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"In whose name I write":

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2007

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"In whose name I write":  
John Henry Newman’s reading of the Alexandrian Fathers  
Benjamin King

The history of doctrine has been shaped by its historiographers. Prominent among nineteenth-century historiographers is John Henry Newman (1801-1890), a patristic scholar whose interest among historians today normally lies in his writings on doctrinal development or in his own story of conversion. It is the purpose of this thesis to show that historians of theology, particularly of the patristic era, should also be interested in Newman’s engagement with Origen, Athanasius and Cyril of Alexandria. In turn, this should interest all those who know the Apologia, for as an Anglican and as a Catholic Newman held different views of these Fathers.

This thesis provides an examination of the changes that occur in Newman’s reading of, and writing on, the Alexandrians Fathers across the years. Overall, three things will be seen. First, comparing his first book, The Arians of the Fourth Century (1833), with his later works, reveals a flattening out of Newman’s account of history occurring just when he was propounding that doctrine is dynamic. Secondly, analysis of his sermons of the 1830s and 1840s shows an Alexandrian christology ("Monophysite" in Cyril’s sense, as Newman explains it) in tension with his claims at the time, that he was leaving the Anglican Church because it held an analogous position to the Monophysites of the fifth century. Thirdly, contrasting his translations of Athanasius in the Library of the Fathers (1842-4) with his “free translation” (1881), reveals the effect thirty-five years of reading Catholic scholastic theology had on Newman.
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Finally, thanks to Mum and Colin who took me to the viva, and to Dad who promises to read the thesis.
Abbreviations.

Newman’s works cited (the uniform edition is not always used)

**Apo**  

**Arians**  

**Ath i, ii**  

**BI**  

**Cal**  

**CF**  

**Cons**  

**DA**  

**Dev**  

**Dev (1878)**  

**Diff i, ii**  

**EH i, ii**  

**Fleury i**  

**GA**  

**HS i, ii, iii**  

**Jfc**  

**LD**  
*Letters and Diaries of John Henry Newman.*

**Mon**  
“The Monophysite Heresy” OM, B.2.5.

**Mix**  

**OM**  
Birmingham Oratory Manuscript.

**Ox Frs ii**  

**Ox Frs iii**  
Select Treatises of S. Athanasius in Controversy with the Arians


Parochial and Plain Sermons (San Francisco: Ignatius, 1997) 8 vols. Original vol. and sermon number are given below, then page.


Tracts Theological and Ecclesiastical 1st edition (Basil Montague Pickering, 1874).


Other works cited


Cave, William, Apostolici, or, The history of the lives, acts, death, and martyrdoms of those who were contemporary with or immediately succeeding the Apostles (London: A.C. for Richard Chiswell, 1677).


Petau, Denys, de Trinitate (Venice: Ex Typographia Remondiniana, 1757) from de Theologicus Dogmatibus vol. ii.


Introduction.

What happens to a mind, which, from the age of fifteen, has fed on the writings of the Church Fathers, when, at the age of forty-four, it enters the world of scholastic Catholicism? Moreover, what if prior to entering that world, that mind has digested the Fathers largely with the help of Anglican commentators like Cudworth, Cave and Bull? How does that mind go about integrating two contrasting ways of doing theology: the more Platonic and patristic Anglican mode on the one hand, and the more Aristotelian and medieval Catholic mode on the other?

These are questions that have been left largely unexplored in the myriad writings on the life of John Henry Newman (1801-1890). The focus of this dissertation is the patristic shape of Newman’s theology and specifically his reception of the Alexandrian theologians of the third, fourth and fifth centuries. Mainly, this will mean charting the use in Newman’s theology of Origen (c186-253), Athanasius (295-373) and Cyril of Alexandria (c375-444), beginning with his first book, The Arians of the Fourth Century, published in 1833, and on throughout his life. Newman acknowledged his lifelong engagement with Athanasius in his retranslation of Select Treatises of Athanasius in 1881. There Athanasius is introduced as the one “in whose name and history years ago I began to write, and with whom I end” (Ath i, ix). It is from this quotation that this dissertation takes its title, although the title leaves intentionally ambiguous the question of in whose name it is that Newman writes. For I argue that Newman’s memory in 1881 is inaccurate; it is much more likely that, when Newman “began to write” theology and

1 Newman remembered of his adolescence: “I read Joseph Milner’s Church History, and was nothing short of enamoured of the long extracts from St. Augustine, St. Ambrose, and the other Fathers which I found there” (Apo 20).

2 In 1827, while in Germany, Pusey bought Newman a collection of patristic writings, which, he told his sister Harriet, “fit into my bookcases capitally” (LD ii, 30). In 1831 his friends and pupils bought him another thirty-six volumes, which he described as “so fine in their outsides as to put my former ones to shame” (LD ii, 369). These volumes included the works of Origen, Athanasius and Cyril of Alexandria, as well as others who will appear from time to time in this thesis, Augustine, Epiphanius, Basil, and Irenaeus.
patristic history in the 1830s, he was influenced more by Origen and Cyril than by Athanasius.

Although scholars have long been aware of the depth and variety of Newman’s reading of the Fathers, when it comes to his doctrine it is usual to present him as a person who espoused Athanasian orthodoxy. Attention has typically focused on fourth- and fifth-century theological controversy, and the writings of Athanasius in particular, to discover Newman’s own view of doctrinal truth. Even those scholars who recognise Newman’s early interest in pre-Nicenes like Clement of Alexandria (c150-c215) and Origen, nevertheless spend more time on how his reading of the post-Nicenes related to his shifting opinions on the Church of England and the Church of Rome. The account of his conversion to Catholicism which Newman began to give in Lecture XII of Certain Difficulties felt by Anglicans (1850), and polished in the Apologia (1864 and 1865), governs this type of scholarship. In what follows a more nuanced account of Newman’s reading of the Fathers will be presented, one that recognises a period in Newman’s life when his interest in doctrine was less rigidly conciliar than it became in the 1840s.

Central to Newman’s understanding of pre-Nicene doctrine were Clement and Origen, the latter of whom Newman turned against when in the 1840s he was promoting his Athanasian version of orthodoxy. Yet Origen was much more Newman’s hero in his Anglican years than Athanasius was, though by 1845 he saw him as a father of heresy.

Selby and Stern are two examples of scholars whose discussion of Clement and Origen is underpinned by a single quotation from the Apologia. Yet, in spite of Newman’s claim to have been interested only “in the philosophy, not the theological doctrine” of the early Alexandrians, this is not an accurate reminiscence of the content of his first book, in which it was precisely the Alexandrian philosophical tradition (not the

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4 See Diffi, 371-374.

catechetical school) that was the precursor to Arianism \((\text{Apo} \ 36)\).\(^6\) Rather, Newman’s early understanding of theology seems to have been shaped around Origen.\(^7\) In a fascinating reply, in October 1836, to Edward Pusey’s doubts about including Origen in the Tractarians’ \textit{A Library of the Fathers} series – “you mean to say you knew and liked it?” asks a surprised Pusey of \textit{Contra Celsum} – Newman writes:

what I read of his “against Celsus,” seemed to me full of matter for reflection and very valuable… Is his Commentary on St Matthew impossible [for inclusion]?

Williams of Trinity has read it, and might give an opinion \((LD \ v, 368)\).

Newman and his disciple, Isaac Williams, admired Origen’s scriptural exegesis and his catechetical methods. It is interesting to note from this quotation that Newman had by no means read all that was available of Origen; but, at this stage, he had not read much Athanasius either. In fact, only from 1835 onwards, as is shown in his sermons and letters,\(^8\) does he seem to have examined Athanasius in any detail.

Although its main intention is to explore which Fathers Newman was most interested in and when, in so doing this thesis questions some other truisms of his patristic reading that are based on the \textit{Apologia}. The assumption of Newman’s dependence on Bull for his reading of the Fathers will be shown to be inaccurate from his earliest work onwards.\(^9\) Also, the decision of many interpreters to read Newman’s patristics as a matter of his own biography, rather than of rigorous research, must be

\(^6\) The relevant quotation, admitting his earlier fascination with the pre-Nicenes in \textit{Arians}, is: “The broad philosophy of Clement and Origen carried me away; the philosophy, not the theological doctrine; and I have drawn out some features of it in my volume, with the zeal and freshness, but with the partiality of a neophyte”.

\(^7\) The predisposition toward Origen was traditional to many English divines, especially the Cambridge Platonists in the seventeenth century and Bishop Butler in the eighteenth century, who this thesis will show to have been central to Newman’s writings on the Fathers. For a concise account of this, see Harrold, C.F., “John Henry Newman and the Alexandrian Platonists,” \textit{Modern Philology} 37 (1940).

\(^8\) In a letter to Keble dated 20 November 1837, Newman cites Athanasius’s various works which reply to the attack mounted in Wilson’s \textit{A Brief Examination of Professor Keble’s Visitation Sermon} (Oxford: 1837); the topic is the \textit{homoousion} with which much of this dissertation is concerned \((LD \ vi, 165-6)\).

\(^9\) Newman writes of his conviction that “Antiquity was the true exponent of the doctrines of Christianity and the basis of the Church of England; but I take it for granted that the works of Bishop Bull… were my chief introduction to this principle” \((\text{Apo} \ 36)\). Stern concurs: Bull acted for Newman “comme guide et qui, d’après son propre témoignage, contribua plus que tout autre à ancrer en lui [cette] conviction,” 81. By contrast, Thomas (1991) draws attention to a letter from October 1831 to Rickards in which Newman “severely qualifies his admiration; [Bull, Waterland, Petavius, Baronius and the rest] are ‘magnificent fellows but they are Antiquarians or Doctrinists, not Ecclesiastical Historians’,” 35, quoting \textit{LD} ii, 371.
questioned. Of course, engagement with an historical text is about both give and take. But while most scholars examine what Newman brought to the patristic texts he read, they overlook what he also received from them (this is why my title implies a two-way process, speaking of Newman’s “reading” of the Fathers rather than simply his “use” of them). Guided by what was considered the “auto-centrism” of the Apologia, the famous Anglican Dean of Westminster, W.R. Inge, chose to view Newman’s patristic writing as autobiographical too. In 1912, Inge claimed “Newman’s writings, and his life, are a ‘human document’ in a very peculiar degree… Even his historical portraits are constructed from his inner consciousness; hence their historical falsity – all ages are mixed in his histories – and their philosophical truth.”

Stephen Thomas is one who has taught us to question the accuracy of the Apologia, especially the reminiscences about quite when Newman drew a parallel between Anglicanism and Monophysite heresy.

Yet even Thomas follows Inge by interpreting most things Newman wrote as having an autobiographical content, as if everything was of a piece with the Apologia. By contrast, this dissertation sets out to see Newman’s mind shaping what he read of the Fathers, but also being shaped. He gave a different account of the Arian controversy in the 1870s, for instance, than in his first book in 1833.

Such a view gives an alternative perspective from other Newman studies. Although it examines those writings chronologically, it will not divide Newman’s life into Anglican and then Catholic periods as most studies do. Chapter one gives a chronological overview of Newman’s writings on the Alexandrian Fathers by concentrating on three periods (the 1830s, the 1840s and the 1860s-70s) rather than just two (Anglican and Catholic), in order to see his shifting views on the key themes of scriptural interpretation, the rule of faith, and tradition – in so doing, the chapter

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12 This tendency seems to have been in place right from the beginning of Newman scholarship with Richard Church’s The Oxford Movement: Twelve Years, 1833-1845 (London and New York: Macmillan, 1891). Recent studies like those of Thomas (1991) and Turner (2002) also end when Newman becomes a Catholic. Even when taking a thematic approach, Ian Ker divides Newman’s writings into “Anglican” and “Catholic” categories in Newman on Being a Christian (Notre Dame: University of Notre Dame Press, 1990).
emphasises continuities in his patristic work on either side of his conversion. Chapter two examines in detail the book with which Newman’s engagement with the Alexandrians began, *Arians*, looking at the ways in which the previous two centuries of debate on these Fathers helped form his opinions. The terminology for most of Newman’s patristic theology is present in *Arians*, setting the stage for all subsequent discussion of the Alexandrians.

Chapter three centres on Newman’s christological doctrine, showing how he drew more from Cyril of Alexandria than from Athanasius in various sermons preached between 1835 and 1849. These sermons straddle the time of Newman’s conversion. Exploring them shows how shifts in his interpretation of the Fathers were based on the reading he was doing and not just on what was going on in his private life. However, one particular change in his private life, his move to Littlemore in April 1842, did afford Newman the time and peace to translate Athanasius (work on which he had begun the year before) and perhaps allowed him to see himself in the role of the exiled Alexandrian heading to Rome. This period was not only when Newman’s thoughts turned towards Rome, but also when he came to a more narrowly Athanasian interpretation of doctrine. Interestingly, however, his christology remains “Monophysite” – in the Cyrilline sense described herein – even when Newman claims it was the analogy of Monophysitism and Anglicanism that led him to leave the latter.

Chapters four and five concentrate on his engagement with Athanasius, comparing Newman’s earlier translation of the anti-Arian works in the volumes of *A Library of the Fathers* (1842-4) and his later version in *Select Treatises of Athanasius* (1881), and charting the increasingly “Latin” ways in which Newman now read Alexandrian theology. But note how this Latinisation begins before his conversion. There had been change in his reading of the Alexandrian Fathers before he went to Rome and more change was to come after, as he began to engage seriously with scholasticism. In the 1887 “Advertisement,” not long before his death, he admitted that he wished he could alter his translation further.

What do I mean by a “Latin” reading of the Greek Fathers? This thesis is not concerned with the over-simplified accounts of the differences between Greek and Latin notions of Trinity found in twentieth-century scholarship; in fact, it attempts to locate
Newman’s writing in an historical period before such categories came to dominate doctrine. The arguments about what de Régnon said, or might not have said, about Greeks approaching God from the three and Latins from the one, are not relevant to discussions of doctrine taking place in the nineteenth century. Nineteenth-century scholars have their own mistakes for which to be responsible, and Newman among them. Newman in the 1830s had a very different conception of the divine Trinity than he came to hold in the 1840s. As shall be shown in Arians in chapter two and in an 1832 letter discussed in chapter four, Newman began by describing the Trinity in terms that fit poorly with “Western” doctrinal language today. I argue that Newman describes God in terms more akin to the Alexandrians he is reading than to the “Trinity” scholars since Newman have written about. My suggestion, following John Behr and Sarah Coakley, is that readers of the Fathers today find it difficult to see past the doctrinal terminology of the late-nineteenth and twentieth centuries. Yet Newman’s viewpoint is not ours: he could read the Fathers without inflicting on them notions of East-West difference that have arisen since. Newman’s own ideas of what are distinctively Greek or Latin conceptions of God’s Trinity begin with his critique of Gibbon in the 1840s. Newman’s categories for how the three Persons can be one are those of Latin “numerical” and Greek “generical” unity, which he claims are ways of saying the same thing.

Of course, the really interesting question is whether Newman had any influence on shaping the doctrinal categories which followed? As the principal translator of Athanasius for A Library of the Fathers, Newman has had an enormous influence on the way he has been read by the Anglophone world. It will be argued that Newman’s

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15 “Gibbon remarks that the doctrine of ‘a numerical rather than a generical unity,’ which has been explicitly put forth by the Latin Church, is ‘favoured by the Latin language; trias seems to excite the idea of substance, trinitas of qualities.’ ch. 21, note 74” (Ox Frs viii, 46 note k). Newman accepts Gibbon’s couplet of “numerical” and “generical,” even while he nuances the historian’s assertions.
mistake was to conceive Athanasius’s theology in terms he takes from Augustine. In his freer translation discussed in chapter five, however, it is not so much Augustine himself as the regnant form of scholasticism Newman encountered in the Catholic Church that he read back into Athanasius.

The description in chapters four and five of Newman’s changing interpretation of Athanasius avoids the simplistic divisions of East and West which beset a certain type of twentieth-century doctrinal history, and does so in order to reveal the mistakes in the historiography of doctrine that Newman introduced in the nineteenth century. The terms used here – Latin, scholastic, systematic – are not intended to be pejorative but heuristic, as attempts to name the changes going on in Newman’s brilliant but unsystematic mind. Only once those changes have been seen can we judge “in whose name” Newman really wrote.

16 The translations of Newman and his friend Mark Atkinson, with some revisions, are the weight of Athanasius: Select Works and Letters in the NPNF series, still the most widely used translations of certain texts.
Chapter 1.

Newman and doctrinal truth: An examination across the years

Introduction

Images of the recent revolutions in Europe, as well as the English revolution, haunted the small number of clergymen who gathered at Hugh James Rose’s Rectory in Hadleigh in East Anglia between 25 and 29 July 1833. But so did images of the early Church. The sermon preached to them that Sunday, presumably by A.P. Perceval, invoked Jesus’s warnings to his earliest followers: “All the signs and the tokens of evil which marked the days when good King Charles was put to death, are gathering around, and showing themselves again... The ministers of religion are openly reviled and abused... Too soon, I fear, many of us may be called upon to put in practice those lessons which the Scriptures teach, of how to suffer persecution.”17 In the minds of the “High Churchmen” gathering in Hadleigh, first the repeal of the Test and Corporation Acts in 1828 and the emancipation of Catholics in 1829, then the Reform Act in 1832 and now the Irish Church Temporalities Bill presaged the destruction of the Anglican establishment. The Irish Church Bill passed in the House of Lords the day after the Hadleigh conference ended.18 Although Newman had not been at the gathering, he like they saw the courage of the early Church in the face of persecution as an example for worried Churchmen to follow.

Keble, who on 9 July 1833 had famously preached against the “National Apostasy” of the Irish Church Bill at St. Mary’s in Oxford, where Newman was vicar, had not been at the Hadleigh conference either. But Hurrell Froude had attended, and reported back that the incursions of the State into the Church were not being resisted

17 This attribution comes from the fact the sermon appears in Perceval’s Collection of Papers, 42, quoted in Turner (2002), 85.

18 The conference agreed to petition the Archbishop of Canterbury; by February 1834, signatures from some 7000 clergy had been collected. See McGrath “Introduction” to The Church of the Fathers Birmingham Oratory Millennium Edition (Notre Dame: University of Notre Dame Press, 2003), xvi note 25.
strongly enough by the older High Churchmen, whom he now saw as part of the problem. Newman, Froude and Keble, who had first united in their opposition to Sir Robert Peel’s bid for re-election as Oxford’s M.P. after introducing a parliamentary bill to emancipate Catholics, now responded to this latest crisis by publishing the *Tracts for the Times*. By 9 September 1833, Newman had written and published the first three *Tracts*. Two more of Newman’s were published on 29 October (numbers 6 and 7), one on 31 October (number 8), one each on 4 and 11 November (numbers 10 and 11), another on 13 December (number 15), and one each on 23 and 24 December (numbers 19 and 20). In the midst of all this, on 5 November 1833, his first book was finally published. *The Arians of the Fourth Century*, completed before his travels to the Mediterranean earlier in the year, used the third- and fourth-century Fathers as ammunition against the reforms.

By contrast to the group of friends in Oxford, Hugh James Rose responded to the crisis by taking over the editorship of the *British Magazine*, which had begun in 1832 as an ecclesiastical voice of opposition to the Whig reforms. High Churchmen like Rose worried about those who had joined their opposition only out of “a negative recoil from ‘French principles’,” as Nockles puts it, and wanted instead a commitment to “philosophical depth” and “ethical insight.” Under Rose’s editorship, the *British Magazine* aimed to instil these characteristics in his readership. Newman, it must be remembered, still regarded himself as High Church, which is why in August 1833 he sent Rose a set of articles about the fourth century for publication in the *Magazine*: three on the way Ambrose withstood imperial pressure and a fourth on Basil’s response to the Emperor Valens’s incursions into the Church. Newman’s polemic against the Whig

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19 At the conference, a division seems also to have arisen over the honour to be accorded to the English Reformers. Older High Churchmen, whom Froude came to label “Zs,” praised the Reformers, whereas Froude and Newman, the “Apostolics” or “Ys,” criticised them. (Evangelicals were labelled “Xs.”) See Nockles, Peter, *The Oxford Movement in Context* (Cambridge: CUP, 1994), 124-5.

20 For an account of the provisions of the Irish Church Temporalities Bill, Newman’s reaction to it, and the dates of the *Tracts*, see McGrath “Introduction,” xi-xvii, esp. note 29.

21 Nockles (1994), 323-4. Here Nockles points out the lack of the latter two was “[w]hat most dismayed Victorian High Churchmen about their Georgian forebears.”
reformers was as thinly disguised here as it was in Arians. Too thinly disguised for Rose who, as when he and Lyall had rejected Arians for publication in the *Library of Anglo-Catholic Theology*, showed he had different opinions about the High Church cause from Newman. The articles Newman sent him were published in the correspondence section, and under the comment, “The Editor begs to remind his readers that he is not in any way responsible for the opinions of his Correspondents.”

It is clear from this that the High Church party, of which Newman still saw himself a part in 1833, looked for support from clergy throughout England with the *Tracts for the Times* and other High Anglican opinion-forming journals like the *British Magazine* and *British Critic*. The ironies of Newman’s position here should not be lost. Newman the polemicist took advantage of the national role of the Church precisely when he argued for distancing the Church from national politics. His was a party position at the very time when, in Arians, he criticised his opponents for being a party over-against the apostolic Church, just like the Semi-Arians. The party mentality behind Newman’s publications aimed at taking his argument into the “public square,” but in order to propound the role of “secrecy” (the *disciplina arcani*) in the Church. The collapse of the *ancien régime*, although Newman felt it diminished the role of the English Church in the life of the nation, nevertheless opened the possibility for him to express radical views about the Church in the new free market of ideas.

22 The first Ambrose article began, “No considerate person will deny that there is much in the spirit of the times, and in the actual changes which the British Constitution has lately undergone, which makes it probable, or not improbable, that a material alteration will soon take place in the relations of the Church towards the State... [which] makes it a practical concern for every churchman to prepare himself for a change, and a practical question for the clergy, by what instruments the authority of Religion is to be supported, should the protection and patronage of the Government be withdrawn” (*CP* 339).

23 Quoted in McGrath “Introduction,” xxi.

24 Of course, the Tractarians only disapproved of the current direction of national politics: after 1832, as Nockles puts it, “Tractarian anti-erastianism entailed a repudiation not of the role of the state per se in matters ecclesiastical, but true to the Caroline model, repudiated only a secular or infidel and indifferent state enslaving the Church.” “Church and King': Tractarian Politics Reappraised” in Vais, P (ed.), *From Oxford to the People: Reconsidering Newman and the Oxford Movement* (Leominster: Gracewing, 1996), 95.

25 Williams “Introduction” to *The Arians of the Fourth Century* Birmingham Oratory Millennium Edition (Notre Dame: University of Notre Dame Press, 2001), xlv. Jürgen Habermas has shown that the public square was of growing importance in the nineteenth century. See Turner (2002), 53-55.
Stephen Thomas argues that the real target of Newman’s polemic in the early-1830s were those who had gained most from the fracturing of the Confessional State, those he dismissed as mere “Protestants” and who fell into the categories of evangelicals or liberals. Evangelicals receive many stinging rebukes in Arians for thinking that biblical literalism will ever provide a sufficiently rich sacramental and doctrinal theology. It is the pedagogy of the disciplina arcani which converts the soul, not preaching the atonement to the masses without proper reserve. Without obedience to sacraments and to sound doctrine, the mob will be swayed by heretical leaders like Arius. The likelihood of heresy had only been increased by the Whig reforms: liberals who act just as Eusebius of Nicomedia did, convincing the monarch that heterodoxy was in the best interest of the Empire. Rowan Williams adds to the list of those criticised in Arians and in so doing helps explain why Rose and Lyall objected to Newman’s unpublished manuscript: Arians attacked those bishops and Churchmen who had done so little to defend the ancien régime, many of whom were High Churchmen. 26

Here lies an important difference between Thomas’s and Williams’s description of Newman’s polemic. Williams gives a theological account of Arians, Newman explaining that the Confessional State was lost by bishops rather than won by liberals, just as in the fourth century when, in the face of the Arian onslaught, “The orthodox majority of Bishops and divines... timorously or indolently, kept in the background” (Arians 294). Williams’s description of Newman – one with which this chapter is largely in agreement – centres on the “rule of faith” and the disciplina arcani as keys to the orthodoxy of the pre-Nicene Church. Both were about keeping the scriptural language used of God dynamic, instead of attempting to manage mystery as if it were political economy. Here the decisions at the Council of Nicaea represent a decline like that which, in his own time, resulted from parliament’s interference in the Church. The Nicene Creed was, for Newman, the end of a golden age; “the Homoūsion,” as he calls it, 27 was a mere formula. Williams is right to stress the radical dimension of this version of High

26 Williams writes in his “Introduction” that “The overwhelming majority of the bishops during these years had supported the extension of the rights of Protestant Dissenters and had been at best ineffectual and lukewarm in their resistance to Catholic Emancipation; a substantial minority had backed the Reform Bill of 1832,” xxiv. Nockles finds that the majority of bishops on the Episcopal Bench were High Churchmen.
Churchmanship. Through the *disciplina arcani*, the pre-Nicene Fathers did a better job of conserving the orthodox faith than did subsequent Fathers who fixed it within the parameters of the Nicene formula. Williams explains how older High Churchmen viewed this opinion:

Lyall wrote to Rose that ‘a “secret tradition” is no tradition at all’, and this sums up the anxieties of orthodox High Church theologians. Newman is apparently granting that pre-Nicene formulations actually are compatible with something other than Nicene orthodoxy (indeed Newman criticises earlier Anglican scholars like Bishop Bull for failing to come clean about this). 28

Newman’s opinions shocked Lyall. The revolutionary quality of his Church history will be an ongoing theme in the chapters which follow.

*Arians* was a theological, not just an historical work, then, and yet, says Williams, "Newman’s own perspectives and proposals are often flawed by a colossally over-schematic treatment and a carelessness in detail." 29 These are not the traits of a careful historian, and they enabled patristic scholar and Anglican bishop, John Kaye, among others, to criticise Newman for his lack of evidence that there was ever a pre-Nicene *disciplina arcani*. 30 Perhaps Newman in the 1830s falls between the two stalls of history and theology – stalls he is still trying to straddle in the 1840s, the second period to be examined in this chapter. As Nicholas Lash observes of the *Essay on Development*, the “brilliantly drawn descriptive parallels between the church of the Fathers and nineteenth-century Roman catholicism as Newman envisaged it in 1845… are phenomenological sketches in which ‘doctrine’ in the narrow sense plays a very small part.” 31 Lash argues

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27 In what follows, when Newman uses Greek script in these works, I transliterate into English. When Newman uses transliterations, these may show different conventions from those of today.

28 Williams "Introduction," xxxi; quoting Lyall to Rose, 19 October 1832, forwarded to Newman (*LD* iii, 105).

29 Williams "Introduction," xxxvi.

30 Williams "Introduction," xxx; citing *LD* iv, 169 note 1. Newman had cited “Bing. Antiq. x.5” as the basis for saying Clement and Tertullian invoked the text against casting pearls before swine “in justification of their cautious distribution of sacred truth” (*Arians* 47). While this is what Bingham writes, nevertheless he concentrates mainly on post-Nicenes writers: “testimonies of Theodoret, St. Austin, St. Ambrose [t]o which we may add that of St. Cyril of Jerusalem.” Bingham, Joseph, *The Antiquities of the Christian Church* reprinted from the original edition (London: Henry G. Bohn, 1845), 470.
that Newman was an historian of doctrine and not a systematian, and with this I largely agree, even though as a Catholic he became increasingly “scholastic.” Yet here is where I do not quite agree with either Lash or Williams. Lash does not allow Newman to be enough of a theologian, creatively engaging with the Fathers. By contrast, Williams does not allow Newman to be enough of an historian, working within the framework of earlier historiography. In what follows, I shall attempt to answer various questions raised by these observations. What theology underlies Newman’s historically questionable musings on the role the *disciplina arcani* played in doctrine? How do his regrets that orthodoxy was made *formulaic* at Nicaea help explain his thoughts on doctrine? How do these observations show that Newman’s ongoing interest in pre-Nicene doctrine requires more investigation than it presently receives?

My argument is that, while Newman can be rightly challenged in the historical accuracy of the account he gives before and after Nicaea, nevertheless what is important about the first period of his life is that Newman had not yet aligned himself rigidly with conciliar orthodoxy. Newman was aware of the unhistorical aspects of *Arians* even before publication, and maybe tried to pre-empt criticism by writing: “it is not the actual practice of the Primitive Church, which I am concerned with, so much as its principle. Men often break through the rules, which they set out for themselves for the conduct of life, with or without good reason” (*Arians* 52). In the 1830s, Newman recognised in the *rules* of the pre-Nicenes, even when not followed, a richness and dynamism in doctrine that subsequent eras forgot. This begins to change in the 1840s, and the shift to a rigid orthodoxy is completed in the 1860s-70s, as this and following chapters will show. In each of these three periods, we will examine three themes Newman saw himself taking—rightly or wrongly—from the pre-Nicenes: first, his understanding of their method of scriptural interpretation; secondly, the way in which they used the Rule of Faith; and thirdly, his exploration of an idea he discerned in Clement and Origen, which he called

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32 Williams is, of course, comparing Newman with historians who had no theological insight. E.g. a Protestant historian like Mosheim, “who regards the intellectual history of the Church as a fundamentally secular affair, since true doctrine is found in Scripture” is, in Newman’s mind, no better suited to writing ecclesiastical history than an unbeliever like Gibbon. See Williams, Rowan, “Newman’s *Arians* and the Question of Method in Doctrinal History” in Ker, Ian, and Hill, Alan, (eds.) *Newman after a Hundred Years* (Oxford: Clarendon, 1990), esp. 266.
the capacity for "Traditionary Religion," whereby humans discern truth without the need for formulae like that of Nicaea. In these three areas, Newman thought the pre-Nicene Fathers delivered the truth about the God of Jesus Christ to all who read their teaching.

1) Newman in the 1830s
(a) The Interpretation of Scripture

One criticism made by Abbé Jager in the 1830s was of Newman's attempt to distinguish, from the beginning of the Church, two categories of orthodox doctrine. Jager judged this unhistorical, and today Stephen Thomas thinks it confused. First, Newman put the essentials of doctrine into a category he called "Episcopal Tradition." These are the teachings deemed necessary to salvation; they are unchanging, although he was not always clear which these were. Secondary to essentials, but extremely important nonetheless, are the teachings that supplement Episcopal Tradition, which he called "Prophetical Tradition." Leaving aside the question of whether such an account can be discerned quite so clearly in the history of the early Church, one can see what Newman was trying to do. He aimed to seal up the essentials in one category, while allowing room in the second category for dynamism and enrichment of the faith. Questions to do with how this two-fold division actually works, and to which category various doctrines belong, are, I think, less important than Newman's observation that the pre-Nicenes recognised that some dimensions of doctrine are unchanging, and others are dynamic. A doctrine as unchanging as the three divine Persons was nevertheless taught by the pre-Nicenes with ever-shifting terminology. The secondary teaching or doctrine was expansive, though the primary teaching -- the three Persons in one God -- was firmly held. Prophetical Tradition was

partly written, partly unwritten, partly the interpretation, partly the supplement of Scripture, partly preserved in intellectual expressions, partly latent in the spirit and temper of Christians; poured to and fro in closets and upon the housetops, in

33 Thomas (1991) gives this critique: "About generalities, Newman is precise but arcane. Yet when it comes to specifying the content of orthodoxy, he attempts to evade, with bluff practicality, the tighter distinctions he has elsewhere established." He has "inherited all the unresolved conundra of the Jager controversy [of 1835]," 195.
liturgies, in controversial works, in obscure fragments, in sermons, in popular prejudices, in local customs (VM i, 250).

What is clear is that, while he considers the essentials of doctrine (scripture, the creed) to be written and fairly fixed in content, secondary teachings (levels of interpretation, customs) are mainly oral and embodied. This is seen with the Rule of Faith in section 1(b) below, which, as the lens through which scripture and tradition were read, became a rule to guide liturgy and ethics in order that primary truth might be embodied. The written might have priority over the oral and embodied, but the rest of this chapter will argue that you cannot have truth without them both. Truth is, as we shall see in section 1(c), felt for Newman as well as thought.

This is a far richer account of doctrine than was offered by many of his contemporaries. His two-fold account was offering a critique on two fronts. First, contra the rationalists of his day, he wanted the faith to be fixed in essentials, but also rich and creative rather than dry and rational. This was what the Prophetical should be all about, had the rationalists not "reduced [prophecy] to 'prediction' that could be verified; and so men lost sight of the way in which prophecy was a means of declaring God's works and words." Then, contra the evangelicals of his day, with whom he agreed on essentials, he promoted the importance of secondary tradition as a way to delve far deeper into scripture than they allowed.

The two-fold pattern of doctrine was not laid out fully until the Lectures on the Prophetical Office, published in 1837, which gave the terms "Episcopal and Prophetical Tradition" to primary and secondary levels of doctrine respectively. But the two-fold

34 Such an argument should not ignore the differences between Arians and the Lectures on the Prophetical Office. The latter seems more concerned with fixing the faith in the creeds, both before and after Nicea, whereas the former relished the richness and diversity of pre-Nicene teaching. Moreover, the Lectures describe the Apostle's Creed "as of the nature of a written document" with "an evidence of its Apostolical origin the same in kind with that admissible for the Scriptures" (VM i, 249). Günter Biemer shows how radical, given his Anglican context, Newman's claims were, in Newman and Tradition trans. K. Smyth (New York: Herder and Herder, 1967), 17.

35 This is Andrew Louth's view of Newman, who was motivated by his colleagues Pusey and Keble to criticise the rationalist theology of his day. See "The Oxford Movement, the Fathers and the Bible," Sobornost 6:1 (1984), 32.
pattern was already established in *Arians* (1833). It was the pattern, for instance, of the patristic method of interpreting scripture. The pattern was also suggested in 1836, in an article for the *British Critic* usually known as “The Brothers’ Controversy,” in which Newman distinguishes written “creeds” from the unwritten “Apostolic Tradition.” Lash writes: “it is important to notice that the process by which ‘Bishop compares notes with bishop’, enabling them to recognise in each other’s local credal formulae the profession of a common faith, ‘implied time and accurate thought, freedom of discussion, questioning, reviewing’.” Lash is attempting to add dynamism to Newman’s conception of Episcopal Tradition but the Newman of the 1830s would probably refuse this idea. While Lash seems to be making room for development of doctrine, even in Episcopal Tradition, well before 1845, Newman himself argues that the *regula fidei* “was from the first fixed in a set form of words called the Creed... These articles varied somewhat in the different branches of the Church; but inasmuch as they were but heads and tokens of the Catholic doctrine, and when developed and commented on implied each other, this argued no difference in the tradition of which they were the formal record” (my italics). The bishops are interpreters, thus I would argue representatives of “Prophetical” tradition, who are basing their interpretations on a rule – the rule of their respective creeds. Only at the point of acknowledging their agreement did the bishops recognise that Episcopal Tradition was fixed, nevertheless there had actually been agreement all along due to the one divine author.

In “The Brothers’ Controversy,” the Rule of Faith became Newman’s standard for interpreting scripture. Before that, in *Arians*, he used as his “rule” the pre-Nicene notion called the *skopos* or, as it became when Newman translated it into English, the “scope” of

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36 Lash (1975), 125, has discerned in *Arians* a two-fold treatment of “Apostolic Tradition” as “both the process of oral transmission, and the content of that process, the creed (p. 135), in so far as the latter term is understood to refer, formally, to ‘the great doctrines of the faith’ (p. 134).” The dynamic and oral is thus separated from the fixed and credal, although Lash continues by clarifying that, at this stage, Newman does not mean by “creed” the “explicit crystallisation in authoritative conciliar formulae.”

37 *British Critic* xxxix, July 1836, 170.

38 Lash (1975), 127.

39 *British Critic* xxxix, July 1836, 187. Obviously, Newman does use the word “development” here, but unlike in *Dev* does not allow for any alteration of meaning.
any biblical text. The *skopos*, or as it might be better translated "aim," of any particular scriptural passage sets the framework in which it should be interpreted. For instance, says Newman, the tradition of the pre-Nicenes held that the *skopos* of John 5:26, "As the Father hath life in Himself, so hath He given to the Son to have life in Himself," provided from these words the doctrine of the Father’s begetting of the Son (*Arians* 159).40 Put another way, the rule by which the pre-Nicenes interpreted this text enabled them to discern within these words the primary (fixed) doctrine of the Son’s eternal generation from the Father. Secondary (dynamic) levels of teaching were also discernable from this text which, in line with the *skopos*, would enrich their understanding of that doctrine.

Among the Alexandrians, like Clement and Origen, it was known that "(as a general rule) every passage has some one definite and sufficient sense, which was prominently before the mind of the writer, or in the intention of the Blessed Spirit, and to which all other ideas, though they might arise, or be implied, still were subordinate" (*Arians* 60). But through allegory and typology, a text will also admit of "the secondary and distinct meaning of the prophecy" – what he might later call a Prophetic sense – which "is commonly hidden from view by the veil of the literal text, lest its immediate scope should be overlooked; when that is once fulfilled, the recesses of the sacred language seem to open, and give up the further truths deposited in them" (*Arians* 61, my italics). These two levels of interpretation represent the pre-Nicene distinction between a primary, or "literal," sense of scripture and various secondary, or "allegorical," senses.41

The notion of *skopos* guides both levels: first as the "general rule" by which the primary level is discerned, then to make sure the secondary senses run in line with the "immediate scope." The Alexandrian Fathers were prepared to flip the priority of the two levels to better reveal the scope of the text, thus on occasion making the secondary sense more

40 It is not surprising that Newman chose a text from John to show the pre-Nicenes’ christological doctrine. As Heine notes, Origen "referred to the *skopos* of the Gospel of John when he says, in the introduction to his commentary on that Gospel, that none of the other evangelists has shown Jesus' 'divinity as perfectly as John'." Heine, Ronald, *Gregory of Nyssa's Treatise on the Inscriptions of the Psalms* (Oxford: OUP, 1995), 41.

41 In a sermon preached over two Sundays in May 1838, entitled "The Gospel Feast," Newman writes of the difference between literal signifiers and allegorical signifieds: "Now the Old Testament, as we know, is full of figures and types of the Gospel; types various, and, in their literal wording, contrary to each other, but all meeting and harmoniously fulfilled in Christ and His Church" (*PS* vii.12, 1512).
important than the literal. Newman writes, "sometimes the secondary sense may be more important in after ages than the original, as in the instance of Jewish ritual; still in all cases (to speak generally) there is but one main primary sense, whether literal or figurative" (Arians 61).

In Arians, Newman introduces skopos in the section on "The Church of Alexandria," for it is from Origen in particular that he takes the idea. (By the 1840s, when translating the Discourses Against the Arians, Newman came to write that "ecclesiastical scope" was Athanasius's great insight.) In 1833, he defends Origen and others from the charge that allegory is an "abuse" of scriptural meaning: "So far then as the Alexandrian Fathers partook of such a singular gift of grace (and Origen surely bears on him the tokens of some exalted moral dignity), ... in the same degree they stand not merely excused, but are placed immeasurably above the multitude of those who find it easy to censure them" (Arians 63-64). The one point at which Newman questions Origen's over-allegorising of the text is an interesting exception: "Origen spiritualizes the account of Abraham's denying his wife, the polygamy of the Patriarchs, and Noah's intoxication" (Arians 64). Newman, while attempting to confute modern habits of scripture reading, nevertheless is modern himself in not acknowledging the vast breadth of patristic interpretation of all texts42 – especially on topics of sex and alcohol.

This two-fold pattern was, for Newman, a far more profound way to read the Bible than what he called the "Protestant" tendency to come to scripture afresh, as if it had never been interpreted before, and settle for only one level of meaning. In his Lectures on Justification, published in 1838, Newman was mounting a polemic against the continental Reformers, but underlying his polemic is an important distinction which he sees between those who look for depth of meaning and those who want only clarity. He writes, "There are, doubtless, difficulties in Scripture in proportion to its depth; but I am speaking of a mode of interpretation [i.e. the Protestant one] which does not feel depth nor suspect difficulty" (Jfc 124). Newman embraced the difficulties of scripture,

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42 In this respect, Newman follows Pusey and Keble, who, Louth (1984) argues, "want such a tightly organized system of allegory as I doubt the tradition would deliver," 43.
just as Origen had done. By contrast, the Protestant way of interpreting scripture, as he saw it, was to explain the signification of a biblical text from context alone, examining the literal word but without a guiding rule, and with no opportunity to open up deeper levels of meaning. The context of Jesus’s remark in John 5, for instance, was not sufficient to search the fullness of meaning intended by John the Evangelist and the Spirit who guided him. For Newman, meaning was not found just in the context, but rather in the primary and secondary levels of interpretation of scripture, levels that had been discerned according to a rule or *skopos*. Moreover, the *skopos* was not simply an individual’s interpretation of any given text, but the Church’s interpretation bequeathed by the earliest Fathers.

The scriptures, for Newman as for Origen, show us the Word in his words with greater or lesser adequacy depending on the reader’s spiritual formation. And in order “to understand them we must feed upon them, and live in them, as if by little and little growing into their meaning” coming to see deeper, secondary truths (*PS* iii.10, 566). We must recognise that “The words of Scripture were appropriated to their respective senses by their writers; they had a meaning before we approached them, and they will have that same meaning, whether we find it out or not” (*Ifc* 119). Here Newman is establishing a primary level – or sense – of scripture, one that is sealed up and protected, even to the extent we might miss it. However, in addition to the primary sense are a number of secondary senses which allow further richness in the interpretation of scripture. Put briefly, the two levels of interpretation of scripture are guided by one rule or *skopos*, just as in doctrine there are two levels – Episcopal and Prophetic – but one Rule of Faith.

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43 In a sermon from 1835, Newman faces up to the contradictions: “‘Sleep on now, and take your rest;’ and immediately after, ‘Rise, let us be going.’ (Mt 26:45, 46)... I am not saying that we cannot possibly remove any part of the seeming opposition between such passages, but only that on the whole there is quite enough in the narrative to show that He who speaks is not one whose thoughts it is easy to get possession of; that it is no light matter to put one’s-self, even in part, into the position of His mind, and to state under what feelings and motives He said this or that; in a word, I wish to impress upon you, that our Saviour’s words are not of a nature to be heard once and no more” (*PS* iii.10, 566). In one of a series of lectures given at St. Mary’s in the summer of 1835, published as *Tract 85*, Newman tries another tack: “there are some wise and unknown reasons for doctrines being, as we find them, not clearly stated” in scripture (*DA* 125).
(b) The Rule of Faith

The Rule of Faith embodied for the Fathers a way of living out the primary and secondary doctrines taught by scripture and tradition. The Rule was, for Newman, neither primary nor secondary doctrine; like skopos it was the interpretative framework within which scripture and tradition made sense and were lived out. In fact, in the Lectures on the Prophetic Office, Newman seems to replace what in Arians he had called “scope” with “Rule of Faith.” Such a development seems consistent with some of the arguments presented in Arians, for instance:

Surely the Sacred Volume was never intended, and is not adapted, to teach us our creed; however certain it is that we can prove our creed from it, when it has been taught us, and in spite of individual producible exceptions to the general rule. From the very first, that rule has been, as a matter of fact, that the Church should teach the truth, and then should appeal to Scripture in vindication of its own teaching (Arians 50, my italics).

Interestingly, Newman became surer of his argument about pre-Nicenes, namely the creed as the way in which the Church expresses scriptural truth, the “more I read of Athanasius, Theodoret etc.” In a letter to Hurrell Froude in 1835, Newman says that, based on his reading of post-Nicenes, “I incline to say the Creed is the faith necessary to salvation… and to maintain that Scripture, according to the Fathers, is the authentic record and document of this faith.” Immediately after Arians, therefore, Newman was bolstering his confidence in pre-Nicene orthodoxy by referring to what came after. In his 1837 Lectures, he holds that the faith was delivered to the Apostles and was handed down in the form of a “rule,” used to interpret the Bible, which remained the same into the fifth century. In Lecture XIII, Newman aims to show that precisely the two Fathers he mentioned to Froude, Athanasius (295-373) and Theodoret (c393-c466), shared but one Rule of Faith, together with Vincent of Lérins (d. before 450) whom Anglicans had

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44 23 August 1835 (LD v, 126).
historically considered the standard-bearer of tradition. Moreover, he thinks all three inherited the Rule from the pre-Nicenes, which is to say that the early Fathers held to what became the Nicene Creed.

Newman argues that *scripture* requires the Rule of Faith in order to be interpreted rightly, and *tradition* requires the Rule to insure that the doctrines taught are those found in scripture. Scripture must take priority over tradition, writes Newman: “There is no other way of accounting for [Vincent’s] saying, ‘first the authority of the Divine Law, next the Tradition of the Church Catholic’... The very need of Tradition arises only from the obscurity of Scripture, and is terminated with the interpretation of it” (*VM* i, 322-3). In this quotation, thinks Newman, Vincent is saying the same thing as Athanasius and Theodoret. Athanasius is confident that tradition should be enough to silence heresy, because tradition is the embodiment in earlier Fathers of the Rule of Faith, the rule by which they discerned doctrine from scripture. If tradition does not convince heretics, then they must be taken to the relevant passages of scripture itself. But in those passages, if interpreted rightly, will be found nothing other than the truth already taught by the tradition. (The later Newman would call this the argument of “Via Media” Anglicans as seen in section 2b.)

It was the living out of the Rule of Faith by the pre-Nicenes that was most important for Newman. By that I mean, they provided for those who came after a *tradition* of teachings. The doctrines they taught became embodied in this tradition, became the authority to which later Christians turned; so by simply referring to the tradition of the Fathers one testified to the veracity of any particular doctrine. Newman seems to take from Irenaeus the idea that even if “the Apostles left us no Scriptures, doubtless it had been a duty to follow the course of Tradition, which they gave to those whom they put in trust with the Churches. This procedure is observed in many barbarous nations, such as believe in Christ, without written memorial, having salvation impressed

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45 Stern (1967) says the same is true of seventeenth-century Anglicans and Catholics (apart from Petavius): “Comme son contemporain Bossuet, Bull entend que le canon de Lérins, ‘quod ubique, quod semper, quod ad omnibus,’ soit pris à la lettre,” 81.

46 Athanasius is quoted extensively here at *VM* i, 323-6, including from *contra Apollinarem* which Newman did not doubt (as most scholars do today) was by Athanasius (*LD* xxix, 75). Theodoret is quoted at *VM* i, 326-7, which he closes with the pithy statement, “Here is the doctrine of the Gallic Vincentius in the mouth of a Syrian bishop.”
through the Spirit on their hearts, and diligently preserving the Old Tradition” (*VM* i, 244). The tradition embodies the scriptures, for Newman as for the pre-Nicenes, in what he calls a rule.

But why “rule” and not just “creed”? In a shift between *Arians* and these 1837 Lectures, Newman seems to go back on his earlier suggestion that the creed is not a rule because it cannot be lived out. In his first work, he argued that doxological accounts of the faith were preferable to the dry formula of the Nicene Creed. Thomas sees Newman, in *Arians*,

announcing a *tension*, between the preciser Trinitarian language of the era of the ecumenical councils (‘Creeds’), and the looser language of pre-Nicene Christianity, where words are organically related with the worshipping life of a community (‘doxologies’): ‘We count the words of the Fathers, and measure their sentences; and so convert doxologies into Creeds.’

Yet Newman now portrays the Rule of Faith as identical with the various creeds used either side of the Council of Nicaea (see *VM* i, 219-221). Newman is helped out of the confusion by his Lectures on Justification (1838), which provide a clear (because polemical) account of why a creed can be a rule that is lived out, rather than a principle that is thought out.

Here he argues that we miss living grace-filled lives if we focus our mental activity on *principles* rather than *rules*. Rules “are adapted for immediate practice... and are directed and moulded according to the end proposed, not by correctness of reasoning or analysis.” Rules are favoured by Newman, as he thinks they were favoured by the Fathers. The switch to only principles caused some of the mistakes of the Reformation. He writes, for instance, “justification by faith only is a principle, not a rule of conduct... This is where men go wrong. They think that the long and the short of religion is to have faith; that is the whole, faith independent of every other duty; a something which can

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47 This sounds like Irenaeus’s *Adversus Haereses* iii.4.2: “Those who, in the absence of written documents, have believed this faith, are barbarians so far as regards our language; but as regards doctrine, manner and tenor of life, they are, because of faith, very wise indeed, and they do please God ordering their conversations in all righteousness, chastity and wisdom.” Quoted in Behr, John, *The Way to Nicaea* (New York: SVS Press, 2001), 44.

exist in the mind by itself, and from which all other holy exercises follow” (Jfc 334-5). Polemically this statement is to the detriment of “Protestants,” whose principles have become detached from a holy way of life. Viewed as a contribution to epistemology, however, it entails a view of the mind as embodied through practical rules.

(c) Traditionary Religion

Newman found in the pre-Nicenes a third theme to help us appreciate his view of doctrinal truth, which in 1833 he calls “Traditionary Religion,” the recognition “that all knowledge of religion is from [God], and not only that which the Bible has transmitted to us. There never has been a time when God had not spoken to man, and told him to a certain extent of his duty” (Arians 79-80). Humans are created to be religious, and Traditionary Religion includes all the ways in which God is made known – through conscience, through dreams, even what Clement called “the Dispensation of Paganism” – “so that Revelation, properly speaking, is an universal, not a local gift” (Arians 80-1). The Alexandrians, Clement and Origen, according to Newman, knew the faith not merely by principle but by living it practically, hence elsewhere Newman speaks of a “traditionary practice” that is not to be mistaken for “principles of interpretation” (CF 106). Moreover, their teachings were based on an understanding of the “prophetic” which looked for the allegories and typologies of scripture in the world around them. The Alexandrians read the cosmos as God’s communication to humans by way of “Traditionary Religion.” Newman’s interest in this aspect of Alexandrian teaching has much in common with Coleridge (1772-1834), who was also interested in Platonic cosmology. Allegory and cosmology were part of Newman’s conversation not only with the Alexandrians of the pre-Nicene era but with the Romantics of his own day. The fruit of all this was a life of devotion to God, lived with the sort of “enthusiasm” seen in

49 Scripture commandments, writes Newman, were “acted upon as [rules and admonitions] by the primitive Christians, whether from their received principles of interpretation or the traditionary practice of the Church.” This quotation first appeared in a “Letters on the Church Fathers” series of three articles on Antony of Egypt in the British Magazine, July-September 1835.

50 Of course the question of Newman’s Platonism is as much disputed as the question of his Romanticism. For a survey of views on whether Newman or Coleridge was more favourable to Plato, see Newsome, D, Two Classes of Men: Platonism and English Romantic Thought (London: John Murray, 1974), ch. 4.
the holy lives of the early Fathers. Enthusiasm in religion was propounded by Coleridge and defended by Newman in his “Letters on the Church Fathers.”

Of the pre-Nicene Fathers described in Arias, Origen was a particular hero. Origen was the most famous member, along with Clement, of the so-called “Alexandrian School.” From his chapter on this school in Arias, we see that Newman learned a pedagogical method which he claimed reflected God’s own pedagogy:

What, for instance, is the revelation of general moral laws, their infringement, their tedious victory, the endurance of the wicked, and the “winking at the times of ignorance,” (Acts 17:24) but an “Economia” of greater truths untold, the best practical communication of them which our minds in their present state will admit? What are the phenomena of the external world, but a divine mode of conveying the realities of existence...? And our blessed Lord’s conduct on earth abounds with the like gracious and considerate condescension to the weakness of His creatures, who would have been driven either to a terrified inaction or to presumption, had they known then as afterwards the secret of His Divine Nature (Arias 75-7).

The Alexandrians taught Newman that God’s revelation occurs economically through the conscience, through the external world, and through the scriptures. The Alexandrians interpreted God’s economy so well because, says Newman, they recognised that God was present in every person and in all creation. Through an “economic” method of teaching, Clement and Origen could draw students into the truth. Beginning with the sorts of pagan philosophy that were useful for scriptural interpretation, and only slowly teaching their pupils Christian doctrine, Clement and Origen developed what Newman regarded as a curriculum for conversion. In their “peculiar caution” they aimed “to rouse

51 For more on the way Coleridge used enthusiasm to encourage moral development, see Barth, J. Robert in idem., and Mahoney, John L., (eds.) Coleridge, Keats, and the Imagination (Columbia: University of Missouri, 1990), 139. For Newman’s defence of the “enthusiasm” of Antony of Egypt, see CF 101.

the moral powers to internal voluntary action," by drawing initiates into the Church; “their dread [was] loading or formalizing the mind” (Arians 49). 53 In this gradual approach, opposed as it was to easy formulas, the Alexandrians provided the model for Newman’s own teaching on reserve in his opposition to evangelicalism’s perpetual preaching of atonement.

Newman thought the privacy and obscurity of the pre-Nicenes testified to their ability to preserve Christian doctrine in a way that the post-Nicenes could not. After all, privacy and obscurity were part of God’s own pedagogy in the scriptures, which were full of parables and “dark sayings” (c.f. Pss 49:4, 78:2 and Mt 13:35 quoting the prophet Ezekiel). The Alexandrians, thought Newman and his own Oxford school, followed Christ’s example in explaining the faith to catechumens privately “in the house.” Origen in his Commentary on St Matthew had interpreted scriptural references to “in the house” as indicating God’s wisdom is revealed in secret. 54 The Alexandrian school was also the centre for allegorical interpretations of scripture, says Newman, “before the history of heresy had taught the necessity of caution in their phraseology” (Arians 94). Sadly, their rule of interpretation, based as it was on skopos, was challenged at the time of Nicaea by the rise of heretical “schools,” based, he says, on the rule of sophistry.

In this regard, the activities of Eusebius of Nicomedia provided Newman with an anti-hero to contrast with Origen. He portrays Eusebius as lacking reserve in his dealings with the Emperor Constantine, especially in overlooking the disciplina arcani that drew people slowly into the faith through a long catechumenate. Eusebius is blamed for breaking with pre-Nicene tradition: “The shrine of the Church was thrown open to [the emperor’s] inspection… its mysteries were officiously explained to one who was not yet even a candidate for baptism” (Arians 264). The catastrophic consequence of Eusebius’s influence at court was the rise of Arianism among the emperors. Such openness could not have happened, Newman thinks, if the faith had not begun to be discussed publicly by

53 Again, there are similarities with Coleridge’s thought. “Religion and Morality [are] the means of reforming the human Soul in the Divine Image (Idea),” writes Coleridge in the “Advertisement” to Aids To Reflection (Burlington VT: Chauncy Goodrich, 1829). The divine image is already within us, so that even pagans participate through Christ in God’s inner life. But with a recognition of this Idea comes a responsibility to learn and to live Christ.

54 The remarks about “dark sayings” and the importance of saying things “privately” are made by Newman’s curate at St Mary’s in Oxford, Isaac Williams, in Tract 80, part i, section 4.
Arius. Therefore, the making public of the faith during the Arian disputes represented a diminution of the best way to preserve truth.

While we might question Newman's account of what was going on before Nicaea and what, if anything, was lost in the Nicene formulation, more important is what these arguments show about his understanding of truth as something best grasped in an indefinable way. It is an understanding that seems to have much in common with the Romantics of his day. Truth, here, is never able fully to be represented and therefore is better felt than expressed. Newman claimed to find in the pre-Nicenes a theory that doctrine is felt as much as thought, a theory he shared with Romantics like Coleridge. For Newman, thoughts are drawn towards an object by desire, which implies the mind has feelings. In one sermon of 1839 he wrote that, "As hunger and thirst, as taste, sound, and smell, are the channels through which this bodily frame receives pleasure, so the affections are the instruments by which the soul has pleasure... Our real and true bliss lies in the possession of those objects on which our hearts may rest and be satisfied" (IPS v.22, 1158-9, my italics). Here Newman seems to be using the ancient tradition begun by Origen of identifying the "spiritual senses." These are spiritual analogues to the bodily senses through which our souls, as it were, feel their way towards God. One recent commentator has written, "sometimes Origen will talk of the spiritual senses as the 'faculties of the heart', for with them love – properly purged – finds its integration with mind in the Logos (Christ)." Newman says something similar in this sermon, that while most people try to satisfy their affections with "love of home and family" – objects which in themselves are not wrong to desire – the soul remains restless until it finds "what is

55 Newman thinks it was only at "the end of the second century" that the Fathers began to write down the faith in order to prohibit error (Arians 52). Since Walter Bauer, however, it has become customary to see St Paul's Epistles as written formulations to defend against heresy. For an account of Bauer's contribution, see King, Karen, What is Gnosticism? (Cambridge, MA: Harvard UP, 2003), 110-115.

56 In his "Introduction" to Fifteen Sermons preached before the University of Oxford (London: SPCK, 1970), Donald MacKinnon is right to notice certain empiricist tendencies in Newman, whose sermons do not reflect simply "the protest of a romantic," 16. But Romanticism was not unsophisticated about epistemology, as Coleridge's engagement with Kant shows. Perhaps it was through Coleridge that Newman came upon the "Kantian distinction between phenomena and things in themselves" that MacKinnon detects in the XVth sermon, 22.

more stable,” the divine Object (PS v.22, 1159). Desire for what is missing leads to a feeling of peace once that Object is received. This is why, for Newman, intellectual clarity is always accompanied by a feeling of peace, for we have received the missing Object, God’s gift of Christ in the Spirit.

For Newman, as well as for the Romantics, psychology and sensation were intertwined, so that one cannot say whether thought leads to feeling, or whether feeling causes the mind to become settled. He writes in the 1839 sermon:

When we have discovered the solution of some difficult problem in science, we have a conviction about it which is distinct from that which accompanies fancied discoveries or guesses. When we realize a truth we have a feeling which they have not, who take words for things. And so, in a like manner, if we are allowed to find that real and most sacred Object on which our heart may fix itself, a fulness of peace will follow, which nothing but it can give (PS v.22, 1162).

Newman’s theory of doctrinal truth shares much with the Romantics. Feelings based on rules seem to be the best way to judge truth, rather than scientific arguments. As long as we are obedient to “right knowledge,” which he attributes to the Fathers, we shall through scripture come to know the sacred Object in our hearts (Jfc 123). But modern liberalism in respect of tradition will make it more difficult for us than it was for them, for, as he noted in 1839, the early “Fathers might have traditionary information of the general drift of the inspired text which we have not. Moderns argue from what alone remains to them; they are able to move more freely. Moreover, a certain high moral state

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58 Newman’s sermon was entitled “The Thought of God, the Stay of the Soul,” which of course suggests Augustine’s Confessions might have been another influence upon it.

59 Newman is also Romantic in his view that the physical and psychic are intertwined in the calming properties of music, which might have to do with an “electric current passing from the strings through the fingers into the brain and down the spinal marrow. Perhaps thought is music” (LD xxii, 9). Vargish, Thomas, Newman: The Contemplation of Mind (Oxford: OUP, 1970), 51 note 2, makes a revealing comparison between Newman’s 1865 letter and Wordsworth’s The Prelude (1805-6): “The mind of man is fram’d even like the breath/ And harmony of music”.

60 Newman states, in the midst of a polemic, “The Protestant sense [of an idea] is more close upon the word, the ancient use is more close upon the thing. A man, for instance, who described bread as ‘the staff of life,’ need not disagree with another who defined it only chemically or logically, but he would be his inferior in philosophy and his superior in real knowledge” (Jfc 99). The words “staff of life” produce more feeling, more conviction, than any chemical definition.
of mind, which times of persecution alone create, may be necessary for a due exercise of mystical interpretation. To attempt it otherwise than from the heart,” he warns us, “would be a profanation; better not attempt it at all” (EH i, 286). Newman may well have thought, however, that the persecution of his own Church by the State in the 1830s opened up the possibility of mystical and apocalyptic interpretations once more. Certainly it was a time for heart and feeling, not just the intellect, and a time to return to tradition. What about the times which followed? To these this chapter now turns.

2) Newman in the 1840s

(a) The Interpretation of Scripture

The discoveries about pre-Nicene scripture interpretation which Newman had made in the 1830s continued to provide the categories for his thought into the 1840s. His two-fold division of interpretation, with both primary and secondary senses of a text guided by a skopos, is the model for a sermon from November 1842. In it he refers to everyday language to explain how the biblical prophecy can have both a literal (primary) sense and a figurative (secondary) sense:

We constantly use figures of speech whenever we speak; yet who will say that the main course of our conversation is not to be taken literally? We talk of a cutting wind and a threatening sky, without meaning that literally the sky is able to threaten, or the wind to cut; yet, in spite of these figures, we mean what we say, as to the general run and drift of our sentences (SD 186).

The key here is the “general run and drift,” which is to say the skopos guiding how figures can be used to give a literal sense. Here Newman is presenting a more complex account of the interaction of primary and secondary senses than in Arians. There is much similarity between Newman’s recognition of the overlapping of the literal and figural, and Origen scholar J.D. Dawson’s remarks on de Principiis iv.3.5: “An allegorical reading is, then, both a linguistic and a philosophical process that connects literal impossibilities, historical realities, and literal fictions, producing a single coherent narrative.” Dawson is defending Origen from those who claim that a figural reading

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61 From “Prospects of the Anglican Church” originally published in the British Critic, April 1839.
largely ignores the plain sense of the scripture text it claims to interpret. Like Origen, Newman’s sermon grounds his interpretation in the primary sense, even suggesting that it is “the false philosophy of modern religion” which “professes to give the Bible to the poor that they may judge for themselves, yet it will not let them read it in a plain way, lest they read it like the saints of former ages... but it interposes with its own officious note and comment, to fix upon it a strained figurative meaning” (SD 217, my italics). Like Origen, Newman seeks a single coherent narrative, guided by the “general run and drift” of a passage, rather than a “strained figurative meaning.”

Newman’s opinions were shifting in the 1840s though. Lash shrewdly observes an extension of Newman’s exegetical practice to non-biblical texts, beginning in 1841 with his interpretation of the Thirty-nine Articles in Tract 90. In the Essay on Development Newman applies the distinction between the primary sense and the secondary sense to the creeds, which up to now have been the skopos or rule to guide interpretation and not the subject of interpretation. He writes, with respect to trinitarian doctrine,

First, the Creeds of that early day make no mention in their letter of the Catholic doctrine at all. They make mention indeed of a Three; but that there is any mystery in the doctrine, that the Three are One, that They are coequal, coeternal, all increate, all omnipotent, all incomprehensible, is not stated, and never could be gathered from them. Of course we believe that they imply it, or rather intend it. God forbid we should do otherwise! But nothing in the mere letter of those documents leads to that belief. To give a deeper meaning to their letter, we must interpret them by the times which came after (Dev 13).

A deeper meaning is expressed in the early creeds than “merely” the plain sense of the letter. Lash suggests why, in the Essay, Newman begins to dismiss as the “mere letter” the plain sense of these texts. Now the polemic is directed against those who “confine themselves to the mere literal interpretation of Scripture.” In practice, however, the effect of his polemic is

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63 Lash (1975), 93.
seriously to tilt the balance in the other direction, thus dangerously weakening the tension between the historical and the transcendent, the "human" and the "divine."  

Newman has taken an allegorical reading of scripture he claimed to find in the Alexandrians and applied it to the events of ecclesiastical history, as if those events are the "letter" of history of which a transcendent sense can also be given. The allegory is there for all to read: the teachings of the Church which develop and grow through history are orthodox, whereas those which corrupt and perish are heresies. Lash is right to notice Newman's tendency to stray too far from the letter of the early creeds when "interpreting" them by the times which came after (Dev 13). Particularly ironic here is the "literalness" with which Newman reads off this supposed allegorical moral from historical contingency.  

The mid-1840s was a time when Newman turned away from the pre-Nicenes and fixed himself upon Athanasius. The paradoxical result was Newman's assumption that something resembling Athanasius's "Trinity" was implied in the early creeds, whereas in Arians he had been more interested in the dynamic secondary teachings about the three Persons. (It will be argued in chapter four below that the notion of Trinity he adopts as

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64 Lash (1975), 92, quoting Dev 323.

65 Newman was keen to hold onto the notion that such developments as the doctrines about the Virgin Mary were in line with the faith of the earliest Christians, not least to help his Anglican friends over their difficulties with Catholicism. In a letter to Catherine Ward on 18 November 1848, Newman says he is responding to her question "whether I have so far shown [Marian doctrine's] compatibility with the primitive Creed, as to destroy the objection drawn from it against the prima facie claims of modern Rome." His response is that the Essay "starts with assuming the historical identity of the present and past Church, that is, with the infallibility of the former" (LD xii, 332-333). While such an assumption begs the question, nevertheless Lash (1975) admits "it does seem to be the case, for example, that christians who receive the decrees of Chalcedon interpret the christology of the new testament in their light - not, indeed, as a principle of scientific exegesis, but as a matter of religious fact," 104.

66 As Lash (1975) writes, Newman's "judgement that... the view expressed in the Essay is a 'real' one, is facilitated by his ability to see, in a monolithically conceived Roman catholic system, the fulfilment of those biblical prophecies of the 'kingdom' which he had long tended to interpret with disturbing literalness," 16. In similar vein, the "Essay on the Miracles Recorded in Ecclesiastical History" claims the "miraculous" nature of Arian's death as "strictly of an historical character" (Fleury i, clxxi).

67 Newman wrote to Henry Wilberforce on 25 June 1846, "The fact I believe to be this - the early Fathers made incorrect intellectual developments of portions or aspects of that whole Catholic doctrine which they held, and so far were inconsistent with themselves." And more strongly, "I really do not think you can
his standard in the 1840s is not even that of Athanasius.) It can already be seen how Newman’s idea of development actually represents a making static of a previously dynamic account of doctrinal language. Because the pre-Nicenes are seen to lead to Athanasius, therefore their early creeds are judged a development. But much of their secondary teaching is now seen to veer towards later heresy.

This new account seems to have crystallised while he was translating and annotating the *Discourses Against the Arians*, a project he began in the summer of 1841. Here Newman gives a revealing gloss to Athanasius’s phrase, “the ecclesiastical scope [skopos] as an anchor for the faith,” in *Discourse* III.58:

> It is remarkable that he ends as he began, with reference to the ecclesiastical scope, or *Regula Fidei*, which has so often come under our notice... as if distinctly to tell us, that Scripture did not so force its meaning on the individual as to dispense with an interpreter, and as if his own deductions were not to be viewed merely in their own logical power, great as that power often is, but as under the authority of the Catholic doctrines which they subserve (*Ox Frs* xix, 482-3 note f).

Probably he saw his own Anglican Church in the early-1840s as much under threat from heresy as Athanasius’s Church had been and, in response, seems to narrow his view of what constitutes orthodoxy. Although this threat had been there in the early-1830s too, in *Arians* he had left room for a breadth of pre-Nicene interpretation of the language scripture and tradition used for the Father’s relationship to Son and Spirit. There was but one skopos, yet each text admits of a “secondary and distinct” sense, as “the recesses of the sacred language seem to open” (*Arians* 61). His earlier understanding of skopos did not prevent diverse secondary interpretations of scripture, nor disagreements which led to refinements in doctrine. By the time he was translating the *Discourses*, however, he has come to see the faithful “interpreter” no doubt as Athanasius himself. The various senses of scripture, which the Fathers themselves valued so much, seem subsumed into one ecclesiastical standard.

deny, that the Fathers, not merely did not contemplate true propositions, (afterwards established) but actually contemplated false” (*LD* xi, 183).
Newman’s reading of Athanasius drove a similar alteration in his argument about the Rule of Faith. The 1840s witness the collapse of the “Via Media” position on the regula fidei that Newman had spent so much of the 1830s trying to construct. The reasons for this collapse have recently been hotly debated. Whatever else might explain Newman’s journey out of the Church of England, his growing interest in Athanasius had only an ambiguous impact on his view of the “Via Media” — in spite of what he later claimed to have recognised while translating the Discourses, that, in upholding Anglicanism, he was “turning devil’s advocate against the much-enduring Athanasius” (Diffi, 388). In 1844, Newman’s translation of Discourse II.44 still relies on Vincent to make Athanasius’s arguments about a single Rule of Faith for the Church in all times and places. In a summary of Athanasius’s views on Proverbs 8:22, in which the bishop shows that “He created me” is not equivalent to “I am a creature,” Newman writes:

Here, as in so many other places, he is explaining what is obscure or latent in Scripture by means of the Regula Fidei. “Since the canon of Scripture is perfect,” says Vincentius, “and more than sufficient for itself in all respects, what need of joining to it the ecclesiastical sense? because from the very depth of Holy Scripture all men will not take it in one and the same sense,” &c. Commonit. 2 (Ox Frs xix, 343 note c).

Newman continues to collapse all pre- and post-Nicene regulae into one, his notes on Discourses suggesting a unity between Origen’s and Athanasius’s rule. This, of course, could not be rejected entirely because it was Athanasius’s own argument against the Arians, maintaining that his was the faith handed down by the apostles and on through Origen. However, by the mid-1840s Newman himself seems to have lost his earlier confidence in Origen, as the annotations to the Athanasius volume sometimes show but as becomes clearest in the Essay on Development (see chapter four below).

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68 Particularly by Ian Ker and Frank Turner. Especially interesting regarding the Fathers is the assessment given by Turner (2002) of Newman’s correspondence with Mrs Froude between April and July 1844, in which Newman shapes the account of his supposed insight in 1839 “that the English theory was ‘disproved by Antiquity’,” 507-512. See also Ker’s review of Turner in the TLS 6 December 2002, 32.
While it might not explain his conversion, there is a theological shift in Newman in the 1840s relating to his reading of the Fathers. There is even some evidence of a comparison in his mind between Anglicanism and Monophysitism; not enough, however, to justify his later claim that, after researching the Monophysites in the summer of 1839, “at once and irrevocably I found my faith in the tenableness of the fundamental principles of Anglicanism disappear” (Diff i, 373). Around the same time as he began his translation of Athanasius, Newman was working on a proposed Theological Dictionary, one passage of which is of particular interest. Here he indeed distanced himself from the Lectures on the Prophetical Office, albeit elsewhere he defended the position he held there. He even suggests the Monophysites play an analogous role to Jeremy Taylor’s “Dissuasive [against Popery] part ii. 1. §4” which he had cited in Lecture IX (VM i, 228 note 4):

I am in doubt whether my quotations from Jeremy Taylor of what was done at Ephesus and Chalcedon about there being no fresh additions to the Creed (Romanism, lecture 9) is fair. There was a great contest between parties whether the doctrine of the Incarnation should have further development, which was a question of expedience... not... [a] matter of principle. — Again Eulogius [bishop of Alexandria] argues against the Monophysites, who said that there might be no additions, that there might, only not contrary to Nicaea. Newman now thinks, “Other additions, i.e. developments, are of course what we should allow,” as long as they are in line with Nicene (or Athanasian) orthodoxy. But this “we” appears to be addressed to his fellow Anglicans and only implicitly is the Anglican divine, Jeremy Taylor, likened to a Monophysite. His work on Monophysitism in 1839

69 “In some of these instances,” he writes of Athanasius’s writings, “the words aletheia, logos, &c., are almost synonymous with the Regula Fidei; vid. para tēn alētheian... and Origen de Princ. Praef. 1. and 2.” (Ox Frs xix, 329 note 1).


71 In the autumn of 1842, Newman was defending the position he took in the Lectures on the Prophetical Office from the attack in William Goode’s Divine Rule of Faith and Practice. In a letter to Miss Holmes of 20 September 1842, Newman writes, “The question is, whether the phrase ‘Evangelical Tradition’ in St Athanasius means what the words at first convey, something independent of scripture, or [means] the four Gospels – Mr. G maintains the latter after Suicer” (LD ix, 107-8). This was his view in Dev 341 note 1.
caused him to question his earlier espousal of a *regula fidei* that was not open to addition, but it would take until the *Essay on Development* for Newman to reject the "Via Media" outright.

In the *Essay* Newman writes, "Let it not be for a moment supposed that I impugn the orthodoxy of the early divines, or the cogency of their testimony among fair inquirers; but I am trying them by that unfair interpretation of Vincentius, which is necessary in order to make him available against the Church of Rome" (*Dev* 15). Here he finally rejects the "unfair interpretation" of the Vincentian Canon offered in the Lectures. Yet this is a difficult position for Newman to hold, on the one hand criticising "Via Media" Anglicans for invoking Vincent to justify pre-Nicene orthodoxy, and on the other hand claiming not to "impugn the orthodoxy" of the early Fathers. Newman’s new position is difficult to hold for two reasons. First, the *Essay* judges the pre-Nicenes by the standards of later orthodoxy as much as Anglicans do, but unlike Bull and Cave he finds their orthodoxy lacking. Take Origen as an example. Albeit teachings are corrupted in ways their authors cannot control, Newman thinks Origen’s “speculations... developed and ripened with impunity in Syria” and “gave rise first to Arian and then to Nestorian heresy” (*Dev* 282). As much as Newman wants to see development from the pre- to the post-Nicene Rule of Faith, the example of Origen shows how dubious it is to do what Newman does: “to interpret the previous steps of a development by the later” (*Dev* 153). Origen himself knew nothing of Arianism or Nestorianism. Secondly, not to believe that early and later Fathers hold the same beliefs was actually to go against the Fathers’ own self-understanding. Athanasius saw himself in accord with his Alexandrian predecessors and came to their defence. In Newman’s day, patristic historian W.W. Harvey wrote of the “theory of development” that “If ever we find any trace of this dangerous delusion in Christian antiquity, it is uniformly the plea of heresy.”*73* While the *Essay* might be more historically accurate than Newman’s earlier work, it does not reflect the Fathers themselves as well as did his writings in the 1830s.

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72 Quoted in Stern (1967), 125 note 108.

73 W.W. Harvey’s footnote to i.10.2 in his edition of Irenaeus’s *Adversus Haereses* (Cambridge: 1857). Quoted in Behr (2001), 38 note 55.
In a key passage in the Essay’s Introduction he writes: “Doubtless, the theory of the Secret and the theory of Developments are expedients, and so is the dictum of Vincentius; so is the art of grammar or the use of the quadrant; it is an expedient to enable us to solve what has now become a necessary and an anxious problem” (Dev 28). The Newman of the 1830s had thought the “theory of the Secret” (or disciplina arcani) preserved the same Rule of Faith which “Vincentius” said had been universally held. What had been two arguments on behalf of one and the same regula fidei are now “expedients” in attempting to solve his “anxious problem” of where orthodoxy is to be found. To call them “expedients” alongside “the theory of doctrinal development” is to claim that the latter is no more than one among many “views”; however, the remainder of the Essay will set out to show his to be the best account of historical events. The “theory of the Secret” is explained by Newman as an “expedient” to understanding the variations between pre-Nicene writings and later orthodoxy. The pedagogical method of the early Fathers aimed first to appeal to pagan philosophy and then draw initiates slowly into Christian truth; as such, their extant writings need not reflect the fullness of their teaching. Although this was Newman’s opinion in Arians, he now calls it “a hypothesis, which has been put forward by divines of the Church of Rome,” and in large part to be rejected (Dev 25). Newman writes of the disciplina arcani: “That it existed as a rule, as regard the Sacraments, seems to be confessed on all hands,” and “goes some way to account for that apparent variation and growth in doctrine, which embarrasses us when we would consult history for the true idea of Christianity; yet it is no key to the whole difficulty” (Dev 25-6, my italics).

In seeing the secret tradition and Vincent’s Canon as two different “expedients,” by the way, he appears to have come round to the opinion of Archdeacon Lyall in a letter forwarded to Newman by Rose in 1832. Lyall regarded the disciplina arcani as a Catholic notion and Vincent’s Canon as Protestant, which is why the Anglican

74 “View” is a rightly topographical image: “When we have lost our way, we mount up to some eminence to look about us… [not] into the nearest thicket to find out [our] bearings,” wrote Newman to Mrs Anstice, 18 December 1845 (LD xi, 69). Quoted in Lash (1975), 37-8, who points out the overtones of the word “view” make it especially pertinent to Newman as an historian rather than a theologian.

75 Chadwick, Owen, *From Bossuet to Newman* 2nd edition (Cambridge: CUP, 1987), 68-9, shows that the “divines” Newman had in mind were the seventeenth-century Emanuel a Schelstrate and his followers.
Archdeacon rejected the former in favour of the latter. Although Newman follows Lyall’s two-fold distinction, he rejects both “expedients” as solutions to his problem. His new view of tradition allows the faith to be preserved in less static ways than the Anglicans’ Vincentian tradition, so that the “Nicene... usage” of *homoousios*, for example, might be seen as a development of doctrine rather than representing – as it did for Archdeacon Lyall and for Bull – no change at all. When he came to edit the *Lectures on the Prophetical Office* for republication in 1877, he points out that Vincent’s Canon “though unalterable, [also] admits of growth” (*VM* i, 224 note 6). His view of the Vincentian Canon in the 1870s is a reflection of his argument in the *Essay*. He has made what as an Anglican he took to be a statement that there is but one Rule of Faith to be simultaneously open to doctrinal development.

What epistemology underlies the notion of a Rule of Faith? Newman’s connection of duty and epistemology has led some to argue that he considered good habits the only glue, as it were, between signs and what they signify. For instance, Stephen Thomas writes that, in *Arians*, “the ‘things’ to which words refer are patterns of behaviour (‘habits’), rather than ideas or objects, while Newman reserves for words an assessment verging upon the sceptical or nominalistic.” This cannot be right of Newman; in his 1838 *Lectures* he says he is not a nominalist because he is dealing with the objective “things” that words signify:

> Our duty is to be intent on things, *not on names and terms*; to associate words with their objects, instead of measuring them by their definitions; to speak as having eyes, and as if to those who have eyes, not as groping our way in the dark by intellectual conceptions, acts of memory, and efforts of reason (*Jfc* 121, my italics).

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76 Lyall’s letter of 19 October 1832, forwarded to Newman by Rose, noticed the incompatibility of pre-Nicene secrecy and Vincentian universality. Lyall wrote of the draft of *Arians* he had seen: “Mr Newman’s notions about tradition appear to me directly adverse to that which Protestant writers of our own church have contended for – according to them a ‘secret tradition’ is no tradition at all – quod semper, quod ubique, quod ab omnibus, is the very definition of authentic tradition” (*LD* iii, 105). At the time, Newman seems to have ignored this criticism, perhaps believing that the pre-Nicenes’ gifts of intuition and guidance by the Spirit meant they were all believing the same thing.

77 Thomas (1990), 182.
Admittedly, with the word “duty” we see a Romantic understanding of words and their signification that, as with Coleridge’s “morality” or Keble’s “ethos,” integrates good habits with discerning the truth. Like other Romantics, Newman believed humans know truth when they act rightly; but the connection between what humans know and the words they use to describe it is not guided by habit (or convention) alone. For Newman, the signified throws light upon the sign. He wrote in these same Lectures that the signified has priority over, and gives meaning to, the sign. Lash is right to argue that some passages in the Essay “seem to be suggesting both the latent presence of the ‘reality’, the ‘whole idea’, behind its particular human expressions, and also an awareness that what men are ‘trying to say’ may be more significant than the ‘obvious’ meanings of the formulations they actually achieve.” Just as the smaller thing participates in the larger, we read the sign in the light shed by the “idea” beyond it, aware that we cannot fully comprehend it. Therefore, the human interpretative effort does not produce the meaning of any idea, it discriminates the truth in which the signs participate. Newman seems to have picked up such Platonism from the Fathers; he did not learn it from Plato. Also

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78 The Tractarians are usually depicted as critical of the Broad Churchmen like Coleridge and his followers, the Oxford Noetics. See most recently Jones, Todd E., *The Broad Church: Biography of a Movement* (Lanham, MD: Lexington Books, 2003). However, this chapter shows the Tractarians and Romantics perhaps shared more than either side admitted.

79 Newman argues that a sign can signify only one thing: any word can only participate in one idea and not another: “Words stand for one idea, not two; if the same word seems to have several, these are really connected together. The words of Scripture were appropriated to their respective senses by their writers; they had a meaning before we approached them, and they will have that same meaning, whether we find it out or not” (*Jfc* 119).

80 Lash (1975), 101. Lash considers this as of a piece with the richness of “Prophetical Tradition” in expressing the ideas of “Episcopal Tradition” in the *Lectures on the Prophetical Tradition*.

81 Vargish (1970) writes: “Ideas, for Newman, are vast, apparently heterogeneous complexes, involving time, place and the agency of man. No single aspect or point of view can comprehend the entirety of a real idea. But an idea cannot be apprehended by the mind except through a variety of aspects. The means by which the mind realizes an idea is analogous to the process of viewing some material object, perhaps a sculpture, from different angles in different lights,” 43

82 Although Newman holds Platonic notions, he does not use Platonic categories. E.g. in “Home Thoughts Abroad,” in the *British Magazine* of March 1834, Newman wrote: “Forms are transitory—principles are eternal: the Church of the day is but an accidental development and type of the invisible and unchangeable. It will always have the properties of truth; it will be ever (for instance) essentially conservative and aristocratic; but its policy and measures will ever vary according to the age” (*DA* 12-13). Newman elsewhere admitted having “never read the works of Plato.” Noted in Lash (1975), 48, quoting Tierney, Michael, *A Tribute to Newman: Essays on Aspects of his Life and Thought* (Dublin, 1945), 275.
in classical fashion, habits and rules of life are the way in which the relationship of a sign to the thing signified makes practical sense. That is what Newman’s idea of a “rule” is all about. David Newsome has shown that Newman depended here on Aristotle’s Poetics and Ethics, which he read as an Oxford undergraduate thanks to Whately’s new curriculum. Newman took “what Aristotle described as phronesis in the sphere of ethics [and] translated it into the sphere of epistemology. Phronesis is the quality which enables us to make right judgements in matters of conduct; it is not an absolute truth, because one man’s duty might differ from another’s.” Such an epistemology made room for a breadth of “true” language like that of the pre-Nicenes, without resorting to nominalism. Moreover, he discovered this well before he wrote the Grammar of Assent.

It is a patristic understanding of the words of scripture that he wants Christians to agree upon, because the Fathers offer the best (secondary) explanation of the (primary) words. Likewise, a (secondary) definition like homoousios acts as an “explanation” of the (primary) words of the creeds. This is why, in the Lectures on the Prophetical Office, Newman classes homoousios – even though it became part of the creed – as secondary tradition, rather than as essential Episcopal Tradition like the rest of the creed. The word was introduced at Nicaea “merely in explanation of a great article of faith” (VM i, 228).

Newsome (1974), 67. Isaac Williams said this most clearly in Tract 87: “The Fathers seem always to imply that the secrets of CHRIST’S kingdom are obtained only by a consistent course of self-denying obedience; that a knowledge of these things is not conveyed by mere words, nor is a matter of excited emotion, but is a practical knowledge of the heart, obtained more and more by self-renouncing duties like prayer and the like; and thus it is, that, by the Cross of CHRIST, we are brought to Him, and led on to the knowledge of GOD. So that this higher degree of faith ‘goeth not forth but by prayer and fasting.’ This is often either explicitly stated by Origen and others. St. Augustine sets it forth,” part iv, section 13.

Newsome’s account of his epistemology suggests Newman was not “being pulled in contrary directions” as Thomas (1991) claims: “His heroes were Bull and the early Fathers. He wanted to be their disciple and to revive and defend the classical idea of orthodoxy... On the other hand, Newman was the child of British empiricism, hypersensitive to epistemological issues, concerned with the psychology of impressions and ideas, agnostic about their object,” 182. Rather, Newman was simultaneously epistemologically sensitive and fully patristic.

Vargish thinks the English empirical tradition accounts for Newman’s view that disputes in religion could be solved if humans were able to agree on words: “Many of our controversies in religion, many of our personal struggles and sufferings, are about ‘the poor ideas conveyed to us in certain figures of speech’. Our idea of God is an earthly one, and our difficulties of belief often merely verbal.” Vargish, Thomas, Newman: The Contemplation of Mind (Oxford: OUP, 1970), 45, quoting Newman’s XVth University Sermon (1843). Newman’s views on scripture language were very different from those on the continent, as
disagree with Thomas’s argument that such a placement reveals Newman “desperate” in his polemic against Catholics “to fix and perpetuate” the unalterable meaning that had always been held by the Church,” while also recognising that the words signifying that meaning can change. Again Thomas is trying to depict Newman as a nominalist, for whom what a word signifies depends only on habit or convention. But I think Newman is simply saying what he finds the Fathers saying. As he writes in a footnote to his Athanasius translation in 1842, “S. Gregory says in a well-known passage; ‘Why art thou such a slave to the letter, and takest up with Jewish wisdom, and pursuest syllables to the loss of things?’… Orat. 31. 24.” (Ox Frs viii, 136 note i). Newman’s focus still in the 1840s is the thing being signified in a word like homoousios, not because he rejects the word as empty in itself, but because he wants to know the Object which gives that word life. When the change came, it occurred only at the level of secondary not of primary teaching—what in the Essay he saw as a development.

(c) Traditionary Religion

Newman’s understanding of “Traditionary Religion” in the 1830s was that it complemented the revealed religion seen in the scriptures. Both types of religion worked by means of economia for the pre-Nicene Fathers, the traditionary type discerned by one’s conscience in the economy of God’s created order and protected by the Church’s disciplina arcani, and the revealed type learned through an economical form of scripture teaching governed by the Rule of Faith. Neither type of religion was “scientific,” in the sense of deductively reasoned; rather each was felt through a person’s ethos and in community with others, especially with a wise teacher. Having seen in 2 (a) and (b) can be see by comparing them with Olender, Maurice, The Languages of Paradise: Race, Religion, and Philology in the Nineteenth Century trans. A. Goldhammer (Cambridge MA: Harvard UP, 1992).

86 Thomas (1991) 196, quoting VM i, 226.

86 As he writes in his Preface to the Fathers of the Church volume, The Catechetical Lectures of S. Cyril (1839): “In like manner, when our Saviour says, ‘I and My Father are One,’ and Antiquity interprets ‘One’ to mean ‘one in substance,’ this is an addition to the wording, but no addition to the sense. Of many possible means of interpreting a word, it cuts away all but one, or if it recognizes others, it reduces them to harmony and subordination to that one… Catholic Tradition professes to do for Scripture just which is desirable, whether it is possible or not, to relieve us from the chance of taking one or other of the many senses which are wrong or insufficient, instead of the one sense which is true and complete” (Ox Frs ii, xiii).
above some of the changes that took place in the 1840s, very little seems to have shifted in Newman's view of Traditionary Religion. This shall be seen by examining the two themes just mentioned, *economia* and *ethos*.

**Economia.** The pre-Nicene heroes of Newman's earlier years are introduced more carefully into his argument in the *Essay* than they were in *Arians*. He no more than alludes to their dealings with "pagan science" which, he acknowledged before, had formed the basis of the Alexandrians' curriculum for converting non-Christians to the faith. Theirs was an economical pedagogy that began by teaching what Christianity had in common with philosophy, of which he now writes only this:

> The Alexandrian Fathers, who are said to owe so much to Pagan science, certainly show no gratitude or reverence towards their alleged instructress, but maintained the Catholic Tradition. Clement speaks of heretical teachers as perverting Scripture, and essaying the gate of heaven with a false key, not raising the veil, as he is, by means of tradition from Christ (*Dev* 342).

The veil of the letter of scripture, which Clement raised only gradually (economically) and in accord with traditionary religion, is torn off by heretics, leaving scripture to be seen by those who cannot interpret it rightly. To interpret rightly, says Origen, "we must not depart from that first and ecclesiastical tradition" (*Dev* 343). Clement and Origen agree on the importance of tradition and therefore they agree on truth:

> That there is a truth then; that there is one truth; that religious error is in itself of an immoral nature; that its maintainers, unless involuntarily such, are guilty in maintaining it; that it is to be dreaded; that the search for truth is not the gratification of curiosity (*Dev* 344).

But this final clause gets to the reservation Newman now has about the pre-Nicenes. When they strayed into speculations out of curiosity, they strayed into error. Speculation is the stuff of science, for Newman, and not of traditionary religion. By contrast to the pre-Nicenes, he claims to find no such speculation in "St. Athanasius, St. Augustine, St. Leo [who] are conspicuous for the repetition *in terminis* of their own theological statements." Implying a contrast between the pre- and post-Nicenes, Newman writes, "Here we see the difference between originality of mind and the gift and calling of a
Doctor in the Church; the holy Fathers just mentioned were intently fixing their minds on what they taught, grasping it more and more closely” (Dev 353).

Just three years earlier, in his 1842 annotations, Newman was upholding the argument made in Arians that secondary doctrine was best expressed by a diversity of imagery. He notices that Athanasius followed this pattern after Nicaea and explains the reason as follows:

one image corrects another; and the accumulation of images is not, as is often thought, the restless and fruitless effort of the mind to enter into the Mystery, but is a safeguard against any one image, nay, any collection of images being supposed sufficient (Ox Frs viii, 43 note d).

No imagery is capable of letting its hearer into the mystery of God; rather the multiplication of images protects that mystery. This push towards multiplication and dynamism of doctrinal language is, paradoxically, reversed when the idea of development carries all before it. Not multiplication but “repetition,” not dynamism but lack of “originality,” is what the Essay claims to find in “a Doctor of the Church” (Dev 353).

But to support the Fathers “fixing their minds” does not, it would seem, mean he conceived them as any more systematic than before, as shall now be shown.

Ethos. As Nicholas Lash has observed, “One of the reasons for Newman’s insistence that he was ‘no theologian’ and that the Essay was not a work of theology, was that, for much of his life, he accepted the view that deduction was the only appropriate method of proof and argument in theology.”87 To conceive “theology” in this way, Newman must have had in mind what is today called “systematic theology” or what, back in 1831, he described to Rose as “Theology as a science” as opposed to “the historical view.”88 The perception of himself as an historian rather than a theologian only became clearer when, in the autumn of 1846, he visited Rome and encountered Catholic

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87 Lash (1975), 23.

88 In a letter to Rose, 28 March 1831, he wrote: “I had considered a work on the Articles might be useful on the following plan. First, a defence of the articles – then, the history of our own – then an explanation of them founded on the historical view – then, a dissertation on the sources of proof – e.g. revelation or nature, the Bible or the Church, the Old or the New Testament, etc. – then, some account of the terms used in Theology as a science, e.g. Trinity, Person, merits of Christ, grace, regeneration, etc. – and lastly, so general view of Christian doctrines to be proved from scripture, and to be referred to their proper places in the Articles” (LD ii, 321-2).
scholasticism at first hand. After his time in Rome, Newman slowly begins to use what
in 1831 he had called “the terms of Theology as a science”; but, in line with what had
gone before, it is the idea of God as Trinity that gives traditionary (“Catholic”) meaning
to the words used of God – only then will the signification be “correct” (TT 301). In his
1858 essay, “On St. Cyril’s Formula,” quoted here, Newman continues to shy away from
the sort of logical definitions he finds in scholastic theology. It seems Athanasius is
Newman’s hero throughout this period because he refused to conceive of God in
scientific categories:

This great author scarcely uses any of the scientific phrases which have since
been received in the Church and have become dogmatic; or, if he introduces them,
it is to give them senses which have long been superseded. A good instance of his
manner is afforded by the long passage, Orat. iii. 30-58, which is full of theology,
with scarcely a dogmatic word. The case is the same with his treatment of the
Incarnation (TT 293).

And yet, as rector of a Catholic University, Newman realises that he must not decry
scientific theology. The Fathers’ “reluctance to fix the phraseology of doctrine cannot be
logically taken to imply an indisposition towards dogma itself; and in matter of fact it is
historically contemporaneous with the most unequivocal dogmatic statements. Scientific
terms,” he adds, “are not the only token of science” (TT 293). Newman appears in a bit
of a muddle. The muddle might be sorted out by saying that, while not a scholastic
theologian, Newman was a patristic theologian. The methods of the Fathers were
certainly not “deductive,” to use Lash’s word, but they were properly theological.89
While it is true of the Catholic Newman that he resisted being classed as a systematic
theologian, the theology of the Fathers continued to be his study. The result is a
peculiarly patristic attempt to be systematic, as Gilson will point out with respect to the
Grammar of Assent (1870).

What guaranteed that Fathers like Athanasius spoke the truth was their ethos.

Newman writes of obedience and duty in the Essay: “Christians were bound to defend

89 Lash (1975), 25, writes: “In 1851, Newman declared that there were two ‘legitimate instruments for
deciding on the truth of religion... the way of history and the way of science’ (Prepos p. 57). By ‘science’,
in this context, he meant the deductive method employed by theologians who ‘carry out’ the ‘great
systems’ of catholic doctrine ‘into its fulness, and define [it] in its details, by patient processes of reason’.”
and to transmit the faith which they had received, and they received it from the rulers of the Church; and, on the other hand, it was the duty of the rulers to watch over and define this Traditionary faith" (Dev 341, my italics). The wording here warrants comparison with a quotation from Lectures on Justification noted above: "If no word is to be taken to mean more than its logical definition, we shall never get beyond abstract knowledge, for it cannot possibly carry its own explanation with it" (Jfc 123). Logical definition achieves no more than abstraction, thinks Newman in 1838, but in the Essay, Newman is talking about "definition" in terms of traditionary religion. The latter sort of definition is not to be encountered only in the "abstract," because to do so would be to miss the truth of Christianity which is made concrete in a person's ethos. There is further continuity between what he wrote in 1838 and in the Essay when he wrote of

Two opinions... each may be abstractedly true... [but] one is held as a matter of indifference, the other as a matter of life and death; one is held by the intellect, the other by the heart: it is plain which of the two must succumb to the other. Such was the conflict of Christianity with the old established Paganism, which was almost dead before Christianity appeared (Dev 345).

Paganism is a science of the head, not a traditionary religion of the heart. Paganism can be nothing but abstract, he thinks, because it does not involve the heart: pagan sacrifice, as he shows in his novel Callista (1855), is a matter of obedience to the empire, whereas Christianity is for the eponymous heroine a religion of self-sacrifice through obedience to God. The ethos of Christianity is what shows it to be really not "abstractedly" true.

There is much similarity between the reality signified by a word like homoousios and what Newman now calls "living principles." There is in the Essay on Development a sense in which Newman shifts the meaning of the word "principle" towards something like "rule," notions which in the Lectures on Justification he had opposed to one another. Lash writes of such principles,

90 In Cal, Cyprian of Carthage is instrumental in Callista's conversion. This same is the same Cyprian of whose ethos Newman had written in a Preface to the Fathers of the Church volume, The Treatises of S Cyprian (1839): "While exhorting to almsgiving, he is already an example of voluntary poverty; if he praises virginity, he has himself embraced the single life; he insists on the nothingness of earthly things, having first chosen contempt and reproach; he denounces the heathen magistrate, with the knowledge that he is braving his power; and he is severe with the lapsed, because he himself is to be a Martyr" (Ox Frs iii, xxiii).
As with any key term in Newman's writings, summary definition is impossible: one can only observe the use which he makes of it in different contexts. In general, it can be said that, in the Essay, the range of meaning covered is similar to that covered, in ordinary English usage, by the term ‘law’... It thus refers to the motive forces at work within an individual or a society, to deeply implanted attitudes and convictions.\(^91\)

A “living idea,” when “it is carried forward into the public throng and draws attention,” writes Newman, “becomes a living principle within them, leading them to an ever-new contemplation of itself, an acting upon it and a propagation of it” (Dev 35). The idea upon which this living principle is based, Newman points out, can be “true or false,” or in ecclesiastical terms orthodox or heretical. Just because a living principle need not correspond with truth does not make Newman’s position nominalistic. He simply argues that the living principles of the Fathers are true and those of heretics are not.

3) Newman in the 1860-70s

(a) The interpretation of Scripture

Newman wrote much in the early 1860s, but published little. Pertinent to this period, “The Teaching of the Fathers” are his notes on the subject of biblical inspiration. In his reconstruction of these notes, Derek Holmes has taken into account Newman’s various drafts in dating them between 1861 and 1863.\(^92\) Holmes has also noted that “the controversy over the nature and extent of inspiration was occasioned by the publication of Essays and Reviews in 1860.”\(^93\) Although the 1860s and 1870s were a time when Newman was as much in thrall to Athanasius as he had been in the 1840s, it is noticeable that the Alexandrian bishop is only mentioned twice in “The Teaching of the Fathers,” both times in the midst of lists of other patristic writers (BI 92, 94), whereas Clement of Alexandria and Origen are mentioned multiple times. When it came to scriptural interpretation, it was still the pre-Nicene Alexandrians from whom Newman drew.

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\(^91\) Lash (1975), 107.

\(^92\) The unfinished “The Teaching of the Fathers” is BI 84-98.

\(^93\) Holmes “Introduction,” vii.
However, the views of Origen's critic, Jerome, also appear frequently, as they have since Newman's annotations of Athanasius in the 1840s, albeit here more often than there. Jerome agrees with Origen, for instance that "the very letters and syllables of divine Scriptures are full of mysteries" (BI 87).

In these unpublished papers on biblical inspiration, in contradistinction to most pre-Nicenes, Newman was grouping Clement and Origen with the post-Nicenes. A brief note dated 4 July 1861 muses:

the early (Ante-Nicene) Fathers quote scripture differently from the Post-Nicene? and this difference founded on difference of school of interpretation? Theophilus, Justin, etc., are they literalists? if so, they look on the books of Moses as histories — and find them just the antagonistic informations to what especially met the Ante-Nicenes, viz., that mythology, cosmogony, philosophy of the Ancients. Hence they speak of Genesis as a true and divine narration of facts. The Post-Nicenes on the contrary were not so much controversialists with Pagans (vide Civitas Dei?) and again they were spiritualists — hence they speak of Scripture, not so much as a history, but as a mystery — (Origen, by the bye, must be taken with them, and Clement for his organa as well as mysteries. What of Irenaeus?) (BI 83).

Themes from Arians and the Essay abound as he traces back to the pre-Nicene era a profound disjunction between literal and spiritual interpretations of scripture that would divide the "Eastern" from the Alexandrian Churches. In Arians Origen had been his hero, but by the mid-1840s Newman had aligned Origen with the Easterners because of his rejection of homoousios, even though he saw Origen as a spiritualist in his reading of scripture; in the 1860s, Origen is back with the Alexandrians, where he will stay. Furthermore, he treats pre-Nicene literalism with perhaps more sympathy than before, explaining it in terms of the ongoing debates with the Pagans. Alexandrians are definitely favoured, however, and he puts Justin among the Eastern literalists, a position the Martyr will continue to hold in an appendix to his new edition of Arians ten years later (Arians 417). The 1871 edition of Arians holds, as does this 1861 note, that the pre-Nicene Alexandrians had more in common with post-Nicene Alexandrians than they did.
with contemporaries in other places. And that commonality is grounded in the way
Alexandrians interpreted scripture.

A brief observation should be made here about Newman’s drift towards
scholasticism. The mention, in the quotation above from his unpublished 1861 notes on
biblical inspiration, of “Civitas Dei” suggests that Augustine was never far from
Newman’s thoughts in this period. In a paper he wrote in 1861 on the same subject,
Newman contrasts “rigid” and “liberal” teaching. Newman writes of his conviction of
the “rigid” being correct:

I am confirmed in this view by the question of the divine decrees.94 Here perhaps
the words rigidior and liberior may be used respectively of the doctrine of St
Thomas and [on the other hand] St Alfonso, Francis of Sales… The theologians of
the four first centuries took the liberior view; St Augustine the rigidior; and it was
transmitted through St Gregory [the Great], St Anselm, St Thomas, and their
schools down to the 16th century (BI 15-16).

Again, a distinction is drawn between the pre- and the post-Nicenes, and by the standard
of the latter – in particular Augustine – the former are judged inadequate. But the
legitimacy of Augustine is proved by the transmission of his standard into the scholastic
era. Reading Augustine through the theologians who came after him, particularly the
schoolmen, was the pattern for much of Newman’s writing after 1845 (see chapter five
below). Patristic categories do not, however, always accord with scholastic categories, as
in the case of biblical inspiration. As Newman admits in “The Teaching of the Fathers,”
the question of whose agency is at work in the writing of scripture is not one encountered
in patristic authors (rather the Fathers will say, “God speaks in Scripture,” “The power of
God played upon the scriptural writers,” “The Holy Ghost wrote Scripture,” or “The Holy
Ghost inspired the sacred writers,” BI 84-5). “Is any part of Scripture the work of that
individual person whom the Holy Ghost moved to write it?” writes Newman: “I conceive
the Fathers hardly ask themselves this definite question, as it might be asked in the
Schools subsequently” (BI 88).

94 This is an expression for God’s providence that Newman had used in the title to the sermon “Divine
Decrees” on 24 February 1832. There he said that God has “shown us from the beginning, that His own
glory is the End, and justice the essential Rule, of His providence” (PS ii.11, 304). “Rule” for Newman
always has moral connotations, in this case God’s “moral government.”
In "The Teaching of the Fathers," Newman repeatedly says that the patristic interest lies in matters of "faith and morals" (BI 91, 93, 96). The matter in which Newman's contemporaries are interested, the nature of the biblical inspiration, is not discernible from the Fathers' manifold expressions about inspiration. This leaves Newman to hypothesise what the Fathers might think about the inerrancy of scripture:

So it seems, that a work may be written under the plenary inspiration of the Holy Ghost, in the judgment of the Fathers, yet at the same time may be so far human still, as not to be guaranteed against errors short of serious ones... The strong language in which the Fathers speak of [the scriptures'] inspiration, is no obstacle to their also holding, whether in fact they hold it or not, that the inspiration does [no] more than secure them from any faults except errors against faith and morals (BI 91).

Newman seems to express here Origen's belief that the errors in scripture were part of God's plan too. While error might creep into the words of scripture, said Origen, there was a mystical reason for this. The limited canon of books in scripture seems to play the same role in the Fathers as does the idea that those books were especially inspired:

Newman suggests Irenaeus appealed to "One Author," the Holy Spirit, to safeguard the unity of scripture in "the Gnostic Controversy, which set Old T[estament] against N[ew]..." (BI 96). Inspiration and canonicity seem to be economies, the first safeguarding scriptural teaching on morals, the second safeguarding scripture against misinterpretation by Jews, pagans and heretics. To call them economies is to invoke Origen's teaching on economy which, as Robin Selby has argued, Newman repeatedly follows.95

Newman makes an observation about the Rule of Faith as the guide to scriptural interpretation, which is subtly different from what he has written before. As well as being controversialists in their interpretation of scripture, opposing Jewish readings and arguing with pagan philosophy, he acknowledges that the pre-Nicenes wrote "at a time, when the Catholic Church could not be appealed to as a patent fact in an extended

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95 Selby (1975), 11, writes that Origen's "idea that an economy is the nearest approach we can make to truth, compatible with our condition, is found frequently in Newman's writings, and we may conjecture that when he expressed his notorious maxim that it is no more than a hyperbole to say that a lie is the nearest thing to truth [in the XVth University Sermon], he may have had in mind this sentence of Origen's:
establishment and a long and glorious history, and before there was that hierarchy of saints and martyrs" (*BI* 88). This shows two things about Newman’s view of scriptural interpretation in his later life. First, he had previously praised the pre-Nicenes for not revealing the secrets of the faith – when those secrets were revealed it was precisely by lay writers like Justin who were engaged in controversy. But now he appears to hold up the later “glorious history” of the Church as the period of Christian flourishing, rather than as a sort of decline as in *Arians*. But he has not shed his criticism of the Emperor Constantine, a figure with no formal catechesis or theology, for involving himself in the dispute between Arius and Alexander of Alexandria. The Emperor, as a public figure, had interfered in the secrets of the faith. Newman uses the same argument in the *Grammar* that he did in *Arians*. 96 The second thing shown in the quotation above is that Newman now thinks the early Church a lot less unified than he has in his past writings: whatever rule of faith was in operation it was not able to guarantee good scriptural interpretation in the same way as “the Catholic Church... as a patent fact” could later.

(b) The Rule of Faith and Traditionary Religion

Etienne Gilson has commented that, “while it would be wrong to imagine Newman as unacquainted with scholasticism when he wrote the *Grammar of Assent*, it must not be forgotten that, born and educated in the Anglican Church, his first theological formation owed little to the scholastics... [rather,] owing to him, the great theological style of the Fathers has been worthily revived in the nineteenth century.” 97 This shrewd observation explains why, though Newman certainly became more scholastic in method in the 1870s, he never lost his patristic insights. It is interesting that his early Romanticism resonates still in the discussion of “natural religion” and the “illative sense” in 1870. The *Grammar* deals jointly with themes that previously I have separated – how

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96 Compare *GA* 132 with *Arians* 249.

to live by the Rule of Faith and how Traditionary Religion directs humans towards the knowledge of God – therefore here they shall be discussed together.

In his notes on biblical inspiration Newman wrote, “the Fathers were in the practice of using the [expressions] ‘inspiration,’ ‘divinely directed,’ ‘Spirit-instinct,’ and the like, not only definitely of the gift of revelation and its authorized enunciation, but as moral gifts” (BI 88, my italics). Here in the early 1860s are the notions, first, of scripture being protected by the regula fidei and, second, of ethos – or, in other words, Revelation and Traditionary religion. By the time of the Grammar, however, the distinction is put in terms of “revealed” and “natural” religion (GA ch. 10). Newman had played around with these terms even before he wrote “The Teaching of the Fathers.” In “St Cyril’s Formula,” in 1858, he argued that a word like “hypostasis” neither means Person nor Essence exclusively; but it means the one personal God of natural theology, the notion of whom the Catholic corrects and completes as often as he views Him as a Trinity” (TT 301). Here is the God of natural theology – encountered through the conscience in ways he described previously as traditionary religion – now corrected by Catholic dogma. This transition to a more scholastic form of language can be traced elsewhere in “St. Cyril’s Formula,” such as when he describes his purpose in the second paragraph:

Every Catholic holds that the Christian dogmas were in the Church from the time of the Apostles; that they were ever in their substance what they are now; that they existed before the formulas were publicly adopted, in which, as time went on, they were defined and recorded, and that such formulas, when sanctioned by the due ecclesiastical acts, are binding on the faith of Catholics, and have a dogmatic authority. With this profession once for all, I put the strictly theological question aside; for I am concerned in a purely historical investigation into the use and fortunes of certain scientific terms (TT 287-8).

Certain complementary words are in play here as Newman attempts to use scholastic language. There are “dogmas” and there are the “formulas” in which dogmas are expressed. There are “dogmas” and then the “authority” which comes only when dogmas are made binding by the Church. Finally, there are dogmas as a “theological” question, which seems to deal with their “substance,” and there are dogmas as a “scientific” question, which by implication deals with changes in their accidents over time, as an
"historical investigation" reveals. While Newman has, therefore, put the doctrine of
development into Aristotelian terms, he has avoided conceiving in binary terms dogma
itself and the content of dogma. The content of dogma stays the same even when
scientific terms are introduced to explain it. The primary content is fixed, the secondary
teaching is dynamic.

Newman keeps some of this terminology in 1870, including calling homoeousios a
"scientific word" (GA 144). What in "St. Cyril's Formula" he had referred to as a
"theological question," the truth of dogma, in the Grammar he calls "religion." Theology
is now conceived only systematically, as "a system of truth" (GA 140). Religion is
what people really assent to, whereas theology lays out the grounds for a notional assent.
The Nicene Creed is part of religion, except for that one word, homoeousios, which
"means nothing more than 'really one with the Father,' being adopted to meet the evasion
of the Arians." He continues,

The Creed then remains now what it was in the beginning, a popular form of faith,
suited to every age, class, and condition. Its declarations are categorical, brief,
clear, elementary, of the first importance, expressive of the concrete, the objects
of real apprehension, and the basis and rule of devotion. As to the proper Nicene
formula itself, excepting the one term "Consubstantial," it has not a word which
does not relate to the rudimental facts of Christianity (GA 144).

Upon such facts, thinks Newman, the believer assents to God's Trinity. But Newman
thinks the facts are best presented not in the Nicene but in the Athanasian Creed. His
love for the Athanasian Creed, it should be pointed out, does not result from the
traditional attribution of the Creed to Newman's hero. Newman, throughout his writings,

98 One of Newman's concerns about Origen, as expressed in 1864, is the preference for science over
dogma; in A Letter Addressed to Rev. E.B. Pusey he writes this about Origen and Marian dogma: "St. Basil
derives his notion from Origen, that the Blessed Virgin at the time of the Passion admitted a doubt about
our Lord's mission, and Origen, so far from professing to rest it on Tradition, draws it as a theological
conclusion from a received doctrine. Origen's characteristic fault was to prefer scientific reasonings to
authority; and he exemplifies it in the case before us" (Diffii, 143).

99 He writes here: "Religion has to do with the real, and the real is the particular; theology has to do with
what is notional, and the notional is the general and the systematic. Hence theology has to do with the
dogma of the Holy Trinity as a whole made up of many propositions; but religion has to do with each of
those separate propositions which compose it, and lives and thrives in the composition of them. In them it
finds the motives for devotions and faithful obedience; while theology on the other had forms and protects
them by virtue of its function of regarding them, not merely one by one, but as a system of truth."
knew that it was not Athanasius’s own. Rather, in Romantic vein, he saw it as “not a mere collection of notions, however momentous... [but] a psalm or hymn of praise, of confession, and of profound, self-prostrating homage, parallel to the canticles of the elect in the Apocalypse. It appeals to the imagination quite as much as to the intellect” (GA 153). While it would be a mistake to argue that Newman did not see the importance of a creed as a “collection of notions” as well, yet he does not want a creed that produces mere notional assent. This is why he turns away from that one particular word in the Nicene formulation – to which he has always been cool. After 1870, he turns his attention to the doctrine of co-eternity instead of homoousios (see chapter five).

His engagement with pre-Nicene doctrine seems to have shaped his arguments about the “illative sense.” Gilley nicely describes the latter as the “power to pass straight from facts to conclusions”; but while Gilley notices the similarities and differences between Newman’s illative sense and the thought of Locke and Keble, he does not make any connection with Newman’s work on the Fathers. This in spite of the fact the Lectures on Justification claim to take from the “ancients” the notion that feelings based on rules are the best way to judge the truth of a “thing” and not rationalistic argument (Jfc 99). This is the same illative sense the Grammar describes in terms of Aristotle’s doctrine of phronesis:

the rule of conduct for one man is not always the rule for another, though the rule is always one and the same in the abstract, and in its principle and scope. To learn his own duty in his own case, each individual must have recourse to his own rule; and if that rule is not sufficiently developed in his intellect for his need, then

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100 Although he writes, “has not the categorical proposition of St. Athanasius, ‘The Holy Ghost is God,’ such a place in the imagination and the heart, as suffices to give birth to the noble Hymns, Veni Creator, and Veni Sancte Spiritus?”, he nevertheless knows this line from the Creed was not written by the bishop of Alexandria (GA 140). In Arians he cited Daniel Waterland’s Works (Oxford: 1823). The first chapter of Waterland’s A Critical History of the Athanasian Creed examines seventeenth- and eighteenth-century scholarly, most of which assigned the creed to the Western Church not earlier than the fifth century.

101 He praises scripture in similar terms: “And if the New Testament be, as it confessedly is, so real in its teaching, so luminous, so impressive, so constraining, so full of images, so sparing in mere notions, whence is this but because, in its references to the Object of our supreme worship, it is ever ringing the changes (so to say) on... propositions [of the faith]...?” (GA 138).

102 Gilley (1990), 360.
he goes to some other living, present authority, to supply it for him, not to the dead letter of a treatise or a code (GA 356).

The vital importance of moral conduct and scope, of duty and authority, and of a living rule rather than a dead letter, all reflect Newman’s earlier thinking on the Fathers. Gilley is not alone in arguing the Grammar takes a “nominalist” position, because “Newman thought of experience as an experience of individual objects, and it is only our experience of such real individual objects that is real, not the abstractions we derive from them.”

But this is a false distinction. That truth is “one and the same in the abstract” is not unimportant to Newman. He thinks that abstract (primary) truth about God was grasped by the Fathers who taught it through secondary doctrine, both of which were guided by one regula fidei. As he writes earlier in the book, there “cannot” be two Rules of Faith (GA 150). This is not a “mere man-made convention,” as Gilley’s argument would have it, but a truth both in abstract and in practice. Newman’s chapter on “Apprehension and Assent in the matter of Religion” recognises that people assent in two different ways to the God who is worshipped as Trinity, first through “religion,” which grasps after the Object of dogmas and is thus the grounds of a real assent, secondly through “theology” which provides propositions about that Object to which is made a notional assent. But, as Gilson warns, to see these two types of assent in opposition is to misread Newman: rather, theology is the science of the very dogmas through which, in our hearts and minds, humans give real assent to the divine Object. This, I would agree with Gilson, is Newman’s theology in “the style of the Fathers.”

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103 Gilley (1990), 356. This is English nominalism rather than the medieval scholastic kind. W.R. Inge (1921) said that it is “Locke whom Newman resembles in his theory of knowledge,” while also offering this criticism which Inge took from Locke, “To most people... the fact that opinions are so manufactured is no proof that they ought to be so,” 193.

104 Gilley also writes: “Men differ politically or ethically or religiously because their different arguments go back to different choices in what they are as persons. This is, in a sense, Newman alone with his Creator,” 359. By contrast to such philosophical idealism, John Connolly has argued that, for Newman, “As an assent, certitude is always preceded by a process of reasoning that presents truth to the mind. If there is any error in certitude, it is the reasoning process that is false and not the assent.” Connolly, John R., John Henry Newman: A View of Catholic Faith for the New Millennium (Lanham, MD: Rowan and Littlefield, 2005), 63.

105 Gilson’s “Introduction” explains Newman’s view: “If it is a question of achieving a scientific knowledge of the Christian faith, theology alone, being notional, can do it; but religion is both personal and real, and, unless we content ourselves with a vague religious sentiment, the only way to restore Christianity in the hearts and minds of men is to assent to dogmas as to so many real and particular objects,” 19.
experience God’s reality in a way that is both individual and communal, an experience grounded in traditionary and revealed religion.

Conclusions

The three themes that have been repeatedly discussed are not treated discretely by Newman, of course, but intertwine to give a comprehensive account of “patristic” doctrine. That comprehensiveness underpins many of Newman’s writings in the 1830s, 1840s and 1860s-70s.

A series of four sermons in November and December 1835, called “The Patristical Idea of Antichrist,” and later published as Tract 83, exemplifies Newman’s thinking. He follows the Fathers’ methodology, rather than offering a private judgement on scripture deduced from the context of particular texts. He writes that if the Fathers were to “say, ‘These are our opinions: we deduced them from Scripture, and they are true,’ we might well doubt about receiving them at their hands. We might fairly say, that we had as much right to deduce from Scripture as they had” (DA 45). But the Fathers are offering interpretations based upon a rule, our second theme, commonly agreed upon and dating back to apostolic times. Moreover, implicit here is Newman’s suspicion of “deduction” and praise for traditionary religion, our third theme, which at this stage in his life is really a Romantic view of intuition that he claims to find in the Fathers. In their interpretation of scriptures about the coming of Antichrist, however, the Fathers did not share the unity they did on matters of doctrine, where the Vincentian Canon applied:

I follow the ancient Fathers, not as thinking that on such a subject they have the weight they possess in the instance of doctrines or ordinances. When they speak of doctrines, they speak of them as being universally held. They are witnesses to the fact of those doctrines having been received, not here or there, but everywhere (DA 45).

106 James Tolhurst’s claim that in these sermons, rather than patristical, “the force of the argument is really scriptural,” draws a false distinction. Newman holds that his scriptural exegesis is learned from the Fathers. Tolhurst, “Introduction” to Discussions and Arguments on Various Subjects Birmingham Oratory Millennium Edition (Notre Dame: University of Notre Dame Press, 2004), xviii.
Newman thus shows areas of interpretation in which the Fathers were prepared to disagree. In matters "prophetical," the interpretation of scripture was far more flexible than in matters "doctrinal." This would seem to be another way of viewing the division between a primary and a secondary interpretation: that prophecies (narrowly understood) could only be interpreted at a secondary (Prophetical) level and could not be the basis of primary (Episcopal) teaching. Of course, the Fathers still provide the best guides to interpreting prophecy, and in this sermon it is mainly to the interpretations of Irenaeus and Hippolytus that Newman turns, for

though the Fathers do not convey to us the interpretation of prophecy with the same certainty as they convey doctrine, yet, in proportion to their agreement, their personal weight, and the prevalence, or again the authoritative character of the opinions they are stating, they are to be read with deference (DA 47).

The difficulty for us in interpreting prophecy, which causes Newman to privilege the interpretations of the pre-Nicenes, has mainly to do with the form of expression used. Newman is convinced prophecies were given in oral rather than in written form. And the privacy and obscurity of the pre-Nicene Church testified, in Newman’s eyes, to her ability to preserve Christian doctrine. Privacy and obscurity were part of God’s own pedagogy in the scriptures and the justification for a disciplina arcani.107

Pre-Nicene tradition, for the early Newman, bestowed richness and dynamism through secondary traditions, which were “not committed to writing” but passed on orally (DA 46). For the later Newman, even though Athanasius has replaced Origen as his hero, he thinks a person’s real assent to God is not the result of written creeds, but of an experience of the truth to which the creed (as notional) points. The categories of primary and secondary tradition help to explain Newman’s epistemology throughout his life. And from the beginning of this chapter, it has been seen that Newman needed both primary and secondary tradition – any allegorical interpretation of scripture relied upon the literal word, just as dogma is not solely about real assent without also being about notional. But

107 “What the Apostles disclosed concerning the future, was for the most part disclosed by them in private, to individuals—not committed to writing, not intended for the edifying of the body of Christ,—and was soon lost. Thus, in a few verses after the passage I have quoted, St. Paul says, ‘Remember ye not, that when I was yet with you, I told you these things?’ (II Thess 2:5) and he writes by hints and allusions, not speaking out” (DA 46).
Newman was more sympathetic to the secondary than to the primary, as clearly became the case after 1841 when he interpreted allegorically first the Thirty-Nine Articles in *Tract 90*, then the creeds and ecclesiastical history in the *Essay*. In the *Grammar* he was more excited by real assent than by notional. Even as he became more scholastic in the 1860s and 1870s, he considered formulae (even scholastic formulae)\(^{108}\) as mere notional apprehension.

This explains why he was suspicious of *homoousios* in the Nicene Creed. One way of guaranteeing orthodoxy, he has always recognised, is to come up with a formula, but that limits the richness of language which he relishes. In *Arians* he had argued that the doctrine of God’s Trinity was constant from the time of the Apostles and, with the introduction of *homoousios* at Nicaea, its formulation destroyed the richly dynamic language found in pre-Nicene writings. In the 1830s, *homoousios* is, at best, a necessary evil. In the 1840s, he is still suspicious of *homoousios*, but feels it is the only word to guarantee a true understanding of the relation of Father and Son and thus “in duty to be received on account of its Catholic sense” (*Ox Frs* viii, 157 note i). From the time of his Athanasius translation until around 1870, Newman seems – in spite of his feelings about richness of language – to install this word as the standard by which orthodoxy is judged.\(^{109}\) With the *Grammar* in 1870, however, he shifts back away from *homoousios* as “the one instance of a scientific word having been introduced into the Creed from that day to this” (*GA* 144). The *Essay on Development* criticised scientific (systematic) doctrine and here the *Grammar* appears to as well. But by time of the *Grammar*, as Gilson points out, Newman realises the role of systematic theology in providing the

\(^{108}\) In a letter from 1869, Newman clearly has some suspicion of scholasticism still: “In physical matters, it is the senses which gives [sic] us the first start... In like manner we have to ascertain the starting points for arriving at religious truth. The intellect will be useful in gaining them and after gaining them – but to attempt to see them by means of the intellect is like attempting by the intellect to see the physical facts which are the basis of physical exercises of the intellect, a method of proceeding which was the very mistake of the Aristotelians of the middle ages, who, instead of what Bacon calls ‘interrogating nature’ for facts, reasoned out everything by syllogisms” (*LD* xxiv, 275-6). Quoted in Lash, Nicholas, “Introduction” to *An Essay Towards a Grammar of Assent* (Notre Dame: University of Notre Dame Press, 1979), 9. That the intellect is involved at all, suggests Lash, is proof that Newman was no fideist.

\(^{109}\) Thus, Newman actually finds it “remarkable that Athanasius scarcely mentions the word ‘One in substance’ in his Orations or Discourses, nor does it occur in S. Cyril’s Catecheses, of whom, as being suspected of Semi-Arianism, it might have been required, before his writings were received as of authority” (*Ox Frs* viii, 157 note i).
notional safeguard for a real assent. Newman reads the Greeks with eyes that have become increasingly habituated to reading in "Latin" ways, and yet his own intuitions about the Fathers have changed very little.
Chapter 2.

A Play of Mirrors:

Newman and his sources in *The Arians of the Fourth Century*.

Introduction

From his first reference to the Fathers in his letters on into his first book, it was writing the history of the pre-Nicene Church that appealed to Newman. But there is a play of mirrors in Newman's account of pre-Nicene history. I do not mean this simply in the sense that people tend to see themselves when they look into mirrors, although there was certainly some of this in *Arians*. Newman was recording history within an Anglican tradition that sought to return to the primary sources. But just as those sources did not accurately reflect what was happening in the pre-Nicene Church, neither did the seventeenth-century scholars, in whose train Newman was following, accurately reflect their sources. Rather, when he came to the sources, Newman had a breadth of interpretations to choose from, including scholars from outside his own tradition, such as the Catholic, Denys Petau (Petavius, as Newman called him), and the Protestant, Johann Lorenz Mosheim. As the rays of truth bounced off these various mirrors, it was for Newman to try to work out where those rays intersected with his own purposes in writing a history of the period. In his turn, Newman made changes to these prior interpretations of events, recording history in a way that would be polemical in his own day.

Throughout this chapter, attention will be given to the interaction of Newman and those who preceded him in their interpretation of events. But it is also necessary to look at the earliest set of mirrors themselves, the primary sources. That Newman took many arguments directly from these sources is seen most clearly in a quotation from Alexander

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10 On 27 January 1826, Newman wrote to E. Smedley: "May I venture to inquire whether it would fall in with your arrangements, were I to undertake the Fathers of the 2nd and 3rd centuries in one paper" (*LD* i, 274).

11 *Arians* arose from a letter of 9 March 1831 from Hugh James Rose, in which the Anglican Thirty-nine Articles were to be considered the basis for a volume on the Ecumenical Councils to be included in Rose's and Archdeacon Lyall's projected *Library of Anglo-Catholic Theology* (*LD* ii, 321).
of Alexandria, which seems to sum up Newman’s account of the origins of Arius’s heresy:

“Ye are not ignorant,” [Alexander] writes to the Constantinopolitan Church concerning Arianism, “that this rebellious doctrine belongs to Ebion and Artemas, and is in imitation of Paulus of Samosata, Bishop of Antioch, who was excommunicated by the sentence of the Bishops assembled in Council from all quarters. Paulus was succeeded by Lucian, who remained in separation for many years during the time of three bishops.” (Arians 24)

Theodoret preserved Alexander’s letter in his *Ecclesiastical History* i.4. Newman starts with sources like Theodoret not only because they contain all that is extant of the writings of the period, but also because the writings these early historians chose to preserve share Newman’s prejudices. For instance, in this quotation the main villains of *Arians* (with the exception of the Eusebians) are introduced, connected together, and focused on Antioch, in the pattern Newman’s own thesis follows. Newman treats his primary sources rather less critically than his Oxford contemporary, Edward Burton.112 But, as will become clear, Newman is working within a very English tradition of reading the sources that he shares with Burton.

**Mirror Opposites: 1) Antiochene heresy.**

Newman considered the primary difference between the Alexandrians and Antiochenes to have been a dispute about how to read scripture. There were two ways of reading scriptural texts: materialistically and literally (as exemplified by the school of Antioch) versus spiritually and allegorically (the school of Alexandria). But this difference in scriptural interpretation resulted in two views of authority, which is to say the authority of bishops as well as of tradition in the Church, and consequently in two views of the Christian ethos. This triad – scripture, authority/tradition, and ethics –

112 Burton weighs the trustworthiness of his various sources in his Introduction to the 1829 Bampton Lectures, arguing for instance that “Wherever Epiphanius and Theodoret differ, few persons would hesitate to follow the latter,” in Burton, Edward, *An Inquiry into the Heresies of the Apostolic Age* (Oxford: Rivingtons, 1829), xiiii. Such an introduction to the sources seems to have been conventional, even when less incisive than Burton’s: Cave merely names his sources for information on the fourth century, “the chief whereof (setting aside Eusebius, of whom elsewhere, and a small part of whose history relates to this period) are four, all writing much about the same time, viz. Socrates, Sozomen, Theodoret, and Philostorgius,” (*Lives* ix). Newman has no such introduction.
interacts throughout Arians. For instance, the following quotation on (i) the scripture doctrine of Christ combines (ii) the authority of being “orthodox” with (iii) the right religious feeling. By implication, (i) an improper exegesis of scripture will result in (ii) a false teaching about the Son and (iii) a materialist rather than a spiritual ethic:

since a belief in our Lord’s Divinity is closely connected (how, it matters not) with deep religious feeling generally, – involving a sense both of our need and of the blessings he has procured for us, and an emancipation from the tyranny of the visible world, – it is not wonderful, that those, who would confine our knowledge of God to things seen, should dislike to hear of His true and only Image (Arians 273).

The theology of Origen saturates this quotation, with a desire to penetrate the veil of the world and of Christ’s human nature, to see the glory of God beneath. Moreover, it is clear Newman saw Church order and tradition as concerns related to proper exegesis of scripture and to living a good life. As shall be seen throughout this chapter, the problem of Arianism is not so much one of subordinationism (Newman admits Origen also subordinated the Father to the Son) but of exegetical method and ethical living (in both respects, the early Newman thinks Origen exemplary).

For Newman, the dispute between Antioch and Alexandria was about the way scripture doctrines came to be embodied – not just in ecclesiastical order and tradition, but in ethics. The Arian sophists challenged ecclesiastical order, the teaching of the Fathers before them, and all the while acted unethically. The force of Newman’s argument lies in his ability to link all these factors together in his portrayal of Arianism, but it is worth looking at each factor in turn.

113 Origen, like Newman, grounds the ability to penetrate the veil in the proper interpretation of scripture. Newman’s critique of literalism shares the startling claim of the Commentary on John i.33: “Before the sojourn of Christ, the Law and the Prophets did not contain the proclamation which belongs to the definition of the Gospel, since he who explained the mysteries in them had not yet come. But since the Saviour has come and has caused the Gospel to be embodied, he has by the Gospel made all things as Gospel” (ANF trans). Those who do not have the right view of Christ, especially for Newman the “Judaizing” heretics, cannot see through the veil of scripture to the Gospel beneath.

114 The charge of “sophistry” is found in the patristic texts Newman was reading. In Antiquity, as Paul Kolbert writes, “the person who learned doctrines without going to the trouble to live them was dismissed as a mere ‘sophist’.” Kolbert, P.R., “Athanasius, the Psalms, and the Reformation of the Self” Harvard Theological Review 99:1 (2006), 87.
i) Exegesis. In Newman’s argument, the Antiochene method of exegesis represents the mirror opposite method of reading scripture to that of the Alexandrian school. Those who followed the Rule of Faith interpreted scripture in line with the “Catholic” traditions of earlier Fathers. Paul of Samosata, by contrast, expressed “contempt for the received expositors of Scripture at Antioch,” and thus set the pattern for subsequent Antiochene exegesis in the way he argued against the doctrine of the Father’s equality with the Son (Arians 36). Instead of producing a skopos that might elevate the allegorical sense of scripture over the literal sense, Newman laments that the Antiochene rule elevates the literal to the exclusion of the allegorical, infamously resulting in a Son who is a mere creature. Newman writes:

The Catholics (not to speak of their guidance from tradition in determining it) had taken “Son” in its most obvious meaning; as interpreted moreover by the title “Only-begotten,” and as confirmed by the general tenor of Revelation. But the Arians selected as the sense of the figure, that part of the original import of the word, which... is at best what logicians call a property deduced from the essence or nature” (Arians 206).

It is important to recognise that Newman conceives the Arians as those who deal in the arguments of “logicians”; in this use of logic over tradition, the Arians show themselves to be the inheritors of an Antiochene mode of exegesis begun by Paul of Samosata, which prizes the systematic over the allegorical. The Antiochene rule for interpretation was an “abstract logical process,” upon which the Arians went about “erecting their system of heresy” (Arians 220). The rule of the school of Antioch was based on small portions of scripture, and not sufficiently open to the breadth and depth of interpretation of both Testaments. Unlike for the Alexandrian school, Antiochene teaching is seen only from the point of view of the heresy it produced, Arianism. Newman’s argument shall be seen to be an inversion of his predecessors’, who regarded the Alexandrians as those who

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115 There is a grain of truth in Newman’s account of Alexandrian-Antiochene differences in reading scripture, but no more than a grain. As de Lubac has shown, the Antiochenes “did not cut themselves off from the Church in any of their activities. And they were fully aware of the ‘ecclesiastical canon’ of the harmony of the two Testaments, even though they understood it more modestly, and they certainly did not reject all typology. But it is beginning with them that the exegesis of the Bible starts to lead a life of its own. Their attitude of mind and their form of work entitle them to be considered as the real founders of
brought philosophy to Christian doctrine. The connection of Antioch and heresy was as unquestioned for Newman as Alexandria and Arianism had been for his predecessors.

ii) Church order. Crucial, for Newman, is not simply that Arius’s exegesis threatened trinitarian doctrine, but that he rejected both “a traditional system of theology, consistent with, but independent of, Scripture” and challenged Church order by disputing with his bishop, Alexander of Alexandria (Arians 220). Newman does not make much of the fact that Arius is an “Alexandrian” deacon; his apparent schooling under Lucian seems to Newman enough to distance him from the orthodoxy of the Alexandrian Church where he served. Again, the Antiochenes are mirror opposites of the Alexandrians for Newman, with one school breeding heresy by opposing the Fathers’ tradition and the other orthodoxy by maintaining it. Those receiving a sophistical education at Antioch were taught to challenge established norms for argument’s sake rather than for building up the Church.116

iii) Ethics. The full force of Newman’s thesis comes only with the argument that the Arians’ literal interpretation of scripture, and their disregard for ecclesiastical authority, failed to bring holiness of life. The thrust of this thesis is outlined in the opening section of Chapter I, “The Church of Antioch,” where he establishes the “connection between judaizing discipline [which is not ascetical] and heresy in doctrine” (Arians 21). The final section of Chapter II, called “The Arian Heresy,” is followed by Chapters III to V on the historical outcome of Arianism – a depiction of the bloody repression of holy men and women by the “arianizing” or “judaizing” emperors and bishops of the fourth century. This is largely the thesis of Athanasius too, that holiness of life is the result of right reading of scripture guided by sound ecclesiastical authority; the supporting evidence for this argument is his History of the Arians.117 But in this respect,

116 Newman writes: “while the science of argumentation provided the means, their practice of disputing for the sake of exercise or amusement supplied the temptation, of assailing received opinions. This practice, which had long prevailed in the Schools, was early introduced into the Eastern Church” (Arians 31).

117 Certainly Newman’s account of post-Nicene Alexandria follows Athanasius: the people were far more holy when he was bishop than when Arians were in charge. Upon his return from exile, “How many unmarried women, who were before ready to enter upon marriage, now remained virgins to Christ! How many young men, seeing the examples of others, embraced the monastic life! How many wives persuaded their husbands, and how many were persuaded by their husbands, to give themselves to prayer, as the
of course, both Newman’s and Athanasius’s thesis depended wholly on Origen’s earlier connection between literalism in scriptural exegesis and a failure to penetrate the veil of the flesh of Christ. As Origen said at the very start of *On First Principles*, those who refuse to acknowledge that the Son, who for us dwelt in the flesh, is the Word of God, do not “derive the knowledge which calls men to lead a good and blessed life.”118

As a pupil of the Antiochene school, not of the Alexandrian, Arius’s unethical behaviour makes sense to Newman: “Arius followed in the track thus marked out by his predecessor [Paul]. Turbulent by character, he is known in history as an offender against ecclesiastical order, before his agitation assumed the shape which has made his name familiar to posterity” (*Arians* 28). Newman wants to trace a lineage from the bloodshed resulting from Arius’s heresy and Eusebius of Nicomedia’s influence at court, back through Lucian, to Paul of Samosata – all supposedly members of the Antiochene school – and discerns in all of them characteristics of self-importance and disobedience. In what follows, each of Newman’s suggested causes of Arianism will be discussed, before turning to Newman’s depiction of the orthodox alternative.

(a) The causes of Arianism: the confusion of philosophy and theology in Alexandria?

Newman recognises the causes of Arius’s heretical doctrines of the Trinity to have been two: sophistical methods of argument and a literal exegesis of scripture. Both causes represent a confusion of philosophy for theology. But there was nothing new in Newman interpreting early heresies in this way. Many of his predecessors perceived Arianism to result from an interaction of heretical theology with the wrong philosophy – and the lesson drawn, therefore, was that, in any account of Arianism, one must consider *which* theology and *which* philosophy were involved. In the seventeenth century, Cudworth considered this interaction, and Cave followed him closely. Cave, like Mosheim who followed in the eighteenth century, accepted Cudworth’s account that Alexandrian Neoplatonic philosophy bred the subordinationist doctrine of the Trinity that was central to Arian theology. These three did not agree on all points however. While

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*Hist Arianos* xxv (NPNF trans.).
editing a version of Cudworth’s *True Intellectual System*, Mosheim found much to criticise in its analysis of philosophy and theology in the early Church.\(^{119}\) Cudworth was favourable to the Christian appropriation of Platonic philosophy in the pre-Nicene era, whereas Mosheim argued in *de Rebus* that, in appropriating Plato, “the Alexandrian doctors… conceded to philosophy some authority in matters of religion” (*de reb* ii, 143). But, generally speaking, Cudworth, Cave and Mosheim portrayed the catechetical schools of Alexandria as closely linked to the city’s philosophical schools. Neoplatonism was suited alike to Alexandrian theologians (the “doctors” to whom Mosheim refers) and philosophers (much was said about Ammonius). Whereas Cudworth defends the “new Platonic” philosophy, and Mosheim attacks the theologians who “imbibed” it,\(^{120}\) Cave simply accepts that Alexandria is the first place to look for the rise of Arianism.

All of the scholars under examination considered academic centres like Alexandria to have had “schools” understood more or less in the terms of their own day, with a formal structure and curriculum, a headmaster (or “rector” as Mosheim’s translator puts it) and often assistant masters.\(^{121}\) This view of the catechetical school is under greater investigation today.\(^{122}\) It is Cave’s opinion that Origen “took in Heraclas, who had been his scholar… to be his partner, dividing the work between them, the younger and more untutored *catechumens* he committed to [Heraclas]” – thus implying a structured school at Alexandria, which received sponsorship from the church, for whose benefit the tutors taught (*Apostolici* 220). Although Cave bases his opinion on Eusebius’s *Ecclesiastical History* vi.15, weighing other evidence from that source leads John Behr to conclude, “It is more likely, however, that [Bishop] Demetrius was more directly involved [in Heraclas’s appointment] and that Origen was ousted from his

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\(^{118}\) *de Principiis* Pref.

\(^{119}\) Mosheim translated *TIS* into Latin, published in two volumes (Leyden: 1773).

\(^{120}\) The term “new Platonic,” and the accusation that Origen “imbibed” this philosophy, is from the English translation of Mosheim. For example: “All things that exist, whether corporeal or void of gross matter, emanated eternally from God, the source of all things. This first principle of the new Platonic school, derived from Egyptian wisdom, was the basis or foundation of Origen’s philosophy” (*de reb* ii, 149-150).

\(^{121}\) “Clemens. Alex. rector of the Christian school at Alexandria” (*de reb* ii, 150).

\(^{122}\) Whether this really was a “school” is discussed by Bardy, G, “Aux origines de l’école d’Alexandrie,” *Recherches de Sciences Religieuse* xxvii.3 (1937).
previous role.”¹²³ The bishop seems to have attempted to bring the school under the greater control of the church in that city, uniting the church and school for a generation to come. But Cave, in his reading of Eusebius (whom he backs up with Jerome), conceived a school that was already sponsored by the church, a relationship begun a generation before by Pantaenus, and Clement his successor.

The problem Cave and Mosheim perceived in the Neoplatonism of the third and fourth centuries in Alexandria is that some teachers were more interested in questions of philosophy than theology. This seems to have been a pattern, earlier in the third century, in Rome. Here the philosophical school of Artemas had taught his disciples to use their philosophy to misinterpret scripture.¹²⁴ Later in the century Rome was also host to Plotinus, whose Neoplatonism followed the fashion of his Alexandrian teacher, Ammonius. This same Ammonius sought to be the reconciler of “the Schools of Plato and Aristotle,” hence Cave’s claim that the Eclectics took what was best from each philosopher (*Apostolici* 216). Above all, though, the Eclectics were Neoplatonists, and their philosophy brought flaws to theology. Mosheim uses as evidence of these philosophers’ influence on theology a letter written by Origen *against* the philosophical tendencies of the Alexandrian catechetical school (recorded in *EH* vi.19). Mosheim writes of Origen’s discontent that “upon placing himself under the tuition of Ammonius, [Heraclas] assumed the philosopher’s mantle, and continued ever after to wear it,” both as head of the catechetical school and as presbyter (*de reb* i, 340). Mosheim here reveals the naivety of Cave’s account of the happy interaction of Origen and Heraclas as co-heads of the school. In other respects, though, Mosheim agreed with Cave’s argument

¹²³ Behr, John, *The Way to Nicaea* (2001), 166. The merging of church and school probably explains why, “Heraclas succeeded Demetrius as ‘bishop’ of Alexandria (*EH* vi.26), and the following head of the Catechetical School, Dionysius, another ‘pupil’ of Origen, also succeeded to the episcopacy after Heraclis,” 167.

¹²⁴ The following report is recorded in *EH* v.28: “Some of [Artemas’s pupils] give all their energies to Euclidean geometry, and treat Aristotle and Theophrastus with reverent awe; to some of them Galen is almost an object of worship. When people avail themselves of the arts of unbelievers to lend colour to their heretical views, and with godless rascality corrupt the simple Faith of Holy Writ, it is obvious that they are nowhere near the Faith. So it was that they laid hands unblushingly on the Holy Scriptures, claiming to have corrected them.”
that the *Alexandrian* catechetical school swallowed too large a dose of Neoplatonism; the result was Arianism.

Newman sees the opposite to be the case. It was the catechetical school under Paul in *Antioch* that swallowed too large a dose of that city’s philosophy, while, in Alexandria, theologians like Origen took only what they wanted from the philosophical schools. When it comes to the rise of Arianism, Newman’s focus is on a different city—and thus on a different philosophy. In all that follows, it is important to see that where Newman conflates the two types of school (catechetical and philosophical) in Antioch, Cudworth, Cave and Mosheim conflate philosophy and theology in Alexandria under Pantaenus and his successors.

While Newman rejects Mosheim and Cave’s suggestion that Clement was a member of the Eclectic “sect,” he does accept that the philosophical school in Alexandria bred this form of Neoplatonism. Following Cave, who used the terms “Junior Platonism” and “Electivism” almost interchangeably, Newman refers to “infant Platonism” and “Eclecticism” at Alexandria. But Newman wants to end the notion that the catechetical schools of Alexandria taught Neoplatonic philosophy—largely, it seems, in order to remove all suspicion of taint from Origen. Mosheim, for instance, thought Origen’s theology was corrupted by his “his preceptor Ammonius Saccas, the celebrated founder of the new Platonic school,” and that Origen never more than “slightly modified” what he learned there (*de reb* ii, 150). While following Mosheim in portraying Ammonius as “virtually the founder” of the Eclectic school, Newman nevertheless rejects Mosheim and Cave’s claim that Ammonius remained a Christian throughout his life.

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125 Clement is given membership of this “sect” by Cave in virtue of being one of those thinkers “who obliged not themselves to the dictates and sentiments of any one philosopher, but freely made choice of the most excellent principles out of all” (*Apostolici* 195). Origen would likewise fall into this loose amalgam of largely Platonic philosophers. Under Ammonius, Cave writes, “Origen made himself perfect master of the Platonic notions, being daily conversant in the writings of Plato, Numenius, Cronius, Apollophanes, Longinus, Moderatus, Nichomachus, and the most principal among the Pythagoreans, as also of Chaeremon and Cornatus, stoics” (*Apostolici* 217).

126 For Mosheim, Origen was not only a philosopher: although the “philosophical light, which shone in Origen and others, was not great, yet it was sufficient to dissipate and entirely overthrow the absurd fictions of [Gnostic] sects” (*de reb* ii, 243, my italics). But philosophy is also where Origen is at his weakest, says Mosheim, for his “timidity and changeableness are apparent, when he offers philosophical explanations of those Christian doctrines which theologians call revealed truths” (*de reb* ii, 147).
(Arians 101). The more Ammonius moved towards philosophy, for Newman, the more corrupt his theology became. Eventually, according to Newman, Ammonius renounced what he had learned in the catechetical school and lapsed from orthodoxy. But Newman has to show – in spite of the confusion in the primary sources – that it was not until after he taught Origen that Ammonius “gradually disclosed the systematic infidelity on which [his teaching] was grounded” (Arians 102). After all, argues Newman, Origen would not truck with a philosophy that attacked Christian doctrine (as shown when Origen refused to hear Paul of Samosata, with whom he shared a patron). He is sure Origen would have nothing to do with the philosophy of a lapsed Christian. Although it shall be seen that his English predecessors defended Origen from many of his critics, they did not work as hard as Newman to retell the story of pre-Nicene Alexandria.

(b) The causes of Arianism: the confusion of philosophy and theology in Antioch?

Cave says it was not just the philosophical doctrine of Alexandrian Neoplatonists that became the source of Arian heresy, but also the theology of Lucian of Antioch. Lucian’s catechetical school in Antioch has long been a highly debated subject of fourth-century theology, in spite of the little that is known about it. Cave saw Lucian teaching Arius a theology to match the philosophy Arius had learned in Alexandria. Quoting Arius’s admission, in a letter to Eusebius of Nicomedia, that they were “Fellow-Lucianists,” Cave nevertheless remains ambiguous about quite how close Arius was to Lucian’s school. Cave thinks Arius was admitted to this fraternity, but he will not say whether Arius learned subordinationism from Lucian himself. For whether Arius learned Lucian’s doctrines “at the first or second hand,” he writes, “it is hard to say” (Lives 155). Such refusal to speculate leaves Arius located in Alexandria in Cave’s account, whereas Newman situates him in Antioch. Newman will, by contrast, quote Arius’s letter to Eusebius of Nicomedia in full, as evidence in his case that Arius was a member of Lucian’s school, for Newman wants to portray an Arius who took both his theology and his philosophy from Antioch.

127 Cave and Newman both discuss the evidence of Ammonius lapsing in his faith, but come to the opposite conclusion. See Apostolici 216.
Newman seems to have been the first to argue that the sources show a school of theology in Antioch, dating from roughly the same era as that in Alexandria. Cave cannot have doubted that schools to teach catechumens existed, but their formal status is not recognised in the sources. All Cave mentions are the “Sophistical” schools – which had no church affiliation beyond that one of these schools of philosophy had the presbyter, Malchion, as “head” (Hist Lit 99). Not until Cave’s account reaches the fourth century will he find a catechetical school in Antioch under Lucian. Newman, by contrast, considers Paul “the founder of a school rather than of a sect, as encouraging in the Church the use of those disputations and sceptical inquiries, which belonged to the Academy and other heathen philosophies” (Arians 6). His consideration of the role this “school” played in the Church suggests Newman has in mind a parallel with Alexandria’s catechetical school. But he thinks Paul’s school in Antioch is really only masquerading as a catechetical school. Newman knows he is setting himself against two of his predecessors here. On one hand, Newman turned around Mosheim’s argument regarding the Alexandrian catechetical school and used it regarding this purported Antiochene school. Mosheim thought it was the Alexandrians who had a philosophical school that masqueraded as a catechetical school. On the other hand, Cave had already shown that the methods Newman called “disputations and sceptical inquiries” were typical of Antiochene sophism, and even implied that Paul used these methods at the first gathering of churchmen at Antioch to avoid “the severe censure of the Synod by sly pretences” (Hist Lit 98). But Cave did not suggest there was any official Antiochene catechetical school in the third century.

If Cave and Newman agree that Antioch was home to “Aristotelian” sophism, beyond this Newman tells a very different tale. In contrast to Cave, who says that Neoplatonism continued in Alexandria after Ammonius, Newman argues that when Ammonius stopped teaching “the infant philosophy languished” in Alexandria, switching its focus to Rome, where Plotinus “began his public lectures A.D. 244” (Arians 107).

128 Newman did this in Arians, a decade before substantiating his ideas further in Dev 281ff, on “The Syrian School” (appended to the 1871 edition of Arians as Note I).

129 He writes, for example, that Eusebius of Nicomedia was “one of Lucian’s principle scholars, who so strenuously defended his master’s principles, that he made all his interest subservient to it” (Lives 160).
But it was also taught in Antioch. And who in Antioch took over this philosophy, corrupted as it has become by Ammonius’s renunciation of Christianity? In Newman’s eyes, the obvious candidate was the heretical Paul of Samosata. The elements which Newman discerns in the heresy of Arius are coming into conjunction in Antioch: here “Paulus of Samosata, the judaizing Sophist, [was] the favourite of a court which patronized Eclecticism, when it was neglected at Alexandria” (Arians 132). Newman turns Queen Zenobia into the matrix of heretical cross-fertilisation of “carnal” Judaism, Paul’s sophism, and the Eclectics’ faulty trinitarianism.\(^{130}\)

At times, Newman finds himself struggling to convince even himself of this new thesis. As Rowan Williams puts it, Newman “shows signs of strain as he attempts to fit into one pattern the diversity of theologies he deals with.”\(^{131}\) Newman plays with his mirrors far more than Cave, for instance, who will say no more of Paul and Lucian’s relationship than that they flourished in the same city, and that the latter altered and (from the orthodox perspective) improved the earlier man’s heretical doctrines. Newman goes much further, claiming that Paul introduced the Aristotelian philosophy found among the sophists to the theology of the East, bequeathing to the whole Church a heritage of heresy. But he dare not explore too closely the interaction of Paul and Lucian, seeing as, “Though a friend, as it appears, of Paulus,” Lucian had an opposing view on the pre-existence of the Son (Arians 7 note 3).\(^{132}\) Newman also faces the question that, if all “Lucian’s pupils were brought together from so many different places, and were promoted to posts of influence in so many parts of the Church,” then where was the commonality among them? (Arians 25-26) Where Newman is consistent, however, is arguing in other works that unity of schooling, rather than the diversity of where they

\(^{130}\) Newman does not really explain how this cross-fertilisation worked. He describes great differences between the various schools of thought: “The Eclectics... had followed the Alexandrians in adopting the allegorical rule... Judaism, on the contrary, being carnal in its views, was essentially literal in its interpretations; and, in consequence, as hostile from its grossness, as the Sophists from their dryness, to the fanciful fastidiousness of the Eclectics” (Arians 110).

\(^{131}\) Williams “Introduction,” xxxviii.

\(^{132}\) Paul seems to have denied the pre-existence of the Son as the Word, whereas this footnote continues: “Epiphanius (Ancor. 33) tells us, that [Lucian] considered the Word in the Person of Christ as the substitute for a human soul.”
ended up, is what is important. But Newman dare not throw too much light on the exact relationship of people to places, lest his view of the East as heretical and Alexandria as orthodox begins to look doubtful.

(c) The causes of Arianism: Judaism.

Newman's genealogy of Arianism is at its most playful with mirrors in the role he gives to Judaism. Newman wrote of Arius's predecessor in Antioch, "Ancient writers inform us that [Paul's] heresy was a kind of Judaism in doctrine, adopted to please his Jewish patroness" (Arians 5). The list of sources, Athanasius, Chrysostom, Theodoret and Philaster, is similar to Mosheim's list for the same claim, albeit that Nicephorus replaces the less trustworthy Philaster (de reb ii, 231). Imputed Judaism is an ancient slur that the later commentators pick up, and it seems Newman is just as keen as his predecessors to discredit Paul based on scant evidence for his Judaism.134

Yet, while it is true that the sources say Zenobia was Jewish, there was also a long heritage to the belief that, if there was a natural home for Jewish thought in the ancient world, it was Alexandria. Mosheim most clearly makes the connection between Jewish thought and the teachers of the Alexandrian catechetical school. "Notwithstanding all the desire which these good men evince to persuade us that they entertained a partiality for no particular [philosophical] sect, they were certainly attached to the Eclectics, a sect that flourished formerly in Egypt"; for instance, continues Mosheim, "compare Clement and Origen with Philo Judeas, one equally a disciple of the Eclectic school" (de reb i, 343). Newman, who wants to portray the East as the home of a philosophy infected with Judaism, therefore faces a problem: what to do with Philo? Cudworth had defended the Middle Platonism of Philo.135 Newman, by contrast, criticises Philo in spite of his being

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133 The unity of schooling was what made Basil and Gregory Nazianzen brothers-in-arms, even though they lived in different places (CF 52). And in Newman's own experience, Keble lived out the Oxford ethos even when he was serving his Gloucestershire parishioners – perhaps more so there in fact.

134 It should be noted that anti-Judaism seems to have been a part of Anglicanism from its beginning. E.g. Lancelot Andrewes's Christmas sermon, preached before the royal court in 1605, meditates on who will receive the blessing promised to Abraham's seed? "Surely, not the Hebrues alone; nay, not the Hebrues, at all, for all their carnall propagation." Andrewes, Lancelot, Sermons ed. G.M. Story (Oxford: OUP, 1967).

135 For instance, Cudworth writes: "Platonick and Pythagorick doctrine exactly agreeeth [with] Philo the Jew also, That God which is before the Word or Reason; is better and more excellent than all the rational
from Alexandria - but does so not from the perspective of his philosophy so much as his Judaism. Newman suggests Philo’s religion led him to misunderstand the Platonic Trinity in a way that is seen “perhaps to prepare the way for Arianism” (Arians 93).

It has already been shown how Newman regarded materialism as complemented by literalism in the reading of scripture. Materialism and literalism were, in the view he took from Origen, the same problem: one could not penetrate the veil of the flesh, the other the veil of words. Newman, in fact, attributed literalism to Jewish materialism, in perhaps the most fascinating play Newman makes with his predecessors’ mirrors. Mosheim, for whom allegory (in the form of parables) is an archetype of Jewish exegesis, claims the Alexandrians learnt to read the various “senses” of scripture from the Jews (de reb i, 359). Newman claims the very opposite – that the Jews taught the Antiochenes how to read the Bible too literally. Newman saw such literalism in many early heresies. The materialism of Judaism appealed to Cerinthus and Ebion, says Newman, who, compared to other first-century Gnostics, thought the Jewish Law more helpful and the Demiurge correspondingly less fearful. But Newman (unlike Mosheim) fails to mention that “it was a part only of the law of Moses which appeared to Cerinthus worthy of being retained” (de reb i, 256, quoting Epiphanius). Newman treats Cerinthus and Ebion as Jews who failed to penetrate the veil of the Law and thereby to recognise the reality of the Son of God about whom it spoke. The results for their christology were heretical: “the Cerinthians and the Ebionites… though more or less infected with Gnosticism, were of Jewish origin, and observed the Mosaic Law; and whatever might be the minute peculiarities of their doctrinal views, they also agreed in entertaining Jewish rather than Gnostic conceptions of the Person of Christ” (Arians 20, citing Burton notes 74 and 82). Albeit this “Jewish” Christ was not a Gnostic Aeon but a fully human Messiah, still Jewish materialism did not give the full picture of Christ as Son of God.

nature; neither is it fit that anything which is generated, should be perfectly like, to that which is originally from itself, and above all” (TIS 585).

136 There is confusion in his predecessors here. Cave thinks that Origen “learned that allegorical and mystical way of interpretation, which he introduced to the Christian doctrine,” from the stoics Chaeremon and Cornatus “as Porphyry truly enough observes” (Apostolici 217).
Thus it was no surprise that, as Burton put it, some Christian heretics “believed with Cerinthus that he was a mere man, born of human parents.”

With the materialism and literalism of the first-century heretics came a “carnal” ethic, which Newman in line with Englishmen like Burton, described as typically Jewish. Mosheim, it should be noted, did not accept this connection. Employing the historical-critical methods of German historiography, he argued that the account Cerinthus purportedly gave, of deeds of “the grossest sensuality” that would be licit during the Millennium at the end of time, was really only a later slur on this sect. Mosheim explained that this account of the Millennium was not taught by Cerinthus but attributed to him at a later date; in fact, it “originated with Caius, the presbyter and Dionysius Alexandrinus, two writers of the third century... [in] dispute with the Chiliasts... [T]he object of these writers was evidently to repress this doctrine” (de reb i, 254). But while Mosheim was critical of his sources, the English were more in their thrall. Based on the testimony of a source he usually treats with suspicion, Epiphanius, Burton is so sure of the Ebionites’ Judaism that he doubts Ebion can “be entitled to the name Christian.”

Burton upholds “ancient testimony” when it alleges a connection between a heretic and Judaism, and Newman is no different.

The sensuality of Ebion and Cerinthus inform the Jewish practices and doctrines that, for Newman, find a home in Antioch. When Burton claimed of Ebion, “Whether he published his doctrines in Rome and Cyprus, as is said by Epiphanius, may perhaps be doubted; but that he disseminated them in Asia, and in the neighbourhood of Ephesus, can hardly admit of dispute,” he provided Newman with a bridge between Judaism and Eastern heresy. With the help of such analysis, Newman could claim the “doctrine of the Ebionites,” though slightly altered, was taken up by the “followers of Paulus of

137 Burton (1829), 184.

138 Burton (1829) writes of Mosheim’s “conjecture”: “since we can come to no certain conclusion, where ancient testimony is on the one side, and conjectural criticism is on the other, I can only refer the reader to the arguments of Mosheim,” 483 note 76.

139 In the same place, Burton (1829) writes that, considering the “strong expressions which [St Paul] uses in his Epistles against Judaizing teachers,” it is “easy to see” why the Ebionite form of Gnosticism opposed the Pauline Epistles, 499 note 82.

140 Burton (1829), 183.
Samosata" (Arians 120). The point of intersection of Judaism and Christian heresy is not Alexandrian philosophy (as for Cudworth) or exegesis (as for Mosheim)141 but in Antiochene sophism, literalism, and sensuality. As has already been seen, these three find their matrix in Queen Zenobia, for this Antiochene/Jewish materialism has powerful gender symbolism. Williams carefully maps together Newman’s anti-Eastern, anti-Jewish positions and anti-female positions. As exemplified by Queen Zenobia, Williams says, “the false theology of Syria is ‘female’ – sensual, preoccupied with appearance rather than reality (hence the literalism in interpreting Scripture), incapable of rational detachment from the self-interested deliverances of unaided human intellect… Spiritually speaking, men are from Alexandria, women from Antioch.”142 However, Williams overemphasises Newman’s originality by failing to remark that a similar gender division can also be found in Cave’s account of Arius, and throughout the primary sources on Paul of Samosata too.143 For instance, the Synodal Letter asked: “How could he reprove another man, or advise him not to associate any longer with a ‘bride’, for fear of a slip – as Scripture warns us – when he has dismissed one already and now has two in his house, both young and pretty, whom he takes round with him whenever he leaves home, living, I may add, in luxury and surfeiting?” (quoted in EH vii.30). Cave noted the affinity between Arius and women, especially in using women “to solicit the justice of the tribunals, to take cognizance of [Arius’s] case, and to rescind the sentence of his diocesan, creating the aged and venerable bishop all imaginable trouble and disturbance” (Lives 157). Many of Newman’s observations about the heretics, therefore, come from primary sources mediated through an English tradition, such as when he records that “[Alexander] speaks especially of younger females as zealous in [Arius’s] cause, and as traversing Alexandria in their eagerness to promote it” (Arians 139).

141 For Mosheim’s critical remarks on Alexandrian exegesis, which picked up from Jewish allegory, see de reb i century II §34.

142 Williams “Introduction,” xl.

143 Behr (2001) shows how the Synodal Letter establishes a link between women and the heresy of seeing Christ as from below. “Along similar lines, the Letter charges Paul with having stopped the singing of certain hymns to the Lord Jesus Christ, hymns which were probably Paschal as it is further alleged that Paul had women sing songs to him [instead] on the great day of Pascha,” 213.
Judaism, both in Newman and the sources he follows, furnishes a particular view of male sexuality too. This is shown in the way both primary sources and secondary commentators treat circumcision. Epiphanius, for instance, writes that Ebionites "boast also of having circumcision, and they pride themselves in considering this as the seal and mark of the patriarchs," as do the Cerinthians.\textsuperscript{144} In the early Church, as well as later commentators, attention is drawn to the relation of circumcision, on the one hand, to sensuality and, on the other hand, to effeminacy. Heretics seem to associate with women rather than with men, and women seem especially prone to falling under their influence; the result is a confusion of gender role – the heretic is either over-sexed or de-manned. Origen is an example of the confusion in gender caused by mutilation of male genitalia. Origen is said by the early historians to have castrated himself in order to prove his chastity whilst he lived and taught among women. Cave gives three sources for the story: Epiphanius explains that Origen's chastity was due to "Medicinal applications"; Jerome claims that "it was done with the knife"; and Eusebius (always seeking to put the best spin on Origen's actions) says he castrated himself "partly out of a perverse interpretation of our Saviour's meaning, when he says, 'There be some which make themselves eunuchs for the Kingdom of Heaven's sake'" (\textit{Apostolici} 219). Newman, by contrast, does not mention Origen's self-mutilation at all. Maybe he recognises the allegation as a piece of malicious gossip to discredit Origen. However, Newman's treatment of his hero provides an instructive contrast to his treatment of "Judaizing" heretics like Paul. The latter is accused of insisting his followers be circumcised based upon one particularly dubious source. In spite of the doubts he expresses elsewhere about the accuracy of Philaster's \textit{Liber de Haeresibus} §64,\textsuperscript{145} he quotes this source to claim that Paul was circumcised. As an addition to the same footnote, the later Newman admits: "Epiphanius denies that the Paulianists circumcised" (\textit{Arians} 22 note 5, with 1872 addendum). The

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\textsuperscript{144} The quotation continues of the Cerinthians, "according to their absurd argument, \textit{It is enough for the disciple to be as the master: now Christ was circumcised; do thou therefore be circumcised.}" \textit{Panarion} xxx.16, rendered by Burton (1829), 500. Attention is drawn to this, Burton's note 82, on \textit{Arians} 20.
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\textsuperscript{145} Newman expresses doubt that Philaster is right to say that Paul was so much a Jew that he persuaded his patroness "to judaize" ("\textit{docuit Zenobiam judaizare}"). Philaster (d. c397), or Filaster, was Bishop of Brescia and an opponent of Arianism. Burton (1829) said that \textit{de Haeresibus} "has been proved to contain many inaccuracies," xi.
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early Newman had doubts about Philaster – doubts that the later Newman confirmed – but he willingly slurred Paul’s name with whatever he could find.

(d) The Causes of Arianism: Paul’s Heresy.

For Newman, as has now been sufficiently shown, the “sophistical” trajectory of Antiochene Christian thought began with Paul of Samosata and led, via Lucian, to Arianism. Newman describes as “a wretched sophism” Paul’s view that, were there to be a common substance between Father and Son, logically that substance must be prior to both Persons (Arians 192). Since nothing can be prior to the Father, Paul considered this argument as sufficient for rejecting homoousion in favour of a subordination of Son to Father. In Newman’s opinion, Paul, even at his most theological, is no more than a sophist philosopher. But what were his sources for such a claim?

Rather than focus on Paul’s theology, this section examines the sources Newman uses for Paul’s heresy. Indeed Newman is less concerned what Paul said compared to how he said it, admitting that “The arguments of Paul (which it is not our purpose here to detail) seem fairly to have overpowered the first of the Councils summoned against him (A.D. 264), which dissolved without coming to a decision” (Arians 27). Two points stand out from this sentence. First, Newman seems fascinated by Paul’s sophistical method of argument, fascinated by the skill of any rhetor, himself included, to win disputes. Secondly, Newman closely reflects his sources when suggesting it is “not our purpose” to examine in detail Paul’s theology. In commenting upon Paul’s argumentative character, Newman seems to be replicating his source, Eusebius (whom he cites), who was in turn replicating the Synodal Letter condemning Paul – indeed, the only extracts of the Letter preserved by Eusebius are those to do with ethical and political concerns, not with doctrine. The letter itself sustains the prurient interest of Eusebius

146 Newman makes his opinion clear from the start of Arians: “As to his heresy, it is difficult to determine what were his precise sentiments concerning the Person of Christ, though they were certainly derogatory of the doctrine of His absolute divinity and eternal existence. Indeed, it is probable that he had not any clear view on the solemn subject on which he allowed himself to speculate; nor had any wish to make proselytes, and form a party in the Church... His habits, too, as a sophist, would dispose him to employ himself in attacks upon the Catholic doctrine, and in irregular discussion, rather than in the sincere effort to obtain some definite conclusions, to satisfy his own mind or convince others,” 4-5.

147 A point made by Behr (2001), 207.
and Newman by focusing on Paul’s flaws. It decries Paul’s character before following up with a disclaimer that “as we said before, a man could be called to account for these things, if only he had a catholic mind and was one of our number”; but since (as the Council judged) neither of these applied to Paul, he could not be expected to behave in any way other than immorally (EH vii.30). The letter continues, “But when he burlesqued the mystery and paraded with the filthy sect of Artemas (it is our unpleasant duty to name his father), we do not feel called upon to ask for an explanation of this.” Paul, because of his consorting with heretics like Artemas, is judged a heretic – by the Council, by Eusebius and by Newman – but never given the chance to have his theological views laid out.

Before a little more is said about Artemas, it is worth noting a contrast here with other sources for Paul, as well as what other commentators make of those sources. The person chosen to dispute Paul’s theology at the Council was, as Newman tells us, a priest from Antioch named Malchion; but Newman does not give us any of the extracts of the dispute, even though they are preserved in a number of sources. Mosheim, for instance, in a section cited in Arians, says, “the point at issue between this Samosatean [sic] and Malchion can be drawn from Theodoret [Haeret. Fab. ii.8]” (de reb ii, 240).148 Cave is aware that, as he writes in the Historia Literaria in his entry on Malchion, “From this disputatio or Dialogus Leontius [of Byzantium] drew selections for the book contra Nestorium” (Hist Lit 99).149 Had Newman wanted to delve more deeply into Paul’s theology, the lead was there in Mosheim and in Cave’s entry on Malchion. Moreover, Paul had purportedly left his own words to posterity, the “Ten Questions” to Dionysius, mentioned by Cave in his entry on Paul (Hist Lit 98), and also by Mosheim (de reb ii, 232). What sources does Newman use? He cites none of these, although from somewhere among them must have come the notion that “the Son was but inhabited by a divine power or presence impersonal, and therefore had no real existence before He came

148 For Newman’s footnote on this section of Mosheim, see Arians 5. While Mosheim argued that Paul’s opinion “is so variously and inconsistently stated by the ancients, that it is with difficulty ascertained,” yet he tried hard to figure out what Paul taught (de reb ii, 228).

149 The Acta of the Council of Antioch in 268/9 were also recorded in the fifth century by Eusebius of Dorylaeum.
in the flesh" (Arians 128). Newman does refer to a letter from some bishops early on in the Council, which he confusingly calls the “Synodal Letter” (although its contents are different from the letter against Paul, more commonly called that, recorded by Eusebius). This source gives Paul’s argument that the Son had no pre-existence before the birth of Jesus Christ by making a counter-argument: that scripture shows “His ministrative office under the Jewish law, such as His appearance to Abraham and Jacob, and to Moses in the burning bush” (Arians 129). Here Newman likens Paul’s theology to the heresy of “emanationism,” one of many early heresies that seem to converge in Newman’s discussion of Paul. It was a form of Sabellianism, says Newman, which conceived of Christ as an emanation (aporrhoia) of God instead of a divine Person (hypostasis), and thus held there to be no pre-existence of the Son before his incarnation.

Yet Newman was not investigating Paul’s words but his method of argument. Even Paul’s opponent, Malchion, is mentioned primarily for the fact that he was trained as a sophist like Paul. It made sense to Newman that only a sophist could triumph over another in argument: “Malchion, a presbyter of Antioch, who, having been by profession a Sophist, encountered his adversary with his own arms” (Arians 27, my italics).
Newman’s use of the past tense, which I have put in italics here, implies that Malchion turned his back on philosophy when he embraced Christian theology, or at least made it the handmaid of theology. Malchion had raided the Egyptian stores for the most convincing rhetoric he could find and then used it to teach Christian truth – just as Origen did in Alexandria. Newman strives to argue that Paul remained a sophist and never became a theologian, by contrast to Malchion, which prevented him from seeing the fullness of Christian truth. It should be noted, however, that Eusebius shows Malchion as head of the school of sophists in Antioch at the time of his dispute with Paul – a fact which Newman’s account omits.

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150 In his footnote on Arians 129, Newman cites Routh’s Reliquiae Sacrae as his source for what is now called the “Letter of the Six Bishops.” Newman’s confusion on what to call the letter might be as a result of another insight of Behr (2001): “The names of the six bishops to whom the letter is attributed appear among the names given in the ‘Synodal Letter,’ and it is possible that this letter was composed at one of the earlier meetings and sent to Paul prior to the final assembly,” 220.

151 Eusebius describes Malchion as “principal of a school of rhetoric, one of the centres of Hellenic education at Antioch” (EH vii.29). Cave follows Eusebius in making him currently the head of the school, whereas Mosheim says that Malchion “had presided over the school of the Sophists at Antioch” (de reb ii, 240, my italics).
Both Cave and Newman refer to Paul’s heresy as the reincarnation of Artemas (or Artemon). In this they follow Eusebius, who writes: “Artemon’s heresy, which again in my own day Paul of Samosata has tried to revive... [held] that the Saviour was merely man” (EH v.28). Eusebius does not explain the christological consequences of the doctrine of ψιλόν ἀνθρώπον,152 but considers this doctrine to be reflected in the Synodal Letter’s remark that “[Paul] will not admit that the Son of God came down from heaven... especially where he says that Jesus Christ is from below” (EH vii.30). While Eusebius does not give his readers much more on which to base a depiction of Paul’s/Artemas’s christology, Cave and Mosheim supplement this with Epiphanius’s remarks in the Panarion lxv.1.5.153 Mosheim quotes the source regarding Jesus Christ, that “The divine Reason came and solely operated in him” (de reb ii, 239). Based on this same source, Cave argues that “By his position, and because he was so full of himself as to force out the truth (as Epiphanius says), [Paul] revived the Artemonian heresy, denying that Christ the Word of God had an hypostasis [subsistentia] distinct from the Father, and that on earth he was a mere fallen man; before Mary he did not exist, and the Name of the Son of God merited nothing but good works” (Hist Lit 98). Newman’s interest in Artemas’s heresy takes the perspective not of what he said but, once again, of his philosophical argumentation. Newman says, based on EH v.28 (the section on Artemas), the argument by which Paulus of Samosata baffled the Antiochene Council was drawn from a sophistical use of the very word substance, which the orthodox had employed in expressing the scriptural notion of the unity subsisting between the Father and the Son. Such too was the mode of reasoning adopted at Rome by the Artemas or Artemon, already mentioned, and his followers, at the end of the second century (Arians 34).

152 Eusebius does, however, quote those who see it as a rejection of “the books of Irenaeus, Mileto, and the rest, which proclaim Christ as God and man, and all the psalms and hymns written from the beginning by faithful brethren, which sing of Christ as the Word of God and address Him as God” (EH v.28).

153 Behr (2001) thinks the christology described in Panarion lxv.1.5 resembles that of an earlier Antiochene theologian, Theophilus: “Epiphanius also claims that Paul held the Word to be a nonsubstantial, nonpersonal utterance of God, or thought existing in God like ‘reason in the heart of man,’ perhaps echoing the distinction between an ‘immanent’ and an ‘uttered’ logos taught in Antioch a century earlier by Theophilus,” 217.
This quotation can be compared with what Cave wrote in his two works, the *Ecclesiastici* and the *Historia Literaria*. Throughout this chapter, it has been noted that Newman’s account has similarities with Cave’s account in the *Ecclesiastici*, since, for both, the role of philosophy is key to understanding theological heresy. It is not simply the location of the school, but the type of philosophy it teaches that produces heresy. Although resident at Rome, and not in Antioch, Artemas ran a school of sophists in the vein followed by Paul. Newman has gone beyond Cave’s *Historia Literaria*, however, by connecting a sophistical philosophy to the “very word *substance*” as it referred to the unity of Father and Son. His interest here is only the philosophical perspective. Paul’s sophistry allowed him to trick the bishops at the Council of Antioch, the rejection of *homoousion* being seen less as a theological doctrine than a sophistical argument.

Newman introduces the word *homoousion* at this point, chapter I section two of *Arians*, primarily because he is using Athanasius as his source— or, more precisely, Athanasius as he is quoted in Bull. It was Bishop Bull who argued that post-Nicene and pre-Nicene use of *homoousion* was the same, whereas I have been arguing that Newman is more interested in pre-Nicene than post-Nicene (or Athanasian) orthodoxy. It is not surprising, however, that at this point in his argument Newman resembles Bull, for Bull too viewed Paul as a sophist intent on preventing the Alexandrians from using *homoousion*. In chapter I of *Arians*, “the celebrated word” is not discussed in the context of third-century theology (the subject of chapter II), but is used to show that Paul was a sophist who influenced Arius. Both heretics in their day presented sophistical arguments against “*homoœsion* (consubstantial) . . . which the orthodox had employed in the controversy, and to which Paulus objected as open to a misinterpretation. Arius followed in the track thus marked out by his predecessor” (*Arians* 28). Newman is, at

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154 Rather than quote from *de Synodis* extensively, he refers us to Bull’s account of the *homoousion* debate in *Defensio* ii.1 §9-14 ( *Arians* 28 note 5; also 34 note 1). Newman’s direct quotations of Athanasius in *Arians* are few.

155 Taking an argument straight from Athanasius, who described “Paul[ ]'s] attempted sophistry” in *de Synodis* §45, Bull wrote: “in striving by every means to overthrow the received doctrine of the divinity of the Son, [Paul] employed a sophistical argument, derived from a wrong understanding of the meaning of the expression ‘of one substance;’ and thus: If the Son be of one substance with the Father, as you (Catholics) say, it will follow, that the Divine Substance is, as it were, severed into two parts, whereof one constitutes the Father, and the other the Son; and thus that there existed a certain Divine Substance, anterior to the Father and the Son, which afterwards was distributed into two parts” (*Defensio* 78).
this early point in his career, interested in the dynamic nature of theological language that makes someone like Origen a precursor not of heresy but of an enriched orthodoxy. Thus, in chapter I section five, he defends Origen and his pupils for their doubts about "the word Homoílosion" because it had become "more or less connected with Gnostic, Manichaean, and Sabellian theologies. Hence early writers, who had but opposed these heresies, seemed in a subsequent age to have opposed what had been by that time received as the characteristic of orthodoxy" (Arians 129). But, at this stage in his thought, Newman is not prepared to go against Bull by arguing that pre-Nicenes thus had a different theology of ousia from those writers who came after Nicaea. Newman would clarify his thoughts on this subject in the early-1840s, however, carrying to a logical conclusion the suggestion that Alexandrians like Origen and Dionysius could not countenance homoousion because of its Manichaean/materialist and Sabellian/emanationist overtones.156

In what follows, it is important to distinguish Newman’s attack on sophistical approach to doctrine, and his defence of Origen and his followers’ exegetical approach. Both struggled with the conception of homoousion, both subordinated the Son to the Father, but how they did this proved the crucial difference for Newman.

Mirror Opposites: 2) Alexandrian orthodoxy

In the remarkable chapter II of Arians, the young Newman shows that what we regard as "traditional statements of the Catholic doctrine, which are more explicit than Scripture, had not as yet, when the [Arian] controversy began, taken the shape of formulae" (Arians 234). The phrases Newman uses in this history of doctrine – teachings which “called for the imposition of,” or were “consigned,” to formulae – suggest a faith that becomes frozen rather than living in order to test against heresy.157 Although

156 By contrast to Bull in my previous footnote, Newman in 1842 recognised that, whatever Athanasius wrote about Paul, it need not mean that “Catholics” in the third century used homoousion. See chapter four below.

157 Does Rowan Williams actually follow Newman’s insights into the pre-Nicenes when he writes the following? “In short, Origen’s sense of what orthodoxy requires, because it is based upon a close connection between orthodoxy and the practice of systematic spiritual exegesis..., is almost bound to appear heterodox in an age when the dominant discourse of theology is moulded by the pressure to agree formularies that can be communicated economically and authoritatively.” Williams, Rowan, “Origen:
Newman bases his thesis on a number of quotations from Athanasius in these chapters, nevertheless he sees a decline in the way doctrine was taught by post-Nicenes compared to pre-Nicenes.

The fourth section of chapter II focuses firstly on teaching about the divinity and humanity of Christ, and secondly on two aspects of trinitarian teaching the “Catholic” pre-Nicenes recognised but which Antiochenes ignored: the doctrines of coinherence and monarchia. “Catholic Trinitarianism” is here opposed to “all counterfeits, whether philosophical, Arian, or Oriental” (Arians 174, my italics). Chapter I showed where the Oriental sophists in Antioch, as well as the Eclectics, were wrong. In chapters III to V, Newman will show the Arians were wrong because, in continuity with the Antiochene sophists, they interpret “ecclesiastical doctrine” incorrectly.

All early modern and modern writers on patristic doctrine were in one way or another commenting on the great Catholic scholar Petavius. In recognising a gulf between pre- and post-Nicene teaching on the Trinity, Petavius’s *de Trinitate* set the scene for succeeding generations to explain early trinitarian doctrine. Petavius challenged the idea that the faith of the pre-Nicene Church resembled the categories employed at the Council of Nicaea. Indeed, in many instances, the pre-Nicene Fathers had more in common with the Arians, than with the Council that condemned Arius’s teaching. Petavius regarded Origen as a particularly dangerous example of the inherently heretical teaching of the pre-Nicenes on the Trinity. He wrote, “As to Origen, it is certain that he entertained impious and absurd opinions concerning the Son and the Holy Spirit” (*de Trin* i.12 §9). Petavius argued that the source of the early Fathers’ heresy was Platonism, and this can be seen in four doctrinal loci. The first locus centres on the pre-Nicene figure on whom so much of Newman’s early theology depends, Origen, especially in the face of the charges of Platonism in his conception of the relation of creation to creator. The second and third loci discuss subordinationism with reference to the two different perspectives usually taken of trinitarian doctrine, the theological and the economic. Newman discerned the distinction between the theological and economic view of the Son’s relation to the Father in the writings of Clement and Origen in

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particular, "Thus [economia] is applied by the Fathers, to the history of Christ’s humiliation, as exhibited in the doctrines of His incarnation, ministry, atonement, exaltation, and mediatorial sovereignty, and, as such distinguished from the ‘theologia’ or the collection of truths relative to His personal indwelling in the bosom of God" (Arians 74). The fourth locus is one in which Origen is not accused of being Platonic, but other pre-Nicenes are, which is to say the Son’s co-eternity with the Father.\(^{158}\)

(a) The question of the diastēma between Father and Son: Arius is reported by Athanasius to have written in the Thalia, “for him [the Son] it is impossible to search out the mysteries of the Father, who exists in himself; for the Son does not [even] know his own substance” (de Synodis 15).\(^{159}\)

By the time of Nicaea, theologians drew a clear divide (diastēma) between God on the one hand, and the things God had created ex nihilo on the other. But this foundational question of Nicene theology – whether to set the diastēma between God and the Son or between the Father/Son/Spirit triad and creation – was far from decided in the pre-Nicene era. A failure to recognise the subtleties of this debate about division explains some of the confusion amongst later commentators on this early period. So here the subtleties will be discussed briefly.

“Up to about A.D. 200,” writes Williams, “the consensus among philosophers was that God and matter were co-eternal (that is, matter was agenētos).”\(^{160}\) Origen (d. 253) was writing around the time that the philosophical consensus was shifting, and some of his arguments played a part in the rejection of the idea of two agenēta by Methodius of Olympus (d. c311), who was successful in radically dissociating the Creator from creation.\(^{161}\) This philosophical shift had an obvious impact among Christian theologians,

\(^{158}\) Origen’s references to the co-eternity of the Son include Commentary on Jeremiah ix.4, 70. 3-28, de Principiis i.1.9, 40.11, iv.4.1, 350.15-16, Commentary on John i.29, 37.2-12, ii.1, 53.14-24. This list is taken from Williams, Rowan, Arius 2nd edition (London: SCM, 2001), 320 note 176.

\(^{159}\) Trans. Williams (2001), 103.

\(^{160}\) Williams (2001), 184.

\(^{161}\) In fact, Methodius “takes the Origenian assumption that God cannot ‘begin’ to be the creator of a world of ordered matter... and turns it against Origen by pointing out that an eternally passive material principle cannot but be an agenētos substance.” Williams (2001), 186.
and provides a good historical reason both why Arius thought only the Father was unoriginate (agennētos), and why Athanasius depicted Arius as saying the Son was merely a creature. Either the Son was God, or he was created by God: Nicene orthodoxy put the Son on the divine side, while the Arians were seen to put him on the side of the creatures. When judged by the standards of this later theology, the terms of which had not been set in Origen’s day, many of Origen’s writings seem to place the Son on the side of creatures. Indeed Petavius wrote, “Origen, as he preceded Arius in time, so was he his equal in impiety; nay, he taught him his impious doctrine” (de Trin i.12 §10).

For Petavius, then, it was Origen who handed on to the Arians the idea that the Son of God was to be classed with creatures, rather than with God. In the Preface to On First Principles, for example, Origen described the Son as “made” by the Father, rather than “begotten.” In book iv. 4, Origen calls the Son “a thing created, wisdom” using the Greek word ktisma rather than the word used by the Nicene Fathers, gennēma, a thing begotten. Petavius also discusses (in de Trin i.12 §§6-7) Origen’s description of the Son as “a generated God” or genēton in the missing commentary on Psalm 1, as recorded by Epiphanius in On the heresy of Origen. To Petavius, Origen appeared as the source of the Arian arguments that the Son was a creature rather than, as the Nicene Creed held,

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163 Translated in Defensio 220.

164 Origen’s translator, Butterworth, notes: “Jerome, Ep. Ad Avitum 2, says that in the beginning of the first book of the De Principiis Origen declared that ‘Christ was not begotten the Son of God, but made such’. (Latin factum=Greek genēton). Rufinus has modified this statement. It is probable, however, that genēton and gennēton were not very clearly distinguished in Origen’s time. Origen certainly taught that the Son and Holy Spirit were created, but he thought that the alternative to this was to assert that they were unbegotten, which was true of the Father alone.” de Principiis 3 note 1.

165 de Principiis 314 note 6. Moreover, Origen is using the image of created wisdom from Proverbs (8:22 is quoted), and equating it to the “first born of every creature” in Col 1:15. For more on Origen’s view of the Son as God’s Wisdom, see my next note.

166 Bull counters Petavius by quoting Contra Celsum vi.17, in which Origen “proves the absolutely divine and uncreated nature of the Son in these words, which are clearer than any light; ‘For no one can worthily know Him who is ingenerate [agenēton] and the first-born of all generated nature, as the Father who begat [gennēsas] Him, nor the Father as [can] the living Word, both His Wisdom and Truth’” (Defensio 230). Arius also accepted the Son as Word and Wisdom, but not as agenēton.
homoousios with the Father. Petavius did not take into account the rapid development in terminology in between the year 200 and the Council of 325; indeed it will become clear that few later churchmen did consider the pre-Nicenes on their own terms, even the ones who defended them from Petavius’s charges. Rather, the standard by which to judge the likes of Origen was whether they placed the divide (diastēma) between the God and creation, as the Nicenes did, or between the hypostases, as the Arians did. Were the Son and Spirit one with the Father or with creation?

Cudworth was aware of the need to avoid using the language of homoousion when it did not apply. The Neoplatonists of Origen’s day had no conception of “one and the same numerical substance or essence,” yet even they “acknowledged none of those hypostases to be creatures, but all God” (TIS 592). The Neoplatonists were not, then, the source of the heresy that saw the Son as merely a creature. Or were they? Cudworth, though more sympathetic to the Neoplatonists than Petavius, nevertheless shows how perilously close they came to leaving the third hypostasis on the side of creatures. Gysi succinctly sums up the argument:

Cudworth rejects the Neo-Platonic view of the Trinity as a progressive dividing out of the transcendent One into multiplicity, whether this process is understood as taking place in three strides or as a continuum. He, nevertheless, appreciates the desire lying behind this view, to preserve the strict oneness of the transcendent cause beyond Being and Knowledge. Yet, from the conception of such a progressive division, it is obviously but a small step towards considering the third “hypostasis” psyche as World-Soul, which is immersed in matter and directs the universe in vital union from within.¹⁶⁷

Cudworth, therefore, recognised within the Neoplatonists a tendency towards “dividing out” the hypostases – from the most transcendent (hen) to the more earth-bound hypostases (nous and psyche), the third hypostasis in particular descending, as it were, far below. This is similar to what Arius is recorded to have written in the Thalia: “You should understand that the Monad [always] was, but the Dyad was not before it came to

¹⁶⁷ Gysi, Lydia, *Platonism and Cartesianism in the Philosophy of Ralph Cudworth* (Bern: Herbert Lang, 1962), 107, citing TIS 552.
be... and he [lit.: this one – the Holy Spirit?] is different from both” (de Synodis 15).168

The next generation of theologians after Origen, Cudworth seems to say, could have interpreted the Neoplatonic arguments to mean that the second and third hypostases are detached from the One. This will be the argument presented by Cave for the birth of Arianism.

Conditioned by the later Church to speak in the doctrinal terms taken only from the Councils, the later commentators who are being examined discussed the pre-Nicenes in terms of whether they considered the divine hypostases to be *homoousios*. For the rest of this section, Origen and Justin Martyr will function as the exemplary pre-Nicenes of these later discussions of consubstantiality. Bull is sure Justin spells out the doctrine of consubstantiality when Justin “says that the Son is begotten of the Father, just as fire is kindled of fire. But who will refuse to allow that the fire which is kindled of another fire is of the self-same nature and substance as it? as Justin himself says elsewhere in the same Dialogue” (Defensio 138).169 Newman, however, does not perceive the language of *homoousion* here. Rather, it was a word chosen *later* to make clearer the sorts of argument Justin was making: “For this purpose the word *homoüision* or *consubstantial* was brought into use among Christian writers” (Arians 186). Newman recognises that only after a good deal of thought did the Fathers fix upon consubstantiality as the best way to describe the relation of the three hypostases. This is at the heart of what separates Newman from early moderns like Bull. The earlier thinkers are more ready to read the later terminology of Nicaea into the language of the pre-Nicenes. Newman has no need to do so; and to understand why he has no need, the difference in context between himself and the earlier English scholars should be explained.

As discussed in chapter one above, Arians holds that the pre-Nicene Church stayed robustly “orthodox” precisely because it refused to formulate what orthodoxy was. Williams interprets Newman as saying:

Yes, belief had been there from the start, but the language of Christians had taken time to catch up with the fullness of what was believed; in an era when Christian commitment was radical and deep, and there was a proper spiritual formation for

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169 Referring to Trypho 61.
members of the Church, it was simply the case that those who needed to understand did understand. Furthermore, theological language, though unsystematic in this early age, had had its own ways of correcting misunderstanding by its variety and fluidity; it was never mortgaged to one set of images, even though it dealt with images rather than formulae.  

By resisting “mortgaging” themselves to a single formulation of doctrine, the language of the earliest Fathers (unlike the post-Nicenes) was rich and fluid. One practical example of this is Origen’s description of the Son as the “radiance” of the Father. Only at Nicaea was the looser language of “doxologies” replaced by the credal orthodoxy of the homoousion (Arians 180). Arians, then, was a manifesto on behalf of a movement that sought to reclaim the robustness and richness of the pre-Nicene Fathers. This movement was fighting a different set of battles from those of the seventeenth-century divines. In the seventeenth century, High Churchmen like Bull and Cave responding to puritans, who claimed an ordered Church was unbiblical, by arguing that little had changed between the “primitive” era and Nicaea. They also had to reply to Petavius, whose idea was that the pre-Nicenes erred without a Magisterium, by showing that the Church had always taught the same thing. Rather than needing to justify the orthodoxy of the Fathers in response to these challenges from left and right, as Bull and Cave had done, Newman sought to regroup the Church of England around patristic teachings in all their richness, holiness and emotion.

However, none of this is to say Newman rejected the idea of a pre-Nicene “orthodoxy” in line with later Fathers. Newman agreed with Bull that Justin was

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170 Williams “Introduction,” xxxiii.

171 Origen’s terminology became unacceptable, Newman recognises, for historical reasons: “In Origen’s comment on the Hebrews, the homoousion of the Son is deduced from the figurative title apaugasma, or radiance, there given to Him... But at this era, the middle of the third century, a change took place in the use of it and other similar words, which is next to be explained. The oriental doctrine of Emanations was at a very early period combined with the Christian theology. According to the system of Valentinus, a Gnostic heresiarch, who flourished in the early part of the second century, the Supreme Intelligence of the world gave existence to a line of Spirits or Eons, who were all more or less partakers of His nature” (Arians 188-9).
opposing a heresy of the day with some early understanding of orthodoxy. Orthodoxy is, for Bull and Newman, the Church’s truth as it is taught in response to the heresies of the day. Whilst Newman does not accept that the pre-Nicenes had fixed the truth in terms of **homoousion**, nevertheless they were already talking about the unity of God’s **ousia**, which was from the earliest date used to express the reality and subsistence of the Son...

Justin Martyr, for instance, speaks of heretics, who considered that God put forth and withdrew His Logos when it pleased Him, as if He were an influence, not a Person, somewhat in the sense afterwards adopted by Paulus of Samosata and others. To meet this error, he speaks of Him as inseparable from the substance or being, **usia**, of the Father (*Arians* 186).

Newman here cites the **Dialogue with Trypho** 128, a complicated piece of early “orthodoxy.” Although, in respect of the Father, the Son is “something numerically distinct,” it is not “as if the essence of the Father [**tou Patros ousias**] were divided.”

Justin is working hard with language to depict within God a distinction (from the verb **apomerizo**) that is not a division (from the verb **merizō**). What Newman means in using Justin, however, was to prove that the pre-Nicenes conceived **ousia**-language as having to do first of all with divine personality.

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172 Though, for Bull, it was not the Samosatene heresy but a “teaching very nearly the same as was afterwards maintained by Sabellius” (*Defensio* 138).

173 Thus, for both of them, heresy forced the Church to adopt the creed. Bull wrote: “Surely it is most certain, that the [Nicene] fathers, in their Creed, although they intended primarily to impugn the dogma of Arius, do yet in some places touch on the heresies of others. For instance, when they define that all things were made by the Son, they do not aim a blow at the Arians, who never denied this, but at the Ebionites, Artemonites, Samosatenes, and other heretics of the same stamp” (*Defensio* 241).

174 ANF trans.

175 Interestingly, Petavius took this distinction that is not a division within God to be what the Nicene Creed meant by “Light from Light.” Petavius asks rhetorically, “What can be added to this profession of the faith and of the Trinity? or what has been set forth more express, more significant, more effectual, in the assembly of the fathers at Nice itself, or after it? For the formula which was there settled, God of God, Light of Light, very God of very God, was anticipated so long before by this sentiment of Justin” (*Preface to de Trin*). Translated in *Defensio* 138.

176 Personality here does not have “psychological” connotations. Newman rejects what Rowan Williams rejects: “the assumption that hypostasis means (or includes in its meaning) ‘personality’, the assumption, that is, that it is a psychological category. Any historical survey – indeed, even a moment’s sober reflection
Newman took the passage from Justin to be proof that the pre-Nicenes had a language of ousia that was unlike the Neoplatonists'. Before him, Cudworth had shown that the Neoplatonists spoke of God as hyperousios precisely to keep the divine hen transcendent and divided from the hypostases that were closer to creation.177 Newman, however, argues that the pre-Nicenes were not primarily Platonic when they referred to God’s ousia. Instead, they used the notion of ousia on biblical grounds, he says, especially the Septuagint’s translation of the divine name as ho ὅν, while the Platonists “chose to refine [the notion], and from an affectation of reverence refused to speak of God except as hyperusios” (Arians 186). Put simply, the pre-Nicenes referred to the divine ousia as a way of thinking about God’s personhood, which is to say God’s revelation through the Person/ousia of the Son – first as a voice in the burning bush, then in the flesh.178 The Neoplatonists, on the other hand, wanted to use ousia language as a protection against trying to think of God as ousia in precisely this personal sense, which is to say a protection against making the Logos equal to God. Heretics, writes Newman, tried to employ this Platonic argument to attack the use of homoousion among the early “orthodox.” But, not least to confute the heretics, the Alexandrian Fathers held on to the word homoousion in the sense of ousia used by Justin, with its personal and not material meaning:

It is worth observing that, when the Asiatic Churches had given up the consubstantial, they [the Alexandrians], on the contrary, had preserved it. Not only Dionysius willingly accepts the challenge of his namesake of Rome, who reminded him of the value of the symbol; but Theognostus also, who presided at the Catechetical School at the end of the third century (Arians 193). As will be seen repeatedly in his work of the 1830s, Newman sees a dynamic continuity between the thought of the Greek-educated Justin, Clement and Origen, and those who followed in the Alexandrian school.

— should make it plain that this is not and could not be the case.” Williams, “Person and Personality in Christology” in Downside Review vol. 94 (1976), 254.

177 In fact, Newman cites both Cudworth and Petavius for this term (Arians 195 note 8).

178 Newman writes that the Word and Spirit each have a Personality, rather than “the apparent Personality ascribed to Them in the Old Testament,” but it is a Personality derived from the Father’s (Arians 154).
At a later date, it should be noted, Newman became dissatisfied with the generalisations he made about the pre-Nicenes in *Arians*. For what Justin said, and what Origen said, were not the same thing. In the quotation concerning *Trypho* 128, although Newman states that *ousia* and Logos meant roughly the same thing to all pre-Nicenes, he overlooks the fact that the same was true of the Neoplatonists. This is not, therefore, the source of opposition between Neoplatonists and Origen that the early Newman would have us believe. For in using *ousia* to mean Logos, both Origen and the Neoplatonists sought to express a division between God and the Logos in terms of *ousia*. The later Newman adds in a footnote that Origen employed the word “*hyperusios*” – or *epekeina ousias* – in *Contra Celsum* vi.64 (*Arians* 186 note 2). Just as much as the Neoplatonists distinguished *hen* from *nous*, Origen drew a distinction between the being of the Logos and the God beyond being.

(b) The question of subordination in the “theological” Trinity: Origen wrote, “the Son is not more powerful than the Father, but subordinate (*hypodeesteron*); according to his own words, ‘The Father that sent Me, is greater than I’” (*Contra Celsum* viii § 15).179

Petavius presented the scholars who followed him with two arguments. First, as seen above, he regarded certain pre-Nicene Fathers to be the source of the Arian heresy. Secondly, Petavius opposed the subordinationist language of the pre-Nicenes not just because it resulted in heresy, but because the special influence of Platonism on the pre-Nicenes made them inherently heretical. Cudworth accepts this second argument only in part: he is willing to admit that doctrine in the early Church was not “pure” (at least in the sense which Petavius means, that is, doctrine free from Platonism).180 But Cudworth challenges Petavius’s view that the pre-Nicene Fathers erred owing to their Platonism. For Cudworth, Platonism is part of Christian discourse, and his aim is to distinguish a good type of “Refined Platonism” in Christian doctrine from the “Junior Platonism” of

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179 Quoted from *Arians* 165.

180 Cudworth affirms that the pre-Nicene Fathers “are by Petavius taxed for Platonism, and having by that means corrupted the purity of the Christian faith, in this article of the Trinity. Which how it can be reconciled with those other opinions, of ecclesiastic tradition being a Rule of Faith, and the impossibility of the visible Churches erring in any point, cannot easily be understood” (*TIS* 595).
certain Neoplatonists. He argues the pre-Nicene use of Plato was acceptable – indeed it was inevitable, due to the similarities of Platonic and Christian notions of the Trinity. Petavius was right, says Cudworth, to see trinitarian doctrine before Nicaea to be different from that which came later, but he was wrong to claim that pre-Nicene doctrine tended towards Arianism simply because it was Platonic. Cudworth argues for a very slender distinction between the type of Neoplatonism that tended towards subordination “ad extra,” and the type of Neoplatonism that recognised subordination “ad intra.” The first type of subordination resulted in the heresy of Arius, writes Cudworth, while the second type resulted in the “orthodox Fathers” of the Nicene Council.

Cudworth, then, accepts the charge that subordination was part of the pre-Nicene account of the “theological Trinity.” Petavius accuses them of error on the grounds of their subordination. But, to Cudworth, it is unjust for Petavius to criticise the pre-Nicenes when Petavius himself praises the Fathers after Nicaea for something approaching subordination:

[Petavius] concludeth the true meaning of [the Nicene] Creed to be this, that no Person of the Trinity is greater or less than other in respect of the essence of the Godhead common to them all... but that notwithstanding there may be some inequality in them, as they are Hic Deus et Haec Persona. Wherefore when Athanasius, and the other orthodox Fathers, writing against Arius, do so frequently assert the inequality of all the Three Persons, this is to be understood in way of opposition to Arius only, who made the Son to be unequal to the Father, as heteroousios... one being God, and the other a creature; they affirming on the contrary, that He was equal to the Father, as homoousios... that is, as God and not a creature (TIS 599-600).

Yet, in the section of Petavius that Cudworth quotes in order to make this argument, the Catholic scholar does not use the word “subordination,” let alone imply there is an orthodox type. What Petavius wrote was, “The Father is in a right and Catholick manner affirmed by most of the ancients, to be greater than the Son, and He is commonly said also, without reprehension, to be before Him in respect of original” (Cudworth’s

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181 E.g. TIS 601. Cave also wrote of the Neoplatonists as “Junior Platonists” (Lives 155). Newman prefers “infant Platonism” to “Junior Platonism,” e.g. Arians 112.
translation, *ibid.*). It is one thing to say, as Petavius does here, that the Father is “greater than” and “origin of” the Son, but quite another to say, as Cudworth does, that the Son is “subordinate” to the Father.\(^{182}\)

Cudworth thinks the Nicene Fathers accepted *homoousion* precisely because it allowed room for some sort of subordination, unlike two other options, *tautoousion* and *monoousion*. Epiphanius spoke of *tautoousion*, “a generical or specifical, and not of a singular or individual sameness,” the three hypostases each having the same kind of substance, something like a universal (*TIS* 611) – an important concept in chapter four below. Those who considered the hypostases to be *monoousion*, or individually all the same, did not allow for *difference* between the hypostases. Lydia Gysi has subtly shown the slippage of language from inner-trinitarian “difference” into “subordination”:

Cudworth comes to the conclusion that the Trinity cannot be comprehended at all, without the assumption of a certain subordination “ad intra.” Without any kind of difference, there could be neither inter-relation nor action within the Persons.\(^{183}\)

The language of subordination in the pre-Nicenes is something to which Petavius objects altogether. While Petavius could not refuse the second sentence here, he would be very troubled by the first sentence.

Even if they disagree about the amount of subordination in the pre-Nicenes, the early moderns agree that subordination was part of Neoplatonism, and that this has consequences for Arianism. Cudworth and Cave suggest, following Petavius, that the Neoplatonists’ “gradual subordination” led to the idea of *divided* hypostases. Cudworth’s argument about the Neoplatonists is by far the most subtle. He even complains that many “late writers” (Petavius?), who are unwilling to accept the terms of Platonism, have latched on to the idea of “gradual subordination” as inherently Arian without understanding it in the context of a philosophical framework with no notion of consubstantiality:

\(^{182}\) Cudworth writes: “there are sundry places in Scripture which do not a little favour, some *subordination* and priority both of order and dignity, in the persons of the Holy Trinity; of which none is more obvious, than that of our Saviour Christ, ‘My Father is greater than I’” (*TIS* 598, my italics).

\(^{183}\) Gysi (1962), 107.
And this is the true reason, why so many late writers, have affirmed Platonism to symbolize with Arianism, and the latter to have been indeed nothing else than the spawn of the former, meerly [sic] because the Platonists did not acknowledge one and the same numerical essence or substance of all their three hypostases; and asserted a gradual subordination of them; but chiefly for this latter ground. Upon which account some of the ancients also, have done the like, as particularly S. Cyril [of Jerusalem] (TIS 592).

The use of “merely” here is interesting, suggesting the arguments for a direct link between Platonism and Arianism are minimal. Without an idea of one divine substance, how can the Neoplatonists be blamed for subordinating the hypostases? There was no substance in which they found their unity. But, in spite of this, they conceived not of multiple gods, but of one hen with two subordinate hypostases. Still, Cudworth admits “manifest disagreements” between himself and the Neoplatonists, disagreements which can “by no means be dissembled, palliated, or excused” (TIS 592). The trouble with a “gradual subordination” within the Trinity, however, is the hypostases become divided out or graduated according to the relation to the earth (as discussed in the first doctrinal locus above). Cave took up Cudworth’s argument and inserted an element of paranoia. The Neoplatonists, “out of spite for Christianity, (to which the old scheme [of the Platonic Trinity] did too near approach,) began to depart from the ancient doctrine of Plato in this matter, stretching the differences, and gradual subordination, which the elder Platonists had made among the hypostases into too wide a distance” (Lives 155, my italics). It should be noted here that, as for Cudworth, a degree of subordination among the hypostases is acceptable, as long as it does not go to “too wide a distance,” which it did with the Neoplatonists and – crucial for Cave – with Arius whom they taught in Alexandria.

For Newman, of course, the Neoplatonists in Alexandria were not responsible for the Arian misunderstanding of the Trinity. But though he rejects Petavius’s first

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184 For Cudworth, three hypostases – if they were identical and undifferentiated – spoke of tritheism. Rather, “the Platonick Christian would further apologize for these pagan Platonists after this manner. That their intention in thus subordinating the hypostases of their Trinity, was plainly no other, than to exclude thereby a plurality of co-ordinate and independent Gods, which they supposed an absolute co-equality of them would infer” (TIS 596).
argument, that Platonism is to blame for Arianism, Newman still has to defend the Fathers against Petavius's second argument, that pre-Nicene doctrine was inherently Platonic and thus heretical. In Arians, Newman seems to turn to Bull for some help in this second argument. He quotes these words from the Bishop: “The Catholic doctors, both before and after the Nicene Council, are unanimous in declaring that the Father is greater than the Son, even as to divinity [paternity?]; i.e. not in any nature or essential perfection... but alone in what may be called authority, that is in point of origin” (Arians 164-5, Defensio 571). Put simply, Bull says the pre-Nicenes conceived the Father as different from the Son only as origin, or author; the two are not divided in substance or perfection. It should be noted that Newman has to correct Bull in the midst of quoting him here, for though the Bishop does not accept any subordination within the Trinity, his terminology would nevertheless push him towards Cudworth's subordinationism if the Father really was greater in his divinity. Although he accepts inner-trinitarian difference (for instance, in the Father being origin of the Son, as the pre-Nicene doctrine of “monarchia” stated), Newman does not concede that this requires there be subordination within the Trinity.

Newman will admit, however, unlike Bull, that the pre-Nicenes had a real problem finding the right language to differentiate properly the divine persons. An Alexandrian like Clement, for instance, is accused by some of appearing to divide the hypostases, suggesting ditheism, and by others of appearing to diminish their differences, suggesting emanationism, as when using the image of the sun and its ray for Father and Son. Newman defends Clement in his customary way, acknowledging the dynamic quality of doctrinal language in this period. For this reason, though, he will not accept

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185 Newman begins by showing the irony of Petavius’s position towards the Alexandrians: “Athenagorus is charged with Sabellianism by the very writer (Petau), whose general theory is that he was one of those Platonizing Fathers who anticipated Arius.” Newman lists the contradictions inherent in criticising the early Fathers from the perspectives of two different heresies: “Gregory of Neo-Caesarea was called a Sabellian, because he spoke of one substance in the Divine Nature; he was called a forerunner of Arius, because he said that Christ was a creature. Origen, so frequently accused of Arianism, seemed to be a Sabellian, when he said that the Son was Auto-aletheia, the Archetypal Truth” (Arians 224). Newman takes this criticism of Petavius straight from Bull (Defensio 438), citing de Trin iii.5 §4.

186 Newman writes, “Contrasted with all created beings, the Son and the Spirit are of necessity Unoriginate in the Unity of the Father. Clement, for instance, calls the Son, ‘the everlasting, unoriginate, origin and commencement of all things.’ It was not till [the Catholics] became alive to the seeming ditheism of such
Bull’s easy statement that “Origen manifestly teaches, in more than one place, that the Son is equal to and on a par with the Father” (*Defensio* 583). Cudworth, of course, has already noted that while Athanasius “amongst others cites Origen’s testimony too; yet was this only for the eternity and divinity of the Son of God, but not at all for such an absolute co-equality with the Father, as would exclude all dependence, subordination and inferiority” (*TIS* 595). That the language Origen used was subordinationist cannot be escaped, a fact Newman conceded from the beginning (see the quotation with which this section began).

In a footnote to the quotation from Bull above (*Defensio* 571), Newman also includes the quotation from Cudworth above, in which he cites Petavius (*TIS* 599-600). It has been shown that these three – Petavius, Cudworth and Bull – do not hold the same view on the “orthodoxy” of the pre-Nicenes, and Newman seems to cite them all in order to correct them all. Notwithstanding that many of the early Fathers accepted the language of subordination,

orthodox theology has since the time of Arius worn a different aspect; first, inasmuch as divines have measured what they said themselves; secondly, inasmuch as they have measured the Ante-Nicene language, which by its authors was spoken from the heart, by the necessities of controversies of a later date. And thus those early teachers have been made appear technical, when in fact they have only been reduced to system; just as in literature what is composed freely, is afterwards subjected to the rules of grammarians and critics (*Arians* 164).

Newman argues, *contra* Petavius, that the pre-Nicenes should not be “afterwards subjected” to the standards of a later council; *contra* Cudworth, that what is “spoken from the heart” is not the same thing as a systematic argument; and, *contra* Bull, that there is a “difference” in “theology… since the time of Arius.” The pre-Nicenes freely spoke of the Son’s subordination because, for them, this did not contradict unity of the divine substance. Here Newman agreed with Cave, that philosophical systems were not always suited to theological arguments. Only once Arius had forced the Church into a choice between seeing the Son as God or as a creature, did the notion of subordination begin to

phrases, which the Sabellian controversy was sure to charge upon them, that they learned the accurate discrimination observed by Alexander [when writing against Arius]” (*Arians* 183).
imply division within the divine ousia. Only after Arianism, Newman thinks, do doubts arise in our mind about the pre-Nicene position, so that the Christian “would not allow himself to reflect upon what he does, did not the attack of heresies oblige him” (Arians 163).\textsuperscript{187}

(c) The question of subordination in the “economic” Trinity: Athanasius caricatures Arius’s position as, “God used to be on his own (monos), and his Word and Wisdom did not yet exist. But then God wanted to make us; and only then did he make some kind of being (hena tina) that he dubbed Word, Wisdom and Son, so that through him he might make us” (Contra Arianos I.5).\textsuperscript{188}

The Athanasian arguments for confuting Arianism are the ones accepted among these later commentators. But this does not mean Newman, even when he followed his predecessors, thought of himself as necessarily “Athanasian.” By the time of writing Arians, the standard for orthodoxy in English thought was Athanasius. The argument being made here, however, is that in spite of the Athanasian air in which he breathed, Newman was strikingly open to pre-Nicene theology, particularly that of Origen. There were some English precursors to this praise for Origen, not least Cave and Bull. Cudworth was the most plainly Athanasian of the English commentators, his arguments resembling the man whose theology he seemed to value above all others.

Athanasius, in pointing out the mistakes of the Arians, put this question to the Arians: If you are suggesting that the act of creation is beneath God’s dignity, then why is it not also beneath God’s dignity to create a Son who in turn will enact the creation of the world? Athanasius, saw the Arian argument as one with infinite regress, for “if some being as a medium be found for Him [i.e. God the Father], then again a fresh mediator is needed for this second [i.e. the Son], and thus tracing back and following out, we shall invent a vast crowd of accumulating mediators.”\textsuperscript{189} Cudworth made this same argument against the Neoplatonists, again summed up succinctly by Gysi:

\textsuperscript{187} It seems that Newman was concerned particularly not to hold the position of Cudworth – hence he is clear that after Nicaea one is right to worry about the language of subordination.

\textsuperscript{188} Trans. Williams (2001), 100.
In a gradual descent the transcendent One sends itself out into the Many; the
divine is conceived as a divine sphere, which can be symbolised as a continuum,
upon which any number of points can, ad libidum, be fixed; the result is the
interpolation of intermediary hypostases; thus *henades* ("Ones") were interpolated
between the *en* [sic] and the *nous*; *noes* between the *nous* and the *psychē*; and
*psychai* from the *psychē* down to animal souls. They represent a continuous
descent from the transcendent One down to animal souls. The fixation of three
main hypostases on this continuum appears as arbitrary and unjustified.\(^{190}\)

Cudworth argued this to be a mistake, for in trying to solve the derivation of the Many
from the One, the Neoplatonists lost the particularity of the hypostases within a great
chain of being. The Neoplatonists attempted not just to subordinate the Platonic
hypostases *ad intra*, as seen above, but also *ad extra* — divided them, in other words,
according to their activities in the divine economy.

The question that is relevant in this section, of course, is whether the pre-Nicenes
had a similar subordination within the Godhead based on a division of activities? Arius
conceived a *diastēma* in time between God’s existence and the coming into being of the
Father-Son dyad, during which time the Son is *made* in order to do the work of creating
the cosmos. The Father and Son divide their labour, as it were. But this also leaves the
Son divided from the creation by another *diastēma*. For communication to occur between
God and humans, a being *other than* the Father must make the unknowable God known;
thus, if the incarnation is to occur at all, it must be undertaken by a being who is not of
the same substance as the Father.\(^{191}\) The Son takes flesh, in the Arian view of the
economy, to mediate better the Father to creation, which is the second of the Logos’s
"two phases of existence."\(^{192}\) The incarnation, for an Arian, further underscores the
division in action and in will of the Son and the Father.

\(^{189}\) *Contra Arianos* II.26.

\(^{190}\) Gysi (1962), 108, citing *TIS* 555f.

\(^{191}\) According to Williams (2001), "what is most *distinctive* about the *Thalia,*" as far as it can be
reconstructed from the writings of Athanasius, is "the absolute unknowability of the Father," 105.

\(^{192}\) Williams (2001), 117.
By the standards of Nicene orthodoxy, the Arians considered the Son as only quasi-divine, yet also the creator who fulfils the Father’s will. The pre-Nicenes seemed to come close to this description of the Son too. Petavius paraphrases Tertullian as having said, “[God the Father] then put forth out of Himself, and, as it were, embodied the Word, that is to say, gave unto Him a substance and a Person of His own, at the time when He framed all created things out of nothing, and employed the Word for that purpose” (de Trin i.5 §3). Petavius railed against Origen too, who seemed to mean something similar when he wrote, “the Son of God, the Word, was the immediate Creator, and, as it were, the actual framer of the world; whilst the Father of the Word was primarily Creator, by reason of His having given commandment to His Son, the Word, to make the world (de Trin i.4 §5). Petavius regards these as misunderstandings of the true relation of God to creation, and uses Athanasius as his standard of orthodoxy by which to judge the early Fathers.

Neither Cave nor Bull accepts that the early Alexandrians made mistakes akin to those of the Arians. Among those accused of mistakes, Origen was perhaps most in need of defence, and it is to his aid that they come above all – Cave’s apology for Origen’s purported heresies is far longer than that for the other Alexandrians, Clement or Gregory, just as his “Life” is longer than theirs. In a way that provides a model for Newman, Cave wrote that “the disallowed opinions that [Origen] maintains are many of them such as were not the Catholic and determined doctrines of the Church, nor disputed by divines, but either philosophical, or speculations which had not been thought on before” (Apostolici 236). Even Bull agrees, in respect at least to Origen, that orthodoxy is a work in progress, for some of his writings were “revised when his genius was somewhat tempered by age; others he poured out with the profusion [of]… the heat of youth” (Defensio 220). Newman seems to follow them closely in arguing that Origen’s “speculations, extravagant as they often were, related to points not yet determined by the Church” (Arians 98). Newman’s six-fold defence of Origen from the charge of heresy

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193 Petavius was referring to Contra Praxeas vii. Translation in Defensio 534.

194 Translation in Defensio 233.
(Arians 98-9) is almost identical to the defence of him found in Cave and in Bull.\textsuperscript{196} Newman’s first line of defence is Cave’s last – the vanguard and rearguard position in their respective arguments that Origen was no heretic. Newman recalls Origen’s “habitual hatred of heresy,” which Cave in his account describes as “refusing so much as to communicate in prayer with Paul the Heretic of Antioch” who was a favourite of Origen’s patroness (\textit{Apostolici} 237). Newman’s second point has already been discussed, that Origen’s “speculations… related to points not yet determined by the Church.” Thirdly, in Newman’s words, “[Origen’s] opinions… were imprudently made public by his friends.” Cave explains they “were written privately, and with no intention of being made public” (\textit{Apostolici} 236). Newman’s fourth point is also made by Cave shortly after, that the texts have become corrupt. Bull expands on this, saying that within his lifetime Origen complained that people had interpolated things into his writings that he had not written (\textit{Defensio} 218).\textsuperscript{197}

Fifthly (and more positively) Newman says “the doctrine of the Trinity is [by Origen] clearly avowed, and in particular our Lord’s Divinity energetically and variously enforced.” Cave says the same thing, albeit indirectly, when he notes that “Athenasius, in all the heat of the Arrian [sic] controversies… particularly quotes [Origen] to prove our Lord’s coeternity and coessentiality with the Father exactly according to the decisions of the Nicene Synod” (\textit{Apostolici} 237; but, it should be noticed, \textit{not} “co-equality,” the very attribute Cudworth says Athenasius could not use Origen to prove, \textit{TIS} 595). Newman’s sixth point is made indirectly at this stage of Cave’s argument: “that Athenasius in all the heat of the Arian controversies… should never charge [Origen] on that account” (\textit{Apostolici} 237). Such apologies for the heretical sounding doctrines of the Alexandrians seem to follow a convention begun by Basil of Caesarea. In Cave’s “Life of Gregory of

\textsuperscript{195} Cave calls Clement one of those whose “great piety and serviceableness in their generations while they lived, and the singular usefulness of their writings to posterity since they are dead, are abundantly enough to weigh down any little failures or mistakes that dropped from them” (\textit{Apostolici} 199).

\textsuperscript{196} All three writers use Pierre Daniel Huet (1630-1721), Bossuet’s tutor, as a reference in their defence of Origen. For instance, Bull debates with Petavius (and with Sand, the Socinian) using Huet to defend textual variations that are charitable to Origen (\textit{Defensio} 231).

\textsuperscript{197} This letter is recorded in Rufinus, \textit{de Adult libb. Orig.} Of course, in the ancient world, there are many instances of writers dissociating themselves from works attributed to them, e.g. II Thessalonians 2:2. (I owe this observation to John Behr.)
Neocaesarea” he quotes the defence Basil made of the Wonderworker: his “desire to gain the gentile” meant Gregory was not as careful with his language as became necessary in a later age, and besides many of his arguments were “spoken in the heat of disputation.” The result was that later heretics “strained” his meaning (Apostolici 280-1). Yet, even in spite of these patristic conventions, the extent of the Anglican defence of Origen is somewhat surprising. Admittedly, Origen had been more clearly labelled a heretic by the later Church than other Alexandrian Fathers (anathematised especially at the second council of Constantinople) and thus required more defending. But, for that very reason, it is all the more surprising that Newman and Cave go to such lengths to find excuses, and mitigating circumstances, for the passages in Origen that later councils of the Church found “heretical.”

Bull defended Origen from the claim that the Son was subordinate to the Father in his actions and will in two additional ways. In respect of perceiving the Son as the creative “Power” of God, Origen had called the Son the “second God,” which is to say derived of the Father. His first argument is one he uses often for other pre-Nicenes, that, in spite of a difference of words, Origen meant the same thing as the post-Nicenes. He claims in this case, “Origen called the Son second God, in no other sense than that in which Basil... called Him second in order from the Father” (Defensio 584-5). Cudworth, however, had already recognised how selectively the post-Nicenes quoted from the earlier Fathers, for they did not necessarily mean the same things at all (Athanasius used Origen’s arguments “only for the eternity and divinity of the Son of God, but not at all for such an absolute co-equality of him with the Father,” TIS 595). Bull also had a second, more subtle, argument to show that Origen perceived the Father and Son as equal in their works. Earlier in his two-volume work he wrote the about Origen’s use of the word hōsperei: “The Son, his words are, ‘is the immediate Creator of the world, since He was, as it were, Himself the actual framer of it;’ by which caution [Origen] meant, without doubt, to meet the error of those who refused to admit the undivided operation of the Father and the Son in the same work of creation” (Defensio 234). The presence of

198 Contra Celsum v. 35. Bull also quotes Jerome’s saying this meant, for Origen, “that the Son in comparison with the Father is a very small Light” (Defensio 585), albeit that Bull has “God” instead of Jerome’s word, “Light.”
hôsperei ("as it were") suggests that Origen thought the Son "secondary" to the Father only as a manner of speaking. After all, Bull holds Origen’s doctrine to be that the Father is prior to the Son in no other respect than as origin. 199

Newman adapted Bull’s way of defending the economic Trinity of the early Fathers by seeing them in continuity with the post-Nicenes. A classic example of this—and perhaps one of Newman’s more slippery moments—is his reading of the later Fathers’ notion of connaturalia instrumenta into the pre-Nicene writings. Paraphrasing Petavius’s charge (in de Trin i. 3 §7), Newman recognises that “a ministry is commonly ascribed to the Son and Spirit, and a bidding and willing to the Father, by Justin, Irenaeus, Clement, Origen and Methodius,” a division of divine labour that seems to subordinate the second and third hypostases. But Newman insists we can read these Fathers as “altogether in the spirit of the Post-Nicene authorities already cited… as soon as the second and third Persons are understood to be internal to the Divine Mind, connaturalia instrumenta” (Arians 166). The “spirit” of what the post-Nicenes said, rather than what the pre-Nicenes actually said, is being invoked. Bull seems to be the source of this list of Fathers who can be made orthodox if understood in the spirit of “con-natural instruments” (Defensio 573; Bull’s list does not include Methodius).

However, Newman is not—in spite of first impressions—following Bull in his practice of claiming that the pre-Nicenes used different words but meant the same things as the post-Nicenes. Instead, something new is going on, the implications of which Newman has not yet fully recognised. Newman makes the convincing argument that, since Origen had no conception of a creaturely Son, therefore, even when he used subordinationist language, he must have meant by it something very different from what the Arians meant later. He reports:

Having mentioned the absurd idea, which had prevailed, of parts or extensions in the Divine Nature, [Origen] proceeds: “Rather, as will proceeds out of the mind, and neither tears the mind nor is itself separated or divided from it, in some such

199 Of course Origen subordinated the Spirit more than this suggests. For instance, the Commentary on John ii. 10: “while all things were created through the Word, the Holy Spirit is of more honour than all others and first in rank of all who have been created by the Father through Christ.” Quoted in de Principiis, 3 note 4.
manner must we conceive that the Father has begotten the Son, who is His Image” (Arians 170).

Nevertheless, though different from the fourth-century heretics, Newman will not admit that Origen could also have meant something different from Athanasius or Basil here, even though the logic of his position drives him in that direction. He therefore says that Basil made a very similar argument to Origen, even though the exact content of this quotation from Origen reveals something else. Origen is drawing an analogy between, on the one hand, the relation of mind to will, and on the other, the relation of Father to Son; thus, the Son equates to the will of God. (Origen does not call him specifically the divine “Will” in the way Athanasius does.) In taking this to be an argument for connaturalia instrumenta, Newman retroactively forces Origen into a post-Nicene mould, in suggesting the Son can only be the will of God if he is co-natural (or homoousios) with the Father. By his own standards, Newman does not need to regard the pre-Nicenes through the lens of “co-natural” language. He has, after all, shown the importance of regarding the homoousion as a concept which came after the earliest patristic writings, moreover a word which was at the time of Origen the subject of debate with Paul of Samosata. Newman’s (mistaken) leap from Origen’s analogical argument to a post-Nicene defence of homoousion is completed a few pages later, when he tells us, “it was one of the first and principal interrogations put to the Catholics by their Arian opponents, whether the generation of the Son was voluntary or not on the part of the Father; their dilemma being, that Almighty God was subject to laws external to Himself, if it were not voluntary, and that, if on the other hand it was voluntary, the Son was in the number of things created” (Arians 196). The Catholic retort, typical of Athanasius, is whose nature did the Son share – that of Almighty God or of things created? Yet, framed thus, the question of the divine will was very different at Nicaea from the way Origen himself framed it.

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200 Gregg and Groh argue that Athanasius answers the objection in a way that does not do justice to his Arian interlocutors. They compare the substantialist logic of Athanasius with the voluntarist logic of the Arians, each of which is coherent in itself, but incompatible with the other. See Gregg, R.C., and Groh, D.E., Early Arianism: A View of Salvation (Philadelphia: Fortress, 1981), 161-83.

201 The Athanasian tone to such a question seems evident when, shortly after, Newman quotes the Bishop of Alexandria’s response to these interrogations: “the Arians direct their view to the contradictory of
Like those he followed, Newman could only see Origen as a step along the way to Nicaea. But, in so viewing him, Newman is not measuring Origen with an Athanasian yardstick, as did Petavius, nor, like Cudworth, arguing that Origen and Athanasius said two different things. Rather, he conceives an “Alexandrian” style of language, which Origen shares as much with Athanasius as with Cyril of Alexandria who followed them both. In fact (a rather strange fact, unless he conceived these Fathers as sharing one language), in explaining the counter-arguments to Arianism, Newman quotes Cyril before he quotes Athanasius:

The Catholics wisely answered them by a counter inquiry, which was adapted to silence, without countenancing, the presumptuous disputant. Gregory of Nazianzus asked them, “Whether the Father is God, volens or nolens?” And Cyril of Alexandria, “Whether He is good, compassionate, merciful, and holy, with or against His choice? For, if He is so in consequence of choosing it, and choice ever precedes what is chosen, these attributes once did not exist in God.” Athanasius gives substantially the same answer, solving, however, rather than confuting, the objection. “The Arians,” he says, “direct their view to the contradictory of willing, instead of considering the more important and the previous question; for, as unwillingness is opposed to willing, so is nature prior to willing, and leads the way to it.” (Arians 208; citing Petavius de Trin ii.5 §9, vi.8 §14.)

This Alexandrian style of language – which was also used by the Cappadocians – had its roots, for Newman, in Origen and Clement. Here, I would like to borrow the insight of Rowan Williams, who talks about pre-Nicene doctrine as “what has been called an ‘ecology’ of doctrinal language: within the whole system of Christian speech, words receive their proper sense, balanced by others, qualified and nuanced by their neighbours.”  

Williams elegantly sums up here what Arians brought to the investigation of pre-Nicene doctrine, for unlike his predecessors Newman thought of sound doctrine in terms of a language. By referring to “Christian speech,” Williams

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willing, instead of considering the more important and previous question," that of “nature” or substance (Arians 208).

recalls Newman's emphasis on the "doxologies" in which the Church spoke before a fixed Creed was adopted in 325. I would add to Williams's argument that the right "ecology of Christian language," for Newman, was an Alexandrian one, discerned in the writings of the early Alexandrians and carried on from the fourth century of the Church's history by Athanasius, the Cappadocians and Cyril. Moreover, Newman suggests that sound doctrine was a language that evolved, observing at one point: "The reverential spirit in which the [pre-Nicene] Fathers held the doctrine of the *gennesis*, led them to the use of other forms of expression, partly taken from scripture, partly not, with a view of signifying the fact of the Son's full participation in the divinity of Him who is His Father, without dwelling on the mode of participation or origination, on which they dared not speculate" (*Arians* 162). Even though he regrets the shift from an era of doxologies to one of creeds, his argument here about the doctrine of *gennesis* will later in *Arians* be his justification for the acceptance of the non-scriptural *homoousion* at the Council of Nicaea.²⁰³

d) The co-eternity of the Father and Son: Tertullian wrote, "He has not always been Father and Judge, merely on the ground of His having always been God. For He could not have been the Father previous to the Son, nor a Judge previous to sin" (*adversus Hermogenes* iii).

The *temporal* consequences of the different conceptions of the Trinity among the early Church Fathers is the next doctrinal locus. Some of the pre-Nicenes, while using the language of subordination, had strong arguments for a unity among the hypostases that precluded a *diastēma* between Father and Son. Subsequent scholars, on the other hand, found others to have entertained notions of a temporal *diastēma* between the Father and the Son that approached Arianism, such as Tertullian's quotation above.²⁰⁴ Petavius discerned many writings that suggested the generation of the Son, though not in time, was subsequent to a self-subsistent God. For this very reason, Petavius opposes Novatian's

²⁰³ Newman gives us advance warning that this is the direction his argument is taking in note 3 here, citing Athanasius, *ad Serap.* i. 20.
description of the Son as “God originating from God, so as to be the Second Person, yet not interfering with the Father’s right to be called the one God. For, had He not a birth, then indeed when compared with Him who had no birth, He would seem, from the appearance of equality in both, to make two who were without birth, and therefore two Gods” (quoted in Arians 177).

When it comes to the Anglican commentators, the Latin Fathers seem particularly susceptible to later challenges that they did not accept the co-eternity of the hypostases. Cave dismisses Novatian as a heretic, naming one of the ages of heresy in the Literaria Historia after him, the “saeculum Novatianum.” Though Novatian is defended for his trinitarian doctrine, Bull readily admits he is “no great authority in the Church” (Defensio 476). The English writers seem less willing to defend the Latin Fathers than they were to defend the Greeks. This probably has to do with the association of Latin writers with the Catholic Church of later times. Indeed it is noticeable how few Latin Fathers were printed in seventeenth-century England, compared to Greek Fathers.205 Moreover, of the Latin Fathers who were venerated by Anglicans in the early modern era, Cyprian seems to have been a favourite precisely because he opposed the Latin extremism of Novatian and the papalism of Stephen. Newman in Arians continues within this trajectory of feeling no great veneration for the Latin Fathers. Although Newman traces the Arian claim regarding the Son, that “once he was not,” back to Paul in Antioch, nevertheless, in an interesting footnote at the start of the section on the “The Arian Heresy” he suggests that Origen argued against an early version of Arianism that “might be [from] Tertullian” (Arians 202 note 2).206 Newman’s argument that the home of orthodoxy is Alexandria, not Antioch, is clear throughout – but his subtext may be that the Latin West is also suspect!

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204 His argument against Hermogenes, of course, was a philosophical one: if matter is eternal, as Hermogenes stated, then there can be no God. The context is the question of how even to conceive of time before creation, a subject on which the Christian Church was just cutting its teeth.


206 Newman does not cite his sources, neither Tertullian’s adversus Hermogenes iii, nor Origen’s Commentary on John xx.94.
On the whole, however, Newman like Bull upholds those Fathers traditionally understood as important, whether from the Greek or Latin Church. As is customary for him, Bull seeks to interpret Novatian in a way that appears at one with Nicene orthodoxy. 207 Newman’s defence is more erudite, recognising that the Stoics had two ways of conceiving the Platonic Logos, yet basically makes the distinction Bull does in order to defend some Latin pre-Nicenes whom the Latin Petavius called too Platonic: the “Endiathetic” standing for the Word, as hid from everlasting in the bosom of the Father, while the “Prophoric” was the Son sent forth into the world, in apparent separation from God, with His Father’s name and attributes upon Him, and His Father’s will to perform... [But] if we carry off their expressions hastily or perversely, as some theologians have done, we shall perhaps conclude that they conceived that God existed in One Person before the “going-forth,” and then, if it may be said, by a change in His nature began to exist in a Second Person; as if an attribute (the Internal Word, “Endiathetic;”) had come into substantive being, as “Prophoric.” The Fathers, who have laid themselves open to this charge, are Athenagorus, Tatian, Theophilus, Hippolytus, and Novatian (Arians 198).

In this statement, Petavius is undoubtedly being criticised for “hasty or perverse” interpretations of the Fathers. Moreover, Newman seems to have learnt from Cudworth or Cave to take seriously differences among Platonists about the hypostases, and to have applied what he found to an argumentative form that resembles Bull. For all its originality, Arians was the work of an Anglican among other Anglicans. 208

207 Bull writes, “[Novatian] together with Tertullian, whom he almost always follows, seems to lay down a two-fold nativity of the Son, in that He is God; one, whereby he existed from eternity in God the Father and from Him, as the co-eternal offspring of the eternal Mind; the other, that whereby He went forth from God the Father when He willed, to create the world, and that going forth of His this author, following Tertullian, calls a procession” (Defensio 479).

Conclusions

(a) On the primary sources and their commentators. Petavius followed the early historians of the Church, especially Eusebius of Caesarea, in describing a "catechetical school" at Alexandria. Cave liked Eusebius as a theologian, and as an historian follows him almost word for word. Bull thinks Eusebius "(if any one) acknowledged the subordination of the Son to the Father, as to His origin and principle" (Defensio 569). Newman also thinks that Eusebius is the exemplar of subordinationism: "there is no sufficient evidence in history that the Arians did make this use of Neo-Platonism, considered as a party. I believe they did not, and from the facts of history should conclude Eusebius of Caesarea alone to be favourable to that philosophy" (Arians 114-115). But Newman takes many arguments straight from Eusebius, especially to praise Origen and to demonise Paul of Samosata.

How might Cave have influenced Newman's historiography of the Fathers? Speculating, it seems that Cave and Newman shared two approaches. First, both historians trace out what would today be called a genealogy of heresy. Cave's Historia Literaria divides (all too neatly) into fourteen "saecula" of heresy, which follow the first age, the "Apostolicum." The heresies begin with the "Saeculum Gnosticum," then "Novatianum," "Arianum," "Nestorianum," "Eutychian," "Monotheleticum" and so on up to "Scholasticum." Newman's own account of ecclesiastical epochs shares another thing with Cave's, and that is the choice of heroes and villains. Most of the heroes are Greek Fathers who fought against the "Syrian" and "Latin" heresies of Cave's list – Origen, Athanasius, Basil and Cyril.

Newman himself notes in An Essay on the Development of Doctrine that successive generations of Fathers would accuse their predecessors of corrupting doctrine. Here he will write of his former hero: "The great Origen died after his many labours in peace; his immediate pupils were saints and rulers in the Church; he has the praise of St. Athanasius, St. Basil, and St. Gregory Nazianzen, and furnishes materials to St. Ambrose

209 Cave's hagiography of Eusebius set him apart from contemporaries. "He was charged, perhaps with a little more reason, by Le Clerc, who was then writing his 'Bibliotheque Universelle,' with 'writing panegyrics rather than lives,' and also with 'having forcibly drawn Eusebius, who was plainly enough
and St. Hilary; yet, as time proceeded, a definite heterodoxy was the growing result of his theology, and at length, three hundred years after his death, he was condemned" (Dev 85). Cyril of Alexandria accuses Diodorus of Tarsus of being – with Theodore of Mopsuestia – one of the authors of Nestorianism; this same Diodorus, however, is reported to have “died at an advanced age, in the peace of the Church, honoured by the praises of the greatest saints” (Dev 85). Although in Arians Newman grasped the unreliability of ex post facto attacks on the pre-Nicenes, such as from Petavius, yet he grasped it in such a one-sided way that he defended only the Alexandrian Fathers from critics. By 1845, he was more even handed, realising that an Oriental like Diodorus was not by necessity of geography a heretic. Nevertheless, as chapter four will show, such fathers of heresy not without blame, even Origen.

(b) On Platonism and ousia. While Petavius said that the pre-Nicene Fathers were more Platonic than orthodox in their trinitarian doctrine, Newman is intent on defending them, particularly those of the Alexandrian school, from Petavius’s charges. Cudworth was also opposed to Petavius, albeit his motive for defending the pre-Nicenes was very different from Newman’s. Cudworth’s focus is primarily Platonism not patristics. He finds ways to “plead their excuse, who had no Scripture Revelation at all, to guide them” – meaning the early and middle Platonists. His main plea here is that, if “the generality of Christian doctors, for the first three hundred years after the apostles’ times” could do no better than turn to Plato, why should others be blamed for following the master philosopher (TIS 595)?

Newman does not agree with any of his seventeenth-century sources about the early Church’s use of homoousion. Sometimes he follows Bishop Bull, in arguing for a continuity between the pre-Nicene and the post-Nicene Fathers. For instance, he argues that the idea of the consubstantiality of Father and Son was an early one: “The term homoousion is first employed for this purpose by the author of the Paemander, a Christian Arian, over to the side of the orthodox, and made a trinitarian of him;’ this produced a paper warfare between the two great writers.” Dictionary of National Biography vol. iii (Oxford: OUP, 1963), 262.

210 Quoting the Mémoires pour servir à l’histoire ecclésiastique des six premiers siècles, of Louis-Sébastien Le Nain de Tillemont (1637-1698), an important source for Arians. For more on him, see McGrath “Introduction,” lxx-1xxii.
of the beginning of the second century. Next it occurs in several writers at the end of the second and the beginning of the third.” But, as he continues, crucially, in “the middle of the third century, a change took place in the use of it and other similar words,” as a result of the Council of Antioch called to condemn Paul’s heresy (Arians 188-9). The question is whether, in saying the change took place in “words,” Newman also thinks change took place in ideas also? Bull did not believe the idea signified by the word “homoousion” changed at all in this period. He wrote that there was no more than an apparent contradiction between the councils of Antioch and Nice[a]… The fathers of the council of Antioch with good reason abhorred [Paul’s] interpretation of the word; and therefore, not caring much for words in a question of such moment, they were content to suppress the term itself in silence, in order to cut off all occasion for the cavils of the heretics, provided only that the thing was agreed on, i.e. the true divinity of the Son (Defensio 78).

It has been seen how important language and its proper theological use is for Newman: he did not depict the pre-Nicenes “not caring much for words.” By contrast with Bull, Newman conceived the continuity between pre- and post-Nicene theology as employing dynamic and shifting terminology. However, at this stage, though on the right lines, Newman did not fully recognise that shifting terminology might depend on changing ideas. As different from Cudworth and Bull as he tried to be, he regarded “orthodoxy” with post-Nicene eyes even as he affirmed the dynamism of pre-Nicene doctrine.

(c) On Alexandria and orthodoxy. Bull accuses Petavius of too quickly maligning Origen. Petavius seems to think himself “bound” by “his religion” to uphold the anathemas of the Second Council of Constantinople, says Bull, rather than defending Origen as many “illustrious men of the Church of Rome” have done – such as Erasmus and Pico della Mirandola (Defensio 221).211 This seems to be a standard way of defending Origen among seventeenth-century Anglicans, for Cave cites the good things Erasmus and Haymo of Halberstad had to say about him (Apostolici 234, 238). Newman, by contrast, does not cite any Catholic authorities in Origen’s defence.

211 Also mentioned here are James Merlin of Victurnia, Sixtus of Siena, Claudius Especaenus, Genebrard, and Peter Halloix.
Both Newman and Cave set up an Alexandrian lineage that fixes their heroes to a particular school, with a particular way of reading and arguing about the scriptures. That method is called "Economy" by Newman. The economic method is spelled out in Origen's *Letter to Gregory* which Cave paraphrases thus:

he lets him know, that he instructed him mainly in those sciences and parts of philosophy which might be *introductory* to the Christian religion; acquainting him with those things in geometry and astronomy which might be useful for the understanding and explaining the Holy Scriptures, these things being as *previously* advantageous to the knowledge of the Christian doctrine...; [and] advising him, before all things, to read the Scripture, and that with the most profound and diligent attention, and not rashly to entertain notions of divine things, or to speak of them without solemn premeditation (*Apostolici* 271, my italics).

The use of some pagan philosophy *previous to* the study of the Scriptures is, say both Cave and Newman, typical of the method of teaching employed by the Alexandrian catechetical school. From Origen's *Letter*, Newman recounts how Origen drew Gregory into the Church: "While professedly teaching him Pagan philosophy, his skilful master insensibly enlightened him in the knowledge of the Christian faith. Then leading him to Scripture, he explained to him its difficulties as they arose; till Gregory, overcome by the force of truth, announced to his instructor his intention of exchanging the pursuits of the world for the service of God" (*Arians* 67). "This," says Newman in a footnote here, "was Origen's usual method." Newman extrapolates from Origen's economic method, by which he taught a few scholars whom he gathered around himself in Caesarea, Gregory among them, into a whole curriculum for everything taught at the school in Alexandria. Newman seems to overlook the discontinuities in the Alexandrian school in the third century – many of which were the result of Origen's feuds with his bishop. Rather, he describes the Alexandrian school as "a pattern to other Churches in its diligent and systematic preparation of candidates for baptism,"212 as well as "carefully examining into

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212 Newman is silent on whether this "pattern" was actually followed by other churches.
the doctrines revealed in Scripture, and of cultivating the habit of argument and
disputation” (*Arians* 41).

Orthodox language seems to work, for Newman, by suppressing heresy. But, in
the pre-Nicene era, one heresy was suppressed at a time. Origen’s pupils, Gregory of
Neocaesarea and Dionysius of Alexandria, were taught by their master to defend against
two forms of Sabellianism, “the Patipassian and the Emanative,” says Newman. Yet, in
so doing, they have unfairly “incurred odium in a later age, as if they had been
forerunners of Arius” (*Arians* 125). Newman also argues that until any particular
Christian doctrine was refined in the fire of controversy, the pre-Nicenes were free to
explore those areas of doctrine whose bounds the Church had not yet set. This has been
shown to be a traditional notion among Anglican writers, who consistently defended
Origen for his speculations in uncharted theological territory.

(d) *On Antioch and heresy.* Petavius and Cudworth see the subordinationist tendencies
within Platonism to be the source of Arius’s depiction of the Trinity. But whereas
Petavius blames the Neoplatonists, Cudworth seeks to understand them, albeit without
letting their mistakes be “dissembled, palliated or excused” (*TIS* 592). In fact, Cudworth
suggests that it is other “late writers,” perhaps Petavius, who “have affirmed Platonism to
symbolize with Arianism” because of the subordinationism both groups have in common
(*TIS* 592).

In his brief recapitulation of the different accounts of Arianism’s genealogy given
by Cave and Newman, Rowan Williams overlooks four *similarities* Newman has to Cave.
These show Cave and Newman to be closer than Cave and Cudworth, in spite of
Williams invoking of the latter when discussing Cave. First, Williams fails to see the
connections between Cave and Newman in the anti-Jewish and anti-female perspective
on heresy they share with their sources. Secondly, Cave and Newman stress the role
played in Arianism by Lucian of Antioch (whom, by the way, Bull defends). Williams
argues that, unlike Newman, whose genealogy of Arianism tended to downplay
Neoplatonists in favour of Antiochenes like Paul and Lucian, Cave mentions the latter
figures only fleetingly.\textsuperscript{213} But Paul and Lucian are nevertheless mentioned, and not simply passed over. Later in the same work, Williams implies that, regarding Lucian, Newman was the start of “some very questionable reconstructions of Arius’s intellectual background.”\textsuperscript{214} Instead we see that Cave used Lucian as evidence of proto-Arianism in Antioch, even when that evidence was in fact empty of content. Thirdly, both lay most of the blame for Arius’s success on Eusebius of Nicomedia, a “fellow Lucianist” of Arius (though Cave is less sure than Newman what that means). Admittedly, Cave does follow Cudworth’s argument in perceiving Eusebius of Nicomedia as the wrong type of Platonist, whose doctrine of the Trinity was too subordinationist, whereas Newman portrayed the pupils of Lucian as part of a Syrian tradition of theology dating back to Paul of Samosata. However, the difference between Newman and Cave here masks a fourth and final similarity. Newman and Cave are furthest apart in an area in which, above all, they agree: both think that the schools of the ancient Church explain the rise of the Arian heresy. For Cave, the philosophy of Alexandria found common cause with the school at Antioch under Lucian, while for Newman philosophy and theology came together in Antioch under Paul.

Newman recognises with Cave that Alexandrian Platonism at the time of Origen (but never under Origen) delved too far into the mystery of the Trinity; but this, for Newman, was not the source of Arianism. Instead, the family tree of heresy begins in Antioch, even when its branches spread into Alexandria, as in the case of Actius and Eunomius: “The skill of Asterius was a Sophist by profession. Actius came from the School of an Aristotelian of Alexandria. Eunomius, his pupil, who re-constructed the Arian doctrine on its original basis, at the end of the reign of Constantius, is represented by Ruffinus [sic] as ‘pre-eminent in dialectic power’” (\textit{Arians} 30). In a very unspecific footnote here – though one which acknowledges the debt Newman owes – he cites “Cave, \textit{Hist. Literar.} vol. i.”

\textsuperscript{213} Williams (2001) thinks it significant that “Only at the end of a longish disquisition on [philosophy] does Cave add that Arius had been predisposed to such views by … Lucian,” 3.

\textsuperscript{214} Williams (2001), 30.
(e) The minimal role of Athanasius. The final sentence of *Arians*, of course, made explicit his view that the English Church shared in the ancient concerns of Athanasius. This has led subsequent interpreters to read a love for Athanasius into the start of the book as well. But this chapter has sought to read the book forwards, not backwards, beginning where Newman does with the pre-Nicene Fathers.

The parallels between contemporary England and the ancient Church are there from the start of the book as well, in the focus on the competing schools of Paul and Origen. *Arians* was finished in 1832, when the leaders of his own day, first the rabble-rousing political or religious reformers, and secondly the Anglican statesmen and bishops in parliament, reminded Newman not only of the Arians but of Paul and his patroness. They were as much of a "court party" as the Eusebians. Newman’s dislike of a misdirected populace can be seen at various points, and Paul like Arius is seen creating a "public debate" among those least able to judge right from wrong (*Arians* 139). What was worse, a rabble-rouser like Paul or Arius, was more than likely a "tool of deeper men" or of powerful leaders like Zenobia (*Arians* 39), or had troubling designs on the "received opinions" of Christian orthodoxy (*Arians* 31). As a result of these difficulties, the pre-Nicene Church, like England, suffered at the hands of heresy, as it did with the rise of Arianism.

The Antiochene schools of philosophy and theology bred a method of disputation (sophistry) and biblical interpretation (literalism) which Newman blames for the Arian heresy. By contrast, Alexandria had a catechetical school that had taught sound doctrine and exegesis for many years, under Clement and Origen. England’s school of orthodoxy was in Oxford of course. What was needed in Oxford was a return to the

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216 Cave, writing at the end of the upheavals in regime of the seventeenth century, was also keen to show that Arius’s main appeal was “amongst the common people, and... women” (*Lives* 156).

217 Newman writes of Arius’s sophistry: “First, we read of the excitement which his reasonings produced in Egypt and Libya; then of his letters addressed to Eusebius and to Alexander, which display a like pugnacious and almost satirical spirit; and then of his verses composed for the use of the populace in ridicule of the orthodox doctrine” (*Arians* 28; citing “Socr. i.5, 6. Theod. Hist. i.5. Epiphan. [Panarion] lxix.7, 8. Philostorg. ii.2. Athan. de Decret. 16.”).
teaching that was offered by likes of Origen in Alexandria, for only then "our Athanasius and Basil will be given us in their destined season, to break the bonds of the Oppressor, and let the captives go free" (Arians 394).
Chapter 3.

Preaching the Word:
The Alexandrian shape of Newman’s christology

Introduction

Following the praise the Alexandrian Fathers received in *Arians*, the years after 1833 saw Newman engage with them more critically. He was prepared to oppose the extreme positions held by some of their number, especially Apollinarius, a friend of Athanasius, and Eutyches, a friend of Cyril of Alexandria. By 1839 he would write as a corollary of his criticism, especially in *Arians*, of the Syrian capital Antioch: “It may be observed that, as Syria was the especial seat of Arianism, so Egypt which had resisted it, was the seat of Monophysitism, the counter error which succeeded it” (*Mon 2*).

Throughout the 1830s, Origen still lay behind much of Newman’s theology—especially Origen’s exegetical method of interpreting scripture. Moreover, like Origen and the Alexandrians who followed him, Newman sought to integrate his views on the Son of God into the rich web of Christian doctrine. This chapter will focus on Newman’s writings on the Son—his christology—but not to the exclusion of other teachings. It is a mistake to read Newman’s christology independently of other theological themes. For his christology was deeply rooted in a conception of the relations between God and God’s Son and Spirit, and had profound ramifications for the lives of human beings in relation to God.

A word should be said about the terminology of doctrine here. From the time he finished *Arians*, Newman thought of it as only the first in a two volume series of doctrinal history. The way Newman saw it, *Arians* had presented the history of the doctrine of the Trinity and a subsequent work was to consider the doctrine of the Incarnation.²¹⁸ Newman, like most in his age, considered there to be a series of doctrines,

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²¹⁸ On 5 July 1832, Newman wrote to H.J. Rose wondering whether to include a discussion of the Nicene Creed in an appendix to *Arians* or “leave this, till after the doctrine of the Incarnation is discussed in the second volume—for I cannot here comment on the Niceno-Constantinopolitan, for some of its clauses require a notice of heresies which fall under the doctrine of the Incarnation” (*LD* iii, 65). This again shows that Newman’s first interest in *Arians* was the pre-Nicene era.
that could be treated discretely even though they were interconnected. But because of his patristic research he was perhaps more careful in his doctrinal language than most. In particular, Newman used the patristic labels of “theologia” and “economia” as these related to God and humanity: “What, for instance, is the revelation of general moral laws, their infringement, their tedious victory… but an ‘Economia’ of greater truths untold…?” – the truths of theologia (Arians 75). C.S. Dessain has shown (albeit in a very general way) how important the Greek Fathers were in giving Newman a christology that related directly to doctrines Dessain categorises as “the Holy Trinity” and human “deification.”219 Although Dessain’s point about the Fathers is correct, in Arians Newman was even closer to them than Dessain. Arians has sections entitled “The scripture doctrine of Trinity” and “The ecclesiastical doctrine of the Trinity” rather than Dessain’s “the Holy Trinity.” Instead of “deification,” Newman wrote that “a belief in our Lord’s Divinity is closely connected (how, it matters not) with deep religious feeling generally” (Arians 273). Newman might have seen himself examining Trinity and Incarnation discretely but it was only later, as subsequent chapters will show, that his doctrine became more systematic.

Throughout this chapter, his sermons will be the place to judge the impact of his patristic research, as opposed to Stephen Thomas’s focus on the polemical works. Newman can be seen to integrate these doctrines in his Christmas sermon of 1834, preaching that, “By birth [Christ] is the Only-begotten and express Image of God; and in taking our flesh, not sullied thereby, but raising human nature with Him, as He rose from the lowly manger to the right hand of power – raising human nature” (PS ii.3, 252).

Andrew Louth has argued that the summation of his work on the doctrines of Christ, the Trinity, and human deification, occurred in the 1838 Lectures on Justification. Louth begins by quoting from Lecture IX:

“This is really and truly our justification, not faith, not holiness, not (much less) a mere imputation; but through God’s mercy, the very Presence of Christ”: here, in

219 "The East has always emphasized that the grace of justification is a personal union with God, the result of our deification. In the West grace has tended to be thought of as more a remedy for sin and as a quality of the soul. Newman’s emphasis, in his sermons and in his treatises, is on our deification and on the indwelling of the Holy Trinity that follows from it” in Dessain, C.S., “Cardinal Newman and the Eastern Tradition” Downside Review vol. 94 (1976), 95.
a sentence which sums up the central theme of his *Lectures on Justification*, Newman gives expression to this central conviction of the Oxford Movement, the conviction that as we respond to God in Christ, God Himself is present to us, in our hearts, drawing us to Himself: a conviction which expresses, as we have seen, the heart of the patristic doctrine of deification.\(^{220}\)

In Newman’s christology of the 1830s, the Son’s incarnation is the Father’s way to raise humanity up, in the power of the Spirit, into the very life of God. In the work of both Louth and Dessain, it should be noted there is a tendency to generalise about the Fathers regarding Newman’s “patristic doctrine.” Roderick Strange, in showing how the Fathers shaped Newman’s christology, gives only a thematic account.\(^{221}\) Such a tentative approach to naming *which* Fathers were important to Newman *when* is understandable since Newman’s references in his early works are often unclear and in sermons, of course, non-existent. Nevertheless, there is evidence in the sermons he preached in 1835 and 1836 that an examination of Apollinaris, as he called him, altered Newman’s christology. Section 2 will chart these changes in the sermons. Change in his christology occurred again as a result of the further reading that led to the *Lectures on the Prophetical Office* in 1837 and the *Lectures on Justification* in 1838 and, above all, his study of the Monophysites in 1839. Section 3 will examine two sermons from the 1840s, from 1840 and from 1849, in order to compare them with what had gone before, but also to show that Newman’s Cyrilline christology continued into his years as a Catholic. First, however, section 1 will focus on the starting point for what would follow: his research into Origen’s student, Dionysius.

1) Newman in 1834: Dionysius of Alexandria.

It has already been seen how attractive Newman found the writings of Origen and Clement in the early 1830s. Up until August 1834 he was thinking of producing a new edition of *Arians*. Then he changed his mind, writing to Bowden, “pray give yourself no

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\(^{220}\) Louth (1983), 74-5.

\(^{221}\) The thematic drive of Strange’s work on Newman causes him to jump around chronologically. E.g. he mentions that the emphasis on Christ’s divine nature in an 1836 sermon seems to exclude a fully human
trouble about [procuring] the German Athanasius – when I shall have an opportunity of correcting my Arians is of course very uncertain and of distant date.”

This shows how little of Athanasius Newman had read for Arians, but also how Athanasius would not be the focal point of his next project. For it was to Dionysius of Alexandrian that Newman turned his attention and, in the period 1834-5, he read Athanasius mainly in relation to his study of Dionysius. In 1836, he even distanced himself from Athanasius because of the way his terminology had been abused by Apollinarius. From here the eyes of Newman, predisposed to anything Alexandrian, seemed to fall upon the christology of Cyril, and he pursued Cyrilline arguments into the late-1830s, at which point he became aware how his terminology was abused by Eutyches and Severus.

This period of Newman’s patristic thought begins, then, with Origen. Roderick Strange shows how important the idea of Christ as a “pattern” was to Newman in connecting Christ’s life with our growth in holiness in imitation of him. While Strange does not suggest from whence the image came, he is typical of many scholars in suggesting that Newman was already a fully-fledged Athanasian thinker in the 1830s; but that move was not made until the 1840s. Rather, Origen’s use of “pattern” seems to lie behind Newman’s engagement with questions of how the Son of God can suffer, and how in our sufferings we are like the Son? Origen wrote,

not understanding that the Logos had become the man Jesus, he [Celsus] would have Him to be subject to no human weakness, nor to become an illustrious pattern to men of the manner in which they ought to bear the calamities of life, although these appear to Celsus to be most lamentable and disgraceful occurrences, seeing that he regards labour to be the greatest of evils, and pleasure the perfect good.224

nature, but then leaps to the 1858 essay “On St. Cyril’s Formula”, and even to an 1881 note in Ath ii, to clarify why this is an example of Newman’s position on mia physis. Strange (1981), 57-63.

222 To John Bowden, 10 August 1834 (LD iv, 320). “German Athanasius” is Athanasius der Grosse und die Kirche seiner Zeit by J.A. Möhler (Mainz: 1827). As Williams (1990) notices, Bowden had previously provided Newman with “a list of the contents of Möhler’s book; his appetite was sufficiently whetted for him to consider making a serious beginning with German, but no more about Möhler appears,” 275.

223 Strange (1981), 52.

224 Contra Celsum ii.42 (ANF trans.), my italics.
There are many similarities here with Newman’s equally rhetorical sermon of May 1835, entitled “Bodily Suffering,” in which he calls upon his hearers to follow the “pattern” of Christ and renounce the pleasure of worldly goods:

Pain, which by nature leads us only to ourselves, carries on the Christian mind from the thought of self to the contemplation of Christ, His passion, His merits, and His pattern; and, thence, further to that united company of sufferers who follow Him and “are what He is in this world.” He is the great Object of our faith; and, while we gaze upon Him, we learn to forget ourselves. (PS iii.11, 577, my italics.)

It was shown above that in Arians Newman relished Origen’s interpretation of scripture. While I agree with Rowan Williams that Arians caricatures Paul of Samosata and his successors in Antioch, in that work Newman also recognised in Origen what Williams himself recognises in Nicaea: that “the Word of God is the condition of there being a human identity which is the ministering, crucified and risen saviour, Jesus Christ; but the existence of Jesus is not an episode in the biography of the Word.” Newman regarded the literalism of Paul of Samosata as just such a biography, whereas Origen had a theology of the Word made flesh. Newman praised Origen because of his profound insights into Christ’s Person, which were revealed through interpretations of scripture that used language in ways that Newman found fascinating. Origen considered there to have been a constant exchange of properties in Christ, “and for this reason, throughout the whole of scripture, while the divine nature is spoken of in human terms[,] the human nature is in its turn adorned with marks that belong to the divine prerogative.” The way in which Christ is “spoken of” here came to be called the communicatio idiomatum, and from Newman’s perspective was more attractive than the “literalistic” Samosatene alternative. Origen provided a means of describing Christ that opened up the mystery of his Person without trying to explain it: “if [the human understanding] thinks of God, it sees a man; if it thinks of man, it beholds one returning from the dead with spoils after

225 Williams (2001), 244. For his criticism of Newman, see 3-5.

226 de Principiis ii.6.3. I describe this as the communicatio idiomatum even though I am aware that Origen did not use the term (nor did Newman until his translation of Athanasius, cf. Ox Frs xix, 348 note i, 443 note h).
vanquishing the kingdom of death."\textsuperscript{227} This was precisely the sort of christology that Newman, all rhetoric and poetry himself, began to preach in the middle of the 1830s.\textsuperscript{228}

It was a desire to address some of the factual errors in \textit{Arians} which led him in March 1834 to begin to read Dionysius of Alexandria. The process of further study, he wrote to his aunt in 1835, "carried me forward into a very large field of reading, principally in the Fathers. The immediate object to which I am making this subservient is to an edition of the fragments of St. Dionysius, Bishop of Alexandria."\textsuperscript{229} So Newman was reading widely in the Fathers at this time, in order more specifically to focus on Dionysius, whom he had mentioned only briefly in \textit{Arians}.\textsuperscript{230} The connection was natural: Dionysius's \textit{Refutation and Defence} upon which Newman worked, and fragments of which were preserved in Athanasius's \textit{de Sententia Dionysii}, dealt mainly with questions of Sabellianism and Arianism, two of the heresies which relate to the subject of his first volume, the doctrine of the Trinity. The subject of his projected second volume would wait, for by the time he wrote to his aunt, on 9 August 1835, he was just days away from a flurry of writing on Apollinarianism.\textsuperscript{231} His thoughts were never far from fourth- and fifth-century discussions of the Incarnation, even as he worked on the third-century discussions of the Trinity arising from Dionysius.

There is a typically Alexandrian flavour to an attempt to integrate the doctrines of Trinity and Incarnation, flowing from scripture as Origen interpreted it: the Son's

\textsuperscript{227} \textit{de Principiis} ii.6.2. For more on the rhetorical importance of the \textit{communicatio idiomatum} see Brian Daley's entry in Lacoste, Jean Y, \textit{Encyclopedia of Christian Theology} (New York: Routledge, 2005), 748.

\textsuperscript{228} The connections between Newman's christology, as laid out in this chapter, and such remarks as the following by Origen, seem more than coincidental. Origen wrote, "we must believe that there did exist in Christ a human and rational soul, and yet not suppose that it had any susceptibility to or possibility of sin," \textit{de Principiis} ii.6.5.

\textsuperscript{229} To his Aunt Elizabeth (\textit{LD} v, 120).

\textsuperscript{230} Regarding the pre-Nicene Rule of Faith, Newman had written: "The great Dionysius, who has himself been defamed by the 'accuser of the brethren,' declares perspicuously the principle of the orthodox teaching. 'The particular expressions which I have used,' he says, in his defence, 'cannot be taken separate from each other ... whereas my opponents have taken two bald words of mine, and sling them at me from a distance; not understanding, that, in the case of subjects, partially known, illustrations foreign to them in nature, nay, inconsistent with each other, aid the inquiry'" (\textit{Arians} 225, quoting \textit{de Sent Dion} 18).

\textsuperscript{231} Thomas (1991) records that he began with "a rough draft written on 15 August 1835 on the 'defection of Apollinaris'," 90.
“sojourn” in the flesh, as the human Jesus, after all teaches us that “Father” is the very name of God. The two natures of the Son are central, from Origen onwards, to the argument that the existence of the Son, as revealed in the flesh, is constitutive of what it means to be God – an insight the law and prophets could not fully explain since they lived before Christ’s coming in the flesh. As Athanasius himself explained in the fragments of Dionysius that Newman was reading, the Son teaches us that God’s name is Father and in so doing shows that the Son is divine too:

For he [Dionysius] teaches openly that the Son is not a thing made or created, while he taxes and corrects those who accuse him of having said that God was the creator (of Christ), in that they failed to notice that he had previously spoken of God as Father, in which expression the Son also is implied. But in saying thus, he shews that the Son is not one of the creatures, and that God is not the maker but the Father of His own Word.

Thus neither for the Alexandrian Fathers, nor for Newman who studied them so closely, was christology something added on to more primordial discussions about the doctrine of God.

Of course, in exploring Newman’s use of the Fathers in the mid-1830s, it is important not to forget his wider concerns as leader of the Oxford Movement and editor of the Tracts for the Times. As Newman continued in the letter to his aunt quoted above, “I have far graver objects in view. I mean, one must expect a flood of scepticism on the most important subjects to pour over the land, and we are so unprepared, it is quite frightful to think of it. The most religiously-minded men are ready to give up important doctrinal truths because they do not understand their value.” Here Newman gives the context for his patristic studies at this time. His letter hints at the two events during the course of 1835 that revealed to Newman the problem of the devaluation of doctrine by the “religiously-minded” – indeed by two Oxford dons – the controversy with Hampden

232 Origen wrote, “First we must know this, that in Christ there is one nature, his deity, because he is the only-begotten Son of the Father, and another human nature, which in very recent times he took upon himself to fulfil the divine purpose [economia]. Our first task therefore is to see what the only-begotten Son of God is, seeing he is called by many different names according to the circumstances and beliefs of the different writers,” de Principiis i.1.1.

233 de Sent Dion 21.
about subscription to the Thirty-nine Articles as a basis for admission to Oxford, and Blanco White's conversion to Unitarianism. Both events made clear to Newman the pressing need for a patristic conception of doctrine rather than contemporary "scepticism" towards traditional teaching. If Newman had begun to study Dionysius in 1834 to examine the links between Sabellianism (which the Alexandrian bishop attacked) and Arianism (of which he was later accused), it soon became imperative, in the wake of these two events, to examine the link between Sabellianism (or "scepticism" as Newman saw it) and Unitarianism. And yet he did not examine this link in any obvious way, for Newman launched into work on the Apollinarian heresy.234

Stephen Thomas admits the difficulty in explaining the connection between a heresy which denies that the one God is three Persons, and a heresy which denies that Christ had a human soul. A way of making this connection seem less strange is to acknowledge that throughout this time, Newman had in mind the need for a right doctrine of both the Trinity and the Incarnation – the subjects of what he had wanted to be two complementary volumes. Thomas has clearly shown how important a theory of heresy was to Newman at this stage of the Oxford Movement and his labours to this end were intensive. Thomas considers Newman to have found in August 1835, in his writings on Apollinarius, a theory linking "two such apparently unrelated heresies as Sabellianism and Apollinarianism: that is, that all heresies are particular forms of an identical underlying rationalism, and therefore, have hidden relations with one another, which may be drawn out."235 Nevertheless, even before the polemical writings on Apollinarius,

234 Thomas (1991) presents a powerful case for why contemporary events drove Newman to put pen to paper in connecting Dionysius's refutation of Sabellius and the later Fathers' condemnation of Apollinarius: "Six days before Newman saw the transition from Sabellianism to Apollinarianism, he had begun to perceive the importance of Blanco's thesis that 'Sabellianism is but Unitarianism in disguise'… Three days later [6 August 1835], referring again to Blanco's book, he was beginning to see its value 'as a witness to the tendency of certain views'. Then, on 9 August, came the first of his declarations that study of Dionysius leads inevitably to Apollinarian controversy," 89. Put simply, Thomas argues that Newman began to see Blanco in the role of Apollinarius – a tragic figure who, in his desire for truth, is led away from it. For Blanco, Sabellianism led to Unitarianism. For Apollinarius, denying Christ's human soul led to equal infidelity.

235 Thomas (1991), 89. Thomas regards this as "[a] strategy re-asserting patristic theology against contemporary liberalism, exposing proposals to modify ancient dogma as part of a vast process of secularisation. The equation of heresy and infidelity is not, in itself, a new stage in Newman's thinking. However, the method is new, in its subtlety and acknowledgement of complexity. Most important is the separation of a heretic's intention from tendencies embedded in his language which have a life of their own," 106.
Newman had been preaching sermons that rhetorically reduced Sabellianism to its seeming opposite, *christological* heresy. For a subtle reader of the Alexandrians, like Newman, there was much to learn in their way of attacking trinitarian heresy, like that of Sabellius, by reducing it to heresies to do with the Incarnation, like those of Apollinarius or Nestorius or Ebion.236 The sermon from 8 March 1835, “The Humiliation of the Eternal Son,” ends with a warning that all heresy reduces to a rejection of Christ’s divinity. He writes against those who distinguish, through their “reason, and dispute,” between the Christ who lived on earth and the Son of God Most High, speaking of His human nature and His Divine nature so separately as not to feel or understand that God is man and man is God... I fear I must say (to use the language of ancient theology), that they begin by being Sabellians, that they go on to be Nestorians, and that they tend to be Ebionites and to deny Christ’s Divinity altogether (*PS* iii.12, 592).

Perhaps Thomas’s focus on trinitarian heresy, which he considers the fruit of Newman’s study of Dionysius, prevents him from seeing that Newman’s thought was actually based on wider study of many Alexandrians – a scope that ranged from Origen confuting Paul of Samosata (who resembled the “Ebionites,” as the previous chapter showed) to Cyril’s attack on Nestorius. Dionysius was only the top layer of a rich reading of Alexandrian sources.

Newman was not reading only Dionysius between March 1834 and August 1835, for, in order to write his “Letters on the Church Fathers” for the *British Magazine*, he delved ever deeper into post-Nicene writings. Neither was he only researching for scholarly and polemical purposes, but also for sermons. Much later, in 1852, Newman reflected to a friend on a sermon he preached on 12 April 1835, “The Tears of Christ at the Grave of Lazarus,” and admits that “the Fathers of the 4th century impress[ed] me” into conceiving of Christ as able to grow in knowledge in his human nature.237 In that

236 Stead showed how important the rhetoric of “reduction rhetorta” was in the arguments made by the Alexandrians. This method “saddles the opponent with the very proposition which he regards as evidently false.” Stead, G.C., “Rhetorical Method in Athanasius,” *Vigiliae Christianae* vol. 30 (1976), 34. Similarly, Newman employs this method in reducing Apollinarianism to Arianism, the very heresy Apollinarius set out to oppose.

237 To William Dodsworth (*LD* xv, 56).
sermon, which shall be examined below, Newman had written that Christ was “all knowing, yet partially ignorant,” a view he attributes in the letter to Athanasius.\footnote{Contra Arianos III.42.} Newman wrote to Froude, in August 1835, that he has been reading “Athanasius, Theodoret etc.”\footnote{Dated 23 August 1835, just days after he began work on Apollinarius (LD v, 126).} – the second of these two, in his Ecclesiastical History, looking back on fourth-century debates with the eyes of someone immersed in fifth-century christological controversy. Thus it would seem reasonable to think Newman was engaged in reading Apollinarius in exactly this context, as part of his wider exploration of christology. Moreover, those words quoted from his 1835 sermon, which gave Newman such trouble later as he discussed them with his friend in 1852, show that Thomas might be wrong to argue Newman saw himself in Apollinarius. In April, perhaps reacting against the Apollinarian themes he was already reading, Newman preached that Christ had a human \textit{nous} and that it was “partially ignorant.” When in August Newman came to write “Apollinaris’ history,” he had therefore already opposed what he saw as the central tenet of the heresy, the absence of a human \textit{nous} in Christ. Even so, he wrote generously of Apollinarius himself:

> He had suffered and laboured for the truth’s sake in a time of persecution; he had been a vigorous and successful opponent of Arianism during the ascendancy of that heresy; and he seems to have at length been betrayed into an opposite error by the unguarded zeal with which he encountered it.\footnote{OM B.3.5, “Apollinaris’ history,” 1. Quoted by Thomas (1991), 92-3.}

Thomas suggests this passage was autobiographical, Newman viewing himself in these traits. It might be true that Newman was sad that so close a friend of Athanasius as Apollinarius could be led into error, but, after reading later Alexandrians like Cyril, he could not sympathise with the \textit{content} of the heresy. Rather than depicting a Newman who was sympathetic to Apollinarius, it seems more plausible to consider Newman learning from the heretic’s mistakes. This, in fact, is what seems to happen in Newman’s sermons over the course of 1835 and 1836, as he shapes his christological terminology in reaction to what he discovers in Apollinarius. This shall be shown in three areas: his
shifting opinion of the term “organon,” his language regarding Christ’s human mind, and his use of the communicatio idiomatum in depicting Christ’s Person.

2) Newman between 1835 and 1836: Apollinarius or Cyril?

There was an aspect of Apollinarius’s thought which did appeal to Newman. This, as Thomas has pointed out, was that he began with the “Church’s ‘great article’: that the Personality of God is his Divine Essence, so that his manhood is ‘but an addition to his real nature’.” However, in the work of Cyril and his followers like Leontius of Byzantium, Newman found a far more fruitful way than Apollinarianism to pursue a christology built on exactly this foundation. During 1835 and 1836, Newman came to realise that, if the Apollinarian avenue of Alexandrian thought was closed off, then he should take the Cyrilline one instead. (Newman was probably reading Leontius to get information for his critique of Apollinarianism.) By laying out the crimes of Apollinarius, Newman seems to have recognised the theological importance of Christ having a human body and soul without either interfering with the supremacy of the divine Person – in other words, he retained a firmly Alexandrian christology.

The study of Apollinarianism also enabled Newman to return to one of the themes of Arians – his suspicion of the East, and especially Antioch. The most virulent of the Apollinarians, he wrote in “Apollinaris’ history” on 19 August 1835, were those who succeeded the man himself and went to live in Antioch. When he wrote his notes called “Apollinarianism” on 22 August 1835, which he later gathered into the essay called “The heresy of Apollinaris,” the context in which he placed the followers of Apollinarius was an Eastern one: Nestorians, Arians and Sabellians were the heretics to be compared with Apollinarians (TT 280-1, §4.11-14). This would continue to be a theme of his work on the “Monophysites” at the end of the 1830s.

What most troubled Newman about Apollinarius was that he used logic to the exclusion of “Catholic” teaching. Logic drew Apollinarius to conclude “the Lord had no

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241 This is a passage from “Apollinarianism” omitted from the version in TT entitled, “The heresy of Apollinaris.” Quoted by Thomas (1991), 99.

242 Due to different pagination of the many versions of this essay available, while here I quote from the 1874 edition of TT, I shall also include the paragraph numbers.
mind, because He had no human personality; [whereas] Catholics said, that since He had in all respects a human nature, He had a human mind” (TT 263, §1.8). Yet, as in all Newman’s arguments about doctrine, logic is not what determines truth, but scripture interacting with tradition. The rule of faith is invoked as a corrective: “This is what comes of Reasoning in the province of theology, unless in the first place we inquire our way by Scripture and Tradition, and then proceed to reason under the information thence afforded us” (TT 309). These arguments had been made before Newman came to write on Apollinarius in August 1835. In Arians, he had levelled them at Paul of Samosata and Arius, who ignored the rule of faith when interpreting scripture. Writing “Apollinarianism” on 22 August, Newman laments that Apollinarius thought he was opposing Arianism with “a strong and (what may be called) intelligible doctrine, asserting with more or less clearness... not merely that Christ was more than man, but that he was simply the Eternal Son, either without the addition of a human nature, or with only its nominal addition.” The pre-Nicene example of doxology, by contrast, was unconcerned with “strong,” “intelligible” doctrine whenever such “clearness” threatened revealed truth. The Apollinarians, perhaps looking only at the “plain” sense of doctrine, forgot the richness of scriptural truth, taking instead “a plain and broad view of the subject which, while rescuing them from Humanitarianism, saved them also from the irritation of mind occasioned by that subtle orthodox phraseology which had been rendered necessary by Arianism itself” (my italics).243 In this one complex sentence, Newman is dealing with three of his favourite themes: the danger of interpreting scripture only at a surface level, his opposition to those in Newman’s own day whose “humanitarianism” left them irritated by orthodoxy, and his nostalgia for pre-Nicene doxology before Arianism had forced the “subtle phraseology” of a formulised faith. These three form a unified argument: while rightly opposing the Arians’ sophistry, Apollinarius nevertheless replaced their arguments with sophistry of his own, ignoring the Rule of Faith as much as any nineteenth-century sceptic.

Working through the implications of all this had a great impact on Newman’s preaching. The most public discussion Newman gives of his Alexandrian position in the

243 A passage also omitted from TT and quoted by Thomas (1991), 98.
mid-1830s came not in his “Letters on the Church Fathers” series, nor in the *Tracts*, but in his sermons. The christological insights of post-Nicene theology will be considered here as they are found in four sermons: two from 1835, “The Humiliation of the Eternal Son” and “Tears of Christ at the Grave of Lazarus,” and two from 1836, “The Incarnate Son, a Sufferer and Sacrifice” and “Christ, the Son of God Made Man.” What is evident in these four sermons is that Newman’s christology is based on a series of presuppositions, which might date to Origen, but can at the very least be called distinctively Alexandrian.

(a) The human in Christ as an *organon*

Apollinarius, as a follower and friend of Athanasius, shared many of his opinions. In “Apollinaris’ history” from 18 August, Newman stressed the closeness of their thought and explained that it was only after the patriarch died that Apollinarius revealed himself for what he was. This is why, as Newman wrote in “Apollinarianism” on 22 August, there is so much in the heresy that appears to be protecting the teaching of the Fathers. The great truth which they had ever propounded, was that the Eternal Son had come into the world in our nature—language which implied that His Personality was divine, and His manhood only an adjunct to it, instrument, or manifestation. The Word was clothed in flesh, he would say; He dwelt, acted, revealed Himself in the flesh, but this was as far from being a real addition to His own self, as a *garment or an instrument is from being a part of a man*. A garment is made to fit the wearer; so must our Lord’s human nature be shaped and adjusted for a union with His divine. It had not a substantive character; it was not an hypostasis; else it would have a personality of its own; accordingly, it could not in all respects be similar to the ordinary make of human kind (*TT* 261, §1.6, my italics).

In summary, therefore, Apollinarius had used terminology he took from Athanasius – the idea of Christ’s human nature as an instrument (*organon*) or garment – yet in Apollinarius’s conception the Son was not fully human.

The impact this realisation had on Newman can be seen in the care with which he used this Athanasian terminology *after* August 1835. Beforehand, in the sermon from
March 1835, "The Humiliation of the Eternal Son," Newman conceives the human nature of the divine Son in Athanasian terms, as an instrument which the Son uses to save us. The Son’s work in the flesh in this sermon is rich with overtones of Athanasius’s soteriology. When, for example, in his anti-Arian writings, Athanasius interpreted “He created me” from Proverbs 8:22, he wrote: “we must not conceive that the whole Word is in nature a creature, but that He put on a created body and that God created Him for our sakes, preparing for Him a created body.” Newman borrows this image when he preaches: “The flesh which he assumed was but the instrument through which he acted for and towards us... Having clothed Himself with a created essence, He made it the instrument of His humiliation; He acted in it, He obeyed and suffered through it” (PS iii, 12, 588-9). The flesh of Christ is an organon of God by which the work of salvation is done. The work of salvation is key here, and Newman only uses the idea of an organon when referring to the Son’s work in the flesh. In this enterprise, the flesh is an organon of God, which is precisely not to say the Son is an organon of the Father, a view held by the Arian heretics. Newman says that, even in the incarnation, “In [the Son’s] eternal union with God there was no distinction of will and work between Him and His Father; as the Father’s life was the Son’s life, and the Father’s glory the Son’s also, so the Son was the very Word and Wisdom of the Father, His Power and Co-Equal Minister in all things” (ibid. 587, my italics).

However, due to his work on Apollinarius, Newman recognised Athanasius’s image could be misunderstood to mean Christ put on humanity as we put on a garment or take up an instrument. As a result, an examination of his 1836 sermons shows that he tried to protect against this misunderstanding. In the sermon, “Christ, the Son of God Made Man,” Newman says that, in Christ taking our nature upon him,

244 Contra Arianos II.47.

245 Back in 1833, Newman included a letter from Alexander of Alexandria quoting, and commenting on, the Arians’ view of the Word as organon: “He is mutable and alterable by nature, as other rational beings; and He is foreign and external to God’s substance, being excluded from it. He was made for our sakes, in order that God might create us by Him as by an instrument; and He would not have had subsistence, had not God willed our making.’ Some one asked them, if the Word of God could change, as the devil changed? They scrupled not to answer, ‘Certainly, He can.’” (Arians 218) Here Newman offered no commentary himself, though he would later point out the distinction between the Arian and Catholic use of organon when translating Contra Arianos III.31 (Ox Frs xix, 443 note g).
it must not be supposed, because it was an instrument, or because in the text [Hebrews 9:11] it is called a tabernacle, that therefore it was not intimately one with [the Son], or that it was merely like what is commonly meant by a tabernacle, which a man dwells in, and may come in and out of; or like an instrument, which a man takes up and lays down. Far from it; though His Divine Nature was sovereign and supreme when he became incarnate, yet the manhood which He assumed was not kept at a distance from Him (if I may so speak) as a mere instrument, or put on as a mere garment, or entered as a mere tabernacle, but was really taken into the closest and most ineffable union with Him (PS vi.5, 1226).

Newman’s sermon stresses the difference inherent in analogies from human life that we use of God. For while Athanasius writes that the Logos “put on a created body,” he did not do so in the same way a human puts on, say, a boiler suit, or in this day a spacesuit, to do a special job.\(^{246}\) The equivocation of the terms in any analogy, especially one predicated of a divine nature, prevents Athanasius being taken to mean that the Logos is the same as a space traveller and his flesh merely a suit. Newman, here, shows his continuing interest in the rules of speech. Having (he hopes) properly safeguarded the image of the garment, Newman goes on to speak of what in Athanasius’s Greek would be peri auton: “He surrounded Himself with it;” but also that, “He lodged it within Him; and thenceforth the Eternal Word, the Son of God, the Second Person in the Blessed Trinity, had two natures” (PS vi.5, 1228). A further linguistic tactic here is the immediate subversion of the garment image by suggesting it is just as correct to say that the flesh had the Logos surrounding it (peri auton). Newman the preacher is stretching his analogies.

In addition to a safer use of the language of organon, Newman’s sermons of 1836 see a new analogy to explain what the Word takes on when united with a human nature. This is the image of the Word taking on flesh almost as a new “attribute.” In all his sermons, Newman seems determined to hold to a strong union of the two natures, one which tends to prioritise the divine over the human. Now at one point in the same 1836

\(^{246}\) The contemporary image is that of Hanson, R.P.C., The Search for the Christian Doctrine of God (Edinburgh: T&T Clark, 1988), 448.
sermon, Newman appears close to the Apollinarian position he described the previous year in this way: “[Apollinaris] would say, as a man was not a garment, so our Lord was not a man; that is, strictly speaking, He had not a manhood; He was God clothed in our nature” (TT 262, §1.7). Puzzlingly, this is almost the same argument Newman himself uses in his sermon, “Christ, the Son of God Made Man.” Thus, Christ “was not strictly speaking, in the English sense of the word, a man... As He had no earthly father, so has He no human personality” (PS vi.5, 1225). In other words, because Jesus Christ is a Person only by virtue of the divine Word, thus not “a man,” he can be thought of as a Son only in his divine nature. Striving for an image to explain this to his hearers – and it must always be borne in mind that Newman’s theological mode is rhetorical – Newman says that Christ took on humanity “(if we may dare so to speak) almost as a new attribute of His Person; of course, I speak by way of analogy, but I mean as simply and indissolubly” (PS vi.5, 1227). And herein lies the reason Newman is not Apollinarian.247 There is a great deal of difference between the image of Christ putting on a garment, which the sermons of early 1835 use, and him taking on an attribute. What is the difference? The image of an “attribute” was not used by Apollinarius, but by followers of Cyril’s theology, like John of Caesarea and Leontius of Byzantium.248 Newman would find out, in 1839, that the heretical Severus of Antioch also used the image of an attribute, in order to deny Christ a human personality.249 And if Christ’s only personality was that of the divine Person, he had but one nature – and Newman could be called what he came to call Severus, a “Monophysite,” of which more below.

In 1836, Newman wants the human, whom the Logos assumes, to be fully human, agreeing with Cyril that this means it must be substantive (be a hypostasis of sorts) but not so as to replace the divine Person with a human one. This is a difficult position to hold, and seems to be forced on Newman just as much as on Cyril by the fear of

247 Thomas (1991) thinks that Newman “is very close to the heretic,” 143.

248 I owe this to Brian Daley, who says that the question of whether the Person of the Incarnate Word is the Word, and that his humanity, complete though it is, is something taken on almost like a new “attribute,” found its fullest formulation among these sixth- and seventh-century theologians.

249 Although Eutyches is mentioned in “Apollinaris’ history” in 1835, Severus of Antioch is not named until Mon in 1839.
accusations of Apollinarianism. One way to avoid such accusations was to accept that the human Jesus had a mind (*nous*) of his own.

(b) The ignorance of Christ in his human nature.

In further reaction to the Apollinarians, then, Newman accepted in his 1836 sermons that Christ could be ignorant in his human nature without that threatening the omniscience of his divine nature. Looking back in a letter of March 1846, he recalls his “own mistake” at this time “was saying that our Lord was ‘allknowing as God, ignorant as man.’ Almost all the Fathers of the Fourth Century, I believe, say the same – but the Church has since determined such doctrine to be heresy.”

In the early 1830s, it was the debates of the fourth century which led Newman to think of Christ as “ignorant as man,” before he became aware of arguments that such a position was heretical. These debates, of course, involved Newman in further investigation into Arian heresy. Various Arians made much of the scripture references to Jesus growing in wisdom (Lk 2:52). How could the Son grow in knowledge if he were God? Obviously, said Arius, the Son was not God, but God’s “perfect creature, yet not as one among the creatures.”

The Arians put forward a variety of christologies to explain in what the Son’s perfection lay, Arius himself arguing, in Williams’s words, “that God, in endowing the Son with the dignity of heavenly intimacy from the very beginning of his existence... know[s] that his first born will always be worthy of the highest degree of grace, a perfect channel for creative and redemptive action.”

Williams suggests that to Athanasian ears such logic “may sound rather tortuous.” Athanasius tried to portray change in Arius’s conception of an unchanging relation between Father and Son, with grace coming to the Logos in his incarnate ministry, advancing him from a human to a quasi-divine status. Athanasius thus accused the Arians of adoptionism.

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250 To Henry Wilberforce, 10 March 1846 (*LD* v 135).

251 From Arius’s letter to Alexander, quoted in Williams (2001), 104.

252 Williams (2001), 114-5.

253 *Contra Arianos* I.38.
While Arian christology interpreted Luke 2:52 to show that the Logos was a creature, it was of the utmost importance for Athanasius to demonstrate that the text showed something else. But Athanasius recognises the interpretive problem with which he is faced, arguing that the text cannot mean what it seems to mean because, "If He advanced when he became man, it is clear that, before He became man, He was imperfect."\textsuperscript{254} Neither Athanasius nor, admittedly, Arius wanted to accept imperfection in the Logos. So the text must be interpreted alternatively. For Athanasius, because the wisdom of the Logos was continuously being revealed in the human, it appeared to those around him as if Jesus Christ were increasing in wisdom. Really, of course, he only advanced in his human nature, for "how can Wisdom advance in wisdom?"\textsuperscript{255}

But still Athanasius is open to the charge that "natural" growth of the human soul is irrelevant to Christ, and therefore cannot claim that the whole human was "deified... by becoming Himself man."\textsuperscript{256} Is the human Jesus really growing in wisdom as any human would, or is he advancing only by virtue of the Logos? Even if Jesus’s soul does grow in wisdom as other humans, when it comes to those moments which require divine insight – for instance, at Lazarus’s tomb, or on the cross – then the Logos takes over and trumps human ignorance and suffering with divine knowledge. This seems to be Newman’s own position in the 1835 sermon, "Tears of Christ at the Grave of Lazarus," that Christ in his humanity was filled with the knowledge that he had as Logos. For in this sermon, dating from April, he said:

Here was the Creator of the world at a scene of death, seeing the issue of His gracious handiwork. Would not He revert in thought to the hour of creation, when He went forth from the bosom of the Father to bring all things into existence? There had been a day when He had looked upon the work of His love, and seen that it was "very good." Whence had the good been turned to evil, the fine gold become dim? (PS iii.10, 568-9)

\textsuperscript{254} Contra Arianos III.51.

\textsuperscript{255} Contra Arianos III.51.

\textsuperscript{256} Contra Arianos I.38.
If these were Christ's thoughts upon seeing the grave of his friend Lazarus, this would imply that the divine knowledge, as it were, crossed over from the Word into the mind of Jesus. But then did the human mind of Jesus fulfil any function? Unless the human Jesus freely accepts divine wisdom, how is Jesus humanly receiving it? How is the divine not imposing it upon a mindless human? From here it was a small step to Apollinarianism, a danger Newman seems to have realised later that year.

In his work in August 1835, he wrote of the heretics that "they said that a human intellect was unnecessary to the Incarnate Word, whose infinite intelligence would supply every need which a human mind could answer; and, if unnecessary, to teach it was to introduce a gratuitous difficulty into theology" (TT 266, §2.7). As was the case with Newman's language of organon, the sermons which follow his work on Apollinarianism show him more aware of the shortcomings of Athanasius and trying to find a way to make him safe. In the face of Apollinarius's arguments, Newman recognises two directions he might take in clarifying his christology: Cyril or Nestorius? Either, like Cyril, he could stress that the two minds of Christ, human and divine, were coextensive in a single Person. Or, he could take a Nestorian line that there were two persons in Jesus Christ, one divine and one human, and that the twain need never meet.

Of course, it has already been shown that Newman was heading in the Alexandrian, hence Cyrilline, direction from Arians onwards – and that there are Cyrilline touches to his writings even before August 1835. This was true of his sermon "The Humiliation of the Eternal Son" in March. Like Cyril, Newman admits that Christ had a human mind and therefore a human will, and was truly tempted and suffered as a human. After all, only a human will could learn obedience to the Father. For, while the Logos shall always have "concurrence" with the Father in their single divine Will and activity, the flesh he took was "a separate will and a separate work" in order that "what had been mere concurrence [before the incarnation,] became obedience" (PS iii.12, 587).

257 Anatolios gives a good account of how, in fact, human salvation depends upon divine wisdom "reversing" human ignorance in Christ; for without this cross-over humans could not reorient themselves to God. Anatolios writes: "especially with regard to 'negative' experiences of fear, ignorance, death, etc., Christ's appropriation of these simultaneously constitutes their very reversal." Anatolios, K, Athanasius: The Coherence of his Thought (London: Routledge, 1998), 154.
But Newman’s work on Apollinarius helped him further explore the later Alexandrian answers to the question of how Christ grew in wisdom.

In two successive unpublished sermons from 1836 (numbers 407 and 408), in which he recognised the problems involved in conceiving divine omniscience in a fully human Christ, Newman conducted two different thought experiments. This is an observation made already by Roderick Strange, though he seems to miss the ramifications of Newman’s Apollinarian research that are evident in these sermons. In the first of these unpublished sermons, Newman argues:

That our Blessed Lord and Saviour took upon Him a human soul as well as a body is proved, if it be necessary to prove it, by His fearing, sorrowing, being in an agony, praying the cup might pass from Him, and feeling Himself forsaken by the Father. The Son of God in His original nature never could have these feelings—they are human—they are feelings of a human soul—they are not bodily feelings. They are neither of the body, nor again of the Son of God—they evidence the presence of a human soul, which He took to Himself as His own as well as the body, even a perfect manhood—and acts according to it, being inseparably united to it, when and as far as He pleased.

The inseparability of this union is pure Cyril, and the Person who is the subject of this union is “the Son of God in His original nature.”

By the time of his work on the Monophysites, it shall be seen below that Newman thought that Cyril’s ideas offered support to heretics. But in 1836, this is the very form of christological language we find in Newman’s unpublished sermon number 407. Here the divine Person is the locus of all the actions and feelings and memories of the human Jesus: “As a man of self-control can turn away from his own thoughts, suspend his memory, make unknown to himself what he knows, not have what he has, then take it again, as he knows how to let out his feelings, how to repress them, and how to be

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258 Therefore it is wrong to imply that neither Newman nor Cyril were concerned about the human suffering and tempting of Christ. See Brilioth, Yngve, The Anglican Revival: Studies in the Oxford Movement (London: Longmans, 1925), 223, for a view that Newman does not take the tears of Christ seriously.

259 Strange (1981) writes, “In each sermon, therefore, Newman posed the difficulty and in each he offered not a solution—‘I will not presume to decide how really is the case’—but an account which illustrated how the statements affirming the two minds in Christ could be reconciled,” 72. Quoting no. 407, 14.
serious, and how to be mirthful, so in some unknown way did our Saviour rule that
manhood, which He had made part of Himself, though ever distinct and entire in itself in
His one indivisible person. The human Jesus experiences these feelings and
memories, for instance his growth in wisdom, nevertheless in this analogy it is the Logos
who chooses when to “suspend his memory... to let out his feelings [and] to repress
them.” Strange considers this sermon to show continuity with what Newman had written
the year before. Yet, rather than Cyrilline, that had sounded more Nestorian. Although it
also mentions memories that can be suspended, more striking is Newman’s phrase that
Christ “possessed a double assemblage of attributes”:

Thus He possessed at once a double assemblage of attributes, divine and human.
Still he was all-powerful, though in the form of a servant; still He was all-
knowing, though seemingly ignorant; still incapable of temptation, though
exposed to it; and if any one stumble at this, as not a mere mystery, but in the very
form of language a contradiction of terms, I would have him reflect on those
peculiarities of human nature itself, which I just now hinted at. Let him consider
the condition of his own mind, and see how like a contradiction it is. Let him
reflect upon the faculty of memory, and try to determine whether he does or does
not know a thing which he cannot recollect, or rather, whether it may not be said
of him, that one self-same person, that in one sense he knows it, in another he
does not know it. This may serve to appease his imagination, if it startles at the
mystery (PS iii.12, 589-90). 262


262 Newman’s invocation of the imagination is typical of certain Romantic traits seen in his writing. These
mysteries, Newman admits, cannot be grasped by our ratiocinative powers – but they can by our
imaginative powers. But there is a difference between Newman’s use of “imagination” and Coleridge’s,
for instance. For Coleridge, imagination enables us to create the world we experience in order to know it,
“a repetition in the finite mind of the eternal act of creation in the infinite I AM.” Quoted in Jones (2003),
34, from Biographia Literaria I, 304, in The Collected Works of Samuel Taylor Coleridge (Princeton:
1969-) vol. vii. For Coleridge this is a religious insight, but for the Tractarians “the province of the true
poet has been not to invent likenesses, but to trace out the analogies, which are actually impressed upon
creation” (my italics). Quoted from Pusey’s unpublished “Lectures on Types and Prophecies in the Old
64. Where the Romantics spoke of human co-creativity with God, the Tractarians spoke of our recognition,
and only through grace, of God’s work in our lives.
Rather than the Logos being the subject, as if, in the 1836 sermon, a “man of self-control,” in this earlier sermon the subject is two-fold, as if a schizophrenic who both “knows [and] does not know” something. The difference between Newman’s 1835 and 1836 sermon is subtle, but no less significant for that. His language is becoming more boldly Cyrilline. In the 1836 sermons, as has been seen, a new analogy has been found from the later history of christological doctrine. Now the image Newman uses to describe the relation of the human to the divine in Christ centres on divine “attributes” rather than human faculties. In one of his published sermons from 1836, for instance, Newman writes: “He acted through both of them [natures], sometimes through both at once, sometimes through One and not through the other, as Almighty God acts sometimes by the attribute of justice, sometimes by that of love, sometimes through both together” (PS vi.5, 1228). The primary predicate of this analogy, importantly, is “Almighty God” rather than a human of self-control or a schizophrenic. The pre-eminent Cyrilline solution to the problem of describing the union of natures in Christ was to posit a communicatio idiomatum; thus here the divine attributes are predicated of the human, and the properties of the human are described as “attributes” of the divine. The properties are not kept separate, but predicated of the opposite nature than that to which they properly belong.

The second of Newman’s unpublished sermons from 1836 that is under discussion, number 408, presents a less successful argument. However it is important for showing the impact his thoughts about Apollinarianism had on his preaching. According to Newman, Christ is one person and that Person is the Son. Again, though, how can the suffering of this one person and his growth in knowledge be explained? The answer, in this sermon at least, came by way of an analogy with what Newman took (for argument’s sake) to be the two-fold constitution of the human soul, as both rational and animal:

As He took rational soul and body into His divine nature, yet without interfering with the sovereignty of His original self or the unity of his person, so we for what we know have joined to our rational souls that animal souls [sic] which brutes have – which in brutes indeed governs as a supreme intelligence, such as it is, but which in us does not constitute a second self within ourselves but is one with us,
and acts (when it acts) strictly as a property or part of ourselves and altogether subordinate.  

What is intriguing about Newman’s thought experiment, and this is overlooked by Strange, is that the idea of animal and rational properties of the soul had an Apollinarian dimension. Some of those who followed Apollinarius, not the heretic himself, suggested Christ had only the animal part of the human soul. To this, Newman retorts: “His party answered that it was His animal soul that suffered; but could the mere animal soul say, ‘Eli, Eli, lama,’ &c.?” (TT 277, §4.6). In his sermon, Newman seems to leave open to argument whether or not, in Christ’s human nous, he was free to grow in knowledge as well as to suffer because within his human soul there were two parts, the animal and the rational. If Christ’s divine mind switches on or off his human mind, so too the rational part of the soul is (in principle) able to choose whether or not to respond to the animal drives within the soul. But this is just multiplying the instances in which the divine must have the option of over-riding the human in order for Christ to be obedient. If there is leakage of knowledge from the divine nature into the rational part of the human soul, is there not also to be leakage to the animal part? In which case, why even introduce the idea of rational and animal parts to the soul into the argument? Newman seemed to realise that this thought experiment was no real help and soon dropped the idea.

In 1835 and 1836, as he was exploring the ramifications of Apollinarian arguments for his own christology, Newman had clearly wanted Christ to have the ability to grow in knowledge as evidence of a human nous. For Newman in August 1835, after all, it was the heretical Apollinarians who granted Christ only a divine mind, for “They succeeded to argue that the human mind was necessarily sinful” (TT 268, §2.10). Due to Newman’s later positioning of himself on the question of the fullness of knowledge in the human mind of Christ, there is opportunity for some confusion here. In August 1835, judging by the expression “they succeeded to argue,” he seems to think that the Apollinarians’ logic led them to take up a unique position in arguing that Christ was not able to be ignorant. Newman later discovered that there were many in the ancient world who thought that, to argue for Christ’s ignorance, would be to admit of his sinfulness. As

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a Catholic, suggests Strange, under the influence of the likes of Augustine, Newman came to hold “the Greek view that ignorance was of sin, and therefore could never be affirmed of Christ.”¹²⁶⁴ But, in 1836, he was quite happy to see Christ as “all knowing, yet partially ignorant” and to explain the union implied by this model in terms of a Cyrilline communicatio idiomatum.

(c) The Communicatio Idiomatum

With his recognition in Arians that Christ’s ousia was the locus of divine characteristics, Newman also recognised the need to prevent Christ’s assumption of a human nature at the incarnation from resulting in “two sons,” one a divine being, the other a human. This was the pit into which the Assyrian theologian, Nestorius, fell, and to avoid it Newman took the path of Nestorius’s opponent, Cyril. Even when his formulations are not those of Cyril, the trajectory away from “two sons” might be called Cyrilline. As one recent patristic commentator puts it, Cyril’s focus on Christ’s unity made the Word the “sole personal subject of all his own acts as eternal Lord (the creation, the inspiration of the ancient prophets, and so on) but after the incarnation the same one is also the personal subject directing all his actions performed within time and space.”¹²⁶⁵ Christ is called “Son” because that is who he is from all eternity, and the Person of the human Jesus is this same Son. In his 1835 sermon, “The Humiliation of the Eternal Son,” Newman uses this Cyrilline argument to criticise modern forgetfulness of the ancient doctrines of Christ:

we have well-nigh forgotten the sacred truth, graciously disclosed for our support, that Christ is the Son of God in His Divine nature, as well as His human; we have well-nigh ceased to regard Him, after the pattern of the Nicene Creed, as “God from God, and Light from Light,” ever one with Him, yet ever distinct from Him. We speak of Him in a vague way as God, which is true, but not the whole truth;

¹²⁶⁴ Strange (1981), 77. See note 2, which suggests the relevant work of Augustine is de Peccatorum Meritis ii.48.

and, in consequence when we proceed to consider His humiliation, we are unable to carry on the notion of His personality from heaven to earth (PS iii.12, 591). Newman’s desire “to carry the notion of His personality from heaven to earth” does not imply an attempt to figure out the fully human psychology of the person of Christ; rather, Newman seeks to present in his sermons the incarnation of what the commentator on Cyril calls the “sole personal subject” of Christ, which is to say the Word. The theme of this sermon in particular is that the Word is the one who takes on the form of a servant – in which form he suffered. His text is Hebrews 5:7-8, which he interprets as follows:

This, then, is the force of the words, “Though He was a Son, yet had He experience of obedience.” He took on Him a lower nature, and wrought in it towards a Will higher and more perfect than it. Further, “He learned obedience amid suffering,” and, therefore, amid temptation. His mysterious agony under it is described in the former part of the text; which declares that “in the days of His flesh,” He “offered up prayers and supplications, with strong crying and tears, unto Him that was able to save Him from death, and was heard in that He feared” (PS iii.12, 587).

Newman clearly wants to give full “force” to sufferings of the Word in the flesh, though not without problems arising. In this respect he followed Cyril, who had proclaimed: “God wept. God died. God… suckled. To [Cyril’s] opponents, especially Nestorius, this language broke the very foundations of their christological scheme, and they attacked it as akin to mythology.” Is Newman also engaging in mythology? How can Christ suffer in the flesh, when the Person doing the suffering is the impassible Logos rather than human person? How can Christ be humanly tempted when his will is always subject to “a Will higher than it”?

In answer to these questions, Cyril’s Alexandrian forebears left him with the communicatio idiomatum as an exegetical tool which recognised that some attributes which are predicable properly of Christ’s human nature, can – because Christ is one

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McGuckin (1995), 45. It should be noted that interpretations of Cyril are still the subject of scholarly controversy. In this quotation, McGuckin seems to allow for real exchange to take place between the divine and human properties in Christ so that, for example, as a human God speaks. For an interpretation of Cyril which opposes any real exchange, for it is the human and not the Logos who speaks, see Weinandy, Thomas, Does God Suffer? (Edinburgh: T&T Clark, 2000), 199-206.
Person – be predicated of the divine nature too. Newman uses this tool frequently, perhaps in Romantic fashion to appeal to the heart rather than the head, as in these sentences from the other 1835 sermon: “When, then, our Saviour weeps from sympathy at Mary’s tears, let us not say it is the love of a man overcome by natural feeling. It is the love of God, the bowels of compassion of the Almighty and Eternal, condescending to show it as we are capable of receiving it, in the form of human nature” (PS iii.10, 568).

Underlying this rhetoric was an Alexandrian tradition that went back at least to Origen. If the Eternal Son, in spite of his impassibility, is seen weeping, then it must be that in his flesh the Son can express emotions which he cannot properly as God.

Preached on Palm Sunday 1836, “The Incarnate Son, a Sufferer and Sacrifice,” represents Newman at his most Cyrilline. He says that the Son “added a new nature to Himself, yet so intimately, that it was as if He had actually left His former self, which He did not” (PS vi.6, 1231-2). Previously in his sermons, the Person of the Logos assumed human nature; but here, the divine Person has become so intimate with the flesh he took on, it was “as if” humanity were his only nature. In other words, where before Newman has shown us the hypostatic union from Christ’s divine perspective, in this sermon he shows it from Christ’s human one. The consequences are clear:

As the soul acts through the body as its instrument,—in a more perfect way, but as intimately, did the Eternal Word of God act through the manhood which He had taken. When He spoke, it was literally God speaking; when He suffered, it was God suffering. Not that the Divine Nature itself could suffer, any more than our soul can see or hear; but, as the soul sees and hears through the organs of the body, so God the Son suffered in that human nature which He had taken to Himself and made His own (PS vi.6, 1232).

This is an example of communicatio idiomatum along Cyril’s lines, in which the properties are exchanged between the divine Logos and the human flesh he assumed, such that “When He spoke, it was literally God speaking.” Newman makes plain here that it is “not a figurative way of speaking” to say God’s Son was among us, rather “it is a literal and simple truth.” But, therefore, since it was “literally” God speaking, this means that, to the extent that the Logos was speaking through him, the human who provided the
voice did not have agency other than in the divine Person.\textsuperscript{267} The actor in the flesh was none other than God’s eternal Son. One begins to see how close this is to Eutyches’s position, about which more in a moment.

Newman cannot deny the analogical dimension to all of this. The analogy has God as the primary predicate: it is God who speaks with Jesus’s voice, and therefore only derivatively is the human Jesus speaking. Hence the “literal” speaker is divine, and by analogy we can say that the human speaks God’s words. To explain more clearly what he means about the relation of the human to the divine Person, in fact, Newman has to use another analogy. He chooses an analogy that Cyril himself favoured, of the unity of human and divine in Christ being like that of the body and soul in humans.\textsuperscript{268} Just “as the soul sees and hears through the organs of the body, so God the Son suffered in that human nature which He had taken to Himself and made His own” (PS vi.6, 1232).

Newman needs to speak analogically because inherent within such modes of speech, of course, is the difference that prevents one saying that the human flesh assumed by the Logos is the same as the soulless body posited by Apollinarianism.\textsuperscript{269} The Logos assumed a fully human body and soul for Newman, as he did for Cyril, that divine attributes might be predicated of it, and that human properties might be predicated of the divine.

A recapitulation of Newman’s criticism of Apollinarianism shows the difference between a heretical use of communicatio idiomatum and Cyril’s theological doctrine. In “Apollinarianism,” Newman recognises that Apollinarian heretics did not use the analogy for the hypostatic union of the human body and soul, and instead saw in that union a new

\textsuperscript{267} In the sermon “Christ, the Son of God Made Man,” also from 1836, Newman wrote: “He took upon Him our nature, as an instrument of His purposes, not as an agent in the work” (PS vi.5, 1225, my italics).

\textsuperscript{268} When annotating Athanasius in the early 1840s, he comments on these analogies: “Our Lord’s real manhood and imputed sinfulness were alike adjuncts to His Divine Person, which was of an Eternal and Infinite Nature; and therefore His Manhood may be compared to an Attribute, or to an accident, without meaning that it really was either. The Athan. Creed compares the Hypostatic Union to that of soul and body in one man, which, as taken literally by the Monophysites became their heresy” (Ox Frs xix, 359 note f).

\textsuperscript{269} He had already used this analogy, which is common enough in christological doctrine, before his work on the Apollinarians. He preached in 1835, “Just as we speak of seeing our friends, though we do not see their souls but merely their bodies, so the Apostles, Disciples, Priests, and Pharisees, and the multitude, all who saw Christ in the flesh, saw, as the whole earth will see at the last day, the Very Eternal Son” (PS iii.12, 588).
compound of divinity and humanity – thus introducing change into both the human and
divine in Christ:

Let it be observed, [Apollinarius] did not merely say that the Incarnation was
analogous to the union of soul and body, as the Athanasian Creed rightly teaches,
and as the Eutychians afterwards perversely maintained, but that it was an actual
instance of that union. The Word was the very soul of a human body... but both
changed in that resulting whole (TT 271, §3.4).

The communicatio idiomatum of Apollinarius does not occur across two wholly different
natures because the divine and human collapse into one another to form “a compound
nature, a sunthetos ousia.” By contrast, Cyril’s doctrine recognises that there must be
difference in order for there to be exchange at all, and therefore preserves the theological
distinction between the divine and human in Christ. In a way, Cyril is implied with this
mention of Eutyches, who, in spite of his otherwise heretical notions of Christ’s person,
“perversely” used the orthodox teaching of Cyril on this point. Thus, in one respect at
least, at this stage of his thought, Newman saw Eutychian heresy as superior to the
Apollinarian heresy: Eutyches followed Cyril in using the body-soul analogy properly of
the union of human and divine in Christ. 270

Certainly, when examining the christology of the mid-1830s, Newman’s debt to
Cyril has become clear. It has been seen, moreover, that to focus on the union of the
Logos with flesh is not necessarily the same thing as to declare the full humanity of Jesus
Christ. While correcting his work of some of Apollinarius’s mistakes, in 1836 Newman
still preached that Christ “has no human personality” and held the view that, when the
Logos decides, a sort of leakage can occur from his divine to his human mind. As will
now be shown, his position differs considerably from Pope Leo and his Latin
representatives at the Council of Chalcedon. Newman represents what might be called
Cyrilline Chalcedonianism rather than Leonine.

270 In fact, it is by no means certain Apollinarius did not mean something very similar, in his writing, to the
analogy of soul-body in humans and the union of divinity-humanity in Christ. See Behr, John, The Nicene
3) Newman after 1836: Cyril or Eutyches?

Newman has based his christology on an exegesis of scripture drawn from Origen. This methodology, followed by other Alexandrians, has the interpreter discerning which biblical texts refer to the human nature in Christ, which to the divine nature, and which to a *communicatio idiomatum* of the two:

For instance, take the following passages of scripture: “I do nothing of Myself;” “He that sent me is with me;” “the Father hath not left Me alone;” “My Father worketh hitherto, and I work;” “Whatsoever I speak, even as the Father said unto Me, so I speak;” “I am in the Father, and the Father in Me.” Now, it is true, these passages may be understood of our Lord’s human nature; but, surely, if we confine them to this interpretation, we run the risk of viewing Christ as two separate beings, not as one Person; or, again, of gradually forgetting or explaining away the doctrine of His Divinity altogether (*P5* vi.5, 1223-4).

Here, Newman’s interpretation seeks first to defend against any Nestorian conception of two sons and, secondly, against those who thought Christ’s sonship meant he was not fully divine.\(^{271}\) In mounting this defence he relies on his Alexandrian defence team of Athanasius and Cyril. But it has already been shown that Newman, in using Athanasius, found it necessary to correct him where Apollinarius had taken his thought to heretical extremes. Between 1836 and 1840, in work done for two sets of *Lectures* and above all on the Monophysites, Newman came to realise that Cyril also needed some correction. First, though, the difference between an Alexandrian christology, traced from Origen to Athanasius to Cyril, and the two-nature christology of Leo, should be clarified. Newman was firmly in the Alexandrian camp, for his sermons from the mid-1830s conceive the divine and human natures in Christ not in parallel to one another, but coextensive, albeit with the divine having priority. As Origen, Athanasius and Cyril all stated, the Logos becomes human only in order to do the work of salvation. Moreover,

\(^{271}\) Such a defence seems to have been a constant preoccupation of Newman in 1836. Strange (1981) writes that “in his first unpublished sermon of the set in 1836, he noted the way some heretics had denied the true humanity of Christ, others his true divinity, and others again ‘that God became man, considering the Son of God and the Son of man to be two distinct beings, the one condescending to dwell with the other.’” He
because the property of God is simply to be – whereas it is in the nature of creatures, who are subject to time, to become – for Origen, Athanasius, and Cyril, he truly is the Logos and only becomes Jesus Christ.272 Newman’s 1836 sermons also put the emphasis on the “Eternal Word” rather than the “human nature” Christ assumes (e.g. PS vi.6, 1232). His is not the suggestion, found in Pope Leo’s Tomus ad Flavianum, of symmetry in the natures of Christ. He follows the Alexandrians’ portrayal of a divine actor in human flesh, rather than Leo’s symmetrical view of two natures, arguing that it is the Son whose voice is heard whenever Jesus speaks. Furthermore, Christ’s will is described in Alexandrian terms in the 1835 sermon, “Humiliation of the Eternal Son.” There Newman said that, in taking on “a separate will and a separate work” in the flesh, still the Son had “concurrence” with the Will he shared with the Father, albeit in the flesh it was manifested as not as “mere concurrence [but] obedience” (PS iii.12, 587). Both a human will and a divine Will operate in Christ, according to this sermon, yet the divine Will uses the human will as the instrument by which the Son’s work on earth is done.273 Leo on the other hand, according to Grillmeier, held that “the human will of Christ is the means by which he is proved before God.”274 Obedience to the divine Will testifies to the activity of the human will for Leo, whereas for Newman it testifies more to the passivity of the human in Christ.

Although Newman follows Cyril’s Alexandrian christology closely, this particular Father faces criticism after 1836. In the Lectures on the Prophetical Office (1837), Cyril is accused of hot-headedness in the speed with which he conducted affairs at the Council commented: ‘None of the three took in the true notion of the Christ, the one Christ, at once God and man’,” 62.

272 I owe this formulation to John Behr.

273 It seems too early in Newman’s work to see this as a hint of Maximus. It is not until his work translating Athanasius, published in 1842, that he begins referring to Maximus. There, however, he quotes Maximus from his friend Routh’s Reliquaries, so it cannot be ruled out that he had not read Maximus earlier: “Again, let it be observed how S. Maximus comments upon S. Gregory Nazianzen’s words in the following passage: ‘The great Gregory Theologus seems to me thus to teach in his great Apologetic, “One, hen, out of both, and both through One,” as if he would say, for as there is one out of both, that is, of two natures, One as a whole from parts according to the definition of hypostasis, so,’ etc.” (Ox Fr viii, 173).

274 Grillmeier, A, Christ in Christian Tradition trans. J.S. Bowden (New York: Sheed and Ward, 1965), 471. He draws the contrast between the Alexandrians’ and Leo’s christology thus: Athanasius “ascribes victory in Gethsemane to the divine will in Christ, while the weakness of the flesh asks to be freed from
of Ephesus. Cyril does not exhibit what Newman considers the proper ethos. But the squabbling and mutual recriminations between Cyril and John of Antioch do not invalidate the truth that Cyril established at the Council, just as the way in which the Reformation was carried out does not (for the Anglican Newman) invalidate the truth of its cause:

Cyril and Nestorius, with their respective partisans, arrived at Ephesus at the time appointed, before John, Bishop of Antioch, and the Orientals. After waiting for a fortnight, Cyril opened the Council, as President, without them; in spite of the earnest representations of the Imperial Officer, who intreated him to allow a further delay. Its proceedings thus unsatisfactorily commenced, were concluded within the space of a single day... At the end of several years John and Cyril, making mutual admissions and explanations in points of doctrine, were reconciled to each other, and jointly assented to the condemnation of Nestorius. From that time Nestorius has been accounted a heretic by the Church... But, anyhow, the scandals of the Council of Ephesus are an effectual hindrance to any over-delicate and fastidious criticisms by Roman writers of our Reformation (VM i, 345-7).

Notice the criticism at this point in 1837 is not about Cyril’s doctrine but about his ethos. Like Athanasius, though, could he not be accused of opening up the possibility of heresy among his followers, with Eutyches playing Apollinarius to Cyril’s Athanasius? Earlier in the Lectures, Newman does imply a criticism of Cyril for the influence he had on Eutyches. Cyril is as responsible for Eutychianism, says the Anglican Newman, as Gregory of Nyssa was for giving Catholics a justification for the doctrine of transubstantiation. But surely this is to say Cyril was not really blameworthy at all for what is, Newman thinks, a pernicious outcome? He writes, as he did in Arians, that these openings for later heretical teachings occur when the Fathers speculate as individuals rather than when their doctrine is guided by collective tradition: “St. Cyril might afford a handle to Eutyches; Tertullian might be a Montanist; Origen might deny the eternity of future punishment; yet all such instances, whatever be their weight from other circumstances, still, as not professing to be more than expressions of private opinion,

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suffering. Leo sees in the struggle of Christ the manifesta distinctio of the nature that takes and the nature that is taken and shapes a clear dyotheletic formula... ‘Superiori igitur voluntati voluntas cessit inferior’.”

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have no weight at all, one way or other, in the argument from Catholic Tradition” (*VM* i, 52-3). In 1837, Newman was therefore as sympathetic to Cyril as he was to Origen, drawing back from a direct criticism of the opportunities Cyril afforded Eutyches, just as in *Arians* he had forgiven Origen for his private speculations. However, as the engagement with Apollinarius led him, at the end of 1835, to safeguard some of Athanasius’s arguments, Newman used further research into Eutyches in the summer of 1839 to clarify his views on Cyril. That research bore fruit in a flurry of writings on those heretics he gathered under the banner of “Monophysites” in August. But, as will be shown with reference to sermons from 1840 and 1849, Newman merely revised his christology in a more Cyrilline direction. In spite of what he wrote later about the influence of his Monophysite research upon his conversion to Catholicism, his own christology in this period showed a Cyrilline sort of Monophysitism.

(a) The likeness of Apollinarianism and Eutychianism

Newman was aware of Eutyches’s heresy at least as early as that of Apollinarius. Indeed, these two Alexandrian heretics seemed complementary in Newman’s eyes, as he showed in “Apollinaris’ history” of 19 August 1835. There he connects Apollinarianism with Eutychianism, as well as the heresies of Newman’s own day:

> Being many of them [the Apollinarians] scarcely sincere in their recantation, they cherished and gradually propagated those notions in the Church which before they had failed in spreading externally to it. The evil increased; it infected the Catholic body and the dissensions followed which developed itself in the heresies of Nestorius and Eutyches, the schisms and prostrations of the Eastern Church, a gradual preparation for the triumphs of Mohammedanism and the establishment of heretical doctrines which continue within the Church to this day.

275 The Monophysites play a large role in Newman’s recasting of his life as one of growing dissatisfaction with the Church of England. Over four years later, in a letter to Mrs Froude on 5 April 1844, Newman depicts himself “struck” by the importance of Rome in opposing Eutyches’s position on Christ. However, he also thinks it “a point on which some stress might be laid,” that “I was led in the course of my regular reading… to the Monophysite controversy, and to the Council of Chalcedon and St. Leo’s works inclusively.” Stanford, Derek, and Spark, Muriel, (eds.) *Letters of John Henry Newman: A Selection* (London: Peter Owen, 1957), 100. In fact, during the summer of 1839 and into 1840, it is clear that Leo’s own christology did not appeal to Newman.
Newman is telling the same story for Eutychianism and for Apollinarianism: both heresies grew out of a corruption of Alexandrian teaching; both flourished in Antioch and therefore ended up having to do with the theology of the “East” rather than Egypt; and, together with the contemporary sceptic, both put more emphasis on logic than traditional teaching. The story he told about Apollinarianism in 1835, of course, ended with a reduction of all heresies to mere forms of Arianism – a teleology already hinted at in this passage, with its reference to Islam’s and to modern sceptics’ denial of Christ’s full divinity. In 1839 he tells this story again, but with Eutychianism taking centre stage.

In August 1839, Newman engaged the heresy he described as “Monophysitism” with the vigour with which he had written his two pieces on Apollinarianism in August 1835. The longest piece is an unpublished manuscript entitled “The Monophysite Heresy” and dated 23 August 1839. Newman himself recognised the parallels with his work four years earlier; indeed, Stephen Thomas observes, he bound “an abstract of [the] MS” together with a copy of his paper “Apollinarianism.”

There was a clear parallel in the way the leader of each heresy, Apollinarius and Eutyches, began as close friends of the Alexandrian Fathers, Athanasius and Cyril respectively. Eutyches and his followers said they taught nothing other than what they learned from Cyril: “They claimed but the use of what was already received, what had already been determined against heresy. They wished to add nothing, they said, they were contented with what had been already provided for them” (Mon 58).

What, though, was Eutyches’s error, and how did it relate to what Newman called “Monophysitism”? Eutyches did not himself object to the language of “two natures” being used of Christ, although he did insist the terms be used in a certain way. When Eutyches was condemned at a Synod in 448, his opponent Flavian proposed the following formula: “We acknowledge that Christ is from two natures after the incarnation, in one hypostasis and one person confessing one Christ, one Son, one Lord.”

As Grillmeier records, “Eutyches... only accepted the formula ‘from two natures’ under pressure and


277 As Thomas (1991) observes, this bound, but unpublished, paper is not to be confused with “another untitled manuscript, of only eleven pages, dated 1839, which ends abruptly,” 206.

278 Quoted in Grillmeier (1965), 457.
gave it a twist which prevented his opponents from using the expression and set it up as a 
Monophysite catchword: ‘I acknowledge that the Lord was “from two natures” before the 
union, but after the union I acknowledge only “one nature”’. The trouble with 
heretics, Newman has maintained since Arians, is that they are inclined to prefer 
sophistry to traditional teaching. Therefore, the Council of Chalcedon employed 
homoousion as a test against Eutychian heretics, as the Council of Nicaea had against 
Arians, although this time it was Christ’s human nature that was described as homoousios 
with humanity (something Eutyches had denied). Sophistry asserts dry logic, thinks 
Newman, whereas the traditional teaching asserts a richer interpretation of scripture that 
yields a Christ who is one substance both with God and with humans.

The fault which he says Eutychianism shares with Arianism is “an allowance of 
abstract reasoning, in other words, that is, maintenance of intellectually conceived first 
principles in a matter which was purely of faith” (Mon 4). Newman does not explain 
why a matter “purely of faith” is not open to being discussed “intellectually” — whereas a 
heresy can have its “first principles” analysed by his own rigorous logic. For over the 
course of his paper “The Monophysite Heresy,” Newman uses logic to force all 
Monophysites into the same position, denying both Christ’s full divinity and his full 
humanity:

Then again as this tenet of the mia physis derogated from our Lord’s Godhead, it 
could not but impair the doctrine of His manhood… In order that God might 
certainly be received as man, and man held to be God, it seemed to teach that 
Christ came short of being God in that He was man, and of man in that He was 
God (Mon 77).

279 Grillmeier (1965), 458. According to Grillmeier, therefore, the “two natures” of the formula were not 
what divided Flavian from Eutyches, but the “temporal and genetic connotation” in the phrase “from two 
natures.”

280 With knowing irony, Newman uses the logic he learned from his teachers, the sceptical Noetics, to 
connect the errors of all heretics: “Opinions apparently very opposite, or rather those which are apparently 
most so, agree in the major premiss or principle of which they rest, and differ in the minor. Hence they are 
much more connected than at first might be supposed” (Mon 9). In 1874, he was still making the 
observation that heretics agreed on major premises, adding the following note to his 1835 essay, 
“Apollinarianism”: “Arians, Sabellians, Nestorians, and Monophysites, agree together in the assumption on 
starting, that nature and person are always coincident in intellectual beings” (TT 259, §1.3).
In spite of reducing all heresy to the same formula, Newman makes a distinction in this paper between Eutyches’s followers and the Monophysites who came after them – especially Severus of Antioch. This is, in fact, another parallel with the work on Apollinarianism in 1835. There he made a distinction between Apollinarius and those in Antioch who took up his heresy later. Likewise the more Antiochene of the Monophysites, with Severus at their head, are the more dangerous of the heretics. Newman calls their position only “Semi-Eutychian”: they “held that the Divine Nature of the Word had the addition of what viewed by itself was a human nature, but viewed in the Word thereby ceased to be a separate nature, but formed one nature with the divine” (Mon 53). Although this seemed in some ways more moderate than Eutyches’s claim that the human nature could never exist of itself after the union, Newman makes clear that these later Monophysites followed the interests of party spirit, which in Arians he had identified with the Eusebians who were the court party.

It was argued in the beginning of this chapter that, for Newman, the doctrines of Trinity and Incarnation were part of the same theological landscape with the result for humans being the doctrine of deification. By God’s grace, human activity can become a virtuous participation in the divine life. Newman’s claim, made once again in “The Monophysite Heresy,” is that the same but inverse pattern is true of heresy. Heresies, whether trinitarian or christological, are part of the same corrupt landscape, and manifest themselves in vicious human activity – especially party spirit. Newman, in considering all doctrines to flow into one another, had no problem conceiving a trinitarian aspect to Monophysitism, even though it was ostensibly a christological heresy. He argues, for instance, that the principle that physis means “Person” was held by the Monophysites in common with Nestorians, Arians and Sabellians. A participation in the principle involved a participation in its consequences. As applied to the doctrine of the Trinity, it led to the direct conclusion either that there is but one person in the Godhead because there is but one Divine Nature; or that there are Three Persons; that is, it led to Sabellianism or Tritheism (Mon 72). Just as all orthodox doctrine is interconnected, for Newman, so is all heresy. But this is really an argument about the position in respect to orthodoxy taken by parties within the Church rather than about doctrine. For, as will now become clear, Newman’s own
doctrine continued to be that of Cyril, even though it came close to that of various Monophysites.

(b) Predicating suffering of the Son

Christ’s suffering is a major theme of the doctrine of the Incarnation to which Newman keeps returning. In “The Monophysite Heresy,” Newman writes of the Eutychians that “Their real objection lay, not against the word nature, but against the humiliation which the assumption of that nature applied; and whether consciously or not, they objected to the word nature, in order to mask the force of the shock which the humiliation itself gave to their feelings” (Mon 28). In other words, the Eutychians were unwilling fully to countenance the “humiliation” that, in becoming incarnate, the Logos had to undergo. If the human in Christ was a “nature” in itself, then the unity of Christ was threatened, and moreover the divine Person was in danger of being seen to suffer when and as the human suffered. Instead, as Eutyches had it, if there was only one nature after the union, and that nature was divine, then Christ’s sufferings were not experienced in the same way as humans suffer for there was no human agent to experience them. It can be suggested, on the basis of what has already been argued, that this came close to Newman’s own position in the sermons of 1835, when the human was merely an instrument of the Logos. He was already safeguarding his christology against the dangers of Christ’s body being seen as merely an organon in 1836, but by the time he had finished his research into Monophysitism, in 1839, he realised the need to give the human Jesus agency in his suffering. For the Son truly to feel pain, he must feel it in something resembling a human nature.

It was argued above that Newman was aware of Eutyches at least as early as Apollinarius, seeing as the two are mentioned in his writings on Apollinarianism from 1835. Therefore, already in 1836, it is probable that Newman was attempting to avoid Eutychianism when he wrote in the sermon, “Christ, the Son of God made Man”: “This is what His unity consists in,—not unity of nature, but in this, that He who came on earth, was the very Same who had been from everlasting” (PS vi.5, 1228). The christology here is Cyrilline, putting the emphasis on the Person of the everlasting Son as the locus of union with the human, but that union did not make a Eutychian unified nature. Eutyches,
of course, claimed that Cyril had taught a single nature of Christ after the incarnation. Newman, however, claimed Cyril meant something different. Again, as was seen with the Athanasian terminology of organon, the christological sermons gave Newman a chance to safeguard the Alexandrians (and himself) against the accusation of error. But what is different here is that Newman did not drop certain terminology: as will be seen shortly, on the subject of “impassible passibility” little has changed between the sermons, “Bodily Suffering” of May 1835 and “Christ’s Privations a Meditation for Christians” of April 1840. Nor is Christ really suffering as any human would, as can be seen in the sermon, “Mental Sufferings of Our Lord in His Passion,” from 1849. In Gethsemane, preaches Newman, Jesus suffers agony only when his Person (which is divine) allows it: “withdrawing the support of the God-head from His soul, distress, terror, and dejection at once rush in upon it” (Mix 334). This is the opposite of Eutychianism as Newman portrays it because, rather than the divine over-riding of the pain Jesus felt on the cross, the divine is withdrawn so that the Son might suffer in his humanity. For Newman, the suffering on the cross is being absorbed into a divine nature which, as unsuffering, can soak it all up.281 It is the human suffering of a divine Person. Christ’s voluntary suffering is still contrasted with human involuntary suffering in his sermon of 1840: “How little are our sorrows to these! how little is our pain, our hardships, our persecutions, compared with those which Christ voluntarily undertook for us!... How base and miserable are we, for understanding them so little, for being so little impressed by them!” (PS vi.4, 1218). So too in 1849, where he writes of Christ: “when He chose to fear, He feared; when He chose to be angry, He was angry; when he chose to grieve, He was grieved” (Mix 330).

Therefore Newman continues to preach one nature even after his research into the Monophysites. He holds to this in spite of later arguments in the Apologia that in 1839, and for the first time, he found “his own espousal of moderation, and of a conservative view of Tradition resisting development, the very qualities of the Monophysites, who,

281 As one Alexandrian-minded contemporary theologian puts it: “Jesus... weeps and feels terror before death just as any human would: what is odd is the way Jesus overcomes these anxieties and fears – for example, the way he nevertheless conforms his will to the Father’s as the Father’s own Son would – and the saving consequences of such acts – Jesus overcomes our weeping and terror by weeping and being terrified.” Tanner, Kathryn, Jesus, Humanity and the Trinity (Minneapolis: Fortress, 2001), 18.
giving up the extremes of Eutyches, harked back to Cyril and Athanasius, but resisted the present voice of the Church in the Chalcedonian definition.”

In fact, Thomas finds no evidence for Newman’s *ex post facto* worries about looking as if into a mirror at the Monophysites (*Apo* 108) in any 1839 writings or letters. Early in 1840, Thomas detects the merest wobble from Newman concerning the Anglican position in “The Catholicity of the English Church” which appeared in the *British Critic* against Wiseman’s “Anglican Claims.” Can a Church of England be Catholic, asked Wiseman, or is it inherently heretical for a Church polity to define itself by its locality? Heresies, argues Newman, are named after a certain person or a certain doctrine, not after a locality, and Monophysitism is a prime example: “The Monophysites got possession of whole districts, and might seem, if any men, identified with the local Churches in those districts. Yet they are named from Eutyches, from Severus, from Jacob, from Gaianus and from Theodosius.”

The only link between the Monophysites and “Via Media” Anglicans that Thomas can find in 1840 is the “might seem” of the first sentence. That this was not much of a wobble can be seen from the fact that his sermons in the 1840s continued the Monophysite trajectory of a suffering God.

What it means for Christ to suffer impassively is described very differently in these two extended quotations from the sermons, but the result is still a Monophysitism of sorts. Although Christ is described as voluntarily suffering in 1835, there is a tendency to downplay the pain he felt:

And with what calmness and majesty did He bear His sufferings, when they came upon Him, though by His agony in the garden He showed He fully felt their keeness! The Psalmist, in his prediction of them, says, “I am poured out like water, and all my bones are out of joint; my heart is like wax, it is melted;” (Ps 22:14) describing, as it would seem, that sinking of spirit and enfeebling of nerve

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282 The paraphrase is from Thomas (1991), 205.

283 There is evidence that Wiseman’s comparison of Anglicanism to Donatism (not Monophysitism) did disturb him. He wrote about “Anglican Claims” to Frederick Rogers late in September 1839: “we have sprung a leak... It is no laughing matter” (*LD* vii , 154). But, as Turner (2003) points out, Newman quickly returned to the subject of heresy within his own Church: “There and elsewhere in the correspondence of those months, he unhesitatingly equated the Tractarian Apostolicals with the party of truth in the Church of England,” 336.

284 “Catholicity of the English Church,” January 1840, quoted in Thomas (1991), 221.
which severe pain causes. Yet, in the midst of distress which seemed to preclude the opportunity of obedience, He was “about His Father’s business,” even more diligently than when in His childhood He asked questions of the doctors in the Temple; not thinking to be merely passive under the trial, but accounting it as if a great occasion for a noble and severe surrender of Himself to His Father’s will (PS iii.11, 578, my italics).

Here, the suffering is actively accepted, not it seems in order that it might really be felt, but that in suffering Christ might show his obedience to the Father. Words like “noble” and “severe surrender” evoke a stoical not an agonised Christ, and there is a distance between the subject and the agony “it would seem” he was suffering. This same incident is described with a very different tone in his 1840 sermon. Newman preaches about first, what is very wonderful and awful, the overwhelming fear He had of His sufferings before they came. This shows how great they were; but it would seem besides this, as if He had decreed to go through all trials for us, and, among them, the trial of fear. He says, “Now is My soul troubled, and what shall I say? Father, save Me from this hour; but for this cause came I unto this hour.” (Jn 12:27) And when the hour came, this terror formed the beginning of His sufferings, and caused His agony and bloody sweat. He prayed, “O My Father, if it be possible, let this cup pass from Me; nevertheless, not My will, but Thine, be done.” (Mt 26:39) St. Luke adds; “And being in an agony, He prayed more earnestly, and His sweat was as it were great drops of blood falling down to the ground.” (Lk 22:44) (PS vi.4, 1217).

The scriptural passages are multiplied to emphasise how genuine Christ’s “overwhelming fear” was. Although Christ is voluntarily accepting all “He had decreed to go through,” his “terror” drives him to have second thoughts. This is a more passionate passion than was described in 1835.

The 1840 sermon also uses more visceral language for Christ’s suffering on the cross. In 1835, the crucified is a man in control of all that he faces, remembering to quote the appropriate scriptures from the cross: “Even when He seemed to be thinking of Himself, and said, ‘I thirst,’ He really was regarding the words of prophecy, and was bent on vindicating, to the very letter, the divine announcements concerning Him” (PS iii.11,
Only one of Christ's exclamations ("My God, my God, why hast thou forsaken me?") expressed any "horrible dread" and "Doubtless 'that voice was for our sakes;' as when he made mention of His thirst" (PS iii.11, 578). A dutiful Son knowingly fulfilling the words of the various prophets, Jesus is acting mainly as a sign to us, rather than as any other human being would act. The 1835 sermon has a strong emphasis on Christ's suffering fulfilling prophecy, as when he was "'red in His apparel, and His garments like Him that treadeth in the wine-fat' (Isa 63:2); or, in the words of the Apostle, 'He was clothed with a vesture dipped in blood' (Rev 19:13)" (PS iii.11, 572). In 1840, by contrast, even when the focus is on the fulfilment of prophecy, the prophecies themselves have a more humiliating quality to them: "And thus He hung upon the Cross for six hours, His whole body one wound, exposed almost naked to the eyes of men, 'despising the shame,' (Heb 12:2) and railed at, taunted, and cursed by all who saw Him. Surely to Him alone, in their fulness, apply the Prophet's words; 'Is it nothing to you, all ye that pass by? behold, and see if there be any sorrow like unto My sorrow which is done unto Me, wherewith the Lord hath afflicted Me in the day of His fierce anger' (Lam 1:12)" (PS vi.4, 1218). Newman now almost revels in the shame described by the prophet Jeremiah. Perhaps he is showing that, unlike the Eutychians, whom he accused in 1839 of being opposed to "the humiliation which the assumption of that [human] nature applied" to the Son, his christology installs the Son's humiliation at its centre.

In the sermon from 1840, the cry of desolation is not simply one among many words from the cross, but the one in which Newman is most interested. This cry, together with the cry of thirst, is now taken to express real suffering. Emphasis is still on what, in 1835, Newman called Christ's "inherent Divinity," but here this divine Person is handed over to Satan to suffer torments described with gusto:

both in soul and in body was this Holy and Blessed Saviour, the Son of God, and Lord of life, given over to the malice of the great enemy of God and man. Job was given over to Satan in the Old Testament, but within prescribed limits; first, the Evil One was not allowed to touch his person, and afterwards, though his person, yet not his life. But Satan had power to triumph, or what he thought was triumphing, over the life of Christ, who confesses to His persecutors, "This is your hour, and the power of darkness." (Lk 22:53) His head was crowned and torn
with thorns, and bruised with staves; His face was defiled with spitting; His shoulders were weighed down with the heavy cross; His back was rent and gashed with scourges; His hands and feet gored through with nails; His side, by way of contumely, wounded with the spear; His mouth parched with intolerable thirst; and His soul so bedarkened, that He cried out, “My God, My God, why hast Thou forsaken Me?” (Mt 27:46) (PS vi.4, 1217-8).

The mention of Christ’s soul, of course, underscores the point made already in this chapter: that Newman was correcting any Apollinarian implications in his earlier sermon, since he took the main tenet of Apollinarianism to be a denial of a human soul in Christ. As Newman writes in 1849, “it was the soul and not the body which was the seat of the suffering of the Eternal Word” (Mix 325). He explains that this was no ordinary human soul, however: “He Himself created the soul which He took on Himself, while He took His body from the flesh of the Blessed Virgin, His Mother” (Mix 324). It seems that the christological problem that most vexes Newman in his preaching in the 1840s is not the Monophysite, but the Apollinarian one: which is to say, how Christ can have a human soul and yet that soul not to be able to sin? Indeed, it would seem that the Monophysite question, while the later Newman came to write so much about its influence, did not give him much trouble doctrinally at all.

Albeit he stresses that Christ’s passio was really impassio, Newman makes the divine Person the subject of suffering: “His passion was an action... God was the sufferer; God suffered in His human nature; the sufferings belonged to God, and were drunk up, were drained to the bottom of the chalice, because God drank them” (Mix 331). Antiochene opponents accused Cyril and his followers of overvaluing Christ’s suffering by projecting it into God, so that God suffers even if impassibly. As Newman falls back on the communicatio idiomatum to express the mysteries which Cyril taught, he too is open to that challenge. In his divinity, the Son is not fully God because able to suffer, and in his humanity, the Son is not fully human because that suffering only occurs when divine protection is withdrawn.
Conclusions

What do Newman’s sermons show about his christology between 1834-1849?

Firstly, some of the threads from this chapter can be tied together. All Newman’s sermons, to lesser or greater extent, show an Alexandrian method of scriptural exegesis. Nevertheless it has become clear, through this chapter, that the way he interpreted Christ’s actions in certain texts changed. As Newman shifted from the view of Christ’s flesh as merely an organon for the Logos, to a safeguarded emphasis on the Logos as the actor doing the divine work, to allowing the human Jesus fully to experience suffering that it might be absorbed into God, so Newman continually revised his interpretation of various portions of scripture. For instance, in the 1835 sermon, “Tears of Christ at the Grave of Lazarus,” Christ’s grief is a sign for us, rather than the result of affection for Lazarus. The text is understood economically in that “He showed us the Godhead in a new manifestation.” Because “it is the very sight of sympathy in another that affects and comforts the sufferer,” in weeping for Lazarus Jesus showed us the sympathy God has for us (PS iii.10, 567). There is a communicatio idiomatum at work here, enabling a property not usually applied to God (his sympathy) to be seen in the human Jesus. But is the divine really being sympathetic? Rather, is the organon of Jesus’s flesh being manipulated? And, if so, are human observers being deceived by Jesus’s tears? By comparison, in his 1840 sermon, “Christ’s Privations a Meditation for Christians,” a different secondary interpretation is given to enrich the primary (or “literal”) one of Jesus weeping for a dead friend:

Another great suffering from which our Lord did not withdraw Himself, was what in our case we call bereavement, the loss of relations or friends by death. This, indeed, it was not easy for Him to sustain, who had but one earthly near relation, and so few friends; but even this affliction He tasted for our sakes. Lazarus was His friend, and He lost him. He knew, indeed, that He could restore him, and He did. Yet still He bitterly lamented him, for whatever reason, so that the Jews said, “Behold how He loved him.” But a greater and truer bereavement, as far as we dare speak of it, was His original act of humiliation itself, in leaving His heavenly glory and coming down on earth. This, of course, is a great mystery to us from
beginning to end; still, He certainly vouchsafes to speak, through His Apostle, of His "emptying Himself" of His glory (PS vi.4, 1216-7).

For Newman in 1840, the weeping over Lazarus is part of the kenōsis expressed in Philippians 2:7, when the Son humbled himself to become incarnate. This self-emptying in the divine nature is the basis upon which all emptying within the human nature, whether weeping or dying on a cross, ultimately depends. Such an argument is itself a Cyrilline one. 285 Perhaps Newman's need for a more passionate passion also has a rhetorical purpose. His preaching of Christ's suffering in 1840 is more moving, and therefore rhetorically more convincing, than his earlier christological sermons.

By 1840, of course, his reflections on Christ's sufferings had been shaped largely by his research into the Eutychians. Study into other Monophysites in 1839 further shaped his Cyrilline christology. Around this time he encountered the Agnoetae, 286 which provided Newman with some unwelcome news at first. Beforehand, he had no difficulty conceiving that Christ had incomplete knowledge in his human nature, and that he could therefore grow in wisdom as Luke's Gospel taught (Lk 2:52). However, in the letter to Dodsworth much later, he admits that "When I read more, I found the view condemned (or the substance of it) in the case of the heresy of the Agnoitae [sic], after St Athanasius's day." 287 His reading of the Agnoetae had made him alter his christology, as can be seen in his annotations to Athanasius begun a year later, in 1841, where he rejected the idea of an ignorant nous in the Son. As he put it when glossing Discourse III.43, "a soul which left to itself had been partially ignorant, as other human souls, yet as

285 Cyril wrote in his third letter to Nestorius, "The Only begotten Word... came down for the sake of our salvation and abased Himself into emptying [kenōsis] and was incarnate... not indeed casting off what He was, but even though He became Man by the assumption of flesh and blood He still remained God in nature [physis] and in truth" trans. in T.H. Bindley and F.W. Green (eds.) The Oecumenical Documents of the Faith (London: Methuen, 1950). Quoted in Coakley (2002), 13. Coakley argues that this represents no real emptying at all, seeing as the Logos loses nothing but rather adds a human nature.

286 As he wrote when annotating Athanasius, the Agnoetae were "a sect of those very Eutychians, who denied or tended to deny our Lord's manhood with a view of preserving His divinity, being characterized by holding that He was ignorant" i.e. in his human soul (Ox Frs xix, 295-6 note a). In this Newman showed himself a more perceptive reader of the Agnoetae than Suicer, who wrote: "These taught that the divine nature of Christ was ignorant of certain things, like the hour of the last judgement" (my italics). See entry on Agnoetai, Suicer, Thesaurus vol i, 65 ("Hi docebant divinam Christi naturam...quaedam ignorasse, ut horam extremi judicium").

287 Dated 19 March 1852 (LD xv, 56). Newman refers here to what he now realises was a mistake in an 1835 sermon, which he later corrected in the 1868 edition of PS. Cf. PS iii.12 (first edition), 139.
ever enjoying the beatific vision from its oneness with the Word, it never was ignorant really, but knew all things which a human soul can know” (*Ox Frs* xix, 461 note b). In the annotations, Newman believes that Christ’s *nous* knew as much as any human *qua* human could know, enlightened by the (Augustinian?) beatific vision. The fact that *qua* human Christ cannot know more than a human can, however, he sees as part of the “economy.” Enlightened by the beatific vision though it was, Christ’s *nous* chose to fear what any human would that he might reveal to humanity that he was God – thus, facing death, his soul could be “bedarkened [so] that He cried out, ‘My God, My God, why hast Thou forsaken Me?’” (*PS* vi.4, 1218, my italics). But this is, as for Cyril, impassible suffering because Christ freely chooses not to be free from fear.\(^{288}\)

A major theme of this chapter has been Newman’s grasp of the *communicatio idiomatum*, a grasp which reflected his customary interest in the rules of language. This chapter will end, near to where it began, with a quotation from Lecture IX of the 1838 *Lectures on Justification*, in many ways the summation of his Anglican thought on the ramifications for humans of the doctrines of the Trinity and Incarnation. These lectures show the sorts of rhetorical flourishes for which Newman’s sermons are famous, including the *communicatio idiomatum*, which he uses in these *Lectures* to prevent the kind of “spiritualising” of the Atonement found in evangelical preaching.\(^{289}\) Rather than some mechanistic exchange that occurs regardless of humanity, the Atonement represents God really at work in the flesh of Christ and in us through the Spirit. Newman accepted that the Atonement required the *sacrifice* of Christ’s material body and blood, but also insisted that our justification required a *participation* in the body and blood of Christ made present by the Spirit in the Eucharist. The Atonement is made real in humans only

\(^{288}\) Another Cyrilline example in the 1842 annotations is Christ’s grief: “When grief began to be stirred in Him, and His sacred flesh was on the verge of tears, He suffers it *not to be affected freely*, as is our custom, but “He was vehement in the Spirit,” that is, he some way chides His own flesh in the power of the Holy Ghost” (*Ox Frs* xix, 477 note a, quoting fragment of *in John*).

\(^{289}\) Thus it is ironic how evangelical-sounding is his sermon from 1849, when it explains the intensity of Christ’s suffering to be the result of the entirety of human sin: on the cross, “His very memory is laden with every sin which has been committed since the fall, in all regions of the earth, with the pride of the old giants, and the lusts of the five cities, and the obduracy of Egypt, and the ambition of Babel, and the unthankfulness and scorn of Israel” (*Mix* 337).
through the Spirit and only in the Eucharist – the doctrines of Trinity, christology and deification, as was said before, complement each other. He argues that, as the Atonement was a work of flesh and blood, a tangible, sensible work, wrought out in this material world,—not, as the heretics said of old, an imaginary act, the suffering (God forgive the blasphemy!) of a phantom, a mere appearance (for such was the heresy which St. John and St. Paul especially opposed)—as Christ really “came in the flesh,” which none but deceivers and antichrists can deny, and suffered in the real body and blood of man;—so on the contrary the communication of this great and adorable Sacrifice to the individual Christian, is not the communication of that Body and Blood such as it was when offered upon the Cross, but, in a higher, glorified, and spiritual state. The Son of God suffered as the man Christ Jesus, “with strong crying and tears,”—“in weakness” and a body of “flesh;” the crucified Man, the Divine Son, comes again to us in His Spirit… As in God’s counsels it was necessary for the Atonement that there should be a material, local, Sacrifice of the Son once for all: so for our individual justification, there must be a spiritual, ubiquitous communication of that Sacrifice continually. (*Jfe 205*)

For Newman, it is vital “for our individual justification” that the crucified Man is the Divine Son, that the crying and tears of Jesus are the manifestation of God’s Logos. It is vital for us that this is so. For, in Alexandrian fashion, the body of Christ is not only the crucified, risen and ascended flesh of the Son, but also the Eucharistic body on which the Church feeds.
The *Homoousion* before and after Nicaea:
The Eclipse of Origen and the Rise of Athanasius.

Introduction

Already in May 1840, Newman was preparing himself for an experiment in monastic living at Littlemore. Unsurprisingly he saw this experiment in Greek patristic terms, telling Thomas Mozley, “We have bought nine acres, and want to build a *moné*.”290 This was nine months before the publication of Tract 90 precipitated a national debate over Newman’s place in the Church of England. Almost immediately after Tract 90, Newman began the project “to which I had long wished to devote myself” – the translation and annotation of certain works of Athanasius.291 This project fully absorbed him when, in April 1842, to escape public attention, he and a group of young disciples formally established residence at Littlemore. During this “monastic” period, Newman translated *de Decretis, de Synodis* and the four *Discourses* traditionally called *Contra Arianos*. Newman’s edition of the first two works, together with Athanasius’s First Discourse, was published in 1842 as volume viii of *A Library of the Fathers* (Oxford), of which he, Keble, Pusey and Marriott were the editors. The Second, Third and Fourth *Discourses* were published in 1844 as volume xix.292 In between the publication of these two volumes of *Select Treatises of S. Athanasius in Controversy with*...

290 20 May 1840 (LD vii, 328). He continues: “I want a cell to contain three rooms: 1, a sitting-room 12 by 9 (say); 2, a bed-room 6 by 6?; and 3, a cold-bath room 6 by 3?”

291 To the Bishop of Oxford, 14 April 1842 (LD viii, 504-5). The purpose of Newman’s letter is to reassure his bishop, in words which contradict what he wrote to Mozley in my previous footnote. Here Newman states: “A year since I submitted myself entirely to your Lordship’s authority... I not only stopped the series of the tracts on which I was engaged, but withdrew myself from all public discussions of Church matters of the day... I turned myself at once to the preparation for the press of the translations of St. Athanasius... As to my intentions, I propose to live [in Littlemore] myself a good deal... I do not understand what ‘cells of dormitories’ means. Of course I can repeat your Lordship’s words, that I am not attempting to a revival of the Monastic Orders in anything approaching the Romanist sense of the term.”
**The Arians**, a volume called *S. Athanasius Historical Tracts* was published in 1843. This latter was translated by M. Atkinson, with an historical preface by Newman.

In this period of seclusion ("mone") at Littlemore, then, Newman had immersed himself not simply in Athanasius’s anti-Arian writings, but in the history of his life. Such research features in the preface to the *Historical Tracts*, recounting Athanasius’s journeys in exile to Rome in the face of Arian antipathy. It is tempting (and, with hindsight, not inaccurate) to see Newman in these years thinking about whether, in his self-inflicted exile at Littlemore, he should follow Athanasius to Rome in the face of Anglican antipathy.

This focus on Athanasius in the early 1840s enabled Newman to revisit themes from the previous decade in order to correct some of his earlier arguments. In *An Essay on Development* (1845), Newman reassessed the position of Origen and began to place his former hero outside of orthodoxy. The orthodoxy by which Origen is judged is what he previously saw as the formulised faith of Nicaea, specifically by one word, *homoousios*. Origen thought that, as a signifier for God, the word was too materialistic and thus rejected it. Athanasius thought it provided the only alternative to an Arian depiction of God by signifying that the Son was identical with the Father in every respect. But even Athanasius had his doubts about the viability of this word in the wake of Nicaea, doubts which Newman took into account when he wrote *Arians*.

In *Arians*, Newman conceived an "Alexandrian" style of theology, which Origen and Clement began, and which after Nicaea became the language of orthodoxy. However it was not just Athanasius who used this language; Newman’s 1832 work portrayed Gregory of Nazianzus and Cyril of Alexandria confuting Arian heresy with Origen’s theology as much as Athanasius did. In *Arians*, Gregory and Cyril are as likely to be quoted before Athanasius as after, even though they came later, because Newman accepted that, in this Alexandrian style, chronological change was subsumed within the broader category of theological continuity (e.g. *Arians* 208). Alexandrian theology was

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292 Henceforth these two works will be referred to as *Ox Frs* viii and *Ox Frs* xix to distinguish them from Newman’s later (freer) translation of these works in *Ath i*. Many of the notes in *Ath ii* repeat the text of the footnotes to the volumes of *Ox Frs*. For comparison of these translations, see chapter 5 below.

293 E.g. *S. Athanasius Historical Tracts*, iv.
rich and diverse, argued Newman, precisely because it made room for shifting
terminology and private speculations, as long as these were grounded in Origen’s method
of scriptural exegesis. This was not the way Newman’s predecessors read the
Alexandrians. It was shown in chapter two that among early-modern commentators like
Cudworth, Cave and Bull, and moderns like Mosheim, Origen was seen as a step along
the way to Nicaea – and in this Newman was no different. Petavius and, with different
motives, the Socinian Christoph Sand (1644-80), saw Origen as a step not towards the
Council but to Arianism. Petavius and Cudworth both argued that Origen said different
things from Nicaea, though only Petavius thought this meant he in fact erred from
orthodoxy. By contrast, Bull argued that the pre- and post-Nicene Alexandrians were in
continuity. Newman perhaps came closer to Bull here, claiming that Origen used
homoousios in the same sense as the Council; nevertheless, Newman opposed Bull’s
account of an earlier Council at Antioch and its treatment of the word. As will be shown
below, Newman paid less attention to Athanasius’s report on the Antiochene Council
than had Bull, and rather more to Hilary of Poitiers. Newman sought not to oppose
Athanasius’s report so much as to synthesise it with Hilary’s, but in this respect in 1833
Newman showed he did not measure events with an Athanasian yardstick.

Beginning in 1842, however, it is clear that Athanasius started to provide the
standard of orthodoxy by which all other Fathers before and after him were judged,
which explains some of Newman’s peculiar judgements in the 1850s. On the one hand,
in an 1857 reworking of the essay “Apollinaris’ History” for a new edition of The Church
of Fathers, Origen is criticised alongside Nestorius as worse heretics than Apollinarius,
because neither of the first two conform to Athanasius’s version of orthodoxy (CF 392).
On the other, in his 1858 essay “On St. Cyril’s Formula mia physis sesarkōmenē” – a
formula which errs by the standards of the Council of Chalcedon – Cyril is praised
because his use of physis is held by Newman to replicate Athanasius’s use of hypostasis.
Newman’s description of orthodoxy, which in Arians and in his Lectures on the
Prophetic Office had considered the move to fixed terminology at Nicaea as a loss,
becomes fixated on Athanasius alone. As a result, previously drawn distinctions between
theological positions are collapsed into a rather flat account of orthodoxy.
However, what might sound like a thesis of pre- and post-Nicene *continuity*, akin to Bull’s, shifting to a thesis of *change*, akin to Petavius’s, is actually striking out on a third course. In the 1840s, Newman was in fact moving towards an idea of development. Initially, he tried to dress up his *Essay on Development* in the clothes of Bull’s argument, although in fact his new doctrine widened differences from Bull already present in *Arians*. Moreover, unlike Petavius, the idea of development acknowledged the seeds of Athanasius’s teaching were sown by Origen, even though the latter falls short of the standards of orthodoxy. Pious teachers can spawn developments of orthodoxy, but also corruptions that ripen into heresy. The ironic result, though, was that the idea of development was actually less open to historical dynamism than was the thesis of *Arians*. Newman’s “development” is shorthand for the triumph of Athanasian orthodoxy – an orthodoxy which, in the way he presents it, allows little room for complexity or dynamism. The likes of Cyril in the East and Augustine in the West are portrayed not as enriching a tradition but as merely reiterating the teaching of Athanasius.

1) The eclipse of Origen

Origen is not the only pre-Nicene Father whom Newman invokes in his discussions of the predication of *ousia* language of God in the 1840s and 1850s. Yet Origen is of particular interest in the context of my argument, because it has been shown how important Origen’s rich reading of scripture was in the formation of Newman’s theology. Beginning with his translation of the writings of Athanasius, however, Newman starts to change his mind about Origen. Indeed, in section 1(a), based on Newman’s view of the word *homoousion*, the shift in sympathies from Origen shall be traced. This will introduce, in section 1(b), the question of how important to Newman’s thoughts Bishop Bull was. Finally, section 1(c) will examine Origen as he appears in the *Essay on Development*.

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294 Thomas (1991) quotes what he sees as Newman’s “fantastic description of Bull’s methodology. The attempt to transmute Bull’s ponderous form into something fleeter shows how desperate he is to avoid the impression of a total reversal of his earlier ‘Via Media’ approach, in which the *Defence of the Creed of Nicea* had been a mainstay,” 246. However, I will show in section 1(b) that Newman never fully agreed with Bull, whereas Thomas thinks Newman followed Bull until he formulated the idea of development.
Having seen how much *Arians* evoked a pre-Nicene golden age of theology and scriptural exegesis, it is worth revisiting that book’s view of *homoousion* before Nicaea. There, while Newman relished the pre-Nicenes’ refusal to fix the terminology of truth with the word *homoousion*, he nevertheless acknowledged they wrote of the unity of God’s *ousia*. Before him, Cudworth and Petavius explained that the Neoplatonists spoke of God as “*hyperusios*” precisely to keep the divine *hen* transcendently separate from the hypostases which could be active in the world, especially the Logos (*Arians* 186). For any pre-Nicene who subscribed to Neoplatonism, therefore, God the Father’s being was actually “beyond being.” Newman, however, argued that Origen, and Justin before him, referred to God’s *ousia* not in a Neoplatonic sense -- to keep God distant from the other two hypostases, Logos and Spirit -- so much as in the biblical sense of *to òn*. For them, the divine *ousia* was a way of thinking about God as a Person who spoke to Moses in the burning bush through the hypostasis of the Son. 295 In *Arians*, Newman began a theme that would continue throughout his patristic writings, of seeing *ousia*, *prosòpon*, *hypostasis*, and *physis* all signifying more or less the same in Alexandrian theology -- the idea of an individual God, who was not material and yet is a “Person.” For Newman in 1833, Origen was no Neoplatonist because he held that the three hypostases shared the “Divine Unity,” the Source of that unity being the Father’s Person and “Mind” (*Arians* 166). 296 Therefore, writes Newman, the Son and Spirit are consubstantial with the Father because “the second and third Persons are understood to be internal to the Divine Mind, *connaturalia instrumenta*” *(ibid.)*.

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295 That the Son spoke in the burning bush is very different from the later Augustinian idea of angelic voices -- the latter is probably an attempt to safeguard the co-equality of the Son with the Father rather than have him as quasi-divine mediator. In 1845, Newman collapses the difference: “the Ante-nicene Fathers, as in some of the foregoing extracts [from Justin, Clement and the Letter of Bishops at Antioch], speak of the Angelic visions in the Old Testament as if they were appearances of the Son; but St. Augustine introduced the explicit doctrine, which has been received since this date, that they were simply Angels, through whom the Omnipresent Son manifested Himself. This indeed is the only interpretation which could be put on the Ante-nicene statements, as soon as reason began to examine what they meant” *(Dev 398).*

296 Mark Edwards also argues that Origen was no Neoplatonist in terms similar to Newman’s here. For Origen, the “substance” of “God is Mind, [while] the Logos as his demiurgic instrument may be styled his soul *(Peri archon* 2.85) and the Spirit is his matter when he makes himself present in us *(Com John* 2.62).* Edwards, M, “Christ or Plato?” in Ayers, I, and Jones, G, (eds.) *Christian Origins: Theology, Rhetoric and Community* (London: Routledge, 1998), 17.
(a) Origen and homoousion

In 1842, Newman realised he was wrong in thinking that Origen had the same notion of homoousion as the Council of Nicaea. Origen might have used the word homoousios but, if he did, he gave it a different meaning from the Nicene Creed. In de Decretis §27, Athanasius quotes Origen approvingly to show Father and Son were co-eternal; but co- eternal is not the same as co-equal. Athanasius cannot bring forth Origen as a witness for the Son’s co-equality with the Father (a point already made by Cudworth). Equality as well as eternity are the proper implications, for Newman in 1842, of the term homoousion. A consubstantiality of the Son and Spirit with the Father without co-equality was an insufficient doctrine of the Trinity by Athanasian standards. Maybe here Newman had a premonition that Origen could be judged a precursor to the Arian heretics.

The annotations to his translation of Athanasius continue to uphold Origen as orthodox. There are signs that Newman’s view could change, however, specifically because of Origen’s interpretation of ousia language. In a note on the term, ousia, Newman makes a division between, on the one hand, an “Aristotelic sense” in which the word is “predicable of nothing but itself” and therefore not a “universal” to be shared, and, on the other hand, the Christian signification, which takes “a sense of its own, such as we have no example of in things created, viz. of a Being numerically one, subsisting in three persons; so that the word is a predicable or in one sense universal, without ceasing to be individual” (Ox Frs viii, 152 note a). There is also a corrupted Christian sense of ousia, either as something material or Sabellian. As a rehearsal of what shall be argued below, it is clear that Newman’s annotation here does not accord with Athanasius’s text in de Synodis §51. Newman wants “Christian theology” to hold together a numerical

297 Origen is thought to have used the word homoousion based on extracts of his work collected by Eusebius and Pamphilus in their Defence of Origen (Ox Frs viii, 35 note t). Of this work, however, only the first book is extant, and that in the translation of the unreliable Rufinus.

298 For Newman consubstantiality must bring co-equality. In de Synodis §49, Athanasius uses henoideosi which Newman translates that the Son “has equality with the Father by titles expressive of unity” and insists that, among the titles, “unvarying image” does not describe the Son as less than the Father: “By ‘the Son being equal to the Father,’ is but meant that He is His ‘unvarying image;’ it does not imply any distinction of substance” (Ox Frs viii, 149 note x).
oneness with something “generic,” like that found in other universals. But Athanasius is far more like Origen before him than Newman’s (Aristotelian) terms allow: both patristic theologians held to a Platonic view in which Son and Spirit participate in the Father.\textsuperscript{299}

Of those who reject the true Christian sense, then, some do so because \textit{ousia} “either implied the parts of a material subject, or it involved no real distinction of persons, i.e. Sabellianism” (ibid.). Shortly, in his section, “On the alleged Confession of Antioch against Paul of Samosata,” Newman will show this to be exactly the unfortunate choice which Paul presented to the Council of Antioch: either to understand the word \textit{homoousion} to mean that Father and Son were divisions of some divine material, or to conceive of God as Sabellians did and argue there was but one “being” in three self-identical modes (Paul’s preferred option). As in 1833, Newman argues that the Fathers at the Antiochene Council, many of whom were Origen’s disciples, rejected both of Paul’s options. But whereas in 1833, the rejection of \textit{homoousion} was thus laid at the door of the disciples and not the master, now Newman suggests that Origen taught them to be “very jealous of the corporeal ideas concerning the Divine Nature which Paul (according to Athanasius and Basil) imputed to the word \textit{homoousion}” (\textit{Ox Frs} viii, 166). To escape the material sense of the word, Newman implies that Origen held a Platonic theory. The Son and Spirit, in other words, participate in the \textit{ousia} of the Father, an \textit{ousia} which “Platonists, in order to mark their idea of the perfection and simplicity of the Divine Nature, … consider[ed] ‘above substance’” (ibid.). In the paragraph that follows, Newman places Origen alongside Plotinus. In \textit{Arians} Plotinus was considered Origen’s opponent, but in 1842 Newman writes:

The views of physical necessity too, which the material system involved, led [Plotinus] to speak of His energy and will being His substance. 6 Enn. viii. 13.

\textsuperscript{299} Athanasius says in \textit{Discourse} III.15: “when the Father says, \textit{This is My Beloved Son} [Mt 3:17], and when the Son says that God is His own Father, \textit{it follows that what is partaken is not external}, but from the substance of the Father. And as to this again, if it be other than the substance of the Son, an equal extravagance will meet us; there being in that case something between this that is from the Father and the substance of the Son, whatever that be” (\textit{Ox Frs} viii, 203, my italics). As Anatolios (1998) helpfully points out about the language of participation here: “Thus there is nothing in the Father in which the Son does not participate, and there is nothing in the Son other than what he has by participation of the Father. In this way, Athanasius transposes the mystery of the consubstantial generation of the Son from the Father into the terminology and framework of participation,” 107.
And hence Origen; ‘Nor doth God partake of substance, rather He is partaken, than partakes.' contr. Cels. vi. 64” (Ox Frs viii, 166).

By the time Newman came to edit Arians in 1871, moreover, it was exactly this portion of Contra Celsum which he added in a footnote admitting Origen conceived God as hyperousios (Arians 186 note 2).

Placing Origen alongside Plotinus need not mean that Newman considered Origen a Neoplatonist. Indeed, in 1845 he was still maintaining the position he held against Mosheim in Arians. In the Essay on Development, Mosheim is again criticised for arguing that “since there is a resemblance between the philosophical and the Catholic, there is certainly a very strong presumption that the Catholic were actually derived from the philosophical”:

It is plain that, in the whole elaborate Essay [de Reb], there are but two of his statements which are at all of the nature of an argument in behalf of the matter of fact which he proposes to prove: the one, that Origen is said to have introduced Platonick doctrine into his writings; the other, that Synesius is charged with not renouncing his Platonism on becoming a Bishop. Of these, the instance of Synesius is an isolated one; while Origen was never countenanced by the Church even in his day, and has no distinct connexion with the Neo-platonists (Dev 201-2).

Albeit there is “no distinct connexion” with Plotinus, yet three years before writing this Newman opens the possibility that, in order to escape any notion of materiality in God, Origen might have described God the Father as hyperousios. The results for christology were clear. Around 1842, Newman saw what in Arians he had denied: that Origen, like Plotinus, might have conceived the Logos not as homoousios with the Father but subordinate to him. Newman was opening himself to the realisation that, in a Plotinian vein, Origen could have meant that, while God’s “energy and will” might be hypostases in the “material” sense, the Father was beyond “substance” (Ox Frs viii, 166). Even if Origen’s likeness to Plotinus were not enough, there was also the frightening similarity to Arius’s teaching of three separated hypostases, as section 3(c) will show.

(b) The opposition to Bishop Bull
Newman's interpretation of the Council of Antioch is that the Fathers there not only objected to the material sense of *homoousion*, as Origen had taught them, but also to the Sabellian sense. In this respect, at least, in both *Arians* and his notes on *de Synodis*, Newman differs significantly from Bishop Bull. The details of this difference deserve attention for two reasons: first, what Newman wrote in *Arians*, in opposition to Bull, would undergo changes in 1842 and 1845; secondly, Stephen Thomas has not given this difference enough attention. Already in 1833 Newman was presenting a different thesis from Bull, in spite of Thomas's claims. Admittedly in *Arians* Newman thought, like Bull, that the pre-Nicenes had used the word *homoousion*. Newman agreed with the bishop's analysis of the word being "formally recalled (as from exile), and inserted in [the Nicene] Creed, this most fitting expression, which, as they were aware, had been received and approved by the holy fathers prior to the council of Antioch" (*Defensio* 79). Just as often, however, he distanced himself from Bull's interpretations, for he was more prepared to see the dynamism of pre-Nicene theology. Indeed, even Newman's apparent agreements with Bull can be deceptive, as when he cites an account of the Council of Antioch that Bull plainly drew from Athanasius (*Arians* 28 note 5).

According to Bull, in the section of the *Defensio* Newman cites, Athanasius (and Basil who followed him) gave the real reason why the Council of Antioch opposed *homoousion*. That reason, said Athanasius, was Paul's sophistry, which deliberately laid stress on the material sense of the word in order for it to be rejected. Bull thinks the account of Hilary, which puts the blame for its rejection on Paul's use of the word in the Sabellian sense, cannot be correct. Newman sees the tension between the accounts of Hilary and Athanasius but synthesises them, and thus differs fundamentally from Bull. Yes, he agrees with Bull and Athanasius that Paul was cunning, "striving by every means to overthrow the received doctrine of the divinity of the Son," and, moreover, that such

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300 Bull wrote: "It therefore follows, that the assertion of Athanasius is quite true, that Paul framed an argument for impugning the divinity of Christ out of the word *homoousios*, which he was aware was in use among the Catholics, (and possibly so explained by some of them, as to give occasion to its being spoken ill of [at the Council of Antioch]) and that the fathers, accordingly, determined on the suppression of it altogether" (*Defensio* 75).

301 Newman notes in his translation of *de Synodis* §45: "while S. Basil agrees with Athan. in his account of the reason of the Council's rejection of the word, St. Hilary on the contrary reports that Paul himself accepted it, i.e. in a Sabellian sense, and therefore the Council rejected it" (*Ox Frs* viii, 144 note p).
sophistry was copied by the Arians (Defensio 78). But that need not mean Paul was not also Sabellian. Indeed, in Arians Newman thought Paul’s heresy both denied Christ’s full divinity and implied a form of Sabellianism. As well as noting Paul’s Artemonian and Ebionite credentials, Newman argued that his “heresy was derived from the emanative school” of Sabellianism, which conceived of Christ as an emanation of God (Arians 128). As Newman presented the two kinds of Sabellianism – one Patripassian, the other Gnostic or “emanationist” – it became clear that he thought the latter kind very similar to adoptionism. Newman’s exemplary “emanationist” “would speak of the presence rather than the existence of God in His chosen servant; and this presence, if allowed to declaim, he would represent as a certain power or emanation from the Centre of light and truth; if forced by his opponents into a definite statement, he would own to be but an inspiration, the same in kind, though superior in degree, with that which enlightened and guided the prophets” (Arians 123). This exemplary emanationist also bears resemblance to Paul as the Letter of the Six Bishops portrays him (to which Newman alludes, Arians 129).

According to Bull, heretics insist on the “sophism” of misinterpreting the homoousion in a material way, whether “Sabellians, followers of the Samosatene, or, lastly, Arians,” which is why Nicaea “subjoined immediately, God of God, light of light” (Defensio 78). But if before Nicaea the Sabellians had accepted the material meaning of the word in order to criticise homoousios, he argues, “it is no way credible” that the Nicene Fathers would have accepted it too (Defensio 67). After all, Nicaea was as much a Council against Sabellianism as Arianism. Newman thinks just the opposite and acknowledges the threat of Sabellianism was already present at Antioch. In this he followed Hilary.

When he comes to clarify his thoughts, in 1842, Newman employs his argumentative skills to the utmost to weave two accounts together to portray one supremely cunning Samosatene:

Paul then might very naturally have urged this dilemma upon the Council, and said, “Your doctrine implies the homoousion, which is Manichaean, unless it be

302 Newman wrote, “in the course of the third century, the word Homoúsion became more or less connected with the Gnostic, Manichaean, and Sabellian theologies” (Arians 130).
taken, as I am willing to take it, in a Sabellian sense.” And thus it might be at once trite as Athanasius says, that Paul objected, “Unless Christ has of man become God, it follows that He is One in substance with the Father; and if so, of necessity there are three substances [in a material sense,” de Synodis §45] (Ox Frs viii, 167).

Here, Newman is putting not just the adoptionist-sounding words of Athanasius in Paul’s mouth, but also makes him admit the Sabellianism of which Hilary accused him. This has the effect of making Newman’s case for the rejection of homoousion less narrow than Bull’s – though no less fanciful.303 As Newman acknowledges in 1842, some “learned writers” denied altogether “the rejection of the word homoousion in the Antiochene Council” (Ox Frs viii, 165). Among them was the Oxford scholar from whom he drew much in Arius, Edward Burton.304 Such scholars were suspicious of Athanasius’s accuracy in de Synodis §45 and §51 when he depicts Paul – already by the fourth century considered the archetypal heretic – as questioning the homoousion with the very argument the Arians were supposed to have used.305 Although in 1842, Newman does not express any doubt about Athanasius, he does recognise the similarity of the two arguments, noting in his translation that Paul’s opposition to the materialist meaning of homoousios was “the objection which Arius argues against the One in substance... when he calls it the argument of Manichæus” (Ox Frs viii, 143 note p). But, by this stage of the 1840s, Newman is too much in awe of Athanasius to doubt the patriarch’s motives, and thus mixes Paul’s heresy with both an Arian denial of Christ’s divinity and also, following Hilary, with Sabellianism.306

303 Behr (2001) argues: “Given Paul’s insistence on the human character of Christ’s existence, it is unthinkable that he could have taught a unitary God existing as both Father and Son” 219.
304 See Burton in Faber, G.S., The apostolicity of Trinitarianism (London: Rivingtons, 1832) vol. ii, 302.
305 Behr (2001) observes: “The credibility of Athanasius’ account, however, is severely undermined by the fact that he attributes exactly the same argument as he puts on Paul’s lips to his own opponents,” 219. Behr follows De Riedmatten in arguing that any condemnation of homoousion at the Council of Antioch must have been highly qualified since the Synodal Letter was sent for confirmation to Dionysius of Rome, a supporter of the word, 220.
306 There is surprisingly little attention to detail when annotating de Decretis § 24 thus: “Paul of Samosata, Sabellius, and Arius, agreed in considering that the Son was a creature, and that He was called, made after, or inhabited by the impersonal attribute called the Word or Wisdom” (Ox Frs viii, 41-2 note e).
What has become clear is that, on the subject of *homoousion*, Newman was still less “Athanasian” than Bull even in 1842. Were the reports of Hilary and Athanasius to be separated along a scale, and the commentators who followed them be placed on that scale according to whether they favoured Hilary or Athanasius, then Newman would fall in the middle, whereas Petavius would be on the side of Hilary and Bull on the side of Athanasius. In *Arians*, unlike Bull, Newman follows Hilary’s account of the Council to the extent that he presented Paul of Samosata as a Sabellian. But, unlike Petavius, Newman followed Athanasius’s report just as much as Hilary’s.

In 1842, Newman put yet more distance between himself and Bull, this time with respect to Origen. In 1833, Newman had thought that, due to the growth at the end of the third century of two kinds of Sabellianism, it was Origen’s disciples who had opposed predicing *ousia* language of the Father and Son, not their master. Among these disciples was Dionysius of Alexandria, Newman sharing Basil’s criticism of—as well as his explanation for—Dionysius’s opposition to *homoousion* (*Arians* 127). In 1842 he notes that, in the *Commentary on John* xx.16, Origen would “object to the phrase *ek tēs ousias tou patros*” (*Ox Frs* viii, 167). At this stage, however, and in the context of an attack on Paul’s cunning use of *homoousios*, Origen is still not criticised explicitly. That criticism awaited the *Essay on Development*. Before seeing how Origen is treated in the *Essay*, it is important to see how Bull is treated. Nicholas Lash has shown, through a close analysis of the *Essay*, that Newman was aware of the limitations of history writing, including his own, which required the historian “imposing a view” before seeing whether events lined up with this narrative. Newman reveals the limitations of all historiography when he writes of Bull:

> the title of his work, which is a “Defence of the Creed of Nicaea,” shows that he is not seeking a conclusion, but imposing a view. And he proceeds both to defend the Creed by means of the Fathers against Sandius, and to defend the Fathers by means of the Creed against Petavius. He defends Creed and Fathers by

307 Although claiming not to oppose “the venerable Hilary,” to whom he offers “all deference,” surely Bull does just that when he opposes Petavius (and Christoph Sand). Bull argues that, even were it granted “that the Samosatene heretic held precisely the same opinion touching the Son of God as Sabellius, (a position, however, which might with good grounds be questioned,) yet surely Sabellius himself would never have willingly affirmed that the Son is consubstantial (*homoousios*) with the Father, but rather identically-substantial (*tautoousios*)” (*Defensio* 67).
reconciling one with the other... In other words, he begins with a presumption, and shows how naturally facts close around it and fall in with it, if we will but let them. He does this triumphantly, yet he has an arduous work; out of about thirty writers whom he reviews, he has, for one cause or other, to explain nearly twenty (Dev 158-9).

Although Newman suggests the Defensio is carried out "triumphantly" yet there is the barbed suggestion that the Fathers are being "explain[ed]" rather than speaking for themselves. Lash notes that Newman "heightened the critical tone" for the 1878 edition, changing his description of Bull's method.\textsuperscript{308} Now Bull’s title "shows that he is not investigating what is true and what false, but explaining and justifying a foregone conclusion" (Dev [1878] 134). Yet it has become clear that his criticisms of Bull actually began with the first edition of Arians and deepened when he annotated Athanasius in the early 1840s.

(c) Origen in An Essay on the Development of Doctrine

Origen is presented as an ambiguous figure in the Essay on Development. More so than in Newman’s earlier writings, though, Origen seems to presage later heresy. In some ways the story is the same as in Arians, with Origen shown to be a great bible scholar (and thus a source for tracing the development of the canon of scripture, Dev 159). As such, "Origen and others" were responsible for the "allegorical" method of scriptural interpretation dominant in Alexandria; this was used to discern the "Catholic doctrine of the Holy Trinity" in texts "which do not obviously refer to that doctrine... On the other hand, the School of Antioch, which adopted the literal interpretation, was the very metropolis of heresy" (Dev 324). The division between Alexandrian orthodoxy and Antiochene heresy seems to be installed once more. But there is a difference in the account given in the Essay. Each city now plays a role in the idea of development, with Origen’s teachings bridging the two cities. Doctrines grow, according to the Essay, but

they can over-ripen. Whereas in Alexandria, Cappadocia and the West, Origen’s teachings “developed” into orthodoxy, in Antioch they “corrupted” into heresy.

Origen’s teachings “developed” in the minds of some of the finest Eastern and Western Fathers. Newman writes, “St. Gregory Nazianzen and St. Basil digested into form the theological principles of Origen; St. Hilary and St. Ambrose are both indebted to the same great writer in their interpretations of Scripture” (*Dev* 352-3). Origen is included in the list of Fathers who recognised the faith was “Catholic” — which is to say, in line with Newman’s “first test” of development — as is Tertullian, who influenced Pope Leo the Great (*Dev* 249). However, in his “application of the second and third tests” Newman indicates that Origen and Tertullian are “inferior” authorities to those who learned from them; their ideas needed sifting by greater authorities: “Doctrine too is percolated, as it were, through different minds, beginning with writers of inferior authority in the Church, and issuing at length in the enunciation of her Doctors” (*Dev* 352). They are not, it seems, inferior simply because they represent the “beginning” of a doctrine set to develop, but because their minds are too innovative. The “Doctors” of the Church, by contrast, repeat and refine their theological views, rather than inventing new ones: “St. Athanasius, St. Augustine, St. Leo are conspicuous for the repetition *in terminis* of their own theological statements... Here we see the difference between originality of mind and the gift and calling of a Doctor in the Church; the holy Fathers just mentioned were intently fixing their minds on what they taught, grasping it more and more closely” (*Dev* 353). The pattern for true development seems to be conservative rumination rather than speculative innovation.

Elsewhere, in the School of Antioch, Origen’s teachings “corrupted” to produce what Newman calls a “Syrian” brand of theology, which connects Arianism and Nestorianism. This theme of the Essay is completely different from *Arians*, in which Origen had no influence in Antioch. In 1833, Newman mounted a six-fold defence against those who blamed Origen for the Arian heresy, his first line of defence being Origen’s habitual opposition to heresy (*Arians* 98-9). This is not mentioned in 1845, since now Newman thinks teachings “percolate” in ways their authors cannot control; thus, even if not teaching heresy himself, Origen’s views resulted in the “Origenists in Palestine,” and Arians and Nestorians in Syria (*Dev* 244). Newman defended Origen in a
second way by saying that his “speculations… related to points not yet determined by the Church.” It should be added, Newman conceived a difference in Arians between private and public speculation. Thus, he argued, thirdly, that “[Origen’s] opinions… were imprudently made public by his friends” and, fourthly, the texts he did write have become corrupt. Private speculation was acceptable, but putting that speculation into writing and making it public was unacceptable; and, in 1833, Newman thought Origen only speculated in private. In 1845, by contrast, Newman implies that Origen made public thoughts he should have kept private, which is why Demetrius, bishop of Alexandria, was right “to banish Origen for speculations which developed and ripened in Syria” (Dev 282). Fifthly, Newman had said “the doctrine of the Trinity is clearly avowed [by Origen], and in particular our Lord’s Divinity energetically and variously enforced.” It has already been seen that Newman began to have doubts about Origen’s “doctrine of the Trinity” in 1842. As for his christology, Newman thinks that Origen shares much in common with later “Syrian” views:

As it tended to the separation of the Divine Person of Christ from His manhood, so did it tend to explain away His Divine Presence in the Sacramental elements… Some countenance too is given to the same view of the Eucharist, at least in some parts of his works, by Origen, whose language concerning the Incarnation also leans to what was afterwards Nestorianism (Dev 287, my italics).

Newman’s sixth point is that, if Fathers like Athanasius defended Origen, how can later generations criticise? But while Athanasius took Origen at his best, it is clear from the two latest quotations from the Essay that he could also “lean,” or be “ripened in Syria,” towards heretical ends. In his ambiguous views of Origen in 1845, while holding him in esteem because Athanasius did, Newman is newly critical of his “leanings” to heresy.

While arguing that development of doctrine recognises forward movement, in reality the Essay reads history backwards from Athanasius to Origen. But it does not really seem to be Athanasius himself who is the yardstick for judging heresy, so much as a “Latinised” version of the patriarch. The general trend towards Latin can be seen at a shallow level in the very language of doctrine in the Essay. Instead of perichorēsis, the doctrine expressing unity “in God” is now called the circumincessio:
the Divine *Circumincessio*, the most distinctive portion of the Catholic doctrine, and the unity of power, or again, of substance, are declared with more or less distinctness by Athenagoras, St. Irenæus, St. Clement, Tertullian, St. Hippolytus, Origen, and the two SS. Dionysii (Dev 16).

Newman uses the same mixture of Greeks and Latins who had appeared in *Arians*. But now, in using them, he completely ignores the doctrine of the *monarchia* which, in 1833, he argued that they taught. Perhaps this is because, as will now be seen, the *monarchia* has come to exemplify the pre-Nicene tendency to subordinate the Son to the Father. 309

2) The Rise of Athanasius

Back when writing *Arians*, Newman kept up a correspondence with Hugh James Rose, one of the editors of the series of which his book was intended to be part. In these letters, Newman can be seen hazarding to put forward ideas that would end up, in slightly different form, in the book. There is one particular sentence that shows the direction his thought on the doctrine of the Trinity was taking in 1832. He wrote to Rose:

> My conclusion is that it is difficult to conceive God one Person as Three, the difficulty being deeper than people suppose… And, in my own mind, I think it is clear that the whole is an Economy – everyone grants that much of the Scripture account is such – e.g. His being angry, repenting – or resting – etc. etc. – for these, and such like, make up the idea of a Personal God, as distinct from a mere system or Anima Mundi. 310

Two points of special interest come from this sentence. The first is *who* Newman conceives God to be. He uses an expression, “God one Person as Three,” which might seem odd when judged by the standards of post-Nicene orthodoxy. For Newman in 1832, the threefold God is “one Person,” rather than the more typical designation that “God is three Persons in one substance.” Such an expression runs counter to later orthodoxy but does not contradict the teachings of Athanasius, in spite of what Newman came to believe from 1842 onwards. In 1832, however, as he was putting the finishing touches to *Arians*,

309 He writes, “it may be questioned whether any Ante-nicene father distinctly affirms either the numerical Unity or the Coequality of the Three Persons; except perhaps the heterodox Tertullian, and that chiefly in a work [i.e. *Adversus Praxeas*] written after he had become a Montanist” (Dev 14).
Newman seems to emphasise the personal dimension of God—a God who reveals his Person to us by sending forth his Word and Spirit—rather than emphasising (in 1858 for instance) the plethora of meanings of the word “person.” In line with the pre-Nicene doctrine of the *monarchia*, Newman in 1832 regards the Father as the Person who is God, while Word and Spirit are the two who make God known. The Father is the one Person who, by the Word and Spirit, is revealed as “angry” and then “repenting” of his anger in the Old Testament, and “resting” after creation. *Monarchia*, as Newman explains in *Arians*, was the teaching that the Word and Spirit derive their unity from their one Source or Father. He wrote there that the pre-Nicenes discerned in scripture that the Son was a messenger of the one God, whose “personality” derived from the Father’s Person (*Arians* 163). It is thus the Father who is “the one God,” *ho theos*, in the creeds.

At this early stage, Newman also believed that Athanasius upheld the doctrine of the *monarchia*. In *Arians*, he portrayed the patriarch defending the Creed of Nicaea by calling the Father “*ho theos*,” but also stating that God could be no Father without a consubstantial Son. When annotating Athanasius’s writings at Littlemore in the 1840s, however, Newman’s opinions were beginning to shift. As shall be seen, Newman came to reject the *monarchia*, probably under the influence of a more Latin depiction of the Trinity. While the *monarchia* is distinctively Greek in laying stress on the Son’s and Spirit’s derivation from the Father, the Latin depiction stresses the co-equality of the

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310 To H.J. Rose, 16 August 1832 (*LD* iii, 78).

311 In 1858 he explains why the word is so imprecise: “sometimes use it in the abstract, as when we speak of another as ‘insignificant in person;’ sometimes in the concrete, as when we call him ‘an insignificant person.’ How divergent in meaning are the derivatives, *personable, personalities, personify, personation, personage, parsonage*!” (*TT* 288).

312 The full quotation is subtle: “The very name of Son, and the very idea of derivation, imply a certain subordination of the Son to the Father, *so far forth as we view Him* as distinct from the Father, or *in His personality*: and frequent testimony is borne to the correctness of this inference in Scripture, as in the descriptions of the Divine Angel in the Old Testament, revived in the closing revelations of the New” (*Arians* 163, my italics).

313 “Hence it is, that the Father is called ‘the only God,’ at a time when our Lord’s name is also mentioned, John xvii.3, 1 Tim. i.16, 17... The Creed, called the Apostles’, follows this mode of stating the doctrine; the title of God standing in the opening against the Father’s name, while the Son and Spirit are introduced as distinct forms or modes, (so to say,) of and in the One Eternal Being. The Nicene Creed, commonly so called, directed as it is against the impugners both of the Son’s and of the Spirit’s divinity, nevertheless observes the same rule even in a stricter form, beginning with a confession of the ‘One God’” (*Arians* 176).
Persons. Newman perceived these different stresses, perhaps under the influence of Gibbon, whom he quotes in the 1842 work. But he also came to recognise that these two stresses need not conflict. Ironically, however, in attempting to undermine his earlier arguments for a difference of emphasis in Greeks and Latins, Newman re-inscribes those differences by obliterating Athanasius’s doctrine and replacing it with Augustine’s.

Thus, by the 1840s, Newman emphasises the similarities between Athanasius and Augustine, while downplaying the differences. Yet the differences are clear even when they write of the same thing. Take the co-equality of Persons, for instance. Athanasius writes in *Discourse* III.9, “For as the Father is First, so also is [the Son] both First, as Image of the First, and because the First is in Him, and also Offspring from the Father, in whom the whole creation is created and adopted into sonship” (*Ox Frs* xix, 412-3). A Latin like Augustine had a wholly different notion of how co-equality might be described, a fact which Newman fails to realise in annotating this text. While the Greek is speaking of the Son as “Image of the First” (the doctrine of *monarchia*), and co-inhering with the First (*perichorēsis*) which is to say with “the one God,” the gloss Newman gives from Augustine is as follows: “The question has almost been admitted by S. Austin, whether it is not possible to say that God is *One* Person, (Trin. vii. 8.) for He is wholly and entirely Father, and at the same time wholly and entirely Son, and wholly and entirely Holy Ghost” (*ibid* note d). In other words, Newman thinks Augustine came close to accepting that God could be described as “one Person” because each of the three Persons is equally “one God.” Except for the conventions of language, it would be possible for a Latin to call God “one Person as Three.”

Yet notice how different the Latin conception is from the “God one Person as Three” which Newman used in his 1832 letter. There, Newman was basing the threeness of God on the doctrine of *monarchia*, in which the Son and Spirit derive from “the one God” of ancient Israel, the Father. Or, to use Athanasius’s language in Newman’s translation, the Son’s Person derives from the Father so as to be an exact duplicate of the Father, the second remaining different from the “First” in that – and only in that – he is “Offspring.”

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314 Augustine writes: “Why, therefore, do we not call these three together one person, as one essence and one God, but say three persons, while we do not say three Gods or three essences; unless it be because we wish some word to serve for that meaning whereby the Trinity is understood, that we might not be
The second point of interest in the letter to Rose is his view that, even though Christians have some grasp of who God is, there can be no revelation of what God is—the divine ousia. This is what Newman considers to be the scriptural doctrine of “Economy.” In *Arians*, Newman made clear that Clement and Origen saw this as the way scripture reveals the truth about the God who remains a mystery. Clement and Origen were Newman’s guides in the 1830s, rather than Athanasius. Newman is touching on the doctrine of divine simplicity: the teaching that, unlike anything created, God’s nature is not composite but simple, and thus all attributes are predicated of God in a way that befits his unknowable ousia. Humans cannot know what God is like, cannot speak of God in himself—ousia thus expresses a negative theology. For Athanasius, says Newman, it is God as Father whom humans cannot know “as such” and therefore, in the Father’s simplicity, the words “Person” and “Substance” do not convey separate notions about him:

it must be ever borne in mind that we are contemplating divine things according to our notions, not in fact: i.e. speaking of the Almighty Father, as such; there being no real separation between His Person and His Substance. It maybe added, that, though theologians differ in their decisions, it would appear that our Lord is not the Image of the Father’s person, but of the Father’s substance; in other words, not of the Father considered as Father, but considered as God (*Ox Frs* viii, 211 note f [written “l”]).

This quotation reveals the heart of Newman’s new position on the Trinity. Whilst admitting “theologians differ in their decisions,” Newman does not put Athanasius with those who say the Son is indeed “the Image of the Father’s person,” which is where it will be argued the patriarch belongs. For this would be unity based on derivation, which Origen and Athanasius held in common: the unity Newman’s letter to Rose upheld. Instead, Newman introduces in the 1842 annotations an argument for what he calls “generical unity” – the Son and Father are one by virtue of sharing the same “substance” – and claims this was common to Athanasius and Augustine.315 Newman’s point about

altogether silent, when asked, what three, while we confessed that they are three?” *de Trinitate* vii.11 (NFPF trans.).
divine simplicity, in which any knowledge of the Father "as such" is impossible, is thus really a point about generical unity; in other words, to say "the Father's" ousia cannot be known is, for Newman, shorthand for saying that it is the substance shared between three Persons – "God's" substance – which is unknowable. The doctrines of monarchia and perichoresis of Arians have been replaced by a "generical" account of divine unity. On the face of it, Newman's position in 1842 looks in line with what he wrote to Rose, for it seems, predicated on divine simplicity, just as correct to say "one Person as Three" in 1832 as "one substance as three." But, in fact, "one substance as three" signifies something very different. It signifies in 1842 an account of God that is not found in the writings of Athanasius Newman is annotating!

In what follows, these two themes recur, the oneness of God as it derives from the one Source, the Father, and the economy by which this truth is expressed, but as the means by which his loyalty shifts from Origen to Athanasius in the 1840s. In section 2(a), Arians will again be the starting point, then 1842 and 1845. Section 2(b) examines a crucial passage from 1842, for this was when Newman was crystallising his own thoughts around those of Athanasius. This new trajectory will be traced in section 2(c) with respect to the Essay on Development in particular.

(a) How God is one

In his writings in 1833 and in 1842, Newman favours two different couplets when he is talking about the oneness of God. Each of the two terms in these two couplets – though they might appear to be opposites – complement one another in Newman's

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315 I do not want to argue that the notion of "generic unity" precludes all talk of monarchia in the Latin Fathers. For instance, Newman would be right to say of Augustine that it is the Father's essence that is shared (quoting de Trinitate vii.6, Ox Frs viii, 39 note a). As John Kaye pointed out, "Cudworth states the doctrine of the ancient orthodox Fathers to be, that the essence of the Godhead, in which three persons or hypostases agree, as each of them is God, is not one singular and individual, but one common essence. Still there are three ousiai, three singular existent essences, as well as three hypostaseis. [TIS] 601. He states the notion of the Lateran Council to be, that there is a Trinity of persons, numerically the same, or having one and the same singular essence." For Cudworth, therefore, "orthodox Fathers" emphasise equally the Three and the One of God, "generical" and "numerical" oneness, whereas Latin Christianity has come to emphasise only the One. Kaye raises this point in a critique of Newman's annotations in Some Account of the Council of Nicaea (London: Rivington, 1853), 246-7 note 1.

316 The difference between his position in 1832 and in 1843 can be seen in the phrase, from the XVth University Sermon, God's "triple Personality, in the sense in which the Infinite can be understood to have Personality at all" (US 350).
account, to give as full a description of God’s one ousia as possible. The first of these two ways, which he uses in Arians, describes the divine unity as both “of God” and “in God” (Arians 172). The first half of this couplet describes the doctrine known as the monarchia, mentioned above, in which God’s oneness derives from a single Source, hence “of God” means “of the Father.” However, Newman was keen to balance this with the other half of the couplet, the unity arising from the coinherence of Father, Son and Spirit, known as perichorēsis; in this doctrine, “in God” meant the Son’s coinherence “in the Father” through the Spirit.317 This two-fold way of referring to God’s unity was favoured in Arians at the time when Newman conceived the Father as the “one God.” By 1842, although this couplet continued to appear, it was mainly in the texts Newman quoted and only rarely in his notes. In de Decretis §26, for example, Athanasius follows Dionysius of Rome in arguing that God’s unity derives from the one Source or Father; Newman notes here that “the Monarchy... is one of the especial senses in which God is said to be one” (Ox Frs viii, 45 note h). The doxology with which Athanasius ends de Decretis shows the doctrine of perichorēsis that the Son and Spirit are one in the God who is Father: “to God and the Father is due the glory, honour, and worship with His co­existent Son and Word, together with the All-holy and Life-giving Spirit, now and unto endless ages of ages” (Ox Frs viii, 58, my italics).

The way of expressing God’s unity which Newman favoured, however, was shifting by now – to another couplet, “numerical” and “generical” oneness, which in 1842 he takes from Gibbon (Ox Frs viii, 46 note k). Numerical oneness was, claimed Gibbon, stressed by the Latins (a “Trinitas” suggesting one triad) whereas Greeks stressed what was generic to the three Persons (trias suggesting a substance shared among three). These expressions, favoured by Newman, have in twentieth-century history of doctrine been largely replaced. What Gibbon seems to mean by generical unity is a divine substance held in common by the divine Persons; but Gibbon cannot be right about this being the Greek notion, for, as one recent scholar writes of de Synodis §51, Athanasius rejects the “generic” view for it “entails that the persons are somehow

317 Newman quotes Athanagorus: “Let no one ridicule the notion that God has a Son... the Father and the Son being one. The Son being in the Father, and the Father in the Son, in the unity and power of the Spirit, the Son of God is the Mind and Word of the Father” (Arians 172).
Nevertheless, Newman shares Gibbon’s view that the notion of generical unity is “Greek,” while differing from Gibbon in thinking that the Greeks held to numerical unity too. Newmán’s attention in 1842 seems taken with *homoousios* and, in such a state of mind, the ideas of generical and numerical unity replace doctrines of *monarchia* and *perichorēsis*. In *Arians* he thought the scriptural doctrine of economy refused to speculate on God’s *ousia*, and thus excluded from all talk of God any human understanding of “number and comparison” in the Godhead. Of the relation of Son and Spirit to “the Almighty” he wrote:

> Whether They are equal to Him or unequal, whether posterior to Him in existence or coeval, such inquiries (though often they must be answered when once started) are in their origin as superfluous as similar questions concerning the Almighty’s relation to His own attributes (which still we answer as far as we can, when asked); for the Son and the Spirit are *one* with Him, the ideas of number and comparison being excluded (*Arians* 155).

In this early work, of course, Newman was nostalgic for the days before Arian heretics started asking questions that had previously been deliberately left unanswered. Prior to Nicaea, argued Newman, while *who God is* was known to be the Father with his Word and Spirit, *what God is* in essence had been left as a mystery. In *Arians*, Newman shared this reluctance to answer the question of God’s essence in any detail and was even in some ways critical of the Council of Nicaea for attempting an answer. There he wrote relatively little about the “one substance,” making it clear that *homoousion* was chosen for reasons of practicality and expediency, two traits exemplified by an emperor who put peace before truth. It was shown above that Newman believed Origen and his other pre-Nicene heroes accepted that the Father, Son and Spirit were *homoousios* as that term

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319 Newman thinks that “the Greeks by *monas* taught the doctrine of ‘a one’ or a numerical unity. ‘Singulitatem hanc dico,’ says S. Ambrose, ‘quod Græcè *monotēs* dicitur; singularitas ad personam pertinet, unitas ad naturam.’ de Fid. v.3” (*Oxford FRS* viii, 46 note k).
came to be understood in Athanasius’s mature writings. Then, Newman did not conceive unity in “generical” terms. By 1842, however, he did.

It would seem the reason Newman shifted his expressions of divine unity had something to do with his change of mind on who humans mean by the “one God.” He seems, in 1842, to be uncomfortable with the idea that this refers primarily to the Father and only derivatively to the Son and Spirit. In criticising the Second Confession of Sirmium (A.D. 357), therefore, he notices the following danger: that “declaring that the One God is the God of Christ, implies that our Lord is not God” (Ox Frs viii, 123 note u). Newman no longer supports the view that the Father alone is ho theos and, as a consequence, hints appear that he no longer thinks the scriptures and the Fathers actually support it either! Thus he argues: “when S. Paul says ‘God was in Christ;’ he does not mean absolutely the Divine Nature, which is the proper sense of the word [i.e. “God”], but the Divine Nature as existing in the Person of the Son” (Ox Frs viii, 155 note f).

“God” does not mean the “one God” or Source for Newman here, which Paul’s original ho theos did.320 Instead, Newman means by “God” the Divine Nature/ousia, which is common to all three Persons of the Trinity, a generical oneness which allows Newman to depict a robustly co-equal Father, Son and Spirit. Co-equality is now the key signification of homoousion for Newman.

Arguably, Athanasius’s own designation of who God is better sustains the divine numerical unity, for if “the [one] God” is Father, that entails the corollary of a consubstantial Son (and Spirit).321 But Newman seems no longer to read the Alexandrians in their own terminology. Due to worries about the connotations of calling the Father alone “the [one] God,” Newman seems to force Athanasius into a later version of orthodoxy. “The one God” now seems to signify only “unity of substance" and

320 Paul only refers to Christ as “ho theos” once, in Romans 9:5, and the interpretation of this passage is greatly disputed, as is shown by Behr (2001), 58-9.

321 Cross (2003) argues the opposite: that, in fact, the Father’s monarchy is better sustained if ousia is conceived as “the ‘place’ at which the persons overlap,” in other words, if ousia somehow precedes the Persons as in the “generic” view of substance, 470. Athanasius’s derivation view “is simply incoherent, accepting both that the Father possesses, and that he does not possess, the property of being the generator of the Son,” 469. The important point of Cross’s observation for my purposes, however, is to show that Athanasius holds a derivation view rather than a generic view of God’s unity – something Newman forgets. “Thus, consubstantiality is an asymmetrical relation, and Athanasius persistently claims that the Son is homoousios with the Father, but not vice versa: the Father is not homoousios with the Son,” 467.
ignores the unity based on derivation from the Source. While, in the translation of the
Discourses, Athanasius compares the sun and its radiance to God and the Logos – the
sun’s “substance is whole and its radiance perfect and whole, yet without impairing the
substance of light, but as a true offspring from it” – Newman’s gloss moves away from
the unity of derivation that underlies this analogy (Ox Frs xix, 326-7). He writes:

there are two Persons, in Each Other ineffably, Each being wholly one and the
same Divine Substance, yet not being merely separate aspects of the Same, Each
being God as absolutely as if there were no other Divine Person but Himself (ibid.
note g).

Newman’s focus is on “substance” rather than Sonship, on generical unity rather than the
unity by which the Son derives from the Father.322

322 If Behr (2004) is correct about de Decretis §22, then Newman is actually un-Athanasian: “Titles such as
‘God,’ ‘Father,’ ‘Lord,’ and ‘I am’ are held, by Athanasius, to indicate not something ‘about God,’ but ‘his
essence itself,’ which, though signified, remains ‘incomprehensible.’ That the title ‘Father’ is here listed
with other titles indicative of the ‘essence’ of God is significant. It demonstrates that the term ‘essence’ is
not used by Athanasius in a generic sense, as referring to the kind of being God is, but to indicate the very
being of God, God himself. Yet that God is essentially Father… entails there being a Son,” 232.
(b) How God is three

By 1842, then, Newman’s arguments were already shifting. In relation to the
doctrine of God’s threeness or Trinity, the direction of these shifts was expressed most
clearly in an extended note after de Decretis, on the meaning of “hypostasis” in the
Nicene Anathema. Here Newman heads towards a position which considers Origen a
step towards the heresy of Arianism in the East. In the same note, he says Athanasius
was saved from this error in part by his association with the West. Even if this argument
was not fully formulated, yet – to use an image of development favoured by Newman – it
was in this direction that his writings were looking.323 But to explain how he got here, it
is important to see how he conceived Origen and Arius as specifically “Eastern” in their
trinitarian views, and Athanasius as more “Western.” Newman first expresses the
difference between Eastern and Western views of the “Trinity” in a definition in one of
his annotations to de Decretis, where he writes:

The word trias, translated Trinity, is first used by Theophilus ad Autol.[ochus] ii. 15… It is certain that the Latin view of the sacred truth, when perverted, becomes
Sabellianism; and that the Greek, when perverted, becomes Arianism; and we find
Arius arising in the East, Sabellius in the West… It is important, however, to
understand, that “Trinity” does not mean the state or condition of being three, as
humanity is the condition of being man, but is synonymous with “three persons.”
Humanity does not exist and cannot be addressed, but the Holy Trinity is a three,
or a unity which exists in three (Ox Frs viii, 46 note k; cf. Ath ii, 474-5).

Three things in particular stand out from Newman’s definition quoted here, culminating
in his reflections on why East and West suffered different heresies.

First is the questionable way Newman presents the word “Trinity” as the true
development in English of the word trias in the pre-Nicene Church. Not only is Newman
suggesting the word trias was a relatively early signifier for God, but in trying to
substantiate this claim, here by quoting a late second-century Bishop of Antioch,
Newman proves less discriminating of the word “Trinity” than he had been in Arians. As

323 The image is Newman’s in his final letter to William Froude, in 1879: “which way does [the letter] B
look? to the left or to the right?” (LD xxix, 116).
was already shown in chapter two, *Arians* interpreted the second and third centuries as a period of shifts and clarifications in doctrinal language of the Trinity. Reflecting the fact that doctrinal terms had not been formulated, Newman rarely uses the word “Trinity” in relation to early doctrine in *Arians*, except as a gloss to express the divine Object the pre-Nicenes found themselves encountering in scripture and prayer. This implies Newman was aware how little his Alexandrian heroes themselves used *trias*. Among pre-Nicenes, Newman quotes the word only from Gregory of Neocaesarea in the East, and from Tertullian in the West; he also quotes Dionysius of Rome’s mention of “Trinity” from Bull on *de Decretis*, in defence of “Divine Monarchy” (*Arians* 174). His annotations in 1842 seem less sensitive to the rarity of *trias* than *Arians*. Although Theophilus used *trias* Newman does not warn his reader that this bishop’s “three” were God, Word, and Wisdom. He is similarly quick to conclude that Athanasius’s use of “Father, Son and Spirit” represented a fully worked out “trinitarian” doctrine when, in fact, the word “Trinity” appears much more frequently in Newman’s notes than in Athanasius’s own writings. Although Newman finds Cyril speaking of the “ineffable unity of the Trinity,” Cyril more usually follows Athanasius in talking of Father, Son and Spirit (*Ox Frs* viii, 251 note f). Newman seems to have grown overconfident, since *Arians*, of the role the word *trias* played and its continuity of meaning in pre-Nicene and post-Nicene doctrine.

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324 Newman writes, “Thus the systematic doctrine of the Trinity may be considered as the shadow, projected for the contemplation of the intellect, of the Object of scripturally-informed piety: a representation, economical; necessarily imperfect, as being exhibited in a foreign medium, and therefore involving apparent inconsistencies or mysteries; given to the Church by tradition contemporaneously with those apostolic writings, which are addressed more directly to the heart; kept in the background in the infancy of Christianity, when faith and obedience were vigorous, and brought forward at a time when, reason being disproportionately developed, and aiming at sovereignty in the province of religion, its presence became necessary to expel an usurping idol from the house of God” (*Arians* 145).

325 Probably Theophilus’s *trias* was quite different from what Newman, at this stage, considered orthodox. As Behr (2001) notices, there were similarities to Paul of Samosata: “Epiphanius also claims that Paul held the Word to be a nonsubstantial, nonpersonal utterance of God, or thought existing in God like ‘reason in the heart of man,’ perhaps echoing the distinction between an ‘immanent’ and an ‘uttered’ logos taught in Antioch a century earlier by Theophilus,” 217.

326 Only a few times can Newman catch Athanasius using the word “Trinity.” In the notes, he quotes from a later text of Athanasius, *ad Serap* i.14 and iv.6 (*Ox Frs* viii, 33 note r, 184 note k). In Newman’s translations, Athanasius also uses the word in *Discourses* I.17-18, 1.58 and III.15 (*Ox Frs* viii, 205-6, 264; *Ox Frs* xix, 421-2).
Secondly, what stands out from the quotation above is Newman’s view that the English word “Trinity” signifies no earthly three, but only the divine “unity which exists in three.” How this unity-in-three comes about has solely to do, in 1842, with his conception of the word *homoousios*. Once again, in *Arians* he avoided the word as much as possible, aware how dangerous it was for many of the pre-Nicenes (although he believed they conceived the relationship of Son to Father in such a way as came to be called *homoousios*). In spite of the problematic nature of the signifier, however, Newman’s annotations use it in ways even Athanasius did not. Around the time of Nicaea, when proper talk about God’s *ousia* became a theme of the Council, Athanasius was himself wary of such language. Even though the Council had declared the credal way for it to be used, Newman in 1858 recognised how reluctant the Alexandrian was, for over ten years after the Council, to write of *homoousios*: “Athanasius himself, whose imperishable name is bound up with *homoousion*, showed himself most cautious in putting it forward, though it had the sanction of an Ecumenical Council. He introduces the word, I think, only once into his three celebrated Orations, and then rather in a formal statement of doctrine than in the flow of his discussion” (*TT* 291). Yet in annotating these “celebrated Orations,” Newman did not refrain from using the word in a way that signified the generic unity of the *trias*.

In *de Synodis* §51, Athanasius gives what he calls a “Greek” (i.e. philosopher’s) argument against *homoousios*: if “the Son be one in substance with the Father, then a substance must be previously supposed, from which they have been generated; and that the One is not Father and the Other Son, but they are brothers together” (*Ox Frs* viii, 151). Here Athanasius rejects the argument that, to say that Father and Son are one substance, implies a third thing which they both share. If such were the case, there would be a substratum called *ousia* that somehow generated them both, changing their trinitarian relation to that of brothers not Father and Son. Athanasius can reject this argument on the grounds that the Father *is* the substance from which the Son derives. Newman, though, cannot make the same move, for he has changed his mind since the

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327 Newman does not follow through this thought to suggest that a credal formula was probably not of first importance to those attending the council, as does Barnes, M.R., “The Fourth Century as Trinitarian

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days when in *Arians* he recognised the derivation view of unity in the Trinity. In his note to this very passage, Newman argues instead that “Christian theology” considers the divine *ousia* as “in one sense universal, without ceasing to be individual” – in other words, as a generic substance which upholds numerical oneness (*Ox Frs* viii, 152 note a). This is to take *ousia* and its cognate *homoousios* to be signifying generic unity, yet this cannot be what Athanasius himself signifies in a text that rejects conceiving *ousia* as a substratum.

Athenasius does not want *homoousios* understood in the generic sense of those who call Father and Son “brothers.” But there was another common interpretation of the word in the fourth century, that of Paul of Samosata, who took it to signify a Sabellian God in its suppression of *difference* between Father and Son. That interpretation continued as an argument against the word in the minds of the bishops at Nicaea and afterwards. Indeed, at the time of Nicaea, the signifier was an example of what scholar Michel René Barnes calls “unity-language” as opposed to “diversity-language”:

> “of the *ousia*” may sound now to express a relationship (“from the essence”) but it was at the time universally taken by supporters and critics alike to express divine unity. An identical understanding attaches to the famous phrase “*homoousios with the Father*” and may fairly be judged to have been the intention behind the phrase: the unity theology intimated in the use of the same language – God, Light, true God – of both Father and Son is expressed and explained in the creed’s *ousia* language.⁵²⁸

Barnes goes on to suggest that, in the aftermath of Nicaea, Marcellus of Ancyra was able to use the Creed as grounds for a renewal of Sabellianism. For Marcellus, there could not be *two* anythings in God – not two lights or hypostases or *ousiai* – if there was but one God.⁵²⁹ Newman might be alluding to this very problem with *homoousios* after Nicaea when he mentions the influence of “Sabellius in the West.” More likely, however,

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Barnes (1998), 51.

Barnes (1998) argues that, in Rome, Athanasius may have taken from Marcellus the idea of calling “Arians” all those who oppose *homoousios*, 55.
Newman takes the course which Barnes argues most scholars of the Nicene controversy take: overlooking the role of Marcellus, in order to focus on the opponents of Nicaea against whom Athanasius directs attention, the “Arians.” Newman portrays the rejection of the *homoousion* after Nicaea, even when it is on *Sabellian* grounds, as the fault of “Semi-Arians” – like Eusebius of Caesarea, who defended against Marcellus – in support of Barnes’s view that Athanasius’s polemic has pointed scholars in the wrong direction (*Ox Frs* viii, 152 note a). Newman seems to have swallowed Athanasius’s own rhetorical depiction of the triumph of *homoousios* as the only word capable of confuting, on the one hand, Eusebius of Nicomedia and, on the other, Semi-Arians like his namesake of Caesarea. In *Arians*, Newman had already accepted Athanasius’s polemic as true, but back then he remained open to the possibility that the pre-Nicenes might have had a better way than making the faith into a formula. By the 1840s, the formulaic word *homoousios* was the only test against heresy and, moreover, Newman seems to have taken it in a generic sense that was not Athanasian.

This brings up the third and final point: Newman’s interpretation of why the East and West were plagued by different heresies. Whilst he alludes to this in the quotation at the top of this section, he gives it greatest consideration in the extended note on hypostasis. This note integrates Newman’s changing views on Origen with his shifting views on Athanasius. Put starkly and without Newman’s detailed qualifications, the note shows that Origen used *ousia* language in order to stress God’s threeness – a tendency which led to division among the *trias*, as in Arianism. He writes: “Three Hypostases are spoken of by Origen, his pupil Dionysius, as afterwards by Eusebius of Caesarea... and Athanasius”; but Athanasius, under the “influence of the West,” also used hypostasis to speak of God’s one *ousia* (*Ox Frs* viii, 71-2). Latins, like Jerome, took Greeks, like

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330 Barnes (1998) writes: “until recently, authority has settled on Athanasius’ understanding that the immediate post-Nicene trinitarian crisis was occasioned by Arius’ theology instead of Eusebius’ understanding that the immediate post-Nicene trinitarian crisis was occasioned by Marcellus of Ancyra’s theology. Among Athanasius’ greatest polemical triumphs was his development of and promulgation of the rhetorical strategy of identifying his opponents as ‘Arians’,” 54. It should be recognised this tradition precedes Newman, as was shown in chapter two.

331 Newman thought the bishops at the Council were right to take time “to overcome their own reluctance to the formal and unauthoritative adoption of a word, in explanation of the true doctrine, which was not found in Scripture” (*Arians* 252-3).
Origen, to be speaking of three "hypostases" as if the word meant the same as *ousia*, thus implying that God was divided into three essences – the doctrine that, it is claimed, is common to all "Arians." By attaching "no fixed sense to the word," on the other hand, Athanasius could use it in a way suitable to the West, writing elsewhere that ""hypostasis is substance, *ousia"" (Ox Frs viii, 70, quoting *ad Afros* §4). Therefore the patriarch could be judged correct by the standards of Jerome, who "uses strong language" against those who speak only of "Three Hypostases." 332 This is not to say that Newman now considered Jerome in the West as the judge of all things orthodox, just that he has lost his former respect for Origen. Newman's trajectory is taking him away from his former Alexandrian heroes, Origen and Dionysius, and towards a Latin-friendly depiction of Athanasius. 333 In this depiction, the patriarch becomes the point of contact between East and West, thus holding together the tendency towards oneness without Sabellianism in the Latin Church *and* threeness without Arianism in the Greek.

The extended note demonstrates another theme discussed already, the way Newman distanced himself from Bull. The whole note is a critique of Bull’s argument that the mention of both "*ousia*" and "hypostasis" in the Nicene Anathema shows there was already a distinction between the two words which approached later orthodox usage. This is another instance of the split between Bull and Petavius on the amount of continuity, or utter lack thereof, between pre- and post-Nicene doctrine. As was shown above, Newman has a more subtle understanding of the dynamism of doctrinal language than Bull, and happily distances himself from the latter (on this issue, by the way, Routh and Burton also opposed Bull, *Ox Frs* viii, 66). Bull follows Basil’s analysis of the

332 Jerome writes: "If you desire it, then be a *new* faith framed *after* the Nicene, and let the orthodox confess in terms like the Arian" (Ox Frs viii, 70; quoting *Ep* xv.4). Also, in 1845, Newman supported Jerome’s opposition to Origen in *contra Rufinus* (Dev 279).

333 In 1858, Newman added historical detail to this depiction of Athanasius, noting that the shift in his use of "hypostasis" occurred when, as secretary to Alexander of Alexandria, he is presumed to have written in "A.D. 320-324, two formal letters against Arius, one addressed to [Alexander's] namesake of Constantinople, the other encyclical," the second of which changes from an Alexandrian to a Latin use of hypostasis. "Athanasius has, on this supposition, when writing in his Bishop’s name a formal document, pointedly innovated on his Bishop’s theological language, and that the received language of his own Church. I am not supposing he did this without Alexander’s sanction. Indeed, the character of the Arian polemic would naturally lead Alexander, as well as Athanasius, to be jealous of the formula of the *treis hypostaseis*, which Arianism was using against them; and the latter would be confirmed in this feeling by his subsequent familiarity with Latin theology" (*TT* 296-7).
Anathema “in his 78th epistle,” placing his “trust… in the great Basil rather than in the modern Jesuit, Petavius” – just as in section 1(b) above, Bull placed his trust equally uncritically in Basil and Athanasius (Defensio 240). Newman, by contrast, employs the full range of historical-critical methods to argue that the use of hypostasis to mean Person “was little more than Alexandrian till the middle of the fourth century” (Ox Frs viii, 72). Newman can thus present the Alexandrians as presaging orthodoxy, while also giving centre-stage to the greatest of their number, Athanasius, who presented the true doctrine of God where Origen veered towards Arianism.

(c) The language of ousia

From the perspective both of God’s unity and Trinity, then, Newman changed his interpretation of Athanasius from one in which ho theos signified the Father, to one in which each of the three Persons is equally the “one God.” Nevertheless he consistently followed the patriarch’s reticence when speaking of what God is. Even when Athanasius refers to God as “Trinity,” the words are predicated in a unique way, which recognises that the divine ousia can never be known.

In 1842, Newman writes of this unique sort of predication in his annotations. Athanasius uses physis at the end of de Synodis §52, writing of the “nature of Son,” where he might be expected to use “hypostasis of Son.” Newman explains Athanasius’s expression with reference to Cyril (as shall be seen with the 1858 essay on Cyril, reference of one Alexandrian patriarch in respect to the other, especially in instances of untypical terminology, becomes a device of Newman’s scholarship). In 1842 he explicates Cyril, arguing against Nestorius, to be saying:

“three natures” is the One Eternal Divine Nature viewed in that respect in which He is Three… These phrases mean that the Son who is the Divine Substance, is from the Father who is the [same] divine substance. As (to speak of what is analogous not parallel,) we might say that “man is father of man,” not meaning by man the same individual in both cases, but the same nature, so here we speak not of the same Person in the two cases, but the same Individuum (Ox Frs viii, 155 note f; square brackets unidentified).
Therefore, Newman argues, for both Alexandrian patriarchs the substance which Father and Son share brings numerical unity. A Latin term is even used for this generic unity, Individuum, as opposed to the Greek, homoousion. But, in spite of the ways in which such a conception has been shown to be unlike Athanasius, Newman is making a very Athanasian assertion to say that God remains unknown in speaking of the ousia or “Individuum” because these words are “analogous, not parallel” to human usage. God’s unity and Trinity remain a mystery, for though humans can come up with analogies which attempt to make sense of them, they are predicated of a simple (divine) substance rather than a composite (creaturely) substance. Newman is clear: this difference of essence means that humans can in no way be considered “parallel” to God.

This lack of divine-human parallels is the ground upon which Newman will base the argument of his 1858 essay, “On Cyril’s Formula,” which draws together what he sees to be Athanasius’s two senses of hypostasis and Cyril’s two senses of physis. The essay strives to bring together these two Alexandrians’ use of ousia, with respect to God’s being and Christ’s, and might therefore be accused of over-simplification. It is also a confusing piece, continuously moving between the subject matter of trinitarian doctrine (the three hypostases/natures in one hypostasis/nature) and of christology (the unity of human and divine in Christ’s hypostasis/nature). But this peculiar mode of argument is explained by Newman’s peculiar purpose in the essay: to draw on Athanasius’s writing on the Trinity in order to suggest reasons why Cyril could write of one physis in Christ, even though at face value this contradicted Chalcedon’s definition that Christ was one person in two natures. Roderick Strange summarises the argument thus: “according to Newman, a correct understanding of the technical, Alexandrian use of physis prohibited its predication of the humanity of Christ in the same parallel sense in which it is predicated of his divinity.”334 It is clear, then, this was similar to the argument Newman had already formulated in 1842, around Athanasius’s use of physis and hypostasis. There Newman showed that the essence of God and humanity are in no way “parallel” when predicating language of the Trinity, which of course has the consequence in christology of making it difficult to speak of Christ having two separate natures,

human and divine, as if these were comparable in their respective substances. Was Chalcedon wrong, therefore, to speak of two natures? No; rather, for Newman, care must be taken in the question of how we predicate "nature" of God and of humans. It has already been shown, in chapter three, with what care Newman treated the question of the different predication of human and divine in Christ through a *communicatio idiomatum*. In the next chapter it will become clear how many of his earlier thoughts came to be used in the 1858 essay, not only from his work on Athanasius in the 1840s but also from Cyril in the 1830s.

Conclusions

With the idea of development, formulated while in his cell at Littlemore, Newman found a means to prevent theological language even after Nicaea ever becoming static. Shifting terminology is integral to doctrinal development. It was seen in chapter two that, in *Arians*, Newman held that formulae impoverished doctrine. His *Essay on Development* continued to hold this to be true. However, in the 1840s he conceives the golden age of dynamism in terminology to be the years immediately after Nicaea, not as previously those before. What has become clear is that this readjustment of the *Arians*’ argument is the result of two shifts in Newman’s own thought: first, in his view of *homoousios* and, second, in his view of Origen and Athanasius.

First, by the 1840s Newman thinks that, at the Council of Nicaea, a test of orthodoxy was necessary and that the Creed provided it. In 1833, Newman had been less of an advocate of *homoousion* than he became later, but back then he was also sure of Origen’s orthodoxy in respect of the unity of Father and Son, even though the pre-Nicenes did not use the credal word. Secondly, then, it is Newman’s change in his view of this word that causes his change of focus from the hero of the pre-Nicene era, Origen, and those whom he taught like Dionysius, to the hero of the Nicene era, Athanasius, and those whose ideas are derived from him, Cyril and the Cappadocians. Yet what is so extraordinary about this change of focus is the way Newman makes so similar an argument about Athanasius as he had previously made about Origen – each was able to uphold the richness of tradition precisely by avoiding fixed terminology. For beyond *homoousios*, which Athanasius understood rightly as an "obscure" word, post-Nicene
doctrine was far from formulaic. Following on from his arguments in the *Essay on Development*, by 1858 Newman will think that “no better illustration can be given of that intrinsic *independence of a fixed terminology* which belongs to the Catholic Creed, than the writings of Athanasius himself, the special Doctor from whom the subsequent treatises of Basil, the two Gregories, and Cyril are derived” (*TT* 293, my italics). Now the golden age of Alexandrian dynamism is not that of the pre-Nicenes but of Athanasius and his orthodox successors. Newman has taken what he previously saw as the special grace of Origen – a richness in doctrinal language – and applied this to Athanasius, whilst at the same time opposing it to what in 1845 he sees as Origen’s weakness – his innovation and speculation.

Why has this change come while Newman was at Littlemore? Perhaps Athanasius holds together two aspects of doctrine which Newman found in tension within himself in those years of being an “outsider” inside the Church of England: how to reflect the riches of a tradition without making it static, which he thought was Bull’s crime, and how to uphold “orthodoxy” even when faced with charges of being false. In all this, Newman seems to have changed his mind as a result of his translation of Athanasius. This chapter has traced the development of Newman’s doubts about Origen, specifically in the way that, once he realised Origen had no notion of “unity of substance,” the three hypostases seemed to divide. Does Newman think Origen is to blame for later Arian interpretations of him? Based on the evidence of the *Essay*, this is a difficult question to answer because of Newman’s ambiguous stance on Origen. The scope of the *Essay’s* argument leaves room for him to be rescued. In defence of the lack of continuity between pre-Nicene and post-Nicene doctrine, Newman writes of the former:

> Stray heterodox expressions, Sabellian or Unitarian, or what was afterwards Arian, Platonisms, *argumenta ad hominem*, assertions in controversy, omissions in practice, silence in public teaching, and the like, such as alone can be adduced, can be made up into no system. They are “a rope of sand,” to use the familiar phrase, not a *catena*; each stands by itself, with an independence, or an irrelevancy, which precludes the chance of assimilation or coalition (*Dev* 389).

Origen’s occasional inconsistencies with later orthodoxy would surely include his writing within this description. But in the 1840s Newman showed himself far less flexible about
what is and is not “orthodoxy.” Chadwick argues that, in the Essay, “Newman wished to apply later evidence to an earlier epoch, not as an old-fashioned argument de praescriptione (‘The Church has always believed the same and she believed x in the fifth century, therefore she believed x in the third’), but as a genuine use according to the strict canons of historical scholarship.”\(^3\) However, it seems to me Arians had given a more historically convincing account of the pre-Nicene era because, at that stage, Newman was not obsessed about where doctrine would end up. Now, on the one hand, he showed how the earlier epoch could lead to the later; on the other, he criticised the earlier by those later standards. The first part of this process saw Origen’s influence on orthodox and heretic alike, but the second part judged him an “inferior” authority that fell short of later orthodoxy. What was and was not adequate before Nicæa, however, is wholly different from what was adequate or not when judged after the Council. Moreover, Newman’s judgement of the pre-Nicenes is not even based on the language of the Council, so much as on his version of what Athanasius signified by homoousios. For, indeed, in the aftermath of the Council, Athanasius himself avoided the word, and when he did use it, as has been argued, it was to the exclusion of the generic notion of Trinity which has become Newman’s own.

\(^3\) Chadwick (1987), 147. Chadwick thinks Newman followed Cannop Thirlwall (1797-1875) and Barthold Georg Niebuhr (1776-1831) in “suggest[ing] a theoretical pattern into which the facts might rationally fit: and this theoretical pattern could not be constructed out of the facts alone… but must also be affected by probabilities arising from the later and better-known developments of the Greek states or the Roman republic,” 145. See also Biemer, G, “«Neibuhriser?» L’historiographie selon Newman” in Lepelley, C, and Veyriras, P, Newman et l’Histoire (Lyon: 1992), 152.
Chapter 5.

The Athanasius “with whom I end”: Arianism and Origen revisited.

Introduction

Five years after becoming a Catholic, Newman published Certain Difficulties felt by Anglicans in Catholic Teaching (1850). It has been the purpose of my study so far to avoid seeing Newman’s writings on the Fathers primarily from the perspective of his shifting loyalties to the Anglican and Catholic Churches. However, as its title suggests, Anglican Difficulties presents a problem for interpreters of Newman’s writings: from this point onwards, Newman himself is trying to give an account of the Fathers that will explain his conversion to Catholicism. This account was most fully expressed in the Apologia in which, as has been pointed out, Newman rewrote his own history in order to claim his reading of Athanasius and Augustine as reasons for his conversion (Apo 110). Back in the 1950s, Derek Stanford warned against “the mistake by which we establish the Apologia not only as the central canon in Newman literature, but as the best authentic source-book for information on the author’s life.” This chapter will heed Stanford’s warning by having two aims: first to downplay the Apologia in favour of Newman’s writings on the Fathers in this period and, secondly, to continue focusing on the historical research manifest in such patristic writing rather than on polemical arguments.

Rather than accepting Newman’s own account of the ways in which reading the Fathers shaped his conversion to Catholicism, it will become clear that his conversion shaped his reading of the Fathers. My argument here extends chapter four’s discussion of Newman’s “Latin” reading of the Alexandrian writers. But to argue for such a reading is not to fall into the trap set by the Apologia, of considering his conversion as the result of patristic reading done in the early 1840s. Conversion was not the most significant event in his patristic research, although it did make the argumentative form of his work more “Latin” than ever before. Already in the early 1840s his was a “Latinised” interpretation

of Athanasius, guided it seems by Augustine’s teaching on the Trinity, but this does not mean Newman was straightforwardly “Catholic” in doctrine either immediately before his conversion or afterwards. His research into the Fathers continued in many ways to operate over and above the concerns of his denomination. Roderick Strange has recognised that “the standpoint of Alexandrian theology” taken by Newman’s christology was in tension with his support for Chalcedon.\textsuperscript{337} Brian Daley has shown a Cyrilline sort of “Monophysitism” in Newman’s christology during his years as a Catholic.\textsuperscript{338} Therefore, the claim in \textit{Anglican Difficulties} that “it was difficult to make out how the Eutychians or Monophysites were heretics, unless Protestants and Anglicans were heretics also” comes \textit{despite} Newman’s own Monophysitism (\textit{Diffi}, 387). Such Monophysitism, expressed in his Anglican sermons discussed in chapter three, is equally present in the Catholic essay upholding “St. Cyril’s Formula, \textit{mia physis sesarkomene}” in 1858.

“St. Cyril’s Formula,” which Newman produced for \textit{Atlantis}, engaged questions of \textit{ousia} language and christology that seemed to spring from his first translation of Athanasius in the 1840s; he republished this in 1874. Essays on the Fathers written in the 1870s also stress their continuity with that first Athanasius translation. When republishing \textit{Arians} in 1871, he began an extended note for this third edition with: “Already in the Notes on Athanasius… I have explained my difficulty in following Bull and others in the interpretation they assign to certain statements made in the first age of the Church concerning the Divine Sonship” (\textit{Arians} 416). Then in 1872, in a piece entitled, “Causes of the Rise and Successes of Arianism,” Newman says he is “fulfilling an engagement, to which I pledged myself long ago… to draw up some sort of introduction to the Treatises of Athanasius which I translated for the Oxford Library of the Fathers” (\textit{TT} 96). Newman seems to think of himself, in these historical works, fulfilling a past engagement, albeit it shall also be seen that in so doing he was revising past opinions.\textsuperscript{339}

\textsuperscript{337} Strange (1981), 59.

\textsuperscript{338} Daley, Brian, “Newman and the Alexandrian Tradition: ‘The Veil of the Letter’ and the Person of Christ” UNPUBLISHED.
Twice in the 1850s, Newman revisited the Arian controversy, the subject of his first book, *Arians* (1833), and for which his translation of Athanasius (1842-4) had re-ignited a fascination. In both instances, the return to Arianism in the 1850s was fed more by polemical needs than historical interest. First, *Anglican Difficulties* drew comparisons between Anglicans and Semi-Arians in the final of his “Twelve Lectures addressed in 1850 to the Party of the Religious Movement of 1833,” as the subtitle has it. Then, in an article in the *Rambler* in 1859 entitled, “On Consulting the Faithful in Matters of Doctrine,” Newman implied a parallel between current Catholic bishops and the ancient bishops who refused to oppose the Arians and Semi-Arians. Without entering the polemical debates of which his patristic arguments were part, in these two works Newman was aligning his opponents with fourth-century doctrinal positions. The content of the doctrine concerned is less important than the position in relation to Athanasius of those who held the doctrine, as argued in the section 1(a) below. In the 1870s, Newman revisited questions of doctrine relating to Arianism and when he did, as section 1(b) will show, he framed them within the Bull-Petavius debate in which his earlier work was also set. Section 1(c) will show some of the differences between the 1830s and the 1870s in Newman’s view of Semi-Arianism.

If Newman’s research into patristic history always brought with it a desire to revise his work, this is seen most clearly in his retranslation of Athanasius, published in 1881. Section 2(a) will examine the general changes made in that “free translation. Section 2(b) and (c) will be more specific, examining respectively the changes that seem to result from the essays, “St. Cyril’s Formula” and “Causes of Arianism.” Section 2(c) will also show how Newman overturns his opinion, recorded in chapter four above, that to speak of the “co-eternity” of Father and Son was an insufficient test of a patristic writer’s orthodoxy. Nothing short of “homoousios” was enough in the 1840s. In 1872, however, co-eternity is the measure of an orthodox conception of God. Of course, those

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339 As always with Newman, the revision process was ongoing. As he wrote in a Postscript to the 1883 edition of *TT*, “I reflected that a fresh edition of the volume, in which I might avail myself of the opportunity of revision, could hardly be expected in my lifetime” so instead he made “alterations.”

who measure up are the Alexandrians. Thus Origen, who in 1845 was judged to have erred in his conception of the relationship between Father and Son, can be rehabilitated.

1) Arianism

(a) Repositioning the Arians

By the middle 1840s, Newman had made Athanasius the standard by which orthodoxy is judged in all times, a move which ran counter to his previous appreciation of historical dynamism. Now in the 1850s he argues, not that the Tractarians or the Catholic bishops are doctrinally heterodox, but rather that their alignments are analogous to those of Athanasius’s opponents. It is not doctrine but alliances that prove these groups false. The argument of Anglican Difficulties compares the “Via Media Anglicans,” as he describes the Tractarians, with Semi-Arians because of their alliance with the State. The latter “preached peace, professed to agree with neither St. Athanasius nor Arius, excited the jealousies of the Eastern world against the West, were strong enough to insult the Pope, and dexterous enough to gain the favour of Constantine and the devoted attachment of his Son Constantius” (Diff i, 380). The theme of Erastianism has been a constant of Newman’s life, whether as an Anglican attacking the “High and Dry” Churchmen or as a Catholic largely excluded from English civic life. In Arians Newman had criticised the way the Emperor was manipulated by the Eusebians into promoting heresy, just as the King had been manipulated in 1829-32 into allowing reforms to the English State. 341 In Anglican Difficulties, the seventeenth-century divine and darling of the Tractarians’ Anglicanism, Jeremy Taylor, is criticised for his praise of Constantine: Taylor “not only calls Eusebius [of Caesarea], whom it is hard to acquit of heresy, ‘the wisest of them all,’ but actually praises the letter of Constantine [to Alexander and Arius]... as most true in its view and most pertinent to the occasion” (Diff i, 390). He notices how other divines, Field, Bramhall and Hammond, gave support to latitudinarians who were their friends. No wonder the Via Media’s “tendency in theory is towards latitudinarianism; its position historically is one of heresy” (Diff i, 392).

341 G.H. Williams (1951a) argues that the correlation between Church and State after Nicaea meant Eusebius of Nicomedia, “emphasized political insubordination among the charges he brought [on his opponents]: against Marcellus, disobedience; against Paul whom he supplanted in Constantinople, disorder; against Eustathius of Antioch, disrespect of the Empress-Mother; against Athanasius, fomenting Egyptian opposition to imperial sway,” 19.
position of Newman’s erstwhile colleagues, who continue in the Via Media, is that of fourth-century Semi-Arianism.

Turning to “On Consulting the Faithful,” the 1859 article has his hero, Athanasius, once again battling for the Nicene Creed. But this time, he thought “it was the Christian people who, under Providence, were the ecclesiastical strength of Athanasius, Hilary, Eusebius of Vecellae, and other great solitary confessors, who would have failed without them” (Cons 76). The Newman of Arians had been suspicious of popular religion: the popularity of heretics like Paul of Samosata and Arius had been part of the problem – demagogues who courted the masses, especially women. Arius, for instance, found popularity among “younger females” and, due to his heretical drinking songs, “the rudest classes of society” (Arians 139). Admittedly, in Arians, the post-Nicene Alexandrian populace follows Athanasius: Newman has no difficulty believing the people were far more holy under an orthodox bishop than under the influence of Arius or Arian bishops. But Newman’s argument in 1859 has a different flavour altogether. Now, in matters of religion, the people are a conservative force to uphold doctrine rather than a radical force for change: “the Nicene dogma was maintained during the greater part of the 4th century, 1. not by the unswerving firmness of the Holy See, Councils or Bishops, but 2. by the ‘consensus fidelium’.” (Cons 77) Moreover, “the multitude” in Antioch, and in Samosata “a poor woman” prepared to give up herself and her child in martyrdom alongside many others, are given as examples of faithful lay opposition to Arianism (Cons 89, 91). Newman’s suspicion of the crowds in Arians was shaped by the popular reforms of 1829-32. In 1859 he was not suspicious of the crowds but rather was critical of the Catholic hierarchy’s reluctance to educate the laity. This positioning of his opponents in the hierarchy got him into trouble, for which Newman was still apologising in a subsequent version of the essay published as Note V to the 1871 edition of Arians. 342

What is so new in “On Consulting the Faithful in Matters of Doctrine” is that, apart from Athanasius, the fourth-century bishops are cast as supporters of heresy,

342 Newman explains that, in the Rambler, “I was simply writing historically, not doctrinally, and while it is historically true, it is in no sense doctrinally false, that a Pope, as a private doctor, and much more Bishops, when not teaching formally, may err, as we find they did err in the fourth century” (Arians 464). Coulson describes the differences between the Rambler of July 1859 and Note V in Cons 109-118.
whether wittingly or unwittingly. The result is a reassessment of where the centres of Arianism lay. No longer is it just at court, or in Antioch, that bishops uphold the heresy. Now even in Rome the bishops fail to do their job. A decade later, in the wake of Vatican Council’s proclamation of papal infallibility, in “Trials of Theodoret” Newman showed that popes had erred in the past, but not ex cathedra: “It is astonishing to me how any one can fancy Liberius, in subscribing to the Arian confession, promulgated it ex cathedra, considering he was not his own master when he signed it, and it was not his own drawing up” (HS ii, 340). By 1870, Newman is more careful than in 1859 to show that he is not arguing that the errors of individual bishops of Rome call that cathedral seat into question. What is more important from the perspective of my study, however, is that the divisions of East and West, of a heretical Antioch and a pure early Rome, held more or less consistently since Arians, have now become complex. That complexity will increase in the 1870s. But the see of Athanasius remained pure.

(b) Revisiting the causes of Arianism

Newman is next found dealing with the Fathers in the early 1870s, after a hiatus in the 1860s which was probably the consequence of the reaction against “On Consulting the Faithful.” According to Coulson, the scars produced when it was so ill-received by the Catholic hierarchy “provides the reasons for his silence as a Catholic writer between the publication of the Lectures and Essays on University Subjects in 1858 and the writing of the Apologia in 1864, as well as helping to explain why Kingsley’s attack produced such a volcanic reply.”343 Rare exceptions to this silence were essays on post-Nicene Fathers – Chrysostom for the Rambler and Theodoret – faithful souls, as Newman saw it, who faced persecution from the usually faithful Alexandrian Church, perhaps in the same way he faced persecution from the Roman Church. But it was to the pre-Nicenes that he returned in 1871 for his new edition of Arians and what is remarkable is how little changed since the 1840s. In Note II of the Appendix of the new Arians, Newman takes up where he left off in his translation of Athanasius, criticising Bull for his elaborate defence of certain pre-Nicene Fathers. Then, in “Causes of Arianism” in 1872, Newman

343 Coulson “Introduction” 1. See Cons 1-49 for Coulson’s explanation of Newman’s editorship of the Rambler, the debates he engaged in, and why he retired from it after three months.
sees himself belatedly providing the introduction to his Athanasius translation, again taking up the remarks he made concerning Bull.

One sentence he used in the extended note to Athanasius’s Second Discourse in 1842 provides the guiding theme for the present chapter. There he hints at the direction his genealogy of Arianism will take thirty years later: “The Arians maintained that the very word ‘Son’ implied a beginning, or that our Lord was not very God; the Catholics said that it implied connaturalitv, or that He was Very God as one with God” (Ox Frs viii, 272). The question of Sonship shapes Newman’s thoughts in the 1870s, and thus shapes this chapter. When it came to discerning where the Arian view came from, Newman looked to the pre-Nicene schools for precursors, as he had in the original Arians. What he discovered, first in 1842 and again in 1872, was that while the pre-Nicene Fathers clearly accepted the connaturalitv of the Son, they were less sure about the Son’s co-eternity. The difference is that connaturalitv is no longer the key to orthodox belief about the Son in the 1870s.

Justin is a good example here, because it was already seen in chapter two that in Arians Newman saw him as an “orthodox” proponent of the Son’s and Spirit’s connaaturality with the Father, giving the image of “fires kindled from a fire” in Trypho 128 (Arians 186). This kept Justin safe even from condemnation by Petavius. Justin’s follower Tatian, however, was thought suspicious. Newman defends Tatian in 1842 from the accusation of holding “the doctrine of a gennēsis,” in other words implying a beginning to the Son (Ox Frs viii, 280). But in 1872 Newman will no longer defend Tatian, even though he admits Tatian took the image of the “fires kindled from a fire” in a more orthodox direction than Justin did. Rather, Newman groups Tatian alongside those who believed in a “temporal gennesis,” denying the Son’s co-eternity with the Father and unwittingly prefiguring Arianism. He paraphrases Tatian’s view in the Oratio ad Graecos 4-7 of Christ’s Sonship as “[f]rom eternity He was conceived, as if ‘in utero,’ and before time and creation He was born,” in other words implying a beginning to the Son (TT 207-8).

In what follows, the changes in his view of the pre-Nicene Fathers will be examined in the context of his changing opinion of Bull and Petavius. In the 1833 edition of Arians, Newman first engaged the dispute between Bull and Petavius over
whether the Nicene Creed is in continuity with the writings of the Fathers who had gone before (Bull), or is a point of departure (Petavius). This involved him in a defence of the pre-Nicenes more or less in the vein of Bull. Where Petavius argued that the pre-Nicenes were the precursors to Arius, Newman, like fellow Anglicans Bull and Cave, argued they were not. Which pre-Nicenes are particularly vulnerable to the charge of being precursors to Arianism? Those who “if we carry off their expressions hastily or perversely” – an important disclaimer – suggest that

God existed in One Person before the “going-forth,” and then, if it may be said, by a change in His nature began to exist in a Second Person; as if an attribute (the Internal Word, “Endiathetic,”) had come into substantive being, as “Prophoric.”

The Fathers, who have laid themselves open to this charge, are Athanagoras, Tatian, Theophilus, Hippolytus, and Novatian (Arians 198).

His first line of defence for these Fathers is unhistorical, writing of the “extreme absurdity, not to speak of the impiety, of the doctrine imputed to” the five, because it is impossible that Fathers of the Church would hold a position that was then, or would become, heretical (Arians 198). In two specific ways, Newman’s defence of these Fathers is straight from Bull, but in another way it is not. First is the decision to defend Theophilus and Hippolytus by means of their own writings, which follows the pattern of Bull’s Defensio book iii chapters 7 and 8 (Arians 200 note 1). Secondly, he gives Bull’s view that pre- and post-Nicene Fathers used “parallel language” which is precisely why he and Bull can claim Arian doctrine was evidently heretical (Arians 198). Newman thinks even before the heresy the Fathers were denying the premises upon which Arius would teach the Son’s generation; this explains why Bishop Alexander’s response to Arius was so swift, as well as why the Nicene Creed contained an anathema “directed against such as said that ‘the Son was not before His gennesis’” (Arians 199). Although this all sounds like Bull, this last quotation interprets this particular anathema differently from him. That Newman believed here something rather different from Bull becomes clearer in the extended note of 1842.

What did the Nicene Council intend by this anathema? Answering this question is the reason for Newman’s extended note after his translation of the First Discourse, during which he opposes Bull’s argument. In speculating on the arguments of Arians and
Catholics at the Council, writes Newman, “Bull considers that both sides contemplated the proposition, ‘He was before His generation,’—and that the Catholics assented and defended it; some reason shall be given here for the contrary view” (Ox Frs viii, 274). In Bull’s opinion, the Nicene Council anathematised those who taught the Son was not before his generation, because the Catholics held that “the Son, indeed, a little before the creation of the world, proceeded forth in a certain inexplicable manner from the Father… and that in respect of this going forth also, he is called in Scripture the Son of God, and, the First-born” (Defensio 485). However, in Newman’s “contrary view,” the Catholics at Nicaea held no belief that the Son was somehow generated or born of the Father. Rather, the Nicene anathema attacked those who held the Son was a creature, a generated thing, as he had pointed out in Arians. Albeit Newman seems never to have agreed with Bull that the Nicene anathema protected the pre-Nicene conception of the Son as generated, nevertheless he had claimed in Arians that “Athanasius, Gregory Nyssen, Cyril, and other Post-Nicene writers” acknowledged a “change of state in the Eternal Word, from repose to energetic manifestation, as it took place at creation, [which] was called by them a gennesis” (Arians 197). However, in 1842 he opposes this (again it was Bull’s argument) by rejecting the idea of pre- and post-Nicene “parallel language” concerning the birth as logos prophorikos of a Word previously in utero patris. In Discourse II.22, Newman explains, Athanasius is pressing upon the Arians the implications of their argument, based on Proverbs 8:22, that the Son was a creature but not like one of the creatures. Newman paraphrases Athanasius thus: “How is He not a creature, if the formula be true, which they use, ‘He was not before his generation?’ for it may indeed be properly said of creatures that ‘they were not before their generation’” (Ox Frs viii, 276). Newman is putting into other words Athanasius’s charge that for the Word to be thought of as in some sense “born” means that Christ is a creature. This does not include born in the sense implied in the title “first-born of every creature,” however, which Athanasius uses from Colossians 1:15 (and 1:18, cf. Romans 8:29). Athanasius’s use of this title, writes Newman, “does not seem to me to speak of a generation or birth of

344 On his translation of the word “generation,” Newman wrote: “In this translation, genēton and gennēton have been considered as synonymous, in spite of such distinction in the reading, as Montfaucon adopts; and
the Son at all, though figurative, but of the birth of all things, and that in Him" (Ox Frs viii, 278).

In 1842, Newman’s argument against Bull is founded on his close reading of Athanasius, which was not available to him in 1833 when he knew little of Athanasius. For instance, in 1842 he argues that in Discourse II.62, Athanasius “expressly denies Bull’s statement that ‘first-born’ means ‘à Deo natus,’ ‘born of God’” (Ox Frs viii, 279, quoting Defensio 484). Newman no longer thinks the bishop of Alexandria, nor his later successor, Cyril (quoted on Ox Frs viii, 279), share parallel language with his five pre-Nicenes. Newman’s interpretation of patristic language is less guided by Bull than before and, as such, begins to oppose him. Thus where, in 1833, it was Theophihis and Hippolytus whose words were quoted to justify the innocence of all five, in 1842 these are the only two who are definitely guilty; Athenagorus and Tatian are found innocent, Novatian might be (Ox Frs viii, 280).

In the new edition of Arians in 1871, the two pre-Nicenes whom he saw, in the first edition, as examples of pre-Nicenes orthodoxy, are now seen to use language that in its “obvious sense” – a reversal of the disclaimer in 1833 – made way for Arianism:

There seems no reason then why the words of Theophilus, Hippolytus, and the rest should not be taken in their obvious sense; and so far I agree with Petavius against Bull, Fabricius, Maran, Ballerini, and Routh. But, this being granted, still I am not disposed to follow Petavius in his severe criticism of those Fathers (Arians 420).345

In this statement, Newman positions himself between Bull and Petavius, not fully agreeing with either. But of the two, he now seems nearer to Petavius, adding to those whose writing on the Son’s gennesis could be co-opted by Arians, “Justin, Tatian,

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345 Newman refers to Johann Fabricius (1668-1736), the Lutheran author of the fourteen-volume Bibliotheca Graece and the three-volume Bibliotheca Latina; Prudentius Maran (1683-1762), the Maurist Father whose editions of Basil’s works Newman used in translating Athanasius (e.g. Ox Frs viii, 61) and of Cyril’s works he used in 1872 (TT 208); and Pietro Ballerini (1698-1769), the Catholic patristics scholar and canonist, amongst whose works was a three-volume edition of St. Leo the Great. Martin Routh (1755-1854), the President of Magdalen College, was the friend to whom Newman dedicated his Lectures on the Prophetical Office (1837).
Theophilus, Methodius, in the East... Hippolytus, Tertullian, Novatian, Lactantius, Zeno, and Victorinus, in the West” (Arians 417). Tatian and Novatian are back on the list, then, where they will remain in 1872.\(^{346}\) In “Causes of Arianism” Newman analyses pre-Nicene writings closely for language which “now would be called, and rightly called, heresy,” which is his strongest ever statement of pre-Nicene error (TT 251). But while he might seem to share Petavius’s position, still he draws back from the latter’s conclusion, arguing as he did in 1833,

\[\text{it is as unjust to say that Origen, Hippolytus or Methodius introduced Arianism,}\]
\[\text{as it is to say that Alexander, Athanasius and Basil favoured it, merely because}\]
\[\text{they, one and all, in their writings contrast the Son with the God and Father of all,}\]
\[\text{as being the First-born of creation (TT 152).}\]

Newman proves this by showing that Athanagorus, Origen, Alexander, Athanasius and Basil all meant by “First-born” the Son’s “Eternal gennesis” from the Father, whereas the Arians meant something very different – something nearer, as it turns out, to Hippolytus and Methodius.

It is clear, therefore, that not much has really changed in the form of Newman’s argument since the first Arians, seeing as this is still a version of his claim for “parallel language.” However, now only Alexandrians really uphold truth both before and after Nicaea. Just as in Arians, the standard by which the pre-Nicenes are to be judged is whether their language came to be used by the Arians or by the post-Nicene Fathers. The Eastern and Western pre-Nicenes fall on the side of the Arians, whereas the Alexandrian pre-Nicenes align with post-Nicene Fathers. He is still caught between Bull and Petavius. Contra Bull, pre-Nicene language was insufficiently safeguarded and thus could be used to justify Semi-Arian doctrines; but, contra Petavius, that was not the fault of the writers themselves. In the conclusion, he writes playfully of Bull’s defence of the pre-Nicenes as a useful “subterfuge,” one that Newman cannot “accept myself,” yet which works to his purpose (TT 251). After all, Newman needs only to demonstrate those facts in the foregoing centuries which gave a handle to the Semi-Arian doctrine in the fourth, and the statements of a figurative gennesis on the part of

\(^{346}\) Newman also adds the author of the ad Diognetum, Eusebius of Caesarea and Constantine from the East, and the writer of the Elenchus Haeresium, St Hilary and St Phoebadius in the West (TT 199, 219).
the early Catholic writers are so very like the denial of a proper *gennesis* from eternity, that it is no wonder if the Semi-Arians did take them, or rather very wonderful if they had not taken them, to mean what they plainly said (*TT* 252).

Whereas Bull interpreted the pre-Nicenes as writing figuratively of the *gennesis*, Newman agrees with Petavius that they deny the Nicene notion of the Son’s “proper *gennesis* from eternity.” In spite of this, Newman will not give up on the pre-Nicenes, aiming “either to exculpate or excuse those writers, in their involuntary co-operation in a great calamity” (*TT* 119-120).

(c) The role of the Semi-Arians

The problem of Arianism, as Newman set it up in his extended note in 1842, was a heretical view of Christ’s Sonship. The word “Son” was taken by Arius to imply a beginning from, rather than connaturality with, the Father. Newman’s argument has evolved by 1872 to outline the ways in which the Arians were assisted in this misinterpretation of scripture by the writings of the pre-Nicene Fathers. He has consistently argued that most pre-Nicenes accepted the connaturality of Son and Father (*homoousios*, as it were, *avant la lettre*), nevertheless now he notices that such a doctrine did not safeguard the Son’s co-eternity. Rather, by suggesting the Word existed in the bosom of the Father before “going forth” as the Son, the pre-Nicenes could be interpreted as holding to a temporal “birth” of the Son. The only ancient school to prove the exception here was that of Alexandria. Notably, Origen taught the need to safeguard the Son’s co-eternity with the Father, even though he also rejected *homoousios*, Newman’s previously favoured expression for the connaturality of Father and Son. The few individual exceptions in the East were the Fathers of the Council of Antioch, who also rejected *homoousios*, probably because many of them were disciples of Origen (*TT* 216). Dionysius of Rome is “the one great exception in the West” to uphold the doctrine of co-eternity, but here Newman makes no mention of the support Dionysius gave to the word *homoousios* (*TT* 252). Newman’s patristic analysis has changed since 1833-1842 so that now co-eternity is seen as better protection against Arians than connaturality/*homoousios*.

With this change has also come a shift in how he apportions blame for the troubles that beset the Church in the fourth century. It is noticeable how little mention is
made of the heretical archetype, Paul of Samosata, probably because the debate over *homoousios* is no longer Newman’s prime concern (the Council of Antioch warrants two pages, *TT* 216-7). Clearly Arius denied both the Son’s connaturality and co-eternity with the Father. Newman has held all along that this is why the Council of Nicaea introduced the credal test of *homoousios* and anathematised those who said the Son “was not before his generation.” “Since the Nicene Creed,” Newman acknowledged in 1833, Arius’s party “even abandoned his creed” (*Arians* 271). But why, then, did the Church continue to be so divided? Because the real troublemakers in the fourth century was not Arius at all, but as a separate party he called “Semi-Arians.” By 1872 Newman has tidied up his account. No longer does he say, as in 1833, that “the increasing influence of Arius” was due to his “throwing himself upon his fellow-Lucianists,” as if *Arius* were the important heretic (*Arians* 238). Now Newman traces a different genealogy than that of “fellow-Lucianists”: Arius’s true successors took thirty years to emerge, he argues, gathering “under the name of Anomoeans, Aetius and Eunomius being its leaders” (*TT* 101). The Semi-Arians, Eusebius of Caesarea and Eusebius of Nicomedia, by contrast, had a confession of their own, expressed in the Creeds of the various Councils which Athanasius collected together in *de Synodis*.

It might appear that Newman’s bias towards Athanasius leads him in 1872 to make the Semi-Arians who condemned him at those Councils, rather than Arius himself, the more influential of heretics. Rather, it is simply that his scholarship has become better. That Newman no longer thought there was much in common between Arius and the Semi-Arians is actually testimony to questioning Athanasius, in whose rhetoric all of his opponents were “Arians.” Newman discerned that the Eusebians were not interested in upholding Arius’s theology from the fact that “out of the Eusebian Councils which followed the Nicene, two only, or rather one, actually absolved Arius” (*TT* 101). Indeed, the revised translation does away with much of the rhetoric by which Athanasius

[^347]: Lewis Ayers also thinks the Eusebians had a far more influential role in the theological disputes of the fourth century than Arius. For “Eusebians” as a category, see *Nicaea and its Legacy: An Approach to Fourth-Century Trinitarian Theology* (Oxford: OUP, 2004), 52-61.

[^348]: The Anomoeans maintained that the Son’s *ousia* was “unlike” the Father’s, the Eusebians that it was “like.”
connects Arius with those heretics who came after. Compare, for instance, these two translations of the start of the Second Discourse:

I did indeed think that enough had been said already against the hollow professors of Arius’ madness, whether for their refutation or in the truth’s behalf... They, however, for whatever reason, do not succumb; but, as swine and dogs wallow in their own vomit and their own mire, even invent new expedients for their irreligion (Ox Frs xix, 281).

I did indeed think that enough had been said already against the hollow professors of Arius’ madness, whether for their refutation or in the truth’s behalf. They, however, do not succumb; but even invent new modes for their impiety (Ath i, 250).

Many such examples show Newman dampening down Athanasius’s vitriol against his persecutors. While Newman might not like the theology of the Semi-Arians any more than before – upon realising its coherence, he probably liked it less\(^{349}\) – he now gives a more subtle account than before of their Neoplatonic theology. No longer does he imply the “theology of the Eclectics opened to Eusebius of Caesarea a language less obnoxious to the Catholics and to Constantine,” as if Eusebius were merely a sophist (Arians 271). Now the emphasis is not so much the sophistry of the Semi-Arians as their continuity with pre-Nicene Neoplatonism. Newman acknowledges that, at the time of Tertullian and Origen, the regnant Neoplatonism held no notion of the universe having been created “after” the generation of the Son. “From this common ground, two schools took their start, but in opposite directions; the one holding that each of the Divine acts, the other that neither of them, was from eternity... Origen affirmed that the creation was from eternity, as well as the gennesis, and Tertullian affirmed that the gennesis had a beginning as well as the creation” (TT 186). Newman does not go deep into Origen’s fascinating cosmology, with its hierarchical universe participating in the heavenly realm; nevertheless he defends Origen (albeit in a scholastic way that would no doubt offend the

\(^{349}\) In 1850, he admits of Eusebius of Caesarea that “The author has now still less favourable views of Eusebius’ theology than he had when he wrote this in 1832” (Diff I, 381 note 1).
Alexandrian’s belief in the economy of God’s revelation). Rather than Origen’s cosmology, the Semi-Arians conceived the universe in similar Neoplatonic terms to Tertullian. In so doing he shows how different this was from the Aristotelian philosophy of Arius, putting it pithily in a footnote added to Arians in 1871: “Plato made Semi-Arians, and Aristotle Arians” (Arians 335 note 1).

In “Causes of Arianism” Newman succeeds in giving a more complex account of theology on either side of the Nicene Council than he has done before. Newman admits that the Western Church was largely unaware of the Nicene teaching, so that Hilary “did not hear of the Nicene Council or Creed till thirty-one years after the Council was held” (TT 242). Moreover, Hilary thought (as did Bull much later) that a temporal gennesis was legitimised by the Council in its anathema. Hilary only realised the extent of the danger, writes Newman, “after his visit to Asia Minor and Alexandria. In Asia Minor he would have proof of the dangerous use which the Semi-Arians made of the formula, and at Alexandria he became the personal friend of Athanasius, who inherited the Alexandrian antagonistic and true teaching” (TT 243). What is so fascinating about Hilary here is how close he came to Semi-Arianism himself. The Semi-Arian position was so dangerous because it only veered a little from the language of orthodoxy.

Newman continues to hold certain criticisms of the Semi-Arians throughout his life, especially their party spirit, most clearly in his revised translation of Athanasius in 1881. As an Anglican, if Newman conceived the Semi-Arians as representing any specific religious grouping of his own day, it was probably bourgeois Protestants, “men, who, unable to take a broad and common-sense view of an important subject, try to satisfy their intellect and conscience by refined and perverse reservations” (Arians

350 There is something running counter to the economy in the claim, “as to Origen’s notion of the eternity of the Universe, it must be recollected that, though in matter of fact creation is not from eternity, yet it might have been, had God so willed. At least so says Suarez… [and] St. Thomas” (TT 188).

351 G.H. Williams (1951a) shows that Eusebius was more likely Origenist in his “philosophical background”: “A cascade of decreasingly divine potencies from the Supreme, impassible, transcendent One, through the Logos-Son and the Holy Spirit, the chief of spirits, to angels and men… Eusebius [of Caesarea] understood the self-disclosure of the Logos incarnate to be little more than the reminder that man is immortal if he will but confirm to the eternal law of the Logos,” 16.

352 Newman quotes the early Hilary, “The Word was in the beginning God, and with God from the beginning. He was born from Him who was, and He that was born had this prerogative, viz. that He it is
Note that these are “men” – Newman repeats the word in the very next sentence – rather than the “women” followers of demagogues like Arius, of whom more shortly. As a Catholic, if Newman conceived the Semi-Arians representing any contemporary grouping is was, as he argued in Anglican Difficulties, Anglican Churchmen. They are the ones cut off from the rest of the Church “in their private heresy,” as he translates Athanasius in 1881 (Ath i, 209) – a different description from that given in 1842, which had, “their own heresy” (Ox Frs viii, 228). Just after this he writes that those like Asterius, who describe the Father alone as agennetos, “imply that the Word is a work to their own private satisfaction” (Ath i, 209). Such private smugness belongs to a party rather than individuals, and Newman shapes Athanasius’s words in order to condemn the whole notion of parties within the Church. The reason why, says Athanasius, “such men” should be named Arians, is that they “derive the faith which they profess from private persons... whose property they have become” (Ath i, 157). Arius and Asterius are “private persons,” and those who follow them are members of a party not members of the Church. By implication, if Newman is being consistent with his argument in Anglican Difficulties, Anglicanism is equally “private” – therefore merely a party and not the Church. This seems a reasonable explanation for the changes Newman makes in his 1881 translation. There may be a more speculative explanation for why Newman revises some of Athanasius’s language about women in the First Discourse. It was seen above that, in Arians, Newman was happy to imply a connection between the demagogic Arius and the women who surrounded him. In so doing, Newman was following a trope within patristic writing expressed in his original translation of Athanasius, in which Arius is accused of having “an effeminate soul” (Ox Frs viii, 183). Interestingly, this phrase is

who ‘erat antequam nascetur;” that is, there is the same eternity of Him who begat, and of Him who is begotten” Matt. xxxi.3 (TT 243).

This analogy with Newman’s contemporary situation in Arians is suggested by Thomas (1991), 45.

According to Ian Ker, with respect to the Anglican Church, Newman in this period had no “hint of the later understanding of the Second Vatican Council that other churches are not devoid of ecclesiastical significance... But on the other hand, Newman had none of the harsh intolerance of so many of his co-religionists.” Ker, Ian, John Henry Newman: A Biography (Oxford: OUP, 1988), 696.

Cf. “a work after their own measure” (Ox Frs viii, 228).

Cf. “they profess from others” (Ox Frs viii, 180).
omitted from his later translation (Ath i, 159). Likewise, twice in the original translation Athanasius draws an analogy between the serpent deceiving Eve and Arius’s deception, alluding once more to a feminine Arius (Ox Frs viii, 187, 189). Twice the analogy is left out of the later translation. One wonders whether the accusations of Newman’s effeminacy made by Charles Kingsley in their 1860s controversy led to Newman’s reluctance to connect femininity and sophistry. Allusions to the effeminacy of heresy were too close for comfort to one particular Anglican’s polemic against the Catholic Newman. Revisions made to the Athanasius translation not specifically related to Arianism will now be considered.

2) Origen and Athanasius
(a) Select Treatises of Athanasius in Controversy (1881)

By the 1870s, Newman was far from content with his earlier translation of Athanasius. In February 1840, two years before his first volume of Athanasius translations was published, in his “Advertisement” to The Church of the Fathers, he gives an insight into his difficulty:

if a translator be conscious to himself, as he may well be, of viewing either his original or his version differently, according to the season or the feeling in which he takes it up, and finds that he never shall have done with correcting and altering except by an act of self-control, the more easy will it be for him to resign himself to such differences of judgment about his work as he experiences in others (CF 593).\(^{357}\)

Over the seasons of his life, Newman indeed took up his Athanasius translation again. Its themes appear to be a constant agitation. His extended note in the 1871 Arians re-engages a debate on a Nicene anathema began in 1842 and ends by acknowledging “this subject should be treated at greater length than I can allow here” (Arians 422). His revisions leave him dissatisfied. Similar concerns surface in the final lines of “Causes of Arianism” from 1872: “I conclude my inquiry… perhaps rather abruptly, and certainly without exhausting it. I cannot hope to have read all that ought to be read upon it, or to

\(^{357}\) The “Advertisement” is Appendix 2 of CF (2002). It was not reprinted in 1857 or subsequent editions.
have covered the whole ground which it occupies” (*TT* 253). More needed to be said, thought Newman, to do justice to Athanasian orthodoxy, hence perhaps his tinkering with quotations taken from his original translation. All “self-control” seems to have disappeared by 1881, when he published what he misleadingly called a “third edition” of his Athanasius translation. Newman made major changes to the earlier editions – changes described in the “Advertisement” as “allowing myself in abbreviation where he was diffuse, and in paraphrase where he was obscure” – justifying the subtitle, “Freely Translated” (*Ath i*, vii). Newman admitted, in the “Advertisement” for the fourth edition in 1887, that the translation is still not “sufficiently… free” (*Ath i*, x). Newman would like more liberty because, by the 1880s, he is confident enough to put words into Athanasius’s mouth. He adds to the original text these words: “The quarrel then between us and them turns on this question” – “us and them” suggesting Newman identifies himself fully with the cause of Athanasius against his opponents (*Ath i*, 245). Such interpolations, he claims, show no “irreverence towards the great Saint,” for he has come intimately to know him “in whose name and history I began to write, and with whom I end” (*Ath i*, ix). Previous chapters have shown Newman’s memory in this sentence to be not quite accurate. In his early writings on the Fathers, the pre-Nicene Alexandrians like Origen were the ones whose name and history most excited Newman, and his relationship with Athanasius fully deepened in the 1840s. Moreover, it will be shown that the way Newman understood Athanasius in the 1840s is very different from that of the final decade of his life.

In what follows, certain speculations shall be made about the reasons for Newman’s revisions. It is impossible to know the exact reasons Newman changed some parts of his translation and overlooked others. Furthermore, the changes he does make are never wholly consistent, as, for example, when he retranslates the Greek *boulē* respectively as “Will” and “Purpose” where before he had used only “Counsel” (*Ath i*, 198-199/*OX Frs* xix, 491-492). But some changes seem to have obvious explanations. First, Newman wants to make Athanasius more readable, hence a pithier opening sentence: “All heresies have in them an element of mad impiety” (*Ath i*, 155).\(^{358}\) Hence

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\(^{358}\) Cf. “Of all other heresies which have departed from the truth it is acknowledged, that they have but devised a madness, and their irreligiousness has long since become notorious to all men” (*OX Frs* viii, 176).
also the transposition of Discourse III.58-67 to Discourse I – "what seems its more natural place" as Newman puts it (Ath i, 154) – and the reshaping of Discourse I.55-62.\textsuperscript{359} Such presumption is of a piece with Newman’s continued use of the first person where it is not found in the original Greek, such as, "As I have said" (Ath i, 313).\textsuperscript{360} Newman feels he can speak for Athanasius. A second set of changes continues the trajectory found in the Essay on Development (1845) of turning to Latin instead of English terminology. In the 1842 edition, Newman had begun his Athanasius translation noting of the words he renders “irreligion” and “religion”: “the Latin translation is ‘pius’, ‘pietas’” (Ox Frs viii, I note a). In 1881, Newman repeatedly translates these words in this Latin mode. Together with this Latinisation of terms, chapter four observed a flattening out of history in the Essay. The sense there of a fixed standard by which to judge orthodoxy is the ironic result of Newman’s view that doctrine either develops or it corrupts, such that the doctrine as it appears in its final stage determines whether or not it was orthodox to begin with. This can also be seen in the 1881 translation, where Newman invents the phrase, “This is what they [the Arians] urge against the orthodox doctrine” (Ath i, 238). In this sentence, Newman depicts a fixed body of “orthodox doctrine” at the time of Athanasius, an anachronism which also underlies his revised translation of “orthodox teaching” for “orthodoxy” (Ath i, 265/Ox Frs xix, 298). As a result of this notion, only the orthodox are in a position to know what is “an indifferent matter in relation to the Truth,” certainly not heretics (Ath i, 162, my italics). The language of dogma, of matters different and indifferent, underpins this new translation of what had previously run, “little different from Truth,” revealing the Latin direction of his later theology (Ox Frs viii, 188).

(b) “St. Cyril’s Formula” (1858)

In 1855 Newman published a novel about pre-Nicene struggles, Callista, subtitled A Sketch of the Third Century, set in North Africa and featuring Cyprian. On the heels of that, the late-1850s was a time to focus on post-Nicene struggles. He turned first to Cyril.

\textsuperscript{359} The paragraphs in Ox Frs viii, 259-269 are reordered thus – §§5, 3 (omitting the first half), 6, 7, 8, 10, 4, 11, 9, 12 – to make §§89-98 in Ath i, 238-247.

\textsuperscript{360} There is no such phrase in Ox Frs xix, 350. See similar use of the first person in Ath i, 186, 214, 217, 245.
In July 1858, in the Catholic University’s journal *Atlantis*, Newman published an essay entitled, “St. Cyril’s Formula” focusing on the figures who were central to chapters three and four above, Cyril and Athanasius. But it is Athanasius to whom Newman is most in thrall, so that this essay has as much to do with Athanasius – or, more specifically, a Latinised reading of Athanasius – as it does with the Cyril of the title. Likewise an essay on Chrysostom appearing in the *Rambler* in 1859-60, which Newman intended along with something on Theodoret to be part of a larger series, “to have included like sketches of St. Ambrose, St. Jerome, perhaps St. Athanasius… entitled ‘Ancient Saints’” (HS ii, 213), also drew comparisons with Athanasius.\(^{361}\) In matters of doctrine, however, Cyril was Athanasius’s heir. In “St. Cyril’s Formula mia physis sesarkômenê,” Newman argues that, just as “hypostasis” and *ousia* could be applied to God in two distinct senses, the generical and personal, so there were two significations of *physis*. If this latter word were applied to what is divine, it was hard to apply it *in the same sense* to what is human – the two significations of *physis*, divine and human, must be kept distinct, as Cyril recognised.\(^{362}\) For this reason, one can see why Brian Daley has argued that Newman continues as a Cyrilline “Monophysite” even in his Catholic writings.\(^{363}\) In the “Trials of Theodoret” essay from 1870, while Newman tries to be sympathetic to Theodoret, it is clear why an “Antiochene” christology was defective compared to that of the Alexandrians.\(^{364}\) In the revised translation of the Second *Discourse* in 1881, Newman

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\(^{361}\) He writes of Chrysostom: “He is not an Athanasius, expounding a sacred dogma with a luminousness which is almost an inspiration; nor is he Athanasius, again, in his romantic life-long adventures, in his sublime solitariness, in his ascendancy over all classes of men, in his series of triumphs over material force and civil tyranny. Nor, except by the contrast, does he remind us of that Ambrose who kept his ground obstinately in an imperial city, and fortified himself against the heresy of a court by the living rampart of a devoted population. Nor is he Gregory or Basil… not an Augustine… [n]or is he a Jerome… yet I love him” (HS ii, 284-5). This passage gives a good indication of Newman’s favourites in the 1850s.

\(^{362}\) He writes, “the sense in which the Divine Being is an *ousia*, etc., His human nature is not an *ousia*, etc.; so that in that sense there are not two *physeis*, but one only, and there could not be said to be two without serious prejudice to the Catholic dogma” (TT 308).

\(^{363}\) See Daley, UNPUBLISHED.

\(^{364}\) Newman puts the following words into Theodoret’s mouth, in order to give a sympathetic account of why the Antiochene opposed the Alexandrian: “‘Cyril was always attacking some one or other,’ [Theodoret] would say; ‘Pagans, or Philosophers, or Novatians, or Jews, or Joannites. Yesterday it had been Chrysostom, today it was Nestorius. Nestorius was intractable certainly, but he did not really hold what was imputed to him. Those should not throw stones who lived in glass-houses. Cyril was an Apollinarian, beyond a doubt…’” Thoughts such as these, as far as they were indulged in any quarter, were
claims in a new footnote to find all the traits of an Alexandrian christology in Athanasius's writing:

In such passages as this are taught without technical terms the theological truths that our Lord has but one personality, that it is placed in His Divinity not His humanity, that His humanity acts in Him as if an additional attribute, and that there is an interchange of the properties of Godhead with those of manhood in His one Person (Ath i, 260 note 3).

The idea of Christ's humanity being analogous to an "attribute" in his divine Person dates from Cyril and his followers. Yet Cyrilline and Athanasian christology seem to have become one.

The underlying argument of "St. Cyril's Formula" is that Athanasius and Cyril, as well as the Cappadocians, take "the words ousia, hypostasis, physis, and eidos... [as] denoting fully and absolutely all that the natural theologian attaches to the notion of the Divine Being,—as denoting the God of natural theology" (TT 307). Using "hypostasis" as an example, Newman says this "word expressed or suggested the attributes of individuality, self-subsistence, self-action and personality" to the "natural theologian" (TT 300). The great achievement of Athanasius was to use such a word, "with but a slight modification of its sense, of the Trinity as well as of the Unity" (ibid.). Thus, in some instances ousia words referred to the generic substance of God, but in other were specifically "applied to the second Person of the Blessed Trinity, meaning simply that same Divine Being, Deus singularis et unicus, in persona Filii" (TT 308). In chapter four it was argued that Athanasius conceived God's unity not in generical terms, but premised on the Son's derivation from the Father. Nor would Athanasius describe the Son in terms so obviously Augustinian. Here Newman continues what he began in the 1840s, forcing Athanasius into a Latin framework, for while the bishop did call Father, Son and Spirit, "hypostases," this was very different from calling them "Each that same one God" (TT 299). The last word here, ho theos in Greek, Athanasius reserved for the Father alone, with the Son as Son of God. Athanasius himself held that the Son and Spirit derived from

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to Cyril. Cyril was a clear-headed, constructive theologian. He saw what Theodoret did not see. He was not content with anathematizing Nestorius; he laid down a positive view of the Incarnation, which the Universal Church accepted and holds to this day as the very truth of Revelation" (HS ii, 344-5).
the "one God" or Father. In using Cyril as a follower of Athanasius's teaching on *ousia*, this essay seems to continue their roles in the 1840s, when Cyril was used to support Athanasius in a way that was accurate of neither writer's conception of God. Then, Newman had quoted Cyril in a footnote to Athanasius's *de Decretis* referring to the Father as "God," seemingly unaware that the Alexandrians' conception of *ho theos* was very different from Augustine's. Newman is forcing Athanasius and Cyril into a Latin mould, resulting in an uncomfortable fit.

Perhaps to make the fit more comfortable, Newman adjusted much of Athanasius's *ousia* language when he came to revise his translation of *Select Treatises*. Revisiting "St. Cyril's Formula" when preparing it for republication in 1874, he found themes to return to in 1881. In *de Decretis* §22, in which Athanasius declares God to be in *ousia* "Father," Newman now translates "we signify His substance or essence," where he had previously used only "substance." This addition of the word "essence" enables the translator to change to "let us understand only of God that He is a Being or Essence" from "if we only understand that God is" (*Ath* i, 40-1/*Ox Frs* viii, 38). Both translations seek to uphold the simplicity of God, saying that when we use the biblical titles we signify no created being, but an ineffable "substance." Yet to talk about God as "a Being or Essence" is very different from saying "God is," and suggests a Latin scholasticism anachronistic to Athanasius's own conception of *ousia*. Then, in the *Discourses Against the Arians*, Newman alters the places where the word "substance" is found, sometimes omitting "substance" (e.g. *Ath* i, 246/*Ox Frs* xix, 266) and elsewhere adding it (e.g. *Ath* i, 177/*Ox Frs* viii, 206).

Connected to these are changes Newman made to Athanasius's language about the Son. Newman considers "Son" as shorthand for what in the earlier translation were "Son of God" and "Word." Thus he substitutes "the Son is the Word" for the more careful "the Word is the Son of God" (*Ath* i, 289/*Ox Frs* xix, 323). Above, it was made

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365 Annotating *de Decretis* §15, Newman quotes Cyril in the *Thesaurus*, "If thou wilt take from God His being Father, thou wilt deny the generative power of the divine nature, so that it is no longer perfect" (*Ox Frs* viii, 25 note e). Shortly after, annotating the important §22, Newman quotes Augustine *de Trinitate* v.6, "not every thing which is said to be in God is said according to substance" (*ibid.* 38 note z). The Alexandrians have a very different understanding of God from Augustine, who continues that, "although being Father is different from being Son, there is no difference of substance, because they are not called
clear that the Son is only ho theos derivatively, such that Athanasius mostly calls him “Son of God.” But just as the revised translation uses “Son” where Athanasius has “Son of God” in the early parts of the Second Discourse, Newman in various ways suggests the Son’s Person and authority are derived from the Father. Newman’s model in 1881 is more that of the Latin West, where God is conceived to be each of the divine Persons. In Athanasius’s theology, “God being good and Father of the Lord” – as Newman translates it in both versions – “makes His own Son put on Him a human body and become man” (Ath i, 267/Ox Frs xix, 300, my italics). But the later Newman changes the words Athanasius puts in Peter’s mouth to address the multitudes at Pentecost: Peter says that Jesus “made Himself God by manifesting Himself in the works,” compared with the earlier translation’s “Thus then the Father has made Him Lord and King” (Ath i, 265/Ox Frs xix, 298). The emphasis in the two translations is very different, for the later Newman seems to make the Son in some way responsible for his flesh being deified, while the earlier one places all responsibility on the Father. It is the Father who sends the Son, in Athanasius, not the Son who sends himself, just as it is the Father who makes the Son “Lord.” Yet Newman alters this theology by giving the Son more agency in his mission than Athanasius permits, implying for instance that the Son is responsible for “hallowing all through His own Anointing” where he previously had just “hallowing all through the Anointing” which presumably the Son received from the Father (Ath i, 267/Ox Frs xix, 300, my italics).

The suggestion that the advancement of Jesus’s human flesh came from within, through the indwelling Word, of course suggests Apollinarianism. In spite of the warnings in his annotations about Athanasius’s use of organon/instrument to describe Christ’s human body, the 1881 Athanasius sounds more Apollinarian than before (Ath i, 396 note 3/Ox Frs xix, 443 note g). He translates “let He created be understood, not of

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366 This conception continues in the Divine Liturgy of the Eastern Church. In liturgical texts, the Father is called “ho Theos kai Pater,” and the Son “ho Logos tou theou kai theos,” which might be translated “God, that is the Father” and “the Word of God, that is, God.” I owe this observation to Andrew Louth.

367 In the analogy of the architect Athanasius uses in Discourse II.77, the Father does not consult with the Word in the earlier translation, but “consulting” is implied in the later translation (Ath i, 349/Ox Frs xix, 390).
His being a creature, but of that human nature which is attached to Him” where previously he simply had “that human nature which became His” (Ath i, 310/Ox Frs xix, 347). Images of the body as external to the Word appear again in the Second Discourse when he translates: the Word “stood clad in a body” instead of “put on a body” (Ath i, 340/Ox Frs xix, 381). More startlingly still, in the Third Discourse Newman moves the first sentence of §53 and relocates it to a slightly earlier passage, in which context it has a totally different christology. The two versions are worth quoting in full so that the context can be seen:

for all things advance by looking at Him; and He, being One and Only, is in the Only Father, out of whom never does He reach, but in Him abideth ever. To men then belongs advance; but the Son of God, since He could not advance, being perfect in the Father, humbled Himself for us, that in His humiliation we rather might have capacity to increase. This is the real advance, the deifying and grace imparted from Wisdom to men, sin being obliterated in them and their inward corruption, according to their likeness and relationship to the flesh of the Word (Ath i, 420).

For Jesus advanced in Wisdom and grace; and, if we may speak what is explanatory as well as true, He advanced in Himself; for Wisdom hath builded Herself an house, and in herself She gave the house advancement. (What moreover is this advance that is spoken of, but, as I said before, the deifying and grace imparted from Wisdom to men, sin being obliterated in them and their inward corruption, according to their likeness and relationship to the flesh of the Word?) For thus, the body increasing in stature, there progressed in and with it the manifestation of the Godhead also, and to all was it displayed that the body was God’s Temple, and that God was in the body (Ox Frs xix, 474).

In the 1881 version, the key sentence has been moved out of a discussion of how the human “Jesus advanced in Wisdom” and placed into a discussion of “all [created] things.” Albeit the parenthesis suggests Newman in 1844 did not really know what to do with the sentence – dubious as he was about any conception of the Son’s advancement in human knowledge – in this new context it is solely about what advancement humans
(plural) can gain through Christ. The deification of Christ’s flesh does not happen gradually over his lifetime, according to Newman, because, as he writes in a footnote in 1844, “it was from the first taken out of its original and natural condition and ‘deified’ by its union with the Word” (Ox Frs xix, 461 note c). In 1881, such a christology justifies Newman’s amendment of Athanasius’s own argument, so that now it is not Christ whose flesh is deified over time, but rather ours who are “looking at Him.”

Newman is therefore protecting Christ’s divine Person from being mistaken for a human person. For sure, Newman is aware of those phrases of Athanasius which go against Chalcedon, which may be why he drops altogether from Discourse II.64, “the truth declares the Word is not by nature a creature” for, in 451, Christ was declared to have a human nature too (Ath i, 334/Ox Frs xix, 373). A similar unease might explain why, in Discourse III.63, which in his revised translation he moves to the First Discourse, Newman now describes the Word as “by God’s nature the proper Offspring of God’s Substance” where before he only had “by nature the proper Offspring of God’s Substance” (Ath i, 198/Ox Frs xix, 491). It seems Newman wants to make plain that in his divine nature the Son is properly of God, but that he also has a human nature proper to creatures. In a similar clarification earlier in the Third Discourse, Newman adds the word “nature” to yield “our being in the Father is not ours by nature...” from what previously read “our being in the Father is not ours, but is the Spirit’s gift” (Ath i, 387/Ox Frs xix, 433). There is no mistaking a human nature with a divine nature in the revised translation. Newman has become a systematiser of Athanasius’s unsystematic language in order to provide two different terminologies, in this instance a different way of signifying each physis in Christ. This might explain why Newman now describes the Son as “Expression” of the Father where he had been “impress of the Father’s Person” (Ath i, 164/Ox Frs viii, 192). For in “Causes of Arianism,” to which we now turn, it is those adopted as sons who have become the “impress of [Christ’s] own likeness” (TT 158).

This idea seems to come from Athanasius himself, who calls humans the “impression” or “impress” of the Word’s image (Ath i, 350/Ox Frs xix, 391). But where Athanasius

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368 See also Ath i, 175, 180, 182, 378/Ox Frs viii 204, 208, 212, Ox Frs xix, 424.
mixed his words between humans and the human in Christ, Newman in 1881 is much more systematic.

(c) “The Doctrine of the Divine Gennesis” and “Causes of Arianism” (1871-2)

Prior to 1871, Newman had spent a decade in controversy, beginning with his 1859 piece, “On Consulting the Faithful,” continuing when defending the “History of My Religious Opinions” (published as the Apologia), and ending with a systematic account of how religious opinions are formed in the first place in the Grammar of Assent (1870). By contrast, the early 1870s were a period of stability for Newman, his publishers realising that anything the author of the Apologia wrote would sell, and it was to the Fathers that he returned. Between 1870 and 1874, Newman was engaged in re-shaping his historical writings for republication, mainly those from his Anglican years. Thus, a new edition of Arians (1871) appeared in the same year as a collection of articles, mainly those he wrote for the British Critic between 1837 and 1842, called Essays Critical and Historical. These were followed by volumes gathering a mixture of Anglican and Catholic writings in Discussions and Arguments on Various Subjects (1872) and Tracts Theological and Ecclesiastical (1874). The latter included Newman’s essay on “The Heresy of Apollinaris,” left unpublished since it was written in August 1835 and discussed in chapter three above. Three volumes of Historical Sketches were also published, volumes i and iii appearing in 1872, volume ii in 1873. Historical Sketches i and ii are of interest here (volume iii on the nature of a university will receive more discussion below). Volume i contained, among other things, the essays on “Primitive Christianity” omitted from the 1857 and 1868 editions of The Church of the Fathers. It was in the 1857 edition that he placed Origen alongside Nestorius as worse heretics than Apollinarius, in a version of the essay that had begun life as “Apollinaris’ History” in August 1835 (CF 392). Interestingly, this is the one essay Newman omits when he

369 The 1874 edition of TT, from which I am quoting, had in chapter 1 Newman’s “Dissertationunculae Quatuor” (a Latin version from 1846-7 of his extended notes in Ox Frs), followed in chapter 2 by “Causes of Arianism,” and in chapter 3 by “St. Cyril’s Formula.” Later editions had “On the Text of the Epistles of St. Ignatius” as chapter 2, offsetting the number of subsequent chapters by one and changing the pagination.
published the remainder of *The Church of the Fathers* as the first section of *Historical Sketches* ii. 370

The early 1870s were, it seems, a time to look yet again at Origen and the Alexandrians. Back in the mid-1840s Newman had privileged the term *homoousios*, as a result of his work translating Athanasius. Once Newman had accepted this term as the best one to describe the relation of Father to Son, Origen’s rejection of *homoousios* could only ever appear heterodox. By the early 1870s, however, the relative importance of two doctrines of God that Newman had been considering since the 1830s – the connaturality and the co-eternity of the Son – swings towards the latter. The line of argument appears in the “Trials of Theodoret,” which Newman records as having finished in December 1870. 371 There he remarks that the Church of Alexandria “had in the Ante-Nicene times explicitly and consistently maintained our Lord’s Eternal Sonship, which Arianism formally denied” (*HS* ii, 340) – a doctrine Newman had attributed to Origen at least since the first edition of *Arians*. The argument is laid out in the extended note for the 1871 edition of *Arians* entitled “The Doctrine of the Divine Gennessis,” but the scholarship to support his case awaited “Causes of Arianism” published in *Tracts Theological and Ecclesiastical*.

Newman’s argument in 1871-2 emphasises Christ’s eternal Sonship as the best way to reject the Semi-Arian notion of a “temporal gennessis.” He makes this argument based on a new genealogy of Arianism, or more specifically Semi-Arianism: “the Syncatabasis of the Son... as well as the Principatus of the Father, accidentally suggest and favour that form of Arianism, which had such a sudden and wide extension in Christendom on the conversion of the Empire” (*TT* 152). According to Newman, these two pre-Nicene doctrines, the *Principatus* which he previously called “the Monarchia” of the Father and the *Syncatabasis* which he previously called the “going-forth” or “condescension” 372 of the Son, need to be properly safeguarded or else they lead to error.

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370 McGrath (2002) “Introduction,” xlii. This introduction to the latest edition of *CF* is an excellent account of the ways Newman changed the various versions of the essays.

371 *LD* xxv, 448. The “Trials of Theodoret” was not published until *Historical Sketches* ii (1873).

372 Newman used “condescension” once in his discussion of the Son’s *gennessis* in 1833 (*Arians* 198). His rethinking of this doctrine seems to explain the importance given in *TT* to the co-eternity of Father and Son.
In the case of Principatus, that safeguard is an old one: it must be combined with the doctrine of circumincessio or coinherence. This, he claims, is the teaching of the Latin Fathers. In the case of Syncatabasis, Newman is entering into new territory. He has never before been so critical of the pre-Nicene notions of “first, the Logos in the bosom of the Father, or... Endiathetic, which I shall denote by the letter A; next, the Logos born to be a Son, or Prophoric, B; and, lastly, the Logos Prototocos [First-born], C” (TT 199).

The safeguard against this heretical A, B, C is to make clear that the Word is “Son” from everlasting: his gennesis as God is eternal; his only temporal gennesis is the human nature he takes on and in which nature he is “first-born of all creation.” This, he claims, is the teaching of the Alexandrians. Here the details of Newman’s argument in relation to each doctrine shall be examined in turn.

**Principatus.** Newman’s discussion of Principatus arises when Newman returns to trinitarian themes he has been dealing with throughout the years. These themes can be seen in a passage near the beginning of “Causes of Arianism”: [Selected pre-Nicene] passages coalesce and form one whole, and a whole in agreement with the subsequent teaching on the subject of the fourth and fifth centuries; and their doctrine, thus taken as a whole, will be found to contain these four main points:— (1) Each of the Three Divine Persons is distinct from each; (2) Each is God; (3) One proceeds from Another in succession; (4) Each is in the Other Two. In other words, the primitive ecclesiastical tradition concerning the Divine Being includes the doctrines of the Trinity, of the Unity, of the Monarchia or Principatus, and of the Circumincessio or Co-inherence (TT 114).

With respect to each Person’s being ho theos (point 2), Newman alludes to the tension here with the Principatus of the Father (point 3). However, the Circumincessio (point 4) eases the tension because each Person inheres in the others as the one God. This is in some ways a return to Arians, when “Monarchia” and “co-inherence,” combined to uphold Son and Spirit as both “of God” and “in God” (Arians 175). But nowadays Newman thinks that it was largely Greek patristic writers, as well as Pope Dionysius,

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373 He describes the monarchia thus: “of the Three, the Father is emphatically... spoken of as God. Thus St. Justin and St. Clement speak of Him as the God of the Universe; thus Athenagoras speaks of ‘God, His Son and Word, and His Spirit;’ Irenaeus of ‘God and His Hands’” (TT 115).
who held the doctrine of *monarchia*, whereas Latins held the doctrine of co-inherence, among them Pope Dionysius again. In *Arians*, he had described the “Ante-Nicene school of Rome [as] still more explicit” in its doctrine of coinherence than the Alexandrians, but as a Latin authority he had only Dionysius, compared to Athenagorus, Clement and Gregory of Neocaesarea among Alexandrian proponents of coinherence (*Arians* 173). In “Causes of Arianism,” Newman looks only to Tertullian, Dionysius of Rome, and Augustine, contrasting their accounts of co-inherence as ways to protect Christ’s eternal Sonship and finding Augustine the best.

The key is what each Latin Father does with Christ’s words in John’s gospel, “I and the Father are one,” which was commonly translated by the neuter “unum.” Tertullian gave this gloss, “They are all one (unum), by unity of substance”; but the problem with this was “that it seemed to imply a fourth reality in the Divine Being over and above the Three Persons, of which the Three Persons partook” (*TT* 123-4). Such a problem, writes Newman, had led the Council of Antioch to oppose the *homoousion* for its materialistic implications, and also led Eusebius of Caesarea to oppose the word’s reappearance at Nicaea. Dionysius of Rome translated Jesus’s words with the masculine “unus” instead, “saying definitely that the Father is the ‘Unus Deus,’ with the explanation or understanding that the Son and Spirit are in Him” (*TT* 125). But this caused the opposite problem, suggesting “a sort of subordination to the Son and the Spirit, which, scriptural though it was, became a handle to Semi-Arianism” (*TT* 126). The third alternative was Augustine, who understood the translation “‘unus’ [as] expressing any one or other of the Three Persons, since Each of Them (no matter which of Them is taken) is the One God” (*TT* 124). Given “the experience of [Semi-Arian] heresy,” Newman thinks only Augustine’s alternative was safe of the charges of materialism or subordination in the Godhead (*TT* 126).

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374 Without such complementing from the coinherence, the doctrine of *Monarchia* “might be perverted into a Semi-Arian denial of the proper divinity of Son and Spirit, if ever They were thought, by reason of Their derivation, to be emanations, and therefore external to the Essence of the Father” (*TT* 123).
Newman’s choice of Augustine in 1872 is no surprise.\textsuperscript{375} For thirty years, Newman has taken an Augustinian view of various Fathers.\textsuperscript{376} However, as has been argued, this “Augustinianism” is not really Augustine, but a scholastic interpretation of him, as indicated by Newman’s gloss, “‘unus’ stands indeterminately for Either of the Three, somewhat in the sense of an individuum vagum” (\textit{TT} 126). Newman’s interest here, like the scholastics he follows, is in the way divine substance is individuated.\textsuperscript{377} The term \textit{individuum vagum} seems to be used in the same way as it is by Aquinas when commenting on Augustine’s use of “Three Persons” in response to the question, “Three what?” in \textit{de Trinitate} v.9. Aquinas writes, “The vague individual thing, as some man, signifies the \textit{common nature} with the determinate mode of existence of singular things” (\textit{ST} Ia.30.4, my italics). To use a distinction taken from his work in the 1840s, Newman shares Aquinas’s view of \textit{generical} unity of Father and Son, as opposed to the unity that comes with the Son’s \textit{derivation} from the “one God” or Father. Even when Augustine himself wrote of the Son’s derivation in \textit{contra Maximium} ii.3, Newman seems to have convinced himself that the Bishop of Hippo did not really mean it, reading him through medieval scholastic lenses.\textsuperscript{378} Even if “what St. Irenaeus, St. Athanasius, and St. Basil taught, never can be put aside,” when the \textit{monarchia} is not safeguarded by a Latin notion of co-inherence, the 1872 essay shows how it needs correcting (\textit{TT} 133).

\textit{Syncatabasis}. In “Causes of Arianism,” Newman shows his concern for making safe the doctrine of the Son’s “going forth” from the Father. He shows that the

\begin{footnotesize}
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\item \textsuperscript{375} In 1870, he had already written, “the Catholic dogma may be said to be summed up in this very formula, on which St. Augustine lays so much stress, ‘Tres et Unus,’ not merely ‘Unum;’ hence that formula is the key-note, as it may be called, of the Athanasian Creed” (\textit{GA} 125).
\item \textsuperscript{376} Newman does not deny tensions between his Greek hero, Athanasius, and his Latin hero, Augustine; for instance, “Athanasius seems to deny that He [the Son] can be called \textit{jussio}, which Augustine sanctioned” (\textit{TT} 165).
\item \textsuperscript{378} Newman comes close to conflating Augustine with “the times that followed,” especially the middle ages, when he writes: “the tendency of [Augustine’s] theology – certainly that of the times that followed – was to throw that doctrine into the background. The abuse of it by the Arians is a full explanation of this neglect of it. Moreover it was out of keeping with the doctrinal system of the medieval Church” (\textit{TT} 132-3).
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Syncatabasis occurred in a series of stages: it was a process in the sense of the Son “proceeding” from the Father. But this process is from all eternity, with no temporal beginning even though time is brought to birth by it. The process occurs in the following way:

the co-equality and indivisibility of the Father and His Word [means that we] consider the Word... as Himself the Divine Fiat, the Hypostatic Will and Operation, the Counsel, Idea, Design, Purpose, and Effective Force, the Wisdom and Power, which called up the universe out of nothing. This going forth of the Hypostatic Wisdom and Power of God, manifesting Himself externally in creative act, was the commencement of His Temporal Economy, and the immediate introduction of his Syncatabasis... “The Word,” says Athanasius, “when in the beginning he framed the creatures, condescended (sunkatabebêkke) to them, that it might be possible for them to come into being...” Orat. ii. 64. This was the first act of His Syncatabasis (TT 155-6).

Three things stand out in this quotation. First, as already stated, there is a sense of process at work here that can only “begin” once time is created in which to measure a beginning. This is Origen’s point. Secondly, the Alexandrian shape of the christology is clear in the multiplication of titles given to the Word, all of which are predicated of one who is eternally from the Father. In “St. Cyril’s Formula,” Newman had used Athanasius in Discourse II.35 to show the special predication of terms like “fiat” and “pronounced Word”: “God’s Word is not merely prophorikos, nor by His Son is meant His command,” e.g. Fiat lux (TT 319). This quotation from Athanasius in 1858 already shows some minor changes from Newman’s earlier translation by keeping the Greek in the original. Other Greek words and their English equivalents have become dangerous however. This is the third thing to notice in the “Causes of Arianism” piece: Newman is

379 For Origen, seeing as God is outside time, God cannot “begin” to be the Creator of the world in any sense we can understand, because “begin” is a temporal term. From the beginning, God already is the Creator together with the Word, for “as will proceeds out of the mind, and neither tears the mind nor is itself separated or divided from it, in some such manner must we conceive that the Father has begotten the Son, who is His Image,” de Principiis 1.2.6 (Newman’s trans. in Arians 170).

380 His earlier translation has “pronounced” for prophorikos, albeith with the Greek in a footnote, and “He is God also,” as does his later translation (Ox Frs xix, 329/Ath i, 295).
uneasy using “generate” even of created things, perhaps because of the danger of predicating “gen(n)esis” of the Word. Thus, by 1872, he changes Athanasius’s words in Discourse II.64 to “The Word... condescended to them,” where in 1844 he had, “The Word... condescended to things generate” (TT 156/Ox Frs xix, 372, my italics).

Reluctance to talk of “things generate” becomes the pattern of his 1881 revisions of Athanasius too. There the translation of Discourse II.64 – “things which were to have a beginning” – is typical of the whole translation (Ath i, 333). The emphasis is, it seems, on the temporal beginning of creation, which is in no way to be confused with the eternal gennesis of the Son. The human nature which the Son takes on is also described in terms of a “bodily coming into being” instead of a “bodily generation” (Ath i, 336/Ox Frs xix, 376). This seems to be further indication of Newman’s Latinising, for here, following Thomas Aquinas, he keeps distinct that “the Son has proceeded eternally as God” and that “He may proceed temporally, to become man as well, according to his visible mission; or He may proceed temporally by dwelling in man according to His invisible mission” (ST Ia. 43.2). The first has to do with the eternal gennesis, the latter with the Son’s condescension into time. To signify this Thomistic difference, Newman is avoiding all gennesis terminology for created things, even for Christ’s human body. The eternal “going forth” and the temporal “going forth” have now been systematised into two separate terminologies, in a way not found in Athanasius.

The Latinisation of the argument in “Causes of Arianism” is clearer still when Newman discusses what “First-born” might signify, in comparison to what he said in Arians. His exemplars of Catholic truth are no surprise:

This doctrine, expounded by St. Athanasius, confirmed by St. Augustine and St. Thomas, is in tone and drift very unlike Arianism, which had no sympathy with

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381 When Newman does use “generation” it is to replace the even more dangerous-sounding word, “birth.” E.g. “Was He, or was He not? ever, or not before His generation” for “always, or not before His birth” (Ath i, 165/Ox Frs viii, 192).

382 Newman acknowledges, “The phrase ‘temporalis processio’ is used by St. Thomas, Qu. 43. Art. 2, of the Son’s Incarnation” (TT 150).

383 In 1871, he had given this gloss: “Nor are such expositions of the title ‘First-born of creation,’ as Athanasius has so beautifully given us, to the purpose of Bull. Bull takes it to show that gennesis may be considered to be a mission or forthcoming; whereas Athanasius does not mean by the ‘First-born’ any gennesis of our Lord from the Father at all, but he simply means His coming to the creature, that is, His exalting the creature into a Divine sonship by a union with His own Sonship” (Arians 419).
the mysticism and poetry of Plato; but it had a direct resemblance to the Semi-Arian edition of the heresy, and, if put forward without its necessary safeguards and corrections, as we find them in those great doctors, was likely to open the way to it (*TT* 161).

There are reversals from his argument in the first *Arians* which this quotation brings out: first the danger in Platonic language when used “incautiously,” and secondly the consequent need for “safeguards and corrections” to such language. The reversal in respect of Platonic language concerns the relation of “God” to the “Word.” *Arians* held that the title “Son” was more dangerous than the Platonising title, “Word,” because “Son” implied a *gennesis* whereas, when it came to Word, “[n]o appellation, surely, could have been more appositely bestowed to counteract notions of materiality and of distinct individuality, which the title of Son was likely to introduce into Catholic doctrine” (*Arians* 169). By the time of “Causes of Arianism,” Newman has come to hold that “Word” is the more dangerous title. Merely describing the “Word” as from all eternity need imply no more than the *logos endiathetos*, a “Wisdom” or “Reason” that is not differentiated from God, which Newman thinks opens up the heretical possibility that the second Person was not really Son until creation. Therefore, by the time of his revisions of Athanasius in 1881, Newman appears reluctant to translate “*logos*.” This is seen in a comparison of versions of a passage from *Discourse* I.17 in which “Son” replaces “Word”:

if the Son was not, then the Triad is not from eternity, but was a Monad first, and afterwards a Triad, and so the true knowledge which we have of God grew, it seems, and took shape. Then again, if the Son has come out of nothing, I suppose the whole Triad came out of nothing too, or, what is more serious still, being Divine, it included in its unity a created thing, which has worship and glory together with Him-who-is ever, and is made up of strange and alien substances (*Ath* i, 176).

if the Word is not with the Father from everlasting, the Trinity is not everlasting; but a One was first, and afterwards by addition it became a Three; and so as time went on, it seems what we know concerning God grew and took shape. And
further, if the Son is not proper offspring of the Father's substance, but of nothing has come to be, then of nothing the Trinity consists, and once there was not a Three, but a One; and a Three once with deficiency, and then complete; deficient, before the Son was generated, complete when He had come to be; and henceforth a thing generated is reckoned with the Creator, and what once was not has divine worship and glory with Him who was ever (Ox Frs viii, 205-6).

As well as changing "Word" in the first sentence here, there are other ways in which Newman is emphasising the Son's "eternal gennesis" from the Father, rather than any "temporal gennesis." Newman avoids altogether the phrase which Athanasius ascribes to the Arians, of a time "before the Son was generated," and prefers to have the description of the Son as "a created thing" than "a thing generated." Newman seems concerned less with Athanasius's own argument than with the ways in which the heretics undermine the co-eternity of Father and Son.

As has so often been seen, Athanasius's own conception of God is overlooked, here in Newman's rejection of the expression that the Son is proper to "the Father's substance" is ignored (my italics). A Latin conception is preferred, using "Him-who-is" which, according to Aquinas, is "the name of God more properly than this name God" (ST Ia.13.11). Later scholastic notions are projected onto Athanasius in Newman's translation. The same is true of later trinitarian language. Although on the face of it the quotation above shows Newman to be more faithful to the original Greek notion of trias, translating it "Triad" because of an awareness this is not the same as "Trinity," nevertheless on the very next page of his 1881 translation the following change is made:

it belongs to Greeks to introduce a Triad which is generate... but the faith of Christians acknowledges the blessed Trinity as unalterable and perfect and ever what It was (Ath i, 177).

it belongs to Greeks to introduce a generated Trinity... but the faith of Christians acknowledges the blessed Trinity as unalterable and perfect and ever what It was (Ox Frs viii, 206-7).

The 1881 translation reveals an important inconsistency here. In 1842 Newman had been content to translate trias as "Trinity" and, even if that was not wholly accurate, it was at
least consistent to compare a Greek “generated Trinity” with a Christian “blessed Trinity.” What is inconsistent is to compare a Greek “Triad” with a Christian “Trinity” when Athanasius uses the word trias for both. Newman is privileging doctrinal language from after Athanasius’s day and retroactively applying it to his hero.

Conclusions
By 1872, it has been seen that Newman argues that, to be orthodox, all talk of the Son’s gennesis presupposed a doctrine of divine simplicity in which Father and Son were one from all eternity. In 1833, he had argued it was a mistake to think the pre-Nicenes did not have a notion of divine simplicity, “as if... they conceived any change or extension could take place in that Individual Essence, which is without parts or passions, or that the divine generation could be an event in time” (Arians 198-9). The last words are the key here, for in Arians Newman already saw that a doctrine of divine simplicity protected against the temporal gennesis of the Son. In “Causes of Arianism” he writes of the Western pre-Nicenes, “the radical error of these theologians is their imperfect apprehension of the Nature of God, Its simplicity and Immutability, as if His Essence allowed of internal alteration” (TT 232). But Newman holds that the notion of co-eternity held by the Alexandrian Fathers necessitated divine simplicity, making them exemplary among the pre-Nicenes: “His eternal pre-existence, considered as Son, or the eternity of the gennesis... was held and taught without a dissentient voice by the Fathers of the Alexandrian School,” Athenagorus, Clement, Origen, Dionysius, Gregory, Theognostus, Pamphilus, Alexander and of course Athanasius (TT 191). Here Athanasius is seen as the summation of a tradition of teaching, which might be why in the retranslation Newman feels he can incorporate the language of earlier Fathers into Athanasius’. Particularly, it is Origen’s expressions of co-eternity which are passed on to Dionysius, Gregory, Theognostus and Pamphilus, as well as the Cappadocians.384 This seems to be his justification, in 1881, for putting words into Athanasius’s mouth which underscore that co-eternity. In the First Discourse he adds a clarifying sentence not found in the original,

384 Newman writes: “Basil and Gregory of Nazianzen of the school of Origen... took up the work which Athanasius had so long carried on before them” (TT 199).
“coming back then to the eternity of the Son” (Ath i, 175/Ox Frs viii, 204). In the Third Discourse, he invents the sentence: “[the Son] is more than eternal; He is co-eternal” (Ath i, 393/Ox Frs xix, 439).

If Newman’s relationship with Athanasius seems to have been one of growing intimacy, even to the extent of being able to put words in his mouth, his relationship with Origen has been much more rocky. But “Causes of Arianism” sees a return to an appreciation of Origen like that of Arians in 1833, coupled with improved scholarship as to what role Origen played in the development of Nicene orthodoxy. Thus he writes,

The Son interprets and fulfils the designs of the Eternal Mind, not as copying them, when He forms the world, but as being Himself their very Original and Delineation in the Father. Such was the doctrine of the great Alexandrian School, before Athanasius as well as after. Origen calls Him the autosophia, and the idea tôn ideōn… (TT 172).

Newman then goes on to quote Clement and Athenagorus, as well as to argue that Tertullian and Augustine say similar things, but it is Origen and Athanasius who are the focus of “Causes of Arianism.” Origen’s own word here, autosophia, is picked up again soon after, when Newman tinkers with his translation of Discourse II.79, and describes the Son as God’s “Auto-Wisdom” instead of the 1842 translation’s “Very Wisdom” (TT 175/Ox Frs xix, 393). By 1881, Newman liked “Auto-Wisdom” enough to keep it, even when he altered much of the rest of the section (Ath i, 351). Towards the end of his life, Newman has made peace once more with Origen.
Conclusion: A Latin Athanasius for a scholastic Newman

In his 1881 translation of Athanasius, Newman describes God’s work in creation as an “art” where before it was a “science” (Ath i, 286/Ox Frs xix, 320). Science it seems has come to take on a more technical meaning for Newman, the scientia of theology in fact, in line with his growing awareness of scholasticism. This awareness had begun with his journey to Rome in the autumn of 1846 to study at the College of Santa Croce for ordination. (He was ordained deacon in St. John Lateran on 29 May 1847 and priest a day later in the chapel of Propaganda.) Sheridan Gilley describes his course of study in this period as follows: “What with morning lectures in Latin on morals and dogmatics, in which Newman was not unknown to fall asleep, and a full range of services, he seldom got down until four to his own principal Roman study, the writing of four Latin treatises on St. Athanasius, constructed from his notes to his Anglican translations, dedicated to Bresciani, and intended to prove to the Romans that he ‘had bona fide given attention to the documents of ancient theology’.”

It seems the methods of study did not appeal to Newman; nevertheless, during his stay he engaged in “various conversations” with thinkers like Perrone and Passaglia (Cons 64). He found he got on best with the Thomistic Perrone who was interested in ecclesiology but without acknowledging that the events of Church history sometimes necessitated change. Chadwick sees this as the cause of Perrone’s disagreement with Newman’s Essay on Development, a disagreement I take to be symptomatic of Newman’s confused place among the academic specialities in Rome.

He was a Church historian who, in the Essay, found himself opposed to Catholic systematic theology. In “On Consulting the

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385 He now has “let them beware lest they say that it is not by nature but by skill that God Himself is a Framer, so as to admit of his losing the art [to the Son]” where previously he had “not by nature but by science that God Himself is a Framer, so as to admit of His losing the power” (my italics).

386 Gilley (1990) 249, quoting LD xii, 60. The treatises are published in TT 7-91.

387 For Perrone’s interaction with Newman in Rome, see Chadwick (1987), 181-4.
Faithful” he tried to make amends by putting historical flesh on the bones of Perrone’s ecclesiology, only to get into trouble with the Catholic hierarchy.388

"On Consulting the Faithful” was written shortly after his retirement as Rector of the Catholic University in Dublin in November 1858, a post he held since the University opened four years earlier. Most of the scholarship he produced in the 1850s centred on the nature of a university, beginning, in 1852, with Discourses on University Education.389 From June to October 1854 he traced the European tradition from ancient schools in Athens, Macedonia and Rome, to medieval universities in Paris, Oxford and, of course, Dublin which Newman dated from Pope Clement V’s letter to the Archbishop of Dublin in 1311 or 1312 (HS iii, 207).390 What is surprising in all these writings is Newman’s neglect of the early Fathers. There is hardly any discussion of the theological Schools of Antioch and Alexandria, which chapters one and two above showed to be the focus of his earlier patristic work. Newman mentions the decline of the centres of early Christian learning, Antioch and Alexandria,391 but hardly ever their glories,392 and looks instead to Charlemagne for the “principles of which a University is the result, in that he aimed at educating all classes, and undertook all subjects of teaching.” Moreover, the fact that Charlemagne “betook himself to the two Islands of the North for a tradition” of scholarship under Alcuin, enables Newman to give a teleological account of the “the new civilization of Europe” appropriate to his position in Dublin (HS iii, 152). In this writing

388 In his “Introduction,” Coulson makes another suggestion as to his intention in writing “On Consulting the Faithful”: Newman may have had it in mind to give Gillow [a Catholic systematician] a history lesson upon the complexities which inevitably attend upon the rise, flowering and suppression of a particular heresy – in this case Arianism” (Cons 27-8).

389 These Discourses were first published by James Duffy in Dublin in 1852. For a discussion of their contents, before the changes made for The Idea of a University (1873), see McRedmond, Louis, Thrown Among Strangers: John Henry Newman in Ireland (Dublin: Veritas, 1990), 58-67.

390 HS iii, 1-251, gathers together the series of articles from 1854, originally appearing in the Catholic University Gazette.

391 HS iii, respectively 112 and 123.

392 There is brief praise for the Cappadocian “school” as well as the Benedictines: “I do not mean that there are no traces in Christian antiquity of a higher pattern of education, in which religion and learning were brought together,—as in the method of teaching which St. Basil and St. Gregory brought into Asia Minor from Alexandria, and in the Benedictine Schools of Italy” HS iii, 151.
on the university, Newman replaces a former fascination for the ancient ecclesiastical Schools, with a medieval scholasticism rooted in an Anglo-Irish tradition.

His reading of scholasticism shaped his reading of the Fathers, as this thesis has shown. In his 1858 essay, “St. Cyril’s Formula,” Newman states that, “The Schoolmen are known to have insisted with great earnestness on the numerical unity of the Divine Being; each of the Three Divine Persons being one and the same God, unicus, singularis, et totus Deus. In this, however, they did but follow the recorded doctrine of the Western theologians of the fifth century, as I suppose will be allowed by critics generally” (TT 298). With the introduction of “the Schoolmen” into an essay ostensibly about ancient Alexandrian use of ousia language, Newman’s interpretive lenses are revealed. Newman had by now learned the scholastic method of theology. Although this method claimed to originate with Aquinas, it should be remembered that scholasticism had much more to do with what John Montag has called, “The false legacy of Suárez.” Scholastic thought had become rationalist, divorced from its theological origins. This can be traced especially clearly in what he has come to describe as “natural theology.” In “St. Cyril’s Formula,” Newman writes that while both the “theist” and the “Catholic divine” use ousia words to make the same claims about God’s individuality and simplicity, nevertheless, in so doing, “one ascribes to Him one personality and the other three” (TT 300). Thus, a word like “hypostasis” neither means Person nor Essence exclusively; but it means the one personal God of natural theology, the notion of whom the Catholic corrects and completes as often as he views Him as a Trinity” (TT 301). Here “theist”

393 “Scholasticism” here is distinct from the neo-Thomism that would become regnant with Leo XIII’s Aeterni Patris (1878). It is used in the sense Gerald McCool ascribes to Perrone, “a scholastic by tradition, but... [who] no longer looked upon scholasticism as a tightly organized, intrinsically articulated theological system structured by one coherent philosophy of knowledge, man and being,” in Catholic Theology in the Nineteenth Century (New York: The Seabury Press, 1977), 82. The neo-Thomists, by contrast, upheld “a single metaphysical system,” 233. Perhaps Newman’s systematic translation of Athanasius, begun the same year as Aeterni Patris, represents a movement towards neo-Thomism late in Newman’s life.


and “Catholic divine” are categories derived from a later period than the patristic era Newman is examining. From a later era too, it seems, are his categories of God. In this same 1858 essay Newman states that, “The Schoolmen are known to have insisted with great earnestness on the numerical unity of the Divine Being; each of the Three Divine Persons being one and the same God, unicus, singularis, et totus Deus. In this, however, they did but follow the recorded doctrine of the Western theologians of the fifth century, as I suppose will be allowed by critics generally” (TT 298). With the introduction of “the Schoolmen” into an essay ostensibly about ancient Alexandrian use of ousia language, Newman’s latest reading matter is revealed.

But what is this natural theology? It seems to oscillate between what might be called an “English” sense of the word and a “Latin” scholastic sense. William Paley (1743-1805) is an example of the English sort of natural theologian, looking to nature before revelation in order to disclose an account of God’s being. In 1859, Newman refers to “a lecturer,” presumably himself, who when he “spoke in terms of disparagement of ‘Natural Theology,’ on the ground of its deciding questions of revelation by reasonings from physical phenomena [i]t was objected to him, that Naturalis Theologia embraced all truths and arguments from natural reason bearing upon the Divine Being and Attributes” (Cons 58). What this lecturer meant was from “the Protestant school of Paley and other popular writers, the idea of Natural Theology had practically merged in a scientific view of the argument from Design” (ibid.). Realising the difficulty, Newman came to use natural theology increasingly in the Latin sense. Even just a year earlier, in “St. Cyril’s Formula,” Newman was writing concerning “hypostasis” that Socrates, in book iii.7 of his Church History, said “it was a new word, strange to the schools of ancient philosophy, which had seldom professed pure theism, or natural theology” (TT 299). The natural theology of the ancient ecclesiastical schools took up “hypostasis” which they “corrected” and “completed” by the doctrine of God’s Trinity (TT 301). This is a good sort of natural theology, taken up by later scholasticism, rather than the bad English variety of Paley.

396 Here Newman illustrates his point using Gregory of Nazianzus: “of which correction Nazianzen’s language (ὁν autos kata tēn phsin kai tēn hypostasin, Orat. xxviii.9), completed by his usual formula (vid. Orat. xx.6) of the three hypostases”.
Newman in his early years as a Catholic seems to have been caught in a confusion of tongues. But this was not all he was confused about. As has been shown in chapter five, Newman argues in 1858 that he is merely following Athanasius’s interpretation of God’s essence. But in *de Decretis* §22, the word “God,” *ho theos*, signifies the incommunicability of the Father’s “essence” only. On the one hand, for Athanasius as for many patristic writers, the Son is the visible image of this invisible Father from whom he derives. On the other hand, for Newman as for the Schoolmen he was reading, God’s numerical unity appears to rule out a derivation of Son from Father. There is a difference between natural theology’s recognition that God is one and revealed religion’s understanding that this same one God is also three. Following the scholastics, he considers dividing *de Deo uno* from *de Deo trino* to treat them as two different doctrinal *loci*. Or, to be more precise, he is aware of this scholastic division, but in 1858 is not yet willing to employ it – he appears to hang on to a patristic outlook that dated back to his Anglican days and is reluctant to treat doctrines discretely (outlined at the start chapter three). In the 1858 essay, Newman does not write about the one and then the three; instead, he insists that the Catholic “corrects” the doctrine of *de Deo uno* as well as arguing (inaccurately, as has been shown) that Alexandrians used *hypostasis* “with slight modification of its sense, of the Trinity as well as of the Unity” (*TT* 300).

At this stage of his writing, then, Newman is aware of possible scholastic systems by which to structure his arguments, but does not really use them. That has changed by the 1870s, when Newman’s defence of pre-Nicene theology uses exactly the scholastic terms he has been implying. In his Note II for his third edition of *Arians* (1871), he writes that the pre-Nicene description of the divine *gennesis* will “require some accommodation in order to reconcile them with the received Catholic teaching *de Deo* and *de SS. Trinitate*” (*Arians* 417). Newman uses such terms again in “Causes of Arianism” (1872). Insightful here is what he writes about Tertullian:

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397 In respect to Latin words which do mean what they appear to mean in their English counterparts, “we cannot remodel our mother-tongue” (*Cons* 57).

398 Newman writes of the way St Thomas “interprets the ‘non tres aeterni, sed unus aeternus,’ to turn on the contrast of the adjective and substantive” (*TT* 301). Fergus Kerr in *After Aquinas: Versions of Thomism* (Oxford: Blackwell, 2002) does not think Thomas prioritises the one over the three in God, as many twentieth-century critics claimed, 181-3.
His religious knowledge was not ours: truths are taken for granted now on all hands, which had to be learned one by one then. The “de Deo” was not yet a formal theological treatise, familiar to the Schools, and found but a poor substitute in the writings or the floating dicta of heathen philosophy... Now it was in regard to the simplicity of the Divine Nature, that Plato and his numerous followers, down to the Pseudo-Areopagite inclusive, with their doctrine of Divine Ideas, were most in fault (TT 189).

It would seem Newman conceives the de Deo (uno?) in scholastic vein, as the discussion of the simplicity of God’s unity upon which God’s Trinity is predicated. The scholastic method, he implies here, would have prevented the mistakes of the Platonists, including Tertullian himself. The doctrine of de Deo uno does not come at the expense of “the chain of testimonies in the early centuries concerning the Divine Triad,” for, says Newman, “it is impossible to view historical Christianity apart from the doctrine of the Trinity” (TT 112). However, as has been said repeatedly, how he conceives the doctrine of the Trinity is very different from the likes of Origen, Athanasius and Cyril, none of whom would have accepted “that God was to be worshipped in Three distinct Persons... Each of whom was the One Indivisible God, Each dwelt in Each, Each was really distinct from Each, Each was united to Each by definite correlations” (TT 116). Later Greek Fathers may have thought this, but not those Newman held as his heroes.

It has been shown how the theology imbibed by Newman from the scholastics of his day shaped his 1881 translation of Athanasius. When Newman began his revisions in October 1878, he aimed at bringing the patriarch to the ever-growing public who read his books. He also wanted to bolster the Church’s dogmatic claims in opposition to perceived theological liberalism. Newman had told Pusey that he would not duplicate his Library of the Fathers original because “the direct aim” of this new translation would be “the sacred doctrine itself to which [Athanasius] devoted his life, which implies and indeed requires, if one would be honest, fidelity to his theological teaching, but not

399 W.J. Copeland wrote to Newman in April 1879 that a revised translation could be “of such overwhelming importance in the prevailing and increasing antagonism to all dogma” (L&D xxix, 103 note 1).
necessarily to his controversial text. But this focus on doctrine was precisely the problem. By this stage he could not help read Athanasius with scholastic lenses, so was unable to stay faithful to his theology. Newman had ceased to be an accurate historian of doctrine, the role he claimed for himself, and had become what he did not feel qualified to be, a Catholic theologian.

What of the really interesting question posed at the beginning, whether such writings had any influence on the categories by which doctrine was described in the years following Newman? Chapter two offered support to Rowan Williams’s argument that *The Arians of the Fourth Century* helped insure that most textbooks into the twentieth century considered Antiochens and Alexandrians as polar opposites well before the Chalcedonian debates – and that Antioch spawned heretics like Paul of Samosata and Arius (an Alexandrian deacon!) whereas Alexandria made saints. However, chapter two also showed that this depiction was not original to Newman, but inherited from Cudworth and Cave. As for his translation of Athanasius made at Littlemore, the way that one Westerner read the Eastern patriarch came to influence, through the widespread availability of *A Library of the Fathers*, the way generations of Westerners read him. Chapter four uncovered Newman’s depiction of the similarities between Athanasius and Augustine, even though their respective views of what is meant by “the one God” do not agree. The attempt, in the annotations, to tidy up the differences between East and West merely re-inscribes those differences by obliterating Athanasius’s doctrine and replacing it with a Latin one. By 1881, it was not just in the annotations, but in the re-translation itself, that Newman confused himself and subsequent readers about Athanasius. Chapter five revealed the scholastic concepts used to translate *Select Treatises of Athanasius*, concepts even Augustine did not know. Therefore, Newman ends up with an Augustinian reading of an Eastern patriarch, “paraphrased” in scholastic categories (*Ath* i, vii). In 1881, it is certainly not Athanasius “in whose name I write” – but it does not seem to be Origen, with whom he began, or Augustine either (*Ath* i, ix). The Athanasius

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400 Dated 7 October 1878 (*L&D* xxviii, 406).

401 In 1878, after the publication of *Aeterni Patris*, Newman wrote to Fr. Whitty, regarding the *Grammar of Assent*, “If anyone is obliged to say ‘I speak under correction’ it is I; for I am no theologian and am too old, and ever have been, to become one. All I can say is I have no suspicion, and do not anticipate, that I shall be found in substance to disagree with St Thomas” (*L&D* xxviii, 431).
"with whom I end" looks more like a scholastic than like the Athanasius he encountered at Littlemore.
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