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PAUL, THE *OIKONOMOS* OF GOD:
PAUL'S APOSTOLIC METAPHOR IN 1 CORINTHIANS AND ITS
GRAECO-ROMAN CONTEXT

BY

JOHN K. GOODRICH

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Abstract

This thesis seeks to elucidate the nature of Paul's apostleship and apostolic authority by investigating how Paul portrays himself as an *oikonomos* of God in 1 Corinthians (4.1-5; 9.16-23). Modern studies on the metaphor have failed to ascertain what apostolic attributes are implied by the image and how Paul utilised the metaphor to meet his rhetorical and theological objectives, largely because they neither identify the appropriate source domain of Paul's metaphor nor conduct the necessary socio-historical research to illumine its application. Utilising a host of ancient sources to reconstruct the characteristics of the regal, municipal, and private administrators bearing this title, this study seeks to identify the metaphor's source domain and to interpret the relevant Pauline discourses accordingly.

Part 1 surveys the three administrative contexts from Graeco-Roman antiquity in which *oikonomoi* are most frequently attested: Hellenistic kingdoms (Chapter 2), Graeco-Roman cities (Chapter 3), and private estates and enterprises (Chapter 4). While minor variations existed within these administrative contexts, a general profile is discernable in and constructed for each. Moreover, although the profiles of the *oikonomoi* serving in these contexts share certain similar social, structural, and disciplinary characteristics, these administrators are also shown to have significant differences.

Part 2 engages 1 Corinthians 4 and 9 seeking to identify and interpret Paul's metaphor in both discourses. Chapter 5 demonstrates that, of the three source domains examined in Part 1, private commercial administration functions as the most plausible context in which to interpret Paul's metaphor. Chapters 6 and 7 then utilise the profile of the private commercial administrator as a model to illumine Paul's apostleship in 1 Cor 4.1-5 and 9.16-23 respectively and explains how Paul employs the image to meet his rhetorical and theological objectives in both passages.

Chapter 8 summarises the argument of the thesis and draws out the implications of Paul's metaphor for understanding Paul's theology of apostolic authority.

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Declaration

This work has been submitted to the University of Durham in accordance with the regulations for the degree of Doctor of Philosophy. It is my own work, and none of it has been previously submitted to the University of Durham or in any other university for a degree.

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Abbreviations

Abbreviations of ancient literature generally follow the conventions of Patrick H. Alexander, et al. (eds.), *The SBL Handbook of Style* (Peabody, MA, 1999), and the editions used are those from the Loeb Classical Library unless otherwise indicated. Abbreviations of inscriptions generally follow the recommendations of G. H. R. Horsley and John A. L. Lee, 'A Preliminary Checklist of Abbreviations of Greek Epigraphic Volumes', *Epigraphica* 56 (1994): 129-69. For papyri, see John F. Oates, et al. (eds.), *Checklist of Editions of Greek, Latin, Demotic, and Coptic Papyri, Ostraca, and Tablets* (5th ed.; Bulletin of the American Society of Papyrologists Supplements 9; Oakville, CT: American Society of Papyrologists, 2001).

ABSA	<i>Annals of the British School at Athens</i>
ArchDelt	<i>Archaologikon Deltion</i>
AGJU	Arbeiten zur Geschichte des antiken Judentums und des Urchristentums
AJA	<i>American Journal of Archaeology</i>
ANRW	<i>Aufstieg und Niedergang der römischen Welt: Geschichte und Kultur Roms im Spiegel der neueren Forschung</i>
ANTC	Abingdon New Testament Commentaries
ARIDSup	Analecta Romana Instituti Danici Supplement
AUB (<i>iur</i>)	<i>Annales Universitatis Scientiarum Budapestinensis de Rolando Eötvös Nominatae, Sectio Iuridica</i>
AusBR	<i>Australian Biblical Review</i>
Austin	M. M. Austin, <i>The Hellenistic World from Alexander to the Roman Conquest: A Selection of Ancient Sources in Translation</i> (2nd ed.; Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2006)
AYB	Anchor Yale Bible
Bagnall/Derow	Roger S. Bagnall and Peter Derow, <i>The Hellenistic Period: Historical Sources in Translation</i> (Oxford: Blackwell, 2003)
BAR	<i>Biblical Archaeology Review</i>
BASP	<i>Bulletin of the American Society of Papyrologists</i>
BBR	<i>Bulletin of Biblical Research</i>
BDAG	W. Baur, W. Danker, W.F. Arndt, and F.W. Gingrich, eds., <i>Greek-English Lexicon of the New Testament and Other Early Christian Literature</i> (3rd ed.; Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 2001)
BECNT	Baker Exegetical Commentary on the New Testament
BICS	Bulletin of the Institute of Classical Studies
BNTC	Black's New Testament Commentaries

BTB	<i>Biblical Theology Bulletin</i>
BZAW	Beihefte zur Zeitschrift für die alttestamentliche Wissenschaft
BZNW	Beihefte zur Zeitschrift für die neutestamentliche Wissenschaft
CBET	Contributions to Biblical Exegesis and Theology
CBQ	<i>Catholic Biblical Quarterly</i>
<i>Christianity at Corinth</i>	Edward Adams and David G. Horrell, eds., <i>Christianity at Corinth: The Quest for the Pauline Church</i> (Louisville: WJK, 2004)
CJ	<i>Classical Journal</i>
<i>Corinth</i>	Charles K. Williams and Nancy Bookidis, eds., <i>Corinth, the Centenary, 1896-1996</i> (Corinth 20; Princeton: American School of Classical Studies at Athens, 2003)
CQ	<i>Classical Quarterly</i>
Crawford	Michael H. Crawford, <i>Roman Statutes</i> , (2 vols.; BICS 64; London: Institute of Classical Studies; University of London, 1996)
CRF	Otto Ribbeck, <i>Comitorum Romanorum Fragmenta</i> (3rd ed.; Leipzig: Teubner, 1897)
CSCT	Columbia Studies in the Classical Tradition
<i>De Agricultura</i>	H. Sancisi-Weerdenburg, R. J. van der Spek, H. C. Tietler and H. T. Wallinga, eds., <i>De Agricultura: In Memoriam Pieter Willem de Neeve (1945-1990)</i> (Dutch Monographs on Ancient History and Archaeology 10; Amsterdam: Gieben, 1993)
ECC	Early Christianity in Context
EKK	Evangelisch-katholischer Kommentar zum Neuen Testament
<i>Faith of Jesus Christ</i>	Michael F. Bird and Preston M. Sprinkle, eds., <i>The Faith of Jesus Christ: Exegetical, Biblical, and Theological Studies</i> (Peabody, MA: Hendrickson, 2009)
Gonzalez/Crawford	Julian Gonzalez and Michael H. Crawford, 'The Lex Irnitana: A New Copy of the Flavian Municipal Law,' <i>JRS</i> 76 (1986): 147-243
GRBS	<i>Greek, Roman, and Byzantine Studies</i>
GRS	Thomas Wiedemann, <i>Greek and Roman Slavery</i> (London: Routledge, 1981)
HALOT	L. Koehler, W. Baumgartner, and J. J. Stamm, <i>The Hebrew and Aramaic Lexicon of the Old Testament</i> (trans. and edited under the supervision of M. E. J. Richardson; 4 vols.; Leiden: Brill, 1994-1999)
HNTC	Harper's New Testament Commentaries
HNT	Handbuch zum Neuen Testament
HTR	<i>Harvard Theological Review</i>
HUT	Hermeneutische Untersuchungen zur Theologie

ICC	International Critical Commentary
JBL	<i>Journal of Biblical Literature</i>
JETS	<i>Journal of the Evangelical Theological Society</i>
JGRChJ	<i>Journal of Greco-Roman Christianity and Judaism</i>
JHS	<i>Journal of Hellenic Studies</i>
JÖAI	<i>Jahreshefte des Österreichischen archäologischen Instituts</i>
JRA	<i>Journal of Roman Archaeology</i>
JRASup	Journal of Roman Archaeology Supplementary Series
JRS	<i>Journal of Roman Studies</i>
JSNT	<i>Journal for the Study of the New Testament</i>
JSNTSup	Journal for the Study of the New Testament Supplement Series
JTS	<i>Journal of Theological Studies</i>
KEK	Kritisch-exegetischer Kommentar über das Neue Testament (Meyer-Kommentar)
Landvogt	Peter Landvogt, 'Epigraphische Untersuchungen über den Οἰκονόμος: Ein Beitrag zum hellenistischen Beamtenwesen' (PhD Diss., Univ. of Strassburg, 1908)
LNTS	Library of New Testament Studies
LSJ	H. G. Liddell, R. Scott, H. S. Jones, <i>A Greek-English Lexicon</i> (9th ed. with revised supplement; Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1996)
MM	J. H. Moulton and G. Milligan, <i>The Vocabulary of the Greek Testament</i> (London, 1930; Reprint, Peabody, MA, 1997)
NICNT	New International Commentary on the New Testament
NIGTC	New International Greek Testament Commentary
NSBT	New Studies in Biblical Theology
NTS	<i>New Testament Studies</i>
NovT	<i>Novum Testamentum</i>
NovTSup	Supplements to Novum Testamentum
OCD	S. Hornblower and A. Spawforth, eds., <i>Oxford Classical Dictionary</i> (3d ed.; Oxford, 1996)
ÖTK	Ökumenischer Taschenbuch-Kommentar
PRSt	<i>Perspectives in Religious Studies</i>
Renaissance	Susan Walker and Averil Cameron, eds., <i>The Greek Renaissance in the Roman Empire: Papers from the Tenth British Museum Classical Colloquium</i> (BICS 55; London: University of London; Institute of Classical Studies, 1989)

SBL	Studies in Biblical Literature
SBLDS	Society of Biblical Literature Dissertation Series
SBLSS	Society of Biblical Literature Symposium Series
<i>SJT</i>	<i>Scottish Journal of Theology</i>
SNTSMS	Society of New Testament Studies Monograph Series
SNTW	Studies of the New Testament and Its World
TDNT	G. Kittel and G. Friedrich, eds., <i>Theological Dictionary of the New Testament</i> (trans. G. W. Bromiley; 10 vols.; Grand Rapids: Eerdmans, 1964–1976)
THKNT	Theologischer Handkommentar zum Neuen Testament
TNTC	Tyndale New Testament Commentaries
<i>TynBul</i>	<i>Tyndale Bulletin</i>
<i>Urban Christians</i>	Todd Still and David G. Horrell, eds., <i>After the First Urban Christians: The Socio-Historical Study of Pauline Christianity Twenty-Five Years Later</i> (London: T&T Clark, 2009)
<i>Urban Religion</i>	Daniel N. Schowalter and Steven J. Friesen, eds., <i>Urban Religion in Roman Corinth: Interdisciplinary Approaches</i> (HTS 53; Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 2005)
Watson	<i>The Digest of Justinian</i> (trans. Alan Watson; 2 vols.; Rev. ed.; Philadelphia: University of Pennsylvania Press, 1998)
Weiß	Alexander Weiß, <i>Sklave der Stadt: Untersuchungen zur öffentlichen Sklaverei in den Städten des Römischen Reiches</i> (Historia Einzelschriften 173; Stuttgart: Franz Steiner, 2004)
WUNT	Wissenschaftliche Untersuchungen zum Neuen Testament
ZAW	<i>Zeitschrift für die alttestamentliche Wissenschaft</i>
ZNW	<i>Zeitschrift für die neutestamentliche Wissenschaft und die Kunde der älteren Kirche</i>
ZPE	<i>Zeitschrift für Papyrologie und Epigraphik</i>
ZTK	<i>Zeitschrift für Theologie und Kirche</i>
Zulueta	<i>The Institutes of Gaius</i> (trans. Francis de Zulueta; 2 vols.; Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1946)

Chapter 1. Apostleship and Authority in 1 Corinthians

Paul's first epistle to the Corinthians¹ provides a unique and fascinating insight into the social realities and ethical pitfalls that enveloped one of the apostle's earliest and most cherished faith-communities. Throughout its sixteen chapters, Paul's letter repeatedly attests to the conflicts that erupted within the church in Corinth and the volatility of the community's boundaries with the unbelieving world. The church's discord, apparent through political factions (1.10-4.21), civil litigation (6.1-8), abuse of Christian liberties (8.1-11.1), disputes about gender roles (11.3-16), exclusivity over the Eucharist (11.17-34), and elevation of particular ecclesial responsibilities (12.4-31), is indicative of the competitive and dissenting spirit that permeated the congregation. Further, the high level of *fragmentation* that plagued the community seems to have been fuelled intensely by the church's widespread *integration* with non-Christian society; indeed, there was almost no sense of separation between the congregation and the unbelieving world from which it was called.² As John Barclay has astutely observed,

One of the most significant, but least noticed, features of Corinthian church life is the absence of conflict in the relationship between Christians and 'outsiders'. In contrast to the Thessalonian church, the believers in Corinth appear neither to feel hostility towards, nor to experience hostility from, non-Christians. . . . Clearly, whatever individual exceptions there may be, Paul does not regard social alienation as the characteristic state of the Corinthian church.³

A congregation obviously fraught with internal conflict, preoccupied with non-Christian ethics, and absorbed with popular forms of education and leadership, the church in Corinth struggled perhaps more than any other of the apostle's early

¹ I am aware that the canonical 1 Corinthians was not Paul's initial correspondence with the Corinthian church (1 Cor 5.9-11), but this form of reference will be utilised throughout for the sake of convenience.

² See, e.g., Andrew D. Clarke, *Secular and Christian Leadership in Corinth: A Socio-Historical and Exegetical Study of 1 Corinthians 1-6* (AGJU 18; Leiden: Brill, 1993); Bruce W. Winter, *After Paul Left Corinth: The Influence of Secular Ethics and Social Change* (Grand Rapids: Eerdmans, 2000), x. For Paul's portrayal of the Corinthian church as an ideologically distinct community, see Richard A. Horsley, 'Paul's Assembly in Corinth: An Alternative Society', in *Urban Religion* (2005), 371-95; Edward Adams, *Constructing the World: A Study in Paul's Cosmological Language* (SNTW; Edinburgh: T&T Clark, 2000), 147-49.

³ John M. G. Barclay, 'Thessalonica and Corinth: Social Contrasts in Pauline Christianity', *JSNT* 47 (1992): 49-74, at 57-58; cf. Craig Steven de Vos, *Church and Community Conflicts: The Relationships of the Thessalonian, Corinthian, and Philippian Churches with Their Wider Civic Communities* (SBLDS 168; Atlanta: Scholars, 1999); C. K. Robertson, *Conflict in Corinth: Redefining the System* (SBL 42; Bern: Peter Lang, 2001), 53-113.

congregations to grasp and embody the new ‘symbolic order’ of Pauline Christianity.⁴

But while the nature of the Corinthians’ shortcomings distinguished them from Paul’s other churches, it is the manner in which Paul utilised the gospel to remedy these complications that distinguishes 1 Corinthians from the rest of the Pauline corpus. Paul’s first epistle to the Corinthians reveals in a way unlike any other Pauline epistle Paul’s theology *in practice*, that is, the applicability of the gospel to real people and ordinary problems.⁵ According to Gordon Fee, it is this ability of Paul to bring the good news to bear in the marketplace, to facilitate the message as it works its way out in the exigencies of everyday life, which demonstrates the ‘truth[fulness] of his gospel’, and finds unique expression in 1 Corinthians.⁶

A. Paul’s Apostolic Authority

Among the many ways that Paul applies his theology to the lives of the believers in Corinth, few are as prevalent and important in 1 Corinthians as the elucidation of apostleship and apostolic authority.⁷ As James Dunn has remarked, ‘The opportunity to compare Paul’s theology and his practice, or, better, his theology in practice, is nowhere so promising as in the case of apostolic authority’, and ‘[o]n the day-to-day reality of Paul’s apostolic authority, the most instructive text is undoubtedly 1 Corinthians’.⁸ The basis for Dunn’s two assertions seems obvious enough: the way that the Corinthians conceived apostles was a matter of great concern between the believers themselves as well as between the church and

⁴ David G. Horrell, *The Social Ethos of the Corinthian Correspondence: Interests and Ideology from 1 Corinthians to 1 Clement* (SNTW; Edinburgh: T&T Clark, 1996), 53-59; Stephen J. Chester, *Conversion at Corinth: Perspectives on Conversion in Paul’s Theology and the Corinthian Church* (SNTW; Edinburgh: T&T Clark, 2003).

⁵ C. K. Barrett, *A Commentary on the First Epistle to the Corinthians* (BNTC; London: A&C Black, 1968), 26; Hans Conzelmann, *1 Corinthians: A Commentary on the First Epistle to the Corinthians* (Hermeneia; Minneapolis: Fortress, 1975), 9; Raymond F. Collins, *First Corinthians* (Sacra Pagina 7; Collegeville, MN: Liturgical Press, 1999), 29; Victor P. Furnish, *The Theology of the First Letter to the Corinthians* (New Testament Theology; Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1999), 122-23.

⁶ Gordon D. Fee, *The First Epistle to the Corinthians* (NICNT; Grand Rapids: Eerdmans, 1987), 16

⁷ John Scott, *Power* (Cambridge: Polity, 2001), 3, defines ‘social power’ as ‘the socially significant affecting of one agent by another in the face of possible resistance’. In this investigation various forms of power will be identified. One such form is *authority*, which we understand to be an expression of what Scott refers to as ‘persuasive influence’, which involves ‘processes of legitimation and signification that can be organised into complex structures of command and expertise’ (17).

⁸ James D. G. Dunn, *The Theology of Paul the Apostle* (Grand Rapids: Eerdmans, 1998), 571-72.

its founder, and so much so that it was the first topic Paul sought to resolve in the letter (1.10-4.21), one he would soon revisit (9.1-27), and one that would eventually occupy further reflection in later correspondence (2 Corinthians). Clarifying who, or what, Paul and the other apostles were and how they were to be understood, therefore, was a matter of real urgency in Paul's rhetorical strategy as he undertook to direct the church toward ecclesial unity and Christian maturity. At the same time, because the letter is not as polemical as Galatians or 2 Corinthians, it provides an exceptional window into the power dynamics of an apostle playing a relatively unscripted role.

But just as the nature of apostolic power and authority remains a pertinent topic of study in Pauline theology and in 1 Corinthians in particular, the enquiry remains complicated in modern research by the multiplicity of scholarly approaches being employed. Not only do these different avenues leave many interpreters with competing perspectives about the nature of Paul's apostleship, but as the following survey seeks to demonstrate, they too often fail to consider important hermeneutical factors relevant to interpreting Paul's discourse, including its socio-historical and rhetorical contexts.

1. Authority Constructed

Numerous studies in 1 Corinthians have sought to illumine the nature of apostleship and the authority Paul possessed by examining the theological implications of the many illustrative ways the apostle *constructs*, or *describes*, the apostolate. Countless studies, for instance, have investigated Paul's use of the title ἀπόστολος (1 Cor 1.1, 17; 4.9; 9.1-2, 5; 12.28-29; 15.7, 9), aiming to expose the nature of apostleship by deciphering the origin of the title. While a few interpreters have suggested that the Pauline concept originated in Christianity or Gnosticism,⁹ a growing consensus of scholars—following the initial proposal of J. B. Lightfoot and its later development by Karl Rengstorf—suggest that Paul's particular brand of

⁹ For the apostolate as a Christian invention, see, e.g., Johannes Munck, 'Paul, the Apostles, and the Twelve', *Studia Theologica* 3 (1950): 96-110; Arnold Ehrhardt, *The Apostolic Succession in the First Two Centuries of the Church* (London: Lutterworth Press, 1953), 15-20; L. Cerfaux, 'Pour l'histoire du titre Apostolos dans le Nouveau Testament', *Recherches de science religieuse* 48 (1960): 76-92; Günter Klein, *Die zwölf Apostel: Ursprung und Gehalt einer Idee* (Forschungen zur Religion und Literatur des Alten und Neuen Testaments 77; Göttingen: Vandenhoeck & Ruprecht, 1961), 25-52. For its origin in Gnosticism, see, e.g., Walter Schmithals, *The Office of Apostle in the Early Church* (trans. John E. Steely; Nashville: Abingdon, 1969), 98-110.

apostleship had its origin in Judaism and was in some way related to the office of the של יח ('delegate').¹⁰ Going in a similar direction, Karl Sandnes has examined Paul's identification with the Hebrew prophets (2.6-16; 9.15-18), suggesting that Paul understood and portrayed his apostolic role as an extension of the OT prophetic tradition.¹¹ John N. Collins, on the other hand, has focused on Paul's use of the term δίακονος (3.5), arguing quite controversially that Paul's metaphor depicts the apostle as an embassy from God to the church, rather than as a servile position as the term is traditionally understood to mean.¹² Stephan Joubert and Trevor Burke have independently targeted Paul's father metaphor (4.14-21), while Beverly Gaventa has concentrated on Paul's maternal language (3.1-2).¹³ Finally, Zeba Crook, utilising the relational framework of patronage, portrays Paul as a client and beneficiary who out of loyalty labours to 'convert' other clients to his patron God (9.1, 16-17; 15.8-10).¹⁴

But most studies investigating Paul's metaphorical representations of apostleship, while they are normally socio-historically and exegetically focused, neither seek nor are able to address what are arguably the most fundamental theological matters concerning apostolic authority, namely its basis, scope, purpose, and limits. However, this lacuna has in large part been filled by John Schütz, who was one of the first to address Paul's authority utilising modern theory. Combining

¹⁰ J. B. Lightfoot, *The Epistle of St Paul to the Galatians* (London: MacMillan, 1865), 92-101; Karl Heinrich Rengstorff, 'ἀπόστολος', in *TDNT*, ed. Gerhard Kittel (Grand Rapids: Eerdmans, 1972), 1:407-45. More recently, F. H. Agnew, 'The Origin of the NT Apostle-Concept: A Review of Research', *JBL* 105 (1986): 75-96; Jörg Frey, 'Apostelbegriff, Apostelamt und Apostolizität: Neutestamentliche Perspektiven zur Frage nach der "Apostolizität der Kirche"', in *Das kirchliche Amt in apostolischer Nachfolge. I. Grundlagen und Grundfragen*, ed. Theodor Schneider and Gunther Wenz (Dialog der Kirchen 12.1; Freiburg im Breisgau; Göttingen: Herder; Vandenhoeck & Ruprecht, 2004), 91-188, at 180.

¹¹ Karl Olav Sandnes, *Paul - One of the Prophets? A Contribution to the Apostle's Self-Understanding* (WUNT 2/43; Tübingen: J.C.B. Mohr [Paul Siebeck], 1991), 77-130.

¹² John N. Collins, *Diakonia: Re-Interpreting the Ancient Sources* (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1990), 195-97. *Contra* Andrew D. Clarke, *Serve the Community of the Church: Christians as Leaders and Ministers* (First-Century Christians in the Graeco-Roman World; Grand Rapids: Eerdmans, 1999), 233-43; Anni Hentschel, *Diakonia im Neuen Testament: Studien zur Semantik unter besonderer Berücksichtigung der Rolle von Grauen* (WUNT 2/226; Tübingen: Mohr Siebeck, 2007), 91-98.

¹³ Stephan J. Joubert, 'Managing the Household: Paul as *paterfamilias* of the Christian Household Group in Corinth', in *Modelling Early Christianity: Social-Scientific Studies of the New Testament in Its Context*, ed. Philip F. Esler (London: Routledge, 1995), 213-23; Trevor J. Burke, 'Paul's Role as "Father" to his Corinthian "Children" in Socio-Historical Context (1 Corinthians 4:14-21)', in *Paul and the Corinthians: Studies on a Community in Conflict. Essays in Honour of Margaret Thrall*, ed. Trevor J. Burke and J. K. Elliott (NovTSup 109; Leiden: Brill, 2003), 95-113; Beverly R. Gaventa, *Our Mother Saint Paul* (Louisville: WJK, 2007), 41-50.

¹⁴ Zeba Crook, *Reconceptualising Conversion: Patronage, Loyalty, and Conversion in the Religions of the Ancient Mediterranean* (BZNW 130; Berlin: Walter de Gruyter, 2004), 155-69.

detailed exegesis and sociology, Schütz demonstrated that Paul's conception of *apostolic* authority greatly varied from Max Weber's model of *charismatic* authority, since the apostle's authority did not rest on the legitimation of others.¹⁵ Instead, Schütz, after examining a number of Pauline texts (including 1 Corinthians 1-4 and 15), reasoned that Paul's authority transcended the legitimating power of the community and rested on two 'figures of interpretation': (i) the *gospel*, itself 'a power or force in human affairs, the field or sphere in which those called by it now stand and through which they move to a future already adumbrated and in some sense present in the gospel'; and (ii) the *apostle* himself, whose power derives not from an institution—'Paul does not regard apostolic authorization as a sometime thing, as a limited endowment of representative authority'—rather, as the apostle embodies the gospel in his life and ministry, his authority becomes 'inseparable from the whole of the person authorized'.¹⁶ 'Hence, both the gospel and the apostle are manifestations of a single power and are "authority" in that sense'.¹⁷ Deeply learned and nearly comprehensive in scope, Schütz's work remains a leading theological analysis of Paul's authority-concept.

But even Schütz's investigation was not able to address every significant facet of Pauline apostolic power and authority, as he himself failed to provide a detailed account for how Paul's authority was actually exercised. That is to say, while Schütz's treatment provides an intriguing study on Paul's ideology of authority, it remains one dimensional in so far as it fails to analyse how Paul asserted his authority over the Christian community.

2. Authority Asserted

As the studies mentioned above have sought to examine how Paul *constructed* apostolic power and authority, a number of other studies have sought to expose and evaluate how Paul *asserted* that power and authority. Looking beyond Paul's apostolic representations, these studies often utilise modern theory to detect, compare, and assess the use of power and authority in Paul's letters. Bengt Holmberg, whose investigation of the 'structures of authority' in the early church is

¹⁵ John H. Schütz, *Paul and the Anatomy of Apostolic Authority* (SNTSMS 26; Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1975), 268-69.

¹⁶ Schütz, *Authority*, 284.

¹⁷ Schütz, *Authority*, 284.

now quite famous for helping to usher in an age of sociological exploration of the NT, is another who has left a massive imprint on the landscape of Pauline authority studies. Whereas Schütz examined Paul's authority as an ideological abstraction, Holmberg pursued the matter as a sociological reality, utilising 'concrete social facts' to establish what 'actually happened between Paul and his churches'.¹⁸ Relying, therefore, on both Acts and the Pauline letters to supply his historical data, Holmberg compared Paul's power with the Weberian authority models and concluded that the primitive church operated under the influence of a complex structure of ecclesial power based mainly on charismatic authority, and contained mixed degrees of institutionalisation. Moreover, while Holmberg contended that Paul's Gentile mission was largely dependent on, though not subordinate to, the Jerusalem church,¹⁹ he argued that Paul possessed a large measure of regional authority, having been superordinate to his missionary co-workers and having had the necessary leverage over the local churches he founded to admonish them and to expect from them financial support in return for preaching.²⁰ In fact, according to Holmberg, it was Paul's *over*-involvement in those churches that disrupted their development of local political structures (cf. 1 Corinthians 12 and 14).²¹

But while Holmberg's analysis has yielded rich results, his methodology has been criticised by scholars reluctant to impose anachronistic and unsubstantiated models onto the ancient NT text.²² There is, to be sure, much to be gained by using modern theory in the study of biblical literature; theories, frameworks, and models can at the very least function as useful heuristic tools 'for the purpose of developing new approaches to and opening up new questions about early Christianity'.²³ Still, the criticisms directed toward Holmberg's analysis have served to remind

¹⁸ Bengt Holmberg, *Paul and Power: The Structure of Authority in the Primitive Church as Reflected in the Pauline Epistles* (Philadelphia: Fortress, 1980), 203. Holmberg charges Schütz and his methodological predecessors with committing 'the fallacy of idealism'.

¹⁹ Holmberg, *Power*, 55-56.

²⁰ Holmberg, *Power*, 70-93.

²¹ Holmberg, *Power*, 116.

²² E. A. Judge, 'The Social Identity of the First Christians: A Question of Method in Religious History', *Journal of Religious History* 11 (1980): 201-17, at 210; cf. Clarke, *Secular*, 3-6.

²³ David G. Horrell, 'Models and Methods in Social-Scientific Interpretation: A Response to Philip Esler', *JSNT* 78 (2000): 83-105, at 93. See also, e.g., Philip F. Esler, 'Models in New Testament Interpretation: A Reply to David Horrell', *JSNT* 78 (2000): 107-113; David G. Horrell, 'Whither Social-Scientific Approaches to New Testament Interpretation: Reflections on Contested Methodologies and the Future', in *Urban Christians* (2009), 6-20.

interpreters of the need to verify interpretive claims and methodologies with sufficient historical data. As Holmberg himself remarks,

[A] detailed knowledge of the historical setting of the early Christians is indispensable for any historical reconstruction of their real life. Historiography cannot operate without historical data that can serve as evidence, nor can it neglect any available historical data, just because they cannot be easily fitted into one's own outlook or 'model'. Socio-historical fieldwork is what hypotheses, models, and theories work on and are constructed from. This means also that models or theories cannot substitute for evidence, by filling in gaps in the data, as it were.²⁴

Future efforts to elucidate and appraise Paul's apostolic authority, therefore, must situate Paul's letters in their historic context and validate the use of theory with sufficient ancient evidence.

This warning is particularly germane for critics who are expressly suspicious of the apostle's exercise of authority and have sought to expose its suppressive nature without reconstructing the context in which it was employed. Graham Shaw, for instance, while conceding that Paul's letters advocate liberation and reconciliation, (aggressively) argues that those tenets are wholly incompatible with the oppressive ethos of Paul's political practice.²⁵ Paul's assertion of authority is, according to Shaw, 'complex but unrelenting', as he manipulated churches to rely on him, all the while concealing his dependence on them and alienating those believers who failed to ally.²⁶ Further, Paul's abusive exercise of power is to be credited to the apostle's mistaken sense of authorisation. '[T]he brittle, arbitrary and divisive nature of Paul's leadership', Shaw remarks, 'is intimately connected with self-delusion about the resurrection, and a mistaken value attributed to charismatic phenomena'.²⁷ Targeting several Pauline letters, in addition to Mark's Gospel, Shaw has particularly harsh words for Paul's rhetoric in 1 Corinthians:

This letter, which contains the most famous of all Paul's writings, the lyrical passage on love in ch. 13, is in other respects an exercise of magisterial authority. Its keynote is struck in the second verse – the Lordship of Christ. In the name of that Lord Paul demands unity and obedience. He is to be seen subduing critics, subjecting the faithful to his unsolicited censure, and giving firm rulings to their most intimate queries. It is a style that the officials of the Vatican can rightly claim as their own. It is perhaps a sign of Paul's confidence in the exercise of his authority that only a few verses of the letter are devoted to prayer. He briefly thanks God for the spiritual achievement of the Corinthians . . . and

²⁴ Bengt Holmberg, 'The Methods of Historical Reconstruction in the Scholarly "Recovery" of Corinthian Christianity', in *Christianity at Corinth* (2004), 255-71, at 269-70. Cf. Bengt Holmberg, *Sociology and the New Testament: An Appraisal* (Minneapolis: Fortress, 1990).

²⁵ Graham Shaw, *The Cost of Authority: Manipulation and Freedom in the New Testament* (Philadelphia: Fortress, 1983), 181-84. Despite his criticisms of Paul's assertion of authority, Shaw attempts to maintain the integrity and non-malicious intentions of Paul by conceding that the apostle was learning to wed theology and practice throughout his career: '[A]lthough the texts contain much anxiety, aggression and illusion, they also portray a man learning to exercise freedom and love' (184).

²⁶ Shaw, *Authority*, 181.

²⁷ Shaw, *Authority*, 182.

declares his confidence that God will maintain their loyalty – sentiments which both confirm the Corinthians in their position of obedience and rule out of court the possibility of their defection. Here he needs neither to flatter nor cajole, and so he proceeds to command.²⁸

But though Shaw's concerns are refreshingly candid, his rhetoric is habitually overstated and his analysis fails to place any of Paul's discourses in their historic contexts. As Dunn remarks with reference to Shaw's criticisms on 1 Corinthians, 'A fairer reading . . . would be much more sensitive to the rhetorical character of the letter and to the social factors at play in Corinth, particularly when we cannot hear the other sides of the debates and do not know how much the issues were caught up in the social tensions of Corinth, not least between patrons and their clients'.²⁹

Elizabeth Castelli's treatment of Paul's call to μιμήσις, though it offers another stimulating appraisal of the apostle's 'strategy of power', ultimately suffers from a similar kind of contextual neglect.³⁰ Critical of past interpreters who 'either have ignored the implicit articulation of power present in the advocacy of mimetic relations or have rendered the power relationship unproblematic and self-evident',³¹ Castelli has sought, on the basis of the theory of Michel Foucault, to expose the power buried in Paul's rhetoric by showing how the perpetuation of sameness was used to repress deviance and proliferate a single Christian ideology—Paul's own—with the ultimate consequence of monopolising truth and determining who would and would not be saved. Castelli's thesis has particular relevance for 1 Corinthians, where Paul's call to become his imitators surfaces twice and in key sections within the letter (4.16; 11.1). 'Imitation of Paul in both contexts (4:16 and 11:1)', Castelli states, 'has to do fundamentally with the social arrangement of the Corinthian community (unity and identity) and always refers back to the singular authoritative model of Paul'.³² But Castelli's insistence on Paul's manipulation of the Corinthians fails to account for how his call to imitation originally functioned in the letter, that is, as a pattern of *sacrificing* one's authority, rather than *exploiting* it (11.1; cf. 9.19). Castelli attempts to circumvent the matter of authorial intention by

²⁸ Shaw, *Authority*, 62.

²⁹ Dunn, *Theology*, 575-76.

³⁰ Elizabeth A. Castelli, *Imitating Paul: A Discourse of Power* (Louisville: WJK, 1991), 15.

³¹ Castelli, *Imitating*, 33.

³² Castelli, *Imitating*, 114-15. See also Charles A. Wanamaker, 'A Rhetoric of Power: Ideology and 1 Corinthians 1-4', in *Paul and the Corinthians: Studies on a Community in Conflict. Essays in Honour of Margaret Thrall*, ed. Trevor J. Burke and J. K. Elliott (NovTSup 109; Leiden: Brill, 2003), 115-37, who is indebted to Castelli's approach and further emphasises Paul's use of ideology to assert power.

dismissing its accessibility to modern exegetes.³³ As Margaret Mitchell has noted, however, such neglect is at odds with Castelli's own rhetoric as well as the postmodern theory on which her thesis rests.³⁴ Moreover, once the socio-rhetorical context of 1 Corinthians is given fuller attention, it is plain that the Corinthians, not Paul, were those fixated on power.³⁵

Sandra Polaski, who is also informed by Foucauldian methods of detecting power, analyses Paul's autobiographical discourses in order to move behind what Paul *states* about his power to identify what Paul *implies* about it. While she wishes neither to apply a 'hostile reading' to the text, nor 'to vilify Paul's power claims from the outset', nor 'to dismiss them as deceitfully self-serving', Polaski openly employs a hermeneutic of suspicion whereby she attempts to detect in Paul 'evidence of power relations which the surface meaning of the text may mask'.³⁶ This leads her to investigate Philemon, Galatians, and Paul's references to the divine grace given to him (cf. 1 Cor 3.10) in order to demonstrate that the apostle possessed a sense of revelatory authority which he used to plead and persuade his audiences to obey. While he always left his audiences the opportunity to refuse, to do so would have clearly been an affront to him and, just as Castelli observed, would have resulted in placement outside the ideological community.³⁷

Although Shaw, Castelli, and Polaski have raised serious questions about the motives and effects of Paul's apostolic authority, other scholars have suggested that the power relations operating between Paul and his communities were far more complex than those critics wish to realise. Ernest Best, for instance, while recognising that Paul possessed authority derived from the gospel, argued that Paul only made claim to his apostleship and apostolic authority when addressing his

³³ It is significant that Scott, *Power*, 2, notes that a 'power relation cannot . . . be identified unless there is some reference to the intentions and interests of the actors involved and, especially, to those of the principal'.

³⁴ Margaret M. Mitchell, 'Review: Elizabeth A. Castelli, *Imitating Paul*', *Journal of Religion* 72 (1992): 581-82.

³⁵ Cf. Andrew D. Clarke, '"Be Imitators of Me": Paul's Model of Leadership', *TynBul* 49.2 (1998): 329-60, at 342-47; Victor Copan, *Saint Paul as Spiritual Director: An Analysis of the Imitation of Paul with Implications and Applications to the Practice of Spiritual Direction* (Milton Keynes, England: Paternoster, 2007), 181-218.

³⁶ Sandra Hack Polaski, *Paul and the Discourse of Power* (The Biblical Seminar 62; Gender, Culture, Theory 8; Sheffield: Sheffield Academic Press, 1999), 21.

³⁷ Polaski, *Power*, 71: 'Paul moves from relationship-language that is already accepted by his readers . . . to another set of terms, commercial, familial, and even corporeal in nature, which, taken together, describe a universe in which Paul is very close to God in authority'.

relationship with other church leaders.³⁸ In so doing Best attempted to mitigate the charge of Paul's abuse of specifically *apostolic* authority, insisting that Paul exercised authority over his churches only on the basis of his status as their *founder* ('father').³⁹ But Best's distinction between Paul's roles as apostle and church founder seems artificial; despite Best's attempts to do so, there does not appear to be any reason to separate Paul's apostolic and evangelistic roles. Moreover, how one can determine which role Paul occupies when he exercises authority over his converts seems to require evidence beyond what his letters provide.

Kathy Ehrensperger has also given Paul's exercise of apostolic authority a sympathetic reading, attempting to explain how Paul used his authority, not to suppress his churches, but to empower them toward Christian maturity. While she grants that Paul and others in the early Christian movement exercised power *over* their communities and operated within an asymmetrical hierarchy, Ehrensperger places Paul's rhetoric in conversation with contemporary feminist theories of power in order to explain that Paul's authority, far from being domineering, had a transformative objective which sought to *enable* the early believers to reach a status of maturity on par with their leaders.⁴⁰ As Ehrensperger herself remarks, 'Paul emphasizes again and again that the aim of his teaching is to *empower* those within his communities to *support each other*. He acts as a parent-teacher using power-over them to empower them and thus render himself, and the power-over exercised in this role, obsolete'.⁴¹ Ehrensperger's approach involved analysing and re-evaluating many of the same metaphors and motifs examined by her predecessors, such as Paul's grace language, apostleship terminology, parental metaphors, and imitation motif. But though her exegesis is socio-historically grounded and her thesis about the empowering role of the apostolate deserves serious consideration, the assumption that the apostles sought eventually to eliminate the ecclesial hierarchy seems unwarranted. At what point was apostolic authority rendered obsolete, and was this goal actually achievable, or simply hypothetical? Ehrensperger simply goes beyond the evidence when she utilises her framework to expose this ecclesiological goal.

³⁸ Ernest Best, 'Paul's Apostolic Authority-?', *JSNT* 27 (1986): 3-25, at 8-12, 22.

³⁹ Best, 'Authority': 12-18.

⁴⁰ Kathy Ehrensperger, *Paul and the Dynamics of Power: Communication and Interaction in the Early Christ-Movement* (LNTS 325; London: T&T Clark, 2007), 179.

⁴¹ Ehrensperger, *Power*, 136 (original emphasis).

3. Authority Contested

As well as understanding the social context of power, one of the most significant complications with analysing Paul's power and authority in Corinth was that there were within *and* without the community various contestants for power and various understandings of it. Reconstructing the competing power relations operative in the church therefore is an essential hermeneutical step in the interpretive process. Although there is certainly no consensus in modern scholarship about the precise social circumstances facing the community at the time 1 Corinthians was written, what is known (or hitherto found to be historically plausible) must be taken into serious consideration, especially when assessing Paul's power claims and assertions. As Dunn explains, 'Difficult though it is, the reconstruction of social context is necessary for any full understanding of the letter'; indeed, 'as different reconstructions are proffered, or as different facets of the complex historical context of 1 Corinthians are illuminated, so different emphases and facets of the letter itself will be thrown into prominence (and others into shadow)'.⁴²

Dunn's warning is particularly applicable in our case. Few would object, for instance, that one of the major ethical failings of the Corinthian community was its preoccupation with personal power as expressed through honour, boasting, and patronage, and perhaps most apparent in its political, legal, and dietary disputes.⁴³ Thus, L. L. Welborn has rightly and memorably remarked, 'It is a power struggle, not a theological controversy, which motivates the writing of 1 Corinthians 1-4'.⁴⁴ Intensifying these local feuds still further was the disproportionate power and patronage ascribed to individual leaders, including not only apostolic figures such as Paul, Apollos, and Cephas, but perhaps also local dissenters, such as the Corinthian prophetesses and popular orators.⁴⁵ Finally, it is important also to recall the role occupied by God/Christ in Paul's apostolic ministry, particularly as the one who exercised power over him and promised to judge his ministry upon its

⁴² James D. G. Dunn, 'Reconstructions of Corinthian Christianity and the Interpretation of 1 Corinthians', in *Christianity at Corinth* (2004), 295-310, at 296, 309.

⁴³ See, e.g., John K. Chow, *Patronage and Power: A Study of Social Networks in Corinth* (JSNTSup 75; Sheffield: Sheffield Academic Press, 1992), 113-66; Clarke, *Secular*, 59-107.

⁴⁴ L. L. Welborn, 'On the Discord in Corinth: 1 Corinthians 1-4 and Ancient Politics', *JBL* 106 (1987): 85-111, at 89.

⁴⁵ Antoinette Clark Wire, *The Corinthian Women Prophets: A Reconstruction through Paul's Rhetoric* (Minneapolis: Fortress, 1990); Bruce W. Winter, *Philo and Paul among the Sophists: Alexandrian and Corinthian Responses to a Julio-Claudian Movement* (2nd ed.; Grand Rapids: Eerdmans, 2002).

completion. These kinds of power relations must be factored into any discussion of Paul's portrayal and assertion of apostolic authority, as they are foundational to the reconstruction of the occasion of the letter and indispensable for identifying its rhetorical, perhaps even apologetic, objectives.

4. Summary

As this survey has shown, Pauline interpreters have employed a variety of methods and approaches in an effort to elucidate Paul's apostolic authority. But generally speaking, those who investigate the concept restrict their analyses either (ideologically) to the *construction* of Paul's authority or (sociologically) to his *assertion* of authority. For Paul, however, theology is inseparable from practice and thus it is important that both aspects be examined together when possible. It was also shown that many studies neglect certain fundamental hermeneutical factors which should be accounted for when addressing apostolic power and authority. Scholars utilising modern theories of analysis are especially prone to identify power claims without adequately demonstrating that such forms and expressions of power are substantiated by historical data. Beyond this, many of these same studies ignore that there were in Corinth various contestants for power whose own power assertions disrupted the community and thus set the tone for Paul's subsequent response. Because Paul's power relations are so complex, it is important that his exercise of authority not be, as Andrew Clarke warns, 'treated in simplified terms, essentially dealing exclusively with Paul's mechanisms of asserting power'.⁴⁶ Rather, as Clarke recommends, 'Paul's power rhetoric and his power dealings need to be explored within their wider context, including the ways in which Paul defined the limits of his power, the ways in which he undermined the power that was inherent in his own position, [and] how he responded to the power plays of others'.⁴⁷ What is needed, therefore, is an investigation that considers both Paul's construction *and* assertion of authority and that is sensitive to the letter's socio-historical and rhetorical contexts.

⁴⁶ Andrew D. Clarke, *A Pauline Theology of Church Leadership* (LNTS 362; London: T&T Clark, 2008), 106; cf. 108-109.

⁴⁷ Clarke, *Theology*, 106.

B. Paul, the *Oikonomos* of God: A Neglected Metaphor

One apostolic image that too often goes overlooked, yet can be utilised to address the concerns raised by Clarke, is Paul's portrayal of apostleship as an administration (οἰκονομία).⁴⁸ Paul's *oikonomos* metaphor appears in two important passages in 1 Corinthians (4.1-5; 9.16-23) and in each pericope he reveals that his apostleship was being criticised by his own converts. Paul, therefore, employs the metaphor in both texts to correct fundamental misunderstandings about his apostolic role, rights, and responsibilities. The strategic placement of this metaphor, in fact, indicates that Paul thought it accurately communicated his chief apostolic attributes; indeed, the initial directive in 1 Cor 4.1 (οὕτως ἡμᾶς λογιζέσθω ἄνθρωπος) shows that Paul probably considered this metaphor to be a better illustration of the apostolate for his current readership than the other images he deployed in 1 Corinthians 3-4. Further, Paul's reinstatement of the same metaphor in 9.17 is suggestive of his continued confidence in the image's ability to convey his role to this particular church. But beyond this, Paul's metaphor affords a promising way into analysing Paul's construction *and* assertion of authority in 1 Corinthians. Both 1 Cor 4.1-5 and 9.16-23 provide the reader with a portrait of apostleship and the authority inherent in that position in addition to showing how the apostle asserted (or even refused to assert) his authority in an effort to resolve specific problems in the church. Paul's use of this metaphor, therefore, provides a multi-faceted portrait of apostleship and emphasises aspects of his authority which many previous scholarly investigations have overlooked.

Unfortunately, there remains much confusion and debate in Pauline studies about the *oikonomos* metaphor and the way that Paul used it to portray his apostleship. This confusion is, on the surface, due to the fact that there have been an insufficient number of studies completed on the metaphor by biblical scholars;

⁴⁸ The terms οἰκονόμος and οἰκονομία are used metaphorically with reference to apostleship in four passages in the Pauline epistles. Although Paul uses οἰκονόμος in Rom 16.23 for the civic magistracy held by Erastus and in Gal 4.2 as a metaphor for the pre-Christian function of the Mosaic Law, the only undisputed Pauline letter where the metaphor is used in relation to apostleship is 1 Corinthians, where it appears in 4.1-2 (οἰκονόμος [2x]) and 9.17 (οἰκονομία). In the disputed letters, the abstract noun οἰκονομία appears metaphorically for Paul's apostolic commission twice, in Col 1.25 and Eph 3.2; οἰκονόμος is also used in Titus 1.7 as a metaphor for the role of an ἐπίσκοπος and οἰκονομία surfaces in Eph 1.10, 3.9, and 1 Tim 1.4 for the divine plan/administration of God. The metaphor is also implied in the NT *Haustafeln*; cf. J. Albert Harrill, 'Subordinate to Another: Elite Slaves in the Agricultural Handbooks and the Household Codes', in *Slaves in the New Testament: Literary, Social, and Moral Dimensions* (Minneapolis: Fortress, 2006), 85-117.

there exists, for instance, no book-length treatment to date exclusively devoted to explaining this analogy, whether in 1 Corinthians or anywhere else in Paul. But this oversight by biblical scholars is perhaps only indicative of the fact that there is a general unfamiliarity with the concept among ancient historians; indeed, there remains a conspicuous lacuna even in ancient historical scholarship due to the lack of a definitive treatment of the term οἰκονόμος by classicists. Although some studies have been conducted on the use of the Greek terms οἰκονόμος, οἰκονομία, and related terminology, they are few, quite dated, generally lack accessibility as unpublished doctoral theses, and have limited aims so that they do not bring much light to bear directly on Paul's metaphor.⁴⁹ As will be demonstrated in this study, in fact, Paul's *oikonomos* metaphor assumes knowledge about the socio-legal and economic world of the first-century Roman empire that is not immediately obvious in 1 Corinthians and which previous studies of Paul's metaphor have not adequately addressed heretofore.

What is more, certain recent treatments of Paul's metaphor have failed to notice how the title *oikonomos* was used in antiquity and have as a consequence advanced interpretations built on almost no evidence, or have misused source materials to construct arguments which their evidence does not adequately support. It is important at the outset, therefore, to raise the following questions: What were the main contexts in which *oikonomoi* appeared in antiquity? What were the major social, legal, and structural differences between *oikonomoi* in each of those contexts? What kind of *oikonomos* did Paul portray himself to be? What were the attributes of *oikonomoi* that Paul was applying to his apostolic role through the metaphor? Addressing these socio-historical and exegetical issues will comprise the bulk of the following study, since the answers to these questions will determine how the relevant Pauline texts are to be interpreted and how Paul's apostleship and apostolic authority should therefore be comprehended.

⁴⁹ Peter Landvogt, 'Epigraphische Untersuchungen über den Οἰκονόμος: Ein Beitrag zum hellenistischen Beamtenwesen' (PhD Diss., Univ. of Strassburg, 1908); John Reumann, 'The Use of "Oikonomia" and Related Terms in Greek Sources to about A.D. 100, as a Background for Patristic Applications' (PhD Diss., Univ. of Pennsylvania, 1957). Cf. Karin Lehmeier, *Oikos und Oikonomia: Antike Konzepte der Haushaltsführung und der Bau der Gemeinde bei Paulus* (Marburger theologische Studien 92; Marburg: Elwert, 2006).

C. Survey of Interpretations of Paul's *Oikonomos* Metaphor

Paul's portrayal of himself as an *oikonomos* in 1 Cor 4.1-2 and 9.17 has long been recognised as a metaphor whose source domain⁵⁰ is found somewhere in the administrative landscape of the first-century world. But while the *oikonomos* metaphor has significant implications for Paul's theology of Christian apostleship, the precise social context and connotations of the analogy remain disputed in Pauline scholarship. Some interpreters, for instance, have proposed that Paul adopted the title from the administration of religious cults (John Reumann), while others have suggested that it was taken from estate management (Dale Martin). Again some suggest that Paul borrowed the metaphor from Jewish apocalyptic (Benjamin Gladd), others propose Graeco-Roman philosophy (Abraham Malherbe), and still others are reluctant to identify a specific area of derivation, since *oikonomoi* were ubiquitous in Paul's world.⁵¹ But failing to identify the metaphor's source domain accurately will bring, and indeed has already brought, confusion onto Paul's apostolic self-portrayal. Not only do the various opinions about the metaphor attribute competing legal statuses to Paul's apostolic profile, which affects, for instance, the social perception of apostleship as well as how one regards the volitional aspect of his preaching in 1 Corinthians 9, but the failure to distinguish between source domains can easily lead to the indiscriminate use of source materials. It is therefore critical that Paul's metaphor be situated in the right context in order to ensure that it is interpreted accurately.

A number of alternative source domains for the *oikonomos* metaphor have been proposed by Pauline interpreters. Some interpreters, for instance, following the *religionsgeschichtliche Schule*, have attempted to locate the origin of Paul's *oikonomos* metaphor in the religious matrix of the Graeco-Roman world. In the middle of the last century, John Reumann pursued the expression οἰκονόμος

⁵⁰ Zoltán Kövecses, *Metaphor: A Practical Introduction* (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2002), 4: 'The conceptual domain from which we draw metaphorical expressions to understand another conceptual domain is called source domain, while the conceptual domain that is understood this way is the target domain. . . . The target domain is the domain that we try to understand through the use of the source domain'.

⁵¹ See, e.g., Wilfred Tooley, 'Stewards of God: An Examination of the Terms οἰκονόμος and οἰκονομία in the New Testament', *SJT* 19 (1966): 74-86, at 75-76, who considers 1 Cor 4.1-2 to be 'the most pregnant use of the metaphor in the NT', yet fails to suggest a possible source domain despite having already distinguished between the private and civic contexts. See also the indecision of Conzelmann, *1 Corinthians*, 83; Richard A. Horsley, *1 Corinthians* (ANTC; Nashville: Abingdon, 1998), 67, 129-30; Collins, *First Corinthians*, 168-69; Joseph A. Fitzmyer, *First Corinthians: A New Translation with Introduction and Commentary* (AYB; New Haven: Yale University Press, 2008), 212.

μυστηρίων θεοῦ (1 Cor 4.1) by examining a number of Greek inscriptions that depict variously ranked *oikonomoi* in a range of religious capacities. Reumann then proposed that Paul may have adopted the title ‘stewards of the mysteries of God’ from the religious world of his day, especially the mystery cults. Reumann remarked,

[R]ather than any . . . theological explanation, it is the background in Greco-Roman life and use of the term with already existing religious connotations which provide the immediate and most obvious insight into Paul's designation of himself and others as “stewards of God” and his mysteries; as in other instances, he is borrowing terminology current in the religious world of his day.⁵²

But despite Reumann’s impressive sample of texts featuring *oikonomoi* performing religious rites and responsibilities, the mystery cult hypothesis influenced very few interpreters. Not only does the reading fail to account for the monetary use of the metaphor apparent in 1 Cor 9.17 where Paul’s apostolic wage (μισθός) is the issue in dispute, but nearly a decade later Reumann himself abandoned his own proposal in favour of a more ambiguous reading.⁵³ Moreover, in this later work Reumann intimated that the phrase ‘stewards of the mysteries of God’ may have in fact been a Semitism borrowed from Second Temple Judaism, a theory that continues to carry some currency in modern scholarship.

The Semitic hypothesis has, for instance, been advocated by Benjamin Gladd in his recent monograph on Paul’s use of μυστήριον in 1 Corinthians. Although Gladd concedes that ‘Paul may have invented this stewardship metaphor without

⁵² John Reumann, ‘“Stewards of God”: Pre-Christian Religious Application of *Oikonomos* in Greek’, *JBL* 77 (1958): 339-49, at 349. Cf. Hans Windisch, *Paulus und Christus: Ein biblisch-religionsgeschichtlicher Vergleich* (Untersuchungen zum Neuen Testament 24; Leipzig: 1934), 221. Much of Reumann’s work in Paul was directed against Oscar Cullmann’s decontextualised rendering of *oikonomia* as *Heilsgeschichte*. Cullmann’s application of the word was largely influenced by the term’s later-Pauline occurrences (Eph 1.10; 3.2, 9; Col 1.25); cf. Oscar Cullmann, *Christ and Time: The Primitive Christian Conception of Time and History* (trans. Floyd V. Filson; London: SCM, 1951), 33. Cullmann, *Christ and Time*, 223, then imported this later cosmic sense into Paul’s self-designation as an ‘*oikonomos* of God’s mysteries’ (1 Cor 4.1) to the effect that Paul’s metaphor indicated that the apostle was not just entrusted ‘an administration of the divine teaching about salvation but also of the active realization of the redemptive history’. In support of Cullmann’s reading is the fact that a number of patristic authors subsequently utilised *oikonomia* to refer to God’s cosmic plan of redemption; cf. Gerhard Richter, *Oikonomia: Der Gebrauch des Wortes Oikonomia im Neuen Testament, bei den Kirchenvätern und in der theologischen Literatur bis ins 20. Jahrhundert* (Arbeiten zur Kirchengeschichte 90; Berlin: Walter de Gruyter, 2005). Nevertheless, John Reumann, ‘OIKONOMIA-Terms in Paul in Comparison with Lucan *Heilsgeschichte*’, *NTS* 13 (1966-67): 147-67, convincingly showed that the earlier Pauline uses of *oikonomia*-terminology do not refer to God’s redemptive plan.

⁵³ Reumann, ‘OIKONOMIA-Terms’: 161. Still, John Reumann, *Stewardship & the Economy of God* (Library of Christian Stewardship; Grand Rapids: Eerdmans, 1992), 14, maintains that the mystery cult interpretation would have resonated with many in Paul’s world. But as Wolfgang Schrage, *Der erste Brief an die Korinther* (EKK 7; Zurich: Benziger, 1991), 1:321, maintains, ‘Obwohl ihnen nach Paulus μυστήρια θεοῦ anvertraut sind, ist zu bezweifeln, daß der Sprachgebrauch der Mysterienkulte von Einfluß war. Die Apostel sind keine Mystagogen’.

any reference to the OT, Second Temple Judaism, or Mystery Religions', Gladd observes certain resonances between 1 Cor 4.1-5 and the Greek text of Daniel which eventually leads him to suppose that Paul's *oikonomos* metaphor was a familiar *topos* in Jewish apocalyptic.⁵⁴ But Gladd's proposal fails to convince, since, as he himself admits, the Greek phrase is found nowhere in Jewish literature or anywhere else in Graeco-Roman antiquity.⁵⁵ Raymond Brown and Markus Bockmuehl, on the other hand, suggest that a Hebrew parallel may in fact exist from Qumran, both briefly noting the similarities between Paul's designation of apostles as οἰκονόμοι μυστηρίων (1 Cor 4.1) and the phrase לְרֹדֵיכֶם מְשַׁמְרֵת לְרֹדֵיכֶם [א] ('the men who guard your mysteries' [1Q36 16.2]).⁵⁶ The resemblance is certainly striking, but we should not minimise the differences between the actions and responsibilities implied in the Greek noun οἰκονόμος and the Hebrew verb שָׁמַר, especially because the former was directed to Gentile urbanites and the latter to sectarian Jews. While there may be some functional overlap implied between the two terms, they are not strictly equivalent, οἰκονόμος implying the administration and often accumulation of resources and שָׁמַר indicating protection and safekeeping more generally. Furthermore, the fragmentary nature of 1Q36 leaves us with virtually nothing by which to identify who the guardians were and how they were supposed to protect their mysteries, rendering the text basically useless to interpreters of Paul's metaphor.⁵⁷ Beyond this, a Jewish apocalyptic context, just as the mystery religions hypothesis, fails to offer an explanation for Paul's clear monetary use of the metaphor in 1 Cor 9.17.

⁵⁴ Benjamin L. Gladd, *Revealing the Mystery: The Use of Mystery in Daniel and Second Temple Judaism with Its Bearings on First Corinthians* (BZNTW 160; Berlin: Walter de Gruyter, 2008), 172. Gladd, who regards Daniel as a 'steward of mysteries', argues that the shared use of εὐρίσκω and πιστός in 1 Cor 4.2 and Dan 6.4 [Theo] substantiates the claim that Paul was alluding to the Danielic episode. But in the latter text, εὐρίσκω has no syntactical relationship with πιστός; God is not even the subject of the verb, as he is implied to be in 1 Cor 4.2.

⁵⁵ Gladd, *Mysterion*, 171; cf. Markus N. A. Bockmuehl, *Revelation and Mystery in Ancient Judaism and Pauline Christianity* (WUNT 2/36; Tübingen: J.C.B. Mohr [Paul Siebeck], 1990), 166 n. 42. The infrequent and insignificant use of οἰκονομία-terminology in the LXX (οἰκονομέω [3x]; οἰκονόμος [15x]; οἰκονομία [2x]) has been noted by Reumann, 'OIKONOMIA-Terms': 151.

⁵⁶ Raymond E. Brown, 'The Semitic Background of the New Testament *Mysterion*', *Biblica* 39 (1958): 426-48, at 441; Raymond E. Brown, *The Semitic Background of the Term "Mystery" in the New Testament* (Facet Books/Biblical Series 21; Philadelphia: Fortress, 1968), 45; Bockmuehl, *Revelation*, 166.

⁵⁷ Such is perhaps the reason why neither Brown nor Bockmuehl suggest that 1Q36 in any way illumines the Pauline phrase, and why Gladd, *Mysterion*, 270, who is aware of the text, draws no comparisons between it and 1 Cor 4.1. Even A. E. Harvey, 'The Use of Mystery Language in the Bible', *JTS* 31 (1980): 320-36, at 331, who refers to the Qumran expression as an 'almost exact equivalent' to the Pauline metaphor, cannot exclude the possibility of other Pauline influences.

It has also become common in recent years to propose that Paul adopted his *oikonomos* metaphor from the Hellenistic moral philosophers. Abraham Malherbe, for instance, followed by John Byron and Lincoln Galloway, suggests that Paul's use of the analogy in 1 Cor 9.17 should be read in the light of the figurative use of *oikonomos* in Epictetus (*Diatr.* 3.22.3).⁵⁸ Epictetus' *oikonomos* metaphor has as its target domain the 'true Cynic', and likens the person who assumes the Cynic lifestyle without first being assigned to it by God to the person who appoints himself to be the *oikonomos* of a well-ordered house and begins insolently giving orders; he will of course be disciplined by his κύριος. But though there are fascinating similarities between Epictetus' construal of the true Cynic and Paul's portrayal of Christian apostleship (cf. *Diatr.* 3.22.23; 1 Cor 1.17), those who rely exclusively on Epictetus' metaphor to make sense of Paul's analogy face one major problem: Epictetus' portrayal of the true Cynic as an *oikonomos* is itself a metaphor! Epictetus, just as Paul, drew from a particular source domain, namely estate management, and then applied very specific attributes of the manager to the Cynic, several of which are different than what Paul himself underscores. Conspicuously absent from Epictetus' metaphor, for instance, is the subject of money. Yet remuneration is plainly a central concern in Paul's metaphor in 1 Cor 9.17. Therefore, unless it can be demonstrated that Paul and Epictetus used their metaphors identically, which they clearly did not, then it is imperative that the interpreter trace Paul's *oikonomos* metaphor back to its original, *literal* source domain prior to applying attributes to the apostle.

The most common approach to Paul's *oikonomos* metaphor has been to interpret it against the backdrop of literal, managerial slavery. Dale Martin's treatment of the metaphor has been particularly influential in this respect. Martin, who limits his focus to 1 Corinthians 9, argues that the expression οἰκονομίαν πεπίστευμαι (9.17) implied that Paul identified himself as Christ's enslaved,

⁵⁸ Abraham J. Malherbe, 'Determinism and Free Will in Paul: The Argument of 1 Corinthians 8 and 9', in *Paul in His Hellenistic Context*, ed. Troels Engberg-Pedersen (SNTW; Edinburgh: T&T Clark, 1994), 231-55, at 249-51; John Byron, *Slavery Metaphors in Early Judaism and Pauline Christianity: A Traditio-Historical and Exegetical Examination* (WUNT 2/162; Tübingen: Mohr Siebeck, 2003), 249-53; Lincoln E. Galloway, *Freedom in the Gospel: Paul's Exemplum in 1 Cor 9 in Conversation with the Discourses of Epictetus and Philo* (CBET 38; Leuven: Peeters, 2004), 184-86.

representative leader.⁵⁹ Although most biblical scholars regard ancient slavery only as a brutal and oppressive institution, Martin sought to demonstrate that slavery functioned for some in the Roman world as an opportunity for social advancement. Slaves legally had no family, possessed no money, and were normally restricted to a low social status. Martin, however, through an extensive use of literary and non-literary evidence, argued that some slaves circumvented these restrictions, acquiring spouses, children, allowances (*peculia*), and even relatively prominent social standing, experiencing significant social mobility through association with a high-power owner. Martin, therefore, contended that Paul's metaphorical depiction of himself as the οἰκονόμος of the divine κύριος would have elicited a positive impression from persons of a low social condition. While free persons within the church would have responded negatively to Paul's menial self-representation, slaves and others from humble origins would have regarded the metaphor as a designation of power and authority.⁶⁰

But even as many interpreters agree that the phrase οἰκονομίαν πεπίστευμαι (9.17) indicates a claim to slavery and leadership, others contend that the title is legally ambiguous and cannot support the social implications advanced by Martin. Murray Harris, for example, states that Paul's designation in 1 Cor 9.17 'scarcely validates the inference that Paul views himself as a high-status managerial slave (*oikonomos*) in Christ's household, especially since Paul has already used that actual term *oikonomos* twice in the same letter in reference to stewards who are commissioned to expound "the mysteries of God" (1 Cor. 4:1-2), "managers" authorized to divulge God's hidden truths (= the gospel), a role that in fact makes Paul "the scum of the earth" (1 Cor. 4:13)'.⁶¹ Harris also challenges the assumption that either Paul or the Corinthians would have associated managerial slavery with

⁵⁹ Dale B. Martin, *Slavery as Salvation: The Metaphor of Slavery in Pauline Christianity* (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1990); cf. Ritva H. Williams, *Stewards, Prophets, Keepers of the Word: Leadership in the Early Church* (Peabody, MA: Hendrickson, 2006), 76-83; Lehmeier, *Oikonomia*, 219-65.

⁶⁰ Martin, *Slavery*, 84: 'It is important to see . . . that up through [1 Cor] 9:18, according to one form of discourse, at least, Paul has made no move toward humility or self-lowering, even though he has defined himself as a slave of Christ. He has, however, redefined the categories for leadership and authority. Instead of thinking about leaders in the normal ways—as patrons, wealthy, kings, those who are free and do as they will—Paul moves the debate into the common discourses of early Christianity, which talks of its leaders as slaves of Christ. Again, this is not to make Christian leaders less powerful or authoritative but to insist that the discussion be carried on in the context of Christian discourse rather than in that of the upper class or of moral philosophers. Far from giving up his authority, Paul seeks in 9:1-18 to establish it beyond question'.

⁶¹ Murray J. Harris, *Slave of Christ: A New Testament Metaphor for Total Devotion to Christ* (NSBT 8; Downers Grove; Leicester: IVP; Apollos, 1999), 129.

the positive social implications advanced by Martin. According to Harris, managerial slaves ‘formed such a small minority that we may question whether that particular connotation of slavery would have ousted the dominant notion of slavery as humble subjection to a master in the minds of Paul’s converts’.⁶² Moreover, ‘Any suggestion of Paul’s personal concern about “status” . . . seems foreign to an evangelist-pastor who earlier in 1 Corinthians has depicted himself and the other apostles as doomed gladiators entering the arena of human scorn at the end of the procession (1 Cor. 4:9-10), and who aligned himself with menial slavery by pursuing the servile, manual trade of tent-making (Acts 18:3)’.⁶³

John Byron has also challenged Martin’s treatment of the *oikonomos* metaphor. Byron conducted his study firstly by critically assessing Martin’s historical analysis of *oikonomoi*, especially in the inscriptions, and eventually assembled a case for the legal ambiguity of the title.⁶⁴ Unlike Martin, Byron took into consideration Paul’s metaphor in 1 Cor 4.1-2, where Paul used ὑπηρέτης together with οἰκονόμος. But while Byron supposed that the title οἰκονόμος is legally ambiguous, he argued that ὑπηρέτης plainly indicates free status. This, along with an untraditional reading of 1 Cor 9.17, led Byron to conclude that Paul’s *oikonomos* metaphor implies that Paul was a free-will servant.

But Byron’s analysis is not without its own problems. In his reassessment of the legal status of *oikonomoi*, Byron failed to distinguish between the very different kinds of administrators in antiquity that bore this one title, comparing municipal *oikonomoi* of the likes of Erastus from Rom 16.23 with private *oikonomoi* of the likes of the Unjust Steward from Luke 16.1-8.⁶⁵ Such is an obvious case of verbal *parallelomania* (‘excerpt versus context’),⁶⁶ for Byron conflates the evidence, assuming that different kinds of *oikonomoi* in antiquity can at once serve as appropriate parallels for Paul’s use of the term in 1 Corinthians. Nevertheless, Byron (perhaps inadvertently) has brought into question Martin’s assumption that

⁶² Harris, *Slave*, 129-30.

⁶³ Harris, *Slave*, 130.

⁶⁴ Byron, *Slavery*, 241-53; also published as John Byron, ‘Slave of Christ or Willing Servant? Paul’s Self-Description in 1 Corinthians 4:1-2 and 9:16-18’, *Neotestamentica* 37 (2003): 179-98.

⁶⁵ Byron, *Slavery*, 243-44.

⁶⁶ Samuel Sandmel, ‘Parallelomania’, *JBL* 81 (1962): 1-13, at 7: ‘It would seem to me to follow that, in dealing with similarities we can sometimes discover exact parallels, some with and some devoid of significance; seeming parallels which are so only imperfectly; and statements which can be called parallels *only by taking them out of context*. I must go on to allege that I encounter from time to time scholarly writings which go astray in this last regard. It is the question of *excerpt versus context*’ (emphasis added).

managerial slavery serves as the most plausible source domain of Paul's metaphor.⁶⁷ It is therefore imperative that we revisit the ancient evidence to identify from which source domain Paul was borrowing and what apostolic attributes the metaphor implies.

D. Research Aims and Methods

Given the confusion that continues to shroud the interpretation of Paul's *oikonomos* metaphor, it is appropriate for us to revisit the issue in this study in order to provide clarity on those socio-historical, exegetical, and theological matters in dispute. The aims of the following project, then, are threefold. Firstly (socio-historically), in Chapters 2-4 the main three administrative contexts in which the title *oikonomos* was used (regal, municipal, private) will be independently examined in order to illumine the varying social, structural, legal, and disciplinary characteristics associated with each context. The analyses of these contexts will enable us to develop a general profile of the *oikonomoi* who served in them so that in Chapter 5 those profiles can be compared to Paul's own apostolic portrait constructed in 1 Cor 4.1-5 and 9.16-23. By comparing those profiles with the characteristics of Paul's metaphor, a plausible source domain for the analogy will become apparent. Secondly (exegetically), after having identified the metaphor's source domain, in Chapters 6-7 those two passages where Paul applies the metaphor (4.1-5; 9.16-23) will be analysed in order to determine how an accurate understanding of the analogy influences the interpretation of those important Pauline texts. Thirdly (theologically), in Chapter 8 (the conclusion), and on the basis of our understanding of how Paul utilised the *oikonomos* metaphor in 1 Corinthians, the implications of this self-portrayal will be articulated and their significance for Paul's apostolic authority accounted for.

1. Distinguishing Words and Concepts

One of the key methodological contributions of this study will be the differentiation it makes between words and concepts in a way that certain previous studies have neglected. The first way this differentiation will be observed is by

⁶⁷ Byron, for instance, has significantly influenced Galloway, *Freedom*, 184 n. 148.

distinguishing between the various persons (concepts) designated as *oikonomoi*. By giving careful attention to these diverse source domains, this study seeks to use the relevant source materials responsibly, so as to avoid any parallelomanic pitfalls.

The second way that the word-concept distinction will be observed is by analysing each of those diverse roles (concepts), not only through the designation *oikonomos*, but when possible also through a variety of Greek synonyms and Latin correlatives. Along these lines L. Michael White and John Fitzgerald have emphasised the importance of examining ‘semantic fields’, rather than ‘individual key words’, when drawing parallels, warning that ‘the data used in making comparisons must not be restricted to instances of verbal identity or similarity’, since ‘[s]ome of the most striking parallels between Christian and non-Christian texts are primarily conceptual and involve little or no verbal agreement between the two’. ‘In future studies’, they therefore advise, ‘it will be crucial to investigate such terms, not simply in isolation from one another but as part of the conceptual “linkage group” to which they belong and with increased attention to the social worlds in which they are used. Similarly, attention will need to be given to combinations of Greek words as well as to equivalent terms and similar expressions in Latin and other languages’.⁶⁸

Awareness of both of these kinds of word-concept distinctions will be of central importance in this investigation, since each has been overlooked in previous studies. If, for example, Byron had focused on the same concept, or role, that Martin had expressly targeted, that is, *private* estate managers, Byron would have eliminated from his investigation those free *oikonomoi* who served in *municipal* roles and then probably reached different conclusions. Alternatively, had Byron opened up his study to Greek and Latin correlatives for private estate managers (e.g. *ἐπίτροπος, πραγματευτής, vilicus, actor, dispensator*), he would have also realised that the slave status of private *oikonomoi* during the Roman period was far more uniform than he supposed, since the legal status of estate managers is generally clearer in the evidence bearing those other terms.

⁶⁸ L. M. White and J. T. Fitzgerald, ‘Quod est comparandum: The Problem of Parallels’, in *Early Christianity and Classical Culture: Comparative Studies in Honor of Abraham J. Malherbe*, ed. J. T. Fitzgerald, T. H. Olbricht, and M. L. White (NovTSup 110; Leiden: Brill, 2003), 13-39, at 31.

2. Utilising Ancient Sources

There has been a growing concern among NT scholars over the past several decades regarding the kinds of extra-biblical materials which should be employed to establish an interpretive context for early Christianity. Those working especially in the Pauline epistles have been challenged to be discriminate about their use of ancient sources due to the limited light certain kinds of evidence can bring to bear on the sociocultural environment of Paul's churches, not least the Corinthian community. According to Justin Meggitt, for instance, there exists 'a fundamental problem that hampers all interpretations of the Corinthian epistles to a significant extent: *the problem of dependence on elite sources* (written and nonwritten)'.⁶⁹ Meggitt remarks, 'Although most scholars use a variety of sources in their analysis of the letters, and believe that their employment of them is increasingly sensitive and sophisticated, failure to recognise the *atypical* and *unrepresentative* nature of much of the material that is employed to reconstruct the context within which the letters are interpreted renders much of what is written about them of little value'.⁷⁰ Therefore, NT scholars, Meggitt maintains, must reconsider their 'evidential presuppositions' and 'undergo a significant change in perspective'.⁷¹ Meggitt makes his recommendation clearer still: 'If New Testament scholars wish to make sense of the preoccupations and expectations of both Paul and the Corinthian community, we must seek out . . . those sources, both literary and nonliterary, that give voice to the world of the nonelite, that articulate what could be termed the *popular culture* of the first century'.⁷² What precisely Meggitt means by 'popular culture' is less than clear. Nevertheless, his warning is applicable for many working in Pauline studies and 1 Corinthians in particular. One cannot simply assume that most or even many of the numerous extant literary works from antiquity characterise the thoughts and attitudes, practices and beliefs of the early believers just because they are contemporary, correspond geographically, and relate thematically with Paul's letters. As Meggitt states, 'If we wish to find more representative sources with which to construct our understanding of the context within which the Corinthian correspondence was written and read, and to interpret such sources appropriately,

⁶⁹ Justin J. Meggitt, 'Sources: Use, Abuse, Neglect. The Importance of Ancient Popular Culture', in *Christianity at Corinth* (2004), 241-53, at 242 (original emphasis).

⁷⁰ Meggitt, 'Sources', 242 (original emphasis).

⁷¹ Meggitt, 'Sources', 242

⁷² Meggitt, 'Sources', 241-42

it is necessary to look beyond New Testament scholarship' and 'to benefit from those who have made the study of "popular culture" their central preoccupation'.⁷³

Accordingly, much of the evidence to be assembled in this study will rely on the work of classicists as well as social, economic, and legal historians, that is, the specialists in the periods, regions, and subjects central to this investigation. Moreover, the reconstructions will necessarily rely on an eclectic collection of evidence, including ancient literature, inscriptions, and papyri. Admittedly, when describing ancient forms of servile administration, every type of evidence has limitations. As J. Albert Harrill laments, 'In the end, we find that none of our sources fulfills our expectations; together, they allow a reconstruction of slavery that few historians specializing in modern periods would find satisfactory'.⁷⁴ But Harrill concedes that a diligent pursuit of reliable sources can result in a faithful reconstruction of ancient slavery. This requires that the highly informative *theoretical* sources (e.g. agricultural handbooks, novels, dreambooks, biblical literature, legal texts, etc.) be supplemented with *actual* portrayals of real-life slaves (e.g. inscriptions, papyri, etc.).⁷⁵ Harrill, in fact, provides as an example how the profile of Petronius' fictional and seemingly exaggerated ex-steward Trimalchio (*Satyr.* 26-78), an archetypal *nouveau riche*, is in certain ways validated by Seneca's real-life counterpart Calvisius Sabinus (*Ep.* 27). 'With care', Harrill thus concludes, 'imaginative literature can yield important historical insights'.⁷⁶

Harrill's sentiment is shared by Fergus Millar, whose analysis of Apuleius' second-century CE novel the *Metamorphoses* reveals the historical and contextual insights that can be obtained from certain kinds of ancient fiction. '[T]he invented world of fiction', Millar affirms, 'may yet represent—perhaps cannot help representing—important features of the real world'.⁷⁷ Similar kinds of general historical insights can also be ascertained from certain gospel parables. 'At its simplest', explained C. H. Dodd, 'the parable is a metaphor or simile *drawn from*

⁷³ Meggitt, 'Sources', 243

⁷⁴ J. Albert Harrill, *The Manumission of Slaves in Early Christianity* (HUT 32; Tübingen: J.C.B. Mohr [Paul Siebeck], 1995), 29; cf. William Fitzgerald, *Slavery and the Roman Literary Imagination* (Roman Literature and its Contexts; Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2000), 8.

⁷⁵ Harrill, *Manumission*, 28-29.

⁷⁶ Harrill, *Manumission*, 29; cf. Kathleen McCarthy, *Slaves, Masters, and the Art of Authority in Plautine Comedy* (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 2000), 8.

⁷⁷ Fergus Millar, 'The World of the Golden Ass', *JRS* 71 (1981): 63-75, at 75.

nature or common life'.⁷⁸ More suitable definitions of the parable genre have been offered in recent years,⁷⁹ but Dodd nonetheless discerns how several of Jesus' parables reflect conceivable scenarios, and thus provide reasonably reliable data with which to produce sketches of the ancient world. Even Fabian Udoh, who remarks that the NT slave parables are, on the one hand, 'literary constructs that transmit the *slaveholders*' fantasies, fears, ideals, values, and agenda' and therefore 'do not completely "reflect" the practice of slavery in the Roman Empire', ultimately maintains that the parabolic slave, 'if he is to be comprehensible', must have 'an underlying social reality'.⁸⁰ Thus, in this investigation a host of sources will be utilised to reconstruct the relevant forms of ancient administration, not least ancient fiction and biblical parables for the private context. These theoretical and occasionally elitist sources will be especially useful in this investigation, since even Paul's metaphor considers, to a certain extent, the expectations of his administrative superior (ζητεῖται ἐν τοῖς οἰκονόμοις [1 Cor 4.2]). By relying on the testimonies of various kinds of texts, a range of voices will be heard and the portraits which are assembled will as a result be all the more reliable.

Cognisant of these methodological concerns, this study will proceed now to analyse the various contexts and characteristics of *oikonomoi* as Graeco-Roman administrators.

⁷⁸ C. H. Dodd, *The Parables of the Kingdom* (London: Nisbet & Co. Ltd, 1935), 16 (emphasis added).

⁷⁹ See, e.g., Klyne Snodgrass, *Stories with Intent: A Comprehensive Guide to the Parables of Jesus* (Grand Rapids: Eerdmans, 2008), 7-9.

⁸⁰ Fabian E. Udoh, 'The Tale of an Unrighteous Slave (Luke 16: 1-8 [13])', *JBL* 128 (2009): 311-35, at 328.

Part 1. *OIKONOMOI* AS ADMINISTRATORS IN ANTIQUITY

‘A good modern treatment of the office of the *oekonomus* is still a desideratum’.¹ Almost eighty years have passed since eminent ancient historian Michael Rostovtzeff expressed this lament, yet the scholarly lacuna remains. This is not to suggest that in modern scholarship no studies have appeared which treat *oikonomoi* in any detail; in the past half-century several works have been published which examine the individuals bearing the title in specifically defined geopolitical contexts. Virtually nothing, however, has appeared which attempts a comprehensive analysis of *oikonomoi* from the time of Alexander to the beginning of the Common Era and much confusion regarding the nature of these offices remains as a result. Indeed, many important questions have been inadequately treated and some have never been advanced in scholarly dialogue: What are the main contexts in which *oikonomoi* were employed? What are the constituent parts of the office in each context? What responsibilities were entrusted to them? Where were *oikonomoi* located in their respective administrative hierarchies? Were *oikonomoi* recognised as persons of authority, menial servitude, or somewhere in between? What other characteristics were normally attributed to them and what methods of accountability, or disciplinary measures including rewards and punishment, would they have faced from their superiors? Such questions require answers if biblical scholars, as well as ancient historians, desire a satisfactory understanding of the use of this title.

But the conspicuous absence of a full-scale analysis of *oikonomoi* comes as little surprise once one is introduced to the difficulty of such a task. The abundance of the documentary evidence together with the elasticity of the term and the evolution of its use from Classical Greece to the Hellenistic era through the early Roman empire and into the Byzantine period demonstrates that *oikonomoi* performed a variety of regal, civic, commercial, and even ecclesial services within a number of social contexts while belonging to several different social strata. The term, then, must be treated carefully by paying close attention to its uses in

¹ Michael I. Rostovtzeff, ‘§703’, in *The Tebtunis Papyri*, ed. J. Gilbert Smyly, Arthur S. Hunt, with assistance from B.P. Grenfell, E. Lobel and M. Rostovtzeff (London: Humphrey Milford, 1933), 66-102, at 67.

particular regions and time periods, so as not to confuse its meaning and connotations in one historical context with that in another. In the following three chapters we will survey the administrators who bore the title *oikonomos* in regal, civic, and private contexts—those in which *oikonomoi* have been most often attested during the periods just before and immediately following the birth of the church—in order to construct a general profile of those officials and their respective offices. Of central importance in our reconstruction of these positions are their structural hierarchy, administrative responsibilities, socio-legal status, and methods of accountability. By analysing their attributes it will become clear that, though these administrators share some fundamental similarities, their significant differences require that the offices be conceptually distinguished.

Chapter 2. *Oikonomoi* as Regal Administrators

Within just a few years following the death of Alexander the Great in 323 BCE, his vast empire was partitioned into territories which were then disproportionately issued to his military generals. Alexander's 'successors' (διάδοχοι), which included the likes of Ptolemy, Seleucis, Antigonus, Lysimachus, and others, established independent kingdoms in the regions which they formerly governed while under Alexander's regime. Although individually these civilisations paled in comparison to the size of Alexander's empire, each procured large territories and great wealth while developing the administrative infrastructure necessary to operate independently of one another. Indeed, while they were often preoccupied with lengthy military campaigns, in just a short span of time each of the kingdoms from the Hellenistic era (ca. 323-31 BCE) implemented its own political, military, and economic structure, 'a structure that was to survive almost unchanged until they were incorporated in the Roman Empire and even later'.¹

Some of the earliest non-literary evidence for *oikonomoi* in the Mediterranean basin attests to their functioning as financial administrators in these very kingdoms. Among the Hellenistic monarchies, the Ptolemies, Seleucids, Attalids, and Macedonians deposited the most illuminating evidence for the regal *oikonomos*. Between the literary, epigraphic, and papyrological data from this period, the papyri provide the fullest portrait of *oikonomoi*, although they derive strictly from Egypt and so are limited in relevance almost exclusively to Ptolemaic administration. The inscriptions, on the other hand, reveal less detail than do the papyri about the nature of the office, but on the whole they provide more reliable testimony than do the literary works and represent the office in a wider geographical spread than do the papyri, attesting to the title's use in the administrations of each of the main Hellenistic political powers.² All of these documents, whose dates range from the mid-fourth century BCE and extend to the end of the Hellenistic era, exhibit many of the same traits of *oikonomoi*, including (i)

¹ Michael I. Rostovtzeff, *The Social & Economic History of the Hellenistic World* (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1941), 189.

² F. W. Walbank, 'Sources for the Period', in *The Cambridge Ancient History: The Hellenistic World* (Vol. 7.1), ed. F. W. Walbank et al. (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1984), 1-22, at 11.

their elevated social and administrative rank as regional managers within their respective hierarchies, (ii) their many delegated responsibilities concerning the financial matters of a particular territory, and (iii) the promise of professional advancement or penalty depending on the outcome of their administration.

The Hellenistic administrations, although patterned after the scheme instituted by Alexander, each also to some degree resembled the political and economic models inherited from the governments which preceded Alexander. Most historians therefore agree, 'The regions brought under the control of the Hellenistic kingdoms showed little economic unity or uniformity'.³ Thus, even though the *oikonomoi* who served in each of these kingdoms share many of the same attributes, in our survey we will examine kingdoms individually, due to the structural dissimilarities that existed between them.

A. In the Ptolemaic Kingdom

The Ptolemaic kingdom has provided historians a wealth of data with which to reconstruct the office of the *oikonomos* as a regal administrator. Much of the evidence for the office has been preserved in papyri from Egypt. But mainland Egypt was not the only region controlled by the Ptolemies. For almost the entire period of Ptolemaic rule (ca. 305-30 BCE), the Ptolemies also inhabited and efficiently governed the more distant 'possessions' of Cyprus, Cyrene, Cyrenaica, Syria, Phoenicia, and Palestine. Furthermore, for some years of this period Lycia, Caria, parts of Ionia, the Black Sea region, certain Aegean islands, and even the Peloponnese formed the distant sub-sections of the kingdom.⁴ Due, then, to the abundance of the epigraphic and papyrological evidence left by the Ptolemies, as well as their possible influence upon the administrations of other Hellenistic states, we will begin our examination with the Ptolemaic kingdom.

1. Hierarchy

Among the most notable traits of the regal *oikonomos* was his middle-managerial rank in the kingdom's administrative hierarchy. Although he was given

³ John Kenyon Davies, 'Economy: Hellenistic', in *OCD* (2003), 504.

⁴ Cf. Roger S. Bagnall, *The Administration of the Ptolemaic Possessions Outside Egypt* (CSCT 4; Leiden: Brill, 1976).

charge of an administrative division, the *oikonomos* was by nature a delegate and in that respect subservient to a chain of organisational superiors. Precisely where in the administrative hierarchy of the Ptolemaic kingdom his post was located is of some debate and is especially dependent on the period in view.⁵ Nevertheless, a generally accepted structure of the kingdom will underscore the subordination of *oikonomoi* to the king and his immediate delegates. For the sake of the present study we will adopt the structure of the third-century BCE kingdom,⁶ from where most of the relevant primary evidence derives.⁷

The Ptolemaic state, from the vantage point of the king, was a household (οἶκος). Its administration began with the king himself as head of the household (κύριος), and all civil, financial, military, and legal matters ultimately reported to him.⁸ But with the arrival of new economic institutions imported from the Greek world (e.g. banking, tax farming, auctions of property), the Ptolemaic economy became in need of an infrastructure that would support itself.⁹ The king, therefore, delegated many of his responsibilities to royal officials, most notably the διοικητής, in order to administer the kingdom efficiently. As the chief financial officer, the διοικητής oversaw all of the kingdom's financial matters including its revenue and expenditures.¹⁰ He in turn appointed *oikonomoi* to manage the kingdom's regional divisions, the nomes (νομοί).

⁵ For a comparison between the third-century BCE chain of command with that from the second and first centuries BCE, see Reumann, 'Oikonomia', 253-54.

⁶ On the *terminus post quem* for the disappearance of the Ptolemaic *oikonomos* in the early first century BCE, see Maria Rosaria Falivene, 'Geography and Administration in Egypt (332 BCE–642 CE)', in *The Oxford Handbook of Papyrology*, ed. Roger S. Bagnall (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2009), 521-40, at 527; Thomas Kruse, *Der königliche Schreiber und die Gauverwaltung: Untersuchungen zur Verwaltungsgeschichte Ägyptens in der Zeit von Augustus bis Philippus Arabs (30 v. Chr.-245 n. Chr.)* (2 vols.; Archiv für Papyrusforschung und verwandte Gebiete, Beiheft 11; München: K.G. Saur, 2002), 890.

⁷ For the chronological gaps in the papyrological record, see E. G. Turner, 'Ptolemaic Egypt', in *The Cambridge Ancient History: The Hellenistic World (Vol. 7.1)*, ed. F. W. Walbank et al. (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1984), 118-74, at 118.

⁸ For the Ptolemaic administrative divisions, see Maria Rosaria Falivene, 'Government, Management, Literacy: Aspects of Ptolemaic Administration in the Early Hellenistic Period', *Ancient Society* 22 (1991): 203-27.

⁹ Joseph Gilbert Manning, *Land and Power in Ptolemaic Egypt: The Structure of Land Tenure* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2003), 137.

¹⁰ Some debate remains concerning whether or not the centrally located διοικητής supervised a group of subordinate regional διοικηταί; see, e.g., J. David Thomas, 'Aspects of the Ptolemaic Civil Service: The Dioiketes and the Nomarch', in *Das Ptolemäische Ägypten*, ed. Herwig Maehler and Volker Michael Strocka (Aspects of the Ptolemaic Civil Service; Mainz: Philipp von Zabern, 1978), 187-94. Thomas argues that papyri which suggest διοικηταί held regional offices either utilised the title as shorthand for ὑποδιοικηταί (P.Cair.Zen. II 59236), or belonged to a phase in the second century BCE when power may have been temporarily decentralised. Thomas supposes that 'such a decentralisation, if it ever took place, quickly proved unworkable (though this does not prove

Within the nome a complex network of additional delegates existed. The nome administration was divided into three branches. Firstly, the bureau of the nomarch, along with his locally commissioned subordinates, the *toparchs* and *komarchs*, supervised the nome's agricultural production. Secondly, the bureau of the *oikonomos*, together with his checking clerks (ἀντιγράφεις), was given charge of the nome's finances. Finally, the bureau of the βασιλικὸς γραμματεὺς, with his subordinates, the τοπογραμματεῖς and κωμογραμματεῖς, maintained the necessary official records, especially regarding the land. The head of each of these bureaus reported to the διοικητής in Alexandria.¹¹ Precisely how far the oversight of these officials extended is complex and well beyond the scope of this survey, since various documents hint that jurisdiction could overlap. What concerns us at the present is the office of the *oikonomos* and his subordination to the διοικητής and the king.

An important document that highlights the hierarchical structure of the financial branch of the kingdom is P.Tebt. 703 (Bagnall/Derow §103; Austin §319), a late third-century (after January 208 BCE) memorandum (ὑπομνήμα) generally agreed to have been an appointment charter from a διοικητής to an οἰκονόμος.¹² Dubbed 'the jewel of Greek administrative papyri',¹³ P.Tebt. 703 shows the superordinate rank of the author throughout as he repeatedly instructs the addressee with verbs in the imperative mood. But this hierarchy is especially apparent at the end of the document when the author orders the recipient 'to keep the instructions in hand, and to report on everything as has been ordered' (περὶ ἐκάστων ἐπιστέλλε[ιν] καθὰ συντέτακται). More than any other feature in the document, the need to give an account to the commissioning party attests to the subordinate rank of the *oikonomos*.

The subordinate role of *oikonomoi* is further underscored on occasions when civilians file complaints against them and request their superiors to overturn their decisions. Such was the case when in 254/253 BCE a certain Neoptolemos wrote to

that it was not tried) and the government rapidly reverted to the old situation' (191). On the other hand, P.Ord.Ptol. 21-22 (Bagnall/Derow §64), dated to 260 BCE, suggests that Syria had its own διοικητής, who was supervised by the διοικητής stationed in Alexandria.

¹¹ Bagnall, *Administration*, 3-4; cf. Manning, *Land and Power*, 137.

¹² Although the document does not specify the rank of the two officials, Rostovtzeff, '§703', 66-67, argues that 'the subjects of the memorandum coincide with matters dealt with by the *oikonomos* in the third century B.C.'. For a fine defence of Rostovtzeff's position, see Alan E. Samuel, 'P. Tebt 703', in *Studi in Onore di Edoardo Volterra*, ed. Edoardo Volterra (Pubblicazioni della Facoltà di giurisprudenza dell'Università di Roma 40-45; Milano: Giuffrè, 1971), 451-60.

¹³ Turner, 'Ptolemaic Egypt', 147.

Diotimos (the διοικητής) to appeal a ruling concerning taxation on vineyards made by Theokies (the *oikonomos* of the Aphroditopolite Nome) and Petosiris (the βασιλικὸς γραμματεὺς), which cost Neoptolemos' father, Stratippos, an unusually large sum (P.Cair.Zen. 59236). Neoptolemos, therefore, wrote to the διοικητής requesting that the local and regional officials, including the *oikonomos*, reimburse Stratippos for the expenses he incurred. A similar request was also made in 248 BCE by Theopropos, a Kalyndian landholder, whose tenant farmer had supplied wine for a city festival, but had not been repaid by the city administration for those goods. Theopropos, therefore, wrote to Apollonios (the διοικητής), requesting that he contact the *oikonomos* overseeing Kalynda and instruct the official to reimburse Theopropos for the 250 drachmas plus interest he was owed for the wine (P.Cair.Zen. 59341a). In these instances, appeals by certain individuals over the heads of *oikonomoi* demonstrate that the decisions even of these regional officials ultimately rested on the approval of higher authorities—in these cases the διοικητής—and any executive decisions made by διοικηταί were binding for *oikonomoi*.

Authority over *oikonomoi* did not cease, however, with the διοικητής. Apparently the king himself was regarded as their superior and possessed the authority to appoint *oikonomoi* to office. An inscription from Labraunda in Caria dating to 267 BCE, for instance, records that a certain Apollonius, son of Diodotos, was appointed *oikonomos* directly by King Ptolemy (κατασταθεὶς οἰκο[νό]μος ὑπὸ βασιλέως Πτολε[μαίου] [*ILabraundaMcCabe 2/ILabraunda 43*]). Another inscription from Limyra in Lycia dating to 288/287 BCE and honouring two Caunian *oikonomoi*, Amyntas Eythonos and Sosigenes of Zopyros, follows a similar honourific formula when it indicates that King Ptolemy had appointed the two officials as 'oikonomoi of the land' (κατασταθέντες ὑπὸ βασιλ[έως] [Π]τολεμαίου οἰκονόμοι τῆς χώρας [*SEG 27.929*]).¹⁴ Admittedly, officials who did not report directly to the king were normally assigned to their positions by his representatives, in the case of the financial bureau, by the διοικητής. It is uncertain in these two instances, therefore, whether the king assigned the *oikonomoi* personally or was merely credited with their commission. Even so, it is clear from these documents that *oikonomoi* were

¹⁴ For discussion of this text, especially the difficulty in determining the jurisdiction implied by τῆς χώρας, see Michael Wörrle, 'Epigraphische Forschungen zur Geschichte Lykiens I', *Chiron* 7 (1977): 43-66.

subordinate officials in the Ptolemaic kingdom and they envisaged the διοικητής as well as the king as their administrative superiors.

Despite their rank beneath the διοικητής and king, *oikonomoi* occupied an impressive, regional supervisory position. ‘The Ptolemaic state functioned’, remarks Joseph Manning, ‘by stressing the vertical ties to the ruler through a bureaucratic hierarchy that connected the villages to the nome capitals, and these in turn to the capital at Alexandria’.¹⁵ The middle-management role of *oikonomoi*, then, afforded them great structural authority in the nome. Within these regional territories *oikonomoi* supervised numerous officials who managed the nome subdivisions called toparchies, which were then further divided into villages. Moreover, the *oikonomoi* employed a series of subordinate collectors (λογευταί), auditors (λογισταί, ἐκλογισταί), and checking clerks (ἀντιγράφεις) who functioned as their personal agents.

The structural authority of *oikonomoi* is also apparent in those papyri which describe their many responsibilities. The mid-third century (259 BCE) Revenue Laws, for instance, details the regulations governing tax farming, vineyard supervision, wine production, and oil distribution while frequently mentioning the responsibilities of *oikonomoi* in these commercial and economic divisions. Column 20 of the papyrus explains with particular clarity the authority derived representatively from the king and entrusted to his *oikonomoi*. The column reads: ‘Any tax-farmers who fail to balance their accounts with the *oikonomos*, when he desires them to do so and summons them, shall pay 30 minas to the Crown and the *oikonomos* shall at the same time compel them’ (P.Rev. 20; Bagnall/Derow §114; cf. Austin §297). Two parts of the passage are of interest here. Firstly, the relationship between tax farmers and the *oikonomos* was clearly asymmetrical. The tax farmers, for example, were required to report to the *oikonomos* and balance accounts with him ‘when he desires’ (β[ο]υ[λο]μέν[ου] τοῦ οἰκονόμου), clearly demonstrating the structural superiority of the *oikonomos* over his delegates. His administrative authority is also underscored when the law states that the *oikonomos* is able to compel (συναναγκάζω) the delinquent tax farmer to balance accounts. Such compulsion suggests that the *oikonomos* possessed the structural leverage and legal authority to force his subordinates into action when encountering delay or

¹⁵ Manning, *Land and Power*, 131.

resistance. But the source of his authority is also worthy of clarification. The regal *oikonomos* derived his authority from his association with the king. As stated later in the column, the *oikonomos*, the ἀντιγράφεις, and their agents (οἱ π[αρ' αὐτῶν]) were 'officials of the Crown' (οἱ τὰ βασι[λ]ικὰ πραγματευόμενοι), who were apparently appointed in order to carry out the king's plan to completion.¹⁶ Indeed, it was the king's vision, after descending down through the chain of command, which was enacted in the nomes. Consequently, in tax collection, just as much as in his other supervisory duties, the *oikonomos* represented Ptolemy in the nome as one authorised to command on his behalf.

P.Tebt. 703 also portrays *oikonomoi* as possessing authority in their day to day responsibilities. Early in the document the διοικητής instructed the *oikonomos* to encourage and to inspire (παρακαλεῖν καὶ εὐθαρσετέρους παρασκευάζειν [42-43]) the local farmers. But the *oikonomos* was required to carry out these instructions not only verbally (τοῦτο μὴ μόνον λόγῳ γίνεσθαι [43-44]) and interpersonally, but also by intervening on behalf of the farmers when they were unfairly harassed by local officials. As the charter states, '[I]f any of them complain of the *komogrammateus* or the *komarchs* about any matter touching agricultural work, you should make inquiry [ἐπισκοπεῖν] and put a stop [ἐκποῆι εἰς ἐπίστασ{ε}ιν] to such doings' (44-49; Bagnall/Derow §103; cf. Austin §319). Numerous papyri show that it was in fact commonplace for farmers to write to their regional *oikonomos* to appeal for assistance with these kinds of disturbances. According to Alan Samuel, 'Such appeals are by no means exceptional, and they show that the resolution of disputes in agricultural matters was a normal administrative task for the *oikonomos* in the third century B.C.'¹⁷ By instructing *oikonomoi* to intervene in village affairs on behalf of farmers, this document underscores the administrative authority that *oikonomoi* exercised over village officials, particularly the *komogrammateus* and *komarchs*. As Samuel affirms, 'A number of third century appeals [from villagers] to the *oikonomos* illustrate that his administrative authority was recognized'.¹⁸

The administrative authority of *oikonomoi* is especially illumined by the abovementioned P.Cair.Zen. III 59341a. This papyrus indicates that the *oikonomos*

¹⁶ For more on the agent of the *oikonomos* (ὁ παρὰ τοῦ οἰκονόμου), see W. Clarysse, 'Harmachis, Agent of the Oikonomos: An Archive from the Time of Philopator', *Ancient Society* 7 (1976): 185-207.

¹⁷ Samuel, 'P. Tebt 703', 452.

¹⁸ Samuel, 'P. Tebt 703', 452.

wielded great, yet restricted authority at the nome level, sometimes to the dissatisfaction of the people. As discussed earlier, in 248 BCE a certain Theopropos from Kalynda, in Caria, wrote to the διοικητής concerning money which the city administration owed him. The document reads as follows:

To Apollonios the *dioiketes*, greeting from Theopropos, *theoros* from Kalynda. In year 38 my tenant farmer Theron purchased from the city a concession to supply wine for the festival which is held yearly in Kypranda, and I supplied the wine on his behalf, amounting to 84 *metretai*, at 10 drachmas the *metretes*, which makes 850 drachmas (borrowing at the legal rate of interest, as Theron had no private means and had made the purchase through me). And as the treasurers [ταμιῶν] Diophantos and Akrisios had only given me 600 drachmas in payment of this sum and were withholding the balance of 250 drachmas because all the subscriptions had not been paid up, I brought the treasurers before the *strategos* Motes and the *oikonomos* Diodotos, claiming my 250 drachmas. The treasurers Diophantos and Akrisios demanded that a decree should be issued for them to act on, saying that without a decree it was beyond their authority to repay the money. But the *prytaneis* and the clerk procrastinated and had not written the decree up to the time when, having been appointed a *theoros* by the city, along with Diophantos one of the treasurers, I came here to the king. If therefore it seems good to you, kindly write to our city and to the *strategos* and the *oikonomos* that the 250 drachmas are to be paid to me (together with the interest whatever it may amount to from the time when I paid out money to buy the wine for the city, as I had myself to borrow from other people and am still incurring interest) . . . in order that I may not suffer wrong but be one of the many that have experienced your benevolence. Farewell. (Bagnall/Derow §68)

In this scenario several interesting events occur which reveal the power dynamics involved in the central and peripheral administrative sectors of the kingdom.¹⁹ As stated in the greeting, Theopropos wrote to the διοικητής requesting that he intervene in his suit for reimbursement since he possessed the authority to exact power over regional and city officials. However, because Theopropos had originally summoned the two treasurers to appear before the στρατηγός and οικονόμος, these two regional officials must have also possessed some authority over city administrators. The στρατηγός and οικονόμος were apparently reluctant to get involved in matters of city finance, though, and the πρυτάνεις and γραμματεύς as city officials were asked instead to issue the decree mandating the release of funds for Theopropos, probably at the request of the στρατηγός and οικονόμος. But the πρυτάνεις and γραμματεύς failed to follow through before Theopropos' relocation to Alexandria, thus requiring his direct appeal to the διοικητής.

This letter reveals the great authority of the *oikonomos* in two ways. Firstly, the jurisdiction of the *oikonomos*, at least in Caria, appears to have overlapped considerably with that of the στρατηγός. Not only is he paired with the στρατηγός here as his associate during the dispute, but as a later portion of this letter reveals, his responsibilities extended well beyond matters of finance and into military

¹⁹ For further discussion, see Bagnall, *Administration*, 99-101.

administration (P.Cair.Zen. III 59341b-c).²⁰ Secondly, the *oikonomos* possessed the authority to arbitrate between Theopropos and the entire city of Kalynda in matters of finance. Although he refused to involve himself directly in the repayment of the debt, he and the στρατηγός were nevertheless perceived by Theopropos, the two treasurers, and the πρυτάνεις and γραμματεύς as having the authority to resolve the dispute.²¹

2. Responsibilities

The responsibilities of the *oikonomos* were mostly financial in nature, being charged primarily with administering the revenue and expenditures of the nome. But the *oikonomos* was not confined to accounting and the disbursing of public funds; such were the responsibilities of the βασιλικὸς γραμματεὺς and ἀντιγραφεὺς. Instead, the *oikonomos* developed and implemented the plan for the nome's economy. He was responsible for the nome's agricultural production, for ensuring seed was issued to farmers, and even for encouraging them when the harvest was poor. He was responsible for oil production and linen manufacturing. He also oversaw the entire commercial sector, including the scheduling of deliveries from farms to the market and for regulating its prices. But perhaps the chief financial responsibility of the *oikonomos* in Ptolemaic administration was organising tax collection. Tax farming in antiquity was a complex system of state revenue acquisition involving the auctioning off of collection responsibilities to tax farmers, who after each monthly collection would balance accounts with the *oikonomos* and checking clerk to make certain that the proper sum was accumulated. The *oikonomos* then balanced his accounts with the διοικητής to ensure the same.²² The responsibilities of the *oikonomos* in tax farming are nowhere better preserved than in the Revenue Laws. The document is much too long and detailed to cite or explain here at length. It is sufficient to say here, though, that the kingdom's economy was

²⁰ Bagnall, *Administration*, 245: 'The *oikonomos* was evidently the colleague of the *strategos*, not his subordinate. . . . And the *oikonomos* was at least the equal if not somewhat higher in rank than the commandant'.

²¹ Alan E. Samuel, 'The Judicial Competence of the *Oikonomos* in the Third Century B.C.', in *Atti dell'XI Congresso Internazionale di Papirologia. Milano, 2-8 Settembre 1965* (Milan: Istituto Lombardo di Scienze e Lettere, 1966), 444-50, at 446: 'A review of the evidence shows that the *oikonomos* had no real judicial role, but as any administrator could and would do, he decided matters which affected the satisfactory accomplishment of his tasks'.

²² Turner, 'Ptolemaic Egypt', 152; cf. *NewDocs* 8:49-57.

buttressed by tax revenue, and therefore the involvement of the *oikonomos* in the collection of taxes ensured the financial viability of the kingdom.

Many of the other duties of the *oikonomos* have been preserved in P.Tebt. 703.²³ According to the papyrus the *oikonomos* was responsible for maintaining the depth, strength, and cleanliness of the canals which ran through and hydrated the fields (29-40). He was expected to encourage and inspire the local farmers (42-43) and to prevent the village officials from harassing them (44-49). The *oikonomos* was required to inspect the landscape carefully to ensure that the fields were sown well (49-54), with the correct kinds of crops according to the sowing schedule (κατὰ τὴν διαγραφὴν τοῦ σπόρου [57-58]), and that upon the harvest the grain was punctually transported to Alexandria (70-87). He was to maintain a list of the uses of cattle in agriculture (63-70; 163-174) and to make sure that the calves were fed adequately (183-191), especially the offspring of royal cattle (ἡ ἐκ τῶν βασιλικῶν [67-68]). All of the specifics concerning the operation of weaving houses (τὰ ὑφαντεῖα [87-117]) and of the oil factories (τὰ ἐλαιουργεῖα [134-163]) fell within the jurisdiction of the *oikonomos*. He was responsible for auditing the revenue accounts, village by village if possible, otherwise by *toparchy* (117-134). Moreover, he regulated the prices of items sold in the market (174-182), ensured that trees were planted on schedule (191-211), and organised the maintenance for the royal houses and gardens (211-214). He oversaw the custody of deserting soldiers and sailors prior to their journey to the capital (215-222). Finally, he was responsible for providing the nome with a sense of civil as well as financial security, since the former would bring about the latter (222-234).

Beyond itemising the main responsibilities of the *oikonomos*, the papyrus also lists the official's idealised character traits and work ethic. These attributes, according to the author, were absolutely necessary (δεῖν [261]) for performing the job well. According to the author, the *oikonomos* was to be characterised by honesty (καθαρῶς [262-263]), goodness (βέλτιστος [263]), justice (δίκαιος [266]), and blamelessness (ἀνέγκλητος [276]). Moreover, the papyrus includes numerous admonitions about the manner in which the official should complete his tasks. He was expected, for instance, to inspect the various agricultural, industrial, and commercial sectors of the nome carefully (ἐπιμελῶς [passim]) and zealously

²³ Many of the concerns in P.Tebt. 703 are also addressed in P.Rev.

(προθύμως [120]). The ideal character profile of the *oikonomos*, then, was a central concern in P.Tebt. 703, just as it was in many documents outlining the duties of state officials in Egypt.

In P.Tebt. 27, for instance, the late second-century (111 BCE) διοικητής Eirenaios reprimanded Hermias, the superintendent of revenues, for appointing a poorly qualified *oikonomos*, along with certain other officials. Eirenaios accused Hermias of appointing men who were ‘without exception evil and worthless persons [πᾶσι δὲ κακοῖς καὶ οὐδενὸς ἀξίοις]’ (Bagnall/Derow §110), instructing him rather to nominate ‘persons of repute’ (ἀξιόλογοι). Dorothy Crawford, in fact, drew heavily from P.Tebt. 27 and 703 when she compiled a list of traits commonly associated with royal officials over the three centuries of Ptolemaic rule. Her profile of the archetypical ‘good official’ resembles the *oikonomoi* portrayed in both Tebtunis papyri:

The duty of the official was universal care, ἡ τῶν ὅλων φροντίς, he should be πασίφιλος [friendly to all], and exhibit qualities of care, ἐπιμέλεια, goodwill, εὐνοία, foresight, πρόνοια, keenness and alacrity, σπουδή, προθυμία, or ἐκτενία, and acumen in decision, ἀκρίβεια. He must always show attention, ἐπιστορφή or προσοχή, vigilance, τήρησις or ἀγρυπνία, and care, ἀντίληψις, for those with whom he had contact; the aim of his actions should be justice for all men, ὅπως τὰ δίκαια γίνηται τοῖς ἀνθρώποις.²⁴

Although these documents only prescribe the make-up of the *oikonomos* from the vantage point of the top of the hierarchy, they nevertheless supply an idealised portrayal of the official, indeed one of the perspectives we are seeking here.

3. Accountability

Despite the clearly defined responsibilities entrusted to the *oikonomos*, he may have struggled to meet the demands of his superiors while also maintaining a healthy relationship with the inhabitants of the nome. As Crawford explains, ‘Officials were those used by the king to look after his interests, whilst protecting those of the peasants; it was necessary that they collected as much profit in the form of rents and taxes as was compatible with the continuing co-operation of the peasants. If they were over-zealous on the king’s behalf the peasants would refuse to co-operate; if they were over-kind to the peasants the king would be displeased’.²⁵

²⁴ Dorothy J. Crawford, 'The Good Official of Ptolemaic Egypt', in *Das Ptolemäische Ägypten*, ed. Herwig Maehler and Volker Michael Strocka (Mainz am Rhein: Philipp von Zabern, 1978), 195-202, at 195-96.

²⁵ Crawford, 'Good Official', 195.

In order, therefore, to maintain the dependability of *oikonomoi*, the chief Ptolemaic administrators offered incentives to their subordinates for their achievements, while also penalising them for poor performance. In either case, accountability was implemented by the διοικητής and king to motivate their regional supervisors to serve as instructed.

In the conclusion of P.Tebt. 703, for instance, the author of the papyrus remarks, 'If you act thus, you will fulfil your official duty and your own safety will be assured [ὕμῖν ἢ πᾶς ἀσφάλεια ὑπάρξει]' (255-258). The statement implies that the office carried with it the potential for removal, or demotion, upon a poor performance. But the author also promises professional advancement to the *oikonomos* if he manages well.²⁶ As the author affirmed, '[I]f you are without reproach in this, you will be held deserving of higher functions [γένησθε μειζόνων ἀξιωθήσεσθαι]' (276-278). These kinds of positive and negative incentives kept the *oikonomos* highly aligned with the interests of his superiors.²⁷ Thus, even though it may be, as E. G. Turner maintains, that in Ptolemaic administration 'no regular system of promotion, no *cursus honorum* or specially quick promotion to reward initiative has been traced',²⁸ Crawford is probably correct to affirm the existence of an informal system of promotion, whereby professional advancement could be attained through 'acceptable performance and not antagonizing one's superior'.²⁹

B. In the Seleucid Kingdom

The administration of the Seleucid kingdom (ca. 305-63 BCE) was differentiated from the Ptolemaic system primarily by means of its Achaemenid origin. Whereas historians generally agree that the Ptolemies inherited and immediately adapted the Pharaonic form of financial administration, creating the modified Macedonian system outlined above, the Seleucids similarly laid a

²⁶ Nothing is known precisely about the compensation of οἰκονόμοι. But according to the Zenon archive διοικηταί were provided δωρεαί, temporary grants of land given by the king in substitution for a salary; cf. Michael I. Rostovtzeff, *A Large Estate in Egypt in the Third Century B.C.: A Study in Economic History* (University of Wisconsin Studies in the Social Sciences and History 6; Madison: 1922), 42-55.

²⁷ It is perhaps for this reason that 'good officials', that is, those who were acceptable both to the king and to his subjects, were rather scarce in the Ptolemaic administration. As the abundance of written complaints and royal decrees suggest, 'many officials were both wicked and corrupt' (Crawford, 'Good Official', 199).

²⁸ Turner, 'Ptolemaic Egypt', 147.

²⁹ Crawford, 'Good Official', 199.

Macedonian-style economy atop the existing Achaemenid administration which they inherited from the Persians.³⁰ Thus, even though the basic structure of the Seleucids and their utilisation of *oikonomoi* deserve independent comment, there are few major differences between the administrative approaches of the Seleucids and Ptolemies.

The source that best illumines the framework of the Seleucid financial administration is Pseudo-Aristotle's *Oeconomica*. In the second book of the treatise the author outlines the administrative structure used by the Seleucids, distinguishing between its four spheres (οικονομίαι): 'the administration of a king [βασιλική]; of the governors under him [σατραπική]; of a free state [πολιτική]; and of a private citizen [ιδιωτική]' (*Oec.* 1345b). The governing of satrapies (provinces) and free states (cities) are of primary concern here. The satrapies, which at the kingdom's height spanned from Anatolia to central Asia,³¹ further divided into hyparchies,³² and thus required a vast network of subordinate officials through whom the king regulated the economy, collected taxes, and sold and leased privately and publicly owned land.

1. Hierarchy

The greatest difference between Seleucid and Ptolemaic administration lies in the offices at the top of the chain of command. As with the Ptolemies, the Seleucid διοικηταί were directly subordinate to the king as his chief financial officers. But whereas in the Ptolemaic structure a single διοικητής was appointed to represent the king in financial matters at Alexandria, the Seleucid king appointed numerous διοικηταί both centrally and regionally, placing the majority of them in the satrapies and various other subdivisions (e.g. Coele-Syria). There they supervised finances, serving alongside the στρατηγός, who oversaw civil matters.³³

³⁰ G. G. Aperghis, *The Seleucid Royal Economy: The Finances and Financial Administration of the Seleucid Empire* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2004), 264-69; Susan Sherwin-White and Amélie Kuhrt, *From Samarkhand to Sardis: A New Approach to the Seleucid Empire* (Hellenistic Culture and Society 13; London: Duckworth, 1993), 42; Rostovtzeff, *Hellenistic World*, 440.

³¹ For the known satrapies of the third-century BCE Seleucid kingdom, see Sherwin-White and Kuhrt, *From Samarkhand*, 45.

³² Sherwin-White and Kuhrt, *From Samarkhand*, 46.

³³ Scholars have been unable to agree on the title given to the royal official who functioned as the most senior financial officer of the Seleucid kingdom, if even there was one. Earlier scholars suggested that the officer bearing the title ὁ ἐπὶ τῶν προσόδων functioned in this capacity. More recent scholarship, however, has proposed that ὁ ἐπὶ τῶν προσόδων was equivalent to and came to

The titles given to administrative officials beneath the διοικηταί also diverge from those of the Ptolemaic kingdom. According to G. G. Aperghis, the ἐκλογισταί were the officials responsible for establishing the level of taxation and for supervising the λογευταί who carried out the collection. Οἱ ἐπὶ τῶν ἱερῶν managed the temples and their revenue. The *oikonomoi*, on the other hand, supervised the royal land and revenue, while controlling the expenditures in their financial districts, the subdivisions within the satrapy sometimes referred to as οἰκονομίαι (SEG 39.1289/OGI 179).³⁴ They also cooperated with the *hyparchs*, who oversaw all civil and military matters.³⁵

Much of what is known about the role and responsibilities of Seleucid regal *oikonomoi* derives from a single administrative document known as the Ptolemaios Dossier, an early second-century (ca. 190 BCE) compilation of inscriptions from Scythopolis in Palestine (SEG 29.1613). In Text 4 of the set of inscriptions Ptolemaios, the στρατηγός and high priest, petitioned the king, Antiochos III, to allow certain regional misdemeanours to be handled by local leaders, while those matters of some severity to be dealt with by leaders of the satrapy. Antiochus then forwarded the request to two διοικηταί, Kleon and Heliodoros, before it was formalised on stele. The document reads as follows:

To King Antiochus III, memorandum from Ptolemy the *strategos* and high priest; concerning any disputes that may arise: I request that written instructions be sent so that disputes arising in my villages [ἐν ταῖς κώμαις] and involving peasants with each other should be settled by my agents [ἐπὶ τῶν παρ' ἐμοῦ], but those arising with peasants from the other villages should be investigated [ἐπισκοπῶσιν] by the *oikonomos* and the official in charge of the district, and if they concern murder or appear to be of greater significance they should be referred to the *strategos* in Syria and Phoenicia; the garrison commanders and those in charge of the districts [τῶν τόπων] should not ignore in any way those who call for their intervention. The same letter to Heliodoros. (Trans. adapted from Austin §193)

Even though some of the specifics about the administrative and juridical divisions in the satrapy remain uncertain, this inscription reveals several interesting insights about the role and responsibilities of *oikonomoi* in those regions.³⁶ The stele clearly distinguishes between villages (κῶμαι) and collections of villages, districts (τόποι). Districts were governed by an *oikonomos* and 'the official in charge of the district' ([ὁ

replace the *oikonomos* in the later stages of the kingdom. See further the discussion by Aperghis, *Economy*, 276-77.

³⁴ For discussion of οἰκονομίαι and SEG 39.1289, see John Ma, *Antiochos III and the Cities of Western Asia Minor* (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1999), 136; Philippe Gauthier, *Nouvelles inscriptions de Sardes II* (Hautes études du monde gréco-romain 15; Geneva: Droz, 1989), 129-34.

³⁵ Aperghis, *Economy*, 295.

³⁶ For discussion, see Aperghis, *Economy*, 269-73.

τοῦ τόπ]ου πρ[ο]εστηκώς), who was probably a *toparch*, or *hyparch*. These two officials probably were also those identified as Ptolemaios' agents (τῶν παρ' ἑμοῦ). But while both officials were in some sense subordinate to the στρατηγός (e.g. Ptolemaios)—the general appointed over the satrapy and all of its respective districts and villages—the διοικητής, as the financial counterpart to the στρατηγός, was the immediate supervisor of the *oikonomos*. The Seleucid regal *oikonomoi*, therefore, while remaining at least two or three positions removed from the top of the administrative hierarchy, still occupied high-ranking offices as the chief financial administrators at the district level.

2. Responsibilities

In addition to possessing great administrative authority in their respective regions, the Seleucid *oikonomoi* shared the same area of administrative responsibility as the Ptolemaic *oikonomoi*. As the chief financial official in the district, the *oikonomos* supervised the region's royal land and revenue. Their oversight of Seleucid territory, for instance, is apparent in the Laodike Dossier, a mid third-century (ca. 254 BCE) inscription from Didyma in Ionia, which reports a real-estate transaction that took place between the king's officials and Laodike, the king's ex-wife (SEG 16.710/19.676/OGI 225/IDidymaMcCabe 128). The relevant portion has been restored to read:

The copy of the survey: — Pannoukome and the manor-house and the land belonging to it and the peasants who live there, and there has been conveyed to Arrhidaios the manager of Laodike's property [τῶι οἰκονομοῦντι τᾶ Λαοδίκης] by -krates the hyparch, the village and the manor-house and the land belonging to it, according to the written order of Nikomachos the *oikonomos* [κατὰ τὸ παρὰ Νικομάχου τοῦ οἰκονόμου πρόσταγμα] to which were subjoined that from Metrophanes and that from the king which had been written to him, according to which it was necessary to make the survey. (Trans. adapted from Bagnall/Derow §25; cf. Austin §173)³⁷

This document is of immediate interest because it underscores how *oikonomoi* managed the king's real estate. In this case, though the *hyparch* credited the village, mansion, property, and peasants to Laodike through Arrhidaios, the *oikonomos* Nikomachos was responsible for authorising the transaction on behalf of the king.³⁸

³⁷ For text, translation, and discussion, see also C. Bradford Welles, *Royal Correspondence in the Hellenistic Period* (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1934), 102-104 (§20); Aperghis, *Economy*, 315-18 (§3); Landvogt, 'Οἰκονόμος', 29.

³⁸ Secondly, it is significant that the author draws a distinction between ὁ οἰκονόμος and ὁ οἰκονόμων τᾶ Λαοδίκης. Here ὁ οἰκονόμος is a regal official under whose jurisdiction the real-estate transaction took place. The other manager, Arrhidaios, was the private administrator who supervised Laodike's personal affairs. Private *oikonomoi* of wealthy persons could possess some

The Seleucid *oikonomoi*, just as their Ptolemaic counterparts, also possessed a certain judicial authority, as the earlier Scythopolis text indicates. Although oversight of the royal land and revenue in the districts were their primary concern, apparently the responsibilities of the *oikonomos* extended beyond financial matters and, together with the *toparch* (ὁ τοῦ τόπου προεστηκώς), included legal rule of any number of disputes (ἐγκλήματα) between the peasants (οἱ λαοί) and all minor criminal offenses up to homicide (φόνος). The pair of officials probably maintained their own areas of competency when possible. But as many civil matters also concerned private and public finances, it was probably fitting that the two officials settle certain disputes jointly.

C. In the Attalid Kingdom

The Attalid (or Pergamene) kingdom was the undersized state that remained following the death of Lysimachus in 281 BCE. With Pergamon as its capital the dynasty controlled but a small sector of the northwest corner of Asia Minor until the land was bequeathed to the Romans in 133 BCE. In comparison with the Ptolemaic and Seleucid kingdoms, evidence for the inner workings of Attalid administration is rather meagre. Without question the city of Pergamon was the administrative centre throughout the dynasty, and the remainder of the kingdom continually struggled to develop around it. But the city was governed quite differently than the other Hellenistic capitals in the early years following its inception.³⁹ The king's control over the city was quite limited before the Treaty of Apameia in 188 BCE. Technically, he stood apart from the βουλή and its management of civic finances, although the council στρατηγοί and ταμίαι were appointed by him and provided him opportunities to direct civic policy.⁴⁰ Following the treaty, however, the king developed a hierarchy featuring more empowered civic offices (i.e. στρατηγοί, ὁ ἐπὶ τῆς πόλεως, ὁ ἐπὶ τῶν ἱερῶν προσόδων [cf. the

means. Cf. *Laodikeia* Lykos 1/SEG 47.1739/Austin §168; for discussion, see Michael Wörle, 'Antiochos I., Achaios der Ältere und die Galater: Eine neue Inschrift in Denizli', *Chiron* 5 (1975): 59-78. Nevertheless, they possessed far less authority and responsibility, while operating on a quite different socio-economic plane. As Ma, *Antiochos III*, 149, observes, 'It comes as no surprise that Antiochos II and his subordinates should have distinguished between a Seleukid officer, ὁ οἰκονόμος, and the private manager of Laodike I, ὁ οἰκονομῶν τῆς Λαοδίκης. . . . [Even the] peasants could differentiate between institutions of the central state . . . and their landlord's managers'.

³⁹ R. E. Allen, *The Attalid Kingdom: A Constitutional History* (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1983), 159.

⁴⁰ Allen, *Attalid Kingdom*, 167-68.

Astynomic Law, *OGI 483*]), which increased his control over Pergamon considerably. The hierarchical evolution probably occurred in the outer Attalid territories as well, although these smaller regions required far less developed administrative structures than did those of their Near Eastern neighbours. Whereas the Ptolemies divided their land into nomes, and the Seleucids into satrapies, the Attalids partitioned their main territories into τόποι.⁴¹ Each of these regions was governed politically by a στρατηγός and financially by an οἰκονόμος, both of whom were personally appointed by the king.

But the use of *oikonomoi* in the financial administration of the Attalid kingdom was not confirmed textually until rather recently. The 1996 discovery of a mid-second-century (150 BCE) inscription at a shrine in Pleura, near Sardis, provides for the first time material evidence for the appointment of *oikonomoi* in Attalid regal administration.⁴² The document contains a list of initiates (μύσται) and reports the decision to erect the stele in the shrine at the request of the priest. The relevant portion of the text reads:

When Euthydemus was chief-priest and Kadoas, son of Pleri, was priest. Memorandum to the chief-priest Euthydemus from Kadoas, priest of Apollo in Pleura, who has held the priesthood for a long time. Earlier, when Antiochus was king, I asked the chief-priest Nikanor to give permission that I set up a stele in the sanctuary, on which I record his name, my own and those of the *mystai*, and now I ask you, if it seems right to you, to give order [συντάξαι] to write to Asclepiades, the *oikonomos*, to assign me a place [ἵνα παραδείξῃ μοι τόπον] where I may set up the stele on which I record your name, my own, and those of the *mystai*.⁴³

(From) Diophantos to Attinas: I submit to you the copy of the letter written to me by Euthydemus the chief-priest.

(From) Euthydemus to Asklepiades: Because of the petition made to me by Kadoas the priest of Apollon at Pleura, let it be just as he requested.

The inscription does not reveal much about the profile of the *oikonomos* or the other mentioned officials, and disagreement therefore remains about their rank, duties, and the extent of their jurisdiction.⁴⁴ It is clear, however, that the *oikonomos* Asclepiades was a financial official responsible for allocating space for sanctuary

⁴¹ H. Malay, 'New Evidence Concerning the Administrative System of the Attalids', *Arkeoloji Dergisi* 4 (1996): 83-86, at 84. Due to the variety of communities which were included in the τόποι, Esther V. Hansen, *The Attalids of Pergamon* (Ithaca, NY: Cornell University Press, 1947), 172, suggests that the 'places' were not strict, administrative subdivisions, but ill-defined demarcations of land.

⁴² Even so, historians have for some time been importing Seleucid models into their reconstructions of Attalid administration, and thus assumed all along that the Attalids utilised οἰκονόμοι in provincial management; cf. Hansen, *Attalids*, 169-70.

⁴³ For text, translation, and discussion, see H. Malay and C. Nalbantoğlu, 'The Cult of Apollon Pleurenos in Lydia', *Arkeoloji Dergisi* 4 (1996): 75-81.

⁴⁴ See, e.g., Aperghis, *Economy*, 277-78; Beate Dignas, *Economy of the Sacred in Hellenistic and Roman Asia Minor* (Oxford Classical Monographs.; Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2002), 50-56; Ma, *Antiochos III*, 146-47.

inscriptions. The chief priest (ἀρχιερεύς) Euthydemos was responsible for authorising the decision and for instructing (συντάσσω) the *oikonomos* to allocate (παράδεχομαι) space for the stele. This does not necessarily indicate, however, that the chief priest was directly superior to the *oikonomos*. Euthydemos apparently forwarded the request to Diophantos, who then forwarded the letter to Attinas. The two latter-named officials are of unknown rank, but probably served in the royal administration and were 'in charge of a large territory or of a wide range of matters' in the region of the shrine.⁴⁵ The last named official, Attinas, apparently informed the *oikonomos* Asclepiades about Euthydemos' authorisation. Thus, the *oikonomos* was probably subordinate to Attinas and perhaps also to Diophantos.⁴⁶

Since Attalid *oikonomoi* were apparently responsible for the erection of stelae at local shrines, they probably occupied a less significant administrative position than did the Ptolemaic and Seleucid *oikonomoi*. Clearly they were involved in the payment of various civic and sacred expenses,⁴⁷ but even so, the competencies of Attalid *oikonomoi* were similar to their Seleucid counterparts, being responsible for at least some of the region's finances.⁴⁸ Thus, they were officials with much administrative authority.

D. In the Macedonian Kingdom

The financial administration of the Macedonian (or Antigonid) kingdom remains in relative obscurity in comparison with its Asian and Near Eastern counterparts. At various times during their rule (ca. 294-168 BCE) the Antigonids controlled all of Macedonia, parts of Achaia and southern Thrace, certain Aegean Islands, and Caria. Credible evidence is lacking about how these regions were governed, however, due in part to the focus of the Antigonid kings on warfare rather than administrative development.⁴⁹ Local economic structures are attested,

⁴⁵ Dignas, *Economy*, 54 n. 84.

⁴⁶ Aperghis, *Economy*, 278. *Contra* Malay and Nalbantoğlu, 'Cult of Apollon': 78, who suggest that Diophantos and Attinas were 'royal functioners serving under the chief-priest or the *oikonomos*'.

⁴⁷ Dignas, *Economy*, 55, probably overstates her case when she suggests that the *oikonomos* was 'involved in matters that did not concern land at all, not even sacred territory. The post must have had a very down to earth profile, if Asclepiades was really going to assign a place for a single stele in a small sanctuary'.

⁴⁸ Ma, *Antiochos III*, 136. In fact, Malay and Nalbantoğlu, 'Cult of Apollon': 78, suggest that the *oikonomos* was 'a royal official responsible for the royal land (βασιλική γῆ) as well as for the sanctuaries', and was 'adopted by the Attalids from the Seleucid administration'.

⁴⁹ It is of further significance that Macedonia has so far been inadequately excavated.

but the relationships between the cities and districts, and districts and king, remain somewhat unclear and highly disputed, creating difficulty for those who attempt to reconstruct the administrative framework of the Macedonian kingdom. This is especially disappointing because the balance of power between the king and his people made Macedonia the most distinct of the major Hellenistic powers.⁵⁰ Although certain kings instituted structures that resembled those of neighbouring kingdoms,⁵¹ because these systems changed regularly, simply importing a bureaucratic model from a contemporary state to provide a skeleton on which to build will not do. Neither will it suffice to rely too much on evidence dating from before the Antigonid dynasty. While it has been suggested that the kingdom's structure changed little following the death of Alexander,⁵² recent studies have noted significant changes in city and state organisation not only immediately following the division of the Alexandrian empire, but even between the reigns of various Antigonid kings.⁵³ For our purposes, then, we will focus all of our attention on reconstructing part of only one administrative policy, that of Philip V.

Of the Macedonian kings the reign of Philip V has preserved the most illuminating data with which to work in the Hellenistic period and it is from his rule that we possess the only extant documents attesting to the appointment of *oikonomoi* in Macedonian regal administration. During the forty-three years of his reign (222-179 BCE), Philip spent no more than eight at peace.⁵⁴ For this reason it is not at all strange that the two inscriptions noting regal *oikonomoi* in Macedonia were discovered in army garrisons (IG XII Suppl. 644; SEG 51.640bis).⁵⁵ In these two nearly-

⁵⁰ M. B. Hatzopoulos, *Macedonian Institutions under the Kings: A Historical and Epigraphic Study* (Meletemata 22.1; Athens: Research Centre for Greek and Roman Antiquity/National Hellenic Research Foundation, 1996), 420, remarks that 'the whole structure of the Macedonian state is less elaborate, less hierarchical, and bears less the imprint of an all-pervasive and strictly structured bureaucracy than that of the Ptolemies. . . . Macedonia emerges as more "democratic", if not egalitarian, and relying more on local initiative and autonomy than on a centralised civil service'; contra R. M. Errington, *A History of Macedonia* (Hellenistic Culture and Society; Berkeley: University of California Press, 1990), 218-29. For a balanced view, see F. W. Walbank, 'Macedonia and Greece', in *The Cambridge Ancient History: The Hellenistic World* (Vol. 7.1), ed. F. W. Walbank et al. (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1984), 221-56, at 225-29.

⁵¹ Richard A. Billows, *Antigonos the One-Eyed and the Creation of the Hellenistic State* (Hellenistic Culture and Society; Berkeley: University of California Press, 1990), 268, suggests that something akin to the Achaemenid administration was instituted during the reign of Antigonos Monophthalmos.

⁵² Rostovtzeff, *Hellenistic World*, 250.

⁵³ Walbank, 'Macedonia and Greece', 225-27.

⁵⁴ F. W. Walbank, *Philip V of Macedon* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1940), 259.

⁵⁵ IG XII Suppl. 644, found in Chalcis, was preserved in its entirety. For discussion, see C. Bradford Welles, 'New Texts from the Chancery of Philip V of Macedonia and the Problem of the "Diagramma"', *AJA* 42 (1938): 245-60, at 252-54; M. B. Hatzopoulos, *Macedonian Institutions under the*

identical texts, *oikonomoi* emerge as financial administrators, just as they were in the more abundantly documented kingdoms. But some of their responsibilities included tasks somewhat unfamiliar to those expounded in the Ptolemaic, Seleucid, and Attalid texts examined above. The late third-century BCE inscription found in Chalcis (*IG XII Suppl.* 644), for instance, portrays *oikonomoi* as responsible for the inspection and replacement of basic supplies in Philip's military fortresses (φρούρια).⁵⁶ The lengthy inscription comes in the form of a διάγραμμα and reads as follows:

The *oikonomoi* shall take care that the orders by the king [τὰ διαταχθέντα ὑπὸ τοῦ βασιλέως] concerning the stores be kept without alteration. And while in the presence of the *phrourarchoi*, the things which are already stored, they shall measure those of which there is a measure, [5] and they shall raise those of which there is weight, so that the *phrourarchoi* might also attend to whatever there is. And the agents of the *oikonomoi* [οἱ διὰ τῶν οἰκονόμων χειρισταί] shall have the keys to the warehouses. [10] And the *phrourarchoi* shall seal the bins and they shall be careful that nothing is taken out of the stores, unless something, after having become old, seems useless, in which case these shall be removed whenever the equal amount has been substituted. [15] And they shall bring in the dry grain from the new revenue and immediately arrange to sow [the old grain] on the Chalcidian land. And they shall replace the wine and wood every five years and shall be careful [20] that the sweet one-year-old wine is brought in after having been tested. And they shall also inspect [ἐπισκοπεῖτωσαν] the granaries during the six months of summer whenever there is rain, and during the winter every ten days, and if there is a leak [25] that reaches the grain, they shall repair it immediately. And if any *oikonomoi* or agents of the *oikonomoi* either removes the seals without permission from the *phrourarchoi*, or takes out something before other things have been brought in, [30] or allows something to become useless because he did not inspect it [διὰ τὸ μὴ ἐπισκοπεῖν] according to the times which have been indicated, then after having been examined they shall suffer whatever sentence the king issues in judgment against them [ἐλεγχθέντες παθέτωσαν ὅτι ἂν αὐτῶν ὁ βασιλεὺς καταγνῶι]. And the *phrourarchoi*, if they should neglect care [35] of those things which are being stored, if they willingly give them away to others, or if they themselves should take [from them], then they will be liable to whatever sentence the king issues in judgment against them [ἔνοχοι ἔσσονται ὧν ἂν ὁ βασιλεὺς αὐτῶν καταγνῶι]. And whatever the *oikonomoi* do not do of those things written in this *diagramma*, [40] the *phrourarchos* appointed in whatever place the negligence occurs shall write to the king immediately, so that the king may decide of what punishment he is worthy concerning the one neglecting [ὅπως ὁ βασιλεὺς διαγνῶι περὶ τοῦ ὀλιωρήσαντος τίνος ἄξιός ἐστιν ἐπιτιμῆσεως]. And if he does not write, [45] but the king first learns by another person, he will be exacted a fine of six thousand drachmas. And each of the *oikonomoi*, after having recorded this *diagramma* on a stele, shall set it in the most visible place of the fortress and he, [50] whenever transferred over to another place, or relieved of his duty [ὅταν ἢ μετὰ γηται ἐφ' ἕτερον τόπον ἢ ἀφιῆται ἀπὸ τῆς χρείας], shall hand it over to his successor with the rest of the concerns of the office in accordance with this *diagramma* [παραδιδότω τῶι ἐπικαθισταμένῳ μετὰ τῶν λοιπῶν τῶν ἐκ τῆς οἰκονομίας κατὰ τὸ διάγραμμα τοῦτο].⁵⁷

Kings: Epigraphic Appendix (Meletemata 22.2; Athens: Research Centre for Greek and Roman Antiquity/National Hellenic Research Foundation, 1996), 36-38. *SEG* 51.640bis, found in Kynos, contains lines 36-53 of the previous text. For both, see M. B. Hatzopoulos, *L'organisation de l'armée macédonienne sous les Antigonides. Problèmes anciennes et documents nouveaux* (Meletemata 30; Athens: Research Centre for Greek and Roman Antiquity/National Hellenic Research Foundation, 2001), 151-53 (§1).

⁵⁶ The φρούριον in Chalcis was among the 'fetters of Greece', the three most strategically located Macedonian fortresses located in Demetrias, Corinth, and Chalcis.

⁵⁷ I am grateful to Dr. Paola Ceccarelli and Professor John Barclay for their assistance in the translation of this text.

1. Hierarchy

The *oikonomoi* in view were clearly royal administrators who were subordinate to the king, since the orders they received were issued directly by him (τὰ διαταχθέντα ὑπὸ τοῦ βασιλέως). Since the document also contains instructions to the φρούραρχοι and χειρισταί τῶν οἰκονόμων, we can reconstruct a basic chain of command: the king served as head of the monarchy and delegated oversight to his military and financial subordinates, the φρούραρχοι and οἰκονόμοι; the οἰκονόμοι then further delegated tasks to their agents (χειρισταί). While the φρούραρχοι were required to grant permission to the *oikonomoi* for the opening of storage bins and to notify the king of any mismanagement on the part of the *oikonomoi* or their agents, the *oikonomoi* were not subordinate to the φρούραρχοι. Rather, they were officers of equal rank in complementary departments.⁵⁸ This is most apparent when the text indicates that the king himself, rather than the φρούραρχοι, gave the directives (τὰ διαταχθέντα ὑπὸ τοῦ βασιλέως [1]) and would issue punishment (καταγινώσκω [33, 36]) for any case of negligence. Thus, the *oikonomoi* were subordinate officials located, according to this inscription, directly beneath the king.

The document also shows that the *oikonomoi* possessed some degree of authority. Although the text does not state explicitly which official was in view for most of the instructions, the supervisory nature of the duties and the opening address together suggest that all of the instructions were intended for the *oikonomoi* unless otherwise indicated. But the presence of the χειρισταί (9, 27) indicates that *oikonomoi* did not handle all of the storage matters in each φρούριον personally. Final responsibility for the replenishment of the fortresses' supplies belonged to the *oikonomoi*, but since the χειρισταί maintained possession of the keys to the storage bins (τὰς μὲν κλεῖδας τῶν ἀποθηκῶν [8]) these tasks were probably carried out by the agents. Hence, *oikonomoi*, though subordinate to the king, possessed supervisory authority in the fortresses, and probably over the provinces of the kingdom.

2. Responsibilities

The responsibilities and desired traits of the *oikonomoi* are made clear in the inscription. Once they took inventory of the stored goods (ὧν μέτρον ἔστιν ἀναμετρησάτωσαν . . . ὧν δὲ σταθμὸς ἀνασθησάτωσαν [3-6]), they were responsible

⁵⁸ Walbank, *Philip V*, 294.

for bringing in the new grain (τὸν μὲν σῖτον ἀναγέτωσαν ἀπὸ τῆς νέας προσόδου ἄβροχον [15-16]) and for arranging the old grain to be sown in the local fields (συνατασέτωσαν διαπάσσειν τῆι γῆι τῆι Χαλκιδικῆι [17-18]). Furthermore, they were responsible for replacing the wine and wood every five years (τὸν δὲ οἶνον καὶ τὰ ξύλα ἐγνεούτωσαν διὰ πέντε ἐτῶν [18-19]) and for inspecting (ἐπισκοπείτωσαν [21; cf. 30]) and repairing (ἐπισκευαζέτωσαν [25-26]) the granaries. The purpose for the surplus is not entirely clear. Bradford Welles suggests that the ordinance was given ‘to maintain in a state of constant readiness the “first class” military supplies, grain, wine, and wood’ in case of an enemy siege.⁵⁹ On the other hand, the supplies may have been intended for emergency civilian use, since the peasants would have likely found protection in the fortress during an attack.

But even though the inscription only lists responsibilities associated with the maintenance of army surplus, it is reasonable to surmise that the Macedonian *oikonomoi* were entrusted with responsibilities beyond those listed on this stele, and perhaps outside of military matters. Clearly the φρούραρχος was appointed to a particular fortress (ὁ φρούραρχος ὁ τεταγμένος ἐν ᾧ ἂν τόπῳ [40-41]), but this may not have been the case for the *oikonomos*. When the text states that an *oikonomos* might be ‘transferred over to another place’ (μετάγεται ἐφ’ ἕτερον τόπον [49-50]), the location in view may not be a fortress, but an administrative region, similar to the τόποι managed by the Seleucid and Attalid *oikonomoi*. Moreover, it is plausible, as Welles suggests, that the *oikonomoi* performed duties in addition to those mentioned in the document.⁶⁰ When the text refers to ‘the rest of the concerns of the office’ (τῶν λοιπῶν τῶν ἐκ τῆς οἰκονομίας [52-53]), it indicates that *oikonomoi* performed tasks not mentioned in this διάγραμμα, tasks which may have required supervision beyond the fortress. Indeed, the appointment of χειρισταί might suggest that the responsibilities of *oikonomoi* were so numerous and geographically extensive that personal agents were required to fulfil them. The regularly scheduled instructions mentioned in the text, in fact, required attention only once every ten days at most during the winter, undoubtedly the most demanding season of the year [23-24]. Therefore, it is likely that the *oikonomoi* had more tasks entrusted to them than those listed here. If so, they would have been regarded as persons of great authority in the regal administration of the Macedonian kingdom.

⁵⁹ Welles, 'New Texts': 253. Significantly, nothing is stated about weaponry.

⁶⁰ Welles, 'New Texts': 253.

3. Accountability

The διάγραμμα also makes clear that the office of the *oikonomos* required thoughtfulness (φροντιζέτωσαν [19-20]), punctuality (εὐθέως [16-17]; παραχρήμα [26]), and above all precision (ἐπιμελείσθωσαν ὅπως τὰ διαταχθέντα . . . διατηρῆται ἄφθαρτα, [1-2]). According to the inscription, negligence was simply unacceptable to the king, and in any such cases the offenders would suffer whatever sentence the king issued (ἐλεγχθέντες παθέτωσαν ὅτι ἂν αὐτῶν ὁ βασιλεὺς καταγῶι [32-33]), which might have consisted of one's termination (ἀφιῆται ἀπὸ τῆς χρείας [50-51]), or perhaps worse. Regardless, the *oikonomoi* were warned by way of this inscription not to disregard the king's orders, or else suffer the penalty for mismanagement.

E. Summary

In the preceding investigation we carefully examined the use of the title οἰκονόμος in the regal administrations of the Hellenistic kingdoms.⁶¹ It is notable that during this period the title was used in each of the main four Hellenistic political powers, the Ptolemaic, Seleucid, Attalid (Pergamene), and Macedonian (Antigonid) kingdoms. Due to the minor structural differences that existed between the monarchies, we examined them individually, so as not to confuse the use of the title in one administrative system with that in another. Despite this discriminating approach to the source material, however, several consistent features surfaced in our analysis.

Oikonomoi were always shown to be subordinate financial officials at least one step removed from the top of the administrative hierarchy, and in most cases they were at least two or three steps away. At the same time, *oikonomoi* were without exception regional managers entrusted with the oversight of large territories. As a result, they normally had several delegates at their immediate disposal and supervised numerous other local officials. With such a high administrative rank, *oikonomoi* would have possessed significant social status and

⁶¹ In the Roman period, the *oikonomoi* of Caesar, though clearly belonging to the emperor and forming a somewhat distinct category of administration beyond the private, public, and regal domains, more closely resembled private than regal administrators as they belong to the *familia Caesaris*; cf. Anna Swiderek, 'Les Καίσαρος οἰκονόμοι de l'Égypte romaine', *Chronique d'Égypte* 89 (1970): 157-60; P. R. C. Weaver, *Familia Caesaris: A Social Study of the Emperor's Freedman and Slaves* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1972). We will therefore integrate our discussion of the administrators of Caesar in Chapter 4.

structural authority. But the administrative competencies of *oikonomoi* were usually limited to financial matters, so that their responsibilities typically involved various kinds of revenue acquisition as well as the provisions and payments of needs and supplies of the regional economic sectors. They served in certain judicial capacities on occasion, but this seems to have been necessary only when the offenses involved were of some financial relevance. In either case, *oikonomoi* would have been held accountable for their administrative oversight by their superiors. Several documents indicate that professional advancement was a real possibility for those who carried out the king's wishes. Alternatively, termination and eventual sentencing by the king or an immediate supervisor awaited those who were guilty of mismanagement.

Chapter 3. *Oikonomoi* as Civic Administrators

The epigraphic remains from both the Hellenistic and Roman periods also attest to the appointment of *oikonomoi* as administrators of Greek and Roman cities. Just like the evidence pertaining to regal *oikonomoi*, texts featuring *oikonomoi* in civic contexts have been found throughout the Mediterranean basin and range in date from just before the death of Alexander the Great to the mid-third century CE. But before an analysis of these municipal officials can be undertaken, several methodological difficulties must be addressed.

Firstly, despite the widespread geographical attestation of the title, the inscriptions mentioning municipal *oikonomoi* are not evenly distributed. Many of these inscriptions surface in clusters and in specific geographical regions, most notably western Asia Minor, the Aegean Islands, the coastal cities of the Black Sea, and southern Greece, creating a lack of uniformity across the Mediterranean. It is possible that this clustering is due to modern archaeology's patchy excavating of Greek societies, but it should be noted that there are even very few attestations of *oikonomoi* in some cities that have been heavily excavated.¹

In spite of the scattered usage of *oikonomoi*, though, it is significant for our purposes that the best attested regions are those located at the edges of the Hellenistic kingdoms where an abundance of self-governing cities developed.² It is not surprising, then, that cities in these peripheral regions were administered differently than those managed more closely by the Hellenistic kings and employed titles not normally utilised in cities falling within the direct jurisdiction of the monarchies. In fact, many of the titles used for magistrates in these 'independent' cities were the same as those used for regional administrators in the Hellenistic

¹ Take for example Athens, from which there have been tens of thousands of inscriptions published and just one known instance of <o>*ikonomos* (IG II² 11492/CIG 963/CIL 3.555), which, incidentally, attests to a private slave administrator, not a civic official.

² Although much of western Asia Minor and the Black Sea region fell within the borders of the monarchies, quite often the cities located within those distant territories were given the opportunity to govern themselves, so long as tributes were regularly paid to the kings. For the 'independence' of Greek cities, see, e.g., Ma, *Antiochos III*, 150-74; Mogens Herman Hansen, 'The "Autonomous City-State", Ancient Fact or Modern Fiction?', in *Studies in the Ancient Greek Polis*, ed. Mogens Herman Hansen and Kurt A. Raaflaub (Historia Einzelschriften 95; Stuttgart: Franz Steiner, 1995), 21-43.

kingdoms. After all, in the peripheral independent cities there would have been little concern for titular overlap with regal administrators.³

It is also significant that there are genetic links between many of the cities that appointed *oikonomoi*. It has been well documented that the Greek civilisations of western Asia Minor, for instance, were colonised by the cities of southern Greece. Moreover, the Greek civilisations found in the Black Sea region were largely colonised by the cities of western Asia Minor, particularly Miletus.⁴ Because these regions have hereditary ties, it should come as no surprise that the titles used for city officials in these regions quite frequently overlapped.

A second difficulty with examining the profile of municipal *oikonomoi* is that the inscriptions which mention them rarely reveal anything of real significance. As David Magie laments, 'Unfortunately, the extant documents—principally decrees passed by the Assemblies—yield little information concerning the details of government and the actual administration of public affairs in the Asianic city-states during the Hellenistic period'.⁵ This does not imply that nothing can be ascertained about their civic responsibilities and administrative power. Inscriptions featuring *oikonomoi* indicate much about their involvement in civic purchases and certain public events. But beyond this not much is known directly from these texts. If it can be assumed that every *oikonomos* serving in municipal contexts was entrusted with the same responsibilities, then more can be deduced. But as previously stated, most cities where the title was used were autonomous, constructed their own constitutions, and so were governed differently. It is not entirely clear, therefore, why certain cities appointed entire boards of *oikonomoi*, why some elected only one, and why some appear to have had none. To complicate things further, the titles given to the individuals who fulfilled the duties normally performed by *oikonomoi* were not always the same. It is quite unclear why some cities used the title οἰκονόμος, others ταμίας, and still others ὁ ἐπὶ τῆς διοικήσεως. Were these titles

³ For an introduction to the economy of these free states, see Léopold Migeotte, *The Economy of the Greek Cities: From the Archaic Period to the Early Roman Empire* (trans. Janet Lloyd; Berkeley: University of California Press, 2009).

⁴ Gocha R. Tsetskhladze, 'Greek Penetration of the Black Sea', in *The Archaeology of Greek Colonisation: Essays Dedicated to Sir John Boardman*, ed. Gocha R. Tsetskhladze and Franco De Angelis (Oxford University School of Archaeology Monographs; Oxford: Oxford University School of Archaeology, 2004), 111-135, at 124: 'Virtually all the colonies in the Black Sea region were founded by Miletus'.

⁵ David Magie, *Roman Rule in Asia Minor: To the End of the Third Century after Christ* (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1950), 59.

synonymous? If so, why do they occasionally appear in the same city⁶ and even side by side?⁷ Moreover, why do certain titles surface in some periods, disappear for well over a century, only to reappear again in the same city in a later era?⁸ Such questions create difficulties in the reconstruction of city administrations and must be taken into consideration when investigating the responsibilities and power dynamics of civic *oikonomoi*.

We must, nevertheless, attempt to synthesise what the evidence does suggest. In an effort to do so, we will divide the data into three historical and municipal contexts. We will first analyse the responsibilities and administrative power possessed by those *oikonomoi* serving in Greek cities during the Hellenistic period, then proceed to those characteristics of *oikonomoi* in Greek cities from the Roman period, and finally examine the same features pertaining to *oikonomoi* serving in Roman colonies and *municipia*. While minor differences existed in each of these civic contexts, several consistent features of *oikonomoi* will become apparent over the course our analysis. In each case, *oikonomoi* normally functioned as financial magistrates and possessed considerable socio-economic status within their respective communities (it is noteworthy, however, that a number of municipal *oikonomoi* serving in Greek cities during the Roman period appear to have been public slaves [e.g. SEG 24.496; 47.1662; 38.710; see Appendix 1]).⁹ But despite their

⁶ In Priene, οἰκονόμος, νεωπόιης, and ὁ ἐπὶ τῆς διοικήσεως were all used for financial magistrates. But νεωπόιαι clearly managed sacred funds, suggesting that οἰκονόμοι served in the central treasury. The jurisdiction of οἱ ἐπὶ τῆς διοικήσεως is more complicated, since they made the same payments as οἰκονόμοι. Anton Asboeck, 'Das Staatswesen von Priene in hellenistischer Zeit' (PhD Diss., Univ. of Munich, 1913), 112, concluded that ὁ οἰκονόμος and ὁ ἐπὶ τῆς διοικήσεως referred to the same public office: 'Die Befugnisse beider sind, soweit wir sie kennen, identisch'. This may have been the case, but not necessarily, as ὁ ἐπὶ τῆς διοικήσεως only surfaces four times in Priene, the last attestation being in the second century BCE, while οἰκονόμος appears more than ten times through the first century BCE. Léopold Migeotte, 'La haute administration des finances publiques et sacrées dans les cités hellénistiques', *Chiron* 36 (2006): 379-94, at 388, therefore, suggests that a reform took place during the second century BCE that eliminated ὁ ἐπὶ τῆς διοικήσεως and retained only the οἰκονόμος, entrusting all public funds to him.

⁷ See, e.g., *IMylasa* 301: τὴν αὐτὴν ἐπιγραφὴν ποιείσθω ἐφ' ἑκάστου καὶ παραδίδτω αὐτὰ τοῖς ταμίαις ἢ οἰκονόμοις τῆς φυλῆς (cf. *IMylasa* 201). It could be that in Mylasa the various city tribes (φυλαί) used ταμίαις and οἰκονόμος interchangeably. Cf. *SEG* 39.1243; 52.659; *ISmyrna* 771; 772.

⁸ See, e.g., the titular variety of the Athenian treasury. Cf. Alan S. Henry, 'Polis/Acropolis, Paymasters and the Ten Talent Fund', *Chiron* 12 (1982): 91-118; Alan S. Henry, 'Athenian Financial Officials after 303 B.C.', *Chiron* 14 (1984): 49-91; R. Develin, *Athenian Officials 684-321 B.C.* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1989), 7-12; G. J. Oliver, *War, Food, and Politics in Early Hellenistic Athens* (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2007), 223-27.

⁹ Still, many other municipal οἰκονόμοι in Greek cities during the Roman period were citizens and magistrates (e.g. *CIG* 2811; *SEG* 26.1044; *TAM* 5.743; *Ismyrna* 761; 771; 772; *IStratonikeia* 1). Cf. Alexander Weiß, *Sklave der Stadt: Untersuchungen zur öffentlichen Sklaverei in den Städten des Römischen Reiches* (Historia Einzelschriften 173; Stuttgart: Franz Steiner, 2004), 50-59.

prominence, these officials never possessed any significant political and decision-making authority. Furthermore, the measures taken to ensure their dependability differed between historical and municipal contexts. In fact, it is quite significant that *oikonomoi* serving in these civic roles were neither offered any tangible incentives for administering well, nor held accountable directly to a superior official. Instead, municipal *oikonomoi* were answerable either to the entire community or to a representative body.

A. In Greek Cities of the Hellenistic Period

1. Responsibilities

The *oikonomoi* who served in Greek cities during the Hellenistic period were treasurers, elected magistrates, and citizens. This much is clear from the interchangeable usage of οἰκονόμος with ταμίαις (treasury magistrate) in civic publications.¹⁰ According to the epigraphic record, the most commonly repeated statement mentioning municipal οἰκονόμοι reads as follows: τὸ δὲ ἀνάλωμα τὸ εἰς τὴν στήλην δοῦναι τὸν οἰκονόμον ('And let the *oikonomos* pay the expense for the stele' [OGI 50]). While regularly varying in word-order and word-choice, this formula is mentioned in at least twenty-five inscriptions dated between the fourth and first centuries BCE, as well as in an additional eight inscriptions whose dates are unknown, but whose provenances suggest that they too belonged to the Hellenistic period (see Appendix 2). Significantly, the formula resembles that which was used to authorise the purchases made by ταμίαι and other financial magistrates in many other Greek cities during this timeframe.¹¹

Oikonomoi were also responsible for the payments and provision of numerous gifts and crowns for ambassadors, athletes, and benefactors. A third-century BCE inscription from Ephesus, for instance, has been restored to report how an *oikonomos* was charged with the responsibility of awarding a certain man with a gift in return for his benefactions: 'And the *oikonomos* should send to him the gift of

¹⁰ Although Weiß, *Sklave der Stadt*, 56, deduces that in some instances οἰκονόμοι and ταμίαι held entirely different offices, he concedes that 'der οἰκονόμος τῆς πόλεως in einigen Städten den ταμίαις ersetzte'. Cf. Reumann, 'Oikonomia', 234-35. While Landvogt, 'Οἰκονόμος', 19-21, ultimately rejected a formal equivalence between οἰκονόμοι and ταμίαι, he observed that their responsibilities overlapped considerably.

¹¹ Cf. Alan S. Henry, 'Provisions for the Payment of Athenian Decrees: A Study in Formulaic Language', *ZPE* 78 (1989): 247-93, esp. 259-60.

hospitality [ξένια] so that all might know that the people highly honour the favours being offered for the benefits of the city' (*IEphMcCabe 88/IBM 469*). Although the recipient is not specified in what remains of the inscription, it is clear from another Ephesian publication dating to the same period that such ξενία were offered to wealthy visitors whose favours the city aimed to secure (*IEphMcCabe 60/OGI 10/IBM 453*). Such gifts were apparently sanctioned by law, as suggested by a third-century BCE inscription from Colophon: 'And the *oikonomos*, Koronos, should give the gifts of hospitality [ξένια] to the ambassador [τῶι πρεσβευτῆι] which are in accordance with the law [τὰ ἐκ τοῦ νόμου]' (*SEG 49.1502/REG 1999:2.1*). *Oikonomoi* were also responsible for purchasing and distributing crowns to accomplished athletes and politicians. In one inscription (*IEphesos 1448*; see below) an Ephesian *oikonomos* was commissioned to pay for the crowns presented to Antigonos and Demetrius, whereas in another particularly interesting case the *oikonomos* in Ephesus was instructed to distribute money to the victor of a contest so the athlete could purchase the crown himself:

The boule and people decreed: Neumos son of Andronikos proposed: whereas Athenodoros son of Semon being of equal rights and dwelling in Ephesus has won the Nemean games in boys' boxing and being proclaimed as Ephesian has crowned the city [ἔστεφάνωκε τὴν πόλιν], the city and people decree: Athenodoros is to be an Ephesian, as he was proclaimed in the contest, and there are to be for Athenodoros the honours that are authorized by law for the victor in boys' corporeal events in the Nemea (games); and to proclaim him in the agora as the other victors are proclaimed; the *oikonomos* is to give Athenodoros the money [ἀργύριον] that is authorised by law [τὸ ἐκ τοῦ νόμου] for the crown; and to allot him a tribe and chiliastus. (*IEphesos 1415/IEphMcCabe 69/IBM 415*)¹²

According to the text Athenodoros was to be awarded the prize in cash from the Ephesian *oikonomos*. Presumably the victor would then use the money to purchase his own crown.¹³ Finally, a second-century BCE inscription from Colophon shows that an *oikonomos* was responsible annually for financing a celebration in honour of a certain deceased citizen:

These things were decided by the council and the people: Let the gymnasiarch of the epebes each year, on the day when Athenaios passed away, perform a sacrifice and the race of the *neioi* and epebes in honor of Athenaios. On this day, let also the *paidonomos* put on a sporting competition of the *paides*. Let them be given by the *oikonomos* for the sacrifice and the race and the sporting competition [ὑπὸ τοῦ οἰκονόμου εἷς τε τὴν θυσίαν καὶ τὴν διαδρομὴν καὶ τὸν ἀγῶνα].¹⁴

¹² Trans. adapted from William J. Slater and Daniela Summa, 'Crowns at Magnesia', *GRBS* 46 (2006): 275-99, at 297-98.

¹³ The interesting feature of this award is that it was delivered by Ephesus, even though the athletic contest was held in Nemea. It is probably the case that the policy in Ephesus, and perhaps in other cities as well, was to award gifts to any champion who named the city as their residence; cf. Slater and Summa, 'Crowns at Magnesia': 298.

¹⁴ T. Macridy, 'Altertümer von Notion', *JÖAI* 8 (1905): 155-73, at 163; trans. adapted from Sviatoslav Dmitriev, *City Government in Hellenistic and Roman Asia Minor* (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2005), 36.

It is significant to observe that, while other city officials were integrally involved in the planning of this municipal event, which included cultic as well as athletic oversight, the only responsibility of the *oikonomos* in this instance and in many others was the dispensing of the required funds.

Oikonomoi, however, did on occasion perform duties beyond making public payments. Two lengthy inscriptions reveal their participation in religious festivals and processions. A second-century BCE inscription from Magnesia on the Maeander, for example, mentions a board of *oikonomoi* who were delegated certain cultic duties on behalf of the city (*IMagnMai 98/IMagMcCabe 2*). It was resolved that in the last month of the year they should buy a bull and at the beginning of the new year, when seed was to be sown, they were to offer it as a sacrifice at a public festival. Their participation in the sacrifice as well as in the on-going prayer for peace and prosperity highlights their representative role even in the religious activities of the community. The relevant portion of the inscription reads:

[10] It was decided by the council and people, on the proposal of the people: that the *oikonomoi* in office shall buy the best possible bull and that those who succeed them shall ever after buy the best possible bull in the month of Heraion at the annual festival, and shall dedicate it to Zeus at the start of the sowing in the month of Kronion at the new moon together with the male priest and the female priest of Artemis Leukophryene and the chief magistrate and the Sacred Herald and the one serving as sacrificer for the city.

[18] that the *paidonomoi* send nine boys, with both parents alive, and the *gunaikonomoi* likewise send nine girls, with both parents alive. At the designation of the bull, the Sacred Herald shall pray with the male priest and the female priest and the *stephanephoros* and the boys and the girls and the army commanders and the cavalry commanders and the *oikonomoi* and the Secretary of the council and the notary and the general for the wellbeing of the city and the territory and the citizens and women and children and the other inhabitants of the city and territory for peace and prosperity and the yield of grain and of all other crops and livestock. [. . .]

[46] that also the *oikonomoi* shall provide in the month of Artemision on the twelfth day an additional three sacrificial victims, which they shall sacrifice to Zeus Sosipolis, to Artemis Leukophryene and to Apollo Pythios, to Zeus the finest ram, to Artemis a nanny-goat and to Apollo a billy-goat, sacrificing to Zeus on the altar of Zeus Sosipolis, to Artemis and Apollo on the altar of Artemis. The priests of these gods shall take their customary privileged portions.

[54] that when they sacrifice the bull, they shall divide up the meat among the participants in the procession; they shall divide up the meat of the ram, the nanny-goat and the billy-goat among the *stephanephoros*, the female priest, the army commanders, the presidents, the Temple Clerks of Work, the judges and those who have assisted in the rituals; the *oikonomoi* shall divide up the meat.

[59] that once a bull has been dedicated, the *oikonomoi* shall make a contract so that the bull is maintained by the contractor; that the contractor bring the bull into the agora, and take a collection from the grain-dealers and from the other stall-holders for what he spends on the maintenance of the bull, and it is recommended that they make a donation.

[64] that the *oikonomoi* inscribe this decree in the sanctuary of Zeus on the doorway; that the *oikonomoi* pay for the writing of all these things from the income which they have for the administration of the city [ἐκ τῶν πόρων ὧν ἔχουσιν εἰς πόλεως διοίκησιν].

[67] that this decree is for the protection [φυλακίην] of the city.¹⁵

That *oikonomoi* should have a leadership role in the observance of this festival is to be expected given the purpose of the ceremony as indicated in the final line of the inscription. According to the text, the ritual solicited citywide protection (φυλακίη) from Zeus.¹⁶ It is fitting, therefore, that *oikonomoi* and other magistrates should participate by offering public prayers and sacrifices, since as public officials they represented the community not only in political matters, but also to the gods. As John Reumann observes, the duties of the *oikonomos* ‘go beyond check-signing, for he takes part in the sacrificial rites, if not as a cult official, at least as an intermediary of the municipal government’.¹⁷ But this and other inscriptions show that, even when *oikonomoi* were assigned cultic duties, they were not in these contexts only, or even primarily, acting as ‘religious’ officials, since these texts normally indicate that administrative responsibilities also accompanied their religious tasks.¹⁸ It is significant, for instance, that in this inscription the *oikonomoi* were responsible for offering and dividing sacrifices—seemingly religious tasks—as well as for purchasing the animals, drawing up a contract, and having the decree engraved on a stele, placed in the sanctuary, and paid for by the central treasury—seemingly administrative tasks.¹⁹

¹⁵ Trans. adapted from S. R. F. Price, *Religions of the Ancient Greeks* (Key Themes in Ancient History; Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1999), 174 (§3); cf. Reumann, ‘Stewards of God’: 343.

¹⁶ Even so, Dmitriev, *City Government*, 25, insists that the event represented in this inscription was not a ‘religious’ activity as such, but involved sacrifices and priests because ‘almost everything in Greek cities did’.

¹⁷ Reumann, ‘Stewards of God’: 342.

¹⁸ Of course the sharp distinction between sacred and secular did not exist in the Graeco-Roman world, so that one should not categorise *oikonomoi* or any city official as serving in a purely secular context. As P. J. Rhodes, ‘State and Religion in Athenian Inscriptions’, *Greece & Rome* 56 (2009): 1-13, at 1, remarks, ‘In Athens, and in the Greek world generally, the notion of a separation between church and state was unthinkable’. Moreover, Ramsay MacMullen, *Paganism in the Roman Empire* (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1981), 43, explains, ‘it must be remembered how far from purely secular were most elected officials in cities of Greek or Roman derivation. This year to the gods, the next to the city – such was the pattern of service rendered by the local aristocracy’. Nevertheless, some delineation between public and sacred was recognised in Graeco-Roman cities. Dignas, *Economy*, 272, for instance, maintains that ‘a clear distinction between sacred and public finances, as well as between sacred and public land, existed in the communities of both Hellenistic and Roman Asia Minor’.

¹⁹ Dmitriev, *City Government*, 29-30, further explains that Greek city officials occasionally supervised affairs in different administrative contexts because ‘city offices in Hellenistic Asia were not grouped into any a priori defined fields of city administration. One city official could have different kinds of responsibilities and was classified in more than one category, while officials with different ranges of responsibility could participate in the same kind of activity. The Greeks conceptualized city administration not as a sum of administrative fields but as individual offices which they grouped as the situation required’.

Other inscriptions also present *oikonomoi* as simultaneously fulfilling religious and administrative duties. A late-fourth-century BCE inscription from Ephesus, for example, charges the city *oikonomos* with performing sacrifices as well as making public payments (*IEphesos* 1448/*IBM* 448/*IEphMcCabe* 108/*SIG* 352). The relevant portion of the text was restored to read:

It was decreed [by the council and the people]: Since Demetrios, the king, being responsible for obtaining many great good-things for the Greeks and our city, for good fortune it should be resolved by the people to delight together over the good things which have been announced about the king and the army, and for the Ephesians and all those dwelling within to bear crowns [στεφανηφορεῖν] on the good fortunes which were being announced, and for the priestess and *oikonomos* to offer sacrifice also to Artemis for the good news [εὐαγγέλια] brought, and to pray also for the rest of time, for abundant well-being to come to Demetrios the king and the people of Ephesus. And also to give to Antigonos and Demetrios the crowns which are of the laws. And for the *oikonomos* to pay the expenses which are for the sacrifice. . . . And the *oikonomos* to pay for the crown.

In this text the pairing of the *oikonomos* with the priestess as officiants of the sacrifice and festival demonstrates once more that municipal *oikonomoi* were occasionally delegated religious responsibilities. But, as noted before, the participation of public administrators in public rituals was quite normal in Graeco-Roman antiquity, since city magistrates served as community representatives not only in political matters, but also in religious observance. The *oikonomos* in this text, therefore, should not be confused with a purely cultic official, since the payment announcements in the latter part of the inscription indicate that the *oikonomos* was primarily a public administrator. As Reumann remarks, '[A]ll state officials in antiquity had religious duties to perform, and the fact that an ἄρχων took part in a sacrifice did not make him a cult official. Likewise with the political *oikonomos*'.²⁰

In summary, while a handful of inscriptions mention the cultic duties occasionally delegated to municipal *oikonomoi*, it is apparent in each case that religious oversight only accompanied the administrative responsibilities normally entrusted to them.²¹ Cumulatively, then, the texts mentioning municipal *oikonomoi* reveal that during the Hellenistic period they were always treasurers and often the chief financial magistrates of the Greek cities where they were appointed, having been commissioned to disburse public funds for various civic expenses. As Peter Landvogt explains, 'Die Hauptkompetenzen des οἰκονόμος in diesen Freistaaten bestehen in der Sorge für Aufschrift und Aufstellung von Psephismen und Statuen, in Bestreitung der Kosten für jene Besorgungen sowie für Kränze und

²⁰ Reumann, 'Stewards of God': 344 (original emphasis).

²¹ Reumann, 'Stewards of God': 344: 'At best we can say that these governmental *oikonomoi* at times had cultic duties along with financial ones'.

Gastgeschenke. . . . Kurz, das Charakteristische für die ganze Amtstätigkeit des οἰκονόμος . . . in dieser Periode ist, daß er lediglich als Kassen- oder Finanzbeamter fungiert'.²²

2. Hierarchy

As municipal magistrates *oikonomoi* were, in one sense, considered civic leaders. But their elevated social status and political rank did not translate into great administrative authority like the *oikonomoi* who served in the hierarchies of the Hellenistic kingdoms. Hellenistic cities simply—and quite intentionally—lacked the deep political structure which characterised the monarchies. Instead, political power was designed to be shared by the members of the community. Certain kinds of socio-economic power could be obtained and were exploited effectively in these municipalities. But *oikonomoi* and other local politicians possessed very limited structural leverage with which they could control the community.

The typical independent Greek city of the Hellenistic period was democratic by constitution and instituted three main political bodies to ensure that it was ruled by the people (δημος).²³ The first institution, the assembly (ἐκκλησία), consisted of all the male citizens of the city at least twenty-one years of age. Just as in Athens,²⁴ most city assemblies convened for standard meetings about thirty times per year and for the 'chief meeting' (ἐκκλησία κηρία) ten additional times per year.²⁵ At assembly meetings, which were always summoned by the president (e.g. πρότασις, ἡγεμών), the people made collective decisions, normally by vote, concerning matters proposed by the council. Such matters included the passing of decrees (ψηφίσματα) and legal revisions, although the latter were also required to be confirmed by legislative jurors (νομοθέται).²⁶

²² Landvogt, 'Οἰκονόμος', 17.

²³ A. H. M. Jones, *The Greek City: From Alexander to Justinian* (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1940), 157: 'Democracy was . . . in the hellenistic age universally recognized as the proper constitution of the Greek city, and as the institutions of the Greek city spread over barbarian lands it was the democratic type of constitution which was accepted as the norm'.

²⁴ M. I. Finley, *Politics in the Ancient World* (The Wiles Lectures; Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1983), 70-71, considers it methodologically acceptable to draw general comparisons between Athens and other large city-states.

²⁵ Mogens Herman Hansen, *The Athenian Democracy in the Age of Demosthenes: Structure, Principles, and Ideology* (Norman: Oklahoma University Press, 1999), 133.

²⁶ Hansen, *Athenian Democracy*, 167-69.

The second institution, the council (βουλή), consisted of annually elected magistrates (ἄρχοντες), such as *oikonomoi*, who carried out the executive duties of the city.²⁷ Normally, magistrates in the πόλις were required to be male citizens at least thirty years of age—although exceptions have been noted²⁸—free of any criminal charges, and not to be seeking re-election to an office held the previous year (Aristotle, *Ath. pol.* 55.3). Further, in keeping with the democratic principle, they were to have gained their positions either by vote or by lot.²⁹ While certain cities required a single official for a given magistracy, other cities further reduced the control of elected officials by electing entire boards to a particular office, such as the city treasury.³⁰ But whereas the right to pass public decisions was reserved for the assembly, magistrates were entrusted with the responsibility of preparing decisions for the assembly and implementing those policies passed collectively by the people. Resolutions normally originated with the magistrates and, after the formal motion had been passed by the council, it became a preliminary resolution (προβούλευμα). It was then presented before the assembly for vote where, if passed, the resolution became a decree.³¹ Thus, both the people—by virtue of the assembly—and the council were integral to the decision-making process, as announced in the enactment formulas of many civic publications: ἔδοξεν τῆι βουλῆι καὶ τῶι δήμῳ.³² These statements are suggestive of the great administrative authority and responsibility entrusted to both the assembly and the council. The two bodies functioned complementarily, so that the council was always charged with the important task of proposing and carrying out the decisions made by the assembly.³³

²⁷ Dmitriev, *City Government*, 56; Jones, *Greek City*, 165.

²⁸ Dmitriev, *City Government*, 46-56, discusses instances when women and children (and even kings and deities) were elected to public office.

²⁹ In the east magistrates were normally elected in order to protect the sovereignty of the people. As Jones, *Greek City*, 162, remarks, 'It was an essential principle of Greek democracy to curb as far as possible the power of the executive, the magistrates, and to ensure that the magistracies were equally accessible to all citizens'.

³⁰ Jones, *Greek City*, 163; Migeotte, 'La haute administration': 393-94, argues that 'beaucoup de cités ont concentré en peu de mains la haute administration des finances publiques et souvent celle des finances sacrées'.

³¹ P. J. Rhodes, *The Athenian Boule* (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1972), 104; B. H. McLean, *An Introduction to Greek Epigraphy of the Hellenistic and Roman Periods from Alexander the Great down to the Reign of Constantine (323 B.C.-A.D. 337)* (Ann Arbor: University of Michigan Press, 2002), 218.

³² P. J. Rhodes and David M. Lewis, *The Decrees of the Greek States* (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1997), 4.

³³ Jones, *Greek City*, 164: 'All Greek cities, however democratic, recognized that the primary assembly was a dangerously irresponsible body, and therefore, while leaving to it the ultimate decision on every point of importance, took care that no ill-considered proposal could be suddenly sprung upon it and passed in a snap division. One precaution, which seems to have been universal,

Nevertheless, the entire procedure underscores the sovereignty of the people and the supportive roles of the council and its magistrates.

The third institution of the Greek city was the people's court (δικαστήριον), which further highlights the restricted power of magistrates. If the council was the executive branch of the δῆμος, then the court functioned as its judicial embodiment and was the political establishment with which the final word and source of power rested.³⁴ Although every city had a single δικαστήριον, several courts might convene everyday in a given city, each comprising upward to several hundred male jurors (δικασταί) at least thirty years of age who were selected daily by lot from a large panel of eligible citizens. These courts tried both public and private cases, but those that most often came before the people's court were political hearings.

The distribution of power between each of these three civic bodies has significant implications for how we regard the authority entrusted to the *oikonomoi* appointed in Hellenistic cities. Since Greek cities sought to restrict the power of its politicians by placing the bulk of the decision-making authority in the hands of the citizens, the structural authority of the typical elected official was limited. Beyond this, treasurers such as *oikonomoi* do not appear to have possessed much of any structural authority, as their role was largely to dispense public funds at the instruction of the council. Still further, this responsibility was occasionally distributed among a treasury board, affording the individual *oikonomos* a rather inconsequential role in the development of public policy.

was that no measure might be brought before the assembly which had not been considered and approved by the council'.

³⁴ The precise relationship between the δῆμος and δικαστήριον is disputed. Mogens Herman Hansen, *The Sovereignty of the People's Court in Athens in the Fourth Century B.C. and the Public Action Against Unconstitutional Proposals* (Odense University Classical Studies 4; Odense: Odense universitetsforlag, 1974), 18, argues that, 'The authority of the courts is greater than that of the Assembly, and it is the jurors who are the protectors of democracy'. Cf. Mogens Herman Hansen, *Eisangelia: The Sovereignty of the People's Court in Athens in the Fourth Century B.C. and the Impeachment of Generals and Politicians* (Odense University Classical Studies 6; Odense: Odense universitetsforlag, 1975); Mogens Herman Hansen, 'The Political Powers of the People's Court in Fourth-Century Athens', in *The Greek City: From Homer to Alexander*, ed. Oswyn Murray and Simon Price (Oxford: Clarendon, 1990), 215-43. Peter Rhodes, on the other hand, has maintained that both the assembly and people's court were mere embodiments of the δῆμος; cf. P. J. Rhodes, 'Εισαγγελία in Athens', *JHS* 99 (1979): 103-14; P. J. Rhodes, 'Athenian Democracy after 403 B.C.', *CJ* 75 (1980): 305-23; P. J. Rhodes, *A Commentary on the Aristotelian Athenaion Politeia* (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1981), 314, 489, 525, 545.

3. Accountability

According to the Athenian court system, political hearings generally took four forms.³⁵ Before any elected person could take office, he had to undergo (i) a scrutiny of his legal qualifications (δοκιμασία).³⁶ While in office he could then be removed during any ἐκκλησία κηρία (ii) by vote (ἀποχειροτονία) due simply to the dissatisfaction of the people,³⁷ or (iii) by impeachment (εἰσαγγελία) for criminal behaviour.³⁸ Lastly, at the end of his term he had to undergo (iv) a final review of his conduct and a financial audit (εὔθυνα).³⁹ Only when this final scrutiny was

³⁵ The majority of the evidence for the accountability of Greek city officials is from fourth-century BCE Athens. Fortunately, recent studies have confirmed that much continuity existed between Athenian political trials and those of other Hellenistic cities; cf. Pierre Fröhlich, *Les cités grecques et le contrôle des magistrats (IVe-Ier siècle avant J.-C.)* (Hautes études du monde gréco-romain 33; Geneva: Droz, 2004), 361-62. For attestations of similar judicial scenarios in other Greek cities, see Rhodes and Lewis, *Decrees*, 528-29.

³⁶ The δοκιμασία was not an examination of the candidate's competence, but of his 'formal qualifications, conduct and political convictions' (Hansen, *Athenian Democracy*, 218). In theory the court maintained the power to overturn an election if it believed the candidate was legally unfit for office, although eventually this procedure became something of a formality. During the procedure the candidate was required to reply to a series of standard questions (Aristotle, *Ath. pol.* 55.3). After the candidate successfully answered the questions and provided witnesses to testify on his behalf, all citizens were given the opportunity to bring accusations against the candidate's qualifications, to which he was forced to reply. A vote was then held by the jurors and the candidate was either admitted to or excused from office. Cf. Jennifer Tolbert Roberts, *Accountability in Athenian Government* (Wisconsin Studies in Classics; Madison: University of Wisconsin Press, 1982), 14; Gabriel Adeleye, 'The Purpose of the 'Dokimasia'', *GRBS* 24 (1983): 295-306.

³⁷ The first formal opportunity afforded citizens to criticise magistrates took the form of a vote of no confidence. During every ἐκκλησία κηρία citizens could propose a 'vote on the magistrates' (ἐπιχειροτονία τὰς ἀρχάς), whereby the assembly voted by a show of hands on the approval of a named official. If the vote went against the magistrate (ἀποχειροτονία), then he would be immediately suspended. An impeachment trial (εἰσαγγελία) would follow in order to remove the magistrate from office permanently. The trial itself was presided over by the θεσμοθέται, who carried out the preliminary investigation (ἀνάκρισις) and summoned a court. It included speeches by the prosecution and defence and a vote by the jury. If the jury found the magistrate guilty, then he would be permanently dismissed and punished according to the sentence which was proposed by the prosecution and decided upon by a second vote of the jury. But if he was acquitted, then the magistrate would be immediately restored to his office. Cf. Hansen, *Athenian Democracy*, 221.

³⁸ Impeachment could take different forms and call for varying degrees of punishment. Εἰσαγγελία εἰς τὸν δῆμον could be charged against any citizen for a political crime, but was primarily brought against generals (στρατηγοί) for major crimes committed against the city, such as treason, corruption, or even an unlucky defeat on the battlefield. These offences often resulted in the death penalty, exile, or such a heavy fine that the convicted man became a state debtor and ἄτιμος for life. For a number of examples of impeached magistrates, see Roberts, *Accountability*, 28. Εἰσαγγελία εἰς τὴν βουλήν, on the other hand, could only be brought on magistrates for the lesser charge of maladministration, but could encompass any number of offences and might result in a large fine. Cf. Hansen, *Athenian Democracy*, 212-18.

³⁹ These trial procedures were held in two phases. First, εὔθυνα involved an active investigation into an official's conduct. At the end of every magisterial term each official submitted his accounts to a board of ten inspectors (λογισταί) who would then preside over a court hearing while their assistants (συνεργοί) brought forth against the official accusations concerning the audit. After the initial scrutiny, citizens could come forward and make further accusations of embezzlement, bribery, or a lesser financial offence. After the official testified in his own defence, the jury then voted. If the official was found guilty of either embezzlement or bribery, then he was

completed could the magistrate honourably return to civilian life.⁴⁰ These kinds of political elections and trials were essential for the survival of democracy in Hellenistic cities. According to Peter Rhodes and David Lewis, 'If a Greek state was to be considered in any sense democratic, it was essential that, even if the offices were not open to all citizens, the citizens should have the right to appoint the office-holders and call them to account'.⁴¹

The construction of the assembly and court, then, created a balance of power in the Hellenistic cities, so that civic magistrates, such as *oikonomoi*, could occupy elected office and possess administrative responsibility without being afforded great structural power like the *oikonomoi* of the Hellenistic monarchies.⁴² Certain offices utilised titular prefixes which imply subordination (ὕπο-), but as Sviatoslav Dmitriev explains, 'The development of subordinate relations took place only inside administrative colleges and social organizations and therefore did not create any hierarchical structure in Asian city administration'.⁴³ Again, since magistrates during this period—who do not appear normally to have been paid⁴⁴—were often wealthy enough to finance their own administration or promise some sort of

penalised a tenfold fine; if he was convicted of a lesser offence, then he was fined a lesser amount. The second phase was much more passive. It required that the magistrates reply to any other offences for which they were accused. But these later accusations were brought by citizens first to another panel of inspectors consisting of one corrector (εὐθυνας) and two assessors (πάρεδροι) from each tribe. For only three days following the first phase of the εὐθυναί these inspectors were made available to their respective tribes to receive accusations from citizens. During this time any accusation could be brought forward, but the correctors and assessors were given the opportunity to decide for themselves whether or not the charges were worthy of investigation. If in fact an accusation seemed worthy of further consideration, it was then passed on to court authorities so the magistrate could stand trial once again. If no charges were passed by the inspectors, then the εὐθυναί came to a close and the man returned to civilian life.

⁴⁰ Magistrates also had to be prepared for inspections while in office. The council, for instance, regularly audited the accounts of the treasurers and any other such magistrates entrusted with public funds. A board of ten inspectors (λογισταί) from among the councillors was chosen annually by lot to examine these magistrates during each prytanny. Accused councillors were forced to stand trial and face punishment if found guilty. Additionally, at any point during a magistrate's administration a citizen could bring charges against him and recommend impeachment. Such measures were so fundamental to democratic practice in the Hellenistic city that opportunities to voice grievances were built into the assembly's regularly scheduled meetings.

⁴¹ Rhodes and Lewis, *Decrees*, 528.

⁴² That junior magistrates, and not just στρατηγοί, could be prosecuted for misconduct is best represented by the trial of the acclaimed Athenian general Timotheus, whose sentence fell upon his ταμίης Antimachus, (Demosthenes, [Tim.] 49). Cf. Roberts, *Accountability*, 27, 42-43, 201 n. 54.

⁴³ Dmitriev, *City Government*, 61.

⁴⁴ G. E. M. de Ste. Croix, 'Political Pay outside Athens', *CQ* 25 (1975): 48-52, presents evidence that members of the assembly in Iasus, as well as judges, assembly members, and councillors in Rhodes, received pay. But the practice of paying magistrates was probably not widespread; cf. Dmitriev, *City Government*, 34-35.

benefaction upon election,⁴⁵ public officials normally held a large amount of social clout in the community.⁴⁶ But even though the population was apparently content with the political initiative of the elite, the δῆμος maintained the bulk of political power as they possessed the final vote on all matters which entered the assembly and, perhaps more importantly, the opportunity to prosecute political crimes in the people's court. Thus, civic *oikonomoi* would not have possessed any decision-making authority or structural power stemming from a superior bureaucratic rank. Rather, as Mogen Hansen explains regarding the central treasury, '[T]he job of the Council and the Board of Receivers in relation to the public finances was purely administrative: they had only very limited power to take decisions about the use of the moneys they administered'.⁴⁷ David Magie concurs, saying, 'As a rule . . . treasurers had no authority of their own, their duties being to receive the income of the city and to make payments ordered by the Council or by a decree of the Assembly'.⁴⁸

B. In Greek Cities of the Roman Period

With the spread of Rome came the inevitable deterioration of democracy and the introduction of top-heavy power structures in the cities of the eastern

⁴⁵ Pierre Fröhlich, 'Dépenses publiques et évergétisme des citoyens dans l'exercice des charges publiques a Priène a la basse époque hellénistique', in *Citoyenneté et participation a la basse époque hellénistique*, ed. Pierre Fröhlich and Christel Müller (Hautes études du monde gréco-romain 35; Geneva: Droz, 2005), 225-56.

⁴⁶ By the Hellenistic period the typical Greek city was in enough financial disarray that the population was generally willing to succumb to the ambitious political careers of the economic elite so long as the city was compensated in the return. Public benefactions and liturgies—often expressed through generous donations to city building projects and the funding of magistracies—eventually provided wealthy citizens avenues to secure long-term control of public offices; cf. Dmitriev, *City Government*, 38-45. As Jones, *Greek City*, 168, explains, 'Democracy was . . . in the Hellenistic age tempered by a convention that the rich should have a virtual monopoly of office, provided that they paid for it liberally. And on the whole the compromise seems to have worked very well. The sanguinary class war which was the curse of Greek politics in the fifth century died down, and the upper classes fulfilled their part of the bargain in no grudging spirit. A very strong sense of civic obligation grew up among them, and they served their cities loyally both with their persons and their purses, as countless inscriptions testify'. Greek cities during the Hellenistic period, therefore, were ideologically democratic, but functionally aristocratic.

⁴⁷ Hansen, *Athenian Democracy*, 263. The inscriptions mentioning the payments of *oikonomoi* never specify which account was to be deducted when paying for stelae, gifts of hospitality, or crowns. It is reasonable to assume, though, that they were paid for by the council, who set aside an account to cover such expenses. For city budgets, see Dmitriev, *City Government*, 36; Christof Schuler, 'Die διοίκησις τῆς πόλεως im öffentlichen Finanzwesen der hellenistischen Poleis', *Chiron* 35 (2005): 385-403; P. J. Rhodes, 'διοίκησις', *Chiron* 37 (2007): 349-62; Léopold Migeotte, 'La planification des dépenses publiques dans les cités hellénistiques', in *Studi Ellenistici* 19, ed. Biagio Virgilio (Pisa: Giardini editori e stampatori, 2006), 77-97.

⁴⁸ Magie, *Roman Rule*, 61.

Mediterranean. Although not all democratic principles and practices were discarded outright during the Roman period, most Greek city governments came to function as aristocracies, rather than as the democracies so prevalent in the Classical and Hellenistic periods. Of course democracy's decline was neither instantaneous nor universal. The changes introduced in the Roman period were already present in infancy as early as the beginning of the Hellenistic era.⁴⁹ Moreover, not all cities adopted Rome's policies, so that there remained features of the democratic model in a number of Asian cities which continued to function just as they had centuries earlier. But while neither the labels 'oligarchy' nor 'aristocracy' ever appear in city constitutions, in both form and function most Greek cities under Rome came to resemble miniature versions of the Roman republic.

According to G. E. M. de Ste. Croix, three factors led to the gradual 'destruction of Greek democracy'. The first cause was the growth of magisterial and conciliar control of the assembly.⁵⁰ In many Greek cities during this period the people maintained some involvement in the creation of public policy. Indeed, the councils of certain cities continued to require the approval of the assembly in the policy-making process. But the assembly's power to reject proposals was largely theoretical and rarely utilised. The epigraphic evidence from the Roman empire demonstrates that the ἐκκλησία convened mainly for the purpose of ratifying honorary decrees and the proposals that the magistrates chose to present to the people. The assembly, then, had become little more than a confirmatory body and its power largely nominal.⁵¹

A second factor that led to the demise of democracy and the rise of oligarchy in the Greek city was the attachment of liturgies to civic magistracies.⁵² Like the magistracies of the Hellenistic period, city officials under Rome were elected annually by the assembly of adult male citizens. During the Roman period, however, the annual lists of magisterial candidates were produced by the council and the assembly's only responsibility in elections was the selection of the candidates from

⁴⁹ As F. F. Abbott and A. C. Johnson, *Municipal Administration in the Roman Empire* (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1926), 69: 'When Rome entered Greece, the era of the independent city-state had already passed'.

⁵⁰ G. E. M. de Ste. Croix, *The Class Struggle in the Ancient Greek World: From the Archaic Age to the Arab Conquests* (London: Duckworth, 1981), 300; Abbott and Johnson, *Municipal Administration*, 75.

⁵¹ Magie, *Roman Rule*, 641.

⁵² de Ste. Croix, *Class Struggle*, 300.

the pre-approved list of nominees.⁵³ During this period magistracies also came attached with property qualifications, often because magistrates were expected to finance their administrations personally.⁵⁴ A third-century CE inscription from Thessalonica demonstrates this reciprocal exchange as it recognises the generosity of a certain Zosimos, the city's *oikonomos* and benefactor (τὸν εὐεργέτην [IG X 2.1.150]). But the property qualification was not an entirely new observance during the Roman period. As Jones remarks, it simply 'gave legal sanction to what was already the general practice, making illegal for the future what had in the past been theoretically possible—that the people might elect to office radically minded politicians of humble station'.⁵⁵ The use of elections was a small concession to democracy, but in some cities even voting rights were restricted to a few, which is implied by the differentiation between 'ecclesiasts' and 'citizens' in certain inscriptions.⁵⁶

With council nominations out of the reach of the poor, magisterial posts became almost hereditary and perpetually controlled by the elite. This is even demonstrated in several *oikonomoi* inscriptions from the Roman period. One *oikonomos* from Cos, for instance, is said to have served his post for well over two decades: 'Philetos, *oikonomos* of the city of Cos, managing [οἰκονομήσαντος] blamelessly for 23 years' (IKosPH 310).⁵⁷ A funerary column of a well-respected citizen from Crete, moreover, mentions the man's three sons, all of whom apparently served as *oikonomos* in their lifetime: '[Kletonymos] certainly did not extinguish his life in old age glowing like some star, through the imprudence of his *daimon*, while protecting his country with his counsels. Rather the *oikonomoi*, pillars of his reputation [δοξῆς κίονες], prevailed in good foresight. For he left three sons of

⁵³ Magie, *Roman Rule*, 640–41.

⁵⁴ Dmitriev, *City Government*, 140–57.

⁵⁵ Jones, *Greek City*, 171.

⁵⁶ Magie, *Roman Rule*, 640; cf. Abbott and Johnson, *Municipal Administration*, 75–76.

⁵⁷ The date of this inscription is still uncertain, but is estimated to be from no earlier than the first century BCE. Dmitriev, *City Government*, 223, considers the *oikonomos* to be a magistrate. But P. M. Fraser, 'Notes on Two Rhodian Institutions', *ABSA* 67 (1972): 113–24, at 115, suggests that the individual was a public slave, arguing that 'the words τῆς πόλεως seem normally to be used of state-employment of a humble sort . . . and would not be appropriate to a regularly elected official or magistrate'. Cf. Susan Sherwin-White, *Ancient Cos: An Historical Study from the Dorian Settlement to the Imperial Period* (Göttingen: Vandenhoeck & Ruprecht, 1978), 222. But Fraser's generalisation cannot be applied to numerous *oikonomoi* bearing the qualifier τῆς πόλεως (e.g. *IPriene* 83; 109; 99; 117; *TAM* 5.743; *IAphrodMcCabe* 275).

his own'.⁵⁸ These examples demonstrate that magistracies, including the office of the *oikonomos*, were important roles in city administration and were controlled by certain socio-economic groups, and even individual families. By the Roman period the elite clearly had a tight monopoly on political office.

The third factor contributing to democracy's demise while under Rome was the elimination of the popular law courts.⁵⁹ In the democratic city the δικαστήριον held the magistrates accountable for political crimes, ensuring that the council operated in the best interest of the people. But in the Roman period, the juries were largely non-functioning bodies, so that the council was left without accountability or any built-in restrictions.⁶⁰ Some ancients still regarded these courts as operative during this period (e.g. Plutarch, *Mor.* 805a; Dio Chrysostom, *Or.* 49.15).⁶¹ But the involvement of the courts in the prosecution of the ruling class is almost completely absent from the epigraphic record.⁶² Without the people's court the council became sovereign.⁶³ As Jones explains, 'When [the council] came to be no longer a mere committee of the assembly, renewed at frequent intervals and responsible to the popular courts for its acts, but a permanent and therefore irresponsible body, it inevitably became the governing body of the city'.⁶⁴

⁵⁸ For text, translation, and discussion, see Martha W. Baldwin Bowsky, 'Epigrams to an Elder Statesman and a Young Noble from Lato Pros Kamara (Crete)', *Hesperia* 58 (1989): 115-29. The date of this inscription is probably the late-second century BCE.

⁵⁹ de Ste. Croix, *Class Struggle*, 301.

⁶⁰ Some supervision was applied by the provincial governor and his imperial agents; cf. Abbott and Johnson, *Municipal Administration*, 78; Alan K. Bowman, 'Provincial Administration and Taxation', in *The Cambridge Ancient History: The Augustan Empire, 43 B.C.-A.D 69 (Vol. 10)*, ed. Alan K. Bowman, Edward Champlin, and Andrew Lintott (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1996), 344-70, esp. 366. But not much is known about the involvement of these imperial officials in the accountability of local magistrates; cf. François Jacques, *Le Privilège de Liberté: Politique Impériale et Autonomie Municipale dans les cités de L'occident romain (161-244)* (Collection de L'école Française de Rome Rome: École française de Rome, 1984), 379-425.

⁶¹ Dmitriev, *City Government*, 157: 'The evidence for the *dokimasia* of city officials in preprovincial Asia and in various Roman provinces suggests that at least some city officials in the province of Asia also had to pass a *dokimasia* before being admitted to office'; cf. C. P. Jones, *The Roman World of Dio Chrysostom* (Loeb Classical Monographs; Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 1978), 98; I. Makarov, 'Les données épigraphiques sur l'histoire de Chersonèse Taurique du Ier s.a.C. au Ier s.p.C.', in *Provinciae Imperii Romani inscriptionibus descriptae. Barcelona, 3-8 Septembris 2002* (Barcelona: Barcelona, 2007), 877-83.

⁶² Joyce Reynolds, 'Cities', in *The Administration of the Roman Empire, 241 BC - AD 193*, ed. David Braund (Exeter Studies in History; Exeter: University of Exeter, 1988), 15-51, at 31, maintains that 'in most cities the more important cases went to a Roman court'.

⁶³ Although Rome tried not to interfere in the legislation of cities in the east, the absence of official accountability in these cities might stem from the policies of magisterial immunity in the west; cf. E. J. Weinrib, 'The Prosecution of Roman Magistrates', *Phoenix* 2 (1968): 32-56, at 36-37; Joseph Plescia, 'Judicial Accountability and Immunity in Roman Law', *American Journal of Legal History* 45 (2001): 51-70, at 51-56.

⁶⁴ Jones, *Greek City*, 171.

Rome's aristocratic and timocratic policies clearly dominated the majority of the cities of the eastern Mediterranean. Even though each of these features was already present during the Hellenistic period, the power enacted over *oikonomoi* in the Greek cities under the Roman empire changed markedly in this period. No longer were they mere administrative functionaries serving as representatives of the δήμος. During the Roman period the *oikonomoi* serving as treasury magistrates—though they largely remained unpaid⁶⁵—belonged to the socio-economic elite, were patrons of the city, and remained unaccountable to the general population. Still, the magistracy was not considered a position of great structural power. Just as before, their administrative powers were restricted to making payments as decided by the council. While they were able to utilise their wealth and social stature to obtain office, once they were elected to the magistracy the administrative power of the *oikonomos* was quite limited.

C. In Roman Colonies and *Municipia*

The appointment of *oikonomoi* in the *coloniae* and *municipia* of the eastern Roman empire requires that we also analyse the political structures of these cities since *coloniae* and *municipia* were governed quite differently than their Greek counterparts.⁶⁶ Unfortunately, the administrative rank and responsibilities of *oikonomoi* in these Roman cities remains tentative due to the absence of a bilingual text from antiquity containing the Greek title and a Latin correlative. Much debate has therefore ensued in an effort to identify, for instance, the rank and status of Erastus, the acquaintance of Paul and *oikonomos* of Corinth (Rom 16.23). NT specialists as well as ancient historians have proposed a number of possible Latin renderings for Erastus's title, including *arcarius* (servile accountant),⁶⁷ *quaestor*

⁶⁵ Dmitriev, *City Government*, 141.

⁶⁶ During the Roman Republic and early empire *coloniae* were newly established cities comprised largely of army veterans and freedmen settlers commissioned from Rome, while *municipia* were previously inhabited, conquered towns incorporated into the Roman state. Cf. Abbott and Johnson, *Municipal Administration*, 3-9. For the similarities between Rome and its colonies, see Aulus Gellius (*Noct. att.* 16.13.8-9a), who described them as 'miniatures' and 'copies' of the capital, and A. W. Lintott, *Imperium Romanum: Politics and Administration* (London: Routledge, 1993), 130, who likens them to 'Roman islands in a more or less foreign sea'.

⁶⁷ Vulg.; A. G. Roos, 'De titulo quodam latino Corinthi nuper reperto', *Mnemosyne* 58 (1930): 160-65; Henry J. Cadbury, 'Erastus of Corinth', *JBL* 50 (1931): 42-58; P. N. Harrison, *Paulines and Pastorals* (London: Villiers, 1964), 100-105; Justin J. Meggitt, 'The Social Status of Erastus (Rom. 16:23)', *NovT* 38 (1996): 218-23; Steven J. Friesen, 'Poverty in Pauline Studies: Beyond the So-Called New Consensus', *JSNT* 26 (2004): 323-61, at 354-55.

(treasury magistrate),⁶⁸ and *aedilis* (public works magistrate),⁶⁹ but to date no consensus has emerged.

The identification of the Latin equivalent for *oikonomos* in Roman *coloniae* and *municipia* has received some clarification in recent years, however, by the discovery of an inscription from the Achaean colony of Patras (*SEG* 45.418). Paying tribute to the *oikonomos* Neikostratos, the inscription displays the man's *cursus honorum* and therefore provides the opportunity to compare his current rank with that of his previously held municipal positions. The inscription was restored to read:

<p>τὸν Οἰκονόμον τ[ῆς] κολωνείας Νεικό[στρα]- τον τὸν δις Ἄγων[οθέ]- 4 την Ἀγορανομήσα[ντα] φιλοτείμως δις Γρ[αμμ]- ατεύσαντ[α] φιλοδόξως κατασκευάσαντα ἀπ[ὸ θε]- 8 μελίων τὸ τρέκλειν[ον] ψηφοθετήσαντα .[- 2-3 -] [- - 4-5 - -] εὐφρασίας Π[- 2-3 -] [- - 6-7 - -] - 3-4 - EN[- 3-4 -] 12 [- - - 11-12 - - -]πρ[- 3-4 -] (Reproduced from <i>SEG</i> 45.418)⁷⁰</p>	<p>‘Neikostratos, <i>oikonomos</i> of the colony, twice the president of the games, having generously served as <i>agoranomos</i>, having twice lavishly served as secretary, having built the triclinium from its foundation, having laid the mosaic . . . of good cheer . . .’</p>
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Several details in this inscription are relevant for our enquiry. Firstly, it is significant that Neikostratos, perhaps a freedman, was honoured here as the *oikonomos* of the colony after having held several prestigious posts earlier in his

⁶⁸ Gerd Theissen, 'Soziale Schichtung in der Korinthische Gemeinde: Ein Beitrag zur Soziologie des hellenistischen Urchristentums', *ZNW* 65 (1974): 232-72, at 245; Wayne A. Meeks, *The First Urban Christians: The Social World of the Apostle Paul* (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1983), 59; Victor P. Furnish, 'Corinth in Paul's Time: What Can Archaeology Tell Us?', *BAR* 14 (1988): 15-27, at 20; Jerome Murphy-O'Connor, *Paul: A Critical Life* (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1996), 268-70.

⁶⁹ *IKorinthKent* 232; David W. J. Gill, 'Erastus the Aedile', *TynBul* 40 (1989): 293-301; Andrew D. Clarke, 'Another Corinthian Erastus Inscription', *TynBul* 42 (1991): 146-51; Clarke, *Secular*, 46-56; Bruce W. Winter, *Seek the Welfare of the City: Christians as Benefactors and Citizens* (First-Century Christians in the Graeco-Roman World; Grand Rapids: Eerdmans, 1994), 179-97.

⁷⁰ Nikolitsa Kokkotake, 'ΣΤ' ΕΦΟΡΕΙΑ ΠΡΟ· Ι' ΣΤΟΡΙΚΩΝ ΚΑΙ ΚΛΑΣΙΚΩΝ ΑΡΧΑΙΟΤΗΤΩΝ: Οδός Ηφαίστου 13 και Ηλία Μηνιάτη', *ArchDelt* 47, no. B'1 (1992): 129-57, at 130. While the editors of *SEG* 45.418 have dated the inscription to the Roman period generally, through personal email correspondence Joyce Reynolds has suggested to me that the lettering indicates a date perhaps no earlier than the late-second century CE.

career. Of particular importance in Neikostratos' *cursus* was his tenure as ἀγωναθέτης (cf. *Achaïe II* 136 and 266).⁷¹ The president of the games, as Athanasios Rizakis indicates, was an office that only the wealthiest individuals of the city could afford to occupy: 'agonothètes et *munerarii* font partie de la tranche la plus riche de la société locale car ils sont appelés à faire des dépenses très élevées pour les jeux et les concours de la cité'.⁷² The adverbs φιλοτείμως and φιλοδόξως also vividly describe the liberality of Neikostratos' previous administrations. They testify to the man's high social status while highlighting how he generously gave of his own wealth, probably in the form of benefactions—like the triclinium and mosaic (κατασκευάσαντα ἀπὸ θεμελίων τὸ τρέκλεινον ψηφοθετήσαντα)—in exchange for his offices and public admiration. As Jon Lendon explains, 'In Greek, one of the usual terms for public benefaction was *philo-timia*, an act of "glory-love". It was in honour terms that the rich man's motivation, involving so much trouble and expense, was chiefly understood: he devoted to the city his money and effort and got honour in return—cheering in the assembly and the voting of honorific decrees and monuments'.⁷³ In view of this description, it is clear that no mere slave (*arcarius*) or aspiring citizen could have fitted Neikostratos' profile. Rather, as the text intimates, the office of *oikonomos* in an Achaean colony, such as Patras, was reserved for accomplished and highly visible aristocrats, and was indicative of social, economic, and political achievement.

Secondly, it should be observed how Neikostratos' *cursus* undermines the interpretation which equates the offices of οἰκονόμος and ἀγορανόμος in Achaean colonies. Bruce Winter, for example, seeking to identify Erastus the *oikonomos* from Rom 16.23 with Erastus the *aedilis* from *IKorinthKent* 232, has proposed that Corinth's unusual political structure permitted οἰκονόμος (i.e. Rom 16.23) to be used

⁷¹ A. D. Rizakis, 'La Colonie romaine de Petras En Achaïe: le Temoignage Épigraphique', in *Renaissance* (1989), 180-86, at 184: 'Grâce à l'épigraphie nous connaissons, aujourd'hui, l'existence des concours patréens; des textes, provenant des cités voisines de Corinthe et de Delphes mais aussi de Laodicée de Syrie, mentionnent des concours à Patras, sans toutefois préciser leur nom exacte; il en est de même d'une longue liste agonistique en latin, trouvée à Patras et qui présente un intérêt particulier en ce qui concerne l'origine ethnique des concurrents et les noms des différentes épreuves'.

⁷² A. D. Rizakis, *Achaïe II. La cité de Patras: épigraphie et histoire* (Meletemata 25; Athens: Research Centre for Greek and Roman Antiquity/National Hellenic Research Foundation, 1998), 30.

⁷³ J. E. Lendon, *Empire of Honour: The Art of Government in the Roman World* (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1997), 86.

interchangeably with ἀγορανόμος and ἀστυνόμος, two textually confirmed equivalents for *aedilis*.⁷⁴ Winter explains:

The term ἀγορανόμος usually involved the organisation of the games in cities in the East as well as administrative and financial duties. However, the job description of the *aedile* was determined by a situation peculiar to Corinth. The holder of that office would be responsible for sponsoring the games, which returned to Corinth c. 40 B.C., soon after it was founded as a colony. Precisely when the duties of running the Games were separated from the aedileship is not unclear [*sic?*] but the office of 'President of the Games' (ἀγωνοθέτης) in Corinth was created as a separate liturgy no later than the beginning of the first century A.D. Such was their fame and the burden of private sponsorship borne by the president that the office was given precedence over any other liturgy in Corinth, including that of magistrates who normally held the most senior position. This change in the duties of the *aedile* in Roman Corinth meant that his function was that of chief administrative officer and city treasurer. Such duties could best be rendered descriptively by the term οἰκονόμος, a natural and entirely appropriate term.⁷⁵

While Winter's argument for a 'descriptive' use of οἰκονόμος in Rom 16.23 is ingenious, the likelihood that οἰκονόμος might have actually been used this way in Corinth is highly improbable, since Neikostratos' *cursus* in SEG 45.418 demonstrates that, even in an Achaean colony where ἀγωνοθέτης and ἀγορανόμος were two distinct offices, οἰκονόμος likewise referred to a magistracy altogether separate from the ἀγορανόμος.

Still, the question remains: In Patras, to which magistracy did οἰκονόμος correspond? In Neikostratos' *cursus* in SEG 45.418, ἀγορανόμος (ἀγορανομέω) unquestionably corresponded to *aedilis*.⁷⁶ Moreover, since in Patras the Greek equivalents for *duovir* were στρατηγός (*Achaïe II* 110) and ἀρχὸς πενταέτηρος (*Achaïe II* 37),⁷⁷ the use of οἰκονόμος in Neikostratos' inscription indicates that he served as *quaestor*.⁷⁸ But where in the administrative hierarchy were *quaestores* located, and what kinds of administrative power and responsibilities did municipal *quaestores* possess?

1. Hierarchy

The reconstruction of the administrative structures of Roman colonies and *municipia* is made possible mainly through the remains of a number of Latin

⁷⁴ Winter, *Welfare*, 185-87: ἀγορανόμος (IGRR 1.769); ἀστυνόμος (Epictetus, *Diatr.* 3.1.34). Cf. Hugh J. Mason, *Greek Terms for Roman Institutions: A Lexicon and Analysis* (American Studies in Papyrology 13; Toronto: Hakkert, 1974), 175.

⁷⁵ Winter, *Welfare*, 189; cf. 191.

⁷⁶ Mason, *Greek Terms*, 19, equates ἀγορανομέω with *aedilis esse* in a municipal context.

⁷⁷ Rizakis, *Achaïe II*, 29.

⁷⁸ For a fuller defence of this position, see John K. Goodrich, 'Erastus, *Quaestor* of Corinth: The Administrative Rank of ὁ οἰκονόμος τῆς πόλεως (Rom 16.23) in an Achaean Colony', *NTS* 56 (2010): 90-115.

statutes. These texts were legislated by the central Roman government in an effort to unify the civic administrations of their provincial settlements in the period when many of them were founded.⁷⁹ The *Lex Iulia Municipalis*, or *Tabula Heracleensis* (ILS 6085; FIRA I² 13), for instance, is a collection of regulations instituted in 45/44 BCE to standardise local administration in the settlements both ‘within the city of Rome or nearer the city of Rome than one mile’ and ‘in *municipia* or colonies or prefectures or *fora* or *conciliabula* of Roman citizens’ (*passim*; Crawford 24).⁸⁰ Equally significant are the remains of the four city charters discovered in Spain.⁸¹ The *Lex Coloniae Genetivae Iuliae* (*seu Ursonensis*), or *Lex Ursonensis* (ILS 6087/FIRA I² 21), for instance, comprises four bronze tablets from the colony of Urso dating to 45/44 BCE and contains many of the same stipulations concerning the responsibilities of the senate, *duoviri*, and *aediles* included in the *Lex Iulia Municipalis*.⁸² Both of these *leges* reveal much about how colonies were founded and governed in the late Republic and early empire. Moreover, they have special relevance for this study because Corinth, as a Roman colony founded in early 44 BCE, was probably commissioned with a nearly-identical charter.⁸³ Regrettably, neither the *Lex Iulia Municipalis* nor the *Lex Coloniae Genetivae Iuliae* mention the office of the *quaestor* or contain significant information concerning magisterial accountability. Fortunately, much of the missing information from these two documents is supplemented by the well-preserved remains of three Spanish *municipium* charters dating to the Flavian period. The *Lex Salpensana*, *Lex Malacitana*, and *Lex Irnitana* are near-verbatim copies of what must have been a charter template and together provide close to a comprehensive account of city administration and magisterial responsibility in a typical Flavian city. Using this assortment of laws and charters to inform our study, we can reconstruct the typical municipal government under the late Republic and early empire in order to discover how administrative power was issued to and held over the municipal *quaestor*.

⁷⁹ Abbott and Johnson, *Municipal Administration*, 57; Barbara Levick, *Roman Colonies in Southern Asia Minor* (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1967), 80.

⁸⁰ For full text, translation, and discussion, see Michael H. Crawford, *Roman Statutes* (2 vols.; BICS 64; London: Institute of Classical Studies; University of London, 1996), 355-91.

⁸¹ For the relevance of Spanish charters in the reconstruction of city constitutions across the empire, see, e.g., Leonard A. Curchin, *The Local Magistrates of Roman Spain* (Phoenix Supplementary Series 28; Toronto: University of Toronto Press, 1990), 12. For their relevance to Greek cities, see Clarke, *Serve the Community of the Church*, 40.

⁸² For full text, translation, and discussion, see Crawford, *Roman Statutes*, 393-454.

⁸³ Curchin, *Magistrates*, 14.

Political power in the ancient Roman city was unevenly shared between three civic institutions: the assembly of citizens (*comitia*), local senate (*ordo decurionum*), and magistrates (*magistratia*). Unlike the Hellenistic Greek city, power did not rest with the people or even the assembly. Rather, as in the lesser-privileged Greek cities under Rome, the only notable responsibility of the assembly was to elect civic magistrates nominated by the senate. Administrative power in the Roman colony and *municipium*, then, was entrusted to a few, the aristocrats, who controlled the primary decision making bodies, the senate and the magistracies.

The *ordo* consisted of the local senators (*decuriones*), whose number differed from city to city—being as low as thirty, as high as six hundred, but often hovering around one hundred—and would have been specified in the city’s constitution (e.g. *Lex Irnitana* 31).⁸⁴ Candidates for admission to the *ordo* were elected annually and were required to meet basic legal, financial, and age qualifications before being elected by the existing decurions. These qualifications ensured that the empowered elite maintained political authority and that any undesirable members were excluded.⁸⁵

The magistrates were nominated annually from among the existing senators by the *ordo* and elected by the assembly. Candidates for office could not have held office within the five years leading up to their candidacy (*Lex Malacitana* 54) and were expected to fund large portions of their administration personally, including certain expensive public services which were stipulated in the city constitution. The officials to be elected each year included two *duoviri*, two *aediles*, and, in some cities, two *quaestores*. Aspiring aristocrats often, but not always, progressed up through the magisterial ranks according to the *cursus honorum*, whereby they would take office sequentially from *quaestor* to *aedilis* to *duovir*.⁸⁶

The *duoviri* (*duumviri*) were the chief local dignitaries and presided over the senate. They also served as the judicial magistrates of the city. They might personally hear a number of smaller civil and criminal cases, although these cases could also be decided by juries made up of senators. The more costly and important cases were sent before the provincial governor, who became more and more involved in local affairs through the centuries. Regarding the relationship of the

⁸⁴ Curchin, *Magistrates*, 22.

⁸⁵ Curchin, *Magistrates*, 27.

⁸⁶ Curchin, *Magistrates*, 29, doubts the validity of any fixed sequence.

duoviri to the lower magistracies, they possessed greater *potestas* than the *aediles* and *quaestores* and could apply *intercession* against the acts of those lesser officials, provided this took place within three days of a complaint being received (*Lex Salpensana* 27; *Lex Malacitana* 58). The lesser officials, however, were not directly accountable to the *duoviri*. They were subject to the discretion of the *duoviri* in some administrative decision-making and could be prosecuted by them following their term, but the *duoviri* did not possess any direct political authority over the junior magistrates.

The *aediles* functioned as deputies to the *duoviri*. They might at times function in a judicial capacity, but were primarily entrusted with the management of public works and city maintenance, which involved overseeing the restoration of public roads and buildings as well as supervising the marketplace. Moreover, they were expected to sponsor annual athletic contests and religious festivals. Although little is said in the extant charters about the oversight of city finances by the *aediles*, there is little room to doubt that they handled public funds, especially in towns which had no *quaestor*.

The *quaestores* are completely absent in the earliest Spanish colony charters and may not have existed in all cities.⁸⁷ Therefore, not as much is known about their responsibilities and governing authority as the *duoviri* and *aediles*. What is known about the municipal *quaestores* in the provinces comes largely from the *Lex Irnitana*. Once in office *quaestores* were responsible solely for the administration of public finances. As chapter 20 of the charter indicates, 'The quaestors . . . are to have the right and power [*ius potestasque*] of collecting, spending, keeping, administering and looking after the common funds . . . at the discretion of the duumviri [*pecuniam commune . . . exigendi erogandi custodiendi atministrandi dispensandi arbitratu{m} Iiurorum*]' (Gonzalez/Crawford).⁸⁸ Even so, the quaestorship comprised of considerably less political and judicial power than the senior magistracies. Although they were given command of their share of public slaves (*servi communes*), nowhere do the charters suggest that *quaestores* possessed any decision-making authority

⁸⁷ Curchin, *Magistrates*, 29-30: 'Clearly the quaestorship did not exist in all towns, and the quaestors' financial duties must have been undertaken by the other magistrates'. Still, as Curchin notes, it is perhaps significant that certain Caesarian colonies elected *quaestores* (e.g. Tarraco, Valentia, Emerita/Norba), even though the office was not mentioned in the Caesarian colony charters.

⁸⁸ W. D. Lebek, 'Domitians *Lex Latina* und die Duumvirn, Aedilen und Quaestoren in Tab. Irn. Paragraph 18-20', *ZPE* 103 (1994): 253-92, at 264-69.

regarding public expenditures. Budget revisions were made by the senate in consultation with the *duoviri*, and instructions regarding public payments apparently came through the *duoviri* and at their discretion (*arbitratum*).⁸⁹ *Quaestores*, on the other hand, were simply entrusted with the unenviable task of making and receiving payments on behalf of the central treasury.⁹⁰

Regardless of the tedious nature of their work, *quaestores* were always assumed to possess high social and economic status. According to chapter 54 in the *Lex Malacitana*, for instance, *quaestores* were required to be Roman citizens and *decuriones*, who were generally among the one-hundred wealthiest members of the city, possessing at least 100,000 sesterces.⁹¹ Chapter 60 in the *Lex Irnitana* furthermore mandated all candidates for the quaestorship to deposit sizable 'securities' (*praedes*) for the office prior to the casting of votes on election day. Together these stipulations indicate that *quaestores* were prominent individuals in Roman communities, even if they lacked administrative power. After all, magistracies were indicative of social, rather than political hierarchy, often requiring more personal munificence than professional competence.⁹²

Political power in the Roman city, then, truly rested with the senate. This centralisation of administrative authority is underscored in chapter 129 of the *Lex Coloniae Genetivae*:

Whoever shall be *Iiviri* [*duoviri*], aediles, or prefect of the *colonia Genetiva Iulia*, and whoever shall be *decurions* of the *colonia Genetiva Iulia*, they are all diligently to obey and observe the decrees of the *decurions* without wrong deceit, and they are to see that whatever it shall be appropriate for any of them to undertake or do according to a decree of the *decurions*, they undertake or do all those things, as they shall deem it proper, without wrongful deceit. If anyone shall not have acted in this way or shall have done anything contrary to these rules knowingly with wrongful deceit, he is to be condemned to pay 10,000 sesterces <to the colonists> of the *colonia Genetiva Iulia* for each occasion, and there is to be action, suit and claim for that sum according to this statute by whoever of them shall wish in a recuperatorial trial before the *Iivir* or prefect and there is to be right and power. (Crawford 25)

⁸⁹ Rizakis, *Achaïe II*, 29.

⁹⁰ For more on the powers of municipal *quaestores* during the empire, see W. Liebenam, *Städteverwaltung im römischen Kaiserreiche* (Amsterdam: Hakkert, 1967), 265-66; for *quaestores* in Republican Rome, A. W. Lintott, *The Constitution of the Roman Republic* (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1999), 136-37.

⁹¹ Clarke, *Secular*, 27. In most Roman cities magistrates were also required to be freeborn (cf. *Lex Malacitana* 54). Exceptions were made, however, in certain colonies; cf. A. J. S. Spawforth, 'Roman Corinth: The Formation of a Colonial Elite', in *Roman Onomastics in the Greek East: Social and Political Aspects*, ed. A. D. Rizakis (Meletemata 21; Athens: Research Centre for Greek and Roman Antiquity/National Hellenic Research Foundation, 1996), 167-82, at 169.

⁹² Lendon, *Honour*, 21.

That all of the magistrates would be subject to the decrees and decisions of the *ordo* suggests that the senate had final say in all matters relating to public policy.⁹³ Even though the magistrates were entrusted with the oversight of particular fields of administration, they—especially *quaestores*—were largely functionaries appointed to carry out the decisions of the *ordo*. It was the senate, then, that was the ultimate decision making body: the senate decided what buildings were to be erected, what expenses were to be paid, how taxes were to be collected, and what laws were to be passed.⁹⁴ They even functioned as the jury for many of the larger cases too important for the *duoviri* to decide themselves. But perhaps most significantly, the senate was the political body that called the magistrates to account.

2. Accountability

What is known from the remains of charters and *leges* about the accountability of magistrates in Roman colonies and *municipia* of the early empire suggests that cities feared very little that magistrates might abuse their political power. It was the senate, after all, that possessed the bulk of the city's decision-making authority while functioning without any form of accountability toward the *plebs*. Thus, impeachment or political prosecution of magistrates for administrative corruption or negligence was not as much of a concern as in the Greek cities.

According to the charters, the primary administrative concern of the senate was embezzlement of public funds by those magistrates who had access to them. Throughout the charters and *leges* instructions were provided mandating the provision of *praedes* by magisterial candidates prior to election. These securities, which could be paid for by the candidates directly or by bondsmen if the expense was too great, functioned as collateral on behalf of the candidates ensuring that those magistrates who handled the public funds would not steal from the city

⁹³ Abbott and Johnson, *Municipal Administration*, 68: 'It is rather surprising that Caesar, in founding the colonia Genetiva Iulia after his hard struggle with the Roman senate, did not magnify the power of the magistrates or the popular assembly at the expense of the *ordo*, but he adopted the pure Roman tradition for the three branches of the government'.

⁹⁴ Curchin, *Magistrates*, 59: 'In the financial sphere, the decurions received accounts of public business and decided upon the expenditure, loan, and investigation of public funds. They could pass decrees on the sale of property under a *lex praediatoria* (law concerning auctions) and on the annual inspection of sources of revenue in the town's territory. More importantly (although not mentioned in the surviving charter fragments), the decurions were responsible for ensuring the collection of taxes, although (to prevent any conflict of interest) they could not act as tax-farmers themselves'.

treasury or flee from their responsibilities.⁹⁵ Chapter 60 of the *Lex Irnitana* and *Lex Malacitana* provides a helpful summary of the procedure:

Those who in that municipium seek the duumvirate or the quaestorship . . . each of them, on the day on which the election is held, before the votes are cast, is to provide at the discretion of the person who holds that election *praedes* to the common account of the municipes, that their common funds which he handles in the course of his office will be kept safe for them. If it appears that too little has been secured for that purpose with those *praedes*, he is to register *praedia* at the discretion of the same person. And that person is to accept *praedes* and *praedia* from them without wrongful intent, until everything has been properly secured, as he may think proper. Anyone of those for whom it is necessary for votes to be cast at the election for duumviri or quaestors, whose fault it is that everything has not been properly secured, is not to be regarded as eligible by the person who holds the election. (Gonzalez/Crawford)

The mere threat of losing the *praedes* normally prevented magistrates from embezzling public funds. But how did the senate keep record of what was spent and whether or not elected officials in fact stole from the community?

The primary means by which the senate secured its treasury was through the rendering of accounts at the close of each magisterial term. As several important *leges* indicate, each official was required to produce upon the completion of their administration evidence for the purchases they made with community monies while in office. This procedure is most clearly explained in chapter 67 of the *Lex Irnitana*:

Whoever has received common funds of the municipes of that municipium, he or his heir or whoever has an interest in the case is to deliver them to the public account of the municipes of that municipium within the next 30 days after he has received those funds. And whoever runs and handles the common accounts or any common business of the municipes of that municipium, he or his heir or whoever has an interest in the case, within the next 30 days after he has ceased to run and handle that business or those accounts, provided that there is a meeting of the decuriones or conscripti, is to produce his accounts and render them to the decuriones or conscripti or to the person to whom the commission has been given of accepting and checking them, according to a decree of the decuriones and conscripti which has been passed when not less than two thirds of them are present. (Gonzalez/Crawford)⁹⁶

If the accounts were not rendered by the magistrate, then according to chapters 68 and 69 of the statute the senate was able to appoint prosecutors, summon the alleged criminal before the senatorial court, and sue him for the money he owed. But apparently the threat of losing the *praedes* was not severe enough to prevent all defection, since some additional forms of punishment also had to be enforced. If, for instance, a candidate refused to fulfil the duties of his office, he himself was liable for his obligations, but so were his bondsmen and his nominators. One can, therefore, imagine the pressure applied to an elected magistrate by his supporters to complete his term. Moreover, if a magistrate refused to fulfil his duties, the

⁹⁵ Abbott and Johnson, *Municipal Administration*, 86.

⁹⁶ See also the *Lex Coloniae Genetivae Iuliae* 80; *Lex Tarentina* (7-25).

governor was entitled to intervene and compel him to complete his responsibilities (Dig. 50.4.9). Precautions were also instituted in order to prevent the official from fleeing the city. If, for example, a magistrate attempted to flee, then the city would seize his property and surrender all his possessions to his successor. If, on the other hand, he was caught, according to the early fourth-century CE Theodosian Code (12.1.16), the fugitive was forced to serve two terms rather than just one.⁹⁷

D. Summary

In the preceding survey we encountered *oikonomoi* in three different kinds of Graeco-Roman cities and observed that the title would have carried slightly different connotations in each municipal context. After examining the role of *oikonomoi* in the political hierarchies of the Hellenistic Greek city, the Roman Greek city, and the Roman colony and *municipia*, we noted that the office was normally considered a civic magistracy, or perhaps a liturgy (except in the few instances in the Roman period when the title referred to a public slave), and the responsibilities which were entrusted to these officials primarily and consistently included the administration of public finances, particularly the payment of community expenses. The persons who occupied these prominent offices, therefore, were always citizens. Beyond this, as political magistracies became more and more monopolised by the socio-economic elite, the *oikonomos* became closely associated with public benefaction.

But the social standing of these magistrates did not have a direct bearing on the authority entrusted to them. Despite their social and legal privilege, *oikonomoi* possessed very little structural power. In certain circumstances they would have had delegates at their disposal, but normally the officials who occupied this position were administrative functionaries, merely serving as the bursar for the ruling body. The personal incentives for occupying this public office were also quite limited. Although serving as an *oikonomos/quaestor* functioned as one of several possible means of advancing one's social status, such honours were not accompanied by any immediate tangible or monetary benefits. Rather, as a public office, the position was normally quite costly, often requiring promises of munificence in order to receive

⁹⁷ Abbott and Johnson, *Municipal Administration*, 86.

election. But as long as one's administrative duties were fulfilled to the community's satisfaction, the annual term ended peaceably with a mere balancing of accounts.

Chapter 4. *Oikonomoi* as Private Administrators

The private administrative sphere is the context in which *oikonomoi* are most commonly attested in antiquity. Scores of ancient literature, inscriptions, and papyri from across the Mediterranean basin and throughout the Graeco-Roman era refer to the *oikonomoi* who served as managers of privately-owned businesses and estates. The most voluminous evidence for the service of *oikonomoi* in this area is ancient literature, especially the economic handbooks from the Hellenistic philosophical tradition. Many recent studies on ancient slavery, however, have distanced themselves from these kinds of literary sources, largely because they present estate administration from the vantage point of the proprietor. While recognising this bias, the present investigation makes no attempt to distance itself from these literary texts, since this chapter aims to produce a portrait of private administrators as they were popularly conceived. We are therefore just as interested in an *ideological* portrait of private administration as an *actual* one. For this reason, the use of caricatures and stereotypes—even occasional depictions of the ‘perfect administrator’ (ἀποτετελεσμένος ἐπίτροπος [Xenophon, *Oec.* 13.3]; *perfectus villicus* [Columella, *Rust.* 11.1.12])—will be useful for illuminating Paul’s metaphor, especially when literary portrayals can be substantiated by real-life testimonies from inscriptions and papyri. These kinds of documentary evidence are very useful for supplementing the literary sources, as they are able to confirm through scenarios taken from ‘normal life’ the ideas and practices described and prescribed by the literary authors.

Further, since much of the most illuminating data derives from texts that refer to private administrators as something other than οἰκονόμοι, in the following study we will also use as supporting evidence (i) Greek sources which prefer the titles ἐπίτροπος, πραγματευτής, and δούλος,¹ as well as (ii) Roman sources which

¹ Admittedly, the relationship between οἰκονόμος and other Greek and Latin administrative titles is disputed. Jean-Jacques Aubert, *Business Managers in Ancient Rome: A Social and Economic Study of Institores, 200 B.C. - A.D. 250* (CSCT 21; Leiden: Brill, 1994), 33-34, suggests that οἰκονόμος corresponded with *villicus*, and ἐπίτροπος with *procurator*. The epigraphic record, however, demonstrates that οἰκονόμος had the lexical range to be translated: *villicus* (CIL 3.447/ILS 1862; CIL 3.555/ILS 1867); *actor* (CIL 9.425/ILS 3197/IG 14.688, with IGRR 1.464/CIG 5875), and *dispensator* (CIL 3.333/ILS 1539/IGRR 3.25; SB 6.9248). Moreover, that ἐπίτροπος can be translated *villicus* is apparent in Columella, *Rust.* 11.1.5, where he quotes from Cicero’s translation of Xenophon, *Oec.* 12.3-4. Many other Greek terms were

employ Latin equivalents, such as *vilicus*, *actor*, *dispensator*, *institor*, and *servus*.² By supplementing our study with evidence that uses these correlative terms, we will benefit from a more comprehensive analysis of the *concept* of administration without the liabilities that accompany surveys unnecessarily restricted to a single word. Moreover, the use of such (near) synonyms is especially important in this study since, while numerous and significant descriptions of *oikonomoi* appear in literary sources from the periods of Classical and Hellenistic Greece, the Latin *vilicus* and other synonyms are used far more abundantly and in more illuminating ways in the sources from the early empire.

In this chapter, then, we will provide an overview of the private administrative sphere in order to show that business administrators were popularly conceived of as subordinate and servile managers subject to the total (structural and legal) dominance of the master and proprietor. They were responsible for the profitability of the enterprise, which afforded them considerable representative authority over the workforce and in trade negotiations with third contracting parties. Finally, their loyalty to the owner's interests—demonstrated through obedience and the moderate success of the business—determined whether the administrator would reap reward or punishment, which could be manifested through varying degrees of generosity or vengeance.

also used for private estate administrators (e.g. χειριστής, φροντιστής, μιζοτέρα). It is probable, then, that the Greek terms for private managers were roughly interchangeable and could indicate a range of administrative roles; cf. Jesper Carlsen, 'Estate Managers in Ancient Greek Agriculture', in *Range History Matters: Studies Presented to Jens Erik Skydsgaard on His Seventieth Birthday*, ed. Karen Ascani et al. (ARIDSup 30; Roma: L'Erma di Bretschneider, 2002), 117-26, at 117-18; Jesper Carlsen, *Vilici and Roman Estate Managers until AD 284* (ARIDSup 24; Rome: L'Erma di Bretschneider, 1995), 15-16; Dominic Rathbone, *Economic Rationalism and Rural Society in Third-Century A.D. Egypt: The Heroninos Archive and the Appianus Estate* (Cambridge Classical Studies; Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1991), 62.

² The Latin administrative titles normally referred to specific administrative positions, though they evolved over time. Harrill, 'Subordinate', 103-104, explains that in the Latin tradition the *ordo mancipiorum* had a threefold chain of command: (i) *procurator* (steward-attorney, or full representative), followed by (ii) *vilicus* (bailiff) and (iii) *praefectus*, *monitor*, or *magister* (overseer, foreman). Other designations were also utilised (*actor*, *atriensis*, *dispensator*, *institor*), but their specific functions varied according to literary and historical context. For some of the regional complexities involving the use of both Greek and Latin terms, see Dorothy J. Crawford, 'Imperial Estates', in *Studies in Roman Property*, ed. M. I. Finley (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1976), 35-70, at 51-52. Despite the minor differences that may have existed between these administrators, their close conceptual overlap permits us to draw insights from a range of titles. As H. C. Tietler, 'Free-Born Estate Managers in the Graeco-Roman World', in *De Agricultura* (1993), 206-213, at 210, explains: 'Although the mutual relationships between these *vilici*, *actores*, *oikonomoi*, *pragmateutai* et ceteri, the hierarchy among some of them and the precise content of their tasks are not as sufficiently known as one might wish, one thing at least seems clear: in one way or another they could be put in charge of the management, the supervision or the administration of an estate. In that respect it seems justified to place them together under a common denominator, regardless of subtle distinctions'.

A. Hierarchy

While the employment of delegate estate managers was considered beneficial from very early in most ancient Mediterranean societies, the title οἰκονόμος originally applied to the heads of households who personally supervised their own estates (cf. Xenophon, *Oec.*, 1.1-4). But as estates grew larger, military and political obligations weightier, and the migration of rural settlers to urban centres more popular, the burden of running estates and directing labourers became heavier as well.³ Landowners, then, who desired to cultivate their estates while participating in non-agrarian interests, were forced to make a functional compromise, that is, by developing various systems of absentee landownership involving the appointment of estate administrators.⁴ Not every estate owner could afford to entrust their livelihood to another, but this was often the solution for the elite. As Aristotle explains, '[A]ll people rich enough to be able to avoid personal trouble have a steward who takes this office [ἐπίτροπος λαμβάνει ταύτην τὴν τιμὴν], while they themselves engage in politics and philosophy' (*Pol.* 1255b35-37).⁵ But though absentee landownership during the fourth century BCE was perhaps a rare privilege even among the rich, by about the second century BCE it had become commonplace among the landed elite to entrust the responsibilities of business administration to various kinds of delegates.⁶

³ Aubert, *Business Managers*, 120.

⁴ Paul Erdkamp, *The Grain Market in the Roman Empire: A Social, Political and Economic Study* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2005), 12, estimates that in antiquity roughly 80% of the population was engaged in agriculture, a statistic which he claims is a 'commonplace' in historical scholarship. While it is beyond the scope of this study to offer any sort of adjustment to this figure, we can concede that agriculture functioned as the economic base for the vast majority of ancient persons. As Aristotle observed, '[T]he largest class of men live from the land and the fruits of cultivation' (*Pol.*, 1256a38-40).

⁵ Michael H. Jameson, 'Agriculture and Slavery in Classical Athens', *CJ* 73 (1978): 122-45, at 138: 'The richer might be able to leave the farm to a manager, or to oversee the work without dirtying their hands. But the bulk of the landowners would have been *autourgoi* and if possible would have purchased *oiketai* in order to have men work with them, *synergous*'. For business affairs as a distraction and an annoyance to elite estate owners, see, e.g., Pliny, *Ep.* 2.15; 4.6; 5.14; 7.30; 9.15; 9.20; 9.36.

⁶ Aubert, *Business Managers*, 121; Michael I. Rostovtzeff, *The Social & Economic History of the Roman Empire* (2nd ed.; Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1957), 18. M. I. Finley, *Ancient Slavery and Modern Ideology* (London: Chatto and Windus, 1980), 83-84, argues that Rome had become a slave society no later than the third century BCE and implies that *vilici* would have been appointed regularly by then.

1. Subordination

Absentee landownership generally took one of two forms, tenancy or agency, the difference generally lying in who made the payments and who kept the proceeds. Tenancy required that an estate be leased to an occupant farmer, who could further sublet the estate or cultivate the land personally with his own staff. The benefit for tenants was that, after the base amount was paid to the landlord (in either cash or kind), they were then able to keep the remainder of the yields for themselves. Agency, on the other hand, required that estates be entrusted to the care of managers, who then might lease (parts of) the property to tenants, farm the land personally, or supervise a team of their own labourers. In the agency model landowners, or masters (κύριοι/*domini*), were entitled to the proceeds, but were also responsible for all of the estate's operating expenses and for maintaining the manager's loyalty by offering certain kinds of incentives, normally family privileges and monetary grants.⁷

Despite its popularity during the early to mid Republic, by the Principate tenancy became the expert's preferred method of estate management.⁸ In the first century CE, for example, Columella insisted that 'it is better for every kind of land to be under free farmers [*liberis colonis*] than under slave overseers [*vilicis servis*]' (*Rust.* 1.7.6), especially for distant estates out of easy reach of the owner. This warning, however, did not deter every estate owner from appointing agents. The model was used enough throughout the early empire that even Columella included a job description for *vilici* and advised those property owners employing agents to purchase estates within easy reach of the city, in order to sustain the loyalty of the manager through the ever-present possibility of a surprise inspection (*Rust.* 1.1.18-1.2.1).

⁷ Even though additional options existed that adopted features from both models, the simple distinction between tenancy and agency will suffice for this study. For more on tenancy, see, e.g., Bruce W. Frier, *Landlords and Tenants in Imperial Rome* (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1980); P. W. de Neeve, *Colonus: Private Farm-Tenancy in Roman Italy during the Republic and the Early Principate* (Amsterdam: J. C. Gieben, 1984); Lin Foxhall, 'The Dependent Tenant: Land Leasing and Labour in Italy and Greece', *JRS* 80 (1990): 97-114, at 104-111.

⁸ Peter Garnsey and Richard P. Saller, *The Roman Empire: Economy, Society and Culture* (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1987), 72. Still, Aubert, *Business Managers*, 133, admits the difficulty in discerning whether absentee landowners preferred one system over the other, demonstrating that 'in many cases agency existed side-by-side with tenancy and independent smallholdings, and that the various systems of management supplemented each other'.

Whereas the relationship between the landowner and tenant could have entailed a number of reciprocal obligations and involved different kinds of power dynamics,⁹ the relationship between the principal and agent was decidedly asymmetrical. Administrators were always subordinate to the principal, being ranked directly beneath either the master or a *procurator* (e.g. Pliny, *Ep.* 3.19).¹⁰ This hierarchy is apparent in a host of Greek inscriptions (see Appendix 3). Because these texts are often quite brief, normally being religious tributes or funerary epitaphs, they usually fail to mention much more than the administrator's name, title, and relationship to the principal. The name appears often—although not exclusively—as a nominative absolute, and the title in apposition to the name. Both then commonly stand in close proximity to—sometimes even bracketing—the name of the principal, which normally appears as a possessive genitive, creating a formula bearing close resemblance to the slave-master construction found in many other Greek and Latin inscriptions (e.g. Φίλων Κλαυδίας Γαλλίτης οἰκονόμος [SEG 28.1034/*INikaia* 196]).

2. Legal Status

While it is impossible to ascertain the legal status of every private administrator, it is generally safe to assume that most were slaves (δοῦλοι/*servi*; e.g. *RECAM* 2.34; *ILS* 4199) and freedmen (ἀπελεύθεροι/*liberti*; e.g. *TAM* 3.258; *ILS* 7372). Even eminent ancient historian Moses Finley in his celebrated volume on *The Ancient Economy* generalised that 'management throughout the classical period, Greek as well as Roman, urban as well as rural, was the preserve of slaves and freedmen'.¹¹ There are a few exceptions to this rule,¹² yet there remain two

⁹ Foxhall, 'Dependent Tenant': 100-104.

¹⁰ The *procurator* (ἐπίτροπος) appears increasingly after the first century CE; cf. Christoph Schäfer, 'Procuratores, actores und vilici: Zur Leitung landwirtschaftlicher Betriebe im Imperium Romanum', in *Landwirtschaft im Imperium Romanum*, ed. Peter Herz and Gerhard Waldherr (Pharos 14; St. Katharinen: Scripta Mercaturae, 2001), 273-84. Thomas Corsten, 'Estates in Roman Asia Minor: The Case of Kibyrtis', in *Patterns in the Economy of Roman Asia Minor*, ed. Stephen Mitchell and Constantina Katsari (Swansea: Classical Press of Wales, 2005), 1-51, at 11-13, observes how an ἐπίτροπος supervising the entire Ummidii estate delegated its three divisions to πραγματευταί. Corsten observes that a similar hierarchy may have also been present on the nearby estate of M. Calpurnius Longus, which attests to an ἐπίτροπος and οἰκονόμοι (18); cf. Stephen Mitchell, *Anatolia: Land, Men, and Gods in Asia Minor* (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1993), 164.

¹¹ M. I. Finley, *The Ancient Economy* (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1973), 75-76. Also W. W. Buckland, *The Roman Law of Slavery: The Condition of the Slave in Private Law from Augustus to Justinian* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1908), 131: 'It is hardly an exaggeration to say that, in the age of the classical lawyers, Roman commerce was mainly in the hands of slaves'. For the servile status of *oikonomoi* in the Roman period, see Landvogt, 'Οἰκονόμος', 8, 13.

significant reasons for regarding estate managers and other private business administrators from the Roman period as normally—though not exclusively—slaves or freedmen.

Firstly, the nomenclature of private administrative texts suggests that most managers had servile origins. Typically, Roman freedmen are demarcated in the documentary evidence by the adoption of the praenomen and/or nomen (gentilicium) of their former master,¹³ as were a number of private administrators, such as (i) the *vilicus* Gnaeus Vergilius Nyrius, freedman of Gnaeus (*Cn. Vergilio Cn. l. Nyrio . . . vilico* [CIL III 7147]), and (ii) Claudius Thallos, *oikonomos* of Gaius Claudius Calpornianus (Κλαύδιος Θάλλος Γ. Κλαυδίου Καλπορνιανοῦ οἰκονόμος [SEG 29.1306/*INikaia* 205]).¹⁴ Slaves, on the other hand, were identified simply by a personal name, as were (i) Eutychos, slave *pragmateutes* of Julia Tabille (Εὔτυχος Ἰουλίας Ταβίλλης δοῦλος πραγματευτῆς [TAM 5.442]), and (ii) Artemon, slave *oikonomos* of Marcus Calpurnius Longus (Ἀρτέμων Μ. Καλπουρνίου Λόνγου δοῦλος οἰκονόμος [SEG 48.1606/*IGRR* 4.895]).¹⁵ Additionally, seven of the ten *oikonomoi* identified by Thomas Corsten in his study of the Bithynian population have only one name,¹⁶ while Jean-Jacques Aubert observes—mostly on the basis of nomenclature—that less than ten percent of the *vilici* in Italy and Sicily were freedmen and none were freeborn.¹⁷ Thus, even though the majority of inscriptions mentioning private

¹² Philodemus indicates that some estate managers were free-born: 'And how can he [Pseudo-Aristotle/Theophrastus] say that there are two kinds of slaves, the overseer and the worker, while both of them can also be free men' (*Oec.* 9.16-20). Xenophon, moreover, recorded that the free and once rich Eutheros enquired of Socrates how he might make a living. Socrates suggested that Eutheros hire himself out as a bailiff to an estate owner, but Eutheros objected to the idea because he did not want to make himself a slave (δουλείαν ὑπομείναιμι [*Mem.* 2.8.1-4]). But these exceptions prove the rule. See further Rhona Beare, 'Were Bailiffs Ever Free Born?', *CQ* 28 (1978): 398-401; Walter Scheidel, 'Free-Born and Manumitted Bailiffs in the Graeco-Roman World', *CQ* 40 (1990): 591-93. The suggestion of Tietler, 'Estate Managers', 213, is to be preferred, who recommends that historians 'consider those who occupied functions as *vilicus*, *oikonomos*, *actor* and the like as slaves unless the contrary is proved'. Cf. Egon Maróti, 'The *Vilicus* and the Villa System in Ancient Italy', *Oikumene* 1 (1976): 109-24, at 115.

¹³ A. M. Duff, *Freedmen in the Early Roman Empire* (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1928), 52-53; Susan Treggiari, *Roman Freedmen during the Late Republic* (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1969), 250-51.

¹⁴ For *vilici* as freedmen, see Duff, *Freedmen*, 93; Treggiari, *Freedmen*, 106-110.

¹⁵ Sandra R. Joshel, *Work, Identity, and Legal Status at Rome: A Study of the Occupational Inscriptions* (Norman: University of Oklahoma Press, 1992), 39, while conceding that 'a single name is not as secure an indication of servile status as a nomen is of free status', cautiously maintains that individuals with single personal names were normally slaves. For more on how to determine legal status, see McLean, *Greek Epigraphy*, 112-48, esp. 129-131; Weaver, *Familia Caesaris*, 42-86.

¹⁶ Thomas Corsten, 'The Role and Status of the Indigenous Population in Bithynia', in *Rome and the Black Sea Region: Domination, Romanisation, Resistance*, ed. Tønnes Bekker-Nielsen (Black Sea Studies 5; Aarhus: Aarhus University Press, 2006), 85-92, at 89.

¹⁷ Aubert, *Business Managers*, 149-57.

administrators fail to identify their legal status explicitly, it is generally safe—based on convention—to assume the servility of private administrators with a single name, unless otherwise indicated.

Secondly, the limitations of the Roman law of commercial agency made the employment of dependent intermediaries, such as slaves and freedmen, the safest and most convenient means for transacting business.¹⁸ This was the case in the western and eastern parts of the empire, even Roman Palestine.¹⁹ Aaron Kirschenbaum offers four reasons why slaves were those ‘psychologically best suited’ to occupy these roles: (i) ‘self-respecting free men were unwilling to accept positions in which they had to obey the orders of an employer’;²⁰ (ii) ‘employers preferred to utilize the services of men whose character they knew and on whose obedience they could rely’; ‘slaves could be chastised if they disobeyed instructions’; and (iv) ‘slaves had formed the habit of executing their masters’ orders’.²¹ But beyond these ‘psychological’ bases, Kirschenbaum explains that in Rome the employment of slave and freed agents was additionally beneficial on legal and pragmatic grounds.

To begin with, transacting business in the Roman world was complicated by the fact that there existed no law of direct agency. While free agents (e.g. clients, friends) could act as intermediaries in the negotiation of contracts and the

¹⁸ Jean Andreau, *Banking and Business in the Roman World* (Key Themes in Ancient History; Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1999), 64-70; Alan Watson, *Roman Slave Law* (Baltimore: Johns Hopkins University Press, 1987), 90-114. Slave agency was more significant in Roman than in Greek law, largely because slaves were members of the Roman *familia*, and thus fell within the *potestas* of the *paterfamilias*. Slaves in the Greek *oikos*, however, were only considered property; cf. Sarah B. Pomeroy, *Families in Classical and Hellenistic Greece: Representations and Realities* (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1997), 21.

¹⁹ Catherine Hezser, *Jewish Slavery in Antiquity* (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2005), 275-84; cf. Udoh, ‘Unrighteous Slave’: 315-24.

²⁰ For elite attitudes and involvement in Roman commerce, see John H. D’Arms, *Commerce and Social Standing in Ancient Rome* (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 1981); H. W. Pleket, ‘Urban Elites and Business in the Greek Part of the Roman Empire’, in *Trade in the Ancient Economy*, ed. Peter Garnsey, C. R. Whittaker, and Keith Hopkins (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1983), 131-44; Andrew Wallace-Hadrill, ‘Elites and Trade in the Roman Town’, in *City and Country in the Ancient World*, ed. John Rich and Andrew Wallace-Hadrill (Leicester-Nottingham Studies in Ancient Society 2; London: Routledge, 1991), 241-72; Andreau, *Banking and Business*, 9-29.

²¹ Aaron Kirschenbaum, *Sons, Slaves and Freedmen in Roman Commerce* (Jerusalem: Magnes Press, 1987), 32. Kirschenbaum also notes that ‘the superior *savoir-faire* as well as the unscrupulous character of many hellenized Orientals that had been brought as slaves to Rome were the concomitant personal and psychological qualities that account for their generally uninhibited dynamic activity in the field of commerce and for their specific usefulness as agents’ (149). It is also worth noting that slaves who were old enough to serve in administration had normally acquired significant education and experience growing up in the household and on the estates of their masters (Columella, *Rust.* 11.1.7); cf. Aubert, *Business Managers*, 151.

transferral of property on behalf of a business owner (Gaius, *Inst.* 2.90-92),²² third contracting parties were reluctant to make payments to free agents since there was no universal, extemporaneous legal device established to ensure the money would be subsequently transferred to the intended party. Certain legal arrangements (*locationes conductio; mandata; negotiora gestio*) and legal remedies (*actiones*) were introduced to commercial law that made the principal responsible for specific liabilities incurred by an agent,²³ but generally the principal himself remained unprotected if the agent was free.

Roman law, however, possessed a built-in system of non-contractual obligations which permitted the heads of households (*paterfamiliae*) to make various kinds of commercial transactions—provisions and acquisitions—through certain household members. As the second-century CE jurist Gaius states, ‘Acquisitions come to us not only by our own acts, but also through those whom we hold in *potestas*’ (*Inst.* 2.86; trans. Zulueta). The *potestas*, or power of the head of the family, extended over not only one’s wife and children, but also one’s slaves. Because everything these dependents practically (*de facto*) possessed belonged legally (*de iure*) to the head of the household, whatever they acquired through their monetary grant (*peculium*) likewise became the property of the *paterfamilias/dominus* (Gaius, *Inst.* 2.87, 89).²⁴ This was also the case in ancient Jewish legal practice. As the Tosefta states, ‘The son who does business with what belongs to the father, and likewise the slave who does business with what belongs to his master, behold, they [the proceeds] belong to the father, they [the proceeds] belong to the master’ (*t. B. Qam.* 11.2).²⁵ But despite the representative privileges slaves retained, in their commercial capacity they could not bring injury upon the master. As Kirschenbaum explains, ‘[A] person in *potestas* could not worsen the condition of the head of family economically or legally. Thus, a subordinate in power could neither create

²² It was, however, illegal for unqualified free men to act as intermediaries: ‘From what we have said it is evident that through free men who are neither subject to our power nor *bona fide* possessed by us, and through the slaves of others of whom we have neither a usufruct nor a lawful possession, acquisition is impossible on any account’ (Gaius, *Instit.* 2.95; trans. Zulueta).

²³ Aubert, *Business Managers*, 40-116.

²⁴ For more on the *peculium*, see Buckland, *Slavery*, 187-238; Ireneusz Zeber, *A Study of the Peculium of a Slave in Pre-Classical and Classical Roman Law* (Acta Universitatis Wratislaviensis 491; Wrocław: Wydawn, 1981); Kirschenbaum, *Sons*, 31-88; Watson, *Slave Law*, 90-101; Jean Andreau, ‘Les esclaves "hommes d'affaires" et la gestion des ateliers et commerces’, in *Mentalités et choix économiques des romains*, ed. J. Andreau, J. France, and S. Pittia (Scripta Antiqua 7; Bordeaux: Ausonius, 2004), 111-26.

²⁵ For more on Jewish laws of commercial agency, see Hezser, *Jewish Slavery*, 276-82.

obligations for his master nor render him liable to suit. Moreover, since a slave could not be hailed into court . . . it was useless to bring an action against [him]';²⁶ the liability of the slave was always limited to the extent of his *peculium*. Thus, while the use of slaves in commerce was often very advantageous, certain limitations remained.

Freedmen, on the other hand, whose ties of *potestas* were severed by manumission, also frequently functioned as agents for their former masters. The freedman's competence in business administration was often derived from his prior education and experience as a commercial slave. But while many of the freedman's commercial dealings following manumission aimed to generate profit for himself, a significant portion of his efforts continued to be rendered on behalf of his patron, as was both compulsory and customary. The jurist Ulpian, for instance, states, 'A freedman and a son should always consider the person of a father and a patron honourable and inviolable' (*Dig.* 37.15.9; trans. Watson; cf. *Lex Irnitana* 97). The filial reverence which the freedman owed to his former master was commonly described as deference (*obsequium*) and duty (*officium*), and was routinely expressed in the freedman's fulfilment of certain services (*operae*) for his patron. These services, being semi-contractual by virtue of 'the oath of the freedman' (*iusiurandum liberti* [Gaius, *Inst.* 3.96]), were legally binding and customarily rendered as payment for manumission.²⁷ But besides the formal, legal dimension of these obligations, the principle of loyalty (*fides*) served as an additional basis for the freedman's continued labour. Collectively, these factors contributed to the regular employment of freedmen as commercial agents. Thus, even without explicit mention of legal status in most of the documentary evidence, it can be deduced, with W. V. Harris, that '[a]mong the Romans it was largely freedmen and slaves . . . who managed the commercial enterprises'.²⁸

Once it is realised that private administrators were normally slaves and freedmen, their subordinate rank and compulsory obedience to their masters or patrons becomes more apparent. In antiquity it was simply accepted that 'the free

²⁶ Kirschenbaum, *Sons*, 38.

²⁷ Duff, *Freedmen*, 36-49; Treggiari, *Freedmen*, 68-81.

²⁸ W. V. Harris, 'Trade', in *The Cambridge Ancient History: The High Empire, A.D. 70-192* (Vol. 11), ed. Alan K. Bowman, Peter Garnsey, and Dominic Rathbone (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2000), 710-40, at 732-33.

rules [ἄρχει] the slave' (Aristotle, *Pol.* 1260a10).²⁹ As Peter Garnsey explains, 'The slaveowner's rights over his slave-property were total, covering the person as well as the labour of the slave'.³⁰ Keith Bradley clarifies the asymmetry and exploitative nature of slavery in Roman society:

In the master-slave relationship . . . there were no restricting factors: the slave was at the complete and permanent disposal of the master and except by an act of resistance could never find relief from the necessity of obeying because there were no countervailing rights or powers in the condition of slavery itself to which the slave had recourse. From the slave it was complete submission that the master expected.³¹

Bradley's portrayal is also the perception of slavery represented in much ancient popular literature. In Chariton's mid-first-century CE novel, for instance, the administrator (διοικητής) Leonas, speaking to his master Dionysius about the newly acquired slave Callirhoe, remarked, 'You are her master, with full power over her, so she must do your will whether she likes it or not [κύριος γὰρ εἶ καὶ τὴν ἐξουσίαν ἔχεις αὐτῆς, ὥστε καὶ ἐκοῦσα καὶ ἄκουσα ποιήσει τὸ σοὶ δοκοῦν]' (*Chaer.* 2.6.2). As slaves, then, administrators were considered forced labour, mere chattel, and basically powerless with respect to their masters.

The outlook of most freedmen was not markedly different than that of a slave, as noted above. Caught somewhere between the status of slavery (*servitus*) and that of the freeborn person (*ingenuitas*), freedmen often enjoyed certain privileges of citizenship even while maintaining other stigmata of servility and continuing to labour under the subjugation of the propertied class.³² More on the low social status of slave administrators will be addressed in Chapter 6. For now, however, we can conclude that private administrators gazing up the chain of command would have perceived themselves, even in the physical absence of their

²⁹ The *Digest* defines the slave as one who is 'subjected to an alien dominion' (*Dig.* 1.5.4.1). For a survey of ancient ideologies of slavery, see Peter Garnsey, *Ideas of Slavery from Aristotle to Augustine* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1996). For a modern sociological analysis of the institution, see Orlando Patterson, *Slavery and Social Death: A Comparative Study* (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 1982), 13, who famously defines slavery as 'the permanent, violent domination of naturally alienated and generally dishonored persons'.

³⁰ Garnsey, *Ideas of Slavery*, 1; cf. Finley, *Ancient Slavery*, 77.

³¹ K. R. Bradley, *Slavery and Society at Rome* (Key Themes in Ancient History; Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1994), 5.

³² Jean Andraeu, 'The Freedman', in *The Romans*, ed. Andrea Giardina (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1993), 175-98, at 179: 'The freedman ceaselessly swung back and forth in pendular fashion between the past and the future, citizenship and slavery, assimilation and rejection, and he was a channel for the greater party of the heterogeneities and contradictions of the society that surrounded him'. Henrik Mouritsen, 'Freedmen and Decurions: Epitaphs and Social History in Imperial Italy', *JRS* 95 (2005): 38-63, at 62, suggests, 'The freedmen's continued use of epitaphs, with little regard for the prevailing norms and customs, would suggest a certain degree of non-integration in Roman society'. For the assimilation of freedmen, see Lauren Hackworth Petersen, *The Freedman in Roman Art and Art History* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2006), 228.

masters or patrons, as delegates and would have constantly been aware of their vulnerability to the power of their superiors.

3. Authority

Despite being subordinate to a principal and often of marginal socio-legal status, estate managers and business administrators normally occupied elevated positions within the households or managerial units to which they were assigned. Due to their aptitude for business, for instance, freedmen administrators during the Roman period were commonly appointed as legal guardians (*tutores*) of free minors and their patrimonies (Dio Chrysostom, *Or.* 73.3; Philo, *Prob.* 35). These assignments attributed to the administrator authority (*auctoritas*) to make investment decisions regarding the ward's property, especially while the heir was an infant (*Dig.* 26.1.1.pr; 41.2.32.2). Paul himself, in fact, once drew upon this custom in an illustration about the provisional constraint of the Mosaic Law (Gal 4.1-2).³³

Beyond guardianship appointments, private administrators also would normally have supervised a team of subordinate labourers (*subiecti* [Columella, *Rust.* 1.8.10]). This workforce, which consisted largely—though not only—of fellow slaves, provided the administrator with extensive structural leverage with which to issue commands. Indeed, just as the master was known ‘to rule [*imperare*] his slaves’ (Cicero, *Resp.* 3.37), so the administrator was placed over an enterprise ‘to rule [*ἄρχειν*] the labourers’ (Xenophon, *Oec.* 12.3), to be as it were their master (*magistrum esse operariorum* [Columella, *Rust.* 11.1.4]). But the administrator's authority to command (*auctoritatem ad imperium* [Columella, *Rust.* 1.8.3]) did not originate with him personally. As the owner's representative, the administrator ‘had provisionally been entrusted with some of the powers of the *pater familias*’.³⁴ K. D. White reiterates this point: ‘Where the owner was normally non-resident, the steward (*vilicus*) was given virtually complete authority over the entire staff,

³³ For the ἐπίτροποι and οἰκονόμοι in Gal 4.1-2 as private administrators, see John K. Goodrich, ‘Guardians, not Taskmasters: The Cultural Resonances of Paul's Metaphor in Galatians 4.1-2’, *JSNT* 32 (2010): 251-84; Peter Garnsey, ‘Sons, Slaves - and Christians’, in *The Roman Family in Italy: Status, Sentiment, Space*, ed. Beryl Rawson and Paul Weaver (Oxford: Clarendon, 1997), 101-21, at 106; cf. Richard P. Saller, *Patriarchy, Property and Death in the Roman Family* (Cambridge Studies in Population, Economy and Society in Past Time; Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1994), 181-203.

³⁴ Carlsen, *Vilici*, 75.

whether of free or of servile status'.³⁵ In fact, one first-century BCE literary fragment from L. Pomponius reads, 'To be a bailiff far from the city [*longe ad urbe vilicari*], where the master seldom comes, is, in my opinion, not to be a bailiff, but to be the master [*non vilicari, sed dominari*]' (CRF 45-46).³⁶

The same derivative authority was also afforded to the *dispensator*. As urbanised accounting clerks of exceptionally large *familiae*, *dispensatores* did not normally oversee large workforces like *vilici*, but could still acquire numerous personal slaves (*vicarii*/οὐκάριοι [P.Oxy. 735.6-7]) attached to their *peculium* and handle considerable sums of money in their master's name.³⁷ This is especially the case for the *dispensatores* and other intermediate clerical aids belonging to the household of Caesar (cf. ILS 1514/GRS §127).³⁸ Such administrators in the *familia Caesaris*—though technically neither regal officials in the Hellenistic sense nor public servants in the municipal sense, and yet also somewhat distinct from privately-owned administrators in the scale of their operations—managed the accounts of various departments and enterprises attached to the imperial administration and thus possessed unique opportunities to exploit their master's purses and power for their own socio-economic benefit.

More on the administrator's supervisory responsibilities, especially those of the *vilicus*, will be discussed below. It will suffice for now, however, simply to re-emphasise that his managerial functions, as Jean-Jacques Aubert notes, 'were the source of considerable power for the *vilicus*, and the basis of patronage in the countryside'.³⁹

³⁵ K. D. White, *Roman Farming* (Aspects of Greek and Roman Life; London: Thames and Hudson, 1970), 350.

³⁶ Cited at Carlsen, *Vilici*, 77; Maróti, 'Vilicus': 117. Carlsen supposes that the power of the manager increased in direct proportion to the owner's ability to control him. Thus, the greater the distance from the master to the estate, the greater the opportunity for the manager to do what he wished (78).

³⁷ Carlsen, *Vilici*, 151; Jesper Carlsen, 'Dispensatores in Roman North Africa', in *L'Africa romana: Atti del IX convegno di studio*, ed. Attilio Mastino (Pubblicazioni del Dipartimento di storia dell'Università di Sassari 20; Nuoro: Gallizzi, 1992), 97-104.

³⁸ Weaver, *Familia Caesaris*, esp. 200-206. For imperial *oikonomoi*, see Strabo, *Geogr.* 17.1.12; Swiderek, 'Καίσαρος οἰκονόμοι': 159-60; P. A. Brunt, 'The Administrators of Roman Egypt', *JRS* 65 (1975): 124-47, at 140.

³⁹ Aubert, *Business Managers*, 171. For managerial slaves and patronage, see Martin, *Slavery*, 22-49.

B. Responsibilities

Administrators were normally responsible for supervising a branch of a particular business, whether appointed to a rural estate (*villa rustica*), a factory (*officina*), or an urban shop (*taberna*). *Vilici* and *actores*, for instance, have been attested in a number of private contexts, including mines (*CIL* X 1913), aqueducts (*CIL* X 3967), baths (*CIL* VI 8676), libraries (*CIL* VI 8744), gardens (*CIL* VI 623/*ILS* 3521), apartments (*CIL* VI 9483) amphitheatres (*CIL* VI 10163/*ILS* 5155), and granaries (*CIL* VI 36786).⁴⁰ *Dispensatores*, moreover, managed military funds (*CIL* VI 8516, 8517, 33737), schools (*CIL* VI 10166), crops (*CIL* VI 544, 634, 8472), and gardens (*CIL* VI 8667, 8675), among other things.⁴¹ Naturally, the commercial context and social location determined the scope of the administrator's tasks. But aside from minute differences, the general responsibilities of private administrators were normally very similar,⁴² usually involving 'the supervision of real estate and possibly other slaves'.⁴³ Given these basic areas of oversight, it should be noted that the chief objective of estate and business administration in antiquity was to yield some margin of financial return (*κέρδος/fructus*).⁴⁴ For this reason, it is important to begin

⁴⁰ Carlsen, *Vilici*, 31-43. For the administrative staff of imperial mines, see Alfred Michael Hirt, *Imperial Mines and Quarries in the Roman World: Organizational Aspects 27 BC-AD 235* (Oxford Classical Monographs; Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2010), 251-58.

⁴¹ Carlsen, *Vilici*, 151; Carlsen, '*Dispensatores*', 97.

⁴² According to the jurist Pomponius, 'The man in charge of a block of flats is not very different from a bailiff, but he lives among urban slaves' (*Dig.* 50.16.166pr). Even Aubert, *Business Managers*, 38, who observes with respect to *institores* few strict commonalities between them, suggests that they at least shared similar administrative skills and duties. There was, however, a great divide between urban and rural life which extended even to slaves. Ramsay MacMullen, *Roman Social Relations: 50 B.C. to A.D. 284* (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1974), 31, explains that 'away from the city each mile marked a further deviation from correctness'. The rural estate manager could, therefore, sense some inadequacy when in the territory of his urban counterpart, as demonstrated by Chalinus' taunting of Olympio in Plautus' play *Casina*: '[W]hat are you slinking around in the city for, you trumpery bailiff? Why aren't you at the farm, in your own dominion? Why don't you choose to tend to the business you're in charge of and leave city concerns alone? . . . Back to the farm, back to your own province, and be damned to you!' (*Cas.* 97-103). The absence of urban luxuries on country estates also affected the attractiveness of being assigned a rural post. Columella warned not to appoint a city slave as a rural *vilicus*, for want of the city's excitement (*Rust.* 1.8.1-2). Horace, for instance, once relocated an urban slave longing for the country to his Sabine farm, only to have the new *vilicus* later grumble about what he missed in the city (*Ep.* 1.14.14-15). Indeed, for some slaveowners relocation to the country was a form of punishment. Trimalchio, for instance, confessed that after being suspected of beating his mistress, his master banished him to a country stewardship (*vilicatio* [Petronius, *Saty.* 69]).

⁴³ Carlsen, *Vilici*, 31. Chrysippus (ca. 280-207 BCE) defines administration (*oikonomia*) in similar terms: 'as an arrangement concerned with expenditures and tasks [ἀναλωμάτων καὶ ἔργων] and has to do with the care of possessions and of those who work on the land [κτῆσεως ἐπιμέλειαν καὶ τῶν κατ' ἀγρὸν ἐργαζομένων]' (Stobaeus, *Ecl.* 2.95.12-14).

⁴⁴ It is beyond the scope of this study to engage the perennial debate about the 'primitivist' (Moses Finley) or 'modernist' (Michael Rostovtzeff) nature of the ancient economy. For a selection of leading contributions in this respect, see the essays (re-)published by Walter Scheidel and Sitta Von

our survey of the responsibilities of private administrators with a brief overview of the financial goals of business owners themselves, that is, those whose enterprises were large enough to require managers.

1. Financial Productivity

It is commonly acknowledged that in Graeco-Roman antiquity the vast majority of people from the free population who were not tenants were small-landholding peasants who lived at or near subsistence level.⁴⁵ Because survival was routinely at stake, it is implausible that these peasant landowners would have taken great risks in their land development strategies or have sought to produce much beyond that which was needed to meet their immediate needs.⁴⁶ More to the point, because this large portion of the landowning population was actively involved in the cultivation of their own properties, they did not appoint managers to run their estates.⁴⁷

The financial security of absentee landowners, on the other hand, afforded them other investment options. Living well above subsistence, owners of large estates who could afford to appoint managers established a variety of economic goals and implemented a range of administrative strategies, normally utilising their estates as a means for long-term investment. According to some ancient theorists, estate owners and managers alike should seek to *maximise* profits.⁴⁸ The Greek philosophers, for instance, generally maintained that the very objective of private administration ('economics'/'economy' [οἰκονομικός/οἰκονομία]) was to generate

Reden, eds., *The Ancient Economy* (Edinburgh Readings on the Ancient World; Edinburgh: Edinburgh University Press, 2002). More recently, see Neville Morley, *Trade in Classical Antiquity* (Key Themes in Ancient History; Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2007); Walter Scheidel, Ian Morris, and Richard P. Saller, eds., *The Cambridge Economic History of the Greco-Roman World* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2007).

⁴⁵ Finley, *Ancient Economy*, 105; Garnsey and Saller, *Roman Empire*, 43.

⁴⁶ Erdkamp, *Grain Market*, 95-105, suggests that, while enough surplus would have been sought to fulfil community obligations (98), for smaller-scale peasant farmers 'long-term subsistence was prized higher than short-term profit' (96). He observes further that small landholders generally adopted a 'constrained profit maximisation' approach, whereby 'peasants pursue profit only within the limits that are set by their primary goal of long-term security' (100).

⁴⁷ Maróti, 'Vilicus': 109, notes that the employment of an estate manager is '[t]he fundamental difference between the small-peasant farming based on autarchy, and the organization of the Villa-farmstead aimed at production for the market'.

⁴⁸ Jean-Jacques Aubert, 'The Fourth Factor: Managing Non-Agricultural Production in the Roman World', in *Economies Beyond Agriculture in the Classical World*, ed. D. J. Mattingly and John Salmon (Leicester-Nottingham Studies in Ancient Society 9; London: Routledge, 2000), 90-111, at 93-94, differentiates between the 'strategic' (global, long-term) decisions made by entrepreneurs and the 'tactical' (narrower, short-term) decisions made by business managers.

income.⁴⁹ The fourth-century BCE philosopher Xenophon, for example, reported how a certain Critobulus informed Socrates that ‘the business of a good estate manager [οἰκονόμου ἀγαθοῦ] is to manage his own estate well [εὖ]’ (*Oec.* 1.2). While the appropriateness of the adverb εὖ would be contested outright three centuries later by Philodemus of Gadara (ca. 110–35 BCE), it is clear from elsewhere in Xenophon’s discourses that the ἀγαθὸς οἰκονόμος—who for Xenophon is a *free* gentleman farmer—should seek to increase one’s assets, since as an expert investor he knew the right times to make purchases (*Mem.* 2.10.3–4) and the best ways for generating profit (*Mem.* 3.4.11). For Xenophon, then, *oikonomia*—as the discipline of the *oikonomos*—was ‘the knowledge by which men can increase [αὔξειν] estates’ (*Oec.* 4.4), and making large profits was its chief objective.⁵⁰

Aristotle later downplayed the profit-generating responsibility of the *oikonomos* by drawing a distinction between money-making (χρηματιστική) and administration (οἰκονομική). According to Aristotle, ‘the function of the former [i.e. χρηματιστική] is to provide [πορίσασθαι] and that of the latter [i.e. οἰκονομική] to use [χρήσασθαι]’ (*Pol.* 1256a11–13). Thus, riches (πλοῦτος), for Aristotle, were simply tools (ὄργανα) which administrators use to manage the household (*Pol.* 1256b37–38). Pseudo-Aristotle, however, returned to Xenophon’s perspective by emphasising the need for administrators both to obtain and employ wealth. According to Pseudo-Aristotle, οἰκονομική ‘tells us first how to acquire a household [κτῆσασθαι οἶκον] and then how to conduct its affairs [χρήσασθαι αὐτῷ]’ (Aristotle, [*Oec.*] 1.1.1). His profile of the ideal *oikonomos* reflected both of these dimensions:

There are four qualities which the [οἰκονόμος] must possess in dealing with his property [τὰ χρήματα]. Firstly, he must have the faculty of acquiring, and secondly that of preserving what he has acquired [τὸ κτᾶσθαι δυνατόν χρηρῆ εἶναι καὶ φυλάττειν]; otherwise there is no more benefit in acquiring than in baling with a colander, or in the proverbial wine-jar with a hole in the bottom. Thirdly and fourthly, he must know how to improve his property, and how to make use of it [εἶναι κοσμητικὸν τῶν ὑπαρχόντων καὶ χρηστικόν]; since these are the ends for which the powers of acquisition and of preservation are sought ([*Oec.*] 1.4.1).

⁴⁹ Peter Spahn, ‘Die Anfänge der antiken Ökonomik’, *Chiron* 14 (1984): 301–23. While many of these writings became quite dated by the first century CE, the ideas they presented were very popular in the eastern parts of the empire, apparently even among the non-elite—some of the tradition was at least familiar to the authors of the NT (see the *Haustafeln* [Eph 5.21–6.9; Col 3.18–4.1; Titus 2.1–10; 1 Pet 2.18–3.7]; David L. Balch, *Let Wives Be Submissive: The Domestic Code in 1 Peter* (SBLDS 26; Atlanta: Scholars Press, 1981), esp. 29 and 109)—and were probably implemented into the curriculum of estate managers. While some of the economic treatises appear to have been produced primarily for academic objectives, certain others (Xenophon, *Oec.*) seem to have had practical intentions, some of which were shared by the Roman agronomists (Cato, Varro, Columella, Palladius).

⁵⁰ Sarah B. Pomeroy, *Xenophon Oeconomicus: A Social and Historical Commentary* (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1994), 52; cf. Pomeroy, *Families*, 22.

According to the later Aristotelian tradition, money-making (χρηματιστική) was an important component of the larger discipline of administration (οἰκονομική). The ἀγαθὸς οἰκονόμος, then, was required to *acquire, retain, multiply, and utilise* property for the benefit of the household.⁵¹

While the Greek philosophers debated the relationship between financial productivity and administration, the great emphasis on profit-making was perpetuated also in the Latin tradition. Varro, for instance, advised the estate owner to seek from his investments both ‘profit and pleasure’ (*utilitatem et voluptatem*), that is, both a material return (*fructum*) and enjoyment (*delectationem*). And quite significantly, Varro immediately clarified that ‘[t]he profitable [*utile*] plays a more important role than the pleasurable’ (Varro, *Rust.* 1.4.1; cf. 1.2.8; 1.16.2-3; 3.2.15-17).⁵² Echoing Varro’s concerns, Cicero underscored the importance of deriving profit from estate management when he asked, ‘Which of us may not survey his estate or go to see his rural concerns, whether in quest of profit or of amusement [*vel fructus causa, vel delectationis*]?’ (*De or.* 1.58.249).

The emphasis in Columella’s treatise is even stronger. For one, Columella describes his target audience as the ‘attentive head of a household [*diligens pater*’

⁵¹ The first-century BCE philosopher Philodemus of Gadara later disputed these definitions due to their implicit promotion of material greed. As an Epicurean, Philodemus rejected both poverty and wealth, and combated any ideology that led to either of those two conditions. As Reumann, ‘Oikonomia’, 193, explains, ‘The basic problem for an Epicurean discussing *oikonomia* in the first century B.C.—when his philosophy still stood for an absence of pain and a neutral state of feeling as the goal, not sensual self-indulgence, as in its later perversion—was the fact that household management was *popularly* interpreted to mean money-making; but to an Epicurean the goal of this science was only to provide a comfortable living according to a mean of expediency’. Philodemus’ major opponents with respect to household management were Xenophon and Pseudo-Aristotle (Theophrastus). Philodemus’ primary critique was directed at Xenophon’s use of εὖ in *Oec.* 1.2. For the Epicurean to live and manage ‘well’ implied that he should live and manage comfortably, but also simply, rather than lavishly, as Philodemus interpreted Xenophon to mean. In his treatise, then, Philodemus sought to explain ‘not how to live nobly in a household [οὐχ ὡς ἐν οἴκῳ καλῶς ἔστιν], but how one must take a stand regarding the acquisition and preservation of property [ἀλλ’ ὡς ἴστασθαι δεῖ περὶ χρημάτων κτήσεώς τε καὶ φυλακῆς], with which *oikonomia* and *oikonomikos*, it is agreed, are strictly concerned’ (*Oec.* 12.6-12). Cf. David L. Balch, ‘Philodemus, “On Wealth” and “On Household Management:” Naturally Wealthy Epicureans Against Poor Cynics’, in *Philodemus and the New Testament World*, ed. John T. Fitzgerald, Dirk Obbink, and Glenn S. Holland (Leiden: Brill, 2004), 177-96. Philodemus, therefore, distinguished himself from his predecessors by his emphasis on the preservation (φυλακή), rather than the use and increase, of property, and by explaining that a philosopher has a ‘moderate mean of wealth [πλούτου μέτρον]’ (*Oec.* 12.17-19), insisting neither on prosperity nor poverty, but happiness and expediency. Philodemus therefore argued, ‘We would say that the good household manager [τὸν ἀγαθὸν οἰκονόμον] is the provider of possessions and goods [τὸν κτημάτων καὶ χρημάτων ποριστήν]. . . which he sets in order [ἃ διοικονομεῖ], and his function is to manage a household happily [τὸ μακαρίως οἶκον οἰκεῖν]’ (*Oec.* 3a.6-14)).

⁵² J. Love, ‘The Character of Roman Agricultural Estates in the Light of Max Weber’s Economic Sociology’, *Chiron* 16 (1986): 99-146, at 117-24, considers it ‘undeniable’ that the estates about which Varro writes ‘are implicated to varying degrees in profit making’ (123).

familiae], whose heart is set on pursuing a sure method of increasing his fortune [*rei familiaris augendae*] from the tillage of his land' (*Rust.* 1.1.3).⁵³ His detailed discussion on the operation of a vineyard has been considered '[p]ossibly the single most important piece of evidence . . . suggestive of the existence of capitalism in Roman agriculture' (cf. *Rust.* 3.3).⁵⁴ Not only do Columella's remarks on viticulture present 'valuable insights as regards the general attitude towards business and money making in Roman times', but '[h]is work is most illuminating as to the precise extent estateowners oriented their activities towards the generation of monetary profits'.⁵⁵ Reiterating these observations about estate *ownership*, K. D. White applied the point to estate *management*: 'In the appointment of a *vilicus* . . . the sole consideration is the economic one of obtaining a *maximum* return for the heavy expenditure by placing the responsibility on the shoulders of one whose tact and firmness in handling the staff were matched by dependability and integrity'.⁵⁶

It is significant to note, however, that even as numerous ancient economic theorists emphasised the pursuit of large, indeed optimised profits, it is also apparent that in antiquity certain—perhaps many—wealthy landowners preferred to minimise risk by implementing sensible, long-term production strategies on their landed investments at the expense of a considerable, immediate return.⁵⁷ Despite having the profit-seeking agenda just mentioned, Columella, for instance, prescribed a rather conservative approach in his instructions on viticulture. He affirms—contrary to his contemporaries—that 'the return from vineyards is a very rich one [*uberrimum esse reditum vinearium*]' (*Rust.* 3.3.2), and that it is 'consistent with good business to plant them' (3.3.15).⁵⁸ But even still, Columella proceeds to favour—again, relative to other farmers—a steady and enduring production

⁵³ Grundy Steiner, 'Columella and Martial on Living in the Country', *CJ* 50 (1954): 85-90, at 88: 'The whole point of Columella's handbook of course is to provide the special knowhow to guarantee that the hardships and the toil of farming will not be in vain but result in profit for the owner and in useful products to benefit society in general'.

⁵⁴ Love, 'Character': 124.

⁵⁵ Love, 'Character': 127.

⁵⁶ White, *Roman Farming*, 350-51 (emphasis added).

⁵⁷ This would seem to challenge the view of Erdkamp, *Grain Market*, 103, who states, 'In general, risk aversion declines as wealth rises'. Nevertheless, relative to their lower-class counterparts, wealthy landowners still received sizable returns from their estates, as apparent through their lavish life-styles and expensive civic benefactions; cf. Finley, *Ancient Economy*, 103.

⁵⁸ Columella insists that those who take care in their viticulture 'will easily outdo in the increase of their ancestral estates all those who hold fast to their hay and pot-herbs. And he is not mistaken in this; for, like a careful accountant, he sees, when his calculations are made, that this kind of husbandry is of the greatest advantage to his estate [*maxime rei familiari conducere*]' (*Rust.* 3.3.7).

strategy, assured that his methods will reap greater dividends over time than those who are less risk-averse. Columella's conservatism is especially apparent in his criticisms of those maximalists who 'strive for the richest possible yield at the earliest moment [*fructum vero plerique quam uberrimum praesentem consecantur*]; they make no provision for the time to come, but, as if living merely from day to day, they put such demands upon their vines and load them so heavily with young shoots as to show no regard for succeeding generations' (3.3.6).

Furthermore, Dennis Kehoe, in his studies on the letters of Pliny (esp. *Ep.* 3.19; 9.37) and several large estates in early Roman Egypt, has observed that some real-life, wealthy Roman senators purchased and cultivated large tracts of land, not as the means to generate great profits and social advancement, but to secure a comparatively modest, yet dependable return.⁵⁹ While he acknowledges that some landowners profited enormously from risky land-based investments (cf. Pliny the Elder, *Nat.* 14.49-51), Kehoe has shown that others—perhaps due to the unpredictability of droughts in the Mediterranean region, or the uncertainty of the Nile's flooding—implemented rather conservative approaches to agricultural production with the intention of obtaining steady and lasting revenue.⁶⁰ Admittedly, Kehoe has been criticised in some cases for forcing the documentary evidence from Egypt to fit the model he abstracts from the investment strategies of Pliny.⁶¹ But even still, the data he gathers which do fit his model require us to adjust our suppositions about the investment goals of absentee landowners.

⁵⁹ Dennis P. Kehoe, *Management and Investment on Estates in Roman Egypt during the Early Empire* (Papyrologische Texte und Abhandlungen 40; Bonn: R. Habelt, 1992), 168: 'This income depended primarily on the landowner's ability to achieve a sufficient level of productivity from his property, while his security required him to keep as low as possible the investment necessary to achieve this level of productivity'. See also Dennis P. Kehoe, 'Allocation of Risk and Investment on the Estates of Pliny the Younger', *Chiron* 18 (1988): 15-42; Dennis P. Kehoe, 'Approaches to Economic Problems in the "Letters" of Pliny the Younger: The Question of Risk in Agriculture', *ANRW* II 33.1 (1989): 555-90; Dennis P. Kehoe, 'Investment in Estates by Upper-Class Landowners in Early Imperial Italy: The Case of Pliny the Younger', in *De Agricultura* (1993), 214-37. Cf. P. W. de Neeve, 'A Roman Landowner and His Estates: Pliny the Younger', *Athenaeum* 68 (1990): 363-403.

⁶⁰ Garnsey and Saller, *Roman Empire*, 74: 'Landowners had a strictly limited notion of profit and how to seek it, and a gravely defective method of calculating it. . . Attitudes to profit-seeking in agriculture differed, even among the aristocracy. Yet profit-seeking is not the same as profit maximization, and a value system that put a premium on wealth-consumption could not at the same time promote productive investment'. Even nearly a century ago, W. E. Heitland, *Agricola: A Study of Agriculture and Rustic Life in the Greco-Roman World from the Point of View of Labour* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1921), 206, noted that, during the early Principate, 'the true imperial interest was, not to squeeze the most possible out of [provincial subjects] at a given moment, but to promote their continuous well-being as producers of a moderate but sure revenue'.

⁶¹ Cf. Roger S. Bagnall, 'Managing Estates in Roman Egypt: A Review Article', *BASP* 30 (1993): 127-35.

If, then, the primary goal of estate and business administration was social and economic security through slow and steady profits—at least for those wealthy enough to appoint an administrator—then it is reasonable to surmise that the aims and methods of estate and commercial managers would have been somewhat modest as well. This, in fact, is what is perceived from some popular Graeco-Roman literature, particularly biblical parables. Commercial agents in the Synoptic gospels are responsible, on the one hand, solely for increasing their employer’s property. In the Lucan Parable of the Unjust Steward (Luke 16.1-8), for instance, the *oikonomos* initially is threatened with termination and abandonment for squandering his master’s wealth (διασκορπίζων τὰ ὑπάρχοντα αὐτοῦ [Luke 16.1]). But by the end of the narrative, the *oikonomos* is praised (ἐπαινέω), not for demanding the debts owed his master *in their entirety*, but in his cunningness (φρονίμως) for reducing them enough to coax the debtors to make payment while satisfying his master’s financial expectations (Luke 16.8).⁶² Since such a tactic elicits commendation and perhaps exoneration,⁶³ it seems reasonable to conclude that the administrator was responsible only for producing a moderate return.⁶⁴

This is also the caricature of the good (and faithful) slave in the Parable of the Talents and the Parable of the Ten Mina (Matt 25.14-30//Luke 19.11-27).⁶⁵ In both of these accounts, commercial agents were responsible not simply for *maintaining* the master’s investment, but for *increasing* his possessions (κερδαίνω

⁶² This interpretation underscores the economic, rather than sociological, benefits of the administrator’s actions; *contra* David Landry and Ben May, 'Honor Restored: New Light on the Parable of the Prudent Steward (Luke 16:1-8a)', *JBL* 119 (2000): 287-309; John S. Kloppenborg, 'The Dishonoured Master (Luke 16,1-8a)', *Biblica* 70 (1989): 474-94. Our reading finds a significant parallel in Pliny, *Ep.* 9.37, where the senator reduces debts and adjusts his letting policy to secure the financial cooperation of his otherwise hopeless and delinquent tenants. For a summary of the parable’s wide range of interpretations, see Dennis J. Ireland, *Stewardship and the Kingdom of God: An Historical, Exegetical, and Contextual Study of the Parable of the Unjust Steward in Luke 16:1-13* (NovTSup 70; Leiden: Brill, 1992), 5-47.

⁶³ Darrell L. Bock, *Luke* (BECNT; Grand Rapids: Baker, 1994), 2:1332.

⁶⁴ It could be that the master’s praise is also directed at the ability of the *oikonomos* to make ‘friends’ with the debtors (v. 9). Regardless, his cunningness is at least in part represented by his ability to profit his master.

⁶⁵ On the relationship between the two parables, see Ivor H. Jones, *The Matthean Parables: A Literary and Historical Commentary* (NovTSup 80; Leiden: Brill, 1995), 463; Snodgrass, *Stories*, 523-25. Neither version employs strictly administrative titles, but it should be noted that Matthean parables often use δούλος to denote slave administrators (e.g. δούλος in Matt 24.45 = οἰκονόμος in Luke 12.42). In fact, Joachim Jeremias, *The Parables of Jesus* (Rev. ed.; New Testament Library; London: SCM, 1963), 56 n. 25, explains, ‘The reason for the change from δούλος to οἰκονόμος was that Luke, as is shown by 12.41, limited the application of the parable to the apostles’. Furthermore, πραγματεύομαι in Luke 19.13 suggests a managerial position similar to that of an *oikonomos*. For managerial slavery in Matthew, see Jennifer A. Glancy, *Slavery in Early Christianity* (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2002), 112-22.

[Matt 25.16, 17, 20, 22]; πραγματεύομαι [Luke 19.13]; διαπραγματεύομαι [Luke 19.15]).⁶⁶ The greater each agent earned, the greater they were entrusted at their master's return. The need to generate a profit is further underscored in each narrative through the case of the wicked (and lazy) slave. The failure of the slave to invest his allowance resulted in his dismissal and violent death (Matt 25.26-30//Luke 19.24-27). The gruesome finale, even if somewhat hyperbolic, illustrates the urgency laid upon the slave to generate profit, while also showing the uselessness of the one who fails to do so. But it is perhaps equally surprising to notice that the master's expectations of the final slave were not, it would seem, beyond reason. While a profit was required, the master's investment goals seem rather modest since the minimal bank interest which such a small deposit would have generated would have been sufficient to meet the master's expectations (Matt 25.27//Luke 19.23).

Finally, Jesus' remarks following the Parable of the Faithful and Wise Steward (Luke 12.42-48) likewise indicate that an agent who was appointed specifically to an estate was also expected to multiply what had been entrusted to him.⁶⁷ As Jesus is reported to have explained, 'From everyone to whom much [πολύ] has been given, much [πολύ] will be required; and from the one to whom much [πολύ] has been entrusted, *even more* [περισσότερον] will be demanded' (Luke 12.48).⁶⁸ But while Jesus' remark implies that a profit had to be earned, he does not suggest that an *enormous* return was expected. Generating especially large profits, in fact, could have been problematic for the estate manager. As Jesper Carlsen explains, 'The bailiff did not have any incentive to boost the farm's production or increase its profits year after year, as that could create expectations from the owner of a constantly rising yield; expectations which would be still more difficult to meet if the means of production remained unchanged; therefore the easiest and safest

⁶⁶ For the requirement of the slaves to produce a profit, see Snodgrass, *Stories*, 532; Aubert, *Business Managers*, 4 n. 18; Ben Chenoweth, 'Identifying the Talents: Contextual Clues for the Interpretation of the Parable of the Talents (Matthew 25:14-30)', *TynBul* 56 (2005): 61-72, at 70-71.

⁶⁷ Joel B. Green, *The Gospel of Luke* (NICNT; Grand Rapids: Eerdmans, 1997), 504.

⁶⁸ Even though the term οἰκονόμος is replaced with δούλος following verse 42, it should be understood that a managerial slave is in view throughout the parable; cf. Kyoung-Jin Kim, *Stewardship and Almsgiving in Luke's Theology* (JSNTSup 155; Sheffield: Sheffield Academic Press, 1998), 137.

thing for the *vilicus* was to keep production ticking over at a level which could be reached without problems year after year'.⁶⁹

Since a satisfactory return from a landed investment was relative to the kind and size of the enterprise in view as well as the aims of the individual entrepreneur, it is impossible to be precise about how productive administrators were expected to be in every circumstance. We can generalise, however, that it was always advantageous for estate and business owners to find an ambitious administrator, one who, as Xenophon's Ischomachus described, was 'covetous of gain [φιλοκέρδεια] in a moderate degree' (Xenophon, *Oec.* 12.16).

2. Personnel Supervision

As a means to agricultural and industrial production, private administrators were required to oversee a team of subordinates.⁷⁰ It would be misleading, in fact, to make any sharp distinction between revenue acquisition and labour supervision in the ancient economy, for the outcome of the former objective was heavily reliant on the success of the latter. Greek and Latin authors alike observed that the manner in which an administrator commanded his labourers greatly influenced the productivity of the enterprise. For instance, while many of his contemporaries insisted that bareness in agriculture was due to poor climate and the disposition of the elemental beings (*Natura* and *Tellura*), Columella maintained that most estate failures were caused by poor management: 'I do not believe that such misfortunes come upon us as a result of the fury of the elements, but rather because of our own fault; for the matter of husbandry, which all the best of our ancestors had treated with the best of care, we have delivered over to all the worst of our slaves [*pessimo cuique servorum*], as if to a hangman for punishment' (*Rust.* 1.*praef.*3). Since slaves were often thought to contribute to poor production, it was critical for an administrator who wished to run a profitable business, therefore, to be able to direct his team of subordinates efficiently.

The group of slaves (*familia*) that an administrator supervised could have been quite large. Although the size of a given workforce depended generally on the nature of the enterprise, the depth of its managerial structure, and the

⁶⁹ Carlsen, *Vilici*, 74.

⁷⁰ Carlsen, *Vilici*, 54, maintains that managing his staff was in many ways the estate administrator's 'most important task'.

entrepreneurial strategy of the business owner, it is probable that many estate managers were responsible for several dozen slaves. Seneca, in fact, intimates that some estates were so large that the administrator could be compared to a consul (*Ira* 1.21.2) or king (*Ep.* 89.20). Apuleius, in his second-century CE novel the *Metamorphoses*, may have even alluded to such a manager, ‘whose master had entrusted [*permiserat*] him with the stewardship of his entire household [*cunctam familiae tutelam*] and who acted as overseer of that extensive holding [*possessionem maximam . . . villicabat*]' (*Met.* 8.22). Zenon, the mid-third-century BCE *oikonomos* of Apollonius⁷¹—though clearly an exceptional case—also possessed extensive supervisory responsibilities as the manager of two very large estates (δωρεαί) in the Arsinoe and Memphis nomes.⁷² From his papyri collection one is afforded an excellent insight into the range of supervisory responsibilities with which a private administrator could have been entrusted, as well as the problems which he could have had to resolve. As C. C. Edgar explains,

It was [Zenon] who gives orders about paying the salaries of the domestic staff and to whom their complaints are addressed. He has sufficient control over the λόγος Ἀπολλωνίου to arrange for the gradual repayment of a debt out of the wages of the debtor. The foremen of Apollonios's estates write to him about crops and cattle. The dispatch of provisions from Alexandria, the feeding of the horses, the making of mattresses are among the things that occupy his attention. He is in constant communication with the members of the household left in Alexandria, especially with the chief of them, a certain Amyntas, who gives him all the news, how the cook has run away with eighty drachmas, and how the carpenter, Καλλιάναξ ὁ κίναϊδος, detected in some knavery, has gone up the river to put a plausible case before Apollonios.⁷³

These and many other administrative matters were charged to Zenon's oversight during his tenure under Apollonius. But of particular significance is the large number of subordinates whom he supervised.⁷⁴ While most managers of large estates and businesses were not able to rival the breadth and depth of Zenon's administrative staff, many, nevertheless, were responsible for supervising

⁷¹ For Zenon's title as *oikonomos*, see P.Lond. VII.2133 (Ζήνωνι τῶι παρ' Ἀπολλωνίου οἰκονόμῳ λόγος ἀργυρικός) and P.Edg. 16 (ὑπόμνημα Ἀράτῳ παρὰ Ἀριστέως μνησθῆναι Ζήνωνι τῶι οἰκονόμῳ καὶ Κρίτῳ). Apollonius was the finance minister to Ptolemy Philadelphos. Rostovtzeff, *Large Estate*, 39, explains the implied hierarchy from Zenon to Ptolemy: 'Zenon . . . was the chief manager of all the private affairs of Apollonius, both commercial and agricultural. He stood in the same relation to Apollonius as Apollonius to the King. Thence his title οἰκονόμος the manager of Apollonius' οἶκος (estate), of all the economic affairs of Apollonius'.

⁷² Δωρεαί were temporary grants of land given by the king to privileged individuals normally in substitution for a salary; Rostovtzeff, *Large Estate*, 42-55.

⁷³ C. C. Edgar, ed., *Zenon Papyri in the University of Michigan Collection* (University of Michigan Studies. Humanistic Series; Ann Arbor: University of Michigan Press, 1931), 22-23.

⁷⁴ Rostovtzeff, *Large Estate*, 87.

numerous kinds of delegates (e.g. *vilica*, *subvilici*, *praefecti*, *monitores*, *magisteri*) and even more menial labourers.⁷⁵

Given the number of subordinates administrators oversaw, labour efficiency often demanded some degree of job specialisation among the slave staff. Columella maintained that specialisation not only created a sense of healthy competitiveness among the slaves and even generated pride in their work, but also enabled the manager to identify which slaves were performing inadequately, since any given task was the responsibility of a single labourer (*Rust.* 1.9.5-8). Given, then, this advisable approach to job allocation, most administrators of large *familiae* divided their staff into subsidiary teams and then allocated to the slaves individual jobs.⁷⁶ The administrators themselves also probably participated in some of the enterprises' manual labour to set an example for and to win the respect of their subordinates, as the agronomists repeatedly advised (Cato, *Agr.* 5.5; Varro, *Rust.* 1.17.5; Columella, *Rust.* 11.1.4, 7-9, 14-18, 26-27; 11.3.65; 12.1.3). But given their need to keep track of all the agricultural yields (Cato, *Agr.* 2.1) and to record all the tasks performed on and off the estate by members of the staff (*Agr.* 2.2), the manager's time was probably in large part monopolised by their supervisory and administrative duties.⁷⁷

Not as much is known about the size and infrastructure of non-agricultural businesses, such as factories and workshops (*officinae*). Studies on the Roman brick and tile industry as well as the manufacturing of various ceramics (amphorae, terra sigillata, terracotta lamps) have shown that owners often delegated production responsibilities to business managers. Although the legal status of these overseers has been the subject of some debate (particularly the identity of the *officinatores*),⁷⁸

⁷⁵ For the administrator's associates and subordinates, see Aubert, *Business Managers*, 175-99; White, *Roman Farming*, 355-56; Jesper Carlsen, 'Subvilicus: Subagent or Assistant Bailiff?', *ZPE* 132 (2000): 312-16; Jesper Carlsen, 'The *Vilica* and Roman Estate Management', in *De Agricultura* (1993), 197-205.

⁷⁶ Bradley, *Slavery and Society*, 73.

⁷⁷ Aubert, *Business Managers*, 172, observes, 'If we look at the occupations of *vilici* in the literary sources, we notice that we rarely find them out in the fields'. Because they were so busy '[s]earching for contractors, negotiating the contracts, overseeing their execution, calculating the laborers' remuneration', we should conclude that estate managers had little time to share in the actual farmwork.

⁷⁸ In the brick industry, for example, Tapio Helen, *Organization of Roman Brick Production in the First and Second Centuries A.D.: An Interpretation of Roman Brick Stamps* (Annales Academiae Scientiarum Fennicae, Dissertationes Humanarum Litterarum 5; Helsinki: Suomalainen Tiedeakatemia, 1975), 108-109, has argued that *officinatores* were normally (nearly 80%) freeborn contractors, rather than slave or freedman agents, as previously thought (e.g. Duff, *Freedmen*, 92). John P. Bodel, *Roman Brick Stamps*

several studies have shown that not a few of these enterprises would have been managed by slave or freed *vilici* and *actores*.⁷⁹ In fact, as Aubert argues, the methods of administration commonly employed in these factories and workshops probably originated from the managerial approaches utilised on the *villa rustica*:

The managerial system used in the clay industry seems to have been borrowed from agricultural concerns (*fundi*), and was adapted to both rural and urban contexts. The manufacture of containers for the export of staples produced in agricultural estates and the exploitation of clay districts located in the vicinity of farmsteads for the production of building material must have directly benefited from the existence of the *vilicus* system.⁸⁰

Thus, despite the shortage of data regarding the size and structure of these non-agricultural businesses, it is reasonable that the administrators of factories and workshops would have shared many of the same responsibilities and attributes as those on rural estates. But how did these administrators motivate their subordinates and what kinds of skills were required to manage them?

In order to run a business well, it was preferred that managers possess a number of specific attributes. Beyond a desire for money-making, managers were expected to have general leadership skills, a strong work ethic, and significant experience in their area of production.⁸¹ As a leader, for instance, the administrator was expected to motivate his subordinates to work productively. This could be accomplished in several ways. According to Ischomachus, the truly great leader is able to motivate his staff 'by his will [γνώμη] rather than his strength [ῥώμη]' (Xenophon, *Oec.* 21.8). As Ischomachus explained:

[I]n private industries, the man in authority [ὁ ἐφεστηκώς]—bailiff [ἐπίτροπος] or manager [ἐπιστάτης]—who can make the workers keen, industrious and persevering—he is the man who gives a lift to the business and swells the surplus [πολλὴν τὴν περιουσίαν ποιοῦντες]. . . . [I]f at sight of him they bestir themselves, and a spirit of determination and rivalry and eagerness to excel falls on

in the Kelsey Museum (Kelsey Museum of Archaeology, Studies 6; Ann Arbor: University of Michigan Press, 1983), 4, contests this point, suggesting that the title *offinator* could have been born by a variety of persons, including 'anything from a slave foreman in his master's service to a powerful industrialist of equestrian rank' (4). Cf. Aubert, *Business Managers*, 222-36; P. R. C. Weaver, 'Imperial Slaves and Freedmen in the Brick Industry', *ZPE* 122 (1998): 238-46.

⁷⁹ Jean-Jacques Aubert, 'Workshop Managers', in *The Inscribed Economy: Production and Distribution in the Roman Empire in the Light of instrumentum domesticum*, ed. W. V. Harris (JRSup 6; Ann Arbor: University of Michigan Press, 1993), 171-81, at 174; cf. Aubert, *Business Managers*, 201-321 (*passim*). For other industries, see Carlsen, *Vilici*, 31-55.

⁸⁰ Aubert, *Business Managers*, 319.

⁸¹ The general nature of the administrator's leadership ability is represented well in Socrates' explanation to Nicomachides about the similarities between the ἀγαθὸς οἰκονόμος and the ἀγαθὸς στρατηγός. Listing their overlapping responsibilities, Socrates noted how both were required to make their subordinates willing and obedient (κατηκόους τε καὶ εὐπειθεῖς), to appoint men to appropriate posts, to punish the bad (τοὺς κακοὺς καλᾶζειν) and to reward the good (τοὺς ἀγαθοὺς τιμᾶν . . . προσήκειν), to win the goodwill of those under them (τοὺς ὑπηκόους εὐμενεῖς), to attract allies and helpers, to keep their possessions, and to be strenuous and industrious (ἐπιμελεῖς καὶ φιλοπόνους) in their own work (Xenophon, *Mem.* 3.4.7-9).

every workman, then I should say: this man has a touch of the kingly nature in him [τι ῥῆθος βασιλικού]. And this, in my judgment, is the greatest thing in every operation that makes any demand on the labour of men, and therefore in agriculture. (Xenophon, *Oec.* 21.9-11)⁸²

But managing a successful estate purely by will was hardly realistic. Eventually, administrators had to utilise force. Cato even prescribed a chain of such disciplinary measures: ‘If anyone commits an offence [*deliquerit*] he must punish him [*vindicet*] properly in proportion to the fault. . . . If the overseer sets his face against wrongdoing [*nolet male facere*], they will not do it [*non faciet*]; if he allows it [*passus erit*], the master must not let him go unpunished [*dominus inpune ne sinat esse*]’ (*Agr.* 5.1-2). Administrators would have punished fellow-slaves primarily through beatings and incarceration (Columella, *Rust.* 1.8.16).⁸³ In Plautus’ *Casina*, for instance, the *vilicus* Olympio explained emphatically to his master Lysidamus how given the opportunity he would penalise the urban slave Chalinus: ‘Only let him come to the farm! I’ll send the fine fellow back to town to you, under a yoke like a charcoal peddler’ (*Cas.* 2.8.437; cf. *Pseud.* 38-61).

Administrators who were overly reliant upon the whip, however, also ran the risk of developing enmity between themselves and their labourers. As Columella cautioned, the *vilicus* who wished to manage a productive estate was required to strike a balance between ruling with laxness (*remisse imperet*) and leniency (*lenius*) on the one hand, and ruling with cruelty (*crudeliter imperet*) and severity (*dominorum*) on the other. It was preferred that labourers ‘fear his sternness than detest his cruelty [*timeant eius severitatem, quam crudelitatem detestentur*]’ (Columella, *Rust.* 1.8.10; 11.1.6, 25; cf. Aristotle., [*Oec.*] 1344a29). Failure to find a balance between the two could be met with grave personal consequences, as illustrated in the Parable of the Faithful (and Wise) Steward. In both the Lucan and Matthean accounts, Jesus explains that the manager set over the master’s slaves and entrusted with the responsibility of issuing to them their allowance of food and drink would eventually be punished once his master discovered that the manager was hoarding the rations and beating (τύπτω) the slaves without cause (Matt 24.45-51// Luke 12.42-46). Alternatively, Hippocrates, the real-life *vilicus* of a certain Plautus, apparently

⁸² Although by line 10 of the discourse the δεσπότης is the kind of leader in view, it is clear from line 9 that the generic concept under consideration is ‘the man in authority’ (ὁ ἐφεστηκώς), of which the ἐπίτροπος, ἐπιστάτης, and δεσπότης each serve as examples.

⁸³ Conversely, managers were urged by the philosophers and agronomists to encourage hard working slaves with food, clothing, praise, and leisure (Aristotle, [*Oec.*] 1344a29-1344b12; Cato, *Agr.* 5.2).

exercised his command so judiciously that his subordinates paid tribute to him through a funerary inscription, signing it: 'the rural slaves, over whom he exercised authority with moderation [*quibus imperavit modeste*]' (ILS 7367/GRS §152).

In addition to being strict with his subordinates, the manager of an estate was required also to be learned in farming and very robust (*robustissimus*), so he could both 'teach those under his orders and himself adequately carry out the instructions which he gives' (Columella, *Rust.* 11.1.3). The manager was required to be neither too young nor too old, but of middle age, preferably around 35 years old, so as to be strong and experienced enough to earn the respect of his subordinates while setting an example for them in work ethic (*Rust.* 1.8.3; 11.1.3-4). As Pseudo-Aristotle summarises, 'Right administration of a household [*οἰκονομεῖν*] demands in the first place familiarity with the sphere of one's action; in the second place, good natural endowments; and in the third, an upright and industrious way of life. For the lack of any of these qualifications will involve many a failure in the task one takes in hand' (Aristotle, [*Oec.*] 1345b6-12).⁸⁴

3. Trade

In addition to supervising the enterprise's workforce, business administrators were charged with participating in many kinds of monetary transactions. Estate managers, for instance, were responsible for buying farm tools, slaves, animals, seed, fodder, and various other kinds of agricultural equipment (Columella, *Rust.* 11.1.23). They might hire additional paid-labourers according to specific tasks (Cato, *Agr.* 2.6; 5.3; Petronius, *Satyr.* 53.10; Matt 20.8) and let contracts for leases, labourers, and certain other farm supplies. They also handled credits and deposits (Cato, *Agr.* 2.6), and registered all transactions involving cash, grain, wine, oil, and fodder in the estate's records (Cato, *Agr.* 2.5; Luke 16.2).⁸⁵ Finally, they were responsible for selling the surpluses of produce and other commodities, including everything that was considered superfluous and marketable, such as sick slaves, weak animals, and old tools (Varro, *Rust.* 1.16.4; 1.22.1; 1.27.4; Cato, *Agr.* 2.1).⁸⁶

⁸⁴ White, *Roman Farming*, 353-54.

⁸⁵ For the literacy and arithmetical competency of the administrator, see Jean-Jacques Aubert, 'De l'usage de l'écriture dans la gestion d'entreprise à l'époque romaine', in *Mentalités et choix économiques des romains*, ed. J. Andraeu, J. France, and S. Pittia (Scripta Antiqua 7; Bordeaux: Ausonius, 2004), 127-47.

⁸⁶ Aubert, *Business Managers*, 170-71; cf. Carlsen, *Vilici*, 70-80.

Managers whose business transactions involved writing contracts, however, were normally required to receive official authorisation from their principal to do so. This stipulation was not always mandatory by law, but was frequently observed by business owners due to the risks involved in using middlemen. Principals, for instance, could not sue third contracting parties as a result of the contracts negotiated by their extraneous agents. Even more significantly, third contracting parties could not sue principals directly as a result of those very same mediated contracts, as liability was restricted to the extent of the slave's *peculium*.⁸⁷ Over time, however, several legal remedies were introduced to Roman commercial law which aimed to enforce the contracts established by an agent. The most significant remedy for our purposes is the second-century BCE *actio institoria* (*Dig.* 14.3). As Aubert explains,

The *actio institoria* was based on the idea that principals who benefited from the transactions of their dependent business managers should also incur liabilities arising from them. According to the terms of the praetorian Edit, the principal who had appointed an agent (*institor*) to run his business expected him to negotiate contracts with customers, suppliers, and contractors, in a specifically designated place (estate, workshop, store, or any other facility) or elsewhere, and accepted full liability for the transactions performed by his agent on the basis, and within the scope, of his appointment (*praepositio*). Consequently, third contracting parties were given a legal remedy against either the agent or the principal.⁸⁸

Institores were generally slaves, although by the Principate free persons could also receive such authorisation. But this concession was probably introduced only to permit slave *institores* who had been freed to continue working for their former master without interruption. In such cases, however, the principal no longer appears to have been able to sue a third contracting party, even if he himself could be sued.⁸⁹

The use of *institores* had several immediate commercial benefits. One advantage for principals was the opportunity to offer legal assurance to third contracting parties through low-risk, mediated business transactions. Still, the third party had to be sure about the authorisation of the agent with whom they were entering into business negotiations. As Aubert explains, 'Circumspection was required on the part of a third contracting party entering into a business transaction with an agent, so that the transaction did not fall outside the scope of the [agent's] appointment. For instance, a moneylender had to make sure that the

⁸⁷ Aubert, *Business Managers*, 196-98.

⁸⁸ Aubert, *Business Managers*, 52-53. Cf. Andreau, *Banking and Business*, 66.

⁸⁹ Andrew Lintott, 'Freedmen and Slaves in the Light of Legal Documents from First-Century A.D. Campania', *CQ* 52 (2002): 555-65, at 558.

money borrowed by the *institor* would likely be used in fulfilment of the task entrusted to him'.⁹⁰ Such assurance could be supplied through the agent's authorising documentation. Thus, another benefit of the *institor* arrangement was the ability of the principal to restrict the kinds of transactions his manager could conduct by documenting the precise scope of the commission through a charter (*lex praepositionis*). The charter could then be disclosed to prospective clients to ensure the precise nature of the agent's authorisation. These advantages are apparent in the following third-century CE contract:

I have empowered you [συνέστησά σοι] by this document to administer [φροντιοῦντα] my estate in Arsinoe, and to collect the rents and, if need be, to arrange new leases or to cultivate some land yourself, and to give receipts in my name, and to transact any business connected with stewardship [πάντα τῇ ἐπιτροπῇ ἀνήκοντα ἐπιτελέσαντα], just as I can transact it when I am present [καθὰ κάμοι παρόντι ἔξεστιν], and to distribute the plots in Karamis, restoring to me what remains over, as to which matter I rely on your good faith [πίστι], and I confirm whatever you decide about them [εὐδοκῶ οἷς ἔαν πρὸς ταῦτα ἐπιτελέσῃ]. (BGU 1.300)⁹¹

This document shows with significant clarity the representative nature of an agency appointment. In this sort of arrangement, the administrator was able to manage the principal's many financial responsibilities just as if the owner was present (καθὰ κάμοι παρόντι ἔξεστιν), since the principal's confirmation accompanied the decisions made by the administrator (εὐδοκῶ οἷς ἔαν πρὸς ταῦτα ἐπιτελέσῃ). For this very reason it was important when appointing an agent to specify the scope of the commission by listing each of their constituent tasks. By doing so, the principal not only made himself liable for those actions performed by the agent within the scope of the appointment, but the principal formalised and publicised his authorisation. The principal's liability would then be sufficiently disclosed to prospective third contracting parties.

In the light of the first two benefits of the *institor* arrangement, an additional advantage was that principals could maximise their production by authorising and then stationing various business managers in strategic locations all across the empire. And just such use of multi-branch enterprises has been detected in various kinds of ancient commerce, such as the ceramics industry. Through the study of production signatures, for example, W. V. Harris has proposed that certain

⁹⁰ Aubert, *Business Managers*, 14.

⁹¹ Trans. David Daube, 'Neglected Nuances of Exposition in Luke-Acts', *ANRW II* 25.3 (1985): 2329-56, at 2335. The document technically is not a *lex praepositionis*, but a temporary agreement (ὁμολογία) between a principal and agent. It nonetheless contains many of the features expected in a *lex praepositionis*. Cf. Aubert, *Business Managers*, 11; Gábor Hamza, 'Einige Fragen der Zulässigkeit der direkten Stellvertretung in den Papyri (Das Verhältnis zwischen Vollmacht und Auftrag im Recht der Papyri Ägyptens als römischer Provinz)', *AUB (iur)* 19 (1977): 57-68, esp. 61-62.

entrepreneurs commissioned numerous agents to various locations to widen the base of their production and sale of terracotta lamps. Harris suggests that one manufacturer ('Fortis'), for instance, may have had between twenty and thirty workshops—although not necessarily all active at once—including branches in northern and central Italy, Gaul, Germany, Pannonia, Dalmatia, and Dacia. A second firm ('C. Oppi Res. '), on the other hand, had branches in Gaul, Sardinia, Spain, Rome, and several in North Africa.⁹² Thus, the use of *institores* in Roman commerce became a common means by which business owners could expand their commercial interests while simultaneously offering third contracting parties confidence and security with the principal's backing.

But business administrators such as οἰκονόμοι, ἐπίτροποι, *vilici*, and *actores* were not *institores* by default. The *Digest* indicates that the *vilicus*, for instance, had to be specially assigned to sell goods in order to qualify as an *institor*.⁹³ Moreover, while the agronomists each indicate that administrators routinely conducted financial transactions, they were reluctant to allow their managers to become overly involved in trade (Cato, *Agr.* 5.3-4; 142; Varro, *Rust.* 1.16.5; 2.5-7; Columella, *Rust.* 1.8.13; 3.21.6).⁹⁴ Columella particularly warns against spending too much time trading: 'He [the administrator] should not employ his master's money [*pecuniam domini*] in purchasing cattle or anything else which is bought or sold; for doing this diverts him from his duties as a bailiff and makes him a trader [*negotiatorem*] rather than a farmer [*agricolam*] and makes it impossible to balance accounts with his master' (*Rust.* 11.1.24). These remarks emphasise the supplementary nature of trade in certain business arrangements. Of course other kinds of commercial and

⁹² W. V. Harris, 'Roman Terracotta Lamps: The Organization of an Industry', *JRS* 70 (1980): 126-45, at 141-42.

⁹³ 'Since a bailiff [*vilicus*] is appointed to farm rather than to trade, a person who deals with the bailiff of another has no action against the owner; but if I authorize my bailiff to sell goods as well, it is fair that I should be liable to an action based on the action for the manager's conduct [*actio institoria*] (*Dig.* 14.3.16)'. Another ruling seems to indicate they might actually be *institores* by default: 'Labeo also wrote that full liability attaches to the person who appoints another to lend money or to run a farm [*agris colendis*] or to be trader or a public contractor' (*Dig.* 14.3.5.2). But the stipulation probably assumes the commission of the agent.

⁹⁴ Aubert, *Business Managers*, 8 n. 30, remarks about *vilici*: 'There is no doubt that farm managers were often involved in moneylending, trading, and contracting'. In fact, Aubert, 'De l'usage de l'écriture', 137, states, 'Le caractère périssable des fruits et légumes, des produits laitiers et des œufs, voire de la viande et des céréales, rend ce type de développement de la fonction du régisseur absolument incontournable'; cf. Erdkamp, *Grain Market*, 109-110; Hamish Forbes and Lin Foxhall, 'Ethnoarchaeology and Storage in the Ancient Mediterranean: Beyond Risk and Survival', in *Food in Antiquity*, ed. John Wilkins, David Harvey, and Mike Dobson (Exeter: University of Exeter Press, 1995), 69-86, at 78-81; Tiziana J. Chiusi, 'Landwirtschaftliche Tätigkeit und actio institoria', *Zeitschrift der Savigny-Stiftung für Rechtsgeschichte (Romanistische Abteilung)* 108 (1991): 155-86.

administrative slaves were expected to handle and exchange funds regularly. A *dispensator*, for example, whose service as an accountant required the grant of a sizable allowance (*peculium*), would have continually been responsible for making and receiving payments.⁹⁵ Despite the relative frequency of these transactions, trade was an inevitable part of private administration. It was, therefore, generally important for administrators to have conceived, like Petronius' Trimalchio, 'a passion for business [*concupivi negotiari*]' (*Satyr.* 76).

C. Accountability

The desired ethical make up of private administrators consisted chiefly of loyalty (*πίστις/fides*), which was tangibly expressed through deference (*obsequium*) to the master.⁹⁶ Xenophon, for instance, recorded how Ischomachus prescribed fidelity, or goodwill, as the primary character trait to teach a new estate manager: '[T]he first requirement will be that he should be loyal [*εὐνοίαν*] to you and yours, if he is to represent you in your absence' (*Oec.* 12.5).⁹⁷ Columella similarly warned that a new *vilicus* should always be tested early by his master in order to ensure the bailiff's competence in farming and his 'fidelity and attachment to his master [*domino fidem ac benevolentiam*]; 'without these qualities, the most perfect knowledge possessed by a bailiff is of no use' (*Rust.* 11.1.7).

Numerous fictitious tales and real-life testimonials affirm that loyalty was also the primary idealised trait of administrators in popular culture. In his novel *Callirhoe*, for instance, Chariton used *πίστος* and *πίστις* several times to characterise private administrators. On one occasion the master Dionysius commended his *oikonomos* Phocas, saying, 'You are my benefactor [*εὐεργέτης*]; you are my true

⁹⁵ Carlsen, *Vilici*, 149: '*Dispensatores* fundamentally differed from *vilici* and *actors* by not being *institores*: the legal foundation for their work was the consent of the master, *permissu domini*, which was considered as the precondition for the slaves' *peculium*'. Aubert, *Business Managers*, 196, notes, 'The position of *dispensatores* was comparable in many ways to that of *vilici* or *actores*'. However, 'each time a *dispensator* entered a contract on behalf of his master, he did so upon request (*iussum*) from the master himself or from his *procurator*' (198).

⁹⁶ K. R. Bradley, *Slaves and Masters in the Roman Empire: A Study in Social Control* (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1987), 21-45. Fidelity was the hallmark of all kinds of relationships. As Cicero explains, '[M]en commonly do not entrust [*mandate*] anything except to a friend [*amico*], and do not trust [*credit*] any one except one whom they think faithful [*fidelem putat*]' (*Verr.* 29.1). For this reason fidelity also became the idealised attribute of many menial slaves and private administrators. Valerius Maximus explains that a slave's fidelity to his master is more praiseworthy (*laudabilis*) than a wife's to her husband, since the former is less expected (*Lib.* 6.8.praef.).

⁹⁷ Carlsen, *Vilici*, 57; Aubert, *Business Managers*, 159-62; Joshel, *Work*, 33.

guardian [κηδεμῶν ἀληθίης] and my most loyal supporter [πιστότατος] in confidential affairs' (*Chaer.* 3.9.11-12; cf. 2.4.6; 5.1). The same *oikonomos* was elsewhere similarly described as a φιλοδέσποτος for his eagerness to ensure his master's security (*Chaer.* 3.7.2).⁹⁸ Loyalty also typified the archetypal administrators in the biblical tradition. In their repeated casting of trusted slaves in the parables, the authors of the Synoptic gospels portray faithfulness (πίστος) as the principal virtue of good administration (e.g. Matt 24.25//Luke 12.42; Matt 25.21-23//Luke 19.17). For this reason Jennifer Glancy explains that, in the gospels, 'a faithful slave is one who occupies a managerial position and has moreover internalized the master's interests to the extent that he will work unsupervised when his master is away'.⁹⁹ Fabian Udoh similarly remarks, 'The faithful manager (ὁ πιστὸς οἰκονόμος [Luke 12.42]) is defined by the symbiosis between him and the master, such that he knows, anticipates, and does the master's will, that is, what promotes the master's best interest'.¹⁰⁰

The testimony of funerary epitaphs—while probably containing a certain degree of embellishment—still further suggest that some real-life administrators aspired to, and perhaps even achieved fidelity.¹⁰¹ The first-century CE *oikonomos* Italos, for instance, apparently exhibited such faithful service that his master personally erected a memorial for the bailiff and even mourned his death: 'In this place Chrestos buried aged Italos; he wept for his faithful steward [οἰκονόμον πιστὸν] when he died. In return for a good life and industrious servitude [δουλοσύνης φιλοεργοῦ], he fulfilled these sacred rites for him as a favour' (*SEG* 28.1033/*NewDocs* 3.10). Another monument was raised for 'the most faithful [*fidelissimo*] Gallicanus', the *vilicus* of Afinianus (*ILS* 7371). Still another tribute was dedicated to a certain Sabinianus, who is described as 'a *vilicus* and a good and most faithful man [*vilico et homini bono et fidelissimo*]' (*ILS* 7370; *GRS* §153). Similar honours were also paid to Cerdontus and Junius, who were both remembered as most faithful

⁹⁸ Φιλοδέσποτος was also the name of a second-century CE *oikonomos* from Sparta (*CIG* 1276) and an *actor* (Philodespotus) in Apuleius' *Metamorphoses* (2.26), just as the name Pistus was given to one of Plautus' fictional *vilici* (*Mer.* 2.2.1).

⁹⁹ Glancy, *Slavery*, 114.

¹⁰⁰ Udoh, 'Unrighteous Slave': 330.

¹⁰¹ Despite the ubiquity of the rebellious slave, Joseph Vogt, *Ancient Slavery and the Ideal of Man* (trans. Thomas Wiedemann; Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 1975), 130, maintains that there were many actual slaves, especially those serving in close proximity to the master, 'who reciprocated their master's good will and concern for them by industrious and dedicated work; there were always slaves who were dependable . . . slaves to whom one could readily entrust one's property'.

actores (ILS 7376/CIL XIV 469; CIL VI 9119/CIL XIV 2301). Collectively, these texts plainly show that the quintessential administrator was characterised by loyalty. And so long as this virtue was apparent, the satisfaction of the master and the longevity of the administrator were secure.

But while administrators were keenly aware of their need to manage responsibly, their fidelity was constantly reinforced through the structural hierarchy of the managerial unit. Over the course of his tenure an administrator would be called to account by his master, or immediate superior, through sporadic and unannounced inspections. In *Callirhoe*, for instance, Dionysius waited until just before the harvest to inspect the herds and crops at his seaside estate, presumably to ensure the profitability of the harvest (*Callirhoe*, 2.3.1). But beyond seasonal assessments, masters also made random and unannounced visits in order to observe the work ethic of their labourers (Aristotle, [*Oec.*] 1345a).¹⁰² In the gospel parables, for example, the uncertainty of the master's return was the method by which he maintained the administrator's diligence while left unsupervised (Luke 12.46//Matt 24.51). Surprise inspections, therefore, served two purposes: (i) they enabled the master to examine the various areas of production and the unveiled loyalty of the administrator and his staff; this then (ii) kept the administrator managing the enterprise industriously for fear of the master's wrath.

1. Reward

The outcome of the inspection normally resulted in either the reward or penalisation of the administrator. If the agent managed reliably, he could receive a number of various kinds of rewards.¹⁰³ To begin with, slave administrators—along with menial slaves—would receive certain basic necessities, such as food and clothing. As Pseudo-Aristotle cautioned, 'Unless we pay men, we cannot control them [ἀμίσθων γὰρ οὐχ οἶόν τε ἄρχειν]; and food is a slave's pay [δούλω δὲ μισθὸς τροφή]' (Aristotle, [*Oec.*] 1344b3). Ischomachus, in fact, instructs estate owners to

¹⁰² Inspections involved, among other things, the examination of the condition of the estate's produce, equipment, labourers, and accounting records (Cato, *Agr.* 1.2; 2.5; Columella, *Rust.* 1.8.20; Matt 25.19; Luke 16.2).

¹⁰³ Immediately following Ischomachus' prioritisation of fidelity among administrators, Socrates inquired of him, 'And how, in heaven's name, do you teach your man to be loyal to you and yours?' Ischomachus' response is telling: 'By rewarding him [εὐεργετῶν], of course, whenever the gods bestow some good thing on us in abundance' (*Oec.* 12.6).

provide their administrators the best of the food and clothes, since the better servants deserve the superior provisions (Xenophon, *Oec.* 13.10). Other administrators might also receive verbal commendation. Ischomachus, for instance, states that slaves with ‘an ambitious disposition [φιλότιμοι τῶν φύσεων] are also spurred on by praise [τῷ ἐπαίνῳ παροξύνονται], some natures being hungry for praise as others for meat and drink’ (Xenophon, *Oec.* 13.9; cf. 13.12; Luke 16.8). Still other administrators might receive a promotion with increased responsibility (Matt 25.20-23//Luke 19.16-19), including additional financial and personnel oversight (Matt 24.46-47//Luke 12.43-44).¹⁰⁴ Finally, certain administrators might receive some kind of monetary compensation.¹⁰⁵ If one was a freeman or freedman, the administrator would receive a wage (μισθός), in either cash or kind.¹⁰⁶ If one was a slave, however, the master might award the administrator a salary (ὀψώνιον; σύνταξις [cf. P.Oxy. 42.3048]).¹⁰⁷

Administrators who did not receive an ὀψώνιον, however, may have benefited from an alternative financial arrangement, the grant of a *peculium*.¹⁰⁸ The *peculium* of a slave could include money, provisions, and even other slaves. Though it legally belonged to the master, it functioned as a sort of allowance through which

¹⁰⁴ Some NT scholars doubt if real-life administrators would have been motivated by the rewards presented to Jesus’ parabolic slaves, since they would have prized manumission over occupational promotion and material gain; cf. Mary Ann Beavis, ‘Ancient Slavery as an Interpretive Context for the New Testament Servant Parables with Special Reference to the Unjust Steward (Luke 16:1-8)’, *JBL* 111 (1992): 37-54, at 43. But while this evaluation is true, these critics downplay the reality that promotions up the slave hierarchy were desirable. Columella, for example, suggests that the *vilicus* himself should be promoted to his post from among the hardened, experienced, and hardworking slaves (*Rust.* 1.8.2). These managerial positions not only had the bonus of appearing as freemen’s work (Aristotle, [*Oec.* 1344a), but provided the slaves with increased contact with the master, which in turn afforded them more privileges and better prospects for future manumission.

¹⁰⁵ Aubert, *Business Managers*, 161: ‘*Vilici* formed a select group of privileged slaves and were therefore more likely to be induced by social or economic incentives to side with landowners’.

¹⁰⁶ Eusebius, quoting a letter of Dionysios, bishop of Alexandria, for instance, recalls the martyrdom of Ischyron, ‘the hired steward of one of the rulers [ἐπετρόπευέν τινα τῶν ἀρχόντων ἐπὶ μισθῷ]’ (*Hist. eccl.* 6.42.1). It is not clear, however, if Ischyron was a slave, freed, or free. Similarly, in the mid-fourth century BCE Xenophon (*Oec.* 1.3-4), reporting a conversation between Socrates and Critobulus, explains how the gentleman farmer (οἰκονομικός) who is able to manage his own estate well would also be competent to manage the estate of another in exchange for a μισθός. Xenophon almost certainly does not have a slave administrator in view, although Pomeroy, *Oeconomicus*, 218, suggests the possibility of a freedman. For the salary of free or freed agents in *mandatum*, see Alfons Bürge, ‘Salarium und ähnliche Leistungsentgelte beim *mandatum*’, in *Mandatum und Verwandtes: Beiträge zum römischen und modernen Recht*, ed. Dieter Nörr and Shigeo Nishimura (Berlin: Heidelberg, 1993), 319-38.

¹⁰⁷ Jane Rowlandson, *Landowners and Tenants in Roman Egypt: The Social Relations of Agriculture in the Oxyrhynchite Nome* (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1996), 205; Rathbone, *Economic Rationalism*, 91-92.

¹⁰⁸ As Varro explains, ‘The foremen are to be made more zealous by rewards, and care must be taken that they have a bit of property of their own’ (*Rust.* 1.17.5). He continues to explain that administrators might be rewarded with a family and exemption from work (*Rust.* 1.17.5-7).

the slave could conduct business and thus increase on his master's behalf (Matt 25.14-30//Luke 19.11-27). But before returning the *peculium* to their masters, slaves lived off what they earned, which supplied their needs and motivated them to manage responsibly. In fact, Jean Andreau has recently argued that the entire *peculium* arrangement was intended to enable the slave to make a fortune and then return part or all of the sum to the master in exchange for manumission.¹⁰⁹ An anonymous freedman friend of Petronius' Trimalchio, for instance, admits to having purchased his freedom for a thousand denarii, which could have only been supplied by just this sort of *peculium* arrangement (*Satyr.* 57).¹¹⁰ All of these kinds of awards were quite commonplace and were thought—by the agronomists anyway—to benefit the farm. As Columella summarises, 'Such justice and consideration [*iustitia et cura*] on the part of the master contributes easily to the increase of his estate [*multum confert augendo patrimonio*]' (*Rust.* 1.8.19).

2. Punishment

Much literature has been written about the punishment of slaves in the ancient world that applies directly to administrators as well. Normally, if an administrator were found to be unfaithful and disobedient to his master he would have been liable to great professional and physical maltreatment. But in some instances of administrative carelessness, it appears that they were punished rather lightly. After all, administrators were specially skilled and educated labourers who possessed great money-making potential for their masters. Severely injuring or killing one's administrator, therefore, was not always in the best interest of the proprietor. Ischomachus, for instance, remarked that he punished his estate managers, not vindictively, but for pedagogical purposes, to train them how to superintend the estate better. As Ischomachus explained,

¹⁰⁹ Andreau, 'Les esclaves', 116-17: 'Au moment où l'esclave allait être affranchi, le maître pouvait lui redemander le pécule tout entier tel qu'il était au moment de l'affranchissement, ou bien lui en reprendre seulement une partie. Quelle partie? Assez souvent, semble-t-il, le maître demandait une somme équivalant au prix d'achat de l'esclave, afin qu'elle lui permît de racheter un esclave de valeur analogue'. Andreau points as evidence to Pliny the Elder, *Nat.* 7.39.128-129.

¹¹⁰ Although the LCL translation suggests that the freedman's purchase was for his own manumission, Petronius' Latin text is ambiguous and may indicate that the freedom of the freedman's wife (*contubernalis*) is in view. In either case, the story depicts the great monetary possessions of a slave. The boast of the fictitious bailiff Olympio, 'I can get freed for a farthing [*una libella liber possum fieri*]' (Plautus, *Cas.* 316), is of course hyperbole, but nevertheless demonstrates that slave stewards possessed adequate funds to purchase manumission.

Whenever I notice that they are careful [ἐπιμελομένους], I commend them and try to show them honour [ἐπαινῶ καὶ τιμᾶν περιῶμαι αὐτούς]; but when they appear careless, I try to say and do the sort of things that will sting [δήξεται] them. . . . If you want to make men fit to take charge, you must supervise their work and examine it, and be ready to reward work well carried through, and not shrink from punishing carelessness as it deserves. (Xenophon, *Oec.* 12.16, 19)

These kinds of gentle punishments—those which merely ‘sting’—were suitable for generally-obedient administrators, those who, even when deserving of punishment, were still of great value to their masters.

But some administrators were punished quite violently, especially when they had caused their masters great misfortune. Rural estate managers and business agents were especially liable to the master’s aggression,¹¹¹ for as Ramsay MacMullen observes, ‘It was easy for [the master] to hurt people he never saw’.¹¹² While some administrators were banished to a distant country estate (Petronius, *Satyr.* 69), others were heavily beaten and whipped (Columella, *Claud.* 38.2; Chariton, *Chaer.* 3.9.5-7).¹¹³ In his novel, Chariton tells that during an inspection a master’s anger toward his administrator might be expressed in a subtle complaint (μέμψις) or in such fury (βαρύθυμος) as to require a lover’s intercession and rescue from death (*Chaer.* 2.7.2-6; cf. Cicero, *Resp.* 1.59). Moreover, the masters in the gospel parables are quite famous for viciously penalising disobedient managers. In certain cases they desert or demote their managers to menial servitude (Luke 16.2-3),¹¹⁴ and in others they have their administrators cut into pieces (διχοτομέω [Luke 12.46//Matt 24.51]).¹¹⁵ These horrific examples were not exceptional. As Saller maintains, ‘Romans regularly *and legitimately* inflicted on their fellow men corporal punishments that maimed and even killed’.¹¹⁶

D. Summary

In the preceding analysis of private administrators we sought through the use of the title οἰκονόμος and several other Greek and Latin correlatives to identify

¹¹¹ Cicero remarked, ‘If a man, as a guardian, or as a partner, or as a person in a place of trust, or as any one’s agent, has cheated any one, the greater his offence is, the slower is his punishment’ (*Caecin.* 2.7).

¹¹² MacMullen, *Social Relations*, 6. Seneca’s *vilicus* appealed to the intimacy and longevity of their relationship in an attempt to appease his master’s anger (*Ep.* 12.1-3).

¹¹³ Fitzgerald, *Slavery*, 32-50.

¹¹⁴ Beavis, ‘Ancient Slavery’: 49, who argues that demotion and desertion were suitable forms of punishment for slaves, because the inflicted slaves would either be left to fend for themselves and probably to die, or be demoted to digging as a drudge.

¹¹⁵ Ulrich Luz, *Matthew 21-28: A Commentary* (Hermeneia; Minneapolis: Fortress, 2005), 224-25; cf. Beavis, ‘Ancient Slavery’: 43.

¹¹⁶ Saller, *Patriarchy*, 134 (original emphasis).

their main characteristics and chief attributes. Several features of the position were consistently observed. Although οἰκονόμος originally referred to a free proprietor of an estate, over time the title and the responsibilities of estate and business management came to be identified almost exclusively with slaves and freedmen. Administrators, therefore, were typically the subordinates of wealthy masters/patrons, although administrators themselves were normally located in positions of authority as well. Granted the responsibility of running an enterprise, private administrators were charged with making steady—though not excessive—profits for the proprietor and with directing a group of subordinate labourers to achieve that end.¹¹⁷ Administrators were often authorised to enter into contract negotiations with potential third contracting parties. Both to their slave staffs as well as to third parties, then, administrators acted as representatives of their principals and were entrusted with the right to act for them as such. Administrators, however, were generally not liable for their contracts. Rather, when formally authorised, the principal was normally held responsible for all commercial dealings, as long as the agent acted within the scope of his commission. But even though third parties could not charge the administrator with fault, business managers were always held accountable to their principals for the work they performed. Depending on their fidelity to their principal, they either received rewards (e.g. promotion, commendation, allowance) or punishment (e.g. demotion, chastisement, death).

¹¹⁷ In his treatise on estate management, Xenophon records how Ischomachus summarises the make-up of the good administrator: '[A]fter you have implanted in him a desire for your prosperity and have made him also careful to see that you achieve it, and have obtained for him, besides, the knowledge needful to ensure that every piece of work done shall add to the profits [ὠφελιμώτερα], and, further, have made him capable of ruling [ἄρχειν], and when, besides all this, he takes as much delight in producing heavy crops for you in due season as you would take if you did the work yourself. For it seems to me that a man like that would make a very valuable bailiff [πολλοῦ ἂν ἄξιος εἶναι ἐπίτροπος]' (Xenophon, *Oec.* 15.1).

Summary of Part 1

In Chapters 2-4 we surveyed the three main administrative contexts from Graeco-Roman antiquity in which *oikonomoi* served (regal, municipal, private) in order to highlight their key similarities and significant differences. Therein we made several important observations relevant for our enquiry concerning Paul's metaphorical use of *oikonomos*. Firstly, we noticed that the social and legal status of *oikonomoi* varied according to the kind, period, and location of the administration in view. The civic *oikonomoi* from the Hellenistic period, for instance, were freemen, while those in municipal positions during the Roman period could have been free, freed, or slaves. Moreover, although regal *oikonomoi* from the Hellenistic period were always freemen, during both the Hellenistic and Roman periods private *oikonomoi* were almost always freedmen or slaves. Secondly, we observed that the administrative structures in which *oikonomoi* served varied according to context. Although regal and private *oikonomoi* operated in hierarchical structures, civic *oikonomoi* served in democratic and republican forms of government, which dramatically affected the power they possessed and the manner—and even possibility—of their calling to account. These observations will enable us now to identify the source domain of Paul's *oikonomos* metaphor in 1 Corinthians 4 and 9.

PART II. PAUL'S *OIKONOMOS* METAPHOR IN 1 CORINTHIANS 4 AND 9

Interpreting the Apostle Paul's portrayal of himself as an *oikonomos* in 1 Corinthians 4 and 9 has long troubled NT interpreters. This difficulty is not due, however, to the infrequency with which the term was used in antiquity. As was made apparent in Part 1, the title was used so commonly in the ancient Greek-speaking world that modern scholarship remains conflicted regarding the precise source domain of Paul's metaphor. Just as troubling is that only a handful of studies of Paul's use of the term have been conducted in any detail, and even fewer have paid much attention to the differences between its regal, municipal, and private contexts. This is especially surprising given that the metaphor occupies an important rhetorical and theological role in the two passages where it appears in 1 Corinthians.

But when Paul's portrayal of his administration is analysed in light of the various models surveyed in Part 1, it becomes clear that Paul adopted the term from just one of those contexts and employed it strategically in an effort to elucidate the nature of his apostleship and to elicit a very specific response from his readers. In Chapter 5 we will apply a basic method for identifying metaphors and thereby make a case for the source domain of Paul's analogy. Then in Chapters 6 and 7 we will turn to Paul's employment of the metaphor in 1 Corinthians 4 and 9 respectively seeking to illumine how Paul deployed the image in two distinct epistolary contexts to meet his particular rhetorical and theological objectives.

Chapter 5. Identifying Paul's *Oikonomos* Metaphor in 1 Corinthians

Having surveyed in Part 1 the three distinct administrative contexts in which *oikonomoi* are most attested in Graeco-Roman antiquity, in this chapter we will seek to identify which of those contexts is responsible for Paul's metaphor in 1 Corinthians. But in seeking to identify the image's source domain, we will greatly increase the plausibility of our results if we examine Paul's letter, including its epistolary and social contexts, employing strict hermeneutical criteria that can direct and clarify our analysis. Our investigation of Paul's metaphor will benefit significantly from the principles recommended by Nijay Gupta.

In a recent article, Nijay Gupta has introduced a series of seven principles and related questions which aid in the identification and interpretation of Pauline metaphors. Three of those principles are of particular relevance here. The first principle, *cotextual coherence*, asks the question: 'Is the source domain made prominent elsewhere in the discourse?' The second principle, *analogy*, asks the question: 'Is the metaphorical term or phrase used in similar ways elsewhere?' Finally, the third principle, *exposure*, asks the question: 'To what extent were the author and reader exposed to, or in contact with, the source domain?'¹ Significantly, when these questions are posed to Paul's metaphor in 1 Corinthians, it only resonates with one source domain examined in Part 1: private commercial administration. In what follows we will demonstrate how these principles illumine Paul's adoption of this particular source domain.

A. Cotextual Coherence

Evidence that commercial agency, or the private administrative sphere, is the appropriate source domain of Paul's *oikonomos* metaphor is, in the first place, supplied in 1 Cor 4.1-5 and the larger discourse in which this passage is located. The first indication lies in the hierarchy Paul constructs involving apostles and God/Christ. In 4.1-5 Paul portrays apostles to be serving in a subordinate role closely resembling those occupied by *oikonomoi* in private structures from Graeco-

¹ Nijay K. Gupta, 'Towards a Set of Principles for Identifying and Interpreting Metaphors in Paul: Romans 5:2 (προσαγωγή) as a Test Case', *Restoration Quarterly* 51 (2009): 169-81, at 174. The sequence of these principles has been reversed here.

Roman antiquity. This is most apparent when Paul declares that apostles serve a κύριος, namely Christ (4.4-5). Paul indicates that it is Christ who will return to examine and acquit him. At that time the Lord will expose the secret things of darkness (τὰ κρυπτὰ τοῦ σκότους) and the desires of the heart (τὰς βουλὰς τῶν καρδιῶν), and issue either rewards or penalty to his apostles (4.5; cf. 3.8, 14-15).

This hierarchy is reinforced in 4.1-3. Firstly, the genitive constructions ὑπηρέτας Χριστοῦ and οἰκονόμους μυστηρίων θεοῦ (4.1) bear close resemblance to the administrator-master relationship exhibited in both Greek and Latin inscriptions. The use of the genitive in the phrase ὑπηρέτας Χριστοῦ is possessive. Since οἰκονόμος, on the other hand, is a cognate of the verb οἰκονομεῶ (LSJ I.1-2), the construction οἰκονόμους μυστηρίων θεοῦ probably constitutes an objective genitive, so that apostles are those who manage, or dispense, God's mysteries.² Nevertheless, because the mysteries belong to God,³ the οἰκονόμοι are by implication his subordinates. Secondly, a hierarchical model is apparent when Paul states that it is required of *oikonomoi* that they be found faithful (4.2). But to *whom* must the apostles prove faithful? Verses 3-4a reveal the wrong persons, namely other believers, human judiciaries, and even the apostle himself. While Paul considers it the mission of the apostolate to serve the church (3.21-22), their subordination and accountability are to none other than Christ (4.4b-5). Finally, the fact that apostles were entrusted with oversight of a particular commodity, the μυστήρια θεοῦ (4.1), implies the metaphor's commercial derivation, since *oikonomoi* who managed a specific product normally served in private commercial contexts, as did Genealis, the commercial slave of Caesar: Γενεάλ[ιος] Καίσαρος δούλου οἰκονόμου ἐπὶ τοῦ σείτου [*sic*, σίτου] (*IKios 46/IGRR 3.25*).⁴

Collectively, then, these textual features suggest that Paul served in an administrative configuration that was markedly different from the democratic and republican structures of both Greek and Roman cities. Furthermore, since by the time of Paul's ministry the regal *oikonomos* (in the Hellenistic sense) was a thing of

² This goes slightly against Gladd, *Mysterion*, 168 n. 9, who suggests a genitive of subordination (e.g. 'stewards over the mysteries of God'), although in the light of *IKios 46/IGRR 3.25* (cited immediately above), Gladd could be correct.

³ Schrage, *Der erste Brief an die Korinther*, 1:320: 'ὑπηρέται Χριστοῦ und οἰκονόμοι der Geheimnisse Gottes, nicht Besitzer eigener Mysterien'. For additional indicators in 4.1-5 of the subordination of apostles to God/Christ, see Chapter 5.

⁴ The original Greek text of this bilingual inscription probably presented Genealis' name in the genitive case (Γενεάλ[ιος]), although the Latin renders it in the nominative: [*Ge*]nealis, Caesaris Aug(usti) [*se*]rvos {servus} verna, dispens(ator) [*ad*] frumentum.

the distant past, the source domain of Paul's metaphor must be the private administrative sphere. This is then further confirmed by Paul's frequent use of other private domestic metaphors in 1 Corinthians, especially in the letter's opening four chapters: ἀδελφοί (*passim*); διάκονοι (3.5); τέκνα (4.14, 17); παιδαγωγοί (4.15); πατήρ (4.15).⁵

B. Analogy

The commercial use of the *oikonomos* metaphor in 1 Cor 4.1-5 finds additional support in 9.17. In the earlier passage, Paul uses the noun οἰκονόμος in an effort to portray the role apostles occupy in God's administration. It is then significant that Paul employs the abstract noun οἰκονομία in 9.17 for a similar purpose. In the latter instance, however, Paul uses the metaphor in order to explain how as God's slave he can be entitled to a μισθός (9.18), and why his primary ministerial objective is 'to gain' (κερδαίνειν) converts. The intricacies of this difficult passage will be addressed at length in Chapter 7. For now it is sufficient simply to observe that Paul's concerns with slavery, remuneration, and making evangelistic profits suggest that the source domain of his οἰκονομία metaphor in 9.17 is the realm of private commercial administration, especially since municipal *oikonomoi* were often wealthy citizens, normally did not receive a wage, and were responsible for making payments, not profits. Therefore, because Paul figuratively utilises the οἰκονομ- lexical stem in two passages in the same letter to refer to his apostleship, we can with great certainty conclude that Paul drew both metaphors from the same private administrative context.

C. Exposure

Paul was familiar with many of the features of the urban sector of the ancient world. As Wayne Meeks remarks, 'Paul was a city person. The city breathes

⁵ Archibald Robertson and Alfred Plummer, *A Critical and Exegetical Commentary on the First Epistle of St Paul to the Corinthians* (ICC; Edinburgh: T&T Clark, 1911), 75: 'God is the master (iii. 23) of the Christian household (1 Tim. iii. 15), and the stores entrusted to His stewards are the "mysteries of God"'. Cf. Fee, *First Corinthians*, 159; Joubert, 'Managing', 216; Ben Witherington III, *Conflict and Community in Corinth: A Socio-Rhetorical Commentary on 1 and 2 Corinthians* (Grand Rapids: Eerdmans, 1995), 138; Richard B. Hays, *First Corinthians* (Interpretation; Louisville: John Knox Press, 1997), 65; Anthony C. Thiselton, *The First Epistle to the Corinthians: A Commentary on the Greek Text* (NIGTC; Grand Rapids: Eerdmans, 2000), 336.

through his language'.⁶ For this reason, it is not surprising that on several occasions in 1 Corinthians Paul borrowed images from everyday Corinthian life in order to illustrate various theological insights (e.g. 1 Cor 9.24-27). The metaphor under investigation in our study would have functioned similarly. Paul's portrayal of apostles as *oikonomoi* would have resonated richly within the colony's flourishing commercial context. Even as early as the fifth century BCE, Thucydides could affirm that 'Corinth had from time out of mind been a commercial emporium [ἐμπόριον]' (War 1.13.5).⁷ This was also true of the city which Paul knew in the first century CE.⁸ But Corinth's success as a trade centre was not accidental; the city's wealth was due largely to geography.

1. Corinth's Strategic Location

Because of its location, Corinth served to unite the eastern and western parts of the Mediterranean, resting as it were 'at the cross-roads [ἐν τριόδῳ] of Greece' (Dio Chrysostom, *Or.* 8.5). Writing during the period of Corinth's desolation—Corinth remained in ruins from 146-44 BCE after being sacked by the Roman general Lucius Mummius—Cicero considered Corinth's location to be a navigational centrepiece: '[I]ts position was such on the straits and the entrance to Greece, that by land it held

⁶ Meeks, *Urban*, 9. Paul's acquaintance with the city began in his youth. Luke reports that Paul was born in Tarsus (Acts 22.3; cf. 9.11; 21.39), a philosophical and commercial centre as well as the capital of the Roman province of Cilicia. Paul then spent an unspecified number of years in Jerusalem, where he received his Pharisaic education (Acts 22.3; 26.4; cf. Gal 1.14, 22; Phil 3.5-6); cf. Martin Hengel, *The Pre-Christian Paul* (London: SCM Press, 1991), 18-39; Willem Cornelis van Unnik, *Tarsus or Jerusalem: The City of Paul's Youth* (London: Epworth Press, 1962); James D. G. Dunn, *Beginning from Jerusalem: Christianity in the Making* (vol. 2; Grand Rapids: Eerdmans, 2009), 330-33. Finally, he devoted over three decades to missionary activity, during which time he established numerous churches in some of the leading cities in the northeast Mediterranean basin. By the end of the 60s CE, Paul could even boast, '[F]rom Jerusalem and as far around as Illyricum I have fully proclaimed the good news of Christ' (Rom 15.19). We can, then, without hesitancy assert with Meeks that 'the mission of the Pauline circle was conceived from start to finish as an urban movement' (10).

⁷ Translation from Thucydides, *The History of the Peloponnesian War* (trans. Richard Crawley; London: J. M. Dent, 1910), 7. Joan M. Frayn, *Markets and Fairs in Roman Italy: Their Social and Economic Importance from the Second Century BC to the Third Century AD* (Oxford: Clarendon, 1993), 10, explains, 'The Greek term ἐμπόριον denotes a market centre, mainly on the coast, importing and exporting goods to and from distant places, either in the same country or in foreign parts'. For the city up to the mid-fourth century BCE, see J. B. Salmon, *Wealthy Corinth: A History of the City to 338 BC* (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1984); for 228-44 BCE, see James Wiseman, 'Corinth and Rome I: 228 B.C.-A.D. 267', *ANRW II* 7.1 (1979): 438-548, at 450-96.

⁸ See, e.g., Furnish, 'Corinth in Paul's Time: What Can Archaeology Tell Us?'; Jerome Murphy-O'Connor, 'The Corinth that Saint Paul Saw', *Biblical Archaeologist* 47 (1984): 147-59; Jerome Murphy-O'Connor, *St. Paul's Corinth: Texts and Archaeology* (3rd ed.; Collegeville, MN: Liturgical Press, 2002); Meeks, *Urban*, 47-49; Peter Oakes, 'Contours of the Urban Environment', in *Urban Christians* (2009), 21-35, at 32-34.

the keys of various places and almost united two seas, set over against each other especially for purposes of navigation, separated by a very small intervening space' (*Agr.* 2.87). The narrow isthmus on which Corinth was built was an advantageous site on all accounts, even serving to join numerous people groups. As Aristides lauded,

[Corinth] is, as it were, a kind of market place [ἀγορά], and at that common to all Greeks, and a national festival [πανήγυρις], not like this present one which the Greek race celebrates here every two years, but one which is celebrated every year and daily. If just as men enjoy the official status of being public friends with foreign cities, so too did cities enter into this relationship with one another, the city [Corinth] would have this title and honor everywhere. For it receives all cities and sends them off again and is a common refuge for all, like a kind of route [ὁδός] and passage [διέξοδος] for all mankind, no matter where one would travel, and it is a common city for all Greeks, indeed, as it were, a kind of metropolis [μητρόπολις] and mother [μήτηρ] in this respect. For among other reasons, there is no place where one would rest as on a mother's lap with more pleasure or enjoyment. Such is the relaxation, refuge, and safety for all who come to it. (*Or.* 46.23-24)⁹

Corinth, then, was a city of repute throughout antiquity, and many of its accolades were owed to its auspicious placement.

Corinth's location was also its primary reason for being refounded. Strabo credits Julius Caesar's decision to recolonise Corinth to the city's 'favourable position' (εὐφύϊαν [*Geogr.* 8.6.23]),¹⁰ the payoff being the city's potential to serve as a centre for all kinds of trade.¹¹ For this reason, in June 44 BCE, after lying nearly uninhabited for over a century, Caesar's plan to resettle the site was implemented by Antony (Appian, *Hist. rom.* 8.136; Strabo, *Geogr.* 8.6.23; Plutarch, *Caes.* 57.8; Diodorus Siculus, *Libr.* 32.27.1).¹² It is especially noteworthy that the colonists dispatched from Rome included a large contingent of freedmen, many of whom had become entrepreneurs or were serving their patrons as business agents.¹³ So

⁹ For all translations of Aristides, see P. Aelius Aristides, *The Complete Works* (2 vols.; trans. Charles A. Behr; Leiden: Brill, 1981). For the Greek text, see Aelii Aristidis, 'Quae Supersunt Omnia', ed. Bruno Keil (Berlin: Weidmann, 1958).

¹⁰ Edward T. Salmon, *Roman Colonization under the Republic* (Aspects of Greek and Roman Life; London: Thames and Hudson, 1969), 135: 'Another Caesarian colony founded for economic or social reasons was the most celebrated of them all, Corinth. . . . It was manifestly intended to revive the mercantile glories of the city that Mummius had destroyed'. Cf. Mary E. Hoskins Walbank, 'The Foundation and Planning of Early Roman Corinth', *JRA* 10 (1997): 95-130, at 99: 'The refounding of Corinth, a great commercial centre of the past, was in keeping with Julius Caesar's economic and colonial policies of relieving economic distress at home, particularly at Rome, and of developing the provinces'.

¹¹ Cicero's appreciation for the ease of access to every city of the Peloponnese was especially true of Corinth: '[A]ll the products of the world can be brought by water to the city in which you live, and your people in turn can convey or send whatever their own fields produce to any country they like' (Cicero, *Resp.* 2.9).

¹² For the circumstance and date of the foundation, see Walbank, 'Foundation': 97-99.

¹³ For the limited number of army veterans in Corinth, compared to freedmen and businessmen, see Spawforth, 'Colonial Elite', 168-73. For an overview of the colony from its foundation in 44 BCE to 267 CE, see Wiseman, 'Corinth': 497-533.

strategic was Corinth's location that by the late first century CE the colony had already become a 'flourishing centre of commerce, administration, the imperial cult, and entertainment'.¹⁴ As Strabo explained,

Corinth is called "wealthy" [ἀφνειός] because of its commerce [τὸ ἐμπόριον], since it is situated on the Isthmus and is master of two harbors, of which the one leads straight to Asia, and the other to Italy; and it makes easy the exchange of merchandise [ἀμοιβὰς τῶν φορτίων] from both countries that are so far distant from each other. And just as in early times the Strait of Sicily was not easy to navigate, so also the high seas, and particularly the sea beyond Maleae, were not, on account of the contrary winds; and hence the proverb, "But when you double Maleae, forget your home." At any rate, it was a welcome alternative, for the merchants both from Italy and from Asia, to avoid the voyage to Maleae and to land their cargoes here. And also the duties on what by land was exported from the Peloponnesus and what was imported to it fell to those who held the keys. And to later times this remained ever so. (Strabo, *Geogr.* 8.6.20; cf. Cicero, *Resp.* 2.9)¹⁵

The Maleae was the infamous cape of the southeastern Peloponnese which had for centuries posed a terrible risk for seafarers.¹⁶ Crossing at the isthmus, therefore, provided a welcome relief for those who wished to avoid the dangerous trek around Greece's southern tip.

The isthmus benefitted transport in two ways. Firstly, smaller ships that were required to continue their voyage from one sea to the next could, for a price, be carried by trolleys along the six kilometre-long δίολκος strip stretching across the narrowest part of the isthmus (Strabo, *Geogr.* 8.6.22; Pliny the Elder, *Nat.* 4.10). Secondly, either of the two major harbours at opposing sides of the isthmus could have served as a final destination.¹⁷ At the harbours goods were imported, stored, traded, and exported at either end of the isthmus. The Lechaion Harbour, which was located directly north of the colony on the Corinthian Gulf, was used for shipping to and from Italy and was easily reached from the city's ἀγορά/*forum* by the 3,150

¹⁴ A. J. S. Spawforth, 'Corinth: Roman', in *OCD* (2003), 391. Walbank, 'Foundation': 107, agrees: 'These new Corinthians were entrepreneurs, eager to seize onto a good thing, and ready to exploit their resources and connections as far as possible; just the sort of people to make a commercial success of their city'. Cf. Mary E. Hoskins Walbank, 'What's in a Name? Corinth under the Flavians', *ZPE* 139 (2002): 251-64, at 261.

¹⁵ G. D. R. Sanders, 'Urban Corinth: An Introduction', in *Urban Religion* (2005), 11-24, at 15: 'Well-watered, overlooked by an imposing acropolis, flanked by a large fertile plain to the north and northwest, and located between two seas, Corinth commanded the principal nodal point in the land and sea communications of southern Greece. Its strategic and commercial position was supplemented by valuable natural resources for export, including building materials, excellent clays for ceramic and mortars, wood, and agricultural produce. It was not so much Corinth's own riches that were being moved, however. The importance of Corinth was as an entrepôt through which the produce of other regions was shipped'.

¹⁶ Murphy-O'Connor, *St. Paul's Corinth*, 54.

¹⁷ Corinth also had two simpler docking facilities at Schoenus and Poseidona which served either end of the δίολκος.

metre-long Lechaion Road (Strabo, *Geogr.* 8.6.22; Pausanias, *Descr.* 2.2.3).¹⁸ The Cenchreae Harbour (see image 1 below), on the other hand, being the lesser of the two, was located to the east of Corinth on the Saronic Gulf and served to facilitate trade with Asia (Dio Chyrsostom *Or.* 37.8; Apuleius, *Metam.* 10.35; Aristides, *Or.* 46.23).¹⁹ Both Cenchreae and Lechaion grew quite famous in antiquity for their shipping and attest to the sheer volume of Corinth's commercial interests during the early empire.²⁰



(1)



(2)

Coins featuring: (1) the Cenchreae Harbour with a statue of an unidentified deity shown in mid-harbour (though it probably stood on the north mole) and three ships in the foreground (Antoninus Pius, 138-161 CE; © The Trustees of the British Museum [1899,0401.26; CGR3668]); (2) the Corinthian ἀγορά with the north and south stoas (Caracalla 198-211 CE; © The American Numismatic Society).²¹

2. Corinth's Prosperous Ἀγορά

Many of the goods transported to the vicinity of Corinth, either by land or sea, whether for the Pan-Hellenic festivities²² or everyday use, eventually made their way to be sold in the Corinthian ἀγορά (see image 2 above). It was in the marketplace where the local and international tradesmen exchanged their goods.²³

¹⁸ For the products and destinations of the Lechaion Harbour, see Donald Engels, *Roman Corinth: An Alternative Model for the Classical City* (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1990), 12.

¹⁹ Murphy-O'Connor, *St. Paul's Corinth*, 16-19.

²⁰ Sanders, 'Urban Corinth', 14-15; C. K. Williams, 'Roman Corinth as a Commercial Center', in *The Corinthia in the Roman Period*, ed. Timothy E. Gregory (JRSup 8; Ann Arbor: JRA, 1993), 31-46, at 38-39, explains how Corinth's commercial sphere benefitted from all the transportation, since 'many of the market buildings at Corinth probably served as distribution centers for the various products that were to be shipped abroad and for other products that were to be sold in the city and nearby, as well as for products destined for the eastern part of the Peloponnese and inland Arcadia'.

²¹ Images from M. J. Price and B. L. Trell, *Coins and Their Cities* (London: Vecchi, 1977), 83 (Figure 146) and 84 (Figure 148).

²² Corinth's bustling economy also owed much to the Isthmian Games, the second largest of the Pan-Hellenic festivals (Strabo, *Geogr.* 8.6.20).

²³ Pausanias provides a detailed description of the layout of the marketplace during the second century CE (*Descr.* 2.2.6-3.1). It is unfortunate, however, that in 77 CE an earthquake destroyed

Kathleen Slane remarks, ‘It is noteworthy . . . that the ports of Corinth were located not at the *diolkos* but at the locations on their respective coasts closest to Corinth. This suggests that cargoes arriving from either direction were normally off-loaded and broken up, that Corinth acted as a middleman, and perhaps also as a market in the trade between east and west’.²⁴ Mary Haskins Walbank agrees when she writes, ‘Although Corinth’s agricultural resources provided a valuable underpinning, the city’s prosperity rested primarily on trade and on its function as an entrepôt between east and west, in addition to an invisible trade in usury and bottomry’.²⁵ Thus, Aristides described—albeit a century after Paul’s letter—the busyness of Corinth’s marketplace and the profusion of its merchandise: ‘Indeed, you would see it everywhere full of wealth [πλούτου] and an abundance of goods [πλήθους ἀγαθῶν], as much as is likely, since the earth on every side and the sea on every side flood it with these, as if it dwelled in the midst of its goods and was washed all around by them, like a merchant ship [ὀλκάδα]’ (*Or.* 46.27).

Donald Engels’ study on the economy of Roman Corinth has attempted to demonstrate the basis of Corinth’s economy. While most cities in the Graeco-Roman period survived on agriculture and consumerism, Engels has (controversially) proposed that Corinth should be categorised as neither an agro- nor a consumer-town. Rather, Engels contends that Corinth’s economy was supported by services (e.g. religion, education, cultural and judicial activities).²⁶ It is beyond the scope of this study to attempt either to confirm or deny Engels’ thesis, but it is safe to affirm that Corinth had an unusually robust economy and relied to a large extent on trade. This owes much to the poor agricultural conditions of the *territorium* surrounding the city. Although some farming was possible, and in fact some scholars now contend that there was more arable land than Strabo supposed (*Geogr.* 8.6.23),²⁷

much of the city that Paul knew. The marketplace then went under extensive reconstruction, so that much of what is discussed in ancient literature about the city’s appearance post-dates the first century CE and is irrelevant for our study. Nevertheless, archaeology and a few ancient sources are able to provide reliable evidence for the nature of Corinthian commerce in the mid-first century CE.

²⁴ Kathleen Warner Slane, ‘Corinthian Ceramic Imports: The Changing Pattern of Provincial Trade in the First and Second Centuries AD’, in *Renaissance* (1989), 219-25, at 219.

²⁵ Walbank, ‘Name’: 259.

²⁶ For criticisms of Engels’ treatment, see, e.g., Richard P. Saller, ‘Review: Donald Engels, *Roman Corinth*’, *Classical Philology* 86 (1991): 351-57; A. J. S. Spawforth, ‘Roman Corinth and Ancient Roman Economy’, *The Classical Review* 42 (1991): 119-20.

²⁷ Oakes, ‘Contours’, 35: ‘So much space seems to have been centuriated [in Corinth] that even if, as Strabo asserts, farming was difficult, it must have been a major component of the city’s economic activity’. Cf. David Gilman Romano, ‘City Planning, Centuriation, and Land Division in Roman Corinth: *Colonia Laus Iulia Corinthiensis* & *Colonia Iulia Flavia Augusta Corinthiensis*’, in *Corinth*

neither the size nor the soil of the hinterland was suitable to sustain the Corinthian population or the local economy.²⁸ The colony, then, was forced to take advantage of its easy access to trade routes and the services it could offer guests.

Roman Corinth was well-known for distributing a wide range of products. C. K. Williams suggests that the items known to have been in surplus there were wool, dyed woven goods, olive oil, honey, and possibly wine.²⁹ Corinth also developed quite a reputation for its artisans. As Strabo reports, 'The city . . . was always great and wealthy [ἡ μεγάλη τε καὶ πλουσία], and it was well equipped with men skilled both in the affairs of state and in the craftsman's arts; for both here and in Sicyon the arts of painting and modelling and all such arts of the craftsman flourished most' (*Geogr.* 8.6.23). Of its manufactured goods, Roman Corinth was best known for producing bronze, marble, and various kinds of pottery (e.g. terracotta lamps, terra sigillata, bowls, roof tiles).³⁰ Moreover, the high quantity of imports made Corinth an ideal location for those industries whose products required a combination of goods.³¹ These locally manufactured items were probably produced in small factories outside the city, or even workshops in the marketplace.³² In either case, business owners living in distant cities would have appointed various kinds of business administrators to supervise their local operations,³³ some of whom probably bore the titles *οἰκονόμος*, *ἐπίτροπος*, *vilicus*, *actor*, or *dispensator*.³⁴

(2003), 279-301, at 289-90; David Gilman Romano, 'Urban and Rural Planning in Roman Corinth', in *Urban Religion* (2005), 25-59, at 43.

²⁸ Engels, *Roman Corinth*, 25: 'Corinth provided a huge market for agricultural surplus whose size had far outstripped the ability of its hinterland (*territorium*) to supply'. Williams, 'Commercial Center', 38: 'The Corinthia was not suited to raise a large crop of grain, at least not enough for export after the Augustan period. In fact, with the population that the Corinthia had after the initial colony took root — let us say in the Flavian-Hadrianic period — grain surely was imported on a regular basis to supply the needs of the area. Foodstuffs that were not able to be produced locally would have been much in demand in a provincial capital'. Cf. Walbank, 'Name': 258-59.

²⁹ Williams, 'Commercial Center', 38; cf. Slane, 'Ceramic Imports', 220.

³⁰ Engels, *Roman Corinth*, 33-39. See further: Oscar Broneer, *Terracotta Lamps* (Corinth 4.2; Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 1930); Doreen Canaday Spitzer, 'Roman Relief Bowls from Corinth', *Hesperia* 11 (1942): 162-92; K. S. Wright, 'Early Roman Sigillata and Its Local Imitations from the Post-War Excavations at Corinth' (PhD, Bryn Mawr College, 1977), esp. 453-73; Carol C. Mattusch, 'Corinthian Bronze: Famous, but Elusive', in *Corinth* (2003), 219-32; Mary Lou Zimmerman, 'Corinthian Trade with the Punic West in the Classical Period', in *Corinth* (2003), 195-217. For the high volume of imported pottery during the first century CE, see Slane, 'Ceramic Imports', 221-23.

³¹ Engels, *Roman Corinth*, 33.

³² For the excavations of workshops in the Corinthian marketplace, see Williams, 'Commercial Center', 37-38. See also David W. J. Gill, 'The Meat Market at Corinth (1 Corinthians 10:25)', *TynBul* 43 (1992): 389-93; Winter, *Corinth*, 293-95; Murphy-O'Connor, *St. Paul's Corinth*, 24-28.

³³ Spawforth, 'Colonial Elite', 171, argues that 'the new colony drew off eastern *negotiatores* from less well-located communities in Greece and the Aegean'. But a number of these wealthy entrepreneurs sent their freedmen commercial agents to the city to set up shop in their place.

Plutarch alludes to the prominence of these commercial middlemen when he uses *πραγματευτής*—another widely recognised synonym for *οικονόμος*—to describe the aggression of Achaean business agents and the threat they posed to habitual debtors: ‘And so “one after another takes over”³⁵ the borrower, first a usurer or broker of Corinth [*τοκιστής ἢ πραγματευτής Κορίνθιος*], then one of Patrae, then an Athenian, until, attacked on all sides by all of them, he is dissolved and chopped up into the small change of interest payments’ (*Mor.* 831a).³⁶ The early colony had a large contingent of just these kinds of business agents. As Williams remarks, ‘The freedmen-agents were an important part of the population sent to Corinth, serving the wealthy families who foresaw the colony as a potentially strong commercial center. These freedmen were sent out to ensure Roman control of the markets at this point on the east-west trade route and to secure positions for interested Roman families in this new distribution center in the eastern Peloponnesos’.³⁷

In summary, Corinth’s commercial prosperity developed a reputation that was widely recognised both inside and outside of the city, that is, among its residents as well as among itinerant philosophers and visiting apostles. The constant influx of potential converts was probably even a major reason why Paul devoted to this church so much time, energy, and letter-writing. For at Corinth Paul had an ideal base for his Gentile mission; to secure viable churches there would be to guarantee the proliferation of the gospel all across the Mediterranean world.³⁸

Spawforth suggests that the C. Heius family may serve as an example. Although these colonists were wealthy enough to hold public office shortly after the colony’s founding (cf. *IKorinthKent* 151), it may be that this family of freedmen was commissioned to Corinth by the prominent Delian *negotiator* C. Heius Libo. If so, then ‘we have here a case of a leading family of Roman businessmen which sent freedmen to represent its interests in the new colony’ (172). But the stream of servile agents did not end at the city’s inception. Spawforth surmises that ‘colonial Corinth’s reputation for being “freedman-friendly” continued to attract freedmen in the years after the foundation’ (170).

³⁴ The only extant epigraphic occurrence of *οικονόμος* in Corinth attests to the later-Roman purchase (*ἀγοράζω*) of a sepulcher by a certain Loukas from the *οικονόμος* Andreas (*SEG* 11.171b). *IKorinthKent* 558 suggests that the two individuals were imperial employees.

³⁵ Here Plutarch quotes the Greek philosopher Empedocles (ca. 490–430 BCE). The LCL edition of Plutarch cites Friedrich W. A. Mullach, *Fragmenta Philosophorum Graecorum* (vol. 1; Paris: Editore Ambrosio Firmin Didot, 1860), 2, at v. 35; cf. M. R. Wright, *Empedocles: The Extant Fragments* (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1981), 137, at 107(115) v. 12.

³⁶ Based on this text, Williams, ‘Commercial Center’, 31 n. 3, reasons that ‘Corinth especially was known for its business representatives’. But apparently the ethos of Corinth’s commercial scene had a reputation as well. Commenting on the wretchedness and desperation of Corinthian retailers, Dio Chrysostom remarks how one can observe in Corinth ‘peddlers [*καπίλων*] not a few peddling [*διακατηλευόντων*] whatever they happened to have’ (*Or.* 8.9).

³⁷ Williams, ‘Commercial Center’, 33.

³⁸ Sanders, ‘Urban Corinth’, 15.

Most importantly for our purposes, however, Corinth's commercial fame provided Paul with a familiar metaphorical field from which to draw an illustrative portrait of his apostolic position. Paul's *oikonomos* metaphor would have resonated deeply in Corinth's commercial context, carrying with it not a few implications about who Paul was, what he was sent to do, and what kind of authority he possessed.

3. Paul and Ancient Commerce

Paul spent a considerable amount of time in the commercial world. According to Luke, Paul preached in the ἀγορά everyday while in Athens (Acts 17.17), and he probably did likewise in other cities as well. Paul was especially well acquainted with the Corinthian ἀγορά. It was there where Paul stood trial before Gallio (Acts 18.12-16) and it was the ἀγορά he had in view when he urged the Corinthians not to dispute over the consumption of polluted foods purchased from the local meat market (1 Cor 10.25). In fact, Paul and his co-workers themselves would probably have been familiar faces in the marketplace of Corinth—as well as in Thessalonica, Ephesus, and elsewhere³⁹—where they laboured as artisans (Acts 18.3; cf. 20.34) from dawn to dusk for eighteen months (1 Cor 4.12; cf. 1 Thess 2.9).

Paul's particular trade as a tentmaker (σκηνοποιός)⁴⁰ also situated the apostle in various urban workshops (ἐργαστήρια/*officinae/tabernae*).⁴¹ Ronald Hock suggests that Paul laboured in workshops 'wherever and whenever he was doing missionary preaching and teaching'.⁴² Hock explains that the size of these workshops depended on their location, but that the average shop accommodated between about a half-dozen and a dozen artisans. Paul's workshop in Corinth was at least large enough to accommodate him, Aquila, and Priscilla and functioned also as their residence (Acts 18.3).⁴³ Furthermore, though the NT does not indicate whether or not Paul himself laboured in an administrative hierarchy significant enough to require a manager, Aeschines explains that in the fourth-century BCE a certain

³⁹ Ronald F. Hock, 'The Workshop as a Social Setting for Paul's Missionary Preaching', *CBQ* 41 (1979): 438-50, at 440, notes that 'Paul's reference to Barnabas' working to support himself (1 Cor 9:6) would thus cover the so-called first missionary journey and the stays in Antioch (Acts 13:1-14:25 and 14:26-28; 15:30-35), the periods when Luke has Barnabas as Paul's travel and missionary companion'.

⁴⁰ For the scope of Paul's trade, see Ronald F. Hock, *The Social Context of Paul's Ministry: Tentmaking and Apostleship* (Philadelphia: Fortress, 1980), 20-21.

⁴¹ Hock, *Social Context*, 32, notes that 'most workshops would be located in or near the *agora*' and in close proximity to businesses specialising in the same trade.

⁴² Hock, 'Workshop': 440.

⁴³ Hock, *Social Context*, 33; Murphy-O'Connor, *St. Paul's Corinth*, 194

Athenian workshop which employed nine or ten slave leatherworkers also employed a superintendent (ἡγεμῶν [Tim. 97]). Thus, it is highly plausible that the apostle was personally familiar with how local businesses and commercial enterprises were managed, making private administration the likely source domain of his *oikonomos* metaphor.

D. Summary

Through just a cursory analysis of Paul's metaphorical use of οἰκονόμος and οἰκονομία in 1 Corinthians 4 and 9, we have noticed that the managerial structure in which Paul functioned as an apostle far more closely resembled the systems implemented in ancient private administration than in Hellenistic kingdoms or Graeco-Roman cities. Moreover, this source domain would have resonated richly with the church in Roman Corinth, since the colony was renowned throughout the ancient world as a centre for international trade and the home to many servile business agents. Beyond this, Paul's gospel preaching and leatherworking profession routinely situated him among all sorts of merchants and craftsmen for many hours at a time, exposing him to the social, legal, and administrative intricacies of the Roman commercial world, as occasionally reflected in his discourses (e.g. ἀγοράζω [1 Cor 6.20; 7.23]; ἐξαγοράζω [Gal 3.13; 4.5]; πιπράσκω [Rom 7.14]; κερδαίνω/κέρδος, ζημιόω/ζημία [1 Cor 3.15; 9.19-22; Phil 1.21; 3.7-8]; μισθός/ὄψώνιον [Rom 4.4; 6.23; 1 Cor 3.14-15; 9.17-18]).⁴⁴ With this first-hand experience in the realm of the ἀγορά and ἐργαστήριον, it seems to be well within the capability of Paul to draw on his understanding of the commercial world for the purpose of illustrating to a church all too familiar with trade and business his role and responsibilities within God's administration.

⁴⁴ A. C. Zenos, 'St. Paul as a Business-Man', *Old and New Testament Student* 12 (1891): 71-78, at 75-76.

Chapter 6. Interpreting Paul's Metaphor in 1 Corinthians 4.1-5

Having established the private commercial world of Roman Corinth as the most plausible context in which to read Paul's *oikonomos* metaphor, we will now seek to demonstrate the significance of the image in Paul's first letter to the Corinthians. Over the next two chapters we will investigate Paul's metaphor in 1 Corinthians 4 and 9, specifically for the purpose of elucidating Paul's theology of apostolic authority. The concept of authority in Paul is, however, quite complex and admittedly a number of avenues could have yielded results. But this particular metaphor has been selected partly because of its relative neglect in Pauline scholarship and its repeated use in key Pauline discourses.¹ Even more importantly, however, this image provides unique insight into our larger theological concerns, the construction and assertion of authority. Over the course of the next two chapters we will seek to demonstrate the fruitful way that Paul employs the *oikonomos* metaphor in both 1 Corinthians 4 and 9 to negotiate his identity as a person of privilege and authority on the one hand, and one of relative insignificance and obligatory service on the other. Moreover, in both passages Paul applies the metaphor in an effort to respond to perceived or anticipated critics.² These texts, then, provide ample opportunity to analyse Paul's portrayal and exercise of authority within contexts where the issue is expressly in view and indeed a matter of some dispute.

In the present chapter we will seek (i) to identify *what* Paul's metaphor in 1 Cor 4.1-5 indicates about his understanding of apostolic ministry (especially

¹ The lack of attention Paul's *oikonomos* metaphor has received in modern scholarship remains quite disproportionate to the rhetorical and theological significance it carries in 1 Corinthians. As Gladd, *Mysterion*, 165, explains, 'During the past few decades, many have explored the notions of apocalypticism, revelation, and mystery in the Pauline corpus. In these expeditions, however, one stone appears to be left unturned: Paul's enigmatic phrase "stewards of the mysteries of God"'. This lacuna is surprising given that Paul's metaphor concludes one of the most instructive passages in the early part of Paul's letter (4.1-5), and is central to one of the most disputed passages in the middle portion of the letter (9.16-23).

² Our two texts, 1 Cor 4.1-5 and 9.16-23, have much in common. In the larger contexts where they appear (1.18-4.21; 9.1-23), Paul is on the defensive; he even introduces 1 Corinthians 9 as ἡ ἐμὴ ἀπολογία (non-apologetic readings will also be engaged below). Additionally, in both sections Paul indicates that there exist persons—presumably in the church—who are scrutinizing him (ἀνακρίνω [4.3-4; 9.3; cf. 2.15-16]). Finally, one of the primary matters in dispute within the church is Paul's refusal of financial support. This issue is perhaps implicit in 4.12, but becomes explicit in 9.12, 15, 18-19. It is therefore highly plausible that Paul chose to portray himself as an οἰκονόμος in 4.1-2, though especially in 9.17, because the image itself connotes monetary concerns (see chapter seven).

concerning hierarchy, responsibility, and accountability), and (ii) to trace *how* Paul employs the image there to bring about ecclesial and ethical change in the community. To attain these two goals it will also be important to identify the problems that Paul was facing in Corinth, including the kinds of resistance, or power plays, the apostle perceived himself to be up against. It will be argued that 1 Corinthians 1-4 reveals not only the existence of fractures in the church at Corinth, but that the divisions themselves materialised as a result of a fundamental theological misunderstanding about who, or what, apostles are, and a corresponding misapprehension about how the church should relate to them. Moreover, based on the content, style, and tone of Paul's discourse, it will be argued that Paul perceived his authority to be the subject of criticism in Corinth. Unfortunately, the validity of some of these social and rhetorical assumptions has been challenged in recent scholarship. We must, therefore, begin our investigation by addressing the social and rhetorical context of 1 Corinthians 1-4. Once a plausible case is made for reading the letter this way, we will then turn our attention to Paul's discourse in 4.1-5.

A. The Social and Rhetorical Context of 1 Corinthians 1-4

Our investigation of 1 Cor 4.1-5 must begin with an analysis of the rhetoric of the first four chapters of the letter, so as to establish as best we can something of the social context in which Paul was situated when he wrote the letter. The central questions to ask at this stage are: What is Paul's primary rhetorical objective in 1 Corinthians? What are his subsidiary rhetorical objectives in 1.18-4.21? What does he perceive to be the current status of his relationship with the Corinthian church? What has Paul attempted to accomplish by the time he reaches 4.1-5?

1. The Rhetorical Objective of 1 Corinthians

The appearance of Margaret Mitchell's book-length treatment of the rhetoric of 1 Corinthians marked a significant watershed in the analysis of Paul's letter. In her seminal study, *Paul and the Rhetoric of Reconciliation* (1991), Mitchell argued that 1 Corinthians is a unified composition with a single rhetorical objective, and as a case of deliberative rhetoric, the letter has reconciliation as its primary

goal.³ Her argument rests both on the letter's form and on its thematic congruencies, which closely resemble those modeled in ancient rhetorical handbooks and exhibited in both ancient speeches and letters.

Mitchell's conclusions are largely convincing since, when 1 Corinthians is taken as a compositional unit, Paul's reconciliatory objectives are apparent from beginning to end.⁴ Most telling of the letter's deliberative intentions are: (i) its prospective outlook, or future orientation, most evident in Paul's use of παρακαλῶ ὑμᾶς in 1.10, 4.16, and 16.15, the first and last instances forming an inclusio around the entire epistle; (ii) the repeated appeals to 'advantage', explicit in the use of συμφέρω/σύμφορος (6.12; 7.5, 35; 10.23, 33; 12.7); (iii) the use of a variety of examples, in this case from the Hebrew Scriptures, Hellenistic culture, and Paul himself (4.16; 11.1); and (iv) the presence of factions in the community (σχίσματα [1.10; 11.28]; αἰρέσεις [11.19]; ἔριδες [1.11; 3.3]), which Paul repeatedly sought to resolve.⁵ Furthermore, if the inclusio formed by παρακαλῶ ὑμᾶς in 1.10 and 16.15 marks the compositional and rhetorical unity of the entire letter, then the inclusio formed by the phrase in 1.10 and 4.16 indicates that 1.18-4.21 forms a subsection within it.⁶ The separateness of this unit is also indicated by the inclusio formed by Paul's statements about his evangelistic work in the community: οὐ γὰρ ἀπέστειλέν με Χριστὸς βαπτίζειν ἀλλὰ εὐαγγελίζεσθαι (1.17); ἐν γὰρ Χριστῷ Ἰησοῦ διὰ τοῦ εὐαγγελίου ἐγὼ ὑμᾶς ἐγέννησα (4.15).

³ Margaret M. Mitchell, *Paul and the Rhetoric of Reconciliation: An Exegetical Investigation of the Language and Composition of 1 Corinthians* (Louisville: WJK, 1991), 24: 'Deliberative rhetoric is argumentation which urges an audience, either public or private, to pursue a particular course of action in the future'. For 1 Corinthians as deliberative rhetoric, see also, e.g., George A. Kennedy, *New Testament Interpretation through Rhetorical Criticism* (Studies in Religion; Chapel Hill: University of North Carolina Press, 1984), 87; Welborn, 'Discord': 89; L. L. Welborn, 'A Conciliatory Principle in 1 Cor. 4:6', *NovT* 29 (1987): 320-46, at 326; Stephen M. Pogoloff, *Logos and Sophia: The Rhetorical Situation of 1 Corinthians* (SBLDS 134; Atlanta: Scholars Press, 1992), 25; Witherington III, *Conflict*, 75. For critiques of Mitchell and Witherington, see R. Dean Anderson, *Ancient Rhetorical Theory and Paul* (Rev. ed.; CBET 18; Leuven: Peeters, 1999), 254-65; Stanley E. Porter, 'Paul of Tarsus and His Letters', in *Handbook of Classical Rhetoric in the Hellenistic Period, 330 B.C.-A.D. 400*, ed. Stanley E. Porter (Leiden: Brill, 1997), 533-85, at 551-54.

⁴ Cf. Collins, *First Corinthians*, 20. Roy E. Ciampa and Brian S. Rosner, 'The Structure and Argument of 1 Corinthians: A Biblical/Jewish Approach', *NTS* 52 (2006): 205-18, have recently argued that Paul's primary objective in 1 Corinthians is to establish the purity of the church for the glory of God.

⁵ Mitchell, *Reconciliation*, 65-183. For the church as embroiled in bickering, but not divided, see Johannes Munck, 'The Church without Factions: Studies in 1 Corinthians 1-4', in *Paul and the Salvation of Mankind* (London: SCM, 1959), 135-67.

⁶ Mitchell, *Reconciliation*, 207. Ciampa and Rosner, 'Structure': 210-12, may be correct to argue that the first major section ends at 4.17, while 4.18 begins the new section concerning sexual immorality and greed and extending to 7.40.

In Mitchell's framework, 1.10 serves as the letter's thesis statement (πρόθεσις/*propositio*) and 1.11-17 functions as the statement of facts (διήγησις/*narratio*). The proof sections (πίστεις/*probationes*) are (a) 1.18-4.21, (b) 5.1-11.1, (c) 11.2-14.40, and (d) 15.1-57,⁷ with 15.58 functioning as the conclusion (ἐπίλογος) and 16.1-24 as the epistolary closing.⁸ But while many scholars now agree with Mitchell about the general deliberative character of 1 Corinthians, there remains some uncertainty concerning the rhetorical function of the first proof (1.18-4.21).⁹ If the entire letter is deliberative, then how does this unit contribute to Paul's argument?

2. The Rhetorical Objectives of 1 Cor 1.18-4.21

Prior to Mitchell's influential volume, a significant contingent of Pauline interpreters considered 1.18-4.21 to be a defense of Paul's apostolic authority, due to the seemingly apologetic function of many of his self-referential statements (e.g. 2.1-5; 3.1-4; 4.1-5, 8-16).¹⁰ More recently, however, Mitchell and others have contended that Paul had *no* opponents during the writing of the epistle, his apostleship was *not* being challenged by anybody in the church, and those passages

⁷ Mitchell, *Reconciliation*, 207. For an alternative approach to framing the proofs, see Witherington III, *Conflict*, vi-viii.

⁸ Some of Mitchell's advocates regard 16.1-12 to be an additional proof, 16.13-18 the recapitulation (*peroratio*), and 16.18-24 the letter closing; cf. Witherington III, *Conflict*, 313-24.

⁹ Mitchell, *Reconciliation*, 207, admits, 'While scholars are virtually unanimous in regarding 1:18 (or 1:10) – 4:21 as a discrete section of the letter, a section which treats the problem of Corinthian factions, there is debate about the function and purpose of this section within the whole composition'.

¹⁰ A chief proponent of this position was Nils A. Dahl, 'Paul and the Church at Corinth according to 1 Corinthians 1:10-4:21', in *Christian History and Interpretation: Studies Presented to John Knox*, ed. William R. Farmer, C. F. D. Moule, and Richard R. Niebuhr (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1967), 313-35. The final footnote in the essay's republication, however, reveals some of Dahl's later reservations; Nils A. Dahl, 'Paul and the Church at Corinth', in *Studies in Paul: Theology for the Early Christian Mission* (Minneapolis: Augsburg, 1977), 40-61, at 61 n. 50: 'To call the section "apologetic" is to downplay the degree to which Paul is critical of his own adherents as well as of his opponents. Nevertheless, the section lays a foundation for the subsequent parts of the letter, it serves to reestablish Paul's true authority, and it does contain apologetic elements, see esp. 1 Cor. 4:2-5 and 18-21'. See also, e.g., F. C. Baur, 'The Two Epistles to the Corinthians', in *Paul: The Apostle of Jesus Christ, His Life and Work, His Epistles and His Doctrine*, vol 1 (London: Williams and Norgate, 1873), 267-320; Johannes Weiß, *Der erste Korintherbrief* (KEK 5; Göttingen: Vandenhoeck & Ruprecht, 1910), 92; Barrett, *First Corinthians*, 101; Schütz, *Authority*, 190; Gerd Theissen, 'Legitimation und Lebensunterhalt: Ein Beitrag zur Soziologie Urchristlicher Missionare', *NTS* 21 (1975): 192-221; J. Bradley Chance, 'Paul's Apology to the Corinthians', *PRSt* 9 (1982): 144-55; Michael Bünker, *Briefformular und rhetorische Disposition im 1. Korintherbrief* (Göttinger theologische Arbeiten 28; Göttingen: Vandenhoeck & Ruprecht, 1984), 52-59; Peter Marshall, *Enmity in Corinth: Social Conventions in Paul's Relations with the Corinthians* (WUNT 2/23; Tübingen: J.C.B. Mohr [Paul Siebeck], 1987), 217; Karl A. Plank, *Paul and the Irony of Affliction* (Semeia Studies; Atlanta: Scholars Press, 1987), 11-24; Fee, *First Corinthians*, 48-49.

which appear to be polemical only do so on the basis of illegitimate mirror-reading.¹¹ Furthermore, some of these scholars insist that Paul's letter must conform to one rhetorical genre,¹² and because 1 Corinthians is a case of deliberative rhetoric, all self-referential and seemingly apologetic elements are dismissed as *exempla*.¹³ These interpreters even find textual support for their readings in Paul's use of *μμητής* (4.16) and the verb *μετασχηματίζω* (4.6), the latter implying through 'covert allusion' that the disputes between the parties which attached themselves to Paul, Apollos, and Cephas (1.12; 3.4, 22) were purely figurative and represented by way of analogy altogether different quarrels centring around unnamed leaders in the church.¹⁴ Paul's apostleship was, therefore, not in question.

a. Paul's Apologetic Objective

In spite of these arguments there remain good reasons for regarding 1.18-4.21 as having a defensive function. Firstly, although some interpreters reject the possibility that a deliberative letter might simultaneously have an apologetic dimension, the rhetorical flexibility of the epistolary genre suggests that certain passages could have a defensive posture.¹⁵ Several sub-units of 1 Corinthians, in fact, feature characteristics of non-deliberative rhetoric. Mitchell herself concedes that 1.18-4.21 includes epideictic elements and 'has as its purpose the censuring of the

¹¹ Mitchell, *Reconciliation*, 54-55; Pogoloff, *Logos*, 102; Witherington III, *Conflict*, 74.

¹² Anderson, *Rhetorical Theory*, 255.

¹³ Mitchell, *Reconciliation*, 54-55, 209; John T. Fitzgerald, *Cracks in an Earthen Vessel: An Examination of the Catalogues of Hardships in the Corinthian Correspondence* (SBLDS 99; Atlanta: Scholars Press, 1988), 120-22; Raymond Pickett, *The Cross in Corinth: The Social Significance of the Death of Jesus* (JSNTSup 143; Sheffield: Sheffield Academic Press, 1997), 74-84; Brian J. Dodd, *Paul's Paradigmatic "I": Personal Example as Literary Strategy* (JSNTSup 177; Sheffield: Sheffield Academic Press, 1999), 45.

¹⁴ The literary device was typically used to admonish an audience by way of analogy. Benjamin Fiore, "'Covert Allusion" in 1 Corinthians 1-4', *CBQ* 47 (1985): 85-102, at 95, for instance, recognizes that Paul's use of covert allusion refers to the metaphors in 3.5-4.5 which aim to instruct the church how to regard their leaders. David R. Hall, 'A Disguise for the Wise: μετασχηματισμός in 1 Corinthians 4.6', *NTS* 40 (1994): 143-49, on the other hand, dismisses the criticisms of Paul and other apostles as representative of entirely different quarrels. In other words, the parties Paul attaches to the apostles did not actually concern them.

¹⁵ The mixing of rhetorical genres has been defended. See, e.g., Raymond F. Collins, '1 Corinthians as a Hellenistic Letter', in *The Corinthian Correspondence*, ed. Riemund Bieringer (BETL; Leuven: Leuven University Press, 1996), 39-61, at 60-61: '[T]he modes of rhetorical argumentation were sometimes so intermingled in a single sustained argument that one could speak of a mixed type of rhetoric'. Also, David E. Aune, *The New Testament in its Literary Environment* (Library of Early Christianity; Louisville: WJK, 1987), 23: 'Greco-Roman literary composition often departed from the prescriptions of ancient literary and rhetorical theory'. Cf. Fredrick J. Long, *Ancient Rhetoric and Paul's Apology: The Compositional Unity of 2 Corinthians* (SNTSMS 131; Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2004), 24-28.

Corinthians for their factionalism'.¹⁶ George Kennedy also observes that, though 1 Corinthians is 'largely deliberative', 'it contains some judicial passages, for example 1:13-17 claiming that [Paul] had not created faction in Corinth and chapter 9 defending his rights as an apostle'.¹⁷ Such rhetorical licence even within a deliberative letter opens the door for the possibility of also attributing to 1.18-4.21 an apologetic function.

Secondly, there are clues that the apostles mentioned by Paul in the party slogans (1.12; 3.4, 21-23) are the actual leaders who were the objects of inappropriate partisanship. Despite the objection of interpreters who, on account of Paul's use of 'covert allusion' in 4.6, fictionalise the disclosed *apostolic* parties (Paul, Apollos, Cephas) and assume the existence of parties attached to *undisclosed local* leaders, it seems quite excessive to allow Paul's use of μετασχηματίζω in 4.6 to mask *which* leaders are in view. In fact, there is no indication that unnamed leaders were ever the objects of boasting in 1 Corinthians. And if Paul was not included among the revered leaders, then why did he remove himself from the disputes by denying his participation in baptism (1.13-16) when local leaders almost certainly could not have denied the same? Rather, as Morna Hooker has argued, the ταῦτα in 4.6, as the direct object of μετασχηματίζω, refers only to the three metaphors employed in 3.5-4.5 (gardeners, builders, servants/administrators). These were 'figuratively applied' to Paul, Apollos, and perhaps Cephas not to hide the identities of the actual party leaders, but simply to demonstrate that apostles are merely intermediaries and should not be the objects of adulation.¹⁸ Thus, a minimalist reading of this rhetorical device is preferred, as it simply highlights the use of analogy, not an undisclosed

¹⁶ Mitchell, *Reconciliation*, 209-10, cf. 213-25; cf. Joop F.M. Smit, 'Epidictic Rhetoric in Paul's First Letter to the Corinthians 1-4', *Biblica* 84 (2003): 184-201. For the use of epideictic rhetoric in deliberative or forensic speeches, see the comment ascribed to Cicero: 'And if epideictic is only seldom employed by itself independently, still in judicial and deliberative causes extensive sections are often devoted to praise or censure' (*Rhet. her.* 3.8.15).

¹⁷ Kennedy, *Interpretation*, 87; cf. Elisabeth Schüssler Fiorenza, 'Rhetorical Situation and Historical Reconstruction in 1 Corinthians', *NTS* 33 (1987): 386-403, at 393, who cites Kennedy. For recent defenses of the apologetic function of 1 Corinthians 1-4, or parts of it, see, e.g., Duane Litfin, *St. Paul's Theology of Proclamation: 1 Corinthians 1-4 and Greco-Roman Rhetoric* (SNTSMS 79; Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1994), 171; J. S. Vos, 'Die Argumentation des Paulus in 1 Kor 1,10-3,4', in *The Corinthian Correspondence*, ed. R. Bieringer (BETL 125; Leuven: Leuven University Press, 1996), 87-119, esp. at 87, 90, and 119; Donald P. Ker, 'Paul and Apollos—Colleagues or Rivals?', *JSNT* 77 (2000): 75-97, at 90-91; Joop F. M. Smit, "'What is Apollos? What is Paul?": In Search for the Coherence of First Corinthians 1:10-4:21', *NovT* 44 (2002): 231-51, at 250; Wanamaker, 'Power', 136; Long, *Ancient Rhetoric*, 120.

¹⁸ Morna D. Hooker, "'Beyond the Things which are Written": An Examination of 1 Cor. IV.6', *NTS* 10 (1963): 127-32, at 131; cf. Ker, 'Paul and Apollos': 92.

agenda. Accordingly, while the slogans which Paul quotes to the Corinthians in 1.12 may not be 'actual party-cries from the Corinthians themselves', we can reasonably conclude that 'underlying Paul's statements in 1:12 is an historical truth that people at Corinth are lining up behind the various missionaries' (i.e. Paul, Apollos and Cephas).¹⁹

Thirdly, there is significant evidence to support the case that Paul at least *perceived* his authority to be in jeopardy. While at the time of this letter there probably was neither any intrusion of false teachers in Corinth nor the outright rejection of the apostle by the Corinthians, there are indications that Paul considered his apostolic authority, or primacy, to be a matter of real dispute. Admittedly, Nils Dahl probably goes too far when he deduces, 'The other slogans are all to be understood as declarations of independence from Paul'.²⁰ Nevertheless, since Paul himself indicates that the parties in the church included a group *loyal* to him, it is reasonable to suppose that there were also persons in Corinth who were *critical* of him. This is also apparent in light of the fact that Paul presents his role and manner of preaching as in need of explanation (1.17; 2.1-5; 3.1-4; 4.1-5).

Not every scholar will be pleased with this understanding since a degree of mirror-reading is required. Mirror-reading as a hermeneutical method has, after all, been heavily criticised by a number of modern NT interpreters. Mitchell, for instance, prudently challenges the assumption that whenever Paul speaks about himself, he seeks 'always to ward off charges'.²¹ Nevertheless, one should be wary of any methodological protest which calls for a radical reversal of the hermeneutical pendulum. Mitchell's suspicions about mirror-reading, while valid, need not result in the absolute abandonment of the technique.²² After all, the decision to interpret every Pauline self-reference merely as an *exemplum* requires just as much

¹⁹ Mitchell, *Reconciliation*, 83 (original emphasis).

²⁰ Dahl, 'Corinth', 322.

²¹ Mitchell, *Reconciliation*, 55 n. 156. She does recognize 2 Corinthians 10-13 as a defense.

²² *Contra* George Lyons, *Pauline Autobiography: Toward a New Understanding* (SBLDS 73; Atlanta: Scholars Press, 1985), who suggests that mirror-reading 'is an inappropriate, if not entirely fallacious, method for identifying either Paul's opponents or the function of his autobiographical remarks: (1) It does not give sufficient weight to the argumentative origins of Paul's denials and antithetical formulations, while (2) it gives too much weight to extra-textual assumptions' (96); '[s]ince we have only Paul's presumed defense and not the accusation, it is necessary to exercise restraint in asserting too confidently that a specific charge existed, and if so, what it may have been' (97). Cf. William Baird, "'One Against the Other": Intra-Church Conflict in 1 Corinthians', in *The Conversation Continues: Studies in Paul and John in Honor of J. Louis Martyn*, ed. Beverly R. Gaventa and Robert T. Fortna (Nashville: Abingdon, 1990), 116-36, at 119

presumption as the judgments made in mirror-reading. To obtain carefully formulated exegesis, then, one needs only to apply a cautious and consistent methodology.²³ Our study, then, will benefit further from the mirror-reading principles proposed by John Barclay and Jerry Sumney.²⁴

b. Mirror-Reading 1 Corinthians

In his influential article on mirror-reading, John Barclay offers seven criteria useful in the evaluation of a polemical letter. (1) The *type of utterance* requires that the reader consider the significance and limitations of certain kinds of statements (assertions, commands, etc.). Barclay explains, among other things, the implications of Pauline *denials*: 'If Paul makes a *denial*, we may assume that, *at least*, those whom he addresses may be prone to regard what he denies as true, and *at most*, someone has explicitly asserted it'.²⁵ (2) *Tone* demands due attention to be given to those statements made with emphasis and urgency. (3) *Frequency* suggests that statements made in repetition are probably central themes. (4) *Clarity* insists that the interpreter consider if the text contains any significant ambiguities that might prevent the reader from giving it priority. (5) *Unfamiliarity* asks if a theological motif is so uncommon that it stands out as something to which Paul might be reacting. (6) *Consistency* considers if the previously mentioned criteria taken collectively point to a single opponent. (7) *Historical plausibility* allows what other evidence is available to be considered in order to demonstrate the likelihood of the hypothesis.

²³ It was Dahl, 'Corinth', 317-18, in fact, who first issued 'a strict method' in the study of 1 Corinthians 1-4. In his essay, Dahl urged interpreters to respect the onesidedness of the letter, to give priority to this letter and this section over the remainder of the epistle and the Pauline corpus, to assume the letter's integrity, and to account for the total argument in chapters 1-4 when reconstructing the historical context. Dahl also advised the reader to give priority to the 'relatively clear and objective statements' over 'evaluations, polemical and ironic allusions, and warnings and exhortations'. Cf. Jerry L. Sumney, 'Studying Paul's Opponents: Advances and Challenges', in *Paul and His Opponents*, ed. Stanley E. Porter (Pauline Studies 2; Leiden: Brill, 2005), 7-58, at 44.

²⁴ John M. G. Barclay, 'Mirror-Reading a Polemical Letter: Galatians as a Test Case', *JSNT* 31 (1987): 73-93, at 84, considers mirror-reading to be 'a good deal more difficult than is usually acknowledged, but not wholly impossible. What is needed is a carefully controlled method of working which uses logical criteria and proceeds with suitable caution'. In some ways, mirror-reading 1 Corinthians is on surer ground than many other Pauline letters, since certain difficulties present elsewhere do not apply to this discourse. In 1 Corinthians, for example, Paul directly addresses his so-called critics, rather than responding to one party about the remarks made by another, as in 2 Corinthians. Similarly, while Paul utilizes some hyperbole and sarcasm in 1 Corinthians (e.g. the quarrels probably did not involve 'each' believer [1.12]; Paul was not completely indifferent about being scrutinized [4.3; cf. 4.14-16]; see also 4.8-10), the 'distorting effects of polemic' apparent perhaps in Galatians is probably less of a concern in 1 Corinthians.

²⁵ Barclay, 'Mirror-Reading': 84 (original emphasis).

These criteria when applied collectively suggest that in 1 Corinthians Paul was reacting polemically to an urgent matter in the church. Since, according to Barclay's method, the very presence of a denial permits the reader to assume that the audience was at least inclined to believe the contrary, then Paul's *clear, emphatic, and repeated denials* about the role of eloquent speech in his preaching (1.17; 2.1-5; cf. 2 Cor 10.10) suggest that these issues—which are relatively *unfamiliar* outside of the Corinthian correspondence (cf. 1 Thess 2.1-12)—were probably misunderstood by, and of particular importance to, the church in Corinth. Moreover, Bruce Winter and others have convincingly demonstrated the *historical plausibility* of this reading in their reconstructions of the Corinthian disputes against the backdrop of Graeco-Roman oratory and the budding Second Sophistic.²⁶

Jerry Sumney's basic methodology for identifying Pauline opponents also confirms our suspicions. In order to prioritise certain kinds of epistolary texts above others, Sumney differentiates between *explicit statements* ('those in which the author speaks directly about the opponents'), *allusions* ('statements which seem to address opponents, but are indirect, and so more or less oblique references to them'), and *affirmations* ('statements which neither explicitly refer to opponents nor obviously allude to them').²⁷ When seeking to identify which texts make reference to opponents, Sumney naturally grants more weight, or 'certainty', to explicit rather than to allusive statements—even though he is suspicious of the 'reliability' of data arising from polemical and apologetic contexts, over against didactic, thanksgivings, and similar kinds of discourse.²⁸ But since the reliability of a particular report need not prevent us from concluding that during this early period Paul at least *perceived* himself to have had critics in Corinth (even if not 'opponents'/false teachers), it is notable that Sumney's methodology enabled him to identify no less than eleven verses in 1 Corinthians 1-4 explicitly referring to critics (1.10-12; 3.3-4, 21-22; 4.3, 6-7, 18-19) and another thirty alluding to them (1.13-17, 18-25; 2.1-5, 13-16; 3.5-9; 4.8-13). As Sumney remarks, 'Our search for opponents has

²⁶ Winter, *Sophists*, esp. 180-202; cf. Winter, *Corinth*, 31-43; Litfin, *Proclamation*, 137-209; Clarke, *Secular*, 36-39, 101-105; Wenhua Shi, *Paul's Message of the Cross as Body Language* (WUNT 2/254; Tübingen: Mohr Siebeck, 2008), 112-86; Corin Mihaila, *The Paul-Apollos Relationship and Paul's Stance toward Greco-Roman Rhetoric: An Exegetical and Socio-Historical Study of 1 Corinthians 1-4* (LNTS 399; London: T&T Clark, 2009).

²⁷ Jerry L. Sumney, *"Servants of Satan", "False Brothers" and Other Opponents of Paul* (JSNTSup 188; Sheffield: Sheffield Academic Press, 1999), 23.

²⁸ Sumney, *Servants*, 25-32.

yielded no evidence that the problems in Corinth are the result of intruders who are attempting to take Paul's place. Rather, the questions raised about Paul come from the Corinthians themselves. There are clearly challenges to his authority as he is compared to other leaders, specifically at least Cephas and Apollos'.²⁹ With Sumney, then, we can conclude that Paul's apostolic authority was being scrutinised when he wrote 1 Corinthians.

The reconstruction of 1 Corinthians made possible through the principles presented by Barclay and Sumney is even more plausible given that Paul's preaching, presence, and apostleship came under heavier attack, provoking an even more comprehensive defense, in 2 Corinthians. One must ask how plausible it is that the very themes included in Paul's self-references in 1 Corinthians (esp. 1.17; 2.1-5) could have become the basis of the accusations in subsequent correspondence (2 Cor 10.10) *without* having already been the objects of dispute—even in an embryonic form—during the earlier letter. Such a scenario is highly improbable.

But if 1.18-4.21 does contain apologetic undertones, then it must also be explained briefly how Paul's autobiographical remarks and reflections about his preaching serve the reconciliatory (deliberative) intentions of 1 Corinthians while also functioning as more than paradigms to be imitated (*exempla*).³⁰ After all, how can Paul instruct the Corinthians to imitate him if they are against him? But as we established earlier, when Paul wrote the letter his apostolic authority was neither under full attack nor even the primary problem in Corinth. And because the Corinthians had not been introduced to formal opponents during this period, there was no need for him to deliver a full apologetic just yet. After all, nobody in antiquity wanted to hear others praise themselves, for 'to speak to others of one's own importance or power is offensive' (Plutarch, *Mor.* 539a).³¹ Rather, Paul sought only briefly to censure the church and to justify his *modus operandi* in order to eliminate the party mentality while also regaining their confidence so he could

²⁹ Sumney, *Servants*, 79.

³⁰ Long, *Ancient Rhetoric*, 55, observes that, although examples (*παραδείγματα*; *exempla*) were important in deliberative rhetoric, they were also commonly used in forensic rhetoric.

³¹ See, e.g., Favorinus (Dio Chrysostom, *Or.* 37), who defended his former statue, rather than himself, in order not to deter his audience; cf. Maud W. Gleason, *Making Men: Sophists and Self-Presentation in Ancient Rome* (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1995), 9; L. Michael White, 'Favorinus's "Corinthian Oration": A Piqued Panorama of the Hadrianic Forum', in *Urban Religion* (2005), 61-110, at 67-73.

instruct them further about unity and Christian maturity.³² As Duane Litfin explains, ‘The fact is that in raising the subject of his preaching Paul has not left the Corinthian quarrels at all. On the contrary, he has moved to the heart of them’.³³

Thus, we can with confidence agree with Peter Marshall when he asserts, ‘It is clear through 1:10-4:21 Paul is defending himself in an endeavour to re-establish his apostolic authority in Corinth and that the divisions in Corinth were related to criticisms that some had made against Paul’s conduct as an apostle’.³⁴ Furthermore, while the reader need not conclude that Paul was facing formal opponents, Paul’s censuring of the Corinthians for their apparent criticisms of his preaching (2.1-5; 3.1-4; 4.3-5) suggests that Paul was facing more hostility from the church than many recent interpreters have realised.³⁵

3. The Structure of 1 Cor 1.18-4.21

Interpreters of 1 Corinthians have not infrequently attempted to subdivide 1.18-4.21 into even smaller units. Among these approaches, Joop Smit’s analysis is to be preferred. Smit contends that ‘this passage consists of four general reflections, each in a different, highly rhetorical style and followed by a practical conclusion formulated with much less rhetorical flourish’.³⁶ Based on textual syntax, Smit argues that the stylised reflections and corresponding conclusions are divided as follows: (a) 1.18-31 followed by 2.1-5; (b) 2.6-16 followed by 3.1-4; (c) 3.5-23 followed

³² For the close association between forensic and epideictic rhetoric, see Winter, *Sophists*, 182: ‘His *apologia* must be seen as his critique of the Corinthians and not simply a justification of his *modus operandi*. Like Aristides, who concluded his apologetic oration to a friend with “Call these remarks a defence (ἀπολογία), or if you wish, a well intentioned censure (ἐπιτίμησις), or even a combination of the two”, Paul in 1 Corinthians 1-4 clearly combines both’. See also Lyons, *Autobiography*, 28: ‘Although the goals may differ, the topics of an author’s own “life,” encomium, or apology are hardly distinguishable’.

³³ Litfin, *Proclamation*, 188.

³⁴ Marshall, *Enmity*, 217.

³⁵ I am in general agreement with the rhetorical analysis of Smit, ‘Epideictic’: 200: ‘In 1 Cor 1,10-4,21 Paul builds up an argument to justify his rather unimpressive performance. To that end, from the four encomia [1.18-31; 2.6-16; 3.5-23; 4.6-13], evaluations of a more general character, he draws four specific conclusions regarding his former preaching at Corinth: this is in accordance with the highest, divine norms (2,1-5); this has been consciously adapted to the starting-position of the Corinthians (3,1-4); the Corinthians do not have the right to judge Paul, because he is in the service of God (4,1-5); as founder of the community Paul is entitled to the respect of the Corinthians (4,14-21)’.

³⁶ Smit, ‘Epideictic’: 185. It could be that in this discourse, despite his verbal dismissal of rhetoric, Paul was attempting to demonstrate his rhetorical skill; cf. Smit, ‘Apollos’: 247; Wire, *The Corinthian Women Prophets*, 47.

by 4.1-5; and (d) 4.6-13 followed by 4.14-21.³⁷ What is striking about Smit's pattern is that the four conclusions clearly stand apart from their corresponding reflections, not simply in their lack of rhetorical flourish, but also in the directness with which Paul communicates with the Corinthians. In each conclusion, for example, Paul turns from a primarily third-person mode of discourse to address the church in the first and second person.³⁸ Also, the transitions in 2.1 and 3.1 are marked by the expression *κἀγὼ ἀδελφοί*, demonstrating that 2.1-5 and 3.1-4 share the same function in the units in which they appear.

Smit's analysis has significant implications for how one reads 1 Corinthians 1-4. Based on placement, directness, and tone, the conclusion passages should be given far more weight when interpreting Paul's rhetorical objectives than they have received in much recent scholarship. By concentrating on these smaller units, the reader will no doubt detect Paul's stern tone of blame and defense. In the following survey, then, we will summarise Paul's argument in each individual unit in order to prepare for a more comprehensive analysis of 4.1-5.

a. 1 Cor 1.18-2.5

Paul's primary concern in 1.18-2.5 is to demonstrate the centrality of the power of God, and alternatively the powerlessness of persuasion, in gospel proclamation. This emphasis is apparent through the way 1.17 and 2.4-5 bracket the unit, as both texts (i) deny Paul's use of words of wisdom (*οὐκ ἐν σοφίᾳ λόγου* [1.17]; *οὐκ ἐν πειθοῖς σοφίας λόγοις* [2.4]), and (ii) convey the rationale (purpose) for Paul's *modus operandi* (*ἵνα μὴ κενωθῇ ὁ σταυρὸς τοῦ Χριστοῦ* [1.17]; *ἵνα ἡ πίστις ὑμῶν μὴ ᾗ*

³⁷ For these divisions, consider the terminological associations observed by Smit, 'Apollos': 236-39: (a) the relationship between *ὁ λόγος* and *δύναμις θεοῦ* from 1.18 resurfaces in 2.1-5; *Χριστὸς ἐσταυρωμένος* from 1.23 reappears in 2.2; *τὰ ἀσθενῆ* from 1.25-27 becomes *ἐν ἀσθενείᾳ* in 2.3; the rejection of *σοφία ἀνθρώπων* at the end of the first unit (2.5) announces the theme of the second (2.6-3.4); (b) *λαλέω* (2.6, 7, 13) and *πνευματικός* (2.13[2x], 15) reappear in 3.1; *λαλοῦμεν ἐν τοῖς τελείοις* in 2.6 is in opposition to *λαλήσαι . . . ὡς νηπίοις* in 3.1; the formula *οὐ . . . ἀλλά* from 2.6-7, 8-9, 12-13 repeats twice in 3.1-2; Paul and Apollos, who are mentioned in the slogans at the end of the second unit (3.4), announce the theme of the third (3.5-4.5); (c) Paul's explicit use of metaphor in 3.5-17 resurfaces in 4.1-5, the *ὑπηρέται* and *οικονόμοι* from 4.1 corresponding with the *διάκονοι* and *συνεργοί* from 3.5 and 9 respectively; the judgement theme in 3.12-17 is repeated in 4.3-5; the synecdochic use of *ἡμέρα* for judgement in 3.13 reoccurs at 4.3; the hierarchy exhibited in 3:18-23 is qualified in 4.1-5; (d) the verb *φυσιώω* stated at 4.6 is repeated as the main theme in 4.18-19.

³⁸ Paul occasionally addresses the church in the second person outside of these conclusions, but the tone of these segments is noticeably different; cf. Smit, 'Apollos': 232; Smit, 'Epideictic': 185, 200; Fiore, 'Covert': 87-88.

ἐν σοφίᾳ ἀνθρώπων ἀλλ' ἐν δυνάμει θεοῦ [2.5]).³⁹ For the remainder of the unit (1.18-31), then, Paul responds to those in the church who desired that persuasion play a central role in his preaching by demonstrating that any other approach to Paul's ministry would have obstructed the recipient from receiving the wisdom and power intrinsic to the message itself (1.18, 24, 30). But while Paul surely seeks to illustrate the power of the word of the cross, he emphasises to an even greater extent the utter weakness of conventional wisdom by demonstrating the inability of the σάρξ to grasp such a foolish gospel (1.26, 29). Indeed, the rejection of the gospel by professional academics (σοφός, γραμματεὺς, συζητητής [1.20]), the dismissal of the message by sign-demanding Jews and wisdom-seeking Greeks (1.22-23), and yet the inclusion of the unimpressive Corinthian believers, most of whom lacked all such fleshly wisdom, power, and nobility (1.26), indicates that conventional wisdom and power is at odds with the wisdom and power of God.⁴⁰ Instead, God saves those whose minds have been transformed to regard real wisdom and power as exhibited in the cross (1.30), so that no one can boast *before* God (1.29), but only *in* him (1.31).⁴¹ As Litfin explains, '[I]n his wisdom God chooses to work through means which the world finds weak, foolish, and unimpressive so that there can be no question in the end as to who has accomplished the result'.⁴²

Thus, in 1.18-2.5 Paul explains that he could not have utilised 'words of wisdom' (i.e. persuasive speech) in his articulation of the gospel because the gospel

³⁹ Litfin, *Proclamation*, 190: 'The close parallelism of these two statements is no accident. The first looks forward, the second looks back; the first states the theme to be developed in 1.18-2.5, the second restates the same theme, this time as a conclusion of what has just been developed'.

⁴⁰ Mitchell, *Reconciliation*, 212, maintains that Paul intended here to show that 'God's wisdom has the power to unite all those who are called, both Jew and Greek (1:24; cf. 12:13), thus ending ethnic separation in the common acceptance of the scandal of the cross (1:23-24)'. This interpretation would support her reconciliatory reading of the letter. But Paul's reference to the crucifixion of Christ in 1.23 does not demonstrate God's unifying intentions for Jews and Greeks, but the paradoxical power and wisdom of his seemingly unimpressive gospel. As becomes clear in 1.24, Paul sought to demonstrate that Christ's humiliating death (1.23) was counter-intuitively δύναμις (rather than σκάνδαλον) for believing Jews and σοφία (rather than μωρία) for believing Greeks. As Hays, *First Corinthians*, 30, explains, 'The fundamental theological point is that if the cross itself is God's saving event, all human standards of evaluation are overturned. This outlandish message confounds Jews and Greeks alike, who quite understandably seek evidence of a more credible sort, either empirical demonstrations of power ("signs") or rationally persuasive argumentation ("wisdom"). But the apostle offers neither. Instead, "we proclaim Christ crucified" (v. 23)'.

⁴¹ Richard B. Hays, 'Wisdom according to Paul', in *Where Shall Wisdom Be Found?: Wisdom in the Bible, the Church and the Contemporary World*, ed. Stephen C. Barton (Edinburgh: T&T Clark, 1999), 111-23, at 113, maintains, 'Paul has taken the central event at the heart of the Christian story – the death of Jesus – and used it as the lens through which all human experience must be projected and thereby seen afresh. The cross becomes the starting point for an epistemological revolution, a *conversion of the imagination*'.

⁴² Litfin, *Proclamation*, 193-94.

is utter foolishness from the perspective of conventional wisdom. Only divine wisdom transmitted through God's mystery (2.1) and divine power applied through God's spirit (2.4) are able to produce faith in the unbeliever (2.5). In this unit, then, Paul aims to reestablish the validity of his seemingly unimpressive mode of gospel proclamation and to censure the church for preferring an alternative approach. As Litfin explains, 'Paul's goal is nothing less than to defend his *modus operandi* as a preacher. To do so he must demonstrate that it is theologically inspired. Hence he argues that he could not have operated otherwise; he was locked into simple proclamation — in contrast to the impressive εὐγλωττία of the rhetor — by the demands of the Gospel itself'.⁴³

b. 1 Cor 2.6-3.4

After establishing in 1.18-2.5 the rationale for his unimpressive *manner* of preaching, Paul in 2.6-3.4 explains why it was that he brought the Corinthians an equally unimpressive *message*. Paul's primary concern in 2.6-3.4 is to demonstrate why the Corinthians were not ready for more substance in the preaching they received during his earlier visit, and thus to defend the content of his preaching at that time.⁴⁴ Throughout this unit Paul explains that divine wisdom is intended for mature believers, the τελείοι and πνευματικοί, while wisdom is incomprehensible for immature believers and unbelievers, the νηπίοι, ψυχικοί, and σαρκίνοι. As Corin Mihaila summarises, '[T]he wisdom of God identified with the message of the cross is perceived only by the "mature" and "spiritual" as a result of the revelation of God's Spirit and not as the a result of human wisdom, and much less of the teachers' eloquence'.⁴⁵ But in the conclusion of this section (3.1-4), Paul explains that, while his preaching to the Corinthians contained the basic *ingredients* of wisdom, he did not provide them with the real *substance* of his divine insights as if they were mature enough to digest them. Due to their immaturity, Paul was not even *able* to speak to the Corinthians this way (οὐκ ἠδυνήθην λαλῆσαι ὑμῖν ὡς πνευματικοῖς ἀλλ' ὡς σαρκίνοις [3.1]). They were simply unprepared for the depths of God's

⁴³ Litfin, *Proclamation*, 201. Cf. Mihaila, *Paul-Apollos*, 17-24.

⁴⁴ Jouette M. Bassler, '1 Corinthians 4:1-5', *Interpretation* 44 (1990): 179-83, at 180, 'It was the inept way he preached the gospel (2:3-4) and the way he seemed to hold back from the Corinthians the "meat" of the message (3:1-3) that the Corinthians objected to'.

⁴⁵ Mihaila, *Paul-Apollos*, 26.

wisdom and at that time could only consume milk, not solid food (3.3). And just in case the Corinthians take exception to Paul's accusation, he conveniently points to their factions—the topic of the next unit—as symptomatic of their very condition.

c. 1 Cor 3.5-4.5

First Corinthians 3.5-4.5 has been labeled the 'centerpiece in the rhetorical structure of 1 Cor 1:10-4:21', since it is here where 'Paul deals explicitly and at length with the problem of social disunity in the Corinthian church'.⁴⁶ In order to eliminate inappropriate partisanship and criticism of individual apostles, it is in this pericope that Paul, through the employment of three elaborate metaphors (3.6-9a; 3.9b-17; 4.1-5), elucidates *what* (τί [3.5])⁴⁷ the apostles are and *how* (οὕτως; ὡς [4.1]) the early believers should regard them in relation to God and the church.⁴⁸

Firstly, Paul explains that the church is a field in which the apostles labour by sowing and watering seed—the gospel (3.7). It is God, however, who is the primary agent in salvation, enabling the harvest by causing its growth (ὁ ἀυξάνων); he, therefore, is the only one who is 'anything' (τι) and deserving of allegiance. Secondly, the church is a building which the apostles construct.⁴⁹ Unlike the field analogy, however, the structural image focuses primarily on the labourers, rather than on God. And instead of concentrating on the nothingness of God's agents, this metaphor seeks to remind the church that the builder is responsible for *how* he builds (ἕκαστος δὲ βλέπῃ πῶς ἐποικοδομεῖ [3.10]).⁵⁰ In this metaphor, Christ is the edifice's foundation (θεμέλιος [3.11]) and the apostles are the builders who must

⁴⁶ David W. Kuck, *Judgment and Community Conflict: Paul's Use of Apocalyptic Judgment Language in 1 Corinthians 3:5-4:5* (NovTSup 66; Leiden: Brill, 1992), 220.

⁴⁷ Clarke, *Serve the Community of the Church*, 241: 'It may be argued that Paul's use of the neuter interrogative pronoun τί, as opposed to the masculine form τίς, implies a stress on the task which is performed, rather than on the importance of the relationship between the διάκονος and the Lord. Thus, he writes that the one who plants and the one who waters are comparatively "nothing".'

⁴⁸ Paul's temple metaphor in 3.16-17 has been considered a third analogy, but its close association with the preceding building metaphor suggests that they are actually the same image; it is the *oikonomos* metaphor (4.1-5) which functions as the third.

⁴⁹ For the political use of architectural metaphors for deliberative ends, see Welborn, 'Conciliatory': 337; Mitchell, *Reconciliation*, 99-111.

⁵⁰ Kuck, *Judgment*, 181-82: '[Paul] recognized that the Corinthians were attempting to examine, test, compare, and judge the wisdom and work of their leaders and of one another. Paul is telling them not only to wait and allow God to reward the labor of each (3:8b) but also to wait and see how each one's work will fare before God's judgment. Only at the final day can the quality of work be adequately disclosed'. See also Matthias Konradt, *Gericht und Gemeinde: Eine Studie zur Bedeutung und Funktion von Gerichtsaussagen im Rahmen der Paulinischen Ekklesiologie und Ethik im 1 Thess und 1 Kor* (BZNW 117; Berlin: Walter de Gruyter, 2003), 258-84.

choose carefully which materials they will employ in their construction. Their labour will ultimately be tested (δοκιμάζω) by God, and at that time the quality of their work will become apparent (φανερός; δηλώω; ἀποκαλύπτω [3.13]).⁵¹ Based on how the work of the individual labourers fare, they will receive just payment (μισθός [3.14]) or penalty (ζημιώω [3.15]).⁵²

Paul had three central aims with these metaphors. Firstly, Paul sought to eliminate partisanship among believers (ὥστε μηδεὶς καυχάσθω ἐν ἀνθρώποις [3.21]) by showing God to be the one responsible for the conversion and maturation of believers, and the apostles as mere complementary (συνεργοί [3.9]; cf. ἐν [3.8]), subordinate agents of the gospel (3.5; cf. 3.22). By placing the primary focus on God, Paul aimed to make him alone the object of their boasting. Secondly, by portraying the church as the holy temple of God (3.16-17) and yet vulnerable to poor construction (3.13-14), Paul challenged believers to be discriminate about whom they regard as their teachers. While the apostles are considered colleagues, they are individually assigned, assessed, and compensated (ἕκαστος δὲ τὸν ἴδιον μισθὸν λήμψεται κατὰ τὸν ἴδιον κόπον [3.9]) and should therefore take care how they build, utilising the right materials in accordance with the building's Christological foundation (3.10-12). The church should at the same time be careful not to permit precarious building to take place, since what is poorly erected will eventually be tested and give way (3.13). Thirdly, Paul aimed to produce trust in himself within the church in order to reestablish his standing among them, by emphasising that his work had been faithful to the pattern he now prescribes. It is perhaps significant that in both the agricultural and architectural metaphors, Paul presents himself in the founding position (ἐγὼ ἐφύτευσα, Ἀπολλῶς ἐπότισεν [3.6]; ὡς σοφὸς ἀρχιτέκτων θεμέλιον ἔθηκα, ἄλλος δὲ ἐποικοδομεῖ [3.10]). By doing so, Paul sought to reestablish

⁵¹ Harm W. Hollander, 'The Testing by Fire of the Builders' Works: 1 Corinthians 3.10-15', *NTS* 40 (1994): 89-104, at 96: 'It is God who, at the Final Judgment, will disclose their work and will administer justice to each of them individually'; *contra* Craig A. Evans, 'How are the Apostles Judged? A Note on 1 Corinthians 3:10-15', *JETS* 27 (1984): 149-50, who suggests that he testing in 1 Cor 3.10-15 refers to the the earthly occasions when the faith and maturity of the church is assessed through their performance in persecution and difficult circumstances (2 Thess 1.6-10).

⁵² Smit, 'Apollos': 242, is probably correct to conclude that Apollos, rather than Peter, is the unnamed apostle building on Paul's work, and '[a]pparently his arrival has negatively influenced the valuation of certain believers at Corinth concerning Paul's former visit'; *contra*, Baur, 'Two Epistles', 269-81; C. K. Barrett, 'Cephas and Corinth', in *Abraham unser Vater: Juden und Christen im Gespräch über die Bibel*, ed. Otto Betz (Arbeiten zur Geschichte des Spätjudentums und Urchristentums 5; Leiden: Brill, 1963), 1-12; Michael D. Goulder, *Paul and the Competing Mission in Corinth* (Peabody, MA: Hendrickson, 2001), 22-23; Philipp Vielhauer, 'Paulus und die Kephaspartei in Korinth', *NTS* 21 (1975): 341-52; and (possibly) Fitzmyer, *First Corinthians*, 192.

his authority in the community, not in an effort to marginalise the other apostles, but to resecure his right to address their ethical shortcomings and to offer them fatherly direction in their pursuit of Christian, or Christlike, maturity (cf. 4.14-16; 11.1).

d. Summary

Paul's discourse up through 3.23 has been both theologically enriching and ethically challenging for this infantile church. One could even make the case that the groundwork for Paul's apologetic and reconciliatory objectives has been satisfactorily laid by the end of the letter's first three chapters. But one critical issue still remains unaddressed: the impropriety of the Corinthians' criticisms of the apostles. Therefore, in 4.1-5 Paul will introduce the *oikonomos* metaphor initially to reiterate several of the same apostolic attributes he has already stressed, namely the apostles' relative insignificance as subordinates of God who are accountable to him, in addition to their collegiality and responsibility to preach. But this time Paul will portray these attributes with a particular view toward underscoring the apostle's authority and immunity from community judgment. It is only by emphasising these traits that Paul's apostolic ethos can begin to be restored in the Corinthian church.

B. 1 Corinthians 4.1-5

Once Paul reaches the conclusion of the unit at 4.1-5, he shifts back to describing the role of apostles in relation to God and the church. But this time the tone and urgency of Paul's discourse is significantly more emphatic, his *description* turning here into *prescription* as he employs the imperative mood for only the seventh time in the letter so far—and the first time regarding how leaders should be conceived. Since Paul's instructions concern the *manner* of the church's perception (οὕτως; ὡς),⁵³ he clearly assumes that the Corinthians had certain preconceived

⁵³ The οὕτως is cataphoric and signals the use of metaphor; cf. L. L. Welborn, *Paul, the Fool of Christ: A Study of 1 Corinthians 1-4 in the Comic-Philosophic Tradition* (JSNTSup 293; ECC; Edinburgh: T&T Clark, 2005), 243; Fee, *First Corinthians*, 158 n. 3; Fitzmyer, *First Corinthians*, 212. For οὕτως as anaphoric, see Conzelmann, *1 Corinthians*, 82; Erich Fascher, *Der erste Brief des Paulus an die Korinther* (THKNT 7/1; Berlin: Evangelische Verlagsanstalt, 1975), 142; Helmut Merklein, *Der erste Brief an die Korinther. Kapitel 1-4* (ÖTK 7.1; Gütersloh: Echter, 1992), 290.

notions of church leadership.⁵⁴ It was, in fact, their promotion of patronage, boasting, wisdom, jealousy, strife, and other such leadership principles and practices foreign to his cruciform ideology that granted Paul the opportunity earlier to charge the church with thinking and behaving as mere humans (ἄνθρωποι [3.3-4]). It is for this reason that in 4.1 Paul must review how the *human* should regard apostles (οὕτως ἡμᾶς λογιζέσθω ἄνθρωπος ὡς).⁵⁵ Furthermore, the conceptual and collective nature of this exhortation functions to support his earlier appeal that believers agree with one another (τὸ αὐτὸ λέγητε πάντες [1.10]).⁵⁶ But what do the metaphors that Paul employs here indicate about Christian apostleship, and how is Paul's portrayal of apostles this way supposed to bring an end to the Corinthian factions? It is our understanding that in 4.1-5 Paul uses the *oikonomos* metaphor to negotiate between his portrayal of apostles as subordinate, insignificant functionaries on the one hand, and as God's authoritative, gospel-bearing representatives on the other. In the light of this objective, Paul's final concern is to illustrate the immunity of apostles to the church's evaluations and to reprimand them for their inappropriate behaviour.

1. Apostolic Hierarchy

As demonstrated in Chapter 4, the term *οικονόμος* implies the presence of an administrative hierarchy and the manager's occupation of an intermediate position within that structure. In private administration, the rank of the *oikonomos* varied according to context. But regardless of the size and scope of the managerial unit to which the *oikonomos* was assigned, during the mid-first century CE the administrator nearly always served directly beneath the proprietor as his immediate delegate and representative. In 1 Cor 4.1-5, the *oikonomos* metaphor similarly carries certain social and structural implications which Paul seeks to express about his role, so that the Corinthian church will (i) understand precisely who, or what, apostles are, and (ii) allow this new outlook to shape both their ecclesiology and their ethics.

⁵⁴ For the Corinthian church's non-Christian perceptions of church leadership, see Clarke, *Secular*, esp. 89-107.

⁵⁵ All of Paul's fifteen uses of ἄνθρωπος/ἀνθρώπινος in 1 Corinthians 1-4 seem to be pejorative (esp. 3.21; 4.3, 9); cf. Collins, *First Corinthians*, 171; Weiß, *Der erste Korintherbrief*, 92.

⁵⁶ Winter, *Sophists*, 181.

a. Subordination

By applying the *oikonomos* metaphor to himself, Apollos, and perhaps Cephas, Paul underscores the subordinate role they all share within God's administration. As discussed briefly in Chapter 5, this hierarchical relationship is indicated especially by the genitives in the construction ὑπηρετάς Χριστοῦ καὶ οἰκονόμους μυστηρίων θεοῦ (4.1) and the presence of a κύριος (4.5) within the structure. This apostolic hierarchy is also affirmed in several other texts in 1 Corinthians. In the letter opening, for instance, Paul asserts that he was called to be an apostle of Christ Jesus (ἀπόστολος Χριστοῦ Ἰησοῦ) by the will of God (1.1). This genitive also points to the subordination of apostles to God/Christ. Moreover, as an apostle Paul could say that it was Christ who commissioned him (ἀπέστειλén με Χριστὸς [1.17]). Paul's manner of speaking about his commission is exactly that used for dispatching commercial agents. According to one third-century CE letter, for example, Herakleidus, the *oikonomos* of the proprietor Alypius, was sent (ἀπέστειλα τὸν οἰκονόμον) to an estate to make arrangements (τὴν διαταγήν) for an approaching harvest (P.Flor. 2.134). Paul's repeated reference to his commission suggests that, like Herakleidus, he too occupies a subordinate rank, but his is in relation to God. And as God's servants and administrators, apostles are 'radikal von ihm abhängig und ihm untergeordnet'.⁵⁷

b. Social and Legal Status

Paul's *oikonomos* metaphor does not simply indicate 'radical subordination', but as suggested in Chapter 4, also carries social and legal connotations which Paul further uses to shape his portrait of apostleship. The status of Paul's position, however, is often overlooked in exegetical treatments of 1 Corinthians 4 and those scholars who treat the issue have opposing perspectives. Dale Martin, for instance, whose historical analysis of *oikonomoi* as private commercial administrators reached many of the same conclusions we reached in Chapter 4, applied the concept of managerial slavery to Paul's use of οἰκονομία in 1 Cor 9.17, arguing that Paul's metaphor would have elicited a plurality of responses from the socially stratified Corinthian congregation.⁵⁸ But Martin's assumptions about the social and legal

⁵⁷ Schrage, *Der erste Brief an die Korinther*, 1:320.

⁵⁸ Martin, *Slavery*, esp. 68-85. Martin's assumptions about the social make-up of, and relational dynamics within, the Corinthian church (119, 126-28) were largely influenced by Gerd Theissen, 'The Strong and the Weak in Corinth: A Sociological Analysis of a Theological Quarrel', in

statuses implied by Paul's metaphor have recently been challenged by a number of interpreters. These assessments will be handled in turn.

i. The Legal Status of Οἰκονόμοι

John Byron has contended that the *oikonomos* image, far from having servile connotations, actually casts Paul and the apostles as free and voluntary servants.⁵⁹ Byron's detailed analysis, however, fails to account for several historical and exegetical insights which are critical for discerning the legal implications of Paul's metaphor. Firstly, Byron criticises Martin for failing to notice that the phrase 'slave of Christ' does not appear in 1 Corinthians with reference to Paul. According to Byron, Martin 'overlooks that not only does Paul not describe himself as δοῦλος Χριστοῦ in 1 Corinthians, also Paul never describes himself as οἰκονόμος Χριστοῦ. In fact, this phrase does not appear anywhere in the NT'.⁶⁰ Presumably, this accusation is intended to suggest that if either δοῦλος Χριστοῦ or οἰκονόμος Χριστοῦ were used in 1 Corinthians, then Martin's argument would find support; because they are *not* employed in 1 Corinthians, however, Martin's argument is somehow weakened. On the surface Byron is correct; Paul does not employ the precise phrases Byron identifies anywhere in 1 Corinthians. But Byron is guilty of requiring *too* much direct terminological congruency. It simply does not follow that, because Paul nowhere uses these exact phrases in 1 Corinthians (or anywhere else in the case of the latter), then the phrase οἰκονομίαν πεπίστευμαι in 9.17 cannot carry the meaning Martin attributes to it. Besides this, Paul does use, as Byron later observes, the phrase οἰκονόμοι μυστηρίων θεοῦ in 4.1 with reference to himself, Apollos, and perhaps other apostles, and this metaphor is immediately preceded by Paul's portrayal of apostles as servants of Christ (ὑπηρέτας Χριστοῦ). In the light of Christ's superordinate role in Paul's very similar, adjacent self-description, the phrase 'οἰκονομοί of the mysteries of God' certainly denotes the same kind of position as 'οἰκονομος of Christ'.

The Social Setting of Pauline Christianity: Essays on Corinth (Philadelphia: Fortress, 1982), 121-43. Curiously, Martin never considers 1 Cor 4.1-2 in his investigation. For the slave status of Paul's metaphor in 4.1-2, see also Schrage, *Der erste Brief an die Korinther*, 1:320-21.

⁵⁹ Byron, *Slavery*, 241-57. Following Byron, see now Galloway, *Freedom*, 184 n.148, and perhaps John Paul Heil, *The Rhetorical Role of Scripture in 1 Corinthians* (SBL 15; Atlanta: SBL, 2005), 142 n.51.

⁶⁰ Byron, *Slavery*, 242. The same observation is made by Harris, *Slave*, 129.

Secondly, Byron charges Martin with assuming the synonymy of οἰκονόμος and δοῦλος in Pauline literature, since they both stand as terms for slaves in Martin’s framework.⁶¹ But this accusation is simply false; Martin nowhere suggests that the two terms were strictly ‘synonymous’. Instead, Martin argued that οἰκονόμοι were *mostly* slaves, specifically *managerial* slaves, and therefore a subset (hyponym) of δοῦλοι.⁶² But even so, Martin conceded that not *all* οἰκονόμοι were slaves,⁶³ an admission which Byron himself eventually seeks to exploit.⁶⁴ Therefore, while Martin maintains that by the early empire οἰκονόμοι often share the same referent as δοῦλοι, Byron incorrectly charges Martin with strictly identifying the two concepts.⁶⁵

Thirdly, Byron accuses Martin of misunderstanding Paul’s argument in 1 Cor 9.17. Martin—along with most modern scholars—regards Paul’s depiction of preaching involuntarily (ἄκων) in 9.17 as indicative of (moral) slavery and being unentitled to a wage (μισθός). Furthermore, since Paul links involuntary preaching with being entrusted with an administration (οἰκονομίαν πεπίστευμαι), Martin considers Paul’s *oikonomos* (*oikonomia*) metaphor as an admission to being a slave. Incidentally, Martin interprets Paul’s portrayal of preaching involuntarily as his actual condition. Byron, on the other hand, interprets Paul’s preaching in 9.17, not as involuntary, but as voluntary (ἐκών), and as deserving of a wage. The logic of Paul’s argument in 9.15-18 will be treated comprehensively in Chapter 7. It is sufficient here simply to point out that, despite his attempt to demonstrate that Paul’s preaching was performed voluntarily, Byron never adequately explains how he is able to dissociate Paul’s explicit correlation of involuntary preaching (i.e. slavery) with being entrusted with an οἰκονομία; regardless of Paul’s actual condition, the apostle seems to link these two concepts.

Fourthly, in order to demonstrate the statistical uncertainty of the legal status of *oikonomoi*, Byron attempts to use Martin’s catalogue of *oikonomoi* inscriptions against him. Byron observes:

⁶¹ Byron, *Slavery*, 243.

⁶² Martin, *Slavery*, 11-15.

⁶³ Martin, *Slavery*, 17: ‘[F]or the Roman Empire as a whole and for the Roman imperial period, the *oikonomoi* were of servile status (slave or freed). Furthermore, in private life they were *almost always* of servile status and were *mostly* slaves’ (emphasis added).

⁶⁴ Byron, *Slavery*, 243.

⁶⁵ For semantic sense relations, see Moises Silva, *Biblical Words and Their Meaning: An Introduction to Lexical Semantics* (Rev. ed.; Grand Rapids: Zondervan, 1994), 119-35.

Of the 81 inscriptions catalogued by Martin, only 8 can be identified as slaves, 3 as freed, 12 as free, and another 21 can only be listed as 'probably' slave or freed. A total of 41, roughly half, are of unknown status making identification impossible. Indeed a total of 62 of the inscriptions, roughly 75 percent, offer no evidence in support of a conclusion that οἰκονόμος usually indicated a slave status.⁶⁶

Although Byron's statistics initially appear damning for Martin's thesis, it must be observed that Martin's catalogue included both private *and* civic *oikonomoi*. Yet Byron repeatedly fails to discriminate between these very different kinds of administrators, a categorical distinction with significant socio-legal implications. Indeed, on two occasions Byron attempts to demonstrate the free status of the private *oikonomoi* under investigation in Martin's study by presenting as evidence *oikonomoi* who held some form of civic office: (i) Erastus, the first-century CE *oikonomos* of Corinth (Rom 16.23);⁶⁷ (ii) Philokalos, the third-century CE citizen of Ephesus (CIG 2717/Istratonikea 1103).⁶⁸ But comparing *municipal oikonomoi* of the likes of Erastus from Romans 16 with *private oikonomoi* of the likes of the Unjust Steward from Luke 16⁶⁹ is perhaps akin to comparing the rank and status of the *Secretary* of the State with the rank and status of the *secretary* of a small firm; obviously, the two persons are not comparable simply because they share the same title. In fact, nearly all of the *oikonomoi* falling within Martin's 'Free and Probably Free' and 'Unknown' categories were municipal administrators and served as treasury magistrates.⁷⁰ This classification is clearly indicated in most of those inscriptions; many even state explicitly the very context of their appointment (e.g. ἡ πόλις [CIG 2717]; ἡ βουλή [CIG 2811]; ἡ πατρίς [CIG 4132]). Therefore, while the general usefulness of Martin's catalogue suffers considerably due to its integration of private and municipal administrators, the general reliability of his thesis should not be dismissed prematurely.

⁶⁶ Byron, *Slavery*, 243-44.

⁶⁷ Byron, *Slavery*, 243.

⁶⁸ For the socio-legal status of the Ephesian civic *oikonomos*, Byron, *Slavery*, 244, relies on Reumann, 'Stewards of God': 344.

⁶⁹ For the indiscriminate use of both Erastus and the Unjust Steward, see Byron, *Slavery*, 243-44. In fact, Byron's use of the Parable of the Unjust Steward (Luke 16.1-8) as evidence for the free status of *oikonomoi* requires an unwarranted assumption about the legal standing of this particular manager. According to Byron, this *oikonomos* is 'clearly not a slave but a "free treasurer" who expects to be able . . . to continue his work outside his master's household after being removed from his position as steward' (244). But what Byron assumes to be clear is in actuality still a matter of great dispute among NT scholars; cf. Beavis, 'Ancient Slavery': 43-53. For a more recent defense of the steward's servile (slave or freed) status, see Udoh, 'Unrighteous Slave': 333.

⁷⁰ Most of these city *oikonomoi* were examined and discussed by Weiß, *Sklave der Stadt*, 51-55.

ii. The Legal Status of Ὑπηρέται

Based on his analysis, Byron concludes that οἰκονόμος is a legally ambiguous term and that any attempt to retrieve Paul's meaning from 1 Corinthians 4 and 9 would require that ὑπηρέτης, the parallel and supposedly more legally implicit term from 4.1, be examined for support. It was therefore Byron's next contention that ὑπηρέτης connotes willing service, offering as confirmation several instances from ancient literature where the term carried this significance.⁷¹ Two objections, however, must be raised in opposition to Byron's conclusions concerning the legal status of ὑπηρέται. Firstly, it is quite significant that Byron, in his brief overview of the word, conceded that a ὑπηρέτης could be obliged to obey when the superordinate figure in the hierarchy is deity.⁷² Since the superordinate figure in the apostolic hierarchy is God/Christ, then at the very least the sense of obligatory, rather than 'free-will', service associated with divinely appointed ὑπηρέται should be present in 1 Corinthians 4 and 9. Secondly and more importantly, the strictly free status of ὑπηρέται assumed by Byron is dubious. In fact, there remain numerous ancient texts which demonstrate that ὑπηρέτης could connote slavery. These testimonies, however, either went undiscussed or misrepresented in Byron's analysis. We will, therefore, need to take another look at the data.

In his analysis Byron does not, for example, consider the early first-century BCE divinations of Artemidorus of Ephesus. Yet in his multi-volume treatise, 'The Interpretation of Dreams', Artemidorus seems to consider ὑπηρέται as a category among household slaves. Explaining how a number of household articles, when dreamt about, correspond to various domestic servants, Artemidorus itemises these associations in what appears to be an ascending slave hierarchy (οἱ θεραπεύοντες, ὑπηρέται, οἰκονόμοι, ταμίαι) and even lists ὑπηρέται and οἰκονόμοι consecutively (*Onir.* 1.74).⁷³ Because ὑπηρέται fall between οἱ θεραπεύοντες and οἰκονόμοι (which for Artemidorus are servile positions [cf. 2.30]), it is reasonably clear that ὑπηρέται were also considered slaves in Artemidorus' servile framework. This in no way indicates that ὑπηρέται, or for that matter οἰκονόμοι, were *always* slaves, but it

⁷¹ Much of Byron's argumentation is indebted to Karl H. Rengstorf, 'Ὑπηρέτης', in *TDNT* (Grand Rapids: Eerdmans, 1964-1976), 532-34, 537, who repeatedly describes ὑπηρέται as free and voluntary servants.

⁷² Byron, *Slavery*, 245-46.

⁷³ This passage is mentioned briefly by Martin, *Slavery*, 34.

demonstrates that ὑπηρέται *could* possess slave status, even in a piece of literature as popular as Artemidorus' divinations.

The legal ambiguity of ὑπηρέται is also apparent in Aristotle's *Politics*, another treatise that went undiscussed by Byron. In a famous passage revealing the philosopher's impressions about the near personhood of slaves, Aristotle compares δοῦλοι to ὑπηρέται in order to explain their auxiliary function.⁷⁴ Aristotle declares that just as 'an assistant [ὁ ὑπηρέτης] in the arts belongs to the class of tools' and 'every assistant [πᾶς ὑπηρέτης] is as it were a tool that serves for several tools', so slaves (δοῦλοι) are living tools (τὰ ἔμψυχα) who utilise those tools that are lifeless (τὰ ἄψυχα [*Pol.* 1253b]). Moreover, 'if every [lifeless] tool could perform its own work when ordered', then 'mastercraftsmen would have no need of assistants [ὑπηρετῶν] and masters no need of slaves [δούλων]' (1253b). Finally and quite significantly, just as certain tools are instruments of production, while other tools are instruments of action, so an assistant (ὑπηρέτης) of a mastercraftsman is an instrument of production, while 'a slave is an assistant [ὁ δοῦλος ὑπηρέτης]' in so far as he is an instrument of action (1254a). This elaborate—and indeed tortured—analogy demonstrates the functional overlap between δοῦλοι and ὑπηρέται. Although it must be conceded that ὑπηρέτης is *not* depicted here as a strict synonym for δοῦλος, it is clear that Aristotle observed and exploited certain similarities between them, which apparently were close enough that he considered a δοῦλος to be a subset (hyponym) of ὑπηρέτης.

Furthermore, in his analysis of Plato's *Politicus*, Byron misrepresents the discourse when he implies that Plato *always* delineated between δοῦλοι and ὑπηρέται by classifying the former as 'tame animals' and the latter as 'free persons (ἐλευθέροι) who serve willingly'.⁷⁵ While these descriptions do appear in the text, the legal classification that Plato attributes to these two groups is far more complex than Byron realises. Firstly, Byron seems to miss that in this Socratic dialogue the Stranger (Ξένος) considers δοῦλοι and ὑπηρέται to comprise a single category of possessions, explaining at one point, 'There remains the class of slaves and servants in general [τὸ δὲ δὴ δούλων καὶ πάντων ὑπηρετῶν λοιπόν]' (*Pol.* 289c). Therein the Stranger couples δοῦλοι and ὑπηρέται together under one 'final' rubric (τὸ λοιπόν),

⁷⁴ For the importance of this passage in Aristotle's view of slavery, see, e.g., Garnsey, *Ideas of Slavery*, 122.

⁷⁵ Byron, *Slavery*, 246.

that of living property (ζώων κτήσιν [289b-c]). Moreover, the phrase δούλων καὶ πάντων ὑπηρετῶν suggests that δοῦλοι belong to the larger category referred to as πάντων ὑπηρετῶν. Secondly, the interchangeability of δοῦλοι and ὑπηρέται is apparent in the Stranger's immediately preceding statement, when he refers to the class consisting of δοῦλοι and ὑπηρέται simply as δοῦλοι (289b). Finally, the close identification of δοῦλοι with ὑπηρέται is made abundantly clear when later in the passage the Stranger—counter to his own intuition—asserts that the greatest servants (μεγίστους ὑπηρέτας) were indeed those 'bought servants, acquired by purchase, whom we can without question call slaves [τούς ὠνητούς τε καὶ τῷ τρόπῳ τούτῳ κτητούς: οὓς ἀναμφισβητήτως δούλους ἔχομεν εἰπεῖν]' (289d-e).⁷⁶

These complex uses of ὑπηρέτης allow us to reach several conclusions about how the term was used in antiquity. On the one hand, since Plato used ὑπηρέτης with reference to free persons, the term should not be taken on its own to imply slavery. On the other hand, since authors such as Artemidorus, Aristotle, and Plato do on occasion refer to ὑπηρέται as slaves, it is incorrect for Byron to maintain that ὑπηρέται must have been *by necessity* free-will servants. One may be able to find additional texts to challenge Byron's conclusions. But the preceding analysis is sufficient to show that the term ὑπηρέτης was quite ambiguous and probably intimated less about one's legal status than about one's rank and function in a given hierarchy. Perhaps a better description, then, is that ὑπηρέται were attendants, or subordinates (LSJ II.1),⁷⁷ without any pre-conditioned legal status, even if in the majority of instances they happened to have been free.⁷⁸ As Rengstorf remarked, 'In all these instances ὑπηρέτης κτλ. serve to characterise someone, whether man, god, or divine being, in terms of the fact that he stands and acts in the service of a higher will and is fully at the disposal of this will'.⁷⁹ If this description is accurate, then Byron's approach to the titles in 1 Cor 4.1 must be reversed. Rather than interpreting οἰκονόμος in the light of ὑπηρέτης, it is better to understand ὑπηρέτης

⁷⁶ But lest one assume that Plato *always* considered ὑπηρέται to be slaves, it should be observed that after announcing that the greatest servants were slaves, the Stranger abruptly transitioned to speak of 'those free men who put themselves voluntarily in the position of servants [τῶν ἐλευθέρων ὅσοι τοῖς νυνδὴ ῥηθεῖσιν εἰς ὑπηρετικὴν ἐκόντες]' (Pol. 289e). Moreover, the Stranger then differentiated between ὑπηρέται and persons serving (τούς διακονοῦντας) as heralds, clerks and those serving (ὑπηρετήσαντες) in public offices. But when the Stranger asked what to call these public officials, the Young Socrates suggested that they ought to be labeled ὑπηρέται.

⁷⁷ Thiselton, *First Corinthians*, 335.

⁷⁸ Unfortunately, the scope of this study does not permit us to confirm or challenge this final supposition.

⁷⁹ Rengstorf, 'ὑπηρετης', 531.

in the light of οἰκονόμος. The word order progresses, therefore, from abstract to concrete, just as the epexegetical καί implies.⁸⁰ Furthermore, it is best to consider private *oikonomoi* as normally slaves, as argued by Martin. We have sought to demonstrate this further in Chapter 4. The advice of H. C. Tietler on this matter is perhaps as appropriate here as it was there: '[C]onsider those who occupied functions as *vilicus*, *oikonomos*, *actor* and the like as slaves unless the contrary is proved'.⁸¹

iii. The Social Status of Οἰκονόμοι

Based on his conclusions about the slave status of *oikonomoi*, Martin argued that they could have possessed status inconsistency, whereby their humble legal status contradicted the considerable social status they acquired through managerial privileges and their master's patronage. The status inconsistent nature of Paul's metaphor, therefore, would have elicited a plurality of responses from his readership. But the contrast of impressions which Martin argues was evoked by Paul's metaphor has also been subject to much criticism. Few would object that, as a servile position, an *oikonomos* would have connoted ignominy to free persons, especially those who possessed some degree of socio-economic status.⁸² But Martin also quite controversially claims that managerial slaves had opportunities for social mobility, and therefore Paul's metaphor would have elicited admiration from those lower on the social spectrum.⁸³ While Martin's proposal about Paul's strategy to portray himself as a high-status-by-association administrator has been accepted by some interpreters,⁸⁴ a number of NT scholars have raised objections which must be considered.

⁸⁰ Rengstorf, 'ὕπηρετης', 543; Xavier Léon-Dufour, 'Jugement de l'homme et jugement de Dieu. 1 Co 4,1-5 dans le cadre de 3,18-4,5', in *Paolo a uno chiesa divisa (1 Cor 1-4)*, ed. L. de Lorenzi (Rome: Benedictina, 1980), 137-53, at 146. Probably also Fee, *First Corinthians*, 159.

⁸¹ Tietler, 'Estate Managers', 213.

⁸² Richard A. Horsley, 'The Slave Systems of Classical Antiquity and Their Reluctant Recognition by Modern Scholars', in *Slavery in Text and Interpretation*, ed. Allen Dwight Callahan, Richard A. Horsley, and Abraham Smith (Semeia 83/84; Atlanta: Society of Biblical Literature, 1998), 19-66, at 56: 'The wealth they acquired and influence they wielded did not give the "managerial" slave or freedperson any dignity or standing in the society. As literary sources, particularly satire, indicate quite clearly, the more wealthy and powerful the slave or freedperson, the more contemptuous he would be in the eyes of honourable people.'

⁸³ For support, Martin, *Slavery*, 31, refers to, e.g., P. R. C. Weaver, 'Social Mobility in the Early Roman Empire: The Evidence of the Imperial Freedmen and Slaves', in *Studies in Ancient Society*, ed. M. I. Finley (London: Routledge and Kegan Paul, 1974), 121-40; Weaver, *Familia Caesaris*.

⁸⁴ See, e.g., Williams, *Stewards*, 82.

On the one hand, a number of weak objections have been proposed that do not give Martin's thesis a fair reading. These require an initial response so that the more critical issues in Martin's theory can be addressed. Some interpreters, for instance, have suggested that Paul's metaphor cannot carry the positive connotations Martin suggests it has in 1 Cor 9.17 simply because the context for the metaphor in 4.1-2 will not allow for it. However, the fact that Paul describes his apostleship in 1 Corinthians 3-4 in various ways with diverse social implications—that is, as a διάκονος in one instance and a σοφὸς ἀρχιτέκτων in another, as a μωρός on the one hand and as a πατήρ on the other—suggests that Paul's portrayal of himself as an *oikonomos* need not necessitate that the metaphor be understood negatively simply because it surfaces near the *peristasis* catalogue (4.9-13); the context simply does not *demand* this understanding as some have suggested.⁸⁵ Moreover, even though some interpreters acknowledge that slavery could be portrayed positively in certain contexts, many remain skeptical that Paul's Corinthian readers would have understood slavery so optimistically. As Murray Harris observes,

“[M]iddle-level, managerial slaves” formed such a small minority that we may question whether that particular connotation of slavery would have ousted the dominant notion of slavery as humble subjection to a master in the minds of Paul's converts. Would not Paul's Corinthian readers or any typical Greco-Roman urbanites have interpreted the term *doulos* in light of their own experience or observation of slavery? And would that understanding of slavery not correspond precisely to the contextual indicators of 1 Corinthians 9, where the slave is someone who has no rights (vv. 12, 15, 18) and is under obligation to serve another (vv. 16-17).⁸⁶

But while Harris' initial observation demands consideration, his later comments neglect three important issues. Firstly, some slaves, such as *oikonomoi*, *did* in fact have certain 'rights'. How this applies to 1 Corinthians 9 will be explained in Chapter 7. But it is sufficient now simply to note that obligation did not necessarily exclude servile privileges. Secondly, it makes no difference in this instance how urbanites would have interpreted the term δοῦλος, since Paul's metaphor in 1 Corinthians 4 and 9 is that of an οἰκονόμος. It is then the early Christians' experiences and observations about this particular form of slavery that is crucial for interpreting Paul's metaphor. Finally and very significantly, 'Paul's Corinthian readers', as identified by Harris, would have understood that business slaves, such as *oikonomoi*, were among the privileged slave class. We are not here suggesting that

⁸⁵ *Contra Harris, Slave*, 129.

⁸⁶ Harris, *Slave*, 129-30.

this provided *oikonomoi* elevated social status. But because business slaves and freedmen formed a significant portion of the population in commercially saturated Corinth (as noted in Chapter 5), it is plausible that the church in Corinth would have been well aware of some of the material (though not social) benefits these managerial slaves experienced.

At the same time, there is significant cause for doubting that many slave administrators would have been highly admired and honoured in antiquity as persons with significant social status, even by the menial slave population. Although slave administrators could possess representative authority within the organisations they managed and had access to certain material privileges (see Chapter 4), this hardly indicates that they acquired elevated social status. In fact, the material privileges enjoyed by administrators along with the right they possessed to abuse their subordinates could promote, not admiration and envy, but apathy and indifference, or even hatred and resentment, from other slaves. As Keith Bradley remarks, ‘As the slaveowner’s representative on the spot, the bailiff gave the slave orders for work, managed his daily routine, and disciplined him. In so doing he became the object of intense anger and defiance: he was after all only a slave himself’.⁸⁷ Moreover, the social mobility of slaves was such an anomaly that it is highly unlikely that even slave administrators would have been regarded as possessing significant social status in the ancient world. As Richard Horsley explains,

Roman imperial society generally consisted of a static pyramid of legally mandated orders and a relatively rigid hierarchy of statuses. For what minimal social mobility there was, slavery, even most “managerial” roles, would not have provided a very promising launching pad, considering the social stigma that still attached to the minority of slaves who became freedmen/women—unless we are thinking of a social mobility that happened over three or four generations. The experience of the vast majority of slaves cannot be mitigated by focusing on the unusual influence or atypical mobility of a “select few.”⁸⁸

After comparing the Roman slave system with several other slave cultures, Orlando Patterson’s sociological investigation reached similar conclusions.

⁸⁷ Bradley, *Slavery and Society*, 72. In response to Martin, I. A. H. Combes, *The Metaphor of Slavery in the Writings of the Early Church from the New Testament to the Beginning of the Fifth Century* (JSNTSup 156; Sheffield: Sheffield Academic Press, 1998), 80, argues, ‘We are hampered . . . by the lack of evidence shaped by the attitudes of the lower classes and Martin’s use of funerary inscriptions to make up this deficiency is admirable. But such ritualized sentiments as those found in such a context cannot be regarded as complete evidence of an entirely different mindset from the enormous resentment that so often arose against the power of favoured slaves’.

⁸⁸ Horsley, ‘Slave Systems’, 57; cf. 58. Garnsey, *Ideas of Slavery*, 186, also responds to Martin by stating, ‘Slavery for most slaves was highly undesirable and anything but an avenue of upward mobility’.

Patterson remarks, '[I]f we consider not the content of what the elite slave did, but the structural significance of his role, we find immediately that it is identical with that of the most miserable of field slaves. He was always structurally marginal, whether economically or socially, politically or culturally. His marginality made it possible for him to be used in ways that were not possible with a person who truly belonged'.⁸⁹ These objections do not indicate that there existed in Roman slave society anything like slave homogeneity and a shared slave identity; there did exist, after all, a variation of slave jobs whose desirability by slaves was dramatically affected by location and proximity to the master.⁹⁰ But regardless of slight variations in rank and privilege, the vast majority of slaves were considered dishonoured persons.⁹¹ This is underscored by the fact that even administrators were subject to their master's wrath, being vulnerable to beatings and even murder, and such personal bodily violations were indicative of social disrepute.⁹² Therefore, since Paul's metaphor implies legal restraint and oppression, it is highly implausible that it would have also connoted social superiority.

It should be concluded, then, that through the *oikonomos* metaphor Paul sought to demonstrate the vast insignificance of the apostles in comparison with their principal. Not only are the apostles subordinate to God/Christ, but they are his slaves who serve him out of compulsion and humility. Understood in this way, the apostles should not be regarded as in competition with one another.⁹³ As administrators of the same principal and of the same resources, the apostles should rather be considered colleagues (συνεργοί [3.9]) who contribute to the growth of the church in complementary ways (3.6, 10).⁹⁴ As Paul maintains later in the epistle, 'Whether then it was I or they [εἴτε οὖν ἐγὼ εἴτε ἐκεῖνοι], so we preach and so you

⁸⁹ Patterson, *Slavery*, 332. J. Albert Harrill, 'Review: Dale B. Martin, *Slavery as Salvation*', *Journal of Religion* 72 (1992): 426-27, at 426, remarks, 'Martin's sharp separation of upper-class values and perceptions from those of the lower class looks at times artificial and exaggerated. . . . It is questionable whether the humble freeborn population felt "class" or even "order" solidarity with the servile masses. Lower-status persons often share, if not exaggerate, the values and prejudices of their social betters'; Harrill provides as an example Petronius' Hermeros (*Satyr.* 38).

⁹⁰ Bradley, *Slavery and Society*, 72-73.

⁹¹ Patterson, *Slavery*, 331-32; Michael Joseph Brown, 'Paul's Use of δοῦλος Χριστοῦ Ἰησοῦ in Romans 1:1', *JBL* 120 (2001): 723-37, at 731-32. Harrill, 'Review': 427: '[F]rom a historical perspective, any "honor" conferred even on high-ranking servile persons was always fragile'.

⁹² Saller, *Patriarchy*, 134-39.

⁹³ Mihaila, *Paul-Apollon*, 212. Contra Joubert, 'Managing', 216, who curiously claims, 'Only Paul had access to the "mysteries of God" (1 Cor. 2:1, 7; 4:1), and only he could communicate its contents to others' (emphasis added).

⁹⁴ Victor P. Furnish, "'Fellow Workers in God's Service'", *JBL* 80 (1961): 364-70.

believed' (15.11). By disregarding which apostle mediated the gospel and emphasising instead their shared rank and objectives, Paul sought to eliminate boasting in leaders. In this sense, the *oikonomos* metaphor functions like the *διάκονος* metaphor in 3.5-9, where Paul draws out the intermediary role he and the apostles occupy between God and the church. Likewise, the apostles in 4.1-2 are mere *oikonomoi*, authorised slave agents, commissioned by God to distribute his mysteries. And by illustrating the subordinate, servile, and functionary role of the apostles, Paul seeks to convey their exceedingly depressed status relative to Christ their *κύριος*, and thus to eliminate inappropriate adulation and partisanship in the Corinthian community.

c. Authority

While Paul's *oikonomos* metaphor is pregnant with shameful connotations, the image is not entirely void of notions of influence. Even as Paul's metaphor implies subordination and servility, it simultaneously casts the apostolate as a position of unique power. By virtue of having been appointed by the resurrected Christ and entrusted with the mysteries of God, Paul's metaphor portrays apostles as authorised representatives sent from God to speak and act on his behalf to the church and all humanity.

As demonstrated in Chapter 4, private administrators were appointed to supervise a managerial unit, which entitled them to a significant amount of representative authority in the handling of the principal's resources and the management of his personnel. But generally speaking, administrators were not able to utilise the principal's resources in any way they wished; often the slave's authorisation was limited by the scope of his commission (*praepositio*). Paul's *oikonomos* metaphor implies that apostles were entrusted with a similar kind of restricted authority. The apostle's authorisation to speak and act for God was likewise limited to the domain of the resources with which they were entrusted, namely the mysteries of God (4.1).⁹⁵ Of course apostles were also subordinated to these mysteries, so that their words and actions lost divine authorisation if and

⁹⁵ Just as an administrator was not appointed until after he had first been tested by many trials (*prius experimentis inspiciendus* [Columella, *Rust.* 11.1.7]), so Paul asserts that he had to be approved by God to be entrusted with the gospel (δεδοκιμάσαμεθα ὑπὸ τοῦ θεοῦ πιστευθῆναι τὸ εὐαγγέλιον [1 Thess 2.4; cf. Gal 2.7]).

when they contradicted God's revelation (Gal 1.8-9; 2.11-14).⁹⁶ But within that realm, so long as their life and speech were consonant with the gospel they proclaimed, the words and actions of the apostles were considered authoritative (1 Thess 2.13).⁹⁷

As Paul's analogy situates him and the other apostles equally beneath the Lord, the location of the Corinthians in Paul's metaphorical framework remains somewhat obscure. Their relationship with the apostles is, in fact, quite dynamic. On the one hand, since God is the principal and Paul is the agent, those whom Paul seeks to 'gain' (κερδαίνω [9.19-22]) are at once the 'profits' he acquires *and* the third contracting parties with whom he conducts the 'kerygmatic transaction'. From this perspective, Paul positions himself alongside of, rather than above, the church. At an initial glance, this would reinforce the non-hierarchical ecclesial structure which many scholars have suggested is implied in Paul's letters.⁹⁸

But Paul's *oikonomos* metaphor further implies that he was appointed to manage, not only God's resources, but also his personnel. This was the structural model established in commercial enterprises, and Paul's portrayal of apostles as *oikonomoi*, while not *explicitly* referring to those over whom he was structurally superior, at the very least suggests that they were afforded this kind of administrative rank and authority in the church.⁹⁹ This connotation finds support

⁹⁶ Schütz, *Authority*, 281-82; Hans von Campenhausen, *Ecclesiastical Authority and Spiritual Power in the Church of the First Three Centuries* (trans. J. A. Baker; Stanford, CA: Stanford University Press, 1969), 36.

⁹⁷ Schütz, *Authority*, 282: '[Paul] can actually count on asserting power over against the churches when and where there is a power vacuum in them by virtue of the failure of Christians to reflect and embody the power which originally he made available to them'. Just as the apostles possess authority in the gospel they received through the revelation of Jesus Christ (Gal 1.12), so they themselves are instantiations of that very revelation by virtue of having witnessed the resurrection (Gal 1.16) and having been commissioned to proclaim it (the use of ἐν in Gal 1.16 is spatial/locative, rather than instrumental ['by/through'] or referential ['to']; cf. Gal 2.20; 4.19). Fee, *First Corinthians*, 159, neglects the authority which resides in the apostle. But as Schütz explains, Paul 'identifies gospel with apostle. He makes the apostle the paradigm of the gospel he proclaims. Both the message and the messenger proclaim grace and both embody grace, grace as event' (135).

⁹⁸ See, e.g., Elisabeth Schüssler Fiorenza, *In Memory of Her: A Feminist Theological Reconstruction of Christian Origins* (New York: Crossroad, 1983), 205-241. See also S. Scott Bartchy, 'Undermining Ancient Patriarchy: The Apostle Paul's Vision of a Society of Siblings', *BTB* 29 (1999): 68-78, at 77, who argues that Paul sought to create a 'dynamic "horizontal" network of exchanges of spiritual power and material goods rather than affirming a fixed hierarchy of any kind'. Cf. S. Scott Bartchy, 'Who Should Be Called Father? Paul of Tarsus between the Jesus Tradition and Patria Potestas', *BTB* 33 (2003): 135-47. For Paul's sibling language as connoting mutuality, rather than structural equality, see Andrew D. Clarke, 'Equality or Mutuality?: Paul's Use of "Brother" Language', in *The New Testament in Its First-Century Setting: Essays on Context and Background in Honour of B. W. Winter on His 65th Birthday*, ed. P. J. Williams et al. (Grand Rapids: Eerdmans, 2004), 151-64.

⁹⁹ Admittedly, Paul does not expressly state that authority is bound up with the metaphor. But the normal practice of appointing administrators over estates and businesses, along with similar biblical and non-biblical, metaphorical portrayals of private *oikonomoi* (e.g. Luke 12.42; Gal 4.2; Titus

elsewhere in 1 Corinthians and Paul's other letters where he articulates some kind of structural superiority over immediate delegates, local church leaders, and (lay) believers.¹⁰⁰ Timothy, for instance, while remaining Paul's ἀδελφός and συνεργός in the gospel (1 Thess 3.2; Rom 16.21), is also subordinate to him as the apostle's τέκνος ἀγαπητός (1 Cor 4.17) whom he commissions to visit the Corinthians and other churches to lead and speak on his behalf (4.17; 16.10; 1 Thess 3.2).¹⁰¹ Paul also sent a number of other delegates to represent him, including Titus (2 Cor 8.16-17, 22-23; 12.18), Epaphroditus (Phil 2.25; 4.28), and Epaphras (Philm 23; cf. Col. 1.7; 4.12). Due to the fact that Paul commissions them, these delegates should be considered in some sense subordinate to the apostle.¹⁰²

Beyond his immediate delegates, however, Paul also recognises the existence of certain local church leaders, including the ἐπισκόποι and διακόνοι in Philippi (Phil 1.1) and those leading (οἱ προϊστάμενοι) in Thessalonica and Rome (1 Thess 5.12-13; Rom 12.8). Significantly, there were also a number of named and unnamed local leaders in Corinth. Paul, for example, identifies such persons as Stephanas, Fortunatus, and Achaicus as those whom the Corinthian believers must recognise (ἐπιγινώσκω) and submit to (ὑποτάσσω) on account of their work and toil (1 Cor 16.15-18). Chloe, Gaius, and Crispus may have also been leaders in Corinth, since the former two hosted house churches (1.11, 14; Rom 16.23) and the latter was once the leader of the local synagogue (Acts 18.8; cf. 1 Cor 1.14). There were then those unnamed figures in the community who were gifted in administration (κυβέρνησις [12.28]), which may also indicate local leadership.¹⁰³ Paul's authority extends over all of these local leaders because he, as the founder of the community, is the ἀρχιτέκτων (3.10),¹⁰⁴ and they are, as it were, subordinate contractors.

1.7; 1 Pet 4.10; Ign. Pol. 6.1; Epictetus, *Diatr.* 3.22.3), suggest that structural authority is implied by the image.

¹⁰⁰ Clarke, *Theology*, 81; cf. David G. Horrell, 'Leadership Patterns and the Development of Ideology in Early Christianity', *Sociology of Religion* 58 (1997): 323-41.

¹⁰¹ Reidar Aasgaard, 'My Beloved Brothers and Sisters!': *Christian Siblingship in Paul* (JSNTSup 265; ECC; London: T&T Clark, 2004), 289-90.

¹⁰² Holmberg, *Power*, 60; Clarke, *Theology*, 93; Ehrensperger, *Power*, 53, 57; (57). Anthony Bash, *Ambassadors for Christ* (WUNT 2/92; Tübingen: J.C.B. Mohr [Paul Siebeck], 1997), 121.

¹⁰³ Clarke, *Theology*, 84-85.

¹⁰⁴ Jay Shanor, 'Paul as Master Builder: Construction Terms in First Corinthians', *NTS* 34 (1988): 461-71, at 465-66: 'As ἀρχιτέκτων, Paul assumes responsibility for overseeing the coordination and general progress of the work, a fact to which his authoritative posture in the Corinthian Epistle itself bears cogent testimony'. See also Alison Burford, *The Greek Temple Builders at Epidauros: A Social and Economic Study of Building in the Asklepeian Sanctuary, during the Fourth and Early Third Centuries B.C.* (Liverpool: Liverpool University Press, 1969), 139: 'There was no other distinction, technically

Finally, Paul also considers his converts to be persons over whom he possesses structural authority. The Corinthian believers, for instance, as Paul's own work in the Lord and the seal of his apostleship (9.1-2), are nothing less than Paul's spiritual 'children' (4.14-16). As such, Paul possesses the leverage to admonish and to instruct them to imitate him as he imitates Christ (4.16; 11.1). It is perhaps even significant that the believers in Corinth were regarded as slaves (δοῦλοι) and freedmen (ἀπελευθέροι) of Christ (7.22-23; cf. 6.20). Given this identification, Paul's rank as *oikonomos* provides him a more senior position in the ecclesial household. One can then imagine up to five layers in the early ecclesial hierarchy: (i) God/Christ; (ii) Paul/apostles; (iii) apostolic delegates; (iv) local leaders; (v) believers.¹⁰⁵ All of these instances attest to the fact that the Pauline churches had at least a 'simple hierarchy', and in some cases, like Corinth, an even more complex structure was present.¹⁰⁶

It is important to realise, however, that while Paul utilises the *oikonomos* metaphor implicitly to *construct* his representative authority in God's *domus*, Paul does not here explicitly *assert* his authority over the community. And whereas the image entails an ecclesial hierarchy and thereby ascribes authority to the apostolate, this portrayal of apostles as managerial slaves does not undercut the redefined and more sensible perception of apostleship he made in the initial three chapters of the letter. In order to achieve his objective of eliminating inappropriate apostolic perceptions and partisanship Paul does *not* have to portray the apostles without *any* structural authority or ecclesial significance. Eventually, Paul will cast the apostles as last of all, criminals sentenced to death, foolish, weak, dishonoured, hungry, thirsty, impoverished, homeless, persecuted, slandered, the scum of the earth, and the refuse of all things (4.9-13). But this catalogue of hardships is still several verses off, in an entirely new unit (4.6-21), and Paul's rhetoric simply has not escalated there quite yet. At present, Paul must only demonstrate that the rank and status of the apostles are vastly insignificant to that of the κύριος.

speaking, between the architect and the craftsmen who worked with him on the temple than that the architect was more skilled and thus competent to command them'. Cf. Fitzmyer, *First Corinthians*, 192.

¹⁰⁵ Perhaps the most tenuous distinction in this hierarchy is between (iii) apostolic delegates and (iv) local leaders. But, since these delegates normally represent Paul to the communities in his absence, it is reasonable to conclude that they possess structural authority over those churches and their local leaders (cf. 1 Cor 4.17; 16.2; 1 Thess 3.2).

¹⁰⁶ Clarke, *Theology*, 80-88.

Despite possessing apostolic authority, servility was the general principle that characterised the apostle's exercise of leadership. Paul's apparent freedom from the church, yet self-enslavement for the sake of the gospel is one example of how apostolic authority was to be exercised not to the detriment, but for the benefit of the body of believers (9.19). This ethos of Christian leadership also goes some way to explain the hierarchy Paul constructs in the reversal of the Corinthian slogans in 3.21-23. If the apostles are subordinate directly to Christ (4.1) and accountable to him alone (4.3-5), then how can they simultaneously 'belong' to the church (3.21-22)? It must be that Paul and the apostles, in their effort to serve God faithfully, labour to achieve both the salvation and maturation of the Corinthians to the extent that—practically speaking—they are at the service of the community.¹⁰⁷

2. Apostolic Responsibilities

Paul's description of apostolic ministry in 4.1-5 does little more than *imply* what constituted his responsibilities as God's agent. His characterisation of apostles as ὑπηρέται Χριστοῦ suggests only their subordinate and auxiliary role as assistants in God's administration. The construction οἰκονόμους μυστηρίων θεοῦ, on the other hand, goes further, indicating that the responsibilities of the apostles primarily involved the dissemination of the heavenly goods entrusted to them. As stated earlier, the genitive in οἰκονόμους μυστηρίων is objective, so that the apostles are administrators who dispense μυστήρια θεοῦ. But what is it that Paul refers to here as God's mysteries?

In both ancient Jewish and early Christian literature, the general sense of μυστήριον, as Markus Bockmuehl indicates, involves 'any reality of divine or heavenly origin specifically characterized as hidden, secret, or otherwise inaccessible to human knowledge'.¹⁰⁸ Bockmuehl further notes that God's mysteries generally involve two main areas: 'redemption (eschatology, cosmology) and sanctification (halakhah)'; '[b]oth are God's property and prerogative . . . and can be described as stored up in heaven'.¹⁰⁹ In general agreement with Bockmuehl,

¹⁰⁷ The inverted pyramid of 3.21-23 must therefore be regarded as an instance where Paul sought, as Clarke, *Theology*, 101, remarks, 'to limit the perception of his status, whilst not removing it'.

¹⁰⁸ Bockmuehl, *Revelation*, 2.

¹⁰⁹ Bockmuehl, *Revelation*, 125. 'With few exceptions, however, the writers' interest centres on secrets of the celestial world, where the privileged seer glimpses prepared storehouses of the

Benjamin Gladd adds that God's mysteries have an inherently polemical role, functioning as an apocalyptic motif to subvert conventional knowledge of the present age.¹¹⁰ The mysteries to which Paul refers in 1 Corinthians imply these very themes.

According to 1 Corinthians, the mysteries entrusted to the apostles consist of divine and eternal wisdom (2.7) specially disclosed through God's spirit (2.10). More specifically, Paul equates the *μυστήριον τοῦ θεοῦ* with the message of the crucifixion of Jesus Christ (2.1-2), that is, the gospel (1.17-18; 15.1-8).¹¹¹ In the first, then, God's mysteries have a decidedly Christological focus and constitute Paul's theology of the cross.¹¹² Still further, God's mysteries include the 'wider implications of the work of God in Christ', namely righteousness, sanctification, and redemption (1.30), including the unimaginable future inheritance which remains unknown to the 'rulers of this age' (2.8), yet awaits 'those who love God' (2.9).¹¹³ These insights have been disclosed to the apostles and it is they who are responsible for proclaiming God's mysteries, firstly to unbelievers for the purpose of salvation (1.18, 21, 24), and secondly to believers for the purpose of maturation (3.2).¹¹⁴

Central to Paul's understanding of his apostolic task, however, is the manner in which the gospel message is to be communicated. Paul maintains that he was sent to proclaim the gospel (*εὐαγγελίζομαι*), not with rhetorical flair—that is, without eloquent speech (*σοφία λόγου* [1.17; cf. 2.1, 4]) or impressive bodily presence

eschatological *Heilsgüter* along with other furnishings of heaven which demonstrate God's universal saving sovereignty' (125-26).

¹¹⁰ Gladd, *Mysterion*, 105-107. Gladd also notes that Second-Temple Jewish references to God's mysteries consistently allude to Daniel 2. Bockmuehl, *Revelation*, 124, explains that during the post-exilic period an increasing interest in hidden wisdom arose among the various Jewish groups. 'These emphases', Bockmuehl states, 'were further accentuated in the Graeco-Roman period, sometimes in response to stimuli from Hellenistic culture and religion'.

¹¹¹ For the original reading of 2.1 with *μυστήριον*, rather than *μαρτύριον*, see Veronica Koperski, "'Mystery of God" or Testimony of God in 1 Cor 2,1: Textual and Exegetical Considerations', in *New Testament Textual Criticism and Exegesis: Festschrift J. Delobel*, ed. A. Denaux (BETL 161; Leuven: Leuven University Press, 2002), 305-15; cf. Gladd, *Mysterion*, 123-26.

¹¹² Bockmuehl, *Revelation*, 165: 'Paul's message about Christ crucified is called the mystery of God'.

¹¹³ Bockmuehl, *Revelation*, 162. Gladd, *Mysterion*, 157, adds that 'the *μυστήριον* in 2:1, 8 [sic, 2.7?] is the Messiah, Lord of glory reigning while he is defeated and accursed' (original emphasis).

¹¹⁴ Throughout 1 Corinthians 1-4 Paul associates apostleship almost entirely with the task of preaching: *ἀπέστειλέν με Χριστός . . . εὐαγγελίζεσθαι* (1.17); *ἡμεῖς δὲ κηρύσσομεν Χριστὸν ἐσταυρωμένον* (1.23); *ἦλθον . . . καταγγέλλων ὑμῖν τὸ μυστήριον τοῦ θεοῦ* (2.1); *ὁ λόγος μου καὶ τὸ κήρυγμά μου* (2.4); *σοφίαν δὲ λαλοῦμεν* (2.6); *λαλοῦμεν θεοῦ σοφίαν ἐν μυστηρίῳ τὴν ἀποκεκρυμμένην* (2.7); *ἃ καὶ λαλοῦμεν* (2.13); *οὐκ ἠδυνήθημεν λαλῆσαι* (3.1); *πανταχοῦ ἐν πάσῃ ἐκκλησίᾳ διδάσκω* (4.17). This is also the case in most of 1 Corinthians 3-4, although veiled in metaphor: *γάλα ὑμᾶς ἐπότισα* (3.2); *ἐγὼ ἐφύτευσα, Ἀπολλῶς ἐπότισεν* (3.6); *θεμέλιον ἔθηκα* (3.10); *ἐγὼ ὑμᾶς ἐγέννησα* (4.15).

(παρουσία τοῦ σώματος [2 Cor 10.10; cf. 1 Cor 2.3])—but by simply announcing the message of the crucified messiah (1.17-18; 2.2).¹¹⁵ Paul’s gospel, as he explains later in the epistle, consists of the message of the death, burial, resurrection, and appearances of Jesus Christ (15.1-8). And when stripped of all rhetorical adornment, this gospel is no less than the power of God for salvation (1.18; cf. 1.24; Rom 1.16; 1 Thess 1.5) and the very means by which the Corinthians themselves are being saved (1 Cor 15.2).¹¹⁶ Paul, therefore, insists that his proclamation must not aim to manipulate his audiences, but simply to relay the revelation which he has been entrusted. In his ministry Paul seeks to remove unnecessary ornamentation from God’s message so that faith might rest on Christ’s power, rather than on Paul’s own persuasiveness (1.17; 2.4-5).

It is significant that Paul’s understanding of the agency and power of the gospel together with his disavowal of rhetorical invention, is also underscored throughout 1 Corinthians 1-4 through the way he refers to his preaching. As Litfin explains,

The verbs Paul uses to describe his public speaking, such as εὐαγγελίζω, κηρύσσω, καταγγέλλω, and μαρτυρέω, are decidedly non-rhetorical. No self-respecting orator could have used such verbs to describe his own *modus operandi*. Indeed, even though they deal with the subject of public speaking such verbs play no significant role in the rhetorical literature. This is understandable because these verbs describe a form of speaking which is at its core the antithesis of rhetorical behavior. The principles of rhetorical adaptation are irrelevant to the κῆρυξ. His role is not to discover the persuasive probabilities inherent in his subject, or search the τόποι for arguments that will carry weight with his listeners, much less to package the whole so that the message will be irresistible. That sort of thing belongs to the persuader. The herald’s task is not to create a persuasive message at all, but to convey effectively the already articulated message of another. The matter of rendering that message persuasive is not his affair. It is not surprising, then, that such verbs were largely unusable to the rhetoricians. Nor, in the light of Paul’s understanding of his mission, is it surprising that he should embrace such verbs for his own. He perceived his public speaking in a profoundly different light from the orators who were so prominent in his day. He had been entrusted with a message and it was his task to announce it in simplicity to all who would listen.¹¹⁷

Given Paul’s manner of articulating his preaching ministry elsewhere, his portrayal of apostles as *oikonomoi* of God’s mysteries becomes more understandable. As a commercial agent Paul is a messenger, a mere conduit of the word of the cross.¹¹⁸ His chief responsibility is to take the currency entrusted to him—the foolish message of the crucified messiah (1.21, 23)—and to invest it in the market of the

¹¹⁵ Litfin, *Proclamation*, 181-209; Winter, *Sophists*, 141-64.

¹¹⁶ Schütz, *Authority*, 40-53. For the word of the cross as empowering epistemological and ecclesiological/ethical transformation, see Alexandra R. Brown, *The Cross and Human Transformation: Paul’s Apocalyptic Word in 1 Corinthians* (Minneapolis: Fortress, 1995), 157-67.

¹¹⁷ Litfin, *Proclamation*, 195-96.

¹¹⁸ Bockmuehl, *Revelation*, 166: ‘[T]his metaphor fits perfectly with the function of Paul’s ministry as a source of revelation’.

unbelieving world. But whereas commercial administrators generate profits, apostles produce converts (κερδαίνω [9.19-22]). Paul's investments require neither flamboyance nor clever marketing, only the simple depositing of God's heavenly resources (1.21; 3.5; 15.2, 11). As agents commissioned to various parts of the Gentile world, the apostles are simply purveyors of God's salvific message. And all profits are ultimately for God's benefit.

3. Apostolic Accountability

After expressing what role and corresponding responsibilities have been entrusted to the apostles, Paul proceeds to explain what God truly expects of them and how he secures their obedience. Verse 2 begins with the particles ὥδε λοιπόν, a complicated phrase which functions to connect Paul's preceding assertion with that which follows. The difficulty with the phrase lies with λοιπός. While ὥδε in this instance means 'in this case' (BDAG 2) and draws an inference from verse 1, λοιπός here can either strengthen the inferential sense already present from ὥδε ('in this case, moreover' [NASB]; cf. BDF §451 [6]; Epictetus, *Diatr.* 2.12.24) or introduce a new idea ('now' [NIV]), so that 'λοιπόν becomes an inceptive particle, looking forward, rather than an inferential connective, looking back'.¹¹⁹ Since the following gnomic statement transitions somewhat awkwardly from what precedes (see especially the verb's change in person and mood), and Paul introduces it entirely for the purpose of addressing the matter of apostolic judgment in 4.3-5, the latter inceptive sense is to be preferred. Together the phrase should be translated 'in this case, now', so that ὥδε looks backward and λοιπόν points forward.¹²⁰

However one translates ὥδε λοιπόν, the phrase clearly makes way for Paul's forthcoming proverbial statement (*sprichwortartige Satz*).¹²¹ As he continues, Paul reminds his audience that 'it is required in administrators that one is found faithful [ζητεῖται ἐν τοῖς οἰκονόμοις, ἵνα πιστός τις εὐρεθῆ]' (4.2). The proverb recalls the surprise inspections to which absentee business owners subjected their representative agents in ancient commerce. The primacy of loyalty in servile

¹¹⁹ Margaret E. Thrall, *Greek Particles in the New Testament: Linguistic and Exegetical Studies* (New Testament Tools and Studies 3; Leiden: Brill, 1962), 26-28, here at 27. Based on Epictetus' use of the phrase, Welborn, *Fool*, 244, suggests that it is a 'verbal gesture of annoyance by one who is forced to concede that a general truth is applicable in the present case'.

¹²⁰ See, e.g., Schrage, *Der erste Brief an die Korinther*, 1:321 ('hierbei nun').

¹²¹ Fascher, *Der erste Brief des Paulus an die Korinther*, 143.

relationships, including private administration, was of course common knowledge in Graeco-Roman antiquity and was probably especially so in Roman Corinth, where a large portion of the population had servile roots. The primary function of this statement, however, is not to divulge original insight about what principals expected of their subordinates, but simply to raise the issue of servile responsibility and accountability in anticipation of verses 3-5. These are introduced through two evaluative verbs. The first, ζητέω, indicates the existence of the principal's behavioural expectations, while the second, εὐρίσκω, reveals the future orientation of the principal's judgment.¹²²

But Paul's articulation of the proverb is deliberately vague, for the apostle maintains the ambiguity of the evaluating party by using the passive voice for both verbs. Of course Paul's point is not entirely concealed; clearly the administrator's principal is the only one competent to judge his manager. But Paul omits the identity of the evaluating party for rhetorical effect, that is, to prepare the way for his renunciation of phoney and inappropriate judges in the three forthcoming verses.¹²³ In other words, by not disclosing precisely who judges God's administrators, Paul is able to present and reject three unsuitable critics (the church, a court, oneself), ultimately for the sake of demonstrating the impropriety of just one of them—ὕμῶν.

Paul's censure of the Corinthians for their apostolic evaluations in verses 3-5 marks a major escalation in the tone of the discourse. Paul has resisted addressing their criticisms particularly of *him* for the initial three chapters of the letter. But here the apostle meets them head-on, for Paul considers their judgments to be a great affront, not because he is in anyway threatened or emotionally affected by them, but because the subtext of judging teachers and public speakers is the

¹²² Gladd, *Mysterion*, 172 argues that in 1 Cor 4.2 Paul alludes to Dan 6.4 [Theo]. But his case is tenuous, since in the latter text εὐρίσκω has no syntactical relationship with πιστός and God is not the subject of the verb, as he is implied to be in 1 Cor 4.2. A better (though imperfect) parallel is Phil 3.9, where, following a clear commercial metaphor in 3.7-8, Paul expresses his need to be found (εὐρεθῶ) righteous through faith in Christ (διὰ πίστεως Χριστοῦ); the genitive is objective; cf. R. Barry Matlock, 'Saving Faith: The Rhetoric and Semantics of πίστις in Paul', in *Faith of Jesus Christ* (2009), 73-89, at 75-78; Richard H. Bell, 'Faith in Christ: Some Exegetical and Theological Reflections on Philippians 3:9 and Ephesians 3:12', in *Faith of Jesus Christ* (2009), 111-25, at 111-20; Preston M. Sprinkle, 'Πίστις Χριστοῦ as an Eschatological Event', in *Faith of Jesus Christ* (2009), 165-84, at 183. Although the two metaphors are not the same, both 1 Cor 4.1-5 and Phil 3.7-9 employ commercial language and Paul's calling to account.

¹²³ This rhetorical strategy is exhibited especially by the way the ἵνα + aorist-passive-subjunctive verb εὐρεθῆ in 4.2 is mirrored by the ἵνα + aorist-passive-subjunctive verb ἀνακριθῶ in 4.3.

exercise of power over them. This association is easily overlooked outside the context of Graeco-Roman oratory. Therefore, before proceeding to Paul's censure, it is important to address the power of the audience in ancient oratory, in order to show how criticisms were perceived by the orator.

a. Corinth's Oratorical Context

In addition to being renowned as a focal point in trans-provincial trade, Corinth was also a famous centre for education during the early empire. Especially during the second-century CE Hellenistic Renaissance—the Second Sophistic—the city attracted many philosophers and rhetors,¹²⁴ whose schools and oratorical skills became quite famous in Greece.¹²⁵ Demetrius the Cynic, a late first-century intimate of Seneca, for instance, was a resident of Corinth,¹²⁶ while Herodes Atticus (Philostratus, *Vit. soph.* 551), Aelius Aristides (*Or.* 46.23), Apollonius of Tyana (Philostratus, *Vit. Apoll.* 4.25, 7.10), Dio Chrysostom (*Or.* 31.121), and Plutarch (*Mor.* 723a) also frequented the city. The Corinthians even erected a bronze statue to Favorinus in front of the city library to stimulate the youth in scholastics (Dio Chrysostom, *Or.* 37.8).¹²⁷

Auditing speeches was one of the most popular and important spectator activities in the early empire. As Tim Whitmarsh explains, 'Oratory was not just a gentle pastime of the rich: it was one of the primary means that Greek culture of the period, constrained as it was by Roman rule, had to explore issues of identity, society, family, and power'.¹²⁸ As some orators acquired great fame for their rhetorical skill, others were handicapped by their failure to impress. Indeed, as a performance-oriented profession, oratory established a reciprocal, co-dependent relationship between the speaker and audience. Whether the orator delivered a

¹²⁴ G. W. Bowersock, *Greek Sophists in the Roman Empire* (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1969), 17-29, does not include Corinth among the most visited 'cities of the sophists', but recognises it as a client city of Herodes Atticus.

¹²⁵ For the importance of an established reputation among sophists, see George A. Kennedy, 'The Sophists as Declaimers', in *Approaches to the Second Sophistic*, ed. G. W. Bowersock (University Park, PA: American Philological Association, 1974), 17-22, at 17.

¹²⁶ Tacitus, *Hist.* 4.40; Lucian, *Ind.* 10; Seneca, *Ep.* 20, 62; *Vit. beat.* 18; *Prov.* 3.3, 5.5; Philostratus *Vit. Apoll.* 4.25; *Ep.* 36, 37.

¹²⁷ Engels, *Roman Corinth*, 45; Robert S. Dutch, *The Educated Elite in 1 Corinthians: Education and Community Conflict in Graeco-Roman Context* (JSNTSup 271; London: T&T Clark, 2005), 95-138.

¹²⁸ Tim Whitmarsh, *The Second Sophistic* (Greece & Rome, New Surveys in the Classics 35; Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2005), 1; cf. C. E. W. Steel, *Roman Oratory* (Greece & Rome, New Surveys in the Classics 36; Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2006), 54.

speech in order to educate or amuse, the audience offered honour in return, providing them a kind power over the speaker.¹²⁹ This interplay was something of a microcosm of the entire Roman honour system. To understand precisely how this exchange functioned, we must therefore examine briefly the nature of honour in antiquity.

i. Roman Preoccupation with Public Honour

Jon Lendon describes life in the Roman world as a ‘ceaseless, restless quest for distinction in the eyes of one’s peers and of posterity’.¹³⁰ And ceaseless it was. The pursuit of honour was a cultural addiction driven by a tenacious and competitive aspiration for public approval. Plutarch describes the competitive and irrepressible lust for honour and praise that saturated the early empire:

[W]hen others are praised [ἐπαίνοις], our rivalry [τὸ φιλότιμον] erupts, as we said, into praise of self; it is seized with a certain barely controllable yearning and urge for glory [δόξαν] that stings and tickles like an itch, especially when the other is praised for something in which he is our equal or inferior. For just as in the hungry the sight of others eating makes the appetite sharper and keener, so the praise of others not far removed inflames with jealousy [τῆ ζήλοτυπία] those who are intemperate in seeking glory [δόξαν]. (*Mor.* 546c)

The rivalry (φιλοτιμία) about which Plutarch writes was not restricted to the privileged elite, but was endemic to all of Roman society. In Rome this pursuit of honour was, as Carlin Barton explains, ‘the fire in the bones’.¹³¹ Thus, Cicero’s famous motto: ‘To be equal to others in liberty, and first in honour’ (*Phil.* 1.34).

But honour was not an individualistic enterprise. In ancient Rome honour was a public pursuit, so that the honouree acquired his or her status only through community recognition. ‘Renown [*claritas*]’,¹³² remarked Seneca, ‘is the favourable opinion of good men; for just as reputation does not consist of one person’s remarks, and as ill repute does not consist of one person’s disapproval, so renown does not mean that we have merely pleased one good person. In order to constitute renown, the agreement of many distinguished and praiseworthy men is necessary’

¹²⁹ Andrew J. E. Bell, ‘Cicero and the Spectacle of Power’, *JRS* 87 (1997): 1-22, esp. 16-20.

¹³⁰ Lendon, *Honour*, 35.

¹³¹ Carlin A. Barton, *Roman Honor: The Fire in the Bones* (Berkeley: University of California Press, 2001).

¹³² A sampling of Greek and Latin terms belonging to the honour discourse are: δόξα/*gloria* (‘glory’/‘reputation’); τιμή/*honor* (‘honour’); ἔπαινος/*laus* (‘praise’). For a lengthier treatment, see Lendon, *Honour*, 272-79; David A. deSilva, *Honor, Patronage, Kinship & Purity: Unlocking New Testament Culture* (Downers Grove: IVP, 2000), 27-28.

(Ep. 102.8).¹³³ As Lendon explains, 'No quality was honourable in and of itself. Honour was mediated through the perceptions of others, and even a superfluity of worthy qualities was of no use unless these qualities were publicly known, and approved by other aristocrats'.¹³⁴ Thus, the pursuit of honour kept the typical Roman preoccupied with his or her public performance. Indeed, life in Rome was, as Henry Nguyen suggests, a 'grand spectacle'.¹³⁵

ii. Conferring Honour as Power

It is often recognised that in Rome the possession of honour implied the acquisition of power, since honour could be used to influence one's peers.¹³⁶ But it is not as often realised that the ability to *confer* honour also translated into power for the purveyor. Lendon, for instance, refers to the conferral of honour as 'power directed upwards'. While recognising that honour in the realm of Roman government 'contributed to the power of the rulers over the ruled', Lendon notes that honour also 'contributed to the power of the ruled over the rulers'.¹³⁷

This inversion of the power dynamic is perhaps most noticeable in the practice of deference in the realm of politics. Desiring to gain public approval as much as any other commodity, it was not uncommon in legislation for politicians to succumb to the wishes of the citizens when arriving at a decision. Lendon explains, 'A governor treated his subjects with deference not least because men . . . in whose hands his reputation lay, were watching. Appalling failures of deference on the part of governors attracted unfavourable attention, perhaps even a blistering speech from Libanius'.¹³⁸ And if conferring honour and shame was associated with the

¹³³ Sociologist J. A. Pitt-Rivers, 'Honor and Social Status', in *Honour and Shame: The Values of Mediterranean Society*, ed. J. G. Peristiany (London: Weidenfeld and Nicolson, 1965), 21-77, at 21, suggests, 'Honour is the value of a person in his own eyes, but also in the eyes of his society'. Cf. Bruce J. Malina, *The New Testament World: Insights from Cultural Anthropology* (Rev. ed.; Louisville: WJK, 1993), 31-33.

¹³⁴ Lendon, *Honour*, 37.

¹³⁵ V. Henry T. Nguyen, *Christian Identity in Corinth: A Comparative Study of 2 Corinthians, Epictetus and Valerius Maximus* (WUNT 2/243; Tübingen: Mohr Siebeck, 2008), 33.

¹³⁶ Honour manifests as power in a number of ways. See, e.g., Ramsay MacMullen, 'Personal Power in the Roman Empire', *American Journal of Philology* 107 (1986): 512-24; Peter Garnsey, *Social Status and Legal Privilege in the Roman Empire* (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1970); Richard P. Saller, *Personal Patronage under the Early Empire* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1982).

¹³⁷ Lendon, *Honour*, 24.

¹³⁸ Lendon, *Honour*, 204; cf. 230-34.

possession of power in the assembly, so it was in the ἀγορά as well. Dio Chrysostom explains:

If one were acquainted with spells learned from Medea or the Thessalians which were so potent that by uttering them he could make any one he pleased weep and suffer pain though confronted by no misfortune, would not his power [δύναμις] be regarded as tyranny [τυραννίς]? While, in dealing with one who has become puffed up by reputation [τὸν ἐπὶ δόξει καχαυνωμένον] there is none who does not have this power [ἰσχύν]; for by speaking two or three words you have plunged him into misery and anguish. (Or. 66.16-17)

It was, then, the vulnerability of persons to the pleasure of honour and pain of shame that provoked them to seek, at whatever cost, the approval of their peers.

It is also significant to observe that the power of reputation was often couched in judicial terms. In the public arena the honouree was considered the defendant and his peers functioned as the judge, jury, and witnesses. Bruce Malina appropriately remarks that ‘honor is all about the tribunal or court of public opinion and the reputation that court bestows’.¹³⁹ Lendon similarly suggests that, ‘A man’s honour was a public verdict on his qualities and standing’.¹⁴⁰ Dio Chrysostom explains:

Is not the trial concerning reputation [ὁ περὶ τῆς δόξης ἀγών] always in progress wherever there are men—that is, foolish men—not merely once a day but many times, and not before a definite panel of judges [δικασταῖς] but before all men without distinction, and, moreover, men not bound by oath, men without regard for either witnesses or evidence? For they sit in judgement [δικάζουσι] without either having knowledge of the case or listening to testimony or having been chosen by lot, and it makes no difference to them if they cast their vote at a drinking bout or at the bath and, most outrageous of all, he who to-day is acquitted [ἀπολύσει] to-morrow is condemned [καταδικάζει]. (Or. 66.18)

In the light of the evidence presented here, it is clear that in the Roman world the pursuit of honour and praise placed an individual in a position of need and social subjugation to his or her peers. Perceived as if they were on trial, it is not surprising that orators regularly found themselves in just such positions of vulnerability to the audiences from whom they coveted praise.

iii. Conferring Praise as Power in Oratory

Given the centrality of honour in the Roman world, it comes as no surprise that orators were among Rome’s most notorious ‘popularity-seekers’ (φιλοδόξοι). This preoccupation with honour is apparent throughout the writings of the moral

¹³⁹ Malina, *New Testament World*, 42.

¹⁴⁰ Lendon, *Honour*, 36. Barton, *Honor*, 212: ‘Calling on spectators—or judges, for they were inseparable notions in the Roman mind—of an oath or an action was a Roman’s way of saying, “Go ahead: put me in the spotlight. My words and my actions will stand the test of your scrutiny.” The presence of witnesses made every act into an ordeal’.

philosophers. Epictetus is but one who repeatedly and colourfully indicated how common it was for orators during the early empire to covet the praises of their audiences. In one monologue, for instance, after Epictetus asked his interlocutor about the benefits of being an orator, the interlocutor responded, ‘But praise me [ἀλλ’ ἐπαίνεσόν με]’, prompting Epictetus to enquire, ‘What do you mean by “praise”?’ The orator then explained, ‘Cry out to me, “Bravo!” or “Marvellous!”’ (*Diatr.* 3.23.23). The same preoccupation with praise surfaces in Epictetus’ instructions to orators before taking the stage. According to Epictetus, just before lecturing, the orator should ask himself, ‘Do you wish to do good or to be praised? [ὠφελῆσαι θέλεις ἢ ἐπαινεθῆναι;]’ (*Diatr.* 3.23.7). The question was, of course, rhetorical and supposed to remind the orator that his lecture ought to benefit his audience, not himself. But it also reveals for the historian how often ancient orators were enticed by their own ambition. Epictetus, in fact, considered ‘sorry’ (κακῶς) those orators who were found ‘gaping for the praises of men [χάσκων περὶ τοὺς ἐπαινέσοντας]’ and counting heads in their audiences (*Diatr.* 3.23.19). So pervasive was the preoccupation with honour among orators that Aristides considered himself to be one of only a few orators who lectured not for the sake of ‘wealth, reputation, honor, marriage, power, or any acquisition’, but because he genuinely loved speeches (*Or.* 33.19-20). The significant number of orators who were preoccupied with praise during the early empire is even more evident in the orations of Dio Chrysostom (e.g. *Or.* 32, 33, 35), who time and again distanced himself from the popular philosophers (e.g. sophists) due to their self-interest.

This lust for praise afforded spectators significant influence over orators before, during, and after a rhetorical performance. The fate of the orator, then, always rested in the hands of the audience, as it possessed the power to make or break the speaker’s reputation and even emotional stability.¹⁴¹ Epictetus, for

¹⁴¹ The power of the spectator is apparent in many areas of Roman society, especially politics. Bell, 'Cicero': 19, notes: 'Virtus was a key ideological quality and, because his career was short of military indications that he possessed it, Cicero had no recourse but to performance at a *contio* in order to record the popular approbation that warranted his claim. The Populus, therefore, had the power to make Cicero the sort of man he could never be on solely his own merits'. Gregory S. Aldrete, *Gestures and Acclamations in Ancient Rome* (Ancient Society and History; Baltimore: Johns Hopkins University Press, 1999), 154, explains that 'acclamations do not just confer authority, power, and legitimacy upon a ruler; they also bestow power upon those who give them'. Of course orators also used persuasion as a form of power over their audiences. Aristides says that if he were to declaim frequently, 'everything would be mine and under my spell' (*Or.* 33.4). For more on the interplay between the political orator and audience, see Robert Morstein-Marx, *Mass Oratory and Political Power in the Late Roman Republic* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2004), 119-59.

instance, alludes to the susceptibility of the orator to the emotional impact of an audience's response:

For why is it that the orator, although he knows that he has composed a good speech, has memorized what he has written and is bringing a pleasing voice to his task, is still anxious [ἔτι ἀγωνιᾷ] despite all that? Because he is not satisfied with the mere practice of oratory. What, then, does he want? He wants to be praised by his audience [ἐπαινεθῆναι ὑπὸ τῶν παρόντων]. Now he has trained himself with a view to being able to practise oratory, but he has not trained himself with reference to praise and blame [ἔπαινον δὲ καὶ ψόγον]. For when did he ever hear any one say what praise is, what blame is, and what is the nature of each? What kinds of praise are to be sought, and what kinds of blame are to be avoided? And when did he ever go through this course of training in accordance with these principles? Why, then, are you any longer surprised because he surpasses all others in the field in which he has studied, but in that in which he has not practised he is no better than the multitude? He is like a citharoede who knows how to play to the harp, sings well, has a beautiful flowing gown, and still trembles when he comes upon the stage; for all that has gone before he knows, but what a crowd is he does not know, nor what the shouting and the scornful laughter of a crowd are. Nay, he does not even know what this anxiety [τὸ ἀγωνιᾶν] itself is, whether it is something that we can control, or beyond our powers, whether he can stop it or not. That is why, if he is praised [ἐπαινεθῆ], he goes off the stage all puffed up; but if he is laughed to scorn, that poor windbag of his conceit is pricked and flattens out. (*Diatr.* 2.16.5-10)

Thus, the vulnerability of orators to praise and blame, honour and shame, positioned them beneath, as it were, the power of their critics. Although not dealing specifically with oratory, Dio Chrysostom remarks how desperately an individual might respond in order to meet the expectations of his audience:

Clearly, therefore, if a person is going to be exceedingly anxious to win the praise of the crowd as well [τοῦ παρὰ τῶν πολλῶν ἐπαίνου], believing that its praise or censure has more weight [κυριώτερον] than his own judgment, his every act and wish will be aimed to show himself the sort of person that the crowd expects [lit.: values; ἀξιοῦσιν οἱ πολλοί]. (*Or.* 77/78.24)

According to Dio, the individual—orator or otherwise—who adapts his performance due to his anxiety of the crowd is beneath their power.

The audience's power over the orator is also implied when the enterprise is portrayed in forensic terms. According to the Athenians, it was through speech (λόγος) that the public was able to appraise (δοκιμάζω) the wise (Isocrates, *Nic.* 6-7). In fact, the entire goal of rhetoric was to establish a judgment (κρίσις) and, therefore, every auditor of speeches was, as it were, a judge (κριτής) from whom the orator received a verdict (Aristotle, *Rhet.* 1377b2).¹⁴² This was also the perception of rhetoric under Roman rule and is perhaps no better exemplified than in Favorinus'

¹⁴² Aristotle continues, '[J]udgements are pronounced in deliberative rhetoric and judicial proceedings are a judgement—it is not only necessary to consider how to make the speech itself demonstrative and convincing [πιστός], but also that the speaker should show himself to be of a certain character and should know how to put the judge [τὸν κριτήν] into a certain frame of mind' (*Rhet.* 1377b2); 'Now the employment of persuasive speeches is directed towards a judgement [κρίσιν]; for when a thing is known and judged, there is no longer any need of argument. And there is judgement, whether a speaker addresses himself to a single individual and makes use of his speech to exhort or dissuade, as those do who give advice or try to persuade, for this single individual is equally a judge [κριτής], since, speaking generally, he who has to be persuaded is a judge [κριτής]' (1391b18).

Κορινθιακός. In the Corinthian Oration, Favorinus famously portrayed himself advocating for his missing statue as if it were on trial before the Corinthians. In an epideictic speech posing as an apology,¹⁴³ Favorinus blames the Corinthians for removing their statue of him:

Then supposing some such decree were to be passed in Corinth too, prescribing that statues should be subjected to an accounting [εὐθύνας]—or rather, if you please, supposing this to have been already decreed and a trial [ἀγώνος] to have been instituted—permit me, pray permit me, to make my plea before you in my own behalf as if in court [ἐν δικαστηρίῳ]. Gentlemen of the jury [ἄνδρες δικασταί], it is said that anything may be expected in the course of time; but he who stands before you is in jeopardy of first being set up [τεθῆναι] as the noblest [ἄριστος] among the Greeks and then being cast out [ἐκπεσεῖν] as the worst [πονηρότατος], all in a brief span of time. (Dio Chrysostom, *Or.* 37.22)

Courtroom language pervades much of this discourse (cf. 37.16). But even in this brief sampling, the repeated use of words from the δικ- root (δικαστήριον, δικαστής), the noun ἀγών for a generic trial,¹⁴⁴ and the technical term εὔθυνα for a calling to account,¹⁴⁵ definitely signal a forensic perspective. As L. Michael White has additionally demonstrated, τιθέναι and ἐκπίπτειν form a word-play, since both terms have architectural *and* legal connotations, further indicating that a trial scene is in view.¹⁴⁶ Moreover, it is significant for our purposes that Favorinus expressly acknowledges the power of the audience, as they possess the authority to pronounce nobility (ἄριστος) or villainy (πονηρότατος).

We could of course turn to additional examples of trial language in non-forensic speeches. But let us summarise so far. The use of forensic language was a familiar feature in ancient oratory and was used to convey the susceptibility of the speaker to the judgments of his audience. Furthermore, since oratory was caught up in the honour system of the early empire, the privilege to award praise or blame provided the audience a position of power over the orator that is often acknowledged even in the speech. With this context in view, let us return to 1 Corinthians 4 to evaluate how Paul portrays and responds to the interrogation of his jury, the Corinthian church.

¹⁴³ For Favorinus' rhetorical strategy, see Gleason, *Making Men*, 9; White, 'Favorinus', 69-71.

¹⁴⁴ Significantly, ἀγών can also denote an oratorical performance (e.g. Philostratus, *Vit. soph.* 526, 580, 601); cf. Whitmarsh, *Second Sophistic*, 39.

¹⁴⁵ See, e.g., Mogens Herman Hansen, *The Athenian Democracy in the Age of Demosthenes: Structure, Principles, and Ideology* (Norman: University of Oklahoma Press, 1999), 222-24; Roberts, *Accountability*, 17-18.

¹⁴⁶ White, 'Favorinus', 69-70.

b. The Rhetorical Function of Forensic Language in 1 Cor 4.1-5

It is within the context of oratorical verdicts as ‘power directed upwards’ that Paul portrays and ultimately rejects his Corinthian critics. In the following exposition we will demonstrate that Paul repudiates these criticisms by playing the Corinthians, as it were, at their own game. By representing the Corinthian evaluations as a judicial proceeding, Paul casts the church as an audience scrutinising his rhetorical ability, an entirely normal procedure in the world of declamations. But Paul is not a rhetor and he is therefore immune to these judgments. Instead, Paul is an *oikonomos* who is accountable and acquitted only by his κύριος. It is the Lord alone who will announce Paul’s verdict at his coming, and therefore the church must cease to judge him and the other apostles. In this way Paul mixes oratorical and administrative metaphors in order to express the absurdity of the church’s behaviour.

i. Forensic Language in 1 Cor 4.3-5

Paul’s use of forensic language begins in verses 3-5, where the presence of courtroom terminology is quite explicit.¹⁴⁷ Paul’s use of ἡμέρα in 4.3, for instance, is widely regarded as parallel to its use in 3.13 where Paul refers to the ‘Day’ of God’s eschatological judgment. From there it is no large step to observe that Paul uses the phrase ἀνθρωπίνης ἡμέρας to refer to an earthly tribunal; this phrase even refers to a judicial proceeding on an early Christian amulet.¹⁴⁸ The use of δικαίω for ‘acquittal’ (4.4) also clearly indicates that a courtroom motif is present in this pericope. Furthermore, the verb κρίνω (4.5) conveys the notion of reaching a legal verdict, as it does in 1 Corinthians 5-6 and elsewhere.

The verb ἀνακρίνω, which appears three times in this passage (4.3[2x], 4), is also a forensic term and alludes to a judicial proceeding. The verb ἀνακρίνειν can carry the meanings (i) ‘to question or examine’ generally (cf. Acts 17.11), and (ii) ‘to discern’ a matter of information, but it can also indicate (iii) ‘to scrutinise’ in a

¹⁴⁷ Kuck, *Judgment*, 197 n. 246, observes Paul’s abundant use of other kinds of evaluative terms in 4.2-5 (ζητεῖται, εὐρεθῆ, πιστός, σύννοια, φωτίσει, φανερώσει, ἔπαινος).

¹⁴⁸ Campbell Bonner, ‘A Reminiscence of Paul on a Coin Amulet’, *HTR* 43 (1950): 165-68, at 167.

judicial hearing.¹⁴⁹ The verb, in fact, was used the latter way in Greek literature to refer to the performance of a preliminary judicial interrogation, the ἀνακρίσις.¹⁵⁰ The verb surfaces in numerous Lucan courtroom accounts referring to just such a pre-trial hearing (Luke 23.14, Acts 4.9; 12.19; 24.8; 28.18),¹⁵¹ and the noun ἀνακρίσις is used this way in Acts when Festus explains why he sent Paul before King Agrippa: ‘I have nothing definite to write to our sovereign about him [Paul]. Therefore I have brought him before all of you, and especially before you, King Agrippa, so that, after we have examined him [τῆς ἀνακρίσεως γενομένης], I may have something to write’ (Acts 25.26 [NRSV]).¹⁵²

In Paul ἀνακρίνω appears only in 1 Corinthians, where it appears no less than ten times (2.14, 15[2x]; 4.3[2x], 4; 9.3; 10.25, 27; 14.24) and in a forensic sense in at least 9.3, 4.3-4, and probably in 2.15. Based, therefore, on the legal connotations of ἀνακρίνω along with the other forensic terms from 4.3-5, it is clear that Paul was portraying himself to be in a preliminary hearing (ἀνακρίσις) before the Corinthian church. Moreover, in light of the oratorical context sketched above, it is plausible that Paul’s use of forensic language in 4.1-5 draws on the conventional perception of an oration as a miniature trial. In 4.3-5, then, the Corinthians are portrayed as spectators/jurors who were evaluating the ministry of Paul, the orator/defendant.

ii. The Rhetorical Function of the Trial Scene

Due to the fact that Paul’s primary ministerial responsibility in this and several earlier texts is the faithful communication of the mysteries of God (4.1-2; cf. 1.17; 2.1-5, 6-7, 13; 3.2, 5, 10), the church’s evaluations of Paul were probably

¹⁴⁹ LSJ implies the high frequency of this judicial sense when it provides for its most basic definition ‘*examine closely, interrogate, esp. judicially*’.

¹⁵⁰ See, e.g., Isaeus 5.32; Andocides 1.101; Demosthenes 48.31; Aristotle, *Ath. pol.* 56.6; SIG 953.46; Josephus, *Ant.* 17.131; Sus 45-51; A. R. W. Harrison, *The Law of Athens* (vol. 2; Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1971), 94-105; Douglas M. MacDowell, *The Law in Classical Athens* (Aspects of Greek and Roman Life; London: Thames and Hudson, 1978), 240-43.

¹⁵¹ Allison A. Trites, ‘The Importance of Legal Scenes and Language in the Book of Acts’, *NovT* 16 (1974): 278-84, at 279, observes that ἀνακρίνω is used in Acts by Jewish (4.9) and Roman officials (24.8; 23.14) in order to demonstrate that ‘both Paul and the Jerusalem apostles work in an atmosphere of hostility and contention’.

¹⁵² Cf. Trites, ‘Legal Scenes’: 282. Despite Luke’s repeated use of ἀνακρίνω and ἀνακρίσις throughout his narrative, scholars have paid surprisingly little attention to these occurrences; cf. H. W. Tajra, *The Trial of St. Paul: A Juridical Exegesis of the Second Half of the Acts of the Apostles* (WUNT 2/35; Tübingen: J.C.B. Mohr [Paul Siebeck], 1989), 124, 185.

targeting his oratorical ability.¹⁵³ As one whose bodily presence was weak, and whose speech was contemptible (2 Cor 10.10), this evaluation was probably more of a shameful critique. As Dahl contends,

From the statement, 'With me it is a very small thing that I should be judged by you or by any human court' (4:3), we may safely infer that some kind of criticism of Paul has been voiced at Corinth. And it is not difficult to find out what the main content of this criticism must have been. That becomes evident in phrases like, 'Not with eloquent wisdom' (οὐκ ἐν σοφίᾳ λόγου, 1:17), 'Not in lofty words of wisdom' (οὐ καθ' ὑπεροχὴν λόγου ἢ σοφίας, 2:1), 'Not in persuasiveness of wisdom' (οὐκ ἐν πειθοῖ σοφίας, 2:4), 'Milk, not solid food' (γάλα. . . οὐ βρωμα, 3:2).¹⁵⁴

In this statement Dahl correctly observes that Paul's seemingly amateurish oratorical skill is the subject of the church's criticisms here as well as earlier in the letter.¹⁵⁵ Litfin explains, 'These status-conscious Corinthians apparently harbored few reservations about rendering a negative judgment of Paul's abilities as a speaker. They perceived the wandering Jewish Apostle in this respect in much the same light as they perceived other itinerant speakers: as fair game for their evaluations'.¹⁵⁶ As observed from our sketch about oratory and honour, an audience's praise or blame could make or break an orator, both professionally and emotionally. Paul, therefore, portrays the Corinthian interrogation as if the church attempted to wield power over him. Whether this power was wielded intentionally or incidentally, the gesture itself was, in his view, quite out place.

But Paul's response is telling. For Paul, the evaluations of the church (ὕψ' ὑμῶν), a Roman court (ὕπὸ ἀνθρωπίνης ἡμέρας), even himself (ἐμαυτόν), are of no consequence (4.3).¹⁵⁷ When it comes to worldly opinions about his ministry, Paul is completely indifferent; as 4.3 indicates, he did not care in the least (ἐμοὶ δὲ εἰς ἐλάχιστόν ἐστιν). As an *oikonomos* of Christ, no opinion mattered other than that of his κύριος, since Christ is the one who would ultimately acquit him at the final

¹⁵³ Welborn, 'Discord': 107, states that 'Paul's language in 4:1-5 leaves little doubt that his opponents sought to "examine" his credentials in quasi-judicial proceedings'. But Paul's language cannot be taken literally, as Welborn seems to suggest. The Corinthians neither had nor intended to examine Paul in an actual hearing. Paul's metaphor reflects only his portrayal of a power struggle and is almost certainly not how it was actually devised by the Corinthians; cf. Robertson and Plummer, *First Corinthians*, 75-76; Hans Lietzmann and Werner George Kümmel, *An die Korinther I/II* (3. Aufl. ed.; HNT 9; Tübingen: J.C.B. Mohr (Paul Siebeck), 1969), 18.

¹⁵⁴ Dahl, 'Corinth', 321.

¹⁵⁵ Moreover, Dahl perceptively notices the thematic links between Paul's earlier 'conclusion sections', where he explains his *modus operandi* (2.1-5; 3.1-4), and this 'conclusion section', where he finally addresses and ultimately dismisses the Corinthian evaluations as of no consequence to him.

¹⁵⁶ Litfin, *Proclamation*, 163.

¹⁵⁷ Paul is mainly concerned here with the criticisms of the church, rather than a secular court or his conscience. But since oratory was often practiced and evaluated in court, the reference to a human tribunal confirms that Paul's oratorical ability is in view. For Paul's examination of his own conscience in 4.3 as it relates to the matter of unrecognized sin, see Chester, *Conversion at Corinth: Perspectives on Conversion in Paul's Theology and the Corinthian Church*, 195-202.

judgment (4.5).¹⁵⁸ As he articulates elsewhere, ‘Who are you to pass judgment on servants of another? It is before their own lord that they stand or fall [σὺ τίς εἶ ὁ κρίνων ἀλλότριον οἰκέτην; τῷ ἰδίῳ κυρίῳ στήκει ἢ πίπτει]’ (Rom 14.4 [NRSV]).¹⁵⁹ It is in this manner that Paul objects to Corinthian interrogations, for as God’s agent he was responsible to God alone. Paul is to be found faithful in the eyes of his master (1 Cor 4.2) and any alternative pursuit of approval would mean that he was serving another Lord (Gal 1.10).

Paul makes a similar plea in 1 Thess 2.3-6, where he expresses his utter indifference toward popular opinion and the church’s evaluation of his preaching.¹⁶⁰ There Paul insists:

[O]ur appeal [παράκλησις] does not spring from deceit or impure motives or trickery, but just as we have been approved by God to be entrusted the gospel [δεδοκιμάσαμεθα ὑπὸ τοῦ θεοῦ πιστευθῆναι τὸ εὐαγγέλιον], so we speak, not to please people, but to please God who tests our hearts [λαλοῦμεν οὐχ ὡς ἄνθρωποις ἀρέσκοντες ἀλλὰ θεῷ τῷ δοκιμάζοντι τὰς καρδίας ἡμῶν]. As you know and as God is our witness [μάρτυς], we never came with words of flattery or with a pretext for greed; nor did we seek praise from people [ζητοῦντες ἐξ ἀνθρώπων δόξαν], whether from you or from others’.

Although the congruencies in these texts are occasionally inverted—for instance, Paul dismisses ecclesial evaluations in 1 Cor 4.3-5, but submits to God’s testing in 1 Thess 2.4—they are many and are often explicit.¹⁶¹ Most significant for our purposes is that Paul expresses as the sole objective of his preaching ministry the pleasure of God, rather than the pleasure (ἀρέσκω) and glory (δόξα) of humans. While he does not say so as strongly as he does in 1 Cor 4.3, Paul wholly discounts the evaluations of his rhetorical skill by his audiences,¹⁶² seeking instead divine approval of his

¹⁵⁸ Léon-Dufour, 'Jugement', 144: 'Le verset 5 radicalise et justifie le devoir de ne pas juger'.

¹⁵⁹ Hays, *First Corinthians*, 67.

¹⁶⁰ For 1 Thess 2.1-12 as a defense, Seyoon Kim, 'Paul's Entry (εἴσοδος) and the Thessalonians' Faith (1 Thessalonians 1-3)', *NTS* 51 (2005): 519-42; Jeffrey A. D. Weima, 'An Apology for the Apologetic Function of 1 Thessalonians 2.1-12', *JSNT* 68 (1997): 73-99; John M. G. Barclay, 'Conflict in Thessalonica', *CBQ* 55 (1993): 512-30, at 513; Walter Schmithals, *Paul & the Gnostics* (trans. John E. Steely; Nashville: Abingdon Press, 1972), 137-38. *Contra* Abraham J. Malherbe, "'Gentle as a Nurse": The Cynic Background to 1 Thess ii', *NovT* 12 (1970): 203-17. See also Karl P. Donfried and Johannes Beutler, eds., *The Thessalonians Debate: Methodological Discord or Methodological Synthesis?* (Grand Rapids: Eerdmans, 2000), 3-131.

¹⁶¹ Of particular significance for our study are the following parallels: (i) the seemingly equivalent images οἰκονόμους μυστηρίων θεοῦ (1 Cor 4.1) and πιστευθῆναι τὸ εὐαγγέλιον (1 Thess 2.4; cf. οἰκονομίαν πεπίστευμαι in 1 Cor 9.17); (ii) the repetition of forensic language (ἀνακρίνω, ἡμέρα, κρίνω [1 Cor 4.3-5]; δοκιμάζω, μάρτυς [1 Thess 2.4-5]); (iii) the use of ζητέω (1 Cor 4.2; 1 Thess 2.6); (iv) the ambiguous reference to believers as ἄνθρωποι (1 Cor 4.1; 1 Thess 2.4, 6); (v) the use of καρδιά as the source of Paul’s qualification (1 Cor 4.5; 1 Thess 2.4); (vi) the emphasis on the internal dimensions of Paul’s ministry (πιστός, τὰ κρυπτὰ τοῦ σκότους, τὰς βουλάς τῶν καρδιῶν [1 Cor 4.2, 5]; πλάνη, ἀκαθαρσία, δόλος [1 Thess 2.3]); (vii) the use of praise/honour as a ministerial incentive (ἔπαινος in 1 Cor 4.5; δόξα in 1 Thess 2.6).

¹⁶² It is striking that Paul refers to his preaching with the verb λαλέω (cf. 1 Cor 2.6-7, 13). He indicates that he seeks not to please men with his eloquence and tone, but to please God by simply

motivations (καρδία). This objective is established by the fact that God is the one who has tested and equipped (δοκιμάζω, πιστεύω [2.4a]) Paul for apostolic ministry and is the one who ultimately will call him to account (δοκιμάζω [2.4b]).¹⁶³

Paul's stern rebuke in 1 Cor 4.1-5, then, is his response to what he perceived to be a power play on the part of the Corinthians. Their criticisms of Paul as Christ's agent were an implicit attempt to usurp the exclusive authority of God over the apostle. As Richard Hays summarises, 'Paul's point is simply that they [the Corinthians] have arrogated to themselves the right to pass judgment on his work in a way that is inappropriate to their position and impossible for any human being on this side of the *parousia*'.¹⁶⁴ At that eschatological hearing, Christ will not consider the apostle's eloquence, physical presence, or any tangible marker of ministerial success, as do the Corinthians. Only the apostle's internal qualities will matter, for all of his secret motivations will be laid bare (φωτίσει τὰ κρυπτὰ τοῦ σκότους) as Christ alone searches the apostle's heart (φανερώσει τὰς βουλάς τῶν καρδιῶν [4.5]). This will ensure that Paul's chief ambition is faithful compliance to the commission entrusted to him by God (4.2). And only after being acquitted will Paul then receive his grand reception of praise (ἔπαινος; cf. Luke 16.8; Xenophon, *Oec.* 13.9, 12), this time not from a worldly audience, but from God.¹⁶⁵

heralding the gospel. Thus, just as in 1 Corinthians, Paul's concern is to distance his *modus operandi* from that of popular philosophers and sophists; cf. Bruce W. Winter, 'The Entries and Ethics of Orators and Paul (1 Thessalonians 2:1-12)', *TynBul* 44 (1993): 55-74.

¹⁶³ Abraham J. Malherbe, *The Letters to the Thessalonians: A New Translation with Introduction and Commentary* (AYB 32b; New York: Doubleday, 2000), 141 suggests that Paul's use of δοκιμάζω stems from the OT tradition of prophetic testing (e.g. Jer 11.20; 12.3; 17.10; 20.12; Psalm 17.3). But it could be that Paul had a Graeco-Roman forensic setting in view; cf. Aeschines, *Ctes.* 3.15; Earl J. Richard, *First and Second Thessalonians* (Sacra Pagina 11; Collegeville, MN: Liturgical Press, 1995), 96; Weima, 'Apology': 84.

¹⁶⁴ Hays, *First Corinthians*, 67. Many commentators suggest that Paul was criticising the church's *inability* to judge others due to their ignorance of the individual heart and its private motivations. But while the fallibility of human assessment may be a factor, once the power connotations of a courtroom scrutiny are realised, it is clear that Paul believed that the Corinthians also lacked the *authority* to judge him. As Kuck, *Judgment*, 221, remarks, 'Paul's admonition not to judge is warranted by his appeal to the higher court of God's judgment. The contrast is not only, or even primarily, between present and future judgment. It is more a matter of *who does the judgment*: Christians are ultimately accountable to God, not to one another, for their work is assigned and empowered by God' (emphasis added). Cf. Calvin J. Roetzel, *Judgment in the Community: A Study of the Relationship Between Eschatology and Ecclesiology in Paul* (Leiden: Brill, 1972), 168; *contra* Thiselton, *First Corinthians*, 341.

¹⁶⁵ Kuck, *Judgment*, 208: '[ἔπαινος] is parallel to μισθός (3:8 and 14) in that it expresses the thought of individually appropriate rewards, not just corporate salvation'.

C. Summary

In this chapter we addressed a number of social-historical, exegetical, and theological issues central to the interpretation of 1 Corinthians 1-4. It was initially argued that, despite the resistance of many recent interpreters, Paul's rhetoric in the first four chapters of the letter betray various features of apologetic. Based on the application of certain fundamental mirror-reading principles, a case was made that Paul at least perceived his apostolic authority to be the subject of criticism in the Corinthian church. Furthermore, we have shown that 1 Cor 4.1-5 is an integral unit in the rhetorical strategy of the early part of Paul's letter. In this brief passage Paul aims to eliminate several ecclesial and ethical shortcomings plaguing the Corinthians. As Jouette Bassler astutely observes, 'Paul thus had two serious problems to address—a general *overvaluation* of human leadership in the community and a criticism or *undervaluation* (by some) of his own ministry and gospel. Furthermore, he had to address these problems in such a way that his solution to one did not exacerbate the other'.¹⁶⁶ It has been our contention here that Paul sought to resolve this dilemma by portraying himself and all apostles as God's *oikonomoi*, thereby attributing to them certain social and structural characteristics that enabled him to negotiate the risky terrain of simultaneously diminishing *and* defending his apostleship. By casting apostles as legally inferior, status-depleted subordinates as well as divinely authorised, critically immune administrators, Paul seeks to censure the Corinthians for their inappropriate, power-implicit evaluations—and thus to reaffirm his own apostolic ethos—without also providing them additional grounds for adulating their leaders. For Paul, then, the apostle as *oikonomos* is a rhetorically ingenious, yet culturally subversive image, having both the contextual relevance to resonate with the community and the connotative diversity to serve its multi-purpose deployment.

¹⁶⁶ Bassler, '1 Corinthians 4:1-5': 180 (emphasis added).

Chapter 7. Interpreting Paul's Metaphor in 1 Corinthians 9.16-23

As we have seen from Chapter 6, Paul utilised the image of the private administrator in 1 Cor 4.1-5 to illumine various misunderstood features of his apostleship. Among those features were Paul's location within the ecclesial hierarchy, his responsibility to preach the gospel, his indifference toward popular opinion, and his expectation to be found faithful and praiseworthy before Christ at his coming. What was striking about the metaphor, however, was its ability to negotiate Paul's status as a person of authority while also portraying him as a person of relative insignificance in comparison to God/Christ. In 1 Corinthians 9 Paul offers a similar portrayal of his apostolic role, but this time for a different purpose. The need has arisen again to clarify certain misunderstood aspects of his apostleship, not least his apostolic authority,¹ but in this instance he does so in order to explain how it is that he has the right to receive financial support from the Corinthian church while simultaneously being compelled to minister as an apostle. The metaphor of administration is cast once more, but the characteristics of apostleship that the image conveys are more veiled this time around.

In this chapter, therefore, we will apply what we know about first-century private commercial administration to Paul's discourse in 1 Corinthians 9 in order (i) to elucidate the apostle's logic and the message of the discourse, and (ii) to further our understanding of Pauline apostleship. But before we do so, we will briefly examine the rhetorical and socio-religious contexts of 1 Cor 8.1-11.1 in order to situate 9.1-27 appropriately. Next, the text will be analysed, certain exegetical cruxes treated, and a general profile of Paul's apostleship constructed.

A. The Rhetorical Context of 1 Corinthians 9

The rhetorical strategy of 1 Corinthians 9 has long been a matter of dispute in modern scholarship. Many have argued that the chapter is a digression whereby Paul defends his apostolic right to receive and refuse material support from churches which benefit from his preaching in order to ward off criticisms directed

¹ Dunn, *Theology*, 577, regards 1 Corinthians 9 as 'Paul's most sustained exposition of how he conceived of his authority (*exousia*)'.

toward him for having plied a trade.² According to adherents of this position, criticisms of Paul's apostolic lifestyle were not voiced from the entire church, as there remained some in the congregation who were 'of Paul' (1.12; 3.4, 22). Nevertheless, certain believers who would have preferred to support Paul financially—as they did Apollos and other itinerant teachers—were accusing Paul of lacking what they considered to be an appropriate apostolic ethos and his apostolic authority was jeopardised as a result. In his response to the Corinthians, Paul therefore offered a defence of his apostleship (9.3), his rights as an apostle (9.6-8), and his decision to lay those rights aside for the benefit of certain persons in the community (9.12, 15, 19).

This approach to Paul's rhetorical strategy is to be commended for its ability to explain the use of such explicit forensic language as ἀπολογία and τοῖς ἐμὲ ἀνακρίνουσιν (9.3). Moreover, this view adequately handles the vigor of the rhetoric in verses 1-14 as well as the sheer length of the interruption, which points to the existence of real tension between the apostle and the church.³ Further, the reappearance of certain themes reminiscent of 1 Corinthians 1-4—which was argued earlier to contain a defensive posture—suggests that 1 Corinthians 9 revisits some of the apologetic elements addressed earlier in the letter.⁴ On the other hand, this position fails to explain adequately the chapter's relationship with those which frame it (chs 8 and 10), making for a harsh transition and an out of place digression in the middle of a significant dispute within the community. Further, if 8.1-11.1 forms a unified section, as most scholars recognise, and Paul's concluding admonition instructs the church to imitate him as he imitates Christ (11.1), then

² Supporters of this position often recognise a secondary deliberative function of this passage. Still, they normally prioritise Paul's apologetic intention. See, e.g., Barrett, *First Corinthians*, 200; Conzelmann, *1 Corinthians*, 151-53; Fee, *First Corinthians*, 393; Horsley, *1 Corinthians*, 124; Winter, *Sophists*, 166; Fitzmyer, *First Corinthians*, 353. Some advocates of this position have argued that all or part of the apologetic interruption is actually an interpolation; cf. Weiß, *Der erste Korintherbrief*, 231-34; Jean Héring, *The First Epistle of Saint Paul to the Corinthians* (trans. A. W. Heathcote and P. J. Allcock; London: Epworth, 1962), 75; Walter Schmithals, *Gnosticism in Corinth: An Investigation of the Letters to the Corinthians* (trans. John E. Steely; Nashville: Abingdon, 1971), 92-93. Wilhelm Wuellner, 'Where is Rhetorical Criticism Taking Us?', *CBQ* 49 (1987): 448-63, and Vernon K. Robbins, *The Tapestry of Early Christian Discourse: Rhetoric, Society, and Ideology* (London: Routledge, 1996), 88-89, regard the passage as featuring a mixture of forensic and epideictic rhetoric.

³ Barrett, *First Corinthians*, 200: 'Paul would hardly have spent so long on the question of apostolic rights if his own apostolic status had not been questioned in Corinth'.

⁴ For the thematic parallels between 1 Corinthians 4 and 9, see E. Coye Still III, 'Divisions over Leaders and Food Offered to Idols: The Parallel Thematic Structures of 1 Corinthians 4:6-21 and 8:1-11:1', *TynBul* 55 (2004): 17-41; Richard Liong-Seng Phua, *Idolatry and Authority: A Study of 1 Corinthians 8.1-11.1 in the Light of the Jewish Diaspora* (LNTS 299; London: T&T Clark, 2005), 179-85.

Paul's appeal for imitation must refer to 9.1-27, since he nowhere else in those three chapters provides a personal example to follow. Finally, the overlapping themes between chapter 8, 9, and 10 seem to suggest that chapter 9 has a more organic relationship with its neighbours than this position would otherwise permit.

Given the shortcomings of the strictly apologetic interpretation of 1 Corinthians 9, a number of authors contend that Paul situated chapter 9 between chapters 8 and 10 for the sole purpose of offering an *exemplum* of self-sacrifice.⁵ From this perspective, Paul's hypothetical refusal to eat idol meat in 8.13 functions to transition the discourse to 9.1, where he authors a fictitious defence of his rights as an apostle in order to demonstrate that he has given them up for the benefit of the church and the progress of the gospel. The example is particularly presented for the benefit of those 'strong' Corinthians whose theological astuteness has enabled them to justify their participation in certain pagan meals. But these practices, while theologically defensible, have proved ecclesially destructive, as certain 'weak' believers have emulated the behaviour of the strong by also participating in pagan meals, which consequently wounded their consciences. In chapter 8, then, Paul exhorts the strong in the church to forgo their right to eat idol meat, and in chapter 9 provides an example of self-sacrifice which the strong should follow.

This position gives appropriate attention to the thematic parallels between chapter 9 and chapters 8 and 10. It fails, however, to take seriously the element of defence that is apparent both in earlier parts of the letter and in chapter 9. While it is plausible that most of Paul's original readers were in full agreement with the case he constructs in 9.1-14, it is also true—as many scholars suggest—that Paul's refusal of rights could, and probably did, elicit objections from those who disapproved of him plying a trade. Many supporters of this position deny that 1 Corinthians betrays any indication that disputes had already risen about the authority of Paul's apostleship or that objections had been made about his refusal of financial support when Paul wrote the letter.⁶ However, the fact that the important topics in 1 Corinthians 9 were already a matter of heated polemic in 4.10-13, and eventually

⁵ See, e.g., Robertson and Plummer, *First Corinthians*, 176, 179; Joachim Jeremias, 'Chiasmus in den Paulusbriefen', *ZNW* 49 (1958): 145-56, at 156; Wendell L. Willis, 'An Apostolic Apologia? The Form and Function of 1 Corinthians 9', *JSNT* 24 (1985): 33-48; Mitchell, *Reconciliation*, 246; Witherington III, *Conflict*, 203; Joop Smit, 'The Rhetorical Disposition of First Corinthians 8:7-9:27', *CBQ* 59 (1997): 476-91, at 478; Thiselton, *First Corinthians*, 666-67; David E. Garland, *1 Corinthians* (BECNT; Grand Rapids: Baker, 2003), 404-406; Galloway, *Freedom*, 152.

⁶ Mitchell, *Reconciliation*, 246.

became a matter of open dispute in 2 Corinthians 10-13, supports the plausibility of at least some criticism of Paul's policy at an early period in his relationship with the church.

Having, therefore, considered the individual viability of both positions on Paul's rhetorical strategy, it is likely that 1 Corinthians 9 serves not one, but two rhetorical purposes: in 1 Corinthians 9 Paul seeks to demonstrate through personal example how believers should love and edify one another at one's own expense, and also to defend his refusal of a wage by explaining, albeit quite inexplicitly, his policy of material support.⁷

B. The Socio-Religious Context of 1 Corinthians 9

Few clues in the text offer any explanation for the precise socio-religious context responsible for giving rise to the conflicts addressed in 1 Cor 8.1-11.1.⁸ This, however, has not prevented scholars from hypothesising about the actual circumstances to which Paul's discourse is addressed. Given, for example, Paul's references to idolatry (8.4-6; 9.13; 10.14, 18-22), athletics (9.24-27; 10.7), and civic law (10.23) all within this individual rhetorical proof, Bruce Winter has quite insightfully suggested that this interchurch conflict was provoked by the Isthmian Games, specifically the presidential temple banquets which accompanied the contests.⁹

⁷ See, e.g., F. W. Grosheide, *The First Epistle to the Corinthians* (NICNT; Grand Rapids: Eerdmans, 1953), 202; Schmithals, *Gnosticism*, 92; David L. Dungan, *The Sayings of Jesus in the Churches of Paul: The Use of the Synoptic Tradition in the Regulation of Early Church Life* (Oxford: Blackwell, 1971), 5-6; William F. Orr and James Arthur Walther, *1 Corinthians: A New Translation with Introduction and Commentary* (AYB 32; Garden City, NY: Doubleday, 1976), 240; Hock, *Social Context*, 60-61; Marshall, *Enmity*, 283-84; Martin, *Slavery*, 83; Paul Douglas Gardner, *The Gifts of God and the Authentication of a Christian: An Exegetical Study of 1 Corinthians 8-11:1* (Lanham, MD: University Press of America, 1994), 67-68; Hays, *First Corinthians*, 146; Horrell, *Social Ethos*, 205; Lehmeier, *Oikonomia*, 241; Robinson Butarbutar, *Paul and Conflict Resolution: An Exegetical Study of Paul's Apostolic Paradigm in 1 Corinthians 9* (Paternoster Biblical Monographs; Milton Keynes, England: Paternoster, 2007), 109.

⁸ For a review of scholarly research on the socio-religious context of 1 Cor 8.1-11.1, see John Fotopoulos, *Food Offered to Idols in Roman Corinth: A Social-Rhetorical Reconsideration of 1 Corinthians 8:1-11:1* (WUNT 2/151; Tübingen: Mohr Siebeck, 2003), 1-48. See also, e.g., Wendell L. Willis, *Idol Meat in Corinth: The Pauline Argument in 1 Corinthians 8 and 10* (SBLDS 68; Chico, CA: Scholars Press, 1985); Derek Newton, *Deity and Diet: The Dilemma of Sacrificial Food at Corinth* (JSNTSup 169; Sheffield: Sheffield University Press, 1998); Alex T. Cheung, *Idol Food in Corinth: Jewish Background and Pauline Legacy* (JSNTSup 176; Sheffield: Sheffield Academic Press, 1999); Phua, *Idolatry*, 29-125.

⁹ Winter, *Welfare*, 166-77. Winter further argues that ἡ ἐξουσία ὑμῶν αὐτῆ (8.9) refers to 'a civic privilege which entitled Corinthian citizens to dine on "civic" occasions in a temple' (166); cf. Winter, *Corinth*, 280-82; Butarbutar, *Conflict Resolution*, 109. But as observed by David G. Horrell, *Solidarity and Difference: A Contemporary Reading of Paul's Ethics* (London: T&T Clark, 2005), 173, the

But while many of the hypotheses proposed by Winter and other interpreters are certainly possible, Paul simply provides the non-Corinthian reader too little information to be sure about what specific civic and religious events in the colony gave rise to the quarrel. In fact, it seems reasonably clear that Paul was addressing an ethical dilemma that was known to surface somewhat routinely. According to the discourse, the Corinthians encountered food offered to idols in venues that were specifically pagan (ἐν εἰδωλείῳ [8.10]; τραπέζης δαιμονίων [10.21]), commercial (ἐν μακέλλῳ, 10.25), and domestic (εἴ τις καλεῖ ὑμᾶς τῶν ἀπίστων [10.27]). It is therefore unnecessary to isolate a single occasion that gave rise to these particular conflicts, since Paul may have been addressing a rather ubiquitous problem about which there are simply too many unknown factors.

What is known, however, is that certain meals provided theologically astute believers the opportunity to eat sacrificed meat, and the exercise of this right applied undue pressure onto those believers who would not have ordinarily participated in such meals. According to Paul, when this pressure causes an individual to behave beyond the integrity of their own conscience, they become ruined (ἀπόλλυμι [8.11]). Paul considers such negative influence to be a sin against the weaker believer and indeed sin against Christ (8.12). And because of the severity of these consequences, Paul professes that, if eating meat offered to idols caused another believer to stumble, he would go so far as never to eat meat offered to idols again (8.13).

C. Paul's Defense and Refusal of His Right to a Wage (9.1-15)

After declaring that he would never eat meat again if it offended another believer (8.13), Paul begins his discourse in 9.1-27 by affirming his apostolic rights. The affirmation comes in the form of no less than seventeen rhetorical questions spanning 9.1-13.¹⁰ The opening question is one of the most perplexing. Paul asks simply, 'Am I not free?' (οὐκ εἰμὶ ἐλεύθερος [9.1a]). The kind of freedom that Paul has in view is debated in modern scholarship, because Paul uses the notion of

'rights' asserted by the Corinthians seem to have been such on the basis of theological legitimation, rather than civic privilege.

¹⁰ Fitzmyer, *First Corinthians*, 355.

freedom in several different ways in his letters.¹¹ But based on the series of questions in verses 4-13, and the way that Paul contrasts freedom and slavery in verses 16-17 and 19, he probably has in view the freedom to exercise certain rights as an apostle. Through his next question Paul therefore aims to affirm his apostolic legitimacy: 'Am I not an apostle?' (οὐκ εἰμὶ ἀπόστολος [9.1b]). Paul then grounds his apostleship in two propositions: he has seen the risen Christ (9.1c), and he is responsible for the conversion of the Corinthian believers (9.1d-2).

After having established the legitimacy of his apostleship in verses 1-2, in verse 3 Paul enters into a lengthy defense of his apostolic rights. Each question in verses 4-13 aims to reveal the material privileges that accompanied various kinds of labour, all of which demonstrate that apostles too have the right to be supported financially for their service. Indeed, just as a soldier does not serve in the military furnishing his own meals, or a vineyard worker labour without eating his own fruit, or a shepherd without access to the flock's milk (9.7), or a threshing ox without eating grain (9.9-10), or a priest without sharing in the temple sacrifices (9.13), so neither should an apostle preach the gospel without the opportunity to receive material support from those to whom he ministers (9.11-12a).¹² The Lord, in fact, commanded (διατάσσω) that apostles live off of the gospel (9.14).¹³ But after having made a case for his possession of certain inalienable rights, Paul twice insists that he has not used any of those rights (9.12a, 15a). The grounds for Paul's twin refusals, in addition to being central to the aim of the chapter, eventually direct Paul to use the *oikonomos* (*oikonomia*) metaphor and therefore must be explained in some detail.

¹¹ See, e.g., Hock, *Social Context*, 60; Galloway, *Freedom*, 155-80. Cf. Hans Dieter Betz, 'Paul's Concept of Freedom in the Context of Hellenistic Discussions about the Possibilities of Human Freedom', in *Paulinische Studien* (Tübingen: J.C.B. Mohr [Paul Siebeck], 1994), 110-25.

¹² For closer treatments of Paul's analogies, see, e.g., Chrys C. Caragounis, 'ὉΨΩΝΙΟΝ: A Reconsideration of Its Meaning', *NovT* 16 (1974): 35-57, at 51-52; David Instone-Brewer, '1 Corinthians 9.9-11: A Literal Interpretation of "Do Not Muzzle the Ox"', *NTS* 38 (1992): 554-65; Peter Richardson, 'Temples, Altars and Living from the Gospel (1 Cor. 9.12b-18)', in *Gospel in Paul: Studies on Corinthians, Galatians and Romans for Richard N. Longenecker*, ed. L. Ann Jervis and Peter Richardson (JSNTSup 108; Sheffield: Sheffield Academic Press, 1994), 89-110.

¹³ Paul may have been referring to Matt 10.10 or Luke 10.7. Dungan, *Sayings*, 79-80, and Martin, *Slavery*, 69, suggest the former. David G. Horrell, '"The Lord commanded... but I have not used...": Exegetical and Hermeneutical Reflections on 1 Cor 9.14-15', *NTS* 43 (1997): 587-603, at 595, says, 'It is just as likely that Paul is alluding to (some form of) this whole block of instruction as that the proverb "the worker is worthy of his wage" alone is in view'.

1. Grounds for Refusal #1: An ‘Obstacle’

In his first refusal, Paul states that he has not made use of his right to receive material support (οὐκ ἐχρησάμεθα τῇ ἐξουσίᾳ ταύτῃ [9.12a]) because he would rather endure the hardships and meagerly wages of manual labour than in any way place an obstacle (ἐγκοπὴ) in the way of the gospel of Christ (9.12b). The precise nature of the obstacle that Paul sought to avoid placing remains ambiguous, but nevertheless deserves some explanation. We can assume that some similarities existed between the example he offers in chapter 9 and the conflict he sought to extinguish in chapter 8. In the earlier scenario, certain believers with weak consciences were avoiding food offered to idols (8.7). Paul therefore exhorted those with strong consciences—those who did *not* avoid idol food—to forgo their right (ἐξουσία) to eat idol food so that their right would not become a hindrance (πρόσκομμα) for weaker believers (8.9). Assuming that the presentation of Paul’s *exemplum* in chapter 9 was modeled after the conflict between the Corinthians themselves in chapter 8, it can be plausibly deduced that the party for whom Paul sought to eliminate an obstacle through his refusal of material support were those he similarly labeled ‘the weak’ (οἱ ἄσθενεῖς [9.22]). This is supported further by the fact that, although Paul used the comparative particle ὡς when referring to his accommodation for Jews, for those under the Law, and for those outside the Law, he conspicuously omits ὡς in his admission to having become weak in order to win the weak (ἐγενόμην τοῖς ἄσθενέσιν ἄσθενής [9.22]), which suggests that weak believers were in fact those for whom Paul wished to accommodate by refusing material support.

Many ideas have been proposed concerning the identity of the weak in verse 22 and how the obstacle placed before them could function to hinder the gospel.¹⁴ Views range from classifying the weak as those who were suspicious of greed,¹⁵ to those who closely associated the acceptance of tuitions fees with sophistry,¹⁶ to those who factiously sought to develop patron-client ties with their teachers,¹⁷ to

¹⁴ While not everyone assumes the identification of the weak (9.22) and those to whom the gospel is obstructed (9.12), the presentation of the following views is in no way compromised by assuming their association here.

¹⁵ Weiß, *Der erste Korintherbrief*, 262; Barrett, *First Corinthians*, 207; John C. Hurd, *The Origin of 1 Corinthians* (London: SPCK, 1965), 204-205; Nils A. Dahl, 'Paul and Possessions', in *Studies in Paul: Theology for the Early Christian Mission* (Minneapolis: Augsburg, 1977), 22-39, at 34.

¹⁶ Winter, *Sophists*, 164-69.

¹⁷ Hock, *Social Context*, 61; Martin, *Slavery*, 120-21; Horrell, *Social Ethos*, 215.

those belonging to a low socio-economic stratum.¹⁸ These views are not mutually exclusive and most scholars adopt some combination of them in their historical reconstructions. There remains the possibility, however, that Paul may have labeled this group ἄσθενής not in an effort to describe their social or theological condition, but simply to draw a terminological link between chapters 8 and 9. If this is so, then ἄσθενής refers to an actual group, but in no way provides a window into their particular social circumstances.

But while it is perhaps too unclear to identify who precisely are ‘the weak’ in 9.22, Paul provides several clues that aid in identifying how the acceptance of material support could function as an obstacle in certain circumstances. Firstly, Paul was clearly under the impression that the acceptance of material support could strain some of his churches (2 Cor 11.9; 12.13-16; 1 Thess 2.9). Although he occasionally received funds from other congregations to aid in meeting his material needs while serving in distant regions (2 Cor 11.8-9; Phil 4.15-16), Paul for the most part was self-sufficient (αὐτάρκης [Phil 4.11]).¹⁹ He, in fact, considered his refusal of aid to be a gesture of his love and exaltation of the Corinthians, having had their best interest in mind (2 Cor 11.7-8, 11). Secondly, Paul apparently considered it dangerous to the success of his ministry if he was confused with other teachers who boasted of their ability to charge their students exorbitant fees.²⁰ Paul, therefore, desired to distinguish himself from those teachers so that comparisons could not be made between them and the apostle (2 Cor 11.12). Thirdly, Paul may have thought

¹⁸ Weiß, *Der erste Korintherbrief*, 238; Dungan, *Sayings*, 30-31; Theissen, ‘Strong’, 124-40; Scott J. Hafemann, *Suffering and Ministry in the Spirit: Paul’s Defence of His Ministry in 2 Corinthians 2:14-3:3* (Paternoster Biblical and Theological Monographs; Carlisle: Paternoster, 1990), 133. This meaning of ἄσθενής is supported in 1.26-27 where Paul contrasts ‘the weak’ and ‘the strong’ to create a binary between the wealthy, respectable people of society and the poor and shameful. In 4.10 Paul even identifies himself with ‘the weak’, where he associates weakness with social, economic, physical, and occupational disrepute, mentioning his artisanship as contributing to his weakness. But the presence of ‘the weak’ in 1 Corinthians 9 does not require there to be a corresponding group within the church characterised as ‘the strong’. Although ‘the weak in conscience’ in 1 Corinthians 8 suggests the existence of some who were ‘strong in conscience’, in 9.22 it is possible that Paul considered the entire community as ‘weak’—in whatever sense Paul means there—and in need of accommodation. In his criticism of the strong in 1.27 and 4.10, Paul may have, after all, been addressing the entire church; cf. Barclay, ‘Thessalonica and Corinth’: 57. Furthermore, ἄσθενής functions in a number of different ways in this epistle (e.g., 9.22; 11.30; 12.22) and throughout 2 Corinthians. It is therefore tenuous to assume, based on evidence originating from outside this passage, that ‘the weak’ in 9.22 belong to a socio-economically defined group. For further criticisms of the socio-economic classification, see Justin J. Meggitt, *Paul, Poverty and Survival* (SNTW; Edinburgh: T&T Clark, 1998), 107-108.

¹⁹ Wilhelm Pratscher, ‘Der Verzicht des Paulus auf finanziellen Unterhalt durch seine Gemeinden: Ein Aspekt seiner Missionsweise’, *NTS* 25 (1979): 284-98.

²⁰ Winter, *Sophists*, 166-69.

that by not conforming to the contexts of the very people he aimed to save, he would not have been able to apply the gospel to their particular social and theological situation. Several times in 1 Cor 9.19-22, for instance, Paul reiterates his desire to conform to his target audiences, summarising his unique ministry approach by stating, ‘I have become all things to all people, so that by all means I might save some [τοις πασιν γέγονα πάντα, ἵνα πάντως τινὰς σώσω]’ (9.22). Given that objective, the meaning of the statement ‘we endure anything rather than put an obstacle in the way of the gospel of Christ [πάντα στέγομεν, ἵνα μή τινα ἐγκοπὴν δῶμεν τῷ εὐαγγελίῳ τοῦ Χριστοῦ]’ (9.12) might mean that Paul was willing to overcome the hardships of working with his hands in order to associate with the working class.²¹ Finally, Paul may have thought that receiving financial aid from converts who, despite their generosity, did not intend to participate in Paul’s sufferings could prevent the church from growing in maturity (Phil 1.7; 4.14). Paul, then, may have desired that the Corinthians envisage their gifts as symbols of partnership in Christ and the gospel before he accepted their support.²²

The trouble with identifying ‘the weak’ and how they would be obstructed from the gospel if Paul were to accept support remains a matter for further investigation in Pauline scholarship. But whatever the case, Paul’s refusal was on account of them so that the gospel might reach and save some (τινὰς σώσω [9.22]). This objective, in fact, was a matter of utmost importance for Paul, as the second grounds for his refusal indicates.

2. Grounds for Refusal #2: Paul’s ‘Boast’

Paul’s second declaration of refusal is similar to the first. Initially, Paul affirms that he has not used any of his rights (ἐγὼ δὲ οὐ κέχρημαι οὐδενὶ τούτων [9.15a]).²³ But this time he goes well beyond asserting that he prefers hardships to

²¹ Horrell, *Social Ethos*, 215; Hafemann, *Suffering*, 133.

²² Timothy B. Savage, *Power through Weakness: Paul’s Understanding of the Christian Ministry in 2 Corinthians* (SNTSMS 86; Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1996), 98-99. The possibility of this as a factor at work in the Corinthian church is questionable in light of the fact that Paul promises never to accept pay from them (2 Cor 11.9, 11).

²³ The use of the plural τούτων (v. 15a) surely parallels τῆ ἐξουσίᾳ ταύτῃ (v. 12b). Even if Paul has multiple rights in mind (cf. vv. 4-6), the right to material aid is the chief idea here; cf. Fee, *First Corinthians*, 416, n. 12. The ταῦτα in v. 15b, however, refers to the arguments he is currently presenting (ἔγραψα) in support of ‘these rights’ (15a). Further, the use of the first person pronoun ἐγὼ in verse 15 suggests a sense of ‘individuality and emphasis’, by which Paul sets himself apart from those who made no such refusal; cf. Thiselton, *First Corinthians*, 693.

obstructing the gospel by stating that he would in fact rather die than have anyone nullify his boast (9.15b).²⁴ Unfortunately, in verse 15 Paul does not explicitly state the object of his boast. Nevertheless, since in verse 16 he considers preaching the gospel to be a boastless activity for him (οὐκ ἔστιν μοι καύχημα) because it is compulsory under the terms of his commission (9.17), Paul's boast should be identified with the completion of a certain task that he is not mandated to fulfil.²⁵ Paul's boast, therefore, at the very least consists of his refusal of pay.²⁶ This much is confirmed in 2 Cor 11.10 where Paul again refers to his ongoing policy of refusing payment from the Corinthians as a matter worthy of boasting (καύχησις). But the grounds for Paul's boast can be further defined based on the parallels apparent between verses 12 and 15:

- (a) ἀλλ' οὐκ ἐχρησάμεθα τῇ ἐξουσίᾳ ταύτῃ,
 (b) ἀλλὰ πάντα στέγομεν,
 (c) ἵνα μὴ τινα ἐγκοπὴν δῶμεν τῷ εὐαγγελίῳ τοῦ Χριστοῦ
 (9.12) . . .
- (a¹) ἐγὼ δὲ οὐ κέχρημαι οὐδενὶ τούτων. . . .
 (b¹) καλὸν γάρ μοι μάλλον ἀποθανεῖν
 (c¹) ἢ- τὸ καύχημά μου οὐδεὶς κενώσει (9.15)

²⁴ Hafemann, *Suffering*, 139: 'The reason for the almost inconceivable weight which Paul thus attaches to his practice of self-support lies in his understanding of this practice as his "boast," which would be "nullified" or "invalidated" should someone pay him for his ministry'. Paul also refers to his refusal to accept support from the Corinthians as καύχησις in 2 Cor 11.10.

²⁵ While receiving praise from others in ancient Rome was considered 'the most pleasant of recitals' (Plutarch, *Mor.* 539D), praising oneself was typically regarded as repugnant, since it was tied up with advancing one's own social status. As Savage, *Power*, 41, states, 'In Corinth, perhaps more than anywhere else, social ascent was the goal, boasting and self-display the means, personal power and glory the reward'. But, according to Plutarch, there were exceptions to this rule, so that an orator could justifiably affirm himself in public on certain occasions without being distasteful (*Mor.* 539E). Self-praise was permissible in order to instill confidence and good repute in one's audience (539F), to discredit harmful people (544F), and to counter and refute their self-praises (545E-F). Although Paul repudiated boasting earlier in the letter, his practice of it here is justified, because he does so with the intent to defend himself. For boasting in the Graeco-Roman world, see, e.g., E. A. Judge, 'Paul's Boasting in Relation to Contemporary Professional Practice', *AusBR* 18 (1968): 37-50; Christopher Forbes, 'Comparison, Self-Praise and Irony: Paul's Boasting and the Conventions of Hellenistic Rhetoric', *NTS* 32 (1986): 1-30; Duane F. Watson, 'Paul and Boasting', in *Paul in the Greco-Roman World: A Handbook*, ed. J. Paul Sampley (Harrisburg, PA: Trinity Press International, 2003), 77-100; Jennifer A. Glancy, 'Boasting of Beatings (2 Corinthians 11:23-25)', *JBL* 123 (2004): 99-135; Michael Wojciechowski, 'Paul and Plutarch on Boasting', *JGRChJ* 3 (2006): 99-109.

²⁶ Paul's boasting in his *refusal* of pay and toil as an artisan is ironic, because the itinerant teachers of the day normally boasted in their *acceptance* of pay and *avoidance* of work. Paul, however, subverts this practice by boasting in his poverty and labor, indeed in his weaknesses, those things which while culturally unimpressive, nonetheless manifest the power of God.

In both constructions Paul announces his refusal (a, a¹), asserts his acceptance of or preference for an unpleasant course of action (b, b¹), and reveals the negative consequences he avoids by virtue of that course (c, c¹). Given the similarities between the two statements, Paul's boast in verse 15 should be interpreted in the light of the ἵνα-clause in verse 12 (c), that is, Paul boasts in the fact that by refusing support he has voluntarily subjected himself to hardships in order to ensure the progress of the gospel.

In summary, Paul boasts in the fact that he has voluntarily done everything within his power to save unbelievers and at great personal cost to himself. Through his refusal he is able to go above and beyond his apostolic mandate in order that the gospel might reach its intended ends. Paul's boasting, then, is closely tied to his apostolic self-understanding. But in order to stress this point further in verses 19-23, Paul must first embark on a brief digression where he explains why preaching on its own is insufficient for him to merit a boast.

D. Paul's Ministry as an Administration (9.16-23)

The relationship between verses 16-18 and the sections which frame it is problematic for many scholars. Ernst Käsemann, for instance, suggested that verses 16-18 introduce a complete change of topic, so that the entire section is superfluous (*überflüssig*).²⁷ But upon close examination, it is apparent that the digression plays an important supportive function in the larger rhetorical strategy of the discourse. Paul's argument—without necessarily exhibiting syllogistic logic—is a rebuttal to the anticipated criticisms of certain philosophically astute Corinthians.²⁸ The passage's explanatory nature is apparent in Paul's repeated use of γάρ, which surfaces a surprising four times in verses 16-17. Through the use of the conjunction, the argument escalates from one clarifying thread to another until Paul eventually ends the digression with the paradoxical assertion that his μισθός is in fact his very refusal of the right to be paid. Verses 16-18, therefore, provide a unique glimpse

²⁷ Ernst Käsemann, 'Eine paulinische Variation des „amor fati“', *ZTK* (1959): 138-54, at 139.

²⁸ Käsemann, 'amor fati': 139, refers to the passage as '*leidenschaftliche*', but '*völlig unlogischen*'. But even though the logic is difficult to follow, Joost Smit Sibinga, 'The Composition of 1 Cor. 9 and Its Context', *NovT* 40 (1998): 136-63, has shown through detailed statistical analysis that the ratio of syllables and verbal forms in 1 Corinthians 9—especially at verses 16 and 17—confirms that this chapter was 'the careful and patient work of a highly trained literary craftsman, who gave full attention to the final shape of the whole composition as well as to the perfect form of innumerable details'.

into Paul's apostolic profile, albeit in the form of a seemingly detached excursus. As Gordon Fee explains, 'Although one has the feeling that the argument got away from him a bit, nonetheless the explanations of vv. 16-17 probably help us as much as anything in his letters to understand what made Paul tick'.²⁹ It is this transparency together with the fact that Paul here refers to his commission as an administration to elucidate his apostolic role, rights, and responsibilities that makes this passage so important for our study. In what follows, then, we will examine Paul's digression in order to discover how he used the *oikonomos* (*oikonomia*) metaphor to clarify for the Corinthians certain features of his apostleship.

1. Apostolic Rights and Status: Wages and Volition (9.16-18)

The digression begins in verse 16 with Paul's admission to compulsory preaching, which he concedes in order to explain why he must refuse support to maintain his boast (9.16a). Compulsion, Paul states, has been laid upon him through his commission (9.16b), so that judgment awaits him if he does not preach the gospel (9.16c). But Paul immediately anticipates an objection to this concession: if he is under compulsion to preach, then according to moral philosophy he is a slave of God; and if he is a slave of God, then how can Paul be entitled to a wage? Recognising his vulnerability to this protest, Paul then clarifies his particular status as God's slave by indicating the precise position he holds in God's administration: he is God's slave administrator (*οἰκονομίαν πεπίστευμαι* [9.17]). But how Paul's argument demonstrates his entitlement to a wage is unclear. In order to make the point, he presents what are often regarded as two opposing conditional sentences addressing the voluntary nature of his preaching: *εἰ γὰρ ἐκὼν τοῦτο πράσσω, μισθὸν ἔχω· εἰ δὲ ἄκων, οἰκονομίαν πεπίστευμαι* (9.17). But did Paul preach the gospel willingly or unwillingly, and how does his volition affect his right to be paid? Although this is the very matter which Paul aims to illumine in verses 16-18, modern scholarship remains divided over Paul's actual condition. We will therefore need to analyse Paul's argument closely, carefully scrutinising the existing views, in order to elucidate Paul's approach to his preaching.

²⁹ Fee, *First Corinthians*, 415.

a. Paul as an Unpaid, Involuntary Preacher: Dale Martin

In verse 17 Paul appears to present two opposing propositions involving the volitional aspect of his preaching:

Table 3: The Clausal Structure of 1 Cor 9.17		
Protasis 1	εἰ γὰρ ἐκῶν τοῦτο πράσσω	9.17a
Apodosis 1	μισθὸν ἔχω	9.17b
Protasis 2	εἰ δὲ ἄκων	9.17c
Apodosis 2	οἰκονομίαν πεπίστευμαι	9.17d

Most modern scholars interpret the former proposition to be hypothetical and the latter to be Paul's actual condition, so that verses 16-18 indicate that Paul preached the gospel involuntarily. Supporters normally reach this position in part because they regard Paul's admission to having had compulsion (ἀνάγκη) laid on him in 9.16 to be equivalent to preaching unwillingly (ἄκων) in 9.17c.³⁰

But while there are good reasons for correlating ἀνάγκη and preaching ἄκων, this interpretation is fraught with questionable assumptions. Because preaching ἐκῶν³¹ is coupled with having a μισθός in 9.17a-b, most interpreters automatically conclude that Paul's admission to preaching ἄκων in 9.17c indicates that he was *not* entitled to receive pay. This itself is due to the assumption that in verse 17c-d Paul intended to present an approach that was entirely antithetical to 17a-b: if 9.17a is opposed to 9.17c, then it is normally presumed that 9.17b is

³⁰ See, esp., Martin, *Slavery*, 71-85. Cf. Charles Hodge, *An Exposition of the First Epistle to the Corinthians* (New York: Robert Carter & Brothers, 1862), 162; Thomas C. Edwards, *A Commentary on the First Epistle to the Corinthians* (London: Hodder and Stoughton, 1885), 235; Charles J. Ellicott, *St. Paul's First Epistle to the Corinthians: With a Critical and Grammatical Commentary* (London: Longmans, 1887), 164; James Moffatt, *The First Epistle of Paul to the Corinthians* (London: Hodder and Stoughton, 1938), 120-21; Barrett, *First Corinthians*, 209-210; Käsemann, 'amor fati': 149-53; Margaret Thrall, *First and Second Letters of Paul to the Corinthians* (Cambridge Bible Commentaries on the New Testament; Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1965), 69-70; Gerhard Dautzenberg, 'Der Verzicht auf das Apostolische Unterhaltsrecht: Eine Exegetische Untersuchung zu 1 Kor 9', *Biblica* 50 (1969): 212-32, at 227; Lietzmann and Kümmel, *An die Korinther I/II*, 43; Conzelmann, *1 Corinthians*, 158; Leon Morris, *The First Epistle of Paul to the Corinthians: An Introduction and Commentary* (2nd ed.; TNTC 7; Leicester: InterVarsity, 1985), 135; Hafemann, *Suffering*, 141-44; Schrage, *Der erste Brief an die Korinther*, 2:324-26; Horrell, *Social Ethos*, 207; Hays, *First Corinthians*, 152-53; Horsley, *1 Corinthians*, 129-30; Harris, *Slave*, 130; Thiselton, *First Corinthians*, 696; Garland, *1 Corinthians*, 425; Phua, *Idolatry*, 191-92; Richter, *Oikonomia*, 45; Lehmeier, *Oikonomia*, 230-31; Williams, *Stewards*, 81; Butarbutar, *Conflict Resolution*, 161.

³¹ Gardner, *Gifts*, 92-93, proposes that ἐκῶν be translated 'intentionally' in order to emphasise purposefulness. But intentionality displaces the emphasis on the will and thus the philosophical implications bound up with the assertion, as discussed by Malherbe below.

opposed to 9.17d. After all, one expects the obverse of voluntarily preaching for a wage (*merces*) to be involuntarily preaching for free (*gratuitum*).³²

This interpretation also owes much to the supposition that all forms of slavery—managerial slavery included—connote unpaid labour. This assumption surfaces, for instance, in an important essay by Ernst Käsemann, who remarks, “[W]hen Paul describes his preaching as something that is laid upon him and thus not to be looked upon as a service which brings with it a reward, he is, in his own way, picking up the saying of Jesus in Luke 17.10: “We are unworthy servants; we have only done what was our duty””.³³ Dale Martin similarly remarks,

By stating that he is compelled to preach and that he therefore does not do it willingly, Paul explains why he does not receive a wage from the Corinthians. When Paul asks, in verse 18, “What then is my pay?” he does so having already rejected the possibility that he is entitled (that is, as Christ’s slave agent) to receive pay in the normal sense, thus opening up the possibility that he may receive pay in an abnormal sense. . . . Paul here says he is not able to accept pay because he is Christ’s slave agent.³⁴

The interpretation of verse 17 presented by Käsemann and Martin is representative of most scholars who interpret Paul’s preaching as involuntary and therefore without pay.³⁵ But aside from the fact that it rests on certain baseless assumptions (as will be demonstrated later), this interpretation struggles to make Paul’s argument coherent. If Paul wished to communicate that he should not receive pay, then why did he not simply say so, perhaps stating, εἰ δὲ ἄκων, οὐ μισθὸν ἔχω? Or, why did he not portray himself as a menial slave (δοῦλος), rather than a privileged commercial agent (οἰκονόμος)? Moreover, this reading must turn a blind eye to

³² See, e.g., Fee, *First Corinthians*, 420: “[T]his first sentence [verse 17a-b] is intended merely to set up the opposite alternative, which in fact rules out any possibility of “reward” or “pay” in his case’. See also Martin, *Slavery*, 75: ‘One last linguistic indication that Paul is here describing himself as Christ’s slave agent lies in his opposition of “being entrusted with an oikonomia” to “having a wage” (*misthos*)’.

³³ Käsemann, ‘amor fati’: 140-41; translation from Ernst Käsemann, ‘A Pauline Version of “Amor Fati”’, in *New Testament Questions of Today* (Philadelphia: Fortress, 1969), 217-35, at 220. Numerous other interpreters find resonances between 9.16-17 and Lucan sayings of Jesus; see, e.g., Siegfried Kreuzer, ‘Der Zwang des Boten: Beobachtungen zu Lk 14 23 und 1 Kor 9 16’, *ZNW* 76 (1985): 123-28; Fitzmyer, *First Corinthians*, 368. Cf. Marshall, *Enmity*, 303: ‘A slave, in most instances, could expect no salary, as Paul and his readers were well aware’.

³⁴ Martin, *Slavery*, 71. In order to make verse 17 cohere with verse 18, Martin must interpret Paul’s μισθός in verse 18 in an ‘abnormal sense’. He explains that ‘the reward Paul receives for preaching as a slave of Christ is the opportunity to give up his authority, his power’ (85). Cf. Fitzmyer, *First Corinthians*, 368. Martin, with many other interpreters, recognises that verse 18 expresses some kind of a paradox. But the fact that Martin must render Paul’s μισθός as ‘abnormal’ exposes the strain his interpretation places on Paul’s argument. Hafemann, *Suffering*, 143-44, avoids a paradoxical sense by regarding Paul’s μισθός in 9.18 as eschatological (cf. 3.8, 14). But while an eschatological reward awaits the faithful completion of Paul’s ministry (9.24-27), his μισθός in 9.18 cannot refer directly to it since he expressly states that his μισθός is in fact his refusal.

³⁵ So, Conzelmann, *1 Corinthians*, 158: ‘[O]nly voluntary labor deserves and gains a reward’; Thiselton, *First Corinthians*, 696: ‘Paul makes a logical point that only acts carried out from self-motivation or self-initiative belong to the logical order of “reward”’.

Paul's larger objective in the discourse—the demonstration of the refusal of his right to receive material support. As observed above, in verses 4-14 Paul repeatedly insists that he has the right to receive pay from the Corinthians.³⁶ Käsemann and Martin, however, conclude that in verses 16-17 Paul contradicts what he so adamantly maintained for the entire first half of the chapter!³⁷ This reading absolutely strips Paul of his ἐξουσία, so that he has neither the right to *use* nor the right to *refuse* a wage for his preaching. Beyond that, in verse 18 the question τίς οὖν μου ἐστὶν ὁ μισθός suggests that Paul actually believes he is entitled to a wage. If Paul, after conceding in verse 17 that he is not entitled to a wage, immediately changes his mind yet again and suggests that he is entitled to pay after all (even in an 'abnormal sense' as Martin maintains), then one must conclude that Paul's discourse is completely incoherent.

This thesis, then, has the advantage of interpreting ἄκων in verse 17 as echoing ἀνάγκη in verse 16, and thus correctly regards 17c-d as Paul's real situation. But by understanding 17d as the opposite of 17b, Martin and many other interpreters leave Paul without any entitlement to pay, which undercuts Paul's entire argument in verses 4-14 and makes Paul's claim to having a μισθός in verse 18 appear out of nowhere, a leap in logic that even an 'abnormal' reading like Martin's is unable to satisfy.

³⁶ This discrepancy is in fact one of Malherbe's strongest points. See Malherbe, 'Determinism', 249 n. 35: 'My interpretation differs from that of most commentators, who take εἰ δὲ ἄκων as a real condition, interpreting it in light of ἀνάγκη. This would mean that (unlike the other apostles) Paul had no right to financial support'. This tension is also apparent in Robertson and Plummer, *First Corinthians*, 189-90, who regarded both 17a-b and 17c-d as Paul's actual condition.

³⁷ Even Richard A. Horsley, 'Consciousness and Freedom among the Corinthians: 1 Corinthians 8-10', *CBQ* 40 (1978): 574-89, at 588, as he seeks to demonstrate that 'Paul surely knows what he is doing' in the juxtaposition of slavery and freedom throughout 9.16-19, must admit that his approach is 'seemingly contradictory'. Unfortunately, this interpretive inconsistency continues to resurface. In her unpublished doctoral thesis, Kate C. Donahoe, 'From Self-Praise to Self-Boasting: Paul's Unmasking of the Conflicting Rhetorico-Linguistic Phenomena in 1 Corinthians' (PhD Diss., Univ. of St Andrews, 2008), 194-95, writes, 'Paul's purpose in life is to preach the gospel without financial profit. . . . If Paul freely chose to proclaim the good news in Corinth, then he could expect a reward from the Corinthian community. However, since he does not preach out of his own volition, he is not entitled to material compensation. . . . Similar to the steward who is not entitled to pay, Paul likewise is not entitled to recompense from believing communities under his care. As one entitled to no reward, Paul asks τίς οὖν μου ἐστὶν ὁ μισθός (9:18). He equates receiving payment with his ability to freely proclaim the gospel to everyone without any patronal obligations impeding his ministry. By offering the gospel free of charge (ἀδάπανος), Paul avoids abusing his authority by making full use of his right (καταχρησασθαι τῇ ἐξουσίᾳ μου) in the gospel'. But Donahoe's recognition that 'Paul avoids abusing his authority by making full use of his right' clearly contradicts her earlier conclusion that Paul in fact has no right to receive pay as God's slave administrator.

b. Paul as a Paid, Voluntary Preacher: Abraham Malherbe

Given the weaknesses of the traditional reading, Abraham Malherbe has recently defended an alternative position which places Paul's discourse in the context of Cynic-Stoic debates on predestination.³⁸ By reading Paul's application of the terms ἐλεύθερος, δουλόω, ἐξουσία, ἀνάγκη, ἐκόν, and ἄκων in the light of their philosophical context, Malherbe seeks to make the apostle's volition compatible with divine necessity.³⁹ Malherbe argues that Paul's preaching, while on the one hand a compulsion (ἀνάγκη), was nevertheless conducted willingly (ἐκόν), rather than unwillingly (ἄκων) as traditional interpreters such as Käsemann and Martin understand him.⁴⁰

According to Stoicism, the wise man alone can be free, but only by ridding himself of all passions and desires which conflict with the predetermination of Fate. So, Seneca states, 'I have set freedom before my eyes; and I am striving for that reward. And what is freedom, you ask? It means not being a slave to any circumstance, to any constraint [*necessitati*], to any chance; it means compelling Fortune to enter the lists on equal terms' (*Ep.* 51.9). Epictetus agrees with Seneca's Stoic conception of freedom, saying, 'He is free who lives as he wills [ὡς βούλεται], who is subject neither to compulsion [οὔτ' ἀναγκάσαι], nor hindrance, nor force, whose choices are unhampered, whose desires attain their end, whose aversions do not fall into what they would avoid' (*Diatr.* 4.1.1; cf. 2.1.23).⁴¹ But while compulsions

³⁸ Malherbe, 'Determinism', 231-41, masterfully traces Paul's argument from 1 Corinthians 8 to 9 to demonstrate the influence of Stoic thought in the discourse: 'In 1 Corinthians 9 Paul makes use of Greek philosophic terminology as he discusses the compulsion under which he is to preach the gospel. He does so, not because he is a Greek philosopher, but partly because the practical issue that he is addressing was raised in philosophic terms' (243). For the influence of Stoicism on the Corinthian church, see Terence Paige, 'Stoicism, ἐλευθερία and Community at Corinth', in *Worship, Theology and Ministry in the Early Church: Essays in Honor of Ralph P. Martin*, ed. Michael J. Wilkins and Terence Paige (JSNTSup 87; Sheffield: JSOT, 1992), 180-93.

³⁹ For Paul's freedom as financial independence from the Corinthians, see Hock, *Social Context*, 61. But the philosophical, rather than social or economic, sense of freedom is to be preferred, as Paul seems to speak of being free as interchangeable with possessing apostolic rights. Cf. Collins, *First Corinthians*, 329; Galloway, *Freedom*, 164.

⁴⁰ Malherbe, 'Determinism', 249-50; cf. Reumann, 'OIKONOMIA-Terms': , at 159; Hock, *Social Context*, 100 n. 113; F. F. Bruce, *1 and 2 Corinthians* (New Century Bible; London: Oliphants, 1980), 85-86; Robbins, *Tapestry*, 85; Collins, *First Corinthians*, 348; Byron, *Slavery*, 249-53.

⁴¹ A. A. Long, *Epictetus: A Stoic and Socratic Guide to Life* (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 2002), 221: 'It is virtually certain that Epictetus' concept of a free will, far from requiring the will's freedom from fate (i.e. a completely open future or set of alternative possibilities or choices), presupposes people's willingness to comply with their predestined allotment. The issue that concerns him is neither the will's freedom from antecedent causation nor the attribution to persons of a completely open future and indeterminate power of choice. Rather, it is freedom from being constrained by (as distinct from going along with) external contingencies, and freedom from being constrained by the errors and

impose themselves on all people, according to Stoicism they can be overcome through reason and philosophy by desiring those very things that are necessary.

The following excerpts from Seneca instruct the Stoic how to achieve liberation:

'Then how can I free myself?' you ask. You cannot escape necessities, but you can overcome them. By force a way is made. And this way will be afforded you by philosophy. Betake yourself therefore to philosophy if you would be safe, untroubled, happy, in fine, if you wish to be,—and that is most important,—free. There is no other way to attain this end. (*Ep.* 37.3)

[T]he wise man does nothing unwillingly [*invitus*]. He escapes necessity, because he wills to do [*vult*] what necessity is about to force upon him [*coactura*]. (*Ep.* 54.7)

See to it that you never do anything unwillingly [*invitus*]. That which is bound to be a necessity if you rebel, is not a necessity if you desire it [*volenti*]. This is what I mean: he who takes his orders gladly [*libens*], escapes the bitterest part of slavery,—doing what one does not want to do [*nolit*]. (*Ep.* 61.3)⁴²

These readings promote philosophy as the great liberator of the soul, since through reason alone one can direct his or her desires toward that which is necessary.

Additional examples from Epictetus solidify this point:

Come, can anyone force [*ἀναγκάσαι*] you to choose something that you do not want?—He can; for when he threatens me with death or bonds, he compels [*ἀναγκάζει*] me to choose.—If, however, you despise death and bonds, do you pay any further heed to him?—No.—Is it, then, an act of your own to despise death, or is it not your own act? It is mine. (*Diatr.* 4.1.70-71)

As for me, I told you that the only unhindered thing was the desire; but where there is a use of the body and its co-operation, you have heard long ago that nothing is your own.—Granted that also.—Can anyone force [*ἀναγκάσαι*] you to desire what you do not want?—No one. (*Diatr.* 4.1.74)

These texts support the idea that moral philosophers prescribed reason in the battle against the enslaving power of compulsions and those outward circumstances beyond one's control. Apparently, even death, if one could resist fearing it, would cease serving as a person's master, since the one who went along with his or her outer compulsions became, as it were, inwardly free.

It is within this context of ancient philosophy that Malherbe reads Paul's argument in 9.15-18. Malherbe initially acknowledges the dissimilarity between Paul and the Stoics (and the Cynics), since Paul, to the abhorrence of moral philosophy, grants that he has had compulsion laid upon him (9.16).⁴³ But Malherbe proceeds to explain that Paul in fact closes the gap between himself and the Stoics through his voluntary acceptance of divine necessity:

passions consequential on believing that such contingencies *must* influence and inhibit one's volition'. Cf. Susanne Bobzein, *Determinism and Freedom in Stoic Philosophy* (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1998), 330-57.

⁴² For the relevance of Seneca's remarks for Paul's discourse, see especially the terminological overlap between Seneca and the Vulgate's rendering of verses 16-17: *nam si evangelizavero non est mihi gloria necessitas enim mihi incumbit vae enim mihi est si non evangelizavero si enim volens hoc ago mercedem habeo si autem invitus dispensatio mihi credita est.*

⁴³ Malherbe, 'Determinism', 249; cf. Martin, *Slavery*, 76, who regards Paul's admission to being compelled as a 'philosophical faux pas'.

As we have seen . . . Stoics exercised [sic] their free will in the manner in which they conducted themselves within the providential scheme of things. So does Paul. He willingly does what necessity has laid upon him, thus exercising [sic] his freedom, the topic that has engaged him throughout this long argument. That it is freedom of action that predominates in his thinking and not compulsion, is evident from vv. 18-19. There he provides the grounds for forgoing his *exousia* — his freedom did not compel him to insist on his *exousia*, but allowed him to forgo it.⁴⁴

According to Malherbe, therefore, Paul conducts his preaching functionally as a Stoic: like the Stoics, Paul, though *outwardly* compelled, cooperates with divine necessity by *inwardly* desiring his apostolic mandate. Malherbe concedes that Paul has been entrusted with an administration (notice the perfect tense of *πιστεύω* in 9.17d), which he possesses presumably by virtue of his compulsion, so that '[i]f Paul were to preach unwillingly (*εἰ δὲ ἄκων* is hypothetical)', he would have to preach anyway, for 'he nevertheless has been entrusted with an *οἰκονομία*'.⁴⁵ But even so, Paul's preaching is performed willingly, thus freely and deserving of pay.

In his examination, Malherbe insightfully applies to Paul's discourse the concepts of freedom and constraint found in the Stoics. Moreover, he carefully notices that in verses 18 and 19 Paul possesses the right, and thus the freedom, to receive and refuse material support. But Malherbe's contention for the actuality of 17a-b and the hypothetical nature of 17c fails to account for three exegetical observations. Firstly, from Malherbe's perspective, it remains unclear why Paul included 17c-d in the discourse at all. If 17a-b represents Paul's actual condition and becomes the subject of more focused discussion in verses 18-19, then Paul's inclusion of 17c-d—particularly the disclosure of his administration in 17d—merely reinforces the already revealed fact that Paul is *externally* compelled to preach (9.16) and his underlying, *outward* condition is that of a slave of God.⁴⁶ From Malherbe's perspective, then, 17c-d unnecessarily detracts from Paul's argument, thus his is an implausible reading. Secondly, despite Paul's possession of his right in verse 18 and his freedom in verse 19, it is not clear that Paul performs his preaching willingly in verse 17. As intimated earlier in reference to Martin's interpretation, Paul's right to be paid does not rest *exclusively* on voluntary preaching, as interpreters normally suppose. Such is an unwarranted assumption based solely on the presumed

⁴⁴ Malherbe, 'Determinism', 250.

⁴⁵ Malherbe, 'Determinism', 249; cf. 251.

⁴⁶ *Contra* Byron, *Slavery*, 243-53, who argues that Paul conceived of his administration as befitting free persons. For the use of *οἰκονομία* and *πιστεύω* (in the passive voice) as denoting a slave *οικονόμος*, see Artemidorus, *Onir.* 1.35 with 2.30; cf. Martin, *Slavery*, 75, 200 n. 44.

antithesis of the apodoses in 17b and 17d. As will be demonstrated below, Paul's right is maintained *in spite of* the involuntary nature of his preaching.

Finally and quite significantly, the ways in which Paul acknowledges the ongoing presence of his compulsion suggest that he had not overcome all external coercions, whether by reason, will, or otherwise. In addition to the texts cited above, there are a number of passages from Paul's Stoic contemporaries which demonstrate that having *any* compulsion was equivalent to performing involuntary actions and being a slave. This point is made explicitly by Seneca, Epictetus, and Philo:

I am under no compulsion [*nihil cogor*], I suffer nothing against my will [*nihil patior invitus*], and I am not God's slave but his follower' (Seneca, *Prov.* 5.6).

Doesn't it strike you as "having to do with being a slave" for a man to do something against his will, under compulsion [τὸ ἄκοντά τι ποιεῖν, τὸ ἀναγκαζόμενον]? (Epictetus, *Diatr.* 4.1.11)

When, therefore, it is in another's power to put hindrances in a man's way and subject him to compulsion [ἀναγκάσαι], say confidently that this man is not free. (Epictetus, *Diatr.* 4.1.56)

The unhampered man, who finds things ready to hand as he wants them, is free. But the man who can be hampered, or subjected to compulsion [ἀναγκάσαι], or hindered, or thrown into something against his will [ἄκοντα], is a slave. (Epictetus, *Diatr.* 4.1.128)

The law-giver of the Jews describes the wise man's hands as heavy, indicating by this figure that his actions are not superficial but firmly based, the outcome of a mind that never wavers. No one then can compel him [πρὸς οὐδενὸς οὖν ἀναγκάζεται], since he has come to despise both pain and death, and by the law of nature has all fools in subjection. (Philo, *Prob.*, 29-30)

He who always acts sensibly, always acts well: he who always acts well, always acts rightly: he who always acts rightly, also acts impeccably, blamelessly, faultlessly, irreproachably, harmlessly, and, therefore, will have the power [ἐξουσίαν] to do anything, and to live as he wishes [ὡς βούλεται], and he who has this power [ἔξεστιν] must be free. But the good man always acts sensibly, and, therefore, he alone is free. Again, one who cannot be compelled to do anything [μὴτ' ἀναγκάσαι] or prevented from doing anything, cannot be a slave. But the good man cannot be compelled [οὔτ' ἀναγκάσαι] or prevented: the good man, therefore, cannot be a slave. That he is not compelled nor prevented is evident. One is prevented when he does not get what he desires [ῶν ὀρέγεται], but the wise man desires things which have their origin in virtue, and these, being what he is, he cannot fail to obtain. Further, if one is compelled [ἀναγκάζεται] he clearly acts against his will [ἄκων]. But where there are actions, they are either righteous actions born of virtue or wrong actions born of vice or neutral and indifferent. The virtuous actions he performs not under constraint but willingly [ἐκῶν], since all that he does are what he holds to be desirable. The vicious are to be eschewed and therefore he never dreams of doing them [πράττει; cf. 1 Cor 9.17a]. Naturally too in matters indifferent he does not act under compulsion. To these, as on a balance his mind preserves its equipoise, trained neither to surrender to them in acknowledgement of their superior weight, nor yet to regard them with hostility, as deserving aversion. Whence it is clear that he does nothing unwillingly [ἄκων] and is never compelled [ἀναγκάζεται], whereas if he were a slave he would be compelled [ἠναγκάζετ'], and therefore the good man will be a free man' (Philo, *Prob.*, 59-61).⁴⁷

⁴⁷ Galloway, *Freedom*, 140, summarizes, '[T]he ἐλεύθερος [in Philo's *Quod omnis probus liber sit*] desires only those things that are virtuous, and in achieving these goals will act willingly and not unwillingly. In all judgments, the ἐλεύθερος cannot be compelled or hindered but will exercise good sense, self-control, and justice'. For the use of ἐκῶν and ἄκων in literal, legal slavery, see Chariton: 'Do not bring a curse upon yourself! You are her master [κύριος], with full power over her [τὴν ἐξουσίαν ἔχεις αὐτῆς], so she must do your will whether she likes it or not [ἐκούσα καὶ ἄκουσα]' (Chariton, *Chaer.* 2.6.2); cf. 'Hence, it needs must follow that those too who have authority [ἔχοντας

Because these philosophers consistently identify the person under compulsion with one who acts involuntarily, it is clear that Paul’s admission to having a compulsion laid upon him—notice the present tense of ἐπίκειμαι in verse 16—is equivalent to stating that his preaching is performed unwillingly.

Further, the perpetuation of Paul’s constraint to preach the gospel is apparent from his fear of the consequences for *not* preaching: οὐαὶ γάρ μοί ἐστιν ἐὰν μὴ εὐαγγελίσωμαι (9.16b). What would Paul have had to fear if indeed he willfully preached? In Stoicism the very fear of pain and punishment was indicative of slavery, as explained by Epictetus: ‘[A]nd if you hear him say, “Alas! What I must suffer! [τάλας ἐγώ, οἷα πάσχω]” call him a slave; and in short, if you see him wailing, complaining, in misery, call him a slave in a *toga praetexta*’ (*Diatr.* 4.1.57).⁴⁸ Epictetus himself apparently overcame the fear of illness, torture, and death, and was therefore considered free:

But I have never been hindered in the exercise of my will, nor have I ever been subjected to compulsion against my will [ἠναγκάσθην μὴ θέλων]. And how is this possible? I have submitted my freedom of choice unto God [προσκατατέταχά μου τὴν ὀρμὴν τῷ θεῷ]. He wills that I shall have fever; it is my will too. He wills that I should choose something; it is my will too. He wills that I shall desire something; it is my will too. He wills that I should get something; it is my wish too. He does not will it; I do not wish it. Therefore, it is my will to die; therefore, it is my will to be tortured on the rack. Who can hinder me any longer against my own views, or put compulsion [ἀναγκάσαι] upon me? That is no more possible in any case than it would be with Zeus. (*Diatr.* 4.1.89-90)

Epictetus conquered his compulsions by desiring illness, torture, and even death if they were the will of God. As Epictetus states, quoting Diogenes, ‘The one sure way to secure freedom is to die cheerfully’ (*Diatr.* 4.1.30). But in his discourse Paul makes no such claims to desire or cheer, but only acknowledges through a prophetic ‘woe’ the sentence he would face should he not comply with his divine commission. Indeed, Paul insists that he cannot cheer or ‘boast’ (καύχημα) for preaching the gospel (9.16). Such is the condition of one who is compelled to preach. As Käsemann remarks, ‘Diese Gottesmacht drängt ihn ruhe- und schonungslos als ihren Sklaven durch die Mittelmeerwelt’.⁴⁹

While Malherbe’s interpretation, then, has the advantage of explaining that Paul is entitled to a μισθός (9.18), there is no indication in verses 16-18 that Paul regards himself to have overcome his compulsion, and thus is inwardly free. The

ἐξουσίαν] over some one of these circumstances are our masters [κυρίους]’ (Epictetus, *Diatr.* 4.1.59). Also, Aristotle: ‘Men act voluntarily when they know what they do, and do not act under compulsion (ἐκόντες δὲ ποιῶσιν ὅσα εἰδότες καὶ μὴ ἀναγκαζόμενοι’ (*Rhet.* 1.10.3).

⁴⁸ For the use of τάλας in the prophetic woes, see Is 6.5 (LXX): καὶ εἶπα ὦ τάλας ἐγώ ὅτι κατανένυγμαί.

⁴⁹ Käsemann, ‘amor fati’: 150.

discourse suggests, rather, that Paul truly is compelled like an administrator of God, and his admission to being so would have in fact been abhorrent to a Stoic. Since, therefore, neither Martin nor Malherbe have articulated views that make coherent all the details in the passage, we will offer a new reading that accounts for both the philosophical and commercial contexts demanded of the discourse, by portraying Paul as a paid, yet involuntary preacher.

c. Paul as a Paid, Involuntary Preacher: A New Reading

It is our contention that, not only did Paul preach involuntarily as a slave administrator, but his position as administrator, far from dismissing his right to receive payment, actually supported his claim to being deserving of remuneration. Whether, therefore, he preached willingly or unwillingly—that is as a free labourer or a slave administrator—Paul was entitled to a μισθός.

i. The Compensation of Slave Administrators

The payment of administrators and other privileged slaves for their labour is certainly not a new proposal (see Chapter 4). Martin himself conceded that business slaves, and especially administrators, would normally have received compensation for their work. Yet Martin resisted the conclusion that Paul was issued a *paid* administration because of how the apostle referred to the arrangement.⁵⁰ Moreover, Martin apparently assumes, along with the rest of Pauline scholarship, that the conditional sentences in 9.17 are in complete opposition to one another. In other words, he regarded the protasis in 17a (εἰ γὰρ ἐκὼν τοῦτο πράσσω) to be in opposition to the protasis in 17c (εἰ δὲ ἄκων), and the apodosis in 17b (μισθὸν ἔχω) to be in opposition to the apodosis in 17d (οἰκονομίαν πεπίστευμαι). When analysed closely, however, one realises that the two apodoses are *not* antithetical; while the protases in 17a and 17c are opposed, the apodoses in 17b and 17d are *not*. Paul never states explicitly that he is without the right to receive a wage, but simply insists that he is a slave of God. And quite significantly, he is not a menial slave (δοῦλος),

⁵⁰ Martin, *Slavery*, 75: 'It is true that slaves were usually paid by their masters for their work. This was probably even more often true for managerial slaves than for common laborers, but *misthon echein* is not a normal way of referring to this financial arrangement'. Martin also discusses how slaves were able to circumvent the legal barriers which prevented them from obtaining possessions (7-11).

but a slave administrator by virtue of having been entrusted with an administration (οἰκονομίαν πεπίστευμαι). And as an administrator, that is, a privileged commercial slave, Paul implies that he possesses the right to receive payment, an implication that will now be demonstrated.

The remuneration of administrators for their labour is suggested in literary and non-literary texts. The privileges of slave stewards in the Latin agronomists and other real-life bailiffs from Roman Egypt often included some form of monetary compensation. Jane Rowlandson, for instance, describes how the landowners of Oxyrhynchus paid their administrators in cash and/or kind. ‘Like tenancy’, she writes, ‘agricultural wage labour took a variety of forms, from long-term employees (ranging in status from bailiffs to humble servants) to independent workers or craftsmen being paid for performing a single service. In both cases, but particularly the former, payment in kind was often supplemented by or substituted for cash wages’.⁵¹ Dominic Rathbone makes a similar distinction between the forms of compensation, explaining that all permanent employees of the Appianus and related estates in the Arnsinoite nome received either a salary (ὀψώνιον), in the form of ‘a fixed monthly allowance of cash and wheat and sometimes vegetable oil’, or a wage (μισθός).⁵² A mid third-century CE document from Oxyrhynchus, for instance, mentions a certain Calpurnia Heraclia, who in her corn registration reports that ‘monthly allowances [from her corn holdings] are given to the agents and stewards and farmers and boys and monthly workers [δίδονται μηνιαῖαι συντάξεις πραγματευταῖς τε καὶ φροντισταῖς καὶ γεωργοῖς καὶ παιδαρίοις καὶ καταμηνείοις]’ (P.Oxy. 3048.19-20).⁵³ The labourers, of course, could then easily barter these allowances in the marketplace to supply their cash needs.⁵⁴

⁵¹ Rowlandson, *Landowners and Tenants*, 205.

⁵² Rathbone, *Economic Rationalism*, 91-92. Rathbone, however, contends that there exists ‘no evidence that the independent administrators of the Appianus estate were paid a salary for their services. . . . A salary might anyway have been seen as socially demeaning. The administrators instead enjoyed occasional perks such as hospitality when they visited *phrontides* and opportunities to make personal profits by dealing in estate produce, but we may guess that their main rewards were the prestige and influence conferred by association with the estate, Appianus’ patronage and gifts from him’ (70-71). But the exceptional nature of the Appianus estate may be due to the fact that the central administrators were probably free or freedmen already in possession of some means, being ‘barely inferior to the owners for whom they acted’ (70).

⁵³ Rowlandson, *Landowners and Tenants*, 207, states that the labourers listed in the letter were ‘certainly estate employees’.

⁵⁴ Rathbone, *Economic Rationalism*, 111-12.

A more common form of compensation among slave administrators was the grant of a *peculium*.⁵⁵ As discussed in Chapter 4, the *peculium* of a slave, while legally belonging to the master, served as an allowance of money, provisions, and other slaves by which the slave could live from day to day and even increase in order to purchase various luxuries. Two kinds of purchases verify that administrators and other privileged slaves earned great sums of money which were then treated as their own. Firstly, the great monetary gain of some administrators is apparent in the epitaphs they are responsible for erecting. Although some of these inscriptions are modest, others are quite lavish and make a point to mention that the monuments were paid for by the administrator himself, presumably with his *peculium*.⁵⁶ But undoubtedly the most important purchase a slave could make was his freedom. As Peter Garnsey remarks, ‘Unless we grant that profits could be made in [trading ventures and manufactures], it is difficult or impossible to understand how it was that slaves were able to buy their freedom’.⁵⁷ Therefore, even though payments and allowances came in a variety of forms, it is clear that administrators and other privileged slaves could expect to be compensated for their labour.

ii. Corresponding Apodoses: 1 Cor 9.17 and 2 Cor 5.13

The fact that administrators normally received compensation for their labour has significant implications for our reading of 1 Cor 9.16-18. Far from implying that he is an unworthy slave who simply fulfils his duty (Luke 17.10), by asserting that he has been entrusted with an administration, Paul insists that he is a privileged slave of God who, though compelled to preach, is entitled to pay. The conditional sentences that make up verse 17, therefore, should no longer be considered completely antithetical, as the scholarly consensus maintains. Instead,

⁵⁵ Watson, *Slave Law*, 90-101; Andreau, *Banking and Business*, 66: ‘According to several texts in the *Digest*, the slave *institor* would often get a salary, a *merces*, in return for his work (*operae*). But, in some cases, he did not receive any direct reward. In such a case, his *operae* were free, *gratuitae*, but he probably had other benefits (for instance, some better opportunity to run his *peculium*). The money sunk in the business was not part of the *peculium* of the slave-agent. But that does not mean that the slave did not also possess a *peculium*, so that in practice a certain confusion could sometimes arise over which sums were entrusted to the slave as part of his *peculium* and which were those that he managed in his capacity as agent’.

⁵⁶ Cf. Carlsen, *Vilici*, 95. Bradley, *Slaves and Masters*, 110: ‘From epigraphic evidence it appears that at times [slaves] spent what must have been substantial sums on commemorative epitaphs and even public monuments’.

⁵⁷ Peter Garnsey, ‘Independent Freedmen and the Economy of Roman Italy under the Principate’, *Klio* 63 (1981): 359-71, at 370.

the two apodoses correspond: if Paul preaches willingly, then naturally he is entitled to a wage; but (δέ) if he preaches unwillingly, as in fact he does, then he has been entrusted with an administration, which still entitles him to remuneration.⁵⁸

The plausibility of Paul utilising two corresponding, rather than antithetical apodoses in 1 Cor 9.17 is in fact supported elsewhere in the Corinthian correspondence. In 2 Cor 5.13, Paul states, 'For if we are irrational, it is for God; if we are rational, it is for you' (εἴτε γὰρ ἐξέστημεν, θεῷ· εἴτε σωφρονοῦμεν, ὑμῖν).⁵⁹ Having had experiences which have brought into question Paul's rationality, here the apostle defends himself and his actions by contrasting, as he does in 1 Cor 9.17, two alternative protases in order to legitimate a single proposition about his ministry—its selfless nature.⁶⁰ Paul's selflessness is expressed through two seemingly competing apodoses: his actions are performed either for the benefit of God (θεῷ) or for the benefit of the church (ὑμῖν). In either case, however, whether Paul is found to be out of his mind or with sound mind, a single proposition is affirmed: he ministers for the benefit of others. As Ralph Martin verifies, 'On the surface, it comes into view that no matter the state of Paul's mind or disposition, he does nothing for himself; all is done for God and the Corinthians. . . . [W]hether Paul speaks of his exceptional behavior or his ordinary, all of his actions are directed towards someone else'.⁶¹ Moyer Hubbard similarly maintains, '[H]owever vexing the parts may be, the whole is reasonably clear: Paul is stating that his actions are entirely free of selfish ambition and wholly "other" directed'.⁶² Murray Harris concurs: 'Whatever the background to this difficult verse, its general import seems clear. Paul disowns self-interest as a motive for any of his action. . . . [A]ll is for God's glory and the benefit of others'.⁶³

Thus, in 2 Cor 5.13 we have another example of two conditional sentences with antithetical protases, but corresponding apodoses, through which Paul makes

⁵⁸ The δέ in verse 17 is adversative, but the two concepts being contrasted are ἐκῶν and ἄκων, not μισθὸν ἔχω and οἰκονομίαν πεπίστευμαι.

⁵⁹ For the defence as targeting Paul's rhetorical lucidity, rather than sanity, see Moyer Hubbard, 'Was Paul Out of His Mind? Re-Reading 2 Corinthians 5.13', *JSNT* 70 (1998): 39–64, esp. 61.

⁶⁰ The correspondence between 1 Cor 9.17 and 2 Cor 5.13 is further supported by the apologetic function of the two discourses and their shared use of γάρ. Cf. Frank J. Matera, *II Corinthians: A Commentary* (NTL; Louisville: WJK, 2003), 131.

⁶¹ Ralph P. Martin, *2 Corinthians* (WBC 40; Waco, TX: Word, 1986), 126–27.

⁶² Hubbard, 'Was Paul Out of His Mind?': 39.

⁶³ Murray J. Harris, *The Second Epistle to the Corinthians: A Commentary on the Greek Text* (NIGTC; Grand Rapids: Eerdmans, 2005), 417.

a single point. In the light of this passage, the rhetorical approach argued for in 1 Cor 9.17 finds strong support.

iii. The Coherence of 9.16-18

Having established that administrators were normally compensated for their work, we argued that Paul's administration was deserving of pay and that 1 Cor 9.17 should be interpreted as containing two corresponding apodoses. But how then should verse 17 read and how does this new reading correlate with the exegetical insights in verses 16-18 observed in the earlier critiques of the views represented by Martin and Malherbe?

The digression begun in verse 16 is introduced in order to ward off the anticipated criticisms of certain philosophically astute members in the church. While in verses 12 and 15 Paul boasts in the fact that he has refused his right to receive material support and thus has endured hardship for the sake of the gospel, in verse 16 he explains why preaching the gospel by itself is insufficient to merit a boast. He must preach because God has compelled him to preach (9.16).⁶⁴ In fact, neglect of his commission, as with the other Hebrew prophets, will be met with God's judgment (οὐαί).⁶⁵ But Paul anticipates that this concession will raise the issue

⁶⁴ Throughout his letters Paul refers to a number of mechanisms which motivate him to preach. Paul testifies that it is the χάρις of God that set him apart for apostolic ministry (Rom 1.5; Gal 1.15; 1 Cor 15.10). Given the instrumentality of grace in the economy of God, one can then assume that it is the same grace that continued to obligate him to fulfill his call. Cf. As Polaski, *Power*, 122; John M. G. Barclay, "'By the Grace of God I Am what I Am': Grace and Agency in Philo and Paul", in *Divine and Human Agency in Paul and His Cultural Environment*, ed. Simon J. Gathercole and John M.G. Barclay (LNTS; London: T&T Clark, 2006), 140-57, at 151; Ehrensperger, *Power*, 90; Zeba A. Crook, 'Grace as Benefaction in Galatians 2:9, 1 Corinthians 3:10, and Romans 12:3; 15:15', in *The Social Sciences and Biblical Translation*, ed. Dietmar Neufeld (SBLSS 41; Atlanta: SBL, 2008), 25-38. But beyond the grace of God, the very gospel itself is suggested to have compelled Paul to preach; cf. Käsemann, 'amor fati': 150.

⁶⁵ Crook, *Reconceptualising Conversion*, 160, and Zeba Crook, 'The Divine Benefactions of Paul the Client', *JGRChJ* 2 (2001-2005): 9-26, at 18-19, argues that Paul's ἀνάγκη and fear of divine vengeance (οὐαί) indicate that he understood himself to be the client of his patron God. But Crook fails to notice that Paul's compulsion rhetoric more closely belongs to the sphere of philosophy, and his use of οὐαί belongs to the OT prophetic tradition. As Harry P. Nasuti, 'The Woes of the Prophets and the Rights of the Apostle: The Internal Dynamics of 1 Corinthians 9', *CBQ* 50 (1988): 246-64, at 257-58, states, 'Paul's self-conception in v 16 is clearly such as to link him with the biblical prophets, especially Jeremiah' (cf. Jer 15.10). Comparisons can also be made between Paul and Isaiah (6.5) and Baruch (Jer 45.3 [LXX 51.33]); cf. Gunther Wanke, 'ôy und hôy', *ZAW* 77 (1966): 215-18; Waldemar Janzen, *Mourning Cry and Woe Oracle* (BZAW 125; Berlin: De Gruyter, 1972); Sandnes, *Paul*, 125-30. Nevertheless, Paul's prophetic compulsion is couched in philosophical terms in order to contextualise his thoughts within the philosophically influenced congregation. For a criticism of the patron-client model as a descriptor of Paul's call, see David J. Downs, 'Is God Paul's Patron? The Economy of Patronage in

of his freedom and right to receive remuneration. If Paul is compelled to preach the gospel, then his critics will automatically assume that he is simply a slave of God and labours without the right and privilege of material compensation. In order to circumvent this charge, then, Paul in verse 17 explains that, despite his compulsion, his particular role as a slave of God allows him to retain certain apostolic rights. After all, if Paul preached ἑκὼν, then naturally he would be entitled to receive a μισθός. But since he preaches ἄκων,⁶⁶ he is also entitled to compensation because his particular form of privileged slavery is that of a paid administration. By the end of verse 17, therefore, Paul still possesses the right to material support, which he argued for incessantly in verses 4-14 and is required to have in order to refuse that right in verses 12, 15, 18, and 19. He then without any insincerity or rhetorical abnormality can in verse 18 ask, ‘What therefore is my wage [τίς οὖν μού ἐστὶν ὁ μισθός]?’⁶⁷ And in typical Pauline fashion he explains that his payment is, quite paradoxically, the opportunity not to make use of his right to receive pay.

Paul's Theology', in *Engaging Economics: New Testament Scenarios and Early Christian Reception*, ed. Bruce W. Longenecker and Kelly D. Liebengood (Grand Rapids: Eerdmans, 2009), 129-56.

⁶⁶ Many reject that Paul preached unwillingly and under compulsion because they correlate motives with the acceptability of the service rendered. John Calvin, *The First Epistle of Paul the Apostle to the Corinthians* (trans. John W. Fraser; Edinburgh: Oliver and Boyd, 1960), 193, for instance, remarked, '[T]he true meaning, in my view, is that the service of a man, which is done grudgingly and, as it were, against his will, is quite unacceptable to God. Therefore, whenever God has demanded something from us, we are deceiving ourselves, if we imagine that we are fulfilling it properly, when we do it grudgingly. For the Lord expects his servants to be eager, so as to take pleasure in obeying Him, and demonstrate their cheerfulness by acting without any hesitation. In short, Paul means that the only way in which he would do justice to his calling, would be by doing his duty with willingness and unbounded eagerness'. Additionally, Grosheide, *First Corinthians*, 210, dismissed *all* of 9.17 as hypothetical 'since the apostle does his work with joy'. It cannot be denied that Paul conveys great compassion for those to whom he preaches (Rom 9.1-3) and insists that he ministers out of emulation of Christ's love (2 Cor 5.14). But Paul's ministry brought upon him so many hardships, and the resurrection was such a consuming reality for him, that he consistently preferred (μᾶλλον) to be away from the body and at home with the Lord (2 Cor 5.8). In fact, when pressed to choose between persisting in ministry and departing to be with Christ, the apostle considered death to be more advantageous (κέρδος [Phil 1.21]), admitting that being with Christ was his desire (ἐπιθυμία) and indeed far better (πολλῶ μᾶλλον κρείσσον [1.23]), even if ministering to the church was at the moment a greater necessity (ἀναγκαιότερον [1.24]).

⁶⁷ While it is clear why the subjects of Paul's analogies in verses 4-14 were entitled to receive food directly from their respective purveyors, it is puzzling initially why Paul, as an administrator, was entitled to be compensated by the church (the third-party beneficiaries of his service), rather than God (his principal). Perhaps this is because administrators who were afforded *peculia* from their principals, rather than returning the profits immediately to their masters, normally retained and lived off of the sums they received from the third-contracting parties with whom they conducted business. Since administrators were an exceptional breed of slaves who were normally entitled to compensation, this interpretation offers a plausible explanation for Paul's rare, yet strategic self-portrayal as an administrator of God.

2. Apostolic Responsibility: ‘Depositing’ the Gospel (9.18)

While re-reading how Paul used his *oikonomos* metaphor in verse 17 provides solutions to the standard exegetical problems interpreters face in verses 16-18, it is our contention that Paul continued to portray his role as an administrator in the verses which follow, and that the metaphor clarifies further some of the images that surface along the way. In verse 18, for instance, Paul’s metaphor is perpetuated through his use of the verb τίθημι. The reason that Paul employed τίθημι of all verbs to express his gospel proclamation has been largely overlooked by Pauline scholars, despite the fact that Paul uses it only rarely in relation to the gospel and that there is little agreement on what manner of action τίθημι denotes in this verse. Some translations suggest ‘make the gospel free of charge’ (KJV; ASV; RSV; NRSV),⁶⁸ others propose ‘offer the gospel without charge’ (NET; NASB; NIV), and still others read ‘present the gospel free of charge’ (ESV). Admittedly, the verb τίθημι has a broad lexical range (cf. LSJ), so that each of these translations is possible and their implications not mutually exclusive. But given Paul’s commercial metaphor in verse 17 and that his concern remains with monetary matters in verse 18, it is worth enquiring if and how τίθημι might carry on the monetary theme by figuratively portraying Paul’s preaching as a commercial, or monetary, transaction.

The possibility of interpreting τίθημι in the light of the monetary theme finds support in the occasional use of the verb in contexts involving banking and commerce (cf. LSJ II.7-8; BDAG 2; MM 5087 [2]). In the fourth century BCE, for instance, τίθημι was used to denote bank payments in the work of Demosthenes: ‘And let no one of you wonder that I have accurate knowledge of these matters; for bankers are accustomed to write out memoranda of the sums which they lend, the purposes for which funds are desired, and the payments which a borrower makes [τιθῆται], in order that his receipts and his payments [τά τε ληφθέντα καὶ τὰ τεθέντα] may be known to them for their accounts’ ([*Tim.*] 49.5). Plutarch’s famous treatise on the dangers of borrowing money offers additional examples of the monetary use of τίθημι. Speaking of the impiety of money-lenders, Plutarch states that they ‘make the market-place a place of the damned for the wretched debtors; like vultures they devour and flay them, “entering into their entrails,” or in other instances they stand over them and inflict on them the tortures of Tantalus by

⁶⁸ Cf. Thiselton, *First Corinthians*, 698.

preventing them from tasting their own produce which they reap and harvest'. Plutarch then reiterates his point with another startling image: 'They say that hares at one and the same time give birth to one litter, suckle another, and conceive again; but the loans of these barbarous rascals [i.e. money-lenders] give birth to interest before conception; for while they are giving they immediately demand payment, while they lay money down [τιθέντες] they take it up, and they lend what they receive for money lent' (*Mor.* 829b). These uses of τίθημι clearly carry monetary significance.

Another important example of the monetary use of τίθημι is found in biblical literature. In the Parable of the Ten Mina (Luke 19.11-27), Jesus is reported to have told a parable about a nobleman who, before going on a long journey, entrusted ten commercial slaves (δοῦλοι) with one mina each, instructing them to conduct business (πραγματεύομαι [19.13; cf. 19.15]) until his return. Upon his arrival, the nobleman inspected the transactions of the slaves to find that one slave had not conducted any business. In the explanation for his disobedience, the slave confessed that he felt it was safer for him not to do business than to risk losing the mina out of fear of the master's retribution. He reasoned with his master, insisting,

'[Y]ou are a harsh man; you take what you did not deposit [ἔθηκα], and reap what you did not sow [ἔσπειρα].' [The master] said to him, 'I will judge you by your own words, you wicked slave! You knew, did you, that I was a harsh man, taking what I did not deposit [ἔθηκα] and reaping what I did not sow [ἔσπειρα]? Why then did you not put my money into the bank? Then when I returned, I could have collected it with interest' (Luke 19.21-23 [NRSV])

In this passage, τίθημι clearly carries monetary significance. Moreover, the translation 'deposit' is appropriate, since banking and investments are in view.⁶⁹

And though in this parable the nobleman is the one who 'deposits' and 'takes up' the investments, in antiquity administrators were also associated with the depositing of goods and produce. The cognate noun θέμα, in fact, is widely attested for the grain deposits made by landowners, perhaps through their administrators, in the papyri of Roman Egypt (e.g. P.Oxy. 2588-90, 4856-90; P.Ryl. 199.12 P.Tebt 120.125).⁷⁰ In these texts, θέματα refer to private deposits in a granary and are often handled by

⁶⁹ The relevance of this passage for 1 Corinthians is further supported by the fact that earlier in Paul's discourse he figuratively referred to preaching for pay with the same agricultural analogy: 'If we have sown spiritual good [τὰ πνευματικά ἐσπείραμεν] among you, is it too much if we reap your material benefits [τὰ σαρκικά θερίσομεν]?' (1 Cor 9.11).

⁷⁰ See also Friedrich Preisigke, *Girowesen im griechischen Ägypten, enthaltend Korngiro, Geldgiro, Girobanknotariat mit Einschluss des Archivwesens: ein Beitrag zur Geschichte des Verwaltungsdienstes im Altertume* (Hildesheim; New York: G. Olms, 1971), 72; Rowlandson, *Landowners and Tenants*, 116; Nikos Litinas, 'Sitologi Documents Concerning Private Transactions in the Oxyrhynchite Nome', *ZPE* 160 (2007): 183-202, esp. 197.

commercial administrators (see Appendix 4).⁷¹ Admittedly, these receipts nowhere suggest that the administrators actually deposited the produce. But given the fact that absentee landowners often delegated great amounts of financial and commercial responsibility to their managers (see Chapter 4), it is almost certain that administrators were those responsible for making deposits as well.

A final example of the monetary use of *τίθημι* is found much closer to our original context. In the concluding remarks of 1 Corinthians, Paul provides instructions for the church regarding the Jerusalem collection. He states, ‘On the first day of every week, each of you is to put aside and save [παρ’ ἑαυτῶ τιθέτω θησαυρίζων] whatever extra you earn, so that collections need not be taken when I come’ (1 Cor 16.2 [NRSV]).⁷² Again, *τίθημι* here undoubtedly carries a monetary sense and perhaps also implies the making of a deposit (BDAG 2).⁷³

Given, therefore, the lexical range of *τίθημι* and the fact that Paul himself uses the verb elsewhere in 1 Corinthians in a monetary sense, it is conceivable that the apostle also uses it in 1 Cor 9.18 to portray his gospel preaching as a kind of commercial transaction, perhaps in the sense of ‘deposit/entrust the gospel’. This translation of *τίθημι* is also supported in 2 Cor 5.19, where Paul portrays himself as the recipient of a similar kind of trust: ‘[I]n Christ God was reconciling the world to himself, not counting their trespasses against them, and *entrusting* [θέμενος] the message of reconciliation to us’ (NRSV; cf. ESV).

But far from serving like ‘the many who peddle the word of God’ as a commodity for profit (2 Cor 2.17),⁷⁴ Paul distinguishes himself as an apostle through his refusal of pay and by issuing the gospel free of charge (ἀδάπανος).⁷⁵ The

⁷¹ P.Oxy. (2008), 76. Dieter Hagedorn, ‘Θέμα’, *ZPE* 25 (1977): 197-98, along with the editor of P.Mich 11.604(16), suggests that *θέμα* can also indicate a receipt for a *θέμα*-payment (‘Quittung für eine *θέμα*-Zahlung’). For grain storage in Roman Egypt, see Geoffrey Rickman, *Roman Granaries and Store Buildings* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1971), 298-306.

⁷² Cf. Tobit 4.9: ‘So you will be laying up a good treasure for yourself against the day of necessity’ (θέμα γὰρ ἀγαθὸν θησαυρίζεις σεαυτῶ εἰς ἡμέραν ἀνάγκης).

⁷³ See also the use of *παραθήκη* as the gospel ‘deposit’ in 1 Tim 6.20 and 2 Tim 1.12-14, and *παρατίθημι* in 1 Tim 1.18 and 2 Tim 2.2 for the ‘entrusting’ of various verbal deposits; cf. Jerome D. Quinn and William C. Wacker, *The First and Second Letters to Timothy: A New Translation with Notes and Commentary* (Grand Rapids: Eerdmans, 2000), 554-57.

⁷⁴ For anti-sophistic sentiments about the peddling of wisdom and philosophy, see, e.g., Philo, *Gig.* 39; *Mos.* 2.212; Plato, *Prot.* 313c-d. The difference between the apostle as *κάπηλος* (*καπηλεύω*) and *οικονόμος* is that the *κάπηλος* conducts business without ‘sincerity’ (*εὐλικρινεία*) and accountability. Paul, however, preaches ‘as from sincerity’ (ὡς ἐξ εὐλικρινείας) and ‘in the sight of God’ (*κατέναντι θεοῦ* [2 Cor 2.17]), not seeking money, but converts (9.19-23).

⁷⁵ Frederick W. Danker, *Benefactor: Epigraphic Study of a Graeco-Roman and New Testament Semantic Field* (St. Louis, MO: Clayton Publishing House, 1982), 333-34. Timothy H. Lim, ‘Not in

adjective ἀδάπανος, a synonym of δωρεάν (2 Cor 11.7), is simply the negation of δάπανος ('charge, cost'). Paul uses verbal cognates when, after reassuring the Corinthians that he is still not interested in their money, he declares, 'I will most gladly spend [δαπανήσω] and be spent [ἐκδαπανηθήσομαι] for you' (2 Cor 12.15). In Paul's approach to apostolic support, he will not accept pay from those to whom he currently ministers, and never from certain churches (2 Cor 11.9, 12). Instead, he offers his own life and body as the expense for his services (1 Cor 9.27; cf 9.18-19). Verse 18, therefore, should read: '[As an administrator], what then is my reward? Just this: that in my preaching I may *deposit/entrust* the gospel free of charge, so as not to make full use of my right in the gospel'. The image depicted by this meaning of τίθημι extends Paul's administrator metaphor from verse 17 to verse 18 and more thoroughly envelopes this passage in the monetary, commercial theme.

3. Apostolic Objective: 'Gaining' Converts (9.19-23)

Having argued that Paul's metaphor extends into 9.18, it is our contention that it also continues into 9.19-23. As the γάρ at the beginning of 9.19 indicates, Paul closely associates what he said earlier about his refusal pay with his forthcoming discourse on his accommodating ministry strategy (9.19-23). Paul has already admitted that he is a slave administrator of God. Even so, he indicates in verse 19 that he is 'free from all [*people*]' (ἐλεύθερος γὰρ ὢν ἐκ πάντων [9.19a]), since he retains the rights as an apostle not to ply a trade (9.6) and instead to receive financial support from the church (9.4, 12, 14). But in verse 19 Paul indicates that he also has the right to refuse those rights and in that way to enslave himself to others (πᾶσιν ἑμαυτὸν ἐδούλωσα [9.19b]).⁷⁶

Persuasive Words of Wisdom, but in the Demonstration of the Spirit and Power', *NovT* 29 (1987): 137-49, at 145: 'For Paul, to peddle the gospel for profit is to lower the word of God to the level of a commodity sold in the market place'.

⁷⁶ Garland, *1 Corinthians*, 425: 'As God's slave, Paul ultimately sets himself free from others (7:22-23). Some are compelled to speak because of their need for money, which in turn means that they are compelled to preach only to those who can pay. By refusing fees, Paul was able to exercise freedom to preach to one and all'. B. Hall, "'All Things to All People": A Study of 1 Corinthians 9.19-23', in *The Conversation Continues: Studies in Paul and John in Honor of J. Louis Martyn*, ed. Beverly R. Gaventa and Robert T. Fortna (Nashville: Abingdon, 1990), 137-57, and Galloway, *Freedom*, 183, erroneously argue that Paul's ἀνάγκη extends even to his refusal of pay, so that his self-enslavement is not voluntary, but is mandated by his call. But in order to do so, they must redefine 'slavery', 'right', and 'freedom' and confuse those concepts to an utterly unrecognizable state, presumably because they fundamentally misunderstand Paul's logic in verses 16-18.

Several theories have been proposed about the implications of Paul's self-slavery in verse 19.⁷⁷ Perhaps most famously, Ronald Hock has contended that Paul's self-enslavement refers to the social degradation of his working as an artisan, a profession typically occupied by slaves (cf. 2 Cor 11.7).⁷⁸ But in addition to the fact that such a characterisation would have been offensive to at least a good number—almost certainly the vast majority—of the Corinthian Christians, who in all probability shared his status as wage labourers,⁷⁹ Paul's repeated use of Stoic themes throughout 1 Corinthians 8-9 (as seen above) suggests that his declaration of freedom in 9.1 and 19 together with his self-enslavement in verse 19 should probably be interpreted within the context of moral philosophy.⁸⁰ By stating that he is free from all, yet has enslaved himself to all, Paul explains in philosophical terms that, while he has certain rights, he has relinquished them for the benefit of those to whom he ministers.

Paul then explains how his strategy of accommodation plays out. To the Jews, Paul explains, he became as a Jew; to those under the law, he became as one under the law; to those outside the law, he became as one outside the law; finally, to the weak, he became weak. But driving his ministry strategy was Paul's ultimate objective to see people saved, and he even summarises his approach by asserting that he adapts to his audiences—that is, he becomes 'all things to all people'—in order that he 'might save some' (9.22).⁸¹ But σῶζω is not Paul's preferred term for conversion in this passage. Instead, it is striking that Paul repeatedly referred to his missionary objective with the verb κερδαίνω.

⁷⁷ Martin, *Slavery*, 86-135, argues that Paul's approach resembles the demagogue, populist leader topos from antiquity.

⁷⁸ Ronald F. Hock, 'Paul's Tentmaking and the Problem of His Social Class', *JBL* 97 (1978): 555-64, at 558-60; cf. Hock, *Social Context*, 59-62.

⁷⁹ Cf. Todd D. Still, 'Did Paul Loathe Manual Labor? Revisiting the Work of Ronald F. Hock on the Apostle's Tentmaking and Social Class', *JBL* 125 (2006): 781-95, at 787-89, and the response by Ronald F. Hock, 'The Problem of Paul's Social Class: Further Reflections', in *Paul's World*, ed. Stanley E. Porter (Pauline Studies 4; Leiden: Brill, 2008), 7-18. For the socio-economic level of the Pauline communities, see, esp., Bruce W. Longenecker, 'Socio-Economic Profiling of the First Urban Christians', in *Urban Christians* (2009), 36-59.

⁸⁰ Malherbe, 'Determinism', 251-52.

⁸¹ Michael J. Gorman, *Cruciformity: Paul's Narrative Spirituality of the Cross* (Grand Rapids: Eerdmans, 2001), 181-92, has shown that Paul's self-lowering in 1 Cor 9.19 closely—and probably intentionally—resembles the humiliation of Christ represented in Phil 2.6-8. As Gorman states, 'Perhaps Paul's most sustained systematic reflection on his own experience of cruciform ministry appears in 1 Corinthians 9' (181). Cf. David G. Horrell, 'Theological Principle or Christological Praxis? Pauline Ethics in 1 Corinthians 8.1-11.1', *JSNT* 67 (1997): 83-114; Seyoon Kim, 'Imitatio Christi (1 Corinthians 11:1): How Paul Imitates Jesus Christ in Dealing with Idol Food (1 Corinthians 8-10)', *BBR* 13 (2003): 193-226.

While many interpreters have noticed the oddity of Paul's reference to his evangelistic work with κερδαίνω, very few have sought to explain Paul's application of it. Abraham Malherbe and Clarence Glad, on the one hand, both suggest that Paul here is indebted to Cynic tradition. They both cite speeches of the Cynic philosopher Antisthenes, where the author juxtaposes κερδαίνω and σώζω to express Odysseus' preference to undergo ill-treatment if thereby he might gain something or save people.⁸² Margaret Mitchell and Raymond Collins, on the other hand, have both advocated the view that κερδαίνω here carries the rhetorical sense of advantage. Because Paul's letter has significant deliberative intentions, Mitchell and Collins suggest that Paul's use of the verb in 1 Corinthians is simply another instantiation of this rhetorical topos.⁸³ But while Paul occasionally interacts with moral philosophy, and his use of the verb certainly serves a rhetorical function (one objective of the chapter, after all, is to serve as an *exemplum*), these explanations do not give sufficient weight to the monetary theme that has been running throughout the chapter.⁸⁴

David Daube additionally noticed that the application of κερδαίνω in the sense of 'to win over an unbeliever to one's faith' is 'quite un-Greek'; indeed, '[t]here is nothing remotely analogous in Liddell-Scott or the papyri'.⁸⁵ Nevertheless, Daube observed that the consistent way the NT authors use the verb as a 'missionary term' (conversion [1 Pet 3.1]; turning from sin [Matt 18.15]), requires an explanation beyond mere coincidence. Since κερδαίνω appears nowhere in the LXX, Daube looked to Rabbinic Judaism, where he found a precedent for utilising commercial terms for 'the gaining by God of men whom he had cast away'.⁸⁶ But significantly,

⁸² Malherbe, 'Determinism', 253; Clarence E. Glad, *Paul and Philodemus: Adaptability in Epicurean and Early Christian Psychagogy* (NovTSup 81; Leiden: Brill, 1995), 251.

⁸³ Mitchell, *Reconciliation*, 248; Collins, *First Corinthians*, 353.

⁸⁴ For a list of other possible scholarly views on the influence of Paul's thought in verses 19-23, see Margaret M. Mitchell, 'Pauline Accommodation and "Condescension" (συγκατάβασις): 1 Cor 9:19-23 and the History of Influence', in *Paul Beyond the Judaism/Hellenism Divide*, ed. Troels Engberg-Pedersen (Louisville: WJK, 2001), 197-214, at 198. Mitchell may rightly question whether any single Hellenistic 'tradition' is responsible for Paul's accommodation motif, but the plausibility of the commercial use of κερδαίνω is strengthened by the fact that it is not dependent upon Paul's education or familiarity with popular philosophy.

⁸⁵ David Daube, 'κερδαίνω as a Missionary Term', *HTR* 40 (1947): 109-120, at 109. David Daube, *The New Testament and Rabbinic Judaism* (Jordan Lectures in Comparative Religion 2; London: Athlone Press, 1956), 352-61. Cf. Heinrich Schlier, 'κερδαίνω', in *TDNT* (Grand Rapids: Eerdmans, 1964-1976), 673.

⁸⁶ As Daube, 'κερδαίνω': 109, remarks, 'No Rabbinic parallels have so far been adduced; but surely, they ought to exist, for if there had been no Rabbinic influence, it is difficult to see how the New Testament writers should have come to employ the verb in a way neither classical nor

Daube was not able to demonstrate that there was ever an association between this commercial sense and God's gaining or winning over Gentiles.⁸⁷ Admitting this shortcoming, Daube aimed to narrow the gap in 1 Pet 3.1 and 1 Cor 9.19-22 by attempting to show a sense of intertextual indebtedness by these NT letters to Rabbinic precepts. However, the associations Daube mapped out remain very weak, which provides room for exploring the possibility that Paul's use of κερδαίνω in 1 Cor 9.19-22 originated from the commercial theme already established earlier in the discourse.

It is not our objective here to show how non-Pauline Christian literature came to use κερδαίνω in a missionary sense. Nevertheless, it is significant that in nearly all of its sixteen occurrences in the NT (whether literal or figurative), the verb retains a strong commercial or monetary sense. This meaning of κερδαίνω becomes explicit when on a number of occasions the verb is contrasted with its antonym ζημιόω. Each of the Synoptics, for instance, report Jesus cautioning his followers about gaining (κερδαίνω) the world and yet forfeiting (ζημιόω) their souls/lives (Matt 16.26//Mark 8.36//Luke 9.25).⁸⁸ The verb is also used in Acts 27.21 during Paul's voyage to Rome where it is ironically juxtaposed with ζημία to indicate the ship's 'accruing' of both damage and 'loss' (κερδῆσαι τε τὴν ὕβριν ταύτην καὶ τὴν ζημίαν). In Phil 3.7-8, Paul's only use of κερδαίνω outside of 1 Cor 9.19-22, he used it quite famously along with κέρδος,⁸⁹ ζημία, and ζημιόω to underscore the enormous 'gain' he considers to have obtained by knowing Christ, in contrast to the 'loss' which was his life before Christ.⁹⁰ Also quite significant is the occurrence of κερδαίνω in the Parable of the Talents. In this narrative the verb is

vernacular'. Daube's conclusions are followed by, e.g., Lietzmann and Kümmel, *An die Korinther I/II*, 180; Barrett, *First Corinthians*, 211; Conzelmann, *1 Corinthians*, 159-60 n. 17; Martin, *Slavery*, 209 n. 1; Schrage, *Der erste Brief an die Korinther*, 2:339; Thiselton, *First Corinthians*, 701; Fitzmyer, *First Corinthians*, 369.

⁸⁷ Daube, 'κερδαίνω': 117.

⁸⁸ It is striking that each of the Synoptics also uses ὠφελέω in the statement, further confirming that a monetary metaphor is in view, and employs σώζω in a parallel expression in the immediately preceding verse.

⁸⁹ It is noteworthy that in Phil 1.21-24 Paul uses both κέρδος and ἀναγκαῖος; cf. κερδαίνω and ἀνάγκη in 1 Cor 9.16-22.

⁹⁰ For Paul's use of these terms in a commercial or accounting sense, see Peter T. O'Brien, *The Epistle to the Philippians: A Commentary on the Greek Text* (NIGTC; Grand Rapids: Eerdmans, 1991), 382-91; Markus N. A. Bockmuehl, *A Commentary on the Epistle to the Philippians* (BNTC; London: A&C Black, 1997), 204-208; John Reumann, *Philippians: A New Translation with Introduction and Commentary* (AYB; New Haven: Yale University Press, 2008), 488-92. Gordon D. Fee, *Paul's Letter to the Philippians* (NICNT; Grand Rapids: Eerdmans, 1995), 316, even observes that Paul uses here 'the language of the marketplace'.

used no less than four times to indicate the generation of great profits by commercial slaves for their master (Matt 25.16, 17, 20, 22). Even in the verb's apparent 'missionary' sense regarding community discipline in Matt 18.15, it is perhaps significant that Jesus' discourse progresses shortly thereafter to the Parable of the Unforgiving Slave, which also involves a cast of commercial slaves (Matt 18.23-35). Finally, a commercial sense of the verb is also clear in Jas 3.1, where it is coupled with the explicit commercial term ἐμπορεύομαι.⁹¹

In the light of the consistent commercial use of κερδαίνω by a host of NT authors and Paul's obvious application of the verb this way in Phil 3.8, it is highly plausible that Paul also intended this sense in 1 Cor 9.19-22. By using this verb, Paul indicates that, as God's commercial administrator, the chief objective of his apostolic administration is to generate a 'profit' for God his principal.⁹² But in contrast to real-life administrators, Paul is not satisfied with simply producing a modest return for his master. Paul could certainly preach the gospel while getting paid by his churches and still make a respectable evangelistic 'return' in the process. But Paul goes well beyond the expectations of his master and all of God's other agents by forgoing his right to a wage in order to procure an even *greater* profit than he would have been able to obtain otherwise (ἵνα τοὺς πλείονας κερδήσω [9.19]).

Paul's refusal to be paid, however, is simply one instantiation of his ministerial strategy of accommodation. Adaptation was the very hallmark of his apostleship, being the pattern by which he was able to save a host of unbelievers in all kinds of socio-religious contexts.⁹³ The 'profit-seeking' objective of his ministerial strategy is apparent in the grammatically, syntactically, and verbally repetitive construction that spans verses 19-22:

⁹¹ Thus, the only NT passage outside of 1 Cor 9.19-22 where κερδαίνω surfaces without a plausible monetary theme is 1 Pet 3.1.

⁹² Lehmeier, *Oikonomia*, 231: 'Das Handeln eines tüchtigen οικονόμος strebt nach Gewinn (κέρδος)'. Edwards, *First Epistle to the Corinthians*, 237-38: 'The word [κερδήσω] both explains μισθός and carries on the metaphor of the steward. He refuses payment in money that he may make the greater gain in souls. But the gain is that which a faithful steward makes, not for himself, but for his master'. Cf. Robertson and Plummer, *First Corinthians*, 190.

⁹³ H. Chadwick, "'All Things to All Men'", *NTS* 1 (1955): 261-75; Hall, "'All Things to All People": A Study of 1 Corinthians 9.19-23', ; Glad, *Paul and Philodemus*, 249-77; Stephen C. Barton, "'All Things to All People": Paul and the Law in the Light of 1 Corinthians 9.19-23', in *Paul and the Mosaic Law: The Third Durham-Tübingen Research Symposium on Earliest Christianity and Judaism*, ed. James D. G. Dunn (WUNT 1/89; Tübingen: Mohr Siebeck, 1996), 271-85.

- 9.19 ἑλεύθερος γὰρ ὢν ἐκ πάντων πᾶσιν ἑμαυτὸν ἐδούλωσα
 ἵνα τοὺς πλείονας κερδήσω
- 9.20 καὶ ἐγενόμην τοῖς Ἰουδαίοις ὡς Ἰουδαῖος
 ἵνα Ἰουδαίους κερδήσω
 τοῖς ὑπὸ νόμον ὡς ὑπὸ νόμον, μὴ ὢν αὐτὸς ὑπὸ νόμον
 ἵνα τοὺς ὑπὸ νόμον κερδήσω
- 9.21 τοῖς ἀνόμοις ὡς ἄνομος, μὴ ὢν ἄνομος θεοῦ ἀλλ' ἔννομος Χριστοῦ
 ἵνα κερδάνω τοὺς ἀνόμους
- 9.22 ἐγενόμην τοῖς ἀσθενέσιν ἀσθενής
 ἵνα τοὺς ἀσθενεῖς κερδήσω
 τοῖς πᾶσιν γέγονα πάντα
 ἵνα πάντως τινὰς σώσω

By implementing this particular ministry strategy, Paul seeks to save more unbelievers than would be possible if he had not adopted such an accommodating approach. In other words, although he has rights as an apostle and is therefore free (ἐλεύθερος), Paul has given up his rights (9.18) and so voluntarily enslaved himself to his churches (9.19a) in order that he might make even more profit for his master (9.19).

Hock has drawn a similar association between Paul's use of κερδαίνω and the monetary theme already present in the discourse. It was Hock's contention that Paul was applying the verb in an anti-sophistic manner like the philosophers. For while the sophists pursued financial profit (κέρδος) and fame (δόξα) by entertaining wealthy patrons, the philosophers opted for poverty in order to acquire (κερδαίνω) the greater prizes of learning and friendship (Epictetus, *Diatr.* 4.1.177; Xenophon, *Mem.* 1.2.7).⁹⁴ According to Hock, Paul, in a similar anti-sophistic demonstration, impoverishes himself in order to acquire specific non-monetary benefits—converts, rather than a wage.⁹⁵ But Hock fails to acknowledge the significant disparity

⁹⁴ Hock, *Social Context*, 100 n. 114; cf. Philostratus, *Vit. Apoll.* 8.7.3. Hock also lists Dio Chrysostom, *Or.* 70.5, but Dio's use of κερδαίνω there does not appear to involve the support of philosophers. See also, e.g., Marshall, *Enmity*, 314-15; Fee, *First Corinthians*, 426-27 n. 24; Gorman, *Cruciformity*, 184; Garland, *1 Corinthians*, 429.

⁹⁵ Hock, *Social Context*, 62.

between Paul and the philosophers.⁹⁶ Whereas the philosophers sought entirely to benefit *themselves*, the ultimate beneficiary of Paul's pursuit—aside from his converts—was *God*. Just like the commercial slaves in the Parable of the Talents, Paul's 'profits' were not his own; just as those slaves were required to make more (ἄλλος) talents for their master (Matt 25.20-22), so Paul seeks to generate a sizable return (τοὺς πλείονας) to deliver unto his.

Therefore, through his accommodating approach to ministry, Paul becomes an active participant in the gospel's mission. As he explains at the end of the discourse in 9.23, Paul refuses his rights and accommodates to his audiences 'for the sake of the gospel' (διὰ τὸ εὐαγγέλιον), that is, to facilitate its advancement in Corinth and elsewhere as its 'co-partner' (συγκοινωνός).⁹⁷ In this text, Paul's use of συγκοινωνός connotes business partnership (*societas*) in keeping with the commercial theme.⁹⁸ The term clearly had this precedent in antiquity (BDAG; MM 609; cf. P.Bilabel 19.2; P.Cair.Masp. 2.67158.11)⁹⁹ and probably would have been heard this way by the Corinthians in a discourse saturated with commercial terminology. But precisely how does Paul partner with the gospel?

The application of either συγκοινωνός or συγκοινωνέω with reference to the gospel is unique for Paul and the rest of the NT authors. Elsewhere, for instance,

⁹⁶ Hock, *Social Context*, 65: 'Paul's apologies of his tentmaking, and the criticisms implied therein, show the influence of the philosophers' debates over the appropriate means of support, as we have seen in Paul's choice of language' (e.g. κερδαίνειν [9.19]).

⁹⁷ The enigmatic phrase συγκοινωνός αὐτοῦ γένημαί is troublesome for a number of reasons. Chief among them is how to understand the sense in which Paul actually is a συγκοινωνός. A number of translations and interpreters regard Paul as a sharer 'in the blessings of the gospel' (e.g. RSV, NRSV, NIV, ESV); cf. Günther Bornkamm, 'The Missionary Stance of Paul in 1 Corinthians 9 and in Acts', in *Studies in Luke-Acts: Essays Presented in Honor of Paul Schubert*, ed. Leander E. Keck and J. Louis Martyn (Nashville: Abingdon, 1966), 194-207, at 197-98; Conzelmann, *1 Corinthians*, 161; Fee, *First Corinthians*, 432; Witherington III, *Conflict*, 213. But while the pronoun αὐτοῦ certainly refers back to τὸ εὐαγγέλιον earlier in the verse, συγκοινωνός must be understood in an active, rather than a passive sense.

⁹⁸ For the *societas*, see Alan Watson, *The Law of Obligations in the Later Roman Republic* (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1965), 125-46; Reinhard Zimmermann, *The Law of Obligations: Roman Foundations of the Civilian Tradition* (Capetown: Juta, 1990), 451-76. J. Paul Sampley, *Pauline Partnership in Christ: Christian Community and Commitment in Light of Roman Law* (Philadelphia: Fortress, 1980), argues that Paul conceives of the Christian community (esp. the Philippians and Romans) as a *societas*, but does not apply the concept to συγκοινωνός in 1 Cor 9.23. For a critical assessment of Sampley, see G. W. Peterman, *Paul's Gift from Philippi: Conventions of Gift-Exchange and Christian Giving* (SNTSMS 92; Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1997), 123-27. But Paul's use of συγκοινωνός/συγκοινωνέω elsewhere with reference to other persons does not negate its use here as connoting a business partnership.

⁹⁹ P.CairMasp 2.67158, a mid-sixth century (568 CE) business contract from Antinoopolis in Egypt, specifies how Aurelius Psois and Aurelius Josephus, brothers-in-law and business partners (συνκοινωνοί, συνπραγματεύται) in carpentry, divide their business shares (μέρα) and responsibilities, including their gains (κέρδοι, ὠφέλιμοι) and losses (ζημίαι). Cf. Thiselton, *First Corinthians*, 707.

Paul only uses those terms for the relationship which believing Jews and Gentiles share in God's promises (Rom 11.17) and the active participation of the Philippians in various aspects of Paul's ministry (Phil 1.7; 4.14). The latter two examples, however, are significant parallels for our text. Whereas Paul *accepts* financial support from the Philippians and thus becomes *their* 'co-partners' in the advancement of the gospel (Phil 4.14-18; cf. 1.7), he *rejects* support from the Corinthians in order that he might become the *gospel's* 'co-partner' towards them. In this sense, the gospel is an independent agent, or force, and Paul aims to cooperate with it as its *συγκοινωνός*, rather than obstruct it as its competitor.¹⁰⁰ To this end, becoming the gospel's *συγκοινωνός* would mean that Paul seeks to do, or not to do, whatever is necessary (i.e. renouncing his rights and adapting to his audiences) in order for the gospel to accomplish its intended goal.¹⁰¹ And since Paul understands his apostolic role as primarily involving the preaching of the gospel (1.17; 4.1), he must only proclaim the gospel and not impede its progress, whether through rhetorical adornment or by exploiting his apostolic rights (1.17; 2.1-5; 9.12).

But in the end, Paul's objective is not for God's advantage alone. Just like many commercial slaves, Paul laboured diligently in order to secure privileges. Rather than working for an immediate financial payoff, Paul serves as a faithful administrator (4.2) in order to receive an uncorruptable prize (*ἄφθαρτος στέφανος* [9.25]; *βραβεῖον* [9.24]) and eschatological wage (*μισθός* [3.8, 14]) to be issued along with his master's praise (*ἔπαινος*) upon his return (4.5).¹⁰²

¹⁰⁰ Cf. Zimmermann, *Law*, 451: 'Societas is thus not based, primarily, on an antagonism of interests; its essence is the pooling of resources (money, property, expertise or labour, or a combination of them) for a *common purpose*' (original emphasis).

¹⁰¹ As Schütz, *Authority*, 52, explains, 'If vv. 19-23 repeat the same theme of renunciation as is found in the preceding portion of ch. 9, then Paul must mean that he has done all this to become a participant in the dynamic character of the gospel – to share in the gospel's own work. He is commissioned to preach the gospel (v. 17), but his *reward* comes in sharing in the effectiveness of the gospel, not hindering this force. That is accomplished by disregarding "apostolic" rights and claims'. Cf. Morna D. Hooker, 'A Partner in the Gospel: Paul's Understanding of His Ministry', in *Theology and Ethics in Paul and His Interpreters: Essays in Honor of Victor Paul Furnish*, ed. Eugene H. Lovering and Jerry L. Sumney (Nashville: Abingdon Press, 1996), 83-100; Collins, *First Corinthians*, 356; Fitzmyer, *First Corinthians*, 372.

¹⁰² It is because Paul's preaching without pay in this way affords him an eschatological reward that he considers his refusal of his right a boast (*καύχημα*) in 9.15, a term which elsewhere also has eschatological significance (e.g. 2 Cor 1.14; Phil 2.16).

E. Summary

In this chapter we attempted again to address a number of social-historical, exegetical, and theological issues in Paul's first epistle to the Corinthians, this time targeting Paul's notoriously complicated discourse in 1 Corinthians 9. Through this investigation we have seen for a second time the way that Paul has utilised the image of the apostle as an *oikonomos* to articulate at once several fundamental characteristics of his apostolic position that were misunderstood by those in the Corinthian church. Firstly, we observed that the apostle, who initially defended at great length his right to receive material support from the Corinthians (9.1-14), insisted that he would not exploit that right in the church because it would prevent the gospel from accomplishing its intended goal (9.12, 15). In fact, we saw that Paul's right to receive payment was very different from his commission to preach the gospel, which was not a right at all. Paul's preaching itself was not a matter of choice; he was compelled to preach through his divine commission, and did so unwillingly (9.16-17). He was, therefore, considered a slave, not of men, but of God. Much to the surprise of his critics, however, Paul's slavery to God did not nullify his right to receive pay, because Paul's particular form of slavery was a private administration, in which he maintained his right to receive pay (e.g. *peculium*) despite being forced to preach. Nevertheless, though he was free to utilise this right, Paul enslaved himself to the Corinthians by refusing to accept a wage from them, insisting instead that, as God's administrator, his 'kerygmatic transactions', or 'deposits', would be made without cost to their recipients (9.18). Moreover, Paul freely chose to assume the life of an artisan, because by forgoing his right to receive his own material benefits he was able to secure even greater evangelistic gains for God his principal than he would have been able to otherwise (9.19). This accommodating approach to apostolic ministry became characteristic of all Paul's missionary efforts (9.19-22), for he realised that in order to maximise his evangelistic profits he had to cooperate, rather than conflict, with the gospel as its business partner (9.23). Moreover, these evangelistic gains, though strictly speaking they belong to God, nevertheless secure Paul's eschatological payoff, his uncorruptible wage that awaits him at Christ's return (9.24-27; cf. 3.8, 14; 4.4-5).

Through the *oikonomos* metaphor, then, Paul is able to elucidate a number of otherwise confusing, and even conflicting, characteristics of his apostolic ministry.

Not only does the image portray the apostle as a slave of God who is compelled to fulfil his commission, but it affords him the right, indeed the apostolic authority, to demand financial support from the churches to which he ministers. It is also significant that Paul casts the image in order to evade anticipated criticisms of his apostleship. Right when it seems that Paul has been rhetorically cornered into admitting that as God's slave he in fact does not possess the right to a wage as he had contended for the first half of the chapter, Paul then dramatically turns the table on the argument by announcing his status as God's slave administrator. The metaphor not only exonerates him of the anticipated charge of financial disentanglement, but also rhetorically paves the way for employing the other commercial terms which surface in the latter part of the chapter (9.18-23). Finally, it is of utmost importance to this study that Paul as an apostle, who has even received dominical authorisation to be supported by his churches (9.14), actually forfeits his freedom and authority in order that God, the gospel, and Paul's churches might be further enriched through his poverty (cf. 2 Cor 8.9). Paul's exercise of authority, then, was not a precondition for his apostleship. Rather than asserting authority over his churches, Paul subordinated his authority to his greater apostolic mandate, the winning of converts for Christ. And in this way Paul embodies the very person of Christ (1 Cor 11.1; cf. Phil 2.6-11), by humiliating himself for the greater glory of God (1 Cor 10.31), the good of humanity (10.33)—and even the benefit of his own eschatological status (9.24-27).

Chapter 8. Conclusions

A. Summary

This study has sought to elucidate the nature of Paul's apostleship and especially the exercise of his authority in 1 Corinthians. Although a number of other passages and themes could have been explored as possible means for understanding these theological concepts, this investigation has concentrated on Paul's portrayal of apostles as *oikonomoi* in 1 Cor 4.1-5 and the particular relevance of that designation for Paul's own ministry in 9.16-23. Unfortunately, this aim was immediately recognised to be complicated by the fact that Paul's description is a metaphor, and as such requires the interpreter to identify as accurately as possible Paul's intended source domain. Several source domains previously proposed in NT scholarship were immediately ruled out as unlikely or unhelpful. Moreover, while Dale Martin and others have suggested that ancient managerial slavery provides an adequate window into Paul's metaphor, it was shown that the criticisms and counter evidence marshalled against Martin's historical assumptions and exegetical conclusions by other interpreters, such as Murray Harris and John Byron, were considerable enough to raise questions about the reliability of Martin's thesis. It was therefore concluded that a full-scale reassessment of the ancient evidence was necessary in order to interpret Paul's *oikonomos* metaphor.

In Part 1, we surveyed the three kinds of *oikonomoi* most frequently attested in Graeco-Roman antiquity, those who served as regal, municipal, and private administrators. In this section we took special note of the rank and status these administrators possessed within their respective hierarchies, as well as their responsibilities and answerability to a superior person or body. In Chapter 2 we saw that the *oikonomoi* serving as regal administrators were appointed exclusively in the Hellenistic kingdoms. There we observed that, despite variations in chronology, geography, and political hierarchy, the social and structural attributes of these administrators were surprisingly consistent. In each of the main four political powers of the Hellenistic period, *oikonomoi* served as regional financial administrators and supervised significant resources in the divisions of those

kingdoms. Being representatives of the king in matters of finance, these figures had considerable authority to make decisions in their area of supervision and in their respective regions. These officials were subordinates, however, and they were held accountable for their administration by their superiors, in most instances by the king or by his immediate delegate.

In Chapter 3 we observed that the *oikonomoi* serving as municipal administrators in Graeco-Roman cities were characterised by a greater degree of social and structural diversification than their regal counterparts. The municipal *oikonomoi* serving in Hellenistic Greek cities, for instance, were free persons and served as treasury magistrates. In fact, due to the poor economic conditions of Hellenistic cities, the men occupying this office would normally have possessed significant social and economic standing. This would have also been the case for some *oikonomoi* serving in Greek cities during the Roman period. However, there were also public slaves bearing this title who would have been from a humble socio-economic condition. Evidence for the rank and status of *oikonomoi* serving in Roman cities, particularly Roman colonies, is much harder to come by. The question of the position and corresponding socio-economic status of Erastus in Corinth (Rom 16.23) continues to be disputed. However, an inscription from the neighbouring city of Patras has demonstrated that the title in an Augustan colony in Achaea can refer to a local dignitary serving as *quaestor*, the civic treasury magistrate. But regardless of the socio-economic status of the persons who bore the title in a municipal context, these *oikonomoi* were neither entrusted with a great amount of authority, nor situated in a deep administrative hierarchy, nor always subject to an accounting. And when these magistrates were held to account, they were normally answerable to a local governing body (ἐκκλησία/δικαστήριον; *ordo decurionum*), rather than an individual sovereign (κύριος).

In Chapter 4 we examined the *oikonomoi* serving as private commercial administrators. There we observed that the persons bearing this title (or any number of Greek and Latin equivalents), while being free gentlemen farmers during the Classical Greek period, almost always were slaves or freedmen during the Roman period, normally serving a κύριος/*dominus* as business managers. In this capacity they were given the responsibility of making profits for their owner through the production, trade, and investment of various goods and resources.

Thus, they were also entrusted with a considerable amount of authority to speak and act on behalf of their principal, commanding whatever staff that served beneath them and representing the master to third contracting parties. Because of their legal condition, they possessed very humble social status, though they possessed at the same time rather unique rights and privileges, including opportunities to circumvent the legal restraints preventing them from having money and other kinds of possessions. But as slaves, they were vulnerable to various forms of punishment, including violent abuse and death.

Having outlined in Part 1 the major social and structural differences between the *oikonomoi* serving in regal, municipal, and private administration, in Part 2 we sought to compare the portraits assembled in Part 1 to the *oikonomos* metaphor Paul applied in 1 Corinthians, in order to identify its source domain and to interpret how Paul used the metaphor to meet his rhetorical and theological objectives. In Chapter 5 we briefly analysed 1 Corinthians 4 and 9, observing that, because in 1 Corinthians 4 Paul's apostolic framework was a hierarchy with a κύριος in the superior position, and in 1 Corinthians 9 Paul's metaphor concerned his entitlement to a wage, Paul's source domain was probably private administration. This was further confirmed through an analysis of the commercial prosperity of Roman Corinth. There we demonstrated that Corinth was an affluent commercial emporium during the early empire where private servile administrators would have been familiar figures in the marketplace. Lastly, it was shown from his experience as an artisan and his knowledge of commercial terminology that Paul himself was probably familiar with many of the normal practices of conducting trade and making investments in the commercial world of the Roman empire.

With the private administrator in view, we then turned to Paul's metaphor in 1 Corinthians 4 and 9 in order to examine how Paul utilised the *oikonomos* metaphor for his rhetorical strategy. In Chapter 6 we examined 1 Corinthians 1-4 initially to demonstrate that the church in Corinth was facing two major ecclesial and ethical shortcomings: the inappropriate adulation of apostles and the undue criticism of Paul's own ministry. This enabled us to suggest that Paul utilised his *oikonomos* metaphor in 1 Cor 4.1-5 both to underscore the social and structural insignificance of the apostles in relation to God/Christ, and to emphasise the authority of the apostles as well as their immunity to the criticisms of the

Corinthians. In addition to restoring his own apostolic ethos to its proper place in Corinth, Paul sought to censure the Corinthians for passing judgment on him and his colleagues as if the church possessed the authority either to acquit or to convict the apostles.

Finally, in Chapter 7 we examined Paul's metaphor in 1 Corinthians 9 where, in a discourse with both apologetic and deliberative intentions, he portrayed himself as God's administrator in order to resolve the matter of his apostolic right to receive and refuse a wage. There we traced Paul's argument from the beginning of 1 Corinthians 9 and showed that the complexity of Paul's logic required that we critically assess the two prevailing interpretive options. Rather than concluding that Paul preached voluntarily with the right to receive pay, or that Paul preached involuntarily without such a right, we revisited what we observed in Chapter 4 about the monetary privileges of private administrators and concluded that Paul's metaphor was skilfully employed in order to demonstrate that he could be a slave of Christ while simultaneously being entitled to some kind of monetary allowance, probably a *peculium*. Our impressions about the pattern of Paul's logic in 1 Cor 9.17 was even shown to find strong support in a similar literary formula in 2 Cor 5.13. Then, contrary to the scholarly consensus, we argued that Paul's metaphor continues into 1 Cor 9.18, where Paul's preaching activity was portrayed as a financial deposit, and even into 9.19-23, where we argued that Paul's ministry objective of gaining converts and partnering with the gospel were probably also metaphorical depictions of his apostleship as a commercial administration. Quite significantly, however, we saw that the apostolic right which Paul incessantly defended for the first half of the chapter was sacrificially forfeited for the ultimate benefit of the gospel, his converts, and God his principal. Through Paul's self-enslavement to the Corinthians by virtue of his plying a trade, we argued that Paul subjected his apostolic right and authority to his greater mandate to make as many converts as possible.

By interpreting Paul's *oikonomos* metaphor in this double-sided sense (social, legal, and structural degradation + authority, immunity, and privilege) in both 1 Corinthians 4 and 9, this study has shown that Paul's deployment of the image is far more versatile than NT scholarship has previously considered it to be. Although another case for the multi-dimensional interpretation of this metaphor was

proposed two decades ago by Dale Martin in his examination of 1 Corinthians 9, in this study we not only took into consideration Paul's employment of the metaphor in 1 Corinthians 4, but we have also sought to demonstrate that Paul's use of the image is quite dissimilar to Martin's analysis. It was Martin's contention that Paul's metaphor connoted different things to different people. Martin argued that because *oikonomoi* were slaves, they would have been despised by the elite. But since they were empowered through patronal ties to their master, they would have been honoured and envied by those from a low socio-economic condition. In the light of the status inconsistency of *oikonomoi*, Martin argued that Paul's status-laden metaphor would have elicited disrepute from the privileged believers in Corinth, but respect from his lowly converts.

In this investigation, however, we have argued for a significant revision of Martin's construal. It was our contention that Paul's metaphor sought to portray apostles as socially and structurally inferior to God, therefore eliminating inappropriate adulation of leaders. At the same time, Paul used the image to cast apostles as having both unique rights and authority by virtue of their commission. Paul used the image, therefore, simultaneously to emphasise the servility *and* privilege of apostleship in both 1 Corinthians 4 and 9, underscoring his insignificance and compulsion as well as defending his immunity and rights. It is our thesis, then, that Paul's metaphor is double-sided, but was employed to impart the same theological insights to, and elicit the same sociological response from, the entire Corinthian church.

B. Theological Implications

This study has a number of implications for Paul's theology of apostolic authority. Because the metaphor we analysed and the passages we examined cannot address every aspect of Paul's authority, we will of course not be able to exhaust the topic. Nevertheless, this study, which has been sensitive to the relevant power-dynamics operative in Corinth (methodology), carries with it implications for both Paul's construction of authority (ideology) and his assertion of authority (sociology) in 1 Corinthians.

1. Methodology

Because Paul's power relations are quite complex, it was important in this study not to over-simplify the concept and instead to take into consideration a number of socio-historical and rhetorical factors. In this investigation, therefore, we explored Paul's power rhetoric and power dealings, as Andrew Clarke has recommended, 'within their wider context, including the ways in which Paul defined the limits of his power, the ways in which he undermined the power that was inherent in his own position, [and] how he responded to the power plays of others'.¹ Accordingly, this study sought to interpret Paul while being cognisant of the power struggles present in Corinth and the numerous parties competing for prominence. By placing Paul's discourses in their socio-rhetorical context, we have demonstrated that Paul's power assertions were neither unprovoked nor unilateral. It was shown in both 1 Corinthians 4 and 9 that Paul at least perceived himself to be the subject of the church's criticisms and power plays. His self-representation as an *oikonomos* and the power intrinsic to that position, then, were presented in response to such threats and were highly defensive in posture.

2. Ideology

It was shown from 1 Corinthians 4 and 9 that Paul utilises the *oikonomos* metaphor to construct a portrait of his apostolic authority. In 1 Cor 4.1 Paul's authority was explained as both structural and derivative from God through Paul's apostolic appointment. Because Paul was entrusted with the mysteries of God, he was afforded the authority to speak and act on God's behalf to the church and all humanity. But the authority that the apostle possessed was not, as some interpreters assume, unique to Paul, so as to imply an ecclesial despotism. Sandra Polaski, for instance, argues that through his use of grace language, 'Paul emphasizes the universality of God's act in Christ and seeks to reserve to himself unique authority as interpreter of the divine gift'.² But as we observed through the plurality of the *oikonomoi* which Christ commissioned, Paul's authority as a mediator of the gospel was unique neither among the apostles nor even in the Corinthian church. Of course Paul's authority in Corinth was also neither ordinary nor entirely

¹ Clarke, *Theology*, 106.

² Polaski, *Power*, 123.

equivalent with that of Apollos and Cephas; Paul underscores his role as the church's founder (4.14-16; 9.1-2) precisely to claim some kind of exceptional status among them. But his depiction of all apostles as *oikonomoi* of Christ indicates that *each* possessed the revelatory authority to offer and interpret God's grace. In fact, this is exactly one of the points Paul seeks to establish through the metaphor, for only by demonstrating that all of the apostles who ministered in Corinth were entrusted with God's mysteries is Paul able to extinguish the partisanship which permeated the church.

But just as Paul does not claim unique authority as one of several of Christ's *oikonomoi*, so it must also be recognised that Paul's claim to authority as an agent of Christ does not confuse his position with Christ's. Elizabeth Castelli, for instance, remarks, 'However *imitatio Christi* is defined, Paul's act of imitation is an act of mediation. But it is also a presumptuous move on Paul's part, because he is setting himself in a structurally similar position to that of Christ. . . . Paul does appear at times to confuse his own position with that of Christ or God. Here, the call to imitation is interwoven with this confusion of identity'.³ But as we observed in our study, Paul's aim for the *oikonomos* metaphor is completely at odds with Castelli's assertion. Paul deployed the image precisely to distinguish him from Christ, to establish himself as but Christ's servile intermediary. Even if Paul's place in the apostolic hierarchy is situated between Christ and the church so that the church receives the gospel from the apostle rather than Christ, Paul's function was entirely to serve the church (3.21-22) and to do everything in his power to ensure their salvation and maturation (3.1-2; 9.19-23). Thus, Paul's *oikonomos* metaphor is incompatible with Castelli's understanding of Pauline imitation language and the strategy of power it instills.

Beyond this, it is significant that Paul's *oikonomos* metaphor portrays Paul's apostolic ministry as an obligatory task. Because Paul is compelled to preach the gospel and to fulfil his apostolic mandate as a slave of Christ, Paul's exercise of authority and power is itself a compulsion and merely an extension of the authority being exercised by God over the apostle. That is to say, to some extent, the power Paul asserts, so long as it is in keeping with the gospel, must be attributed to the one who compels Paul to speak and to act, for Paul's ministry was carried out under the

³ Castelli, *Imitating*, 112.

expectation of eschatological judgment (4.5; 9.16). This nuance is often ignored in examinations of Paul's apostolic authority, especially by those who charge Paul with manipulation. But as an administrator of God, Paul exercised his authority in loyalty and as obedience rendered to his Lord.

3. Sociology

Paul's *oikonomos* metaphor also has significant implications for how we regard Paul's assertion of authority. As mentioned in Chapter 1, previous studies, such as those by Shaw, Castelli, and Polaski, have identified in Paul's letters, and in 1 Corinthians in particular, various assertions of power in Paul's interaction with his churches. While this investigation has no intentions of denying that Paul exercised power and authority in Corinth and his other churches, it has sought to bring balance to the scholarly portrayal of Paul as one who exercises his authority manipulatively and unrelentlessly as if he were committed to retaining it at all costs. On the contrary, this study has demonstrated that in certain circumstances Paul portrayed himself as an authorised agent of God, but refused to exercise the authority intrinsic to his position.

In 1 Cor 4.1-5, for example, Paul used the *oikonomos* metaphor to construct a figurative representation of his apostleship, which entailed a significant amount of authority derived from the gospel. But though Paul's metaphor was pregnant with notions of power, he did not apply it in an attempt to place himself over, as it were, the Corinthian church. Rather, Paul's metaphor was applied primarily to demonstrate the impropriety of the power being exercised by the Corinthians themselves. Far from being domineering, then, Paul's assertion of power in this instance is to be characterised by its ironic absence in the face of opposition.

Furthermore, the studies by Shaw, Castelli, and Polaski all fail to mention that Paul did not exploit his authority in the manner perhaps most expected from an apostle, that is, through the acceptance of material support. Though Paul possessed the right to receive financial aid from the Corinthians, he did not assert this authority, but instead subjected it to his greater apostolic mandate, the production of as many converts as possible. For when Paul's authority in some way becomes an obstacle to that greater objective, it is entirely appropriate for him to

relinquish his authority, so that the gospel, the church, God, and even Paul himself will all benefit.

Given Paul's refusal to receive support, it then becomes clear that Paul's authority was afforded for the purpose of obtaining converts and enabling them to reach maturity. With this particular outlook, the authority entrusted to Paul begins to resemble what Kathy Ehrensperger describes as 'transformative power'. As explained in Chapter 1, it was Ehrensperger's contention that Paul's apostolic authority was afforded to him in order to empower the church toward maturation. While Paul provides no indication, as Ehrensperger supposes, that the apostolic hierarchy sought to render itself obsolete, Paul's apostolic authority does appear to have an empowering objective. For this reason, when Paul's rights and authority obstruct the saving power of the gospel and thus in some way prohibit the maturation of the believing community, he subjects that authority to his greater apostolic mandate.

When Paul's authority is recognised as having this pedagogical purpose, his assertion of power begins to appear far more benevolent. Of course not every authority figure in ecclesiastical history has regarded their appointment in just this way. For this reason modern interpreters of Paul are in some sense justified for their suspicions of the apostle's claims to and exercise of authority. But it is my hope that this exposition of two important, yet underappreciated Pauline texts will go some way towards exonerating Paul of some of the charges raised against him by modern scholars, and providing a model of sensible church leadership for twenty-first century practitioners.

Appendices

Appendix 1: Municipal Οικονόμοι Titles

Reference	Date	Region	Province	City	Greek Text
<i>IPriene 83; IPrieneMcCabe 39</i>	2 nd BCE	Asia Minor	Ionia	Priene	[10] τὸν οἰκονόμον τῆς πόλεως
<i>IMylasa 301; IMylasaMcCabe 3; Landvogt p.45</i>	Late 2 nd BCE	Asia Minor	Caria	Mylasa	[19] οἰκονόμοις τῆς φυλῆς
<i>IPriene 109; IPrieneMcCabe 51</i>	120 BCE	Asia Minor	Ionia	Priene	[266] τὸν οἰκονόμον τῆς πόλεως
<i>IPriene 99; IPrieneMcCabe 77</i>	100 BCE	Asia Minor	Ionia	Priene	[13] τὸν οἰκονόμον τῆς πόλεως
<i>IPriene 117; IPrieneMcCabe 50</i>	1 st BCE	Asia Minor	Ionia	Priene	[71] τὸν οἰκονόμον τῆς πόλεως
Romans 16.23; Weiß p.51	55 CE	Greece	Achaia	Corinth	Ἔραστος ὁ οἰκονόμος τῆς πόλεως
<i>SEG 18.496; ISmyrna 761; ISmyrnaMcCabe 110; Hellenica (11-12) p.228-230; Weiß p.54</i>	1 st CE	Asia Minor	Ionia	Smyrna	[4] Διόδωρος νεώτε ρος οἰκονομῶν
<i>IMylasa 364; IMylasaMcCabe 222; Weiß p.55</i>	93-94 CE	Asia Minor	Caria	Mylasa	[7] οἰκονομικός, Μολῆς [οἰκο]νομικός.
<i>SEG 47.1662 (39.1316); Weiß p.53</i>	1 st -2 nd CE	Asia Minor	Troas	Kyme	[2] Ἀπολλωνίδης οἰκονό μος τῆς πόλεως
<i>CIG 3162; ISmyrna 771; ISmyrnaMcCabe 124; Weiß p.54; Landvogt p.27</i>	125-138 CE	Asia Minor	Ionia	Smyrna	[30] οἰκονόμος Πάμφιλος · νε(ώτερος)
<i>TAM 5.743; Weiß p.51</i>	2 nd CE	Asia Minor	Lydia	Julia Gordus	[2] ο[ι][κ]ονόμον πάσης πόλεως βουλη[ς] <τ>ε μεγίστης Φάϊνον

JÖAI 16 (1913), Beibl.72; MAMA 5 Lists I(i):182,45; Weiß p.51	2 nd CE	Asia Minor	Phrygia	Dorylaion	[10] Εὐτύχ ους οἰκονόμου τῆς πό λεως
IG 5.1.40; Weiß p.54	2 nd CE	Greece	Achaia	Sparta	[6] Φιλοδέσποτος οἰκονόμος
SEG 24.496; Weiß p.54	2 nd -3 rd CE	Greece	Macedonia	Stobi	Διαδούμενος οἰκονόμος τῆς Στο βαίων πόλεως καὶ οἱ σύνδουλοι τὰς Νύμφας ἐποίησαν.
ILeukopetra 78; Weiß p.51	230-232 CE	Greece	Macedonia	Beroea	[2] Κοδ[ρ]ᾶτος οἰκον[όμ]ος τῆς Βεροιαίων πόλεως
IG 10.2.1.150; Weiß p.54	3 rd CE	Greece	Macedonia	Thessalonica	[16] Ζώσιμος οἰκονόμος τῆς πό λεως τὸν εὐερ γέτην
CIG 2717; IStratonikea 1103; IStratonikeiaMcCabe 199; Weiß p.54; Landvogt p.45	Late 3 rd CE	Asia Minor	Caria	Stratonicea	[2] Φιλοκάλου β' οἰκονόμο[υ]
CIG 3777; TAM 4.276; SIG 1231; Weiß p.53; Landvogt p.26	3 rd -4 th CE	Asia Minor	Bithynia	Nicomedia	[1] [Γ]ᾶιος [Τ]ρύφωνος οἰκον[όμ]ος
IKosPH 310; Isc.diCosFun EF6; Weiß p.52; Landvogt p.24	Roman	Aegean	Cos	Cos	Φιλήτου οἰκονόμου τῆς Κώων πόλεως οἰκον[ο]μή σαντος ἔτη κγ' ἀμέμπ[τ]<ω>ς.
CIG 2512; IKosPH 308; SIG 1252; Weiß p.52; Landvogt, p.24	Roman	Aegean	Cos	Cos	Διονυσίου πό λεως Κώ ων οἰκο νόμου.
KFF (Herzog) 129; Weiß p.53; Landvogt p.24	Roman	Aegean	Cos	Cos	Δημητρίου ο[ικ]ονόμου γερουσίας ἐτῶν -- λγ.
SEG 26.1044; Weiß p.51	Roman	Aegean	Crete	Arkades	[1] οἱ οἰκονόμοι ἐπεμ[ε]λήθ ην τῷ βαλανε[ί]ω ἐκ τῶν [τᾶς] πόλεος ... οἰκονόμοι Σωκλῆς Πρατο μήδους, Φίλινος Δινοκλέος
CIG 2811; IAphrodMcCabe 302; IAphrodSpect 85; Weiß p.51; Landvogt p.44	Roman	Asia Minor	Caria	Aphrodisias	[1] [ἡ βουλή? Μέναν]δρο[ν β'?] τοῦ Μ[ενάνδρου] υἱὸν Μενάνδρου τοῦ οἰκο νόμου αὐτῆς
TAM 2.1151; Weiß p.53	Roman	Asia	Lycia	Olympus	[1] Διονύσιος, οἰκονόμος τῆς πόλε ως

		Minor			
TAM 2.1163	Roman	Asia Minor	Lycia	Olympus	[6] Μακαρίω, οἰκονόμω τοῦ Λυκίων ἔθνους
IGRR 4.1630; Weiß p.53; Landvogt p.27	Roman	Asia Minor	Lydia	Philadelphia	[6] τῆς ἀναστάσεως τοῦ τῆς πόλεως οἰκονόμου Ἀντωνίου
SEG 45.418	Roman	Greece	Achaia	Patras	[1] [τὸ]γ Οἰκονόμον τ[ῆς] κολωνείας Νεικό[στρα] τον
SEG 38.710; Weiß p.54	Roman	Greece	Macedonia	Thessalonica	[1] Λονγεῖνος οἰκονόμος τῆς πόλεως
CIG 3793; IKalkhedon 101; Weiß p.51; Landvogt p.26	Unknown	Asia Minor	Bithynia	Chalcedon	[1] Διονύσιος οἰκονόμος Χαλχηδονίων
IAphrodMcCabe 275; L. Roberts, EA, p.299; Weiß p.51	Unknown	Asia Minor	Caria	Aphrodisias	[2] πιστότατον οἰκονόμον τῆς πόλεως Εὔφρωνα
Crowfoot & Anderson, JHS 19 (1899) p.124 (#136); Weiß p.54; Landvogt p.48	Unknown	Asia Minor	Galatia	At-kafasi	[1] Γάλλικος (ὁ) οἰκονόμος Πλομμέων
IEph 3863	Unknown	Asia Minor	Ionia	Ephesus	[6] Ἐγησίππου Ὀπι [.....]ου οἰκονόμου τῆς Καιρήνων [κατοικί]ας
IPriene 108; IPrieneMcCabe 66; Landvogt p.37	Unknown	Asia Minor	Ionia	Priene	[347] τὸν οἰκ[ονόμον τῆς πόλε] [ως]
IPriene 115; IPrieneMcCabe 102	Unknown	Asia Minor	Ionia	Priene	[7] οἰκονόμος τε γενόμενος καὶ γεωποιῆς τῆς πόλεως
IKilikiaBM 2 105,91; Weiß p.53	Unknown	Asia Minor	Pamphylia	Laertes	τοῦτον ἔτευξε Κόνων αἰώνιον οἶκον ἑαυτ[ῶ] οἰκονόμος πόλεως πᾶσι τε τοῖς ἰδίους.
IGRR 4.813; IHierapj 35; Weiß p.51; Landvogt p.47	Unknown	Asia Minor	Phrygia	Hierapolis	[11] τῶν οἰκονόμων τῆς πόλεως Τατιανοῦ καὶ Διοκλέους
CIG 6837; Landvogt p.48	Unknown	Asia Minor	Phrygia	Unknown	[1] Ἀμέριμος οἰκονόμος τῆς πόλεως

Appendix 2: Municipal Οικονόμοι Payment Formulas

Reference	Date	Region	Province	City	Greek Text
<i>Clara Rhodos</i> 10.27,1; <i>IG</i> 12.6.1.150	Late 4 th BCE	Aegean	Cos	Cos	[24] τὸν δὲ οἶκον[ό]μον εἰς τὸ ἀνάλωμα ὑπηρετήσαι . . . [31] τὰ δὲ ψήφισμα τόδε ἀποστε[ῖ]λαι τοῦς πρυτάνεις καὶ τὸν οἰκονόμον εἰς Κῶ τοῖς προ[ο]ξ[έ]νοις τοῖς [ἀ]γαθοῦσι τὰ δικαστήρια καὶ ἀξιοῦ πο[ι]ῆ[σ]α[ι] αὐτοὺς πάντα [κα]τὰ τὰ γεγραμμένα
<i>Ieph</i> 1448; <i>IephMcCabe</i> 108; <i>IBM</i> 448; <i>SIG</i> 352; <i>OGI</i> 352	302 BCE	Asia Minor	Ionia	Ephesus	[10] τοῦ δὲ ἀναλώματος τοῦ εἰς τὴν θυ[σί]αν ἐπιμελεῖσθαι τ[ὸν ο]ικονόμον . . . [15] τοῦ δὲ στεφάνου ἐπιμε[λεῖ]σθαι τὸν οἰκονόμον
<i>IPriene</i> 6; <i>IPrieneMcCabe</i> 71; <i>Landvogt</i> p.36	330-200 BCE	Asia	Ionia	Priene	[29] [τὸ] [δὲ ἀν]άλωμα ὑπηρετήσαι τὸν οἶκο[νό]μον
<i>SEG</i> 48.1404; <i>Preatti</i> 175/179,1	300-250 BCE	Asia Minor	Ionia	Colophon	[30] τοῦς δὲ πωλητὰς ἀποδόσθαι τὸ ἔργον, τὸ δὲ ἀργύριο[ν] τοῦ ἔργου δοῦναι τὸν οἰκονόμον.
<i>OGI</i> 707; <i>IGLSkythia</i> 1.65; <i>SIG</i> 3.707	300-250 BCE	Thrace	Scythia	Olbia	[39] τ[ὸ] [δὲ] ἀνάλωμα τὸ εἰς τὸν τελαμῶνα δ[οῦ]ναι τοῦς οἰκονόμους ἀφ' ὧν χειρίζουσ[ιν] [αὐτ]οί
<i>SEG</i> 52.659	300-250 BCE	Thrace	Thrace	Agathopolis	[7] τὸ δὲ ἀν[άλωμα] δοῦναι τοῦς οἰκονόμους
<i>OGI</i> 51; <i>IGPtol</i> 36; <i>Prose sur pierre</i> 6; <i>CairoMus.</i> 18.9284	285-246 BCE	Egypt	Egypt	Ptolemais Hermiou	[25] τὸ δ' εἰς ταῦτ' ἀνάλωμα δοῦναι τὸν οἰκονόμον Σωσίβιον
<i>SEG</i> 49.1502; <i>REG</i> (1999) 2,1	281-261 BCE	Asia Minor	Ionia	Colophon	[49] τὸ δὲ ἔργον τῆς κατασκευῆς τῆς στήλης καὶ τῆς ἀναγρα[φ]ῆς τῶν ψηφισμάτων μισθῶσαι τὸν οἰκονόμον Κόρωνον καὶ τῶι μισθωσαμένωι δοῦναι τὴν δόσιν, συγγραφὴν δὲ τὸν ἀρχιτέκτονα γράψαι· δοῦναι δὲ καὶ τῶι πρεσβευτῆι τὸν οἰκονόμον Κόρωνον ξένια τὰ ἐκ τοῦ νόμου.
<i>IPriene</i> 18; <i>IPrieneMcCabe</i> 57; <i>IBM</i> 415; <i>OGI</i> 215; <i>SEG</i> 30.1360; <i>Landvogt</i> p.36	270-262 BCE	Asia Minor	Ionia	Priene	[18] τὰ δὲ ἀναλώματα τὰ γενόμενα ὑπηρετεῖν τοῦς οἰκονόμους
<i>OGI</i> 50; <i>IGPtol</i> 35; <i>CairoMus.</i> 17.9270; <i>Prose sur pierre</i> 3	269-246 BCE	Egypt	Egypt	Ptolemais Hermiou	[12] τὸ δὲ ἀνάλωμα τὸ εἰς τὴν στήλην δοῦναι τὸν οἰ[κον]όμο[ν] Σωσίβιον
<i>IMagMai</i> 15.b;	222 BCE	Asia	Caria	Magnesia	[19] τὸ δὲ ἐσόμενον ἀνάλωμ[α εἰς] [τε τὴν στήλην] καὶ τὴν ἀναγραφὴν, τῶν ἐγδόσεων

<i>IMagnMcCabe</i> 99; <i>SEG</i> 4.497		Minor			γενομ[ένων,] [δότησαν οί οικο]νόμοι ἐκ τῶν ἐψηφισμένων πόρων ἐμ μηνὶ Ἑ[ραιῶ][νι].
<i>ILampsacus</i> 33 (cf. <i>IPrieneMcCabe</i> 14)	3 rd BCE	Asia Minor	Phrygia	Lampsacus	[27] τὸ δὲ ἔργον τῆς κατασκευῆς τῆς [στή]λης καὶ τῆς ἀναγραφῆς τοῦ ψηφίσματος [ἐγ][δ]οῦναι τὸν οἰκονόμον Φανόδικ[ο]ν, καὶ τῶι μισθῶσα[μέ]νῳ δο[ῦ]ναι τὴν δόσιν·
<i>SEG</i> 51.936	3 rd BCE	Thrace	Scythia	Histria	[19] [τὸ δὲ ἀνάλωμα δοῦναι] τὸν οἰκονόμ[ο]ν, μερ[ί]σαι δὲ [τοὺς μεριστάς] . . . [36] τὸ [δὲ ἀνάλωμα δοῦναι τὸν οἰκονόμ]ον, με[ρ]ίσαι δὲ τοὺς μεριστάς]
<i>IGLSkythia</i> 1.6	3 rd BCE	Thrace	Scythia	Histria	[3] τὸ δὲ ἀνάλωμα δοῦναι τὸν οἰκονόμον, μερίσαι δὲ τοὺς μεριστάς ἀπο στειλαὶ δὲ αὐτῶι καὶ ξένια τὸν οἰ κονόμον·
<i>IGLSkythia</i> 1.14	3 rd BCE	Thrace	Scythia	Histria	[1] [τὸ δὲ ἐσόμενον ἀν]άλωμα δοῦναι τ[ὸν οἰκονόμον ἀπὸ τῶν προσόδων]
<i>IGLSkythia</i> 1.19; <i>SEG</i> 24.1099	3 rd BCE	Thrace	Scythia	Histria	[15] [τὸ] δὲ ἀνά[λωμα δοῦναι] [μὲν τὸν οἰκονόμ]ον [μερίσαι] δ[ὲ] τ[οὺς μερ]ιστάς.
<i>IGLSkythia</i> 1.11; <i>SEG</i> 16.430	3 rd BCE	Thrace	Scythia	Histria	[6] [τ]ὸ ἐσόμενον [ἀνάλωμα δο][ῦ]ναι δὲ τοῦ[ς οἰκονόμους].
<i>IGLSkythia</i> 1.21; <i>SEG</i> 24.1094	3 rd -2 nd BCE	Thrace	Scythia	Histria	[4] [τὸ δὲ ἀνά] [λωμα δοῦναι τὸν οἰκονόμ]ον, με[ρ]ίσαι δ[ὲ] τοὺς με[ρ]ιστάς]
<i>IGBulg</i> 1 ² .37(2)	3 rd -2 nd BCE	Thrace	Thrace	Odessus	[15] τὸ δὲ ἀνά[λωμα τὸ γινόμενον εἰς τὴν ἀναγραφὴν τῶι προξενιῶν τῆς τε Εὐδόξου τοῦ Ἑρακλείτου καὶ τῶν δικαστῶν δοῦναι τοὺς οἰκονόμους Διονύσιον καὶ Σωκράτην ἐκ ὧν χειρίζουσιν.
<i>IMagMai</i> 98; <i>IMagnMcCabe</i> 2; <i>SIG</i> 589; <i>Landvogt</i> p.31	197 BCE	Asia Minor	Caria	Magnesia	[64] τὸ δὲ ψήφισμα τόδε ἀναγρά[ψ]αι τοὺς οἰκονόμους εἰς τὸ ἱερὸν τοῦ Διὸς εἰς τὴν παραστά[δα, ἀναλισκέτωσαν δὲ εἰς ταῦτα πάντα τὰ γεγραμμένα οἱ [οἰ]κονόμοι ἐκ τῶν πόρων ὧν ἔχουσιν εἰς πόλεως διο[ί]κισιν]
<i>IMagMai</i> 94; <i>IG</i> 12.6.1; <i>IsamosMcCabe</i> 33*5; <i>Landvogt</i> p.33	2 nd BCE	Asia Minor	Caria	Magnesia	[9] [το]ὺς δὲ οἰ[κο] [νόμους το]ὺς μετὰ Τόννιον ὑπηρε[τῆ]σαι τὸ ε[ἰς] τὴν ε[ἰ]κόνα [ἀνήλωμα ἐκ τῶ]ν πόρων ὧν ἔχουσιν εἰς πόλεως διο[ί]κισιν·
<i>IGLSkythia</i> 1.34	2 nd BCE	Thrace	Scythia	Histria	[7] [τὸ δὲ εἰς ταῦτα ἐσόμενον] ἀνάλωμα ὑποτε[λεῖν] - - - - - τὸν οἰκο]νόμον·
<i>IGLSkythia</i> 1.40	2 nd BCE	Thrace	Scythia	Histria	[1] τὸ δ[ὲ] ἀνάλωμα δοῦναι τὸν οἰκονόμον, μερίσαι δὲ το[ῦς μεριστάς]---
<i>IOlbia</i> 36	2 nd BCE	Thrace	Scythia	Olbia	[4] [τὸ δὲ εἰς αὐτὸν] ἐσόμεν[ον ἀνάλωμα] [δοῦναι τοὺς οἰκονόμ]ους·
<i>IGLSkythia</i> II 6	1 st BCE	Thrace	Scythia	Tomis	[19] τὸ δὲ ἀνάλωμ[α τὸ γενόμενον] [δοῦναι τὸν οἰκονόμ(?)ο]ν
<i>IKalkhedon</i> 4	Unknown	Asia Minor	Bithynia	Chalcedon	[8] [τὸ δὲ ἀν]ά[λωμα δι] [δόμεν τοὺς οἰκο]νόμ[ους] κα[τ] τὸν [νόμον].
<i>IMagMai</i> 12;	Unknown	Asia	Caria	Magnesia	[17] εἰς δὲ τ[ὴν σ]τήλην ὑπηρετῆ[σαι] [τοὺς οἰκονόμους κ[α]τὰ τὸν] [νόμον --]

<i>IMagnMcCabe</i> 83; Landvogt p.34		Minor			
<i>IMagMai</i> 89; <i>IMagnMcCabe</i> 98; Landvogt p.34	Unknown	Asia Minor	Caria	Magnesia	[84] [τ]ὸ δὲ ἀνάλωμα τὸ ἐσόμενον εἷς τε τὴν στήλην καὶ τ[ὴν ἀναγρα]φ[ὴν] τῶν ψηφισμάτων ὑπηρετῆσαι τοὺς οἰκονόμους [ἐκ τῶν πό]ρ[ων] ὧν ἔχουσιν εἰς πόλεως διοίκησιν·
<i>IMagMai</i> 101; <i>IMagnMcCabe</i> 106; Landvogt p.32	Unknown	Asia Minor	Caria	Magnesia	[88] τὴν δὲ ἐσομένην δαπάνην χορηγησάτωσαν οἱ οἰκονόμοι, κομισάσθωσαν δὲ ἐκ προσηψη[φισθησομένων] πόρων.
<i>IMagMai</i> 103; <i>IMagnMcCabe</i> 100; Landvogt p.33	Unknown	Asia Minor	Caria	Magnesia	[66] [-- τὸ δὲ ἀνάλωμα -- δό]τ[ωσαν] οἱ οἰκονόμοι ἐμ[--] τὰ ξένια.
<i>IKolophonMcCabe</i> 7	Unknown	Asia Minor	Ionia	Bulgurca	[9] τὸ δ' ἔργον τῆς κατασκευῆς τῆς στήλης καὶ τῆς ἀναγραφῆς τοῦ ψηφίσματος καὶ τῆς ἀναθέσεως ἐγδοῦναι τὸν οἰκονόμον Ἀπολλόδοτον καὶ τῶι μισθωσαμένωι δοῦναι τὰς δόσεις ἀπὸ τῶν πόρων ὧν ἔχει εἰς τὴν διοίκησιν
<i>IEph</i> 3513b	Unknown	Asia Minor	Ionia	Ephesus	[4] [πρὸς] τὴν θέσιν τῶ[ν στηλῶν] [οἰ]κονόμου δόντος
<i>IPriene</i> 57 (restored as ταμίας); <i>IPrieneMcCabe</i> 14	Unknown	Asia Minor	Ionia	Priene	[8] [τὰ δ' ἔργα τῆς κατασκευῆς τῆς στήλης καὶ τῆς ἀναγραφῆς τοῦ ψηφίσματος μισθωσά[τω ὁ οἰ]]κονόμος -- καὶ τοῖς μισθωσαμένοις δότω τὰς δόσεις ἀπὸ τῶν εἰς τὴν διοίκησιν·]

Appendix 3: Private Οικονόμοι + Principal Inscriptions

Reference	Date	Region	Province	City	Greek Text
<i>ILaod.Lyk.</i> 1; <i>Aperghis</i> (2005: 325-26 [§8]); <i>Chiron</i> 5, p.59-87	267 BCE	Asia Minor	Phrygia	Laodicea	Βανάβηλος ὁ τὰ τοῦ Ἀχαιοῦ οἰκονομῶν
<i>OGI</i> 225; <i>Didyma</i> 20; <i>Welles, RC</i> 20; <i>Aperghis</i> (2005: 315-18 [§20]); <i>Landvogt</i> (1908: 29)	254-253 BCE	Asia Minor	Ionia	Didyma	Ἀρριδαίωι τῶι οἰκονομοῦντι τὰ Λαοδίκης
<i>SEG</i> 28.1033; <i>Bithynische St.</i> 3.12; <i>INikaia</i> 192; <i>NewDocs.</i> 3.10	1 st CE	Asia Minor	Bithynia	Nikaia	ἐνθάδε γηράσαντ' Ἴταλὸν κατέθαψε δακρύσας οἰκονόμον πιστὸν Χρῆστος ἀποφθίμενον ἀντ' ἀγαθοῦ δὲ βίου καὶ δουλοσύνης φιλοεργοῦ τὴν ὅσιαν αὐτῷ τήνδ' ἀπέτεισε χάριν.
<i>SEG</i> 48.1562	1 st CE Late	Asia Minor	Lycia	Balboursa	[Φ]ιλόστρατος οἰκο νόμος Μαρκίου [Τι]τιανοῦ
<i>TAM</i> 3.258	1 st CE Late	Asia Minor	Pisidia	Termessos	Ἀπελλῆς γ' ὁ καὶ Οἰκ[ονο]μικός, ἀπ[ε]λεύθερος] κ(αὶ) π(άροικος) Οὔαν[ε]ιτος, κατέστ[η]σε τὴν θήκην Ἀπελλῆ καὶ Πυθι άδι γο(νεῦσιν) καὶ ἑαυτῷ καὶ τῇ γυ(ναικί) αὐτοῦ καὶ τοῖς ἐξ αὐτοῦ μόνον· ὁ δὲ παρὰ ταῦτα πει ράσας ἔνοχος ἔσται ἀσεβεία τῇ εἰς τοὺς κατοι χομένους.
<i>SEG</i> 44.1000; <i>IHadrianopolis</i> 19; <i>Landvogt</i> (1908: 25-26)	1 st -2 nd CE	Asia Minor	Bithynia	Cretia	Κλαυδίου Σευήρου Ὁφελίων οἰκο νόμος
<i>INikaia</i> 1336	1 st -2 nd CE	Asia Minor	Bithynia	Nikaia	[Κυ]ιρίνος, Εὐανγέλου οἰκονόμος ζήσας ἔτη κα'. Χαῖρε
<i>SEG</i> 28.1045; <i>IPrusa</i> 165; <i>Pfuhl-Moebius</i> 2.1142	1 st -2 nd CE	Asia Minor	Bithynia	Prusa ad Olympum	Ἐσπερος Ἐσπέρου υ' Ἐσπερος Ἐσπέρου υἱός, Τιβερίου δὲ Κλαυδίου Πωλίωνος Φαίτρου οἰ κονόμος
<i>SEG</i> 48.1606; <i>IGRR</i> 4.895; <i>Corsten</i> (2005: 41 [§12])	1 st -2 nd CE	Asia Minor	Lycia	Kibyra	Ἀρτέμων Μ(άρκου) · Καλπουρν[ί]ου Λόνγου δοῦλος οἰ κονόμος
<i>SEG</i> 48.1563	150 CE	Asia Minor	Lycia	Balboursa	[-- οἰκονόμος? Τ. Μαρ]κίου Δηιοτηρια νοῦ
<i>SEG</i> 30.725; <i>IGBulg.</i>	150-250	Thrace	Thrace	Pautalia	-- -ιος οἰκονόμος Ἀλεξάνδρου

5.5787	CE				
SEG 34.1263; TAM 4.57	2 nd CE	Asia Minor	Bithynia	Nikaia	Μ. Σκρειβωνίου Καπετωλίνου οἰκονόμος
AnSt 16, p.129	2 nd CE	Asia Minor	Lycia	Patara	Ἄφθορος οἰκονόμος Κλαυδίου Τιτιλιανού
AnSt 17, p.117	2 nd CE	Asia Minor	Pisidia	Antioch	Νεικηφόρος Μαρυλλείνου οἰκονόμος
IG 2.2.11492; CIG 963; CIL 3.555; Landvogt (1908: 22)	2 nd CE	Greece	Attica	Athens	Q. : Calpurnio : Eutucho : Philetus p(u)bl(ici) XX [vigesimal] lib(ertatis) vi-cus fecit. Κ. · Καλπουρνί<ω> : Εὐτύχ<ω> Φίλητος εἰκοστῆς ἐλευθερίας · ἰκονόμος · ἐποίησεν · γνη<σίω> · στρατι<ώ>τη.
IG 10(2).2.9	160 CE	Greece	Macedonia	Zivojno	Γλαυκίας Ἀναχαρινοῦ Ἀ[δα]ίου οἰκονόμος
RECAM 2.34; Anderson (1937: 19)	161-180 CE	Asia Minor	Galatia	Böyük Idi-Agatch	Εὐτύχη <ς> Σεββ(αστῶν) οἰκονο {ν}μος χωρίων Κωνσιδιανῶ[ν]
Grabdenmäler 78; JDAI 84, 179 (R89)	180 CE	Greece	Macedonia	Langadas	Ὀνήσιμος Αἰλίου Μηνογένους οἰκονόμος
TAM 5.88	194-195 CE	Asia Minor	Lydia	Saittai	Ἐπίκτητον οἰκονόμον Μαρκίας
IGBulg. 5.5577	200-250 CE	Thrace	Thrace	Augusta Traiana	Σειγηρὸς οἰκονόμος Φλ(αοῦ) Δινεος Λονγείνου
SEG 37.1087	2 nd -3 rd CE	Asia Minor	Pontus	Amisos	Ἐπίκτησιν Ἀντ(ωνίου) Κέσπου οἰκονόμον
Milne, Cairo Mus. 9365	2 nd -3 rd CE	Egypt	Egypt	Unknown	Τατετρίφισ Διο νυσίου γυνή Παχούμιος οἰκ(ο) νόμου κοιράν(ου).
SEG 33.528; IG 10(2).2.8	2 nd -3 rd CE	Greece	Macedonia	Herakleia Lynkestis	Φαβρίκιος οἰκονό[μος] τῆς συνβίου Ἐλπίδος καὶ τοῦ Ἐλπε[ι]δηφόρου τεθνώτω[ν]
SEG 19.786; cf. SEG 48.1535	Before 212 CE	Asia Minor	Pisidia	Olbasa	[Ῥ?]εντων, Μελίτωνος κα[ι] Ῥωμανοῦ οἰκονομῶν
SEG 43.441; SEG 39.620	229-230? CE	Greece	Macedonia	Agrosykia	Εὐφρᾶς, οἰκονόμος Αἰλίας Σαβίνης
INikaia 1057	3 rd CE	Asia Minor	Bithynia	Nikaia	Κοσμιανὸς οἰκονόμος ὑπὲρ τῶν δεσποτῶν
INikaia 1062	3 rd CE	Asia	Bithynia	Nikaia	Γράπτος, Ἀννίας Ἀστίλλης τῆς κρατίστης οἰκονόμος

		Minor			
SEG 49.858; IG 10(2).2.295	3 rd CE	Greece	Macedonia	Pelagonia	Συνφό[ρω] τῷ γλυκυ<τά>τω ἀνδρὶ οἰ κονόμῳ Παραμόνο[υ]
SEG 28.1034; <i>Bithynische St.</i> 3.13; <i>INikaia</i> 196	Roman	Asia Minor	Bithynia	Nikaia	Φίλων Κλαυδίας Γαλλίτης οἰκονόμος
SEG 20.32; <i>IPrusias</i> 103	Roman	Asia Minor	Bithynia	Prusa	Παντάγαθος Τ. Φλ. Δομιτιανοῦ Δημοκράτους οἰκονόμος
<i>IPrusa</i> 68	Roman	Asia Minor	Bithynia	Prusa ad Olympum	Ἄνθουσα Φοίβου γυνή, οἰκο νόμισσα Τει μοθέου
RECAM 2.324	Roman	Asia Minor	Galatia	Yurtbeyci	Φιλήμων Ἀπ πουλείας Κο νο[ρ]δίας οἰ κονόμος
SEG 48.1593	Roman	Asia Minor	Lycia	Kibyra	Μάρ[κ]ου Καλ πορνίου Λό[ν]γου οἰκο νόμος
TAM 2.437	Roman	Asia Minor	Lycia	Patara	Ζώσιμος οἰκονόμος Τιβερ[ί]ου Κλαυδίου Ἀγριππείνου
SEG 41.1325	Roman	Asia Minor	Pamphylia	Karain	Σουρίνας οἰκονό μος Ἄγαθος
SEG 52.1361	Roman	Asia Minor	Phrygia	Tyriaion	[Ἵπ]ερ κυ[ρίου] [Λ.?] Κ(αλπουρνίου) Πρόκλο[υ] σωτηρίας Εὔκαρπος οἰκονόμος
IG 9.2.1124; Landvogt (1908: 22)	Roman	Greece	Thessaly	Magnesia	Φιλόλ[— — —] Σεβασ[του(?)] {Σεβασ[τῶν](?)} οἰκον[ό]μο[ς].
<i>IKios</i> 46; <i>IGRR</i> 3.25; <i>CIG</i> 3738; <i>CIL</i> 3.333; <i>ILS</i> 1539; Landvogt (1908: 26)	Roman	Asia Minor	Bithynia	Kios	[Ge]nealis, Caesaris Aug(usti) [se]rνος {servus} verna, dispens(ator) . . . Γενεάλλ[ι]ος Καίσαρος δούλου οἰκο νόμου ἐπὶ τοῦ σείτου {σίτου}
IG 12.8.221	Unknown	Aegean Islands	Samothrace	Samothrace	Γ. Ἰούλιος Νίγερ, Τ. Ῥουτειλίου Ποτείτου Οἰκονόμος
SEG 28.1015; TAM 4.150	Unknown	Asia Minor	Bithynia	Dakibyza	Σωσύλος Ῥηγλι[α]νοῦ Ἴππωνος οἰκον[ό]μο[ς] {οἰκονόμος}
TAM 4.276; <i>CIG</i> 3777; <i>SIG</i> 1231; Landvogt (1908: 26)	Unknown	Asia Minor	Bithynia	Nicomedia	[Γ]άσιος [Τ]ρύφωνος οἰκον[ό]μο[ς] . . . δὲ καὶ ἐλευθε [ρία] παρὰ τῶν κυρίων μου φιλαν θρώπων πολειτῶν [τῶ] <θ>ετῶ μου τὰ προσ<κ>εἶμ<ε> [να τ]ῶν τόπων ἀπεδόμη Κ<λ>.Τα[— —] [φ Κ]αλλίστω.

<i>INikaia</i> 1201; Robert (1970: 242)	Unknown	Asia Minor	Bithynia	Nikaia	Δορύφορον τῆς κρα τίστης Κ[λ](αυδίας) Ειάδος {δ} οἰκονόμον
<i>INikaia</i> 1413	Unknown	Asia Minor	Bithynia	Nikaia	Εὐάγγελος, Ἀντιπατρί δος οἰκονόμος
<i>INikaia</i> 1466	Unknown	Asia Minor	Bithynia	Nikaia	Εὐπραξία, Γ. Κ ατιλλίου Κλ αυδιανοῦ Θρ άσωνος οἰκ ονόμισα
SEG 29.1306; <i>INikaia</i> 205	Unknown	Asia Minor	Bithynia	Nikaia	Κλαύδιος Θάλλος, Γ. Κλαυδίου Καλπορνια νοῦ οἰκονόμ ος
TAM 2.518	Unknown	Asia Minor	Lycia	Pinara	Συμφό[ρου] οἰκονόμου Κλαυδίας Πλατωνίδ[ος].
MAMA 6.246	Unknown	Asia Minor	Phrygia	Yenice	Ὀνήσιμος Βάσ σου καὶ Πο τεΐτου καὶ Μάρ κου Πωλ λίων οἰκο νόμος
MAMA 8.399	Unknown	Asia Minor	Pisidia	Çavundur	Εἰρήνη Λονγίλλιανοῦ καὶ Σεουήρου οἰκονόμισσα
IGRR 3.279; Landvogt (1908: 48)	Unknown	Asia Minor	Pontus	Euchaita	Κάλλιστις οἰκο(ν)όμος? Οὐαλερίου [Λόν?]γου τριβούν ου
<i>St.Pont.</i> 3.194	Unknown	Asia Minor	Pontus	Euchaita	Κάλλισ τος οἰκο νόμος Χαγόν δας
<i>ISalymbria</i> 185	Unknown	Asia Minor	Thrace	Byzantium	Ἐρμάφιλος, Θρά σωνος οἰκονόμος
IG 14.688	Unknown	Italy	Italy	Venusia	Βριτζίου Πραί σεντος Σάγαρις οἰκο νόμος.

Appendix 4: Private Administrators Handling Bank Deposits (θέματα)

Reference	Date	Translation
P.Oxy. 621	162-163 CE	Dionysia, alias Diogenis, daughter of Amm(), from the city of Oxyrhynchi, through Didymos, gr(ammateus?), and Sarapas, <i>oikonomos</i> [οἰκονόμου], to sitologi of Taampemou, greetings. Transfer to . . . of Diogeneis, two artabas . . . from the amount which you hold in deposit [ἐν θέματι] for me from the wheat-crop of the past 3 rd year of Antoninus and Verus the lords of Augusti. (2 nd hand) I, Sarapas, <i>oikonomos</i> [οἰκονόμος], have signed.
P.Oxy. 2588	24 September 148 CE	Diogenes, former agoranomos and former gymnasiarch, by Hermias his steward [οἰκονόμου], to the sitologi of the upper toparchy, Sko district. Transfer to Thonis, son of Thonis and grandson of Thonsius, of Oxyrhynchus, 19 ½ artabae of wheat (making nineteen and a half artabae of wheat) out of those you hold in deposit [ἐν θέματι] for me from the wheat-crop of the 11th year of Antoninus Caesar the lord.
P.Oxy. 4859	120/21 CE	Herma-us, steward [οἰκονόμος] of Claudius Munatianus, to the <i>sitologos</i> of Pacerce Eastern, greetings. Transfer, from the amount you hold on deposit [ἐν θέματι] for Claudius Munatianus, from the wheat-crop of the 4 th year of Hadrianus Caesar the lord, to Herais . . . of Sarapion, eight (and) one-eighth artabas, total 8 1/8 art.
P.Oxy. 4862	122 CE	Claudius Germanus, steward [οἰκονόμος] of Claudius Munatianus the younger, to the <i>sitologos</i> of Ophis, greetings. Transfer, from the amount you hold on deposit [θέματος] for the aforesaid Claudius Munatianus, to Demetrius or to whomever he chooses, from the wheat-crop of the 6th year of Hadrianus Caesar the lord, thirty-four (and) a half (and) one-quarter artabas, total 34 art.
P.Oxy. 4863	26 September, 122 CE	Claudius Munatianus to the <i>sitologos</i> of the district of Ophist(?), greetings. Transfer, from the amount you hold on deposit [θέματος] for me, from the wheat-crop of the past 6th year of Hadrianus Caesar the lord, to Didymus son of Ptolemaeus, grandson of Ptolemaeus, mother Prima, seven hundred artabas, total 700 art. . . . (2nd hand) I, Leontas, overseer [ἐπίτροπος] of the aforesaid Claudius Munatianus, have countersigned the aforementioned seven hundred, total 700 art.
P.Oxy. 4870	c. 122-3 CE	Euphemus, steward [οἰκονόμος] of Agathocleia alias Apollonia, daughter of Ischyriion, to the <i>sitologos</i> of Ophis, greetings. Transfer the (artabas) that you hold on deposit [ἐν θέματι] for me, from the wheat-crop of the . . . year of Hadrianus the lord, to Apollo—. . .
P.Oxy. 4871	c. 122-3? CE	Valeria Artemidora through Epaphroditus, steward [φροντιστοῦ], to the <i>sitologi</i> of the eastern toparchy, district of Ophis, greetings. Transfer, from the amount you hold on deposit [ἐν θέματι] for me, from the wheat-crop of the past (nth year) . . .
P.Oxy. 4879	29 August – 27 September 141 CE	Claudius Chaeremon to the <i>sitologi</i> of the eastern toparchy, district of Phoboou, greetings. Transfer, from the amount you hold on deposit [ἐν θέματι] for me, from the wheat-crop of the 4th year of Antoninus Caesar the lord, to Claudia Ptolema through Epaphroditus, steward [οἰκονόμου], twenty artabas of wheat.
P.Oxy. 4881	20 September 147 CE	Dionysis [sic] son of Anti—, through Nomerius [sic], freedman and steward [οἰκονόμου], to the <i>sitologi</i> of the eastern toparchy, district of Seneceleu, greetings. Transfer the remaining (artabas) that I hold on deposit [ἐν θέματι], from the wheat-crop of the 10th year of Antoninus Caesar the lord, to Pnepheros son of Hermias, (for his account) at the hamlet of Horus. . . . I, Nemeris, freedman of the aforesaid Dionysius, have submitted (this).

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