. Atypical forms do exist. In these homilies, Chrysostom does not suggest how to distinguish demonic possession from mental illness or other natural illnesses.

The Wider Perspective

Theodoret paints a picture similar to Chrysostom’s. The primary image is the raving demoniac, such as the girl “who for a long time had been delirious (κορυβαντώσις)

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65 Hom. in Mt. 43.3; PG 57.460; NPNF I, 10, p. 275
66 Hom. in Mt. 32.1; PG 57.378; NPNF I, 10, p. 211
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and raving (λυττώσης),” 67 the person who “begged to be freed from demonic fury (δαιμονικῆς λύττης),” 68 and the raving maniac (κορυβαντιῶν καὶ μεμηνῶς 69) who was delivered from diabolical frenzy (διαβολικῆς ... βακχείας). 70

Not only do demons cause rage, but they are subject to it themselves. Unable to drive Thalelaeus from their mountain haunt, the demons were “filled with rage (λύττης) and frenzy (μανίας).” 71

Although the violent demoniac seems to be the norm, other possibilities exist. The woman who suffered from morbid gluttony could have been either demon possessed or mentally ill. Thus, the difference was not always obvious. A similar passage involves a noblewoman who “lost her wits (ἔξω μὲν τῶν φρενῶν ἐγεγόνει) and was unable to recognize household members, and could not bear to take food or drink. She continued delirious (παραπαίουσα) for a very long time.” Most of the people considered her condition demonic, but “the doctors named it a disease of the brain.” The saint healed her, but nothing in the story indicates that he cast a demon out from her. 72

Thus, Chrysostom’s view of the demoniac is much like his view of the mentally ill. Both are insane and can be easily characterized as suffering from μανία. Both may share some responsibility for entering their conditions, but both deserve pity, unlike the purposely sinful. As mentioned above, this will be shown to be a natural outgrowth of his view of humanity.

Passions as a Form of Demonic Possession

In various places, Chrysostom speaks of demonic involvement in passions. Though he does not seem to call the passion-ridden person δαιμονών, he does indicate that demons do in some sense dwell in those in thrall to their passions. Two notable examples are the Jews who rejected Christ and Judas.

The wrathful man is under demonic control:

For so too the physicians (ἰατροὶ), when ... shamefully handled by the insane (μαινομένων), then most of all pity them, and take measures for their perfect cure, knowing that the insult (ὕβρις) comes of the extremity of their disease (νοσήματος). Now I bid thee too have the same mind touching them that are plotting against thee,

67 Thdt, Hist. Relig. 3.9; SC 234; Price (1985), pp. 40-1
68 Thdt, Hist. Relig. 6.6; SC 234; Price (1985), p. 65
69 a form of μαινομένων
70 Thdt, Hist. Relig. 9.4; SC 234; Price (1985), p. 82
71 Thdt, Hist. Relig. 28.1; SC 257; Price (1985), p. 180
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and do thou so treat them that are injuring thee. For it is they above all that are diseased ... who are undergoing all the violence ... set him free (ἐλευθέρωσον) from that grievous demon (δαίμονος ... χαλεποῖο), wrath (θυμοῦ). Yea, for if we see persons possessed by devils (δαιμονῶντας), we weep for them; we do not seek to be ourselves also possessed. (δαιμονιστῇ).73

Above, wrath is identified with the demon provoking it, and the wrathful man is at least likened to the demoniac, but is not directly so-called.

Below is another passage linking wrath and demons:

Consider that he who is insolent (ὑβρίζων) is beside himself (ἐξέστηκεν) and mad (μαίνεται), and thou wilt not feel indignant, when insulted, since the possessed (δαιμονωμένοι) strike us, and we, so far from being provoked, do rather pity them. This do thou also; pity him that is insolent to thee, for he is held in subjection (κατέχεται) by a dreadful monster (δεινὸ ... θηρίῳ), rage (θυμῷ), by a grievous demon (χαλεπῷ δαίμονι), anger (ὀργῇ). Set him free as he is wrought upon (ἐνεργούμενον) by a grievous demon (δαίμονος χαλεποῦ), and going quickly to ruin. For so great is this disease (νόσημα) as not to need even time for the destruction of him that is seized with it.74

Again, wrath is identified with the demon that provokes it. Chrysostom describes the wrathful man as “held in subjection” (κατέχεται) and “wrought upon” (ἐνεργούμενον) by the demon. While neither of these terms need imply demonic possession, they both (especially the latter) can be used in that manner.75

The covetous man (φιλάργυρος) is in some sense inhabited by demons. Comparing demoniacs with Judas and other φιλάργυροι, Chrysostom remarks that should anyone remove all restraints from the φιλάργυρος, “then would he know assuredly the demon that is in them (ἐν αὐτοῖς δαίμονα) to be far fiercer, and more frantic (μανικώτερον) than he who is just now gone forth.”76 The φιλάργυρος is not only inhabited by a demon, but by one more frantic (μανικώτερον) than one possessing a demoniac. The reason is that demoniacs “for the more part act in insensibility” (ἀναισθησίᾳ), but Judas and those like him are “frantic while they reason” (μετὰ λογισμοῦ παραπαίουσιν).77

Another passage concerning Judas shows him to be indwelt by a demon:

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73 Hom. in Mt. 18.4; PG 57.270; NPNF I, 10, pp. 127-8
74 Hom. in Mt. 87.4; PG58.773; NPNF I, 10, p. 518
75 e.g. Hom. in Mt. 28.3; PG 57.354-5; NPNF I, 10, pp. 192-3; Hom. in Mt. 82.6; PG 58.745; NPNF I, 10, p. 496
76 Hom. in Mt. 28.4; PG 57.356; NPNF I, 10, p. 194
77 Hom. in Mt. 28.4; PG 57.356; NPNF I, 10, p. 193
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Such is covetousness (φιλαργυρία), it renders men fools (μωροὺς) and senseless (ἀνοήτους) ... and devils. This man at least received (προσίετο) unto him the devil even when plotting against him, but Jesus, even when doing him good, he betrayed, having already become a devil in will (προαιρέσει). For such doth the insatiable (ἀκόρεστος) desire of gain (χρημάτων ἐπιθυμία) make men, out of their mind (ἐκφρονας), frenzy-smitten (παραπλῆγας) ...

But how do Matthew and the other evangelists say, that, when he made the agreement touching the treason, then the devil seized (εἷλεν) him; but John, that “after the sop Satan entered into him (εἰσῆλθεν εἰς αὐτὸν).” And John himself knew this, for further back he saith, “The devil having now put (βεβληκότος) into the heart of Judas, that he should betray Him.” How then doth he say, “After the sop Satan entered into him?” Because he enters not in (οὐκ ... εἰσέρχεται) suddenly, nor at once, but makes much trial first ... For after having ... assailed him quietly, after that he saw him prepared to receive him (ἐπιτήδειον πρὸς ὑποδοχὴν), he thenceforth wholly breathed himself into him (ἐπνευσε), and completely got the better of him (ὁλοσχερῶς αὐτοῦ περιγέγονε).  

The demon of φιλαργυρία truly possessed Judas, although his outward behavior remained so apparently normal that the other disciples had no inkling of his identity as Christ’s betrayer. The demon possessed him by degrees and at last, completely got the better of him. That the demon at last “wholly breathed himself into him” (ἐπνευσε) may have to do with commonly held views of how demons gain physical access to the body, but it also brings to mind Christ’s breathing the Holy Spirit onto the disciples. Judas, in his frenzied desire for riches, forsakes the One Who would have breathed the Holy Spirit into him and accepts instead the breathing in of a demon. It is no wonder that Chrysostom describes Judas and those similarly afflicted as “out of their mind” (ἐκφρονας) and “frenzy-smitten” (παραπλῆγας).”

The Jews who refused to accept Christ were like the man delivered from one demon, only to be possessed by seven worse.

For before also ye were possessed by a devil (κατείχεσθε δαίμονι), when ye were worshipping idols ... exhibiting great madness (μανίαν); nevertheless I ... cast out that devil by the prophets; and again in my own person I am come, willing to cleanse you more entirely. Since then you ... have wrecked yourselves in greater wickedness (… to slay Him); therefore your sufferings will be more grievous than ... those at Babylon ... and under the first Antiochus ... But not this only doth the illustration declare, but that they should be also utterly destitute of all virtue, and more assailable by the power (ἐνεργείᾳ) of the devils (δαίμονων), than at that time. For then even although they sinned, yet were there also among them such as acted uprightly, and God’s providence was present with them, and the grace of the Spirit ...
but now of this guardianship too they shall be utterly deprived ... so that there is now both a greater scarcity of virtue, and a more intense affliction, and a more tyrannical operation of the devils (δαιμόνων ἐνέργεια)...

Where now are they that seek after signs? ... a considerate mind is needed, and if this be wanting, signs are of no profit. See, for instance, how the Ninevites without signs believed, while these, after so many miracles, grew worse, and made themselves an habitation of innumerable devils, and brought on themselves ten thousand calamities; and very naturally (εἰκότως). For when a man, being once delivered from his ills, fails to be corrected, he will suffer far worse than before … of necessity such an one will be overtaken by the ambush of the devils. Since surely … he ought to have been sobered, by his former sufferings, and by his deliverance; or rather a third thing also is added, the threat of having still worse to endure. But yet by none of these were they made better. 79

Those who refused to be corrected became “an habitation of innumerable devils, and brought on themselves ten thousand calamities,” not as an arbitrary punishment but “very naturally.” Deprived by their recalcitrance of the grace of the Spirit, what else could they expect but “a greater scarcity of virtue, and a more intense affliction, and a more tyrannical operation of the devils”?

Wider Perspective

Basil, in the above-mentioned text, considers that drunkard to wrestle with “a self-chosen demon.” Gregory Nazianzen says that Julian the Apostate was “ruled by the crooked serpent which possessed (κατέσχε) his soul.” There is no reason to believe that Julian was possessed in the obvious sense, but surely Gregory’s accusation was serious. Gregory also vehemently accuses Julian of insanity. Julian “was raging (ἐλύσσα) against us, whose madness (μανείς) in rejecting Christ … had now rendered him intolerable to others … How utter was the derangement (παραπληξίας) and folly (ἀνοίας).” 80 Although Gregory does not explicitly state which passions he has in mind, he clearly considers Julian both insane and in some sense demon-possessed and also highly culpable.

Thus far, it has been shown that Chrysostom and contemporaries considered the purposely or flagrantly sinful as not only insane, but demon possessed and highly culpable.

79 Hom. in Mt. 43.3-4; PG 57.460-1; NPNF I, 10, pp. 275-6
80 GNz, Or. 7.11.5; Boulenger; NPNF II, 5, p. 233
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Words Used to Describe Demoniacs

As indicated by the above quotes, the main term that Chrysostom uses is δαιμονῶν. He also uses ἐνεργούμενος and κατεχόμενος and ἐνοχλούμενος at least once each. For those possessed by their passions, Chrysostom does not appear to use δαιμονῶν. He does use versions of the other two terms and speaks of ἐν αὐτοῖς δαίμονα in reference to the covetous (φιλάργυροι). He also uses a variety of terms to refer to the entering of the demon into Judas (see above). If this distinction holds in other works, it would be some indication that he thought of these two types of possession as distinctly different things. Be that as it may, he does consider possession by passions to be a true form of demonic possession.

As also indicated by the above quotes, Chrysostom fairly often refers to the μανία of the possessed. He does not generally use other terms that could be understood to mean “mad” for the possessed. The one time that he uses ἀναισθησία in reference to demoniacs, it refers to their unawareness of their behavior, not the senselessly mad behavior of the covetous and other passion-plagued persons. He does, of course, understand the σεληνιαζόμενος to be demon-possessed. However, σεληνιαζόμενος describes not demonic possession in general, but a specific type of demonic possession that – according to Origen, Chrysostom, and various other patristic writers – was erroneously assumed to be of natural aetiology.

Only for the false prophet does Chrysostom use various terms (παρεξεστηκώς, πνευματοφόρος, μαινόμενος, and βακχευόμενος ὑπὸ τῶν πονηρῶν πνευμάτων) for a demon-possessed person. Interestingly, he does not call the false prophet δαιμονῶν. It would be instructive to check his usage in the wider corpus to see if this remains true.

It remains to ask why Chrysostom overwhelmingly prefers μανία to describe the condition of the possessed. Μανία is the closest Greek equivalent to the English ‘mad,’ with its breadth of meaning. Chrysostom uses it sometimes in reference to mental illness, but mostly in reference to the passions. Two other words (ἀλογία and ἄνοια) that Chrysostom frequently uses to refer to the passion-plagued have more specifically to do with lack of relationship with the Λόγος of God. Since Chrysostom believes the demon-possessed often are humble, he probably considers them much more likely to be...

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81 Hom. in Mt. 28.4; PG 57.356; NPNF I, 10, pp. 193-4 - they that are troubled by evil spirits (ἐνοχλούμενοι), deserve rather our pity and our tears
82 Hom. in Mt. 28.4; PG 57.356; NPNF I, 10, p. 193
well of νοῦς than those willingly possessed by their passions. In addition, μανία is a more apt description for demonic possession than these other two terms because of its association with rage; with the divine frenzy of the devotees, priests, and priestesses of the gods; and with the medical sense of μανία as an affliction. While various other terms bear one or more of these associations, only μανία bears them all. This does not explain why Chrysostom seldom or never uses other terms in particular situations, but it does help explain his preference for this specific term.

The Wider Perspective

Gregory Nazianzen says above that it is better to be a demoniac (δαιμονών) than not to “admit the equality nor the Godhead” of Christ. One assumes that he has the typical demoniac in mind. When, however, he refers above to Julian’s being possessed by a serpent, he uses κατέσχε. This seems in general agreement with Chrysostom’s usage.

Theodoret, however, uses various terms to refer to what is obviously typical demonic possession – troubled by an evil demon (πονηροῦ δαίμονος ἐνοχλουμένης), full of the action of the evil demon (τῆς τοῦ πονηροῦ δαίμονος ἐνεργείας ἀνάπλεως), and beset by a demon (ὑπὸ δαίμονος πολεμουμένη). Also unlike Chrysostom, Theodoret does not favor μαινόμενος over other terms that denote wild and violent raving. This is amply demonstrated in the above section on “Symptoms of Possession” by the different words Theodoret uses to describe the raving of the demoniacs. At this point, it is not clear that this is due to anything other than a stylistic difference.

Summary

The possessed are to be pitied and even admired. They may bear some responsibility for becoming or remaining possessed or relapsing—luxurious living is inimical to deliverance from possession. However, they are not responsible for their actions while under demonic compulsion. Even in the depths of demonic attack, demoniacs benefit from God’s constant tender care. Violent and uncontrolled behavior is typical of demonic possession, but atypical instances occur in which the malady seems similar to

83 Thdt, Hist. Relig. 3.9; SC 234; Price (1985), pp. 40-1
84 Thdt, Hist. Relig. 9.4; SC 234; Price (1985), p. 82
85 Thdt, Hist. Relig. 3.22; SC 234; Price (1985), p. 46
normal diseases. In addition, the man possessed by his passions is truly indwelt by
demons. Chrysostom does not seem to call such a person δαμασκονών, but he does use
terms that he also uses to describe the possessed. Among terms that mean “mad,” he
overwhelmingly prefers μανία to refer to the possessed.

While other writers would agree that there are things worse than demon possession
and that demoniacs are not necessarily responsible for their plight, Chrysostom is
remarkable for his outspoken championship of the mentally ill and the possessed.

It now remains to examine Chrysostom’s view of sinful madness as the lower limit
case of humanity. Also, it will be shown how sinful madness is worse than mental
illness or demonic possession because it is a willful rejection of the Λόγος and the
exalting of the ἄλογος aspect of human nature, thus making the sinner worse than the
ἄλογος and akin to demons.

SINFUL MADNESS

While the demon-possessed and the mentally ill are often partly responsible for their
conditions, by and large, they are not responsible for their actions when in the grip of
their disease. This is in contrast to the vast majority of people whom Chrysostom
considers mad. These include persecutors, pagan philosophers, idolaters, atheists,
heretics, Christ’s enemies, and the passion-plagued. In short, all sin is madness. The
following passage, concerning Herod the Great’s attempt to deceive the magi and thus
slay the infant Christ, illustrates this truth:

Seest thou his extreme folly (μανίας)? ... if intending to plot against Him, how is it
thou dost not perceive, that from the fact of their being asked secretly the wise men
will be able to perceive thy craft? But ... a soul taken captive by any wickedness
becomes more utterly senseless (ἀνοητοτέρα) than anything.\(^\text{86}\)

The key to Chrysostom’s understanding of the utter ἄνοια of wickedness lies in his
understanding of the ἄλογος man. Therefore, before examining the different types of
sin that Chrysostom classes as mad, it is necessary to examine his view of the ἄλογος
man.

The ἄλογος Man

\(^{86}\) Hom. in Mt. 7.3; PG 57.76; NPNF I, 10, p. 46
The ἄλογος man fails to attain his full humanity. In two key passages, St. John speaks of what separates men from the brute beasts (ἄλογα). In the first, Chrysostom is chastising his listeners for neither reading nor paying heed to Scripture:

For if thou wouldest learn how great is the profit of the Scriptures, examine thyself, what thou becomest by hearing Psalms, and what by listening to a song of Satan ... For this cause we have need continually of those songs, which serve as charms from the Spirit. Yes, for this it is whereby we excel the irrational creatures (ἄλόγων), since with respect to all other things, we are even exceedingly inferior to them. This is a soul’s food, this its ornament, this its security; even as not to hear is famine and wasting; for “I will give them,” saith He, “not a famine of bread, nor a thirst of water, but a famine of hearing the word of the Lord (λόγον Κυρίου).”

What then can be more wretched? when the very evil, which God threatens in the way of punishment, this thou art drawing upon thine head of thine own accord ...87

Clearly, this ability to hear the word of the Lord is chiefly noetic, having to do not just with Scripture but with the Word Himself. Also important is the contrast of Psalms with songs of Satan. The ἄλογος man has aligned himself somehow with Satan.

The second occurs in a discussion of Christ’s injunction not to call another “fool” (μωρόν).

Think it not then a light thing to call another “fool” (μωρόν). For when of that which separates us from the brutes (ἄλόγων), and by which especially we are human beings, namely, the mind (νῷ) and the understanding (συνέσει), — when of this thou hast robbed thy brother, thou hast deprived him of all his nobleness (εὐγενείας).88

In the previous passage, the difference between man and beast has to do with the ability to hear the Λόγος. Here, it has to do with the νοῦς and the σύνεσις. In both cases man’s superiority over the beasts is directly related to his ability to perceive and respond to God.

In another key passage, Chrysostom contrasts the gluttonous man with the monk.

they are fed on a food most excellent, not setting before themselves cooked flesh of beasts (σάρκας ἄλόγων); but oracles of God, (λόγια Θεοῦ) ... a honey marvelous, and far superior to that whereon John fed of old in the wilderness ... No foul word can those spiritual mouths bring forth ... One would not be wrong in comparing the mouths of them that ... are mad (λυσσώντων) after worldly things, to ditches of some mire; but the lips of these to fountains flowing with honey, and pouring forth pure streams.89

87 Hom. in Mt. 2.6; PG 57.31; NPNF I, 10, p. 13
88 Hom. in Mt. 16.8; PG 57.249; NPNF I, 10, p. 111
89 Hom. in Mt. 68.4-5; PG 58.646; NPNF I, 10, p. 419

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This passage brings to mind Chrysostom’s astonishment that people can voluntarily undergo a famine of the Word of God, which God threatens as a great punishment. These monks, who eschew σάρκας ἄλογων, suffer no such famine. Taking these two passages together and remembering the freight of the word σάρξ, it seems reasonable to posit that the man who attends too much to the flesh of beasts becomes ἄλογος and ‘fleshly’ himself.

Below, Chrysostom, speaking of the necessity of ascetic struggle after baptism, links certain human passions with the brute beast.

Let no man then become chaff ... nor lie exposed to wicked desires, blown about by them easily every way. For if thou continue wheat, though temptation be brought on thee, thou wilt suffer nothing dreadful; nay, for in the threshing floor, the wheels of the car ... do not cut in pieces the wheat; but if thou fall away into the weakness of chaff, thou wilt both here suffer incurable ills ... and there thou wilt undergo the eternal punishment. For all such persons both before that furnace become food for the irrational passions (ἄλογοις ... παθείν) here, as chaff is for the brute animal: (ἄλογοις ζώοις) and there again they are material and food for the flame.  

Thus, the Christian who allows himself to become food for the irrational passions in this life makes himself food for the flames of hell. Taken in conjunction with the above passages, this indicates that failure to feed upon the Λόγος or λογία of God leads not only to feeding on σάρξ of ἄλογα, but eventually to oneself becoming food for the ἄλογα passions and then to the flames.

This ἄλογία summarizes the state of sinful man. Estranged from the Λόγος (and, thus, from the entire Trinity), man allies himself with Satan, fails to be fully man and becomes worse than the ἄλογα. This subhuman state is clearly a state of madness. One can understand, then, Chrysostom’s above quote that “a soul taken captive by any wickedness becomes more utterly senseless [ἀνοητοτέρα] than anything.”

Persecutors

Below Chrysostom is reconciling Christ’s command, “Take no thought what ye shall speak” with the injunction “Be ready to give an answer to every man that asketh you a reason of the hope that is in you.”

as long as the contest is among friends, He commands us also to take thought; but when there is a terrible tribunal, and frantic assemblies (δήμοι μαυνόμενοι), and

90 Hom. in Mt. 11.6; PG 57.199; NPNF I, 10, p. 72
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terrors on all sides, He bestows the influence from Himself, that they may take courage and speak out, and not be discouraged, nor betray the righteous cause.91

It is not clear whether the above mob is Gentile or Jewish. Below, Chrysostom is discussing the complicity of the Jews with Julian the Apostate:

Ye know accordingly even in our generation, when he who surpassed all in impiety, I mean Julian, was transported with his fury (ἐξεβακχεύθη), how they ranged themselves with the heathens, how they courted their party.92

Even St. Paul, in his character of Saul the persecutor, comes in for strong words: “He converted the blessed Paul also when frantic (μαινόμενον) and raging (λυττῶντα), and darting fire.”93

All above descriptors of persecutors share, unsurprisingly, an element of uncontrolled violence. Whether Chrysostom thought the persecutors to be out of control in the common meaning of the phrase is not clear. One would assume that Saul, at least, had the outward appearance of control, or he would likely not have been put in a position of responsibility by the Jewish authorities. If so, the accusations of μανία and other types of madness would not primarily indicate the rational mind’s loss of control over one’s actions, but rather a darkened nous that cannot recognize the insanity of persecuting those who are following God.

Pagan Philosophers

In the following passage, Chrysostom has been discussing the apparent contradictions of the evangelists’ accounts of Christ’s earthly life:

I do not yet say, that those likewise who glory greatly in rhetoric and philosophy, having many of them written many books touching the same matters, have not merely expressed themselves differently, but have even spoken in opposition to one another ... Far be it from me to frame our defense from the frenzy (παρανοίας) of those men, neither am I willing out of falsehood to make recommendations for the truth.94

Frenzy is a better translation of this word than paranoia would be, given its modern connotations. Again, though, Chrysostom does not likely consider all pagan philosophers to be violently mad. Perhaps the παρανοία of the philosophers is that they

91 Hom. in Mt. 33.5; PG 57.394; NPNF I, 10, p. 223
92 Hom. in Mt. 43.3; PG 57.460; NPNF I, 10, p. 276
93 Hom. in Mt. 30.1; PG 57.362; NPNF I, 10, p. 199
94 Hom. in Mt. 1.4; PG 57.18; NPNF I, 10, p. 4
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not only mistake falsehood for truth, but set themselves up as teachers of the truth. In this way, they are violently opposed to the truth.

Idolaters

If pagan philosophers are mad, much more idolaters. The above passage concerning false prophets assumes that they are idolaters.\(^{95}\) It is not clear how much of the behavior described here is specific to behavior during the receiving and giving of a false prophecy, but the false prophets are clearly maddened in some sense by their commerce with demons.

A paragraph or two later, Chrysostom discusses the demon that is cast out of a person, only to return with seven worse.

For before also ye were possessed by a devil, when ye were worshipping idols, and were slaying your sons to the devils, exhibiting great madness (μανίαν); nevertheless I forsook you not, but cast out that devil by the prophets; and again in my own person I am come, willing to cleanse you more entirely. Since then you will not attend ... your sufferings will be more grievous than ... those at Babylon ... in Egypt, and under the first Antiochus...\(^{96}\)

The people in question are the idolatrous Israelites of the Old Testament. They were in some sense possessed by demons and afflicted with μανία while worshiping idols and sacrificing their own children to them.

Below, Chrysostom compares those guilty of πλεονεξία with those celebrating Bacchanalian rites.

For it were far better to be naked as to clothing, than being clad with the fruits of covetousness (πλεονεξίας), to go about like them that celebrate the orgies (βακχευομένους) for Bacchus. For like as they have on madmen’s (μαινομένων) masks and clothes, so have these also. And much as the nakedness of the possessed (δαιμονών) is caused by madness (μανία), so doth madness (μανία) produce this clothing, and the clothing is more miserable than the nakedness.\(^{97}\)

In the first and third instances above, the idolaters are clearly influenced by demons to act in a way that they would not ordinarily. There is no suggestion, though, that these people exhibit mad behavior at other times. Also, at least some members of their societies considered such behavior appropriate in the “proper” places. These people

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\(^{95}\) Hom. in Mt. 43.3; PG 57.460; NPNF I, 10, p. 275

\(^{96}\) Hom. in Mt. 43.3; PG 57.460; NPNF I, 10, p. 275

\(^{97}\) Hom. in Mt. 81.3; PG 58.734; NPNF I, 10, p. 488

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probably would not be considered mentally ill in a modern sense if they behaved properly within the context of their culture.

The second instance, that of the idolatrous Old Testament Jews, involves sacrificing one’s own children to demons. Context does not tell whether the idolaters were in control of their actions at the time. One would think either that the idolaters had been whipped into a frenzy before committing such an abominable sin or that they slew their children in full knowledge but in abject fear of the demons.

In summary, idolaters engage in mad behavior through direct demonic compulsion or through fear. The words used to describe this madness all imply loss of control and some imply violence. These mad behaviors were probably countenanced in their particular places (prophesying, celebrating Bacchic rites, sacrificing children), but would have been recognized as mad outside that context. Probably Chrysostom would consider this countenance of such behavior as part of the madness.

Atheists

In explaining why the second great commandment is like the first, Chrysostom quotes Scripture:

But wherefore “like unto this?” Because this makes the way for that, and by it is again established; “For every one that doeth evil hateth the light, neither cometh to the light;’ and again, “The fool (ἄφρων) hath said in his heart, There is no God.”

And what in consequence of this? “They are corrupt, and become abominable in their ways.”

Unlike most of the words examined above, ἄφρων does not convey uncontrolled, violent madness. However, the modern English “fool” probably does not do the term justice. This “mindlessness” that refuses to acknowledge God is directly responsible for them becoming “corrupt and ... abominable in their ways.”

Disbelief in Christ

To laugh at belief in Christ is mad:

If any one therefore say to thee, Dost thou worship the crucified? say, with ... your countenance gladdened, “I do both worship Him, and will never cease to worship.”

And if he laugh, weep for him, because he is mad (μαινεται).

98 Ps. 53:1 (KJV)
99 Hom. in Mt. 71.1; PG 58.661; NPNF I, 10, p. 431
100 Hom. in Mt. 54.5; PG 58.538; NPNF I, 10, p. 336
Chrysostom says nothing more about such a person than that he laughs at one who worships the Crucified. This in itself, however, is sufficient for Chrysostom to consider such a person mad and a worthy subject for tears.

Probably, this is the underlying basis for considering persecutors, idolaters, pagan philosophers, etc. to be mad. Whether or not their behavior is at times mad by the criteria of the reasoning mind, they are mad for rejecting the Crucified. In so doing, they reject fundamental reality.

**Heretics**

Chrysostom commonly calls heretics mad. Sometimes, he refers to particular beliefs or attitudes toward Scripture without actually naming the heresy. Other times, he takes issue with specific heretical sects. The heresies that Chrysostom combats are various. Some are impugning the goodness of God. Others speak blasphemously of Christ's character, Humanity, Divinity.

*Denying God’s Goodness*

Below, Chrysostom combats a heretical belief having to do with the time one is born and a cyclic understanding of world events:

Where then are they who set up the power of a nativity and the cycle of times against the doctrines of the church? For who has ever recorded that another Christ appeared ... For there was never another Sodom, nor another Gomorrah, nor another flood ... And altogether, what is a nativity? nothing else than injustice, and confusion, and that all things are born along at random; or rather not at random only; but more than this, with folly (ἀλογίας).\(^{101}\)

Chrysostom refuses this belief as being against the doctrines of the Church and as implying a basic injustice and folly (ἀλογία) in the world. This, of course, reflects on the justice and wisdom of God.

The following quote concerns those who “reject the law.”

In the next place, they criticize the law (νόμον) in the old covenant, which bids put out “an eye for an eye,” ... What then do we say in answer to this? That it is the highest kind of philanthropy ... And if this be cruelty, it is cruelty also for the murderer to be restrained, and the adulterer checked. But these are the sayings of senseless men (ἀνοητῶν), and of those that are mad to the extreme of madness (τὴν ἐσχάτην μανίαν μανίαν) ... their reasoning comes round to the very contrary ... the God of the old covenant, whom they call cruel, will be found mild and meek: and

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\(^{101}\) Hom. in Mt. 75.4; PG 58.691; NPNF I, 10, p. 454

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He of the new, whom they acknowledged to be good, will be hard and grievous, according to their madness (ἄνοιαν)?

Here, Chrysostom uses Christ's taking up of the little child to take issue with the Manichaeans.

He calls us on to all natural excellencies (φυσικὰ κατορθώματα), indicating that of free choice (προαιρέσεως) it is possible to attain them, and so silences the wicked frenzy (λύτταν) of the Manichaeans. For if nature (φύσις) be an evil thing, wherefore doth He draw from hence His patterns of severe goodness?

And the child which He set in the midst suppose to have been a very young child indeed, free from all these passions. For such a little child is free from pride (ἀπονοίας) and the mad desire of glory (δοξομανίας), and envy (βασκανίας), and contentiousness (φιλονεικίας), and all such passions, and having many virtues, simplicity (ἀφέλειαν), humility (ταπεινοφροσύνην), unworldliness (ἀπραγμοσύνην), prides itself (ἐπαϊρεται) upon none of them; which is a twofold severity of goodness; to have these things, and not to be puffed up (φυσάσθαι) about them.

The following is thoughtless blasphemy against God's goodness, rather than part of a heretical belief system:

For the free woman behaves herself unseemly in the midst of her slaves as spectators, and the slave again in like manner in the midst of the slaves, and they cause the gifts of God to be blasphemously spoken of by foolish men (ἀνοίητων).

For instance, I hear many say ... “Would there were no wine.” O folly! (ἀνοίας) O madness! (παραπληξίας) When other men sin, dost thou find fault with God's gifts? And what great madness (μανίας) is this? What? did the wine, O man, produce this evil? Not the wine, but the intemperance of such as take an evil delight in it.

All these passages assume that to call into question God's goodness is serious madness. From a Christian viewpoint, this makes eminent sense. God's goodness is a foundational reality. To call it into question can only be madness.

Impugning Christ's Character, Humanity, and Divinity

Christ's Character

Below, Chrysostom is referring to Matt. 6:26.

102 Hom. in Mt. 16.6-7; PG 57.246-7; NPNF I, 10, pp. 108-9
103 Hom. in Mt. 58.3; PG 58.569; NPNF I, 10, p. 360
104 Hom. in Mt. 57.2; PG 58.564; NPNF I, 10, p. 356
105 Behold the fowls of the air: for they sow not, neither do they reap, nor gather into barns; yet your heavenly Father feedeth them. Are ye not much better than they?
some of the ungodly (ἀσεβῶν) have come to so great a pitch of madness (ἀνοίας), as even to attack His illustration. Because, say they, it was not meet for one strengthening moral principle, to use natural advantages (φυσικῶν πλεονεκτημάτων) as incitements to that end.  

To accuse the Incarnate God of saying things that are “not meet for one strengthening moral principle” is foolish indeed.

Christ’s Humanity

The following quote concerns Christ’s agony in Gethsemane:

sweats flow over him … that the heretics might not say this, that He acts the agony … By saying then, “If it be possible, let it pass from me,” He showed His humanity; but by saying, “Nevertheless not as I will, but as Thou wilt,” He showed His virtue and self-command, teaching us even when nature (φύσεως) pulls us back, to follow God. For since it was not enough for the foolish (ἀνοήτοις) to show His face only, He uses words also.  

Whether the foolish (ἀνοήτοις) are the heretics or those easily swayed by them is unclear. What is clear is that Chrysostom’s concern is with protecting his flock’s understanding of the full humanity of Christ.

Christ’s Divinity

Below, Chrysostom is chastising those who consider Christ to be truly ignorant of the Day of His Second Coming:

And ye indeed say that ye know even His substance, but that the Son not even the day … yet His substance is much greater than the days, even infinitely greater. How then, while assigning to yourselves the greater things, do you not allow even the less to the Son, “in whom are hid all the treasures of wisdom and knowledge.” But neither do you know what God is in His substance, though ten thousand times ye talk thus madly (μαίνησθε), neither is the Son ignorant of the day, but is even in full certainty thereof.

The imputation of ignorance to Christ is an indirect attack on His Divinity since, being fully Divine, of course He knows the day. Those who think they know the substance of God and yet deny Christ’s knowledge of the Day of His own Coming talk madly (μαίνησθε). Chrysostom does not explain himself, but from an Orthodox perspective, it certainly seems mad to claim to know God in His unknowable innermost being and

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106 Hom. in Mt. 21.2; PG 57.297; NPNF I, 10, p. 148
107 Hom. in Mt. 83.1; PG 58.746; NPNF I, 10, p. 497
108 Hom. in Mt. 77.2; PG 58.703; NPNF I, 10, p. 463
then claim that One Person of the Trinity does not know a major part of the Divine Economy.

The context of the following passage is Christ’s birth from the Virgin:

Shame on them who busy themselves touching the generation on high. For if this birth, which ... was manifested and handled with hands, can by no man be explained; of what excess of madness (μανίας) do they come short who make themselves busy and curious touching that unutterable generation? For neither Gabriel nor Matthew was able to say anything more, but only that it was of the Spirit ... Do not either thou then inquire; but receive what is revealed, and be not curious about what is kept secret.\textsuperscript{109}

Here it is madness not just to claim to understand Trinitarian mysteries, but even to busy oneself over them. Presumably, such an attempt is mad not only because it is totally futile, but also because it is impious and smacks of great hubris.

\textit{Miscellaneous}

Not to apprehend the truth of the Resurrection is foolish:

speaking of His resurrection, He saith, “When the corn of wheat hath fallen into the earth, except it die, it abideth alone; but if it die, it bringeth forth much fruit.”

Whereby also the blessed Paul being instructed uses the same similitude, “Thou fool (ᾼφρων),” he saith, “that which thou sowest is not quickened, except it die.”\textsuperscript{110}

Seemingly, the person is ᾼφρων because he cannot extrapolate from an earthly reality to a heavenly one. Most likely, this is not primarily a foolishness of the brain, but of the nous. To deny the Resurrection is to deny fundamental realities concerning Christ and man. Such a person is mad not because he does not reason well, but because he does not perceive fundamental realities.

Below Chrysostom is explicating Matt. 7:6.\textsuperscript{111}

And full well did He say, “turn again and rend you:” for they feign gentleness, so as to be taught: then ... quite changing from one sort to another, they ... deride us, as deceived persons (ἀπατηθέντας) ... It is not, you see, that those truths furnish them with armor, but they become fools (ἀνόητοι) in this way of their own accord, being filled with more willfulness (ἀπονοιαίας). ... it is no small gain for them to abide in ignorance (ἀγνοία), for so they are not such entire scorners. But if they learn ... will they themselves be ... rather the more damaged, and to thee they will cause endless difficulties.\textsuperscript{112}

\textsuperscript{109} Hom. in Mt. 4.3; PG 57.43; NPNF I, 10, pp. 22-3
\textsuperscript{110} Hom. in Mt. 77.1; PG 58.701; NPNF I, 10, p. 462
\textsuperscript{111} Give not that which is holy unto the dogs, neither cast ye your pearls before swine.
\textsuperscript{112} Hom. in Mt. 23.3; PG 57.311; NPNF I, 10, pp. 159-60
This quote concerns the character of heretics, rather than any particular heresy. They learn truth and feign virtue only to cause destruction. “They become fools (ἀνόητοι) ... of their own accord, being filled with more willfulness (ἀπονοίας).” They learn truth with their brains, but have no desire to be transformed by truth in their innermost being. They are filled not with humility, but with ἀπονοία. Perhaps this is the key difficulty of heretics, from Chrysostom’s perspective. Their madness is that they say things about God without knowing Him experientially. This explains Chrysostom’s frequent charge of ἀνοία in heretics – the heretic has an unenlightened nous. Words such as μανία, παραφροσύνης, and λύσσω express the desperate nature of the heretic’s madness and perhaps the violence done to self and others.

**Concerning the character of heretics**

Concerning those who said “He casteth out devils through the prince of the devils,” Chrysostom remarks “What can be more foolish (ἀνοητότερον) than this?”.

Concerning Christ’s Enemies

Concerning those who said “He casteth out devils through the prince of the devils,” Chrysostom remarks “What can be more foolish (ἀνοητότερον) than this?”.

In regard to the Scribes and Pharisees who sought a sign, he wonders “could then anything be more foolish (ἀνοητότερον) than these men (not more impious only), who after so many miracles, as though none had been wrought, say, ‘We would see a sign from Thee?’”

Some of Chrysostom’s most vehement accusations of madness concern those that attempted or succeeded in Christ’s murder. Herod the Great’s attempt to slay the infant Christ is “an act of extreme idiocy (ἀνοίας) not of madness (μανίας) only.” At Christ’s triumphal entry into Jerusalem the children “although of age immature, uttered things that had a clear meaning, and were in accordance with those above” in contrast to “the men things teeming with frenzy (παραφροσύνης) and madness (μανίας)” who sought to slay him. Concerning Christ’s being spit on, beaten, and mocked, Chrysostom asks,

Wherefore did they these things, when they were to put Him to death? ... That thou mightest learn their intemperate spirit (ἀκόλαιστον τρόπον) by all things, and that ...

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113 Hom. in Mt. 32.2; PG 57.378; NPNF I, 10, p. 211
114 Hom. in Mt. 43.1; PG 57.455; NPNF I, 10, p. 272
115 Hom. in Mt. 7.2; PG 57.75; NPNF I, 10, p. 45
116 Hom. in Mt. 67.1; PG 58.633; NPNF I, 10, p. 410
they thus showed forth their intoxication (παροινίαν), and gave full swing to their madness (μανίας).

Elsewhere, he remarks on the irony that Pilate wanted to free Jesus and the Jews refused:

The ruler petitions the people; and not even so do they become gentle, but grow more savage and bloodthirsty, driven to frenzy (ἐκβακχευόμενοι) by the passion of envy (βασκανίας). For neither had they whereof they should accuse Him, and this though He was silent, but they were refuted even then by reason of the abundance of His righteous deeds, and being silent He overcame them that say ten thousand things, and are maddened (μαινομένους).

The following concerns Christ’s murderers as described in the parable of the tenants of the vineyard:

Come, let us kill Him ... for what reason? what of any kind had they to lay to His charge ... Is it that He honored you, and being God became man for your sakes, and wrought His countless miracles? or that He pardoned your sins? or that He called you unto a kingdom?

But see together with their impiety great was their folly (ἀνοιαν), and the reason of His murder was full of much madness (παραπληξίας). “For let us kill Him,” it is said, “and the inheritance shall be ours.”

Christ had come to save fallen man. What could it be but great madness to oppose Him, even to the point of theocide? Chrysostom uses a variety of words indicating mindlessness and violent frenzy to express this madness, but he can not find sufficient expression for the horrors of it.

The following quote concerns Pilate’s washing his hands and the people crying, “His blood be on us, and on our children.”

See here too their great madness (παραπληξίαν). For passion (ὁρμή) and wicked desire (πονηρὰ ἐπιθυμία) are like this. They suffer not men to see anything of what is right. For be it that ye curse yourselves; why do you draw down the curse upon your children also?

Nevertheless, the lover of man, though they acted with so much madness (μανία) ... so far from confirming their sentence upon their children, confirmed it not even on

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117 This word is hard to translate because it contains elements of drunkenness, insult, frenzy, etc. Nine of its sixteen occurrences in these homilies concern Christ’s trial and Crucifixion. No English translation can do justice to the charge Chrysostom is making against Christ’s murderers.

118 Hom. in Mt. 85.1; PG 58.757; NPNF I, 10, p. 506

119 Hom. in Mt. 86.1; PG 58.764; NPNF I, 10, p. 511

120 Hom. in Mt. 68.1; PG 58.641; NPNF I, 10, p. 415
them, but ... received those that repented, and counts them worthy of good things
beyond number.

This is a necessary counterbalance to Chrysostom's severe language concerning those
who oppose Christ to the point of slaying Him. Even this madness is not beyond God's
loving care.

The Passion-Plagued

The title of this section does not imply that the above groups of people are not
passion-plagued. Clearly, they are. However, the emphasis above had to do with their
being – as pagans or heretics – not of the Church. Their madness is the madness of those
not united to Christ. In contrast, many (perhaps most) of the following passages are
directed towards careless Christians.

The very large number of references makes it impossible to do justice in the limited
space available to the subtleties of Chrysostom's views on the madness of the passions.
Any scheme chosen will be more or less arbitrary because Chrysostom uses a wide
variety of expressions and specific words to speak of passions. Also, the various
passions are often intertwined – one leading to another, which leads to still another.

The scheme that will be followed below is first to speak of the three foundational
passions – gluttony, the madness of riches, and pride – and then to group the other
passions in relation to them. Those passions that do not fit well into any category (or fit
equally well under all three) will be discussed separately. It should be noted, however,
that the decision to group certain passions together is somewhat arbitrary. Thus, on the
one hand, Chrysostom obviously knows the ascetic tradition linking gluttony and lust,
which justifies discussing lust in relation to gluttony. On the other hand, luxury could
go equally well with gluttony and madness of riches.

Three Foundational Passions

As with various Fathers, Chrysostom sees the temptations of Christ as representing
the foundational passions. The person who succumbs to none of these provides no
toehold to other passions. The topic of the passions is a much discussed one.
Chrysostom's scheme, which seems unaware, for example, of the developing Evagrian
tradition, is given below:
And how saith Luke, that “he ended all temptation.” ... in mentioning the chief of the temptations, he had spoken of all, as though the rest too were included in these. For the things that form the substance of innumerable evils are these: to be a slave to the belly (γαστρὶ δουλεύειν), to do anything for vainglory (κενοδοξίαν), to be in subjection to the madness of riches (μανίᾳ χρημάτων). Which accordingly that accused one considering, set last the most powerful of all, I mean the desire of more (πλείονος ἐπιθυμίαν) ... as being of more force than the rest.  

These will be discussed in the order Chrysostom gives them, which is the order that they appear in St. Matthew’s account of the temptations of Christ.

**Gluttony, Lust, Drunkenness, Luxury**

**Gluttony**

The following passage is from Chrysostom’s comments on the first temptation of Christ:

For not in his fast, but in his hunger he approaches Him; to instruct thee how great a good fasting is, and how it is a most powerful shield against the devil, and that after the font, men should give themselves up, not to luxury (τρυφή) and drunkenness (μέθη), and a full table (τραπέζῃ πληθούσῃ), but to fasting. For, for this cause even He fasted, not as needeth it Himself, but to instruct us. Thus, since our sins before the font were brought in by serving the belly (γαστρὶ δουλεύειν): much as if any one who had made a sick man whole were to forbid his doing those things, from which the distemper arose ... He Himself after the font brought in fasting. For indeed both Adam by the incontinence (ἀκρασία) of the belly was cast out of paradise; and the flood in Noah’s time, this produced; and this brought down the thunders on Sodom. For although there was also a charge of whoredom (πορνείας), nevertheless from this grew the root of each of those punishments; which Ezekiel also signified when he said, “But this was the iniquity of Sodom, that she waxed wanton in pride (ὑπερηφανίᾳ) and in fullness of bread (πλησμονῇ ἄρτων), and in abundance of luxury (εὐθηνίαις).” Thus the Jews also perpetrated the greatest wickedness, being driven upon transgression by their drunkenness (μέθης) and delicacy (τρυφῆς).  

Chrysostom credits gluttony with being at least part of the ancestral sin and being the root of Sodom’s whoredoms. He also links it with drunkenness and luxury. Thus, it is a very serious passion in its own right and in its tendency to lead to other serious passions.

In the next section of the homily, Chrysostom examines Christ’s reply to this temptation:

121 Hom. in Mt. 13.4; PG 57.212; NPNF I, 10, p. 83  
122 Hom. in Mt. 13.1; PG 57.209; NPNF I, 10, pp. 80-1  
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“Man shall not live by bread alone.”

So that He begins with the necessity of the belly. But mark, I pray thee, the craft of that wicked demon ... For by what means he cast out also the first man, and encompassed him with thousands of other evils, with the same means here likewise he weaves his deceit; I mean, with incontinence of the belly (γαστέρα ἀκρασίας). So too even now one may hear many foolish ones (ἀνοήτων) say their bad words (κακά) by thousands because of the belly (κοιλίαν). But Christ, to show that the virtuous man is not compelled even by this tyranny to do anything that is unseemly, first hungers, then submits not to what is enjoined Him; teaching us to obey the devil in nothing.\(^\text{123}\)

Chrysostom concedes the necessity of feeding the belly. However, unlike “foolish ones (ἀνοήτων)” who “say their bad words by thousands because of the belly … the virtuous man is not compelled even by this tyranny to do anything that is unseemly.” Due to the close link between lust and gluttony, Chrysostom’s reference to “bad words” may mean licentious words.

In the application part of this same homily, Chrysostom talks of those who focus on the present life:

Yet for all this some are so cold (ψυχροὶ) and senseless (ἀνόητοι) as to be always seeking only the things that are here, and uttering those absurd sayings, “Let me enjoy all things present for a time, and then I will consider about things out of sight: I will gratify my belly (χαρίσομαι τῇ γαστρὶ), I will be a slave to pleasures (δουλεύσω ταῖς ἡδοναῖς), I will make full use of the present life (παραχρήσομαι τῷ παρόντι βίῳ); give me today, and take tomorrow.” Oh excess of folly (ἀνοίας)! Why, wherein do they who talk so differ from goats and swine? For if the prophet permits not them to be accounted men, that “neigh after their neighbors wife,” who shall blame us for esteeming these to be goats and swine, and more insensible (ἀνοητοτέρους) than asses, by whom those things are held uncertain, which are more evident than what we see?\(^\text{124}\)

Again, one sees the close relationship of gluttony with lust. No mention is made of wine or luxury, but a luxurious present life is evident here. The person who lives in this manner is ἀνόητος.

The following passage contrasts the gluttonous man unfavorably with the brutes.

we are worse even than the brutes (ἀλόγων), by the judgment not of them that are in health only, but even by our own. For that ye have judged yourselves to be baser than both dogs and asses, is evident from thence: that these brutes (ἀλόγα) thou dost not compel to partake of food, beyond their measure; and should any one say,\(^\text{123}\) Hom. in Mt. 13.2; PG 57.211; NPNF I, 10, p. 81
\(^\text{124}\) Hom. in Mt. 13.5; PG 57.214; NPNF I, 10, p. 84

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“Wherefore?” “Lest I should hurt them,” thou wilt reply. But upon thyself thou bestowest not so much as this forethought.\textsuperscript{125}

Chrysostom does not directly call such people mad, but surely one who judges himself baser than the ἄλογα is ἄλογος himself.

Below, he takes issue with the proverb “Let me have ... something pleasant and sweet, and let it choke me.”

For it means ... Have thou no regard to what is honorable; have thou no regard to what is just ... seek one thing alone, pleasure (ἡδονήν) ... And what else would swine say, if they had a voice? What else would filthy dogs? But perhaps not even they would have said such things, as the devil hath persuaded men to rave (λυττάν).

Wherefore I entreat you, being conscious of the senselessness (ἀναισθησίαν) of such words as these, to flee such proverbs, and to choose out those in the Scriptures that are contrary to them.\textsuperscript{126}

Again, Chrysostom compares such people unfavorably to beasts. Their attitude is senselessness and raving.

One is reminded of the monk and the gluttonous man. Fed on “oracles of God” (λόγια Θεοῦ), not on “cooked flesh of beasts” (σάρκας ἄλογων), the monk is not susceptible to foul words or foolish jesting, unlike those “mad (ἀνοσοῦντων) after worldly things.”\textsuperscript{127} One in his right mind does not focus on the food of his body, but of his soul. Otherwise, he is raving mad, worse than the brute beasts, and inclined to a whole host of other passions. Chrysostom’s common use of ἄνοια to describe the glutton makes sense in this context. One who feeds his body at the expense of his soul cannot help but be ἄνόητος.

Lust

Sexual lust is in some sense both natural and unnatural. Chrysostom says this of the five foolish virgins,

“After their many labors ... and those trophies which they had set up over the madness (λυττώσης) of natural appetite (τὰ τρόπαια ἀ κατὰ τῆς φύσεως), disgraced, and with their lamps gone out, they withdrew, bending down their faces to the earth. For nothing is more sullied than virginity not having mercy (ἐλεοῦ) ... Where then was the profit of virginity, when they saw not the bridegroom?”\textsuperscript{128}

\textsuperscript{125} Hom. in Mt. 57.5; PG 58.565; NPNF I, 10, p. 357
\textsuperscript{126} Hom. in Mt. 73.4; PG 58.678; NPNF I, 10, p. 444
\textsuperscript{127} Hom. in Mt. 68.5; PG 58.646; NPNF I, 10, p. 419
\textsuperscript{128} Hom. in Mt. 78.2; PG 58.713; NPNF I, 10, p. 471

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Context strongly suggests that Chrysostom is speaking of sexual appetites, although he may also be including the appetite for food, which inflames sexual desire. Either way, this appetite is mad (λυττώσης), even though natural.

On the other hand, the sexual appetite is no excuse for sin. Below, he is speaking about castration:

Therefore I beseech you to flee from such lawlessness. For together with the things I have mentioned, neither doth the force of lust (ἐπιθυμίας) become milder hereby, but even more fierce. For from another origin hath the seed that is in us its sources, and from another cause do its waves swell. And some say from the brain, some from the loins, this violent impulse (οἰστρον) hath its birth; but I should say from nothing else than from an unguided will (γνώμης ἀκολάστου) and a neglected mind (διανοίας ἡμελημένης): if this be temperate (σωφρόνη), there is no evil result from the motions of nature (φυσικῶν).129

Here, Chrysostom considers the violent impulse (οἰστρον) of lust to be not from nature, but from an unguided will and neglected mind. These two views need not be in conflict. Perhaps he simply means that the sexual urge is natural, but if unguided it will quickly become sinfully mad.

Speaking about anger and sin in general, Chrysostom uses King David as an example of sin’s grievous effect on one’s rationality:

For anger and sin is a more frantic thing (ἐκστατικώτερον) than any drunkenness, and puts the soul in greater distraction (παραφροσύνῃ).

Who, for instance, was wiser (συνετώτερος) than David? Yet for all that, when he had sinned he perceived it not, his lust (ἐπιθυμίας) keeping in subjection all his reasoning powers (λογισμοὺς), and like some smoke filling his soul.130

The lustful man is so mad as to be like a demoniac:

For so when any man is dissolute (ἀκόλαστος), eager after all embraces, he differs not at all from the demoniac, but goes about naked like him, clad indeed in garments, but deprived of the true covering, and stripped of his proper glory; cutting himself not with stones, but with sins more hurtful than many stones. Who then shall be able to bind such a one? Who, to stay his unseemliness (ἀσχημονούντα) and frenzy (οἰστρούμενον), his way of never coming to himself (ουδέποτε ἐν ἑαυτῷ γινόμενον).131

Also madly sinful is the man who simply watches licentious things. Those who frequent the theater “insult the common nature (κοινὸν τῆς … φύσεως) of men and

129 Hom. in Mt. 62.3; PG 58.600; NPNF I, 10, p. 384
130 Hom. in Mt. 60.1; PG 58.585; NPNF I, 10, p. 373
131 Hom. in Mt. 28.4; PG 57.355; NPNF I, 10, p. 193
women” for “they are bodies alike, both that of the harlot, and that of the free-woman.” To consider appropriate in the theater that which is unseemly in the marketplace is “absurdity and a disgrace, and words of the utmost madness (παραπληξίας).”

In speaking of lust, Chrysostom uses words that convey the idea of violent madness. These are fitting descriptions of the sexual urge gone awry.

**Drunkenness**

The above quote concerning those who account themselves viler than the brutes speaks not only of gluttony but of drunkenness:

And as when a fever is passed by, the mischievous consequences of the fever remain; so also when drunkenness is past, the disturbance of intoxication is whirling round both the soul and body; and while the wretched body lies paralyzed, like the hull of a vessel after a shipwreck, the soul yet more miserable than it, even when this is ended, stirs up the storm, and kindles the desire; and when one seems to be sober, then most of all is he mad (μαίνεται) imagining to himself wine and casks, cups and goblets.

Though drunkenness is itself a type of madness, the sober man who desires to be drunk is madder.

Below, Chrysostom is speaking again of the godly lives of monks.

Seest thou a glorious victory? For such a trophy as the hosts in all parts of the world having met together have not power to erect, this each one of those men erects; and all things that from the army of drunkenness lie mingled together wounded, delirious (παράφορα) words of frenzy (παραπληξίας), insane (μανικὰ) thoughts (νοήματα), unpleasing haughtiness (τυφος). And they imitate their own Lord, at whom the Scripture marveling saith, “He shall drink of the brook in the way, therefore shall He lift up the head.”

Unlike the sober madman who desires to be drunk, these monks control what goes into and what comes out of their mouths by their imitation of Christ.

As with lust, drunkenness is fittingly spoken of in terms of violent madness.

**Luxury (Τρυφή)**

The person living in luxury is like a dead man:

And if one could but once see a man’s soul who is living in luxury (τρυφή) and vice (κακία), thou wouldest perceive that it is far better to lie bound in a grave ... and to have a stone laid over thee, than that heavy cover of insensibility (ἀναισθησίας).

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132 Hom. in Mt. 6.8; PG 57.72; NPNF I, 10, p. 43
133 Hom. in Mt. 57.5; PG 58.565; NPNF I, 10, p. 357
134 Hom. in Mt. 70.4; PG 58.659; NPNF I, 10, p. 429

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Wherefore … it behooves the friends of these dead men … past feeling (ἀναλγήτως), to come near to Jesus in their behalf … their hands too, thou shalt see these again bound to their belly, like those of the dead, and fastened about not with grave-clothes, but … with the bands of covetousness (πλεονεξίας): obtaining … no leave from her to be stretched out for alms-giving (ἐλεημοσύνην) … rather she renders them more useless than those of the dead.\(^{135}\)

This man is insensible to the desperate madness to which τρυφή and πλεονεξία have brought him. He cannot give alms, which as Chapter Three will demonstrate, means he is not even fully human.

The belly and luxury are inimical to prayer:

For nothing is mightier than a man who prays sincerely … is continually waiting upon Him, and controlling the belly (γαστρὸς), and casting out luxury (τρυφήν). But if thy body be too weak to fast continually, still it is not too weak for prayer … although thou canst not fast, yet canst thou avoid luxurious living; and … even this is enough to pluck down the devil’s madness (μανίαν). For indeed nothing is so welcome to that evil spirit, as luxury and drunkenness; since it is both fountain and parent of all our evils … It makes swine of men, and worse than swine ….

Such an one is in no respect different from a demoniac (δαιμονῶντος), for like him he is lost to shame (ἀναισχυντεῖ), and raves (μαίνεται). And the demoniac (δαιμονῶντα) at any rate we pity, but this man is the object of our aversion and hatred. Why so? Because he brings upon himself a self-chosen madness (μανίαν).\(^{136}\)

Here again one sees the close relationship between luxury, the belly, drunkenness and lust. The man living in luxury has chosen his madness and thus is worse than a demoniac. Conversely, if one’s body is too weak to fast, even abstinence from τρυφή is sufficient “to pluck down the devil’s madness (μανίαν).”

Explaining how there can be both tribulation and luxury in the last days, Chrysostom compares those living in luxury to the righteous:

If there be luxury (τρυφή) then, and peace, and safety, as Paul saith, how doth He say, “after the tribulation of those days?” … Luxury for them that are in a state of insensibility (ἀναισθήτως) and peace. Therefore He said not, when there is peace, but “when they speak of peace and safety,” indicating their insensibility (ἀναισθητον) to be such as of those in Noah’s time, for that amid such evils they lived in luxury (ἐτρυφων).

But not so the righteous, but they were passing their time in tribulation and dejection (ἀθυμία). Whereby He shows, that when Antichrist is come, the pursuit of unlawful pleasures shall be more eager among the transgressors, and those that have learnt to

\(^{135}\) Hom. in Mt. 27.4; PG 57.349; NPNF I, 10, p. 188

\(^{136}\) Hom. in Mt. 57.4; PG 58.563-4; NPNF I, 10, p. 356

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despair of their own salvation. Then shall be gluttony (γαστριμαργίαι), then revelings (κῶμοι), and drunkenness (μέθαι).\textsuperscript{137}

Yet again, the close relationship among all these passions is evident. This lifestyle brings an insensibility not found in the righteous. Interestingly, the righteous pass their time in tribulation and dejection, but they are not the ones who have despaired of salvation. The luxurious man lives in a torpor that prevents his seeing his desperate state and the coming judgment.

᾽Αναισθησία and ἀναλγησία well express the torpor of the lover of luxury towards righteousness. Conversely, μανία and other such words convey the mad violence of the luxurious person’s longings.

To summarize this section, gluttony is a primary passion that brings with it a whole host of others, including lust, drunkenness, and luxury. Chrysostom uses many strong words to describe the madness and insensibility of those who live such a life. Interestingly, he usually uses ἄνοια to describe gluttony, generally reserving words connoting violence for the passions springing from it. Perhaps this is because gluttony is a foundational passion – from such ἄνοια springs violent madness. In contrast to those living such a life is the monk, who feeds primarily on the oracles of God, and the righteous man who passes his time in tribulation and dejection but has not despaired of his salvation.

\textit{Vainglory, Pride, Hypocrisy}

In the quote that started this section, Chrysostom lists vainglory (κενοδοξία) as one of the three chief temptations. In the section where he discusses this particular temptation, he does not use the word κενοδοξία, but does say that Christ teaches us through this temptation “that we should do nothing at all for display (ἐπίδειξιν) and vainglory (φιλοτιμίαν).”\textsuperscript{138} The relation of meaning among the words is fairly obvious. Another word of similar meaning is δοξομανία. For simplicity’s sake, words and expressions that have to do with seeking glory elsewhere than in God will be discussed under the heading “Vainglory.”

\textbf{Vainglory}

\textsuperscript{137} Hom. in Mt. 77.2; PG 58.703-4; NPNF I, 10, p. 464

\textsuperscript{138} Hom. in Mt. 13.3; PG 57.211; NPNF I, 10, p. 82
In the following passage, Chrysostom takes issue with those who do all things for display.

In every case then is vice (κακία) a grievous thing, but ... it is yet more grievous, when it thinks itself sufficient even to amend others ... But these things He said, by all intimating their mad desire of glory (δοξομανίαν), and their exceeding frenzy (σφοδρὰν ... λύσσαν) concerning this pest. For this became a cause to them of all their evils, namely, that they did all things for display. This both led them away from the faith, and caused them to neglect what really is virtue, and induced them to busy themselves about bodily purifyings only, neglecting the purifications of the soul. So therefore to lead them into what really is virtue, and to the purifyings of the soul, He makes mention of mercy, and judgment, and faith. For these are the things that comprise our life.\textsuperscript{139}

From the root of doing things for display comes the fruit of daring to think one can teach others when one does not even know his own need for amendment. Both δοξομανίαν and λύσσαν convey the idea of violent madness, λύσσαν having primary reference to rabid dogs.

When man seeks improper glory, he is dishonored.

Even so also than him that is arrogant (ἀπονενοημένου) and mad about glory (δοξομανοῦντος), and accounts himself to be high (ὑψηλοῦ), nothing is more base and dishonored. For the race of man is fond of contention, and against nothing else doth it set itself so much, as against a boaster (ἀλαζόνα), and a contemptuous man (ὑπερόπτην), and a slave of glory (δόξης δοῦλον). And he himself too, in order to maintain the fashion of his pride (ἀπονοίας), exhibits the conduct of a slave to the common sort, flattering, courting them, serving a servitude more grievous than that of one bought for money.\textsuperscript{140}

Even from a worldly viewpoint, seeking glory is madness (δοξομανία). The slave of glory (δόξης δοῦλον) is the most servile of slaves.

Far worse, however, is that the vainglorious man has lost his true being:

Why feel as Nebuchadnezzar felt? For he too set up an image, thinking from wood and from a senseless (ἀναισθήτου) figure to procure to himself an increase of fame ... Seest thou the excess of his madness (μανίας); how, thinking to do honor, he rather offered insult, to himself? ... For as he for his image, so some men claim to be admired for their clothes, others for their house; or for their mules and chariots, and for the columns in their house. For inasmuch as they have lost their being as men (ἄνθρωποι εἶναι), they go about gathering ... such glory (δόξαν) as is full of exceeding ridicule (γέλωτος).\textsuperscript{141}

Chrysostom goes on to contrast Nebuchadnezzar with the three holy youths:

\textsuperscript{139} Hom. in Mt. 73.2; PG 58.675; NPNF I, 10, p. 441
\textsuperscript{140} Hom. in Mt. 62.5; PG 58.603; NPNF I, 10, p. 386
\textsuperscript{141} Hom. in Mt. 4.10; PG 57.51; NPNF I, 10, p. 28
The noble and great servants of God, not by these means, but by such as best became them, even by such did they shine forth (ἐφάνησαν) ... their high self-restraint (φιλοσοφία) alone was sufficient, and showed him that wore the diadem and the purple, as much inferior in glory (κεκτημένους λαμπροτέρους) to those who had no such thing, as the sun is more glorious (λαμπρότερος) than a pearl.

Thus, man’s proper glory has to do with his character and true being, not with earthly trappings. From the whole tenor of Chrysostom’s writings, one understands this proper glory and man’s true being as having to do with being in right relationship with God.

Vainglory is worst when it concerns virtue.

“Take heed that ye do not your alms before men, to be seen of them.”

He roots out what remains the most tyrannical passion of all, the rage (λύσσαν) and madness (μανίαν) with respect to vainglory, which springs up in them that do right.

For at first He had not at all discoursed about it; it being indeed superfluous, before He had persuaded them to do any of the things which they ought, to teach in which way they should practice and pursue them.142

If vainglorious man has lost his true being, surely the man who is vainglorious about virtue is the furthest away from his true being, since man’s being is rooted in right relationship with God and brother.

Pride

As with vainglory, various Greek words are translated pride. One, ἀπόνοια, often translated ‘arrogance’ in the NPNF, has obvious roots in the word νοῦς. Lampe’s first definition is “loss of right reason, madness shown in a. desperate, shameless wickedness, b. overweening arrogance, presumption, c. desperate folly.” Thus, ἀπόνοια is not so much a synonym for “pride” or “arrogance” as it is a type of madness that often manifests itself in these things.

The Pharisees were guilty of pride and thus drew on themselves a curse:

Therefore He said, “of such is the kingdom of Heaven,” that by choice (προαιρέσει) we should practice these things, which young children have by nature (φύσει). For since the Pharisees from nothing else so much as out of craft (κακουργίας) and pride (ἀπόνοιας) did what they did, therefore on every hand He charges the disciples to be single hearted (ἀφελεῖς) ... For nothing so much lifts up (ἐπαίρει) unto haughtiness (ἀλαζονείαν), as power and precedence ... The Pharisees ... were cast upon the shoal of their mad desire of glory (δοξομανίαν).143

Thus, pride makes one unfit for the kingdom of Heaven.

142 Hom. in Mt. 19.1; PG 57.273; NPNF I, 10, p. 130
143 Hom. in Mt. 62.4; PG 58.601; NPNF I, 10, p. 385

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In the story of the publican and the Pharisee, another Pharisee falls for lack of humility, the mother of virtues:

For even after he had arrived at the very summit, he “went down” with the loss of all, because he had not the mother of virtues: for as pride (ἀπόνοια) is the fountain of all wickedness, so is humility (ταπεινοφροσύνη) the principle of all self-command. Wherefore also He begins with this, pulling up boasting (ἀλαζονείαν) by the very root.  

If pride is the fountain of all wickedness, it is no wonder how strongly Chrysostom berates it below:

nothing is worse than arrogance (ἀπόνοια). This even takes men out of their natural senses (τῶν κατὰ φύσιν ἔξωσιν φρενῶν), and brings upon them the character of fools (μωρῶν); or rather … it really makes them to be utterly like idiots (ἀνοιτῶς).

For like as, if any one, being three cubits in stature, were to strive to be higher than the mountains … we should seek no other proof of his being out of his senses (ἀνοίας); so also when thou seest a man arrogant (ἀπονενοημένον), and thinking himself superior to all … seek not … any other proof of that man’s madness (παρανόιας). Why, he is much more ridiculous than any natural fool (φύσει μωρῶν), insomuch as he absolutely creates this his disease on purpose. And … because he doth without feeling it (ἀναλγήτως) fall into the very gulf of wickedness.

For when will such an one come to due knowledge (ἐπιγνώσεται) of any sin? when will he perceive that he is offending (αἰσθήσεται πλημμελῶν)?

This person is in a desperately serious condition. He creates his disease on purpose and yet has no feeling or sense of what he is doing.

Above, Chrysostom speaks of the ancestral sin in terms of gluttony, but below, he speaks of it in terms of ἀπόνοια.

For nothing doth God so abhor as arrogance (ὑπερηφανίαν). For this object hath He done all things from the beginning, in order that He might root out this passion. Because of this are we become mortal, and are in sorrows, and wailings … Because of this are we in toil, and sweat, and in labor continual, and mingled with affliction. For indeed out of arrogance (ἀπονοια) did the first man sin, looking for an equality with God. Therefore, not even what things he had, did he continue to possess, but lost even these.

For arrogance (ἀπόνοια) … far from adding to us any improvement … subtracts even what we have; as, on the contrary, humility, so far from subtracting from what we have, adds to us also what we have not.  

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144 Hom. in Mt. 15.2; PG 57.225; NPNF I, 10, p. 92
145 Hom. in Mt. 58.3; PG 58.570; NPNF I, 10, p. 361
146 Hom. in Mt. 65.6; PG 58.625; NPNF I, 10, p. 403

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whereas the greatest of evils … had their entering in from pride (ἀπονοίας) — … the devil … did thus become a devil; as indeed Paul plainly declared, saying, “Lest being lifted up with pride (τυφωθεὶς), he fall into the condemnation of the devil:” — and the first man, too, puffed up (φυσηθεὶς) by the devil with these hopes … became mortal (for expecting to become a God, he lost even what he had; and God also upbraiding him with this, and mocking his folly (ἄνοιαν), said, “Behold, Adam is become as one of us”\textsuperscript{147}

In Chrysostom’s usage ὑπερηφανία, φυσηθεὶς, and τυφωθεὶς are either synonymous with or very closely related to ἀπόνοια.. These three are connected with Adam’s sin, the latter two with the devil’s first sin.

Considering that various other words were available, it is interesting how often Chrysostom uses ἀπόνοια when he wants to speak of pride’s being the root cause of evil. Most likely, he is stressing the sheer madness of this fundamental fact of fallen human nature.

**Hypocrisy**

Hypocrisy is obviously related to vainglory – the hypocrite’s glory is “empty” glory because he does not deserve it. In discussing Matt. 6:16,\textsuperscript{148} Chrysostom exposes an odious example of hypocrisy.

not only do we imitate the hypocrites, but we have even surpassed them. For I know, yea I know many, not merely fasting and making a display of it, but neglecting to fast, and yet wearing the masks of them that fast, and cloaking themselves with an excuse worse than their sin.

For “I do this,” say they, “that I may not offend the many.” … What sayest thou? There is a law (Νόμος) of God which commands these things, and dost thou talk of offense? And thinkest thou that in keeping it thou art offending, in transgressing it, delivering men from offense? And what can be worse than this folly (ἀλογίας)?\textsuperscript{149}

This hypocrisy is particularly odious in that it seeks honor for what it is not even doing. The hypocrites of Christ’s time at least performed good deeds, although they left the more important good deeds undone and did not examine their hearts.

To summarize this section, vainglory is one of the three fundamental temptations. The vainglorious man has lost his true being. Closely related to vainglory is pride,

\textsuperscript{147} Hom. in Mt. 15.2; PG 57.224; NPNF I, 10, p. 92

\textsuperscript{148} And when ye fast, be not as the hypocrites, of a sad countenance. For they disfigure their faces, that they may appear unto men to fast.

\textsuperscript{149} Hom. in Mt. 20.1; PG 57.287; NPNF I, 10, p. 140

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which is Satan’s sin and at least one component of the ancestral sin. Chrysostom often uses ἀπόνοια to refer to pride in key passages, perhaps because he wishes to underscore the utter madness of it.

The Madness of Riches – Love of Wealth, Usury, Lack of Almsgiving, Earthly-Mindedness

As in Chapter Three, “the madness of riches” here designates a wide variety of terms that Chrysostom uses to describe a focus on material wealth. In the Homily 13 passage about the three chief temptations, Chrysostom speaks of madness only in relation to riches. He also states plainly that this madness of riches is the worst of the three temptations of Christ, and by extension probably the worst of all temptations. Considering gluttony’s and pride's roles in the ancestral sin, that is a very strong statement to make, but well in keeping with Chrysostom’s usage. This is so well recognized that his apolytikion speaks of ἀφιλαργυρίας ... θησαυροὺς...

This section will look first at love of wealth, then usury, lack of almsgiving, and finally earthly mindedness.

Love of Wealth

He who does not despise wealth has little to no chance of conquering any other passion:

if thou dost not endure to despise wealth (χρημάτων ὑπεριδεῖν), of what wilt thou ever get the better? of lust (ἐπιθυμίας), or of the mad desire of glory (δοξομανίας), or anger (θυμοῦ), or of wrath (ὀργῆς)? … as to lust, and anger, and wrath, many impute it even to the temperament of the flesh, and to this do students of medicine refer the excesses thereof … But with respect to covetousness (Φιλαργυρίας), no one ever heard of their having said any such thing. So entirely is the pest the effect of mere remissness, and of a soul past feeling (ἀναλγήτου).

There is no excuse for Φιλαργυρία. One cannot plead constitutional disposition. Most likely, this is why Chrysostom thinks the person who cannot conquer it probably cannot conquer any other passion. It would also explain why he considers it so terrible. The more voluntary a sin, the worse it is. There is no physical compulsion at all towards this condition, hence its odiousness.

The lover of wealth delights in his horrible disease.

150 http://analogion.net/glt/texts/Jan/27.uni.htm
151 Hom. in Mt. 81.5; PG 58.736-7; NPNF I, 10, p. 490
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I bid thee reason concerning him also that loves wealth (φιλοχρημάτου) and money (φιλαργύρου) ... nothing is more foolish (ἀφρονεότερον) than the slave of wealth (χρημάτων δούλου) ... becoming a captive, he prides himself, and leaps for joy; and seeing a dog rabid (λυττῶντα) and flying at his soul ... he actually supplies him with abundance of food, that he may leap upon him more fiercely, and be more formidable.  

He also neglects his children’s salvation and his own.

“What is a man profited,” saith He, “if he shall gain the whole world, but lose his own soul.” But because the love of money (χρημάτων ἐρως) hath overturned and cast down all, and hath thrust aside the strict fear of God, having seized upon the souls of men like some rebel chief upon a citadel; therefore we are careless both of our children’s salvation, and of our own, looking to one object only, that having become wealthier, we may leave riches to others ... Hence great is our folly (ἄνοια) ... we take care of horses and asses rather than of children.  

The following occurs shortly below the passage comparing the dissolute man (ἀκόλαστος) with a demoniac. The rest of this long passage contrasts demoniacs with “the covetous man” (φιλάργυρος).

I ... would sooner consent to dwell with ten thousand demoniacs (δαιμονώντων), than with one diseased in this way (ταύτην νοσούντος τήν νόσον) ... they that are troubled by evil spirits (ἐνοχλούμενοι), deserve rather our pity and our tears. And the one for the more part act in insensibility (ἀναισθησίᾳ), but the others are frantic while they reason (μετὰ λογισμοῦ παραπαίουσιν), keeping their orgies (βακχευόμενοι) in the midst of cities, and maddened (μαινόμενοι) with some new kind (καινήν) of madness (μανίαν). For what do all the demoniacs (δαιμονώντες) so bad, as what Judas dared to do, when he showed forth that extremity’ of wickedness? And all too that imitate him, like fierce wild beasts (θηρία) escaped from their cage, trouble their cities, no man restraining them. For these also have bonds upon them on every side ... And should any one remove these altogether from them, then would he know assuredly the demon that is in them (ἐν αὐτοῖς δαίμονα) to be far fiercer, and more frantic (μανικώτερον) than he who is just now gone forth.  

Elsewhere, Chrysostom berates Judas again.

Such is covetousness (φιλάργυρια), it renders men fools (μωροὺς) and senseless (ἀνοητοὺς) ... and devils ... This man at least received unto him the devil even when plotting against him, but Jesus, even when doing him good, he betrayed, having already become a devil in will, For such doth the insatiable desire of gain make men, out of their mind (ἐκφροσυνας), frenzy-smitten (παραπληγιάς), altogether given up to gain, as was the case even with Judas.  

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152 Hom. in Mt. 51.6; PG 58.518; NPNF I, 10, p. 320  
153 Hom. in Mt. 59.7; PG 58.584; NPNF I, 10, p. 371  
154 Hom. in Mt. 28.4; PG 57.356; NPNF I, 10, pp. 193-4  
155 Hom. in Mt. 81.3; PG 58.733; NPNF I, 10, p. 487  
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Chrysostom cannot find sufficient words to describe the madness of the ἕλαργυρος. Contrary to much modern thought, Chrysostom does not look for more comprehensible motives for Judas’ betrayal of Christ. ὑλαργυρία led him to such an enormity. This is incomprehensible. It is the last word in madness, and the enormity of it is that such people are “frantic while they reason.”

The love of wealth is mad even when honestly gained.

But if to get money honestly be ... of extreme madness (ἀνοίας); when not even the honesty is there, how can such a man choose but be more wretched than any? ... when hell is added thereto, and the loss of the kingdom, how great wailings are due to him, both living and dead?156

Thus, even under the best circumstances, obsession with earthly wealth is mad. When one compares the greatest earthly wealth to the least heavenly reward, this makes perfect sense.

Usury

Usury is mad even on the usurer's own grounds:

Why dost thou pass by the wealthy one, and trouble him that hath not? ... This hardly repays a hundredth part, but the other “an hundredfold and eternal life.”

Surely then is it not the utmost senselessness (ἀνοίας), not so much as to know how to gain? ... How many have involved both themselves and others in extreme poverty through their unspeakable covetousness (πλεονεξίαν)!157

The usurer is not even good at what he is trying to do. He passes by the One Who could make him wealthy and fails at his own senseless efforts.

Chrysostom goes on to shame usurers by comparison to the pagan Romans:

How then is it not a horrible thing, if thou ascribe not even so much honor to the polity of Heaven, as the legislators to the council of the Romans ... and thou art not ashamed even of the very folly (ἀλογίαν) of the thing? For what could be more foolish (ἀλογώτερον) than this ...

Why, are there not many honest trades? ... Why rave (μαίνῃ) and be frantic (παραπαίεις), cultivating thorns for no good?158

The supposed Christian acts worse than the pagans. The usurer is a fool and raving mad because he cares less about heaven than earth and carefully cultivates thorns. With no proper basis, this husbandry can produce nothing good.

156 Hom. in Mt. 23.9; PG 57.320; NPNF I, 10, p. 166
157 Hom. in Mt. 56.5; PG 58.556-7; NPNF I, 10, p. 350
158 Hom. in Mt. 56.6; PG 58.557-8; NPNF I, 10, p. 351

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Lack of Almsgiving

The reverse side of love of wealth is the refusal to give alms. As Chapter Three will demonstrate, this is not a minor sin, but a major failure to be human.

Other virtues do not count as such in the person who does not give alms:

And after these virtues let us seek, which together with our own salvation will be able in the greatest degree to profit our neighbor. Such is almsgiving, such is prayer, or rather even this latter is by the former made efficacious, and furnished with wings.\textsuperscript{159}

Considering how much Chrysostom condemns τρυφή, the fact that he considers failure to give alms even worse is noteworthy, but not surprising. Lack of feeling for one’s suffering brother seems to be the mature fruit of self absorption.

Below, Chrysostom shows other aspects of the same thing:

Seest thou not … how much they give away to the harlots? but thou givest not so much as the half … the devil is exhorting to give to whom it may chance, procuring us hell, and thou givest; but Christ to the needy, promising a kingdom, and thou, far from giving, dost rather insult them, and thou choosest (αἱρῇ) rather to obey the devil … than to submit to Christ, and be saved.

And what could be worse than this frenzy (παραπληξίας)?\textsuperscript{160}

If sinners can give for the sake of vainglory or to fulfill selfish lusts, what can it be but frenzy to fail to submit to Christ that He might save us?

He … hath made thee a sharer in His goods, having received nothing of thee … What then can it be but extreme senselessness (ἀνοίας), not even by this gift to be made kind towards men, not even to give a return for a free gift, and less things for greater? Thus whereas He hath made thee heir of Heaven, impartest thou not to Him even of the things on earth?\textsuperscript{161}

Failure to help the poor is not just failure to submit to Christ. It is failure to return His free gift to receive even greater, and worse, it is overlooking Christ Himself. This is extreme senselessness even from the viewpoint of self-interest.

Earthly Mindedness

One could make a case for lumping a wide variety of passions under earthly mindedness. The following passage concerns the Parable of the Sower:

And wherefore … did He not put the other vices also, such as lust (ἐπιθυμίαν σαμαμάτων), vainglory (κενοδοξίαν)? In speaking of “the care of this world, and the

\textsuperscript{159} Hom. in Mt. 77.6; PG 58.710; NPNF I, 10, p. 468
\textsuperscript{160} Hom. in Mt. 66.3; PG 58.629; NPNF I, 10, p. 407
\textsuperscript{161} Hom. in Mt. 45.2; PG 58.474; NPNF I, 10, p. 287
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deceitfulness of riches,” He set down all. Yea, both vainglory and all the rest belong to this world, and to the deceitfulness of riches; such as pleasure, and gluttony, and envy and vainglory, and all the like.

But … it is not enough to be freed from riches only, but we must cultivate also the other parts of virtue ... Nay, no one part is sufficient for our salvation, but there is required first a careful hearing, and a continual recollection; then fortitude, then contempt of riches, and deliverance from all worldly things. 162

Thus, “the care of this world” and “the deceitfulness of riches” can between them encompass everything else. The cure for this omnibus of passions is in some sense the opposite virtues of the Three Giants so often found in ascetic literature - ignorance, forgetfulness, and sloth. Careful hearing combats ignorance; continual recollection, forgetfulness; and fortitude, sloth. Surely, Chrysostom with his monastic background recognized the necessity of these three virtues to combat any passion – especially such a deadly pair as “the care of this world” and “the deceitfulness of riches.”

Below are two examples of the madness of earthly mindedness.

How then is it not of the utmost folly (ἀνοίας), where destruction and waste is the lot of all that is stored, there to heap up all, but where things abide untouched and increase, there not to lay up even the least portion; and this, when we are to live there forever? 163

For when in extreme old age thou art building splendid houses ... when thou plantest trees, which will bear their fruit after many years ... and art eagerly busy in many other such things, the enjoyment whereof thou wilt not reap; is it indeed for thine own sake, or for those to come after, that thou art so employed? How then is it not the utmost folly (ἀνοίας), here not at all to hesitate at the delay of time; and this though thou art by this delay to lose all the reward of thy labors: but there, because of such waiting to be altogether torpid; and this, although it bring thee the greater gain, and although it convey not thy good things on to others, but procure the gifts for thyself. 164

In the first case, the person spends all his efforts on what is destined for destruction. In the second, he not only does this, but does it without expectation of his own gain. All along, had he given even a fraction of the effort to godly gain, he would have become very wealthy spiritually. This is madness.

To summarize this section, the person who concentrates on procuring earthly wealth and goods – even honestly gained – is mad. The ultimate example of the madness of

162 Hom. in Mt. 44.4; PG 57.469; NPNF I, 10, p. 282
163 Hom. in Mt. 12.4-5; PG 57.207; NPNF I, 10, p. 79
164 Hom. in Mt. 20.6; PG 57.294; NPNF I, 10, p. 145
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philaguria is Judas. Unlike gluttony, lust, and anger; this passion has no physiological basis, thus being so much the more culpable. Chrysostom uses a wide variety of words to describe its madness. Some (e.g. μανία, λύσσω, παραπλήξ, βακχεύω) convey violent madness and utter lack of self-control. Others (e.g. ἄνουα ἀλογία μωρία) emphasize a mindlessness rooted in not knowing God. Still others (ἀναισθησία, ἀναλγησία) describe not the madness of riches, so much as the highly culpable unawareness of one’s perilous condition.

Other Passions

The remaining passions fall into two groups:

1. passions of reaction that could easily be triggered by any of the above passions
2. “madnesses” that are sins in themselves (as opposed to being merely descriptive terms)

Passions of Reaction – Anger, Envy

ANGER

Chrysostom speaks often of anger, wrath, unwillingness to forgive, etc. “Anger (θυμός) and sin is a more frantic thing (ἐκστατικώτερον) than any drunkenness, and puts the soul in greater distraction (παραφροσύνῃ).”\(^\text{165}\) Julian the Apostate “was transported with his fury (ἐξεβακχεύθη)” against Christians because of his paganism.\(^\text{166}\) “Curse not him that uses thee despitefully; for so hast thou undergone the labor, but art deprived of the fruit; thou wilt bear the loss, but lose the reward; which is of the utmost folly (ἀνοίας).”\(^\text{167}\)

Below, Chrysostom rebukes those who will not pray after sexual intercourse with their wives, yet are untroubled by praying after giving way to wrath:

For it is truly the devil’s bed, to wallow in insults and reviling. And like some wicked adulterer, wrath (θυμός) dailles with us in great delight … making us give birth to diabolical enmity, and doing all things in a way opposite to marriage. For whereas marriage causes the two to become one flesh, wrath (θυμός) severs into many parts them that were united, and cleaves and cuts in pieces the very soul.\(^\text{168}\)

\(^{165}\) Hom. in Mt. 60.1; PG 58.585; NPNF I, 10, p. 373
\(^{166}\) Hom. in Mt. 43.3; PG 57.460; NPNF I, 10, p. 276
\(^{167}\) Hom. in Mt. 18.4; PG 57.269; NPNF I, 10, p. 127
\(^{168}\) Hom. in Mt. 51.5; PG 58.516-7; NPNF I, 10, p. 319

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Wrath is the opposite of marriage because it destroys unity. Considering Chrysostom’s great concern for unity in the Body of Christ, one can see why he considers this such a terrible sin.

The angry man is in some sense under demonic control.

Consider that he who is insolent (ὑβρίζων) is beside himself (ἐξέστηκεν) and mad (μαίνεται), and thou wilt not feel indignant, when insulted, since the possessed strike us, and we, so far from being provoked, do rather pity them. This do thou also; pity him that is insolent to thee, for he is held in subjection (κατέχεται) by a dreadful monster (Θηρίῳ), rage (Θυμῷ), by a grievous demon (Δαίμονι), anger (Οργῇ). Set him free as he is wrought upon (ἐνεργούμενον) by a grievous demon (Δαίμονος), and going quickly to ruin.169

Yea, for if we see persons possessed by devils (δαιμονώντα), we weep for them; we do not seek to be ourselves also possessed (δαιμονῶν).

Now let us do this too likewise with respect to them that are angry (ὀργιζομένων); for in truth the enraged (Θυμοῦμενοι) are ... more wretched than [the possessed], being mad (Μαινόμενοι) with consciousness of it (μετὰ αἰσθήσεως). Wherefore also their frenzy (παραπληξία) is without excuse. Trample not then on the fallen, but rather pity him.170 Both these passages counsel pity for the angry man, but the second insists that he is without excuse because he is “mad with consciousness of it.” He is in some sense voluntarily the prey to demons. This is the depth of his fallen condition, and for that very reason, he is to be pitied.

ENVY

Chrysostom often speaks of the envy of Christ’s enemies. Herod’s envy led him to destroy the infants in his attempt to kill Christ. “For driven wild (ἐκβακχευθεὶς) by this anger (Οργῆς), and envy (Βασκανίας), as by some demon, he takes account of nothing (οὐδενὸς ποιεῖται λόγον), but rages (μαίνεται) even against nature (Φύσεως) herself.”171 The crowd that demanded Christ’s death grew “more savage and bloodthirsty, driven to frenzy (ἐκβακχευώμενοι) by the passion of envy (Βασκανίας).”172 Below, Chrysostom has been discussing the Pharisees’ contention that Christ cast out demons by demonic power.

169 Hom. in Mt. 87.4; PG 58.773; NPNF I, 10, p. 518
170 Hom. in Mt. 18.4-5; PG 57.270; NPNF I, 10, pp. 127-8
171 Hom. in Mt. 9.1; PG 57.175; NPNF I, 10, p. 55
172 Hom. in Mt. 86.1; PG 58.764; NPNF I, 10, p. 511

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Such a thing is envy, than which no worse evil can exist ... For as ... evil spirits in our hurt, so also doth he delight in his neighbor's ills ... accounting the calamities of others his own joys ... he considers not what pleasure may accrue to himself, but what pain to his neighbor. These men therefore were it not meet to stone and beat to death, like mad (λυττῶντας) dogs, like destroying demons (δαίμονας), like the very furies? ... dost thou, on seeing a man receive benefits, become like a wild beast (ἐκθηριοῦσαι) ... what can be worse than this madness (μανίας)? ... For this turns a man into a devil (διάβολον), this renders one a savage demon (δαίμονα). Thus did the first murder arise; thus was nature (φύσις) forgotten defiled ...

And who knows not (ἀγνοεῖ) ... that envy (βασκανία) is an evil thing? No one indeed is ignorant (ἀγνοεῖ) of it: yet they have not the same estimation of this passion as of adultery and fornication. When, at least, did any one condemn himself bitterly for having envied? ... No man at any time: but if he shall fast and give a little money to a poor man ... he counts himself to have done nothing horrid, held as he is in subjection by the most accursed passion of all.

The envious deserve to be stoned. They are like mad dogs and demons. The horror of this passion is that people are easily reconciled to being afflicted with it.

It is interesting that Chrysostom connects envy with the first murder and also so often with those who tried to kill Christ. Murderous from the beginning, envy does not stop even at theocide.

In summary, Chrysostom often remarks on the envy on those who tried to kill Christ. Envy is a horrendous madness that everyone knows to be sinful and nobody takes seriously.

“Madnesses” That Are Sins in Themselves

Ἀπόνοια should be listed here, but has already been discussed under the heading of Pride.

ἈΝΑΙΣΘΗΣΙΑ, ἈΝΑΛΓΗΣΙΑ

These will be discussed together because they both have to do with insensibility to one's sinfulness. In an above-cited passage, the man exhibiting ἀπόνοια is especially wretched “because he doth without feeling it (ἀναλγήτως) fall into the very gulf of wickedness.” “When will such an one come to due knowledge (ἐπιγνώσεται) of any sin? when will he perceive that he is offending (αἰσθήσεται πλημμελῶν)?”174 Also mentioned above is the man who lives in luxury (τυφή). “It is far better to lie bound in a grave ... and to have a stone laid over thee, than that heavy cover of insensibility

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173 Hom. in Mt. 40.3; PG 57.442-3; NPNF I, 10, pp. 261-2
174 Hom. in Mt. 58.3; PG 58.570; NPNF I, 10, p. 361
(ἀναισθησίας) ... they are past feeling (ἀναλγήτως).”¹⁷⁵ In both of these cases, the mentioned passion either results in or is accompanied by ἀναισθησία and ἀναλγησία.

Elsewhere, Chrysostom is not addressing any particular passion. He is simply warning people that they must be aware of their sinfulness.

Neither must thou think lightly of it, because thou hast no pain (οὐκ ἀλγεῖς) in sinning; rather on this very account most of all do thou lament, that thou feelest not (οὐκ αἰσθάνῃ) the anguish of thine offenses. For not because sin bites not, doth this come to pass, but because the offending soul is insensible (ἀναίσθητον) ... The best thing then is, to avoid sin in the first instance: the next to it, is to feel (αἰσθάνεσθαι) that we sin, and thoroughly amend ourselves.¹⁷⁶

Wherefore I entreat you now at length to be awakened, and to look another way, unto the Sun of Righteousness. For no man while sleeping can see the sun ... but ... he beholds all as in a dream. For this cause we need much penance, and many tears; both as being in a state of insensibility (ἀναλγήτως) while we err, and because our sins are great, and beyond excuse.¹⁷⁷

The other side of insensibility of one's own sins is insensibility to God. The following passage concerns those who will say, “Lord, have we not prophesied in thy name?” and yet be cast away from Him:

For all the grace was of the free gift of Him that gave it, but they contributed nothing on their part; wherefore also they are justly punished, as having been ungrateful (ἀγνώμονες) and without feeling (ἀναίσθητοι) towards Him that had so honored them as to bestow His grace upon them though unworthy.¹⁷⁸

Chrysostom does not say this here, but he certainly understands sin to have a personal aspect – all sin is sin against persons, and especially against God. In the end, one's insensibility of one's own sin is insensibility to God.

ἈΝΟΙΑ

In addition to being descriptive of various kinds of passion, ἄνοια is itself a passion. In early life “there is much thoughtlessness (ἀνόητον) and timidity (μικρόψυχον).”¹⁷⁹

Detailing the dangers of different stages of life, Chrysostom says

For our present life is an out stretched ocean ... the first sea to view is that of our childish days, having much tempestuousness, because of its folly (ἀνόητον), its

¹⁷⁵ Hom. in Mt. 27.4; PG 57.349; NPNF I, 10, p. 188
¹⁷⁶ Hom. in Mt. 14.3; PG 57.221; NPNF I, 10, p. 89
¹⁷⁷ Hom. in Mt. 10.6; PG 57.190; NPNF I, 10, p. 66
¹⁷⁸ Hom. in Mt. 24.1; PG 57.322; NPNF I, 10, pp. 167-8
¹⁷⁹ Hom. in Mt. 10.1; PG 57.185; NPNF I, 10, p. 62
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facility (εὐκολίαν), because it is not steadfast (πεπηγέναι). Therefore also we set over it guides and teachers … adding what is wanting to nature (φύσει).\footnote{Hom. in Mt. 81.5; PG 58.737; NPNF I, 10, p. 490}

Here, the ἀνόητος character of youth is coupled with being facile (εὐκολίαν – perhaps better translated 'easily led') and not steadfast. Perhaps, this early ἄνοωα is fairly blameless – the νοῦς is more unformed than willfully dead. It must, however, be corrected or – as Chrysostom says later (not just of this passion but of all passions of all stages of life) – the person will reach the end of life with no spiritual cargo and thus be destined for hell.

If uncorrected in youth, ἄνοωα becomes more deadly. Chrysostom describes a wife “fond of dress … dissolved in great luxury (τρυφῇ), and talkative, and foolish (ἀνόητον).”\footnote{Hom. in Mt. 30.5; PG 57.368; NPNF I, 10, pp. 203-4} Her husband must correct her, but slowly and very gently. Seemingly, her ἄνοωα is too far advanced for the more straightforward correction of the very young. Christ warns the Jews of the coming destruction of Jerusalem in such manner as “to furnish even to the most senseless (ἀνοήτοις) and contentious a clear proof of that which should come to pass at His coming.”\footnote{Hom. in Mt. 74.3; PG 58.683; NPNF I, 10, p. 448} If this full-blown ἄνοωα is still correctable, it is only through terrors unthinkable.

Some General Observations on the Madness of the Passions

The above examples do not provide an exhaustive list of the Greek words Chrysostom used to describe the madness of various passions. Therefore, one cannot safely make many generalizations. However, Chrysostom clearly sees most passions as having a component of violent madness about them and considers the passionate person’s nous to be in a bad state.

Chrysostom often says of a particular passion that there is none worse. “Envy (βασκανία) is the most accursed passion of all.”\footnote{Hom. in Mt. 40.3; PG 57.442; NPNF I, 10, p. 262} “Nothing is worse than arrogance (ἀπονοίας).”\footnote{Hom. in Mt. 58.3; PG 58.570; NPNF I, 10, p. 361} “Nothing, nothing is more foolish (ἀφρονέστερον) than the slave of wealth.”\footnote{Hom. in Mt. 51.6; PG 58.518; NPNF I, 10, p. 320} “Nothing is more grievous than wrath (ὀργῆς) and fierce anger (Θρασύτητος).”\footnote{Hom. in Mt. 10.6; PG 57.191; NPNF I, 10, p. 66} All except envy leave the possibility of other things as bad – just not
worse. Probably, though, Chrysostom is just employing hyperbole to show how serious these passions are.

Whenever Chrysostom compares the passionate with the mentally ill or the possessed, the passionate are at least as mad, but usually considerably worse. The reason is that the passionate person is “mad (μαινόμενοι) with consciousness of it (αισθήσεως)” and “brings upon himself a self-chosen (αὐθαίρετον) madness (μανίαν).” Conversely, Chrysostom often talks about the ἀναισθησία and ἀναλγησία of particular passions or of sin in general. These seem to be contradictory contentions. Perhaps, though, this apparent contradiction is consistent with the madness of passions – the madly passionate person knows what he is doing and yet he does it anyway. To continue in sin knowingly is, ironically, the very depths of ἀναισθησία and ἀναλγησία.

Throughout his writings, Chrysostom stresses right relationship with God and compassion for others. It is surely no accident, then, that he saves some of his most vehement accusations of madness for those who attempted to kill Christ and for those afflicted with “the madness of riches” and thus obliviously cruel to the poor. Judas, the ultimate example of the insanity of sin, combines both.

The Wider Perspective

To give a fair representation of the usages of the writers here adduced would be an exhaustive project. Thus, all that is attempted is to give some idea of the range of concepts that these writers regard as mad. As one would expect of writers who expend so much energy against heresies, much of the usage of these terms is against heresies and heretics. Words used to describe heresies or heretics include – but are not limited to – μανία,189 μελαγχολική,190 λύσσα,191 οἰνοπλήκτων and φρενῖτις,192 ἀτοπία, ἄνοια, and ἀλογία,193 and ἀναλγησία.194 The breadth of terms includes raving madness, being out of one's mind and senses, drunkenness, etc.

187 Hom. in Mt. 18.4; PG 57.270; NPNF I, 10, pp. 127-8
188 Hom. in Mt. 57.4; PG 58.564; NPNF I, 10, p. 356
189 Thdt, Hist. Eccl. 1.8; GCS 44.38; NPNF II, 3, p. 46
190 Thdt, Hist. Eccl. 1.3; GCS 44.19; NPNF II, 3, p. 39 (apparently translated “madness”); BtG, De Spir. Sanc. 17.41; SC 17; Anderson (1980), p. 68
191 GNz, Or. 21.13; PG 35.1096; NPNF II, 7, p. 272
192 BtG, De Spir. Sanc. 6.15; SC 17; Anderson (1980), p. 32
193 BtG, De Spir. Sanc 17.41; SC 17; Anderson (1980), pp. 68-69
194 BtG, De Spir. Sanc. 20.51; SC 17; Anderson (1980), p. 79

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Julian the Apostate and his pagan supporters received their share of epithets. Julian was accused of λύσσα against the Christians, μανία in rejecting Christ, and παραπληξία and ἄνοια in trying to suborn St. Caesarius.195 His pagan followers “ran in corybantic frenzy (λυττῶντες καὶ κορυβαντιῶντες) round about the streets.”196 In this case, the primary reference is surely to the unrestrained lewdness of the corybantic processions.

Greek natural philosophy197 and, in general, the foolish wisdom of this world198 are μωρανθείση σοφία. Astrology is ἄνοια and μανία.199 Various passions are mad – “mad love for glory” (δοξομανία),200 worldly pursuits of various sorts (ἀφροσύνη),201 gambling and a generally luxurious lifestyle (μανία),202 greed for money (χρυσομανία),203 lack of self-control (ἀφροσύνη),204 lust (λυσσώδης ἐπιθυμία),205 anger (φρενῖτις, παραπλήξ),206 and breaking of monastic vows (μανία).207

This brief catalog illustrates that Chrysostom’s consideration of all kinds of sin to be insanity is in keeping with his contemporaries. The prominence of words conveying the idea of violence or of impaired νοῦς is also in agreement with Chrysostom. Two instances in Basil’s writings show an understanding of ἀλογία similar to Chrysostom’s.

Do not despise fish because they are dumb and quite unreasoning (ἀλογάς); rather fear lest, in your resistance to the disposition of the Creator, you have even less reason (ἀλογώτερος) than they.208

Will the heretic cast in His teeth the manger out of which he in his unreasonableness (ἀλογός) was fed by the Word of reason (Λόγου)?209

195 GNz, Or. 7.11.5; Boulenger; NPNF II, 7, p. 233
196 Thdt, Hist. Eccl. 3.3; GCS 44.181; NPNF II, 3, p. 96
197 BIG, Hexaem. Hom. 9.1; SC 26; NPNF II, 8, p. 102
198 BIG, Hexaem. Hom. 3.6; SC 26; NPNF II, 8, p. 69
199 BIG, Hexaem. Hom. 6.7; SC 26; NPNF II, 8, pp. 85-6
200 BIG, De Spir. Sanc. 30.76; SC 17.30.76; Anderson (1980), p. 114. This is a direct translation. Most of the others are not translations of the word at all, but terms meaning madness that were used to describe the word or those acting in such a fashion.
201 BIG, Hexaem. Hom. 4.1; SC 26; NPNF II, 8, p. 72
202 BIG, Hexaem. Hom. 8.8; SC 26; NPNF II, 8, p. 101
203 BIG, Ep. 115; Courtonne 2. (1957-1966); NPNF II, 8, p. 191
204 BIG, De Spir. Sanc. 20.51; SC 17; Anderson (1980), p. 80
205 BIG, Ep. 2.2; Courtonne 1.6; NPNF II, 8, p. 110
206 GNy, Contr. Eunom.1.1.5; Jaeger (1960a), NPNF II, 5, p. 35
207 BIG, Ep. 44.1; Courtonne 1.110; NPNF II, 8, p. 147
208 BIG, Hexaem. Hom. 7.4; SC 26; NPNF II, 8, p. 92
209 BIG, Ep. 8.5; Courtonne 1.28.; NPNF II, 8, p. 118
The former shows fallen man’s tendency to slip below the naturally ἄλογα beasts. The latter shows that man is meant to feed primarily from Christ the Word.

**SUMMARY AND CONCLUSION**

Chrysostom offers hope for the mentally ill and possessed, but delivers stern warnings to those possessed by their passions. He accepts physiological bases for mental illness, with the exception of σεληνιασμός, which he considers demonic. Both the mentally ill and the possessed may bear some responsibility for their condition, but they are not responsible for actions done under demonic influence. Pity is the proper, and seemingly even the common, attitude towards the mentally ill and the possessed. The possessed, and presumably the mentally ill, are worthy of admiration if they accept their suffering with φιλοσοφία.

In contrast to the possessed and the mentally ill are those possessed by their passions. The fundamental madness of sin may be explained in terms of the ἄλογος man – fallen man in his native condition. Unconnected to God’s Λόγος, he descends into madness, becoming worse than the ἄλογα. Those outside the Church – persecutors, idolaters, pagan philosophers, heretics, etc. – are mad, as are those inside or outside the Church who live in their passions. Gluttony, vainglory, and the madness of riches are the fundamental temptations, from which all others flow. The person enslaved to sin is madder than the mentally ill or possessed because he is mad with consciousness. On the other hand, he is hopelessly insensible of his desperate state. Chrysostom has especially harsh words for Christ’s murderers and for the self-absorbed, who neglect their poor brother. Since one cannot be fully human when not in right relationship with God and brother (especially the poor), hatred of Christ and contempt of one’s poor brother represent the nadir of the madness of passions.

The above represents the lower limit case of humanity (which ironically is a failure to be human, a descent below the ἄλογα, and a kinship with demons). The epitome of the upper limit case of humanity is the monk, who feeds on λόγια Θεοῦ and whose lips pour forth honey and clear streams. By feeding on the proper food for a human, he remains pure and nothing comes from him that would pollute another.

The above comments have focused on the madness of the passions, not on their cure, thus presenting a grimmer picture than Chrysostom himself paints. In fact, Chrysostom
is far from dismissing the passion-ridden. He bids his listeners to pity the wrathful and set them free from the grievous demon. He counsels the husband of the woman in ἄνοια to lead her gently out of her condition. He puts forth monks as models to emulate. In fact, one could make a case that the main purpose of his homilies is to lead people out of the madness of their passions.

From that viewpoint, one may conclude as follows. Mental illness and demonic possession are minor forms of madness that God permits for the healing of the passions. Those so afflicted are to be pitied and admired. Willful sin is a far more serious madness, precisely because of its willful rejection of God and neighbor. It is the native condition of the ἄλογος man – the rejection of the Λόγος and all that is highest about humanity. The worst reaches of this condition are seen in enmity towards God and in the madness of riches and contempt of the poor. All passions are ἄλογος, but covetousness, envy of others, and enmity towards God are particularly virulent strains. These reveal those afflicted with them as the antithesis of the eminently sane man – the monk, who feeds on λόγια Θεοῦ and suffers no dearth of the Word of God. By constant comparisons of the insane of soul with the mentally ill and demoniacs, Chrysostom wishes to shock his hearers into recognition of their madness so that, chastened and humbled, they may begin to heal.

Chrysostom Compared to His Contemporaries

Chrysostom’s contemporaries would all readily agree that sin is madness and, at least in some cases, a type of demonic possession and that not all mental illness is demonic possession. Whether or not these individual writers held compassion to be the appropriate and common attitude towards the possessed, at some point this must have become the case, as evidenced by the remarkably gentle prayers of exorcism in the Orthodox Church’s Great Book of Needs. The Theotokion of Ode 5 even refers to the possessed as the Theotokos’ ‘faithful servant.’ Gregory Nazianzen indicates that heresy is worse than demonic possession and Basil that drunkenness is worse. Basil’s reason is the same as Chrysostom’s – the involvement of choice. A more detailed study of these writers and others is in order to see how widespread the belief is that sin is worse insanity than demonic possession or mental illness.

210 Saint Tikhon’s Monastery (1999), p. 17
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Clearly, though, this concept looms large in Chrysostom’s thought – both out of compassion for the mentally ill and possessed and concern for the spiritual well being and true sanity of the “normal” Christian.

It now remains to examine how this concept fits into Chrysostom’s framework for understanding the Christian life and being human in general.
CHAPTER THREE – Law, Healing, Community, and What It Means to Be Human (in the Homilies on Matthew).

INTRODUCTION

This chapter contends that Chrysostom’s view of what it means to be human is inextricably linked with his view of the πολιτεία of heaven. This πολιτεία has God at its head, is sacramental and Trinitarian, and is possible only through the Incarnation of Christ. The upper limit case of humanity is the angelic man, again exemplified by the monk, who is the model member of the πολιτεία of heaven. Full of love (the chief characteristic of this πολιτεία), he is in right relationship with God and neighbor and not held fast by temporal things. The lower limit case is the man who lives for himself. Such a man rejects the way of life (πολιτεία) of this community (πολιτεία). He lives for earthly things and lives in enmity with God and neighbor. Thus, Chrysostom views man on a wide spectrum from supra-human and angelic to sub-human and inhuman. This spectrum is co-terminous with that of sane to insane of soul. Where one is on this continuum is directly related to whether one is in proper relationship with God and neighbor or not.

Juridical, Therapeutic, and Community Paradigms

This chapter and the next arose from an examination of the contemporary Orthodox belief that characterizes western Christianity as juridical in character, often contrasting it with a more-loving, person-oriented therapeutic eastern Christianity. Thus, before positing a community paradigm, it is helpful to examine contemporary Orthodox literature on the subject of juridical and therapeutic paradigms, in order to see how modern Orthodox frame their understanding of their faith.

Orthodox theologians often trace a legalistic, juridical western Christian approach back to Anselm and St. Augustine. Lossky states that “Anselm’s mistake was ... that he ... wanted to see an adequate expression of the mystery of our redemption accomplished by Christ in the juridical relations implied by the word ‘redemption.’” Ware comments, “While Orthodoxy interprets the Crucifixion primarily as an act of triumphant victory over the powers of evil, the west – particularly since the time of

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Anselm of Canterbury (?1033-1109) – has tended rather to think of the Cross in penal and juridical terms.” Gabriel considers east and west to have different views of divine justice and erroneously traces this back to St. Augustine’s supposed use of analogia entis and analogia fidei.

Divine justice, however, means one thing in Orthodox Christianity and something else in Western Christianity ... Divine justice is not a juridical scheme. The justice of God and the love of God are the same thing ... While the West equates death with divine justice, for the fathers death is injustice ... the divine justice that the fathers speak of confounds all human understanding and models of justice ... Western Christianity got into this dilemma because it inherited Augustine's rationalistic methods of knowledge called analogia entis and analogia fidei.

This critique of the western approach is not always counterbalanced by an explicit appeal to an Orthodox therapeutic approach. Lossky’s concern is that the juridical paradigm be recognized as being one image “found side by side with many other images.” Above, Ware contrasts Christ as Victor with Christ as juridically required Victim. Also above, Gabriel contrasts two forms of divine justice. Lossky's and Ware's citations also exhibit a common Orthodox tenet – one cannot fully explain God or the things of God.

All the above agree that the West’s view is overly juridical, but none specifically contrast the juridical paradigm with the therapeutic paradigm as such. Ware does contrast these two paradigms, when speaking of the sacrament of penance. However, he is not comparing East and West, but the public penance of the early Church with the confession of thoughts to an elder:

If the model ... with public penance is primarily juridical, the model ... with spiritual counsel, is more therapeutic. Confession as we know it today represents a growing together of these two tendencies. ... Is coming to confession like going to a law court, or like going to a hospital? ... there is truth in both approaches. They are not mutually exclusive. ... we should combine the two. Even so ...I myself find the therapeutic model much more helpful — to see confession above all as a sacrament of healing, to think of it as coming to Christ the Doctor.

Here, Ware does not propose thinking of confession in totally therapeutic terms, but rather combining the two. Elsewhere, Ware is somewhat stronger:

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212 Ware (1997), p. 229
213 Gabriel (2000), p. 84
214 Lossky (1974), pp. 100-1
215 Ware (1999)
Not that the penance should be regarded as punishment ... We do not acquire 'merit' by fulfilling a penance, for in his relation to God man can never claim any merit of his own. Here, as always, we should think primarily in therapeutic rather than juridical terms.”

Other Orthodox do specifically contrast the juridical West and therapeutic East. Hughes compares the doctrines of Ancestral Sin of the early Church and present-day Orthodox with the doctrine of Original Sin “developed by Augustine and his heirs in the Western Christian traditions” and concludes that “the approach of the ancient church points to a more therapeutic than juridical approach to pastoral care and counseling.”

According to Morelli, the Catholic Encyclopedia describes guilt as “liability to punishment incurred by transgressing a law.” Shortly after, he states the following:

Orthodox Christianity does not hold to the notion that guilt is a punishment for sin. Guilt certainly exists as an indicator that sin has occurred, but confession and repentance are understood in more therapeutic terms, as a means by which the sinner is restored to communion with God and through which spiritual healing is affected (sic) and not as the process by which punishment is imposed.

Guroian expresses a strong preference for the therapeutic paradigm, but understands “that none of these metaphors and images can stand alone or completely illumine the meaning of salvation.” He goes on:

Yet, at a particular moment in civilization, one of these metaphors or images may enjoy special power to reach and touch human hearts and minds. I believe that the therapeutic vision and its trinity of physician, treatment, and cure have this power today, mainly because of the pervasive presence of medicine in modern life.

This survey of the literature shows a general consensus among the Orthodox that the West has overemphasized the juridical paradigm. There is also an indication that this overuse is rooted in a belief that one can comprehend God and the things of God. However, none of these authors say that the juridical images have no place in Orthodox Christianity or that the therapeutic image is the only important Orthodox image of salvation.

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216 Ware (1980)
218 Morelli (2006)
The present author, having spoken on these two paradigms many times to lay audiences, has observed several reactions:

1. People consistently react negatively to portrayals of God as Judge and Lawgiver, but positively to portrayals of Him as Healer.

2. Likewise, people consistently react negatively to the concept of sin as a legal transgression, but positively to the concept of sin as a disease.

3. Many people use “sin as a disease” as a rationale for slackening their spiritual efforts. One woman remarked that she was praying “Forgive me my diseases.” Another confessed that she had used this concept as an excuse for harmful, sinful behaviors and for her anger at people who tried to correct her. She summed this up as, “I sin because I’m sick. Leave me alone so that I can be healed!”

The first two reactions are consonant with a view of law as a necessary restraint on freedom to preserve the lives and freedom of the individuals in a given society. However, this joyless, loveless attitude towards law is at odds with the Psalmist’s love of the Law [e.g. Psalm 18:8 (LXX), Psalm 118 (LXX) in its entirety] and Christ’s summary of the Law as love of God and love of neighbor (Matt. 22:37-40; Mark 12:29-31; Luke 10:27).

The third reaction is contrary to fundamental Christian teachings about sin and repentance. Surely, patristic writers would be aghast at any interpretation of therapeutic language that causes people to cease striving towards holiness and to be unconcerned at the effect of their sin on others.

These observations led the author to reflect that some more fundamental paradigm must affect one’s view of law and healing (and everything else). The answer was posited to lie in one’s understanding of man. Is he fundamentally a relational being (a person in Zizioulas’ sense\(^\text{220}\)) or a discrete individual? If man is fundamentally relational, then the Psalmist’s fervent love of law and Christ’s summing up of law as love make perfect sense. Law preserves love. It preserves the person in right relationship with God and fellow, thus preserving the person's freedom to be fully human. Furthermore, healing is a community event – a restoration of the diseased person to the community and of the community itself to health.\(^\text{221}\) Thus, “sin as disease” provides no excuse for sinful

\(^{220}\) Zizioulas (1985), p. 18

\(^{221}\) Morrill (2007)
behavior. As long as one refuses to do one's own part in achieving reconciliation with God and man, one remains diseased and, indeed, not fully human.

If, however, man is fundamentally a discrete individual, law is always a constraint on personal freedom, accepted more or less grudgingly as a safeguard against the total loss of personal freedom. To the discrete individual, healing is only peripherally connected to other individuals. Rather, healing is fundamentally an internal event that allows the person to regain his independence. In such a paradigm, it is easy to conclude with the above-mentioned woman that one's sins are one's own concern, not one's neighbor's.

Scope of Chapter

This chapter is confined to St. John Chrysostom's homilies on Matthew. The depth of study afforded by a narrow scope allows careful investigation of Chrysostom's use of ἄνθρωπος and of how he relates community, law, and healing. In his first homily on Matthew, Chrysostom points out that as any part of an animal has “all the things out of which the whole is composed ... likewise with regard to the Scriptures; in each portion ... one may see the connection with the whole clearly appearing.” Thus, in Chrysostom's own view, any one portion of Scripture has at least a clear connection to the rest of Scripture. The homilies on Matthew form Chrysostom's largest set of homilies on a particular book of Scripture and, if taken as one work, his largest extant work. For that reason alone, they are a reasonable starting point in ascertaining Chrysostom's views on the teachings of the Church. A more specific reason for studying these homilies is that Chrysostom presents St. Matthew's Gospel (and, indeed, all the Gospels) as setting out the commonwealth (πολιτείας) of heaven. Thus, the Matthew homilies are particularly fertile ground for an investigation of community and law and – as the most cursory word search would reveal – of healing.

The argument in this chapter will start with an examination of Chrysostom's understanding of man (as seen in his use of ἄνθρωπος). Then, it will move to his understanding of the πολιτεία of heaven, looking at 1) three of its major expressions – the kingdom of heaven, the family of God, and the Body of Christ, 2) how law and healing fit into the πολιτεία, and 3) love as its chief characteristic, the madness of riches

222 Ibid.
223 Hom. in Mt 1.3.; PG 57.17-8; NPNF I, 10, p. 4. All Greek references were taken primarily from the TLG. When possible, the physical volumes were consulted.
224 Hom. in Mt 1.6; PG 57.20; NPNF I, 10, p. 6
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as its rejection, and the monk as the model member. The conclusion will show that one truly can not understand Chrysostom’s view of man without understanding his view of the πολιτεία of heaven.

WHAT IS MAN? 225

Chrysostom sees humans on a very wide spectrum, ranging from the ideal, supra-human man to the sub-human and inhuman. Even in his sinfulness, man still retains God’s image. Human nature is in some sense truly one. Human nature is forever changed because of the Incarnation, but not all choose to benefit from that change.

The Ideal Man

Often Chrysostom uses ‘man’ to mean the ideal man, whether in his pristine state, at his best in this fallen world, or in his redeemed state.

Man in his pristine state was glorious, and this glory is still attainable. The work of monks (Chrysostom generally saw the monk as the ideal man) is that of Adam’s “before his sin, when he was clothed with the glory, and conversed freely with God, and dwelt in ... great blessedness ... rather ... they enjoy even greater grace by the supply of the Spirit.” 226 This glorious state is also attainable by lay people. “All at least have learned what things they are to do, and ... been emulous also of them; and not in the cities alone ... but also in the summits of the mountains.” There one can see “choirs of angels shining forth in a human (ἀνθρωπίνῳ) body, and the commonwealth (πολιτείαν) of Heaven manifested here on earth.” 227 The latter part of this reference is to monks, but the πολιτεία of heaven is clearly attainable by all Christians.

Virtue is natural to man. “Virtue is according to our nature (φύσιν) ... we all, of ourselves, know our duties; and that it is not possible for us ever to find refuge in ignorance.” 228

Conversely, the man who is not virtuous is not a man at all. “I cannot clearly make out whether thou art a man (ἄνθρωπος) ... when thou art like an ass, kicking, and like a bull, wantoning.” “Seeking the difference of catechumen and believer,” Chrysostom

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225 For ease of discussion, ‘man’ is used in the remainder of this paper (unless otherwise noted) to mean humankind or a particular human as a member of humankind.

226 Hom. in Mt. 68.3; PG 58.643-4; NPNF I, 10, pp.417-8

227 Hom. in Mt. 1.5; PG 57.20; NPNF I, 10, p. 5

228 Hom. in Mt. 23.5; PG 57.314; NPNF I, 10, p. 162

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cannot find “the difference between a man (ἀνδρὸς) and a wild beast (θηρίου).”

This language brings to mind the state of the ἄλογος man, who has insanely descended below the beasts.) So, to be a man at all – let alone a believer – one must be above the brute passions. Even non-Christians are capable of this to some degree.

Those who “have lost their being as men (ἀνθρώποι)” gather “to themselves ... such glory as is full of exceeding ridicule ... their clothes ... their house ... their mules and chariots.” This strongly suggests that the true man is inherently glorious. The three holy youths in the Babylonian furnace provide an example of man’s true glory as linked to virtue – specifically, a love of God strong enough to die for Him, a love of neighbor stronger than love of self, φιλοσοφία and deep humility. All attempts to find glory elsewhere are ridiculous.

Christ’s purpose in His Incarnation was not only to take men back with Him to heaven, but that “even before thy going up to that place, thou mightest understand that it is possible for thee to inhabit earth as it were heaven.” This is possible through baptism “that noble birth, which we received from the beginning.” Being thus called to heaven, the Christian must not long for the things of earth which are “a shadow and a dream.”

Seeking the glory of man and the desires of this world puts one in the power of Satan. “For nothing doth so make us fall under the power of the devil, as longing for more, and loving covetousness (πλεονεξίας ἐρᾷν).” Rather, the good Christian follows “the way which Christ that taught us” – trusting God, despising earthly goods beyond one’s needs and being “content with the glory which is from above, making no account of that which is of men.” Obviously, these two glories are mutually exclusive.

Man’s light – his true glory – is in the manifestation of virtue and this redounds to God’s glory. “‘Ye shall not only ... amend the world, if ye live aright, but ye will also give occasion that God shall be glorified ... well did He say, ’your light,’ for nothing makes a man so illustrious, how manifold soever his will to be concealed, as the manifestation of virtue.”

Though not seeking glory from man, such a man’s glory cannot be concealed.

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229 Hom. in Mt. 4.8; PG 57.48-9; NPNF I, 10, p. 26
230 Hom. in Mt. 4.10; PG 57.52; NPNF I, 10, pp. 28-9. Reference is to ἀγάπη.
231 Hom. in Mt. 12.4; PG 57.206; NPNF I, 10, p. 78
232 Hom. in Mt. 13.4; PG 57.212; NPNF I, 10, p. 83
233 Hom. in Mt. 15.7; PG 57.233; NPNF I, 10, pp. 98-9

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This glory also has to do with being sons of God through “that noble birth” – again, probably a reference to baptism.

Chrysostom sometimes uses a specific human trait as a touchstone for whether one is truly human or not. Man’s highest part – his νοῦς, with which he relates directly to God – makes him especially human. “The mind (νῷ) and the understanding (συνέσει) are ... that which separates us from the brutes (ἀλόγων), and by which especially we are human beings (ἀνθρώποι).”234

Mercy also is of the essence of true humanity. “‘A man (ἀνθρώπος) is a great thing, and a merciful man (ἀνήρ) a precious thing’ ... unless one hath this, one hath fallen away even from being a man (ἀνθρώπος).” Not only is being merciful being a true man, but “This is God. For, ‘be ye ... merciful as your Father.’” Further, one who does not show true mercy free from covetousness (πλεονεξίας) is “not even living.”235

The true human must contribute to the common good in worldly matters, and much more in spiritual matters, “since he .. who is living for himself only, and overlooking all others, is useless, and is not so much as a human (ἀνθρώπος) being, nor of our race (γένους).” Ironically, the one who does seek others’ good helps himself because “It is not possible, for one who seeks after the good of the rest to overlook his own.”236

The poor man has a claim on others as part of the sacramental community. He “is a man (ἀνθρώπος), inhabiting the same world ... having the same soul (ψυχὴν), the same Lord, a partaker with thee of the same mysteries (μυστηρίων), called to the same heaven with thee.” Thus, he has on others “a strong claim, his poverty, and his want of necessary food.”237 The reference to mysteries is certainly sacramental and probably Eucharistic. Having the same soul indicates a very profound sense of oneness within this community. Furthermore, the context of the above passage is Christ’s saying, “Inasmuch as ye did it not to one of the least of these, ye did it not to me.” Thus, how one treats the members of this community – especially the poor – is how one treats Christ.

Taken together, the four previous quotes show man as a communal being. For a person to be truly of this community, the vertical component must be intact – through

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234 Hom. in Mt. 16.8; PG 57.249; NPNF I, 10, p. 111
235 Hom. in Mt. 52.5; PG 58.524; NPNF I, 10, p. 325
236 Hom. in Mt. 77.6; PG 58.710; NPNF I, 10, p. 469
237 Hom. in Mt. 35.3; PG 57.409; NPNF I, 10, p. 235
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the νοῦς, the person knows God. Such a person is necessarily merciful like his Heavenly Father, making possible the correct horizontal component – to live for one another in the sacramental community and particularly to care for the poor.

Sometimes Chrysostom sees man at his most sublime as more than human. The earlier reference to monks as angels in human bodies suggests this. Elsewhere, Chrysostom laments that Christians “are bidden to surpass those under the old law (παλαιᾷ) and yet show ourselves inferior to the philosophers among the heathens.” The tragedy of this is that those who “ought to be angels and sons of God, do not even quite maintain our being as men (ἄνθρωποι).” Rather, those who spoil their neighbor’s goods are worse than wild beasts, who act thus by nature (ἀπὸ φύσεως), whereas “we ... are honored with reason (λόγῳ), and yet are falling away unto that unnatural (παρὰ φύσιν) vileness.”

This passage shows man in several states. On one hand, the man who spoils his neighbor is worse than a wild beast. He is not yet a man, having betrayed his being as one honored with reason (λόγῳ). Yet men are called to rise above their own being as men and become angels and sons of God.

Having become sons of God, men are more accountable for sin. “For no longer art thou punished merely as a man (ἄνθρωπος), but as a son of God that hath sinned; and the greatness of thy honor becomes a mean of bringing a sorer punishment on thee.”

To summarize, to be human in the highest sense is to be virtuous, to love God and neighbor, and to seek God’s glory and the neighbor’s welfare, and even to rise above man’s estate to the state of angels and of sons of God. This is man in his glory – man in the highest sense of the word. Some aspects of this are possible even to an unbeliever, but to be human in the fullness of the word is possible only in Christ and has a definite sacramental component. Man’s ultimate high estate as sons of God entails higher responsibility.

Inhumanity

The very concept of inhumanity presumes a departure from some virtuous humanity. Chrysostom describes various people as inhuman, but with particular reference to the merciless. He tells his hearer that even if he were “savage (ὠμός) and inhuman (ἀπάνθρωπος) beyond measure, and wilder (ἀγριώτερος) than the very wild beasts

238 Hom. in Mt. 21.4; PG 57.300; NPNF I, 10, p. 150
239 Hom. in Mt. 12.4; PG 57.207; NPNF I, 10, p. 78
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(θηρίων) ... thou wouldest not choose at thy death to leave unhonored the servant that had been affectionate to thee.”

A sick person would not be charged “with cruelty (ὠμότητα) nor inhumanity (ἀπανθρωπία)” for not being present at a relative’s funeral, which implies such an act to be inhuman without such an excuse.

Most of the other references to inhumanity have to do either directly or indirectly with lack of mercy, especially to the poor. Those who give alms for the sake of vainglory are particularly reprehensible “for the mask was of mercy (ἐλεημοσύνης), but the spirit (διάνοια) of cruelty (ὠμότητος) and inhumanity (ἀπανθρωπίας).” These hypocrites, seeing “another perishing with hunger” are “seeking vainglory (φιλοτιμίαν), and not putting an end to his suffering.”

True Christians, on the other hand, must “put away inhumanity (ἀπανθρωπία) and ... give alms, and not with money only, but with words also.” In so doing “we may both escape the punishment for reviling, and may inherit the kingdom (βασιλείαν) which is for blessing and almsgiving, by the grace and love towards man (φιλανθρωπία) of our Lord Jesus Christ ... Amen.”

Chrysostom regularly ends his sermons with a reference to the φιλανθρωπία of Christ. Here, though, there seems to be an unstated link between Christ’s φιλανθρωπία and almsgiving of both words and money. How can one inherit the kingdom of the Lover of Man if one does not do as He does?

Inhumanity towards others is connected with an unwillingness to listen to Christ. Those who criticized Christ for healing the man with the withered hand, being “ungentle and inhuman (μισάνθρωποι), choose rather to hurt the fame of Christ, than to see this person made whole.” Christ “in His love towards man (φιλάνθρωπος) ... points out their inhumanity (ἀπανθρωπίαν). And He ‘setteeth’ the man (ἀνθρωπον) ‘in the midst’ ... endeavoring to ... move them to pity.” The ἀπανθρωπία and μισανθρωπία of the enemies of Christ the Φιλάνθρωπος lay primarily in their hatred of Him, which made them unable to find any mercy for a suffering fellow man.

240 Hom. in Mt. 13.5; PG 57.215; NPNF I, 10, p. 85
241 Hom. in Mt. 27.3; PG 57.348; NPNF I, 10, p. 188
242 Hom. in Mt. 19.1; PG 57.275; NPNF I, 10, p. 131
243 Hom. in Mt. 35.5; PG 57.412; NPNF I, 10, p. 238
244 Hom. in Mt. 40.1; PG 57.439; NPNF I, 10, p. 259
Inhumanity towards the poor is inhumanity towards Christ. “Of what favor canst thou be worthy ... who ... in lending to men at usury sparest nothing; but in feeding thy Lord through His poor art cruel and inhuman (ἀπάνθρωπος)?” Rather, “Let us become at length mild and humane (φιλάνθρωποι), that we may not draw down on ourselves the intolerable punishment.”\(^{245}\) Here, Chrysostom contrasts φιλάνθρωποι not with μισάνθρωπος, but with ἀπάνθρωπος. The person who does not love his fellow is not just a hater of humans, but himself inhuman.

Ἀπανθρωπία extends far beyond lack of almsgiving. Commenting on Christ’s command “Be ye merciful as your Father,” Chrysostom says, “If merely to enjoy one’s own be inhuman (ἀπανθρωπίας), much more to defraud (ἀφαιρεῖσθαι) others.”\(^{246}\) Thus, at its root, ἀπανθρωπία is a self-absorbed existence that is a total failure to be like one’s heavenly Father. This dovetails nicely with Chrysostom’s comment that even “to get money honestly be ... of extreme madness (ἀνοίας).” Thus, the self-absorbed is inhuman and insane.

As one might expect, Chrysostom’s conception of the ideal man and of the inhuman man are often like a picture and its photonegative. The ideal man is virtuous, loving God and neighbor. The inhuman man is self-centered, at odds with God and his fellow man. In speaking of the ideal man, however, Chrysostom seems more likely to speak of the aspects concerning God (e.g. what separates man from beast is the νοῦς, by which he perceives God). In contrast, in speaking of the inhuman man, Chrysostom speaks far more often of his lack of mercy towards man. Of course, this was a common usage of the word, which Chrysostom did not invent. Still, there is sense in this distinction. The man in proper relationship with God can relate in godly love towards the rest of mankind. On the other hand, the man who does not even care for the obvious bodily needs of others, surely cannot care for God, but has become worse than a wild beast and thoroughly inhuman. He is ἄλογος.

**Man as Limited and Prosaic**

Some references to man have to do with his limitations. Speaking of Christ’s saying that “All things are delivered unto me,” Chrysostom comments, “Do not surmise anything human (ἀνθρώπινον). For He uses this expression, to prevent thine imagining

\(^{245}\) Hom. in Mt. 45.3; PG 58.476; NPNF I, 10, p. 287

\(^{246}\) Hom. in Mt. 52.5; PG 58.524; NPNF I, 10, p. 325

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Concerning Peter’s confession of Christ as the Son of God, Chrysostom says, “Peter indeed spake, but the Father suggested, and that thou mightest believe the saying to be no longer a human (ἀνθρωπίνη) opinion, but a divine doctrine.” Exhorting those who always consider themselves in sorrow, he says that this cannot be true because “it is impossible, being a man (ἀνθρωπον), to be always in sorrow.” He considers that the multitude “because they saw His miracles greater than human (κατὰ ἀνθρωπον), accounted Him a man (ἀνθρωπον) indeed, but one that had appeared after a resurrection.

None of the above examples of “humanness” is clearly sinful. The first indicates unaided man’s inability to work great miracles. The second indicates his inability to know God without God’s help. The third shows a combination of physical and emotional limitation, although it is a good limitation.

In a few cases, “human” seems to have to do with the prosaic – the things that people normally do. Concerning Christ’s saying “Seek and ye shall find, knock and the door shall be opened,” Chrysostom remarks, “He hath blocked up thy approach with that similitude, again framing arguments, and by those human things (ἀνθρωπίνων πραγμάτων) urging us to be confident on these matters.” Elsewhere, Chrysostom comments that Christ “states an argument from a human example (παραδείγματος ἀνθρωπίνου), thus saying, ‘Do men gather grapes of thorns, or figs of thistles? even so every good tree bringeth forth good fruit, but the corrupt tree bringeth forth evil fruit.’”

Thus, in these uses, the import of “human” is of man’s limitations. All have to do with his being a creature, and some may have to do with sinfulness. In none of these cases could man transcend his limitations without divine help. As will be suggested in the next chapter, man’s limitations play an important role in understanding Chrysostom’s broad view of man. Man by himself is a very limited creature. If he chooses to unite himself to God, he becomes splendid. If he chooses to stay within himself, he loses his true glory and becomes subhuman and demonic.

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247 Hom. in Mt. 38.2; PG 57.430; NPNF I, 10, p. 252
248 Hom. in Mt. 54.2; PG 58.534; NPNF I, 10, p. 333
249 Hom. in Mt. 53.4; PG 58.530; NPNF I, 10, p. 330
250 Hom. in Mt. 54.1; PG 58.533; NPNF I, 10, p. 332
251 Hom. in Mt. 23.4; PG 57.312; NPNF I, 10, pp. 160-1
252 Hom. in Mt. 23.7; PG 57.316; NPNF I, 10, p. 163

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Man as Fallen

Often Chrysostom conceives of man in his sinful, fallen state. By the power and knowledge of the Gospels, “the human race (τῶν ἀνθρώπων τὸ γένος)” is converted “from a brutish (θηριώδους) disposition ... to something very gentle and mild.” St. John the Baptist’s garment of hair “bore tokens of nothing less than a kingdom (βασιλείας), and of repentance.” By it, he instructed men “to separate themselves from all things human (ἀνθρωπίνων), and ... to hasten back to their earlier nobleness, wherein Adam was before he wanted garments or robe.” In the first passage, man is portrayed as brutish and fierce without the power of the Gospel. Though Λόγος and ἄλογος do not appear here, there is a parallel with brutishness in those who do not have the power of the Gospel of the Word. In the second, “all things human” are clearly not good, but the context is a fall from an Adamic purity and the possibility through Christ of a kingdom and repentance. Thus, this pejorative sense of “human” has reference to an original goodness and a potential for change through the Gospel of Christ.

The twelve apostles are remarkable for prevailing over their adversaries, “not by slaying [them], but by converting and reforming them.” “Having found them as bad as devils, they made them rivals of angels, enfranchising human nature (ἀνθρωπίνην φύσιν) from this evil tyranny.” Human nature itself is, if not itself evil in its fallen state, at least subject to the tyranny of evil. The interplay of person and nature is very interesting here. The apostles have made their persecutors (i.e. particular persons) rivals of angels, but have enfranchised human nature. Obviously, Chrysostom does not mean that all humans therefore are no longer under this tyranny. However, it does seem that human nature itself has somehow truly been freed. Perhaps Chrysostom would say that the nature is free, but the particular person has to accept that freedom. It is also very interesting that he speaks not of Christ, but of the apostles, enfranchising human nature. Probably this is due to a strong concept of synergy – Christ works through the apostles, but the apostles are truly working.

At times, Chrysostom speaks of people who are sinful by nature or of human nature itself as seemingly sinful.

253 Hom. in Mt. 10.3; PG 57.188; NPNF I, 10, p. 64
254 Hom. in Mt. 10.4; PG 57.188; NPNF I, 10, p. 64
255 Hom. in Mt. 33.4; PG 57.393; NPNF I, 10, pp. 222-3
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For among men (ἀνθρώπων) ... one man is passionate by nature (φύσει), and another from having fallen into a long illness ... some men are flexible and fickle by nature (φύσει), while others become so by being slaves to luxury (τρυφῇ), and by living effeminately. 256

Re Peter’s fear of the wind although he was walking on the water – For such a thing is human nature (ἀνθρωπίνη φύσις); not seldom effecting great things, it exposes itself in the less; as Elias felt toward Jezebel, as Moses toward the Egyptian, as David toward Bathsheba. 257

Re Peter’s boast that he would not deny Christ – He checked him, not compelling him to the denial, God forbid! but leaving him destitute of His help, and convicting human nature (φύσιν ... ἀνθρωπίνην). 258

For by saying, “Ye are the salt of the earth,” He signified all human (ἀνθρωπίνην) nature (φύσιν) to have “lost its savor,” (μωρανθεῖσαν) and to be decayed by our sins. 259

In the first quote, φύσις refers to particular people’s nature; in the second and fourth, to human nature in general (whether as a truly single thing or merely in the aggregate is not clear from context). In the third, it seems to refer to human nature in general, but with particular reference to Peter. The first case clearly refers to a sinful bent that is not of choice, and this seems to be implied in the others.

Elsewhere, Chrysostom strongly rejects the idea that sin belongs to one’s nature. “If by nature (φύσει) all were bad, it were not possible for any one to be good, but if good by nature (φύσει), then no one bad. For if there were one nature (φύσις) of all men (ἀνθρώπων), they must needs in this respect be all one.” However, many good people become worthless and many worthless good, “the one through remissness (ῥᾳθυμίᾳ), the other by earnestness (σπουδῇ); which ... indicates that these things do not come of nature (φύσεως).” 260 Thus, sin and virtue are both of choice, not of nature. The apparent contradictions in Chrysostom’s view of human nature will be discussed in the next section.

Most of the above pejorative uses of human refer to general tendencies more than to specific sins. The first passage concerning Peter speaks of a human tendency to attain great things and yet fail in lesser things, which could apply to any kind of sin. The

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256 Hom. in Mt. 37.1; PG 57.420; NPNF I, 10, pp. 243-4
257 Hom. in Mt. 50.2; PG 58.506; NPNF I, 10, p. 311
258 Hom. in Mt. 82.3; PG 58.742; NPNF I, 10, p. 494
259 Hom. in Mt. 15.6; PG 27.231; NPNF I, 10, p. 97
260 Hom. in Mt. 59.2; PG 58.576; NPNF I, 10, pp. 365-6
second passage concerning Peter has to do with St. Peter’s inability to follow through on his desire not to deny Christ – and by extension with man’s inability to do the good he desperately wishes to do. In the passage immediately preceding these two, lustful passion and fickleness may both be attributed either to nature or to the person’s actions, but there is no reason to think Chrysostom couldn’t have adduced a wide variety of other sins as examples.

At times, however, Chrysostom does have a particular passion in mind. Strongly admonishing his hearers not to “make a profit of other men’s poverty,” he says, “Why dost thou leave God, and get human (ἀνθρώπινα) gains? Several times, the reference is towards the disciples’ vainglory and jealousy towards each other. Thus, when James and John request to sit at Christ’s right and left hand, “they out of shame and confusion of face, because under the influence of a human (ἀνθρωπίνου) passion they were come to do this, took Him privately apart from the disciples, and asked Him. It is interesting that Chrysostom is particularly likely to single out jealousy and vainglory as human failings. Perhaps this is because fallen man has lost his own glory and desperately seeks glory in vain things and is jealous of those who have what he does not. Also of interest is the fact that Chrysostom uses “human” once to refer to injustice to the poor, but much more commonly considers such people “inhuman.” Perhaps, as bad as vainglory and jealousy are, they still show a connection (though a perverted one) with others. Depradation of the poor, however, is self-centered in an even worse way.

In short, Chrysostom often uses “human” in a pejorative sense. At times this refers to specific persons’ actions, whether willful or by defects in his nature. Other times it seems to refer to a sinful bent in the whole human race. Chrysostom considers fallen human nature in some sense sinful, but he also insists that every man makes his own choice to sin or not to sin. Used pejoratively, “human” can have reference to various passions, but jealousy and vainglory seem prominent among them.

The Image of God in Man

Made in the image of God, Man retains this image even in his fallen state. Chastising women who use cosmetics, Chrysostom says that it would be extremely dangerous to

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261 Hom. in Mt. 56.5; PG 58.556; NPNF I, 10, p. 350
262 Hom. in Mt. 65.2; PG 58.619; NPNF I, 10, p. 399. See also Hom. in Mt. 58.2; PG 58.568; NPNF I, 10, p. 359 and Hom. in Mt. 65.3; PG 58.621; NPNF I, 10, p. 401
add one’s own work to “an image (εἰκόνι) of the emperor” and continues, “Well then, man works and thou addest not; but doth God work, and dost thou amend it?”

The implication is that the woman adorning herself is made in God’s image and therefore ought not to dare attempt to improve His work.

Neither should one slight the image of God in another. “Nay, what can be more unpleasing than this, when thou smitest him that is made after God’s image (εἰκόνα), and from thine insolence to him gatherest enjoyment for thyself?”

Human Nature

Apparent Contradictions in Chrysostom’s Concept of Human Nature

In the above sections, Chrysostom seems to contradict himself in his views on the sinfulness of human nature. On one hand, he speaks of Christ convicting human nature and of human nature’s tendency to do great things but to fail in small things. He also speaks of human nature (φύσιν) playing the harlot. On the other hand, as mentioned above, he insists that no one is good or bad by nature and that virtue is according to our nature and that therefore no one can plead ignorance. In the last case, he clearly does not equate “natural” with “unalterable” – otherwise, sin would be impossible. The context seems to imply that virtue is still natural even in fallen man in that he has a conscience telling him what is virtuous and what is not. Fallen human nature does, however, easily falls prey to sin, but the particular person can choose whether he will actually commit a sin or not. This would be in line with the common Orthodox understanding of ancestral sin as causing a bent in human nature but not eradicating the conscience nor making it impossible to avoid sin.

Second, Chrysostom states that nature is unchangeable, but also speaks of the apostles enfranchising human nature. However, this enfranchisement of human nature is a divine act (although accomplished by the apostles), and surely God can change the nature of His own creatures. Indeed, Christ has done just that.

263 Hom. in Mt. 30.6; PG 57.370; NPNF I, 10, p. 204
264 McLeod (1995) and Krupp (1991) hold that Chrysostom sees the Image of God only in the male. Harrison (2002) holds a more nuanced view. This will be discussed in the next chapter.
265 NPNF here translates εἰκόνα as “likeness”
266 Hom. in Mt. 48.6; PG 58.494; NPNF I, 10, p. 302
267 Hom. in Mt. 3.4; PG 57.35-6; NPNF I, 10, p. 17

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Changed Human Nature – Christ’s Role and Man’s Cooperation

Christ changes human nature by His Incarnation, Baptism, Cross, Ascension, etc. Yet man must put effort if he wishes to participate in this change.

By His Incarnation, Christ unites human nature with God, which concerns all men. “God hath come upon earth ... joining God’s nature (θείαν φύσιν) with man’s (ἀνθρωπωτίνη).” That Christ “was born of our substance” concerns all men. “For if He came unto our nature (φύσιν) ... it was to all; but if to all, then to each one.” Not all “reap the profit therefrom,” but this was not God’s doing, “but the fault of them that were not willing (βουληθέντας).” Thus, the Incarnation has radically changed human nature, uniting it with the Divine. However, to profit from it one must be willing and not be remiss.

The Incarnation was necessary because man could not come to God. “How went He forth? ... coming nearer to us by His clothing Himself with flesh (τῆς κατὰ σάρκα περιβολῆς). For because we could not enter, our sins fencing us out from the entrance, He comes forth unto us.” Christ having become Incarnate, it follows that He would undergo all that pertains to human nature.

He who vouchsafed to be born so long in a Virgin’s womb, and to come forth thence with our nature (φύσεως), and ... to suffer all the rest which He suffered; — why marvellest thou if He vouchsafed also to be baptized ... For the amazement lay in ... that being God, He would be made Man; but the rest after this all follows in course of reason.

Thus, Christ’s Incarnation implies as a matter of course His baptism and death and all other events in His life. All these events, moreover, have significance of their own.

In His Baptism, Christ has joined “the old covenant with the new, God’s nature (φύσιν) with man’s (ἀνθρωπωτίνη).” Christ’s Baptism (and by extension Christian baptism) is linked with His taking us to heaven, the coming of the Holy Spirit, and the new πολιτεία.

For this baptism alone hath the grace of the Spirit ... Not until then ... did the Spirit make His approach. Because henceforth He leads us away from the old to the new polity (πολιτείαν) ... sending down His Spirit from thence to call us to our country.

268 Hom. in Mt 2.2; PG 57.26; NPNF I, 10, pp. 9-10
269 Hom. in Mt 82.5; PG 58.744; NPNF I, 10, p. 495
270 Hom. in Mt 44.3.; PG 57.467; NPNF I, 10, p. 281
271 Hom. in Mt 12.1.; PG 57.201-2; NPNF I, 10, p. 75
272 Hom in Mt 2.2; PG 57.26; NPNF I, 10, p. 10
there ... Having then all this in thy mind, do thou show forth a life worthy of the love (ἀγάπης) of Him who calls thee ... with this very purpose the Lord, having first come here ... did then, taking thee with Him, depart thither; that ... thou mightest understand that it is possible for thee to inhabit earth as it were heaven ... the heaven is ... opened ... for thee ... not to ascend only, but to lead up others also, if thou wilt; such great confidence and power hath He bestowed on thee in all that is His.  

Through the joint work of Christ and the Spirit, men can ascend to heaven with Christ. Men’s proper response is to live heavenly lives on earth and take others with them to heaven.

Christ’s Cross is involved in His changing of human nature. In “the city of God ... standeth the trophy of the cross, glorious, and conspicuous, the spoils won by Christ, the first-fruits of our nature (φύσεως), the booty of our King (Βασιλέως).” The first-fruits of our nature is probably Christ Himself, although it might possibly be a reference to the first Christians.

Chrysostom does not in these homilies explain how the Cross is tied with the renewal of human nature, but he does speak more generally about the role of the Cross. The manner of Christ’s death is instructive. “He ... endure[d] ... the most shameful death; and before His death, stripes; and before His stripes, upbraidings, and jeers, and revilings; instructing thee to bear all manfully. And though He died, and put off His body, He resumed it again in greater glory, herein also holding out to thee good hopes.” Christ’s death was a ransom. “Even my life did I give a ransom ... for enemies.” By the Cross, Christ puts an end to the devil’s power. “Though the evil spirit is grieved, when he is driven out of a body, yet much more so, when he sees a soul delivered from sin. For indeed this is his great power. This power caused Christ to die, that He might put an end to it.”

Christ’s Ascension is also involved in the changing of human nature. “And in the Old Testament, it was upon Moses’ going up, that God came down; but here, when our nature (φύσεως) hath been carried up into Heaven, or rather unto the royal throne, then

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273 Hom. in Mt 12.3-4.; PG 57.206; NPNF I, 10, pp. 78-9
274 Hom in Mt. 2.1; PG 57.24; NPNF I, 10, pp. 8-9
275 Hom. in Mt. 31.4; PG 57.375; NPNF I, 10, p. 209
276 Hom. in Mt.65.4; PG 58.622; NPNF I, 10, p. 401
277 Hom. in Mt. 46.4; PG 57.481; NPNF I, 10, p. 291
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the Spirit makes His descent." The close relationship of the coming of the Spirit with the taking up of human nature into heaven should be noted.

As mentioned above, Chrysostom links Christ’s taking us to heaven (presumably in His Ascension) with His Baptism (and by extension Christian baptism), the coming of the Holy Spirit, and the new πολιτεία.

Somewhat surprisingly, Chrysostom nowhere in these homilies specifically links Christ’s changing of human nature with His Resurrection. He does, however, speak of the destruction of death through the Resurrection of Christ’s Body. “How then were the gates of brass burst, and the bars of iron broken in sunder? By His body; for then first was a body shown, immortal, and destroying the tyranny of death.” This at least hints at some effect on human nature, with the Resurrection of His Body making possible the destruction of death’s tyranny for other humans.

To summarize, Chrysostom either implicitly or explicitly sees the major events of Christ’s earthly life as integral to His transformation of human nature. His Incarnation implies within itself all the other events of His earthly life. A key aspect of His ability to change human nature is that He has, in Himself, joined it with the divine nature. Also important are the role of the Spirit, Christian baptism and the Christian’s own efforts.

What Is Man?

Chrysostom views man on a spectrum. At the upper limit, he sees man as of exalted rank and called to equality with the angels and even to being a son of God. On the other hand, he sees man as a limited creature and, in his sinfulness, lower than the beasts. To be human in the highest sense is to be in community with God and one’s fellow man, and yet vainglory and jealousy are particularly human sins. Human nature is sinful and yet not sinful.

Chrysostom nowhere in these homilies explicitly addresses these apparent discrepancies. However, a possible solution is provided below, based on Chrysostom’s statements concerning man and how Christ transforms human nature. Man in his pristine state was clothed in glory and conversed freely with God. In man’s current state, however, all human nature has lost its savor and is decayed by sin. Yet, the good or evil that men do is of choice, not of nature. Further, fallen though he is, man retains

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278 Hom. in Mt. 1.1; PG 57.15; NPNF I, 10, p. 2
279 Hom. in Mt. 36.3; PG 57.416; NPNF I, 10, p. 241
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the image of God to a certain degree, and virtue is still natural to him (at least as regards
his having a conscience). Christ through His Incarnation (which implies the rest of His
life and saving work), forever changed human nature and united it with the Divine. Yet,
the choice remains with each person whether he is to live in this newness or not.

Thus, mentions of man’s glory and high estate have some reference to his pristine
state (aspects of which are still retained in his fallen condition), but still more so to his
state of being united with the Divine through Christ. On the other hand, man in his
fallen state is debased, the more so because of his high origin and still higher calling in
Christ. Each man, of his own will, can choose to attain to that high calling or remain
fallen. The former becomes true man again and even more so, he becomes a son of God.
The latter becomes human in the pejorative sense, which eventually is to become
thoroughly inhuman.

The tie to Chapter Two’s theme of the Λόγος and ἄλογος man is perhaps not readily
apparent. However, the fact that Christ’s Incarnation has forever changed human
nature through uniting it to the Divine gives new depth to the understanding of the
ἄλογος man. Through the Incarnation, the Λόγος has infused humanity with His own
Divinity. Thus, to reject Him now is reject one’s deepest humanity, whereas to love and
obey Him is to be more fully human and at the same time supra-human.

Also, in both cases, Chrysostom clearly envisions a spectrum of humanity: supra-
human to sub-human and sane to insane. This vision of humanity on a spectrum will
later be tied to Chrysostom’s oft-repeated maxim that different medicines are needed for
different diseases to reconcile apparently contradictory statements made by
Chrysostom, especially in regard to marriage.

Now, Chrysostom’s understanding of man will be set in the context of the πολιτεία
of heaven.

THE ΠΟΛΙΤΕΙΑ OF HEAVEN

The πολιτεία of heaven consists of beings united in love. Three chief images of this
community are the Kingdom (βασιλεία) of Heaven, the Family of God and the Body of
Christ. Love is the chief law. The healthy member of this community (epitomized by the
monk) is loving and unselfish. Each image has its own flavor, but each presupposes a
vertical relationship with God and a horizontal relationship with other created beings.
Also, all come down to loving or refusing to love. Love being the hallmark of this πολιτεία, those who insist on living for themselves can, ultimately, find no place there and are in fact not even human.

Chrysostom’s Use of Πολιτεία

No one English word can adequately translate πολιτεία. NPNF translates it variously as polity, commonwealth, citizenship, way of life, discipline, course of life, etc. When meaning course of life, the word can refer to a small group or one person – not just an entire society.

In his first homily, Chrysostom states that “the aforesaid republic (πολιτείας) is ... the subject on which this book was written.” Not surprisingly, this homily sees the most concentrated use of the term (18 times out of roughly 100 in the entire set of homilies on Matthew), mostly in explicit and implicit contrast with the Republic (Πολιτεία) of Plato or any other πολιτεία promulgated by pagan philosophers. Chrysostom has no good words to say about such philosophers. “An evil spirit ... at war with our race, a foe to modesty, and an enemy to good order, overturning (πάντα ἄνω καὶ κάτω ποιῶν) all things, hath made his voice be heard in their soul.” These philosophers have no true knowledge of God. “For how could they, who made for gods images of beasts ... and of other things still more vile?” In contrast to Plato’s Πολιτεία, the πολιτεία of heaven is simple to understand, yet produces great virtue, comprehended in “love (ἀγάπῃ) of God and ... neighbor.”

The πολιτεία of heaven has other superiorities. People of all walks of life and ages live it and become angelic while still in the body. God is “the framer ... and ... lawgiver (νομοθέτην) of the statutes (νόμων) there set.” Its rewards are “a life which hath no end, and to become children of God, to join the angels’ choir, and to stand by the royal throne, and to be always with Christ.” Its “popular guides (Δημαγωγοὶ)” are seemingly mean folk such as publicans, fishermen, and tentmakers. But, because they “are now living for ever ... even after their death they may possibly do

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280 Hom. in Mt. 74.3; PG 58.683; NPNF I, 10, p. 448; Hom. in Mt. 90.4; PG 58.792; NPNF I, 10, p. 533; Hom. in Mt. 37.3; PG 57.423; NPNF I, 10, p. 246
281 Hom. in Mt. 1.6; PG 57.20; NPNF I, 10, p. 6
282 Hom. in Mt. 1.4; PG 57.19; NPNF I, 10, p. 5 (NPNF has ‘oversetting’ instead of ‘overturning’)
283 Hom. in Mt. 1.5; PG 57.19; NPNF I, 10, p. 5
284 Hom. in Mt. 1.5; PG 57.20; NPNF I, 10, p. 5
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the greatest good to the governed (πολιτευομένους).” Being “at war not with men, but with devils,” this πολιτεία’s warriors have God Himself as captain, and their armor consists of “truth and of righteousness, and faith, and all true love of wisdom (φιλοσοφίας).”

Thus, the πολιτεία preached by the Gospel writers is that of heaven, but is accessible to even the simplest people. This is only possible because “it was a divine power that pervaded all, and made it to prosper with all men.”

This πολιτεία is part of the Good Tidings declared by the evangelist. “God on earth, man (ἄνθρωπος) in Heaven ... men (ἄνθρωποι) had fellowship with the angels ... reconciliation made between God and our nature (φύσιν) ... the polity (πολιτείαν) of those above planted on the earth.”

The nominal Christian possesses no surety of entrance into this glorious πολιτεία. “We have nothing in common with Heaven, but our citizenship (πολιτεία) goes no further than words. And yet because of this, God hath threatened even hell ... that He might persuade us to flee this grievous tyranny (τυραννίδα).”

To those who do not even listen to God’s commands, Chrysostom ends his introductory homily with both great soberness and joy:

With great trembling ... let us worship the King (βασιλέα) that is therein.... enter ... with a mystical silence.

... it is ... the letters of ... the Lord of angels, which are on the point of being read.

If we would order ourselves on this wise, the grace itself of the Spirit will lead us in great perfection, and we shall ... attain to all the good things ... Amen.

The soberness and joy both are rooted in the fact that this is not just any πολιτεία, but the πολιτεία of the great King – the Lord of angels.

To summarize this first homily, the πολιτεία of heaven is comprehended in love of God and neighbor. In it men and angels mingle, men live angelic lives, and men even become children of God. It is easily accessible to anyone who seriously pursues it, but must be approached with fear and trembling. The reason is the same for both – the King, lawgiver, and framer is God Himself. Thus, He can make possible what man

285 Hom. in Mt. 1.5-6; PG 57.20; NPNF I, 10, pp. 5-6
286 Hom. in Mt. 1.4; PG.57.18; NPNF I, 10, p. 4
287 Hom. in Mt. 1.2; PG 57.15-6; NPNF I, 10, p. 2
288 Hom. in Mt. 1.7; PG 57.22; NPNF I, 10, p. 7
289 Hom. in Mt. 1.8; PG 57.24 NPNF I, 10, p. 8

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cannot. But approaching the Lord of angels is a solemn, awe-inspiring mystery, which is certainly not for those who do not even pay attention to His words.

Chrysostom speaks of the πολιτεία of heaven throughout these homilies. Since he is usually echoing what he says in the first homily, only those cases adding significant information will be adduced here.

The πολιτεία of heaven requires a conduct higher than that of the Old Law. When Joseph realizes that the Theotokos is pregnant he does not “deliver her to die ... but conducts himself now by a higher rule than the law (ὑπὲρ νόμον πολιτεύεται). For grace being come, there must needs henceforth be many tokens of that exalted citizenship (πολιτείας).”

On the other hand, the new πολιτεία, while superior to the old, is not fundamentally opposed to it. When John the Baptist says, “‘Think not to say, we are children of Abraham,’ he is providing for another point also; not to seem in any sense opposed to the ancient polity (πολιτείᾳ).”

Citizenship in this πολιτεία comes through baptism. “For this baptism alone hath the grace of the Spirit ... henceforth He leads us away from the old to the new polity (πολιτείαν) ... For He hath not made us angels and archangels, but He hath caused us to become ‘sons of God’ and ‘beloved (ἀγαπητοὺς).’” In response, one must “show forth a life worthy of the love (ἀγάπης) of Him who calls thee, and of thy citizenship (πολιτείας) in that world” and have nothing to do with the earth “for thou hast thy Head (κεφαλὴν) abiding above.”

Here Chrysostom combines family and body imagery to speak of this πολιτεία.

The members of the πολιτεία of heaven must balance respect for “the common laws (κοινοῖς νόμοις)” and “the common government (κοινὴν πολιτείαν)” with “the perfection of their doctrines.” “They should neither, while earnest to speak of the doctrine, fall under suspicion of overturning the laws (νόμων); nor again, while earnest to show that they were not overturning the common government (κοινήν πολιτείαν), corrupt the perfection of their doctrines.”

290 Hom. in Mt. 4.4; PG 57.44; NPNF I, 10, p. 23
291 Hom. in Mt. 26.4; PG 57.338; NPNF I, 10, p. 388
292 Hom. in Mt. 12.4; PG 57.206; NPNF I, 10, p. 78
293 Hom. in Mt. 33.5; PG 57.394; NPNF I, 10, p. 476
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The Beatitudes provide the foundations of Christ’s new polity (πολιτείας). The first Beatitude is the “remedy suitable to the disease (νοσήματι)” of the fundamental evil of pride (ἁπονοίας). “He … laid this law (νόμον) first as a strong and safe foundation … If this be taken away, though a man reach to the Heavens in his course of life (πολιτευόμενος), it is all easily undermined.” Thus, one’s course of life (πολιτευόμενος) must reflect Christ’s πολιτεία or all can be ruined.

Monastics are exemplars of this life. “And now, shouldest thou come unto the desert of Egypt … everywhere in that land may be seen the camp of Christ, and the royal (βασιλικῆν) flock, and the polity (πολιτείαν) of the powers above.”

The πολιτεία enjoined upon those under grace is “so easy … as to want … a soul and purpose only.” The injunctions given under grace (Have no enemy. Hate no man. Speak ill of no man.) are so easy that “the opposites of these things are the greater hardships.”

Chrysostom essentially ends his last homily on Matthew by exhorting his flock to emulate Peter and the other apostles in “their life (βίου) and conversation (πολιτείας),” particularly “the casting away of one’s goods, for this was the apostles’ achievement.” To speak of the casting away of one’s goods as the crowning achievement of the apostles is surprising in its own right and also as being essentially the ending note of the last homily on Matthew. One might expect to hear about the apostles’ converting the world, loving God unto death, etc.

On further examination, however, it is not so surprising. One can safely assume that Chrysostom is not speaking merely of casting away physical goods, but of casting out of their hearts the love of worldly things. As true citizens of heaven, the apostles conducted their lives accordingly – with love of God and love of neighbor. They were the very opposite of the inhuman person who lives merely for himself and of the pursuer of material things, mad with a “madness (μανία), sorer than that caused by devils, than that from frenzy (φρενίτιδος).” This being the case, their casting away of

294 Hom. in Mt. 15.1; PG 57.223; NPNF I, 10, p. 91
295 Hom. in Mt. 15.2; PG 57.224; NPNF I, 10, p. 92
296 Hom. in Mt. 8.4; PG 57.87; NPNF I, 10, p. 53; cf. Hom. in Mt. 55.6; PG 58.548; NPNF I, 10, p. 344; Hom. in Mt. 68.4-5; PG 58.646; NPNF I, 10, p. 419
297 Hom. in Mt. 90.3; PG 58.790; NPNF I, 10, p. 532
298 Hom. in Mt. 90.4; PG 58.792; NPNF I, 10, pp. 533-4
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their own goods can be seen as a practical expression of their unwavering commitment to the πολιτεία of heaven. Thus, Chrysostom ends these homilies with a practical way of gauging whether one is becoming more a citizen of heaven or not. Sublime as the πολιτεία of heaven is, it is in the reach of all Christians, and Chrysostom is intent on leading his hearers there.

To summarize, membership in this πολιτεία is through baptism. It is a new πολιτεία and superior to the old, yet not opposed to it. God is its founder and must be approached with awe. The Beatitudes are the new πολιτεία’s foundational laws. The citizens of this πολιτεία must balance living as its true members with not opposing the common laws and government. Monastics exemplify this life. The casting away of one’s goods is a practical expression that one has indeed embraced this πολιτεία.

The next section will further investigate Chrysostom’s understanding of this πολιτεία by examining three major images of it.

Three Major Expressions of the Πολιτεία of Heaven

Although Chrysostom states from the outset that the subject of Matthew’s Gospel is the πολιτεία of heaven, he does not – as was noted above – use the term very frequently (roughly once per homily). He is, however, constantly speaking of this πολιτεία. Three major expressions of this πολιτεία are the Kingdom of Heaven, the Family of God and the Body of Christ. These will be examined below.

The Kingdom of Heaven

Although Matthew’s Gospel never uses the term πολιτεία, it does refer often to the Kingdom (βασιλεία) of Heaven. Thus, the terms βασιλεία and βασιλεύς appear often in these homilies. God the Father is King, but so is Christ. The King is great in glory and worthy of all reverence, yet He is Father to the citizens of His Kingdom. The King has taken on human form in the Incarnation. Being children of the King, the citizens of Heaven share in His glory. The Kingdom of Heaven is yet to come, but is already present in the Person of Christ and in the lives of saints, especially monks. One cannot enter the Kingdom without grace, but righteousness is also required and there is also a sacramental component.
God the Father is the King of Heaven. At the Last Supper, Christ says, “I will not drink of the fruit of this wine, until that day when I drink it new with you in my Father’s kingdom (βασιλεία).”

Yet Christ Himself is also King. Christ is under no obligation to pay tribute money for He is “Son, not of an earthly king (βασιλέως), but of the King (no word) of Heaven, and [himself] a King (βασιλέα).”

One cannot attain the Kingdom without recognizing Christ as God. To the scribe that said, “‘That to love (ἀγαπᾷν) his neighbor is more than whole burnt sacrifices,’” Christ answered, “‘Thou art not far from the kingdom (βασιλείας);’ because he overlooked low things, and embraced the first principle of virtue. For indeed all those are for the sake of this, as well the Sabbath as the rest.” Though love of neighbor is so important, it is insufficient to bring the man into the Kingdom because he has not yet recognized Christ’s Godhead. “Not excepting Himself from being God ... but since it was not yet time to disclose His Godhead, He ... praises him for knowing well the ancient principles, so as to make him fit for the doctrine of the New Testament.”

Chrysostom does not directly refer to the Holy Spirit as King of Heaven in these homilies. However, the Spirit has a prominent place in the first homily, which is avowedly about the πολιτεία of heaven. Chrysostom starts the homily by talking of “the grace of the Spirit” that “should be instead of books to our souls.” He ends it with “If we would order ourselves on this wise, the grace itself of the Spirit will lead us in great perfection, and we shall arrive at the very royal throne ...” The Spirit is not inferior to the God Who came down to Moses. Also, Chrysostom not uncommonly ends his homilies by invoking all three Persons of the Trinity (e.g. Homilies 53, 55-58, 75) In addition, as the previous two references from the first homily (and many others throughout the other homilies) make clear, a relationship with Him is absolutely essential for anyone who wishes to attain the kingdom. It is not clear why Chrysostom does not refer to the Spirit directly as King. This may have to do with living at a time when the Spirit’s full equality was still a raging question and therefore may have been –

299 Hom. in Mt. 82.2; PG 58.739; NPNF I, 10, p. 492
300 Hom. in Mt. 5.18; PG 58.567; NPNF I, 10, p. 358
301 Hom. in Mt. 71.1; PG 58.662; NPNF I, 10, p. 432
302 Hom. in Mt. 1.1; PG 57.13; NPNF I, 10, p. 1
303 Hom. in Mt. 1.8; PG 57.24; NPNF I, 10, p. 8
304 Hom. in Mt. 1.1; PG 57.15; NPNF I, 10, p. 2
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as has been suggested for other Fathers of that time – a diplomatic way of asserting His full divinity without causing more division than necessary. Be that as it may, this reticence is in keeping with a common tendency to speak of the Spirit in terms of His role of directly touching people’s hearts and bringing them to the Father and Christ.

The King of Heaven is exceedingly glorious and worthy of reverence. If, when Moses received the Law, the Israelites “were in trembling and fear ... much more we, when we are to hearken to such words, and are ... to enter into Heaven itself, ought to show forth a greater self-denial (φιλοσοφίαν) ... For ... ye shall see ... the King (Βασιλέα) Himself sitting on the throne of that unspeakable glory.”

Christians must worship reverently with body and soul both because of God’s inherent majesty and because of their great need. “We are drawing nigh unto God, whom the seraphim behold and turn away their faces, not bearing His brightness ... for escape from those intolerable punishments, for attaining to the Heavens ... Let us, I say, fall down before Him both in body and in mind.”

Though the King is so great and awesome, He has become Man. “Being Son of the Unoriginate God ... His true Son, He suffered Himself to be called also Son of David, that He might make thee Son of God. He suffered a slave to be father to Him, that He might make the Lord (Δεσπότης) Father to thee a slave.” Though King (Βασιλέα), He appears “in thine own form ... in the garb of a common soldier ... lest ... He should cause the enemy to fly from the conflict with Him, and lest He should confound all His own people.” The King is Christ, although by extension the Father is King, too. The Son of God became Man to make men – who had been slaves – to be sons of God.

So, while Christians must fear God exceedingly, this fear is not the trembling terror of a slave because the King of Heaven is also Father to Heaven’s citizens. “Thy kingdom (βασιλεία) come’ ... is the language of a right-minded child, not to be rivetted to things that are seen ... but to hasten unto our Father, and to long for the things to come.”

Thus, the true child of the Kingdom, while he trembles before God’s holiness, hastens to Him as Father.

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305 Hom. in Mt. 2.1; PG 57.23; NPNF I, 10, p. 8
306 Hom. in Mt. 51.5; PG 58.516-7; NPNF I, 10, pp. 319-20
307 Hom. in Mt. 2.1-2; PG 57.25-6; NPNF I, 10, pp. 9-10
308 Hom. in Mt. 19.4; PG 57.279; NPNF I, 10, p. 134
The children of the Kingdom share in their Father’s glory. “‘Then shall the righteous shine forth as the sun in the kingdom (βασιλεία) of their Father.’ Not because it will be just so much only, but because this star is surpassed in brightness by none that we know.”

Although adopted, these children inherit the kingdom (Βασιλείαν) as truly their own. “He said not, Take, but, ‘Inherit,’ as one’s own, as your Father’s, as yours, as due to you from the first.”

This Kingdom is yet to come. Chrysostom defines the kingdom as the time of the Resurrection, including the judgment of sinners. “For He was used to mean by ‘the kingdom (Βασιλείαν),’ not merely the enjoyment thereof, but also the time of the resurrection, and that awful coming.”

Yet, the Kingdom is already present. First and foremost, it is present in Christ Himself. Commenting on Christ’s saying, “But if I cast out devils by the Spirit of God, then the Kingdom (βασιλεία) of God is come unto you,” Chrysostom asks, “What means ‘the Kingdom (βασιλεία)?’” and answers with, “My coming.” Christ’s saying, “There are some of them that stand here, which shall not taste of death, until they see the Son of Man coming in His kingdom (βασιλεία)” refers to His Transfiguration before Peter, James, and John. “He ... to show what kind of glory that is wherewith He is to come, so far as it was reveals this; that they should not grieve any more ... the kingdom (Βασιλείαν) indeed He shows in the vision.”

Christ’s Resurrection is also the Kingdom. In Christ’s words, “I will not drink of the fruit of this wine, until that day when I drink it new with you in my Father’s kingdom (βασιλεία),” the kingdom refers to Christ’s “own resurrection.”

The Kingdom of Heaven is present also in the lives of right-living Christians, particularly monks, in whom “Christ’s kingdom (Βασιλείαν) shines forth in its brightness.”

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309 Hom. in Mt. 47.1; PG 57.482; NPNF I, 10, p. 293
310 Hom. in Mt. 79.2; PG 58.719; NPNF I, 10, p. 476
311 Hom. in Mt. 16.4; PG 57.243; NPNF I, 10, p. 106
312 Hom. in Mt. 41.2; PG 57.443; NPNF I, 10, p. 265
313 Hom. in Mt. 56.1; PG 58.549; NPNF I, 10, p. 345
314 Hom. in Mt. 82.2; PG 58.739; NPNF I, 10, p. 492
“The very face of the kingdom (Βασιλείας) of Heaven” is to be found in the “good conversation (πολιτευομένους)” of Christians. Pagans seeing this "will be reformed."\textsuperscript{315}

The citizens of the Kingdom can also be characterized as soldiers. As “soldiers of a heavenly King (Βασιλέως)” Christians must not live “the life ... of worms. For where the King (βασιλεύς) is, there should also the soldier be.” This provides a needful reminder to the citizens of the Kingdom that they are at war while in this world. Yet, they have the ever-present help of the heavenly King, Who is humbler than any earthly king. “For the earthly king (βασιλεύς) indeed would not endure that all should be in the royal courts (βασιλείοις), and at his own side, but the King (no word) of the Heavens willeth all to be near His royal throne.”\textsuperscript{316}

The Kingdom of God is represented in all the Beatitudes. “When He saith, “they that mourn shall be comforted;” and, “they that show mercy shall obtain mercy;” and, “the pure in heart shall see God;” and, the peacemakers “shall be called the children of God;” nothing else but the Kingdom (βασιλεία) doth He shadow out by all these sayings.”\textsuperscript{317}

The Kingdom is inseparably bound with Christ's glory. To be “cast ... out of God's kingdom (βασιλείας)” is a “loss of ... glory” that is “a far greater punishment than hell.” “Ten thousand hells” are “nothing like what it will be to fail of that blessed glory, to be hated of Christ ... better surely to endure a thousand thunderbolts, than to see ... that eye of peace not enduring to look upon us.” Chrysostom goes on to wonder, “If He, while I was an enemy ... gave Himself up unto death: when after all this I do not vouchsafe to Him so much as a loaf in His hunger, with what kind of eyes shall I ever again behold Him?”\textsuperscript{318}

From the above, either Christ’s glory is itself the Kingdom or it is so closely bound with it that to speak of one is to speak of the other. Also, it seems significant that Chrysostom goes from talking about the horror that “it will be to fail of that blessed glory” to speak of Christ’s mildness and His pursuit of fallen man unto His own death. Thus, Christ’s awesome glory seems to be inextricably bound in Chrysostom’s mind with His gentleness and self-abasement.

\textsuperscript{315} Hom. in Mt. 43.5; PG 57.463; NPNF I, 10, p.277
\textsuperscript{316} Hom. in Mt. 54.5; PG 58.538; NPNF I, 10, p. 336
\textsuperscript{317} Hom. in Mt. 15.5; PG 57.228; NPNF I, 10, p. 95
\textsuperscript{318} Hom. in Mt. 23.7-8; PG 57.317; NPNF I, 10, p. 164
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If the Kingdom is Christ’s glory or Christ Himself, then surely nothing can be higher. However, concerning Christ’s saying, “love (Ἀγαπᾶτε) your enemies ... That ye may become like your Father which is in Heaven,” Chrysostom says, “He makes not mention here of earth ... nor of the kingdom (Βασιλείας) of Heaven; but of that which was more thrilling than all; our becoming like God, in such wise as men might become so.”\(^\text{319}\) In this context, he is obviously using “the kingdom of Heaven” in a lesser sense than Christ’s glory or Christ Himself.

In Heaven “is life eternal, and unspeakable glory, and inexpressible beauty ... and the untold glory of the King (Βασιλέως).” Having said this, Chrysostom exhorts his hearers not to “be backward to show mercy on them that are in need.” Rather, whatever one must throw away or suffer, “let us bear all easily, that we may obtain the garment of the kingdom (βασιλείας) of Heaven, and that untold glory.”\(^\text{320}\) Again, heaven is tied up with the glory of God. Mercy to those in need seems to be a necessary prerequisite to attaining the kingdom and glory. This makes sense because how could one enjoy the glory of the King Who died for His enemies if one never had concern for those in need?

Entrance into this Kingdom is through grace, but also requires the contribution of one’s own share. “To know the mysteries of the Kingdom (βασιλείας) of Heaven ... is a gift, and a grace bestowed from above.” This does not, however, imply “because it is a gift, that therefore free will (αὐτεξούσιον) is taken away.” Rather, “When any one hath forwardness and zeal, there shall be given unto him all things on God’s part also: but if he ... contribute not his own share, neither are God’s gifts bestowed.”\(^\text{321}\) In a similar vein, the harlots who believed John the Baptist’s message entered into the Kingdom (βασιλείαν) “not of grace only ... but also of righteousness. For ... having obeyed and believed, and having been purified and converted, so did they enter in.”\(^\text{322}\)

Thus, entrance into the kingdom is impossible without grace, but also requires repentance, a righteous life, and earnestness. Chief among the required virtues are humility or meekness, mercy or almsgiving, and love.

Humility and meekness are requisite for entering the Kingdom. God does not “so readily accept prophets’ lips, as those of meek and forbearing men.” The one who keeps

\(^{319}\) *Hom. in Mt.* 18.3-4; *PG* 57.268-9; *NPNF* I, 10, pp. 126-7  
\(^{320}\) *Hom. in Mt.* 54.6; *PG* 58.540; *NPNF* I, 10, p. 338  
\(^{321}\) *Hom. in Mt.* 44.1; *PG* 58.471; *NPNF* I, 10, pp. 284-5  
\(^{322}\) *Hom. in Mt.* 67.3; *PG* 58.636; *NPNF* I, 10, p. 412  
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his “mouth like to Christ’s mouth ... with great confidence shalt set foot in the Heavens, and enjoy the kingdom (βασιλείας).” 323

“The kingdom (Βασιλεία) of heaven is reserved” for those “who are like those children, lowly and simple, these above all men are able to deliver the guilty by their prayers.” This statement was made in a discussion of the prayers of the Liturgy. Chrysostom goes on to say, “But the mystery itself, of how much mercy, of how much love to man (φιλανθρωπίας) it is full, the initiated know.” Then, he says, “When ... thou art showing mercy to a man ... let the object of thy mercy see it only; but if it be possible, not even he. But if thou set them open, thou art profanely exposing thy mystery.” 324

There is an intimate connection here among simplicity of heart, prayer for others, the Eucharistic mystery and the mystery of almsgiving. All are interconnected and all requisite for attaining to the Kingdom.

Christ likens the Kingdom (Βασιλεία) of Heaven to the ten virgins. Chrysostom sees this parable, the preceding parable of the faithful and wicked servants (Matt. 24:44-51, which he apparently considers as two parables) and the following parable of the talents (Matt. 25:14-30) as being about the same thing. All four are “admonishing us ... about diligence in almsgiving, and about helping our neighbor by all means which we are able to use, since it is not possible to be saved in another way.” In the parable of the virgins, however, “he speaketh particularly of mercifulness in alms, and more strongly than in the former parable.” Christ’s purpose in using virgins in this parable is to show that great and pure as it is, virginity “if destitute of the good things arising out of almsgiving, is cast out with the harlots, and He sets the inhuman (ἀπάνθρωπον) and merciless with them.” 325 Thus, helping the needy is so necessary that the greatest purity of life is insufficient to gain the Kingdom of Heaven without it.

Love being the Kingdom’s chief law, the one who refuses to love his brother is severely punished. Revilers (λοιδόρους) are rightly cast out of the kingdom (Βασιλείας).

There is nothing for which God takes so much pains, as this; that we should be united and knit together one with another. Therefore ... He ... is a severe avenger and

323 Hom. in Mt. 78.4; PG 58.717-8; NPNF I, 10, p. 474
324 Hom. in Mt. 71.4; PG 58.666; NPNF I, 10, p. 435
325 Hom. in Mt. 78.1; PG 58.711; NPNF I, 10, p. 470

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punisher of those who despise the duty. For ... nothing so effectually gives entrance and root to all wickedness, as the taking away of love (ἀγάπης)."\(^{326}\)

Chrysostom does not explain the paradox that the loving God severely punishes those who do not love. However, since “the taking away of love” gives entrance to all wickedness, this punishment would be a safeguard for the community and a warning to the one who refuses to love.

The Kingdom of Heaven is associated with the sacraments of baptism and communion. Explaining why John the Baptist identified Christ as “He which baptizeth with the Holy Ghost,” instead of mentioning the signs and wonders Christ would soon do, he explains, “In his mention of the chief thing, he comprehended all; death dissolved, sins abolished ... our ascent into heaven, our citizenship (πολιτείαν) with the angels ... our partaking of His kingdom (Βασιλείας) ... all these things He bestowed on us by that gift."\(^{327}\) The following passage, while not showing a causal relationship, does link baptism and the Eucharistic table with the Kingdom. “He gave up His Son for thee, He gave thee a baptism full of so many good things, He gave thee a holy table, He promised a kingdom (Βασιλείαν), and the good things that cannot be told.”\(^{328}\) The sequence of the above quote is probably not coincidental, with each one seeming to set the groundwork for those following. So, baptism and the Eucharist are important prerequisites for receiving the Kingdom.

In summary, the Kingdom of Heaven has God (the Father) and Christ as King. The Holy Spirit is not inferior to them and leads people to the heavenly throne. The glory of the King is great and a cause for trembling. However, the citizens of the Kingdom tremble not as slaves, but as loving adopted children of the awesome King, Who became Son of David so that they might become sons of God. Baptism and the Eucharist are foundational for entrance into the Kingdom. Christians are not only citizens of the Kingdom, but soldiers of the King. The Kingdom is in some sense synonymous with Christ and His glory, which is linked to His self-abasement for the sake of man. The Kingdom is still to come and yet already present in the Person of Christ and in those who live true Christian lives, especially monks. It is not attainable without grace, but also requires virtue and earnestness. Chief characteristics of its citizens are humility,

\(^{326}\) Hom. in Mt. 16.8; PG 57.249-50; NPNF I, 10, pp. 111-2
\(^{327}\) Hom. in Mt. 11.6; PG 57.199; NPNF I, 10, p. 73
\(^{328}\) Hom. in Mt. 66.5; PG 58.632; NPNF I, 10, p. 408
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almsgiving, love, and a proper regard for the King. Failure to love is severely punished. If one persists in this refusal, the punishment is an eternal hell, but its other torments are less grievous than falling from Christ's glory.

The Family of God

Membership in the family of God implies relationship with the entire Trinity and the rest of the family members. Life in this family is sacramental. Membership in God's family implies certain patterns of behavior characteristic of God.

The true child of God the Father seeks the Father's glory beyond all else. "Worthy of him who calls God Father, is ... to ask nothing before the glory of His Father ... For His own glory He hath complete ... but He commands him who prays to seek that He may be glorified also by our life."329 "That 'His name be hallowed,' is the exactness of a perfect conversation (πολιτείας) ... and to be able to call God 'Father,' is the profession of a blameless life (πολιτείας)."330

Man's adoption into the family of God is possible because Christ "suffered a slave to be father to Him, that He might make the Lord Father to thee a slave."331 To call God Father implies relationship with the Son and the Spirit. "He who calls God Father, by him both remission of sins ... and righteousness, and sanctification, and redemption, and adoption, and inheritance, and brotherhood with the Only-Begotten, and the supply of the Spirit, are acknowledged."332 This relationship with Father, Son, and Holy Spirit also implies sanctification and righteousness. Thus, the new family member, though adopted, bears the family resemblance.

Entrance into this family is in baptism. This is a spiritual birth, but requires sensible means (i.e. water) since man is corporeal. "In baptism, the gift is bestowed by a sensible thing, that is, by water; but that which is done is perceived by the mind, the birth, I mean, and the renewal ... because the soul hath been locked up in a body, He delivers thee the things that the mind perceives, in things sensible."333

With Christ's Baptism and the Mystical Supper, the old πολιτεία gives way to the new, making men sons of God and giving them a heavenly Head. "As on one table then,

329 Hom. in Mt. 19.4; PG 57.279; NPNF I, 10, p. 134
330 Hom. in Mt. 19.6; PG 57.281; NPNF I, 10, p. 136
331 Hom. in Mt. 2.1; PG 57.25; NPNF I, 10, p. 10
332 Hom. in Mt. 19.4; PG 57.278; NPNF I, 10, p. 134
333 Hom. in Mt. 82.4; PG 58.743; NPNF I, 10, p. 495

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so in one river now, He had both sketched out the shadow, and now adds the truth ... henceforth He leads us away from the old to the new polity (πολιτείαν) ... He hath caused us to become 'sons of God.'”

Through the Sacraments, Christians become brothers. “For baptism renders a man a brother and the partaking of the divine mysteries.” As sons of God, Christians are bound together with many things, particularly the Eucharistic table and cup.

For indeed there are many things to bind us together. One table is set before all, one Father begat us, we are all the issue of the same throes, the same drink hath been given to all ... we are commanded to love (φιλεῖν) ... even our enemies ... we have the same city, and the same house, and table, and way, and door, and root, and life, and head, and the same shepherd, and king (βασιλέα), and teacher, and judge (κριτήν), and maker, and father ... what indulgence can we deserve, if we be divided one from another?

As the above quotes show, membership in this family implies certain patterns of behavior. Adopted members of God’s family must glorify God by blameless lives. They must love even their enemies and deserve no indulgence for their divisions.

Elsewhere, Chrysostom says to pray “Thy kingdom (βασιλεία) come” is “the language of a right-minded child, not to be rivetted to things that are seen, neither to account things present some great matter; but to hasten unto our Father, and to long for the things to come.” Clearly, the proper behavior of a child of God is not merely external, but is rooted in a desire and love for Him.

The true child of the Father loves his brothers. Christians should “make our prayer common, in behalf of our brethren also ... nowhere looking to his own, but everywhere to his neighbor’s good. And by this He ... brings in the mother of all good things, even charity (ἀγάπην).” This call extends to one’s enemies. “Love (Ἀγαπᾶτε) your enemies, and pray for them which despitefully use you: bless them that curse you, do good to them that hate you. That ye may become like your Father which is in Heaven.”

334 Hom. in Mt. 12.3; PG 57.206; NPNF I, 10, p. 78
335 Hom. in Mt. 79.1; PG 58.718; NPNF I, 10, p. 475
336 Hom. in Mt. 32.7; PG 57.386; NPNF I, 10, pp. 217-8
337 Hom. in Mt. 19.4; PG 57.279; NPNF I, 10, p. 134
338 Hom. in Mt. 19.4; PG 57.278; NPNF I, 10, p. 134 – The passage says “charity,” in accordance with older English usage. From here on, the word will be given as “love” except when directly quoting.
339 Hom. in Mt. 18.3; PG 57.268; NPNF I, 10, p. 126 (Matt. 5:44)
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All the above passages imply the importance of the vertical relationship (adopted child of God to God as Father) in proper horizontal relationships (brother to brother). One who does not respond to God as a dutiful child to a righteous and loving Father will have unhealthy relationships with the other members of the family.

As Father in this family, God has “the power both to crown and to punish.” Though God does punish, He does so as a loving Father. “Though He have been provoked to anger, yet is He fond of His children; and one thing only doth He seek ... to see thee repenting and entreating Him. Would that we were warmed in like measure, as those bowels are moved to the love (ἀγάπην) of us.”

Those who refuse to forgive are not true sons of the Father and are self-condemned. Commenting on Christ’s words, “If ye forgive men their trespasses, your heavenly Father also will forgive you,” Chrysostom says, “We ourselves have control over the judgment that is to be passed upon us (κύριοι τῆς κρίσεως τῆς περὶ ἡμῶν ἡμεῖς)... on thee, who art to give account, He causes the sentence to depend.”

In summary, men become sons of God through Christ and in the birth of Baptism. Membership in this family implies the common Eucharistic meal and communion with the Trinity and the other adopted children. The πολιτεία of this family is characterized by ἀγάπη. As Father, God rewards and punishes. His anger is motivated by love. Those who remain divided are without excuse. Those who refuse to forgive are self-condemned.

The Body of Christ

Christians can become members of Christ’s Body because He has taken on human nature. Membership has a sacramental component. The hallmark of the Body is love. Its members cannot be saved without each other. Special consideration belongs to the poor member. To neglect him is to neglect Christ.

The following paragraph is from a discussion of the text, “This is my body” and therefore pertains to this section although there is no direct mention of Christ’s Body.

340 Hom. in Mt. 19.2; PG 57.276; NPNF I, 10, pp. 131-2
341 Hom. in Mt. 22.6; PG 57.306; NPNF I, 10, p. 155
342 Hom. in Mt. 19.6; PG 57.281; NPNF I, 10, p. 136
He was born of our substance ... if He came unto our nature (φύσιν) ... it was to all; but if to all, then to each one. And how was it ... all did not reap the profit therefrom? This was ... the fault of them that were not willing.  

Christ, having taken on the one human nature, has made it possible for all to become members of His Body. Some are unwilling, but that is their fault.

Membership in the Body of Christ is sacramental – through baptism and maintained eucharistically. “So also in baptism, the gift is bestowed by a sensible thing.” “The body and blood of Christ ... with this we are fed with this we are commingled, and we are made one body and one flesh with Christ.” “With each one of the faithful doth He mingle Himself in the mysteries, and whom He begat, He nourishes by Himself.”

Great punishment “is appointed to them that partake unworthily ... Look therefore, lest thou also thyself become guilty of the body and blood of Christ.” “Let then no Judas be present, no covetous man. If any one be not a disciple, let him withdraw, the table receives not such. For 'I keep the Passover,' He saith, 'with my disciples.’” “Let no inhuman person be present, no one that is cruel and merciless, no one at all that is unclean.” The enormity of becoming “guilty of the body and blood of Christ” is heightened by the fact that He is “feeds his sheep with his own limbs ... with His own blood, and by all means entwines us with Himself.”

A true disciple of Christ should “go out unto the hands of the poor, for this spot is the mount of Olives,” the reference to the Mount of Olives having to do with following Christ on His way to His betrayal and Passion. Thus, almsgiving is somehow a participation in Christ's saving work for mankind.

The Eucharistic Body and Christ's Body as Church are inseparably linked. One cannot truly honor Christ in the Eucharist while neglecting Him in the person of the poor brother. “Wouldest thou do honor to Christ's body? ... do not while here thou honorest Him with silken garments, neglect Him perishing without of cold and nakedness.”

This identification of Christ with the poor brother is a common theme of Chrysostom’s. The man who neglects the poor neglects Christ and is worthy of great

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343 Hom. in Mt. 82.5; PG 58.744; NPNF I, 10, p. 495
344 Hom. in Mt. 12.4; PG 57.206; NPNF I, 10, p. 78
345 Hom. in Mt. 82.4-5; PG 58.743-4; NPNF I, 10, pp. 495-6
346 Hom. in Mt. 50.3; PG 58.508; NPNF I, 10, p. 313
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punishment. “Of what favor canst thou be worthy ... who ... in lending to men at usury sparest nothing; but in feeding thy Lord through His poor art cruel and inhuman?”

“Would ye that I bring before you Christ, anhungered, naked ... how many thunderbolts must ye not deserve, overlooking Him in want of necessary food, and adorning these pieces of leather [i.e. shoes] with so much diligence?” In light of the teaching of Christ's taking on the one human nature, this identification bespeaks a simple reality. Neglect of the poor brother truly is neglect of Christ.

Christians cannot be saved without each other. “It is not possible for one to be saved, who hath not looked to the common good.” In fact, “he ... who is living for himself only, and overlooking all others is useless, and is not so much as a human being, nor of our race.” Conversely, “It is not possible, for one who seeks after the good of the rest to overlook his own; for he who seeks after the good of the rest ... helps them to the utmost of his powers ... will abstain from all wickedness, will apply himself to all virtue.”

One person’s sins have implications for all. Chrysostom asks men who frequent the theater, “How dost thou not blush being put in mind of the partner of thy home, when thou seest nature (φύσιν) herself put to an open shame? ... goest thou up into the theater, to insult the common nature (κοινὸν ... γένος) of men and women, and disgrace thine own eyes?” Chrysostom is appalled at those who “endure to stand by quietly” while men fight. “What! is it a bear that is fighting? ... It is a man (Ἄνθρωπός), one who hath in every respect fellowship with thee: a brother, a member.” Those who “take pleasure in such calamities” are “asses without reason (ἀλόγων).” When seeing “a man behaving himself unseemly” one should “account the unseemliness thine own.” These injunctions are not mere legalistic rules. Rather, they spring from an awareness of a true oneness among humans, especially Christians.

Love is indispensable to members of Christ’s Body.

The insolent man mars all the beauty of love (ἀγάπης) ... tears asunder the members of Christ. … ” [Love is] the mother of every good ... the bond which holds together our whole condition ... Admire the mildness of these laws (νόμων). Therefore ... He

347 Hom. in Mt. 45.3; PG 58.475-6; NPNF I, 10, p. 287
348 Hom. in Mt. 49.5; PG 58.502; NPNF I, 10, p. 308
349 Hom. in Mt. 77.6; PG 58.710; NPNF I, 10, p. 469
350 Hom. in Mt. 6.8; PG 57.72; NPNF I, 10, pp. 42-3
351 Hom. in Mt. 15.10; PG 57.236; NPNF I, 10, p. 101

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makes so much account of this commandment; and is a severe avenger and punisher of those who despise the duty.\footnote{Hom. in Mt. 16.8; PG 57.249-50; NPNF I, 10, pp. 111-112}

Love is both law and bond. Those who despise the duty of love tear asunder Christ's members and are severely punished by God.

As brothers and members of each other, Christians should make every effort to bear with each other. Chrysostom rebukes those who choose non-Christians friends over Christians on the grounds that “the one is worthless, but the other kind and gentle.” Chrysostom rejoins, “And art thou not ashamed ... at exposing thy brother, thy fellow member, him that hath shared in the same birth with thee, that hath partaken of the same table?” If the man is “worthless and insufferable ... then for this reason become his friend, that thou mayest put an end to his being such a one, that thou mayest convert him, that thou mayest lead him back to virtue.”\footnote{Hom. in Mt. 59.6; PG 58.581; NPNF I, 10, p. 369}

However, one must not permit another to harm one's own spiritual life. Such a member is to be cut off for the sake of the Body and even for his own sake. Chrysostom understands Christ’s injunction “If thy right eye offend thee, pluck it out, and cast it from thee. For it is profitable for thee that one of thy members should perish, and not that thy whole body should be cast into hell” (Matt. 5:29) to refer not to one’s own body, but the Body of Christ. The members cast away are “them who are near unto us” who continue in ungodliness:

This were not to act as one hating the eye, but as one loving (\(φιλοῦντος\)) the rest of the body ... if he who harms thee by his friendship (\(φιλίᾳ\)) should continue incurable (\(ἀνίατος\)), his being thus cut off will both free thee from all mischief, and he also will himself be delivered from the heavier charges, not having to answer for thy destruction along with his own evil deeds.

Seest thou how full the law (\(νόμος\)) is of gentleness and tender care, and that which seems to men in general to be severity, how much love towards man (\(φιλανθρωπίαν\)) it discloses?\footnote{Hom. in Mt. 17.3; PG 57.258; NPNF I, 10, p. 118}

Thus, the severance of the incurable member from Christ's Body is an act of love towards the whole Body and even towards the incurable member. Chrysostom
seamlessly mixes law, love, and healing. The law of love banishes the incurable member for the Body’s sake and the prevention of further harm to the incurable member.

A Comparison of the Kingdom, Family, and Body Images

The πολιτεία of God, whether understood as kingdom, family or body, has several clear characteristics. It is a sacramental fellowship of love in which humans participate with God (and also with angels). There is a clear vertical component (citizens to King, children to Father, body members to head) as well as a horizontal component (citizens, children, or body members to each other) dependent on the vertical relationship for proper functioning. Humans can enter this πολιτεία only because Christ took on human nature. Love is the chief law. Those who reject love are punished seriously, yet this punishment is out of concern for the community and is intended to aid the offending person. For those who refuse correction, there is an eternal hell.

Each image has its own particular strengths. The kingdom image is excellent for emphasizing the glory of the King and the profound reverence in which He must be approached. It also lends itself naturally to warfare imagery. The great strength of the family image is its ability to express deep and tender love. The body image most clearly shows the depth of unity. However, none of these is the exclusive province of one image. The citizens of the Kingdom are also children of the King. The children of the heavenly Father must seek their Father’s glory above all else. The revilers are cast out of the Kingdom for tearing apart the Body of Christ.

Of course, these three images are not at all exhaustive of Christ’s (or God’s) relationship with the Church:

“I am Father, I am brother, I am bridegroom, I am dwelling place, I am food, I am raiment, I am root, I am foundation, all whatsoever thou willest, I am.” “Be thou in need of nothing, I will even be servant, for I came to minister, not to be ministered unto; I am friend (φίλος), and member, and head, and brother, and sister, and mother; I am all; only cling thou closely to me.”

The components of this list hold in common a nurturing love. Christ – in His love and humility – is willing to take on the lowliest role for the sake of His beloved. However,

355 Hom. in Mt. 1.5; PG 57.20; NPNF I, 10, p.6 – The rewards in their commonwealth (πολιτείας) are ... to become children of God, to join the angels’ choir ... and to be always with Christ;

Hom. in Mt. 11.6; PG 57.199; NPNF I, 10, p. 73 – death dissolved, sins abolished ... our citizenship (πολιτείαν) with the angels

356 Hom. in Mt. 76.5; PG 58.700; NPNF I, 10, p. 461

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for man to benefit from this, he must (at least eventually) understand Christ’s and his own place in the \( \piολιτεία \) of heaven. The man who is not willing to love God with heart, soul, strength and mind (and this must include obedience and great awe – or the person does not truly know the God he purports to love) and his neighbor as himself has no place in that \( \piολιτεία \).

Thus, though they are not exhaustive, these three images present well the Christian view of what it means to be human in the best sense – to be united in Christ as children of the awesome King of Heaven and as indivisible body members of the One Who humbly took on human nature to unite man to God. In the context of these images, one can also see where man is human in the pejorative sense, failing of his true humanity. Thus, the citizen of heaven who does not seek the glory of his Father the King, the body member that does not so much as acknowledge his fellow member, the child of God who lets Christ go hungry in the person of the poor brother – all these are human in the bad sense, which is in fact a failure truly to be human at all.

Now that the basic outlines of the \( \piολιτεία \) of heaven have been established, it remains to see whether Chrysostom’s juridical and therapeutic language fits well into this framework.

**LAW AND HEALING IN THE \( \piολιτεία \) OF HEAVEN**

**Law**

Both the Old and New Laws are of God, but the New is superior and the Old has been superseded. The New Law is stricter than the Old because there is more grace. The New Law does not require disobedience to the civil law. At its highest, Law is synonymous (or at least inseparably bound) with having the Spirit of God in one’s heart. Law is summed up in love of God and of neighbor.

Christ is the Lawgiver of the Old and the New Testaments. “There is but one and the same Legislator (\( \nuομοφτετήν \)) of either covenant (\( Διαθηκῶν \)).”

The Old Testament Law was good in its day, but has been superseded by the New. The Old (\( \Παλαιὰν \)) Law (no word) “doth not now bring in them who live (\( πολιτευομένους \)) after the coming of Christ, favored as they are with more strength,
and bound to strive for greater things ... its own foster-children, them it doth bring in one and all." 358 “Then it was sufficient for salvation ... to know God only; but now ... there is need also of the knowledge of Christ.” 359

That the Incarnate Christ gave a Law is an important tenet of the faith. Below, Chrysostom had been explaining that the Gospels – though different in certain aspects – all agree “in the chief heads” of “our doctrines.”

But what are these points? Such as follow: That God became man, that He wrought miracles, that He was crucified, that He was buried, that He rose again, that He ascended, that He will judge (μέλλει κρίνειν), that He hath given commandments (ἐντολὰς) tending to salvation, that He hath brought in a law (νόμον) not contrary to the Old Testament, that He is a Son, that He is only-begotten, that He is a true Son, that He is of the same substance with the Father, and as many things as are like these. 360

The aspects of the Old Law concerning morality are still in effect because they agree with the New Law. Concerning Christ’s injunction to do all that the scribes and Pharisees say, but not what they do, Chrysostom says, “He meant all things that correct the moral principle, and amend the disposition, and agree with the laws (νόμοις) of the New (Καινῆς) Testament (no word).” 361

Living under faith is easier than living under law because of the power of grace. “The hardness of the law (νόμου) changed into easiness of faith. For it is no longer toils and labors, saith he, but grace, and forgiveness of sins, affording great facility of salvation.” 362

However, the easiness of faith does not allow for remissness. Christ’s commandments being themselves a Law, Christians are obligated to obey them. Due to the great nature of virginity “neither under the old (Παλαιᾷ) dispensation (no word) was it fulfilled ... nor under the new (Καινῇ) was it brought under the compulsion of the law (νόμου).” 363 This implies that Christ’s new law is indeed compulsory.

Grace comes with Christ, but this brings not lawlessness, but a stricter law. “If under the law (νόμῳ) one ought to give fourfold, much more under grace.” 364

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358 Hom. in Mt. 16.4; PG 57.244; NPNF I, 10, p. 107
359 Hom. in Mt. 36.3; PG 57.417; NPNF I, 10, p. 241
360 Hom. in Mt. 1.2; PG 57.16-7; NPNF I, 10, p. 3
361 Hom. in Mt. 72.1; PG 58.667; NPNF I, 10, p. 436
362 Hom. in Mt. 10.3; PG 57.187; NPNF I, 10, p. 64
363 Hom. in Mt. 78.1; PG 58.711; NPNF I, 10, p. 470
364 Hom. in Mt. 52.5; PG 58.525; NPNF I, 10, p. 326

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of the evil one? Yes ... now, after so high a rule of self-restraint (φιλοσοφίαν); but then
not so."

With grace and its stricter law also comes greater punishment for those who do not
avail themselves of grace. Concerning Ahab’s unlawful taking of the vineyard of
Naboth, Chrysostom says, “If he, who would have paid the fair price, was so punished,
because he took from one unwilling, he who ... taketh by violence from the unwilling,
and that when living under grace (ἐν τῇ χάριτι πολιτεύομενος), of what punishment
will he not be worthy?"

The Law of Christ does not require disobedience to civil law. As mentioned in the
section on the πολιτεία of heaven, true members of that πολιτεία balance respect for
“the common laws (κοινοῖς νόμοις)” and “the common government (τὴν κοινὴν
πολιτείαν)” with “the perfection of their doctrines.” Of course, should civil law
require disobedience to the Law of Christ, Christ’s Law must come first.

Law is summed up by Love of God and neighbor. “His commandments, and the sum
of them, are, ‘Thou shalt love (Αγαπήσεις) the Lord thy God, and thy neighbor as
thyself.’” The second is like the first “because this makes the way for that, and by it is
again established.” Since “to love (ἀγαπᾷν) God is to love (ἀγαπᾷν) one’s neighbor”
and “to love (ἀγαπᾷν) one’s neighbor worketh a keeping of the commandments, with
reason doth He say, ‘On these hang all the law (νόμος) and the prophets.’” When the
lawyer in this Gospel passage said, “To love (ἀγαπᾷν) his neighbor is more than
whole burnt sacrifice,” Christ responded, “Thou art not far from the kingdom
(βασιλείας).” Christ thus commended the lawyer “because he ... embraced the first
principle of virtue.” Yet, this is more directly related to the second great
commandment than to the first. Perhaps, this just further demonstrates the close
connection between the two and the second’s dependence on the first.

The New Law, in its highest sense, is not that of the written word, but of the Spirit.
Chrysostom starts Homily 1 thus:

365 Hom. in Mt. 17.6; PG 57.262; NPNF I, 10, p. 121
366 Hom. in Mt. 86.4; PG 58.770; NPNF I, 10, p. 515
367 Hom. in Mt. 33.5; PG 57.394; NPNF I, 10, p. 476
368 Chrysostom is conflating Matt. 22:34-40 with Mark 12:28-34
369 Hom. in Mt. 71.1; PG 58.662; NPNF I, 10, pp. 431-432. Reference is to ἀγάπη.
It were indeed meet for us not at all to require the aid of the written Word, but to exhibit a life so pure, that the grace of the Spirit should be instead of books to our souls. But, since we have utterly put away from us this grace, come, let us at any rate embrace the second best course. For that the former was better, God hath made manifest. And Paul too, pointing out the same superiority, said, that they had received a law (νόμον) “not in tables of stone, but in fleshy tables of the heart..."

2. Reflect then how great an evil it is for us, who ought to live so purely as not even to need written words, but to yield up our hearts, as books, to the Spirit; now that we have lost that honor, and are come to have need of these, to fail again in duly employing even this second remedy (φαρμάκῳ).”

Thus, to the Christian, Law in its highest sense is synonymous (or at least inseparably bound) with the grace of the Spirit in the heart. Scripture is a corrective law and medical remedy for the impure of heart.

The Old Testament is imperfect compared to the New.

And if it be more imperfect than the new (Καινῆς), neither doth this imply it to be evil: since upon this principle the new (Καινὴ) law (no word) itself will be in the very same case. Because in truth our knowledge of this, when compared with that which is to come, is a sort of partial and imperfect thing, and is done away on the coming of that other.

By the “new law” that is to be superseded (in the coming Kingdom), Chrysostom may mean the New Testament teachings of Christ. To the extent that Christ’s teachings remain external to the heart, they would be inferior to the grace of God that has become a law for the heart. On the other hand, Chrysostom may be referring to an incomplete fruition of the grace of the Spirit in the hearts of those living in this fallen world. Even those saints who have acquired the law of God in their hearts will presumably have it graven more deeply in the next life – where the “new law” is expressed in its fullness.

Healing

Christ is the healer of soul and body. Therapeutic language in no way implies that the sinner bears no responsibility for his sin. The ‘therapy’ of God can be gentle or rough, depending largely on the disposition of the ‘patient.’ Christ tries by all means to heal men of their spiritual diseases, but in the last resort, the incurable are cut off for the sake of the Body.

370 Hom. in Mt. 1.1; PG 57.14; NPNF I, 10, p. 1
371 Hom. in Mt. 16.5; PG 57.244; NPNF I, 10, p. 107
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As Maker of body and soul, Christ heals both. Concerning the healing of the palsied man, Chrysostom says, “Seest thou how He indicates Him to be Creator both of souls and bodies? He heals (ἰᾶται) therefore the palsy in each of the two substances, and makes the invisible evident by that which is in sight.”

Sin causes most bodily disease. “Let us do away then with the well-spring of our evils, and all the channels of our diseases (νοσημάτων) will be stayed. For the disease (νόσημα) is not palsy only, but also our sin; and this more than that, by how much a soul is better than a body.” The soul being so much better than the body, its sicknesses also have great effect on the body. Not only physical diseases, but death itself, are rooted in sin. “For if the sum of all, death itself, hath its root and foundation from sin, much more the majority of our diseases (νοσημάτων) also: since our very capability of suffering (ταθητούς) did itself originate there.”

Thus, bodily illness is not an arbitrary punishment for sin, but a natural consequence. An obvious example is “the pleasures of luxury” (αἱ τῆς τρυφῆς ἡδοναί), which “destroy the body more, together with the soul also; and upon the one and upon the other they bring ten thousand scourges of sickness (νοσημάτων πληγάς).”

Sin is the cause of most bodily disease, but personal sinfulness is not the cause of every disease. Those who are like whitened sepulchers are “incurably diseased (ἀνίατα νοσεῖς), and more grievously than they that are maimed in their bodies, and become fetid. For that disease (νόσος) ... is without any blame, nay even is deserving of pity; but this of hatred and punishment.”

As the above quote shows, therapeutic language does not absolve the sinner from blame. The “whitened sepulchers” are “incurably diseased” but “deserving of ... hatred and punishment.” Chrysostom warns the covetous, “Hearken, all ye covetous, ye that have the disease (νόσημα) of Judas; hearken, and beware of the calamity.” Clearly, Judas and those similarly diseased are not guiltless.

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372 Hom. in Mt. 29.3; PG 57.361; NPNF I, 10, p. 197
373 Hom. in Mt. 14.3; PG 57.221; NPNF I, 10, p. 89
374 The superiority of the soul to the body is, of course, an important part of Chrysostom’s (or any traditional Christian) concept of man. However, this is so well understood as not to need proof or further comment.
375 Hom. in Mt. 27.2; PG 57.345; NPNF I, 10, p. 185
376 Hom. in Mt. 14.4; PG 57.222; NPNF I, 10, p. 90
377 Hom. in Mt. 73.3; PG 58.676; NPNF I, 10, p. 442
378 Hom. in Mt. 80.3; PG 58.727; NPNF I, 10, p. 483
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As Physician, God both prevents and corrects diseases.

As a skillful physician (ἰατρὸς) exhibits not only the preventives of our diseases (προφυλακτικὰ τῶν νοσημάτων), but their correctives (διορθωτικὰ) also, even so doth He likewise. Thus, to forbid our calling ‘fool,’ is a preventive (προφυλακτικὸν) of enmity; but to command reconciliation is a means of removing the diseases (νοσημάτων) that ensue on the enmity.\(^ {379} \)

Elsewhere, Chrysostom points out “both the disease (νόσον) which is the consequence of neglect, and the good health which results from obedience.”\(^ {380} \)

The therapy differs largely according to the disposition of the patient. Chrysostom recommends using “every means of amendment in imitation of the best physicians” to bring “an enemy of the truth ... back into virtue ... For neither do they cure in one manner only, but when they see the wound not yield to the first remedy, they add another ... and now they use the knife, and now bind up.”\(^ {381} \)

Although God is the Master Physician, some people remain incurable through their own fault. They must be cut off for the sake of the body. “Thus it is possible for Heaven to be united to earth. Since the physician (ἰατρὸς) too in this way preserves the rest of the body, when he amputates the incurable (ἀνιάτως) part\(^ {382} \) However, as mentioned above, this too is done in love for the diseased member so that “he also will himself be delivered from the heavier charges.”\(^ {383} \)

In summary, sickness of soul naturally leads to sickness of body, both of which Christ heals. Whether one experiences Christ's precepts as preventatives, gentle cures, or painful cures, depends largely on one's own disposition. In the last resort, the incurable are removed from the Body out of love for the Body and even out of love for the incurable.

**Interplay of Law and Healing**

Chrysostom commonly sees law and healing as dealing with the same things. Law is a medicine for the soul. “Since this [pride] was the stronghold of our evils, and the root and fountain of all wickedness, He, preparing a remedy (φάρμακον) suitable to the disease (νοσήματι), laid this law (νόμον) [the first beatitude] first as a strong and safe
Chrysostom exhorts his listeners, “Let us carefully attend, lest the medicines (φάρμακα) of salvation, and the laws (νόμοι) of peace, be accounted by any man laws (νόμοι) of overthrow and confusion.” Sin is both lawlessness and disease. “And whence did the multitude pass the right judgment on Him (τὴν ὀρθὴν περὶ αὐτοῦ ἐφερόν ψήφον)? Was it not because this disease (νοσήματι) had no hold on them? For nothing, nothing so much tends to make men lawless (παρανόμους) and foolish (ἀνοήτους), as gaping after the honor of the multitude.”

In at least one instance, Chrysostom opposes law and healing, saying of Christ “He hath come as a Physician (ἰατρὸς), not a Judge (δικαστὴς).” One might take this to mean that Christ’s role as Judge is secondary and even inferior to His role as Physician. On the other hand, in his list of “the chief heads, those which constitute our life and furnish out our doctrine,” Chrysostom includes that Christ “will judge (κρίνειν), that He hath given commandments (ἐντολὰς) tending to salvation, that He hath brought in a law (νόμον) not contrary to the Old (Παλαιὰ) Testament (no word),” but says nothing about His being Physician. In turn, one might understand this to indicate that Christ’s role as Judge and Lawgiver is the primary one.

How did Chrysostom view law and healing? Most likely, he saw them as different slants on (or aspects of) the same thing. Whether one looks at Christ’s commandments as laws or as healing precepts, one’s own disposition determines whether they are received with joy, resignation, or loathing. For the one who wants nothing of love, unity, and humility – thus steadfastly refusing the way of life (πολιτεία) of heaven – there is, in the end, no place in the commonwealth (πολιτεία) of heaven.

It is probably in this sense that Chrysostom speaks of Christ coming as Physician, not as Judge. While a man remains on this earth, Christ the Physician tries by all means to cure him. If he insists on remaining incurable, Christ becomes Judge. Because most men

384 Hom. in Mt. 15.2; PG 57.224; NPNF I, 10, p. 92
385 Hom. in Mt. 23.1; PG 57.307-8; NPNF I, 10, p. 157
386 Hom. in Mt. 40.4; PG 57.444; NPNF I, 10, p. 263
387 Hom. in Mt. 3.3; PG 57.35; NPNF I, 10, p. 17
388 Hom. in Mt. 1.2; PG 57.17; NPNF I, 10, p. 3
389 There is no adequate English word here because the πολιτεία of heaven is a kingdom, not a commonwealth or republic. However, for lack of a better term, commonwealth is used here inion to refer to the community as a whole as opposed to its way of life.
do not “exhibit a life so pure, that the grace of the Spirit should be instead of books to
our souls,” they have not received “a law (νόμον) not in tables of stone, but in fleshly
tables of the heart.” Thus, one of the chief things Christ did was to give “written words”
as a “second remedy (φαρμάκῳ).” When Chrysostom lists “that He will judge, that
He hath given commandments tending to salvation, that He hath brought in a law not
contrary to the Old Testament” as chief tenets of the faith, he is not saying that Christ
has not come as Physician, but that these commandments are the remedy of man’s
spiritual lawlessness and disease.

All the above aspects of the πολιτεία of heaven express the primacy of love, even
kingdom and law, which most modern westerners would consider to be opposed to
love. Thus, the next section looks at love, the madness of riches (which causes one to
focus on self and reject love), and the true monk, who is the model citizen of the
πολιτεία of heaven.

LOVE, THE MADNESS OF RICHES, AND MONKS

Love

Love is the deepest expression of the πολιτεία of heaven. The madness of riches
(μανίᾳ χρημάτων) with its attendant vices is symptomatic of the rejection of that
πολιτεία. Monks are model citizens of heaven.

Humility and “judgment, mercy, and faith,” are indispensable for Christians, and
the beatitudes are the foundations of Christ’s πολιτεία. However, love is the chief
commandment and almsgiving, love’s necessary outworking. Love is “the first principle
of virtue. For indeed all those [other commandments] are for the sake of this.” “Christ
hath taught us ... all virtue in general ... in few and plain words ... on two
commandments (ἐντολαῖς) hang the Law (νόμος) and the Prophets; that is to say, on the

390 Hom. in Mt. 1.1; PG 57.14; NPNF I, 10, p. 1. The context here suggests that Chrysostom is
referring to both the Old and New Testaments.

391 Hom. in Mt. 15.2; PG 57.224-5; NPNF I, 10, p. 92 – Though ... any other good thing whatever,
be gathered together in thee; without humility (ταπεινοφροσύνης) all fall away and
perish.NPNF I, 10

392 Hom. in Mt. 73.2; PG 58.675; NPNF I, 10, p. 441 (cf. Matt. 23:23) – mercy, and judgment, and
faith ... are the things that comprise our life, these are what purify the soul, justice, love to
man, truth

393 Hom. in Mt. 15.1; PG 57.223; NPNF I, 10, p. 91 – (in starting the discussion of the Beatitudes)
what kind of foundations of His new polity (πολιτείας) doth He lay for us?

394 Hom. in Mt. 71.1; PG 58.662; NPNF I, 10, p. 432. Reference is to ἀγάπη.

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love (ἀγάπη) of God and ... of our neighbor... at another time, ‘Whatsoever ye would that men should do to you, do ye also to them; for this is the Law (νόμος) and the Prophets.’ 395

The person who loves gives alms. Chrysostom highly commends fasting, but it has “the last place in the choir of virtue. For the greatest thing is love (ἀγάπη), and moderation (ἐπιείκεια), and almsgiving (ἐλεημοσύνη); which hits a higher mark even than virginity (παρθενίαν).” 396 “Without virginity indeed it is possible to see the kingdom (no word), but without almsgiving it cannot be. For this is among the things that are essential, and hold all together.” It is “the heart of virtue.” 397

It should be noted that all the instances given here refer to ἀγάπη, but Chrysostom also uses versions of φιλία, ἔρως, and στοργή to speak of God’s love for man 398 and man’s love for God 399 and fellow. 400 Chrysostom’s usage of these terms would be an interesting study in its own right.

The madness of riches (μανία χρημάτων) 401

If love and almsgiving are hallmarks of the πολιτεία of heaven, the madness of riches is the hallmark of its rejection. Of the three temptations of Christ, the madness of riches is the most powerful:

For the things that form the substance of innumerable evils are these: to be a slave to the belly (τὸ γαστρὶ), to do anything for vainglory (κενοδοξίαν), to be in subjection to the madness of riches (μανίᾳ χρημάτων). Which accordingly that accursed one 395 Hom. in Mt. 1.5; PG 57.20; NPNF I, 10, p. 5 396 Hom. in Mt. 46.4; PG 58.480-1; NPNF I, 10, p. 291 397 Hom. in Mt. 47.4; PG 58.486; NPNF I, 10, p. 295 398 ἀγάπη – Footnote #85; φιλία – Footnotes #152 & #154; στοργή or φιλοστοργία – Footnote #432; ἔφως – Footnote #331. 399 ἀγάπη – Footnotes #77 & #154; φιλία – Footnotes #152 & #154; στοργή or φιλοστοργία – Footnote #432; ἔφως – Footnote #331. 400 ἀγάπη – Footnotes #77 & #96; φιλία – Footnotes #134 & #152; στοργή or φιλοστοργία – Footnote #661; ἔφως – Footnote #663 401 In these homilies, Chrysostom uses this exact phrase just this once, although he couples μανία and χρημα several times. In contrast, he uses πλεονεξία over 80 times in its negative sense; φιλαργυρία at least 50 times; ἐπιθυμία in reference to riches, mammon, earthly things, etc. at least 30 times; and φιλοχρηματία at least 13 times. He also uses a variety of other expressions and images to convey similar passions. The choice of this phrase as the umbrella term for this cluster of words and phrases has firstly to do with its placement in a key verse – this is the phrase Chrysostom uses to describe the most powerful of the three basic temptations. In addition, the phrase is broad enough to encompass the remaining terms and images Chrysostom uses to describe similar passions – from socially acceptable self-interest to the φιλαργυρία of Judas that led to Christ’s betrayal.
considering, set last the most powerful of all, I mean the desire of more (πλείονος ἐπιθυμίαν): ... For nothing doth so make us fall under the power of the devil, as longing for more (τοῦ πλείονος ἐφίεσθαι), and loving covetousness (πλεονεξίας ἐρᾷν). 402

Chrysostom uses three terms to speak of essentially the same thing – μανίᾳ χρημάτων, πλείονος ἐπιθυμίαν, and πλεονεξίας ἐρᾷν. All three terms conjure images of inordinate desire, which is a major theme in these homilies.

The problem is not desire per se, but its wrong focus. “What then can be more lawless than this? what more horrible? I do not mean the substance of riches (χρημάτων), but the unseasonable and frantic (μανικῆς) desire (ἐπιθυμίας) of them?” 403. “We are not so enamored (ἐφώμεν) of meat and drink, as of gaining, and compassing ourselves with more and more, He [Christ] bade us to transfer this desire (ἐπιθυμίαν) to a new object, freedom from covetousness (πλεονεκτεῖν).” 404

The man enthralled by such desires has no love for man or creation:

Why, he would have no man exist, that he may possess all things. And he stops not even at this, but when in his longing (ἐπιθυμίᾳ) he shall have destroyed all men, he longs (ἐπιθυμεῖ) also to mar the substance of the earth, and to see it all become gold; nay, not the earth only, but ... all things that appear. 405

Far before a man comes to such a pass, however, he has ceased to be fully human.

For, if in worldly matters ... all ... contribute to the common good, and to their neighbor’s advantage; much more ought we to do this in things spiritual. For this is most properly to live: since he at least who is living for himself only, and overlooking all others, is useless, and is not so much as a human being (ἄνθρωπος), nor of our race (γένους). 406

This person is not necessarily actively causing anyone harm – he is merely overlooking others. Chrysostom makes similar points elsewhere. “If merely to enjoy one’s own be inhumanity (ἀπανθρωπίας), much more to defraud others.” 407 Also, he contrasts almsgiving not with covetousness, but with inhumanity (ἀπανθρωπίας). 408

Such a person has no right to commune of the Eucharist.

402 Hom. in Mt. 13.4; PG 57.212; NPNF I, 10, p. 83
403 Hom. in Mt. 9.6; PG 57.184; NPNF I, 10, p. 61
404 Hom. in Mt. 15.4; PG 57.227; NPNF I, 10, p. 94
405 Hom. in Mt. 28.5; PG 57.356-7; NPNF I, 10, p. 190
406 Hom. in Mt. 77.6; PG 58.710; NPNF I, 10, p. 469
407 Hom. in Mt. 52.5; PG 58.524; NPNF I, 10, p. 325
408 Hom. in Mt. 32.8; PG 57.388; NPNF I, 10, p. 219

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With each one of the faithful doth He mingle Himself in the mysteries, and whom He begat, He nourishes by Himself ... Let then no Judas be present, no avaricious man (φιλάργυρος) ... Let no inhuman person (ἀπάνθρωπος) be present, no one that is cruel and merciless (ἀνελεὴς), no one at all that is unclean.409

These very strong words seem, at best, hyperbolic in a society where people are seen as discrete individuals. However, in the πολιτεία that Chrysostom sketches, these words make perfect sense. If Christ has truly taken on human nature and made men sons of God and members of His own Body, men are brothers and members of each other. Thus, the man who lives for himself is no man at all and has nothing to do with the Eucharist, in which Christ feeds His flock with His own limbs.

Monks

Monks are the model citizens of heaven. “As angels converse (πολιτεύονται), so do they.”411 “Seest thou how greatly these strangers and pilgrims have benefitted us, these citizens (πολίται) of the wilderness, or rather citizens (πολίται) of the Heavens? For whereas we are strangers to the Heavens, but citizens (πολίται) of the earth, these are just the contrary.”412 In several homilies (particularly Homilies 8, 55, 68, 69, and 70) he brings them forth as examples for his hearers.

Why are they model πολίται of heaven and good examples for Chrysostom’s flock? Most likely because they are the models of all virtue, but particularly of prayer, love and non-acquisitiveness.

For when they have stripped themselves of all that they have, and are crucified to the whole world ... those having nothing at all but a body only and hands, force their way on and strive eagerly to find thence a supply for the poor413

as fathers of the whole earth, so do they offer up their praises for all, and train themselves to a sincere brotherly love (φιλαδελφίαν).414

And their work is what was Adam’s also at the beginning and before his sin, when he was clothed with the glory, and conversed freely with God415

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409 The NPNF has “covetous.” From here onwards, the translations, though based on the NPNF, may be modified to provide more consistent translation of key terms.
410 Hom. in Mt. 82.5; PG 58.744; NPNF I, 10, p. 496
411 Hom. in Mt. 47.4; PG 58.486; NPNF I, 10, p. 295. Chrysotom refers here to the voluntarily poor, but almost certainly has monks in mind.
412 Hom. in Mt. 55.6; PG 58.548; NPNF I, 10, p. 344
413 Hom. in Mt. 8.5; PG 57.88; NPNF I, 10, p. 54
414 Hom. in Mt. 55.5; PG 58.546; NPNF I, 10, p. 343
415 Hom. in Mt. 68.3; PG 58.643; NPNF I, 10, p. 417
Monks are the opposite of the inhuman covetous man. Stripping themselves of possessions, they give alms from manual work, pray for the world, and are restored to man’s pristine state. They are virgins in the fullest sense. “For nothing is more sullied than virginity not having mercy,” but “how close Christ is joined unto the virgins that strip themselves of their possessions; for this indeed is virginity.”\textsuperscript{416} This makes sense in light of another quote from the same passage, “by lamps here, He meaneth the gift itself of virginity, the purity of holiness; and by oil, humanity, almsgiving, succor to them that are in need.”\textsuperscript{417} If virginity is the lamp, it must have oil to fulfill its being.

Thus, monks serve as examples for the laity by their whole-hearted devotion to God, which by its very nature makes them beacons of love.

The lives of monks and laity differ but not radically.

I do not make it a law (νομοθετῶ) that you are to occupy the mountains and the deserts, but to be good and considerate and chaste, dwelling in the midst of the city. For in fact all our laws are common to the monks also, except marriage; yea rather, even with respect to this, Paul commands us to put ourselves altogether on a level with them; saying, “For the fashion of this world passeth away;” that “they that have wives be as though they had none.”\textsuperscript{418}

Why does Chrysostom not command celibacy, when Paul in a sense does? The answer lies partly in Chrysostom’s willingness to accept the beginnings of virtue in the hopes of further progress. Thus, to the man who curses his brother, he says, “If thou canst not bear to bless him that curses thee, hold thy peace, and accomplish but this for the time; and proceeding in order, and striving as thou aughtest, thou wilt attain to that other point also.”\textsuperscript{419} Elsewhere he suggests that his hearers divide virtue into different levels and work on subsequently higher levels “and let us join these one with another, and write them upon our soul.”\textsuperscript{420}

Chrysostom is not content to leave people with a little virtue, but he knows that most are not easily detached from the world and from sin. So, as a wise physician, he works little by little to remove the πολιτεία of earth from his hearers, ever strengthening the πολιτεία of heaven.

\textsuperscript{416} Hom. in Mt. 78.2; PG 58.712-3; NPNF I, 10, p. 471
\textsuperscript{417} Hom. in Mt. 78.1; PG 58.711; NPNF I, 10, p. 470
\textsuperscript{418} Hom. in Mt. 7.7; PG 57.81; NPNF I, 10, p. 49
\textsuperscript{419} Hom. in Mt. 78.3; PG 58.715; NPNF I, 10, p. 473
\textsuperscript{420} Hom. in Mt. 11.8; PG 57.201; NPNF I, 10, p. 74
The saintly monks are model citizens of heaven because they have completed this process as far as is possible in this world. They are true imitators of the life and πολιτεία of the apostles, in the casting away of their goods.\(^{421}\) As Chrysostom explains elsewhere, this action is worthless if not motivated by love. When motivated by love, however, this voluntary dispossession is visible proof of the πολιτεία of heaven.

To summarize, Chrysostom sees humans on a continuum. The truly human and indeed supra-human person is in correct relationship with the Trinity (which assumes both awe and love) and with other humans (especially other Christians). The glory of such a person is that he lives for God’s glory and thus partakes of Christ’s glory. He is a citizen of the πολιτεία of heaven, a member of Christ’s body, and a son of God. This πολιτεία is sacramental and man’s participation is possible only by the Incarnation. The law of this πολιτεία is love of God and neighbor. Keeping this law is health; departure from this law is disease. Christ is Physician, but not of those who refuse to be healed. Such a one is on the other side of the human continuum. Living for himself, he is human in the pejorative sense, and eventually becomes inhuman. There is, in the end, no place for him in the πολιτεία of heaven, for he has rejected its way of life (πολιτεία).

**DISCUSSION**

Can Chrysostom’s Paradigm of Life Be Characterized as Predominantly Therapeutic, Juridical or Community-based?

**Therapeutic Paradigm**

Chrysostom certainly employs therapeutic language in these homilies, but he does not consider healing the main Christian paradigm.

First, he never explicitly makes this claim. This is, of course, not conclusive because a) if it were a commonly accepted paradigm, there would be no need to state it explicitly and b) it might be an unconscious paradigm either of Chrysostom’s or of the larger Christian community (it is hard, though, to imagine therapy as an unconscious paradigm unless one defines it very loosely). Second, though he uses therapeutic language often, he does not use it as frequently as one might expect if that were his main paradigm. Third, when he gives the list of chief heads of doctrine, he does not

\(^{421}\) Hom. in Mt. 90.4; PG 58.792; NPNF I, 10, pp. 533-4

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mention healing at all. True, this is not an exhaustive list, but if healing loomed large in Chrysostom’s mind, one would expect him to mention it there.

In one instance he does speak of Christ coming as Physician, not as Judge. However, he clearly envisions Him as Judge also – so much so that he lists as one of the chief heads of doctrine “that He will judge.” Thus, Chrysostom does not conceive of the Christian life predominantly in explicitly therapeutic terms.

If by therapeutic paradigm one means that God is concerned with restoring the person to spiritual wholeness (as opposed to simply being concerned that the person behave correctly), Chrysostom would undoubtedly agree. However, such a meaning is too broad to be very useful. In addition, untempered with other imagery, the therapeutic paradigm is easily warped in such a way as to downplay God’s righteousness and the reality of hell. Chrysostom himself certainly never does this. In fact, his therapeutic language not infrequently speaks of incurable people and diseases. Lastly, a therapeutic paradigm begs the question – what does health look like? This in turn begs the question – a healthy what? Which leads to another question posited at the beginning of this chapter – What is man?

**Juridical Paradigm**

Although nobody is likely to argue that Chrysostom’s main paradigm of Christian life is juridical, he undeniably uses juridical language very often in these homilies. Of course, the relationship of Christ’s commandments (the New Law) and the Old Testament Law looms large in this Gospel. Therefore, Chrysostom might be expected to talk much about law. What one might not have expected is his very positive view of Law – even the Old Testament Law, in its proper time and place. Among the “chief heads” of doctrine are that God [here meaning Christ – the Incarnate God] “will judge, that He hath given commandments tending to salvation, that He hath brought in a law not contrary to the Old Testament.”

Chrysostom’s juridical language is not legalistic. Law is not about external conformity but about loving God and neighbor. Law at its highest is the law of the Spirit in the heart of the faithful. For those (the vast majority of humanity) who fall short of this sublime Law (νόμον), there is the corrective of written words, which Chrysostom sees as a second remedy (φάρμακῳ). This, among other references, shows a therapeutic
dimension to law – when man falls short of the law of the heart, he receives written words as a remedy. However, for those who ultimately refuse the remedy, Christ is no longer Physician, but Judge. Thus, while law is about love of God and neighbor, it has a very stern side for those who do not follow it.

As with therapeutic language, juridical language cannot provide a fundamental paradigm because it, too, is begging a question. The question here is what sort of community is the law for? Even earthly laws often cannot be understood outside of the culture in which they exist. If God’s Law is meant for all men, one again returns to the question “What is man?”

**Community-based Paradigm**

Chrysostom does explicitly state that the subject of Matthew’s Gospel is the πολιτεία of heaven, even though Matthew never uses that word. What Matthew does speak much about is “The Kingdom (βασιλεία) of heaven.” In fact, he uses the term βασιλεία more than any of the other Gospel writers do, both in absolute terms and proportionally. So, it is noteworthy that Chrysostom characterizes Matthew’s subject matter as the πολιτεία, instead of the βασιλεία of heaven. Perhaps this is because πολιτεία is a broader term than βασιλεία and naturally includes personal behavior.

Also, the fact that these homilies deal with a Gospel and not an epistle is significant. The epistles were often addressing specific problems. Therefore the main theme of an epistle is not particularly likely to be the main theme of Christianity itself. On the other hand, a Gospel presents the good news as a whole (although, naturally, not in great detail at each point). This is even more significant in that Chrysostom also speaks of all the evangelists as setting out the πολιτεία of heaven. Thus, Chrysostom’s characterization of Matthew’s and the other evangelists’ theme as the πολιτεία of heaven is at least suggestive that he considers this the major theme of Christianity itself.

Chrysostom’s juridical and therapeutic language fit nicely into this concept of the πολιτεία of heaven. The law and the way of life (πολιτεία) of this commonwealth (πολιτεία) is love of God and of neighbor. At the highest level, the law is the Spirit living in the heart, and Christ Himself is the very βασιλεία of heaven. This is the full

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422 *Hom. in Mt. 1.5; PG 57.20; NPNF I, 10, p. 5.*
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expression of the πολιτεία of heaven. People living at this level are in perfect spiritual health.

However, in this fallen world, such people are scarce. The rest of humanity, diseased by sin, tends to experience law as a corrective. The more diseased one is, the more painful the remedies and the more burdensome God’s laws seem. God does everything possible to bring people to a realization of their desperate state so that they may be restored to their place in the πολιτεία. However, those who steadfastly refuse to love God and neighbor are cast out as incurably diseased. Yet this is in some deep sense their own choice. There is no place for them in the commonwealth (πολιτεία) of heaven because they have rejected its way of life (πολιτεία).

Chrysostom’s list of chief heads of doctrine makes sense within this context.

But what are these points? Such as follow: That God became man, that He wrought miracles, that He was crucified, that He was buried, that He rose again, that He ascended, that He will judge (μέλλει κρίνειν), that He hath given commandments (ἐντολὰς) tending to salvation, that He hath brought in a law (νόμον) not contrary to the Old Testament, that He is a Son, that He is only-begotten, that He is a true Son, that He is of the same substance with the Father, and as many things as are like these.

This list describes God in His Divinity and His Humanity and also His place in the πολιτεία of heaven. This knowledge is crucial for members of the πολιτεία of heaven because this πολιτεία is a βασιλεία, not a republic. Furthermore, the citizens of the πολιτεία are children of its King. Thus, knowledge of the King is critical. In this context, the law and commandments are clearly far more than rules of external behavior. Rather, for the pure, they are the way to communion with the King and the rest of the community. For sinners, they are the way to restoration to that communion.

Chrysostom uses various images to portray this πολιτεία – three major ones being Kingdom, Family, and Body. These three share many things in common. However, each has its own distinct flavor that, unbalanced by the other images, can lead to a skewed understanding of God and the Christian life.

In short, the πολιτεία of heaven provides a context in which to answer the question “What is man?” Man at his highest is a member of the commonwealth (πολιτεία) of heaven whose way of life (πολιτεία) is in complete harmony with that πολιτεία, which is not a republic, but a kingdom (βασιλεία) that includes angels and men. He is the
adopted child of the King of Heaven, Who – having taken on human nature and made the Church His own Body – has given man a share in His own glory. Man’s proper response to this King is holy fear and ardent love. This love manifests itself in selfless love of others, especially the poor Christian brother, in whom Christ is truly present. Thus, the true man lives in a self-emptying communion of love with the Trinity and with his fellow. Paradoxically, in doing this, he becomes himself. Man may, on the other hand, refuse to love and choose to focus solely on himself. He then loses his glory and his true being. He is human in the pejorative sense, which is in fact inhuman. Uncorrected by repentance, he can have no part in the πολιτεία for which he was made because he has rejected its way of life (πολιτεία). One may also look at this continuum in terms of sanity and insanity of soul. Where one is on this continuum is directly related to whether one chooses to love God and neighbor or to love one’s self.

Furthermore, in this πολιτεία, there is no conflict between law and healing. The law of this πολιτεία may be summed up as loving God with all the mind, soul, heart and strength and loving one’s neighbor as oneself. In the highest sense, this law is the Holy Spirit in the hearts of the believers, who are united in Christ (Who is Himself in some sense the βασιλεία of heaven) as body members and brothers and as sharers of a common nature. The monk is the model citizen of this πολιτεία. He has done as Chrysostom advises his hearers – to imitate the life and πολιτεία of the apostles, by casting away his earthly goods for the sake of Christ. Having cast them out of his very heart, he is free to love and worship God and to care for his brother. He is in perfect spiritual health and in perfect harmony with God and – in so far as lies with him – with his brother. Although the monk is the model citizen, anyone may attain to this high state.

To depart from the law of the πολιτεία of heaven is to depart from God and fellow, to become desperately sick of soul and to fail from true humanity. The man who lives for himself – even without actively hurting others – is not truly human. The man who abuses the poor is the complete antithesis of a citizen of the πολιτεία of heaven. He is completely inhuman – falling lower than the beasts. Failing to love Christ in his brother, he cannot possibly love God. Vainglory and jealous are particularly “human” failings. The vainglorious or jealous person, like the avaricious man, has abandoned the two great commandments. Insisting on his own glory, he cannot partake of Christ’s glory.
Jealous of others, he cannot love man. His almsgiving is detestable and cruel because it is for himself, not the other.

One who does not live in perfect love of God and man experiences law on a lower plane. The less he loves, the harsher his experience of the law. This can also be cast in therapeutic terms – the greater the disease, the more desperate the remedy. Seen either as law or healing, the purpose is the same – the well-ordering of the πολιτεία and the restoration of the particular person to a godly way of life (πολιτεία). A person can, however, permanently reject the way of love. Then, healing is no longer possible. Having rejected Christ as Physician, the person experiences Him as Judge.

Chrysostom’s teaching is clear – the chief law of the πολιτεία of heaven is love of God and neighbor. One whose way of life (πολιτεία) reflects this love is a true citizen of the πολιτεία of heaven, a good child of the heavenly King and Father, a healthy member of the Body of Christ, and a true human being who rises above his humanity to be like God. The one who refuses to love God and brother rejects his own glory and his own humanity. Thus, one can express the limit cases of humanity not just as sanity and insanity, but as the true citizen of the πολιτεία of heaven and the self-centered person who rejects that πολιτεία.

CONCLUSIONS

Chrysostom’s view of the Christian life has strong therapeutic and juridical components, which are not at variance with each other. Whether one finds healing and law gentle or harsh is dependent on the condition of one’s own soul. Chrysostom does not set out either healing or law as a main paradigm. From the homilies on Matthew, at least, one can argue that he does see the πολιτεία of heaven as the main paradigm of the Christian life. This paradigm is broad enough to provide a view of man and to accommodate both therapeutic and juridical components. Also, the “πολιτεία of heaven” itself suggests what Chrysostom’s homilies make clear – the Christian’s way of life (πολιτεία) must accord with the πολιτεία of heaven. Otherwise, in the end, he will be cast out through his own fault because he simply does not belong.

However, the πολιτεία of heaven needs to be fleshed out by various images to avoid presenting a skewed understanding of life. Three major images are the Kingdom of Heaven, the Family of God, and the Body of Christ. The vertical component must be
intact in order for the horizontal components to work well. This vertical component is not towards an unreachable superior, but to God, Who through the extreme humility of Christ, has bent down through the Incarnation to raise man above the angels to be like God. Furthermore, the relationship with the Trinity is exceedingly close. The Holy Spirit in man is Himself the Law of Grace. Harm done to a member of Christ's Body is truly harm done to Him. The adopted children of the Father inherit His kingdom as truly His and thus truly their own. Participation in the πολιτεία of heaven is sacramental. The monk is the model citizen of this πολιτεία and the upper limit case of humanity; the one sick with the madness of riches is his antithesis.

Each image has its own distinct flavor. The kingdom imagery best presents awed reverence towards God; the Family, love; and the Body, oneness with Christ and each other. Even so, one must remember that all the paradigms together still fall short of explaining God, His doings, and Man, who is made in His Image. One cannot ultimately explain God, only experience Him humbly. Chrysostom puts it beautifully:

Let us not therefore with noise or tumult enter in, but with a mystical silence ... If we would order ourselves on this wise, the grace itself of the Spirit will lead us in great perfection, and we shall arrive at the very royal (βασιλικόν) throne, and attain to all the good things, by the grace and love towards man (φιλανθρωπίᾳ) of our Lord Jesus Christ, to whom be glory and might, together with the Father and the Holy Ghost, now and always, even for ever and ever. Amen. ⁴²³

Whether or not Chrysostom consciously considered the πολιτεία of heaven to be the main theme of Christian life, this πολιτεία certainly provides a necessary (though – as shown above – not all-encompassing) framework within which to comprehend Chrysostom’s view of what it means to be human. Whether seen as sane or a true member of the πολιτεία, man at the upper limit of humanity loves God and neighbor and is therefore in right relationship with the head of this πολιτεία and all its members. His antithesis is the ἄλογος man who has chosen to love himself instead of God and neighbor. In so doing, he cuts himself off from his true humanity, his place in the πολιτεία of heaven, and his sanity.

The next chapter will widen the net in order to see how well these conclusions stand when taken outside the immediate context of the Homilies on Matthew.

⁴²³ Hom. in Mt. 1.8; PG 57.24; NPNF I, 10, p. 8
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CHAPTER FOUR – Law, Healing, Community, and What It Means to Be Human – a Broader View

INTRODUCTION

This chapter attempts to verify and expand the previous chapter’s conclusions. Instead of examining all of Chrysostom’s writings, four works were chosen – *The Homilies on the Statues*, *The Commentaries on Galatians*, *The Homilies on Romans*, and *The Treatise on the Priesthood*. *The Homilies on the Statues*, which deal a severe political crisis in Antioch, should offer important information on the practical, earthly implications of the πολιτεία of heaven. Galatians and Romans are, of course, the two Pauline epistles that deal most with law and grace. Therefore, Chrysostom’s commentaries and homilies on these are likely to provide valuable information concerning his use of juridical language. No comparable biblical books (or large sections of books) that heavily employ therapeutic language exist. The closest candidate would be the parable of the Good Samaritan in Luke, but no unquestionably authentic Chrysostom homily on this parable exists. Thus, *The Treatise on the Priesthood*, which has a fair amount of therapeutic language, was chosen as the fourth work. Furthermore, if Chrysostom truly had a predominantly therapeutic paradigm of the Christian life, one might reasonably expect that he would make this clear in a work that centers on the responsibilities of the priest to God and, especially, to flock.

Space does not allow the detailed treatment given *The Homilies on Matthew*. Thus, general agreement with the main points of the previous chapter will be briefly noted. Extensions or seeming contradictions of these points will be noted at greater length, as will new but related issues.

In addition, to set Chrysostom’s writings in a broader context, writings of other 4th century Fathers (particularly the Cappadocians) will be examined, along with secondary sources throwing light on certain aspects of his life and times.

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424 The overturning of the statues of Emperor Theodosius and his deceased Empress in reaction to a special tax resulted in imperial penalties upon the city and great uncertainty as to possible further repercussions. See Baur (1959) pp. 259-61

425 The *Clavis Patrum Graecorum* lists In parabolam Samaritani (*PG* 62.755-8) among the doubtful and spurious works.

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This chapter upholds the general conclusions of the previous chapter. True, these writings nowhere speak of the πολιτεία of heaven as the main theme of any writings or Christianity in general. However, the broad spectrum of what it means to be human can not be understood outside of the context of a πολιτεία founded on love of God and neighbor.

WHAT IS MAN?

Again, humanity involves a wide spectrum, from the supra-human and angelic to the subhuman and inhuman. Man is made in God’s image. Human nature is in some sense truly one. The saints, through humble love of God and neighbor, transcend man’s limitations. The self-centered man, attempting to aggrandize himself, limits himself till he is subhuman, sub-bestial and demonic.

The Ideal Man

God holds human nature in great honor. St. Paul names as glory “the blessings to come” and shows “how the human race is cared for on God’s part and in what honor He holds our nature (φύσιν).”

The true human is virtuous. For Paul was a man, partaking of the same nature (φύσεως) with us ... But because he showed such great love (ἀγάπην) toward Christ, he went up above the Heavens, and stood with the Angels. And so if we too would rouse ourselves up some little ... we too may ... be counted worthy to ... share the glory unutterable, which God grant that we may all attain to by the grace and love toward man (φιλανθρωπίᾳ) of our Lord Jesus Christ ... Amen.

Being the conclusion of the last homily on Romans, this passage can reasonably be taken as being very important to Chrysostom’s understanding of this epistle. The great virtue shown by St. Paul is tied up with love of Christ and companionship with the angels. Christians must participate in this virtue, which brings entrance into the heavens and a share in the unutterable glory. However, the attainment of this heavenly, angelic life is still only possible by Christ’s grace and love towards man.

Man's glory is in glorifying God. “Let us send up glory unto Him by our works ... that we may also enjoy the glory that cometh of Him.” Conversely, one who sins is
“bereft of the glory,” being among “those who have offended.” 429 All that a priest does is towards the end of “the glory of God, and the edifying of the Church.” 430

The man who has conquered his passions attains an angelic life. “The old life hath been made to vanish, and this new and angelic one is being lived in (πολιτευομένης) ... But ... I groan deeply to think how great religiousness (φιλοσοφία) Paul requires of us, and what listlessness we have yielded ourselves up to, going back after our baptism to the oldness we before had.” 431 Thus, to rise to the angelic estate implies baptism and also a sustained effort of φιλοσοφία.

In short, Man’s glory is in glorifying God, and through love of God he can share in “the unutterable glory.” God holds man’s nature in high honor, but intends for him to rise above his nature to the heavens through great love towards God and φιλοσοφία. The apostles and bishops are to exemplify this surpassing of human nature so that the laity may emulate them. Thus, with this great honor comes the responsibility to rouse oneself up to attain to it.

Inhumanity

As with the previous chapter, inhumanity mostly is concerned with lack of mercy, especially to the poor. 432 Inhumanity to others is inhumanity to Christ. 433 Not all examples of inhumanity deal with lack of mercy to the poor. Because of the Old Testament account of Jephthah’s sacrifice of his daughter (which God did not prevent), “many of the unbelievers impugn us of cruelty and inhumanity (ἀπανθρωπία).” 434 To say that one has nothing in common with others (in this case, blasphemers) is “diabolical inhumanity (ἀπανθρωπία) for ... they partake of the same nature (φύσεως) with us ... and are invited to the same blessings with ourselves.” 435

429 Hom. in Rom. 7.2; PG 60.444; NPNF I, 11, p. 377
430 Sacerdot. 6.4; SC 272; NPNF I, 9, p. 77
431 Hom. in Rom. 10.4-5; PG 60.480; NPNF I, 11, p. 406
432 Hom. in Rom. 19.8; PG 60.594-5; NPNF I, 11, p. 495 – “For this also the covetous (φιλάργυρος) man is odious, in that he not only disregards men in a beggared state, but because he gets himself trained for cruelty and great inhumanity (ἀπανθρωπία).” See also Hom. in Rom. 14.9; NPNF I, 11, PG 60.536; p. 449; Hom. in Rom. 21.1; PG 60.603; NPNF I, 11, p. 502
433 Hom. in Rom. 18.6; PG 60.581; NPNF I, 11, p. 485 – Feed Him in thy lifetime ... at all events do the next best thing. Leave Him joint-heir with thy children ... and break down thy inhuman spirit (ἀπανθρωπία).
434 Ad Pop. Antioch. 14.3; PG 49.147; NPNF I, 9, p. 434
435 Ad Pop. Antioch. 1.12; PG 49.33; NPNF I, 9, p. 343
In short, as in the Matthew homilies, Chrysostom uses “inhuman” most commonly in reference to lack of mercy to the poor, which is in a true sense, lack of mercy towards Christ. To deny one's commonality with other men is also inhuman.

Man as Limited and Prosaic

At times, human means prosaic. “To render his language palatable, he uses a human (ἀνθρωπινή) example to make this plain by.” This use of human examples (ἀνθρωπινῶν) frequently occurs in types also, as when the prophet takes the girdle, (Jeremiah 13:1-9.) and goes down to the potter’s house (Jeremiah 18:1-6.)

'Human' refers to man's limitations. The excellent preacher “is not allowed to avail himself of the usual plea which human nature (ἀνθρωπείας φύσεως) urges, that one cannot succeed in everything” yet “being but a man (ἀνθρωπον), he ... must sometimes fall short of the mark.” The saints undergo hardships so that “others may not have a greater opinion of them than belongs to human nature (ἀνθρωπίνης φύσεως), and take them to be gods and not men (ἀνθρώπους).” To care for Christ's Body properly, priests must “far surpass ordinary human (ἀνθρωπίνην) virtue.” Christians ought not to “call God to account for what is done ... though to human reasoning (ἀνθρωπίνοις λογισμοῖς) the thing commanded appears even amiss.” Men “need the Spirit’s aid” even to pray properly. “So feeble is man (ἀσθενής ὁ ἄνθρωπος), and such a nothing by himself.”

The above quotes show various limitations of particular humans or of human nature, ranging from basic creaturely limitations to limitations brought on by the fall but not in themselves culpable to most likely due to personal sin. The last quote is greatly important because it shows that man was never meant to be a being unto himself, but always in relationship with God. It also helps explain why man is capable of such a great range of being. He was never meant to be by himself. When united to God, he

436 Hom. in Rom. 12.2; PG 60.496; NPNF I, 11, p. 418
437 Comment. Gal. 3; PG 61.653; NPNF I, 13, pp. 27-8
438 Sacerdot. 5.5; SC 272; NPNF I, 9, p. 72
439 Ad Pop. Antioch. 1.6; PG 49.23; NPNF I, 9, p. 336
440 Sacerdot. 4.2; SC 272; NPNF I, 9, p. 64
441 Hom. in Rom. 2.6; PG 60.410 (#6) NPNF I, 11, p. 350
442 Hom. in Rom. 14.7; PG 60.533; NPNF I, 11, pp. 446-7
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attains his full, supra-human humanity. When focusing on himself, he cuts himself off from his own being and becomes subhuman and inhuman.

**Man as Fallen**

In the Matthew homilies, pejorative uses of “human” usually refer to general tendencies more than to specific sins. When Chrysostom does have a particular passion in mind, jealousy and vainglory are the most common.

In these four works, the pejorative use of “human” more often relates to particular passions than to general tendencies. At least one instance refers to lust, with virgins having to fight not only against snares laid by men, but also “the madness (μανία) of their own human (no word) nature (φύσεως).” However, jealousy, vainglory and related passions predominate.

He does not refuse even ... to speak the names of human passions (παθῶν ... ἀνθρωπίνων), and to call Himself jealous ... that you may learn the intenseness of the love (ἀγάπης).

I used to deride secular rulers (ἀρχόντων), because ... they are ... guided by considerations ... of wealth, and seniority, and human (ἀνθρωπίνης) distinction.

Many of the ordinations now-a-days ... are due to human (ἄνθρωπων) ambition.

*Re St. Paul’s former persecution of the Church* – If my efforts against the Church sprung not from human motives (δι’ ἄνθρωπων), but from religious though mistaken zeal, why should I be actuated by vain-glory, now that I ... have embraced the truth?

*Re circumcision* – All this is done through human (ἄνθρωπων) ambition ... that they may please men (ἄνθρωποις).

If thou hast performed a good deed, consider whether it was not from vain glory, or through necessity, or malevolence, or with hypocrisy, or from some other human (ἄνθρωπων) motive.

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443 Sacerdot. 3.13; SC 272 (y); NPNF I, 9, p. 57. NPNF has “passionateness” instead of “madness.”
444 Hom. in Rom. 23.5; PG 60.621; NPNF I, 11, p. 516
445 Sacerdot. 3.11; SC 272; NPNF I, 9, p. 54
446 Sacerdot. 4.1; SC 272; NPNF I, 9, p. 62
447 Comment. Gal. 1.9; PG 61.627; NPNF I, 13, p. 10
448 Comment. Gal. 6.3; PG 61.678; NPNF I, 13, p. 46
449 Comment. Gal. 6.1; PG 61.675; NPNF I, 13, p. 44
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one of the wisest of men (ἀνήγ), having regard to the avarice and pride of human nature (ἀνθρωπίνης φύσεως) ... instructs him to be affable and accessible to the suppliant.450

All the above entail either jealousy or vainglory or passions that either spring from them or would be exacerbated by them. In the last case, the pride and avarice of human nature lead to neglect of the poor, which ironically is routinely called inhumanity. Thus, the fallen human has become inhuman.

Here as in the Matthew homilies, Chrysostom seems more likely to call certain passions “human” than others. He usually details the sins of the soul rather than of the flesh. Perhaps this is because the sins of the soul are against the most exalted part of one's humanity and thus most representative of fallen humanity.

The distinction found in the Homilies on Matthew holds here also – jealousy and vainglory are particularly “human” faults, while lack of mercy to the poor is inhuman. This is consonant with the idea that the lower limit case of humanity has to do with self-centered rejection of the πολιτεία of heaven and of love. Jealousy and especially vainglory show an extremely perverted relationship to others, but lack of mercy to the poor is the abnegation of relationship and the most basic responsibilities to others. One is reminded of the covetous man who “would have no man exist, that he may possess all things ... he longs also to mar the substance of the earth, and to see it all become gold; nay, not the earth only, but ... all things that appear.”451

Man as God’s Image

To bear the Image of Christ is a great honor to man. To mistreat man is to mistreat God’s image and therefore to mistreat Christ. Honor is due to man because he is made in God’s image. The image of God does not imply having the same substance as God. It has to do specifically with the image of government. It has to do more with men than with women.

God greatly honors those “whom He did foreknow” by predestining them “to be conformed to the Image (εἰκόνος) of His Son.” This is a “superb honor! for what the Only-begotten was by Nature (φύσει), this they also have become by grace (χάριν).”452

450 Sacerdot. 3.12; SC 272 (19); NPNF I, 9, p. 56
451 Hom. in Mt. 28.5; PG 57.356-7; NPNF I, 10, p. 190
452 Hom. in Rom. 15.1; PG 60.541; NPNF I, 11, p. 453
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This seems to be somewhat different from bearing the Image of God, which was given at creation. Perhaps “Image” here bears more the meaning of “Likeness,” which Chrysostom uses elsewhere to speak of man’s virtue. Alternatively, Chrysostom may have in mind what some of his contemporaries, and especially later Byzantine theologians, called theosis.

Judaizers (and, perhaps by extension, other heretics) run the horrific risk of defacing the Image. Concerning St. Paul’s lament over the Galatians “My little children, of whom I am again in travail until Christ be formed in you,” (Gal. 4:19), Chrysostom exclaims, “Observe what a wail he utters ... Ye have defaced (διεφθείρατε) the image (εἰκόνα), ye have destroyed (ἀπωλέσατε) the kinship (συγγένειαν), ye have changed (ἡλλοιώσατε) the form (μορφήν), ye need another regeneration (ἀναγεννήσεως) and refashioning (ἀναπλάσεως).” Interestingly, Chrysostom uses διαφθείρω in relation to the image. According to Liddell and Scott, the word can also refer to losing a child by miscarriage or premature birth. Thus, Chrysostom’s intent may be much stronger than “deface.” Be that as it may, he does not believe that these Galatians have completely lost the image because he goes on to liken Paul to wise physicians (ἰατρῶν) attempting to heal them.

To mistreat a man is to mistreat God’s image. “For when thou throttlest a debtor ... thou tramplest under foot God’s image (εἰκόνα) ... if men (ἄνθρωποι) are not of the same substance (οὐσίας) as God, (as indeed they are not), still they have been called His image (εἰκών); and it were fitting they should receive honor on account of the appellation.”

Wrong done to God’s image is wrong done to Christ. “Your dog is well attended too, while man (ἄνθρωπος), or rather Christ ... is straitened with extreme hunger. ... He that was made in the Image (εἰκόνα) of God stands in unseemly plight, through thy inhumanity (ἀπανθρωπίαν).”

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453 e.g. Hom. in Eph. 21.4; PG 62.154; NPNF I, 13, p. 156 – For the likeness (ὁμοιωσιν) is in this, in the virtue (ἀρετή) of the soul ... to be good, to be meek, to be forgiving, (because all these are attributes of God); Serm. in Gen. (1-9) 3.1; PG 54.591, Kelly (1995), p. 59 – His ‘likeness’ (ὁμοιωσιν) indicates that he should be kind and gentle as he is.

454 NPNF says “likeness,” not “image.”

455 Comment. Gal. 4.2; PG 61.660; NPNF I, 13, pp. 32-3

456 Comment. Gal. 4.2; PG 61.660; NPNF I, 13, p. 33

457 Ad Pop. Antioch. 3; PG 49.57; NPNF I, 9, p. 362

458 Hom. in Rom. 11.6; PG 60.492; NPNF I, 11, p. 414

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The image of God has to do with man’s role as governor on earth.

At the very time He formed us, He honored our race (γένος) with this kingdom. For He said, “Let us make man after our image (εἰκόνα), and after our likeness (ὁμοίωσιν).” ... The image (εἰκόνα) of government is that which is meant ... as there is no one in heaven superior to God, so let there be none upon earth superior to man (ἀνθρώπου).459

The above quote speaks of “our race (γένος)” as being honored with the kingdom, which might be taken to suggest that Chrysostom has in mind both men and women. As mentioned in the previous chapter, Chrysostom implied that women ought not to use cosmetics because they would be trying to improve on God's image.

On the other hand, Chrysostom in his Romans' homilies says, “Now hear what He saith when He was forming the man, 'Let Us make man (ἄνθρωπον) in Our Image (εἰκόνα):' and again, 'Let Us make an help meet (βοηθόν) for him. It is not good for him to be alone.’”460 The context shows that he is referring specifically to the male. This is in keeping with passages in the Genesis homilies that clearly teach that the Image of God resides in the male but not the female.461 Further, it is generally agreed that Chrysostom, following general Antiochene usage, sees the image exclusively in the male. However, as Harrison points out, Chrysostom (along with Theodore of Mopsuestia) fails to affirm that woman “shares the divine image ... because they defined the key terms differently. However ... Theodore and John do believe women possess everything the Greek Fathers are generally understood to include in the image and likeness of God.”462 Be this all as it may, with the possible exception of governance, Chrysostom's concerns here would certainly apply to men as well as women – mistreating a human being is mistreating Christ.

**Human Nature**

Human nature is constrained by certain necessities. It appears to be inherently sinful, and yet men are not forced by nature to sin. Furthermore, in at least some ways, human nature is good. The saints transcend human nature's limitations. Human nature is in some sense one. It is changed by the Incarnation.

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459 *Ad Pop. Antioch.* 7.2; *PG* 49.93; *NPNF* I, 9, p. 391
460 *Hom. in Rom.* 23.4; *PG* 60.619; *NPNF* I, 11, p. 515
461 *Hom. in Gen.* (1-67) 8.3-4; *PG* 53.72-3; Hill (1986), p. 111. Serm. in Gen (1-9) 2.2; *PG* 54.589.
462 Harrison (2002), p. 265
Human nature has certain limitations. Many of the passages in the section on “Man as limited or prosaic” can be taken to refer to inherent limitations of human nature – its finiteness, the limits of its reasoning capacity, its subjection to suffering, etc – in either its primal or fallen state.

The following passage concerns other limitations:

No man can escape the characteristic accidents of humanity (no word), such as, to eat and drink, to sleep and grow, to hunger and thirst, to be born and die, and the like ... And so if vice were an essential element of this life, no one could avoid it, any more than the things just mentioned ... for natural (φυσικῶν) necessity is inusperable by all.463

All these limitations seem to be due to man’s being a mortal animal. Man is not, however, forced by natural necessity to sin.

Among the unavoidable “characteristic accidents of humanity” mentioned above is death. On the one hand, death is natural and – unlike sin – not to be grieved over. “Be not sad then on account of death; for it is natural (φύσεως) to die: but grieve for sin; because it is a fault of the will (προαιρέσεως).”464 However, death is natural not to original human nature, but to fallen human nature. The body of Man in paradise “was not thus corruptible and mortal ... but when man (no word) ... expected to become himself a god ... God made the body subject to much suffering (πολυπαθὲς) and disease (ταλαίπωρον); to instruct him by its very nature (φύσεως) that he must never again entertain such a thought.” Now death teaches “all men (no word) the mortality and corruptibility of our nature (φύσεως)” thus limiting the depths of their impiety.465

As with the Matthew homilies, Chrysostom denies that men are forced by nature to sin, and yet sometimes speaks of human nature as somehow inherently sinful. The first passage quoted above insists that there is no natural necessity towards vice. The second passage above implies the same thing since it states that sin is a fault of the will. Elsewhere, Chrysostom insists that “wickedness is no natural (φύσει) evil” as proved by sharing the same nature (φύσεως) with the wicked yet being “freed from their wickedness.”466

463 Comment. Gal. 1.4; PG 61.619; NPNF I, 13, p. 5
464 Ad Pop. Antioch. 6.4; PG 49.86; NPNF I, 9, p. 385
465 Ad Pop. Antioch. 11.2; PG 49.121; NPNF I, 9, p. 414
466 Hom. in Rom. 12.7; PG 60.503; NPNF I, 11, p. 423
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Furthermore, human nature retains portions of its native goodness. Examples include man's being in the Image of God, certain types of love and nature's reasonings. Having made Man in His image, God bestowed “honor on our nature (φύσιν)” by granting man sovereignty over other creatures, Paradise as a dwelling, the gift of reason, and an immortal soul. Man still retains some portion of all but the second.

Certain types of love are natural. Compassion for the sorrowful is natural. “To weep with them that weep ... nature (φύσις) itself fulfills perfectly.” Love of kin is also of nature. Speaking of a woman who, during the incident of the statues, boldly entreated the judge for her son, Chrysostom remarks, “Great is the tyranny of nature (φύσιν), and irresistible is the obligation arising from the maternal pangs!” However, the monks who came to plead for the prisoners “so loved (ἐφίλησαν) those ... whom they had never seen ... that if they had possessed a thousand lives, they would have chosen to deliver them all up for their safety.”

The love of kin is not just human, but also shared with the beasts. Those who do not love each other are in a worse plight than the brutes, who have affection (φιλοστοργίαν) for each other by nature (φύσεως).” But thou who besides nature (φύσεως) hast countless causes to ... attach thee to the member [in Christ] ... art become of wilder nature (no word) than they.

The two passages above show those following nature, rising above it, and sinking below it. The woman was acting under “the tyranny of nature.” The monks rose above it to care for those that they did not even know. The careless Christian who does not attach himself to his fellow member in Christ sinks below the brutes.

Conscience was implanted in man from the beginning.

The knowledge of what is good and what is not such is an original and fundamental part of our nature (ἐξ ἀρχῆς ἡμῖν καταβεβλημένην) ... the willing what is good and the not willing what is evil was made a fundamental part of us from the first (ἀνώθεν ἣν περὶκαταβεβλημένον). But the Law, when it came, was made at once a stronger accuser in what was bad, and a greater praiser in what was good.

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467 Ad Pop. Antioch. 7.2; PG 49.93; NPNF I, 9, pp. 391-2
468 Hom. in Rom. 22.1; PG 60.610; NPNF I, 11, p. 507
469 Ad Pop. Antioch. 17.2; PG 49.173; NPNF I, 9, p. 453
470 Hom. in Rom. 11.6; PG 60.492; NPNF I, 11, p. 415
471 Hom. in Rom. 13.2; PG 60.510; NPNF I, 11, p. 429
Although this passage does not use φύσις, the implication is that conscience belongs to man’s nature, not just to a specific man. Thus, both the knowledge of right and wrong and the will to do good are inherent to man. However, one is not forced to obey this desire. Otherwise, there would be no bad acts to accuse.

The Gentile, without the condemnation arising from the Law is “condemned solely from the reasonings of nature (φύσεως), but the Jew, ‘in the Law,’ that is, with nature (φύσεως) and the Law too to accuse him.” Conversely, “When the Gentiles ... do by nature (φύσει) the things contained in the law, these, having not the law, are a law unto themselves.” Chrysostom interprets “by nature” to mean the reasonings of nature. Thus, the Gentile who acts according to nature in this sense is not compelled by nature (in the sense of the mother whose son was in danger), but is choosing to listen to his conscience. When he chooses to disobey these reasonings, he is condemned.

Clearly, obedience to these reasonings is not an unalterable fact of nature or nobody could sin. As in the Matthew homilies, Chrysostom not only recognizes the personal choice to sin, but a bent towards sin in human nature itself.

“For I was alive without the Law once.” ... it, both by the things it did, and the things it did not do, weighed down human nature (ἀνθρωπίνη φύσις). For when “I was alive without the Law,” he means, I was not so much condemned.

Re the priest – if he happens to overlook some trifle, as is natural (εἰκός) in a human being ... that little blunder overshadows all the rest. And all men are ready to pass judgment on the priest as if he was not ... one who inherited a human nature (ἀνθρωπείαν ... φύσιν).

The first of these passages implies that human nature was already to some degree condemned before the Law, but that the Law weighed it down further. The second passage indicates that the inheritance of a human nature makes it extremely difficult not to overlook some apparently trifling sin. In addition, the reference to the avarice and pride of human nature in the above section indicates a sinful bent in human nature itself, as may the reference to its passionateness.

Not all sin, however, results from yielding to the sinful bents of human nature. One can sin beyond nature. Two examples are lack of natural affection and homosexuality.

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472 Hom. in Rom. 5.4-5; PG 60.428; NPNF I, 11, pp. 364-5
473 Hom. in Rom. 12.5; PG 60.501; NPNF I, 11, p. 422
474 Sacerdot. 3.10; SC 272; NPNF I, 9, p. 52
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Those who are “disobedient to parents” stand “against nature (φύσιν) itself,” being “without natural affection (ἀστόργους)” and “traitors even to the gift of nature (φύσεως) ... which even beasts have got towards each other.”

As one might expect in the homilies on Romans, sins beyond nature generally seem to refer to homosexuality. Homosexuals make “man’s nature (ἀνθρωπίνη φύσιν) all that enemies could” and are “more senseless than irrational creatures ... for in no case does such intercourse take place with them, but nature (φύσις) acknowledgeth her own limits.” Such evils were born “of luxury; of not knowing God.” Homosexuals are in a more miserable plight than prostitutes. “For in the case of the one the intercourse, even if lawless (παράνομος), is yet according to nature (φύσιν): but this is contrary both to law (παρὰ φύσιν) and nature (παρὰ φύσιν).” On the other hand, “Adultery arises not from nature (φυσικῆς), but from wantonness against nature (παρὰ φύσιν), which prescribes the use not the misuse.”

Here, the adulterer is considered wanton against nature, whereas the prostitute is sinning according to nature. In the former passage, Chrysostom seems to refer to nature’s bent towards sin. In the latter, he seems to refer to desire as it was implanted in human nature by God for the sake of the continuance of the family.

Although man can sin beyond nature, he can also transcend human nature, as the saints demonstrate. This involves transcendence of sin and certain non-sinful limitations of humanity. It is by faith and is sacramental. The transformed human also transforms nature.

The saint transcends the sinful bent of human nature. The three youths in the Babylonian furnace surpassed human nature (φύσιν ἀνθρωπινῆν) in that “being encircled on all sides with innumerable waves, their condition is easier than that of those who enjoy an entire calm!” The clemency of the Emperor Theodosius after the incident with the statues “surpasses human nature (ἀνθρωπινῆν ... φύσιν).”

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475 Hom. in Rom. 5.1; PG 60.422; NPNF I, 11, p. 360
476 Hom. in Rom. 4.3; PG 60.420; NPNF I, 11, p. 358
477 Hom. in Rom. 4.2; PG 60.419; NPNF I, 11, p. 357
478 Comment. Gal. 5.3; PG 61.669; NPNF I, 13, p. 39
479 Ad Pop. Antioch. 18.2; PG 49.183; NPNF I, 9, pp. 460-1
480 Ad Pop. Antioch. 21.3; PG 49.217; NPNF I, 9, p. 486

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Saints can even transcend some of their mortal limitations. The martyrs underwent “ten thousand forms of torture! ... human nature (φύσιν ἀνθρωποπίνην) exhibiting that which is above nature (ὑπὲρ φύσιν).”

The transcendence of nature is by faith. “This is a chief characteristic of faith ... to seek for that which is above nature (ὑπὲρ φύσιν) ... and so to accept everything from the Power of God.”

Baptism is a birth above nature. “In our regeneration it is not nature (φύσις), but the Words of God spoken by the Priest, which ... form and regenerate him who is baptized.” Though not stated here, the baptismal regeneration is certainly crucial to transcending fallen human nature.

The transformed human has power to transform other created things. “The piety of the youths [in the Babylonian furnace] changed the nature (φύσιν) of things; or ... what was far more wonderful, it stayed the operation of them, even whilst their nature (φύσεως) remained. For it did not quench the fire, but though burning, made it powerless.”

This power of the saints to transcend nature is, of course, not radically their own, but proceeds from God. Chrysostom represents Patriarch Flavian as telling Emperor Theodosius that, if he were to turn aside his wrath from the city of Damascus, “the Gentiles, and Jews, and the whole empire as well as the barbarians ... will ... say one to another, ... 'Great indeed must be the God of the Christians, who makes angels out of men (ἀνθρώπων), and renders them superior to all the constraining force (ἀνάγκης) of our nature (φυσικῆς)!"}

From the above several passages, nature seems both sinful and good, both changeable and unchangeable, with sinners descending below its sinful bents and saints transcending its limitations. This is in accord with the general conclusions of Chapter Three.

481 Ad Pop. Antioch. 19.1; PG 49.187; NPNF I, 9, p. 464
482 Hom. in Rom. 17.2; PG 60.566; NPNF I, 11, p. 473
483 Comment. Gal. 4.4; PG 61.663; NPNF I, 13, p. 35
484 Ad Pop. Antioch. 4.3; PG 49.63; NPNF I, 9, p. 367
485 Ad Pop. Antioch. 21.3; PG 49.217; NPNF I, 9, p. 486
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Part of this seeming contradiction can be resolved by Chrysostom’s teaching on free will\textsuperscript{486} and on a type of changeable nature. Man has it in his power “to become by free choice (προαιρέσει)” like “adamant reverberating the blows it receives ... happens to be by nature (φύσεως).” This is “wholly of grace” but “because the acts of free-will (προαιρέσεως) led the way thereto.”\textsuperscript{487} God has honored man by permitting him to attain of his “own free choice (προαιρέσεως)” certain virtues that the irrational animals “have as natural (φύσει) advantages ... in order that thou mayest also receive a reward.”\textsuperscript{488} Virtues would not be laudable if they were unalterably part of one’s being. The attainment of these virtues is by grace, but grace does not avail the one who does not exercise his free will in fighting the passions.

Chrysostom does not explicitly say that man’s free will is part of his nature, but it is hard to imagine Chrysostom’s believing that any man does not inherently possess free will. Accepting this, one could conclude that the free will that belongs to man’s nature allows him – by his willingness, the aid of his natural conscience and grace – to sink into or even below his sinful bents or to rise above not only his sinful bents, but other aspects of his fallen humanity, such as pain and mortality.

The question remains, “How can nature be changed?” Along with Aristotle, Chrysostom routinely insists that “things natural (φύσεως) remain unalterable (Arist. Eth. b. 2, 100:1), as we have told you frequently in other discourses also.”\textsuperscript{489} Yet Chrysostom recognizes a use of “nature” that does not imply unalterability. In Romans 11:24 (in which the Jews are branches according to nature of the good olive tree and the Gentiles the wild olive branches grafted in contrary to nature), when St. Paul “keeps speaking of ‘according to nature (παρὰ φύσιν),’ and ‘contrary to nature (κατὰ φύσιν),’ do not suppose that he means the nature that is unchangeable (ἀκίνητον ... φύσιν), but ... the probable and the consecutive, and on the other hand of the improbable.”\textsuperscript{490}

Thus, ‘according to nature’ can simply mean that which a certain thing usually does or is usually true of it.

\textsuperscript{486} Chrysostom is far likelier to speak of προαιρέσεις (822 instances of προαίρω in TLG) than of αὐτεξουσία (50 instances of αυτεξου in TLG)
\textsuperscript{487} Hom. in Rom. 3.4; PG 60.416; NPNF I, 11, pp. 354-5
\textsuperscript{488} Ad Pop. Antioch. 12.2; PG 49.130; NPNF I, 9, p. 420
\textsuperscript{489} Hom. in Rom. 12.7; PG 60.503; NPNF I, 11, p. 423
\textsuperscript{490} Hom. in Rom. 19.5; PG 60.591; NPNF I, 11, pp. 492-3

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In short, man’s free will allows him to sink below or rise above his usual condition. The first is his own fault. The second requires his effort, but is possible only through grace.

Human nature is in some sense one. Following are quotes in which φύσις is translated ‘the human race’ or some equivalent.

Even in former times, and before the Law was given, the human race (ἀνθρώπων φύσις) fully enjoyed the care of Providence.

... If they have a Law written, and show the work of it in them, how comes reason to be able to accuse them still? But he is not any longer speaking of those only who do well, but also of mankind (φύσεως) universally.\footnote{Hom. in Rom. 5.5; PG 60.429; NPNF I, 11, p. 364}

Now neither Adam, nor any body else, can be shown ever to have lived without the law of nature. For as soon as God formed him, He put into him that law of nature (νόμου ... φυσικοῦ), making it to dwell by him as a security to the whole kind (φύσει).\footnote{Hom. in Rom. 12.6; PG 60.502; NPNF I, 11, p. 423}

The use of φύσις in a context that suggests that it means “mankind” may be just a convention. However, Chrysostom could easily have used a word that unambiguously means mankind. The use of φύσις here thus does seem to suggest something deeper than being members of the same group.

Having become Man, Christ deified human nature, so that man might, through baptism, participate in the life of God. Christ took on the same human nature that all mankind has and, with it, won the victory over sin. Christ’s flesh was “like (όμοίαν) indeed to our sinful flesh, yet sinless (ἀναμάρτητον), and in nature (φύσει) the same with us ... He let it abide in its own nature (φύσεως), and yet made it bind on the crown of victory over sin, and then after the victory raised it up, and made it immortal.”\footnote{Hom. in Rom. 13.5; PG 60.515; NPNF I, 11, pp. 432-3}

Having won that victory and ascended to the heavens, Christ has “shown our nature (φύσιν) on the King’s throne.”\footnote{Hom. in Rom. 15.3; PG 60.544; NPNF I, 11, p. 455}

Because Christ has done this, it is possible for men to become by grace what He is by nature. “See what superb honor! for what the Only-begotten was by Nature (φύσει), this they also have become by grace.”\footnote{Hom. in Rom. 15.1; PG 60.541; NPNF I, 11, p. 453}

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This occurs through baptism. “‘For as many of you as were baptized into Christ, did put on Christ.’ ... If Christ be the Son of God, and thou hast put on Him, thou who hast the Son within thee, and art fashioned after His pattern (ἀφομοιωθεὶς) hast been brought into one kindred (συγγένεαν) and nature (ἰδέαν) with Him.”

The rationale for including this quote, even though it does not use φύσις, is given in the following section.

Two other aspects of human nature to which Chrysostom often refers in these homilies are the Law of Nature and man’s nature as a being with body and soul. Discussion of the Law of Nature will be left to the section on Law.

Man is an animal (thus having an animal body), but superior to the brutes. The body is not inherently evil. The soul is naturally great, but through free choice may turn to sin. The soul that does this brings both itself and its body into sin.

Man's body is superior to the beasts'. God furnished the brutes with “their weapons in their own body,” but made “the nature (φύσει) of my body” with weapons extraneous to the body to show “that man (ἄνθρωπος) is a gentle animal (ζῶον)” for men surpass the brutes both “in our possessing a rational nature (ψυχὴν ... λογικὴν)” and because “we also excel them in body,” which God made “to correspond with the soul’s nobility, and fitted to execute its commands.”

This seems to contradict Chrysostom’s Matthean homilies, where he contends that by man’s ability to hear the Word of God “we excel the irrational creatures, since with respect to all other things, we are even exceedingly inferior to them.” However, these are not necessarily contradictory views. Man cannot compete with the animals in terms of their strength, speed, etc. His superiority of body lies in its propriety for a gentle and rational animal.

The body is not inherently evil. “This is not the complaint, the being compassed about with the flesh, for this is so by nature (φύσεως), but the having chosen a carnal life.” “He does not say, let not the flesh live or act, but, ‘let not sin reign,’ for He came not to destroy our nature (φύσιν), but to set our free choice (προαίρεσιν) aright.”

496 Comment. Gal. 3.5; PG 61.656; NPNF I, 13, p. 30
497 Ad Pop. Antioch. 11.4; PG 49.125; NPNF I, 9, p. 416
498 Hom. in Rom. in Mt. 2.6; PG 57.31; NPNF I, 10, p. 13
499 Hom. in Rom. 13.7; PG 60.517; NPNF I, 11, p. 435
500 Hom. in Rom. 11.2; PG 60.486; NPNF I, 11, p. 410
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The soul may turn from its natural greatness to sin. “The soul when it hath lost its
greatness of nature (μεγαλοφυὲς) and lowly-mindedness ... becomes fearful, as well as
bold and unreasonable, and loses its powers of self-consciousness. And he that has lost
these, how is he to know things above himself?” ⁵⁰¹

The soul that does this brings both itself and its body into sin. “The body then is
indifferent between vice and virtue ... the flesh ... becomes this or that ... not owing to its
own nature (φύσιν) ... but through the fault of the thought which commands it.” ⁵⁰²

On the other hand, when one yields soul and body to God, both are transformed.
Christ transforms the body “not by changing its nature (φύσιν), but rather by giving it
wings ... With them that believe, and have the Spirit, the flesh henceforth ... becometh
wholly spiritual, crucified in all parts, and flying with the same wings as the soul.” ⁵⁰³

To summarize, man is made in God's image and retains some part of his native glory,
yet through the ancestral sin his nature is now limited beyond its original creaturely
limitations and is bent towards sin. Even so, sin is a matter of free will. Through sin,
men mar their souls and, with them, their bodies, and thus become worse than the
beasts because beasts are what they are by nature, while humans have free choice. By
the gift of free will, men may sink below the natural sinful bent of their race or rise
above human nature to kinship with Christ. The ability to rise above human nature
comes through the Incarnation, baptism and grace, but requires man's free choice and
the effort presupposed by that free choice. These conclusions are in general agreement
with those of Chapter Three.

How Christ Changes Human Nature

As opposed to the Matthew homilies, the four works chiefly investigated here say
little or nothing directly of how Christ transforms human nature. A few indirect
examples do exist, though. Relationship with the members of the Trinity and baptism
are key concepts here.

The believer is united to Christ in baptism. Below Chrysostom is commenting on the
text “For as many of you as were baptized into Christ, did put on Christ.”

⁵⁰¹ Hom. in Rom. 20.4; PG 60.600; NPNF I, 11, p. 500 ⁵⁰² Hom. in Rom. 11.3; PG 60.487; NPNF I, 11, pp. 410-1 ⁵⁰³ Hom. in Rom. 13.8; PG 60.518; NPNF I, 11, p. 435
Why does he [i.e. St. Paul] not say, “For as many of you as have been baptized into Christ, have been born of God?” for this was what directly went to prove that they were sons ... If Christ be the Son of God, and thou hast put on Him, thou who hast the Son within thee, and art fashioned after His pattern (ἀφομοιωθεὶς), hast been brought into one kindred (συγγένειαν) and nature (ἰδέαν) with Him ... 

Having said, “We are all made children of God through Faith,” he does not stop there, but tries to find something more exact, which may serve to convey a still closer oneness (ἐνωσίαν) with Christ. Having said, “ye have put on Christ,” even this does not suffice Him, but by way of penetrating more deeply into this union (συναφείας), he comments on it thus: “Ye are all One in Christ Jesus,” that is, ye have all one form (μορφὴν) and one mold (τύπον), even Christ’s.\(^{504}\)

Chrysostom does not use φυσίς in this section, but the argument that those “fashioned after His pattern (ἀφομοιωθεὶς) have been brought into one kindred (συγγένειαν) and nature (ἰδέαν) with Him” seems to imply that baptism brings about a change in human nature to a closer union and likeness with God.

Baptism affects not just the spirit, but the body. 

When then Adam sinned ... and his body became liable to death and sufferings, it received also many physical losses, and the horse became less active and less obedient. But Christ, when He came, made it more nimble for us through baptism, rousing it with the wing of the Spirit. And for this reason the marks for the race, which they of old time had to run, are not the same as ours. Since then the race was not so easy as it is now.\(^{505}\)

Again, Chrysostom does not use the term φυσίς here, but the reference to the liability of Adam’s body to death and suffering seems to imply a change in nature of baptized believers through the power of the Spirit.

On the other hand, one homily later, Chrysostom insists that Christ does not change the nature of flesh, but gives it wings.

Christ ... hath even made the flesh to weigh us down less, and to be more spiritual, not by changing its nature, but rather by giving it wings. ... For as when fire cometh in company with iron, the iron also becomes fire, though abiding in its own nature (φύσει) still; thus with them that believe, and have the Spirit, the flesh henceforth goeth over into that manner of working, and becometh wholly spiritual, crucified in all parts, and flying with the same wings as the soul.\(^{506}\)

\(^{504}\) Comment. Gal. 3.5; PG 61.656; NPNF I, 13, pp. 29-30

\(^{505}\) Hom. in Rom. 12.3; PG 60.498-9; NPNF I, 11, p. 420

\(^{506}\) Hom. in Rom. 13.8; PG 60.518; NPNF I, 11, p. 435

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Thus, in some sense, the flesh of baptized believers has changed from that of Adam, yet the nature of the flesh remains unchanged. Chrysostom does not explicitly explain this apparent discrepancy. In both cases, though, the flesh has submitted to the Spirit. On one hand, this causes a huge difference in the abilities of the flesh to obey God. On the other hand, the flesh does not become something other than what it inherently is.

Two themes explicit or implicit in the above passages are the importance of baptism in changing human nature and the Christian’s relationship with the members of the Trinity. Through the Spirit, the Christian’s flesh is transformed or given wings. Through putting on Christ, one becomes a son of God.

Though Chrysostom says relatively little in these four works on how Christ transforms human nature, he does speak at more length on the topic in his homilies on the Gospel of John and in one extended passage in the second Homily on Eutropius.507 As above, baptism and the action of the Holy Spirit are key aspects of how Christ changes human nature. Others include Christ’s Incarnation, earthly ministry, and Ascension.

Human nature is remade in baptism. “There is no longer a mother ... and embraces of bodies; henceforth all the fabric of our nature (φύσεως) is framed above, of the Holy Ghost and water.”508 This regeneration is tied up with Christ’s Incarnation and Ascension:

Our nature (φύσις) had fallen an incurable fall ... There was no possibility of raising it again, had not He who fashioned it ... stamped it anew with His Image, by the regeneration of water and the Spirit ... for He clothed Himself with our flesh, not as again to leave it, but always to have it with Him. Had not this been the case, He would not have deemed it worthy of the royal throne, nor would He while wearing it have been worshipped by all the host of heaven.509

Elsewhere, Chrysostom also links Christ’s Incarnation and Ascension to the raising up of man’s nature.

As at a marriage the maiden goes not to the bridegroom, but he hastens to her, though he be a king’s (βασιλέως) son, and though he be about to espouse some poor and abject person, or even a servant, so it was here. Man’s nature (φύσις) did not go

507 Kelly (1995) (pp. 154-5) believes this sermon to concern Chrysostom’s enemy Count John, not Eutropius.
508 Hom. in Jn. 26.1; PG 59.153; NPNF I, 14, p. 90
509 Hom. in Jn. 11.2; PG 59.80; NPNF I, 14, p. 39
up, but contemptible and poor as it was, He came to it, and when the marriage had taken place, He suffered it no longer to tarry here, but having taken it to Himself, transported it to the house of His Father.  

In both the above cases, the exalting (and implicitly the transformation) of man’s nature is inextricably linked to Christ’s taking on humanity and ascending in His human body to His Father. 

Christ healed human nature during His earthly ministry.

One might see ... Him showing ... how God formed Adam from the earth ... dead hands moving, palsied feet leaping amen ... For having taken in hand the common nature (φύσιν) of men ... He ... raised up again what was entirely fallen down.

And what should one say of the fashioning of the soul, so much more admirable than that of the body? The health of our bodies is a great thing, but that of our souls is as much greater as the soul is better than the body ... our bodily nature (φύσις) follows whithersoever the Creator will lead it ... but the soul ... does not in all things obey God, unless it will to do so (ἄν μὴ βούληται). For God will not make it beautiful and excellent, if it be reluctant and in a manner constrained by force, for this is not virtue (ἀρετή) at all; but He must persuade it to become so of its own will and choice (χρὴ βουλομένην καὶ ἑκόσιαν πείσαι γενέσθαι τοιαύτην).

Christ's healing of human bodily nature here is not the complete transformation of it, but the temporary healing of illness. Of more importance is the fact that the transformation of human nature (here specifically of the soulish nature) is not unilaterally Christ’s doing, but requires human response.

The passage in the second homily on Eutropius strikes notes similar to those mentioned above.

He would not bring an harlot into Heaven, but He Himself comes down. Since she could not ascend on high, He descends to earth. ... He becomes that which the harlot was ... in order that she may not be scared when she sees Him, that she may not rush away, and escape. He cometh to the harlot, and becomes man. And how does He become this? He is conceived in the womb, he increases little by little and follows like me the course of human growth. ... He takes the sinner and espouses her to himself. And what doth He give her? a signet ring. Of what nature? the Holy Spirit. ... Next He saith “Did not I plant thee in a garden?” She saith “yea?” And how didst thou fall from thence? “The devil came and cast me out of the garden.” Thou wast planted in the garden and he cast thee out: behold I plant thee in myself, I uphold thee. ...: I carry thee in myself who am the Lord of Heaven. The shepherd

510 Hom. in Jn. 18.2; PG 59.115; NPNF I, 14, p. 63
511 Hom. in Jn. 12.2; PG 59.83; NPNF I, 14, pp. 41-2
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carries thee and the wolf no longer comes: or rather I permit him to approach. And so the Lord carrieth our nature (φύσιν): and the devil approaches and is worsted ... observe: He took dust from the earth and made the man; He formed him. The devil came, and perverted him. Then the Lord came, took him again, and remolded (ἀνεφύρασεν), and recast (ἀνεχώνευσεν) him in baptism, and He suffered not his body to be of clay, but made it of a harder ware. He subjected the soft clay to the fire of the Holy Spirit. “He shall baptize you with the Holy Ghost and with fire:” He was baptized with water that he might be remodeled, with fire that he might be hardened.  

Thus, Christ transforms man's nature by taking it upon Himself by becoming Man, growing little by little, worsting the devil while carrying human nature. Also involved are baptism and the Spirit. In the comments that Christ does not bring a harlot to heaven and that Christ's bride is about to go to her Bridegroom's home, the role of Christ's Ascension is hinted at – He does not take her to heaven as a harlot, but He does take her when He has transformed her. As above, Christ's action is not unilateral – to hearken and behold belongs to the bride.

Chrysostom's explanation of the relationship of Christ's becoming Man and His transformation of human nature is disappointingly prosaic – Christ takes on human nature so as not to frighten the harlot that is to become His bride. Interestingly, Chrysostom does not take this golden opportunity to attribute Christ's transformation of human nature to the oneness of human nature.

Chrysostom fails to take other obvious opportunities to do the same.

When the Jew says to thee, How came it, that by the well-doing of this one Person, Christ, the world was saved? thou mightest be able to say to him, How by the disobedience of this one person, Adam, came it to be condemned? ... from the nature of the thing (τῆς τοῦ πράγματος φύσεως) as from the power of Him that

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512 Hom. in Eutrop. 2.11; PG 52.406; NPNF I, 9, pp. 259-60
513 Hom. in Eutrop. 3.15; PG 52.410-1; NPNF I, 9, pp. 262-3
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transacteth it, and from the very suitableness thereof (for it suiteth much better with God to save than to punish), the preeminence and victory is upon this side.\footnote{Hom. in Rom. 10.1; PG 60.475; NPNF I, 11, p. 402}

When he [\textit{i.e.} St. Paul] was discussing how by Christ being justified (Δικαιωθέντος) all the rest enjoyed that righteousness (δικαιοσύνης), he brought in Adam's case, saying, "For if by one man's offense (παραπτώματι) death reigned (ἐβασίλευσε), much more they which receive abundance of grace shall reign (βασιλεύσουσι) in life." And the case of Adam, indeed, he does not clear up, but from it he clears up His (or his own), and shows that it was more reasonable that He Who died in their behalf should have power over them at His will. For that when one had sinned all should be punished, does not seem to be so very reasonable (κατὰ λόγον) to most men. But that when One had done aright all should be justified (δικαιοῦσθαι), is at once more reasonable and more suited to God.\footnote{Hom. in Rom. 16.5; PG 60.554-5; NPNF I, 11, p. 464}

In both these cases, Chrysostom could have made a strong argument for Christ's work saving or justifying man on the basis of the unity of human nature. His failure to do so is probably not due to a disbelief in such unity, as elsewhere he does indicate such a belief. Either he takes it so for granted that he does not bother to mention it, or he simply does not consider it a major aspect of how Christ saves humanity.

To summarize, these works support the general conclusions from the Matthew homilies. Chrysostom sees Christ's Incarnation and Ascension as integral to His transformation of human nature. A key aspect of Christ's ability to change human nature is that He has taken it up in Himself. Also important are the role of the Spirit, Christian baptism and the Christian's own efforts.

One major difference is that Chrysostom talks far less of the effects of specific events in Christ's life on the transformation of human nature. Of course, the Matthew homilies deal with specific events in Christ's life in a way that most of the other works could not be expected to do. However, the homilies on John also deal with specific events in Christ's life, yet there is much less emphasis here on the effect of these events on the transformation of human nature. The reason for this is not readily apparent.

While Chrysostom does consider human nature as in some sense truly one, he does not stress this unity as the main reason that Christ is able to transform and save human nature.

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The Wider Perspective

In its broad outlines, Chrysostom’s answer to “What is man?” is a very common one. Man’s native glory and bearing of the Image of God, his creaturely limitations, and his fall are all traditional Christian assumptions, as is the superiority of soul to body. That Christ somehow transforms and saves human nature by taking on human nature is assumed by all three Cappadocians and by Theodoret.

But the scope of our art is … to make Christ to dwell in the heart by the Spirit … This is why God was united to the flesh by means of the soul. For that which He has not assumed He has not healed; but that which is united to His Godhead is also saved.

By that first-fruits which I have assumed, I am in Myself presenting all humanity (ἀνθρώπινον) to its God and Father.”

Since, then, the first-fruits made the true God to be its God, and the good Father to be its Father, the blessing is secured for human nature (φύσει) as a whole, and by means of the first-fruits the true God and Father becomes Father and God of all men (ἀνθρώπων).

For if what was reigned over by death was not that which was assumed by the Lord death would not have ceased working his own ends, nor would the sufferings of the God-bearing flesh have been made our gain… we who had died in Adam should not have been made alive in Christ.

How exactly this transformation and salvation works is understood differently by different Fathers. Russell, in The Doctrine of Deification in the Greek Patristic Tradition says the following concerning deification (θεοποίησις and related terms):

Until the end of the fourth century the metaphor of deification developed along two distinct lines: on the one hand, the transformation of humanity in principle as a consequence of the Incarnation; on the other, the ascent of the soul through the practice of virtue. The former, broadly characteristic of Justin, Irenaeus, Origen, and Athanasius, is based on St. Paul’s teaching on incorporation into Christ through

516  Gregory Nazianzen (GNz), Or. 2.22-3; PG 35.432-3; NPNF II, 7, pp. 209-10
517  GNz, Ep. 101.32; SC 208; NPNF II, 7, p. 440
518  Gregory of Nyssa (GNy), Refut. Conf. Eunom.84 ; Jaeger(1960b) 346; NPNF II, 5, p. 113
519  Basil the Great (BtG), Ep. 256.2; Courtonne 3.116; NPNF II, 8, p. 300
520  Theodoretus (Thdt), Eccl. Hist. 5.3; GCS 44.279-80; NPNF II, 3, p. 132

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baptism and implies a realistic approach to deification. The latter, typical of Clement and the Cappadocians, is fundamentally Platonic and implies a philosophical and ethical approach. By the end of the fourth century the realistic and philosophical strands begin to converge …

The Antiochene fathers are different. They speak of men as gods only by title or analogy. When the Antiochenes are compared with the Alexandrians, the correlation between deification and Christology becomes clear, the contrast between the metaphysical union of the Alexandrians and the moral union of the Antiochenes in their Christology being reflected in their respective attitudes to deification. For the Alexandrians the transformation of the flesh by the Word is mirrored in the transformation of the believer by Christ. For the Antiochenes the deliberate and willed nature of the union of the human and divine in Christ finds its counterpart in the moral struggle that human beings need to experience before they can attain perfection.521

While Russell’s contentions may be correct in regards to θεοποίησις and related terms, the Cappadocians’ and Theodoret’s insistence on the necessity of Christ’s taking on human nature for the salvation of mankind do not seem to make sense without the assumption of a real unity of human nature. At any rate, it is very clear that man could not have been saved without the Incarnation, through which Christ heals man and presents all mankind to His Father. In this, they are in line with Chrysostom.

“That man’s will remains free” and that “we are responsible for our acts” is a tenet on which the Greek Fathers agree. Yet free will is of no avail without grace. “Grace … is a state of communion with God, and if a man must use his free will to attain it, there can be no question but that the blessedness in which it consists is wholly the gift of God.”522 Baptism is the entrance into the exalted state. According to Gregory of Nyssa, it is “the new birth from above” through which “our nature (φύσις) is transformed from the corruptible to the incorruptible.”523 Gregory Nazianzen uses baptism to prove the divinity of the Holy Spirit, asking “if He is not to be worshipped, how can He deify me by Baptism?”524

Although all Church Fathers agree that man is made in God’s image, “the fathers offered widely divergent views as to how human beings actually image God and where exactly this gift of image can be said to reside within them.”525 The Alexandrian and

522 Kelly (1978), pp. 351-2
524 Gnz, Or. 31.28; Barbel; NPNF II, 7, p. 327
Cappadocian Fathers “hold that the ‘image of God’ applies primarily to the Word and in an applied sense also to humans. They also look upon the human image as residing in the highest part of the soul ... While this kind of outlook has helped to develop an understanding of grace ... it effectively minimizes the role that the human body plays in the economy of salvation.” The Antiochene tradition, on the other hand, “held that humans were a unified whole of body and soul and identified the image of God, not as Philo did with the ‘first’ creation, but with the person of clay fashioned at the ‘second’ creation.” Although none of the above quotes of Chrysostom directly says this, his immense concern for the physical well being of the person made in God’s Image is certainly in line with such a belief. Further, the Antiochenes generally rejected the belief that the “image resides in the higher reaches of the soul.”

Chrysostom’s belief that the Image of God has to do with man’s dominion was also held by Diodore (likely Chrysostom’s own teacher). According to Carter, Theodore of Mopsuestia also held this view early in his career, but replaced it “with the human spiritual-material composite as the syndesmos of the whole created universe.” McLeod takes “passing remarks” from Theodoret of Cyrus “on the image as it pertains to humans as the bond of the universe” as perhaps “manifesting a shift in Antiochene thought away from both Diodorus’ and John Chrysostom’s emphases upon image as being first and foremost a reflection of God’s creative and dominative power ... ‘Image’ now signifies not only the pre-eminence and dominion that human beings possess within the universe but also the way that the rest of creation can know, love, and serve their God.”

526 Ibid., p. 32
527 Ibid., p. 36
528 Ibid., pp. 37-8
529 Carter (2003), p. 175
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Both McLeod\textsuperscript{531} and Krupp\textsuperscript{532} comment on Chrysostom's statements that only the male is in the image of God. Further, McLeod and Carter both seem to consider this an early Antiochene view, stemming from Diodore, but held only partly or not at all by later Antiochene theologians.\textsuperscript{533}

The two passages adduced by McLeod and Krupp unambiguously state that the image of God resides in the male, not the female. Compared to such statements, the hints that the image is also found in the woman are weak.\textsuperscript{534} Possibly, however, Chrysostom changed his opinion over the years\textsuperscript{535} or was not consistent with his terminology.\textsuperscript{536} As mentioned in the previous chapter, Harrison contends that the Antiochenes simply mean something different by “the image” than the majority of the Greek Fathers do, but hold that both men and women do have everything that these Fathers generally mean by the terms “image” and “likeness." Be that as it may, the above passages are obviously among those that lay him open to charges of sexism.

To properly appreciate Chrysostom's views, one must take very seriously his insistence that men and women share “one form (τύπος), one distinctive character (χαρακτὴρ), one likeness (ὁμοίωσις).”\textsuperscript{537} In addition, as McLeod points out, “When he created woman, God made her 'of equal honour' with man, appointing her ... 'a helper

\textsuperscript{531} Serm. in Gen. (1-9) 2.2; PG 54.589; McLeod (1995), p. 34 – Men and women have one form (τύπος), one distinctive character (χαρακτὴρ), one likeness (ὁμοίωσις). Then why are men said to be in the “image (εἰκὼν) of God” and women not? This is because what Paul says about the “image” (εἰκόνα) does not pertain to form (μορφῇ). The “image” (εἰκόνα) has rather to do with authority (ἀρχὴν), and this is what the man has. The woman has it no longer. For he is subjected to no one, while she is subjected to him.

\textsuperscript{532} Hom. in Gen. (1-67) 8.4; PG 53.73; Hill (1985), p. 111; Krupp (1991), p. 164 – Since it is on the basis of command (ἀρχῆς) that the image (εἰκόνος) was received and not on the basis of form (μορφῆς), man commands everything whereas woman is subservient ... If, however, he had been speaking about form (μορφῆς), he would not have distinguished between man and woman being identical in type (τύπος), after all.


\textsuperscript{534} Quasten (1983) places the 9 Genesis sermons in 386 and the 67 Genesis homilies most likely in 388 (p. 434). Hill (1986) gives a variety of possibilities and tentatively concludes that the 67 homilies were preached in Antioch perhaps as early as 385 (pp. 5-6). The Matthew homilies were most likely preached in 390 [Quasten, p. 437; Kelly (1995), p. 90]. Quasten (p. 442) puts the Romans homilies “during his Antiochene period, i.e. between 381 and 398, most probably shortly after he finished with the Gospel of St. John.” Kelly (p. 90) states that the Romans homilies have been “plausibly assigned” to 392. If this is true, the two quotes suggesting that woman might share the image of God were written a few years after the Genesis homilies.

\textsuperscript{535} The latter suggestion is weakened by the fact that previous to the above quote from Homily in Gen. (1-67) 8, Chrysostom speaks of the precise usage in the Genesis account of “Image” and “Form.” However, he may be referring to the Genesis account itself, not his own usage.

\textsuperscript{536} McLeod (1995), p. 34
fit for him," words which stress her equality with him." It was only after she yielded to temptation and "showed herself unfit for rule" that God "condemned her to a subordinate role."\(^{537}\) Krupp, who is among those who accuse Chrysostom of being sexist,\(^{538}\) comments "Equality brings disorder ... Since the Fall there has been subjection in the created order and the subjection of woman to man is a part of this ... There can be equality of form and substance but not of authority."\(^{539}\) He further notes that Chrysostom believed that women could achieve true equality with men through martyrdom, in the conditions of the early church, and pre-eminently, through the celibate life.\(^{540}\)

Thus, according to Chrysostom, women were equal in authority to men before the fall and when living lives of holiness (especially of celibacy) would appear no longer to be subservient to men. In all other ways, men and women remain equal, sharing one form, character, and likeness. To moderns, equality in all fronts but one seems to be mere propaganda. To Chrysostom, this was not the case. The woman's lack of authority in this fallen world would certainly not bar her from seeking the heavenly things, which are the real human being's true concern and which he ardently desired for all.

In summary, Chrysostom's view of man is, in general, a common one for a Greek Father. Man's native condition is glorious, although even in his native glory, he bears creaturely limitations. In his fallen condition, man descends far beneath that glory. However, through Christ's Incarnation, Death, and Resurrection, man is raised up from that fall. This occurs through grace and the sacraments, but man must exert his free will to cooperate with God's grace.

Somewhat of an exception is Chrysostom's understanding of the Image of God as residing in the male only and referring to man's authority, but this is shared at least in part with other Antiochenes. In Chrysostom's case, this difference in authority was not the case before the Fall nor for those living in holiness. Even where he seems most sexist to modern ears, he exhibits a clear desire to raise women above the broken humanity of this world to the true humanity in Christ.

\(^{537}\) *Serm. in Gen. (1-9) 4.1-2; PG 54.594-5; Kelly (1995), p. 59
\(^{538}\) Krupp (1991), p. 163
\(^{539}\) Ibid., p. 165
\(^{540}\) Ibid., pp. 166-7
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Thus far, it has been shown that Chrysostom’s view of man and human nature is in its broad outlines standard for his time. These views are very well known and seemingly unremarkable. The concluding chapter, however, will show that it is extremely difficult for citizens of modern democracies to understand some of the basic implications of these beliefs.

THE ΠΟΛΙΤΕΙΑ OF HEAVEN

The πολιτεία of heaven consists of relational beings in the communion of love. This πολιτεία is sacramental and possible only through the Incarnation. Three chief images of this community are the Kingdom (βασιλεία) of Heaven, the Family of God and the Body of Christ. Love is the chief law. The healthy member of this community is loving and unselfish. Each image has its own flavor, but each presupposes a vertical relationship with God and a horizontal relationship with other created beings. Also, all come down to loving or refusing to love.

Chrysostom’s Use of Πολιτεία

Nowhere in these four works does Chrysostom claim, as he does for Matthew, that their subject matter is the πολιτεία of heaven. This is to be expected, since he is dealing with specific issues or with epistles addressing specific issues. He does not often use πολιτεία or related forms in these works. When he does, the reference is usually to the way one lives, although at times he is referring to the Old Testament dispensation or community, the Christian community, etc.

The πολιτεία of Christians must be consonant with their baptism. It is an appropriate response to God’s love and must also comprehend love of neighbor. One must approach God with awe. The πολιτεία of the true Christian is angelic. This life is led in the Spirit.

One’s way of life (πολιτεία) must be consonant with the grace of baptism. “Lest ... they should turn negligent of their conversation (πολιτείας) after it [baptism] ... even supposing you receive baptism, yet if you are not minded to be “led by the Spirit’ afterwards, you lose ... the preeminence of your adoption.”541 “Our soul which had

541 Hom. in Rom. 14.2; PG 60.525; NPNF I, 11, p. 441
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grown old with the oldness of sin, hath been all at once renewed by baptism ...

Wherefore we require a new and heavenly rule of life (πολιτείαν).

The πολιτεία of Christians is an appropriate response to God’s love. “How mighty is the love (ἀγάπη) of God! we which were enemies and disgraced, have all at once become saints and sons ... Let us then keep showing a conversation (πολιτείαν) worthy of the gift.”

“God hath provided for us on either hand ... then, let us glorify Him ... and let us shew forth an excellent conversation (πολιτείαν).”

The holy life that men should lead involves both soul and body. “Become the priest of thine own body, and of the virtue of thy soul ... having shown that each man is a priest of his own flesh by his conversation (πολιτείας), he mentions also the way whereby we may compass all this ... 'And be not fashioned after this world; but be ye transformed by the renewing of your mind.'” Both body and soul are meant to be offered up to God. When, however, the soul is sick with sin, the body takes ascendancy and the man’s actions become bodily in the negative sense.

God must be approached with awe. Chrysostom does not specifically link this with the Christian πολιτεία in any of these four writings. However, in his zeal to banish swearing from Antioch, he says, “For if it be necessary to punish those who blaspheme an earthly king (βασιλέα), much more so those who insult God.”

This πολιτεία must also comprehend love of neighbor. “After this grace ... there is need also of a life (πολιτείας) suited to it ... And show it we shall, if we keep with earnestness love (ἀγάπην), the mother of good deeds.”

God especially glories in “the being closely united.” Therefore, one must not say, “Him I love (φιλῶ) that loveth (φιλῇ) me; if my right eye does not love (φιλῇ) me, I tear it out” for “thou that art called to a greater citizenship (πολιτείαν) ... art liable to greater laws (νόμων).”

Thus, love of neighbor is an appropriate response to God’s bounty to man.

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542 Comment. Gal. 6.3; PG 61.679; NPNF I, 13, p. 47
543 Hom. in Rom. 1.4; PG 60.400; NPNF I, 11, p. 342
544 Ad Pop. Antioch. 10.6; PG 49.118; NPNF I, 9, p. 411
545 Hom. in Rom. 20.2; PG 60.597; NPNF I, 11, p. 497
546 Ad Pop. Antioch. 1.12; PG 49.32; NPNF I, 9, p. 343
547 Hom. in Rom. 7.5; PG 60.447; NPNF I, 11, p. 380
548 Hom. in Rom. 27.3; PG 60.647; NPNF I, 11, p. 536

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The πολιτεία of the true Christian is angelic and must be consciously lived out. “The virgin has striven for nobler aims, and eagerly sought the highest kind of philosophy, and professes to exhibit upon earth the life (πολιτείαν) which angels lead.”549 “He even led us to the life of angels, and ... to the best conversation (πολιτείας) ... Let us then continue living this life.”550

This life is led in the Spirit. “And how are they to become acceptable? In the Holy Ghost. For there is need not only of faith, but also of a spiritual way of life (πολιτείας), that we may keep the Spirit that was given once for all.”551

The person who does not live a godly life belongs to an alien community. “Estranged the merciless soul is.” Such souls are “slaves to sin and are in an alien community (πολιτείᾳ).”552

The above echoes Chrysostom’s Homilies on Matthew, the main difference being that in these writings πολιτεία does not usually mean the community, but the life lived by its members. The remainder of this section will deal with several issues not directly dealt with in the previous chapter – first, the relationship of Christians to their city (πόλις); second, the relationship between civil and priestly authority; third, common responsibility for individuals’ sins; and last, the relationship of the Christian πολιτεία to free will, grace, faith, and law.553

The Relationship of the Christian to the City

The Christian is a member of his earthly city, but more so of the heavenly. By living true Christian lives, Christians make cities truly cities. Christians are true members of their communities, but have a higher allegiance to the City built by God.

The following passage makes several key points:

If there is no possibility for a person who is living in the midst of cities to be a disciple, this is a sad imputation on this rule of conduct (πολιτείας) ... this I say, not as abusing those who have taken up with the mountains ... let us introduce the discipline they have there here also, that the cities may become cities indeed. This will improve the Gentile.554

549 Sacerdot. 3.13; SC 272; NPNF I, 9, p. 57
550 Hom. in Rom. 11.4; PG 60.489; NPNF I, 11, p. 413
551 Hom. in Rom. 29.2; PG 60.655; NPNF I, 11, p. 543
552 Hom. in Rom. 6.6; PG 60.440; NPNF I, 11, p. 374
553 This section was expanded beyond looking at variants of πολιτεία. In most instances, however, Chrysostom is speaking either explicitly or implicitly of the Christian’s place in the πόλις. Therefore, it seemed reasonable to include this section here.
554 Hom. in Rom. 26.4; PG 60.643; NPNF I, 11, p. 533
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Christian virtue is for monastic and city dweller alike (although the monastic seems more successful in practice). Failure of city dwellers to live such a life is a mark against the Christian πολιτεία. On the other hand, the exhibition of true Christian πολιτεία makes the city truly a city and improves the non-Christian.

The ties of the Christian πολιτεία are greater than the civil πολιτεία or kinship. “This is a sorer evil than even a civil [war], as our mutual rights are greater than those of citizenship (πολιτείας), yea, than of kindred itself.”\footnote{Hom. in Rom. 8.9; PG 60.466; NPNF I, 11, p. 394} Though πολιτείας refers to the civil community, Chrysostom clearly is comparing this πολιτεία to a greater one.

In a sense, the Christian has no earthly city. “If thou art a Christian, no earthly city is thine. Of our City 'the Builder and Maker is God' ... We are enrolled in heaven: our citizenship is (πολιτευόμεθα) there!”\footnote{Ad Pop. Antioch. 17.2; PG 49.177-8; NPNF I, 9, pp. 456-7} Thus, the Christian’s ultimate allegiance belongs to God and His city.

To summarize, the πολιτεία of Christians comprehends love of God and neighbor and is consonant with one’s baptism. The true Christian, because his ultimate allegiance is to a higher city, is an indispensable member of his earthly city.

As will be shown in the concluding chapter, Chrysostom’s ultimate allegiance to the πολιτεία of heaven makes much of his worldview very hard to grasp for citizens of democratic, materialistic societies.

Three Major Expressions of the Πολιτεία of Heaven

Although Chrysostom states from the outset that the subject of Matthew’s Gospel is the πολιτεία of heaven, he does not – as was noted above – use the term very frequently (roughly once per homily). Three major expressions of this πολιτεία are the Kingdom of Heaven, the Family of God and the Body of Christ. These will be examined below in some depth.
The Kingdom of Heaven

Chrysostom speaks of God or the Father or the Son as King, but not the Spirit. However, the Spirit is God and is the One Who works the works of the Kingdom (βασιλείας) in Christians. “The whole is God’s doing ... the system relating to the Kingdom (βασιλείας) ... and the other marvelous acts ... the Holy Spirit wrought in us.”

The King is great in glory and must be accorded appropriate reverence. Thus, as mentioned above, one should inflict blows on a man who “blasphemed the King (βασιλέα) of angels.” In addition, the one who spends the King’s goods (βασιλικά) not on His glory but on “robbers, and harlots, and witches” has not just insulted the King, but has “done the kingdom (βασιλεία) the greatest wrong.” Thus, wrong done to the King affects the entire community.

Though great in glory, the King (βασιλέα), being unspeakably humble and loving, “was not ashamed of being crucified for thy sake.” The appropriate response to such love is to “love (Φιλήσωμεν) Him as we ought to love (φιλεῖν) Him” as did “those great and noble men” who counted not “the kingdom (βασιλείαν) of heaven ... in comparison of Him they longed for.”

Baptism and the Eucharist are foundational for entrance into the Kingdom. “No one can enter into the kingdom (βασιλείαν) of Heaven except he be regenerate through water and the Spirit, and he who does not eat the flesh of the Lord and drink His blood is excluded from eternal life.” Christians are not only citizens of the Kingdom, but soldiers of the King. “Thou too hast presented thy members for the war against the devil ... to God, the King (βασιλεῖ) of the universe.”

557 Ad Pop. Antioch. 16.3; PG 49.165; NPNF I, 9, p. 447; Hom. in Rom. 18.5; PG 60.579; NPNF I, 11, p. 483
558 Hom. in Rom. 5.7; PG 60.432; NPNF I, 11, p. 367
559 Hom. in Rom. 15.3; PG 60.544; Hom. in Rom. 24.2; PG 60.624; NPNF I, 11, p. 518
560 Hom. in Rom. 29.2; PG 60.656; NPNF I, 11, p. 544
561 Ad Pop. Antioch. 1.12; PG 49.32; NPNF I, 9, p. 343
562 Hom. in Rom. 3.2; PG 60.412; NPNF I, 11, pp. 351-2
563 Comment. Gal. 6.3; PG 61.679; NPNF I, 13, p. 46
564 Hom. in Rom. 5.7; PG 60.432; NPNF I, 11, p. 367
565 Sacerdot. 3.6; SC 272; NPNF I, 9, p. 47
566 Hom. in Rom. 20.1; PG 60.596; NPNF I, 11, p. 497

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In the Matthew homilies, Chrysostom presents the Kingdom as in some sense synonymous with Christ and His glory, which is linked to His self-abasement for the sake of man. However, nowhere in these four writings does Chrysostom equate Christ and His glory with the Kingdom. Rather, Chrysostom at times contrasts the Kingdom with God and with love towards Him.

The Kingdom is something other and less than God. “Nor the kingdom (βασιλείαν) of heaven did they count of, in comparison of Him they longed for.”

Loving God is greater than the Kingdom. “His saving us ... when we were in such plight ... not merely by His Only begotten, but by His Blood, weaves for us endless crowns to glory in ... This is greater than the Kingdom (βασιλείας).” Paul feared “falling from his love (ἀγάπης) for [Christ.] For this was in itself more dreadful than hell, as to abide in it was more desirable than the Kingdom (βασιλείας).”

Yet loving God is itself the Kingdom. “Let us become gentle at last, and love (φιλήσωμεν) God as we ought to love (φιλεῖν) Him ... For this is ... the kingdom (βασιλεία) of Heaven.”

Chrysostom obviously uses “The Kingdom” in different ways. In Matthew, it can mean Christ Himself and His glory. In these four works, it can mean His love or something less than Christ and His love. It is not clear exactly what the Kingdom means in these contexts. Perhaps Chrysostom just means that everything else in the Kingdom of Heaven receives its beauty and meaning from God and therefore is less desirable than God Himself.

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567 Hom. in Rom. 5.7; PG 60.432; NPNF I, 11, p. 367
568 Hom. in Rom. 9.3; PG 60.471; NPNF I, 11, p. 399
569 Hom. in Rom. 15.5; PG 60.546; NPNF I, 11, p. 457
570 Hom. in Rom. 23.5; PG 60.622; NPNF I, 11, p. 516
571 Chrysostom also uses βασιλεία to mean reign or sovereignty [e.g. Hom. in Mt. 22.1; PG 57.300; NPNF I, 10, p. 151 – Solomon was surpassed by their [i.e. lilies of the field] beauty, and that not once nor twice, but throughout all his reign (βασιλείας); Hom. in Rom. 11.2; PG 60.486; NPNF I, 11, p. 410 How then, is it that “sin reigns?” ... from thy listlessness. Wherefore ... he also points out the mode of this reigning (τρόπον ... βασιλείας); Ad Pop. Antioch. 7.2; PG 49.93; NPNF I, 9, p. 391 – the lion ... rules by nature over the quadrupeds ... The character of sovereignty (βασιλείας εἶδος) is, therefore, constantly allotted to his race ... Such a kind of sovereignty (βασιλείας) God bestowed upon us from the beginning.] No such usage referring to the Kingdom of Heaven was found. However, a thorough search was not made.
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The Kingdom is still to come. “Here we shall enjoy much tranquility, and there we shall attain the kingdom (βασιλείας) of heaven.” Yet it is already present in those who live true Christian lives. “He who ... is confident respecting things to come, hath here already tasted of the kingdom (βασιλείας)! It is not attainable without grace. “That ... we may be found worthy of the kingdom (βασιλείας) of heaven, through the grace and lovingkindness (φιλανθρωπίᾳ) of our Lord Jesus Christ ... Amen.” Yet it requires endurance of “things that are grievous ... in that ... we may afterwards ... inherit the kingdom (βασιλείαν) of heaven.” The things that “lead thee to the Kingdom (βασιλείαν)” are “righteousness, and peace, and joy,’ and a virtuous life, and peace with our brethren.” Its citizens include both men and angels. “Near the Throne of the king (θρόνου ... βασιλικοῦ) .. the Cherubim sing the glory ... the Seraphim are flying, there shall we see Paul, with Peter, and as a chief and leader of the choir of the Saints.”

Those who love as Peter and the Psalmist loved “even here shall ... enjoy the Kingdom (βασιλείαν),” but “surely we deserve the utmost punishment ... who ... yet wax wanton against His love (ἀγάπης).” Falling from one’s love of God is “more dreadful than hell, as to abide in it was more desirable than the Kingdom (βασιλείας).”

These four works add little to the Matthean understanding of the Kingdom. One thing of note is that they never seem to equate the Kingdom with Christ, His Resurrection, His Second Coming, etc. Rather, they at times look at the Kingdom as a lesser thing than God and the love of God, and at times look at the Kingdom as being itself the love of God. At this point in the research, no reason for the difference is evident.

572 Ad Pop. Antioch. 15.5; PG 49.162; NPNF I, 9, pp. 444-5
573 Ad Pop. Antioch. 2.6; PG 49.42; NPNF I, 9, p. 350
574 Ad Pop. Antioch. 9.5; PG 49.111-2; NPNF I, 9, p. 405
575 Ad Pop. Antioch. 16.5; PG 49.168; NPNF I, 9, pp. 449-50
576 Hom. in Rom. 26.1; PG 60.638; NPNF I, 11, p. 530
577 Hom. in Rom. 32.2; PG 60.678; NPNF I, 11, pp. 561-2
578 Hom. in Rom. 5.7; PG 60.432; NPNF I, 11, p. 367
579 Hom. in Rom. 15.5; PG 60.546; NPNF I, 11, p. 457
580 The Matthean homilies do not portray the kingdom exclusively in these terms. For example, Chrysostom lists various beatitudes and says, “nothing else but the Kingdom doth He shadow out by all these sayings.” (Hom. in Mt. 15.5; PG 57.228; NPNF I, 10, p. 95)
The Family of God

Membership in the family of God implies relationship with the entire Trinity and the rest of the family members. “This is not what God commands, that thou shouldest have nothing to do with him; but that thou shouldst have much to do with him. For this reason he is thy ‘brother.’” Life in this family is sacramental. “We are gendered” by baptism. Despite being partakers of the same Eucharistic table, some “have no notion of dealing well by [their] brother,” but instead “tear their own members” and “arm [themselves] against one another.” Membership in God’s family implies a lifestyle worthy of God. “For when he calls Him Father, he shows them to be sons ... Let us then keep showing a conversation (πολιτείαν) worthy of the gift.” Those who receive baptism but “are not minded to be 'led by the Spirit' afterwards ... lose ... the preeminence of your adoption.” Rather “as many as live up to (πολιτεύονται) this all their life long, 'they are the sons of God.'”

Characteristics of family members include love, the bearing of one another’s burdens, fervent attempts to restore those who have broken fellowship with the family, and great care for the brother’s salvation. This care includes, when necessary,
strong rebuke. Wrong done to one’s brother is a wrong done to Christ. God’s children are subject to correction, but “the incurably ill (ἀνίατα νοσοῦντας)” are cut off.

God’s love extends beyond that of earthly parents. His corrections are themselves the proof of His fatherly love.

Most of the above are very similar to what Chrysostom has to say in the Matthean homilies. Chrysostom does make one interesting point in these homilies that, as far as the author could see, does not occur in the Matthean homilies. Chrysostom puts these words in the mouth of Paul, regarding the Galatians who have gone back to the Law, “Ye have defaced the likeness, ye have destroyed the kinship, ye have changed the form, ye need another regeneration and refashioning, nevertheless I call you children, abortions and monsters though ye be.” On one hand, acceptance of the Law destroys one’s kinship with God and necessitates regeneration (which would seem to suggest a second baptism). On the other hand, Paul still calls these Galatians children, even though they have become abortions and monsters. Perhaps this can be understood in terms of Galatians, Chapter 5, Verse 12, p. 39, which also concerns the Galatians. Clearly, Paul still thought that there was hope of correction for the Galatians, and therefore, they were still in some sense children and not aliens. Nevertheless, in their return to the Law, they were so dangerously close to permanently losing their family likeness that they could be described as “abortions and monsters.”

This language is interesting in comparison with Romans, Homily 14, Verse 8:14, pp. 440,1, which threatens baptized believers who do not live by the Spirit with the loss of “the preeminence of your adoption.” Although the latter is a very serious thing, it does

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591 Ad Pop. Antioch. 1.12; PG 49.32; NPNF I, 9, p. 343 – Should you hear anyone ... blaspheming God ... rebuke him; and should it be necessary to inflict blows, spare not to do so ... exhibit such a tender care as becomes brethren.
592 Hom. in Rom. 8.8; PG 60.465; NPNF I, 11, p. 394 – when thou speakest ill of thy brother ... it is a member of Christ that thou art slandering
593 Comment. Gal. 5.3; PG 61.668; NPNF I, 13, p. 39. Instead of ‘incurably ill,’ NPNF has ‘incurably depraved.’
594 Hom. in Rom. 2.4; PG 60.406; NPNF I, 11, p. 347 – He loveth (φιλεῖ) thee more than they who begat thee, and goes exceeding far beyond a father’s yearnings of affection (φιλοστοργίαν) to thee, and a mother’s anxiousness (κηδεμονίαν).
595 Ad Pop. Antioch. 7.3; PG 49.94; NPNF I, 9, p. 392 – those fathers, who especially love (φιλοῦντες) their offspring ... correct their children when they are disorderly ... they are pre-eminently fathers when they act thus.
596 Comment. Gal. 4.2; PG 61.660; NPNF I, 13, pp. 32-3

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not seem to have the same force as the warning to the Judaizers. It might be of worth to compare Chrysostom’s comments to Christians flirting with heresy and to careless Christians to see if his language tends in general to be harsher with heresy.

*The Body of Christ*

As Head of His Body, Christ raises His members to a glory far above their natural state. Unity and love are imperative for members of Christ’s Body. A wrong done to Christ’s member, especially a poor man, is a wrong done to Him. Membership in the Body is sacramental.

Christ, the Head of the Body, makes Christians members of His Body and raises them far above their natural state. “For we were ... made brothers of the Only-begotten ... and even as a Body with the Head, so were we united unto Him! ... we received ... glory and dignities far transcending our natural state (ἡμετέραν ... φύσιν).”

Neglecting the poor is to neglect Christ. “Christ ... is straitened with extreme hunger ... the member of Christ ... does not even enjoy the food that is necessary for him, owing to thy rapaciousness.”

Membership in the Body of Christ is sacramental. Through baptism “we ... become members of that blessed Head.” Those sinful Christians who partake of the Eucharistic table while fighting with each other “tear their own members.”

Sinful members must be chastened for the sake of the whole Body. “Although there was but one who had committed fornication among the Corinthians ... if that member were not chastened, the disease (νόσημα) progressing onward would at length attack all the rest.”

Conversely, unity in the Body of Christ glorifies God. “A glory it is to God that they ... be united ... neglect not the member that is broken off.” When Christ’s members are joined “closely into one,” they may then proceed “to the battle without.”

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597 Hom. in Rom. 10.2; PG 60.477; NPNF I, 11, p. 403
598 Hom. in Rom. 11.6; PG 60.492; NPNF I, 11, p. 414
599 Sacerdot. 3.6; SC 272; NPNF I, 9, p. 47
600 Hom. in Rom. 8.8; PG 60.465; NPNF I, 11, pp. 393-4
601 Ad Pop. Antioch. 13.4; PG 49.142; NPNF I, 9, p. 430
602 Hom. in Rom. 28.1; PG 60.650; NPNF I, 11, p. 539
603 Hom. in Rom. 22.1; PG 60.609; NPNF I, 11, p. 506
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to another member of Christ’s Body is to do good to oneself. “If a man have [love – ἀγάπη] everything else follows ... he is bestowing it on himself.”

Love is indispensable to Christ’s Body. “Thou owest love (ἀγάπην) to thy brother ... If love leave us, the whole body is rent in pieces. Love (Φίλει) therefore thy brother.”

A Christian must consistently respond in love to the member that hates him, replying, “I will not leave off loving (φιλῶν) thee” for “that wicked demon stands by ... desiring to snatch away the member.” Members of Christ’s Body, “should be very ready to mourn for [their] own members” as if they were themselves in peril.

Again, most of the above is very much in line with the Matthean homilies. Unlike those homilies, however, he does not speak of the removal of the incurable member (in the final sense of hell) as for that member’s good. In addition, when he does speak of the incurable here, he is referring to the alien deceivers.

To summarize, as Head of His Body, Christ raises His members to a glory far above their natural state. Unity and love are imperative for members of Christ’s Body. A wrong done to Christ’s member, especially a poor man, is a wrong done to Him. Membership in the Body is sacramental.

Interplay among the Metaphors

As with the Matthean homilies, Chrysostom fairly often refers to the images of brother and member in close proximity. Several examples have already been mentioned above. He also on occasion links kingdom imagery with body or family imagery.

“Thou hast put on Christ, thou hast become a member of the Lord, and been enrolled in the heavenly city, and dost thou still grovel in the Law (νόμον)? How is it possible for thee to obtain the kingdom (βασιλείας)?” “The king (βασιλεὺς) ... has need of his subjects, and the subjects of the king (βασιλείως); just as the head has need of the

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604 Hom. in Rom. 21.2; PG 60.604; NPNF I, 11, pp. 502-3
605 Hom. in Rom. 23.3; PG 60.618; NPNF I, 11, p. 514
606 Hom. in Rom. 27.3; PG 648; NPNF I, 11, p. 537 Slightly later, Chrysostom seems to equate ἀγάπη and φιλία
607 Ad Pop. Antioch. 17.2; PG 49.180; NPNF I, 9, p. 458
608 Sacerdot. 3.6; SC 272; NPNF I, 9, p. 47; Hom. in Rom. 8.9; PG 60.466; NPNF I, 11, p. 394; Hom. in Rom. 10.2; PG 60.477; NPNF I, 11, p. 403; Hom. in Rom. 23.3; PG 60.618; NPNF I, 11, p. 514; Ad Pop. Antioch. 20.5; PG 49.204; NPNF I, 9, p. 476
609 Comment. Gal. 2.6; PG 61.644; NPNF I, 13, p. 21
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feet.”610 “Brother aided by brother is like a strong city, and well fortified kingdom
(βασιλεία). Do not dissolve this genuine intimacy, nor break down the fortress.”611

It is interesting that Chrysostom often links the images of brother and member, but
much less so brother and kingdom or member and kingdom. Perhaps these images
spring so quickly to Chrysostom’s mind because they figure so prominently in the
Pauline epistles. Or perhaps it is because these images portray the great closeness of
Christians to Christ and each other better than any other images could.

No matter which of these images Chrysostom uses, he speaks of sacraments and love
as foundational, and all have a primary vertical component and horizontal components
that depend on the vertical. However, each still has its own peculiar strength as an
image – the kingdom to highlight God’s glory; the body, unity in diversity; and the
family, love.

As also true of the Matthean homilies, Chrysostom at times produces long lists of the
things that Christ is to the believer. “He is our fullness ... and the Way, and the Husband,
and the Bridegroom ... a root, and drink, and meat, and life ... Apostle, and High-Priest,
and Teacher, and Father, and Brother, and Joint-heir, and sharer of the tomb and
Cross.”612 “He hath Christ as a Head, and a Table, and a Garment, and Life, and Light,
and a Bridegroom, and He is every thing to him.”613 Thus, again, the three images
discussed here by no means exhaust the relationship of Christ and the believer.

The Wider Perspective

Again, Chrysostom’s teaching on the πολιτεία of heaven bears similarities to others
of his time. In a cursory search through the NPNF volumes of the Cappadocian Fathers,
various references were found to the πολιτεία of Christians. It is tied to the work of the
Spirit in the Christian’s life.614 It is also tied to baptism.615 Baptism requires a life of purer
πολιτεία. Grace is obtained through one’s πολιτεία.616 Monastics have, in their day-to-

610 Ad Pop. Antioc. 11.4; PG 49.125; NPNF I, 9, p. 417
611 Sacerdot. 1.4; SC 272; NPNF I, 9, p. 36 – quoting Prov. 18:19 (LXX)
612 Hom. in Rom. 24.2; PG 60.624; NPNF I, 11, p. 518
613 Hom. in Rom. 27.4; PG 60.650; NPNF I, 11, p. 538
614 BIG, De Spir. Sanc. 19.49; SC 17; Anderson (1980), pp.77-8 – changing our earthly, passionate life
into heavenly citizenship (πολιτείαν)
615 GNz, Or. 40.8; PG 36.368; NPNF II, 7, p. 362 – The virtue of Baptism is to be understood as a
coyenant with God for a second life and a purer conversation (πολιτείας)
616 GNy, De Opif. Hom. 22; PG 44.209; NPNF II, 5, p. 413 – I think it is one’s duty ... to purchase for
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day lives, “large opportunity for being instructed in this heavenly citizenship (πολιτείαν) through the actual practice of it.” At the last judgment, each soul must “give an account of its service and conversation (πολιτείας) here; whether it has followed the flesh, or whether it has mounted up with the spirit, and worshipped the grace of its new creation.” Thus, the Christian life is sacramental and synergistic, requiring both grace and personal effort.

As with Chrysostom, the Cappadocians fairly often use body, family, and kingdom images in speaking of the Christian life. This is nothing surprising, since all three are important Biblical images.

Membership in the family implies relationship with Father, Son, and Holy Spirit. Christ is the first born of many brothers through His Incarnation and baptism and resurrection. “Through the Holy Spirit comes ... our adoption as God’s sons.” Forgiveness is a hallmark of this family. The lack of brotherly love is greatly lamentable. The separation of heretics (at least those of partly correct doctrine and good life) is a tearing apart of the family. This last has no counterpart in the works here addressed, but Chrysostom asked his parishioners to “hold out a brotherly hand to the Anomoeans to pray fervently that ‘they may desist from their madness.’”

Membership in Christ’s Body is in the Spirit and through baptism. As members of Christ's Body, Christians should live in harmony with each other through the Spirit.
The fall of the impious is like the loss of a limb and the righteous should grieve over him.\textsuperscript{627} Those not joined to the rightful bishop are severed members.\textsuperscript{628} Chrysostom, given the Paulinian schism in Antioch and his problems with Novatians and with disaffected clergy while he was Bishop of Constantinople, would probably agree with this, although he does not make such a statement in the works here addressed. True members of Christ's Church would feel compassion even for a notable heresiarch.\textsuperscript{629} The above quote about the Anomoeans suggests that Chrysostom might concur with this, although neither he nor any of the Cappadocians would allow that pity to harm the Orthodox, or for that matter, to harm the heretic by allowing him to continue unchanged in his heresy.

The Kingdom of Heaven is entered sacramentally\textsuperscript{630} and through the power of the Holy Spirit,\textsuperscript{631} but also requires one to labor.\textsuperscript{632} Those who seek this kingdom treat others with the loving-kindness that they themselves need.\textsuperscript{633} Gregory Nazianzen sees the Kingdom as Light (though not stated here, he is certainly speaking of the uncreated

\begin{itemize}
\item be so combined and knit together by the harmony of the Spirit, as to form one perfect body really worthy of Christ Himself, our Head.
\item \textsuperscript{627} BIG, Ep. 22.3; Courtonne 1.57; NPNF II, 8, p. 129
\item \textsuperscript{628} BIG, Ep. 67; Courtonne 1.159; NPNF II, 8, p. 164 – Re Meletius and the split amongst the Orthodox in Antioch. He is a man of unimpeachable faith; his manner of life is incomparably excellent, he stands at the head, so to say, of the whole body of the Church, and all else are mere disjointed members.
\item \textsuperscript{629} GNy, Contr. Eunom. 1.1.4; Jaeger (1960a); NPNF II, 5, p. 35 – Re Eunomius, leader of the Anomoeans ... Pitiable indeed seemed the condition of this poor man, from the extreme weakness of his soul in the matter of the Faith, to all true members of the Church; for who is so wanting in feeling as not to pity, at least, a perishing soul?
\item \textsuperscript{630} GNy, Contr. Eunom. 3.9.56; Jaeger (1960a); NPNF II, 5, p. 238 – But we, having learnt ... that “except a man be born again of water and of the Spirit he shall not enter into the kingdom of God,” and that “He that eateth My flesh and drinketh My blood, shall live for ever,” are persuaded ... that our salvation is confirmed by participation in the sacramental customs and tokens; GNz, Or. 40.3; PG 36.361; NPNF II, 7, p. 360 – Re baptism Illumination ... is ... the key of the Kingdom (βασιλείας) of heaven.
\item \textsuperscript{631} BIG, De Spir. Sanc. XV.; Anderson (1980), p. 59 – Through the Holy Spirit comes ... our ascension to the Kingdom of heaven.
\item \textsuperscript{632} BIG, Ep. 18; Courtonne I.48; NPNF II, 8, p. 126 – Only of them that labor for holiness and truth are the hopes destroyed by no deception; no issue can destroy their labors, for the kingdom (βασιλείας) of the heavens that awaits them is firm and sure.
\item \textsuperscript{633} GNz, Or. 16.19; PG 35.961; NPNF II, 7, p. 254 – What of those who sit on lofty thrones ... taking no account of the God over all, and the height of the true kingdom (βασιλείας) that none can approach unto, so as to rule their subjects as fellow-servants, as needing themselves no less loving-kindness?
\end{itemize}
Light) for the purified of mind." Basil the Great sees the Kingdom as Contemplation. Basil’s defining the Kingdom as contemplation is the other side of Gregory Nazianzen’s definition. Those in the Kingdom contemplate the Light of Christ. Gregory of Nyssa differentiates between Christ's kingdom and His nature. It is not clear in this quote whether Gregory sees the Kingdom as Christ Himself in His authority or whether it just pertains to Him in His authority. Chrysostom does not use such language. However, his seeing the Kingdom as Christ or His glory might well be his own way of stating what Gregory Nazianzen expresses in terms of the uncreated Light. Most likely, Chrysostom is using more easily accessible language to express a similar concept of the Kingdom.

As with Chrysostom, no matter which of the three images they use, the Cappadocians speak of baptism as an entrance, of the role of the Spirit, and of the necessity of labor and of love, mercy, or forgiveness. This may indicate the importance of these three images to their conception of Christian life. Conversely, it may simply show that baptism, Spirit, etc. loom so large in their minds that they connect them with everything. Certainly, given the time in which they lived, the divinity of the Spirit was a huge issue and His relationship with baptism was an important aspect of the defense of His divinity. Further study including other images would indicate which supposition (if either) is true.

Again, although there is nothing new or surprising here, the concluding chapter will show that modern citizens of democracies miss major implications of these beliefs.

**LAW AND HEALING IN THE ΠΟΛΙΤΕΙΑ OF HEAVEN**

**Law**

As with the other sections, most of what Chrysostom says in these works echoes his statements in Matthew. “God ... gave the Law (νόμον).” “Christ also gave the Law (φόρτεως) another.”

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634 Gn, Or. 40.25; PG 36.424; NPNF II, 7, p. 377 – Receive besides this the Resurrection, the Judgment and the Reward according to the righteous scales of God; and believe that this will be Light to those whose mind is purified ... proportionate to their degree of purity, which we call the Kingdom (βασιλείαν) of heaven.
635 BG, Ep. 8.12; Courtonne I.36; NPNF II, 8, p. 122 – The kingdom (βασιλείαν) of the heavens ... is the very contemplation of realities.
636 Gn, Contr. Eunom. 3.4.59; Jaeger (1960a); NPNF II, 5, p. 190 – the appellation of Christ indicates His kingdom, while the idea of His kingdom is one, and that of His Nature (φόρτεως) another.
637 Comment. Gal. 1.5; PG 61.619; NPNF I, 13, p. 6

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(νόμον).” 638 (Both cases refer to the Old Testament Law.) “The relationship of the Old (Παλαιᾶς) Testament (no word) with the New (Καινῆς)” is very close. The purpose of both was “that the door of faith might open brightly upon them that hear it.” 639 The Law, in its time, stood in the place of the Spirit. “The Law (νόμος) stood, according to its power, in the place of the Spirit before the Spirit’s coming upon us.” 640

Although the Old Law (νόμον) was good in its time, it has been superseded. “The Church of God ... commends it, though its day is over, because of its profitableness while its season lasted.” 641 For the old dispensation (πολιτεία) was a will of God, yet not the ultimate purpose ... But that ... perfect one ... is the new conversation (πολιτεία).” 642

Christ’s Incarnation did what the Law could not do. “Is it the greater thing that the Law (νόμος) accomplished, but the less that the Only-Begotten did? Surely not ... it was for this that the Only-Begotten came ... for He took none other flesh, but this very one ... beset with troubles.” 643 The Old Law was given by the Spirit, but the new Law is the Spirit Himself. “It is the Spirit he is here calling the law of the Spirit ... The other was merely given by the Spirit.” 644

Grace having arrived, abiding by the Law (νόμον) is now destructive. “If when grace is come ... [the law] confines those who ought to go forward to grace, then it is the destruction of our salvation.” 645 “Thou hast put on Christ ... and dost thou still grovel in the Law (νόμον)?” 646

The abolishing of the Law, however, does not pertain to those parts of it belonging to conscience. Thus, the command (ἐντολή) regarding the Sabbath “was not one of those which were accurately defined of our conscience, but ... temporary .... and ... was abolished afterwards. But those which ... uphold our life, are ... ‘Thou shalt not kill; Thou shalt not commit adultery; Thou shalt not steal.’” 647 The Law is no longer

638 Comment. Gal. 3.5; PG 61.655; NPNF I, 13, p. 28
639 Hom. in Rom. 7.1; PG 60.442; NPNF I, 11, p. 376
640 Comment. Gal. 5.6; PG 61.672; NPNF I, 13, p. 41
641 Sacerdot. 4.4; SC 272; NPNF I, 9, p. 65
642 Hom. in Rom. 20.3; PG 60.598; NPNF I, 11, p. 498
643 Hom. in Rom. 13.5; PG 60.514; NPNF I, 11, p. 432
644 Hom. in Rom. 13.4; PG 60.513; NPNF I, 11, p. 431
645 Comment. Gal. 3.5; PG 61.656; NPNF I, 13, p. 29
646 Comment. Gal. 2.6; PG 61.644; NPNF I, 13, p. 21
647 Ad Pop. Antioch. 12.3; PG 49.131-2; NPNF I, 9, pp. 421-2

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necessary to maintain the laws of conscience because one who lives by the Spirit would
never transgress them. “He that hath the Spirit as he ought, quenches thereby every evil
desire, and ... needs no help from the Law (νόμου), but is exalted far above its
precepts.”

The new dispensation itself has laws, represented as from God, from Christ, from St.
Paul, etc. “God hath never said ... Thou art ... always coming to church and hearing My
laws (νόμων), but ... setting ... anything above My commandments.” Christ “has
given us laws (ἐνομοθέτησε) upon all these points for our good.” “In the New
(Καινῇ) Testament (no word) there are thousands of laws (νόμοι).” “The divine law
(νόμος) indeed has excluded women from the ministry.” The country people “most
rigidly observe” “the law (νόμου) which Paul gave.”

Those under Grace are held to stricter requirements than those before or under the
Law (νόμος). “Virtue (ἀρετή) hath been now made an easier thing (for which cause
also we are under far stricter obligations of religious living).” “For the bonds of the
Law (νόμου) are broken ... not that our standard may be lowered, but that it may be
exalted.” This stricter law has to do with greater love. “Nor give utterance to that cold
saying, ... 'if my right eye does not love me, I tear it out.' For ... thou that art called to a
greater citizenship (πολιτείαν) ... art liable to greater laws (νόμων).” Love allows
the transcendence of the Law. “When the yoke of the Law (νόμου) was taken off
them ... another was laid on, that of love (ἀγάπης), stronger than the former, yet far
lighter and pleasanter.”

Law is summed up in love of God and of neighbor. “For God doeth everything that
He may be loved (φιληθῇ) by us ... let us ... love (φιλήσωμεν) God as we ought to love
(φιλεῖν) Him ... this is ... the kingdom (βασιλεία) of Heaven.” “The whole work of the

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648 Comment. Gal. 5.6; PG 61.672; NPNF I, 13, p. 41
649 Hom. in Rom. 14.9; PG 60.536; NPNF I, 11, p. 449
650 Hom. in Rom. 22.4; PG 60.613; NPNF I, 11, pp. 509-10
651 Hom. in Rom. 12.5; PG 60.500; NPNF I, 11, p. 421
652 Sacerdot. 3.9; SC 272; NPNF I, 9, p. 49
653 Ad Pop. Antioch. 19.1; PG 49.190; NPNF I, 9, p. 466
654 Hom. in Rom. 13.7; PG 60.517; NPNF I, 11, p. 434
655 Comment. Gal. 5.4; PG 61.670; NPNF I, 13, p. 39
656 Hom. in Rom. 27.3; PG 60.647; NPNF I, 11, p. 536
657 Comment. Gal. 5.4; PG 61.670; NPNF I, 13, p. 40
658 Hom. in Rom. 23.5; PG 60.622; NPNF I, 11, p. 516
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commandments (ἐντολῶν) is concisely ... completed. For the beginning and the end of virtue (ἀρετῆς) is love (ἀγάπη). The law “is fulfilled not in circumcision but in love (ἀγάπη).” Loving one’s neighbor is loving God. “Let us then love (Φιλῶμεν) one another, since in this way we shall also love (ἀγαπήσοντες) God.” Failure to love the poor is failure to love Christ and the worst possible breach of the Law. “Thou dost not look upon Him even when pining with starvation ... What can be worse than such a breach of law (παρανομίας) as this?” Love must be according to God’s Law. “Either we love no one (φιλοῦμεν), or ... we love (φιλοῦμεν) contrary to what seemeth good unto God, acting in both against the Divine law (νόμον).”

As mentioned above, the law of the Spirit is the Spirit Himself. Without the indwelling of the Spirit (and, indeed of the whole Trinity), one cannot keep God’s Laws. “For wheresoever one Person of the Trinity is, there the whole Trinity is present ... great evils ... come of not having the Holy Spirit ... inability to satisfy His laws (νόμων), not being Christ’s as we should be, the want of His indwelling.” On the other hand, the blessings of having the Spirit include “Having Christ himself ... living an immortal life ... running with ease the race of virtue.”

Thus, in its highest sense, Law is synonymous (or at least inseparably bound) with the Spirit in one’s heart. One can keep the various laws of God because the One Who is Himself the Law of the Spirit lives within him. The next two points are best understood in light of this.

The man that lives according to God’s Laws sees reality as it is. “If ye learn ... what God may will ... and know how to distinguish the nature of things (τῶν πραγμάτων ... τὰς φύσεις), thou art in possession of the whole way of virtue ... What then are the things which God willeth? to live in poverty, in lowliness of mind ... in all the other points whereon He hath given us laws (ἐνομοθέτησεν).”

God’s Laws are gifts. Chrysostom represents Flavian, when interceding for the people of Antioch, as telling the Emperor, “I am come into your royal presence

659 Hom. in Rom. 23.3; PG 60.619; NPNF I, 11, p. 514
660 Comment. Gal. 5.4; PG 61.670; NPNF I, 13, p. 40
661 Hom. in Rom. 23.4; PG 60.619; NPNF I, 11, p. 515
662 Hom. in Rom. 15.6; PG 60.547; NPNF I, 11, p. 457
663 Hom. in Rom. 2.2; PG 60.403; NPNF I, 11, p. 345
664 Hom. in Rom. 13.8; PG 60.519; NPNF I, 11, p. 436
665 Hom. in Rom. 20.2; PG 60.598; NPNF I, 11, p. 498
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with the sacred laws (ἵερων ... νόμων); and instead of all other gifts, I present these.”

If in fact, the highest Law is simply the indwelling Spirit, the keeping of the Divine Laws is either a step towards His permanent indwelling or its result. Obviously, then, these Laws are the greatest of gifts and would bring understanding of fundamental reality.

The Law of Nature

The homilies on Romans speak extensively about the moral law (or laws) of nature. This is not a major theme in the other works here considered. In a key text, the Romans homilies differentiate among three moral laws – natural law, written law, and the law of works.

For there is a natural law (νόμος ὁ φυσικὸς) and there is a written law. But there is one also between these, that by works ...

“For when the Gentiles … which have not the Law (νόμον)” ... The written one. “Do by nature (φύσει) the things of the Law (νόμου)” ... that by works. “These having not the Law (νόμον)” ... The written one. “Are a law (νόμος) unto themselves” ... using the natural (φυσικῷ) law (no word). “Who show the work of the Law (νόμου)” ... that by actions. For that which is by writing lieth outside; but this is within, the natural (φύσεως) one, and the other is in actions (φύσεως) ... if this be not present they are of no good, but even very great harm.

Thus, the law of nature is an internal knowledge of right and wrong; the written law, an external guide; and the law of works, one's response to the other two. If one's works do not conform with the external and internal laws, these laws do more harm than good.

The Law of Nature (φυσικὸ ... νόμον) made men aware of sin, but not to the degree that the written Law did. Thus, when St. Paul says, “I should not have known sin but by the Law (νόμου),’ He is speaking, not of absolute want of knowledge, but of the more accurate knowledge.

The Law of Nature (νόμον ... φύσεως) is also called “the Law (νόμῳ) of my mind (νοός),” and the law (νόμῳ) of sin is opposed to it. “When God formed man, he implanted within him from the beginning a natural law (νόμον ... φυσικόν),” giving “utterance to conscience within us.” This law “made the knowledge of good things, and

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666 Ad Pop. Antioch. 21.3; PG 49.219; NPNF I, 9, p. 488
667 Hom. in Rom. 6.2; PG 60.435; NPNF I, 11, p. 370
668 Hom. in Rom. 12.6; PG 60.502; NPNF I, 11, p. 423
669 Hom. in Rom. 13.3; PG 60.511; NPNF I, 11, p. 430
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... the contrary, to be self-taught.” Thus, those aspects of the written law that are part of the natural law (i.e. “Thou shalt not kill.”) were given with no explanation because “conscience had taught this beforehand.”  

Some Gentiles before and after the Law “obeyed the law of nature (φυσικῶ ... νόμω)” and “strictly kept all things, save the Jewish observances, which contribute to piety.”  

This was the more remarkable in that “the written (γραπτὸν) Law (no word) even required less than the law of nature (φυσικός ... νόμος),” owing to God’s great condescension towards the Jewish race. Chrysostom concludes from this that those “who lived (πολιτευσάμενοι) under the old (Παλαιὰ) dispensation (no word), had no hardship done them by so moderate a system of laws being imposed (συμμέτρου νομοθεσίας) upon them” and that if they were still unable to gain the upper hand over sin “the charge is against their own listlessness.”  

Christ, in introducing the Golden Rule, was “not introducing a strange law, or one which surpassed our nature (ἡμῶν τὴν φύσιν), but that which He had of old deposited beforehand in our conscience ... For the knowledge of virtue He hath implanted in our nature (ἡμῶν τῇ φύσει); but the practice of it and the correction He hath entrusted to our moral choice (ἡμῶν τῇ προαιρέσει).” This seems contradictory to the concept of the true human surpassing human nature. Perhaps, Chrysostom here refers to human nature in its pristine state. Alternatively, he may just be trying to show how light the commands of Christ are.  

This passage can be interpreted in light of the three laws discussed above. The natural law is witnessed to by a man’s conscience, but the man must then use his moral choice to act on it, thus abiding by the law of works instead of falling into soul-destroying listlessness.

**Faith, Grace, Works**

Any discussion of the place of Law in Chrysostom’s Romans homilies and Galatians commentaries must take into account his understanding of Faith, Grace, and Works.

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670 Ad Pop. Antioch. 12.3; PG 49.131; NPNF I, 9, p. 421
671 Hom. in Rom. 5.3; PG 60.426; NPNF I, 11, p. 363
672 Hom. in Rom. 13.4; PG 60.512; NPNF I, 11, p. 431
673 Ad Pop. Antioch. 13.3; PG 49.140; NPNF I, 9, p. 428
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Chrysostom’s statements on this topic are complex and sometimes seemingly contradictory.

Salvation by faith is superior to that of works. “It was impossible to be saved otherwise than by faith ... this salvation ... was even the cause of a bright glory, and a greater than that through works.”\(^{674}\) This might imply that salvation by works is possible, but within Chrysostom’s thought, it can only mean that salvation by faith is better than salvation by works, were salvation by works possible.

Abraham came to thrive in faith “by giving glory to God.”\(^{675}\) Though he was great in works, faith made Abraham worthy of the gift of God. “If he who was before grace, was justified by Faith, although plentiful in works, much more we.”\(^{676}\) “After saying, that the gift of God was great and unspeakable ... he shows farther that Abraham’s faith was deserving of the gift” thus proving that he had not “been honored without reason.”\(^{677}\)

However, “faith is not opposed to the Law (αὐτῷ, referring to νόμος).” Rather, faith establishes the Law in that it does what the Law purposed but could not effect – “to make man righteous.”\(^{678}\)

Nor is faith an excuse for listlessness. “After having said much on the subject of faith, he had set it before righteousness which is by works, to prevent any one from supposing what he said was a ground for listlessness, he says, ‘let us have peace,’ that is, let us sin no more, nor go back to our former estate.”\(^{679}\) Also, faith requires greater labor than temperance and similar virtues.

The believer works more than the other, and requires more power ... it is not only he that succeeds in temperance, or any other virtue of this sort, but he that displays faith also who requires even greater power. For as the one needs strength to beat off the reasonings of intemperance, so hath the faithful also need of a soul endued with power, that he may thrust aside the suggestions of unbelief.\(^{680}\)

Faith is the Christian’s contribution to his salvation. “How are we to be saved ... we ... offer no small matter ... our faith.”\(^{681}\) This might imply that Christians are saved by faith alone. Elsewhere, Chrysostom states exactly that. “He who adhered to Faith alone, is

\(^{674}\) Hom. in Rom. 8.1; PG 60.453; NPNF I, 11, p. 385
\(^{675}\) Hom. in Rom. 8.5; PG 60.461; NPNF I, 11, p. 391
\(^{676}\) Comment. Gal. 3.2; PG 61.650; NPNF I, 13, p. 25
\(^{677}\) Hom. in Rom. 8.5; PG 60.460; NPNF I, 11, p. 390
\(^{678}\) Hom. in Rom. 7.4; PG 60.447; NPNF I, 11, p. 380
\(^{679}\) Hom. in Rom. 9.1; PG 60.467; NPNF I, 11, pp. 395-6
\(^{680}\) Hom. in Rom. 8.5; PG 60.461; NPNF I, 11, p. 391
\(^{681}\) Hom. in Rom. 7.2; PG 60.443; NPNF I, 11, p. 377

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blessed." \(^{682}\) "This is the only gift that we brought in to God, believing Him in what He promised shall come ... by this way alone we were saved." \(^{683}\)

On the other hand, faith alone is insufficient. "He showed goodness to thee ... that thou mightest ... do things worthy of God’s love toward man (φιλανθρωπίας). For there is need of something more than faith." \(^{684}\) Faith is the Christian’s contribution to his baptism; earnestness, his contribution afterwards.

There are two mortifyings, and two deaths, and that one is done by Christ in Baptism, and the other it is our duty to effect by earnestness afterwards. For that our former sins were buried, came of His gift. But the remaining dead to sin after baptism must be the work of our own earnestness, however much we find God here also giving us large help. For this is not the only thing Baptism has the power to do, to obliterate our former transgressions; for it also secures against subsequent ones. As then in the case of the former, thy contribution was faith that they might be obliterated, so also in those subsequent to this, show thou forth the change in thine aims, that thou mayest not defile thyself again. \(^{685}\)

Thus, baptism can secure even against subsequent sins, but this also requires earnestness in the baptized believer.

Faith must produce a spiritual life if one is to keep the Spirit. “There is need not only of faith, but also of a spiritual way of life (πολιτείας), that we may keep the Spirit.” \(^{686}\) In fact, without works one cannot have the Spirit and *vice versa*. “If we have good works, we shall have the Spirit; and if we have the Spirit, we shall also have good works.” Conversely, “if we have no works, the Spirit flieth away. But if we be deserted by the Spirit, we shall also halt in our works.” \(^{687}\)

Thus, faith is the Christian’s only contribution to his salvation, but is clearly insufficient without works. One cannot even keep the Holy Spirit without works.

Chrysostom’s views of grace, works, and law are similarly complex. Grace is the work of the entire Trinity. “The Law stood (νόμου) ... in the place of the Spirit before the Spirit’s coming upon us ... but now that grace is given, what more need is there of the Law (νόμου)?” \(^{688}\) Thus, the Spirit’s coming is intimately connected with the coming of

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\(^{682}\) *Comment. Gal. 3.3; PG 61.651; NPNF I, 13, p. 26*

\(^{683}\) *Hom. in Rom. 14.6; PG 60.532; NPNF I, 11, p. 446*

\(^{684}\) *Hom. in Rom. 19.5; PG 60.590; NPNF I, 11, p. 492*

\(^{685}\) *Hom. in Rom. 11.1; PG 60.483; NPNF I, 11, p. 408*

\(^{686}\) *Hom. in Rom. 29.2; PG 60.655; NPNF I, 11, p. 543*

\(^{687}\) *Hom. in Rom. 28.2; PG 60.651; NPNF I, 11, p. 539*

\(^{688}\) *Comment. Gal. 5.6; PG 61.672; NPNF I, 13, p. 41*
grace. Grace also involves the work of Father and Son. “Observe ... the necessity of having grace present with us, and that the well-doings herein belong alike to the Father and the Son.”

Chrysostom often contrasts grace with the Law. “The law of nature (φύσεως ... νόμος) availed not, and the written (γραπτὸς) Law (no word) was of no advantage ... after this the salvation which is by grace was necessary.”

“The reality hath succeeded to the type, and grace hath shut out the Law (νόμον).”

“Christ hath both delivered us from our offenses, and secured us for the future ... For neither of these did the Law (νόμος) avail, but grace was sufficient for both.”

This seems to indicate that grace alone is sufficient for these two benefits. On the other hand, “No one will be able to make us ... blessed, if we do not make ourselves such, following up the grace of God.”

Following after grace involves a new way of life. “Our soul ... hath been ... renewed by baptism ... Wherefore we require a new and heavenly rule of life (πολιτείαν) ... it is in their power to be true Israelites, who keep this rule, who desist from the old ways, and follow after grace.”

In a passage mentioned previously, Chrysostom states that all is of grace, yet insists that willingness and living rightly are also required.

Next that you may learn that it came not of your own willing temper (εὐγνωμοσύνης) only, but the whole of it of God's grace also, after saying, “Ye have obeyed from the heart,” he adds, “that form of doctrine which was delivered you.”

For the obedience from the heart shows the free will (αὐτεξούσιον). But the being delivered, hints the assistance from God. But what is the form of doctrine? It is living aright, and in conformity with the best conversation (πολιτείας).

He even sees good works as properly called grace. Paul “speaks of grace, not to disparage the labor of resolve on our part ... For he knows how ... to call even well doings, graces; because even in these we need much influence from above.”

Chrysostom also distinguishes between true good works and spurious good works. “For as gold ... when committed to the fire, is closely proved, and all that is spurious is..."
Thus, all is grace and yet true good works must be present, along with an entire new way of life.

One way in which the Romans homilies and Galatians commentaries differ from the Matthean homilies is that they are less likely to contrast the Old and New Laws than they are to contrast Law and grace. However, in a few key places, they show an extremely important understanding of the new Law. Chrysostom understands Galatians 5:25 (If we live by the Spirit, by the Spirit let us also walk) as “being governed (πολιτευόμενοι) by His laws (νόμους). For this is the force of the words ‘let us walk,’ that is, let us be content with the power of the Spirit, and seek no help from the Law (νόμου).”

Thus, one who seeks no help from the Law is under greater laws. Not only are these the laws of the Spirit, the “Law of the Spirit” is the Spirit Himself. “He here calls the Spirit the law (νόμον) of the Spirit ... The other was merely given by the Spirit, but this even furnisheth those that receive it with the Spirit in large measure.” Thus, the Law of the Spirit is the Spirit furnishing Himself to the faithful. In a similar vein, Chrysostom identifies Grace as “the law (νόμου) of grace.”

Even more importantly, he defines “the law of faith (πίστεως νόμος)” as “being saved by grace.”

Thus, far from decrying law, Chrysostom exalts law to the highest possible state – with the Spirit being Himself the Law of the Spirit. The close connection of grace with the Spirit and also the Father and Son (not to mention the common understanding of grace as God Himself acting in human beings) also shows that law at its highest has to do with being in proper relationship with God and attaining power for living from Him. Likewise, the definition of “the law of faith” as “being saved by grace” points to a relationship with the God Who in His compassion grants grace to men.

The problem with the Old Law is not that it is a law, but that it could not go far enough – it was external and could not produce righteousness. The law of nature, though internal, also could not produce righteousness. For either of these to be of any...
use at all, a law of works was required. However, even this was insufficient, but faith, which comes from glorifying God, was needed. Those under the New Covenant (and most likely, those justified under the Law and before the Law) enter into relationship with God through faith and that faith necessarily exhibits works.

A further problem with the Law is revealed in the following passage.

“For none of us liveth unto himself, and no man dieth unto himself. For whether we live, we live unto the Lord; and whether we die, we die unto the Lord,”... For how can he that liveth unto the Law (νόμῳ), be living unto Christ? ... We are not free, we have a Master who also would have us live, and willeth not that we die, and to whom both of these are of more interest than to us.” The problem is not with the Law, but with an improper attitude towards it. The man who lives for the Law has no room in his heart for the Master who cares more for him than he does for himself.

True faith involves love and prevents such bondage to the Law.

“For in Jesus Christ neither circumcision availeth any thing, nor uncircumcision; but faith working through love.” ... this error had crept in because the love of Christ had not been rooted within them. For to believe is not all that is required, but also to abide in love (ἀγαπῶντας) ... Had ye loved (ἠγαπᾶτε) Christ as ye ought, ye would not have deserted to bondage, nor abandoned Him who redeemed you.

Thus, not only is love the highest expression of the Law, it is the necessary outworking of Faith, which is itself a law and can be described as “being saved by grace.” In the end, faith, grace, law, and true works are all about restored relationship between God and man, which naturally results in restored relationships among men.

Before concluding this section, one must attempt to reconcile Chrysostom’s insistence on faith alone with his insistence that more than faith is needed. This can be understood in terms of συνεργία. Man must work, but if the works are truly good, God Himself is working them. However, another possibility exists. Πίστις can mean both faith and faithfulness. Perhaps, Chrysostom uses the word sometimes in the first sense, sometimes in the other, and sometimes encompassing both. Chrysostom himself recognizes that St. Paul employs words in different ways to express different aspects of truth and it seems that Chrysostom does the same thing here.

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702 Hom. in Rom. 25.2; PG 60.631; NPNF I, 11, p. 524
703 Comment. Gal. 5.2; PG 61.666; NPNF I, 13, p. 37
704 Hom. in Rom. 10.4; PG 60.479; NPNF I, 11, p. 405 – “How shall we,” he says, “that are dead to sin, live any longer therein?” ... indeed he elsewhere saith that sin itself is dead. But there to show that virtue is easy ... here ... to rouse the hearer, he puts the death on his side.
Thus, when he speaks of faith as man’s only contribution, he may be thinking of the entire scope of πίστις. On the other hand, when he speaks of the necessity of more than faith, he may have in mind the initial act of belief.

His denigration of works righteousness can similarly be reconciled with his absolute insistence on good works. It is not simply the difference between works anterior to faith in Christ and works afterwards. True, works cannot save, but works are an integral part of faith. Thus, the works that he decries are spurious works, done for the sake of the Law (or perhaps vainglory), as opposed to the works that come of love of God, without which the Spirit flees from a man, and which are possible only in the Spirit.

However one attempts to understand Chrysostom’s complex views on faith, works, law, grace, etc., it is evident that they are relational – primarily between God and man, and flowing from that primary relationship, secondarily between man and man. The difficulty of teasing apart the work of man and the work of God is some indication of how very close the relationship of man to God is in the πολιτεία.

In short, law is summed up in love. Neither the internal natural law nor the external written law is useful without the law of works, but faith and grace are required beyond that. With these, the Christian is able to keep the law of love because he is filled with the One Who is Himself Love.

Healing

Christ is the healer of soul and body. “As the paralyzed body needed the hand from above, so doth the soul which hath been deadened.” Yet His work extends far beyond mere healing, for “what we received was not a medicine (φάρμακον) only to countervail the wound, but even health, and comeliness, and honor, and glory and dignities far transcending our natural state (ἡμετέραν ... φύσιν).”

Sickness of soul and body bear certain similarities and also affect one another. “As in the body, a neglect of wounds (τραυμάτων) generates fever, mortification, and death; so in the soul, slight evils overlooked open the door to graver ones.” Sickness of soul affects the body. God cushioned the brain so that “it might not be rubbed and pained in striking against the hard bones which

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705 Hom. in Rom. 7.3; PG 60.445; NPNF I, 11, p. 378
706 Hom. in Rom. 10.2; PG 60.477; NPNF I, 11, p. 403
707 Comment. Gal. 1.6; PG 61.623; NPNF I, 13, p. 8
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encompass it, in the throbbing and quick pulsation to which it is subject in anger and similar affections.”

On the other hand, “although we be never so philosophic, the nature (φύσις) of the body proves incapable of deriving any benefit for its own health, from the philosophy of the soul.”

This last quote refers to the closing of the baths in Antioch and the hardship endured by those needing the baths for medical reasons. This does not mean that the body is affected only by the sins of the soul and never by its virtues – as is shown in the next quote. Bodily imbalances affect the soul, which can (at least in this case) overcome the body’s disposition. Quarrelsomeness “comes either from excessive heat (φλεγμονής), or from coldness; but both of these is the might of love (ἀγάπης) wont to correct by its warmth.”

Certain material things can affect health of both body and soul. “Night, again, is not only a medicine (φάρμακον) for bodily sufferings, (παθῶν ... σωματικῶν), but also for mental diseases (ψυχικῶν νοσημάτων), in giving rest to anguished souls.” This quote concerns not the virtues of the soul, but its emotions – specifically, grief over loss of a son.

On the other hand, the “bodies as well as souls” of simple country people “enjoy a sound state of health, inasmuch as they have banished all luxury of diet, and driven off all the evil floods of drunkenness.” Here, Chrysostom is mostly talking of the soul in terms of its virtues, although he certainly would agree that such lives contribute also to emotional health. Bodily weakness can affect certain disciplines such as fasting, but “the chief of the precepts (ἐντολῶν), and those which maintain our life” cannot “be impaired ... through the weakness of the body.”

Sickness of soul is much more disgusting than sickness of body. This makes sense, since the soul’s illnesses arise by choice. “In the one case, there is the necessity of nature (φύσεώς ... ἀνάγκη); in the other, the whole is seated in the power of choice (προαιρέσει).”

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708 Ad Pop. Antioch. 10.3; PG 49.124; NPNF I, 9, pp. 415-6
709 Ad Pop. Antioch. 14.6; PG 49.152; NPNF I, 9, p. 437
710 Hom. in Rom. 27.3; PG 60.648; NPNF I, 11, p. 537
711 NPNF says “labors” instead of “sufferings.”
712 Ad Pop. Antioch. 8.1; PG 49.98; NPNF I, 9, p. 395
713 Ad Pop. Antioch. 19.1; PG 49.190; NPNF I, 9, p. 466
714 Ad Pop. Antioch. 20.1; PG 49.198; NPNF I, 9, p. 472
715 Hom. in Rom. 10.5; PG 60.480; NPNF I, 11, p. 406
716 Ad Pop. Antioch. 18.3; PG 49.186; NPNF I, 9, p. 462
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Sickness of soul is more serious than that of the body and requires more care. “If, when the body needs healing, such exactness is required on our part, much more ought we, when our care is about the soul ... to search into every particular with the utmost accuracy.”717

Though more serious than sickness of body, sickness of soul is more easily healed. “From bodily sickness (ἀῤῥωστίας) no great injury (βλάβη) could arise, (for ... death would in any case ... dissolve the body); but everything depends upon the health (ὑγεία) of our souls; this being by far the more precious and necessary.” For this reason, God “hath made the medicining (θεραπείαν) of it easy, and void of expense or pain (ἀνώδυνον).” Thus, while “to cure (θεραπεύσαι) the body ... is not an easy matter to every one ... to cure (ιάσασθαι) a sick (ἀῤῥωστοῦσαν) soul is easy to all.”718

On the other hand, the Body of Christ (here meaning the Church) is harder to cure than the individual’s body. “That body is subject to more diseases (νόσοις) and assaults than this flesh of ours, is more quickly corrupted, and more slow to recover.”719 The challenge is that maladies of the soul are “not easy ... for a man to discern” and that “Christians above all men are not permitted forcibly to correct the failings of those who sin.”720

Man’s free will can explain the apparent contradiction. The man who wishes to be free of sin may do so easily, but the unwilling man cannot be easily healed by another.

Therapeutic language in no way implies that the sinner bears no responsibility for his sin. Those guilty of ἀπονοία (here translated “recklessness”) are “more miserable than the mad (τῶν μαινομένων) ... they are beside themselves (ἐξεστήκασι), as are these, but they are not excused, as are these, but are hated only.”721 “When the soul receives a wound (πληγὴν) ... it is ... gnawed by an evil conscience; and ... at the time of judgment (κρίσεως), it is delivered over to eternal punishment.”722

The ‘therapy’ of God can be gentle or rough, depending largely on the disposition of the ‘patient.’ “Observe his wisdom [i.e. Paul’s], how he gave a deep cut in the former

717 Ad Pop. Antioch. 3; PG 49.52; NPNF I, 9, p. 358
718 Ad Pop. Antioch. 8.3; PG 49.101; NPNF I, 9, p. 397
719 Sacerdot. 4.3; SC 272; NPNF I, 9, p. 64
720 Sacerdot. 2.3; SC 272; NPNF I, 9, p. 41
721 Hom. in Rom. 20.4; PG 60.600-1; NPNF I, 11, p. 500
722 Sacerdot. 6.13; SC 272; NPNF I, 9, p. 82
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part, and then when he had succeeded in what he wished, how he uses much kindliness next.”723 “Paul hath varied his discourse according to the need of his disciples, at one time using knife and cautery, at another, applying mild remedies (φάρμακα).”724

The good priest must know how “where the circumstances ... require it ... to be both kind and severe, for it is not possible to treat all those under one’s charge on one plan.”725 “Come forward and raise [the blasphemer] up ... both by meekness and by vehemence; let the medicine (φάρμακον) be various.”726

Ailments of soul admit of various medicines. Heresy can be healed only by “the powerful application of the Word.” However, “as regards the ordering of our daily life ... the life of another may provoke us to emulation.”727 “Fasting is a medicine (φάρμακον) but “since then the danger in fasting is so great to those who do not know how they ought to fast, we should learn the laws (νόμους) of this exercise.”728

The one who puts in mind his sins and the Day of Judgment will “take back with him the medicine (φάρμακον) for all these things.”729 The remedy for the lust of the flesh is walking in the Spirit.

“Walk by the Spirit, and ye shall not fulfill the lust of the flesh.” ... nothing ... renders us so susceptible of love (ἀγαπητικοὺς), as to be spiritual, and nothing is such an inducement to the Spirit to abide in us, as the strength of love (ἀγάπης) ... having spoken of the cause of the disease (νόσον), he likewise mentions the remedy (φάρμακον) ... the life in the Spirit.”730

As the highest law is to be filled with the Spirit, full health is to walk in Him, thus generating love, which gives the Spirit further inducement to indwell the believer.

Christians are affected by each other’s sickness and responsible in part for their cure. The following concerns the insurrection in Antioch. “Behold, the crime was that of a few, but the blame comes on all!” Chrysostom reproves his hearers that they had not “chastised them, and corrected the sick (νενοσηκὸς) member” and then admonishes them, “let us control their spirit, and provide for their salvation.”731 Likewise, when one

723 Hom. in Rom. 29.1; PG 60.653-4; NPNF I, 11, p. 542
724 Comment. Gal. 1.1; PG 61.612; NPNF I, 13, p. 1
725 Sacerdot. 6.4; SC 272; NPNF I, 9, p. 77
726 Ad Pop. Antioch. 1.12; PG 49.34; NPNF I, 9, p. 344
727 Sacerdot. 4.3; SC 272; NPNF I, 9, p. 64
728 Ad Pop. Antioch. 3; PG 49.51-52; NPNF I, 9, p. 358
729 Ad Pop. Antioch. 15.2; PG 49.155; NPNF I, 9, p. 440
730 Comment. Gal. 5.5; PG 61.670-1; NPNF I, 13, p. 40
731 Ad Pop. Antioch. 2.3; PG 49.38; NPNF I, 9, p. 347

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 Corinthian man committed fornication, “if that member were not chastened, the disease (νόσημα) progressing onward would at length attack all the rest.”\textsuperscript{732}

Though God is the wise Physician of souls, His medicines can be harmful to those who reject the cure. “What great evil sin is, namely, a listless will, an inclinableness to the worse side, the actual doing ... and the perverted judgment.” Because of these the great evil from which Christ had delivered humanity “by the medicines used to cure it (ιατρικῶν φαρμάκων), had become worse, and was increased by the preventives (κωλυόντων).”\textsuperscript{733} The wounds of those who persist in this rejection become incurable. “When one day is past, the shame becomes greater; and when the second has arrived, it is still further increased; ... thenceforth the wound (ἐλκος) will become incurable (ἀνίατον).”\textsuperscript{734} Those who cannot receive correction are cut off. “He admonishes and chastens the former as his own children, and as capable of receiving correction, but their deceivers he cuts off, as aliens and incurably ill.”\textsuperscript{735}

\textit{The Role of the Priest}

Since \textit{The Treatise on the Priesthood} extensively addresses the role of the priest as healer for his flock, a short section must be devoted to this topic. The priest is the proper healer of his flock. The person who wishes to correct his brother should “Show the wound (ἐλκος) to the priest; that is the part of one who ... is anxious on his behalf.”\textsuperscript{736} As mentioned above, the priest cannot heal by compulsion because “God rewards those who abstain from evil by their own choice (προαιρέσει), not of necessity. Consequently much skill is required that our patients (κάμνοντες) may be induced to submit willingly to the treatment (Θεοκαπείας).”\textsuperscript{737} Nor can the priest use the same punishment for the same offenses. “For we ought not, in applying punishment, merely to proportion it to the scale of the offense, but rather to keep in view the disposition of the sinner, lest ... in your zealous endeavors to restore what is fallen, you make the ruin

\textsuperscript{732} \textit{Ad Pop. Antioch.} 13.4; \textit{PG} 49.142; \textit{NPNF} I, 9, p. 430
\textsuperscript{733} \textit{Hom. in Rom.} 12.6; \textit{PG} 60.503; \textit{NPNF} I, 11, p. 423
\textsuperscript{734} \textit{Ad Pop. Antioch.} 20.5; \textit{PG} 49.205; \textit{NPNF} I, 9, pp. 476-7
\textsuperscript{735} \textit{Comment. Gal.} 5.3; \textit{PG} 61.668; \textit{NPNF} I, 13, pp. 38-9. \textit{NPNF} has ‘depraved’ instead of ‘ill.’
\textsuperscript{736} \textit{Ad Pop. Antioch.} 3; \textit{PG} 49.54; \textit{NPNF} I, 9, pp. 359-60
\textsuperscript{737} \textit{Sacerdot.} 2.3; \textit{SC} 272; \textit{NPNF} I, 9, p. 41
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greater.” His ministry includes “knitting together the severed members of the Church.”  

Because the priest “must have a care for the moral health” of his flock, he must “fortify himself with a very strict guard” to avoid the devil’s snares.” When he does sin, his “wounds (τραύματα) ... need more assistance” because they “are aggravated through the dignity of the Priest, who dares to commit them.”

The priesthood also has a judicial aspect. “The judicial (κρίσεων) department of the bishop’s office involves ... difficulties exceeding those experienced by men who sit to judge (δικάζειν) secular affairs; for it is a labor to discover exact justice (δίκαιον) ... and ... difficult to avoid destroying it.” Not only is the judicial aspect of the priesthood more difficult than that of secular judges, the priest has far greater authority. “They ... have received an authority which God has not given to angels or archangels ... They who rule (κρατοῦντες) on earth have indeed authority to bind, but only the body: whereas this binding lays hold of the soul and penetrates the heavens.”

The priest’s ministry has many aspects. However, “all ... have one end in view, the glory of God, and the edifying of the Church.”

To summarize, Christ heals both soul and body. Body and soul affect each other’s health both positively and negatively. Therapeutic language does not excuse sin. God uses gentle and harsh cures as needed. Of various remedies used, the chief seem to be love and walking in the Spirit, which each strengthen the other. The sickness of one member of Christ’s Body affects all others. Such a person must be disciplined for his own sake and that of the Body. If he is incurable, he is cut off from the Body. Unlike the Matthew homilies, Chrysostom does not state anywhere in these homilies (as far as the author was able to determine) that being cut off permanently from the Body was somehow good even for the incurable member. The priest functions as healer, but also as judge. The priest’s goal in all he does should be the glory of God and the edifying of the Church.

738 Sacerdot. 2.4; SC 272; NPNF I, 9, p. 41
739 Sacerdot. 6.8; SC 272; NPNF I, 9, pp. 78-9
740 Sacerdot. 6.11; SC 272; NPNF I, 9, p. 80
741 Sacerdot. 3.14; SC 272; NPNF I, 9, p. 58
742 Sacerdot. 3.5; SC 272; NPNF I, 9, p. 47
741 Sacerdot. 6.4; SC 272; NPNF I, 9, p. 77
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**Interplay of Law and Healing**

Significantly, both the Romans homilies and the Galatian commentaries speak of the Old Testament Law as a medicine. “When we desire a thing, and then are hindered of it, the flame of the desire is but increased. Now this came not of the Law... but sin ... used what was good for the reverse. But this is no fault in the physician (ἰατροῦ), but in the patient who applies the medicine (φαρμάκῳ) wrongly.”744 “As the Jews were not even conscious of their own sins, and in consequence did not even desire remission; the Law (νόμον) was given to probe their wounds (τραύματα), that they might long for a physician (ἰατρόν).”745

Taking these alone, one might be tempted to conclude that Chrysostom thinks primarily in therapeutic terms. However, he is also capable of opposing law and healing.

The priest must heal the wounds of his flock by their free consent, as opposed to the secular judge who forces compliance to certain laws. The priest cannot do this because “God rewards those who abstain from evil by their own choice (προαιρέσει), not of necessity.”746 Here, Chrysostom sees Law in terms of compulsion and therapy in terms of free consent.

As priest during the aftermath of the riot concerning the statues, Chrysostom applies to “the sore of despondency ... the medicine of consolation.”

“The rulers (ἄρχοντες) threaten; therefore must the Church give comfort ... Since therefore the rulers also make you afraid ... the Church administers daily consolation; telling us that the fear of rulers is profitable, and profitable too the consolation that comes from hence [i.e. the Church]. For the fear of the former does not permit ... listlessness, but the consolation of the latter does not allow us to sink the weight of sadness; and by both these means God provides for our safety.”747

Here, Chrysostom seems to see the civil authorities in very juridical terms and the Church in very therapeutic. However, the Church herself teaches that these are complimentary roles, by which God provides for the safety of the community.

Interestingly, though Chrysostom speaks of the Old Law as therapeutic in the Galatians commentaries and Romans homilies, he never seems to speak of civil

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744 Hom. in Rom. 12.5; PG 60.500; NPNF I, 11, p. 421.
745 Comment. Gal. 3.5; PG 61.655; NPNF I, 13, p. 29.
746 Sacerdot. 2.3; SC 272; NPNF I, 9, p. 41
747 Ad Pop. Antioch. 6.1; PG 49.81; NPNF I, 9, p. 381
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law in therapeutic terms in the Homilies on the Statues. Rather, as noted above, he contrasts the consolatory and therapeutic nature of the priestly office with the punitive nature of secular authority towards the wicked, yet accepts both as necessary for the welfare of the city. He does see the riots as a wound to the civil community. However, the “remedy for the wound (ἰάσις τῷ τραύματι) and a medicine for these evils (φάρμακον τοῖς τοσούτοις κακοίς)” is not punishment, but forgiveness and restoration of the city to Imperial favor so as to defeat the demonic powers that were behind the riot. The result of such magnanimity would be that pagans, Jews, and barbarians alike would glorify the Christian God “who makes angels out of men (ἀνθρώπων), and renders them superior to all the constraining force of our nature (ἀνάγκης φυσικῆς)!”

Thus, in the context of the insurrection in Antioch, Chrysostom contrasts juridical civil power with therapeutic priestly role. The healing of the civil wound is not by force, but by Christian forgiveness. Perhaps, this can be understood by his statement that even if the priest were not forbidden to use force, there would be no scope for it “inasmuch as God rewards those who abstain from evil by their own choice, not of necessity.” Thus, the civil power would not be spiritually therapeutic for those who are only constrained externally and do not choose to change their ways. On the other hand, the exhibition of Christian forgiveness by the Emperor would change the people’s hearts, thus allow the wound in the community to heal.

Had Chrysostom chosen to do so, though, he could easily have cast this into terms similar to the Galatians passage above and said that the civil authorities’ powers were given so to probe the rioters’ wounds, that they might long for a physician. Thus, he is making similar points in different ways. Perhaps, his reason for contrasting the civil and priestly authorities in this manner is precisely that he wished the people to run to the Church for spiritual comfort and thus emphasized her consoling role.

Below, Chrysostom differentiates among the offices of Judge, Physician, and Teacher.

Judges (Δικασταὶ) in general, when they find thieves and grave-robbers, do not consider how they may make them better, but how they may make them pay the penalty of the offenses committed. But God ... when He finds a sinner, considers ... how He may amend him ... So that God is at the same time a

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748 Ad Pop. Antioch. 21.3; PG 49.217; NPNF I, 9, p. 485-6
749 Sacerdot. 2.3; SC 272; NPNF I, 9, p. 41
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Judge (δικαστὴς), a Physician (ἰατρὸς), and a Teacher (διδάσκαλός); for as a Judge (δικαστὴς) He examines, and as a Physician (ἰατρὸς) He amends, and as a Teacher (διδάσκαλός) He instructs those who have sinned, directing them unto all spiritual wisdom.  

On the secular level, the Judge simply enforces laws and requires payment of penalties. Even as Judge, God is superior to this in that His main role as Judge is to examine. As Physician, He then amends, and as Teacher He instructs sinners so that they may attain unto wisdom. Here, Chrysostom leaves unmentioned the fact that some people refuse to amend and that God then judges them in a final sense. However, only a few paragraphs later, he asks those whom he is attempting to cure of swearing oaths "What pardon ... shall we have?" implying that failure to amend would be severely punished.

Again, Chrysostom uses different terms and concepts in different ways to make various points. Law is a medicine, and God is a compassionate Judge, Physician, and Teacher. Yet, to those who refuse to amend, law is simply an external rein on behavior that they have no wish to change. To such people, no excuse remains.

The Wider Perspective

The Cappadocians paint a similar picture to Chrysostom’s in regard to Law. Law is tied up with love. One shows one’s love for God by keeping His Law. Love of God is honoring to Him and is a command of the Law. The two great commandments of Christ (love of God and neighbor) are well known to all Christians. Love is the fulfilling of the law. The Cappadocians also commonly use therapeutic language. In his Oration in Defense of His Flight to Pontus (which Chrysostom most likely took as his model for his On the...
Priesthood), Gregory Nazianzen uses therapeutic language liberally. Sections 16-37 form an extended comparison of “the work of the physician (ἰατρείαν) of souls with the treatment of the body,” showing that the latter is more important because of the great worth of the soul and more difficult because of man’s unwillingness to admit his disease.

Christ is the healer of soul and body. Vice (κακίας) is “the most serious of sicknesses (ἀῤῥώστηματων).” Sins are wounds (τραύματα).

Some specifics include bitterness, envy, vainglory, love of wealth, gluttony, frivolous speech, astrology, and division in the church. Heresy is a major target, as would be expected, considering how much of the Cappadocians’ work was in response to heresies.

As a good Physician, God does not force healing upon the unwilling.
contagious. Some sin is incurable and only made worse by attempts to cure it. Gregory of Nyssa, being a universalist, believed that all sin would be curable in the next life.

The Cappadocians’ attitude towards heretics is very illuminating in regard to their therapeutic language. As shown above, all refer to heresy as illness. Gregory of Nyssa felt “all true members of the Church” would pity Eunomius and mentions that his brother Basil had attempted the cure. Concerning Apollinarius, Basil counseled certain Egyptian bishops “as skillful physicians to try and bring him back to the right order of the Church.” Yet nobody familiar with the Cappadocians’ treatises on heresies could suppose that the therapeutic language represented some amelioration of the condition of heretics. Thus, their therapeutic language approximates Chrysostom’s – sin is an illness calling simultaneously for pity and reviling. Except for Gregory of Nyssa, it is safe to assume that they understood incurable sin as eventually involving an eternal hell.

The Cappadocians show some interesting interplay among metaphors of healing and law. According to Gregory Nazianzen, the spiritual physician must help in subjecting the body to the soul, “as indeed the divine law (νόμος) enjoins, which is most

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772 *BiG, De Spir. Sanc.* . 30.78.; *SC* 17; *Anderson* (1980), p. 117 – Just as a contagious disease (λοιμικάς συμπαθείας) spreads from the sick (κάμνουσιν) to the healthy during an epidemic, in these days we have become ... carried away by this wicked rivalry possessing our souls.

773 *BiG, De Spir. Sanc.* 1.3; *SC* 17; *Anderson* (1980), pp. 17-8 – Re those objecting to the doxology Basil used – Your wish certainly is to help these people, or, if they should prove completely incurable (ἀνιάτως), to safeguard those who associate with them.; *GNz*, Or. 39.15; *PG* 36.352; *NPNF* II, 7, p. 358 – Re John the Baptist's statement “the axe is laid unto the root of the tree,” And what the “Axet?” The excision of the soul which is incurable (ἀθεραπεύτου) even after the dung. [presumably the reference is to manuring the tree]

774 *GNy*, *Contr. Eunom.* 1.1.1; *Jaeger* (1960a); *NPNF* II, 5, p. 35 – the gratuitous waste of many prepared drugs (φαρμάκων) on the incurably-diseased (ἀνίατα νοσοῦσι) ... becomes in many cases the occasion of a change for the worse.

775 *GNy*, *Catech. Magn.* 8; *Strawley*; *NPNF* II, 5, p. 483 – If, however, the soul remains unhealed (ἀθεράπευτος), the remedy (θεραπεία) is dispensed in the life that follows this.

776 Basil’s attitude towards Apollinarius underwent a shift. In letter 244, he says he had never considered Apollinarius an enemy and even respected certain things about him. [*BiG, Ep.* 244.3; *Courtonne* 3.76; *NPNF* II, 8, p. 286] His attitude changed after he read more of Apollinarius' writings. In letter 263, he considers Apollinarius as much a threat to the churches as the Arian Eustathius of Sebasteia. [*BiG, Ep.*263.4; *Courtonne* 3.124; *NPNF* II, 8, p. 302] If these letters are roughly chronological, he wished for Apollinarius' restoration even when he considered him a threat.

777 *BiG, Ep.* 265.2; *Courtonne* 3.131; *NPNF* II, 8, p. 304
excellently imposed on His whole creation, whether visible or beyond our ken.” Basil considers “the sentences of terrible judgment and everlasting punishment” to be among the “many remedies (ἀλεξήματα) for evil in Scripture … and medicines (φάρμακα) to … lead to health (σωτηρίαν).” Since he is not a universalist, he probably means the threat of punishment rather than the actual sentence. He may, however, be referring to a relatively common idea that hell acts as a tourniquet on wickedness, staying the sinner from worse sin. To Ambrose of Milan, Basil writes, “It is the Lord Himself who has transferred you from the judges of the earth to the throne of the Apostles ... heal the infirmity of the people, if any are infected by the disease of Arian madness.” There would seem to be a parallel between being an earthly judge and sitting on the Apostles’ throne. If so, Basil here sees a link between being a judge in the Church and healing the disease of heresy (and presumably any other sin). He does see a similarity between being a magistrate and being a physician. On the other hand, he distinguishes between Christ as Bridegroom for the pure and Physician (ἰατρός) for those still in need of healing from sin. He makes a similar distinction between Christ as shepherd for those still in sin and Christ as King (βασιλεὺς) of those “who have risen to a higher way of life, submitting themselves to their lawful (ἐννόμου) ruler (ἐπιστασίας).” Gregory of Nyssa at least once differentiates between law and healing. “As, then, He presents Himself as a physician (ἰατρός) to those who are in need of healing (θεραπείας), so He is Almighty (παντοκράτωρ) over one who has need of being ruled (κρατεῖσθαι).” He does not, however, say which is the better state.

Although the above is necessarily very sketchy, it does seem that, along with Chrysostom, the Cappadocians do not generally see Law as lesser than Healing. However, they would certainly all agree that it is good to cooperate with one’s treatment and better yet not to need treatment at all.

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778 GNz, Or. 2.18; PG 35.428; NPNF II, 7, p. 209
779 BIG, Ep. 46.5; Courtonne 1.122; NPNF II, 8, p. 151
780 BIG, Ep. 197; Courtonne 2.; NPNF II, 8, p. 235
781 BIG, Ep. 299; Courtonne 3.173; NPNF II, 8, p. 318 – The case of magistrates (ἀρχόντων) seems to me like that of physicians (ἰατρευόντων). They see awful sights; they meet with bad smells; they get trouble for themselves out of other people’s calamities.
782 BIG, De Spir. Sanc. 8.18; SC 17; Anderson (1980), p. 36
783 BIG, De Spir. Sanc. 8.17; SC 17; Anderson (1980), p. 35
784 GNy, Refut. Conf. Eunom. 125; Jaeger (1960b), p. 120
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LOVE, THE MADNESS OF RICHES, AND MONKS

Love

Love is fundamental to the Christian life. God’s love towards man is His greatest glory. Love draws God to the one who loves and is itself made possible by God. Love of God is the greatest commandment. Love of God must produce love of others, particularly brothers in Christ. Love of brother implies action. Almsgiving is love’s necessary outworking. However, there are things greater than almsgiving.

Love is fundamental to the Christian life. “To love (ἀγαπᾷν) one another” is “the mother of good deeds” and “productive of every virtue.” In the saying, “’Thou shalt love (ἀγαπήσεις) thy neighbor as thyself’ ... the whole work of the commandments (ἐντολῶν) is concisely ... completed. For the beginning and the end of virtue is love (ἀγάπη).” “If a man have this, everything else follows.” It is “the fulfilling (πλήρωμα) of the law (νόμου) ... in default of it no spiritual gift [has] any profit.” Love (ἀγάπης) is above the Law (νόμου) and provides a yoke that is “stronger than the former, yet far lighter and pleasanter.” Love (ἀγάπης) “can do everything” yet despite the depths to which Christ went for the love of man, “with it all Christ was not to gain all, yet still He died for all; so fulfilling His own part.” Love must be “without dissimulation. Since this is what love (ἀγάπη) is.” On the other hand, God is so loving towards man that He accepts even tiny acts of love. “For it is possible ... even at our last breath to please God ... Hast thou not fed Him in thy lifetime? At all events when departed ... give Him a share of thy goods. He is loving unto man (φιλάνθρωπος), He doth not deal niggardly by thee.”

“To display His love toward man (φιλανθρωπίαν)’ is “God’s greatest glory.” The Cross of Christ “is the sum of the Divine love (κηδεμονίας) toward us.” God’s love is

785 Hom. in Rom. 23.3; PG 60.618; NPNF I, 11, p. 514
786 Hom. in Rom. 23.3; PG 60.619; NPNF I, 11, p. 514
787 Hom. in Rom. 21.2; PG 60.604; NPNF I, 11, p. 502 – The antecedent is ἀγάπη.
788 Sacerdot. 2.6; SC 272; NPNF I, 9, p. 43. Reference is to ἀγάπη.
789 Comment. Gal. 5.4; PG 61.670; NPNF I, 13, p. 40
790 Hom. in Rom. 26.1; PG 60.637; NPNF I, 11, 529
791 Hom. in Rom. 21.2; PG 60.604; NPNF I, 11, p. 502
792 Hom. in Rom. 18.6; PG 60.581; NPNF I, 11, p. 485
793 Hom. in Rom. 18.5; PG 60.579; NPNF I, 11, p. 483
794 Comment. Gal. 3.1; PG 61.649; NPNF I, 13, p. 24
expressed in the Eucharist. “What love of God to man (φιλανθρωπίας)! He who sitteth on high with the Father ... gives Himself to those who are willing to embrace and grasp Him.”

Love draws God to the one who loves and is itself made possible by God. In the one who expresses love (ἀγάπην), “the Son taketh up His abode along with the Father, and the grace of the Spirit frequenteth.” Love (ἀγάπης) is “an inducement to the Spirit to abide in us,” but conversely “nothing ... renders us so susceptible of love (ἀγαπητικοὺς) as to be spiritual.”

To love God is, of course, the first of the two great commandments. Christians should emulate St. Paul’s “great love (ἀγάπην) toward Christ,” because of which he “went up above the Heavens, and stood with the Angels.” Love towards Christ is expressed by “putting Him on,” which means “never being without Him, having Him evermore visible in us, through our sanctification, through our moderation” which implies that “thou doest His deeds.” “It is a sufficient reward ... to the saints that they are serving God; since this indeed to the lover (φιλοῦντι) is reward enough, to love (φιλεῖν) the object of his love (ἐρώμενον).” The previous quote seemingly equates serving God with loving Him. Love of God is further expressed by suffering for Him. St. Paul’s bonds are “a proof of the soul’s love of wisdom (φιλοσοφίας), and the strongest sign of a longing (πόθου) for Christ.” So crucial is love of God to man’s being that “if anyone have sense and reason, he has already endured a hell when he is out of sight of God,” and “did we but love (ἐφιλοῦμεν) Christ as we should love (φιλεῖν) Him, we should have known that to offend Him we love (φιλουμένῳ) were more painful than hell.”

Love of God must produce love of others, particularly brothers in Christ. God reckons love of others as love of Him. “You see the words of a vehement lover (ἐραστοῦ)! If thou love (φιλής) My beloved (ἐρωμένος), then will I also reckon

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795 Sacerdot. 3.4; SC 272; NPNF I, 9, pp. 46-47
796 Hom. in Rom. 8.6; PG 60.464; NPNF I, 11, p. 393. NPNF I, 11
797 Comment. Gal. 5.5; PG 61.671; NPNF I, 13, p. 40 – Context strongly implies that “spiritual” here means “filled with the Spirit”
798 Hom. in Rom. 32.4; PG 60.681; NPNF I, 11, p. 564
799 Hom. in Rom. 24.4; PG 60.627; NPNF I, 11, pp. 520-521. Reference is made here to ἀγάπην.
800 Ad Pop. Antioch. 1.8; PG 49.26; NPNF I, 9, p. 338
801 Ad Pop. Antioch. 16.3; PG 49.165; NPNF I, 9, p. 447
802 Hom. in Rom. 5.6; PG 60.430; NPNF I, 11, p. 366
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Myself to be greatly beloved (φιλεῖσθαι) of thee.”

The proper response to the Master’s unthinkable love is “not to turn aside, not only from the poor, but not even from those who would lead us away to death.”

Being pleased at suffering for Christ, the persecuted Christian who blesses his persecutor shows “the greatness of his love (ἐρωτα).”

The priest’s care for the flock of Christ is a proof both of the great interest that Christ “takes in the superintendence of these sheep” and of the priest’s love for Christ. The fulfilling of this task of feeding Christ’s sheep shows greater love (φιλία) than “fasting, sleeping on the ground, and prolonged vigils” and to “defend the wronged, be as a father to orphans, and supply the place of a husband to their mother.”

Love of others requires deeds. Love (ἀγάπην) “is not bare words … but … a putting forth of itself by works.”

Its summit is self-sacrifice. “Greater love (ἀγάπην) … hath no man than this that a man lay down his life for his friends.”

In some sense, love belongs only to the brother in Christ and not to the outsider. “For in the other case he requires abstinence from quarrelling, and hatred, and aversion: but here loving (φιλεῖν) too, and not merely loving (φιλεῖν), but the loving of relatives (στέργειν).”

Love of those by whom one is hated makes God “a debtor” to the person who so loves (φιλῶν) and is a great good work “without which not even he that is a martyr can please God much.”

However, love must be, in some sense, deserved. Speaking of Amplias, whom St. Paul refers to as “my beloved (ἀγαπητόν),” Chrysostom says, “if he had not acquired great virtue, he would not have attracted his love (ἐρωτα).”

Almsgiving is love’s necessary outworking. “Even if [a beggar] were going to kill thee … thou shouldest not neglect him when starving. For thou art a disciple of Him Who desired the salvation even of them that crucified Him.”

To “provide our children

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803 Hom. in Rom. 23.4; PG 60.619; NPNF I, 11, p. 515
804 Hom. in Rom. 21.4-5; PG 60.607-8; NPNF I, 11, p. 505
805 Hom. in Rom. 22.1; PG 60.609; NPNF I, 11, p. 506
806 Sacerdot. 2.1; SC 272; NPNF I, 9, pp. 39-40
807 Hom. in Rom. 7.5; PG 60.447; NPNF I, 11, p. 380
808 Sacerdot. 2.6; SC 272; NPNF I, 9, p. 43, quoting John 15:13
809 Hom. in Rom. 21.2; PG 60.605; NPNF I, 11, p. 503. This passage goes on to speak of ἀγάπη.
810 Hom. in Rom. 27.3; PG 60.647; NPNF I, 11, p. 537
811 Hom. in Rom. 31.2; PG 60.670; NPNF I, 11, p. 555
812 Hom. in Rom. 21.4; PG 60.607; NPNF I, 11, p. 505
and friends and relations above their needs” while neglecting “Christ pining with hunger” is to “love (φιλοῦμεν) contrary to what seemeth good unto God.” 813 Because “we commit many transgressions every day” and therefore “need so much of His love to man (φιλανθρωπίας) ourselves,” “we have need of all good deeds, chiefly however of love to man (φιλανθρωπίας) and gentleness.” 814 The context shows that Chrysostom is speaking primarily of almsgiving.

However, there are things greater than almsgiving. “One who dispenses money to the needy, or otherwise succors the oppressed, benefits his neighbors … to some extent, but so much less than the priest in proportion as the body is inferior to the soul.” 815 “Giving thanks to God, when one falls into such calamities, is a far greater matter than giving alms. For not what we give in alms only, but whatever we have been deprived of by others, and born it with fortitude; this too brings us much fruit.” 816

The first quote is easily understood. The priest primarily helps the greater part of the man and therefore his ministration is a greater one. 817 However, Chrysostom much more often connects love with almsgiving than with deeds directly benefiting the soul. Perhaps the explanation lies in his oft-repeated dictum that if one starts with small virtues, one can attain work great virtues. Also, almsgiving is probably the most obvious way in which to show love towards man, and thus to Christ. Thus, the person who is not doing this does not love with the true love of God, whereas the one who gives alms in a right spirit is well on his way to ascending to the greatest heights of love.

The second quote above is harder to understand. With all Chrysostom’s insistence on love, how can he consider bearing calamity with fortitude to be greater than giving alms? True, the above quote is speaking of “what we have been deprived of by others.” However, the immediate context does not flesh out this thought. Instead, it talks about making such a man “more approved” and giving him “a greater reward.” This seems to be advocating a self-centered attitude rather than the God- and neighbor-centered attitude that Chrysostom champions. The text goes on, however, to speak of Job’s life and to conclude that “to bear nobly and thankfully the privation of all things, is a far

813 Hom. in Rom. 2.2; PG 60.403; NPNF I, 11, p. 345
814 Hom. in Rom. 19.8; PG 60.594; NPNF I, 11, p. 495
815 Sacerdot. 2.4; SC 272; NPNF I, 9, p. 42
816 Ad Pop. Antioch. 1.10; PG 49.29; NPNF I, 9, p. 341
817 This would also explain the above passage concerning the priestly ministrations being greater than defending the wronged and so forth. (See Footnote #815)
greater thing than it was to give alms whilst living in affluence” and that “there is nothing so good as thanksgiving; even as there is nothing worse than blasphemy.”

Interestingly, Chrysostom here exalts thanksgiving as the greatest good, rather than love. As the next chapter demonstrates, Chrysostom at times uses superlative language of different virtues, and this is probably largely a rhetorical device. However, if one understands love in terms of being in right relationship with others, this exalting of thanksgiving makes sense. So, perhaps Chrysostom’s meaning can be understood thus. One who is properly thankful to God must be in right relationship with others in so far as it lies with himself. Such a person would love the God Whose glory is His Cross and therefore would love his brother in the same manner.

In short, love is paramount in the Christian life. God and His love makes it possible for one to love Him and, in Him, of one’s brother.

The madness of riches

If love and almsgiving are hallmarks of the πολιτεία of heaven, the madness of riches is the hallmark of its rejection. The fate of the covetous is dreadful. “For what severer evil can befall one, than being hated by all men, than hating all men ... And if their fate here be such, consider also what comes after this life.” Speaking of various vices as worms that “kindle the hell which never extinguishes,” Chrysostom says, “Let us draw up the root of wickedness from beneath ... What then is the root of the evils? ... The love of money (φιλαργυρία).” The lover of money ignores “man, or rather Christ” who “is straitened with extreme hunger.” This disease of the soul is like a thirst that cannot be quenched so that “our torment were but growing greater ... our state of punishment were more distressing,” and by it “you will destroy your own self, with all that belongs to you.” “The root and foundation of riches is pride (ἀπόνοια).” Still, wealth in itself is not evil. “For neither is wealth an evil, nor poverty in itself; but these things, either of them, become so according to the free choice (προαίρεσιν) of those who make use of them.”

818 Ad Pop. Antioch. 1.10; PG 49.30; NPNF I, 9, p. 341
819 Hom. in Rom. 13.11; PG 60.524; NPNF I, 11, p. 439
820 Hom. in Rom. 11.5; PG 60.491; NPNF I, 11, p. 414
821 Hom. in Rom. 11.6; PG 60.492; NPNF I, 11, p. 414
822 Hom. in Rom. 12.8; PG 60.505; NPNF I, 11, p. 425
823 Ad Pop. Antioch. 2.5; PG 49.39-40; NPNF I, 9, p. 348
824 Ad Pop. Antioch. 15.3; PG 49.158; NPNF I, 9, p. 442
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Thus, the covetous man is the antithesis of the good citizen of heaven. His love of material goods does not permit him to love God or neighbor and ends up destroying all that he has and casts him into hell. His passion is rooted in pride. This makes perfect sense because the tiniest trace of humility would permit more love of God and brother than such a man is capable of showing.

Monks

Monks are model citizens of heaven. However, the priest has a more difficult path. Celibacy is not required to be an outstanding disciple of Christ.

Monks are model citizens of heaven. Their virtues are numerous. In the Homilies on the Statues, Chrysostom speaks of the monks who came down out of the mountains to defend those charged with the insurrection. “These men so loved (ἐφίλησαν) those ... whom they knew only from their calamity, that if they had possessed a thousand lives, they would have chosen to deliver them all up for their safety ... For, indeed, if they had not before prepared themselves against every sort of slaughter, they would not have been able ... to have manifested such magnanimity. This courageous disregard for death is rooted in fear of God. “He only is blessed, who feareth the Lord.” Such a one “lays hold of the wisdom which is from above” and “enjoys a continued tranquillity, and laughs to scorn all things which seem to be sorrowful.” The blessed life of monks” seems to be equated with “the true philosophy.” The monks are living proof of the truth of the Gospel writers because they “have succeeded to the piety of those men” and “have consequently exhibited their boldness.” This stands in stark contrast to the Greek philosophers whose “deeds now loudly proclaim, as they did aforetime, that all with them is ... a piece of acting.”

Although monks are such shining lights, the priest has a more difficult path. The following are all taken from The Treatise on the Priesthood. “Great is the conflict which recluses undergo,” but compared to the “exertions with those which the right exercise of the Priesthood involves” the difference is “as great as the distance between a king (βασιλέως) and a commoner.” The reason is “that the recluse ... does not commit

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825 Ad Pop. Antioch. 17.2; PG 49.173; NPNF I, 9, p. 453
826 Ad Pop. Antioch. 18.4; PG 49.186; NPNF I, 9, p. 463
827 Sacerdot. 1.2; SC 272; NPNF I, 9, p. 33
828 Ad Pop. Antioch. 17.2; PG 49.175; NPNF I, 9, p. 455
829 Sacerdot. 6.5; SC 272; NPNF I, 9,p. 77
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many and great sins. For he does not meet with things which irritate and excite his mind,” unlike the priest, “who has devoted himself to whole multitudes, and has been compelled to bear the sins of many.” The man who bears this and “has remained steadfast and firm” is “to be ... admired of all, for he has shown sufficient proof of personal manliness.” Chrysostom, using this as a justification for evading ordination says, “Do not thou, therefore, for thy part wonder if I, who avoid the market-place and the haunts of the multitude, have not many to accuse me.” When his friend Basil expresses concern that those “who are careful about the concerns of this world” would be “set over the administration of the Church,” Chrysostom responds that only those men should be ordained who “are able after mixing and associating with all … to keep their purity undefiled, and their unworldliness, their holiness, constancy and sobriety unshaken, and to possess … all other virtues which belong to recluses, in a greater degree than they.”

Given Chrysostom’s normal exaltation of monks, one might think this a rhetorical device employed mostly to gain his point. Further, living an ascetic life (though in his mother’s house) as Chrysostom was at the time, perhaps he was comparatively disparaging the monastic life out of humility. However, when he wrote the treatise some twenty years later, Chrysostom was already a priest. Whether or not the argument was from humility, the point remains valid. The monastic life would be exceedingly difficult, if not impossible to live in the world. Thus, one might see Chrysostom’s model priest as in some sense the monk *par excellence* because he has all the monk’s virtues without the setting that makes them easy.

Celibacy is not required to be an outstanding Christian. “It is possible for a man even in the married state to be worthy of being looked up to, and noble.” The virtue of Priscilla and Aquila “made them more conspicuous than the sun … the love (ἀγάπην) which Christ required of them, that they exhibited” and they achieved the proof of discipleship, “they took up the Cross and followed Him.”

Again, Chrysostom comes back to love, particularly as expressed by taking up the Cross and following Christ. Priscilla and Aquila are not second-class citizens in the

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830 *Sacerdot.* 6.6-7; SC 272; *NPNF* I, 9, p. 77
831 *Sacerdot.* 6.8; SC 272; *NPNF* I, 9, p. 78
834 *Hom. in Rom.* 30.3; *PG* 60.664; *NPNF* I, 11, p. 551
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Kingdom of Heaven because they fully express the love that is the hallmark of that kingdom.

Perhaps one can understand Chrysostom’s seemingly contradictory remarks thus. The monk is the model citizen of heaven, as a lover of both God and man. However, those who achieve this love are great no matter whether they are married or virgins. Further, those who achieve such virtue (and one imagines that they are relatively few) while required to mix fully in the world are greater than monks because they possess all the monks’ virtues under conditions of much greater temptation.

The Wider Perspective

As shown in the section on law, all the Cappadocians recognized the importance of love in the Christian life, with Basil stating that in fact all Christians know this. Basil and Gregory Nazianzen recognize the importance of giving alms, as presumably would Gregory of Nyssa. Certainly, though, their concern for the physically downtrodden is not in the forefront of their writings as was Chrysostom’s. It is possible that this has to do with the higher Antiochene view of the body, but it probably has more to do with the fact that much of Chrysostom’s corpus is homilies given in cities with considerable populations both of the well-to-do and the downtrodden.

All three shared Chrysostom’s high esteem of monastic life, with Basil and Gregory Nazianzen both having lived as monastics and having a “desire for an ascetic life of withdrawal and contemplation,” Basil having “founded several monastic communities, and provided them with guidance on how to live the monastic life.” Gregory of Nyssa (who in his youth married and may, as a bishop, still have lived with his wife”) wrote a laudatory treatise On Virginity, in which he details all the advantages of monastic life over married life. Still, they recognized that monasticism was not the only appropriate Christian life. For Basil, the ideal of monastic communities was not “different from

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835 GNz, Or. 40.31; PG 36.404; NPNF II, 7, p. 371; BtG, Hexaem. Hom. 5.6.; NPNF II, 8, p. 79; Louth (2004a), p. 293 – monasteries following Basil’s ideals provided hospices for travellers and hospitals for the sick.

836 Louth (2004a), pp. 290-1, 298

837 GNy, De Virgin. 8.1; SC 119; NPNF II, 5, p. 352 – We are well aware that it is not a stranger to God’s blessing. But...the common instincts of mankind can plead sufficiently on its behalf. BtG, Ep. 9.3; Courtonne 1.40; NPNF II, 8, p. 123 – “It is quite right for you, a man of action, to have crowds and towns in which to show your good deeds. For me, quiet is the best aid for the contemplation and mental exercise whereby I cling to God.” GNz, Or. 7.9.6-7; Boulenger; NPNF II, 7, p. 232 – Inasmuch as philosophy is the greatest, so is it the most difficult, of professions, which can be taken in hand ... only by those who have been called forth by the
Thus, they generally held that the monastic life was superior (in Basil’s case, this might only be superior in practice as opposed to theory) to life in the world, but that both were acceptable to God. This was a common view according to Price, who says, “One constant theme of Theodoret’s Religious History, as of Athanasius’s Life of Antony, is the willingness of monks to assure laymen that life in the world could be acceptable to God.”

The priest must hold to a higher standard than a private individual. Sin in the priest is serious because, “the injury which extends to many is greater than that which is confined to a single individual.” No comparison is made to monastics here, but Gregory could probably subscribe to Chrysostom’s view that the priest’s responsibility here is greater than that of the simple monk.

Kelly, explaining Chrysostom’s position in On the Priesthood, says

When he left his cave … he did not conceive of himself as ceasing to be a monk ... he not only remained a monk at heart (what, after all, was a monk but a Christian striving to live out the gospel to the full?), but continued, as far as his new situation permitted, to practice his routine of monastic austerities.

It was inevitable, in … explaining how daunting as a young man living in quasi-monastic seclusion he had found the prospect of priesthood, that he should highlight the contrast between the two vocations … John never ceased to regard the monk, whether layman or priest, as representing authentic Christianity. What he consistently demanded … was that the monk should always be ready to place himself at the service of the community, since 'there is nothing chillier than a Christian who is not trying to save others'.

In short, Chrysostom did hold the common opinion of his time that the monk is the model of Christian life. If he continued to hold that the priest's task was the more daunting task, that was because the true priest lives a monk's life in the world.

**DISCUSSION**

In summary, to be truly human is to be in correct relationship (which assumes both awe and love) with all three members of the Trinity and with other humans (especially other Christians). The glory of such a person is that he lives for God’s glory. He is a

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838 Louth (2004a), p. 293
839 Price (1985), xxvi
840 GNz, Or. 2.3; PG 35.409; NPNF II, 7, p. 205
841 GNz, Or. 2.10.; PG 35.420; NPNF II, 7, p. 207
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citizen of the πολιτεία of heaven, a member of Christ's body, and a son of God. Whichever of these images he uses, Chrysostom stresses proper vertical and horizontal relationships, primacy of love and sacramental foundations of entrance into the community. The law of this πολιτεία is love of God and neighbor. External law functions as a medicine, but can also be contrasted with the consolatory, therapeutic role of the priest. Christ is Physician, but not of those who refuse to be healed.

In general, the above agrees with the basic findings of the previous chapter. Some of the more interesting differences to or furtherances of the conclusions of the previous chapter are given below.

As in the Matthew homilies, Chrysostom is more likely to call sins of the soul “human” than sins of the flesh. This makes sense in that soul's sins are against the most exalted part of one's humanity and thus most representative of fallen humanity. He also is more likely to call jealousy and vainglory “human” and lack of mercy “inhuman.” This is in line with the fact that the further one separates oneself from others, the less human one is.

Chrysostom's exaltation of almsgiving, although still high, is not as strong in these homilies. Though absolutely crucial to the Christian life, it is much inferior to priestly ministrations and also inferior to bearing with fortitude deprivation by others. The first is easily explained by the soul's superiority to the body. The second is also explainable in these terms, in that the man who patiently bears deprivation by others is strengthening that part of him that is able to love God and man. Thus, one might conclude that Chrysostom’s utter insistence on almsgiving is not based on its being the highest of virtues. Rather, it may be a lowest common denominator – if one does not even have enough compassion to care for the obvious physical needs of the poor, how can one dare claim to be a Christian?

Man's free will allows him – with the aid of his natural conscience and of grace – to sink into or even below his sinful bents or to rise above not only his sinful bents, but other aspects of his fallen humanity, such as pain and mortality. Evils against nature, such as homosexuality, are born of luxury and of not knowing God. Souls that sin in this way cannot know themselves, much less things higher than themselves.

Although Chrysostom still highly exalts the monastic life, he considers the priest who lives in the world to be greater because he attains the monk's virtues without the
benefit of the monk’s lifestyle.

All the above make sense within Chrysostom’s view of man on a continuum, ranging from highly exalted to seriously debased. Man without God is fallen man, who is inhuman because he has broken away from his source of being. Such a man cannot possibly be in right relationship with the rest of creation and even ignores the obvious physical necessity of the poor member of Christ. On the other hand, the one who seeks after God is man as he was meant to be. This man, of necessity, will see Christ in his fellow and do any good for him, with almsgiving a necessary outworking of that love. The monk in one sense epitomizes this, but the person who can do so in the world is greater because his temptations are greater.

Nothing was found in the wider overview that greatly differed from Chrysostom’s teachings except for the universalism of Gregory of Nyssa, the Cappadocians’ concept of the Image of God, and Chrysostom’s much greater emphasis on almsgiving. The purport of this is that most of what Chrysostom had to say was commonplace for his time. In fact, much of what he says is so standard that there would seem to be no reason to report it. However, the very commonplace nature of what he says lends more weight to the importance of seeing how much of what he says is misunderstood by modern citizens of democracies.

Another Look at the Therapeutic, Juridical and Community Paradigms

Therapeutic Paradigm

Again, no justification for considering healing to be Chrysostom’s main paradigm is evident. True, he speaks of the Law as medicine, but he also differentiates Christ’s functions as Judge and Healer and accepts both as important. The Treatise on the Priesthood (as does Gregory Nazianzen’s Defence of His Flight to Pontus) makes extended use of therapeutic language and speaks often of the priest as healer of his flock. Yet, the priest also has a juridical function and Chrysostom speaks in this work of divine law and of love as “the fulfilling of the law,” thus indicating a high regard for God’s law. Chrysostom states that the priest’s chief aim in all that he does is the glory of God and the edifying of the Church. He had just employed an extended therapeutic metaphor

843 Sacerdot. 3.9; SC 272; NPNF I, 9, p. 49 – The divine law (νόμος) indeed has excluded women from the ministry
844 Sacerdot. 2.6; SC 272; NPNF I, 9, p. 43. Reference is to ἀγάπη.
and then a shorter sailing metaphor before making this statement. If therapy were his main paradigm, one would have expected him to employ only the therapeutic metaphor or to place it immediately before this statement. However, that may be, this statement is easily accommodated by nearly any metaphor. The community paradigm, however, would give it broader overtones than either the therapeutic or juridical could do.

*Juridical Paradigm*

The Galatian Commentaries and Romans Homilies are considerably more likely than the Matthean homilies to contrast law with grace or faith than Old Law with New Law. However, grace is synonymous with the law of grace and the Spirit Himself with the law of the Spirit. Thus, Chrysostom again seems not to be decrying law, but differentiating between a lower external law (in this case, the Old Law) and the internal law of the Spirit, which is the Spirit Himself abiding in the earnest Christian and which is most clearly expressed by love. The problem with the Old Law (and, by extension, any external law) is that if adhered to for its own sake, it keeps the person from living at the highest level of law – that of the indwelling Spirit, which in turn makes him less than fully human. In addition, Chrysostom introduces the concept of three laws – an internal law of nature (conscience), an external written law (the Old Law), and the law of works. The first two are actually harmful without the third, but the man who has the third still needs grace and faith and the indwelling Spirit.

Law has a therapeutic dimension, and through judgment, Christ gives those who do not abide by the law the opportunity to repent and be healed. Those who refuse to amend have no excuse and are justly cast into hell, yet even this is a mercy since it prevents their continuing in wickedness. Those who question God’s justice in this matter would understand if they were virtuous.

The Homilies on the Statues provide a practical example of the interface of Christian πολιτεία and civil law. Chrysostom here mostly differentiates between civil law and priestly power, but both are essential for the city’s well being. Chrysostom does not explicitly cast law in therapeutic terms. However, it is clearly necessary and healthful for the life of the community. “If you deprive the city of its rulers, we must lead a life less rational than that of the brutes (θηρίων ἄλογων ἄλογώτερον).”

As noted 845 Ad Pop. Antioch. 6.1; PG 49.82; NPNF I, 9, p. 381

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above, perhaps he contrasted priestly consolation and the secular law as threat simply
to drive people into the arms of the Church at this critical time in Antioch’s history.

Chrysostom’s therapeutic and juridical language do not contradict each other. At
times, he speaks of the therapeutic aspect of law and at other times of the contrast
between civil law and priestly authority. However, even when he contrasts them, he
sees them both as necessary for the welfare of the community. He does state that law is
not necessary for the one who lives according to the Spirit. So, when speaking of the
necessity of civil law, he almost certainly has in view man in his fallen state, in need of
an external law because he does not have (or ignores) the inner law of the indwelling
Spirit. The best that this lower law can do, however, is to bring the person to recognize
his need for the Divine Physician. The man who comes to this recognition is on his way
to restoration to his place in the πολιτεία of God and to his true humanity.

Community-based Paradigm

Unlike the Matthew homilies, none of these works posits the πολιτεία of heaven as a
main theme, which is not surprising since none deals with a Gospel or a text that
purports to show Christianity in its entirety. However, this term often appears in the
Galatian commentaries and the Romans homilies to describe the way of life incumbent
on those under grace. Thus, those under the law of the Spirit must exhibit lives in
harmony with the Spirit. This, of course, involves love of God and neighbor and all that
one could state of the citizens of heaven.

Again, Chrysostom’s juridical and therapeutic language fits nicely into the concept of
the πολιτεία of heaven. The law and the way of life (πολιτεία) of this commonwealth
(πολιτεία) is love of God and of neighbor. At the highest level, the law is the indwelling
Spirit. The person who lives in this way is in perfect spiritual health.

The vast majority, however, do not live on this plane and therefore require external
law and spiritual healing, which is gentle or harsh as necessary. This healing became
possible by the Incarnation – Christ healed troubled human flesh in His own Body. It
also presupposes baptism and the Eucharist, through which one becomes a member of
Christ and feeds on Him. Thus, having re-entered the πολιτεία of heaven, such a one
can rise even beyond perfect health and full humanity through the law of the Spirit,
which is the indwelling Holy Spirit Himself.

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However, the more diseased one is by sin, the more burdensome God’s laws seem and the more painful the remedies. God as Judge, Physician, and Teacher does everything possible to restore people to their place in the πολιτεία and thus to their true humanity of love of God and neighbor. However, those who steadfastly refuse to love God and neighbor are cast out as incurably diseased.

The Cappadocians could agree with this general outline. Basil states the following,

Also, because of the many ways grace is given to us poor men …He is described by innumerable other titles: Shepherd, King, Physician, Bridegroom, Way, Door, Fountain, Bread, Axe, and Rock. These titles do not describe His nature (φύσιν), but … are concerned with His manifold energies, by which He satisfies the needs of each in His tenderheartedness to His own creation. Those who flee to His ruling care for refuge, and through patient endurance correct their evil ways, He calls sheep … He is King of those who have risen to a higher way of life, submitting themselves to their lawful ruler.846

The basic thought here, with which all the Cappadocians and Chrysostom could readily concur, is that God greatly loves His creatures and helps them in every possible way. However, some accept God’s help gratefully, some less so, and some not at all. One could express this truth in juridical language, therapeutic language, some combination of both, or with other paradigms. The problem with focusing too closely on one paradigm is the tendency to miss certain things that other paradigms make clearer. This is seen in modern Americans’ distaste for juridical language and complacent attitude towards therapeutic language. These four Fathers avoid that trap. They constantly employ a variety of metaphors, but know that metaphors can not describe the ineffable joys of the Kingdom of Heaven or the inexpressible woes of Hell. Even though Chrysostom explicitly says that the πολιτεία of heaven is the subject of Matthew’s Gospel (and of the other Gospels), he hardly uses the term in any except the first sermon. Instead, he colors in the picture with a wide variety of metaphors.

CONCLUSIONS

Thus, one must be very cautious in proposing a main paradigm of Christian life. Further, these works provide no direct evidence that Chrysostom (let alone the Cappadocians) considered the πολιτεία of heaven to be the main paradigm of Christian life. Nevertheless, if one feels compelled to choose a main paradigm, the πολιτεία of heaven is preferable to both law and healing. Man was created to be a member of the

846 Big, De Spir. Sanc. 8.17; SC17; Anderson (1980), p. 35
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community of heaven – in right relationship with God and therefore with his fellow men, the angels, and the rest of creation. The law of this community is the indwelling Spirit, manifest through love. When man forsakes God, he forsakes this community and his true humanity. He is then in need of an external law to bring him to the realization of his need for the Physician, Who in His love for mankind, became Man and healed human nature so that the inhuman fallen man may become true man again and indeed transcend his nature.

Whether or not Chrysostom saw the πολιτεία of heaven as the main paradigm of Christian life, two things are certain. First, as will be shown in the concluding chapter, this πολιτεία is inextricably linked to his view of man on a wide spectrum from sanity/love to insanity/self-centered. Second, failure to understand (let alone live and believe) the way of life (πολιτεία) of this πολιτεία makes it nearly impossible for citizens of modern, materialistic democratic societies to understand very basic things that Chrysostom and other Fathers are saying.
CHAPTER FIVE: Conclusions

This Chapter summarizes and draws together the main conclusions of Chapters Two through Four by showing how Chrysostom views man on a continuum. Next, it interprets contemporary Chrysostom studies in light of these findings. Finally, it examines the question, “How does one study somebody who would almost certainly consider one to be insane?”

SUMMARY AND DISCUSSION OF RESULTS

This thesis demonstrates that Chrysostom envisions a wide spectrum when he considers man. The lower limit case is the ἄλογος, self-centered man who has disconnected himself from God and neighbor to such a degree that he denies very basic responsibilities – those to the poor brother. Ironically and tragically, in his attempts to aggrandize himself, he loses his true humanity and becomes subhuman, sub-bestial and demonic. The upper limit case, exemplified by the monk, feeds on λόγια Θεοῦ and loves God and neighbor. He rises above his humanity to an angelic, true humanity that is united to God through the sacraments, the Incarnation of Christ, and the work of the Holy Spirit. All this is within the context of the πολιτεία of heaven, which is comprehended in love of God and neighbor. Three major images of this πολιτεία are the Βασιλεία of Heaven, the family of God, and the Body of Christ. All three have in common vertical and horizontal relationships, but each has its own flavor. Thus, one must be in awe of the King of Heaven, love Him as Father, and be inseparably united to Him as Head.

That Chrysostom saves his most vehement accusations of insanity for the slayers of Christ and for the covetous is no accident. If one can not be fully and transcendentally human outside of this πολιτεία, then it is the last madness to attempt to slay the Lord of this πολιτεία. Likewise, since the poor man is a member of Christ, to covet more when one’s poor brother lacks a sufficiency is truly an attack against Christ and a failure in the most basic of duties.

Within this context, one can understand why Chrysostom consistently portrays the possessed in a far better condition than he does the insane of soul – particularly the covetous, envious and the slayers of Christ. The possessed and mentally ill are mostly sinned against, as opposed to sinning. If one under such a burden humbly and
thankfully turns to God, he shows himself still very much capable and worthy of a place in the πολιτεία of heaven, where the chief law is love and “blessed are the poor in spirit” was “laid ... first as a strong and safe foundation.” The poor in spirit know their desperate case and are grateful for any good shown to them. Such people easily fit into the πολιτεία of heaven, whose King is the humble God-Man, Who came to earth to save the lost. Conversely, the one who willfully sins, especially against the poor, has no place in the πολιτεία of heaven – no matter how virtuous he seems otherwise. How can he? In denying his poor brother’s needs, he denies Christ Himself, Who has united Himself to men through the Incarnation and Who is Himself the βασιλεία of heaven. This is the great insanity, the one that Chrysostom – that great spiritual doctor – puts forth all his efforts to cure.

Chapters Three and Four started as attempts to examine and, hopefully, prove the contention that community is a better paradigm than the juridical or therapeutic in that it better answers the question “What does it mean to be human?” and can incorporate both juridical and therapeutic language. While community is obviously a better paradigm than the other two, it is not definitive, by any means. First, although Chrysostom does state that the subject of the Gospels is the πολιτεία of heaven, nowhere else in the works here examined does he state such a thing nor suggest it as an overarching paradigm. Second, the necessity of fleshing it out with so many images shows that it is still quite susceptible to misunderstanding. If one must answer the questions, “Healing for whom?” and “Law for whom?” one must also answer the question “A community of whom?” If the community defines the man, man likewise defines the community.

Thus, this research has not so much succeeded in finding a succinct paradigm in which to understand the Christian life as in providing a fleshed out view of the πολιτεία of heaven and man’s place in it. This is the milieu in which to find a true man and by which to measure the degree of departure from that height.

As mentioned earlier, the particulars mentioned above are nothing new. However, the implications of Chrysostom’s overall view (which is very similar in its main points to his contemporaries’) are quite difficult for modern Chrysostom scholars to see
because Chrysostom’s beliefs are so different from those of modern materialistic, democratic societies.

There are at least two aspects of such societies that stand out as being far removed from the πολιτεία of heaven. First, they are, on the whole, unabashedly earthly minded. Second, they have a deep and inherent distaste for a hierarchical society such as the πολιτεία of heaven must necessarily be. The average member of such a society is clearly insane by Chrysostom’s standards and therefore unlikely to be able to understand him properly.

Thus, the next section will look at the implications of this state of affairs for modern Chrysostom scholarship – both in terms of placing him in his own context and of appropriating his wisdom for modern times.

Implications for Modern Chrysostom Scholarship

This section will proceed first by showing implications for scholars working on topics related to the passions. Then, it will take a broader view, showing that modern Chrysostom scholarship is prone to critique Chrysostom by earthly standards that he would decry and without understanding and appreciating the special glories of a hierarchical society such as the πολιτεία of heaven must necessarily be.

Passions as Insane

An obvious conclusion of this research is that Chrysostom scholars must take his language about the madness and demonic nature of the passions very seriously. Up till now, however, this language seems to be treated mostly as a rhetorical device. For example, Blackburn, discoursing on Chrysostom’s attempts to break men of public displays of anger, shows at some length that “the man who permits himself to become angry on his own account temporarily forfeits his very rationality” and that “The one who relents to his anger becomes possessed by it in the same way that a demoniac is possessed by a demon.” However, in his conclusion, he does not mention this at all. Likely enough, this omission indicates that Blackburn takes this language as mostly rhetorical. Similarly, de Wet, in John Chrysostom on Envy, says “An arsenal of metaphors is incorporated by Chrysostom to caricaturise the envious individuals. They are

847 Blackburn (2010), p. 298
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described as ‘mad dogs’, ‘destructive demons’, ‘dung beetles’ and likened to the Furies.” As with Blackburn, he makes no mention of this in his conclusion. In de Wet’s case, the fact that he starts this list by calling them “an arsenal of metaphors” and does not follow up with an examination of the truth of the accusations of madness and demonic likeness indicates that he takes accusations of insanity and mental illness as metaphors employed for rhetorical force, roughly equal to being called ‘dung beetles.’ The results of this study, however, necessitate that scholars take these accusations seriously and ponder what they mean for those who suffer these terrible diseases. Since Chrysostom’s sermons almost invariably address the sins of his hearers and since he considers sin insane, these implications affect the work of almost any Chrysostom scholar.

Likewise, the above study of Chrysostom’s view of the πολιτειά of heaven has almost universal application. Below, it will be demonstrated that modern scholars easily fall into judging Chrysostom by rules foreign and inimical to him. Two major reasons for this are an earthly orientation and a distaste for hierarchical society.

**Earthly Orientation**

Chrysostom’s views on marriage are a good example of an area in which both factors make it very hard to do justice to Chrysostom’s thought. Schroeder, studying Chrysostom’s views on spousal violence, has much to say about Chrysostom’s fervent condemnation of wife-beating, in contrast to St. Augustine and St. Basil the Great, who countenance it in one form or the other. She goes on, however:

Like his contemporaries, Chrysostom speaks of the wife’s obligation to endure physical chastisement from her husband, even when … unjust and unwarranted … Here we have an example of what Blake Leyerle calls “the limits of Chrysostom’s reforming vision.” … Chrysostom urges the wife to consider the martyr’s reward accruing for her in heaven, as well as the praise she will receive in this life for her endurance.

Chrysostom’s views on separation by women married to believers is based on 1 Cor 7.10–11 … the wife should not separate from the husband, but if she does separat-

**De Wet (2010), pp. 255,6.** He goes on to say that “These assertions of Chrysostom coincide with the typical classical definitions of envy by Aristotle and others.” This brings up a very interesting question – how seriously do Aristotle and other classical writers take this language?

**Schroeder references PG 61.222 (For English translation, see Hom. in I Cor. 26.8; NPNF I, 12, p. 155.) The text mentions a reward laid up (τὸν ἀποκείμενον ... μισθόν), the context clearly being “laid up in heaven,” but not explicitly a martyr’s reward.**
ate, let her remain unmarried or else be reconciled to her husband.” … without specifically advising a wife to separate, Chrysostom indirectly permits it.\(^{850}\) Schroeder does not pause to consider seriously Chrysostom’s urging the wife to consider the reward laid up for her in heaven.\(^{851}\) The latter is not at all surprising since few moderns seriously set their sights on such a reward. Rather, the common modern hope for marriage is to have a happy life in this world, which is obviously highly unlikely for an abused wife. Chrysostom, on the other hand, focuses on heaven and states that in this world the righteous “were passing their time in tribulation and dejection.”\(^{852}\) Thus, the fact that the woman might suffer greatly in such a marriage was certainly not an automatic reason to tell her to leave.

The phrase “Chrysostom’s reforming vision” is very telling – it conjures images not of heaven, but of earth. True, Chrysostom did care very much about the earthly lives of his flock, especially of the downtrodden, but his view was always soteriological. As Mayer points out, in speaking of Chrysostom’s exaltation of poverty,

for John there is a higher purpose – the correction of the soul, leading to the attainment of salvation. This central thesis in John’s moral discourse is remarkably consistent … it is found distributed for the most part throughout a body of homilies preached to different audiences in different cities over an eighteen-year period.\(^{853}\)

Chrysostom, in urging the woman to remember her crown, was bent on making her a member \textit{par excellence} of the πολιτεία of heaven. Within the context of his thought, he would be hard pressed to find a better good towards which to urge another. Therefore, one must judge him first of all based on what he was actually attempting to do – help the woman to attain to heaven and a heavenly crown.

Within those constraints, one might reasonably ask, “Was urging the wife on to win a heavenly crown likely to cause her to achieve that goal, or might she be more likely to fall into despair and even lose her faith?” Perhaps this question occurred to Chrysostom himself, which could be why he tacitly allowed the separation of a woman from her abusive Christian husband. This would accord well with his repeated insistence that physicians must use different remedies in different situations. Successfully urging a spiritually strong woman on to a type of martyrdom was the best possible outcome.

\(^{851}\) Harrison (2000), pp. 201,2
\(^{852}\) Hom. in Mt 77.2; PG 58.703-4; NPNF I, 10, p. 464
\(^{853}\) Mayer (2009), p. 100

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One who is not quite so strong might temporarily need an earthly incentive – the praise of men. For the weak, giving allowance to that weakness so that she would continue in the Faith is, although not ideal, probably the best possible outcome. In all cases, Chrysostom’s primary goal is not earthly happiness or even safety, but the πολιτεία of heaven.

Another reasonable question for those who study Chrysostom with the purpose of learning how to live is, “How likely would a modern woman be to achieve a martyr’s crown under such conditions?” Nonna Verna Harrison, in a review essay of David Ford’s book Women and Men in the Early Church: the Full Views of St. John Chrysostom touches on this question:

St John says that if their husbands beat them, wives should continue to obey them regardless of the cost, and like the martyrs they will be rewarded in heaven. Ford says that if he were here today he would be more compassionate and allow them to leave their marriages, but how do we know this? Chrysostom makes it clear that each of us is obligated to do as God has commanded us whether others do their duty or not … Although some women saints have achieved holiness by voluntarily accepting such abuse, it would be unreasonable to expect this of battered women today, though a few exceptional ones may be called to follow the same path. Harrison understands Chrysostom’s orientation towards the πολιτεία of heaven better than Schroeder seems to do. Thus, Harrison acknowledges that some women saints became holy through accepting such abuse and admits the possibility that a few exceptional battered women of modern times may also be called to follow this path. However, she says in no uncertain terms that this is unreasonable to expect of the vast majority.

Harrison is convinced that Chrysostom has much to say of importance to our culture, although she is – rightly – very alive to the dangers of taking his words outside the context of his culture and transplanting them unexamined into ours. She offers instead the opinion that “the best way to follow Chrysostom’s teaching today is to pursue the same ultimate aims as he did.” These aims, according to Harrison are “to promote love and other virtues among his flock, turn them away from every kind of sin,

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855 Harrison (2000), p. 196 – “His writings are always spiritually edifying. Much of what he says has timeless significance and immediate practical value, yet this is not always the case.”
856 Ibid, p. 200 – “Because of all these cultural differences, Chrysostom’s advice about men’s and women’s roles and family life cannot be transferred directly or simplistically into today’s context. Any attempt to do so would probably have pastoral consequences very different from those St John had in mind.”
and lead them to unity in Christ.” Unfortunately, although alive to the dangers of taking Chrysostom out of context, she is not sufficiently alive to the dangers of deciding what exactly is context and what exactly are his “ultimate aims.” Thus, she approves of his wishing to promote virtue in his flock, but she does not think this should extend to a modern battered woman staying in an abusive marriage – despite the fact that “Chrysostom makes it clear that each of us is obligated to do as God has commanded us whether others do their duty or not.” It is hard to imagine that Chrysostom would consider such a duty not to be among his ultimate aims, even if he does not think all his hearers are actually likely to attain to it. Harrison may well be right that the majority of battered women are not capable of staying in their marriages without great physical and spiritual harm (and, by the way, she makes no mention of his tacit acceptance of separation). Chrysostom, were he here, might even agree with her assessment. However, Chrysostom would certainly see that as a most lamentable aberration, not as an acceptable difference between modern culture and his. If, out of pastoral concern, he allowed certain couples to separate, he would still do all he could to uphold the God-ordained roles of man and woman in marriage and to inculcate a firm resolve to obey God no matter what the cost.

Harrison, however, states that “His passionate devotion to virtue takes precedence over other goals such as social hierarchy. For instance, he recommends that when a husband is sinful and his wife virtuous, she should teach him.” Surely, though, Chrysostom meant this as a temporary measure – until the man was virtuous enough to teach his wife. He never intended virtue to have precedence over God-ordained social hierarchy. Rather, as shown above, he was a skilled spiritual physician, and he was willing to use unusual, potentially dangerous medicines when the situation called for it. But he never mistook the medicines for one’s daily food.

Harrison herself (2002), pp. 269,70 says “According to Chrysostom, woman is subordinate to man both in Paradise and after the fall, but in two very different ways. In Paradise she is his dignified, free, and equal collaborator … After the fall the husband is the master and the wife is the slave …[but] the harshness of her slavery is also tempered by their mutual ties of love and desire.” Thus, Chrysostom clearly considers submission of the woman to the man as a given, although the nature of the submission changes after the Fall. Perhaps Harrison is referring specifically to the social expectation that the woman stay with the battered husband, but Chrysostom clearly refers this to obedience to God.

857 Ibid, p. 205
858 Harrison herself (2002), pp. 269,70 says “According to Chrysostom, woman is subordinate to man both in Paradise and after the fall, but in two very different ways. In Paradise she is his dignified, free, and equal collaborator … After the fall the husband is the master and the wife is the slave …[but] the harshness of her slavery is also tempered by their mutual ties of love and desire.” Thus, Chrysostom clearly considers submission of the woman to the man as a given, although the nature of the submission changes after the Fall. Perhaps Harrison is referring specifically to the social expectation that the woman stay with the battered husband, but Chrysostom clearly refers this to obedience to God.
It is very significant that Sister Nonna is genuinely trying to appropriate Chrysostom’s “ultimate aims” for modern times yet is willing to discard the dictum that we should “do as God has commanded us whether others do their duty or not.” Certainly, when physical injury and death are probable, there is great pastoral wisdom (with which Chrysostom would most likely concur, given his understanding that one must motivate people where they are at, introducing higher motives and virtues as one is able\(^{859}\) in not asking somebody to accept such a situation before they are ready, and many may never be ready. However, if a Christian is unwilling to include obeying God no matter what among his basic presuppositions (even if allowing that most of us will fall short of this at some point), what does that mean for somebody faced with the prospect of martyrdom? Harrison thinks she is being true to Chrysostom’s real aims, but one doubts that Chrysostom would have thought so. Whatever else this shows, it demonstrates that godly desire for the kingdom of heaven and firm resolve to obey at all costs are utterly foreign to modern materialistic, democratic cultures and that members thereof find it incredibly difficult to enter into the mindset of those who do have such a desire and resolve.

Thus, modern scholars find it difficult to understand Chrysostom’s mind set because our focus is much more on things of earth than on things of heaven. In this particular case, the earthly desire is a very sympathetic one – not to be harmed physically and emotionally by one’s own husband. For those who are not taken with heavenly desire, Chrysostom’s position seems harsh or at least impractical. However, those who grew up in a culture that extolled the martyrs who went joyously to their deaths would have a much more favorable opinion of Chrysostom’s advice.

Distaste for Hierarchical Society

Another key aspect of modern culture that makes it so difficult to understand Chrysostom is a distaste for hierarchical society. This can be illustrated by examining the translation of the term συγκατάβασις. Συγκατάβασις is “Chrysostom’s distinctive notion about the Scriptures” which encompasses “God’s gracious acceptance of the limitations … of the human condition—eminently in the Incarnation, and derivatively

\(^{859}\) e.g. *Hom. in Mt.* 30.6; *PG* 57.368; *NPNF* I, 10, pp. 203. “If [a man] have a wife fond of dress … dissolved in great luxury, and talkative, and foolish … How then shall he reform her? Not by enjoining all at once, but the easier things first, and in matters by which she is not vehemently possessed. For if thou hasten to reform her entirely at the beginning, thou hast ruined all.”
in that other incarnation of the Word in Scripture.” In On Looking Again at Sunkatabasis, the late Robert C. Hill announced that συγκατάβασις “is usually to be translated as ‘considerateness’ … though I have not seen this in use elsewhere.” This was a change from “the habitual translation, ‘condescension’” because “there is in sunkatabasis no suggestion … of patronising, condescending behaviour.” Hill continued to use this translation till not long before his death well over twenty years after he first used the term.

The striking thing about this choice is that, as far as this author was able to ascertain, Hill never says anything in this paper about the fact that “condescension” is a direct translation of συγκατάβασις nor bemoans the loss of its positive connotations. He rightly understands that the modern connotations of condescension are pejorative, but he does not stop to consider the profound implications of this fact.

First, there is no longer any English word that puts a positive connotation to the idea “come down with.” Tellingly, in explaining why he rejected “condescension” for translating this word, Hill says συγκατάβασις “has no suggestion of … patronising, condescending behaviour.” Here is another pejorative word for a descending vertical movement – patronising. “Deign” has suffered the same fate.

Second, the loss of the positive aspects of this word shows the loss of the concept. The emotional weight of “come down with” has all gone negative.

Third, in translating συγκατάβασις as “considerateness,” Hill gutted the word of its movement and its particular glory. This is all the more stunning in that he insists that the Incarnation is “the paradigm of considerateness.” What irony! Surely, if anybody ever lovingly “came down with” another it was God the Son at His Incarnation!

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860 Hill (1986), p. 17
861 Hill (1981a), p. 4
863 In his paper on ἀκρίβεια, Hill (1981b), p. 36 does state that ‘condescension’ is a calque, but does not investigate the implications of this fact.
864 “Paternal” still has positive connotations, but the weight of the word lies with the softer attributes of a father, not his authority.
865 It would be instructive to trace this history and see its relationship to the degree of democracy in a particular government.
866 Hill (1981a), p. 11
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Hill's inability to find a fitting English translation is not his fault. He had no word available to him. The eye-opening thing, though, is that such a well respected translator did not realize this.

The implications for modern English speakers attempting to study Chrysostom are great. Only with the greatest difficulty can we comprehend the joy of knowing that one who is higher has descended to be with us. Rather, we are predisposed by our native language to feel “condescended to” and “patronized.” With such predispositions, we can not easily enter into Chrysostom's amazement and joy at the Incarnation. Further, this has implications not just for the pre-eminent vertical relationship (God to man), but for all relationships of authority and submission. If it is so hard for us to hear that God condescends towards us, how can we possibly believe that a wife can be submissive and still be equal to her husband? If we can do neither of these things without great effort, how can we expect to understand much of Chrysostom's thought?

How Does One Study a Person Who Assuredly Would Consider One Insane?

Given Chrysostom's list of the insane – pagans, heretics, the lustful, the covetous, even those who just live for themselves – there are very few (if any!) Chrysostom scholars to whose sanity Chrysostom himself would attest. What are the implications of this for those who study him?

Since Chrysostom is not generally calling into question these people’s reasoning powers, many may not consider this a very pressing question – just because they disagree with Chrysostom does not mean they can not understand the force of his arguments. However, the above examples show that very capable scholars do, in fact, misunderstand him because they are arguing from different (often unarticulated) presuppositions, which Chrysostom himself would consider insane. Furthermore, the example of συγκατάβασις shows that one may not be only intellectually ill-equipped to understand his arguments, but emotionally ill-equipped also. Finally, Chrysostom himself would argue that those lacking in virtue are morally ill-equipped to understand sound doctrine. Previous to the quote below, Chrysostom was describing those who fault God both for His long-suffering with sinners and His threats of hell.

Harrison (2000), p. 198 understands some part of this. She notes that Chrysostom’s “thought lends itself easily to the critiques of some feminist scholars, who themselves define human relationships in terms of power and thus can only understand the refusal to grant women authority as misogyny.”
“Alas the sin-loving soul (φιλαμαρτήμονος) ... from this ... all these opinions have their birth. And so if they who utter these things should be minded to lay hold upon virtue, they will presently find themselves satisfied concerning hell also, and will not doubt.”

Thus, it is imperative to understand the implications of studying Chrysostom when he would consider one insane. At the very least, a scholar must realize that the likelihood that he well understands Chrysostom’s thought is almost nil when Chrysostom himself would consider him too insane in sin to understand his thought.

If one believes in absolute truth, one must – to be honest and consistent – at least consider the possibility that Chrysostom is correct in his assessment of the insanity of those still in their sin. If he were considered insane both within his own time and culture and throughout the centuries, one would be justified in not seriously considering the possibility that Chrysostom is correct in this matter. However, his brilliance, centuries of esteem and love, and position as one of the Three Holy Hierarchs of the Orthodox Church make his views worth a hearing. One can easily say “Yes, but he is the product of his time and culture,” forgetting that this argument goes both ways. The question is “In a particular situation in which persons, times, or cultures disagree; are the differences a simple matter of taste or is somebody right (or at least closer to right) and somebody wrong?”

Further, by Chrysostom’s reckoning, simply ascribing to certain beliefs is clearly not enough to know the truth. Rather, one must know the Λόγος (Who said of Himself, “I am the Way, the Truth, and the Life”), and that is a matter of being part of His Body through the sacraments and obeying Him.

One who tries to live according to Orthodox precepts must start with the assumption that “If St. John Chrysostom considers one insane, Chrysostom is probably right!” The fact that the understanding of sin as insanity is nearly universal in the Orthodox tradition moves this estimate of one’s sanity from a probability to a near certainty. With that in mind, it is instructive to look at a paragraph and a short quote from Sister Nonna’s The Inevitability of Hermeneutics:

868 Hom. in Rom. 31.4; PG 60.673; NPNF I, 11, pp. 558-9
869 In fact, the author’s master’s thesis shows that the consideration of sin as insanity is essentially universal in the early Church and in Orthodox tradition. Thus, these questions actually affect all patristic and Orthodox scholars.
The hermeneutical task of recognizing the distance between [Chrysostom’s] cultural world and ours and examining how best to bridge that distance is therefore inescapable. This crucial hermeneutical task … is a matter of evaluating how best to apply the words of Scripture and the Fathers to concrete human situations. This involves knowing which words to speak in each circumstance and in what sense they can be heard so as to bring life, as a physician knows which medicine will heal a given patient's illness. Such discernment requires a clear perception of what Chrysostom was doing pastorally in his own context … this is where scholarship makes a contribution. But pastoral wisdom that clearly perceives contemporary needs and conditions is most essential.  

We need to distinguish Ford's opinions from those of St John and evaluate Ford in the context of contemporary theological discussion.  

The first paragraph is full of very important points and laudable goals. The problem is that if we are insane in sin, how do we go about achieving them? The short quote, however, is problematic in its own right. What guarantee do we have that “contemporary theological discussion” is not predominantly heretical? When in uncharted waters, whose opinion is trustworthy? Below are some tentative ideas for deciding how to apply patristic teaching in modern times, bearing in mind that the author is certainly among those that Chrysostom would consider insane. Before beginning, however, it should be noted that this is not intended as a complete set of principles for Orthodox patristic study. Rather, it is simply a list of major points one needs to keep in mind when attempting to apply patristic advice if, in fact, we are really insane in our sin. 

First, since lack of virtue makes for lack of true understanding, an Orthodox theologian needs to live a life of repentance and striving for virtue. Second, to lessen the problem of separating a Father’s “ultimate aims” from his cultural presuppositions, one must strive not only to know that Father’s cultural milieu, but to be broadly conversant with the writings of saints from different times and places. Third, in examining the contemporary scene, special weight must go to the works of theologians who are recognized for their holiness. Fourth, one must examine one’s own presuppositions – both the rational and emotional – that clash with those of the Father in question. The fifth point is best expressed by a story often told by the author’s abbess. Once she asked her elder, “How should I read Scripture?” He answered, “On your knees.”

870 Harrison (2000), pp. 200,1
871 Ibid., p. 203
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Using the above five points, let us examine the example of the battered woman and Chrysostom’s contention that we should “do as God has commanded us whether others do their duty or not.” First, one can not understand this comment from the inside unless one makes very serious attempts to obey God, no matter how bad things seem. A person who has experienced the joy and comfort of obeying God in seemingly impossible situations would have a better chance of understanding why St. John would recommend such a thing. He would also have a better chance of convincing others to do likewise, either by encouragement or by simple example. Second, do other Fathers or more contemporary saints address this issue? Assuming that there is no general consensus, are there obvious cultural or other differences between elders with different opinions? Third, who among modern theologians has addressed this issue? Are they noted for their holiness? As with the second point, if there is no general consensus, are there any obvious explanations for the differences? Fourth, what are one’s own presuppositions that make Chrysostom’s position seem unfeeling, unhelpful, inappropriate etc.? As stated above, one likely presupposition is that physical harm is a limit past which God does not require one to go (with a possible exception for martyrdom). This in turn implies a presupposition that almost nothing is worse than physical harm. Upon identifying such a presupposition, a serious Christian must examine it in light of the Scripture, patristic consensus, etc. If he finds that it conflicts with the consensus of the Church, he must ask “How do we regain the patristic consensus?” Here, Chrysostom, with his willingness to allow people to reach virtue step by step and his understanding of different medicines for different diseases, has much to teach us. True, our solutions may be rather different from his, but our “ultimate aims” must indeed be the same – and these certainly must include utter loyalty to and love for the King of the πολιτεία of heaven. Fifth, one must “read Scripture (and, with it, the Fathers) on one’s knees.” For the serious Christian, patristic study must be first and foremost about encountering God and then about using that knowledge to help one’s fellow. If one studies the Fathers and does not humbly pray to the God that they loved and for the people whose lives may be profoundly affected by what one writes,

872 Of course, one can not utterly discount somebody’s opinion because he does not live up to it. Nor is one obligated to believe everything that a particular holy person says. However, other things being equal, the words of one who knows and loves the Λόγος are much more likely to be in accord with the πολιτεία of heaven than the words of one who is ἀλόγος by patristic standards.

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Chrysostom would certainly consider him among the ἄλογα and far from the πολιτεία of heaven.

A Last Word

In the end, we misunderstand Chrysostom because – unlike us – he whole-heartedly desired the πολιτεία of heaven for himself and his flock. True, this includes being a good member of one’s earthly πολιτεία, as long as the demands of heaven and earth do not conflict, but Chrysostom never doubted where his true loyalty lay. He was also convinced that a citizen of the πολιτεία of heaven is of true use to his earthly πολιτεία only insofar as he stays true to his ultimate allegiance. We, however, whether we mean to or not, are much more attuned to our earthly πολιτεία. Thus, when the heavenly πολιτεία calls for enduring abuse, we consider Chrysostom still limited by his times. Surely, he would think that we are tragically and insanely limited by ours. He offered a heavenly crown and we reject it in the hopes of an easier life. He offered us the God-Man Who “came down with” us, but we prefer a democratic heaven and earth.

Chrysostom was no wide-eyed idealist. His understanding of humanity reached from the sub-bestial to the divine, and as a skilled spiritual physician he worked with people wherever they were on that continuum. To the valiant abused wife, he offered a heavenly crown. The woman not yet ready to reach for such a goal he urged on by human praise. To the one who could not rise even to that level, he was willing to show compassion and tacitly accept her separation from her husband. In all cases, though, his goal was always that they might attain the πολιτεία of heaven.

One may fault him for this goal. However, in doing so, one must be clear that he is judging Chrysostom by standards and goals alien to him. Chrysostom undoubtedly worked hard to be of earthly good, but this was always in the hope of furthering the πολιτεία of heaven. To him, the person who focuses on earthly good for its own sake is insane and not of our race.

Was Chrysostom right? If he were here, he might well say, “Become virtuous. Then, you will know.”
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PG: *Patrologia Graeca*, Migne. (Standard for Greek refs. unless cited below).


SC: *Sources Chrétiennes*.

TLG: *Thesaurus Linguae Graecae*
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