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Dissertation

# The unity of *Phaedrus*

Reconsidered

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Submitted in 2005



15 MAR 2006

## **Declaration**

This dissertation is the results of my own work.

Material from the published or unpublished work of others, which is referred to in the dissertation, is credited to the author in question in the text.

Tomoko Hanno

## Abstract

My dissertation will discuss the whole argument of Plato's *Phaedrus* according to a particular approach I have adopted. This approach deals with three problems unique to this dialogue: **(a)** the subject of *Phaedrus*, **(b)** the influence of *Phaedrus* as the interlocutor and **(c)** the critique of written works. To solve these problems, I will divide the subject into four stages and examine each stage. Finally, the question "what unites *Phaedrus*?" will be answered.

There are four stages, each corresponding to a chapter.

Chapter 2: (1) In the first part of this dialogue, what is argued?

Chapter 3: (2) In the second part of this dialogue, what is argued?

Chapter 4: (3) How do the characters converse on those topics?

Chapter 5: (4) What does the author, Plato, intend to express by writing this dialogue?

Chapters 2 and 3 will discuss problem **(a)**, chapter 4 is on problem **(b)** and chapter 5 is on **(c)**. As the arguments proceed through its stages, I think we may acquire the more comprehensive and transcendental view: the view of the author.

Through this dissertation, we shall seem to understand the main subject: that the best kind of companionship (the aspect of love) consists in inquiring into truth by engaging in *logos* (the aspect of rhetoric) [from chs.2 and 3]. And what Plato wants to tell us by writing this dialogue is to show a picture of a philosopher which Plato regards as true [ch.4] and to attempt to provoke us the readers, in order to encourage us to practise this activity in the way that Socrates does [ch.5]. As we leave the dialogue, we are supposed to embark on philosophical search for ourselves.

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## Abstract

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## **Acknowledgements**

I would like to thank Professor C.J.Rowe for his helpful insights and comments, which were invaluable in getting this dissertation completed.

I wish to express my thanks to assistant Professor N. Notomi for thoughtful suggestions and comments on an earlier draft of this dissertation.

I wish to thank the Department of Classics and Ancient History, and University of Durham for its great environment for my research.

I also express gratitude to my parents for a lot of encouragement and help.

Tomoko Hanno

# 1. Introduction

## 1-1 The problems of *Phaedrus*

This dissertation will deal with *Phaedrus*, which is one of the most important works of Plato and is located in the middle period. I would like to focus on the question: what unites this dialogue? In other words, I will consider “what does Plato express by writing this dialogue?” But, first, let us offer a general account of this work. The *Phaedrus* has two characters: Socrates and Phaedrus (the title is named after this interlocutor). Just as in most of all Plato’s dialogues, Socrates is the main speaker of this dialogue. In the beginning, he bumps into Phaedrus with Lysias’ speech on love. Thus, first, they seem to concentrate on love; especially Socrates gives a splendid speech about ideal love as his second speech. But, after finishing the speeches, Phaedrus suggests a question about the criterion of wonderful speeches. Then the discussion on speaking (rhetoric) starts. Therefore, generally speaking, the former part of this dialogue is about love and discussed by relatively long speeches, but the latter part is concerned with rhetoric with short conversation. In addition to the variety of subjects and styles, we might notice plenty of Platonic ideas: the three parts of soul, recollection, beauty itself (the Idea or Form) and dialectical methods (Collection and Division).

Now, let us ask the question again: “what does Plato want to tell us?” As we have seen from the general survey offered here, the many subjects and styles and variety of Platonic ideas prevent us from focusing on any single way of approaching the *Phaedrus*. However, this question seems to be more difficult to solve because of the use of dialogue form. For, there seem to be commonly three crucial problems with reading Plato’s dialogues: the absence of the author, the conversation form and the characters’ diversity. Now, let us examine these three features.

The first difficulty is the absence of Plato from his dialogues<sup>1</sup>. Instead of him, Socrates is usually the main speaker. Thus, we often hesitate to say that some arguments are strictly “what Plato asserts”. What is more, because of the conversation form, every proposal is open to “yes” or “no” from the interlocutor (or interlocutors).

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<sup>1</sup> There are two references to his name, in *Apology* (34A) and *Phaedo* (59B). But Plato never becomes a character who asserts his opinion in his dialogues.



Thus, it may be open to doubt whether a statement is intended to be true if the interlocutor denies it. Finally, the third point makes the reading Plato's works more complex. I mean, the interlocutors of Plato's dialogues are full of variety, in respect of their ages, origins, occupations and interests. Plus, they respectively express their ideas, whether affirmative or negative, from their own point of view. Therefore, it seems important for us to identify the nature and tendencies of interlocutors, when a statement is confirmed or denied. We have to take into consideration who affirms or denies it. Owing to these three problems, identifying true Plato's intention is highly problematic. Therefore, we seem to be not allowed to read through it in a simple way, as if his dialogue were a logical treatise. If we dare to take that way, we seem to risk being led toward the wrong interpretation. Thus, to sum up, a typical feature of all the problems in question is that the real argument of the dialogues is hard to identify. To put it another way, it urges us to search.

We have other problems too that are unique to *Phaedrus*, which make us more perplexed. As we have seen from the general account of the dialogue offered here, we might easily discover a kind of complexity, especially in its subject. Secondly, we have to consider the interlocutor, Phaedrus, because he seems to have a great influence on the subject, argument and style. Thirdly, the most embarrassing feature is the critique of written works. This is strongly asserted by Socrates at the end of this dialogue. But if we notice that this statement is written by Plato, this becomes still more contradictory and a more difficult problem to us. These three problems peculiar to *Phaedrus* might be clarified as the following: (a) the subject of this dialogue, (b) the influence of the interlocutor (Phaedrus) and (c) the criticism of writing.

In addition to the first three general difficulties affecting the reading of Plato's dialogue, we have recognized that *Phaedrus* has three other problems. First of all, in the next section (1-2), I focus on the first problem, (a), briefly in order to illustrate the difficulty of interpreting this dialogue and to show the approaches of other commentators who have studied *Phaedrus*. And in 1-3, I will refer to the other two difficulties: (b), (c). Then finally (1-4), I am going to suggest my approach to the interpretation of *Phaedrus*, which can deal with the original three difficulties and the three other problems peculiar to this dialogue.

## **1-2 The problem of the subject**



This much I think you would say; that every speech should be put together like a living creature, as it were with a body of its own, so as not to lack either a head or feet, but to have both middle parts and extremities, so written as to fit both each other and the whole. (264c1-5)<sup>2</sup>

This seems to be one of the most famous passages in *Phaedrus*. The powerful statement that every speech should have an organic structure is necessarily appropriate for this dialogue itself. However actually it might be nearly impossible to fit this rule to it because of the complexity which we have considered before. For example, if we look for a “head” part, namely a part where its subject is defined, or look for a relationship of corresponding to the limbs, namely its organic connection around a subject, we seem to be hardly able to identify these features.

If Plato is to avoid a contradictory situation between what he does and what he says, it is natural to think that there is a unity of conception behind this dialogue. If we can find something that can unite *Phaedrus*, it might be easy to find out its organic structure. However this is one of the notorious problems of this dialogue. The problem may become clear from Hackforth’s remarks (1952)<sup>8</sup> that “it is not obvious, at a first reading, what its subject and purpose are, whether there are two or more, and if so how they are connected”. Why is this problematic, and how can this problem be solved?

First, in order to consider the cause of the problem, what appear to be the dialogue’s subjects should be described. About these, de Vries (1969)<sup>22</sup> gives the following summary of ancient opinions:

Hermias has a list of δοξαι του σκοπου of the dialogue. Some scholars had argued that it treated περι ερωτος, others περι ρητορικης. One might hold that ερωσ was the subject of the first part, ρητορικη of the second; one may also say that it treats περι ψυχικης αρχης. Moreover it was held that there were several different σκοποι, περι ψυχης being proposed, περι ταγαθου and περι του πρωτου καλου..... He agrees with the opinion of Iamblichus who held that the dialogue treats περι του παντοδαπου καλου.

Thus, a great number of subjects in *Phaedrus* can be identified; namely Love, Rhetoric, Origin of soul, Soul, Good and Beauty. Moreover de Vries supplements this list by saying that “to those which are listed by Hermias may be added dialectic, diacritical method, mania and anamnesis” (p.22). The fact that these various subjects

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<sup>2</sup> The translation of *Phaedrus*, as in what follows, is from Rowe (1986a).

exist in one dialogue makes it difficult to find the main subject. And this seems to be a cause of the impression of disorder in *Phaedrus*.

Especially Love and Rhetoric seems to be more major subjects among them, as we have considered before (and as de Vries points out). Rowe (1986a)<sup>7</sup> describes precisely this as “the chief task of any interpreter of *Phaedrus*”, namely “to understand the powerful speech by Socrates on the nature of love, and the second, the larger part of which is occupied by a rather more prosaic discussion of rhetorical theory and practice”. In brief, the more important topics should be focused on Love and Rhetoric; our task seems to be not only to decide which subject is suitable for the whole dialogue, but also to understand what relationship these subjects have. Now we can narrow this problem. The question should be asked in this following way. If there is one subject which can unite this dialogue, what is it, on Love, or Rhetoric, or a third topic? Moreover if one particular topic can be settled on, what relationship does it have with the other candidates?

How can this problem be solved? To consider this question, Hackforth (1952)<sup>9</sup> proposes the following approach. He suggests that “it is helpful to ask for the purpose rather than the subject”. And he shows three purposes in this dialogue.

To vindicate the pursuit of philosophy, in the meaning given to that word by Socrates and Plato, as the true culture of the soul, by contrast with the false claims of contemporary rhetoric to provide that culture.

This is one of the purposes which he thinks as most important. Hackforth seems to think that, through *Phaedrus*, Plato tried to encourage us to engage in philosophy. And he explains that this purpose “is present throughout, and is what gives the dialogue its unity”. Thus he thinks what unites this dialogue is the purpose, namely philosophy, not a subject, for example Love, Rhetoric or other ones; “once this is seen...by the reader, he will no longer think it necessary or helpful to ask whether the main subject is Love and Rhetoric.”(p.9)

I think that Heath (1989) interprets this dialogue very similarly to Hackforth. Heath seems to avoid thematic unity through any subject. Instead, he thinks “the criterion of appropriateness” (p.170) important. He says “the various themes touched on ... should all be philosophically significant, that is, appropriate to the function or functions of the genre” (p.173).

What is this “appropriateness”? He explains it by saying that “the themes touched on should correspond to the teaching-needs of the interlocutor or pupil” (p.173). Thus he puts emphasis on the purpose of teaching philosophically, and he thinks any subjects should be required to achieve this aim. So he claims it is not necessary to find any single subject running through the dialogue. Rather he thinks “given Plato’s conception of philosophical discourse it is the imposition of thematic unity which would in such circumstances amount to a violation of the dialogue’s appropriate order” (p.172). Therefore Heath’s idea seems to be similar to Hackforth’s: the purpose is more essential than the subject<sup>3</sup>.

The way of uniting *Phaedrus* by its purpose appears to be really attractive. In this way, we may well think we do not need to struggle with the problem any more because we do not have to decide which subject is critical or what relationship the numerous subjects have. However it seems to be too fast to reach this decision. For there would be the following question left unsolved; namely is there any of Plato’s dialogues that does not have the aim of encouraging us to philosophise? This purpose might apply to not only *Phaedrus*, but also to almost all Plato’s dialogues. Thus even if we regard this purpose as the unifying facts of *Phaedrus*, the characteristic aspect of *Phaedrus* would never be brought to light. What does *Phaedrus*, whose subjects are mainly supposed to be love and rhetoric, tell us, specifically?

Against this type of interpretation, Rowe (1989) seems to think that there is a key subject which can unite this dialogue, not a purpose. As I have said before, this dialogue has two parts, about love and rhetoric. But he clearly maintains that the “two parts can be said to form a single argument, which is itself a species of ‘thematic’ unity” (pp.175-6). In order to find a method of uniting *Phaedrus*, he identifies “the place of Socrates’ palinode” as the most difficult problem (p.176). The ‘palinode’ is represented by Socrates’ second speech, which describes lover and beloved in detail.

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<sup>3</sup> Heath (1989)164 remarks that “earlier treatments of the dialogue form do take a different view” from later Neo-Platonists. In other words, the Neo-Platonists think that “every text should have a single target, intention or theme, to which everything in the text could be related”. Contrarily, Heath picks up Dio Chrysostom and offers Dio’s positions: “if in the course of discussing one topic another topic suggests itself, then it is perfectly legitimate to pursue the new topic far beyond its bearing on the original theme, as a subject of discussion in its own right.” In short, it might be that a speaker can choose any subjects, if it is useful for the audience from a philosophical viewpoint. This ancient interpretation is also the way uniting according to “purpose”, as Hackforth and Heath do.

Thus, generally speaking, the earlier part including Socrates' second speech appears to be about Love. However Rowe regards Socrates' second speech as "relevant to the discussion about legein (logoi)" (p.177). This is important. In short, he seems to focus on Rhetoric as the main subject of this dialogue.

The outline of his idea is this. At first, he regards the palinode as something that has a dynamic role. Thus, if the palinode is considered only in the context of the first part, "it appears as rhetoric", however "its real status only emerges in the course of [the second part], which looks back and reflects on it". Therefore "the palinode will itself become, retrospectively, philosophical" (p.184). That is to say, the status of palinode changes as the argument proceeds and it is properly interpreted from the point of the second part of *Phaedrus*.

If so, the theme of love in *Phaedrus* is never critical. Ultimately, Rowe asserts love is not the subject of even the first part. For he thinks that even in the first part Plato is concerned about "how things are to be said" (p.188). What this means is that it is important how a subject is said, not what subject is discussed. So the whole first part is related with the latter part about legein, namely Rhetoric. Moreover Rowe says "we may regard this section (the first part of the *Phaedrus*) as a digression" (p.188). Putting the former part together with the latter part, he seems to think the subject of *legein* can completely unite the whole dialogue.

This idea seems really powerful and convincing, but I am afraid that he thinks Love is less valuable than seems right. For there seems to be a critical reason why Plato chooses Love as a topic of this dialogue. The reason why I think so is a characteristic of Socrates. In Plato's dialogues Socrates can be often found as a lover. For example, in *Charmides*, Socrates frankly expresses his amazement at the beauty of Charmides. Thus it might be necessary to consider Socrates as a lover in order to understand this *Phaedrus*.

As we have seen so far, we could understand that it is difficult to identify the subject which can unite this dialogue. In order to cope with this problem, I will present my way of interpreting this dialogue. And this way can be applied to the other two problems and the original difficulties which Plato's dialogues commonly have. Before introducing my approach (in 1-4), let us examine the other two problems briefly, in the next section.

### 1-3 The other problems unique to *Phaedrus*

In 1-1, I have suggested three special problems for the interpretation of this dialogue: **(a)** the subject of this dialogue, **(b)** the influence of the interlocutor (Phaedrus) and **(c)** the criticism of written speeches. And we have examined the first one, considering how other commentators cope with this problem. Then, in this section, the other difficulties will be introduced briefly. It will help to understand my approach as explained in the next section.

The second problem, **(b)**, is about the character, Phaedrus. If we put an emphasis on the style namely dialogue form, not only the speaker but also the interlocutor seem to play an important role in the argument. Basically, Phaedrus is described as a person who loves beautiful speeches on any subject. He is eager to be concerned with producing speeches. He is inclined to believe famous people somewhat blindly. Especially, he sticks to the popular type of rhetoric (to which Lysias belongs), which is completely different from reformed rhetoric which Socrates strongly recommends. The presence of Phaedrus must be taken into consideration, because it is possible that his answers and his attitude may seriously affect (more exactly, distort) the process of Socrates' argument. I will deal with this problem mainly in chapters 4 and 5.

The third problem, **(c)**, seems to be the most problematic of all. For, the author himself denies his activity: Plato criticizes writing, in a document written by himself. In *Phaedrus*, Socrates insists on the advantage of speaking, compared with writing, which is just an "amusement" or "reminder" (276B-E). But, it is the case that Plato writes down his thought. How should we deal this problem? This problem will be discussed in chapter 5.

Now, we have recognized three problems unique to *Phaedrus*, and then in the next section, I will suggest the way of interpretation which can deal with these problems. And the approach I shall propose seems to be also suitable for the original problems of Plato's dialogues: the absence of the author, the proposal open to 'yes' or 'no', and the variety of interlocutors. As I have referred before, these difficulties can increase the uncertainty of any arguments which the characters state. In other words, it requires us to remember that every statement and argument in his dialogues might be judged by ourselves and reconsidered over and over again. This seems to have the same root as the criticism of writing, and it seem to be the core of Plato's thought. My approach which will be explained in the next section will clarify this idea.

#### **1-4 The approach I will take**

In this section, I will suggest my approach to read through the dialogue. This way seems to be helpful in dealing with the three original problems which Plato's dialogues have, and the three problems peculiar to *Phaedrus*. I intend to develop my dissertation according to this approach. First, I try to divide this dialogue into the following four stages as the following:

- (1) In the first part of the dialogue, what is argued?
- (2) In the second part of the dialogue, what is argued?
- (3) How do the characters converse on those topics?
- (4) What does the author, Plato, intend to express by writing the dialogue?

And each stage is corresponding to each chapter: (1) is chapter 2, (2) is chapter 3, (3) is chapter 4 and (4) is chapter 5. Stage (1) and (2) will deal with the arguments on love and rhetoric respectively. But in stage (3), we will focus on the characters who make the arguments. Then, in stage (4), concentrating on "writing", we will consider the view of Plato as the author. Thus this way of interpreting the dialogue enables us to acquire a more comprehensive and more transcendental view. Now, I would like to explain this approach more exactly.

First, the argument of Love will be examined as stage (1) in chapter 2 of the dissertation. The first part of this dialogue mainly consists of three speeches on love. The most important speech seems to be Socrates' second speech, and there, love is defined as a kind of mania (insanity). However, I will focus on the repeated conception "*sophrosyne*": true love seems to be more harmonious and well-organized for both a lover and a beloved. This love is as ideal as becoming like gods, nearly impossible for human beings. But it is clear that the man who is eager to come close to the ideal state with his beloved should be called a philosopher.

Then, the inquiry proceeds to the next stage (2) about the second argument of this dialogue, which will be discussed in chapter 3. The subject seems to change from Love to Rhetoric. In chapter 3, it will be clear that the ideal rhetoric has two features: organizing the structure of a speech well and taking care for the listeners, for the purpose of pursuing truth most efficiently. And someone who possesses these conditions can be properly called a philosopher. Here, we may see that the concept of

philosophy provides a connection between love and rhetoric. So, what relationship do these subjects have? This is problem (a).

As we have seen above, the discussion on love suggests the extremely ideal picture of companions: a true lover eagerly tries to proceed to truth and to urge his beloved to do so. But in the argument, it lacks a description of an actual way of doing this. How can we pursue truth with our true friends? It is possible to say that the discussion of rhetoric seems to supply the actual way to become ideal companions. In other words, the later argument might have a function of complementing the ambiguous and missing part of the earlier argument. Namely, both arguments are about philosophy, but the argument on love might suggest the unrealistic and ideal aspect, and the rhetorical part complements by offering the realistic and concrete way in which the ideal picture might come true. If we take this approach to the problem (a), the subject which unites this dialogue, it seems to be possible to answer that it is the ideal but realistic kind of companionship to pursue truth by using speeches (*logos*). The ideal picture of love converges with the activity of true rhetoric, but the core of the conception of love stays alive as an ideal relationship with others.

Thirdly, let us consider the relationship between Socrates and Phaedrus, as stage (3), which will be argued in chapter 4. At the same time, we can consider problem (b): the influence of Phaedrus as the interlocutor. If we focus on Phaedrus, we can recognize that he is very interested in rhetoric. At a glance, he will be able to be the best companion of Socrates, in respect of love of speeches. But it will be revealed that he seems to have an intrinsic preference for flowery and beautiful speeches and dependence on authority. Moreover, he does not hesitate to express his misunderstanding of what Socrates argues. Thanks to his failings, the argument often wanders, so that Socrates' way of speaking does not seem to be ideal one which Socrates has suggested, because of the lack of well-organized structure. However, Socrates tries to give speeches to Phaedrus in the most efficient way: he considers Phaedrus sincerely and attempts to convert him to philosophy. This attitude shows that Socrates' way of speaking seems to be best possible in this actual world. In other words, the vivid description of their conversation might show the realistic activity of Socrates as a philosopher. Thus, stage (3) presents us with a more realistic aspect than stage (2).

Finally, we will examine Plato's critique of written speeches as stage (4). This will be dealt with chapter 5 and this is related with problem (c): the criticism of

writing. This is the most embarrassing problem because this is naturally applied to the dialogue itself which Plato wrote. Compared with speaking, written works are regarded as just an “amusement” or “reminder”, which does not require any serious attention. How do we understand this criticism? This problem seems to be deeply connected with the presence of Phaedrus: until the end of the dialogue, we cannot clearly judge whether he changes his mind to leave trivial rhetoric and decides to embark on research. In other words, in spite of the eagerness of Socrates to make Phaedrus convert to philosophy, there is no evidence that Phaedrus decides to engage in philosophy. Therefore, we are urged to ask ourselves: “Is Socrates’ speaking to Phaedrus successful or not?” or “Are the arguments of this dialogue appropriate or not?”. To put it another way, the dialogue itself turns to be a question to us. However, the dialogue keeps silent in response to any questions we ask. Thus, we have to start with the inquiry and the conversation by ourselves or with other readers, leaving the dialogue as just a “reminder”.

This is my approach to interpreting this dialogue, and the outline of my whole dissertation. As we have seen, this way seems to be suitable for three problems unique to *Phaedrus* and finally, to cope with original problems which every use of Plato’s dialogue form has. For, all of the difficulties seem to be useful for making every statement open to question. By using dialogue form with these features, Plato encourages readers to attempt to look for truth.

According to the approach, the main arguments of this dissertation will be put forward. In the next chapter, let us go to the first stage: the discussion of love.



## 2. About Love

### 2-1 What is Love in *Phaedrus*?

As we have seen in the Introduction, there seem to be two main themes in this dialogue: Love and Rhetoric. First of all, according to my approach, in this chapter 2 let us inquire into Love in the first part of *Phaedrus*. The consideration will lead us to understand the true meaning of Love in *Phaedrus*, and help us to examine the discussion on rhetoric in the second part.

The term which I translate as Love is *eros*. The word *eros* is defined in the Greek-English Lexicon as “love”, mostly in the sense of sex and passion, or “desire”. However these two concepts are not enough to understand *eros* in Plato’s context, because he seems to give *eros* more positive meanings as well. Especially, in *Phaedrus*, *eros* appears to be both a good thing and a bad thing. For example, in some speeches, *eros* is thought of as a crucial evil; thus a lover is equivalent to a “sick” and “mad” person. By contrast, in another speech, *eros* is regarded as a blessing from the gods. More complicatedly, in the latter part of this dialogue, Socrates seems to think of these extremely different speeches as one speech, and admire the organic structure from the dialectical point of view.

This drives us to ask a question: what kind of love does Plato regard as true Love in this dialogue? It seems to be extremely incomprehensible for the reader.

For the purpose of answering this question, let us describe the Love of *Phaedrus* in detail concentrating on the first part of the dialogue, which is generally thought to be about Love. Especially, I shall focus on the three speeches on Love: Lysias’ speech (230e6-234c5)<sup>4</sup>, Socrates’ first speech (237b2-241d1) and Socrates’ second speech (243e9-257b6). In spite of the contrasting definitions and different descriptions of Love in these speeches, the following examination will clarify the true character of Love. And then if we apply the clear vision of Love that here emerges in the latter part of *Phaedrus*, about Rhetoric, I think the image of Rhetoric will be more obvious.

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<sup>4</sup> Lysias does not appear in this dialogue as a speaker, but he plays a very major role as “his (Plato’s) main target” (Rowe(1986a)138). Plato describes Lysias’ works as *kompseuo* (to be smart) (227c7), *asteios* (charming) (d1) and *demopheles* (of public use) (d2). About these words, see de Vries(1969)37 (“as often in Plato, “asteioi” is not without irony”). The way he use these words seems to show that Plato does not approve of Lysias’ speech in this dialogue.

My approach of this section will be like this: the three speeches about Love will be examined in turn. Lysias' speech and Socrates' first speech will be considered at the same time (2-2), because they start from the same proposition, namely that one should show affection to non-lovers because love is a bad thing. Then, Socrates' second speech will be examined in detail (2-3, 2-4). It offers the divine aspect of Love and, as we will note later, the true image of Love (2-5).

Through this approach, the concepts of "*sophrosyne*"<sup>5</sup> (temperance) and "madness" will come into focus; for the contrast will make Lysias' speech and Socrates' first speech easier to understand. Especially in Socrates' second speech, Love is defined as one of divine madness, and finally Love will emerge as implicitly a kind of "divine *sophrosyne*" which we seem to be able to achieve through divine madness.

## **2-2 Love as human madness**

We will begin by considering Lysias' speech. Its subject is claimed to be that "favours should be granted to a man who is not in love rather than to one who is" (227c7-8). How does Lysias demonstrate this problematic statement? To solve this question, we have to make clear the idea of love which Lysias has.

By and large, his speech appears to consist of fifteen arguments. A feature of his speech is the comparison between non-lovers and lovers. This is underlined by the repeated usage of *men* and *de*; namely Lysias refers to one party first, and then the other party, to distinguish non-lovers from lovers. And approximately half the arguments<sup>6</sup> show that Lysias approves of non-lovers in comparison with lovers.

It is useful to quote 231a2-6 as a distinct example of what I have said;

Those in love repent of the services they do when their desire ceases; there is no time appropriate for repentance for the others. For they render services with regard to their own capacity to render them, not under compulsion but of their own choosing, in the way in which they would best look after they own affairs.

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<sup>5</sup> It is difficult to think of the appropriate English word for "*sophrosyne*" so I transliterate. (Sometimes, it is translated as "self-control" and "temperance".)

<sup>6</sup> There are six clear examples which I can confirm in Lysias' speech. Especially, 232a1-232a4 seems to be an obvious case.

Here the contrast between lovers and non-lovers about their credibility will be clear. The reliability of the non-lovers can be thought of as something derived from their right judgement, not their desire as in the case of the lovers. But this is a feature to be considered later. Now let us turn to lovers, who are here characterized by “desire”. The following quotation, from 231c7-d6, gives a more manifest image of lovers. More importantly, it will clearly show a fault of lovers and Lysias’ concept of Love.

What is more, how is it reasonable to give away such a thing to someone who has an affliction of such a kind, which no person with experience of it would even try to avert? For they (lovers) themselves agree that they are sick (*nosein*) rather than in their right mind (*sophronein*), and that they know that they are out of their mind, but cannot control themselves; so how, when they come to their senses, could they approve of the decisions they make when in this condition? (231c7-d6)

In short, there is a suggestion here that when they are “in their right mind”, they regret their previous decisions which they made while they are in love. From this, it seems reasonable to suppose that Lysias’ lovers think wrongly because of their desire. Lysias seems to regard this state as being “sick”.

On the other hand, how are non-lovers described? Let us consider the following sentence.

But if you listen to me, in the first place I shall associate with you with an eye not to present pleasure, but to the benefit which is to come, because I am not overcome by love, but master of myself... (233b6-c1)

The speaker is represented as saying that he himself is not in love and he can control himself, which is referred to as an advantage of non-lovers. The important point to note is that he (the speaker) pretends not to fall in love with a beautiful boy, though he actually wants his favours. For the purpose of this speech is only to persuade a beautiful beloved to show affection to this speaker, as non-lover. He tries to do that to repeat his advantage towards his beloved, but he never expresses his desire to acquire the affection from the boy explicitly. If he tells of his love honestly, he must admit that he is the very lover who he himself regards harmful.

Judging from the above, it seems difficult to distinguish lovers and non-lovers actually, but here let us make clear the concept which Lysias has in mind. Non-lovers’

self-control can be thought of as a kind of *sophrosyne*, which enables them to be self-controlled and consider the future. By contrast, the lovers whom Lysias describes have opposite features; namely they think wrongly due to their desire and pursue temporary pleasure.

Now let us turn to the first speech of Socrates. The reason why I deal with this speech at the same time as dealing with what Lysias' speech says, as I have said before, is that their starting-points seem to be equivalent. This remark of Phaedrus shows this idea clearly;

For my part, I will believe like this; I will allow you to make it an assumption that the man in love is more sick than the man not in love. (236a6-b1)

This assumption appears to be almost identical to Lysias' statement<sup>7</sup>. Obtaining this agreement with Phaedrus, Socrates begins his first speech reluctantly. So, their two speeches regard lovers as being sick. This will turn out to be clear from following considerations.

Let us turn to the description of Love in Socrates' first speech in detail. At the beginning of his speech, the definition of love is brought to light. First, he distinguishes "an inborn desire for pleasures" from "an acquired judgement which aims at the best" (237d7-9), which is able to rule and lead us. Then he says that when we are under the control of desire, we are in a state of "excess". On the other hand, when judgement rules us and makes us rational, this is said to be "restraint (*sophrosyne*)". Finally, he clearly defines Love;

The irrational desire which has gained control over judgement which urges a man towards the right, borne towards pleasure in beauty, and which is forcefully reinforced by the desires related to it in its pursuit of bodily beauty, overcoming them in its course, and takes its name from its very force---this is called love. (238b8-c4)

Now this definition of Love<sup>8</sup> presents the nature of lovers in this way: a lover can be defined as "the man who is ruled by desire and enslaved to pleasure" (238e2-3)

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<sup>7</sup> The idea is repeated in the whole of Lysias' speech, but it is manifest at 231c7-d6 cited before.

<sup>8</sup> Griswold (1986)63 refers to two features of Love (*eros*) in Socrates' first speech: 'short-lived' and 'self-contradictory'. About the latter, he explains it by saying that "Eros is the desire for bodily beauty, but the lover prefers a beloved who is unmanly,

and “a sick man” (e4). This is deeply linked with a feature of love previously mentioned in Lysias’ speech. As I said earlier, lovers whom Lysias describes are characterized by sickness.

Though we can find the same term “sick” in both Lysias’ and Socrates’ first speech, does it have actually an equivalent meaning? The concept of Socrates’ first speech seems to be a little different from Lysias’ meaning. More exactly, it is more precise than Lysias’ meaning. This can be seen from the following passage. It is a part of the argument which explains the unreliable character of lovers.

When he ceases to be in love, he is untrustworthy for the future, for which he promised many things.... Now, when he should be paying what he owes, he changes in himself and adopts a different ruler and master, sense and sanity (*sophrosyne*), in place of love and madness.... (240e8-9.....241a2-4)

The purpose of this passage is to make us think of the exact state of lovers in Socrates’ first speech. From this citation, we may notice that it is said to be “madness”, not just “sickness”. Is the “madness” different from the “sickness”? If so, what is the implication of “madness”? To answer these questions, the lovers in both Lysias’ speech and Socrates’ first speech have to be considered more carefully in the following two ways.

To begin with let us examine a passage mentioned before. I cite the important part again;

They (lovers) themselves agree that they are sick (*nosein*) rather than in their right mind (*sophronein*) and that they know that they are out of their mind, but cannot control themselves; (231c7-d6)

Here we may notice the strange situation of lovers, which lovers agree that they know (*eidennai*) that they are out of mind. They admit that they go wrong under the influence of their desire. What makes this situation different from the situation in which someone does not notice that he himself is doing a wrong action or has a wrong attitude? The former situation seems to be worse than the latter because the man agrees and knows his licentious way of life. However he has no intention to put his life right and stop satisfying his desire. The very kind of man who makes his own life

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weak, and lacking in natural charm.” Griswold (1986)<sup>48</sup> finds this failing (self-contradictory) in Lysias’ speech as well.

worse by himself would be regarded as being “mad”, not just “sick”. And the criticism of Socrates<sup>9</sup> seems to be directed at this fact<sup>10</sup>.

Then how do they spend their life? As we have noticed, the lovers are defined as people “ruled by desire and enslaved to pleasure”. Socrates claims that this kind of person “will make the one he loves as pleasing to himself as possible” (238e3-4) because “to a sick man anything which does not resist him is pleasant” (e4-5). This attitude is described in detail according to the aspect of mind, body and estate (238E-240A). For example, their harmful influence in the aspect of mind will be quoted;

Necessarily, then, he will be jealous, and by keeping him from many other forms of association, of a beneficial kind, which would most make a man of him, he will be a cause of great harm to him; and the greatest harm he will cause will be by keeping him from that association from which his wisdom would be most increased. This is that divine thing, philosophy, from which the lover will necessarily keep his beloved far away, out of a dread of being despised; (239a8-b6)

The lovers desire the beautiful boy and make him weaker and inferior, and never competent to outdo lovers in any area. This kind of attitude can be called a kind of madness.

On the other hand, how about non-lovers who do not seem to suffer this miserable state? Lysias’ speech gives many comments on them<sup>11</sup>. Beforehand, the feature of non-lovers seems clearly to be as self-control from the passage (233b6-c1). However as I mentioned at that time, the man who shows the merit which non-lovers are supposed to have to a beautiful boy is just pretending not to be in love with him, since he actually wants a boy to show affection to him. Thus the reason why non-lovers insist on controlling themselves seems to be based on their self-interested thinking<sup>12</sup>. In this case, their *sophrosyne* appears just a means to acquire a beloved one.

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<sup>9</sup> Lysias seems to imply that “madness” means losing control. Thus the concept of madness improves from the idea of Lysias’ meaning, but not explicitly, to Socrates’ definition.

<sup>10</sup> I do not know whether this mad man can exactly identify what is bad. However, if he does not understand that, he can notice that he is in wrong state. For example, if the sick person does not know the name of his illness, he can notice his bad condition. The problem here is not that he is ill, but that he ignores his illness, although he notices it.

<sup>11</sup> This consideration on non-lovers has to be limited to Lysias’ speech; for there is no reference about non-lovers in Socrates’ first speech.

<sup>12</sup> Griswold(1986)45 comments on the non-lover: “he is associated with calculation” and he repeatedly refers to “the importance of being self-interested.”

Furthermore, although Lysias himself seems to understand this hidden fact, he cleverly conceals it. Lysias seems to make his speech look like serious advice for young men, but he is perhaps really showing his skill in advancing the paradoxical idea that non-lovers are more suitable than lovers. This intention of the author appears to be self-interested as well.

It follows from what has been said that the non-lovers who are described in Lysias' speech may actually be equivalent to the lovers in Lysias' and Socrates' first speech because they are in the same position: they understand what they actually are; in lovers' case, they know that they think wrong and pursue beautiful boys physically, and then they intend to make boys weaker and inferior. They are just harmful to boys. And in non-lovers' case, they pretend not to be in love with boys and display their "self-controlled" attitude to acquire the affection of boys. So as to give a name to this state, the meaning of madness in Socrates' first speech should be recalled. It clearly shows the character of people who do not intend to correct their wrong way of life. The very term, madness, seems to be appropriate for the concept of Love mentioned in this section.

### **2-3 Love as divine madness**

In this section, let us look closely at Socrates' second speech. Here, what kind of Love can we find? What difference does it have from Love as previously defined? Can it be regarded as the true image of Love? To answer these questions, the approaches to be taken here are: first, a definition of Love in Socrates' second speech, secondly an outline of Love, and finally a cause of the Love will be explained in turn.

In the first place, a definition of Love should be discussed. At a first glance, this question seems to be easy because Socrates clearly claims that Love in his second speech is "the fourth kind of madness" (249d4-5). Again, we can find madness as a definition of Love; however it seems to be extremely different from the madness as Love to which Lysias' and Socrates' first speech have referred.

In order to make this point clear, the precise meaning of madness and *sophrosyne* should be understood. These two concepts are evidently expressed in this passage:

The ancients testify to the fact that god-sent madness is a finer thing than man-made sanity (*sophrosyne*). (244d4-5)

From this citation, we might expect that, in his second speech, *sophrosyne* is human, and madness is from the gods. What meaning do they have respectively? At all events the Love in Socrates' second speech seems to be referred to as one of "god-sent madness".

Before turning to a closer examination of Love as divine madness, a few remarks should be made concerning human *sophrosyne*. What is this *sophrosyne*? Does it seem to be the same as the contradictory self-control mentioned before? For the purpose of thinking about this, let us concentrate on the end part of Socrates' second speech. There, after enumerating the merits of true lovers, Socrates refers briefly to the demerits of non-lovers.

The acquaintance of the non-lover, which is diluted with a merely mortal good sense (*sophrosyne*), dispensing miserly benefits of a mortal kind, engenders in the soul which is the object of its attachment a meanness which is praised by the majority as a virtue, and so will cause it to wallow mindlessly around and under the earth for nine thousand years. (256e4-257a2)

From this passage, it seems that the mortal *sophrosyne* has a negative meaning. Especially "dispensing miserly benefits of a mortal kind" seems to be noteworthy because his phrase clearly reminds us of the previous *sophrosyne* as self-interested thinking. Thus it is allowed to say that this kind of *sophrosyne* can be called as "human (mortal) *sophrosyne*".

Let us now return to the consideration of Love as one of madness from the gods. In his second speech, the statement that divine madness is better than human *sophrosyne* is repeated. In addition to the quotation of 244d4-5 above, we can see it in an explanation of three kinds of divine madness. These kinds of madness are briefly summarised by Rowe (1986a)168: "the madness of the seer, of sufferers from an inherited curse, whose madness finds a cure for their suffering, and of inspired poet"<sup>13</sup>. For example, Socrates expresses himself like this about the madness of the seer.

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<sup>13</sup> In Socrates' second speech, divine madness is better than human *sophrosyne*. However, these three kinds of madness seem to be not worth much because poetry is referred simultaneously. This will be clear as the argument proceeds.



The prophetess at Delphi and the priestesses at Dodona achieve much that is good for Greece when mad, both on a private and on a public level, whereas when sane (*sophrosyne*) they achieve little or nothing” (244a8-b3)

Love in his second speech is such a kind of divine madness, one that comes as a blessing from gods. In fact, “such madness is given by the gods to allow us to achieve the greatest good fortune” (245b7-c1). Of course, it should also be added that this kind of madness has nothing similar to the previous madness in Lysias’ and his first speech. Later, at 265A, these two kinds of madness are clearly distinguished: “the one caused by sickness of a human sort” and “the other coming about from a divinely caused reversal of our customary ways of behaving” (265a9-11).

In the second place, let us turn to an outline of Love in his second speech. How is this kind of Love as one of divine madness described? The description of Love begins with a long story about soul (246A-249D). Soul is portrayed vividly. Socrates depicts soul as “the combined power of a winged team of horses and their charioteer” (246a7) in both divine and human cases. In divine cases, the horses and the charioteer are good and of good origin. However, in human (and other living things’) cases, the horses are both good and bad. It means that one of a pair is good horse and other is bad. But a more precise account of the horses will be given later. Now the point that needs to be emphasized is that it is “difficult and troublesome” (247b4) for the charioteer of human soul to drive his horses because of the mixture.

Then Socrates continues telling a story about the way souls travel. In the case of divine souls, because “the chariots of the gods travel easily, being well-balanced and easily controlled” (247b1-3), they can proceed to outside without difficulty and stand on the back of heaven, then look at the “things outside the heaven” (247c2) completely. What are these “things outside the heaven”? Socrates tries to give it an expression in this way: it means “being which really is” (247c7) outside the heaven, which seems to be “without colour or shape, intangible, observed by the steer man of the soul alone, for example, Justice itself, self-control (*sophrosyne*) and knowledge”(247d6).

On the other hand, in the case of human or other souls, even though they all are eager to try to observe the “things outside the heaven”, some barely succeed but not completely, others scarcely do it, stepping on and pushing each other; for it is highly

difficult to drive their horses whose characters are good and bad. In this conflict and confusion, “many souls are maimed, and many have their wings all broken” (248b3).

Socrates describes the destiny of souls which cannot follow the travel of gods and observe the “things outside the heaven” completely. They are assigned to enter a human body and a kind of way of life according to how much of the truth the soul saw<sup>14</sup>. Anyway because “a soul which has never seen the truth will not enter this (human) shape” (249b5-6), it is meant that any human soul has the natural capacity to contemplate the truth to a greater or lesser degree.

The outline mentioned above has finally made clear the concept of Love as divine madness. Socrates describes this kind of madness as follows.

The madness of the man who, on seeing beauty here on earth, and being reminded of true beauty, becomes winged, and fluttering with eagerness to fly upwards, but unable to leave the ground, looking upwards like a bird, and taking no heed of the things below. (249d6-8)

This passage says that lovers are passionate about remembering the truth, and this passion seems to make them forget everything and so be called “mad”. Especially they are eager to remember Beauty itself (true beauty) through their senses. It means what is beautiful can be caught by their sight, because the beauty is “most evident and most loved” (250d7-e1) and the visual sensation is “the keenest” (250d3) among our senses. Thus, in the third place, the cause of Love seems to be beauty itself. However, we must note this condition of lovers.

And these (souls), when they see some likeness of the things there, are driven out of their wits with amazement and lose control of themselves, though they do not know what has happened to them for lack of clear perception.(250a6-b1)

The cause of Love is defined as Beauty itself, but these lovers do not yet know this. As a result, though they do not know what attracts them strongly, they just long for and follow beautiful boys. This state will be considered soon.

The whole general image of Love has now been made clear. Next we have to examine closely real features of lovers who are affected by this kind of Love. Then let

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<sup>14</sup> According to the ordinance of Necessity, the souls which saw the truth most are ordered to become a seed “which will grow a man who will become a lover of wisdom (*philosophos*) and of beauty” (248d2-3)

us move to this question: what is the state of lovers when they catch sight of the beauty? Socrates explains the lover as “the man who observed much of what was visible to him before” (251a2) and their extraordinary attitude when they see a beautiful shape, as if it were like a god. The unusual state of lovers can be represented by these two changes which that arise in lovers. First, the lovers feel fear. It is useful to quote this description: “(The lover) shudders and experiences something of the fears he had before, and then reveres it (a beautiful boy) like a god as he looks at it” (251a3-5). Then secondly, the wings of lovers’ soul start to grow up:

After he (a lover) has seen him (a beloved one), the expected change comes over him following the shuddering ---- sweating and a high fever, for he is warmed by the reception of the effluence of beauty through his eyes, which is the natural nourishment of his plumage. (251b5-7)

It amounts to saying that souls regain their wings because of their love, a kind of divine madness. Moreover the very wings presently enable us to come back to the heaven, where gods live. The return to heaven is regarded as the final end of every human soul.

However, here we have to pay attention to the passage which explains that lovers in divine madness are described concretely.

The entire soul, stung all over, goes mad with pain; but then remembering the boy with his beauty, it rejoices again. The mixture of both these states makes it despair at the strangeness of its condition, raging in its perplexity, and in its madness it can neither sleep at night nor keep still where it is by day, but runs wherever it thinks it will see the possessor of the beauty it longs for; and when it has seen him and channelled desire in to itself it releases what was pent up before, and finding a breathing space it ceases from its stinging birth-pains, once more enjoying this for the moment as the sweetest pleasure. This it does not willingly give up, nor does it value anyone above the one with beauty, but quite forgets mother, brothers, friends, all together, not caring about the loss of his wealth through neglect, and with contempt for all the accepted standards of propriety and good taste in which it previously prided itself it is ready to act the part of a slave and sleep wherever it is allowed to do so, provided it is as close as possible to the object of its longing; (251d5-a7)

In this passage, we may notice that the lover’s state is easily influenced by the presence of his beloved. Lovers long for the boy at any price. Can this state directly remind us of truth? Of course, they are eager to acquire beauty, but they do not know exactly what they try to obtain truly. Namely they seem to think that what they must

take is the beautiful beloved one, not the beauty itself perceived through this boy. Divine madness is rightly defined as the enthusiasm for seeing the beauty itself. However here in addition to it, there seems to be other kind of enthusiasm, or to put it more exactly saying, a kind of confusion. How does this confusion give influence to recollection?

For the purpose of considering this, let's start with a lover's attitude. As we noticed above, it is a lover who is scared at the cause of love, namely the Beauty itself. And the fact seems to urge the recovery of his wings. This frightened attitude is good evidence whether he is actually in Love or not<sup>15</sup>. This will be clarified by the comparison with the attitude of non-lovers who face a beautiful person; for Socrates depicts non-lovers who are not suffering from this kind of fear at 250e1-251a1;

The man whose initiation was not recent, or who has been corrupted, does not move keenly from here to there, to beauty itself, when he observes its namesake here, so that he does not revere it when he looks at it, but surrendering himself to pleasure does his best to go on four feet like an animal and father offspring, and keeping close company with excess has no fear or shame in pursuing pleasure contrary to nature;

The importance of the concept of fear cannot be overemphasized because without fear as first change, there seems to be no chance for the success for growing of wings. It means that he misses the great opportunity to go back to the heaven where the gods live, the truth exists and he originally lives. This seems to be miserable because it is natural and necessary for soul to be eager to live in "the plain of truth" where it can acquire "the pasturage which is fitting for the best part of the soul" (248c6-7).

The lovers who long for and follow beautiful boys appear to be close to this kind of people. Of course, they are different because the lover's attitude is caused by beauty itself, not simply their lusts. However I think that they are never unrelated because this kind of lover does not understand what it is they desire, so that they run

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<sup>15</sup> Hackforth(1952)98 comments "What strikes us first is the initial stage, the shuddering awe (251A) which the holiness of the beauty inspires; it would seem that Plato finds the origin of spiritual love in that same "sense of the holy" in which some modern thinkers have found the origin of religion."

after beautiful boys themselves a bit blindly. That is to say, they appear to share some features of ordinary lovers and non-lovers<sup>16</sup>.

The concept of shame<sup>17</sup> which is referred to with fear seems to be crucially important. As it will be shown in the next section, these both concepts are repeated many times through the process of loving. More importantly, it can give a hint towards an answer to the question; the relationship between the confused and miserable situation of lovers and their possibility of remembering truth and recovering of wings as divine madness. I think that the recovery of wings that occurs in souls might not be enough to be understood only by explaining the several changes explained before. Therefore in the next section, it is important to examine a state of soul in detail, so that the great role played by the concepts of fear and shame in the process of Love can be shown.

#### **2-4 Love as “divine *sophrosyne*”**

In the previous section, as influences on lovers, we may notice the physical changes (warming up and sweating), the emotional changes (feeling fear and shame) and customary changes (forgetting everything but beauty). However the connection between these changes and recollection is not manifest. Namely the divine madness makes lovers remember truth, but in fact their attitude following the beautiful boy day in and day out seems to be so far from the image of one who pursues the truth. Thus I think that there is the missing process which connects the lovers longing for boys and the recovery of his wings. In order to find this missing part, in divine madness, we

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<sup>16</sup> These lovers remind us “non-lovers” in Lysias’ and Socrates’ first speech. They pretend not to be lovers, although they are eager to acquire boys. In this case, they have no fear, but there is just desire of physical pleasure.

<sup>17</sup> It is noteworthy that a concept of shame is closely related to the fear from the quotation mentioned above. (For example, in *Euthyphro*, see “where there is shame there is also fear” (12b9). There is other examples 656E6-647A, 671C-D and 699C in *Laws*.) Especially the feature of the non-lover may be manifest in the contrast with an attitude of Socrates. At the beginning of his second speech, he explains the reason why he wants to recant his first speech. Socrates frankly expresses his anxiety to Phaedrus; namely, anxiety that his previous speech is “dreadful” (242d4) because he offends against Eros as “a god, or something divine” (242e2). As a result, Socrates tries to obtain the agreement of Phaedrus saying that “you see how shameless the speeches were” (243c1-2). At the same time, Socrates mentioned that someone whose character is gentle and noble would suppose to be listening to someone who never understands true kind of Love, so that the man thinks Socrates’ previous speech as bad. Then Socrates makes a decision to restate a speech of Love “out of shame for what this man would think, and out of fear of Love himself” (243d3-4).

need to consider what happens to a soul which is described as a charioteer and his two horses.

First, the description of soul should be clearly remembered. The soul is described as “the combined power of a winged team of horses and their charioteer” (246a7). The actual point is that human souls are considered as a mixture of good and bad. This is directly depicted in the characters of two horses: one good and one bad;

The first of the two, which is on the nobler side, is erect in form and clean-limbed, high necked, nose somewhat hooked, white in colour, with black eyes, a lover of honour when joined with restraint and a sense of shame, and a companion of true glory, needing no whip, responding to the spoken command alone; the other is crooked in shape, gross, a random collection of parts, with a short, powerful neck, flat-nosed, black-skinned, grey-eyed, bloodshot, companion of excess and boastfulness, shaggy around the ears, deaf, hardly yielding to whip and goad together. (253d3-e5)

What kind of action do these horses take when they see an appearance of a beloved one? Interestingly their attitudes are completely opposite: when a charioteer has a chance to look at his beloved, a good horse is “constrained by shame” (254a2) because it is obedient to his master. By contrast, a bad horse tries to rush at the boy by force because it “no longer takes notice of goading or the whip from the charioteer” (254a3-4).

As I mentioned above, the rush forwards and withdrawal of lovers are described by the actions of two horses, the character of one of whom is *sophrosyne*, the other *hubris* (excess). In this case, two parts of the soul appear as hesitating to go forward to the beautiful boy, but the other part of soul drags them forcefully to the boy. It is manifest that the lovers’ state of soul can be seen as a kind of confusion and conflict.

This state seems readily connected with the situation of miserable lovers who wander around their boys because of the mixture of joy and pain. In this case, these two horses seem to be equal, or else the bad horse appears to be a bit stronger than good one. Therefore the soul is dragged closer to the beautiful boy all the time. This unruly power of the bad horse causes that the lovers to sigh for their lovers and their soul falls into utter confusion.

When the bad horse drags the chariot to the beautiful one, the charioteer starts to remember beauty itself though his appearance more clearly.

As the charioteer sees it [the flashing of beloved's face], his memory is carried back to the nature of beauty, and again see it standing together with self-control (*sophrosyne*) on a holy pedestal. (254b5-6)

The important point to note is the fact that *sophrosyne* is referred to along with beauty. So far, beauty has been treated as something special among the Forms because only beauty can be seen through our senses so that it causes the one seeing to feel fear as the first change of Love. But now, it appears that both beauty and *sophrosyne* can be remembered. What is this *sophrosyne*? And what does it have to do with Love?

To answer these questions, let us consider the passage which succeeds the one above. When the charioteer sees the beloved one close by him, "he becomes frightened, and in sudden reverence falls on his back" (254b7-8). It is important to pay attention to the concepts of fear and reverence (shame) appearing at the same time in his attitude here. In the previous section, these concepts were expected to be regarded as something essential as considerations of lovers. What is more, these concepts can be recognized in the action of his horses. When the charioteer is surprised at the beauty of the beloved one and pulls back his reins, his good horse tends to follow the charioteer willingly and "drenches the whole soul with sweat from shame and alarm" (254c4-5). However, the bad one will try to go against the instruction of his charioteer, and encourage him to go forward to the beloved "shamelessly" (d7).

In this way the bad horse pulls the chariot to his beloved one against the charioteer and white horse's desire, but finally it surrenders itself to its charioteer. This scene is described like this;

When the same thing happens to the evil horse many times, and it ceases from its excesses, now humbled it allows the charioteer with his foresight to lead, and when it sees the boy in his beauty, it nearly dies with fright; and the result is that now the soul of the lover follows the beloved in reverence and awe. (254e5-255a1)

This black horse which used to act forcefully against the charioteer now seems to follow him; thus every part of soul, the charioteer and his team of horses seem to have a same intention and attitude. In this case, the soul has a kind of harmony, in which the charioteer rules his horses without difficulty. This harmonious state is really different from the confusion and conflict which the soul of the lover experienced

when it saw its beloved. For in that case, the bad horse has the power to drag, but now the bad horse is strictly ruled. Thus, in this harmonious situation, lovers do not seem to long for and wander around the beautiful boy. And they are eager to proceed to truth with this boy. To consider this harmony in detail, it is helpful to note “reverence and awe” cited in the above passage.

These two concepts, fear (awe) and shame (reverence), are repeated in the passage about the lovers’ approach to the beloved one; for example, when a charioteer catches sight of his beloved, as I mentioned before, he stands in awe and feels reverence.

After the frightened charioteer pulls back his reins, his good horse feels shame about his approach to the beloved, but his bad horse resists and forces the charioteer to go close to the beloved again. However, at last, the bad horse becomes obedient and the charioteer feels reverence and fear toward the beauty of beloved unimpededly.

For reasons mentioned above, the very man who can feel awe and fear before the beauty of the beloved is regarded as being able to create in himself the united condition of soul, namely harmony. This will remind us of the previous idea, according to which feeling fear is good evidence for deciding whether one is actually in love or not.

In order to make clear the harmonious state of soul, let us consider the passage about a case in which a charioteer succeeds in controlling a bad horse, this passage may be the most important part of the whole argument of Love;

If the better elements of their minds get the upper hand by drawing them to a well-ordered life, and to philosophy, they pass their life here in blessedness and harmony, masters of themselves and orderly in their behaviour, having enslaved that part through which evil attempted to enter the soul, and freed that part through which goodness enters it; and have won the first of their of their three submissions in these, the true Olympic game --- and neither human sanity (*sophrosyne*) nor divine madness has any greater good to offer a man than this.(256a7-b7)

What is immediately apparent in this passage is the repeated reference to a concept of harmony: “well-ordered life”, “blessedness and harmony”, “masters of themselves” and “orderly in their behaviour” because of the enslavement of the evil part of the soul, the bad horse. A lover whose soul is harmonious seems to live happily and in an orderly way, and “when they die they finally become winged and light”. Here the process of re-growing wings appears to be explained well. It is important to notice the process the lover associates with his beloved. The lover does



not intend to follow his beloved and acquire the body due to his desire. Rather he seems to think of his beloved as the important one because he reminds him of truth, namely of beauty itself<sup>18</sup>. Thus it can be said that this lover is aware somehow of what he loves truly, namely the beauty itself perceived through the beautiful boy.

On the contrary, how about lovers who fail to become harmonious? Socrates refers this kind of lovers as people who are “devoted not to wisdom but to honour” (256b7-c1). They cannot rule their bad horses sufficiently, so that their soul remains confused. Thus their soul has to leave their body without wings. However they are very close to ideal lovers: in the near future they are able to regain their wings as “no small reward for their lover’s madness” (256d5-6). They can be said to be second-best lovers because they are not philosophers, but *philotimoi*. It is they who are described as lovers longing for their beloved all along, as mentioned before.

By comparison with these second-best lovers, the important role of harmony can be seen evidently. In the previous section, the connection between the attitude of lovers as divine madness and the recovery of their wings has not seemed altogether clear. However, now the concept of control or harmony reached through fear and shame seems to throw light on this connection. Thus, this harmony seems to be the very requirement to win the genuine reward for Love.

Now three crucial points can be reached. First, is the state of control and harmony the same as divine madness? As we have examined this state, the lover regards only his beloved as valuable for him, and he forgets everything but the boy, for example, his family, his friends and his property. In this case, his soul is just wandering around in pursuit of his beloved because he does not know what he has to acquire exactly: the beautiful boy or something beautiful. It seems to be impossible to find any resemblance between this situation of Love and the Love of control and harmony mentioned above. This difference can be clearly found in the quotation above. The relevant part is this.

Neither human sanity (*sophrosyne*) nor divine madness has any greater good to offer a man than this.

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<sup>18</sup> Griswold (1986)134 thinks that the state of *sophrosyne* “depends on continually renewed recollection.” I agree with him, because one must continue to perceive the beauty through the boy, feeling fear and shame to become true lovers. This is the feature of true lovers, it is very difficult, though.

This sentence clarifies the possibility that there is something greater than human sanity and divine madness. “This” means that “winning the first of their three submissions in these, the true Olympic games”, namely “becoming winged and light” after the death, which the harmonious life makes possible. This harmonious and well-ordered way of life can be thought of as the true Love, which should be clearly distinguished from the Love referred to as just divine madness. For this state avoids the miserable state of confusion.

Secondly, this harmonious state of soul looks extremely similar to that of the divine soul. As we have mentioned, all divine soul is good and of good origin. It means that every part of soul is good so that the charioteer easily controls his horses. The harmonious soul of lovers seems to bear a close resemblance to the divine soul; for the charioteer of this soul drives his chariot with little difficulty because his bad horse has become obedient to him. This idea gives substance to that of “becoming like god” in *Phaedrus* (252e1-253c6). But this is an idea which we shall examine in the next section.

Finally, this well-ordered and harmonious life of lovers is clearly referred as “philosophical” in the passage: “the better elements of their minds get the upper hand by drawing them to a well-ordered life, and to philosophy”. Here it is useful to quote the argument about the philosopher.

It is with justice that only the mind of the philosopher becomes winged; for so far as it can it is close, through memory, to those things his closeness to which gives a god his divinity. Thus if a man uses such reminders rightly, being continually initiated in perfect mysteries, he alone through that initiation achieves real perfection” (249c4-8)

As above, the very Love whose feature is harmony and control seems to enable a soul to grow its wings again. And now it is a philosopher who can acquire his wings. This clearly shows the deep relationship between a philosopher and a lover. “A man uses such reminders rightly” seems to imply that a philosopher is also regarded as a lover who acquires the united state of soul and his wings, by remembering Beauty itself through the beauty of beloved one.

To conclude this section, the state in question should be distinguished from those confused lovers who are eager to acquire both the body and beauty itself, which is caused by divine madness. In order to give it a proper name, let us remember the

previous argument about *sophrosyne* (254b5-6). In the discussion, we have confirmed that when a lover comes closer to the beauty of a beloved one, the charioteer of his soul remembers not only Beauty itself, but also *sophrosyne*. And finally, his whole soul acquires the character of harmony and control, so that he can stay with his beloved with awe and reverence. It enables him (and his beloved) to spend a harmonious and well-ordered life and then to recover their wings. Thus this concept of harmony and order is deeply related to *sophrosyne*.

However, of course, this kind of *sophrosyne* should be clearly distinguished from the “mortal (human) *sophrosyne*” considered in 2-2<sup>19</sup>. Finally, it seems to be possible to call the Love “divine *sophrosyne*”, which has “divine madness”<sup>20</sup> as its beginning. It should be concluded, from what has been said above, that Love in Socrates’ second speech can be called “divine *sophrosyne*”<sup>21</sup>.

## 2-5 The image of true love in *Phaedrus*

In the previous section, the Love in Socrates’ second speech has turned out to be “divine *sophrosyne*” and it has a high possibility of being regarded as the true image of Love in *Phaedrus* because of its greatness and superiority. However, the real state of divine *sophrosyne* has not yet become clarified. I mean when the state of soul acquires “divine *sophrosyne*”, what kind of life does the man himself lead in this world? Namely what action or attitude does this divine *sophrosyne* make him choose?

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<sup>19</sup> North (1966)176-7 refers to *Phaedrus* as “the most important dialogue to think of *sophrosyne*”. For in this dialogue, we can admit “its ambiguous attitude towards this excellence”. In Socrates’ first speech, *sophrosyne* is regarded as “the conventional superiority” of sanity, but in his second speech, the kind of sanity is “disparaged” and “Socrates eulogizes *eros* as a form of Divine madness infinitely superior to mere human rationality”(p.178).

<sup>20</sup> “As it is the greatest of goods come to us through madness, provided that it is bestowed by divine gift” (244a6-8). The “through (*dia*)” shows that we can reach the greatest of goods through (or by way of) madness. In other words, it seems to be possible to point out that there is something beyond the madness. The term as “divine *sophrosyne*” is found in *Sophrosyne* written by North(1966)179, but she means the *sophrosyne* as one of the Forms.

<sup>21</sup> Griswold (1986)75 points “the complicated status of *sophrosyne*” in Socrates’ second speech. We can find two kinds of *sophrosyne*: One is “mortal *sophrosyne*” which is “defined in a utilitarian way” and the other is “divine *sophrosyne*”. And he thinks “divine erotic madness and divine *sophrosyne* are to be united in the successful experience of love.” Thus he concludes with “the philosopher is somehow the synthesis of lover and non-lover.”

To answer this question, first the general state of divine *sophrosyne* should be examined more clearly. From the previous section, it is clear a charioteer has the greatest power to rule his horses. And this state leads to a harmonious and well-ordered life. However, what does the simile of the charioteer and his horses refer to? Namely, what are the parts or aspects they represent?

It seems to be relatively easy to begin to answer this question. When we turn to Plato's *Republic* 4, three parts of soul are well examined there: "reason", "spirit" and "appetite". To begin with, reason and appetite are divided;

We will call the part of the soul with which it calculates the rational part and the part with which lusts, hungers, thirsts, and gets excited by other appetites the irrational appetitive part, companion of certain indulgences and pleasures. (439D)<sup>22</sup>

And then the spirited part is distinguished as a third part of soul. It is the part "by which we get angry" (439E) and this anger "sometimes makes war against the appetites, as one thing against another" (440A). And "in the civil war in the soul it aligns itself for more with the rational part" (440E). From this outline, we notice there is also a quite resemblance concerning the roles of parts of soul in *Republic* 4 and the charioteer and horses in *Phaedrus*: charioteer is representative of reason, a bad horse is appetite<sup>23</sup>, and a good horse seems to take the charioteer's side<sup>24</sup>. Thus it is possible to say that a charioteer and his two horses correspond with reason, spirit and appetite respectively.

It is helpful to describe *sophrosyne* in *Republic* briefly before moving on to the main task in relation the general state of *sophrosyne* in *Phaedrus*. *Sophrosyne* in *Republic* is one of four cardinal virtues and is explained by different expressions; for example, "a kind of consonance and harmony" (430e3-4), "a kind of order, the mastery of certain kinds of pleasures and desires" (430e6-7) and "self-control" (430e11). The next passage seems to be especially noteworthy.

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<sup>22</sup> The translation of *Republic*, as it is in what follows, is from G.M.A.Grube.

<sup>23</sup> Griswold (1986)96 comments, in Lysias' speech and Socrates' first speech, "it is clear that their notion of *eros* is represented by the black horse alone." In addition, the presence of bad horse is a distinct feature being different from the soul of gods. Namely, the human soul can be good and bad. Thus, "rhetoric" is important subject in this dialogue. (cf. p.134)

<sup>24</sup> A bad horse which "tends to pull the chariot and its occupant downwards" is "presumably the 'appetitive' part of the soul in the *Republic*; the other, noble, horse is the 'spirited' part, the 'ally' of the charioteer, the rational part." (Rowe(2003) 172)

--- And is not he moderate (*sophrosyne*) because of the friendly and harmonious relations between these same parts, namely, when the ruler and the ruled believe in common that the rational part should rule and do not engage in civil war against it?

--- Moderation is surely nothing other than that, both in the city and in the individual” (442c10-d2)

It might appear that there is much in common between *sophrosyne* here and *sophrosyne* in *Phaedrus*. However we finish the comparison between *sophrosyne* in *Republic* and *sophrosyne* in the *Phaedrus*, let us turn to the situation of divine *sophrosyne* in *Phaedrus*.

Now that the role of the three parts, charioteer and two horses, is clear, the general state of divine *sophrosyne* may be precisely understood. As we considered, a charioteer seems to represent reason, so that the fact that a charioteer has great power to control his horses means that reason can make the whole soul united “hierarchically<sup>25</sup>”. Moreover, the team of horses is willing to follow his orders. In this case, a wish or intention of the charioteer will be carried out as the decision of the lover.

What is a wish or intention of a charioteer, namely reason? To consider this question, let us refer to J.M.Cooper (1984)’s “Plato’s theory of human motivation”. First, he thinks “Plato’s theory that there are three parts is, roughly, the theory that there are three psychological determinants of choice and voluntary action” (p.5). Moreover, he interprets “on Plato’s theory all three of the parts are independent sources of motivation” (p.5). It means “there are desires of reason as well as bodily appetites and impulses of a spirited nature” (p.5). What kind of desire does he assign to reason? Cooper shows there are two major jobs of reason: to know the truth and to rule. This implies that there are two desires of reason: desire to know the truth and desire to rule. Especially, compared with appetite, reason is always regarded to select what is good based on what is best. For example, in thirst, if there is a conflict between “desire to preserve his health” and “desire to drink”, the former should be selected because it is “the consequence of a higher-order desire for good”(p.8). Namely, generally speaking, the desire of reason seems to be “desire for good”.

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<sup>25</sup> Griswold (1986)96, 135 refers to the unity of soul as “a hierarchical relationship to each other”. And he comments that the unity of soul “derives from the successful pursuit of the goal desired by reason”. And in this case, “the wholeness of a soul yoked by reason is not achieved by satisfying every desire of the soul”(p.94)

However what does it mean for reason to have such kind of desire? That reason has desire for good seems to reflect the fact that every human being is naturally supposed to desire to live a good life.

The man who is in a state of divine *sophrosyne* seems to have the equivalent character mentioned above. Namely, it seems that he is never overcome by any appetitive desire so that he can always pursue what is good for him. This way of living is represented as a “life here in blessedness and harmony” (256a8-b1) in Socrates’ second speech.

The general state of a man who is in the state of divine *sophrosyne* is now clear. Next, his actual practice should be considered. What kind of action or attitude does he choose as good? Here what we must remember is the deep connection between true lovers and philosophers (256a7-b7 and 249c4-8, cited in the previous section). The close relationship seems to suggest what we should think of the real works of lovers: the question can be transformed into this question “what does a philosopher engage in?”

Perhaps the question will be considered in the latter part of *Phaedrus*, and we shall focus on that in the following chapter. However, an answer to our question can be found by using the view of the relationship between Love and philosophy as a clue.

The above should be considered in the argument “becoming like gods<sup>26</sup>” which is included in Socrates’ second speech. Simply speaking, the argument mainly explains that “each man lives after the pattern of the god in whose chorus he was, honouring him by imitating him so far as he can” (252d1-2). The statement that each man follows his own god seems to very controversial, however it is possible to say that each man “proceeds in accordance with their god and seeks that their boy should be of

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<sup>26</sup> Sedley (1999)309 comments that becoming like gods “is indeed a pivotal feature of Plato’s thought.” He finds this idea especially in *Symposium* and *Theaetetus*. He thinks “god perfectly embodies those standards (the standards for morality), and hence constitutes for human moral action not only its proper overseer but also the one perfect exemplar.” Thus, becoming like gods means becoming morally good. (By contrast, Annas (1999)65 seems to think that becoming like gods is not becoming virtuous man, but trying to escape to heaven: “a religious or spiritual attitude than a moral one.” Then, she puts emphasis on “the flight idea” (p.63) in *Phaedrus*.) However, Sedley regards *Phaedrus* as the dialogue which has “a very different ethical application of the *homoiosis theoi* theme” (p.315) because of the reference to individual gods (Zeus, Hera, Apollo...). He comments “the myth (i.e. Socrates’ second speech) has made it clear that all these different gods are alike guided by a complete grasp of the moral Forms” (p.315). But I think that Plato thinks that becoming like Zeus is exceptional because it enables us to become a philosopher.

the same nature, and when they acquire him, imitating the god themselves and persuading and disciplining their beloved” (253b4-6).

It is noteworthy that “becoming like god” in the context of Love is not only the task of the lover himself but also the relationship between a lover and his beloved<sup>27</sup>. Namely not only does a lover try to imitate his god, but the lover too is eager to make his beloved be like his god, because he thinks that the beloved himself can give him a resource for imitating his god. We should especially concentrate on “those who belong to Zeus” (252e1), because the people seem to be philosophers referred in the ordinance of Necessity, and more exactly they are the only true lovers. This will be clear from the following:

Those who belong to Zeus seek that the one they love should be someone like Zeus in respect of his soul; so they look to see whether he is naturally disposed towards philosophy and towards leadership, and when they have found him and fall in love they do everything to make him of such a kind” (252e1-5).

From this passage, it emerges that a man who belongs to Zeus intends to make his beloved a philosopher in addition to being a philosopher himself. And this is no doubt the real practice of a lover as possessor of divine *sophrosyne*. However, how does he do that? What makes his beloved become a philosopher? The concrete method does not seem to be clear because there is no reference to the way in the former part of *Phaedrus*, about Love. In other words, this part shows just an ideal kind of relationship, not describes how to establish the relationship actually.

Before moving on to consider the real method, examined in the later part of the dialogue concerning rhetoric, this point deserves explicit emphasis: a true lover is a philosopher who both tries to improve his intellect and encourages his beloved to develop his philosophical ability.

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<sup>27</sup> Griswold (1986)128-9 points out “the lover’s search for himself must take place through his divinization of the beloved.” And “the mirror like nature of the other’s soul is indispensable if one is to see oneself.”

### 3. About Rhetoric

#### 3-1 The outline of the second part, about rhetoric

In this chapter, the second part of *Phaedrus* will be discussed. This is stage (2) of my approach. But, before considering the main argument, I shall give the outline of the arguments in this part. After that, our inquiry will proceed to the second part of this dialogue about Rhetoric. However there seem to be two kinds of rhetoric: ideal rhetoric and the ordinary one. Both these kinds will be examined, respectively in 3-2 and 3-3. Through this examination, we shall find a connection with the first part about Love in 3-4. All this consideration of rhetoric will show the concrete method of establishing ideal relationship of true lovers, who have been regarded as philosophers and possessors of divine *sophrosyne* in the previous chapter (3-5).

Now let us proceed to the outline of the latter part of this dialogue. This part begins with Phaedrus' remark on Socrates' second speech. He admires this speech briefly, and soon he shows his concerns with Lysias, his favourite man, because he is afraid that Lysias' previous speech looks worse when it is compared with Socrates' second speech. What Phaedrus says here and his concerns itself appear very interesting, but consideration of Phaedrus' attitude will be made in the next chapter, chapter 4. Phaedrus continues by saying that,

Just recently one of the politicians was abusing him with this very charge, and throughout all his abuse kept calling him a "speech-writer"; (257c5-6)

The argument about rhetoric in *Phaedrus* starts with this concern at the beginning. Then Socrates begins to discuss speech-writing. During this short discussion, Socrates claims speech-writing itself is not shameful because not only speech writers but also people generally tend to hope that their written work and their written name will last for ever. What is the criterion by which people judge a speech as being shameful? This question is presented by Socrates in the focus of the following sentence.

What is the way to write acceptably, or not acceptably? (258d7)



Namely, the crucial point is not whether it is written or not, but how it is composed. And it is not too much to say that the following arguments in the latter part of the dialogue are given to answer this question. For, this question is clearly referred to at the beginning and at the end. Namely, the main argument starts from 259E (after the myth of the cicadas as an interlude), and again, the same question comes up: “in what way it is acceptable to make and write a speech, and in what way it is not” (259e2). Then, in the conclusion, Socrates says “we were to weigh up the reproach aimed at Lysias about his writing of speeches, and speeches themselves, which were written scientifically and which not”(277a10-b2).

The arguments from 259E to 278B seem to be the chief arguments of the second part<sup>28</sup>. First, a relationship between rhetoric and knowledge is referred to. To speak sufficiently well needs knowledge (on what kind of knowledge, see below, 3-3) which one can acquire through philosophy. Then, Socrates picks up the previous speeches about love as an example to explain what he believes is true rhetoric. After rejecting Lysias’ speech because of its lack of definition and order, Socrates shows Division and Collection in his two speeches as the true dialectical method. Then, the condition of speaking and writing well become clear, namely that they are based on knowledge and use Division and Collection. It seems to be the proper answer (answer a) to the main question of this discussion: “how to write (speak) speeches acceptably?”. However, an unsuitable remark of Phaedrus forces Socrates to continue the argument again; Phaedrus says “the rhetorical kind seems to me still to elude us” (266c8-9).

The argument after this remark is difficult to understand because there seems to be much irony about ordinary rhetoric and the analogy with other arts. But, simply speaking, an ideal and true image of rhetoric becomes clear by comparison with existing and ordinary rhetoric. Here we can find a repeated assertion about how to learn “a science of rhetoric” which seems to be an application of Division and Collection. I mean this way seems to be to grasp the nature of soul and identify how many kinds of soul and speeches, and then to understand how to apply the most appropriate speech to the soul from the aspect of effective persuasion. Here we seem

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<sup>28</sup> Griswold seems to think of a different division of the second part, namely 257C-274B (when does rhetoric lack art?) and 278B-End (when is rhetoric art?). For, he regards the myth of Theuth/Thamus (274B-275B) as the most important part of this dialogue. Thus, he thinks that true rhetoric is not dealt in the part discussing Division and Collection (265D-266A). This idea is different from mine. (His idea is examined in note 53)

to find another aspect of speaking well, namely understanding the suitability of the audience for a speech and the opportunity to give a speech for the purpose of acquiring the most effective influence (answer **b**). Socrates clearly describes a true method of rhetoric by explaining the way to obtain this “science of rhetoric”.

This will suffice as an outline of the argument about rhetoric<sup>29</sup>. The structure is complicated (the cause seems to be Phaedrus, but this will be examined in the next chapter), but the main target seems to be indisputable: true rhetoric which Socrates persistently claims we need, compared with ordinary rhetoric. And key terms are ‘truth’ or ‘knowledge’ acquired by Division and Collection, and ‘the inquiry into soul’. This consideration is related to answers **a** and **b** mentioned above. What relationship do these two answers have in regard to speaking well?

Especially, in this chapter, the nature of ideal rhetoric will become evident, namely who, when, to whom, how and why to put it into practice. In order to consider these questions, it is better to concentrate on ordinary rhetoric first because of the manifest contrast with the ideal one.

### **3-2 About ordinary rhetoric**

In this section, existing rhetoric will be dealt with. As I have said in the previous section, the nature of true and ideal rhetoric seems to become clearer if it is compared with this ordinary rhetoric. And this kind of rhetoric is one that Socrates refers to with irony and rejects evidently. Then, in fact, what features make this ordinary rhetoric false and less valuable?

The reference to ordinary rhetoric appears after 266D, where Phaedrus claims that there is something to be acquired other than dialectical method. As I said, Socrates seems already to have finished the definition of rhetoric (how to speak and write well) before this statement. However he has to embark on a new inquiry because of the question of Phaedrus: “the rhetorical kind seems to me still to elude us”(266c8-9). Then, Socrates enumerates various methods of what is regarded to be “the science of

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<sup>29</sup>Though I do not treat it, later (274B-278B) Socrates suddenly offers a distinction between speaking and writing, and claims that speaking is better than writing. Socrates talks as if they have been distinguished strictly from the beginning of the second part, but that hardly seems to be the case. I will consider this problem in chapter 5, but if I talk about it in advance, it is not whether a speech is spoken or written, but how it is composed that is important. And this is deeply related with the aim of a speaker: namely for instruction or not.

speaking”: first, as Socrates points out, there has to be a ‘preamble’ at the beginning, and secondly, ‘exposition’ and ‘testimonies’ and then ‘proofs’, ‘probabilities’. Socrates vigorously and ironically continues to pick up on techniques like ‘covert allusion’ or ‘indirect praise’. Finally, Socrates refers to ‘recapitulation’ as if these methods had a function which makes speeches well-ordered<sup>30</sup>. But they can be regarded as ordinary rhetorical techniques, to some extent superficial skills<sup>31</sup>. Here, the difference of attitude is really interesting, ironic Socrates and enthusiastic Phaedrus, but now we have to consider what kind of advantage and disadvantage these methods have. This is asked in this following way;

Soc.: Let’s hold what we have more closely up to the light, and see just what the power of the science is which is contained in them.

Ph.: A very forceful power it is, Socrates, when it’s a question of mass gatherings. (268a1-3)

Here, it is clear that these ordinary techniques are efficient in “mass gathering”. This reference implies that these are effective only for the mass, but not for individuals. I mean, these methods seem to have an inflammatory influence on crowds. It is impossible for Socrates to approve of this kind of effectiveness (we must notice that only Phaedrus points out this feature as something good). Socrates warns by saying that “see whether their warp has some gaps in it” (268a5-6). It seems that there are gaps between rhetoric to be found and rhetoric found here.

Then what is the demerit of these methods? Socrates evidently explains by using an analogy with other arts: medicine (268a8-c4), tragedy (268c5-d5) and music (268d6-e6). In each analogy, Socrates posits two groups, true experts and mock experts, the latter shamelessly claiming they are excellent in the field, the former

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<sup>30</sup> The way of listing these skills is interesting because it easily reminds us of the necessity of organic structure in every speech. However, it is obvious that those who use these methods, namely ordinary rhetoricians, do not attach importance to this well-organized structure. They want to just persuade people by focusing on probability. Then, from this way of reference, I think that Socrates seems to try to express a strong ironic feeling and an extreme contrast between true methods (which truly make a speech organic) and trivial methods (mentioned here).

<sup>31</sup> Rowe (1986a)204 says ‘it is worth noticing that he (Socrates) does not explicitly commit himself here (or indeed anywhere else) to the view that all, or indeed any, of the techniques in question are in fact useful towards the proper purposes of the orator’. And Hackforth (1952)143 also comments “the practice of rhetoric... fell far short of anything that would entitle it to the name of a *techné*, a solid scientific accomplishment”. And “the actual catalogue of these *technemata* ... are of little importance.”

easily finding some crucial mistakes made by the latter. In the case of rhetoric (269a5-c5), Adrastus and Pericles are represented as true experts of rhetoric. Socrates thinks that they might reprove Socrates and Phaedrus, and would forgive the false rhetoricians by saying that;

Phaedrus and Socrates, one should not get angry, but be forgiving, if some people who are ignorant of dialectic prove unable to give a definition of what rhetoric is, and as a result of being in this state think that they have discovered rhetoric when they have learned the necessary preliminaries to the science, and believe that when they teach these things to other people they have given them a complete course in rhetoric, and that the matter of putting all of these things persuasively and of arranging the whole, as something involving no difficulty, their pupils must supply in their speeches from their own resources. (269b4-c5)

In this passage, we may find some failures of the false experts, who may be able to deal cleverly with the many trivial techniques mentioned above. They cannot define what rhetoric is and they do not know dialectical method which Socrates thinks of as the genuine rhetorical method (266C, Collection and Division, to be considered in the next section). Actually, they are satisfied with understanding “the necessary preliminaries to the science” which means various artistic and trivial methods. Thus they seem to lack both knowledge and true method. Picking up these points, it is impossible for them to be true rhetoricians.

Their mistakes seem to be clear, but one more aspect should be added. It is their relationship with their pupils. They teach their students only the necessary preliminaries, but they never instruct them in the genuine methods of rhetoric, namely “the matter of putting all of these things persuasively and of arranging the whole” as Pericles might think (I cited above). As a result, their pupils are left without true methods. And it could be easy for them to become the kind of rhetoricians who lack true knowledge and methods, and try to teach their preparatory skill as true rhetoric methods. This harmful influence is immeasurable. What is more, let’s consider the speech which has no appropriate arrangement, given by false rhetoricians. Perhaps this kind of speech will make the audience thoughtless or confused because it has no logical structure. I think it seems to be like an advertisement because it has just an impact on people, making them move without making them think clearly about it.

There are two aspects of these demerits: as mentioned above, one is lack of knowledge and the other is a wrong relationship with other people. They are not just

ignorant, but harmful for their students, or audience, because they teach only preliminaries while being content with their teaching. These two disadvantages seem to be very important if we want to make clear the difference between true rhetoricians and ordinary rhetoricians. I mean, true rhetoricians are competent in these two aspects, namely having knowledge (answer a) and a good relationship with their audience (answer b). Thus, from the consideration above, we may notice that the features of these false experts are completely opposite to the state of true experts.

Then who is a true rhetorician? Socrates imagines that Pericles would list the false points of self-professed rhetoricians. Now let us consider Pericles, who is referred as an able rhetorician in *Phaedrus*. Pericles, as at a glance Plato seems to intend to imply, does not exhibit these kinds of demerit so that he seems to be able to disprove ordinary rhetoric experts. Thus Socrates admires Pericles by saying that

It is not surprising, I suppose, my good fellow, that Pericles turned out to be the most complete of all with respect to rhetoric. (269e1-2)<sup>32</sup>

If so, what feature does Pericles have? From the passage cited before (269b4-c5), being different from ordinary rhetoricians, Pericles appears to be aware of true rhetorical methods and to have sufficient knowledge, and pass on his true rhetorical techniques to people. Especially, he seems to have an ability in “the matter of putting all of these things persuasively and of arranging the whole”. This might mean that he is able to compose his speech “persuasively” as a whole (more persuasively than speeches of ordinary rhetoricians). This concept of “persuasiveness”<sup>33</sup> seems to be important for the consideration of rhetoric in this dialogue. What is “persuasiveness”? What kind of persuasiveness does he seem to have? And then, is this kind of persuasiveness required as a skill of true rhetorician?

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<sup>32</sup> Hackforth (1952)149 affirms that Plato refers to Pericles as ‘oratorical excellence’. And this is a feature ‘which neither Socrates nor Plato would deny’. In addition, de Vries (1969)233 comments that ‘here his (Pericles’) rhetorical gifts are praised’. I admit that Pericles has a kind of oratorical excellence, but whether it is true rhetoric or not is a problem.

<sup>33</sup> *Pithanos* means “persuasive” and this term appears three times in this dialogue: 269c2, c9 and 272d8. The first occasion is in the passage cited above. The second follows the first, and it refers to the person who seems to be a true rhetorician, namely Pericles. The last occasion is in the context which recommends acquiring “what is convincing” rather than truth. Thus this concept of “persuasive” seems to be connected with Pericles and what it is plausible for people to agree to easily.

Let's focus on Pericles more in order to answer the question. Unfortunately, we do not have enough reference to Pericles, but his relationship with Anaxagoras is clearly shown in *Phaedrus*.

All sciences of importance require the addition of babbling and lofty talk about nature; for the relevant high-mindedness and effectiveness in all directions seem to come to a man from some such source as that. This is something that Pericles acquired in addition to his natural ability; for I think because he fell in with Anaxagoras, who was just such a person, and became filled with such lofty talk, and arrived at the nature of mind (*nous*) and the absence of mind, which were the very subjects about which Anaxagoras used to talk so much, he was able to draw from there and apply to the science of speaking what was applicable to it. (269e-270a8)

Here, we may notice some expressions, which do not seem to show simply praise, for example “babbling” or “lofty talk”<sup>34</sup> as problematic terms. However the most noteworthy sentence seems to be that Pericles “arrived at the nature of mind (*nous*) and the absence of mind” after he met Anaxagoras. The praise for Pericles is related to the influence of Anaxagoras<sup>35</sup>. Now we have to remember one of the most famous passages in Plato's dialogues. In *Phaedo*, Socrates frankly expresses his disappointment about Anaxagoras' *nous*. Namely, when Socrates was interested in natural science, he sought for “the cause for everything”. However he could not be satisfied with the explanation of natural science. One day he had a chance to listen to Anaxagoras and he was extremely attracted by his thought about *nous*. Thus, Socrates was eager to obtain the book of Anaxagoras. However,

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<sup>34</sup> de Vries (1969)233 gives a comment that “babbling” was the term which the man in the street used as a matter of course to denote philosophical discussions. And “stargazing (lofty talk)” is “used contemptuously for cosmological speculation”. Plato uses the terms sometimes to characterize his own philosophical occupation, but they show some “proud humility” and some self-irony.

Rowe seems to think that these words are used negatively by comic writers, but used positively by Socrates (Plato). And, now, when he refers to Anaxagoras and Pericles as those who engage in babbling and lofty talk, Socrates just pretends to use positively (namely ironically). See Rowe's comment (1986a)205. These comments show these words are very ambiguous.

<sup>35</sup> Hackforth (1952)149 comments “what Pericles took from him (Anaxagoras) was not a doctrine, but method of viewing thing, of viewing anything”. But I think what is important is not what subject he learnt, but the fact Pericles was taught by Anaxagoras.

This wonderful hope was dashed as I went on reading and saw that the man made no use of Mind (*nous*), nor gave it any responsibility for the management of things, but mentioned as causes air and ether and water and many other strange things. (98C)<sup>36</sup>

This famous passage clearly shows that Socrates has negative feeling toward Anaxagoras. From this fact, we must infer that Socrates' praise for Pericles is doubtful<sup>37</sup>. For, in this context, Pericles is said to learn from Anaxagoras to develop his rhetoric ability. However what happens if the very lesson is not reliable, or more exactly, false from the Socratic point of view? In this case, the persuasiveness mentioned before as Pericles' merit has to be questioned as well. What kind of persuasiveness is it?

Here, we have to remember a kind of rhetoric which Phaedrus continues to insist on. This is based on "probability", not "truth" or "knowledge". This appears repeatedly in the second parts, especially 260A (insisted by Phaedrus) and 272D-273D (assuming that Lysias would assert it). And Phaedrus is eager to affirm that this is very effective and powerful. This kind of rhetoric seems to be different from other kind mentioned before as just dealing with various artificial skills. Those who engaged in this type would have no crucial knowledge. They cannot organize their speech well as Pericles seems to be able to do. However, when the knowledge of Pericles is doubtful, what is based on his speech? It is natural to think it is not knowledge (truth), but "probability" which is similar to knowledge (truth). Then let us see what happens if we trust this "probability" excessively.

This type of speech can be seen especially in a law-court. An interesting example here is: if a weak and brave man beats up a strong cowardly man, the former would have to defend himself. However, at that time, "neither party should speak the truth" (273b6) because the truth appears to be not persuasive for their audience. Who thinks the weak man could defeat the strong man? As a result, each of them has to claim that 'I am right' in an extremely strange way.

The coward (the strong man) should say that he wasn't beaten up by the brave (weak) man single-handed, while the other man should establish that they were on their own together, and should resort to

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<sup>36</sup> The translation of *Phaedo* is from G.M.A.Grube.

<sup>37</sup> "Given what we know of Plato's view of Anaxagoras, the net result is to transform what looks initially like a positive judgment in Pericles into a negative one"(Rowe (1986a)204)

the well-known argument, ‘how could a man like me have assaulted a man like him?’ The coward will certainly not admit his cowardice, but will try to invert some other lie and so perhaps offer an opening for his opponent to refute him (273b6-c4)

Even if they are eager to prove their innocence to win the case, this situation manifestly shows a ridiculous result when people depend on only persuasiveness, not on truth. Namely it is the fact that beaten man intends to testify against himself because he blindly pursues persuasiveness rather than the truth although he is relegated to a very unfavorable position. The strong but coward man has to lie still further in order to cover up his lie, and the weak but brave man just tries to have that poor man’s defects exposed. As a result, the brave (weak) man takes advantage of his foolish testimony, so that he will be able to easily win this case (just using common phrase). The speaker (the beaten man) does not care about the truth, so that the result which his speeches produce is terribly distorted and absurd. And Socrates points out, extremely ironically, “the way to speak ‘scientifically’ will be something like this” (273c4-5)<sup>38</sup>.

Thus, a man who pursues only persuasiveness seems often to put an emphasis on what people naturally think. And this seems to be “easier and shorter” route (272c1) to become a rhetorical expert: “the man who is going to be competent at rhetoric need have nothing to do with the truth about just or good things, or indeed about people who are such by nature or upbringing. For they say that in the law-courts no one cares in the slightest for the truth about these things, but only for what is convincing; and this is what is probable, which is what the man who is going to speak scientifically must pay attention to”(272d4-e2). And “it gives us the entire science” (273a1)<sup>39</sup>. And Socrates thinks this method is learned from “Lysias or anything else” (272c2).

If Lysias is regarded as one of the people involved in this kind of rhetoric, it is proper to look at his speech concerning its truth and influence. First, can we find any truth in his speech? His speech, as we have seen, recommends boys to show affections to non-lovers. But actually, these non-lovers pretend not to love beautiful boys and their outward *sophrosyne* conceals their self-interested thinking. In the previous chapter, we have taken his speech as refused by Socrates’ second speech, which

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<sup>38</sup> The answer of Phaedrus is noteworthy: “Of course (*Ti men*)” (c6).

<sup>39</sup> Phaedrus says that “You have stated just what those who profess to be experts in speaking say” (273a2-3). I think this is only one proper answer of Phaedrus throughout this dialogue.



seems to be described truly as far as Socrates can. Moreover, we may think Lysias wants to make a display of his skill in this paradoxical subject, not to say what he has considered carefully and seriously. But, he is so skilful that he can attract many people, especially Phaedrus. Thus his speech is persuasive and attractive enough for it to be admitted that he is one of the eminent orators in Athens at that time. However he lacks truth and care for his audience<sup>40</sup>, namely answer **a** and **b**.

In addition, what kind of orator do they become, people who go by this easier and shorter route? Socrates picks up Tisias as one of such a kind of people, namely those who “profess to be experts” (273a3). However I think that Pericles can be included in this group, even though there is no speech of Pericles in this dialogue (so that we cannot examine his speech). He seems to be able to compose his speech persuasively and in a well-organized<sup>41</sup> way, so that in that point he seems to be superior to other trifling rhetoricians who can deal with just superficial techniques. However Pericles seems to have no knowledge which gives a basis to true rhetoric because his knowledge is derived from Anaxagoras. Thus, from this fact<sup>42</sup>, his skill of organizing speeches well turns out to be false. Namely, his persuasiveness is just of no value for imitation, and it will collapse in the face of true persuasiveness. Therefore, it is evident that he is never a true rhetorician<sup>43</sup>.

From what we have said so far, we can discover two groups, namely trivial rhetoricians who are skilful at artistic techniques and the class of rhetoricians of some ability who can give their speeches persuasively. But both of them belong to existing

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<sup>40</sup> Griswold (1986)49 rightly points out some faults toward listeners in Lysias’ speech, especially about the result. Namely, the speaker in Lysias’ speech offers favours not only for the speaker himself, but also for the interests of the boy (false beloved one, because the lover of Lysias’ speech is never a true lover), and if the boy accepts his offers, this fact makes him a “self-interested” man like the speaker (false lover). Thus, this kind of speech will spoil the listeners.

<sup>41</sup> Socrates attributes this merit, “arranging the whole”, to Pericles (passage cited before).

<sup>42</sup> We cannot consider his influence within this dialogue because we have no reference. However, if his speech is neither excellent nor true, but he and everyone regard it excellent and true, it is natural to think that this result is not good.

<sup>43</sup> We must remember a criticism of Socrates of Pericles’ political skill in *Gorgias* (515B-517A). Rowe (1986a)204 cites Guthrie’s remarks that ‘to Plato the two [i.e. oratory and statesmanship] cannot be separated’. Compared with Socrates, as a true statesman and true orator, it is necessary to deny that Pericles is true because he seems to lack knowledge and consideration of the people of Athens (see especially 515D-516D in *Gorgias*: “Pericles certainly showed them (citizens) to be wilder than they were when he took them over”). I think this idea is right, but there are opposite comments on Pericles, see note 32.

and ordinary rhetoricians because they commonly have no access to truth and no care for audience. However, it is possible for them, Lysias and Pericles, to be more harmful and terrible than others. For, though they have no certain knowledge, they can give some more persuasive speeches. Moreover, it is confirmed that ordinary rhetoricians have an influence on mass audiences. But, Lysias and Pericles seem to be able to produce a more dreadful effect on an audience. For their false persuasiveness can easily pull the strings of crowds as they please, in spite of their lack of truth.

We have considered ordinary rhetoricians. And now we can identify their general features as the following two aspects: (1) a lack of truth in their speeches and (2) a lack of care about the people to whom their speeches are directed. By contrast, it can be considered that ideal rhetoricians have the following two merits, namely that there is truth in their speeches and that they show consideration to the listeners. In the next section, let us concentrate on the image of ideal and true rhetoricians in *Phaedrus*.

### 3-3 About ideal rhetoric

In the previous section, 3-2, we have seen the failings which ordinary rhetoricians have, namely lack of truth and care. However, they seem to be crucial for excellent speeches, because from the beginning of the latter part of this dialogue, Socrates insists on the importance of truth in any speech.

Well then, for things that are going to be said well and acceptably, at least, mustn't there be knowledge in the mind of the speaker of the truth about whatever he intends to speak about? (259e4-6)

What kind of truth is it? For, as Socrates admits, we can never acquire ultimate truth insofar as we are human beings. This is obvious from the statement of *Apology*<sup>44</sup> of Plato, but there seems to be a reference to this in *Phaedrus*. Namely, Socrates says

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<sup>44</sup> After Socrates accepted the oracle "no one was wiser than Socrates", he often visited someone reputed wise, a politicians, poets, writers and craftsmen. But he just noticed that he was wiser than everyone. For, in the case of a politician, he thought "I am wiser than this man; it is likely that neither of us knows anything worthwhile, but he thinks he knows something when he does not, whereas when I do not know, neither do I think I know; so I am likely to be wiser than he to this small extent, that I do not think I know what I do not know" (21D). Besides this consideration, Socrates clearly said that "what is probable is that in fact the god is wise and that his oracular response meant that human wisdom is worth little or nothing....". Thus Socrates is wise as far as he admits "his wisdom is worthless". Only gods are allowed to achieve truth and be called truly as "wise".

that it is not appropriate to call someone “wise (*sophon*)”, but it seems “to be fitting only in the case of a god” (278d4). And, in the case human beings, we have to call them “a lover of wisdom (*philosophon*)” even if they “know how the truth is” (278c4-5). Perhaps, for this “truth” seems to be always provisional.

In order to answer his question, the following sentence will give a hint: “unless he engages in philosophy sufficiently well he will never be a sufficiently good speaker either about anything” (261a4-5). Namely, if we engage in philosophy, we have the possibility (even if hardly) of gaining this knowledge<sup>45</sup>. (Admitting “our wisdom is worthless” may be the start-point of philosophy, going close to the knowledge.)

In addition, we may note that Socrates treats rhetoric as “leading of the soul (*psychagogia*)” twice (261a8 and 271c10). And, though I shall examine this part later, Socrates describes the ideal speech which “takes a fitting soul” (276e6) and delivers knowledge to a listener, and makes him “as happy as it is possible for a man to be” (277a3-4). It is possible to think there is a deep connection between rhetoric and the souls of audience in this dialogue. Thus, this is also a key idea when we interpret the arguments about rhetoric.

Thus, I think we can take the following two approaches corresponding to the features: truth and soul. They seem to be deeply related with respectively (1) dialectical method (Division and Collection) and (2) inquiry into the soul, so that we shall consider the picture of true rhetorician according to these aspects.

In the first place, we concentrate on dialectical method. Socrates claims that this can be shown in two Socrates’ speeches. But, before that, in order to consider the method, it seems to be better to examine Socrates’ comments on Lysias’ speech.

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<sup>45</sup> Concerning the difficulty of acquiring truth, Griswold (1986)170 ff. presents a question as “the crux of the problem of rhetoric”. Namely, “if a philosopher cannot express in discourse, even to himself, what he contemplates, then he cannot distinguish himself from the zealot or the dogmatist and so ceases to be a philosopher.” I think that what he asks here is whether there is a certain way of distinguishing a true philosopher from a false philosopher (sophist). (In addition, he refers the distinction between “divinely erotic madman” and “humanly erotic madman”.) And the answer can be in the effort of a philosopher. It means, he is not just convinced of what he thinks as true, but “he will be persuaded only if he hears himself giving reasons for what he sees” (p.172). Thus he has to try to “express himself in discourse”. In his attitude, Griswold thinks “rhetoric is already present”. However, Griswold points out that it is difficult for the eager philosopher to avoid making a mistake. To solve the problem, Griswold thinks that Socrates offers “*dialogesthai*” and that this method will be discussed the arguments from the myth of Theuth / Thamus. Finally, if there is a clear distinction between a philosopher and a sophist (false philosopher), it might be the activity of philosopher, namely dialogue.

Compared with it, Socrates shows the advantages of his speeches and the real methods of dialectic which are displayed in his speeches.

At the beginning, Socrates makes Phaedrus repeat the first part of Lysias' speech.

' You know how matters are with me, and you have heard me say how I think it is to our advantage that this should happen; and I claim that I should not fail to achieve what I ask because I happen not to be in love with you. Those in love repent of the services they do when their desire ceases---' (230e6-231a3 in Lysias' speech, 262e1-4 and 263e3-264a3 in second part of *Phaedrus*)

And Socrates properly points out that the subject which Lysias deals with, Love, is a "disputed case" like 'just' and 'good'. It means that Love is something on which "we diverge, and disagree both with each other and with ourselves" (263a9-10).

However Lysias fails to define this disputed subject when he starts his speech. What is more, there is another terrible feature in his speech. Socrates frankly expresses this feature saying that Lysias is "trying to swim through his speech in reverse, on his back". It means that his speech starts with the conclusion of his speech, namely that a boy should show favours to non-lovers. As a result, it is manifest that Lysias' speech has an utterly disorderly structure, because it lacks the definition of the subject, to be placed at the beginning, and instead it starts with the conclusion, which ought to be placed at the end. Socrates describes the situation like this.

Don't the elements of the speech seem to have been thrown in a random heap? Or do you think the second thing he said had to be placed second for some necessary reason, or any of the others where they were? (264b3-5)

Here, two failures in Lysias' speech are pointed out. These are the lack of definition and logical order<sup>46</sup>. Thus we can infer that Socrates' speeches have the advantage in these aspects. And Socrates himself says "there was something in them (Socrates' speeches) which should be noticed by those who wish inquire into speeches" (264e7-8). And this 'something' seems to be two procedures, namely Collection and Division. Collection is explained:

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<sup>46</sup> These features may clarify the aim of Lysias' speech. Repeating the conclusion throughout his speech makes the audience accept it without doubting or arguing. It may help to recall the attitude of Phaedrus at the beginning of *Phaedrus*. He is just impressed by Lysias' speech and eager to remember the whole speech. (228A-E)

There is perceiving together and bringing into one form items that are scattered in many peaces, in order that one can define each thing and make clear whatever it is that one wishes to instruct<sup>47</sup> one's audience about on any occasion. (265d3-5)

What function does this procedure have<sup>48</sup>? Rowe (1986a) 200 says "this does not mean that collection itself provides the definition, but that is necessary preliminary to it". Collection seems to prepare the pre-definition, for example "a kind of desire" or "a kind of madness" (265a6-7)<sup>49</sup> in the case of Love. It is possible to think that Collection prepares the hypothetical definition, through its potential to give a proper beginning. Because of this procedure, a certain definition which both speakers agree with can be arrived at and it enables the speech to be "clear and self-consistent" (265d6-7).

And the explanation of Division is this;

Being able to cut it up again, form by form, according to its natural joints, and not try to break any part into pieces, like an inexpert butcher. (265e1-3)

How does this Division work in Socrates' speeches? Socrates explains that "there were two kinds of madness, the one caused by sickness of a human sort, the other coming about from a divinely caused reversal of our customary ways of behaving." (265a9-11). We have discussed these two kinds of Love in previous chapter. This

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<sup>47</sup> Here, it is noteworthy that Socrates refers to the conception of teaching when he talks about rhetoric. This concept will become important later, especially in the context of written and spoken speeches.

<sup>48</sup> "The first method consists in taking a comprehensive view of the multitude of scattered particulars and bringing them under one general form of notion, for the purpose of defining and so placing out of doubt the nature of the particular subject you wish to give instruction in' (Thompson (1868) 107-8)

<sup>49</sup> Hackforth (1952)133 gives a comment on this procedure of Socrates' speeches. He thinks there is a serious problem. Namely, "Socrates speaks as though the generic concept of madness had been common to his two speeches", but he thinks it is not true. Namely in the first speech, Socrates starts from "hubris" and in the second one "madness". Then Hackforth criticizes Plato for not taking appropriate procedures (Division), but I think the problem of definition can be solved in the following way. First, we notice both concepts mean a situation which "desire surpasses sanity" (as hypothetical definition). And then by Division, what "desire" and "sanity" respectively are, as discussed in the two speeches seems to be more exactly understood. Namely, in the first speech, 'human desire (to pursue for beautiful bodies) which surpasses human sanity' and in second speech, 'divine desire (to remember the truth, Form) which surpasses human sanity'.

Division, Rowe says, means cutting up the genus again “by its natural joints”, until the definiendum is reached (p.200) in this following way.

And just as a single body naturally having the same name, and labeled respectively left and right, so too the two speeches regarded derangement as naturally a single form in us, and the one cut off the part on the left-hand side, then cutting it again, and not giving up until it had found among the parts a love which is, as we say, ‘left-handed’, and abused it with full justice, while the other speech led us to the parts of madness on the right-hand side, and discovering and exhibiting a love which shares the same name as the other, but is divine, it praised it as cause of our greatest goods.(265e4-266b1)

Thus, by the procedure of Division, we can find two kinds of definiendum in Socrates’ speeches: ‘left-handed’ madness and divine madness<sup>50</sup>. Here the hypothetical definition of Love given by Collection, “a kind of madness”, is more exactly defined again. Namely this method enables us to move our inquiry forward. Thus, using both procedures, we seem to have a possibility to pursue truth efficiently<sup>51</sup>. Namely we posit the starting-point (genus or a part of definition) given by Collection, which is agreed to by each speaker and listener. Then, we can acquire a more exact definition through the process of Division<sup>52</sup>.

And, we must notice the relationship between the explanation of Division and well-ordered structure, which Socrates refers to as one of the sufficient conditions of excellent speech, as follows.

Every speech should be put together like a living creature, as it were with a body of its own, so as not to lack either a head or feet, but to have both middle parts and extremities, so written as to fit both each other and the whole. (264c2-5)

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<sup>50</sup> See chapter 2 (especially 2-2 and 2-3). The former has been regarded as “human” madness, which forces people to think wrongly and strongly desire a beautiful body. The latter is divine madness which compels us to desire to remember the truth. Both of them can be characterized as “desire” and “madness”.

<sup>51</sup> Thompson (1868)108 refers two passages of *Cratylus* (386E and 387) as important, because they “show that the method owed its value in Plato’s eyes.... to its power as an engine of positive discovery, and as a means of revealing the thought or plan in Nature which underlies all her phenomena”. And he says “if we remember this, we shall not wonder at the enthusiasm with which Socrates presently speaks of the able dialectician”.

<sup>52</sup> We seem to be able to proceed with our inquiry, based on the new definition given by Division. Thus, these procedures (Collection and Division) enable us achieve a more accurate definition as far as we can.

It is possible to think that Collection prepares a hypothetical definition to start the speech which is like a head, and Division can give speeches an organic structure<sup>53</sup> “just as a single body” to discover a more exact definition. Some scholars<sup>54</sup> are anxious about the way of dividing, namely Plato seems to intend to explain Division as dichotomy but this challenge seems to fail. But I think that it is important not whether the speech is divided in exactly two directions or not, but whether it has a reasonable structure or a logical system which both a speaker and a listener can follow. From this point, Socrates’ two speeches have a proper Division to offer a systematic construction.

Now let’s remember the two faults of Lysias’ speech: the lack of definition and ordered structure. Namely, there is no definition of the subject (Love) at the beginning, and no organic structure because the conclusion is merely repeated over and over again. However, these two procedures mentioned above seem to be able to supply the deficits of Lysias, and more generally of existing orators.

As mentioned above, we can understand how the dialectical method is important when one tries to compose speeches. Using these procedures, we can identify the provisional definition of the subject which we should start from, and the proper and logical structure by which we can discuss clearly and consistently. And they appear when we intend to seek for truth and they help us to acquire a more exact knowledge. Namely, it is crucial that we try to pursue the truth in our own speeches if we are eager to give a splendid speech. The very two procedures are, as Socrates clearly claims “the science of speaking” (266c2-3). And the person who has this science can be regarded as a true rhetorician.

For the purpose of considering this science of speech more, let’s focus, secondly, on inquiry into soul. This can be examined by thinking how one acquires this art. The

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<sup>53</sup> Griswold (1986)181 seriously criticizes this method of Division by saying that “much of the content and significance of the (Socrates’) speech is lost when they are dissected by the butcher’s art”. For example, the explanation of Division never refers to soul as the important theme. Thus, Griswold think “the animal is dead when it is operated upon by the art of definition, division and collection”. I think he regards these arts (Division and Collection) as the feature of written speeches, being comparing with “live activity of *dialegesthai*”. Certainly, actual conversations, and even this dialogue does not have these arts completely. I will deal with this problem in the next chapter. But, I do not admit that the arts or speeches with these arts look like “phantoms”, as Griswold thinks. On the contrary, the kind of speeches is as ultimately ideal as it is nearly impossible.

<sup>54</sup> Hackforth (1952)133 and Hermeias (Thompson (1868)109 refers to him.)

way to learn this science, or how to teach it, is repeated in this dialogue four times<sup>55</sup>, 270d1-7 (a general explanation), 271a4-b5, 271c10-272c8 and 273d8-e4 (I will consider the last passage in the next section). Especially, I will pick up what Socrates says about teaching the science at 271a4-b5.

In that case it is clear that both Thrasymachus and anyone else who seriously teaches a science of rhetoric will first write with complete accuracy and enable us to see whether soul is something which is one and uniform in nature or complex like the form of the body; for this is what we say is to reveal the nature of something.

And in the second place, he will make clear with which of its forms it is its nature to do what, or to have what done to it by what.

And then thirdly, having classified the kinds of speeches and of soul, and the ways in which these are affected, he will go through all the causes, fitting each to each and explaining necessarily results in one being convinced and another not, giving the cause in each case.

This is how to teach the science, but the way of learning is almost the same as to this method<sup>56</sup>. If this method is explained more simply, it is possible to say first that it is a matter of identifying what soul is, secondly of understanding the activity and passivity of soul, and finally of knowing what kinds of speeches and soul there are. All this process is for the purpose of understanding the best way of matching audience (soul) and speeches from the point of view of persuasion. Here, in order to become a competent speaker (or composer), we have to get hold of the nature of both soul and speeches, and the cause of persuading people by giving an efficient speech to a specific kind of soul.

We should remember here the persuasiveness of Pericles and other rhetoricians, in the previous section. The persuasiveness seems to be based on “probability”, because the orator is not interested in truth, but they seem to be able to “arrange the whole” “persuasively”. What difference in persuasiveness is there between ideal orators and existing orators?

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<sup>55</sup> Griswold (1986)196 includes 277b5-c6 as one of the arguments about the way. But this passage is so important that I shall discuss it independently, in the next chapter.

<sup>56</sup> At 270d1-7, those who “want to be experts ourselves and be capable of making others experts” are explained. “First, is the thing (soul, 270e5) ... simple or complex? Next, if it is simple, we should consider... what natural capacity it has for acting and on what, or what capacity it has for being acted upon, and by what; and if it has more forms than one, we should count these, and see in the case of each, as in the case where it had only one, with which of them it is its nature to do what, or with which to have what done to it by what?”



In the ideal case, it is manifest that the way of teaching (learning) rhetoric is deeply connected with “leading of the soul” (one of the necessary things for excellent speeches) because it enables one to show how to persuade people in the most effective way. Therefore, an eminent orator needs to care about not only his speeches, but also the situation of his audience. Namely he does not only concentrate on how to compose his speech well, but also tries to recognize his influence on the audience seriously. This makes it clear that this orator takes the results of his speeches into consideration. He has to consider seriously the effect which his speeches have because a fine speech should bring a fine influence and a fine result on listeners.

By contrast, what is the influence of ordinary orators who lack the truth and lack care for their audience? Even if they can give their speeches “persuasively”, the result apparently is quite different from the result of true oratory. In order to see this, I will pick up a conversation between Socrates and Phaedrus. Socrates offers an example like this;

When an expert in rhetoric who is ignorant of good and evil finds a city in the same condition and tries to persuade it, not by making his eulogy about a miserable donkey as if it were horse, but about what is evil as if it were good, and having applied himself to popular opinions actually persuades the city to do evil instead of good...(260c6-10)

Then Socrates asks “what kind of fruit do you think the (ordinary) expert in rhetoric reaps from the seed he sowed after that persuasion?” Phaedrus replies “it is not very good” (260c10-d2). In this case, what is the aim of the speech? Clearly, it is extremely different from the aim of excellent orators, because persuading people to do bad instead of good is really harmful not only for the audience, but also for the speaker. This kind of speech looks like an empty opinion based on malice (including indifference) and the ignorance of the speaker. Or, the orator wants to show his artistic skill by dealing with a paradoxical and deceptive theme (as in the case of Lysias’ speech). In either case, it is impossible for this kind of speech to have a good influence.

In this section, we have discovered that there are two features which ideal orators have, but ordinary rhetoricians not: (1) well-ordered speech which aims at the truth, and (2) a serious attitude towards his audience. The first one can be based on dialectical methods, Collection and Division, to provide a definition and a logical and

organic structure. And the second feature comes from the inquiry of souls, which enables us to understand the best way of making a match between souls and speeches, to persuade them efficiently.

And the very man who has these features seems to be perfectly able to give an excellent speech with great influence. He can be properly called an ideal rhetorician. And in the next section, I would like to focus on the relation with a true lover described in the former part of this dialogue. It is useful to remember that Socrates says a true lover is a philosopher. And a true rhetorician is also a philosopher, who tries to acquire truth. Thus I think the picture of a philosopher of this dialogue can be clarified by understanding a feature which both a true lover and a true orator have.

### **3-4 The relationship between ideal lovers and ideal orators**

In the previous section, the whole picture of ideal orators has become clear. Next, in this section, I shall try to look for common features which both ideal lovers and ideal orators have. First, let us start with the aspect of truth. If we remember the description of ideal lovers, as discussed in chapter 2, the most characteristic trait is 'divine *sophrosyne*' which enables them to live a well-organized and harmonious life. And those who live such a life are said to be "philosophers" (256a7-b7) who can use their reminder rightly. It means that they can be here modestly with their beloved boys and perceive beauty through these beautiful boys, and try to remember the truth (the Form) as far as they can. And in this chapter 3, true orators turn out to be always conscious of the truth, because if it were not for the intention to acquire truth, they would never need and provide dialectical method, which enables them to make speeches clear and self-consistent. It is necessary for a true rhetorician to pursue truth and have the ability to use a dialectical method. They should be properly called as 'philosophers', and this is supported by Socrates' remark to the effect that if someone intends to speak well, he must "engage in philosophy" (264a4). Both of them connect with truth and they turn to be a philosopher.

In addition, how is the aspect of his attitude to a companion? It will become manifest if we focus on the relationship of ideal lovers and ideal rhetoricians to their beloved and their audience. In the previous section, true orators seem to hope that their speeches will influence their audience well, so that they will improve their life. And in the context of love, as we have seen in 2-5, it is evident that a lover tries to

imitate his god, but the lover is also eager to make his beloved be like his god (in the argument of “becoming like gods”)<sup>57</sup>. Thus, we can also identify the common feature as consideration for their companion: for the audience (listener, interlocutor) in a rhetorical context and for the beloved one in a love context<sup>58</sup>. And, “leading of the soul” seems to point out this function of rhetoric<sup>59</sup>.

Now, I will suggest that “divine” and “*sophrosyne*” may be considered as key terms which enable to show clearly the connection between true lovers and philosopher, true orators. I will examine this idea by concentrating on the way of learning (teaching) the science of speeches at 273d8-e4 (the last example). The passage expresses a kind of summary of how to be a competent orator.

If not, we'll believe what we showed just now, that unless someone counts up the various natures of those who are going to listen to him, and is capable of dividing up the things that are according to their forms and embrace each thing one by one under one kind, he will never be an expert in the science of speaking to the degree possible for mankind. This ability he will never acquire without a great deal of diligent study, which the sensible man ought to work through not for the purpose of speaking and acting in relation to men, but in order to be able both to say what is gratifying to the gods, and to act in everything, so far as he can, in a way which is gratifying to them. (273d7-e8)

This passage says, as I have suggested before, that people who want to be excellent orators should know the kind of soul and things (speeches). For it helps them to be able to persuade people in the most effective way. And here, the sensible man is referred as someone who is eager to acquire the art of speech. This “sensible

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<sup>57</sup> In the context of love, the attitude or change of a lover are shown in singular forms. At 256a7-b7 (one of the most important passage and cited in the previous chapter), the most blessed life of a lover is described, but in the passage we can find plural forms of personal pronouns. For example, “they masters of themselves and orderly in their behaviour” (b1-2), “they become winged and light” (b4) and “they have won the first of the three submissions” (b5). It is plausible that both a lover and a beloved boy are referred to here, because just before this passage, Socrates explains the attitude of a boy loved by a lover. Thus, I think Plato intends to show both a lover and a beloved are promised to live their harmony life and acquire their wings because of Love. We may notice the importance of companionship from this passage.

<sup>58</sup> North (1966)177 comments on lovers and rhetoricians that “the goal of each is ultimately the same: training the soul --- of the beloved in the first section; of the hearer, in the second.” I think that “training the soul” means a kind of instruction, which enables them to be better (from the point of truth).

<sup>59</sup> Griswold (1986)159 says that “the rhetorician is a lover in that he attempts to lead the soul of his beloved”.

man” represents *ton sophrona* (273e6)<sup>60</sup>. Here, we find the relation between lovers and orators again. For, as we have discussed in the previous chapter, true lovers can be characterized by the term *sophrosyne*.

It seems strange that lovers should be referred to in the context about how to be good rhetoricians. However, in order to give speeches most efficiently, orators have to face the individual and take a particular way. True rhetoricians have to get hold of the nature of their listener and give their speech to him in the most appropriate way. “The dialectical expert is engaged in the improvement of particular and different minds and will continue to relate them as particular and different” (Rowe (1990)246). I think this relationship between the true rhetorician and his audience is very similar to that of lovers. For true lovers also must put emphasis on the intellectual aspect, namely to turn the eyes of his companion to truth and to develop their intelligence with the help of their beloved<sup>61</sup> in a private way.

The most important thing in this passage is that both of them are conscious of gods as one which we proceed to. For, true lovers seem to try to become like gods themselves, and here true orators attempt to gratify the gods. In other word, “complete harmony of desire which the gods enjoy” (Rowe (1990)235) for true lovers, and true knowledge of the Forms in the divine region for true rhetoricians. As mentioned so far, it is not too much to say that ideal lovers are equal to ideal orators, and they are “philosophers”. And the very philosopher is, as Plato suggests, Socrates<sup>62</sup>. And actually, if we approach him from both sides, a true lover and a true orator, the real picture of Socrates seems to become clear.

### 3-5 Socrates as a true rhetorician

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<sup>60</sup> The concept of *sophrosyne* appears 16 times in this dialogue. In 10 examples, the term means human *sophrosyne* and in 4 examples it means Idea (Truth) or one of virtue. These meanings have been clear in chapter 2. Of the remaining 2 examples which are in second part of this dialogue, one is here and another is about modest amount of money. I think this *sophrosyne* (discussed here) cannot be understood properly without the concept of Love as “divine *sophrosyne*”.

<sup>61</sup> It means “sensual interplay with the beloved would be merely a first stage, giving way to the higher ‘eroticism’ represented by interchange of an intellectual sort.” (Rowe(1990)242).

<sup>62</sup> North (1966)177 says “both methods of education are intimately connected with the historical Socrates, whose teaching effected the union of *logos* and *eros*”. (Concerning “historical”, North does not seem to give a detailed explanation.)

In this chapter 3, the feature of true rhetoricians has been found clearly through comparison with ordinary orators. The most important points are (1) that speech has to have a well-organized and self-consistent structure in order to reach the truth efficiently, and (2) that orators have to pay attention to the person to whom his speech is directed, and take the result into consideration. The person who fulfils these criteria completely is regarded as a “philosopher”, and he is also a true lover.

Thus, now I think we can give an answer to the questions raised in the first section of this chapter: who, when, to whom, how and why put the true rhetoric into practice. The true rhetoric is practiced by true rhetoricians (more exactly, philosophers), at well-timed opportunity, to their listener (their own interlocutor as his companion), by giving an appropriate and logical speech in order to have the most excellent influence, because they can together reach the truth in efficient way (and this is the true meaning of persuasiveness<sup>63</sup>).

And these things which the true rhetorician does can be regarded as the concrete methods of becoming a true lover, because the true rhetorician can be identified with the true lover. We confirmed only the image of the true lover, but not the actual way of becoming a true lover in the first argument. Then the argument on rhetoric seems to complement the missing part of the argument.

Now we can clarify the subject of the whole argument of the dialogue. From the point of the discussion on Love, the theme might be ideal and well-organized companionship toward truth. And from the point of rhetoric, it might be the most efficient way to acquire truth: dialectical methods and consideration for the partner. Therefore, if we combine these views, we can reach the subject of *Phaedrus*: well-organized companionship to reach truth by using dialectical methods. This is the answer to problem (a): the subject which unites the dialogue.

We believe that Socrates is the philosopher whom Plato rightly identifies: true lover and true rhetorician. Thus, in the next chapter, let's focus on the interaction between Socrates and Phaedrus, because I would like to make clear real features of his speeches and the influence of his speeches on Phaedrus. If Socrates' speech is perfect (and so has the two features mentioned above), Phaedrus will achieve a better state by being given such speeches. Or is there another possibility?

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<sup>63</sup> And, this true persuasiveness seems to be deeply related with teaching. I think the conception of instruction is important for interpreting the argument about written and spoken speech. But this will be discussed in chapter 5.

## 4. The relationship between Socrates and Phaedrus

### 4-1 The perspective of this chapter

So far, we have discussed Love and Rhetoric in *Phaedrus* to clarify the picture of a philosopher. Especially, in the previous chapter about Rhetoric, from the aspect of truth, an ideal speech has a logical structure for everyone involved in the argument to be able to follow and approach the truth as far as they can. And this seems to mean a true “persuasion” which makes the listeners embark on the pursuit of truth efficiently. In addition, from the aspect of care, an excellent speech has a great effect on the audience and makes them better (this means that it enables people to love wisdom, namely to become philosophers). For, a speaker has consideration for the people to whom his speech is directed. The person who can give these kinds of speech seems to be a true rhetorician, namely a true philosopher and a true lover because the true lover is not only a philosopher, but also someone who tries to make his beloved better (i.e. philosophical). And an ideal and moderate companionship might enable him to do that. Thus, we conclude that the dialogue has the subject: the best kind of companionship to reach truth by *logos*. And there is no room for doubt that Socrates is a true philosopher.

First, I think that it is good to call attention to the perspective of this chapter again. For, as I explained in the Introduction, our research is taking a wider and higher perspective, as the arguments proceed. In chapter 2, the three speeches about love have been examined in detail, especially about what Lysias or Socrates try to say. Next, in chapter 3, the arguments which we have considered in chapter 2 have been complemented according to the retrospective perspective. Now, in this chapter, we will focus on the two characters of this dialogue, Socrates and Phaedrus, who engage in the arguments of *Phaedrus*, so that we shall be able to understand what Plato wants to tell us more clearly<sup>64</sup>. And this chapter will deal with problem (b): the influence of Phaedrus as an interlocutor. What kind of influence does he give the argument? And how does Socrates cope with Phaedrus? Throughout this chapter, I try to clarify the

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<sup>64</sup> The next chapter, chapter 5, will have a higher perspective than that of chapter 4. Namely, *Phaedrus* will be considered, not in relation to its argument, the structure or the characters, but to the work itself as a written dialogue.



word and deed of Socrates, and to acquire the clear vision of a philosopher living in the real world.

Thus, in this chapter, first, in 4-2, we are going to concentrate on Phaedrus, especially his intrinsic temperament and his preferences. Then we shall see his attitude as two interruptions. In 4-3, the question how Socrates faces up to Phaedrus will be answered. He seems to manage to deal with the preferences and tendencies of Phaedrus when he gives an argument. Finally, in 4-4, we shall consider whether Socrates' way of speaking can be regarded as ideal one or not. According to this consideration, the relationship between Phaedrus and Socrates becomes evident.

#### **4-2 Phaedrus as an interlocutor**

In this section, let us consider Phaedrus. How is he described by Plato? In the former part of this section, his features, and in the latter part, his concrete attitude are going to be focused on.

In the first place, let us start with his features or tendencies. His characteristic features are well expressed in the beginning of this dialogue (227A-230E). He bumps into Socrates, when he goes outside the wall to take a walk. He has spent all this morning sitting in Epicrates' house where Lysias is staying. And Phaedrus asks Socrates to listen to the speech of Lysias. Socrates is glad to accept his proposal, but he easily sees through Phaedrus' real plan.

When he (Phaedrus) heard Lysias' speech he did not hear it just once, but repeatedly asked him to go through it for him, and Lysias responded readily. But for Phaedrus not even that was enough, and in the end he borrowed the book and examined the things in it which he was most eager to look at, and doing this he sat from sun-up, until he was tired and went for a walk, unless I am much mistaken actually knowing the speech quite off by heart, unless it was rather a long one; and he was going outside the wall to practise it. (228a7-b6)

From this passage, what feature can we notice about Phaedrus? One of most evident features is his love for speeches. He is glad to hear the same speech, and continue to read it as far as he can memorize it<sup>65</sup>. Then, he goes outside in order to try

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<sup>65</sup> His eagerness seems to make him admire speeches which have excellent expressions and language, and memorize them, but not encourage him to have questions about speeches. For example, about Lysias' speech, he asks Lysias to

to put his display of the speech into practice. And, fortunately, he comes across Socrates. This feature also becomes clear from Phaedrus' own statement. He hopes that he can narrate what Lysias composes worthily "more than I would to come into a stack of money" (228a4).

In addition, Phaedrus seems to be presented as a father of speech, which means that he contributes to produce another speech. For example, after reading Lysias' speech, Phaedrus does not fail to catch a word of Socrates, when Socrates is careless enough to say that "I must have heard something" more excellent than Lysias' speech. Then Phaedrus forces Socrates to tell the story. What is more, after Socrates' first speech, Socrates hesitates to continue his speech because he "had a certain feeling of unease" (242c8) during telling his speech. However Phaedrus is eager to try to let Socrates continue. At the time, Socrates frankly expresses his impression on Phaedrus, a bit ironically.

You've a superhuman capacity when it comes to speeches, Phaedrus; you're simply amazing. Of the speeches which there have been during your lifetime, I think that no one has brought more into existence than you, either by making them yourself or by forcing others to make them, in one way or another. ... Just so, now, you seem to me to have become the cause of my making a speech. (242a7-b2, b4-5)

As we gather from this passage, Phaedrus loves to hear a lot of speeches, so that if there is no speech to hear, he does not mind forcing anyone to make speeches. The expression "A man who is sick with passion for hearing people speak" (228b6-7), though it refers to Socrates, seems to describe Phaedrus as well<sup>66</sup>.

As mentioned above, the two particular features of Phaedrus are clear: his somewhat blind eagerness for speeches and his practice of producing more speeches to hear. They are the basic nature of Phaedrus, namely love for speeches. But, before examining his features more, let us focus on the very interesting interlude of this

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repeat his speech to remember it, but he does not seem to ask a question about the problematic theme, "why does a beautiful boy show his affections to a non-lover, not a lover?" And I am going to pick up this problem later.

<sup>66</sup> In addition, we can find the similar expression, for example "a companion in his manic frenzy" (228b7) or "the one in love with speeches" (c1-2). Socrates says as if these expressions show Socrates himself, but it is natural that he implies Phaedrus with sarcasm.



dialogue: the myth of the cicadas (258E-259D). It seems to help us to understand Phaedrus more exactly.

Here, Socrates tells a story about the cicadas being in the Muses' service. Socrates believes that they look down on them, and if he and Phaedrus can engage in conversation in the middle of daytime against the drowsiness, "they may respect us and give us that gift which they have from the gods to give to men" (259b1-2). Then Socrates starts to explain the life of the cicadas.

The story is that these cicadas were once men, belonging to a time before the Muses were born, and that with the birth of the Muses and the appearance of song some of the men of the time were so unhinged by pleasure that in their singing they neglected to eat and drink, and failed to notice that they had died; from them the race of cicadas was afterwards born, with this gift from the Muses, that from their birth they have no need of sustenance, but immediately sing, without food or drink, until they die, and after that go and report to the Muses which among those here honours which of them. (259b6-c6)

If we remember the reference to Phaedrus as "a man who loves the Muses" (259b5), namely a follower of the Muses<sup>67</sup>, this story about the cicadas does not mean just praise, but it includes a bit of criticism<sup>68</sup>. Socrates tries to describe the presence of Phaedrus as one of the very cicadas which devote themselves to hear speeches and does not take care of themselves, moreover does not notice even their death. I think Socrates wants Phaedrus to notice his state through this story. For, Phaedrus seems to

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<sup>67</sup> Griswold (1986)166 comments that "he (Phaedrus) is dedicated to the pleasure of discourse unmixed with the pains and pleasure of the body. ... We thus cannot avoid comparing Phaedrus to the men enthralled by the extent of ignoring nourishment."

<sup>68</sup> It is not easy to judge whether this comparison of Phaedrus with the cicadas is positive or not. The judgments of some commentators differ. De Vries (1969)192-3 gives a comment that "the myth of the cicadas serves as a relaxing intermezzo. But at the same time, some fun is made of Phaedrus' philologia". But Rowe (1986a)194 comments that "I doubt de Vries' suggestion that the comparison with the garrulous cicadas makes fun of Phaedrus, specifically". Certainly, we remember the cicadas are supposed to report to Muses about people who engage in arts (choral dance and so on). Especially in the case of philosophy, the cicadas serve Callipe and Ourania, who represent philosophy and rhetoric (and this connection may point out the relationship between philosophy and rhetoric). Thus, they seem to be positive. But this is the story after they die, and while they are living as human being (not cicadas), they indulge in pleasure of songs, namely just delighting in music and speeches (so, negative meaning). Thus, this seems to show the possibility of change in Phaedrus: as someone can turn into a cicada who devotes himself to Muses, especially Calliope and Ourania, after he dies, Phaedrus will be able to become a true devotee of them (philosophy and rhetoric). But about the change of Phaedrus, we will discuss in the next chapter.

be satisfied with just listening to speeches as far as he forgets everything, without having any doubt about the argument and asking any question.

This attitude of Phaedrus, being content with listening to beautiful speeches without self-examination, seems to clarify his preference and tendency. He does not care whether the speech which he hears with joy is right or false. His attention is paid to whether it is beautiful or not<sup>69</sup>. Phaedrus seems to be glad that the speech is more beautiful “in its language” (234c7)<sup>70</sup> and longer<sup>71</sup>. Griswold (1986)<sup>22</sup> rightly points out the condition of Phaedrus, namely “his interest tends more to the aesthetic”<sup>72</sup>.

In this point, Phaedrus as an interlocutor of Socrates seems to be very peculiar to this dialogue about love and rhetoric. For example, in *Gorgias*, Callicles vigorously offers his own argument and, if it is refused, he gives up the conversation with anger. And, in *Meno*, Meno tries to ask a question which he is very interested in, namely “can virtue be taught?” (70A). Being compared with them, Phaedrus just enjoys hearing any kind of speech (unlike Callicles), whatever the subjects (love or rhetoric) without questions and answers (unlike Meno). The more beautiful speeches he can hear, the happier he is.

The consideration above describes Phaedrus as a person who is intelligent and curious, but a bit passive<sup>73</sup>. He is clever enough to follow any subject which Socrates

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<sup>69</sup> What it more, this beauty does not seem to mean that beauty itself which is described as the true cause of Love in Socrates’ second speech. Certainly it seems to be something beautiful and comfortable which seems to be explained as a wrong cause of love in Lysias’ speech and Socrates’ first speech. Namely, both Socrates and Phaedrus love speeches, but the kind of love seems to be different. The former aims at truth, the latter just something beautiful and comfortable.

<sup>70</sup> This is a merit of Lysias’ speech which Phaedrus refers to. Phaedrus tends to put the emphasis on the way of using language, so later (257A) Socrates confesses that when he gave his second speech, “it was forced to use somewhat poetical language because of Phaedrus” (257a5-6).

<sup>71</sup> When Phaedrus talks about the excellent points of Lysias’ speech, he refers to not only the quality but also the quantity. For example, “do you think any other Greek (than Lysias) would have different things from these to say, which were weightier and more in number, about the same matter?” (234e2-4). Other examples are 235b4-5, 235d6-7 and 236b2. From these parts, Phaedrus seems to tend to put the emphasis on the sophistication and the richness of words, not the content or the truth of any speeches. Thus he seems to be satisfied with listening to beautiful and comfortable speeches; the longer they are, the better, though he can deal with both styles: a long speech and a short conversation.

<sup>72</sup> He comments that “Phaedrus’ love of speeches springs not from a love of the truth but from a love of their form, their shape or appearance. He loves beautiful and rhetorical speeches.”

<sup>73</sup> It is interesting to compare with three qualities to test whether a soul lives rightly or not in *Gorgias*. Socrates uses three expressions to admire the nature of Callicles as

offers, and he intends to accept any kind of speech, but he does not provoke Socrates into examining the argument. He just engages in producing many speeches, especially beautiful (comfortable) and long ones. Griswold (1986)<sup>25</sup> rightly says that “Phaedrus is a somewhat effete and self-indulgent ‘lover of the Muses’, a cultured dabbler in rhetoric”.

Secondly, Phaedrus seems to have another noteworthy feature besides love for speeches. I point to his dependence upon authority. As we have seen so far, we can readily find his preference for Lysias, as “the cleverest of present writers” (228a1-2). Moreover, he refers to a lot of people whom he thinks of as excellent people. So, when they discuss ordinary rhetoricians, especially their trivial skills (266D-268A), Phaedrus is glad to pick up the names of people who are engaged in these skills. For example, “the worthy Theodorus”, “Masterly, Prodicus!” or “But weren’t there some such things of Protagoras?”. There, the difference of attitude between Socrates and Phaedrus is clear. And, at the end of this dialogue, Phaedrus tries to remind Socrates of Isocrates “the beautiful” (278e8)<sup>74</sup>.

In addition, Phaedrus is highly interested in the author or the origin of speeches. This feature seems to be relevant to his reliance on authority. Phaedrus repeatedly asks Socrates the question. For example, when Socrates refers to “men and women of antiquity and wisdom” who can present more excellent speeches than Lysias’, Phaedrus asks Socrates “Who are these people? And where have you heard anything better than this?”(235B-C). Socrates notices this feature and makes Phaedrus pay attention to this feature to correct his attitude<sup>75</sup>. We will discuss this reliance on authority in the next section.

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an adequate interlocutor, namely “knowledge, good will, and frankness” (487A). Being compared with these qualities, Phaedrus is in some extent intelligent (being familiar with modern thoughts and flexible for any subject) and friendly to Socrates. But there is a problem about his frankness. For, he rarely expresses his opinion (if he had) except praise for satisfactory speeches.

<sup>74</sup> Rowe (1986a)215 comments that “One special point in common between Lysias and Isocrates, and one which is particularly relevant to the concerns of the Phaedrus, is that both were essentially writers of speeches.” About Isocrates, I will discuss in the next chapter (especially 5-1) because it clarifies the failure of Phaedrus.

<sup>75</sup> One of most the important and famous examples is 275b5-c4. “Well, my friend, those at the sanctuary of Zeus of Dodona said that words of an oak were the first prophetic utterance. So the men of those days, because they were not wise like you modern, were content because of their simplicity to listen to oak and rock, provided only that they said what was true; but for you, Phaedrus, perhaps it makes a difference who the speaker is and where he comes from: you don’t just consider whether what he says is right or not.”

As I have mentioned above, we can identify two major features of Phaedrus: namely love of speeches and dependence on authority. Then, I would like to raise the next question: what does Phaedrus do in this dialogue? To examine his attitude, let us concentrate on the second part of this dialogue. For, compared with the first part, it takes the form of a conversation, not of long speeches. Thus I suggest we can easily identify the character and contribution of Phaedrus in this part<sup>76</sup>.

Now, I shall focus on his responses to Socrates. Phaedrus' answers seem to change the direction of the argument at two places. Let us to examine them in turn.

The first one is his response to Socrates' second speech at 257B-D (I have referred to this part in the previous chapter briefly). When Socrates has finished his long, divine speech, Phaedrus makes the following comments on his speech.

I join in your prayer for that, Socrates, if indeed it is better for us. For some time I have been amazed at how much finer you managed to make your speech than the one before; so that I'm afraid Lysias will appear wretched to me in comparison, if he really does consent to put up another in competition with it. Indeed, my fine fellow, just recently one of the politicians was abusing him with this very charge, and throughout all his abuse kept calling him a 'speech-writer'; so perhaps we shall find him refraining from writing out of concern for his reputation. (257b7-c7)

His praise of Socrates' speech is just one sentence, namely "for some time I have been amazed at how much finer you managed to make your speech than the one before". Then his concerns soon move to Lysias and speech writing. Here, the rapid shift of themes, from Love to Rhetoric, appears.

What does his attitude show? Phaedrus seems to be satisfied with hearing the speech, so when the speech ends, his attention quickly moves to another speech which he hopes to get from Lysias. Thus there are no questions and answers<sup>77</sup>; he does not

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<sup>76</sup> Griswold (1980)157 says about the second part that "the palinode over, we come tumbling down from the heights to the more familiar earth ... to the level of Phaedrus, in effect."

<sup>77</sup> The lack of questions and answers is also clear at the end of Lysias' speech. And there, we can see the "aesthetic" aspect of Phaedrus as well: love for beautiful speeches. Lysias' speech ends with the following sentence: "So then I think I have said enough; but if you miss something which you think has been left out, ask it." (234c4-5). The phrase "ask it" should be noteworthy because we can see the fact that the speaker (author) encourages the listener (reader) to ask something, even if he requires only additional points besides what he has told. However, Phaedrus' response is quite typical of him: "how does the speech seem to you, Socrates? Does not it seem to you to be extraordinarily well done, especially in its language?" (234c6-7). Certainly, Phaedrus never has a question, but just admires the flowery language.

try to understand with all his might what Socrates tells. I am afraid that this meaning of “fine” which Phaedrus uses is just about the beautiful language, not the argument or truth which Socrates tries to express<sup>78</sup>. Is Phaedrus content merely because he is comfortable?

Next, we shall look at the second intervention of Phaedrus at 266C. As we have seen in chapter 3, before this interruption, Socrates has completed the definition of ideal rhetoric. But Phaedrus gets a word in edgeways.

.... But you seem to me to call this kind of thing (i.e. what they have argued so far: the science of speaking) by the right name, when you call it dialectical; the rhetorical kind seems to me still to elude us. (266c8-9)

Here, this expression of Phaedrus clearly shows he cannot follow Socrates, even if he has given positive responses to Socrates so far. As a result, Socrates has to start with the arguments about the skills of rhetoricians, though ironically<sup>79</sup> because he thinks of them as false. For example, he refers to the skills which Phaedrus is very interested in as just “the refinements of the science” (266d9). Besides, at 277A-D, the responses of Phaedrus clearly reveal his poor understanding. There, Socrates summarizes the ideas which he has described so far.

Soc: Then now, Phaedrus, we can decide those other issues, since we have agreed about those.

Ph: What are they?

Soc: The ones we wanted to look into, which brought us to our present conclusion: ...

Ph: I thought so; but remind me again how<sup>80</sup>.

...

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<sup>78</sup> And this anxiety comes true as the argument proceeds. First, we can notice Phaedrus’ misunderstanding about Socrates’ arguments in this section. Moreover, in the next chapter, it will be clarified that Phaedrus seems to confuse the thoughts of Socrates and Isocrates.

<sup>79</sup> At 267D-268A, when Socrates has picked up some trivial skills, he asks Phaedrus “anything else you can add on the subject of speaking scientifically”. So, Phaedrus answers “only small things, and not worth mentioning”. But, when we take the enthusiastic attitude of Phaedrus into consideration, this answer seems to mean not having no important things, but showing modesty about saying what he knows, namely “I know only small things and not worth mentioning, but...”. He seems to want to refer to some skills which he knows and Socrates fails to refer to. Thus, Socrates cruelly and ironically prevents him from referring to them, by saying “then let’s leave the small points”.

<sup>80</sup> De Vries (1969)257 comments “Phaedrus assents, but does not really know what he assents to.”

Soc: And what about the matter of its being fine or shameful to give speeches and write them, and the circumstances under which it would rightly be called a disgrace or not? Hasn't what we said a little earlier shown ---

Ph: What are you referring to?

Soc: Hasn't it shown that....<sup>81</sup>.

From these passages, Phaedrus does not seem to understand what Socrates is eager to tell him. He seems to pretend to understand it, but his understanding is very superficial<sup>82</sup>, though. He just hears what Socrates says, but does not reach any deep understanding of it<sup>83</sup>. Thus, he does not seem to mind about interrupting the argument

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<sup>81</sup> Socrates' statements after the last question of Phaedrus cited seem to hint at a little irritation. Hackforth (1962)161 comments "Socrates continues his sentence as though there had been no interruption" (of Phaedrus).

<sup>82</sup> Some commentators (Hackforth, Heath) believe that Phaedrus has changed throughout this dialogue. The most important evidence seems to be Phaedrus' response at 276A. There, Socrates describes "a legitimate brother" of speeches (logos) as the following: "The one that is written together with knowledge in the soul of the learner, capable of defending itself, and knowing how to speak and keep silent in relation to the people it should". Phaedrus expresses his agreement with it and says, "You mean the living and animate speech of the man who knows, of which written speech would rightly be called a kind of phantom." Here, clearly he replies correctly. But what if this answer is cited from a famous rhetorician? We can find a similar statement in a book, *On those who write written speeches* or *On sophists* by Alcidas. In this book, we can find this sentence: "And I do not think it is right that speeches written down should even be called speeches, but should be thought of as images (eidola, phantom) and patterns and imitation of speeches, and we could reasonably have the same opinion about them as we have about bronze statues and stone monuments and depictions of animals. For, just as these are imitations of real bodies and give delight to the view but offer no use in human life" (27). From this passage, especially the way it uses the word "eidola", it seems that Phaedrus uses this idea as if it were his own. If it is true that he plagiarizes from Alcidas' work (and Plato intends to describe him that way), it may show not only Phaedrus' reliance on a famous rhetorician, but also the fact that Phaedrus still sticks to the ordinary (non-Socratic) rhetoric. Thus, though Phaedrus refers to "the man who knows", it is highly possible that this knowledge does not mean Socrates "knowledge". This problem will be examined in the next chapter, especially focusing on the relationship with Isocrates.

<sup>83</sup> Even if Phaedrus shows a proper response, it seems to be better that we think of it carefully. For example, at 278b5-6, Phaedrus agrees with Socrates by saying that "quite definitely I wish and pray for what you say." De Vries (1969)260 hesitates to say "at least Phaedrus seems to have been seriously "converted"", but continues to comment "some doubts remains about the degree of his understanding." Moreover, at 277c7, Phaedrus also agrees with Socrates: "absolutely; that was just about how it appeared to us (*pantapasi men oun touto ge outo pos ephane*)". We can notice there are many expressions to emphasize. However, if Phaedrus does not understand what Socrates says at all, these expressions give us some ironic and ridiculous implications.

with his improper questions, but he fails to offer appropriate questions when they are needed.

Why does Plato choose Phaedrus as Socrates' respondent in this dialogue? For, as we have considered, we can notice a great number mistakes or misunderstandings on his part. It is difficult to solve this problem, but Phaedrus seems to be perhaps the most appropriate person, when Plato is dealing with Love and Rhetoric at the same time, because of his love for speeches (logos). But we shall consider this problem well later in 4-4.

Here, it seems interesting to try to compare his love with Socrates' kind. In the case of Phaedrus, this love is similar to that of Lysias and Socrates' first speech. He seeks for beautiful speeches, but it is for his satisfaction, not for inquiry for truth as in Socrates' case. Socrates notices Phaedrus' tendencies, and he seems to try to convert Phaedrus to philosophy by managing to use effective way of speaking.

However, this is incredibly hard, for Phaedrus just enjoys listening to speeches which deal with any kind of subject. How does Socrates cope with that? And what is the most efficient and influential speech for this kind of people, people like Phaedrus? In the next section, we shall concentrate on Socrates' relationship to Phaedrus to answer the questions.

### **4-3 Socrates' relationship to Phaedrus**

In the previous section, we have considered the features of Phaedrus described in this dialogue, namely his passion for speeches and dependence on authority. He tends to like hearing speeches composed of beautiful languages, but not to be eager to understand the arguments seriously. Now, in this section, let us focus on the attitude of Socrates<sup>84</sup> towards a Phaedrus who has these features.

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<sup>84</sup> The general features of Socrates in *Phaedrus* are the following: "He is poor, goes bare foot, is given to self-depreciation and mock-respect for persons of repute, urbane and lively, prone to word-play, eager for discussion but conscious of his own ignorance, even on the subject of Love on which elsewhere he proclaims himself an expert" (Hackforth (1952)13). And de Vries (1969)5 gives some interesting comments about Socrates' portrait.

And I have not dealt with "a susceptibility to the influence of external Nature" as "one new feature" of Socrates (Hackforth (1952)14). It seems to be very interesting when we think of Socrates' second speech (243E-257B) or his last prayer to local gods (278B-279C).

First, how does Socrates deal with Phaedrus' love of speeches, as it is described at the beginning of this dialogue? For example, in responding to the request of Phaedrus, Socrates offers his first speech and his second speech to withdraw the first one and to compensate for his sin. Then, in response to the irrelevant question of Phaedrus, Socrates has to start with the argument about rhetoric. Socrates' key feature will be evident especially in the arguments about rhetoric.

Socrates tells the story of the cicadas and a story about Thamus and Theuth in Egypt. In the previous section, we have considered the story of cicadas. What makes Socrates tell this story? Before the beginning of the story, Phaedrus enthusiastically expresses his opinion about engaging in speeches in the following way.

You really ask if we need to (examine rhetoricians in respect of writing acceptably or not acceptably)? What would anyone live for, if I may put it as strongly as that, if not for such pleasures as this? Not, I think, for those which have to be preceded by pain if one is to enjoy pleasure at all – a feature possessed by nearly all the pleasures relating to the body; which is why indeed they are rightly called slavish. (258e1-5)

In this passage, the “this” in the second line means examining all speakers to consider the problem that is “what is the way to write acceptably, or not acceptably?” (258d7). And Phaedrus calls it “pleasure”<sup>85</sup>. Then Socrates begins to telling this story about the cicadas<sup>86</sup>, which “were so unhinged by pleasure that in their singing they neglected to eat and drink, and failed to notice that they had died” (259b8-c2). Thus, here, I suppose that Socrates tries to have Phaedrus notice his state, because he is clearly proud of his pleasure being contrasted with other “slavish” pleasures. Certainly it seems to be better than them, but not best, because his pleasure does not

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<sup>85</sup> At the almost end of this dialogue (276D-E), when Socrates and Phaedrus talk about “amusement” (we will discuss in the next chapter), it is impressive that Phaedrus is excited to say “a very fine form of amusement it is you’re talking of (writing for amusement, as a reminder for himself or anyone who is following the same track), Socrates, in contrast with a mean one (drinking and so on).” Here, Phaedrus regards someone as excellent who “is able to amuse himself with words, telling stories about justice and the other subjects you speak of.” From this statement, we can know that Phaedrus thinks indulging in writing or telling speeches is pleasure and “fine”. (Phaedrus does not seem to change throughout this dialogue as well. See 5-1.)

<sup>86</sup> This story is a digression from the argument about rhetoric, and even if there is not this story, we have no trouble to understand the argument of rhetoric: The part after this story can easily be connected with the part before this story. Therefore, this digression is not a crucial part of the argument to interpret, but it seems to be related with Phaedrus personally: this is especially for Phaedrus.



include serious attention to himself or deep understanding of any speech, but just pure enjoyment. Especially, one of the most crucial points seems to be that, when he indulges in the pleasure, he forgets himself. Therefore Socrates warns Phaedrus about his attitude, of just enjoying speeches or something about speeches, by using the most efficient way for him: telling a story.

Next, what of the story of Thamus and Theuth in Egypt? This story is at the beginning of the new stage of the argument on rhetoric, as we move from the argument about “in what way it is acceptable to make and write a speech, and in what way it is not?” (259e2) to the one about “the subject of propriety and impropriety in writing”, namely “in what way, when it is done, it will be done acceptably, and in what way improperly”(274b6-7). In other words, the important point is put on “writing”, not “speaking and writing”. Here, Socrates seems to offer the story to effect the transition of the subject. By telling the story, which clearly conveys the criticism of writing (deep dependence on letters), Socrates can efficiently bring Phaedrus to recognise a change of subject.

What is more, Socrates’ use of examples to explain things seems to be one of the efficient methods of encouraging Phaedrus to understand readily at 262C-266D.

Soc: So do you want to take the speech of Lysias which you are carrying with you, and the ones I made, and see in them something of the features which we say are scientific and unscientific?

Ph: More than anything; as things are, our discussion is somewhat bare, because we do not have sufficient examples. (266c6-9)

Phaedrus frankly confesses a weakness at understanding abstract thinking. Then Socrates agrees to accept his proposal, and makes him read the beginning of Lysias’ speech twice. Basing himself on that, Socrates makes clear the failings of the speech. In order to acquire understanding and agreement from Phaedrus, Socrates is happy to use a concrete example.

As we have seen so far, in responding to Phaedrus’ love of speeches, Socrates is willing to tell a story, use an example and repeat the same things<sup>87</sup> to make Phaedrus

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<sup>87</sup> In this case, Socrates makes Phaedrus read the beginning of Lysias’ speech twice; but there is also a case where Socrates himself repeats his opinion. Thus, the passage about the inquiry on soul appears four times (270d1-7, 271a4-b5, 271c10-272c8 and 273d 8-e4) in the *Phaedrus*. About this passage, we have already seen in 3-3. Some of the passages are about how to reach the science of rhetoric, and some are about the way of learning, but the content seems to be similar. The purpose of repeating seems

understand truly and rightly. These seem to be the most effective ways to persuade him, or to educate him<sup>88</sup>. And they are suitable only for Phaedrus, who loves speeches passionately, but does not prepare himself for philosophical arguments. In other words, in Phaedrus' case, telling a story or giving an example might be substituted for logical and abstract arguments. Perhaps, each person has his own way of understanding.

Secondly, how does Socrates deal with reliance on authority? Socrates recognizes his tendency, and I think that he makes use of it to persuade him more efficiently. For example, as we have considered before, Phaedrus respects Lysias from the bottom of his heart, and Socrates notices his feeling, so that he picks up Lysias' speech repeatedly, and makes Phaedrus himself think through the failings of the speech. This is a more effective way to persuade him than if Socrates tried to enumerate the demerits of Lysias and show them to Phaedrus. For, if he did that, it would not be easy for Phaedrus to change his opinion<sup>89</sup>, the danger being that Phaedrus would be inclined to stick to his opinion and admire Lysias more and more, against Socrates' hope.

Let us consider another example. In the second part of this dialogue, Socrates repeatedly says that a grasp of truth is necessary for making a good speech. And he refers to Tisias as a representative of those who say that "probability" is more important than truth when people want to speak well. There, Socrates confirms that

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to be also to acquire the right understanding from Phaedrus, and emphasize Socrates' statement efficiently.

<sup>88</sup> On the transition from Socrates' first speech to his second, Griswold (1986)72 comments "since he (Socrates) wishes to educate Phaedrus, Socrates first cites an example based on another opinion": "if a man of noble and gentle character who had experienced love of a similar person overheard the previous speeches, he would judge the speakers to be not free and the speeches to be sailor's talk". I think this example seems to enable the listener to understand what he says. In this case, by using this example, we can easily notice that the former speech has less value.

<sup>89</sup> In 272C, when Socrates talks about "easier and shorter route" (see chapter 3), Socrates asks Phaedrus: "if you have any help to give from what you have heard from Lysias or any else (about the easier and shorter route, namely ordinary rhetoric), try to remember and tell me". But Phaedrus rejects the request: "If it depends on trying, I would; but as things are I'm just not in a position to help." Then, Socrates decides to tell something he has heard; but before that, he says "the saying goes, Phaedrus, that it's right to give the wolf's side of the case as well."

This conversation is very interesting when we think of their relationship. Clearly, Phaedrus seems to be sensitive to any criticism toward Lysias, thus he might reject Socrates' offer. Then, Socrates regards Lysias as "wolf's side" ironically. From this case, Phaedrus' love for Lysias is so strong that Socrates seems to try to make Phaedrus notice Lysias' disadvantages indirectly.

Phaedrus has gone over to Tisias (273a4). And Socrates rejects the idea of Tisias completely (273A-274A). In this case, I think that Socrates seems to believe that it is more efficient to controvert Tisias as an authority, not Phaedrus himself.

We have considered how Socrates deals with two tendencies of Phaedrus. Socrates seems to try to communicate with Phaedrus and tell him what he really wants to say, dealing with Phaedrus' tendencies: Socrates is willing to tell a story, to refer to authority<sup>90</sup> and to emphasize the same argument for the purpose of making Phaedrus understand better<sup>91</sup>.

However, now, we need to discuss Socrates' way of speaking. For, as we have seen in the previous chapter, Socrates insists on the ideal rhetoric which has a well-organized structure for reaching truth. But, when we look at Socrates' way of speaking, we see that there is a considerable difference between what he thinks of as ideal and what he actually does. For there is no dialectical method which is described as Collection and Division, in his conversation with Phaedrus.

If, as we said at the end of chapter 3, a true rhetorician can give an ideal speech, and the rhetorician is a philosopher, namely Socrates, how can we solve this problem? In order to answer this question, we need to consider the second aspect of a true rhetorician, namely care for his audience. From this aspect, the attitude of Socrates is striking because he considers Phaedrus seriously. Socrates always struggles with Phaedrus, because Phaedrus tends to admire a beautiful way of using language, and to ignore the content of what the author wants to say.

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<sup>90</sup> This feature of Phaedrus appears several times in the *Phaedrus*. Whenever Socrates notices it, he does not forget to ask Phaedrus not to do it. For example, when Socrates refers to medicine in order to clarify what true rhetoric is by saying that "the method of the science of medicine is, I suppose, the same as that of the science of rhetoric"(270b1-2), the conversation between them is as follows:

Soc: Then do you think it is possible to understand the nature of soul satisfactorily without understanding the nature of the whole?

Ph: If one is to place any reliance in Hippocrates the Asclepiad, one can't understand about the body either without this procedure.

Soc: And he's right, my friend; but besides Hippocrates we should examine our account to see if it agrees with him. (270c1-5)

Here, we may notice what Phaedrus thinks an account as true, basing himself not on truth but on reliance in Hippocrates. Thus here, first of all Socrates draws Phaedrus' attention to his tendency to follow what famous people say blindly, and tries to correct it.

<sup>91</sup> Besides it, Socrates seems to intend to tell a long speech for Phaedrus (see 234e3, 235b4-5, 235d6-7 and 236b2), for example, Socrates' second speech.

#### 4-4 Socrates' speech especially for Phaedrus

In the previous section, a severe problem faced us: is it possible or not for Socrates as a true philosopher to give non-ideal speeches? Socrates does not in fact seem to follow the rule for producing good speeches, namely structure organized by Division and Collection for the reaching of truth. However we have noticed that he cares sincerely about Phaedrus and his tendencies. In this section, let us concentrate on the fact that what Socrates says is directed to Phaedrus.

First, we shall consider the condition of Phaedrus. In particular, he has two preferences, one for speeches and the other for authority. That is, Phaedrus likes beautiful language and tends to depend on what well-known people say. Then, Phaedrus frankly expresses his lack of understanding in relation to abstract arguments. To put it another way, Phaedrus is not sufficient to be a partner of Socrates and to be engaged by a speech developed by dialectical method (Division and Collection). Let us ask the question: what does Plato tell us (the readers) by using this kind of character as Socrates' interlocutor? What does Plato want to say by selecting Phaedrus, who is very interested in speeches, but very dependent on authority?

If Plato intends to represent Socrates as a true philosopher, namely as a true follower of Zeus, how should we think of Phaedrus? Socrates cares for Phaedrus and speaks only to him. The activity ought to be one like the following.

And so those who belong to Zeus seek that the one they love should be someone like Zeus in respect of his soul; so they look to see whether he is naturally disposed towards philosophy and towards leadership, and when they have found him and fall in love they do everything to make him of such a kind. (252e1-5)

Socrates' devotion to Phaedrus seems to be similar to the attitude of this follower of Zeus<sup>92</sup>. Once he recognizes a character in his beloved, for example love of *logos*, he tries to expose it clearly as far as he can. Here, Phaedrus can be understood as someone who has not started with philosophy yet. He seems to be preparatory to

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<sup>92</sup> However de Vries (1969)6 rightly comments "Nor is there any foundation for the belief which establishes erotic links between Phaedrus and Socrates or Plato." In this case, Socrates is for a follower of Zeus (a true lover) and Phaedrus for beloved one. But we do not need to assume that Socrates really loves Phaedrus. Here, Socrates faces Phaedrus as if he were a true lover of Phaedrus, to improve Phaedrus as a philosopher (or make him into one). Socrates' way of loving can be said as "Platonic Love": loving philosophically, not erotically.

philosophy. More exactly, Socrates seems to concentrate on the love of speeches (logos) and he attempts to see if Phaedrus has an inherent potential for philosophy.

Phaedrus seems to cause the way of speaking which Socrates displays in the second part of this dialogue. That is, Socrates tries to persuade Phaedrus in the way most suited to his preferences<sup>93</sup>, so that Phaedrus will be embarking himself in philosophy. Is this speech of Socrates an ideal one or not? To answer this question, let us focus on the passage (277b5-c6) in which Socrates talks about the way to be an excellent orator. It seems to be a summary in the last part of dialogue.

Until a man knows the truth about each of the things about which he speaks or writes, and becomes capable of defining the whole by itself, and having defined it, knows how to cut it up again according to its forms until it can no longer be cut; and until he has reached an understanding of the nature of soul along the same lines, discovering the form which fits each nature, and so arranges and orders his speech, offering a complex soul complex speeches containing all the modes, and simple speeches to a simple soul – not before then will he be capable of pursuing the making of speeches as a whole in a scientific way, to the degree that its nature allows, whether for the purpose of teaching or persuading, as the whole of our previous argument has indicated.

In the first part of this passage, we can notice that Collection and Division are referred to, that is, “defining the whole” as Collection and “cutting it up again according to its forms until it can no longer be cut” as Division. Then, in the same way, the nature of soul has to be considered. Finally, we have to “arrange and order” speeches to match the soul of audience. This passage clearly describes the whole way of acquiring the ability to speak scientifically, in other words, dialectical method and the care for soul.

It is noteworthy that the passage about care for soul is repeated for emphasis, that is, “offering a complex soul complex speeches containing all the modes, and simple speeches to a simple soul”. Here, Socrates clarifies the importance of giving speeches to suitable souls. And this sentence offers important evidence about the attitude of

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<sup>93</sup> Griswold(1980)534 comments “the development of the *Phaedrus* ... could be explained in the light of Socrates’ efforts to persuade Phaedrus in various ways” and “Socrates’ philosophical discourse is formed or stylized in accordance with the soul he is addressing.” Griswold continues to explain these comments to say “Socrates’ two speeches are narrated for the sake of (because of) Phaedrus. Since Phaedrus is plainly unaffected by Socrates’ spectacular myth, Socrates suddenly shifts his style of discourse to arguments about the nature of rhetoric. Phaedrus appears to be more affected by this style and more interested in this topic.”

Socrates, so helping to give an answer to the question what whether the speech of Socrates is excellent or not. To clarify it, let us look at the comment about 277c2-3 of Rowe (1986a) 212-3.

He comments that the terms of “simple” and “complex (variegated)” does not mean “simplicity and complexity in 270b ff”, but they are equal to the meaning in 230a3-6.

I inquire – as I said just now – not into these but into myself, to see whether I am actually a beast more complex and more violent than Typhon, or both a tamer and a simpler creature, sharing some divine and un-Typhonic portion by nature. (230a3-6)

The distinction between a complex soul and a simple soul depends on whether it has a divine feature or not, because “every soul is in principle complex” (it consists of three parts). Here, let us remember the argument in section 2-5. In this section, the state of soul which is truly in love was considered. The kind of soul is ruled rightly by the charioteer, namely reason, and has a harmonious state as if it were a divine soul<sup>94</sup>. This is a “simple soul” and the person who has this kind of soul is truly a philosopher. Contrary, a “complex” soul means one which is influenced by other parts of soul and has no well-organised state. Thus non-philosophical people who cannot reach the divine situation (true love) have a “complex” soul.

If we base ourselves on this consideration, “offering a complex soul complex speeches” seems to mean “offering non-philosophical people non-philosophical speeches”<sup>95</sup>. Now, it seems to be possible to judge the attitude of Socrates toward Phaedrus. As we have seen so far, Phaedrus’ preferences and tendencies seem to show fact that he has non-a philosophical (complex) soul. So, Socrates, who identifies him correctly, gives Phaedrus complex speeches, which enable him to cope with the non-

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<sup>94</sup> Rowe (1986a)213 rightly comments “if speeches are to match souls, a ‘simple’ speech for a ‘simple’ soul will address itself to the ruling rational element alone, while a ‘variegated’ speech, for the variegated soul, will be forced to speak to all the elements in it, including the worst”.

<sup>95</sup> Rowe (1986a)212 says about the concept of a ‘variegated’ soul, that this is related to “the description of the democratic state and the corresponding type of individual in *Republic VIII*: the democratic state is ‘like a *poikilos*’ garment..., variegated with all types of characters (557c); so too the democratic individual (561e), whose way of life is marked by his giving equal status to all his desires, with no distinction between good and bad (588c ff).” And Griswold (1986)25 comments about this state of Phaedrus that he is “a cultivated dabbler in rhetoric, materialistic physics, and medicine”.

rational parts. That is, he tells a story, refers to famous people (to reject their idea), uses concrete examples and repeats the same argument. All of them seem to be highly suitable for Phaedrus' complexity<sup>96</sup>.

As mentioned so far, Socrates gives speeches corresponding to Phaedrus, so that he seems to disobey the rule that a speech should employ. Division and Collection should include a definition and a clear structure generally. However, he tries to acquire the best result to give speeches in the most efficient and suitable way for Phaedrus. What is the result? It ought to make Phaedrus someone who is suitable for using dialectical methods and proceeding to truth together with Socrates. This prepares the base for Phaedrus to embark on quest for truth. Then it results that Phaedrus will become a philosopher in the future<sup>97</sup>. Therefore Socrates' attempt is actually the activity of a true follower of Zeus, a true lover and rhetorician.

Is this way ideal or not? This judgement seems to be difficult because it lacks one of the conditions for ideal speeches<sup>98</sup>, which has been clarified in the previous chapter. However, it is convincing that the choice of Socrates is the best for a philosopher living in the actual (non ideal) world<sup>99</sup>. A philosopher living in the world is never in

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<sup>96</sup> It seems to result that Socrates' speech is non-philosophical, but it would be too hasty to reach the assumption. We have to focus not on the fact that Socrates does not give a philosophical way of speech, but the fact that Socrates tries to deal with Phaedrus, who has a complex soul, therefore Socrates has to use a non-philosophical way of speaking. It is difficult to clarify the meaning of the "non-philosophical way." But, here, I think of it as a lack of Division and Collection (in other words, a lack of definition or organic structure.)

<sup>97</sup> By offering a complex soul complex speeches, someone who has a complex soul does not seem to directly change into someone who has a simple soul: philosophical soul. And, even if someone offers a suitable speech, the listener does not seem to change so quickly. However, I think, it has a great possibility to improve the listener in the long view.

<sup>98</sup> The gap between the picture of ideal speeches and the way which Socrates shows seems cause the difficulty of interpretation of this dialogue like "the Gothic art" which de Vries (1969)22 cites from Shorey. This serious problem, namely the complex structure of this dialogue will be dealt with in the next chapter.

<sup>99</sup> Compared with written works, Socrates maintains that spoken speeches are excellent at 274B-278B. Socrates explains the superiority as an earnest attitude for speeches. (It is very interesting to compare with the concept of "amusement", which is repeated in this dialogue. See the next chapter.) First, Socrates defines ideal speeches as "one that is written together with knowledge in the soul of the listener, capable of defending itself, and knowing how to speak and keep silent in relation to the people it should" (276a5-7). Moreover, he hopes that the man who will give speeches should "make use of the science of dialectic, and taking a fitting soul plants and sows in it words accompanied by knowledge" (276e5-7). From these statements, Socrates wants to put more emphasis on offering suitable speeches to souls, than using strictly Division and Collection. Here, Socrates seems to think of flexibility as

the situation where everyone around him has a high intellect, frankness to say what they think and eagerness for conversation (question and answer style). Actually people misunderstand, people lie and people hate. Plato vividly describes the philosopher who manages to express what he thinks and improve his listeners in this actual world.

And as we have considered above, we seem to be able to answer the problem (b): the influence of Phaedrus. Coping with Phaedrus' non-philosophical character, Socrates has to have a great difficulty, so that his way of speaking looks irregular as we have seen. I think that Plato might choose Phaedrus as an interlocutor because of a representative of the common (non-philosophical) people living in the world.

The next question is whether Socrates' struggle can have a good influence on Phaedrus or not. In order to answer the question, in the next chapter, let us focus on the state of Phaedrus. If the argument which we have considered so far is right, we ought to find that Phaedrus converts his way of life and wants to be a philosopher like Socrates. Does Phaedrus become a philosopher or not?

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more important. (And, in the second part of this dialogue, Division and Collection are discussed just once, but there are so many references to inquiry into soul.)



## 5. Problem of the *Phaedrus*

### 5-1 Is there change in *Phaedrus*?

In this chapter, we shall take a wider perspective on the dialogue. We have considered the arguments of Love and Rhetoric respectively in chapters 2 and 3. Then, we proceeded to discuss the attitude of Phaedrus and Socrates, who are the characters of this dialogue. Finally, as a further stage, let us focus on what the author (Plato) intends to express by writing this dialogue.

To begin, it will be helpful to have a review of the previous chapter. We have seen the unique features of Phaedrus, namely his passion for speeches and his reliance on authority, and Socrates' relationship to Phaedrus. More exactly, Phaedrus loves to listen to any beautiful speech somewhat blindly (i.e. he does not seem to care about the truth) and he is eager to produce more speeches. And, he is inclined to depend on what famous people say and to want to know who the speaker is or what the origin of a speech is. In response to this attitude, Socrates tries to find an adequate way of talking to Phaedrus. To suit Phaedrus' taste, Socrates is willing to tell a story, to offer an example and to repeat the same argument in order to make Phaedrus understand what he wants to say. As a result, the form of Socrates' speaking is not strictly an ideal one, because it has no organic and well-organized structure<sup>100</sup>. However, Socrates' attempt may be as close to "ideal" as far as he, a philosopher living in the actual world, can manage.

This was what we concluded in the previous chapter, and if it is true, we should be able to recognize the influence on Phaedrus. In other words, if Socrates can succeed in persuading Phaedrus, and Phaedrus understands properly what Socrates wants to say, Phaedrus will need to abandon his special features, love for speeches and authority, and to embark on the search for the truth, namely philosophy. Now, let us look at his attitude at the end of this dialogue to see the result.

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<sup>100</sup> As I pointed out a note in the previous chapter, the lack of organic structure is not a proper reason for concluding that Socrates' way of speaking is non-philosophical. But now his speech is directed to the one who has non-philosophical soul, so he has to choose that way. (If he offers philosophical way to the person who is non-philosophical, it also seems to be inappropriate because the person might not be persuaded. In this case, it is not an ideal speech either.)

As we have seen in chapter 4, Phaedrus does not hesitate to show his misunderstanding of Socrates' argument. That is, from 277A to E, we can see the fact that Phaedrus has not understood what Socrates has said so far. At that point, Socrates has completed his case and asks Phaedrus to inform his friend (Lysias) of it. And Phaedrus' reply is the following:

Phdr: And what of you? What will you do? For we certainly shouldn't pass over your friend, either.

Soc: Who is that?

Phdr: The beautiful Isocrates. What will you report to him, Socrates? What title shall we give him?

Soc: Isocrates is still young, Phaedrus: ...

Here, Phaedrus refers to Isocrates as a "friend" of Socrates (278e6). How should we think of this reference to Isocrates? What kind of features does Isocrates have as a friend of Socrates? In order to consider these questions, let us look at briefly Isocrates' *Against the sophists*.

There, first Isocrates enumerates the failings of sophists, who insist that they have ability to educate young people about oratory. Isocrates indicates their "utter disregard of the truth" and the fact that they engage in "devoting themselves to disputation", and "deceive us with lies" (1). In addition, he points out the fact that they "distrust those from whom they are to get this money (just three or four minae)" because they doubt whether their pupils will pay their tuition after the lecture (5). Isocrates comments that this is their most "ridiculous" feature<sup>101</sup>.

There are some resemblances between Socrates and Isocrates. One of the most important points is the recommendation that a good rhetorician has to know the most effective way to speak. Isocrates says "oratory is good only if it has the qualities of fitness for the occasion, propriety of style, and originality of treatment" in the case of discourse (13). What he says seems to be similar to a condition of Socrates' ideal

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<sup>101</sup> Norlin (1928)164-5, note.b comments that "Socrates speaks with the same sarcasm of a sophist named Evenus, who professed to teach all the virtues necessary to a good man and a good citizen for five minae". In *Apology*, Socrates says that he had asked Callias about an expert who makes people excel in their proper qualities. Then Callias had answered that the man was Evenus from Paris and "his fee is five minas". Socrates thought ironically that "Evenus is a happy man, if he really possesses this art, and teaches for so moderate a fee" (20B-C). Therefore, this rebuke against sophists is common to both Socrates and Isocrates. In addition to this point, since there are some of the same features shared between them, Phaedrus seems easily to misunderstand the thought of Socrates and Isocrates.

oratory: to give appropriate speeches to individual listeners<sup>102</sup>. Again, Isocrates enumerates three required features for a competent orator: nature, practical experience and formal training (14). They seem reminiscent of three requisites which Socrates refers to: nature, knowledge and practice (269D)<sup>103</sup>.

However, it is easy to find the main differences between both of them. First, Isocrates insists that becoming an excellent orator is not difficult. Thus, he says “to obtain a knowledge of the elements out of which we make and compose all discourses is not so very difficult if anyone entrusts himself . . . to those who have some knowledge of these things” (16). By contrast, in *Phaedrus*, as we have seen in chapter 3 and 4, even ideal orators who possess two requirements (i.e. abilities to produce speeches with an organic structure by Division and Collection, and to offer suitable speeches to people in order to persuade efficiently) have great troubles in trying to say what they want to say in this actual world. Compared with this view, Isocrates seems optimistic.

Next, let us focus on what Isocrates thinks about the way to become a good orator. He considers that the student of oratory must “learn the different kinds of discourse and practice himself in their use” (17)<sup>104</sup>. They take lectures and imitate the way of the teacher, so that they will be able to “show in their speaking a degree of grace and charm which is not found in others” (18). Here, we can recognize Isocrates’ view of the aim of oratory. What he regards as an excellent feature of oratory seems to be its beauty, not its truth. In this point, *Phaedrus* seems to argue with Isocrates.

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<sup>102</sup> However, as we shall know later, there is a fundamental difference between them. Especially, Isocrates never mentions “soul” in the explanation of rhetoric. In *Phaedrus*, rhetoric is regarded as “leading a soul” and those who are eager to become able orators have to inquire into soul. And we can see many arguments in Plato’s dialogues to the effect that soul is so important that we have to take care of soul first of all.

<sup>103</sup> It seems likely to be interesting to compare Isocrates’ “experience” with Socrates’ “knowledge”. Plato criticizes rhetoric as just “experience” in *Gorgias*, and in this book of Isocrates, there are some parts where we may notice relationships with some phrases of Plato’ *Gorgias*: 519C, 460E and 463A, which Norlin(1928) points out at p.167 and p.174.

<sup>104</sup> The concrete way of becoming competent orators is the following: “to choose from these elements those which should be employed for each subject, to join them together, to arrange them properly, and also, not to miss what the occasion demands but appropriately to adorn the whole speech with striking thoughts and to clothe it in flowing and melodious phrase” (16). It is interesting to compare this with the requirements for becoming able rhetorician in *Phaedrus*, as we have seen in chapter 3.

Then Isocrates identifies someone who engages in the activities mentioned above with “the devotee of philosophy” (18). And he regards himself as one of “those who have pursued philosophy” (14). Namely, Isocrates thinks that a rhetorician is a philosopher, but by that he means that someone who can compose and display a graceful speech is someone who can deal with *logos* excellently. In this respect, Phaedrus seems to believe simply that Isocrates is a “philosopher” (d3). But the meaning of “philosopher” which Socrates uses is someone who pursues truth in his speech and care for the partner. And a rhetorician who can do that is equal to a philosopher. Therefore, Socrates and Phaedrus use the same word “philosophy”, but in totally and fundamentally different ways<sup>105</sup>: the Socratic, and the Isocratic.

As we have seen above, we can understand what Phaedrus accidentally expresses when he refers to Isocrates: in addition to the misunderstanding of the opinion of Socrates, it is evident that he still sticks to the beautiful appearances of speeches and the names of famous people. First, he seems still to love the beautiful speeches which make him feel comfortable. For the very aim of Isocrates in speeches, which Phaedrus approves of, is “grace” and “charm”, not “truth” or “knowledge”. Moreover, Phaedrus still has the feature of reliance on well-known rhetoricians<sup>106</sup>. Therefore, we may conclude that Phaedrus is still in his original place: passion for beautiful speeches and dependence on authority.

That is, we may conclude that Phaedrus has not changed his attitude or preference even by the end of the dialogue. This is illustrated by what Socrates says next to Phaedrus. After he (pretends to) eulogize(s) Isocrates, he says “so that is the report I

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<sup>105</sup> In fact, when Phaedrus refers to Isocrates, Socrates seems to express a feeling of slight irritation. Then, Socrates describes the future of Isocrates as very promising. Actually, it seems to be so excessive that we often wonder if this praise is Plato’s real intention or not. For example, he is “superior to Lysias and his speeches” and has “a greater nobility” (279A). I think it is natural to suppose that Socrates (Plato) means to use irony to Phaedrus, to use exaggerated expressions and so to compare Isocrates with Lysias whom Phaedrus admires. Socrates continues saying that “some diviner impulse led him to greater things; for there is innately a certain philosophical instinct in the man’s mind” (279a8-b1). De Vries (1969)264 comments that this praise is “a mordant sarcasm” and, about this meaning of “philosophy”, he says “Plato leaves it to his readers to decide whether ... Philosophia (is) in the Platonic or the Isocratic sense.” Rowe (1986a)215 thinks Plato has implied the presence of Isocrates in the beginning of the dialogue. The common feature of Lysias and Isocrates is that both were “essentially writers of speeches” because Isocrates was poor at his delivery. Thus, Rowe thinks “what Plato says about Isocrates here is ironic”.

<sup>106</sup> Rowe (1986a)215 comments that Isocrates is “a counterpart of Lysias belonging to Plato’s own generation”. Isocrates seems to have been a match for Lysias in respect of (written) speeches.

take from the gods here to Isocrates as my beloved, and you take the other to Lysias as yours". And Phaedrus answers innocently "I'll do it" (279b2-4)<sup>107</sup>. There is no record of what Phaedrus tells Lysias later, but it is highly possible that Phaedrus will not inform Lysias of the reformed rhetorical style which Socrates has argued for because he cannot understand it properly. (Instead, I am afraid that Phaedrus will be eager to recommend Lysias to make another speech in rivalry with Socrates.) And even if Phaedrus converts to philosophy and encourages Lysias to philosophy, this "philosophy" may well be totally different from Socratic philosophy. Phaedrus is still Phaedrus<sup>108</sup>.

Finally, now, let us turn to the most important question: why does Plato have Phaedrus behave like this? In other words, why does *Phaedrus* not end up with a clear change in Phaedrus? This question is deeply related with the idea that the way of speaking which Socrates uses towards Phaedrus is excellent. I mean, if the speech which Socrates gives is especially effective for Phaedrus, it is natural to expect that Phaedrus should accept the influence and show some signs of changing. At the least, Plato could have described a reformed Phaedrus, someone who intends to start vigorously with Socratic philosophy at the end of the dialogue. However, Plato does not do so. Why does Plato venture to keep Phaedrus unchanged? What is he trying to tell us?

In order to answer these questions, we shall consider why Plato writes this dialogue. That is, we need to take a wider view to examine the dialogue: the author's view. In this chapter, in 5-2, let us focus on the criticism of writing activity, and then

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<sup>107</sup> Heath(1989b) thinks of this reply as having a positive sense, and assumes that Phaedrus abandons ordinary rhetoric which he has been extremely interested in. (Similarly, Hackforth (1952)13 also comments "I am inclined to think that Phaedrus is converted to philosophy in the end".) Thus, "Phaedrus in the end is attached still to Lysias, but not perhaps to rhetoric; for he promises to convey the conclusions of their discussion to his beloved --- conclusions which amount to a condemnation of rhetoric as he and Lysias have hitherto conceived it" (pp.190-1). This might be true if Phaedrus perfectly understood what Socrates wants to say and what true rhetoric is. But, Phaedrus seems to misunderstand. However it is true, as Heath says, that Socrates always intends to improve Phaedrus, throughout the dialogue. Heath comments "Socrates has the same paedeutical aims in the palinode and in the discussion" (p.190)

<sup>108</sup> It is useful to remember that Phaedrus borrows the phrase from Alcidamas in 267A, where some commentators are inclined to recognize the positive change of Phaedrus. (Phaedrus seems to plagiarize from Alcidamas' work by saying "you mean the living and animate speech of the man who knows, of which written speech would rightly be called a kind of phantom") This was considered in chapter 4.

(5-3) the structure of *Phaedrus* itself. Finally (5-4), we will face the question which this dialogue itself presents to us.

## **5-2 The criticism of writing in *Phaedrus***

In this section, we shall concentrate on the critique of writing in this dialogue. This seems to cover the written letter, written contents and writers themselves. This is very problematic because of the fact that Plato himself writes dialogues. First, let us confirm the nature of the criticism of writing exactly.

This appears at 274B-278B in the dialogue: the last part of the argument about Rhetoric. At the beginning, Socrates suddenly makes a proposal, namely “what we have left is the subject of propriety and impropriety in writing” (274b6-7). This specification, “writing”, is unexpected for us because there has been no clear distinction between writing and speaking so far<sup>109</sup>. But, from here on, Socrates strictly divides writing and speaking, and totally criticizes the method of writing.

The criticism starts as a story of Egyptian gods: Theuth and Thamus. Theuth discovered and invented a lot of arts, for example number or calculation. What we have to understand is the fact he invented letters as well. Then he went to Thamus, a king of all Egypt, and explained the merit and demerit of his inventions. His explanation about letters is the following.

But this study, King Thamus, will make the Egyptians wiser and improve their memory; what I have discovered is an elixir of memory and wisdom. (274e4-6)

But King Thamus rejected the advantage of letters, as follows. The passage is a bit long, but I will cite all of what Thamus says because of its importance.

Most scientific Theuth, one man has the ability to beget the elements of a science, but it belongs to a different person to be able to judge what measure of harm and benefit it contains for those who are going to make use of it; so now you, as the father of letters, have been led by your affection for them to

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<sup>109</sup> At the beginning of the second part of this dialogue, *Phaedrus* presents the evaluation of speech-writers, especially *Lysias* at 257C. Then Socrates poses the question “in what way we can speak or write a speech fine and in what way not fine?” (259E). Thus, as Rowe(1986a)207 rightly points out, “since the ‘science of speaking’, or rhetoric, includes the writing of speeches, there is no real contrast between ‘speaking’ and ‘writing’”.

describe them as having the opposite of their real effect. For your invention will produce forgetfulness in the souls of those who have learned it, through lack of practice at using their memory, as through reliance on writing they are reminded from outside by alien marks, not from inside, themselves by themselves: you have discovered an elixir not of memory but of reminding. To your students you give an appearance of wisdom, not the reality of it; having heard much, in the absence of teaching, they will appear to know much when for the most part they know nothing, and they will be difficult to get along with, because they have acquired the appearance of wisdom instead of wisdom itself. (274e7-275b2)  
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This passage seems to contain every criticism of writing. Here, the criticism is characterized as the following two features: that writing prevents people from remembering truth within themselves, and makes people wise-seeming men. A deep indulgence in written words seems to be a bad influence on readers.

So, why are written works harmful? Socrates accounts for this by using the analogy of a painting. That is, even if a picture looks like alive, it cannot answer our questions but “preserves a quite solemn silence” (275d6). In the same way, no written words are able to reply to us and “they point to just one thing, the same each time” (275d9). The reason, then, is that there seems to be no opportunity of questions and answers<sup>111</sup>.

How do people become, who are eager to devote themselves just to written works? As Thamus clearly said, they try to remember written words. As a result, it gives people “the appearance of wisdom”. In other words, they spend a lot of their time reading or listening to written works in order to remember them without questions and answers, so that they look intelligent at a glance because of what they have memorized. But, if something goes beyond their understanding, they do not seem to be able to follow it at all. They seem to be able to deal with the subject with which

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<sup>110</sup> And it is noteworthy that Phaedrus replies to this story and expresses his surprising feeling with joy: “Socrates, you easily make up stories from Egypt or from anywhere else you like”(275b3-4). His love for speeches is still remarkable. And because of no questions and answers, it is clear that Phaedrus undoubtedly relies on what Socrates and Egyptian kings say. It illustrates his reliance on authority.

<sup>111</sup> Moreover, we can see the other reason: written work has no ability to choose the reader (listener). “Every composition is trundled about everywhere in the same way, in the presence both of those who know about the subject and of those who have nothing at all to do with it, and it does not know how to address those it should address and not those it should not.” (275e1-5) This demerit is well understood by contrast with the Socrates’ way of speaking: he manages to fit his speech to his listener (Phaedrus).

they have already become familiar. This fact is enough to prevent people from embarking on a philosophical research. They are getting far from Truth<sup>112</sup>.

Is the very man who depends on written works perhaps Phaedrus? As we have seen in the previous chapter, he eagerly remembers the speech of Lysias and tries to practice what he has memorized on Socrates. He looks intelligent, in fact is intelligent to some extent<sup>113</sup>, but he cannot follow Socrates' argument perfectly. For, it seems to be beyond the limit of his comprehension. The person who is influenced badly seems to be equal to Phaedrus<sup>114</sup>. To put it another way, this story of Theuth and Thamus also points out the real situation of Phaedrus, like the story of the cicadas. The criticism of writing is directly against Phaedrus, who loves just to accept any speech without questions and answers.

How should we react to this critique as readers of *Phaedrus*? In this dialogue, as Socrates gives his warning about the dangers of deep indulgence in written works, is Plato trying to deliver something to us the reader? Simply speaking, does Plato think that this dialogue, a written work, will be a bad influence on the reader, like Phaedrus?

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<sup>112</sup> Griswold(1980)541 articulates the criticism of written works by saying that “the written word lets us persuade ourselves too easily that we are in irrefutable possession of the truth, while in fact we are not. It facilitates our tendency to become dogmatists or religious zealots rather than philosophers” because of the lack of questions and answers.

<sup>113</sup> Hackforth (1952)13 comments that “He (Phaedrus) is plainly an intelligent person, alive to the movement of thought in his day; no stranger to Socrates, but clearly not of his ‘circle’”. Phaedrus may be regarded as a person who is familiar with the modern fashion of thought and rhetoric. Heath (1989a)173 thinks of the reason why Plato chooses Phaedrus as a character: “he (Phaedrus) and the pattern of his preoccupations were representative in some way of those to whom Plato was addressing the dialogue, or had some philosophical relevance to them”. It seems interesting to cite de Vries’(1969)5 comment on Phaedrus in other dialogues: “in the *Protagoras* (315C) Phaedrus is among the audience of Hippias, the teacher of universal science. His interest is wide, but superficial. He is interested in mythology (*Symp.* 178b ff.; *Phdr.* 229b, 259b), but above all things he is addicted to “literature” and a fervent admirer of Lysias.”

<sup>114</sup> Griswold (1986)211 regards the disadvantage of writing as being that “the written word will encourage the reduction of philosophy to a merely intellectual business”, because he thinks of “the language about the growth of the soul and the externality of the written word” as something “indicate(s) that Socrates is praising a way of life as opposed to a *merely* intellectual occupation”. (We have to pay attention to the word “merely”.) This “intellectual occupation (business) seems to mean something “devoid of the recollective insight into Truth and so of the madness of eros”. And he comments that “the written monologue ... possesses the dangerous tendency to drug living thought. The *Phaedrus* is named after a man who perfectly exhibits this danger” and “the critique of writing is ... a critique of Phaedrus as well”. (p.213)



To answer this question, let us consider Griswold's idea (1981) about Plato's dialogues. He thinks every dialogue of Plato's is immune to this criticism of written words because of the style: dialogue form. In other words, writing something that is itself in spoken form not like a composition, but like a conversation. He offers two reasons to justify his opinion that "Plato's use of the dialogue form both preserves the sense of uncertainty and incompleteness that characterizes Socratic dialogue, and neutralizes Socrates' objections to writing"(p.542)<sup>115</sup>.

The first reason is this: Griswold thinks "these texts faithfully mirror Socratic dialogue": that is, a dialogue in which the main speaker never presents his own opinion: Plato's dialogues are not dogmatic. Thus "Platonic philosophy is precisely that it is not a dogma, a system, but a search"(p.543). There is no statement in his dialogues for the reader to memorize<sup>116</sup>. What we the readers engage in seems to be taking part in the Socratic dialogue and facing Truth<sup>117</sup>.

We may find this opinion very attractive. Plato's dialogue is like a preserved food, and when we feel hungry for conversation, all we have to do is to open and read the dialogue. But is it true? When we read the dialogue, are we supposed to be having a real conversation? This seems problematic. We should consider the structure of dialogue form itself in the next section<sup>118</sup>.

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<sup>115</sup> And Griswold(1980) thinks Socrates' attempt is to "keep his own views in a state of ultimate unclarity, uncertainty, incompleteness" (p.542), because he has to avoid the most dangerous situation: "solipsism". Thus, "one must discourse in such a way as to arrest the danger, and this consists of questioning others and defending oneself" (p.542). In this position, Plato seems write down Socratic dialogue to prevent us from "solipsism" (to encourage us to embark on search constantly, namely without being satisfied with sticking to one position).

<sup>116</sup> "A Platonic dialogue does not present a clear and certain or complete teaching". And because of its anonymity, the dialogue can avoid "dogmatism" (Griswold (1986)220-1).

<sup>117</sup> The second reason is the following: when Socrates offered his objection to written works in the dialogue, "Socrates did not conceive of the dialogue form as Plato developed it" (Griswold(1980)543). In other words, if Socrates knew dialogue form as a writing style, which Plato seems to invent first, Socrates would not have criticized written works, because dialogue form could be immune to the disadvantages of written works. Thus, the fact Socrates does not notice this new style, dialogue form, causes his criticism. But I think this reason is a bit strange because it seems to confuse the historical Socrates (who did not seem to know the style in fact) with the Socrates whom Plato describes.

<sup>118</sup> Griswold(1980)546 note15 says "what I have said does not, to be sure, explain why Plato decided to write in the first place. I am trying only explain why it is that he wrote dialogues" in his article. But I would like to examine "why and how does Plato write?"

### 5-3 The problem of the structure of *Phaedrus*

In this section, let us consider the structure of the dialogue. Griswold thinks, as we have seen above, that Plato's dialogues are immune to the critique of written works because Plato writes in dialogue form. But here, I would like to focus on the fact that Plato writes works, in spite of the fact he points out the harm of written works.

Now we shall examine the structure of *Phaedrus*. How does the author, Plato, intend to compose this dialogue? Generally speaking, it starts with the scene on the bank of the Ilissus. In this introduction, Phaedrus bumps into Socrates, and they sit on the bank to enjoy Lysias' speeches about love. Then, in the main part, there are two arguments: about Love (230E-257B) and about Rhetoric (257B-277A or 278B). The first part consists of three (long) speeches about love, and second part is in conversation form, between Socrates and Phaedrus. Here, Socrates severely criticizes writing. Finally, Socrates gives a message to Lysias and Isocrates, prays to the local gods and leaves<sup>119</sup>.

Now let us compare the dialogue with an ideal speech. As we have seen in chapter 3, there are two required conditions for ideal oratory: (1) a speech has to have a well-organized and self-consistent structure in order to reach the truth efficiently and (2) orators have to pay attention to the person to whom their speech is directed, and take the result into consideration. First, we shall consider the first condition.

Can we find a well-organized structure in *Phaedrus*? First of all, we have to ask the question: what is the subject? The problem of the subject we have considered in chapters 2 and 3. Generally, there seems to be two subjects in this dialogue: Love and Rhetoric. Then if we try to find the definition of the each subject, as a good starting point for proper argument, we fail to find it. (E.g. the argument about Love starts with the speech of Lysias, which Socrates severely criticizes. And the first part of the argument about Rhetoric is the wrong praise of Phaedrus.) Then, as we concluded at the end of chapter 3, what might unite *Phaedrus* is the concept of good relationship with someone (the aspect of Love) to attain truth by people's having a conversation with each other (the aspect of Rhetoric). However the problem still remains. Even if we admit that the theme could unite the dialogue, we cannot find the well-organized structure. It is extremely problematic, because if the author (Plato) obeys the first rule,

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<sup>119</sup> See the more detailed outline of *Phaedrus* which forms the appendix of this dissertation.

to supply an organic structure for his speech (actually the man who states that is himself!), he must have offered a definition of the subject (which can be acquired by dialectical methods). It is one of the most important procedures because we the readers can start our search with the characters (and the author), from the definition. But we are given no clue to a definition in *Phaedrus*.

Someone may think that it is natural that there is no definition and structure because this is a dialogue. And, in relation to this point, Griswold seems to think that Plato's books have different rules from other written works, so that the critique does not apply to Plato's case. But this does not seem to be reasonable because Plato the author himself clearly presents the conditions for excellent composed works, and Plato himself breaks them. Namely, if the author intends to keep the rules, he can do it easily.

Here, the original question has come back. That is the problem of Socrates' way of speaking to Phaedrus, as considered in the previous chapter. Socrates here too departs from the ideal form. However, his speech seems to be as good as a philosopher in the real world can make it. For Socrates tries to address Phaedrus, responding to his preferences and tendencies. Even though his speech has no structure, it is full of consideration for the listener.

Therefore, now let us think of *Phaedrus* in respect of its influence and outcome: condition (2) for ideal oratory. First, we have to identify the people at whom Plato intends to aim. In order to consider this question, it may be helpful to refer to M.M.McCabe (1982). She thinks that we are "the targets" (p.69). To put it another way, the real interlocutor of Socrates in Plato's dialogues is us, namely the readers. Thus, we have to "wary of supposing that every question is closed, every line of argument merely an aniseed trail towards the revealed truth of Platonism" (p.69). We have to regard every statement in this dialogue which Plato presents as a question which is addressed to us.

However, there is still a problem. How can Plato address us, as Socrates addresses Phaedrus? At a glance, it seems to be impossible because written works cannot vary according to their readers. But McCabe thinks it is possible. Moreover, she thinks that this part of criticism of writing enables the dialogue to do that. Her explanation is the following.

She explains the use of double arguments (*dissoi logoi*) as a matter of "playing one argument off against another" (p.68): *antilogia*. This method is characteristic of

Zeno<sup>120</sup>, but she regards it as a positive way to “incorporate the views of an unknown reader” (p.69)<sup>121</sup>. When all opinions are discussed and “each arm of the dilemma concludes as an antinomy, the reader is suspended between the arms, and forced to question the very structure of the argument”. Thus, McCabe assumes that “this method of *antilogia* triggers speculation” (p.69).

How do we apply this idea to the case of *Phaedrus*? The *antilogia* seems to occur in the criticism of written works: Plato writes “do not trust written words”<sup>122</sup>. Faced with this problematic position, we wonder what Plato wants to say: whether writing itself is good or not? As a result, we have to start on the search by ourselves. McCabe proposes that this function which makes people embark on search is the aim of *Phaedrus*<sup>123</sup>. For “the *Phaedrus* proposes that inquiry is stimulated by paradox”<sup>124</sup>.

Thanks to its influence on the reader, it may be possible for the dialogue to be immune to the general criticism of written words<sup>125</sup>. It does not force us to remember

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<sup>120</sup> “Zeno makes his hearers see the same thing as both the same and different, one and many, moving and at rest.... This art of *antilogia* works by conflating and confusing same and different”. She seems to think that Plato regards Zeno as “a knowledgeable practitioner of antilogic”.

<sup>121</sup> She thinks “*antilogia* is neutral; it may be practiced either by an ignorant man, or by a knower” (p.68). And it is likely that she thinks that if the man who knows (e.g. Zeno or Plato) uses this art, it has useful meaning.

<sup>122</sup> McCabe (1982)65 comments that “it has been recognized that this passage (*Phaedrus* 274C-277A, namely the criticism of written words) is odd. Here is Plato, writing a book which repudiates the writing of books” and “this is a full-blooded antinomy – and consequently hard to shrug off”. “At 277e7 Socrates says ‘No *logos* has ever been written, whether in verse or in prose, which is worthy of great attention...’. ‘Socrates’ says it; but Plato writes it. If he writes to convince, he writes that writing should not convince us; if what he writes does convince us, it convinces us that it should not convince us.” However, Rowe (1986b)115 offers some objections against this idea. He concludes “there is no antinomy here”, because Plato shows that writing can convince us, but not teach us. For the details of Rowe’s idea, see the next section.

<sup>123</sup> Griswold(1980) seems to agree with McCabe. Thus, as we have seen, “what the Platonic dialogues teach about “Platonic philosophy” is precisely that it is not a dogma, a system, but rather a search” (p.543). Later (1986) he states more clearly that “the dialogues not only encourage the search, and even defend the view that philosophy is a search, they also portray this very activity” (p.223).

<sup>124</sup> This idea also may give us a hint of how to avoid the criticism, that written works cannot help themselves. I mean the point of this criticism is that written works may deceive us. The reason why written works deceive us might be the fact they always just show the same words and keep silence (i.e. they cannot help themselves). But the function of double arguments can offer not only single opinion, but also several views. Thus, it would be able to correspond to many people who have different idea.

<sup>125</sup> Griswold (1986)223 thinks that dialogue has nothing to memorize, and nothing to authorize. “Plato’s anonymity reflects his pedagogical awareness of the danger his authority poses to his student’s growth”. It seems to be interesting to compare these

any idea or phrase, so that it is incapable of making a person even appear “wise”. Instead, it gives us an opportunity to embark on search for Truth. From this perspective, we can regard Plato’s dialogues as something to improve us. As a result, we judge that the *Phaedrus* is worth considering with serious attention.

However, is this solution correct?<sup>126</sup> For there is a problematic concept which is repeated though this dialogue: “amusement”. Socrates says that the speeches which he offers are just “amusement” at 262C-D (as I will consider in the next section). And written works are expressed as “amusement” as well. What does this word mean? Does not this “amusement” prevent us from examining written dialogue too closely? Anyway, we have to consider this idea to understand rightly what Plato wants to say and why Plato chooses to write.

#### **5-4 The question of *Phaedrus***

In this section, let us concentrate on the problematic term “amusement”. In order to identify what Plato intends to express by using this word, we shall pick up some examples in the second part of *Phaedrus*. First, Socrates uses this word when he refers to his two speeches.

By some chance – so it seems – the two speeches which were given do have in them an example of how someone who knows the truth can mislead his audience by making play (*prospaizon*) in what he says (*logoi*). (262c10-d2)

And we can find other parts which refer to “amusement”. Socrates makes this comment on his second speech: “the madness of love we said was best, and by expressing the experience of love through some kind of simile, which allowed us perhaps to grasp some truth, though maybe also it took us in a wrong direction, and mixing together a not wholly implausible speech, we sang a playful hymn in the form of a story...” (265b5-c1). And then, Socrates continues with the following:

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features with the features of *Phaedrus*: passion for speeches (remembering and practising them) and reliance on authority.

<sup>126</sup> Rowe(1986b)114 rejects Thompson’s idea: “So long as something is written in dialogue form, it is said, it will be immune to Socrates’ general case against writing”. He asks against Thompson, “Why, if Plato means to make an exception for one written form, does he make Socrates insist, four times over, that it applies to all forms?”

To me it seems that the rest really was playfully done (*pepaisthai*), by way of amusement (*paidia*); but by chance two principles of method of the following sort were expressed, and it would be gratifying if one could grasp their significance in a scientific way. (265c8-d1)

From the passages mentioned above, we see how Socrates regards his previous speeches. There are some peculiar features which characterize them: namely they are told “playfully” and “by chance”, and have the capacity to deceive the audience (in other word, to lead people in a false direction). Here, Socrates clearly seems to have doubts about what he said before.

If we focus on the passage in the last part of this dialogue (277A-279C), this problem becomes more serious. When Socrates is about to finish the discussion of rhetoric, he says “so now we have had due amusement (*pepaistho*) from the subject of speaking” (278b7). Now, we can see that Socrates judges all the discussions which have been displayed in this dialogue as “amusement”, not just his speeches of Love. What does this mean? If it means that the whole discussion is literally a mere pastime, what should we conclude about the dialogue as a whole?

To answer these questions, now, we need to know the meaning of “amusement”. What does this “amusement” relate to? It seems to be associated with “writing”. Namely “his garden of letters, it seems, he will sow and write for amusement (*paidia*), when he does write, laying up a store of reminders both for himself, .... and for anyone who is following the same track” (276d1-3). Here, writing is compared with speaking, which should be paid serious attention. Again, we should notice the critique of writing, as de Vries (1969)<sup>20</sup> says, “this (writing qualified as a *paidia*) is certainly a depreciation”.

Now, we have to deal with the serious problem: Socrates clearly regards his whole arguments as “amusement”. As we have considered above, “amusement” is something little to be examined seriously. What does Plato intend? Rowe (1986a) focuses on Socrates’ two speeches in respect of possessing “a large number of central Platonic ideas” (p.9). Plato presents these ideas in the dialogue<sup>127</sup> (especially in the first part<sup>128</sup>), and he himself looks back on them in it (in the latter part). And, in the latter part, we have a number of uses of the term for “amusement” (which refer to the

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<sup>127</sup> In this point, Rowe offers an objection to Griswold’s idea that the dialogue has no doctrine to be memorized. See 5-2 above.

<sup>128</sup> We can find “Idea” and recollection, which are typically regarded as Platonic ideas.

arguments which have been presented in the dialogue). Rowe thinks that “Plato will in part be using the dialogue in order to comment on the nature and value of his own output as a writer” (p.10). Plato seems to try to review his ideas in order to be judged in respect of their truth. The idea of “amusement” which appears frequently seems to make his whole arguments open (suspended)<sup>129</sup>, even if the idea was written in dialogue form or not.

This “amusement” seems to give a greater impetus on us to try to understand this dialogue. For, by regarding the whole discussion as “amusement”, Plato tries to show that not only writing itself, but also the contents of *Phaedrus* should be devalued. This makes us think that every passage is open to be questioned, or to be doubted. We have to ask ourselves “Is Socrates’ way of speaking in fact persuasive? Can we admit that it is efficient?”, or “Are the arguments, for example about ideal Love or dialectical method, true or false?”. We are supposed to be wondering by ourselves<sup>130</sup>, because the dialogue gives no answers, like a painting.

In order to answer these questions, we the readers seem to have to engage in dialectical method: conversation. Namely, we have to converse with other readers to solve the questions: sometimes we have doubt us to a passage of the dialogue, sometimes we agree with it. And this attempt seems to be important for the author as well. By saying that a writer has to possess something more than what he writes, and by implying that his written words are “amusement”, Plato has to try to make himself more valuable than his works. Rowe rightly (1986a)11 says “Plato himself expects to be challenged about what he has written, and to be forced to improve on it”.

Given what we have said about “amusement”, we the readers are supposed to be forced to embark on research by ourselves. This can avoid making people wise-seeming men, because in the company of other people it seems to be harder for us to keep our subjective and arbitrary impressions than when we just read books. In other words, we are encouraged to proceed to lively conversation to improve ourselves.

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<sup>129</sup> Rowe (1986b) 116 comments “Socrates’ attitude towards his speech will exactly parallel Plato’s towards his dialogue”. As Socrates regards his arguments as “amusement”, Plato also regards his dialogue as “amusement”. It enables Plato to criticize his own idea indirectly (Rowe expresses it as “subterfuge”).

<sup>130</sup> McCabe (1982)72 comments that “Were we to consider the book antinomy within the dramatic context of the dialogue, ... there would be no paradox, since the antinomy is exclusively about the written word. And so the true nature of the dialogue – that it is a piece of literary composition – is brought home to us just because we, the readers, are outraged by the antinomy”.

“Amusement” enables us to do that because it makes the whole discussion doubtful<sup>131</sup>, which provokes the readers.

Now, it is possible for us to understand what Plato intends to say in presenting this dialogue. In other words, *Phaedrus* itself is Plato’s attempt to make us think by ourselves and converse with others. And this attempt seems to be intended directly to make us all do philosophy. As Griswold (1986)222 says, “Plato’s dialogues seem designed to function as mirrors of a peculiar sort, for they allow the reader who is unsuited to philosophy to see himself in the text, and the reader who is suited to philosophy to glimpse something that he has not yet achieved and that he desires.”

Finally, we can now answer the question about the change in *Phaedrus*, which we raised in 5-1. We cannot admit that *Phaedrus* has changed, by accepting Socrates’ speeches. Why does Plato not describe *Phaedrus* as someone who decides to turn to philosophy, if Socrates’ way of speaking is excellent? The same problem seems to apply to us the readers: whether we have changed after reading this dialogue, if Plato writes excellently? The absence of significant change in *Phaedrus* shows that our situation is still open to be decided. In other words, Plato tries to make us focus on ourselves and locate in the same situation of *Phaedrus*. As Socrates hopes that *Phaedrus* will become someone who has something more valuable inside than written works, Plato wishes that the readers become this kind of people. Certainly, Plato seems to expect us to converse with other readers, questioning and answering, namely converting to philosophy. I think Plato might wait for us to change spontaneously, by leaving his dialogues for coming ages<sup>132</sup>.

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<sup>131</sup> Griswold (1986)218-9 offers an interesting idea on the structures of *Phaedrus*. “The *Phaedrus* offers us a palinode recanting the first two speeches of the *Phaedrus*; then a recantation (in the form of a discussion of the *techne* of words) of his palinode; then a recantation (introduced by the Theuth/Thamus story) of this recantation; followed by Plato’s recantation (visible in his deed of writing) of the critique of writing expressed by the personae in his text. But a self-qualification of Plato’s irony will also appear, for the deed of writing can be seen to acknowledge its inferiority to living dialogue between philosophers. This fifth palinode of the *Phaedrus* returns us to something like Socratic *dialogesthai* as the proper medium for philosophizing. For Plato, too, dialogue is the living self-motion of thought.”

<sup>132</sup> Griswold (1986)224 points out two advantages of Plato’s dialogue as written works: namely, that when compared with spoken words, they have “permanence” and “repeatability”. They enable these dialogues to acquire “a far wider audience”. Thanks to Plato’s dialogues, we moderns can start philosophy properly.



## 6. Conclusion

### 6-1 The outline of the whole discussions

We have considered the whole argument of *Phaedrus* according to the approach which I suggested in the Introduction. I have dealt with three problems unique to this dialogue: (a) the subject of *Phaedrus*, (b) the influence of Phaedrus as the interlocutor and (c) the critique of written works. To solve these problems, we have divided the whole dialogue into four stages and examined each stage. In this final chapter, basing ourselves on the discussions, let us answer the first question “what unites *Phaedrus*?”

But before that, in this section, it is better to look the main chapters again in order to draw our conclusions properly. As I said, there are four stages and they correspond to each chapter. I list the four stages again.

- (1) In the earlier part of this dialogue, what is argued?
- (2) In the latter part of this dialogue, what is argued?
- (3) How do the characters converse on those topics?
- (4) What does the author, Plato, intend to express by writing this dialogue?

And each stage was corresponding to each chapter: (1) was chapter 2, (2) was chapter 3, (3) was chapter 4 and (4) was chapter 5. Stage (1) and (2) dealt with the arguments on love and rhetoric respectively. But in stage (3), we focused on the characters who made the arguments. Then, in stage (4), concentrating on “writing”, we considered the view of Plato as the author. Thus this way of interpreting the dialogue enabled us to acquire more comprehensive and more transcendental view.

As stage (1), we considered the first part of the dialogue, the discussions of love. There, I examined the three speeches on love in turn to identify the exact meaning of *sophrosyne* and *mania*. In Socrates' second speech, love is defined as a kind of madness, --- a divine kind. But, love can be still more worthy because it enables a lover to lead a well-organized life: a philosopher's life. The ideal status can be described as one under the control of reason. This will come true, not by one's searching alone, but by the lover and the beloved cooperating with each other. This

ideal companionship seems to be similar to becoming like gods, something extremely hard for human beings.

As stage (2), the second part of this dialogue was examined. The arguments are concerned with rhetoric. In chapter 3, I discussed ideal rhetoric by comparing it with ordinary rhetoric, whose representatives are Lysias, Pericles and other trivial rhetoricians (whom Phaedrus admires). The worthless rhetoricians have two failures: lack of knowledge and lack of care for their audience. By contrast, Socrates seems to think of ideal oratory as one enabling a person to proceed to truth by using dialectical method, and paying attention to the listener to whom his speech is directed. This is the most efficient and certain way to make the speaker reach truth with the listener. Thus this rhetorician can be called as a philosopher properly.

This concept of the philosopher connects two subjects, love and rhetoric. As we have considered, the discussion of love presented a picture of ideal companionship involving the development of each other's intellectual ability. And then, the discussion of rhetoric seems to reinforce the actual aspects of the ideal philosophical companionship. Thus, if we answer problem (a), the subject of *Phaedrus*, it is cooperation to develop one's philosophical capacity by engaging in dialectical method. This relates with the view both of love and of rhetoric.

Then what of the relationship between Socrates and Phaedrus? This, we considered in chapter 4 (stage (3)). And this connects with problem (b): the influence of Phaedrus as the interlocutor. First, we recognized the nature of Phaedrus; love for speeches and reliance on authority. Moreover, it is clear that Phaedrus fails to follow Socrates' arguments. Therefore, Socrates has to be flexible with Phaedrus, so that his speech is forced to be distorted, for example by telling a story to have Phaedrus understand easily, repeating the same statement for emphasis and using many concrete examples to acquire Phaedrus' conviction. The reason is that Socrates is trying to convert Phaedrus to philosophy and embark on the search with him. Thus Socrates manages to correspond with Phaedrus. Here, we can recognize the true picture of a philosopher living in the world.

Finally, as stage (4), Plato's critique of writing has been discussed in chapter 5. And this is problem (c). First, we examined the change or lack of change in Phaedrus, because it seems to be deeply related with understanding the meaning of the critique. In spite of Socrates' eagerness, Phaedrus does not seem to decide to convert to philosophy. Rather, Phaedrus fails to understand what Socrates wants to say and

confuses it with Isocrates' idea of rhetoric. What does this poor situation of Phaedrus mean? Perhaps, we are forced to ask ourselves, "Is Socrates' way actually effective or not?" or "are the arguments of this dialogue appropriate or not?" Here, we can recognize what the critique means. It recommends us not to trust written works but to search by ourselves, by using *logos*. In this case, this dialogue as a written work never helps us because "they [it] point[s] to just one thing, the same each time" (275d9). Thus, we have to start with the inquiry and the conversation by ourselves or with other readers, leaving the dialogue as just a reminder.

As we have seen above, this interpretation leads us to a comprehensive reading of the whole dialogue. As the argument proceeds, the picture of a philosopher gets more actual and accurate. Finally, the argument forces us to become involved in the inquiry which is presented in *Phaedrus* and makes us philosophers. In the next section, basing ourselves on the all considerations above, I will clarify the unity of *Phaedrus*.

## **6-2 The unity of *Phaedrus***

In the previous section, we have looked back on the whole argument of the dialogue. Now, in this section, let us consider an idea which enables us to unite the *Phaedrus* as a whole. In the Introduction, especially 1-2, and in chapters 2 and 3, we have examined the subject of *Phaedrus*. There, the main subject seems to be double: a best kind of companionship (the aspect of love) to inquire into truth by engaging in *logos* (the aspect of rhetoric).

Is this the true purpose for which Plato writes the *Phaedrus*? Does Plato intend to say that this kind of companionship is best and admirable for everyone? I think that the answer is yes, and also in a way no. Let me explain. Certainly, Plato might hope that we recognize this kind of friendship is best, but he might be satisfied with not just recognizing, but practising.

This seems to be clarified by the considerations in chapters 4 and 5. There, we considered the relationship between Socrates and Phaedrus, and the critique of written works of Plato. The latter seems, at a glance, to involve Plato in a contradiction. However, it could be special device of Plato's: to make us embark on inquiry, not sticking to the book. And Plato shows the word and deed of Socrates, as a very realistic model of conversation in the living world, searching for truth.

Thus, the *Phaedrus* seems to have two functions. One is to show the picture of a philosopher Plato regards as true. A philosopher can be in cooperation with others to proceed to truth, by exchanging opinions with each other. And the other function is to attempt to provoke us the reader in order to encourage us to practise this activity like Socrates. We are not only supposed to read and recognize how Plato confronts the problems on love and rhetoric and manages to solve them, but finally to inquire by ourselves, regarding the solution written by Plato as just tentative.

Thus, the critique of writing seems to show the deep coincidence between the thought and the practice of Plato. The *Phaedrus* seems to give us the true picture of philosopher which we have to become, and the material which enables us to start with discussion (as a base), and a realistic model (as a reminder) of the way to argue using dialectical method. Plato intends to write down his ideas, because he might think that it is great help for us. But he never forgets the harm of writing, which has possibility of preventing any progress. Thus, Plato criticizes written works themselves, urging us not to rely on them deeply. Thus, when we finish reading this dialogue, we are supposed to get started with a search to try to solve the puzzle. For, the *Phaedrus* itself faces us as a big question.

### **6-3 Application to other dialogues**

In this section, I will consider whether this consideration of *Phaedrus* can be applied to Plato's other dialogues. Detailed discussion of the dialogue's relationship with other works lies outside the scope of this dissertation. Thus, here I will merely offer a starting-point for such a discussion.

*Symposium* may be picked out as a most suitable text to contrast with *Phaedrus*. The reason is that *Symposium* also deals with love, and is supposed to be composed in the "middle period of Plato's writing, along with e.g. the *Phaedo*, the *Republic* and the *Phaedrus*" (Rowe (1998)11). Thus, comparing these two dialogues with each other, we will be able to clarify the similarities and differences between them and acquire a proper interpretation of *Symposium*.

First, let us look at the outline of *Symposium*. The scene is Agathon's, a tragic poet's, house. He holds a drinking-party to celebrate his prize. Then, people who are invited decide to give a speech on love in turn as entertainment, instead of listening to the flute or drinking too much. The first speaker is Phaedrus, who first proposes love

as the theme. Then, the participants each give an encomium of love. Finally, Socrates offers his speech on love (but first, he begins to offer questions to Agathon in short conversation form, in his familiar way). Now, let us think of his speech, especially what Diotima, a woman of Mantinea, says to Socrates. In fact, Socrates confesses that “she is the very person who taught me too about erotics”(201d5).

Diotima’s speech seems to consist of two parts: the preliminary passage (204d1-209e4) and the main passage (209e5-212a7) which includes the famous “ascent” description. Here, we shall focus on the passage where the “ascent” of love is treated as an initiation. There, Diotima highly recommends turning to a single body, all beautiful bodies, and beauty in souls and so on. At a glance, it seems to be that this process of love is personal activity, which can be engaged in alone. For, one individual may just look at various kind of beauty and proceed to more complete and spiritual beauty.

However, we have to examine the passage more closely. Diotima explains the first stage: “If the one leading him leads him correctly, he must fall in love with a single body and there procreate beautiful words, and then realise for himself that the beauty that there is in any body.....” (210A). Moreover, there is another clear example:

The next stage is that he must consider beauty in souls more valuable than beauty in the body, so that if someone who is decent in his soul has even a slight physical bloom, even then it’s enough for him, and he loves and cares for the other person, and give birth to the sorts of words – and seeks to them – that will make young men into better men.... (210C)

Here, I admit it is too simple a comparison, but we seem to certainly find the common features<sup>133</sup> of love in *Phaedrus*: care for others and giving a speech. And the process from beauty of body to beauty of soul can remind us of love defined as *sophrosyne*: not indulging in physical pleasure, but engaging in mental development.

As we have seen above, there seem to be two interesting points which *Symposium* and *Phaedrus* have in common. The first is the picture of Phaedrus. In *Symposium* too,

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<sup>133</sup> de Vries (1969)108 comments “at first sight a striking disagreement with what is said in the *Symp.*; there it is explicitly stated that Eros is not a god (202bc), nor a child of Aphrodite, but of Penia (202 d ff.).” And he cites the idea of Hackforth by saying that “Hackf. 55 rightly explains the apparent “retraction” as a result of the different aims and points of view of the two dialogues: in *Symp.* the soul’s effort is stressed, in the *Phaedrus* the “possession”, the divine madness which presupposes a deity as its source.”

it is clear that Phaedrus loves speeches and is eager to produce speeches, as Eryximachus, who proposes to give a speech on love in turn, rightly points out<sup>134</sup>.

The second point relates to the concept of love. There are some differences, for example a lot of definitions or the lack of reference to mania in *Symposium*, but it is possible for both dialogues to have a deep relation with each in respect of love<sup>135</sup>. Thus, can the *logos* in the process of love in *Symposium* be examined by comparing it with *logos* of *Phaedrus*<sup>136</sup>?

What I have said above will be our next problems. As our interpretation of *Phaedrus* widens and extends, we shall have to consider what Plato wants to say, from one dialogue to other dialogues, and to the dialogues as a whole. Thus, first, I will start with application of this consideration of *Phaedrus* to *Symposium* as a next task<sup>137</sup>. It seems not easy, but there is no doubt that the result will be excellent if we succeed.

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<sup>134</sup> Rowe (1998)135 suggests an interesting comment: “it looks as if the ‘favour’ Eryximachus is doing Phaedrus includes setting things up so that he can give a speech he has prepared (the beginning of the *Phaedrus*, too, has Phaedrus anxious to show off his rhetorical skills)”.

<sup>135</sup> *Lysis* is also an important dialogue, which deals with the subject of love. About this dialogue, Cooper (1997)687 comments briefly in *Plato, Complete Works* that Socrates in *Lysis* recommends to Hippothales that “the right way is by engaging them (beloved boys, *Lysis*) in philosophical discussion. If they are worth attention at all, it is by turning them toward the improvement of their souls, that is, their minds, that you will attract their sober interest and grateful affection.” Here, Cooper points out the relationship between *Lysis*, and *Phaedrus* and *Symposium*.

<sup>136</sup> Concerning *logos*, it would also be interesting to compare *Phaedrus* and *Gorgias*, whose subject is rhetoric. In the case of *Gorgias*, ordinary rhetoric is regarded as just experience by Socrates. Just like the rhetoric Phaedrus admits, rhetoric in *Gorgias* seems to have no connection with truth.

<sup>137</sup> This consideration is beyond the limits of this dissertation. I show the next step of this research.

## **The outline of Phaedrus**

(based on the outline of Hackforth and Rowe)

The scene on the bank of the Ilissus 227A-230E

First part about "Love" 230E-257B

Lysias' speech 230E-234C

Criticism of Lysias' speech and Transition to Socrates' first speech 234C-237B

Socrates' first speech 237B-241D

A definition of love 237B-238C

Conclusion 238C-241D

Socrates' recantation of his speech and Transition to Socrates' second speech 241D-243E

Socrates' second speech 243E-257B

Socrates' second speech begins Three types of divine madness 243C-245C

"Experiences and actions" of divine and human souls The procession of souls and its fall and incarnation 245C-249D

The blessings of the madness of love The soul's recollection of ideal beauty

Love as the regrowing of the soul's wing 249D-257A

The speech concluded A prayer to Love 257A-B

Second part about "Rhetoric" 257B-277A

Transition to a discussion about speaking and writing 257B-259D

Preliminary consideration of speech writing 257B-259D

Interlude- the myth of the cicadas 258E-259D

Rhetoric as it should be, and as it is 259E-274B

Rhetoric and knowledge 259E-261A

Knowledge of resemblances and differences 261A-264E

Dialectic method as exhibited in preceding speeches 264E-266B

The technique of existing rhetoric 266C-269C

The true method of rhetoric 269C-274B

How useful is writing as a medium of communication and teaching? 274B-278B

Messages to Lysias and Isocrates A final prayer 278B-279C

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