The historiographical Jesus: memory, typology and the son of David

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The Historiographical Jesus:

Memory, Typology and the Son of David

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by

Anthony Le Donne

2006

- 3 MAY 2007
לישראל
Declaration

I declare that this thesis embodies the results of my own work, that it has been composed by me and that it does not include work that has been presented for a degree in this or any other university. All quotations have been acknowledged in the footnotes.

Anthony Le Donne

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Abbreviations

Analecta Biblica
Anchor Bible
Anchor Bible Dictionary
Andrews University Seminary Studies
Arbeiten zur Geschichte des antiken Judentums und des Urchristentums
Aufstieg und Niedergang der Römischen Welt
Before Current Era
Biblica
Biblischer Kommentar Altes Testament
Cambridge University Press
Catholic Biblical Quarterly
Current Era
Dead Sea Discoveries
Expository Times
Harvard University Press
Liber Antiquitatum Biblicarum
Loeb Classical Library
Manuscript(s)
Masoretic Text
New Testament
Novum Testamentum
Oxford University Press
Forschungen zur Religion und Literatur des Alten und Neuen Testaments
Hebrew Bible
Herders Theologischer Kommentar zum Alten Testament
Historical Jesus Research
International Critical Commentary
Journal for Biblical Literature
Journal for the Study of the Historical Jesus
Journal for the Study of Judaism Supplemental Series
Journal for the Study of the New Testament
Journal for the Study of the New Testament Supplemental Series
Journal for the Study of the Old Testament
Journal for the Study of the Old Testament Supplemental Series
Journal for Theology and the Church
Journal for Near Eastern Studies
Journal of the American Oriental Society
Jüdische Schriften aus hellenistisch römischer Zeit
Revue de Qumran
Septuagint
Sheffield University Press
Smyth & Helwys Bible Commentary Series
Social Forces
Social Memory (Theory)
Society for Biblical Literature Dissertation Series
Society for Biblical Literature Seminar Papers
Society for New Testament Studies Monograph Series
Studies in Biblical Theology
Studiorum Novi Testamenti Societas Manuscript Series
Vetus Testamentum
Word Biblical Commentary

AnBib
AB
ABD
AUSS
AGJU
ANRW
BCE
Bib
BKAT
CUP
CBQ
CE
DSD
ExpT
HUP
LAB
LCL
MS(S)
MT
NT
NovT
OUP
FRLANT
HB
HTKAT
HJR
ICC
JBL
JSJSup
JSNT
JSNTSup
JSOT
JSOTSup
JTC
JNES
JAOS
JSHJ
JSHRZ
RevQ
LXX
SAP
SHBC
SF
SM
SBLDS
SBLSP
SNTS
SBT
SNTSMS
VT
WBC
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This work would not have been possible without the continued support of my parents, Gary and Patricia Le Donne. Their sacrifice and hard work is ever-present in my mind. I will never be able to repay what they have invested in me. Finally, I cannot express enough my gratitude to my wife Sarah, to whom this work is dedicated. Without her, I would not have any frame of reference to translate ידמ.
I

Introduction

I.1 The Problem of New Testament Types

When engaging historical study of Jesus, the historian recognizes that much of Jesus' New Testament (NT) portrayal was modeled after scriptural precedents. Scriptural models, prophetic fulfillments and overarching narrative-grids are so much a part of the NT that scholarship has been forced to question how much these texts actually contribute to "history proper". Indeed, how does one distinguish history from typology? Different solutions to this question have resulted in extremely different approaches to historical Jesus research (HJR). Those who presuppose that typological storytelling betrays wholesale invention inevitably conclude that when typology is employed in a biblical account, the historicity of this account is tenuous. In his study on Acts, Goulder's first two criteria for historicity illustrate this:

(1) Where [...] we find passages with no apparent root in symbolism, or with unimportant traces of types, we shall be justified in assuming that St. Luke was setting down a factual story... This will be our first criterion: where there are no types, Acts is intended to be factual.

(2) Where an incident or passage can be accounted for wholly, or almost wholly, on typological grounds, we shall have to be very wary indeed of giving it weight as history. This gives us a second criterion: the thicker the types, the less likely is the passage to be factual.²

---

¹ The definition of typology offered by K.J. Woolcombe is helpful: "Typology, considered as a method of exegesis, may be defined as the establishment of historical connexions between certain events, persons or things in the Old Testament and similar events, persons or things in the New Testament. Considered as a method of writing, it may be defined as the description of an event, person of thing in the New Testament in terms borrowed from the description of its prototypical counterpart in the Old Testament" ["The Biblical Origins and Patristic Development of Typology", in Essays on Typology (eds. Lampe and Woolcombe; SBT 22; London: SCM, 1957), 39-40]. This definition will serve as a preliminary gloss until the present study can more fully discuss the nature of typology in chapters II and III.

Here Goulder presupposed a dichotomy between typological story and factual history. When the historian applies this dichotomy to HJR, much of the biblical accounts of Jesus must be deemed "ahistorical".

More recently, Gerd Lüdemann has put forth a portrait of the historical Jesus that is built upon only those historical facts that he considered to be "authentic", meaning episodes of the Jesus tradition that betray no evidence of redaction. While "scriptural appeals by the evangelists" is not one of his five stated "criteria for inauthenticity", he often excludes material on this basis. For example, he considers Mk 9:11-13 to be inauthentic because the evangelist seems to have associated John the Baptist with Elijah and Jesus with the Danielic Son of Man. Moreover, he argues, this saying is juxtaposed with an account that bears affinity to the account of Moses on Sinai. Such affinities lead Lüdemann to conclude that the sayings associated with this episode are the products of invention. Lüdemann structures his study throughout by separating material which has been interpreted from material that is historical.

A similar dichotomy between scriptural appeals and historicity is the driving force behind much of John Dominic Crossan's work. Crossan argues that the NT accounts of Jesus are mostly fiction based upon scriptural precedents. In his The Birth of Christianity, Crossan assesses the passion narratives in this way:

The individual units, general sequences, and overall frames of the passion-resurrection stories are so linked to prophetic fulfillment that the removal of such fulfillment leaves nothing but the barest facts ... biblical models and scriptural precedents have controlled the story to the point that without them nothing is left but the brutal fact of crucifixion itself.

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4 They asked him, saying, "Why is it that the scribes say that Elijah must come first?" And he said to them, "Elijah does first come and restore all things. And yet how is it written of the Son of Man that he will suffer many things and be treated with contempt? But I say to you that Elijah has indeed come, and they did to him whatever they wished, just as it is written of him."
5 Lüdemann, 2000, 59. Incidentally, it should be noted that it is much more likely that this saying was incorporated into Mark's narrative in association with the story of Elijah's appearance that immediately precedes this saying. Thus, Lüdemann is incorrect to conclude that Mark has John the Baptist in mind in this context. It is much more probable that the association with John the Baptist (which Lüdemann intuitively observes) has carried over from the pre-Markan tradition.
6 Lüdemann, 2000, 60-1; Cf. also comments on the association between Jesus and Isaiah's suffering servant, Lüdemann, 2000, 105.
7 J.D. Crossan, The Birth of Christianity: Discovering What Happened After the Execution of Jesus (Edinburgh: T&T Clark, 1998), 521; My thanks to M. Goodacre for his yet to be published paper which similarly critiques Crossan on this point ["Prophecy Historicized or Tradition Scripturalized: Reflections on the Origin of the Passion Narrative" (via personal correspondence)].
Because of this, Crossan describes the gospel narratives as "Prophecy Historicized", a genre that is more typological than historical. This presumed dichotomy between typology and history is pervasive in Gospels scholarship. Both Goulder and Crossan forthrightly adhere to this dichotomy; however many others, like Lüdemann, betray this tendency in less obvious ways.

In his *The Historical Figure of Jesus*, E. P. Sanders includes a chapter titled "Two Contexts." Therein Sanders describes what he calls the "theological context" of Jesus and distinguishes this from what he calls the "context of Jesus' own career". The former of these sets Jesus within the salvation history of Israel. This context places Jesus alongside great figures such as Moses and Elijah. In this way, the gospels intend to portray Jesus as a type of Moses (*et al.*) thus allowing Jesus' traditional predecessors to illuminate his role. The second of Jesus' contexts, posits Sanders, is the immediate social and political climate in which Jesus lived. This context has more to do with the history of the first century (e.g. John the Baptist and the emerging Christian Church) and less to do with Israel's salvation history. Sanders points out the difficulty that this creates for historical study:

> There are no absolutely certain signs that tell us when a passage in the gospels has been invented as a parallel to an earlier stage of the history of salvation, when it has been recast to emphasize an actual parallel, and when Jesus himself (or John the Baptist) intentionally created a reminiscence. 9

Thus Sanders (unlike the scholars cited above) acknowledges that the historian cannot simply attribute a passage framed in theological context to the early Church "since Jesus himself was a theologian". On the other hand, Sanders rightly suspects that the evangelists have imposed their own theology upon Jesus. Therefore, distinguishing the evangelists' theology from Jesus' theology becomes hazardous. Sanders writes:

> The more parallels there were between Jesus and characters or prophecies in Hebrew scripture, the more likely Matthew, Mark and Luke were to invent still more. They may have reasoned that if there were six similarities, there probably had been a seventh. I think that there is no doubt that they did invent some, though the possibility of overlaps, or of Jesus' own conscious imitation of scriptural types, means that we must often be uncertain. 11

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8 Sanders, *The Historical Figure of Jesus* (London: Penguin, 1993), 78-97.
9 Sanders, *Historical Figure*, 90.
10 Sanders, *Historical Figure*, 97.
11 Sanders, *Historical Figure*, 85. I agree with much of Sanders' assessment, so it is with great respect that I offer the following critique.
Here Sanders places his finger on the central problem of relating typology with history. But while his description of the problem hits the mark, his conclusion must be challenged. If it can be granted, as Sanders does, that Jesus did evoke scriptural types during his life, such typologies might have been further developed by those who remembered him and told stories about him. In this way, Sanders aptly describes how interpretations of historically significant figures are gradually distorted according to changing contexts of memory over time. Where Sanders errs is his assessment of "two contexts" as if there are only two available to historical inquiry. On the contrary, there are not only two contexts; there is a long continuum of many historical contexts that stand between Jesus and the evangelists, each connected to the others.

By placing the typological discussion in a different category than the context of "Jesus' own career", Sanders has created two contexts and thereby bifurcates his historical portrait of Jesus. This is not to say that there are no discernable differences between the typological imagination of the early church and the typological imitations of the historical Jesus. The opposite is true. Surely, such interpretations were distorted over time, sometimes with dramatic implications. However, rather than speaking of two contexts, I will argue that the model of a continuum is more suitable. By placing typological appeals to Israel's salvation history (most often) in a separate category than Jesus' own career, Sanders has underestimated how inseparable history and typological interpretation are from one another.

I will argue that typological appeals to salvation history are to be expected along each stage of the Jesus tradition. All history, whether salvation history or otherwise, borrows language, categories and types from previous eras. For this reason, the model of a continuum is to be preferred, one that places early typological interpretations of Jesus and the interpretations of the early church along the same trajectory.

1.2 **Historiography: Where to Begin?**

In both of the above quotes from Sanders, he voices his "uncertainty". This uncertainty stems from the recognition that Jesus' typological imitations are difficult to distinguish from the evangelist's typological representations of him. Here Sanders probably falls back on the Historical-Positivistic\(^\text{12}\) notion that an *ideal* historical inquiry is one that can

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\(^{12}\) Historical-positivism is the theory that history is the task of employing rational or empirical methods, in an objective and value-neutral way, to accurately determine what happened in the
subtract interpretation from history leaving only the “actual” description of the past. When he laments that this cannot be done, he voices his uncertainty. Two recent studies have made similar observations concerning Crossan’s hermeneutics, and Lüdemann is particularly vulnerable to this criticism. I should clarify at this point that I do not intend to lump all of the above into a single category. Since no current scholar (that I know of) claims Historical-Positivism, it is more accurate to say that many betray tendencies toward Historical-Positivism. If anything, my critique of Crossan, Lüdemann and Sanders suggests that Historical-positivism is the default position for much of NT scholarship, even among those whose approaches and conclusions vary widely. Consider the following statement made by Ben Witherington:

Much that is true about the historical Jesus is not historically demonstratable because the evidence is meager. Thus, the readers must content themselves with the fact that the historically demonstratable truths about Jesus and early Christianity are at best only a subset of what was historically true about these matters.

Much like Sanders, Witherington makes an earnest attempt to move away from Historical-Positivism. Witherington states very clearly that “there is no such thing as uninterpreted history”. He concludes that “we have no ancient sources about Jesus and early Christianity from “neutral” observers”. In both these statements, I wholeheartedly concur. But when Witherington’s first (block) quote is examined closely, a certain Historical-Positive lapse is evident. Here he makes a distinction between “historical truth” and “historically demonstratable truth”. In his mind the latter is only a subset of the former. By describing “historically demonstratable truth” as a meager subset of the more comprehensive “historical truth” that is no longer available to the historian, Witherington’s default conception of history surfaces. Perhaps not in every case, but certainly in the quote provided, what Witherington means by “historical Jesus” is Jesus past. Cf. D.R. Hiley, J.F. Bohman, and R. Shusterman, Introduction to The Interpretive Turn: Philosophy, Science, Culture (eds. Hiley et al.; Ithaca: Cornell Univ. Press, 1991), 2-3.

13 H. Childs, The Myth of the Historical Jesus and the Evolution of Consciousness (SBLDS 179; Atlanta: SBL, 2000), 21-58; D.L. Denton Jr., Historiography and Hermeneutics in Jesus Studies: An Examination of the Work of John Dominic Crossan and Ben F. Meyers (JSNTSup 262; London: T&T Clark Intl., 2004), 57-78 esp.77. Denton does well to distinguish the “early Crossan” (pp.18-42) from the “later Crossan” (pp.43-56). Much of Denton’s criticism is directed toward the “early Crossan” but he maintains that Crossan’s early faults have not been corrected but merely tempered in recent years.

14 After removing all of the redacted material from the historical material Lüdemann regularly concludes with a summary one-word judgment as to a text’s historical value, e.g. “Nil”, “Unhistorical”, “Wordless”. This is normally followed by a brief (one paragraph) assessment of the historically valuable (i.e. unredacted) material. Cf. G. Stanton, review of G. Lüdemann, Jesus After 2000 Years: What He Really Said and Did, JTS 54 (2003): 422.


16 Witherington, History, 15.
as he existed independently of historical memory. But by his own principles such a history does not exist. So while Sanders voices uncertainty and Witherington voices probability, both assume a similar stance with regard to what the historian is trying to accomplish.

It must be stated in no uncertain terms that "historical truth" has no subsets. There are not subsets of historical truth there are only degrees of probability. There is no historical truth that is not projected on the basis of evidence (or to use Witherington's term: "demonstratable"). The only thing that stands behind such historical truth is the forgotten past, and what has been forgotten about the past is not available for analysis. The "historical Jesus" is the figure that becomes plausible on the basis of the historical evidence; there is no other. If Jesus historians are ultimately hoping to glimpse a long forgotten past, the evidence is doomed to be seen as meager and the impossibility of analyzing "the past" will block us at every turn.

In contrast, I do not see "historical probability" as a barrier to the historian. All truth is simply measured in degrees of probability — to say that "historical truth" is always only "probable" does not distinguish it from any other kind of truth.

To be fair, I have no doubt that both Witherington and Sanders had intended to move in a similar direction. Furthermore, I should acknowledge that a great deal of excellent exegesis has been done under the watch of Historical-Positivism. I consider myself fortunate to rely on more than two centuries of historical-critical methodology. What my critique brings to the fore is the need for further clarification as to what exactly the task of history entails.

HJR has only begun to scratch the surface of the issues being discussed in contemporary historiographical circles. But once this need has been felt, where does one begin? In answering this question, Keith Jenkins writes that while most historians would agree that a rigorous method is important, there is a problem as to which rigorous method they are talking about. [...] Would you like to follow Hegel or Marx or Dilthey or Weber or Popper or Hempel or Aron or Collingwood or Dray or Oakshott or Danto or Gallie or Walsh or Atkinson or Leff or Hexter? Would you care to go along with modern empiricists, feminists, the Annales School, neo-Marxists, new-stylists, econometricians, structuralists or post-structuralists, or even Marwick himself, to name but twenty-five possibilities? And this is a short list!  

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17 The idea of "subsets" of truth betrays the idea that there is historical truth that is a priori.
Add to this list all those emerging branches that have budded since Jenkins wrote in 1991.\textsuperscript{19} While methodological variety is not necessarily a problem for the postmodern mind, it is a problem for the author who hopes to survey these methods, do justice to the contributions of each and then have space left over to say something of his own. With this in mind, I will answer the question in this way: The best place to begin is to identify some key deficiencies with a particular discipline and seek out a particular historiographical discussion that attempts to speak to these most directly.

So rather than attempting to provide a comprehensive survey of contemporary historiography, I will narrow my discussion to a branch of historiography that recently has taken seriously the problem of hermeneutics, the relay of tradition and typological interpretation. I refer to an historiographical discussion that has emerged (for the most part) in the past twenty years called Social Memory theory (SM). In my estimation, this focus will (1) provide an entry point into many key hermeneutical concerns shared by many contemporary approaches to historiography and (2) serve as an apt departure point from which to apply these concerns to HJR. This will be the focus of the following chapter.

Before doing so, I would be remiss not to acknowledge a handful of studies that have previously attempted to bridge the gap between historiography and HJR, and admirably so. There is perhaps no name in contemporary research that is more associated with Jesus and historiography than Ben F. Meyer. In introducing the work of Lonergan to HJR,\textsuperscript{20} Meyer established “Critical Realism” as the most appealed to alternative to what I have referred to as the default setting of Historical-Positivism. Meyer presents Lonergan’s “cognitional theory” as if it comprehensively represents the more general theory of Critical Realism. Thus for Meyer, Critical Realism specifically denoted Lonergan’s cognitional theory.\textsuperscript{21} This theory attempts to combat the “naïve” realists’ conception of knowing as “seeing”. Rather, Lonergan emphasized a more complex process of knowing which involved the interaction between experience, understanding and judging.\textsuperscript{22}

\begin{itemize}
\item \textsuperscript{19} Lest we adopt a caricature of postmodernity, it is necessary to point out that not every new contribution breaks away from the pack; many attempt to refine the discipline and have been helpful to this end.
\item \textsuperscript{21} Cf. Denton, \textit{Historiography}, 81-2.
\item \textsuperscript{22} For a concise treatment of this theory, see B. Lonergan, “Cognitional Structure”, in \textit{Collection: Papers by Bernard Lonergan} (Toronto: Univ. of Toronto, 1988). \textit{As per the guidelines of the}
Perhaps Meyer’s greatest influence was felt indirectly through the adaptation of Critical Realism by N.T. Wright. Wright acknowledges his debt to Meyer and proceeds to adapt this theory to his own concerns for what he calls “the essentially ‘storied nature’ of human knowing.” Both Meyer and Wright emphasize that there must be a reciprocal relationship between the “real object” (which exists independently from the knower) and the mind which knows the thing. Both seek to contextualize the knowing process within the knower’s perspective and worldview. Wright’s contribution to this discussion is his emphasis on the important role that stories play in creating a worldview and the way that the knower is inclined to understand his own story within the framework of larger stories. This requires that personal stories be arranged in narrative form; it also suggests the possibility that personal narratives are shaped by metanarratives. For Wright, the act of writing history is not dissimilar to the way that personal stories almost intuitively take shape. Thus, in his view, there is no great gap between events that have occurred in time and stories created about those events. Thus history “is neither ‘bare facts’ nor ‘subjective interpretations’, but is rather the meaningful narrative of events and intentions.”

In my opinion, Critical Realism has been a worthwhile corrective. If one thinks of (naïve) Realism as one extreme and Idealism as another, Critical Realism could be thought of as that force of gravity which pulls back on the pendulum swinging toward Idealism. It now serves the same correcting purpose against the momentum of Post-Structuralist and Deconstructionist thought (i.e. the denial of any form of realism). But as is often the case with such correctives, their counter-momentum tends to pull back further than need be.

One deficiency of Critical Realism that the present study will attempt to correct is its underemphasis on subconscious interpretation. The concept of “judging” (which is seen as the culmination of experience and understanding to form knowledge) connotes a process which moves toward conscious thought. This suggests that understanding is a process that involves intentional cognition. Indeed, both Lonergan and Meyer begin by

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*SBL, the full page extents of journal articles and articles in a collected volume will be provided in the bibliography.*


25 Wright, *New Testament*, 82; More recently Denton (*Historiography*, 168-92) has endeavored to refine this concept and use it as a guiding principle in the analysis of historical data. He calls his adaptation “Narrative Intelligibility”. There is much in Denton’s work that moves this discussion forward and will be revisited in my own discussion of “narrativization” (II.3).
assuming that the knower is "aware of an object". I have no problem with this description of the interplay between the knower and act of intentional knowing. Indeed this aspect of knowing is an apt description of the interaction between written history and the historian who intentionally attempts to understand the intended sense of the text. But it must be said that much of knowledge (that does not come via textual transmission) comes to us intuitively and unawares. In my discussion of memory theory, I will emphasize the idea that most often the interplay between memory and perception happens on a subconscious level (II.2.3-4, II.3 below). Wright hints in this direction when he discusses how often and swiftly we process the perceived past, "selecting tiny fragments of our lives and arranging them into narratives". When thought of in this way, "judging" might occur on a more intuitive level. However, this process is generally underemphasized by adherents of Critical Realism. It is precisely this aspect of memory that I will emphasize in my discussion of "memory distortion". Otherwise, the reader will probably find that my theoretical arguments and models cohere in large part with Critical Realism but are not reliant on them. Conversely, I do not draw directly from the overt tenets of Critical Realism and so the reader does not need to be well versed in Lonergan or his adherents to follow my theoretical argument.

A recent representative from the other side of the pendulum is Hal Childs. Childs describes himself as a Postfoundationalist, by which he means that he considers rational or objective foundations for knowledge to be unachievable. Childs aims to undermine the entire enterprise of historical-critical scholarship and redefine history as myth. Childs’ theory and method rely heavily on Heidegger’s interpretation of Jung. Within this program, the quest for the historical Jesus is only valuable if it takes on a "psychological-archetypal" aim. Childs avers that the idea that Jesus is a separate historical entity from the historian is a carry over from Positivism; rather, Jesus Christ is

26 Meyer, Critical Realism, 8; Lonergan writes: “Just as operations by their intentionality make objects present to the subject, so also by consciousness they make the operating subject present to himself” [Method in Theology (London: Darton, Longman & Todd, 1972), 8].


29 For example, I (like the adherents of Critical Realism) discuss the "hermeneutical circle" and adapt the concerns presented in this discussion to my own historiographical theory and method. But I do so through interaction with Schleiermacher, Dilthey, Heidegger et al. and not through any interaction with Lonergan.


31 Childs, Myth, 99.
the archetype that constitutes the psyche of the Christian West. He argues that the historian projects his own ego and the collective subconscious of his culture onto the historical Jesus in order to see "the reflection at the bottom of the well [which] reveals previously unknown aspects of the "face of God" that desires incarnation." Thus the value in HJR is found in the process of projection so that the subconscious has a means to become conscious.

In stark contrast to Critical Realism, Childs' approach to HJR is defined by his conception of the subconscious interpretation. While my approach will also emphasize Heideggerian thought and the role of subconscious interpretation, it will have very little else in common with Childs' approach. I will presume that while the historian stands in relationship to history, she does indeed have a basis for relative individuation. Moreover, while I grant that certain historical events and figures can take on mythic and archetypal significance, I do not think that all history can be equated with myth. Thus part of my own method will involve the distinction between memory and invention. Because Childs' method resists the idea that these two can be separated, one must seriously question whether his method even aims at historical inquiry.

Finally, I must acknowledge my debt to the recent work of James Dunn. After providing a more detailed survey of hermeneutics and historiography than do most contributions to HJR, Dunn aligns himself with Critical Realism. While I do not assume such a stance, much of my theoretical argument hinges on the concept of memory. This concept was brought to the fore of HJR through the publication of Dunn's Jesus Remembered. Dunn argues more forthrightly than his predecessors that Dunn's Jesus Remembered. Dunn argues more forthrightly than his predecessors that HJR should not be an attempt to describe "what actually happened" but an attempt to account for the initial impact of the earliest memories of Jesus. "The only realistic objective for any 'quest of the historical Jesus' is Jesus remembered." I take this for granted over the course of the present investigation, but it should be asked whether Dunn has departed from Critical Realism at this point. The aim of a Critical Realist history, according to Meyer, is to establish "man as he was"; i.e. "History studies historical reality". It seems that in order for Dunn to maintain his association with Critical Realism, he has to

32 Childs, Myth, 221.
33 Childs, Myth, 98.
34 Childs, Myth, 125.
35 J.D.G. Dunn, Jesus Remembered (Grand Rapids: Eerdmans, 2003), esp.Ch.6.
36 Dunn, Jesus Remembered, 882.
38 Meyer, Critical Realism, 27.
redefine historical “reality” in terms of historical “memory”. My own study will attempt to do just that; I will argue that history is primarily defined by the limits of memory. However, I have no intention of redefining Critical Realism on the basis of my findings.

Dunn’s way into the concept of memory is through his emphasis on the oral character of the Jesus tradition. Indeed, oral tradition presupposes the process of memory, and a particular kind of memory at that. By examining the method of transmission, he offers a theory of how the initial memories of Jesus were transmitted and took synoptic shape. Central to his thesis is the notion (common among oral historians) that oral tradition is a balance between variance and stability. While the details are expected to vary, the core substance of the tradition is expected to remain stable. While the discussion of orality and the NT precedes Dunn’s treatment, his work has gained for the discussion a much wider exposure than had been formerly enjoyed. Moreover, his work firmly places HJR within this discussion and re-envisages Jesus’ relationship to the synoptic tradition in light of this. I consider his work to be a significant advance in HJR in this regard.

What Dunn does not offer in Jesus Remembered is a theory of memory that interacts with recent historiographical discussions of memory theory. Most notably, Dunn’s work has been vulnerable to questions raised by Social Memory (mentioned above). This deficit recently has been remedied, but Dunn does so by distancing his

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40 See also T. Mournet, Oral Tradition and Literary Dependency: Variability and Stability in the Synoptic Tradition and Q (WUNT 195; Tübingen: Mohr Siebeck, 2005).
concept of "formative memory" from SM. This is the departure point for my own study.

In what follows, I will largely align my approach with the key tenets of SM and will critically adapt these to the unique concerns presented by HJR. Because SM is a relatively new field (having only gained momentum in the past 20 years) and almost completely new to HJR (having only been introduced in the past 3 years), the present dissertation will be the first large-scale adaptation of SM to NT studies. Moreover, my study will be among the first to approach HJR from the standpoint of SM that does not take the form of a general introduction to SM. In contrast to Dunn, I consider SM to provide the Jesus historian with a theoretical and methodological way forward that is a welcome middle ground between Critical Realism and post-foundationalism. Having said this, my study (III.1) will modify SM in a few fundamental ways. Because SM is a relatively new approach to historiography in general and HJR in particular, there is ample room for redefinition.

I.3 Thesis and Delimitation

It is my contention that Jesus can be examined and discussed as an historical figure as long as history is thought of in terms of memory distortion. This statement is not intended to be concessionary. I will argue that all perception is distorted in the mnemonic process and that historical memory is best understood in this way. Building from this argument, I will suggest that the multiple (and sometimes contradictory) interpretations of Jesus found in the Gospels allow the historian to chart trajectories of mnemonic distortion that have been propelled forward by the initial perceptions of Jesus by his contemporaries.

44 In Dunn's view, Jesus' initial impact decisively formed the memories of him and provided a stabilizing force for the oral transmission of these memories. I will revisit this discussion below (II.3, III.1.2).
45 Here I refer to the newly inaugurated (2004) Society of Biblical Literature section: "Mapping Memory".
46 Deserving mention is G.M. Keightley, "The Church's Memory of Jesus: A Social Science Analysis of 1 Thessalonians", BTB 17 (1987). To my knowledge her study was the first to introduce SM to NT studies. It was another 15 years before SM attracted wider interest among biblical scholars.
47 However, see the early advances made by R.A. Horsley, "Prominent Patterns in the Social Memory of Jesus and Friends" (2005) and H. Hearon, "The Story of the Woman who Anointed Jesus' as Social Memory: A Methodological Proposal for the Study of Tradition as Memory", in Memory, Tradition and Text: Uses of the Past in Early Christianity (Leiden: Brill, 2005).
48 Memory distortion will be defined and illustrated in the following chapters (II.2.3-4, III.1).
In order to demonstrate how distortion trajectories can be charted, I will focus on typological interpretation. I will argue that typology is a particular manifestation of memory distortion and that it provides an apt example of how memories are propelled forward by certain patterns of interpretation that evolve over time and (re)consideration. Central to this thesis is the concept of mnemonic continuity: I will argue that memory distortion (most often) is a gradual and imperceptible process that renders past perceptions intelligible to the continually shifting contexts of the present. Because of this, distortion trajectories can be charted backward and the historian can postulate the most plausible historical memory(ies) that best account for these distortions.

My thesis will be argued from the broad to the narrow. I will begin with a discussion of historiography and memory, narrow this discussion to typology and then focus my theoretical model onto a specific issue of HJR. The bulk of this dissertation will involve historical and exegetical questions concerning the title "Son of David". This topic will provide a work table for my historiographical thesis. In this way, I hope to avoid an overly long treatise on theoretical models and abstract concepts. Such discussion will be confined to chapters II and III where I will directly discuss the theoretical and methodological issues pertaining to history, memory and typology. Thereafter, the reader will be able to observe my primary historiographical thesis as it is applied to a particular group of texts, ideas and historical developments. So while my primary aim with these latter chapters is to demonstrate how my thesis plays out in historical Jesus research, my secondary aim is to shed new light on the title "Son of David" and how it was applied to Jesus. Specifically, I will emphasize the role that David and Solomon typology played in the application of this title more so than previous studies on this topic.49

Given that my primary thesis is theoretical, my treatment of Son of David will be limited to texts that specifically manifest this phrase. It occasionally will be necessary to relate this small group of texts to the larger spheres of Davidism, Messianism, Christology, etc. But I will limit my discussion of these to the specific points of overlap with the title Son of David. This dissertation is not primarily about these larger concepts and will not attempt to provide a comprehensive study on Davidism, Messianism or Christology. In this way, my study is different from previous treatments of Son of David.

My chapters will proceeds as follows: (I) In this chapter, I have introduced what I consider to be a fundamental deficiency of HJR, that being the misunderstanding of the relationship between history and typology. I believe that this misunderstanding is a

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49 See my introductions to chapters IV and V.
product of the tendency to want to separate historical fact from interpretation. I have suggested that greater attention to historiographical discussions outside biblical studies might serve to remedy this false dichotomy. (II) In the following chapter, I will situate my interests in historiography and memory theory within a survey of several important contributors to hermeneutical theory. I will then survey the development and key theorists of Social Memory theory and suggest how this historiographical discussion might be of use to HJR. (III) My third chapter will put forth my primary thesis concerning the relationship between history, memory and typology. I will illustrate my theoretical model and lay out my methodology that is an outworking of this model.

Chapters IV through VII will demonstrate my theory and method via exegesis. The introduction of chapter IV serves as an introduction to these chapters. I refer the reader to that secondary introduction for an overview of my exegetical aims.
II

History and Memory

This chapter will attempt to follow the thread of certain ideas pertaining to history and memory as they have developed in historiographical thought. For the sake of space and focus, I will highlight a selection of important shifts in this development: My first section will (1) examine the historiographical presuppositions of Benedict Spinoza, (2) compare the dichotomies at work in the thinking of Gotthold Lessing and (3) Leopold von Ranke, (4) discuss the hermeneutical circle and the key contributors to this concept, including Schleiermacher and Heidegger, and (5) critique the conception of history in the work of Rudolf Bultmann. In this way, I aim to set the stage for my second section which concerns the historiographical implications of Social Memory theory, its beginnings and the contributions of its contemporary adherents. My first section will consider issues related to history, perception and interpretation. The second section will be focused on the specific features of memory theory and memory distortion and their implications for historiography.

Over the course of this dissertation, I will assume three premises. In the present chapter, I will discuss these with an aim to build from this foundation in the chapters that follow: (A) If perceptions are to be remembered then they will inevitably be interpreted, subconsciously, consciously, or both. (B) Perceptions that contribute to historical memory are thus always interpreted along each stage of the tradition that they inhabit. (C) The historian is never able to interpret an uninterpreted past.

My most central thesis will not be addressed in full until my second chapter. Thus I list these three positions as premises rather than conclusions. However, as with all premises, each could be seen as a conclusion in its own right. Hence the necessity of the present chapter. Because this chapter is largely a survey of selected historiographical ideas, I will not attempt to structure what follows into three neatly contained sections that coincide with each of my three premises. Rather, I will tease out the issues related to my three premises as I work through this survey.
II. Interpretation

The reader will notice that premise C employs the word “interpret” twice. I here grant that the historian’s primary role is that of interpreter. This, of course, is an uncontroversial position among contemporary historiographers. What I aim to emphasize is that the ancient perceivers of events and figures were themselves interpreters. As such, historical memory is from the very beginning the product of interpretation. While this point is often acknowledged, ultimately historiographers have been preoccupied with the nature their own task. Historiography since Collingwood and Trevelyan\(^1\) has increasingly centered on the theories and methods employed by the contemporary interpreter.\(^2\)

I view the self-reflection of the historian on her role as an interpreter to be essential and have no desire to undermine this progress. Rather, I wholeheartedly agree and refocus my own discussion onto the role that interpretation played for the first perceivers of history, on whose memories historical data was first based. Thus, to fill out premise C, I take for granted that historical memory exists first in the interpretations of the ancient perceivers and only then in the subsequent interpretations of historians. With this in mind I begin with Spinoza.

II.1 Spinoza and Scripture

Benedict (Baruch) Spinoza (1632-77) provides a window into the early concern for biblical hermeneutics,\(^3\) and by inference, the philosophy of history. The chief aim of Spinoza’s *Tractatus Theologico-Politicus* was to combat what he considered the abuse of Scripture at the hands of the Church.\(^4\) Spinoza accused the Church of using the Bible to justify doctrine and thereby attributed to the Holy Spirit “every result of their diseased imagination” (7:7).\(^5\) His solution to this problem was to study Scripture by the same principles as one studies nature, with pure intellect and without emotion. Spinoza writes:

> By working in this manner everyone will always advance without danger of error – that is, if they admit no principles for interpreting Scripture [...] and will be able

\(^1\) R.G. Collingwood (1889-1943) and G.M. Trevelyan (1876-1962).

\(^2\) This was prefigured by Dilthey’s notion that perceptions of the past are filtered through historian’s worldview (H.A. Hodges, *Wilhelm Dilthey* (London: Routledge and Kegan Paul, 1969), esp.228); See discussion in R.C. Solomon, *Continental Philosophy since 1750: The Rise and Fall of the Self* (Oxford: OUP, 1988), 106.

\(^3\) By “early” I mean that Spinoza’s work was an antecedent to the hermeneutical concerns of the Enlightenment and thereafter.

\(^4\) And thereby undermine the Church’s use of Scripture for political sway, see S. Preus, *Spinoza and the Irrelevance of Biblical Authority* (Cambridge: CUP, 2001), 1-33, esp.4-6.

with equal security to discuss what surpasses our understanding, and what is known by the natural light of reason (7:11).

In other words, Spinoza advances the idea that scripture ought to be read as “historical narrative” and not as a proof text for dogma.

While Spinoza’s hermeneutic foreshadows the divorce of faith and history that finds fruition in modern biblical criticism, it most loudly bespeaks Spinoza’s conception of historical inquiry as akin to natural science. The foundational assumption on which Spinoza’s historiography was built was that history, like nature, can be objectively studied, categorized and understood. Of course, contemporary, postmodern critics will question whether nature can be observed in this way, but what concerns the present study is Spinoza’s analogy. It is obvious that he took for granted that the natural world could and should be studied with “pure intellect” and devoid of prejudice. What would have been more controversial to his contemporaries was that the historical narratives of Scripture should be objectified in the same way. Spinoza averred that scripture can only be fully understood when it is studied in and for its historical and literary context. And as he provides exegetical examples for his method, we witness the anticipation of modern historical criticism if not the very birth of it.

Spinoza held that all scripture fell into one of two categories: revelation and historical narrative. As indicated above, it is his hermeneutic pertaining to historical narrative that most interests the present study. But the simple delineation between these two genres bespeaks Spinoza’s conception of history. This categorization demonstrates that Spinoza considered history to be something other than revelation. So a brief word on his conception of revelation is warranted. He considered revelation to be the product the prophet’s imagination, and that knowledge deriving from revelation was much less reliable than that derived from the observation of nature (2:16). This was not due to the lack of divine influence, but due to the fact that “God adapted revelations to the understanding and opinions of the prophets” (2:125). Spinoza argued that in order for God’s message to the prophet to have been intelligible, it would have had to condescend

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6 Spinoza claims that biblical scripture “is chiefly made up of historical narratives and revelation” (7:21). The Gospels fall into what Spinoza attributes to the former category.

7 G.W. Dawes provides a helpful treatment along these lines as he discusses both Spinoza and Troeltsch (“Introduction”, in The Historical Jesus Quest: A Foundational Anthology (Leiden: Deo Publishing, 1999), 2-3); Cf. M. Rae, History and Hermeneutics (Edinburgh: T&T Clark, 2006), 4-21, esp.7-8.

to the limitations of the ancient mind. As such, revelation does "reveal" the divine but it is more representative of the ignorance, and conflicting opinions of the prophets. "It therefore follows that we must by no means go to the prophets for knowledge, either of natural or of spiritual phenomena" (2:126).

Spinoza considered historical narrative to be less tainted by the revelatory process, but acknowledged that a similar process takes place in certain episodes of historical narrative. In the instance of Job, the "historian" gave an account of a revelation from God. In such cases, the ancient historian represents the same sort of limitations that hindered the prophets. Consider the following passage with special attention to Spinoza's parenthetical comment:

The reasonings by which the Lord displayed His power to Job (if they really were a revelation, and the author of the history is narrating, and not merely, as some suppose, rhetorically adorning his own conceptions), would come under the same category - that is, they were adapted to Job's understanding... (2:132).

Spinoza's parenthetical comment betrays his understanding of history as something other than rhetoric that embellishes the author's "own conceptions". To do so was to extend beyond simple narration and thereby the narration would cease to be history. It is thus evident that Spinoza's notion of history had little tolerance for the interpretive agendas of the ancient authors. Spinoza's main argument deals with the revelatory process, arguing that any adaptation to the ancient person's understanding renders the text suspect. In both comments, Spinoza betrays the idea that the filter of ancient human perception and understanding hinders an otherwise straight-forward process. His parenthetical comment speaks to his distrust of conscious agendas and his main argument speaks to his distrust of implicit worldviews. Spinoza concluded:

We have now more than sufficiently proved our point, that God adapted revelations to the understanding and opinions of the prophets, and that in matters of theory without bearing on charity or morality the prophets could be, and, in fact, were, ignorant, and held conflicting opinions (2:125)... We can come to no different conclusion with respect to the reasonings of Christ, by which He convicted the

9 Spinoza wrote, "...So also did the revelation vary, as we have stated, according to individual disposition and temperament, and according to the opinions previously held [by the prophets]. It varied according to disposition, in this way: if a prophet was cheerful, victories, peace, and events which make men glad, were revealed to him; in that he was naturally more likely to imagine such things. If, on the contrary, he was melancholy, wars, massacres, and calamities were revealed; and so, according as a prophet was merciful, gentle, quick to anger, or severe, he was more fitted for one kind of revelation than another. It varied according to the temper of imagination in this way: if a prophet was cultivated he perceived the mind of God in a cultivated way, if he was confused he perceived it confusedly. And so with revelations perceived through visions. If a prophet was a countryman he saw visions of oxen, cows, and the like; if he was a soldier, he saw generals and armies; if a courtier, a royal throne, and so on" (2:32-37)... "each doubtless saw God under the form in which he usually imagined Him" (2:54).
Pharisees of pride and ignorance, and exhorted His disciples to lead the true life. He adapted them to each man's opinions and principles (2:133-4).

Interestingly, Spinoza likened the speaking of Christ to his contemporaries to the speaking of God to humanity. In his view, Christ's speech condescended to the "opinions and principles" of his ancient audience when he spoke of angels and devils. Accordingly, Spinoza believed these references to the supernatural did not give insight to Christ's understanding of reality, but rather gives insight into the worldview of the historical audience and the historian himself. Spinoza picked up this line of reasoning again in chapter seven, this time in regard to "historical narrative":

...the narratives generally contain miracles - that is, as we have shown in the last chapter, relations of extraordinary natural occurrences adapted to the opinions and judgment of the historians who recorded them...(7:12).

Crucial to understanding Spinoza on this point is his commitment to rationalism and his subsequent rejection of the supernatural. Spinoza defined this view of reality in the first part of his Ethics. Spinoza held that there is only one and infinite substance in the universe and he called this substance God. Because of this, Spinoza held that God and Nature were one and the same. Moreover, God does not act in ways contrary to his own nature. Therefore, according to Spinoza, things perceived as supernatural are simply natural occurrences which have been misunderstood due to the limited perceptions of the historian.

It is at this point where Spinoza's treatment of the historical narratives is of particular interest to the present study. Spinoza granted that certain supernatural accounts were tainted by the worldview of the ancient perceiver. But he did not appeal to this

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10 Perhaps indicative of a high Christology on his part, or at least on the part of his readers. This is interesting considering his objection to a "personal" God in favor of a pantheistic conception of God within Nature. Cf. F. Copleston, A History of Philosophy (New York: Doubleday, 1963), IV:262-3.
11 Spinoza was of the opinion that Christ did not himself believe in angels and devils, but spoke of these in order to be understandable to his ancient audience (2:135-7).
12 Cf. Spinoza's comment on the "historian" who wrote the book of Joshua (2:68).
13 Copleston, Philosophy, 261-2.
14 See Ethics, propositions XI and XIV.
16 "Further, as nothing happens in nature which does not follow from her laws, and as her laws embrace everything conceived by the Divine intellect, and lastly, as nature preserves a fixed and immutable order; it most clearly follows that miracles are only intelligible as in relation to human opinions, and merely mean events of which the natural cause cannot be explained by a reference to any ordinary occurrence, either by us, or at any rate, by the writer and narrator of the miracle" (6:21).
process in instances that did not invite doubt by rationalist standards. While Spinoza admits that "the narratives are in great measure adapted to the prejudices of each age" he was inclined to see most narrative as "perfectly plain" while others were "more speculative". The latter description was only used of those passages that recorded the supernatural whereas the most common kind of passage simply bespoke "their real meaning" (7:67). Where biblical accounts did not seem incongruous with his understanding of nature, Spinoza made little appeal to "speculative" process of ancient perception. He believed that history was more reliable when the perceptions of the historian were less recognizable. It is not overstating the case to suggest that the closer the historian's perceptions were to Spinoza's own perceptions of reality, the less inclined he was to recognize them as tainted. It is for this reason that Spinoza not only provides a window into early hermeneutical concerns, but also an apt springboard for the present study's interest in the interplay between perception and historiography.

Three observations are pertinent: (1) Spinoza's aim was to reinvent biblical interpretation in the form of scientific objectivity. While it is easy to criticize Spinoza with the hindsight of postmodernity, he should be praised for his initial pushing of the pendulum toward historical criticism. (2) Spinoza was correct to recognize that the ancient historians' perceptions of natural events were tainted by their respective worldviews. In hindsight, we can apply this recognition to all perceived events whether they are understood to be supernatural or otherwise. (3) It follows from the first two observations that Spinoza took history as straightforward narrative when the ancient historian was as objective as possible and the modern interpreter was equally objective. If either of these "ends" seemed influenced by subjective interests, Spinoza considered the history compromised and therefore less likely to convey knowledge of the past.

II.1.2 Lessing and Historical Testimony

Gotthold Ephraim Lessing (1729-81) represents a period where "historical consciousness" came to prominence with dramatic implications. In several ways, Lessing considered himself a disciple of Spinoza. For a discussion of Spinoza's more general influence upon Lessing see H. E. Allison, Lessing and the Enlightenment (Ann Arbor: Univ. of Michigan, 1966), 121-2.
In a short essay written in 1777, Lessing lamented that there was an insurmountable gap between historical truth (which is always, at best, accidental\(^{19}\)) and experiential certainty (which, via reason, cannot be doubted), thus leading to his famous dictum, “The accidental truths of history can never be the proof for the necessary truths of reason.”\(^{20}\) Recent treatments of Lessing have emphasized the gap he saw between certainty and faith.\(^{21}\) While there can be no doubt that this is the overall emphasis of Lessing’s essay, the immediate argument that gave rise to this quote has to do with the general uncertainty of historical truth regardless of its faith claims. As such, Lessing provides a window into his historiographical stance. Thus I will take a closer look at Lessing’s general concept of history and how he saw this to relate to the “truths of reason”.

Lessing began from the premise that miracles and fulfilled prophecies were once realities (i.e. in the NT period), but are no longer. This was important for him as he was also committed to the idea that faith in Christ must come as the result of the “the proof of the spirit and of power”, by which he meant the proof of Jesus’ mighty deeds, his fulfillment of prophecy and his resurrection from the dead. He states repeatedly that he has no doubt that these did in fact take place,\(^{22}\) but that he cannot believe these on the basis of mere testimony.

The problem is that this proof of the spirit and of power no longer has any spirit or power, but has sunk to the level of human testimonies of spirit and power.

The problem is that reports of fulfilled prophecies are not fulfilled prophecies; that reports of miracles are not miracles. These, the prophecies fulfilled before my eyes, the miracles that occur before my eyes, are immediate in their effect. But those – the reports of fulfilled prophecies and miracles, have to work through a medium which takes away all their force.\(^{23}\)

It is clear that Lessing’s gap was a product of the idea that historical truth is less certain than truth arrived at by experience. He continues:

Or is it invariably the case, that what I read in reputable historians is just as certain for me as what I myself experience?

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\(^{19}\) In contrast to “necessary truth”, accidental truth should be thought of in terms of contingency. See discussion in R.C.S. Walker, “Contingency” (London: Routledge, 1998). This article rightly grounds the concepts of necessary essence and accidental extension in the thought of Spinoza and Leibniz to which Lessing was philosophically attracted.


\(^{22}\) Echoing L.P. Wessel, it is difficult to determine whether Lessing was stating his true opinion in this respect [G.E. Lessing’s Theology: A Reinterpretation, (The Hague: Moulton, 1977), 45].

\(^{23}\) Lessing, “Proof”, 52.
I do not know that anyone has ever asserted this. What is asserted is only that the reports which we have of these prophecies and miracles are as reliable as historical truths can ever be. And then it is added that historical truths cannot be demonstrated: nevertheless we must believe them as firmly as truths that have been demonstrated. 24

Lessing cannot bring himself to do so. There is an implicit empiricism in Lessing’s thinking. Certainty comes by way of demonstrating and through personal experience. If a truth cannot be demonstrated in his own experience, he does not feel obliged to view it as anything more than one possibility among others, however probable it might be. 25 But it cannot be doubted that Lessing also betrays his dependence on rationalism as well. This evident in Lessing’s dictum:

If no historical truth can be demonstrated, then nothing can be demonstrated by means of historical truths. That is: accidental truths of history can never become the proof of necessary truths of reason. 26

Here we see the idea of the importance of building truth upon a priori reason. To clarify Lessing’s argument further, two points of clarification are warranted. The first involves the conception of “demonstration”. Demonstrieren was a technical term used in the Leibniz-Wolffian school of philosophy. It referred to the process of proving the truth of a proposition with absolute certainty. 27 While Lessing favors the term beweisen, he specifies elsewhere that he defines it along these lines. He defines beweisen in this way: “die Verbindung einer Wahrheit mit andern anerkannten und ungezweifelten Wahrheiten…” 28 According to Lessing, Geschichtswahrheiten are not indubitable and therefore cannot serve as the foundation for any higher class of truth. This, of course, hints toward a dependence upon rationalist thought which prioritized different truths according to class.

This leads to the second concept that Lessing employs: reason. Recent treatments of this passage have overlooked the importance of Lessing’s appeal to the “necessary truths of reason”. Indeed, the recent studies noted above simply apply the value of “faith” to this juxtaposition, arguing that it is “history vs. faith” that is at issue. While such an association is not entirely misleading (considering the larger aim of the essay), it fails to account for Lessing’s local argument upon which he introduces a key ideal of the

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24 Lessing, “Proof”, 53.
25 He is much less inclined to build his religious life around such uncertainty. His commitment to logic did not allow him “to jump with that historical truth to a quite different class of truths” and form all of his “metaphysical and moral ideas accordingly” [Lessing, “Proof”] 54.
26 Lessing, “Proof”, 53 (Chadwick’s emphasis).
27 Wessel states that the method employ in mathematical proofs was the ideal model [“Theology”, 111]. Cf. Lessing [“Proof”, 55-6] where he appeals to the example of a mathematical “truth”.
Enlightenment, that being “reason”. It is important to recognize that Lessing’s immediate juxtaposition is between history and reason. Cassirer suggested that perhaps “no other century is so completely permeated by the idea of intellectual progress as that of the Enlightenment.” Such progress involved “all the various energies of the mind” which are “held together in a common center of force”. He explained that

When the eighteenth century wants to characterize this power in a single word, it calls it “reason”. “Reason” becomes the unifying and central point of this century, expressing all that it longs and strives for, and all that it achieves.29

Cassirer’s assessment aptly contextualizes Lessing’s appeal to reason.30 Lessing earnestly wanted to be able to subject historical propositions to the same rigor and scrutiny that was demanded by the truth of reason. But in the end he was forced to concede that historical truth would always defy such analysis. This is most evident in Lessing’s list of rhetorical questions on the subject of historiography:

What does it mean to accept an historical proposition as true? to believe an historical truth? Does it mean anything other than this: to accept this proposition, this truth as valid? To accept that there is no objection to be brought against it? To accept that one historical proposition is built on one thing, another on another, that from one historical truth another follows? to reserve to oneself the right to estimate other historical things accordingly? Does it mean anything other than this?31

The process outlined here does not contain any truth that can be accepted a priori. It always begins with an accidental truth and therefore must always (only) work toward tenuous conclusions. So as much as he wished he could be certain of the “reports” about Jesus, he could not. He laments that this uncertainty “is the wide ugly ditch, over which I cannot come, however often and earnestly I have tried to make the leap. If anyone can help me over, please do it. I ask, I implore him.”32

Thus Lessing seems to be comfortable employing both rational ideas and empirical ideas simultaneously. Indeed, this further supports the recent move away from the oversimplified distinction between rationalism and empiricism in contemporary philosophy.33 But in either case, Lessing was at a loss. Historical data were not first hand

30 Wessel, “Theology”, 47.
32 Lessing., “Proof”, 54-5; For an outside perspective of Lessing’s angst see the comments of E.B. Pusey, An Historical Enquiry into the Probable Causes of the Rationalist Character lately Predominant in the Theology of Germany (London: C. and J. Rivington, 1828), 51.
33 P. Strawson represents a wide consensus of thought when he surveys Descartes, Leibniz, Hume, Kant and others and concludes “Perhaps empiricism and perhaps rationalism too... are matters of degree with more or less of each tendency to be found in each philosopher” ["The Incoherence of Empiricism II", Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society 66 (1992): 140].
and therefore not scientifically testable and neither could they be considered \textit{a priori} knowledge.

Spinoza's early attempts at studying history as if it was engaging in natural science set in motion an idea that historical truth could be obtained once all interpretation had been accounted for and bracketed. The desire to do so lies at the heart of Lessing's dilemma. Ultimately, however, Lessing's theory of reasonable truth demanded data that had not been passed through the filters of human testimony. History simply could not provide such data.

II.1.3 Ranke and Empiricism

While Leopold von Ranke (1795-1886) has had a significant impact on historiography, he wrote very little on the subject. Georg Iggers has collected a series of essays written by Ranke wherein the historian speaks most directly to the theory behind his method. The following will critique Ranke's views on historiography as represented in these excerpts.

Throughout each of his essays, Ranke is vehemently opposed to the notion that the disciplines of philosophy and history should ever overlap. In Ranke's mind, the two were irreconcilable. This is most clearly seen in Ranke's conception of philosophy. Ranke was reacting to a particular school (self designated as students of the "philosophy of history") which had argued for a teleological ideal of history.\footnote{Here Ranke mentions Fichte as his key opponent within this school; however, it becomes clear later that he also has Hegel in mind.} According to Ranke, this school has conceived history in terms of progressive epochs wherein humanity boosts itself closer to perfection with each successive era. Finding such a notion absurd, Ranke attacks not only this notion but also the discipline of philosophy in general. He avers that there are only two epistemological means available to human knowledge. The first of these is "through the perception of the particular", while the second is "through abstraction". Moreover, he attributed the former to historical research and the latter to philosophical research and states that these two epistemological forms must be kept in separate camps.\footnote{L. von, Ranke, \textit{The Theory and Practice of History} (New York: The Bobbs-Merrill Co., 1973), 30.} Here Ranke clearly shows his inclination for empiricism over and against rationalism. Ranke considered historians who sought to philosophize about history to be departing from scientific investigation.

Ranke defined philosophy as an inquiry into the unknowable, while history was epistemologically straight-forward. Ranke's main objection to philosophical inquiry was
his aversion to abstract thought in general. From this point of view, such preoccupations robbed history of its distinct objective nature. We see here the fruition of Spinoza's vision for historiography, not in his philosophy but in his hope that history could be treated in the same way as natural science. As discussed, Spinoza argued that with a more objective approach to history, historical certainty could be attained. This simply required a straight-forward approach by both the first perceivers of the events and the contemporary historian. Ranke, for his own part, does his best to achieve objectivity on the latter end of the equation; that is, as a latter day historian attempting to divorce himself of all subjectivity. Ranke's ultimate objective was to subject history to empiricism "which imposes conditions and is subject to empiricism." While Ranke perhaps represents an extreme outworking of Spinoza's notion, the connection between them is undeniable and thus a specific trajectory of historiographical theory is recognizable.

Ranke argues that the historian must remain "free from prejudice", by this he means, "not the lack of interest, but rather an interest in pure cognition undulled by preconceived notions". In this way, Ranke is not dissimilar to Lessing, both considered true science to involve a thorough testing in order to verify the truth with certainty. Where they differed was that Lessing had no confidence that historical data could be the object of science whereas Ranke did. In contrast to Lessing, Ranke was much more optimistic about the historian's ability to examine historical data empirically (like mathematics). He was very confident about what the historical scientist was able to accomplish if the data in question could be demonstrable. Iggers observes, "Ranke held a relatively simple theory of knowledge. He assumed that the past spoke directly to the historian who would honestly listen to it." Iggers continues:

In a sense, far from placing history on scientific foundations, Ranke in fact excluded the study of the past from scientific analysis and reserved an important place for intuition and subjectivism in the interpretation of historical processes.

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36 Ranke, Theory, 34.
37 Ranke, Theory, 40; However, we should avoid here the common caricature of Ranke which associates him with a strictly fact-and-date approach to history. Rather he, like Humboldt, was interested in the forces and purposes that drive these events in their interconnectedness. Indeed, Ranke (Theory, 48ff) openly critiques the fact-and-date approach. Cf. Denton, Historiography, 168.
38 Ranke (Theory, 30) himself makes analogy between the science of history and mathematics.
By this Igers means that because Ranke was unaware of his own hermeneutic, he unwittingly bled much more of his own intuition into his presentation of the past than he was aware. In this way, Ranke's rejection of abstract thought toward his discipline became the source of his own bias.

II.1.4 The "Hermeneutical Circle"

In Friedrich Schleiermacher (1768-1834), we witness the gap between historical truth and absolute objectivity narrow. Schleiermacher's hermeneutical circle was born out of an attempt to explain the interpretive process that takes place in the relationship between grammar, text (i.e. supposed author) and reader. This model most often has been celebrated for its circular movement from the "part" to the "whole" of a text, whereby the particular detail interprets the larger context and vice versa. But, closer to my present interests, Schleiermacher extended his model to a wider spectrum of, what he called, "psychological" hermeneutics. Beyond his explanation of understanding as a linguistic and grammatical process, he aimed into the mind of the author and described the inner networks of the author's thought-world in terms of circularity as well. Because of this, he is often credited as the first to adapt Herder's ideas on interpretation beyond the interpretation of texts to a more general concern for human understanding. While contemporary literary critics will question Schleiermacher's goal to "understand the author better than he understood himself," his argument for the interconnectivity between interior thought and manifested language is still in play in contemporary discussion. Where the present discussion finds Schleiermacher's circle especially helpful is in his discussion of "Vorverständnis".

42 F.D.E. Schleiermacher does qualify this idea by speaking of intuitively imagining the author as a "general type". In this way the author's distinctive traits are to be measured against what is generally known of those with similar characteristics [Hermeneutics, The Handwritten Manuscripts (Missoula: Scholars Press, 1977), 150-1]. Cf. Humboldt’s emphasis upon the historian’s application of empathy ["Task", 23].
43 W. Iser adapts the hermeneutical models of Schleiermacher, Gadamer and Ricoeur (et al.) and explains, “In hermeneutics the circle is employed to interrelate the explicit with the implicit, the hidden with the revealed, and the latent with the manifest. It basically sets out to recover what an author has not been aware of when writing, or what lies beyond the historical material to be observed in the present, [...] that is, the author's subconscious, a historical past, or the buried telos of the fractured self – is what structures this type of interpretation” [The Range of Interpretation (New York: Columbia Univ. Press, 2000), 8].
Schleiermacher argued that in order for something to be understood, it must be associated with an already understood category. He gives the example of a child learning a new word through the process of comparison. In his view, children are only able to understand a new word by relating the meaning of that word with a previously established category of meaning. He thus concluded that “Jedes Kind kommt nur durch Hermeneutik zur Wortbedeutung.”\textsuperscript{44} Gadamer further unpacks this by explaining that, when a new word is learned, one must assimilate an alien category into a limited sphere of significance and this process initially alters the word’s “original vitality”.\textsuperscript{45} The process becomes circular because one’s grammar (or language\textsuperscript{46}) is in constant interaction with the acquisition of new words. This is what Schleiermacher termed the “grammatical” aspect of hermeneutics.

In expansion of this circle to general categories of perception, he posits that nothing can be understood that a person “cannot perceive and construct as necessary. In accordance with this maxim, understanding is an unending task.”\textsuperscript{47} We see here the outworking of Schleiermacher’s second definition of understanding: “Nothing is understood that is not construed.”\textsuperscript{48} This idea of the construal of perceptions is very close to my own interests and will be revisited below.

The hermeneutical circle was picked up and given definition by Wilhelm Dilthey (1833-1911). Dilthey was indebted to Schleiermacher’s psychological application of hermeneutics but saw in Schleiermacher’s thought a flaw that needed correcting. He judged that Schleiermacher’s attempt imaginatively to “become the author” of the text presupposed a certain universality of human perspective.\textsuperscript{49} Dilthey argued that the interpreter’s worldview separated him from the thought-worlds of those who hold and

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\item \textsuperscript{44} F.D.E. Schleiermacher, \textit{Hermeneutik, Nach den Hand-schrif-ten neu her-aus-gegeben und eingeleitet von Heinz Kimmerle} (Heidelberg: Karl Winter Universitätverlag, 1959), 40.
\item \textsuperscript{46} K. Mueller-Vollmer, \textit{The Hermeneutics Reader}: New York, (1985), 10.
\item \textsuperscript{47} Schleiermacher, \textit{Hermeneutics}, 41.
\item \textsuperscript{48} \textit{Notes}, 1809; as quoted in Mueller-Vollmer, \textit{Reader}, 8; set together the two part definition reads: “Everything is understood when nothing nonsensical remains. Nothing is understood that is not construed.” Gadamer [\textit{Philosophical Hermeneutics}, 7] rightly places the first part of this definition within the context of historical romanticism and questions its usefulness for contemporary interpreters.
\item \textsuperscript{49} This had been the conclusion of Hume (1711-76) who spoke in terms of the sameness of mankind “in all times and places” [D. Hume, \textit{An Enquiry Concerning Human Understanding} (Oxford: OUP, 1961), VIII.1].
\end{itemize}
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held a different perspective. This, of course, served to distance the contemporary historian from the ancient perceiver in that their worldviews were fundamentally different. Both the contemporary historian and the ancient perceiver were embedded within their respective historical circumstances and, in this way, always alienated to some degree.

For Dilthey, the hermeneutical circle meant that "all understanding always remains relative" because the interpreter was always moving to-and-fro from part to whole and vice versa. And because he was always moving to-and-fro from the projection of his own perspective to the assimilation of the novum, interpretation was ever being modified. Thus it "can never be completed". The interpreter is able to reach provisional conclusions, but ultimately the fact that such conclusions are always subject to revision made Dilthey's circle a vicious one.

This is addressed by Martin Heidegger's (1889-1976) contribution to the subject. Heidegger's use of the hermeneutical circle allowed him (reminiscent of Schleiermacher) to speak in terms of "Vorhabe, Vorsicht und Vorgriff" and the essential roles that these play in assimilating new perceptions. He argued that the interpretation of a new thing requires a fore-conception of what one might perceive. Therefore, not only is interpretation colored by preconceived points of view but it is prefigured by them. "Any interpretation which is to contribute to understanding must already have understood what is to be interpreted." Heidegger is careful to qualify this circularity:

But if interpretation must in any case already operate in that which is understood, and if it must draw its nurture from this, how is it to bring any scientific results to

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50 Dilthey argues that our worldviews are products of our lived experience and since experiences vary from person to person, culture to culture, so do worldviews [Hodges, Dilthey, 31]. Cf. discussion in S.J. Grenz, A Primer on Postmodernism (Grand Rapids: Eerdmans, 1996), 99-103.
52 In his Being in Time Heidegger often raises objections to his own arguments to further the discussion. One question that he raises concerns the problem of understanding. His goal was to put forth a means of understanding Dasein (i.e. the person who lives responsibly and authentically in the midst of his "thrown-ness" into existence). He grants that in order to do so, one must already have at least a vague understanding of what "being" is. Recognizing the circularity of this, he argues that all understanding is circular in that we always project possibilities onto the world around us. This is the larger context of his application of the hermeneutical circle. See discussion in R. Polt, Heidegger: An Introduction (London: Routledge, 1998), 30-1, 70-1.
53 M. Heidegger, Sein und Zeit (Tübingen: Max Niemeyer, 1961[27]), 150-1. Later Ricoeur will attempt to lessen the paradoxical nature of "fore-conception" by describing the circle in terms of "guess" and "validation" [Interpretation Theory: Discourse and the Surplus of Meaning (Fort Worth: Texas Christian Univ. Press, 1976), 79].
maturity without moving in a circle, especially if, moreover, the understanding which
is presupposed still operates within our common information about man and the
world? Yet according to the most elementary rules of logic, this circle is a circulus
viciosus. If that be so, however, the business of historiological interpretation is
excluded a priori from the domain of rigorous knowledge. In so far as the Fact of
this circle in understanding is not eliminated, historiography must then be resigned to
less rigorous possibilities of knowing. Historiography is permitted to compensate for
this defect to some extent through the 'spiritual signification' of its 'objects.' But
even in the opinion of the historian himself, it would admittedly be more ideal if the
circle could be avoided and if there remained the hope of creating some time a
historiography which would be as independent of the standpoint of the observer as our
knowledge of Nature is supposed to be.

But if we see this circle as a vicious one and look out for ways of avoiding it,
even if we just 'sense' it as an inevitable imperfection, then the act of understanding
has been misunderstood from the ground up.56

Heidegger thus moves away from the idea that knowledge (here historical knowledge) is
lamentably uncertain because of the inevitable subjectivity of perception. As long as we
do not allow our "fore-having, fore-sight and fore-conception to be presented to us by
fancies and popular conceptions" the task of analyzing historical knowledge will be no
less rigorous than "the most exact sciences" (like mathematics). He argued that the
historian's correct move "is not to get out of the circle but to come into it in the right
way" because the "circle of understanding is not an orbit in which any random kind of
knowledge may move"; rather, it exists properly to structure perceptions and make them
meaningful to the person who exists in the world authentically.57

Thus Heidegger here clarifies two key points that will be picked up in my
discussion of memory below: (1) The inherent subjectivity of perception is not to be
lamented or circumvented by the historian; (2) The interpretation of new perceptions
naturally involves the recycling of previously known interpretations.58

A fuller treatment would have to discuss the work of Boeckh, Gadamer and
Ricoeur. But for the sake of space and focus, I will only add that Gadamer's utilization
of the hermeneutical circle serves to emphasize that the circle works on the level of the
subconscious and thus it is impossible to always enter it "in the right way". In a decided
modification of both Schleiermacher and Heidegger, Gadamer commented:

55 Polt [Heidegger, 101] describes Historiography [Historie] as "scientific study of the past". Other
commentators view this term as a synonym for historiography.
56 Heidegger, Being and Time, 194 (translator's emphasis).
57 Heidegger, Being and Time, 195.
58 This, of course, is not the end of Heidegger's interpretive process. Gadamer [Truth and
Method, 267] sums up Heidegger's model by stating that "interpretation begins with fore-
conceptions that are [eventually] replaced by more suitable ones." Such "more suitable"
conceptions are then projected as fore-conceptions of meaning onto subsequent perceptions.
The prejudices and fore-meanings that occupy the interpreter’s consciousness are not at his disposal. He cannot separate in advance the productive prejudices that enable understanding from the prejudices that hinder it and lead to misunderstandings.\footnote{Gadamer, \textit{Truth and Method}, 295.}

In sum, Schleiermacher’s circle (and Heidegger’s adaptation of it) demonstrates how a new perception can attract a significance that has been prefigured (or “fore-conceived”) in a similar type of category. Following the lead of Schleiermacher, one might describe all understanding in terms of the hermeneutical comparison between typical thought-categories. Following the lead of Heidegger, one might describe all understanding in terms of the projection of typical significance. Perhaps the process of interpretation actually \textit{anticipates} familiar types of significance. This discussion will be revisited in my next chapter as I introduce typology. But more immediately, this discussion sets the stage for the discussion of memory theory in the latter part of the present chapter. Before doing so, it will be helpful to see how some of the themes evidenced above find an outlet in the thought of Rudolf Bultmann.

II.1.5 \textit{Bultmann, Hermeneutics and History}

Heidegger’s influence on the theology and exegetical career of Rudolf Bultmann (1884-1976) has been well documented.\footnote{E.g. D. Fergusson, \textit{Bultmann} (Collegeville: The Liturgical Press, 1992), 50-73, 90-3; G. Jones, \textit{Bultmann: Towards a Critical Theology} (Oxford: Polity Press, 1991), 63-125; J. Painter, “Theology as Hermeneutics: Rudolf Bultmann’s Interpretation of the History of Jesus” (1987): 11-116; Thielston, \textit{Two Horizons}, 143-292 esp.176-80.} Heidegger’s treatment of the hermeneutical circle is especially seen in Bultmann’s famous essay, “Is Exegesis Without Presuppositions Possible?”\footnote{See especially his use of “pre-understanding” [R. Bultmann, “Is Exegesis Without Presuppositions Possible?” in \textit{The Hermeneutics Reader} (ed. K. Mueller-Vollmer; Oxford: Basil Blackwell, 1985) 246].} The point of Bultmann’s essay was to exhort modern historians to acknowledge critically their own presuppositions as they attempt to translate ancient and alien languages and worldviews. Here Bultmann emphasizes that historians must be aware of but not ultimately controlled by their presuppositions. In this way, Heidegger’s admonition for the historian to enter critically the hermeneutical circle can be seen in this essay. Bultmann argues that historical science [\textit{die historische Wissenschaft}] cannot verify acts of God; it can only verify that certain people believed that God had intervened in history.\footnote{Bultmann, “Exegesis”, 244.} We perhaps see in this statement Heidegger’s move away from the Rankean notion that the historian is simply a passive observer of the past. At first glance, it seems that Bultmann has echoed the sentiment that history is ultimately concerned with...
interpretations of the past and not the actual past. But it is also possible that, like Spinoza, Bultmann was more inclined to employ this distinction when the ancient interpreters referenced acts of God.

In English, the semantic range of the word “history” has two primary facets. History can simply denote time sequence, as in the phrase “over the course of history”. History can also denote a specific discipline, as in what is written down about the past. The German Geschichte has a similar semantic range. Geschichte can simply denote the continuum of time. On the other hand, it can denote "story" and carry all the connotations of this range (i.e. report, account, narrative, tradition, etc). It is therefore not surprising that Bultmann employed the word Geschichte in both ways.

Perhaps the best place to start this discussion is by mentioning how the English loan-word “Historie” is sometimes set against “Geschichte”. In fact, it was Bultmann’s teacher, Martin Kahler, who introduced the distinction between these words by speaking in terms of der historische Jesus and der geschichtliche Christus. For Kahler, this distinction was born out of a polemic against modern historicism, which endeavored to establish (without presuppositions) objective facts. Thus the term Historie connotes the interest in the brute facts of history while Geschichte, in this context, carries the idea of impacting tradition. That is, Geschichte is seen through the eyes of personal interest (or perhaps, the eyes of dogma). With this in mind, one wonders whether, in the context of Kahler’s dichotomy, “geschichtliche Christus” is not best rendered as “traditional Christ”. In a very helpful introduction to Kahler, Carl Braaten discussed this nuance and decided to render historische as “historical” and geschichtliche as “historic”. Yet Bultmann does not seem to follow Kahler’s lead in respect to his terminological distinction. The issue is further complicated when one notices that Bultmann does not use the term Historie with any frequency or consistency. While such a distinction is

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63 I extend my thanks to Michael Widmer and Ron Hermes for their insight on this topic. My personal correspondence with both has helped me to hone what follows.

64 As most evident in the title of M. Kahler’s, Der sogenannte historische Jesus und der geschichtliche, biblische Christus (Munich: Deichert & Leipzig, 1896).

65 C.E. Braaten wrote: “The term [Historie] has primary reference to the problem of historical knowledge... [T]he “historical [historische] Jesus” is fashioned by a method which strives to divest itself of all presuppositions, and to establish objective facts, whether or not anyone has an existential interest in these facts, we can at least understand why Kahler and others like Bultmann and Tillich speak of the irrelevance of the “historical Jesus” for Christian faith. But the “historic [geschichtliche] Christ” is not irrelevant. This term refers to Jesus insofar as he is the object of faith, the content of preaching, and confessed by the believing community as Lord, Messiah and Redeemer.” [“Introduction” to The so-called Historical Jesus and the Historic Biblical Christ, by M. Kahler (Philadelphia: Fortress, 1964), 21].

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valuable for Kähler, Bultmann avoided the phrase “historische Jesus” in favor of the phrase “geschichtliche Jesus”.

Bultmann did, in one work, draw a distinction between these terms in an attempt to distinguish fact from event in saying that the cross was “a historic [geschichtliche] fact originating in the historical [historisch] event” of the crucifixion.66 Painter rightly points out that, in this context, the geschichtlich fact of the cross is a fact of eschatological significance which is paradoxically manifested in the historisch event of the crucifixion.67 It is the former that carries existential value. Painter also points out that a similar distinction is sometimes made in Bultmann’s commentary on John.68 Yet most often, Bultmann used these terms interchangeably and does so throughout his career.69 Therefore, while Bultmann’s conception of history should at times be seen against the backdrop of Kähler’s, it will not suffice simply to appeal to the same distinction that Kähler made between Historie and Geschichte. This may be due to Heidegger’s influence in that Heidegger was inclined to use both Historie and Geschichte in terms of existential-historical possibilities.70 Regardless, Bultmann’s use(s) of these terms must be understood from within their local semantic context(s).

In Bultmann’s introduction to Jesus, he devoted attention to the nature of history and the task of the historian.71 It should be noted that his understanding of the historian’s task is, in at least two ways, remarkably parallel to that of R.G. Collingwood (1889-1943).72 Although Collingwood is widely celebrated as the bridge-builder between history and philosophy, Bultmann is due more credit in this regard than is normally given.

68 R. Bultmann, Das Evangelium des Johannes (Göttingen: Vandenhoeck & Ruprecht, 1941).
69 E.g. R. Bultmann, Jesus (Berlin: Deutsche Bibliotheck, 1926), 16; R. Bultmann, Theologie des Neuen Testaments (Tübingen: Mohr Siebeck, 1948), 2; R. Bultmann, Die Geschichte der synoptischen Tradition (Göttingen: Vandenhoeck & Ruprecht, 1961), 1, 282, 297.
70 In this case, “existential” history is history that discloses the possibilities of authentic humanity and is thus more concerned with future application than it is with the past [J. Macquarrie, An Existentialist Theology: A Comparison of Heidegger and Bultmann (London: SCM, 1965[55]), 171]. Cf. the discussion of Heidegger in Polt, Heidegger, 100-2.
71 Bultmann, Jesus; More popularly known as R. Bultmann, Jesus and the Word (New York: Scribner’s, 1934[26]).
72 I say “parallel” because Collingwood’s most influential work, The Idea of History, was not published until 1945 (posthumously). Furthermore, even Collingwood’s earliest publications (which may have been accessible prior to the writing of Bultmann’s Jesus) contain arguments which substantially differ from Bultmann’s. E.g. In his first monograph, Collingwood argued, “To speak of studying the mind of Jesus from within may seem presumptuous; but no other method is of the slightest value” [R.G. Collingwood, Philosophy and Religion (London: Macmillan, 1916), 42-3]. In contrast, one of Bultmann’s primary aims was to avoid any attempt to "render Jesus as a[n] historical phenomenon psychologically explicable" [Bultmann, Jesus, 6].
In a full turn away from Spinoza, Bultmann thought it crucial to recognize the distinction between history and the natural sciences.\(^\text{73}\) In his view, man perceived nature as something other than himself; natural scientists were able to separate themselves from the object of their inquiry.\(^\text{74}\) According to Bultmann, no such objectification can be made by historians since they are “a part of history” themselves and thus the task of the historian requires “considering a living complex of events in which he is essentially involved.”\(^\text{75}\) Collingwood would later give full voice to this distinction between history and natural science.\(^\text{76}\) Also, Collingwood runs parallel to Bultmann in his idea that the past “is not a dead past. By understanding it historically we incorporate it into our present thought and enable ourselves […] for our own advancement.”\(^\text{77}\) This understanding of historical understanding is similar to Bultmann’s notion of “encountering” history which will be discussed in what follows.

This notion of the subjectivity of the historical task is of crucial importance to Bultmann's method. The aim of his task hinges on this notion. Bultmann argued that the examination of history is no neutral orientation about objectively determined past events, but is motivated by the question how we ourselves, standing in the current of history, can succeed in comprehending our own existence, can gain clear insight into the contingencies and necessities of our own life purpose.\(^\text{78}\)

As such, historical inquiry is only valuable as an existential (or self-involving\(^\text{79}\)) enterprise; history is not to be “viewed” but to be “encountered”. This, the chief tenet of his method, should be chiefly commended for its insightful criticism of modern historiography. I do not take lightly the importance of this contribution to HJR and to historiography in general. So it is with great irony that some of Bultmann's most unfortunate weaknesses are found in his commitments to a modern mindset.\(^\text{80}\)

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\(^\text{73}\) This, of course, was first championed by Dilthey (1833-1911). See the selected passages provided by Hodges, *Dilthey*, esp. 142.

\(^\text{74}\) It is worth noting that Bultmann, like Spinoza, considered natural science to be an objective and detached discipline.

\(^\text{75}\) Bultmann, *Jesus*, 3.

\(^\text{76}\) This is a distinction that runs throughout many of Collingwood's publications. It is given full treatment in his *The Idea of History* (Oxford: OUP, 1956), esp.5, 213-5.


\(^\text{78}\) Bultmann, *Jesus*, 10; cf. “...die Befragung der Geschichte keine neutrale Orientierung über objectiv feststellbare Vergänge in der Vergängenheit ist, sondern von der Frage bewegt ist, wie wir selbst, die wir in der Bewegung der Geschichte stehen, zur Erfassung unserer eigenen Existenz gelangen, d. h. Klarheit gewinnen können über die Möglichkeiten und Notwendigkeiten unseres eigenen Wollens” [Bultmann, *Jesus*, 13].


\(^\text{80}\) The balance of this section will critique such weaknesses. Yet I do so with the greatest respect and fully aware that I am able to do so with the benefit of a postmodern context, of which Bultmann was a forerunner.
In the quote provided above Bultmann argued that "history is no neutral orientation about objectively determined past events". It is then surprising that only pages later he undermined this notion in his assessment of the ancient interpreters:

Of course the doubt as to whether Jesus really existed is unfounded and not worth refutation. No sane person can doubt that Jesus stands as founder behind the historical movement whose first distinct stage is represented by the oldest Palestinian community. But how far that community preserved an objectively true picture of him and his message is another question. 81

For the modern historian, Bultmann urges "encounter" and "dialogue". 82 Bultmann described the historian's task in terms of existential self-involvement. History was not an objective accounting of facts; it was a subjective endeavor whereby the historian stands in the current of history and is personally affected by it and (in turn) projects this subjectivity back onto his understanding of the significance of this history. According to Bultmann, the historian properly approaches history by internalizing and projecting his interpretation of history.

But in his assessment of the writers of the NT, Bultmann notices these very same "subjective" characteristics and concludes that they were not interested in history. Rather, such characteristics demonstrate only their interest in their faith experiences. This point must be underscored as it is Bultmann's fatal flaw. Bultmann did not allow the ancient interpreters to employ the same hermeneutic that he himself professed. Because the gospel writers are existentially involved with their subject matter they must be doing something other than history.

I do not think that Bultmann considered this a double standard. It is more probable that he was previously committed to the idea that the Jesus tradition was mythical by virtue of genre. As such, the authors of this tradition were not trying to be existentially involved historians; they were existentially involved myth-makers. On this point, Macquarrie's masterful treatment of Bultmann still provides the best assessment. Macquarrie, whose *An Existentialist Theology* is largely sympathetic to Bultmann's theology, examines what he considers a presupposed undercurrent in Bultmann's conception of myth. Macquarrie concludes that Bultmann was apt to classify a NT narrative as myth

(a) what might be called myth proper, the representation of the divine and other-worldly in human and this-worldly terms; (b) everything in the New Testament

82 Bultmann, *Jesus*, 4, 12.
which implies those first-century concepts which now belong to a world that is no longer, and are not acceptable or intelligible to the modern mind.\textsuperscript{83}

Macquarrie grants that there is myth contained in the NT and therefore Bultmann was justified in applying the first classification. But Macquarrie criticizes the latter classification:

The truth is that at this point we perceive in Bultmann's thought not the influence of existentialism but the hangover of a somewhat old-fashioned liberal modernism. He is still obsessed with the pseudo-scientific view of a closed universe that was popular half a century ago, and anything which does not fit into that tacitly assumed world-picture is, in his view, not acceptable to the modern mind and assigned to the realm of myth.\textsuperscript{84}

What needs to be distinguished here is the difference between historical narrative interpreted through the glasses of a mythological worldview and the genre of myth.\textsuperscript{85} As Macquarrie rightly concludes the two are given to overlap in the NT. But it cannot be presumed a priori that a narrative that betrays a particular worldview coincides with a particular genre. Macquarrie concedes that Bultmann was inclined to assign the genre of myth much too readily and often unjustifiably so.

If Macquarrie is correct that we should expect much more narrative in the Gospels that represents an interest in historical narrative, we should also expect that all of this narrative will betray a mythological worldview to some extent. No doubt evidence of an ancient worldview will become most recognizable to post-Enlightenment eyes in cases where the narrative looks most alien to our own worldview. But it is irresponsible only to appeal to the author's worldview in cases where the narrative seems alien to our sensibilities. This critique can be aptly applied to Spinoza and Bultmann alike.

I would contend that Bultmann was correct in his description of history as an existentially subjective endeavor. The hermeneutical circle requires that we project our own worldview and pre-judgments on to our perceptions of history. I would also contend that we should expect the same of the ancient interpreters of history.

\section*{II.1.6 Preliminary Observations}
Recalling my initial premises, I will summarily revisit each in light of the above survey.

\textsuperscript{83} Macquarrie, \textit{Existentialist}, 167.

\textsuperscript{84} Macquarrie, \textit{Existentialist}, 168.

\textsuperscript{85} This is a distinction that is sorely lacking in Bultmann's influential "New Testament and Mythology", in \textit{Kerygma and Myth} (ed. H. Bartsch; New York: Harper & Row, 1953). In this essay, he correctly argues that the worldview of the NT is mythological. But one is hard pressed to determine when he is speaking of the narrative world of the NT and when he is speaking of the general worldview of the first preachers of the kerygma.
A) If perceptions are to be remembered then they will inevitably be interpreted, subconsciously, consciously, or both. We see the beginnings of this concept in Spinoza who recognized that the biblical authors tended to color their perceptions of historical narrative with a mythological worldview. But, for Spinoza this coloring was not comprehensive; he tended to recognize this “coloring” when the subject matter involved acts of God. One of Bultmann’s advances was to reject Spinoza’s conception of history as objective science.

B) Perceptions that contribute to historical memory are thus always interpreted along each stage of the tradition that they inhabit. This idea is shared by both Lessing and Ranke. Lessing lamented that because history is filtered through secondary testimony, it can neither be approached rationally nor empirically. On the other hand, Ranke optimistically endeavored to see beyond interpretations to the objective “history” beneath. Both also are naïvely optimistic about the scientist’s ability objectively to obtain truth by way of empiricism. The crucial difference is that Lessing did not regard history as an appropriate subject matter for scientific inquiry while Ranke did. Bultmann, like Lessing, did not regard history to be scientifically objectifiable but did not lament this fact. That historical memories have to be interpreted gave Bultmann the occasion to enter into existential dialogue with history.

C) The historian is never able to interpret an uninterpreted past. The beginnings of this idea are evidenced in Schleiermacher’s hermeneutics. The idea that a text or perception is only understood subjectively and that this understanding is ongoing led Dilthey to concede that all understanding is incomplete and inescapably circular. Heidegger followed the lead of Schleiermacher but refused to resign historical understanding to the realm of defeatism. Heidegger acknowledged that interpretation was ongoing and encouraged the historian to embrace this subjectivity and, in doing so, enter the hermeneutical circle on the right foot. While Bultmann admirably returns to the biblical texts from this vantage point, a fatal flaw emerges in his historiography. While Bultmann encourages the subjectivity of the modern historian, he fails to recognize the hermetical circle at work in the perceptions of the ancient historians.

II.2 Social Memory Theory
11.2.1 Halbwachs and the Roots of Social Memory

Sociologist Maurice Halbwachs (1877-1945) is widely considered the father of a theory called “Social Memory”. His 1925 monograph married the ideas of Henri Bergson, who was interested in the relationship between memory and time, with those of Emile Durkheim, who was interested in the relationship between society and the individual. Halbwachs’ groundbreaking work had two main objectives. The first was to argue “that the past is not preserved [in the memories of individuals], but reconstructed on the basis of the present.” The second was to demonstrate that cognitive reconstruction of the past is fundamentally spurred and constrained by “social frameworks.” In keeping with his first objective, Halbwachs began his study by exploring aspects of individual memory that suggest that memories are products of the present and not preservations of the past. By moving from individual memory to the social frameworks of memory, Halbwachs studied the cohesion and interdependence of these two spheres. He examined this relationship in the context of dreams, family, religion, and social class. Halbwachs’ conclusion can be narrowed to three main points: (1) Memory is the reconstruction of the past based on the needs of the present. (2) Collective memory is that which is articulated into social communication. (3) All memories are conceived within social frameworks.

As this summary indicates, Halbwachs was concerned with societal effects upon individual memory and not initially interested in the ways that his approach to memory could aid contemporary approaches to history. From here, Halbwachs becomes a highly

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86 Henceforth: SM.
90 Halbwachs [On Collective Memory, 48] wrote, “Most of the time, when I remember, it is others who spur me on; their memory comes to the aid of mine and mine relies on theirs. [...] My memories are recalled to me externally, and the groups of which I am a part at any given time give me the means to reconstruct them, upon condition, to be sure, that I turn toward them and adopt, at least for the moment, their way of thinking.”
91 Halbwachs [Collective, 40] does soften his first point by saying, “Clearly, I do not in any way dispute that our impressions perdure for some time... after they have been produced. But this “resonance” of impressions is not to be confused at all with the preservation of memories.”
92 It is necessary to point out that the terms “social memory” and “collective memory” have slightly different nuances: Halbwachs used the qualifier sociaux to describe the ways that group ideologies inform individual memories. Collective memory, rather, was used to connote memories shared and passed down by groups. As these concepts are given to overlap, the terms “collective” and “social” are often used synonymously in current discussions. In fact, they are currently used synonymously with such frequency that their nuances vary from author to author. Of late, another term, “cultural memory” has gained considerable currency. The implied distinction here simply broadens the scope of collective memory and implies a long-term cultural tradition; this should be contrasted with “communicative memory” which implies a short-term orally communicated memory (meaning within three generations).
93 A more detailed account of Halbwachs’ work will be provided in the following section.
paradoxical character in the history of historiography. At the University of Strasbourg, Halbwachs was a close colleague of Marc Bloch and Lucien Febvre. Yet he resisted their expanding definitions of history. As the innovators of the “history of mentalities” approach, Febvre and Bloch were beginning to implement interdisciplinary tools for historical research that reached beyond historical positivism.\(^94\) In contrast, Halbwachs maintained a more conventional positivist understanding of the historian’s task.\(^95\)

In 1941 Halbwachs undertook a project which put his theory of memory to work in the field of topographical commemoration.\(^96\) Halbwachs used Palestine’s commemorated (or enshrined) landscape as an example of collective memory. He endeavored to show how many traditional points of reference on Israel’s landscape were first conceived in the imaginations of European Christians in the Middle Ages. From the fourth century onward, pilgrims who had imagined the topographical setting of Christ’s life sojourned to the “Holy Land” to visit the sites made famous by the Gospels. Certain images of the biblical setting had become so engrained upon their mind’s eye that upon arrival it was inevitable for them to “discover (invent)” locations to anchor their imaginative conceptions. Halbwachs explained how these pilgrims superimposed an imagined Holy Land upon the physical landscape of Palestine. On these topographically significant sites were built religious shrines and churches to commemorate events from Christ’s life. Halbwachs’ conclusion was that these commemorative sites were valuable for tracing collective memory\(^97\) and of no value to historians interested in the historical events behind these commemorations. Simply put, Halbwachs argued that collective memory was an unreliable source for history.

Before going further, we should note that Halbwachs’ study was seriously deficient in several ways. The first is that he relied heavily upon the account by pilgrim of Bordeaux and neglected any part that Constantine played in the localization of holy

\(^94\) Cf. the discussion of Bultmann and Collingwood above.

\(^95\) P. Hutton provides a valuable survey of Halbwachs’, Bloch’s and Lebvre’s relationship [History as an Art of Memory (Hanover and London: University Press of New England, 1993), 73-77].


\(^97\) Thus it becomes clear that Halbwachs’ conception of collective memory is not necessarily derivative of individual memories. This is demonstrated as he makes a distinction between “collective memory” and “actual memories” (Halbwachs, Collective, 212). One might seriously question whether the term memory doesn’t become a misnomer in this case. Halbwachs seems to use collective memory in the same way that others use the term tradition. However, in order to understand Halbwachs’ work, it must be noted that collective memory is sometimes derivative of individual memories but not always.
sites. Also, he inexplicably presupposed that the Synoptic Gospels took written form in the second century and perhaps over a century after the events to which they attest. This poorly defended position was foundational to Halbwachs’ conclusion that the Gospels are mostly invented and fictive in nature. Halbwachs also misrepresented (and oversimplified) the relationship between Jewish and Christian religious belief. Halbwachs was under the impression that Christianity was “drastically opposed” to Judaism and therefore understood the belief systems of the two religions to be “sharply contrasted”. This is unfortunate because it consequentially weakens his otherwise insightful comments on the correspondence between Jewish topography and Christian commemoration.

However, despite these shortcomings, Halbwachs’ employed method became the prototypical model for later historians of tradition. In Patrick Hutton’s assessment, this work “has come to be regarded as something of a model in the field. Halbwachs showed historians how to write a history of the politics of memory, and it is especially for this accomplishment that they pay him homage today.” This homage is not due to Halbwachs’ expertise on Christian origins, nor is it due to his conclusion that collective memory is of no use to history. In fact, Halbwachs’ conclusion has been largely rejected; many since have seen the enormous debt that historiography owes to the study of memory. Essentially, Halbwachs’ work is celebrated for his recognition that the analysis of commemoration provides a window into the thought-world of the commemorators themselves. In other words, how a society chooses to remember her origins betrays a great deal of information about her current stage of development.

However, it was through the posthumous publication of La Mémoire collective that Halbwachs’ historiographical conclusions became known. It became clear that Halbwachs saw a rigid distinction between collective memory and history. For Halbwachs, history was an objectively written science that took place once collective

100 Halbwachs, *Collective*, 213.
102 Hutton, *History*, 75.
103 This will be explicated in what follows.
memory had disappeared. Yet his overt objection to the application of memory studies to historical inquiry was not enough to deter the impact that his implied method would eventually have.

It was not until Jacques Le Goff's series of essays in 1977 that Halbwachs' conception of memory was given full voice within the discourse of historiography. However, much like Halbwachs, Le Goff distinguished between oral memory and written history. This dichotomy has not deterred Nathan Wachtel from arguing that Halbwachs' study of collective memory provided a valuable method for analyzing oral tradition. Yet, while Wachtel's essay had significance for oral historians, the implications that SM had for national, political and cultural histories had not yet been realized. It was Pierre Nora who finally debunked the false dichotomy between history and memory.

Nora's most celebrated work, *Les Lieux de mémoire*, undertakes a French history via the 'sites of memory' of France. This work was considerably influenced by Halbwachs' study of the Holy Land. Nora and his collaborators map France's past onto its present geography, architecture and festivals. This multi-authored work was the first and remains the fullest application of SM to a national history. Nora's work demonstrates a conception of collective memory that transcends both oral tradition and written history. Nora's conception of history sets memory at center stage. Yet Nora's most overt contribution to the historiographical discussion is found in his article, "Between Memory and History." This piece promotes a view of memory and history that is distinct from that of his predecessors.

As mentioned above, Halbwachs understood memory as a fluid series of reconstructions while history was associated with solidified objectivity. Le Goff's view

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107 At this point, it must be made clear the present study does not intend to propose a "Halbwachsian" approach to historiography. Halbwachs' importance should not be seen in his work alone; rather it is the influence that his work had on subsequent historiographers that makes his work important for the present study.


had not deviated from this substantially. Le Goff argued that "memory, on which history draws and which nourishes it in return, seeks to save the past in order to serve the present and the future." Thus, Le Goff takes Halbwachs' conception of memory and argues that history is built upon this process of subjective reconstruction. But, at the same time, Le Goff seeks to describe history in terms of objective scientific methods that can, in some sense, "preserve the past". Nora takes the opposite stance arguing that it is memory that is "absolute, while history can only conceive the relative." Nora holds that memory's fluidity is precisely what makes it reliable. "It remains in permanent evolution," ever upholding the completion of the present. According to Nora, it is history that is "always problematic and incomplete." Therefore he promotes a theory of "real memory" that is "unviolated" as long as it remains in the realm of the subconscious. Nora laments that the scientific methods of historians, in their attempt to establish critically a "true" memory, can only distort memory. Contrary to Le Goff, who understood memory as merely a building block on which to construct history, Nora argues that collective memory is the essence of historical inquiry. Moreover, Nora argues that collective memories are most active on a subconscious level continually upholding continuity with the present. History, in contrast, is the intentional reconstruction of memory.

Nora's work paved the way for historiographical interest of SM in the 1980's and thereafter. And while Nora's conception of collective memory seemingly won the day, most historians who implement SM fall practically somewhere in between Le Goff and Nora. The balance of this study will draw upon the work of these authors with attention to their conceptual contributions and not necessarily to the chronological order of their work.

114 Le Goff, History, 99.
115 Le Goff, History, 106-110.
116 Le Goff, History, 179-216.
117 Nora, Between, 9.
118 Nora, Between, 8.
119 For a particularly scathing critique of Nora's conception of collective memory see N Gedi and Y. Elam, "Collective Memory - What is it?" History and Memory:8 (1996). Their criticism will be revisited below.
II.2.2 From Memory to Social Memory

It is common for introductions of SM first to point out that even the most basic form of memory (individual memory) is a combination of the past recollection and present imposition. The present study will follow suit in the hope that the following will introduce some of the central interests of SM.

Halbwachs' conception of memory was hinged on the process of localization. In this process, mental images associated with the past are anchored to specific mental frames of reference. By themselves, these images (which carry only a residue of the past) are abstract and incomplete until they are set firmly within a context of meaning. These contexts, or frames, of meaning form fragmentary ideas into complete and cohesive memories. The purpose of this process is to reinforce images associated with the past by localizing them within imaginative contexts wherein these ideas are meaningful and intelligible to the present state of mind. Patrick Hutton summarizes:

Remembering, therefore, might be characterized as a process of imaginative reconstruction, in which we integrate specific images formulated in the present into particular contexts identified with the past.

Hutton aptly describes Halbwachs' conception of imaginatively localized memories. But it should be added that Halbwachs conception of "the past" is inconsistent. He vacillates between a past which can be represented by present states of mind and a past which is largely unknowable. Such inconsistency is mirrored in Hutton's summary. One may question whether the term "reconstruction" (borrowed from Halbwachs) is helpful to describe the process of localization. Such a metaphor connotes an entity which has become disjointed and can be reassembled. Yet this seems incongruous with Halbwachs' argument that mental images associated with the past are fragmentary at the start. Perhaps then, the concept of "reinforcement" (also used by Halbwachs) is more helpful to describe the part that imagination plays in this process.

In order for images associated with the past to make sense in the present state of mind, the localization process must reinforce memories with plausibility and integrity. Since the actual past cannot be conjured up to verify such reinforcements, the imagination is held in check by the combined memories of the social group of which it is a part. If a particular individual memory is not rendered plausibly in social dialogue, it

122 Hutton, History, 78.
will be corrected and in some cases rejected. Therefore, as an individual memory becomes a collective memory through this dialogue it is corrected and completed by established collective memories. Social groups, therefore, stabilize individual memories by providing parameters for their formation. As Halbwachs conceived it, collective memory is an intricate complex of social norms, interpretations and attitudes which spur and constrain this imaginative process. Thus collective memory creates "social frameworks" in which individual memories must be localized if they are to have meaning.

To introduce the complexity of memory, Halbwachs used the example of an adult who happens upon a book familiar from childhood. He describes the probable reminiscence and nostalgia evoked by the book. Yet he also describes the inevitable feeling of incompleteness:

This is so because we feel a gap continues to exist between the vague recollection of today and the impression of our childhood which we know was vivid, precise, and strong. We therefore hope by reading the book again to complete the former vague memory of our childhood.123

In this example, the adult's present cognitive state is reliant upon a past perception. This much may be obvious. Yet, this example also demonstrates that the adult's cognitive state imposes a present perception upon a former perception. Specifically, the incomplete recollection of the artifact (i.e. the book) is completed by the present perception of the artifact. Thus the memory is reinforced: both past and present perceptions are fused to create the present cognitive state. Furthermore, the past perception is swallowed by the present so completely124 that the adult is no longer able to distinguish comprehensively between the two perceptions.125

The above example is a valuable introduction in that it suggests a scene laden with potential reminiscence. In such a circumstance the adult is intentionally given to reflect upon past experience. Yet one may imagine a more complex case in which an individual memory and collective memory are conflated. Such instances are manifold within family memories. In some cases family memories are so entirely social in nature that distinguishing them from individual recollections is all but impossible.126 Fentress and Wickham cite the case of an adult who remembers an episode from his childhood. In

123 Halbwachs, Collective, 46.
124 Cf. Lowenthal, Past, xvii.
125 One could question whether an example so far removed from the present is helpful to the discussion of recent memories. While this particular example of reinforcement does not intend to speak to this, the present study will provide more apt examples of recent memory below.
126 Le Goff, History, 4.
this episode he recounts how he destroyed his parents' fine china in a jealous reaction to the birth of his younger sibling. Yet in this account, the adult confesses his inability to distinguish his own memory from that of his parents. He was uncertain "whether the memory of the incident was real or whether it was merely the memory of the incident as he had reconstructed it in his childish imagination after hearing the story repeated by his parents". 127

Here the memory has not only been reinforced, but it has been *socially* reinforced. 128 Moreover, it has been socially reinforced to such an extent that the memory has become entirely social in nature. It is imperative that this position is not misunderstood. The memory in question is "entirely social" not at the expense of the child's individual memory, but in conjunction with the individual memory. Fentress and Wickham's example aptly demonstrates the phenomena of SM as first conceived by Halbwachs. In his words,

> [T]he greatest number of memories come back to us when our parents, our friends, or other persons recall them to us. [...] It is in society that people normally acquire their memories. It is also in society that they recall, recognize and localize their memories. 129

Halbwachs' statement is perhaps extreme; he is probably overstating his case. Even so, the key role that family members, friends and co-workers play in reinforcing memory should not be understated either. People often rely on social dialogue to reinforce forgotten data. This is likely SM's most recognizable manifestation. Yet Halbwachs' conception of SM ran far more deeply. Halbwachs argued that the individual's relationship to society is so innate that it affects individual memories even before they enter social dialogue. One could say that there is also an internal social dialogue that parallels the external. This has led to the argument that every memory, be it private or communal, is social in nature. In Michael Schudson's assessment,

> [E]ven where memories are located idiosyncratically in individual minds, they remain social and cultural in that (a) they operate through the supra-individual cultural construction of language; (b) they generally come into play in response to social stimulation, rehearsal, or social cues [...]; and (c) there are socially structured patterns of recall. 130

As Schudson's first point indicates, the social framework of language shapes memory on such a foundational level that memories are, to some extent, social from the start. And in

130 Schudson, "Dynamics", 347.
line with Halbwachs, Schudson’s subsequent points (b and c) emphasize how pervasive social and cultural frameworks are within individual reinforcement. Yet before it is possible to examine how frameworks like language and articulation shape memory (and, in turn, history) it will be necessary to introduce a key feature of SM and of the present dissertation: memory distortion.

II.2.3 Memory Distortion
The study of SM presupposes that memory is not merely the cognitive preservation of past events. Rather, “memory is a process of encoding information, storing information, and strategically retrieving information, and there are social, psychological, and historical influences at each point.” Borrowing from the fields of neurology and psychology, SM theorists use the term distortion to delineate the difference between memory of the past and past actuality. Memory distortion is most often utilized by historians to show the relationship between SM and political power. Undoubtedly, political regimes have been and are in the business of the intentional distortion of the past as a means of controlling public opinion. Yet, memory distortion is not necessarily malevolent, nor does it always need to be consciously strategic in nature. Revisionist-history is only an extreme form of memory distortion, and is by no means distortion’s most prevalent manifestation.

It will be necessary to shake the negative connotations from the word “distortion” in order to understand its necessary and beneficial function. It is crucially important to point out that distortion is, most commonly, a natural and benign function of memory selection.

Matters of emphasis, perspective and interpretation are the very basis for memory’s existence. It is simply impossible to know every detail about any object; or put

135 Schudson, “Dynamics”, 351.
136 The designation “memory distortion” may also conjure notions of false memory that have been made famous by cases of false allegations of child abuse. In these extreme cases hypnosis and suggestive role-play spurred false memory. Aside from demonstrating how influential external contexts can be on memory, these extreme cases should not be appealed to as common representations of distortion. For a study of this nature, see Ceci S. J., “False Beliefs”, in Memory Distortion (ed. D. Schachter; Cambridge: HUP, 1995).
another way, it is impossible to see an object from every vantage-point. In the same way, it is equally impossible to recollect an object without emphasizing certain details, or to recall an object without perspective or interpretation. With this in mind, Kammen admits, “[We] do not know where veracity ends and distortion begins.” Yet this statement perhaps betrays a certain false dichotomy between “veracity” and distortion. It must be stated in no uncertain terms that memory is distortion. This is so regardless of any claims to veracity. If the criteria for veracity were defined by a given memory’s lack of distortion all discussion about the past would be rendered futile. Schudson aptly describes the issue at stake: “The notion that memory can be “distorted” assumes that there is a standard by which we can judge or measure what a veridical memory must be.” Similarly Assmann posits, “[T]he notion “distorted memory” seems to presuppose that there is something like ”undistorted memory”.” Schudson argues that such a standard is nonexistent since “[d]istortion is inevitable. Memory is distortion since memory is invariably and inevitably selective”.

With this in view, it is necessary to examine further the types and roles of distortion in memory and history. Schudson suggests four categories of distortion: (1) distanciation: the tendency for memories to become vague or for details to be forgotten; (2) instrumentalization: the tendency for memories to be reinterpreted to serve the present better; (3) conventionalization: the tendency for memories to conform to socio-typical experiences; and (4) narrativization: the tendency for memories to be conventionalized through the constraints of story telling. And I would add a fifth, (5) articulation: the tendency for memories to conform to language conventions. As the latter

139 Assmann, “Antijudaism”, 366; Yet, the term is necessary due to the pervasiveness of the “passive recall” model (cf. III.1.1 below). Unless the theorist qualifies the term memory with “distortion” the hearer will likely think of memory in terms of passive recall.
140 Schudson, “Dynamics”, 348; However, Schudson (p.361) rejects the notion that such a position demands an agnosticized approach to memory (or history). Rather he asserts, “If interpretation were free-floating, entirely manipulable to serve present interests, altogether unanchored by a bedrock body of unshakable evidence, controversies over the past would ultimately be uninteresting. But in fact they are interesting. They are compelling. And they are gripping because people trust that a past we can to some extent know and can to some extent come to agreement about really happened.”
142 This is similar, though not identical to Ricoeur’s treatment of literary/hermeneutical distanciation [“The Hermeneutical Function of Distanciation”, Philosophy Today 17.2 (1973)]. The concept is perhaps best summed up by Nietzsche who stated that the human animal’s default position is that of forgetfulness but, by breeding memory into humanity “forgetfulness can be suspended in certain cases” [F. Nietzsche, The Genealogy of Morals (Garden City: Doubleday Anchor Books, 1956[1887]), 39].
two of these have the most importance for the present study, the following section will be appropriately devoted to issues of articulation and narrativization.\(^{143}\)

II.2.4 *Articulation and Narrativization*

As my discussion of distortion has suggested memory is not passive recall of the past. The “past can never be preserved in a pure, complete, and authentic form but must always be reconstructed from the viewpoint and within the semantic frames of a changing present.”\(^{144}\) The “semantic frames” to which Assmann refers are perhaps the most influential of Halbwachs’ previously mentioned “social frameworks”. This is so because memories are most often localized within language conventions. As Fentress and Wickham state, “memory can be social only if it is capable of being transmitted, and, to be transmitted, a memory must first be articulated. Social memory, then, is articulate memory.”\(^{145}\) Yet articulation can be manifested in many forms. Some memories are given expression through ritual, such as a religious observance or commemorative calendar.\(^{146}\) Another common form of articulation is through art, such as a monument commemorating a particular event or person.\(^{147}\) But in most cases, the articulation of memory requires verbal or written language as its central medium.\(^{148}\)

It is necessary to recognize that when the memory is translated into language, this articulation must *conform* to the accepted semantic frameworks of its context. Thus issues of vocabulary, syntax, grammar, metaphor and genre act as social frameworks.\(^{149}\) The very nature of communication demands that memory is rendered intelligibly. Truly,

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\(^{143}\) Yet, as one might expect, these spheres also have a tendency to overlap. Thus I will not wholly neglect the first three types in what follows.

\(^{144}\) Assmann, “Antijudaism”, 366.

\(^{145}\) Fentress and Wickham, *Social Memory*, 47.

\(^{146}\) Assmann examines Deuteronomy and deciphers seven ways to remember: “making conscious” (Deut 6:6; 11:18); “education and conversational remembering” (6:7); “making visible” (6:8); “storing up and publication” (27:2-8); “festivals of collective remembering” (16:3; 16:12); “oral transmission [via poetry and song]” (31:19-21); and “canonization” (“Collective Memory and Cultural Identity”, *New German Critique* 65 (1995): 18-9).

\(^{147}\) As mentioned previously, Nora, *Realms*, esp. 611-37 was crucial in demonstrating this point. For a more recent study on non-verbal articulation see P. Burke, *Eyewitnessing: The Uses of Images as Historical Evidence* (London: Reaktion Books, 2001).

\(^{148}\) In fact, it is very rare for either of the former media to emerge without the accompaniment of language, to some extent; Cf. Fentress and Wickham, *Social Memory*, 47.

\(^{149}\) This list is by no means comprehensive. On this point see J. Lyons, *Language, Meaning, and Context* (London: Fontana, 1981). Lyons concludes that “no word can be fully understood independently of other words that are related to it and delimit its sense. Looked at from a semantic point of view, the lexical structure of a language – the structure of vocabulary – is best regarded as a large and intricate network of sense-relations: it is like a huge, multidimensional spider’s web, in which each strand is one such relation and each knot in the web is a different lexeme.”
“every time a tradition is articulated, it must be given meaning appropriate to the context, or the genre, in which it is articulated.”  

In this way, the transition from memory to language involves not only translation, but also interpretation. Thus, the meaning and significance of the memory is formed (and reformed) by the context(s) of articulation.

Moreover, as we delve more deeply, it becomes apparent not only that the early stages of articulation aid a memory’s reception into society, but that language also acts as a hermeneutic for the memory’s conveyor. Along these lines, Halbwachs recognized the essential interdependence between memory, perception and language. For Halbwachs, being able “to give names to objects and to distinguish one from the other by means of their names” is an integral part “of understanding their significance.” Simply put, “Speech is an instrument of comprehension.” Hence verbal conventions constitute what is at the same time the most elementary and the most stable framework of collective memory.

When articulating memory into a social setting, unconsciously, memory conforms to patterns familiar to the present group. Gedi and Elam helpfully draw out a passage from Tolstoy’s War and Peace to demonstrate this very point:

[Rostov] described the Schoen Graben affair exactly as men who have taken part in battles always describe them [...], as they have heard them described by others, and as sounds well [...]. He began his story with the intention of telling everything exactly as it happened, but imperceptibly, unconsciously and inevitably he passed into falsehood.

Tolstoy goes on to explain that the story that Rostov conveyed was exactly what “his listeners expected to hear.” Granted this is a fictive example, but the implication is that the articulation of memory is also subject to “narrativization”.

The narrativization process forces both the story-teller and the audience into stereotypical patterns. Indeed, stereotypes “are an indispensable part of our cognitive mechanism, rational patterns according to which our impressions are modeled.” Narrativization not only shapes our memories as we retrieve them in story-telling, but also provides a grid by which we interpret our environment and our role therein. The grid provided by narrativization is most prevalent on a subconscious level. Lowenthal insightfully posits that “stories appear to us as just a natural way of thinking about

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150 Fentress and Wickham, Social Memory, 85.
151 Halbwachs, Collective, 45.
152 Halbwachs, Collective, 44.
153 Halbwachs, Collective, 45.
156 Gedi and Elam, “What is it?” 46.
157 Cf. Nora, Between, 8.
things, a way of ordering our knowledge [...] and representing them in our minds.” He continues:

The fact that we assimilate stories so readily, accepting them as representations of reality (even when we know that they are fictions), renders their function as containers of memories all but imperceptible. When we listen to a story, or when we fantasize, memory is just there. We rarely need to make an effort. Yet the function of memory in stories is all the more important for being so largely invisible. Stories do more than represent particular events in a general fashion. Stories provided us with a set of stock explanations which underlie our predispositions to interpret reality in the ways that we do. 158

As such, pasts worth remembering are so because they bear resemblance to interesting plots, characters and settings in our mind’s eye. These resemblances function as ‘mnemotechniques’, or vehicles for memory. This is explicated by Fentress and Wickham:

[A] plot functions as a complex memory image, and learning a repertoire of plots is equivalent to learning a large-scale mnemotechnique that permits the ordering, retention, and subsequent transmission of a vast amount of information. Remembering in visual images, syntactically linked and articulated in a causal and logical relations, we make up little stories. This is a ‘mnemotechnique’ we constantly use without being aware of it. [...] To be remembered and transmitted at all, the facts must be transformed into images, arranged in stories. Internal contexts, such as narrative genres, exist as the typical patterns in which we experience and interpret events of all kinds. Accommodating remembered facts into predisposed internal contexts may impose a radical reordering of that memory at the outset. 159

Narrativization is therefore highly distortive but also highly mnemonic and therefore functionally vital.

With this in mind, the impact that metanarratives and archetypes have on perception is paramount in their distortive and mnemonic capabilities. The climactic moments of our lives are measured against, and interpreted by, the climactic moments of great stories and, indeed, history itself.

Peter Burke observes that, “In early modern Europe, many people read the Bible so often that it had become part of them and its stories organized their perceptions and their memories.” Burke’s first example of this provides a compelling instance of typological cognition.

Johann Kessler was a Swiss Protestant pastor of the first generation. In his memoirs he tells the story of how, as he puts it, ‘Martin Luther met me on the road to Wittenberg’. He and a companion stayed the night in the Black Bear at Jena, where they shared a table with a man who was dressed as a knight but was reading a book — which turned out to be a Hebrew psalter — and prepared to talk about theology. ‘We asked, “Sir can you tell us whether Dr Martin Luther is in Wittenberg just now, or where else he may be?”’ He replied, “I know for certain that he is not at Wittenburg at

158 Lowenthal, Past, 223.
159 Fentress and Wickham, Social Memory, 72, 73-4.
this moment" [...] "My boys," he added, "What do they think about this Luther in Switzerland?"

The students still don't get the point until the landlord drops a hint. My own point, however, is that consciously or unconsciously, Kessler has structured his story on a biblical prototype, that of the disciples who met Christ on the road to Emmaus.160

Burke also points out that the autobiography of John Bunyan "made use of schemata; Bunyan's account of his conversion is clearly modeled, consciously or unconsciously -- it is difficult to say which -- on the conversion of St. Paul as described in the Acts of the Apostles."161

It is at this point that my discussion moves in the direction of typology. I will not give a full treatment of typology until my next chapter, but there is need to mention it here as I will argue that typology can be manifest in the form of narrativization. This can be seen most recognizably in the influence of metanarratives. Metanarratives are stories that are so culturally significant and so well known that they become standards of significance, by which all similar stories are measured and interpreted.162 It is this interpretive process that elevates certain key characters of such stories to the status of archetypes. Typology is a means of interpreting the roles of relatively new characters (in the narratives of story and history) by the great characters of metanarratives.

In the cases of Bunyan and Kessler the narrativization of their personal stories were localized within, and given meaning by, the legendary stories of their religious heritage. Here we witness the marriage of individual memories to historical narratives. As seen previously (II.2.2), the localization of individual memories into social frameworks is facilitated by imaginative reinforcement. Such frameworks allow certain fragmentary images to be rendered meaningful and intelligible to the present state of mind. Remembering is a process of imaginative reinforcement that integrates specific images evoked in the present into particular frames associated with the past.163 As this study has suggested, the remembering process most commonly disguises such frameworks. Narrativization is most commonly unnoticed. However, as in the examples of Kessler and Bunyan, the climactic moments of personal stories often require uncommon and "grand localizations" in order to give appropriate meaning to these memories. At such times, the metanarratives of our collective memories are manifested much more recognizably. The narrativized gridlines are laid bare, and beg to be

160 Burke, "History", 103.
161 Burke, "History", 103.
162 I here emphasize the plural: metanarratives.
163 Hutton, History, 78.

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recognized. This is the function of “typology” – it is a recognizable appeal to the metanarratives and archetypes that have shaped our collective memory.

Further, this kind of grand narrativization is not only limited to religious experience. Zerubavel has recognized a similar typological manifestation in times of national/political crisis. She points to a recent episode in Israel’s history (1920) where accounts of the battle at Tel Hai had immortalized a one-armed military hero named Yoseph Trumpeldor. Zerubavel explains that Israel’s collective political identity was so weak, and her projected outlook was so bleak, that her collective identity was in a state of crisis. In this context, a group of settlements in Northern Galilee were under siege but successfully defended by a small band of soldiers led by Trumpeldor. The small victory was so welcomed by the public that “the outpouring of oral and written literature that began soon after the battle – speeches, articles, poems, and songs – reveals the frequent use of the term aggada (legend) and aggadati (legendary).” Moreover, the oral and written literature about Trumpeldor often created a link between him and the famous Jewish heroes of Antiquity. Trumpeldor was called the “great-grandson of the ancient heroes” and described as “a soldier in Bar Kokhba’s army who has come to us from previous generations.” It was written that “there is not much difference between two thousand years ago – Judah and Maccabee and Bar Kokhba, and one year ago – Yoseph, the one armed.”

Zerubavel cites many such associations with ancient lore. And evaluates:

Trumpeldor’s presentation as the modern reincarnation of the ancient heroes elevated him beyond the immediate historical situation and assured him an honorable position in the pantheon of Jewish heroes. The “legendary framework” served to legitimize the chronological incongruity of condensing two periods, historically separated by two thousand years, into a single heroic lore.

In such a case, when a national identity is downtrodden with foreign occupation, exile or servitude, a society will choose to commemorate a tradition more remote from the present. By reaching further back in the society’s history, commemorators are able to promote a more noble identity based on the society’s “golden age.” Since societies are often more open to the reinterpretation of more remote traditions, commemorators can weave themes of peace, political dominance and affluence into these golden ages with less resistance. So doing, remembrancers can spur their societies toward more desirable ideals with typological appeals to noble traditions. As seen in the case of Trumpeldor, a

168 Lowenthal, The Past is a Foreign Country, 21-25.
similar manifestation of this can also be applied to contemporary heroes. If a certain contemporary figure is perceived as particularly instrumental in his attempt to regain formerly golden ideals, this individual may indeed be typologically narrativized with legendary language. This may include accounts of the deeds of an individual bearing resemblance to archetypal figures of the society’s golden age. Insightfully, Zerubavel writes:

[T]he line separating “history” from “legend” is neither that clear nor necessarily consistent. This ambiguity does not stem only from the historical dimension of the legend, but may also result from the literary qualities of the historical narrative. When history is rendered in a story form that follows the structure of the legend, the classification of the narrative can easily become open to negotiation. 169

As Zerubavel has alluded, the conflation of tradition with contemporary history does not only run in one direction. Such implementation of sacred texts can become a powerfully distortive lens when interpreting the traditions themselves. When Trumpeldor’s generation evoked Bar Kokhba to interpret his character, they inevitably reinterpreted Bar Kokhba in light of Trumpeldor. Israel had to reinvent her tradition (however slightly) to accommodate for the new addition of Trumpeldor. However, as Zerubavel argues, the invention of tradition is not free from the constraints of the older tradition(s). The successful invention of tradition requires a close proximity to the older tradition so that its reception into the society is a smooth one. If an invention is too radical it will be largely rejected. An invented past will fail if the “society becomes aware of [its] fabricated character. Such awareness may lead to doubts about the appropriateness and validity of [the invention’s] commemoration of the past.” 170 Thus, depending on how central a collective memory is to a cultural identity, the conditions by which a tradition can be reinvented are particularly narrow. Innovative reinterpretation of tradition is only successful to the extent to which it is accepted.

In addition to Zerubavel’s comments, it should also be pointed out that the typological appeal to Bar Kokhba et al. reinforced a heroic memory into Israel’s contemporary consciousness. And inversely, the memory of Trumpeldor was localized into the more established collective memory of Israel’s heroes. Thus the memories of both figures were reinforced by this typological conflation. The example of Trumpeldor is an apt demonstration of the role of SM in historiographical discussion. As seen previously, Halbwachs’ two main objectives were summarized: (1) To show that the past

is not preserved in the memories of individuals, but imaginatively reconstructed¹⁷¹ according to the needs of the present; (2) To show that the cognitive reconstruction¹⁷² of the past is fundamentally spurred and constrained by social frameworks. When applied to the present historical discussion, we may assert that: (1) The memory of Trumpeldor was created by way of imaginative reinforcement. (2) This reinforcement was both spurred and constrained by the social frameworks of Israel’s collective memory. What Halbwachs first conceived as an application for individual memory has become a highly effective methodological aid when applied to history.

By surveying the cases cited over the course of this section, it becomes clear that collective memory often survives by being articulated in narrative form. In Fentress’ and Wickham’s example the adult conflated his own memory with the story that his parents told. Tolstoy’s Rostov unwittingly conflated his own account with stereotypical accounts familiar to his social group. Burke’s accounts of Kessler and Bunyan show that they conflated their own stories with religious metanarratives. And finally, Zerubavel has demonstrated that contemporary political histories can be conflated with historical archetypes.

In all of these cases it can be strongly argued that the typological conflation between personal narratives and social narratives are conceived within a short timeframe and often within the life of personal memory. Most of these narrative conflations were imagined by the individual remembers themselves and not by mythmakers generations later. There is no evidence that Trumpeldor himself appealed to the legendary figures to which he was appended. However, in his case, it is clear that these typological connections were made within months of his historical act. In light of this evidence, it can be argued that typological narrativization is often a means of remembering itself and not necessarily a literary device employed in a far-removed context. Moreover, the recent work on SM has introduced a methodological approach to history that can aid the navigation through social narratives that conflate history with myth and legend. As such, I purpose to examine the historiographical value of specific typological conflations conceived by memories contemporary and near contemporary with the historical Jesus.

II.3 Memory versus Commemoration

¹⁷¹ As the reader may recall, the present study prefers the term reinforcement instead of reconstruction. Therefore, a modified version of Halbwachs’ thesis will be applied.

If SM is to be of value to Jesus historians, it must be acknowledged that there are two distinct applications of this theory. One of these deals more directly with the social constraints upon personal memories, the other deals more with the commemorative activity of communities. The former explores the ways in which present cognitive states evoke, constrain and distort a person's perception of his or her personal past (i.e. Halbwachs original conception of the theory). The latter explores the ways that present social contexts influence the collective memories of groups. To avoid confusion, I will henceforth refer to the former as "memory" and the latter as "commemoration".

Both applications of SM emphasize the role of the contemporary interpreters over that of the original perceivers of the event(s). But this feature is even more exaggerated in the latter: commemorative analysis. And it is commemorative analysis that has become more common in contemporary historiography. The simple reason for this is that SM most often examines how history is commemorated in far removed contexts, by which I mean a period measured by multiple generations. In such cases, literal, personal memory does not factor into the constraints of the commemoration. This can be seen most clearly in the work of Nora and Schwartz.

When Nora examines the ideological and political motives behind the planning of France's bicentennial celebration, his aim is to speak of an imposed national memory; in other words, a politically-charged and strategic commemoration. Nora is ultimately interested in the French national identity as it stands 200 years after the revolution. Similarly, when Schwartz examines the changing significance of the national monuments in Washington D.C., his aim is to speak of how later generations utilized perceptions of

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173 There are several subsets (for a summary of these, see A. Kirk, "Social and Cultural Memory", in Memory, Tradition and Text: Uses of the Past in Early Christianity (Semeia 52; Leiden: Brill, 2005)). My concern is with the two most basic aims of SM.

174 Unfortunately, this is not a semantic distinction that is common to SM. Elsewhere I have argued that SM theorists often confuse literal memory with memory as a metaphor for tradition; see my "Memories of the Temple-Saying: A Critique and Application of Social Memory", in Jesus in Early Christian Memory: Essays in Honor of James D.G. Dunn (eds. S. McKnight and T. Mournet; New York: Continuum, 2007), forthcoming. There I argue that SM theorists most often consider memory as metaphor the same as commemorative activity. I would not disagree. But, in the conflation of these semantic spheres, memory's denotative value (and its importance for historiographical discussion) often goes under appreciated. However, see the similar delineation made by A. Assmann, Zeit und Tradition: Kulturelle Strategien der Dauer (Beiträge zur Geschichtskultur 15; Köln: Böhlau, 1999), 64. For this reason, I would contend that words like tradition and commemoration are ultimately more helpful to speak of memory as metaphor. On this point, cf. also Gedi and Elam, "What is it?" 30-2. But, contrary to Gedi and Elam, I do see value in the implied metaphor. Thus I will often use word commemoration and tradition synonymously. But I will hereafter employ the term "memory" only when I refer to the word's denotative value.

175 Nora, Realms, 611-37.
the past.\footnote{Schwartz, "Social Context".} In both cases, the interest is in the \textit{history of tradition} and, as such, the emphasis is on the commemorating communities. One is free to apply this method to commemorative activities that occur within the same generation of the event,\footnote{Cf. Zerubavel, "Legendary".} but in such cases the historian is obligated to fill out this picture by discussing personal testimonies (i.e. the memories of those contemporary to the event).\footnote{J. Assmann suggests a span of 40 years for "kommunikative Gedächtnis", or, more specifically, the period when the first generation begins to die. He juxtaposes this with "kulturelle Gedächtnis" [\textit{Das kulturelle Gedächtnis: Schrift, Erinnerung und politische Identität in frühen Hochkulturen} (Munich: Beck, 1992), 11, 50-6]. Elsewhere he speaks of communicative memory in terms of a three generation framework [\textit{Religion und kulturelle Gedächtnis: Zehn Studien} (Munich: Beck, 2000), 30]. M. Bockmuehl has recently suggested a "living memory" that extends to the second generation (approx. 70-150 years) ["New Testament Wirkungsgeschichte and the Early Christian Appeal to Living Memory", in \textit{Memory and Remembrance in the Bible and Antiquity} (eds. L.T. Stuckenbruck, S.C. Barton, B.G. Wold; Tübingen: Mohr Siebeck, 2007), forthcoming].} This measuring of commemorative aims against personal memories simply returns the discussion to "memory" as Halbwachs originally conceived it.\footnote{Again, I must point out the notable caveat that contemporary SM theorists return to this discussion with historiographical interests. As discussed, this is a departure from Halbwachs’ interests.}

Returning to two of the above examples, we saw that both Kessler’s account of his encounter with Luther and the popular interpretations of Trumpeldor provide windows into the perceptions of these events within the same generation that they took place. In such cases, those contemporary to the historical events have a part in shaping how the memory is interpreted and thus distorted. I have highlighted these examples because the distortion has taken the form of typological interpretation and, in this way, anticipate my next chapter. My point at this stage, however, is a simple one: \textit{In order for the historian properly to analyze such stories, commemoration analysis must be coupled with the analysis of personal memories.}

Within the first two generations of an historical event it is nearly impossible to analyze the commemoration without also analyzing the initial perceptions, memories and interpretations of that event. One cannot isolate an historical event from its impact and the trajectory of stories set in motion thereby.\footnote{Cf. M. Moxter ["Erzählung und Ereignis: Über den Spielraum historischer Repräsentation", in \textit{Der historische Jesus: Tendenzen und Perspektiven der gegenwärtigen Forschung} (eds. J. Schröter and R. Brucher; BZNW 114; Berlin: De Gruyter, 2002), 78-87] who borrows from Ricoeur in his discussion of the relationship between event and story.} At this point, I react against the tendency of previous schools of historiography that reduced historical episodes to simple
sociotypical categories and "law-like generalizations on human behaviour". \[181\] While conventionalization is a common form of memory distortion, it does not act as an all-encompassing umbrella that covers the unique features contributed by the historical agent which set the episode in motion.

As discussed above, narrativization is a kind of conventionalization. Stories tend to follow certain patterns. But what must be emphasized is that the individuals who first experience an historical event (or themselves act it out) follow such patterns. Upon reflection and retelling of these events, individuals will further conventionalize/narrativize their "stories". Denton summarizes that narrative is not "an incidental means of writing up the findings of research, but a way of knowing and of describing experience that cannot be reduced to other terms (e.g. the generalizations of analysis)". \[182\] Thus it is important to grant that such narrative distortions happen at the stage of personal memory long before these stories enter the realm of commemoration.

In this way, I also aim to temper the efforts of Hayden White to reduce all historical narrative to literary device. White's idea of "emplotment" is a valuable contribution to this discussion. Inevitably, historical memories must be emplotted in a way that makes sense of the important elements of "the plot". Part of this process involves the imposition of "importance" upon such elements.

When the historian selects events to be set within a narrative, a fundamentally distortive (and thus mnemonically valuable) effect happens simply by truncation. \[183\] By truncation I mean that stories require a beginning, middle and end that are not present in the actuality of time. From the human perspective, time seemingly runs backward and forward ad infinitum. Sequenced events in time do not have beginnings and ends, merely previous causes and later effects. On the other hand, stories (including histories) always have beginnings and ends. Therefore all histories must truncate time at both ends. When the historian chooses to begin the story, she employs her first distortive tool: where to begin? For example, should the story of America begin with the European exploration or with Native Americans? Should the story of Gandhi begin in Britain, India or South Africa? Such discernment requires interpretation.

Another distortive feature of narrativization involving beginnings is what White calls the "inaugural motif". When an historical event is employed to introduce a story it will inevitably take a different shape than if it is employed elsewhere in the story.

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183 What has been called "distanciation" above.
According to White, the same is true when employing a “transitional motif” or a “terminating motif”. The narrativization of the historical event colors the interpretation of the event.

It is sometimes said that the aim of the historian is to explain the past by "finding," "identifying," or "uncovering" the "stories" that lie buried in the chronicles; and that the difference between "history" and "fiction" resides in the fact that historian "finds" his stories, whereas the fiction writer "invents" his. This conception of the historian's task, however, obscures the extent to which "invention" also plays a part in the historian's operations.

White is correct to notice that this emplotment of history is much like the process of writing a fiction. However, he underemphasizes the constraints imposed upon the historian (or to use SM terminology: commemorator) by those who previously narrativized the episode. Because the first memories of an historical event are narrativized at the start by the acting agents themselves, these remembering individuals impact how their stories will be retold. "Narrative does indeed create meaning, but it does so in the course of life, and not simply after the fact." Moreover, this becomes an absolutely crucial point to underscore when the historical memories are being narrativized with the lifetime of those who experienced these events.

If a story becomes culturally significant enough to transcend its original application and is applied to a larger ideological framework, a distance is created between the story and the event. Even so, such distortion is held in check by the initial interpretations of that event. The further removed the commemoration is from the historical event, the less likely these spheres will interact. Memory theorists call this transition a “crisis of memory”. But until this crisis has completely run its course, commemorative analysis must be coupled with memory analysis.

I contend that SM's historiographical interest in commemoration should only be applied independently when there are no personal memories to be measured. To avoid discussion of personal memory when the commemoration has been shaped by living

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186 Functionally, the term narrativization is not dissimilar to the term “fictionalization” referred to by Holmberg [Holmberg, “Questions”, 445-57]. Here he borrows the idea from J. Schröter, “Die Frage nach dem historischen Jesus und der Charakter historischer Erkenntnis”, in *The Sayings Source Q and the Historical Jesus* (ed. Lindemann; Leuven: Leuven Univ. Press, 2001), 228-33. However, I prefer the term narrativization because the fictionalizing process does not render a memory-story fiction, it merely renders the memory to look like fiction. That is to say that both memory-stories and fictional-stories are narratives. So I think the designation narrativization more aptly describes the process under discussion.
memories of the historical event is irresponsible. Indeed, to do so misleads the analysis. Evidence of early memory demands historiographical analysis appropriate to this phenomenon. Dunn has observed that SM has tended to place “emphasis on the creative, rather than the retentive function of memory.” In his view, an overemphasis on the interpretive reinforcement (i.e. distortion) of memory weights the analysis too heavily toward “the character of the communities which maintained the tradition.” Dunn’s criticism suitably describes the tendencies of commemorative analysis. As argued here, this tendency can and should be tempered when coupled with memory analysis.

Because the Gospels represent a marriage between memory and commemoration, neither SM approach will be independently sufficient for a mnemonic analysis of the Jesus tradition. But conversely, when SM is applied in both respects to the Gospels, one can expect results that shed light both on how Jesus was initially remembered and how these memories contributed to his commemoration in early Christianity.

In the following chapter, I will adapt some of the key concerns of SM with this critique in mind. In doing so, I will suggest a theoretical model that aims to manifest some of the strengths of the historiography discussed in this chapter and hopes to avoid some of the pitfalls.

191 As he points out within this context, there is a certain affinity here with classic form criticism.
The present chapter will rely heavily on the research presented in the previous chapter (II). In what follows, I will offer my own adaptation of SM which attempts to be sensitive to the concerns of historiography first discussed from Spinoza to Bultmann and which is sensitive to current HJR that has explored the relationship between history and memory. In this chapter, I will offer the theory and method that constitute my primary thesis. I will argue that the analysis of mnemonic distortion provides the Jesus historian a means to locate and chart historical memories that betray typological interpretation.

To provide illustrations of my theory and method, I will employ the example of John the Baptist. My aim in doing so is not to contribute something original to John the Baptist research, but to illustrate how my theoretical models might look when applied to an historical figure like Jesus.

### III.1 Social Memory: An Adaptation

Social Memory theory is not without its shortcomings. I am attracted to SM because it attempts to take seriously several key hermeneutical concerns that have challenged contemporary historiography. While I do consider SM to advance this ongoing discussion in a number of ways, the application of SM to historical methodology must be done with caution. In the following section, I offer a critical adaptation of SM, one that will specify my own assessment of the central issues and establish a working model for how historical memory functions.

#### III.1.1 The Mnemonic Cycle

In the previous chapter, I introduced several suppositions and arguments that characterize SM. Among these, I have highlighted three conceptual elements that attempt to describe
the mnemonic process: previously established mnemonic frames (here I will call these categories), memory distortion, and localization. What might be evident from my survey of SM theorists is that the emphasis on these concepts varies depending on the theorist. SM is a relatively young field that is still trying to clarify its methods. But all seem to agree that the mnemonic process involves the interaction between these three mnemonic aspects. The purpose of attempting to describe this process is to supplant the “uncritical” model of memory as passive recall. The diagrams below represent my appraisal of this discussion and serve to illustrate the concepts previously discussed.

The Passive Recall Model

The Passive Recall Model illustrates the model of memory that SM seeks to supplant. This model describes memories as simple approximations of perceptions (X). The intake of perception acts like a filing system which preserves this perception as a “memory”. The notion that memory is a sort of storage unit, or filing system, that preserves memory is thought to be inadequate, and for good reason. Having already explored the rejection of this concept, I will only reiterate that this model does not appropriately describe the essential concepts that seem to be at work in the mnemonic process. Indeed, this model presupposes a relative lack of process; a new perception is simply stored and recalled in close approximation to what was initially perceived.
Figure 1a illustrates what I consider to be the essential aspects of the mnemonic process as introduced in the previous chapter. Although I have assigned particular letters (A-D) to this process, the circular (and therefore ongoing) nature of the process illustrates that memory does not have an absolute point of departure and ultimate telos. As such, movement A represents an entry point into the analysis of memory and not the “starting point” of memory.

Movement A represents a particular mnemonic category of significance. In Halbwachsian terms, this could be thought of as a “mental frame”.¹ Or in the terminology of Hutton, this could be thought of as a mental “context” associated with the past.² The basic concept here is that of a previously established category (A) by which a person is able to associate new perceptions (C).

The reader might already notice some affinity between this model and my previous discussion of the hermeneutical circle. Because I did not initially conceive the present model in response to Schleiermacher, I will not attempt to force the two together. But because there is an affinity between this model and the hermeneutical circle, I will briefly suggest how the two might relate: Point A is not dissimilar to Schleiermacher’s conception of “Vorverständnis”³ or Heidegger’s descriptions of “Vorhabe, Vorsicht und Vorgriff”.⁴ Or, to bring this discussion to contemporary thought, one might describe

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² Hutton, *History*, 78.
⁴ Heidegger, *Sein und Zeit*, 150-1.
movement A in terms of “guess” and point C in terms of “validation”. I have honed my own historiographical interests in dialogue with SM because, in many ways, I think it improves upon these discussions. What the present model provides, that is not emphasized with enough clarity in discussions of the hermeneutical circle, is an analysis of the movement from A to C and vice versa. With this in mind, movements B and D provide the chief advances upon previous discussions.

As all memory is distorted memory, movement B could represent any number of previously discussed distortions (instrumentalization, distanciation, etc). Each new perception (C) that enters the mnemonic cycle must be recognized and interpreted to some extent. In order for C to be categorized within a meaningful frame it must have been given meaning by a mind composed of prior memories and therefore accustomed to certain patterns of distortion. Thus movement B represents the necessary distorting process that renders a new perception intelligible to a socially and culturally conditioned context.

Just as the movement from A to C serves to distort the new perception, this newly assimilated information serves to distort the previous frame of meaning (A). If a new perception is to be classified as “new” it must vary from the familiar in some way. Thus the memory of C is added to what was previously understood about the categories to which C had been associated. Both A and C have been mnemonically reinforced in this synthesis. Movement D, then, represents the distorting effect that the novum has on the previous category. When two concepts are set together to reinforce one another, both are distorted.

In the process of localization, there is often a dominant mnemonic framework that facilitates the significance of other concepts. When a concept is reinforced within a larger framework, both the concept and the framework are distorted in the merger. Most often, the dominant and controlling mnemonic paradigm (the framework) is distorted to a lesser degree. Conversely, the concept is meaningful insofar as it conforms to the framework; thus it is distorted to a greater extent.

Take for example John the Baptist. Because he is an historical figure, we can assume that he was particularly memorable. Indeed, the Jesus of Q appeals to this memory:

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5 Ricoeur, Interpretation, 79.
6 This will manifest in varying degrees depending on the impact of C.
7 This will be further explored in my discussion of proof-texting vs. typological interpretation in IV.2.2. But it should also be pointed out that not all mnemonic categories act dominantly. Some categories act less like frameworks (that provide structure for new perceptions) and more like less rigid categories (that might be more inclined to reshape according to the new perception).
Jesus began to speak to the crowds about John, "What did you go out into the wilderness to see? A reed shaken by the wind? But what did you go out to see? A man dressed in soft clothing? Those who are splendidly clothed and live in luxury are found in royal palaces! But what did you go out to see? A prophet? Yes, I say to you, and one who is more than a prophet" (Lk 7:24-6; cf. Mt 11:7-9).

This saying provides a fascinating window to the relationship between Jesus and John and perhaps (implicitly) Herod. But, for the purpose of my present discussion, it also aptly illustrates the mnemonic cycle. Jesus’ series of rhetorical questions draws upon the concept of pre-categorization. One might paraphrase Jesus’ question as follows, “Well, what did you think you would find out there?” Such a question presupposes that his audience had some prior notion of what sort of person lives and preaches in the Judean wilderness. The implied answer is that everyone who made the effort to go out to see John had already anticipated what they might find. Helpfully for those of us who do not share this historical context, Jesus then supplies the “obvious” answer: those who made the trek out to see John had already some understanding of where prophets reside, what they might wear, what their socio-economic status might be, etc. Such mental associations with the category “prophet” betray what I have described as movement A.

If it can be determined that the perceivers of John had certain prophetic expectations of him before they actually perceived him, such pre-categorization of John would have inevitably colored (distorted) their actual perceptions of him. The most obvious kind of distortion in this case would be that of conventionalization: the tendency for memories to conform to socio-typical experiences. Jesus and his audience seem to agree that prophets in the wilderness tend to behave and dress in certain ways. Going out to “see” a prophet presupposes a certain socio-typical experience with that historical context. This would include conforming to the socio-typical roles of speaker-audience. It also might include some symbolic reenactment of a previously known ritual. The list could continue but the point has already been made: If you go out to see a man and expect a prophet, it will distort your perceptions and interpretations of him along this lines.

Another possible distortion would be narrativization: the tendency for memories to be conventionalized through the constraints of story telling. In the mnemonic sphere under analysis (the sayings source: Q), Jesus follows the above quote by claiming that John “is the one about whom it is written, ‘Behold, I send my messenger before your face, who will prepare your way before you.’” (Lk 7:27 // Mt 11:10). In this way, Q (and perhaps Jesus) interpreted John’s significance by associating him with a particular scripture (Mal 3:1). Having already perceived John as a prophet, Jesus has further
interpreted him through the association of prophecy. There is perhaps no clearer statement of narrativization: Jesus claims that John is Malachi 3:1. Thus, both by conventionalization and narrativization, the memories of John were distorted, what I have here described as movement B.

That Jesus has presupposed that his audience has indeed perceived John is evident and thus we move from C to D. The point that Jesus is making about John is that he is not only a prophet but "more than a prophet". Here Jesus’ interpretation illustrates the accommodation of the novum. John is a "prophet", which presupposes a familiar association for Jesus’ audience. But John is also "more than a prophet", which argues that John’s significance has the capacity to reinterpret the previous parameters of prophethood. In this case, Jesus’ interpretation of John’s significance suggests that one can be both a prophet and the fulfillment of a prophecy. Thus the previous category of significance (“prophet”) must be distorted to accommodate for the novum.

Furthermore, if one takes Mal 3:1 as a category of significance, Jesus’ application of this passage to John demands that the passage itself be reinterpreted in light of John’s significance. In Halbwachsian terms, we could say that John’s significance has been “localized” within the framework of Malachi; conversely, the significance of Malachi has been “reinforced” within the new perception of John the Baptist. In both of these ways, the previous categories of significance have been mnemonically synthesized (distorted), what I have described as movement D.

III.1.2 Mnemonic Continuity and Trajectory
The present section will bring to the fore a crucial aspect of my thesis as it is central to my understanding of historical memory. At this point, I will move from synchronic to diachronic analysis. In doing so, I will argue that the analysis of memory distortion allows a charting of mnemonic trajectories that can be measured and triangulated. In this way my ultimate purpose is to postulate the plausible perception that gave rise to a particular memory (or memories). I will further argue that the aim is not to postulate what an undistorted memory probably looked like, but to postulate what an early distorted memory probably looked like.

In my previous section, I described what I have termed the mnemonic cycle. This model, in essence, is a rough guide for synchronic analysis of memory distortion. Using

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8 A fuller treatment would also have to discuss instrumentalization: the tendency for memories to be reinterpreted to serve the present better. Surely, Q (and perhaps Jesus) has distorted John’s memory via the interpretation of Jesus’ own ministry.
the example of Q's portrayal of John the Baptist via Jesus, I have demonstrated how the application of SM can shed light on how a particular mnemonic sphere\(^9\) can interpret (distort) memories according to the presuppositions and purposes therein. In my description of movement D, I argued that the previous category of significance both distortion and is distorted by the mnemonic process of assimilating a new perception.

If the reader has followed by argument thus far, she will have recognized that movement A (the previous category of significance) cannot remain static. It must continually distort in order to accommodate for the novum (C). In this way the mnemonic process is not, as Heidegger warned, a vicious circle. It presupposes previous mnemonic cycles and propels subsequent mnemonic cycles. Thus synchronic analysis can only be completed in the move toward diachronic analysis. This has led many to heed Heidegger’s warning and to speak in terms of a hermeneutical “spiral”\(^1\). Consider the following diagram.\(^1\)

![Figure 2a: The Diachronic Continuity of Memory](image)

*Figure 2a represents the logical move from the synchronic process of memory to diachronic continuity of memory. If it can be granted that new perceptions have a distortive effect upon previously established categories, movement A is reinterpreted along each memory cycle. With this in mind, A\(_2\) represents this reinterpretation of that*

\[^9\text{Perhaps an author and/or community.}\]
\[^11\text{Again, it is necessary to point out that this diagram was initially conceptualized in dialogue with SM and not primarily with general hermeneutical theory. Still the conceptual affinity warrants mention and perhaps serves to ground this discussion within the larger and longer theoretical dialogue.}\]
category. I have placed the initial category in brackets to indicate that we are analyzing a mnemonic category and not the category as it existed independently of memory distortion.\textsuperscript{12} Points B\textsubscript{2} through B\textsubscript{5} represent memory distortion as it evolves within each new memory cycle.

The "push" represented by movement D is the "impact"\textsuperscript{13} of the novum (C). Indeed, if there was nothing essentially important, unique or peculiar about the new perception it would not be memorable. Depending on the extent of this impact, the momentum created by C can vary considerably. If something strikes you as mildly funny, it might be assimilated fairly easily into the previous category (B\textsubscript{2}); if something forces a paradigm shift upon your worldview (e.g. a religious experience), dramatic and forceful momentum can occur. Even so, most often, the mnemonic spiral serves to have a stabilizing effect upon new perceptions.

What is vital to this model is the concept of mnemonic continuity. In order for successive memory distortions to be thought of as a "trajectory" there is little room for dramatic distortions. Once a perception has been localized within a particular mnemonic category, the distortions thereafter will constitute only incremental modifications to that category. This, of course, is not an absolute. Certainly, human history is measured in terms of paradigm shifts. For example, the perception of celestial bodies underwent a dramatic shift in the post-Copernicus era. Or, on a more personal level, a severe traumatic experience can have a similar effect. But even in such cases, societal constraints and the need for internal continuity tend to temper such paradigm shifts so that their effects are felt over a longer period of time. More commonly, memory progresses without dramatic shifts. To borrow again from Nora, memory remains in permanent evolution, ever upholding the completion of the present.\textsuperscript{14}

In order for the importance of mnemonic continuity to be fully appreciated, I must reiterate and underscore my conception of memory distortion. As stated in the previous chapter, memory distortion should not be immediately equated with "false" memory, nor should it evoke notions of unreliability or uncertainty.

Memory distortion, in its most prevalent form, can be likened to the convex shape of a lens that receives and refracts light by the very parameters of its design. When performing its proper function, a telescope lens distorts an imaged object in order to magnify it. Depending on the quality of the lens, the viewer is able to perceive an

\textsuperscript{12} This, after all, is an analysis of the nature of historical memory and not past actuality.
\textsuperscript{13} I borrow this term from Dunn (I will revisit this concept below).
\textsuperscript{14} Nora, \textit{Between}, 9.
approximate distortion of distant objects not visible to the naked eye. The fact that the lens does not "report" the object's image exactly how it was received is exactly its value. In the same way, memory distorts the past to render it intelligible to the present.

This analogy is perhaps idealized; some of our memories are more like kaleidoscopes, distorting uninteresting shapes into interesting abstractions. Yet most memories must lie somewhere between these two models. If these two models represent two extremes of a spectrum (telescopic on one end, kaleidoscopic on the other), most memories are closer to the former, more objective model of the telescope. This must be so because memory's primary function is to render the past (which is invisible to the naked eye) intelligible to the present. Such intelligibility demands an acceptable approximation of the past to maintain a certain level of diachronic continuity with the present. Our memories demand a high degree of continuity in order to tie all of our shifting frames of meaning together. It is the integrity of this chain that determines its reliability. I can account for where and who I am now (and why) by analyzing the continuity of this chain.

I contend that it is this continuity that makes the charting of mnemonic trajectories possible for the historian. Because mnemonic distortions are most often spurred and constrained by previous and cognate distortions, it is possible to measure and relate distortion trajectories. Admittedly, once we expand this discussion from personal memory to commemorative traditions, the model of a simple spiral becomes inadequate by itself. When expanded, one could imagine a complex matrix of interconnected distortion spirals, each related to (and in some degree of tension with) other similar distortion spirals. The examination of cultural tradition is "complex, pluralistic and labyrinthine". Thus we must avoid the concept of a single all encompassing macro-spiral akin to the concept of a single spiraling Metanarrative. Rather, the historian is provided with multiple trajectories that branch off in separate directions.

Still the essential continuity of tradition (commemoration) must be emphasized. It is because of these "branching" trajectories that the historian is able to comparatively analyze the development of thought and patterns of distortion. Each generation has a close relationship to the immediately previous generation, whether by affinity or

15 Notice that I qualify this as a "more objective" model, rather than an "objective" model.
16 Assmann, Religion, 29.
17 As indicated in my discussion of narrativization, the role of metanarratives (plural) cannot be understated, but it is the diverse interpretations of culturally significant stories that propel the life of these stories forward. Cf. Dunn's critique of Wright in Jesus Remembered, 331-2.
reaction. No one commemorating community can be adequately discussed without explaining how this group might relate with the context that spurred and constrained their development.\textsuperscript{18}

Thus in order adequately to account for the origin of a mnemonic trajectory, the historian must compare and contrast interpretive spheres (i.e. mnemonic cycles) that seem to be distorting a memory in opposite directions. Once these spheres are compared and contrasted, it is then necessary to postulate how these divergent traditions relate to one another.

With this in mind, the historian’s task should not be to attempt to set aside traditional distortions but to navigate through them.\textsuperscript{19} This requires the historian to locate a synchronic interpretive sphere wherein a tradition has served a particular purpose, take inventory of the distortive tendencies of that sphere and attempt to account for its relationship with other interpretive spheres. Once two or more mnemonic spheres are located and compared, the ensuing analysis moves from synchronic to diachronic analysis.\textsuperscript{20} If it can be assumed that two or more spheres relate a cognate tradition, the comparison of this relationship will either suggest a common tradition that preceded both spheres or suggest dependence. In either case, it is now appropriate to speak in terms of mnemonic distortion trajectories that might be triangulated to postulate a common origin.\textsuperscript{21} Fundamental to this analysis is the idea of continuity. If a tradition is to exist at

\textsuperscript{18} W. Horbury has made a similar point in his discussion of the “continuity(ies)” of Jewish tradition from the second century BCE to Rabbinic tradition. He points out the error in underemphasizing the continuous relationship between “pre-Rabbinic” and post-Temple thought. Following Vermes, Flusser and Sanders, he argues that the NT “belongs to a series of developments of Jewish interpretive tradition, running from the Septuagint and the [Dead Sea] Scrolls to the Targums and rabbinic literature” [\textit{Herodian Judaism and the New Testament} (WUNT 193; Tübingen: Mohr Siebeck, 2006) 221-35, esp.230f]. While he grants that the destruction of the Temple had an enormous impact upon Jewish thought in general, he avers against the conclusion that this traumatic event broke the essential continuity of thought between the pre-Temple rabbis and post-Temple rabbinic literature. Indeed, it could be added (in light of the present discussion) that the fundamental importance of the post-Temple rabbis was to establish a cultural link between their own communities and the tradition that defined Jewish culture.


\textsuperscript{20} This approach is not dissimilar to Assmann’s charting of the relationship between communicative memory and cultural memory: “cultural memory can be considered to be a special case of communicative memory. It has a different temporal structure. If we think of the typical three-generation cycle of communicative memory as a synchronic memory-space, then cultural memory, with its traditions reaching far back into the past, forms the diachronic axis” [Assmann, \textit{Religion}, 8].

\textsuperscript{21} This will be further illustrated in the following section.
all it must have had some relationship to what came before it and an impact on what followed.22

This idea of continuity is not wholly incompatible with Sanders' description of “two contexts” discussed previously (I.1). He argued that

the only way to proceed in the search for the historical Jesus is to offer hypotheses based on the evidence and to evaluate them in light of how satisfactorily they account for the material in the Gospels, while also making Jesus a believable figure in first-century Palestine and the founder of a movement which eventuated in the church.23

Sanders emphasized that Jesus must stand firmly within first-century Palestinian Judaism; indeed, this is the chief contribution of his work and a highly influential one. Here he also emphasized that Jesus must stand in some relationship with the Gospel material and the early church. I consider my present argument concerning the continuity of memory to fill out the gap created by Sanders’ two contexts. I contend that the mnemonic distortion evident within the Jesus tradition provides the historian with the data needed to establish the relationship between synchronic stages. Memory is in a constant process of distortion. Most of the time, this distorting process remains reliably stable and therefore historically chartable.

More recently, Schröter has made a similar point in discussing the relationship between historical event and historical story.24 Schröter has argued that any interest in the historical Jesus must attempt to understand him in relationship to the effects that his life had on those who eventually told stories about him. If the historian is to take seriously the *Wirkungsgeschichte* that stands between the initial memories of Jesus and the stories of Jesus, the two cannot be disjointed. To take this relationship seriously, he argues, means that the stories about Jesus cannot be simply set aside in search for the “real” Jesus; conversely the historical Jesus cannot be simply ignored in favor of the stories. Schröter argues:

Stellt jedoch jede historische Konstruktion eine Verbindung von Ereignis und Erzählung dar..., dann kann auch eine gegenwärtige Jesusdarstellung die narrativen Repräsentationen der Person Jesu in den Evangelien nicht einfach beiseite stellen. Sie hat sich stattdessen an diesen zu orientieren und sie unter heutigen Erkenntnisbedingungen neu zusammenzusetzen. Das Ergebnis ist nicht der „wirkliche“ Jesus hinter den Evangelien. Das Ergebnis ist eine historische

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22 This idea is at least as old as Leibniz whose most celebrated contribution to historiography was his “law of continuity”. See the reprint of his 1704 preface to his *New Essays on the Human Understanding* in G. H. R. Parkinson, ed., *Leibniz: Philosophical Writings* (London: J.M. Dent, 1973), 158: “Nature makes no leaps.”


He concludes that “das MkEv eine historische Erzählung darstellt, die auf einer Verbindung von Ereignis und Erzählung basiert.”26 Schröter’s argument is very close to my own in that I do not think that history is ever able to achieve a picture of the unremembered (undistorted) past. It is the effects of the past that are available for analysis and not the past itself. This impossibility of obtaining “pastness” is what many scholars have in mind when they refer to the “real” Jesus. Indeed, those historians who think that history seeks to describe the “real” past will always lament, as Lessing did, that the task is ultimately futile. So to offer my own qualification of Schröter’s argument, I would add that what the postmodern mind has taught us is that we must always qualify what we mean by real. What is real is that which has been perceived and interpreted and thus distorted. But once qualified it is no longer helpful to draw a distinction between the real Jesus and the remembered Jesus. For those disciples of the first generation, the real Jesus was the Jesus of their memory.

As argued thus far, memory distortion most often goes unnoticed by the rememberer. If Jesus was to have had any effect on what was remembered about him, we must assume that the distortions to Jesus’ story as represented in the Gospels stand in relationship to the initial impact that Jesus had on the memories of his disciples. Thus my approach incorporates Dunn’s argument for the “impact” of historically memorable figures and events.27 Dunn acknowledges his debt to Dahl’s “cross-section” method as it attempts to locate shared “characteristics” in divergent traditions.28 But my approach will also attempt to locate contrasting memories, those which stand in tension to each other allow the historian to postulate the most plausible origin for such tensions. If one is to take the theses of Dunn and Schröter for granted, the next logical question is what to do with memories that are in sharp contrast to one another?

In this respect, I incorporate the thesis of Theissen and Winter who speak in terms of the “plausibility” of historical effects. In response to Lessing’s resignation that historical assurance is impossible, the authors write that the “accidental truths of history

26 Schröter, “Historizität”, 205.
27 Dunn (“Eyewitnesses”, 478) writes “What Jesus said (and did) changed the lives of these first disciples; it shaped them; it was truly bread of life for them; it became an integral part of their life-perspective.” He emphasizes, “It is not ‘ordinary’ remembering that I have in mind, but the remembering of the transformative impact” (p.479); cf. Dunn, Jesus Remembered, 329, 882.
are, however, the only possible basis of historical assurance." It is not the historian's task to arrive at an absolute measurement of the past. Instead, the historian must account for contrary accounts and interpretations by plausibly rendering a history of effects. "Incoherent elements that can be coherently interpreted are the best evidence that we are getting close to the historical truth." I would echo this aspect of their thesis in full voice.

Because memory distortion is constant, it is chartable and therefore historically measurable.

III.1.3 Memory, Typology and Trajectory

In my treatment of SM in the previous chapter, I argued that memory often survives by being articulated into narrative form. In my discussion of distortion by narrativization, I gave three examples of typological localization. In Burke’s accounts of Kessler and Bunyan, it became evident they conflated their own stories with religious metanarratives. In Zerubavel’s account of Trumpeldor, it became evident that contemporary political histories can be conflated with historical archetypes. I have thus demonstrated that typological conflation between personal narratives and social narratives can be conceived within the life of personal memory. In the first two cases, the narrative conflations were imagined by those who themselves experienced and interpreted these events. In the case of Trumpeldor, it is clear that the typological connections between him and Bar Kokhba were made within months of his historical acts.

In light of these examples, it can be argued that typological narrativization is often a means of remembering itself and not necessarily a literary device employed in a far-removed context. In what follows I will argue that the typological process is very closely related to the mnemonic process.

29 Theissen and Winter, Plausible Jesus, 234; In recognition of the accidentalness of historical data, the authors claim that not only can we not take the data at face value (this is not new observation), but we can be assured of the inability of humans comprehensively to falsify historical truth. They argue that the more convinced we are of the “accidental” character of the data, the more “intuitive certainty is generated within us” (p.234). It is for this reason that the historian is most benefited from the (1) taintedness of the data (p.231) and the (2) accidentalness of the data (p.234). Because the data will betray both of these characteristics, it will inevitably provide a somewhat incoherent amalgamation of information. According to the authors, the historian’s task is to make sense of this incoherence in the way that seems most plausibly coherent to the larger contextual picture. This includes both the context of the event(s) and the later effects of these events.

30 Theissen and Winter, Plausible Jesus, 234.
Having already detailed the steps of the mnemonic process, Figure 1β should be immediately familiar to the reader. As such, I will unpack my argument with further analysis of John the Baptist. In this way, I will both illustrate the typological cycle in historical terms and provide a precedent for typology from the same context as Jesus.

With the above figure in mind consider this saying by the Matthean Jesus:

> And from the days of John the Baptist until now the kingdom of heaven suffers violence, and violent men take it by force. For all the prophets and the Law prophesied until John. And if you care to accept it, he himself is Elijah, who was to come. He who has ears to hear, let him hear (Mt 11:12-15).

This text clearly appeals to a particular category from the HB: Elijah. As such, Jesus' saying mnemonically evoked certain narratives from 1 and 2 Kings. Of particular interest is 2Kgs 2, where Elijah is taken up to heaven upon YHWH's chariot. But in this context, the category seems to be eschatological and thus evokes memories of Malachi's appendix.31 This could be thought of as movement A. Jesus' claim that John "is Elijah, who was to come" points to the possibility that John the Baptist was the fulfillment of this prophecy. Indeed, as seen above, Q contains a similar association between John and Mal 3:1. Thus John, again, can be thought of as the new perception, or in literary terms, the NT category (C). This eschatological conflation between narrative category and contemporary figure is an excellent example of distortion via narrativization, what I have

31 "Behold, I am going to send you Elijah the prophet before the coming of the great and terrible day of YHWH. And he will restore the hearts of the fathers to their children, and the hearts of the children to their fathers, lest I come and smite the land with a curse" (Mal 4:5-6).
described as movement B. The fact that Malachi interprets Elijah in an eschatological way demonstrates that there was a distortion trajectory of Elijah tradition already in place. But at this point, we are chiefly concerned with how Matthew has commemorated these categories. Movement D represents the necessary interpretation of Elijah in light of John's significance. If Jesus' audience is able to accept this interpretation of John, they will be forced to read Mal 4:5-6 differently than they formerly had. In this way, Matthew's commemoration of Elijah was localized within perceptions of John and John's significance was distorted by the previous category of Mal 4:5-6.

Thus far, this analysis of typological memory has been chiefly synchronic. As is a matter of course, this analysis begs to be filled out by comparing this synchronic sphere to other similar manifestation of mnemonic distortion. For example, the fact that John was remembered for baptizing calls to mind Elisha narratives (cf. 2Kgs 5:10). Thus the possibility emerges that memories of John were further distorted by such narrativization. In the simple addition of this detail, the present analysis has moved from the synchronic to the diachronic. Consider the following diagram:

![Figure 2b: The Distortion Trajectory of Elijah Typology](image)

As discussed in the previous section, a simple spiral cannot adequately model the complex matrix of commemoration(s) which constitute the life of a culturally significant
tradition. What this model provides is a single trajectory of interpretation that extends from the traditional narrative to the contemporary figure.\textsuperscript{32}

Again, I have placed the previous mnemonic category in brackets to indicate that it is the memory of Elijah’s legend that interests us and not the actual Elijah. Also, it should be pointed out that this continuum has been significantly shortened to highlight only four shifts in distortion along the way. The first of these shifts is present, in the narrative of 2Kgs 2 in that Elisha is modeled as a type of Elijah. Standing by the Jordan River, Elisha witnesses Elijah’s departure and receives both his “mantle” (2:13-14) and his “spirit” (2:15). As such the first localization along this trajectory is a synthesis of the significance of Elijah and Elisha. Thus emerges the possibility of a dual typology along later stages of this trajectory.\textsuperscript{33} Part of Elisha’s narrative included his prescription of baptism in the Jordan (2Kgs 5:10). With these details in mind, we return to Jesus’ typological interpretation of John the Baptist and notice remarkable similarities. Memories of John were dominated by his ministry as a baptizer in the Jordan near the very place where Elijah was taken to heaven.\textsuperscript{34} Returning to our original context in Matthew, we see that Jesus’ appeal to Elijah’s significance was eschatologically filtered through Malachi.\textsuperscript{35}

What I have demonstrated here is how an interpretive distortion trajectory can take on typological significance. Thus far, this has been nothing more than a tradition-historical analysis. Indeed, this analysis has yet to make any claims concerning the historical John the Baptist. In order to do so will require a measuring of this trajectory against other trajectories in order to triangulate these and postulate a plausible historical

\textsuperscript{32} I.e. this is only one possible trajectory among many; I have not yet attempted to compare and contrast this particular trajectory with others.

\textsuperscript{33} C.A. Evans has argued that the Baptist’s ministry evidences Elijah, Elisha and Joshua typologies ["The Baptism of John in a Typological Context", in \textit{Dimensions of Baptism} (eds. F.M. Cross and S.E. Porter; JSNTSup; Sheffield: SAP, 2002)].

\textsuperscript{34} J.A. Trumbower writes: "[A]ccording to the [Fourth Gospel], John the Baptist began his baptizing career in Perea on the eastern side of the Jordan River (clearly in Jn 10.40 and also in 1:28, properly understood). According to 2Kgs 2.8, Elijah was taken up to heaven from precisely this spot" ["The Role of Malachi in the Career of John the Baptist", in \textit{The Gospels and the Scriptures of Israel} (eds. C.A. Evans and W.R. Stegner; JSNTSup; Sheffield: SAP, 1994), 36-7]. Cf. J. Murphy-O'Connor, "John the Baptist and Jesus: History and Hypotheses", \textit{NTS} 36 (1990): 360 n.7.

\textsuperscript{35} J.J. Collins has observed that 4Q521 f.2.3 reads, “fathers will turn to sons”. This along with the fragmentary 4Q588 shows that some in the first century held a similar notion of Elijah’s coming as that of Malachi [\textit{The Scepter and the Star: The Messiah of the Dead Sea Scrolls and Other Ancient Literature} (New York: Double Day, 1995), 117-22]. Also Sir 48:10-11 reads: “Who is ready for the time? As it is written, 'To still the wrath before the fierce anger of God, to turn the hearts of the fathers back to the children and to restore the tribes of Israel. Blessed is he that sees you [Elijah] before he dies." Cf. J.E. Taylor, \textit{The Immerser: John the Baptist within Second Temple Judaism} (Grand Rapids: Eerdmans, 1997), 146, 284.
perception that gave rise to such memories. With this in mind, the following section will move from mnemonic theory to historical method.

In sum, the present chapter has argued (1) that memory can adequately be described as a cyclical process that moves from previous category to new perception, (2) that this process requires distortion in order to render the past intelligible to the present, (3) that the mnemonic cycle moves diachronically to tie together an integral continuity and (4) that mnemonic analysis has the capacity to illuminate typological interpretation.

III.2  Historical Method

My aim thus far has been to introduce a handful of theoretical concerns to HJR with the hope that the discussion of contemporary historiography might invite reassessment of historiography within HJR. If I have done so successfully, the preceding discussion should be relatively unique among works on the historical Jesus. I highlight this now because, for the most part, my exegetical chapters will appear closer to the standard of HJR. I will take for granted several aspects common to many Jesus historians including redaction criticism, cultural exegesis, etc. My application of memory theory will undergird this analysis and often surface in such discussions but this will be set alongside an exegetical analysis that will be familiar to most NT researchers. Although certain aspects of my method will be unfamiliar to HJR (e.g. the mnemonic value of typology and the process of triangulation), I believe that my "corrective" is (for the most part) compatible with the historical-critical exegesis already in place in HJR. Thus what is most unique about the present work will be felt most keenly in my critique and application of historiography and memory theory, but I advise the reader to keep my primary thesis in mind throughout my exegetical chapters.

III.2.1 Historical-Critical Exegesis

What the reader should look for in my exegetical chapters is not simply the mentions of "mnemonic" and "distortion", but the overall argument of each chapter. In other words, my theoretical thesis will be best demonstrated not in the exegetical details, but in my overarching exegetical telos.³⁶ I see my method as a natural outworking of my theory, which (out of necessity) involved "big picture" historiographical concepts. So what I

³⁶ No doubt both are important; thus my work with Son of David will be considerably more detailed than my preliminary examples concerning John the Baptist.
provide in my exegetical chapters has in mind both the forest and the trees. Therefore, it is important that the reader is attentive to the larger themes developing throughout these chapters that will not come to fruition until my conclusion.

The remainder of this section will serve to clarify my aim and method. First a brief summary will be offered followed by explanation.

Each chapter that follows will demonstrate at least five steps in varying order. (1) I will survey cultural traditions that look to be related to the NT passage of interest. I will chart their interpretive trajectories previous to, parallel and following the NT text/subject of interest. (2) I will focus on two or more manifestations of the same episode (i.e. story/saying) within the Jesus tradition with specific attention to how this tradition functions mnemonically in its respective synchronic contexts. Moreover, I will analyze this episode with an eye toward specific manifestations of mnemonic distortion. (3) Once the synchronic function of the Jesus episode has been discussed, I will analyze the episode's diachronic movement. I will attempt to determine where each version of the episode stands in relation to the others and suggest one or more mnemonic distortion trajectories of the Jesus tradition. (4) If it can be established that the synchronic context of this tradition represents a particular sphere along a diachronic distortion trajectory, due consideration will be given to the possibility that the trajectory emerged prior to the tradition's literary form. At this point authenticity criteria will be employed to determine whether the tradition originated in memory or invention. (5) If it is possible to establish diverging distortion trajectories and the tradition seems to have been among the early and widespread memories of Jesus, I will follow the trajectories and triangulate backward to postulate the most plausible historical scenario. At this stage, it is important that this historical context renders the episode intelligible to the cultural backdrop previously established in step one.

1. Step one is, of course, a well known step in HJR and historiography in general. Because the Jesus tradition emerged within the context of first century Hellenistic Judaism, the examination of certain cultural traditions serves to anchor Jesus to this historical context. These include scriptural frameworks, ranging from metanarratives and archetypes to precedents and proof texts. These would also include popular ideologies, political climates, etc. ③ When dealing with the HB and LXX, I will attempt to establish a tradition trajectory whereby a particular fountainhead (a text, or group of texts) has taken on special cultural significance over time. In this way, step one will follow Figure 2a to

③ Jan Assmann terms this "cultural memory". My preference for "cultural tradition" has already been discussed (II.3).
analyze the movement from [A] to and through B, to established a trajectory of interpretation. It is important to emphasize that it is the movement from [A] to B that is available for analysis. The fountainhead has been set in brackets to demonstrate that the uninterpreted/undistorted past is ultimately unavailable to the historian.

For example, 2Sam 7 will prove important on several levels over the course of this dissertation. In the following chapter I will discuss the Davidic Covenant as it is represented by (B) 2Sam 7, (B₂) Isa 11, (B₃) 1Chr 17 and (B₄) PsSol 17. Each point along this trajectory will also represent a synchronic rotation as represented by Figure 1α. Thus, step one will anticipate the full rotation of each synchronic circle (i.e. A, B, C and D of Figure 1α) but will be primarily interested with movement B. Each manifestation of the Davidic Covenant will betray certain mnemonic distortions according to the context, but in many ways the fountainhead will engender a certain degree of stability throughout this trajectory.

2. Step two is a common step to redaction criticism. Students of the NT are taught to compare and contrast similar episodes in the Jesus tradition in order to determine the characteristics, agendas and tendencies of each evangelist. The present study has described mnemonic distortion in similar fashion. As an episode of the Jesus tradition is adapted to the narrative world of an evangelist, it is distorted by that evangelist’s authorial tendencies. Conversely, when that episode becomes a part of the evangelist’s narrative, it contributes to the plot (and sometimes theme, characterization, telos) of the story. When (as is often the case) the evangelist’s tendencies involve the application of scriptural categories to the Jesus tradition, one can expect the episode to be localized within such mnemonic frameworks. This corresponds to the movement from B to C in Figure 1α. One can also expect that the NT category reinterprets the significance (however slightly) of the scriptural category. This corresponds to the movement from C to D in Figure 1α. The synthesis (or mnemonic reinforcement/localization) of old and new categories will promote the contemporary relevance of the scriptural category and thus propel the distortion trajectory of the fountain head. This corresponds to the movement from D to A in Figure 1α and anticipates the movement from D to A₂ in Figure 1β.

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38 I should mention now that my use of diagrams and assigned letters (A, B, etc.) will be left behind in my exegetical chapters. While these were helpful to detail my theoretical aims, they might prove cumbersome over the course of my exegetical chapters. Moreover, certain chapters will require that I follow a different procession of steps depending upon the text and subject.
39 See above discussion of continuity (III.1.2).
40 It is at this point that the present model conforms most easily to Schleiermacher’s hermeneutical circle (cf. II.1.4).
For example, in chapter five (V.2), I will demonstrate that the synchronic circle representing Matthew’s commemoration of Jesus, applies the title Son of David with more frequency than do the other evangelists. We are able to determine that Matthew is particularly interested in this title by comparing Matthew to Mark (et al). In doing so, step two will anticipate the diachronic concerns of step three where Matthew’s use of previous tradition will suggest a particular trajectory. Indeed sometimes I will set these steps together in the same section. But, and this is especially true of V, it will be important to discuss thoroughly the world of Matthew’s narrative; i.e. my primary interest at this point is synchronic analysis. It will be demonstrated that Matthew’s agenda to promote Jesus’ significance via scriptural categories (e.g. Isaiahic Messiah, Son of David, etc.) also projects new significance onto the scriptures being employed.

3. Step three aims to establish particular interpretive tendencies that betray an episode’s development over time. By comparing and contrast different synchronic stages of the Jesus tradition (i.e. the Gospels), my discussion will move from the synchronic to the diachronic. This move is often made intuitively by NT scholars. By comparing Matthew to Mark, it is only natural for some speculation as to their literary relationship to come to the fore. Indeed, theories relating to the synoptic problem have been borne out of such discussions. What concerns the present step is the charting of commemorative development from Q to Mark, Mark to Matthew, Mark to Luke, etc. This step is absolutely essential to my methodology as it hinges on my ability to establish two or more points of distortion that are suggestive of a particular interpretative trajectory. In some cases, the argument will be strengthened if another independent and diverging distortion trajectory can be established that suggests a common point of departure.

For example, in VI, Jesus’ entry into Jerusalem is examined. This examination demonstrates that Mark’s account has been distorted by Matthew. It also suggests that Mark has reworked a previous tradition. Thus these two evangelists propel this episode forward by adapting Jesus’ entry to their respective tendencies for distortion.

4. Step four will speak to the question of whether an episode of the Jesus tradition originated in memory or invention. This will be discussed at length in the following section alongside a brief treatment of authenticity criteria.

5. Step five brings together the previous diachronic steps and postulates an historical portrait. If it can be established that (x) an episode manifests itself in two or more points along an interpretive trajectory, that (y) this episode represents an early and widespread memory and that (z) this episode is intelligible in the cultural context
discussed in step one, the trajectory(ies) can be charted backward in order to postulate an historical portrait. This is what I have referred as triangulation.

I will return to the case of John the Baptist once more to exemplify step five. I have previously argued that John stood along a particular trajectory of interpretation which was spurred and contained by Elijah typology. This typology can be most clearly seen in the overt statement by the Matthean Jesus, “And if you care to accept it, he himself is Elijah, who was to come” (Mt 11:14). But thus far, I have not established that this Elijah typology was a live interpretation during the historical ministry of John the Baptist. Indeed, this saying is singly attested by Matthew which suggests the possibility that Matthew invented it. Perhaps typological interpretations of John’s significance simply betray literary devices employed by the evangelists. In order to establish an historical portrait, it will be necessary to measure the distortion trajectory represented by Mt 11:12-15 against at least one other distortion trajectory. Such is provided by the Fourth Gospel.

In the Fourth Gospel, the evangelist portrays a dialogue between John and the Jewish authorities:

And this is the witness of John, when the Jews sent to him priests and Levites from Jerusalem to ask him, “Who are you?” And he confessed, and did not deny, and he confessed, “I am not the Christ.” And they asked him, “What then? Are you Elijah?” And he said, “I am not.” “Are you the Prophet?” And he answered, “No.” (Jn 1:19-21).

In this story, John is directly asked if he is Elijah and he responds negatively. Here we have a direct contradiction with the Jesus saying in Mt 11:12-15.

This is where, in my method, I employ triangulation. I have already established a distortion trajectory that is inclined to interpret John via narrativization. The first point along this trajectory is Q (Lk 7:24-6 // Mt 11:7-9) which localized John’s significance within Malachi 3:1. The second point along this trajectory is Mt 11:12-15, which localizes John’s significance within Mal 4:5. Thus Matthew adopts Q’s distortion and moves this distortion forward with his own interpretation. In this way, these two points allow us to establish a distortion trajectory. We can call this trajectory X.

The story provided by the Fourth Gospel demonstrates a negative reaction to a similar typological interpretation. In this way, the Fourth Gospel does indeed show that some people were under the impression that John’s ministry should be interpreted via Elijah typology. While the Fourth Gospel has attempted to downplay this typology, it still provides information regarding the possibility of John’s typological significance. Furthermore, we have seen that the Fourth Gospel places John’s ministry in the exact
location where Elijah was taken to heaven (10:40, cf. 1:28). This detail was probably not invented by the evangelist as it runs contrary to the Baptist’s direct denial of this typology. Thus the Fourth Gospel provides evidence of a separate distortion trajectory moving away from trajectory X. We can call this trajectory Y.

We have already established a distortion trajectory that moves from Elijah/Elisha narrative into the first century’s eschatological expectations (e.g. Mal 4:5). We can call this trajectory Z.

It is the historian’s responsibility to account for the relationship between these trajectories. With this in mind consider the following diagram.

Figure 3: Example of Triangulation

I have here illustrated distortion trajectories in linear fashion. In doing so, I do not intend to negate the spiraling effect of memory distortion. Rather my intention is to highlight the continuity of distortion trajectories over time. As such, the reader should think of these trajectories in terms of Figures 2α and 2β provided above. The reader will notice that the arrows move in the direction of general chronological sequence.

As shown by the sphere in the center of these three trajectories, historical plausibility is given parameter by the extant literary distortion trajectories. Triangulation thus does not pinpoint an exact historical reality; rather it describes the mnemonic sphere
that best accounts for the mnemonic evidence. The purpose of triangulation is to establish a plausible intersection between the established trajectories.

This, of course, assumes that there is reason to affirm the "historicity" of a perception (hence step 4). In order to establish this, it must be determined whether a narrative episode is best explained as the product of memory, or whether it is the product of invention. To this I now turn.

III.2.2 The Question of Origin: Memory or Invention?

I have argued for a historical method that establishes trajectories of mnemonic distortion. Building from my adaptation of SM, this presupposes that all memory is distortion. Halbwachs was inclined to speak of memory in terms of imaginative reinforcement; this should not be confused with wholesale imagination. The acknowledgement that memory is a creative process should not be confused with whole-sale creation. There is, after all, a difference between an invented story and a memory-story. While the two narratives might look similar, the initial act of telling a memory-story is different. Firstly, if a storyteller narrates from personal memory, she thinks that she is transmitting a memory; she does not think that her story is being invented. Secondly, unless the teller intends to deceive her audience, the audience thinks that what they are hearing reflects a memory. If she does not intend to tell a memory-story, she will most often provide certain genre cues. While there is likely overlap in the diachronic processes, the crucial difference is this: Does the story have an origin in perception or invention? In most cases, both the story-teller and the audience presuppose an answer to this question and thus the historian must attempt to answer it as well.

In answering, the historian attempts to establish early and widespread perceptions/interpretations/distortions of a memory. Traditionally, HJR has employed “authenticity criteria” to support arguments for “historicity”. With some qualification, the present study will rely on some of these criteria. The first qualification is that the connotations behind the words “authentic” and “historicity” must be modified according to the definition of the historical task discussed above. In asking the question of origin,

41 Granted, I have not offered here a comprehensive treatment of the John the Baptist tradition; I have selected those details which have served to illustrate my models. It should be noted that not every bit of mnemonic evidence will be able to be treated in the same way. At times the present study will need to grant that aspects of the Son of David tradition do not betray evidence of typology and thus have been distorted along different lines.

42 It should be mentioned that each two trajectories constitute a possible triangle when juxtaposed against a plausible point of intersection. Thus only two established trajectories are required for a possible triangle. But the more trajectories that can be established, the more possible triangles can be applied.
the historian attempts to establish whether a story originated in the perceptions contemporary to the historical event. The aim is not to dig for an undistorted memory; the historian’s aim is to account for the earliest mnemonic distortions of a memory-story. As long as it is kept in mind that the historical goal is not to verify what “actually happened”, I am comfortable with these terms.

Depending on which treatment one reads, there are anywhere from 7 to 25 different authenticity criteria. The present dissertation will exercise more caution than most in my application of these criteria. Criteria will always be applied in plurality; I will never appeal only to one criterion alone. In most cases, I will not argue for an episode’s origin in memory unless three or more criteria can be applied. Moreover, in my judgment, some criteria provide stronger results than others. More often than not I will avoid definitive argument for mnemonic origin unless one of the applicable criteria represents one of my “stronger” criteria. The present section will briefly survey the criteria that will be employed over the course of this study. I list in the order of relative strength.

Multiple Attestation: First suggested by Burkitt, this criterion can be employed when two or more independent synchronic traditions convey a similar episode. Such multiply attested tradition suggests that the episode represents early and widespread material. Originally, Burkitt considered this criterion to be applicable for overlaps between Mark and Q. More recently, this criterion has been applied to a wider spectrum of Jesus tradition. It is important that this criterion is only employed when an episode in attested in independent traditions. As such, the application of this criterion will presuppose the author’s stance concerning the independence of John to the Synoptics and the existence of Q. I will side with the scholarly majority in both cases and thus affirm both the (relative) independence of John and the two source hypothesis.


44 Cf. J.P. Meier, A Marginal Jew: Rethinking the Historical Jesus (New York: Doubleday, 1991), 1:167-95; however I do not follow Meier’s assessment of which Criteria are “primary” and which are “dubious”.


46 Burkitt, Transmission, 147.


48 Pace F. Neiryneck and J. Delobel et al., Jean et les synoptiques: examen critique de l'exégèse de M.-E. Boismard (BETL 49; Louvain: Univ. Press, 1979) and adherents. Because this hypothesis
The present study will apply the Criteria of Multiple Attestation accordingly and consider this criterion to be among the stronger arguments when it is used in conjunction with any of the following.

Embarrassment: Following the lead of Meier, I also consider this criterion to be among the stronger arguments. The supposition that the Gospels contain invented material is predicated upon the notion that early Christianity had motive to invent material as they commemorated Jesus' post-Easter significance. This commemoration tended to exalt Jesus in several ways and decrease or eliminate details that cast him in embarrassing light. Because of this, episodes which do indeed contain such details are not easily explained as Christian invention. Moreover the fact of their presence indicates that the episode was not removed from the tradition because it was well known among the memories of Jesus and carried some degree of authority.

Contrary Tendency: This criterion is similar but not identical to the Criteria of Embarrassment. This criterion presupposes the general findings of redaction criticism. If an episode contains details that promote an agenda that runs contrary to the evangelist's editorial tendencies, those details were not probably the product of his invention. One could put Embarrassment under this heading in that Embarrassing details run contrary to the tendency to venerate Jesus. However, not every detail that runs contrary to the tendencies of the evangelist is embarrassing in nature. Some have attempted to apply this criterion to the more general tendencies of early Christianity. But Meier correctly argues that we should not suppose that every circle of early Christianity held common editorial tendency. However, unlike Meier I do indeed think that this criterion can be confidently applied when the detail is measured against the

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50 Meier, Marginal Jew, I:168.
51 Porter [Authenticity, 106-10] describes these two as a single criterion.
53 Meier, Marginal Jew, I:182.
particular (and well accepted) tendencies of the individual evangelists.⁵⁴ For example, if one of Luke’s key agendas is to extend Jesus’ significance to Gentiles, any details within Luke that run contrary to this agenda are best explained as early memory. Finally, it should be noted that the goal is not to find data in Luke’s tradition that is “uninterpreted” but to find interpretations that the evangelist has chosen not to develop.

Multiple Forms: This criterion is to be distinguished from Multiple Attestation. Instead of appealing to a similar episode in independent traditions, the criterion of Multiple Forms appeals to similar content that features in different kinds of genre. For example, if similar content appears in a saying and also in a parable, or if similar content appears in the narration of Jesus’ actions and also in dispute dialogue, this criterion is warranted. For example Jesus’ respect for John the Baptist appears both in logia and in the narration of his baptism. This, of course, does not speak to the historicity of the final form of these sayings/stories, it merely indicates that such respect was remembered of Jesus’ historical life and ministry.

Coherence: I consider this criterion among the weaker arguments against invention. This criterion may be applied if a particular content coheres with “core” material that is little disputed among Jesus historians. The trouble with such application is twofold. (1) It presupposes that there are certain characteristics of Jesus that are of little dispute in HJR. Such characteristics are very few.⁵⁵ (2) It is possible that a characteristic well known to early memory would have bled into other episodes during narration. For these reason, this criterion will be employed only with caution and only in conjunction with two or more other criteria.

Semitisms and Semitic Influence: These criteria represent two sides of the same coin. The appeal to Semitisms deals primarily with evidence of Semitic language and the appeal to Semitic Influence deals with evidence of larger cultural and geographical categories. Both should be applied with caution. The former presupposes that Jesus and his Jewish contemporaries most commonly spoke Aramaic and/or Hebrew. The latter presupposes that Jesus et al. thought in categories common to Jews living in first century Semitic culture. Since the Gospels are written in Greek, such criteria argues that certain Greek grammatical structures, loan words and translations betray an origin in Semitic

⁵⁴ C.A. Evans, Jesus and His Contemporaries (AGJU 25; Leiden: Brill, 1995), 18.
⁵⁵ C.E. Carlston has argued that this criterion is only warranted when an episode coheres with Jesus’ eschatological call to repentance [“A Positive Criterion of Authenticity”, Biblical Research 7 (1962): 34]. This aptly demonstrates that this criterion has a tendency to confirm the presuppositions of the scholar.
memory. As such, if one is able to identify a Semitism or Semitic Influence with confidence, it might place the episode which manifests this feature closer to Jesus’ historical context. There are several objections to the use of this criterion, including:

1. Evidence for such features might simply betray the evangelist’s spoken language.
2. There are often alternative grammatical explanations for many so-called Semitisms.
3. There are some Jesus historians who have suggested that Jesus might have spoken Greek. Indeed, such objections have shown the limitation of Matthew Black’s once standard work on the subject. Still, there are certain cases where a Semitism seems most probable. Such cases include (1) the overt presence of Semitic vocabulary, (2) cases where the saying presupposes a Semitic word play, (3) cases where the use of a word or grammar has consistently defied easy explanation on the basis of Greek grammar. With these concerns in mind, I will apply this criterion in such cases and in conjunction with other (stronger) criteria. The criterion of Semitic Influence will be similarly applied with caution in instances where a Semitic cultural category (beyond grammar/vocabulary) suggests an origin in Semitic memory.

Before moving forward, I will state again that the use of authenticity criteria is simply one stage of my historical method. I employ these criteria in an attempt to distinguish between memory and invention. I am not under the impression that the simple appeal to such “historicity” completes the historian’s task. Thus this section needs to be taken within the larger argument of chapters I-III.

III.3 Conclusion

This chapter has attempted to clarify my historiographical theory and method. I have argued that the analysis of memory distortion and the mnemonic process in general is a valuable resource for historical inquiry. Moreover, I have argued that historical typology exemplifies the relationship between memory and history. As discussed in the previous chapter, one of the virtues of typology is that it betrays narrativization more obviously

57 This is perhaps to be considered in the case of Matthew’s Gospel.
59 E.g. S.E. Porter, “Did Jesus Ever Teach in Greek?” TynBul 44.2 (1993).
60 E.g. Mt 3:9.
than most forms of mnemonic distortion. Thus typology provides the present study with a window into mnemonic distortion that can be readily applied to the Jesus tradition.

My method is an outworking of my theory. I have tried to demonstrate in this chapter how the Jesus historian can relate the separate synchronic commemorations of Jesus as represented by the Gospels to establish diachronic distortion trajectories that have been set in motion by early memories of the historical Jesus. I have employed the example of John the Baptist to illustrate how this might look when applied to the Gospels. From here forth, this dissertation will demonstrate my theory and method by looking at a particular group of texts concerning the title Son of David.

Over the course of my exegetical chapters I will argue that certain typological interpretations were applied to early memories of Jesus and thus give a window into historical memory distortion. Once such historical memories have been established, I will be able to apply my historiographical theory to historical Jesus research. In doing so, I hope also to contribute to the ongoing discussion concerning the significance of the title Son of David. With this in mind, I consider the following exegetical chapters to provide a worktable on which my historiographical theory and method might be displayed.
IV
Typology and the Son of David

As argued in the previous two chapters, typology can be thought of as a form of memory distortion in that it is a powerful mnemonic tool and a highly influential interpretive cipher. The present study will now attempt to apply the previous theoretical model to a specific typological aspect of the Jesus tradition. The remainder of this dissertation will examine the title “Son of David” with an aim to (1) ascertain the title’s entry point into the Jesus tradition, (2) analyze the ways that it was mnemonically distorted in the interpretation of Jesus’ ministry (and vice versa\(^1\)) and (3) discuss how this distorted the more developed (i.e. formalized) Jesus tradition in early Christianity.

I have chosen the title Son of David\(^2\) for two reasons. The first is that while a form of Davidic messianism seems to have been significant in proto-Christian thought,\(^3\) it did not maintain prominence in the writings of the NT. There are many NT texts that take Jesus’ Davidic status for granted, but this concept has been all but eclipsed by other Christological claims and titles. In some of these texts it is possible that Son of David was intentionally downplayed; in others it served as a backdrop for Christology but still relatively less prominent as compared with titles like “Son of Man”, “Son of God”, “Christ” and “Lord”. Because the title has been relegated to obscurity in the Jesus tradition, the passages that betray its presence tend toward the “less developed” stages along Christological trajectory(ies). This said, we will see over the course of this dissertation that Son of David is not prominent in the earliest stages of the tradition either. Thus the title stands at a bridge between the initial memories of Jesus and the

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\(^1\) Following the mnemonic cycle, we should expect that if the title was used in or about the career of Jesus, this application distorted both the significance of the title and the significance of Jesus’ ministry.

\(^2\) For the sake of brevity I will henceforth use Son of David in place of the phrase “the title Son of David”. At times I will need to refer to a non-titular idea or figure using a form of this moniker; in such cases I will simply refer to “David’s son”.

\(^3\) By “Proto-Christian” I mean the particular Jewish messianic circle that began to emerge around the ministry of Jesus that would eventually become a Christological circle composed of both Jews and Gentiles.
"Jesus tradition" as it was commemorated by the authors of the NT. Moreover, it will be possible to chart the mnemonic sphere associated with Son of David from early perception distortion (memory) to later tradition distortion (commemoration).

The second reason for choosing Son of David as a test case is because there is need for an exploration of the possibility that this title is derivative of typological interpretation of both Davidic and Solomonic tradition. It is common for studies on this topic to take the title to stem from either Davidic messianism or Solomonic exorcistic activity. Yet in most cases these categories are treated as mutually exclusive options. I will argue that these overlapping mnemonic spheres reinforced one-another to mutually distort the memories of Jesus and provided a mnemonic framework for Son of David. My overarching exegetical aim is to demonstrate that the mnemonic background of Son of David was both Davidic and Solomonic, that it was typological in nature and – above all – that the charting of memory distortion will show how early memories of Jesus were initially shaped by typological interpretation. In these ways, my exegetical aim will provide a work table for my primary theoretical and methodological arguments.

The present chapter will suggest the possibility of a Solomon typology in which these memories were localized. This chapter will be weighted toward the analysis of mnemonic trajectories of Solomon tradition. This is necessary because previous studies have tended toward a strictly "Davidic" reading of many texts which have close ties to Solomon tradition. It must be make clear that I do not intend to argue in favor of the latter at the expense of the former. But because texts like 2Sam 7, Isa 11 and PsSol 17 have long attracted strictly Davidic interpretations, a Solomonic perspective will help to fill out the discussion and at points offer corrective exegesis. In this way, I will offer a fresh perspective on the mnemonic framework(s) evoked by Son of David typology. Thus this chapter will provide a general backdrop by which specific acts and words of Jesus can be mnemonically measured. I will proceed by (1) discussing the uses of Son of David in the HB and (2) discussing the use of Son of David in PsSol 17. Given these aims, this chapter will serve as an extended treatment of what I have called "Step One" of my proposed exegetical process.

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4 As discussed previously, it is necessary to establish one or more trajectories that move toward a more fully developed Christology, but since my overarching aim is to contribute to historical Jesus research my study will be weighted toward the discussion of early perception distortion as represented by the Synoptic Gospels.

5 Because I do not examine any texts within the Jesus tradition in this chapter, my method will not be displayed in full until the chapters that follow.
IV.1 Son of David in the Hebrew Bible

The most common starting point for Son of David studies is a discussion of (1) how the phrase relates to royal messianism and (2) when the phrase was first used as a messianic title. While these are important questions and will need to be addressed in due course, very few studies begin by asking how the title was used in the HB. Remarkably, what should be seen a foundational element of the discussion has been relegated to footnotes and passing mentions. Burger, whose work provided the most extensive treatment of Son of David, was particularly deficient in this regard. His "jüdische Hintergrund" devoted little more than a single paragraph to the HB before moving to first century texts! Lohse incorrectly claimed, "The title Son of David occurs for the first time in Ps. Sol. (17:21), which belonged to the middle of the 1st cent. B.C." The few studies that have devoted attention to the pre-messianic development of the phrase have tended to bracket these results when the discussion shifts to messianic texts. This tendency has painted the title as a tradition-historical conundrum that emerged in the first century rootless and without precedent. Neugebauer's comment is very telling:

'Sohn Davids' ist [von 10 bis 200 nach Christus] neben 'Messias' die einzig geläufige Bezeichnung für den kommenden Heilsbringer. Belege dafür gibt es freilich erst nach 70, aber das liegt daran, daß aus der Zeit zuvor messianische Aussprüche überhaupt fehlen.

Neugebauer assumed the premise on which many biblical scholars approach this topic: Because the title is believed to be of messianic origin, the pre-messianic use of Son of

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7 E. Lohse, "τιτ ό διανυθ", in TDNT VIII (ed. G. Friedrich; Ann Arbor, MI: Eerdmans, 1972), 480; No doubt, Lohse intended to say that PsSol 17 contains the first messianic application of the title, still the oversight was and is a costly one and bespeaks a larger neglect with regard to Son of David scholarship. It may well be the case that Lohse's oversight has had an unfortunate impact upon a large segment of NT scholarship. W.L. Lane [The Gospel of Mark: The English Text with Introduction, Exposition and Notes (Grand Rapids: Eerdmans, 1974), 435] cited Lohse and mimicked his error. This error is repeated by R.H. Gundry [Mark: A Commentary on His Apology for the Cross (Grand Rapids: Eerdmans, 1992), 718; D.R. Bauer, "Son of David", in Dictionary of Jesus and the Gospels (eds. J. Green and S. McKnight; Downers Grove: InterVarsity, 1992), 767] and B. Witherington [The Gospel of Mark: A Socio-Rhetorical Commentary (Grand Rapids: Eerdmans, 2001), 332].
David is largely ignored. This premise misleads the discussion from the start and is in desperate need of reconsideration. What these studies have understated is that messianism was a result of prophetic hopes and typological categories that predate the fully developed messianism(s) of the first century BCE. It is crucial to emphasize that Son of David has discernible roots in proto-messianic mnemonic categories that provide evidence of its development. Previous studies have yielded unsatisfactory results because they have downplayed the first and dominant interpretive context of the title in the HB. They have proved unsatisfactory in a number of ways, including the tendencies (a) to maintain an unhelpful dichotomy between Davidic and Solomonic categories, (b) to misinterpret and misuse PsSol 17, and (c) to truncate the conceptual sphere from which early Christianity borrowed when the title was adapted to Jesus.

Recently a modest but provocative advance has been made by Pablo Torijano in his monograph, Solomon the Esoteric King. Torijano’s chapter on Son of David (Ch. VI) builds from his sound and thorough analysis of Solomon tradition beginning with 2 Samuel and its subsequent trajectory to and through Hellenistic Judaism. While this chapter is brief, it convincingly demonstrates the need for further “research into the relationship between the wise king and this title to see whether the title was used as a substitute for the king’s name or whether it embodied a particular characterization of the king that could be adapted to other situations.”

The present study aims to provide an analysis along these lines. Therefore, my contribution to Son of David research will begin from the simple premise that Son of David virtually always refers to Solomon in the HB. Therefore when later texts apply

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10 E.g. Burger, Jesus als Davidssohn, 17.
12 P.A. Torijano, Solomon the Esoteric King: From King to Magus, Development of a Tradition (JSJSup 73; Leiden: Brill, 2002).
13 His treatment of Son of David in the NT is a mere eight pages within the chapter, yet succinct and suggestive.
14 Torijano, Solomon, 106.
15 Torijano, Solomon, 25, 106; He argues that there is only one exception where Son of David is applied to someone other than Solomon (the title is applied to Absalom in 2Sam 13:1). He has overlooked 2 Chr 11:18 where the phrase is applied to Jerimoth. Even so, his point is clear: Exceptions aside, Son of David is a distinctly Solomonic designation. Cf. G. Schneider, “Zur Vorgeschichte des christologischen Prädikats ‘Sohn Davids’”, TTZ 80 (1971).
this phrase as a title, the first and most obvious explanation is that it is Solomonic.\textsuperscript{16} Unless there is good reason to suppose otherwise, the presence of this title in a passage in (or contemporary to) the NT ought to be first measured against this category.

IV.1.1 *Son of David in the Monarchial Narratives*  
That Son of David refers to Solomon is most obvious in the monarchial narratives of 1 and 2 Chronicles. This feature does not appear in the books of Samuel or Kings. Son of David as a formal title for Solomon seems to be a product of the Persian period or shortly before. This said, the present discussion will be helped by attention to Solomon’s place in the larger biblical narrative, which requires preliminary attention to 2 Samuel.

It is well known that 2Sam 7’s account of the Davidic Covenant was an important text (if not the most important text) for establishing Israel’s ideal political relationship with God, foreign nations and the Temple.\textsuperscript{17} I include here Nathan’s oracle as represented by 2Sam 7:8-17:

\textsuperscript{8}Now therefore, thus you shall say to my servant David: “Thus says YHWH of Hosts [יהוה הيحש], I took you from the pasture, from following the sheep, that you should be ruler over my people Israel. \textsuperscript{9}And I have been with you wherever you have gone and have cut off all your enemies from before you; and I will make you a great name, like the names of the great men who are on the earth. \textsuperscript{10}I will also appoint a place for my people Israel and will plant them [את עמים], that they may live in their own place and not be disturbed again, nor will the wicked afflict them any more as formerly, \textsuperscript{11}ever since the day that I commanded judges to be over my people Israel; and I will give you rest from all your enemies. YHWH also declares to you that YHWH will make a house [בית] for you. \textsuperscript{12}When your days are complete and you lie down with your fathers, I will raise up your seed [ןכמרא אדメל] after you, who will come forth from you, and I will establish his kingdom. \textsuperscript{13}He shall build a house [בית] for my name, and I will establish the throne of his kingdom forever. \textsuperscript{14}I will be a father to him and he will be a son to me; when he commits sin, I will correct him with the rod of men and the strokes of the sons of men, \textsuperscript{15}but my love [_emails] shall not depart from him, as I took it away from Saul, whom I removed from before you. \textsuperscript{16}And your house and your kingdom shall endure before me forever; your throne shall be established forever.” \textsuperscript{17}In accordance with all these words and all this vision, so Nathan spoke to David.

Because I will need to interact with this text over the course of this dissertation, the full importance of this text for my study will not be realized until my conclusion. But I do intend for the present chapter to set a firm foundation for the rest of my exegetical

\textsuperscript{16} It is noteworthy that the only use of the phrase “Son of David” in the Dead Sea Scrolls (4Q398 f.11 13.1) attributes the title to “Solomon, Son of David”. This text will be revisited below (VI.3).

\textsuperscript{17} A. Anderson, *2 Samuel* (WBC 11; Dallas: Word, 1989), 112: “2Sam 7 is, without doubt, the theological highlight of the Books of Samuel if not of the Deuteronomistic History as a whole.”
chapters, so I will here discuss what I anticipate to be principal concepts for later exegesis.

The scholarly majority considers at least parts of Nathan’s oracle to represent the earliest form of the Davidic Covenant,\(^18\) others argue that this text is based upon an earlier (non-extant) form.\(^19\) While this passage is replete with Deuteronomist language, redactional cues and theology, the title נַחַנְנוּ הַנְוֶּלֶכֶת at least is indicative of the antiquity of the tradition.\(^20\) All seem to acknowledge that 2Sam 7 is the proper place to begin any discussion of this covenant, regardless of origin.\(^21\)

Mowinkel regarded this passage as an etiology meant to explain why Solomon, and not David, built the Temple.\(^22\) This view remains a valid reading,\(^23\) if not the most probable. Attempts to argue otherwise have had to contend with the (possible) tension between 7:5-7 and 7:13.\(^24\) The former verses seem to have a negative tone with regard to anyone building a temple; the latter verse anticipates Solomon’s dedication of the Temple (VII.2). Weinfeld argued that 7:8-17 has affinity to Hittite and Assyrian “grant” treaties.\(^25\) These options need not be mutually exclusive.

It is important to highlight that the essential features of this covenant involve the juxtaposition between the building of a יִבְּרוֹפ (the Solomonic Temple) and the establishing of a יִבְּרוֹפ (the Davidic Dynasty).\(^26\) This wordplay thus sets house as referent alongside house as metaphor; YHWH will allow the former to be built for him (7:11), while

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20 Rost, *Succession*, 36.
23 Anderson, 2 *Samuel*, 113.
24 The attempt by Gakuru [*Davidic Covenant*, 50] to harmonize this tension is unconvincing.
YHWH himself will establish (or build) the latter (7:13). That these concepts are connected is seen most clearly in the complimentary parts of 7:13: "He shall build a house for my name, and I will establish the throne of his kingdom forever."

It is most common for scholars to take 13a as a later insertion which served to narrow a more general promise of perpetual lineage to a specific promise concerning Solomon. This will prove important in what follows in that it demonstrates that later interpreters considered the Davidic Covenant to be primarily referring to Solomon, the archetypal Temple builder. This might be further confirmed by the singular "seed" language, which can be seen to carry the connotation of a singular figure. Moreover, the prerequisite of "rest" from Israel's enemies (7:1, 11) might be a conceptual prefiguring of Solomon's legacy of peaceful dominance. More conclusively, 7:14-15 provide the best evidence that Nathan's oracle has been edited with Solomon's legacy in mind, both the good and bad of it. YHWH promises to be a father to "him" and thus specifies a particular figure by using the third-person, singular. While "he" is expected

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27 In the LXX, this is further emphasized by the double use of the verb "οἰκοδομέω". In 7:11 YHWH “οἶκον οἰκοδομήσεις κυρίῳ” and in 7:13, the promised king "οἰκοδομήσει ... οἶκον". Cf. Ps 89:4’s use of הובא to describe the “building up” of the throne of David’s seed.

28 E.g. Hertzberg, Samuel, 287; Anderson, 2 Samuel, 121-2; the phrase “a house for my name” is a Deuteronomic feature (cf. 1Kgs 3:2; 5:3; 8:18).

29 Cf. D.J. McCarthy “[II Samuel 7 and the Structure of the Deuteronomic History”, JBL 84 (1965): 134] who argued that both Solomon’s story and the fulfillment of the Davidic Covenant are brought to a climax in 1Kgs 8 when Solomon dedicates the Temple. This connection will be revisited in VII.2 of the present dissertation.

30 The significance of vegetation language will be dealt with elsewhere. At this point it should be mentioned that the use of לזר is striking considering the use of לוּשׁ in 7:10. Juel suggests that this concept serves to connect the Davidic Covenant with Ex 15:17 which also uses לוּשׁ [Messianic Exegesis: Christological Interpretation of the Old Testament in Early Christianity (Philadelphia: Fortress, 1988), 65].


32 J. Laansma [I Will Give You Rest (WUNT 98; Tübingen: Mohr Siebeck, 1997), 26] has argued that the concept of rest both points backward to Deut 12, 31:1-6 and forward to 1Kgs 8. As such this passage serves to tie together Israel’s connection to the land, their leader and the cult. Laansma’s argument might be further strengthened by the recognition of the use of the verb לוּשׁ in the description of Israel’s rest within the land. This vegetation metaphor is perhaps conceptually linked to the metaphorical לוּשׁ of David. This dual imagery might serve to tie YHWH’s previous promises concerning the land to the present promise of political dominance.

33 Hertzberg, Samuel, 287; Cf. 1Chr 22:7-10 which refers to 2Sam 7:14 and contrasts Solomon’s legacy to that of David: “Behold, a son will be born to you, who shall be a man of rest; and I will give him rest from all his enemies on every side; for his name shall be Solomon, and I will give peace and quiet to Israel in his days” (1Chr 22:9). For a fuller discussion on the etymology of Solomon’s name and how this relates to his legacy see W. Johnstone, 1 and 2 Chronicles (JSOTSup 253; Sheffield: SAP, 1997), 241.

34 I will discuss the nature of Solomon’s father-son relationship to YHWH below.
to commit sin, he will not be in danger of losing YHWH’s favor; this is an unmistakable apology for Solomon’s famous disobedience.\textsuperscript{35}

More important for the present study than the oracle’s original form is its influence on later commemorative narratives. Nathan’s prophecy sets in motion a mnemonic trajectory that eventually finds its way to multiple forms of messianic eschatology in later Judaism and Christianity. Burger rightly observed that, in later messianic texts, the language of 2Sam 7 is routinely used to describe the Davidic messiah. “Der Vergleich [zwischen dem erwarteten Sohn Davids und seinen Vorgängern] zeigt eine fast stereotype Terminologie, die sich auf einen eng begrenzten Kanon alttestamentlicher Stellen zurückführen läßt.”\textsuperscript{36} This is our first indication that typological comparison is at work. When language is routinely exported from a cultural archetype and employed in the description of a new category, we must entertain the possibility of typology. The ensuing analysis proceeds by asking: Has the latter end of the mnemonic trajectory (i.e. the later interpreter) attempted to emphasize specific characteristics of a new category (e.g. a contemporary figure or event) that cohere with the mnemonic legacy of an archetype or metanarrative? But before I am in a position to ask and answer these questions, it will be necessary to establish certain characteristics that have taken on archetypical significance in the mnemonic trajectories of Israel’s tradition.

It has become commonplace in NT scholarship to point to 2Sam 7 as the fountainhead of later Davidic categories. But what has been often overlooked is the fact the language of does not point forward to David’s legacy but of Solomon’s. Many previous analyses have made this mistake. Lohse hit painfully close to the mark but ultimately missed:

In der messianischen Erwartung der Synagoge ist stets der Name des Sprosses Davids genannt, doch eigentlich wird niemals ein weiteres Wort über seine Person hinzugefügt. Es genügt, auf das Vorbild des Königs David hingewiesen zu haben, um Weg und Auftrag des messianischen Herrschers hinreichend zu kennzeichnen.\textsuperscript{37}

Lohse overstates the scarcity of the data but his point is well taken. The pre-image of Monarchy (he points only to David), in many cases, provided a suitcase loaded with meaning and able to be easily imported into royal eschatology by mere evocation. No doubt, David mnemonically anchored Israel’s commemoration of the once great

\textsuperscript{35} Cf. 1Kgs 11:34-6.
\textsuperscript{36} Burger, Jesus als Davidsohn, 18.
monarchy and thus served as a royal archetype. But appealing to David alone misleads the discussion. It must be emphasized that YHWH's promise was first fulfilled in the person and reign of Solomon. Because the aim of 2Sam 7 was to describe Solomon, many "Davidic" attributes ascribed to later royal figures were pre-figured in the person and reign of Solomon. In many cases, Davidic hopes and figures are described with attributes that were first embodied in Solomon's legacy.

As will be examined in more detail over the course of this dissertation, later eschatological texts tended to attract certain key attributes that help to identify the eschatological Davidic figure: he is related to David, he is uniquely endorsed by God, he is endowed with YHWH's spirit, he reigns over the foreign nations, he is a wise judge, he builds the Temple, etc. These mnemonic categories manifest themselves in several different combinations depending upon the agenda of the community and the other scriptural precedents and paradigms employed in the description. But almost all of these later texts seem to be influenced and held in check by their mnemonic fountainhead: 2Sam 7.

This is not to say that every eschatological interpretation of 2Sam 7 was working with a Solomon typology. While attention to Solomon's legacy will prove extremely helpful in my discussion of Davidic categories, it must also be acknowledged that the most important aspect of Solomon's legacy is that he was David's son. In this way, Solomon was an archetype in conjunction with his father; much of his archetypal characteristics were an extension of characteristics which David embodied. Certainly not all of Solomon's characteristics were pre-figured in David (e.g. Solomon as Temple builder), but enough to view Solomon's legacy as an extension of David's. As such, the evocative language of 2Sam 7 does not stem from a single archetype (as it might for someone like Adam or Abraham). Instead it calls to mind the divinely promised relationship between the two archetypes; the Davidic Covenant was given to David through Solomon. I suspect that this is why later interpreters (like the Chronicler) employed the title "Son of David". Because this title mnemonically evokes an archetypal relationship rather than a single archetype. It is to be expected that some typological comparisons tended toward one archetype at the expense of the other. But, in varying degrees, 2Sam 7 held such distortions in check. With this in mind, I will presently

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38 For a somewhat dated but still useful discussion of messianic criteria see G.L. Davenport, "The Anointed of the Lord in Psalms of Solomon 17", in Ideal Figures in Ancient Judaism: Profiles and Paradigms (eds. J.J. Collins and W.E. Nickelsburg; Chico: Scholars Press, 1980); He focuses mainly on the first three of the above categories.

39 For example, it was common for later interpreters to localize the Davidic Covenant within the framework of Isa 11. This will be discussed in detail below.
explore the nature of this father-son relationship and how it was commemorated in the monarchical narratives.

Solomon’s introduction to the narrative is described in 2Sam 12:24 where David comforts Bathsheba after the death of their son. In this context, the physical conception of Solomon is described: David “went in to her and lay down with her,” and she gave birth to a son, and he named him Solomon. And YHWH loved him”. The coital act is here doubly described to emphasize the fulfillment of YHWH’s promise of David’s seed who would eventually build the Temple, have eternal reign and enjoy a father-son relationship with YHWH (2Sam 7:12-14).

The birth of Solomon was the fulfillment of 2Sam 7. This is confirmed by the extremely rare statement of YHWH’s affection for the child: “וְיָרָהוּ אֱלֹהִים אֲבֹהַּו” (12:24). There is only one other time in the HB that YHWH is said to “love” someone (Mal 1:2). Moreover, Solomon is the only individual ever said to be so loved (cf. Neh 13:26). This statement of affection recalls 2Sam 7:15 where YHWH promises, “My love [סודר] shall not depart from him.” It is, however, interesting to note 2Sam 7’s use of סודר as opposed to 2Sam 12’s use of אֱלֹהִים. One possibility is that the former connotes YHWH’s covenantal commitment to David’s son while the latter connotes YHWH’s emotional commitment to him. Perhaps then, אֱלֹהִים represents a heightening of YHWH’s relational bond to Solomon. Von Rad has called this “the quite irrational love of God for this child” that should be seen as “a paradoxical act of election on the part of God.” It is therefore likely that this statement of love is an outworking of YHWH’s promise, “I will be a father to him and he will be a son to me...” (2Sam 7:14). For even though Solomon would “commit iniquity” (7:14), YHWH would continue to love him unconditionally.

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40 יִרְאוּ אֱלֹהִים וּרְשָׁבָה נְמוּ... 
41 This is the only place in scripture where coitus is doubly described. Elsewhere the verb בָּרָא is used alone (cf. Gen 16:4, 30:4, 38:2; Judg 16:1; 2Sam 16:22; Ezek 23:44). 
42 In Malachi, Jacob represents a collective. 
43 Cf. 1Kgs 8:23 where Solomon states “Oh YHWH, the God of Israel, there is no God like you in heaven above or on earth beneath, keeping covenant [ברירה] and love [סודר] to your servants...” 
like a son (7:15). In this way, Solomon's father-son relationship to both David and YHWH are confirmed as Solomon is introduced to the narrative in 2Sam 12:24. Thus Solomon's character is introduced in two ways: (1) He is the fulfillment of the "seed/semen" promised to David. (2) He is uniquely loved as a son by YHWH. This background will prove important as this discussion moves forward to Chronicles. It suggests that Solomon's designation as Son of David was not a mere reminder of physical relationship; it was meant to recall the Davidic Covenant.

Chronicles extrapolates from what is largely implicit in 2Sam 7 and 12 to give a detailed account of how the covenant played out in the relationship between David and Solomon. This is most vividly seen in David's provision for, advice to, and commissioning of Solomon as Temple-builder (1Chr 10-29; esp. 17:11-14; 22:1-19). The Solomon of Chronicles is portrayed, not merely as David's progeny nor his immediate heir, but the fulfillment of the Davidic Covenant and thus the extension of David's legacy. It is at this point that we turn our attention to the overt manifestations of the title. Torijano has shown that in the post-exilic texts the monikers "Solomon" and "Son of David" were invariably linked. While he takes for granted that the phrase is titular, more could and should be said in confirmation of this probability. Compare the following texts from 2 Chronicles:

2 Chr. 11:18: And Rehoboam took for himself a wife, Mahalath, the daughter of Jerimoth, the son of David [דוד בן דוד], and of Abihail, the daughter of Eliab, the son of Jesse.

2 Chr 30:26: So there was great joy in Jerusalem; for since the time of Solomon, the Son of David [דוד בן דוד], King of Israel, there were none like him in Jerusalem.

2 Chr 35:3: And he said to the Levites that taught all Israel, who were holy to YHWH, "Put the holy Ark in the house which Solomon, the Son of David [דוד בן דוד], King of Israel did build...."

The first of these examples is the sole text in 2 Chronicles where the phrase יְרוּם does not refer to Solomon. Notice that, in this example, the context is that of simple familial relations. For each primary character, their father and grandfather are mentioned. There is no reason to think that יְרוּם is applied as a title in this case. The Chronicler has

46 2Sam 7:15 demonstrates that YHWH’s love for Solomon should be seen in opposition to YHWH’s very conditional commitment to Saul. This further suggests that Solomon’s son relationship to YHWH was particularly determinative of his love-covenant.


48 W. Brueggemann, Solomon: Israel’s Ironic Icon of Human Achievement (Columbia, SC: Univ. of South Carolina, 2005), 162-5.

49 Torijano, Solomon, 24-25, 106.
simply used lineage to specify how these obscure characters relate to previously mentioned characters. While it may be suggested that the phrase functions likewise in the case of Solomon, the latter two examples demonstrate otherwise. In these cases, is couched between Solomon’s name and the obviously title, “King of Israel”. Thus given the context, Son of David seems to be one of two titles designating Solomon’s rank. Notice also that “Son of David” is primary and “King of Israel” is secondary.

The Chronicler’s agenda to paint Solomon as the ideal king is seen most directly in his distortion of Nathan’s prophecy:

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>2 Samuel 7:12-16</th>
<th>1 Chronicles 17:11-14</th>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td>When your days are complete and you lie down with your fathers, I will raise up your seed after you, who will come forth from you, and I will establish his kingdom. He shall build a house for my name, and I will establish the throne of his kingdom forever. I will be a father to him and he will be a son to me; when he commits sin, I will correct him with the rod of men and the strokes of the sons of men, but my love shall not depart from him, as I took it away from Saul, whom I removed from before you. And your house and your kingdom shall endure before me forever; your throne shall be established forever.</td>
<td>And it shall come about when your days are fulfilled that you must go to be with your fathers, that I will establish your seed after you, who shall be of your sons; and I will establish his kingdom. He shall build for me a house, and I will establish his throne forever. I will be his father, and he shall be my son; and I will not take my love away from him, as I took it from him who was before you. But I will settle him in my house and in my kingdom forever, and his throne shall be established forever.</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

The only significant changes to this tradition serve to emphasize Solomon’s fulfillment of this prophecy. The first distortion is the additional phrase “will be of your sons” (1Chr 17:11). The emphasis of the idea of sonship may point to Solomon’s sonship to David, but in and of itself does not convince of a Solomonic emphasis. However, the second distortion is the absence of the phrase “when he commits sin, I will correct him with the rod of men…” (2Sam 7:14). This confirms the Chronicler’s agenda to portray Solomon as the ideal king. Solomon’s sins are forgotten all together in Chronicles and this passage coheres with that agenda. The third distortion involves the shift from the second-person singular “your house (i.e. David’s lineage)” to the first-person singular “my house (i.e. the Temple)”. Also, it is his (Solomon’s) throne that will be established

52 Pomykala, Davidic Dynasty, 89; Johnstone, Chronicles, 206; E. von Nordheim (“Konig und Tempel: Der Hintergrund des Tempelbauverbotes in 2 Samuel vii”, VT 27 (1977): 452) argued that “my house” (17:14) refers to the people of Israel, rather than the Temple. This is improbable.
and not David’s. In this way, Solomon’s relationship to the Temple is further emphasized under the authority of YHWH’s ultimate ownership of both Temple and kingdom. In these ways, the Davidic Covenant in 1Chr 17 places a greater emphasis on Solomon in comparison with 2Sam 7.53

In general, the Chronicler’s portrait of Solomon conforms to the commemorative interests of Israel as a primarily cultic community.54 In the Persian period, Israel had little political autonomy except for firm center of gravity in their (modestly) rebuilt Temple.55 Within this social framework, Israel’s kings are “presented primarily as patrons and leaders of the temple cult.”56 Brueggemann continues:

In the environment of the Persian period, the maintenance of a distinctive Jewish identity would seem to be a primarily rhetorical-interpretive concern. This agenda, in the horizon of the Chronicler, is taken to be the maintenance of Jewish identity through participation in the temple cult. This means, in turn, that the temple cult in Jerusalem is imagined in this literature not in terms of its actual modesty but in terms of the remembered and imagined first temple that is the gift of Solomon. Thus the Solomon imagined here is a glorious figure without blemish or flaw.57

In stark contrast to the ironic and paradoxical portrait of Solomon in 1 and 2 Kings, “Solomon, the Son of David” was the image of the ideal king of Israel’s golden age. The importance of this nuance must be underscored. As mentioned, Son of David is used as a title (among the monarchical narratives) only by the Chronicler. The depiction of Solomon in Chronicles is that of the ideal king, cultic leader, economic genius, etc.58 Thus Son of David was a mnemonic category59 that evoked Solomon as he was commemorated by Chronicles: practically perfect in every conceivable way. With this in mind, the introductory line of 2 Chronicles summarizes the aim and content of the book:

"Now Solomon, the Son of David was strengthened in his kingdom, and YHWH his God was with him, and magnified him exceedingly" (2 Chr 1:1).

considering that נַעַם is used as a Temple referent in 17:12 and given the general emphasis on the Temple cult in Chronicles; cf. P. Dirksen, 1 Chronicles (Leuven: Peeters, 2005), 235.

53 Braun, Chronicles, 198-9.
56 Brueggemann, Ironic Icon, 161.
57 Brueggemann, Ironic Icon, 161.
59 Cf. E. Lohmeyer, Gottesknecht und Davidsohn (FRLANT 61; Göttingen: Vandenhoeck & Ruprecht, 1953), 68 who described the title as an information package which carried a particular paradigm of meaning.
Brueggemann pithily describes the Chronicler’s portrayal as, “Solomon Glorious, One-Dimensional, Minus Irony.” It is this commemorative revision of Solomon’s life that Son of David was meant to label. One could think of this in terms of intentional distanciation: Solomon’s sins were forgotten in order to create the memory of an ideal monarchy and Temple cult. In sum, Son of David finds its entry point into the Davidic interpretative trajectory with an overt distortion of Solomon’s character.

IV.1.2 Son of David as Archetypal Sapiential Author

The other major employment of Son of David is found in wisdom literature where it is used an appeal to pseudepigraphal authority. Compare the above text (2 Chr 1:1) to the following:

Prov 1:1: The proverbs of Solomon, the Son of David, King of Israel.
Qoh 1:1: The words of the Preacher, the Son of David, King in Jerusalem.

I specifically highlight these introductory verses because they seem to have been influenced by a well known form of the title which is also attested in 2 Chr 30:26 and 2 Chr 35:3. In the case of Proverbs, the form of the title mirrors that which is later found in the narrative of Chronicles:

Prov 1:1: שלמה בן-דוד מלך ישראל
2 Chr 30:26: שלמה בן-דוד מלך ירושלים

Save only the form of David’s name, the two are identical. Since the phrase seems to have titular significance for the Chronicler, there is good reason to believe that the Sapiential occurrence of the same form is used in a titular way. Proverbs follows the more primitive form of David (דוד) that is common to classical biblical Hebrew, while 2 Chr 30:26 (et al) predictably follows the form common to late biblical Hebrew (דוד). Qoh 1:1 unexpectedly follows the primitive form: חכמה בן-דוד מלך ירושלים.

60 Brueggemann, Ironic Icon; the title of his 9th chapter.
63 It is generally agreed that Qoheleth was authored circa 250 BCE. However D.C. Fredericks (Qoheleth’s Language: Re-evaluating Its Nature and Date (Lewiston: Mellen, 1988), 266-78) has
This might suggest that the title was well known prior to Chronicles and that its form remained intact over a long period. We cannot, however, rule out the possibility that all of the above were prefixed to the tradition by later editors.64

That Solomon’s name was an attractive pseudonym is well known.65 In most cases the aim was to appeal to Solomon’s divinely bestowed wisdom (cf. 1Kgs 3:11; 3:28; 5:9) and the fact that he was reputed to be sapiential author (1Kgs 4:29-34; 5:12).66 The overarching portrayal of Solomon in 1Kgs 3-5 is that of the archetypal wise king. Much like 2Sam 7, which served as a catalyst for messianism, 1Kgs 4:32 was a fountainhead for subsequent wisdom trajectories. Solomon’s reputation grows in quality and quantity in the LXX. In the MT of 1Kgs 4:32, Solomon is said to have "spoken 3000 "proverbs [againstוgaben]" and 1005 "songs [נושאים]". The number of parables increased in the LXX to 6000 and the number of songs increased to 5000.67 Moreover, in the LXX, the book of Proverbs is attributed solely to Solomon; all other supposed authors are eclipsed.68 In the MT, Proverbs is conveyed as a composition of Solomon’s sayings alongside those which he has compiled from other wisdom teachers. But in the LXX, these other wisdom teachers, such as "the wise" (22:17), "Agur" (30:1) and "Lemuel" (31:1) were downplayed so to purport Solomon as the one and only sapiential author.

Concerning Qoh 1:1, Torijano argues that while there is no direct mention of Solomon, the combination of the titles “Son of David” and “King in Jerusalem” together with the sapiential content of the text support the argument for a specific pseudepigraphical attribution.69 He reasons that because in most cases these titles are set together, Solomon’s name was probably implied. Therefore he insists that “the royal title and the ‘Son of David’ formula, which seem to have been naturally linked with Solomon, would be viewed then as referring to the king and the Son of David par

argued that Qoheleth’s language is in accord with pre-exilic Hebrew and has thus suggested that an earlier date must be reconsidered.

66 Brueggemann, Ironic Icon, 181.
67 This aspect of Solomon’s reputation played into Solomon’s legendary authority over the demonic realm (V.1).
69 Torijano, Solomon, 24.
excellence." If one is convinced by Torijano's assessment of Qoheleth, it would also follow that the title's referent was so exclusively applied that even without explicitly naming Solomon, it was understood as a Solomonic referent.

But Torijano's argument does not answer the most obvious question: If the author meant to appeal to Solomon pseudepigraphically, what has been gained by the omission of his name? The argument could be made that the raison d'être of the pseudonym is that a name is employed. This is exactly what Qoheleth avoids! Perhaps a better solution is that "the Preacher" has cast himself as a type of Solomon. By all accounts, Solomon was considered to be the archetypal wise king. With this in view, Qoheleth might have fancied himself as a Solomonic antitype. He has given himself "Solomon-like traits to make him a suitable figure for the examination of wealth and wisdom that the book reports." As such, the Preacher is not meant to be Solomon in a pseudepigraphal sense; rather he is Solomonic in a typological sense. It is not necessary to see a hard and fast dichotomy between these two categories. In this case, however, the Preacher seems to have chosen a literary device that looks more like typology than it does like pseudepynomity.

Finally, some comments are warranted on Ps 72. While the title is not used in this psalm, it provides an interesting parallel in the first line: . The MT heading attributes this psalm . Likewise, the Septuagint attributes this psalm εἰς Σαλομώνιου (LXX 71:1), but this heading is absent in the earliest manuscripts. Mowinckel concluded that the heading "is sure to belong to the latest additions to the psalm texts." The editor has no doubt recognized the several points of reference to Solomon tradition in this psalm and assigned it to Solomon accordingly. Not the least of these is the original first line's reference "to the son of the king " . This further confirms that later interpreters considered Solomon to be the son of the king and not just one among many. Among the many points of reference to Solomon tradition are the gift of gold from Sheba in 72:10 and 15 (cf. 1Kgs 10:10) and from Tarshish in 72:16 (cf. 1Kgs 10:22).

70 Torijano, Solomon, 23 (emphasis his).
71 Or as J. Blenkinsopp puts it, Solomon was the "undisputed patron" of the sapiential tradition [Sage, Priest, Prophet: Religious and Intellectual Leadership in Ancient Israel (Louisville: Westminster John Knox, 1995), 85].
72 Fox, Proverbs 1-9, 56.
73 Moreover, it is not clear that pseudepigraphy in the way that we know it through apocalyptic literature was well established at the time of Qoheleth. Thus it is not advisable to draw too hard a distinction between the two. My thanks to Loren Stuckenbruck for this point.
75 J.L. Mays, Psalms (Louisville: John Knox, 1994), 238.
That this psalm evidences the development of Solomon tradition is obvious. This is important to the present study in that Ps 72 was likely not intended to be sung to a specific king, but repeated from king to king and “intended for an ideal type of king and appointed to be used continually”. In this way, Solomon tradition was used to honor subsequent kings of Israel as a way to embody their kingship with Solomonic traits. We see here that the ideal king is one who typologically mimics Solomon’s legacy. Gunkel said it best when he commented that this psalm does “not portray a particular king as such. Rather, the singers carry the ideal ruler in their heart which they place upon the rulers of their time like a wonderful majestic coat.” Seen in this way, this psalm was not so much an homage to Solomon as it was a passing on of Solomon’s mantle.

Fortuitously, the final verses of this psalm (72:18-9) seem to be a later addition which marks the conclusion of the section of “Psalms (Prayers [תפלה]) of David, son of Jesse”. But this divisional note must have preceded the division of the Psalter into five books and is thus a very early notation. We see again that Solomon tradition was understood to be an extension of David tradition. Indeed, the original opening line refers to both the king and his son: “Give the king your judgments, Oh God, and your righteousness to the son of the king.” This line uses parallel imagery where “judgments” is associated with “righteousness” and “the king” is another way to say “son of the king”. This parallel serves to cast the new king in the model of the established legacy.

Thus we witness in the redaction of Ps 72 three steps along a Solomonic trajectory parallel to that of Son of David tradition. (1) In the earliest form of the psalm, Solomon’s legacy was used typologically to model the ideal kingship and, in this way, to honor new Solomon antitypes. (2) The postscript demonstrates that Solomon’s legacy was understood to be an extension of David’s legacy. (3) The heading shows that Solomon was ultimately known as the archetypal royal “son”.

Ps 72 will be important in what follows as this tradition was localized within Isa 11 and PsSol 17. To this we now turn.

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77 Contrast this with the simple appeal to the lineage of David in 132:11-12.
79 Weiser, *Psalms*, 504.
80 It is also interesting to note that the targum of Ps 72 attributes the psalm not to Solomon but to the Messiah. Cf. The “messianic” interpretation of the Davidic Covenant in 2 Chr 6:42 where Solomon is likely in view, so Fitzmyer, “Son of David Tradition”, 119.
IV.1.4 Isaiah 11:1-9

I here break from my chronological analysis of Son of David tradition and backtrack to Isaiah. Isa 11 is included at this point because this Davidic text will prove especially pertinent to my discussion of PsSol 17 in the following section. As such, the significance of this passage for the present study will not be fully appreciated until then. The passage reads:

1 Then a shoot will spring from the stump of Jesse, and a branch from his roots will bear fruit [רֵאֵשׁ מִנֹּה יִשְׂרָאֵל מִשְׁמַר רוּפֵה]. 2 And the Spirit of YHWH will rest on him, the spirit of wisdom and understanding, the spirit of counsel and strength, the spirit of knowledge and the fear of YHWH. 3 And he will delight in the fear of YHWH. And he will not judge by what his eyes see, nor make a decision by what his ears hear, 4 but with righteousness he will judge on behalf of the poor, and decide with fairness for the afflicted of the earth. And he will strike the earth with the rod of his mouth, and with the breath of his lips he will slay the wicked. 5 Also righteousness will be the belt about his waist, and faithfulness the belt about his waist. 6 Then the wolf will dwell with the lamb, and the leopard will lie down with the kid, and the calf and the young lion and the fatling together, and a little boy will lead them. 7 Also the cow and the bear will graze; their young will lie down together, and the lion will eat straw like the ox. 8 And the nursing child will play by the hole of the cobra, and the weaned child will put his hand on the viper's den. 9 They will not hurt or destroy in all my Holy Mount, for the earth will be full of the knowledge of YHWH as the waters cover the sea (Isa 11:1-9).

Isa 11 begins with a barrage of vegetation imagery. This should be seen as a continuation of the forest imagery in Isa 10. 81 Isa 10 ends with the image of a forest being clear-cut representing YHWH’s destruction. 82 Thus, amidst this divine judgment, 11:1 portrays the remnant of righteous Israel (cf. 10:21) from which a divinely endorsed king will emerge. In addition, this vegetation metaphor might recall 2Sam 7 where (as seen above) David’s נֵרָם is promised. 83 This is one possible royal allusion among many in this passage.

The prophet reinforces the royal imagery by claiming that this figure will have divinely bestowed wisdom (11:2). Previously in 10:13, YHWH boasts of his victory over Assyria “by my own wisdom” and “understanding”. In 11:2 these attributes are transferred to the king by means of YHWH’s spirit of wisdom and understanding. 84 Considering the affinity between the royal “seed” language of Davidic Covenant and this

81 W.A.M. Beuken, Jesaja 1-12 (Herders Theologischer Kommentar zum Alten Testament Freiburg: Herder, 2002), 304.
82 Commentators are divided as to whether the forest represents the Assyrian army (e.g. B.S. Childs, Isaiah (Louisville: Westminster John Knox, 2001), 97) or corrupt Israel (e.g. J.D.W. Watts, Isaiah 1-33 (WBC 24; Waco: Word Books, 1985), 163-4). What will prove important in what follows is that YHWH is understood as the “Divine Forester” (Watts’ term). On this point there is no disagreement.
83 This allusion is likely an explication of Isa 6:13, which equates the “stump [מְלָחֵד]” of righteous Israel with the “holy seed [רֵאֵשׁ קָדָשׁ]”.
84 נַחַת עֵלִי רֵאֵשׁ קָדָשׁ רֵאֵשׁ מקַשׁת.”
passage, it is not surprising to see a possible allusion to Solomon’s divinely bestowed wisdom (1Kgs 3:11; 3:28; 5:9). Wildberger commented that the spirit resting upon the king is a common notion (1Sam 10:6, 10; 11:6; 16:13, 14, 19:9; 20:23), but this spirit is specifically called a “spirit of wisdom”. He pointed to Solomon’s request and divine endowment of wisdom as the “prime example” of divine wisdom granted so that the king is equipped to act as judge [ועש] over his people. Solomon’s wisdom is granted in relation to his installment as king over Israel. Wildberger also observed that 1Kgs 3:9 provides the correct sense evoked by מְשֶׁר in Isa 11:2, 4.

Brueggemann comments that the king’s duty to judge righteously on behalf of the poor (11:4) echoes the “crucial programmatic royal statement of Ps 72:1-2, 4”. The fact that Isa 11 describes the king in terms of “righteousness” (11:4, 5) is owed to Ps 72:1-3 where righteousness is mentioned three times:

_A Psalm of Solomon._ Give the king your judgments, Oh God; and your righteousness to the king's son. May he judge your people with righteousness, and your afflicted with justice. Let the mountains bring peace to the people, and the hills in righteousness.

Isaiah’s divine declaration, “They will not hurt or destroy in all my Holy Mount” (11:9) is likely borrowed from Psalm 72:3, “Let the mountains bring peace to the people.” Furthermore, the image presented in Isa 11:9, “for the earth will be full of the knowledge of YHWH as the waters cover the sea” echoes Ps 72:8, “may he also rule from sea to sea”. This might further support the Solomonic character of Isa 11 because Ps 72, in both name and content, is a “Psalm of Solomon”.

It has been suggested that the combination of attributes assigned to this figure demonstrates that Isaiah expects a specific type of king and is not simply describing the common expectation for all kings of Israel. If this is so, Isa 11 has developed Solomon tradition and applied it to a subsequent king. Much like Ps 72, this passage has endowed its king with distinctly recognizable Solomonic characteristics. The prophet has here

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85 H. Wildberger, _Jesaja 1-12_ (Minneapolis: Fortress, 1991[72]), 471-2; cf. Childs, _Isaiah_, 103.
87 Wildberger, _Isaiah 1-12_, 472.
89 This has clearly been developed toward a cultic ideology (perhaps by a later redactor).
90 We must also entertain the possibility that the psalmist borrowed from Isa 11. Perhaps the safest of all positions is to say that both texts have drawn from similar mnemonic spheres.
described his hope for a king to fulfill what was promised in 2Sam 7, who would model attributes first assigned to Solomon.

Isa 11:4 is perhaps the verse that most interests the present study as later tradition will allude to it in conjunction with Son of David: “And he will strike the earth with the rod of his mouth, and with the breath of his lips he will slay the wicked.” This metaphor should be seen as an outworking of the previous endowment of wisdom. The wise king is able to exert power merely by the wisdom of his words. The phrase “the breath of his lips” (11:4) demonstrates that his divinely given “spirit of wisdom” (11:2) is what will make him dominant. As such, the dual metaphor in 11:4 represents the application of the king’s divinely given wisdom. Compare also the imagery of Isa 9 where Israel will break “the rod of their oppressor” (9:4) due to the birth of a child who “will sit on the throne of David” (9:6). In this context, YHWH is angry with his enemies because “every mouth is speaking foolishness” (9:17). Isa 11’s wise king is therefore set in antithesis to YHWH’s foolish enemies described in Isa 9. Thus the power of wisdom is the central attribute of this king. This is brought to a climax at

93 The LXX reads, “κοπαὶ ἐν οἴκῳ ἡμῶν.” The insertion of “word” instead of “rod” perhaps demonstrates a trajectory of this tradition which has associated political power with the ability to speak forth the wisdom of God; cf. W. Horbury, Jewish Messianism and the Cult of Christ (London: SCM), 91. This will be revisited below.


95 A brief word is warranted on the use of metaphors. The employment of violent metaphors does not necessarily suggest that the subject matter is violent. Consider the following statements: Gandhi fought British imperialism. Wilberforce led the charge against the slave trade. Knox sparred with Queen Mary. In each of these examples, the language of violence has been used to refer to a non-violent historical event. Or, to place this discussion closer to our topic, consider the following statement: “...no one can tame the tongue; it is a restless evil and full of deadly poison” (Jas 3:8). Here James develops a longstanding metaphor of Hebrew wisdom tradition which thought the tongue to be “deadly”. Cf. “By forbearance a ruler may be persuaded, and a soft tongue breaks the bone” (Prov 25:15). This is a textbook example of a “metaphor by juxtaposition” [N. Frye, The Great Code: The Bible and Literature (New York: Harcourt Brace Jovanovich Parde Ilana, 1982), 57]. Wisdom tradition believed the spoken word to hold real power, much like a weapon. Shrewd speech was a powerful weapon in diplomacy; it could “break bones”. Truly, “death and life are in the power of the tongue” (Prov 18:21). Isaiah 11:4 should be seen along the lines of these metaphors. G.B. Gray [The Book of Isaiah (ICC Edinburgh: T & T Clark, 1969), 217] wrote of Isa 11, “There is certainly no hint that the king will be a warrior: he reigns after war has been abolished” (cp. 9:4f). Wildberger, Isaiah 1-12, 478 similarly writes, “It is possible that for Isaiah the power-laden word of the Messiah is simply his administration of justice, which does not destroy the evildoer directly” ... and more directly, “the Messiah is no battlefield hero ... The Messiah is a prince of peace” (p.483).

96 Cf. Beuken, Jesaja 1-12, 312.

97 P.D. Wegner, An Examination of Kingship and Messianic Expectation in Isaiah 1-35 (Lewiston: Mellen Biblical Press, 1992), 255 observes that “strike with the rod of his mouth” is a phrase normally descriptive of YHWH (cf. 2Sam 22:9; Ps 18:8; Mal 4:6).

98 Beuken, Jesaja 1-12, 304.

99 In the HB, there are examples of both priests and prophets who “slay by the words of my [YHWH’s] mouth” (Hos 6:5; cf. Jer 18:18; Isa 49:2). But “similar expressions about the typical
the end of the oracle where the "the Earth will be full of the knowledge of YHWH" which brings about uncontested worship in the Temple (11:9).

Commenting on Isa 11:4, Kaiser wrote that the attributes of understanding and wisdom "have in mind the judicial capacity of a king, which determines his activity in internal and foreign policy." Kaiser points to 1Kgs 3:16-28 as a particularly memorable example of judicial wisdom: Solomon's most legendary judgment. Directly after YHWH endows Solomon with wisdom (1Kgs 3:5-15) the author of 1 Kings demonstrates the outworking of this gift with a story about a dispute between two harlots over a baby. Each woman claiming that the child is her own, Solomon calls for a sword and commands that the baby be divided between the two. The true mother (the one who is prepared to relinquish the baby in order to spare its life) cries out for mercy upon hearing Solomon's command. Solomon then spares the child and discerns correctly which woman has told the truth. Thus the power of Solomon's words negated the need for his sword.

Isa 11 tells of a Davidic king who is given special wisdom by YHWH so that he can impart justice for the poor of Israel. Rather than wielding a literal weapon, this king imparts justice using only the words of his mouth. Isa 11:2-4 may well allude to this ironic juxtaposition between word and weapon. Indeed, according to 1Kgs 3:28, this story of judgment is what made Solomon renowned for divine wisdom. In sum, the divinely given wisdom is used by the king to judge for his domestic poor, maintain dominant peace in foreign relations and establish a secure context for the Temple. Each of these traits echoes Solomon's legacy.

It is not crucial to my study to convince that Isaiah was specifically referring to Solomon. Given the quantity of echoes, this may well be the case, but it is enough simply to recognize that the king of Isa 11 has Solomonic traits. We must keep in mind the possibility that both Isaiah 11 and 1 Kings took initial shape around the seventh century...
BCE. It is possible that the monarchical narratives were influenced by similar ideals and characterized Solomon accordingly.

IV.2 Psalm of Solomon 17

Written in the first century BCE, Psalm of Solomon 17 is an important text as it develops longstanding Hebrew concepts along messianic lines within a Hellenistic context. The following passage employs Son of David against this backdrop:

PsSol 17 is specifically important to the present study in two ways. The first and most obvious is that it is the only occurrence of Son of David as a pre-Christian, messianic title. Together with chapter 18, it is widely considered the locus classicus for Davidic messianism of this period.

The second is that this psalm provides an excellent example of how historical events near the turn of the Common Era were localized within mnemonic frameworks and how they were interpreted and distorted thereby. While it is often controversial to presume the historical value of Jesus' deeds, no scholar disputes the basic history of the relationship between the Hasmoneans, the Pharisees and Pompey (or, if one prefers, the hand of a Christian scribe might have changed the original genitive to a nominative (i.e. “the Lord’s Anointed” vs. “Lord Christ” in 17:32), this discussion is not ultimately crucial to my study. Both sides of the argument grant that the original was employed as a messianic category.

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103 I will here follow the Greek version and numeration.
104 E.g. A.S. van der Woude, *Die Messianischen Vorstellungen der Gemeinde von Qumrân* (Assen: Gorcum, 1957), 114; Most studies approach this text by surveying the text critical issues related to the use of “messiah” [see discussion in M. de Jonge, “The Expectation of the Future in the Psalms of Solomon”, in *Jewish Eschatology, Early Christian Christology and the Testaments of the Twelve Patriarchs*: Collected Essays of Marinus de Jonge (NTSup 63; Leiden: Brill, 1991)]. I will sidestep this discussion as I am more concerned with the way Son of David has been employed. Suffice it to say that whether there are four mentions of messiah or less (there are omissions in the Syriac), there is enough evidence for one to assume that Son of David has been applied in terms of messianism in PsSol 17. Also, while it is interesting to note that the hand of a Christian scribe might have changed the original genitive to a nominative (i.e. “(the) Lord’s Anointed” vs. “Lord Christ” in 17:32), this discussion is not ultimately crucial to my study. Both sides of the argument grant that the original was employed as a messianic category.
Herod the Great\textsuperscript{105}. As discussed previously (1.1), it is too often assumed that evidence of scriptural allusions and typologies in the portrayal of Jesus betray the interests of literary invention. For this reason, it will serve my thesis to analyze a scripturally influenced text that reflects undisputed historical events.

Having already discussed the precedents for Son of David in the HB, it is clear that the titular form was always employed to evoke Solomon tradition. Yet there are at least two distinct fountainheads (and therefore at least two sometimes overlapping mnemonic trajectories) from which this traditional trajectory flows: 2Sam 7 and 1Kgs 3-5. The author of PsSol 17 has recognized both of these trajectories as they have been developed by Isa 11. The psalmist has localized contemporary historical events within this Isaianic framework and as a result has endowed contemporary religious/political figures with typological significance by following the lead of Isaiah.\textsuperscript{106} I will presently argue that it is this context that best explains PsSol 17's employment of Solomon's title: Son of David.

IV.2.1 Psalm of Solomon 17 and Isaiah 11

The fact that this psalm has utilized Isa 11 is widely recognized. PsSol 17:24 contains an unmistakable allusion to Isa 11 where the wise king defeats the wicked using only the "rod of his mouth" and the "breath of his lips" (11:4). Scholarship has been quick to discuss the relationship between these texts in this regard, but what has received very little attention is the relationship between the non-titular vegetation metaphor in Isa 11:1 ("shoot/branch" [נֶוה/תְּחִלָּה]) and Son of David as it has been employed in PsSol 17:24. The connection between the two is obviously Davidic, but because the psalmist has changed the vegetation metaphor of Isa II into a title formerly used only of Solomon, more analysis is required. I will suggest the possibility that the psalmist, having the


\textsuperscript{106} That this is also an eschatological framework needs to be taken for granted at this point. This unique social-framework (and how it factors into the mnemonic equation) will be discussed below.
benefit of hindsight, has recognized the Solomon-like traits of Isa 11 and has thus applied Son of David to this tradition.

Torijano has rightly described PsSol 17-18 as application of Solomon tradition to first century messianism. He argues:

The future “Son of David” described in the Psalm is depicted according to the principal positive traits that characterized Solomon in 1 Kings. Besides, it echoes the canonical Psalm 72 (which is also entitled “Psalm of Solomon”), which may provide further support for an early ascription of the Psalms of Solomon to the wise king.\textsuperscript{107}

Torijano correctly notices the Solomonic traits of this messiah, but his observation warrants more attention than he was able to dedicate due to the broad scope of his study.

Torijano moves from this argument to explain the psalmist’s interpretation of historical events via a rubric of Solomon tradition. While his analysis is helpful, he has arrived at his position prematurely. Perhaps the facts that (1) Son of David is previously only a Solomonic title and (2) the title appears in a collection titled the Psalms of Solomon are enough to convince that PsSol 17 is a development of Solomon tradition. But since this connection has escaped the eyes of the vast majority of Psalms of Solomon scholarship, more support is necessary. Moreover, Torijano neglects to demonstrate how the psalmist’s interest in Isaiah applies to his treatment.

The following chart will list the conceptual parallels between Isa 11 (and context) and PsSol 17-18. I have ordered these parallels in order of strength rather than of textual sequence:

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Isaiah 11 and Context</th>
<th>Psalm of Solomon 17-18</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td><strong>A</strong></td>
<td>“And the Spirit\textsuperscript{A} of YHWH will rest on him, the spirit of wisdom\textsuperscript{A} and understanding,\textsuperscript{B} the spirit of counsel\textsuperscript{B} and strength,\textsuperscript{C} the spirit of knowledge and the fear of YHWH” (11:2).</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>“God made him powerful in the Holy Spirit\textsuperscript{A} and wise\textsuperscript{B} in the counsel\textsuperscript{B} of understanding,\textsuperscript{C} with strength\textsuperscript{C} and righteousness” (17:37).</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>B</strong></td>
<td>With “the spirit of wisdom ... he will strike the earth with the rod of his mouth” (11:2, 4).</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>He will “drive out in wisdom ... with an iron rod to destroy the lawless nations with the word of his mouth” (17:23-4). Cf. “…the rod of discipline of the Messiah of YHWH, in the fear of his God, in wisdom of spirit” (18:7).</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>C</strong></td>
<td>“...with righteousness he will judge on behalf of the poor” (11:4).</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>“He will judge peoples and nations in the wisdom of his righteousness” (17:29).</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>D</strong></td>
<td>A child is born who will sit on “the throne of David” (9:7) and usher in an era of peace (9:7; 11:6-10).</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>The usurpers of “the throne of David” (17:6) achieve it by violent means (17:5), but the Son of David will not rely on horse, rider, bow or army nor will finance war (17:33).</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>E</strong></td>
<td>The expected figure will be a royal “branch/shoot of Jesse” (11:1).</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>The expected messiah will be “the Son of David” (17:21).</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

\textsuperscript{107} Torijano, Solomon, 107.
As demonstrated here, the psalmist's interest in Isa 11 extends well beyond the most commonly pointed out allusion (β). The first three parallels (α, β, γ) seem to have taken on concepts directly from Isaiah. Parallels delta through theta might not be convincing if considered in isolation, but the quality of the first three parallels alongside the quantity of the others leaves little doubt that all of the above are owed to the influence of Isa 11 and context.

The alpha parallel represents so many conceptual commonalities (I have pointed out five) that one could almost consider it a paraphrase. Indeed the single point of dissimilarity is the mention of "righteousness" in 17:37, but even here can be seen thematic overlap (η). As shown by beta, PsSol 18:7 has recognized that the "breath of his lips" is a manifestation of the "spirit of wisdom" mentioned in Isa 11:2. Thus the psalmist has juxtaposed the "rod" with the "spirit of wisdom". Parallel gamma further demonstrates that the psalmist is acutely interested in wisdom. As he paraphrases Isa 11:4, he speaks of "the wisdom of his righteousness" rather than just "righteousness".

Several commentators recognize the echo of Ps 72:2 in γ. It is possible that the psalmist has drawn directly from Ps 72. It is also possible that Ps 72 has been recognized via Isa 11 and thus incorporated into PsSol 17:29. We saw previously that Isa 11 owes its interest in royal and judicial righteousness to Ps 72:1-3 (or perhaps these traditions were mutually interpretive). In similar fashion, PsSol 17 may owe its interest to righteousness to both texts. But given the several allusions and echoes of Isaiah, Isa 11 seems to be the controlling mnemonic paradigm. Moreover, the conceptual progression in PsSol 17 more or less follows the causal relationships in Isaiah:

109 It is therefore incorrect to suggest that the psalmist's use of scripture was a product of casual association, contra S. Holm-Nielsen, Die Psalmen Salomos (JSHRZ 4.2; Gütersloh: Gütersloher Verlagshaus, 1977), 101.
1. God acts decisively to end the conflict between Israel and her enemies (Isa 10:33-4 // PsSol 17:7-9, 12, 34).

2. The Davidic covenant is reestablished ( Isa 11:1, 10 // PsSol 17:4, 10, 21).

3. The king's attributes are described (Isa 11:2-5 // PsSol 17:22-5, 36-43).


5. Israel's enemies will be cast from the land or allowed to stay in subservience and worship (Isa 11:13-4 // PsSol 17:28, 30).

6. There will be a return from exile (Isa 11:10-2, 15-6 // PsSol 17:31, 44).

7. All of the above will establish a context for cultic purity (Isa 11:9 // PsSol 17:30-31, 43, 45).

Isa 11's oracle devotes most of its attention to the attributes of the king (3; cf. α, β, γ, η above) and the depiction of the peaceable kingdom (4; cf. δ above). Predictably, the psalmist devotes considerable attention to developing these characteristics. For the psalmist, however, the peaceable kingdom is described mainly in terms of Israel's relationship with foreigners (point 5; cf. ζ). This will be discussed further below when I address the psalmist's concept of militancy.

There are, of course, many other passages in Isaiah that resemble the themes and motifs addressed here. Both Watts and Pao have argued extensively that Isaiah's "new exodus" paradigm was highly influential in first century thought. With this in mind, it is likely that the psalmist was familiar with this paradigm and has naturally depicted his eschatological cause-effect accordingly. In other words, from an Isaianic paradigm, it would be natural for a well known Isaianic theme mnemonically to evoke the teleological emphasis of Isaiah: YHWH as warrior, leads to new exodus, leads to proper foreign relations, etc. I do not think that the psalmist was rigidly and systematically guided by the conceptual sequence of Isa 11. Rather, he has most likely consciously employed language from Isa 11 and this, in turn, called to mind (consciously or subconsciously) the mnemonic framework associated with this language. It is then

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111 Several commentators have argued that the Son of David in this psalm is expected to be responsible for cultic purity alongside his royal office. This topic will be addressed in my discussion of Mk 12:35-7 (VII).

important to observe that PsSol 17's conscious allusions to Isa 11 focused primarily on his description of the Solomonic king (α, β, γ, δ). The psalmist's primary interest in Isaiah was for this description. Secondarily (perhaps subconsciously) the language from Isa 11 served as a mnemonic force of gravity which pulled the Isaianic framework into place. Once in place, the inclusion of other concepts and texts in PsSol 17 must ultimately cohere with the Isaianic framework.

This will be seen more clearly in the psalmist's distortion of Ps 2:9 and Deut 17:16-7 below. At this point, it is more important to observe that PsSol 17 has localized Ps 72 within an Isaianic framework and portrayed the coming royal figure in this light. The presence of Ps 72 in the psalmist's memory is highly likely. As seen previously, there are multiple echoes (and at least one allusion) of Ps 72 in PsSol 17, but none with the pervasive strength of those concerning Isa 11. In this way, Isaiah provided the dominant mnemonic paradigm which evoked associations with other like passages. This mnemonic framework is further confirmed by the fact that the psalmist introduces the Davidic Covenant with the phrase "the throne of David". This phrase is used in relation to the Davidic Covenant in 1Kgs 2:45, "But King Solomon shall be blessed, and the throne of David shall be established before YHWH forever." This is mnemonically localized in Isa 9:6-7's description of the royal son, the prince of shalom:

For a child will be born to us, a son will be given to us. And the government will rest on his shoulders, and his name will be called wonderful counselor, mighty god, eternal father, prince of peace. There will be no end to the increase of his government or of peace. On the throne of David and over his kingdom, to establish it and to uphold it with justice and righteousness thereafter and forevermore...

That Isa 11:6-10 is a further development of this picture has already been established above. This king will be known for his legacy of peace is central to Isa 11's portrait. We are now in the proper position to gauge the function of Son of David as it has been employed by PsSol 17.

If it can be granted that PsSol 17 was heavily influenced by Isaiah in both language and concept (and perhaps overarching theme), why has the psalmist not used the royal moniker supplied by Isa 11? If he was intent to recall the Davidic Covenant in 17:4 and 10, why has Son of David been substituted for vegetation language? The answer to this question builds from Torijano's recognition of Solomonic categories. Firstly, Isa 11 has described his royal figure using distinctly Solomonic language; the prophet has alluded to or echoed 2Sam 7, 1 Kg 3 and/or Ps 72 to depict his king in terms of Solomon's legacy. Secondly, PsSol 17's royal figure has followed Isa 11 most closely where the royal characteristics are the most recognizably Solomonic. Thirdly, PsSol 17
seems to have followed Isaiah's lead thematically and within this framework has similarly borrowed from Ps 72 and 1Kgs 2:45. Thus PsSol 17 has made explicit what was implicit in Isa 11: Solomon typology.

The psalmist has recognized from Isa 11 affinities to Solomon tradition and applied the title "Son of David" to this royal figure, a phrase that is only used in a titular way of Solomon. Moreover, the application of the title is not that of mere precedent or generic Davidic hope. It is specifically typological because the psalmist hopes for a Davidic figure that embodies both the characteristics and legacy of Solomon. We may now add to this foundation Torijano's original observations that Son of David is specifically a title for Solomon in the HB and that it has been employed here in the climatic chapter of a text titled the Psalms of Solomon. Torijano also argues that the psalmist has in mind an idealized Solomon who is "free from sin" (17:36). In other words, this Solomonic figure will possess all of Solomon's admirable qualities and none of his faults. Therefore, much like the Chronicler, Son of David connotes a mnemonically distorted version of Solomon's legacy.

In sum, there are six reasons to believe that PsSol 17:21 bears evidence of Solomon typology: (1) Elsewhere, the phrase is used as a title only when applied to Solomon. (2) The title is found in a text attributed to Solomon. (3) Isa 11 is Solomonic and has heavily influenced this psalm's characterization of the king. (4) Both Isa 11 and PsSol 17 echo Ps 72 which is Solomonic and is also called a "Psalms of Solomon". (5) The psalmist's appeal to the Davidic Covenant uses language from 1Kgs 2:45. (6) The Son of David in this psalm is portrayed primarily as a peaceful king; this recalls Solomon's legacy. Point six will be addressed presently.

IV.2.2 The Role of Militancy in Psalm of Solomon 17

It is often supposed that Jesus was misunderstood by his contemporaries because the idea of a non-militaristic messiah was unfamiliar to Jewish thought. Collins has concluded that the expectation for a militant messiah was so prevalent in the thought-world of Jesus' contemporaries that the non-militaristic application of this title was confusing for them. His rational is that since Jesus seems to have been nonviolent, "the idea that he was the messiah, son of David, must have seemed extremely paradoxical to most Jews of

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113 Torijano, Solomon, 106-8; I will argue below that the sinless state of the Son of David should be read in contrast with the sins of the non-Davidic rulers and the foreign oppressors previously mentioned in the psalm (17:5, 8, 23). But this interpretation is not necessarily mutually exclusive from Torijano's reading.

114 E.g. Bauer, "Son of God ", 767.
the time.” This would mean that “most Jews” were only familiar with militaristic royal messianism. Yet, Hurtado does well to qualify this notion since “it is not so clear how widely embraced such a hope was.” Indeed, while there is no doubt that many Jews did expect an eschatological warrior figure, there is evidence that suggests the presence of alternative mnemonic categories closer to those employed around the career of Jesus.

De Jonge suggests that while the figure in PsSol 17 is characterized in terms of militancy, the “awaited prince does not fight only with military and political weapons [...] PsSol 17:32-34 stresses the spiritual aspects of the reign of this king by God’s grace.” Similarly, the present section aims to demonstrate that PsSol 17 does not describe an eschatological warrior figure. Rather the Son of David described in this psalm achieves his rule over the gentile nations through YHWH’s violent intervention on his behalf. I do not intend to argue that the Son of David in this passage is a pacifist messiah. Rather, this figure is the beneficiary of YHWH’s deliverance and placed in power to keep the peace on Israel’s behalf. As will be seen in what follows, such “peace-keeping” is not the same as pacifism, but requires the defense of Israel and the Temple. I will argue that the psalmist has been heavily influenced by Isa 11 and context in this regard.

Crucial to my argument is the difference between typological exegesis and other kinds of eschatological interpretation. In what follows, I will distinguish such interpretation by providing examples of how Isa 11 was utilized in the different texts circa first century.

Recently Atkinson argued that PsSol 17 describes the expectation for a violent and militant Davidic messiah who will lead Israel in war against their foreign

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oppressors. In support of his argument, Atkinson appeals to several texts in the Dead Sea Scrolls that seem to portray a militaristic Davidic figure. He claims that the depiction of a militaristic messiah figure "is not completely new since it builds upon the violent messianic descriptions found in Psalm 110, Isaiah 11 and other biblical texts." This point is crucial to Atkinson's thesis because several of these texts allude to Isa 11. Moreover, these allusions tend to center on Isa 11:4 which (as seen previously) describes a weapon emerging from the mouth of the Davidic figure. Atkinson surveys several texts (4Q161, 4Q285 f7, 4Q252, 4Q174, 1QM 1.5, 4Q246 and 1QSb 5), all of which, according to him, portray a militaristic Davidic figure. While Atkinson often mistakes political dominance for implicit military action, there are at least two explicit examples of eschatological militancy (1QSb 5 and 4Q285). Thus his analysis is helpful with regard to these texts. However, his study omits any treatment of 4 Ezra 13:8-13, a text which also alludes to Isa 11:4's oral weaponry, but does so in antithesis to the use of literal weaponry.

After this I looked, and behold, all who had gathered together against him [i.e. the "man"], to wage war with him, were much afraid, yet dared to fight. And behold, when he saw the onrush of the approaching multitude, he neither lifted his hand nor held a spear or any weapon of war; but I saw only how he sent forth from his mouth as it were a stream of fire, and from his lips a flaming breath, and from his tongue he shot forth a storm of sparks. All these were mingled together, the stream of fire and the flaming breath and the great storm, and fell on the onrushing multitude which was prepared to fight, and burned them all up, so that suddenly nothing was seen of the innumerable multitude but only the dust of ashes and the smell of smoke. When I saw it, I was amazed. After this I saw the same man come down from the mountain and call to him another multitude which was peaceable. Then many people came to him, some of whom were joyful and some sorrowful; some of them were bound, and some were bringing others as offerings.

While 4 Ezra evidences several interesting characteristics of early messianism, I will focus only on the use of Isa 11:4. It is clear from this context that the violent weaponry emerging from the mouth of this figure (in this case, "flames") are not to be associated

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118 K. Atkinson, I Cried to the Lord: A Study of the Psalms of Solomon's Historical Background and Social Setting (JSJSup 84; Leiden: Brill, 2004), 129-79; Atkinson, "Herodian Origin".
119 Atkinson, Cried, 151.
120 That the Dead Sea Scrolls ever alludes to Ps 110 is doubtful [contra J. Marcus, The Way of the Lord: Christological Exegesis in the Gospel of Mark (Louisville: John Knox, 1992), 133]. Even so, it should be said that Ps 110 was interpreted in rabbinic thought as evidence that YHWH fights on behalf of the messiah while the messiah passively sits. Midr Ps 110 states, "The Holy One, blessed be He, declared, 'he will sit, and I will make war'" (parasha 4). Thus Ps 110 need not be interpreted in terms of militant Messianism.
121 These will be addressed in due course.
122 Juel, Exegesis, 162.
123 See discussion in Stuckenbruck, "Messianic Ideas"; I will leave open the question of whether or not the "man" in this passage is actually a messianic figure, what is more important to this discussion is how the metaphor from Isa 11:4 has been understood by the author.
with literal weapons of war. The author explicitly states that the man will not lift a hand for warfare. In this way, the author has followed the significance of Isaiah’s metaphor.

Stone has done well to compare this text with others where the words of YHWH have the power to kill. Texts like Wis 18:15 and Hos 6:5 demonstrate this imagery. And closer to our present text, the messianic lion of 4 Ezra 11:38-12:3 kills the gentile eagle by way of his speech. Thus the metaphor of oral fire represents the concept of divine utterance. This is important in that it shows that the strength of this messiah is to be equated with his ability to speak the words of God.

But given that we are explicitly told that this man wields a non-warlike power, what are we to do with the fact that he then uses this power to burn alive an onrushing army? It cannot mean that the man destroys the nations in conquest because the “other multitude” is a peaceable group composed of both Jews and gentiles. The difference between the onrushing multitude and the peaceable multitude is that the former is aggressively attacking. Therefore, while not a man of war, this figure will indeed destroy invading armies to protect Israel. In other words, he is not a man of conquest, but a defender. Indeed there is no need for conquest because all foreign nations who do not attack Israel will come of their own volition, submissive and bringing with them the exiled children of Israel. The author of 4 Ezra 13 has followed Isaiah’s depiction of a messiah who uses words rather than weapons to maintain political dominance. But 4 Ezra emphasizes the caveat that this messiah will defend Israel against nations intent on the conquest of Israel.

We witness a similar tension in PsSol 17. While the psalmist clearly states that the Son of David will not rely on horse, bow or army, there is a clear allusion to Ps 2:9, “You shall break them with an iron rod; you shall shatter them like pottery.”

124 M.E. Stone, Fourth Ezra (Hermeneia Minneapolis: Fortress, 1990), 386-7.
125 This particular text is complicated further by the possibility that this Messiah is in some sense divine, so Müller [Menschensohn, 20], or at least bearing “angelic and superhuman traits,” so W. Horbury, Jewish Messiahism and the Cult of Christ (London: SCM, 1998), 86. But Horbury is careful to qualify this description by emphasizing that Israel’s king was sometimes described as “the angel of God” (e.g. 2Sam 14:17, 20). Noteworthy for my present concerns, David is called “angel of God” in connection with his ability to speak the wisdom of God.
126 That “some were bringing others as offerings” is a metaphor used by Isaiah to portray gentiles carrying home the children of Israel to return them from exile (Isa 66:20). Cf. Müller, Menschensohn, 117.
127 In 4 Ezra 12:32-3, the Davidic messiah (in the form of a lion) is depicted as a defender of Israel against Rome (obviously a nation who has invaded the borders of Israel); Cf. M.E. Stone, “The Concept of the Messiah in IV Ezra”, in Studies in the History of Religions 14 (Leiden: Brill, 1968), 302.
128 Müller [Menschensohn, 120] also points out that this figure possesses many theophanic characteristics which do not seem to stem from Isa 11; cf. Wegner, Kingship, 255.
17:23-4 expects the Son of David to, “rub out the arrogance [ὑπερθηκανίαν] of sinners like a potter’s jar; to shatter all their confidence [ὑπόπτασσει] with an iron rod…” Yet the psalmist is even more reluctant to use militaristic language than was the author of 4 Ezra. Instead of rubbing out the sinners, the Son of David rubs out the “arrogance” of the sinners. Instead of shattering the people, the Son of David shatters their “confidence”. In this way, the psalmist’s use of Ps 2:9 should be seen as an extension of Isa 11:4. While both metaphors are violent images, the non-violent significance of Isaiah’s metaphor trumps that of Ps 2:9. The psalmist is committed to an Isaianic paradigm in which the coming king is portrayed as a person of wisdom and peaceful domination. Ps 2:9 has been localized within this Isa 11 framework and has been distorted accordingly. Isa 11 is therefore the dominant mnemonic framework which has attracted similar concepts but distorted them within its own telos.

In order to demonstrate this more clearly, it will be necessary to compare PsSol 17’s use of Isa 11 with another text that alludes to Isa 11 but is not controlled by its framework. 1QSb provides an excellent contrast as it appeals to Isa 11:4 but in a much different way. 1QSb 5:24-9 describes the נְשָׁיָה הָנָּדֵרָה (5:20) borrowing the metaphor of verbal weaponry. The relevant portion of this text reads:

129 Many translators incorrectly translate υπόπτασσει as “substance” in this context. In rare cases, the word does denote “being” as such (cf. Heb 1:3), but it is used most commonly to convey confidence, steadiness or assurance. Given that the word is being paralleled with ὑπερθηκανίαν, there is no reason to appeal to the lesser used definition.

130 The idea that “prince of the community” was a Davidic title at Qumran seems to have won scholarly consensus, so van der Woude, Vorstellungen, 114-15; J.J. Collins, The Skeptic and the Star: The Messiahs of the Dead Sea Scrolls and Other Ancient Literature (New York: Doubleday, 1995), 60-3; Oegema, Anointed, 92-3; Zimmermann, Messianische Texte, 68, 94. Zimmermann summarizes, “Die wahrscheinliche Identifizierung in 4Q285 5, der Gebrauch beider Bezeichnungen in 4Q161 [...], vor allem aber die Tatsache, daß sowohl der ‘Fürst’ in 1QSb 5 und 4Q285 als auch der ‘Sproß’ in 4Q161 mit Jes 11,1ff in Verbindung gebracht werden, spricht dafür, daß mit diesen Bezeichnungen jeweils eine davidisch-messianische Gestalt gemeint ist” (p.125).

131 Unless otherwise noted, I will follow the reconstruction of D. Parry and E. Tov, The Dead Sea Scrolls Reader (2 vols.; Leiden: Brill, 2004).

132 The reconstruction of רְבִּיעַ is by no means certain. I here follow the reconstruction offered by both Parry and Tov and Michael Wise, The Dead Sea Scrolls: A New Translation (eds. M.O. Wise, M.Abegg, E.Cook; San Francisco: HarperSanFrancisco, 1996) 150. Although, it is not crucial to the present argument that this reconstruction is followed.
...May you be righteous by the strength of your mouth, lay waste the earth with your rod! With the breath of your lips may you kill the wicked! May He give you a spirit of counsel and eternal might rest upon you, the spirit of knowledge and the fear of God. May righteousness be the belt around your waist, and faithfulness the belt around your loins. May He make your horns iron and your hoofs bronze.

May you go like a bull. May you trample the nations like mud in the streets! For God has established you as the scepter over the rulers; before you peoples shall bow down, and all nations shall serve you. He shall make you mighty by His holy name, so that you shall be as a lion among the beasts of the forest; your sword will devour prey, with none to rescue. Your swift steeds shall spread out upon the earth.

At first glance, Isa 11 seems to be the controlling mnemonic paradigm which has also attracted other scriptural allusions. In this way, Atkinson has correctly recognized conceptual parallels between the texts. However his treatment confuses the concepts presented in both cases. At several points in his study, he claims that “Isaiah’s verbal weaponry has been replaced with a literal instrument of execution.” On the contrary, the imagery in this text is no less metaphorical than the language of Isaiah. Just like Isa 11:4, the author of 1QSb 5:25 associates the weapon with “the strength of your mouth”. This is confirmed by how the author follows the next metaphor for wisdom used by Isaiah: “With the breath of your lips may you kill the wicked”. While the imagery is violent, the referent of the metaphor, like Isaiah, is still “the spirit of knowledge and the fear of God” (1QSb 5:25). The author of 1QSb has kept the violent metaphor (oral weaponry) and he has even maintained the same referent (wisdom) but he has changed the significance of the referent.

Isaiah’s appeal to wisdom demonstrated that the king had no need for literal weaponry; the power of his words alone demanded deference. Contrarily, the author of 1QSb appeals to wisdom as the ultimate strength behind his military prowess. Thus Atkinson is correct in claiming that 1QSb depicts a militant messiah. This is seen more vividly in 1QSb’s distortion of Isaiah’s other metaphors (like bulls goring and lions

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133 Isa 11:4.
134 Isa 11:2.
135 Isa 11:5.
137 שמש Is here translated “scepter”, however it should be noted that it is the same noun used for “rod” in 5.25; cf. Num 24:27; Gen 49:10.
138 Cf. Zimmermann, Messianische Texte, 50, 58, 71, 94.
140 I have presently challenged Atkinson’s reasoning and not his conclusion with regard to 1QSb. This will become important in his treatment of PsSol 17 where Atkinson’s (similar) reasoning has led to an incorrect conclusion.
preying) which do indeed refer to violent content (i.e. warfare). 1QSb 5:27-9 records the violent metaphors of Isa 11:4 in an almost unaltered way while he subverts the peaceful metaphors of Isa 11:6-7:

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Isaiah 11</th>
<th>1QSb</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>A ...righteousness will be the belt about his waist, And faithfulness the belt about his waist (Isa 11:5).</td>
<td>May righteousness be the belt [around your waist, and faithfu]lness the belt around your waist... (1QSb 5:26).</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Ω And the wolf will dwell with the lamb, And the leopard will lie down with the young goat, And the calf and the young lion and the fatling together; And a little boy will lead them. Also the cow and the bear will graze, Their young will lie down together, And the lion will eat straw like the ox (Isa 11:6-7).</td>
<td>May he (i.e. YHWH) make your horns iron and your hoofs bronze! May you gore like a bull. May you trample the nations like mud in the streets! ...He shall make you mighty by His holy name, so that you shall be as a lion among the beasts of the forest; your [sword will devour] prey, with none to rescue. Your [swift steeds shall spread out upon] the earth (1QSb 5:27-9).</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Up until the end of 1QSb 5:26, the author seems to have more or less followed the lead of Isaiah. I have emphasized this by showing in A that the author of 1QSb directly quotes Isa 11:5. However in Ω, 1QSb has transformed the Isaianic beast metaphor and has moved in the exact opposite direction from the telos provided by Isaiah. Instead of peaceful beasts, we see violent beasts. In Isaiah, the cow and the lion graze; in 1QSb, the bull gores and the lion preys. Commenting on 1QSb 5, Wildberger writes,

> It is apparent that Isaiah’s terminology has been used; however, in his imagery of the king, Isaiah has placed emphasis upon one who establishes righteousness (and along with that peace); in the above cited passage that emphasis is [ ...] abandoned in favor of concepts such as those found in Psalm 2 and other passages. 142

The author of 1QSb seems to have utilized Isa 11 to support concepts to which he is previously committed. Rather than following the lead of Isa 11, the author distorts the text to support his conception of a militant figure. This text seems to be along the same trajectory as 4Q285 f7 143 which most likely portrays a violent “Branch of David” piercing his enemy to death. 144

141 It is difficult not to see here affinity with the bull of the Animal Apocalypse which was identified with the Davidic messiah by earlier generations of scholarship, so R.H. Charles, The Book of Enoch or 1 Enoch (Oxford: Clarendon, 1912), 215-6. This however has been recently challenged, e.g. G.W.E. Nickelsburg, George W.E. Nickelsburg in Perspective: An Ongoing Dialogue of Learning Vol. 1 (Leiden: Brill, 2003), 69-70.

142 Wildberger, Isaiah 1-12, 484.

143 Zimmermann, Messianische Texte, 68.

144 I read the controversial verb פָּרַע as a hiphil third person singular verb with a third person masculine singular suffix as argued by G. Vermes, “The Oxford Forum for Qumran Research Seminar on the War Rule from Cave 4 (4Q285)”, JJS 43 (1992); In support of Vermes, see e.g.
After distorting the metaphors of Isaiah, the author of 1QSb extols the size and efficiency of the figure’s cavalry: “Your [sw]ift steeds shall spread out upon [the earth]” (5:29). Contrast this with PsSol 17:33: “For he will not trust in horse and rider and bow, nor will he multiply his gold and silver for war. Nor will he gather hope in a multitude for a day of war.” In this way, the psalmist appeals to the restrictions of the king’s power in Deut 17:16-7. Within the Isaianic paradigm, the quote of Deut 17:16-7 has been distorted to better conform to the mnemonic framework of a dominant but peaceful king and kingdom. PsSol 17:33 adds “for war [εἰς πόλεμον]” to Deut 17:16.\textsuperscript{145} Atkinson fails to discuss how this passage might fit into his reading of PsSol 17.

The ideal king hoped for by the psalmist is specifically not a warrior king. Instead, he is expected to rely on YHWH alone for his strength:

The Lord himself is his king, the hope of the strong. Through the hope in God he will even show mercy to all the nations who stand before him in fear. For he will strike the earth with the word of his mouth forever; he will bless the Lord’s people with wisdom and joy (17:34-5).

Here, for a second time, Isa 11:4 is paraphrased and, from this context, it is clear that Isaiah’s metaphorical oral weaponry has been interpreted in contrast to literal weaponry. In other words, the power of the king’s wisdom negates the need for literal weapons. Müller rightly understood the lack of earthy weapons to be a negation of the need for military might. Instead the figure relies upon divine intervention. According to Müller the lack of earthly weaponry is a demonstration of faith, “sie liegt im Vertrauen auf die Kraft Gottes, Gott ist seine Stärke (17,34). Die Macht, die sich auf Kriegswaffen stützt, wird ersetzt durch die Macht, die darin besteht, daß Gott den Messias stärkt (vgl. 17,37-40).”\textsuperscript{146} Müller concludes that the victory over foreign powers will come “Nicht [...] im Vertrauen auf die eigene strategische Fortüne oder mit den Mitteln einer überlegenen militärischen Macht wie die Hasmonäer in der Gegenwart, sondern allein durch Gottes Hand!”\textsuperscript{147}

\textsuperscript{145} It is possible that the psalmist is not responsible for this addition. Cf. a similar addition in the Temple Scroll 56:15-18; D. Rosen and A. Salvesen, “A Note on the Qumran Temple Scroll 56:15-18 and Psalm of Solomon 17:33”, \textit{JJS} 38 (1987). Even so, it is clear that the psalmist has utilized the Deuteronomy passage to depict the Son of David as a non-militaristic figure as he omits the other prohibitions between Deut 17:16a and 17c which are not relevant to the issues of warfare.

\textsuperscript{146} Müller, \textit{Menschensohn}, 119-20.

\textsuperscript{147} Müller, \textit{Menschensohn}, 170.
Isaiah is helpful to the notion of a militant messiah in so far as it depicts a Davidic figure ruling over the foreign nations who have submitted out of fear of the Lord and his Anointed.\footnote{There can be no dispute that YHWH’s eschatological war does not include the universal extermination of the gentiles. Those who do fear God will coexist with Israel in submission to the king. Zimmermann, *Messianische Texte*, 58 has rightly pointed to Gen 27:29 (alluded to by 1QSb) and Isa 60:12 as the conceptual background for this.} It is important to realize that, in general, the expectations of the messianic age included liberation from oppression of the enemies of God. Within this broad expectation were varieties of portraits of how this liberation would come about. Some portraits portrayed a messianic figure as the central liberator. In these cases, the language of messianic militancy is more common. In other cases, God himself is Israel’s liberator and the messianic figure takes on the role of peace-time governor and/or purifier. Isa 11 better fits this second portrait. PsSol 17 has followed in similar fashion.

But this is where the author of 1QSb and the psalmist part ways: The two authors have chosen to reinforce the Isaiah paradigm with similar metaphors but with opposite conceptual aims. The psalmist has followed the lead of Isaiah in depicting a dominant but peaceful king who relies on God’s intervention in matters of warfare. The author of 1QSb expects that this royal figure will be YHWH’s agent for militancy. It is therefore incorrect to claim that 1QSb and PsSol 17 have interpreted Isa 11 toward a common end.\footnote{Contra Atkinson, *Cried*, 129-79 and Zimmermann, *Messianische Texte*, 58.}

The difference between PsSol 17 and 1QSb provides an excellent example of how mnemonic localization functions and has the capacity to distort. As is common to eschatologically minded texts of this period, the authors have drawn from a variety of different scriptural passages to support their portrait of YHWH’s unfolding plan.\footnote{This of course presupposes that the author believes that scripture can be used to interpret contemporary and coming events; cf. B.D. Chilton, “Commenting on the Old Testament”, in *It Is Written: Scripture Citing Scripture: Essays in Honour of Barnabas Lindars* (eds. D.A. Carson and H. Williamson; Cambridge: CUP, 1988), 138.} However, it is crucially important to recognize that not every allusion to scripture functions in the same way. In some cases, a passage can function as the controlling mnemonic paradigm by which other concepts are localized and given meaning within a particular framework. In other cases, a passage can be localized within an already existing framework and thus receives its significance insofar as it coheres to the dominant paradigm. As discussed in the previous chapter, both the dominant framework and the new concept are distorted in this process, but the dominant mnemonic paradigm tends to remain more stable while the concepts imported into it tend to be distorted to a
greater extent. More often than not, when two scriptures are set together, one will have the dominant influence.

In PsSol 17, Isaiah seems to function as the dominant and controlling paradigm: *Isaiah’s figure ushers in an era of peaceful post-war coexistence with God-fearing gentiles, so the psalmist’s eschatological community should expect a similar type of redemption.* Contrarily, 1QSb has imported Isa 11 into a paradigm to which he is previously committed: *As learned from other scriptures, God’s plan requires a militant redeemer figure. So Isaiah must contribute to this notion.* Therefore the psalmist has tended to distort his eschatological concepts to fit the mold of Isaiah, while 1QSb has conformed Isaiah to fit the mold of his eschatology. In the former text, the hope for a Son of David is localized within the mnemonic framework provided by Isa 11. In the latter, Isa 11 has been mnemonically localized within the eschatological hope for a militant Davidic figure. In sum, Isa 11 looks to be the controlling mnemonic paradigm of PsSol 17 but only a contributing concept for the author of 1QSb.

From this vantage point, it is possible to suggest a distinction between typological exegesis and the eschatological exegesis employed by the author of 1QSb. Typological exegesis tends to cast eschatological categories into larger scriptural frameworks; archetypal figures of the past are transposed along with their ancient contexts (and significance) onto events of the present and near future. On the other hand, the author of 1QSb tended to reinterpret passages from scripture according to the needs of eschatology. Of course, one would be ill advised to draw this distinction too firmly, but we can say that typological exegesis is interested in the relation of the similarity of paradigms past and present rather than the “freie Verwendung biblischen Textes”.

The psalmist’s appeal to the Son of David does not simply recall a single aspect of the archetypal royal figure, he appeals to the entire mnemonic framework of the figure as provided by Isa 11. Since this figure was portrayed as David’s heir, with divinely bestowed wisdom, as a wise judge, as a bringer of shalom, the psalmist imprints these characteristics upon his eschatological hope. That all of these characteristics recall Solomon’s legacy is not lost on the psalmist and he thus favors the title applied only to Solomon: Son of David.

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151 Cf. van der Woude, *Vorstellungen*, 123.
IV.2.3 History and Typology in Psalm of Solomon 17

I have intentionally avoided discussion of the historical context of PsSol 17 until this point. In order to demonstrate how a religious-political text can project a typological interpretation upon contemporary historical events, I have first attempted to set the literary and ideological mnemonic frameworks in place. Having done so, I hope to demonstrate that this psalmist has interpreted historical events and relationships by mnemonically localizing them within an Isaianic eschatological framework.

De Jonge has insightfully commented that the Psalms of Solomon "do not describe historical events, but reflect them." Indeed, one could make a similar argument for all works of history, even those that aim to be more descriptive. His point is well taken however. The author of PsSol 17 intends to stand along the tradition of the Psalter (even if he has broadened this genre to a certain extent). As such, the interpretation of historical events in PsSol 17 "reflects" history through the distorted mirror of scriptural paradigms and eschatological worldview.

Our historical backdrop begins with the Hasmoneans and their claim to Israel's monarchy. After his 27 year reign, Alexander Jannaeus left the throne to his wife Salome Alexandra. In contrast to her husband, Salome took a great interest in the proper execution of Jewish law and, by doing so, endeared herself to the people. Josephus described Jannaeus as a bloodthirsty ruler who mistreated and killed his own people (cf. Sota 47a). Salome, wanting to distance herself from her husband's reputation, showed great interest in the "proper" interpretation of Jewish law. Guided by her interest in piety, she elevated the Pharisees to the role of religious and political counselors. According to Josephus, the Pharisees enjoyed enormous political influence during this time (cf. b. Ta'an 23a). Salome gave them authority to administrate public affairs and jail, banish or execute whomever they pleased. She was content to allow the Pharisees to handle domestic government while she handled foreign concerns. Ultimately, while her reign was remembered as a time of prosperity in Israel, she became less and less autonomous. Josephus says that "while she ruled others, the Pharisees ruled her."
She established her son Hyrcanus II as highpriest and had intended for him also to take the throne in her wake but this never happened. Her death in 67 BCE spurred a power struggle between Hyrcanus II, Salome’s younger son Aristobulus II and Herod Antipater. Pompey entered the picture in 63 and by taking advantage of this instability, took over Jerusalem. Hyrcanus II eventually returned as highpriest under Roman rule via Herod Antipater. Meanwhile, the Pharisees fell from influence and never enjoyed so much power again. We learn from PsSol 17 that they were violently removed (17:4-6) and chased from the city (17:16-9). The first of these passages is very telling of the overall concerns of the psalmist and “reflects” the key problems of his historical context:

PsSol 17:4 sets the stage from an eschatological perspective, recalling the Davidic Covenant and projecting this forward to the resolution of Israel’s plight (cf. 17:21f). In what follows, the psalmist explains the reason that this eschatological kingdom has been delayed; it was “due to our sins”. The word play between ἀμαρτίας and ἀμαρτωλοί is important in that it speaks to the type of sin being described. The sinners are those who “rise up and attack” and “expel”, who “rob by force” and make “desolate”. Thus Schüpphaus rightly equated the sin mentioned in 17:5 with the “räuberischen Ansturm” of the Romans. This violent description of the “sinners” is due to the similar sins of domestic Israel. This is an apt interpretation of the historical context described above: The domestic battles between Hyrcanus II and Aristobulus II left the outward defenses considerably weaker than they were under Salome. As a direct result, Pompey was given opportunity to move in and besiege Jerusalem. Violence from within invited violence from the outside.

The psalmist’s interpretation of YHWH’s hand in these events is due to his underlying mnemonic framework. Basic to the worldview of Ancient Israel was the notion that nationally committed sin invited divine retribution on a national level.

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Isaiah's voice on this subject (as discussed previously) was no small factor. From this mnemonic framework the psalmist naturally associated Pompey's violent removal of Israel's corrupt leadership with the way that YHWH typically works (cf. Isa 10:33-4).

YHWH would eventually act as "Savior" (PsSol 17:3) but this is always accomplished by divine intervention. Within an Isaianic framework, Israel is never saved by rising up against her oppressors, YHWH always acts as divine warrior on Israel's behalf. Violent uprising on the part of Israel was not an option because foreign oppressors always represented YHWH's punishment until they were removed from power (either by another foreign power or by YHWH himself\(^{162}\)). Thus the psalmist interprets Pompey's actions as YHWH's divine punishment of the civil war between Salome's two sons. This framework also colored the psalmist's interpretation of Pompey's ultimate demise in PsSol 2:26-7:

> And I did not wait long until God showed me his arrogance pierced on the mountains of Egypt, more set at naught than the smallest thing on earth and sea. His body was carried about on the waves in much disgrace and there was no one to bury it, for God had disdained him with contempt.\(^{163}\)

Pompey, who had arrogantly entered the Holy of Holies 15 years prior, fled to Egypt only to be assassinated upon his arrival. Here the psalmist interprets his death as a divine act of YHWH. Clearly, the psalmist did not think that the messianic Son of David played a part in this vindication. As always, from an Isaianic perspective, YHWH himself exacted his own vengeance. Pompey was simply a tool used by YHWH to correct Israel. After the tool had been used, YHWH discarded it. In this case, it was through the instrument of another gentile power. This is another repeated feature in Isaiah.

Once YHWH had acted as divine warrior, his king would rise up from the remnant of Israel to protect the peace and act as domestic judge. This is the mnemonic frame provided by Isa 11. Childs' comments on Isa 11:2 are especially pertinent:

> Solomon, as a type of the wise king (1 Kings 3:9), is given wisdom in order to govern rightly, distinguishing good from evil. Counsel is the capacity needed for sagacious diplomacy among the peoples, and is joined with the required power needed to achieve a goal. In contrast to Assyria's ruthless exercise of brute force, this counsel controls [the use of power] for establishing order and welfare of those governed.\(^{164}\)

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\(^{162}\) These categories are given to overlap (cf. Isa 13:4, 17).

\(^{163}\) Jonge, *Outside*, 160-1.

\(^{164}\) B.S. Childs, *Isaiah* (Louisville: Westminster/John Knox), 103.
This, the central conveyed historical interest of Isa 11, provided a standard by which the Pharisees could measure their own historical context. The overt appeal to Isa 11:4 in PsSol 17:23-4 shows that the true king will govern with wisdom rather than militancy.  

For he will strike the earth with the word of his mouth forever; he will bless the Lord's people with wisdom and joy. And he himself will be free from sin, in order to rule a great people, to put to shame officials and to win sinners by the strength of the word (17:35-6).

Instead of mirroring the violent sins of the sinners (like Salome’s sons), the Solomonic king is contrasted with the sinners. His only weapon is the wisdom of his word, thus he is without sin. He will not rely on horse, bow or army because YHWH will be warrior on his behalf (PsSol 17:33-4). Unlike the civil war between Salome’s sons and the ensuing siege by Pompey, the Solomonic king was expected to usher in an era of shalom (Isa 11:6-8).

From this perspective one wonders whether the Pharisees, as political advisors, conveyed Alexandra to the people as “Salome, the Peace of Zion”. What can be said with some certainty is that the Pharisees had for nine years with Salome (from their perspective) the ideal interim state until YHWH’s messiah came. They were able to decisively enact domestic justice and purity for Israel as they saw fit. And in the meanwhile, they lived like royalty. When they were ousted by Salome’s sons (probably Aristobulus), they viewed it as an Isaianic type exile. They were the righteous remnant waiting for YHWH to cut down Israel’s corrupt leadership and finally establish an era of shalom, such as they had under Salome. But when the time came, the Solomon antitype would establish an eternal golden age of shalom, secure the Temple from invaders and govern the people with wisdom. In this way, the messiah would be the antithesis to the present political-religious leadership in Israel.

As the present dissertation moves forward to discuss the mnemonic frameworks and typological interpretation of the historical Jesus, it will be beneficial to keep in mind

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165 Wildberger, Isaiah 1-12, 461 observed that the MT’s rendering of Isa 11:4 “strike the earth with the rod of his mouth” seems to interrupt the flow of thought. He argued, “The almost universally accepted emendation ‘violent ones’, very likely reflects the correct reading.” While this reconstruction would be advantageous to the present study, it is unlikely. Firstly, the present translation of PsSol follows the LXX of Isaiah: ‘violent ones’. Secondly, IQSb, quoting Isa 11:4, supports the Hebrew: ‘violent ones’.

166 See discussion in Bruce, History, 6, 76-7.

167 The Hasmonaean leadership on a “temporary” basis; that is to say “until a true prophet should arise” (1Mace 14:41).

168 Josephus writes that the enemies of the Pharisees sought protection from Aristobulus during Salome’s reign (JW 1.114).
that the Pharisees were close ideological cousins with Jesus’ first followers and among Jesus’ first perceivers. As such, the initial perceptions and memories of Jesus will be closely related to the mnemonic frameworks betrayed by this psalmist. 169

In my discussion on PsSol 17, I have aimed to demonstrate that one should expect among Jesus’ contemporaries that the application of scriptural paradigms and typologies was an integral aspect of historical interpretation. These worked as mnemonic frameworks that were commonly settled on the subconscious level of worldview. Because of this, overt and intentional (i.e. conscious) appeals to scriptural and archetypal categories seemed intuitive and, indeed, necessary to interpret properly the significance of historical memories.

169 Also, it is no coincidence that Matthew is the lone evangelist with special interest in Son of David typology, while at the same time intent on antagonizing the Pharisees. This will be discussed in more detail in Chapters VI and VII.
The Therapeutic Son of David

In 1970, Christoph Burger’s *Jesus als Davidssohn* represented the most comprehensive study to date on the title “Son of David”. Burger’s work touched a wide range of relevant biblical and extracanonical texts and discussed the Christological as well as the historical implications of his analysis. It is unfortunate then that Burger’s study was unaware of a short essay by Loren Fisher. What must have seemed a small oversight in 1970 rendered Burger’s work all but outmoded only a decade later. Fisher’s essay very modestly suggested that Son of David might have been initially applied to Jesus in response to his reputation as a Solomon-type exorcist. Burger’s treatment was oblivious to this possibility and, as a result, was unable to anticipate subsequent research about the ways that demonology, exorcism and healing had been incorporated into the Jewish

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1 Burger, *Davidssohn*; F. Hahn began his chapter on Son of David by observing, “There is no comprehensive recent study of the “Son of David” tradition” [The Titles of Jesus in Christology: Their History in Early Christianity] (London: Lutterworth, 1969 [63]), 240). This comment was still relevant in 1969 when the English translation of Hahn’s work was published. In many ways, Burger’s work filled this lacuna.


3 While ultimately influential, Fisher’s work was limited in two ways: (1) Fisher’s treatment utilized Montgomery’s publication of the Aramaic texts and Yamauchi’s incantation bowl inscriptions that appealed to the authority of “King Solomon, Son of David [דָּוִד הַמָּלֵךְ / מָלכָּא הַדָּוִד]” [J.A. Montgomery, *Aramaic Incantation Texts from Nippur* (Philadelphia: University of Pennsylvania Museum Publications, 1913); E.M. Yamauchi, “Aramaic Magic Bowls”, *JAOS*:85.4 (1965)]. While important as corroborating evidence for later scholarship, his seminal study cautiously pointed to evidence that post-dated the NT by 500 years [Fisher, “Son of David?” 84-5]; as such, his results remained tentative. (2) He did not recognize the likelihood that Son of David, as it was applied to exorcism in Mt 12:33, was a product of Matthean redaction (pp. 92-93)]. Even so, Fisher sufficiently demonstrated that exorcistic activity was well at home in certain segments of Judaism and was linked to Solomon tradition. His unique insight set the stage for the more detailed work of D. Duling, “The Promises to David and Their Entrance into Christianity - Nailing Down a Likely Hypothesis”, *New Testament Studies* 20 (1974); E. Lövestam, “Jésus Fils de David chez les Synoptiques”, *Studia Theologica* 28 (1974[72]) and K. Berger, “Die Königlichen Messiastraditionen des Neuen Testaments”, *New Testament Studies* 20 (1984).
thought-world. Burger was under the impression that healing and exorcism were not compatible with the expectations of the Son of David. He argued that the Jewish concept of Son of David stood in direct tension with the more Hellenistic notion of ("Divine-man") therapeutic activity. He was convinced that the latter concept influenced Mark's portrayal of Jesus and subsequently concluded, "Die Anschauung, daß Jesus als Davidsohn Wunder tut, hat Matthäus nicht aus dem zeitgenössischen Judentum, sondern von Markus übernommen." According to Burger, Matthew's therapeutic emphasis on the title could not have arisen from the Jewish thought-world.


5 Burger, Jesus als Davidsohn, 42-71 esp. 43-4.

6 Burger, Jesus als Davidsohn, 79.

7 Burger [Jesus als Davidsohn, 169-70] argued that Matthew's portrayal of Son of David as a healer betrays "seine mangelnde Kenntnis der jüdischen Vorstellung vom davidischen Messias". Meier speaks for many contemporary scholars in saying that Burger's treatment "betrays a surprising ignorance of [...] Solomon as exorcist and miracle worker" [J. P. Meier, "From Elijah-
Contemporary historians are keenly aware of just how deeply embedded demonology was in the worldview of Jesus’ contemporaries. It is now common among NT scholars to suggest (among other possibilities) a conceptual connection between the title Son of David and Solomon’s legendary prowess as an exorcist. But the questions of Jesus’ relationship with this tradition and how it might have influenced the evangelists (especially Matthew) have divided scholarship. All now agree that Matthew’s use of Son of David takes on therapeutic significance, but not all are convinced that this points to Solomon typology. In sum, Burger’s thesis that Matthew’s application of the title is in some way linked with therapeutic activity has won the day, but his argument that this betrays a gentile understanding of Son of David has been largely rejected. This has left many who are not persuaded by the Solomonic exorcism paradigm to voice uncertainty. France admits that “it is not immediately clear why Matthew has chosen to link healing so specifically with the ‘Son of David’ motif”. Stanton lamented that the connection “remains something of an enigma”.

The present chapter will be guided then by three questions/topics: (1) If the Solomonic exorcism paradigm did indeed influence Jesus or the early Christians, how so? And (2) given that Matthew has developed Son of David more than any NT author, what mnemonic framework has he assumed and how has this trajectory been further distorted by Matthew? After addressing these concerns, I will (3) discuss where the historical Jesus likely stood in relation to these mnemonic trajectories.


9 R.T. France, Matthew: Evangelist and Teacher (London: Akademie, 1989), 285; he continued by saying that healing and exorcism “are not the ‘deeds of the Messiah’ which would have been the natural connotations of ‘Son of David’ in many Jewish minds”.

There are multiple precedents for healing in the HB (e.g. Gen 20:12, 17-18; 2Kgs 5; Isa 35:5-6; 53:4) so there is no disagreement that YHWH’s intervention sometimes included relief from illness.\(^\text{11}\) Exorcism, on the other hand, has proved a very difficult mnemonic category to trace. It is all but absent from the HB,\(^\text{12}\) only to be picked up with fervor in the NT. Moreover the Synoptics give the impression that demon-possession was a common occurrence and that exorcism was a well known practice. It seems that demonology and measures taken in response to it represent a very slowly moving mnemonic trajectory that suddenly exploded in several directions shortly before the turn of the first century BCE. Before the Persian period, there were mnemonic frames in place in which demonology would eventually find a home (i.e. mythological, apocalyptic and eschatological worldviews\(^\text{13}\)), but certainly not of the ilk that we find the NT. Therefore, before any observations can be made of the trajectory of Jewish thought on this subject, a brief word is warranted on Persia’s influence on the Greco-Roman world.

In the sixth century BCE, the Median tribe (known as a tribe of priests) was reputed to have uncanny insight into the occult.\(^\text{14}\) Although they were revered for this they were also feared\(^\text{15}\) and the object of polemic. Magos is a Persian loan word and was often used as a polemical designation.\(^\text{16}\) Greco-Roman culture included several different occult sciences such as divination, astrology, alchemy and exorcism.\(^\text{17}\) But the category “magic” is more difficult to define. The use of this term varies widely and often includes association with these other categories. Indeed, many now think that the term is of such little help that it should be avoided all together as a descriptive designation. But the term is most often associated with suspicion; it most often becomes a label for questionable activity. Thus I will briefly address this usage.

For the most part, practices associated with “magic” were prohibited in the Greco-Roman world. Practitioners of “magic” were ostracized or executed. MacMullen


\(^{12}\) 1Sam 16:14-23 will be discussed in detail below.


\(^{15}\) Cf. Isa 13, where YHWH’s heavenly host is riding to war against Israel. The army consists of heavenly beings (13:4-5) but also is said to include the Medes (13:17). Perhaps then, this tribe was known for its association with heavenly beings.

\(^{16}\) Garrett, *Demise*, 12.

\(^{17}\) Cf. Garrett, *Demise*, 12-3.
summarized that there was “no period in the history of the empire in which the magician was not considered an enemy of society”. But even though many looked suspiciously on magic and in general considered it evil, it was widely popular. By the turn of the Common Era, the practices listed above were so widely used that that they were incorporated into religious life in many different sects including Judaism and Christianity and garnered interest across socioeconomic lines. As such, “magic” became less taboo in some circles. But Judaism, mirroring Greco-Roman culture, needed to keep a firm distinction between the legitimate magic and illegitimate magic. Exorcism seems to have been eventually accepted as a legitimate practice in Greco-Roman culture and this included certain Jewish circles.

It seems that Jewish concepts of cosmic dualism and evil agency underwent dramatic reinterpretation leading up to the first century. This change led texts like Philo, Jubilees and 1 Enoch to distort Israel’s patriarchal history. 1QapGen 20.16-21, 28-9 portrays Abraham as an exorcist. 4Q242 references an anonymous Jewish exorcist (perhaps Daniel). 11Q5 27.10 mentions psalms which David prescribed for singing over the possessed. 11Q11 records four psalms fitting this description (plus Ps 91 which may function similarly). The possibility that David’s legacy was interpreted demonologically will be dealt with in due course. What is of present interest is how this ideology might have contributed to Davidic messianism.

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19 On this point see the very helpful discussion of magic and religious life in Aune, “Magic”; However for an alternative view which emphasizes that many were skeptical of the supernatural, see F.G. Downing, “Magic and Scepticism in and around the First Christian Century”, in *Magic in the Biblical Word: From the Rod of Aaron to the Ring of Solomon* (ed. T.E. Klutz; London: T&T Clark, 2003). Downing is able to argue to this end by distinguishing healing from magic (p.87). I am less confident that these two (very amorphous) categories can be so neatly separated.
20 Aune, “Magic”, 1516.
22 Philo, SL 3.110-1.
23 One could safely say that, once a group had “legitimized” a kind of magic, it ceased to be referred to (polemically) as magic; cf. the discussion of Essene “magic” in Lange, “Magic”, 377ff. But keep in mind that, for many Jews, the authority behind the practice was more important than the type of practice (cf. Mk 3:22); contra Smith, *Magician*, 68-80.
V.1.1 *Isaianic Therapy in 4Q521*

Novakovic has recently concluded that Jewish messianism and Jewish therapeutic ideology were altogether separate categories in first century Judaism. Novakovic bases her conclusions “on the assumption that the link between the Davidic messiah and healing cannot be found as such in the extant early Jewish literature”.27 This “assumption” is confirmed in her analysis of 4Q521. She argues that this early Jewish text (which possibly links the expectation of healing to the messianic age) is too fragmentary to allow us to come to any definite conclusion with regard to the subject performing the healing acts mentioned. There continues to be questions about how the first part of this text relates to the latter portion.28

The first line explicitly claims that “[the heavens and earth will listen to his messiah [םלשיי מר몸]”. The text goes onto apply the promises of Isa 61:1-2 eschatologically. These include, “freeing prisoners, opening eyes of the blind [מפלתק עלון], raising up those who are bow[...] (line 8)” and thus eschatological therapeutic activity is explicitly described. However, it is possible that these two portions of the text were not intended as a continuous commentary and perhaps should not be read as mutually interpretive. Thus, it is unclear whether this messiah is the doer of these Isaianic deeds in line 8. Novakovic correctly suggests that YHWH might be the logical subject of these acts.29

She also reiterates that it is unclear whether line 1 refers to a single figure, “to his messiah [םלשיי מר몸]”, or plural, “to his messiahs [cf. the defective pl. משיי מר몸]”.30 It is also unclear whether this text refers to a uniquely prophetic messiah over and against a priestly or royal messiah,31 or perhaps a fusion of all three offices.32 Because of these ambiguities Novakovic concludes that 4Q521 cannot be numbered among the later Jewish texts which attribute the act of healing to the Davidic messiah. Novakovic is unconvinced that 4Q521 is royal in character and thus argues that this text should not be used to describe first century Davidic messianism. She writes:

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32 Zimmermann, *Messianische Texte*, 382-5 tends toward Collins’ argument that 4Q521 has primarily a prophetic messiah in mind, but nuances Collins’ distinction between these offices.
We must thus conclude that interpretations which aim to clearly define the role and character of God’s Messiah in line 1 by seeing him as God’s agent in bringing about the end-time blessings remain highly speculative. The text neither clarifies the relationship between God and Anointed nor gives any specific information about his identity.\[^{33}\]

I find Novakovic’s reading of this text to be excessively cautious and ultimately unsatisfying. While it would be unwise to conclude too much about the royal messiah’s eschatological activity on the basis of the text, two suggestions are warranted.

First and foremost, line 7 promises that YHWH will place his “devout [חַסְדָּי] on a throne of an everlasting kingdom [לִלְךָ מֵלֶכֹת נַעֲרֵי].”\[^{34}\] That “kingdom” and “throne” are indicators of royal imagery should go without saying. But the fact that these concepts are coupled with the idea of an “everlasting” tenure suggests that line 7 alludes to 2Sam 7:13 where YHWH promises to “establish the throne of his kingdom forever”. This imagery, coupled with the explicit reference to “his messiah(s)” in line 1, suggests that the two parts of this text are meant to be mutually interpretive.\[^{35}\] As such, we must remain open to the possibility that, in the first century, Isaianic promises for therapeutic activity (e.g. healing the blind) were expected of the royal messiah.

Secondly, Q (Mt 11:2-5/Lk 7:19-22) contains a conceptual parallel to 4Q521 in its eschatological application of Isa 61:1-3 (cf. Isa 35:5-6).\[^{36}\] In this text, Jesus sends word to the imprisoned John the Baptist by quoting Isa 61. I will sidestep the question of historicity at this point and merely point out that both Matthew and Luke presuppose that Jesus is, in some sense, the messiah.\[^{37}\] Thus when the Baptist questions whether Jesus is “he who is to come” (Mt 11:2), it is clear that Jesus’ messianic identity is being clarified.

\[^{33}\] Novakovic, Messiah, 176.
\[^{34}\] The use of the plural, both here and in line 5 might support the thesis that multiple messiahs are in view [M. Becker, “4Q521 und die Gesalbten”, RevQ 18 (1997): 78]. But it could also refer to the collective of “devout” Israel who will share in the final victory of the messiah. It has been pointed out to me that Rev 3:19-21 might be an apt conceptual parallel. If so, perhaps those who occupy this “throne” are not royal figures. However, it should be pointed out also that Rev 3:21 presupposes that Jesus (as messianic conqueror) is first seated on his Father’s throne before the people of God are welcomed to be seated. Indeed, this royal “throne” imagery is continued through chapters 4 and 5 where Jesus is called the “Root of David” (Rev 5:5). It seems that the most natural reading of Rev 3-5 is that where “throne” imagery is employed, a royal figure is primarily in view, and then only by extension the devout of God’s people are welcomed to be seated. If 4Q521 does have a collective enthronement in mind, one might expect a similar eschatology. But the application of Revelation’s throne imagery to 4Q521 will have to remain speculative.

\[^{37}\] This will be discussed more thoroughly over the course of the present and subsequent chapters.
for the reader. In this context, Jesus presumes that the fulfillment of such Isaianic promises (including therapeutic activity) will serve to answer the Baptist’s question:

"Go and tell John what you hear and see: the blind receive their sight and the lame walk, lepers are cleansed and the deaf hear, and the dead are raised up, and the poor have good news preached to them" (Mt 11:4-5).

Most often, 4Q521 has been used to shed light on this Q saying, and rightly so. My point, in this case, is that the reverse is also true. By appealing to the apparent fulfillment of Isa 61:1-3, Jesus clarifies his identity to the Baptist as the “one who is to come” – the one who John previously predicted would come (Mt 3:11-12//Lk 3:15-7). When 4Q521 is read in this light, the possibility is strengthened that the therapeutic promises of Isa 61 were applied as manifestations of the messianic age. Furthermore, both the Q saying and 4Q521 add an element that is absent from the text of Isaiah: resurrection (4Q521 f.4 2.12; Mt 3:5//Lk 3:17). With this in mind, it seems prudent to suggest that these interpretations of Isa 61 represent parallel distortion trajectories of this passage, both localized within eschatological and messianic frameworks.

Novakovic’s claim that this text does not give any specific information about the messianic figure referred to in 4Q521 is misleading. While the possibility that 4Q521 links royal messianism to Isaianic therapy should not be overstated, there is also a danger in understating this possibility.

In her excessive caution, she draws an overly rigid distinction between YHWH’s activity in the messianic age and the explicit statements of messianic agency. Collins has argued convincingly that, with regard to Isa 61, YHWH’s promised actions in the eschaton find particular extension through the agency of his Anointed. On the other hand, Novakovic’s strict distinction between Davidic, therapeutic and messianic categories does not seem to represent the mnemonic categories of the first century texts discussed in this section; such dichotomies mislead the discussion. I am not suggesting that such distinctions are always unhelpful. My point is that, in many cases, these categories are not mutually exclusive and often share the same conceptual framework and “proof-texts”. In the case of 4Q521, it is possible that the language of royal

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38 The Lukan version of the Baptist’s prediction places the expectation of this eschatological figure after a question concerning the identity of “the Christ” (Lk 3:15).
39 One might also appeal to 11Q13 which describes the eschatological judgment by Melchizedek as heralded by a messenger who is “[an]jointed of the Spirit” (2.18). 11Q13 2.4-25 quotes, paraphrases or alludes to Isa 61 no less than four times (2.4, 9, 14, 19). But since this text is not quite as overtly “messianic”, I will merely suggest the possibility. What is perhaps even more intriguing is that Melchizedek, both an eschatological and royal figure, is linked with such Isaianic promises.
messianism has been mnemonically localized within the interpretation of Isa 61. In light of Mt 11:4-5, 4Q521 might provide an early link between eschatological therapeutic activity and royal messianism as well as evidence that messianic categories can be conceptually reinforced without regard to rigid exegetical categories.

In sum, first century Judaism was influenced by a wide range of ideologies, both foreign and domestic. The influence of gentile "magic" (including exorcistic practice) must be underscored. This seems to have created a cultural tension, not only for Israel but also for the wider Greco-Roman culture. Yet certain forms of therapeutic activity were domesticated by some circles and thus legitimized. As 4Q521 might suggest, Isaianic promises for therapeutic activity were utilized as a mnemonic cipher by which contemporary notions of therapy could be interpreted and related to first century messianism. We cannot say with any confidence that therapeutic activity was a prominent feature among the messianic expectations of the first century. But we can conclude that any messianic ideology that took seriously the promises of Isaiah would have been open to the concept of messianic therapy. This might explain why the Qumran library commemorates David both as the father of the messiah and as the prescriber of therapeutic exorcisms.

V.1.2  *The Testament of Solomon*

Solomon's legacy included many archetypal features, but it was not until this period that he was commemorated as the exorcist *par excellence*. In this way, Solomon's legacy presents a fascinating case of commemorative distortion. Since the fountainhead and trajectory for Solomon the exorcist tradition is difficult to fix with certainty, it will behoove the present study to begin with the fully developed framework and work backward.

The Testament of Solomon is by far the most developed frame along our trajectory. All other references to this tradition are implicit, fragmentary or take the form of parenthetical comment. In contrast, the author of TSol tells an elaborate story about Solomon's authority over the demonic realm, the source of his authority, the means by which he subdues demons and what he does with them once they have been subdued. It even goes so far as to purport that Solomon forced his demon slaves to help him construct the Temple (1.7; 2.8; 6.12; 12.5).

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41 One is left to wonder whether this author had any concern or knowledge of Jewish cultic purity!
The text was important for Lövestam as he dated the text earlier than most. He suggested that the earliest form of the tradition might precede Christianity. Berger was more cautious with the date but relied even more heavily upon the text in his treatment of Son of David. The text is commonly placed between the first and fourth centuries CE. Charlesworth has suggested that the tradition likely extends to the earlier end of this spectrum. What can be said with certainty is that TSol was subject to Christian (and other) redaction and should be used with caution. What TSol provides for the present study is an extreme end to a mnemonic trajectory. With this in mind, it is not surprising to see that at least some segments of Christianity took interest in this story and localized the Jesus tradition within it. So, here at the end of the trajectory, the tradition attracted Christian interest.

Both Lövestam and Berger emphasized the fact that Solomon is titled Son of David in the context of exorcism (TSol 1:7 and 20:1). While it is possible that one or both of these is independent of NT influence, this cannot be assumed with any confidence. Berger argued that 20:1’s phrase: “ὁσιλεύ Σολομῶν υἱὸς Δαυῤῥ, ἐλέησον με” is a formula unparalleled in the Synoptic tradition and is most likely free

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44 Charlesworth, “Son of David”, 82.
45 See the (still useful) discussion in C.C. McCown, The Testament of Solomon (Leipzig: J.C. Hinrich, 1922); More recently, McCown’s textual analysis and analysis has been challenged by T.E. Klutz, “The Archer and the Cross”, in Magic in the Biblical Word: From the Rod of Aaron to the Ring of Solomon (ed. Klutz; London: T&T Clark, 2003). He has argued that ms Q should be given more textual priority and be seen on par with ms D. Based on this reconstruction, Klutz argues for a revised literary arrangement.
47 I here follow the translation and numeration of F.C. Conybeare, “The Testament of Solomon”, JQR XI (1898): paragraph 122: And I (Solomon) said to him: "By what angel art thou frustrated?" And he answered: "By the only-ruling God, that hath authority over me even to be heard. He that is to be born of a virgin and crucified by the Jews on a cross. Whom the angels and archangels worship. He doth frustrate me, and enfeeble me of my great strength, which has been given me by my father the devil" (cf. ms N 15:10-2).
48 That this tradition was also present in later Jewish thought has been demonstrated by J. Bowman, “Solomon and Jesus”, Abr-Nahrain 23 (1984-85); he surveyed a wide range of Rabbinic texts which, among other things, commemorate Solomon as an exorcist. He also points to Solomon’s similar reputation in early Islamic texts.
49 Cf. also the Greek heading (1:1).
50 Duling, “Solomon”, 243-4; The occurrence in 1:17 was thought by McCown to be in the earliest form of the text; that which he associated most closely with MS D. Moreover, Duling points out that this occurrence is attested in MSS H, I, L, V, W, P, Q.
51 This formulation is found in MS H.
52 Cf. Mk 10:47.
from Synoptic influence. But given the other Christian redactional activity of this text (cf. also TSol 12:3), Berger’s argument is difficult to defend.

What is more important for the present study is the recognition that Son of David was considered Solomonic at the earliest stage of the Solomonic distortion trajectory (IV.1.1) and here at the most fully developed stage. Moreover, these occurrences of Son of David demonstrate that later Christians had no problem with the application of this title to Solomon instead of Jesus.

Charlesworth has helpfully emphasized a decidedly pre-Christian element of TSol concerning the relationship of exorcism to illness. He has pointed out a common motif throughout the text in which Solomon demands to know the demon’s abilities. His study catalogued several cases where the demon admits to causing physical infirmity and/or illness. I will only select a few: One demon causes boys to grow thin (2:2); another attacks ten day old infants, inflames the limbs and feet and causes festering sores (9.6); another prevents people from recovering from disease (11:2); another blinds children in the womb (12:4-5); still another causes eye injuries (13:7).

This sampling from Charlesworth’s list demonstrates that the demonological belief system represented by TSol extended to a wide variety of infirmities. The last two in particular are important to the present study in that they show that blindness, both from birth and as caused by injury, are the result of demonic influence. From the perspective of TSol, demons influenced fetal defects, illness in young children, “accidental” illness later in life, and the recovery from illness. Charlesworth rightly

55 Charlesworth, “Son of David”, 81;
56 G.H. Twelftree correctly observes that the general pattern of exorcism in the TSol does not seem to be modeled after the NT [Jesus the Exorcist: A Contribution to the Study of the Historical Jesus (Peabody: Hendrickson, 1993), 36].
57 The other elements of this pattern of exorcism includes Solomon demanding (1) the demon’s name, (2) the name of the angel which is able to thwart the demon, (3) what the demon can do and (4) either the submission of the demon or some sort of negotiation on the part of the demon in Solomon’s favor.
58 Sorensen (Possession, 119-20) suggests that power over the demonic realm is linked with wisdom. The first step in exerting authority over a demon is determining its name. In his study on ancient Mesopotamia, A.L. Oppenheim associates wisdom with the knowledge of names. The ability to name the objects of one’s environment was indicative of knowledge of the nature and purposes of those objects. The knowledge of “names and their individual features and behavior was considered the privilege of the sage” [Man and Nature in Mesopotamian Civilization (vol. 15 Sup. 1 of Dictionary of Scientific Biography; ed. Gillespie; New York: Schribners, 1978), 1:634]. Sorensen builds from this in his examination of exorcism in early Hellenistic culture. “The importance of the name even in early Greece, however, is demonstrable as a method of “diagnosis” to determine the agent of affliction” (Sorensen, Possession, 120n.4).
suggests the possibility that Solomon was considered a healer\(^{59}\) as well as an exorcist.\(^{60}\)

Taking his suggestion further, one could say that Solomon was a healer by way of exorcism. He rooted out the causes of illness: demons.

V.1.3 Antiquities 8.42f., LAB\(^{61}\) 60, 11Q11 and Wisdom of Solomon 7

Josephus' Ant. 8.42f has been called the *locus classicus* for the tradition of Solomon as exorcist. I here offered an abbreviated version:

Now the sagacity and wisdom which God had bestowed on Solomon was so great, that he exceeded the ancients (8.42). [...] He also composed 1005 books of odes and songs, of parables and similitudes 3000; for he spoke a parable upon every sort of tree (44) [...] and in like manner also about beasts, about all sorts of living creatures, whether upon the earth, or in the seas, or in the air; for he was not unacquainted with any of their natures, nor omitted inquiries about them, but described them all like a philosopher, and demonstrated his exquisite knowledge of their several properties. God also gave him knowledge of the art used against demons for the benefit and healing of humans. He also composed incantations by which fevers are relieved, and left behind forms of exorcisms with which those possessed by demons drive them out, never to return and this method of cure is of great force until this day (45).\(^{62}\)

Josephus first references Solomon's divine bestowal of wisdom (IKgs 3) and claims that he was the wisest and shrewdest person in history (most of this section has been excluded in my abbreviation). He then goes on to tell of Solomon's legacy as a sapiential author. He follows the Hebrew account of 1 Kg 4:29-34 rather than the LXX's expansion.\(^{63}\) Solomon’s encyclopedic knowledge of the natural world is then recounted. He is purported as having knowledge concerning the natures and properties of every creature and plant. It is from this context that Josephus introduces Solomon’s skill in exorcism. Josephus continues (beyond the portion here provided) to tell of Solomon’s method for exorcism which was practiced by one of Josephus’ contemporaries, an exorcist named Eliezar. This included the use of a ring (for abstracting the demon) and a bowl of water (to prove that the demon had exited the victim). The mention of this ring is


\(^{60}\) Charlesworth, “Son of David”, 82; With this in mind, U. Luz misleads this discussion by arguing that Solomon was reputed as an exorcist but never as a healer *Matthew 8-20: A Commentary* (Minneapolis: Augsburg Fortress, 2001), 42.

\(^{61}\) Pseudo-Philo’s *Liber Antiquitatum Biblicarum*.


\(^{63}\) “...and his songs were 1,005” (4:32); cf. “...and his songs were 5000” (4:32 LXX).
reminiscent of TSol wherein Solomon uses a signet ring (TSol 1.5). Elsewhere, Josephus' description of demonological healing included the use of Baaras root (JW 7.185). This would seem to cohere with the preface of this section which recounts Solomon's knowledge of plants. The connection between Solomonic authority and the bowl of water has some affinity with the inscriptions mentioned previously in my discussion of Fisher. Therefore, moving backward from TSol and the later archeological evidence, the commonalities in Josephus (1) demonstrate a mnemonic sphere in which Solomon tradition was localized and (2) point back to 1 Kings 3-4 as the fountainhead of this trajectory.

There is some dispute as to whether Wisdom of Solomon 7:17-21 should be placed along this trajectory. If it does belong, it would provide an earlier and less developed point of reference for the Solomon as exorcist tradition. Wis 7:20 is of immediate interest (I have set this verse in italics):

For he has given me certain knowledge of the things that exist, namely, to know how the world was made, and the operation of the elements; The beginning, ending, and duration of the times; The alterations of the turning of the sun, and the change of seasons; The cycles of years, and the positions of stars; The natures of living creatures, and the furies of wild beasts: the violence of spirits [πνευμάτων θίασ], and the reasonings of men; The species of plants [διαφόρας φυτών] and the powers of roots [δυνάμεις ρίζων]; And all such things as are either secret or manifest, I know them.

Solomon, the supposed speaker, here recounts the origin and extent of his knowledge. In this context, knowledge is best understood as a synonym for wisdom. Gilbert argued that this passage occupies a central place in Pseudo-Solomon's "concentric pattern". Among the several features of this pattern, Pseudo-Solomon refers to his gift of divine wisdom

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64 The use of the ring varies from text to text: Josephus' Eliezer places the ring in the possessed person's nose, while TSol portrays Solomon as wearing the ring engraved with a pentagram (cf. bGit68a where the ring is engraved with the tetragrammaton).

65 It is noteworthy that Josephus calls this a procedure for healing the effects of illness caused by demons. This will be revisited below.

66 For a more recent treatment, see Charlesworth, "Son of David", 79-80; for the original text see Montgomery, Texts from Nippur, 231.

67 A wide range of dates have been suggested for this composition (third century BCE to second century CE) but the more extreme suggestions have been largely rejected (L.L. Grabbe, Wisdom of Solomon (Sheffield: SAP, 1997), 89-90). The range that garners the most support spans from 31 BCE to 41 CE. See discussions in C. Larcher, Le Livre de la Sagesse ou la Sagesse de Solomon (nouvelle série 1; Paris: Gabalda, 1983), 1:148-61 and D. Winston, Wisdom of Solomon (AB 43; Garden City: Doubleday, 1979), 20-5. Larcher argues for a date between 31-10 BCE. Winston suggests 37-41 CE.
which precedes a description of his wisdom, its nature, origin and function.\textsuperscript{68} Both features can be seen in this passage. Dimant has argued that the entire book should be seen in relation to its pseudonymic framework which guides the author’s patterns and themes.\textsuperscript{69} Chief among these is the theme of divine wisdom. When seen in this light, Wis 7:17 is an unquestionable allusion to 1Kgs 3, where God bestows wisdom on Solomon. The author proceeds in boasting of Solomon’s encyclopedic knowledge of the created order\textsuperscript{70} and thus shows close affinity to Ant 8.42f. Both Josephus and Pseudo-Solomon begin by appealing to 1Kgs 3 and follow by explaining the extent of Solomon’s wisdom.

The central point of contention among scholarship has to do with whether “\textit{πνευμάτων βίας}” refers to “violent (evil/unclean) spirits” in a demonological sense, or whether it might simply betray a sort of animism where “winds/breaths” are endowed with malicious intentions (cf. Jn 8:24).\textsuperscript{71} Novakovic has recently argued for the latter and concludes that this passage is not to be placed along the Solomon as exorcist trajectory. Her reasoning is that this particular sequence recounts Solomon’s “knowledge of healing arts”\textsuperscript{72} which includes the therapeutic natures of “roots [\(\pi \rho \zeta \gamma \nu \nu\)]” and “plants [\(\varphi \upsilon \tau \omega \nu\)]”. She argues that exorcism should be categorized separately from healing, thus “spirits” should not be taken as demons in this context. While Novakovic is correct to see the therapeutic connection between roots and plants she draws an unhelpful dichotomy between exorcism and healing.\textsuperscript{73} Novakovic appeals to Josephus’ connection between roots and healing properties in JW 2.136,\textsuperscript{74} but fails to connect this concept with JW 7.185 which explicitly states that the Baaras root was used for illness caused by demonic possession.\textsuperscript{75} A more natural solution is to see the last three categories as references to the natures of sickness (as caused by spirits) and remedy. Moreover, Hilbner argued that a reference to “winds” in this context seems out of place:

\textsuperscript{69} D. Dimant, “Pseudonymity in the Wisdom of Solomon”, in \textit{La Septuaginta en la investigacion contemporanea} (Madrid: Instituto Arias Montano, 1985).
\textsuperscript{70} On the function of “\textit{Listenwissenschaft}” in the ANE, see Grabbe, \textit{Wisdom of Solomon}, 64-66.
\textsuperscript{71} Hogan, \textit{Healing}, 52.
\textsuperscript{72} Novakovic, \textit{Messiah}, 98.
\textsuperscript{73} Novakovic, \textit{Messiah}, 99.
\textsuperscript{74} “...they inquir after such roots and medicinal stones as may cure their fevers” (2.136).
\textsuperscript{75} “[Baaras root] is only valuable for one of its virtues: if it is only brought to sick persons, it quickly drives away those called demons, which are no other than the spirits of the wicked, that enter into men that are alive and kill them, unless they can obtain some help against them” (7.185). Cf. also 1 Fn 8:3 where the leader of the fallen angels teaches humanity the uses of roots in magic. Jub 10ff explains that Noah was taught how to use herbs to cure illness cause by demons. M. Hengel observed: “As sicknesses were of demonic magical origin, they could only be effectatively combated by a kind of ‘white magic’ taught by the good angels” \textit{[Judaism and Hellenism]} (Minneapolis: Fortress, 1974), 241.

142
Nachdem [...] zuvor von wilden, also gefährlichen Bestien die Rede war, liegt es nahe anzunehmen, daß es dem Autor um eine weitere Gefahr geht, nämlich die Einwirkung böser Geister auf das Denken und Wollen der Menschen.  

Hübner then suggests that this progression of ideas leads to the healing properties of plants seen at the end of the list. In this way, the list refers to dangerous beings and culminates with the most dangerous of these: violent spirits. This association then invites the inclusion of Solomon’s knowledge of how to handle such dangers.

Given the context (especially the immediately following context), it is best to affirm McCown’s early assessment that Wis 7:16-20 does indeed provide a background for Solomon’s power over the supernatural causes of sickness, what later mnemonic categories referred to as demons. In sum, there are three features of this text that suggest it provides an earlier and less developed precedent for Ant 8.42f and TSol: (1) the implied backdrop of 1Kgs 3, (2) the detailed list of Solomon’s knowledge of the natural and supernatural world, alongside (3) the likelihood that this included demonological illness and healing.

The most common move in previous studies has been to fill out the portrait provided by Josephus and TSol with corroborating texts like LAB 60:3 and 11Q11. But this line of reasoning fails to recognize the distinctive characteristics of these texts suggestive of a parallel mnemonic trajectory concerning Solomon and exorcism. LAB 60 records an elaboration of 1Sam 16:14-23. I have here offered an abbreviated version.

And at that time the spirit of the Lord was taken away from Saul, and an evil spirit was terrifying him. Saul sent and brought David, and he played a song on his lyre by night. This is the song he played for Saul so that the evil spirit would depart from him, “[...] do you not remember that your brood was created from an echo in the abyss? But the new womb, from which I was born, will rebuke you, from which in

76 H. Hübner, “Die Weisheit Salomons” (Das Alte Testament Deutsch: Apokryphen; Göttingen: Vandenhoeck & Ruprecht, 1999), 100-1.
77 McCown, Testament, 91.
78 Duling, “Solomon”, 239.
81 The song sung by David is a fascinating window in to the origin of evil spirits that may or may not cohere with the myth of the watchers. It recounts the order of creation and reminds the demon that evil spirits were “second born”. It is on this basis that the demon must submit to David’s authority. The appeal to a Davidic descendent seems to be a further appeal to authority, perhaps a spiritual trump card.
time one will be born from my loins and will rule over you." And when David sang praises, the spirit spared Saul (LAB 60:1-3).

Berger suggested that the promised descendant of David represents an expectation for a royal messiah. Charlesworth and Novakovic follow the lead of McCown in arguing that LAB 60.3 refers to Solomon. The latter interpretation is to be preferred, although the royal imagery cannot be denied. The language used is similar to that of 2Sam 7:12 (LXX). But there is no need to see these two options as mutually exclusive. Duling rightly observed that "royal language does not exclude Solomon!"

What is striking about this passage is that a clearly demonological mnemonic sphere has been projected upon a story other than 1Kgs 3. There is no mention of divinely bestowed wisdom in reference to David's descendant. Furthermore, there is no evidence that the mnemonic trajectory anchored by 1Kgs 3 had direct influence on this text. There is no mention of rings, bowls, roots or information gathering on the part of David. Furthermore, the title Son of David is not present in this text. As such, LAB 60:3 seems to represent a parallel but separate mnemonic trajectory.

This is confirmed by the Dead Sea Scroll's interpretation of Ps 91. As mentioned, 11Q5 27 refers to four prayers prescribed by David for praying over "the stricken [דומני]". 11Q11 records four psalms to be used to combat evil spirits (cols. 1-5) and includes a form of Ps 91 which has been reformatted demonologically (col. 6). Puech concluded that this grouping represents a ritual which predates the Qumran community. This ritual seems to mirror biblical psalms such a Ps 6, rather than contemporary

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82 Arguet autem te metra nova unde natus sum, de qua nascetur post tempus de lateribus meis qui vos domabit.
83 It is possible that Pseudo-Philo considers this punishment for the fact that "Saul has not driven the wizards [malefic] from the land". It is interesting that Saul, commemorated for his association with the evil spirit, also carried the reputation of having consulted with the occult at Endor. "Behold he will go to those whom he has scattered, to obtain divination [divinatio] from them, because he has no prophets" (LAB 64:1). On the relationship between the function of diviners and prophets see Garrett, Demise, 14-5.
85 McCown, Testament, 91; Charlesworth, "Son of David", 141; Novakovic, Messiah, 100-1.
86 2Sam 7:12 LXX: "...ωστε εκ της κομης ουω...".
87 Duling, "Solomon", 240 (emphasis his).
88 Novakovic, Messiah, 103.
89 It remains inconclusive as to whether the author of 11Q5 had particular knowledge of the tradition represented by 11Q11. While a possibility, it is presently only necessary to notice how David was doubly commemorated as such in the Dead Sea Scrolls.
“magical” procedures. The procedure consists of singing psalms and thus parallels LAB 60; it bears little affinity to the procedure described in Ant 8.42f. Notice the use of Solomon’s name in association to this ritual: 11Q11 2.2-4 reads:

\[
\text{אֲלֵהֶזֶה רִים אֵיךְ תְּמַשְׁמֵהוּ}
\]

[...] Solomon, [...] and he shall invoke[k]e [...] the spirits, [...] and the demons, [...] These are [the demons. And the p[rice of enmil]ty

When the four psalms are taken together, it seems that the story of David’s singing over Saul alongside his reputation as a psalmist provides the mnemonic backdrop for this tradition. Because the reference to Solomon is so fragmentary, little more can be said of Solomon’s role in this procedure. But before moving on two observations are necessary: (1) The Solomon as exorcist tradition was a live cultural category prior to Jesus’ historical context. (2) There is a definite association between Solomon and David’s legacy as an author of psalms for the purpose of exorcism. Therefore, while previous studies have taken for granted that a demonological interpretation of 1Kgs 3 provided the fountainhead for the Solomon as exorcist tradition, LAB 60 and 11Q11 point us in the direction of 1Sam 16 as an alternative possibility. With this in mind, a closer look at this text is warranted.

V.1.4 A Demonological Reading of 1 Samuel 16

As discussed, we do not find the sort of demonology in ancient Israel that we find near the turn of the Common Era. Sorensen suggests that the practice of exorcism was likely classified alongside necromancy and conjuring and thus condemned by earlier generations (Cf. Ex 22:18; Lev 19:26, 31; 20:6, 27; Deut 18:10-11). However, the idea that humanity was the battleground for spiritual beings seems to have manifested itself in other beliefs before a fully developed Jewish demonology evolved. Indeed the plight of Job seems to have been thought of (at least by later redactors) in terms of spirits

92 B. Nitzan argues the invocation of the divine name (5.6-10) distinguishes this incantation not only from gentile magic but also from other Jewish magical texts [Qumran Prayer and Religious Poetry (Leiden: Brill, 1994), 235].

93 Reconstruction followed from Puech, “Ritual”; He suggested that the name of Solomon gave greater authority to the ritual (p.408).

94 Does the feminine ending denote liliths? Cf. the Babylonian Talmud (bGit68a; cf. PesR 15) which renders Qoh 2:8b “male and female singers [תְּרָישִׁים]” as “male and female demons [תְּרָישִׁים]”.

95 Sorensen, Possession, 47-8.
contending (cf. Job 1-2). Perhaps the closest cousin of a possession-exorcism story in the HB is that of Saul and the evil spirit from YHWH:

Now the Spirit of YHWH departed from Saul and an evil spirit from YHWH [רוח אלוהים] terrorized him. Saul's servants then said to him, "Look now, an evil spirit from God [רוח יי] is terrorizing you. Let our lord now command your servants who are before you. Let them seek a man who is a skillful player on the harp; and it shall come about when the evil spirit from God is on you, that he shall play with his hand, and you will be well (1Sam 16:14-16).

The story concludes, "So it came about that whenever the spirit from God [רוח אלוהים] came to Saul, David would take the harp and play with his hand; and Saul would be refreshed and be well, and the evil spirit [רוח רעה] would depart from him" (16:23). As has been shown in the above discussion of 11Q11, this story was likely interpreted from a possession-exorcism perspective by later psalmists. This story seems to betray the belief (common to other texts in Mesopotamia) that a good spirit could depart from a person and thus open the door to misfortune. In this case, the misfortune is directly caused by an "evil spirit". Due to the limits of this study, the question of YHWH's relationship with this evil spirit will be bracketed. What is presently important is Saul's relationship with the spirit.

In this story, the departure of YHWH's Spirit symbolizes the "withdrawal of favour from Saul". It demonstrates that YHWH's spirit now rests upon David and foreshadows the transfer of the kingship to David. What is interesting to our discussion of demonology is the fact that the departure of YHWH's Spirit is directly linked to the employment of the evil spirit; YHWH's removal of one spirit made way for the entry of another kind.


The story certainly betrays some level of cosmic duality; the nature and extent of this duality will have to be the subject of another study. For an excellent treatment of the categories of demonology and duality in later Judaism, see Wright, "Origin", Ch.6.


Klein, "2 Samuel", 159.

D.A. Gunn called 1Sam 16:14-23 the "microcosm" of the rest of Saul's story [The Fate of King Saul (JSOTSup 14; Sheffield: JSOT Press, 1980), 78].

T.W. Cartledge, 1 & 2 Samuel (SHBC 7; Macon: Smyth & Helwys, 2001), 210 relates this idea to Jesus' parable of the exiting and returning spirits (Mt 12:43f//Lk 11:24f).
(16:18). It will be helpful to keep this context in mind as Saul is alluded to in the giving of the Davidic Covenant.

The present study has previously discussed the Davidic Covenant (IV.1.1). What has been bracketed until now has been the allusion to Saul in the Davidic Covenant. Through Nathan, YHWH tells David, “My love [יְהֹוָה] shall not depart from him, as I took it away from Saul, whom I removed from before you” (2Sam 7:15). That this alludes to the symbolic removal of YHWH’s Spirit is possible. But what can be said with confidence is that the mention of Saul in 2Sam 7:15 presupposes the narrative context of YHWH’s rejection of Saul in favor of David. As Gunn et al. have observed, 2Sam 16 is the quintessential presentation of this shift in YHWH’s favor. This said, it should also be observed that there is no direct mention of the role YHWH’s Spirit in the Davidic Covenant. It is possible to associate יְהֹוָה conceptually with YHWH’s Spirit, but it is at best only implied. Even so, the role of the Spirit in the fulfillment of the Davidic Covenant becomes paramount for other interpretations such as Isa 11 (and especially later messianic interpretations). It is precisely this perspective that interests this study.

YHWH promised that his relationship with Solomon would stand in direct contrast to that of Saul. It is possible that the promise of YHWH never to remove his covenantal love (=favor/commitment) from David’s son invited later speculation from a demonological perspective. Unlike Saul, David’s son would always have the benefit of the Spirit of YHWH and thus be invulnerable to evil spirits. Just as David was able to perform an “exorcism” because YHWH was with him, Solomon would always have the Spirit of YHWH and thus authority over evil spirits.

The suggestion of this alternative fountainhead is admittedly dependent on how 2Sam 7 was possibly interpreted in conjunction with 1Sam 16 rather than on hard evidence. But there are two reasons that this alternative must be taken seriously. (1) LAB 60 has localized 1Sam 16 within a demonological framework and used this text as a springboard to associate the story with David’s progeny. As shown, this reference seems

106 See the previous discussion on the Isa 11 and PsSol 17 (IV.2,1-2).
107 I should emphasize that I am primarily interested in the possible conflation of these concepts in later interpretations and not what is to be drawn out of 1Sam 16 and 2Sam 7 as they related prior to a demonological perspective.
to depend upon language from the LXX of 2Sam 7:12. (2) Neither LAB 60 nor 11Q11 appeal to 1Kgs 3.

In this way, it serves my present purpose to observe that later interpreters associated David's possession of the divine Spirit to be an effective combatant of evil spirits. As the contrast of Saul is mentioned in 2Sam 7, Solomon too might enjoy such abilities. All considered, it is best to remain open but cautious of this possibility.

V.2 Matthew's Portrayal of the Son of David

While it is true that Matthew employs Son of David more than any other NT author, it should be made clear that he uses this title only a handful of times and in various contexts. Matthew uses the title twice to emphasize Jesus' royal lineage (1:1, 1:20), twice in the context of (only) blindness (9:27, 20:30-31), once in the context of healing the lame and blind (21:15), twice in the context of therapeutic exorcisms (12:33, 15:22) and twice to highlight Jesus' relationship to Jerusalem/Temple (21:9, 15). (I have not included here Matthew's account of the question concerning the messiah's identity in Mt 22:41-6. As will be discussed, Matthew avoids using the title in his account.\(^\text{109}\)) It is important to recognize this general diversity in that there is a danger in drawing too much significance from any one of these contexts. In this section, I will focus primarily upon those instances where Matthew's redaction is most evident. This will guide the present study to discuss the title's employment in contexts of therapy. But it must be kept in mind that Matthew was comfortable with the title's plurisignificance\(^\text{110}\) in that he was generally happy to include Son of David tradition that was not localized within a therapeutic agenda. From this premise, two questions arise: How did Matthew alter the tradition that he received? And what did Matthew contribute to this overall portrait of Son of David?

V.2.1 The Jericho Healing and Parallels

Burger rightly concluded that Matthew's interest in Son of David was sparked by the Markan words of Bartimaeus. That Matthew significantly expanded this context(s) and reapplied the title throughout his gospel is evidence that his understanding of the title

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\(^{109}\) This might suggest the limits of Matthew's diversity and at the same time speaks to the extent of his inclusion of tradition. Because Mk 12:35-7 can be read in a way that disassociates Jesus from Son of David, Matthew disassociates the title from the Davidsohnfrage. Yet the account is not altogether excluded.

went well beyond that of Mark.\textsuperscript{111} Because of this, my analysis of Matthew will begin with a comparison of Mk 10:46-52 and Mt 20:29-34 // 9:27-31.

As seen in the first two columns, Matthew’s Jericho healing follows the overall structure of Mark’s. (A) The setting of Jericho is specified and the blind person(s), who are sitting by the side of the road, call out to Jesus saying “Son of David, have mercy...!” (B) The blind person(s) is rebuked by the crowd but cries out again for the Son of David. (C)

\textsuperscript{111} Cf. Loader, “Son of David”, 579-80; Contra Burger, Jesus als Davidsohn, 79.
Jesus replies and asks "What do you want me to do for you?" (D) The blind person(s) requests to "see again". (E) Jesus heals and the person(s) follows Jesus.

Aside from Mark's characterization of Bartimaeus, this is essentially the same story. Matthew follows Mark's setting, sequence and telos. While Matthew's language is rarely identical to that of Mark in this account, many of the variations can be explained by the shift from singular to the plural: For example, the singular ἄκοινοςς is changed to the plural ἄκοινοις (A). The singular ἐλέησόν με is changed to the ἐλέησον ἡμᾶς (B). The singular καὶ εὐθέως ἀνεβλήφην is changed to the plural καὶ εὐθέως ἀνεβλήφαν (E).112 Thus much of the vocabulary is similar, only inflected differently according to person. Furthermore, Mark's introduction to this character (A) and his detail concerning his cloak (C) has been understandably omitted. In sum the shift in characterization accounts for most of the variants. Aside from the character difference, Matthew's Jesus is moved with compassion and heals by touch rather than mere words (E).113

When Matthew 20:29-34 is compared with 9:27-31 the reverse is true: The characterization is of the same mold but the stories differ in setting, sequence and telos. There are two figures instead of one.114 The figures are nameless.115 They are blind.116 At points the language is identical. For example:

A: λέγοντες ἐλέησον ἡμᾶς ... υἱὸς Δαυίδ. = λέγοντες ἐλέησον ἡμᾶς, υἱὸς Δαυίδ.
D: Λέγοντοι αὐτῷ κύριε = Λέγοντοι αὐτῷ ... κύριε.

Notice that, in the first of these (A), Matthew has placed the title at the end of the sentence in the emphatic position. The evangelist has done this every time that he has employed the title throughout his gospel.117 In sum, the similarities between Mt 9:27-31 and 20:29-34 simply manifest what is common to Matthean redaction. On the other hand, the differences in content seem to dominate this discussion.

It seems that the sequence and telos of Mt 9:27-31 have been determined by what Luz refers to as a quilting effect. He observes that this story "appears almost like a quilt made of patches from earlier stories".118 Mathew has made use of Mk 1:43 which had

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112 This last example is interesting because ἀνεβλέπω is not common in Matthew. There will be need to return to his anomaly below.
113 A closer look at the grammatical anomalies in Mark's story will be dealt with below.
114 Cf. Mt 4:18, 21; 8:28; 18:19-20; 20:30; 21:1, 7; 22:40; 26:60; 27:21, 38... .
115 Cf. Mt. 8:28; 9:18; 20:30; 21:1; 26:60; 27:38.
117 Loader, "Son of David", 572.
118 Luz, Matthew 8-20, 46; he also points out that Mt 9:27-31 is rich with Matthean vocabulary.
been previously omitted. In this way, the story’s telos is that of the messianic secret motif (F) which is not present in either version of the Jericho healing. The belief motif determines the dialogue between Jesus and the men (C, D). Instead of Jesus asking what the men want of him, he asks if they believe he is “able to do this” (9:28). The referent of the demonstrative is simply implied by the context. Their reply to this question is strikingly similar to Mt 13:51. The contribution of πίστει in Mt 9:28 might have been taken from Mk 10:52 which Matthew has omitted from his own Jericho account. This is one of the very few similarities that are shared between Mk 10 and Mt 9.

It can be concluded from this analysis that Matthew’s account of the Jericho healing has been taken from Markan tradition and modified according to the tendencies of Matthew. Moreover, Matthew has taken a title that Mark only associates with Jesus’ presence in Jerusalem and applies it in like contexts in other places in his narrative. The present study has not surveyed enough texts to see a theme developing, but this will be made clear in due course. At this point it will suffice to say that Matthew has understood the Jericho healing to be a story of great significance and has thus applied Son of David with more emphasis than did Mark.

This explains the application of the title in Mt 9:27-31, but the overall story is not easily explained as a duplicate of the Jericho healing. The most common suggestion is that Matthew has modeled both of his accounts after Mk 10:46-52, but equally common to this discussion is an acknowledgement of uncertainty. After extensive analysis, Fuchs concluded that Matthew was privy to a different version of Mark. My analysis has shown that aside from the use of the cry, “Son of David, have mercy...”, Mt 9:27-31 has very little in common with Mk 10:46-52. The fact that there are several affinities between Matthew’s revision of the Jericho healing (20:29-34) and this account does not ultimately convince that this story is a duplicate. As I have pointed out, these affinities are easily explained as typical Matthean features.

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119 Mt 13:51: Σω๐̂μάκατε τάῦτα πάντα; λέγουσιν αὐτῷ: ναι.
120 See also the form of the plea: ἐλέησον! This is common to all three stories; so J. M. Gibbs, “Purpose and Pattern in Matthew’s Use of the Title "Son of David”", NTS 10 (1963-4): 449.
122 Burger [Jesus als Davidssohn, 170] wrote: “Erscheint ferner bei Markus Jesu Auftreten als Davideide noch mit Jerusalem verknüpft, ist bei Matthäus dieser Zusammenhang gelöst. ...und die Vorstellung vom heilenden Davidssohn durchzieht sein ganzes Evangelium.”
123 Of the many commentators that hold this position, see e.g. Duling, “Therapeutic”, 399; Loader, “Son of David”, 572; D.A. Hagner, Matthew 1-13 (WBC 33A; Dallas: Word, 1993), 252; Luz, Matthew 8-20, 46.
A better solution emerges when Mk 8:22-6 is considered in tandem with the above analysis.

And they came to Bethsaida. And they brought a blind man to Jesus and implored him to touch him. Taking the blind man by the hand, he brought him out of the village; and after spitting on his eyes and laying his hands on him, he asked him, “Do you see anything?” And he looked up and said, “I see men, for I see them like trees, walking around.” Then again he laid his hands on his eyes; and he looked intently and was restored, and began to see everything clearly. And he sent him to his home, saying, “Do not even enter the village.”

This healing story is commonly thought to be one of the few omissions of Mark’s narrative in Matthew. Given the difficulty of relating Mt 9:27-31 to Mk 10:46-52, we might take seriously the possibility that the evangelist has not wholly omitted this episode. Rather he has received the tradition (likely orally) that stands behind Mk 10:46-52 and has heavily reworked this story to echo typical Matthean motifs and language. Consider the following parallels: (1) In both passages Jesus heals the blind. (2) In both passages Jesus heals by touching the eyes. (3) Both passages end with a form of the messianic secret motif. (4) Add to this the possibility that both healings were done in private. Perhaps Matthew has used the general framework of the story and filled it out with details that better suit his portrayal of Jesus.

There are several reasons for doing so including the embarrassment of the partial failure of Jesus’ first attempt. Also Matthew seems to prefer such characters to lack individual characteristics so that it “is easier to identify with them”. Also Jesus is not generally portrayed as having made use of physical media in healing. The evangelists (Matthew included) generally prefer to display Jesus’ power via the spoken word or simple touch. But most important to my present study is the possibility that Matthew has intentionally excluded details that call to mind foreign “magical” practice, a la Caesar worship. Jesus’ act of spitting in the Mk 8 account resembles a story told of Vespasian. Matthew similarly omits Jesus’ use of saliva as detailed by Mk 7:31-7 (Mt

126 Cf. Matthew’s elimination of the similar “second try” (Mk 5:8-10) in the story of the Gadarene Demoniats (Mt 8:28-34). In Matthew’s portrayal, the exorcism takes much less effort on the part of Jesus.
127 Luz, Matthew 8-20, 47.
128 Suetonius wrote: “A man of the people, who was blind, and another who was lame, together came to [Vespasian] as he sat on the tribunal, begging for help for their disorders which Serapis had promised in a dream; for the god declared that Vespasian would restore the eyes, if he would spit upon them, and give strength to the leg, if he would deign to touch with his heel. Though he had hardly any faith that this could possibly succeed, and therefore shrank even from making the attempt, he was at last prevailed upon by his friends and tried both things in public before a large
15:29-31). By distancing Jesus' healing from that of gentile therapy (i.e. that which might be polemicized as “magic”), Matthew has painted Jesus’ therapeutic activity in a particularly Jewish light. Thus the title Son of David has the effect of associating Jesus’ therapeutic activity within a Jewish mnemonic frame rather than otherwise. This agenda will be made clearer in my analysis of the Beelzebul Controversy below. Before doing so, a final observation is necessary with regard to Matthew’s use of the Jericho healing.

Matthew’s portrayal of Jesus’ therapeutic activity should be read in connection with his interpretation of Isa 35:5-6 and Isa 61:1-2. Isa 61:1 LXX promises “sight to the blind [τυφλοῖς ἀναβλέψων]”. As demonstrated above, ἀναβλέψω is not common in Matthew. He borrows this word from Mark infrequently, only twice. In response to the Baptist’s question, Jesus alludes to Isa 35:5-6 // Isa 61:1-2. Jesus instructs John’s disciples to tell him that the “blind see again [τυφλοὶ ἀναβλέπωσων]” (Mt 11:5). Matthew’s rare use of this word in the Jericho healing (Mt 20:34) serves to connect this activity to Isaiah by way of Mt 11:5. A similar use of Isaiahic (LXX) language is seen in Mt 9:30 where it says that “their eyes were opened [ἡπευκύθησαν αὐτῶν οἱ οφθαλμοί].” Matthew has likely intended an evocation of Isa 35:5: “τότε ἀνοιχθῶσαν οἱ οφθαλμοί τυφλῶν”. The plural of “the blind” in this context might explain why Matthew prefers to have his healings done in multiples.

Matthew’s interest in Isa 35:5 may have influenced how he has arranged his sequence of pericopes in 9:27-34. In the first pericope the blind are healed (9:27-31) in the second the deaf hear (9:32-4). This corresponds to Isa 35:5: “Then the eyes of the blind will be opened, and the ears of the deaf will be unstopped.” Lastly, Gibbs has noticed a common formula used in Mt 9:27-8; 15:22, 25; 17:15; 20:30-33 involving “have mercy” and the titles “Son of David” and “Lord”. In Mt 11:2-6 the works of the “coming one” consist of having mercy and healing. Matthew’s portrayal of the therapeutic Son of David demonstrates that Israel’s hopes of restoration have been realized in Jesus. The Son of David is specifically associated with Jesus’ Jewishness and dissociates him from gentile therapy.

crowd; and with success” (Divus Vespasianus 7.2-3). NB: Serapis was known as a healing god (Theissen, Miracle Stories, 269).
130 Mt 14:19 is the other occurrence and it is used in a context other than healing the blind.
131 Davie and Allison, Matthew, 2:140.
132 Luz [Matthew 8-20, 46] points out that ἀναοίγω is used in conjunction with ὀφθαλμοί no less than fifteen times in the LXX.
133 Cf. my discussion of the two animals in Mt 21:7 (VI.4).
V.2.2 Therapeutic Exorcisms in Matthew

Theissen observed that Mark tends to dichotomize the categories of healing and exorcism (Mk 1:32-33; 3:10-11; 6:13). In contrast, Matthew occasionally changes Mark’s ἐκβάλλω-stories and describes them in terms of θεραπεύω or ἱάομαι. What is not immediately clear is if this shift represents an implied distinction between healing and exorcism on the part of Matthew. Novakovic and Duling have argued that Matthew has intentionally downplayed Son of David as exorcist in favor of a portrayal of Son of David as healer. But this dichotomy is unwarranted for three reasons. The first is that Matthew is not averse to referring to exorcism as ἐκβάλλω, in fact he does so frequently, often to describe Jesus’ therapeutic ministry. The second is that even though Matthew prefers θεραπεύω in Son of David contexts, he occasionally employs ἐκβάλλω in conjunction with θεραπεύω (Mt 8:16, 10:1, 10:8). In these cases θεραπεύω is meant to qualify ἐκβάλλω, not replace it. Lastly, as Charlesworth has shown with the TSol, sickness was often understood demonologically.

That Mark tends toward this dichotomy suggests that there were varying interpretations of this relationship in the first century. But this only confirms that Matthew’s interpretation was more in line with Josephus and the author of TSol as the evangelist has chosen to blur the distinction set in place by Mark. It should be pointed out that not every illness was thought to have been caused by demons. Exorcism seems to be under the larger therapeutic umbrella but not identical with it. Matthew was intent to portray Jesus as the healing messiah and has included Mark’s exorcism stories because he understands exorcism to be a form of healing. This is important for Matthew who wants Jesus to be understood as the divinely authorized messianic healer rather than associated with foreign therapy. Son of David features prominently in this agenda as will be shown in the following analysis of Mt 12:22-8 and 15:21-28.

The Beelzebul controversy has attracted an enormous amount of scholarly interest. It is often viewed as a window into (the historical) Jesus’ personal interpretation

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136 Theissen, Miracle Stories, 85; he admits that this dichotomy should not be taken too far in that the two are obviously related and thus associated with one another.
138 Mt 7:22; 8:16, 31; 9:33, 34; 10:8; 12:24, 26, 27, 28; 17:19.
139 Charlesworth, “Son of David”, 82.
140 Sorensen [Possession, 135] demonstrates that Mark consistently uses separate verbs for exorcism which suggests that he classified these as separate therapeutic categories.
141 Theissen, Miracle Stories, 85.
of his ministry of exorcism and its relationship to the kingdom of God. My present interests are more concerned with how Matthew has localized this story within his own agenda. Mt 12:22-8 reads:

22 Then a demon-possessed man, blind and mute, was brought to Jesus and he healed him, so that the mute man spoke and saw. 23 All the crowds were amazed, and were saying, "This man cannot be the Son of David, can he?" 24 But when the Pharisees heard, they said, "This man casts out demons only by Beelzebul, the ruler of the demons!" 25 And knowing their thoughts Jesus said to them, "Any kingdom divided against itself is laid waste; and any city or house divided against itself will not stand. 26 If Satan casts out Satan, he is divided against himself; how then will his kingdom stand? 27 If I by Beelzebul cast out demons, by whom do your sons cast out? 28 But if I cast out demons by the Spirit of God, then the kingdom of God has come upon you.

The Markan arrangement of this tradition (in all likelihood, independent from Q) does not narrate an exorcism story. Mark’s version takes the form of an independent accusation from the “scribes”. For the most part, Matthew has followed Q. Lk 11:14 reflects Q’s introduction, "Καὶ Ἰν ἐκβάλλων δαιμόνιον..." Novakovic is correct in observing that Matthew has intentionally omitted "ἐκβάλλω" from this introduction. But it cannot be doubted that Matthew intends this story to be associated with exorcism. Indeed ἐκβάλλω is used five times in the following sequence of sayings. It is clear from this context that Matthew was comfortable classifying Jesus’ exorcism under the umbrella of therapy. Sorensen speaks to Matthew’s agenda in this respect:

"By classifying exorcism as a form of healing [Matthew gains] the practical advantage of connecting Jesus’ activity to the biblical prophetic tradition about the works that identify the true messiah which otherwise did not mention exorcism among Jesus’ messianic acts, even though it was not prescribed by prophecy.”

As seen in the previous section, Matthew interpreted Jesus’ therapeutic ministry in light of the promises of Isaiah. It is important to recognize that Matthew has placed this

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142 E.g. J.D.G. Dunn, Jesus and the Spirit (Grand Rapids: Eerdmans, 1975), 44-9; Wright, Victory of God, 195, 438; M. Bockmuehl, This Jesus (Downers Grove: InterVarsity, 1994), 56.

143 Lovestam, “Fils de David”, 99 summarizes the relationship between demons, illness and kingdom nicely: “On sait que dans le N.T. les démons sont l’émanation, les représentants d’une unique puissance ennemie de Dieu. Chez les Synoptiques leur action se manifeste dans la maladie, physique ou psychique, ou les deux à la fois.” Thus in his therapeutic and exorcistic ministry, Jesus was battling a unified power hostile to God.

144 Novakovic, Messiah, 104; cf. a similar redactional pattern in Mt 4:23, 24; 9:35; 15:30; 21:14. Novakovic also notes that "even though Matt 4:24 mentions demoniacs (δαιμονίων, ζώμενοι), they belong to a more general category (those afflicted with various diseases and pains) whom Jesus healed (ἐθραπένευσεν)" (p. 105).

145 Sorensen, Possession, 135-6.
controversy directly after a fulfillment formula which quotes Isa 42.146 The verses immediately preceding our passage specify that the messiah’s task involves blessings for gentiles. Matthew is careful to follow this quotation with a story that emphasizes Jesus’ Jewishness. Thus Sorensen is correct that this played into Matthew’s decision to classify this exorcism as an act of Isaiahic therapy.147

This agenda is further clarified as Matthew aimed to disassociate Jesus’ ministry from foreign therapy. Jesus is accused of acting on the authority of a foreign deity. By accusing Jesus of being in league with Beelzebul (the ancient God of Ekron148) the Pharisees associated Jesus with foreign therapy. If so, Jesus would have been understood as an outsider and an enemy of YHWH and his people. Matthew has used this dialogue as an opportunity to demonstrate that Jesus acts on behalf of YHWH and Israel by the power of the Spirit of God.149 While the Pharisees have tried to paint Jesus as an outsider,150 Matthew’s Jesus refutes this accusation by appealing to other precedents for Jewish exorcism. The logic here is that if Jesus is acting on the authority of Satan, the other “sons” of Israel must do so as well. Thus the key issue in the Beelzebul Controversy is whether Jesus is a practitioner of foreign therapy151 or if he ought to be counted among the “sons” of Israel.

I have thus far left Matthew’s application of Son of David to this context unmentioned. This has been necessary to determine the central issue(s) in Matthew’s received tradition. We are now in a position to determine what is was that attracted the

146 “Behold, my servant whom I have chosen; my beloved in whom my soul is well-pleased; I will put my Spirit upon him and he shall proclaim justice to the gentiles. He will not quarrel, nor cry out; nor will anyone hear his voice in the streets. A battered reed, he will not break off, and a smoldering wick, he will not put out, until he leads justice to victory. And in his name the Gentiles will hope” (Mt 12:18-21 cf. Isa 42:1-4).

147 It is also notable that Isa 42 heavily concentrates on blindness (42:7, 16, 18 and three times in verse 19). The verse closest to the Matthew quotation promises “to open blind eyes” (Isa 42:7). It is then no coincidence that Matthew has followed his fulfillment formula with the healing of a blind man.

148 Ekron was originally associated with Canaanite territory (Jos 13:3). See W.E.M. Atkin, “Beelzebul”, JBL (1912); Beelzebul is featured prominently in TSol (2:8-3:6; 6:1-11) as “the ruler of the demons”, but it is difficult to determine how much this reflects NT influence.149 Notice that Matthew has not attached the circumlocution “τῶν οὐρανῶν” as is his tendency. Davies and Allison [Matthew, 2:339-40] argue that Matthew has intentionally maintained this language to call attention to the contrast between kingdom of Satan and the kingdom of God. This concept of the duality of spiritual kingdoms is reminiscent of the belief manifested at Qumran that Belial’s kingdom stood in direct opposition to the people of the community (4Q286 f7 2.1-6). Cf also the role that the Spirit plays in establishing YHWH’s true community in 1QS 3.6 and the duality of spirits referred to in 1QS 3.18-19. For an assessment of duality (both cosmic and ethical) in the latter test see Frey, “Dualistic”, 294.

150 Theissen [Miracle Stories, 272] surveys a wide range of sources which suggest that, in Palestine, magic was generally associated with travelers from other countries.

151 On the perception of Jesus as a magician, see Smith, Magician, 94-139; Aune, “Magic”, 1523-9; Stanton, “Magician”, esp. 171-5; Wright, Victory of God, 440.
title to this context. Because the crux of Jesus’ argument was to appeal to the precedent of other Jewish exorcists, Matthew has associated Jesus with the most well known (indeed the archetypal) precedent for exorcism: Solomon, the Son of David. Matthew’s portrayal of Jesus is that of an exorcist so talented and successful that he struck awe into his supposed onlookers and invited the possibility that he was Solomon redivivus. Jesus does not act on the authority of foreign deities, he is among the sons of Israel and, moreover, he is the Son of David. It is on this basis that he has authority to therapeutically cast out demons.

I am not persuaded by the argument that Matthew has in mind only Isaianic fulfillment of messianic healing. There can be no doubt that his framework was crucially important to Matthew; it has led him to classify Jesus’ exorcism as a therapeutic act. But the fact that he specifically associated this passage with Son of David (a title not taken from Isaiah) shows that Matthew had a broader notion of how to interpret Jesus’ therapeutic ministry. Because exorcism was such a large part of his received tradition and because it (at least in this case) carried the negative connotation of foreign exorcistic practice, Matthew had need of a category that was in line with both royal messianism and Jewish exorcism. Solomon typology served to bridge these two mnemonic spheres for Matthew.

Matthew’s account of the Canaanite woman and her daughter sheds further light upon Matthew’s Son of David agenda (Mt 15:22-8):

22And behold, a Canaanite woman came out from that region, and began to cry out, saying, “Have mercy on me, O Lord, Son of David; my daughter is cruelly demon-possessed.” 23But he did not answer her a word. And His disciples came and kept asking him, saying, “Send her away, for she is shouting out after us.” 24But he answered and said, “I was sent only to the lost sheep of the house of Israel.” 25But she came and began to bow down before him, saying, “Lord, help me!” 26But he answered and said, “It is not good to take the children’s bread and throw it to the dogs.” 27But she said, “Yes, Lord; but even the dogs feed on the crumbs which fall from their masters’ table.” 28Then Jesus answered and said to her, “O woman, your faith is great; be it done for you as you wish.” And her daughter was healed at once.

152 Novakovic [Messiah, 107] argues that Matthew emphasizes Jesus as the healing messiah and deemphasizes Jesus the exorcist. Central to her conclusion is a dichotomy between Solomon the exorcist tradition and Davidic messianism. Novakovic argues that the title Son of David should be understood exclusively in terms of healing and rejects the notion that Matthew has inherited a tradition which has fused these two categories. She concludes that Matthew “neither presupposes nor accomplishes the converging of the traditions about Solomon as exorcist and the Davidic Messiah. […] Jesus’ healing miracles function as the messianic deeds and not as the acts of the miracle worker after the order of Solomon”.

153 Charlesworth, “Son of David”, 84.

154 Cf. Berger, “Messiastraditionen”, 13; he concluded that Son of David was a Solomonic category and, at the same time, in complete coherence with Matthew’s Deutero-Isaianic program.
This is a fascinating story which will not be treated in full presently. However several brief observations are warranted to confirm my previous analysis. (1) Jesus is hailed Son of David in conjunction with a request for exorcism. (2) Matthew has emphasized that the “demon-possessed [δαιμονίζωμαι]” has been “healed [θάρσομαι].”155 (3) The issue of Jesus’ relationship to foreigners is at center stage as the woman is a Canaanite.156 (4) Matthew has made three significant conceptual alterations to this story that warrant further detail and comment: (4A) Matthew has added to this dialogue Jesus’ words: “I was sent only to the lost sheep of the house of Israel” (Mt. 15:24). (4B) Matthew has omitted from this dialogue Jesus’ words: “Let the children be fed first...” (Mk 7:27a). (4C) Matthew has added to this dialogue the woman’s words: “Son of David” (Mt 15:22).

In this passage we see a similar network of interlocking concerns as were present in Mt 12:22-8. Matthew is chiefly interested in showing that Jesus’ therapeutic activity confirms his Jewishness and is in no way to be associated with foreigners. The Matthean Jesus emphasizes this by saying that his ministry is only aimed at Israel (4A). Mark’s story hints in the direction of a hierarchical sequence: first Israel, then the gentiles. By Matthew’s account, Jesus has no intention of coming to the aid of Canaan even secondarily (4B). Matthew has taken every effort to portray Jesus’ therapeutic ministry as a distinctly Israelite blessing (4C). Within this context the application of Son of David serves to align Jesus’ ministry of exorcism with the distinctly Jewish archetype, Solomon. Jesus, as Son of David, cannot be accused of having any sympathy for the therapy of gentiles.

The woman eventually receives the benefits of the Son of David’s therapeutic ministry because she assumes the posture that is theo-politically correct, she kneels.157 She comes to Jesus in complete deference and submission158 and thus receives the

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155 This story demonstrates that exorcism and healing are overlapping mnemonic frames. D. Trunk has argued that Matthew has downplayed exorcism but admits that he is unsure whether this story fits the form of a healing story either [Der messianische Heiler: eine redaktions- und religionsgeschichtliche Studie zu den Exorzismen im Matthäusevanglium (Freiburg: Herder, 1994), 142]; Davies and Allison, Matthew, 2:544 have called this story a “mixed-form”.

156 Cf. the previous association with Ekron in Mt 10:25; 12:24.

157 Theissen, Miracle Stories, 53.

158 Trunk [Heiler, 149-50] argues that Mark’s ἀοριστόν προοιμίῳ (Mk 7:25) has been changed by Matthew to the imperfect προοιμίῳ in order to show even more humility on the part of the woman (Mt 15:25). Berger (“Messiastraditionen”, 22) very helpfully extended this theme to Matthew’s infancy narrative (Mt 2). Here the foreign Magi come in proper deference and submission to the true King of Israel.
superfluous blessings from the table of YHWH’s chosen people.\textsuperscript{159} Even then, Jesus heals by distance rather than entering the house of a gentile.

In summary, this section has argued that Matthew subsumed exorcism under the heading of therapy, not because he has chosen to downplay exorcism, but because he understands Jesus’ exorcisms to be in line with Isaiah’s promised healing. By associating Jesus’ therapeutic ministry with Isaiah, Matthew has distanced Jesus from any accusation of foreign therapy or gentile sympathy. The Solomonic title Son of David aptly serves this agenda in that it provides a Jewish precedent for exorcism. Jesus as Son of David is fashioned after the archetypal royal exorcist: Solomon.

\subsection*{V.2.3 Son of David, Authority and Metaphorical Blindness}
Kingsbury argued that, because Son of David is most common in the context of Jesus healing the blind, it represents a literary symbol on the part of Matthew to contrast the metaphorical blindness of Israel (represented by the Pharisees) with the opening of the eyes of true Israel (represented by Jesus’ followers).\textsuperscript{160} I am largely sympathetic to this thesis and would also add an observation based on my previous examination of PsSol 17 (IV.2.3). Because the PsSol 17 is commonly attributed to the Pharisees, one might consider the possibility that one of Matthew’s arguments with the Pharisees concerned the proper understanding of the title Son of David.\textsuperscript{161}

With this in mind, there is a repeated motif in Matthew’s gospel where the title is applied to Jesus by a lesser member of society and this sparks a negative comment on the part of the Jewish leadership (12:23-4; 21:15). Considering Matthew’s indictment of the Pharisees and scribes in Mt 23,\textsuperscript{162} this is no doubt part of Matthew’s agenda. Although it must be said that this idea manifests itself in an overarching theme more than it does in a frequently repeated motif. As mentioned, there are only two occurrences where Son of David is localized within a leadership dispute. The first instance, the Beelzebul Controversy, has already been discussed. I will also briefly touch upon the second instance, Jesus’ healing in the Temple, in the following chapter (VI.4). With this in mind,

\textsuperscript{160}J.D. Kingsbury, “The Title "Son of David" in Matthew's Gospel”, \textit{JBL} 95 (1976): 601-2; T.Y. Mullins calls this Matthew’s “three-motif constellation” [“Jesus, the 'Son of David'”, \textit{AUSS} 29 (1991) 123].
\textsuperscript{161}J.W. Bowker [\textit{Jesus and the Pharisees} (Cambridge: CUP, 1973), 38-52] argued that Jesus was condemned as a false elder that had led Israel astray. The point is worth repeating, however, that the Pharisees probably represent the first-century group most ideologically similar to that of Jesus’ movement (and perhaps Matthew’s community).
\textsuperscript{162}In Mt 23:16-26 they are insultingly called “blind” no less than five times (cf. the similar but more modest accusation in 15:14).
I will circumvent redundancy as much as possible and focus on Matthew’s larger thematic picture. After all, one must try to avoid “the folly of interpreting the individual pericopae of the gospel in isolation from each other.” In the end, the “many pieces of Matthew hang together and were intended to shed light upon one another. Meaning resides not just in the parts but in the whole.”

As seen previously in my analysis of the Beelzebul Controversy, Matthew has taken a dispute concerning the authority behind his exorcisms and has turned it into a platform for his Son of David agenda. As pointed out by Kingsbury, part of this agenda included a polemical portrayal of Israel’s leadership. Matthew’s account is essentially a demonological “healing” followed by three responses. Matthew has couched the first response (the crowd’s Son of David association) between Jesus’ healing exorcism and the second response (the Pharisees’ accusation). The third response is reserved for Jesus who has the final word. More accurately, Jesus has several final words as Matthew (following Q) launches into a series of rebukes aimed at the Pharisees. In this way, Matthew’s crowd is open to the possibility of Jesus as the Son of David because he has restored sight and speech to a blind and mute person. In contrast, Israel’s leadership is blind to this possibility and they are silenced by Jesus’ rebuke. This thesis has been picked up by Trunk. He correctly observes that the dispute concerning the authority of Jesus’ exorcisms “gewinnt so eine paradigmatische Bedeutung für den Streit um den Messias Israels, den ‘Sohn Davids’” Matthew’s climatic healing in the Temple should be seen from this vantage point.

As will be discussed in the following chapter, the Matthean Jesus enters Jerusalem amidst acclamations that publicly declare him the Son of David. Upon entering the Temple, Jesus “drove out [ἐξεβάλετε]” the merchants (21:12). Immediately after his demonstration,

The blind and the lame came to him and he healed them. But when the chief priests and the scribes saw the wonderful things that he had done, and the children who were shouting in the Temple, “Hosanna to the Son of David!” they became indignant and said to him, “Do you hear what these are saying?” (21:14-16).

163 Davies and Allison, Matthew, 2:141.
164 Trunk, Heiler, 92.
166 Pertinent to this usage is Twelftree’s survey of how ἐκβάλλω generally functions in the LXX [Exorcist, 110]: It is primarily used when Yahweh’s enemies are about to be cast out of the land. “Most occurrences of ἐκβάλλω in the LXX are in contexts where an enemy, frustrating or standing in the way of God fulfilling his purpose for his chosen people of Israel, is cast out (ἐκβάλλω) so that God’s purpose can be fulfilled. This purpose is most often the possession of the promised land.” Cf. LXX Ex 23.20; Deut 33.27-8.
In accordance with the motif, Jesus has the final word and the dialogue ends. Thus again we have a healing followed by three responses in the exact order of the Beelzebul Controversy: (1) The amazed onlookers apply Son of David to Jesus. (2) Israel’s leadership attempts to correct this interpretation of Jesus’ healing. (3) Jesus rebukes Israel’s leadership.

But more important than the motif (which is rare in Matthew\(^{167}\)) is the theme which stands behind it: Jesus as Son of David has divine authority to subdue the enemies of God’s people, whether they are demons or false leaders. Jesus’ authority within the Temple precincts further demonstrates his condemnation of Israel’s leadership. As the Son of David, Jesus heals the blind and lame in the Temple and continues to condemn the Temple establishment through sayings, disputes and parables until his ultimate indictment of the Pharisees as “blind guides” in Mt 23.

Thus far I have followed Kingsbury in arguing that Matthew’s juxtaposition of literal blindness and metaphorical blindness is directly related to Jesus’ status as Son of David. It is now necessary to offer a possible reason why Matthew has associated Son of David with this theme. Building upon earlier suggestions,\(^{168}\) Paffenroth has argued that Jesus’ Temple healings as the Son of David should be read in light of a particular episode from the life of the historic David.\(^{169}\) I offer here an abbreviated version of 2Sam 5:3-10 (emphasis indicative of pertinence).

So all the elders […] anointed David king over Israel. David was thirty years old when he became king […] Now the king and his men went to Jerusalem against the Jebusites, the inhabitants of the land, and they said to David, “You shall not come in here, but the blind and lame will turn you away”; thinking, “David cannot enter here.” Nevertheless, David captured the stronghold of Zion, that is the city of David. David said on that day, “Whoever would strike the Jebusites, let him reach the lame and the blind, who are hated by David’s soul, through the water tunnel.” Therefore

\(^{167}\) Given that this motif is only used twice by Matthew, the possibility emerges that these accounts are metaphorically related. The healing exorcism of Mt 12:22ff was used by the evangelist as a springboard for sayings related to exorcism. In this context ἐκβαλλω is used four times (12:24, 26, 27, 28). This is the highest concentration of such vocabulary in Matthew. It is possible that when Jesus “drove out [ἐκβαλεν]” the merchants, he performed a metaphorical exorcism of the Temple. Furthermore Jesus’ reference to the “house [οἴκια]” of the strong man (12:29) might anticipate “my house will be called a house of prayer [ὁ οἶκος μου οἶκος προσευχῆς κληθήσεται]” (Mt 21:13 cf. Isa 56:7; Jer 7:11). From this possibility, we might reconsider the possibility that Beelzebul was appealed to for the etymology of the name “Lord of the House (=Temple?)” that was first suggested by L. Gaston, “Beelzebul”, TZ 18 (1962): 253-4.


they say, "The blind or the lame shall not come into the house." So David lived in the stronghold and called it the city of David. [...] David became greater and greater, for YHWH, God of hosts, was with him.

Paffenroth argues that Jesus as Son of David has been "contrasted, not compared, with his father David: David was a powerful warrior" while "Jesus is a powerful healer". She argues that the central parallel is that David excluded the blind and lame from the city (and Temple by way of the saying associated with the story), while Jesus cured the blind and lame in the Temple. Mullins suggests that Matthew inherited the three-motif constellation and did not himself see a connection with 2Sam 5. Trunk observes that there must be some connection but gives no suggestion of how these stories might relate. The problem commonly felt in this discussion is that the title Son of David serves to associate Jesus (in some sense) with the historic David, but Jesus seems to be opposite to David with respect to his healing of the blind and lame.

A better solution to this problem is seen when one takes seriously Matthew's interest in metaphorical blindness. In my estimation, Jesus as the healing Son of David is typologically similar to David in this respect; Paffenroth's argument for contrast is misplaced. Matthew has typologically called to mind David's hatred for the blind and his refusal of their presence in Jerusalem/Temple. But for Matthew, the question is who is really blind? According the evangelist, it is not the literally blind that the Son of David hates; in fact, Jesus restores sight to these marginalized members of society. In such contexts, the Matthean Jesus is reputed for his compassion (Mt 9:36; 14:14; 15:32; 20:34). Rather the worst kind of blindness is metaphorical. Israel's leaders, especially the Pharisees, represent spiritual blindness and thus are condemned from a pulpit of Temple authority. This is the context that best explains Matthew's use of Isa 56:7 on the lips of Jesus. Isa 56:7-10 reads:

170 Mullins ["Son of David", 122-5] argues, "[T]he First Gospel probably did not see a special importance in the references to blindness in conjunction with the Son-of-David."

171 Trunk, Heiler, 61-3.


173 Paffenroth ["Anointed", 553] argues that because David was unable to save his child from death (2Sam 12:16ff) he was understood to have been a poor healer; in contrast, Jesus is an excellent healer. This connection seems vague and is contrary to David's reputation as discussed above (V.1.3).

174 Thus Jesus cannot be accused of Temple impurity. An interesting observation has been made by Davidson, Angels at Qumran, 185-6; he points out that at Qumran, the blind (among others) are excluded from the congregation because of the presence of angels (CD 15.15b-17a par. 4QDa 8 1.6-7 and 1QSa 2.4b-9). Perhaps the rationale here is that demons are associated with physical defect and angels are associated with Temple worship and the two are opposed to one another. Cf. also the exclusion of the ritually impure due to the presence of angels in 1QM 7.1-7.
Even those I will bring to my Holy Mount and make them joyful in my house of prayer. Their burnt offerings and their sacrifices will be acceptable on my altar. For my house will be called a house of prayer for all the peoples. 8YHWH God, who gathers the dispersed of Israel, declares, yet I will gather to them, to those gathered.

All you beasts of the field, all you beasts in the forest, come to eat. 10His watchmen are blind; all of them know nothing...

As seen previously, Matthew’s blindness theme was taken in large part from Isa 35:5 and 61:1-2. It is evident from the context of Isa 56 (from which Jesus quoted during his Temple demonstration) that Matthew’s interest in metaphorical blindness has also been informed by Isaiah. This climatic quotation of Isaiah also brings to fruition Matthew’s Jewishness-vs.-foreigner theme. Jesus is here portrayed as an advocate for foreign worship in the Temple. Matthew’s quote demonstrates that this concept does not stem from Jesus’ foreign sympathies but from Isaianic theology: If the nations come in deference and submission to YHWH and his chosen people, their sacrifices will be acceptable on the altar.

To this theme, the evangelist again has appended Son of David typology in order to lend authority to Jesus. Son of David connects Jesus to Solomon in that Jesus is portrayed in terms of therapy and in terms of Temple authority. The title also connects him with David who was also known for therapeutic activity and, most importantly, his rejection of the blind from Jerusalem. As should be expected from this mnemonic sphere, Son of David evokes a dual typology. There seems to be no tension between a healing Davidic messiah and an exorcizing Solomon redivivus in Matthew’s program. Both support Matthew’s thesis that Jesus is the Son of David.

Matthew’s gospel betrays a tension between Jesus’ association with foreign sympathies and his own belief that Jesus was the Jewish messiah. Matthew’s application of Isaiah serves to locate Jesus within a distinctly Jewish agenda. His application of Son of David serves to disassociate him from foreign sympathies. The evangelist has reinforced both mnemonic categories in his presentation as a response to non-Christian Jews who associate the Jesus movement with gentile sympathies and non-Jewish ideology.

175 It should also be noted that the by product of Jesus healing the blind in the Temple is that these “impure” people were no longer blind! Thus issues of purity are satisfied and Jesus’ association with David is intact. I.e. Jesus, like David, does not suffer the presence of blind people in the Temple; he remedies this impurity by healing them.
Generally speaking, NT scholarship is divided into three (sometimes overlapping) theories about Jesus' ministry of exorcism. The first is that Jesus' exorcisms betray an apocalyptic and eschatological worldview. This group argues that the historical Jesus (and/or the evangelists) understood his exorcisms as the initial binding of Satan in preparation for the eschaton. The second group argues that Jesus' exorcistic ministry was ultimately about ritual purity. Kee has argued that the purpose of Jesus' ministry was to restore the covenantal relationship between the community and its marginalized "impure" members. He thus extends Jesus' association with sinners and the physically afflicted to Jesus' ministry of exorcism. The third group understands Jesus' exorcistic activity as a metaphor for liberation from Roman imperialism. Others have postulated a combination of the above. I am inclined to agree that the best explanation must include a combination of facets from all three perspectives. However I will presently bracket the question of Jesus' intentions and attempt to address how Jesus was perceived by his contemporaries.

The present chapter has thus far focused on (1) the possible backgrounds for first century exorcist/therapeutic ideology and (2) Matthew's redactional agenda with regard to Son of David and therapy. In the first section my interest was primarily diachronic. This discussion showed that the subject of "magic" brought with it great cultural tension. While many facets of magical practice were considered evil, certain therapeutic facets such as exorcism were legitimatized and incorporated into religious life. This included the localization of Israel's archetypal figures within demonological categories. My

176 E.g. Sorensen, Possession, 129; Garrett, Demise, 46.
178 Twelftree, Exorcist, 173, 224. Most studies from this perspective the sayings associated with the Beelzebul controversy as the hermeneutical key by which one can unlock Jesus' intentions.
180 E.g. R.A. Horsley, Jesus and the Spiral of Violence: Popular Jewish Resistance in Roman Palestine (San Francisco: Harper & Row, 1987), 184-90; J.D. Crossan, The Historical Jesus: The Life of a Mediterranean Jewish Peasant (San Francisco: Harper & Row, 1992), 313-8; C. Myers, Binding the Strong Man: A Political Reading of Mark's Story of Jesus (Maryknoll: Orbis, 1988), esp.190-4: Most studies from this perspective utilize Mark's story of the Gerasene Demoniac as the hermeneutical key by which one can unlock the rest other stories of exorcism. Sorensen, Possession, 130 disagrees with this theory, arguing that there is insufficient evidence that there was hostility toward Roman occupation or that this is a theme in Mark. I find Sorensen's objection unconvincing.
largely synchronic analysis of Matthew demonstrated that many of these concerns and interpretive moves were reflected in his presentation of Jesus as Son of David. As I now turn to discuss the historical Jesus, it will be necessary to locate his exorcistic and therapeutic activity somewhere along the mnemonic trajectory laid out in section one and in some relationship to the mnemonic sphere discussed in section two.

V.3.1 Evidence of Memory
That Jesus was perceived as an exorcist by his contemporaries is one of the few positions that enjoys virtual scholarly consensus. In his seminal examination of Jesus’ miracles, Strauss concluded that Jesus’ exorcisms were among those that had a high claim to historicity. 182 Every generation of scholarship since has confirmed this assessment with majority. 183 It then becomes less a question of whether Jesus’ contemporaries perceived events that they interpreted as exorcisms but which accounts within the synoptic tradition are best explained as memory rather than invention. I will argue that four of the above passages are the product of early memory.

Mk 8:22-6: (1) As discussed in brief above, Mk 8:22-6 seems to have embarrassed Matthew. Luke has likely omitted this story altogether for similar reasons. I have previously referred to this account as Jesus’ “second-try” healing. In his first attempt the blind man only sees blurrily; people look like moving trees. In contrast, Matthew’s Jesus heals effectively on the first try and with little effort. (2) Jesus spits on the man’s eyes in this process. Not only does this act describe more effort than Matthew was willing to afford, it (3) calls to mind foreign therapy where saliva was thought to have healing properties (cf. Caesar worship). 184 Thus the criterion of embarrassment can be applied in three ways in this case. Furthermore, Jesus uses physical media to heal and thus strays from the formula of healing via the spoken word or simple touch. Thus the criterion of Contrary Tendency applies. For these reasons, Mk 8:22-6 looks to represent an account of early memory rather than invention.

Mt 15:21-8//Mk 7:24-30: (1) The account of Canaanite/Syrophoenician woman’s daughter is a story that was likely embarrassing on several levels. For Matthew, the fact that this woman is a gentile requires a heightening of Jesus’ unsympathetic demeanor. As discussed, Matthew’s minor distortions to this tradition probably betray his apologetic

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184 Matthew and Luke similarly omit Mark’s account of Jesus healing of the deaf man wherein Jesus uses his saliva (Mk 7:31-7 cf. Mt 15:29-31).
debate with non-Christian Jews. (2) From a gentile perspective, the fact that Jesus refers to the woman as a dog would have been highly embarrassing. The observation that κυνάριον refers to a domesticated dog rather than a stray dog does not assuage the tension created by the assumed theo-political hierarchy on Jesus’ lips. It is not surprising that Luke has altogether omitted this account. (3) This woman refuses to be deterred by Jesus and ultimately wins the argument! This is an extremely rare occurrence in the gospels and runs contrary to the editorial tendencies of both Mark and Matthew. (4) It is possible, although not conclusive, that Matthew’s account represents a source independent from Mark. There can be no doubt that Matthew had knowledge of Mark’s version but it seems as though he has chosen not to use it in preference for his own source. If this is so, the criterion of Multiple Attestation might be cautiously applied. (5) The phrase “ἡ εἰς ἑαυτῷ τῷ θυγατρίῳ αὐτῆς πνεύμα ἀκάθαρτον” might betray Semitic influence as well as a grammatical Semitism. The first is that “unclean spirit” is a particularly Jewish designation which has connotation of purity. Second, “ἡ ... αὐτῆς [whose ... her]” seems redundant in Greek but not in Aramaic or Hebrew. A Semitic formulation would include the indeclinable relative pronoun AllowAnonymousor (Aramaic) or יוש (Hebrew). All considered, this story is one of the most difficult in the NT to attribute to invention.

Mt 12:22-8//Mk 3:21-7//Lk 11:14-22: (1) The variations between the Markan and Q versions of the Beelzebul Controversy suggest independence. As such the story is multiply attested. (2) Furthermore Mark’s account does not take the form of an exorcism story; rather, it is an independent saying. The logion form of this controversy in Mt 10:25 confirms that the criterion of Multiple Forms is warranted. (3) In the Markan version the context is that of a dispute between Jesus and his family. In addition, Jesus has here been accused of being both insane and in league with a foreign deity. These details were obviously embarrassing to Matthew in particular and potentially embarrassing to those who used the Markan tradition.

185 Trunk, Heiler, 144.
186 Mt 15:22-8 and Mk 7:26-30 show very little evidence of literary dependence. Of the 140 words in Matthew and the 130 words in Mark the two stories share less than 40 words in common; so, Davies and Allison, Matthew, 2:542; Dunn [“Jesus in Oral Memory” 101-2] has offered a comparison of these stories as a case for his thesis of synoptic orality and done so compellingly. These stories seem to betray “spontaneously different variations (retellings) on a theme (the identifiable theme and core).”
who held James and Mary in high regard. This story is best explained as having derived from early memory.

Mt 20:29-34//Mk 10:46-52: (1) It is worth reiterating that Mark’s gospel was not particularly motivated by a Son of David agenda. Anderson suggests that “Mark may have seen a connexion between the designation Son of David here and the messianic fervour of the people on the entry into Jerusalem in 11:9-11.”189 If he did, he has not spelled it out for his reader. As will be discussed below (VI.2), Mark does not make use of the title in the account of Jesus’ entry into Jerusalem, and then provides a very ambiguous use of the title in Mk 12:35-7 (VII). It seems clear that the title was relatively unimportant for Mark and that he has probably not invented it in this context. (2) In addition, the phrasing of “νερεί Δαυίδ Ἰςραήλ” (10:47) and “τοῦ Ἰςραήλ” (10:50) are anomalous formulations in Mark. The second of these “the Jesus” is particularly difficult to explain.190 These titles run contrary to the editorial tendencies of Mark in both form and function. (3) The phrase “ὁ νιὸς Τιμαίου Βαρτιμαίος” (Mk 10:46) contains the obviously Aramaic רֶבֶץ preceded by the explanation of this designation in Greek.191 (4) The title “ῥαββίου” (10:51) reflects a heightening of רֶבֶץ or רָבִּיע with the suffix רֶבֶץ. These Aramaisms suggest that the original story was not told in Greek and this story is very difficult to explain grammatically at times. For these reasons this story was likely based on memory rather than invention.

In sum, the stories that seem most likely to have originated from memory are Mark’s “second-try” healing, the exorcism of the Syrophoenician daughter, and the Beelzebul controversy. In each of these cases, Jesus has been remembered for his relationship to gentiles or gentile magical practice. In the latter two stories, Son of David has been attached to the tradition by Matthew. The one case where Son of David has been remembered in the career of Jesus is in the Bartimaeus healing. This is the only case where Son of David does not seem to have been employed as a part of a

190 Charlesworth [“Son of David”, 78] suggests that “the Jesus” perhaps demonstrates that there was something in the name that was titular and connotative of healing like Joshua Ben Parayah who was reputed as healer in Aramaic incantation texts; cf. Montgomery, Texts from Nippur, no.17 line 14. I do not find this suggestion compelling.
191 Gundry, Mark, 599 supports the argument that the Aramaic רֶבֶץ reflects the conceptual connection of impurity “be unclean [נָשֶׁר]” which would have made the Greek meaning of “Τιμαῖος [honored one]” misleading to Mark’s audience. Gundry also observes that Mark usually introduces the translation of a Semitism by including “ὁ ἴσαν” i.e. “ὁ ἴσαν ἰσαὶ (μεθερμηνεύομενον)”; cf. Mk 3:17; 5:41; 7:11, 34; 12:42; 15:16, 22, 34, 42. He has not done so in this case.
Christological program since Mark does not seem interested in relating the title to any Christological claim.

V.3.2 Evaluation of the Evidence

Having discussed the mnemonic trajectories, spheres and frameworks associated with Jesus’ historical context the present chapter is now in a position to ask the crucial question: How does the title Son of David relate to Jesus’ historical career as an exorcist and healer? Based on my treatment of the evidence in this chapter the entry point of Son of David into the Jesus tradition seems to have been Bartimaeus’ cry for healing. That Jesus was known for his therapeutic activity seems certain. We cannot say with certainty that this took place in Jericho or that it occurred in Jesus’ final week. It is not clear whether Son of David was a central part of Jesus’ reputation or whether it was applied only in this case. As the title is employed in Mark, it remains relatively underdeveloped and isolated. As will be seen, we are not ultimately helped by its application in Mk 12:35-7 and so our only recourse is to measure the title’s significance against the mnemonic trajectories leading up and through the first century and the mnemonic spheres available to this period.

I have demonstrated previously that (1) as a title, Son of David carried Solomonic significance from its earliest manifestations in the HB, (2) it maintained this significance until the first centuries BCE, (3) it is only extant in the Dead Sea Scrolls when used of Solomon and (4) it continued to be applied to Solomon’s legacy as it took on demonological significance in the TSol. Given this trajectory, I would agree with Charlesworth “that the most probable explanation of Bartimaeus’ οὐκ Δαυΐδ is some Solomonic denotation.”193

Having made this point, the red thread that has run throughout this chapter is Jesus’ relationship to foreign ideas, his possible sympathy to these and Matthew’s legitimizing apologetic. What has been most clear from the texts surveyed and the redactional agenda(s) of Matthew is that Jesus’ therapeutic career was marked with suspicion and conflict. Such suspicions and disputes are evident in the earliest tradition and continue throughout Jesus’ legacy. The characters in Matthew’s gospel reflect well the multicultural tensions discussed in the first part of this chapter. Indeed Matthew’s stance on the significance of Jesus’ therapeutic ministry seems a natural reaction to accusations like the one leveled by Celsus:

...Jesus, on account of his poverty, was hired out to go to Egypt. While there he acquired certain (magical) powers which Egyptians pride themselves on possessing. He returned home highly elated at possessing these powers, and on the strength of them gave himself out to be a god (Origen, Contra Celsum, 1.28).

Celsus’ quote (solidly placed in the second century) offers an alternative interpretation of Jesus’ healing career. This trajectory is also evident in the much later Talmudic literature: In b.Sanh. 107b, Jesus is accused of being a false teacher, “...and the master said: Yeshu practiced magic [כימיש] and deceived and led Israel astray.” Similarly b.Sanh. 43a recounts an execution where Yeshu [шей] “is going to be stoned for practicing magic [כימיש] and leading Israel astray.” These latter quotes are problematic in several respects including the problem of determining if Yeshu refers to Jesus of Nazareth. If so, we must also take seriously the possibility that this tradition has reacted to a much later and formalized version of the Jesus tradition. However, it is interesting to note that the claim of execution by stoning does not seem to reflect Gospel tradition.

Perhaps a less tenuous manifestation of this trajectory can be found in Josephus’ famous “Jesus” passage. It has been widely suggested that once the “Christian interpolations” have been removed, an original core might be established. Meier’s reconstruction reads:

At this time there appeared Jesus, a wise man. For he was a doer of startling deeds, a teacher of people who receive the truth with pleasure. And he gained a following among many Jews and among many of Gentile origin.  

However, considering what has been suggested by the non-Christian witnesses thus far, Stanton’s reconstruction might be closer to the original:

Jesus was a doer of strange deeds, and a deluder of the simple-minded. He led astray many Jews and Greeks.  

While possible, such will have to remain speculation. However, for my present purposes, the affinity between the Beelzebul Controversy and the Celsus quote is enough to establish a contrary mnemonic trajectory. Jesus’ opponents in the Controversy accuse him of acting on the authority of a foreign deity. Celsus, who is otherwise skeptical concerning the supernatural, accuses Jesus of practicing magic which he learned in Egypt.

Thus we have two separate interpretive trajectories. One (represented by Mark, Q and Matthew) explains Jesus’ healings and exorcisms as divinely authoritative. The other (betrayed by Mark and Q, but stated forthrightly be Celsus) explains Jesus as a foreign trained magician and deceiver.

Evidence of this latter trajectory was picked up by Morton Smith.  He argued, with some success, that Jesus’ career as an exorcist (combined with certain accusations present in the sayings tradition and his eventual alienation from the Jewish religious establishment) is best explained in terms of magic. Especially pertinent to the present chapter is the observation that Mark’s introduction to the Beelzebul controversy includes an accusation of insanity. Smith comments,

> From this [accusation] it seems that Jesus’ exorcisms were accompanied by abnormal behaviour on his part. Magicians who want to make demons obey often scream their spells, gesticulate, and match the mad in fury.  

By appealing to a larger network of historical evidence from this period, Sanders argued that Jesus does not seem to fit the picture of a magician. He pointed out that Smith placed too much weight on the Greek Magical Papyri and even if such literature were to be used judiciously, what we know of Jesus does not quite cohere with this context. Sanders contended that the fuller picture of Jesus’ cultural milieu(x) measured against core gospel material makes Smith’s magician portrait unlikely.  Sanders’ objection is well taken and garners much of my sympathy. But there are two possible historical questions that might be asked in this case. The first is was Jesus a Magician? The second is was Jesus perceived by many to be a magician?

I would argue that it is the latter question that is most helpful in this case. This is so because (as discussed above) being labeled as a magician was often a polemical designation. Much like being labeled a “trouble-maker”, one did not choose this label in first-century Judaism; it was forced upon an individual by his (adversarial) contemporaries. One may ask the question was Jesus a trouble-maker? But the historically responsible reply will have to qualify the answer by specifying who might have perceived Jesus as such. Jesus’ actions may well have invited such suspicion. With this in mind, we might think of the label “magician” in the same way that we think of the perception of sedition. Jesus was thought to be seditious by those who felt threatened by

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198 Smith, *Magician*, 43.
199 Sanders, *Judaism*, 165-73.
200 Garrett, *Demise*, 12.
his movement. In the same way, we might say that Jesus was perceived as “magician” by those who felt threatened by his career as an exorcist.

The evidence suggests that Jesus did attempt to heal people with various methods and various degrees of success. The Beelzebul Controversy probably reflects the real concerns of Jesus’ family and of the local religious leaders that Jesus’ ministry incorporated foreign practice and/or sympathy. I think that this was how the historical stage was set when the title Son of David first entered the scene. Jesus and/or his disciples had need of an effective answer to these accusations. The Solomonic title, Son of David, served as a domestic precedent by which Jesus could be “properly” interpreted: 

*No, Jesus is not practicing foreign “magic”, he is like Solomon, the Son of David. He is therefore acting on the authority of YHWH on behalf of Israel.* Such arguments most likely found support and set in place the mnemonic framework of typology.

Matthew’s agenda to localize Jesus’ significance within the therapeutic promises of Isaiah and interpret Jesus’ personality via Solomon typology reflects the apologetic of an “insider” and in this way is probably closer to how Jesus would have wanted to be perceived. Although the statement might seem counter-intuitive, Matthew’s distortion of the tradition might provide a better historical portrait of Jesus than the memories against which this distortion reacted. It is not advisable to take this rationale to an extreme; the reader must first be reminded of how I have used the word distortion in the present study. Matthew’s distinctly Jewish apologetic has aimed to localize Jesus within the worldview that Jesus once inhabited. From the evangelist’s perspective, those who had labeled Jesus a magician and consorter with foreign deities had misunderstood Jesus and the significance of his therapy. Jesus’ rebuttal to this interpretation in the Beelzebul Controversy (which I have argued to be the product of early memory) confirms that Jesus felt that he had been misunderstood. In this way, Matthew’s redactional agenda has followed the mnemonic trajectory set in motion by the historical Jesus. I am convinced that Matthew did not see his alterations of Mark and Q in terms of distortion; his story was simply a “better” interpretation of the events and their significance.

Finally, a helpful parallel to this study can be seen in another work of apologetic by Flavius Philostratus. Philostratus is a hagiographer who commemorated the life of Apollonius of Tyana. In contrast to Lucian who accused him of being a charlatan,

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Philostratus portrays Apollonius as a learned doer of miraculous deeds including healing. Interestingly, the wonder-worker also travels to the East to learn from magi:

With respect to the Magi, Apollonius has said all there is to be said, how he associated with them and learned some things from them, and taught them others before he went away. [...] One of his students] says that he once asked his master: "What of the Magi?" and the latter answered: "They are wise men, but not in all respects." (1.26).

Thus we see a similar tension at work. Apollonius had obviously gained a reputation of having learned magic from foreign teachers. Many, like Lucian, were suspicious of him. This passage demonstrates Philostratus' attempt to distinguish Apollonius from foreign-taught magic. While he did learn from the magi, his wisdom was ultimately his own. One hundred years after the life of Apollonius, Philostratus (much like Matthew) writes as an apologist against what he believed to be undue slander of the great man.

The author also, on occasion, attempts to rationalize the miraculous deeds of Apollonius. In one instance, the healer raises a girl from the dead. But Philostratus' commentary is especially indicative of his own dispositions:

Now whether he detected some spark of life in her, which those who were nursing her had not noticed (for it is said that although it was raining at the time, a vapor went up from her face) or whether her life was really extinct, and he restored it by the warmth of his touch, is a mysterious problem which neither I myself nor those who were present could decide (4.45).

Here Philostratus distorts the tradition he has received by suggesting the possibility that there was still a "spark of life" within the girl. It is important to recognize that the author is not simply attempting to make this story more palatable for his audience; he is sincerely attempting to make sense of the story for himself. Moreover, Klauck rightly observes, "Ironically, Philostratus' rationalistic tendency may mean that he has achieved a more accurate picture of what actually happened than the popular narrative version of the oral tradition."205

I would argue that Matthew's apologetic is very similar in this respect. Certainly Matthew is not at pains to rationalize or downplay Jesus' therapeutic career, but he does

203 Trunk [Heiler, 328-351] gives a detailed treatment of the parallels between Apollonius and Jesus in his treatment of Jesus and the Canaanite woman. Philostratus recounts a story where Apollonius exorcises a demon from a distance. The woman is told by the demon that he will kill her child if she takes him before the exorcist, so the exorcist writes down an incantation for the mother so that he does not have to be present.

204 Much of this account involves Apollonius traveling from country to country learning and debating with other wise men.

205 Klauck, Context, 174; I will sidestep any discussion of Klauck's own rationalizing tendency and concern for "what actually happened".
distort the Jesus tradition in a way that makes it "more authentic". 206 By distorting the
Jesus tradition in order to make it more intelligible to a Jewish mnemonic sphere (i.e.
what makes sense to Matthew), the evangelist returns Jesus to the approximate context in
which he was originally interpreted. In this way, the mnemonic circle of Matthew’s
interpretation synthesizes the evangelist’s perception of Jesus with familiar Jewish
categories like Isaianic therapy and Son of David.

206 Also, one must keep in mind the possibility that a later remembrancer (in this case, Matthew)
has been influenced by an earlier tradition that was unknown to more immediate sources. My
thanks to Loren Stuckenbruck for emphasizing this point in personal correspondence.
Excursus:
The Presupposition of Davidic Descent

In a recent and very intriguing article, Levin explores the relationship between adoption and legal inheritance as it pertains to Jesus as both Son of David and Son of God.\(^1\) Perhaps the most important contribution of this article is that it convincingly debunks the notion that Jesus’ adoption by Joseph (as professed by the genealogies and infancy narratives) would have served to legitimate his claim as Davidic heir. Levin points out just how common this notion is within NT scholarship, often with little to no justification.\(^2\) He argues that the evidence occasionally used to justify Jesus’ inherited lineage\(^3\) does not speak to the legal implications of inheritance and lineage. Levin concludes that “there is nothing in Jewish law, in either the Hebrew Bible or in later Halakah, which can be seen as the model by which Jesus, Son of God, could have been considered the legal, but not genetic, heir to the Davidic throne.”\(^4\) Rather, this concept has been taken from the Roman law and practice which was employed in the succession of Caesars.\(^5\) From this conclusion, Levin suggests that Matthew was not a Jew writing

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\(^3\) E.g. b.Sanh 19b: “Whoever brings up an orphan in his home is considered by Scripture as though the child had been born to him.” Cf. b.Bat 8.6.

\(^4\) Levin, “Son of David”, 425; Cf. the similar conclusion arrived in the consideration of Paul’s adoption metaphor by F. Lydall, *Slaves, Citizens, Sons: Legal Metaphors in the Epistles* (Grand Rapids: Academic, 1984), 80-1. The following comment by Anderson, 2 Samuel, 122 is also appropriate, “Extra-family adoption does not seem to be attested in the OT.”

for a Jewish-Christian audience. Instead, Matthew is better understood from the standpoint of Greco-Roman culture.

While Levin provides a much needed corrective to the common misconstrual of Jewish adoption and inheritance, his final suggestion is unwarranted. Moreover, I find this a curious move on Levin’s part considering that he regards the infancy narratives of Matthew and Luke (the texts that most emphasize Jesus’ Davidic descent) to have originated from a common oral tradition. With this in mind, there is no reason to project the inherent literary assumptions of Matthew’s genealogy onto the gospel as a whole. If Levin is correct in this regard, a less severe suggestion would be that Matthew has included a lineage tradition into his gospel that originated from gentile Christianity. Indeed this solution fits well with what else we know of Davidic descent tradition in the NT. I will briefly sketch this progression in three stages.

The first stage is given voice by Romans 1:3-4 (cf. 2 Tim 2:8), which is generally considered to be a pre-Pauline creed taken from primitive Christianity. From this text we learn that Jesus “came from David’s seed according to the flesh; who was established the Son of God with power by the resurrection from the dead”. In all likelihood, this creed originated as an early post-Easter reflection on Jesus’ “messianic” status among his first Jewish followers. In other words, Jesus was perceived within a messianic framework before his execution and this perception had to be reshaped and made intelligible to a post-Easter framework. One could think of this as the most dramatic occurrence of memory distortion in the memories of Jesus. As this creed found its way into gentile Christianity, it was localized within the mnemonic-framework(s) of Greco-Roman culture.

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6 I think that he is correct for reasons that I explore shortly.
8 The fact that this creed is antithetically juxtaposed perhaps betrays the resolution (i.e. synthesis) to the early tension caused by Jesus’ “failure” as messianic claimant.
9 As has been argued elsewhere in this dissertation, life-changing religious experience and/or severe trauma has the capacity significantly alter one’s worldview and cause a person to reevaluate the significance of previously memories (III.1.2).
10 It is necessary to keep in mind, however, that this segment of gentile Christianity was composed of people who were keenly interested in Jewish concepts and scripture. Therefore we should expect a certain degree of respect for the original mnemonic framework.
This leads to the second stage of Davidic descent tradition: the genealogies. As Levin has helpfully pointed out, the idea of legal adoption into royal lineage was more at home in Greco-Roman culture than it was in Jewish culture. From this perspective, the claim that Jesus "came from David's seed" was likely reconsidered in terms of a Roman-like adoption into David's genealogy. This is perhaps the best backdrop by which to measure the significance of Matthew's and Luke's genealogies. In this new context, the belief represented by Rom 1:3-4 might have invited an etiological explanation of how Jesus could be both descended from David and also the Son of God. As Levin astutely points out, these two ideas are naturally linked in Jewish royal tradition, so there would have been no need to explain how Jesus could be both without contradiction. Matthew adapted this non-Jewish tradition into his gospel because, in his view, Jesus' attachment to David's family tree did not contradict his own conception of Jesus as Son of David; it only reinforced this concept from a different angle. Of course, where Matthew's

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11 Brown [Birth, 75-82] argued that Matthew received the genealogy tradition rather than authoring it himself. Moreover, there is reason to believe that the tradition was Greek in origin. He argued that Matthew's genealogy is historically incomplete but intended to be orthographically uniform in that 14 generations supposedly separate crucial generations of Israel's history. Brown pointed out that there are actually only 13 generations from the Exile to Jesus but Mt 1:17 explicitly states that the number 14 is intended to be emphasized. Among the many possible significances of the number 14, it orthographically represents the Hebrew name רְאוֹמ (note that form רְומָז would have more correctly represented the Hebrew of this period). This in addition to the fact that David is placed at the crux of the first section (his is the 14th generation listed) and the fact that he is mentioned prominently in Mt 1:1 and 1:17 support the idea that this genealogy represents a Davidic emphasis.

Brown was inclined toward the possibility that the omissions in Matthew's genealogy were not the work of the evangelist. Rather Brown thought it likely that he received this tradition already lacking certain names. His reasoning is that he thinks it "strange for [Matthew] deliberately to have omitted generations in order to create the pattern and then to have called the reader's attention to it as something marvelous and (implicitly) providential" (p.75). Moreover, Brown argued that the omission of Kings Ahaziah, Jehoash, and Amaziah was the result of an accident due to the similarity of the names Uzziah (Azariah) and Ahaziah. Thus what should have read "Joram was the father of Ahaziah" was "rendered Joram was the father of Uzziah." The possible confusion between these names is most plausible in the Greek where Ochozias (Gk for Ahaziah) looks similar to Ozias (Gk for Uzziah). If this is correct than Matthew received this tradition in Greek and incomplete upon reception.

12 Levin ["Son of David", 417 n.7] writes, "Assuming the validity of the commonly held 'two source' or 'Markan priority' theory of the composition of the Synoptic gospels on one hand, and considering the vast literary differences between the annunciation, birth and infancy accounts in Matthew and Luke on the other, I would posit that both drew their stories from a common oral tradition, independent of Mark, Q or each other, which each transformed into writing in his own way, in accordance to his own purposes and style."

13 For a discussion of the pre-Matthean sources of the larger infancy narrative, see Davies and Allison, Matthew, 1:190-5.

14 In 2Sam 7 (to which Rom 1:3-4 alludes), Solomon is said to be both David's seed and YHWH's son. Cf. Ps 2:7. With these texts in mind, it would be much more natural for the Jewish mind to think in terms of a divine adoption of a human son, rather than the other way around.

15 Levin, "Son of David", 419.
redaction is most evident concerning Son of David is in the connection between the title and Jesus’ therapeutic activity.

This leads to the third stage of Davidic descent tradition: Matthew’s portrayal of Jesus’ therapeutic ministry. As the Son of David, Jesus heals the blind and lame and casts out demons. In Matthew, the social outcasts (e.g. the blind) recognize Jesus as Son of David while the leadership of Israel attributes his work to Satan. Ironically the leadership is blind (23:16-26) and the blind see correctly. Matthew’s primary objective with regard to Son of David was therapeutic, not genealogical. While the Davidic descent tradition did not contradict his therapy agenda (thus he was happy to include it), it was not his chief concern. Rather, Matthew’s use of Son of David was guided by his interpretation of blind Bartimaeus’ cry “Son of David, have mercy on me!” (Mk 10:47-8). What in Mark is a singular story becomes a repeated motif in Matthew. This will be discussed more in the following section, but it will suffice my present sketch to posit that Matthew’s portrayal has something to do with Jesus performing the healings expected of the messianic age (cf. Isa 35:5-6; 4Q521). In sum, Jesus’ association with the Davidic Covenant seems to have been (1) presupposed by the earliest Christians, (2) reformulated in terms of adoption from a Greco-Roman perspective and (3) returned by Matthew to a more Jewish interpretation whereby the Son of David demonstrates his messianic status by performing the healings expected of the messianic age.

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16 J.M. Gibbs, “Purpose and Pattern in Matthew’s Use of the Title "Son of David"”, *NTS* 10 (1963-4); Kingsbury, “Son of David”; Loader, “Son of David”.

17 Moreover, even though Matthew’s genealogy emphasizes Davidic descent (see previous discussion from Brown above), the evangelist is much more intent on portraying Jesus as the Son of God. Brown [Birth, 142-3] ultimately concluded that the larger purpose of Mt 1 is show that Jesus was of divine origin and not merely of Davidic origin. Cf. J.D. Kingsbury, *Matthew: Structure, Christology, Kingdom* (Philadelphia: Fortress, 1975), 42-53; J.D.G. Dunn, “Christology in the Making: A New Testament Inquiry into the Origins of the Doctrine of the Incarnation” (1989[80]): 49-50.

18 Indeed the application of Son of David on the lips of the blind man is atypical for Mark; the evangelist does not develop this connection elsewhere.

19 Contra M. Karrer, *Der Gesalbte: Die Grundlagen des Christustitels* (Göttingen: Vandenhoeck & Ruprecht, 1991), 284-7, 293-4 and Gerbern S. Oegema, *The Anointed and his People: Messianic Expectations from the Maccabees to Bar Kochba* (JSPSup Sheffield: Sheffield Academic, 1998), 161. Karrer argues that, in the NT, Son of David should be understood only as an appeal to Jesus’ lineage and not to his status as the messiah. Oegema similarly argues, “For the whole of the New Testament […] the question of Jesus being the son of David is not used to designate him as Messiah, but to connect his origin to the house of David.” Both are at odds with a large contingent of Matthean scholarship on this point.

20 Other studies that address the larger developmental issues around this topic include W. Michaelis, “Die Davididsohnschaft Jesu als historisches und kerygmatisches Problem: Beiträge zum Christusverständnis in Forschung und Verkündigung”, in *Der historische Jesus und der kerygmatische Christus* (eds. H. Ristow and K. Matthiae; Berlin: Evangelische Verlag, 1962); Duling, “Promises”; Meier, “Elijah-like Prophet”. 177
Jesus’ entry into Jerusalem and procession toward the Temple\(^1\) is pertinent to the present study for several reasons. The most obvious is that Mark’s account refers to the “Kingdom of our father David”. Matthew reinforces this imagery by appending the title Son of David to the tradition (21:9). What is less obvious, but more important for our concerns, is the extent to which Ps 118, Zechariah 9:9 and 1 Kings 1:34ff have influenced this event and how it was remembered in the Jesus tradition.

The present discussion will be divided into four sections. (1) I will assess Mark’s presentation of the Entry and argue that its core is a product of memory rather than invention. (2) The second section will aim to pinpoint the conceptual categories (e.g. scriptural precedents) at work in the tradition. It will then be necessary to discuss the trajectory that these scriptural types had taken in the HB. (3) My third section will discuss references to Davidic “Offspring” language in the Dead Sea Scrolls to establish a parallel trajectory. (4) I will then discuss the shape that this tradition took in the wake of a narrativized Jesus tradition. This section will continue to trace the previous trajectory(ies) as manifested in the literary categories employed by Matthew. (5) I will then postulate the most plausible *Sitz im Leben Jesu* of the Entry based upon my previous analysis of mnemonic trajectories.

In this way, my discussion will trace Son of David tradition from its seminal concepts in the HB to its fruition in the post-Easter Jesus tradition (and beyond\(^2\)). By doing so alongside a discussion of parallel trajectories, this discussion will attempt to establish where the historical Jesus’ Entry into Jerusalem stood along this trajectory.

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\(^1\) Henceforth: Entry.

\(^2\) In certain cases, it will be helpful to compare the Jesus tradition with Rabbinic and Targumic traditions.
VI.1 Memory versus Invention

What is initially striking about Mark 11:1-11 is how legendary it seems. Jesus’ prediction of the colt’s location gives an impression of foreknowledge and the story could easily be read as a christological apologetic. At first glance, Bultmann’s assessment that the story is legendary (perhaps only containing a grain of reminiscence) is very attractive. Yet it is difficult to dispute the logic of Taylor’s rebuttal that no “legend would have broken off the account with the anticlimax [of 11:11] and it is only as a reminiscence that this statement is natural.”

Evans continues this line of thought, “Had the early church invented the story of the entrance… we should have expected a more pronounced christological element and surely a more impressive conclusion.” In addition, the problem of the word “Hosanna” (Mk 11:9, 10) has proved to be a troublesome Semitism that seems uncomfortably rendered in the Greek. One is hard-pressed to explain these features as literary invention.

If Bultmann’s suggestion that this story is derivative of a grain of reminiscence is correct, this grain would likely be some common denominator between Mark and John.

1[...]
Both record Jesus riding an animal into Jerusalem. Both mention the use of foliage to welcome Jesus. Both record the shout, Ωαφωνε which quotes Ps 118:25-26 and follow this with a mention of royalty. Thus John confirms four out of five of Mark’s narrative elements. Therefore the criterion of Multiple Attestation (III.2.2) is warranted as one might expect from a public spectacle. Still, this does not speak to the historicity of the first unit concerning the acquisition of the colt (vv.1-6).

Catchpole examines twelve examples of royal entry processions, six from 1 and 2 Maccabees and six from Josephus, and determines certain common elements that form a pattern. These elements include (a) a previously established status of the individual in question, (b) the previous defeat of an enemy, (c) entry into the Temple (if the city has one) followed by cultic activity. Catchpole compares Jesus’ Entry to these formal entries and argues that Jesus’ Entry fits the form of a king’s procession after a final defeat of his enemies. Catchpole considers Zech 9 an example of such a pattern and concludes that the story of Jesus’ Entry has been invented on the basis of this passage.

Witherington objects both to Catchpole’s reading of Zechariah and to his assessment of Mk 11. With regard to the first, Witherington points out that Zech 9 does not speak of a royal procession following a victorious battle. Rather, it seems to speak of a king who proceeds into a city still occupied by the enemy. This being so, the liberator of Zech 9:9 is welcomed for the victory he is expected to achieve at the city.

8 Mark uses πόλιν, while John refers to the colt of a donkey, ὀνάπυλον. For a discussion on the ambiguity of the species of the beast see F.F. Bruce, “The Book of Zechariah and the Passion Narrative”, BJRL 43 (1960-61): 339 n.1.
9 στωμός κόραντες ἐκ τῶν ἄγρων (Mk 11:8) could refer to stalks of grain or reeds of some sort. Evans [Mark, 144] prefers “tall grass” which corresponds better with the geography and available resources. According to John, palm branches [τὰ βαμβάκ τῶν φοινίκων] are waved (Jn 12:13). Also noteworthy is that Simon was hailed with palm fronds during his procession before re-dedicating the Temple in 1Macc 13:51 (cf. 2Macc 10:1-7).
10 Mark and John are identical in the phrasing at this point. This further supports the notion of a pre-Greek memory of the event.
11 The fifth, which John has omitted, is Jesus’ entry into the Temple.
12 Meier [“Elijah-like Prophet”, 67] suggests that the Entry was an historical event, but suggests that it was not as grand as some might imagine. He opines that a smaller group of disciples might have engineered the pomp. Even so, it seems that the event had enough of an audience to have been remembered in independent circles.
15 Catchpole, “Entry”, 321. Catchpole’s heading “cultic activity” includes (1) the offering of a sacrifice, or (2) the expulsion of objectionable people and/or (3) purification of uncleanness. Given the broadness of this last heading, one must question the validity of a single pattern.
17 Witherington, Christology, 105 points to Zech 9:10 as evidence that before the king can be victorious “the war horses must be first cut off from Jerusalem.” With this aim the king’s purpose
Thus Witherington argues that Zech 9 does not fit Catchpole’s model. If this is so, Catchpole has mistaken two competing models for a single model.

Building upon Witherington’s objection, it should also be pointed out that Zech 9:9’s purpose in the larger context of Zechariah is to affirm Zerubbabel’s claim to the Davidic throne by mimicking the procession of Solomon (1Kgs 1:32-40).\textsuperscript{18} Solomon’s prototypical entry served to solidify his claim as David’s successor. In this way, the royal processions of 1 Kings and Zech 9 served the purpose of legitimizing the identity of a figure who has not yet achieved the status of king. This, the central purpose of the act, grates against the second element of Catchpole’s pattern.

Witherington’s second objection to Catchpole’s thesis parallels one the central concerns of the present study. Catchpole appears to be guilty of a common fallacy when pursuing a formgeschichtliche approach to narrative: He assumes that because the narrative seems to fit a particular formal pattern, one can therefore draw conclusions about the historical authenticity of the narrative’s essential content.\textsuperscript{19}

In the case of Jesus’ Entry, it is the formal pattern that evokes the intended symbolism. It is possible that Jesus’ actions did not actualize all of these elements. But even if a few elements were remembered by eyewitnesses, the distortion of conventionalization would invite Social Memory to fill in the remaining elements.

More recently, Kinman has offered a material advance on Catchpole’s study by surveying a wide variety of royal processions in Antiquity and Late Antiquity.\textsuperscript{20} Kinman sees less affinity between Jesus’ Entry and these precedents which were generally accompanied with much more acclamation and the official welcome of the social elite. Kinman concludes:

Clearly, nothing like this sort of welcome occurred at Jesus’ entry. No great battle had been waged and won, no slaves set free, no military opponents captured, paraded and prepared for slaughter, no great booty taken and no great company of victorious soldiers were there to accompany Jesus. Seen in this light, Jesus’ entry would, if anything, have stood as a modest embarrassment to those who might have hoped to see it in triumphalist colours.\textsuperscript{21}

\textsuperscript{18}Evans, Mark, 143; In further support of the Solomonic character of Zech 9:9, the following verse claims that this figure “will speak peace to the nations, and his dominion will be from sea to sea, and from the river to the ends of the earth” (9:10). Besides the echo of Solomon’s name [דוד], this is a direct quote from Ps 72:8 which is a “Psalm of Solomon”; cf. M. Fishbane, Biblical Interpretation in Ancient Israel (Oxford: OUP, 1985), 502.

\textsuperscript{19}Witherington, Christology, 104.

\textsuperscript{20}Kinman, Entry, 25-64.

\textsuperscript{21}Kinman, Entry, 122.
Added to this, in order to properly follow Jewish royal precedents, the High priest should have been present at the ceremony to endorse Jesus as the messiah. While contemporary readers often refer to this as the “Triumphal Entry”, the historical backdrops suggests otherwise. Jesus’ Entry served to highlight his rejection by Jerusalem’s leadership and foreshadow his opposition to the Temple establishment. We might then cautiously apply the criterion of Embarrassment alongside Semitisms and Multiple Attestation.

If it is safe to assume that the latter half of Mark’s account has roots in early memory, it may then be asked: Was this act perceived as a typological mimic of Zech 9:9 and/or 1Kgs 1:32-40? Or was this act typologically modeled after these traditions as the account was passed down? The present chapter will attempt to demonstrate that the answer to both questions is yes. This will be done by tracing the distortion trajectories of this tradition and measuring these tendencies against the mnemonic spheres and frameworks common to Jesus’ historical context.

VI.2  Mark 11 and Scripture

Mark intends to show that Jesus choreographed this procession and that it was indeed symbolic. In Mark 11:2, Jesus knows of and sends for the colt. We are told that the animal had never been ridden, not so subtly hinting that the animal was purposed for this particular occasion. Thus, as far as Mark is concerned, the colt is the key to understanding Jesus’ symbolism. The welcoming shout, “Blessed is the coming kingdom of our father David,” makes it obvious that the symbolic significance of the colt is royal in nature. Mark’s intention to demonstrate the royal nature of Jesus’ Entry is also seen in his mention of the disciples throwing their garments on the colt (11:7). This detail might allude to a tradition of honoring YHWH’s anointed (cf. 2Kgs 9:13). In addition to these considerations is the possibility of an appeal to Zech 9:9 where the prophet describes a similar entry. But because the evangelist does not make an overt appeal to Zechariah in this context, better light will be shed on Mark’s intentions by first discussing the scriptural category that he directly employs: Ps 118.

22 This will be discussed in more detail below.
23 J.D. Crossan, “Redaction and Citation in Mark 11:9-10 and 11:17”, BR 17 (1972).
25 In 2Kgs 9, Jehu is anointed as king and immediately his subjects cover his path with their garments. It is worth noting, however, that this story does not describe a royal procession where Jehu rides into the city seated on an animal.
VI.2.1 *Psalm 118*

Lohmeyer argued that the phrase βασιλεία τοῦ πατρὸς ἡμῶν Δαυίδ should be seen as a later, non-Jewish interpretation of “Kingdom of God.”²⁶ Schmithals, likewise, argued that the reference to David as “father” betrays a non-Jewish understanding of Israel’s patriarchs.²⁷ He appealed to *b.Ber.* 16b, which reads, “The term fathers is only applied to three.” The implied three are Abraham, Isaac and Jacob. However, both Pesch and Evans rightly point out that *b.Mo‘ed Qat.* 16b claims that “God will make [David] chief next to the three fathers.” Such inclusion is also seen in *Sir* 45:25 (cf. also *Sir* 47:1-11).²⁸ Ernst suggested that the phrase is of Jewish origin but betrays Christian interpolation which has identified Ps 118’s “one coming in the name of the Lord” with David’s son.²⁹ He thus attempts to account for a Jewish tradition which has taken on a Christian trajectory. While this seems to take a middle ground, Evans demonstrates that the conflation of Ps 118 and Davidic interpretation can be seen along a later Jewish trajectory as well. Tg. Ps 118:22-29 considers this passage to have been written of David who is “worthy to be ruler and King.”³⁰

Ps 118:25 was a prayer originally directed to YHWH. As such, it is important to determine whether the crowd’s shout is here directed at YHWH or Jesus. Torrey suggested that rather than “God save us!” the cry is meant to mean “God save him!”³¹ In this way, the supplication was something akin to “God save the Queen!” Coggan and Gundry have argued that Hosanna should be understood in light of its etymological kinship to the name “Joshua (=Jesus).”³² In this scenario, the crowd is perhaps reminding Jesus to be like his namesake and “save” them by leading them in conquest. But there is reason to believe that the use of Ps 118:25 in this context is something other than a cry for help. The Greek transliteration ὧσαννα has eluded conclusive etymology. C. Burger took the odd form to be evidence of an author ignorant of Jewish customs.

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²⁷ W. Schmithals, *Das Evangelium nach Markus* (OTNT 1-2; Gütersloh: Mohr, 1979), 2:485.
³⁰ Evans, *Mark*, 140.
³² F.D. Coggan, “Note on the Word hosanna”, *Expository Times* 52 (1940-41); Gundry, *Mark*, 630.
Burger's logic is faulty. If this story has been invented by a Greek-speaking gentile, what purpose is served by employing a Semitism unintelligible to him? Moreover, one is hard pressed to explain the Semitism's inclusion if the custom it represented was wholly unknown to the narrator. It is much more likely that this Greek-speaking story-teller is relaying a story that has origins in memory. The fact that the narrator is unfamiliar with the Semitism is evidence that (at least part of) this story has not been invented in Greek. The criterion of Semitic Influence (already mentioned) is therefore warranted, but what is presently more important is that Burger's explanation of Gentile ignorance does little ultimately to solve the etymological problem.

One solution has highlighted the resemblance of ὡσαννά to the short form of the imperative ἐπηγίζεσθαι which is rendered ἐπηγίζεται (cf. Ps 86:2) and conjectures a coupling with the preceptive particle ἀν. This solution is supported by the unique presence of both words in Ps 118:25: ἀναίρεται ἡ ρήσις τοῦ ἄνω ἐν τῷ ἄνωτε ἡ ἡ τοῖχος ἡ. According to this solution, ὡσαννά reflects the transitive ἐπηγίζεσθαι. But as Fitzmyer has pointed out, this solution fails to explain the supposed shorter form of the phrase ἀναίρεται. This hypothetical coupling never occurs in biblical Hebrew. Following Kautzsch, Fitzmyer defends a competing solution which understands the term ὡσαννά to reflect the Aramaic ἀναίρεται rather than the Hebrew ἀναίρεται. This solution acknowledges that Ps 118:25, in part, is responsible for the supplication, but concludes that this verse alone cannot explain the etymology of ὡσαννά. It is possible that there was Aramaic interference on the Hebrew verse at some point during its transmission. Perhaps the resemblance of the Hebrew phraseology to the Aramaic prayer invited such conflation. In either case, the oddity of ὡσαννά lies in the fact that the LXX, as a rule, translates as ἀκούον and never uses a Semitic transliteration as is found in Mk 11:9-10.

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33 Burger, Jesus als Davidsohn, 167.
34 Luke's account (19:38) likely omits Hosanna for this reason.
35 The longer form is far more common (cf. Ps 12:2; 20:10; 28:9; 60:7; 86:16; 108:7).
36 Ps 117:25 LXX: ὃ κύριε σῶσον δῆ ὃ κύριε εὐδόκησον δῆ.
39 Fitzmyer notes that Ps 118:25 is the only instance in biblical Hebrew where ἀναίρεται and the particle ἀν are so juxtaposed.
40 If this is so, Kautzsch (Grammatik, 173) overstated the case by claiming that ὡσαννά cannot be identified with ἀναίρεται. Surely there is some connection seeing that Ps 118:25 has the same connection seeing that Ps 118:25 is the only instance in biblical Hebrew where ἀναίρεται and the particle ἀν are so juxtaposed.
This suggests that, in this case, there was a certain phonetic value to the word which would have been lost if it had been rendered in Greek. The fact that the evangelist does not provide an explanation suggests that the meaning (or purpose) of this word has been taken for granted.\(^1\) In this way, Mark’s transliteration probably reflects a popularized proclamation that was familiar to his audience. Perhaps then the function of the cry ωσαννα lay not in its etymology but in its connotative value. In other words, the meaning of ωσαννα was not in the word’s derivation but in its popular use.

Perhaps this word was akin to the use of “hallelujah” by modern English speakers. In popular English-speaking culture, hallelujah most commonly represents a proclamation of joy and does not necessarily connote praise to YHWH as the etymology denotes.\(^2\) Similarly, it is possible that ωσαννα did not connote a supplication to God for salvation (as the etymology implies) but rather a stereotypical greeting of pilgrims common to Jerusalem festivals. Similarly, later rabbinic commentary associate Ps 118:25-26 with the Feast of Tabernacles and Hanukkah.\(^3\) This seems to be the sense later given to the phrase in Didache 10:6\(^4\) which mirrors the dative of Mathew’s ωσαννα τῷ υἱῷ Δαυὶδ (21:9). Fitzmyer concludes:

> The best explanation of the dative τῷ υἱῷ Δαυὶδ remains that Ναβυαρα had lost its original meaning of a cry for help and had become a cry of greeting to pilgrims coming to Jerusalem for feasts. If this be correct, then the other cry Ὄσιαννα ἐν τοῖς ὑψιστοῖς is equally explicable: Let the greeting being given to the Son of David extend even to the heights of heaven (where God Himself dwells)\(^5\).

So in Fitzmyer’s view, the greeting is directed to both Jesus as messiah and, by extension, God. Given Mark’s “Son of God” Christology, the evangelist was probably comfortable with the ambiguity. But it is this ambiguity that also calls attention to Mark’s apparent lack of redaction in 11:9-10. Given the agenda delineated in Mk 1:1, one would expect at least the title “Christ” if not “Son of God”. For this reason, it is probable that Mark has chosen not to alter substantially the actual words of the shout present in the tradition passed to him. Mark’s motivation was not passive however. There

\(^{1}\) Indeed it is Mark’s tendency to do so (cf. Mk 10:46).
\(^{3}\) J.A. Sanders, “A New Testament Hermeneutic Fabric: Psalm 118 in the Entrance Narrative”, in *Early Jewish and Christian Exegesis* (eds. C.A. Evans and W.F. Stinespring; Atlanta: Scholars Press, 1987), 179; See b. Sukk 45a; b. ‘Arak 10a; m. Pesah 5:5; 10:6; b. Pesah 117a; 118a; 119a; b. Pesah 117a; 118a; 119a; 118a; 119a; This has led some, justifiably so, to question Mark’s (and John’s) dating of the event, e.g. T.W. Manson, “The Cleansing of the Temple”, *BJRL 33* (1950/1).
\(^{4}\) “Let generosity come, and let this universe pass away. Hosanna to David’s son [ὁσιαννα τῷ υἱῷ Δαυὶδ]!”
is good reason to believe that Mark has left the crowd's shout relatively unaltered in order to localize his Entry narrative within a Ps 118 framework. As such, it seems that Mk 11 represents a distortion in the direction of Ps 118.

Evans follows Cranfield by calling attention to the similar immediate contexts of Mk 11 and Ps 118:25. According to the Psalm, the blessing is shouted "from the House of YHWH" (v.26). This "blessing" is an outworking of the homogeneity between the "house of Aaron" and the rest of Israel already demonstrated at the start of this psalm. It is then no coincidence that Jesus' procession toward the Temple invites a quotation of this psalm. Mark's utilization of Ps 118 was likely intended to put Jesus' relationship to the Temple at center stage. Marcus posits, "Mark links the Davidic thrust of the crowd's acclamation (11:9-10) with Jerusalem and the Temple by juxtaposing the acclamation with the redactional verse 11:11." Given this juxtaposition, the lack of acknowledgement by the Temple establishment was tantamount to an overt rejection of Jesus' messianic agenda. Mark takes this a step further in his juxtaposition of Ps 118's homogenous relationship between the "house of Aaron" and "he who comes in the name of YHWH" against the apparent lack of homogeneity between Jesus and the Temple establishment. The anticlimax of Jesus' uneventful arrival to the Temple grounds and quick departure thereafter may simply be the exclamation point punctuating this very loud silence on the part of the priesthood.

VI.2.2 Zechariah 9:9 and 1 Kings 1:32-40

Many commentators see Jesus' Entry as an allusion to Zech 9:9:

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47 Cranfield, Mark, 351.
48 Evans, Mark, 145.
49 "Let Israel now say that his mercy endures forever! Let the house of Aaron now say that his mercy endures forever!" (Ps 118:2-3).
50 Marcus, Way, 138.
51 Sanders, "Entrance Narrative", 188.
52 There is no doubt that Mark's anticlimax is in part a result of his literary motif where one story is couched between the bookends of a symbolically related story. See W.R. Telford [The Barren Temple and the Withered Tree (JSNTSup 1; Sheffield: JSOT Press, 1980), 39-68] for the most comprehensive treatment of Mark's use of the withered fig tree in connection to Jesus' Temple demonstration. It should be noted, however, that Jesus does indeed enter the Temple briefly upon his arrival and with no welcome. Thus Mark's anticlimax highlights Jesus' non-relationship with the Temple establishment and foreshadows Jesus' Temple demonstration. This coheres well with Telford's treatment of Mark's agenda.
Rejoice greatly, O daughter of Zion! Shout, O daughter of Jerusalem! Behold, your king is coming to you; He is righteous and endowed with salvation, humble, and mounted on a donkey \(\tau\nu\rho\iota\rho\overline{\nu}\)\(^{54}\), even on a colt \(\nu\iota\rho\iota\sigma\)\(^{55}\), the foal of a donkey \(\alpha\varepsilon\nu\alpha\nu\nu\)\(^{56}\).

This prophecy was originally intended to legitimate Zerubbabel, a descendant of David, as king in a time when there had been an absence of this office in Israel. In this way, Zech 9:9 became a particularly popular text for later messianic circles.\(^{57}\) But before the significance of Zechariah can be fully appreciated, it must be pointed out that this passage is itself an allusion to 1Kgs 1:32-40.

\(^{32}\)Then King David said, “Call to me Zadok the priest, Nathan the prophet, and Benaiah the son of Jehoiada.” And they came into the king’s presence. \(^{33}\)And the king said to them, “Take with you the servants of your lord, and have my son Solomon ride on my own mule \(\iota\mu\lambda\nu\)\(^{58}\), and bring him down to Gihon. \(^{34}\)And let Zadok the priest and Nathan the prophet anoint him there as king over Israel, and blow the trumpet and say, ‘Long live King Solomon!’ \(^{35}\)Then you shall come up after him, and he shall come and sit on my throne and be king in my place; for I have appointed him to be ruler over Israel and Judah.” \(^{36}\)And Benaiah the son of Jehoiada answered the king and said, “Amen! Thus may YHWH, the God of my lord the king, say. \(^{37}\)As YHWH has been with my lord the king, so may He be with Solomon, and make his throne greater than the throne of my lord King David!” \(^{38}\)So Zadok the priest, Nathan the prophet, Benaiah the son of Jehoiada, the Cherethites, and the Pelethites went down and had Solomon ride on King David’s mule, and brought him to Gihon. \(^{39}\)Zadok the priest then took the horn of oil from the tent and anointed Solomon. Then they blew the trumpet, and all the people said, “Long live King Solomon!” \(^{40}\)And all the people went up after him, and the people were playing on flutes and rejoicing with great joy, so that the earth shook at their noise.

For the purposes of the present study, it is crucial to point out that David never mounts an animal in this manner to legitimate his claim to the throne. This act is done by Solomon in order to claim his status as David’s successor. This act symbolically distinguished Solomon from Adonijah. Both were heirs, but David placed Solomon on his own mule to symbolically endorse him as the rightful heir to his father’s throne.\(^{59}\) Furthermore, David had hoped to promote the notion that Solomon would be a greater king than his father. It is also important that David’s endorsement of Solomon included


\(^{54}\) LXX = ὑπογύρλου.

\(^{55}\) LXX = πωλού νέου.

\(^{56}\) LXX omits this phrase.

\(^{57}\) Zechariah’s importance in the first century will be discussed in more detail below.

\(^{58}\) LXX = ὑπογύρλου.

\(^{59}\) Contrast the unsuccessful processions of Absalom (2Sam 18:9) and Mephibosheth (2Sam 19:26); cf. Sanders, “Entrance Narrative”, 179.
the support of both the prophet Nathan and Zadok the priest. They announced his new office with a shout and followed his procession. Lastly, Zadok the priest plays the crucial role of anointing Solomon.

Considering this historical backdrop, the possibility must be considered that such a royal entry is a uniquely Solomonic act. Solomon was the first son of David to become like his father, and eventually supercede his father. Zechariah (and perhaps Jesus) drew upon this imagery in order to embody what was first achieved in the reign of Solomon. As David’s original design intended, the act of riding a colt amongst shouts of royal adulation was a symbolic claim to be David’s successor. Thus the act was Davidic in a particularly Solomonic sense. Zechariah was prophesying that Zerubbabel would sit on David’s throne just like Solomon had.

This affinity with Solomon is of particular importance for Zechariah, because Zerubbabel is prophesied as the builder the Temple; this too is the responsibility of the Davidic king and it is particularly Solomonic. Zech 6:12-13:

Then say to him, 'Thus says YHWH of hosts, "Behold, a man whose name is Branch, for he will branch out from where he is; and he will build the Temple of YHWH."

Indeed, he will build the Temple of YHWH and it is he who will bear the honor and sit and reign. And there will be a priest at his throne and a council of peace between the two...’

This text highlights the mutual relationship between the priest and the royal figure “Branch,” no doubt following the lead of 1Kgs 1. Here also we are reminded of the relationship between the “one coming” and the priesthood in Ps 118. Both texts emphasize the king’s peaceable relationship with the priesthood.

Such vegetation language is not uncommon in texts which refer to an eschatological Davidic figure. This metaphor most likely connotes a sort of family-tree imagery, evoking the concept of lineage. The metaphor probably stems from 2Sam 7:12 where David is promised that his descendant, or “seed [גזר],” will proceed from him and establish his kingdom. Zech 6:12-13 is interesting for several reasons, but what is particularly interesting at this point is that used as a name. As

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60 Cf. my previous discussion of Isa 11-(IV.1.3) and below in the present chapter (V.3).
61 In this passage YHWH promises to appoint a place for his people Israel and he “will plant them [נשתים]...” (2Sam 7:10). This serves to connect the Davidic Covenant with Ex 15:17 which also uses תמי, see D. Juel, Messianic Exegesis: Christological Interpretation of the Old Testament in Early Christianity (Philadelphia: Fortress, 1988), 65.
indicates, the vegetation metaphor has evolved from a conceptual referent to a specific title. נַעַר (6:13) demonstrates the figure’s royalty. The fact that he will “build the Temple” shows that the promise to David concerning Solomon is being eschatologically recycled.

It is at this point where Mark’s lack of appeal to Zechariah is most curious. Especially given the fact that Mark appeals to Zechariah in several other places in his narrative. Mark Black’s doctoral dissertation demonstrated pervasive influence of Zechariah upon Mark’s passion narrative. The many Markan phrases and concepts borrowed from Zechariah cannot be detailed here, but Marcus’ summary of Mark 14’s relationship to Zech 9-14 aptly exemplifies the narrative grid provided by Zechariah to much of the Passion narrative.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Mark</th>
<th>Zechariah</th>
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</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>14:24</td>
<td>My blood of the covenant</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>14:25</td>
<td>That day, kingdom of God</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>14:26</td>
<td>Mount of Olives</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>14:27</td>
<td>Strike the shepherd and sheep will be scattered</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>14:28</td>
<td>Resurrection</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>14:28</td>
<td>Restoration of scattered sheep</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Elsewhere, Mark has borrowed language directly from Zech LXX. There can be little doubt that Mark’s Passion was heavily influenced by Zechariah. But Mark 11:8-11 seems to deviate from this pattern. There is no borrowed language from Zechariah as one might expect (cf. Matthew’s use of Zech 9:9). Instead this passage hinges on Ps 118. The affinity with Zech 9 can indeed be seen in that both have a royal figure riding amidst adulation, but there is no evidence of a redactional attempt to highlight this affinity. Compare this caveat with the introductory Markan frame of the entry passage in Mk 11:2: “καὶ ἐξῆλθεν ἐπὶ κοπριλλότατον”. Black suggests that this detail takes its cue from Zech 9:9 LXX which describes the animal as a “μύρα καθαρσίας”. This vague connection is the closest conceptual allusion to Zechariah in Mk 11:1-11 and it is found in Mark’s redactional introduction. There is simply no overt link between Zech 9 and the core of the material that Mark received.

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63 Marcus, Way, Ch.8.

64 Notice the use of double negative, a common trait of Mark’s redaction, so V. Taylor, The Gospel according to St Mark (London: Macmillan, 1966), 46.

Black is certain that "Mark was aware of the relationship between this story [of Jesus' Entry] and Zech 9.9". However, Ambrozic argued that the influence of scriptural precedents on this account influenced Jesus' Entry in pre-Markan tradition. He concluded that "it was the tradition as such which influenced the story; the working of the OT texts was only indirect". Black admits, "The passage recalled (Zech 9.9), while acknowledged as messianic in contemporary literature, is nonetheless one of the most humble messianic images available; and even its use lies just beneath the text rather than in plain view.

By not overtly appealing to Zech 9 or 1Kgs 1, Mark is either not aware of this connection or is content to leave the royal adulation implicit in his narrative as it is in Ps 118. For this reason, it is more likely that the subtext of Mark betrays not what the evangelist hopes to portray but something that is embedded in the tradition that Mark has received. This suggests that Mark's mnemonic localization of the Passion narrative within a Zechariah 9-14 framework did not originate with Mark. Rather, the evangelist has followed the lead of an interpretive trajectory that has understood Jesus' last week in light of Zechariah. But in the particular case of Jesus' Entry, the significance of Jesus' act has not been highlighted in this way.

If, then, it is correct to say that there is an implicit political dimension akin to Zechariah in this narrative, it will be necessary to analyze how Zechariah's royal categories were interpreted in the first century. This will be done by discussing the messianic trajectory of Zechariah in the Qumran library.

VI.3 The Dead Sea Scroll's Davidic Offspring

In order to appreciate better the function of the Son of David in the Jesus tradition, it is necessary to compare the form taken by similar titles/categories employed in the Dead Sea Scrolls. The present section will suggest that "David" should be distinguished from the "Offspring of David" in that the texts of the Qumran library employ the former as a historical figure, while the latter is an eschatological figure. This discussion will also shed light on Zechariah's influence on messianic categories contemporary to the writing of the NT.

66 Black, "Slain Messiah", 163.
68 Black, "Slain Messiah", 168.
Son of David is rarely ever employed in the Dead Sea Scrolls. This is striking considering how many other Davidic referents are evidenced in this library. Among the undisputed Davidic referents are מִשְׁמָאֵל מְשָׁא יִשְׂרָאֵל. And of particular interest to the present discussion: רֹדֵּר וּמָתָר רוּדֵר. I will presently focus on the last two in this list (and cognates) as I am specifically interested in how the proper name David functions in Qumran messianism.

As discussed previously (IV), PsSol 17:23 contains the first titular mention of Son of David within a messianic context. This is certainly an important text to fill in the backdrop of the title. However, in order to take seriously the conceptual backdrop of our title, the hard and fast lines between Davidic titles and the exact phrasing of Son of David must be blurred. The fact that PsSol 17:23 uses this exact phrase is helpful as it is proof that the messianic application of Son of David was indeed pre-Christian. What cannot be inferred from this fact is that PsSol 17 contains the first extant reference to a titular form of this expectation. This is so because there are other Davidic titles in pre-Christian literature which carry a similar eschatological significance. One such case has been seen previously in Zech 3:8 and 6:12 where Zerubbabel, a descendant of David, is called "Branch [לֵית]."

The Dead Sea Scroll’s interest in David was largely due to the community’s preoccupation with eschatological categories. In 2Sam 7:13, YHWH promises that David’s son will have an everlasting kingdom. This language invited eschatological interpretation and, when filtered through texts like Zechariah, took on a particularly messianic character. As mentioned above, 2Sam 7:12’s mention of David’s “seed [רָדֵּר]” contributed to a common vegetation metaphor. The following texts exemplify this metaphor:

There I will cause to sprout [לֵית] the horn of David, I have prepared a lamp for my anointed (Ps 132:17).

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69 As noted previously, the only use of the phrase “Son of David” in the Dead Sea Scrolls is 4Q398 f.11 13.1: “Solomon, Son of David”.


71 Telford [Barren Temple, 137-41] surveys a large quantity of HB passages that relate to metaphorical vegetation language and posits that the tree was often used a metaphor for an individual’s or collective Israel’s spiritual status. This probably stands behind the royal application of this metaphor. In the present section, I focus only on the application of this metaphor to Davidic figures (and their counter parts).
In those days, at that time, I will cause a branch of righteousness of David to spring forth, and He shall execute justice and righteousness on the earth (Jer 33:15; cf. 23:5).

Then a shoot will spring from the stem of Jesse, and a branch from his roots will bear fruit (Isa 11:1). 72

In the case of Ps 132, the imagery is less explicit. But 132:17 demonstrates that the verbal use of "branch" is an appropriate interpretation of 2Sam 7:13 (Ps 132:11 directly appeals to 2Sam 7:13). Both Jeremiah and Isaiah extend the metaphor. This becomes a popular messianic category in the Dead Sea Scrolls. Consider the following phrases:

- "branch of David" (4Q161 7-10 3.22; 4Q174 1-3 1.11; 4Q252 5.3-4, 4Q285 5 3; 5 4)
- "seed of David" (4Q479 fl.4)
- "and a shoot shall come out of the stump of Jesse" (4Q285 f7.2)
- "sprout of Jesse" (4Q161 3.15)

Other messianic references to the Davidic figure include:

- "tent of David" (CD 7.14; 4Q174 3.12, 13)
- "one who sits on the throne of David" (4Q252 5.2)

What is common to all of the above is that (1) these references are indirect in nature (i.e. none appeal to "David" independently from circumlocutive language) and (2) all these references are eschatological categories. In the Qumran corpus, when David is referred to as an historical figure, he is simply called "David" (CD 5.2, 5; 1QM 11.2; 4Q174 3.7; 4Q177 1.7, 4:7; 4Q398 f11 13.1, f14 17ii:1; 4Q504f1 6-8). In such cases, he is not called the son of Jesse or the branch of Jesse; there is no circumlocution employed. It seems then that circumlocutions are applied only when the category is specifically eschatological.

Given the consistency of the contexts where David is evoked, we may conclude that where David is referred to as an eschatological category, some circumlocution (such as vegetation language) will be employed. Conversely, where David is referred to as an historical figure, no circumlocution is employed. In these cases, the proper name stands alone. This variation is not due to the style of the individual authors because, as seen in CD and 4Q174 which contain both historical references and eschatological references, this formula holds true.

72 Cf. also Ezek 17:3-4.
73 CD 7.14 uses רדך.
One possible reason for this circumlocution is reverence. After all, similar circumlocutions are used in Jewish literature when referring to YHWH. However, the analysis of other eschatological figures attested in the Dead Sea Scrolls dismisses this possibility. This is so because circumlocution seems to be distinctive of Davidic messianism. For example, contrast the above Davidic language with 11Q13. This eschatological text predicts the return of Melchizedek as a liberator of Israel. Guided by imagery from Isaiah, the author expects this figure to defeat the sons of Belial and lead Israel in a type of new Exodus. What is most intriguing about this figure is that Isa 61:2 is quoted, but rather than “proclaiming the year of the YHWH’s favor” this texts proclaims “the year of Melchizedek’s favor” (11Q13 2.9). Considering the monotheistic source of this text, it is hard to imagine a more exalted depiction! 11Q13 2:11 makes a similar substitution for the divine name in its interpretation of Ps 7:7-8. 11Q13 2.10 claims that Melchizedek is אלהים (spoken of in Ps 81:1) who pronounces judgment over all other gods. 74 No other expected figure in the Qumran library is venerated in such exalted categories. If authors of the Dead Sea Scrolls were concerned about circumlocution out of reverence for an eschatological figure, one would expect 11Q13 to employ such language around Melchizedek’s name. This strongly suggests that the circumlocution of David’s name was not due to a YHWH-like reverence.

Once this possibility has been dismissed, it becomes more probable that the Davidic messiah was referred to indirectly because these texts are not referring to a David figure. Rather, following the lead of 2Sam 7, the Qumran community expected a messiah like David’s offspring. 4Q174 1:10-1375 supports this hypothesis:

[This verse is expressed in Aramaic, translating the Hebrew text in the context of the Davidic covenant, where the Branch of David is promised a new kingdom.]

“And YHWH decrees to you that He will make you a house,” and that “I will raise up your offspring after you, and establish the throne of his kingdom forever. I will be a father to him, and he will be My son” This passage refers to the Branch of David, who is to arise with the Interpreter of the Law, and who will arise in Zion in the Last Days, as it is written, “And I will raise up the tent of David that is fallen.” This passage describes the fallen Branch of David, whom He shall raise up

74 11Q13 2:10 reads: אלהים [ובא ב الإدارة לבראשית] אלהים ישמם 
75 K.E. Pomykala, The Davidic Dynasty Tradition in Early Judaism: Its History and Significance for Messianism (Society of Biblical Literature Early Judaism and Its Literature 7; Atlanta: Scholars Press, 1995), 192 represents the scholarly majority that dates this text to the late first century BCE or early first century CE.
This text conflates and exploits 2Sam 7:12, 14, Amos 9:11 and Zech 6:13. But 2Sam 7 is most prominently interpreted. Although fragmentary, the text sustains a common eschatological focus throughout. As such, it has the potential to illuminate Qumran’s understanding of the Davidic messiah on several levels. I am here merely interested in the titles employed.

As mentioned, the title Son of David is virtually absent in the Dead Sea Scrolls. The only text that explicitly employs this title reads:


Although this text is too fragmentary to contribute to my thesis in any great way, two points are warranted. The first highlights what I noted previously in chapter IV: As should be expected, Son of David is specifically a Solomonic referent. The second point is more pertinent to my discussion in the present section: This indirect mention of David is not an eschatological referent; it is undoubtedly an historical reference. The author refers the blessings that came “in the days of Solomon, the son of David”. Following the lines cited, several other historical references are mentioned. Lines 6-7 conclude, “…remember the kings of Israel and consider their works carefully. For he who feared [the law] was delivered from his troubles.” This conclusion exhorts the remembrance of historical kings because much can be learned from the consequences of their historical attitudes toward the law. Thus among the Dead Sea Scrolls, Son of David is not employed as an eschatological category. While this text does mention David indirectly, it is a direct reference to his historical son: Solomon.

While it is perhaps impossible to answer why Solomon’s title was not employed eschatologically in the Dead Sea Scrolls, 4Q174 might provide a clue. Abegg and Evans observe that 4Q174 is the only mention of the Davidic messiah as “son.” Following 2Sam 7:14, the “Branch of David” will be a son to YHWH. Yet all of the passages that might indicate that this passage was originally about David’s literal son (Solomon) have

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76 Unless otherwise noted, I will follow the translation of M. Wise, M. Abegg and E. Cook, The Dead Sea Scrolls: A New Translation (San Francisco: Harper & Row, 1996). However, it should be noted that one would expect כָּלְכָל to be glossed “tent” in line 17.

77 More to the point, 2Sam 7:11 is quoted immediately prior to this passage.

78 G.J. Brooke, Exegesis at Qumran: 4QFlorilegium in its Jewish Context (JSOTSup 29; Sheffield: JSOT Press, 1985), 144.

79 3Q398 f.11 13.1, emphasis mine.

80 Abegg and Evans, “Messianic”, 199.
been removed. Pomykala writes:

Missing from the quotation are the phrases stating that: 1) God will raise up David's seed when his days are fulfilled and he lies with his fathers; 2) this offspring will come from David's own body; and 3) this offspring will build a temple for God's name. Without these phrases the dynastic promise is freed from the moorings of its historical fulfillment so that it directly addresses the eschatological situation, which is the central concern of the author.

As seen in my previous discussion on the "Prince of the Community" in 1QSb, this author's expectation of the Davidic messiah was not constrained by typological frameworks. For the most part, the interpreters represented by the Dead Sea Scrolls were free to apply, conflate and omit scriptural passages to conform to their eschatological ideals. It is possible that because Son of David was traditionally applied to Solomon, the Qumran community has avoided this title. 4Q398 demonstrates that Son of David is only ever used as a Solomonic referent in the Dead Sea Scrolls. Moreover, the title "Son of David" was made prominent by the Chronicler who emphasized David's and Solomon's jurisdiction over the Temple and cultic matters. The Qumran community sought to emphasize the opposite: the Davidic messiah was to be secondary to the priestly messiah. Thus the author's conception of David's offspring is not as an antitype of Solomon. This might explain why the renewed Temple is built by YHWH for the Davidic figure and not vice versa (4Q174 1.1-6).

This decreased role for the Davidic messiah is to be expected. Not only did the Qumran community want the Davidic messiah to have decreased jurisdiction over cultic matters, but this figure was to be of lesser rank in political matters as well. As is well known, Qumran's messianism included multiple offices. 4Q174 mentions two: the first is the Branch of David the second is the Interpreter of the Law. Fitzmyer voices his initial surprise at this duality:

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83 IV.2.2; Abegg and Evans ["Messianic", 194] note that all of the occurrences at Qumran of the נְשֵׁיָ֫ו (ךל) are messianic.
84 Horbury, *Cult*, 45.
85 For the sake of focus, I will not discuss whether this Temple is metaphorical or literal. For representatives on either side of this argument see D. Dimant, "4QFlorilegium and the Idea of the Community as Temple", in *Hellenica et Judaica* (eds. A. Caquot, M. Hadas-Lebel, and J. Riaud; Leuven: Peeters, 1986) and M.O. Wise, "4QFlorilegium and the Temple of Adam", *RevQ* 15 (1991-2).
86 Zimmermann [*Messianische Texte*, 71] comments on the reduced rank of the Davidic Messiah in 4Q161: "Um gerechtes Gericht ausüben zu können, ist der erwartete König auf die Belehrung und auf Anweisungen von seiten der Priester angewiesen."
Even though מִשְׁמֶרֶת was applied in post-monarchial times to a historical priest in Leviticus 4, it is a surprise to see a priestly figure become a part of the Qumran community’s messianic expectations, because there is little in the Old Testament itself about a future “priest,” unless Zech 6:13b is so understood. 88

While Fitzmyer suggests this connection very cautiously, the evidence for Zechariah’s influence on Qumran’s messianism warrants a stronger argument. Firstly, Zech 6:12-13 does indeed mention two eschatological offices under peaceful co-existence: Zerubbabel (or “Branch”) and Joshua the High Priest. Secondly, both figures are depicted as olive branches 89 and called “sons of anointing [בֵּן-יֵשׁכָּר]” in 4:14. 90 The invitation toward messianic interpretation is obvious. Thirdly, Zech 6:12 is the first time the vegetation metaphor becomes a messianic title foreshadowing the title “Branch of David.” 91 Thus, Zechariah has the potential to illuminate at least three peculiar features of Qumran’s messianism. Still, while Zechariah seems to have spurred the imaginations of the Dead Sea interpreters, it obviously did not constrain their messianism to any great extent. Zechariah’s royal messiah was a Solomon figure who is expected to build the Temple and the priestly “messiah” seems to have a supporting role. As seen, Qumran departs from these ideas. 92

As the next section returns to the NT, it will be important to keep the following points in mind. (A) Some circles in the first century thought that Zechariah provided a precedent for dual messianism. (B) The messianic Davidic figure at Qumran should not be seen as an antitype of David or Solomon since there is a strict separation between eschatological and historical categories. (C) Scriptural precedents served to spur messianic ideas at Qumran but did little to constrain them. In what follows, I will suggest that the evangelists (particularly Matthew) represent a more typological approach to the application of Scripture while betraying some affinity to what we have seen in this section.

88 Fitzmyer, Scrolls and Christian Origins, 83.
89 The vision of Zech 4 shows the Temple as a lamp-stand alongside two olive branches which pour out their oil.
90 Collins, Scepter, 77.
91 It is commonly argued that Qumran has adapted the vegetation language of Jeremiah, e.g. A.S. van der Woude, Die Messianischen Vorstellungen der Gemeinde von Qumran (Assen: Gorcum, 1957), 171; Juel, Exegesis, 67; C.A. Evans, “Are the "Son" Texts at Qumran Messianic?” (1998): 141; J. Laansma, I Will Give You Rest (WUNT 98; Tübingen: Mohr Siebeck, 1997), 225-6. There can be no doubt that the Jeremiah texts cited above also contributed to the “Branch” language. I do not wish to paint these two passages as mutually exclusive options.
92 A more comprehensive treatment would have to consider the influence of Num 27:18-23 on Qumran’s multiple offices as portrayed in the examples of Eleazar and Joshua.
VI.4 Matthew's Zechariah Localization

F.F. Bruce catalogued eleven parallels between Zechariah and Jesus' Passion spanning all four Gospels. To summarize these parallels, the following chart has set direct quotations in quotes, strong allusions in simple text and echoes in italics.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Quote / Concept</th>
<th>Zechariah</th>
<th>Gospel</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1. “Say to the Daughter of Zion, ‘Behold, your king coming... mounted on a colt, the foal...!”’</td>
<td>9:9 + Isa 62:11(^{94})</td>
<td>Mt 21:4ff.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2. “King coming... seated on an ass's colt!”</td>
<td>9:9</td>
<td>Jn 12:14ff.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>3. “…shall not look on him whom they have pierced”</td>
<td>12:10 + Ex 12:46</td>
<td>Jn 19:33ff</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>4. “I will strike the shepherd…”</td>
<td>13:7</td>
<td>Mk 14:27//Mt 26:31</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>5. Weighed out... 30 pieces of silver</td>
<td>11:12</td>
<td>Mt 26:15</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>6. Money cast down... used to buy field</td>
<td>11:13 + Jer 18:2</td>
<td>Mt 27:9ff</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>7. The poor of the flock // little ones</td>
<td>11:11//13:7</td>
<td>Lk 12:32</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>10. Flowing of living water</td>
<td>13:1 + Is 44:3par.</td>
<td>Jn 7:38</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>11. House of trade(^{85})</td>
<td>Tg.Zech 14:21</td>
<td>Jn 2:16</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

As seen here, the first four parallels take the form of direct quotations. Taken together, five and six seem strongly influenced by Zechariah even though no direct quote is supplied. The next five represent faint echoes, perhaps too vague to be noticed individually. But given the weight of the previous six and the overall total, one is compelled to consider their merit.

Bruce concludes that there is enough evidence to suggest that the parallels to Zechariah in Jesus' Passion originated in the mind of Jesus himself; that individual quotations should not be seen as “something isolated, but as part of Jesus' presentation of Himself as the good shepherd.”\(^{96}\) For the sake of focus, Bruce's interpretation of Jesus as the “shepherd King” will not be considered here. At this point it is necessary to assess whether Bruce's argument that traces Zechariah tradition back to Jesus can be sufficiently sustained.

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\(^{93}\) Bruce, “Book of Zechariah”.

\(^{94}\) This conflation with Isa 62:11 further confirms Matthew’s interest in Isaiah as discussed in the previous chapter (V.2).

\(^{85}\) In this case, the key conceptual parallel is the Aramaic paraphrase “there shall no longer be a trader in the house of the YHWH on that day.” Here the meturgeman has changed “Canaanite” to “trader.” The late date of the written tradition cautions against any strong argument. Even so, it seems that there are two exegetical options available. The first places this tradition after the destruction of the Temple. If this is so, Tg.Zech suggests that the Herodian Temple was remembered as an institution corrupted by the abuse of trade. The second option is that the written tradition represents a much earlier sentiment that is contemporary to the issue at stake in Jesus' Temple demonstration. Both options cast further light on the state of the Temple shortly before its destruction.

\(^{96}\) Bruce, “Book of Zechariah”, 345.
Since it is upon the direct quotations that this argument is centered, I will begin here and work outward to the more peripheral evidence. On the basis of the quotations alone, the dispersion of these quotations is unexpected. Numbers one and two originate independently in Matthew and John. The Fourth Evangelist also directly appeals to Zech 12:10 as he interprets the physicality of Jesus' death. It should be pointed out that in each of these cases, the Zechariah quotations derive not from the lips of Jesus but from the narrative interpreters of Jesus' actions. Mk 14:27 employs Zech 13:7 in the context of Jesus' prediction of his death and resurrection. Matthew follows suit. Such sayings are generally taken to be a result of post-Easter apologetic. This does not negate the possibility that Jesus foresaw his death (if only in a cause-effect sort of way) and had appealed to Zechariah in doing so. Yet the weight of scholarly opinion does not lend itself to Bruce's thesis thus far. What can be said is that the evangelists appeal to Zechariah with remarkable uniformity. What cannot be said is that there is enough evidence to trace this line of thought back to the mind of Jesus. This is confirmed by Matthew's employment of Zechariah in Judas' betrayal. Here again, it is the narrator who has interpreted the significance of the thirty pieces of silver. As far as the narrator is concerned Jesus has no knowledge of this money or its significance.

As such, it is more probable that Matthew has followed Mark's lead in quoting Zech 13:7 and has taken this saying as a key for understanding the larger significance of the events of the Passion. Noticing the many similarities between Mark's Passion and Zechariah, Matthew has created something of a Zechariah matrix. This can be seen in Matthew's interpretation of Jesus' Entry as the fulfillment of Zech 9:9. It can also be seen in Matthew's expansion of Mk 14:11 to include details from Zech 11:12-13. Bruce is then correct to quote Dodd on this matter:

There is no reason to suppose that this belongs to the primitive corpus of testimonia, but we may well believe that Matthew was led to it because the whole passage of Zechariah was already recognized as a source of testimonies.97

In this way, Matthew has followed a distortion trajectory present in the tradition he has received and has expanded it.98 Similarly the Fourth Evangelist has utilized Zechariah, not in matrix fashion, but as a resource for his theme of Jesus as the "good shepherd." The crucial difference between Matthew and John is the extent of their expansions and

98 P.J. Achtemeier observes that in comparison to Matthew, Mark's Entry account seems "unusually ambiguous" ['And He Followed Him: Miracles and Discipleship in Mark 10:46-52", Semeia 11 (1978): 130]. Matthew's account has thus taken steps to improve this ambiguity.
the extent of their creative license. In the case of John, the evangelist has probably inherited a shepherd metaphor uttered by Jesus (cf. Mk 6:34; Lk 12:32) and expanded this into a dominant literary theme. Matthew, on the other hand, follows Mark’s lead as far as events are concerned and uses the Zechariah matrix to supply details and thereby interpret these events.

As Matthew’s account of Jesus’ Entry follows Mark, the evangelist reinforces the implicit typology with more explicit appeals. In this way, Matthew continues the trajectory of typological localization which is implicit in Mark’s narrative. This typological localization distorts the tradition in two ways. The first is narrativization: the process of distortion that takes place in story telling. The second is instrumentalization: the reinterpretation of memories in order to serve the present better (II.2.3-4).

Jesus’ Entry was a public exhibition. As such, there were originally several personal memories of this event which first competed and then reinforced one another to become formalized into a socialized version of the event. Mark’s account relayed a particular socialized version of the event. Upon Matthew’s hearing of the story, the evangelist received a highly formalized account which was part of a narrative complex. It seems that Matthew’s retelling took its interpretive cues from those implicit in Mark.

Matthew consciously rolled this trajectory forward by localizing the event within an already established category of significance, one with considerable momentum. By appealing to Zechariah directly, the evangelist placed the significance of Jesus’ act within a potent and evocative memory vehicle. As attested in the Qumran library, messianic categories in the first century had an extremely strong magnetism, pulling (and conflating) disparate texts and traditions into conglomerates of eschatological expectation. Texts like 2Sam 7 invited associations with similar incarnations of familial expectation. Matthew’s use of Zech 9:9 might be explained in such a way. The fact the crowd’s cry departs from the Ps 118 formula to include, “Blessed is the coming kingdom of our father David” (Mk 11:10) might have spurred memories of messianic proof-texts contained in this category. Therefore, Matthew’s localization of Jesus’ act within Zechariah 9:9 betrays instrumentalization and narrativization. But Matthew’s use of Zechariah is different than of the Dead Sea Scrolls in that the evangelist also seems constrained by this Zechariah framework. This will be fleshed out in what follows.

Matthew's account strays from Mark's with regard to its immediate telos. Mark's anticlimax is dropped altogether to include what becomes one of the most climatic moments of narrative: Jesus' demonstration in the Temple. This is a textbook example of distortion by narrativization. When memories are transformed into stories, they receive beginnings and endings. Moreover, the details included in these stories are so because they serve the telos of the story. This happens along all stages of memory. In Matthew's case, the evangelist has taken the broader telos of the story and placed it in the immediate context of Jesus' Entry. The Temple was, of course, both Jesus' final destination and the central reason that his symbolic act was effective. In both these ways, Matthew's broader telos is not radically different than Mark's. What Matthew does distort is Mark's immediate anticlimax. This is simply good story telling. It should be noted, however, that Mark's placement of the fig tree incident (Mk 11:12-14; 20-26) was undoubtedly strategic. Mark has couched the Jesus' Temple action within a type of actualized parable. With this in mind, it is possible that Matthew's distortion comes closer to how the event was originally remembered. This is confirmed by Luke's corresponding climax.

Given Zechariah's influence upon Mathew's interpretation, the evangelist's teleological emphasis is understandable. For Matthew, Jesus' royal office is linked with his relationship to the Temple, and as such, Matthew places Jesus' demonstration in a more prominent location in his narrative. This shift is better explained when Matthew's use of Zechariah is examined. As shown, Zech 9:9 mimics Solomon's original claim to the throne in 1Kgs 1:32-40. Zechariah employs this imagery because Zerubbabel's most important office is that of Temple builder. The prophet portrays him as the antitype of Solomon in order to demonstrate his authority as the "Branch" of David spoken of in 2Sam 7. As Dead Sea Scrolls attest, Zechariah's dual figures (priestly and royal) contributed to a dual Messianism in the first century. Both figures were expected to lead Israel in the last days and a large part of this was the expectation of a reestablished Temple. It is this expectation concerning the Temple that illuminates Matthew's telos.

100 Mark, of course, also represents narrativized distortion. My point here is to say that Matthew's unique narrative has further distorted the story of the Entry to conform accordingly.
101 Also, Matthew omits the details of the fetching of the colt and its "unriddenness", perhaps because these details do not directly connect to either of the scriptures to which Matthew has appealed; cf. Black, "Slain Messiah", 170-1.
102 Cf. Hagner, Matthew 14-28, 600.
103 There is no need to suppose that Matthew and Luke are privy to an independent "Entry-Source". Both seem to have distorted Mark's story by their own narrativization in order to correct Mark's anticlimax.
This must be kept in mind when reading Mt 21:2, 5 and 7. Here Matthew borrows from Zechariah by inventing dual animals. LXX Zech 9:9 reads:

Χαίρε σφόδρα θύγατερ Σιων κήρυσσε θύγατερ Ιερουσαλήμ Ἰδοὺ ὁ βασιλεύς σου ἐρχεται σοι δίκαιος και σωζόν αὐτός πραῖς καὶ ἐπιβεβηκὼς ἐπὶ υποζύγιον καὶ πῶλον νέου.

This text takes the Hebrew dual description of the same animal [עֶמְלָנָה] and creates two separate animals. As such, Matthew has taken a poetic category and literalized it in his narrative.

This literalization is perhaps an extension of the first century belief of dual messiahs as suggested by Zechariah and evidenced in the Dead Sea Scrolls. We have thus far seen that (1) Ps 118 emphasizes the king’s relationship with the Temple establishment, (2) Zadok played a key role in Solomon’s prototypical inaugural procession, (3) Zechariah describes both the king and the high priest as “anointed” and (4) Qumran’s expectation of multiple messiahs was influenced by Zechariah. From this perspective, it is clear that Matthew followed suit with first three of the above in placing Jesus’ relationship to the Temple establishment at center stage. Given that Zechariah was the dominant mnemonic paradigm at work in Matthew’s interpretation, his literalization of the two animals might also have served to comment on Jesus’ relationship with the Temple establishment. In Zechariah, both Zerubbabel and Joshua were anointed and each had a crucial role in reestablishing the Temple; Zerubbabel took on Solomon’s mantle of building the Temple, while Joshua occupied Zadok’s priestly office. This is most probably the paradigm that informed Matthew’s interpretation of Jesus’ relationship with the Temple. But in Jesus’ case, the high priest is absent and at odds with Zion’s king.

What is not clear at this point is whether Matthew is portraying Jesus as filling both offices due the absence of his counterpart, or whether the evangelist has merely intended to highlight the negligence of high priest. If it is the former, Matthew’s account serves as a defense against those who would begrudge Jesus both offices. If it is the latter, Matthew has demonstrated that Jesus made every effort to include the Temple establishment in the coming kingdom; it was their decision to reject the messiah that ultimately excluded them. In either case, Matthew has ultimately portrayed Jesus as a

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104 This detail probably does not have origins in memory, contra Gundry, Matthew, 409; and Hagner, Matthew 14-28, 594. Gundry’s argument that the colt was accompanied by its mother for comfort is not convincing [The Use of the Old Testament in St. Matthew’s Gospel (SNT 18; Leiden: Brill, 1967), 197-9].

105 Ironically Thom 47 reads, “Jesus said, ‘A person cannot mount two horses or bend two bows’…”
singular messiah. If Matthew did indeed feel the need to address messianic duality (viz. Qumran ideology), he does so by highlighting that Jesus alone rode into Jerusalem on two animals. By localizing his narrative within a Zechariah framework, Matthew has more than just garnished Mark's storyline with a few scriptural citations and allusions. Matthew has interpreted Jesus' significance by mnemonically associating his symbolic act with an historical type. According to Matthew, Jesus was the Davidic antitype predicted by Zechariah and first modeled by Solomon. It is in this sense that Matthew has employed the title Son of David. Given the results of my previous chapter concerning Matthew's interest in this title, there can be little doubt that Matthew saw a connection between Jesus' Entry and Solomon typology as mediated by Zechariah. In this way, Matthew probably saw his account to be an improvement of Mark's because Mark had not adequately drawn out the significance of Jesus' symbolic procession. While it was enough for Mark to relay the crowd's Davidic shout, Matthew takes this a step further and associates Jesus with the Solomonic title: Son of David.

According to Mt 21:9, Jesus rides into Jerusalem amidst the shouts, "Hosanna, Son of David! Blessed be he who comes in the name of the Lord! Hosanna in the Highest!" this is a departure from Mark in that Son of David is inserted in place of Mark's mention of "the kingdom of David our father!" As Matthew's agenda dictates, Son of David again finds a prominent position in his narrative. In this story, Jesus' procession leads to the Temple where Jesus will demonstrate his authority over it as the messianic Son of David. Zechariah again mnemonically guides Matthew's imagery. Jesus' authority over the Temple is justified by the fact that he is typologically akin to the first Son of David, Solomon, who served as the prototype for Zechariah's prophecy. Unlike the Dead Sea Scrolls, Matthew has imported the context of Zechariah to inform Jesus' significance and not merely the imagery. This not only serves to strengthen Jesus' eschatological significance but it also anchors him within an archetypal memory.
Thus far the present discussion has focused on interpretive trajectories. This study has traced the process of mnemonic reinforcement by localization: the categorization of memories within previous established traditions. We are now in a position to ask the following questions: What were the first memories of Jesus’ Entry into Jerusalem and how might these account for the mnemonic trajectories that followed?

Wright, among others, has placed a great deal of weight on the fact that Jesus rode into Jerusalem on a colt.108 Lane has pointed out that, since pilgrims traditionally entered the city on foot for such festivals, Jesus’ mounting of a colt was a conscious royal appeal to Zech 9:9.109 Surely, Mark seems to think that the details surrounding the procurement of this colt are important for the reader. But to infer that the Sitz im Leben Jesu of this story tells us something of Jesus’ original appeal to royal imagery perhaps places undue weight on the simple fact that Jesus mounted a colt and rode it. Are we justified to infer so much from this mounting?

Witherington observes that there is no other mention of Jesus riding an animal.110 Furthermore, France’s pith is appreciated, “Jesus walked all the way from Galilee, and surely did not need to ride a donkey for only the last two miles.”111 The act of riding a colt in Jerusalem therefore is abnormal on three levels. One, pilgrims usually walked. Two, Jesus is said to have ridden only in this instance. Three, Jesus rides only on the last leg of his journey. These three abnormalities give more credence to the special character of the act. That there was a traditionally established royal significance for riding into the city amid cheers of welcome only secures the likelihood that the act was not happenstance. This said, it is hard to imagine that simply mounting a colt would have

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108 Wright, Victory of God, 491ff.
109 Lane, Mark, 393.
110 Witherington, Christology, 106.
111 France, Matthew, 296.
attracted so much attention. In order for the proper symbolism to be evoked there must have been some choreography involved. We might take seriously, then, Meier’s suggestion that a small group of disciples prompted the crowd\(^{112}\) (or as many as could be swayed).

This leads us to ask, how are we to imagine this so-called pomp? As seen above in Fitzmyer’s discussion, the adulation \(\omega\alpha\nu\nu\alpha\) was probably no more than a typical greeting offered to every pilgrim entering the city for a feast. It is more than likely that \(\omega\alpha\nu\nu\alpha\) does not represent a royal adulation in and of itself. Witherington suggests that

Jesus simply [was] accompanied by various pilgrims […] singing the pilgrim songs, one of which is based on Ps. 118:26ff. and was certainly used during the Feasts of Tabernacles and Passover. (Psalm 118:26 may be no more than a greeting used to address pilgrims as they approach the holy city.)\(^{113}\)

Sanders, very plausibly, suggests that shouting of \(\omega\alpha\nu\nu\alpha\) and the shouting of blessing were antiphonal.\(^{114}\) While Sanders’ suggestion imagines a chorus shouting in accord rather than in unison, another possibility exists. One might imagine a larger group of welcomers with no messianic agenda shouting \(\omega\alpha\nu\nu\alpha\) (as was the custom), with a smaller group of Jesus’ followers spinning the welcome in a messianic direction. It is more probable that Jesus and his disciples took the opportunity to reinterpret the ready-made appeal to Ps 118 than it is to imagine an entire crowd coming to the same interpretation in unison. If this is so, the distortion of this memory within a Davidic/Solomonic category began in the minds of the first observers.

Finally, it will be helpful to return to Bruce’s suggestion that the appeal to Zechariah tradition was historical before it was literary. As discussed, he demonstrated that allusions and direct quotes of Zechariah are prevalent in the Passion narratives of all four gospels. While Bruce’s conclusion that Zechariah typology existed in the mind of Jesus is difficult to defend, it is probable that this typology was present among Jesus’ contemporaries. While it is extremely difficult to probe the historical mind of Jesus, it is not so difficult to establish early and widespread perceptions of Jesus.


\(^{114}\) Sanders, “Entrance Narrative”, 181-2; cf. Evans, Mark, 146; Horbury suggests that this chorus might betray an early Christian hymn that has been worked into the narrative [Cult, 109]. Looked at from a SM perspective, song is an extremely effective mnemotechnique that facilitates the stability of a memory as it transitions from context to context. Thus, the possibility emerges that Hosanna represents both a Jewish festival ritual and an adapted Christian ritual.
Jesus’ Entry into Jerusalem is an apt case study for the present dissertation because there is early and widespread evidence of typological interpretation that is not overtly manifested in the earliest Synoptic account. Mark has made no literary attempt to draw out the significance of Jesus’ action by an appeal to Zechariah, nor has he given any overt cues concerning Solomon typology. The typological significance of Jesus’ Entry seems to have first existed on the level of memory. That Mark’s subtext betrays this typology is confirmed in the overt appeals to Zechariah by John and Matthew and the overt application of Son of David by Matthew.

In the minds of Jesus’ disciples (and perhaps others), this was indeed a typological act. It was either choreographed by them or by Jesus himself. Given what we have seen of Catchpole’s patterns and how influential Zechariah was at Qumran, the typology was specifically meant to demonstrate a claim of political leadership. But more importantly, the mimicry of Solomon’s precedent as filtered through Zechariah was meant to elicit the endorsement and support of the Temple priesthood.

In the story of Solomon, Zadok was included in the ceremony. Zechariah’s “Branch” of David, Zerubbabel, was partnered with his co-anointed Joshua. Qumran’s eschatology envisioned the coming of at least two messiahs, one to reestablish the priesthood and one to reestablish the Davidic line. Ps 118 illustrates homogeny between the house of Aaron and the rest of Israel. Later Aramaic interpreters represent this as the relationship between David and the Temple. The several historical and literary precedents catalogued by Catchpole typify a cultic destination and activity whether for good or ill. If Jesus’ Entry into Jerusalem evoked any of these precedents, this act would have been perceived as an invitation to the priesthood to acknowledge his claim as David’s successor. It is improbable that the title Son of David was used of Jesus during this episode. Even so, Matthew’s use of Son of David simply makes explicit a typology that can be deduced from the early and widespread memories of this event.
In Mk 12:35-7, Jesus poses a series of questions challenging the so-called scribal teaching concerning the Son of David.

Because the questions presented in this pericope remain ultimately unanswered by Jesus’ audience, or Jesus himself, it has invited and continues to invite inference. The Davidssohnfrage is Jesus’ only mention of the title Son of David in the Gospels and therefore it is obviously pertinent to the present study. But it should be said from the outset that while a thorough analysis of this logion is required, the reader should not expect more than modest exegetical results. Due to the difficulties with respect to origin and meaning, the Davidssohnfrage does little to clarify the question of Jesus’ relationship to the title. Complicating matters further, Ps 110 (quoted in this passage) presents several exegetical problems of its own. Indeed, the Davidssohnfrage has often left exegetes and theologians with more problems concerning Son of David and solves very few. This will be detailed below, but it is not to say that the logion is of no value for the larger methodological aim of the present dissertation.

Over the course of this study, I have argued in favor of an historical method that traces the evidence of mnemonic distortion along redactional trajectories to postulate early and widespread perceptions of Jesus by his contemporaries. In the case of the Davidssohnfrage, its value will be found in that it is an historically indefinite test case for my proposed method. Because the origin of the saying is uncertain, it will be necessary to approximate where the Davidssohnfrage stands on its distortion trajectory. Moreover, this logion betrays certain ideological categories that were relevant in Jesus’ historical context. For both of these reasons, the Davidssohnfrage is historically important despite its ambiguity.
The present chapter will be laid out as follows: (1) The question of the origin of Mk 12:35-7 will be discussed. (2) Psalm 110 will be analyzed for the purpose of tracing its trajectory(ies) of interpretation through the first century and beyond. (3) The interpretation(s) of this psalm will be measured against the trajectory of davidic and messianic ideology(ies) that converged in or near the first century. (4) Mk 12:35-7 will be measured against the previous discussions with special emphasis upon pre-Markan tradition.

VII.1  
Mk 12:35-7 and the Problem of Origin

Scholarship is divided on the historical value of Mk 12:35-7. There are good reasons to think that this passage reflects a memory of an argument between Jesus and the Jerusalem leadership. There are also reasons to think that this story reflects an early, but invented, story which has placed Ps 110 on the lips of Jesus. Both possibilities will be given equal voice in what follows. Although my discussion of origin and historicity will be more comprehensive than most commentators, I will not ultimately decide in favor of “historicity” or against it.

It is worth reiterating, however, that if one were to come to the conclusion that this passage is best explained as a product of invention, it would not necessarily render moot the discussion of the historical Jesus. If the story represents early invention,¹ it is of value in that it provides a window to which interpretative categories had been employed to understand Jesus’ significance and how. By locating these categories and analyzing their distortive effect(s), we gain insight into how memory-stories of Jesus might have been interpreted at earlier stages of the Jesus tradition. Conversely if one were to come to the conclusion that this passage is a memory-story, it would not necessarily render moot the discussion of interpretive distortion. As has been argued extensively in the present dissertation, all memory requires interpretation and is therefore distorted. In the case of a memory-story adapted by Mark’s narrative, one should expect that Mark has employed interpretive categories that render the story meaningful to his post-Easter context. With

¹ By “early”, I mean an invention-story that circulated among the first generation of Jesus’ followers. The importance of this lies in the idea of historical plausibility. If the invented story was used to interpret Jesus’ significance within a category that does not seem plausible to those people who remembered his words and deeds, the story would have had a difficultly being established in SM. It also worth acknowledging the possibility that invented stories about Jesus may have circulated during his lifetime (as sometimes happens with controversial figures). Again these stories would have only gained acceptance if they cohered with other “established” memories of Jesus.
this in mind, the discussion of origin will aid our decision of how to best apply these interpretive categories to Jesus’ historical context.

VII.1.1 In Favor of Memory

Bultmann argued that this logion was a product of an early Christian dispute over Jesus’ Davidic descent. Thus the Davidssohnfrage was penned by a small circle who denied Jesus’ relationship with David. While this theory has come under fire, it was more fully defended by Burger. Burger argued that the Davidssohnfrage represents a tradition whose purpose “ursprünglich war, die jüdische Auffassung von der Davidssohnschaft des Messias zu widerlegen.” Chilton exposes a weakness in this argument, averring that Bultmann’s “hypothetical circle” would have held an ideology contrary to the theology of Mt 1:6, 17, 20; Lk 1:27, 32, 3:31; Rom 1:3, 2Tim 2:8 and Rev 5:5, 22:16. Because there are so many different strata representing unanimity on this point the lack of positive evidence for the existence of the hypothetical circle is problematic. Brown also noticed this unanimity and noted that Jesus’ Davidic decent does not seem to have been controversial in the earliest traditions. Chilton goes on to argue that it is difficult to attribute this tradition to early church redaction because although the titles “Son of David”, “Messiah” and “Lord” are used in the passage, none of these are used in ways that are typical of NT usage. The distance between Lord (God) and lord (messiah) is very dissimilar to NT usage (cf. Mk 5:19-20 where Jesus’ identity is in view). Furthermore, according to Chilton, the Davidssohnfrage would seem to contradict both Matthean and Lukan genealogies, “and does not correspond to any theme which is emphasized in Mark.” Chilton’s observation of the atypical use of titles in this passage is not easily disputed and perhaps is the strongest reason to affirm an origin in early memory rather than invention. Chilton writes:

3 Burger, Jesus als Davidssohn, 52-9.
4 Burger, Jesus als Davidssohn, 166.
In fact, the citation of Psalm 110 presupposes a critical distance between ‘the lord’ (God) and ‘my lord’ (the Messiah) which is not maintained elsewhere in the New Testament (cf. particularly Mk 5.19, 20) when Jesus’ identity is in view. One might generally argue that Jesus and God are closely identified when the former is called ‘lord’, but he is not so designated in the present case. On reflection, then, the so-called Christological titles in the passage do not correspond very well to what we, on the basis of ordinary New Testament usage, might expect the early Church to have said of Jesus.7

Following Chilton, it is possible that this saying represents an early stage of memory and therefore does not typify the more Christologically charged versions of these titles found in later traditions.8 Chilton’s observation might indicate that this tradition preserves a use of the title son of David which has not yet been reinforced with Christological distortion. One must grant that the evangelists included the tradition hoping to evoke a more fully developed Christology.9 But since the theological statement being made on the lips of Jesus is ambiguous, one imagines an original context that predates the fully developed agenda(s) of Christology. Marcus writes:

The apparent denial in Mark 12:35-37 that the Messiah is the son of David, therefore, represents a puzzling piece of christology that is at home neither in first-century Judaism, nor in first-century Christianity, nor in the flow of Mark’s story.10

Perhaps the most difficult question to answer is why a creation of the early church would yield such little Christological data. Evans argues that no “explicit affirmation of Christology is provided.” He asks, “What has been clarified? What has the church gained? Casting doubt on the Davidic descent of the messiah is hardly what we should expect the church to have done…”11

Before moving on to the factors which cast doubt on the saying’s origin, one last point is warranted. The quotation formula that introduces Ps 110:1 is an anomaly for the Markan Jesus. Nowhere else in Mark does Jesus cite Scripture by appealing to the authority of the Holy Spirit.12 In addition, 12:37’s use of πόθεν instead of the more

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7 Chilton, “Reflections”, 194.
9 Burger, Jesus als Davidsohn, 116.
10 Marcus, Way, 140.
12 Lohmeyer [Markus, 262] argued that, elsewhere in the NT, when the Holy Spirit is appealed to in citation the author does so for eschatological reasons (cf. Acts 1:16; 4:25; Heb 3:7; 9:8; 10:15; 1Pet 1:21). This would seem to cohere with the internal discussion of Messianic expectations within this pericope (discussed below).
common πῶς is atypical in Mark. In these ways, the saying runs contrary to the editorial tendency of the evangelist. As will be discussed below, there are several other indicators which suggest that the Davidssohnfrage is not a Markan creation. This, however, does not prove that the logion is derivative of memory, but it does suggest that, if the saying was invented, it was done so prior to Mark’s composition.

VII.1.2 In Favor of Invention

Chilton’s statement that the saying does not thematically correspond to any of Mark’s emphases is open to scrutiny. Telford has argued that one of Mark’s principal motives was to promote a “Son of God” Christology at the expense of a more Jewish-political understanding of son of David. Therefore, in contrast to Chilton’s statement, the Davidssohnfrage might serve to distance “Christ” from “son of David” and if so it fits neatly into one of Mark’s key agendas. If one agrees with Telford that Mark had such an aim, it weakens Chilton’s argument for historicity.

More problems of this nature surface when one considers the popularity of Ps 110 among the NT writers. Taken together Mt 22:44; 26:64; Mk 12:36; 14:62; Lk 20:42; 22:69; Acts 2:33-35; Rom 8:34; 1Cor15:25, 27; Eph 1:19-22; Heb 1:3, 13; 5:5-10; 8:1; 10:13 suggest that Ps 110 was a potent memory-vehicle that carried the early Church’s conception of an exalted Christ. Bultmann argued that the use of this quote assumes Jesus’ status as messiah (and perhaps even his pre-existence). That this psalm was placed on the lips of Jesus for this reason must remain a possibility. Furthermore, the quote of Ps 110 is dependent upon the Septuagint.

<table>
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<tr>
<th>Mk 12:36</th>
<th>Psalm 109:1 LXX</th>
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<tr>
<td>εἶπεν κύριος τῷ κυρίῳ μου κάθου ἐκ δεξιῶν μου, ἐὰς ἐν θῷ τοὺς ἔχθροὺς σου ὑποκάτω τῶν ποδῶν σου.</td>
<td>εἶπεν ὁ κύριος τῷ κυρίῳ μου κάθου ἐκ δεξιῶν μου ἐὰς ἐν θῷ τοὺς ἔχθροὺς σου ὑποπόδιον τῶν ποδῶν σου.</td>
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13 Cf. Mt 22:45; Lk 20:44.  
15 W.R. Telford, The Theology of the Gospel of Mark (Cambridge: CUP, 1999), 35-54; Hahn, [Titles, 13-15] previously argued that this saying is a result of a Hellenistic community attempting to support the notion that Jesus was not only the Son of David but also the Son of God.  
16 Telford, Mark, 36-7.  
17 For a survey and treatment of these passages and later apostolic witness concerning Ps 110, see Hengel, Studies in Early Christology, 119-225.  
20 Hahn, Titles, 114; Pesch, Markusevangelium, 254; Davies and Allison, Matthew, 250.
The agreement is not perfect (set in bold above), but close enough to suggest dependence. Marcus suggests that the use of “under” instead of the LXX’s “footstool” is due to conflation with Ps 8:7 LXX: “You have subordinated all things under [ὑποκάτω] his feet.” This suggests that the pericope was conceptualized in Greek thought. More to this point, Marcus also draws attention to the chiastic structure of this pericope.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Kai ἀποκριθεὶς ὁ Παρασίτης ἔγραψεν διδάσκαλον ἐν τῷ ἱερῷ:</th>
<th>A</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Πῶς λέγουσιν οἱ γραμματεῖς ὅτι ὁ χριστὸς υἱὸς Δαυίδ ἔστιν;</td>
<td>B</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>αὐτὸς Δαυίδ εἶπεν ἐν τῷ πνεύματι τῷ ἀγίῳ;</td>
<td>C</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Ἑλπιὼν κύριος τῷ κυρίῳ μου:</td>
<td>D</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Καθὼς ἐκ δεξιῶν μου,</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>ἔως ἃν ἔρχωσιν ἐνοχὸς σου</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>ὑποκάτω τῶν ποδῶν σου.</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>αὐτὸς Δαυίδ ἔλεγεν αὐτὸν κύριον,</td>
<td>C'</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>καὶ πόθεν αὐτοῦ ἔστιν υἱὸς;</td>
<td>B'</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Καὶ ὁ πολὺς ὠχὸς ἤκουεν αὐτοῦ ἰδέας.</td>
<td>A'</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

In this way, the lines are arranged to highlight the quotation of Ps 110:1 which is the keystone. Such structure lends support to the argument that the Davidssohnfrage was originally authored in Greek. But the possibility remains that Mark (or an earlier memory) has simply restructured a saying inherited from an earlier stage of oral tradition. Marcus writes:

What is Mark’s direct role in shaping this passage? It seems essentially to be limited to fashioning the frame of the passage, Mark 12:35a, 37c. Mark 12:35a, “and answering Jesus said, teaching in the Temple,” is replete with Markan vocabulary. The word “teaching,” for example, indicates a favorite theme of Markan redactional verses, and the mention of the Temple links our passage with the overlapping redactional framework of the entire section 11:27-13:1. As for v. 37c, “large crowd” is a characteristic term for Markan redaction.

Marcus concludes that aside from the redactional frame “the rest of the passage seems to be basically traditional”. But as we have just seen, the bulk of “the rest of the passage” seems dependent upon the Septuagint. In sum, the introductory and closing remarks, the scriptural citation and the overall structure look to have originated in Greek. So the

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21 Pesch, Markusevangelium, 254.
22 Marcus, Way, 130; Hay [Glory, 35-6] demonstrated that the coupling of these verses is common in early Christianity.
23 Gnilka [Markus, 2:169] argued for an origin in Hellenistic Jewish Christianity for an altogether different reason. He contended, “Die Relativierung der Davidsohnschaft des Messias ist im palästinischen Judenchristentum, wo man Genealogien schuf, um sie abzusichern, schwer unterzubringen, zumal sie der Kyriowürde gegenübergestellt wird.” This argument is only convincing if one agrees with Gnilka’s premise concerning the origin of the genealogies.
24 Marcus, Way, 131.
25 Marcus, Way, 131.
possibility remains that this logion was invented by a Greek speaker for a Hellenistic audience.

All considered, the origin of the Davidssohnfrage remains elusive. Chilton’s argument for dissimilarity and tradition contrary to the tendency of the evangelists does not ultimately convince that this logion has an origin in early memory. On the other hand, this logion is not easily explained as early Christian invention. Accordingly the Davidssohnfrage provides the present study with an opportunity to apply my proposed method to an historically indefinite test case.

VII.1.3 Distortion and Mark 12:35-7
Crucial to my proposed application of memory distortion is the idea of continuity. I have previously discussed how memory most naturally functions as a translator which renders perceptions of the past intelligible to the frameworks of the present. I have argued that a perceived continuity between former perceptions and new perceptions is essential for maintaining both personal and social stability. A breach in one’s perceived mnemonic continuity has the capacity to cause identity crisis and a disassociation from the new social framework which has dramatically negated the integrity between past and present. When applied to the Jesus tradition, the principle of continuity militates against a dramatic breach between Jewish-Christian Christology(ies) at the time of Mark’s authorship and the Jewish messianism(s) contemporary to the historical Jesus. Mark’s presentation of the Jesus tradition is best seen as the stabilization of an interpretive distortion trajectory connecting the social-frameworks of Mark’s community to significant (i.e. self-defining) memories of Jesus. Mark’s Story, stories and sayings of Jesus must lie somewhere along this trajectory.

Because the Davidssohnfrage is historically indefinite (i.e. it seems to repel easy classification with either social-framework but seems at least partially intelligible to both) I would argue that this particular saying represents a kind of middle-stratum between early memories of Jesus and later Christian invention. In order for this to be the case, two things must be demonstrated: (a) that the Davidssohnfrage was intelligible both to a pre-Christian, Jewish framework and to a Christological framework and (b) that there is evidence of mnemonic distortion which enables us to chart a plausible course between the two frameworks.

Perhaps the biggest difficulty for those who argue for the historicity of the Davidssohnfrage is its use of Ps 110:1. We have seen that this text was one of the most popular in the NT and that the Markan citation seems to betray Greek authorship. But
when this discussion is approached from the paradigm of memory distortion, another possibility emerges. This quotation of Ps 110:1 might betray what the present dissertation has referred to as conventionalization.

Conventionalization is the process of memory distortion whereby memories tend to conform to socio-typical experiences. In the case of scripture quotation, if a text has been memorized it will tend to evoke a more formal citation. For instance, in contemporary, popular Christianity the verse John 3:16 is often memorized in the King James Version. This verse is so popular in some circles that when read aloud from other (newer) versions, the reader is inclined to use the more familiar words “begotten”, “believeth” and “perish” in place of the alternate words provided by the text before them. The same could be said for the Lord’s Prayer in liturgical recitation. More contemporary versions are often printed for congregations in order to be read from aloud, but even so, the phrases “who art in Heaven” and “Thy kingdom” tend to be spoken aloud in place of the phrases “who is in Heaven” and “Your kingdom.” In such cases, the more familiar expressions tend to dominate one’s memory and thus have the capacity to distort.

The fact that Ps 110 was so popular in early Christianity and that the tradition known now as the Septuagint was largely their translation of choice makes it probable that the Davidssohnfrage was distorted along the lines of conventionalization. As this logion was passed down, it might have attracted a memorized form of Ps 110:1. This does not necessarily support an origin in memory rather than invention; it merely weakens the argument for invention on the basis of affinity to the Septuagint. The Davidssohnfrage may or may not have originated in Greek, but in either case, one should expect a conventionalized citation as the logion was localized within a framework where Ps 110 was well known and often cited.

Another manifestation of mnemonic distortion evident in the Davidssohnfrage is that of narrativization. Narrativization is the tendency for memories to be distorted through the constraints of story telling. This category of distortion no doubt overlaps with the previously discussed category. But here I specifically call attention to the chiastic formation of the Davidssohnfrage, that which Marcus calls a “beautifully arranged” structure.26 Marcus’ comment is perhaps telling of why chiasms were mnemonically important for oral cultures. The fact that they can be recognized for the elegance of their form27 speaks to the possibility that they had the capacity to reinforce narrative mnemonically.

26 Marcus, Wzy, 130.
27 Especially in the case of shorter, simple chiasms: e.g. ABCBA.
If we are to take seriously the notion that the Jesus tradition existed in oral tradition for any period of time, the role of narrativization cannot be underestimated. While this certainly applied to the larger narrative of Mark, I am here concerned with the distortive effect that this had on the Davidssonfrage as an individual unit. As emphasized in previous chapters, the restructuring of memories to conform to the conventions of story telling most often occurs on a subconscious level. But as Dunn has recently pointed out, it is necessary to take inventory of the kind of memories that are represented in the Jesus tradition. Memories of Jesus were transformative for both individuals and groups and there is a strong likelihood that they were formally memorized for oration. As such, we should not expect them to have functioned casually. 28

Perhaps then narrative structures also played a more strategic role in the memorization of individual units. The present study has previously described the nature and function of mnemotechniques (or memory-vehicles; II.2.2). One might think of the examples of rhyme and song as common techniques used in memorization. It is possible that the imposition of a chiasm upon a story or logion functioned in similar fashion. 29 By memorizing the Davidssonfrage along the lines of chiastic structure, the story would have maintained a high degree of stability in the re-telling. As such, the Davidssonfrage might betray a kind of mnemotechnique utilized by ancient orators.

One last observation on memory distortion should be made with regard to distanciation. As previously discussed, distanciation is the most simple and prevalent form of memory selection. It is the tendency for memories to become vague or for details to be forgotten (II.2.3). This observation is relevant to Gagg’s suggestion that the Davidssonfrage is only a fragment of a longer “Streitgespräch”. 30 Gagg saw in Mk 12:35-37 an abbreviated conflict-story that stemmed from a situation in the life of Jesus but did not obtain its Markan form until the pre-questions of Jesus’ adversaries were left out. If Gagg was correct, this pericope betrays a formalized kind of distanciation in which a larger story has been lost in favor of a more mnemonically stable chiastic structure; or perhaps, merely in favor of a more pithy form of the story.

29 Cf. the discussion of chiasms in J.D. Harvey, Listening to the Text: Oral Patterning in Paul's Letters (ETS Studies 1; Grand Rapids: Baker, 1998), Chs. 5, 13.; Harvey’s work is ultimately concerned with the larger structures and patterns in Paul’s letters but he effectively lays a background for oral and aural patterns utilized in Hellenism (e.g. Homer). He analyzes chiastic structure alongside other patterns such as ring composition, inclusio, etc.
30 R.P. Gagg, “Jesus und die Davidssonfrage: Zur Exegese von Markus 12:35-37”, TZ 7 (1951); Gagg’s suggestion was picked up by Cranfield, Mark, 381-2 and Schneider, “Davidssonfrage”, 68; and more recently by Davies and Allison, Matthew, 250.
In sum, analysis of the Davidsohnfrage yields a number of possible mnemonic distortions which suggest that Mk 12:35-7 stands somewhere along a trajectory between the earliest memories of Jesus and the fully developed commemoration of Jesus by the early Church. And because of the subject matter, this text provides a window to the thought-world in which Son of David developed along a messianic trajectory and branched out in the direction of Christology. Therefore it will be necessary to establish the pre-Christian trajectory which provided the relevant point of departure. The following section will analyze Ps 110 in order to determine where this psalm stands along this trajectory and its eventual attraction by the Jesus tradition.

VII.2 Psalm 110

The present dissertation’s proposed method has argued for the importance of locating the trajectory(ies) of any scriptures in which the stories of Jesus have been localized. I have argued that the fundamental virtue of this is that, once located, such texts can be expected to have typologically distorted the memories of Jesus by his contemporaries and (subsequently) such distortions can be historiographically charted. This, of course, presupposes that specific incidences of pre-Christian usage can be found and that noticeable distortion has taken place.

Unfortunately not every text in the HB has a discernable (and chartable) life between its oldest recognizable form and its NT usage. In such cases, to speak of a “trajectory” on which Jesus’ connection with the tradition is located might be misleading. Yet, as is often the case, there is enough intertextuality in the HB that such texts often betray ideas that have been previously developed in other passages. In this way, a tradition which does not demonstrate a history of interpretation prior to the first century will often demonstrate the development of other traditions and therefore does indeed represent a distortion trajectory in this sense. Ps 110 is such a text as it draws upon (and uniquely develops) several Hebrew concepts that hearken to other precedents in the HB. Ps 110 reads:

לאריך ממער
נאש יהוה אדונינו שך לימי עט-יאשיה איבך יהו הלביר
מסה-ננך שלח יהוה ממען רוח ברך אתך
ncmp נדבק בים חהל חזרה-קרס מרומ מטור לבלי ילאדך
נשבה יהוה אל יהו נחמ איבך עלולא על-ברך מביא-ברך
אiddleware מתח בורא-אמפי מלבך
ירן בורא-מעת יאמר פשת-ורה
מחול ברוך יאמר לע-יך יים ראש

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A Psalm of David.

1. YHWH says to my lord: "Sit at my right hand until I make your enemies a stool for your feet."
2. YHWH will stretch forth your strong scepter from Zion, "Rule in the midst of Your enemies."
3. Your people will volunteer freely in the day of your power; In holy array, from the womb of the dawn, your youth are to you as the dew.
4. YHWH has sworn and will not change His mind, "You are a priest forever according to the order of Melchizedek."
5. YHWH is at your right hand; he will shatter kings in the day of his wrath.
6. He will judge among the nations, he will fill them with corpses; he will shatter the chief men over a broad country.
7. He will drink from the brook by the wayside; therefore he will lift up his head.\(^{31}\)

Ps 110 does not have a history of interpretation prior to the first century. This is especially odd given the apparent popularity of Ps 110 in early Christianity and later rabbinic messianic\(^{32}\) interpretations.\(^{33}\) One explanation for this is that Ps 110’s composition was relatively late. The date of composition for Psalm 110 is disputed to such an extent that the debate represents a spectrum of possibilities spanning almost a thousand years. Hardy was among those scholars who considered this Psalm to have its origins in the historical reign of King David.\(^{34}\) According to Mettinger, the psalm was produced during Solomon’s reign.\(^{35}\) Yet there is evidence that this psalm was composed

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\(^{31}\) 110:7 has defied confident interpretation. L.C. Allen calls the verse enigmatic but eventually suggests that the “reference may be to a ritual drinking from the Gihon spring as a sacramental means of receiving divine resources for the royal task” [Psalms 101-150 (WBC 21; Nashville: Thomas Nelson, 2002), 118]. M. Dahood called this verse “baffling” and attempts to “prescind” from the MT vocalization in order to make sense of it [Psalms III: 101-150 (ABC 17A; Garden City: Double Day, 1970), 119]. I here follow the lead of the NASB.

\(^{32}\) E.J. Kissane, who assigned late authorship, argued that Psalm 110 was initially composed with a messianic agenda and was interpreted as such from the start ["The Interpretation of Psalm 110", \(ITQ\) 21 (1954)]; cf. J.L. McKenzie, “Royal Messianism”, \(CBQ\) (1957): 36. This view has been recently challenged by H. Bateman, “Psalm 110:1 and the New Testament”, Bibliotheca Sacra:149 (1992); S. Gillingham, “The Messiah in the Psalms: A Question of Reception History and the Psalter”, in King and Messiah in Israel and the Near East (JSOTSup 270; Sheffield: SAP, 1998), 212-15.

\(^{33}\) Hay [Glory] provided a fairly comprehensive treatment of how Ps 110 was interpreted in both Christian and rabbinic literature and concluded that there is no single dominant interpretive commonality except that the lord is often thought to refer to the messiah; cf. Juel, Exegesis, 137-9.

\(^{34}\) E.R. Hardy, “The Date of Psalm 110", \(JBL\) 64 (1945); cf. F.L. Horton, The Melchizedek Tradition: A Critical Examination of the Sources to the Fifth Century A.D. and the Epistle to the Hebrews (SNTSMS 30; Cambridge: CUP, 1976), 34.

in the post-Exilic period, perhaps in Hellenistic Judaism. Callimachus relays a Greek mythological parallel in *Hymn to Apollo* 29. Apollo is said to have been seated at the right hand of Zeus (cf. Ps 110:1), and in verses 67-68, Apollo is praised for always keeping his oath (cf. Ps 110:4). But it is also possible that the Greek hymn borrowed from an earlier mythology akin to that manifested in Ps 110. Furthermore the fact that the psalm has been authored in Hebrew might suggest a pre-Hellenistic date.

Treves argued that the psalm was composed in the Maccabean period by deciphering an acrostic from the initial letters of the divine voice that spells out “Simon is terrible (or awe-inspiring)”:

If correct, the reference is to Simon Maccabeus (142-135 BCE) who followed his brother Jonathan in claiming both the offices of king and high priest. 110:4 states that “YHWH has sworn and will not change His mind, ‘You are a priest forever according to the order of Melchizedek’.” Similar to the language in 110:4, Simon was said to be “ἀρχιερέα εἰς τὸν αἰῶνα” (1Macc 14:41).

Note the similar claims to (1) priesthood by a royal figure and (2) to eternal tenure. But Treves’ supposed acrostic is not ultimately convincing and it is not necessary that the psalm was composed in the Maccabean period to have been used by the Maccabees.

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38 J.W. Hilber [“Psalm CX in the Light of Assyrian Prophecies”, *VT* 53.3 (2003)] has recently revived the suggestion of H. Gunkel [*Die Psalmen* (Göttingen: Vandenhoek & Ruprecht, 1926), 481-3] that Ps 110 contains several parallels with Assyrian prophetic oracles (Hilber counts twelve). This argument reopens the possibility that this psalm was composed as early as the seventh century BCE.
40 Treves, “Acrostic”, 85; He neglected to mention that the Maccabees also closely aligned themselves with Phinehas (1Macc 2:54) who is also given an eternal priest covenant (Num 25:12-3). See A. Schofield and J.C. Vanderkam, “Were the Hasmoneans Zadokites?” *JBL* (2005): 74-5. This does not necessarily negate the appeal to Melchizedek tradition, but it does demand that the Melchizedek connection served as a secondary reinforcement. For a more comprehensive answer to Treves, see J.W. Bowker, “Psalm CX” *VT* XVII (1967): 31-41.
41 In order for the acrostic to work, one has to begin with the first character of the Divine voice (thus the middle of the first verse) rather than the first character of the first verse. Furthermore it is not entirely clear that the Divine voice is continued throughout the psalm since there is a shift from first to third person [see discussion in E.S. Gerstenberger, *Psalms Part 2 and Lamentations* (FOTL 15; Grand Rapids: Eerdmans, 2001), 263].
42 If one supposes that Ps 110 was utilized by the Maccabees (perhaps for the coronation of Simon; so Cranfield, *Mark*, 381), it might explain why the Qumran library contains no mention of the psalm. The absence of Ps 110 in the Dead Sea Scrolls is striking given its triumphant character and its explicit mention of (the highly revered) Melchizedek. It has long been assumed that the Qumran community was opposed to the Maccabean (non-Zadokite) claim to the high
While a late date may explain the absence of Ps 110's overt use until Christian and Rabbinic literature, such a supposition must remain inconclusive.

Where Treves' treatment of Ps 110 is most compelling is in his observation that Ps 110 would have been especially helpful to those wishing to claim both royal and sacral offices. While there are biblical precedents that militate against Aaronic duty being done by someone other than a descendent of Aaron, Melchizedek (both king and priest endorsed by YHWH) provides an alternative. This further supports lMacc 14:41's allusion to Ps 110:4. While it is not crucial to the present study to prove that Simon appealed to this verse, it provides a possible precedent for how Ps 110 might have been applied in Jesus' context. What is presently important is to recognize is that Ps 110 uniquely relates the dual offices of king and high priest. There are extremely few passages in the HB that suggest the merger of these offices. With this in mind, a discussion of intertextuality will prove important in what follows.

What most interests HB scholarship about Ps 110 is the problem presented by 110:4. Bracketing 110:4, the psalm is royal from start to finish, promising continued military dominance. The fact that there is a mention of priestly office amidst the graphic depiction of military victory has led many to wonder whether the psalmist had one or two figures in mind. For my own purposes, it will suffice to observe that for later interpreters, it was an option to interpret Ps 110 as a description of a single figure who holds both the offices of king and priest. The Epistle to the Hebrews confirms that this interpretation was a live possibility in early Christianity. The author of Hebrews interprets Jesus' significance by applying both Ps 110:1 (Heb 1:3, 13; 10:12; 12:2) and Ps 110:4 (Heb 7:17-21). So if one does not find the connection between the Hasmoneans and Ps 110 convincing, the application of Ps 110 in Hebrews is

priesthood. So J.C. VanderKam, The Dead Sea Scrolls Today (Grand Rapids: Eerdmans, 1994), 103; H. Burgmann, Der "Sitz im Leben" in den Josuaflucht-texten in 4Q379 22 II und 4QTestimonia (Krakow: Enigma, 1990); Fitzmyer, Scrolls and Christian Origins , 253-4. With this in mind, it seems reasonable that, if this psalm was employed for the enthronement of Simon (or one of his kin), it would have been unpopular with the "sons of Zadok" at Qumran. This, of course, is an argument from silence, but for Qumran to completely ignore a text that was elsewhere interpreted messianically is perplexing and warrants modest speculation.

43 Cf. the demise of Uzziah in 2Chr 26:18; 27:2.


45 Furthermore, the author of this epistle is comfortable applying to Jesus royal language (Ps 2:7) alongside sacral language (Ps 110:4). Indeed the author employs the titles "Son" (cf. Ps 2:7) and "High Priest" (Ps 110:4) with equal frequency, so V.C. Pfitztner, Hebrews (Nashville: Abingdon Press, 1997), 38.
uncontroversial. Later rabbinic interpretations also support this interpretation. The meturgeman understood this psalm to refer to a single figure but was uncomfortable assigning both offices to him. In the Targums, the sacral elements have been removed from Ps 110 in favor of purely royal language. Tg.Ps 110:4 reads:

YHWH has sworn and will not repent, that you are appointed leader in the age to come, because of the merit that you were a righteous king.

There is no attempt here to separate the two offices by applying each to a different figure. Instead the meturgeman simply eliminates the second office and with it the name of Melchizedek. Therefore, while this interpretation disagrees with the dual office messianism held by the author of Hebrews, both agree that Ps 110 refers to only one figure.

The fact that none of the Dead Sea Scrolls quote Ps 110 might indicate that the Qumran community was uncomfortable with psalm’s application of dual offices as well. Because the Qumran community saw a division of these offices, perhaps this psalm was unattractive. This possibility would further suggest that the single figure interpretation was the dominant application of this psalm among Jesus’ contemporaries. Because there is no explicit first century application of Ps 110 to support a two figure

46 It is apparent that Ps 110 became an extremely popular messianic proof-text in rabbinic thought. Texts such as Sanh 38b, Gen.Rab 85.9 and Num.Rab 18.23 suggest that Ps 110 was commonly thought to be instructive of the coming messiah’s character and office. Midrashic teaching on this Ps 110:4 (given by R. Eleazar ben Pedat ca. 250CE), instructs that what the Lord tells to David, “to the messiah also it shall be said.” This is important for two reasons. Here the rabbi supposes that 110:4 was written originally to David suggesting a merging of royal and sacral offices. It also teaches that the Messiah will be divinely endorsed for priestly office in similar fashion. Numbers Rabbah 18.23 makes a connection between Ps 110 and the “Rod of Aaron for the House of Levi (Num 17.8)”. Ps 110 is referenced and then the claim is made that this messianic staff is the same one which every king would hold until the destruction of the Temple.

47 I am unconvinced by those who argue that 11QMelch echoes Ps 110. Marcus [Way, 133] argues to this end, concluding that “the combination of themes found in both documents (Melchizedek, exaltation to God’s right hand, divine Kingship, victory over enemies, and judgment) is too close to be fortuitous.” Cf. Witherington, Mark, 333.

On the contrary, it is because there are so many conceptual similarities between these texts that are not derived from Ps 110 that the absence of a direct quote or allusion is puzzling. 11QMelch directly quotes both Ps 82:1 and Ps 7:6. The text borrows the idea of divine kingship and judgment from the former and the idea of victory over enemies from the latter. Also while the 11QMelch figure is exalted there is no mention of Ps 110’s “right hand” language (contra Marcus). It must be kept in mind that 11QMelch is an interpretation that frequently incorporates and conflates direct quotations. In fact, the ratio of quotes per sentence is virtually 1:1. There are several places where a direct quote or allusion to Ps 110 is warranted but absent. Instead the author chooses to quote a myriad of other texts. Because of this, the relationship between the Ps 110 and 11QMelch can be best characterized as parallel but independent interpretive trajectories.

48 However, there is a possible exception in 4Q266.
paradigm, one could argue that such a reading was simply not an available possibility. My own conclusion will be more modest, however. I will only posit that Ps 110 invited many to suppose that a single figure could legitimately hold both royal and sacral offices. It is probable that this interpretation was spurred by the traditional precedents evoked by the psalm.

The appeal to Melchizedek in Ps 110:4 is telling of the general purpose of the psalm. Here the psalmist appeals to the figure described in Gen 14:18-20 as both a king and priest. This lends support to the idea that the original psalmist appealed to this unique precedent to justify a single figure holding both offices. This case is strengthened further by the observation that the appeal to Melchizedek is typological in nature. Fitzmyer writes, "Whatever the puzzling Hebrew phrase [šel-derat melē calfur] means, no one has ever suggested that it be understood in terms of hereditary succession."50 This, of course, is due to the fact that the king-priest mentioned in Gen 14 has neither recorded lineage nor progeny. Indeed one of the reasons that Melchizedek intrigued later interpreters was his mysterious possession of both offices and yet, apparently, he was endorsed by "God Most High" (Gen 14:18).51 What Ps 110:4 shows is that, in some cases, divine endorsement trumps proper lineage. This is most likely why Hyrcanus took the title "High priest of God Most High [θεοῦ υψίστου]" (Ant 16.163).52

The psalmist is not claiming that his priest is a descendant of Melchizedek. Rather, Melchizedek is the archetypal high priest with no other claim to the office except divine endorsement. Ps 110's priest embodies certain characteristics that are reminiscent of Melchizedek. Specifically the priest is divinely endorsed and he enjoys eternal tenure. In these two ways, the Ps 110 priest is of the same type as Melchizedek. Moreover, if indeed there is only one figure referenced in this psalm, a third characteristic is shared: both figures hold the dual offices of king and priest. But it is the first attribute that is the most important. From divine endorsement flows the office(s) and perpetuity. Essentially this is what Ps 110 is: a divine endorsement of the same type that YHWH first offered to Melchizedek. Fitzmyer points out that the author of Hebrews similarly interprets Ps

49 Dahood [Psalms, 112] avoided the use of the proper name in favor of the etymologically literal "legitimate king" but most translators favor the use of the proper name.

50 Fitzmyer, Semitic Background, 225.

51 It is possible that this enigma invited the "eternal" aspect of the Melchizedek tradition. Having come from nowhere and having returned in the same way, the "righteous king of Salem" invited a great deal of speculation for later interpreters (cf. Heb 7:3). However it is more likely that the Ps 110:4 reference to eternal office owes its origin to the underlying canvas provided by 2Sam 7. This will be discussed further below.

52 The LXX of Gen 14:18 reads, "Μελχίσεdek ... ἱερεὺς τοῦ θεοῦ τοῦ υψίστου."
110:4 as “κατὰ τὴν ὁμοιότητα Μελχισεδεκ” (Heb 7:15). The phrase “according to the likeness of…” is clearly the language of typology. In the case of Ps 110, the psalmist is not merely appealing to a precedent; he is not saying, “God has made this kind of endorsement before, so it must be legitimate to affirm a similar case.” The appeal is much stronger; it asserts that God is acting now like he has acted before. The priesthood claimed in 110:4 is typologically defined by Melchizedek, not merely a legitimating reference.

At this point it is important to grant that there is no necessary dichotomy between claim to office via lineage and claim via typological appeal. One can easily imagine instances where it might be advantageous to evoke both. Certainly there is a great deal of weight carried in the claim of Davidic lineage. Although Idumean, Herod claimed to be of David’s line through Jewish-Babylonian descent in an attempt to strengthen his claim to be “King of the Jews”. But the claim of Davidic descent would not have been enough (after all, there were many descendants of David); in order to substantiate such a claim one had to embody the characteristics promised to David’s heir. Of primary importance is the perception that this particular descendant of David is the one endorsed by YHWH in 2Sam 7. It was not enough to be a descendant of David; such appeals must be typologically modeled after the specific characteristics first promised of Solomon. In similar fashion, Ps 110 is a typological appeal that presupposes YHWH’s promise to David in 2Sam 7. So while Fitzmyer is correct that the appeal to Melchizedek is not an appeal to lineage, Ps 110 is also undoubtedly Davidic in a typological sense.

The most prominent typological characteristic of Ps 110:4 is Melchizedek’s eternal office. It is also the characteristic least easily construed from Gen 14. This aspect of the divine endorsement echoes 2Sam 7:13: “He shall build a house for my name, and I will establish the throne of his kingdom forever.” Because the appeal to Melchizedek has

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53 Fitzmyer, *Semitic Background*, 226 asks, “Does the Peshitta reflect this in Ps 110:4 or preserve its own ancient interpretation: badmîteh d Melkiz’deq, ‘in the likeness of Melchizedek’?” While it is not within the scope of this study to answer his question, it is important to note that the rabbinic testimony corroborates the interpretative trajectory on which Hebrews stands.


55 I have previously demonstrated that Zerubbabel (from David’s family-tree; he is literally named “Branch”) further strengthened his bid for the throne by typologically mimicking Solomon’s historic ride into Jerusalem (Zech 9).


57 Hillel, Judah the Prince, Hiyya and Huna are all said to be of Davidic descent without any messianic claim.

58 With this in mind, one should consider Herod’s rebuilding of the Temple a politically advantageous act as it served to align him with the promise of 2Sam 7:13. Cf. also Simon’s re-dedication of the Temple (1Macc 13:51).
been localized within a royal psalm, the Gen 14 allusion has been reinforced with Davidic language.\textsuperscript{59} That this is a specific allusion to the Davidic Covenant is confirmed by the preamble: “YHWH has promised and will not change his mind…” In this way, 110:4 references a covenant previously oathed and mnemonically appropriate for an enthronement ceremony.\textsuperscript{60} Notice the several conceptual links to the Davidic Covenant present in Ps 110: (1) David, (2) enthronement, (3) eternal tenure, (4) rest from enemies, (5) promise of progeny, (6) divine oath. With these several points of coherence in mind, there can be little doubt that the reference to a previous divine oath recalls the Davidic Covenant.\textsuperscript{61} But what is unique about the allusion in 110:4 is that a priestly office is being reinforced with language originally attributed to David’s heir. One aspect of the Davidic Covenant that is not present in Ps 110 is the promise to build the Temple. It is possible that this cultic aspect of 2Sam 7 has been reformulated. In the Davidic Covenant, David’s son is expected to (a) build the Temple and thus (b) enjoy eternal tenure. These two concepts are juxtaposed in 2Sam 7:13.\textsuperscript{62} In Ps 110:4, there is no mention of building the Temple, but a cultic promise remains linked with the promise of eternal tenure. The Davidic heir is promised eternal sacral jurisdiction over the Temple cult. In light of this, 110:4 should not be seen as a parenthetical reference to priestly office in an otherwise royal psalm. Rather it is an extension of the Davidic Covenant to include sacral duty. This argument will be further supported in what follows. This dramatic addition to the royal job-description is perhaps unexpected but, as will be discussed, not without precedent.

Ps 110 echoes 2Sam 7:11: “I will give you rest from all your enemies.”\textsuperscript{63} This is seen metaphorically in the footstool (v.1) and scepter (v.2) and then reinforced in 110:5-6. The graphic depiction of “filling the nations with corpses” and “shattering kings” may well be a summary of 2Sam 8 which recounts David’s defeat of several foreign armies and kings. This possibility becomes more likely when the last verse of this chapter is considered, “…and the sons of David became priests [זנים בני דויד וכהנים]” (2Sam

\textsuperscript{59} The reference to enthronement in 110:1 likely hearkens back to this promise as 2Sam 7:13 uses throne imagery.

\textsuperscript{60} Contrast this with Ps 2:7: “I will surely tell of the decree of YHWH: he said to me…” This preamble makes no reference to a previous divine endorsement; it is self referential.

\textsuperscript{61} Mettinger [\textit{King and Messiah}, 258-9], however, took a slightly different approach. He suggested that 2Sam 7 drew upon and crystallized concepts previously manifested in Ps 110. While this remains a possibility (if one is willing to grant Mettinger’s early date), he was mistaken that this psalm uses “son of God” language (p.258). Unfortunately, this mistake occupied a central place in his treatment of Ps 110.

\textsuperscript{62} On the intentional reciprocity of 7:13 see IV.1.1.

\textsuperscript{63} McKenzie, “Royal Messianism”, 35-6; Kraus, \textit{Psalmen}, 763-4; Fitzmyer, \textit{Semitic Background}, 225; The echo of Ps 2 is also unmistakable, so Haney, \textit{Royal Psalms}, 122.
8:18). This detail has puzzled interpreters of 2Sam, but for our purposes, it serves to better illuminate Ps 110:4.

If the psalmist’s conceptual under-girding extends from the popular 2Sam 7 to the less celebrated chapter 8, it might explain why a mention of priestly office was warranted in the first place. Perhaps the Davidic king of Ps 110 has taken on the mantle of these first “sons of David” who were priests (thus inviting the explicit appeal to Melchizedek for affinity’s sake). If so, Psalm 110 is at the same time a typological and an ancestral appeal. It is important to note that while some of David’s sons were priestly, only one of them was both king and priest; Solomon alone provides a (legitimate) royal/sacral precedent. Solomon acts out this priestly office in 1Kgs 3:4 by offering “one thousand burnt offerings” before building the Temple. Then more officially in 1Kgs 8, Solomon offers sacrifices during the dedication of the Temple. In this rare exception to the rule, Solomon acts as priest as he officiates on Israel’s behalf over the altar with the peace offering, burnt offering, with oxen, sheep and grain (in exaggerated quantities). Solomon offers these sacrifices before (1Kgs 8:5) and after (8:62-4) his prayer of dedication wherein he claims the fulfillment of the Davidic Covenant. Thus the extension of the Davidic Covenant to include sacral duty was rare (only seen with Solomon), but not unprecedented.

Ps 110, then, is drawing upon a linear tradition which is built upon YHWH’s seminal promise to David and its prototypical fulfillment in Solomon. This tradition

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64 E.g. G. Wenham, “Were David’s Sons Priests?” ZAW:87 (1975); Anderson, 2 Samuel, 137-8.
65 Saul (1 Sam. 13:8-14), Adonijah (1 Kgs 1:9), Uzziah (2 Chr 26:16-21), and Ahaz (2 Kgs 16:13-14; 2 Chr 28:1-5) all attempt to conflate these offices to their own damage.
68 1Kgs 8:16-27 is especially pertinent in that Solomon’s prayer of dedication claims that his dedication of the Temple is the fulfillment of the Davidic Covenant with specific emphasis upon the fulfillment of 2Sam 7:13a. This passage in 1Kgs 8 directly alludes to 2Sam 7 in several respects and includes the following request placed upon the lips of Solomon: “Now therefore, Oh God of Israel, let your word, I pray, be confirmed which you have spoken to your servant, my father David” (1Kgs 8:26). In this supplication, Solomon calls upon YHWH to fulfill his end of the Davidic Covenant. One might see this text in parallel to Ps 110:4 where the psalmist assures the Davidic king that “YHWH has promised and will not change his mind…” In the 1Kgs 8:26, the appeal takes the form of supplication; in Ps 110:4, the appeal takes the form of reaffirmation. It is not necessary to argue that either text was drawing from the other; this parallel simply demonstrates that the proper establishment of the Temple cult involved an appeal to the Davidic Covenant. It was important for all parties involved to legitimate their activity by localizing it within YHWH’s promise to David.
69 Horbury [Cult, 44-6] has argued that, as Solomon’s legacy increases in Chronicles to include sacral jurisdiction, the notion of a “dual” leadership in Israel diminishes. While texts like Lev 4:3 suggest two anointed figures, the Chronicler envisages a clear sacral hierarchy, with Solomon as chief over the chief priest.
undergirds the thought-world on which this royal psalm is based. When read in this light, the overt typological appeal to Melchizedek can be seen as a cohesive part of this structure. The psalmist, much like the author of 1Kgs 8, seems to have seen in the Davidic Covenant a legitimation of the king’s sacral duty. The psalmist typologically reinforced this concept by appealing to the archetypical priest-king of Gen 14:18. This interplay between the conceptual under-girding of Ps 110 and the overt typology of Ps 110:4 helps to explain why the mention of a second (priestly) office was warranted amidst a royal psalm. What at first glance looked to be a sacral parenthesis in an otherwise royal poem can be better understood as an expected feature in light of 2Sam 8:18, 1Kgs 3:4 and 8:5, 62-4.

In the present section, I have followed an admittedly thin thread backward from the Maccabees, to Solomon, to Melchizedek. It is “thin” because precedents for priest-kings are extremely rare in the HB. But this has been necessary because Ps 110 is specifically interested in legitimating a royal figure according to the likeness of Melchizedek. It is impossible to know with any certainty where Ps 110 stands in relationship to Solomon and/or Simon, but there is a strong likelihood that the psalmist has appealed to and extended the Davidic Covenant to include priestly office. This extension is given primary authoritative weight in the appeal to Melchizedek. So while it is perhaps less important to link Ps 110 to Solomon and the Maccabees, it is more important to recognize that the central feature that made Ps 110 distinct and memorable was its legitimation of kingship and high priesthood in a single text. This essential feature is simply corroborated by the psalm’s possible relationship to these other precedents. If it can be granted that Ps 110 provided dual legitimation, it will be necessary to keep this in mind when reading Mark. Mark has placed both quotes of Ps 110 within a Temple context and has used these quotes to highlight Jesus’ conflict with the Temple establishment.

VII.3 Psalm 110 in Markan Context

There are narrative indications that the Davidsohnfrage is not of Markan origin. The present section will argue that Mk 12 is a compilation of related sayings and that 12:35-7, in particular, is pre-Markan. Mark’s implementation of the Davidsohnfrage will then be measured against Mark’s larger narrative and Christological agendas in order to analyze how and to what extent this pericope has been distorted within this localization. Having already touched upon this above, I here will focus on the immediate context of
the Davidssohnfrage in Mk 12 and the evangelist’s climatic trial scene in Mk 14. There are several reasons to see these two passages as mutually interpretative (which will be discussed below) but the central reason is that these two passages place Ps 110 on the lips of Jesus. By devoting brief attention to the trial narrative, light may be shed on Mark’s attraction to this psalm.

VII.3.1 Immediate Context: “The Scribes” Logia
The verse that directly precedes the Davidssohnfrage emphasizes a narrative conclusion. At the end of Jesus’ conversation with the scribe (12:28-34), Mark concludes by saying: “When Jesus saw that he had answered intelligently, he said to him, “You are not far from the kingdom of God.” After that, no one would venture to ask him any more questions” (12:34). Several observations concerning this verse are pertinent to the present section. The first is that the phrase “καὶ οὐδὲς οἶκε τῇ ἐσόμαι αὐτῶν ἐπερωτήσατε” denotes an end to Jesus’ reception of questions; this much might be obvious. The more important observation is that the phrase seems to connote an end to dialogue in the Temple precincts. In Mark’s context, however, the dialogue is picked up again in the next verse (12:35). This narrative incongruity might be explained by reading a shift in the speaking roles; in the immediately preceding pericopes Jesus was being questioned, whereas in the Davidssohnfrage he becomes the questioner.\footnote{Evans, Mark, 276.} But this reading presumes a certain rhetorical rigidity (a lack of give and take) between the parties, where each is assigned a particular role. Instead I think it is more natural to read such dialogues with fluidity, where each party is free to take on either role. With this in mind, the best reading of 12:34 is that of a narrative conclusion which implies an end to dialogue and not merely a reversal of speaking roles.

It is also important to observe the general mood in this pericope as compared with its immediate context. Jesus’ debate with the Sadducees in 12:18-27 demonstrates a decidedly hostile mood.\footnote{Mark 12:24 reads: “Is this not the reason you are mistaken, that you neither understand the scriptures nor the power of God?” Mk 12:27 concludes with, “…you are greatly mistaken.”} As seen above, Jesus’ discussion with the scribe immediately prior to the Davidssohnfrage concludes with the complimentary statement: “When Jesus saw that he had answered intelligently, He said to him, “You are not far from the kingdom of God” (vs. 34). 12:35 proceeds with contempt toward scribal teaching and yet “the large crowd enjoyed listening to him” (12:37). Does this statement presume that there were no scribes present to argue? If this logia-sequence was Mark’s creation, one
must either assume that the scribe mentioned previously in 12:34 has left or that he agrees with Jesus on this point. Mark 12:38-40 militates against the latter solution as Jesus moves from attacking a scribal teaching to a diatribe about the character of the scribes. The most plausible solution is that Mark has here acted as a collector of tradition rather than an original composer.

It seems as if Mark was unconcerned with the shifts of mood in his narrative and is more concerned with topical arrangement. This kind of narrative arrangement likely betrays mnemonic reinforcement; logia concerning the scribes have been mnemonically categorized together. Mark (or previous oral memory) remembered Jesus’ criticism of the scribes “who devour widows’ houses” (12:40) and intentionally has placed this criticism in a Temple treasury setting. Since this memory was previously reinforced by other logia concerning the scribes (perhaps they were previously memorized in this way), these other logia were evoked from memory alongside Mark 12:41-44. Simply put, one saying concerning the scribes called to mind the others.

Since the logia located in Mk 12 cannot be placed confidently in the historical setting of the Temple, it will be necessary to question the intended setting of the Davidssohnfrage. Mk 12:35 specifies that Jesus’ use of Ps 110 is meant to be understood in a Temple setting. It is possible that this detail was attached to the tradition that Mark received. It is also possible that this detail is a product of Markan redaction. The new pericope begins, “Καὶ ἀνοκριθεὶς ὁ Ἰησοῦς ἐλέγεν διδάσκαλον ἐν τῷ ἱερῷ…” Since the setting of the immediate context is clearly the Temple precincts, the introduction to the pericope might be seen as unnecessarily redundant. The larger narrative context necessitates a Temple setting. Therefore this detail might have been attached to the Davidssohnfrage in its pre-Markan form. On the other hand, the vocabulary in 12:35a is common to Mark. It is possible that the evangelist has repeated the setting for emphasis. In either case, it is clear that the evangelist has associated Ps 110 with Jesus’ conflict with the Jerusalem Temple establishment. This might be confirmed in that the

72 There are historical questions concerning the identity of the scribes but what is key in this discussion is the fact that Jesus associates the scribes with the other religious leaders in 12:38-39. Thus, in Mark’s context, this saying serves as a launching point to lament the widow’s offering (12:41-44).

73 Perhaps complimentary to this observation is the suggestion by Marcus [Way, 145-6] that the evangelist has placed the Shema-saying immediately prior to the Davidssohnfrage lest there be any charge that Jesus’ exaltation undermined monotheism.

74 K.L. Schmidt, Der Rahmen der Geschichte Jesu: literarkritische Untersuchungen zur ältesten Jesusüberlieferung (Berlin: Trowitzsch, 1919), 289; Taylor, St Mark, 490.


76 Marcus, Way, 131.
Markan Jesus only appeals to this psalm one other time and it is during Jesus’ trial before the Sanhedrin where Jesus’ relationship with the Temple is at center stage.\footnote{Following the scholarly consensus, I do not take Mk 16:19 to be original Mark’s narrative. It is, however, interesting that the “final redactor” of Mark has used the language of Ps 110 to convey Jesus’ ultimate telos.}

\textbf{VII.3.2 Larger Context: The Trial Narrative}

It is often noted that Jesus’ trial hinges on Jesus’ confession to the charge of being “ὁ χριστός ὁ υἱὸς τοῦ εὐλογητοῦ” (Mk 14:61). But, as Chilton has pointed out, the simple claim of messiahship would not have necessarily warranted the charge of blasphemy or sedition.\footnote{Chilton, “Reflections”, 211; contra Lane, \textit{Mark}, 536.} With this in mind, it will be helpful to observe Mark’s conceptual links between (a) Jesus’ conflict with the Temple establishment, (b) the title χριστός and (c) the use of Ps 110 that is present in both 12:35-7 and 14:55-64. By examining how Mark has linked these concepts in his trial narrative, we will be better able to estimate how the evangelist has localized the \textit{Davidssohnfrage} within his larger narrative.

In Mark’s trial scene, two key themes converge and find clarity. Jesus’ conflict with the Temple establishment climaxes and Jesus’ true identity is conveyed.\footnote{M. Hooker, \textit{The Son of Man in Mark} (London: SPCK, 1967), 163; J.D. Kingsbury, \textit{The Christology of Mark} (Philadelphia: Fortress, 1983), 162.} Because of this, neither theme can be properly understood apart from the other. Jesus’ true identity is cast in antithesis to the true identity of Temple establishment. That Jesus’ stance concerning the Temple is at center stage is made clear by Mk 14:58. Jesus is accused of having predicted the Temple’s destruction and restitution.\footnote{This will be revisited below.} Mark is careful to point out that this accusation represents an inconsistency on the part of the false witnesses.\footnote{Mark employs ψευδωματορέω twice (15:56-7).} This detail (while not explicitly denying that Jesus made such a claim) speaks to Jesus’ innocence in contrast to the guilt of his accusers and the general illegitimacy of the trial.\footnote{J.B. Green argued that this contrast is part of Mark’s agenda to paint Jesus as the righteous sufferer of the psalms (e.g. Psalms 22, 31, 34, 35 and 69), who was innocent, accused falsely but would eventually be vindicated by God. This paradigm also explains Jesus’ initial silence at the trial (14:61) and the mocking and abuse that Jesus’ receives after the trial (14:65). Both elements are featured in these psalms [\textit{The Death of Jesus: Tradition and Interpretation in the Passion Narrative} (WUNT 2:33; Tübingen: Mohr Siebeck, 1988), 317-8]. Green follows the earlier leads of Dodd, \textit{Scriptures}, 97-8 and B. Lindars, “New Testament Apologetic: The Doctrinal Significance of the Old Testament Quotations” (1962): 89-93. Cf. also Juel, \textit{Exegesis}, 89-116 and J. Painter, \textit{Mark’s Gospel} (London: Routledge, 1997), 195.} This is further illuminated in Jesus’ dialogue with the Markan high priest.
After a period of silence on Jesus’ part, “the high priest was questioning him, and saying to him, ‘Are you the Christ, the Son of the Blessed?’” Notice here the circumlocution for the name of God and the affinity of this confession with Mk 1:1: “…Christ, the Son of God”. Mark has thus placed his central confession of Jesus’ identity on the lips of his chief antagonist.\(^{83}\) Compare this with the similar “Son of God” confessions on the lips of the demon in Mk 3:11 and the Roman centurion in Mk 15:39.\(^{84}\) Peter’s “Christ” confession in Mk 8:29-33 also follows this motif. Here Peter confesses “you are the Christ” but is in the same context rebuked as “Satan (Accuser)”. It is then no coincidence that Peter’s denial of Jesus antithetically mirrors\(^{85}\) the confession of Mark’s High Priest (14:54, 66-72).

Jesus’ positive affirmation of the High priest’s question is then clarified with a conflation of Dan 7 and Ps 110: “I am; and you shall see\(^{86}\) the Son of Man sitting at the right hand of Power, and coming with the clouds of heaven” (Mk 14:62).\(^{87}\) Berger correctly described this quote in terms of ironic juxtaposition.\(^{88}\) His exegesis of Mark’s trial scene drew out the relationship between the charge of blasphemy against Jesus (14:64) and the actual blasphemy committed by the judicial counsel against God’s agent. He helpfully compared this judicial reversal to the final words of the martyrs in the context of their Roman trial in 2Macc 7:34-6:

But you, unholy wretch, you most defiled of all men, do not be elated in vain and puffed up by uncertain hopes, when you raise your hand against the sons of Heaven. You have not yet escaped the judgment of the almighty, all-seeing God. For our brothers after enduring a brief suffering have drunk of everlasting life under God’s covenant; but you, by the judgment of God, will receive just punishment for your arrogance.

In this way, the accused/judged claims ultimate victory in that he will be vindicated by God as he is among the “sons of Heaven”. The key idea here is that one cannot condemn

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\(^{84}\) Cf. also Mk 15:2, 18, 32 concerning the title “King of the Jews”.


\(^{86}\) N. Perrin argued that “you shall see” echoes Zech 12:10 [“Mark 14:62: The End Product of a Christian Pesher Tradition?” *NTS* 12 (1965)].

\(^{87}\) Juel [Exegesis, 168] suggested that Ps 80 provides a precedent for the merger of the conceptual spheres manifested in Ps 110 and Dan 7: “Let your hand be upon the man of your right hand; upon the son of man whom you have made strong for yourself.” (80:17; emphasis added to highlight the key concepts paralleled in Ps 110:1 and Dan 7:13). The targum of Ps 80 interprets this verse messianically. Hay [Glory, 26] suggested that the authorship of Dan 7 was conceptually dependent upon Ps 110.

YHWH's sons without bringing down reciprocal judgment. Berger concluded that Jesus' self-identification as the figure of Dan 7 and Ps 110 served to condemn all those who would condemn him. In this way, the "Ankündigung des Menschensohnes ist eine Gerichtsdrohung". Jesus' scriptural pronouncement shows him to be the true judge, while the Markan high priest is judged to be false. Conflated within this context, Ps 110 is to be read in similar fashion. Ps 110 is here used as a threat against the Jerusalem Temple establishment, in that by identifying himself with Ps 110, Jesus has claimed authority over the Temple and its cult. It is in antithesis to the false authority of the high priest that Jesus is "Christ, the Son of God".

As seen in my previous discussion of Ps 110, what made this psalm distinctive and memorable was its rare legitimation of a priest-king not of Aaronic descent. It is no coincidence that Mark has placed this psalm on the lips of Jesus as he claims to be God's true wielder of Temple authority at the expense of the established high priest. The

89 It is fascinating that both trials appeal to the idea of divine sonship (and circumlocute the divine name). Perhaps this betrays a protective aspect of divine sonship whereby a true son of God may not be harmed. The most likely solution is that this is an extension of the collective concept of sonship often applied to Israel as opposed to their oppressors (cf. Ex 4:22-3). It is also interesting to note that in Q, the true "sons of the Most High [υἱοὶ θεοῦ]" love their enemies (Mt 12:45/Lk 6:35) and promote peace (Mt 5:9) in the midst of persecution.

90 Note the similar ideas of reciprocal judgment found in Q: Mt 7:11/Lk 6:37 (cf. Rom 2:1); Mt 12:41-2/Lk 11:31-2; Mt 12:27/Lk 11:19.


92 To better support Berger's conclusion, it will be helpful to recall the thesis of J. Theisohn, Der ausserwählte Richter: Untersuchungen zum traditionsgeschichtlichen Ort der Menschensohngestalt der Bilderreden des Äthiopischen Henoch (SUNT Göttingen: Vandenhoeck & Ruprecht, 1975), 112: "Für die Heilserwartung des nachat. Judentums ergibt sich als Schlußfolgerung, daß sie durch die Gestalten des endzeitlichen Königs, Priesters und Propheten nicht vollständig umschrieben ist. Man wird diese Reihe [...] zu ergänzen haben durch die Gestalt des endzeitlichen Richters." Theisohn qualifies this by suggesting that "die eschatologische Richtergestalt dem [konzeptuellen] Bereich "Königtum" entstammt." It is in this qualification that we are most helped in our discussion of Mark's trial narrative. Jesus' jurisdiction over the Temple cult, and/or his authority as eschatological Judge, extends from the general conception of kingdom authority. This explains why the appeal to the authority of the Danielic figure has been conflated with the royal-priestly text of Ps 110. Cf. the thesis of Horbury [Cult, 65]: "[O]ne should not search for an abstract unifying principle of messianic hope, but should recognize that the various concepts surrounding the messianic figure are essentially those which surrounded the Davidic king." Horbury here follows the work of H. Riesenfeld, Jésus transfiguré: l'arrière-plan du récit évangélique de la Transfiguration de Notre-Seigneur (Copenhagen: Hakan Ohlsson, 1947), 54-83.

93 Cf. Hooker, Son of Man, 169-70.

94 Thus clarity is also given to Jesus' statement concerning the destruction and restitution of the Temple. Mark's Jesus does have authority over the Temple, but his claim to this authority has been misunderstood.

95 C.H.T. Fletcher-Louis has argued that Dan 7's Son of Man should be understood the cultic mediator between God and Israel and in this way bears a close resemblance the high priests Temple function ["The High priest as Divine Mediator in the Hebrew Bible: Dan 7.13 as a Test Case", SBLSP 36 (1997)]. It is not within the scope of the present section to argue that Daniel's Son of Man is (or is not) a high priestly figure, nor it is necessary to do so. For my present
tearing of the high priest’s garments likely foreshadows the tearing of the sanctuary curtain in Mk 15:38. Thus Mark opens this scene by pointing backward to Jesus’ misunderstood statement concerning the destruction of the Temple and closes it by pointing forward to the rending of the Temple’s curtain. Jesus’ identity is thus revealed in direct relationship to the Temple cult. The Markan Jesus, in contrast to the corrupt Temple establishment, is the true mediator between humanity and God. His fate and the fate of the Temple are tied together.

VII.3.3 Mark’s Davidssohnfrage

Caution is warranted as we return to the Davidssohnfrage from this vantage point. While my brief treatment of Mark’s trial narrative has perhaps helped to clarify Mark’s agenda with regard to some of the key concepts emphasized in Mk 12:35-7, it must be acknowledged that several important christological elements of the trial narrative are absent in the Davidssohnfrage. I have already mentioned the overlap which includes Son of David, Christ, Ps 110 and the Temple each within a setting of conflict. With this in mind, it is highly probable that the evangelist has included the Davidssohnfrage in his narrative to develop certain themes which come to fruition in the trial narrative (what I have referred as “narrativization”). But it is also necessary to acknowledge that the trial focuses on the titles Son of Man, Son of the Blessed (=God), directly quotes Dan 7:13 and manifests Mark’s antagonist confession motif. Furthermore, the Davidssohnfrage serves to distance Jesus from a particular (or limited) understanding of the messiah, while the association between scriptural precedents in the trial narrative is inclusive of multiple concepts and titles. Finally, the Davidssohnfrage hinges on Jesus’ word play argument, it is enough to observe that Ps 110 speaks directly of a high priestly figure and that Mark has used this psalm to support Jesus’ authority. This reading of Ps 110 may or may not support Fletcher-Louis’ reading of Dan 7. So while I am sympathetic to his more recent treatment of Ps 110 [C.H.T. Fletcher-Louis, “Jesus as the High priestly Messiah”, JSJ 4.2 (2006): 173-4], I remain cautious as to what this treatment presupposes of Dan 7’s Son of Man. Fletcher-Louis’ emphasis on the cultic aspects of the Son of Man might be tempered by the possibility that “…zur Zeit des ersten jüdischen Krieges war die Menschensohnvorstellung längst eine Symbiose mit den irdisch-nationalen Erwartungszielen um den königlichen Ben David eingegangen (4 Ezra 13:1-13; syrBar 53:1-3, 7b-11)” [U.B. Müller, Messias und Menschensohn in jüdischen Apokalypsen und in der Offenbarung des Johannes (Studien zum Neuen Testament Band 6; Gütersloh: Gütersloher Verlagshaus, 1972), 310]. 96 Hooker, Mark, 357; Hooker’s literary argument is strengthened by recent observations by Fletcher-Louis [“High priestly Messiah”, 159-60] that the garments of the high priest represent the Glory of God (Ex 28:2, 40; Sir 50:11; 2 En 22:8). With this in mind, the significance of the high priest’s garments was especially linked with the purpose of the sanctuary. 97 Juel [Exegesis, 166] correctly concluded that “promises of the coming Son of man [in Mk 13 and 14] serve as validation of Jesus’ claim to be the true Christ, the Son of God. The point of the
between Lord and lord; this title is altogether absent in the trial scene. In sum, the Davidssohnfrage touches upon enough subjects of interest to Mark that he has adapted it into his narrative but his interest is limited to developing certain aspects of the tradition. It seems that Mark's interest in the Davidssohnfrage was in its use of Ps 110 and not because he had any particular interest in the title Son of David. Thus in order to observe how the Davidssohnfrage fits into Mark's narrative agenda, it will be more fruitful to focus on Ps 110.

We are now in a position to assess Mark's use of Ps 110 and his aim for including the Davidssohnfrage. If the Markan Jesus was utilizing Ps 110 to make a claim of sacral authority, such a claim would have been perceived as a threat by the Jerusalem Temple establishment. Jesus' appeal to the Ps 110 figure while he taught in the Temple would have undermined the authority of the contemporary Temple establishment. Hahn argued that Mk 12:37's "πόθεν αὐτοῦ ἐστίν υἱὸς;" should be interpreted as "In what sense is he his son?" While this interpretation is based upon an argument of connotative value, it does indeed capture the emphasis of the question. Jesus has asked his opponents to specify in what sense the messiah is David's son. This suggests that the office of the messiah was open to interpretation; it could be debated.

The use of Ps 110 implies how the Markan Jesus envisaged the messiah and his relationship to the Temple. Jesus' appeal to the Ps 110 figure while he taught in the Temple undermined the authority of the contemporary Temple establishment. Jesus' interpretation of messianic office was threatening to the current priesthood. Mark confirms this in his trial narrative.

sayings is not that Jesus is Son of Man, as opposed to something else, but that everyone will witness his public vindication". Cf. Juel, Messiah and Temple, 77-95 esp. 85ff..

98 Κύριος does not feature prominently in Mark. Aside from Titus and the Johannine Epistles, Κύριος (and cognate inflections) occur less frequently in Mark than in any other NT book (1.38 occurrences per 1000 words). Mark only uses the root 18 times (cf. Matthew's 80; Luke's 105; Acts' 107; John's 52). Furthermore, Mark does not use the titular form with any uniformity. It is often used to refer to YHWH echoing the LXX's rendering of the tetragrammaton (Mk 1:3; 11:9; 12:11, 29). But it is also used of Jesus, connotative of "master" or "rabbi" (7:28), it is used by Jesus to refer to YHWH (5:19; 13:20) and it is used by Jesus of himself to claim authority (2:28). It is also notable that Mark's appendix contains the only occurrence in the Gospels of "Lord Jesus [κύριος Ἰησοῦς]" (16:19) and does so in connection with Ps 110. Luke does not employ this title until the beginning of Acts.

99 Hahn, Titles, 252; Cranfield, Mark, 382.
VII.4 Historical Analysis

VII.4.1 Jesus and the Temple-Saying

My discussion of Ps 110 has brought to the fore Jesus' relationship to the Temple and its priesthood. With this in mind, it will be helpful to compare the Davidssohnfrage with historical memories that clearly speak to this relationship. Jesus' Temple-Saying (Mk 14:56-9 cf. Jn 2:18-21) is especially relevant in this respect.

It is not advisable (nor possible) to broadly describe a national Jewish sentiment toward the Temple and priesthood. It is, however, necessary to observe that there was a longstanding Jewish sentiment that considered the Temple to have been defiled by its ministers and no longer suitable to house the presence of God. Ezek 8-10 describes the glory/presence of God departing from the Temple. Because of this, the prophet believes that a new Temple is required in order for God's glory to return (Ezek 43:1-12). Ezek 40–48 is the prophet's final vision of a new and eternal heavenly Temple, Jerusalem and theocracy. Malachi echoes a similar criticism of the Temple priesthood (see especially Mal 2) and expects an eschatological messenger to come and purify the "sons of Levi (Mal 3:1-3).

It is upon this foundation that the Testament of Levi makes a similar critique of the earthly priesthood and expects an eschatological priest to eventually come and establish a new Temple from Heaven. The author writes of the priest in this way: "The heavens shall be opened, and from the Temple of glory sanctification shall come upon him" (T.Levi 17:10). Use of T.Levi to establish a Jewish interpretive trajectory is complex, however, because this book has been substantially redacted by a Christian editor. Yet, fortunately, 4Q541 preserves a comparatively large fragment (9, Col. 1) of T.Levi which confirms that the pre-Christian version expected this eschatological figure to reestablish an effective Temple cultus. This document expects the figure to make atonement for his generation, and enact God's commands on earth as they have been issued in Heaven. The fragment does not specifically preserve the statement of 17:10 which speaks of the heavenly "Temple of glory" but 4Q541 confirms enough about this figure to take seriously the possibility that the pre-Christian version was extending the trajectory of Ezek 40-8. Part of this extension includes the belief that the eschatological

100 For a more comprehensive treatment of this subject, see A. Le Donne "Memories of the Temple-Saying: A Critique and Application of Social Memory", in Jesus in Early Christian Memory: Essays in Honor of James D.G. Dunn (eds. S. McKnight and T. Mournet; New York: Continuum, 2007) forthcoming.
Temple would be ushered in by a specific figure. This belief comes not from Ezekiel, but from texts like Zechariah. ¹⁰¹

As discussed in the previous chapter, Zech 6:12 expects "Branch (Zerubbabel)" to rebuild the Temple. The Targum of Zechariah interprets this messianically by inserting the title "Messiah" in place of the name "Branch." The belief that the messiah would rebuild the Temple is also attested in Tg.Isa 53:5. Elsewhere YHWH himself is expected to build the Temple (11QTemple 29:7-10; cf. 2Bar 4:3). These beliefs do not necessarily contradict each other if the messiah is seen as God's agent on the Earth. One could say that YHWH's metaphorical "hands" are the literal actions of the messiah.¹⁰² Indeed, this metaphor is made explicit in the rabbinic interpretation of Solomon's first Temple construction:

But when He [YHWH] came to build the Temple, He did it, as is done, with both of His hands, as it is said, "The sanctuary [דיון], Oh Lord, which your hands have established" (Mekilta on Ex 15:17-21).

The rabbi is not supposing that YHWH instead of Solomon built the Temple; he is merely giving proper credit to God for Solomon's Temple.

To summarize, there was a well-established voice in the HB which criticized Jerusalem's priesthood and believed that the Temple was ineffective in its ultimate purpose. This voice was given a specific shape by Ezekiel who depicted YHWH's presence forsaking the Temple until a new Temple of Heaven was erected in the eschaton. This trajectory was extended to include an eschatological figure. Some circles, like those represented by T.Levi (cf. 4Q541), envisioned this figure as a priest who would usher in the Temple of Heaven and sanctify his people. Other circles, like those represented by Tg.Zech and Tg.Isa (cf. Zech 6:12) emphasized the role of the Davidic messiah as the Temple builder. Still others, like those represented by 11QTemple and 2 Baruch, believed that YHWH himself would build the eschatological Temple.¹⁰³

Important to my discussion of memory is the eschatological character of these traditions. These texts not only represent possible mnemonic categories, these eschatological voices were intended to project forward and provide an interpretive grid

¹⁰² This, after all, is the sense given in Ps 110:2 where the YHWH extends the king's scepter.
¹⁰³ Cf. also Tob 14; 1En 91; Rev 21:1-3. The last of these reads: "Then I saw a new heaven and a new earth; for the first heaven and the first earth passed away, and there is no longer sea. And I saw the holy city, a new Jerusalem, coming down out of Heaven from God, made ready as a bride adorned for her husband. And I heard a loud voice from the throne, saying, 'Behold, the tabernacle of God is among men, and he will dwell among them, and they shall be his people, and God himself will be among them!'"
by which later realities might be measured. Social frameworks effect perceptions in varying degrees depended upon how central the framework is to the society’s worldview. In the first century some communities were extremely eschatologically-minded, some less. Those who were inclined to interpret contemporary events in eschatological ways were also inclined to associate specific characters, regimes, problems, victories and salvations of the past with those of the present. It is possible that fervent expectation for a new Temple and an incorrupt priesthood acted as a catalyst for dissatisfaction with the contemporary Temple and Temple establishment. And, of course, the reverse is true; dissatisfaction and disillusionment with the first century Temple establishment called to mind such texts and thus spurred eschatological hopes. The spiraling character of mnemonic localization provides continuity between perceptions of the past and present (III.1.2-3). In the case of eschatological social frames, this continuity has the capacity to collapse into a single historically defining moment, one where traditional categories, future hopes and present realities collapse into one climatic event. The expectations for a new Temple from Heaven, a new Kingdom of God, a righteous and wise ruler, etc. seem to have the markings of such mnemonic categories. Theissen correctly sees this as the backdrop for Jesus’ claim concerning the destruction and rebuilding of the Temple.104

Having already touched upon the Markan context of the Temple-Saying, it will now serve to compare this synchronic frame with that of the Fourth Gospel. Directly following Jesus’ Temple demonstration John includes the following interaction and interpretation:

The Jews then said to him, "What sign do you show us as your authority for doing these things?" Jesus answered them, "Destroy this Temple, and in three days I will raise it up." The Jews then said, "It took forty-six years to build this temple, and you will raise it up in three days?" But he was speaking of the temple of his body. So when he was raised from the dead, his disciples remembered that he said this; and they believed the scripture and the word which Jesus had spoken (2:18-22).

Here the evangelist places on Jesus’ lips a saying remarkably similar to what Mark’s "false witnesses" accuse Jesus of saying.105 But the interpretation of this saying is

104 G. Theissen, "Die Tempelweissagung Jesu", TZ 32 (1976): 158: "...in [der Tempelweissagung] wird [...] die Sehnsucht nach einem Tempel laut, der unmittelbar von Gott stammt und nicht in das Netz menschlicher Interessen verflochten ist. Es ist die radikaltheoretische Sehnsucht nach Unmittelbarkeit Gottes, die sich in der basileia-Verkündigung in politischer Metaphorik, in der Tempelweissagung in kultischer Metaphorik artikuliert hat." Here Theissen is speaking specifically of the hopes of rural Israel as opposed to the city-dwelling population. He argues that Jesus’ opposition to the Temple establishment reflects the opposing ideologies between these socio-regional groups.

105 Mk 14:56-9: For many were giving false testimony against him, but their testimony was not consistent. Some stood up and began to give false testimony against him, saying, "We heard Him
opposite. Thatcher has recently drawn from Jn 7:37-9 and 20:22 to label this kind of commemoration “pneumatic memory” and describes it as “a complex reconfiguration of past experience” in light of new interpretations of scripture that had been prompted by the Holy Spirit.\textsuperscript{106} In doing so, he argues that John’s gospel was, by nature, a commemoration of how the community’s religious experience interacted with their memories of Jesus. This approach to Johannine commemoration is very close to my own concerns. John has commemorated the Temple-Saying according to his particular christological agenda.\textsuperscript{107} In this case, the distortive effects of the mnemonic process are acutely recognizable.

Mark and John represent two diverging distortion trajectories. Mark aims to show that Jesus never made such a claim concerning the Temple’s destruction and rebuilding (or if he did, he had been misunderstood\textsuperscript{108}); to claim otherwise is to testify falsely. Contrarily, John aims to show that Jesus did indeed speak of rebuilding the Temple but takes the saying metaphorically (the Temple’s reinstitution represents Jesus’ resurrected body). In this way, Mk 14 and Jn 2 are heavily redacted accounts which run in separate directions. Furthermore, it is highly probable that these stories represent distortion trajectories which share the same mnemonic point of departure – namely, the perception that Jesus made a claim similar to what Mark’s false witness accused Jesus of saying in 14:58.\textsuperscript{109} This does not necessarily speak to the historicity of Mark’s trial narrative. It is more likely that Mark has placed this on the lips of his characters in response to an early and widespread memory of Jesus’ claim. Nonetheless, we may positively assert that

\textsuperscript{106} T. Thatcher, “Why John Wrote a Gospel: Memory and History in an Early Christian Community”, in \textit{Memory, Tradition and Text: Uses of the Past in Early Christianity} (Semeia 52; Leiden: Brill, 2005), 84-5; He concludes that “because John does not view memory as a mental archive of information but rather as a complex spiritual experience, it seems unlikely that he would [write a Gospel] in order to preserve traditional material about Jesus for later review and recitation.”

\textsuperscript{107} That the Jerusalem Temple represented the presence/glory of YHWH and the locus for Israel’s worship is well known. But for the Johannine community, Christ occupied this locus. Beasley-Murray comments that, in Johannine theology, “[T]he glory of God and the presence of God are revealed in the only Son and his redemptive acts; it is in and through him that mankind experiences that presence, is transfigured by that glory, and offers a worship worthy of his name” \textit{[John} (WBC 36; Nashville: Thomas Nelson, 1999), 42].

\textsuperscript{108} Indeed, logia such as Mk 11:23 and 13:1-2 constrain Mark from completely denying that Jesus might have made such a claim. Such sayings also allow us to appeal to the criterion of Multiple Forms as well as Multiple Attestation.

\textsuperscript{109} Sanders, \textit{Judaism}, 71-6; M. Dibelius hypothesized that the entire trial narrative was invented around this accusation, which itself is of pre-Passion origin \textit{[From Tradition to Gospel} (London: Ivor Nicholson and Watson, 1934), 182-93].
Jesus was remembered (both by his followers and his adversaries) to have made such a claim.

If this is so, we may conclude that Jesus was perceived by many as the Temple-building messiah and/or the eschatological priest associated with the mnemonic categories surveyed above. In either case, Jesus’ claim would have been perceived as (1) a stance of opposition to the current Temple establishment and (2) an aim to usher in the eschatological Temple of Heaven. In Michael Wise’s opinion,

it is felicitous to see here a messianic declaration in which Jesus clears the way for the Temple of the eschaton. Such a declaration would be in keeping with the negative attitudes toward the Temple [in previous and contemporary Judaism], and would look forward to a new Temple and, presumably, a new Jerusalem.\footnote{Wise, “Temple”, 816.}

If so, there is perhaps no better example in the Gospels of a discrepancy between saying and interpretation. John’s interpretive shift plainly illustrates the disparity between Jesus’ original preaching and later preaching about Jesus. And yet Jn 2:19 includes Jesus’ saying all the same. There has been no attempt to place the Johannine interpretation on the lips of Jesus. Sanders rightly asserts, “John 2:19 shows how deeply embedded in the tradition was the threat of destroying and the promise of rebuilding the temple. It was so firmly fixed that it was not dropped, but rather interpreted.”\footnote{Sanders, Judaism, 72-3.} So while Thatcher is correct to say that John’s Gospel was not written “in order to preserve traditional material about Jesus for later review and recitation”,\footnote{Thatcher, “Why John Wrote”, 85.} such material is evident and available for analysis nonetheless. Moreover, it has been prominently displayed in this pericope. The memory has been framed by the commemoration.

 Returning to the Davidssohnfrage from this vantage point will allow us to measure the distortions evident in Mark’s narrativization against a particularly important aspect of Jesus’ ministry that originated in historical memory.

VII.4.2 Jesus and the Davidssohnfrage

Many interpreters who are unconvinced that the Davidssohnfrage is meant to deny Jesus’ Davidic descent prefer to state that the title Son of David was simply “not adequate”\footnote{Cranfield, Mark, 383.} to describe the messiah.\footnote{Taylor, St Mark, 490-3; Pesch, Markusevangelium, 2:249-57; Marcus, Way, 139-44; R.E. Watts, Isaiah’s New Exodus in Mark (Grand Rapids: Baker Academic, 2000[97]), 287-9; Witherington, Mark, 333; Evans, Mark, 275-6.} This point of view generally argues that the saying does not deny Jesus’ Davidic descent as much as it portrays the messiah as being much more than...
just Son of David. However, it is seldom suggested how exactly these titles ought to be distinguished. If the title Son of David did not quite capture the full sense of the messianic office, what is this fuller sense? It is sometimes suggested that there is an implied appeal to the “greater” titles Son of Man \(^{115}\) and/or Son of God.\(^ {116}\) While this is most probably what Mark has in mind, it is less probable that this was the original implication of the pre-Markan setting of the Davidssohnfrage. Neither of these titles is mentioned in the pericope and the distance created between Lord and lord suggests a less developed Christology.

Perhaps a better solution is one that takes into account (1) the concepts uniquely developed in Ps 110, (2) the setting provided within the Davidssohnfrage pericope, (3) the setting provided by the larger Markan context and (4) the direction taken by later NT developments. I contend that following this trajectory will betray a continuous development of related ideas.

We saw above that Ps 110 is unique in that it takes those obscure traditions which have conflated royal and sacral offices and developed these into a typological depiction of enthronement. The royal figure in Ps 110 is divinely endorsed to wield sacral authority. It seems no coincidence then that Mark has placed Jesus’ quote of Psalm 110 in a Temple setting. Furthermore, the logion itself (internally) provides a Temple context for the saying (Mk 12:35) presenting the possibility that the pre-Markan tradition also supposed a Temple setting. So by all accounts, the Davidssohnfrage is meant to be interpreted in light of its Temple context. This link between the presumed context and the unique subject matter of Ps 110 has been given very little consideration in previous discussions of Mk 12:35-7. However, when the Davidssohnfrage is seen in this light, the possibility arises that Jesus’ quote has made a messianic claim to sacral authority.

The fact that the Davidssohnfrage portrays “David” calling the messiah “lord” highlights the belief that the messiah will supercede David. Jesus’ interpretation of Ps

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\(^ {115}\) T. Eskola [Messiah and the Throne (Tübingen: Mohr Siebeck, 2001), 180] concludes, “The point of Jesus’ speech is evident. The messiah cannot be merely a political earthy king. He must be a heavenly ruler who shall also be David’s Lord, not his son and subordinate. Therefore [...] the Son of Man is actually identified with the son of David.” Lohmeyer [Markus, 263] similarly suggested that Son of Man ideology was intended but that Jesus was not associating himself with the Son of Man.

\(^ {116}\) Telford [Mark, 36-7] argues that the Davidssohnfrage is drawing a distinction between a Gentile concept of Son of God and the Jewish concept of political messiah. Indeed, the title Son of God certainly superceded Son of David in early Christianity. But building from my previous argument for mnemonic continuity, I am opposed to painting the two frameworks in such a stark contrast in cases of uncertain origin. Moreover, if one is to follow Telford’s thesis, one has to grant that the Davidssohnfrage represents a fully developed Markan Christology. My argument thus far has yielded results to the contrary.
argued that the messiah promised to David would be his superior. It is likely that this messianic interpretation flows from the same fountainhead common to the other forms of Davidism previously discussed. The promise to David in 2Sam 7 was that his son would be given authority to do what was beyond David’s authority, namely, to have jurisdiction over the building of the Temple. Thus the Davidic Covenant promised that his son would supercede David in this specific respect. As I have argued, Ps 110 extends the Davidic Covenant to include priesthood as well. When one follows the lead of this trajectory, it is possible to suggest how exactly the messiah was to be David’s superior. According to Ps 110, the Davidic king (unlike David) would have divinely endorsed authority over both the kingdom and the Temple.

Given this context, it is possible that Jesus’ appeal to Ps 110 was meant to emphasize his divinely endorsed authority in and over the Temple as messiah. With Ps 110 in mind, it is not necessary to understand such a claim as negation of political authority; according to the Psalmist, the two need not be mutually exclusive. This coheres well with Daube’s observation that the Davidssohnfrage bears the markings of rabbinic haggadah (cf. Nidda 69b-71a); this might suggest that “the intention of Jesus would have been to suggest the ultimate correctness of both alternatives.” The Davidssohnfrage would in this way represent a belief that Jesus was messianic in the dual sense promoted by Ps 110: both royal and sacral.

Mark has followed the lead of many of these elements as he has located the Davidssohnfrage to his narrative. But the simple act of including the pericope within his narrative has distorted its telos and endowed certain internal subjects with thematic significance. The subjects “Christ”, “Ps 110”, etc. have been localized within a narrative framework that is particularly interested in the christological development of these subjects. In this way, (some of) the subjects under discussion in the pre-Markan form of the Davidssohnfrage are set to work thematically. Therefore, there are two ways to read the Davidssohnfrage: (1) as a contributor of Markan themes and (2) as an isolated discussion.

117 The context of 2Sam 7 places David’s inability to build the Temple at center stage.
120 This is remarkably similar (but not identical) to how the author of Hebrews utilizes Ps 110: In this later context, Christ is also the High Priest like Melchizedek. The difference between these passages is that Hebrews has carried this distortion trajectory to a particular Christological extreme. Heb 9 argues that Christ’s priestly authority extends to the heavenly Temple; the Davidssohnfrage merely implies that the Messiah will have sacral jurisdiction. For this reason, it is correct to assert that these two passages stand along parallel trajectories but that Hebrews represents a more fully developed sphere of Christological distortion.
As seen in my discussion of Mark’s larger context, the problem involved in attempting the first reading is that some of the subjects under discussion in the Davidssohnfrage (such as Son of David) are of less interest to Mark’s Christology. Because the Davidssohnfrage did not serve as the guiding mnemonic framework of Mark’s themes, the evangelist has left some of the subjects in this discussion underdeveloped. Unless there is some acknowledgement of this, the reader will be frustrated by Mark’s contentedness to introduce certain subjects without further explanation. Contrast this with the trial narrative which does indeed serve as a more directive framework whereby certain thematic developments are guided and given their narrative meaning(s). Mark’s trial narrative is among a handful of gravitational hubs which attract and propel his narrative elements. Within this narrative context, the telos of the Davidssohnfrage in Mark’s narrative is guided and distorted. Mark’s interest in the Davidssohnfrage revolves around his portrayal of an exalted and vindicated Christ. Because Ps 110 is a prominent subject and because Jesus’ use of this psalm sets him in opposition to the Temple establishment, Mark has used the Davidssohnfrage to propel themes that find climax in his trial narrative. A byproduct of this telos is that the significance of Son of David has been marginalized.

This acknowledgement leads to the second reading, which also is problematic. By granting that Mark is relatively uninterested in the development of Son of David, further analysis of Son of David involves an attempt to prescind from Mark’s narrative context. This is problematic because it is impossible to read a passage in total isolation. No tradition is conceived or passed down apart from some mnemonic context. Thus in order to isolate the Davidssohnfrage from Mark’s narrative, one must postulate the now lost mnemonic frame by which the tradition was originally given meaning. As indicated in the first section of the present chapter, the original context of the Davidssohnfrage must remain indefinite. Thus our second reading presents two possibilities: (a) the Davidssohnfrage was invented by one of Mark’s predecessors to combat a misunderstanding of Jesus’ relationship to the title Son of David or (b) the Davidssohnfrage represents a memory of Jesus attempting himself to qualify the messianic expectation associated with title Son of David.

In either case it is highly probable that the Davidssohnfrage originated in relationship to an historical perception of Jesus. The only remaining question is whether this perception was remembered by one of Jesus’ contemporaries. While this must

121 I here specifically refer to theme, but this “hub” is also directive of plot, characterization, etc. as discussed above.
remain inconclusive, we can conclude with relative certainty that the Davidssohnfrage betrays conceptual links with mnemonic categories available to Jesus' contemporaries. In this way, this pericope does indeed aid our discussion of Jesus' historical context.

It is my contention that both readings are necessary for exegesis and historical inquiry. As demonstrated, a strictly literary reading will be ultimately frustrated because Mark is not strictly a narrator; he is a narrator of received tradition and therefore does not give his full attention to every detail that he has included in his narrative. On the other hand, a strictly "historical" reading will be frustrated by passages (such as ours) that defy confident historical postulation. It is therefore necessary to measure pericopes against both their synchronic narrative context and their diachronic development. As the present discussion of the Davidssohnfrage has attempted to demonstrate, it is in the relationship between these contexts that historical Jesus research is most fruitful.

VII.5 Conclusion

As briefly discussed, early and widespread memories of Jesus considered him to have claimed divinely endorsed authority to destroy the present Temple to make way for the Temple of Heaven. While the Davidssohnfrage might not have originated in early memory, it does confirm two important aspects of the historical Jesus: (1) Jesus' perceived rank and mission stood in direct opposition to the Jerusalem Temple establishment. And (2) Jesus' perceived rank and mission were hinged upon his authority over the Jerusalem Temple. My exegesis of Ps 110 in conjunction with the Temple context of the Davidssohnfrage has shown that the Markan portrayal of Jesus is that of a messiah characterized by both of the above aspects.

The Davidssohnfrage is of pre-Markan origin and seems to have extended these historical perceptions of Jesus albeit in a highly distorted form. This distortion has localized Jesus' significance within the exegesis of Ps 110. When applied christologically, this psalm painted Jesus as having both royal and sacral jurisdiction. In this way, the Davidssohnfrage propels the interpretive trajectory of Ps 110 in a distinctly christological direction. While the saying does not represent a fully developed Christology as does Hebrews, it looks to be a midpoint along this trajectory. Therefore Son of David is best understood to be a title employed not by the earliest memories of Jesus but rather a mnemonic frame employed by later Christianity to assimilate pre-Christian memories of Jesus into more fully developed Christology. Son of David thus
provided the necessary mnemonic continuity between the historical Jesus and the Christology of early Christianity.
In chapter III, I presented my theory of historiography as I discussed the essential relationships between history, memory and typology. In order to illustrate my theory and proposed method, I provided an admittedly superficial treatment of John the Baptist tradition. I am now in a position to return to my theoretical argument upon the foundation of the more detailed exegesis demonstrated over the course of this study concerning the title “Son of David”.

VIII.1 *The Mnemonic Cycle*

An excellent example of the mnemonic cycle can be seen in the *Davidssohnfrage* (VII). In Mk 12:35-7, the Markan Jesus challenges a teaching concerning the Son of David by offering a new perspective on Ps 110.

**Figure 1γ: The Mnemonic Cycle**

![Diagram of the Mnemonic Cycle]

- A. Son of David
- B. Messianic Interpretation
- C. New Perspective on Psalm 110
- D. Reconsideration of Son of David in light of Psalm 110

Key:
- A. Mnemonic Category of Significance
- B. Trajectory of Distortion
- C. Contemporary Perception
- D. Localization of the Perception within the Previous Category
Jesus’ first question presupposes that a particular mnemonic frame (A) is already in place: “How is it that the scribes say that the Messiah is the Son of David?” (12:35). As I have argued, Mark is more interested in endowing Jesus’ significance with that from Ps 110 than he is with clarifying the significance of the title Son of David (VII.3.3). As such, Son of David does not act as the dominant mnemonic framework in this case. This logion presupposes that Son of David is a well-known category (A) and that it is subject to messianic interpretation (B), but Jesus’ use of Ps 110 (C) demonstrates the inadequacy of the previous category. Thus C, in this case, acts as the dominant category and A receives the larger portion of distortion (D); A must be realigned accordingly.

Because the previous category (A) does not ultimately control the new perception, this cycle does not necessarily demonstrate typological interpretation. The Markan Jesus argues that the messiah cannot so easily be categorized as Son of David as evidenced by Ps 110. As Mark has inherited this tradition (VII.3.1), he has used it to emphasize the importance of Ps 110. As such, he distorts this tradition to serve better his “present” interests concerning Jesus’ sacral authority. As shown in my discussion of the contrasting interpretations of Isa 11 by PsSol 17 and 1QSb 5, typology requires that the scriptural category (A) play a more constraining role in the mnemonic localization (IV.2.2). Contrarily, the Davidssohnfrage demands that the previous category (Son of David) is diminished by the “superior” messianic interpretation provided by Ps 110. If this new perspective on Ps 110 is to be taken seriously, Mark’s audience must reconsider how Son of David fits into this new paradigm (cf. 12:37). In this way, both Ps 110 and Son of David are distorted by instrumentalization: the tendency for memories to be reinterpreted to serve the present better (II.2.3). As argued, Mark’s interest in Ps 110 was hinged on his agenda to show Jesus’ authority over the Temple and the priesthood. Such distortion follows the lead of the issues at stake in Ps 110 (VII.2). In this way, we see that Mark’s use of the Davidssohnfrage anticipates Jesus’ appeal to Ps 110 during his trial before the high priest (VII.3.2).

It is necessary to point out that, thus far, no discussion of historical memory has been offered; this has been an entirely synchronic analysis. This mnemonic cycle has

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1 Indeed, the presupposition behind Jesus’ first question suggests that it was uncontroversial to interpret Ps 110 messianically. In all likelihood, the previous category of significance (A) invited common patterns of distortion.

2 Eventually, the author of Hebrews employs Ps 110 as category A and localizes Jesus’ significance (C) therein. This is an apt example of typological distortion and also demonstrates how new interpretations (if memorable) tend to become mnemonic categories of significance. But at this point, my interest is limited to a synchronic analysis of Mark.
simply illustrated how mnemonic distortion most commonly functions when previous categories are reconsidered in light of new interpretations.

VIII.2 The Typological Cycle

I have compared Mark's non-typological use of Son of David with that of Matthew (V.2). Mt 12:22-3 represents a Matthean addition to the Beelzebul Controversy concerning Son of David: "Then a demon-possessed man who was blind and mute was brought to Jesus, and he healed him, so that the mute man spoke and saw. All the crowds were amazed, and were saying, 'This man cannot be the Son of David, can he?'" This suggestion of Jesus' identity is couched between an appeal to Isa 42 and a competing interpretation of Jesus' actions by the Pharisees. With this framework in mind, consider the following figure:

Figure 18: The Typological Cycle

As argued (III), typology is primarily a manifestation of the mnemonic process and not necessarily a literary device. This will be further demonstrated in my diachronic analysis below. However, as illustrated by Matthew's synchronic framework, typology is also a literary device that naturally follows the mnemonic cycle. So, as illustrated here, Matthew's commemoration of Jesus' therapeutic ministry is essentially similar to the mnemonic process. The key difference is that Matthew's commemoration typologically distorts Jesus' significance. Unlike Mark's use of the title, Matthew imports a mnemonic framework with the title Son of David and thus allows this framework to guide his own narrative. Thus Matthew, keenly interested in legitimating Jesus' ministry via scriptural
precedents, interprets several of Jesus’ healings as Davidic/Solomonic. I have also argued that Matthew has used Isaianic therapy passages in a similar way: they are not simply proof-texts; such passages impose meaning upon Matthew’s Jesus and guide the structure of his narrative.

I have argued that Matthew’s adaptation of Mark is an apologetic against accusations much like those leveled by the Pharisees in Mt 12:24: “But when the Pharisees heard this, they said, ‘This man casts out demons only by Beelzebul the ruler of the demons.’” By localizing Jesus’ significance within a Son of David apologetic, Matthew has undoubtedly distorted the Jesus tradition. But equally important is that, from Matthew’s perspective, his interpretation has provided a corrective; he has “correctly” reinforced Jesus’ therapeutic significance from a Jewish-Christian perspective.

VIII.3 Diachronic Continuity
In comparing Matthew’s use of Son of David to that of Mark, my discussion has inevitably moved from synchronic to diachronic analysis. Indeed, comparing Matthew to Mark is nothing new to NT studies. What my dissertation has tried to emphasize is that the distortions that occur from one mnemonic cycle to the next (most often) maintain continuous patterns of distortion, what I have referred as distortion trajectories. With this in mind consider the following diagram:
The Jericho healing enters Mark’s commemorative interests very modestly (B). The fact that Bartimaeus calls Jesus “Son of David” is incidentally included (V.2.1). Indeed, the title is only used one other time in Mark (12:35-7) and does little to clarify the title’s significance (VII.3.3). In Mark’s narrative world (C), the category “Son of David” is less subject to distortion simply because Mark does not offer much interpretation as to how it should be applied to Jesus, if at all. Due to the prominence of Mark’s other agendas (D), Bartimaeus’ plea is isolated (A2) and relatively undeveloped (B2).

As discussed (III.1.2), a simple spiral does not adequately illustrate the complex oral and literary progress from Mark to Matthew. It is not my intention to over-simplify the larger relationship between the two books. What I have demonstrated in Figure 2y is the distortion from Mk 10:46-52 to Matthew through the analysis of a single pericope and subsequent theme. As such, B3 is not meant to represent a single mnemonic cycle, but a longer continuum of cycles which are not made manifest until Matthew’s commemoration of this tradition (B5).

It is important to reemphasize that while Matthew has distorted his received tradition (B), this distortion has not taken the form of dramatic shifts. To the point, Matthew’s therapeutic apologetic follows the lead of what he has found implicit in Mk 10:46-52. What began as a therapeutic context for the title has been distorted further in
this direction. Moreover, Matthew has not invented this application of Son of David; he stands as the beneficiary of a long trajectory of interpreters who have distorted Solomon’s and David’s legacy along these lines. Consider the following expansion of the previous diagram:

![Figure 25: The Distortion Trajectory of Solomon the Exorcist Tradition](image)

This figure illustrates much of chapter V, but it also highlights a key point made in chapter IV. The reader will be reminded that Solomon’s legacy was first and foremost an extension of his father’s; with “Son of David”, the Chronicler coins a title that embodies both the promise to David and the fulfillment of this promise in Solomon (IV.1.1-2). Thus, it is not surprising to find that “Solomon the Exorcist” tradition caused a reconsideration of David’s legacy. Moreover, because of the cyclical character of mnemonic localization, it is difficult to tell which of these figures attracted demonological speculation first (V.1.3-4).

In light of Figure 25, I will reiterate five points that have been important for the present study:

1. As a title, “Son of David” was a Solomonic referent (a) from its first use by the Chronicler, (b) through its use as a sapiential pseudonym/archetype, (c) as it was employed in PsSol 17, (d) as it was employed in the Dead Sea Scrolls, and (e) as it was

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3 I emphasize again that, with this spiral, I am following the single thread of a much larger complex of tradition. Indeed, each cycle attracts and localizes categories from many other spirals with conceptual kinship.
employed in the Testament of Solomon. Given this continuity, Matthew’s use of the title should be seen along this trajectory.

(2) My second point speaks more directly to my primary theoretical thesis: The shift from Solomon as the archetypal wise king to exorcist par excellence is a dramatic distortion. In SM terminology, one could say that Solomon tradition underwent a dramatic re-localization as it was reinforced by demonological categories. Having said this, it is crucial to recognize that this distortion is first evidenced several hundred years after Solomon’s legacy first took shape. I must reiterate that within the first generation of an historical memory (especially those with significant impact) distortions happen incrementally and continuously. Each distortion must be rendered intelligible to the previous mnemonic cycle and to the one which follows. With this in mind, I return to Matthew’s distortion of the Jesus tradition.

(3) By expanding Figure 2γ to show how it related to the longer Solomon the Exorcist tradition (2δ), I have demonstrated that Matthew’s apologetic distortion follows the lead of a much longer trajectory. Thus by “distorting” Mark, Matthew has predictably moved this larger continuum forward. Yet, as seen over the course of this dissertation, Matthew rarely distorts Mark’s tradition in dramatic fashion. This is so because such distortions have been spurred and constrained by the SM established by the first interpretations of Jesus by his contemporaries. In this way, distortions to the Jesus tradition were subject to the constraints of the first categories employed during Jesus’ historical ministry.

(4) Finally, Figure 2δ has left a noticeable gap between the pre-Christian traditions and “Son of David” as it first appears in Mark 10. Indeed, a more complete model would show many gaps along a much longer trajectory. I have underscored this gap so that I might point out that such typological interpretations of Jesus most probably stand somewhere along this trajectory. As I have argued, Bartimaeus’ typological interpretation of Jesus as “Son of David” betrays an interpretation contemporary to Jesus’ context (V.3.1-2). In making such a connection, Bartimaeus locates Jesus’ significance along this larger scriptural trajectory.

The fact that this detail was included in Mark’s narrative suggests that Bartimaeus was not alone in his interpretation of Jesus. While Mark may not have

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4 It is noteworthy that the Testament of Solomon eventually attracted Christian interest. This further demonstrates how previous categories can be reinforced and conflated in the process of mnemonic distortion.
5 As discussed (II.2-3), SM theorists generally grant two to three generations before a “crisis of memory” occurs.
chosen to develop this interpretation, it has been remembered in the Jesus tradition because some group of rememberers found it interesting, clarifying, appropriate etc.

No doubt, Mark represents a distorted version of this account which is further distorted by Matthew. After all, each cycle does not represent a new perception (cf. 2y movement C), but a distortion of that perception (cf. 2y movement B₂). It is because of these distortions that historical memory is chartable. Such diachronic analysis suggests that Solomon/David typology was an interpretation that preceded the more formalized literary manifestations of this typology. However, I have argued that distinguishing a memory-story from literary invention requires closer comparison of the distortion tendencies of related synchronic cycles (V.3.1).

VIII.4 Historical Memory
Over the course of this dissertation, I have made judicious use of authenticity criteria. The application of such criteria has been one step among several to postulate historical memory. I have argued that, while the assessment of origin by no means exhausts the historian’s task, it is necessary to attempt to distinguish tradition which originated in memory from that which originated in invention (III.2.1-2). Yet even in cases where a story’s origin is doubted, I have argued that the evidence of distortion represented by such a story is valuable for charting interpretive trajectories. Thus, while the origin of the Davidssohnfrage is inconclusive (VII.1), it confirms Mark’s interest in Ps 110, his disinterest in Son of David and helps to confirms Jesus’ historical tension with the Jerusalem Temple establishment (VII.4). Because Mark’s interpretive tendencies can be seen, such analysis provides the historian with a means of charting such distortion.

As argued (II.2.3; III.1) mnemonic distortion is most prevalent on the subconscious level. However, typological distortion tends to be more recognizable as it involves overt comparisons between significant mnemonic categories and especially impressionable new perceptions. This is seen most clearly in Jesus’ entry into Jerusalem and procession to the Temple. The following figure draws largely from the analysis of chapter VI:
Much like Figure 2δ, a dual typology sets this trajectory in motion. In order to set Solomon apart from all other would-be claimants to his throne, David choreographs Solomon's anointment procession. In this way, Solomon is explicitly modeled after David. In 1Kgs 1, Solomon is set upon David's mule, is hailed as king and anointed by Zadok the highpriest (1Kgs 1:39). Shouting to YHWH this procession supplicates, "make his throne greater than the throne of my lord King David!" This narrative is reenacted by Zerubbabel and Zadok (who is also anointed; VI.2.2). As argued, the emphasis in both cases is on the homogeny between the highpriest and the Davidic heir. This is especially important for Zerubbabel as he is given the Solomonic task of rebuilding the Temple.

This narrative background has been under-emphasized in many previous studies on the Entry. But when seen along this trajectory, the absence of an endorsement by the highpriest in Jesus' Entry demands to be recognized. That there should have been a cohesive relationship between Jesus and the Jerusalem Temple establishment is highlighted by Mark's inclusion of Ps 118 which emphasizes this relationship. This further confirms that Jesus' Entry mnemonically evoked scriptural precedents that emphasized the relationship between the anointed king and the priesthood. Moreover, I have argued that the appeal to Ps 118 is best explained as historical memory rather than invention (VI.1; VI.2.1). Considering this trajectory and the themes evoked and echoed...
by Ps 118, it is most probable that at least some of Jesus’ contemporaries interpreted his actions as a scriptural mimic.

What this discussion demonstrates is that typological imitation is an act of narrative distortion. I have argued that, in this case, this “narrativization” colored the first memories of Jesus’ historical act (VI.1). Consider the following figure:

Figure 3B: Mnemonic Triangulation of Jesus’ Entry

This figure illustrates what I have referred to as mnemonic triangulation (III.2.1). Trajectory Z represents a linear projection of Figure 2e above. Trajectories X and Y represent the mnemonic distortions evidenced in the narratives of John and Mark. As shown, Mark makes no explicit typological appeal (X). Although some have argued that Mark and Luke (X2) betray implicit typologies, all agree that they diverge from John (Y) in their non-use of Zech 9:9.

What is most important for my present argument is the fact that both John (Y) and Matthew (X1) independently provide a direct quotation of Zech 9:9. This warrants the application of Multiple Attestation (III.2.2); but more importantly, it provides two separate trajectories that seem to have been propelled by the same mnemonic sphere. Thus the most plausible explanation for this is that the typological interpretation of Jesus’ Entry originated in historical memory and not by literary invention. While Mark employs Zechariah imagery elsewhere, he does not do so in this instance. However, his account contains enough implicit cues that Matthew has recognized this typological significance of Jesus’ act and distorted this tradition to include both a quote of Zechariah and the Solomonic title “Son of David”.

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VIII.4 Conclusion

Over the course of this dissertation, I have attempted to demonstrate that the historical Jesus is the memorable Jesus; he is the one who set distortion trajectories in motion and who set the initial parameters for how his memories were to be interpreted by his contemporaries. If this is so, then the historian does not “find” Jesus in spite of the distortions of the evangelists. Rather, the historian discerns his historical presence and impact on the basis of these distortions. It is because these distortions exist that we can confidently postulate the mnemonic sphere in which the memories of Jesus were located.6

Building from this, my primary thesis, the key results of my work have been threefold. (1) When history is thought in terms of memory distortion, the dichotomy between historical fact and historical interpretation dissolves.7 (2) When the mnemonic process is related to typological interpretation, the false dichotomy between history and typology dissolves.8 (3) When typology is thought of as a kind of memory distortion (narrativization), the title “Son of David” exemplifies how a mnemonic category can develop typologically and be charted accordingly. In these ways, I consider the present work to be both a hermeneutical corrective and an historiographical advance in historical Jesus research.

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6 Contra Sanders (1.1).
7 Contra Crossan and Lüdemann (1.1).
8 Contra Goulder (1.1).
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