Augustinian Interiority: The Teleological Deification of the Soul through Divine Grace

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Augustinian Interiority:
The Teleological Deification of the Soul through Divine Grace

by

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A thesis submitted in fulfilment of the requirements for the degree of
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A Thesis Abstract

Augustinian interiority is a way of deifying ourselves in order to attain true happiness (i.e., teleology). Augustine approaches deification chiefly in terms of the ‘image of God’, from the perspectives of ontology and teleology. Ontologically, we are created in the image of God and this image is indestructible as long as God sustains our life. Teleologically, the image has been deformed (and true happiness has become a remote reality for us) due to the Fall. Humanity therefore needs to be restored. How, then, can we renew the image? Augustine observes that the more we know and love God, the more we become like Him. How, then, can we get to know who/what God really is? This is what Augustinian interiority concerns: its intellectual dimension (i.e., knowing God) cannot be separated from its ethical dimension (i.e., loving God).

The desire for true happiness, which is God, is universal among us. Since we cannot strive for what we do not know, we must know something about happiness before we pursue it, and the knowledge must be innate in our memory. In addition, learning/knowing a thing is refreshing our latent memory of that thing. Eventually, our endeavour to understand God is, in fact, an attempt to recall wholly what we have already known about Him. Why, then, do we remember so little about God – especially His immaterial nature? This is because we are preoccupied with material and worldly things. Thus, passing beyond the world of senses, we must make an effort to grasp the reality of the soul, which is, like God, incorporeal and rational: the soul is the best clue to knowledge of God. Then, we will be able to perceive correctly God’s immanence, omnipresence, and transcendence. Faith is crucial for making progress in our intellectual and ethical ascent to God. However, it is not enough just to believe revealed truths, but we must try to understand them by all means possible. In this way, we can cling to God with our mind and heart, be deified, and move closer to true happiness. Yet, we need to bear two things in mind. One is that without divine grace nothing is possible for us. The other is that, although we cannot know God completely in this life, we must hope for it and love to increase our theological knowledge.
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No part of this thesis has previously been submitted by me for a degree in this or in any other University. Material from the work of others has been acknowledged and quotations and paraphrases suitably indicated.
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3 Cf. *De vera religione* 39.73: ‘Reasoning does not create but discovers (Truth/God) (*ratiocinatio talia facit, sed invenit*)’.
5 *De Trinitate* 5.8.9.
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Introduction

Augustine did not use an exact Latin equivalent of the English word ‘interiority’. Nonetheless, there are texts that scholars feel confident to associate with the idea of interiority. For instance, Madec and Antoni refer to ‘Tu (i.e., Deus) autem eras interior intimo meo et superior summo meo’ (*Confessiones* 3.6.11), while Turner refers to ‘et ecce intus eras et ego foris et ibi te quarebam’ (*Confessiones* 10.27.38). Antoni and Taylor point to another passage in *De vera religione* 39.72: ‘Noli foras ire, in teipsum redi: in interiore homine habitat veritas’. The common feature of all these examples is that God/Truth is immanent in each one of us. Why, then, did Augustine encourage his readers to return to the self and search for God/Truth there? In order to find the answers, we need to have recourse to his thought concerning teleology and deification.

In Augustine’s thoughts teleology, deification, and interiority overlap considerably with each other. Teleology concerns true happiness: this is a Greek idea that Augustine encountered through reading the *Hortensius* at the age of nineteen. As a consequence of this reading achieving true happiness became a lifelong preoccupation. Deification is about personal transformation. Now, Augustine says in *In euangelium Ioannis*
tractatus 23.5, ‘it (i.e., the soul) is made blessed by participation in God’\(^\text{18}\). Here, as I shall explain later, ‘participation’ is actually the language of deification among the Church Fathers. Thus, the passage means that, by ‘participating’ in God, the soul becomes deified and attains happiness. Interiority is also a way of ‘participating’ in God. Yet, Augustine insists that we must, beforehand, know where to find God. As mentioned, God is within us, not ‘out there’, hence interiority is crucial. In summary, we can truly be happy by becoming deified through interiority. In other words, the purpose of interiority is to render ourselves (or to be rendered) similar to God so that we find true happiness, which is God.\(^\text{19}\)

Now, scholars generally, and rather oddly, tend to disapprove of the claim that deification is integral to Augustine’s thought.\(^\text{20}\) (Some scholars, especially Christians, feel uncomfortable with Augustine’s notion of ‘deification’;\(^\text{21}\) since for them the notion, which is of pagan origin, is blasphemous.) As a matter of fact, the word ‘deification’ in its various Latin forms rarely appears in Augustine’s entire works.\(^\text{22}\) However, Bonner is absolutely right to insist that that by no means implies that deification is insignificant. Thus, in line with Bonner, Folliet\(^\text{23}\), and Casiday\(^\text{24}\), I shall explain why deification matters in relation to interiority (and teleology).

The idea of deification originates in Graeco-Roman paganism, in which the distinction between humans and deities is not as sharp as the Christian distinction


\(^{19}\) Cf., Soliloquia 1.1.3 (‘Deus beatitudo’) and Confessiones 10.23.33 (‘gaudium de veritate’). Also, see Sermones 150.3.4: ‘Listen first to the common aim of all philosophers.... It is characteristic of all philosophers that, through their study, inquiry, discussion, their very life, they have sought to possess a happy life. This alone was the cause of philosophising (Haec una fuit causa philosophandi). Furthermore, I think that the philosophers even have this search in common with us. For, if I should ask you why you believe in Christ, and why you have become Christians, every man will answer truthfully by saying: for the sake of a happy life. The pursuit of a happy life is common to philosophers and to Christians’ quoted in Vernon J. Bourke, Augustine’s love of wisdom: an introspective philosophy (West Lafayette: Purdue University Press, 1992), 44.


\(^{24}\) Cf., Casiday, ‘St. Augustine on deification: his homily on Psalm 81’, 23–44.
between the Creator God and His creation. Such an idea contributed significantly to shaping the philosophical-religious dimension of society as well as individuals. On a national level, the imperial cult of deifying and worshipping both deceased and reigning Roman emperors was practised: it was a crucial means for unifying society. At an individual level, it was arguably a way for personal religious development, and its chief representatives are Orphism (i.e., a mystery religion) and the Platonic philosophical tradition. Plato and the self-professed heirs of his philosophical legacy held that there is in each one of us a divine part, which is to be discovered and ‘actualized’.

We do not know what motivated the Christians to initiate, in the 2nd century, their serious consideration of deification, which is based on Psalm 82:6 (‘I said, you are gods and all of you sons of the Most High’). Nonetheless, in the course of its development many Christian intellectuals felt free to appropriate the Platonic idea of deification, though Church Fathers were ‘careful to maintain the absolute ontological distinction between God and his creation’. (Regarding the imperial cult, Christians rejected it in the time of persecution, otherwise they became tolerant of it.) Eventually, ‘until the end of the fourth century’, as Russell summarises the systematisation of Christian deification,

‘the metaphor of deification develops along two distinct lines: on the one hand, the transformation of humanity in principle as a consequence of the Incarnation; on the other, the ascent of the soul through the practice of virtue. The former,

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26 from the time of Augustus (63 BC –AD 14).
27 since Domitian (AD 51 – 96)
28 Russell, The doctrine of deification in the Greek patristic tradition, 9-10. Also, see Ibid., 16: in the Graeco-Roman world ‘the divine and human worlds were not separated by an impenetrable barrier.’
29 Cf., Russell, 10.
30 Cf., Holte, Béatitude et Sagesse, 14-15: ‘L’αναφαίτησις est l’état de l’homme où l’élément divin n’est ni affaibli ni étouffé, mais se trouve au contraire actualisé avec son maximum de plénitude et de force’.
31 Russell says in his book The doctrine of deification in the Greek patristic tradition, ‘Philosophical religion was based on the conviction that the attainment of the divine was fundamentally the realization of something within oneself’ (p. 10). But the ‘something’ is the divine part of the human person.
broadly characteristic of Justin, Irenaeus, Origen, and Athanasius, is based on St Paul’s teaching on incorporation into Christ through baptism and implies a realistic approach to deification. The latter, typical of Clement and the Cappadocians, is fundamentally Platonic and implies a philosophical or ethical approach. By the end of the fourth century the realistic and philosophical strands begin to converge.  

Russell explains further how the Christian ‘metaphor of deification’ was influenced and shaped by Greek ideas. The ethical transformation was regarded as restoring the ‘likeness (homoiosis) to God’. The ‘realistic approach’, on the other hand, was developed on the basis of the concept ‘participation (methexis) in God’. Both ‘homoiosis’ and ‘methexis’ are Plato’s vocabulary, and are important elements of the subsequent Platonic tradition. The two terms are distinct from one another. Yet, they are commonly applied to describe the relationship between supreme (or absolute) being and contingent being. In a nutshell, a contingent being is a ‘likeness’ (or ‘imitation’/’copy’) of, and also ‘participates’ in, Being.  

The mature Augustine’s theory of deification, too, has both the ‘realistic’ dimension and the ‘ethical’ dimension. The best way to identify the similarities and to get a general idea concerning the theory is to understand his use of the terms ‘participation’ and ‘image/likeness (of God)’ in two different ways. One is ontological: ‘He makes you a partaker of His immortality’. The other is teleological: ‘It (i.e., the soul) is made blessed by participation in God.’ ‘Image/likeness (of God)’ is employed in De Trinitate 14.2.6 in both senses:

34 Cf., Russell, 9-10.
37 Cf., Russell, 2. For more explanation see White, ‘9 Plato's metaphysical epistemology’, 289, 293, 295, 299 & 301.
38 Soliloquia 1.1.4 & De Trinitate 1.7.14.
39 Sermones 166.4.4.
40 In euangelium Ioannis tractatus 23.5 (‘Participatione Dei fit beata’) quoted in Bonner, ‘Augustine’s Conception of Deification’, 373.
We talk about the soul’s immortality, of course, with certain qualifications; the soul does have its own kind of death, when it lacks the happy life which ought truly to be regarded as the soul’s life; but (1a) it is called immortal because it never ceases to live with some sort of life even when it is at its unhappiest. In the same sort of way, (2) though the reason or understanding in it may appear at one moment to be in a coma, at another to be small, at another to be great, the human soul is never anything but rational and intellectual. And therefore (2a) if it is with reference to its capacity to use reason and understanding in order to understand and gaze upon God that it was made to the image of God, it follows that from the moment this great and wonderful nature begins to be, this image is always there, whether it is so worn away as to be almost nothing, or faint and distorted, or clear and beautiful. (3) Divine scripture indeed bewails the distortion of its true worth by saying, Although man walks in the image, yet he is troubled in vain; he treasures up and does not know for whom he gathers them (Ps 39:6). (3a) It would not have ascribed vanity to the image of God unless it had observed that it had been distorted. (3b) But it shows clearly enough that this distortion cannot stop its being image by saying, Although man walks in the image. So this sentence can be true whichever way round you put it; as well as saying (3c) Although man walks in the image, yet he is troubled in vain, you could also say (3d) “Although man is troubled in vain, yet he walks in the image.” (3e) Although it is a great nature, it could be spoiled because it is not the greatest; and (3f) although it could be spoiled because it is not the greatest, yet because it is capable of the greatest nature and can share in it, it is a great nature still. 41 [De Trinitate 14.2.6]

41 Hill’s translation: ‘Nam sicut ipsa immortalitas animae secundum quemade modum dicitur; habet quippe et anima mortem suam, cum vita beata caret, quae vera animae vita dicenda est; sed immortalis idem nuncupatur, quoniam qualicumque vita, etiam cum miserrima est, nunquam desinit vivere: ita quamvis ratio vel intellectus nunc in ea sit sopitus, nunc parvus, nunc magnus apparet, nunquam nisi rationalis et intellectualis est anima humana; ac per hoc si secundum hoc facta est ad imaginem Dei quod uti ratione atque intellectu ad intellegendum et conspiciendum Deum potest, profecto ab initio quo esse coepit ista tam magna et mira natura, sive ita obsoleta sit haec imago, ut pene nulla sit, sive obscura atque deformis, sive clara et pulchra sit, semper est. Denique deformitatem dignitatis eius miserans divina Scriptura: Quamquam, inquit, in imagine ambulat homo, tamen vane conturbatur: thesaurizat, et nescit cui congregabit ea. Non itaque vanitatem imaginis Dei tribueret, nisi deformem cerneret factam. Nec tantum valere illam deformitatem, ut auferat quod imago est, satisc ostendit, dicendo: Quamquam in imagine ambulat homo. Quapropter ex utraque parte veraciter pronuntiari potest ista sententia, ut quemadmodum dictum est: Quamquam in imagine ambulat homo, tamen vane conturbatur; ita dicatur, Quamquam vane conturbatur homo, tamen in imagine ambulat. Quamquam enim magna natura sit, tamen
In this text there are basically three ontological statements, which are:

(1) the soul’s immortality, (1a) it never ceases to live (i.e., the soul never ceases to be);

(2) the human soul is never anything but rational and intellectual, (2a) this image [of Reason\(^{42}\)/God] is always there, whether it is … distorted (thus becoming rational is becoming like Reason/God);

(3b) this distortion cannot stop its being image.

These phrases imply that the soul’s existence and its (state of) being the image of God/Reason cannot be separated from one another. Consequently, since God has made us partake in His immortality;\(^{43}\) God does not allow His image in us to perish.

Regarding the teleological aspect (or life/death) of ‘image of God’, the relevant passages are:

(1) the soul does have its own kind of death, when it lacks the happy life which ought truly to be regarded as the soul’s life,

(1a) [it never ceases to live … even when] it is at its unhappiest (i.e., [the soul is ontologically immortal though] it is teleologically perishable);

(2) [though] the reason or understanding [i.e., the image of Reason/God] in it may appear at one moment to be in a coma, at another to be small, at another to be great, [the human soul is never anything but rational and intellectual] (i.e., [the soul is by nature rational though] the degree of its rationality varies);

(2a) [this image is always there, whether] it is so worn away as to be almost nothing, or faint and distorted, or clear and beautiful;

\(^{41}\) vitiari potuit, quia summa non est: et quamquam vitiari potuerit, quia summa non est, tamen quia summae naturae capax est, et esse particeps potest, magna natura est.’

\(^{42}\) Cf., *De ordine* 1.8.25; *Confessiones* 3.6.10, 3.7.12, 13.9.10 & 11.8.10.

\(^{43}\) Cf., *Sermones* 166.4.4.
(3b) this distortion [i.e., of the image of God] cannot stop its [i.e., the soul’s] being image (i.e., [the soul is ontologically the imperishable image of God though] the image can be teleologically distorted).

The teleological mutability of the image is also expressed in terms of ‘troubled’ (3c & 3d) and ‘spoiled’ (3e & 3f). Similarly, De Trinitate 14.4.18 is another instance of the twofold meaning of the term ‘image’:

For now it (i.e., the mind) loves itself with a straight, not a twisted love, now that it loves God; for sharing in him results not merely in its being that image, but in its being made new and fresh and happy after being old and worn and miserable.⁴⁴

Here, Augustine says that renewing (‘renovatur’) the image of God and making oneself happy (‘beatificatur’) go hand in hand. (Notice that ‘sharing [participatione]’ in God in the above text is used in both ontological [i.e., ‘being that image’] and teleological sense [i.e., ‘its being made new and fresh’].) What, then, makes the image deformed or reformed? That depends on our ethical life:

See to what extent you are unlike. You assuredly displease because of that unlikeness, since you have been made in the image of God; but by a perverse and evil life you are troubled in yourself and have destroyed in you the image of your founder. Being thus made unlike, look to yourself and be displeased with yourself; and from that very moment you will have begun to be made like, since that thing displeases you which also displeases God.⁴⁵ (Enarrationes in Psalmos 75.3)

⁴⁴ Hill’s translation: ‘Iam enim se non diligit perverse, sed recte, cum Deum diligit, cuius participatione imago illa non solum est, verum etiam ex vetustate⁴⁴ renovatur, ex deformitate reformatur, ex infelicitate beatificatur.’
Consequently, both the Greek Fathers’ doctrine of deification and Augustine’s understanding of deification consist of a ‘realistic’ (or ontological) dimension and an ‘ethical’ (or teleological) dimension: ethics is an integral constituent of teleology. (In fact, the level of the image’s perfection is determined not only by the ethicality of our way of life, but also by our understanding of God. Furthermore, the latter is a more critical factor than the former: I shall explain this later.)

Note Bonner argues that Augustine mentions the complete obliteration of the image of God by sin in a number of places; 46 for example,

By sin Adam lost this image imprinted in the spirit of the mind which we receive by the grace of righteousness 47,

Are they not worthy to suffer such things, that God should bring their image to nothing in His City, because they themselves have likewise brought the image of God to nothing in the Earthly City? 48

Bonner suggests some possible reasons for such a ‘strange aberration’ in Augustine as follows;

we cannot ignore the influence of Neo-Platonism. According to Plotinus, an image can only obtain a true likeness to its model if it is turned to it in contemplation. …. Again, Augustine regards the image of God in man as being found in the mens, the highest part of the soul, which is capable of supernatural life. If that supernatural life were brought to an end by sin, God’s image would perish … Finally, account should be taken of the parallel in Augustine’s mind between man’s creation in Adam and his recreation in Christ by reform and

47 De Genesi ad Litteram 6.27.38 quoted in Bonner, 504: footnote no. 38 De Gen. ad lit. VI.27.38: “Hanc imaginem in spiritu mentis impressam perditid Adam per peccatum; quam recipimus per gratiam iustitiae; non spirituale atque immortale corpus, in quo ille nondum fuit, et in quo erunt omnes sancti resurgentes a mortuis: hoc enim praemium est illius meritii, quod amisit.”
48 Enarrationes in Psalms 72.26 quoted in Bonner, 504-505: footnote no. 40 Enar. in Ps. 72,26: “Domine, in civitate tua imaginem illorum ad nihilum rediges. Nonne digni sunt haec pati, ut Deus in
renewal. As G. B. Ladner has expressed it: ‘… Reformation-renovation, then, is a second turning to God from nothingness, starting with a new conversion, a renewal this time to the creational condition of formation’.49

Here, Bonner is not aware that, while being mistakenly convinced that the ‘loss’ of the image (or the image’s being reduced to ‘nothing’) must mean an ontological demise, he is correctly attempting to make sense of the ‘loss’ from the perspective of teleology: ‘sin’ is, above all, an ethical language. Let us turn to the Confessions 13.21.29 for further clarification:

It is profitable only for already baptized believers to keep them from love of this world (Jas. 1: 27) that their soul may live to you (2 Cor. 5: 15). It was dead when it was living in pleasures (I Tim. 5: 6), pleasures, Lord, which bring death.50

What the ‘death’ of the soul means, I think, is very clear: it cannot be construed literally as meaning the termination of the soul’s existence. Therefore, we must not interpret, in an ontological sense, any Augustinian text concerning the annihilation of the image: in this life, the soul always remains as an image of Being.

I have so far demonstrated that the idea of deification similar to Greek Fathers’ is an integral element of Augustine’s thoughts. Also, I have briefly explained that the teleological part of Augustinian deification can be designated as ‘interiority’. Yet, this assertion of mine needs a further justification, and the best way to start it is to highlight in more detail how the two constituent parts of deification differ from one another: it will also lead to a correct definition of the term ‘Augustinian deification’.

civitate sua imaginem illorum ad nihilum redigat ; quia et ipsi in civitate terrena imaginem Dei ad nihilum redegerunt? In civitate tua imaginem eorum ad nihilum rediges.”

49 Bonner, 505-506. Also, see Bourke, 123-124: ‘Difficulty arises from the fact that Augustine used the term “immortality” in a different sense when discussing the effect of sin upon the soul (City 12.4). Thus, a soul that has sinned seriously is called “dead” in the sight of God. This does not mean that a sinner ceases to exist; rather, Augustine thought that all human souls are undying. They live on to a future life of happiness or punishment. In the Incomplete Work against Julian (6.30), he acknowledges that there are two meanings of immortality, and the more important meaning is the religious one.’

50 Chadwick’s translation: ‘non prodest nisi iam fidelibus contingere se ab amore huic saeculi, ut anima eorum tibi vivat, quae mortua erat in deliciis vivens, deliciis, Domine, mortiferis’
God, first of all, has made us ontologically ‘participate’ in Him by ‘adopting’ us as His sons through the Son’s incarnation, crucifixion and resurrection, and our baptism:

If we are made *sons of God*, we are also made *gods*; but this is done by grace of adoption, and not by generation;\(^{51}\)

(incarnation) God wishes to make you a god, not by nature, like Him (i.e., Christ) whom He begot, but by His gift and adoption. For just as He through His humanity was made a partaker of your mortality, so He makes you a partaker of His immortality by exaltation;\(^{52}\)

the Son of God came … and was made the Son of Man, in order to reform us to the image of God;\(^{53}\)

(crucifixion) for if He (i.e., the Son) had not willed to be deformed, you would not have recovered the form which you lost. He, therefore, hung upon the cross, deformed; but His deformity was our beauty. In this life, therefore, let us hold the deformed Christ. What is the deformed Christ? *Far be it from me to glory, save in the cross of our Lord Jesus Christ, through which the world hath been crucified unto me and I unto the world.* This is the deformity of Christ;\(^{54}\)

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\(^{51}\) quoted in Bonner, ‘Augustine’s Conception of Deification’, 378: footnote no. ‘39 Enar. in Ps. 49. i. 2: “Ego dixi: Dii estis, et filii Excelsi omnes; vos autem ut homines moriemini, et sicut unus ex principibus cadetis. Manifestum est ergo, quia homines dixit deos, ex gratia sua deificatos, non de substantia sua natos. Ille enim iustificat, qui per semetipsum non ex alio iustus est; et ille deificat, qui per seipsum non alterius participatione Deus est. Qui autem iustificat, ip9e deificat, quia iustificando, filios Dei facit. Dedit enim eis potestatem filios Dei fieri. Si filii Dei facti sumus, et dii facti sumus; sed hoc gratiae est adoptantis non naturae generantis.” CCSI, xxxviii. 575-6.’

\(^{52}\) Sermones 166.4.4. Also, see ibid., (‘if He Himself is the Selfsame and cannot in any way be changed, by participating in His divinity we too shall be made immortal in eternal life; and this pledge has been given to us by the Son of God … that before we should be made partakers of His immortality, He should Himself first be made a partaker of our mortality. For just as He was mortal, not of His substance but of ours, so we shall be immortal, not of our substance but of His’) quoted in Bonner, 378: footnote no. ‘40 Serm. 166. iv. 4: ‘Deus enim deum deu m deum a vult facere: non natura, sicut est ille quem genuit; sed dono suo et adoptione. Sicut enim ille per humanitatem facts est particeps mortalitatis tuae; sic to per exaltationem facti participem immortalitatis suae.’ PL, xxxviii. 909.’

\(^{53}\) De Trinitate 4.4.7 (McKenna’s translation).

(resurrection) because that flesh (i.e., of Christ’s) has received resurrection and eternal life, which arose and being made alive ascended into heaven, this has been promised to us also. For we expect the inheritance itself, eternal life;

(baptism) Behold, a man has received the Sacrament of that birth, being baptized; he hath the Sacrament, and a great Sacrament, divine, holy, ineffable. Consider what a Sacrament! To make him a new man by remission of all sins!

Note that in De Trinitate 14.17.23 Augustine clarifies the role of baptism, which I take as a preparation for our teleological participation. In other words, baptism does not renew the image of God, but prepares for it:

To be sure, this renewal (i.e., of the image of God) does not happen in one moment of conversion, as the baptismal renewal by the forgiveness of all sins happens in a moment, so that not even one tiny sin remains unforgiven. But it is one thing to throw off a fever, another to recover from the weakness which the fever leaves behind it; it is one thing to remove from the body a missile stuck in it, another to heal the wound it made with a complete cure. The first stage of the cure is to remove the cause of the debility, and this is done by pardoning all sins; the second stage is curing the debility itself, and this is done gradually by making steady progress in the renewal of this image. These two stages are pointed out in the psalm where we read, *He is gracious to all your iniquities, which happens in baptism, and heals all your infirmities* (Ps 103:3), which happens by daily advances while the image is being renewed.

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57 Hill’s translation: ‘Sane ista renovatio non momento uno fit ipsius conversionis, sicut momento uno fit illa in baptismo renovatio remissione omnium peccatorum, neque enim vel unum quantulumcumque remanet quod non remittatur. Sed quemadmodum alius est carere febris, alius ab infirmitate, quae febris facta est, revealescere; itemque alius est infulum telum de corpore demere, alius vulnus quod eo factum est secunda curatione sanare : ita prima curatio est causam removere languoris, quod per omnium fit indulgentiam peccatorum ; secunda ipsum sanare languorem, quod fit paulatim proficiendo in renovacione huius imaginis’ quoted in Bonner, ‘III. Augustine’s Doctrine of Man. Image of God and Sinner’, 511: footnote no. 66.
In summary, we are constantly in the state of being invited to renew the image of God through the Son’s participation in our life and through our baptism: the latter is the culmination of God’s invitatory act.

As for the teleological side of our participation in God, it is changeable in terms of degree throughout our life. In other words, one’s level of participation is subject to change, and differs from another’s. Hence, Augustine describes it in quantitative language, often in conjunction with ‘image/likeness (of God)’: the more we participate in God, the more we become like Him (‘… while the inner man is being renewed more and more’). Note that in *De peccatorum meritis et remissione et de baptismo parvulorum* 2.8.10 Augustine says that ‘full adoption and deification, however, only take place after death, at the resurrection’: it goes without saying that ‘full’ is quantitative language.

What, then, does Augustine mean by ‘participation’ on our part in the teleological sense? In *De Trinitate* 7.6.12 Augustine says, ‘One does not approach God by moving across intervals of place, but by likeness or similarity, and one moves away from him by dissimilarity or unlikeness.’ So, we can put the same question in the following way without detriment to its meaning: ‘How can we render ourselves similar to God?’, or ‘How can we move closer to God?’

The answer is twofold and can be found in the Augustinian texts cited above. One is by means of loving God or maintaining an ethically upright lifestyle (cf., *De Trinitate* 14.4.18 and *Enarrationes in Psalmos* 75.3): our way of life become truly ethical if we love God more than His creation. The other is our reason’s action of ‘understanding and gazing upon God’ (*De Trinitate* 14.2.6). These two are inseparable from one another, but there is a logical precedence as well as superiority between them. Since

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58 *De Trinitate* 4.3.5 (McKenna’s translation): ‘... cum magis magisque renovatur interior homo’. Also, see *De Trinitate* 9.11.16 (McKenna’s translation): ‘we are like God inasmuch as we know Him (Quocirca in quantum Deum novimus, similes sumus)’.
59 quoted in Bonner, ‘Deification, Divinization’, 266.
60 Hill’s translation: ‘Non enim locorum intervallis sed similitudine acceditur ad Deum, et dissimilitudine receditur ab eo.’
61 Cf., *De Trinitate* 12.11.16: (Hill’s translation) ‘For man’s true honor is God’s image and likeness in him, but it can only be preserved when facing him from whom its impression is received. And so the less love he has for what is his very own the more closely can he cling to God. (Honor enim hominis verus est
Augustine stresses in a number of places that we cannot love what we do not know,\(^{62}\) gaining knowledge of God is logically (not temporally) prior to loving God and so the former is a more decisive factor than the latter. Consequently, Augustine says in *De Trinitate* 9.11.16, ‘we are like God in as much as we know Him’\(^ {63}\), and this is based on two premises. One is that ‘all knowledge concerning the species of a thing is similar to that thing which it knows’\(^{64}\) (*De Trinitate* 9.11.16): I shall explain what the Augustinian term ‘species (species)’ means in the following paragraph. The other is that, when we love such knowledge, our mind ontologically becomes similar to that species.\(^{65}\) Yet, ‘(we are) never like him (i.e., God) to the point of equality, since we never know him as much as he himself is.’\(^{66}\)

Note that Augustine frequently uses the Latin word ‘species’ – as well as ‘genus’ – primarily as collective nouns in all cases: the Oxford Latin Dictionary defines ‘species’ as ‘a subdivision of any class or kind, a sort, species, etc.’, and ‘genus’ as ‘a class containing in itself a number of subordinate kinds or variety’. These are a pair of correlative terms, just like ‘left’ and ‘right’, ‘high’ and ‘low’. Hence, ‘(human) person’, for example, is a species of the generic term ‘animal’, but simultaneously is a genus with respect to ‘man’ and ‘woman’. Augustine maintains that a definition of a thing becomes truthful when that definition refers to the species of that thing; for instance,

\(\text{(each individual man) defines the human mind by a special and general knowledge. … when he speaks the truth about the human mind, either specially or generally.}^{67}\)

\(^{62}\) Cf., *De Trinitate* 10.1.1: (McKenna’s translation) ‘no one can in any way love a thing that is wholly unknown’. *De libero arbitrio* 2.15.40: ‘wisdom … in the knowledge of which you found delight’.

\(^{63}\) (McKenna’s translation) ‘Quocirca in quantum Deum novimus, similes sumus’.

\(^{64}\) This is my own translation of ‘omnis secundum speciem notitia, similis est ei quam novit’: (Hill’s translation) ‘all positive knowledge of quality is like the thing which it knows’: (McKenna’s translation) ‘all knowledge according to the species is similar to that which it knows’.

\(^{65}\) Cf., *De Trinitate* 9.11.16: (McKenna’s translation) ‘The mind, therefore, possesses a certain likeness of the species known to it, whether we are pleased with the species or displeased with its privation (Habet ergo animus nonnullam speciei notae similitudinem …)’: (Hill’s translation) ‘So the consciousness has some kind of likeness to the positive quality known, either when it takes pleasure in it or when it is displeased with the lack of it.’ McKenna’s translation is better than Hill’s.

\(^{66}\) *De Trinitate* 9.11.16 (Hill’s translation).

\(^{67}\) *De Trinitate* 9.6.9 (McKenna’s translation): ‘humanam mentem speciali aut generali cognitione definit. … de humana specialiter aut generaliter verum dicit’. There is a similar passage in *De ordine* 2.11.31:
the definition of a generic term itself must include all the species.\textsuperscript{68}

Therefore, ‘knowledge according to the species’\textsuperscript{69} means ‘a definition of a (generic) term according to its species’: ‘defining’ a thing perfectly is the same as ‘understanding’ that thing perfectly; for instance,

it is not by seeing many minds with our bodily eyes that we gather, by way of analogy, a general or special knowledge of the human mind; but we contemplate (intuemur) the inviolable truth, whence we can as perfectly as possible define, not what each man’s mind is, but what it ought to be in the light of the eternal types.\textsuperscript{70} (‘Contemplate’, ‘understand’, ‘see’ and ‘know’ are synonymous with each other in Augustine’s language.\textsuperscript{71})

I would have you define what sensation itself is, so that all these may be included in one simple definition, and nothing else that is not sensation may be understood (intellegereetur) under it.\textsuperscript{72}

Based on Epistulae ad Galatas expositio 30 (394/395 AD), Bonner defines Augustinian deification as ‘sonship by adoption and not by nature through God’s participation in our humanity in the person of Jesus Christ’.\textsuperscript{73} This is a lopsided definition, for it refers to the ontological part only. Bonner’s problem here is that he has failed to identify the multiple meanings of the word ‘nature’. Whenever Augustine stresses the difference between the Son of God and the sons of God in terms of ‘nature’, he is not implying any more than the distinction between the Creator and His creation, and the immutability of the former and the mutability of the latter. In many other parts of his works Augustine simultaneously emphasizes a crucial similarity between God and the soul. That is that both of them share the common immaterial ‘nature’. Thus, the

\textsuperscript{68} De Trinitate 15.9.15 (McKenna’s translation): ‘Definitio autem ipsius nominis generalis, omnes etiam species complectatur necesse est.’

\textsuperscript{69} De Trinitate 9.11.16.

\textsuperscript{70} De Trinitate 9.6.9 (McKenna’s translation).

\textsuperscript{71} Cf., De quantitate animae 27.53, 33.76 & De Trinitate 1.8.16: ‘contemplare’, ‘scire’, ‘intellegere’ and ‘videre’.

\textsuperscript{72} De quantitate animae 23.41. Also, see ibid., 25.48.
Creator God is immutable Good, Beauty, Being, and Reason;\(^74\) whereas the soul – as being created in the image of God, or as a result of the Son’s participation in our humanity – is mutably good, beautiful, existent, and rational.\(^75\) The ontological gap between the Creator and creatures is eternally insurmountable and this is what ‘sonship by adoption and not by nature’ means. However, God has made the soul ‘capable (\textit{capax [Dei]}\(^76\))’ of becoming immutably good (or rational/existent) through knowing and loving Him – in other words, through teleologically participating in Him – and this is what striving for ‘full adoption’\(^77\) means. Therefore, Augustinian deification is, by definition, ‘the process of the soul’s becoming immutably good through knowing and loving the Creator God, as He has made it possible by adopting us as His sons “through participating in our humanity in the person of Jesus Christ”\(^78\).’ In other words, for Augustine ‘deifying (\textit{deificari})’ means rendering the soul immutably good through increasing our knowledge of God and loving Him; as the Son of the Creator God enabled it through his incarnation, death, and resurrection, and also through our baptism.

How, then, does deification relate to interiority? I insisted that the latter is a way of achieving the former. Now, in order to demonstrate the methodological character of interiority, I shall introduce and explain two personal issues of Augustine’s regarding the intellectual side of our participation in God. One of them is ‘What is the true knowledge of God?’ Augustine’s theological development underwent three phases before his baptism, namely Manichaean materialism, Stoic materialism,\(^79\) and finally Neoplatonic incorporealism. Manichaeism and Stoicism kept Augustine away from God, whereas Neoplatonism facilitated his participation in God:\(^80\) the latter is often dubbed as ‘Neoplatonic enlightenment’. The other important issue is how to be persistent in our struggle to know God better. Augustine had difficulty in rendering his lifestyle ethical in accordance with his previous intellectual conversion, and such a


\(^{75}\) Cf., \textit{Confessions} 3.6.10, 3.7.12, 13.9.10, and 11.8.10.

\(^{76}\) Cf., \textit{Confessions} 1.6.9, 7.5.7, and 13.9.10.

\(^{77}\) Cf., \textit{De Trinitate} 14.8.11 & 15.20.39.

\(^{78}\) Cf., \textit{De peccatorum meritis et remissione et de baptismo parvulorum} 2.8.10 quoted in Bonner, ‘Deification, Divinization’, 266.

\(^{79}\) Bonner, ‘Deificare’, 266.

\(^{80}\) Stoic materialism dominated Christian theology in the time of Augustine: I shall explain later.

\(^{80}\) Cf., \textit{Confessiones} 7.10.16.
difficulty hampered him from making further progress in gaining true knowledge of God: in *De vera religione* 3.4 and *De Trinitate* 2.15.25\(^{81}\) he maintains that ‘carnal’ people think about God in ‘carnal’ manners. Thus, for Augustine our intellectual participation in God cannot be considered in isolation from the problem of what the right way of pursuing knowledge of God is.

What, then, does Augustine argue to be the correct methodology for gaining knowledge of God? In the *Confessions* 7.10.16 Augustine says that, when he was reading ‘*libri platonicorum*’, God led his mind to Himself by ushering him ‘into his inner self’\(^{82}\) and, then, making him see above his mind ‘the immutable light’. In the *Confessions* 10.17.26 Augustine describes the same thing more concisely: ‘Here I am climbing up through my mind towards you who are constant above me.’ We can see here the semantic consistency with the texts quoted, as the examples of interiority, in the very beginning of the Introduction. In short, Augustinian interiority is turning inwards, then upwards, in search for God.

Note that there are three key concepts constituting the theoretical foundation of Augustinian interiority, namely the incorporeity of the soul and God, God’s immanence, and God’s transcendence. First of all, due to the incorporeal nature of God and the soul, God cannot be found in a material world, hence inward turn to the soul. Secondly, we cannot look for what we do not remember/know: ‘how may I find you, if I do not remember you?’\(^{83}\) This is to say that knowledge of God is in our memory, hence God’s epistemological immanence: as mentioned, for Augustine knowledge is a substance. Why, then, have many people almost completely – but not entirely – forgotten God and, consequently, do not seek Him? That is because they are preoccupied with material things.\(^{84}\) Finally, since God is the Creator of the soul, the former transcends the latter; hence an upward turn.

We can now sum up Augustinian deification in reference to teleology and interiority. Since we are created to participate in Being, we are ontologically the image of God.

\(^{81}\) and also *De Trinitate* 8.2.3.
\(^{82}\) *redivire ad memet ipsum intravi in intima mea*.
\(^{83}\) *Confessiones* 10.17.26 (my own translation): ‘quomodo iam inveniam te, si memor non sum tui?’
\(^{84}\) Cf., *Confessiones* 10.23.33.
Yet, due to our lack of participation in terms of remembering, knowing, and loving God; we have been exiled from true happiness (i.e., God) and the image has been disfigured. Therefore, we must deify ourselves by turning inwards and afterwards upwards, if we are to attain true happiness.

By and large, we can find the mature Augustine’s theory of deification in the young Augustine’s thoughts. As a matter of fact, the terms ‘adoption’ and ‘participation’ are scarcely employed in the early works, and baptism does not seem to play any significant role. However, the most fundamental idea concerning our ontological participation – that is, as long as our existence is sustained by God, the image of God in us cannot be obliterated and so we are in the state of being invited to renew the image – was firmly held by the young Augustine. For instance, in *De quantitate animae* 2.3 Augustine insists in terms of ‘likeness’ that we are created to participate in God’s immortality:

Augustine. … the soul is like to God. …

Evodius. That is exactly what I should like you to explain: how the human soul is like to God. For, although we believe that God has been made by no one, you said previously that the soul is made by God Himself.

…

E. … God made the soul immortal …

…

E. … just as He, being immortal, makes something immortal in His own likeness …

…

E. … I cannot make anything immortal …

A. … your soul has not the same power as He in whose likeness it has been made.

Also, the Christological element is not entirely absent:

today throughout the nations and peoples the proclamation is made: “In the beginning was the Word, and the Word was with God, and the Word was God. This was in the beginning with God, and all things were made by him, and
without him was nothing made” (John I: 1). In order that men may receive the Word, love him, and enjoy him so that the soul may be healed and the eye of the mind receive power to use the light, to the greedy it is declared: “Lay not up for yourselves treasures upon earth where moth and rust destroy, and where thieves break through and steal. But lay up for yourselves treasures in heaven where neither moth nor rust destroys, and where thieves do not break through nor steal. For where your treasure is there will your heart be also” (Matt. 6:19). To the wanton it is said: “He who sows in the flesh shall of the flesh reap corruption. He who sows in the spirit shall of the spirit reap eternal life” (Gal. 6:8). To the proud it is said: “Whosoever exalteth himself shall be abased and whosoever humbleth himself shall be exalted” (Luke 14:11). To the wrathful it is said: “Thou hast received a blow. Turn the other cheek” (Matt. 5:39). To those who strive it is said: “Love your enemies” (Matt. 5:44). To the superstitious: “The kingdom of God is within you” (Luke 17:21). To the curious: “Look not on the things which are seen, but on the things which are not seen. For the things which are seen are temporal, but the things which are not seen are eternal” (II Cor. 4:18). Finally, to all it is said: “Love not the world nor the things which are in the world. For everything that is in the world is the lust of the flesh, the lust of the eyes and the ambition of this world” (I John 2:15).85

This text implies the divine initiative for our deification by means of the Word’s incarnation, crucifixion and resurrection. Moreover, teleological participation, in other words interiority, was fully developed by the young Augustine:

“I am happy to emphasize the good advice that the soul should not pour itself out in the senses beyond the measure of necessity, but rather should recall itself from the senses and become a child of God again, that is, be made a new man by putting off the old. There is surely need to begin at this reformation because of the neglect of God’s law - and no other warning does Sacred Scripture utter more often in simple truth and in parable. I should like to develop this point and, of course, to bind myself by the same law, so to speak, that I lay down for you, namely, to render an account of myself to myself, to whom I ought before all

85 De vera religione 3.4.
others to render an account, and thus become to God, in the words of Horace, “a
friend made a bond-servant to his lord.” This renovation cannot take place at all,
unless we are remade in the image of Him who gave us that image to keep as a
most precious treasure, when He gave us to ourselves with such a nature that
only He Himself can rank before us. But, to me no work is more laborious, no
activity more like inactivity, than this renovation of spirit, for the soul has not the
strength to begin or complete it, except with the help of Him to whom it turns
itself. Hence it comes about that man’s reformation must be sought from the
mercy of Him whose Goodness and Power are the cause of man’s formation.”

‘Child’ in this context must mean – in the language of the mature Augustine – the state
of being ‘adopted by grace’, not ‘by nature’.  

(Note that, regarding the young Augustine’s concept of participation, David V.
Meconi’s article ‘St. Augustine’s Early Theory of Participation’ gives us a good
insight into the ontological dimension, while Folliet’s ‘Deificari in otio. Augustin,
Epistula 10.2’ concentrates on an exposition of the teleological [or ethical]
dimension.)

I have so far demonstrated that deification includes teleology, to which interiority
pertains. Therefore, Augustinian interiority must be approached from the perspective
that is the amalgam of teleology and deification.

The Structure of this Thesis
Augustine began to construct a theory concerning interiority after reading Neoplatonism
and subsequently undergoing an intellectual transformation. Yet, due to his continued
failure to live up to his moral expectations, the theory would remain, for a while,
incomplete with respect to the ethical dimension: this means that the intellectual part

86 De quantitate animae 28.55, the Father’s of the Church translation.
87 Cf., In euangelium Ioannis tractatus 2.13.
90 Cf., Confessions 7.20.26: (Chadwick’s translation) ‘after reading the books of the Platonists and
learning from them to seek for immaterial truth, I turned my attention to your ‘invisible nature understood
of Augustinian interiority is temporally as well as logically prior to the ethical part. Therefore, I shall, in Part I, investigate the course of Augustine’s theological development in the period between reading the *Hortensius* and his encounter with Neoplatonism. In Part II, I shall examine both the intellectual and the moral dimensions of the young Augustine’s theory of interiority.

In Part I, I shall first of all explain why, through reading the *Hortensius*, Augustine suddenly began to associate his pursuit of happiness with knowledge of God, knowledge of the soul, and ethical uprightness (chapter 1). Augustine encountered Manichaeism, Stoicism, and Neoplatonism in the course of his theological adventure; and settled with the last one. Hence, the questions to be explored are ‘What were Augustine’s criteria for determining whether a theological view is acceptable or not?’, and ‘Why did Manichaeism (chapter 2) and Stoicism (chapter 3) failed to meet those criteria?’

As for Neoplatonism, it was the concept of immateriality that revolutionised Augustine’s way of thinking about God and the soul – especially in reference to God’s immanence, omnipresence, and transcendence: he had already become familiar with the first two through Stoicism. Thus, I shall examine how Plotinus (the founder of Neoplatonism) argued for God’s immateriality and the three modes of God’s existence (chapter 4). I shall also analyse the basic structure of Plotinian interiority, since Augustinian interiority is modelled on it.

Although Augustine considered some Neoplatonic ideas as invaluable, he converted to Christianity and the creation doctrine became incorporated into his view of reality (Part II). Augustine regarded that the constituents of reality are hierarchically organized according to the criteria of divisibility, mutability, rationality, and Creator-or-creature. Ontologically, the soul is inferior to God while being superior to any other creature: this is permanently unchangeable. Teleologically, the soul’s middle rank in the hierarchy is not ‘static’ but ‘dynamic’.

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frequently in terms of ‘image (of God)’\textsuperscript{92}, ‘ascent (to God)’\textsuperscript{93}, rational-or-irrational\textsuperscript{94}, and wise-or-unwise\textsuperscript{95} (not ‘adoption’ or ‘participation’). Depending on what we (i.e., our heart and mind) are preoccupied with, the ‘image of God’ either deteriorates or is restored: there are seven levels of ‘ascent’ or deification. (Cf., chapter 1.)

To renew the image of God, we must acquire true knowledge of God. Yet, knowing/learning is remembering what we have already known. This is a theory of reminiscence that originates from Plato. Plato felt that it required a justification. Hence, he argued that the soul existed in a previous life, learnt many things there, and is born into this life with that knowledge. Augustine, too, makes references to the pre-existence of the soul in a number of places: in agreement with Teske, I shall argue that Augustine first accepted it explicitly, but subsequently implicitly.\textsuperscript{96} (Cf., chapter 2.)

Alongside the theory of reminiscence, Augustine insisted on God’s epistemological immanence in memory. This is based on the presupposition that both God and the soul are incorporeal. How, then, can we be certain that their common nature is distinct from the body? Augustine argued (especially in \textit{De quantitate animae})\textsuperscript{97} that the incorporeity of the soul is provable and it automatically makes that of God conclusive. Nonetheless, many people are ignorant of the soul’s true nature, let alone God’s, and the cause of the ignorance is their preoccupation with sensible things. Consequently, some of them, like Augustine before his Neoplatonic enlightenment, search for God in a material realm. Thus, we need to free ourselves from the obsession with bodily and worldly things and, then, endeavour to understand the reality of the soul: this is the first step towards the true knowledge of God (or the first step for our intellectual ‘ascent’ to God). Yet, God is not only immanent in, but also transcends, the soul. Therefore, we must also strive to perceive God’s superiority over the soul. (Cf., sections a & b.)

\textsuperscript{92} \textit{Soliloquia} 1.1.4 & \textit{De quantitate animae} 28.55.
\textsuperscript{93} \textit{De vera religione} 29.52 & \textit{Confessiones} 9.2.2.
\textsuperscript{94} Cf., \textit{Soliloquia} 1.1.5 & \textit{De Trinitate} 13.1.4.
\textsuperscript{95} Cf., \textit{De ordine} 2.13.38 & \textit{Confessiones} 13.2.3.
\textsuperscript{97} Passim.
Reason is not independent of, but always interacts with, the will. The perverse will is the cause of reason’s being blind to God and is responsible for our ‘irrationally’ loving creatures more than the Creator. However, the depraved will cannot be healed without, first of all, remembering God; for we cannot love what we do not know.\textsuperscript{99} (Cf., section c.) Yet, only few people are capable of knowing God through reason alone.\textsuperscript{100} The majority of us need to rely on faith in order to purify our will.\textsuperscript{101} (Cf., section d.) Furthermore, since we are created, we do not have the power to help ourselves in our struggle to improve the image of God: we need the grace of the Creator at every level of our ascent to Him.\textsuperscript{102} (Cf., section e: this is to argue against Folliet’s and Bonner’s interpretations of the young Augustine.)

In Part III, I shall turn to the \textit{Confessions}. The structure of this part will be similar to that of the previous one. The similarity lies in stressing that, regarding Augustinian interiority, there is no substantial change between the early works and the later ones. There are two small points to notice. One is that I shall affirm again the above-mentioned argument of Teske, that Augustine failed to free himself completely from the Platonic idea of the soul’s pre-existence. The other is that Augustine began to identify memory with the mind.\textsuperscript{103}

The last part of this thesis refers to \textit{De Trinitate} and there are some things unique about it. First of all, the image of God becomes the image of the Trinity. Although memory, reason, and the will have always been the key features of Augustinian interiority from the outset, for the first time the Augustine of \textit{De Trinitate} explicitly insists that the soul images the Trinity only if it remembers, understands, and loves God: \textsuperscript{104} we have the ‘\textit{capax Dei}’ – in other words, we are capable of ‘participating’ in

\textsuperscript{98} \textit{Soliloquia} 1.1.5.
\textsuperscript{99} Cf., \textit{De libero arbitrio} 2.15.40: ‘wisdom … in the knowledge of which you found delight’.
\textsuperscript{100} Cf., \textit{De Ordine} 2.11.30.
\textsuperscript{101} Cf., \textit{Soliloquia} 1.6.12 & \textit{De ordine} 2.9.26.
\textsuperscript{102} Cf., \textit{Soliloquia} 1.1.2.
\textsuperscript{104} Cf., John Edward Sullivan, \textit{The image of God: the doctrine of St. Augustine and its influence} (Dubuque: Priory Press, 1963), 115-116. Frederick van Fleteren, ‘Thematic Reflections on the \textit{De Trinitate}’, in \textit{Proceedings of the PMR Conference}, vol. 12/13 (1987-1988), 224: ‘Now it is obvious to all that the soul as the image of God, first heard by Augustine from the lips of Ambrose in 385, is the major theme of the final eight books of the \textit{De trinitate}. Augustine examines various triads and trinities, only the last of which does he think can truly be called an image of God. The memory, understanding, and love of God which man possesses as he gazes at the eternal presents us with the closest, albeit still
God with our memory, mind, and heart –, but we can image the Triune God only if we actually exercise the capability. \textsuperscript{105} Secondly, Augustine – linguistically – approaches the doctrine of the Trinity, and how the soul resembles the Triune God. Bonner maintains that Augustinian ‘deification pertains to the realm of dogmatic, rather than contemplative, theology; it describes the consequence of the saving work of Christ rather than a mystical state enjoyed by a contemplative.’ \textsuperscript{106} Yet, an intellectual participation is, as I have demonstrated, a crucial factor for our teleological deification (or interiority) and reaches its peak in the dialectical approach to the Trinity. Thirdly, frequently quoting the biblical passage “the invisible things of God from the creation of the world are clearly seen, being understood by the things that are made, even his eternal power and Godhead” (Rom. 1:20)\textsuperscript{107}, Augustine often holds that knowledge of the self is an essential pre-requisite for gaining knowledge of God. However, in \textit{De Trinitate} the logical precedence between them disappears. They are now interdependent on one another: in fact, this is implicitly mentioned in earlier works. Finally, Augustine explicitly declares that knowledge is a ‘substance’\textsuperscript{108} and, in addition, is similar to what it is knowledge of.\textsuperscript{109} Thus, since knowledge of God is similar to God, through possessing it we become deified.\textsuperscript{110} Again, this was alluded to in previous writings.

Now, five (5) features of Augustinian interiority are noteworthy: contrary to some scholars’ insistences, none of them undergoes a change, or fails to be a core constituent of interiority either in his early or later works.

First (5-1), the deification of the soul often – but not always – occurs in the order of memory, reason and will. Unless we remember God, we cannot endeavour to understand Him.\textsuperscript{111} Furthermore, we become ‘perfect lovers’\textsuperscript{112} of God only if we know Him perfectly.\textsuperscript{113}
What, then, does ‘remembering God’ mean? In what sense is it the starting point of deification? Augustine associates the act of remembering with faith and reason, which are the two distinct – but mutually inseparable – means of gaining knowledge about God.\textsuperscript{114} Hence, the significance of memory must be approached with reference to reason (5-1-1) and faith (5-1-2) respectively.

Above all (5-1-1), reason (i.e., the ‘mind’s eye’\textsuperscript{115}) is capable of knowing God, with the help of God in terms of grace and illumination,\textsuperscript{116} inferentially through observing His creation.\textsuperscript{117} Yet, by the time we desire\textsuperscript{118} knowledge of God and actually search for it, we have already known something about Him and have retained it in our memory. In other words, precisely due to our memory of God, we can aspire to know God more than what we can remember about Him: no one can pursue what he/she does not know/remember.\textsuperscript{119} (As I shall explain later in this Introduction, this is an extension of his other argument that we can love only what we know.) Furthermore, we are ontologically conditioned to love only what pleases us.\textsuperscript{120} Thus, our universal, constant
desire for Wisdom\textsuperscript{121}, Truthfulness\textsuperscript{122}, and genuine happiness\textsuperscript{123}, each of which is another name of God, demonstrates that we have always had certain memories of God and have incessantly enjoyed recalling it. In short, due to the ‘innate’\textsuperscript{124} delightful memory of God, we have always wanted to possess Him, who is Wisdom, Truth, and true Happiness (\textit{beata vita}). Eventually, Augustine says in \textit{Confessions} 1.1.1, ‘you have made us and drawn us to yourself’\textsuperscript{125}; this text must be interpreted in the first place in terms of memory, delight and desire/love (as well as reason and faith).

In reference to the interaction between memory and reason in terms of delight, desire and love, Augustine put three questions to himself and attempted to answer them.

The first question is how we initially got to know God, so that we have always had the memory of Him. Augustine admitted in \textit{Confessions} 10.20.29 that this is a conundrum.

The second question concerns whether or not reason takes precedence over memory. There are a few indications that Augustine gives priority to reason in his early works. For instance, in \textit{De ordine} 2.2.6–7 Licentius insists that memory (as well as will) – constituting the ‘lower part (\textit{subjecta pars})’ of the soul – ‘serve (\textit{servire})’ reason: in other words, the former is the ‘servant (\textit{famulus})’, whereas the latter is the ‘master (\textit{dominus})’. This servant-master relationship between memory and reason lasts unaltered even if one becomes ‘wise’\textsuperscript{126}, for no other part, but only the reason/mind of a wise man’s soul, is with God: being wise is the ideal state of the soul to be reached.

\textsuperscript{121} Cf., \textit{De ordine} 2.3.10 ‘just as we shun darkness with our eyes by the very fact that we are not willing not to see, so likewise, whoever shall desire to escape unwisdom (\textit{Ut enim oculis tenebras vitamus eo ipso quo nolumus non videre, sic quisquis volet vitare stultitiam})’.
\textsuperscript{122} Cf., \textit{De vera religione} 49.95 (‘When we are asked which is better, truth or falsehood, we answer with one voice that is better, truth or falsehood, we answer with one voice that is better’ & 49.94).
\textsuperscript{123} \textit{Confessiones} 10.23.33 (‘joy in Truth/God [\textit{Beata quippe vita est gaudium de veritate}]’ & 10.20.29 ([Chadwick’s translation] ‘Is not the happy life that which all desire, which indeed no one fails to desire? [\textit{Nonne ipsa est beata vita, quam omnes volunt et omnino qui nolit nemo est}?]’)
\textsuperscript{124} Cf., Gilson, \textit{The Christian Philosophy of Saint Augustine}, 78: ‘... in a more general sense, we can say that in Augustinism any knowledge, whether its object be corporeal or incorporeal, implies an innate element to the extent that it is a truth. Here also, the Innatism of which we speak is not an original gift bestowed on the soul once and for all: it means merely that in any true knowledge, there is an element which comes neither from things nor from ourselves, but from a source which is more intimate to us than our own inner selves.’
\textsuperscript{125} Boulding’s translation: ‘fecisti nos ad te’.
\textsuperscript{126} Alternatively, ‘new, inward and heavenly man (\textit{novus homo, et interior, et caelestis})’ (\textit{De vera religione} 26.49).
through deification. Augustine admires such an argument as Licentius’, though he soon expresses a certain reservation about it.\textsuperscript{127} In \textit{De musica} 6.8.21 Augustine himself says that memory is an assistant (‘\textit{adjuvare}’ or ‘\textit{ministrare}’) to reason: in reference to \textit{De musica} Winkler maintains that Augustine depicts memory, to a certain degree, like a ‘servant’ who provides vital services to its master.\textsuperscript{128}

Furthermore, we can discover the implication of reason’s superiority to memory if we consider which one of faith, hope and love remains for ever: bear in mind that memory retains what we believe, that is, what we do not yet understand.\textsuperscript{129} In \textit{Soliloquia} 1.7.14 Augustine asks, ‘Why should faith be needed, since now it (i.e., \textit{anima}) sees (God)?’ The redundancy of faith after this life means that we will then have no need to retain in memory what we will have believed about God until the end of our life on earth. Augustine insisted on the same thing in \textit{De doctrina Christiana} 1.38.42 and \textit{De Trinitate} 1.8.17. Therefore, reason’s ultimate superiority to memory becomes manifest when we see God ‘face to face’\textsuperscript{130}. In \textit{De Trinitate} 10.11.18-19 Augustine, on the other hand, insists that memory and the will are not inferior to reason: all three of them are, rather, ‘equal (\textit{aequalis})’\textsuperscript{131} to each other as the image of the Trinitarian God.\textsuperscript{132}

\textsuperscript{127} Cf., \textit{De ordine} 2.2.6-7: ‘(Augustine says that) if we do not attribute sense perception to the intellect, we do not attribute it to any power of the soul. It follows, then, that it must be attributed to the body. But to me nothing seems to be more absurdly said than this. … (Licentius replies that) The soul (\textit{anima}) of a wise man … thoroughly cleansed by acts of virtue and already cleaving to God, merits the name of wise, and it is unfitting that any other part of him be called wise. Nevertheless, certain soiled and cast-off garments, so to speak - of which he has divested himself and from which he has, as it were, withdrawn unto himself - still serve that soul; or, if such a soul ought still to be pronounced integral, they certainly serve that part of the soul which alone is fittingly called wise; they are in subjection to it. And I believe that memory itself resides in this subordinate (\textit{subiecta}) part. … [Hereafter, \textit{De ordine} 2.2.7] Pondering over this declaration of his (i.e., Licentius) with admiration, I (i.e., Augustine) … “Against your opinions,” I (i.e., Augustine) replied, “I say nothing now, so that what we have taken in hand may be completed. Some other time, however, when God Himself will have rendered it opportune in accordance with order, we shall diligently observe how the matter stands on this point, for the question is not one of minor importance, or one that is exhausted by such a brief discussion.”’ Ibid., 2.5.17: ‘that the mind (\textit{mentem}) of a wise man remains immovable with Him (i.e., God).’ Ibid., 2.13.38: ‘unwise men generally follow their own feelings and habits rather than the very marrow of truth - which indeed only a very exceptional mind beholds’.

\textsuperscript{128} Cf., Klaus Winkler, ‘La Théorie Augustinienne de l a mémoire à son point de départ’, \textit{Augustinus Magister} I (Paris: Études Augustiniennes, 1954), 518: ‘Dans \textit{le De musica}, la mémoire reste dans une certaine mesure en état de serviteur, mais ses services sont indispensables’.

\textsuperscript{129} Cf., \textit{Soliloquia} 1.4.9; see below the discussion about Augustine’s approach to memory in relation to faith in section (5-1-2).

\textsuperscript{130} \textit{Confessiones} 10.5.7 & \textit{De Trinitate} 1.8.16. Also, see \textit{Soliloquia} 1.6.12-1.7.14: Augustine here mentions hope of understanding revealed truths because we cannot see God ‘face to face’ in this life.

\textsuperscript{131} \textit{De Trinitate} 10.11.18.

\textsuperscript{132} Cf., \textit{De Trinitate} 10.12.19: ‘it seems to be difficult to distinguish in it (i.e., the soul) between its memory of itself and its understanding of itself. That these are not in fact two things, but one thing called by two names, is the impression you might get in this case where they are joined together very closely
However, Augustine maintained such equality only in reference to souls living in this life.

The last question is, as Harrison points out, what we love about God while we struggle to know Him: ‘In both texts (i.e., *Confessions* 10 and *Soliloquia*) he makes clear that even though he knows neither himself nor God at this stage, his desire to know is inspired by his love of God; his desire is, as it were, to fully know what it is that he loves: ‘My love for you, Lord, is not an uncertain feeling but a matter of conscious certainty. With your word you pierced my heart, and I loved you .... And what is the object of my love?’ (*conf.* 10. 6. 8-9); ‘Now you only I love ... I perceive I must return to you ... Teach me how to come to You. I have nothing else but the will to come. I know nothing save that transient dying things are to be spurned, certain and eternal things are to be sought after. This only I know, O Father, but how to come to you I know not’ (*sol.* 1. 5).’

Augustine indirectly answers the question in *De Trinitate* 10.1.1-10.2.4, analyzing what actually happens when one seeks the meaning of an unknown word, for instance, ‘temetum’. There are some similarities between such a linguistic investigation and Augustine’s pursuit of knowledge about God.

Augustine, above all, restates what the question is:

Suppose someone hears the word *temetum*, and in his ignorance asks what it means. … If anyone, therefore, applies himself with ardent diligence to know, and inflamed with this zeal continues this search, can he be said to be without love? What, then, does he love? … We are inquiring about what it is that he loves in the thing that he is eager to know, and which certainly he does not yet know; and we wonder why he loves it, since we know with absolute certainty that nothing can be loved unless it is known. (*De Trinitate* 10.1.2)

and one is not prior at all in time to the other; love too is not felt so obviously to be present when no neediness exhibits it, because what is being loved is always to hand.’ (Hill’s translation.)

133 Harrison, *Rethinking Augustine’s Early Theology*, 57.

134 It means any intoxicating drink or wine: see *De Trinitate* 10.1.2.

135 McKenna’s translation.
Next, Augustine insists that we have already known three things about ‘temetum’ by the time we strive to discover its definition. Moreover, we have certainly loved the three pieces of knowledge, which alone arouse our desire to make the effort. First, ‘temetum’ is a ‘sign’ ‘signifying’ something: only when we recognize the sign, can we be motivated to seek its significance. Second, we know what it is like to be perfectly proficient in a language, and the fact that we are earnestly ‘hoping’ to achieve it: what does he love then? It must be that he knows and sees by insight in the very sense of things how beautiful the discipline is that contains knowledge of all signs; and how useful the skill is by which a human society communicates perceptions between its members, since otherwise an assembly of human beings would be worse for its members than any kind of solitude, if they could not exchange their thoughts by speaking to each other.

Finally (and most importantly), as long as we have the desire to learn the new word, we know that we love the act of knowing:

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136 Cf., De Trinitate 10.1.2: (McKenna’s translation) ‘it is a sign, namely, that it is not a mere word, but that it signifies something.’ Also, see De ordine 2.11.34 & De magistro 2.3-4.

137 Cf., De Trinitate 10.1.2: (McKenna’s translation) ‘it (i.e., the sign) … shall have moved him with the desire of knowing the thing of which it is the sign’.

138 De Trinitate 10.1.2: see the following footnote.

139 De Trinitate 10.1.2: (Hill’s translation) ‘This then is the lovely and useful form (“speciem [decoram et utilem]” in Latin, “[this beautiful and useful species] species” in McKenna’s translation – that is, the species of the “hope” of being perfect in a language: see the beginning of chapter ‘Interiority and Deification’ in this Introduction) which the soul discerns and knows and loves, and anyone who inquires about the meaning of any words he does not know is studiously trying to perfect it in himself as far as he can; for it is one thing to observe it in the light of truth, another to desire to have it at one’s disposal. What one observes in the light of truth is what a great and good thing it would be to understand and speak all the languages of all peoples, and so to hear nobody as a foreigner, and to be heard by no one as such either. The loveliness of such knowledge is now perceived in thought, and the thing so known is loved. This in turn is contemplated, and so inflames the studiousness of learners that they get all excited about it and hunger for it in all the work they put into acquiring such a competence that they may embrace in actual use what they have prior knowledge of in reason; and the more hope anyone has of coming by such a competence the more ardent is his love for it. You put more passion into your study of a discipline if you do not despair of being able to master it. But if you have no hope at all of acquiring a thing, you are lukewarm in your love for it or you do not love it at all, even though you are quite aware how beautiful it is.’ The passages, such as ‘the more hope anyone has of coming by such a competence the more ardent is his love for it’ and ‘if you have no hope at all of acquiring a thing, you are lukewarm in your love for it or you do not love it at all’, suggest that hope and love are inseparable: hope is the object of love.
everyone loves knowing, a fact that cannot be unknown to anyone who desires to know something.\footnote{De Trinitate 10.2.4 (McKenna’s translation): ‘ipsum scire quisque amat, quod nulli scire aliquid cupiendi esse incognitum potest.’}

Consequently, Augustine concludes that

every love of a studious mind, that is, of a mind that wants to know what it does not know, is not the love of that thing which it does not know, but of that which it does know, and on account of which it wishes to know what it does not know.\footnote{De Trinitate 10.1.3: (McKenna’s translation) ‘he who loves to know the unknown does not love the unknown, but the knowing of it. For unless he knows what it is to know, no one would be able to say with confidence, either that he does know, or that he does not know.’}

Note that Augustine earlier drew a similar conclusion in De quantitate animae 27.53: ‘reason proceeds from a basis in something known in leading us to something unknown.’

Regarding Augustine’s passionate pursuit of knowledge about God, we therefore can conclude that he was not in love with God whom he had not yet seen ‘face to face’\footnote{Confessiones 10.5.7, De Trinitate 1.8.16, and Soliloquia 1.6.12-1.7.14.}; he was rather in love with the act of knowing God.\footnote{Cf., De Trinitate 10.1.3: (McKenna’s translation) ‘when you say, He loves to know the unknown, it is not the same as saying, He loves the unknown. The first can happen, namely, that one loves to know the unknown, but it is impossible to love the unknown. The word ‘know’ has not been put there without

Nonetheless, there is also an important difference between Augustine’s search for the meaning of ‘God’ and that of ‘temetum’. When we want to learn a new word, we endeavour to learn in what sense it is conventionally applied. However, regarding what/who God is, there are often considerable disagreements about it among us. (We often argue against each other that one’s concept of God is more accurate than another’s. Also, although there are similarities, among Christians, in the ways that they
think about God, there are also differences among them.) Thus, when Augustine was determined to render ‘Wisdom’/‘God’ meaningful to himself after reading the *Hortensius*, he wanted to do so specifically in a Christian context: it was not a search for a conventional, universal way of thinking about God. That is why Augustine immediately turned to the Christian Bible: unfortunately, he adopted an erroneous approach to the Bible and inevitably would grow contemptuous of what he read in it. Afterwards, he explored Manichaeism just because it appeared to be an authentic form of Christianity. Augustine also thought about resorting to the scepticism of the Academics. However, he eventually found a way to settle the problem of how ‘God’ should be defined: that is through understanding the Catholic teaching about God from the perspective of Neoplatonism (i.e., the ‘certain books of the Platonists’).

In summary, Augustine loved the act of understanding the Christian God after reading the *Hortensius*.

Augustine’s approach to memory in relation to faith (5-1-2) is entirely different. Revealed truth about God is not innate. We must be taught about the truth in order subsequently to have it in our memory:

I would not desire them (i.e., things about God), if I already knew them. Was I not able, nonetheless, to speak of them? Indeed, I spoke, not of those things which I grasped with my intellect, but of the things which I had gathered from many sources and committed to memory, the things which I believed as much as

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reason, since he who loves to know the unknown does not love the unknown, but the knowing of it.’ Also, see *Contra academicos* 1.8.23 ‘he is searching, he is wise. He is happy in being wise’.

144 Cf., Peter Brown, *Augustine of Hippo*, (London: Faber and Faber, 1967), 41: ‘The precise form of “Wisdom” that Augustine might seek, would, of course, be very different from what Cicero would have recognized as “Wisdom”. Augustine was a boy from a Christian household. … One thing, however, was certain: a pagan wisdom, a wisdom without the “name of Christ” was quite out of the question. Paganism meant nothing to Augustine.’ Also, see Maurice Testard, *Saint Augustin et Cicéron I : Cicéron dans la Formation et dans l’Œuvre de Saint Augustin* (Paris: Études Augustiniennes, 1958), 20-35: it explains how the *Hortensius* might have influenced Augustine (‘Nous ne présenterons pas les résultats de l’enquête comme des certitudes, simplement comme des vraisemblances’ [p. 28]).


146 *Confessiones* 7.9.13.
I could. But to know - that is something else (i.e., what Augustine believed about God had come from many sources) (Soliloquia 1.4.9);

you may be called upon in prayer that you may be known. Yet “how shall they call upon him in whom they have not believed? and how shall they believe without a preacher?” (Rom. 10: 14) (i.e., through preachers we learn about God’s self-revelation, commit it to our memory, and believe it).

In this way, despite the incomprehensibility of the Christian doctrines about God, we can at least bring the doctrines from memory to the mind and make an effort to understand them steadfastly with hope and love: such an effort keeps us away from our obsession with earthly, perishable things.

What, then, makes us determined to believe the teachings of the Catholic Church and commit them to memory? Augustine argues that we are made to love only what pleases us, and that divine grace intellectually allures us to delight in learning the teachings and eventually believe them. In other words, a person can become a believer of the Catholic faith only when divine grace gives that person delight in reading about (or listening to) Catholic teachings. (Such an argument of his is reflected in his distinction

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147 ‘quod non cuperem si iam scirem: num igitur eo minus illa dicere potui? Dixi enim non quae intellectu comprehendi, sed quae undecumque collecta memoriae mandavi, et quibus accommodavi quantam potui fidem: scire autem aliam est.’
148 Confessiones 1.1.1.
149 Cf., Soliloquia 1.6.12, De ordine 2.5.16 & De vera religione 8.15.
150 Cf., Sermones 159.3: see above.
151 Cf., Ad Simplicianum 1.2.21: ‘Who has it in his power to have such a motive present to his mind that his will shall be influenced to believe? Who can welcome in his mind something which does not give him delight? But who has it in his power to ensure that something that will delight him will turn up, or that he will take delight in what turns up? If those things delight us that serve our advancement towards God, that is due not to our whim or industry or meritorious works, but to the inspiration of God and to the grace which he bestows. He freely bestows upon us voluntary assent, earnest effort, and the power to perform works of fervent charity . . . “It is not of him that willeth, nor of him that runneth, but of God that hath mercy.” We could neither will nor run unless be stirred us and put the motive power in us’ quoted in Harrison, Rethinking Augustine’s Early Theology, 148-149. Harrison subsequently hold that ‘The idea that it is delight that motivates the will is not something new to Augustine’s thought, of course. As we saw in the previous chapter, and as we will demonstrate further in the concluding chapters of this book, Augustine uses it to describe how grace inspires and motivates the will, through the gift of the Holy Spirit, from Cassiciacum onwards. It is also clearly present in his other reflections on Romans in the two years preceding the second book of Ad Simplicianum. In the Expositio propositionum . . . ’ Also, see Ibid., 150.
Augustine, on the other hand, insists that reason is involved in the act of choosing what we are going to believe:

Authority demands belief and prepares man for reason. Reason leads to understanding and knowledge. But reason is not entirely absent from authority, for we have got to consider whom we have to believe (*De vera religione* 24.45). However, this passage must be interpreted in the light of Augustine’s distinction between the two kinds of delight mentioned in *De ordine* 2.11.34: that is, our intellectual consideration of whom we are to believe is dictated by what delights our reason.

Since reason judges what is to be believed and committed to memory, whether or not remembering logically precedes reasoning is on the whole ambiguous: on the one hand, due to our memory of God, we can endeavour to understand/know God inferentially through observing His creation; on the other hand, reason determines what we are to believe and store in our memory. However, the order of occurrence between understanding and loving is unequivocal: we cannot love and delight in what we do not know or believe.

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152 Cf., *De ordine* 2.11.34: ‘Therefore, delight of the sense is one thing; delight through the sense is something else. Graceful movement delights the sense, but the timely import of the movement delights the mind alone through the sense. (*Aliud ergo sensus, aliud per sensum: nam sensum mulcet pulcher motus, per sensum autem animam solum pulchra in motu significatio.*) This is more easily noticed in the case of hearing: whatever has a pleasing sound, that it is which pleases and entices the hearing itself. What is really signified by that sound, that is what is borne to the mind, though by the messenger of our hearing. And so, when we hear these lines - “Why do the suns in the winter rapidly sink in the ocean? What is the hindrance that holds back late-coming nights in the summer?” - our praise of the meter is one thing, but our praise of the meaning is something else. Neither is it in the same sense of the term that we say: “It sounds reasonable” and “It is spoken reasonably.”’

153 Cf., *De libero arbitrio* 2.13.35: ‘who is happier than the man who finds joy in the firm, changeless, and most excellent truth?’ Also, see *De Trinitate* 10.1.1: (McKenna’s translation) ‘no one can in any way love a thing that is wholly unknown’.

154 E.g., God’s immateriality, immanence, omnipresence, transcendence in a Neoplatonic sense: see section (b) of chapter 2 in Part I.
Secondly (5-2), contemplation – in other words, gaining true knowledge of God – is an integral part of deification. Although Bonner investigated the theme of deification appearing in the later works, it is interesting that he does not mention the text ‘we are like God inasmuch as we know Him’ (De Trinitate 9.11.16) at all. Consequently, Bonner argues that the mature Augustine’s idea of deification is based on dogmatic theology – primarily Christology – rather than contemplative theology: ‘Perhaps the most obvious feature of Augustine’s teaching is, that so far as he is concerned, deification pertains to the realm of dogmatic, rather than contemplative, theology; it describes the consequence of the saving work of Christ rather than a mystical state enjoyed by a contemplative. It is of course true that the question of Augustine’s personal mysticism is a controversial one, with a great gulf fixed between those scholars who maintain that he was a mystic and those who deny it. The present writer inclines to denial rather than to affirmation; but in this particular case, opinions on this point are irrelevant, in view of Augustine’s direct assertion that deification will take place only in the life to come.’ However, the text from De Trinitate 9.11.16 ‘we are like God inasmuch as we know Him’ speaks for itself, contemplative theology is crucial for deification, just as it is in the early works.

Thirdly (5-3), Augustine relies on dialectics to draw conclusions (through reason and faith) about who/what God is. What, then, is the nature of his dialectics in this respect?

Augustine’s dialectical approach to knowledge of God intrinsically depends on finding right pairs of correlative terms, which are, for instance, ‘begotten (genitus)’ and ‘unbegotten (ingenitus or “not begotten”’). ‘although begotten differs from unbegotten, it does not indicate a different substance, because just as son refers to father, and not son to not father, so begotten must refer to begetter, and not begotten to not begetter.’ Although Augustine explains the linguistic nature of ‘signs’ in De Trinitate 9.7.12; his endeavour to understand Wisdom/God after reading the Hortensius has always been a search for correct pairs of correlative terms, with which he can

155 Cf., De quantitate animae 33,74.
157 De Trinitate 5.7.8.
158 Cf., De Trinitate 5.7.8: (McKenna’s translation) ‘Begotten and unbegotten are terms that are currently in use (genitus et ingenitus commode dicuntur).’
159 De Trinitate 5.7.8 (Hill’s translation).
describe God as the truly Transcendent Reality (res). Thus, before reading Neoplatonism, he assumed that, since ‘corporality’ and ‘nothing’ (i.e., ‘not corporality’) were correlative, God must have dimensional properties: otherwise, God is nothing, but that is highly improbable. However, Augustine has later learned two new pairs of correlative terms from the ‘libri Platonici’. One is ‘material’ and ‘immaterial’ (i.e., ‘not material’), and the other is ‘being’/‘substance’ and ‘nothing’ (i.e., ‘not being’). Eventually, he began to think of God as an immaterial being, and evil as ‘not a substance’ or ‘nothing’. (‘Good’ and ‘evil’, ‘beauty’ and ‘not beauty’ are also two distinct pairs of correlative terms.) In addition, as a Christian, Augustine always distinguished ‘Creator’ from ‘creature’ (i.e., ‘not Creator’) and, so, God is the former whereas everything else is the latter.

It must be stressed that how to think about God in an indisputably transcendent way was one of the most important questions that dictated Augustine’s search for knowledge of God from the beginning, and the problem of evil was the biggest stumbling block in this regard. Hence, trawling chiefly through Manichaeism, Stoicism, (Academic scepticism), Neoplatonism, and Christian theology; Augustine finally concluded that only the last two described God’s transcendence perfectly, that is, God is the immaterial Creator.

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160 Cf., Confessiones 7.1.1: (Chadwick’s translation) ‘With all my heart I believed you to be incorruptible, immune from injury, and unchangeable. Although I did not know why and how, it was clear to me and certain that what is corruptible is inferior to that which cannot be corrupted; what is immune from injury I unhesitatingly put above that which is not immune; what suffers no change is better than that which can change.’

161 Cf., Confessiones 7.1.1.

162 Cf., Confessiones 7.10.16 & 7.12.18.

163 Cf., Confessiones 7.10.16: “‘I am that I am.” (Exod. 3.14)’

164 Cf., Confessiones 7.12.18.

165 Cf., Confessiones 3.7.12.

166 Cf., De ordine 2.19.51: ‘I shall say no more, except that to us is promised a vision (aspectum) of beauty - the beauty through whose imitation all other things are beautiful, and by comparison with which all other things are unsightly.’

167 Cf., Confessiones 7.3.4 & 7.5.7

168 Cf., Confessiones 7.1.1-7.2.3.

169 Cf., De vera religione 18.35: ‘Whatever is must have some form, and though it be but a minimal good it will be good and will be of God. The highest form is the highest good, and the lowest form is the lowest good. Every good thing is either God or derived from God. Therefore even the lowest form is of God. … That out of which God created all things had neither form nor species, and was simply nothing’ quoted in Harrison, Rethinking Augustine’s Early Theology, 100. Also, see De vera religione 40.74, 43.81, 55.113 & Confessiones 7.9.14.
Fourthly (5-4), contrary to Folliet’s as well as Bonner’s insistence, divine grace is crucial for our deification not only in the mature Augustine’s thoughts, but also in the young Augustine’s:

today throughout the nations and peoples the proclamation is made: “In the beginning was the Word, and the Word was with God, and the Word was God. This was in the beginning with God, and all things were made by him, and without him was nothing made” (John I: 1). In order that men may receive the Word, love him, and enjoy him so that the soul may be healed and the eye of the mind receive power to use the light … To the proud it is said: “Whosoever exalteth himself shall be humbled and whosoever humbleth himself shall be exalted” (Luke 14:11).

(As the above text demonstrates, Christology is a crucial element of deification: ‘Let us therefore walk while we have the day, i.e., while we can use reason. Let us turn to God so that we may deserve to be illumined by his Word, the true light, and that darkness may not take possession of us. Day is the presence of the “light that lighteth every man

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170 Cf., Folliet, ‘Deificari in otio. Augustin, Epistula 10. 2’, 225-226 : ‘Tout au long de cette lettre Augustin va tenter de décrire ce programme afin de décider son ami à partager un tel idéal. En tout cas, résolution est prise par lui de vivre le plus possible à l’écart des affaires, comme étranger à tout ce qui passe, uniquement préoccupé de se préparer à la mort, de purifier son âme et de vivre comme mort à toute affection charnelle. En des formules très brèves et très denses, Augustin décrit sa vie ascétique et ce qu’elle lui procure dès ici-bas : joie, bonheur, tranquillité, sécurité, intimité avec Dieu. Une telle vie, précise-t-il, certains hommes la désirent ardemment mais ne peuvent y arriver en raison de leurs charges, d’autres préfèrent la vie turbulente des affaires, seul l’otium permettrait aux uns et aux autres de « se déifier » : ‘deificari enim utrisque in otio licebat.’ Cf., Ibid., p 226: ‘Nul doute que le mot deificari ne peut s’entendre ici de l’élévation à l’ordre surnaturel par la grâce, vu le sens réfléchi qu’a ce verbe dans la phrase et le complément « in otio » qui lui est adjoint. … Augustin parle en chrétien converti, mais sa description de l’ascèse à laquelle il vise, et les expressions dont il se sert, laissent soupçonner que son idéal de vie présent est beaucoup plus proche de celui du sage, tel que le présentent les philosophes néo-platoniciens, que de celui de l’Évangile : la préoccupation de la mort, la possession dès ici-bas de l’apatheia et du bonheur, la purification qui à elle seule nous ‘rend semblable à Dieu’, sont des traits caractéristiques de l’ascèse néo-platonicienne.’ Cf., Ibid., 235-236: ‘On a beaucoup discuté sur les rapports d’Augustin avec Plotin et Porphyre; dans le cas présent l’influence porphyrienne me paraît trop évidente pour être contestée. Peut-être s’étonnera-t-on de trouver encore dans la bouche du converti de Milan de tels accents, mais ses lecteurs ne s’y trompaient pas : ‘Vos lettres parlent à mon oreille comme le Christ, comme Platon, comme Plotin’, lui écrit Nebridius en 389. Augustin n’a pas encore découvert toute la richesse de la grâce du Christ ; la purification, l’assimilation à Dieu par les vertus, sans le secours de la grâce, [236] sont à ses yeux chose possible pour l’homme. Et c’est un des grands reproches qu’il adressera plus tard à Porphyre qui l’avait entraîné dans cette voie, « de n’avoir pas voulu reconnaître le Christ Seigneur comme le Principe dont l’incarnation nous purifie ».’

171 De vera religione 3.4. Also, see Ibid., 16.30, 38.71, and 42.79.
coming into the world” [John 1:9].

This is because, as Harrison stresses, ‘Christ is the “sacrament and example” of the work of divine grace in response to humanity’s fallenness for Augustine.’

We can approach the indispensability of divine grace in two ways. One is in reference to intellectual transformation. For Augustine an intellectual pursuit of an object can be motivated by our desire of it alone, which in turn can be triggered only by our delight in that object: in short, no delight, no intellectual pursuit.

Thus, pleasing us with the beauty of His creation, God allures us to transcend the ‘fleshly pleasure’ and advance towards the eternal joy of seeing Beauty itself (i.e., dialectically ‘ascending’ to God) by questioning what the cause of the delight is.

All that the Creator has created is beautiful, for the Creator is Beauty itself.

(Here, Augustine does not say that the beauty of created things helps us recall the standard of beauty – that is, Beauty or the Creator God. He rather says that we have already ‘known’ the standard, so that we can ‘judge’ whether a thing is beautiful or not.) The other way is with respect to ethical transformation. After his intellectual conversion, Augustine failed to free himself from his old, lascivious habit.

Thus, due to such a

172 *De vera religione* 42.79. Ibid., 3.4: ‘To the proud it is said: “Whosoever exalteth himself shall be abased and whosoever humbleth himself shall be exalted” (Luke 14:11)’.

Ibid., 16.30: ‘the Word became flesh and dwelt among us. For thus he showed to carnal people, given over to bodily sense and unable with the mind to behold the truth, how lofty a place among creatures belonged to human nature’.

173 Harrison, *Rethinking Augustine’s Early Theology*, 252. Also, see Ibid., 47-48 & 253-254.

174 Again, refer to *Sermones* 159.3: see above.

175 Cf., *De vera religione* 29.52 & *Confessiones* 9.2.2.

176 Cf., *De vera religione* 32.59, 42.79 and 52.101 (‘We turn from artistic works to the law of the art’).


177 Cf., *Soliloquia* 1.1.2: ‘O God, who from nothing hast created this world which every eye sees to be most beautiful.’

178 *De vera religione* 29.53 & 30.56 (‘All things which are beautiful to the senses, whether they are produced by nature or are worked out by the arts, have a spatial or temporal beauty, as for example the body and its movements. But the equality and unity which are known only by the mind, and according to which the mind judges of corporeal beauty by the intermediary of the senses, are not extended in space or unstable in time.’)

179 See the chapter ‘Habit’ in Harrison, *Rethinking Augustine’s Early Theology*, 189-193: ‘…Augustine is also prompted to reflect on the influence which habit exercises upon the soul in the *De musica* (390), where, as we have seen, the effect which the body has upon the soul, and its ability to operate freely, is one of the central themes of book 6. Here he refers to what he describes as the “impetus of carnal occupations (carnalium negotiorum... inpetus)”, which the soul does not, indeed, cannot restrain, because through “long habit” and “turbulent memories” they hinder its conversion to God. Thus, it is clearly habit, present in the soul through memory, which makes it difficult for the soul to overcome its sinful actions at will. Obviously thinking of Adam’s sin, and the effects of original sin, Augustine observes that the soul was strong when it first sinned, but having sinned it is made weaker, and is less capable of removing what it has done: “The soul does not extinguish those carnal motions at will in the same way as it exerts them at will. For the punishment of the sin is not in its power in the same way as the sin. Surely the soul is a great thing, yet it does not remain capable of suppressing its own lascivious motions.” Augustine’s quotation of Rom. 7: 24-5 follows naturally in this context. Later in book 6 he observes with
firsthand experience of himself, Augustine was acutely aware that the human person – being created out of nothing – is not the master of his/her own self.\textsuperscript{180}  

Finally (5-5), no living person can know God fully and, so, deification cannot be completed in this life:

Hope (of knowing God fully) does not leave the soul as long as it is in this life, \textsuperscript{181}

we do not know Him (i.e., God) as He Himself knows Himself.\textsuperscript{182}

In summary, reason is ultimately superior to memory; contemplative theology continues to be an integral part of the mature Augustine’s theory of deification; dialectics is the only means for the intellectual side of Augustine’s ‘ascent’\textsuperscript{183} to God through reason and faith; divine grace is indispensable for our deification; and the soul cannot be fully deified in this life. Therefore, the main point of my argument in this thesis is to demonstrate that these central elements of Augustinian interiority remain unaltered.

\textsuperscript{180} \textit{Cf.}, \textit{Soliloquía 1.15.30}: ‘Do not choose to be, so to speak, your own master and under your own dominion, but proclaim yourself the servant of Him who is our kindest and most helpful Lord. For, if you do this, He will not cease to lift you up to Himself, and He will allow nothing to happen to you which is not for your good, even though you do not know it.’

\textsuperscript{181} \textit{Soliloquía 1.6.12-1.7.14}.

\textsuperscript{182} \textit{De Trinitate 9.11.16} (McKenna’s translation).

\textsuperscript{183} \textit{Cf.}, \textit{De vera religione 29.52} & \textit{Confessiones 9.2.2}. 
Augustinian interiority is closely associated with Greek teleology: the former is also a form of the latter. The word ‘teleology’ is derived from the word ‘telos’, which means the goal, or the Value, in an ethical sense. For ancient Greek thinkers the goal of our life is *eudaimonia*,\(^{184}\) that is, happiness\(^ {185}\) attainable through having the divine part of the self fully ‘actualized’\(^ {186}\) – in other words, through possessing virtue (αρετή), which is a moral and intellectual ability acquired by exercise:\(^ {187}\) wisdom (σοφία) is the highest virtue and is knowledge of the self and God.\(^ {188}\) Thus, teleology is basically about an ethical transformation, which leads us ultimately to true happiness, through discovering and cultivating the divine element in us.\(^ {189}\)

Augustine encountered Greek teleology through the *Hortensius*, which is a protreptic work of Cicero written in response to his friend orator Hortensius Hortalus’ attack on philosophy.\(^ {190}\) Philosophy in the time of Augustine consisted of not only an intellectual element, but also a moral element.\(^ {191}\) Augustine tells us in *Confessions* 3.4.7 that, due to Cicero’s ‘exhortation to *philosophy*’, he began to pursue ‘*wisdom*’. Hence, what Augustine meant by ‘philosophy’ is identical to what we mean by ‘teleology’.\(^ {192}\) This is to say that for Augustine philosophy primarily concerns the goal of our life and, so, is synonymous with – as Holte puts it – ‘teleological speculation’\(^ {193}\): ‘no one has any right to philosophize except with a view to happiness.’\(^ {194}\)

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185 Cf., Holte, *Béatitude et Sagesse*, 14: ‘ce concept (i.e., ἐυδαιμονία) ne doit pas être compris comme désignant premièrement ni exclusivement un état affectif, (encore qu’il implique toujours une expérience de nature emotionnelle)’.
186 Cf., Holte, 14-15: ‘L’ἐυδαιμονία est l’état de l’homme où l’élément divin n’est ni affaibli ni étouffé, mais se trouve au contraire actualisé avec son maximum de plénitude et de force’.
187 Cf., Holte, 15 : also, see ibid., footnote no. 1: ‘ἀρετή peut désigner toute habileté ou dextérité acquise par l’exercice, (cf. l’anglais « excellence »), mais particulièrement la force intérieure d’où sort l’activité morale et intellectuelle.
188 Cf., Holte, 15, footnote no. 2: ‘σοφία, au sens étroit, est déjà, défini par les stoïciens comme “l’intelligence des choses divines et des choses humaines”’.
189 Cf., Holte, 12-16.
192 Cf., Holte, 13.
193 Holte, 12.
194 *De civitate Dei* 19.1.
Holte argues that ethics became the most important issue for Augustine after his conversion to philosophy/teleology. However, what was equally important, and even logically prior, to Augustine’s yearning for a radical change in his lifestyle was gaining knowledge of God and of the self (i.e., wisdom). The reason is that in Greek teleology acquiring wisdom is an essential prerequisite for an ethical transformation: in other words, a practical conversion depends on a theoretical conversion. Augustine’s own life attests to it. For instance, from Neoplatonism he learnt to perceive God as immaterial and, so, identical with Wisdom and Happiness. Only then was he able to check his preoccupation with material, earthly and carnal things, though not completely. Eventually, he says in Confessions 4.2.3,

I knew nothing about love for you, of whom I had no conception other than of physical objects luminous with light.

In other words, as long as Augustine thought about God in a materialistic manner, he was incapable of loving things other than what he could perceive with his senses. In short, due to the priority of theory over practice, Augustine wanted to know God and the soul as the first step forward to happiness through an ethical transformation.

Neoplatonism helped Augustine to settle partially his problem concerning what the right way to think about God and the soul is, and to establish a theory concerning how we must approach God epistemologically. Augustinian interiority involves not only intellect, but also memory, will, faith, hope, love, and divine grace. However, we cannot love what we do not know. Also, the collective role of faith, hope, love and divine grace is primarily to assist reason in its search for God. Consequently, although acquiring knowledge of God is only an intermediate stage on our way to true happiness, the former is on the other hand the goal of the intellectual part of Augustine’s teleological project:

\[195\] Cf., Holte, Béatitude et Sagesse, 13: ‘quand Augustin identifie la philosophie avec la spéculation téléologique, c’est que dans sa pensée l’éthique constitue la tâche première et propre de la philosophie.’

\[196\] Cf., Soliloquia 1.1.2.

\[197\] Cf., Soliloquia 1.1.3.

\[198\] Cf., Confessiones 8.1.2: ‘now I had discovered the good pearl. To buy it I had to sell all that I had; and I hesitated (Matt. 12:46).’
wisdom … in the knowledge of which you found delight (De libero arbitrio 2.15.40),

To the rational and intellectual soul is given to enjoy the contemplation of his (i.e., God’s) eternity, and by that contemplation it is armed and equipped so that it may obtain eternal life (De vera religione 3.3),

When I seek you, my God, what I am seeking is the happy life (Confessiones 10.20.29),

This is eternal life, that they should know you, the one true God, and Jesus Christ whom you have sent (Jn 17:3). (De Trinitate 1.8.17) … Now therefore let us look for the trinity which is God in these eternal things, incorporeal and unchangeable, since the happy life which is nothing if not eternal is promised to us in the contemplation of them. (Ibid., 15.4.6) (Here, Augustine combines the Christian term ‘eternal life’ with the Greek teleological term ‘happy life’.)

Therefore, in this part of my thesis I shall tread the course of Augustine’s teleological adventure before his baptism, investigating the main characteristics of each major source of his theological learning. I shall focus on explaining how Augustine was influenced by the Hortensius, why he was dissatisfied with Manichaeism and Stocism, and finally which part of Neoplatonism played a decisive role in shaping his mind. (I shall present the finalised theological view of the young Augustine in the first chapter of Part II under the title ‘Augustine’s view of reality’.)

In a nutshell, after reading the Hortensius, Augustine changed his way of pursuing happiness: he now began to strive for knowledge of God and the soul so that he could love God, render his lifestyle ethical, and finally attain true happiness. Thus, in chapter

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199 (Chadwick’s translation.) ‘Non enim amare te noveram, qui nisi fulgores corporeos cogitare non noveram’. I find the following translation of Outler is more accurate: ‘I knew not how to love thee because I knew not how to conceive of anything beyond corporeal splendors.’

200 in quibus (i.e., ‘pura mente’) animae tanti rationali et intellectuali datum, ut eius aeternitatis contemplatione perfruatur, atque afficiatur ex ea, aeternamque vitam possit mereri’

201 ‘…in ipsis rebus aeternis, incorporalibus et incommutabilibus, in quorum perfecta contemplatione nobis beata, quae nonnisi aeterna est, vita promittitur, Trinitatem quae Deus est inquiramus.’ Also, see De
1, I shall investigate the significance of such a change in Augustine, in historical, theological and philosophical context. I shall also explain what Greek teleology is.

In his pursuit of true knowledge of God, Augustine encountered firstly Manichaeism, next Stoicism, and finally Neoplatonism, before his conversion to the Catholic faith. In the theological exploration of his Augustine had two criteria for determining whether a theory of reality is acceptable or not. One is that it should resolve the problem of evil. The other is that it should describe God as irrefutably transcendent: God must be incorruptible, inviolable, and immutable. These two are, in fact, inseparably intermingled: if God is genuinely transcendent, nothing can pose threat to Him in any way. Manichaeism and Stoicism failed to meet the two criteria, whereas Neoplatonism did not. This is the reason why Augustine makes references to some Manichaean and Stoic ideas when he mentions the significance of his encounter with Neoplatonism in Book 7 of the Confessions. Thus, examining some relevant features of the former two will help us to understand the impact of Neoplatonism on the formation of Augustine’s mind.

In chapter 2, I shall examine Manichaeism: God and Evil are two independent, co-equal and co-eternal powers and are at war against one another. Eventually, such a dualism makes God vulnerable to the evil force.

In chapter 3, I shall investigate Stoicism. Referring to Confessions 7.1.1-2 and 7.5.7, Baguette argues that, after abandoning Manichaeism, but before reading ‘certain books of the Platonists’, Augustine studied Stoicism. The reasoning behind the argument of Baguette is that Augustine’s idea of God’s being ‘diffused (infussum or diffusum), ‘permeating (penetrare), ‘filling (implendo), and ‘surrounding (ambientem)’

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Trinitate 1.6.10: ‘life everlasting (i.e., eternal life) can scarcely be mortal and subject to change (Neque enim ipsa vita aeterna mortalis est secundum aliquam mutabilitatem)’. (All are Hill’s translations.)

202 Cf., Confessiones 7.3.4 & 7.5.7
203 Cf., Soliloquia 7.1.1.
204 Cf., Soliloquia 7.3.4 (the problem of evil and Manichaeism) & 7.5.7 (the problem of evil and Manichaeism and Stoicism).
205 Soliloquia 7.9.13.
207 Confessiones 7.1.1.
208 Confessiones 7.1.2.
209 Confessiones 7.1.2.
the world are all compatible with Stoic materialism: Stoicism, together with
Epicureanism, dominated the Roman world in Augustine’s time.  

Stoicism is fundamentally a material pantheism (whereas Manichaeism is material
dualism). God penetrates and concurrently encompasses the whole world; thus God is
omni-presently immanent in, and is inseparably intermingled with, the world in an
ontological sense. Yet, such pantheism makes impossible even to raise questions about
evil as an experiential reality:

I visualized you, Lord, surrounding it (i.e., God’s creation) on all sides and
permeating it, but infinite in all directions … God is good and is most mightily
and incomparably superior to these things. But being God, God created good
creatures. See how God surrounds and fills them. Then where and whence is
evil? How did it creep in?  

Neoplatonism, on the other hand, helped Augustine to resolve the problem of evil: it
did not give Augustine the solution to the problem, but only suggested a way to settle
it. More importantly, the immaterial concepts of soul and God (i.e., Intellect and the
One) in Neoplatonism revolutionized Augustine’s way of thinking about God’s
immanence, omnipresence and transcendence. Eventually, Augustine adopted the basic
structure of the Neoplatonic idea regarding how to ascend to God intellectually.

210 Confessiones 7.5.7
211 Cf., Vernon J. Bourke, Augustine’s Quest of Wisdom: Life and Philosophy of the Bishop of Hippo,
(USA: The Bruce Publishing, 1945), 55.
213 Confessiones 7.5.7 (Chadwick’s translation). Note that in Stoicism the mode of God’s existence with
respect to the universe is modelled on that of the soul’s (i.e., pneuma, which means literally ‘hot/fiery
breath’) with respect to the body: Cf., Michael Lapidge, ‘7 Stoic Cosmology’, in John M. Rist (ed.) The
214 Cf., Michele Federico Sciaccà, Saint Augustin et le néoplatonisme : la possibilité d’une philosophie
chrétienne; (Louvain: Publications universitaires de Louvain, 1956), 14; ‘Avant tout Augustin a vu, à ce
moment, la «façon» de résoudre le problème; mais il n’en a pas vu la «solution». Celle-ci sera élaborée
postérieurement et à plusieurs reprises, jusqu’au moment où elle atteindra sa formulation précise. Les
«platoniciens» lui ont seulement servi de point de départ, mais dès maintenant Augustin s’engage dans
une voie autonome, qui le conduira à résoudre le problème d’une manière tout à fait214 personnelle.’ Also,
see Sciaccà, Saint Augustin et le néoplatonisme, 13-19; Gerald Bonner, St. Augustine of Hippo: Life, and
Controversies (Norwich: The Canterbury Press, 1963), 201-204, chapter (iv) ‘Creator-or-creature’ in Part
II.
215 Cf., Confessiones 7.10.16.
Our ‘mind’s eye’ cannot ‘see’ God ‘face to face’. We can only perceive the reality of God dialectically through understanding His creation. Accordingly, Plotinus’ argument for God’s immateriality is based on his proof of the soul’s incorporeity, which I shall investigate in the first section of chapter 4. Afterwards, I shall examine how Plotinus maintains God to be immanent, omnipresent, and transcendent; and finally the key elements of his theory concerning interiority: whenever the need arises, I shall mention in what way Augustine’s thoughts resemble Plotinus’.

1) The Hortensius

Just before telling us, in the Confessions 3, about the impact that reading the Hortensius had on him, Augustine argues that being happy is unquestionably a universal desire. At the same time, Augustine regretfully confesses how he used to pursue happiness: for instance, he enjoyed gratifying his carnal desires, loved the joy felt in watching stage plays, and pursued his career in rhetoric for no other reason than making himself happy.

At nineteen years of age, Augustine, as a student of eloquence, had to read the key textbook Hortensius in the course of the syllabus. Yet, it turned out that he was captivated not by its style, but by its exhortation to ‘imperishable Wisdom’. He immediately decided to pursue a different kind of happiness, which is ‘worthy’ and not ‘vain’, and which can be attained only through dedicating one’s whole life (i.e., the mind and the heart) to Wisdom.

In the historical context of the Graeco-Roman era, such a transformation as Augustine’s was an archetype of a ‘cultural’ conversion occurring among certain

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216 Cf., Soliloquia 1.6.12 & Confessiones 7.10.16
217 Cf., Confessiones 10.5.7 & De Trinitate 1.8.16. Also, see Soliloquia 1.6.12-1.7.14.
218 Cf., De vera religione 25.47 & 29.52, De doctrina Christiana 1.4.4, De Trinitate 15.2.3.
219 Cf., Confessiones 3.2.3: (Boulding’s translation) ‘yet there can be no doubt that everyone aspires to be happy. (Certe omnis homo gaudere vult.)’
221 Cf., Confessiones 3.2.2-3.3.6.
222 Cf., Confessiones 3.4.7-8.
223 Cf., Confessiones 3.4.7: (Outler’s translation) ‘Suddenly every vain hope became worthless (viluit) to me …’. 
people. In ancient Greece, there coexisted two major cultural traditions, which were mutually irreconcilable. One was ‘literary’ or ‘rhetorical’, whereas the other was ‘philosophical’. The well-known representatives of the former are the Sophists and Isocrates, whereas those of the latter are Socrates and Plato. The former constituted the dominant consciousness, whereas the latter was the road less travelled. The clash between the two traditions continued unabated in late antiquity. Thus, Augustine’s decision to pursue Wisdom was actually an alteration of his cultural orientation – that is, adapting himself to a tradition which was entirely new and unfamiliar to him.224 However, we need to note that, despite the commencement of his love affair with philosophy, Augustine continued to study rhetoric rather than giving it up altogether. In other words, the two mutually irreconcilable traditions were merged together in Augustine until he renounced his career in 384 AD. This was possible because, as Courcelle explains, in Augustine’s educational context philosophy was the ‘crowning’ part of the rhetoric curriculum and was taught by the teachers of rhetoric.225

Now, there are two things to note. One is that philosophy in the Graeco-Roman era involved not only the intellectual, but also the moral as well as the social dimension.226 Hence, what was called a ‘philosophical conversion’ in those days was, in fact, more like what we in the twenty-first century regard as a ‘religious conversion’.227 The other is that Augustine decided to devote himself to philosophy for only one, single reason: that is, to attain true happiness.228


Augustine would later convert to the Christian faith and consider it to be a ‘true philosophy’ (Cf., Contra Academicos 3.19.42 & De ordine 2.1.1.) Thus, Chin holds that the Confessions can be interpreted as an invitation to compare between “Augustine the rhetor” (Books 1-8) and “Augustine the Christian” (Books 9-13): see Catherine Chin, ‘Christians in the Roman Classroom: Memory, Grammar, and Rhetoric in “Confessions X”, Augustinian Studies 33/2 (2002), 161-182.

225 Cf., Pierre Courcelle, Recherches sur les Confessions de saint Augustin (Paris: E. De Boccard, 1950), 58-60: the footnotes no. 1, 2 & 3 in p. 60 refer to Confessiones 4.16. 28 (‘What good did it do me that at about the age of twenty there came into my hands a work of Aristotle which they call the Ten Categories? My teacher in rhetoric at Carthage, and others too who were reputed to be learned men, used to speak of this work with their cheeks puffed out with conceit’ [Chadwick’s translation]), 4.14.21 & 4.14.23.

226 Cf., Henri-Irénée Marrou, Saint Augustin et la fin de la culture antique, 172.


Augustine’s quest for true happiness never waned throughout his life. Holte argues in his book *Béatitude et Sagesse* that one can find hard evidence of it in *De civitate Dei*, which Augustine began to compose forty years after reading the *Hortensius*.229 Here, Augustine re-emphasizes that what causes a person to pursue Wisdom is solely that person’s desire for happiness:

The reason for this is that no one has any right to philosophize except with a view to happiness. Now, what makes a man happy is the supreme good.

Hence, there is no reason for philosophizing apart from the supreme good. From this it follows that no school of philosophy is properly so called unless its search is for the supreme good.230 (*De civitate Dei* 19.1)

Although Augustine wrote it at the age of at least fifty-nine, it provides us with additional information concerning the influence of the *Hortensius* upon the formation of his mind.

There are three keywords in the excerpt from *De civitate Dei* 19.1. These are ‘happy (*beatus*)’, ‘philosophy’ (i.e., love of Wisdom), and ‘supreme good (*finis boni*)’. All these are teleological term: ‘supreme good (*finis boni*)’ – more precisely, ‘*finibus bonorum et malorum*’ – is Cicero’s Latin translation of ‘telos (τέλος)’.231 We can find similar language and overtones in the *Confessions* 3.4.7–8. For example, ‘Wisdom’, ‘philosophy’, and ‘delight (*gaudium*) of human vanity’ unmistakably connote teleology. Therefore, I shall explain briefly what Greek teleology is and what its chief issues are. (Holte maintains that Augustine’s early works display his knowledge of Cicero’s teaching of ethics and moral philosophy, thus Augustine must have read some other Ciceronian books, for example, *De finibus*.232)

*Telos* is fundamentally an ethical term, though how a philosophical school used it is semantically different from another. This is to say that ethics is the core element of

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230 ‘Quando quidem nulla est homini causa philosophandi, nisi ut beatus sit; quod autem beatum facit, ipse est finis boni; nulla est igitur causa philosophandi, nisi finis boni: quamobrem quae nullum boni finem sectatur, nulla philosophiae secta dicenda est.’
Greek teleology. On the other hand, *eudaemonia* constitutes the nucleus of Greek ethics. Consequently, eudaemonism in an ethical sense is at the heart of Greek teleology: Christians translated ‘*eudaemonia* (εὐδαιμονία)’ often as ‘*beatitudo*’, whereas pagan philosophers as ‘*beata vita*’.233

The primary meaning of *eudaimonia* does not concern feelings, even though it always involves the emotional dimension of human life. It, in the first place, refers to an ideal life where our desires are satisfied without immoderation (οβρπτε):234 the ancient Greeks believed that such a life belongs to gods only.235

Although there is no evidence that eudaimonism has a religious aspect, etymologically the term ‘*eudaimonia*’ has its origin in religion: it is derived from the word ‘*daimon* (δαίμων)’,236 which means god or goddess. It was widely believed, among those who refused to secularize *eudaimonia*, that *daimon* is a divine, supreme ‘part’237 (or ‘power238/’faculty239) of the human person.240 That part is generally considered to be ‘intelligence’: for instance, Plato explicitly designated human reason as ‘*daimon*’ (*Timaeus* 90 a),241 but Cicero interestingly does not.242 Nonetheless, in the

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233 Cf., Holte, 13-14: also, see the footnotes.
234 Cf., Holte, 14: Holte translates it as ‘coupables de démesure’.
235 Cf., Holte, 13-14.
236 but the etymology of ‘*daimon*’ is not clear.
237 ‘composante’
238 ‘puissance’
239 ‘faculté’
242 Cf., Philip Cary, *Augustine’s Invention of the Inner Self: The Legacy of a Christian Platonist* (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2000), 132: ‘Interestingly, Cicero does not make the usual move of pointing to the faculty of reason, but rather dwells on a pair of abilities that received systematic treatment by rhetoricians rather than philosophers: memory and invention (*Tusc.* 1:56-65). We can see the divinity of the soul reflected in the works of these two powers, Cicero argues, just as we can see God in the works of nature. “So it is with the mind (*mente*) of the human being, although you do not see it, just as you do not see God – nonetheless, just as you recognize God from his works, so from the memory and discovery (*inventio*) of things and its quickness of movement and all the beauty of virtue you must recognize the divine power of the mind. (*Tusc.* 1:70)”’ Also see Prosper Alfaric, *L’évolution intellectuelle de saint Augustin: I Du Manichéisme au Néoplatonisme* (Paris: Émile Nourry, 1918), 352: ‘Il (i.e., Cicero) ne discute l’immortalité de l’âme qu’avec la plus grande réserve, et il se montre beaucoup plus disposed à l’admettre qu’y la nier.’
cultured milieu of ancient thought, one generally took for granted that the soul is divine.\textsuperscript{243}

The divine power grows or deteriorates in counter-proportion to other kinds of powers that we (i.e., the soul) have. Thus, \textit{eudaimonia} denotes the ideal state of human existence, in which the divine power is fully actualized by eradicating the other powers completely.\textsuperscript{244} (Augustine cites a similar Ciceronian text from the \textit{Hortensius} in \textit{De Trinitate} 14.19.26: ‘if the souls which we have are eternal and divine, we must conclude, that the more we let them have their head in their natural activity, that is, in reasoning and in the quest for knowledge, and the less they are caught up in the vices and errors of mankind, the easier it will be for them to ascend and return to Heaven\textsuperscript{245}.)

One can cultivate the \textit{daimon} to the full only by means of virtue (\textit{αρέτη})\textsuperscript{246} and its supreme form is Wisdom (\textit{σοφία}), which Stoics (one of whom is Cicero) define as knowledge of things divine and human:\textsuperscript{247} accordingly, Augustine says in \textit{De ordine} 2.18.47, ‘To philosophy pertains a twofold question: the first treats of the soul; the second, of God.’\textsuperscript{248}

In summary, Greek teleology concerns itself with maximizing the divine capacity (i.e., \textit{daimon}, which is often considered to be reason) of the human person in order to achieve and maintain the optimum ethical lifestyle (i.e., \textit{eudaimonia}) through knowing God and the human person (i.e., Wisdom).\textsuperscript{249} Similarly, after reading the \textit{Hortensius}, Augustine strived to find the right way to think about God and render his lifestyle ethical.\textsuperscript{250}

\textsuperscript{243} Cf., Cary, \textit{Augustine’s Invention of the Inner Self}, 86.

\textsuperscript{244} Cf., Holte, \textit{Béatitude et Sagesse}, 14-15.

\textsuperscript{245} Cicero, \textit{Hortensius}, fgt. 97 (Opera, IV, 3, ed. Müller, 1980, 325) quoted by Peter Brown, in \textit{Augustine of Hippo} (London: Faber and Faber, 1967), 40: ‘aeternos animos ac divinos habemus, sic existimandum est, quo magis hi fuerint semper in suo cursu, id est, in ratione et investigandi cupiditate, et quo minus se admiscuerint atque implicaverint hominum vitis et erroribus, hoc his faciiliorem ascensum et reditum in caelum fore.’

\textsuperscript{246} I.e., an ‘inner force’, acquired by exercise, to carry out moral and intellectual conduct: see Holte, \textit{Béatitude et Sagesse}, 15, footnote no. 1.

\textsuperscript{247} Cf., Holte,15, particularly footnote no. 2.

\textsuperscript{248} ‘Cuius duplex quaestio est: una de anima, altera de Deo.’ Also, see \textit{Soliloquia} 1.2.7.

\textsuperscript{249} Cf., Holte, \textit{Béatitude et Sagesse}, 12-15.

\textsuperscript{250} Later, Augustine says in \textit{De ordine} 2.8.25, ‘one part pertains to the regulating of life, and the other pertains to the directing of studies.’
Having converted to philosophy, Augustine immediately turned to the Christian Bible. This is certainly due to the fact that the Catholic faith was the religion of his upbringing. Moreover, an important characteristic of the 4th century Christianity is that Christ was seen as the ‘Wisdom of God’ rather than the suffering Saviour; there were no crucifixes in Augustine’s time. Thus, having resolved to pursue Wisdom and then picking up the Bible, Augustine obviously thought that he was about to find ‘True Wisdom’. Nonetheless, Augustine was rather disappointed with the Bible. Brown explains exactly what made him think that it was not worth reading as follows: ‘He had been brought up to expect a book to be “cultivated and polished”: he had been carefully groomed to communicate with educated men in the only admissible way, in a Latin scrupulously modelled on the ancient authors. Slang and jargon were equally abhorrent to such a man; and the Latin Bible of Africa, translated some centuries before by humble, nameless writers, was full of both. What is more, what Augustine read in the Bible seemed to have little to do with the highly spiritual Wisdom that Cicero had told him to love. It was cluttered up with earthy and immoral stories from the Old Testament; and, even in the New Testament, Christ, Wisdom Himself, was introduced by long, and contradictory, genealogies.’

2) Manichaeism

251 Cf., Brown, Augustine of Hippo, 41-42. There are a few other matters noteworthy here:
Firstly, there was no clear distinction between philosophy and religion in the Greco-Roman era. Accordingly, in De ordine 1.11.32 Augustine implicitly mentions that the Catholic faith is a form of ‘philosophy (i.e., love of Wisdom)’. (Cf., Arthur Hilary Armstrong, ‘Chapter 1: Introductory’, in Arthur H. Armstrong [ed.], The Cambridge History of Later Greek and Early Medieval Philosophy [Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1967], 5.)
Secondly, as Nock points out, however ‘hard thinking’ was required from students of a Greek philosophical school, they were simultaneously expected to believe and be loyal to the teachings of their school. Thus, ‘the philosophy which addressed itself to the world at large was a dogmatic philosophy seeking to save souls.’ Eventually, ‘Christian dogma was in conflict not with the free Greek spirit, but with other dogma and with fossilized tradition.’ (Cf., Arthur Darby Nock, Conversion, the old and the new in religion from Alexander the Great to Augustine of Hippo [Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1961], 181 & 185. Also, see Henri-Iréné Marrou, Histoire de l’éducation dans l’antiquité [Paris: ed. Seuil, 2nd ed.1950], 422-426.)
Finally, Testard holds that, as a Christian child, Augustine had presumably encountered the same teleological – yet universal – questions about human life, with which Cicero dealt in the Hortensius. Hence, the Ciceronian book probably evoked such a ‘memory’ of Augustine’s, which in turn might prompt him to inquire what the Christian Bible had to say with respect to the questions. (Cf., Maurice Testard, Saint Augustin et Cicéron I : Cicéron dans la Formation et dans l’Œuvre de Saint Augustin [Paris: Études Augustiniennes, 1958], 28, 31-32.)
252 Cf., Confessions 3.5.9.
253 Brown, Augustine of Hippo, 42.
Augustine was drawn to Manichaeism in his search for true happiness. He believed that Manichaeans were ‘authentic Christians’, for they constantly repeated the name of God.\(^{254}\) Also, he found their ‘rationalism’ very appealing.\(^{255}\) How, then, did the Manichaean Augustine perceive God? Notice the following two things about Manichaeism. One is that its perception of God and its theory of evil were inseparable.\(^{256}\) The other is that, regarding what God is, there is inconsistency between its official doctrines and its adherents’ actual teachings: this undoubtedly puzzled Augustine. Thus, I shall, first of all, summarize the Manichaean views concerning God/Good and Evil from Bonner’s *St. Augustine of Hippo: Life, and Controversies*. Secondly, I shall explain what the inconsistency is. Finally, I shall explain briefly what Augustine maintained to be the problem with his way of seeing things, so that he was unable to identify and tackle any shortcoming of Manichaeism as he would later be able to do.

‘In the beginning,’\(^{257}\) two co-equal and co-eternal powers of Good/God and Evil – or Light and Darkness – existed side by side, and neither could destroy the other. However, they were not by nature preserved from the possibility of contact for, while they were both infinite, the Kingdom of Light extended to the North, the East, and the West, but the Kingdom of Darkness to the South alone, so that there was a point of contact where the Kingdom of Darkness pierced like a wedge into the realms of Light. It was this point of contact, and the enclave of Darkness in the world of Light, which

\(^{254}\) Cf., *Confessions*, trans. Henry Chadwick (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1991), 40, footnote no. 15. Also, see *Confessiones* 3.6.10: (Chadwick’s translation) ‘In their (i.e., Manichaeans’) mouths were the devil’s traps and a birdlime compounded of a mixture of the syllables of your name, and that of the Lord Jesus Christ, and that of the Paraclete, the Comforter, the Holy Spirit. These names were never absent from their lips; but it was no more than sound and noise with their tongue.’ Gerald Bonner, *St. Augustine of Hippo: Life, and Controversies*, (Norwich: The Canterbury Press, 1963), 159-161 & Brown, *Augustine of Hippo*, 42-44.

\(^{255}\) Cf., Bonner, *St. Augustine of Hippo*, 161-162: Bonner here points out that ‘the appearance of rationalism is, in fact, wholly misleading.’ Also, see *De beata vita* 1.4: ‘I persuaded myself that belief was more to be accorded to those who taught than to those who gave orders (*mihique persuasi docentibus potius quam iubentibus esse credendum*).’ *De utilitate credendi* 1.2: ‘they (i.e., Manichaeans), on the other hand, were forcing faith on no one without first hunting for and disentangling the truth (*se autem nullum premere ad fidem nisi prius discussa et enodata veritate*).’

\(^{256}\) Cf., *De libero arbitrio* 1.2.4: ‘Since you [i.e., God] force me to agree that we are not taught to do evil, tell me the cause why we do evil and replies: ‘That is a question that gave me great trouble when I was a young man. It wearied me and drove me into the arms of heretics’ (quoted in Bonner, *St. Augustine of Hippo*, 194). *Confessiones* 3.7.12: (Boulding’s translation) ‘I was being subtly manoeuvred into accepting the views of those stupid deceivers by the questions they constantly asked me about (1) the origin of evil, and (2) whether God was confined to a material form with hair and nails, and (3) whether people who practiced polygamy, killed human beings and offered animal sacrifices could be considered righteous.’

\(^{257}\) or before the creation of the world.
made possible the intermingling which we see in the present world, where good and evil are mixed.

The Kingdom of Light decided to fight the enemy himself. He therefore evoked a first emanation, the Mother of Life, who, in turn, evoked another being, Primal Man – not to be confused with Adam. Primal Man, clothed in the Five Bright Elements: Air, Wind, Light, Water, and Fire, which formed his soul, descended to the frontier of the Kingdoms of Light and Darkness and engaged the enemy armies in combat. Here he was defeated and the Five Bright Elements were devoured by the princes of Darkness, the infernal Archons. This was the Fall, as the Manicheans conceived it. The Bright Elements which the evil Archons had devoured were the soul of Primal Man, the Son of God, who was himself a hypostasis of the soul of his Father. In consequence, the dark Archons had, within their own entrails, a portion of the substance of God.

Primal Man addresses to the Father a cry for help, and was eventually delivered into his heavenly homeland. Although Primal Man had been redeemed, the Five Bright Elements were still mingled with darkness in the entrails of the evil Archons, and it was necessary that they too should be delivered. Their deliverance was the sole purpose of the construction of the world.

Meanwhile, the King of Darkness engendered two demons, a male called Ashaqloun and a female called Namraël, and sent them into the world to frustrate the purposes of the powers of Light. Ashaqloun united with Namraël to engender the first two human beings, Adam and Eve. The human race, then, is sprung from demonic parents, as is witnessed by its body, which is the same form as that of the demons, and by its sexuality, which urges it to couple and reproduce, thus continuing to imprison particles of Light in the flesh. Nevertheless, because of the presence of some particles of Light which are consubstantial with God, the human person is not wholly a diabolic creature; a good nature exists in him and he can free himself from his fleshly bonds and ascend to the Paradise of Light.

The machine for the separation of Light from Darkness had been established and, through the ages, according to Mani, it continued the work for which it was designed.
Gradually, the particles of Light were disengaged from the carnal mass; the souls of the Elect, after death, were gathered into the ‘Column of Glory’ from which they were transferred, by means of the Moon and of the Sun, to the Paradise of their origin. However, this process of liberation is impeded by the sins of humanity, of whom the great majority choose to cling to the mixture, and so prolong the captivity of Light in Darkness. In the end, Good and Evil will once again be separate, as they were in the beginning.258

Note the following four points, against which Augustine would argue later. Firstly, God and Evil are two independent co-equal and co-eternal powers. Secondly, the hypostasis of the soul of Primal Man (or the Son of God) and that of his Father consist of the Five Bright (physical) Elements; namely Air, Wind, Light, Water, and Fire. Thirdly, God and Evil are currently intermingled in terms of hypostasis, for the latter has devoured the Son of God. Finally, the human body originates from Evil, whereas the soul originates from Good.259 Thus, the entrapment of the soul within the body signifies a dominion of the evil power over the former, not completely but to a certain extent. (Later, Augustine would maintain that God is the immaterial, incorruptible, immutable, and transcendent Creator; who is the Good, the Being, and Wisdom. Also, all creatures are good, for their existences are sustained by the supreme Good or the Being, whereas evil is non-existence.)

Contrary to the Manichaean system, its followers260 were not actually prepared to admit that God can be defiled: they liked to hold that God is uncompromisingly incorruptible.261 Thus, due to the inconsistency, Augustine had to question continually how he should understand evil without detriment to the incorruptibility of God: God must remain transcendent any evil force. It remained an unresolved problem for more or less a decade. However, after reading the libri platonicorum262 and then converting to

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258 Cf., Bonner, St. Augustine of Hippo, 162-171.
259 Cf., Bonner, 168.
260 Cf., Bonner, 198.
261 Cf., Bonner, 198-199: ‘God, they (i.e., Manichees) held, was incorruptible - a fact which Augustine was able to put to good use in his successful debate with Felix the Manichee who, because of his unwillingness to assert that God was corruptible, was ultimately persuaded to anathematize Mani and become a Catholic Christian. This reluctance on the part of the Manichees to carry their theological premises to a logical conclusion left them helpless in the face of Nebridius’ question: what would the force of Darkness have done if God had declined its challenge to battle’ (cf., Confessiones 7.2.3).
262 Confessiones 7.9.13.
Christianity with a Neoplatonic mindset, Augustine could solve the problem of evil and simultaneously diagnose why he had been unable to do so as a Manichaean. Mann puts Augustine’s self-diagnosis in a nutshell as follows: ‘Although Manichaism is dualistic, the dualism is confined within a thoroughgoing materialism. Goodness is identified with corporeal light; evil with physical darkness. The youthful Augustine found this feature of Manichaism unobjectionable because he antecedently had had difficulty understanding how anything could exist without being corporeal (Conf. 5.10–19, 7.1.1–2). It was, he says, as if God were a boundless ocean completely permeating the finite sponge of the created world (Conf. 7.5.7). Taking the metaphor a step further, we can offer on behalf of the Manichaeans the observation that the same sponge is also awash with a supremely toxic fluid – indeed, that the two fluids together not only permeate but constitute the sponge.’

This is, in fact, partially flawed, for perceiving God as ‘a boundless ocean completely permeating the finite sponge of the created world’ is compatible with Stoicism, not Manichaeism: I shall explain this in the subsequent chapter.

Note that the intellectual part of Augustine’s quest for Wisdom was fundamentally dialectical: he tried to find correct pairs of correlative terms, with which he could describe God as truly transcendent. Thus, since ‘incorporeity’ was not part of the Manichaean Augustine’s vocabulary, his view of reality was in terms of either-corporeal-or-nothing (i.e., if not corporeal, then it does not exist): ‘Is truth then a nothing, simply because it is not spread out through space either finite or infinite?’ This was the reason that Augustine was incapable of resolving the problem of evil.

Immediately after departing from Manichaeism, Augustine took on another form of materialism called Stoicism. The transition from the former to the latter was – as Baguette puts it – a transition from materialistic dualism to materialistic pantheism.

3) Stoic materialism

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264 Confessiones 7.10.16 (Boulding’s translation): ‘Numquid nihil est veritas, quoniam neque per finita neque per infinita locorum spatia diffusa est?’
In 1970, Baguette published the article ‘Une période stoïcienne dans l’évolution de saint Augustin’.\(^{266}\) The main point of the article is to insist that Augustine’s mind was shaped by Stoic materialism during the period in between his involvement in Manichaeism and his acquaintance with Neoplatonism.

Prior to demonstrating the legitimacy of his argument, Baguette stresses that Augustine’s loyalty to Manichaeism had already begun to wane by the time he was about to familiarize himself with Stoic materialism. Such disintegration of Augustine’s Manichaeism should be ascribed to his interest in and exploration of ‘many other philosophers’ ideas (\textit{multa philosophorum})’ before he met Faustus at the age of twenty-nine.\(^{267}\) While associating with Manichaeans, he studied various subjects, namely ‘logic, geometry, music, arithmetic’,\(^{268}\) astrology,\(^{269}\) Aristotle’s \textit{Categories},\(^{270}\) and Academic scepticism;\(^{271}\) he was experimenting with – as André Mandouze puts it – ‘the scientism, the rationalism, and the materialism of his time’.\(^{272}\)

During the experimentation, Augustine compared the ‘rational’\(^{273}\) certitude of scientific knowledge with Manichaean doctrines. Augustine was eventually disillusioned with the ‘appearance of rationalism’\(^{274}\) of the latter.\(^{275}\) For instance, contrary to the scientifically minded people, who accurately calculated and predicted eclipses of the sun and the moon, ‘the Manichees believed eclipses occurred when the sun or the moon wished to veil their eyes from the terrible cosmic battles between the light and the darkness’.\(^{276}\) (Also, what Augustine meant by ‘philosophy’ – that is, ‘love

\(^{266}\) Cf., Baguette, ‘Une période stoïcienne dans l’évolution de saint Augustin’, 47-77.

\(^{267}\) Cf., \textit{Confessiones} 5.3.3. Also, see Goulven Madec, \textit{Saint Augustin et la Philosophie} (Paris: Institut d’Études Augustiniennes, 1996), 31-36.

\(^{268}\) Cf., \textit{Confessiones} 4.16.30

\(^{269}\) Cf., \textit{Confessiones} 4.3.4-6.

\(^{270}\) Cf., \textit{Confessiones} 4.16.28-31.


\(^{272}\) Cf., \textit{Confessiones} 5.3.6: ‘rationes’.

\(^{273}\) Bonner, \textit{St. Augustine of Hippo}, 162.

\(^{274}\) Cf., \textit{Confessiones} 5.3.3: (Chadwick’s translation) ‘I had done much reading in the philosophers and retained this in my memory, I compared some of their teachings with the lengthy fables of the Manichees’: what Augustine means by ‘philosophers’ in this context is actually ‘astronomers’. Also, see \textit{Ibid.}, 5.3.4-6 & Baguette, ‘Une période stoïcienne dans l’évolution de saint Augustin’, 50-51.

of Wisdom’ – became broader: it then began to include science, like mathematics and astronomy.\(^{277}\)

Thereafter, Augustine studied Stoic materialism. Baguette holds that the best evidence of this can be found in the *Confessions* 7.1.1–2 and 7.5.7, though there are also Neoplatonic vestiges in the same passages, as R.J. O’Connell argues:\(^{278}\)

I was unable to grasp the idea of substance except as something we can see with our bodily eyes. … even though I was no longer hampered by the image of a human body, I was still forced to imagine something corporeal spread out in space, whether infused into the world or even diffused through the infinity outside it. This was still the case even though I recognized that this substance was imperishable, inviolable and immutable (necessarily so, being superior to anything perishable, subject to violation or changeable); because anything to which I must deny these spatial dimensions seemed to me to be nothing at all, absolutely nothing, not even a void such as might be left if every kind of body – earthly, watery, aerial or heavenly – were removed from it, for though such a place would be a nothingness, it would still have the quality of space.\(^{279}\)

(*Confessiones* 7.1.1)

Hence I thought that even you, Life of my life, were a vast reality spread throughout space in every direction: I thought that you penetrated the whole mass of the earth and the immense, unbounded spaces beyond it on all sides, that earth, sky and all things were full of you, and that they found their limits in you, while you yourself had no limit anywhere. Since material air – I mean the atmosphere above the earth – posed no barrier to the sun’s light, which was able to penetrate and pass through it, filling it entirely without bursting it apart or tearing it, I assumed that not only the material sky, air and sea, but even the material earth, were similarly traversable by you, penetrable and open in all their greatest and

\(^{277}\) Cf., *Confessiones* 5.3.3-4: Augustine here refers astronomers and mathematicians collectively as ‘philosophers’.

\(^{278}\) Cf., *Confessiones* 5.3.6: especially, ‘what I had learnt in the books of secular wisdom (saecularis sapientiae).’

\(^{279}\) Boulding’s translation.
tiniest parts to your presence, which secretly breathes through them within and without, controlling all that you have made. I held this view only because I was unable to think in any other way; it was false.\textsuperscript{280} (Confessiones 7.1.2)

I conjured up before my mind’s eye the whole of creation: all the things in it that we can see, such as earth and sea and stars and trees and living things that are mortal, and all that we do not see in it, such as the heavenly firmament overhead and all the angels and all its spiritual inhabitants; and my imagination gave form to them also, and arranged them in their due places as though they had been corporeal. And I envisaged your creation as one huge mass in which all were arrayed according to bodily kinds, both those things which were really bodily in nature and the bodies I had myself attributed to spirits. I pictured it as enormous, not of such size as it really was, of course, for that I could not know, but as large as my fancy stretched, yet finite on all sides. I imagined you, Lord, who are infinite in every possible respect, surrounding and penetrating it in its every part, like a sea extending in all directions through immense space, a single unlimited sea which held within itself a sponge as vast as one could imagine but still finite, and the sponge soaked in every fibre of itself by the boundless sea. This was how I pictured your creation filled with your infinite being.\textsuperscript{281} (Confessiones 7.5.7)

Referring to these Augustinian texts, Baguette holds that there are four indications, which suggest Augustine’s familiarity either with Cicero’s De natura deorum or Pliny the Elder’s Naturalis Historia, or both of them.

Firstly, Augustine followed the Stoic way of enumerating the four basic components of the world from the perspective of cosmology, namely, earth, water, air and fire. Notice that both air (\textit{aer}) and fire (\textit{feu}, alternatively sky [\textit{caelum}] or star [\textit{sidus}]) are always adjacent to each other: for example,

\begin{itemize}
  \item \textit{omni corpore et terreno et humido et aerio et caelesti} (7.1.1),
  \item \textit{caeli et aeris et maris sed etiam terrae corpus} (7.1.2),
\end{itemize}

\textsuperscript{280} Boulding’s translation.
In Stoicism one component of the world is generated from/by another and, thus, the arrangement of all the components must follow the order (or the reverse order) of their generation: this is the theory of mixture. Consequently, the similarities between Augustine and Stoics in this respect are by no means accidental coincidences. They suggest that Augustine knew the central tenet of the Stoic theory of mixture.

Secondly, we need to take into account the Stoic doctrine of *pneuma* in conjunction with the theory of mixture, whose crucial feature is ‘the interpenetration of body and body’: these will explain the way that Augustine used to perceive God’s immanence in (all the constituents of) the world.

We above all need to understand the significance of *pneuma* in Greek philosophy. It literally means ‘breath’ (or ‘wind’) and its cosmological significance had ‘its origin in biological thought.’ In Aristotle’s system, it was not ‘external air which was breathed’, but the innate ‘source of bodily vitality’. Zeno, the founder of Stoicism, adopted the Aristotelian idea of *pneuma*: eventually, as for the latter, so for the former *pneuma* – which is corporeal – was ‘spread throughout the entire body, thus vitalizing it.’ Yet, unlike Aristotle, Zeno made it identical with the soul: hence, the latter’s perception of soul was thoroughly materialistic. In this Zeno was followed by all the major Stoics. Such identification led to ‘the Stoic hypothesis of the composition of the world’.

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281 Boulding’s translation.
282 Cf., Baguette, ‘Une période stoïcienne dans l’évolution de saint Augustin’, 59: ‘En fonction de cette théorie où les éléments naissent l’un de l’autre, Cicéron nous dit que l’air monte vers le ciel sous l’action de la chaleur qui transforme l’eau en vapeur … (Pline explique aussi pourquoi il faut concevoir l’air dans le voisinage du ciel, et la raison en est également mécanique : il parle d’un *mutuus complexus*, d’une « mutuelle étreinte », comme traduit J. Beaujeu, qui assure l’équilibre des éléments entre eux, la terre servant d’appui aux autres éléments tandis que les substances légères empêchent les substances lourdes de tomber.)’
284 It is often translated as ‘hot/fiery breath’.
286 Lapidge, ‘7 Stoic Cosmology’, 171. Also, see Baguette, ‘Une période stoïcienne dans l’évolution de saint Augustin’, 60: ‘Λα κρασίς δια ολον est l’expression de l’interpénétration des divers éléments entre eux.’
287 In Aristotle’s system *pneuma* and the soul are different from one another: the latter is incorporeal.
pneuma which was supposed to be a mixture of air and fire’. Later, the idea of cosmic pneuma emerged in Stoicism: it was simply ‘that of the bodily pneuma, penetrating all parts of the body and vitalizing it, applied by analogy to the universe.’ Note that ‘pneuma or one of its components was also defined by the collective “pneuma-like matter”’.292.

In Stoic cosmology, the mixture of air and fire – or either one of them – was the ‘active agent par excellence’. Thus, ‘the Stoics make Fire to be the stuff of all things. God is the active Fire, which is immanent in the universe, but He is at the same time the primal Source from which the crasser elements, that make the corporeal world, come forth. These crasser elements proceed from God and are at length resolved into Him again, so that all that exists is either the primal Fire – God in Himself – or God in His different states. When the world is in existence, God stands to it as soul to body, being the soul of the world. He is not something entirely different from the stuff of the world, His Body, but is a finer stuff, the moving and forming principle – the crasser stuff, of which the world is formed, being itself motionless and unformed, though capable of receiving all sorts of movement and form.’ In summary, the fire – which is ‘vis vitalis’ and divine – pervades all beings, sustaining their existences.

The doctrine of pneuma is obvious in Cicero’s De natura deorum. Baguette, then, holds that the above Augustinian texts were written in the spirit of the same doctrine.

289 Cf., Samuel Sambursky, Physics of the Stoics (London: Routledge and Paul, 1959), 2: ‘This composition was apparently made plausible by analogy of the pneuma with the warm puff of breath. As air represents the principle of Cold, the warmth of the human body makes it likely that the stuff souls are made of is a mixture of cold and hot, of air and fire.’
290 The origin of the cosmic pneuma is untraceable.
292 Sambursky, Physics of the Stoics, 4.
293 Cf., Sambursky, 4.
295 Cf., Baguette, 60. Also, see Sambursky, Physics of the Stoics, 3-4: ‘one can infer from the passage in Cicero’s De natura deorum dealing with the nature of heat that the development of the first thermodynamical notions had begun already in the Old Stoa. Cicero quotes Cleanthes’ doctrine which describes the function of heat in organic nature as a special case of thermic processes: “It is a law of Nature that all things capable of nurture and growth contain within them a supply of heat, without which their nurture and growth would not be possible; for everything of a hot, fiery nature supplies its own source of motion and activity; but that which is nourished and grows possesses a definite and uniform motion ... From this it must be inferred that this element of heat possesses in itself a vital force that pervades the whole world.” Here the active character of heat as such and its connection with dynamic
Consequently, the texts portray God as a large being who permeates infinite space on every side, penetrating the entire mass of the world (cf., 7.1.2), like the sunlight penetrating and simultaneously filling the air without breaking/splitting it (cf., 7.1.2), or like a huge sea soaking a finite sponge entirely within itself (cf., 7.5.7). Also, regarding the passage ‘infused into the world or even diffused through the infinity outside it’ (7.1.1), the way in which Augustine applied ‘infused’ and ‘diffused’ in reference to God is similar to the way that Stoics perceived God’s omnipresent immanence in the world – that is, the theory of mixture that pneuma ‘pervaded’ and ‘extended’ (or ‘stretched’) throughout the universe.

Thirdly, Baguette holds that Augustine was influenced not only by Cicero’s pantheistic view expressed in De natura deorum, but also Pliny the Elder’s in Naturalis Historia: it will explain how Augustine used to perceive God’s omnipresence.

In Cicero’s doctrine of pneuma, air – through physical contact with heat – is transformed into spiritus; then, the spiritus, which is the divine, ultimate source of life, supplies vitality to all animated things. Cicero referred to such activity of air (or spiritus) as ‘adspiratio’. This Ciceronian term is, as Baguette insists, akin to Augustine’s ‘inspiratio’ in the Confessions 7.1.2. Hence, Augustine’s perception of God was compatible with the Ciceronian concept of air.

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297 Ita etiam te, vita vitae meae, grandem per infintata spatia undique cogitabam penetrare totam mundi molem'.


299 ‘siue infusum mundo sive etiam extra mundum per infinita diffusum’.

300 Cf., Sambursky, Physics of the Stoics, 29-30. This is to say that for Stoics ‘pervading’ and simultaneously ‘extending’ are the ways that God (or pneuma) ontologically blends Himself with the world: see Baguette, ‘Une période stoïcienne dans l’évolution de saint Augustin’, 61-62. Note that Augustine had two other pairs of terms that signified exactly the same thing: one were ‘penetrate (penetrare)’ and ‘surround (ambire)’ (cf., 7.5.5) and the other were ‘penetration (penetrabile)’ and ‘circulation (peruium)’ (cf., 7.1.2).

301 Cf., Baguette, 62.

302 For example, ‘animantes autem adspiratione aeris sustinentur’ (Cicero, De natura deorum 2.33.83 quoted in Baguette, 62: hereafter, Cicero developed his own theory of mixture).

303 I assumed that not only the material sky, air and sea, but even the material earth, were similarly traversable by you, penetrable and open in all their greatest and tiniest parts to your presence, which secretly breathes through them within and without, controlling all that you have made. (sic tibi putabam non solum caeli et aeris et maris sed etiam terrae corpus peruium et ex omnibus maximis minimisque partibus penetrabile ad capiendam praevertiant tuant, occulta inspirazione intrinsecus et extrinsecus administrante omnia, quae creasti.)
Prior to discussing a similarity between Pliny and Augustine, Baguette first of all mentions two features of Pliny’s physics, which are consistent with Cicero’s, in order to argue for a certain continuity of Stoic ideas between them.\textsuperscript{304} One is that ‘air’ and ‘spiritus’ are mutually equivalent and interchangeable terms. The other is that the life of the living things originates from air (or spiritus), which permeates the entire universe. Next, Baguette stresses that there is a striking similarity between Pliny’s expression ‘\textit{per cuncta rerum meabilem totoque consortum}’\textsuperscript{305} and Augustine’s ‘\textit{ex omnibus maximis minimisque partibus penetribale}’;\textsuperscript{306} that is, material pantheism. Consequently, Augustine’s concept of God at this stage was consistent with Pliny’s view that \textit{pneuma} is omnipresent.\textsuperscript{307}

Finally, the above Augustinian texts distinguish God from the universe by contrasting the infinitude of the former with the finitude of the latter, though both of them interpenetrate and so are inseparably intermingled with one another. The distinction demonstrates that Augustine already knew and participated in the debate concerning what is cosmologically infinite and what else is not: he was not totally conforming to Stoicism in this debate. In Stoicism, if the universe – which is corporeal – is unique and finite, then there must be an infinite void outside it. Yet, God is corporeal whereas the infinite void is not.\textsuperscript{308} Furthermore, God cannot permeate anything that is not material. Eventually, the God of Stoicism is confined and localized only within the universe. Augustine, on the other hand, held that God is present even in the infinite void.\textsuperscript{309} (Probably, Augustine’s disagreement is grounded on some Manichaean ideas that still lingers on within him.)\textsuperscript{310}

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\textsuperscript{304} Baguette cites four passages from \textit{Naturalis Historia} for examination as follows; ‘proximum spiritus, quem Graeci nostrique eodem vocabulo aera appelant, uitalem hunc et per cuncta rerum meabilem totoque consortum’ (2.4.5), ‘inter hanc caelumque eodem spiritu pendent, certis discreta spatis, septem sidera’ (2.4.6), ‘Tot animalium haustus spiritum e sublimi trahit, at ille contra nititur, tellusque ut inani caelo spiritum fundit’ (2.39.38), and ‘uenti sunt, sine adsiduo mundi incitu et contrario siderum occursu nascentur, sine hic est ille generabilis rerum naturae spiritus hac illuc tamquam in utero aliquo uagus...’ (2.45.45) (cf., Baguette, ‘Une période stoïcienne dans l’évolution de saint Augustin’, 63).

\textsuperscript{305} \textit{Naturalis Historia} 2.4.5.

\textsuperscript{306} \textit{Confessionses} 7.1.2 quoted in Baguette, ‘Une période stoïcienne dans l’évolution de saint Augustin’, 64: ‘penetrable and open in all their greatest and tiniest parts to your presence’.

\textsuperscript{307} Cf., Baguette, 62-64.

\textsuperscript{308} The void is neither a being nor a non-being. It is an intermediary state between being and non-being: see Baguette, 73 (‘il ne possède pas la valeur et la consistance propres aux corps; il n’est qu’un incorporel, c’est-à-dire une réalité intermédiaire entre l’être et le néant’).

\textsuperscript{309} Cf., Baguette, 72.
In this regard, Baguette observes that Augustine’s choice of language is rather more compatible with Plutarch’s. Plutarch distinguished ‘to pan (το παν)’ from ‘to oλον (το ολον)’: the former signifies the whole of the universe as well as the void, whereas the latter only the universe save the void, though both terms literally mean ‘all’ or ‘whole’.\textsuperscript{311} If we compare them with Augustine’s language, then ‘per infinita spatia’ (7.1.2)\textsuperscript{312} pertains to ‘το παν’, whereas ‘earth (terra)’ and ‘heaven (caelum)’ (7.1.2)\textsuperscript{313} to ‘το ολον’.\textsuperscript{314}

In summary, due to his familiarity with Stoicism, Augustine perceived that the world consists of fire, air, water, and earth: God, like pneuma, penetrates and concurrently encompasses the whole world, being inseparably intermingled with it: there is an infinite void outside the corporeal universe but, contrary to Stoics, the infinite God, as Plutarch insisted, is omnipresent not only within but also beyond the universe: anything that is not corporeal is absolute nothing, not even an empty space.\textsuperscript{315} Nonetheless, the problem of evil still remained unresolved and, so, Augustine was not entirely satisfied with the Stoicism: ‘See how God surrounds and fills them (i.e., the created beings). Then where and whence is evil?’\textsuperscript{316}

Note that Stoic corporealism was a common phenomenon in the western Empire and was widespread among Christian thinkers in late antiquity.\textsuperscript{317} Also, before Augustine in

\begin{itemize}
\item \textsuperscript{310} Cf., Baguette, 73-75.
\item \textsuperscript{311} Cf., Plutarque, Des oppositions des philos., 2.1 quoted in Baguette, 73. Also, see Lapidge, ‘7 Stoic Cosmology’, 176-177.
\item \textsuperscript{312} ‘(spread) throughout the infinite space’.
\item \textsuperscript{313} ‘earth, sky and all things were full of you, and that they found their limits in you (haberet te terra, haberet caelum, haberent omnia et illa finirentur in te)’.
\item \textsuperscript{314} Cf., Baguette, ‘Une période stoïcienne dans l’évolution de saint Augustin’, 73.
\item \textsuperscript{315} Cf., Confessiones 7.1.1 & Baguette, 74. Augustine’s concept of nothing seems to be different from Stoics: see Lapidge, ‘7 Stoic Cosmology’, 177: ‘accordingly modern commentators have pictured the Stoic universe as a finite ball floating in an infinite void. But the Stoic view may not have been so simple. For the Stoics everything which existed was corporeal; they admitted only four types of incorporeal things, which had no real existence but were only “things said” (lekta) (SVF 2. 331). One of these four incorporeals was “nothing” (kenon) (SVF 1. 95; 2. 331). Presumably the kenon or void beyond the universe was conceived by the Stoics as this sort of incorporeal; the conception is tantamount to saying “there is nothing outside the universe.”’
\item \textsuperscript{316} Confessiones 7.5.7.
\item \textsuperscript{317} For example, Tertullian, the principal theologian of Africa prior to Augustine, held that both God and the soul were bodies: see Ronald Teske, ‘Augustine’s theory of soul’, in Eleonore Stump and Norman Kretzmann (eds.), The Cambridge Companion to Augustine (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2001),118. However, Madec points out that the methodology of determining which Christian thinkers were truly influenced by Stoicism needs to be critically examined: see Goulven Madec, Saint Augustin et la Philosophie (Paris: Institut d’Études Augustiniennes, 1996), 34-35.
\end{itemize}
the Latin West, ‘there was no clearly articulated concept of non-bodily or spiritual beings – except in the ‘Milanese circle’ of Christian Neoplatonists, including Ambrose, within which Augustine came into contact with the spiritualist metaphysics of Plotinus.’\textsuperscript{318} Even after the death of Augustine in 430, throughout the rest of the 5th century, the incorporeity of the soul was still an idea as peculiar to the majority of the Christians\textsuperscript{319} as any corporeal concept of the soul, like theirs, would be alien to the majority of 21st century Christians:\textsuperscript{320} the term ‘incorporeal (ασωματων)’ is of Neoplatonic origin.\textsuperscript{321}

In 384 Augustine started to attend the sermons of Ambrose in Milan. Teaching that both God and the soul are immaterial,\textsuperscript{322} Ambrose introduced Augustine to Neoplatonism and Christian spiritualism.\textsuperscript{323} Having been under the spell of materialism, Augustine was ‘unknowingly (nesciens)’ impressed by what Ambrose preached: it, all of a sudden, began to break the spell.\textsuperscript{324} (In addition, there were two other things that Augustine learned from Ambrose. One is that ‘allegorization’ was ‘an effective answer to Manichaean attacks on the “grossness” of the Old Testament.’ The other is that, ‘for fallen man, belief is the essential prerequisite for understanding [Confessiones 6.5.7–8].’)\textsuperscript{325} Soon afterwards, Augustine began to read ‘certain books of the Platonists’,\textsuperscript{326} based on which he started to settle the problem of evil and establish a new way of thinking about God and the human person. Also, through the books Augustine was able to adopt the framework of the Plotinian interiority and develop, with addition of Christian elements, his own theory of interiority.\textsuperscript{327}


\textsuperscript{319} For example, Faustus, the bishop of Riez in Southern Gaul, maintained that God is material.


\textsuperscript{321} Cf., Fortin, Christianism et Culture Philosophique au Cinquième Siècle, 49.

\textsuperscript{322} Cf., De beata vita 1.4: ‘I have noticed frequently in the sermons of our priest, and sometimes in yours, that, when speaking of God, no one should think of Him as something corporeal; nor yet of the soul (ali quando in sermonibus tuis, cum de Deo cogitaretur, nihil omni non esse cogitandum, neque cum de anima)’.

\textsuperscript{323} Cf., Madec, Saint Augustin et la Philosophie, 37. By then, Augustine had also despaired of finding Truth in the Catholic faith: see Confessiones 5.13.23-14.24.

\textsuperscript{324} Cf., Confessiones 5.13.23-14.24.

\textsuperscript{325} Cf., Rist, ‘Plotinus and Christian Philosophy’, 403.

\textsuperscript{326} Confessiones 7.9.13.

\textsuperscript{327} Cf., Confessiones 7.10.16.
4) Neoplatonism

In the *Confessions* 7.9.13 and 8.2.3 Augustine says that he encountered, in 386, some ‘books of the Platonists (*libri platonicorum*)’. Notice, first of all, that ‘Platonism is not a closed system with a simple character: it rather has a variegated and complex history.’ Secondly, in late antiquity and throughout the Middle Age, Platonism was known ‘in the guise of Neoplatonism’. (‘Middle Platonism’ is the designation of the Platonism in the period from Antiochus of Ascalon in B.C. 130, to Numenius of Apamea in the late second century A.D., who is followed by Plotinus, the founder of Neoplatonism, in A.D. 204–270.) It was chiefly because Plotinus and his successors considered themselves simply as Platonists, emphasizing that they were the ‘legitimate’ heirs of the philosophical legacy of Plato. Moreover, throughout these periods, the Platonic tradition was generally taken for granted as a unified system. Thirdly, ‘Neoplatonism’ and ‘Neoplatonist’ were coined only in the eighteenth century, referring to the system established by Plotinus and his followers as distinct from Plato’s Platonism. Therefore, the ‘books of the Platonists’ as Augustine knew were actually the books of the Neoplatonists. Finally, Augustine studied Neoplatonism not only once but throughout his lifetime. Rist tentatively suggests that ‘Augustine’s acquaintance with Neoplatonism is probably to be divided into three stages: firstly, before his conversion; secondly, in the 390s; finally, after about 400, when he seemed to have

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332 Cf., Gatti, ‘1 Plotinus: The Platonic tradition and the foundation of Neoplatonism’, 22. Yet, Neoplatonism shares the common features that constitute the very backbone of Platonism; namely ‘the admission of two levels of reality, one sensible and the other intelligible, of which the second is the true cause of the first, which is not capable of explaining itself; the distinction in man of two parts, corresponding to the two levels of reality, that is, body and soul (related to the intelligible and incorruptible); the association of ethics with eschatology in a religious vision of the world; the conviction of the necessity of separating the soul from the body’: see Ibid., 14.
become concerned in particular with the anti-Christian arguments of Porphyry and those
whom he influenced.\textsuperscript{333}

There is an ongoing debate concerning who the author(s) of the \textit{libri platonici\-orum}
are/is, or what the contents of those books are. For instance, O’Daly insists that \textit{Enneads}
4.2 (\textit{On the Essence of the Soul}), 4.3 (\textit{On Difficulties about the Soul}), and probably 4.7
(\textit{On the Immortality of the Soul}) are part of the \textit{libri platonici\-orum},\textsuperscript{334} for Henry at least
\textit{Enneads} 1.6 (\textit{On the Beautiful}) and 5.1 (\textit{On the Three Principal Hypostases}),\textsuperscript{335} and for
Rist only \textit{Enneads} 1.6.5.1 and 6.9.\textsuperscript{336} Nonetheless, it is generally agreed that the
authorship directly and/or indirectly\textsuperscript{337}, via Porphyry, belongs to Plotinus.\textsuperscript{338}

Plotinus was born in Lycopolis, Egypt in A.D. 205: it is not certain whether he was a
Greek or a Hellenized Egyptian. In 233 (i.e., at the age of twenty-eight) Plotinus went to
Alexandria, seeking for philosophical learning. There, he met and taught by Ammonius
Saccas, about whom we know very little. In 242, in pursuit of Persian and Indian
philosophy, he joined the Persian expedition of the Emperor Gordian. However, the
expedition came to a halt due to the assassination of the Emperor. So, Plotinus moved to
Rome in 245 and lived there till 270. While in Rome, he produced fifty-four treatises,
which are collectively a ‘unified synthesis’ of the ideas of almost all the Greek thinkers
before him and, so, are widely acclaimed especially by modern scholars.\textsuperscript{339}

\textsuperscript{333} Cf., Rist, ‘Plotinus and Christian Philosophy’, 406. Similarly, O’Daly holds that ‘among the latter
(considered as a source of Porphyry’s own distinctive psychology) the \textit{Sumnikta Zêtêmata} was likely to
have been used from 386 on, and the \textit{de regressu animae} was known to Augustine from about 417 at the
latest’: see Gerard O’Daly, \textit{Augustine’s Philosophy of Mind} (London: Gerald Duckworth, 1987), 9.
\textsuperscript{334} Cf., O’Daly, \textit{Augustine’s Philosophy of Mind}, 9 & 10: also, refer to the footnotes.
\textsuperscript{337} See Rist, 386: ‘We are not immediately concerned with the influence of Neoplatonism as a whole on
Christianity: that again is too wide a topic, for Plotinus was merely the founder of Neoplatonism, not
perhaps even the most typical Neoplatonist, and many of his successors developed his basic insights plus
additions of their own, in ways which he did not know, and which he would often not have approved. In
treating of Plotinus’s \textit{indirect} influence we can at this stage do little more than observe that the later
Neoplatonists of antiquity reinforced many of his original claims, and therefore his reputation, both
among those who read him personally and among those who knew him through second-hand sources, and
second-hand sources might be Christian as well as pagan.’
\textsuperscript{338} Cf., S. Connolly, ‘The Platonism of Augustine’s ascent to God’, \textit{Irish Ecclesiastical Record}, vol. 78
(1952), 45-46. Also, see Goulven Madec, \textit{Saint Augustin et la Philosophie} (Paris: Institut d’Études
Augustiniennes, 1996), 38; and Willy Theiler, \textit{Forschungen zum Neuplatonismus} (Berlin Walter de
Gruyter, 1966), 160-165.
\textsuperscript{339} Cf., Gatti, ‘1 Plotinus: The Platonic tradition and the foundation of Neoplatonism’, 10: ‘Plotinus has
gathered the legacy of nearly eight centuries of Greek philosophy into a magnificently unified synthesis.
The philosophers mentioned explicitly in the \textit{Enneads} are few enough and include no one outside the
Hellenic period. They are Pherecydes, Pythagoras and the Pythagoreans, Heraclitus, Anaxagoras,
insists that Plotinus most likely knew Christian faith, the *Enneads* are utterly silent about it.\textsuperscript{340} The treatises of Plotinus were later edited and compiled by his student Porphyry, grouping them into six books, each of which consists of nine parts, ‘hence the title *Enneads* from the Greek word for “nine”’.\textsuperscript{341}

How, then, did Augustine read the *libri platoniciorum*? The fact that Augustine had, in his hands, limited texts from Plotinus’ monumental work (in the history of Greek philosophy) means that, as Rist argues, Augustine’s approach to the work was not that of a ‘scholar’, but that of a ‘determined seeker for the way to a good life based on truth’\textsuperscript{342}: I take ‘the way to a good life based on truth’ to mean a teleological conversion, for which Augustine was earnestly yearning as a result of reading the *Hortensius*. In addition, Augustine was, above all, a Christian. Despite his deviation from the Catholic Church, the name of Christ was still the only way to his spiritual ‘safety’ in the world believed to be infested with demons.\textsuperscript{343} The God/Truth of Augustine’s ‘residual’ faith\textsuperscript{344} – as Peter Brown puts it – prior to his baptism was basically the Christian God, regardless of how much he was to be influenced by Neoplatonism. Hence, Augustine read the *libri platoniciorum* in search for a way that he could deepen and enrich his understanding of Catholic theology and thereafter attain true happiness.

Augustine tells us in the *Confessions* that he found and learned four things from the *libri platoniciorum*. ‘Firstly, it was the evidence about God and his eternal Word (cf., 7.9.14), but not about the Incarnation of the latter. Secondly, he discovered that a man must return to himself (cf., 7.10.16); he must look within for God (or Wisdom/Truth), toward his own soul, rather than to the world “outside.” Thirdly, he learned that all things exist insofar as they derive their being from God (cf., 7.20.26).’\textsuperscript{345} Finally and


\textsuperscript{342} Rist, ‘Plotinus and Christian Philosophy’, 405.

\textsuperscript{343} Cf., Peter Brown, *Augustine of Hippo* (London: Faber and Faber, 1967), 41-42.

\textsuperscript{344} Cf., Brown, *Augustine of Hippo*, 41.

most importantly, the human soul and God/Truth are incorporeal (cf., 7.20.26). All these four are mutually interconnected and are pertinent to Augustinian interiority. Thus, based on Augustine’s summary of the lessons learned from the *libri Platonicorum*, I shall investigate the relevant parts of Plotinus’ ideas.

The starting point will be the last one of the four (i.e., the incorporeal nature of the soul and God). This is because the Neoplatonic concept of incorporeity helped Augustine to settle permanently the problem ‘What is the right way to think about God?’ Consequently, he abandoned Manichaean and Stoic materialism, and returned to the Catholic faith. Furthermore, the soul’s and God’s immateriality are the very foundation of God’s immanence, omnipresence, and transcendence, all of which are the key constituent concepts of Plotinian interiority.

Note that I shall refer whatever Plotinus holds to be ‘prior’ to the soul as ‘God’, that is, the One/God and Intellect/Nous: I shall explain briefly what the One and Intellect are. These concepts are the essential constituents of Plotinus’ famous doctrine of procession (or emanation), which he developed in answer to the traditional

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346 The main intellectual problem that Augustine faced during the years prior to, and immediately after, 386 was not the existence of God, but the nature of God as a spiritual being. Accordingly, Teske holds that ‘in reading *Confessions* III through VII, one can hardly miss the repeated recurrence of one theme, namely, Augustine’s complaint about his inability to conceive a spiritual substance’: see Ronald Teske, ‘The Aim of Augustine’s Proof That God Truly Is’, *International Philosophical Quarterly* 26 (1986), 254-255.

347 Cf., *Confessions* 3.7.12 & 7.10.16.

348 Rist argues that, ‘if Christianity is thought to be Neoplatonic, or to find Neoplatonism an essential explanatory tool, it must be Augustine – more than any other Fathers of the Church – who first saw it to be so, or made it so’: see Rist, ‘16 Plotinus and Christian Philosophy’, 404 & 408-409.

349 O’Meara argues that the term ‘hierarchy’ was coined in the 6th century A.D.: it is not a Plotinian term. ‘Prior (proteros)’ and ‘posterior (husteros)’ – rather than ‘superior’ and ‘inferior’ – are actually the language that Plotinus employed to describe how things of the world are relationally structured: see Dominic J. O’Meara, ‘3 The hierarchical ordering of reality in Plotinus’, in Lloyd P. Gerson (ed.), *The Cambridge Companion to Plotinus* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1996), 66-79.

350 Actually, ‘in Plotinus (as in all Greek thinkers) the word θεός (God or god) is of wider application than our word “god.”’ Furthermore, Plotinus distinguished between ‘the God (ὁ θεός)’ and ‘god (or God, θεός)’: the former signifies the One whereas the latter Intellect. For instance, he does not say that the One is ‘more than the God (ὁ θεός), but more than god/God (ὁ θεός)’: ‘when you think of him (i.e., the One) as Intellect or God, he is more’ (*Ennead* 6.9.6.12-15). (See Rist, J, ‘Theos and the One in Some Texts of Plotinus’, *Mediaeval Studies* 24 [1962], 169-180, especially 169-170.) Such a distinction does not exist in Augustine. Hence, it is safe to conclude that Augustine identified Plotinus’ One and Intellect with the Christian God.

351 In Plotinus the One (ἐν) and the Good (ἀγαθόν) are the twin names: see *Ennead* 2.9.1.

352 Gatti is critical about any ‘emanationist interpretation’ of Plotinus: see Maria Luisa Gatti, ‘1 Plotinus: The Platonic tradition and the foundation of Neoplatonism’, 31.
Plotinus, firstly, insisted that the One, which is ‘beyond being’, is the source of all beings. Secondly, the One ‘generates’ Intellect, which is identical with the world of Platonic Forms/Ideas and, so, is the principle that shapes the world ‘posterior’ to it: for instance, it makes material things beautiful, renders the soul ‘intellectual’, and is the source of our human values in the moral and aesthetic world below – in other words, ‘the source of our moral and aesthetic words and propositions’. Human intellect not only participates in, but also is itself, the divine Intellect: nondiscursively contemplates the One. Nonetheless, note that a large part of Plotinus’

353 Gatti, ‘1 Plotinus: The Platonic tradition and the foundation of Neoplatonism’, 28: also, ‘Plotinus has formulated another exceedingly difficult question that no one of the Greek philosophers had ever posed before: why does the One exist and why is it what it is?’
355 In fact, the One is the First Cause in two ways. It is the ‘causal origin of reality’ and the ‘universal object of desire’, that is, the ‘efficient cause’ and the ‘final cause’ (cf., John Bussanich, ‘2 Plotinus’s metaphysics of the One’, in Lloyd P. Gerson [ed.], The Cambridge Companion to Plotinus [Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1996], 45). The One is, therefore, ‘the source … of being and the why of being, giving both at once’ (Ennead 6.8.14.31-2): for instance, with respect to the soul, the One is ‘its (i.e., the soul’s) beginning and end (αρχη και τελος); its beginning because it comes from there, and its end, because its good is there. (ibid., 6.9.9.20-2)’
356 Cf., Enneads 3.8.9, 5.4.2, 5.5.1, 5.1.10, 5.9.7 & 6.9.5 (see below). Also, refer to Arthur H. Armstrong, ‘IV The Background of the Doctrine “That the Intelligibles are not Outside the Intellect”’, in Plotinian and Christian Studies (London: Variorum Reprints, 1979), 395: ‘it would be an inadequate and unsatisfactory description of this relation to say that for Plotinus the Ideas are the thoughts of Intellect. If we are to summarise his doctrine more or less in his own language and according to his own mind we must say rather “The Ideas are Intellect and Intellect is the Ideas” or “Real Being is Ideas and Intellect; they are one reality described from different points of view.”’ For further reference, see Cristina D’Ancona Costa, ‘15 Plotinus and later Platonic philosophers on the causality of the First Principle’, 370; Dominic J. O’Meara, Plotinus: an introduction to the Enneads (Oxford Clarendon Press, 1993), 42; Andrew Smith, Philosophy in late antiquity (London: Routledge, 2004), 14-17 (especially the section ‘Intellect itself’: ‘the objects of thought are not outside the intellect’ in page 15).
358 Cf., Ennead 5.8.3.
359 Cf., Ennead 2.9.1.
361 Ragnar Holte, ‘Faith and Interiority in S. Augustine’s Confessions’, Studia Ephemerides “Augustinianum” 32 (1990), 74: in Confessions 7, 9.13-15 ‘Augustine asserts that, according to Plotin, the human intellect is clearly separated from the divine intellect, the latter being the Light itself but the former only a witness to the Light (cf. John 1, 4-9). Augustine here overlooks the fact that, in Plotin, the human intellect participates in the divine intellect and in the world of ideas, letting human intellect, too, stand forth as more or less divine.’ The world of ideas is within the divine intellect: see Smith, Philosophy in late antiquity, 15 (‘the objects of thought are not outside the intellect’). As for the identification between individual intellect with the divine Intellect, see Smith, 31. Also, see Arthur Hilary Armstrong, ‘Part III Plotinus, Chapter 14: Man and Reality’, in Arthur H. Armstrong (ed.), The Cambridge History of Later Greek and Early Medieval Philosophy (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1967), 255: ‘at the highest level, where Soul is assimilated to Intellect’.
statements about Intellect still remain equivocal.\textsuperscript{362} Thirdly, Intellect ‘generates’ the soul, from which material things, such as the body, finally ‘emanate’.

Plotinus says, ‘he who has learnt to know himself will know from whence he comes’\textsuperscript{363}. In the wide sense it means that self-knowledge is the prerequisite for gaining knowledge of God, hence know thyself.\textsuperscript{364} This is to say that in Plotinus a proof of the soul’s incorporeity is simultaneously that of God’s: this, in turn, is the grounds for his insistence on God’s immanence.\textsuperscript{365} Therefore, I shall examine, in section (a), how Plotinus argued for the soul’s immateriality and, afterwards, in what sense God is immanent, (omnipresent,) and transcendent. In section (b), I shall investigate Plotinus’ theory of interiority.

\textbf{Key points}

Owing to his immaterial concept of God, how Plotinus perceived God’s immanence and omnipresence was completely different from the material pantheism of Stoicism.\textsuperscript{366} This is to say that Plotinus’ use of the ‘small word “in”’\textsuperscript{367} in relation to God’s immanence is basically ‘metaphorical’\textsuperscript{368} and, so, must be interpreted in terms of nature and knowledge. (God is not present \textit{in} any of His creation by occupying a space. Similarly, the soul is not located \textit{in} the body, as if one material thing is placed \textit{in} another.) In a nutshell, the word ‘in’ connotes that God and the soul share the same nature, and that the former is always knowable to the latter. As for God’s omnipresence, Plotinus approached it in terms of power. God’s generative power reaches out to all that

\textsuperscript{364} Cf., Ennead 4.3.1 & 6.7.41.
\textsuperscript{365} Cf., Hubler, ‘The Role of Aesthetics in Plotinus’, 199: ‘immaterial things are not separated by space as are bodies’. Also, see Ennead 5.9.7 (‘Intellect [i.e., God] is within, which is the actual primary realities’), 6.9.8.31-35, and Hubler, 199-201.
\textsuperscript{366} Cf., Robert B. Todd, ‘6 Monism and Immanence: The Foundations of Stoic Physics’, in John M. Rist (ed.) The Stoics, (London: University of California Press, 1978), 137 (\& 138); ‘Monism and immanence are the central ideas in Stoic physical theory. They are associated in any monistic system because the One must in some sense be present in all that is derived from and dependent on it. In Stoicism this recurrent metaphysis is expressed in materialistic terms with the One being a physical element Fire, and the sphere of its immanence the cosmos that evolves from it; Fire is immanent both by being the self-moving source of a cosmogony, and by a continued presence in the created cosmos.’
God has been generating; this is the very sense in which Plotinus maintains that the ‘posterior’ is literally in the ‘prior’. Thus, the body is in the generative power of the soul while the soul is in that of God. In addition to God’s immanence and omnipresence, Plotinus also argued for God’s transcendence, which is lacking in Stoicism, in terms of ‘(structural) simplicity’ and ‘(ontological) dependence’. A generator is structurally simpler than what it has been generating. (Immaterial things are, by nature, ‘simpler’ than material things.) Also, the existence of the posterior (i.e., the generated) depends on the omnipresent generative power of the prior (i.e., the generator), not vice versa. (The way that Augustine insists on God’s immanence and omnipresence is similar to Plotinus’. However, their perceptions of God’s transcendence were bound to be different from one another due to Augustine’s adherence to the creation doctrine of Christianity.)

By reason of God’s immanence and transcendence, Plotinus maintains that we must return to the source of our being by turning inwards to the soul (as opposed to outwards to material things), then upwards to the transcendent God in an attempt to deify (or divinize) ourselves:

life in that realm (i.e., Plato’s World of Ideas/Forms) is the active actuality of Intellect; and the active actuality generates gods in quiet contact with that Good (i.e., the One or the first Principle), and generates beauty, and generates righteousness, and generates virtue. It is these the soul conceives when filled with God (i.e., Intellect), and this is its beginning and end; its beginning because it comes from thence, and its end because its good is there. And when it comes to be there (i.e., Intellect) it becomes itself and what it was … The soul then in her natural state is in love with God and wants to be united with him. … (there is our true love, with whom also we can be united,) having a part in him and truly possessing him … we may embrace him with the whole of ourselves and have no part with which we do not touch God. There one can see both him and oneself as

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368 Cary, Augustine’s Invention of the Inner Self, 103. Also, see Ennead 5.9.7.
369 Cf., Ennead 5.5.9. Also, see O’Meara, Plotinus: An Introduction to the Enneads, 26-27 & Cary, Augustine’s Invention of the Inner Self, 29-30, 103.
370 Cf., Smith, Philosophy in late antiquity, 5 (‘turn our attention inwards and upwards’) & O’Meara, Plotinus, 103 (‘Plotinus often refers to the methods and problems involved in attaining union with the
it is right to see: the self glorified, full of intelligible light - but rather itself pure light - weightless, floating free, having become - but rather, being - a god.\textsuperscript{371}

Regarding the deification which was a common issue to many ancient thinkers,\textsuperscript{372} I have already explained in my Introduction that Augustine was more Porphyrian than Plotinian.\textsuperscript{373}

Note that, in this thesis, all texts cited from the \textit{Enneads} are of A. H. Armstrong’s translations, since, as Gerson argues, Armstrong’s are still the best.\textsuperscript{374}

\textbf{a) The incorporeity of the soul}

Plotinus advocates the Greek traditional aphorism ‘Know yourself’, insisting that ‘it gives us knowledge in both directions, of the things of which the soul is the principle and those from which it is derived.’\textsuperscript{375} Yet, ‘yourself’ should mean ‘your soul’: the most important thing that we must know about the soul is that, contrary to Stoicism, the soul is immaterial; for it is the foremost clue to knowledge of God.\textsuperscript{376} Plotinus’ arguments for the soul’s incorporeity rely on inferences and analogies. I shall introduce only two of them that resemble Augustine’s.

Plotinus, first of all (1), maintains that, if we presume the soul to be corporeal, then its act of perceiving a sensible object must be something like getting a seal-impression of a seal-ring imprinted in wax. Here, the basic premise taken for granted by Plotinus (as well as Augustine) is that sense-perception is the admittance of the ‘impression’ or ‘imprint’ of a corporeal object into the soul through the body.\textsuperscript{377} Consequently, if we

\begin{footnotesize}
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\item \textsuperscript{371} Ennead 6.9.9 (Armstrong’s translations).
\item \textsuperscript{372} Cf., O’Meara, \textit{Plotinus}, 102.
\item \textsuperscript{373} Cf., Georges Folliet, ‘\textit{Deificari in otio. Augustin, Epistula 10. 2’ in Recherches Augustiniennes} 2 (1962), 226.
\item \textsuperscript{374} Cf., Lloyd P. Gerson, ‘Introduction’, 8.
\item \textsuperscript{375} Ennead 4.3.1. Also, see Ibid., 3.4.3, 6.5.7, 6.7.35, 6.9.9; & Cary, \textit{Augustine’s Invention of the Inner Self}, 25.
\item \textsuperscript{376} Cf., Ennead 6.1.26.
\item \textsuperscript{377} Cf., Ennead 1.1.7 (& 4.7.6): ‘soul’\textquotesingle s power of sense-perception need not be perception of sense-objects, but rather it must be receptive of the impressions produced by sensation on the living being (i.e. the compound of the soul and the body’). Also, see \textit{De vera religione} 3.3 (‘impressae’), \textit{Confessiones} 10.8.15 & 10.14.22, and \textit{De Trinitate} 11.2.3 (‘imprimatur’).
\end{itemize}
\end{footnotesize}
consider the soul to be material, then we cannot explain how innumerable sense data are being stored in our memory. For instance, if the soul is fluid, then no sense perception will remain permanently imprinted in the memory because nothing can leave a lasting impression of itself in, for example, water. For those who think of the soul as something solid, it must above all be stressed that we can leave only one impression of an object on a solid matter either at a time or permanently. Accordingly, if the soul is corporeal, then it logically follows that we must be incapable of remembering more than one sensible object either for the rest of our lives, or until we encounter another object. However, as a matter of fact, our memory retains countless sense data. Therefore, the soul cannot be corporeal.\textsuperscript{378}

In \textit{De quantitate animae} Augustine, too, examines the nature of sense data in our memory in order to draw an inferential conclusion about the nature of the soul. However, his approach is not in terms of number, but size, in reference to the data. This is because Augustine has to deal with Evodius' insistence that the soul, though invisible to the corporeal eyes, is spatially extended and its size must be a bit larger than that of the body.\textsuperscript{379} Augustine maintains that, if Evodius' argument is assumed to be true, then sense data in our memory must also have dimensional properties and must be smaller than the soul, so that the data can be said to be contained in the soul. Then, determining the dimensions of the soul becomes problematic when we consider the size of a mental image of, for instance, the city of Milan. The image, like the city itself, must be immeasurably huge: the two must be of the same magnitude, since both of them are material by nature. In addition, in order for the image to be contained in the memory the soul has to be proportionately as big as the city. This is absurd.\textsuperscript{380} Therefore, we cannot presume that sense data in memory have dimensional properties.

\textsuperscript{378} Cf., \textit{Ennead} 4.7.6.
\textsuperscript{379} Cf., \textit{De quantitate animae} 5.7: 'Augustine. Is the soul inside the body only, like the contents of a bottle, so to say, or only on the outside, like a covering, or do you think it is both inside and outside? Evodius. I think it is both inside and outside. For, unless it were inside, there would be no life inside of us, and unless it were on the outside, it could not feel a slight prick on the skin. (\textit{Hoc sentio quod ultimum requisisti. Nam nisi esset in- trinsecus, nihil in visceribus nostris vitale habetur; nisi esset extrinsecus, non etiam in cute leviter possit sentire pungentem.}) Augustine. ... you see that it is as large as the spaces of the body allow.’ (This text echoes the Stoic Augustine’s mind.) Plotinus holds that ‘neither any of the parts of the soul nor the whole soul are in body as in a place.... It (i.e., the soul) is certainly not in the body as in a receptacle either.’ (\textit{Ennead} 4.3.20)
\textsuperscript{380} Cf., \textit{De quantitate animae} 5.9: ‘Why, then, since the soul is in so small a space as its body, can so great images be reflected in it, as cities, and the width of the earth, and any other immense object that can be imagined? I wish you to consider somewhat more carefully how great and how many objects our memory contains; all of these, of course, are contained in the soul. How great therefore, the depth, the
Note that both Plotinus’ and Augustine’s arguments are dictated by the same principle: the soul and what is in it (or the memory) must be of identical nature. Thus, if a sense datum is proved to be immaterial, then the soul itself must also be so, and vice versa:

how then will something which is a size think what is not a size and think what is partless with something which has parts? (Ennead 4.7.8)

if corporeal things are seen with the eyes of the body, in accordance with marvellous affinity of natures, should not the soul by which we see these incorporeal things be itself neither a body nor in any way like a body.\(^{381}\) (De quantitate animae 13.22)

The other (2) way that Plotinus demonstrates the soul’s incorporeity is through contrasting, as an analogy, the differences between quantity and quality\(^{382}\) and then elucidating their relation to bodily things from the perspective of ontology. Ultimately, the question is which one of quantity and quality is essential for the existence of material things. Hence, it goes without saying that Plotinus is here drawing an analogy between the soul and quality, and between the body and quantity.

Quantity, which refers to dimensional sizes,\(^{383}\) is a primary, essential entity of a material thing: thus no quantity, no body.\(^{384}\) On the other hand, quality is separable from and, so, is ‘acquired’ by, a corporeal thing.\(^{385}\) Furthermore, the presence of a quality in a material thing is utterly irrelevant to any quantitative change of that thing:

\(^{381}\) Cf., Ennead 4.7.8: ‘Atqui si corporea corporeis oculis mira quadam rerum cognatione cernuntur; oportet animum quo videmus illa incorporalia, corporeum corpusque non esse.’

\(^{382}\) Cf., Ennead 4.7.8: ‘They will agree that quality is different from quantity … how without being of a certain quantity could it be a body, if every body is of a certain quantity?’

\(^{383}\) Cf., Ennead 4.7.8:1.25.

\(^{384}\) Cf., Ennead 4.7.8: ‘how without being a certain quantity could it be a body, if every body is of a certain quantity?’

\(^{385}\) Cf., Ennead 4.7.8: ‘matter remains the same, being, as they say, a body, but does different things when it acquires qualities, what it (i.e., matter) acquires are immaterial and bodiless rational principles’.
if every body and every mass ceases to be what it was before when divided,\footnote{e.g., a gold ring is no longer a ring when it is broken into pieces.} but when a body is broken up the same quality remains complete in every piece, as for instance the sweetness of the honey is no less sweetness in every fragment, sweetness could not be a body, and the same is true of the other qualities.\footnote{\textit{Ennead} 4.7.8\textsuperscript{1}.}

Like quality, mental powers – such as thinking, perceiving, reasoning, desiring, and supervising –\footnote{Cf., \textit{Ennead} 4.7.8\textsuperscript{1}.} are also unaffected by any dimensional change of the body:

if the powers (i.e., of the soul) were bodies, it would be necessary for the strong powers to be large masses, and the ones which could do little, small masses. But if the powers of large masses are small, but even the smallest masses have great powers, action must be attributed to something other than size: to something sizeless, therefore;\footnote{\textit{Ennead} 4.7.8\textsuperscript{1}.}

Moreover, since quality and the powers pertain to a homogeneous group from the perspective of ontology, the latter are different from the body:

quality in being different from quantity is different from body.\footnote{\textit{Ennead} 4.7.8\textsuperscript{1}.}

Now, in order to explain the existence of the ‘bodiless’ mental powers observable from the body, we must postulate a ‘kind of being’, which is ‘sizeless’: that is the soul.\footnote{Cf., \textit{Ennead} 4.7.8\textsuperscript{1}.} In summary, the soul is ‘bodiless’ and ‘sizeless’, hence immaterial: in other words, it has no quantity, without which we cannot imagine the existence of a material thing.

Similarly, Augustine, too, makes a distinction between quality and quantity:

Aug. Tell me whether “greater” and “better” seem to you to be two distinct things or one and the same thing called by two different names.

Ev. I know that we say that one thing is greater and another is better.
Aug. Which of these two do you think connotes quantity?
Ev. That which we say is greater. 392

Next, Augustine mentions that the intellectual power of the soul is not proportionate to the size/quantity of the body:

The magnitude of a body is not without reason called its bulk, and, if bulk is to be reckoned of great value, then elephants would be wiser than we … a little bee knows more than an ass; certainly, to compare their size would be more than ridiculous. 393

Finally, since the soul lacks quantity, its mode of existence is not occupying space like the body:

focus your attention on the problem of whether the soul has a kind of quantity and local extension, if I may use such terms. Now, because it is not a body – otherwise it could not understand anything incorporeal, as the previous reasoning proved – it undoubtedly lacks space by which bodies are measured. 394

Having introduced how Plotinus argues for the immateriality of the soul, we need to question why Augustine thinks that the pagan concept ‘incorporeal’ is perfectly compatible with the Catholic theology of his time. 395 Fundamentally, Augustine holds that the Neoplatonic concept of incorporeity is synonymous with the Pauline word ‘invisible’: ‘For by him were all things created, that are in heaven, and that are in earth, visible and invisible’. 396 Therefore, not only the soul but also God, both of which are invisible, are by nature incorporeal (or spiritual):

392 De quantitate animae 16.27.
393 De quantitate animae 14.24; ‘tumor enim non absurde appellatur corporis magnitudo, quae si magnipendenda esset, plus nobis profecto elephanti saperent. … illud, quantum opinor, saltem concedet, plus asino sapere apiculam; quorum comparare magnitudines plus profecto est quam asinimum’.
394 De quantitate animae 14.23.
396 Colossians 1.16: ‘quoniam in ipso condita sunt universa in caelis et in terra, visibilia et invisibilia.’ Also, see Fortin, Christianism et Culture Philosophique au Cinquième Siècle , 49.
this world must be used, not enjoyed, so that the invisible things of God may be clearly seen, being understood by the things that are made, - that is, that by means of what is material and temporary we may lay hold upon that which is spiritual and eternal.\(^{397}\)

Notice that in Augustine’s vocabulary both ‘intelligible’ and ‘spiritual’ are synonymous with ‘incorporeal’: ‘intelligible’ is more frequently applied as an antonym of ‘sensible’\(^{398}\), whereas ‘spiritual’ as that of ‘carnal/corporeal’\(^{399}\).

Fortin, however, contests Augustine’s equation of ‘invisible’ with ‘incorporeal’ for the following two reasons. One is that the two terms are semantically different from one another: for instance, air is invisible but still material. The other is that the biblical usage of the word ‘soul’ is conspicuous materialistic.\(^{400}\) (Fortin makes another interesting point, that is, that Plato never insisted on the incorporeity of the soul, though in his time it was widely considered to be invisible: later generation Platonists maintained that the soul is immaterial.\(^{401}\))

i) God’s immanence

In Ennead 5.1.10 Plotinus says that God (i.e., the One and Intellect) and the universal Soul are ‘in’ the individual soul, which is ‘outside’ the realm of sense-perception:

there is the One beyond being … next in order there is Being and Intellect … the nature of Soul in the third place. … they are present also in ourselves. I do not mean in (ourselves as) beings of the sense-world - for these three are separate (from the things of sense) - but in [ourselves as] beings outside the realm of sense-perception; “outside” here is used in the same sense as those realities are also said to be “outside” the whole universe … Our soul then also is a divine

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\(^{397}\) De doctrina Christiana 1.4.4: ‘utendum est hoc mundo, non fruendum, ut invisibilia Dei, per ea quae facta sunt, intellecta conspiciantur, hoc est, ut de corporalibus temporalibusque rebus aeterna et spiritualia capiamus.’ Also, see De vera religione 25.47 & 29.52.

\(^{398}\) Cf., De ordine 2.19.51 & De vera religione 54.104 (‘visible’).


\(^{400}\) Cf., Fortin, Christianism et Culture Philosophique au Cinquième Siècle, 48-50. The primary meaning of the biblical term ‘spirit (πνεῦμα)’ is ‘air’ and that of ‘soul (ψυχή)’ is ‘breath’.

\(^{401}\) Cf., Fortin, 62-63.
thing and of a nature different (from the things of sense), like the universal nature of soul.

Here, Plotinus stresses that God is not in the soul in a material sense. Also, the soul cannot be said to be located in, or confined to, a physical space. Thus, Plotinus’ use of ‘in’ in reference to God’s immanence is intrinsically metaphorical. How, then, are we to understand the small words ‘in’? There are two ways. One is in terms of nature and the other in terms of knowledge: these two are inseparably interconnected.

Ontologically, Plotinus’ cosmology is not a dualism between the material realm and the immaterial realm; since material things are not independent of, but rather continuously being generated and sustained by, intelligent beings – in short, the latter is the life of the former. Yet, as the above excerpt from Ennead 5.1.10 speaks for itself, there is a sharp, essential distinction between the natures of the two realms (‘Our soul … is … of a nature different [from the things of sense]’). Consequently, ‘A is “outside” B’ means ‘A’s nature differs from B’s’, whereas ‘A is “in” B’ means ‘A and B have the same nature’. Therefore, the passage ‘they (i.e., the first three hypostases) are present … in [ourselves as] beings outside the realm of sense-perception’ means that God is, by nature, similar to the soul, but different from the body.

Note that for Plotinus understanding corporeal beings and incorporeal beings requires two distinct mindsets respectively. Hence, turning away from a material realm to an immaterial realm fundamentally means changing our mode of thinking.

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402 In Plotinism the One produces eternally: see Ennead 2.9.3: ‘Of necessity, then, all things must exist for ever in ordered dependence upon each other those other than the First have come into being in the sense that they are derived from other, higher, principles. Things that are said to have come into being did not just come into being [at a particular moment] but always were and always will be in process of becoming’.

403 Cf., Ennead 4.8.7: ‘this nature is twofold, partly intelligible and partly perceptible, it is better for the soul to be in the intelligible’.

404 Cf., Ennead 4.7.10: ‘the soul is not a body makes it clear that it is akin to the diviner and to the eternal nature.’ Cary, too, hold that in Plotinus ‘the metaphor of “inward”, and “outward” represents ontological similarity’: see Cary, Augustine’s Invention of the Inner Self: The Legacy of a Christian Platonist, 103.

405 Cf., O’Meara, Plotinus: An Introduction to the Enneads, 25-26: ‘As he suggests in VI 5. 2, we must try to think of immaterial being, not in terms of the categories that apply to bodies, but in terms of those relevant to its particular nature’. Also, see Ennead 4.3.24 quoted below.

406 Cf., Ennead 4.3.24: ‘those souls which are pure and do not in any way draw anything of body to them will necessarily also have no place anywhere in body. If then they are nowhere in body - for they have no body - a soul of this kind will be where substance and reality and the divine are - that is in god - there it will be with them and in him. But if you are still looking for the place where the soul is, you must look for
Plotinus calls this ‘purification’ and it constitutes a basic part of his theory concerning teleology/interiority.\footnote{O’Meara summarizes Plotinus’ argument for why we need purification as follows; ‘an understanding of the human condition as Plotinus sees it: deriving from divine intellect, we are souls whose nature it is, as expressions of the One, to organize and perfect material existence. Our love of the One (the Good), from which everything of value comes, may however be overlaid by infatuation with our works, with material things, which causes us to forget ourselves, to become ignorant, evil, and unhappy. Release from vice and misery comes by turning our attention back to the One and reaching it as far as possible.’ (O’Meara, Plotinus, 100.) Also, see Ennead 4.7.10.}

Epistemologically, God’s immanence ‘in’ the soul means that the former is always knowable to the latter: for Plotinus that is the logically inevitable conclusion from the premise that God and the soul share the same nature. Here, we need to understand the intelligibility of Intellect and the One separately.

Intellect is the ‘cause’ (or the source) of our knowledge of, for example, virtue. Simultaneously, the former is identical with the true, eternal knowledge of virtue, which is in other words the Platonic Form/Idea (of virtue).\footnote{Cf., Enneads 3.8.9, 5.4.2, 5.5.1, 5.1.10, 5.9.7 & 6.9.5. Also, refer to Armstrong, ‘IV The Background of the Doctrine “That the Intelligibles are not Outside the Intellect”’, 395.} Now, Plotinus, on the one hand, says that the upper part of the soul (i.e., individual intellect)\footnote{Cf., Rist, ‘Back to the Mysticism of Plotinus: Some More Specifics’, 183 & 195.} always remains in Intellect, while the lower part is involved in the world of sense perception:

our soul does not altogether come down, but there is always something of it in the intelligible.\footnote{Cf., Ennead 4.8.8 quoted in Henry J. Blumenthal, ‘4 On soul and intellect’, in Lloyd P. Gerson (ed.), The Cambridge Companion to Plotinus (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1996), 92. Also, see Bussanich, ‘2 Plotinus’s metaphysics of the One’, 56; O’Meara, Plotinus, 102; Cary, Augustine’s Invention of the Inner Self, 25 & Enneads 4.8.7, 2.9.2.}

On the other hand, he also says that the true knowledge is in the soul:

an understanding of the soul … that it (i.e., the soul) derives from Intellect, and that it (i.e., the soul) is by sharing in the rational principle which comes from it (i.e., Intellect) that it (i.e., the soul) possesses virtue; after this they must grasp that there is an Intellect other than that which is called reasoning and reckoning,
… and that our bodies of knowledge are rational principles in the soul and of a kind which have already become manifest there because Intellect the cause of knowledges has become present in the soul.

From these Plotinus concludes that the (higher part of) the soul can obtain the eternal knowledge of virtue directly, not through our corporeal senses:

it is certainly not by running around outside that the soul “sees self-control and justice”, but itself by itself in its understanding of itself and what it formerly was, seeing them standing in itself like splendid statues all rusted with time which it has cleaned.

Note that, whenever Plotinus says that an object is cognitively ‘outside’ the soul, he means that that object is knowable only through bodily senses.

The One is ‘beyond being’. Its epistemological significance is that the One transcends ‘the highest type of thought’ and, thus, is intrinsically ‘ineffable’.

Nonetheless, Plotinus claims that we can still have at least a glimpse of the ineffable One by means of ‘intellection’ and discursive thinking. (Of the two cognitive methods, the former is superior to the latter.) Schroeder maintains that ‘in saying that

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411 The ‘rational principles’ is ‘Platonic Forms’: see Smith, Philosophy in late antiquity, 28.
412 Ennead 6.9.5.
413 Ennead 4.7.10. Also, see Ibid., 4.7.8, 5.5.1 & 5.1.10 (‘this reasoning part of the soul, which needs no bodily instrument for its reasoning’).
414 Cf., Ennead 5.5.1 & 5.1.10.
415 Ennead 5.1.10. Also, see Ibid., 5.2.1.5-7.
417 Schroeder, ‘14 Plotinus and language’, 336: ‘Plotinus’s highest metaphysical principle, the One or Good, is ineffable (V 3.13.1; cf. V.3.14.1-8; V 5.6.11-13; VI.9.5.31-2).’
418 Schroeder, 336: see above. ‘Intellection’ is an ‘immediate, intuitive, and comprehensive understanding’: see Bussanich, ‘2 Plotinus’s metaphysics of the One’, 39.
419 Bussanich, 39: ‘the One transcends … the highest type of thought (cf. VI.9.4.1-16). Discussions about the first principle, therefore, usually stress the limits of reasoning and insist on transcending analysis and conceptualization. … He (i.e., Plotinus) is convinced that discursive thinking is a weakened form of thought, which is inferior to and relies on intellection (noësis), the immediate, intuitive, and comprehensive understanding … Since even pure visionary thinking cannot grasp the One, far more limited is the derivative faculty of discursive rationality (dianoia), which utilizes reified conceptual objects for analysis and reasons successively, that is, inferentially (V3.2-3, 7-9).’ Note O’Meara’s argument concerning how we are to understand the ‘non-discursive’ way of knowing: ‘One might be tempted to compare the higher ‘non-discursive’ way of knowing that Plotinus has in mind with modern concepts of intuitive, artistic, or poetic understanding, as opposed to scientific or logical thought. This comparison could be misleading. Plotinus is not speaking of a form of knowing that is an alternative, possibly a corrective, to science and logic. Rather it represents the goal of science and logic. In his view,
the One is ineffable, Plotinus has already made a statement, albeit negative, about the One. So at least this negative statement is permissible. … Plotinus uses negation to avoid confusion of an incorporeal reality accessible only to the mind or spirit with a corporeal reality perceived by our senses.420

In summary, Plotinus’ use of ‘in’ with respect to God’s immanence is fundamentally metaphorical, implying that God is similar to the soul in terms of nature and, so, is knowable to the soul without any need of corporeal senses. Similarly, when Augustine says that God is in the soul, he means that God is an intelligible reality like the soul and, so, is approachable directly by our mind:

Those things that are comprehended by the intellect, however, are comprehended as existing nowhere else but in the comprehending mind itself and, at the same time, as not contained in space.421

ii) God’s transcendence

Plotinus perceives God’s transcendence in terms of dependence and simplicity: these two are also his criteria for determining how reality is organized.

In Plotinus reality is a structure of – in O’Meara’s language – ‘nonreciprocal dependence’: ‘A (the posterior) depends on B (the prior) – or cannot be without B (the prior) – in such a way that B does not depend on A.’422 Thus, the prior intrinsically, discursive thinking is, for us, the means to an end, complete knowledge, and not the end itself, which is a possession of truth such that it is free of the troublesome, fallible methods which we must use to reach it. And this truth is found in the unity constituted by divine intellect and its objects of thought, the Forms’ (O’Meara, Plotinus, 43). Also, see Bussanich, ‘2 Plotinus’s metaphysics of the One’, 56 ['The noetic life lived by the soul is both intellectual (I.3.4.10-17) and visionary (V.8.4.5-9, 12.3-7; VI.7.12.22-30).'] & John Rist, ‘Back to the Mysticism of Plotinus: Some More Specifics’, 191.

O’Meara, ‘14 Plotinus and language’, 336. Regarding Plotinus’ negative theology, see Bussanich, ‘2 Plotinus’s metaphysics of the One’, 40-41: ‘Learning about the One has positive and negative aspects. … the negative way to the One is often thought to be superior. Language cannot specify what the One is, only what it is not (V.3.14.6-7). Even the designations One and Good are deficient signs of the One’s reality (II.9.1.1-8, V.5.6.26-30, VI.7.38.4-9, VI.9.5.29-34). …’

De immortalitate animae 6.10. Similarly, ‘Do not go abroad. Return within yourself. In the inward man dwells truth’ (De vera religione 39.72) & ‘no one can reach truth who looks for it outside the mind’ (De vera religione 49.94).

O’Meara, ‘3 The hierarchical ordering of reality in Plotinus’, 69. O’Meara explains more as follows: ‘the posterior depends on the prior, being constituted by the prior, incapable of existing “without” the prior which can exist without it. The prior is thus part of, or in, the posterior (as constitutive of it), just as
ontologically transcends the posterior. Similarly, Augustine maintains the same ‘nonreciprocal dependence’ between God and His creation:

For the one who supremely and primordially is is one who is absolutely immutable and who can say in the fullest possible sense, “I am who am” and “You will say, the one who is has sent me to you.” Hence, other things that exist, but could not exist if they were not from him, are good to the extent that they receive their being.\[423\]

The Plotinian term ‘simple (απλος)’ is crucial for understanding why the prior is transcendent to the posterior. To put in a nutshell, what generates is simpler than what is generated.\[424\] In other words, the posterior is more ‘multiple’\[425\] or ‘composite’\[426\] than the prior.

We can also find the language of ‘simple (simplex)’\[427\] in Augustine. However, his use of the word is far narrower than Plotinus’. Any equivalent to the One’s simplicity cannot be found in Augustine.\[428\] The only similarity that I can observe is their use of the term in conjunction with spatiality, divisibility, and perishability. For example, Plotinus maintains that dimensionality intrinsically connotes divisibility and perishability:

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\[423\] De doctrina christiana 1.32.35. Also, see De vera religione 14.28 & Confessiones 11.4.6.
\[424\] Cf., Ennead 3.8.9 & 5.6.3.10-15. Also, see Bussanich, ‘2 Plotinus’s metaphysics of the One’, 50-51.
\[425\] Ennead 3.8.9.
\[426\] Ennead 5.4.2.
\[427\] De quantitate animae 1.2.
\[428\] For the One’s simplicity, see Bussanich, ‘2 Plotinus’s metaphysics of the One’, 42-47. Also, see Ennead 2.9.1, 5.3.13 & 6.8.12.
since they have size, because they are bodies, they can be divided and broken up into little pieces and so undergo destruction also in this way.\textsuperscript{429}

the soul is a single and \textit{simple} nature which has actual existence in its living; it cannot, then, be destroyed in this way. \ldots the soul, as has been demonstrated, is not a mass or a quantity.\textsuperscript{430}

Augustine agrees:

wherever a line (i.e., a geometric intelligible line) can be cut, it is cut through a point\textsuperscript{431} (In geometry the line is constituted by innumerable points, which cannot be divided. Thus, Augustine is here arguing that the indestructible point is simpler than, and so more superior to, the destructible line),

Observe, now, whether the sound of a word can be split up into letters, while its soul, that is, its meaning, allows no division, since it is exactly the very thing which you said a little while ago appears to have neither width nor length in our thought.\textsuperscript{432}

it (i.e., the soul) seems to be something simple.\textsuperscript{433}

In summary, the simplicity of the soul in terms of extension connotes the lack of a geometrical shape. Therefore, for both Plotinus and Augustine the soul is immortal, due to its indivisibility (even in an immaterial sense), and transcends the perishable body.\textsuperscript{434}

Although God and the soul share the same immortal nature, both Plotinus and Augustine insist that the soul is mutable whereas God is immutable. However, in

\textsuperscript{429} \textit{Ennead} 4.7.1 & 4.7.6 (‘a size is naturally capable of division to infinity’).
\textsuperscript{430} \textit{Ennead} 4.7.12 & 3.6.1 (‘if it is a substance without magnitude and must necessarily possess incorruptibility’).
\textsuperscript{431} \textit{De quantitate animae} 12.19.
\textsuperscript{432} \textit{De quantitate animae} 32.66.
\textsuperscript{433} \textit{De quantitate animae} 1.2.
\textsuperscript{434} Cf., \textit{De quantitate animae} 1.2, 2.3 & \textit{Ennead} 4.7.10.
Plotinus only the lower part of the soul is changeable.\textsuperscript{435} On the other hand, in Augustine the entire soul is mutable with respect to time, but not with respect to space. For instance, over a period of times, our reason’s ‘soundness (sanus)’ can either get better or deteriorate,\textsuperscript{436} our ability to judge art works can be sharpened,\textsuperscript{437} and our emotions fluctuate.\textsuperscript{438} Yet, these changes are utterly irrelevant to our geographical movements: in other words, reason’s soundness/sharpness and emotion are not affected by any change in the body.

b) Plotinus’ theory of interiority

Greek teleology concerns attaining true happiness (eudaimonia) in an ethical sense through knowing God and the self.\textsuperscript{439} knowledge of God and the self helps us to discover which power of ours is divine, so that we can cultivate it fully, while eradicating all other powers.\textsuperscript{440} Since the soul is an important ‘clue’ to knowledge of God,\textsuperscript{441} pursuing self-knowledge must be the starting point of our teleological project. Accordingly, Plotinus’ system begins with the search for self-knowledge.\textsuperscript{442}

For Plotinus the human person consists of the body and the immaterial ‘inner man’\textsuperscript{443}, which ‘encompasses’ the soul, Intellect, and the One.\textsuperscript{444} The soul has many ‘power (δύναμες)’\textsuperscript{445}, such as sense-perception, memory, and ‘discursive reason’.\textsuperscript{446}

\textsuperscript{435} Cf., \textit{Enneads} 4.8.7, 5.1.10 & 6.9.7.
\textsuperscript{436} Cf., \textit{Soliloquies} 1.6.12.
\textsuperscript{437} Cf., \textit{De vera religione} 30.54: Augustine maintains that judging pertains to reason alone.
\textsuperscript{438} Cf., \textit{De vera religione} 10.18.
\textsuperscript{439} See chapter (1) ‘The \textit{Hortensius}’.
\textsuperscript{440} Cf., Ragnar Holte, \textit{Béatitude et Sagesse} (Paris: Études Augustiniennes, 1962), 14-15: ‘L’ \zetaοδημονεα est l’état de l’homme où l’élément divin n’est ni affaibli ni étouffé, mais se trouve au contraire actualisé avec son maximum de plénitude et de force, les autres puissances vitales étant soit déracinées soit soumises à sa direction.’
\textsuperscript{441} Cf., Cary, \textit{Augustine’s Invention of the Inner Self}, 83: ‘Cicero is telling Augustine, all draw the soul away from the body and the senses. What is more, they all take the soul as a clue to the nature of God, for “there is in the human soul something divine.” The piety of these philosophers is thus obedience to the divine command, “Know Thyself,” which both Cicero and Plotinus interpret to mean “know thy soul.”’
\textsuperscript{442} Cf., Smith, \textit{Philosophy in late antiquity}, 5.
\textsuperscript{443} This is the term that Plotinus borrowed from Plato. See Smith, \textit{Philosophy in late antiquity}, 7: here, Smith refers to \textit{Enneads} 5.1.10 & 1.1.10.15, and Plato, \textit{Republic} IX 589A.
\textsuperscript{444} Cf., Smith, \textit{Philosophy in late antiquity}, 7.
\textsuperscript{445} \textit{Ennead} 1.1.7.
\textsuperscript{446} Cf., Smith, \textit{Philosophy in late antiquity}, 7: note that memory and reason can operate ‘not only through, but also independently of’, the body.
(For Augustine too the soul has ‘power [vis or potential]’\textsuperscript{447}. Among many powers of the soul, ‘(discursive) reason’ is the agent (or ‘the principal part of the soul’\textsuperscript{448}) that determines our fate. In other words, our teleological state depends on our reason’s orientation.

Reason operates in between sense-perception\textsuperscript{449} and intellect.\textsuperscript{450} Due to its middle position, reason gains ‘information’ through the two powers, which always operate jointly: for instance, ‘if we make the judgement that Socrates is good, we see Socrates with our eyes and note his behaviour, but make the particular judgement that he is good by appealing to our knowledge of the Good in itself, the absolute standard:

if it (i.e., reason) says whether he is good, its remark originates in what it knows through sense-perception, but what it says about this it has already from itself, since it has a norm of the good in itself.\textsuperscript{451}

Our knowledge of the “good in itself” comes from our intellect to our discursive reason, where it can be deployed to interpret the sense-perception.\textsuperscript{452}

Human intellect not only participates in, but also is itself, the divine Intellect, which is identical with the world of Platonic Forms/Ideas.\textsuperscript{453} This is to say that the ‘divine’\textsuperscript{454}, transcendent Intellect is ‘ours’\textsuperscript{455}: it is not something other than the self. Regarding our ownership of intellect/Intellect, Smith remarks that in Plotinus intellect is ‘the core of

\textsuperscript{447} Cf., \textit{De quantitate animae} 32.69 & 35.79 (‘our inquiry concerns itself with the power of the soul, and conceivably the soul can put all these things into action simultaneously … let us, following the ascending order, call the first act vitalization; the second, sensation; the third, art; the fourth, virtue; the fifth, tranquillity; the sixth, initiation; the seventh, contemplation.’). Also, \textit{De ordine} 2.2.6.

\textsuperscript{448} \textit{Enneads} 5.3.3.38-40 quoted in Smith, \textit{Philosophy in late antiquity}, 12.

\textsuperscript{449} Plotinus makes a distinction between ‘sensation and perception’: see Smith, \textit{Philosophy in late antiquity}, 8. Also, see Armstrong, ‘Part III Plotinus, Chapter 14: Man and Reality’, 258

\textsuperscript{450} Cf., Smith, \textit{Philosophy in late antiquity}, 12.

\textsuperscript{451} \textit{Enneads} 5.3.3.6-9 quoted in Smith, 8.

\textsuperscript{452} Smith, 9-10. Also, see Armstrong, ‘Part III Plotinus, Chapter 14: Man and Reality’, 257-258: ‘how souls know this material world … Our higher knowledge, the knowledge of the Forms in intellect, owes nothing to the body or its senses: it comes to soul directly “from within”, by virtue of its contact and kinship with intellect. … it is this higher knowledge which provides our discursive reason with the principles which it should use in making judgements on our sense-experience and regulating our life in the body.’

\textsuperscript{453} Cf., \textit{Enneads} 3.8.9, 5.4.2, 5.5.1, 5.1.10, 5.9.7 & 6.9.5. Also, refer to Armstrong, ‘IV The Background of the Doctrine “That the Intelligibles are not Outside the Intellect”’, 395

\textsuperscript{454} Cf., Holte, ‘Faith and Interiority in S. Augustine’s Confessions’, 74.

\textsuperscript{455} Cf., Smith, \textit{Philosophy in late antiquity}, 12.
our real self’, which ‘transcends our empirical self (i.e., reason’). Similarly, Blumenthal formulates the Plotinian structure of the human person as ‘soul\(^1\) + soul\(^2\) + matter’, by which he means ‘(discursive) reason + intellect + body’. (In Augustine the individual is simply soul + matter.) Therefore, Plotinus insists that our ‘empirical self’ must turn away from the sense world and must become the ‘real self’ – in other words, must become united to the universal Intellect.

Hereafter, ‘with our intellect we must rise in self-transcendence to union with the One’, thus deification. Regarding the union with the One, Rist argues that, even though Plotinus claimed that ‘we can “become” the One’, he never actually said, ‘I am the One’. Thus, Plotinus’ claim would be that ‘we become the One, but we are not the One. And the best interpretation of that idea is that “become” means “become more one-like” in the sense that although we cannot distinguish ourselves or even be distinguished from the One at that time (or better in that mode of being), we are not the One.

Note that at the level of (discursive) reason our self-knowledge is knowledge of our own individual self ‘as other’. At the level of intellect the knower and the known become identical, yet there still exists a duality between the self as the agent of cognition and the self as the object of cognition: thus, our self-knowledge is ‘an image knowledge’ of the self – not oneself. When our intellect rises to the level of the One, there is no duality between the knower and the known and, so, we gain true self-

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458 Cf., De quantitate animae 1.2.
459 Transcending our ‘empirical self’ is making not only intellectual, but also ethical, advancement: ‘when man is living at his highest level, his right action springs spontaneously from his higher self’s unbroken contemplation’ (Armstrong, ‘Part III Plotinus, Chapter 14: Man and Reality’, 253).
460 Armstrong, 250. Intellect’s ‘self-transcendence’ means ‘leaving itself behind’. But ‘for Plotinus there is no way of passing beyond intellect other than through intellect’ (ibid., 239). Note that ‘Platon, en effet, pense que la distance entre Dieu et l’homme est insurmontable aussi en cette vie, nul ne doit s’appeler « sage » (σοφός) mais seulement « ami de la sagesse » (φιλόσοφος). L’union mystique avec la divinité qu’on trouve chez Plotin, est un trait totalement inconnu de Platon, encore que Plotin ne s’avance jamais jusqu’à affirmer une identité métaphysique’: Holte, Béatitude et Sagesse, 49.
462 Cf., Rist, 187-188.
463 Cf., Smith, Philosophy in late antiquity, 12.
knowledge;\textsuperscript{464} though, as explained above, there still remains otherness between them.\textsuperscript{465}

Now, if one asks why the majority of us are not aware of the existence of our own intellect – let alone, what it does - Plotinus answers that we are conditioned to direct ‘our attention either outwards towards sense-perception or inwards towards our intellect. But the needs of the body and the affairs of everyday life attract us only towards an outward deployment of our attention’\textsuperscript{466}, while making us forget who/what we truly are. Thus, he insists that liberating ourselves from the world of sense-perception (i.e., an ethical transformation or ‘purification’\textsuperscript{467}) is essential for our awareness of the higher ‘aspects’ of our nature:\textsuperscript{468}

the soul must let go of all outward things and turn altogether to what is within, and not be inclined to any outward thing, but ignoring all things (as it did formerly in sense-perception, but then in the realm of Forms), and even ignoring itself, come to be in contemplation of that One.\textsuperscript{469}

In summary, Plotinian interiority concerns turning the ‘attention’ of our reason away from sense perception ‘inwards’ to the ‘real self’, and then ‘upwards’ to the One through intellect.\textsuperscript{470}
II. Early works

To summarise Plotinian interiority explained in the previous chapter, ‘we (i.e., discursive reason)’ must turn towards ‘our’ intellect and simultaneously become united to universal Intellect/Nous, thus ‘inward’: since individual intellect is identical with universal intellect, turning to the former is same as turning to the latter. Next, we must strive for union with the One, hence ‘upward’. Individual intellect, universal intellect, and the One transcend (discursive) reason and, so, both the inward turn and the upward turn are in fact the movements of transcending ourselves. What, then, makes the two stages of interiority distinct from each other? Their differences lie in their objectives. The inward movement is restoring our ‘real self’, whereas the upward movement is becoming something other than ourselves (i.e., becoming like the One in Rist’s terms).

Augustine’s interiority is modelled on the basic framework of Plotinus’: that is, we must turn away from material things into the soul and, then, upwards to God, so that we can become like God.

the soul should not pour itself out in the senses beyond the measure of necessity, but rather should recall itself from the senses and become a child of God again, (that is, be made a new man by putting of the old) (‘doubtlessly, becoming a child of God’ is an upward turn to the transcendent God).

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471 Since it is “we” who perceive, he (i.e., Plotinus) locates the “we” or self at the level of discursive reason: Andrew Smith, *Philosophy in late antiquity* (London: Routledge, 2004), 7.
475 Cf., Smith, 12-13
476 Cf., Ennead VI.9.9.24-7: ‘The soul’s innate love (erôs emphutos) makes clear that the Good is there... For since the soul is other than God (i.e., the One) but comes from him it is necessarily in love with him’ quoted in John Bussanich, ‘2 Plotinus’s metaphysics of the One’, in Lloyd P. Gerson (ed.), *The Cambridge Companion to Plotinus* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1996), 55.
477 De Trinitate 9.11.16: ‘We are like God insasmuch as we know Him’.
478 De quantitate animae 28.55: ‘anima, ne se ultra quam necessitas cogit, refundat in sensus; sed ab his potius ad seipsam colligat, et repuerascat Deo’
479 See the Introduction.
Do not go abroad. Return within yourself. In the inward man dwells truth\(^{480}\),

But you were more inward than my inward part and higher than the highest element within me.\(^{481}\)

Despite some similarities between Augustine and Plotinus, there are also differences between them. For instance, although Augustine, like Plotinus, insisted that reason (i.e., ‘mind’s eye’\(^{482}\)) is the agent of interiority,\(^{483}\) Augustine did not maintain that the soul has another power superior to reason, such as the Plotinian intellect/Intellect. (In Augustine the individual consists of the soul and the body;\(^{484}\) not reason, intellect, and matter/body as in Plotinus.\(^{485}\)) Also, although Augustine’s concept of God resembles the second Hypostasis in Plotinus’ system (e.g., God is the ‘Father of Intelligible Light’\(^{486}\) that makes our reason’s cognitive activities possible),\(^{487}\) Augustine’s God is also the Creator of the soul:

God, its (i.e., the soul’s) Creator, is, so to speak, the soul’s proper habitation and its home\(^{488}\).

Eventually, Augustine insisted that we must, first of all, turn inwards and see – with the ‘mind’s eye’ – not only the soul’s incorporeal and rational nature, but also its created nature. Secondly, turning upwards, we are to understand not only God’s immateriality, immanence, omnipresence and transcendence in a Neoplatonic sense, but also God’s Creatorship. Thirdly, we must also endeavour to understand revealed truths about God by means of faith, love, and hope. Finally, since we – as helpless creatures –

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\(^{480}\) *De vera religione* 39.72: ‘Noli foras ire, in teipsum redi; in interiore homine habitat veritas’.

\(^{481}\) *Confessio* 3.6.11: ‘Tu autem eras interior intimo meo et superior summno meo.’

\(^{482}\) *De ordine* 2.4.11 (‘mentis oculos’) & 2.2.7.

\(^{483}\) See sections (a) ‘Why reason’ and (b) ‘Reason’s journey to God’ in chapter (2) ‘Return to reason in order to ascend to God’ of Part II.

\(^{484}\) Cf., *De quantitate animae* 1.2.


\(^{486}\) *Soliloquia* 1.1.2-3.

\(^{487}\) Regarding Augustine’s theory of divine illumination, see section (b) ‘Reason’s journey to God’ in chapter (2).

\(^{488}\) *De quantitate animae* 1.2: ‘Propriam quamdam habitationem animae ac patriam Deum ipsum credo esse a quo creatae est.’
depend on the Creator God in all respects, divine grace is indispensable for our ascent to God.

In chapter 1, I shall investigate Augustine’s view of reality, for it is precisely what makes his interiority distinct from Plotinus’. For Augustine reality is hierarchically structured and God is at the apex. The hierarchy\(^{489}\) is based on comparisons between God and His creation from various perspectives.\(^{490}\) What, then, are the perspectives? In other words, what are the criteria, according to which Augustine constructed a hierarchy of being? This question will help us understand his way of thinking about God – especially God’s transcendence –, and so I shall examine the criteria/perspective in section (a) of chapter 1.

Note that, as explained in the Introduction, Augustine’s pursuit of knowledge of God was fundamentally a search for pairs of correlative terms, with which he can make a correct distinction between God and His creation. For instance, before reading the ‘libri platonicorum’, Augustine saw reality in terms of ‘changeable’-or-‘unchangeable’:\(^{491}\) the immutable God is superior to (or ‘better’\(^{492}\) than) mutable beings. From Neoplatonism Augustine learned the terms ‘material’ and ‘immaterial’: the soul and God are immaterial whereas the body is material. As a Christian, Augustine made a distinction between ‘Creator’ and ‘creature’. Eventually, the foregone conclusion is that God is the immutable, immaterial, rational Creator; whereas His creation lacks at least one of those qualities (e.g., the soul is immaterial and rational, but neither immutable nor the Creator). Therefore, investigating the criteria of Augustine’s hierarchy is the same thing as finding out which pairs of correlative terms are theologically acceptable.

Augustine’s finalised view of reality, the result of his intellectual transformation, became the guideline for his moral transformation: the Confessions tell us that the


\(^{490}\) Cf., De vera religione 52.101: ‘the invisible things of God from the creation of the world are clearly seen, being understood by the things that are made, even his eternal power and Godhead (Rom. 1:20).’

\(^{491}\) Cf., Confessiones 7.1.1.

\(^{492}\) ‘potius’ (De vera religione 48.93) or ‘melius’ (Confessiones 7.1.1).
conversion of his mind\textsuperscript{493} occurred prior to that of his heart\textsuperscript{494}. Thus, from the perspective of ethics Augustine’s ‘hierarchy of being’\textsuperscript{495} is a ‘hierarchy of value’\textsuperscript{496} in terms of ‘better’ and ‘love’. Accordingly, Augustine says in \textit{De vera religione} 48.93,

(He who delights to rule should submissively cleave to God, the sole ruler of all things, loving God more than himself. This is perfect justice, to) love the better things more and the lesser things less.\textsuperscript{497}

Since God is at the apex of the hierarchy and so is ‘better (\textit{potius})’ than anything else, we are to ‘love (\textit{diligere})’ God more than His creation.

Although the \textit{nature} and the \textit{value} of the soul are, from the perspective of ontology, permanently superior to those of the body, but inferior to those of God;\textsuperscript{498} the teleological\textsuperscript{499} state of the soul – in other words, how ‘wise (\textit{sapiens})’ and ‘happy (\textit{beatus})’ we are – is changeable.\textsuperscript{500} In other words, our reason and will can either move closer to, or away from, God and the ‘happy life (\textit{beata vita})’\textsuperscript{501}: we can become either wise and happy through gaining knowledge of God, or foolish and unhappy through forgetting Him. Augustine describes such dynamism of the soul \textit{chiefly} in terms of the ‘image (\textit{imago})’\textsuperscript{502} of God and ‘rationality’\textsuperscript{503}. Therefore, in section (b) of chapter 1, I shall examine what Augustine means by ‘image (of God)’ and ‘rationality’, and how he associates them with the soul’s dynamism in reference to the hierarchy: here, I shall be arguing that the concepts of deification, ‘image of God’, and ‘rationality’ are mutually interconnected. I shall also investigate his theory of assessing how far one has advanced to (or moved away from) God.

\textsuperscript{493} Cf., \textit{Confessiones} 7.18.24.
\textsuperscript{494} Cf., \textit{Confessiones} 8.12.30.
\textsuperscript{495} Cary, ‘Book Seven: Inner Vision as the Goal of Augustine’s Life’, 111.
\textsuperscript{496} Cary, 117.
\textsuperscript{497} ‘… haec est perfecta iustitia, qua potius potiora, et minus minora diligimus.’
\textsuperscript{498} See chapter 1 ‘The \textit{Hortensius}’ in Part I.
\textsuperscript{499} Cf., \textit{De quantitate animae} 34.78: ‘Still, sin does not make the human soul so inferior that the soul of a brute animal is to be preferred to it or even compared with it.’
\textsuperscript{500} Cf., \textit{De beata vita} 4.35.
\textsuperscript{501} Cf., \textit{De beata vita} 4.35.
\textsuperscript{502} \textit{Soliloquia} 1.1.4 (‘O God, who hast made man to Thine image and likeness’), \textit{De quantitate animae} 2.3 (‘the soul is like to God’) & \textit{De vera religione} 45.85.
\textsuperscript{503} \textit{Soliloquia} 1.1.5: ‘Banish from me my irrationality, so that I may know Thee (Expelle a me insaniam, ut recognoscam te)’. 
In chapter 2, I shall investigate Augustine’s methodology of improving our rationality (alternatively, restoring the image of God, or getting ourselves deified) through reason, the will, faith, hope, and the grace of God.

In section (a) of chapter 2, I shall explain why reason, not the will, is the agent of Augustinian interiority, though both of them are the determinants of one’s ‘level (gradus)’ of rationality (or how much one has restored the image of God).

In section (b) of chapter 2, I shall examine Augustine’s theory concerning how reason can ascend to God and there are two major issues in this respect.

To begin with, we cannot search for what we do not know (1). Thus, reason is not independent of memory\(^505\) (and divine illumination\(^506\)) and ‘reason’s search (rationis inquisitio)’\(^507\) for knowledge of God is actually a process of recalling what we have already known about God:\(^508\) in short, knowing God is remembering God. This is a legacy of the Platonic theory of reminiscence, and in order to justify such a theory of his Plato had postulated the pre-existence of the soul, with which Augustine was also familiar.\(^509\) Now, the pre-existence of the soul is in conflict with the creation doctrine, whereas the theory of reminiscence is not. Therefore, Augustine encountered a difficult problem here. Since the soul is merely a creature, we can only ‘discover’ (or ‘disinter’\(^510\)) – not create – knowledge of God in the memory.\(^511\) Yet, how and when did the knowledge first enter into our memory? What is Augustine’s stance on the soul’s pre-existence? Here, following Teske’s argument, I shall be insisting that Augustine first accepted it explicitly but subsequently implicitly.\(^512\)

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504 De quantitate animae 33.70.
505 De beata vita 4.35.
506 Soliloquia 1.6.12 & 1.8.15.
507 De quantitate animae 27.53.
508 Cf., Soliloquia 2.20.34.
510 Soliloquia 2.20.35: ‘refodere’.
511 Cf., De vera religione 39.73: ‘reasoning does not create truth but discovers it (Non enim ratiocinatio taliia fact, sed inventit).’
Being able to remember God means God’s epistemological immanence within the soul (2) (this is possible due to their common, incorporeal nature): thus, ‘do not go abroad. Return within yourself. In the inward man dwells truth.’\footnote{De vera religione 39.72: ‘Noli foras ire, in teipsum redi; in interiore homine habitat veritas’.
} Regarding God’s immanence, Cary insists that for the young Augustine Truth is ‘inseparably’\footnote{Soliloquia 2.12.22.} present in the soul and, so, ‘the highest part of the soul’ must be immutable/immortal like God/Truth.\footnote{Cf., Cary, Augustine’s Invention of the Inner Self, p 105.} Consequently, ‘whenever the mind is turned to itself it is necessarily turned to God, and vice versa’\footnote{Cary, p 105.}: in other words, ‘in Augustine’s earliest writings … there is so little that distinguishes turning to the soul from turning to God’\footnote{Cary, p 105.}. (Cary’s term ‘the highest part of the soul’ reminds us of the individual intellect, which transcends discursive reason, in Plotinus. But I cannot press it because Cary does not make it explicit.) However, I shall argue against Cary that, although Augustine maintained God’s inseparable immanence, Augustine also insisted on God’s transcendence as the Creator of the soul. Consequently, Augustine’s use of ‘inseparably’ in relation to God’s immanence must be interpreted from the perspective of epistemology rather than ontology: ontologically, God is transcendent; thus we still need to turn upwards to God after turning inwards to the self.

As a result of the sin of the first humans, not only our reason\footnote{Cf., De ordine 1.10.29: ‘To have their minds immersed in darkness - that is the common lot of all the foolish and unlearned’.} but also our will\footnote{Cf., De vera religione 37.68: ‘This is the origin of all impiety of sinners who have been condemned for their sins. Not only do they wish to scrutinize the creation contrary to the commandment of God, and to enjoy (frui) it rather than God’s law and truth - that was the sin of the first man who misused his free will - but in their state of condemnation they also make this addition to their sin’ (pay attention to the word ‘enjoy’).} have been malfunctioning: the fall of the will is the cause of reason’s being blind to God.\footnote{Cf., De vera religione 14.27: ‘it is by the will that sin is committed.’} Consequently, not only our reason but also our will have to be healed. What, then, does Augustine argue to be the ideal state of the will? I shall investigate this in section (c) of chapter 2, under the title of ‘Rationality of one’s way of life’. By ‘way of life’ I mean how we relate to material things, the self, and God in terms of, for example, ‘delight’, ‘love’, ‘avoid’, ‘enjoyment’, and ‘use’:\footnote{De vera religione 11.22.12.23.} all these are Augustine’s
own terms, with which he describes the movements of the will. The foregone conclusion is that our will must ‘desire (optare)’ God more than anything else. Yet, the will’s activity depends on reason’s activity because we cannot love or hate what we do not know. In other words, practice depends on theory. Therefore, I shall approach the practical (or ethical) dimension of Augustinian interiority in reference to the theoretical dimension.

In section (d) of chapter 2, I shall examine how faith, love, and hope assist us to render our reason and will sound. The fundamental argument of Augustine in this respect is that, since we do not see God ‘face to face’ and the majority of us are incapable of acquiring true knowledge of God through reason alone, faith helps us to fix our mind’s eye on God. Yet, we must not simply believe, but must – with passion – endeavour to understand, revealed truths. In this way we can be persistent in maintaining an ethical lifestyle, loving to tread the path to God with the hope of seeing Him ‘face to face’.

In section (e) of chapter 2, I shall explain why Augustine stresses the indispensability of divine grace for our intellectual, as well as ethical, ascent to God. This is fundamentally based on his perception of God as the Creator: we, as created beings, are not the masters of ourselves, but the Creator God is, thus our spiritual transformation depends on God’s assistance in all respects and at all stages.

1) Augustine’s view of reality

a) The hierarchy

523 De ordine 1.2.4.
524 De doctrina Christiana 1.3.3-1.5.5.
525 De ordine 1.10.29: ‘I desire (optare) nothing more for myself than I desire for you’.
526 Cf., De libero arbitrio 2.13.35 & De Trinitate 10.1.1.
527 Cf., Soliloquia 1.6.13-1.7.14: ‘Hope, by which it trusts that it will see (visurum), if only it gazes (aspexerit) intently … Hope does not leave the soul as long as it is in this life.’ Also, see Confessiones 10.5.7 & De Trinitate 1.8.16.
528 Cf., De Ordine 2.11.30.
529 Cf., De vera religione 8.15.
530 Cf., Soliloquia 1.15.30.
The idea that the universe is comprised of diverse ‘levels of reality’ is of Greek origin, for instance, the theory of procession that Plotinus constructed partially in answer to the question concerning ‘the derivation of a multiplicity from unity’. The One is the supreme principle of unity, from which Intellect (i.e., the world of Platonic Forms/Ideas) derives. The soul (or the world soul), which is generated by Intellect, rules over corporeal things: the soul is the life of the body. What underlies the Plotinian theory of procession is that ‘reality is a structure of dependence, the posterior depending on the prior, being constituted by the prior, incapable of existing “without” the prior which can exist without it. … As independent and as prior, the cause is different from the posterior, its effect, superior in perfection and more powerful: causes (in the special sense of cause implied by the notion of priority “by nature”) are superior to their effects.’

Augustine, too, believed that reality is hierarchically structured in terms of ‘better (melius)’ and ‘worse (deterius)’ even before his encounter with Neoplatonism. However, from the *libri Platoniciorum* he learned a new way of assessing in what sense one thing is ‘better’ or ‘worse’ than another. Furthermore, despite his fascination with Neoplatonism in 384, Augustine converted to the Catholic faith within the next two years and, so, not only Neoplatonism but also the Christian faith contributed to the formation of his hierarchical view of reality. Therefore, I shall investigate the young

536 The term ‘hierarchy (τοπογραφία)’ was first applied to the notion of the graded structure of the universe by the Christian Neoplatonist known as Pseudo-Dionysius, the Areopagite at the end of the fifth or beginning of the sixth century: refer to O’Daly, ‘Hierarchies in Augustine’s Thought’, 143. Also, see Goulven Madec, ‘Sur la Vision Augustinienne du Monde’, *Revue des Études Augustiniennes* 9 (1963), 140.
537 Cf., Confessiones 7.1.1.
538 Cf., Madec, ‘Sur la Vision Augustinienne du Monde’, 139-146. Also, see Vernon J. Bourke, ‘The Body-Soul Relationship in the Early Augustine’, in Joseph C. Schnaubelt, OSA and Frederick Van Fleteren (eds.), *Collectanea Augustiniana: Augustine – Second Founder of the Faith* (New York: Peter Lang, 1990), 437 (‘Even earlier he had stated in the treatise on the De quantitate animae 33.76 (A.D. 387-9) that the body’s capacity for resurrection is a certainty of Christian faith.’) & 440 (‘While much of Augustine’s early psychology is obviously influenced by Platonic and Neoplatonic teachings, it is
Christian Augustine’s ‘hierarchical scheme’\textsuperscript{539} as the foundation of his interiority. There are, in fact, a number of different versions of the scheme.\textsuperscript{540} Yet, since all of them are compatible with each other, I shall explain their common key elements in order to highlight in what way God is transcendent, and why the soul ranks next to God.

Note that, as mentioned, Augustine’s ‘hierarchy of being’\textsuperscript{541} is also a ‘hierarchy of value’\textsuperscript{542} in an ethical sense. Thus, since Wisdom, God, Being, and the Good are one and the same thing,\textsuperscript{543} the supreme being is the supreme good, which is most valuable and desirable.\textsuperscript{544}

\textbf{i) Divisibility}

In \textit{De quantitate animae} Augustine discusses geometric divisibility as a criterion for determining firstly the values of geometric figures, and then the values of the soul and the body, in order of superiority. Notice that Augustine’s discussion of geometry follows the elementary definitions of geometric figures that appear in Euclid’s first book \textit{Elements}. Yet, we cannot say whether or not Augustine actually read the book or any other relevant text.\textsuperscript{545} Furthermore, his approach to geometry is more ‘philosophical’ than scientific.\textsuperscript{546}
Augustine first of all defines what a ‘line’ is, that is, a length without any width and thickness. In a similar manner we can think of ‘width (latitudo)’ alone, which is two-dimensional with no height or thickness. In the physical world such a line and width do not exist, for all sensible things are essentially three-dimensional. Thus, for Augustine as well as for the Greeks, to whom he is indebted in this respect, geometry is the study of ideal figures.

Having defined what the ideal line and width are, Augustine proceeds to argue that the line is superior (pluris) to the width, since the former is divisible only crosswise whereas the latter both lengthwise and crosswise. In short, Augustine identifies less divisibility with more superiority.

The line, however, is not supreme in geometry, for it consists of ‘signs’ or ‘points’. Note that the geometric ‘sign’ should not be confused with Augustine’s other term ‘sign’ in De magistro 2.3-4, which he uses in a linguistic sense in conjunction with ‘significatio’. Augustine’s use of the geometric ‘sign’ is equivalent to ‘point’ in modern geometry, such as the ‘beginning of a line’ or the ‘centre of a figure’. A point has no length: it has no parts at all and, so, is indivisible in any way. Since a line is divisible through multiple points/signs, each of the latter is superior to the former.
In summary, the sign/point is the supreme geometric figure, followed by the line and then width.\(^\text{553}\)

Note that in Augustine divisibility connotes ontological dependability (*indigere*):

I see that width needs length; otherwise it could not be understood. I notice further that length does not need width for its existence, but without a sign it could not exist. The sign (*signum*, i.e., a geometric point), however, clearly stands by itself and needs none of these.\(^\text{554}\)

In other words, since width is comprised of lines, ontologically the former depends on the latter; similarly, since signs constitute a line, the former cause the latter to exist.

(2) Divisibility of the body and the soul

Following Greek ideas, Augustine holds that the human person consists of the soul and the body.\(^\text{555}\) Even though they are ontologically combined together to form the one single human person, they are of two distinct ‘natures’\(^\text{556}\): the soul is immaterial whereas the body is material. Now, the soul is hierarchically superior to the body, since the latter ontologically depends on the former: the immortal\(^\text{557}\) soul is the life of the

\(^{553}\) Cf., *De quantitate animae* 11.18-12.20.

\(^{554}\) *De quantitate animae* 12.20: ‘Illud autem signum per semetipsum esse et nullius horum indigere, manifestum est.’

\(^{555}\) Cf., *De quantitate animae* 1.2. However, how the young Augustine conceived the make-up of a human being remains a problem: see Vernon J. Bourke, ‘The Body-Soul Relationship in the Early Augustine’, in Joseph C. Schnaibelt, OSA and Frederick Van Fleteren (eds.), *Collectanea Augustiniana: Augustine – Second Founder of the Faith* (New York: Peter Lang, 1990), 435-436; also, see 441-443 (the chapter ‘Man the Composite’). Yet, Pegis holds that we should approach the problem not from the perspective of ‘what is man?’, but ‘how is man ordered and governed?’: see Anton C. Pegis, ‘The mind of St. Augustine’, in *Mediaeval Studies*, vol. VI (1944), 40: ‘How two substances can be added together and make one substance, will always remain an extremely awkward question for St. Thomas’ contemporaries and successors … . In the presence of this question, however, Augustine is innocent rather than wrong … . Augustine’s point refers to the center of gravity in the human composite. What interests him is the question of questions: to discover what is highest and most perfect within himself in order - can we doubt it? - to pursue the higher-highest good above him. Hence, be it noted, the Augustinian definition of man undertakes to answer the question, not *what is man?* but *how is man ordered and governed?*

\(^{556}\) *De quantitate animae* 1.2: ‘naturis’.

There is another way that we can approach the soul’s superiority. That is from the perspective of divisibility.

Referring to the tail of a lizard cut off from the rest of the body, which continues to wriggle; Evodius argues in *De quantitate animae* 31.62 that it unmistakably implies that the soul of the lizard is in the state of being divided into two, and that a segment of the divided soul is present in the tail. Augustine immediately refutes such an argument of Evodius by means of an analogy between the human person and a ‘word (verbum or nomen)’ in *De quantitate animae* 31.63-35.69. Notice that Augustine’s point here is not to explain biologically why the tail severed from the main part of the body still makes movements and appears to be fully animate; but to argue that, despite the tail’s separation, the lizard’s soul remains permanently undivided: he is no way capable of, or interested in, giving a biological explanation.

A word consists of a ‘sound’ (or a pronunciation) and ‘what that sound signifies’ (i.e., meaning). The sound ‘pertains’ to the ear, whereas the meaning to the mind. Moreover, the sound, which occupies a time span, is ‘corporeal’ and, so, is analogous to the body in terms of nature. (For Augustine whatever is divisible by either space or time is material.) The meaning, on the other hand, is similar to the soul: the meaning is a ‘quasi-soul’, since it has no dimensional properties nor is extended in time.

Now, if the word ‘sun’, for instance, is divided into individual letters, then any one of the letters cannot ‘retain’ the meaning of the word ‘sun’: in other words, each letter constituting a word cannot signify what that word as a whole signify. The complete loss of the meaning caused by such a division is analogous to the departure of the soul from the body at death.

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558 Cf., *De quantitate animae* 33.70, 13.22 & *De Moribus Ecclesiae* 1.27.52 (‘a rational soul using a mortal and earthly body’). Also, see Pegis, ‘The mind of St. Augustine’, 40.
559 Cf., *De quantitate animae* 32.65.
560 Cf., *De quantitate animae* 32.67: ‘velut corpus’.
561 Cf., *De quantitate animae* 32.68: ‘But, since everything that the senses perceive is contained in time and place, or rather, the senses perceive what time and space contain, then what we perceive by the eyes is divided by space; what we perceive by the ears is divided by time.’
562 *De quantitate animae* 32.67: ‘quasi anima’.
563 Cf., *De quantitate animae* 32.66-68.
564 Cf., *De quantitate animae* 32.66: ‘individual letters (litteras singulas)’.
565 *De quantitate animae* 32.67: ‘retinere’.
566 Cf., *De quantitate animae* 32.66-67.
Augustine subsequently examines what happens when the word ‘Lucifer’ – composed of ‘light (lux, whose genitive case is lucis)’ and ‘bring (-fer from fero)’ – is divided between the second and third syllable:

the first part has a meaning when we say ‘Luci.’ So, therefore, life exists in more than one half of its body. The part that is left (i.e., ‘-fer’) also has a soul, for, when you are told to carry something, that is what you hear.  

Here, Augustine is not insisting that the example of dividing ‘Lucifer’ into ‘luci’ and ‘fer’ analogously explains why the two disconnected pieces of the lizard’s body can continue to live independently of one another. His point is that ‘Lucifer’, being broken up into ‘luci’ and ‘fer’, completely loses its meaning, rather than having the meaning split up in two. Yet, each of ‘luci’ and ‘fer’ continues to be meaningful independently of one another as if they are two separately ensouled bodies. Similarly, since the soul is, like a meaning of a word, simple (simplex) and immaterial; it can depart from the body but is utterly indivisible. Therefore, the soul is superior to the body: in fact, ‘there is nothing better than the soul’.

**ii) Mutability**

Divisibility implies mutability and, so, all material things as well as all immaterial geometric figures – except the sign/point – are mutable. However, indivisibility does not necessarily connote immutability and the unique instance is the soul. The indivisible soul is mutable with respect to time, not space. For instance, reason’s ‘soundness (sanus)’ changes independently of our physical movements. The more we sharpen our artistic skill over a certain period of time, the better our ability to judge art works will become. Also, our emotions often fluctuate.

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567 That is the planet Venus, the morning star, or literally ‘the light-bringer’.
569 Cf., *De quantitate animae* 32.67.
570 Cf., *De quantitate animae* 32.68.
571 Cf., *De vera religione* 30.54: Augustine maintains that judging pertains to reason alone.
The soul’s dimensional indivisibility but temporal mutability is an important clue for understanding in what way God transcends the soul, that is, that God must be immutable with respect to not only space but also time:

All things which are beautiful to the senses … have a spatial or temporal beauty, as for example the body and its movements. But the equality and unity which are known only by the mind, and according to which the mind judges corporeal beauty through the senses, are not extended in space or unstable in time. … all (sensible beauties) are judged by one and the same standard of changeless equality. … Clearly, then, the standard which is called truth is higher than our minds.576

In *Soliloquia* Augustine argues for God’s absolute immutability in a somewhat different way:577

But will it not be true that truth has ceased to exist? And if the statement will not be true, truth does not cease to exist. And if the statement will be true, what is the reason that it will be true after the collapse of truth, when there is no truth any longer? (Ergone interisse veritatem verum non erit? Si non erit verum, non ergo interit. Si verum erit, unde post occasum veritatis verum erit, cum iam veritas nulla est?)578

This passage can be rephrased in a more logical way as follows:

1) If truth has perished, then nothing can be true at all. (≈ ‘interisse veritatem verum non erit’.)
2) If truth has perished, then the statement ‘truth has perished’ can never be true, for nothing can be true at all. (≈ ‘Si non erit verum, non ergo interit.’)

575 Cf., *De vera religione* 10.18.
576 *De vera religione* 30.56.
577 Cf., *Soliloquia* 2.15.28: ‘truth in no way perishes’.
578 *Soliloquia* 2.15.28.
3) Truth must exist in order that at least the statement ‘nothing can be true at all’, or ‘truth has perished’, is to be true. (\(= \text{Si verum erit, unde post occasum veritatis verum erit, cum iam veritas nulla est}.\))

4) Therefore, it is not true that truth has perished: ‘truth cannot perish’.

In summary, Truth/God is immutable with respect to space and time, whereas the soul only in terms of space. Thus, God is superior to the soul followed by all other creatures, which are mutable in all respects.

iii) Rationality

Augustine first of all classifies souls into three categories and establishes their hierarchical ranks according to the criterion of rationality; namely the vegetative souls of plants, the sensitive (or perceiving) souls of beasts, and the intelligent souls of the human persons in ascending order. Only the human soul has reason, thus it is supreme among all the souls of creatures. Yet, God is the highest Reason:

another Reason from on high (i.e., God) rules over all things.

Why, then, does more rationality mean more superiority? Augustine holds that an important function of reason is judging and ‘what judges is superior to what is judged.’

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579 Soliloquia 2.15.28.
580 God – who is Beauty, Chastity, Truth, Life, Good, Wisdom, and Happiness – makes His creation beautiful, chaste, true, good, wise, and happy (Cf., Soliloquia 1.1.3).
581 God is the Creator of the soul (Cf., De quantitate animae 34.78).
583 Cf., De quantitate animae 33.72-76.
584 Cf., De quantitate animae 33.70-72. Notice that Augustine differentiates intelligence or ‘reason (ratio)’ from ‘skill (affaber)’. For example, the swallow is more skilful at constructing a nest than the human person, but is unable to understand the nature of numbers (cf., De ordine 2.19.49). Again, an unintelligent person can sing more skilfully without any knowledge of rhythm and melody than an intelligent person who has that knowledge (cf., Ibid., 2.19.49). Also, see O’Daly, Augustine’s Philosophy of Mind, 11.
585 De ordine 1.8.25. Also, see Confessiones 11.8.10.
586 De vera religione 29.53.
Since the human soul is capable of making, for instance, aesthetic judgments, it is supreme among God’s creation. Yet, the soul, ‘by itself’, cannot judge the beauty and movement of bodies.\textsuperscript{587} There must be the absolute, unchangeable ‘standard of all arts (\textit{lex omnium artium})\textsuperscript{588}. Furthermore, our reason ‘sees (\textit{videre})’\textsuperscript{589} the standard, and we refer to it when we assess the aesthetic value of a bodily thing.\textsuperscript{590}

The standard of beauty is God, for it is immutable,\textsuperscript{591} and is not an object of our judgments. In other words, human reason can judge everything else except God, who is the Reason. God rather judges us.\textsuperscript{592} Also, we can be mistaken in judging, for our reason is mutable. Thus, the immutable standard is ‘higher (\textit{supra})’ than the human soul,\textsuperscript{593} which ‘excels (\textit{praestare})’\textsuperscript{594} all bodily things.\textsuperscript{595}

iv) Creator-or-creature

The creation doctrine is an important part of the young Augustine’s theory of reality. In many places of his early works Augustine explicitly mentions God’s Creatorship; for example,

\begin{quote}
O God, who from nothing hast \textit{created} this world (\textit{Soliloquia} 1.1.2),
\end{quote}

soul is not what God is … nothing is nearer to God among all the things He has \textit{created} than the human soul (\textit{De quantitate animae} 34.77)\textsuperscript{597},

\textsuperscript{587} Cf., \textit{De vera religione} 31.57: ‘Itaque cum se anima sentiat nec corporum speciem motumque iudicare secundum seipsam’.
\textsuperscript{588} \textit{De vera religione} 30.56.
\textsuperscript{589} \textit{De vera religione} 30.56: ‘This standard of all the arts is absolutely unchangeable, but the human mind, which is given the power to see (\textit{videre}) the standard, (can suffer the mutability of error. Clearly, then, the standard which is called truth is higher than our minds.)’
\textsuperscript{590} Cf., \textit{De vera religione} 30.54-31.57.
\textsuperscript{591} Cf., \textit{De vera religione} 31.57.
\textsuperscript{592} Cf., \textit{De vera religione} 30.54, 30.56 (‘it [i.e., the soul] is excelled by the nature according to which it judges and concerning which it cannot judge’) & 31.58 (‘truth alone judges of us when we cleave to it’).
\textsuperscript{593} Cf., \textit{De vera religione} 30.56.
\textsuperscript{594} \textit{De vera religione} 29.53.
\textsuperscript{595} Cf., \textit{De vera religione} 30.54-31.57.
\textsuperscript{596} ‘Deus qui de nilio mundum istum creasti’.
\textsuperscript{597} ‘animam humanam non esse quod Deus est; ita praesumendum, nihil inter omnia quae creavit, Deo esse propinquius.’
He (i.e., God) rules all creation, subjects the body to the soul, the soul to Himself, and so everything to himself (ibid., 36.80)\(^{598}\),

seek the one God who alone is superior to our minds, and by whom clearly every soul and the whole world has been created (De vera religione 2.2)\(^{599}\).

Why, then, is the creation doctrine indispensable for Augustine?\(^{600}\) Neoplatonism alone was inadequate to resolve the problem of evil, especially in reference to the Manichaean dualism between the Good and Evil. The creation doctrine also played a decisive role in this respect.\(^{601}\) To begin with, there are two important points in Augustine’s account of creation. One is that God creates \textit{ex nihilo}, out of nothing.\(^{602}\) The other is that everything that God creates is good: in other words, the Good God is not the author of evil.\(^{603}\) Based on these two premises, Augustine concluded that evil is a privation of good. Moreover, since the Good is Being itself, the complete privation of good is nothing (or non-being). In short, evil is nothing.\(^{604}\) Conversely, nothing is evil.\(^{605}\)

\(^{598}\) ‘Deus … omne quod condidit regit, subiicit animae corpus, animam sibi, et sic omnia sibi’. Also, see De quantitate animae 1.2, 33.76 & 33.75.

\(^{599}\) ‘unum Deum quaererent, quem solum supra mentes nostras esse, et a quo omnem animam et totum istum mundum fabricatum’. Also, see De vera religione 3.3, 7.13, 10.19 (‘Do not, then, let us serve the creature rather than the Creator’), 11.21, 16.32 & 20.39.

\(^{600}\) Rist asks, ‘Why did Augustine become a Christian, not a Neoplatonist?’ Rist’s answer is that Neoplatonism ‘failed to account for \textit{creation ex nihilo}’. Also, ‘we are not simply our naturally divine souls, but a marriage of our souls with our bodies, which unplatonically are’. See John Rist, ‘Plotinus and Christian Philosophy’, in Lloyd P. Gerson (ed.), \textit{The Cambridge Companion to Plotinus} (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1996), 407.


\(^{602}\) Cf., \textit{Soliloquia} 1.1.2, De quantitate animae 1.2 & De Genesi adversus Manichaeos 8.11. Also, see Scott McDonald, ‘The Divine Nature’, in Eleonore Stump and Norman Kretzmann (eds.), \textit{The Cambridge Companion to Augustine} (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2001), 84: ‘In making things, God requires no aid from any other independent being and uses no pre-existing, independent matter or stuff: both possibilities are ruled out by cosmological monism. Moreover, God does not make things out of God’s own substance, that is, the things that God makes are not in any way parts of the divine substance - that possibility would require either that God be corrupted or that mutable, contingent creatures be equal to God. God makes things out of nothing (\textit{ex nihilo}). The fact that things are created by God \textit{ex nihilo} explains their contingency, mutability, and corruptibility. God gives them being, but because they, are made and made from nothing, they are not true being. They are tinged with non-being, as that which truly \textit{is} is not.’


\(^{604}\) Cf., De ordine 2.2.6, \textit{Soliloquia} 1.1.2, Confessiones 7.10.16 & 7.15.21.
Augustine, as Bonner insists, ‘owed to the Neoplatonists the discovery that evil is a privation of good.’ However, ‘Plotinus, while firmly relegating Evil to the realm of Non-Being, never arrives at the Augustinian position of Evil as simply a privation of Good’. Thus, although ‘the key to the resolution of the ethical problem is suggested in the writings of the Neoplatonists, in adopting it for his own use, Augustine subjected it to a fundamental modification in conformity with the Christian doctrine of creation.’

God’s Creatorship is not only the key to the resolution of Augustine’s ethical problem, but also constitutes the foundation of his theory of teleology. For example, the human person, being a creature, is utterly inadequate and therefore depends on the divine grace for everything (i.e., including our deification): I shall explain this in section (e) of chapter 2 in Part II. Also, since there is an ontologically insurmountable gulp between the Creator – who has no maker of His own self (and is Trinitarian) – and His creation; we need to turn not only inward, but also upward: ‘seek the one God who alone is superior to our minds, and by whom clearly every soul and the whole world has been created.’ God’s Creatorship is Augustine’s rationale for our upward turn, whereas the One’s transcendence over being (i.e., ‘beyond being’) is Plotinus’.

Regarding how Augustine associates God’s Creatorship with the hierarchy, O’Daly remarks that ‘God is both distinct from, and part of, this hierarchy. As its transcendent creator, whose providence extends throughout his creation, he is other than that creation, immutable where it is, even at its highest, rational level, subject to change. But he is also the first term of the scale of being, the necessarily existent, most perfect, and

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605 Cf., De ordine 2.7.23: ‘the nonentity which is called evil (nihil quod dicitur malum)’ Also, see Soliloquia 1.1.2.  
606 Bonner, St. Augustine of Hippo, 201.  
607 Cf., Bonner, 201-204: thus, ‘it is important not to over-emphasize his debt to them for, on this issue, there is a great gulf fixed between Neoplatonism and Christian doctrine’. Also, see Carol Harrison, Rethinking Augustine’s Early Theology: An Argument for Continuity (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2006), 74–89.  
608 Bonner, St. Augustine of Hippo, 199.  
609 See chapter 1 ‘The Hortensius’ in Part I.  
610 Cf., Soliloquia 1.1.2.  
611 Cf., De quantitate animae 2.3 & De vera religione 11.21.  
612 Cf., De ordine 2.5.16. Also, see De vera religione 7.13 (‘There is one God; Father, Son and Holy Spirit. When this Trinity is known as far as it can be in this life’) & 55.107.  
613 De vera religione 2.2.  
614 Ennead 5.1.10 & 5.2.1.5-7.
most uniform being at the apex. I understand that O’Daly here uses ‘hierarchy’ in two different senses, that is, one as a synonym of ‘order’ and the other as a characterization of Augustine’s view of reality. Gilson makes a similar distinction. He first of all insists that ‘the sum-total of all the eternal essences and of the temporal things participating in these essences forms a hierarchy of higher and lower realities, and the relationships born of this hierarchy constitute what is called order.’ Now, Gilson’s interpretation of Augustine is that God is the author of the order: ‘nature is ruled by this order perforce because God Himself has imposed it. (As a part of nature, man also is subject to the divine order.)’ Madec also holds that for Augustine God transcends the order, since the former is the Creator of the latter, and this is what O’Daly means by ‘God is distinct from the hierarchy.’ On the other hand, when Augustine mentions the Creator God in reference to his view of reality, God is ‘part of the hierarchy’ as the ‘first term of the scale of being.’ Thus, ‘hierarchy’ in this sense is synonymous with ‘view of reality’: all beings, including God, are ‘hierarchically’ structured.

In summary, reality is hierarchically ordered in terms of superiority. Having learned the Neoplatonic concept of incorporeity, Augustine insisted that the immaterial are superior to the material, for the former are less divisible and less mutable than the latter. Among immaterial beings the rational are ‘better’ than the irrational. (For this reason the soul is better than the geometric point/sign, though both of them share the same ‘simple’ nature.) Both God and the soul are incorporeal and rational. Nonetheless, the soul is mutable with respect to time whereas God is absolutely immutable and, so, the latter transcends the former. From the perspective of the creation doctrine, creatures are inferior to their Creator, since the former depend on the latter in all respects. This is the

615 O’Daly, ‘Hierarchies in Augustine’s Thought’, 145.
619 ‘potius’ (De vera religione 48.93) or ‘melius’ (Confessiones 7.1.1).
620 Cf., De quantitate animae 1.2.
basic framework of Augustine’s view of reality, which would never change for the rest of his life.

**b) The theory of spiritual development**

By nature, the soul permanently occupies the middle position between God and the body in the hierarchy.  
Yet, depending on what we can see with our mind’s eye and loves, we either advance upwards to God (alternatively, make progress in terms of ‘happy life’, or become deified) or fall downwards away from Him. Augustine discusses such a bi-directional movement of the soul in terms of ‘image of God’.

**i) The image of God**

Augustine’s concept of image is not original. Neither is there any lengthy or developed treatment of it. Sullivan maintains that in Augustine’s early works ‘we find only one explicit reference to the image text from Genesis (i.e., *Soliloquia* 1.1.4), and little apparent use is made of it. On the other hand many texts can be cited to show the influence of Plotinus’ concept of the divine image upon Augustine. Some of these are as follows:

Firstly and most notably, Augustine interpreted the biblical reference to the image of God (i.e., Genesis 1.26) as meaning only the rational soul: ‘God is a spirit and this

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621 Cf., Anton C. Pegis, ‘The mind of St. Augustine’, in *Mediaeval Studies*, vol. VI (1944), 41: ‘The soul is thus a sort of intermediate nature, with the divine ideas immediately above it and the body immediately below: “There is nothing that comes between the highest life, which is immutable Wisdom and Truth, and that which is the last reality to receive life, namely, the body, except the soul” (*De Immortalitate Animae* 15.24)’. Also, see *De quantitate animae* 34.77: ‘the human soul is not what God is, so we must confidently hold that among all the things He has created there is nothing closer to God’ quoted in Marie A. Vannier, ‘Le statut de l’âme dans le “De quantitate animae”’, *Lectio Augustini* 7 (1991), 172. Also, see *De quantitate animae* 34.78.
622 *De beata vita* 4.35.
623 See Vannier, ‘Le statut de l’âme dans le “De quantitate animae”’, 171-175: he explains the significance of ‘image of God’ from the perspective of ‘conversion’.
625 especially in the ‘philosophical dialogues’ (Sullivan, *The image of God, ?*).
626 Sullivan, 7: he holds that Augustine discovered, in *Enneads*, ‘a notion and a doctrine of the divine image in man’ (Ibid., 4).
627 ‘God said, “Let us make man in our own image, in the likeness of ourselves...”’.
implies from Augustine’s point of view a wholly spiritual sense of man as the image of God. (Hence, the soul is superior to the body.)

Secondly, in the comparison between images (or resemblances) and what they resemble, the former are inferior to the latter: the inferior is related to, and also depends on, the superior as being like to it. Thus, of necessity the soul is inferior to God, whom it resembles. Augustine, in fact, holds that all creatures are ‘imitations’ of God:

I shall say no more, except that to us is promised a vision of beauty - the beauty through whose imitation (imitatione) all other things are beautiful.

Yet, since the soul is the closest image of God, the soul ranks immediately after God:

we are remade in the image of Him who gave us that image to keep as a most precious treasure, when He gave us to ourselves with such a nature that only He Himself can rank before us.

Finally, as for Plotinus, so for Augustine, the notion of image connotes the ‘dynamic tendency of the inferior image to become more like to its superior by some return upon this model-principle’. This is the sense, in which the young Augustine used the term ‘reformare’ in association with ‘image of God’, and also, as Sullivan holds, ‘divine’ with regard to the soul: ‘in confirmation of this (i.e., Plotinus’) influence (and that of Cicero) we can refer to Augustine’s use of the term “divine” with regard to man. This term will appear rarely, if at all, in his later writings, but now it is used abundantly. Augustine talks of the “divine mind dwelling in mortals”; he refers to the “divine

628 Cornelia W. Wolfskeel, ‘Some Remarks with regard to Augustine’s Conception of Man as the Image of God’, Vigiliae Christianae 30 (1976), 63 (especially footnote no. 2) Also, see Soliloquia 1.1.4, 1.2.7 & De genesi ad litteram contra Manichaeos 1.17.27. Note that ‘it was Plato who first used the concept of image to depreciate the world of sense-knowledge, and to distinguish it sharply from the world of ideas. In the work of Augustine in which the analysis under consideration appears (the Soliloquies), there is similarly a strong tendency to deny certitude to sense-knowledge, a tendency which finds its complement in the concept of image underlying the thought of Augustine in this period.’ (Sullivan, The image of God, 8: he maintains that Soliloquia 2.9.17 is the evidence.)
629 Cf., Sullivan, 8-9. Also, see Soliloquia 2.9.17 quoted Sullivan, 10.
630 i.e., the Creator God in Augustine or Intellect/Nous in Plotinus.
631 De ordine 2.20.51.
632 De quantitate animae 28.55.
633 Cf., Sullivan, The image of God, 10.
634 Cf., De quantitate animae 28.55.
faculty,’ to “that part of the mind which is divine’; (Cf. Contra Acad., I, 1, 3) he warns that “man will not be divine unless he turns aside from the mortal element”; (Cf. De Ordine, II, 11, 31) he speaks of the soul “returning, as it were, to the region of its origin.” (Cf. Contra Acad., II, 9, 22) Thus, perfecting the image of God means deifying the soul, and vice versa: I have already explained in the Introduction that Augustinian interiority is a methodology for teleologically deifying the soul.

In summary, the soul’s middle rank between God and the body is eternally unchangeable from the perspective of ontology. Yet, depending on where our mind and heart are orientated, our soul – the image of God – can either be deformed or ‘reformed’/deified.  

Apart from ‘image (of God)’, there are many other expressions, with which Augustine mentions the bi-directional movement of the soul; for example, ‘rationality’ (i.e., sania and ‘insania’):

The sixth stage is complete transformation into life eternal, a total forgetfulness of temporal life passing into the perfect form which is made according to the image and likeness of God.

There is no such word as ‘rational’ or ‘irrational’ in the above text. However, I shall explain in the following chapter that the seven levels of the spiritual development discussed in De quantitate animae 33.70-76, 35.79, and De vera religione 26.49 are

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635 Cf., Sullivan, The image of God, 7-8. Sullivan subsequently says, ‘It is only gradually that the young Augustine comes to realize that some things in neo-platonism could not be reconciled with Christianity.’ However, as I shall demonstrate in Part III ‘The Confessions’ and Part IV ‘De Trinitate’, the idea of deification of the soul would continue to be an essential part of the mature Augustine’s theory of interiority.

636 Cf., De vera religione 20.38, 46.88 & 55.107. Soliloquia 2.9.17 (quoted in Sullivan, The image of God, 10-11). Also, see O’Daly, ‘Hierarchies in Augustine’s Thought’, 145-146: ‘This hierarchical order is not static, at least not for humans: even if they, as rational beings with free will, are intrinsically superior to irrational beings without free will, their souls and wills can situate them on a level below that which is appropriate to their nature.’

637 Soliloquia 1.1.5.

638 De vera religione 26.49.
actually the seven degrees of the soul’s ‘rationality’: also, the ‘remaking’ of the image of God means the same as the soul’s (seven levels of) ‘growth in greatness’. 639

ii) Seven levels of rationality640

Base on his view of reality, Augustine develops, in terms of ‘irrationality (insania)’, a theory concerning various stages of spiritual (alternatively, teleological or deificatory) transformation. Augustine defines ‘irrationality’ as the state of being ignorant about God and, consequently, not loving Him: we cannot love what we do not know.641 Notice that there are many paraphrases of ‘irrationality’; for instance, ‘dull of mind (caecus ... mente)’642, ‘uninstructed men (minus eruditis hominibus)’643, ‘unwise men (stulti homines)’644, ‘carnal men (carnalium hominum)’645, and ‘old man (veteris hominis)’646. Augustine, on the other hand, describes the opposite state as ‘health of sound men (valetudini sanorum)’647, ‘good men (bonos vires)’648, ‘spiritual man (homo spiritualis)’649, ‘new, inward and heavenly man (novus homo, et interior, et caelestis)’650, and ‘the few who are wise (sapientibus paucis)’651. Consequently, the irrational must become rational, the carnal spiritual, or the unwise wise – in a word, renew the ‘image’ of God.

How, then, can an irrational person become rational? In other words, how does Augustine argues that we can understand God, so that we can then love Him? Augustine holds that

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Cf., Soliloquia 1.1.5.

Cf., De libero arbitrio 2.13.35 & De Trinitate 10.1.1.

De ordine 1.1.2.

De ordine 1.1.2.

De ordine 2.13.38.

De vera religione 6.11.

De vera religione 26.49.

De ordine 1.8.24; Cf., Ibid., 1.11.32 ‘intellect of a few sound men (paucorum sanorum intellectus)’.

De vera religione 6.11.

De vera religione 12.24.

De vera religione 26.49.

De vera religione 28.15.
the invisible things of God from the creation of the world are clearly seen, being understood by the things that are made, even his eternal power and Godhead (Rom. 1:20).652

(Faith is also crucial for gaining knowledge of God, but I shall discuss it in section (d) ‘Faith, hope, and love’ in chapter 2.) How come we can infer who God is from what we know about His creation? Augustine explains it in terms of ‘signum’ and ‘significatio’.653 The movements of a dancer, for instance, are the signs (signa) representing what the dancer thinks or/and feels (significatio).654 Also, words are pronounced (signa) in order to pass on information (significatio) from one to another.655 Similarly, the beauty of a sensible thing and our ability to make an aesthetic judgement (signa) point to the existence of the absolute, intelligible standard of beauty (significatio), which is God.656 Also, through realizing the soul’s immaterial nature (signa) we can certainly perceive not only God’s incorporeity, but also His immanence, omnipresent, and transcendence (significatio).657 The soul is the most important springboard to knowledge of God and, so, epistemologically turning to the former must be the first stage of our teleological deification. In short, all creatures are the ‘nods’ (signa) towards their Creator (significatio).658 Nonetheless, ‘irrational’ people are incapable of identifying and interpreting the clues to knowledge of God embedded in His creation – most importantly, the significance of the soul’s immateriality. Consequently, they remain in the enjoyment the ‘delight of the sense’, being unable to even think about savouring the ‘delight through the sense’.660

The transition from irrationality to rationality is the basic framework of Augustinian interiority. However, Augustine elaborates it four times in De ordine, De quantitate

652 De vera religione 52.101: similarly, ‘How great the things that are made, that we may find Thee!’ (De ordine 1.5.14) and ‘something concerning God Himself drawn from that comparison of sensible things’ (Soliloquia 1.8.15). Yet, what Augustine inferentially discovered about God is largely Platonic in character: for a discussion about the Platonic influence upon Augustine in this respect, see Gerard O’Daly, Augustine’s Philosophy of Mind, 189-193 [i.e., (iv) Augustine and the Platonic theory of Forms].
653 Cf., De ordine 2.11.34.
654 Cf., De ordine 2.11.34.
655 Cf., De ordine 2.11.34.
656 Cf., De vera religione 30.56, 59-60.
657 Cf., Soliloquia 1.1.4, De quantitate animae 2.3 & De vera religione 43.81, 44.82..
658 De libero arbitrio 2.10.43 quoted in Carol Harrison, Rethinking Augustine’s Early Theology, 108.
659 Cf., De vera religione 52.101.
660 Cf., De ordine 2.11.34.
animae, and *De vera religione*; stretching the two-tier system into seven different levels: all the four versions of seven-levels of the soul’s rationality share the same structure, which is ‘a developmental sequence turning the soul from attachment to sense experience, toward itself, and finally to truth’661, echoing the landmarks in his spiritual journey to God.662 Note that the actual Augustinian expression is ‘seven levels of the soul’s greatness’663, not ‘seven levels of the soul’s rationality’ (cf., *De quantitate animae* 33.70-76). Yet, Augustine uses the term ‘greatness/magnitude (quantus)’ in reference to ‘virtue’664 and ‘power (vis or potentia)’665, not to dimensional size: above all, the soul is immaterial. Simultaneously, Augustine enumerates seven different kinds of the soul’s ‘power’ as follows: ‘the first act, vitalization; the second, sensation; the third, art; the fourth, virtue; the fifth, tranquillity; the sixth, initiation; the seventh, contemplation.’666 His argument here is clear: the more irrational we are, the higher-level power we are incapable of exercising. Thus, the phrase ‘the soul’s greatness’667 means actually ‘the soul’s rationality’.

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<thead>
<tr>
<th>Landmarks</th>
<th>Citations</th>
<th>Themes</th>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td>De ordine</td>
<td><em>De quantitate animae</em></td>
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<tr>
<td>1. Augustine in his teens</td>
<td>When the mind is directed to the multitude of material objects, it cannot see the beauty of the universe. [Cf., 1.2.1-4]</td>
<td>‘The Second Level of the Soul … The soul applies itself to the sense of touch; through it it feels and distinguishes hot and cold, rough and smooth, hard</td>
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<td>preoccup -ation</td>
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<td>things</td>
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662 O’Daly holds that the Augustinian distinction between the seven levels of rationality was influenced by Greek philosophy: see O’Daly, *Augustine’s Philosophy of Mind*, 14-15.
663 *De quantitate animae* 33.70: ‘quanta sit anima septem gradus demonstrant’.
664 Cf., *De quantitate animae* 16.28: ‘when a child is praised for growing up, what is said to be the goal of that growing, if not virtue? … You should not think, therefore, that the soul grows by increasing its size with age as the body does. For, by growing, the soul comes to virtue, which, we admit, derives all its beauty and perfection not from any greatness of space, but from the great power of consistency. And if greater is one thing and better is another, as you already admitted, the soul should not be called greater but better by reason of its advancing with age and becoming subject to reason.’ Also, see Ibid., 14.24: ‘We must regard the soul as great, great indeed, but not great with any material bulk. That way of thinking comes more easily to those who are well trained and approach these questions not from a desire of empty glory, but from a divine love of truth’.
665 *De quantitate animae* 32.69: ‘how great the soul is, not in regard to extension in space and time, but in regard to its power (vi) and capacity (potentia).’
666 *De quantitate animae* 35.79.
667 *De quantitate animae* 33.70.
and soft, light and heavy. Then it distinguishes between unnumbered differences of taste and smell and sound and shapes, by tasting, smelling, hearing and seeing. And in all these it comes to know and seek what suits the nature of its body; it rejects and shuns what is unsuited.’ [33.71]

| 1. ‘The chief cause of this error is that man does not know himself. Now, for acquiring this self-knowledge, he needs a constant habit of withdrawing from things of the senses and of concentrating his thought within himself, and holding it there.’ [1.1.3] | 1. ‘The Third Level of the Soul … the power of reason and thought’ [33.72] |
| 2. Reason enables a person to understand what that person does. [Cf., 2.19.49] | 2. ‘The Fourth Level of the Soul … the more it becomes the cause of its own delight, the more it dares to withdraw from baser things and wholly to cleanse itself’ [33.73] |

2. After reading the *Hortensius*

3. After reading Neoplatonism

‘the Greek word from which the term, philosophy, is derived is in the Latin tongue called love of wisdom. … there is another world utterly remote from these eyes of ours, a world which the intellect of a few sound men

‘The Third Level of the Soul … the science of arithmetic’ [33.72] 

Endeavouring to understand the self

Exploring intelligible things
beholds.’ [1.11.32]

4. After reading the Scriptures ‘To philosophy pertains a twofold question: the first treats of the soul; the second, of God. The first makes us know ourselves; the second, our origin. The former is the more delightful to us; the latter, more precious. The former makes us fit for a happy life; the latter renders us happy. The first is for beginners; the latter, for the well instructed. This is the order of wisdom’s branches of study by which one becomes competent to grasp the order of things and to discern two worlds and the very Author of the universe, of whom the soul has no knowledge save to know how it knows Him not.’ [2.18.47]

1. ‘The Seventh Level of the Soul … we are in the very vision and contemplation of truth’ [33.76]
2. ‘The Seventh Level of the Soul … From this we shall realize how full of truth are the things we are commanded to believe’ [33.76]

Attempting to contemplate God

*De quantitate animae* 35.79 also follows the same framework:

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<tr>
<th>Landmarks</th>
<th>De quantitate animae 35.79</th>
<th>Themes</th>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1. Augustine in his teens</td>
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<tr>
<td>1&lt;sup&gt;st&lt;/sup&gt; Level</td>
<td>‘vitalization (animatio’</td>
<td>‘concerning the body (de corpore’</td>
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<td>2&lt;sup&gt;nd&lt;/sup&gt;</td>
<td>‘sensa-’</td>
<td>‘through the’</td>
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<tr>
<td>Level</td>
<td>Art</td>
<td>About the Body (circa corpus)</td>
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<tr>
<td>3rd Level</td>
<td>‘art’</td>
<td>‘about the body (circa corpus)’</td>
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2. After reading the *Hortensius*

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Level</th>
<th>Virtue</th>
<th>Toward itself (ad seipsam)</th>
<th>Excellently in the presence of an excellent thing (pulchre ad pulchrum)</th>
<th>Things</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>4th Level</td>
<td>‘virtue’</td>
<td>‘toward itself (ad seipsam)’</td>
<td>‘excellently in the presence of an excellent thing (pulchre ad pulchrum)’</td>
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3. After reading *Neoplatonism*

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Level</th>
<th>Tranquillity</th>
<th>In itself (in seipsa)</th>
<th>Excellently in an excellent thing (pulchre in pulchro)</th>
<th>Things</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>5th Level</td>
<td>‘tranquillity’</td>
<td>‘in itself (in seipsa)’</td>
<td>‘excellently in an excellent thing (pulchre in pulchro)’</td>
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4. After reading the Scriptures

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<tr>
<th>Level</th>
<th>Contemplation</th>
<th>In God (apud Deum)</th>
<th>Excellently in Excellence (pulchre apud pulchritudinem)</th>
<th>Things</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>7th Level</td>
<td>‘contemplation’</td>
<td>‘in God (apud Deum)’</td>
<td>‘excellently in Excellence (pulchre apud pulchritudinem)’</td>
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*De vera religione* 26.49 describes how the one, who has already become an ‘inward person (homo interior)’, makes further progress: yet, the basic structure of the description remains unaltered:

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<thead>
<tr>
<th>Landmarks</th>
<th>Spiritual progress of the inward man (homo interior) depicted in <em>De vera religione</em> 26.49</th>
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<td>Attempting to contemplate God</td>
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<td>2.</td>
<td>After reading the <em>Hortensius</em></td>
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<td>3.</td>
<td>After reading Neoplatonism</td>
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<td>4.</td>
<td>After reading the Scriptures</td>
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668 *De quantitate animae* 35.79.
Note Cary insists that ‘in Augustine’s earliest writings … there is so little that distinguishes turning to the soul from turning to God’\(^669\). I shall argue against him in section ‘God is in the soul’ chapter 2.

2) Return to reason\(^670\) in order to ascend to God

a) Why reason

What, then, causes the soul to move upwards or downwards in the hierarchy? The fall is solely due to the misuse of the will.\(^671\) The ascent to God is more complex; for not only the will, but also reason, memory, faith, hope, and divine grace are involved. All these are indeed connected to each other. For instance, reason does not operate independently of memory: due to our memory of God, we can ‘desire (cupere)’ to know God,\(^672\) whom we do not see ‘face to face’\(^673\). Also, our intellectual life and our emotional life are inseparable.\(^674\) Thus, without a passion for knowledge of God, we cannot engage ourselves in the pursuit of the knowledge. In other words, if we are not interested in theology, we simply do not study it. What, then, makes us intrigued by theology in the first place? God attracts our mind and heart to Himself, otherwise we – as created beings – remain utterly helpless in restoring the image of God.\(^675\) Note that, although Augustine discusses, in Confessions, the problem of the will in detail, he was acutely aware of the same problem even in Cassiciacum, undoubtedly from the experience of his own self:

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\(^{669}\) Cary, Augustine’s Invention of the Inner Self, 105.

\(^{670}\) Cf., De ordine 2.11.31: ‘regressus esse in rationem debet’.

\(^{671}\) Cf., De vera religione 14.27 (‘it is by the will that sin is committed’), 20.38 & 37.68. Also, see Eleonore Stump, ‘Augustine on free will’, in Eleonore Stump and Norman Kretzmann (eds.), The Cambridge Companion to Augustine (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2001), 131. ‘On his (i.e., Augustine’s) view in the De libero arbitrio, then, human beings are unable to form a good volition unless God produces it in them or co-operates in producing it. Nonetheless, when they will to sin, according to Augustine they are culpable. It apparently follows that a person can be morally responsible for a sinful act of will even when it was not possible for her not to will to sin. … a person who is unaided by grace cannot do otherwise than sin, and yet she is morally responsible for the sin she does.’

\(^{672}\) Cf., Soliloquia 1.4.9. Also, see section ‘Reasoning is remembering’ in chapter 2.

\(^{673}\) Confessiones 10.5.7 & De Trinitate 1.8.16. Also, see Soliloquia 1.6.12-1.7.14: Augustine here mentions the hope of understanding revealed truths because we cannot see God ‘face to face’ in this life.


\(^{675}\) See section ‘Reason shapes way of life’ of chapter 2 in Part II.
if there is in me any vain desire, do Thou Thyself cleanse me and make me fit to look upon Thee. (*Soliloquia* 1.1.6)

If the soul, while it continues in the course of human life, overcomes the desires which it has fed to its own undoing by enjoying mortal things, and believes that it has the aid of God’s grace enabling it to overcome them, if it serves God with the mind and a good will, it will undoubtedly be restored, and will return from the mutable many to the immutable One. (*De vera religione* 12.24)

Also, notice that, as the texts quoted from *Contra Academicos* 1.1.3, *Soliloquia* 1.1.6 and *De vera religione* 12.24 demonstrate, Augustine makes clear that our will cannot be rendered sound without divine assistance.

Nonetheless, since we cannot love what we do not know, knowing God precedes loving Him. 676 In order to be a ‘perfect lover’ of God, we must first become a ‘perfect knower’ of God. 677 Regarding the relationship between memory and reason, we have always had knowledge of God in our memory, yet only reason – not memory or the will – attempts to remember God fully (or ‘disinter’ 678 the knowledge): I shall explain this subsequently. This is to say that reason is the agent of interiority assisted by memory, the will, faith, hope, and divine grace; thus ‘return to reason’ 679. Our reason is currently in a state of ‘sleep’ due to the fall and, so, must be ‘awakened’ to God, of whom we remember so little:

that divine element in you (*quod in te divinum*), whatever it may be - the element because of which you have always sought after what is fitting and worthwhile;

because of which you have preferred to be generous rather than wealthy; as a

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676 Cf., *De libero arbitrio* 2.13.35 & *De Trinitate* 10.1.1: see the last paragraph of ‘(5-2)’ in my Introduction. Similarly, Linden holds that ‘L’élévation morale de l’homme demeure une condition nécessaire, absolue, et cette élévation morale s’opère conformément et parallèlement au développement de la connaissance intellectuelle’: see Lambertus van der Linden, ‘Ratio et Intellectus dans les premiers écrits de saint Augustin’, *Augustiniana* (1957), 17.

677 Cf., *Soliloquia* 1.1.6.

678 *Soliloquia* 2.20.35: ‘refodere’.

679 *De ordine* 2.11.31. Also, see Linden, ‘Ratio et Intellectus dans les premiers écrits de saint Augustin’, 16: ‘La vie selon la *ratio* est la recherche de la vérité des choses humaines et divines, l’activité qui cherche et aboutit finalement à la *sapientia*, possession totale de la science des choses humaines et divines. La *ratio*, en tant qu’activité animée par un mouvement intérieur, fera place à l’*intellectus*, en tant que contemplation quiète de Dieu, et d’emblée l’âme possèdera la vie heureuse.’
result of which you have never wanted to be more powerful rather than to be more just; the reason you have never given in to adversities and improprieties - that element, I say, which has been lulled to sleep by the lethargy of this life, a hidden Providence has decided to awaken by the various hard reverses you have suffered. (*Contra Academicos* 1.1.3)

Here, what Augustine means by the ‘divine element’ is, in fact, reason:  

Man is animal, rational and mortal. In this definition, when the genus which is called animal has been given, then we notice that two distinguishing notes are added. And by those distinguishing notes, man, I believe, was to be admonished both whither he is to return and what he ought to flee, for, just as the soul’s forward movement has fallen down to the things that are mortal, so ought its return be to reason. By the one term, rational, man is distinguished from brute animals; by the other term, mortal, he is distinguished from God. Therefore, unless it holds fast to the rational element, it will be a beast; unless it turns aside from the mortal element, it will not be divine (*divina*). (*De ordine* 2.11.31)

**b) Reason’s journey to God**

Reason is the ‘intellect’, 682 the ‘mind’s eye’, 683 or a ‘power of the soul’, 684 which is the agent of knowing (*scire*) 685 or understanding (*intellegere*). 686 All knowledge gained through sense-perception, discursive thinking, or intuitive insight is an act of reason. 687 Yet, the soul is created out of nothing and its existence is sustained by the Creator God.

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681 Augustine says in *De Immortalitate Animae* 2.2 that reason is either the soul itself or is in the soul: ‘Ratio profecto aut animus est, aut in animo.’

682 *De ordine* 2.2.5 (‘Wherefore, if we know anything, I think it is contained in the intellect [intellectu] alone, and by it alone can it be grasped’) & 1.11.32.

683 Cf., *De ordine* 2.4.11 (‘mentis oculos’) & 2.2.7.

684 Cf., *De quantitate animae* 35.79: ‘animae potentia’.  

685 Cf., *De libero arbitrio* 2.3.9: ‘whatever we know, we grasp and hold fast by reason (Quidquid enim scimus, id ratione comprehensum tenemus)’ quoted in O’Daly, *Augustine’s Philosophy of Mind*, 178.


Thus, reason’s cognitive activity is not from itself. God – as divine illumination – makes reason’s cognition possible, just as the corporeal eye can see things only in the sunlight: 688

Reason, which is speaking with you, pledges to make God known to your mind just as the sun is shown to the eyes. The senses of the soul are, as it were, the mind’s own eyes; those things, moreover, which are most certain in the sciences are like the things which the sun shines upon that they may be seen - such as the earth and all things earthly: but it is God Himself who does the illumining. Yet, I - Reason - am in minds as the act of looking is in the eyes. To have eyes is not the same as to look, and to look is not the same as to see. Therefore, the soul needs three distinct things: that it has eyes which it can properly use, that it looks, and that it sees. 689

Note the following two points:

One is that Plato was the first person who drew an analogy between the corporeal eye and reason, and between the sun and intellectual/divine illumination: 690 through divine illumination the objects of cognition become intelligible to reason just as sunlight renders material things visible to the eye. Hence, Augustine’s image of the sun is an exact ‘replica’ of Plato’s. 691

The other is that Augustine distinguishes the two epistemological activities of reason, namely ‘looking (aspicere)’ and ‘seeing (videre)’. ‘Looking’ means, for instance,

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688 Cf., Soliloquia 1.8.15.
689 Soliloquia 1.6.12 & 1.8.15.
690 Refer to the ‘Allegory of the Cave’ in the Republic and Phaedrus. Also, see Philip Cary, Augustine’s Invention of the Inner Self: The Legacy of a Christian Platonist (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2000), 18 & 40. Also, ‘for Plotinus the One or God is the sun, the transcendent light’: see Frederick Copleston, A History of Philosophy, Book One, Volume II: Augustine to Scotus (New York: Image, 1952), 62.
691 Cf., Armstrong, Christian faith and Greek philosophy, 70-71: yet, Augustine on the other hand holds that the intellectual light is ‘the Interior Teacher, Christ dwelling in the soul and teaching it from within.’ However, the exact significance of Augustine’s doctrine of divine illumination is ‘elusive’: see Gareth B. Matthews, ‘Knowledge and illumination’, in Eleonore Stump and Norman Kretzmann (eds.), The Cambridge Companion to Augustine (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2001), 180; for a concise summary of Augustine’s theory of divine illumination, see 173-175 & 180-181. Copleston also holds that the interpretation of Augustine’s theory of divine illumination is ‘uncertain’: see Copleston, A History of Philosophy, Book One, Volume II: Augustine to Scotus, 62-67.
‘analyzing (discernere)’\(^{692}\), ‘synthesizing (connectere)’\(^{693}\), understanding the nature of numbers, \(^{694}\) ‘defining’\(^{695}\), ‘distributing’, ‘distinguishing’, or ‘judging’\(^{696}\); all these instances are equivalent to the activities of discursive reason in Plotinism.\(^{697}\)

Hence, as for Plotinus, so for Augustine, reason is the agent of interiority: \(^{698}\) Augustine associates ‘soundness’ with ‘looking’ only (e.g., ‘healthy eye [sanos oculos]’) rather than ‘seeing’. \(^{699}\) ‘Seeing (videre)’ God, on the other hand, means ‘knowing (scire)’ or ‘understanding (intellegere)’ God\(^{700}\) and this is the goal of interiority: ‘O God, … whom to see (videre) is to possess’\(^{701}\) (and possessing God is attaining true happiness)\(^{702}\).

Augustine makes the same distinction as above in terms of ‘reasoning (ratiocinatio)’ and ‘knowledge (scientia)’ in De quantitate animae 27.52-53. ‘Reason (ratio)’ is the ‘mental sight (mentis aspectus)’\(^{703}\), the ‘interior eye (interiorius oculus)’\(^{704}\), or the ‘mental eye (oculi mentis)’\(^{705}\). ‘Reasoning’ is ‘reason’s search (rationis inquisitio), that is, the actual moving of the sight over the things that are to be seen (aspicienda).’\(^{706}\)

\(^{692}\) De ordine 2.18.48.
\(^{693}\) De ordine 2.18.48.
\(^{694}\) Cf., De ordine 2.19.49.
\(^{695}\) Cf., Soliloquia 2.11.20: ‘Is it not clear to you that it could not be a branch of learning if it contained no definitions and no divisions and distinctions of classes and kinds? (Nonne tibi videtur, si nihil in ea definitum esset, et nihil in genera et partes distributum atque distinctum, eam nullo modo disciplinam esse potuisse?)’
\(^{696}\) De vera religione 29.53.
\(^{697}\) Cf., Andrew Smith, Philosophy in late antiquity (London: Routledge, 2004), 7-8: ‘Where then does he locate the individual person? Since it is ‘we’ who perceive, he locates the ‘we’ or self at the level of discursive reason … reason, which stands midway between sense-perception and intellection’. Also, see Ennead 2.9.2 quoted below.
\(^{698}\) Cf., Ennead 2.9.2: ‘one part of our soul is always directed to the intelligible realities, one to the things of this world, and one is in the middle between these; for since the soul is one nature in many powers, sometimes the whole of it is carried along with the best of itself and of real being, sometimes the worse part is dragged down and drags the middle with it’.
\(^{699}\) Cf., Soliloquia 1.6.13: ‘Reason is the gaze (aspectus) of the soul, but, since it does not follow that everyone who gazes (aspectus) at an object sees (videat) it, correct and perfect gaze (aspectus), of the kind which is followed by vision (visio), is called virtue; for, virtue is correct and perfect reason. But, even though it may have healthy eyes (sanos oculos), the gaze (aspectus) itself (i.e., of the soul) cannot turn them toward the light.’
\(^{700}\) Cf., Soliloquia 1.2.7: ‘I desire to know (scire) God and the soul.’ Ibid., 1.7.14: ‘when the soul shall succeed in seeing (videre), that is, knowing (intellegere) God’.
\(^{701}\) Soliloquia 1.1.3.
\(^{702}\) See my Introduction.
\(^{703}\) De quantitate animae 27.53.
\(^{704}\) De quantitate animae 14.23.
\(^{705}\) De quantitate animae 19.37.
\(^{706}\) De quantitate animae 27.53.
‘Knowledge (scientia and sapientia\textsuperscript{707})’ is having the sight of the mind (mentis aspectus) directed upon an object and seeing (videre) it.\textsuperscript{708}

Notice that, although Augustine maintains that we – that is, reason – can strive to understand God only by divine illumination, knowing God is, in other words, seeing the divine light itself:

A certain admonition, flowing from the very fountain of truth, urges us to remember (recordemur) God, to seek Him, and thirst after Him tirelessly. This hidden sun pours into our innermost eyes that beaming light. His is all the truth that we speak, even though, in our anxiety, we hesitate to turn with courage toward this light and to behold it in its entirety, because our eyes, recently opened, are not yet strong enough. This light appears to be nothing other than God. (De beata vita 4.35)

Pay attention to the first sentence of the above text. The first step of approaching the divine light (i.e., God) is remembering God. This is to say that ‘turning … toward this light and to beholding it in its entirety’ is the same as recalling God fully from our memory, thus a theory of reminiscence.

\textbf{i) Reasoning is remembering}

As the text from De beata vita 4.35 cited above demonstrates, Augustine associates ‘reasoning’ with ‘remembering’: we cannot search for what we do not remember.

\textsuperscript{707} De quantitate animae 27.52. Note that, distinguishing between knowledge of created things (scientia) and that of God (sapientia), Augustine insists that the former is inferior to the latter (Cf., Soliloquia 1.5.11-1.6.12). Hence, using scientia as the springboard, we must strive to gain sapientia. See Soliloquia 1.14.25 (‘we seek or desire other things only for wisdom’s sake’) & De quantitate animae 33.75 (‘this activity, namely, the ardent desire to understand truth and perfection, is the soul’s highest vision it possesses none more perfect, none more noble, none more proper. [haec actio, id est, appetitio intellegendi ea quae vere summeque sunt, summus aspectus est animae, quo perfectiorem, meliorem rectoremque non habet.]’) De quantitate animae 33.75 may be interpreted as meaning that reason is divided into a higher part and a lower part. However, unlike Plotinus and Plato, such a distinction of Augustine, as Armstrong argues, is not ‘between two different mental processes or faculties: it is between two different functions of one and the same faculty, reason. The higher reason is reason at work on divine truth, the lower is reason at work on human and material things. The parallel distinction is that between wisdom - the specific excellence achieved by the mind in dealing with divine things, and knowledge or science, its specific excellence achieved in dealing with lower things.’ (Armstrong, Christian faith and Greek philosophy, 71-72.)
Memory of God is an essential prerequisite for ‘seeking (quaerere)’\textsuperscript{709} God. In other words, due to our memory of God, we are able to ‘desire’\textsuperscript{710} to learn more about Him:

Suppose you have forgotten something, and other men desire, as it were, to recall it to your memory. They say, therefore, is it this or that, offering you things different from it as though they were similar. But you do not see what you are desirous of remembering, yet you see that it is not what they say. When this happens, does it seem that you have entirely forgotten? The very caution by which you are advised not to admit to their false suggestions is a part of remembrance. … Such persons, therefore, do not yet see the true, but they cannot be deceived or misled, and they know sufficiently what they are seeking.

\textit{(Soliloquia 2.20.34)}

(Here, Augustine seems to be explaining why he could not have committed himself fully to Manichaeism, or why he could not be entirely convinced of its theological teachings: according to the theory of reminiscence, that was because he knew or ‘remembered’ at least what truth should be like.)

How, then, did knowledge of God/Truth (as well as other intelligible things) first enter the soul/memory? This was, in fact, Plato’s own question that no one before him had asked\textsuperscript{711} and his purpose of raising the question was to justify his theory of reminiscence.\textsuperscript{712} Plato’s answer took the form of a ‘myth’, that is, ‘a myth of transmigration and reincarnation of souls, borrowed from Greek religion and poetry.’\textsuperscript{713} The theory is that ‘our soul is immortal, existing both before and after its time in the body - inhabiting in fact a whole series of bodies, each of which it enters at birth and leaves at death.’\textsuperscript{714} Hence, learning is merely recollecting what ‘we learned in a

\textsuperscript{708} Cf., \textit{De quantitate animae} 27.53.
\textsuperscript{709} \textit{Soliloquia} 2.20.34.
\textsuperscript{710} \textit{Soliloquia} 1.4.9.
\textsuperscript{711} Cf., Cary, \textit{Augustine’s Invention of the Inner Self}, 15.
\textsuperscript{712} \textit{Meno} 81d: ‘Seeking and learning are wholly recollection’ quoted in Cary, \textit{Augustine’s Invention of the Inner Self}, 14: Plato was also the first person to systematize a theory of reminiscence. Also, see Aimé Solignac, ‘La notion de « memoria » chez Augustin’, in \textit{Dictionnaire de Spiritualité} (Paris: Beauchesne, 1980), vol. 10, 995. ‘Augustin connaissait, par l’intermédiaire de Cicéron (\textit{Tusculanes} I, 24, 56 à 25, 61), les thèses de Platon sur l’anamnèse ou réminiscence, et les pages du \textit{Ménon} sur l’esclave-géomètre (cf \textit{De Trinitate} XII, 15, 24)’.
\textsuperscript{713} Cary, \textit{Augustine’s Invention of the Inner Self}, 15-16.
\textsuperscript{714} Cary, 16.
previous life but have since forgotten\textsuperscript{715}, rather than learning something completely new.

Augustine knew the Platonic doctrine concerning the soul’s ‘repeated\textsuperscript{716} incarnations’ (‘repeated’ is the important word here), which is not compatible with Christian dogmas, and a scholarly debate in this respect still remains unresolved. Did Augustine ever think that it is necessary to postulate the soul’s pre-existence in order to justify and complement his theory of reminiscence?

As a matter of fact, Augustine never insisted that God created the soul before the body.\textsuperscript{717} Yet, Gilson, interpreting the young Augustine’s terms ‘forgetfulness’ and ‘reminiscence’ ‘in the sense these terms have in the Platonic doctrine of the soul’s pre-existence\textsuperscript{718}, says, ‘I am inclined to think that at first Augustine accepted the genuine Platonic doctrine.’\textsuperscript{719} In reference to Augustine’s later works Gilson maintains that Augustine developed a theory of reminiscence which no longer demands the idea of the soul’s pre-existence as an essential prerequisite,\textsuperscript{720} since ‘the Platonic recollection of the past gives way to that Augustinian memory of the present whose role becomes more and more important.’\textsuperscript{721}

‘Recollection/memory of the past’ and ‘memory of the present’ are Gilson’s own terms. He associates the former with recalling the experience of what existed before but no longer is; for instance, a person’s current memory of the Berlin Wall that that person saw between 1961 and 1989. If we draw an analogy between the Berlin Wall and God, and between the disappearance of the Wall and the soul’s separation from God (or the soul’s forgetfulness of God); then the conclusion is that what we can remember about God has come from our experience of Him before the soul entered the body. Gilson

\textsuperscript{715} Cary, 16: Cary’s verdicts on Plato’s theory of recollection, and the myth of transmigration and reincarnation of the soul, are that the former is ‘an enduring Platonist doctrine’, whereas the latter is, ‘as an explanation, a failure.’


\textsuperscript{718} Gilson, The Christian Philosophy of Saint Augustine, 71: refer to Soliloquia 2.20.35, De immortalitate animae 4.6, Epistula. 7.1.2 & De quantitate animae 20.34.

\textsuperscript{719} Gilson, The Christian Philosophy of Saint Augustine, 71.

\textsuperscript{720} Cf., Gilson, 72.

\textsuperscript{721} Gilson, 75.
argues that this is what Augustine initially adopted but would later give up. As for the ‘memory of the present’, it refers to the recollection of what currently or eternally exists; for instance, the memory of our own soul.\textsuperscript{722} According to the theory of reminiscence getting to know the soul is same as recalling what we have already known about it, and the soul is always ‘present to itself’.\textsuperscript{723} Therefore, the memory of the soul is the ‘memory of the present’. Similarly, Gilson insists that the mature Augustine’s emphasis on the ever presence of God in our memory transformed his theory of reminiscence in the way that it no longer depends on the idea of the soul’s pre-existence. Since God is eternal and, so, has never been absent from us; our memory of God is, not that of the past, but that of the present.\textsuperscript{724} Gilson’s interpretation of the mature Augustine might seem rather perplexing, but our subsequent discussion of Teske’s arguments against Gilson will hopefully clarify Gilson’s points.

Note that Gilson identifies Augustine’s theory of divine illumination with that of ‘memory of the present’.\textsuperscript{725} In other words, for Gilson both Augustine’s theory of divine illumination and that of reminiscence concerns memory, but the latter makes reference to the past, whereas the former to the present.

Against Gilson Teske, first of all, argues as follows:

The Augustinian doctrine of ‘memory of the present,’ however, if it is to replace Platonic reminiscence that involves recollection of past experience and pre-existence, must not merely claim that the object remembered is presently

\textsuperscript{722} Cf., Ronald Teske, ‘Platonic reminiscence and memory of the present in St. Augustine’, 222-223. & O’Daly, Augustine’s Philosophy of Mind, 446.
\textsuperscript{723} Cf., De Trinitate 10.3.5: (McKenna’s translation) ‘nothing can be more present to itself (i.e., the mind) than itself (se ipsa nihil sibi posit e esse praesentius)’. Also, see Confessiones 10.15.23: (Chadwick’s translation) ‘I mention memory and I recognize what I am speaking about. Where is my recognition located but in memory itself? Surely memory is present to itself through itself, and not through its own image. (Nomino memoriam et agnosco quod nomin o. Et ubi agnosco nisi in ipsa memoria? Num et ipsa per imaginem suam sibi adest ac non per se ipsam?)’

\textsuperscript{724} Cf., Gilson, The Christian Philosophy of Saint Augustine, 71-72. 82 & 75 (‘he [i.e., Plato] was wrong in concluding … that the soul remembers truth as one remembers knowledge of the past. The fact is that truth is always within our grasp … The Platonic recollection of the past gives way to that Augustinian memory of the present whose role becomes more and more important.’).

\textsuperscript{725} Cf., Gilson, 82: ‘To see things in God’s light implies, not Platonic memory of the past, but Augustinian memory of the present’. Also, see Gerard O’Daly, ‘Memory in Plotinus and two early texts of St. Augustine’, in Platonism Pagan and Christian: Studies in Plotinus and Augustine, (Ashgate: Aldershot, 2001), 468. ‘There is no mention of the illuminating aid of God in EVII; but one essential feature of the illuminatio theory is stressed, the validity of a memory of what now is.’
existing, but must also make the further claim that the object was not first experienced in the past, then retained in memory, and finally recalled. In other words, for the Augustinian memory of the present, of which Gilson speaks, the pastness of the experience has to be eliminated.  

Next, re-interpreting the same Augustinian texts on which Gilson bases his arguments, Teske concludes that not only the young Augustine’s, but also the mature Augustine’s, references to memory always – at least implicitly – refer to the prior existence and experience of the soul.

O’Daly, on the other hand, rejects any claim that the soul’s pre-existence – in whatsoever form – was ever a part of the young Augustine’s system, let alone the mature Augustine’s:

Augustine considers pre-existence to be a possible hypothesis, but without opting for it. Nowhere in his early writings does he unequivocally assert the soul’s pre-existence: it is never more than one possibility among others.

In summary, regarding Augustine’s attitude to the soul’s pre-existence, there are three interpretations. Firstly, Augustine initially admitted it but later renounced it (Gilson). Secondly, Augustine first accepted it explicitly but subsequently implicitly (Teske). Finally, Augustine rejected it from the beginning (O’Daly).

It is true that, as O’Daly insists, Augustine did not explicitly assert the soul’s pre-existence. However, as Teske holds, Augustine’s uses of the term ‘experience

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726 Teske, ‘Platonic reminiscence and memory of the present in St. Augustine’, 223.
727 Cf., Teske, 223. Teske holds that even De Trinitate 12.15.24, in which Augustine explicitly rejects the Platonic reminiscence in favour of a divine illumination theory (Cf., 229-231), cannot be interpreted as abandoning the Platonic ‘memory of the past’ altogether (Cf., 235).
728 O’Daly, Augustine’s Philosophy of Mind, 199: however, he later says that ‘the language of recollection is as metaphorical in quant. an. 35 as elsewhere, but that the metaphor is confusingly assertive there. (p 201)’ Also, see, by the same author, ‘Memory in Plotinus and two early texts of St. Augustine’, 468-469; and ‘Did St. Augustine ever believe in the Soul’s Pre-existence?’, Augustinian Studies 5 (1974), 227-35 (see footnotes no. 1 & 2). Armstrong too holds the same view as O’Daly’s: see Armstrong, Christian faith and Greek philosophy, 70.
(experiiri)\textsuperscript{729} in this respect clearly refer to the past. For instance, in \textit{De vera religione} 30.54 Augustine says,

art in the popular sense is nothing but the memory of things we have \textit{experienced} and which have given us pleasure, with the addition of some skilled bodily activity. If you lack the skill you can still judge of the works produced even though you cannot produce them. And the power of judging is much better.\textsuperscript{730}

Bear in mind that in Augustine’s thoughts there is the unchangeable ‘standard (\textit{lex}) of all the arts’ – that is, God – ‘above (\textit{supra})’ the mind.\textsuperscript{731} Moreover, since our mind is ‘given the power to see (\textit{videre})\textsuperscript{732} the standard, we are able to make aesthetic judgements according to it.\textsuperscript{733} Now, pay attention to the phrase ‘memory of things we have experienced and which have given us pleasure’,\textsuperscript{734} Augustine here is not saying that we are eternally experiencing the standard, or that we perpetually have pleasure in ‘seeing’ it as a result of the experience. Therefore, the memory of the experience and the pleasure is an occurrence in the past, though the standard is eternally ever-present in memory.

We can see a similar instance in \textit{Confessions}. Regarding our innate, universal desire for the ‘happy life (\textit{beata vita})’\textsuperscript{735} – that is the ‘joy in Truth’,\textsuperscript{736} or the joy derived from God\textsuperscript{737} –, the Augustine of the \textit{Confessions} insists that it logically presupposes the existence of knowledge (‘\textit{notitia}’\textsuperscript{738}) of it in our memory, which in turn comes from our experience of it.\textsuperscript{739} Here, again, the experience of the ‘joy (\textit{laetari})’\textsuperscript{740} is a thing of the

\textsuperscript{729} \textit{De vera religione} 30.54 & \textit{Confessiones} 10.21.30.
\textsuperscript{730} \textsuperscript{\textit{Ita reperitur nihil esse alium artem vulgarem, nisi rerum expertarum placitarumque memoriam, usu quodam corporis atque operationis adiuncto: quo si careas, iudicare de operibus possis, quod multo est excellentius, quamvis operari artificiosa non possis.'}
\textsuperscript{731} Cf., \textit{De vera religione} 30.56: ‘supra mentem nostram esse legem, quae veritas dicitur’. ‘Beauty’:
\textit{Soliloquia} 1.10.17 and \textit{De vera religione} 3.3 & 33.62.
\textsuperscript{732} \textit{De vera religione} 30.56.
\textsuperscript{733} Cf., \textit{De vera religione} 39.73.
\textsuperscript{734} ‘rerum expertarum placitarumque memoriam’
\textsuperscript{735} \textit{Confessiones} 10.20.29.
\textsuperscript{736} \textit{Confessiones} 10.23.33: ‘beatam vitam, quod non est alium quam de veritate gaudium’.
\textsuperscript{737} Cf., \textit{Confessiones} 10.22.32: ‘That is the authentic happy life, to set one’s joy on you, grounded in you and caused by you (\textit{ipsa est beata vita, gaudere ad te, de te, propter te})’.
\textsuperscript{738} \textit{Confessiones} 10.20.29 quoted in Gérard Verbeke, ‘Connaissance de soi et connaissance de Dieu chez saint Augustin’, \textit{Augustiniana} 4 (1954), 505.
\textsuperscript{739} Cf., \textit{Confessiones} 10.20.29-21.31.
\textsuperscript{740} \textit{Confessiones} 10.21.30.
past so that even in sorrow we can remember the past moment of being joyful.\textsuperscript{741} I shall discuss it in detail in section ‘God’s immanence’ of chapter 2 in Part III.

In summary, we gain knowledge of a being/thing through experiencing it. Eventually, although both the young Augustine and the mature Augustine would not like to admit the pagan idea concerning the pre-existence of the soul, both of them could not find a way to explain how our innate knowledge of God is possible through recollection other than by making references to the past experience of the soul before the body.

**ii) Reason does not create, but discovers, knowledge of God**\textsuperscript{742}

Alongside the term of ‘remember’, Augustine also uses ‘discover (\textit{invenire})’\textsuperscript{743}, in association to our intellectual journey to God, and it has two implications.

One is that knowledge of God is a being. In \textit{De quantitate animae} 27.53 Augustine says that ‘knowledge stands higher than reason’\textsuperscript{744}. Since he applies the terms ‘higher’ and ‘lower’ with respect to the hierarchy\textsuperscript{745} of ‘substances’\textsuperscript{746}, undoubtedly Augustine considers that knowledge is an ontological category: in \textit{De Trinitate} 9.4.6, Augustine explicitly says that ‘knowledge is a substance’\textsuperscript{747}. Thus, when Augustine insists that we can know God \textit{inferentially}\textsuperscript{748} in reference to His creation,\textsuperscript{749} he is at the same time arguing that reasoning is not ‘creating’ but ‘discovering’.\textsuperscript{750}

\textsuperscript{741} Cf., \textit{Confessiones} 10.21.30: ‘gaudium meum etiam tristis memini’.
\textsuperscript{742} Cf., \textit{De vera religione} 39.73: ‘Reasoning does not create but discovers (Truth/God) (\textit{ratiocinatio talia facit, sed invenit})’.
\textsuperscript{743} \textit{De vera religione} 39.73.
\textsuperscript{744} ‘scientiam pluris quam rationem’.
\textsuperscript{745} Cf., \textit{De quantitate animae} 34.78.
\textsuperscript{746} Cf., \textit{De ordine} 2.17.46: ‘no difference between the substance (\textit{substantiam}) of God and that of the soul.’ \textit{De vera religione} 7.13 ‘For every thing, substance (\textit{substantia}), essence or nature, or whatever better word there may be, possesses at once these three qualities: it is a particular thing; it is distinguished from other things by its own proper form; and it does not transgress the order of nature.’
\textsuperscript{747} ‘substantia sit scientia’.
\textsuperscript{748} i.e., in Augustine’s language, ‘reasoning (\textit{ratiocinatio})’.
\textsuperscript{749} Cf., \textit{De vera religione} 52.101.
\textsuperscript{750} Cf., \textit{De vera religione} 39.73: ‘reasoning does not create but discovers it (i.e., truth) (\textit{ratiocinatio talia facit, sed invenit})’.
The other is that human reason is not the Creator: whatever reason understands – whether it be about God, the soul\(^{751}\) or any other thing – is not a mental ‘creation (facere)’ but a ‘discovery (invenire)’:

when, either reasoning with ourselves or being cleverly questioned by another about certain liberal arts, we discover that those things we have found are nowhere else but in our mind, and since discovering is not the same as making or causing - otherwise the mind would bring forth eternal things by means of temporal discovery, for it often does discover eternal things.\(^{752}\)

Note that ‘liberal arts’ in the above text means the academic disciplines that are ‘made (fierе)’\(^{753}\) true by Truth/God. However, Augustine maintains that the ‘art of argumentation’ (i.e., dialectics) is one of the disciplines as well as Truth itself or God Himself.\(^{754}\)

iii) God is in the soul

We can endeavour to ‘remember’, ‘discover’, and ‘understand’ God because Truth/God is in the soul\(^{755}\)/memory and ‘reasoning’ (in search for knowledge of God) is ‘remembering’ (Him):

there is another form of forgetting which can more properly be described as nearer to recalling or recognition of the truth. It is like the experience of seeing something and realising for a certainty that we have seen it at some time in the past. We even assert that we know it, yet we have our work cut out for us to

\(^{751}\) Cf., *De quantitate animae* 14.24: ‘reason itself, by which the soul endeavours to discover (invenire) even itself’.

\(^{752}\) *De Immortalitate animae*. 4.6: ‘cum vel nos ipsi nobiscum ratiocinantes, vel ab alio bene interrogati de quibusdam liberalibus artibus ea quae invenimus, non alibi quam in animo nostro invenimus: neque id est invenire, quod facere aut gignere; aliquoq aeterna gigneret animus inventione temporali (nam aeterna sepe invenit …)’. Also, see *De vera religione* 39.73 & Augustine, A., *The Immortality of the Soul*, The Fathers of the Church Series, trans. Ludwig Schopp (Washington DC: The Catholic University of America Press, 1947), 24, footnote 6: ‘“Discover” is not necessarily to be understood as (reminiscense) in the Platonic sense. For in *Soliloquiae* 1.8.15 Augustine clearly states the doctrine of divine enlightening.’

\(^{753}\) *Soliloquiae* 2.17.31.

\(^{754}\) Cf., *Soliloquiae* 2.11.19-2.13.24. See section ‘Learning (disciplina) is in the soul’ (Cf., Ibid., 2.13.24) of chapter 2 in Part II.

\(^{755}\) Cf., *Soliloquiae* 2.13.24 & 2.19.33 (‘all that the soul knows it possesses within itself’).
recollect and recall where or when or how or in whose presence the thing came to our notice. For instance, if this happens in the case of some human being, we ask where we got to know him, and, when he tells us, suddenly the whole circumstances come flooding back into our memory like a light and the memory need labour no longer to help I us to remember. (*Soliloquia* 2.20.34)

That is also the situation in the case of those who are well trained in the liberal disciplines: they draw out, one might even say, dig out, in the course of learning such pieces of knowledge which were without doubt buried within them in forgetfulness. Nevertheless, they are not content, and they will not rest until they have gazed long and deep on the face of all that truth whose splendour glows within those arts. (*Soliloquia* 2.20.35)

In other words, unless God/Truth is in memory, we cannot ‘remember’ Him.

Memory is where knowledge of God is present, but it does not make memory on a par with reason. Having memory of God is not being ‘with’ God, but understanding God is: since ‘whatever understands God is with (cum) God’\(^\text{756}\), only the intellect/reason of those who know God (i.e., ‘wise men’) is with God.\(^\text{757}\) Memory, on the other hand, is of no use for a ‘wise man’, for he sees God.\(^\text{758}\) There is indeed a moment when the wise man needs memory and that is when he wants to teach Wisdom to others. Yet, in this case, memory acts like a ‘slave’\(^\text{759}\) to his reason.\(^\text{760}\) (These were, in fact, the arguments of Trygetius but Augustine accepts them.)\(^\text{761}\) Furthermore, as I explained in the Introduction,\(^\text{762}\) Augustine maintains reason’s ultimate superiority over memory from the perspective of the afterlife: in the afterlife we do not need memory because we see God ‘face to face’:

\(^{756}\) *De ordine* 2.2.4.

\(^{757}\) Cf., *De ordine* 2.2.5: ‘if we know anything, I think it is contained in the intellect alone, and by it alone can it be grasped. Whence it follows that, if what the wise man knows by understanding is with God, then the entire thing which the wise man knows can be with God.’

\(^{758}\) Cf., *De ordine* 2.2.7: ‘a wise man … has everything in front of the interior eyes of the intellect.’

\(^{759}\) Cf., *De ordine* 2.2.6.

\(^{760}\) Cf., *De ordine* 2.2.4-7.

\(^{761}\) Cf., *De ordine* 2.2.4-7.

\(^{762}\) See, in my Introduction, the section marked as ‘(5-1)’ or ‘(5-1-1)’. 
Why should Faith be needed, since now it sees (God)? We commit what we believe to memory.

what need is there of memory for a wise man, who has everything in front of the interior eyes of the intellect.

In summary, memory is inferior to reason: ‘memory itself resides in this subordinate part.’ However, did the young Augustine insist on reason’s superiority to the point of its being indistinguishable from God? Cary argues that Augustine’s perception of God’s immanence makes God’s transcendence insignificant and, so, in his earliest works ‘there is so little that distinguishes turning to the soul from turning to God’. Regarding ‘the mature version of Augustine’s inward turn’, Cary holds that ‘there are two distinct movements, first “in” then “up.” In the second movement, the soul looks not at itself but above its mutable self to the immutable Truth. ‘But’, Cary maintains, ‘this second movement is unnecessary if the highest part of the soul is immutable or if the immutable Truth is inseparably present in the soul. … as if whenever the mind is turned to itself it is necessarily turned to God, and vice versa: ‘the central purpose of the Soliloquies … was to prove that the soul could not suffer such changes. Hence Augustine’s mature view on this subject represents a profound about-face from his early project.’

Cary is right that for the young Augustine the soul is immortal due to its inseparability from Truth/God. However, as I explained in section ‘Mutability’ in chapter 1, the soul is not entirely immutable. For instance, reason’s ‘soundness (sanus)’ changes. Also, our emotions often fluctuate. Cary uses ‘immortality’ and

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763 Soliloquia 1.7.14. In De Trinitate 8.4.6 he says that ‘we walk by faith, not by sight (2 Cor. 5.7)’.
764 De ordine 2.2.7.
765 De ordine 2.2.6.
766 Cf., Cary, Augustine’s Invention of the Inner Self, 39.
767 Cary, p 105.
768 Cary, p 105.
769 Cary, p 105.
770 Cary, p 106.
771 Soliloquia 2.12.22.
773 Cf., Soliloquia 1.6.12.
774 Cf., Soliloquia 10.18.
'immutability' interchangeably as Augustine did in *De immortalitate animae* 2.2.775

Yet, in other parts of his early works Augustine applies them in two different senses: as explained in section ‘The hierarchy’ of chapter 1, the incorporeal soul is indivisible/immortal, but mutable. In addition to reason’s partial mutability, Cary overlooks the significance of the creation doctrine in the young Augustine’s system: as mentioned in section ‘Creator-or-creature’ of chapter 1, Augustine insisted on an insurmountable, ontological gap between the Creator and the created soul.

How, then, are we to understand God’s *inseparable* immanence? I shall investigate it in reference to God’s transcendence.

(1) Immanence

(a) Learning (*disciplina*) is in the soul 776

The outline of Augustine’s argument for God’s immanence is as follows: (1) only a certain kind of truth is divine; (2) ‘*disciplina* (it literally means “learning”, but has a hermeneutical problem that I shall explain later)’777 is an archetypal instance of what Truth/God makes true; (3) since the soul – not the body – is the agent of cognitive activities, *disciplina* pertains to the soul and, so, Truth/God itself must be in the soul (the soul does not need any corporeal medium to access intelligible realities). Note that for Augustine the art of argumentation (i.e., dialectics) is not only one of *disciplinae* but also Truth itself (or the ‘Intelligible Light’778):779

it (i.e., ‘the science of argumentation’) is through itself that it is a true branch of learning (*per seipsam disciplina vera est*). Who, then, will think it strange if that by which all things are true is through itself and in itself the true Truth.

(*Soliloquia* 2.11.21)

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777 *Soliloquia* 2.11.19.
778 *Soliloquia* 1.1.3.
779 Cf., *Soliloquia* 2.11.20–21.
Firstly (1), there are two kinds of truth. One is ‘self-contradictory’ and ‘two-faced’ – that is, on the one hand, true, on the other hand, false. For instance, a picture of a horse is ‘truly’ a picture if that horse is not real, otherwise the picture is false. The other kind of truth is eternal and makes other things true: this is God, who is immanent within the soul.

Secondly (2), regarding the truthfulness of disciplina, we need to understand what disciplina means before examining why Augustine argues that it is always true. ‘Disciplina’ is derived from the word ‘learn (discere)’. However, only certain kinds of learning can be classified as disciplina and they are the academic disciplines that are established on the basis of the principles (rationes) of definition, division, and distinction; for example, the art of argumentation (discipinalis e regulae disputandi) and grammar: both the principles and the art of argumentation are, in fact, dialectics.

Now, for Augustine the truthfulness of dialectics is beyond doubt: in an epistemological sense, dialectics is ‘self-evident’. Therefore, disciplina is always true. Surprisingly, Augustine maintains that we cannot make any mistake when we apply dialectics – that is, an act of ‘looking (aspicere)’ or ‘reasoning (ratiocinatio)’ – in learning:

no one who learns and holds on to what he learns can be said not to know.

Moreover, no one knows the false.

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780 Cf., Soliloquia 2.10.18: ‘how would the picture be true, if the horse were not false?’
781 Cf., Soliloquia 2.10.18.
782 Cf., Soliloquia 2.11.20.
783 Cf., Soliloquia 2.11.20: ‘I can think of no kind of a branch of learning in which definitions, divisions, and reasoning do not perform their functions in defining the nature of a thing, in assigning to everything its proper place without any confusion of parts, in excluding nothing germane to the subject, in including nothing which does not belong there, in doing all that for which it is called a branch of learning.’
784 Cf., Soliloquia 2.11.21.
785 Cf., Soliloquia 2.11.19-20.
786 Soliloquia 1.6.12.
787 De quantitate animae 27.53.
788 Soliloquia 2.11.20. Later, Augustine says, ‘In corporal and spiritual (imaginary) perception the soul is liable to error; but in things intellectually seen it is not liable to error if there be any error, it is because the soul does not really intellectually see; for what it intellectually sees is true (de Gen. ad litt. xii. 25, 52). Similarly elsewhere. “Intellectual perception is not liable to error; for either: he who thinks something else than what is, does not intellectually see; or: if he does intellectually see, it follows it is true” (ibid. 14,
Cary's interpretation of this text is that - and I agree with him – is that learning (disciplina) is catching sight of some intelligible truth.\textsuperscript{789}

Finally (3), in De immortalitate animae Augustine explains why disciplina is in the soul.

Note that there is, however, an exegetical problem concerning ‘disciplina’ in ‘If disciplina exists anywhere … . (De immortalitate animae 1.1.)’ There is the same problem with the phrase ‘disciplina is truth (Est autem disciplina veritas)’ in Soliloquia 2.13.24. Referring to the text quoted above from Soliloquia 2.11.21, Cary argues that ‘this clause (i.e., “per seipsam disciplina vera est”) could also be read as providing its own subject, in which case it should be translated: “discipline is true through its own self.” In that case the conclusion is that not merely dialectic, but discipline itself is Truth. This conclusion too could be supported by Reason’s line of argument, which implies that Discipline in general is true by virtue of something internal to it, namely, the discipline of argumentation. Precisely because the discipline of dialectic makes all the disciplines true, Discipline in general makes itself true. Thus it seems that if dialectic is Truth, then Discipline also is Truth and Augustine has succeeded in justifying the premise he needs for his proof of the immortality of the soul.\textsuperscript{790} In summary, the problem is whether ‘disciplina’ in this context means one of several disciplinae or disciplina in general.\textsuperscript{791}

Cary approaches the problem in terms of ‘signum’ and ‘res (or sigificatio)’.\textsuperscript{792}

According to Augustine’s explanation in De ordine 2.11.34 signum is sensible whereas

\textsuperscript{29)}: Cuthbert Butler, Western Mysticism: The Teaching of Ss Augustine, Gregory and Bernard on Contemplation and the Contemplative Life (London: Constable & Company, 1922), 50.

\textsuperscript{789} Cary, Augustine’s Invention of the Inner Self, p 96-98: ‘(the argument is, on the face of it, bizarre: the basic premise amounts to the claim that one can never learn anything false. Either Augustine is convinced that no one can ever acquire false beliefs’ or else his premise ought to be read as a claim about the concept of “learning”: any learning worthy of the name means finding truth, not falsehood.) The import of the premise would then be that in true learning we do not just come to believe that some sentence or other is true - as if learning was merely the acquisition of opinion not knowledge - but rather we catch sight of some intelligible truth. If that is the meaning of the premise, then the really questionable part of the argument is the claim that the liberal arts actually consist of such learning.’ Next, Cary continues to investigate it further, raising the following question: ‘why should we think that disciplina necessarily consists of discere, in this strong sense of learning to see the intelligible truth?’

\textsuperscript{790} Cary, p 99.

\textsuperscript{791} Cary, p 98.

\textsuperscript{792} Cf., Cary, p 96.
res is intelligible. For example, an artistic work (i.e., a signum) signifies the existence of the law of arts. However, both disciplinae and Truth are incorporeal and, so, must be res: on the other hand, signa are the words spoken or written for communication in teaching and learning. Therefore, Cary takes ‘disciplina’ (i.e., signum) as meaning disciplina in general (i.e., res). However, in Soliloquia 2.19.33 Augustine explicitly distinguishes one disciplina (e.g., geometry) from another (i.e., Truth). Moreover, in the same text Augustine emphasized that Truth (i.e., one disciplina) makes geometry (i.e., another disciplina) and the soul immortal:

whether the forms of geometry are in the truth or the truth is in them, no one doubts that they are contained in our soul, that is, in our intelligence, and because of this it follows of necessity that the truth exists in our soul. If every discipline is in our soul as in a subject inseparably, and if the truth cannot pass away, why, I ask you, do we have doubts about the perpetual life of the soul because of some familiarity with death? (Soliloquia 2.19.33)

Therefore, I shall, in this thesis, take ‘disciplina’ in De immortalitate animae 1.1 and Soliloquia 2.13.24 as meaning dialectics, which is a disciplina as well as Truth/God itself.

In Soliloquia 2.19.33 Augustine simply insists that the immanence of disciplina in the soul – more specifically in reason – is self-evident, but in De immortalitate animae explains the reasoning behind it as follows:

disciplina is somewhere, for it exists, and whatever exists cannot be nowhere.

Again, disciplina can exist only in that which lives. For nothing that does not live learns anything, and disciplina cannot possibly exist in something that does not

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793 Cf., De vera religione 52.101.
794 Cf., De magistro 2.3.
795 Cf., Cary, Augustine’s Invention of the Inner Self, p 96: ‘the liberal arts are God. But this is exactly the import of Augustine’s key premise here. He flatly identifies disciplina, the word for studies in the liberal arts curriculum, with veritas, the Truth by which every truth (verum) is true - which, as the previous discussions at Cassiciacum make clear, can be nothing other than God.’
796 ‘If disciplina exists anywhere ….’
797 ‘disciplina is truth (Est autem disciplina veritas)’
learn. Again, *disciplina* exists always. For whatever exists and is immutable must necessarily exist always. … *all that the soul knows it possesses within itself.*

Those things that are comprehended by the intellect, however, are comprehended as existing nowhere else but in the comprehending mind itself and, at the same time, as not contained in space. (*De immortalitate animae* 6.10)

It must be stressed that, only if we understand/know God, reason is with God. Otherwise, Truth/God is in memory alone, and memory is a 'world', where intelligible things are found:

all true reasons/principles are in its (i.e., of *animum*) secret places, although because of ignorance or forgetfulness it may seem not to have them or to have lost them,

Hence, reason endeavours to see God, who is in the memory – in other words, reason strives to be with God, who is in the memory – and that is the goal of our life.

Notice that Augustine argues for God’s immanence not only epistemologically, but also ontologically:

whatever understands God is with God. (*De ordine* 2.2.4)

We (i.e., reason) move closer to God by understanding God: we cannot be with God without knowing Him. Thus, if there is no epistemological movement, there is no ontological movement either; the former is the essential condition for the latter. On

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798 *De immortalitate animae* 1.1.
799 Also, see *De immortalitate animae* 2.2 & *De ordine* 2.2.4.
800 Each soul is a world rather than the world, for one soul is completely isolated from another in this life: ‘they could not perceive one another’s minds.’ (*De ordine* 2.12.35)
801 *Soliloquia* 1.1.3. Also, see *De ordine* 1.11.32 & 2.19.51.
803 *De immortalitate animae* 4.6 (‘manifestum etiam est, immortalem esse animum humanum, et omnes veras rationes in secretis eius esse, quamvis eas sive ignorance sive oblivione, aut non habere, aut amississe videatur.’) quoted in Cary, Augustine’s *Invention of the Inner Self*, p 101.
804 In the *Confessions* Augustine argues for God’s immanence both in an epistemological sense and an ontological sense: see Aimé Solignac, *Notes Complémentaires*, vol. 14, *Bibliothèque Augustinienne* (France : Desclée de Brouwer, 1962), 565: ‘Notons cependant qu’Augustin raisonne toujours comme si la
what grounds, then, does Augustine maintain that God is (not only epistemologically but also) ontologically present in the soul? He says that

what he (i.e., a wise man) perceives by the soul, is with (cum) God805 (De ordine 2.2.5).

In other words, knowledge of God is ontologically ‘with (cum)’ God, who is ‘an eternal substance’806. Where knowledge of God exists is where God Himself is. Consequently, knowledge is an ontological reality. In De Trinitate 9.4.6, Augustine explicitly says that ‘knowledge is a substance’807. However, we can find a synonymous expression in his early works. In De quantitate animae 27.53 Augustine says that ‘knowledge stands higher than reason’808: since he applies the terms ‘higher’ and ‘lower’ with respect to the hierarchy809 of ‘substances’810, we can conclude that knowledge is a substance even for the young Augustine. (Note that De ordine 2.2.4 is a synthesis of De immortalitate animae 6.10 and De ordine 2.2.5.) All these lead to the conclusion that knowledge of God, which is superior to the soul, is hierarchically on a par with God: since immaterial beings are not separated, or in the vicinity of, each other in a physical (or geographical) sense; the word ‘with (cum)’ in the above text quoted from De ordine 2.2.5 must be interpreted as meaning hierarchical equality. The Augustine of De Trinitate, however, insists that knowledge of God is inferior to God:
that knowledge (i.e., of God) is less than He, because it is in a lower nature; for
the mind is creature, but God is Creator.\footnote{811}{De Trinitate 9.11.16. (McKenna’s translation)}

In summary, the more our reason gains knowledge of God from the memory, the
closer we (i.e., reason) move towards God; since the knowledge, which is a substance,
is with God.

Augustine insists on not only the immanence of disciplina within the soul/memory,
but also their inseparability.\footnote{812}{Cf., Soliloquia 2.12.22.} This is because of the most common, traditional
objection to the theory of reminiscence. ‘The fact of ignorance seems to show disciplina
is not always in us.’\footnote{813}{Cf., Cary, Augustine’s Invention of the Inner Self, 100-102, especially 101.} Thus, in order to safeguard his theory of reminiscence,
Augustine maintains the inseparability of disciplina and the soul.

**(b) Disciplina and the soul are inseparable**

Augustine explains the inseparability of the soul and Truth/God as follows:

a thing is in a subject in such a manner that that thing cannot be separated from
the subject, as the form and appearance which we see in this wood, as light is in
the sun, as heat is in fire … whatever is inseparably in a subject cannot continue
if its subject does not continue … if fire were to be without heat, it would not be
fire, and we can call snow only that which is white.\footnote{814}{Soliloquia 2.12.22.}

‘This sense of “in” is one that “Augustine” claims is familiar to him from his school
days. It comes in fact from the one text of classical Greek philosophy that Augustine
ever mastered firsthand (even if in translation), Aristotle’s *Categories*. Augustine is
claiming that intelligible things are in the mind in the same way a quality is in a
substance as its subject. Thus God is “in” the soul in the sense of the word “in” defined

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\begin{itemize}
  \item \footnote{811}{De Trinitate 9.11.16. (McKenna’s translation)}
  \item \footnote{812}{Cf., Soliloquia 2.12.22.}
  \item \footnote{813}{Cf., Cary, Augustine’s Invention of the Inner Self, 100-102, especially 101.}
  \item \footnote{814}{Soliloquia 2.12.22.}
\end{itemize}
by Aristotle’s notion of a quality being “in” a subject: “By ‘in a subject’ I mean what is in something, not as a part, being incapable of existing separate from what it is in.”\footnote{145}

Due to the inseparability of \textit{disciplina} and the soul, Augustine concludes that the soul also must be immortal:

If whatever is in a subject endures forever, the subject itself must of necessity endure. Every branch of learning is in the soul as in a subject. If, therefore, \textit{disciplina} endures forever, then the soul must endure forever. But, learning is truth (\textit{est autem disciplina veritas}), and, as reason showed in the beginning of this book, truth abides forever. Therefore, the soul endures forever; if it died, we would not call it the soul.\footnote{146}

Therefore, Cary is right to maintain that ‘Augustine’s argument for the immortality of the soul clearly implies the divinity of the soul’\footnote{147}. ‘For the crucial attribute of the intelligible things that Augustine locates in the soul is their immutability, and their presence in the soul makes the soul also immutable, at least in its higher or rational part. And for Augustine (and also for all orthodox Christians in his times) immutability is the one attribute that is most clearly and certainly characteristic of deity, the characteristic that distinguishes God from everything else’\footnote{148}:

\begin{quote}
the countenance of truth is ever one and changeless,\footnote{149} reason is immutable.\footnote{150} (\textit{De immortalitate animae} 2.2 [386/387])
\end{quote}

\footnotetext[145]{Cary, \textit{Augustine’s Invention of the Inner Self}, p 102. Also see the footnote no. 35: ‘See Conf. 4:28-29. On Augustine’s use of Aristotle’s Categories at this point see Du Roy, 178. It is worth noting that this early logical treatise represents Aristotle at his most un-Platonistic; see “Alexander’s Interpretation of Aristotle” in chapter 2.’}
\footnotetext[146]{\textit{Soliloquia} 2.13.24.}
\footnotetext[147]{Cf., Cary, \textit{Augustine’s Invention of the Inner Self}, 100-101. Also, see \textit{Soliloquia} 2.13.24 (‘The human soul is immortal’) & \textit{De Immortalitate animae} 4.6.}
\footnotetext[148]{Cary, \textit{Augustine’s Invention of the Inner Self}, 100-101.}
\footnotetext[149]{\textit{Soliloquia} 2.20.35.}
\footnotetext[150]{‘(Mutabile est autem corpus humanum, et) immutabilis ratio.’}
However, Augustine argues that, although the soul possesses certain ‘characteristic of deity’, such as immutability (or immortality), God still transcends the soul: I shall now demonstrate it.

(2) Immanence and transcendence

Cary argues that ‘in contrast to Plotinus, the mature Augustine comes to picture the inner space of the soul as something other than the intelligible world itself. This otherness (i.e., the soul’s otherness from God) is marked by the contrast between mutability and immutability. In contrast to the changelessness of Truth, the soul is mutable, which means that it is vulnerable to changes for the worse – corruption and evil and perhaps even death. Yet the central purpose of the Soliloquies (as we have seen) was to prove that the soul could not suffer such changes. Hence Augustine’s mature view on this subject represents a profound about-face from his early project.’

Not only in Soliloquia (and De immortalitate animae), but also in later works, the young Augustine stresses the immutability of reason, for instance, De vera religione 49.95:

When we are asked which is better, truth or falsehood, we answer with one voice that truth is better. And yet we are so sunk in trifles and baseness that we are much more ready to cling to jests and games in which deception, not truth, delights us; than to the precepts of the truth itself. So by our own judgment and out of our own mouth we are sentenced because we approve one thing by reason and pursue another in our vanity.

In short, the truthfulness of reason’s judgements is unchangeable, though carnal desires can make reason malfunction. Thus, reason is always and absolutely the trustworthy guide for our journey to God.

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821 Cf., Cary, Augustine’s Invention of the Inner Self, 106.
822 Cf., De vera religione 41.78: ‘If therefore by negligence or impiety a man, i.e., mind and reason, is subdued by desire he will be a base and unhappy man’.
823 Reason also leads us to true understanding of revealed truths: ‘(Hold fast whatever truth you have been able to grasp, and attribute it to the Catholic Church. Reject what is false and pardon me who am but a man.) What is doubtful believe until either reason teaches or …’ (De vera religione 10.20).
Notice that Augustine insists on the certainty of our judgment and intelligence only in reference to truth other than revealed ones. For instance, in *De immortalitate animae* 2.2 Augustine argues that reason never fails to grasp mathematical truth:

reason is immutable. … It is always in the same way that two and four make six. In the same way, it is always true that four is the sum of two and two … Such reasoning is not subject to change; therefore reason exists. In no way, on the other hand, can that which is inseparably in a subject remain unchanged, after the subject itself is changed.

Revealed truth, on the other hand, still remains impenetrable or ‘ineffable’ to reason (cf., *De ordine* 2.7.24 [386]).\(^{824}\) reason has become too ‘dull’\(^{825}\) to understand the truth that the Catholic Church teaches. Yet, Wisdom, which includes revealed truths, is superior to mathematical truth:

I would not dare assert that wisdom derives from number or is contained in it. I do not see how I could do so because I am acquainted with many mathematicians or accountants, or whatever else they may be called, who work out perfectly accurate and remarkable calculations. But of wise men, I either know very few, or possibly none at all. Wisdom, it strikes me, is far nobler than number. (*De libero arbitrio* 2.30 [388-395])

Moreover, training our mind with mathematics and ‘the science of right reasoning’ can prepare us to understand what the Christian faith teaches (cf., *De ordine* 2.18.47): I shall consider this further in section ‘Train the mind’ of chapter 2.

Nonetheless, Augustine, in other parts of his early works, insists on the soul’s mutability not only with respect to emotion,\(^ {826}\) but also with respect to reason, for instance,

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\(^{824}\) Cf., Gerard O’Daly, *Augustine’s Philosophy of Mind*, 164: ‘Indeed, true philosophy, as understood here by Augustine, deals in transcendental and eschatological categories that make assertions about the full attainability of truth in this life seem as implausible to him as they are to the Academic sceptic’.

\(^{825}\) *De ordine* 1.1.2.

\(^{826}\) Cf., *De vera religione* 10.18 (written in 389/391).
The mind is like healthy eyes when it is cleansed of every taint of the body, that is, detached and purged of the desires for earthly things … it cannot see unless it is healthy (videre nequit nisi sana). (Soliloquia 1.6.12 [386/387])

When Augustine says ‘the mind has to be healed (sanandum esse animum)”827 in De vera religione 3.3 (389/391), it is only a recapitulation of Soliloquia 1.6.12. Furthermore, Augustine does not consider reason’s immutability (or immortality) on a par with God’s, for God is the Creator whereas the soul is His creation (Cf., Soliloquia 1.1.2). Thus, God is Truth itself (Cf., Ibid., 1.1.2), but the soul is made to see the Truth only under divine illumination (Cf., Ibid., 1.6.12 & 1.8.15). In other words, reason’s immutability is not spontaneous, but due to the grace of the Creator.

In De quantitate animae 2.3 (387/388) Augustine makes clear the ontological difference between the Creator God and the soul, who is the image of God:

A. … the soul is like to God. …

E. That is exactly what I should like you to explain: how the human soul is like to God. For, although we believe that God has been made by no one, you said previously that the soul is made by God Himself.

…

E. … God made the soul immortal …

…

E. … just as He, being immortal, makes something immortal in His own likeness …

…

E. … I cannot make anything immortal …

A. … your soul has not the same power as He in whose likeness it has been made.

827 Cf., ‘Nothing hinders the perception of truth more than a life devoted to lusts, and the false images of sensible things, derived from the sensible world and impressed on us by the agency of the body, which beget various opinions and errors. Therefore the mind has to be healed so that it may behold the immutable form of things which remains ever the same, preserving its beauty unchanged and unchangeable, knowing no spatial distance or temporal variation, abiding absolutely one and the same.’
Referring to the same text, Vannier interprets the soul’s immortality as a consequence of being created ‘similar’ to God (or to the ‘image of God’): ‘ce statut original de l’âme vient de ce que «l’âme est semblable à Dieu» (De quantitate animae II,3, p. 231). Créée, mais créée immortelle (ibid.), l’âme est véritablement capax Dei. … Sans doute Augustin reprend-il pour sa démonstration une structure platonicienne, mais il met aussi et surtout l’accent sur la possibilité d’action qui est donnée à l’être humain, sur le caractère dynamique de sa ressemblance avec Dieu.’ 828 Note ‘capax Dei’ is an Augustinian term appearing in De Trinitate, and means our capability to ‘participate’ teleologically in God – that is, to remember, understand, and love God.829 Now, if what Vannier means by ‘capax Dei’ is the soul’s capacity to become like God – in other words, our capacity to deify ourselves –, then he is certainly right in this respect: ‘participate’ is a deificatory language of Church Fathers.830

Later, Augustine argues in De vera religione that, although our body has become mortal due to our sin,831 the Creator God does not allow our soul to perish832, or to be totally separate from Him.833 In other words, God has made the soul immortal.

Therefore, due to the ontological gap between God and the soul, the soul must turn not only inwards but also upwards in search for the Creator God.

(Later, in the Confessions Augustine argues for the same thing in a similar manner. The fact that none of us wants to be deceived834 demonstrates that reason is always in

829 e.g., De Trinitate 14.8.11: (McKenna’s translation) ‘For it is His image by the very fact that it is capable of Him, and can be a partaker of Him (Eo quippe ipso imago eius est, quo eius capax est, eiusque particeps esse potest).’ See Walter H. Principe, ‘Dynamism of Augustine’s Terms for Describing the Highest Trinitarian Image in the Human Person’, Studia Patristica 17 (Part 3), 1295 & 1297, footnote no. 26. Also, see section ‘The image of the Triune God’ of chapter 2 in Part IV.
830 Refer to the first half of the Introduction.
831 Cf., De vera religione 26.48: ‘This is the tradition concerning God’s temporal dispensation and his providential care for those who by sin had deservedly become mortal.’
832 Cf., De vera religione 55.107: ‘We worship one God from whom, through whom and in whom we have our being, from whom we fell away, being made unlike him, by whom we have not been allowed to perish, the principle to which we have recourse, the form we imitate, the grace whereby we are reconciled.’
833 Cf., De vera religione 14.28: ‘Things are made need his good, i.e., the chief good, the supreme essence. They become less when by sin they are less attracted to him. But they are never entirely separated from him. Otherwise they would not exist at all. Movements of the soul are the affections, depending on the will.’
touch with Truth/God, even though our will has become depraved. However, reason is not divine: it is created, since the soul itself is neither Being nor the Creator. Thus, God’s immortality is the only ‘true’ one.

(3) Immanence and omnipresence

Comparing *Soliloquia* 1.15.29 with *De diversis quaestionibus octoginta tribus* 83 section 20 (388-395), Cary holds that there is a difference between the two texts regarding Augustine’s theology from the perspective of ontology. In the *Soliloqua* Augustine says that Truth does not exist anywhere in space (‘non … in loco’) or in material beings (‘non … in rebus mortalibus’), yet it still has to exist ‘somewhere’, for ‘everything, that is, must be somewhere.’ Thus, Truth exists in the soul. However, by the time Augustine wrote the *De diversis quaestionibus octoginta tribus*, Cary insists that Augustine had changed his mind: the immaterial God is not ‘somewhere’ (‘God is not anywhere’), but ‘all things are in Him (i.e., God)’. ‘From this point onward,’ Cary argues that, ‘when Augustine says that God does not exist in a place, he does not mean that God is absent from any place but that his mode of being is non-spatial and therefore he is omnipresent.’

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834 Cf., *Confessiones* 10.23.33: (Chadwick’s translation) ‘I have met with many people who wished to deceive, none who wished to be deceived. … They love the truth because they have no wish to be deceived’
835 Cf., *Confessiones* 10.20.29, 10.21.31, 10.23.33-34.
836 Cf., *Confessiones* 10.25.36: (Chadwick’s translation) ‘you (i.e., God) are not the mind itself. (nec ipse animus es)’.
837 Cf., *Confessiones* 5.3.4: (Chadwick’s translation) ‘they do not in a religious spirit investigate the source of the intelligence with which they research into these matters. Moreover, when they do discover that you (i.e., God) are their Maker, they do not give themselves to you so that you may preserve what you have made.’
838 Cf., *Confessiones* 7.10.16.
839 Cf., *Confessiones* 10.25.36.
840 Cf., *Confessiones* 11.7.9: (Chadwick’s translation) ‘everything is said in the simultaneity of eternity (i.e., when the Word, the Son of God, speaks). Otherwise time and change would already exist, and there would not be a true eternity and true (vera) immortality. … No element of your (i.e., God’s) word yields place or succeeds to something else, since it is truly immortal and eternal.’ *De Trinitate* 1.1.2: (Hill’s translation) ‘Then there is the apostle’s remark, who alone has immortality (1 Tm 6:16); since the soul too is called, and is, immortal in some way, he would not have said who alone has, unless it were the case that true (vera) immortality is unchangingness, which nothing created can have as it is peculiar to the creator.’
841 Cf., Cary, *Augustine’s Invention of the Inner Self*, 104.
842 *Soliloquia* 1.29.
843 Cf., *Soliloquia* 1.29.
844 *De diversis quaestionibus octoginta tribus* 83 section 20 quoted in Cary, *Augustine’s Invention of the Inner Self*, 104.
845 *De diversis quaestionibus octoginta tribus* 83 section 20 quoted in Cary, 104.
846 Cary, 104.
My interpretation of Augustine is that the above two texts are not contradictory to one another: the difference does not show a change in Augustine’s mind. Rather, they are two distinct statements about God made from two different perspectives, thus they can be synthesized in a mutually coherent manner. Briefly, the Soliloquia is an ontological statement about God/Truth from the perspective of epistemology (as explained, for Augustine knowledge is a substance)\(^{847}\), whereas the De diversis quaestionibus octoginta tribus is a statement about the power of God that sustains the existence of all His creation.

The De diversis quaestionibus octoginta tribus 83 section 20 does not tell us in what sense all things are in God, but in what sense they are not in Him:

all things are in him rather than he himself being anywhere … they are not in God as if he himself were a place, for place is in space which is occupied by the length, breadth, and height of a body.

Augustine here makes clear that the analogy of how a material thing is in a place cannot explain God’s omnipresence. How else, then, can we interpret ‘all things are in him’? That is in terms of power:

Who, O great God, can deny that Thou rule all things in order? (De ordine 1.5.14)\(^{848}\)

In other words, everything is governed by the divine order. Probably, in Augustine’s thoughts the divine power permeates the entire universe in a similar manner that the power of the soul reaches to every part of the body and, so, we are able to move any part of it at will:

why should it be surprising if the soul is not corporeal, nor extended in length, nor spread out in breadth, nor made solid by depth, and yet is present so effectively in the body as to control (regimen) all the members of the body and

\(^{847}\) See section ‘Learning (disciplina) is in the soul’ of chapter 2 in Part II.

\(^{848}\) Also, see De ordine 1.3.8: ‘nothing is done apart from order’.
serves as a pivot of action, so to speak, for all the motions of the body? (De quantitate animae 14.23)\textsuperscript{849}

In summary, creatures are in the God, not in the sense that a material thing is located in another, but in His omnipresent power that sustains their existence. On the other hand, Truth/God is not omnipresent from the perspective of epistemology. Truth must exist ‘somewhere’ and that is in memory, for only the mind can understand Truth: I have already explained Augustine’s conception of God’s immanence.

Now, in De vera religione 11.21 Augustine makes a statement about God synthetically from the two perspectives:

A life, therefore, which by voluntary defect falls away from him who made it, whose (i.e., God’s) essence it enjoyed, and, contrary to the law of God, seeks to enjoy bodily objects which God made to be inferior to it, tends to nothingness. … Who is he, then, save the one God, the one truth, the one salvation of all, the first and highest essence from which all that exists derives existence as such?\textsuperscript{850}

In short, quite apart from our epistemological activity, our existences are always sustained by the omnipresent divine power. Also, even though we are epistemologically exiled from our spiritual homeland, God’s saving power is never absent.

\textbf{iv) Train the mind}

Rendering reason ‘sound (sanus)’\textsuperscript{851} is crucial for understanding God, otherwise attempting to see Truth can do more harm than good for us:

(There are some eyes so healthy and vigorous that they can fearlessly turn toward the sun as soon as they are opened. For such as these light itself is health; it is not a teacher that they need, but only, perhaps, some caution. It is enough

\textsuperscript{849} Also, see De quantitate animae 5.7.
\textsuperscript{850} Also, see De vera religione 11.22 (‘The highest essence imparts existence to all that exists’) & Ibid., 14.28 (‘Things are made need his good, i.e., the chief good, the supreme essence.’)
\textsuperscript{851} Soliloquia 1.6.12.
for them to believe, to hope, and to love.) Others, however, are dazzled by the very lustre which they so ardently desire to behold and, not seeing it, they gladly return to the darkness. To these, even though they now are such as might rightly be called healthy, it is dangerous to want to show what they are as yet incapable of seeing. They are, therefore, first to be trained, and, for their own good, their love is to be restricted and nourished.  

(This text reminds us of Augustine’s experience of reading the Christian Bible immediately after the *Hortensius*. Thus, our mind has to be trained *at least* with dialectics or mathematics, so that we can become intellectually ‘healthy’, enough to resolve difficult issues related to God, for example, the problem of evil:

no one ought to aspire to a knowledge of those matters (e.g. the problems of evil) without that twofold science, so to speak – the *science of right reasoning* and that of the *power of numbers*. And, if anyone thinks that this is indeed a great deal, let him master either numbers alone or only dialectics. (*De ordine* 2.18.47)

The ‘science of right reasoning’ can be interpreted in two ways. In a narrow sense it simply means only dialectics, that is, the discipline of defining, dividing, and synthesizing. In a wide sense it signifies all branches of learning (disciplinis), since they are established by means of dialectics, for example, grammar:

When the science of grammar had been perfected and systematized, reason was then reminded to search out and consider the very power by which it produced

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852 *Soliloquia* 1.13.23.
853 Cf., *Confessiones* 3.5.9.
854 ‘sanus’ (*Soliloquia* 1.6.13) or ‘valetudo’ (*De ordine* 1.8.24).
855 Augustine accepted Greek dialectics and ethics, whereas Ambrose only ethics: see Ragnar Holte, *Béatitude et Sagesse* (Paris: Études Augustiniennes, 1962), 151. For Plotinus dialectics is ‘the way in which the mind lays immediate hold on intelligible truth, for its operations are determined by the structure of the intelligible world and it comes into play naturally when the mind reaches the level of Intellect.’ (Armstrong, H., ‘Part III Plotinus, Chapter 14: Man and Reality’, in Arthur H. Armstrong [ed.], *The Cambridge History of Later Greek and Early Medieval Philosophy* [Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1967], 235.)
856 Cf., *De Ordine* 2.5.15.
857 Cf., *De Ordine* 2.13.38.
art, for, by definition, division, and synthesis it not only had made it orderly and syntactical, but also had guarded it against every subtle encroachment of error.\textsuperscript{858}

An instance that Augustine uses ‘science of right reasoning’ in the wide sense is as follows:

If you have a care for order,’ I replied, ‘you must return to those verses, for instruction in the liberal arts … produces devotees more alert and steadfast and better equipped for embracing truth.\textsuperscript{859}

As for the number system (i.e., Mathematics)\textsuperscript{860}, the reason why Augustine insists on its usefulness for making our reason ‘healthy’ is that eternal truth can be found in the form of numbers, for instance, ratios:

But, one to two, or two to four, is a ratio in the truest sense. That ratio was no truer yesterday than today … it will always be such as it is now.\textsuperscript{861}

Precisely due to the immutability of mathematical truth, Augustine says that

numbers and wisdom are of one and the same kind.\textsuperscript{862}

Thus, although Augustine is aware that we can ‘count more easily than be wise’\textsuperscript{863}, learning numbers helps us to be aware of intelligible realities that transcend our minds.\textsuperscript{864}

he can search after things divine - not merely as truths to be believed, but also as matters to be contemplated, understood … if he does not know what pure nothing is, what formless matter is, what a lifeless informed being is, what a

\textsuperscript{858} De Ordine 2.13.38.
\textsuperscript{859} De Ordine 1.8.24.
\textsuperscript{860} Cf., De Ordine 2.18.47 quoted above.
\textsuperscript{861} De Ordine 2.19.50.
\textsuperscript{862} Cf., De libero arbitrio 2.31: ‘una quaedam eademque res est’ quoted in O’Daly, Augustine’s Philosophy of Mind, 182.
\textsuperscript{863} De libero arbitrio 2.30 quoted in O’Daly, Augustine’s Philosophy of Mind, 183.
\textsuperscript{864} In Plotinus both numbers and Forms belong to the second hypostasis (i.e. nous).
body is, what species in a body is, what place and time are, what in a place and at a time signify, what local motion is, what non-local motion is, what stable motion is, what eternity is, what it is to be neither in a place nor nowhere, what is beyond time and forever, what it is to be nowhere and nowhere not to be, what it is to be never and never not to be - anyone who does not know these matters … such a one will fall into every possible error. But then, whoever has grasped the meaning of simple and intelligible numbers will readily understand these matters. ⁸⁶⁵

There is another academic discipline, which is not mentioned in De ordine 2.18.47 cited above, but which can also prepare us to ‘see (videre)’ ¹⁸⁶⁶ Truth. That is geometry. Referring to the geometric discussion between Augustine and Evodius in De quantitate animae, Fortin comments that such a discussion gives ‘Augustine the opportunity to subject Evodius to an exercitatio mentis or mental gymnastic by which, if all goes well, his intellect will gradually be freed from the shackles of the senses (cf. 15,25).’ ⁸⁶⁷

In summary, we need to train ourselves by means of dialectics and/or mathematics, so that we can attempt to understand ‘things divine - not merely as truths to be believed, but also as matters to be contemplated, understood, and retained.’ ⁸⁶⁸ Also, in this way we can be on our guard against falsehoods about God, though we do not yet know (or remember) Him fully. ⁸⁶⁹

c) Reason shapes way of life

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⁸⁶⁵ De Ordine 2.16.44 & De Vera Religione 42.79.
⁸⁶⁶ Soliloquia 1.7.14.
⁸⁶⁷ Ernest L. Fortin, ‘Augustine’s “De quantitate animae”, or the Spiritual Dimensions of Human Existence’, Lectio Augustini 7, 152. ‘The method (i.e., of Augustine’s) was well known to the ancients. Augustine was familiar with it from Varro, who advocated the use of the liberal arts for this very purpose. These arts were not to be cultivated for their own sakes. They were an essential ingredient of the moral formation of the future citizen and thus pointed in the direction of moral and political virtue; and they functioned as tools with which to sharpen the mind for the exercise of the dianoetic virtues or the pursuit of contemplation. They would soon be designated by the terms quadrivium (invented by Boethius) and trivium, from the Latin via, meaning ‘road’ or ‘way’. in this case the way that leads by degrees from less perfect to more perfect forms of knowledge.’ (Ibid., 152-153)
⁸⁶⁸ De Ordine 2.16.44.
⁸⁶⁹ Cf., Soliloquia 2.20.34.
After reading the *Hortensius*, Augustine not only strived to know God/Wisdom, but also to lead a good life. Accordingly, Augustine mentions rationality not only in terms of theology (i.e., reason), but also of our way of life (i.e., the will); for instance,

Reason, then, proceeds from a rational soul into reasonable things which are done or spoken: There are, then, three classes of things in which that “something reasonable” is to be seen. One is in actions directed toward an end; the second, in discourse; the third, in pleasure. The first admonishes us to do nothing without purpose; the second, to teach correctly; the last, to find delight in contemplation. The first deals with right living; the other two, with those branches of learning which we are now considering. Our view of reality and our way of life are inseparably linked: the former logically precedes and shapes the latter. This is what Augustine meant when he said, ‘someone who gives his approval to nothing does nothing.’

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870 For Stoics ‘morality was rationality in action’: see Arthur Hilary Armstrong, *Christian faith and Greek philosophy* (London: Darton, Longman & Todd, 1960), 100. Also, in Plotinus ‘to achieve the transcendental level of existence (i.e., the One) requires both philosophical reasoning and affective training: “[starting from the soul’s experience of the Good] we must speak of it ... proceeding by rational discourse. The knowledge or touching of the Good is the greatest thing, and Plato says it is the “greatest study” [Re505a2], not calling the looking at it a “study,” but learning about it beforehand. We are taught about it by comparisons [analogiai] and negations [aphaireses] and knowledge of the things which come from it and certain methods of ascent by degrees, but we are put on the way to it by purifications and virtues. (Ennead VI.7.36.2-9)” Both cognitive and emotional training seem to be necessary conditions for achieving the highest stage of human development - mystical union with the One - though Plotinus is not always clear about whether they are sufficient.’ refer to John Bussanich, ‘2 Plotinus’s metaphysics of the One’, in Lloyd P. Gerson (ed.), *The Cambridge Companion to Plotinus* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1996), 40 & 56.

871 *De ordine* 2.11.31.

872 *De ordine* 2.12.35. Philosophy in Augustine’s time involved both knowledge and way of life: see Ragnar Holte, *Béatitude et Sagesse* (Paris: Études Augustiniennes, 1962), 18 (’Il vaut la peine de noter que la philosophie, telle qu’elle y est définie, n’est pas considérée seulement comme une activité intellectuelle et scientifique; elle est avant tout une manière de vivre, un style de vie.’ & ’là où ce concept n’est pas ce qui détermine à la fois la recherche intellectuelle et la conduite de la vie, il n’est pas possible de parler de philosophie.’)

873 This is like using a map (theory) to find a location and then going (practice) to it. Wherever we go, we always refer to a street atlas either printed or remembered: if the atlas turns out to be wrong, then we have the problem of reaching our destination. However, a discrepancy between a person’s view of reality and that person’s lifestyle can arise: I shall discuss it later in this chapter in sections (2-2-1) & (2-2-2).

874 *Contra Academicos* 3.15.33: ‘qui nihil approbat, nihil agit’. Also, see Ibid., 2.5.12: ‘the man who gives his approval to nothing also would do nothing.’ Peter King holds that these Augustinian texts have its origin in Cicero’s *Academia*: Cicero, *Academia* 2.12.39: “Accordingly, someone who takes away presentation or assent also takes every action away from life.” In *Academia* 2.19.62 Cicero also says,
Augustine understands way of life in terms of relationship. A person’s lifestyle is that person’s manner of relating himself/herself to material things, the self, other persons, and God: all of them are hierarchically organized. Bear in mind that ‘man (homo)’ means only the soul: ‘our real selves are not bodies.’

How, then, do we relate to the constituents of the hierarchy? To describe various modes of the soul’s relationship with them, Augustine uses words such as ‘love (amo/diligo),’ ‘avoid (fugio),’ ‘follow (sector),’ ‘delight (delecto),’ ‘neglect (negligo),’ etc. ‘Love’ is most frequently employed, but its meaning varies according to the context. For instance, loving things other than God means a strong attachment to them: ‘loving (diligunt) temporal things they do not want the things they love (aman) to pass away.’ Loving God, on the other hand, means making an effort to know God/Truth/Wisdom with dedication, passion and single-mindedness: ‘to prize nothing more highly than the finding of truth, to wish for, to think of, to love nothing else.’

(Later, Augustine creates two new terms to explain the ideal relationship between the soul and each of the four constituents of the world, namely ‘enjoyment [fructus]’ and ‘use [utor].’) Therefore, I shall subsequently investigate Augustine’s arguments concerning how our view of reality fashions our way of life in terms of relationship – in other words, how a person’s way of thinking about God and the soul shapes and affects that person’s ‘rationality in action.’ I shall approach it from the perspective of our relationship with God (2-1), the self (2-2), and other persons (2-3).

‘By doing away with assent, [the Academicians] have done away with every mental movement and every physical action.’ The Ciceronian texts are quoted in Against the Academicians, trans. Peter King (Indianapolis: Hackett Publishing Company, 1995), 38 (footnote no. 81). Also, see Holte, Béatitude et Sagesse, 1962, 80-81.

875 See the introductory part of chapter 1 ‘Augustine’s view of reality’, and section ‘The hierarchy’ in the same chapter.
876 De vera religione 46.89.
877 De vera religione 11.22-12.23.
878 De ordine 1.2.4.
879 De ordine 2.13.38.
880 De vera religione 11.22.
881 De vera religione 11.22.
882 De vera religione 22.43.
883 De ordine 2.20.52.
884 De doctrina Christiana 1.3.3-1.5.5.
885 Armstrong, 1960, 100.
Note that entrusting ourselves to a religion is giving our ‘approval’\(^8\)\(^86\) to its teachings. An important component of a belief system is a theory of reality, according to which we often change (or endeavour to change) our way of life. Thus, faith is also an influential factor that shapes our lifestyle and I shall explain it later in a separate chapter.\(^8\)\(^87\)

Firstly (2-1), only if we admit that God is Truth and love it, will we pursue Truth/God and endeavour to lead a virtuous life: ‘what else is the face of God than the truth for which we yearn and for which, as the object of our love (amatae), we make ourselves clean and beautiful?’\(^8\)\(^88\) Otherwise, we will strive to be happy with inferior, perishable things, such as money\(^8\)\(^89\), and our life will become miserable:

Life which delights (delectata) in material joys and neglects (negligit) God tends to nothingness and is thereby iniquity. …In this way life becomes earthly and carnal. So long as it is so it will not possess the kingdom of God, and what it loves (amat) will be snatched from it. It loves what, being matter, is less than life … for by loving inferior things it is given a place among the inferior creatures, being deprived of its pleasures and afflicted with grief.\(^8\)\(^90\)

Secondly (2-2), regarding our relationship with the self, we above all need to understand what relating to one’s own self means. Augustine maintains that there are many faculties of the soul – for example, reason, memory, emotion, the power to control the body\(^8\)\(^91\), and the power of sense perception\(^8\)\(^92\) –, and that they are related to each other in terms of dominance and submission. The ideal relationship between the faculties of the soul is to have reason in charge:

\(^8\)\(^86\) *Contra Academicos* 3.15.33 quoted above.
\(^8\)\(^87\) See section ‘Faith, hope, and love’ in chapter 2.
\(^8\)\(^88\) *De ordine* 1.8.23.
\(^8\)\(^89\) *De ordine* 2.8.25.
\(^8\)\(^90\) *De vera religione* 11.22-12.23.
\(^8\)\(^91\) Cf., *De quantitate animae* 14.23: ‘yet (the soul) is present so effectively in the body as to control (regimen) all the members of the body and serves as a pivot of action, so to speak, for all the motions of the body’.
\(^8\)\(^92\) Sense perception belongs to the soul rather than the body: see *De quantitate animae* 30.60 (‘it is the soul that is the power [potentia] of the eyes’) & *Soliloquia* 2.3.3 (‘there is no sense without the soul’).
The soul of a wise man … thoroughly cleansed by acts of virtue and already cleaving to God, merits the name of wise, and it is unfitting that any other part of him be called wise. Nevertheless, certain soiled and cast-off garments, so to speak - of which he has divested himself and from which he has, as it were, withdrawn unto himself - still serve that soul; or, if such a soul ought still to be pronounced integral, they certainly subserve that part of the soul which alone is fittingly called wise; they are in subjection to it.  

893 (‘That part of the soul which alone is fittingly called wise’ means reason [ratio].)

Having clarified what a relationship with oneself means, Augustine holds that, if we acknowledge God’s Creatorship, then we can ‘use (utor)’ created beings in order to ‘enjoy (fructus)’ the Creator. 894 Otherwise, we will become slaves to our own vicious emotions, such as anger and envy. 895

However, Augustine is aware that an intellectual transformation does not always results in an affective transformation: this must be from his own experience before his conversion to the Christian faith. Our perverted will must be cured, independently of rendering reason healthy, so that the will be not a hindrance but an assistance to reason. Yet, we ourselves cannot bring this about, only God can by means of ‘delight’. 896 Brown maintains in his book Augustine of Hippo that ‘feeling’ was not an issue in Augustine’s early thoughts. 897 However, as mentioned, Augustine perceived our relationship with all the constituents of the world in terms of ‘love’ and its synonyms. Thus, I shall, first of all, introduce the scholarly debate in this respect. Next, I shall give more evidence that the affective transformation was one of key issues for the young Augustine. Finally, I shall argue that in Augustine’s early thoughts God takes the initiative of making us love and delight in the act of striving to know God.

893 De ordine 2.2.6. ‘Plato … Happiness is a correct functioning of man … when his desires and actions are controlled by reason’: see Dominic J. O’Meara, Plotinus: An Introduction to the Enneads (Oxford Clarendon Press, 1993), 101.
894 Cf., De doctrina Christiana 1.3.3-1.5.5. Also, see De vera religione 44.82: ‘If the rational creature serve its creator by whom, through whom, and to whom it was made, all other things will serve it.’
895 Cf., De vera religione 45.85. Also, see De ordine 2.13.38: ‘unwise men generally follow their own feelings and habits rather than the very marrow of truth’.
896 Regarding the need of the divine grace, see section (e) in chapter 2.
Regarding the young Augustine’s association of the will with ‘delight’, Harrison’s argument against Brown is noteworthy. Referring to Ad Simplicianum (396 AD), Brown says, ‘For the first time Augustine came to see man as utterly dependent on God, even for his first initiative of believing in Him…[he] had come to this conclusion through a reassessment of the nature of human motivation. It is this psychological discovery which gives cogency to the interpretation that he placed on Paul. Briefly, Augustine had analysed the psychology of “delight”. “Delight” is the only possible source of action, nothing else can move the will’.\(^{898}\) Quoting a passage from the Sermones 159.3 (i.e., ‘we do not love something unless it delights us’\(^{899}\)), Harrison agrees with Brown on the ‘psychology of “delight”’: ‘this is a theme which is sounded in Augustine’s thought from the very beginning to the very end and which fashions everything he has to say about the way in which the will of created beings operates. The will is only motivated when something delights it. … “The will can have no motive unless something presents itself to delight and stir the mind.”’\(^{900}\) Also, Harrison says, ‘Brown is absolutely right: the ‘psychology of delight’ is indeed the place where Augustine locates the operation of grace upon the will: grace presents the errant and disabled will of fallen human beings with what will unfailingly delight it and thereby inspire it to the good.’\(^{901}\) However, Harrison disagrees with Brown’s insistence that it is absent in Augustine’s early thoughts: ‘Brown insists that this insight is not found in Augustine’s earlier work: “Ten years before, this element had been notably lacking in Augustine’s programme for a ‘well-trained soul’: such a soul would have risen to truth by academic disciplines, supported by ‘sparkling little chains of argument’. Now ‘feeling’ has taken its rightful place as the ally of the intellect.”’\(^{902}\) We will need to question this conclusion.\(^{903}\) Harrison cites the following texts as the evidence that delight was an important element of Augustine’s system from the very beginning:

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physical bodies occupy a given space; the soul’s space is its desire (en.Ps. 6.9);
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898 Brown, Augustine of Hippo, 154.
899 ‘Non enim amatur, nisi quod delectat.’
901 Harrison, Rethinking Augustine’s Early Theology, 267-268.
902 Brown, Augustine of Hippo, 155.
903 Harrison, 267.
our affections are our feet…according as each man has affection, according as each has love, so does he either approach or recede from God (ibid 94.2);

Delight is like a weight for the soul; delight orders the soul, for ‘where your treasure is, there will your heart be also (mus.6.11.29).\(^{904}\)

I also argue, in agreement with Harrison, that the ‘psychology of “delight”\(^{905}\) is an essential part of the young Augustine’s thoughts. The term ‘delight (delectare/beatus)’ in the early works may not be conspicuous to some of us. Nonetheless, we can find many synonymous terms, such as ‘affection (affectus)\(^{906}\), ‘desire (cupire)’, ‘love’, ‘enjoy (frui)’, ‘pleasure’, and ‘wish (velle)’:

they wish (velle) to scrutinize the creation contrary to the commandment of God, and to enjoy (frui) it rather than God’s law and truth - that was the sin of the first man who misused his free will,\(^{907}\)

when you shall have become such a man that no earthly thing whatever delights (delectare) you, believe me, at that very moment, at that point of time, you will behold what you desire (cupire).\(^{908}\)

Also, I mentioned above that Augustine used ‘love (amo/diligo)’, ‘avoid (fugio)’, ‘follow (sector)’, ‘delight (delecto)’, and ‘neglect (negligo)’ to describe how we relate to material things, the self, other persons, and God. Thus, affective transformation was one of key issues for the young Augustine and he approached it in terms of ‘delight’ and its synonyms.

Regarding the other argument of mine that God takes the initiative in healing our perverted will,\(^{909}\) I shall again turn to Carol Harrison’s book *Rethinking Augustine’s Early Theology*. Here, she stresses that in Augustine we – as ‘fallen human beings’ – are

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\(^{904}\) All are quoted in Harrison, 268.

\(^{905}\) Brown, 154.

\(^{906}\) *De vera religione* 14.28.

\(^{907}\) *De vera religione* 37.68.

\(^{908}\) *Soliloquia* 1.14.24.
‘incapable of returning to the truth, to love, desire and delight in God rather than the world; to cleave to God, and to thereby be sanctified by being conformed to Him.’

Next, referring to *De Beata Vita* 4.35 (386 AD), *De fide et symbolo* 19 (393 AD), and *De Moribus* 1.13.23-1.14.24 (387/389 AD), she argues that the Christian concept of the Holy Spirit as ‘love’ plays an important role in Augustine’s consideration concerning the relationship between the Trinitarian God and the human person. The task of the Holy Spirit is to bind not only the Father and the Son, but also us and God by ‘inspiring in us the desire, delight and love which enable us to cleave to, and be conformed to God’:

It is through love, then, that we become conformed to God; and by this conformation, and circumcision from this world we are not confounded with the things which are properly subject to us. And this is done by the Holy Spirit...for the love of God is shed abroad in our hearts by the Holy Spirit which he has given unto us (Rom.5:5)....But we could not possibly be restored to perfection by the Holy Spirit, unless He Himself continued always perfect and immutable. And this plainly could not be unless He were of the nature and of the very substance of God, who alone is always possessed of immutability and invariableness. ‘The creature has been made subject to vanity’ (Rom.8:20). And what is subject to vanity is unable to separate us from vanity and to unite us to the truth. But the Holy Spirit does this for us. He is therefore no creature. For whatever is, must be either God or creature...how can anything be man’s chief good but that in cleaving to which he is blessed? Now this is nothing but God, to whom we can cleave only by affection, desire, and love.

In addition to the argument of Harrison, I insist that for Augustine our desire for God/Wisdom, together with a memory of Him, are *innate* within us. Hence, we are

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909 This is, in fact, insisting that the divine grace is an indispensable element of Augustinian interiority: see section ‘Divine grace’ in chapter 2.

910 Harrison, 272: also, see the footnote no. 130 ‘e.g. uera rel.24-25; mor. 1.13.23-14.24; 1.17.31; 25.46-47; ep.11; s. Dom. mon. 2.4.11; Gn. adu. Man. 1.22.24.’

911 ‘communion of the Father and Son...as the love and charity subsisting between [them (i.e., the Father and the Son)]’: *De fide et symbolo* 19 quoted in Harrison, 272.

912 Harrison, 272.


914 Cf., *Soliloquia* 1.4.9 & 2.20.34-35 (quoted in section ‘Reasoning is remembering’ of chapter 2): in these texts Augustine uses ‘desire (cupere)’ and ‘memory’ at the same time.
able to recall God, though faintly, and then desire to know Him more. Augustine analogously explains it as follows: if we see an object obscurely in darkness, we naturally want to bring it into light for a clear view:

For, just as we shun darkness with our eyes by the very fact that we are not willing not to see, so likewise, whoever shall desire to escape unwisdom, let him not try to understand it; rather, let him regret that on account of it he does not understand the things that can be understood.⁹¹⁵

Such an innate desire (as well as theological knowledge in our memory) is the grace of God: God never abandons us, though we have turned away from Him:

if Thou shouldst abandon us, we are lost; but Thou dost not abandon us, because Thou art the Supreme Good whom no one ever rightly sought and entirely failed to find. … But, if there is in me any vain desire, do Thou Thyself cleanse me and make me fit to look upon Thee.⁹¹⁶

Furthermore, God not only evokes a good will in us, but also sustains and consolidates it:

So with God’s guidance a man of good will can turn the troubles of this present life to the advantage of courage. Among abounding pleasures and temporal prosperity, he may prove and strengthen temperance. In temptations he may sharpen his prudence, that he may not only not be led into them, but may also become more vigilant and more eager in his love of truth which alone never deceives.⁹¹⁷

Omnipotent God may himself show the truth, or he may use good angels or men to assist men of good will to behold and grasp the truth.⁹¹⁸

⁹¹⁵ *De ordine* 2.3.10. Also, see *De vera religione* 15.29 & 20.38.
⁹¹⁶ *Soliloquia* 1.1.6. Also, see *De Vera Religione* 15.29.
⁹¹⁷ *De vera religione* 15.29.
⁹¹⁸ *De vera religione* 10.20.
Note that, in order to ascend to God, both reason and the will must cooperate. However, they also maintain their independence from one another to a certain degree. Thus, an intellectual transformation does not always result in an ethical/affective transformation. Also, although the will has become depraved, reason is still capable of making sound judgments – especially concerning what we must love – because God always sheds His light upon our intelligence:

When the soul has become involved in its sin, it learns (discit), by paying the penalty (luendo poenas), the difference between the precept it refused to obey and the sin which it committed. In this way it learns (discit) by suffering to know the evil it did not learn (didicit) to know by avoiding it. By making comparison between its former and its present state it loves more earnestly the good which it loved too little, as is seen from its failure to obey.  

(Augustine does not use the word ‘reason (ratio)’ in this text, but ‘learning (discere)’ clearly signifies that its agent is reason.) This is to say that, although a perverse will has brought down reason from heaven to earth, God has not allowed our reason to be completely impaired to the point of being unable to make any sound judgment. In short, reason is not entirely subjugated by the will: reason is still under the guidance of divine illumination to a certain extent.

Due to the independence of reason, our return journey to God begins with reforming reason, not the will. For instance, Augustine says that ‘we are thus admonished that we ought to turn our love from bodily pleasures to the eternal essence of truth.’ This means that God awakens our reason first by admonition and, then, transforms our depraved will accordingly. This is consistent with my interpretation of Augustine that a person’s view of reality shapes that person’s way of life. Another instance is Augustine’s distinction between ‘delight of the sense’ and ‘delight through the sense’. I explained that these two types of delight are associated with ‘signum’ and ‘significatio’: ‘delight of the sense’ is the enjoyment of signum, whereas ‘delight

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919 De vera religione 20.38.
920 De vera religione 15.29: ‘Ita enim nobis suadetur a corporis voluptatibus, ad aeternam essentiam veritatis amorem nostrum oportere converti.’
921 Cf., De ordine 2.11.34.
through the sense’ that of *significatio*.\(^{922}\) I also mentioned that the transition from the former to the latter means giving up the enjoyment of sensible beings for the sake of the enjoyment of immaterial beings. However, such a transition is possible only if we intellectually perceive the *significatio* of a *signum*:

All things which are beautiful to the senses, whether they are produced by nature or are worked out by the arts, have a spatial or temporal beauty, as for example the body and its movements. (*De vera religione* 30.56) . . . But many stop with what delights men and are unwilling to rise to higher things, so that they may judge why visible things give pleasure. (*Ibid*., 32.59)

In summary, since the will cannot delight in what we do not know; the transformation of our will depends on what we remember (memory), perceive (reason), and judge to be rational. Thus, God helps us remember (memory) and acknowledge (reason) His supreme existence, then makes us yearn (will) for full knowledge of Him. Moreover, we also need the grace of God to sustain our love of knowing God, so that our will continually assists reason in our journey to God: (again, as quoted above,)

A certain admonition, flowing from the very fountain of truth, urges us to remember (*recordemur*) God, to seek Him, and thirst after Him tirelessly.\(^{923}\)

As we can see here, regarding how to ascend to God in terms of the relationship between memory, reason, and the will, Augustine’s theory is already Trinitarian. Later, in *De Trinitate*, he discusses how to make a journey to God in terms of memory, understanding (reason), and love as the image of the Triune God. Notice that both in the early works and the later works the order of the deification\(^{924}\) of the soul always follows the sequence of memory, reason, and will.

Finally (2-3), regarding our relationship with others, Augustine holds that we are to love their reason (*ratio*),\(^{925}\) while hating their sins,\(^{926}\) because not only ‘my’ reason

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\(^{922}\) See section ‘Seven levels of rationality’ in chapter 1.
\(^{923}\) *De beata vita* 4.35.
\(^{924}\) See the section (5-1) in my Introduction.
\(^{925}\) Cf., *Soliloquia* 1.2.7: ‘They (i.e., friends of Augustine’s) are men and I do love them, not because they are animals but because they are men; I mean, because they have rational souls (*rationales animas*),
(ratio), but also theirs, are the properties of God: unless we accept that our reason/souls belong to the Creator God, our relationships with others will be ‘carnal’, ‘temporal’, and ‘inhuman’ rather than spiritual, eternal, and human. In addition, unless a person acknowledges the utter helplessness of created beings and the need for the divine grace, then that person will not tolerate others’ absurdity.

d) Faith, hope, and love

Faith pertains to theory, not practice, and theory shapes practice. How, then, does Augustine think that faith affects our way of life, or our ‘rationality in action’? Also, why is faith important, since we have reason, the ‘mind’s eye’?

In answer to the last question, Augustine insists that we do not see God – in the language of the later works – ‘face to face’. Similarly, in Soliloquia 1.6.12-1.7.14 Augustine says that we need, in this life, to be persistent in hoping to know God fully:

‘Hope, by which it trusts that it will see (visurum), if only it gazes (aspexerit) intently … Hope does not leave the soul as long as it is in this life. … the soul, after this life, unites itself wholly to God’. But once we see God, we do not need faith: ‘Why should Faith be needed, since now it sees (God)?’

Now, as quoted above, ‘someone who gives his approval to nothing does nothing’:

which I love even in thieves. For, I can love reason (rationem) in anyone, even when I rightly hate him who makes evil use of that which I love.’

Cf., De quantitate animae 34.78: ‘let us hate, not those who are crushed by vices, but the vices themselves; not sinners, but just sins.’

Cf., De vera religione 46.88: ‘Man is not to be loved by man even as brothers after the flesh are loved, or sons, or wives, or kinsfolk, or relatives, or fellow citizens. For such love is temporal. … the Truth himself calls us back to our original and perfect state, bids us resist carnal custom, and teaches that no one is fit for the kingdom of God unless he hates these carnal relationships. Let no one think that is inhuman. It is more inhuman to love a man because he is your son and not because he is a man, that is, not to love that in him which belongs to God, but to love that which belongs to yourself.’ Note that ‘That in him which belongs to God’ means reason (ratio).

Cf., De vera religione 12.24: ‘It (i.e., the soul) will be re-formed by the Wisdom which is not formed but has formed all things’. Ibid., 48.93: ‘But until he reaches wisdom and perfection he bears with the folly of his neighbour as he would bear with his own, supposing he were foolish and at the same time a lover of wisdom.’

Cf., De ordine 2.4.11 (‘mentis oculos’) & 2.2.7.

Cf., De Trinitate 1.8.16.

Cf., De vera religione 12.24: ‘It (i.e., the soul) will be re-formed by the Wisdom which is not formed but has formed all things’. Ibid., 48.93: ‘But until he reaches wisdom and perfection he bears with the folly of his neighbour as he would bear with his own, supposing he were foolish and at the same time a lover of wisdom.’

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no action. Yet, only few people can know God through reason alone, whereas the majority of us cannot: due to the Fall, our minds have become ‘dull’. Consequently, since most of us do not see God ‘face to face’ in this life, the only way to improve the rationality of our reason and, subsequently, our will is first of all having faith in revealed truths passed on to us through the orthodox Christian tradition. In other words, ‘dull’ minded people need guidance of an authority and the legitimate authority is the Catholic Church:

The mind is like healthy eyes when it is cleansed of every taint of the body, that is, detached and purged of the desires for earthly things - which cleansing it obtains, at first, only by faith. As long as a thing cannot be demonstrated to it because it is unhealthy and defiled by vices - for it cannot see unless it is healthy - it will have no regard for its own health unless it believes that, otherwise, it will not see.

Take note of Augustine’s argument in this text that faith purges us from our depraved desires: faith transforms our way of life in terms of love.

Nonetheless, in other parts of his works, Augustine says that we can take full advantage of faith only if it is accompanied by the hope of seeing God ‘face to face’ after this life: his emphasis on such a hope is actually a call to the intellectual pursuit of Wisdom (i.e., ‘crede ut intelligas’). Hence, faith alone is only the starting point,
not the completion, of Augustinian interiority. We must make an effort, with hope, to understand what we believe: ‘it is not by faith alone, but by trustworthy reason, that the soul leads itself little by little to most virtuous habits and the perfect life.’ Based on the same idea, Augustine distinguishes ‘carnal Catholics (carnales catholici)’ from ‘spiritual Catholics (spiritales catholici)’: the former have faith, but no understanding or action; whereas the latter strive to understand more deeply what they believe.

Although our reason needs assistance from faith, Augustine on the other hand argues that reason chooses what to believe:

Authority demands belief and prepares man for reason. Reason leads to understanding and knowledge. But reason is not entirely absent from authority, for we have got to consider whom we have to believe (De vera religione 24.45).

*Soliloquia* 1.1.4 can also be interpreted as implying reason’s precedence over faith:

O God, who has made man to Your image and likeness, a fact which he acknowledges who knows himself.

In other words, only those, who have already made an inwards turn to themselves and have rendered their reason sound, can see the reasonableness of believing the Scriptural teaching that we are made to the image of God.

Augustine indeed has faith not only in Christian doctrines, but also in our intellectual ability (i.e., ‘reasoning [ratiocinatio]’ – though the ability is very limited – to draw truthful conclusions through inference. For example, in *Soliloquia* 2.18.32-2.19.33 Augustine is so convinced that his argument for the soul’s immortality is utterly flawless. Also, those well-trained minds, which understand the incorporeity of God and the soul, are also trustworthy. We can reach these conclusions under divine

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941 *De Ordine* 2.19.50. Also, see *De quantitate animae* 7.12.

942 Cf., *De vera religione* 8.15. Also, see Armstrong, 1960, 67-68; and Holte, *Béatitude et Sagesse*, 104.


943 *De quantitate animae* 27.53.
illumination. Thus, he expresses such a conviction of his by saying to himself, ‘Believe now your reasons; (believe the Truth)’.\textsuperscript{945} In fact, for Augustine what is contradictory to reason is not faith, but ‘irrationality (\textit{insania})’. For instance (though not a good instance), he holds that even for a ‘dull’\textsuperscript{946} person it is absolutely unacceptable that God Himself commits evil, though he/she may agree that evil is outside the scope of divine providential power:

those who ponder these matters are seemingly forced to believe either that Divine Providence does not reach to these outer limits of things or that surely all evils are committed by the will of God. Both horns of this dilemma are impious, but particularly the latter. For, although it is unsound and most perilous to the soul to hold that anything is beyond God's control, yet even among men no one is blamed for what he could not do or prevent. The imputing of negligence is indeed much more pardonable than the charge of ill will or cruelty. Reason, therefore, not unmindful of piety, is in a manner forced to hold that things of earth cannot be governed by powers divine or that they are neglected and unnoticed, rather than to hold that they are governed in such wise that all complaining about God is inoffensive and blameless.\textsuperscript{947}

Therefore, Augustine’s emphasis on reason does not oppose faith but irrationality.

From the perspective of faith, Augustine classifies humanity into four categories according to their levels of rationality: the most praiseworthy group of people are ‘spiritual Catholics’, for they understand what they believe;\textsuperscript{948} next the Catholics, who do not yet understand revealed truths but sustain their lives with ‘faith’, ‘hope’, and ‘love’;\textsuperscript{949} then ‘carnal Catholics’\textsuperscript{950}, for they have faith but make no effort to know God. Finally, the most irrational people are non-Catholics (as well as heretics and

\textsuperscript{944} See section ‘God is in the soul’ in chapter 2.
\textsuperscript{945} \textit{Soliloquia} 2.19.33: ‘Iamiam crede rationibus tuuis, (crede veritati)’.
\textsuperscript{946} \textit{De Quantitate Animae} 7.12.
\textsuperscript{947} \textit{De Ordine} 1.1.1: ‘... Itaque velut compellitur ratio tenere non immemor pietatis, aut ista terrena non posse a divinis administrari, aut negligi atque contenmi potius quam ita gubernari, ut omnis de Deo sit mitis atque inculpanda conquestio.’
\textsuperscript{948} Cf., \textit{De vera religione} 8.15.
\textsuperscript{949} Cf., \textit{De ordine} 2.8.25: ‘Supported by faith, hope, and love, let them have God the object of their worship, their thinking, and their striving.’
\textsuperscript{950} \textit{De vera religione} 8.15.
schismatic). Augustine argues that they are 'proud' people and their pride is the stumbling block against their becoming Catholics. Regarding how they conduct their lives, Augustine says that they become circumcised, love themselves, not God; worship things other than the Creator; maintain unchristian relationship with others (e.g., they want others to worship them); seek power (potentiam), and are ambitious.

The significance of the four categories of people becomes more apparent if we approach it in the light of the relationship between view of reality and way of life. Theoretically we can work out four sets of combinations between correct and incorrect views of reality, and right and wrong ways of life as follows:

1. A wrong view of reality resulting in a perverse way of life (stage 1).
2. A wrong view of reality resulting in a virtuous lifestyle (stage 2).
3. A correct view of reality but still remaining in a perverse way of life (stage 3).
4. A correct view of reality resulting in a virtuous lifestyle (stage 4).

Set 1, 3 and 4 cover the whole range of Augustine’s experience of himself: stage 1 is what he used to be in his early youth; stage 3 represents his frustration at not being able to change his lifestyle and get himself baptized; and stage 4 is the state which he attained in Cassiciacum after reading the Letter of Paul to the Romans.

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951 De vera religione 8.15 & 25.47.
952 Cf., De vera religione 4.7. Also, see De ordine 2.8.25: ‘For the proud (superbos), let them be less concerned; and by no means are they to become proud themselves. Let them live in a fitting and decent manner. Supported by faith, hope, and love, let them have God the object of their worship, their thinking, and their striving.’
953 Cf., De vera religione 25.47.
954 Cf., De vera religione 13.26: ‘The bad angel loved himself more than God, refused to be subject to God, swelled with pride (superbiam), came short of supreme being and fell.’
955 Cf., De vera religione 55.111. Also, they do not put up with insults as Jesus did (Cf., Ibid., 16.31).
956 Cf., De vera religione 42.101: ‘Quid appetit superbia nisi potentiam, quae refertur ad agendi facilitatem’.
957 Cf., De vera religione 38.69.
958 This is practically impossible in any case other than hypocrisy.
959 Cf., Confessiones 8.1.1: (Chadwick’s translation) ‘My desire was not to be more certain of you but to be more stable in you. But in my temporal life everything was in a state of uncertainty, and my heart needed to be purified from the old leaven (1 Cor. 5.7f.). I was attracted to the way, the Saviour himself, but was still reluctant to go along its narrow paths.’
960 Cf., Confessiones 8.12.29.
Now, ‘carnal Catholics’ are either in stage 3 or probably will be. ‘Spiritual Catholics’, on the other hand, are firmly rooted in the stage 4. Faith, hope and love can make one jump from stage 1 or 3 to stage 4. Yet, it must be stressed again that the entire process of becoming ‘rational’ through faith and reason in terms of theory and practice is brought about by the grace of God; since reason is not the Creator, but is merely one of the created things which depends utterly on the Creator.

e) Divine grace

It is generally agreed in Augustine scholarship that grace is not an important part of his thoughts before 391. However, as a matter of fact, the word ‘grace’ is not entirely absent in the early works; for instance,

it (i.e., the soul) has the aid of God’s grace (gratia) enabling it to overcome them (i.e., ‘enjoying mortal things’) (De vera religione 7.24),

The human body was perfect of its kind before man sinned, but after he had sinned it became weak and mortal. Though that was the just punishment for sin ... The beauty of justice is in complete accord with the grace (gratia) of loving-kindness, seeing that we who were deceived by the sweetness of inferior goods should be taught by the bitterness of penalties. (Ibid., 15.29: also, see Ibid., 17.33, 23.44, and 55.113)

Notice that the above texts are extracted from only De vera religione, which was composed between AD 389 and 391. However, despite the scarcity of the word ‘grace’ in the earlier works, we can find many synonymous expressions, such as ‘compassion/clemency (clementia)’, ‘gift of God (Dei donum)’, ‘admonition (admonitio)’, ‘His help (adiuvante)’, and ‘the most helpful Lord (utilissimi

962 Contra academicos 3.19.42 & De ordine 2.5.16.
963 De beata vita 1.5.
964 De beata vita 4.35.
965 De quantitate animae 28.55.
Domini⁹⁶⁶. Also, Augustine considers God’s becoming man as an expression of divine grace:

the most subtle chain of reasoning would never call back to this intelligible world souls that have been blinded by the manifold shadows of error and rendered forgetful by the deepest filthy from the body, had not God the Highest, moved by a certain compassion for the multitude, humbled and submitted the authority of the Divine Intellect even to the human body itself. (*Contra academicos* 3.19.42)

Great, indeed, though it be that so great a God has for our sake deigned to take up and dwell in this body of our own kind. (*De ordine* 2.5.16)

Note that, as explained in the Introduction, the mature Augustine’s theory of deification consists of two parts, namely ontological and teleological: regarding the former, God has already made us ‘participate’ in Him by ‘adopting’ us as His sons through the Son’s incarnation, crucifixion and resurrection, and our baptism. Similarly, we can interpret the above texts from the young Augustine’s works as referring to the ontological dimension of deification: the Son has already prepared the way for us to ‘participate’ teleologically (i.e., with our memory, mind, and heart) in God.

Augustine’s emphasis on the necessity of divine grace is based on his interpretation of the creation doctrine, that is, that the state of being created out of nothing intrinsically connotes utter dependence on the Creator. Hence, it goes without saying that our ascent to God depends on divine grace in every respect. The evidence can be found in his earliest works written in Cassiciacum and one of them is *Soliloquia*. Before examining a part of the *Soliloquia*, I shall introduce Watson’s argument concerning the general spirit of the text.

In section ‘Reason shapes way of life’ in chapter 2, I have already explained the young Augustine’s awareness of the problem that an intellectual transformation does not always (or necessarily) result in a moral/affective transformation. I also argued that

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⁹⁶⁶ *Soliloquia* 1.15.30: ‘admonished (*suadetur*)’ and ‘punishments (*supplicia*)’ are also applied in *De vera*
in Augustine’s thoughts God takes the initiative in healing our perverted will. Similarly, Watson insists that, when Augustine was writing the *Soliloquia*, he was very ‘conscious’ of the same problem. Furthermore, Augustine acknowledged that the Christian Bible was relevant in this respect more than the *libri platonici*:

The books of the Platonists encouraged him to press on towards the incorporeal truth, but, according to his later account in the *Confessions*, they were not sufficient on their own to bring him to it. He turned once again to the Scriptures, particularly to Paul. Paul made him aware, in a way the books of the Platonists could not do, of the law in his members fighting against the law of his mind (ibid.7,26-27). Paul’s writings convinced him that the ascent to God was not just an intellectual struggle upwards: it was also a fight against the body. The fact that so much emphasis was placed on physical struggle reassured Augustine and helped to lead him onwards, however violent the struggle became. In Paul he could see the Neoplatonist flight from the body, but he saw it presented as the vivid reality of the everyday experience of the ordinary man, rather than the serene ascent of the intellectual in his ivory tower.  

This argument of Watson indeed explains why Augustine discusses God’s Creatorship – in reference to our inability to give up our immorality, our utter dependence of Him, and the problem of evil – right in the beginning of the *Soliloquia*, for instance, 1.1.2:

1) O God, the Founder (*conditor*) of the Universe, grant (*praesta*) me first of all that I may fittingly supplicate Thee; next, that I may so act that I may be worthy of a hearing from Thee; finally, I beg Thee to set me free (*liberes*).  

2) O God, through whom all those things, which of themselves would not exist, strive to be.  

3) O God, who does not permit (*permittis*) to perish even that which is self-destructive (*perimit*).  

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*religione* 15.29.  
968 ‘Deus per quem omnia, quae per se non essent, tendunt esse.’
4) O God, who from nothing has created this world which every eye sees to be most beautiful.

5) O God, who dost not cause evil, and who dost cause that it become not most evil.

6) O God, who, to those few who have their refuge in that which truly is (quod vere est), shows that evil is nothing.

7) O God, through whom the universe, even with its sinister side, is perfect.

8) O God, by whose ordinance the uttermost discord is as naught, since the less perfect things are in harmony with the more perfect.

9) O God, whom everything loves which is capable of loving whether knowingly or unknowingly.

10) O God, in whom are all things (Deus in quo sunt omnia) and yet the shamefulness of every creature does not shame Thee, their wickedness does not harm (nocet) Thee, nor does their error deceive Thee.

11) O God, who has not willed that any save the pure should know the True.

12) O God, the Father (pater) of Truth, the Father of Wisdom, Father of True and Supreme Life, Father of Happiness, Father of the Good and the Beautiful, Father of Intelligible Light, Father of our watching and our enlightenment, Father of the covenant (pignoris) by which we are admonished (admonemur) to return to Thee.\textsuperscript{969}

I shall rephrase some passages in the above text and separate them into two groups, so that we can easily compare Augustine’s perception of the human person with that of God from the perspective of the creation theory.

First of all, regarding the ontological and teleological state of created beings;

1. they cannot bring forth and maintain their own existences [2];

2. they are, by nature, self-destructive (perimere) [3];

3. we can only ask for (rogare) divine assistance (praestere), since God alone can liberate us [1];

4. we can only render (agere) ourselves worthy to be heard by God [1];

\textsuperscript{969} Soliloquia 1.1.2.
5. and finally God takes the initiative for our return to Him by admonishing (admonere) us [12].

Next, as for God,

1. God is the Creator (conditor) [1], producing things out of nothing [4];
   1.1. God is the First Cause (pater) [12];
   1.2. God is Being Itself (quod vere est) [6];
   1.3. God’s power is omnipresent (Deus in quo sunt omnia) [10];
   1.4. God sustains the existence of His creation [2];
   1.5. God is the Ruler, without whose permission (permittere) nothing can take place [3];
   1.6. God is transcendent, so that nothing can harm (nocere) Him [10];
2. God is the Helper (praestere) [1];
3. God is the Liberator (liberare) [1];
4. and finally divine grace is at work among us through the covenant [12].

In summary, since we have no ‘dominion (potestas)’ over ourselves, the whole process of our journey back to God – even ‘undertaking (suscipere)’ it – entirely depends on God’s ‘help/grace (adjuvare/clementia)’.  

Due to his perception of the human person as being utterly helpless, Rist argues that Augustine was probably able to criticise Neoplatonism from the outset: ‘it could describe, metaphysically, something of the “end” for humanity but fail to provide the means. (Plato and) Plotinus supposed that the natural divinity of the human soul (part of which could remain sinless) provides us with sufficient means to climb to “heaven,” to the perfect life. Within us is a pearl in the oyster, a pure, uncontaminated part of the self, which we can with effort free of its contaminations derived from empirical life, so that once again we become perfect. However, Porphyry and his student Iamblichus had lost this confidence in our innate goodness: Iamblichus taught that the whole soul is 

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970 Also, see De quantitate animae 36.80: Augustine insists that, although we have free will to commit sin, we cannot ‘disturb any part of the divine order and law’.
971 Cf., Soliloquia 1.15.30.
972 Cf., De quantitate animae 28.55.
973 a student of Plotinus.
fallen. That means that we have inadequate resources within ourselves to return to the One. We need the help of the gods. \(^{974}\)

Having discussed the young Augustine’s theory of interiority, it is necessary to remind ourselves of why pursuing Wisdom suddenly began to be important for him after reading the *Hortensius*: as Pegis writes,

The search for deliverance is the secret of Augustine’s disquietude. He is not seeking a definition (of the human person), he is seeking liberty; he is not seeking Plotinian immaterialism, he is seeking liberation from servitude to the flesh whose care he finds so attractive and in whose attractiveness he has lost himself and God; he is not seeking to recall and to recapture the life of a Plotinian divinity, he is seeking the grace of God. Christian liberty: *this is* Augustine’s ultimate search.\(^{975}\)

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III. The Confessions

The entire Confessions can be viewed as an organic whole from the perspective of deification, of which interiority is a crucial constituent part. Before proceeding to demonstrate it, I shall briefly remind readers of the scholarly controversy concerning how to approach the structural layout of the thirteen books of the Confessions. The crux of the controversy is whether or not there is any consistency between Books 1-10 and Books 11-13, or an underlying central theme that can explain coherently the difference between Books 1-9, Book 10, and Books 11-13. Augustine says in Retractationes 32,

> The thirteen books of my Confessions praise the just and good God for my evil and good acts, and lift up the understanding and affection of men to Him … The first ten books were written about myself; the last three about Holy Scripture, from the words: “In the beginning God created heaven and earth” as far as the Sabbath rest.

Although Augustine insists in the first half of the excerpt that the sole aim of the Confessions is to praise God through helping his readers turn to God with their minds and hearts, many scholars, concentrating on the second half, argue that there is an apparent discontinuity, at least at a superficial level, between the two/three groups of the thirteen books. For instance, the ‘tone’ of the first nine books is noticeably different from the remaining four books: the former are narrative, descriptive, and autobiographical whereas the latter are largely philosophical and theoretical. They question is ‘What is the main topic and what are merely “digressions” and “appendices”? Some of them endeavour to identify the principle that dominates the whole Confessions. For instance, Pizzolato locates the unity of the Confessions in the

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977 In addition, Vaught points out that ‘the final indication that there is a radical discontinuity in the text is that there is a ten to thirteen year chasm between the death of Augustine’s mother, which he describes at the end of Book IX, and what he writes about in Books X-XIII. When he turns away from the story of his life to the problems of memory, time, and creation, Augustine makes an unexpected transition from the past to the present; and the writer and what he writes about become contemporaneous for the first time’: see Vaught, Access to God in Augustine’s Confessions, 20-21.

idea that Books 1-9 describe the six ages of Augustine’s life and Books 10-13 offer a commentary on the six days of creation in Genesis, ending with the final day of rest in the kingdom of God. Augustine parallels these two ideas explicitly in a couple of texts elsewhere, and here the parallel is clear in his use of imagery derived from the days of creation to describe the ages of his own life (e.g., the tempestuous seas/waters of adolescence). What he describes in microcosm in the first part of Confessions he then describes in macrocosmic terms in the second part. A few other scholars, for example, Zepf, argue that there is no common theme that knits the two parts together.

At first glance Augustine, does not, in any part of the Confessions, seem to address himself to the issue of deification. As a matter of fact, there is no such word as ‘deificari’ or its synonyms. However, if we acknowledge that Augustinian deification consists of an ontological dimension (established on the foundation of the creation doctrine and Christology) and a teleological dimension, and that the latter is in turn comprised of an intellectual part (i.e., memory, reason, understanding, and faith) and a

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979 i.e., 1) infantiæ (Conf., I, 1-7); 2) puellitæ (I, 8-20); 3) adolescentiae (II-VI); 4) iuventutæ (VII-IX); 5) declinatio towards iuventutæ ad senectutæ or gravitas (X); 6) senectutæ (XI-XIII); 7) quies (chiusura’': Luigi Franco Pizzolato, Le Confessioni di sant’Agostino: Da biografia a confession (Milano Vita e pensiero, 1968), 63.
980 Cf., Pizzolato, Le Confessioni di sant’Agostino. For Wundt the unifying principle is the renunciation of evil and the profession of faith (cf., Pizzolato, 30); for Kusch the conversion from the old man (homo vetus) to the spiritual man (homo spiritualis) (cf., ibid., 30); for Landsberg, memory as vision and expectation (cf., ibid., 30); for Le Blond, past, present and future (cf., ibid., 30 & Jean-Marie Le Blond, Les Conversions de saint Augustin (Paris: Aubier, 1950), 17.); for Knauer, the pilgrimage of the soul (peregrinatio animae) and the use of the psalms (cf., Pizzolato, 37); for Vaught ‘faith seeking understanding’ (cf., Vaught, Access to God in Augustine’s Confessions, 22); for Corcoran ‘a pilgrimage to the Sabbath Rest of God’s House’, or a conversion to God, in whom alone our heart can find true ‘rest’ (cf., Confessiones 1.1 & Gervase Corcoran, ‘A Guide to the Confessions of St. Augustine’, Living Flame Series, vol. 17 [1981], 29; in the first nine books of the Confessions he tells the story of God’s calling him, and in the last four the story of his calling on God’); for Chin the transformation of ‘Augustine the rhetor’ (cf., Confessiones 1-8) to ‘Augustine the Christian’ (cf., Confessiones 9-13) (cf., Catherine Chin, ‘Christians in the Roman Classroom: Memory, Grammar, and Rhetoric in “Confessions X”’, Augustinian Studies, vol. 33/2 [2002], 162.); for Canévet self-knowledge (cf., Mariette Canévet, ‘Se connaître soi-même en Dieu : un aspect du discernment spirituel dans les « Confessions » d’Augustin’, Revue des Sciences Religieuses, vol. 64 (1990/1), 27-28 & 41); and for Cary ‘how the soul wanders from God and returns to him’ (Philip Cary, ‘Book Seven: Inner Vision as the Goal of Augustine’s Life’, in Kim Paffenroth and Robert Peter Kennedy (eds.), A Reader’s Companion to Augustine’s Confessions (London: Westminster John Knox Press, 2003), 121.). Solignac has classified and summarised how scholars conducted their researches in this area: see Solignac, Introduction et Notés, vol. 13, Bibliothèque Augustiniennne, 19-20.
981 M. Zepf, ‘Augustine’s Confessions,’ Lutheran Church Quarterly 21 (1948), 214: ‘The entire work is divided into two parts which seem to have nothing whatsoever to do with each other. The biography of the first ten books is suddenly resolved into a dry exposition of the first chapter of Genesis. Who has not been compelled to shake his head and ask what purpose Augustine could have had in mind when he brought together such diverse materials?’ quoted in Vaught, Access to God in Augustine’s Confessions, 20.
practical/ethical part (i.e., love) then we can easily observe that the overall structure of the entire *Confessions* follows his own theory regarding the logical sequence of the deificatory process. I have already mentioned that there are parallels between the young Augustine’s theory of teleological development and the course of his spiritual life from his infancy.\(^{982}\) So, I am here insisting that deification is the central theme of the *Confessions*, repeating my previous argument that the mature Augustine’s theory concerning the multiple levels of the soul’s divinity (or ‘greatness’\(^{983}\)) is fundamentally based on the landmarks in his own spiritual development. I shall demonstrate this before exploring the *Confessions* from the perspective of interiority (i.e., a methodology of getting ourselves teleologically deified). Note that the above text cited from *Retractationes* 32 can be interpreted in a deificatory sense. That is to say that the Augustine of the *Confessions* ‘praises’ God by narrating his spiritual journey to God: first of all, he read the *Hortensius* at the age of nineteen and it helped him remember\(^{984}\) God (cf., 3.4.7-3.4.8), whom he had previously forgotten (cf., 1.1.1-3.3.6); secondly, he endeavoured with passion to ‘see’\(^{985}\) God through understanding His creation (e.g., 3.5.9 -10.43.70); and finally attempted to understand revealed truth with faith and love in the hope of completing his ‘ascent’\(^{986}\) to God (e.g., 11-13).

The *Confessions* start with the affirmation that we (i.e., the soul) are *ontologically* conditioned to desire God, and are *innately* given the ‘capacity’\(^{987}\) to reach Him with our heart and mind by means of divine grace (cf. 1.1.1-1.5.6):

(Note that, unless stated otherwise, all texts quoted from the *Confessions* in this introductory section of Part III are Chadwick’s translations.)

Man, a little piece of your creation, desires to praise you, a human being “bearing his mortality with him’ (2 Cor. 4: 10), carrying with him the witness of his sin and the witness that you ‘resist the proud’ (1 Pet. 5:5). … You stir man to take

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\(^{982}\) Refer to the last section ii ‘Seven levels of rationality’ of the chapter b ‘The theory of spiritual development’ in Part II.

\(^{983}\) *De quantitate animae* 33.70: ‘quanta sit anima septem gradus demonstrant’.

\(^{984}\) Due to the theory of reminiscence, learning is same as remembering.

\(^{985}\) *Confessiones* 7.17.23.

\(^{986}\) *Confessiones* 4.12.19.

\(^{987}\) *Confessiones* 9.11.28 ‘est animus humanus minus capax divinorum’ & 13.22.32. From the perspective of deification it can be translated as ‘the human soul is less capable of becoming divine’.
pleasure in praising you, because you have made us for yourself, and our heart is restless until it rests in you (1.1.1),

Without you, whatever exists would not exist (1.2.2),

you (i.e., God) command me to love you … Open them (i.e., Augustine’s ears) and ‘say to my soul, I am your salvation.’ (1.5.5)

Bear in mind that, although our body has become mortal by virtue of our sin (cf., 1.1.1), our soul remains immortal because God has made us ‘participate’ in His Being – in other words, God continually sustains the soul’s existence (cf., 1.2.2). (As explained in the Introduction, ‘participation’ as well as ‘adoption’ are the language of deification among the Church Fathers.) Also, for the same reason, our soul is enabled to desire God constantly. Augustine explains our ontological participation in God in two ways. One is in terms of the creation doctrine: we are made in the image and likeness of God, which cannot be obliterated (cf., 13.22.32). Thus, as the image of ‘Reason’/God, we are forever supremely rational among God’s creation:

humanity, in your (i.e., God’s) image and likeness, put in authority over all irrational animals by your image and likeness, that is by the power of reason and intelligence. (13.32.47)

The other is from the perspective of Christology:

He is ‘the mediator between God and men, the man Christ Jesus’ (I Tim. 2: 5). He appeared among mortal sinners as the immortal righteous one, mortal like humanity, righteous like God. Because the wages of righteousness are life and peace (Rom. 6: 23), being united with God by his (i.e., Christ’s) righteousness he made void the death of justified sinners, a death which it was his will to share in common with them. (10.43.68)

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988 Cf., Confessiones 4.15.25, 7.9.14 & 7.19.25.
989 Cf., De quantitate animae 2.3, Sermones 166.4.4 & De Trinitate 14.2.6.
990 Cf., Confessiones 4.15.25, 7.9.14 & 7.19.25.
991 Cf., Confessiones 9.3.6 & 11.2.4.
992 Confessiones 11.8.10.
Since the body is anyhow doomed to die, the passage ‘he made void the death of justified sinners’ must be interpreted in the sense that, as the image of the ‘Life’, the soul is made immortal by Christ’s death: as God is the ‘life of souls’, the soul is eternally the ‘life of bodies’ (cf., 3.6.10). There is another similar text:

In him (i.e., Christ) ‘the prince of this world’ (John 14: 30) found nothing worthy of death and killed him, and ‘the decree which was against us was cancelled’ (Col. 2: 14). (7.21.27)

Due to the cancellation of the decree against us, the soul is allowed to ‘participate’ continually in Being/God (and is simultaneously given the potential to ascend to Him).

In the remaining part of the Confessions 1.6.7-13.35.50 Augustine narrates his teleological journey, analysing and interpreting it in reference to the ‘seven levels of the soul’s greatness’993, and there are six key points worth noting for our purposes (6).

Beginning with the examination of his infancy, Augustine first of all (6-1) explains what he holds to be an ‘irrational’ state of the soul, in which he was unable to get the image of God in him renewed – in other words, he was unable to remember God and was consequently obsessed with material and worldly things. (Cf., Confessiones 1.6.7-3.3.6)

Secondly (6-2), Augustine describes how his memory of God was refreshed through reading the Hortensius, (cf., Confessiones 3.4.7-3.4.8) and how he attempted and failed to render the memory more explicit through the Christian Bible, Manichaeism, Stoicism, and ‘many other philosophers’ ideas (multa philosophorum)994 (cf., 3.5.9-6.16.26).

Thirdly (6-3), Augustine insists that God initiated his intellectual ascent to Himself through the ‘libri platonicorum’ (cf., Confessiones 7.1.1-7.10.16):

993 De quantitate animae 33.70.
994 Cf., Confessiones 5.3.3. Also, see Goulven Madec, Saint Augustin et la Philosophie (Paris: Institut d’Études Augustiniennes, 1996), 31-36.
By the Platonic books I was admonished to return into myself. With you as my guide I entered into my innermost citadel, and was given power to do so because you had become my helper (Ps. 29: 11). I entered and with my soul’s eye, such as it was, saw above that same eye of my soul the immutable light higher than my mind … And I found myself far from you ‘in the region of dissimilarity’ (Ennead 1.8.13.15f [from Plato, Stateman 273d])\(^995\), and heard as it were your voice from on high: ‘I am the food of the fully grown; grow and you will feed on me. And you will not change me into you like the food your flesh eats, but you will be changed into me.’ And I recognized that ‘because of iniquity you discipline man’ and ‘cause my soul to waste away like a spider’s web’ (Ps. 38: 14) (7.10.16)\(^996\).

Again, ‘dissimilarity’ and ‘you (i.e., Augustine) will be changed into me (i.e., God)’ are deificatory expressions.

Fourthly (6-4), referring to his utter helplessness in rendering his lifestyle ethical, in accordance with his previous intellectual conversion, Augustine first of all ascribes it to the created nature of our existence and then argues for the indispensability of faith/baptism and divine grace for our deification from the perspective of Christology (cf., Confessiones 7.9.13-9.13.37):

There (i.e., in ‘libri platonicorum’) I read … ‘… He (i.e., the Word) was in the beginning with God. All things were made by him, and without him nothing was made. What was made is life in him; and the life was the light of men. And the light shone in the darkness, and the darkness did not comprehend it.’ Moreover, the soul of man, although it bears witness of the light, is ‘not that light’, but God the Word is himself ‘the true light which illuminates every man coming into the world’. Further, ‘he was in this world, and the world was made by him, and the world did not know him’. But that ‘he came to his own and his own did not receive him; but as many as received him, to them he gave the power to become


\(^996\) Also, see 7.20.26 (‘I believe that you [i.e., God] wanted me to encounter them (i.e., the ‘libri platonicorum’) before I came to study your scriptures’) & 8.2.3 (‘in all the Platonic books God and his Word keep slipping in.’)
sons of God by believing in his name’, that I did not read there (John 1: 1-12) (7.9.13).

Notice here that in Plotinus the upper part of the soul (i.e., the intellect [whereas the lower part is discursive reason]) permanently remains in God (i.e., Intellect or the World of Platonic Forms/Ideas). Thus, in Augustine’s interpretation of Neoplatonism in comparison to Christianity, it is likely that in the former the soul is potentially the ‘light’/God whereas in the latter it is not. Due to the creation doctrine, Christians insist on the soul’s becoming that ‘light’ only by ‘adoption’:

you (i.e., God) sought us that we should seek you, your Word by whom you made all things including myself, your only Son by whom you have called to adoption the people who believe (Gal. 4: 5), myself among them (11.2.4).

‘Adoption’, like ‘image of God’ and ‘participation’, is applied both in an ontological sense and in a teleological sense: this is to say that, although we are created as ‘adopted sons’ of God, the ‘adoption’ has not yet been completed.

In the Confessions the evidence concerning the Christological element of Augustinian deification is very conspicuous, and I shall provide more of it in order to justify my argument that deification is indeed the central theme of the thirteen books as an organic whole:

unless I had sought your way in Christ our Saviour (Titus 1: 4), I would have been not expert but expunged (7.20.26)997.

I read there (i.e., in the ‘libri platoniorum’) that the Word, God, is ‘born not of the flesh, nor of blood, nor of the will of man nor of the will of the flesh, but of God’. But that ‘the word was made flesh and dwelt among us’ (John 1: 13-14), I did not read there. …The books (i.e., the ‘libri platoniorum’) say that before all times and above all times your only-begotten Son immutably abides eternal with you, and that souls ‘receive his fullness’ (John 1: 16) to be blessed, and that they
are renewed to be wise by participation in wisdom abiding in them. But they do not contain that ‘at the right time he died for the impious’ (Rom. 5: 6), and that you ‘did not spare your only Son but gave him up for us all’ (Rom. 8: 32). For you have hidden these things from the wise and revealed them to babes, that toiling and burdened they should come to him to be restored (reficeret) (7.9.14)\textsuperscript{998},

his (i.e., Christ’s) wonderful birth from a virgin was an example of despising temporal things to gain immortality for us (7.19.25).

The word ‘expunge’ in the first excerpt must be interpreted with respect to the soul in a teleological sense. The second excerpt shows Augustine’s Christology in reference to both the ontological (i.e., ‘souls “receive his fullness” to be blessed’, and all human souls have already the Son’s ‘fullness’) and the teleological (i.e., ‘they are renewed to be wise by participation in wisdom’, and how much one person ‘participates in Wisdom’ differs from another) dimensions of deification. The last excerpt from 7.19.25 is Augustine’s Neoplatonic interpretation of Christ’s incarnation: the virgin birth of Christ is God’s admonition that we must turn away from the world of senses to the world of intelligible beings.

Note that the Augustine of the \textit{Confessions} often uses ‘salvation’ and ‘eternal life’ in a deificatory sense:

Who will enable me to find rest in you? … if I fail to love you, you are angry with me … Open them (i.e., Augustine’s ears) and ‘say to my soul, I am your salvation.’ After that utterance I will run and lay hold on you. Do not hide your face from me (cf. Ps. 26: 9). Lest I die, let me die so that I may see it (1.5.5),

That is how it was when at that moment we (i.e., Monica & Augustine in Ostia) extended our reach and in a flash of mental energy attained the eternal wisdom which abides beyond all things. If only it could last, and other visions of a vastly

\textsuperscript{997} ‘Garriebam plane quasi peritus et, nisi in Christo, salvatore nostr, viam tuam quaererem, non peritus sed periturus essem.’
\textsuperscript{998} ‘…venirent ad eum laborantes et onerati et reficeret eos’.
inferior kind could be withdrawn! Then this alone could ravish and absorb and 
enfold in inward joys the person granted the vision. So too eternal life is of the 
quality of that moment of understanding after which we sighed (9.10.25)999.

I was superior to these external objects but inferior to you, and you are my true 
joy if I submit to you, and you have made subject to me what you created to be 
lower than me. This was the correct mean, the middle ground in which I would 
find health (salutis), that I should remain ‘in your image’, and in serving you be 
master of my body. (7.7.11)1000

How can salvation be obtained except through your hand remaking what you 
once made? (5.7.13)1001

In short, ‘salvation’, which is semantically interchangeable with ‘rest’ and ‘eternal life’ 
(cf., 1.5.5, 9.10.25 & 7.7.11), is the ‘remaking’ of the image of God (cf.,5.7.13) through 
attempting to ‘see’ God ‘face to face’1002 (cf., 1.5.5 & 9.10.25) 1003 while liberating 
ourselves from the bondage to material things (cf., 7.7.11).

Fifthly (6-5), in the last part of Book 10, Augustine expresses his Christology in 
reference not only to the ontological dimension, but also the teleological dimension, of 
deification:

For us he was victorious before you and victor because he was victim. For us 
before you he is priest and sacrifice, and priest because he is sacrifice. Before 
you he makes us sons instead of servants by being born of you and being servant 
to us. With good reason my firm hope is in him. For you will cure all my diseases

999 ... talis sit sempiterna uita quale fuit hoc momentum intelligentiae, cui suspirauimus’. Also, see De 
vera religione 3.3 & De Trinitate 1.8.17: ‘eternal life, that they should know you, the one true God, and 
Jesus Christ whom you have sent (Jn 17:3).’
1000 ‘... Et hoc erat rectum temperamentum et media regio salutis meae, ut manerem ad imaginem tuam et 
tibi serviens dominarer corpor. ...’
1001 ‘Aut quae procuratio salutis praeter manum tuam reficientem quae fecisti?’
1002 Confessiones 10.5.7.
1003 Also, see Confessiones 8.1.2 (‘Of a certainty, all men are vain who do not have the knowledge of 
God, or have not been able, from the good things that are seen, to find him who is good’), 10.5.7 & 
12.13.16.
(Ps. 102: 3) through him who sits at your right hand and intercedes with you for us (Rom. 8: 34) (10.43.69),

‘That is why Christ died for all, so that those who live should not live for themselves, but for him who died for them’ (2 Cor. 5: 15) (10.43.70).

In short, Christ – through His incarnation, death, and resurrection – has made us ‘adopted’ sons of God (cf., 10.43.69: ‘he makes us sons instead of servants by being born of you and being servant to us’), enabling our soul to ‘participate’ in His ‘Life’\(^\text{1004}\) (cf., 10.43.70: ‘those who live’). Moreover, only Christ can lead us to our ‘salvation’ (cf., 10.43.69: ‘you will cure all my diseases [Ps. 102: 3] through him’) and make our life full in God (cf., 10.43.70: ‘should not live for themselves, but for him’). In the remaining part of Book 10 Augustine minutely reiterates how he has come to acquire knowledge of God, which is both the goal and the means of his teleological project. Thus, the whole of Book 10 serves more like a summary of Books 1-9.

Finally (6-6), Augustine attempts to ascend to God through faith, hope and love in Books 11-13; for knowing God (especially His immateriality, immanence, omnipresence, and transcendence) through understanding His creation is not sufficient to complete our teleological journey: Holte correctly maintains that ‘Augustinian faith is a faith in search of understanding, striving for union with God in an act of perfect intellectual contemplation of the divine reality, implying a state of perfect rest and peace.’\(^\text{1005}\)

We have seen that Christology has become more integral to the mature Augustine’s theory of deification than the young Augustine’s. Otherwise, there is no noteworthy difference between them. Thus, as in Part II, I shall, first of all, examine the mature Augustine’s hierarchical view of reality in chapter (1), for it gives reasons why he maintained that we must turn to God. Afterwards, in chapter (2), I shall investigate how Augustine argued that we can move closer to God in terms of reason, will, faith, and

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1004 Cf., Confessiones 3.6.10.
divine grace. I shall outline and explain how I am going to investigate this at the beginning of this chapter.

1) Augustine’s view of reality

Like the young Augustine, the mature Augustine understood that reality is hierarchically structured. The hierarchy of reality is also a ‘hierarchy of value’ in terms of ‘better’, ‘love’ and happiness: God is the ‘supreme Value’. Augustine’s criteria for the value system (cf., the Confessions 10.7.11-8.12, 10.17.26 and 10.25.36) are basically same as the young Augustine’s, following the schema of the Neoplatonic hierarchy ‘esse, vivere, intelligere’ in ascending order.

The human soul is ontologically located between the body and God. Yet, from the perspective of teleology, the soul can rise to the level of God or fall below it: in other words, the hierarchical order is not ‘static’ for the soul. Nonetheless, God wills that we ‘orientate’ ourselves to Him alone. Otherwise, being created from nothing, we are destined to suffer from ‘restlessness’.

Corcoran is absolutely right when he comments:

as man emerges from the creative hands of God, he has within himself a motion, a dynamism towards God. It is precisely because man is not complete in himself that he is in motion to something outside himself where he will find his completion. … man must find his identity outside himself, and whether he rises

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1007 ‘potius’ (De vera religione 48.93) or ‘melius’ (Confessiones 7.1.1).
1008 De vera religione 48.93.
1009 Cf., Le Blond, Les Conversions de saint Augustin, 178-180. ‘It (i.e., vitam beatam) is enough, it is there.’ (Confessiones 10.20.29 quoted in Le Blond, 177.) Also, see Soliloquia 1.1.3: ‘O God, Happiness, in whom and by whom and through whom all those things are happy which are happy’.
1012 See chapter 1 ‘The Hortensius’ in Part I.
1015 Cf., Confessiones 1.1.1: ‘feciisti nos ad te’. This is related to ‘my weight is my love’ (Ibid., 13.9.10): for more explanation, see the beginning of section ‘Practical dimension’ in chapter 2.
above himself or sinks below himself depends on the choices he makes. If he opts for God, he will reach the full potentialities of his being and find rest.\footnote{Corcoran, 19.}

I take ‘man must find his identity outside himself’ as ultimately meaning that we are the image of God and, so, must strive to renew the image.\footnote{Confessiones 6.3.4 (‘man being made by you your image (Gen. 1:26)’) & 13.22.32 (‘man “is renewed in the knowledge of God after the image of him who created him” (Col. 3: 10).’) (All are Chadwick’s translations.)}

Augustine mentions the ‘dynamism’\footnote{Corcoran, 19.} of the soul in terms of the ‘image of God’\footnote{Confessiones 13.22.32.} and ‘renewing (renovare)’ the image means deification:

man “is renewed in the knowledge of God after the image of him who created him” (Col. 3: 10).\footnote{Chadwick’s translation: ‘homo “renovatur in agniti one Dei secundum imaginem eius, qui creavit eum’”} (Confessiones 13.22.32).

Augustine describes the ‘dynamism’ of the image of God in several ways. Sagacity is one: God is immutable Wisdom, whereas we – the image of Wisdom/God – can become wise or foolish.\footnote{Cf., Confessiones 4.15.26: (Chadwick’s translation) ‘What could be worse arrogance than the amazing madness with which I asserted myself to be by nature what you are? I was changeable and this was evident to me from the fact that I wanted to be wise and to pass from worse to better.’} Thus, becoming wise is becoming like Wisdom/God. Rationality is another instance: God is ‘eternal Reason’\footnote{Confessiones 11.8.10.}, whereas human reason is created and mutable.\footnote{Confessiones 5.3.4.} In Confessiones 10.6.9-10 Augustine concisely describes two levels of rationality\footnote{Cf., ‘integer sensus’.} in reference to our ability to understand God through understanding (or by ‘judging’) His creation: those, who question whether a being is created or not, pertain to the upper level; otherwise to the lower level. Thus, becoming rational is becoming like Reason/God. (In Part II, I explained that the concepts of sagacity, rationality, and image of God are interconnected.)\footnote{See section ‘The image of God’ in chapter 1.} Becoming wiser or more rational...
is simultaneously an ascent to ‘Being’ itself (i.e., ‘I am who I am’), or increasing our
being, because our existence itself is the image of the supreme Being:

\[ \text{cum te primum cognovi, tu adsumpsisti me ut viderem esse quod viderem, et} \]
\[ \text{nondum me esse qui viderem (Confessiones 7.10.16)} \]

Chadwick translates it as follow:

When I first came to know you, you raised me up to make me see that what I saw
is Being, and that I who saw am not yet Being.

Wetzel criticizes the above translation, arguing that ‘it seems as if Augustine had the
ambition of one day becoming God (Being).’ If Wetzel’s interpretation of Chadwick
is right, then I argue that the latter has grasped the true spirit of Augustinian interiority:
the small word ‘not yet (nondum)’ suggests that becoming God/Being is the goal of
Augustine’s spiritual life, though he admitted that the goal is unattainable in this life.
Note that Wetzel himself observes the idea of deification in Augustine in the same part
of the Confessions:

I (i.e., God) am the food of the fully grown; grow and you (i.e., Augustine) will
feed on me. And you will not change me into you like the food your flesh eats,
but you will be changed into me. (Confessions 7.10.16)

Wetzel comments on this passage in a manner which endorses the passage from the
above translation of Chadwick’s: ‘by the time Augustine would have had his fill of God,
there would be no Augustine left, but only God.’

2) Deification of the soul

\[ ^{1026} \text{Confessiones 7.10.16. Also, see James Wetzel, ‘Will and Interiority in Augustine: Travels in an} \]
\[ ^{1027} \text{Unlikely Place’, Augustinian Studies 33/2 (2002), 150.} \]
\[ ^{1028} \text{Quoted in Wetzel, ‘Will and Interiority in Augustine’, 150.} \]
\[ ^{1029} \text{Quoted in Wetzel, 150, footnote 19.} \]
\[ ^{1030} \text{Chadwick’s translation.} \]
\[ ^{1031} \text{Wetzel, 152.} \]
Augustine maintains that everybody has the innate desire to become like God, and endeavours to justify it from the perspective of teleology. He first of all insists that we have a natural, universal yearning for ‘happy life (*beata vita*)’;\(^\text{1032}\) next argues that the happy life is the ‘joy in Truth’ and Truth is God:\(^\text{1033}\)

if I put the question to anyone whether he prefers to find joy in the truth or in falsehood, he does not hesitate to say that he prefers the truth, just as he does not hesitate to say he wants to be happy. The happy life is joy based on the truth. This is joy grounded in you, O God, who are the truth (*Confessiones* 10.23.33).\(^\text{1034}\)

Since true happiness is the ‘joy’ in God/Truth, wanting to be happy is the same as yearning for God/Truth and vice versa:

> When I seek you, my God, what I am seeking is happy life.\(^\text{1035}\)

‘Seeking God’ means searching for knowledge of God and, upon acquiring the knowledge, we become like God. In other words, we become wiser and more rational through knowing God, for we (i.e., the soul) are the image of Wisdom/‘Reason’\(^\text{1036}\)/God:

> What could be worse arrogance than the amazing madness (*dementia*) with which I asserted myself to be by nature what you (i.e., God) are? I was changeable and this was evident to me from the fact that I wanted to be wise and to pass from worse to better.\(^\text{1037}\)

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\(^\text{1032}\) Cf., *Confessiones* 10.21.31 & 10.23.33 (see below). ‘This was a commonplace dictum in ancient philosophy’: see Vernon J. Bourke, *Augustine’s love of wisdom: an introspective philosophy* (West Lafayette: Purdue University Press, 1992), 43.

\(^\text{1033}\) Other kinds of joy are ‘detestable’ (cf., *Confessiones* 10.21.30).

\(^\text{1034}\) (Chadwick’s translation) ‘... Beata quippe vita est gaudium de veritate. Hoc est enim gaudium de te, qui Veritas es, Deus’. Also, see *Confessiones* 10.20.29 & 10.22.32.

\(^\text{1035}\) Cf., *Confessiones* 10.20.29: ‘Cum enim te, Deum meum, quero, vitam beatam quero.’ And Ibid., 10.22.32: (Chadwick’s translation) ‘There is a delight which is given not to the wicked (Isa. 48.22), but to those who worship you for no reward save the joy that you yourself are to them (*Ext enim gaudium, quod non datur impiis, sed eis, qui te gratis colunt, quorum gaudium tu ipse es*).’

\(^\text{1036}\) *Confessiones* 11.8.10.

\(^\text{1037}\) *Confessiones* 4.15.26.
Consequently, by making progress in our pursuit of true happiness (i.e., ‘joy’ in Truth/God), we become deified; and vice versa.

Therefore, in the first section of this chapter I shall investigate the intellectual dimension of Augustinian interiority, starting with his question ‘How is it possible for us to yearn for the “joy in Truth/God”?’ His answer in a nutshell is that we have already had the knowledge of the happy life in our memory, thus God’s immanence.\textsuperscript{1038} However, our memory of God/Happiness is ‘implicit’ and so we must strive to render it ‘explicit’ in order to attain true happiness.\textsuperscript{1039} This is to say that getting to know God is nothing other than reminiscing God. Here, there still remains the problem of the soul’s pre-existence in relation to Augustine’s theory of reminiscence: as Teske maintains, the mature Augustine’s arguments for God’s epistemological immanence ‘implicitly’ (in Teske’s term) refer to ‘the pastness of the experience’ of God.\textsuperscript{1040} God is not only immanent, but also omnipresent in terms of power and ontologically transcendent;\textsuperscript{1041} in other words, transcendent by nature:\textsuperscript{1042}

I will pass beyond even my memory that I may find you ... where? ... If I find you somewhere beyond my memory, that means that I shall be forgetful of you. And how shall I find you, once I am no longer mindful of you?\textsuperscript{1043} (\textit{Confessiones} 10.17.26)

Since the mind and memory are identical,\textsuperscript{1044} ‘passing beyond \textit{(transire)} my memory that I may find you’ means that God transcends the mind, thus an upward turn.

\textsuperscript{1038} Cf., \textit{Confessiones} 10.20.29 & 10.23.33: see below in the section a ‘God’s immanence’.

\textsuperscript{1039} Cf., Verbeke, ‘Connaissance de soi et connaissance de Dieu chez saint Augustin’, 505-506.

\textsuperscript{1040} Cf., Ronald Teske, ‘Platonic reminiscence and memory of the present in St. Augustine’, \textit{The New Scholasticism} 58 (1984), 223. Also, see section ‘Reasoning is remembering’ in chapter 2 in Part II.

\textsuperscript{1041} Cf., \textit{Confessiones} 5.3.4 (epistemological First Cause and Creatorship) & 7.10.16 (ontological First Cause).

\textsuperscript{1042} Cf., \textit{Confessiones} 3.8.16 (incorruptability) & 7.17.23 (immutability).

\textsuperscript{1043} (Boulding’s translation) ‘Transibo et memoriam, ut ubi te inveniam ...Si praeter memoriam meam te invenio, immemor tui sum. Et quomodo iam inveniam te, si memor non sum tui?’

However, we cannot say ‘beyond (praeter) memory’ in terms of epistemology, for ‘beyond’ in this sense means complete oblivion (cf., *Confessiones* 10.18.27).

It must be stressed that God’s epistemological immanence is not the primary reason for Augustine to insist on an inward turn. In fact, as for the young Augustine, so for the Augustine of the *Confessions* our mind can ascend to God through understanding not only the soul but also His other creation:

your (i.e., God’s) invisible reality is plainly to be understood through created things.\(^{1045}\)

Nonetheless, what matters to Augustine most is how to think *correctly* about God’s immanence – from which the theory of reminiscence ensues –, omnipresence, and transcendence; and what enables to settle the theological issues. As Augustine learned from his experience, it is the immaterial concept of God that must be the foundation of our theology.\(^{1046}\) Now, we do not ‘see’ God ‘face to face’ in this life.\(^{1047}\) How, then, can we come to know God’s incorporeity? Only through understanding the nature of our own soul we can know that God is also incorporeal, thus inwardness.

Why, then, do we remember so little about the happy life (or God)?\(^{1048}\) It is because we are preoccupied with material things.\(^{1049}\) As Chadwick holds that for Augustine ‘to remember God is a conscious act of will, a decision’,\(^{1050}\) the intellectual dimension of Augustinian interiority is not independent of the practical dimension. Thus, in the second section of chapter 2, I shall investigate the practical dimension in terms of the will (or love) and the key points are as follows. Firstly, the activity of the will relies on what reason (i.e., the ‘mind’s eye’\(^{1051}\)) can see, or what we can remember. Yet the direction of ‘reasoning (ratiocinari)’\(^{1052}\) follows what the heart desires to recall from the memory. Secondly, God has designed the mechanism of the heart in such a way that it

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1045 *Confessiones* 7.17.23.
1047 Cf., *Confessiones* 10.5.7.
1048 Cf., *Confessiones* 10.23.33.
1049 Cf., *Confessiones* 10.23.33.
1051 *Confessiones* 7.10.16: ‘oculus animae’.
1052 *Confessiones* 7.17.23.
should become restless when it turns away from Him. Thirdly, turning away from God means not so much loving ‘wrong things’ as loving things in a ‘wrong way’. Fourthly, faith remedies our perverse love of God’s creation. Finally, if the will is ‘divided’ as to whether or not to follow the decision of the mind, then only divine grace can resolve the dilemma (in other words, divine grace makes the ‘split’ will ‘whole’).

a) Intellectual dimension: inward and upward

a) God’s immanence

To recapitulate, Augustine insists that we have an innate desire for the happy life (or God). However, we cannot love what we do not know. Consequently, all of us must have known what true happiness is. In other words, we have got ‘knowledge (notitia)’ of the happy life in our memory, thus God’s epistemological immanence:

they would have no love for it (i.e., beata vita) unless there were some knowledge (notitia) of it in their memory (Confessiones 10.23.33),

it (i.e., the happy life) is known to everyone. If they could be asked if they want to be happy, without hesitation they would answer with one voice that they so wish. That would not be the case unless the thing itself, to which this term (‘happy life’) refers, was being held in the memory. (Ibid., 10.20.29)

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1054 Confessiones 8.10.24.
1055 Confessiones 8.10.22.
1056 Confessiones 8.9.21.
1057 Cf., Confessiones 10.21.31 & 10.23.33 (see above).
1058 Cf., Confessiones 10.20.29: ‘they would not wish to be happy unless they had some idea of happiness … we would not love it (i.e., happy life) if we did not know what it is. (Qui tamen etiam ipsi nisi aliquo modo haberent eam, non ita vellent beati esse … Neepe enim amaremus eam, nisi nossemus).’ (Chadwick’s translation)
1059 (Chadwick’s translation) ‘nec amarent, nisi esset aliqua notitia eius in memoria eorum.’
1060 Chadwick’s translation.
Now, Verbeke insists that ‘notitia’ is knowledge, which is ‘obscure and more or less implicit, but real’; whereas ‘cogitatio’ is ‘actual and explicit knowledge’, which can be gained only via ‘notitia’. Thus, pursuing knowledge of God (or the ‘happy life’) means an endeavour to transform the ‘latent’ and ‘implicit’ notitia of God into the ‘actual’ and ‘explicit’ cogitatio.

How come we have the knowledge of the happy life in memory? Augustine answers the question with the following analogy: we can seek, for instance, a lost coin because we have seen it beforehand and still remember it. Similarly, because we have the memory of the happy life – that is, ‘joy in Truth/God’ – from ‘experiencing it’, we are able to recall it and yearn for it.

Where and when did we experience the happy life? This is Augustine’s question, but he did not attempt to answer it for the fear of admitting the Platonic theory of the soul’s pre-existence. Nonetheless, if we examine carefully Augustine’s use of the word ‘experience’, it is difficult to disprove Teske’s argument that Augustine’s theory of reminiscence ‘implicitly’ presupposed the existence of the soul prior to the body.

We, above all, need to pay attention to Augustine’s distinction among desire, knowledge (notitia), reality (res), and experience in the basic argument of his for God’s immanence – that is, our desire for the happy life logically presupposes our possession of the knowledge about it, which comes from our experience of it.

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1061 Cf., Verbeke, ‘Connaissance de soi et connaissance de Dieu chez s. Augustin’, 505.
1062 Confessiones, 10.12.19, 10.11.18 & 10.8.13.
1064 Verbeke, 505-506.
1065 Cf., Confessiones 10.18.27.
1066 Confessiones 10.23.33.
1067 Confessiones 10.21.31: also, refer to Ibid., 10.20.29-21.30.
1068 Cf., Confessiones 10.22.32: (Chadwick’s translation) ‘That is the authentic happy life, to set one’s joy on you (i.e., God), grounded in you and caused by you (ipsa est beata vita, gaudere ad te, de te, propter te).’
1069 Cf., Confessiones 10.20.29 (‘how have they known about it [i.e., ‘happy life’] so as to want it? Where did they see it to love it? Certainly we have the desire for it, but how I do not know’ & 10.21.31 (‘Where and when, then, have I experienced the happy life for myself.’) (All are Chadwick’s translations.)
1070 Cf., Confessiones 10.21.31: this is a summary of Confessiones 10.20.29-21.31.
Now, the distinction between *notitia* and *res* is, on the one hand, meaningless: Augustine says in *Confessions* 10.23.33\(^{1072}\) that we have the *notitia* of the happy life in memory; but in the *Confessions* 10.20.29 that the happy life itself (*res ipsa*) is in memory.\(^{1073}\) (I explained how the young Augustine’s distinction between epistemology and ontology disappears at the end of section ‘Learning [*disciplina*] is in the soul’ in chapter 2 in Part II.) Similarly, regarding the liberal arts, Augustine says in *Confessions* 10.9.16:

The immense spaces of my memory harbour even more than these (i.e., the images of mountains … and stars), however. Here too are all those things which I received through the liberal arts (*doctrinis liberalibus*) and have not yet forgotten; they are stored away in some remote inner place, which yet is not really a place at all. However, in this case it is not images of the realities that I harbour, but the *realities* themselves (*res ipsas*).\(^{1074}\)

Thus, we can assume that for the Augustine of the *Confessions notitia* is a *res*. Augustine explicitly insists it in *De quantitate animae* as well as in *De Trinitate*:

knowledge stands higher than reason (*scientiam pluris quam rationem*)\(^{1075}\)

(‘Higher’ and ‘lower’ are hierarchical terms from the perspective of ontology)\(^{1076}\),

knowledge is a substance (*substantia sit scientia*).\(^{1077}\)

On the other hand, Augustine differentiates *notitia* from *res* in the way that the former is a result of ‘experiencing’ the latter. In other words, without experiencing a *res*, the *notitia* of that *res* cannot exist in memory:

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\(^{1072}\) quoted above.

\(^{1073}\) (Chadwick’s translation) ‘the thing itself (*res ipsa*, i.e., “happy life”), to which this term (“*beata vita*”) refers, was being held in the memory (*res ipsa, cuius hoc nomen est, eorum memoria teneretur*).”

\(^{1074}\) Boulding’s translation.

\(^{1075}\) *De quantitate animae* 27.53: ‘when this sight of the mind, which we call reason, sees some reality upon which it is focused, we call that knowledge (*cum ille mentis aspectus, quem rationem vocamus, coniectus in rem aliquam, videt illam, scientia nominatur*)’.

\(^{1076}\) Cf., *De quantitate animae* 34.78.
I experienced it (i.e., the happy life, res ipsa) in my mind when I was glad, and the knowledge (notitia) of it stuck in my memory, so that I could remind myself of it.\textsuperscript{1078} (Confessiones 10.21.30)

Although Augustine maintains in Confessions 10.9.16 that liberal arts (doctrinis liberalibus) are realities (res ipsae),\textsuperscript{1079} he holds in Confessions 10.21.30 that there is a difference between our pursuit of, for instance, mathematical knowledge and that of the happy life as follows:

It is surely not the way in which we remember numbers. A person who has a grasp of numbers does not still seek to acquire (adipisci) this knowledge (notitia). But the happy life we already have in our knowledge (notitia), and so we love it; and yet we still wish to acquire (adipisci) it so that we may be happy.\textsuperscript{1080}

This passage can be interpreted as meaning that having the notitia of the happy life in the memory and loving to recall it – even in the moment of sorrow –\textsuperscript{1081} are different from attaining (adipisci) the res ipsa of the happy life. The reason is that in Confessions 10.20.29 Augustine associates adipisci with res, not notitia:

The thing itself is neither Greek nor Latin. Greeks and Latins and people of other languages yearn to acquire it.\textsuperscript{1082} (res ipsa nec Graeca nec Latina est, cui adipiscendae Graeci Latinique inhiant ceterarumque linguarum homines.)

Since the distinction between notitia and res explains why we can recall the memory of a happy moment in the past while currently feeling miserable,\textsuperscript{1083} and leads to the conclusion that the act of remembering in this respect is recalling the notitia rather than

\textsuperscript{1077} De Trinitate 9.4.6.
\textsuperscript{1078} (Chadwick’s translation) ‘expertus sum in animo meo, quando laetatus sum, et adhaesit eius notitia memoriae meae, ut id reminisci valeam’
\textsuperscript{1079} Cf., Confessions 10.9.16.
\textsuperscript{1080} (Chadwick’s translation) ‘Numquid sicut meminimus numeros? Non; hos enim qui habet in notitia, non adhuc quaerit adipisci, vitam vero beatam habemus in notitia ideoque amamus et tamen adhuc adipisci eam volumus, ut beati simus.’
\textsuperscript{1081} Cf., Confessions 10.21.30.
\textsuperscript{1082} Chadwick’s translation.
\textsuperscript{1083} Cf., Confessiones 10.21.30
attaining (*adipisci*) the *res ipsa*; the experience of the happy life remains as an occurrence in the past. Therefore, as Teskes argues, Augustine was not all that successful in severing the tie between our memory (i.e., *notitia*) of God and its reference to our experience of God as a past event.\textsuperscript{1084}

Note that in *De Trinitate* 9.11.16 Augustine distinguishes *notitia* of God from God Himself by insisting that the former is inferior to Him:

it (i.e., *notitia* of God) remains inferior (*inferiore*) to God because it is an inferior nature (i.e., the soul), our consciousness being a creature, but God the creator. (From this we can gather that when the mind knows and approves itself, this knowledge is its word in such a way that it matches it exactly and is equal to it and identical, since it is neither knowledge of an inferior thing like body nor of a superior one like God.)\textsuperscript{1085}

(Consequently, *notitia* of God, which is inferior to God, is superior to the soul.) Furthermore, in *De Trinitate* Augustine makes a sharp distinction between knowledge and its subject in terms of ‘parent’ and ‘offspring’: I shall explain this in section ‘Knowledge of a thing is similar to the reality of that thing’ in chapter 3 in Part IV.

Despite the connundrum concerning ‘where’ and ‘when’ we experienced the happy life,\textsuperscript{1086} God’s immanence in our memory is an abiding conviction of Augustine. Also, despite the ambiguity concerning whether or not *res* and *notitia* are one and the same, Augustine’s reasoning for God’s immanence is always, in the first place, epistemological:

\textsuperscript{1084} Cf., Teske, ‘Platonic reminiscence and memory of the present in St. Augustine’, 220-235.

\textsuperscript{1085} (Hill’s translation) ‘illa notitia; tamen inferior est, quia in inferiore natura est; creatura quippe animus, Creator autem Deus. (Ex quo colligitur, quia cum se mens ipsa novit atque approbat, sic est eadem notitia verbum eius, ut ei sit par omnino et aequale, atque identidem; quia neque inferioris essentiae notitia est, sicut corporis; neque superioris, sicut Dei.)’

\textsuperscript{1086} Cf., *Confessions* 10.20.29 & 10.21.31.
you (i.e., God) have deigned to dwell in my memory from the time I learned of you. … you dwell in it, since I have remembered you from the time I learned of you, and I find you in my memory when I call you to mind. 1087

Yet, God simultaneously transcends the soul in terms of power and nature, thus an upward turn.

**ii) God’s omnipresence and transcendence**

O’Connell insists in his book *St. Augustine’s Confessions: The Odyssey of Soul* that in Plotinus there is a ‘gigantic’ problem of consistency between God’s (i.e., the One or Intellect) omnipresence and the soul’s fall: the question is ‘How, on the face of it, is a “turning away” any longer possible, when every turn will also be “towards” the Omnipresent?’ 1088 Unfortunately, Augustine did not seem to have sensed the problem. 1089 Such a criticism of O’Connell is based on his ignorance that Augustine maintained God’s immanence in an epistemological sense and God’s omnipresence in terms of power:

my God, I would not exist, I would not be at all, were you not in me. Or should I say, rather, that I should not exist if I were not in you, from whom are all things, through whom are all things, in whom are all things? Yes, Lord, that is the truth, 1090 (*Confessiones* 1.2.2),

he (i.e., God) did not create and then depart; the things derived from him have their being in him. 1091

if they did not have their existence in you, they had no existence at all. 1092

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1087 *Confessiones* 10.25.36 (Chadwick’s translation): ‘dignatus es habitare in memoria mea, ex quo te didici. … Habitas certe in ea, quoniam tui memini, ex quo te didici, et in ea te invenio, cum recordor te.’
1090 Boulding’s translation.
1091 *Confessiones* 4.12.18. (Chadwick’s translation)
1092 *Confessiones* 10.27.38. (Chadwick’s translation)
In other words, we are ‘in’ God, or in God’s ever present creative and sustaining power that extends throughout His creation. Notice the first sentence ‘I would not exist, I would not be at all, were you not in me.’ In the same part of the *Confessions* Augustine constantly asks how God can be ‘seized (capere)’ by the soul:

Is there any place within me into which my God might come? How should the God who made heaven and earth come into me? Is there any room in me for you *(est quidquam in me, quod capiat te)*, Lord, my God? Even heaven and earth, which you have made and in which you have made me - can even they contain *(capiant)* you? Since nothing that exists would exist without you, does it follow that whatever exists does in some way contain *(capiat)* you? … To what place can I invite you, then, since I am in you?1093 (*Confessiones* 1.2.2)

Here, Augustine’s questions are not from the perspective of epistemology or ontology. He is rather expressing his doubt concerning whether or not divine power can be ‘confined (capere)’ to the soul.

Yet, Augustine sometimes makes statements about God in terms of both epistemology and divine power simultaneously; for instance,

you (i.e., God) were within, but I outside, seeking there for you, and upon the shapely things you have made I rushed headlong … They held me back far from you, those things which would have no being were they not in you.1094

I take this passage as meaning ‘Forgetting that you are epistemologically immanent within me, my mind searched for (knowledge of) you in your creation, whose existence is sustained by your omnipresent power alone.’ Taking into consideration that ‘within’ and ‘outside’ are metaphors1095 denoting similarity and difference respectively, the above text can also be interpreted as ‘Being ignorant that you (i.e., God) and my soul

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1093 Boulding’s translation.
1094 *Confessiones* 10.27.38. (Boulding’s translation)
share the same immaterial nature, I searched for you in your material creation, whose existence is sustained by your omnipresent power.’

In summary, from the perspective of divine power all creatures are in God, whereas from the perspective of epistemology He is in our memory. Therefore, although our ‘mind’s eye’ or ‘reason (ratio)’ can either turn away from God, or turn back to God (in other words, we can either remain oblivious to God or are determined to remember God); we cannot, by any means, escape from the providential power of God:

‘Him (i.e., God) we love; he made these things and is not far distant.’ For he did not create and then depart; the things derived from him have their being in him. Look where he is wherever there is a taste of truth. (He is very close to the heart; but the heart has wandered from him. ‘Return, sinners, to your heart’ [Isa. 46: 8 LXX], and adhere to him who made you.)

(As for precisely what Augustine means by ‘heart’, see the following section ‘Practical dimension’ in chapter 2.)

Augustine argued for God’s transcendence in terms of nature and ontology. For instance, God’s nature is incorruptible and immutable. Ontologically, God is the First Cause. Also, God is the first epistemological principle. In addition, as explained, knowledge (notitia) of God in the memory, is ‘higher (plus)’ than the soul in terms of ‘substance’ or ‘thing (res)’. Thus, as Solignac remarks, Augustine’s

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1096 Confessiones 7.10.16: ‘oculus animae’.
1097 Confessiones 10.6.10.
1098 Confessiones 4.12.18 (Chadwick’s translation).
1099 Cf., Confessiones 3.8.16: (Boulding’s translation) ‘how can our vices touch you, who are incorruptible? What crimes can be committed against you, who are immune from harm?’
1100 Cf., Confessiones 7.17.23: (Boulding’s translation) ‘I realized that above my changeable mind soared the real, unchangeable truth, which is eternal (inveneram incommutabilem et veram veritatis aeternitatem supra mentem meam commutabilem).’
1101 Cf., Confessiones 7.10.16: ‘I am who am’ (Exodus 3.14).
1102 Cf., Confessiones 5.3.4: (Boulding’s translation) ‘With their (i.e., philosophers) intellect and the intelligence you have given them they investigate these things’.
1103 De quantitate animae 27.53: ‘when this sight of the mind, which we call reason, sees some reality upon which it is focused, we call that knowledge (cum ille mentis aspectus, quem rationem vocamus; connectus in rem aliquam, videt illam, scientia nominatur)...’.
1104 De Trinitate 9.4.6.
1105 See section ‘God’s immanence’ in chapter 2.
statements about God’s immanence and transcendence with respect to memory are ‘paradoxical’.\footnote{Aimé Solignac, ‘La notion de « memoria » chez Augustin’, Dictionnaire de Spiritualité, (Paris: Beauchesne, 1980), vol. 10, 996: ‘Cette analyse de la mémoire n’est cependant qu’un étape dans la montée de l’âme vers Dieu : “Transibò istam uim meam, quae memoria uocatur, uolens te attingere unde attingi potes” (17, 26). Mais ici apparaît un paradoxe il faut à la fois que Dieu soit trouvé au-delà de la mémoire, et cependant en elle et par elle.’}

Since God is transcendent, we are to turn not only inwards but also upwards in our search for (knowledge of) God. The culmination of the ascent is, for example, ‘seeing (\textit{vidi})’ the ‘unchanging light (\textit{lucem incommutabilem})’,\footnote{Cf., Confessiones 7.10.16.} ‘touching (\textit{attingimus})’ the ‘eternal Wisdom (\textit{aeternam sapientiam})’,\footnote{Cf., Confessiones 9.10.25.} or ‘acquiring (\textit{adipisci})’ the ‘happy life (\textit{beata vita})’.\footnote{Cf., Agostino Trape, Saint Augustine Man, Pastor, Mystic (New York: Catholic Book Publishing, 1985), 261-262.} Augustine’s terms, ‘seeing’ and ‘touching’, in this context are often interpreted as mystical experiences.\footnote{Philip Cary, ‘Book Seven: Inner Vision as the Goal of Augustine’s Life’, in Kim Paffenroth and Robert Peter Kennedy (eds.), A Reader’s Companion to Augustine’s Confessions (London: Westminster John Knox Press, 2003), 119.} However, like Cary, I argue that Augustine’s visions of God in Milan, after reading the \textit{libri platoniciorm}, as well as in Ostia with his mother Monica, during their intimate conversation with one another, are ‘not mystical, but epistemological: an insight into the fact that all the mind’s knowledge is dependent on its intellectual ability to judge things by the light of unchanging Truth (7.17.23)’\footnote{See Gerald Bonner, ‘Augustine and Mysticism’, in Frederick van Fleteren, Joseph C. Schnaubelt, O.S.A. and Joseph Reino (eds.), Collectanea Augustiniana. Augustine: Mystic and Mystagogue (New York: Peter Lang, 1994), 113-118. Also, Frederick van Fleteren, ‘Mysticism in the Confessions - A Controversy Revisited’, in Frederick van Fleteren, Joseph C. Schnaubelt, O.S.A. and Joseph Reino (eds.), Collectanea Augustiniana. Augustine: Mystic and Mystagogue (New York: Peter Lang, 1994), 309-311.}.

There are problems in defining ‘mysticism’.\footnote{See Gerald Bonner, ‘Augustine and Mysticism’, in Frederick van Fleteren, Joseph C. Schnaubelt, O.S.A. and Joseph Reino (eds.), Collectanea Augustiniana. Augustine: Mystic and Mystagogue (New York: Peter Lang, 1994), 113-118. Also, Frederick van Fleteren, ‘Mysticism in the Confessions - A Controversy Revisited’, in Frederick van Fleteren, Joseph C. Schnaubelt, O.S.A. and Joseph Reino (eds.), Collectanea Augustiniana. Augustine: Mystic and Mystagogue (New York: Peter Lang, 1994), 309-311.} However, whatever it is, it involves just two things, namely the mind and the heart. Moreover, since we cannot love, nor have any feeling towards, what we do not know;\footnote{Philip Cary, ‘Book Seven: Inner Vision as the Goal of Augustine’s Life’, in Kim Paffenroth and Robert Peter Kennedy (eds.), A Reader’s Companion to Augustine’s Confessions (London: Westminster John Knox Press, 2003), 119.} Augustine’s visions of God are, in the first place, cognitive experiences and, so, we must concentrate on what he intellectually underwent (or his epistemological theory), not how he felt emotionally, in interpreting Him.
From the perspective of the mind, Augustine’s so-called mystical experiences are none other than ‘dialectically’ understanding Gods transcendence. This is, in other words, rendering – in the language of Verbeke – ‘latent’ and ‘implicit’ knowledge of God in the memory ‘actual’ and ‘explicit’ through ‘reasoning (ratiocinari)’. Accordingly, referring to Augustine’s account of his Neoplatonic ecstasies at Milan, Bonner points out that it is a highly ‘intellectualised’ account: ‘these descriptions (i.e., Confessiones 7.10.16 & 9.10.25) of personal experiences are, perhaps surprisingly, even more intellectualised than that of the De quantitate animae (i.e., 33.70-76), a fact which explains Etienne Gilson’s observation that “one never really knows whether Saint Augustine is talking as a theologian or a philosopher.” Similarly, Turner emphasizes that Augustine’s ascent to God in Milan and Ostia is partly – but indispensably – an ‘itinerarium mentis’ (which is characteristically an ‘itinerarium intus’).

Furthermore, after arriving at Neoplatonic conclusions about God’s transcendence in Milan and Ostia, intellectually Augustine had nothing else to achieve, apart from attempting to deepen his understanding of revealed truth. We can see another instance of Augustine’s discovery of a truth in Confessions 10.23.33. After years of pursuing happiness in God’s creation, Augustine finally concludes that true happiness is the ‘joy in Truth/God’: intellectually, he has nothing more to attain, yet there is no mention of ecstasy in this case. In Confessions 10.21.30 Augustine draws a parallel between

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1113 For example, ‘they would not wish to be happy unless they had some idea of happiness’ (Chadwick’s translation) (Confessiones 10.20.29: also see Ibid., 10.23.33).
1115 Cf., De Ordine 2.2.4: ‘Whatever understands God is with God (cum Deo est quidquid intellegit Deum)’
1117 Confessiones 7.17.23. Also, see Ibid., 10.6.10 (‘Animals both small and large see it, but they cannot put a question about it. In them reason does not sit in judgment upon the deliverances of the senses.’ [Chadwick’s translation]).
1118 Bonner, ‘Augustine and Mysticism’, 123.
1121 Cf., Confessiones 10.23.33.
studying mathematics and pursuing the happy life, simultaneously emphasizing that the latter is not simply an intellectual exercise: (to quote again)

It is surely not the way in which we remember numbers. A person who has a grasp of numbers does not still seek to acquire (adipisci) this knowledge (notitia). But the happy life we already have in our knowledge (notitia), and so we love it; and yet we still wish to acquire (adipisci) it so that we may be happy.¹¹²²

Unlike our quest for mathematical knowledge, what more is required to attain the happy life is an ethical transformation: ‘There is a delight which is given not to the wicked (Isa. 48: 22), but to those who worship you for no reward save the joy that you yourself are to them.’¹¹²³ Hereafter, Augustine insists upon a total conversion of our heart to the ‘joy in Truth/God’. Thus, Augustine’s experiences in Milan and Ostia were the experiences of a strong conviction that his final conclusions about God’s transcendence were no less ‘certain (certus)’ than any mathematical truth like ‘seven and three make ten’.¹¹²⁴

Augustine’s ethical conversion followed his intellectual conversion.

b) Practical dimension

Augustine’s emphasis on the indispensability of the will’s role in our deification is more conspicuous in the Confessions than in his earlier works. But can we discuss it independently of reason? If not, what is the relationship between reason and the will?

Holte is right to hold that, in spite of the will’s inferiority to reason, ‘the will plays a decisive role even in the intellectual processes’¹¹²⁵: ‘the direction of the intellect is

¹¹²² Confessiones 10.21.30. (Chadwick’s translation)
¹¹²³ Confessiones 10.22.32 (Chadwick’s translation). Also, see Ibid., 10.23.33.
¹¹²⁴ Cf., Confessiones 6.4.6: (Boulding’s translation) ‘I longed to become as certain of those things I could not see as I was that seven and three make ten (Volebam enim eorum quae non viderem ita me certum fieri, ut certus essem, quod septem et tria decem sint).’
¹¹²⁵ Holte, ‘Faith and Interiority in S. Augustine’s Confessions’, 82.
wholly dependent on the direction of the will.’ Notice that, as for the young Augustine, so for the Augustine of the *Confessions*, reason is ‘superior’ to the will because, only upon gaining knowledge of God, can the renewal of the image of God take place: (to cite again) ‘man “is renewed in the knowledge (*agnitione*) of God after the image of him who created him” (*Col. 3: 10*). Nonetheless, we do not study theology if we are not interested in it. What, then, does loving God, whom we do not see ‘face to face (*1 Cor. 13:12*)’, mean? (The scriptural passage, quoted by Augustine, implies that we do not yet possess full knowledge of God.) Or, what is it that we love in loving God, whom we do not know fully?

We cannot desire what we do not know. We have an innate yearning for God (or the ‘happy life’) and the yearning itself is the evidence that we have already had certain, ‘implicit’ knowledge (*notitia*) of God in our memory. Consequently, love of God means desiring to render the ‘implicit’ knowledge of God ‘explicit’. Therefore, Holte’s argument that ‘the direction of the intellect is wholly dependent on the direction of the will’ can be accepted only on the grounds that the will’s activity depends on what we remember, or what reason sees in the memory, albeit vaguely. In a similar manner, we can criticise Caputo’s insistence that ‘we usually think that we first have to get to know something or someone in order subsequently to get to love them. But one of the great lessons of St. Augustine’s writings is that it is love that drives our search to know. Caught up in the grips of what is loved, love is driven to understand what it loves’. This means that for Augustine, ‘we first have to get to know something or someone in order subsequently to get to love them, but our knowledge of it/him/her does not have be ‘explicit’. As Chadwick correctly maintains, ‘lying deeper than knowing and willing, memory is “the stomach of the mind” (*Confessiones x.21*), a storehouse only potentially in the consciousness.’

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1126 Holte, 82.
1127 Holte, 82.
1128 *Confessiones* 13.22.32 (Chadwick’s translation).
1129 *Confessiones* 10.5.7.
1130 Cf., *Confessiones* 10.6.8: ‘What do I love when I love you (*Quid autem amo, cum te amo*)?’
1132 Cf., Verbeke, ‘Connaissance de soi et connaissance de Dieu chez saint Augustin’, 505.
Having clarified the will’s relationship with memory and reason, I shall now focus on Augustine’s concept of the will. Augustine first of all draws an analogy between the ‘role’ of love and that of ‘weight’, taken from Greek physics, in the *Confessions* 13.9.10:

Our true place is where we find rest. We are borne toward it by love … In goodness of will is our peace. A body gravitates to its proper place by its own weight. This weight does not necessarily drag it downward, but pulls it to the place proper to it: thus fire tends upward, a stone downward. Drawn by their weight, things seek their rightful places. … They are not at rest as long as they are disordered, but once brought to order they find their rest. Now, my weight is my love, and wherever I am carried, it is this weight that carries me.

Each material thing has its ‘own place (locus suus)’, where it can find rest (quiescere). Whenever a thing is displaced, that thing – by its weight – tends to move towards that ‘place’. Similarly, the soul has its ‘own place’, where we can find ‘rest (requies)’, and we are constantly driven to that ‘place’ by love. God is our ‘place’, to which our heart is always driven by love. In other words, God is our teleological goal: ‘our heart is restless until it rests in you’. Thus, due to our innate love of Truth/God, we yearn for joy derived from Truth, hating to be deceived. Whenever we stray from Truth/God, God stirs us, with ‘inward goads’, to move back to Him, to whom we belong and the ‘inward goads’ are the causes of our ‘agitation’ or ‘restlessness’.

Regarding Augustine’s term ‘heart (cors)’, Cayré maintains that ‘le coeur, pour saint Augustin, n’est pas une pure faculté affective … Il désigne l’ensemble des activités

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1136 *Confessiones* 13.9.10 (Boulding’s translation): ‘Requies nostra locus noster. Amor illuc attollit nos … Corpus pondere suo nititur ad locum suum. Pondus non ad ima tantum est, sed ad locum suum. Ignis sursum tendit, deorsum lapis. Ponderibus suis aguntur, loca sua petunt. … Minus ordinata inquieta sunt: ordinantur et quiescunt. Pondus meum amor meus; eo fero, quocumque fero.’
1138 See the beginning of chapter 1 ‘The Hortensius’ in Part I. Also, see Bochet, 106-107.
1139 *Confessiones* 1.1.1: ‘inquietum est cor nostrum, donec requiescat in te’.
1140 Cf., *Confessiones* 10.23.33
1141 *Confessiones* 7.8.12: (Chadwick’s translation) ‘it has pleased you to restore my deformities in your sight (Ps. 18: 15). By inward goads you stirred me to make me find it unendurable until, through my inward perception, you were a certainty to me. (stimulis internis agitabas me, ut impatiens essem, donec mihi per interiorem aspectum certus esses.)’ Also, see Bochet, 122-123.
spirituelles supérieures de l’âme, et si l’amour en est le terme, la vérité en est la pièce centrale, d’autant que c’est par elle que se réalise pour l’âme la présence de Dieu. Un mot très net des Confessions le dit bien : « Ecce ubi est Deus : ubi sapit veritas : intimus cordi est. Voici où Dieu se trouve : là où se perçoit la vérité ! il est au fond du cœur ! » (Conf., l. IV, 12, 8.)  

I interpret ‘intimus cordi est’ as a metaphorical expression, meaning that we have the desire for God deep down in our heart. (Knowledge of) God, on the other hand, is in the memory, not in the heart. Thus, the subsequent text ‘(Look where he is wherever there is a taste of truth. He is very close to the heart;) but the heart has wandered from him. “Return, sinners, to your heart” ( Isa. 46: 8 LXX)’  is an admonition that we must try hard to understand why and what makes us restless when we pursue things other than God.

Straying from God does not mean ‘loving wrong things’. There is no ‘wrong thing’ among creatures; since all of them, having derived their existence from the Good God, are good.  Yet, the degrees of their goodness differ from God’s. Hence, we must love creatures in the light of our relationship with God:

sin is committed for the sake of all these things and others of this kind when, in consequence of an immoderate urge towards those things which are at the bottom end of the scale of good, we abandon the higher and supreme goods, that is you, Lord God.}

In De doctrina Christiana (396-426) Augustine explains the same thing in terms of ‘enjoyment (fructus)’ and ‘use (usus)’.  

An ‘enjoyment’ of a thing is ‘to rest with satisfaction in it for its own sake’ (in short, to ‘rest’ in it). ‘Using’ things

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1142 Fulbert Cayré, ‘Dieu présent au coeur’, L’Année Théologique 11 (1951), 120.
1143 Cf., Confessiones 4.12.18 (Chadwick’s translation).
1145 Cf., Confessiones 7.5.7.
1146 Confessiones 2.5.10 (Chadwick’s translation): ‘peccatum admittertur, dum immoderata in ista inclinatione, cum extrema bona sint, meliora et summa deseruntur, tu, Domine Deus noster’.  
1147 Cf., De doctrina Christiana 1.3.3.
1148 De doctrina Christiana 1.4.4: ‘Frui est enim amore inhaerere alicui rei propter seipsam.’
1149 Cf., Confessiones 1.1.1.
means treating them as a means to attain what we wish to ‘enjoy’. Consequently, we are to ‘enjoy’ God by/through ‘using’ His creation.\textsuperscript{1150}

\textbf{i) The will and faith}

Since the irrationality of our mind causes us to love God’s creation in a ‘wrong way’\textsuperscript{1151}, our ‘mind’s eye (acies mentis)’ needs to be ‘purified (purgare)’ through faith.\textsuperscript{1152} Recall that, when the young Augustine mentioned faith in reference to the will, his emphasis on having faith was based on the inseparability between theory and practice. The Augustine of the \textit{Confessions} too stressed that our views of reality – which are largely comprised of what we believe – shape our ways of life. For instance, he entered into a parent-child relationship with Monica and Patricius because he firmly believed that he was born from them:

\begin{quote}
I considered the innumerable things I believed which I had not seen, events which occurred when I was not present, such as many incidents in the history of the nations, many facts concerning places and cities which I had never seen, many things accepted on the word of friends, many from physicians, many from other people. \textit{Unless we believed what we were told, we would do nothing at all in this life}. Finally, I realized how immovably sure I was about the identity of my parents from whom I came, which I could not know unless I believed what I had heard.\textsuperscript{1153}
\end{quote}

Pay attention to the passage ‘unless we believed what we were told, we would do nothing at all in this life’. It means in a general sense that we cannot do what has never crossed our minds in the form of belief. Such an insistence of Augustine is a repetition of what he had already mentioned in \textit{De utilitate credendi}, in which he held that mutual \textit{trust} between two people is the only way for them to enter into a relationship with one another. The reason is because we cannot know each other’s mind and heart:

\textsuperscript{1150} Cf., \textit{De doctrina Christiana} 1.7.7 & 1.22.20.
\textsuperscript{1152} Cf., \textit{Confessiones} 6.4.6.
\textsuperscript{1153} \textit{Confessiones} 6.5.7 (Chadwick’s translation).
You will say with your own good conscience that there is no deceit in you, and you will assert this with what words you can, but still with words. For as a man you would not be able to reveal to a man the inner recesses of your soul so as to be completely known.\footnote{De utilitate credendi 10.23.}

(There is a similar insistence in the \textit{Confessions} 10.3.3: ‘when they hear me talking about myself, how can I they know if I am telling the truth, when no one ‘knows what is going on in a person except the human spirit which is within’ (1 Cor. 2 : 11)?\footnote{Chadwick’s translation.} Augustine also expatiates on the same thing in \textit{De Trinitate} 9.6.9 and 12.10.15.) In other words, what cannot be known is always an object of either belief or scepticism\footnote{Cf., \textit{De utilitate credendi} 10.24: ‘For there is also no friendship at all unless something is believed which cannot be demonstrated by positive reasoning.’} and one’s inner world (i.e., the mind and the heart) is cognitively inaccessible to another. Hence, the way that we relate to each other, for instance, as friends\footnote{Cf., \textit{De utilitate credendi} 12.26.}, parents and children\footnote{Cf., \textit{De utilitate credendi} 10.24.}, a master and stewards\footnote{Cf., \textit{De utilitate credendi} 13.29.}, a doctor and a patient\footnote{Cf., \textit{De utilitate credendi} 10.24.}, or a preacher and his audience\footnote{Cf., \textit{De utilitate credendi} 10.24.} is founded upon what/who we believe each other to be. Otherwise, the relationship cannot be established or sustained.

Due to the inaccessibility of each other’s mind and heart, Augustinian interiority is epistemologically a lone journey to God. Regarding Augustine’s description of what he and Monica underwent in Ostia in the \textit{Confessions} 9.10.24, Louth says, ‘It is at once an account of a personal experience, and yet not a purely solitary one. The experience grows out of his conversation with his mother. This makes one wonder to what extent friendship, companionship, communion with other human beings, is important for Augustine in his ascent to God, or whether - as with Plotinus - it is a flight of the “alone to the Alone”. I do not think one can be clear on this as far as Augustine is concerned, but there is a strand - and an important strand - in Augustine’s thought that stresses the social nature of final beatitude. … it is important for us as growing out of the
observation that the vision was not a solitary experience.\footnote{1162} Louth also says, ‘Augustine’s estimate of the importance of companionship is complex; it perplexed Augustine, and he perplexes his readers. He is ambivalent, drawn both to the Plotinian aloneness and to the importance and indeed necessity of companionship. It is an unresolved tension.’\footnote{1163} However, we have seen Augustine insisting that we cannot know whether a person is truthful with what that person says and does. Thus, the sharing of ideas and feelings between Augustine and Monica is entirely founded on mutual trust. Epistemologically, they were two completely isolated souls.

In *Confessions* 10.21.30 Augustine explains and emphasizes one soul’s inaccessibility to another – from the perspective of experience – by means of a comparison between eloquence and the ‘happy life’\footnote{1164}. A competent rhetorician can give aspirants of eloquence an experience of his rhetorical skill through words and gestures. Augustine here points out that the rhetorical skill is the object of sense perceptions, so that the aspirants learn it through listening to and watching the rhetorician’s performance. Augustine, on the other hand, insists that joy – or the ‘joy in Truth/God’, which is the happy life (*beata vita*) – cannot be seen, heard, smelled, tasted, or touched: the experience of joy pertains to the soul only. Henceforth, Augustine concludes that no one can give us an experience of the happy life, which he/she has attained and possesses within himself/herself:

we do not experience the happy life in other people through any kind of bodily sense.\footnote{1165}

In short, Augustine argues that we can *experience* a good rhetorical skill by watching and listening to a reputable rhetorician’s performance. However, we cannot make others *experience* the joy that we currently have, though we can express it in many visible and audible ways. Consequently, what are in one’s soul are not only cognitively, but also empirically, inaccessible to another.

\footnote{1164} and also between ‘knowledge of eloquence’ and ‘knowledge of the “happy life”’.
\footnote{1165} *Confessions* 10.21.30 (Boulding’s translation): ‘beatam vero vitam nullo sensu corpore in aliis experimur.’
Unlike another soul, God on the other hand is not entirely impenetrable; since, although our ‘mind’s eye’ cannot see God ‘face to face’, we still have the memory of God, however vague it is. Thus, not everything about God is a matter of belief. God is, to a certain extent, knowable dialectically/inferentially. Consequently, although Augustine held that some of Neoplatonic ideas concerning what God is and the God of the Christian faith (e.g., the Trinity and the existence of divine providence) are mutually coherent, he epistemologically distinguished one from the other in terms of ‘believe (credere)’ and ‘know (noscere)’.

We can know God through ‘reasoning (ratioçinari)’; for instance, His incorporeity, incorruptibility, immutability, immanence, omnipresence, and transcendence. Nonetheless, since the majority of us have almost forgotten God, let alone making an effort to see the intelligible aspect of God; we must above all ‘cling (inhaerere)’ to God by means of faith, and love it, so that we can enter into a relationship with God:

‘We walk by faith, not by sight.’ Now faith will totter if the authority of Scripture begins to shake. And then, if faith totters, love itself will grow cold. For if a man

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1166 Confessiones 7.10.16 (‘oculus animae’) & 6.4.6.
1167 Confessiones 10.5.7: (Chadwick’s translation) ‘I nevertheless know something of you which I do not know about myself. Without question “we see now through a mirror in an enigma”, not yet “face to face” (1 Cor. 13:12) (tamen aliquid de te scio, quod de me nescio. Et certe videmus nunc per speculum in aenigmate, nondum facie ad faciem).’
1168 Cf., Confessiones 10.23.33: (Boulding’s translation) ‘Why are they not happy? Because they are more immediately engrossed in other things which more surely make them miserable than that other reality, so faintly remembered, can make them happy.’ (Cur non beati sunt? Quia fortius occupantur in aliis, quae potius eos faciunt miseros quam illud beatos, quod tenuiter meminerunt).
1169 Cf., Confessiones 13.5.6: (Chadwick’s translation) ‘Here in an enigmatic image (1 Cor. 13:12) I discern the Trinity, which you are, my God. (Ecce apparet mihi in aenigmate Trinitas).’ De Trinitate 7.4.7: (McKenna’s translation) ‘the super-eminent excellence of the divinity (e.g., the Trinity) transcends all the limits of our wonted manner of speaking’.
1170 Cf., Confessiones 9.10.23: ‘because the day when she was to quit this life was drawing near – a day known to you, though we were ignorant of it - she and I happened to be alone through the mysterious workings of your will, as I believe (credo).’ Also, see Ibid., 9.12.32: after the death of Monica, Augustine says, ‘in my mental turmoil I begged you (i.e., God) as best I could to heal my hurt. You did not, and this because, as I believe (credo), you were reminding me that any sort of habit is bondage, even to a mind no longer feeding on deceitful words.’ (All are Boulding’s translations.)
1171 Confessiones 10.20.29: ‘how they came to know (noverunt) it (i.e., the happy life) I do not know.’
1172 Confessiones 7.17.23.
1173 De utilitate credendi 16.34.
has fallen from faith, he must necessarily also fall from love, for he cannot love what he does not believe to exist.\footnote{De doctrina Christiana 1.37.41: ‘(… Non enim potest diligere quod esse non credit.) … But if he both believes and loves, then through good works, and through diligent attention to the precepts of morality, he comes to hope also that he shall attain the object of his love. And so these are the three things to which all knowledge and all prophecy are subservient: faith, hope, love.’ Also, see Confessiones 1.1.1: ‘how can people call upon someone in whom they do not yet believe (…Quomodo autem invocabunt, in quem non crediderunt)?’}

Only upon establishing a relationship with God, can we then correct our irrational love affair with God’s creation:

If physical objects give you pleasure, praise God for them and return love to their Maker lest, in the things that please you, you displease him. If souls please you, they are being loved in God; for they also are mutable and acquire stability by being established in him. Otherwise they go their way and perish. In him therefore they are loved.\footnote{Confessiones 4.12.18 (Chadwick’s translation).}

Note that we retain, in our memory, both Christian beliefs and the ‘implicit’ knowledge (notitia) of God, which can be rendered ‘explicit’, or into a vision of God. But they each take a distinct path of entry into memory. We gained the knowledge through direct ‘experience (experiri)’\footnote{Cf., Confessiones 10. 20.29-21.31.} of God, whereas the beliefs come to us through ‘preachers’ and the historical Jesus:

how can they believe without a preacher (praedicante)? … Let me seek you, then, Lord, even while I am calling upon you, and call upon you even as I believe in you; for to us you have indeed been preached. My faith calls upon you, Lord, this faith which is your gift to me, which you have breathed into me through the humanity of your Son and the ministry of your preacher.\footnote{Confessiones 1.1.1 (Boulding’s translation).}

Thus, we cannot know about the Christian God any more than what we have been taught.\footnote{Cf., Confessiones 10.24.35: ‘Neque enim aliquid de te inveni, quod non meminissem, ex quo didici te.’}
Faith, apart from being the ‘basis for moral purification’, has another important role in Augustinian interiority: faith is also the basis for ‘philosophical enquiry’.\textsuperscript{1179} This is to say that, regardless of whether Augustine is a mystic or not, reaching conclusions about God in a Neoplatonic way is not the objective of his turning back to God. Augustine’s Neoplatonic enlightenment put an end to his materialism, but was also a new beginning in his ascent to God through faith. For this reason Augustine undertook a philosophical/theological investigation of \textit{Genesis} 1.1-2 in Books 11-13, after giving a biographical description of his journey to God \textit{chiefly} from the perspective of Neoplatonism in the preceding Books, and simultaneously arguing that some of Neoplatonic ideas are consistent with Christian theology. Thus, when Augustine says in \textit{De Trinitate} 1.8.17 that eternal life is knowing God and His Son Jesus Christ,\textsuperscript{1180} he was reaffirming that understanding the Scriptures is the goal of his intellectual ascent to God.

In summary, only by entrusting ourselves to the Christian faith can we ‘enjoy’ the Creator and ‘use’ His creation: also, we will be able to ‘see’ the aspect of God that a few Neoplatonists have already ‘seen’ (i.e., His incorporeity, immutability, omnipresence and transcendence).\textsuperscript{1181} Yet, we must continually endeavour to understand revealed truth, though it is impossible to comprehend it fully in this life.

\textbf{ii) The will and divine grace}

Augustine’s ethical conversion did not follow immediately after his intellectual conversion.\textsuperscript{1182} From this experience Augustine insists that not only our ‘mind’s eye’ must be ‘purified’ through faith,\textsuperscript{1183} but also that our will must be made ‘whole (\textit{plerus})’\textsuperscript{1184} by divine grace. Note that, after his Neoplatonic enlightenment, Augustine started to read the Scriptures\textsuperscript{1185} and attend the Catholic Church\textsuperscript{1186}. Hence, as

\begin{footnotes}
\item[1179] Cf., Ragnar Holte, ‘Faith and Interiority in S. Augustine’s Confessions’, 71.
\item[1180] \textit{De Trinitate} 1.8.17.
\item[1181] \textit{De doctrina Christiana} 1.4.4: ‘this world must be used, not enjoyed, so that the invisible things of God may be clearly seen, being understood by the things that are made - that is, that by means of what is material and temporary we may lay hold upon that which is spiritual and eternal’.
\item[1182] Cf., \textit{Confessiones} 7.17.23 & 8.1.2 (‘And now I had discovered the good pearl. To buy it I had to sell all that I had; and I hesitated [Matt. 13:46].’ [Chadwick’s translation])
\item[1183] Cf., \textit{Confessiones} 6.4.6.
\item[1184] \textit{Confessiones} 8.9.21.
\item[1185] Cf., \textit{Confessiones} 7.20.26-21.27.
\end{footnotes}
Bernasconi maintains, the eighth book is not about Augustine’s conversion to Christianity, but about his ethical transformation, about his liberation ‘from the fetters of desire for concubinage ... and from the slavery of worldly concerns’1187.

Augustine associated sin primarily with the will: ‘iniquity is perversity of the will’1188. In his own case his will was not ‘whole’; it was ‘divided’1189, ‘split (dissipare)’1190, or ‘half-wounded (semisauciam)’1191. In other words, his will was in a state of indecision, or ‘hesitation (or delay, cunctatio)’1192, in choosing the good. In Book 8 of the Confessions Augustine gives an analysis of the ‘half-wounded’ will1193. Bernasconi interprets this as meaning that there exist two conflicting wills in Augustine’s system:

Augustine’s explanation is that the will half-maimed by habit (VIII.viii.19), as an incomplete will, be interpreted as in fact two wills in conflict. Habit is understood to constitute a carnal will (VIII.v.10) … The will appears as a faculty distinct from the intellect and from desire only when in conflict with itself. That is to say, it shows itself only when it is split. Hence when Augustine “discovers the will”, he has the impression that he finds not one will but two wills. The split will is not an indecisive will, if that were to mean the will was faced with a choice between rival alternatives. Nor can one say exactly that the split will is a hesitant will, where the will hesitates to will itself. It is precisely because one’s mind is already made up, that it is a question of the will. One has resolved the issue and yet one lacks resolution. This is what Augustine meant when he in this case said that “the very act of willing is actually to do the deed.” But even as he willed to will, he encountered a counter-will. (Augustine’s conflict between two wills is very

1186 Cf., Confessiones 8.1.2-6.13.
1188 Cf., Confessiones 7.16.22.
1189 Confessiones 8.10.24.
1190 Confessiones 8.10.22.
1191 Cf., Confessiones 8.8.19: see below.
1192 Confessiones 8.8.20.
1193 As Bernasconi holds, ‘Augustine’s experience of the will cannot be divorced from its theological context’: see Bernasconi, ‘At War within Oneself”, 57-59.
different from the situation that Paul presented as a conflict between two laws, one good and one evil.)

Augustine, indeed, says ‘two wills’; for instance,

So my two wills (duae voluntates), one old, the other new, one carnal, the other spiritual, were in conflict with one another, and their discord robbed my soul of all concentration.

We are dealing with a morbid condition of the mind which, when it is lifted up by the truth, does not unreservedly rise to it but is weighed down by habit. So there are two wills (duae voluntates). Neither of them is complete, and what is present in the one is lacking to the other.

However, we also need to pay attention to Augustine’s criticism against Manichaean dualism, which holds that the soul has two wills:

‘Let them perish from your presence’ O God, as do ‘empty talkers and seducers’ of the mind who from the dividing of the will into two (duas voluntates) in the process of deliberation, deduce that there are two minds with two distinct natures, one good, the other bad. … In my own case, as I deliberated about serving my Lord God which I had long been disposed to do, the self which willed to serve was identical with the self which was unwilling. It was I. I was neither wholly willing nor wholly unwilling. So I was in conflict with myself and was dissociated from myself. The dissociation came about against my will. Yet this

1194 Cf., Bernasconi, 60 & 62. Bernasconi argues that, although Augustine made frequent reference to St. Paul’s discussion of ‘the struggle between the spirit and the flesh’, their issues were in fact different: Augustine’s problem was his inability to will the good, whereas St. Paul’s was the discrepancy between willing and then acting accordingly. See Ibid., 59-61.
1195 Confessiones 8.5.10 (Chadwick’s translation).
1196 Confessiones 8.19.21 (Chadwick’s translation).
1197 See the chapter (b) ‘Manichaeism’ in Part I. Also, refer to Judith Stark, ‘The Pauline Influence on Augustine’s Notion of Will’, Vigiliae Christianae 43 (1989), 356: ‘In the next chapter of the Confessions (10, 22-24), Augustine develops a lengthy argument to show that the conflict of the will with itself, as he has just presented it, must be distinguished from the Manichaean position.’
was not a manifestation of the nature of an alien mind but the punishment suffered in my own mind. \textsuperscript{1198}

In short, a will can be split into two, but the ‘divided’ will does not suggest the existences of ‘two minds with two distinct natures’ within the self: the human person has only one soul with one will.

Consequently, rendering the will ‘whole’ means making it love God steadily:

the will was strong and unqualified, not the turning and twisting first this way, then that, of a will half-wounded, struggling with one part rising up and the other part falling down. \textsuperscript{1199}

Yet, no one, but only God, can heal our ‘half-wounded’ will:

I believed continence to be achieved by personal resources which I was not aware of possessing. I was so stupid as not to know that, as it is written (Wisd. 8.21), ‘no one can be continent unless you grant it.’ \textsuperscript{1200}

Our will can turn away from God, but can return to Him only by means of divine grace:

My good points are instilled by you and are your gifts. My bad points are my faults and your judgements on them. \textsuperscript{1201}

\textsuperscript{1198} 	extit{Confessiones} 8.10.22 (Chadwick’s translation): ‘\textit{Pereant a facie tua, Deus, sicuti pereunt, vaniloqui et mentis seductores, qui cum duas voluntates in deliberando animadverterint, duas naturas duarum mentium esse asseverant, unam bonam, alteram malam. … .’ Augustine’s view on the ‘divided’ will in \textit{De duabus animabus} 10.14 is slightly different: ‘one mind may be at the same time unwilling and willing, but it cannot be at the same time unwilling and willing with reference to one and the same thing’. It means that the will is always ‘whole’ in wanting or not wanting.

\textsuperscript{1199} 	extit{Confessiones} 8.8.19 (Chadwick’s translation): ‘velle fortiter et integre, non semisauciam hac atque hac versare et iactare voluntatem parte adsurgente cum alia parte cadente luctantem’.

\textsuperscript{1200} 	extit{Confessiones} 6.11.20 (Chadwick’s translation). Also, see \textit{De vera religione} 12.24.

\textsuperscript{1201} 	extit{Confessiones} 10.4.5 (Chadwick’s translation). See \textit{De vera religione} 9.17.
IV. *De Trinitate*

Memory, reason, the will, faith, and divine grace continue to be the integral elements of Augustinian interiority in *De Trinitate*. However, there is an unprecedented development with respect to the psychological aspect of interiority. That is Augustine’s insistence that memory, reason (understanding) and the will form a trinity, which can become the image of the Triune God. Augustine, in fact, introduced numerous trinities in his previous works, for instance, the trinity of ‘being, knowing and willing’ in the *Confessions* 13.11.12.\(^{1202}\) However, as Sullivan insists, despite many similarities between the trinity appearing in the *Confessions* and the other trinities mentioned in *De Trinitate*, the Augustine of the *Confessions* did not maintain that the human person is capable of imaging the Trinity,\(^{1203}\) whereas the Augustine of the *De Trinitate* does.\(^{1204}\)

Similarly, Fleteren argues as follows:

> Though Augustine’s thought is triadic, if not at all times trinitarian, from the beginning (i.e., of *De Trinitate*), he does not in the early works see as many triads in the soul and consequently does not see the soul’s image of God to consist in its triadic nature. The profundity of *memoria Dei, intelligentia Dei, amor Dei* as an image of God is a much later development. Yet the understanding of the *De trinitate* is but a fuller explication in greater detail of the original insight of the early works.\(^{1205}\)

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\(^{1202}\) ‘I wish that men would think about three things to be found in themselves. These three are very different from the Trinity, but I mention them that men may exercise their minds and test and see how far different they are. The three things of which I speak are existing, knowing, willing. For I am, and I know, and I will. I am a being that knows and wills: I know that I am and that I will; I will to be and to know. In these three how inseparable is life, the one life, one mind, one essence; how inseparable the distinction, yet the three are distinct. Let him see this who can. Certainly the fact is in himself’: quoted in John Edward Sullivan, *The image of God: the doctrine of St. Augustine and its influence* (Dubuque: Priory Press, 1963), 115. Also, see *Letter* 11 (389 AD.).


\(^{1204}\) Cf., *De Trinitate* 12.6.7: ‘For God said “Let us make man to our image and likeness”; but a little later it is said, “And God made man to the image of God” (Gen. 1:26-27). The term “our” certainly would not have been correctly used, being plural in number, if man had been made to the image of one person, whether of the Father, or of the Son, or of the Holy Spirit; but because he was made to the image of the Trinity, therefore it was said, “to our image.” But, on the other hand, lest we think that three Gods were to be believed in the Trinity, since the same Trinity is one God, it is said, “And God made man to the image of God”; instead of this, “to His own image” quoted in Sullivan, *The image of God*, 116: ‘In the *De Trinitate* Augustine clearly perceives that man is not only an image of the one God, but of the Trinity, for the Trinity is the one God.’

\(^{1205}\) Frederick van Fleteren, ‘Thematic Reflections on the *De Trinitate*’, in *Proceedings of the PMR Conference*, 12/13 (1987-1988), 224. Also, see Lewis Ayres, “‘It’s not for eatin’ – it’s for lookin’ through’”: memoria, intellegentia, voluntas and the argument of Augustine’s *De Trinitate* IX-X’, in D.
The Augustine of *De Trinitate* uses the word ‘image (of the Trinity)’ in two different senses as before: one is ontological and the other is teleological, and both of them constitute his theory of deification. Ontologically, being endowed with the ‘capacity for God (*capax Dei*)’ – that is, the potential to become like God through remembering, understanding, and loving God –, the soul is created as the image of the Trinity and the image, though mutable, cannot be obliterated:

We have come to the point of discussing the chief capacity of the human mind, with which it knows God or can know him, and we have undertaken to consider it in order to discover in it the image of God. For although the human mind is not of the same nature as God, still the image of that nature than which no nature is better is to be sought and found in that part of us than which our nature also has nothing better. But first of all the mind must be considered in itself, and God’s image discovered in it before it participates in him (*antequam sit particeps Dei*). For we have said that even when it has lost its participation (*participatione obsoletam*) in him it still remains the image of God, even though worn out and distorted. It is his image insofar as it is capable of him and can participate in him; indeed it cannot achieve so great a good except by being his image. Here we are then with the mind remembering itself, understanding itself, loving itself. If we

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Vincent Twomey, Lewis Ayres (eds.), *The Mystery of the Holy Trinity in the Fathers of the Church: The Proceedings of the Fourth Patristic Conference, Maynooth, 1999* (Dublin: Fourth Courts Press, 2007), 37-38: ‘My point of departure will be to note that the extensive and developed use of this triad (i.e., *memoria, intellectus* and *voluntas*) is a feature only of this one work. … At the beginning of our investigation it may help to note in a little more detail the evidence for my claim that the triad *memoria, intellectus* and *voluntas* has a remarkably close connection with the *De Trinitate*. Including some variations on the third term found in Book XV of the *De Trinitate*, Augustine uses the triads *memoria, intellectus*, and *memoria, intellectus, voluntas* around 35 times in his corpus. This rather vague figure stems from the difficulty of assessing passages where the triad and its constituent terms are discussed over a number of complex sentences. Even with such imprecise figures it is striking that over 20 of these uses occur in the *De Trinitate*. Indeed, the triad is used in directly Trinitarian contexts outside this work in just three texts.’ And so, from all the homilies on John’s Gospel and First Letter where Trinitarian topics frequently occur, from the *Confessions*, from his extensive expositions of the Psalms, as well as from the vast majority of his sermons and letters this triad it is simply absent as a basic tool for illustrating Trinitarian doctrine. The triad is not then a standard feature of Augustine’s Trinitarian theology. Equally importantly, the triad is not a standard feature of Augustine’s description of the human soul. Its absence from Augustine’s discussions of the soul in his early works being only one important indicator. Reflection on the will and on memory is of course a central thread in Augustine’s corpus, but this particular triad is not.

Cf., Walter H. Principe, ‘Dynamism of Augustine’s Terms for Describing the Highest Trinitarian Image in the Human Person’, *Studia Patristica* 17 (Part 3), 1295 & 1297, footnote no. 26. Also, see chapter 2 ‘The image of the Triune God’.
see this we see a trinity, not yet God of course, but already the image of God (De Trinitate 14.8.11),\textsuperscript{1207}

For although it (i.e., \textit{homo}) is a great nature, yet it could be corrupted because it is not the highest, and although it could be corrupted because it is not the highest, yet because it is capable of the highest nature and can be a sharer (\textit{particeps}) in it, it is a great nature.\textsuperscript{1208}

In these excerpts ‘partake/sharer (\textit{particeps})’ (or ‘participation [\textit{participatione}]’), which is a deificatory language, is applied in a teleological sense. This is to say that ‘before it participates in him’ means ‘before the soul starts to remember, understand, and love God’. Similarly, ‘it has lost its participation in him’ means ‘the soul no longer endeavours to recall, know, and desire Him (by virtue of its own sin)’. When we ‘lose the participation’, our image of God becomes ‘deformed’ and does not mirror Justice/Truth any more:

‘Be renewed in the spirit of your minds, and put on the new man who was created according to God in justice and the holiness of truth’ (Eph 4:23). … by sinning man lost justice and the holiness of truth, and thus the image became deformed and discolored; he gets those qualities back again when he is reformed and renovated.\textsuperscript{1209}

Teleologically, only when we remember, understand, and love God (or Justice/Truth), our soul images the Trinity:

Anyone who has a lively intuition of these three (i.e., memory, understanding and the will), as divinely established in the nature of his mind, and of how great a thing it is that his mind has that by which even the eternal and unchanging nature can be recalled, beheld and desired - it is recalled by memory, beheld by

\textsuperscript{1207} (Hill’s translation) ‘… Eo quippe ipso imago eius est, quo eius capax est, eiusque particeps esse potest ….’

\textsuperscript{1208} \textit{De Trinitate} 14.4.6 (McKenna’s translation): ‘Quamquam enim magna natura sit, tamen vitiari potuit, quia summa non est: et quamquam vitiari potuerit, quia summa non est, tamen quia summae naturae capax est, et esse particeps potest, magna natura est.’

\textsuperscript{1209} \textit{De Trinitate} 14.5.22 (Hill’s translation).
intelligence, embraced by love - has thereby found the image of that supreme trinity.\textsuperscript{1210}

Imaging the Trinity is, in other words, deifying the soul:

we are like God inasmuch as we know Him,\textsuperscript{1211}

he who knows justice (i.e., the Trinitarian God) perfectly and loves it perfectly is already just.\textsuperscript{1212}

In addition to Augustine’s trinitarian approach to the image of God, there is another thing unique about \textit{De Trinitate} in reference to interiority. Augustine previously held that we must know God’s creation – especially the soul – in order to understand Him, whom we do not see ‘face to face’\textsuperscript{1213}. Yet, in \textit{De Trinitate} Augustine reverses the order: he attempts to understand first of all the Trinity in order to find the trinitarian nature of the soul, since Genesis 1:26-27 says, ‘Let us make man to our image and likeness … And God made man to the image of God.’\textsuperscript{1214} There are, however, two contrasting views regarding the precedence between knowledge of the soul and that of God in \textit{De Trinitate}. Sullivan holds that Augustine’s analyses of psychological trinities are chiefly to use them to ‘exemplify’ the divine Trinity.\textsuperscript{1215} Louth, on the other hand, maintains that ‘Augustine is less concerned to illustrate the doctrine of the Trinity from his understanding of man, than to discover the true nature of man by means of the doctrine of the Trinity that he believes by faith.’\textsuperscript{1216} As for me, both views are complementary.

At the beginning of \textit{De Trinitate} Augustine attempts to understand the Triune God, not on the basis of self-knowledge, but on the premise that the three Persons\textsuperscript{1217} must be

\begin{itemize}
\item \textsuperscript{1210} \textit{De Trinitate} 15.20.39 (Hill’s translation).
\item \textsuperscript{1211} \textit{De Trinitate} 9.11.16 (McKenna’s translation).
\item \textsuperscript{1212} \textit{De Trinitate} 9.9.14 (McKenna’s translation).
\item \textsuperscript{1213} Cf., \textit{De Trinitate} 1.8.16.
\item \textsuperscript{1214} Cf., \textit{De Trinitate} 12.6.7 (McKenna’s translation) & \textit{Soli loquia} 1.1.4.
\item \textsuperscript{1215} Cf., Sullivan, \textit{The image of God}, 148.
\item \textsuperscript{1217} i.e., the Father, the Son, and the Holy Spirit.
\end{itemize}
‘equal (aequalis)’ \( ^{1218} \) with each other in every respect (cf., Book 1, 2, 3 & 4): the premise is a part of the ‘Trinitarian logic’ that the Father, the Son, and the Holy Spirit are three and simultaneously one. \( ^{1219} \) Augustine, then, expatiates – in terms of ‘according to the substance’ \( ^{1220} \) (secundum substantiam [dicitur]) \( ^{1221} \) (or ‘in reference to self [quidquid ad se dicitur]’ \( ^{1222} \)), and ‘in reference to something else (quod autem ad aliquid [dicitur])’ \( ^{1223} \) – why the Scriptures often describe each Person as different from the other two (cf., Book 5, 6, 7 & 8): I shall explain what he means by these terms in chapter (1). In Book 9 and 10 Augustine attempts to discover in what ways we are the image of the Trinity. \( ^{1224} \) This is to say that without some understanding about the Trinity, there can be no discovery of the Trinitarian image in the soul either. Yet, as Sullivan observes, in Book 15 Augustine endeavours to ‘illustrate’ the Trinity by comparing ‘the Father and memory’ (cf., 15.12. 22-14.23), ‘the Son and the mental word’ (cf., 15.10.19-11.21), and ‘the Spirit and love or will’ (cf., 15.18.32-21.41). \( ^{1225} \) Theses eventually lead to the conclusion that knowledge of God and that of the soul are interdependent. \( ^{1226} \)

\( ^{1218} \) De Trinitate 15.3.5.


\( ^{1221} \) De Trinitate 5.6.7.

\( ^{1222} \) De Trinitate 5.8.9.

\( ^{1223} \) De Trinitate 5.8.9: ‘what is said in reference to something does not refer to a substance but to a relationship.’ (McKenna’s translation)

\( ^{1224} \) Ayres argues that, endeavouring to find the image of the Trinity through the use of the Trinitarian logic, Augustine at the same time strives to ‘render more comprehensible that logic itself’: see Ayres ‘‘It’s not for eatin’ – it’s for lookin’ through’’, 40; also, see ibid., 38-39.

\( ^{1225} \) Cf., Sullivan, The image of God, 146 & footnote no. 104 in 161.

\( ^{1226} \) Accordingly, Taylor says, ‘I can only understand myself in the light of a perfection that goes far beyond my powers’: see Charles Taylor, Sources of the Self: the Making of the Modern Identity (Cambridge/Massachusetts: Harvard University Press, 1989), 141; also, see ibid., 140. And Blanchard says, ‘La connaissance de soi est médiatrice pour la connaissance de Dieu. La connaissance de Dieu est médiatrice pour la connaissance de soi’: Blanchard, P, L’espace intérieur chez saint Augustin d’après le livre X des « Confessions », Augustinus Magister, I, p 537.
Nonetheless, since in *De Trinitate* Augustine’s analysis of the Trinity precedes his attempt to find the Trinitarian image in the soul, I shall first of all investigate how Augustine interprets the doctrine of the Triune God in chapter (1), next how he perceived the soul to be the image of the Trinity in chapter (2).

Now, following his previous ‘methodological principle’ of interiority (i.e., ‘*ab exterioribus ad interiora, ab inferioribus ad superiora*’), Augustine again stresses inwardness as essential for our teleological journey to God. That is to say that, turning away from material things to the soul, we must realise that we are an image of God, which is (teleologically) deformed. Yet, we are (ontologically) still ‘*capax Dei*’. Thus, through remembering, understanding, and loving God, we must endeavour to ascend to God. Such an ascent of the soul is, in other words, deification or renewal of the image of God. Thus, in chapter (3), I shall examine how Augustine explains that we can move closer to God in terms of the image (or deification).

1) Augustine’s understanding of the Trinity

Regarding the doctrine of the Trinity, the aim of *De Trinitate* is not to prove that ‘Father and Son and Holy Spirit in the inseparable equality of one substance present a divine unity … although … he who is the Father is not the Son … the Holy Spirit is neither the Father nor the Son’, but to understand it. Thus, in his approaches to the Trinity,

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1227 Cf., Sullivan, 94: also, see ibid., footnote no. 33: ‘In Book 8 of the *De Trinitate* Augustine begins to seek for “an understanding of what has been believed,” that is the doctrine of the Trinity, and in a method characteristic of himself and Plotinus, by a “more inward way,” … His purpose then is to see in the mind of man, the site of the image, something of the divine Trinity. But after addressing himself to various features in the mind reflecting the Trinity, he descends to the lower, and corporeal in man as being “more familiar,” and less of a strain on his readers. Then he rises again to the mind of man, and probes more deeply into the trinitarian aspect of the image there.’ Also, see Frederick van Fleteren, ‘Thematic Reflections on the De Trinitate’, in *Proceedings of the PMR Conference*, 12/13 (1987-1988), 224-225: ‘Books VIII-XV of the *De trinitate* contain an ascent of the mind to God. Starting in Book VIII, Augustine mentions eight triads, the last of which is the true image in man of the trine God. There is a progressive hierarchization among these triads. The first image (*amans, amatus, amor*), found in *De trinitate* VIII, x,14, locates the milieu wherein the final image will be found. Later, Augustine mentions a triad on the sense level: *res visa, visio exterior, intentio*. From that point, there is progressive interiorization and ascension in Augustine’s images until the final trinity (*memoria Dei, intelligentia Dei, amor Dei*) is reached.’

1228 Lewis Ayres argues in his article “Remember that you are Catholic” (*serm*. 52, 2): Augustine on the Unity of the Triune God’ that the ‘fundamental background to the *De trinitate*’ can be found in a range of Augustine’s earlier texts, and discusses what that is: see *Journal of Early Christian Studies* 8 (2000), 39-63.

1229 *De Trinitate* 1.4.7 (Hill’s translation): ‘*Pater et Filius et Spiritus Sanctus unius eiusdemque substantiae inseparabili aequalitate divinam insinuent unitatem*’.
and to the psychological trinity of the human person as the image of God, Augustine has a double task. He has to understand how the constituents of each trinity are one and the same, yet differ from each other. Augustine attempts to tackle the problem in terms of ‘in reference to something else (ad aliquid)’ and ‘in reference to self (ad se)’. These two expressions are Augustine’s own for classifying linguistic expressions. He holds that all statements, not only about God but also about everything else, fall into either one of the two categories. Hereafter, analyzing the characteristics of each of the two categories, Augustine attempts to explain linguistically how the three Persons of the Trinity are both ‘equal’ and ‘united’, and, at the same time, different. Notice that Lewis Ayres has made clear two principles underlying in Augustine’s interpretation of the Trinity in chapter ‘The Grammar of Augustine’s Trinitarian Theology’ in his book Nicaea and its Legacy. One is that God is ontologically ‘simple’: similarly, I explained what Augustine means by ‘simple’ in Part I. The other is Augustine’s linguistic approach in terms of ‘according to substance’ and ‘according to relation’. Ayres dedicated the above chapter to demonstrate how the principle ‘divine simplicity’ played the key role. Thus, I shall concentrate on explaining the linguistic principle.

a) ‘In reference to something else’

Augustine maintains that ‘friend’ and ‘neighbour’ are the instances of relational terms, which refer to more than one person/thing simultaneously, and classifies them into the category ‘in reference to something else’. Augustine hereafter argues that the three Persons of the Trinity are mutually distinct only from the perspective of

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1230 Cf., Geoffrey Bromiley, Historical Theology (Edinburgh: T&T Clark, 1978), 88.
1231 Cf., De Trinitate 1.4.7-1.5.8.
1232 De Trinitate 5.8.9.
1233 De Trinitate 5.8.9.
1235 See section ‘God’s transcendence’ in chapter 4 ‘Neoplatonism’ in Part I. Also, see section ‘Divisibility’ in chapter 1 ‘Augustine’s View of Reality’ in Part II.
1237 Ayres, 365.
1238 De Trinitate 5.8.9.
1239 De Trinitate 5.6.7: ‘a friend is so called in relation to a friend … Neighbour is likewise so called in relation to a neighbour, and since they are equally neighbours to each other (for as the first is neighbour to the second, so is the second neighbour to the first), there is the same neighbourhood in both of them.’ (McKenna’s translation)
relationality: similarly, the constituents of the psychological trinity of the human person are also mutually distinguishable from the same perspective. (Note that ‘much of our traditional understanding of this Trinitarian life of God comes from Gregory of Nazianzus.’\textsuperscript{1240}) Thus, ‘Father’ and ‘Son’ are used to in reference to one another:

the Father is only called the Father because He has a Son, the Son must, therefore, be only called the Son because He has a Father, and so these terms are not said according to the substance.\textsuperscript{1241}

Likewise, both ‘begotten (\textit{genitus})’ and ‘unbegotten (\textit{ingenitus})’\textsuperscript{1242}, too, represent a relationship. This is Augustine’s argument against the Arians, who maintained that ‘begotten’ and ‘unbegotten’ are not relational terms, though ‘Father’ and ‘Son’ are:

the Father is called the Father in relation to the Son, and the Son is called the Son in relation to the Father, but unbegotten refers to the Unbegotten One Himself, and begotten to the Begotten One Himself, and consequently, if whatever is said in reference to the subject Himself is said according to the substance, then to be unbegotten is different from begotten, and consequently their substance is different.\textsuperscript{1243}

Here, Augustine stresses that what matters in dealing with a linguistic expression in search for truth is only its meaning, not its usage.\textsuperscript{1244} ‘Son’ and ‘begotten’ are semantically identical with one another; thus, like ‘son’, ‘begotten’ is also a relational term. As for ‘unbegotten’, it means ‘not a son’:

We must first take note that the expression begotten has the same meaning as son. Therefore, anyone is a son because he was begotten, and because he is a son, he

\textsuperscript{1240} Brian Daley, \textit{Gregory of Nazianzus} (London: Routledge, 2006), 46.
\textsuperscript{1241} \textit{De Trinitate} 5.5.6. (Hill’s translation)
\textsuperscript{1242} Cf., \textit{De Trinitate} 5.7.8: ‘Begotten and unbegotten are terms that are currently in use (\textit{genitus et ingenitus commode dicuntur}).’ (McKenna’s translation)
\textsuperscript{1243} \textit{De Trinitate} 5.6.7. (McKenna’s translation)
\textsuperscript{1244} Cf., \textit{De Trinitate} 5.7.8: ‘one ought not to consider in things what the usage of our language permits, but only the meaning that is clearly apparent from the things themselves (Quamobrem non est in rebus considerandum quid vel sinat vel non sinat dici usus sermonis nostri, sed quis rerum ipsorum intellectus eluceat).’ (McKenna’s translation)
was certainly begotten. When anyone, therefore, is called unbegotten, it signifies that he is not a son.\textsuperscript{1245}

‘Unbegotten’ (i.e., ‘not a son’) is an expression contradicting one’s place in a relationship, but semantically can only be used in a relational context. Therefore, like ‘begotten’, ‘unbegotten’ is also a relational term.

Augustine endeavours to strengthen the above argument by highlighting an important characteristic of relational terms. That is that each of the terms has a semantically complementary counterpart from a specific perspective:

\[\text{genitus et ingenitus commode dicuntur}\textsuperscript{1246}.\]

I interpret ‘\textit{commode}’ as ‘semantically complementary’ or ‘correlative’. I shall explain how Augustine holds that a pair of correlative terms is formed.

The most typical way is that one of them is formed with the combination of the other term and a negative prefix, such as ‘unbegotten (\textit{ingenitus})’ (i.e., ‘\textit{in}’ + ‘\textit{genitus}’), which is semantically complementary to ‘begotten (\textit{genitus})’. On the other hand, there are many other relational terms, which have no complementary counterparts in the form of a single word with a negative prefix; for instance, ‘son’, ‘neighbour’ and ‘friend’:

while in Latin the word \textit{filius} is employed, custom does not authorize the word \textit{infilius}. … Neighbour and friend are relative terms, but still you cannot say \textit{invicinus} as you can say \textit{inimicus}.\textsuperscript{1247}

However, Augustine maintains that the semantic counterpart of any relational term can be created in the form of a phrase that is comprised of ‘not (\textit{non})’ and the same term:

\textsuperscript{1245} De Trinitate 5.7.8 (McKenna’s translation).
\textsuperscript{1246} De Trinitate 5.7.8: ‘begotten and unbegotten are terms that are currently in use’ (McKenna’s translation)
\textsuperscript{1247} De Trinitate 5.7.8.
the meaning remains the same if we use the phrase, *not the son*, just as the meaning remains the same if, instead of unbegotten, we say, *not begotten*.\(^{1248}\)

Therefore, ‘son’ and ‘not son’ (‘neighbour’ and ‘not neighbour’) are semantically interrelated and complementary to one another.

In summary, each relational term has a semantic counterpart, which is expressed either as a word with a negative prefix, or as a phrase with ‘not’ added to the term. Hence, as long as we can make an affirmative statement about anything, we can also make a semantically negative statement about it and both of them are complementary.

Next, Augustine holds that a pair of correlative expressions are formed together always ‘according to (*secundum*)’\(^{1249}\) a specific perspective. For instance, the statements ‘He is the Father’ and ‘They are neighbours’ are made ‘according to’ relationality. Some other instances are substance, quality, relation, and position:

As it, therefore, refers to (*secundum*) a substance when I say, He is a man, so it also refers to a substance when I say, He is not a man. … If I say, He is white, I am affirming according to (*secundum*) quality; but if I say, He is not white, I am denying according to quality. …\(^{1250}\)

Eventually, Augustine concludes that ‘there is no kind of predicament, where to any positive statement we are pleased to make, a denial in the same predicament cannot be made by simply prefixing a negative particle to the subject’\(^{1251}\). If Augustine had ‘perspective’ in his vocabulary, he would have added the phrase ‘according to a specific perspective’ to the passage: he did not formulate a single, general term, which can denote all the words coming after ‘according to’.

Based on the above linguistic analyses of his, Augustine insists that ‘begotten’ and ‘unbegotten’ are semantically correlative from the perspective of relationality.

\(^{1248}\) *De Trinitate* 5.7.8.

\(^{1249}\) *De Trinitate* 5.7.8.

\(^{1250}\) *De Trinitate* 5.7.8. (McKenna’s translation)

\(^{1251}\) *De Trinitate* 5.7.8. (McKenna’s translation)
Therefore, both ‘begotten’ and ‘unbegotten’ must be interpreted in a relational sense. The Holy Spirit, on the other hand, is the ‘Gift of God’. Since He (i.e., the Holy Spirit) is the gift of the Father and the Son, since He ‘proceeds from the Father’ (John 15.26). Since the phrases ‘gift of a giver’ and ‘giver of a gift’ speak for themselves, a ‘gift’ refers to a ‘giver’ and vice versa. Hence, the term ‘Holy Spirit’ can be used only in relation to the ‘Father’ and the ‘Son’ simultaneously. In summary, each of ‘Father’, ‘Son’ and ‘Holy Spirit’ connotes a relationship between two/three Persons of the Trinity:

only the Father is the Father, and indeed He is not the Father of the other two, but only of the one Son. And the three are not sons, since neither the Father nor the Holy Spirit is the Son. And they are not three holy spirits, because the Holy Spirit is neither the Father nor the Son when this term is used as a proper name, by which He is also called the Gift of God.

b) ‘In reference to self’

Regarding the other category of linguistic expressions (i.e., ‘in reference to self’), Augustine says,

\[\text{quidquid ad se dicitur praestantissima illa et divina sublimitas substantialiter dici; (quod autem ad aliquid non substantialiter, sed relative).}\]

‘Ad se dici’ and ‘substantialiter dici’ are tricky phrases to translate. McKenna’s translation is ‘whatever that divine and exalted sublimity is said in reference to Himself is said according to the substance; (but what is said in reference to something does not refer to a substance but to a relationship)’, while Hill’s is ‘whatever that supreme and divine majesty is called with reference to itself is said substance-wise; (whatever it is called with reference to another is said not substance – but relationship-wise)’. Perhaps,
the easiest way to render the phrases intelligible is to say that all linguistic expressions which do not fall into the category ‘in reference to something else’ pertain to the category ‘in reference to self’. Thus, a statement made about a thing ‘ad se’ does not contain any relational term, does not concern how that thing is related to another, and does not refer to two things simultaneously: rather, such a statement informs what the nature of that thing (i.e., ‘substantialiter’) is, or what really it is. (Note that ‘ad se dici’ and ‘substantialiter dici’ are identical with one another.)

In support of the above argument, Augustine gives the following instances:

(1) ‘as the Father is God, the Son is God, and the Holy Spirit is God, and no one doubts that these words are spoken according to the substance’\(1259\) (in other words, each of the Persons is really God),

(2) ‘He is called the great greatness and the powerful power, certainly in reference to Himself’\(1260\),

(3) ‘according to substance He is said to be good and great’\(1261\),

(4) ‘far be it from us to say that God is spirit according to substance, and good according to quality; but both are said according to substance’\(1262\) (in other words, God, whose nature is immaterial, is really the Good Itself).

Eventually, when we speak of each Person of the Trinity ‘in reference to Himself’, we discover that they are indistinguishable from each other because they are altogether one power, one wisdom, one essence, and one God:

the God who begot the Son is not only the Father of His own power and wisdom, but is Himself also power and wisdom, and so, too, the Holy Spirit; but yet that they are not together three powers or three wis doms, but one power and one wisdom, as one God and one essence.\(1263\)

\(1258\) De Trinitate 5.8.9.
\(1259\) De Trinitate 5.8.9. (McKenna’s translation)
\(1260\) De Trinitate 7.1.2 (McKenna’s translation): ‘dicitur magnitudo magna et virtus potens utique ad se ipsum’.
\(1261\) De Trinitate 15.3.5. (McKenna’s translation)
\(1262\) De Trinitate 15.3.8. (McKenna’s translation)
Unfortunately, Augustine’s distinction between the two categories of linguistic expressions is not convincing. Both of them actually share the same characteristics. I shall explain this by analyzing the four examples above, which Augustine argues to be statements about God ‘in reference to Himself’, and the conclusion will be that we can know what a being is only in reference to another being.

c) We cannot make a statement about a thing without referring to other things

The four statements just cited in reference to God also refer to His creation. We might rephrase them as follows;

(1) ‘The Son is God’\textsuperscript{1264} means the same as ‘The Son is not created’.

(‘God’/’Creator’ and ‘not created’ refer to one another.)

(2) ‘He is called the great greatness and the powerful power’\textsuperscript{1265} is semantically identical with ‘Unlike a creature, He is not great/powerful by another’s greatness/power’.

(3&4) Finally, ‘far be it from us to say that God is spirit according to substance, and good according to quality; but both are said according to substance’\textsuperscript{1266} means that – unlike human souls, all of whom are spirits, though not all of them are good – for God to be a spirit and to be good are not two different things.\textsuperscript{1267}

In addition, all the above examples are studded with relational terms. As explained, the most important characteristic of such terms is that each of them has a semantically complementary counterpart, such as ‘begotten’ and ‘unbegotten’,\textsuperscript{1268} and ‘white’ and ‘not white’:

\textsuperscript{1263} De Trinitate 15.3.5. (McKenna’s translation)
\textsuperscript{1264} De Trinitate 5.8.9.
\textsuperscript{1265} De Trinitate 7.1.2.
\textsuperscript{1266} De Trinitate 15.3.8.
\textsuperscript{1267} Cf., De Trinitate 6.4.6: ‘How much more so, then, is this true of that unchangeable and eternal substance, incomparably more simple than the human soul. For in the human soul to be is not the same as to be strong, or prudent, or just, or temperate, for there can be a soul without any of these virtues. But for God to be is the same as to be strong, or to be just, or to be wise, and to be whatever else you may say of that simple multiplicity, or that multiple simplicity, whereby His substance is signified.’ (McKenna’s translation)
If I say, He is white, I am affirming according to quality; but if I say, He is not white, I am denying according to quality.\textsuperscript{1269} (De Trinitate 5.7.8)

Similarly, ‘God’/’uncreated’/’Creator’ and ‘not God’/’created’/’creature’\textsuperscript{1270} are linguistically interdependent on one another. Also, both ‘substance’ and ‘not substance’ – that is, ‘nothing (nihil)’\textsuperscript{1271} – are mutually complementary. ‘Good’ and ‘not good’ (i.e., ‘nothing’,\textsuperscript{1272} ‘not substance’,\textsuperscript{1273} or ‘evil’) are correlative to one another.\textsuperscript{1274}

Consequently, ‘substance’/’reality’, ‘God’ and ‘Beauty’ are relational terms referring to ‘nothing’, ‘not God’ and ‘no Beauty’ respectively, like ‘father’ and ‘son’. That is to say that, if there is no ‘father’, then there cannot be ‘son’, and vice versa: if there is no ‘substance’, then there cannot be ‘nothing’, and vice versa: if there is no ‘God’/’Creator’, then there cannot be ‘not God’/’creature’, and vice versa.

In summary, what Augustine holds to be statements made about God ‘according to the substance’ refer to His creation. Therefore, all linguistic expressions intrinsically pertain to the category ‘in reference to something else’.\textsuperscript{1276} This has a twofold significance. One is that knowledge of God and knowledge of the soul are interdependent. Hence, arguing for a precedence between them is meaningless: Augustine enhanced his understanding of the soul in the light of Christian theology, and vice versa. The other is that Augustine’s dialectical approach to knowledge of God is intrinsically a search for right pairs of correlative terms in reference to His creation.\textsuperscript{1277}

\textsuperscript{1268} Cf., De Trinitate 5.7.8.
\textsuperscript{1269} McKenna’s translation.
\textsuperscript{1270} i.e., ‘creature’.
\textsuperscript{1271} Cf., De magistro 2.3-4.
\textsuperscript{1272} Cf., Soliloquia 1.1.2: ‘evil is nothing (Deus … ostendis malum nihil esse).’
\textsuperscript{1273} Cf., Confessiones 7.12.18: (Chadwick’s translation) ‘the evil into whose origins I was inquiring is not a substance’.
\textsuperscript{1274} If we substitute ‘substance’ for ‘white’, and ‘ontology’ for ‘quality’ in the passage cited from De Trinitate 5.7.8, the whole passage still makes sense: ‘If I say, He is a substance (white), I am affirming according to ontology (quality); but if I say, He is not a substance (not white), I am denying according to ontology (quality).’ (McKenna’s translation)
\textsuperscript{1275} De magistro 2.3 & De Trinitate 9.12.18: ‘res’.
\textsuperscript{1276} For this reason, we can endeavour to know God through His creation: (McKenna’s translation) ‘the invisible things of him (i.e., God), from the creation of the world are clearly seen, being understood through those things that are made. (Cf. Rom. 1.20)’ (De Trinitate 15.2.3).
\textsuperscript{1277} Richard La Croix draws a similar conclusion as mine, that all our statements about God refer to His creation, in his article ‘Augustine on the Simplicity of God,’ The New Scholasticism 51 (1977), 468-69, especially 464-469: ‘The result is that Augustine’s distinction between relative properties and nonrelative
d) Summary

Summarizing Augustine’s interpretation of the Trinity; the Triune God is, on the one hand, one ‘according to the substance’ (or ‘in reference to Himself’). However, the three Persons of the Trinity are not three parts of one divisible substance. Thus, two of them together are not, in any sense, greater than the remaining one, as it is in the material world. Also, the three Persons are not together ‘three powers or three wisdoms, but one power and one wisdom, as one God and one essence.’ In short, they are completely in union with each other. On the other hand, the Persons of the Trinity are three, ‘in reference to each other’. ‘Father’ and ‘Son’ are a pair of correlative terms. Since nothing accidental can happen to God,

one is always the Father and another is always the Son, not indeed in the sense that the Father, from whom the Son is born, never ceases to be the Father because the Son never ceases to be the Son, but in the sense that the Son was always born and never began to be the Son.

The Holy Spirit is the ‘gift of the Father and the Son’. Since ‘gift of a giver’ and ‘giver of a gift’ are semantically complementary to one another, ‘Holy Spirit’ is a relational term referring to the ‘Father’ and the ‘Son’ simultaneously. Therefore, God is one substance and three persons.

properties is incoherent.’ (pp. 468-469) Also, see Alvin Plantinga, God and Other Minds: A Study of the Rational Justification of Belief in God (Cornell University: New York, 1967), 173-180.
1278 Cf., De Trinitate 9.12.18: ‘one and one substance’.
1279 De Trinitate 15.3.5: (McKenna’s translation) ‘not only is the Father not greater than the Son in the substance of truth, but neither are both together something greater than the Holy Spirit alone’. Also see, De Trinitate 5.6.7.
1280 Cf., De Trinitate 5.5.6: (McKenna’s translation) ‘although to be the Father and to be the Son are two different things, still there is no difference in their substance, because the names, Father and Son, do not refer to the substance but to the relation (Quamobrem quamvis diversum sit Patrem esse et Filium esse, non est tamen diversa substantia, quia hoc non secundum substantiam dicuntur, sed secundum relativum; quod tamen relativum non est accidentis quia non est mutabile.’
1281 Cf., De Trinitate 5.5.6.
1282 De Trinitate 5.5.6 (McKenna’s translation): ‘…semper natus est Filius, nec coepit umquam esse Filius’.
1283 Cf., De Trinitate 5.5.6.
1284 Cf., De Trinitate 5.5.6.
1285 De Trinitate 5.11.12.
1286 Cf., De Trinitate 5.11.12.
There is, however, a problem with the linguistic approach to the Trinity. That is that Augustine is unable to interpret what ‘persona’ should mean:

one essence or substance and three persons … Yet, when the question is asked, What three? … The answer, however, is given, three “persons,” not that it might be [completely] spoken, but that it might not be left [wholly] unspoken.\textsuperscript{1289}

(‘Persona’ is the Latin translation of the Greek word ‘hypostasis’, which Augustine argues to be semantically closer to ‘substantia’ than ‘persona’.\textsuperscript{1290}) He attempts to make ‘persona’ meaningful in terms of genus and species, but not successfully:

When it is, therefore, asked what the three or who the three are, we seek to find a generic or a specific name which may include the three together. But we come across none.\textsuperscript{1291}

Nevertheless, Augustine begins to look ‘within the human persons to “show that there are three somethings which can both be separately presented and also operate inseparably.”’\textsuperscript{1292}

2) The image of the Triune God

Augustine first of all finds a resemblance to (not the image of) the Trinity in the act of loving oneself. In this act there are three things involved; namely the mind, its self-knowledge\textsuperscript{1293}, which is the ‘offspring (proles)’\textsuperscript{1294} of the mind, and finally love. These are hierarchically on a par with each other.\textsuperscript{1295} Here, Augustine explains in what sense they are one and simultaneously three in terms of ‘according to the substance

\textsuperscript{1288}Cf., De Trinitate 15.3.5.
\textsuperscript{1289}De Trinitate 5.9.10. (McKenna’s translation)
\textsuperscript{1290}Cf., De Trinitate 5.8.10-9.10: ‘…mian ousian, treis hypostaseis, quod est latine: unam essentiam, tres substantias …’
\textsuperscript{1291}De Trinitate 7.4.7. (McKenna’s translation)
\textsuperscript{1293}For ‘we do not love anything unknown’ (De Trinitate 10.2.4). (McKenna’s translation)
\textsuperscript{1294}De Trinitate 9.12.18.
\textsuperscript{1295}De Trinitate 9.12.18: ‘the offspring is not less, while the mind knows itself as much as it is; nor is the love less, while the mind loves itself as much as it knows and as much as it is.’ (McKenna’s translation)
(secundum substantiam or ad se)\textsuperscript{1296} and ‘in reference to something else (ad aliquid)\textsuperscript{1297}. ‘In reference to each other’, the identities and the roles of the mind, its self-knowledge, and love are mutually distinct:

in relation to its knowledge it (i.e., the mind) is spoken of as knowing, as being known, or as knowable; and when referring to the love by which it loves itself, it is also spoken of as loving, as being loved, or as lovable. … knowledge, although it is referred to a mind that either knows or is known, yet in respect to itself it is also spoken of both as known and as knowing, for the knowledge by which the mind itself knows itself is not unknown to itself. … when referring to the love by which it loves itself, it is also spoken of as loving, as being loved, or as lovable. … love, although it is referred to the mind that loves, of which it is the love, yet it is likewise love in respect to itself, so that it also exists in itself. For love is also loved, nor can it be loved with anything else except with love, that is, with itself. And so each exists in itself.\textsuperscript{1298}

‘According to the substance (or itself)’, the mind, its self-knowledge, and love are each ‘a substance’, yet all of them are together ‘one substance or essence’.\textsuperscript{1299} Hence, we call the mind a mind ‘in reference to itself’.\textsuperscript{1300} Therefore, like the Triune God, the constituents of the trinity found in the act of self-love are distinct from each another, but are simultaneously ‘one substance.’\textsuperscript{1301}

Next, Augustine explains how memory, understanding, and the will reflect the Trinity.\textsuperscript{1302} Here, again, Augustine’s argument for why they are a trinity is based on the same distinction between ‘ad se’ and ‘ad aliquid’. Each of the three is called ‘memory’, ‘understanding’ or ‘will’ ‘with relation to each other (ad aliquid relative [dicitur]).’\textsuperscript{1303}

\textsuperscript{1296} De Trinitate 5.6.7.
\textsuperscript{1297} De Trinitate 5.8.9: ‘what is said in reference to something does not refer to a substance but to a relationship.’ (McKenna’s translation)
\textsuperscript{1298} De Trinitate 9.5.8. (McKenna’s translation)
\textsuperscript{1299} Cf., De Trinitate 9.5.8.
\textsuperscript{1300} Cf., De Trinitate 9.5.8: ‘mens est utique in se ipsa quoniam ad se ipsam mens dicitur’.
\textsuperscript{1301} De Trinitate 9.12.18.
\textsuperscript{1302} Cf., De Trinitate 10.11.17.
\textsuperscript{1303} Cf., De Trinitate 10.11.18.
However, they are collectively one life, one mind, and one substance; for each of them ‘in respect to itself (ad se ipsam)’ is life, mind, and essence.  

There is, however, an issue to bear in mind regarding precisely what Augustine means by the ‘equality’ between memory, reason, and the will. Since the three Persons of the Trinity are mutually ‘equal’, and since the soul is the image of the Trinity: Augustine is bound to argue that there are three ‘somethings’, which are ‘equal’ to each other, and they are memory, reason, and the will. Yet, such an argument of his must be interpreted as referring to the souls of the living only. That is because, as explained in the Introduction, when we see God ‘face to face’, memory becomes no longer necessary and, so, is ultimately inferior to reason and the will.

Now, Augustine’s use of the term ‘image of God’ in *De Trinitate* is twofold in the same way as before, that is, ontological and teleological: this is similar to the twofold manner in which he maintains the soul to be good (bonus). Ontologically, not only the soul but also all other creatures are good, since whatever the Good God has created is good. Teleologically, only the soul, whose *will* is orientated to God, is good.  

Likewise, ontologically, all souls are made ‘to (ad)’ the image of God:

this imperfect image, which is an image nevertheless, that is, of man; 

even though it (i.e., the image of God) has become impaired and disfigured by the loss of its (i.e., the mind’s) participation in God, it remains nonetheless an image of God. For it is His image by the very fact that it is capable of Him, and can be a partaker of Him; and it cannot be so great a good except that it is His image.  

(*De Trinitate* 14.8.11)
Yet, only the trinity of memory, reason and the will, engaged in contemplation of eternal things, images the Trinity:

only in that part which is concerned with the contemplation of eternal things can one find something that is not only a trinity but also the image of God; while in the part that is drawn off for temporal activity one may perhaps find a trinity, but certainly not the image of God.\textsuperscript{1314}

In other words, only when the three psychic ‘faculties’\textsuperscript{1315} are centred on knowledge of God, can they become the image of the Trinity:

this trinity of the mind is not on that account the image of God because the mind remembers itself, understands itself, and loves itself, but because it can also remember, understand, and love Him by whom it was made. And when it does so, it becomes wise; but if it does not, even though it remembers itself, knows itself, and loves itself, it is foolish.\textsuperscript{1316}

It is noteworthy that Principe approaches Augustine’s twofold interpretation of ‘image of God’ in terms of ‘capacity’/‘power’ and ‘activity’:

We have met a few texts where Augustine speaks of this highest image as a power or capacity to remember, know, and love God.\textsuperscript{26} But in these cases it is a power or capacity to act, and Augustine clearly intends and indeed exhorts the person to be as active as possible so as to be more perfectly an image of the Trinity. In this, he says, consists the person’s renovation or re-formation unto the image and likeness of the Trinity.\textsuperscript{1317}

\textsuperscript{1313} McKenna’s translation.
\textsuperscript{1314} \textit{De Trinitate} 12.4.4. (Hill’s translation)
\textsuperscript{1315} \textit{De Trinitate} 10.12.19.
\textsuperscript{1316} (McKenna’s translation) \textit{De Trinitate} 14.12.15. Also, see \textit{De Trinitate} 12.4.4: (McKenna’s translation) ‘that part alone, to which belongs the contemplation of eternal things, there is not only a trinity but also an image of God; but in that which has been diverted to the action upon temporal things, even if a trinity can be found, yet it cannot be an image of God.’
\textsuperscript{1317} Walter H. Principe, ‘Dynamism of Augustine’s Terms for Describing the Highest Trinitarian Image in the Human Person’, \textit{Studia Patristica} 17 (Part 3), 1294.
(Note that Principe accepts the Augustinian term ‘capax Dei’ as a ‘noun-form’ of ‘can [poss] remember, understand/know, and love God’.\textsuperscript{1318} This is compatible with my interpretation. Since all of us are endowed with the ‘power’ to remember, know, and love God, we are undeniably the image of God in an ontological sense. Nonetheless, we can truly image God only if we are ‘actively’ remembering, knowing, and loving Him. Principe quotes the following Augustinian text in order to substantiate his argument:

Yet not all are with (\textit{cum}) Him in the way in which it was said by God, “I am always with you”. Nor is He with all in the way in which we say, “May the Lord be with you”. And so it is a great misery for man not to be with Him without Whom he cannot be... No doubt [man] does not exist without [God], and yet if he does not remember Him, and does not understand or love Him (\textit{si eius non meminit, eumque non intelligit nec diligit}), he is not with Him.\textsuperscript{1319}

Here, again, Augustine’s interpretation of ‘with Him/God’ is twofold. Ontologically we are always with God, otherwise we would not exist; but, from the perspective of teleology, only those of us, who remember, know/understand, and love God, can be said to be ‘with Him’.

Although only the trinity involving knowledge of God is the image of the Trinity, our self-knowledge has its own role in ‘reforming’\textsuperscript{1320} the image, because it is essential in establishing a right relationship between ourselves and God:

Why, then, was it (i.e., the mind) commanded to know itself? It was, I believe, that it might consider itself and live according to its nature, that is, that it might desire to be ruled according to its nature, namely, under Him to whom it must be brought into subjection, and above those to whom it must be preferred; under


\textsuperscript{1319} \textit{De Trinitate} 14.12.16 quoted in Principe, 1292.

\textsuperscript{1320} \textit{De Trinitate} 14.16.22.
Him by whom it must be governed, above those whom it must govern. For it
does many things through evil desires, as though it had forgotten itself.\textsuperscript{1321}

(Note that, as the above text clearly indicates, knowledge of God and that of the soul are
inseparably interconnected.)

3) Reforming the image of the Trinity

Reforming the Trinitarian image is, in other words, transforming ‘bad and
irrational\textsuperscript{1322}, ‘outer’\textsuperscript{1323}, or ‘wicked (impius)’\textsuperscript{1324} people into ‘rational’\textsuperscript{1325}, ‘wise’\textsuperscript{1326} or
‘inner’\textsuperscript{1327} people. The most important factor for the renewal of the image is gaining
knowledge of God, because we cannot love what we do not know.\textsuperscript{1328} Also, the more
we know God, the more we become like God: ‘We are like God inasmuch as we know
Him’\textsuperscript{1329}. On what grounds does Augustine insist that knowledge of God transforms us
to be ontologically ‘similar’\textsuperscript{1330} to Him? The answer lies in Augustine’s ideas on what
the nature of knowledge is, and I shall explain this in the first section of this chapter.
Afterwards, I shall investigate how Augustine holds that we can get to know God:
Augustine’s arguments in this regard are traditional, that is, through reason and faith.

a) The nature of knowledge

i) Knowledge of a thing is similar to the reality of that thing

\textsuperscript{1321} (McKenna’s translation) \textit{De Trinitate} 10.5.7. Also, see Ibid., 9.8.13: ‘Since the creature, therefore, is
either equal or inferior to us, we must use the inferior for God and enjoy the equal, but in God. For just as
you ought to enjoy yourself, but not in yourself but in Him who made you, so you ought also to enjoy him
whom you love as yourself. And, therefore, let us enjoy ourselves and our brethren in the Lord’.
(McKenna’s translation)
\textsuperscript{1322} \textit{De Trinitate} 3.3.8: ‘malis et irrationalibus’.
\textsuperscript{1323} \textit{De Trinitate} 11.1.1.
\textsuperscript{1324} \textit{De Trinitate} 14.15.21.
\textsuperscript{1325} \textit{De Trinitate} 2.17.28.
\textsuperscript{1326} \textit{De Trinitate} 3.3.8: ‘sapientem’.
\textsuperscript{1327} \textit{De Trinitate} 11.1.1.
\textsuperscript{1328} Cf., \textit{De Trinitate} 10.1.1: ‘no one can in any way love a thing that is wholly unknown’. (McKenna’s
translation)
\textsuperscript{1329} \textit{De Trinitate} 9.11.16. Also, Ibid., 9.9.14: ‘he who knows justice perfectly and loves it perfectly is
already just’. (McKenna’s translation)
There are two important texts in this respect as follows:

all knowledge according to the species is similar to that which it (i.e., the mind) knows,  \(^{1331}\)

The mind, therefore, possesses a certain likeness of the species known to it.  \(^{1332}\)

I shall explain what ‘species’ means in the next paragraph. For the moment we can just ignore the word ‘species’, and treat ‘knowledge according to the species’ and ‘the species known’ as synonymous expressions of ‘knowledge’. Consequently, the two texts cited above can be rendered as follows:

knowledge is similar to that which it knows,

The mind, therefore, possesses a certain likeness of the knowledge that it has.

The Oxford Latin Dictionary defines ‘species’ as ‘a subdivision of any class or kind, a sort, species, etc.’, and ‘genus’ as ‘a class containing in itself a number of subordinate kinds or variety’. Augustine’s uses of ‘species’ and ‘genus’ in *De Trinitate* 7.4.7 and 7.6.11 are consistent with the above definitions: they are collective nouns and are mutually correlative, like ‘left’ and ‘right’, ‘high’ and ‘low’. For instance, ‘(human) person’ is a species of the generic term ‘animal’, but is simultaneously a genus with respect to ‘man’ and ‘woman’.  \(^{1333}\) Consequently, Augustine stresses that we define what a genus is in terms of species:

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\(^{1330}\) Cf., *De Trinitate* 9.11.16. For more discussion on Augustine’s uses of ‘*imago*’ and ‘*similitudo*’, see Lewis Ayres, ‘“Remember that you are Catholic” (serm. 52, 2): Augustine on the Unity of the Triune God’, 61-62.

\(^{1331}\) *De Trinitate* 9.11.16 (McKenna’s translation): ‘omnis secundum speciem notitia, similis est ei rei quam novit.’

\(^{1332}\) *De Trinitate* 9.11.16 (McKenna’s translation): ‘Habet ergo animus nonnullam speciei notae similitudinem’

\(^{1333}\) Cf., *De Trinitate* 7.4.7: ‘whatever things are designated specifically by one name in the plural number can also be designated generically by one name. But not everything that we can call generically by one name can also be called specifically by one name. For three horses, which is a specific name, are also called three animals; however, we only call a horse, an ox, or a dog three animals or three substances, which are generic names, or anything else that can be spoken about them generically. But we cannot say three horses, or three oxen, or three dogs, because these are specific names.’ (McKenna’s translation)
no species goes beyond the definition of its own genus. For when I define animal, since a horse is a species of this genus, every horse is an animal.

Hence, ‘knowledge according to the species’\(^{1335}\) means ‘knowledge about a thing – or definition of a generic term – according to the species of that thing’.

For the Augustine of *De Trinitate* ‘knowledge’ often means a definition of that thing in terms of genus and species. Yet, Augustine holds that we cannot define revealed truths about God – for instance, the meaning of ‘persona’ of the Trinity – in such a way, due to God’s transcendence:

> When it is, therefore, asked what the three or who the three are, we seek to find a generic or a specific name which may include the three together. But we come across none, because the super eminent excellence of the divinity transcends all the limits of our wonted manner of speaking. For what is thought of God is truer than what is said, and His being is truer than what is thought.\(^{1336}\)

ii) Knowledge is a substance

In addition to his insistence that the knowledge of a thing is similar to the reality of that thing, Augustine maintains that ‘knowledge is a substance’\(^ {1337}\) and is also ‘a kind of life in the understanding of one who knows’\(^ {1338}\). Due to the ontological nature of knowledge, Augustine holds that knowledge also constitutes the hierarchy of reality: this was implicit in the earlier works, but now becomes explicit in *De Trinitate*. For instance, knowledge about a material thing is higher than that thing itself because the former is in the soul, which is superior to the body:

> the knowledge of the body is greater than the body itself, which is known by that knowledge. For knowledge is a kind of life in the understanding of one who

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\(^{1334}\) *De Trinitate* 7.6.11. (McKenna’s translation)

\(^{1335}\) *De Trinitate* 9.11.16: ‘omnis secundum speciem notitia, similis est ei rei quam novit.’

\(^{1336}\) (McKenna’s translation) *De Trinitate* 9.4.6: ‘substantia sit scientia’.

\(^{1337}\) *De Trinitate* 9.4.6: ‘substantia sit scientia’.

\(^{1338}\) *De Trinitate* 9.4.4 (McKenna’s translation): ‘illa (i.e., notitia) enim vita quaedam est in ratione cognoscentis’.
knows; but the body is not life. And any life is greater than any body, not in bulk but in power.\textsuperscript{1339}

However, knowledge about the soul is hierarchically equal to the soul itself:

From this we can gather that when the mind knows and approves itself, this knowledge is its word in such a way that it matches it exactly and is equal to it and identical, since it is neither knowledge of an inferior thing like body nor of a superior one like God. And while any knowledge has a likeness to the thing it knows, that is to the thing it is the knowledge of, this knowledge by which the knowing mind is known has a perfect and equal likeness.\textsuperscript{1340}

Knowledge about God is higher than the soul:

I confess rather that its sublime knowledge has been too great for me, and that I am unable to reach to it.\textsuperscript{1341}

Yet, knowledge about God is inferior to God Himself:

that knowledge (i.e., of God) is less than He, because it is in a lower nature; for the mind is creature, but God is Creator.\textsuperscript{1342}

Eventually, Augustine’s hierarchy, in ascending order, is material things; knowledge about them; the soul, which is on the par with self-knowledge; knowledge of God; and finally God himself. Therefore, the soul’s intellectual ‘ascent’\textsuperscript{1343} is the ‘reforming’\textsuperscript{1344} the image of God, otherwise the ‘deforming’ of the image: ‘we are like God inasmuch as we know Him’\textsuperscript{1345}.

\textsuperscript{1339} De Trinitate 9.4.4. (McKenna’s translation)
\textsuperscript{1340} De Trinitate 9.11.16. (Hill’s translation)
\textsuperscript{1341} De Trinitate 15.27.50. (McKenna’s translation)
\textsuperscript{1342} De Trinitate 9.11.16. (McKenna’s translation)
\textsuperscript{1343} De Trinitate 10.12.19
\textsuperscript{1344} Cf., De Trinitate 14.16.22.
\textsuperscript{1345} De Trinitate 9.11.16.
How, then, are we to gain knowledge of God? Augustine’s answer is traditional, that is, through reason and faith.

b) Through reason

There is an aspect of God that we can ‘see’ or know through our reason alone,\textsuperscript{1346} for instance, the Good:

This good and that good; take away this and that, and see good itself if you can; so you will see \textit{(videbis)} God who is good not by another good, but is the good of every good.\textsuperscript{1347}

Furthermore, because we ‘see’ the Good, which eternal\textsuperscript{1348}, omnipresent\textsuperscript{1349}, and most importantly epistemologically immanent\textsuperscript{1350} in our soul, we are able to judge whether a thing is good or not:

in all these good things, either those which I have enumerated, or any others which are seen or thought, we would be unable to call one better than the other, if we judge in accordance with the truth, if the idea of good itself had not been impressed upon us \textit{(nisi esset nobis impressa notio ipsius boni)}, according to which we approve of something as good, and also prefer one good to another.\textsuperscript{1351}

Augustine puts the above argument in a different way: God is the ‘Light’ that always ‘touches (tangere)’ our reason and enables us to make judgments concerning, for instance, what is just or unjust:

\textsuperscript{1346} \textit{De Trinitate} 12.5.5: ‘Let him so accustom himself to find traces of spiritual things in material things that, when he shall begin to ascend upwards from them \textit{under the guidance of reason}, he may arrive at that unchangeable truth itself through which all things have been made’. (McKenna’s translation)

\textsuperscript{1347} \textit{De Trinitate} 8.3.4. (McKenna’s translation)

\textsuperscript{1348} See the following footnote.

\textsuperscript{1349} ‘The mind does however remember its God. He always is; it is not the case that he was and is not, or is and was not, but just as he never will not be, so he never was not. And he is all of him everywhere, and therefore the mind lives and moves and is in him, and for this reason is able to remember him.’ \textit{(De Trinitate} 14.15.21: Hill’s translation)

\textsuperscript{1350} Cf., \textit{De Trinitate} 12.7.12: ‘the rational mind where the knowledge of God can reside.’ (McKenna’s translation)

\textsuperscript{1351} \textit{De Trinitate} 8.3.4. (McKenna’s translation)
the man who does not do justice and yet sees what should be done, he is the one who turns away from that light, and yet is still touched by it.\textsuperscript{1352}

Note that our memory is the source of our knowledge,\textsuperscript{1353} thus a theory of reminiscence.

c) Through faith

Together with reason, faith is also essential for reforming the image of God: Augustine's argument for the roles of faith with respect to our deification is the same as before.

Firstly, faith purifies the soul from sin.\textsuperscript{1354} (Again, theory precedes practice.)

Secondly, faith prepares the soul for contemplation of God.\textsuperscript{1355} In other words, faith strengthens ‘the weak eye of the mind’\textsuperscript{1356}, which cannot see or steadily hold its gaze on divine, intelligible things, such as the supreme good. Hence, ‘outer men’ (or ‘irrational people’) must believe that the Good exists since they do not understand the existence of the Good and, consequently, do not love the Good itself.\textsuperscript{1357} (Note that Augustine still holds that ‘reason (ratio)’\textsuperscript{1358} – ‘the eye of the mind (mentis acies)’\textsuperscript{1359} – is the agent of one’s teleological journey\textsuperscript{1360}, as the only partaker of immutable Wisdom.\textsuperscript{1361})

Finally, we must endeavour to deepen both our knowledge of God, and our love of Him, through believing revealed truths.\textsuperscript{1362} Faith is only the beginning, not the end, of a

\textsuperscript{1352} \textit{De Trinitate} 14.15.21 (Hill’s translation): ‘Qui vero non opera tur, et tamen videt quid operandum sit, ipse est qui ab illa luce avertitur, a qua tamen tangitur.’ Also, see Ibid., 8.6.9.

\textsuperscript{1353} Cf., \textit{De Trinitate} 15.21.40: ‘attributing to the memory everything that we know (memoriae tribuens omne quod scimus).’

\textsuperscript{1354} Cf., \textit{De Trinitate} 4.2.4 & 1.8.17 (‘our hearts are purified by faith’).

\textsuperscript{1355} Cf., \textit{De Trinitate} 1.8.17.

\textsuperscript{1356} \textit{De Trinitate} 1.2.4: ‘mentis humanae acies invalida’.

\textsuperscript{1357} Cf., \textit{De Trinitate} 1.2.4: ‘the supreme good exists, which can only be discerned by minds that are wholly purified, and that they themselves are unable to see or to comprehend it for this reason, because the weak eye of the human mind cannot be fixed on a light so dazzling, unless it has been nourished and become stronger by the justice of faith.’ (McKenna’s translation)

\textsuperscript{1358} \textit{De Trinitate} 1.1.1.

\textsuperscript{1359} \textit{De Trinitate} 12.14.23.

\textsuperscript{1360} Cf., \textit{De Trinitate} 4.20.28: ‘when it is advancing towards God …’.

\textsuperscript{1361} Cf., \textit{De Trinitate} 3.2.8 & 12.14.23. Ibid., 12.7.12: ‘rational mind where the knowledge of God can reside.’ (McKenna’s translation)

\textsuperscript{1362} Cf., \textit{De Trinitate} 7.6.12: ‘if this (i.e., the mystery of the Trinity) cannot be grasped by our reason, let it be held fast by our faith, until He shall shine in our hearts who said through the Prophet: “Unless you believe, you shall not understand.”’ (McKenna’s translation)
teleological journey. As Augustine insisted in *De Vera Religione* 8.15 that the ‘carnal Catholic’ must be transformed into a ‘spiritual Catholic’, the Augustine of *De Trinitate* also expresses the same idea in terms of ‘renewal’ of the image of God, making a distinction between ‘cure (*curatio*)’ and ‘healing (*sanare*)’:

This renewal, of course, is not brought about in the one moment of the conversion itself, as in Baptism that renewal is brought about in one moment by the remission of all sins, for there does not remain even one sin … But just as it is one thing to be free from fevers, and another thing to recover from the weakness which has resulted from the fevers; and, similarly, … so the first step in a cure is to remove the cause of the disease, which is done through the remission of all sins; the second is to heal the disease itself, which is done gradually by making progress in the renewal of this image (of God).  

‘Curing’ means purification, whereas ‘healing’ signifies understanding revealed truths. Hence, if we are to rephrase the above passage in the language of *De Vera Religione* 8.15, then we can say that all ‘Catholics’ are ‘cured’ of the disease, but only the ‘spiritual Catholics’ are in the course of being ‘healed’, whereas ‘carnal Catholics’ are those ‘who, though they profess the Catholic faith, do not carefully consider them (i.e., biblical expressions)’  

Augustine speaks of the same thing in terms of the ‘trinity of the inner man’ and the ‘trinity of the outer man’. However, our soul cannot be ‘healed’ completely in this life:

>a certain faith is in some way the beginning of knowledge, but a certain knowledge will only be perfected after this life when we shall see face to face.  

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1363 *De Trinitate* 14.17.23. (McKenna’s translation)  
1364 *De Trinitate* 12.6.7 (McKenna’s translation): ‘nonnulli, etiamsi catholicam fidem asserunt, non tamen diligenter advertunt’.  
1365 ‘Trinitatem interioris hominis’.  
1366 ‘(Trinitatem) exterioris (hominis)’.  
1367 *De Trinitate* 9.1.1. (McKenna’s translation)
In summary, our soul is eternally the ‘image of God’, which is ‘disfigured’ due to the lack/loss of our teleological ‘participation’ in God.\textsuperscript{1368} We are therefore called to restore the image (or become deified) by increasing our knowledge of God (through divine grace), for the knowledge is ‘similar’ to God.\textsuperscript{1369} Yet, since for most of us reason is too ‘weak’ to see God,\textsuperscript{1370} we must endeavour to ascent to God by means of faith, that is, believing and striving to understand revealed truths: nonetheless, the ‘perfection of the image’ can be achieved only afterlife.\textsuperscript{1371}

\textsuperscript{1368} \textit{De Trinitate} 14.8.11.
\textsuperscript{1369} Cf., \textit{De Trinitate} 9.11.16.
\textsuperscript{1370} Cf., \textit{De Trinitate} 1.2.4
\textsuperscript{1371} Cf., \textit{De Trinitate} 15.11.20.
Conclusions

‘Participation’ and ‘adoption’ are deificatory terms of the Church Fathers and Augustine’s uses of them in *De vera religione*, *Confessiones*, and *De Trinitate* make clear that deification is an important part of his thought. Moreover, while demonstrating that Augustine discussed human ‘participation’ in God in the terms of, for example, ‘image of God’, rationality, and ‘capax Dei’ in his late as well as early works; I have argued that becoming ‘like (similis)’ God is not just one of many parts – but the central part – of his thought.

Augustine employed ‘participation’ in ontological and teleological senses: by virtue of Christ’s incarnation, death, and resurrection we are ontologically the imperishable image of God, yet teleologically the image is in a state of deformity due to our (original) sin. In other words, we – as the image of Wisdom/Reason/the Good/Happiness – are permanently endowed with the ‘capacity’ to become wise/rational/good/happy like God; yet many of us are ignorant of the ‘capacity’, let alone cultivating it, due to lack of interiority. Similarly, although God has brought us ‘salvation’ (or adopted us as His children) through Christ, it is yet to be completed through our teleological ‘participation’ in God.

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1372 For ‘participation’ see *De vera religione* 6.10 & 30.54; *Confessiones* 4.15.25, 7.9.14 & 7.19.25; *De Trinitate* 4.2.4, 5.10.11, 6.5.7, 7.1.2, 8.3.5, 14.8.11 & 14.12.15: the term does not seem to appear in *De ordine*, *Soliloquia*, and *De quantitate animae*. For ‘adoption’ refer to *De vera religione* 17.34; *Confessiones* 9.3.6 & 11.2.4; *De Trinitate* 5.11.12 & 5.14.15.


1374 *De Trinitate* 9.11.16.

1375 Cf., *De vera religione* 3.4; *Confessiones* 10.43.68 & 7.21.27; and *De Trinitate* 2.17.29, 4.1, 4.3.5, 4.3.6, 4.7.11 & many more: in *De Trinitate* Augustine mentions our ontological ‘participation’ in God frequently in the language of salvation.

1376 Cf., *De ordine* 1.8.25 & *Confessiones* 11.8.10.

1377 Cf., *Soliloquia* 1.1.2 & *Confessiones* 10.21.30.

1378 Cf., *Soliloquia* 1.1.5 & *Confessiones* 13.32.47

1379 Cf., *Confessiones* 10.8.15: ‘People are moved to wonder by mountain peaks, by vast waves of the sea, by broad waterfalls on rivers, by the all-embracing extent of the ocean, by the revolutions of the stars. But in themselves they are uninterested.’

1380 Cf., *De ordine* 1.8.22 (‘O God of hosts, convert us, and show Thy face; and we shall be saved. [Deus virtutum, converte nos, et ostende faciem tuam, et salvi erimus (Ps 79, 8)]’: salvation is mentioned in a teleological sense); *Soliloquia* 1.1.4: *De quantitate animae* 33.76; *De vera religione* 3.3; *Confessiones* 1.5.5 & 5.7.13; *De Trinitate* 4.7.11 (‘the one who was to come and be the saviour of all who needed to be restored from death [unum futurum in quo esset salus universorum a morte reparandorum]’ [Hill’s translation]: salvation is mentioned in an ontological sense) & 4.3.5-6 (‘Need I produce many examples to show the difference between the soul’s death and the body’s, when they can easily be told apart by anyone in that one sentence of the Lord’s in the gospel: *Leave the dead to bury their dead* (Mt 8:22; Lk 9:60)? It was a dead body, of course, that had to be buried, but its buriers he meant us to understand as
How, then, are we to restore the image of God (or become wise/rational/good/happy like God)? In a nutshell, we must endeavour to remember, know, and love God through faith and reason with God’s help. Knowing God is recalling the knowledge of God innate in our memory (or remembering God, who is epistemologically immanent in our soul), thus a theory of reminiscence. However, due to our preoccupation with material and worldly things, we have difficulty in recollecting our memory of God. Also, we often think about God in a materialistic way. God is indeed incorporeal and this is of paramount importance. We can perceive God’s incorporeity inerentially through understanding the soul’s immateriality: this is an inward turn. Yet, God is not only immanent in the soul, but also transcends it in terms of nature. Therefore, we must turn inwards and, then, upwards in order to become deified: this is what Augustinian interiority is about.

In summary, Augustine understood the Christian salvation in a deificatory sense, and his theory of interiority is a way to complete our salvation.

I have argued that there is no substantial change in reference to interiority between the young Augustine and the mature Augustine, and some of the key points are as follows. Firstly, the soul is created in the image of God and is conditioned to ‘participate’ ontologically in Him. Consequently, the soul is made immortal like God. Yet, precisely due to our created nature, we are not immutable or self-sufficient like God and, so, divine grace is essential for our deification. Secondly, the will is always drawn to ‘delight’: thus, our teleological ‘participation’ in God in terms of memory,
reason and the will is always 'triadic', if not always trinitarian. Thirdly, seeing God 'face to face' in this life is impossible. Fourthly, Augustine’s intellectual ascent to God is fundamentally dialectical (or inferential), whether it be through reason or through faith. This is to say that he always attempted to perceive God in comparison with what is not God, searching for right pairs of correlative terms: through Neoplatonism he learned to see things in terms of material-or-immaterial and mutable-or-immutable, and as a Christian in terms of Creator-or-creature. Finally, I shall turn to De Trinitate 10.1.1-10.2.4, where Augustine carefully examines how one learns a new word, for example, ‘temetum’, for this text reveals a great deal of his self-understanding concerning his own spiritual journey to God. There are, in fact, both similarities and differences between Augustine’s intellectual pursuit of Wisdom/God and our search for the meaning of a word unknown to us; and I have already explained this partially, in the Introduction, as a way to argue for reason’s precedence over the will and also as a starting point of this thesis. However, I shall go through it again in order to summarize the whole of Augustine’s theory of interiority: clarifying where the differences stem from will explain why Augustine described his theological journey in terms of ‘ascent’ and deification.

Augustine, first of all, emphasized that we cannot search for what we do not know. Thus, by the time we try to find the definition of ‘temetum’, we must have already known something about it, namely, its pronunciation, its letters, and the fact/conviction that it is a meaningful ‘word’/‘sign’. (Note that, regarding forgetting and recalling in general, Solignac holds that recognizing forgetfulness itself is possible because what we have forgotten is situated in a ‘context’, and we still remember the ‘context’: if we forget the ‘context’, then we cannot ‘remember the

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1384 Cf., Soliloquia 1.7.14 (‘the soul, after this life, unites itself wholly to God’) & De Trinitate 9.1.1.

1385 Cf., De ordine 2.16.44 (‘God, who is better known by knowing what He is not’), De vera religione 52.101, Confessiones 7.17.23 & De Trinitate 15.2.3 (“the invisible things of God from the creation of the world are clearly seen, being understood by the things that are made, even his eternal power and Godhead” [Rom. 1:20].’ [McKenna’s translation])

1386 It means ‘wine’: see De Trinitate 10.1.2.

1387 De ordine 1.10.29, De vera religione 29.52, Confessiones 9.4.9, and De Trinitate 10.12.19.

1388 Cf., Epistula 10.2 & De Trinitate 9.11.16 (‘we are like God inasmuch as we know Him’).

1389 Cf., De Trinitate 10.1.1.

1390 Cf., De Trinitate 10.1.2.
forgetfulness\textsuperscript{1391} itself either. Therefore, the ‘context’ provides the clues to what we want to recollect. Likewise, the ‘context’, in which we have encountered ‘temetum’, makes us realize that we have come across a new word rather than a meaningless scribble.) Similarly, by the time Augustine was determined to seek, after reading the \textit{Hortensius}, what the Ciceronian term ‘Wisdom’ might mean, he had already realized that the term is a ‘sign’ that signifies something.

Secondly, both our quest for the meaning of ‘temetum’ and Augustine’s for that of ‘Wisdom’ are based on the love of ‘knowing the unknown’, not knowing the known.\textsuperscript{1393}

Finally, we can be enthusiastic about finding the definition of ‘temetum’ only if we have already known about, have been ‘touched (\textit{tangere})’ by, and currently love ‘the beauty of learning, wherein the knowledge of all the signs is contained’\textsuperscript{1394}, and the usefulness of having a linguistic skill.\textsuperscript{1395} Also, the enthusiasm can be sustained only if we persistently ‘hope’ to gain fluency in language.\textsuperscript{1396} Similarly, Augustine’s passionate search for the meaning of ‘Wisdom’/’God’ was sustained by his hope of finding true happiness.\textsuperscript{1397}

In summary, the intellectual dimension of Augustinian interiority is similar to our search for the meaning of an unknown word.

Despite the similarities, there are also differences between them. An important one is that a considerable part of learning a language demands understanding the conventional usage of words in terms of syntax and semantics, whereas the meaning of the

\begin{itemize}
\item \textsuperscript{1391} \textit{Confessiones} 10.16.24: ‘Ergo cum memoriam memini, per se ipsam sibi praesto est ipsa memoria; cum vero memini oblivionem, et memoria praesto est et oblivio, memoria, qua meminerim, oblivio, quam meminerim.’
\item \textsuperscript{1393} De \textit{Trinitate} 10.1.3.
\item \textsuperscript{1394} De \textit{Trinitate} 10.1.2 (McKenna’s translation): ‘pulchritudo doctrinae, qua continentur notitiae signorum omnium’: probably, Augustine means ‘beauty of training oneself in academic disciplines, in which the knowledge of all the signs is contained’.
\item \textsuperscript{1395} Cf., De \textit{Trinitate} 10.1.2.
\item \textsuperscript{1396} Cf., De \textit{Trinitate} 10.1.2.
\item \textsuperscript{1397} Cf., \textit{Confessiones} 3.4.7.
\end{itemize}
teleological term ‘Wisdom’ is disputable, and so is a matter of belief/conviction. This is why Augustine undertook a lengthy theological exploration through Manichaeism, Stoicism, Neoplatonism, and finally Christianity in search for a self-evident definition of ‘Wisdom’/’God’. Yet, Augustine did not think that he could find the definition in his lifetime. In other words, it is impossible in this life to render – to borrow the language of Verbeke – the ‘latent’ and ‘implicit’ notitia of God in memory fully ‘actual’ and ‘explicit’. The Augustine of De Trinitate insists that that is because our language is too limited to describe the transcendent God.

Now, in linguistics, one definition is not valued or prized more than another. Also, no extraordinary experience, such as a mystical experience, is involved in finding and understanding a definition of a word. Why, then, did Augustine describe the cognitive act of becoming clear about what ‘God’/’Wisdom’ might mean (in other words, gaining knowledge of God) in terms of deification and ascent (and arriving at its final stage is attaining transcendence)?

For Augustine, knowledge exists as a substance: ‘knowledge is a substance’. This is the core element of his epistemology that emerges both in his early and later works. For instance, dialectics (‘the laws of argumentation’) is Truth itself, which is an eternal, divine substance; ‘liberal sciences (doctrinae liberales)’, to be recollected from the memory are collectively a ‘thing itself (res ipsa)’; and knowledge about the mind is a substance, which is ontologically ‘identical’ with, and ‘equal’ to, the mind itself.

Due to the ontological nature of knowledge, knowledge of God must exist somewhere and that is in memory: the immateriality of knowledge and the soul is

1399 Cf., De Trinitate 7.4.7 quoted at the end of section ‘Knowledge of a thing is similar to the reality of that thing’ in chapter 3 in Part IV. Also, see Ibid., 7.3.6-7.6.12.
1400 Cf., De Trinitate 9.4.6.
1401 Cf., Soliloquia 2.11.21: ‘If that is the province of the science of argumentation, it is through itself that it is a true branch of learning. Who, then, will think it strange if that by which all things are true is through itself and in itself the true Truth. (At, si ad eam pertinet hoc officium, per seipsam disciplina vera est. Quisquanne igitur mirum putabit si ea qua vera sunt, omnia ab ipsa vera sunt, si et ipsa sit veritas.)’ Ibid., 2.2.2: ‘Truth, therefore, will exist, even if the world ceases to exist. … Truth, therefore, in no way will cease to exist.’ Ibid., 1.1.4: ‘You, the one God, the one, eternal, true substance (substantia).’
1402 Cf., Confessiones 10.9.16-10.10.17.
1403 Cf., De Trinitate 9.11.16.
1404 Cf., Confessiones 10.23.33.
equally important for Augustine to argue that the former is immanent in the latter. Thus, we must turn away from a material world inwards to our memory in search for the definition of ‘Wisdom’/’God’ through faith and reason. Furthermore, since where knowledge of God exists is where God Himself is,\textsuperscript{1405} God is in the soul.

Yet, knowledge of God is not only immanent in, but also transcendent to, the soul.\textsuperscript{1406} Note that, knowledge is a constituent of hierarchically structured reality: an optical image of a material thing in memory is better than that material thing itself;\textsuperscript{1407} the mind and knowledge about itself are again completely ‘equal’ to one another; knowledge about God, which is superior to the soul,\textsuperscript{1408} is inferior to God Himself.\textsuperscript{1409}

Therefore, searching for what ‘Wisdom’/’God’ should mean is far worthier than seeking the definition of ‘\textit{temetum}’. Also, the epistemological act of knowing God is an ontological act of ‘ascending’ to Him (or transcending ourselves). Finally, since knowledge is ontologically ‘similar’ to what it is knowledge of,\textsuperscript{1410} we become deified through remembering, understanding, and loving God.

\textsuperscript{1405} Cf., \textit{De ordine} 2.2.5: ‘what the wise man knows by understanding is with God’.\textsuperscript{1406} Cf., \textit{De quantitate animae} 27.53: ‘knowledge (of God) stands higher than reason’, \textit{De Trinitate} 15.27.50: ‘I confess rather that its sublime knowledge (of God) has been too great for me, and that I am unable to reach to it.’\textsuperscript{1407} Cf., \textit{De Trinitate} 9.11.16.\textsuperscript{1408} Cf., \textit{De Trinitate} 15.27.50 & \textit{De quantitate animae} 27.53: see above.\textsuperscript{1409} Cf., \textit{De Trinitate} 9.11.16: (McKenna’s translation) ‘that knowledge (i.e., of God) is less than He, because it is in a lower nature (i.e., the mind); for the mind is creature, but God is Creator.’\textsuperscript{1410} Cf., \textit{De Trinitate} 9.11.16.
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