“Russia and Turkey in the Geopolitics of Eurasia & the Theory of Median Space: Thesis-Synthesis-Antithesis”

Georgios K. Filis

Ustinov College, December 2008
Στην γυναίκα μου Κρυσταλλία, στους γονείς μου Κωνσταντίνο και Θεοδώρα και στον αδερφό μου Ηλία-Ιάσονα για την υπομονή που έδειξαν και για την συμπαράσταση, αρωγή και αγάπη που μου προσφέρουν...

Ευχαριστώ...
Waiting for the Barbarians

What are we waiting for, assembled in the forum?

The barbarians are due here today.

Why isn’t anything going on in the senate?
Why are the senators sitting there without legislating?

Because the barbarians are coming today.
What’s the point of senators making laws now?
Once the barbarians are here, they’ll do the legislating.

Why did our emperor get up so early,
and why is he sitting enthroned at the city’s main gate,
in state, wearing the crown?

Because the barbarians are coming today
and the emperor’s waiting to receive their leader.
He’s even got a scroll to give him,
loaded with titles, with imposing names.

Why have our two consuls and praetors come out today
wearing their embroidered, their scarlet togas?
Why have they put on bracelets with so many amethysts,
rings sparkling with magnificent emeralds?
Why are they carrying elegant canes
beautiful worked in silver and gold?

Because the barbarians are coming today
and things like that dazzle the barbarians.

Why don’t our distinguished orators turn up as usual
to make their speeches, say what they have to say?

Because the barbarians are coming today
and they’re bored by rhetoric and public speaking.

Why this sudden bewilderment, this confusion?
(How serious people’s faces have become)
Why are the streets and squares emptying so rapidly,
everyone going home lost in thought?

Because night has fallen and the barbarians haven’t come.
And some of our men who have just returned from the border say
there are no barbarians any longer

Now what’s going to happen to us without barbarians?
Those people were a kind of solution.

Constantine P. Cavafy
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td>AIOC</td>
<td>Azerbaijan International Operating Company</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>AKP</td>
<td>Justice and Development Party, Turkey</td>
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<tr>
<td>AM</td>
<td>Asia Minor</td>
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<tr>
<td>AMBO</td>
<td>Albania-FYROM-Bulgaria Oil pipeline</td>
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<tr>
<td>AMSCC</td>
<td>Athens Multinational Sealift Coordination Center</td>
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<td>ANAP</td>
<td>Motherland Party, Turkey</td>
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<tr>
<td>ASALA</td>
<td>Armenian Secret Army for the Liberation of Armenia</td>
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<tr>
<td>BE</td>
<td>Byzantine Empire</td>
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<tr>
<td>BMENA</td>
<td>Broader Middle East &amp; North Africa</td>
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<tr>
<td>bpd</td>
<td>barrel per day</td>
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<td>BS</td>
<td>Blue Stream</td>
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<td>BSEC</td>
<td>Black Sea Economic Cooperation</td>
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<td>BSSA</td>
<td>Black Sea-Straits-Aegean axis</td>
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<tr>
<td>BTC MEP</td>
<td>Baku-Tbilisi-Ceyhan Main Export Pipeline</td>
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<td>BTE NGP</td>
<td>Baku-Tbilisi-Erzurum Natural Gas Pipeline</td>
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<td>BTK</td>
<td>Baku-Tbilisi-Kars Railroad</td>
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<tr>
<td>CFE</td>
<td>Conventional Forces Europe</td>
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<tr>
<td>CIS</td>
<td>Commonwealth of Independent States</td>
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<td>cmy</td>
<td>cubic meters per year</td>
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<td>COSCO</td>
<td>China Ocean Shipping (Group) Company</td>
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<td>CPC BAP</td>
<td>Caspian Pipeline Consortium Burgas-Alexandroupolis Pipeline</td>
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<td>CSTO</td>
<td>Collective Security Treaty Organization</td>
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<td>CUP</td>
<td>Committee of Union and Progress</td>
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<td>DHMS</td>
<td>Disunited Heartland of the Median Space</td>
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<td>DTP</td>
<td>Democratic Society Party, Turkey</td>
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<td>EAEC</td>
<td>Eurasian Economic Community</td>
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<td>EK</td>
<td>Eastern Kentron</td>
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<td>EPC</td>
<td>Ecumenical Patriarchate of Constantinople</td>
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<td>EQ</td>
<td>Eastern Question</td>
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<tr>
<td>EU</td>
<td>European Union</td>
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<td>FYROM</td>
<td>Former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia</td>
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<td>GDP</td>
<td>Gross Domestic Product</td>
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<td>GG</td>
<td>Great Game</td>
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<tr>
<td>ODED-GU(U)AM</td>
<td>Organization of Democracy &amp; Economic Development Georgia-Ukraine (Uzbekistan)-Azerbaijan-Moldova</td>
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<td>GI</td>
<td>Great Idea</td>
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<td>GP</td>
<td>Green Paper</td>
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<tr>
<td>GV</td>
<td>Grand Vizier</td>
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<tr>
<td>HELBROC BG</td>
<td>Hellas-Bulgaria-Romania-Cyprus Battle Group</td>
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<td>HMS</td>
<td>Heartland of the Median Space</td>
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<td>HT</td>
<td>Heartland Theory</td>
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<td>IEM</td>
<td>International Eurasianist Movement</td>
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<td>ILSA</td>
<td>Iran &amp; Libya Sanctions Act</td>
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<tr>
<td>IR</td>
<td>International Relations</td>
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<tr>
<td>ITIGI</td>
<td>Interconnector Turkey-Greece-Italy</td>
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<tr>
<td>KCTS</td>
<td>Kazakhstan Caspian Transportation System</td>
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<td>KDP</td>
<td>Kurdistan Democratic Party</td>
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<td>KRG</td>
<td>Kurdish Regional Government</td>
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<td>MAP</td>
<td>Membership Action Plan</td>
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<td>MG</td>
<td>Minsk Group</td>
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<tr>
<td>Acronym</td>
<td>Full Form</td>
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<tr>
<td>MRD</td>
<td>Motor Rifle Division</td>
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<td>MS</td>
<td>Median Space</td>
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<td>MS-GI</td>
<td>Median Space-type Great Idea</td>
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<td>MS-O</td>
<td>Median Space-type Ottomanism</td>
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<tr>
<td>NA</td>
<td>Near Abroad</td>
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<tr>
<td>NATO</td>
<td>North Atlantic Treat Organization</td>
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<tr>
<td>NEPD</td>
<td>National Energy Policy Development</td>
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<tr>
<td>NW</td>
<td>Northern Wing</td>
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<tr>
<td>OAE</td>
<td>Operation Active Endeavour</td>
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<tr>
<td>OE</td>
<td>Ottoman Empire</td>
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<tr>
<td>OSCE</td>
<td>Organization for Security and Cooperation in Europe</td>
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<tr>
<td>PJAK</td>
<td>Party of Free Life in Kurdistan</td>
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<td>PKK</td>
<td>Kurdistan Worker’s Party</td>
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<tr>
<td>PM</td>
<td>Prime Minister</td>
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<td>PP</td>
<td>Pivot Point</td>
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<td>PUK</td>
<td>Patriotic Union Kurdistan</td>
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<tr>
<td>RMA</td>
<td>Revolution in Military Affairs</td>
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<tr>
<td>ROC(A)</td>
<td>Russian Orthodox Church (Abroad)</td>
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<tr>
<td>RSA</td>
<td>Revolution in Strategic Affairs</td>
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<tr>
<td>SCO</td>
<td>Shanghai Cooperation Organization</td>
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<td>SOCAR</td>
<td>Azerbaijan’s State Oil Company</td>
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<td>SS</td>
<td>South Stream</td>
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<td>SW</td>
<td>Southern Wing</td>
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<tr>
<td>TCP</td>
<td>Trans-Caspian Pipeline</td>
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<td>TMS</td>
<td>Theory of Median Space</td>
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<tr>
<td>tpy</td>
<td>tonnes per year</td>
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<td>TR</td>
<td>Turkish Republic</td>
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<td>TRACECA</td>
<td>Europe-Caucasus-Asia Transport Corridor</td>
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<td>TSKA</td>
<td>Trebizond-Sevasteia-Kaesaria-Adana</td>
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<td>UHMS</td>
<td>United Heartland of the Median Space</td>
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<tr>
<td>UK</td>
<td>United Kingdom</td>
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<td>UN</td>
<td>United Nations</td>
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<td>US</td>
<td>United States</td>
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<td>W-GI</td>
<td>Western-type Great Idea</td>
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<td>WI</td>
<td>World Island</td>
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<td>WK</td>
<td>Western Kentron</td>
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<tr>
<td>W-O</td>
<td>Western-type Ottomanism</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>WW I/II</td>
<td>World War I/II</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>YO</td>
<td>Young Ottomans</td>
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<tr>
<td>YT</td>
<td>Young Turks</td>
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ABSTRACT

The aim of this thesis is to address the issue of the broader geopolitical architecture of Eurasia using as a case study the Russian-Turkish diachronic relations which are being examined through an original and fresh geopolitical/geocultural theoretical framework introduced also in the pages of this research.

The introduction presents a brief overview of the aims, issues and questions that this study expects to achieve, approach and bring up for discussion.

This research is divided into three parts and each part contains two chapters.

Part I deals with the general theoretical framework within which this study is going to be delivered. Chapter 1 critically assesses the existing theoretical geopolitical debate and aims to designate the reasons for the urgent need for the articulation of a new theoretical perspective. Chapter 2 introduces an original approach in the geopolitical theory under the label of the ‘Integrated Geopolitical/Geocultural Theory of the Median Space’. The suggested model makes two major propositions. First that there is a diachronic ‘Median Space’ identity in a specific geographical space which was never disappeared in the midst of the eternal ‘East’-‘West’ competition and is surviving even today. Second, within the Median Space region there is a specific ‘pattern’ on the implementation of International Relations which also remained unchanged throughout the centuries since all the regional and extra-regional actors are operating, consciously or unconsciously, according to its precepts.

Having presented this newly introduced framework Part II and Part III of the research are trying through textual and empirical analysis, respectively to provide the necessary evidence that strengthen the abovementioned new geopolitical model.

Part II through a historical-sociological-anthropological perspective tries to prove the first proposition about the viability of a Median Space mentality. Thus, as a case-study, it examines the diachronic geocultural and geopolitical identity of Russia and Turkey in chapters 3 and 4, respectively.

Part III by engaging International Relations macroscopic and microscopic analysis through chapters 5 and 6, respectively aims to address the second proposition about the specific pattern that is being followed by all actors interacting in the Median Space. Chapter 5, in a macroscopic way examines the suggested pattern through a historical scrutiny of the relations between the spaces that nowadays is being characterized as Turkey and Russia. Chapter 6, in a microscopic way, depicts the contemporary developments of the region and tries to extract the evidence that could support the second Median Space proposition. Initially this chapter examines the ‘energy’ component through an analysis of the contemporary ‘energy game’ and then it approaches the ‘security’ component by moving from a micro-level to a macro-level International Relations analysis starting from the Caucasus area and expanding through the Black Sea-Straits-Aegean system to the whole Median Space region.

Conclusion recapitulates the findings of this research.
ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS

For the completion of this thesis first of all, I owe a special acknowledgement to my supervisor Dr. David Kerr. The last six years, David’s valuable advice guided me in completing my Masters Degree thesis first and after that he made me the great honor to help me with my PhD research. I have to admit that all these years, I tried - not always in a successful way - to follow his instructions. I am aware of the fact that many times I was not able to be very consistent with the schedule that we were following. However, his patience, kindness and understanding allowed me to complete this difficult and important task without any friction or misunderstanding. Thank you very much David.

I would like to declare that this effort would not have been completed without the help and assistance with essential material of the people of the center of geopolitical research and analysis Infognomon in Athens. I owe a lot to Mr. Savas Kalederidis for our discussions and for his support to my efforts. His guidance made me ‘see’ many interesting perspectives on many issues.

To my teacher, friend and … brother Mr. Harry Athanasopoulos I would like to say a special thanks for his willingness to help me and because he believes so much in me. I am honored to be his friend.

Moreover, I would like also to thank my good friends Ms. Eleni Bakatsi, Dr. Stergios Pardalis, Dr. Giannis Platis, Dr. Apostolos Demetriades, Dr. Stelios Tavoularis and Mr. Giorgos Chagias. Without them, their support and friendship I wouldn’t be in a position to overcome the difficulties of all these years.

Furthermore, I would like to thank Froso and ‘Boumboum’ for everything, they know …

Traditionally people are concluding their acknowledgements by thanking their families. What could I say to my father Konstantine, my mother Theodora and to my brother Elias-Jason? Is an acknowledgement enough? They stood by me during all these years and they provided me with everything I needed and wanted but most importantly they offered me their unconditional love. I would say that I only hope to make them proud and I also hope to be in a position to provide them with, at least, a tiny portion of what they have offered to me. Finally, I would like to thank the ‘new’ member of my family, my wife Chrystallia. Thank you for being in my life. The last 10 years we have passed through a lot of difficulties but we have made it. So, I am looking forward for the next … half of a century …
EXORDIUM

On August the 8th, 2008, while the whole world was dazzled by the impressive opening ceremony of the Olympic Games in Beijing it was also got by surprise, at least the unaccustomed to the International Relations (IR) issues, by the names that monopolized the news of these days. ‘Ossetia’, ‘Tskhinvali’ and ‘Vladicaucas’ are not names signaling exotic “oriental” places that someone had to visit. On the contrary, they were representing the stage of a war-drama that was ‘officially’ signaling the Russian ‘come back’ to the forefront of the international scene. The world was not the same any more. In November 2008, a released report titled Global Trends 2025: A Transformed World by the United States (US) National Intelligence Council (NIC), actually verified this view by saying that

The international system – as constructed following the Second World War – will be almost unrecognizable by 2025 owing to the rise of emerging powers, a globalizing economy, an historic transfer of relative wealth and economic power from West to East, and the growing influence of nonstate actors. By 2025, the international system will be a global multipolar one with gaps in national power continuing to narrow between developed and developing countries …

Historically, emerging multipolar systems have been rather unstable than bipolar or unipolar ones. Despite the recent financial volatility – which could end up accelerating many ongoing trends – we do not believe that we are headed toward a complete breakdown of the international system, as occurred in 1914-1918 when an earlier phase of globalization came to a halt. However, the next 20 years of transition to a new system are fraught with risks. Strategic rivalries are most likely to revolve … we cannot rule out a 19th century-like scenario of arms races, territorial expansion, and military rivalries.

This is a story with no clear outcome … Although the United States is likely to remain the single most powerful actor, the United States’ relative strength – even in military realm – will decline and US leverage will become more constrained. At the same time, the extent to which other actors … will be willing or able to shoulder increased burdens is unclear. Policymakers and publics will have to cope with a growing demand for multilateral cooperation when the international system will be stressed by the incomplete transition from the old to a still-forming new order.¹

These few lines perfectly explain and rationalize a research aiming to scrutinize a transforming international system whose final shape is not clearly foreseeable but is definitely not going to be similar to the contemporary one. The last sentence about the need to “cope” with these changes definitely implies, if not urges for, the creation of explanatory frameworks for the IR developments both of today and of the future. In addition to all these, the Russian signs of revival and the war in Caucasus indicate the Russian Federation and the particular territory as the appropriate starting point for launching a research for the present and the future IR system. The ‘play’ for the emergence of new/old poles of power is being staged in this broader region. It is in Eurasia that the future of the global economic and political balance will be decided. It is in the ‘borders’ between Europe and Asia that a significant ‘portion’ of this ‘game’ will be unveiled. Indeed, the culmination of a Western effort that seeks to impose its geopolitical views in Eurasia is being signified by the unilateral, highly debatable and controversial actions concerning the Kosovo-Metohja issue. The unilateral revision (February 2008) of the borders in Europe actually originates from an international system and norm formed after World War II (WWII). Moreover, the open questioning and challenging of this Western-led tutelage was unfolded in the Caucasus region (August 2008) and in a sense signifies the emergence of a process towards the redistribution of power across Eurasia. Both incidents are taking place in the same broader region. Both historically and culturally, the Balkans, Asia Minor (AM) and Caucasus represent a unity since they are considered neither ‘Europe’ nor ‘Asia’ or, to put it better, they are considered both ‘Europe’ and ‘Asia’. Furthermore, diachronically, these areas were more or less incorporated into the same political, imperial formations. Regardless of whether these formations were the Hellenistic states or belonged to the Roman, Byzantine or Ottomans empires, the future of these
territories is highly interdependent. In a few words, adopting a macroscopic point of view, both the Georgian and the Kossovo-Metohja regions constitute in geopolitical, political and cultural terms a unity and as such, they have to be approached as a whole. They are mere ‘episodes’ of the same ‘series’ that its ‘script’ has to do with the competition between a dominant and a revisionist power for supremacy in Eurasia. Naturally, the ‘stage’ for this ‘performance’, the ‘battlefield’, is always the border regions between these two ‘suitors’ of world domination. Consequently, a scrutiny of this process that will focus on the developments in the ‘battlefield’ region might unfold some useful results that will help understand the situation and enable the researcher to find some ‘answers’/ ‘formulas’ in ameliorating or balancing a gradually aggravating reality.

This study is not going to support its theoretical or explanatory framework on a ‘conventional’ basis. Its aim is to blend the existing theoretical and empirical knowledge in an innovative but hopefully comprehensive way and produce an original outcome, both in the theoretical and in the empirical part, suitable for an emerging “brave new world”. In a few words, the aim of this thesis is to address the issue of the broader geopolitical architecture of Eurasia using as a case-study the Russian-Turkish diachronic relations, focusing on the broader area that produced the crises of February and August 2008. Moreover, this relation is examined through an original and fresh geopolitical/geocultural theoretical framework, which is also introduced into the pages of this research. This study is divided into three parts and each part contains two chapters. Each part deals with one of the three major research questions and all questions are interconnected and together constitute a common comprehensible unity. There is a theoretical, an analytical and of course an empirical
concept. The theoretical question that is being approached in the first part of this research, deals mainly with the nature of the geopolitical theory. What is geopolitics and are they applicable in the contemporary era? If geopolitics has a certain level of validity nowadays, then is there a specific way that could be approached and are there any generalizations that could be deducted from their scrutiny? The culmination of this fresh look on the geopolitical theories underpins the emergence of an urgent need for the introduction of new theoretical frameworks that could explain the current IR situation in a more satisfactory way and actually create a counterbalance to the dominant paradigm. Exactly this observation, about the necessity of creating a new approach, leads this research to the introduction of the term ‘Median Space’, a concept not widely known and used by the IR scholarship and geopolitical analysis. This suggested framework actually leads the analysis to the second major question of the research. Is there a Median Space? This analytical conceptual question is being addressed in the second part of this research. In this part, there is an effort to deal with the major identity and geopolitical issues and debates taking place in the two countries that are used as a case study: Russia and Turkey. Finally, the third part of this thesis deals with the last research question, which is the actual empirical one, since it has to do with the diachronic ‘realities’ of the region in question. In a few words, three major research question, one theoretical dealing with the actual nature of geopolitical theory and the need or not to provide a geopolitical rationale in order to explain IR, one analytical dealing with a newly introduced and suggested theoretical framework and one empirical representing the diachronic IR reality which actually conforms with the suggested analytical one constitute a, hopefully, rather coherent structure for dealing with the introduction of a ‘heretic’ theoretical approach in examining IR.
Regarding the question about the contribution to the scholarship, this research aims to contribute in three main ways. First, in theoretical terms this thesis combines the existing knowledge in a new, hopefully, original way both in the first and in the second part of this research. In chapter one the whole critical approach to the existing geopolitical theory constitutes a fresh look on dealing with geopolitical reasoning. In chapter four a new synthesis of the existing knowledge might unfold some surprising results on the issue of the Turkish identity and its relation with the Greek one. Second, in empirical terms this research is presenting a rather updated, up until October 2008, report on major developments in the ‘energy’ and ‘security’ issues of Eurasia and blends them in a rather unusual but meaningful way. Third, this research actually claims originality mainly in its theoretical part and most specifically in the second chapter that introduces the ‘Integrated Geopolitical/Geocultural Theory of the Median Space’. The purpose of this approach is to propose a ‘socially constructed’ ‘grand narrative’ based on the ‘radical’ views of ‘turning the world upside down’ and giving an alternative to the ‘supernumeraries’ of the world scene. Of course, a geopolitical grand narrative does not answer all questions but simply delimits the framework within which many more issues, cultural, economic and political ones could be further examined. Moreover, the theory of the Median Space does not claim the authority of being an “X” article but only aims to suggest an alternative much more relevant to the turbulent 21st century. Furthermore, it aims to offer a tiny contribution to the further development of the geopolitical tradition and the IR field in general. It should be noted that the theory of the Median Space claims originality within the framework of IR and within the geopolitical methodological approach since it was first articulated in the historical and sociological field by Professor Dimitiris Kitsikis. In a few words, this effort tries to expand, elaborate and further
develop Kitsikis’s socio-historical theory by transforming it into a hopefully fully-fledged geopolitical IR approach.

Moreover, besides the three abovementioned observations that through them this thesis could be characterized as a contribution to knowledge it could be suggested that there is also one more element that definitely allows this thesis to claim originality. Classical geopolitical theory, almost exclusively, deals with “space” as the major if not the sole “medium of exchange”, in order to articulate its precepts and doctrines. Definitely, the notion of “space” for an analyst that deals with geopolitics should be and is the most important factor that has to be taken under consideration. However, the “space” is occupied by people, civilizations, and why not, races. So, in dealing with a certain “space” someone should also employ and add to the equation the tenants of this locus. A “sterilized” observation of the geographical terrain, focusing only on the water-routes or the mountainous ranges and the weather conditions, should not be the only indicator for the articulation of a sound geopolitical cogitation. On the contrary, people, their civilizations and their identities, are also an inseparable element of the notion of “space”. They interact in combination with the terrain and create a meaningful totality, since neither geography nor the civilization has a meaning in the absence of the other.

Consequently, this thesis in order to develop its argument and its alternative geopolitical approach, is trying to combine the geographic terrain - the characteristics of the landmass, with the human civilization - the identity of people. Thus, this research, without trying to depart from the “gulf” of geopolitical tradition, is approaching the notion of “space” through a broader angle, which differs, in
methodological and analytical terms, considerably from the classical geopolitical approach. After all, even from these first pages of the introduction, the main framework within which this thesis is going to be developed is becoming clear. The suggested geopolitical approach is titled as an “Integrated Geopolitical/Geocultural” theory. That means that there is an effort for the “unification” under the notion of “space” of both the geographical and the identity factors that interact and only if they taken as a whole some meaningful outcomes could be derived.

In terms of methodology, this research uses an interpretive approach focusing mainly on textual analysis. In the first part of this research, the highly theoretical ‘literature review’ dealing with the major works of geopolitical analysis and most importantly of the primary sources of the dominant and major Anglo-phone school is being studied along with some extensive secondary bibliography. On the issue of the introduction of the new theoretical framework, the sources that are used are once again the Greek-phone primary ones combined with the primary Anglophone and surrounded with certain secondary ones. The second part of this research includes mainly primary and secondary sources from Russian, Turkish, Greek and Greek-Byzantine scholars. The period covered by these sources actually incorporates the last 10 centuries. Finally, the last part of this research includes historical primary and secondary Greek, English-speaking and Turkish sources while the last chapter dealing mainly with the contemporary developments heavily rests on the contemporary news collected from all kinds of textual and electronic (internet) sources, while in some cases material taken from official Greek authorities and interviews has been used.
Overall, this research actually represents a multidisciplinary approach attempting to address a rather multidimensional and complex issue. Consequently, it includes a variety of primary and secondary sources from various fields such as IR, history, anthropology and sociology. It should be noted that the suggested main contribution part of the thesis is totally based on primary sources while all the major ‘heretic’ views across this book are supported by referring to the most influential writers in their fields. It should be added that the references of this research, especially in chapter 6 are indicative due to the obvious reasons of keeping the ‘size’ of this research in acceptable limits. Finally, it would be worth-noticing that the two chapters focusing on the Russian and Turkish identity, chapter 3 and 4, respectively, are parts of much larger essays, thus their references also are indicative.

Moving now to a brief description of the chapters, it should be again reminded that this thesis includes three parts, each consisting of two chapters.

Part I, the ‘Thesis’ part, deals with the general theoretical framework and theoretical questions within which this study is going to be delivered. Chapter 1 discusses and critically assesses the existing theoretical geopolitical debate. Geopolitics, as an analytical tool of IR, has faced a lot of critique, thus the first thing to do is to investigate the compatibility of geopolitical reasoning with the modern world. Having established this relationship, a brief overview of the diachronic geopolitical theory, through an innovative angle though, would unfold a constant diachronic trend that dominates all schools of thought since the emergence of this analytical method. This analysis also aims at indicating a dominant ideology that in the contemporary era remains unchallenged both in the academic and in the practical realms. Therefore, the
need for an alternative approach might emerge. Chapter 2 actually introduces an original approach into the geopolitical theory under the label of the ‘Integrated Geopolitical/Geocultural Theory of the Median Space’. The suggested model makes two major propositions. First, there is a diachronic ‘Median Space’ identity in a specific geographical space, which has never disappeared in the midst of the ‘East’-‘West’ competition. Second, within the Median Space region there is a specific ‘pattern’ regarding the implementation of IR that also remained unchanged throughout the centuries since all the regional and extra-regional actors are operating, consciously or unconsciously, according to its precepts. As it has already been mentioned, the development of this approach which mainly rests on the textual analysis of primary sources scrutinizes the dominant Anglophone geopolitical school and combines it, in a hopefully creative way, with the important opus of Kitsikis. The suggested theory is based on Kitsikis’s existing historical-sociological approach and aims to provide a fully-articulated original geopolitical framework. The main analytical theoretical conceptual question obviously rests on this chapter and is as follows: does the ‘Median Space’ actually exist?

Having presented this newly introduced framework, Part II and Part III of the research attempt, through textual and empirical analysis respectively, to provide the necessary evidence that support the abovementioned new geopolitical model.

Part II attempts, through a more historical-sociological-anthropological perspective, to prove the first proposition about the viability of a Median Space mentality. In other words, it actually tries to address the analytical question about the existence of the Median Space. Of course, dealing with the inhabitants of the whole Median Space is
impossible; therefore, as a case-study, it examines the diachronic geocultural and
geopolitical identity of Russia and Turkey in chapter 3 and 4, respectively. To focus
first, on a volatile region and second on the turbulent relations along with the amazing
similarities of Russia and Turkey could provide the researcher with the necessary
material, enable him to draw some useful results. In these two chapters there is a brief
but comprehensive critical review and assessment of both people’s histories aiming to
trace elements that suggest the existence of a Median Space mentality in their *vita*. In
short, despite the East-centered and West-centered approaches, is there a Median
Space-centered one? Obviously, the existence of such a school could decisively verify
the validity of the suggestive theory. To answer this question, a large volume of
primary and secondary historical, sociological, anthropological and IR sources has
been engaged in both cases. These chapters actually represent the ‘Synthesis’ part of
the research, since their aim is to represent the synthetic nature of the Median Space
identities in the cultural-sociological-political fields, and of the nations and spaces in
question.

Part III, by engaging IR macroscopic and microscopic analysis through chapter 5 and
6, respectively, aims to address the second theoretical proposition about the specific
pattern that is being followed by all actors interacting in the Median Space. Chapter 5
examines in a macroscopic way the suggested pattern through a historical scrutiny of
the relations between the *spaces* that today are referred to as Turkey and Russia. In a
few words, this part is focusing on the IR between the state formations that were
controlling these spaces diachronically; therefore, it incorporates Byzantium in the
picture. A brief examination of these relations would hopefully give rise to the
suggested pattern. Historical primary and secondary resources are heavily used on this
part. Chapter 6, in a microscopic way, depicts the contemporary developments of the region and tries to extract the evidence that could support the second Median Space theoretical proposition. First this chapter examines the ‘ENERGY-Security’ component – stressing on the ‘energy’ constitutive element of the equation, through an analysis of the contemporary ‘energy game’. So, this first part engages with the competition about the hydrocarbons in Eurasia, focusing on the oil and the natural gas distribution of sources, roads and markets. The second part of this chapter approaches the ‘Energy-SECURITY’ component, stressing on the ‘security’ constitutive element of the equation, by moving from a micro-level to a macro-level IR analysis starting from the region of Caucasus and expanding through the Black Sea-Straits-Aegean system to the whole Median Space region. This last part, engaging in a proper-IR way and heavily using empirical evidence from a variety of primary and secondary sources, ranging from books to news and when possible personal interviews, tries to reflect the suggested pattern that could be applied even today. By stressing on the conflicting nature of the major actors, this chapter underlines the ‘Antithesis’ of reality as opposing to the previous ‘synthetic’ nature of the psyche and identity of the peoples and spaces in question.

Finally, the Conclusion recapitulates the findings of this research.

In a few words, this thesis engages a variety of issues, subjects and questions while it is attempting, in a highly synthetic manner, to create a meaningful unity. Its multidisciplinary nature made the whole ‘journey’ difficult, long, and sometimes ‘painful’ but definitely interesting and worthwhile. The final opinion about the academic validity of this study rests on the reader’s decision. In any case, the aim of
this research was to offer a useful explanatory tool for a transformative globe that sees and experiences the changes, and at the same time tries to create a new ‘grant narrative’ in order to explain them.
Part I:

Thesis-Geopolitical / Geocultural Theory Revisited

“I am not blaming those who are resolved to rule, only those who show an even greater readiness to submit.”

Hermocrates¹

¹ Thucydides, History of the Peloponnesian War (London, 1972) (Book IV, 61), p. 300
CHAPTER ONE

The Forerunners of the Geopolitical/Geocultural Debate:
A Critical Assessment

1.1 Geopolitics: “à La Mode” or “passées de mode”?¹

Originally coined by the Swedish political scientist Rudolf Kjellén in 1899 (...), few terms ... have been as controversial and emotive as 'geopolitics'. From its obscure origins at the twilight of the nineteenth century through the widespread and sometimes indiscriminate contemporary uses of the term, the label has frequently been the focus of intense and often acrimonious debate²

The abovementioned passage introduces the reader to a term that for some “has remained ... enigmatic, shadowy, contested and sometimes” characterized as representing a “shameful category” whereas for others seems “to offer the seductive promise of a privileged perspective upon current affairs and a unique insight into the political world”.³ Three main questions are going to be briefly addressed. What is geopolitics? Why and how geopolitics flourished and is there any space for geopolitical analysis in the 21st century?

The definitional problem that the researcher encounters “is notoriously difficult”⁴ to be addressed, since there is even a debate on how to classify geopolitical analysis. Is it a part of Political Geography, of IR or an independent scientific field affiliated to

¹ Parker, G. Geopolitics, Past, Present and Future (In Greek) (Athens, 2002), p. 25
³ Ibid.
geography and/or politics? If it is not an independent scientific field but a part of geography and/or politics, then how could it be described within them, as a methodology, a tradition, a school, a discourse? It is characteristic that almost every geopolitical writer gives his own interpretation. Rudolf Kjellén (1864-1922) who “produced the earliest extended elucidation of geopolitics” in his *Staten Som Livform* (The state as a life form) (1916) presents a digestible definition by saying that “Geopolitics is the teaching of the state as a geographic organism or a manifestation in space”.\(^5\) The next efforts in producing a more comprehensive definition, led to descriptive statements in the size of small paragraphs.\(^6\) However, Heffernan observes that “There is little to be gained by adopting a tightly restrictive definition for we are dealing with … a ‘discourse’, a constellation of writings and images produced by a varied constituency operating in several loci, including the universities, the media, and government ministries”.\(^7\) Despite Heffernan’s efforts not to confine in a definition the scope of geopolitical analysis, international literature offers two rather comprehensive and easily digestible definitions. Parker is defining geopolitics as “the spatial study of international relations”\(^8\) whereas Gray sees geopolitics as “the spatial study and practice of international relations”. By building on Parker’s definition, Gray offers a more elaborate one, since it includes in the geopolitical reasoning not only the scholar but the practitioner as well.\(^9\) Having defined geopolitical analysis as a

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\(^5\) Murphy, T., D. *The Heroic Earth: Geopolitical Thought in Weimar Germany, 1918-1933* (Ohio, 1997), p. 6


\(^8\) Parker, Geopolitics, p. 35

spatial analytical tool of IR, someone could not speak of an independent science but rather of a methodological trend moving in-between the scientific fields of Politics/IR and Geography/Political Geography. After all, the very name ‘geo-politics’ designates its true dual nature, since it derives from the Greek words Γαία (gaea/earth) and Πόλη (poli/city-state) that are combined together in an unbreakable relation.

Concerning the second question, the subject could be approached through two complementary angles. As Heffernan correctly argues, there are reasons that explain the timing of the emergence of the geopolitical analysis and similarly there are aspects that explain the actual character of geopolitical reasoning. The timing, second half of the 19th century, of the emergence of the “geopolitical panic” could be observed through three main dimensions. There was “an upsurge in economic nationalism and a general clamor for tariff reform and protectionism” Heffernan adds that “to some extend, protectionism was a despairing attempt by traditional nation-states to limit the disruption caused by an increasingly global and integrated world economy” and he also implied the “growing conviction that the future would be dominated by large, spatially cohesive and economically self-sufficient geopolitical units”. There was an “unprecedented ‘scramble’ for imperial space from the 1880s onwards”. Finally, “the complex web of bi-lateral treaties and pacts that had characterized the middle decades of the century was suddenly replaced by a simpler and more dangerous, bi-polar arrangement”. The characteristics, however, of the emergent “geopolitical panic” could be explained through a brief glance at the actual context of the era in question. As Heffernan notes, the turn of the century was characterized by the “widespread belief that the changes taking place in the global economic and political system were

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seismically important”. Within this turbulent environment, a rather romantic, even “mystical” mood had been developed, best described with the term *fin-de-siècle/sekelskiftet* (end of the century) mentality. This expression became “a catch-all phrase to describe everything from the architectural and artistic styles of the period through the developments in fashion, design and technology to the wider, often impassioned about the past, the present and the future on the eve of a new century”.11 Friedrich Nietzsche (1844-1900) and Oswald Spengler (1880-1936) with their work constitute the most representative examples of this *Ragnarök*-type romantic/pessimistic/apocalyptic and nihilistic ideology about the future of the European civilization.12 This mixed emotional situation of embracing the change with its opportunities and at the same time fearing it due to the hidden and eminent dangers characterized the whole spirit of the early geopolitical cogitation as well.13 Within this framework new ‘tools’ were used in order for mankind to find more satisfactory explanatory models to interpret the vast changes around the globe.14 The invasion of positive sciences like biology and zoology through the mantle of the Darwinian theoretical framework to geography in order to transform it into a full-fledged positive science created the first geopolitical discourses, especially in the Teutonic world.15

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11 Ibid., p. 31
12 For the romantic, pessimistic, nihilistic and apocalyptic especially for the future of the western civilization views see Nietzsche, F. *Thus Spoke Zarathustra* (in Greek) (Athens, 1983); Spengler, O. *The Decline of the West* (two volumes) (in Greek) (Athens, 2003); Weigert, W., H. *Generals and Geographers: The Twilight of Geopolitics* (New York, 1942), pp. 24-48
13 See, Heffernan, ‘‘*Fin De Siècle, Fin Du Monde? On the Origins of European Geopolitics, 1890-1920*’, p. 31
14 On the impact that *fin-de-siècle* ideologies and romanticism, nationalism and positivism had in the geopolitical discourse see, Vergos, K. *Geopolitics of Nations and of Globalization: For a History of Geography and for a Geography of History* (in Greek) (Athens, 2004), pp. 80-113
15 Friedrich Ratzel (1844-1904) is considered to be the ‘father’ of the geopolitical analysis and the founder of the Teutonic geopolitical school. On his work and the subsequent criticisms see, Bassin, M. *Politics from Nature: Environment, Ideology, and the Determinist Tradition*, in Agnew, J., Mitchel, K. & Toal, G. (eds) *A Companion to Political Geography* (Malden, 2003), pp. 15-18; Parker, *Geopolitics*, pp. 44-78; Mazis, in the Greek translation of Ratzel’s *Lebensraum*, tries to offer through his introductory comments an approach that shaking off the mantle of determinism and organicism from Ratzel’s work. See, Ratzel, F. *Der Lebensraum* (in Greek) (Athens, 2001), pp. 31-71; Mazis, T., I. *Geopolitics: Theory and Practice* (in Greek) (Athens, 2002), pp. 10-18
Moreover, the effort on behalf of the Anglo-Saxon counterpart to create a “new Geography” based on the transformation of the old practical discipline to a more theoretical one contributed to the further development of the geopolitical inquiry.\textsuperscript{16}

Ó Tuathail informs the reader in a passage that “Globalization, informationalization and proliferating techno-scientific risks have transformed the dimensionality and territoriality of geopolitics at the end of the twentieth century. Some have even suggested that this marks ‘the end of geopolitics’”.\textsuperscript{17} Ó Tuathail, being probably the most vocal exponent of the Anglo-Saxon school of critical geopolitics, is questioning even the very existence of the geopolitical analysis. So, is geopolitical approaches passées de mode? The answer to this crucial question could be traced in a twofold manner. It should be approached through the empirical aspect and through the theoretical one. Having briefly described the timing and the context of the raising ‘geopolitical panic’, someone could acknowledge some contemporary developments that resemble that era. The economic nationalism and developed protectionism as a reaction to an interconnected world, the increasing competition for imperial space and the transformation of the complex web of bilateral agreements to an essentially dualistic one amazingly resemble nowadays. These lines are written in the midst of the profound financial and credit crisis (October 2008). The ‘remedy’ or simply the ‘first aid’ for this crisis that has been ‘crawling’ for more than a year is state

\textsuperscript{16} Sir Halford Mackinder (1861-1947) is the ‘father’ of the Anglo-Saxon geopolitical school. In his early works with indicative example his essay \textit{On the Scope and Methods of Geography} (1887) he is talking about an all-encompassing geography suitable for the teacher and for the politician that is going to theorize and simultaneously ‘suggest’ solutions. See his article attached in Mackinder, J., H. Democratic Ideals and Reality With Additional Papers (New York, 1962), pp. 211-240. The Greek translation of the book includes also the essay of Braian Blouet that uncovers some interesting angles of Mackinder’s professional life. It casts some light in the background of the development of his thoughts and underlines his major efforts to create this ‘synthetic’ “new geography”. See Blouet, B. ‘Sir Halford Mackinder (1861-1947) New Aspects for his Life and Work’, in Mackinder, J., H. Democratic Ideals and Reality With Additional Papers (in Greek) (Athens, 2006), pp. 19-115

intervention. Ironically, the place that gave birth to liberalism, United Kingdom (UK), is becoming the ‘model’ of state intervention in nationalizing banks and large financial institutions along with guaranteeing the deposits of the citizens.\textsuperscript{18} UK, Eurozone states and the United States (US), along with the rest of the world are following an unprecedented, in terms of ‘Neo-liberal era’, nationalization programs in order to prevent the system from collapsing.\textsuperscript{19} Moreover, there are cases like Argentina that is imposing “higher tariffs on imports” and “trade barriers” in order to face the threats.\textsuperscript{20} In a few words, Neo-liberalism as expressed by the “excesses of Anglo-Saxon financial capitalism” is in crisis and the only alternative seems to come from the state “regulated models” as expressed by continental Europe.\textsuperscript{21} Irrespectively of the actual outcome of this global crisis and irrespectively of the efficiency or not of the following policies, two main outcomes could be derived from the whole situation. Economic globalization has clearly acquired the required ‘critical mass’ that creates great problems and instability to the whole world whenever something goes wrong. Since economic globalization is so well established and might create profound problems, the demand for the ‘state to come back’ is more urgent than ever. Consequently, the role of the state is bigger, reaffirmed and actually serves as the last resort for social and political security in a more interconnected cruel world. In addition, the recent (August 2008) crisis in Caucasus signifies the ‘come back’ of a self-confident Russia which, despite the fact that does not have as deep ideological differences with the West as it used to have, is directly ‘scrambling’ US and EU for


\textsuperscript{20} For a recapitulation of the policies followed all over the world see ‘Credit Crisis: World in Turmoil’, [http://new.bbc.co.uk] 15 October 2008

‘space’ in Eurasia in clear geopolitical terms. This newly established post-Cold War confrontation, which acts as a capping of the developments that have been taking place especially during the last eight years is leading the world towards a new bipolarity.

At the theoretical level there are further signs indicating the perpetuation and further development of geopolitical cogitation. Taylor in an insightful analysis observes that geopolitics “As a subdiscipline, it is minuscule … compared to the similar discipline of International Relations … in fact we can view geopolitics as the periphery of a periphery of a periphery” which has an “uneasy relation with political geography”. Nevertheless, in the last decades the whole situation has changed due to mainly three reasons. First, due to the increasing interest geopolitics have “become larger in absolute terms” and they have acquired “a critical mass for meaningful reproduction”. Second, due to the more insightful approaches “geopolitics is moving into the core concerns of contemporary social science”. Third, with “states ‘coming back in’ within social sciences, geopolitics can contribute something of substance and insight”. For Sloan & Gray geopolitics is a dialect between “spatial relationships and historical causation” which “combines historical knowledge with a sophisticated capacity of

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22 Russian coordinated efforts to save the system are moving hand-in-hand with its effort to exert further control to areas that were out of reach even during the Cold War era. Its willingness to support Iceland with a multibillion loan with almost no interest rate is indicative of the dual policy of ideological alliance with the US and geopolitical rivalry simultaneously. See, Danielsson, J. ‘What Happened to Iceland?’ [http://new.bbc.co.uk] 10 October 2008; ‘Iceland Nationalizes Biggest Bank’ [http://new.bbc.co.uk] 10 October 2008; Zagorodnyaya, Y. ‘Iceland Turns to Russia For Bailout’, [http://en.rian.ru] 10 October 2008

23 It would be interesting to note that in the midst of the financial crisis Russia first is expressing its opinion that “the confidence in the United States as the “leader of the free world and free economy” had been undermined forever” and second through its policies is aiming to “reconfigure the European security system” by “rendering NATO irrelevant … dismantling the OSCE mechanisms” and “raise the status of” the “Collective Security Treaty Organization (CSTO) to a par with NATO”. Baev, K., P. ‘Russia Counts Its Blessings in the Global Financial Crisis’, [http://www.jamestown.org] 14 October 2008; see, chapter 6


25 Ibid., p. 377
theorizing” resulting in the creation of “a powerful analytical framework” that other methodological tools are not able to provide due to their inability to take into consideration all the variables of geopolitical analysis.26 Geopolitical reasoning is crucial for the state policies since its dynamic nature allows adaptations and can also play three roles: “It can fulfill an interpretative role” (suggests a view that is shaped by ‘space’), it can “function as a policy science” (explains structure of security problems), and it can “be an instrument of political warfare”. Finally, it could act as a “vehicle for justification of political decisions taken on other grounds”.27 Gray argues that “whether they like it or not geography matters. Physical geography literally is inescapable” and “given that human geography must function in particular cultural space, even the geography of the imagination is inescapable.” Thus, “Our imaginations are, after all ‘encultured’ by the civilization that dominates the geographical coordinates of our location”. So, geography is not only “‘out there’ objectively as environment or ‘terrain’” but is “‘within us’, in here, as imagined spatial relationships”.28

Consequently, geopolitical reasoning both in empirical and in theoretical terms is “à La Mode” and will remain like that in the foreseeable future. As Parker correctly asserts “the geopolitical space should be approached as a totality” and “geopolitical analysis is holistic”29 using as a basic instrument the political map30 and aiming at searching for interpretations.31 Within this holistic framework characterized by

27 Ibid., p. 10
28 Gray, ‘Inescapable Geography’, p. 163
29 Parker, Geopolitics, p. 36
30 See, Pantazis, V. Maps & Ideologies: Map Orientation and the Fate of the Peoples (in Greek) (Athens, 1989), pp. 101-276
31 Parker, Geopolitics, p. 35
dynamic changes and uncertainty, the geopolitical intellectual vagueness seemed to “be of minor importance” in relation to the fact that it “was one of those terms that someone instinctively feels that is relevant to the new developments”. 32 “The principal glory” of this holistic “grand narrative” is “the generic capacity … to tie apparently disparate phenomena together in meaningful ways”. The ‘seductiveness’ and simultaneous ‘repulsion’ of this approach is exactly this “meaningful character of geopolitical theory” which “lends itself to the telling of stories with a political message”. 33

1.2 The Eternal – Whether we Like it or Not, Geopolitical Division of the World

i. A Binary World

**Status quo** It means ‘the existing state of affairs and refers to the prevailing pattern of relations in international relations … Status quo policies are likely to be adopted by those states with most gain from a preservation of the existing territorial, ideological and power distribution … 34

**Revisionism** Most often used to denote challenges to the status quo. The term … view international politics in terms of a more-or-less permanent structural tension between defenders of the prevailing order and opponent of it … Instead of accepting the inferior position accorded to them by the prevailing order … revisionist states attempt … to alter the situation in their favour … 35

These comprehensive definitions, if juxtaposed, reveal the ‘grand narrative’ of the whole ‘play’ performed on planet Earth diachronically. Chouliaras observes that pre-war geopolitics was dominated by two main conflicting geopolitical views, the

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32 Ibid., p. 27
33 Gray, *Inescapable Geography*, p. 171
35 Ibid., pp. 480-481
defenders of the status quo (Anglo-Saxons) and the champions of the revisionist approaches (Teutons). Chouliaras’s major observation is correct with the difference that it is applicable timelessly.\textsuperscript{36} Thus, despite the fact that there is a huge debate about the notion of dualism - sea-power against land-power, East against West, ‘we’ against ‘they’ and critical geopolitics considers it as a simplification that distorts the actual picture and leads to devastating enmities, the existence of the status quo and revisionist power is very difficult to be challenged and ignored. A brief glance at the political history of mankind could validate Waltz’s observation that “Systems are either maintained or transformed”.\textsuperscript{37}

Therefore, all the categories of geopolitical reasoning, irrespectively of the era, approach or school could be placed on this main division framework. Moreover, the emergence of geopolitical analysis could be traced during the last half of the 19th century and finally certain geopolitical “ages”\textsuperscript{38} could be identified. Having these in mind, geopolitical era could be divided into three main periods, the first from the late 19th century till the end of WW II, the second from 1945 till the end of the Cold War and the third from the 1990 till currently. These three periods are characterized by the existence of status quo and revisionist geopolitical approaches. During the first period, the American Alfred Thayer Mahan\textsuperscript{39} (1840-1914), the British Mackinder\textsuperscript{40}...

\textsuperscript{36} Chouliaras, A. Geographical Myths of International Politics: An Introduction to the Theory of Critical Geopolitics (in Greek) (Athens, 2004), pp. 23-24

\textsuperscript{37} Waltz, N., K. Theory of International Politics (Massachusetts, 1979), p. 199

\textsuperscript{38} On the “ages of geopolitics” see, Agnew, J. Geopolitics: Re-visioning World Politics (London, 1998), pp. 86-124


\textsuperscript{40} The classical Mackinder, Democratic Ideals and Reality With Additional Papers is invaluable along with the Greek translation with Blouet’s additional work. Among the enormous number of commentary papers and pages dedicated to Mackinder’s work a contemporary and fresh assessment is Sloan, G. ‘Sir
and the French Vidal de la Blache (1845-1918) and Jacques Ancel (1879-1943) represent the status quo geopolitical approaches whereas the revisionist school is represented by the Swedish Kjellén and the Germans Ratzel and Karl Houshofer (1869-1946). During the second period the status quo approaches were represented mostly by the American-Dutch Nicholas Spykman (1893-1943) accompanied mainly by Fr. Edmund Walsh (1885-1956), Hans Weigert (1902-1983), Henry Kissinger, Zbigniew Brzezinski and Colin Gray. The opposing force was


41 On the pre-WWII French geopolitical debate and the focus on commenting the German views see Parker, G. ‘Ratzel, the French School and the Birth of Alternative Geopolitics’, Political Geography, Vol. 19 (2000), pp. 957-969; Parker, Geopolitics, pp. 123-132

42 On Kjellén’s views and his inter-connection with the German geopolitical thinking indicatively see, Parker, Geopolitics, pp. 44-78, Weigert, Generals and Geographers, pp. 106-113; Murphy, The Heroic Earth, pp. 1-24

43 See Ratzel, Der Lebensraum, pp. 81-159 for the actual work of the Geographer and pp. 31-77 for an excellent introductory part assessing Ratzel’s views; Farinelli, F. ‘Friedrich Ratzel and the Nature of (political) Geography’, Political Geography, Vol. 19 (2000), pp. 943-955 offers an interesting angle on identifying the actual nature of political geography through a social point of view and the bourgeois trends of its era

44 Haushofer’s views have become a subject of great debate during the post-WWII era, especially the question whether he indoctrinated and manipulated National-Socialist policies or not. See, Houshofer, K. An English Translation and Analysis of Major General Karl Ernst Haushofer’s Geopolitics of the Pacific Ocean, Weigert, Generals and Geographers, pp. 49-75 & 139-237; Murphy’s ground-breaking work on The Heroic Earth constitutes a valuable resort to the issue in question. Moreover, Natter, Geopolitics in Germany, 1919-45 and Herwig, H., H. ‘Geopolitik: Haushofer, Hitler and Lebensraum’, in Gray, S., C & Sloan, G. (eds) Geopolitics, Geography and Strategy (London, 1999), pp. 218-241 move towards the opposite direction in their assessment on the Houshofer-National-Socialism dipole. While Natter actually undermines Geographer’s contribution to German policies during 1933-1945, Herwig questions an even well-established view that indicates Haushofer’s disassociation from Adolf Hitler’s (1889-1945) policies

45 His most influential work was a compilation of his lectures and notes published (1944) after his death (1943) in Spykman, J., N. The Geography of Peace (in Greek) (Athens, 2004)

46 On the views of one of the founding members of the School of Foreign Service at Georgetown University who also was a Jesuit Priest, a vocal opponent of Bolshevism and an instructor of US post-WWII containment policies see O Tuathail, G. ‘Spiritual Geopolitics: Fr. Edmund Walsh and Jesuit Anti-Communism’, in Dodds, K. & Atkinson, D. (eds) Geopolitical Traditions: A Century of Geopolitical Thought (London, 2000), pp. 187-210

47 In his most important work Generals and Geographers tries to introduce a notion of human geopolitics (pp. 238-259)

48 Kissinger’s actual perception of geopolitics as an art to bring ‘equilibrium’ is evident through his academic work. See Kissinger, H. Diplomacy (in Greek) (Athens, 1995), pp. 896-930 and Kissinger, H. Years of Renewal (in Greek) (Athens, 2000)

49 In line with Spykman’s doctrine see Brzezinski, Z. The Grand Chessboard: American Primacy and its Geostrategic Imperatives (in Greek) (Athens, 1997); Brzezinski, Z. The Geostrategic Triad: Living with China, Europe and Russia (in Greek) (Athens, 2002)

50 Gray moves within the broad Mahan-Mackinder-Spykman line of the status quo geopolitical tradition indicatively see Gray, S., C & Sloan, G. (eds) Geopolitics, Geography and Strategy (London,
represented mainly by the French Yves Lacoste and his circle around the geopolitical journal of *Hérodote*.\(^{51}\) During the third period of the geopolitical reasoning, the status quo approach is still dominated by the actors of the second one, namely the American intellectuals and politicians, with Samuel Huntington\(^{52}\) and an intellectual trend that is identified as the group of critical geopolitics with its ‘gurus’, the Irish Gearóid Ó Tuathail (Gerard Toal)\(^{53}\), the Americans John Agnew\(^{54}\) and Simon Dalby\(^{55}\), the British Geoffrey Parker\(^{56}\) and the German Klaus Dodds\(^{57}\). The revisionist school still is being represented by the Lacoste group.

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\(^{52}\) See, Huntington, P., S. *The Clash of Civilizations and the Remaking of the World Order* (in Greek) (Athens, 1999)


\(^{54}\) See, Agnew, J. *Geopolitics: Re-visioning World Politics*; Agnew, J., Mitchell, K. & Toal, G. (eds) *A Companion to Political Geography* (Malden, 2003), pp. 1-248 in order to comprehend some trends of critical geopolitical thought and some serious critique on them


\(^{56}\) Parker’s seminal work offers a diachronic and comprehensive outlook of the geopolitical thinking through the critical glance without levelling the actual importance of this trend of analysis. See Parker, *Geopolitics*

Chapter 1  Geopolitical Theory Revisited

The purpose of this chapter is not to narrate the works of these thinkers. The cited primary and secondary sources offer in a satisfactory manner a rather clear picture of the aims and goals of each contributor. However, this chapter is going to focus on three main observations that could be deduced from the scrutiny of these sources. These observations have not been adequately presented by the contemporary research and can contribute to the further development of this thesis.

ii. The Anglo-Saxon Status Quo and the Eurasian Revisionist Approach

The first observation deals mainly with the actual characteristics of the dual geopolitical approach. A simple glance could unfold the fact that the major proponents of the status quo theories diachronically are of British and American origins, whereas the representatives of the revisionist views are mainly from France and Germany. During the first period, the status quo group was joined by the French intellectuals. This happened immediately after the end of WWI and the emergence of a world order more favorable towards the French aspirations. The revisionist group was clearly defined within the German intellectual fields. During the second period, the German intellectuals have been totally absorbed, like their country, by the dominant paradigm, while the French counterpart starts to feel rather uncomfortable with the post-war order of things and develops a revisionist approach. The status quo approaches are still emanating mainly from the American and British circles. During the third period, the status quo approaches are once more dominated by the intellectuals of the second period, the Anglo-phone ones, but with an important difference. Now they are represented by two trends within the Anglo-phone scholarship. The traditional geopolitical approaches are always in the front-line of geopolitical inquiry but the emergence of the so-called critical school could also be
observed. On the revisionist side, except for the French school that was developed back in the 70s, there is nothing new to challenge the status quo views. In other words, it could be suggested that diachronically the status quo approaches are being represented by an ‘Insular’ or an ‘Anglo-Saxon’ school of geopolitics. This tradition has been bifurcated after the 90s to the ‘classical’ Anglo-Saxon/Insular school of geopolitics and to the ‘critical’ Anglo-Saxon/Insular school of geopolitics. Similarly, the revisionist approach was initially expressed by the Teutonic school of geopolitics and after WWII by the Frankish one. As Parker has successfully demonstrated, the Franco-German historical element could be labeled as the “Lotharingian Axis”\(^{58}\), something which enables a researcher to characterize the revisionist approach as a Lotharingian one. However, since the contemporary revisionist views to the Anglo-Saxon dominant paradigm are coming mainly from France and other parts of the continent but not from Germany, at least overtly, the revisionist view could be better characterized in a more general manner as a ‘Continental’ or a ‘Eurasian’ one. In short, during the last one-and-a-half century there is a constant intellectual and political friction between the Anglo-Saxon/Insular status quo geopolitical approach and the Eurasian/Continental revisionist geopolitical approach.

iii. The Anglo-Saxon/Insular Fear …

I always believed [said Lord Baldwin … in May of 1935] that the biggest guarantee against the eruption of a war in any part of the globe … would be the close cooperation of the British Empire with the United States of America. The combined forces of our fleets, our human resources and the direct economic projection of power through a combined

\(^{58}\) “Lotharingia” came into being following the Treaty of Verdun in 843 which divided up the empire of Charlemagne among his thee grandsons. Lothair received the Middle Kingdom together with the Imperial title … it ceased to exist after … 870 when its territory was partitioned between its western and eastern neighbours” (p. 61). See, Parker, Geopolitics, pp. 30-63
blockade along with the denial of transactions and for providing loans constitute sanctions that no power … would dare to face … I am looking forward to the future and I see this union of forces for peace and justice for the world … one day … this dream would become reality and then … the world peace is going to be ensured by those that they are speaking our tongue59

…the day will come that everybody will find out that America perceives human rights as more important than anything else and its flag is not of America’s only but of the whole world

[President Woodrow Wilson, Independence Day 1914]60

Irrespective if someone chooses British Lord Baldwin’s line of argument with its ‘realistic’ ramifications or American President Wilson’s one with its more ‘idealistic’ connotations the outcome is one and the same, suggesting that a united Anglo-Saxon power could and should order the globe. These two approaches could be placed within the ‘classical’ Anglo-Saxon/Insular geopolitical approach and within the ‘critical’ Anglo-Saxon/Insular geopolitical approach respectively. Nevertheless, despite the different angles or ‘vocabulary’ adopted by each side, the essence is one and the same, to facilitate the perpetuation of Anglo-Saxon/Insular status quo power in the international arena.

The ‘classical’ school places its main pillars of thought on the three major thinkers of the first and second geopolitical age. Rear Admiral (US Navy) Mahan, Sir Halford Mackinder and Professor Spykman have paved a path, in intellectual and political terms that the other thinkers of the second and third geopolitical age are following almost unquestionably. There is, however, a widespread view that these three scholars

60 Ibid.
were rejecting one another in many important issues and their views were diverging despite some initial common departure points. Nevertheless, it could be suggested that the truth is almost the opposite. Of course, there are some clear differences on secondary issues but the major ‘tools’ and the fundamental ‘ends’ of their geopolitical architecture rest on the same pillars.

Starting with the ‘tools’, it could be said that Mahan and Mackinder “built upon pretty much the same set of geographic features” and that “Mahan’s arguments of 1900 about the dangers posed by an expansionist Russia ‘clearly anticipated Mackinder’s concept of the Eurasian “Heartland”’. Spykman from his side is accepting Mahan’s fundamental principles on what US should do in defending its space but also indicates that since the geopolitical situation has changed it would be better to act in accordance with Mackinder’s views and precepts. Moreover, The Geography of Peace is paying the tribute to both Mahan and Mackinder for their contribution to the geopolitical thought. Despite the abovementioned observations, the major indicator of the common stance of the three thinkers could be offered by a simple consideration of Mahan’s basic geopolitical assumptions, as presented in Sumida’s essay, and a juxtaposition with Mackinder’s and Spykman’s assumptions which, after all, are

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61 On the differences between Mahan and Mackinder, see Sumida, ‘Alfred Thayer Mahan, Geopolitician’, p. 43; on the differences between Mackinder and Spykman see, Mazis, Geopolitics, pp. 21-22; Spykman ‘seems’ to be critical concerning Mackinder’s ideas. See, Spykman, The Geography of Peace, pp. 86, 95-96, 101 & 103-107. The word ‘seems’ is in quotations since Spykman never wrote The Geography of Peace. After his death (June 1943), his views, lectures and notes were compiled in a book by an editing group. The book published at the end of 1943 and as the introductory chapter indicates the editor has “demonstrated great dexterity and imagination” (p. 27) in preparing this book. Consequently it could be argued that is not sure that Spykman contradicts Mackinder however, it is certain that the editors of the book try to make it seem like that. Therefore, in this research the Geography of Peace is going to be referred not as Spykman’s book but as a book based on Spykman’s ideas.


63 Spykman, The Geography of Peace, pp. 25-26. It could be argued with certainty that Spykman adopted this position since the views presented in “his” book are based on published papers (1938 & 1939)

64 Ibid., pp. 91-92
almost the same since the latter has based his analysis to the former.\textsuperscript{65} So, there are four major geopolitical ‘tools’/ideas that could be detected from Mahan’s work. These are “a continuous and unbroken ocean and connecting seas”, “a vast transnational … landlocked state, the Russian Empire, extending without a break from the ice-bound Arctic to the rugged desert-mountain belt of inner Asia, and from Eastern Europe to a point farther eastward than Japan”, “the maritime states of continental Europe and maritime borderlands of southern and eastern Asia” and “the insular states, Great Britain and Japan, with … United States, all wholly disconnected from the mainland of Eurasia”.\textsuperscript{66} Mahan’s four major conceptualizations are directly reminiscent of Mackinder’s and Spykman’s major divisions as well. Mahan’s first observation is parallel to Mackinder’s and Spykman’s beliefs on the existence of a continuous ‘World Ocean’ that encompasses Makinder’s ‘World Island’ (WI) (Eurasia-Africa) or Spykman’s ‘Old World’ (Eurasia-Africa-Australia).\textsuperscript{67} Mahan’s Russian perception of threat is directly connected to Mackinder’s “Pivot-Area” (1904)/“Heartland” (1919, 1943) and Spykman’s “Pivot-Zone”.\textsuperscript{68} Moreover, Mahan’s third concept resembles Mackinder’s “Inner/Marginal Crescent” which generally equals to Spykman’s “Rimland” and “Peripheral Sea”\textsuperscript{69}, whereas his fourth idea depicts Mackinder’s “Outer/Insular Crescent” which is in accord with Spykman’s “Offshore Islands”,\textsuperscript{70} “Overseas Continents”,\textsuperscript{71} “Oceans and Transoceanic New World”.\textsuperscript{72} In a few words, the geographical grand narrative is almost identical. There is a land-locked core-

\textsuperscript{65} Spykman, \textit{The Geography of Peace}, pp. 92-97
\textsuperscript{66} Ibid., p. 42
\textsuperscript{67} See, Mackinder, \textit{‘The Geographical Pivot of History’}, pp. 257-258; Spykman, \textit{The Geography of Peace}, pp. 96-97
\textsuperscript{68} For Mackinder see, ibid, pp. 260-262; for Spykman see ibid., pp. 96, 97-101
\textsuperscript{69} For Mackinder’s both “Crescents” see ibid., p. 262; and for Spykman, see, ibid, pp. 96, 101-103
\textsuperscript{70} Ibid., p. 96
\textsuperscript{71} Ibid., pp. 96,103-105
\textsuperscript{72} Ibid., p. 96
region surrounded by a maritime “amphibious” / “median space” zone, which is surrounded by a remote sea-based zone as well. The historical grand narrative is also almost identical and could be encompassed into three main observations. First, the Anglophone (US and UK mainly) community is a sea-based-power occupying mainly the sea-attached zones (“Outer/Insular Crescent” or “Offshore Islands” and “Transoceanic New World”). Second, there are continental land-based-powers (Russia, Germany, France mainly) occurring in the Eurasian continent (“Pivot-Area” or “Heartland” or “Pivot-Zone” and “Inner/Marginal Crescent” or “Rimland”). Third, the whole power-game focuses on the struggle of the sea-powers to penetrate the core-region and of the land-power to exit the sea in order to dominate the “World Island” at the expense of the sea-powers. The common denominator of this eternal struggle is the ‘battle-field’ which is no other than the “amphibious” / “median space” zone. Within this environment, the “median-space” powers have three choices. To move either towards the land-power or towards the sea-power, or to try to perform an independent strategy with the outcome to unite sea and land-powers against them. In any case the battle-field and most important area for the game of world domination is the median space-amphibious zone. Mackinder (1919) exemplified this idea by his dictum, “Who rules East Europe commands the Heartland: Who rules the Heartland commands the World-Island: Who rules the World-Island commands the World”. Spykman seems to have said that “Who rules the Rimland rules Eurasia, who rules Eurasia rules the fates of the world”. According to analysts, Mackinder focuses on Heartland while Spykman focuses on the Rimland. This constitutes the major difference between the two thinkers. As Mazis says, with Spykman’s dictum “Mackinder’s approach is being overbalanced while Rimland is gaining more

73 Ibid., p. 103
74 Mackinder. Democratic Ideals and Reality, p. 150
75 Spykman, The Geography of Peace, p. 107
importance than the Heartland”. Moreover, in the book based on Spykman’s ideas the American-Dutch Professor seems to believe that “Mackinder’s gnome … is wrong”. But does Spykman ‘say’ something different from Mackinder? From scratch the researcher is observing that Mackinder speaks about “Eastern Europe” that has to be controlled in order to dominate the “Heartland”. Spykman ‘says’ that the “Rimaland” has to be controlled in order to dominate “Eurasia”, thus the Heartland. In both cases, the core-region is approached through a median under the name “Eastern Europe” and “Rimland”. Both of them are saying that in order to dominate the core-region you should control the ‘yard’ not the ‘house’. Second, “Eastern Europe” is part of “Rimland/Inner Crescent” or of “Heartland”? The immediate answer should be that since Mackinder is making a distinction between “Eastern Europe” and “Heartland”, then “Eastern Europe” must be part of the “Inner Crescent”/ “Rimland”. A more in-depth analysis indicates the fact that Mackinder’s Heartland theory has evolved within a period of forty years (1904-1943) and it officially altered three times (1904 initial articulation, 1919, 1943) after experiencing two world wars. Thus, a textual analysis could indicate that Mackinder initially (1904) placed Eastern Europe in Inner Crescent, not in Pivot-Area. Then, after WWI (1919), he claimed that in geographic terms Eastern Europe is not Heartland but due to strategic reasons it has to be identified as part of it. However, even in this case, the southern part of this newly attached to Heartland region, the Balkans and Asia Minor, depends on whether is Heartland or not. This depends on the current overlord of the region. If a land-power dominates the region, then South Europe is part of the Heartland; if a sea-power controls it, then is part of the Inner Crescent. In any case, as Mackinder suggests “It is

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76 Mazis, Geopolitics, p. 21
77 Spykman, The Geography of Peace, p. 107
78 See, Appendix 1, p. 359
79 See, Appendix 2, p. 360
80 See, Appendix 3, p. 361
evident that the Heartland is as real a physical fact within the World-island as is the World-Island itself within the ocean, although its boundaries are not quite so clearly defined”.81 Thus, Mackinder does not necessarily place “Eastern Europe” in Heartland, something which implies that occasionally it might be part of the Inner Crescent thus, Rimland. The book based on Spykman’s ideas, on its side, clearly indicates that “Pivot-Zone” should be “corresponded to the space that Soviet Union exerts political leverage”.82 At a first glance this suggests that Eastern Europe is part of the Pivot-zone. However this might not be the case. *The Geography of Peace* was compiled in 1943, at a time that there was no Eastern/Soviet Block in Europe, in fact inter-war Eastern Europe was closely attached to sea-powers. Consequently, the Soviet Union of Spykman’s period was definitely not exerting influence in Eastern Europe. Moreover, the authors of the book could not know in 1943 the extent of the future Soviet occupation of 1945. In other words, a simple textual analysis indicates that neither Mackinder necessarily placed Eastern Europe in Heartland, at least in geographic ‘determinist’-unchangeable terms nor Spykman necessarily excluded Eastern Europe from Rimland, since the Soviet power during the 30s and during the war was not expanding in that area. Thus, there is a good possibility that Mackinder’s “Eastern Europe” is part of Spykman’s “Rimland” consequently any difference between the two scholars could be difficult to be sustained in terms of scriptures. After all, despite the difference of labeling, their interests focus on the same space, the region between the Baltic and the Black Sea-Straits-Aegean axis (BSSA). In short, not even on the basis of their famous dictums could someone confidently claim that they are having a different approach.

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81 Makinder, *Democratic Ideals and Reality*, p. 111
82 Spykman, *The Geography of Peace*, p. 96
This claim is something that could be further established after considering the common ‘ends’ of Mahan’s, Mackinder’s and Spykman’s geopolitical architecture. Mahan was mainly interested in the safety of the US, 83 Mackinder in the survival of the British Empire 84 and Spykman’s book was concerned with the future safety of a US-led world order. 85 The common denominator of all these concerns was one and only, a close and preferably institutionalized US-UK alliance. By extolling the “English blood which still beat in” American “veins” 86, Mahan was visualizing “an Anglo-American naval consortium” based on the “Political and cultural affinities combined with the absence of major conflicting interests and the existence of strong common ones”. 87 Mackinder, after decades of cogitation, reached (1943) in an outcome directly reminiscent of the NATO structure. Mackinder in the midst of WWII envisages a power that acquires “a bridgehead in France, a moated aerodrome in Britain, and a reserve of trained manpower, agriculture and industries in the eastern United States and Canada”. 88 It would be interesting to notice that for Mackinder this view was older than 1943 since in his Democratic Ideals and Reality (1919) he sees the “British democracy” and “American democracy” “asleep” when Germans tried to “deprive the islanders of their “bridge-head” in France”. 89 Consequently, the ‘seeds’ of the idea for an Anglo-Saxon-led organization using France, or a continental power in general, merely as ‘tool’ is older that it was believed. Spykman’s book on his side is talking about an “absolutely necessary” Anglo-American “close cooperation” that

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83 Mahan, The Influence of Seapower Upon History 1660-1783, pp. 23, 30, 37
85 Spykman, The Geography of Peace, pp. 109-110
86 Mahan, The Influence of Seapower Upon History 1660-1783, p. 34
87 Sumida, ‘Alfred Thayer Mahan, Geopolitician’, p. 53
88 Mackinder, ‘The Round World and the Winning of the Peace’, p. 277. The same idea is being presented in pp. 272-273
89 Mackinder, Democratic Ideas and Reality, p. 153; In his Britain and the British Seas (1901) writes “… the whole course of future history depends on whether the Old Britain … has enough of virility and imagination to withstand all challenge … until such time as the daughter nations shall have grown to maturity”. Weigert, Generals and Geographers, p. 138
will keep open the Atlantic communication lines, Britain will act as an “operational base” and France should act as bridge-head. However, “for the period that will not seek to emerge as a dominant power to the European part of the Rimland” USSR and not France should be preferred to be used by the Anglo-Saxon powers. This ‘Anglo-Saxon’ alliance should have an ultimate geopolitical purpose if its aim was to establish a favorable status quo. Mahan, by talking about an ever-expanding Russian threat, presented it in an elementary way. Mackinder was the one that elaborated and introduced something which was going to act as the ‘holy grail’ of the Anglo-Saxon geopolitical ‘mission’. In his groundbreaking *The Geographical Pivot of History* (1904) he observes that

> The oversetting of the balance of power in favour of the pivot state, resulting in its expansion over the marginal lands of Euro-Asia, would permit of the use of vast continental resources for fleet-building, and the empire of the world would then be in sight. *This might happen if Germany were to ally herself with Russia.* The threat of such an event should, therefore, throw France into alliance with the over-sea powers, and France, Italy, Egypt, India and Korea would become so many bridge heads where the outside navies would support armies to compel the pivot allies to deploy land forces and prevent them from concentrating their whole strength on fleets.\(^{91}\)

Within the ashes of WWI in the *Democratic Ideals and Reality* (1919) the great geographer further elaborates on the 1904 position by saying that

> What if the Great Continent, the whole World-Island or a large part of it, were at some future time to become a single and united base of sea-power? Would not the other insular bases be outbuilt as regards ships and outmanned as regards seamen? … if we would take the long view, must we not still reckon with the possibility that a large part of the Great Continent might some day be united under a single sway, and that an invincible sea-power might be based upon it? -- … *Ought we not recognize that that is the great ultimate threat to the world’s liberty so far as strategy is concerned, and to provide against it in our new political system?*\(^{92}\)

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\(^{90}\) Spykman, *The Geography of Peace*, pp. 131-132. Mackinder’s view of July 1943 that “All things considered, the conclusion is unavoidable that if the Soviet Union emerges from this war as conqueror of Germany, she must rank as the greatest land Power on the globe … in the strategically strongest defensive position” (Mackinder, *The Round World and the Winning of the Peace*, pp. 272-273) definitely is affecting the editors of the book about Spykman’s ideas.

\(^{91}\) Mackinder, *The Geographical Pivot of History*, pp. 262-263; emphasis added

\(^{92}\) Mackinder, *Democratic Ideals and Reality*, p.70; emphasis added
Finally, in the midst of WWII (July 1943), Mackinder is publishing an article *The Round World and the Winning of the Peace* in which he confirms his previous views by claiming that his Heartland Theory “is more valid and useful today than it was either twenty or forty years ago”.\(^9^3\) In a few words, Mackinder views that for the Anglo-Saxon sea-powers that are based outside the Eurasia-Africa, the ‘World Island’, any potential unification of the continental powers either through conquest or through alliance, thus any unification between Germany or Europe in general with the Heartland that is Russia would cause the “great ultimate threat” to the “world’s liberty” which of course means the Anglo-Saxon world order. For Mackinder, this enormous continental power would be in a position to acquire the necessary sea-power – bases, fleet and manpower, that will enable it to annihilate the existing Anglo-Saxon sea supremacy. Thus, this continental unified power will be able first to affect Anglo-Saxon Empire and its wellbeing and second to directly attack the Anglo-Saxon centers of power. This “great ultimate threat” for the Anglophone world might be called the ‘Anglo-Saxon/Insular Fear’. Spykman’s views, as presented by the editors of his ideas, reflect the exact same perception. In the introductory part, Professor Dunn says

> Against a resolute attack from a power or a combination of powers that would have the control of the European continental territory we would have very few capabilities to defend ourselves. Only if the British fleet would control the Atlantic and the Pacific Oceans and we would have the potentiality to use the British islands as a front-base against the continental Europe we would be absolutely sure for the probabilities of our survivor\(^9^4\)

The Anglo-Saxon/insular Fear leads these thinkers to the same outcomes on how to face it and actually avert it. The first step is to form the aforementioned Anglo-Saxon institutional alliance as it was presented to Mackinder’s ‘prophesy’ about NATO. The

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\(^9^3\) Mackinder, *The Round the World and the Winning of the Peace*, p. 276

\(^9^4\) Spykman, *The Geography of Peace*, pp. 25-26; the danger of a possible unification of Eurasia, scattered all over the book (pp. 89-90, 94 & 112-117)
‘aim’ of this alliance would be one and is presented accurately again through Mackinder’s words back in 1919. “We should focus”, the Anglo-Saxon powers, “on the stable resettlement of the affairs of East Europe and the Heartland”\(^{95}\) Mackinder said and added that “we must see to it that East Europe … is divided into self-contained nations”\(^{96}\) thus “a tier of independent states between Germany and Russia”\(^{97}\) should emerge. The Anglo-Saxon powers by implementing the project of creating a “Middle Tier of really independent states between Germany and Russia … will achieve their end, and without it they will not”.\(^{98}\) And what is the end? To avert any coercive or voluntarily unification of Europe and Heartland into an alliance that will acquire the means to project the necessary sea-power to destroy the Anglo-Saxon status quo international order. Professor Dunn’s analysis in the book about Spykman is eloquent. US should “avert European unification … under a sole power”\(^{99}\) and the “perpetual existence of a group of independent states in European Rimaland” is beneficial for the “Anglo-American cooperation”.\(^{100}\) Therefore, US’s “basic political aim, during peace-period and war-period as well, has to be the prevention of the unification of the centers of the Old World under the form of a hostile power towards its interest coalition”.\(^{101}\) In a few words, Mahan-Mackinder-Spykman are following the same line of argument by presenting the Anglo-Saxon/Insular fear as the major threat to the emerging “Anglo-Sphere”\(^{102}\) and are proposing the same solution to their problem. Heartland and Rimland, Russia and Europe should never be united.

Mackinder and Spykman, despite their superficial difference, are representing exactly

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\(^{95}\) Mackinder, Democratic Ideals and Reality, p. 154

\(^{96}\) Ibid., p. 157

\(^{97}\) Ibid., p. 158

\(^{98}\) Ibid., p. 171

\(^{99}\) Spykman, The Geography of Peace, p. 29

\(^{100}\) Ibid., p. 31

\(^{101}\) Ibid., p. 122; same ideas are presented also to pp. 123, 126-127, 135

\(^{102}\) See, Gamble, A. ‘From Anglo-America to the AngloSphere: Empire, Hegemony and the Special Relationship (p. 13) (paper presented to at the BISA US Foreign Policy Working Group Annual Conference, University of Manchester, September 20-12, 2007)
the same approach using the same tools, same analysis and same aims in dealing with geopolitical inquiry.\textsuperscript{103}

The ‘critical’ approach claims the exclusive privilege to dismiss the Anglo-Saxon/Insular Fear and all the ‘nationalistic’ ideologies as inappropriate to contemporary era. But is this the case? Focusing on the ‘preacher’ and the ‘gospel’ of the “Anglophone”\textsuperscript{104} critical geopolitics, Gearóid Ó Tuathail and his \textit{Critical Geopolitics: The Politics of Writing Global Space}, the researcher might draw some useful conclusions. Ó Tuathail claims that “Geography is about power. Although often assumed to be innocent, the geography of the world is not a product of nature but a product of histories of struggle between authorities competing over the power to organize, occupy and administer space”.\textsuperscript{105} Consequently, geopolitical “gaze” ironically “depends on the \textit{suppression} of geography and politics”. And he explains that “geopolitics is a form of geography that requires a systematic forgetting of the struggle over geography in order to make sense” since it

Triangulates the world political map from the Western imperial vantage point, measures it using Western conceptual systems of identity/difference, and records it in order to bring it within the scope of Western imaginings. Geopolitics deppluralizes the surface of the earth by organizing it into essential zones … heartland, rimland … identities (continental, oceanic), and perspectives (the seaman’s point of view, the landsman’s point of view).\textsuperscript{106}

Additionally, the “depoliticization” of the state-politics through geopolitics is being implemented through the utilization of geopolitical reasoning in order “to justify organized violence and murder by the state”. The presentation of the “state as an organism” and the promotion of the idea that “certain political processes” are

\textsuperscript{103} See, Appendix 4, p. 362
\textsuperscript{104} Dodds, \textit{Geopolitics in a Changing World}, p. 33
\textsuperscript{105} Ó Tuathail, \textit{Critical Geopolitics} p. 1
\textsuperscript{106} Ibid., p. 53
“inevitable and eternal processes of nature” are the main dimensions of this “depoliticization”. Ó Tuathail means that geopolitics first ignores geography since they interpret the world through a western-partial point of view and ignore politics since geopolitics accept a deterministic background behind their action. Consequently, geopolitics “should be critically re-conceptualized as a discursive practice by which intellectuals of statecraft ‘spatialize’ international politics in such a way, so as to represent a ‘world’ characterized by particular types of places, peoples and dramas … the study of geopolitics is the study of the spatialization of international politics by core powers and hegemonic states”. Ó Tuathail also notes that many intellectuals have tried to critically assess geopolitical reasoning but their work is moving “within the conceptual infrastructures that make geopolitics possible”. Contrary to these efforts, Ó Tuathail believes that the modern critical geopolitics is moving either ‘outside’ or if it is operating ‘within’ the geopolitical reasoning it does that in a “parasitical” and “mobile, guerrilla” way. Thus, critical approaches “should not be understood as a general theory of geopolitics or an authoritative intellectual negation of it … it is not an “is” but, in the manner of deconstruction, it takes place”. Through the use of “Derridean deconstructionism” Ó Tuathail is confessing that the aim of critical geopolitics is to put geopolitics “under erasure”. Agnew also adds that the “present conditions are not propitious for the continuation of the geopolitical imagination … It is certainly an appropriate time to rethink … dependence on the geopolitical imagination”. So,
Agnew and Ó Tuathail have set four major theses. This research will deal with the major two of them. First, they argue that “simply to describe a foreign policy is to engage in geopolitics … One could describe geopolitical reasoning as the creation of the backdrop or setting upon which “international politics” takes place but such would be a simple view. The creation of such a setting is itself part of world politics”. Thus, “This setting is more than simply a backdrop but an active component of the drama of world politics”. Dalby similarly notes that “all political discourse is geopolitical discourse”. Second, “the rules governing world order were overwhelmingly shaped by the institutional power and disciplinary power/knowledge apparatuses headquartered” into the centers of power and for the contemporary era, this is “the United States”. Thus, US power elites “have become the deans of world politics, the administrators, regulators, and geographers of international affairs. Their power is a power to constitute the terms of geopolitical world order”. Agnew asserts that US aimed to create a “set of institutions to project American practices and ideas about political-economic organization at a global level. These included the United Nations, the General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade, the International Monetary Fund, the World Bank”. So by “the 1960s these strategies had produced the beginnings of a globalized world economy in which many states became progressively internationalized”. Consequently, “pax Americana, designed to promote economic integration … encouraged a degree of globalization that effectively dented the powers of almost all territorial states”. Routledge views the US-led globalization in two main dimensions. The geopolitical dimension “involves the maintenance of the US national security state, and the legitimation of (continued) US

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114 See, ibid., pp. 60-63
115 Ó Tuathail, Critical Geopolitics, p. 60
116 Ibid., p. 180
117 Ibid., p. 61
118 Agnew, Geopolitics, pp. 77-78
military and economic intervention around the world in order to ensure “freedom” and “democracy”. The geoeconomic dimension “involves the doctrine of transnational liberalism or, as it is called, neoliberalism” where the “fundamental principal … is “economic liberty” for the powerful.”\textsuperscript{119} Therefore, critical geopolitics, according to its intellectual indoctrinators, acknowledges that geopolitical thought is pervasive and ‘evil’. Thus, its aim is to ‘eliminate’ it using deconstructionist approaches.

But is this what geopolitics is really doing? Focusing on the second assumption, it should be expected a fierce attack against anything that promotes and perpetuates the status quo situation on the planet. And what is the status quo situation? As all major critical geopolitical thinkers have described, it is the US-led globalization. However, borrowing from the primary sources of critical geopolitics, an observer should draw rather puzzling conclusions. First, all the critical geopolitics scholarship is full of references, from the first page till the last of praising, glorifying and even deifying the globalization either as a certainty that is not going to change or as a hope that has to be fulfilled. Second, there is a remarkable pro-western pro-US cultural and political bias, which is rather surprising if an observer takes under consideration the critical ‘preaching’ about multiculturalism and objectivity in contrast to the classical geopolitical approach. Considering the limitations of this research, two examples might be indicative making this case. Agnew in his book presents certain reasons why there is no need for the “competition for primacy” nowadays, at least not in the way approached by ‘classical’ geopolitical analysis. Despite the fact the four out of five

reasons that he gave are not the case these days (2008)\textsuperscript{120} Agnew is making an assertion which is at least a-historical and certainly debatable, if not disturbing for many people on this planet. “The American ‘hegemony’”, he says, “has been qualitatively different from that of previous eras” since “It has been institutionalized globally through a large number of agencies and has a profound cultural influence”. He adds that “The demise of the Soviet Union has left the United States as the only Great Power with a global message: mass consumption, personal liberty, private property, markets, and electoral democracy …”.\textsuperscript{121} Agnew suggests more or less that any effort to pursue primacy “fails to pass a ‘test’ for trans-historical significance”\textsuperscript{122} because there is a US ‘benevolent’ empire thus there is neither a need nor an effort for change. Furthermore, Ó Tuathail makes an even more controversial statement, relatively to what critical intellectuals say they support. “The problematic of ‘national security’ … is itself a threat to us”\textsuperscript{123} indicates in the most explicit way and explains that despite the fact that ‘national security’ tends to be globalized there are two trends that undermine this effort. First, there is a “unilateralist and neo-isolationist reflex in states (like the US)” and there is “unwillingness on the part of the Western states, alliances and economies to reflexively examine how they themselves may be contributing to global insecurity.”\textsuperscript{124} Second, “the institutions of Western modernity are experiencing a ‘victory crisis’”\textsuperscript{125} so they have to answer “the need for radical

\textsuperscript{120} The four reasons why the ‘pursuit for primacy’ is useless are: (i) Relative power makes sense only if competing great powers exist (ii) Economic prosperity between great powers has been enhanced since 1945 so there is no need for competition (iii) There are very few great powers with high incentive to cooperate (iv) there is global interdependence. Of course, 9/11 and Russian revisionism that reached its peak with the Georgian crisis, along with the always useful observation that “the current trends of the global economy are actually similar to the period between 1870 and 1914” are seriously challenging Agnew’s claims. On the discussion about the actual level of globalization nowadays, see Dodds, Geopolitics in a Changing World, pp. 29-51

\textsuperscript{121} Agnew, Geopolitics, p 82

\textsuperscript{122} Ibid., p.78

\textsuperscript{123} Ó Tuathail, ‘Understanding Critical Geopolitics’, p. 119

\textsuperscript{124} Ibid.

\textsuperscript{125} Ibid., p. 120
institutional reforms to create global systems of regulation and governance”.

In short, Ó Tuathail is worrying about Western ‘tendencies’ not to … intervene and not to construct global structures of dominations. A typical example of this kind of attitude is Ó Tuathail’s analysis of his most favorite subject, the Yugoslav wars and most specifically the Bosnian conflict. In a typical one-sided way, like the ones that in his whole book accuses as ‘partial’ or ‘simplistic’, he is presenting the conflict as “an irreducibly modern war over space, territory, and identity. With its brutal and criminal campaigns of “ethnic cleansing”, with Serbian forces pushing for lebensraum and an ethnically pure state while victims flee in terror …”. The Serbs for Ó Tuathail represent “a fascistic form of modernity” with a “genocidal project”. Ó Tuathail, having compared in the most ‘elaborate’ way the Serbs to the ‘Nazis’ and the Muslims and Croats to the ‘Jews’ he is launching accusations to the US and the West in general because they did not intervene earlier. For this inaction he is blaming the “hegemonic order of ‘common sense’ geopolitics” that “made the development of ‘good sense’ geopolitics more difficult”. Having now invented ‘good’ geopolitics, like the post-WWII intellectuals divided the geopolitics into the ‘good’ Anglo-Saxon ones and the ‘evil’ German, he is underpinning that “The United States is the key power underwriting the cost of the “humanitarian mission” in Bosnia … U.S. fighter aircrafts have bombed the Serbs, yet the United States has scrupulously sought to assert its neutrality in the conflict”. In short, Ó Tuathail’s whole analysis presents the argument that the West and the US did not intervene for many years in Bosnia to punish the ‘evil’ Serbs because they were following the ‘classical’ geopolitical precepts. If they had followed the ‘good sense’ of the critical geopolitical approach

126 Ibid., p. 121
127 Ó Tuathail, Critical Geopolitics, p. 219
128 Ó Tuathail, ‘Understanding Critical Geopolitics’, p. 117
129 Ó Tuathail, Critical Geopolitics, p. 222
that focuses on the moral obligations and humanity, they would have intervened earlier and Bosnia wouldn’t “bleed for years on Western television screens before the source of its violence was finally confronted”.130

Only some comments could be presented as concluding remarks about critical geopolitics. First, critical geopolitics puts in jeopardy the whole structure of the IR discipline. Having in mind the explicit first assertion of critical theory that any politics is geopolitics in combination with the aim of critical geopolitics to destroy the geopolitical way of thinking, an observer could easily conclude that if critical geopolitical approach prevails, the whole field of IR is going to be put under question since it is equated with geopolitical cogitation. Second, critical geopolitics, despite its official claims, is an indispensable part of the status quo Anglo-Saxon/Insular geopolitical tradition rather than a part of radical revisionist one. Regardless of whether this happens consciously or unconsciously, it is certain that the critical school is trying to deconstruct all the geopolitical narrations, is providing no alternative and if it is not embracing, at least is positively disposed to the notion of Anglosphere-led globalization system. Its massage is “everything is false, we stay where we are” but this “where we are” does not mean ‘in the air’ but it clearly means that we are ‘stuck’ to the Anglo-Saxon status quo paradigm. This is done because even if critical geopolitical approach might be tempting for theoretical and academic reasons, the political scientist that seeks answers is not going to follow this track since it leads to nowhere. Either he is going to accept the Anglo-Saxon-led globalization status quo paradigm or he will try to develop an alternative path with the risk to be attacked by the ‘progressive’ critical intellectuals. Third, critical

130 Ó Tuathail, G. ‘Theorizing Practical Geopolitical Reasoning’, p. 625
geopolitics is not only part of the status quo Anglo-Saxon school, but uses all the ways and methods that the ‘classical’ version adopts in order to make its case. In short, critical geopolitics wouldn’t be wrong to be placed as part of the ‘classical’ school with the difference that it represents the most ‘cunning’ version of it. Why is that? First and foremost, in order to present itself as ‘progressive’, ‘radical’ or ‘revisionist’, it has degraded the notion of ‘globalization’ to a secondary feature of international scene that is trying to flourish but the ‘evil’ state is prohibiting it to emerge and create the ‘one thousand years peace’ on the globe. Didn’t they hear the news that globalization is not an outcast but the dominant power at least in intellectual and economic terms on the globe? By undermining ‘globalization’ they present themselves as ‘guerillas’ and ‘Che Guevaras’ of the intellect, which they are not. Secondly, critical geopolitics is doing exactly what they are blaming the others that they do. They are making ‘abstractions’ and support ‘simplified’ pictures of the world based on differences about economic, socio-political and ideological conditions that all are leading towards the ultimate ‘abstraction’: the friction between “globalization” and “anti-globalization” forces. Ó Tuathail is talking of “wild” and “tame” zones where the task of “managing the wild zones of the globe and protecting the security of its tame zones” will be in the minds of the status quo powers.131 For critical analysis the world in the “wild zones” is full of ‘fascists’, ‘butchers’, ‘nationalists’, ‘conservatives’, ‘imperialists’ whereas there are the “tame zones” that are hosting the ‘democrats’, ‘peace-keepers’, ‘internationalists’, ‘progressive’ and ‘globalists’. Most importantly critical analysts have not repudiated the war but for them it is legitimate only when it has to do with ‘human rights’ and ‘freedom’ irrespectively of the subjectivity of the approach in each case. Their motto is one

131 Ó Tuathail, Critical Geopolitics, p. 253
“There is no longer”, as former US President Clinton claimed “a clear division between what is foreign and what is domestic”.\(^{132}\) Is there any more cynic mockery for the intellect of a human being than this assertion, which legitimizes military intervention in a subjective ‘fire-at-will’ manner? However, this cynic confession of power-politics is being academically legitimized by the critical notion of the “territorial trap”. Agnew is complaining by referring to this “trap”, because the state still has a “clearly bounded territorial space”, is preserving “fundamental opposition between ‘domestic’ and ‘foreign’ affairs” and is operating as “the geographical ‘container’ of modern society”. For Agnew, this stance is regressive and has to be bypassed.\(^{133}\) Of course, nobody has asked him if this “trap” should be ‘lifted’ for the Anglo-Saxon status quo powers as well. Finally, within this non-‘simplistic’, non-‘ideological’, non-‘dualist’ and non-‘globalization-deterministic’ critical world, Ó Tuathail offers his readers the ‘final battle’ as well. This battle is going to be between the “forces of globalization and territorially based forces of local survival seeking to preserve and redefine community”.\(^{134}\) In this ‘mortal combat’ critical geopolitics are confronting “the dangers of countermodernity” personified in “orthodox geopolitical discourse” supported by “institutions and intellectuals used to think in ‘either-or’ terms”\(^{135}\), therefore Agnew is right when he urges us “to choose sides” in the last sentence of his book.\(^{136}\) So, what is the difference between the ‘critical’ and the ‘classical’ status quo approach? Chouliaras writes “a geopolitical glance, among other, includes territorial boundaries, a core-region (i.e. friend/foe) and a national

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132 Ibid., p. 190. This opinion is presented by Dodds as well. He writes that “it is recognized the identification of ‘domestic’ and ‘international’ politics is increasingly problematic in these changing times”. Dodds, Geopolitics in a Changing World, p. 7
133 Agnew, Geopolitics, p. 51
134 Ó Tuathail, Critical Geopolitics, p. 254
135 Ó Tuathail, Understanding Critical Geopolitics, p. 121
136 Agnew, Geopolitics, p. 127
mission”. Critical approach, like any other grand narrative has the whole globe as clear territorial boundaries, the Anglo-Saxon space as its core-region and the spread of the geopolitical and geoeconomic globalization as defined in the previous pages of this research as its national mission. Being a clear geopolitical approach critical geopolitics is operating within human society on three levels simultaneously. In the formal academic level it tries to undermine the alternative geopolitical narratives and destroy geopolitical reasoning as such. Furthermore, by equalizing geopolitics with IR it attempts to degrade them as well. After all, who needs these theories during “the end of history”? In the practical political level by promoting Anglo-Saxon globalization and its ideals, it ‘demolishes’ the distinction between the ‘external’ and the ‘internal’ thus under the pretext of ‘human rights’ it legitimizes military interventions. Finally, in the popular/societal level, it presents through media, papers etc., an exaggerated benevolent notion of US-led globalization and Anglo-Saxon culture as the one, the only and final level of human socio-cultural condition and paradigm.

The possibility of placing critical geopolitical theory in the status quo camp makes perfect sense if someone follows the observations of Carr in his ground-breaking The Twenty Years’ Crisis. Carr correctly asserts that only the great powers are making appeals to ‘internationalism’ and ‘universalism’, while the smaller revisionist powers are gathering under the banner of “national solidarity”. As Carr notes, the “popular” in continental Europe view that “the Anglophone nations are masters in covering-up their egoistic national interests by presenting them as a general good” is

137 Chouliaras, Geographical Myths of International Politics, p. 144
138 Carr, The Twenty Years’ Crisis 1919-1939, pp. 124-128
not accurate since the *pax Britannica* followed by the *pax Anglo-Saxonica* implies a centuries-long hegemonic Anglo-Saxon power that has identified itself with the international system and has mingled its interests with the whole of the international community. A hegemonic power always favors the global systems that created, since it tends “to identify” itself “so strongly with the collectivity that it conflated national and international priorities, seeing itself as expressive of the essential interests of the” rest. Critical geopolitics, with its universalistic and ecumenical stances, represents a characteristic example of how the geopolitical thought of the Anglo-Saxon/Insular status quo is trying to adapt on the new world or how the new world is trying to be adapted to the Anglo-Saxon/Insular paradigm. The whole point of this part of the research is to demonstrate that critical geopolitics is actually a status quo approach, whether their adherents have noticed it or not. Consequently, they consciously or unconsciously move within the Anglo-Saxon/Insular Fear concept since they are not allowing alternative geopolitical theories to emerge.

**iv. … The Eurasian/Continental Hope**

… the social pessimism … of social theory was transmuted into an American optimism by mid-century … one consequence of which was the loss of interest in the state as an abstract frame of reference … this intellectual vacuum has a longer historical pedigree in first the English and then the US political tradition … In contrast, the … European traditions … have not banished the state … Geopolitics has reflected this geographical and intellectual tension in the production of knowledge.

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139 Ibid., p. 294  
140 Ibid., pp. 114-119  
142 Taylor, ‘Geopolitics, Political Geography and Social Science’, p. 376
Taylor actually underlines the fundamental difference between the Anglo-Saxon/Insular status quo and the Eurasian/Continental revisionist geopolitical gaze. The main characteristic of the revisionist approaches were/are the promotion of national/regional narratives. An overview of the Teutonic geopolitik and the Frankish géopolitique, along with the continental ones could unfold some interesting aspects of the contemporary revisionist trends.

The Teutonic school flourished during the first geopolitical era and constituted the major intellectual and political rival of the emerging Anglo-Saxon tradition. The Anglo-Saxon/Insular fear found its major rival and/or complement to the precepts of the Teutonic approach. This happened because in the long run Mackinder’s views were absorbed and had the “greater impact … on the development of the … German … variant of geopolitical thought”. Houshofer’s comments on Mackinder’s work are indicative. For the The Geographical Pivot of History Houshofer says “Never … have I seen anything greater than these few pages of a geopolitical masterwork”. Moreover, in a fas est ab hoste doceri mood Houshofer indicates about the Englishman’s Democratic Ideals and Reality that “This book should not be translated into German unless the German people are willing to lose all their self-respect, confronted with such a hateful enemy”. Within this framework the notions of Mitteleuropa (Central/Middle-Europe) and pan-ideen (pan-regions) were developed in the German intellectual and political circles. The first idea encompasses either the approach towards the formation of an economic federation in continental central Europe that will become the dominating power in the region or the approach dictating a German-led economic and political empire around which a unified Europe will

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143 Murphy, The Heroic Earth, p. 4
144 Let us learn from the enemy
145 Murphy, The Heroic Earth, p. 116
emerge. In either case, the major aim should be to confront the Anglo-Saxon status quo power and this would be done with the creation of the *pan-ideen*. A German-led Europe allied with other Eurasian powers could expel the Anglo-Saxons from the WI. Hausrother says “The growth of the new large continental space … means the doom of the British Empire … With Japan as our partner, with Russia placing her resources at our disposal the ring around England becomes tighter and tighter. Against the horizon there stands out a new Eurasian bloc in the making. It extends from Spain to Siberia, from Norway to Africa”. In his *Geopolitics of the Pacific Ocean*, Hausrother in a clear Mackinderian way sees the “ancient task” of the continental “Germanic people” to find access to the “warm seas” and identifies the Anglo-Saxon “bridgehead” France as Germany’s “main oppressor”. In short, for the German tradition the Anglo-Saxon/Insular fear of a potential unification between Europe and Russia actually constitutes the only Eurasian/Continental hope of revising the global balance of power. Moving to the Nazi period, the emulation of the geopolitical with the National-Socialist approaches in the Anglo-Saxon circles is the reason why geopolitics was intellectually expelled. However, Murphy makes two main observations about the geopolitics-National-Socialist relationship. First, while geopoliticians were seeing England as the archenemy the National-Socialists, they perceived the Russian as the major one. Second, the main leitmotif for geopolitics

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146 See, Parker, *Geopolitics*, pp. 79-122
147 Hausrother envisages a German-led *Mitteleuropa* that will be the hegemonic power of the broader region of Euro-Africa. He sees Japan and US as the dominant powers of Pan-Asia and Pan-America respectively. Russia should be one of the tetrarchs to which the region of the Indian sub-continent and southern Asia is assigned. In case that Russia wouldn’t accept this role then Germany and Japan should replace her. In any case, the Berlin-Moscow-Tokyo axis was *a sine qua non* for the new order in the Eurasian continent. See, Mazis, *Geopolitics*, pp. 17-18
149 Hausrother, *An English Translation and Analysis of Major General Karl Ernst Hausrother’s Geopolitics of the Pacific Ocean*, p. xxviii
150 Ibid., p. xxx
was the ‘space’ whereas for the National-Socialists was the ‘race’.\textsuperscript{151} Despite some
points of tangency, Murphy correctly notes that “it would be erroneous to suppose …
that geopolitics or geopoliticians provided some sort of blueprint for Hitler’s war.
Hitler was influenced by geopolitical ideas … and he gladly used … geopolitics to
legitimate his conduct. But his ultimate goals and especially the means by which he
attained them were of his own devising”.\textsuperscript{152} There was nothing unnatural to the
emergence of geopolitics since

Geopolitics inserted itself into German public life, first and foremost, by
attacking the Versailles peace settlement. Without Versailles, geopolitics would
never have risen from obscurity … The goal to subverting or revising the treaty
was a constant across the political spectrum … The geopolitical criticisms of the
treaty … were not significantly different from attacks launched on the treaty by
other Germans, but as Haushofer and others argued, geopolitical critique was
scientific, presumably more objective than other critiques, and, thus, more
credible to a diverse audience\textsuperscript{153}

The post-WWII Frankish school, as expressed by Yves Lacoste and his journal
\textit{Hérodote}, represents the “most substantial and coherent” revisionist approach till
nowadays.\textsuperscript{154} Pre-WWII Frankish school was focusing on raising “an extended
response to Ratzel” and on refuting geopolitik by trying to form “a viable
alternative”\textsuperscript{155} while post-WWII era geopolitics was condemned.\textsuperscript{156} Lacoste started
(60s) developing a new approach leading to re-conceptualizing geopolitics.\textsuperscript{157} So,
“the world of French geography was shaken” due to the published (1976) “journal
\textit{Hérodote}, and Yves Lacoste’s \textit{La géographie, ça sert, d’abord à faire la guerre”\textsuperscript{158}}

First, Lacoste acknowledges the central role of geopolitical analysis since “territorial

\begin{footnotesize}
\textsuperscript{151} See, Murphy, \textit{The Heroic Earth}, pp. 244-247
\textsuperscript{152} Ibid., p. 245; in fact, “Germans were learning to think like geopoliticians long before the Nazis rose
to power” since “geopolitical ideas in the Weimar Republic played a critical role” (p. 241)
\textsuperscript{153} Ibid., p. 46
\textsuperscript{154} Hepple, ‘\textit{GÉOPOLITIQUES DU GAUCHE}, p. 297
\textsuperscript{155} Parker, ‘\textit{Ratzel, the French School and the Birth of Alternative Geopolitics}, p. 964
\textsuperscript{156} On the pre- and post-WWII approaches see, Parker, \textit{Geopolitics}, pp. 123-133; ibid., pp. 957-969
\textsuperscript{157} On Lacoste’s Marxist background see, Claval, ‘\textit{Hérodote and the French Left}, pp. 240-245
\textsuperscript{158} An eloquent title for the author’s views: ‘The Purpose of Geography is, Above All, the Making of War’
\end{footnotesize}
rivalries are specifically geopolitical”. Second, he stresses the need for historical maps since they “allow an understanding of the evolution of a specific situation and an appreciation of the ‘historical rights’, which are claimed in contradiction by several states over the same territory”. Third, he underlines the demand to understand the “reasons and the ideas of the main actors” because the “role of ideas – even wrong ones – is central in geopolitics, since they explain the project and determine, as much as material data, the choice of strategies”.\footnote{Claval, ‘Hérodote and the French Left’, pp. 241-242} Lacoste’s convergence to classical views culminates through his words that

geography was a form of strategic and political knowledge, central to military strategy and the exercise of political power, but that this strategic discourse had become hidden behind the ‘smoke-screen’ (rideau de fumée) of academic geography. Geographers needed to cast off the limitations of their ‘mystified and mystifying discourse’, and become militant and critical analysts of strategy, working to unmask the geographical structuring of power and assisting in the development of counter-strategies\footnote{Hepple, ‘GÉOPOLITIQUES DU GAUCHE’, p. 268}.\footnote{Hepple, ‘GÉOPOLITIQUES DU GAUCHE’, p. 274} Lacoste’s approach, despite the ‘critical’ views that place him within their intellectual camp, actually proposes the opposite thing of what the critical school promotes.\footnote{On Anglo-Saxon critical approaches for Lacoste see, Ó Tuathail, Critical Geopolitics, pp. 58, 160-168} He observes that an apolitical political geography is useless since its actual nature is to assist political aims. “Geography”, he says, should be “knowledge of how to think about space in order to know how to get organized there, to know how to fight there”.\footnote{Hepple, ‘GÉOPOLITIQUES DU GAUCHE’, p. 274} Thus, the ‘pharisaic veneer’ that ‘emasculates’ geopolitics has to be lifted. Actually, acknowledged commentators observe significant differences between the two traditions.
First, there is little interaction and a reciprocal and mutual neglect between them. The Anglo-Saxon camp demonstrates “a linguistic arrogance and imperialism”163 while the Frankish side deals “almost exclusively … within the French context”.164 For the Lacoste-Ḥérodote tradition there is a “surprising omission … on the armaments race, Reagan’s ‘Star War’ initiative and the Second Cold War”.165 Moreover, there is “little direct attention … to geostrategic or geoeconomic analyses at the global scale”, something that stands “in very stark contrast to Anglophone work in critical geopolitics where global strategy … and the post-90 attempts at a ‘New International Order’ have been central themes”.166 On the contrary, the French focus on issues about “Africa, South America, the Mediterranean, southwest, southern and south-eastern Asia”.167 Second, the Lacoste-Ḥérodote tradition traces the origins of geopolitics in the continental German (Ratzel), Swedish (Kjellén) and French (Élisée Reclus (1830-1905), De la Blache) traditions that focus on “geographical contexts … below the global level” and use the state as “the primary scale” whereas the Anglo-Saxon global-level analysis has been underestimated.168 Third, as opposed to the critical theorists, Lacoste accepts that the “grand strategic perspective makes sense”. Consequently, the French “remain remarkably untouched by the doubts about objectivity” that “Anglophone social science” stresses.169 However, the contradiction of accepting the usefulness of the grand narrative while rejecting the Anglo-Saxon holistic approaches indicates one thing. Lacoste is not against the grand narratives in general, but against the Anglo-Saxon grand narrative in particular. Lacoste’s concern

163 Ibid., p. 270
164 Ibid., p. 271
165 Claval, ‘Ḥérodote and the French Left’, p. 250
166 Hepple, ‘GÉOPOLITIQUES DU GAUCHE’, pp. 285-286
167 See, Claval, ‘Ḥérodote and the French Left’, pp. 245-250
168 See, ibid., pp. 278-279
169 Ibid., p. 282
about the nation-state that constitutes the “fundamental geopolitical concept” and does not collapse but resists the forces of globalization goes hand-in-hand with his view that there is a real threat of “the potential loss of French identity in a European Union dominated by Anglo-American global interests”. The solution comes through “the reinforcement of the idea of the nation in France, Germany and the countries of Latin Europe”. This process “can check” the “Anglo-Saxon tendency” for globalization. The French approach represents a revisionist school against the Anglo-Saxon status quo tradition since the “Lacoste-Hérodote do promote an ‘anti-(American) globalization’”. Hepple’s concluding remarks are indicative

One might … see the whole intellectual project of Hérodote as a geopolitical strategy in itself, a Francophone act of resistance against the tide of Anglophone intellectual imperialism – with the neglect of Anglophone perspectives a deliberate piece of resistance – and the building of an alternative international coalition of ‘national perspectives’ against globalizing perspectives. And perhaps this very description – with its assumption of Anglophone perspectives as the ‘global norm’ and Francophone work as the act of (local) resistance – would be seen as an example of the very intellectual imperialism to be challenged!

Nowadays this tradition represents “the largest and most substantial body of contemporary geopolitical analysis in the world”. The new French extravert foreign policy, demonstrated by the Mediterranean Union project, the Caucasus and the financial crises initiatives, is totally in accord with the Frankish revisionist school.

The Lotharingian axis proposed an approach that could unite continental Europe with peaceful means only once. This notion of Pan-Europa (Pan-Europe) introduced by a cosmopolitan visionary the Count Richard Nikolaus Eijiro von Coudenhove-Kalergi

170 Ibid., p. 287
171 See, Claval, ‘Hérodote and the French Left’, pp. 254-258
172 Hepple, ‘GÉOPOLITIQUES DU GAUCHE’, p. 288
173 Ibid., p. 291
174 Ibid., p. 292
175 Ibid., p. 269
(1894-1972). Due to his multicultural origins he spoke about a European federation of equals and became the actual initiator of EU.176

Overall, the Lotharingian axis posed a serious counterbalance to the Anglo-Saxon dominance. However, the Teutonic school was seriously ‘injured’ during WWII and was ‘absorbed’ by the Anglo-Saxon paradigm during the post-WWII era. Pre-WWII Germany, acting as the hegemonic part of *Mitteleuropa*, was replaced by a post-WWII Germany, acting as the front-line element of the West. The ‘Westernization’ of Germany actually destroyed its geopolitical grand narrative.177 The French took the baton after WWII but they never managed to propose an alternative grand narrative since they have been operated as the “bridge-head” of the Anglo-Saxons. Even the Coudenhove-Kalergi’s vision is not a clear continental approach. It started as a Lotharingian and ended as an Anglo-Saxon vision, while it always excluded Russia. Consequently, the Lotharingian axis offers no reliable alternative grand-narrative to counterbalance the Anglo-Saxon one. Both the Teutonic and the Frankish constituent parts, with their ‘incorporation’ to ‘Western’ ideology have also adopted the Anglo-Saxon status quo paradigm, or at least this seems to be the case.

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177 Whenever Germany was a revisionist power it was distancing itself from the West and was becoming Eurasian. Up until WWII German geopoliticians were considering Germany as no-West. “Germans and Russians” Haushofer writes “finally recognized that both of them had been the victims, and, by fighting each … had only pulled the chestnuts out of the fire for the sake of the imperialist aims of the *neighboring Western Powers*” (Weigert, *Generals and Geographers*, p. 140; emphasis added) Moreover, Germans were believing that “the West as a political and cultural unit has perished. A new world culture … emerging from Asia” (ibid., pp. 141-142). Post-WWII Germany abandoned the revisionist paradigm and has become a ‘politically correct’ ‘Westernized’ ‘bridgehead’, like France, against the ‘East’ manipulated by the Anglo-Saxon powers
Russians were ‘flattered’ by the Anglo-Saxon view and the role that was ‘assigned’ to them, consequently they act as the Heartland Theory predicts. Similarly, the rest of the actors of the WI accepted and perform the roles ‘assigned’ to them. The Greek case is indicative. Loukas observes that in Greece “we cultivate the Anglo-Saxon geopolitical thought, which converges with a strong trend of the French geopolitical school … modern German geopoliticians have turned also towards the Anglo-Saxon school, something which is happening with the Russian geopoliticians as well”. Mazis also writes that “Greece is a part of the Rimland … as it is perceived by the Anglo-Saxons” but he correctly adds that “Given that the US determines Europe’s main strategic options … and will indeed continue to determine it … the geostrategic perception of the Greek territory … ought to use as its starting point the US perception”. Of course, this point of view is not wrong but in theoretical terms it offers little to the further development of the geopolitical theory whereas in practical terms it is against the actual interests of the ‘supernumeraries’ of the international scene - the populations that are inhabiting the so-called Rimland.

This analysis demonstrates the need for the development of an alternative grand narrative to the dominant Anglo-Saxon/Insular status quo geopolitical theory. Critical geopolitics could not be the proper vehicle to confer this task. Without offering an alternative, critical views destroy fruitful alternative geopolitical cogitation only to facilitate the dominant paradigm perpetuation. The argument that is being used by the critical theorists in confronting geopolitical views is the social/subjective construction of reality approach. Of course, this doesn’t seem to apply to their views, only to the

178 See, Chapter 3
179 Loukas, I. The Geopolitical Trilogy of Hellenism: The Fraternity of the Argonauts and the Clash of Civilizations, (in Greek), (Athens, 2003), p. 15
views of others. In addition, this line of argument makes ‘a hole in the water’ since according to Gray “The theory is indeed socially constructed, as critical theorists remind us, but so what? In the social sciences, what else could such a theory be?”.  

This social construction of reality implies that “each nation reacts in a specific way to geopolitical factors”.

Thus, “There are as many geopolitics as there are conflicting state systems … There is a Geopolitik, a geopolitique …”. This observation suggests that the people of Rimland should stop being ‘Rimland’ if they want to gain their independence again. Agnew correctly says that “a lord is a lord only through a relationship of mutual recognition with a bond servant”. What is needed today is a “radical” geopolitical perspective, namely “to turn the world upside down”. This could be achieved by challenging the Anglo-Saxon globalization version as “untenable” in geopolitical terms. Newman asserts that “While the world is undergoing significant territorial reconfiguration and re-territorialization, it is not becoming deterritorialized”, moreover, the “Borderless” Globalization is “both culture and discipline-specific” since it illustrates the Anglo-Saxon imperial paradigm to the world. There is a need for “the creation of viable socioeconomic alternatives to neoliberalism which can emerge out of ongoing political, economic, environmental and cultural struggles”. The Eurasian/Continental revisionist view does not seem to offer anything that could be compared to Mackinder’s Heartland Theory. Consequently, “the post-Cold War world still is expecting the “X” article”.

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181 Gray, ‘Inescapable Geography’, p. 168
182 Weigert, Generals and Geographers, pp. 21-22
183 Ibid., pp. 22-23
184 Agnew, Geopolitics, p. 67; emphasis added
187 Routledge, ‘Anti-Geopolitics’, p. 244
188 Chouliaras, Geographical Myths of International Politics, p. 78
CHAPTER TWO

The Integrated Geopolitical/Geocultural Theory of the Median Space

This chapter introduces the ‘Integrated Geopolitical/Geocultural Theory of the Median Space’, an approach that aims to propose a ‘socially constructed’ ‘grand narrative’ based on the ‘radical’ views of ‘turning the world upside down’ and giving an alternative to the ‘supernumeraries’ of the world scene. Of course, a geopolitical grand narrative will not answer all the questions but simply delimits the framework within which many more issues, cultural, economic and political could be further examined. Moreover, the theory of the Median Space is not claiming the authority of being an “X” article but only aims to suggest an alternative much more relevant to the turbulent 21st century and to offer a tiny contribution to the further development of the geopolitical tradition and the IR field in general. Finally, the theory of the Median Space claims originality within the framework of IR and within the geopolitical methodological approach since it was first articulated in the historical and sociological field by Professor Dimitiris Kitsikis. In a few words, this effort attempts to expand, elaborate and further develop Kitsikis’s socio-historical theory by transforming it into a hopefully fully-fledged geopolitical IR approach.

A researcher, in order to proceed with a geopolitical narration, has to be able to make abstractions, think macroscopically and see the broader picture. A geopolitical narration deals with the globe as a unity and not only with a specific country or geographical location. The abstractions should be of the kind that could enable him to reach some meaningful and easily testable results. Mackinder was the first to follow
this path, to create a meaningful ‘grant-narrative’ in global terms. The major geopolitical thinkers that succeeded him proposed their views, without however, departing substantially from Mackinder’s methodology and doctrines. The aim of this chapter is to follow the same path as far as methodology is concerned, in order to create a meaningful ‘grand-narrative’ but not necessarily to reach similar outcomes. In any case, as Mackinder has convincingly indicated, the major methodological geopolitical tool is for the ‘narrator’ to be able to make the necessary abstractions. “Let us begin by “brigading” our data” he says “for only so shall we be able to reason conveniently about the realities which the Continent presents for strategical thought. When you are thinking of large things you must think on broad lines; the colonel of a battalion thinks in companies, but the general of a division in brigades”.

2.1 The Historical/Sociological Theory of the Median Space – Initial Articulation

Nowadays … Hellenism’s obligatory marching towards the reestablishment of the Greek-Turkish space is being reaffirmed despite the hallucinations about a European convergence. However, the anguished question is one: who will ‘wake up’ first and will organize the Greek-Turkish space, is it going to be the Turk or the Greek?

Dimitris Kitsikis, Professor in the History Department of the University of Ottawa, since the end of the 60’s has introduced the “cultural theory of the Median Space”.

Kitsikis says that he “was impressed from the fact that everybody was dividing

2 Kitsikis, N., D. Greek-Turkish Comparative History in the Twentieth Century (in Greek) (Athens, 1998), p. 18
4 Ibid., p. 127
Eurasia to “West” and “East” however, “The boundaries … between these two worlds were considerably varying from one author to another”. Kitsikis detected that these borders were “always laying somewhere between the Adriatic Sea and Hindus River … no author had ever asserted that Italy was not West or India was not East. However, there were authors who were placing Greece to the West whereas others were placing Greece to the East. Pakistan also was placed sometimes to the East and sometimes to the West”.5

Kitsikis established the ‘Theory of the Median Space’ (TMS) through six main observations/suggestions. First, by examining the literature and culture of the people of the Median Space (MS), one could discover their common belief that they constitute the “bridge between East and West”. According to Kitsikis, this region “includes the Soviet Union (except the Baltic republics), the six Balkan states (except Croatia), all the Arab countries (from Morocco to the Arab Peninsula), Ethiopia, Iran, and Afghanistan, the ‘Iranian’ Pakistan west of Hindus River … and … Chinese Turkistan”. Moreover, this land is inhabited mainly by “Slavs, Greeks, Turco-Mongols, Arabs, Jews and Persians. And in this region Egyptian-Greek Paganism and Tuco-Mongol Shamanism yielded to Orthodox Christianity and Islam”.6 Therefore, as Kitsikis pinpoints, “draw the borders of the Median Space as a cultural entity between East and West … according to the people’s own confession that their lands constitute bridges”.7 Second, MS covers almost half of Asia and half of Europe, consequently ‘Asia’ and ‘Europe’ do not constitute ‘cultural’ entities, only ‘geographical’ ones.8

Third, MS includes two basic religions - Greek-Orthodox Christianity and Sunni

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6 Kitsikis, N., D. Greek-Turkish Comparative History in the Twentieth Century, pp. 43-44; Kitsikis wrote these lines in 1978, before the collapse of the USSR and the dismemberment of Yugoslavia
7 Kitsikis, ‘The Median Space’, p. 132
8 Ibid.
Islam - and three minor ones, Shi’a Islam, Alevisim and Judaism. West on the other hand is mostly “Catholic-Protestant” and the East is Hindu and Buddhist. 

Fourth, MS experiences a political unity through the emergence of great empires that occupied vast areas. This unity could be divided in two categories. The first category includes the schemes that were developed in the central areas of the MS and constitute “the Aegean Sea and more specifically the Straits and Constantinople”.

A simple comparison of the areas that the ancient Persian, Hellenistic, Roman, Byzantine and Ottoman Empires used to engulf reveals that they “were covering the same space for 2,500 years and that were tending to place their geopolitical center in the Straits and especially in Constantinople”. The second category includes the imperial formations that coexisted with the former ones but were located in their periphery, such as the Arab, the Sassanid Persian and the Russian Formations. Within this framework, a center-periphery friction occurred with the main prize being the Straits and the Aegean. The Arabs against the Byzantines and the Russians against the Ottomans are illustrative examples of the above. Despite these frictions, Kitsikis considers the MS as an ecumene. Thus, the wars between the MS people could be characterized as “civil wars”.

Fifth, according to Kitsikis, until 800AD Eurasia had only “two ‘Ecumenes’ because Western Europe was following the Byzantine civilization … in the West there was no cultural space before Charlemagne. Eurasia had only two cultural centers Romania (Byzantium) and China”. After the rise of the Western civilization, which was initially created as a curtailed “sick” part of Romania, and the creation of the Western ecumene, West’s main aim was to “destroy the central empire of the Median

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9 Ibid.
10 Kitsikis, History of the Ottoman Empire, p. 50
12 Kitsikis, History of the Ottoman Empire, p. 52
14 Ibid, p. 135
Space and enforce the spiritual cemetery of Westernization”. Sixth, based on all of the abovementioned observations and as a direct function of the TMS, Kitsikis defines the Eastern Question (EQ) as “an internal friction of the Median Space, in which West interferes. This internal conflict comes from the main Median Space’s indigenous people’s aspiration to unite this territory into one empire”. Furthermore, Kitsikis defines the new EQ in relation with the energy game that is being developed in the region of central Asia. In this new development, the “Anglo-Saxon” factor is trying to dominate the MS, the Aegean region and central Asia, by using for its own interest either Greece or Turkey along with Israel. The solution to resist the Western ‘colonization’ of the MS and improve the wellbeing of its native population according to the Professor rests on the rise of the center of the MS into a united spatial state entity. In other words, Kitsikis preaches the creation of a “Greek-Turkish confederation” under a “new-Byzantine model” which would reestablish MS’s center of gravity from Russia to the Straits and the region of the Aegean. Apart from the obvious strengthening of the indigenous populations towards the Anglo-Saxon and Western infiltration, the revitalization of a strong political/cultural entity in the central region of the MS could enable the Greek-Turkish confederation not only to control the Russian expansion, but also to partly control Moscow since Byzantium and Greek-Orthodoxy is Russia’s ‘mother culture’.19

15 Ibid., p. 136
16 Ibid.
17 Ibid, pp. 137-138
18 See, Kitsikis, N., D. The Byzantine Prototype Model of Governing and the End of Parliamentaryism (in Greek) (Athens, 2001)
19 Kitsikis, ‘The Median Space’, p. 140
The researcher could not fail to acknowledge that this approach constitutes an original theory of organizing space based mainly in geocultural terms. TMS places at the forefront of its focus neither the Anglo-Saxon nor the Russian interests as such, but it addresses the peoples that inhabit the center of the MS and suffered during the last centuries from the fierce confrontation between the West and Russia. This confrontation that has been labeled as the EQ and the ‘Great Game’ (GG) serves only the ‘external’ Western interests or the ‘internal’ Russian ones.

Kitsikis bases his argumentation on cultural, historical and sociological grounds. But is he right in geopolitical terms? Does diachronic geopolitical inquiry and actual contemporary developments suggest, even implicitly, that there is such a thing like a MS between West and East including north Africa, middle east, south Asia, central Asia the Balkans and Russia? Can sources and contemporary developments confirm the crucial importance of the Aegean-Straits waterline? Do researchers detect elements about the unity of the suggested space in academic textbooks and contemporary actual developments? Therefore, an additional elaboration on Kitsikis’s theory based on contemporary developments, existing geopolitical texts and historical observation could further develop it, systematize it and organize it into, a hopefully, sound theory that could enrich the contemporary geopolitical debate. TMS further elaboration and elevation into a fully-fledged geopolitical articulation could not neglect to base its analytical tools on the existing and widely accepted geopolitical theories, something which might make it more ‘recognizable’ by the expert and more ‘digestible’ by the average reader.

20 See, Appendix 5, p. 363
2.2 The Geopolitical/Geocultural Theory of the Median Space – Subsequent Elaboration

... the connection between the Heartland, and especially its more open western regions of Iran, Turkestan, and Siberia, is much more intimate with Europe and Arabia than it is with China and India, or yet with Southern ... Africa. The strong natural frontiers of the Sahara Desert and the Tibetan Heights have no equivalent where ... Heartland merges with Arabia and Europe. The close connection of these three regions is well typified by ... geographical formula ... None the less – and indeed just because of its more transitional character – the boundary between the Heartland on the one hand, and Arabia and Europe on the other is worth following with some care.21

Mackinder’s passage leads to two observations that resemble Kitsikis’s TMS and could serve as the best starting point for further elaborating on this theory. First, Mackinder explicitly speaks about a geographic territory whose regions are closely linked. Heartland is connected mainly with Europe and Arabia while it is clearly divided by Tibet and Sahara Dessert from India and China in the east and by Sub-Saharan Africa in the south, respectively. Second, he observes a “transitional” connecting point between Heartland, Europe and Arabia that deserves special “care”.

Mackinder’s first point brings into mind Kitsikis’s suggested MS which actually consists by Russia, Eastern Europe and the Islamic World including North Africa. Mackinder’s second claim resembles Kitsikis’s premise about the centrality of the Aegean-Straits space. It could be argued that Mackinder implicitly confirms the existence of a space as TMS implies and agrees with this theory’s claim that the most crucial point of this space is the Aegean-Strait axis. Consequently, the elaboration of Kitsikis’s TMS, in order to be further justified and developed, will focus on these two concepts, the MS and the suggested Heartland of this territory.

21 Mackinder, Democratic Ideals and Reality, pp. 104-105
i. The Median Space

Mackinder’s WI, instead of three main geopolitical/geocultural spheres, East, West and South (sub-Saharan Africa), has four. Kitsikis’s MS, which is located in-between the above-mentioned three spaces, is a reality for the last twelve centuries.

MS borders in the north with the Arctic Ocean, through a line stretching from the Barents Sea to the Bering Straits. Thus, MS northern border consists of Russia’s arctic coastline. In the east, MS includes Mongolia, Xinjiang – Chinese Turkistan, Islamic Kashmir and ends in the Indian Ocean through Indus River. In other words, the eastern border stretches from Manchuria-Inner Mongolia-Gobi and Taklamakan Deserts to Pamir and Hindu Kush ranges and follows the Indus River until it reaches the Indian Ocean. The eastern border could be symbolically but with a satisfactory level of accuracy designated with the Great Wall of China, whose original purpose was to prohibit the Central Asian Turanic nomad invasions into the Chinese lands. Mackinder’s ‘Monsoon Coastland’ that includes India, Indochina and China serves as a good approximation of this region. 22 Into the south MS’s borderline consists of the Sahara Dessert that stretches from Morocco’s Atlantic coastline to the Red Sea. Researchers, by using geographic, historic and cultural evidences, are reaching the outcome that Northern Africa is closely connected in geopolitical, geoeconomic and geocultural terms with Eurasia. In other words Mediterranean Sea is not a borderline but a bridge between two sides of a common space. Mackinder observes that “Central and Southern Africa were almost as completely severed from Europe and Asia throughout the greater part of history as were the Americas and Australia. In fact, the

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22 See map in Makinder, Democratic Ideals and Reality, pp. 78-79
southern boundary of Europe was and is the Sahara rather than the Mediterranean”\textsuperscript{23} Mackinder actually characterizes Sahara as “a far more effective break in social continuity than does the Mediterranean”\textsuperscript{24} because it has served as “the most unbroken natural boundary in the world”.\textsuperscript{25} Sahara serving as a border between different “Oikoumene”, Africa and “Europe-Mediterranean region”, is being promoted by contemporary researchers as well.\textsuperscript{26} Finally, to the west the MS is divided from the West by the imaginable line that divides Catholic-Protestant societies from the Greek-Orthodox and Islamic ones. This means that this line ‘cuts’ Ukraine and Romania into two across the Dnieper River and the Transylvanian mountains respectively. Huntington’s observations about the dividing imaginable line between Western Europe’s Catholic-Protestant societies and the Greek Orthodox and Islamic ones could serve as an accurate illustration.\textsuperscript{27} At a first glance, the suggested modified MS differs from Kitsikis’s MS mainly in two main aspects. First, Kitsikis includes Mongolia into the East while this research places this country to the MS. Mongolia’s diachronic effort to disentangle with Chinese tutelage has led Ulaanbaatar to Moscow’s arms.\textsuperscript{28} Moreover, the diachronic differences between the Chinese and the Turkic-Mongol element of central Asia best exemplified by the Great Wall do not leave any space for dealing with Mongolia differently. It is not a coincidence that during the post-Cold-War regional re-conceptualization discourse Mongolia is being placed quite often in the same grouping with the central Asian Turkish republics.\textsuperscript{29} Kitsikis’s view that Mongolia belongs to the East because of its Buddhist religion

\textsuperscript{24} Mackinder, Democratic Ideals and Reality, p. 64
\textsuperscript{25} Ibid., p. 76
\textsuperscript{26} See, Parker, J. The Geopolitics of Domination (London, 1988), pp. 9-10
\textsuperscript{27} Huntington, The Clash of Civilizations and the remaking of the World Order, pp. 214-224
\textsuperscript{28} See, chapter 6
\textsuperscript{29} The Turkish Ministry of Foreign Affairs restructured its webpage and places Mongolia in the “Central Asia” grouping. See, ‘Central Asia’, Republic of Turkey Ministry of Foreign Affairs [http://www.mfa.gov.tr]
disregards the abovementioned points. Furthermore, religion could not act as the only and final arbiter since geopolitical considerations are entering the picture as well. For example, Indonesia, the largest Muslim nation, is definitely placed in the East and not in the Islamic part of the MS. Second, Kitsikis concerning the dividing line between MS and the West seems not to take into account the fact that there is a considerable strong and numerous Hungarian-origin Catholic and Uniat community in Romania and Ukraine respectively. These two communities are so strong, dense and active that Huntington’s imaginary line, which takes into account these realities, seems to be more accurate.

The presence of four main dividing lines in the WI has been established so far. Certainly there is a line that delimits the northern coast of Eurasia from the Arctic ice. There is an eastern line in Eurasia that divides the Chinese, Japanese and Indian sphere from the rest of the continent. There is a southern desert line in Africa that separates the northern part from the south and finally there is a western line that separates western and central Europe from the rest of the Eurasian continent. In a few words, an area has been established, which is called MS, through a reduction ad absurdum process. The existence of the MS has been assumed through the ‘negation’ of its ‘Other’, that is with what definitely this area is not ‘related’ and what definitely this area ‘is not’. So, there is an area that consists of half of Europe, half of Asia and northern Africa that is definitely not ‘related’ with Western Europe, Eastern Asia and Southern Africa, at least in cultural terms. The western and eastern borders of this area are mainly ‘imaginative’, since their existence is based on ‘cultural’ religious and racial divisions, whereas the northern and the southern borders are mainly ‘natural’ in

30 Kitsikis, Greek-Turkish Comparative History in the Twentieth Century, p. 42
geophysical terms, since the one is full of ice and the other is a vast dessert. The evident question that rises is the following: even if these four imaginative and geophysical border-lines are ‘there’ and actually divide the MS from the West, the East and the South, why the MS area should be perceived necessarily as a common unity? Why there should be within the MS one ecumene and not many more?

The above mentioned question is raised on geopolitical terms since, as Kitsikis has convincingly shown, the culture and beliefs of the MS people lead them to perceive themselves as a ‘bridge’ between east and west. Moreover, Kitsikis, by presenting a ‘clever’ argument is making a convincing cultural disassociation between what could be perceived definitely as ‘West’ and what as non-‘West’. He says that “as an additional cultural criterion, we could define as West all the countries that the phenomenon of the Renaissance (in Cultural terms - 15th century, in Religious terms - 16th century, Enlightenment – 18th century, Industrial Revolutions – 18th to 20th centuries, Social revolutions – 18th to 19th centuries) is being perceived as a domestic product” whereas non-West are the countries that perceived these developments as an “imported product”.31 For example, with this additional criterion, all the Greek-Orthodox countries could be perceived as non-West, not to speak about the Muslim ones. Once more, this criterion deals with the ‘negation’ of the ‘Other’ and not with the ‘affirmation’ of the ‘Self’, but that doesn’t mean that the ‘negation’ is not an important ‘cohesive’ element for the ‘Self’.

Nevertheless, there are some clear geopolitical ‘positive’ signs for dealing with the justification of the cohesion of the MS and its existence as a distinct ecumene.

31 Ibid, p. 47
Chapter 2  The Theory of Median Space

Starting with a diachronic geopolitical observation, a researcher could not fail to pinpoint once more Mackinder’s earlier aforementioned passage in which he almost intuitively speaks of a united common space in geopolitical terms constituted by ‘Mackinderian’ Heartland (Russia), Arabia (middle East, Mesopotamia), Eastern Europe and North Africa. Another line of argumentation towards the direction of a “symbiotic Slav-Asiatic “Middle World”” which “traces its lineage back through Kievan Russ to Byzantium” and refers to contemporary Russia and the Turkish world is being presented by modern analysts, such Parker and Ladis Kristof. Both analysts are referring to the V. I. Lamanskii who introduced the concept of the “Middle World”. Kristof writes that Lamanskii’s point was

that between ‘Europe properly speaking’ and ‘Asia properly speaking’ there was a ‘Middle World’, a distinct geographical and anthropo-geographical entity. He also noted that, in contrast to the European World and the Asian World, the ‘Middle World’ was able (or almost able) to become one political unit. In terms of culture, ethnography and settlement, however, the ‘Middle World’ was as yet not a homogeneous whole, whatever its potentialities for becoming one; it still remained something rather undefined, neither Europe nor Asia properly speaking

This illuminating passage evidently shows that a Russian-oriented ‘proto-MS’ ideology was introduced from the Russian “Slav-Asiatic” Eurasian circles in the end of the 19th and the beginning of the 20th century. As Kristof correctly observes “the idea of a symbiotic Slav-Asiatic ‘Middle World’ independent from Europe” gradually was transformed “to the idea of ‘Middle World’ allied with ‘Asia Properly speaking’ against Europe.”

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32 Mackinder, Democratic Ideals and Reality, pp. 77, 104
33 Parker, The Geopolitics of Domination, p. 126
34 Ibid., p. 139
36 Kristof, ‘The Russian Image of Russia’, p. 372
37 See, chapter 3
38 Ibid., p. 373
combatting ‘Orientalism’ have unfolded its diachronic geo-strategic role. In his serious re-conceptualization of oriental contribution to the rise of the West, Hobson writes that “Above all the Islamic world constituted no less than the Bridge of the World”. Medieval Muslim states were “serving to unite various arteries of long-distance trade known in antiquity between the Indian Ocean and the Mediterranean”. Abu-Lughod’s ideas about the development of a medieval “incipient world system” composed of “an impressive set of interlinked subsystems in Europe, the Middle East (including the northern part of Africa), and Asia (coastal and steppe zones)” confirms Hobson’s assertions for the existence of an “Oriental Globalization before 1500” that through its ‘bridging’ identity influenced the West so much that “we need to replace the Eurocentric notion of the pristine West with that of the oriental West”. Hobson’s convincing work re-affirms the existence of a common cultural, economical and religious space, stretching from the Indus River to Morocco, that acted as a ‘bridge’ between East and West even from late antiquity. Hobson disregards Greek and Byzantine culture within the framework of undermining Western factor in general, however, at some points he seems undecided if he has to place Greek-Orthodox to the West or not. In any case, the united Islamic world of the MS was in close contact with the Byzantine Orthodox one. Yannoulatos concludes that “from all the living religions, Islam is being located both geographically and spiritually closer to Orthodox Christianity. Despite the deep theological differences and the dramatic frictions of the past, we are standing more or

41 Ibid., p. 40
43 Hobson, The Eastern Origins of Western Civilization, p. 100
44 Ibid., p. 295
45 Ibid., pp. 112, 223, 227-228
less on the same cultural and religious ground”.\textsuperscript{46} In this passage the researcher should not fail to note Yannoulatos’s view that Greek-Orthodoxy is much closer with Islam than with the other sects of Christianity, something which once more indicates the existence of a common space including the symbiosis of both religions.

Starting from the rather academic observations and moving to the contemporary geopolitical developments, the observer could underline the newly emerging space re-conceptualizations that have appeared in the IR field. The main objective for the creation of new regional groups, is for modern IR theory to acquire new analytical tools in order to be able to address the contemporary ‘realities’ in a more adequate and explanatory manner. According to Blank, the Revolution in Military Affairs (RMA) for example, due to the technological advances implies a Revolution in Strategic Affairs (RSA) something that means the “reconceptualization of strategic space”.\textsuperscript{47} As Nikitin observes, “it is time to acknowledge the end of the ‘post-Soviet space’” since “a new geopolitical restructuring” is leading the researcher to different paths.\textsuperscript{48} He continuous by referring to the idea of the ‘Wider Central Asia’ which “excludes Russia from the region and unites the five Central Asian powers within one geopolitical entity alongside Afghanistan; occasionally Pakistan and Iran”.\textsuperscript{49} Except

\textsuperscript{46} Yannoulatos, A. \textit{Islam: A General Survey} (in Greek) (Athens, 2006), p. 406; He underlines the fact that the first Christian analysts of Islam were also the ones who first encountered it either positively or negatively. Byzantines translated first the Koran in Greek and acquired the more accurate information of the new rising power. For these reasons, the forerunners of the by-religious dialogue were the Eastern Romans and the West based its views about Islam on the Byzantine counterparts. The first Latin translation of the Koran did not come before 1143, in the midst of the ‘Crusades’. See ibid., pp. 36-60. On the initiated by the Ecumenical Patriarchate of Constantinople dialogue between Greek-Orthodoxy and Islam see, Papademetriou, C., G. ‘Two Traditions, One Space: Orthodox Christians and Muslims in Dialogue’, \textit{Islam and Christian-Muslim Relations} (Vol. 15, No. 1) (January 2004), pp. 55-64.


\textsuperscript{49} Ibid., p. 6
Wider Central Asia, a second even most important spatial entity that tends to dominate the analytic fields of IR and is being used as an actual foreign policy tool by multinational institutions is the concept of the ‘Greater Middle East’. Blank asserts that “it is possible to talk of a greater Middle East that stretches from Turkey to Afghanistan and perhaps for some aspects also includes all of North Africa” since there is an “undoubtedly … increasingly visible strategic linkage of … Central Asia and the Transcaucasus and the traditionally understood Middle East”.\textsuperscript{50} Especially after 9/11, this vast area could be characterized by a very important development. It has become a “zone of turmoil”\textsuperscript{51} since “for the first time in history” West can project effective military power in the region and US’s mainly “ability to sustain joint military power” has resulted in the “acceleration” of a “pre-existed counter trend intended to ... deny the United States ... access to Central Asia and adjoining theaters”. This emerging rivalry could be better described by being “clearly part of the historic relationships known as the Great Game”.\textsuperscript{52} Besides the geopolitical intellectual cognitive exercises, there is a series of articulated policies that establish this notion as a reality. US administration has launched (November 2003) the Broader Middle East and North Africa Initiative (BMENA) in an effort to promote a “forward strategy of freedom”\textsuperscript{53} into a region covering “a wider geographic scope” including “Pakistan and Afghanistan, not merely the Arab world and Iran”.\textsuperscript{54} The concept of the BMENA was officially implemented through the creation of a forum (December 2004) called the ‘Forum for the Future’. At the forum, representatives from the countries stretching “from Morocco to Pakistan” launched a “multilateral

\textsuperscript{50} Blank, ‘The Greater Middle east and Its Strategic Profile’, p. 2
\textsuperscript{51} Ibid., p. 11
\textsuperscript{52} Ibid., , pp. 4-5; emphasis added
\textsuperscript{54} Ibid., p. 3
development and reform plan aiming at fostering economic and political liberalization” in this area.\textsuperscript{55} The actual implementation of this project came with the establishment of the Foundation for the Future (FFF) (November 2005) an institution that would “support civil society organizations … in their efforts to foster democracy and freedom in the Broader Middle East and North Africa” region.\textsuperscript{56} US BMENA initiative has raised tremendous debate within the West\textsuperscript{57} especially due to its geographic extension, which covers the Muslim world. Both EU and the Muslims raised questions, concerning the actual US aims.\textsuperscript{58} Articles like the one published in the US \textit{Armed Forces Journal} (July 2006) with the title ‘Blood Borders: How a Better Middle East Would Look’ and deals with “amendment of national boundaries between the Bosporus and the Indus” are leaving little space for misunderstandings of the actual US intentions in the region.\textsuperscript{59} Regardless of whether these plans are fulfilled or not, the important point is to acknowledge the existence of a united area in geopolitical terms between Morocco and Indus River. Apart from the political and civil forums that have been developed for this area as a whole, NATO has launched the parallel initiatives to integrate this space in military terms under Western auspices. NATO’s Mediterranean Dialogue (1994) for the riparian states and the Istanbul Cooperation Initiative (June 2004) for the “broader Middle East Region” constitute the main institutional western efforts to infiltrate into the area between

\footnotesize{\textsuperscript{55} Sharp, M., J. ‘The Broader Middle East and North Africa Initiative: An Overview’, Congressional Research Service: CRS Report for Congress (15 February 2005), p. 1 [http://italy.usembassy.gov] \textsuperscript{56} See, ‘Background’ and ‘Mission & Mandate’, Foundation For the Future [http://www.foundationforfuture.org] \textsuperscript{57} The Broader Middle East and North Africa Initiative’, p. 7 \textsuperscript{58} See, Ibid., pp. 7-9 \textsuperscript{59} In this article among others “the absence of an independent Kurdish state” is being described as “The most glaring injustice in the notoriously unjust lands between the Balkan Mountains and the Himalayas”. This article is being escorted by an illuminating map of the region with the depiction of a Kurdish state encompassing except northern Iraq, the whole of eastern Turkey, western Iran and northern Syria. See Peters, R. ‘Blood Borders: How a Better Middle East Would Look’ [http://www.armedforcesjournal.com] (5 July 2006) }
Morocco and the Indus River in military terms.60 As US officials have pointed out (2003) “NATO’s mandate is still to defend Europe and North America. But we don’t believe we can do that by sitting in … Europe … or North America. We have to deploy our conceptual attention and our military forces east and south. NATO’s future … is … in the Greater Middle East”.61 In a few words, US military and political administration considers this vast area as a common unity subjected to deep and thorough intervention either through political, economic and social or military means. Furthermore, EU’s recently launched (July 2008) Mediterranean Union initiative reaffirms geopolitical claims about Mediterranean’s actual connecting rather than dividing role.62 Moving to the Caucasus region, researchers are observing that this space “is increasingly being integrated into the security relations of the Middle East. Indeed the alignments that characterize the Caucasian security complex can actually be drawn further down into the Middle East”63 and this process represents “the inevitable reintegration of the region with its historical contacts to its south”.64 Stretching the inquiry further to the north, the Black Sea enters the picture. Once more, this region is considered to be in close connection with the Caucasus, the Caspian and the Balkans due to “geo-strategic, economic, and socio-political reasons”.65 The area of the “Black Sea”, despite of the fact that it actually consists of six littoral states, could be better defined thorough the Black Sea Economic Cooperation (1992) (BSEC) project that includes Albania, Armenia, Azerbaijan, 

61 ‘The Broader Middle East and North Africa Initiative’, p. 4; emphasis added
64 Ibid., p. 9
Greece and Moldova as well. According to NATO and US analysts, the Black Sea region is treated as “part of a broader region including the Caspian and Central Asia”, namely the “Greater Middle East” region and acts as the “key transit route for Caspian oil”. BSCE depicts Black Sea’s actual geopolitical space, which encompasses all coasts that control the ancient sea-line crossing the Black Sea, the Straits and the Aegean. Historically this route belonged to the power controlling the Aegean and the Straits (Byzantine and Ottoman empires) and became the conflict zone between the central empires of the MS with the peripheral ones, the Arab and the Russian empires, a situation that became more complicated with the rise of the West. The major contribution of this area into global history however was that it became the necessary channel of transmission for the Byzantine cultural and political influence in Russia. This development that was forged into the Crimean peninsula reshaped the medieval world and designated the course of many events in the WI during the last 10 centuries. Russia’s initial entrance into the international scene starts with its entrance into the Byzantine ‘Commonwealth’, an event that shaped Russian identity and connected the Russian factor with the central parts of the MS.

Summing up the diachronic geopolitical observations and the contemporary geopolitical developments, there could be only one outcome. A space that is being designated by the specific aforementioned borders, includes a variety of races and religions and is labeled as the MS exists both in geopolitical and in geocultural terms.

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67 Aydin, ’Regional Cooperation in the Black Sea and the Role of Institutions’, p. 80
70 See, chapter 5
The overlapping notions and the interconnected areas of the ‘Wider Central Asia’, BMENA, and BSEC along with the actual contemporary initiatives in political, economic, social and safety terms prove its existence in modern IR inquiry and practice. Consequently, a further elaboration of the constitutive but unified parts of the MS through a process of geopolitical methodological abstractions might provide the researchers with some useful and meaningful geopolitical outcomes.

MS, as it has been defined, stretches in a vast area occupying large parts of the Eurasian and the African continents. It is characterized by various geographical milieus and is inhabited by many people of different racial, linguistic, cultural and religious origins. However, it seems that a ‘specific’ order and pattern between the geographic, racial-linguistic and cultural-religious elements has been established after millennia of historical fermentation. In a few words, the geographical pattern of the MS could be as follows. The northern part of the MS is covered by tundra polar deserts and ice. This territory borders with the Arctic Ocean. The rest of Siberia is covered with boreal evergreen forests, something which is being transformed to temperate and subtropical evergreen forests in the area west of the Urals. Further to the south, the area that today stretches from Mongolia passes through Central Asia and south of the Urals and reach the Carpathian Range via Ukraine could be characterized by temperate grasslands, the steppe, and temperate deserts. Going deeper to the south, in the space that now is occupied mainly by Pakistan, Afghanistan and Iran, there are high plateaus characterized by subtropical deserts and semi-desserts surrounded by mountainous ranges. Asia Minor and the Balkans are west of the high plateaus. This territory is being characterized as a sea-temperate environment covered with Mediterranean woodlands, except for the central part of
Asia Minor, which has the characteristics of the high plateaus. Finally, the southern part of the MS including the Arabian Peninsula and North Africa is covered mainly with subtropical and semi-deserts regions, except for its Mediterranean coastline, which is more sea-temperate. In racial-linguistic terms, moving again from the north to the south of the MS there are the Slavic populations, inhabiting the tundra and forest zone. The steppe and the desert are occupied by the Turkic-origin populations and the high plateaus by the Indo-European ones. The sea-temperate, western of the high plateau, space is a mix of Kurdish, Greek and Turkish-rooted populations whereas the Southern desert areas are inhabited by the Arabic and Jewish ones. Consequently, in an effort to further systematize the MS, it could be said that four main racial-linguistic groups are covering this space that could be characterized as follows: In the northern tundra/forest area there are the ‘Slavs’ (mainly Russia, Belarus, parts of Ukraine and the Slavic Balkans), in the central steppes and desserts there the ‘Turanic’ populations (mainly the Mongols and the Turkish origin states stretching from Xinjiang to the Caspian Sea), in the central high mountain ranges there are the ‘Aryan’ populations (mainly Pakistan, Afghanistan and Iran) and into the central sea-temperate areas an ‘Aryan’-‘Turanic’ amalgam is being observed (there are the ‘Aryan’ Albanians, Armenians, Georgians and Greeks and the ‘Turanic’ Azeri and Turks). Finally, the ‘Semitic’ population covers the western parts of the MS (mainly the Arabs and Jewish). In addition, it could be said that the Slavic part of the northern MS and the Aryan Greek, Armenian, and Georgian part of the central sea-tempered part follows the Greek-Orthodox creed whereas the Turanic and Aryan part of the central high-ranges space along with the Semitic south follows Sunni Islam. However, three secondary but equally important dogmas existed in the MS. In the Semitic space there is also the Jewish religion and the Aryan central high-ranges
Iranian populations follow the Shi’a doctrine. In the central sea-tempered area except Sunni Islam and Greek-Orthodoxy the Turanic element, Azerbaijan, follows the Shi’a version of Islam as well, and there is a substantial part of Turkish population that follows Alevism, a composite Orthodox-Shi’a-Shaman dogma. Having identified the major geographical, racial-linguistic and cultural-religious elements and their distribution into the MS, some general abstractions could be made based on these observations. First, the MS could be divided into three main zones: the northern, the central and the southern. The northern zone delimits more or less the tundra and forest areas and includes mainly the Slavic Greek-Orthodox populations with the northern Balkans attached to this region. The southern zone includes the dessert space, which is mostly inhabited from the Semitic Sunni and Jewish populations and stretches from the Atlantic coast to Mesopotamia. The central zone, however, is a much more complex area. This area is defined by the Adriatic Sea to the west and reaches up to the eastern borders of the MS, the Chinese Great Wall, the Himalayas and the Indus River. This central zone, as it has been already said, in geophysical terms is divided into two parts: the eastern central part which is identified by its high-plateaus and semi-desserts and the western part which is defined by the sea-temperate Mediterranean milieu. The bordering area that separates the eastern from the western part is of course the Caucasus region and the south mountainous ranges of Kurdistan. In other words, the borderlines between Turkey-Iran-Armenia and Azerbaijan actually divide the central zone of the MS into the eastern and the western halves. This vast area, which actually lies between the Slavic north and the Semitic south, is shared by two main linguistic entities, the Turanians and the Aryans. In the eastern part the Turanians occupy the semi-dessert northern half (Chinese Xinjiang, Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan, Mongolia, Tajikistan, Turkmenistan and Uzbekistan) and
the Aryans occupy the high-plateaus southern half (Afghanistan, Iran, Pakistan). In the western part the division is not ‘horizontal’ but ‘vertical’. The major dividing line lies on the Aegean Sea and the Eastern Mediterranean that divides the Albanian and Greek/Cypriot element from the Turkish one. However, the Turanic half (Azerbaijan and Turkey) is not unified since the Aryan Armenian, Georgian and Kurdish populations divide them vertically.

Having all these in mind, the researcher could visualize the MS as an area divided horizontally into three main sub-regions, the northern, the central and the southern that could be named as the Northern Wing (NW), the Kentron and the Southern Wing (SW) respectively. Moreover, the eastern and western halves of the K, which is vertically divided into these two sub-regions, could be named as Eastern Kentron (EK) and Western Kentron (WK) respectively. The next and final step of this analysis should be to locate the exact space that could be labeled as the Heartland of the MS (HMS). Every geopolitical grand-narrative is defining a specific space as ‘Heartland’ following, once more, Mackinder’s methodology. Any theoretical power-politics narration requires an objective, a target. Only after designating the ‘end’, whatever that might be, the ‘means’ could be organized in a meaningful way. After all, if such an ‘end’ does not exist, then there is no need to theorizing and acting at all.

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71 A symbolic element that signifies the separation between the northern Turanic half of the Eastern Kentron and the southern Aryan half is the ‘Wall of Alexander’ or ‘Red Wall/Serpent’ which “separates modern Mazandaran in northeastern Iran from Turkmenistan”. This “is not just the frontier between two modern states, it is also a very ancient cultural divide: to the south are fertile agricultural grounds, to the north is the steppe … the north is the nomads’ country, the south belongs to peasants and farmers”. See Gorgâni, T. ‘Gorgân Defense Wall’, Gorgân Homepage (Northern Iran) [http://medlem.spray.sel] 16 March 2007; ‘The “Wall of Alexander”’, Livius: Articles on Ancient History [http://www.livius.org]
72 See, Appendix 6, p. 364
73 See, Appendix 7, p. 365
ii. The Heartland of the Median Space

Since Mediterranean men first ventured across the salt water for trade or piracy, the Bosphorus and the Dardanelles have been a magnet to merchants, pirates, conquerors and statesmen. The destroyers of commerce and its organizers … the militarists and navalists … the politicians who pursued national, and the rare statesmen who pursued European ends have, in turn, looked upon … with cupidity or fear, with the assured pride of possession or with the bitterness of envy, as would-be beneficiaries from a dying man’s state or anxious arbitrators between jealous claimants, who watched one another hand on hilt.74

This passage depicts the diachronic value of a broad region that surrounds the Black Sea, the Straits and the Aegean. So, could the WK be characterized as the HMS and if so, how this could be justified? First, the best indication should be to trace the historical movements of the major actors of the MS. The observer could follow the Arabs (SW), the Russians (NW), the Persians and the Turks (EK) diachronically ‘converging’ mainly to this place. Concerning the Arab case, Hobson correctly asserts that “in the Muslim histories of the period, the battle of Tours, Poitiers and the figure of Charles Martel go largely unmentioned. Far greater emphasis is accorded the Arab defeat at Constantinople”. This was done because the Arab troops in the West were representing not an “Islamic invasion” but it was “rather a small band of raiders embarking on a minor raiding mission … they were not interested in going any further. The reason was simple: the Western part of Europe was backward and of little interest to them. Byzantium was both more powerful and more attractive”.75

75 Hobson, The Eastern Origins of Western Civilization, pp. 109-110; in Tours (732), the Arab forces were 80,000 men. More than 200,000 men with 2,560 ships were mobilized against Constantinople (717-718). Their devastating defeat (loss of 170,000 men and only 5 ships returned back home) was characterized as an event that “saved not only the Byzantine Empire … but also the entire civilization of Western Europe”. Vassiliev, A., A. History of the Byzantine Empire: 324-1453 (in Greek) (Volume 1) (Athens, 1995), p. 301
Similarly, Russian diachronic “Drang nach dem Süden”\textsuperscript{76} drive “was much older, more deliberate and more persistent” than the western one.\textsuperscript{77} Western and eastern expansion served only as “a substitute” to the inability to proceed to the Byzantine-Ottoman area.\textsuperscript{78} Moreover, western expansion could also be characterized as a “search for advanced technology”.\textsuperscript{79} For Russians, Constantinople “was best placed geographically to accomplish the great mission of the final triumph of Slav civilization … against Islam, but they would also constitute a spiritual alternative to the ‘Romano-Germanic’ Europe of the west.”\textsuperscript{80} Exactly this diachronic “fundamental failure”, to expand to the south, underlines Russian inability “to become more than just one of the great powers, influential, but never dominant”. For this reason, Russia turned to the west and dealt with “a substitute cultural area in which she was regarded as being a half-oriental intruder”. Finally, when OE was collapsing and Russia was ready to dominate “her own cultural macrocore” she was “frustrated by the combined energies of the European powers” which they were afraid of “the implications” of a Russian penetration to that area.\textsuperscript{81} Concerning the Aryan and Turanic infiltration into that region, the researcher could simply review the wars of Classical, Hellenistic, Roman/Byzantine Greeks against the Achemenid and Sassanid Persia along with the Turkish, Seljuk invasions (11\textsuperscript{th} century) in the area and the subsequent millennial Greek-Turkish interaction in the region. Second, a further analysis of the suggestive MS spatial division would unfold the abovementioned historical reality, which dictates that WK could be the only spatial entity to serve as the HMS. Obviously, the only part of the MS that has direct access to all the other major parts of the MS (NW,  

\textsuperscript{76} Parker, The Geopolitics of Domination, p. 83  
\textsuperscript{78} Parker, The Geopolitics of Domination, p. 83  
\textsuperscript{79} LeDonne, The Russian Empire and the World, 1700-1917, p. 148  
\textsuperscript{80} Parker, The Geopolitics of Domination, p. 85  
\textsuperscript{81} Ibid., p. 91; see chapter 5
SW and EK) and to the West is the WK. NW has direct access to the Kentron and the West but not to the SW. SW has direct access to the Kentron and the West but not to the NW. Moreover, EK has direct access to the NW, SW and the WK but not to the West. The West has direct contact with NW, SW, WK but not with the EK. If someone takes into consideration this simple geographic analysis, the obvious outcome actually reaffirms the historical pattern that all the major MS powers along with the West diachronically converge into the WK. Any other expansion towards another direction was serving mainly secondary needs or was a simple substitute for the inability to achieve the major one, namely to control the WK. Consequently, for historical and geographic reasons, it could be asserted that WK serves as the HMS.

So, does the HMS have ‘natural boundaries’? “Natural boundaries” is a term “without an easy definition but one representing a complex of obstacles establishing “an optimum of conquest”’.82 So, natural border is a limit that beyond that any further movement could lead to ‘overexpansion’ and decline. Humans are consciously or unconsciously trying to “attain some ideal or idealized geographical territory in which the state will be in close conformity with the physical and human environment in which it exists … a territory in which there is a large measure of physical unity bounded by clearly defined ‘natural’ frontiers … as a more secure, prosperous and easily-governed state”.83 With this interpretation, Parker describes this limit also as ‘a minimum of defense’, meaning that this limit constitutes the necessary defense line in order to hold, preserve and secure a specific space in the most efficient way in cultural, social, economic and defense terms. Thus, in ideal situations, the “optimum of conquest” and the ‘minimum of defense’ should cover the same space.

82 LeDonne, The Russian Empire and the World, 1700-1917, p. 4
83 Parker, The Geopolitics of Domination, p. 2
Chapter 2  The Theory of Median Space

Consequently, the space included within ‘natural’ limits would not face cultural, social, economic and defense problems since there would be neither an overexpansion to ‘alien’ spaces nor an ‘under-expansion’ which poses existential problems. The western and southern borders could be detected easily since they are identified by the sea, the Adriatic and the eastern Mediterranean, south of Crete and Cyprus respectively. The major aim is to define “an optimum of conquest” or ‘a minimum of defense’ in the north and in the east. Kitsikis designates as the center of the HMS the triangle created by the three major Byzantine and Ottoman cities of Constantinople, Thessaloniki and Smyrna along with the included Straits-Northern Aegean waters and islands.84 Similarly, Parker writes that “Rumeli is … a physical and cultural extension of the Marmora region, bound to it and to the northern Aegean by the valleys of the Maritza, Struma and Vardar rivers” and that “The power centering on Marmora had historically been able to dominate both Anatolia and the Balkans”.85 Let’s name for this reason this triangle as the Pivot Point (PP) of the HMS. So, having as a starting point the priority to defend the PP, analysts have agreed that the ‘natural’ boundary in the north, in the Balkans, should be the lower Danube or at least the area between Sofia and Philippopolis. For Graves “a Thraco-Marmoran state, to be secure against … attack … had to … hold the Sofia gap …” but preferably had to use “the Danube as his first line of defense”.86 Mackinder is confirming these views by indicating that “the … Danube frontier must be regarded as demarking a penetration form the Mediterranean”.87 Truly, Danube was the famous “limes Romanus” which Romans, Byzantines and Ottomans tried to hold at every cost.88 The Thracian and Macedonian plains do not have any physical defensible boundary to the north, so in order for

84 See, Kitsikis, History of the Ottoman Empire, p. 35
85 Parker, The Geopolitics of Domination, pp. 15-16
86 Graves, The Question of the Straits, pp. 21-22
87 Mackinder, Democratic Ideals and Reality, p. 45
Constantinople and Thessaloniki “the second most important city … comparable to that of Constantinople”\(^89\) to be protected, Danube was the natural limit.\(^90\) Moreover, Graves’s “Sofia gap”, the line crossing the ‘Gates of Trajan’, also serves as a cultural border since it is “the boundary between Dacia and Thrace, and between the Latin and Greek-speaking halves of the Balkan peninsula”.\(^91\) This implies that if the Greeks wanted to preserve and develop the Balkan part of the PP they should create “alliances” from at least the Gates of Trajan and further to the north.\(^92\) Not surprisingly, “this ever-present threat of invasion from the north profoundly affected the Byzantine’s image of Eastern Europe, and … conditioned their policy in that area. Careful and prolonged study of the countries north of the Black Sea was … essential to the empire’s security”. Consequently, the increasing Byzantine encounter with the north and Constantinople’s efforts to develop alliances with the northern races “contributed so much to the preservation and spread of civilization in Eastern Europe”.\(^93\) So, the Byzantine need to secure and create the most preferable conditions for developing the Thessaloniki-Constantinople area forced them to make Danube a ‘natural’ frontier\(^94\) and to create a whole strategy of approaching the nations of the vast regions of NW. A byproduct of this strategic movement was the Russian conversion to a Greek-Orthodoxy and Byzantine culture.\(^95\) The eastern border constitutes almost a similar case. “Asia Minor is … made by nature to be united both politically and economically from the Black Sea to the Taurus, and from the Ionian

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\(^{89}\) Ibid., p. 17

\(^{90}\) Greek Historian Polybius (203-120BC) in describing the efforts of the Byzantines, the Greek colonists, to defend themselves from the “never-ending” northern invasions sees a “Tantalean punishment” vested upon them since geography could not help them. Ibid., pp. 15-16

\(^{91}\) Ibid., p. 20

\(^{92}\) Graves, The Question of the Straits, p. 22

\(^{93}\) Obolenski, The Byzantine Commonwealth, p. 26

\(^{94}\) Only three times in Byzantine history Danube served as *limes Romanus* (538-603, 1018-170 and 1172-1180). See, ibid., pp. 5-6. The Byzantine-Bulgarian border most of the times was stabilized near Sofia and the ‘Gates of Trajan’. During Ottoman era Danube served as a border only after the retreat from the rest European provinces

\(^{95}\) See, ibid., pp. 24-41
coast to the Kurdish highlands”. AM’s central plateau could not constitute a frontier since history has proved that all AM-based powers could not stop before reaching the coast or the Taurus Mountains depending on where they were departing from. A border in the plateau was never stable, it did not allow any economic, cultural and social developments and the efforts to ‘fix’ it did not provide security. This is why Graves observes that British support to the Greeks (1919-1922) to hold the “lowland around Smyrna on “ethnographical grounds”” was a “fatal gift” since “Mr. Lloyd George forgot geography”. The future Greek PM (1936-1941) Ioannis Metaxas (1871-1941), writes in his diary about a conversation he had with the PM (1910-1915, 1915, 1917-1920, 1924, 1928-1932, 1933) Eleftherios Venizelos (1864-1936) in 1915. Venizelos tried to convince him on the possibility of Greece to enter AM on behalf of the allies. Metaxas in his report about the possibility of success draws PM’s attention on the fact that AM “represents a whole through many closely interconnected parts in geographical, economic, historical and ethnographical terms. Therefore it would be very difficult to divide this space … this inevitable will lead to a struggle towards the reunification” moreover, the Straits along with what is today European Turkey “are an indivisible part of western Asia Minor”. If Greece would enter AM, it had to penetrate further to the east, probably up until the ‘natural’ Taurus Mountains ‘border’ in order not to be expelled as a whole, which is what actually happened (1922). So, it could be suggested that the HMS in order to protect and facilitate its PP with all the necessary political, cultural, social and economic conditions, requires to the north a boundary either near Sofia or the Danube, to the

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96 Graves, The Question of the Straits, p. 20
97 Whenever the border was in the plateau, during the Greek/Hellenistic-Persian, the Roman/Byzantine-Persian, the Byzantine-Seljuk, the Byzantine-Ottoman and the Greek-Turkish period the war was inevitable and the combatant’s aim was either to reach the coast or to reach Taurus.
98 Graves, The Question of the Straits, p. 20
99 Kitsikis, Greek-Turkish Comparative History in the Twentieth Century, pp. 191-193
east near Taurus Mountains, Adriatic Sea to the west and Eastern Mediterranean to the south.

Having clearly defined the ‘natural’ borders that HMS ought to have in order for the PP to be protected the last point of this spatial analysis is to understand what the PP constitutes in reality. The obvious answer is the ‘Straits’. But as Graves indicates “The Straits link the Mediterranean and other seas with the rich basin of the Danube, with the great plains of South Russia, the agricultural and mineral wealth of Transcaucasia and the fertile coasts of Northern Anatolia”. The ‘Straits’ as such is of no value if not perceived as a part of a higher geopolitical architecture that definitely includes the Black Sea region. Gibbons concludes that “Until the Black Sea dries up and the wheat-fields of Russia fail to yield, there will be a ‘question of the Straits’”. Obviously there is a clear connection between the Straits and the Black Sea. Napoleon I (1769-1821), expands this unity further to the south by observing that “Greece … has to be annexed by the European Power that will dominate Egypt. And then to the north an independent Constantinopolitan kingdom with its provinces should act as a barrier to the Russian power … I could have divided the Turkish Empire with Russia … We had discuss it many times.” But “Constantinople was always saving Turkey. This capital was a huge problem, the great barrier. Russia wanted it but I shouldn’t have given it to her: it’s a key of the highest importance. Alone it is as valuable as an empire: the one that possess it can rule the world”.

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100 Graves, The Question of the Straits, p. 14
Napoleon connects the possession of Constantinople with the Greek space and even Egypt. By understanding the importance of the city, he agrees that it could not be given to a single power. Thus, he chooses the solution of the creation of an independent kingdom. Nevertheless, he explicitly expresses the view that a sole power should occupy the space between Egypt and Greece. Through this idea Napoleon actually speaks about the water-routes surrounded by these lands, namely the Aegean and the eastern Mediterranean. Obviously, since Constantinople’s task would be to stop Russia, Napoleon clearly implies that this small kingdom would act as a pawn in the hands of the ‘European power’ that would possess the surrounding seas. He could not have meant anything else since a small isolated Constantinople would have no role to play in containing Russia unless it was supported by the power that was occupying the rest of the HMS. For all these reasons, when Napoleon says that “the one that possess it [Constantinople] can rule the world” and at the same lines he speaks of Greek and Egyptian space he simply means that Constantinople has no value without the Aegean water-routes that could be extended up to the Egypt via the eastern Mediterranean. The validity of these observations was proved in practice and further elaborated through geopolitical thinking. Henry Morgenthau, US ambassador to the OE during WWI in his famous Ambassador Morgenthau’s Story more or less explains the prolongation of the war, the US intervention and the collapse of Russia, which led to the Bolshevik revolution due to the closing of the Straits by the Ottoman government. His views are so illuminating that deserve to be presented without any further comment

The fact that the war was prolonged for so many years and finally the US undertook the main burden to carry it out was the result of the closing of the Straits … this was the decisive event that isolated Russia from its allies and led her to defeat and collapse in less than a year time something which

enabled the Russian revolution to erupt. A brief glance in the map reveals that this huge country has only four exits to the seas … the Baltic Sea … closed by the German fleet … the port of Archangel, which is frozen for many months per year … Vladivostok … which is also frozen three months per year … the only useful exit is the Dardanelles. From there the surplus of Russian production was exported … most of the Russian imports and exports follow that road. Germany, by closing it was destroying the economic and military power base of its enemy. By prohibiting the grain exports was depriving Russia from an economic weapon … England and France were prohibited from carrying … enough ammunition … Russia was forced to be based on Archangel and Vladivostok for receiving supplies. The cause of the Russian military defeat in 1915 is well-known: simply her soldiers did not have ammunition to fight.\textsuperscript{103}

Mackinder with his broad thinking insists that “the possession of Greece … would probably carry with it the control of the World-Island”\textsuperscript{104} something which confirms Napoleon’s views. Furthermore, Mackinder, following the great Corsican’s viewpoint, suggests

Why should we not solve the problem of Constantinople by making that historic city the Washington of the League of Nations? … Constantinople will be one of the most accessible places on the globe … From Constantinople the leading nations of the West might radiate light through precisely those regions, oppressed during many past centuries, in which light is most to be desired from the point of view of humanity at large; from Constantinople we might weld together the West and the East, and permanently penetrate the Heartland with oceanic freedom.\textsuperscript{105}

Many points could be derived from these passages. First, Mackinder’s views recapitulate the cardinal importance of the region defined by the Straits and the Aegean as a whole. Second, in no other part of his most known works Mackinder is using such a language for a specific space and most importantly for a city. Third, these views in combination with Morgenthau’s observations are showing the dependence of the Russian space on the Straits-Aegean space. Fourth and more important, isn’t it strange for Mackinder to actually speak about a certain space as the most important, even from a strategic point of view, especially for the West, and not including it in his Heartland suggestive space? So, it could be asserted that the PP

\textsuperscript{103} Morgenhau, H. \textit{Ambassador Morgenthau’s Story}, (Athens, 1998), pp. 173-174
\textsuperscript{104} Mackinder, \textit{Democratic Ideals and Reality}, p. 164
\textsuperscript{105} Ibid., p. 173; emphasis added
actually connects or divides, depending on the geopolitical circumstances, a unity which consists of the BSSA and represents the central life-line of the HMS. The PP could actually be defined as the center of BSSA and this is the reason why ecumenical empires were constructed around it. Thus, the HMS’s ‘natural borders’ by protecting the unity of the PP are actually allowing the BSSA to act as a bridge and not as barrier. West and NW-centered geopolitical thought is mostly interested in making this region function as a ‘barrier’ to each other thus, when they cannot control it, in order to turn it against the other, they try to divide it. The best indication about this kind of attitude again is provided in Mackinder’s work. Despite his views that Constantinople and the Greek space constitute maybe the land from which you can rule the world, Mackinder is not placing it within the Heartland but within the Inner Crescent and definitely under western tutelage. Mackinder writes (1919) at a time when the allies control this area. During that period this space is not Heartland since it is controlled by the sea powers. In the event that NW could conquer HMS, this space would become Heartland. So, Mackinder starts from the clearly geographic concept of an isolated Heartland (1904) and claims that “since land power can to-day close the Black Sea, the whole basin of the sea must be regarded as the Heartland”. He explains this by saying that Heartland “for the purposes of strategic thinking should be given a somewhat wider extension”. With all these, Mackinder actually admits that the initial (1904) Heartland is not where it was initially placed, maybe the Heartland of Russia could be there, but not the Heartland of the WI. Moreover, by presenting a specific geographical space (HMS) as a locus that its status, being Heartland or no-Heartland, depending on the nature of the power that occupies it, he

106 See, Appendix 8, p. 366
107 Ibid., p. 109; see, Chapter 1 and Mackinder’s development of the HT
108 Napoleon seems to acknowledge “Russia’s superbly position” in strategic terms. Loukas, ‘The Geopolitics of Eastern Question and Greece’, p. 21; however, by no means could Russia function as the empire of the world see, Parker Geopolitics of Domination, pp. 76-159
clearly attributes to it an extraordinary unique status, considering it the battlefield for world domination between the West and NW.\textsuperscript{109} This is the reason why HMS is going to be kept divided. None can afford this place to be truly united and independent. Of course, this observation excludes the indigenous populations.

\textbf{iii. The Two Conditions of the Heartland of the Median Space}

The next step would be to further focus our analytical approach on the actual historical conditions of the HMS. Certain, well defined, in geographical, political and cultural terms, space could exist on two fundamental conditions. It could be either united or disunited divided in at least two parts. Thus, for the HMS, there are two spatial situations that could be labeled as the United HMS (UHMS) condition and the Disunited HMS (DHMS) condition.

The UHMS condition implies a unified PP and means the effective control of the BSSA. Moreover, specific ideological proclivities that ‘central’ imperial formations always exist will allow it to seek for \textit{ecumenic} roles. Historical inquiry of at least the last 17 centuries confirms it. During Byzantine peak (5\textsuperscript{th}-7\textsuperscript{th} and 9\textsuperscript{th}-12\textsuperscript{th} centuries) the empire was the major political, military and cultural power at least between the other actors of the MS and the West. With the ‘natural’ borders in Danube and Taurus, a well protected PP consisting of the largest, richest and most civilized cities in the MS, compared maybe only with the ones in China, Byzantium thrived. Byzantine sea-power based on the PP could protect, keep unite and further develop the BSSA in a way most beneficial for the central empire and for the rest of the MS and western populations. The Byzantines managed to defeat the Arab SW and the Aryan-Turanic

\textsuperscript{109} On the unique status of the HMS see, Mackinder, \textit{Democratic Ideals and Reality}, pp. 104-114
Islamic EK, they created a ‘commonwealth’ to the Slavic NW and they were following a balanced working relationship in economic and political terms with the West always from the position of superiority. During the Ottoman peak (14th to 17th centuries) HMS, the PP and the BSSA gradually were reunited under Sultan’s rule and the West that had penetrated during the last Byzantine centuries was expelled to the benefit of the indigenous populations since the economic sea-based power passed to their hands. The Ottomans defeat the Safavid Persian EK, dominate the Arab SW and effectively deal with the NW regions by establishing a rather balanced status quo. Definitely the Ottomans during this period, compared to the Russians, were not acting as the weak part since they were controlling areas stretching up until Poland while Black Sea was an Ottoman lake. With the West, after actually expelling them from the HMS, they managed to acquire equilibrium. The Sultan was originally accepted in the emerging political architecture definitely not from a position of inferiority at least in political terms. Under the status of the UHMS, both the Byzantines and the Ottomans perceived themselves and to a great extend they were perceived by others, as a sole legitimate empire, destined to create an ecumene in a composite manner which could incorporate different elements in a peaceful and mutual beneficial way. In a few words, the state entity that dominates a UHMS could play a primal role to a region extending to the whole of the MS and as a consequence to the rest of the WI. Stamcos shows this in the most eloquent way

The Aegean with its numerous islands effectively controls the diode towards and from the Black Sea, therefore, it constitutes a second but of equal importance key-keeper of the Straits … the control of the eastern Mediterranean belongs to the power that occupies the three important geostrategic locations: Straits-Aegean-Cyprus. These three geostrategic spaces have a so unique geopolitical cohesion, that in the event that they were depending on a sole national decision-

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110 Lamanskii writes (1884) “The Turks gradually conquered all the Venetian bases in Greece, except the ones in the Ionian islands. Thus, the increasing Ottoman power in the Mediterranean which was attained at the expense of Latin despotism was a blessing for the Greeks” Kitsikis, History of the Ottoman Empire, pp. 81-82
making center, this could mean the complete control of the whole peripheral
system of Eastern Mediterranean by this center alone. He who controls this
‘geostategic triad’ is the undisputable ruler of eastern Mediterranean and is in a
position to control the sea-traffic towards and from the Black Sea. In few words
he can control the hub of the “Median Space”

On the contrary, during the period of the DHMS, the sole indigenous political entity
is being dismantled in at least two and most of the times more smaller states that lose
their ‘ecumenical’ status and become more ‘national’, following a non-composite
way that enhances the differences instead of the similarities. Within this environment
the other major MS actors along with more self-confident West are trying to fill the
‘vacuum’ of power. This gradual infiltration could start from a simple increasing
economic activity, which later on could lead to a cultural assimilation that could also
lead even to a direct political control. Byzantine’s gradual decline from (13\textsuperscript{th} to 15\textsuperscript{th}
century) actually broke HMS’s unity. EK Seljuks penetrated into the AM’s plateau
and established a precarious border in central AM. SW is being isolated from the
HMS since it succumbs to Turanic overlords (Fatimids) only the NW especially to
northern of Danube forges further cultural and spiritual mainly bonds with the
mother-culture. Constantinople plays an important role in the nomination of Moscow
as the leading Russian power. In this period, the West uses the Crusades to invade
directly into the HMS and with the 4\textsuperscript{th} ‘Crusade’ (1204) it actually gives the fatal
blows to the ancient Empire and occupies its major European and Aegean territories.
The short-lived Byzantine revival with the liberation of Constantinople (1261) and
the reunification of the PP was not sufficient since all the ‘minimum of defense’
Borders had collapsed form all sides and PP could not be preserved for any longer.
The emerging OE which reunited the HMS reached relatively quickly the decline
level and the HMS started to disunite from inside. Throughout this period, the

\textsuperscript{111} Stamcos, G. The Geopolitics of Archipelago: The Greek Geo-Philosophy and the Challenges of
Globalization, (Thessaloniki, 2007), pp. 49-50
infiltration of the West had been increased and the next major MS power (NW) was rising, seeking to integrate its mother-culture area to its realm for both ideological and strategic reasons.

The reasons for the decline of the *ecumenic* HMS empires will be examined in later parts of this research, but, among others, they are directly linked with the concept of over-expansion.\(^{112}\) The Byzantines, by keeping the border to the Taurus for centuries, were strengthening their state. They were solidifying a basically multicultural empire under a Greek-speaking, Greek-Orthodox and Greek-culture common base. The over-expansion led them to acquire vast eastern regions of non-Orthodox (Armenian), non-Christian (Kurds, Arabs), and non-Greek-speaking populations something that had fatal results during the Seljuk penetration of AM (11\(^{th}\) century). Thus, the collapse came from the interior. The Ottomans, by using a composite Orthodox-Islamic ideology, attracted the Byzantine populations and created a Byzantine-Turkish hybrid. The balance changed when the Ottomans conquered the hard-line Sunni Islamic Arab world. The Sultans, by adopting Sunni Islam as official state ideology and cornering the composite elements that strengthen their empire, actually committed suicide since all the former-Byzantine elements with the Greek population in the forefront started to create irredentist movements directly influenced by the political and cultural ideas of the West. Both in the Byzantine and in the Ottoman case, the over-expansion and trespassing of the ‘natural’ HMS borders made them cross the line of ‘optimum of conquest’ and ‘minimum of defense’ with fatal results for both. The former through the overexpansion incorporated elements that destroyed the unity based on ‘Hellenic/Roman’ ideals the latter incorporated element that

\(^{112}\) See, Chapter 4
destroyed the unity based on the composite ‘Ottoman’ Byzantine-Turkish coexistence and cooperation. West also contributed decisively to the acceleration of the dismantlement of the HMS. In the first case, the West, through the ‘Crusades’, gave the HMS the fatal blow in the name of protecting the ‘West’ against the Islamic SW. In the second case, the West, through the ‘Great Powers’ interventions, gave the HMS the fatal blow in the name of protecting the ‘West’ against the Slavic NW. In a few words, during the Byzantine era the Western efforts/excuses to contain the Arab-Turanic Islamic threat and during the Ottoman era the Western efforts/excuses to contain the Slavic Orthodox threat resulted in the destruction of the UHMS and the creation of the puppet states of the DHMS.

This relentless NW–Western competition that was unfolded into the whole Kentron of the MS in the last two centuries could be characterized as the major reason for the development of the contemporary international architecture of the WI. Russian Slavic NW gradually emerged as the major MS power despite the fact that was in the periphery. The central MS power, OE, was not in a position to effectively contain it as the Byzantines did when the other peripheral MS power, the Arabs, were trying to emerge as the leading power in a previous era. Simultaneously, a self-confident technological advanced West was establishing its sphere of influence mainly in the coastal regions of the Kentron and the East. So, the Russian movement in the Kentron from the north along with the West movement in the Kentron from the south transformed both the EK and the WK into an enormous battlefield between the Russian land-power and the Anglo-Saxon mainly sea-power, giving also rise to the contemporary Geopolitical thinking. In this conflicting environment, two concepts, most of the time interlinked and overlapped in a rather fuzzy way, were created in
order to describe this competition. The first one was the ‘Eastern Question’ (EQ) and the second was the ‘Great Game’ (GG). Despite the ambiguousness of these expressions within the suggested, through this research, geopolitical theory, they could acquire a precise definition and meaning that might enable the researcher to use them not only as historical-relics of the ‘imperial’ past but as an analytical tool for the interpretation of the complex diachronic and contemporary realities. In a few words, the concept of the GG could be directly linked with the specific territory of the EK, while the concept of the EQ could be directly linked with the specific territory of the WK, namely the HMS.\textsuperscript{113}

The GG is something quite easy to analyze since it involves a rather contemporary development. After the unsuccessful for Russia Crimean War and its containment of dominating the HMS, Saint Petersburg turned towards the EK. The British fear of a possible Russian expansion towards the seas and most importantly towards India created a potential battlefield in the EK. This friction resulted in the complete subjugation of EK’s northern horizontal Turanian part to Russia and the direct influence of the West to the southern horizontal Aryan part. This situation more or less has been preserved even today. There are, however, various attempts on behalf of the newly independent Turanian EK states to escape from the NW tutelage mostly by cooperating with the West in energy projects. In the Aryan part of the EK, Iran constitutes the major paradigm of trying to escape from the Western tutelage. Nevertheless, NW still controls to a large extent the Turanian half, mainly through its energy policy initiatives while West still controls the Aryan half mainly through the direct military control of Afghanistan, Pakistan and its threats towards Tehran. Thus,

\textsuperscript{113} See, Appendix 9, p. 367
the GG is still in action, covers the whole EK and “consists of a number of various
games being played simultaneously at different levels within states, between states
and among firms and businesses”.114

EQ engages HMS power-politics, therefore it is a much more complicated issue.
What is the EQ? Initially, the Greek revolution (1821-1828) against the OE was
described (1822) like that by the western powers.115 Throughout the 19th century
Ottoman dismantlement and great power competition in dealing with this issue
brought to the surface many definitions about what EQ really was, focusing on the
rising of the nationalism of Christian nations, the racism against the Turanians, the
expulsion of Islam from Europe or just a matter of taking lands from a declined
state.116 Summing up, the ‘conventional’ western-version of the EQ suggests that it
started with the Treaty of Karlovitz (1699) and ended with the Treaty of Lausanne
(1923) and the destruction of the OE.117 Obviously, this approach ‘was watching the
tree but missing the forest’ since EQ was perceived under the notion that “the
integrity of the Ottoman empire was like a bank on which the Great Powers could
draw to make up the balance of their prestige”.118 But was EQ just an issue of who is
going to benefit from a decaying state like the partitions of Poland?119 Unlike any
other case, EQ was dealing with a competition about controlling “a specific
geographical space with a multiple importance in strategic, economic and even

114 Torbakov, I. ‘Turkish Foreign Policy in the Post-Soviet Space’ (23 December 2002)
[http://www.eurasianet.org]
115 See, Loukas, ‘The Geohistory of the Eastern Question and Contemporary Geopolitical
Architecture’, p. 125
116 See Macfie, The Eastern Question 1774-1923, pp. 1-4; Driault, É. The Eastern Question, (in Greek),
(Volume 1), pp. 83-85
117 Loukas, ‘The Geopolitics of Eastern Question and Greece’, p. 18
118 Macfie, The Eastern Question 1774-1923, p. 4
cultural terms”. Consequently, a second and more sophisticated analysis was developed. In the West, the EQ meant the problem of identifying and constructing the most efficient geopolitical architecture, that could be in a position to contain NW of finding exit to the HMS and its seas. In other words how could the HMS be ‘restructured’ in order to prohibit the NW and facilitate the West? For the NW, EQ meant the problem of identifying and constructing the most efficient geopolitical architecture, which would be in a position to allow NW to find the exit to the HMS and its seas. In other words, how could the HMS be ‘restructured’ in order to facilitate the NW and prohibit the West? Of course, these policies were providing scenarios with or without the OE in existence. Despite the fact that this approach sets up the EQ on a sounder and more sophisticated base, it still addresses mainly Western and NW needs, demands and aims. The EQ is being approached as an exclusive Western-NW multidimensional conflict, starting with OE’s decline. In addressing this deficiency, a third angle to interpret the EQ has been developed and operates in a twofold way. First it underlines its true diachronic, even eternal nature and second it gives a definite answer to who, that is under what geopolitical circumstances, could stand between the West and NW. Pierre Waltz, Dean in the Philosophy department of the University of Clermont-Ferrand in his *La Question d’Orient dans L’Antiquité* (1942) makes some cardinal observations on the EQ. He detects the origins of the EQ back in the Argonaut epic and the Trojan War. He

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120 Ibid., p. 129
121 Metternich states (1828) that “We look on Turkey as the last bastion standing in the way of expansion of another Power” implying Russia. Salisbury’s views (1878, 1892) represent the contradictions of the EQ. On the one hand, “sooner or later” OE’s “greater part of his European Empire must go …” on the other hand “the protection of Constantinople from Russian conquest has been the turning point of the policy of this country …”. See, Macfie, *The Eastern Question 1774-1923*, pp. 89, 112-113, 115-116
122 Tsar Alexander I (1777-1825) agreed (1804) to preserve the OE since Turkey’s “weakness and bad internal administration … constitute valuable guarantees of security”; ibid., p. 13; NW preferred a weak HMS in order to be able to control it
123 See, Tzar’s Nicholas I (1796-1855) notes on the eve (1853) of the Crimean War; ibid., pp. 104-105
acknowledges the eternal struggle between a land and a sea-power for the possession of the space in question. Most importantly, he sets the conditions for the solution of the EQ focusing mainly on the interests of the indigenous people and not on the interests of the NW or of the West. He claims that “the existence of a united Aegeis seems to be the prerequisite for any long-term and durable solution of the eastern question ... if a large empire could be reestablished on both coasts of the Aegean Archipelago [Aegeis space], it could be possible to experience in the South-Eastern Europe an era of peace and serenity”.\textsuperscript{124} Waltz, with these few lines, seems to have conceptualized the real issue, the \textit{raison d’etre} of the EQ and this is no other than the absence of a common power in both sides of the Aegean, including the Straits of course. The Trojan War was actually a north against south collision of the people of the HMS for the control of the Straits. As Graves indicates “the Question of the Straits had been raised by the foundation of the Trojan Kingdom at the door of the Propontis”.\textsuperscript{125} Greek civilization prospered when both sides were united after the war and the same power controlled both sides of the Aegean. When Persians reached the AM and the Aegean became a border again, security was lost. The Greek victory and the continuing Hellenistic age provided a new prosperity and safety in the region, since both sides of the Aegean were united.\textsuperscript{126} During the Roman and the Byzantine periods, as long as the Aegean was a connecting bridge and not a border, a barrier, the empires flourished and \textit{ecumenes} were constructed around the PP and the BSSA. The same happened with the first face of the OE. Whenever, the HMS was scattering West and NW were penetrating the region using the indigenous populations only as

\textsuperscript{124} Kitsikis, \textit{History of the Ottoman Empire}, p. 210; Kitsikis, \textit{Greek-Turkish Comparative History in the Twentieth Century}, pp. 51-52; Loukas, \textit{The Geopolitical Trilogy of Hellenism}, pp. 53-54; Loukas, ‘\textit{The Geopolitics of Eastern Question and Greece}’, p. 23; emphasis and brackets added

\textsuperscript{125} Graves, \textit{The Question of the Straits}, p. 15; in a rather poetic overture he says “Does the tale of Jason signify the first passage of the Straits by Minoan or Mycenaean explorers, and was Medea the daughter of a Caucasian king or a slave girl whose accomplishments deserved a royal pedigree?”, ibid., p. 14

\textsuperscript{126} See the whole work of Loukas, \textit{The Geopolitical Trilogy of Hellenism}
pawns. Zürher in a descriptive but illuminating manner is referring to the EQ “pattern” during the Ottoman period but his words could apply as a whole for the Byzantine period as well only by substituting the names of ‘Great Britain’, ‘France’ and ‘Russia’ with ‘Venice’, ‘Genoa’, ‘Holly Roman Empire’ and the ‘Pope’. He observes a certain “pattern” which was “basically always the same”. He explains that the “discontented communities” that during Ottoman era were mainly the Christians and during the Byzantine one were the Slavs of the Balkans “erupted into regional insurrections, caused partly by bad government and partly by the different nationalisms … One of the powers then intervened diplomatically or even militarily … this caused other major powers to intervene to re-establish ‘the balance of power’ … Usually the end result was a loss of control on the part of the … Ottoman government”.

The contemporary situation where the Aegean operates as a border between people, religions and cultures is indicative of the DHMS condition. This condition is further facilitated by the external penetration of the West and the NW. Both factors are expecting to address their interests better through the prolongation of the DHMS condition, which keeps the indigenous populations under constant friction and under an eternal search for making allies from outside. Churchill’s views (end WWI) on the Straits-Aegean axis that should act as a border/barrier is indicative, “The line of deep water separating Asia from Europe” he says “was a line of great significance, and we must take that line secure by every means within our power”.

Only a permanent division could provide the necessary excuse for intervention. In contrast, the indigenous analysis about the ‘natural’ operation of the Straits-Aegean axis reaches diametrically opposite results. “The Byzantine Empire along with the ancient Greek ecumene” Kitsikis writes “was contemplating the Aegean not as a

border but as a center … around which it was being developed”. The only case where the foreign factor would allow the HMS to operate in uniformity is only to control it completely. Nowadays, West allows the HMS to act as a unit only within the NATO framework, which perceives the Aegean as a common geo-strategic space. In the past, Russia tried through the treaty of St. Stefano (1878) to actually control the major part of the Balkans by creating a great but absolutely controllable Bulgaria something which was averted with the Berlin conference (1880). In any case, whenever the Aegean Sea is operating as a barrier, this is for the benefit of the foreign factor and whenever the external, MS or not, powers are allowing larger unifications this is done only when they are expecting to control these large formations.

The EQ interpretation within the framework of a MS-centric approach actually allows some safe conclusions to be drawn, since they will be combined with the rest of the theoretical approach. EQ is a diachronic question that deals with some geopolitical parameters and conditions of the HMS. EQ exists under the DHMS condition where the Aegean acts as a barrier. EQ does not exist under the UHMS condition where the Aegean acts as a bridge. The existence of the EQ is characterized by heavy foreign (Western, EK, NW, SW) involvement. During the EQ periods, foreign powers aim to create a unified HMS only under the condition that they will indisputably control it. In any other case, during a fierce struggle and competition between almost equal powers they prefer to ‘share’ the ‘spoils’ in a mutual beneficial way. The only solution for the EQ is to return to the status quo ante ... EQ, the indigenous population, especially the people that occupy the PP (Greeks and Turks), to become united under a UHMS. The aim in the sort-run should be to create a mutual

\[129\] Kitsikis, *History of the Ottoman Empire*, p. 80
understanding, cooperation and real alliance, in the medium-run to try to develop confederate bonds and in the long-run to be able to revitalize a really united PP and BSSA through a viable and prosper federation. This could be done only after following a complex path in every aspect of interaction between each other, from the elementary level of economic cooperation to the most sophisticated level of creating a common identity. But is this possible? Michael Herzfeld observes the artificiality of the Greek-Turkish division exactly within the framework that this research suggests. He says that “Since Europe claimed ancient Greece as its spiritual ancestor, Europe also decided what was, or what was not, acceptable as Greek culture in the modern age” so the “complementary opposite of this standard was a monolithic image of orient barbarism, for which the Turks were the most potent living symbol”. Consequently, West’s domination in the HMS is being demonstrated through its “eventual success in persuading the Greeks to adopt the Turks as their natural enemies”. This process also worked in reverse, by making Greeks the archenemies of the Turks. However, the situation is reversible. Anthropological research stresses the “relational” aspect of identity. Kirtsoglou expresses with the most eloquent way the reversibility of this situation. She asserts that acknowledging “one’s identity always in relation to Others implies that the Self is never in stasis and that its perception of the Other – be it as friend or foe or anything in between – is constantly changing”. Thus, “The unfinished, imagined, relational and performative character of national identity is what renders it a ‘hollow category’ … not empty of meaning, but ample, flexible and ever capable of incorporating new historical and political

changes”. The identity imposed by the West between the two main components of the HMS could be bridged through the appropriate multi-dimensional mutual initiatives. The ‘identity’ is something “hollow” thus ‘adaptable’ to the new ‘historical and political changes’ and as such, it could be ‘reshaped’ towards a more composite ‘architecture’.

The ‘Integrated Geopolitical/Geocultural Theory of the Median Space’ as presented in the previous pages could not be better culminated and recapitulated than by using the Mackinderian way of focusing in the essentials. Thus, paraphrasing Mackinder, it could be suggested that “When our statesmen are in conversation” with each other and especially when the owners of the PP are discussing “some airy cherub should whisper to them from time to time this saying.”

*Who rules the Heartland of the Median Space commands the Median Space:*

*Who commands the Median Space influences the World-Island:*

*Who influences the World-Island can be heard in the World.*

The following parts and chapters of this research are engaging with the textual and empirical evidence that make this newly introduced geopolitical analysis if not a ‘reality’ at least a worth-mentioning possibility of becoming a reliable explanatory model of the Eurasian IR.

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133 Mackinder, *Democratic Ideals and Reality*, p. 150
Part II:

Synthesis-Russian and Turkish Psyche/Space & the Eternal Quest for Identity

“One can see things better when one is acquainted with their origin, since the origin is a part of them and in fact the most important part”

St. Francis of Assisi

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CHAPTER THREE

Russian Psycho & the Eternal Quest for ‘Identity’

3.1 Crisis

The word “Russia” has become soiled and tattered … it is involved freely in all sorts of inappropriate contexts. Thus when monster-like USSR was lunging for chunks of Asia and Africa, the reaction the world over was: “Russia, the Russians” … What exactly is Russia? Today, now? And – more importantly – tomorrow? Who, today, considers himself part of the future Russia? And where do Russians themselves see the boundaries of their land?¹

Alexander Solzhenitsyn (1918-2008) with this small passage is demonstrating the eternal geopolitical/geocultural issue that Russian people experience in various degrees of intensity since at least the age of Peter the Great (1672-1725). During turbulent and transitional periods Russian psyche is puzzled with questions like ‘What is Russia?’ and ‘Who is a Russian? These uncertainties are actually cloaking the fundamental issue about “where do Russians themselves see the boundaries of their land?”.

During the post-Cold War period and according to Igor Chumbais the contemporary Russian state experiences a krizis (crisis) that might be described “as the deepest in the entire history of the country”.² How was this crisis brought to the surface with

² Urban, M. ‘Remythologising the Russian State’, Europe-Asia Studies, Vol. 50, No. 6 (Sept. 1998), p. 976. The observer should recall that the break up of USSR cost to the Russians one half of their territory and a quarter of their population. The actual volume of this collapse – that occurs only after the loss of a great war, could be clearly demonstrated by comparing these losses with Germany’s losses after the two World Wars. One might also argue that recent Russian casualties are worse compared to losses with the treaty of Brest-Litovsk! This analogy makes the Russian situation clearer and unfolds the severity of its situation especially during the first years after the Soviet collapse. Consequently the
such intensity? For the majority of the Russians the so-called Perestroika (New Thinking) acted as the catalyst to unfold it.\(^3\) The radical and sudden change from a ‘multicultural’/‘Soviet’ to a more ‘national’/‘Russian’ way of dealing with reality created this ‘vacuum’ of power and ‘loss’ of identity within the Russian ex-Soviet psyche. What do the Russians mean when they speak about a ‘crisis’? Boris Yeltsin (1931-2007) has underlined that “In Russia’s history ... there have been various periods ... Each epoch had its own ideology. [But] now we don’t have one. And that’s bad.”\(^4\) In short, Solzhenitsyn’s words depict exactly what Yeltsin is saying about contemporary Russia. Russians are in crisis because an old identity and space collapsed. The solution, the lysis, to this situation again is provided by Yeltsin when he urges his audience to “give Russia an idea”.\(^5\) Obviously, the whole debate for the lysis of the existing crisis depends on debating Solzhenitsyn’s question on “where do Russians themselves see the boundaries of their land?”.

Naturally, in the post-Cold War period the national identity crisis has been established as the principal issue debated within the new Russian political, strategic, intellectual and cultural circles. Within this framework there is a direct link between identity and foreign policy. Tsygankov rightfully observes that “no military doctrine or national security strategy will endure until and unless the question concerning “what Russia is without the Soviet Union and without the Russian empire” is answered.”\(^6\) Kassianova notes that “foreign policy may be studied as an identity-producing practice, and

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\(^4\) Urban, ‘Remythologising the Russian State’, p. 969

\(^5\) Ibid.

\(^6\) Tsygankov, ‘From International Institutionalism to Revolutionary Expansionism’, p. 248
identity analyzed as an essential, if not always easily operational, variable in the foreign policy process.”⁷ In short, it could be suggested that the actual foreign policy orientation depends on the choices that the Russians are going to make about their national identity. Kassianova continues her analysis by developing a convincing argumentation regarding the ongoing process of self-definition by underpinning that

Foreign policy provides a channel for engagement with the external environment, supplies evidence of the outside world’s perception and appraisal of the collectivity, and functions as an instrument for the realization of the self-image through objectives determined by interests, and as a way of testing its adequacy. In sociological terms, foreign policy works as the principal mechanism of self-identification—defining the collective self against the external environment. The process involves defining ‘us’ against ‘them’ by comparison with the chosen referent(s), differentiation and drawing boundaries. The referent thus becomes an indispensable partner and, at the same time, the ‘other’ whose difference helps clarify the distinctiveness of the identity seeking group. On the political level, the practices of differentiation and the meaning of otherness are directly associated with the mobilizing potential that can be applied to political ends: the ‘other’ can be represented as the external threat that boosts the domestic cohesion and the sense of unity. Translating these abstract considerations into the Russian context conjures up the ‘eternal’ problem of Russia’s relationship with its habitual other, the West and the issue of the nature of this constitutive interrelation in the contemporary world⁸

In other words, Russian identity and foreign policy are almost exclusively going to be determined by the Russian relationship with the ‘West’. Kassianova’s observation in conjunction with Solzhenitsyn’s fundamental geopolitical/geocultural question about “where do Russians themselves see the boundaries of their land” depicts the whole framework of the contemporary Russian ‘quest’ for identity. Is Russia Western or non-Western? If it is non-Western, then could it be Asian or Eurasian? In any case, there is an obvious issue of ‘belongingness’ that puzzles the Russian psyche and creates this crisis. The answer to this crucial question will enable Russians to ‘come back’ to the forefront of international interaction with a renewed vitality, self-respect and self-confidence. Undisputedly, the eight years of the Putin government,

⁸ Ibid., pp. 821-822
coinciding with eight years of US discursive policies in the international arena could give to the observer the impression that this transformative period is heading to an end, at least its preliminary stage. Putin’s successful internal stabilization policies and Anglo-Saxon external destabilization ones seem to offer a great ‘aid’ to Russia by actually ‘helping’ Moscow ‘choose’ its preferable geopolitical/geocultural narrative. For the time being, this seems to be definitely the non-Western revisionist one.

The following analysis aims to briefly sketch the diachronic Russian engagement with its space. The possible existence of a diachronic discernable Eurasian school within Russian society that distances itself from the West but does not fully surrenders to the East could have a positive contribution and support, in geopolitical terms, the existence of not only two but actually three great divisions on the WI. In a few words, the presence of a school that follows the ‘third way’ would actually satisfy the major premises of the introduced geopolitical/geocultural TMS and would further support it. So, does the Russian eternal ‘quest’ for identity, in an attempt to respond to the krizis, manifest the existence of a MS mentality in its gulfs or not?

3.2 Debate

Having identified the nature of the crisis that Russia faces, a brief scrutiny of the historical and contemporary framework could reveal the diachronic peculiar relation of the Russian psyche with space and its relation with the geographical milieu. A critical historical assessment might help the observer unfold the hidden causes that created the ambivalence towards the geopolitical/geocultural orientation especially in relation to the West and thus, might suggest the lysis to the Russian dilemma. So, is Russia European or Eurasian? Why is this division happening? Denys Hay wrote that
“We should remember that a geographical region is in the last resort an abstraction with a history which sometimes tell us much about the past”\(^9\) and gives signals for the future someone might add. As Bassin has correctly observed, Russia’s relation to Orient and Occident has “always been and remains at root ideologically conditioned”.\(^{10}\) However, there is an aspect hugely underestimated or even neglected and this deals exactly with the deep relation between the notions of the geographical dimension of the Russian land and its juxtaposition to the broader cultural/identity equation. The aforementioned ambivalence towards the West rests upon this relation and is the product of the juxtaposition of different views on the geopolitical/identity self-image.

i. The Eternal Debate: West or Eurasia?

The ancient Greek geographers were the first to record the discrete “territorial massifs” that were recognized as Europe, Africa and Asia. The borderlines between these geological formations were defined by huge bodies of water. The border between Europe and Africa was the Mediterranean Sea, between Africa and Asia was the river Nile. The problem was on the depiction of the borderline between Europe and Asia. The lands north of the Sea of Azov were more or less a \textit{terra incognita}. Until the Middle-Ages, due to this situation the researchers had to form an imaginary border between Europe and Asia that was demarcated and defined by the Azov – river Don line.\(^{11}\) This view changed gradually as travelers and the Russians of Moscovy state started to move towards the east. Don was not such a big river and there was no such thing as a major body of water between the territories that were named ‘Europe’

\(^{10}\) Ibid.
\(^{11}\) Ibid., p. 3
and ‘Asia’. Thus, “Europe and Asia were not in fact cleanly set off from each other by a body of water but were instead joined by a very substantial stretch of uninterrupted territory”.12

Despite these developments, the distinction between Europe and Asia continued to exist in literature rather unchallenged. Why was this happening? Bassin gives in a few sentences the whole and accurate picture. Unlike “The Europe identified and bequeathed by the Greeks was a physical-geographical region and carried no additional cultural or political overtones” during the middle-ages and the rise of Christendom for the Europeans “a sense of cultural and political exclusivity and, ultimately, superiority began to emerge. Over the ensuing centuries, this feeling gradually hardened into an inflexible conceit that held Europe to be the most civilized and best governed of all the world regions”.13 Within this framework throughout the 16th and 17th centuries different river routes were suggested in an effort to distinguish Europe from Asia.

Russia, on the other hand, seemed to be totally indifferent to this whole ideological and geographical European unrest. The Moscovy state “drew on cultural and religious roots from Byzantium and by no means saw itself as a part of Europe”.14 Indeed, the “Muscovites had little subjective openness toward Europe or sympathy for the notion of an overarching European preeminence on the world scene … the doctrine of Moscow as the Third Rome, Russians had at their disposal a fully articulated ideology of their own national exclusivity as the chosen bearers of the true

12 Ibid.
13 Ibid.
14 Ibid., p. 4
Christianity”. For them, the terms ‘Europe’ and ‘Asia’ did not hide anything else but a strictly geographical notion.

The whole situation changed during the reign of Peter the Great. Peter, having noticed mainly the technological and intellectual advancements of Europe, started underpinning the importance of being ‘European’. Thus, he establishes the new capital city of St. Petersburg (1703) based on European motives and with an exit to the Baltic Sea. He abolishes the medieval-Byzantine notion of tsarstvie (tsardom) and adopts the more ‘western’ imperia (1721). Peter tried to transform the political identity of his state and adapt it by using Western European criteria. So, the nature of his empire, its actual Eurasian geographical position, was of paramount importance to be dealt with. “Like Spain or England, the Netherlands or Portugal, on the largest scale Russia as well could be divided into two major components: on the one hand a homeland or metropolis that belonged within European civilization and, on the other, a vast, but foreign, extra-European colonial periphery”. The emerged division between ‘metropolis’ and ‘colony’ enhanced the notion of the ‘European Russia’ and of the ‘Asiatic Russian Colony/Siberia’. Where does Europe stop and where does Asia start? Throughout the 18th century there was a huge debate concerning the borderline that had to be adopted. The only fixed point was that Russia had two main distinct parts: Europe and Asia. Only after the turn of the century the Urals – Volga – Don – Azov – Black Sea line proved to be the most influential variant.

The Petrian perception was proved dominant and unchallenged up until the 1830s

15 Ibid.
16 Ibid., p. 5
18 Ibid., p. 8
when a new movement appeared in the Russian political and cultural scene. The *Slavjanofili* (Slavophiles) asserted that Russia had a unique identity and definitely their culture was not Western. Their “spiritual successors”, the Pan-Slavs, questioned any suggestion of European superiority and doubted the unchallenged affiliation of Russia with Europe. For them, Russia had a divine mission that was assigned by providence and had to be fulfilled. This mission was the future union of the Slavic nations under the Russian aegis and this task was translated as a Russian movement towards the West and the South, “to the Elbe, Vienna and Constantinople”.

Nikolai Yakovlevich Danilevskii’s (1822-1885) ideas are considered to be the seminal works about this intellectual trend. Danilevskii, especially in his *Russiia I Evropa* (1869) develops four major points. First, the presentation of Europe as the most progressive social, cultural and intellectual expression of human development is an enormous exaggeration. Second, European characteristics are full of violent, individualistic elements that push people to paths full of lust and desire for material profit and spiritual poverty. Third, Russians have every reason to despise Europeans and be satisfied by the fact that an “unbridgeable cultural and historical gulf” divides them. Four, a close reexamination of the geographical realities of the Russian terrain will demonstrate that Europe is not an independent continent but a mere peninsula of Asia, something like an Indian ‘sub-continent’. Bassin points out that the best way to demolish the ‘myth’ of European ‘uniqueness’ and ‘supremacy’ is first to

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19 It is believed that Georgii Krizanits a 17th century Russian Catholic monk first introduced this notion. See, Kulieri, O. ‘The Eurasianist Geopolitics of the Slavic Bear’, *Geopolitics*, Vol. 3 (Jan. 2000), p. 34
20 Bassin, ‘Russia between Europe and Asia’, p. 9
22 See, Bassin, M. ‘Russia between Europe and Asia’, pp. 9-10
dismantle the whole theory that promotes the physical/geographical/natural peculiarity of the European ‘continent’. This is what the anti-Western school did. They challenged the ‘legend’ by attacking its environmental/geological basis. Danilevskii’s predecessors, such as Alexander von Humboldt (1769-1859), along with other German and French scholars were the first that spoke, in the early decades of the 19th century, about a “single unified European-Asiatic continent”. The theory of plate tectonics also helped geologists and geographers adopt this stance. Consequently, Danilevskii successfully challenged the whole spectrum of boundaries between Europe and Asia, by disputing the idea that the Urals and the suggested rivers could function as a serious geological limit between Europe and Asia. Having rejected completely on a cultural, geographical and geological basis the European identity of Russia, Danilevskii had to replace it with another narration that might be more suitable for the Russian psyche. Based on the abovementioned ideas, he proposed an original path. Russia, in terms of Nature/Geography/Geology, represents a unique, self-contained domain, independent of Europe and of Asia. The landmass of the Russian state is a cohesive, unified territory. There is a unity in terms of Culture/Ethnography/History. The Russians did not ‘colonize’ Siberia, but there was a gradual settlement to these empty and vast territories throughout the centuries. In contrast, European expansion was brutal and had elements of bestiality against the populations of America, Africa and Asia. For him, the settlements beyond the Urals “do not present new [and dissociated] centers of Russian life, but rather only serve to

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23 Ibid., p. 10
24 The celebrated geo-morphologist Oskar Peschel wrote (1870) that he could “tolerate” to designate Europe as a continent only as a “courtesy”. Austrian geologist Eduard Suess introduced (1880s) the term “Eurasia” to refer to the unified European-Asiatic territorial landmass. See, ibid., p. 10
25 He said, “if the Urals separate two continents then what do the Alps, the Caucasus, or the Himalayas separate?” and “the honor of serving as a boundary between two worlds falls to the Ural River, which is a complete nonentity” see, ibid.
broaden Russia’s unified indivisible sphere”. An identical position was adopted by Vladimir I. Lamanski a prominent philologist, ethnographer and a political-geographer. In his work *Tri mira Aziiskogo-Evropeiskogo materika* (1892) that is considered to be another manifesto of Pan-Slavism, he is following Danilevskii’s line since he sees Europe as a mere peninsula of Asia, Russia as a unity and Siberia not as a colony, but as a Russian “homeland and fatherland”.

After the end of WWI the collapse of the Russian Empire and the emergence of Bolshevism, the Soviet era researchers elaborated further on the existing views and developed a different notion, the so-called *Evraziistro* (Eurasianism). This was a political and cultural movement that emerged by the émigré circles in Europe in the early 1920s. The *Evraziity* saw themselves as the inheritors of the Slavophiles and the Pan-Slavic movement of the 19th century, but they adopted a more elaborate doctrine than their predecessors. Their main issue was the opposition to Europe and they “reaffirmed the conviction that Russia’s ill-founded attempt to emulate the west and become part of it had been an elemental source of national degradation and misfortune”.

Nikolai S. Trubetskoi’s (1890-1938) tract *Evropa i chelovechestro* was the first seminal work of this school. Trubetskoi was radical concerning the relations with Europe and the western [Polish, Czechs and Slovaks] and southern [Serbs, Croats, Slovenes, and Bulgarians] Slavs. For him, the other Slavic nations were

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26 Ibid., p. 11
27 See, ibid., pp. 11-12
28 Ibid, p. 13; The main intellectual center of this movement was Paris. Petr N. Savitskii and his team were publishing the newspaper *Evraziia* (Eurasia) for a short period (November 1928-September 1929). They were supporting the view that “Soviet Union was the only promoter, however unpalatable and imperfect, of their dream of an imperial Russia straddling both Europe and Asia without fully identifying itself with either” they were trying to base their views on a blend of “reconciliation and competition with Marxism over the capacity to mobilize society for projects, highlighting the uniqueness of Russia in an even more radical fashion”. See, Tihanov, G. ‘*Seeking a Third Way for Soviet Aesthetics*: Eurasianism, Marxism, Formalism’ [http://www.columbia.edu], pp. 5, 21
29 Bassin, M. ‘*Russia between Europe and Asia*’, p. 14
assimilated by the European civilization and the West not only in cultural but also in religious matters. Consequently, he rejects the Pan-Slavic view and adopts a Russian-centric Slavophil stance. Obviously, for Trubetskoi, the exclusion of the coreligionist southern Slavs from the Eurasian vision implies that religion is not considered as a decisive unified factor. His view implies that Russia’s uniqueness has nothing to do with the hegemonic role that plays in the Slavic world and the leverage that exerts to the Greek-Orthodox Church. Consequently, by rejecting the traditional views of Pan-Slavism and Slavophilism, the author accepts the ‘retreat’ from spaces traditionally within the Russian sphere of influence. Moreover, Petr N. Savitskii, the actual founder of the Eurasianist movement (1921),\(^{30}\) has introduced a more elaborate view concerning its geographical dimensions. For him, Russia belongs neither to Europe nor to Asia. He introduced (1930s) the name “Russia-Eurasia” in order to distinguish it from the ‘Eurasian’ term that geologists or geographers might use.\(^{31}\) In one of his seminal essays he writes that “Eurasia is indivisible. And therefore there is no “European” or “Asiatic” Russia, for the lands that are usually so designated are identically Eurasian lands … the preservation of the terms European and Asiatic Russia is incompatible with the understanding of Russia…as a special and integral geographical world”.\(^{32}\) Savitskii, in general, accepts contemporaneous post-WWI Soviet Union and defends the continuity of its terrain not only based on basic geological and geographic factors but he also uses a bio-geographical line of argumentation.\(^{33}\) Eurasia is being described as a “quarto-partite” unified undivided entity consisting of four natural zones: tundra [north], followed by forest, steppe and

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\(^{30}\) Kulieri, ‘The Eurasianist Geopolitics of the Slavic Bear’, p. 36  
\(^{31}\) Bassin, M. ‘The Russian Geographical Society, the “Amur Epoch”, and the Great Siberian Expedition 1855-1863’, p. 254  
\(^{32}\) Bassin, M. ‘Russia between Europe and Asia’, p. 14  
\(^{33}\) Ibid., p. 15
Consequently, Eurasianists are actually rejecting 19th century simple Pan-Slavism and are trying to identify Russia as a part of Eurasia, not only geographically but also historically, ethnologically and socially. This movement is trying to place Russia into an autonomous cultural-historical complex that engulfs a multi-factor society of “Russian-Slavic, Finno-Ugric, Tatar-Turkic and Mongolian elements.” Bassin observes that the blending of these diverse groups is creating a “single anthropological entity from a common historical heritage – what Trubetskoi called “legacy of Ghengis Khan” – to shared patterns in the folk cultures, fat-ranging philological borrowings and influences, and ethnographic affinities.” According to Savitskii, this blend of geo-historical, geo-cultural, geo-ethnographical, geo-economic and geo-political elements should create a new discipline that he termed ‘geosofia’. The Eurasian movement initially tried to further elaborate based on its Pan-Slavic predecessors but during this process it was considerably transformed and deviated. At the end of the day, a Pan-Slavist does not have many things in common with a Evraziity. The only common ground and starting point for both groups was the belief that Russia was non-West. From that point of view, the Pan-Slavists developed a racially exclusive theory while the Eurasianists adopted a more spatial, thus, racial inclusive approach. Despite its initial activity, by the late 1920s the Eurasian

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34 Ibid.; With the incorporation of the central Asian desert zone of Turkistan the Turanic and Muslim populations are incorporated within this Eurasian unified entity as indivisible parts in geopolitical and geocultural terms
35 Ibid.
36 Ibid., pp. 15-16
37 Ibid, p. 16
38 This division directly resembles the National Socialist racial and Geopolitik-based spatial approach of the interwar Germany
movement was fragmented and according to Bassin “it did not survive the outbreak of World War II”. Today, in the post-Cold War Russia, the movement of ‘New-Eurasianism’ is emerging. Putin’s observation/warning (?) that “Russia has always been aware of its Eurasian identity” is not irrelevant. Therefore it could be argued that the anti-Western movement started as a racial exclusive approach through Slavophilism and Pan-Slavism and has been transformed to a racial and cultural inclusive idea of Eurasianism. The Eurasian trend includes the central Asiatic Turkic populations, while the Catholic Slavic populations are considered aliens. Obviously, Soviet era Eurasianism resembles directly the MS approach. Eurasian ideology includes the major territories (in example NW and the EK) that for the theory of the MS are constituent parts, while it excludes the catholic Slavic ones which are considered parts of the W. In any case, in the Russian space a continuous trend of non-Western stance could be observed since the Muscovite period that emanated from Byzantine affiliations, which has been transformed gradually to a Eurasian Median Space-like attitude.

ii. The Siberia Debate: Blessing or Menace?

If the researcher would like to further focus on this issue and find the ‘core’ debate, the question deals completely and solely with the nature of the land that lies east of the Urals. What is Siberia? This is the real question behind the whole Russian geopolitical question that was introduced by Peter the Great. If Russian psyche answer this question then it might understand what stance it should take. Consequently, the need for a further elaboration on this question dictates a deeper

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39 Ibid., p. 17
investigation on the ‘Siberian’ issue and its development from the 18th century till nowadays.

So, as it has been indicated, through this more or less artificial distinction, between ‘Europe’ and ‘Asia’, ‘Metropolis’ and ‘Colonies’, Siberia was labeled as the ‘Asia’, the ‘colony’ and was perceived as a terra incognita, a land that all kinds of images and narrations might be applied to. Bassin claims that this tabula rasa geographical notion “gave free rein to the imagination of those who undertook to speculate about the Russian east and enabled them to use it as a translucent geographical canvas for what has aptly been called the “externalization of their private vision””.41 In this sense, Siberia was “Asianized”, named as ‘Great Tarary’ and this exact creation of the non-European ‘geographical other’ allowed the Petrian ideology to reaffirm the ‘Europeanism’ of the Russian land western of the Urals. With this depiction the inhabitants of Siberia were perceived as the ‘Aztecs’ and ‘Incas’ of the Russians.42

Nevertheless, this narrative did not last. The change of attitude regarding Siberia was evident from the early-19th century. Gradually, the so-called ‘gold mine’ lost its economic significance. The remote Asiatic colony stopped providing profits for the ‘metropolis’. So, Siberia was compared (1800s) not with British Egypt and India but with the Portuguese colonies of Mozambique and Angola. Siberia represented a “relic of an earlier period of Muscovite imperialism”.43 This relic was useful only as a place for exile for people that the autocratic regime wanted to deport and vanish. So, during the first decades of the 19th century, Siberia had acquired a menacing image.44

41 Bassin, ‘Inventing Siberia’, p. 765
42 See, ibid., pp.768- 770
43 Ibid., p. 771
44 See, ibid.
now possessed the quality of a ‘brake’ to Russia’s European progress. Suddenly, the
cruel Asiatic climate, its vast emptiness, its isolation, its rivers that instead of flowing
to the south they were flowing to the dark Arctic sea and they were useless,45 along
with its eternal “intellectual stagnation” allowed authors to express views (1841) such
us “Russia would be better off … if the “ocean of snow” that was Siberia could be
replaced by a real body of water, which would at least enable convenient maritime
trade with the Far East”.46

But why was Siberia connected with the concept of exile so emotionally? The
‘Decembrists’, young officers that revolted (1825) against the accession of Emperor
Nicholas I, were exiled in Siberia for years. These young educated men were
dispatched to remote territories with the impression that their existence was about to
end. Nevertheless, in their place of exile they found out some amazing qualities of the
local societies. They focused their attention on the absence of serfdom and
aristocracy, on the established more egalitarian and more democratic way of living
along with the less strict pyramid of hierarchy.47 Amazingly enough, they found out
that the people of Siberia possessed all the necessary qualities that would enable them
to bring advancements into the Russian society. Nikolai Basargin, describing his
initial feeling on the prospect of going to exile in Siberia wrote “I had ceased to
consider myself an inhabitant of this world”, a view that changed as he was exploring
the real nature of this land and its people. After his arrival in Siberia he writes, “The
further we traveled across Siberia, the more it gained in my estimation. The common
people seemed to me to be much freer, cleverer, and even more highly educated than

45 Mackinder had not introduced then on the idea that this isolation was actually the advantage of the
Heartland since it could not be reached by the sea-powers
46 Ibid., p. 772
47 Ibid., p. 776
our Russian peasants, especially the serfs. The Siberians better understood the dignity of man and valued their rights more highly”.\(^{48}\) Now, Siberia serves as the antipode of European Russia but not as the primitive land, but as the opposition to the cruel autocracy and hierarchy of the European part of the State. In the exact way that US served as the ‘New World’ for Western Europe, Siberia served as the ‘New World’ for the Russians that were living in the ‘Old World’-European Russia.\(^{49}\) Apparently, this view changed again completely the narration regarding its potentials but it did not change its status as a ‘colony’. With a modern program Siberia might offer its ‘fruits’ to the ‘European Russia’.

The rise of nationalism allowed its adherents to question the official position on the relations of Russia with Europe. For them “it was precisely the obsession with the West and the desire to set Russia as much as possible into a European mold that was obstruction them from recognizing their own unique identity and pursuing independently their own national destiny”.\(^{50}\) Within this framework a process of introspection and self-examination was set in motion. The most tangible prove of this demand for self-awareness was the establishment of the Russian Geographical Society (1845).\(^{51}\) For the newborn society Siberian exploration becomes a messianic vision.

Who is closer to Asia than us? … Which of the European tribes preserved in itself more of the Asiatic element than the Slavs, who were the last to leave their primeval homeland? … Is it not clear that Providence preserved the population [of Asia] as if intentionally from all foreign influence, so that we [the Russians] would find it in a virgin state and therefore be more capable of, and more inclined to accept, those gifts which we will bring to it?\(^{52}\)

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\(^{48}\) Ibid.  
\(^{49}\) See, ibid., pp. 776-778  
\(^{50}\) Ibid., p. 779  
\(^{51}\) See, Bassin, ‘The Russian Geographical Society, the “Amur Epoch”, and the Great Siberian Expedition 1855-1863’, pp. 242-243  
\(^{52}\) Ibid., p. 243
So, from the 1830s there was a “revisionist historiography of Siberia written exclusively by Russians”.\(^53\) Instead of using dark images to describe a place of exile, the narration has changed. Siberia became the ‘wonderland’.\(^54\)

Alexander Herzen (1812-1870) developed a paradigm in which Siberia played the most important role in the de-Europeanization process of the Russian society. He was exiled to Siberia (1835) and at first the road to Siberia was for him “the gates of Hell”.\(^55\) Afterwards, he saw the huge social and natural potentials that Siberia had to offer in contrast to the Europeanized official model and he writes (1835) accordingly “What is Siberia? - here is a country that you do not know at all. I breathed in the icy air of the Urals: it was cold but fresh and healthy … an America sui generis, precisely for the reason that it is a land without aristocratic origins … a country in which people are renewed, closing their eyes on their entire past”.\(^56\) Herzen stressed the affiliation between the two ‘New Worlds’ Russian-East and US as opposing to the degenerated old-European one a view that strengthened and due to the Crimean War.\(^57\) Herzen agreed with claims like “after the war an entire series of reforms would present itself. After they are carried out Russia would again become sufficiently strong in order to continue its historical work in the East, but the arena of this work would have to shift from the Near to the Far East”.\(^58\) For Herzen, the Pacific Ocean was the ‘Mediterranean of the future’ and both Russia and the US had to shape and then take advantage of the potentials of the region.\(^59\) From this point and on,

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\(^{53}\) Bassin, ‘Inventing Siberia’, p. 780  
^{54}\) See, ibid., pp. 783-784  
^{55}\) Ibid., p. 784  
^{56}\) Ibid., p. 787  
^{57}\) Ibid., p. 788  
^{58}\) Bassin, ‘The Russian Geographical Society, the “Amur Epoch”, and the Great Siberian Expedition 1855-1863’, p. 244  
^{59}\) Bassin, ‘Inventing Siberia’, p. 789
Herzen started perceiving the autocratic rule of St. Petersburg as a barrier to the further development of the Russian ‘Wild West’. Thus, he expressed (1862) the vision of an independent Siberia.60

Later on, Alexander Solzhenitsyn presents in few lines a vision that encompasses ancient images, narrations and realities.

Fortunately, we have…a home, a spacious and unsullied home preserved for us by history – the Russian Northeast… The Northeast is a reminder that Russia is the Northeast of the Planet, that our ocean is the Artic, not the Indian Ocean, that we are not the Mediterranean nor the Africa and that we have no business there! These boundless expanses, senselessly left stagnant and icily barren for four centuries, await our hands, our sacrifices, our zeal and our love…[W]e should be directing our forces and urging our young people toward the Northeast – that is the far-sighted solution. Its great expanses offer us a way out of the worldwide technological crisis. They offer us plenty of room in which to correct all our idiocies in building towns, industrial enterprises, power stations and roads. Its cold and in places permanently frozen soil is still not ready for cultivation, it will require enormous inputs of energy – but the energy lies hidden in the depths of the Northeast itself, since we have not yet had the time to squander it… Only a free people with a free understanding of our national mission can resurrect these great spaces, awaken them, heal them, and beautify them with feats of engineering61

If the researcher compares these sentimental and deeply geopolitical arguments with Fyodor Dostoevskii’s (1821-1881) views (1881) that

Russia is not only in Europe, but also in Asia; therefore a Russian is not only a European, but also an Asian. Moreover, perhaps more of our hopes lie in Asia than in Europe. And perhaps in our future fate Asia will be our main escape [toward salvation: iskhod]. Asia, our Asiatic Russia, is … our sickly root, which must not only be refreshed, but entirely reanimated and molded anew!62

Then, with no hesitation it could be argued that the same problems, visions and solutions were circulated and are circulating in the Russian geopolitical/identity debate throughout the centuries. Why is this happening? P. P. Semerov explicitly

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60 See, ibid., pp. 790-792
61 Ibid., p. 794
62 Bassin, ‘The Russian Geographical Society, the “Amur Epoch”, and the Great Siberian Expedition 1855-1863’, p. 252
answers by indicating that Russia

Selected by God as an intermediary between the West and the East, having received Christianity in the capital of an Eastern empire, having spent its adolescence as a European hostage in the captivity of Asiatic tribes, and having been cast by a will of genius [Peter the Great] into the midst of European development, [Russia] has identical similarities to both Europe and Asia, and belongs equally to both parts of the world\(^63\)

Finally, as it has been aforementioned, Bassin believes that the Eurasian school by the late 1920s was fragmented and “it did not survive the outbreak of World War II”. Despite this observation, the environmental deterministic views regarding society, history geography, identity, and even fate were evident in at least some prominent members of the Marxist school. Bassin himself analyzes the work of Georgii Plekhanov (1856-1918) “the “father of the Marxist movement”\(^64\). Plekhanov’s writings were so influential that Lenin characterized them as “the very best of the international Marxist literature”.\(^65\) Plekhanov used environmental determinism in order to demonstrate the applicability of the Marxist theory to the decaying Russian empire. Was Russian society ready for a communist revolution? According to Marxist preaching, every society passes from certain stages of feudalism – capitalism – socialism – communism. Plekhanov observed that Russia is experiencing an evropeiskaia nedocheta (deficiency in Europeanness) and is not ready for a revolution. He writes that “An analysis of the geographical conditions of Russia’s historical process has led me to the conclusion that under their influence the growth of the production forces of the Russian people occurred very slowly in comparison to what we see in the nations of Western Europe”.\(^66\) He believes that the immense Russian plain - Siberia, its monotony, uniformity, vastness and its low density in

\(^{63}\) Ibid, p. 244; emphasis added  
^{66} Ibid., p. 12
population has created this backwardness. These physical qualities allowed an endless process of migration and colonization at the expense of social progress.\textsuperscript{67} On the contrary, the western milieu allowed the increase of population density and the emergence of great urban centers. This situation allowed people to develop their means of production and consequently to increase the social tensions between the classes, a development that favors the eruption of a Marxist revolution. In the near future this is not the case for the Russia. His conclusion was that the Russian evolution was “proceeding according to the same fixed laws of developments as capitalist Europe and … toward the same end.”\textsuperscript{68} This approach led him not to support the October Revolution (1917).\textsuperscript{69} Consequently, it could be suggested that the Russian geopolitical debate, even within the Soviet regime, was never actually interrupted despite the fact that geopolitics was condemned as a ‘colonial’ and ‘imperialist’ justification of ruling and intervention.

\textbf{iii. Geopolitical Debate: The Eurasian/Continental Hope}

Having established the background of the Russian geopolitical agitation, a brief presentation of the contemporary geopolitical debate is going to conclude the whole discussion on the problem of the Russian psyche. The collapse of the Marxist-Leninist approach, a dogmatic and rigid explanatory model of nearly everything, left the

\textsuperscript{67} See, ibid., 13
\textsuperscript{69} It should be interesting to note two things about Plekhanov’s ideas. First, that his views were similar to Vladimir Solov’ev’s (1853-1900) views. Solov’ev supported the idea of the existence of ‘natural’ organic states and of ‘artificial’ ‘inorganic’ ones. For Solov’ev Russia, despite its size, is a natural, in geographic terms, continuous state like all the other Western states. The only difference from the west is that while the Germanic tribes headed towards the peninsula and the coasts the Slavs headed towards the East with the result their paths to diverge. Second, despite the fact that the common trend of depicting Siberia as the west of Russia and the subsequent comparisons of US with Russia is evident for Plekhanov this was a misfortunate comparison. F. J. Turner’s (1861-1932) “frontier hypothesis” that the open space actually acted in a positive way to the American people, the same hypothesis that Herzen made for Siberia, obviously was not celebrated by Plekhanov. See, Bassin, ‘\textit{Turner, Solovév, and the “Frontier Hypothesis”}’, pp. 473-511; Bassin, ‘\textit{Politics from Nature}’, pp. 18-22. In other words, both Turner and Solov’ev with Plekhanov are using the same theoretical framework, make the same assumptions but reach different outcomes for the spaces that are dealing with
Russian society with a huge ideological and security gap that had to be filled quickly with a new explanatory model that could justify the reasons of this collapse and give a new mission for a severely injured nation. Geopolitical analysis could offer the base for the reemergence of the orientation/identity debate regarding the eternal Russian question of ‘What are we?’. Tsygankov correctly observes that a “spatial imagination” emerges in “shaping the future political and cultural boundaries in the region and it analyzes assumptions and arguments made by various geopolitical schools in post-Soviet Russia”.70

The challenges that the geopolitical narrations had to confront immediately consisted mainly of four types. Russian geopolitical approaches had to deal first with ethnically based conflicts second, with economic conflicts in the Caspian Sea concerning mainly the distribution of the energy resources along with the paths that they would follow in order to be exported, third with the political redistribution of power and arrangements in the former Soviet republics under the constraint that more than twenty million ethnic Russians were living outside the borders of the Russia and four with instability of the external borders of Commonwealth of Independent States (CIS) with the ‘far abroad’ countries.71 Moreover, there was a fifth, mostly psychological reason. According to Kerr, Russia’s sudden loss of the derzhava (super power) status “stirs deep feelings of unease mixed with chagrin and resentment. This in turn engenders an obsession of sorts with planning its reacquisition … Russia’s declining strategic fortunes produced a complex of national humiliation “which stimulated rather than constrained the elite’s ‘great power’ mentality.’” Therefore, as Kerr correctly

71 Ibid., p. 104
observes, geopolitical theory “thrives” best after a huge national defeat as the paradigm of interwar Weimar Republic indicates.\textsuperscript{72}

The major modern Russian geopolitical cogitation, like in the past, is represented by two main opposing groups, the Zapadniki (Atlantisists) and the Eurasianists. Both groups are more or less and in various levels borrowing elements in order to shape their narration from four main sources: the 20\textsuperscript{th} century Eurasianism with traces of Pan-Slavic and Pan-Asiatic views, the Teutonic approach and the Anglo-Saxon classical and critical traditions.\textsuperscript{73}

The Atlantisist group is the easiest to deal with, because it is represented by the Westernizers and is based mainly on the premises that Russia is a European state with Western culture. If Russians envisage a stable presence in the Eurasian continent, then they will secure it only through liberal economic and social system adoption and integration to Western institutions.\textsuperscript{74} The main intellectual supporter of this approach is Dimitri Trenin. According to analysts, Trenin’s line of argumentation is directly connected and shows an inclination towards Western scholars and policy makers such as Kissinger, Brzezinski, Gray and Fukuyama. The bottom line of Trenin’s geopolitical observation and suggestion is that the “West has already acquired a strong presence in Eurasia, whether Russians like it or not. While this may be a “harsh reality”, Russia would do well to try and make the best of it”.\textsuperscript{75} Russia has to reject “the much-overused notion of great power [and] any pretence to an imperial role

\textsuperscript{72} Kerr, D. ‘Mackinder and the Heartland Theory in the Post-Soviet Geopolitical Discourse’, p. 1; unpublished paper
\textsuperscript{74} See, Tsygankov, ‘Mastering Space in Eurasia’, pp. 106-107
beyond its borders”. Moreover, there are contributors to Russian geopolitical debate who base their analysis wholly on the critical geopolitical theory such as D. N. Zamyatin.77

The Eurasian approach constitutes a much more complex formation with major divisions, subdivisions and many intellectuals and political practitioners to move within its gulfs. Kerr presents a descriptive and comprehensive assessment for this school’s beliefs

The formulation of their geopolitical doctrine aspired to a single truthful interpretation of national … traditions, the name of which would be awarded to a new ideological current. They proposed that Eurasianism was a special type of culture, thinking and state policy ingrained from time immemorial in the space of the greatest Eurasian state – Russia … The Eurasianists thought of themselves as expressing a special world-view, oriented primarily on special categories. The creation of their political constructs was acquired, therefore, above all from geopolitical measurements.78

The exact complexity of the group consists of the fact that in Russia the concepts of ‘national interests’ and ‘West’ are mutually exclusive. Today an ever increasing number of Russians are developing narrations that differ from the ‘Westernized’ paradigm on various levels, since the concept of the Russian ‘national interest’ is perceived by them as “the interests of the Russian Federation as a Eurasian power”.79 Consequently, the presented scale of cooperation between Russia and the ‘West’ differs from a mild moderate collaboration to the complete disassociation between two completely different and antagonistic identities/geopolitical orientations.80

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76 Tsygankov, ‘Mastering Space in Eurasia’, p. 115
77 See Solovyev, ‘Geopolitics in Russia-Science or Vocation?’, p. 93
79 Ibid., p. 978
80 See, ibid.
Within this framework, the Eurasian school engulfs two major groups. The first group sprung from a dialectic negotiation between the Anglo-Saxon classical geopolitical concepts and various elements of the Russian Eurasian theory. Let’s call this group the ‘classical’ Eurasian group. The second major group consists of the disciples of the need to seriously revise the theoretical classical view. It is important to note that despite the critical stance of this group, it also borrows heavily from the above-mentioned theoretical schemes. It accepts them in principle but is trying to modify them. Let’s call this group the ‘critical’ Eurasian group. Furthermore, following Tsygankov’s work regarding the four major geopolitical divisions in Russia,\(^\text{81}\) the ‘Civilizationist/Isolationist Imperialism’ and ‘Expansionist/Expansionist Imperialism’ schools could be placed in the ‘classical’ Eurasian group, whereas the ‘Stabilizers’ and ‘Geo-Economic’ schools could be fitted in the ‘critical’ one. A brief overview of all four major geopolitical Eurasian-centered groupings could unfold some interesting results.\(^\text{82}\)

The ‘Civilizationist/Isolationist Imperialism’ group is associated with procommunist and neo-communist scholars and politicians and placed itself on the classical conservative political scheme. For the disciples of this group, Russia is culturally anti-Western, an empire into a latent condition that has to acquire its former Soviet borders through a gradual ‘union’ between the ex-Soviet partners. Apart from the control of the ‘Near Abroad’, the ‘Civilizationist’ group seeks nuclear and economic advanced capabilities along with closer relations with states such as China and India.\(^\text{83}\) The major exponent of this approach is Gennadii Ziuganov with his book *The

\(^{\text{81}}\) See, Tsygankov, ‘*Mastering Space in Eurasia*’, p. 106
\(^{\text{82}}\) See, Appendix 10, p. 368
\(^{\text{83}}\) See, ibid., pp. 109-110
Chapter 3  Russian Quest for ‘Identity’

Geography of Victory: Foundations of Russian Geopolitics. The spirit of this book demonstrates the idea of a self-sufficient, in political, military, economic and cultural terms, Russia “in the middle of Eurasia” which acts as an isolated ‘island’. Moreover, there is a focus on Brzezinski’s argumentation in order to unfold the actual danger of the outspoken western ambitions to rule Eurasia. Ziuganov also accepts Huntington’s ideas. By adopting the idea that the Anglo-Saxon status quo approach is in operation nowadays, Ziuganov promotes the need for a solid politico-military buildup of the continental powers of Eurasia along with the creation of close alliances with Orthodox, Asian and Muslim states. Additionally, Ziuganov tries to consolidate the notion of Communism with Orthodoxy and Eurasianism in the interior along with efforts to construct a close alliance with other Eurasian powers such as the Muslim ones, namely Iran in the exterior. The two main conclusions that could be drawn from Ziuganov’s ideas are first that Russia’s international geo-strategic position is subjected heavily to the geopolitical narration of the classical Anglo-Saxon status quo school, something which forces him to endorse the Eurasian/Continental hope option to confront Russia’s problem, and second that the caution that he approaches the issue of ‘overexpansion’ and his devotion to the ‘Russia-Eurasia’ as an isolated island vision allows analysts to characterize his ‘civilizationism’ as ‘Isolationist Imperialism’.

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84 Observe the title of Ziuganov’s book and compare it with Spykman’s ‘The Geography of Peace’. The similarity of the title predisposes any researcher about the spirit and the aims of the Russian politician
85 Ibid., p. 120
86 Tsygankov, ‘Mastering Space in Eurasia’, p. 122
88 Ibid., p. 13; This effort to consolidate the Orthodox with the Muslim world reminds to the researcher the notion of Median Space as a common ecumene of the Greek-Orthodox and Muslim world
The ‘Expansionist/Expansionist Imperialism’ school like the former one is culturally anti-Western but occupies a much more aggressive stance towards the West and especially towards the US and the UK that are perceived as the main threats for Russia. This school heavily rests on the premise that the Anglo-Saxon status quo approach is active nowadays. Consequently, the eternal expansion beyond the Near Abroad borders, through conquest or through the creation of alliances, and spheres of influence is the answer for the survival of the continental powers against the sea powers. Once more, the Eurasian/Continental hope is being adopted as the solution to the Anglo-Saxon threat. Alexander Dugin’s book *Fundamentals of Geopolitics: The Geopolitical Future of Russia* is considered to be a manifestation of the disciples of the ‘Expansionist’ point of view. In Mackinder’s terms, Dugin divides the world between sea and land-powers. These two camps are fighting an endless war without a definite outcome so far. According to his view, the current geopolitical developments towards a uni-polar and globalized world might lead the conflict to the ‘end of history’ and to the annihilation of ‘Tellurocracy’ (land-powers) by the ‘Thallasic’ (sea-powers). The ‘sacral’, ‘mystical’ element of this war is being explicitly uncovered throughout his work. He emphatically observes that this conflict is an “occult Punic war, continuing over the centuries”. So, having to face the ‘Thalassic’ powers, Russia has to be the ‘steam engine’ of the emergence of an enormous alliance between Russia, Germany, Iran and Japan. To this transcontinental block India and China are invited but only on certain conditions and circumstances.

Moreover, Dugin recognizes “affinities” between Greek-Orthodox religion and Islam

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89 Solovyev, ‘Geopolitics in Russia-Science or Vocation?’, p. 91
90 Ingram writes that “the war of continents is held to have been directed throughout history by Eurasianists and Atlanticist ‘orders’ operating within networks of covert agencies (such as the CIA and KGB) and secret societies (such as the Freemasons), professing opposing metaphysical doctrines”; Ingram, A. ‘Alexander Dugin: Geopolitics and Neo-Fascism in Post-Soviet Russia’, *Political Geography*, Vol. 20, (2001), p. 1036
It should be noted that the Expansionists define as ‘Eurasia’ the whole space between Lisbon and Vladivostok thus they promote the unification of this whole region. Through this perspective Dugin’s radical geo-strategic integration of Eurasia under the Aegis of the Russian ‘Heartland’ directly contradicts Ziuganov’s restricted expansion within the boundaries of traditional ‘Russia-Eurasia’ space. Despite this ‘revolutionary’ perception of things, as Ingram claims “the shift towards official Eurasianism has created a political context within which aspects of Dugin’s visions match elements of official policy and consensus, and in which Dugin himself has found a place”. Moreover, Kerr’s important observation that “there are indications that his [Dugin’s] geopolitics and Eurasianism have attracted the attention of the Russian president” is being justified by the facts. As Clover observes, the success of Dugin’s approach on the elites and the public allows him to celebrate by underlining the fact that

The Eurasianists transformed the contradictions between white [ultraconservative] and red on the basis of a broad civilizational project … Nobody else except the Eurasians presented such a project, which dates from the 1920s but is just as operative in the 1990s. The other tendencies – the Slavophiles, the Westerners, the left, the right, the red and white – these are all exhausted, they are for nostalgists, like collecting stamps or old cars.

‘Stabilizers’ recognize the importance of the Eurasian landmass and they seek to establish the equilibrium. Russia should maintain its super-power role, otherwise there is going to be no peace and security in the region. The great power status should be achieved through policies of politico-military balancing along with state-centered

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92 See, Kerr, ‘Mackinder and the Heartland Theory in the Post-Soviet Geopolitical Discourse’, p. 6
93 Ingram, ‘Alexander Dugin: Geopolitics and Neo-Fascism in Post-Soviet Russia’, p. 1048
94 Kerr, ‘Mackinder and the Heartland Theory in the Post-Soviet Geopolitical Discourse’, p. 4; except the aforementioned statements it should not pass unnoticed that Putin awarded and had private conversations with Solzhenitsyn some months before his death
95 Clover, ‘Dreams of the Eurasian Heartland’, p. 11
and organized economic projects. Consequently, Russia should not favor anyone in particular and should contact a multi-vector foreign policy based on its national interests. Like the other groups, the Stabilizers envisage Russia as culturally different from the West but they are not necessarily anti-Western. They can also be critical to their Soviet past and they do not accept the use of force concerning the increase of Russian leverage in the ‘Near Abroad’. Tsygankov finds the Stabilizers to be close to the ‘Geo-economic’ school and traces its origins on the reaction to the pro-Western Liberalism of Kozyrev’s era centered on Primakov’s circle. The major representative of this approach is Khamaludin Gadzhiyev and his Introduction to Geopolitics. Through his work Gadzhiyev seeks a multi-polar world system within which Russia should not merely operate as “a transportation or trade ‘bridge’ between Europe and Asia – something that is often advocated by Geoeconomists – but should bridge and pacify European and Asian civilizations, and also maintain a delicate equilibrium among a wide variety of ethnic groups.” There are many potential fields of collaboration with China, Japan and the West however, “military force, balance of power and interests, and zero sum game cannot entirely disappear from today’s agenda”. In general NATO’s expansion and the energy game in Central Asia constitute the greatest challenges that Russia has to confront. Despite the fact that his main critique rests on the validity of Makinder’s approach, as analysts observe, his analytical methodology is deeply geopolitical.

Finally, the ‘Geo-economics’ group is closely related with the former one but its emphasis is placed mainly on the economic aspect of conducting policies. Like all the

97 Ibid., p. 118
98 Ibid., pp. 118-119
99 See, ibid., pp. 119-120
100 See, Tsygankov & Tsygankov, ‘Dilemmas and Promises of Russian liberalism’, p. 66
rest, they believe that Russia has a Eurasian identity and is acting occasionally either as a bridge or as barrier with the rest of the world especially in economic terms. Their views represent a blend of geopolitical, critical and not, theory along with economic liberalism. In the interrelated world there are threats and opportunities, the main challenge for Russia is the geo-economic aspect of Eurasianism. So, development and prosperity will come through a series of national and private projects with the participation of external powers. Sergei Rogov’s views concerning Russia’s strategy building bridges with its neighbors is the most indicative Russian work that is being attributed to this school.  

101 Many authors are following this paradigm and promote the notion of geo-economics as the defining factor within a “realeconomic era” which its essence should be “a fierce economic competition and even confrontation among territorially confined units”.  

102 For them, the classical geopolitical tradition is obsolete but due to Russia’s geographical location in “the middle of the Eurasian heartland”, they promote the concept of the “geopolitics of cooperation” as the most appropriate strategy for Russia.  

104 Consequently, they envisage a Russian active collaboration with three main geo-economic actors the West, China and the Asia-Pacific. For them, Russia has an intermediate Eurasian identity because despite the dissolution of the Soviet Union, Russia remains the “largest transcontinental power with an impressive belt of neighboring countries that has an intermediate location between Europe and Asia”. Thus, they propose a system of “concentric and overlapping geoeconomic circles” with the first level including EU and China as direct neighboring geo-economic formations and the second including US and Japan.

102 Solovyev, ‘Geopolitics in Russia-Science or Vocation?’, p. 93
103 Tsygankov, ‘Mastering Space in Eurasia’, p. 115
104 See, ibid.; Solovyev, ‘Geopolitics in Russia-Science or Vocation?’, p. 93
as the distant collaborators. Therefore, Russia must develop a comprehensive Eurasian strategy of become the economic center of activity otherwise the danger for further disintegration and conflict is always present. They do not perceive any direct military threat against Russia but they accept the possibility of the exertion of “geoeconomic pressures from the largest economies outside Russia”, which might have devastating effects on its stability and integrity. The answer to these challenges should be the development of a “geopolitical code” that would foster volunteer “economic, cultural and communication integration” of the ‘Near Abroad’. This geo-economic strategy should unite Eurasia and will ameliorate the whole unstable geopolitical situation. Interestingly enough, but not surprisingly, the authors are underlining the issue of the energy routes and the pipelines as the indicative matter of Eurasian unification and Russian increasing leverage. They keep a clearly geopolitical stance and argumentation toward the creation of the energy routes and they underline the importance of the Caspian Sea basin.

3.3 Lysis

The main observation that the researcher could make from the above analysis is the leverage of the ‘Eurasian’ School in relation to the ‘Atlanticist’ one. The Russian intellectual, political and state elites are moving towards a Eurasian stance by adopting various versions of it and by trying to articulate a confident Russo-centric geopolitical speech. This view, whether it is politically correct and extreme or note, whether it is aggressive or not, seems to be highly suitable for the Russian psyche, at least under the influence of the deep crisis that has befallen on the Russian society.

105 Tsygankov, ‘Mastering Space in Eurasia’, p. 116
106 Ibid, p. 116
107 Ibid, pp. 116-117
108 Tsygankov, ‘Mastering Space in Eurasia’, p. 117; see, Appendix 11, pp. 369-370
Chapter 3  Russian Quest for ‘Identity’

The search for the new/old identity has allowed Eurasianism to reemerge and widespread “thanks in part to its all-encompassing, hybrid character” as Clover correctly observes and continuous by arguing that

In the skilled hands of its careful ideologues, Eurasianism has succeeded in reconciling the often contradictory philosophies of communism, religious orthodoxy, and nationalist fundamentalism. Eurasianism therefore manages to be imperial without being nationalist, messianic with out being overtly chauvinistic. It has become an umbrella philosophy, absorbing all that is radical in the bubbling cauldron of post-Soviet political though. Eurasianism, then, may be Russia’s fabled “third way”, a compromise between left- and right-wing extremes – and yet far from the center in its own right\(^{109}\)

Ingram shares the same view, when he characterizes Dugin’s approach as a “kind of third path to socialism”.\(^{110}\) Regardless of whether the Eurasian approach is being attributed to a socialist or a capitalist background – something which is explicitly implied through the various groups that incorporate it, the main issue depends on the fact that Eurasianism is rooted deeply in the Russian psyche. Its diachronic-historical connection with the Russian space and the Russian identity might have changed slightly due to the specific demands of each era but throughout the centuries its hard core remains intact. As Kerr convincingly concludes

Beneath the recognition of the changes that economic and technological development, particularly in Europe and Asia, have wrought on geopolitics, for Russians the concept of Eurasia remains rooted, as it has been historically, in control and defense of territory. It should in this sense be seen not only as the current means of binding the country together against the internal and external forces that may threaten its unity but also the continuing basis of Russia’s great power aspirations\(^{111}\)

In these turbulent and transforming years that a huge process of redistribution of power is taking place and Russia is searching for its diachronic psyche, the geopolitical ‘mission’ of “control and defense of [the Eurasian] territory”, has raised anxious Russian voices, such as General Leonid Ivashov’s that alarm their

\(^{109}\) Clover, ‘Dreams of the Eurasian Heartland’, p. 10
\(^{110}\) Ingram, ‘Alexander Dugin’, p. 1047
\(^{111}\) Kerr, ‘The New Eurasianism’, p. 987
compatriots through statements that

Russia is being surrounded ever more tightly by a powerful military vise [NATO] around her perimeter. Military force is being projected deep into her territory ... CIS member states continue to be drawn away from Russia into NATO’s orbit. Common Market Commissar F. Volkenstein expresses himself quite candidly: Moldova, Belarus and the Ukraine must isolate Russia from Europe. Meanwhile, NATO’s Deputy General Secretary reassures us: Russia has no cause to worry about the future entry of CIS countries into the alliance, inasmuch as this is merely the process of “expansion of democracy.”

So, the lack of understanding the Russian mentality along with the western ‘arrogance’ on various issues, from intellectual to practical, restricts most of the western scholarship in the comprehension of the actual connection of the Russian psyche with the Eurasian geopolitical space. This situation allows easy abstractions and excommunications to be made such as Clover’s rather underestimating position towards geopolitical theory and the Russian Eurasian school of thought. He asserts in a rather mock manner that “Few modern ideologies are as whimsically all-encompassing, as romantically sloppy, and as likely to start a third world war as the theory of “geopolitics”. This kind of easy excommunication and rejection of the ‘other’ intellectually and politically, would allow to General Ivashov and many others to outspokenly shout at their compatriots “Join the ranks! Our Fatherland is in danger!” This battle-cry should be taken seriously by the status quo powers, as the

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113 The actual inconvenience of the Russian scholarship about the lack of understanding, the arrogance and the actual subjectivity of the western scholarship towards to all the ‘other’s’ approaches especially the Russian ones is becoming evident if someone considers Tsygankov & Tsygankov’s words that “IR all too often reflects political, ideological, and epistemological biases of Western, particularly American civilization”. And they continue by emphasizing on the observation that “A perception has arisen throughout the world that Western IR – and Western social science in general – is nothing but a sophisticated ideology and a set of conceptual tools that serve to justify Western global hegemony. In various parts of the globe West-centered world-order studies have often been perceived as unable to promote a just and stable international system because of their exclusively Western orientations and a lack of emphatic understanding of other cultures. Some scholars have argued that rather than promoting the dialogue necessary for finding an appropriate international system, these projects contribute to further isolationism and hostility among international actors” Tsygankov & Tsygankov ‘New Directions in Russian International Studies’, pp. 2-3 Obviously this stance directly reminiscent the analysis on the Anglo-Saxon status quo approach in Chapter 1 of this research
114 Clover, ‘Dreams of the Eurasian Heartland’, p. 9
115 Ivashov, ‘Who’s Noticing the NATO Danger?’
last crisis in Caucasus (August 2008) has also demonstrated, because it is being escorted by a much more deep-rooted belief that

Historically, the Russian people have taken up their burden, evinced by the fact that ‘in the struggle for the liberation of humanity from social and national oppression in the twentieth century, Russia has lost about 100 million of its citizens’. And with that image of the hero-victim before society, it would follow that ‘to be a Russian today means to feel with your heart, confessing with word and deed your participation in the deep culture of the Fatherland with an unquenchable thirst for righteousness and a readiness to willingly be a victim, [to display] that which over the course of long centuries has helped Russia to stand, surprising the world with its greatness, heroism and longsuffering’.

This Eurasian strong trend within Russian space is directly connected with the introduced Eurasian/Continental Hope or Anglo-Saxon/Insular Fear since it actually adopts this approach as the only solution to the problem of security. In any case, Russia demonstrates, in geopolitical/geocultural terms, a strong diachronic sentiment towards Eurasianism following the basic premises that have been introduced with the ‘Integrated Geopolitical/Geocultural Theory of the Median Space’.

116 Urban, Remythologising the Russian State’, p. 980
CHAPTER FOUR

Turkish Psyche & the Eternal Quest for ‘Identity’

4.1 Crisis

… the fracturing of the state ideology of Kemalism and the assertion of other identities and social cleavages herald the rise of participatory politics and illiberal ideologies based not on the broad center-periphery model but on the multiple ethnic, religious and ideological divisions of Turkish society.¹

Is Kemalism collapsing? This ideological stance that emerged during an era that extreme ideologies, such as communism, national-socialism and fascism were being developed in post-WWI Europe is still applicable. Any other offspring of the first decades of the 20th century has retreated from the frontline of human drama and has taken its place in the history books. Kemalism has demonstrated so far an amazing ability to adapt in the circumstances and has survived the changes of the past 80 years. This year (2008) is the 100th anniversary of the Young Turk (YT) revolution (1908) in a decaying OE. It could be argued that Kemalism, being a direct continuation of the YT ideology, has survived for at least 100 years. Kemal Atatürk aimed to create a proper western nation-state from an ecumenic empire based on the Hellenistic, Roman and Byzantine paradigm of the HMS. Unfortunately for the elites of Ankara, the Turkish-Sunni ‘narration’ upon which they based their ‘project’ is not satisfactory for the various national and religious groups of AM. One century after the political initiation of this process the parts seem not to fit together and the whole structure is

shaken. Zürcher’s observation that “the efforts to build a new national identity must now be regarded as having failed”\textsuperscript{2} is indicative of the situation.

The national-social increasing unrest of the last decades is accurately presented by a simple perusal on the recent electoral preferences. The results show that the cleavages are based not on ‘functional’ - right-left oppositions like in the ‘mature’ European states, which have reached a certain level of national cohesion, but on ‘territorial’ oppositions. Three well-defined huge regions could be observed. In the developed western AM the ‘systemic’-‘functional’ Kemalist, parties are dominating the scene. In the less developed central AM the ‘anti-systemic’-‘territorial’ Sunni-Islamist and ultra-nationalist parties are winning, whereas in the southeastern underdeveloped AM the Kurdish organizations are dominant.\textsuperscript{3} This fact indicates two important parameters of contemporary Turkey. First, “Turkey’s social and economic upheaval has begun to bear political fruit”.\textsuperscript{4} This ‘political fruit’ represents “definitive cleavages between ethnic and religious identities correspond with divisions between areas of relative prosperity and relative poverty as a result of historical conditions”.\textsuperscript{5} Second, the actual nature of the aforementioned cleavages facilitates the ‘anti-systemic’ parties that are anti-Kemalist, anti-‘each other’ and generally they are creating many ‘mutual exclusive’ peripheries, such us the Sunni, the Alevi, the Kurdish, the Turkish. This development suggests an “increasing polarization” which “appears to be a symptom of the demise of Kemalism as a locus of identity and state ideology”.\textsuperscript{6} So, the Kemalist western-nationalist paradigm has been fatally harmed and alternative, more

\textsuperscript{2} Zürcher, Turkey, p. 320


\textsuperscript{4} Secor, ‘Ideologies in Crisis’, p. 557

\textsuperscript{5} West, ‘Regional Cleavages in Turkish Politics’, p. 521

\textsuperscript{6} Secor, ‘Ideologies in Crisis’, pp. 558-559
Asian-centric and/or non-Turkish identities are emerging in the ‘Turkish’ psyche and space.

During the last two hundred years the Sunni-oriented Ottomanism and its offspring (Pan) Turkism and Turanism are battling each other and against (Pan) Islamism, Alevism and the Kurds. The differences that arose from this “battle” of identities, as Berkes notes back in 1964, “represented a comprehensive account of the accumulated problems of the Turkish transformation. Allowing for the differences of time and space, several of the questions raised, together with the attitude taken, are still current in our time in Turkey”. OE appeared, emerged and flourished in the core-region of the BE that is the HMS, due to its composite, heterodox Eurasian
identity that adopted consciously and/or unconsciously. For the first time after the 11th century, HMS was united under one indigenous power. This was achieved due to the cooperation of the two main elements of the HMS, the Byzantine Greek-speaking and Greek-Orthodox populations and the converted to heterodox IslamoGreek-Orthodox ‘sect’ Greek or Turkish-speaking populations of southern Balkans and western AM. Thus, Ottoman geopolitical/geocultural orientation was in full conformity with the space that it occupied. Lowry confidingly observes

...the Ottoman state came of age in the Balkans and only really began to turn its attention fully… to eastern Anatolia and the heartlands of the Islamic world in the sixteenth century. From the early 1350s forward, the primary Ottoman focus was Balkan oriented and it is in that steady westward movement that we must begin searching for the institutional origins underpinning Ottoman success prior to the point in time at which they began to be obscured by a classical Islamic veneer … the Ottoman polity in its formative centuries was nurtured and grew in the late-Roman, Byzantine Christian milieu of the Balkans…

A simple examination of the empire’s borders at the beginning of the 16th century uncovers the fact that it occupies almost the same territory that the BE of the 7th to 9th century encompassed, that is the Balkans and the western and central AM along the imaginable geographical but existent ‘cultural’ Trebizond-Sevasteia-Kaesaria-Adana (TSKA) line. During the Byzantine era, this border separated the Greek-speaking Greek-Orthodox populations from the Paulican Armenian and Kurdish populations and served as a relatively stable borderline between Byzantium and Arab Islam for almost 3 centuries. For the heterodox IslamoGreek-Orthodox early Ottomans it served as a border with Iranian Shiism and Arab Sunnism too. The Eurasian balance collapses with the Ottoman ‘over-expansion’ (16th century) outside its cultural-political milieu, exactly like the Byzantine case (11th century). From then on, OE experiences a substantial change in its composition, is being Islamized and gradually shapes a non-synthetic framework within which its subjects are feeling oppressed and

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13 Lowry, W., H. The Nature of the Early Ottoman State (New York, 2003), p. 96
14 Nowadays this ‘line’ ‘divides’ Turkish Republic (TR) in ‘Turkish’ and ‘Kurdish’ territory
react. Facing this gradual collapse, the Ottoman elite found the remedy in ‘westernization’, that is the creation of a ‘pure’ nation-state and the subjugation of religion to it. This process opens ‘Pandora’s box’ and all the centrifugal forces are accelerating. The Ottoman elite is being ‘Europeanized’ through the adoption of a ‘nation-state’ (Turkish-Sunni) identity, the Muslim religious elements are opposed to the rise of nationalism and ‘Europeanism’ since they lose their prerogatives, the non-‘Turkish’ and not-Muslim elements such as the Kurds and the Alevi, not to mention the Christian subjects, are developing a militant irredentism something, which further facilitates the emergence of ultra-nationalist pan-Turkish and Turanic visions, especially after the loss of the European provinces. Today, as Berkes notes, all these problems are present and pressing. The Kurds are combating the Turkish state in southeastern Turkey and have acquired a national hearth in Northern Iraq, something which gives them hopes for the creation of an independent state in the near future. The Alevi, for the first time in history, are organizing political struggles and urgently demand the secularization of the Turkish state. Their actual number, at least 20 million people, does not leave the Turkish state any chance to ignore them. At the same time, the Islamists are gaining power and they are trying to establish a religious-based state, something that suppresses the Alevi and makes them react more against the state. Finally, the Kemalists are trying to exterminate the anti-secular forces since they believe that the Islamic ‘waves’ threaten the existence of the secular-nationalist ruling elite. This situation has been characterized by the Turks as “current ideological tensions”15 but in reality it is not a “tension” but a “tsunami” that shakes the foundations of TR. Kemalism is collapsing and the various powers are going to compete once more for the domination in the AM.

So far, most of these forces do not seem to understand that their exclusive cultural-religious attitudes contribute to the decline, while only the composite Eurasian architectures allow the HMS to be united, enabling the indigenous populations to prosper and live peacefully and safely. One look at the Byzantine and early Ottoman state could be didactic. The following analysis attempts to expose the reasons of this diachronic crisis and to suggest the lysis to the Turkish problem through the simple realization and acceptance of the actual nature of the inhabitants of the HMS. The Eurasian identity was, is and will be a part of their psyche and the only thing that has to be done is to rise to the surface once more.

4.2 Debate

i. On the ‘Nature/Identity’ of the Byzantine State

an understanding of Ottoman society is hardly possible without a previous knowledge of medieval Byzantium. Mehmed Fuad Köprülü (1890-1966) wrote that, “in the era of the initial Seljuk invasion, Anatolia was not heavily populated” and he continued by arguing that a vast Turkish immigration in the AM operated as the leading force for the “spreading of urban life in Anatolia”. Thus, the main purpose of the Turkish expansion in the AM and the first ‘steps’ in the European provinces of the BE was to occupy the empty spaces. Köprülü’s Asian-centric “vision was hailed and continues to serve as a building block of Turkish national historiography”. But was the case so simple and is the Turkish scholar right when he implied that Turco-Mongol elements simply

18 See Köprülü, The Origins of the Ottoman Empire, pp. 207-208, 252-258; Köprülü, F., M. The Seljuks of Anatolia: Their History and Culture According to Local Muslim Sources (Salt Lake City, 1992), pp. 5-7, 23-24
19 Kafadar, Between Two Worlds, p. 10
infused a gap in a territory bigger than contemporary France? If he is right, then the
nature of the Ottoman and in extension modern Turkish state does not demand further
investigation and the Turkish identity should not be a field of scrutiny. But what if he
is not…

The researcher, in order to proceed further on, has to correctly evaluate Jone’s
convincing denotation that it would “seem unwise to seek to explain the changes
affecting a particular society solely with reference to the processes occurring within
its boundaries.” The researcher has “to appreciate the interaction and conflicts that
existed between societies … and the crucial role that they may have played in
instigating changes in methods of governance and in the nature of group identities”.²⁰
Consequently, “only by a closer cooperation between Byzantinists and Ottomanists
are we ever going to be able to approach the “realities” of the late Byzantine and early
Ottoman history”.²¹

So, what was the actual situation that the first Turkish elements, Turkmen nomads and
Seljuks, found during their infiltration into the AM? In other words, what were the
cultural, political and societal conditions in the 11th century BE? Cahen in a seminal
work points out that “Asia Minor in the middle of the eleventh century must still have
been, apart from some points of detail, the highly urbanized, cultivated and
Hellenized Asia Minor of Roman times.”²² This opinion has been supported by many
researchers, but it has been decisively strengthened by the most influential work of

²⁰ Jones, R. ‘Changing geographies of governance and group identities in the Middle Ages: The Role of
²¹ Lowry, W., H., Jr. ‘The Role of Byzantine Provincial Officials Following the Ottoman Conquest of
Their Lands’, in Lowry, W., H., Jr. (ed) Analecta Isisiana IV: Studies in Defterology: Ottoman Society
in the Fifteenth and Sixteenth Centuries (Istanbul, 1992), p. 130
²² Cahen, C. Pre-Ottoman Turkey: A General Survey of the Material and Spiritual Culture and History
c. 1071-1330 (New York 1968), p. 64
Speros Vryonis Jr., eminent Byzantinist Professor in the University of California, through a series of books and articles that have placed the whole debate on a new sound basis.23

Actually, the 11th century BE reached its apogee in political, military, economic and cultural terms.24 Thus, within this general framework, on the eve of the Turkish invasions, AM was neither depopulated and empty nor economically underdeveloped. Furthermore, there was not any lack of religious, cultural and ethnic cohesion for the vast majority of the inhabitants. On the contrary, during these centuries and since Byzantium lost Palestine, Syria, Egypt and North Africa by the Arabs, Italy by the Germanic people and northern Balkans by Slavs and Bulgarians, the AM acted as the ‘reservoir’ that provided the Byzantines with the necessary space, manpower and resources to enable them to face the challenges and construct a much more concrete and durable state during the hard 7th to 9th centuries.25 The internal and external developments during these two centuries enabled the Byzantines to reorganize the state and redefine their ideological, societal and cultural ramparts, something which in turn, enabled them during the following centuries - from the 9th to the 11th, to experience an era of profound economic prosperity, illustrious military victories, notable intellectual development and unprecedented ethnic and religious unity, compared to the rest medieval states of course. In short, the administrative reformations such the system of pronoia (prevision) allowed for the formation of a

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24 For a detailed overview of the BE vita see some of the suggested works in the bibliography.

“new peasant” and “national army” since the state distributed land to the farmers in exchange of military service. In demographic terms, the actual numeric estimates suggest that AM was the most heavily populated region in Europe, something which is supported by the evidence of the dense populated cities and the advanced commercial network. Moreover, the ecclesiastical archives are quite eloquent regarding the number of the metropolitans and the bishoprics. In this environment, economic prosperity was unprecedented as the “dollar of the Middle Ages”, the Byzantine solidus, was not depreciated for seven centuries, from the 4th till the 11th, and was used as a medium for exchange from Egypt to China. Furthermore, in ethnographic terms, some facts are very difficult to be denied: “the dominant language of western, central and eastern Anatolia to the Cappadocia was Greek, and the dominant religion was that of the Greek or Byzantine church”. Following Vryonis’s remarks AM on the eve of the Seljuk incursions constituted the most heavily populated, important, and vital province of Medieval Hellenism, a province continuously subject to the integrating power of church, state, and culture emanating from the heart of the empire, Constantinople. The culture of Anatolia, however, reflected the disparate elements that had been submerged under the appearances of Hellenism and Orthodoxy … In religion, heresy remained a very vital fact in the life of the Byzantine Anatolians, as indeed of the Seljuk and Ottoman inhabitants, so that Anatolia exhibited a split religious personality – Orthodox and Heterodox. It has been asserted that this cultural variety deprived Anatolia of the social and cultural bonds of cohesion and predisposed the province to an easy conquest at the hands of the Turks. This is an inaccurate view, for all historical societies have been characterized by varying degrees of cultural variation, and the crucial question is rather the degree. One should note that though Syria, Egypt, and North Africa fell quickly before the Arabs, and the northern Balkans before the Slavs, central and western Anatolia resisted the Arabs for 400 years. The Turkish conquest, settlement and absorption of the peninsula required another four

26 See, ibid., pp. 72
30 Vryonis, The Decline of Medieval Hellenism in Asia Minor, p. 42
Undoubtedly, the major reason for the Byzantine collapse at the end of the 11th century in AM was not the absence of the Greek-Byzantine element but it was mostly of an internal nature. The constant civil strife between a bureaucratic center and a military periphery brought the Empire to its knees. In addition, the over-expansion in the east, beyond the imaginary border that follows the TSKA line, towards non-Greek-speaking non-Greek-Orthodox populations with the resulting dissolving effects during the time of the Seljuk invasions was the second major reason.

ii. On the ‘Nature/Identity’ of the Early Ottoman State

Moving towards the Ottoman side, the diachronic debate on the nature of this empire is definitely not exhausted with Köprülü’s Asian-centric views. All the major works are seriously taking into consideration the aforementioned facts on the political, cultural, economic and social conditions of the Byzantine AM and Balkans. At what extent one will adopt these views as an explanatory factor about the rise of the Ottoman power, varies from considering them as the most decisive factor to an important but not the major one. Despite the variations, most of the researchers adopt the composite view of the early Ottoman state. They believe that the Ottoman state was actually a Byzantine-Turkish ‘enterprise’ and that it had nothing to do with the exclusive Asiatic connotations that the majority of the people equate hearing the

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31 Ibid., p. 68
33 A leading Turkish intellectual points that Köprülü “was committed to an essentialist notion of nationhood … [his] ideas, if indeed considered, were relegated to the status of the best-possible account of a nationalistic historiography”. Kafadar, Between Two Worlds, pp. 40-41
name ‘Ottoman’. Actually, the nature of the early OE, a period that has been labeled as its ‘Classical Age’ (1300-1600), is an outcome of this dialectic relation between, the ‘Byzantine’ and the ‘Turkish’ which created a hybrid, the ‘Ottoman’. This vibrant composition allowed the early Ottoman state to flourish and the HMS to be united again and become the dominant Eurasian power.

The Byzantine chronicler Theodore Spandunes testifies an amazing passage that should be taken as the starting point for any serious research on the late Byzantine and early Ottoman history and identity. He says that,

In the time of Michael Paleologo, the first of his house to reign as Emperor in Constantinople, there were four lords of the Turks in the vicinity. One was called ‘Michauli’, the second was Turachan, the third Evrenes, the fourth Ottomano. Each was no more than a petty chieftain. They knew that the Emperor Michael had left their frontier. But as they were, they were too divided and scattered to attack their enemies as was their wont; rather they thought of defending themselves. They saw that power of the Christians was too great for them to resist it singly, and they soon decided to look not to their own self-interest but to their common good; and they did something generous and memorable – something which the Christian princes of the time could not bring themselves to do for the promotion of their faith. One day they assembled together to elect one lord from among them. Each of those present had his own say but all agreed that none could match Ottomano in authority, courage and strength of character. They found it hard to decide, for by common consent they would rather have had a brother than a sovereign lord. But they elected Ottomano as such; and he became the first Emperor …

Surprisingly enough, recent research reveals the fact that two of these “chieftains”, Michauli and Evrenes (might be two persons having the same name though) were Byzantine local war-lords, Turachan, of Turkish-origin, was a much later addition to the ruling elite.

34 See, Appendix 12, pp. 371-372
35 A Byzantine origin offspring of the imperial families of Kantakouzenos and Palaeologos
36 Michael VIII Palaeologos (reign 1259-1282), founder of the last dynasty of Palaeologos (1259-1453)
37 North-western AM, Bithynian Theme (province)
38 He liberated Constantinople from the ‘Crusaders’ (1261)
39 After the collapse of Constantinople and of the Byzantine mainland (area of contemporary Greece), the Byzantines were scattered in three states (Nicaea, Trebizond, Epirus). Epirus and Nicaea antagonizing each other for the domination of Constantinople and were fighting the ‘Westerners/Latins’ in order to liberate the Byzantine lands.
and was not among the founders, whereas *Ottomano* was a person of obscure roots, perhaps of Turkish origins or perhaps not.\(^{41}\) Therefore, the early Ottoman state is a corporate venture of a heterogeneous in cultural, religious and racial terms, grouping of “chieftains”, who, due to reasons of self-interest and security, combined their forces and created a hybrid state which, in a relatively short time was transformed into an empire. But could this, on the first sight, highly debatable assertion be theoretically justified with modern science? Could these highly heterogeneous Byzantine sedentary and Turkish nomadic elements, with no blood ties, create an ‘enterprise’ in a meaningful manner for the contemporary researcher? The answer to this crucial question is affirmative. According to Lindner, modern anthropological studies of tribes and their sociopolitical formations underpin the repetition of this pattern and reject the assumption that “a tribe is a patrilinear descent group, a clan whose members all share blood ties … Neither actual nomadic tribes nor clans admit of such a neat definition”. On the contrary, modern theory asserts that except for the notion of kinship, in the ‘tribe’ “the reality is harsher, and ability or shared interests count for as much as blood … membership is actually the result of a political choice to follow … the leadership of a particular chief in response to external pressures”.\(^{42}\) Therefore, “the tribe was a useful device for pulling together such seemingly disparate groups as Turkish pastoralists and Byzantine settlers … field studies show that tribal, clan … membership are more open than tribal idiom or ideology might indicate” because the “tribe, was a useful political institution. Kinship … neither


\(^{42}\) Lindner, *Nomads and Ottomans in Medieval Anatolia*, pp. 8-9
necessarily nor sufficiently defined it”. Thus, “While external dangers may promote
the rise of a chief … membership in the tribe allows groups from varied backgrounds
to live in close proximity and curry on their independent affairs in peace, and some
Byzantines found this a means of survival and success in Bithynia”.43

This composite nature at the top of the pyramid is exactly what enabled the state to
emerge successfully and create a huge dialectic space where the cultures of Europe
and Asia were fused together to create of a solid multicultural base structured on the
Greek-Roman foundations of the (Eastern) Roman Empire. The high level of
inclusiveness of the early Ottoman state could be indicated by pinpointing briefly
some aspects of the religious dialectic position as well as by presenting some
parameters of the institutional composition that was achieved in the gulfs of this
hybrid formation.

First the notion of ghazi and ghaza, the raison d’ etre of attack and expansion for the
Ottomans, did not have the meaning of jihad (Holy War), as it is widely believed.
According to modern and Byzantine sources, it means akin (raid) with the implication
that there was a close cooperation between Greek-Orthodox and Muslim elements for
the emergence of the Ottoman state; therefore, it was not a simple Muslim attack
against the ‘infidels’.44 So, since ghaza, does not mean the extermination of the
‘infidels’ but it actually means the joint Byzantine-Turkish raids on Byzantine ground
for booty, what was the fate of the subjugated populations? The ecclesiastic sources

43 Ibid., pp. 33-34
44 See, Lowry, The Nature of the Early Ottoman State, pp. 45-54; Ducas, M. (trans. & ed. by Grecu, V.)
Historia Turcobyzantina: 1341-1462 (In Greek with Rumanian translation) (Academiae Rei publicae
Popularis Romanicae, 1958), p. 177; Spandounes, On the Origin of the Ottoman Emperors , p. 125;
Akropolites, G. (trans. in modern Greek & ed. by Speropoulos, E., S.) Chroniki Seggraphe (in Greek)
(Thessaloniki, 2004), pp. 401-407
of that era indicate a huge stream of mostly voluntary conversion. This devastating wave of conversion made Gibbons successfully observe that the Ottomans formed their “nation out of the elements on the ground. These were mostly Greek” thus a “new race was born and the new nation formed”. Of course, the next question is what was exactly the dogma to which the Byzantine population was converted so easily? Lowry has defined this religion as “an “Islamochristian” synthesis” and Hasluck in his ground-breaking work characterized it as a “Shia Mohammedanism, and … Christian [religion], the whole having a substratum of pagan animistic elements, many of which might be found in slightly changed form among professedly orthodox Turks or oriental Christians”. Having in mind all of the abovementioned, the latitudinarian attitude of almost all the Sultans of this early era is becoming understandable.

According to Ottoman chroniclers, there were four main ‘tools’ that during the formative period of the OE converted the population to the “Islamochristian” doctrine and contributed decisively to the cultural transformation of the Byzantine identity to the Ottoman one. These institutions were the Ghaziyan-i Rum, the Abdalan-i Rum, the Akhiyan-i Rum and the Bajiyan-i Rum. The first deals with the aforementioned act of ghaza. The second deals with the Dervish, Sufi brotherhoods, mostly the Bektaşîs

45 Gibbons, The Foundation of the Ottoman Empire, p. 63
46 Lowry, The Nature of the Early Ottoman State, pp. 137-138
48 See, Lowry, The Nature of the Early Ottoman State, pp. 136-137; Gibbons, The Foundation of the Ottoman Empire, pp. 248-259; see, Appendix 14, pp. 374-376
49 Vryonis, The Decline of Medieval Hellenism in Asia Minor, p. 363
and the Mevlevîs that were institutionalized in the OE and their existence spans until nowadays. Starting with the first one, “Bektaşî-ism was a sect with beliefs composed of various elements of popular religion and drawn from multiple sources, from shamanism to the religious beliefs of the Balkan people”.\footnote{Inalcik, \textit{The Ottoman Empire}, p. 197} Despite the ‘usurpation’ of the name of Hacci Bektaş (d. 1337-8), the roots of the order can be traced on the Hurufî order and on the teaching of Balîm Sultan, an offspring of a Bektaşi and a Greek woman, who is known as the second founder of this order and who also introduced some new practices.\footnote{See, Vryonis, \textit{The Decline of Medieval Hellenism in Asia Minor}, pp. 229, 370-371} The Hurufî order “	extit{can virtually be regarded as a new religion}”\footnote{Imber, ‘\textit{The Wandering Dervishes},’ pp. 137-138} that would unite all three monotheistic credos and “spread first among guild members … in the Ottoman towns … where Christians and Muslims lived and worked together”.\footnote{İnalcik, \textit{The Ottoman Empire}, p. 197} Husluck is considering this order as a reformist trend of the aforementioned Islamochristian Bedreddînlüs and Kizilbaş\footnote{Hasluck, Christianity and Islam under the Sultans, p. 163}, whereas Vryonis underpins its resemblance with the Greek-Orthodox rituals.\footnote{Vryonis, \textit{The Decline of Medieval Hellenism in Asia Minor}, pp. 371-372} In İnalcik’s words, “Bektaşî-ism was a major factor in spreading Islam among the native Christian populations”\footnote{İnalcik, \textit{The Ottoman Empire}, p. 197; see, Appendix 15, pp. 377-378} both in AM and in the Balkans. The second important order is the Mevlevî. Its patron saint was Maulânâ Jalâl al-Dîn Rûmî (1207-1273) “one of the world’s greatest mystical writers”.\footnote{İbíd., p. 200} Rûmî’s preaching and the Mevlevî that were formally institutionalized after his death, were of purely heterodox nature and more or less approached the Bektaşi doctrine, especially regarding the demonstration of an attitude “humane and tolerant towards Christians and regard all religions reconcilable on a philosophic basis”.\footnote{Hasluck, Christianity and Islam under the Sultans, p. 371} Rûmî’s views on his ‘mission’ in AM becomes evident
through his own pen since he believes that its inhabitants are “ignorant of mystical love … we may transform them alchemically and they will become confidants of the world of gnosis … You [God] … lead me to the land of the Greeks so that I might mingle with them and lead them to the good doctrine”. 59 Around 18,000 Christians were converted only by him. 60 Thus, Ludolph von Suchem’s observation (mid-14th century) that the “Turks as a people were in part Christian renegades” is fully justified. 61

The third major institution, *Akhiyan-i Rum*, was depicting the function of the urban semi-guild, semi-military brotherhoods under the chivalrous ideology of *futuwwa* (“young man” in Arabic). 62 Recent research indicates that these ‘associations of young men’, also referred to *Ahîs*, were connected with the spread within guilds of the *Mevlevî* religion. 63 Furthermore, *Ahîs* were originated on the *veavîau* (young men) associations, which “were the members of the Byzantine circus functions … signifying young men … who indulged in rioting and who also functioned as urban militiamen” 64 and since they flourished between the artisan-urban environments they were including mainly Greek and Armenian elements. 65 Osman, the founder of the Ottoman state, is characterized in some sources as an *Ahî* leader, surrounded “with “fast young men” who evidently belonged to these groups”. The importance of this

59 Vryonis, The Decline of Medieval Hellenism in Asia Minor, p. 386
60 Ibid., pp. 386-390; see, Appendix 16, p. 379
61 Ibid., p. 394
62 See ibid., pp. 394-400
63 Köprülü, The Origins of the Ottoman Empire, pp. 220-230
65 See, Vryonis, The Decline of Medieval Hellenism in Asia Minor, pp. 182-183, 238, 401
possibility is explicitly displayed through Langer & Blake’s words, when they observe that “if Osman was an Akhi leader … it helps to explain not only the Ottoman push to the cities of the Bithynian lowlands, but also the remarkable ability shown from the Ottomans by the very beginning in matters of state organization”. Moreover, the authors quite intuitively suggest that “The “fast young men” in Osman’s following, whether they were Akhi or members of some kindred organization, may well have been the forerunners of the Janissaries … [which] were modelled on the legions of the Byzantine Empire”.

This remark gives the proper footboard for furthering the analysis into the next step and describing one of the major Ottoman institutions that is directly influenced by the synthetic nature of the Ottoman elite and population, by the two major ‘Islamochristian’ tarîkat (orders) and by the latitudinarian Ahî associations. This is a brief analysis of the famous Yeniçeri. The precedents of the Yeniçeri units could be found in the Seljuk state and the practice of using, in the military and the administrative sector, slaves and prisoners of war, the Gulams (young foreigners). The origins of the name along with the exact period of the creation of the Yeniçeri units and the introduction of the devşirme (gathering) practice confuse the researchers. Contemporary studies demonstrate that the devşirme is a practice dating back to the 14th century, that it was ‘introduced’ by a renegade Byzantine-rooted

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66 Langer & Blake ‘The Rise of the Ottoman Turks and Its Historical Background’, pp. 503-504; brackets added
ghazi lord (*Evrenos*) as a practice for his personal benefit and later it was adopted by the Sultan. Therefore, Byzantine ‘elements’ have greatly ‘contributed’, either as victimizers or as victims, to the emergence and success of the Ottoman state from the beginning. The young recruits, aged between 10 to 20 years old, had a complete idea of their origin and were exclusively of the Greek-Orthodox dogma. They were gathered from both AM and the Balkans and were trained to serve the Sultan under the banners of the Sufi brotherhoods. Their future status created envy among the Muslim populations, and there were cases that even Greek-Orthodox parents were pushing their children to be enlisted. However, most of the Greek-Orthodox populations considered this practice as an act of genocide against them and opposed to it. Therefore, it could be asserted that for the *Yeniçeri* corps their legitimacy and existence were based on the actual Eurasian dialectic heterodox character in every aspect and expression of their *vita*. From this heterodox tank, the Ottoman family chose the high-ranked officials of the empire at such an extent, that the OE was, in terms of its ruling administrative and military elite, Islamochristian in religion, Eurasian in race and by no means Sunni and Turkish, as the conventional approach suggests. So, one should not be surprised by Baron Wenceslas Wradislaw’s remarks that, “Never … did I hear it said of any pasha, or observe either in Constantinople or in the whole land of Turkey, that any pasha was a national born Turk; on the contrary, kidnapped, or captured, or turned Turk”.

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71 Kinross, *The Ottoman Centuries*, p. 147
Consequently, one might argue that modern academic research is gradually “becoming aware that Byzantium did not die on that fateful morning of May 29, 1453, and that its civilization remained a potent force in the lives, mentalities and cultural creations”.\textsuperscript{72} So, the “Nachleben of Byzantium”\textsuperscript{73} is particularly evident in the OE, especially during its ‘Classical’ era, and could be examined in two main categories, the physical and the institutional heritage. The latter could be divided into a formal and a folk institutional residue.\textsuperscript{74} Regarding the physical residue, despite the mass conversions, the intermarriages, the \textit{gulam-devşirme} practices and the slave system that resulted in the fusion of the majority of the Byzantine population with the Turks the Greek-Orthodox, the Greek-speaking element remained strong. However, the fusion of these two elements was so extensive, that the words of the Ottoman historian Mustafa Âli, actually confirm the main argument of this analysis, namely that the Ottomans are not Turks but they are a mixture of Eurasian blood and culture based on the Byzantine heritage. Âli observes in the most illuminating way that, “most of the inhabitants of Rum are of confused ethnic origins … there were few whose lineage does not go back to a convert to Islam … the genealogy is traced to a filthy infidel”.\textsuperscript{75}

Moving now to the institutional heritage and more specifically to the formal residue, many points could be mentioned concerning a Byzantine nachleben. The Ottomans generally adopted the Greek-Roman/Byzantine practices in a threefold way. They

\begin{itemize}
\item Vryonis, ‘\textit{The Byzantine Legacy in the Formal Culture of the Balkan Peoples}’, p. 17
\item Ibid.
\item Vryonis, \textit{The Decline of Medieval Hellenism in Asia Minor}, p. 496
\item Fleischer, H. C. \textit{Bureaucrat and Intellectual in the Ottoman Empire} (New Jersey, 1986), p. 254; Whereas, ‘\textit{Rum}’ as Fleischer (p. 254. Brackets added) indicates “in a cultural context, Âli means the Anatolian [north-western AM] and Rumelian [European Greece] heartlands of the Ottoman state, the regions in which the Ottomans had first established themselves and then expanded’ in other words he speaks of the Byzantine heartland within which Ottomans emerged.
\end{itemize}
inherited them by a direct adoption from their Christian subjects, by an indirect adoption by following old Islamic practices that the Arabs themselves had adopted by the Byzantines or by facing similar problems coming up with the same answers. For example, the Ottoman court protocol, the Vizir-I A’zams (Grand Viziers) (GV) along with the adoption of the pronoia system, the timar, was based on the Byzantine tradition. The same was happening with the fiscal system, the agriculture, the urban life, the legal system and the maritime law. Moving to the folk institutional residue of the Byzantine nachleben one might group the common Byzantine-Ottoman practices under the name of religious and family tradition.

76 The aforementioned akhi brotherhood is the most illustrative example. Furthermore, Arab urban institutions such as the public baths, the marketplace, the Umayyad tax system and bureaucracy, the economically religious foundations (wakf), the monumental architecture, the legislation, the coinage (imitating the weight standard and the inscriptions), the sealing of documents and the intellectual borrowings of Arab sciences, such as geography, grammar, medicine, philosophy and music were “indebted to the Byzanitines in varying degrees”. Vryonis, The Decline of Medieval Hellenism in Asia Minor, pp. 463-464. See, Vryonis, ‘Byzantine Circus Factions and Islamic Futuwwa Organizations’, pp. 46-48; Vryonis, S., Jr. ‘Aspects of Byzantine Society in Syro-Palestine: Transformations in the Late Fourth and Fifth Centuries’, in Vryonis, S., Jr. (ed) Byzantina kai Metabyzantina (Malibu 1985), pp. 43-63; Anawati, ‘Factors and Effects of Arabization and Islamization in Medieval Egypt and Syria’, pp. 17-41


79 The timar system was exactly like the Byzantine pronoia and acted as the source of providing the cavalry, the sipahi that along with the Janissaries constituted two main pillars of the army. The early sipahis were mainly Christian or converted to Islamochristian schemes Byzantine populations. See, Phillpots, The Causes and Successes of the Ottoman Turks, pp. 6-9; Lowry, The Nature of the Early Ottoman State, pp. 90-92

80 Vryonis, The Decline of Medieval Hellenism in Asia Minor, pp. 463-475; Lowry, The Nature of the Early Ottoman State, pp. 73-86


82 For the revitalization of the cities through Greek settlement see, Lowry, W., H., Jr. ‘“From Lesser Wars to the Mightiest War”: The Ottoman Conquest and Transformation of the Byzantine Urban Centers in the Fifteenth Century’, in Lowry, W., H., Jr. (ed) Analecta Isiisiana IV: Studies in Defterology: Ottoman Society in the Fifteenth and Sixteenth Centuries (Istanbul, 1992), pp. 47-63

83 Phillpots, The Causes and Successes of the Ottoman Turks, p. 19;

84 Vryonis, S., Jr. ‘The Byzantine Legacy in the Formal Culture of the Balkan Peoples’, pp. 17-44
Vryonis mentions a great variation of customs that were transferred through the intermarriages between the two populations and the synthetic heterodox ‘Islamization’ of the population. Hasluck’s monumental work might supply the researcher with all the necessary information of the common folk-culture that was developed in the Byzantine-Ottoman space. However, one of the most impressive practices applied by the ‘Turks’ of AM since the 12th century, is the custom of Baptism (vaftiz). The “orthodox mothers” of the mixed marriages were baptizing their children. The level of intermarriage was so extensive that the 14th century Byzantine chronicler Niceforus Gregoras, speaking about the population of Bithynia, the Ottoman domain, notes that “all the Bithynians came together, all the barbarians who were of [Orhan’s] race, and all the “mixovarvaroi” [offspring of mixed Greek and Turkish marriages] and … all these of our race”. The level of leverage that the “orthodox mothers” were exerting in this synthetic society was considerable. Three observations are indicative. First, according to contemporary Arabic sources “the women of the Turks are not veiled”. Second, the aforementioned fourth institution, the Bajiyan-i Rum, which facilitated the conversion of AM to Islamochristianity, was a female Bektaşi society that seems to have a quasi-military structure. The third and most important thing that must be investigated is the religious-national background of the mothers of the Sultans of this synthetic period. Six out of the eight Sultans between 1280 and 1512 offered to the Ottoman throne an heir born by a Greek woman. So, Murad’s I famous answer to the Serbs, when they asked him if he was

85 Vryonis, The Decline of Medieval Hellenism in Asia Minor, p. 487-488
86 Lowry, The Nature of the Early Ottoman State, p. 94
87 Gibbons, The Foundation of the Ottoman Empire, p. 157; the veiling was taken by the Ottomans from the Byzantine court protocol; Vryonis, The Decline of Medieval Hellenism in Asia Minor, p. 464
88 See, Köprülü, The Origins of the Ottoman Empire, pp. 230-232
89 The half-‘Greek’ Sultans were: Murad I (reign 1360-1389), Bayezid I (reign 1389-1402), Mehmed I (reign 1413-1421), Murad II (reign 1421-1451), Mehmed II the Conqueror (reign 1451-1481), Bayezid II (reign 1481-1512). See, Lowry, The Nature of the Early Ottoman State, pp. 153-155
going to force them to convert to Islam like the Hungarians forced them to follow Catholicism in order to help them, that “I will build a church near every mosque, and the people shall worship in whichever they may prefer”\(^{90}\) should not amaze anybody.

Closing this critically assessed, historical narration, there is a need for justifying the aforementioned processes of the establishment of the Ottoman state through a comprehensive conceptual theoretical framework. This final aim is going to be approached through the lenses of Jones’s paper and the role of “the networks of intersocietal power relationships” that he introduces.\(^{91}\) So far a synthetic process of ‘secondary state formation’ under the ideas of ‘conflict and coercion’ has been described and established. That means that “the majority of societies that have developed territorial institutions … have done so with respect to neighbouring societies, already organized in the same manner.” This implies that “apart from the half a dozen or so … primary states – in other words, societies that have adopted state institutions independently or in isolation of one another [such as Roman and Byzantine Empires] – all other societies have embraced territorial institutions as their means of governance and rule as a result of interacting with neighbouring, more ‘advanced’ societies”.\(^{92}\) This ‘secondary state formation’ is subjected to the “latent desire to conquer, other societies and peoples, and the need to defend oneself against aggressive neighbours that leads to the developments of increasingly efficient coercive and extractive state institutions”.\(^{93}\) In other words, the creation of complex institutions could be attributed to the existence of neighboring advanced societies and to the need to defend oneself against powerful neighbors.

\(^{90}\) Phillpots, *The Causes of the Successes of the Ottoman Turks*, p. 21
\(^{91}\) Jones, ‘Changing geographies of governance and group identities in the Middle Ages’, p. 906
\(^{92}\) Ibid.; brackets added
\(^{93}\) Ibid., p. 908
Jones is using Mann’s approaches that “the crucial interactions that exist between two or more societies may be best characterized as a nexus of power relationships or networks”.94 Jones, like Mann, makes a clear distinction between the concepts of the ‘distributive’ and ‘collective’ power. By mentioning the first concept, Mann refers to “the ability of individuals, groups or institutions to pursue their own goals and to impose their own will on other, less powerful, individuals, groups or institutions”, while the second concept refers to “circumstances in which people, groups or institutions join together in order to ‘enhance their joint power over third parties or over nature’”.95 What is clearly suggested is that the weaker pre-or-half state societies, in order to deal with or confront the distributive power of a ‘primary’ state with an ‘advanced society’, are adopting state institutions in order to increase their collective and distributive power. In doing this, the weak society has to comprehend and tries to develop the ‘nexus of power relationships’ that exist between and within societies and is comprised of networks of “ideological, economic, military and political power”.96 Since the ‘primary’ state is exerting military domination, political superiority, economic leverage and ideological influence, the ‘secondary’ semi-state has to increase its twofold power. This is done with political effort, meaning “to reduce the jurisdictional autonomy of kin-groups” and “entering into alliances with enemies of the adjacent powerful state, or simply by reducing internal conflict and promoting the belief that its subjects and territory should be governed by fewer individuals and ultimately a single sovereign”. It has to enhance its economic effort “to collect renders and dues in a more specific and consistent manner. It also has to “promote more onerous forms of military service” and “to increase the emphasis on ideologies that stress the virtually untrammeled power and authority of the ruler of

94 Ibid.
95 Ibid., p. 909
96 Ibid.
the state”.97 However, these forms of power may be communicated and materialized in a twofold way, through an ‘authoritative’ and through a ‘diffused’ path. The first form of power “is ‘actually willed by groups and institutions’ and requires definite commands and conscious obedience”,98 while the latter form of power “spreads in a spontaneous, unconscious, decentralized way through a population, resulting in similar social practices that embody power relations but are not explicitly commanded”.98 In other words, the way that a ‘secondary’ state could implement its ideological, political, economic and military aims in order to increase its distributive and collective power and confront the ‘primary’ state is by means of an authoritative, coercive or a diffused dialectic way.

Jones uses this theoretical explanatory framework in order to attempt to explain the relations and identities between England and Wales. In the same manner, this approach could operate equally satisfactory if it was applied to the Byzantine-Ottoman case, since it explains the whole synthetic process that took place and shaped the Ottoman and Turkish identity afterwards. It could be said that the Ottoman principality in the beginning of the 14th century “in the time of Michael Paleologo”, quoting Spandounes, has adopted the role of the ‘secondary’ quasi-state, while the BE with its one thousand years history and society constitutes the ‘primary’ advanced state. The Ottoman state is not being developed simply in the neighboring country of the Byzantine space, but the Ottomans are actually emerging within the Byzantine Empire “in the vicinity” of Bithynia, thus, it is not simply a frontier state but a ‘state within a state’.99 While the Byzantines were exerting their distributive and collective power in the region through a nexus of military, economic, ideological and political

97 Ibid., pp. 909-910
98 Ibid., p. 910
99 See, Appendix 18, p. 383
forms of power by means of a both an authoritative and a diffused way, the “lords of the Turks … Michauli … Turachan …. Evrenes …Ottomano. Each was no more than a petty chieftain” decided to increase their collective and distributive power by joining their forces, in the way that the aforementioned Lindner’s anthropological approach indicated. Through this alliance, the ‘secondary’ state immediately increases its collective power. Moreover, this act reduces the autonomy of the various groups, diminishes internal conflict and promotes the idea of one leader. Remembering Spandounes “they did something generous and memorable … One day they assembled together to elect one lord from among them … Each of those present had his own say but all were agreed that none could match Ottomano in authority, courage and strength of character … But they elected Ottomano as such; and he became the first Emperor of the Turks”. The ‘second state formation’ process was simultaneously defensive and offensive towards the ‘primary’ state since “They knew that Emperor Michael had left their frontier. But as they were, they were too divided and scattered to attack their enemies as was their wont; rather they thought of defending themselves. They saw that power of the Christians was too great for them to resist it singly, and they soon decided to look not to their own self-interest but to their common good”. Apart from the ‘political’ form, the rest of the elements of the nexus of the forms of power were gradually developed, as well. The economic leverage increased in many ways. The embargo of the cities of Bithynia and the dominance of the rural space weakened the ‘primary’ state decisively. The exploitation of the Byzantine mariners and practices, the constant raids and the securing of the widening taxed basis through tolerant and cooperative relations with the Byzantine rural and urban classes, along with a tax system that was almost similar to the one of the Byzantines, improved the economic power decisively. The military
ability was hastened through the ‘onerous’ practices of devşirme and converting pronoiars to timar soldiers. The ideological arsenal was advanced through intermarriages with the Byzantine elite and through the appeal to Seljuk and noble Turkish past. Moreover, the appeals to the legitimate continuation of the Roman-Byzantine Emperors along with the ‘corporate’ way of ruling through the leverage of the founding ‘families’ enhanced this field of power solidification. Spandouen once again reminds us that “They found it hard to decide, for by common consent they would rather have had a brother than a sovereign lord”. The successes of this ‘enterprise’ was so striking that within the first one and a half century of its existence the Ottoman ‘corporation’ was transformed into a ‘primary’ state in terms of power, while the Byzantines were at first deposed into a ‘secondary’ state, again in terms of power, and finally they were extinct/absorbed/transformed and completely replaced through and by the OE. The amazing success of this process, despite the actual Byzantine weaknesses, could be explained only by the way in which the complex nexus of power was implemented by the Ottomans. The whole argument of this section ends up to the conclusion that the diffused form of power was mainly used. This ‘unconscious’, ‘decentralized’ way of implementation worked in a twofold way. First, it allowed for the emergence of the OE and second it secured the nachleben of Byzantium. This observation does not imply that there was no use of the authoritative form of power, since there was an ongoing struggle for centuries, but suggests that the diffused way of fulfilling the demands of the nexus of powers is evident throughout the pages of this section, especially in the ‘Islamochristian’ religion of the state and the Eurasian racial identity of its main functions and elites. If this approach had not been implemented and a single authoritative form had been adopted, then the Ottomans would not have any chance to dominate all over the BE and actually,
In other words, if the authoritative practices had been the main trend, then the conquerors would have become ‘Turks’, racially and religiously different from the populations of the Byzantine state and not ‘Ottomans’, mixture of these elements in a religious and cultural way, from the beginning of their reign and not towards the end. This distinction is the corner stone of this argument, because the identity of ‘Turk’ had nothing to do with the identity of ‘Ottoman’. To an ‘Ottoman’ a ‘Turk’ was nothing more than an “uneducated, rather boorish and peasant-like fellow who spoke common Turkish and was illiterate”. Gibbons correctly explains that the Ottomans had never called themselves Turks until ... the awakening ... of the sentiment of nationality among the subject Christian races. Mouradjea d’Ohsson ... wrote in 1785: ‘ ... According to the Osmanlis, the word Turk belongs only to the people of the Turkestan and ... of Khorassan. All the peoples submitted to the Empire are designated under the name “Osmanlis”, and they do not understand why they are called Turks by the Europeans. As they attach to this word the idea of the most marked insult, no foreigner in the Empire ever allows himself to use it in speaking to them”.

Eventually, modern Turkish scholars, having put some distance between them and the ‘Köprülüian’ Kemalist nationalistic stance, attempt to articulate a more rational and complex argument of their Ottoman past and as an extension of their eternal ‘quest’ for identity. Kafadar’s illuminating words might signal as a re-affiliation of the ‘Turkish’ Psyche to the Eurasian school

Although the word “Turchia” indeed appeared in Latin geographic designations in the twelfth century, from the point of view of the Turkish-speaking populations ... there was no Turkey, either as a geographical or as a political entity, until the end of World War I ... The land was known as the land of Rûm ... The Ottoman ruling class eventually emerged as a combination of Muslims (some by conversion) who spoke Turkish (though not necessarily as a native tongue), affiliated (some voluntarily and some involuntarily) with the dynastic state under the rule of the House of Osman. And “Turk” was only one, and not necessarily a favored one, of the “ethnicities” ruled by that class.
The major issue of how the ‘Ottomans’ became ‘Turks’ by western scholarship and folk culture is depicted in the three major works about *Türkenfurcht* (fear of the Turks) that were spread and developed in Europe after the fall of Constantinople. Miyamoto deals with three ‘best-sellers’ that circulated in west Europe and shaped the opinion about the ‘Turks’. There are two evident and very interesting things in these articles. First, the fear of the ‘Turks’, due to the sorrow and amazement for the conquest of Constantinople, has created a series of prophecies about how these ‘devils’ managed to ‘escape’ from the underground prison that Alexander the Great had closed them behind ‘iron gates’ in Turkestan and how the Greeks will take back their lands and chase them to a place called “red/golden apple”, traditions which have passed entirely in the Turkish folk-culture.103 The second and most important issue for this research is the fact that certain westerner authors who had spend some time in OE, noticed the huge conversion of the Greek-Orthodox populations of the Byzantine space to Islam, something that terrified them even more than the actual Ottoman military threat. In trying to find answers to this, they were asserting that a ‘Turk’ was a person belonging to a ‘sect’! The authors claimed that ‘Turks’ were not a ‘nation’ but a religious heresy that the Christians were receptive due to ‘Turkish’ unprecedented piety and goodness.104 Two things are evident through this approach, which may seem simplistic and ‘naive’ at first, but then strikes accurate. First, for the first time after five centuries, the Europeans were facing an imperial power from Constantinople that ‘threatened’ the western world with ‘unification’, something which was culturally out of the question for them. Second, the ‘sect’ approach

unconsciously reveals the true identity of the ‘Ottomans’: you were not born an ‘Ottoman’, you were becoming one. This religion was actually a ‘hybrid’ Islamochristianity and an Ottoman’s way of life was ‘pious’. Thus, the ‘Ottoman’ was not a ‘Turk’ in race and not a ‘Muslim’ in religion. The ‘Ottoman’ was a Eurasian HMS ‘hybrid’ formation, a synthetic unification and outcome of the Greek/Roman/Byzantine/Greek-Orthodox/sedentary with the Turkish/Heterodox Muslim/semi-nomadic identity, and his state was called_Romania_or_Rūm_, literally ‘land of the Greeks’. Therefore, as Ortayli observes, “there is an eighteen-century canvas, an instance of Austrian folk art that depicts by means of stereotypes the nations of Europe. Beside the Spaniard, the Frenchman, the Swede and the Muscovite, we find … a … figure … labeled *Turk or Greek*”!\(^\text{105}\) Probably the Europeans were not mistaken so much…

iii. On the ‘Nature/Identity’ of the Late Ottoman State

However, the Ottoman EURASIAN identity was not destined to last forever. Gradually, a “classical Islamic veneer”\(^\text{106}\) was about to overshadow the synthetic UHMS power. Three main events contributed decisively to this gradual change of identity of the Ottoman state between the 1450s and 1550s, the capture of Constantinople, the rivalry with Shia Iran over eastern AM, Caucasus and Mesopotamia and the conquest of the Arab/Sunni/Mamluk lands in Middle East and north Africa.

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\(^\text{105}\) Ortayli, *The Problem of Nationalities in the Ottoman Empire Following the Second Siege of Vienna*, p. 32

\(^\text{106}\) Lowry, *The Nature of the Early Ottoman State*, p. 96
Constantinople covered the new occupier with its Roman imperial ‘mantle’ and this gave the Ottomans the status of a legitimate power.\textsuperscript{107} By assuming the new ‘legal’ status, a need for a more strict hierarchical and centralized structure emerged. What the Ottoman dynastic family needed was a major connecting bond of the emerging empire, a \textit{raison d’etre}. This political ideology of that era could only be found in religion.\textsuperscript{108} The direction towards a specific political religion was further accommodated in both a negative and a positive way by the interaction with Shia Iranians and Sunni Arabs/Mamluks, respectively.\textsuperscript{109} The penetration of the EK of the MS, that is the Iranian space, in the eastern AM, Caucasus and Mesopotamia (1512-14) caused an everlasting bloody war against the Shia Savafids. The Ottomans in their political dispute with the Persians ‘demonized’ them along with their allies, the heterodox Anatolian populations, as ‘apostates’ and ‘heretics’ who deserve to be fought.\textsuperscript{110} The conquering of a large part of the SW of the MS (1516-19) that is the Arab/Mamluk world of Syria, Palestine, Hejaz and Egypt changed the population and cultural balances in the empire. Gradually, the dominant synthetic heterodox population of the HMS was found to be outnumbered by the Arab-Orthodox-Sunni element of the SW. Selim I, after having conquered Egypt – the base of the Caliph - and acquired his title and function as the supreme leader of the Muslim world, resettled around 2,000 Muslim bureaucrats, religious scholars and artisans along with the Caliph himself from Cairo to Constantinople.\textsuperscript{111}

\textsuperscript{107} Davison, H., R. \textit{‘The Turks in History’}, p. 8; Itzkowitz, N. \textit{Ottoman Empire and Islamic Tradition} (Chicago, 1972), p. 98
\textsuperscript{108} Rousseau’s Book IV, chapter 8 unfolds the necessity of the existence of the ‘religion of the citizen’ that serves as the connecting bond and the legitimization of the ruler, the law, and state’s wars. See, Rousseau, J., J. \textit{The Social Contract or the Principles of Political Law} (in Greek) (Athens, 2004), pp. 202-217
\textsuperscript{109} See, Inalcik, \textit{The Ottoman Empire}, pp. 207-216
\textsuperscript{110} See, Itzkowitz, \textit{Ottoman Empire and Islamic Tradition}, p. 69
\textsuperscript{111} See, Lowry, \textit{The Nature of the Early Ottoman State}, p. 113
way into all branches of the Ottoman Bureaucracy … within two decades … signs of their growing impact on the evolving Ottoman bureaucracy are apparent even in the terminology employed”.

In a few words, the combination of these three major events that were taking place between the 1450s-1550s transmuted the OE. The EURASIAN Islamochristian ‘Caesar’ had been gradually transformed to a eurASIAN ‘Caliph’ of Sunni-Islam. By the heydays of Suleyman the Lawgiver (reign 1520-1566) this identity change was firmly established. The geopolitical/geocultural ‘balance’ of the HMS was seriously interrupted. Moreover, the “fundamental characteristic” of the OE was its rigid stratified society, divided into two main ‘casts’, the Askeri (the military, incorporated the military and the administrative elite of the OE - Yeniçeri and Sipahis) and the Reaya (the subjects, incorporated the civic and rural population, both the Muslims, actually Islamochristians, and the non-Muslims). The aforementioned three main events that in a sense ‘Islamized’, in Sunni terms, and ‘Asianized’ OE, lead to two main interconnected negative developments that took place between these main casts. On the one hand, the Askeri gradually is being ‘Islamized/Sunnized’ whereas the Reaya is being ‘Christianized/de-Islamized’ both departing from the former EURASIAN stance. Naturally, the appearance of some usual signs of degeneration

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112 Lowry, The Nature of the Early Ottoman State, p. 113; Much of the Muslim element that was absorbed by the Ottoman administration were disciples of the Hanbali legal tradition which “is the strictest, most rigid of the Islamic law schools” (Esposito, L., J. Islam and Politics (New York, 1984), p.110). OE was following the tolerant Hanafi School that, through icmâ (consensus of opinion), allowed room for interpretations, innovations and ‘dialogue’ between the ideological currents. See, Hourani, A. A History of the Arab Peoples (London, 1991), pp. 179-181; Lapidus, M., I. A History of Islamic Societies (Cambridge, 2002), pp. 134-137, 141, 177, 207, 211

113 Fleicher, Bureaucrat and Intellectual in the Ottoman Empire, pp. 267-272

114 Itzkowitz, Ottoman Empire and Islamic Tradition, p. 40
like nepotism, inefficiency and state rigidity are being observed in this era.\textsuperscript{115} However, the most important symptom of this decline was an “intellectual or psychological metamorphosis” of the Ottoman psyche.\textsuperscript{116} Due to the ‘Islamization’ of the OE “from the beginning of the sixteenth century the forces of religious fanaticism became increasingly powerful”.\textsuperscript{117} Thus, the ‘seeds’ of the coming decay were immediately followed by the ‘signs’ of this process.\textsuperscript{118}

The results of this degeneration were eminent, devastating, in a way foreseeable and could be categorized into two main groupings, the external military defeats and the internal social dismantlement. From the mid-16\textsuperscript{th} century military victories becoming either rare or they are too costly with little gain, placing OE generally on the defensive. Successive treaties deteriorate the empire’s position. So far, all agreements were dictated by an ecumenical power, the Ottoman, to their ‘inferior’ counterparts. However, the Ottoman-Austrian treaty of Zsitvatörök (1606) was a pact between equal parties. The treaty of Karlowitz (1699) signifies that “the age of Ottoman expansion came definitely to an end”\textsuperscript{119} and OE’s inferiority was accepted as a fact by

\begin{itemize}
\item[\textsuperscript{116}] Itzkowitz, Ottoman Empire and Islamic Tradition, pp. 57-58
\item[\textsuperscript{117}] İnalçık, The Ottoman Empire, p. 182
\item[\textsuperscript{118}] The external factor should also not be underestimated. One result of the Ottoman emergence in the MS was the West to search alternative routes to reach India. The circumnavigation of Africa (1498) and the discovery of America (1492) triggered the economic and political dominance of the West through colonialism. Except for the obvious economic ‘bypass’ of the OE and the capitulations granted to European powers, the excess supply of silver from America along with the bullionist Ottoman policies, to be paid in silver, created a tremendous influx of cheap or false silver currency. The consequent inflationary pressures were further instigated with successive efforts to control the prices though devaluations of the currency. The need for revenues increased the taxes and the demand of payment on non-false currency was raised by the state to its subjects and from the West to OE. Thus, the empire was forced to export valuable metals and this aggravated the economic problems. See, İnalçık, H. ‘The Turkish Impact on the Development of Modern Europe’, in İnalçık, H. (ed) Analecta Isisiana XIX: From Empire to Republic; Essays on Ottoman and Turkish Social History (İstanbul, 1995), p. 120; Kitsikis, History of the Ottoman Empire, pp. 194-201
\item[\textsuperscript{119}] Heywood, C. ‘The Frontier in Ottoman History: Old Ideas and New Myths’, in Heywood, C. (ed) Writing Ottoman History: Documents and Interpretations (Hampshire, 2002), p. 231
\end{itemize}
the treaty of Passarowitz (1718). With the treaty of Küçük Kaynarca (1774) the issue of dismemberment was triggered and the EQ appeared officially in its conventional form in the international scene.\textsuperscript{120} In the domestic front, as Ortayli puts it, in the late-17\textsuperscript{th} century OE “was in social and economic chaos, and there is no doubt that practically all its institutions were moving towards collapse’.\textsuperscript{121} Actually, as it has been indicated, OE’s institutions collapsed a century ago the results however, were strongly manifested during the 17\textsuperscript{th} century. The ‘Islamization/centralization’ process and the economic degradation had grave results. The local magnates and landowners are acting independently and the state administrative elite, since it is not controlled by the state, is cooperating with the provincial notables. The resulting administrative and religious oppression, poverty, corruption and injustice lead the populations to social unrest and successive (1519, 1526-27, 1559, 1578) revolutions for social, religious and national reasons.\textsuperscript{122} Violent incidents of increased Sunni-Hanbalic zealotry could be traced all over the bibliography.\textsuperscript{123}

Despite the emerging social/religious/national agitation, there were always voices insisting on an archetypical EURASIAN OE, such as Père Osman, who tried in the mid-17\textsuperscript{th} century, “to rally all Ottoman subjects … to the cause of a new eastern state, blending the concepts of the Byzantine and the Ottoman empires”.\textsuperscript{124} These efforts proved unsuccessful though, since the eurASIAN identity had conquered the Ottoman psyche. Itzkowitz correctly underpins that “the most significant fact about the

\textsuperscript{120} See, Kinross, The Ottoman Centuries, pp. 319-413
\textsuperscript{122} On the synthetic Islamochristian and Shia nature of the Kızılbaş and Celâlî revolutions see, Imber, ‘The Wandering Dervishes’, pp. 139-144; İnalçık, The Ottoman Empire, pp. 194-197; Itzkowitz, Ottoman Empire and Islamic Tradition, pp. 92-93
\textsuperscript{123} See, İnalçık, The Ottoman Empire, pp. 179-185
\textsuperscript{124} Kinross, The Ottoman Centuries, p. 316
eighteenth century Ottomans is that they lived completely within an Islamic environment and frame of reference”. However, the “liberal or strict interpretation of the divine law gave rise to a political, cultural and social struggle … since the middle of the sixteenth century and can be viewed as the initial phase of fierce struggle between modernists and reactionaries”.

In general, four major ‘waves’ of ‘Westernism’ that transformed the Islamic late 16th century OE to the contemporary Kemalist TR could be detected. These successive waves of introspection might be (a) The Köprülüs period (1656-1702). (b) The Lâle Devri (Tulip) period (1718-1730). (c) The ‘Transformative’ & Tanzimat (Reorganization/New Order) period (1774-1839 & 1839-1908). (d) The ‘YT’ period (1908-1950).

(a) The unfortunate war against Venice led to the office of GV Mehmed Köprülü. He launched a policy of reforms and he managed to successfully confront the danger. His line of reforms followed his belief that “innovations, condemned by Islamic religious law and popular sentiment alike … were the cause for internal ills. His aim was to bring the state back to the ways of Suleiman the Magnificent”. Thus, he allowed the Ottomans to borrow some military technology techniques and ideas from the West, but his pro-Islamic attitude actually led OE to scientific backwardness. Moreover, the major ‘deposits’ for the recruit of administrative and

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125 Itzkowitz, Ottoman Empire and Islamic Tradition, p. 104
127 Kitsikis, History of the Ottoman Empire, p. 128
128 On his policies and the vita of his offspring see, Kinross, The Ottoman Centuries, pp. 331-356; Itzkowitz, Ottoman Empire and Islamic Tradition, pp. 77-85
129 Itzkowitz, Ottoman Empire and Islamic Tradition, p. 78-79
130 İnalcık, ‘Turkey Between Europe and the Middle East’, p. 145
Chapter 4  Turkish Quest for ‘Identity’

military personnel now comes from AM, among “those who in Ottoman terms had always been regarded as “crude Turks””. Consequently, the ‘Turkification’ of the OE starts around 1683. In a few words, through an even more hostile attitude towards Western culture and more strict orthodox Sunni ideology along with a process of ‘Turkification’, the previous eurASIAN identity of the 16\textsuperscript{th} century is further ‘unbalancing’ the HMS, moving it to an uncompromised eur-ASIAN identity.

(b) After the treaty of Passarowitz (1718) and the established notion that OE could not confront West on equal terms, a new wave of questioning dominated the Turkified/Islamized Ottoman elite. “Why do Christian nations, which were so weak in the past compared with Muslim nations, begin to dominate so many lands in modern times and even defeat the once victorious Ottoman armies?” Ibrahim Müteferrika wonders in his main book (1731) about Ottoman decline. Muslims should “be informed of the condition of their enemies” they should “act with foresight and become intimately acquainted with new European methods, organization, strategy, tactics, and warfare” but this “will be possible only by ending the state of slumber and indifference, dropping sheer fanaticism with regard to learning of European conditions…” This trend was symbolized with the fashion of cultivating Tulips, which became the symbol of “a dawning Turkish renaissance under the influence of Western civilization”. However, this kind of influence, from rococo art to printing non-religious Western works, led the Ottoman elite to a state of atheism. Consequently, these developments led to the revolt of the Turkified/Sunni elements of the Askeri, Ulema and Yeniçeri, leading the poor Sunni classes to friction with the

\begin{footnotesize}
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\item \textsuperscript{131} Ortayli, ‘The Ottoman Empire at the End of the Seventeenth Century’, p. 16
\item \textsuperscript{132} Berkes, The Development of Secularism in Turkey, p. 42
\item \textsuperscript{133} Ibid., p. 44
\item \textsuperscript{134} Kinross, The Ottoman Centuries, p. 380
\item \textsuperscript{135} See, Berkes, The Development of Secularism in Turkey, pp. 28-29
\end{itemize}
\end{footnotesize}
‘Westernized’ luxurious elite.\textsuperscript{136} So, the European element prevails in the elite while the Asiatic element prevails in the lower classes and these two elements seem mutually exclusive. Thus, the elite finally adopts only a superficial ‘Westernization’ in terms mainly of lifestyle and some technicalities without any change in the Islamic core practices. In other words, a non-dialectic uneasy identity of EUR-asianism is being adopted since the state has to maintain ‘balance’/order.\textsuperscript{137}

(c) The treaty of Küçük Kaynarca (1774) and the emergence of the EQ acted as the “first tremor that shook the Ottomans out of their lethargy and complacency”. Now it was obvious that since the Islamic paradigm was not working and the superficial westernization could not help “a new understanding of its problems and fresh solution have to be found”.\textsuperscript{138} This long period is characterized by a deliberate detachment from the ‘Asiatic’ Islamic element and a gradual but decisive effort on behalf of the bureaucratic mainly elite to ‘Westernize’ the empire by stressing the ‘European’ element. The intensity and durability of this effort created equally strong counter-forces, which were suggesting different identities. This era could be divided into two sub-periods, the ‘Transitional’ period (1774-1839) and the \textit{Tanzimat} period (1839-1908).

During the ‘Transitional’ period two Sultans were the protagonists, Selim III (reign 1789-1807) and Mahmud II (reign 1808-1839). The friction between the still strong forces of the ‘tradition’ with the not yet so influential forces of ‘modernization’ led the former to deposition and death, while the latter only the last fifteen years of his

\textsuperscript{136} Ibid., p. 53
\textsuperscript{137} See, Berkes, \textit{The Development of Secularism in Turkey}, pp. 23-69; Mardin, \textit{The Genesis of Young Ottoman Thought}, pp. 138-144
\textsuperscript{138} Itzkowitz, \textit{Ottoman Empire and Islamic Tradition}, p. 108
reign managed to control the opposition mainly due to his success in dismantling the degenerate institution of the Yeniçeri (1826). Nevertheless, Selim’s deposition signified “the end … in reality of medieval” OE since Sultan Mahmud II managed to control the reactionary forces and paved the way for the Tanzimat. Mahmud confined successfully the decentralized forces of the empire but the decisive event that triggered the orientation of the reformist efforts was the Greek revolution (1821-1829) and the subsequent Russian-Ottoman war, which had an unfortunate outcome for the Ottomans. Apart from the ‘unique’, ‘cooperative’ relations of the Greeks with the Turks in building the OE, the Greek Kingdom was a territory that was lost not for the benefit of an existing European power, but it was the first part of the OE that became fully independent, something which created great aspirations to other ‘nationalisms’ and great fear to the Ottomans. Thus, the caused “shock effect” developed for the OE “a consciousness of decline, and immediately tried to change its administrative, educational and military structures”. Again the departing point was the built-up of an army and its expenses. But the changes quickly went deep. New administrative initiatives, reduction of Islamic leverage, educational reforms and lay legislation, all created a new environment much more Europeanized. The first seeds of the conscious Turkish nationalism are traced on this period since, despite the promotion of the ‘Ottoman’ identity for all subjects, the Turkish language was now favored decisively. However, the Islamic character of the Ottoman system, in order to remain ‘balanced’, required the implementation of new laws, not the abolition of the old ones. Consequently, the developed dualism created a ‘schizophrenic’ situation and

139 See, Goodwin, The Janissaries, pp. 214-230
140 Ibid., p. 82
141 See, Zürcher, Turkey, pp. 33-37
a serious cultural clash in the souls of the Ottomans that was manifested most evidently during the *Tanzimat* period.\(^{143}\)

Until 1876, the *Tanzimat* period (1839-1908) was a period of reforms *par excellence*. The next thirty-two years an opposing alternative, Abdül-Hamid’s pan-Islamic version, ruled OE without formally denouncing the reformist era. The Sultan actually made use of *Tanzimat*’s provisions to legitimize his authority. The different kind of opposing ideologies that emanate during this period, especially in the last half of the 19th century, constitute the main identity issues/debate/crisis to contemporary TR as well.

The *Hatt-i Hümâyûn* (Imperial Charter) (1839) and the *İslahat Fermanı* (Reform Edict) (1856) reaffirm the efforts of reordering.\(^{144}\) Despite its liberal provisions however, it could be argued that the *Tanzimat* reformists, by observing the actual illiteracy and “immaturity” of the Ottoman populations, were rather closer to the earlier ‘Holly Alliance’ conservative “bureaucrats” than to the “ideas pronounced by the European constitutionalists of the 1830’s”.\(^{145}\) Moreover, the timing of the reforms was used as a diplomatic tool to ‘attract’ or ‘appease’ the European powers. The 1839 edict ‘coincident’ with the Egyptian crisis, the 1856 edict with the Crimean war and the 1876 constitution with the Bulgarian crisis that led to the Ottoman-Russian war.\(^{146}\) The major aims of this reform were the educational and legal systems. However, due to the inability to substitute completely the previous Islamic codification, the

\(^{143}\) See, Berkes, *The Development of Secularism in Turkey*, pp. 71-135; Mardin, *The Genesis of Young Ottoman Thought*, pp. 144-154

\(^{144}\) See, Mardin, *The Genesis of Young Ottoman Thought*, pp. 155-156; Berkes, *The Development of Secularism in Turkey*, pp. 144-145

\(^{145}\) Mardin, *The Genesis of Young Ottoman Thought*, p. 158, 178-179

\(^{146}\) Zürcher, *Turkey*, pp. 53-54
schooling system developed four types of schools and the legal system operated within three frameworks. Moreover, within the framework of secularisation, the non-Muslim Millets (nations) were transformed from religious-national entities to national-religious entities, something that had grave results for the unity of the empire and led to the emergence of a counterbalance Turkish/Islamic nationalism. Once more, the ‘Transitional’ and Tanzimat period signifies a change of the identity of the OE. The previous EUR-asian identity of the ‘Tulip’ period is being substituted by a EURasian identity. The Tanzimatists definitely stressed the ‘European’ element but now they are trying to compromise it with the ‘Asiatic’ one which, despite its ‘inferiority’, exists. This mixture creates an artificial moribund but acceptable for the era and ‘convenient’ dualism. Naturally, “the end of the political Tanzimat” as Berkes indicates “came when the Turkish element showed signs of revolt against its economic and political nonentity. Despite its national basis, the reaction was still far from being nationalistic”. Therefore, the anti-Tanzimat movement took two main forms, the constitutional Islamic intellectual/theoretical ‘Ottomanism’ of the ‘Young Ottoman’ group and the autocratic pan-Islamic political/practical form of Abdül Hamid’s era.

A secret society named ‘Patriotic Alliance’ was formed (1865), whose exiled members established in Paris (1867) the Yeni Osmanlilar (Young/New Ottoman Society) (YO) society. In the midst of a crisis with Bulgarians, Serbs, in Syria and with Greece and the European powers, the YO tried to find the answer to the

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147 See, Berkes, The Development of Secularism in Turkey, pp. 143, 170, 188-192
149 Ibid., p. 159
150 See, Mardin, The Genesis of Young Ottoman Thought, pp. 10-80
manifested weakness of the OE. However, as Davison puts it, the YO “were never a political party … were a loose group of individualistic intellectuals who had some common attitudes”.\textsuperscript{151} They believed that \textit{Tanzimat} reforms while the intension was good were degenerated and allowed Western intervention and exploitation of the OE, thus \textit{Tanzimat} has damaged OE’s ‘balance’ and leads it to destruction. The solution rests on the adoption of the true Islamic law, the Şeriat, which, if interpreted correctly, provides the ‘legal’ framework for representative constitutional and parliamentarian government.\textsuperscript{152} The YO promoted the simplification-turkification of the language and introduced the notions of ‘fatherland’ and ‘nation’. Moreover, in their effort to combat Pan-Slavism and Pan-Germanism they actually invented an “amorphous proto-Pan-Islamism”,\textsuperscript{153} even the constitution (1876) rest on their writings.\textsuperscript{154} Consequently, the YO are considered to be the intellectual ancestors of the YT and Kemalism. One should bear in mind though that these three interrelated successive periods represent a gradual weakening of the Islamic identity of the official state.\textsuperscript{155} This group presented a EUR-ASIAN identity, since it stressed the (Pan)Islamic and ‘Turkish’ element, while it used heavily western ideological and methodological tools in an effort to promote an ‘Ottoman’ patriotism based on Şeriat. Probably a practical ‘by-product’ of this kind of agitation in an autocratic version is the following ‘Hamidian’ period.

A coup deposed Abdülaziz (30 May 1876), who was replaced by Murad V. Murad’s liberal (promulgation of a constitution) and synthetic (for a close Greek-Ottoman cooperation) views were not meant to be implemented since he was replaced (1

\textsuperscript{151} Davison, \textit{Reform in the Ottoman Empire 1856-1876}, p. 175; for the major figures of the YO, see, Mardin, \textit{The Genesis of Young Ottoman Thought}, pp. 252-384
\textsuperscript{152} See, Berkes, \textit{The Development of Secularism in Turkey}, pp. 205-208
\textsuperscript{153} See, Mardin, \textit{The Genesis of Young Ottoman Thought}, pp. 60-61
\textsuperscript{154} See, Zürcher, \textit{Turkey}, pp. 73-74
\textsuperscript{155} See, Mardin, Ş. \textit{The Genesis of Young Ottoman Thought}, p. 404
September 1876) due to “severe nervous breakdown” by his brother, who reigned as Abdülhamid II (reign 1876-1909). Abdülhamid promulgates the constitution (23 December 1876) in the midst of an international conference that was trying to deal with the Bulgarian crisis and the Russian threats of war against OE. However, the Russo-Ottoman war (1877-78) is unavoidable and ends with the treaty of San Stefano (3 March 1878). With this treaty, Russia creates an enormous Bulgarian state with exit to the Aegean. Now, for the first time, the NW controls in a sense the HMS. The treaty of Berlin (June-July 1878) mitigates the situation for the OE and also for Greece, which saw for a moment all of the northern Aegean Greek-inhabited lands passing in a Slavic power. With the pretext of crisis, the Sultan prorogues the parliament (14 February 1878) that had opened (19 March 1878) and a thirty-year period (1878-1908) of autocracy starts, with Islam taking the status of official religion and for Şeriat being its law. State-centralization, the creation of a European ‘image’, the large appropriation of the Turkish/tribal mythology of Osman’s family, and a constant Islamization and ‘Arabization’ of the administration and the religious doctrine through ‘armies’ of Arab religious notables that were supplanting the Tanzimat bureaucratic apparatus is the story of these days. Pan-Islamism, instigated also by Germany, is the official state-ideology and is directed against the interests of the other powers, which had Muslim subjects. This radical autocratic Islamization instigated in the moribund empire a eur-ASIAN identity and created great unrest in its

156 Zürcher, Turkey, p. 78
158 See, Berkes, The Development of Secularism in Turkey, pp. 246-247
159 See, Zürcher, Turkey, p. 84
160 See, Deringil, S. The Well-Protected Domains: Ideology and the Legitimation of Power in the Ottoman Empire 1876-1909 (London, 1998); the whole work
European provinces. The reaction to this situation came through the ‘modernist’ elements of the empire and took the form of the YT revolution that decisively shaped the future of the OE.

The first organized attempt was held with the foundation (1889) of the ‘Ottoman Unity Society’ in the Military Medical College. The disclosure of the plot led some of the conspirators to Paris, where they joined a group of Ottoman émigrés forming the İttihat ve Terakki Cemiyeti (Committee of Union and Progress) (CUP), known in Europe as YT, despite the fact that “the most misleading aspect … was its inclusion of the word “Turk” ... None … ever used that word. All styled themselves Ottomans”.163 Their main aim was the restoration of the parliament and the limitation of Sultan’s authority. The three main poles of this movement could be generally described as the Westernized/Atheist-oriented pole under Ahmed Riza (1859-1930), the Oriental/Islamic-oriented pole under Mehemd Murad (1853-1912) and the pole of Prince Sabahhaddin (1877-1948), Sultan’s nephew, which was a MS/synthetic-heterodox one. Ahmed Riza managed to lead (1906) the movement while Prince Sabahhaddin formed the liberal faction, preaching minimal government, free enterprise and decentralization/inter-communal cooperation especially between Greeks and Turks. Meanwhile, in Thessaloniki, the ‘Ottoman Freedom Society’ was formed under Mehmet Talât (1874-1921) and created a nationwide network. This organization included many officers of the army stationed in Macedonia like Major Ismail Enver (1881-1922). The CUP established (1907) connections with the association of Thessaloniki that was attached to Riza’s group. The merge was done under the CUP name but from now on “it was the centre in Salonica and not that in

163 Berkes, The Development of Secularism in Turkey, p. 305
Paris which controlled the opposition movement in the empire”.\textsuperscript{164} The Thessalonikian control was so obvious that “many commentators … saw the Young Turk revolution as a product of the city”.\textsuperscript{165} The Ottoman armies in Macedonia revolted in July 1908, demanding the reestablishment of the parliament. The Sultan was forced to restore the 1878 constitution. A collision of identities during this era, along with a constant war (1911-1922) would bring the destruction of the OE, the collapse of CUP, the creation of TR and the rise and heyday of Kemalism. Nowadays, Kemalism is collapsing due to its own rigidities and inefficiencies.

Kemalism was always more of theory for society than one which had grown out of society. Atatürk’s innovation was to use his talents as a technician of social and political process to create a new society instead of dropping up the one that already existed. But he did not really succeed in implanting the values and symbols of the new Republic in the hearts of the masses. It was only the intellectuals, who benefited from the system both economically and socially, who were able to identify with Kemalism and its guiding principle; the masses did not find it quite so easy. Nationalism was the principal formula Atatürk used in turning a multi-ethnic conglomeration into a national state for “Turks”. The masses … were scarcely able to understand this\textsuperscript{166}

Consequently, the aforementioned, in the crisis part, internal strife between the multicultural and multinational elements of AM once more is emerging. Nothing has changed, the EUR[-]Asian and the eur[-]ASIAN schools are in ‘battle positions’, as Zürher observes “After 200 years, the main themes of Turkey’s modern history are still in place”.\textsuperscript{167} But what about EURASIANism? Did it have a place in this mortal combat of the extremes that started immediately after the Islamization of the OE in the 16\textsuperscript{th} century? Had the synthetic paradigm of the UHMS disappear? This crucial question is going to be answered into the lysis part of this chapter.

\textsuperscript{164} Zürcher, \textit{Turkey}, p. 94
\textsuperscript{165} Mazower, M. \textit{Salonica City of Ghosts: Christians, Muslims and Jews 1430-1950} (London, 2004), p. 273
\textsuperscript{166} Steinbach, U. ‘The Impact of Atatürk on Turkey’s Political Culture since World War II’, in Landoua, M, J. (ed) \textit{Atatürk and the Modernization of Turkey} (Colorado, 1984), p. 85
\textsuperscript{167} Zürcher, \textit{Turkey}, p. 320
4.3 Lysis

OE is characterized of its synthetic-dialectic character, which allowed it to inherit the moribund Byzantium. The gradual Sunnization/Turkification of the empire made it ‘astray’ of the EURASIAN ‘path’. As a result, it lost every basis of legitimacy for its constituent elements, mainly the Greek-speaking Greek-Orthodox populations. The ‘decadence’ age came along with a long decay that led to disintegration and destruction. During the crucial late-19th and early-20th centuries, the EURASIAN identity, that culminated in the 1908-1912 period, was always ‘present’, always close to be adopted as an official policy, but always the non-synthetic EUR[-]asian or eur[-]ASIAN options dominated the political scene. This trend continued during the TR period until nowadays. The existence of a coherent and constant trend of this synthetic idea signifies its validity and makes the EURASIAN school a diachronic ‘suitor’ for the Turkish psyche and space. Of course, to speak of a EURASIAN Greek-Turkism, one should also investigate the ‘other’ constitutive part of the ideology. Thus, a closer look on 19th and 20th century Greek view in conjunction with the Turkish one might justify the existence or inexistence of this synthetic ideology and prove that it didn’t ‘die’ with the entrance of the Ottoman forces in Mecca (1510’s).

With the establishment of the Kingdom of Greece (1830s), the vast majority of Greeks including all the great civic, bourgeoisie centers, such as Thessaloniki, Smyrna, and Constantinople were left outside its borders, while a depopulated, poor, agricultural state, devastated by the war, emerged. Consequently, Greece developed an irredentist ideology known as Μεγάλη Ιδέα (Great Idea) (GI). This term was first articulated (14 January 1844) by PM Ioannis Kolettis (1774-1847). Kolettis in a speech proceeds to a geopolitical/geocultural analysis and elaborates on the ‘mission’
of the nation to rejuvenate the HMS by connecting ancient-Greek and medieval-Byzantine past with the modern era.

By her geographical location, Greece is in the center of Europe; with the East on her right and the West on her left, she has been destined through her downfall to enlighten the West and through her regeneration to enlighten the East. The first task has been fulfilled by our ancestors; the second is assigned to us … [W]e have been led astray … from the great idea of the fatherland which was first expressed in the song of Rhigas. … Athens, and the rest of Greece divided in the past in particular states, fell and through her downfall she has enlightened the world. Contemporary Greece, united as she is in one state, one purpose, one power, one religion, should therefore inspire great expectations in the world…

Kolettis’s speech actually encompasses the essence of Greek irredentism and search for identity. First he acknowledges the issue of the MS by placing Greece, Russia and OE in the same geopolitical grouping. Then he asserts that the fall of the BE forced the Byzantine scholars to move to Italy and initiate the Renaissance. Kolettis speaks also of Rega’s vision. Regas Velenstnilis (1757-1798) published (1790s) a revolutionary declaration in which he “envisaged the overthrow of the Ottoman Empire and its replacement with a multi-ethnic state modeled on the Byzantine Empire”. Kitromilides underpins that Rigas “projected … an unequivocally radical political alternative … for the collective future of all Balkan people”. Moreover, Kolettis believes that Greece, by falling to Roman yoke managed to ‘civilize’/‘Hellenize’ the ecumenical Roman Empire thus, ‘enlighten the world’. These ideas were following the line of Adamantios Koraits (1748-1833), the most

169 The Greek historian Constantine Paparregopoulos rediscovers (1840) the ‘missing’ link of the Greek history (the 1000 years of Byzantium) that West maltreated. Western literature, from the enlightenment until recently, through its anti-religious/anti-Catholic sentiments perceived, mistakenly, the Byzantine vita as a theocracy that degenerated and destroyed everything that the ancient and classical era contributed to civilization. See Gibbon. E. The Decline and Fall of the Roman Empire (6 Volumes) (London, 1993); for a comprehensive response see, Vryonis, ‘Hellas Resurgent’, pp. 92-118
fervent adherent of classicism “and towering intellectual leader of the Greek enlightenment” whose western-oriented education and expatriation to Paris made him keep a clear ‘Gibbonian’ stance towards the Byzantine legacy. For him, “there is only one nation, the nation of the Franco-Greeks”.

The ‘mission’ was accepted universally but the ‘way’ that this task had to be fulfilled deviated into two approaches. The one could be described as a non-synthetic Western-rooted nationalistic (nation-state) ideology that might be called as ‘Greek/Greek-Orthodox-oriented Byzantinism’ and the other as a synthetic MS-rooted ecumenical (imperial-[Eastern] Roman) ideology that might be called as ‘Greek/Ottoman-oriented Byzantinism’. Let’s name the first trend as Western-type GI (W-GI) and the second as MS-type GI (MS-GI). This ideological division matches completely and goes hand in hand with the identity developments in the OE of the 19th century. On the one hand, there is a strong trend of a non-synthetic Western-rooted nationalistic (nation-state) ideology defined as the ‘Turkish/Sunni-oriented Ottomanism’. On the other hand, a synthetic MS-rooted ecumenical (imperial-[Eastern] Roman) ideology is always presented and could be called ‘Ottoman/Greek-oriented Ottomanism’. Let’s also name the first trend as Western-type Ottomanism (W-O) and the second as MS-type Ottomanism (MS-O).


Kitromilides, ‘The dialectic of Intolerance’, p. 8. It would be interesting to note that Korais in his work “Dialogue between two Greeks”; present his views in the form of Platonic dialogues and stresses the fact that the ‘Greeks’ should call themselves ‘Greeks’ or ‘Hellenes’ with emphasis on the first one since this is the way that the “enlightened nations of Europe call us”. He is not considering the Byzantine legacy as Greek-oriented and tries to disassociate modern Greeks form the MS Byzantine legacy in favor of the western-oriented classical one. See Lukas, I. Sea Power and the Greek State: The Fleet of the Megali Idea (in Greek) (Athens 1998), p. 50

Kitsikis, History of the Ottoman Empire, p. 233
Both the non-synthetic notions the W-GI and W-O are promoting a non-dialectic stance by preaching the Turkification or Hellenization of the HMS in terms of a ‘zero sum game’. Both of them use the exact same ‘tools’ - westernization-modernization-nationalism, in order to reach opposing conflicting results – ‘pure’ Greek or Turkish space and identity of the HMS. Markos Renieris (1815-1897) is considered to be the ideological founder of the W-GI ideology.\textsuperscript{175} In his works, he poses the question of “What is Greece? Orient or Occident?”.\textsuperscript{176} The answer should be clear “Greece, by her nature, by her civilization and by historical mission, is West not East … During the age of decline and corruption, at the time of the Byzantines, she seemed to transfigure herself into her opposite”.\textsuperscript{177} As Lukas observes, Renieris along with the W-GI adherents “were not seeking the revival of the Byzantine Empire … but they were aiming at the ‘liberation’ of Hellenism as a whole … a region that encompasses within its limits Constantinople not only as the ‘Royal’ city … of Byzantium but also as the ancient colony of the people of Megara”.\textsuperscript{178} For them, the ‘pure’ non-synthetic Greek space that follows the western-type nationalistic currents will solve the EQ. Obviously, W-O and W-GI, by adopting the western-type nationalism are preaching ‘pure’ Greek/Greek-Orthodox and Turkish/Sunni spaces, allowing no space for toleration and EURASIAN synthesis.

What about the MS-GI and the MS-O schools? Were there efforts to implement the ‘Greek/Ottoman-oriented Byzantinism’ or the ‘Ottoman/Greek-oriented Ottomanism’ in the HMS? The following analysis will attempt to demonstrate that the EURASIAN trend always existed, either in the form of ‘Byzantinottomanism’ during the years of

\begin{itemize}
\item[175] Lukas, \textit{Sea Power and the Greek State}, p. 95
\item[176] Peckam, \textit{National Histories, Natural States}, p. 47
\item[177] Ibid., p. 48; Lukas, \textit{Sea Power and the Greek State}, p. 97
\item[178] Lukas, \textit{Sea Power and the Greek State}, p. 95
\end{itemize}
Chapter 4  Turkish Quest for ‘Identity’

the OE or in the form of ‘Greek-Turkism’ during the TR years. Serious efforts towards a synthetic approach between the Greek and Turkish element could be traced in the (a) Tanzimat (b) YT (c) Post-YT periods.

(a) During the 1850s, the first weak voices were raised towards a rapprochement between the two countries. The Crimean War is stressing the increasing danger of the Russian factor against the integrity of the OE. Western powers, in their effort to prevent the NW from controlling the HMS, were favoring a closer relationship between Greece and OE. Within this environment, the “elite Ottoman Greeks”, for example Andreas Coromilis and Iacovos Pitsipios, are proposing a composite view, in the form of a Byzantinottoman empire, as a solution to the problems of the people of the region. Russian expansionism (1870s) that will “activate the Bulgarian factor” automatically “creates coiling reflexes between Ottomans and Greeks”. Three main official efforts could be reported during this period towards the materialization of a Byzantinottoman scheme. First, Stefanos Skouloudis (1838-

179 This concept was first introduced by Kitsikis (1966) in order to describe with one word “a) a cultural phenomenon, the cohabitation and interdependence, from the 11th century of Hellenism and Turkism, b) an ideology based on this cultural phenomenon that aims to establish a Greek-Turkish political aggregation”. See, Kitsikis, Greek-Turkish Comparative History in the Twentieth Century, pp. 62-63.


183 Lukas, Sea Power and the Greek State, p. 121; It would be indicative of the common interest of the Greek and Ottoman elements to contain the Slavic penetration in the region to note that the leader of the Ottoman delegation to the Congress of Berlin (13 June-13 July 1878) that amended the Treaty of St. Stefano (3 March 1878) was a Greek-Ottoman Karatheodoris Paşa whose fervent efforts to defend Ottoman, and thus Greek, interests forced the Secretary of the French delegation Charles de Mouy to write in his memoirs that “he couldn’t believe how it was possible a Greek to demonstrate such a faith in the OE” ibid., p. 129. By keeping OE intact as much as possible Greek element was safeguarding its position in the Balkans since it was not loosing territories in favor of the Bulgarians Lukas, I. ‘The Geopolitics of Free-Masonry and the “Greek-Turkish Friendship”’, Geopolitics, Vol. 2 (Athens, Dec. 1999), p. 17.
185), a Sultan’s Banker\textsuperscript{184} and later Prime Minister (PM) (1915-1916) of Greece, along with GV (1871-1872, 1875-1876) Mahmud Nedim Paşa (1818-1883) tried to enhance a Greek-Ottoman economic cooperation (1875), challenging the great western semi-colonial financial control of the OE\textsuperscript{185} and to “oppose Slavic imperialism” as well.\textsuperscript{186} Due to the strong opposition on behalf of the Anglo-French factor they are ‘loosing’ the ‘game’.\textsuperscript{187} Regardless of the efforts to contain Russian expansion, their ‘uncontrollable’ actions that harmed the Western interests did not allow the Western powers to help them. Second, the revolution of 1876, for which there is ample evidence that it was instigated by the Anglo-French factor,\textsuperscript{188} brought to power Sultan Murâd V (reign 1876). The main “key” figures that brought him on the throne were, GV (1872, 1876-1877), Midhad Paşa (1822-1883) and the Greek banker Cleanthis Scalieris.\textsuperscript{189} The cooperation between these three towards a synthetic Greek-Ottoman architecture had started well before these developments and had wide implications for the history of the region the following years.\textsuperscript{190} As Hanioğlu observes, “Scalieri devoted himself to the establishment of a new Byzantine state. He envisioned a state that would unite Turks and Greeks beneath the shadow of an enlightened Ottoman sultan”.\textsuperscript{191} At that time the intervening external factor was Russia, since it realized that a UHMS under western influence might harm decisively its interests. St. Petersburg instigated a general Slavic insurrection in the Balkans with the resulting ‘Eastern Crisis’ of 1877-78 and achieved the deposition of Murâd.\textsuperscript{192}

\textsuperscript{184} See, Berkes, The Development of Secularism in Turkey, p. 143
\textsuperscript{185} See, Kitsikis, History of the Ottoman Empire, pp. 250-251
\textsuperscript{186} Hanioğlu, M., Ş. The Young Turks in Opposition (Oxford, 1995), p. 35
\textsuperscript{187} See, Berkes, The Development of Secularism in Turkey, p. 143
\textsuperscript{188} See Lukas, I. The History of the Greek Free-Masonry and the Greek History (in Greek) (Athens 1991), p. 159
\textsuperscript{189} Hanioğlu, The Young Turks in Opposition, p. 34
\textsuperscript{190} See, Appendix 20, p. 385
\textsuperscript{191} Hanioğlu, The Young Turks in Opposition, p. 34
\textsuperscript{192} See, ibid, pp. 35-36; Lukas, The History of the Greek Free-Masonry and the Greek History, pp. 158-160; Mazis, Geopolitics, p. 506-508
Third, after the Treaty of St. Stefano, Greece believes that the “Slavic danger is more serious than the Turkish one”. Consequently, the PM (1865, 1870, 1872-74, 1876, 1877) Epaminondas Deligiorgis (1829-1879), supported by Britain, worked for a “close approach and collaboration between Greeks and Turks”, as the requirement for “a renaissance of the East originating from the East”, thus he is considered to be “the first Greek politician oriented towards the vision of the Greek-Turkish rapprochement”. In this framework, Deligiorgis and Midhad created a custom union agreement that was not implemented due to dramatic events in OE. Moreover, individual voices, like Stefanos Xenos (1876), were raised to further support these efforts. The Sultan’s banker, Georgios Zarifis, in a discussion with the British ambassador, presented (1878) a plan of a dual-headed Greek-Ottoman scheme, like the one of Austo-Hungary. However, “England refused to support his plan because Liberal cycles … were … thinking the idea of a ‘Greater Greece’ that would replace … the OE”. Georgios-Typaldos Iakovatos was raising his voice (1879-1880) in the parliament in order to promote even a non-balanced scheme. Iakovatos was preaching the ‘voluntarily’ incorporation of Greece to the OE by abolishing important state, economic and military rights in favor of the OE. Despite all these efforts, the Hamidian regime established for thirty years an Islamic eur-ASIAN identity and only with the 1908 revolution and the hopes for Ottoman ‘democratization’ this debate found a fertile ground to flourish again.

193 Lukas, *The History of the Greek Free-Masonry and the Greek History*, p. 165
194 Mazis, *Geopolitics*, pp. 506-507. It would be worth mentioning that as Mazis (p. 506) notes, “during the initiation of Prince Murad” (20/10/1872) to the mysteries of Freemasonry “the Temple’s ritual was attended” by Deligiorgis being a PM of Greece that time (7/1872-2/1874)
195 Lukas, *Sea Power and the Greek State*, p. 126
196 Lukas, *The History of the Greek Free-Masonry and the Greek History*, p. 166
197 Ortayli, *The Greeks and Ottoman Administration During the Tanzimat Period*, p. 98
198 Lukas, *Sea Power and the Greek State*, pp. 129-130
199 See, ibid., pp. 130-131; Lukas, *The Geopolitics of Free-Masonry and the “Greek-Turkish Friendship”*, p. 17
(b) For ten years (1908-1918), CUP by preaching ‘Ottomanism’ gives hopes to the MS-GI and MS-O adherents. Nevertheless, CUP’s W-O, is the dominant ideology. However, the YT are divided into two main factions, the ruling one, which supports the W-O, under Ahmed Riza and the group under Prince Sabahaddin’s leadership, which supports a MS-O. The MS-O current was a coalition of Turks, Greeks, Albanians and Armenians whereas Ahmed Riza’s group “had not a single Christian member”. On the eve of the revolution, Riza’s group could be best described as “Turkish nationalists” that “gained the upper hand in the CUP” and “chose to replace the term Ottoman to Turk”. Sabahaddin’s group, which “genuinely believed” in Ottomanism is being infiltrated by Greek-Masonic elements and supports deep reformation, decentralization and liberties to the national communities. The difference between these two groups was unbridgeable since, as Berges points out, “The right of maintaining [the ethnic groups] autonomy, cultural and political, which meant union to the separatists [MS-O], meant dissolution to the Unionists [W-O]”.

In Greece, the MS-GI current has gained public and official support since the Greeks perceive the Slavic-Bulgarian threat as the main adversary in the Balkan Ottoman provinces. Thus, they tried to contain them in cultural, political and military terms.

The army officer Athanasios-Souliotis Nikolaidis (1878-1945) and his comrade

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200 For the initial enthusiastic reactions to the YT revolution in relation to Greek-Ottoman fraternity and a potential alliance against the ‘Slavic’ threat, from the official Greek state and the public opinion see, Kitsikis, Greek-Turkish Comparative History in the Twentieth Century, p. 103; Lukas, Sea Power and the Greek State, pp. 193-194; Suliotes-Nicolaides, A. Constantinople’s Organization (in Greek) (Athens-Giannina 1984). p. 60
201 Hanioğlu, The Young Turks in Opposition, p. 198
202 Ibid. p. 216
203 Zürcher, Turkey, p.133
204 Hanioğlu, The Young Turks in Opposition, pp. 38-39
205 See, Berkes, The Development of Secularism in Turkey, pp. 309-313, 329-333
206 Ibid., p. 331; brackets added
diplomat and prolific writer Ion Dragoumis (1878-1920) created secret organizations to combat in an ‘undeclared’ war the Slavic aggression both in Thessaloniki and in Constantinople and seek a ‘rapprochement’ with the OE. Souliotis’s foresighted analysis shows the *raison d’être* of Greek-Turkism, thus it could be argued that it is the milestone for the development of the HMS geopolitical/geocultural approach

The geographical unit that is being comprised by the Balkans and Asia Minor is being inhabited by small nations and states. These two peninsulas are holding one of the most important crossroads of the world. For this reason we are under constant political, economic … pressure by the Great Powers … This pressure is being further facilitated … by us … due to our endless struggles … which cannot end to the total domination of one over the others. Thus, no Balkan or Asian Minor state can stand to its feet … despite all the small successes that might achieve the one against the other … But … we are kindred between each other, we are much more related than the fanatic … education has made us believe … for generations our ancestors were mixed … lived as citizens of the same state, the Byzantine, for more than one thousand years, and now under the Ottoman, thus we are having so many common cultural elements that the aggregate of our distinct cultures constitutes a special kind of civilization within the general civilization of the world … If I could make them all see how close they are, how much they endanger their very existence by mutual extinction, how much happier would be if they were cooperating … at the end they might find the political system that could unite them … which would not be a copy of the known European ones … I had the conviction that this so difficult plan was the only one that could save Hellenism … and only with the dream of the Great Idea [W-GI] we were surely moving to destruction … Ion … was dazzled by the Idea of the Eastern Coalition … Setting aside our reservations … we started trying to materialize the coalition of the nations of the East. The new polity was a chance … Hellenism should try to cooperate with the Young Turks … if the cooperation with them would be impossible we would try to … cooperate against them … with all the nations of Turkey [OE] even with the Muslims … we were not sure if the Bulgarians would cooperate with us …

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208 A leading personality of anti-Occidentalism and Byzantinottomanism as the solution for the regeneration of the ‘East’ and the containment of the Slavic danger. See, Dragoumis, I. *To All the Alive* (in Greek) (Athens 1992); Dragoumis, I. *My Hellenism and the Greeks* (in Greek) (Athens, 1991); Giannopoulos, P. *Westernmania: The Greek Color Towards the Greek Regeneration* (in Greek) (Athens 1996); Sokolis, S., K. *Empire* (Athens, 1993); Peckam, *National Histories, Natural States*, pp. 40, 81-87

209 See, the memoirs, Souliotes-Nicolaides, *Constantinople’s Organization*; Souliotes-Nicolaides, A. *The Struggle for Macedonia*

210 Souliotes-Nicolaides, *Constantinople’s Organization*, pp. 60-64; brackets & stressing added
So, the Greek MS-GI current cooperated closely with the Sabahaddin’s MS-O current against the W-O CUP,\textsuperscript{211} which had adopted a clear pro-Slavic policy and was trying to confine the Greek leverage.\textsuperscript{212} The plan, which was under the auspices of the whole Greek political scene and became accepted by Sbahhadin’s fraction,\textsuperscript{213} was to challenge the pro-Slavic and nationalistic CUP, and to establish such Greek-Ottoman relations, following the older plans for a “Custom Union”, in order for an “Eastern State to be created”, including Romania too.\textsuperscript{214} One revolution (April 1909) and a much more organized plot (1911), not even affected by the Balkan Wars, that was postponed the last minute by the Greek government were the fruits of the cooperation between the two sides. The plan was the custom union program and the creation of a joint fleet to defend the Straits from the Russians.\textsuperscript{215} The MS-GI and MS-O fractions almost succeeded in making the ‘ideal’ of a MS ecumenical state a touchable reality. However, the W-GI and W-O were the dominant ideologies and almost two decades had to pass in order for the UHMS ideal to flourish again. Since then, OE became TR and ‘Byzantinottomanism’ was transformed to ‘Greek-Turkism’.

PM Venizelos and Atatürk, after combating, (1912-1922), initiated another historic rapprochement at a level that “suggested some kind of unification of the two countries”.\textsuperscript{216} With a series of meetings, agreements and pacts (10/6/1930, 9/1930, 211 Ibid., p. 78
212 Ibid., pp. 208-209.
213 Ibid; Lukas, The History of the Greek Free-Masonry and the Greek History, p. 216
214 Suliotes-Nicolaides, Constantinople’s Organization, p. 208-209
216 Volkan & Itzkowitz, The Immortal Atatürk, p. 494; Venizelos’s remarks (10 May 1935) that “you will see that within the next twenty years with Turkey we will create an Eastern federation” and KA’s attitudes making people think that he “was an Apostle … of some kind of a broad Greek-Turkish Empire in the East, a dual-headed Empire with two administrative capitals and with one spiritual, the Augustus’s City … the royal city of a whole eastern world” are indicative of the situation. Kitiskis, History of the Greek-Turkish Space, pp. 19, 27

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9/1931, 14/9/1933) due to a “shared fear of Bulgarian irredentism” a common guarantee of the borders was established and there was an effort to present common delegations in international conferences. West, since it already had these countries under its control, and in an anti-Bolshevik stance, supported these efforts. For the indigenous population, the aim was the creation of a Pan-Balkan Union. However, these efforts were lodged with the conclusion of the less ambitious Balkan Pact (1934) with Greece, Turkey, Yugoslavia and Romania as its members. The coming WWII’s groupings forced the Balkan states to prepare themselves for a new ‘round’. However, Turkish Foreign Affairs Minister (1942-1944) Numan Menemecioğlu said (6 November 1942) that due to the Soviet threats the solution would be “a strong Turkey indissoluble affined with Greece, both of them naturally depended on Great Britain. This block … would be dominant in the Balkans, overwhelming the creation of any South Slavic formation totally connected with the Northern Slavs”.

(c) The post-YT period starts with the simultaneous incorporation of Greece and Turkey in NATO (18 February 1950). Within this framework, PM (1945, 1950, 1951-52) Nikolaos Plastiras (1883-1953) proposes (April-May 1952) to PM Adnan Menderes the creation of a “Greek-Turkish union”. However, the Cyprus issue emerges and shadows the bilateral relations. The most serious effort towards Greek-Turkism is taking place from the military controlled governments in both countries

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217 Zürcher, Turkey, p. 210
218 Kitsikis, History of the Greek-Turkish Space, p. 26
219 London Times passage (12 June 1930) is indicative “Greeks and Turks have important common interests … their territories … are exactly match the Byzantine territory of the end of the 10th century, when the armies of its European and Asian provinces under the leadership of a Caesar coming form Asia Minor, repelled the Russian invaders”. See, ibid., p. 29
220 See, Lukas, History of the Greek Free-Masonry and the Greek History, pp. 242-244
221 See, Zürcher, Turkey: A Modern History, p. 210
222 Iliades, The Secret Archives of the German Ministry of Foreign Affairs and of the Foreign Office for Turkey, p. 213
223 Lukas, ‘The Geopolitics of Free-Masonry and the “Greek-Turkish Friendship”’, p. 19
during the 60s and 70s. This EURASIAN stance was further encouraged by the West, since both countries were under the NATO umbrella/control and were discouraged by the NW – USSR through the local Communist parties. Nevertheless, the escalated Cyprus problem, the Turkish invasion (20/7/1974) and the illegal occupation of 37% of the island up until nowadays buried any further hope. Kitsikis rightly observes that “the Cyprus issue was … the main cause of the failure to any unification efforts” and its solution is the necessary precondition, exactly as it was for Sabahaddin and Souliotis the Cretan issue in their era, for any further step on regenerating an after all geopolitical/geocultural reality, that is the establishment of a EURASIAN Greek-Turkish political scheme which might solve many security issues – especially for Greece, and many identity issues– especially for Turkey.

This synthetic ideological trend is mainly based on the observation that only a UHMS, meaning southern Balkans and AM, at least up until the TSKA line, could act independently, as the Byzantine and early Ottoman empires did, and become a first class Eurasian power. The ‘lethal’ military/political ‘internal’ pressure that the NW of the MS exerts to the HMS in order to get access to the Straits and the Aegean, either directly or through ‘satellites’, causes an important ‘collateral damage’. The West exercises a consequent ‘external’ pressure on the HMS in order to contain the NW

224 The leader of the Greek military coup and PM (1967-1973) Georgios Papadopoulos (1919-1999) says (29/5/1971) “I believe that history leads us towards a federation between Greece and Turkey. It might be implemented in 20 or 50 years. But it is going to be done … If we accept the unification then our strength against the larger states is not going simply to double but is going to multiply”. Turkish PM (1971-72) Nihat Erim (1912-1980) publicly reciprocates (15/7/1971) “I used to believe that Turkey is the natural ally of Greece and I still believe that … I was always stressing that Cyprus could act as the specific paradigm of Ataturk’s and Venizelos’s ideals, that is the establishment one day of some kind of federation between Greece and Turkey” and he continues by claiming that “I always believed that in the international scene Turkey and Greece equals not two but ten, twenty, thirty, due to the fact that our potentials [if we are united] are increasing not arithmetically but geometrically”. Kitsikis, History of the Greek-Turkish Space, pp. 306, 309-310; brackets added

225 See, ibid., pp. 307, 311-313; Lukas, ‘The Geopolitics of Free-Masonry and the “Greek-Turkish Friendship”’, p. 20

226 Kitsikis, History of the Greek-Turkish Space, p. 314
and enter this region. The solution to this dual problem – contain the ‘internal’ NW and emancipating by the ‘external’ West was only the unity of the core-area of the HMS that is, at least of Greeks and Turks. The problem was that both West and NW every time they realized that they could not ‘control’ the whole area, they refused to see it united. They would allow the unification only if they were able to control the whole region. Thus, through an external, West and SW, superimposed ‘divide and rule’ process, the nations of the HMS instead of uniting themselves in the ‘natural’ UHMS synthetic formation and gain real power, they were fighting using nationalistic/religious argumentation for small pieces of lands that might make them a little bigger but definitely not stronger and able to face the challenges of the international system. Of course, this process is diachronic and only the names are changing while the essence remains the same. Since they cannot completely control HMS, the West and NW powers use the one or the other actor in order to promote their interests and ‘keep the balance’. Conversely, for a UHMS the answer in the past was ‘Byzantinottomanism’ and the answer now is ‘Greek-Turkism’. Despite this ‘Synthesis’, the final part of this research will try to depict the ‘Antithesis’ of the ‘divide and rule’ policies used by both the West and the NW, starting from the Middle Ages and reaching the contemporary geopolitical and IR architecture of the region.

However, before this research proceeds to the last part of the thesis, dealing with the “Antithesis” aspect of the IR of the MS, the reader should not fail to notice a substantial difference on the identity debate between the Turkish and the Russian case. Unlike the Russian case that was presented briefly but hopefully in an adequate manner in chapter 3, the Turkish identity, that is the geocultural/geopolitical debate, could not be divided in clear-cut traditional geopolitical frames. In other words, the
Turkish geopolitical/geocultural debate could not be easily identified in a modern geopolitical terminology since there is no geopolitical tradition in Turkey. Besides the systematic ideas of the new Turkish foreign minister professor Ahmed Davutoglu, which are presented in chapter 5 of this research - proposing a kind of geopolitical alternative for his country mainly through the notion of “strategic-depth”, Turkey, is being characterized by geopolitical “poverty”. For this reason, the main distinction that could be made for the Turkish case has to do mainly with the civilizational aspect of its “space”. That is how historically the “European” and the “Asiatic” element interacted and worked either on different levels of cooperation or on different levels of friction throughout the historical vita of what is called today Turkey and Turkish identity. The aim of this research was to try to systematize something which was never before presented through this angle and was never before scrutinized in the literature in relation to the issue of “eurasianism”. This approach indicates the different periods with their representatives, mainly through a “geocultural” analysis. In a few words, it could be argued that the way that the different trends - mainly political and not intellectual, in the OE and the TR, were presented aim to propose an initial geopolitical/geocultural delimitation and stratification which was never existed before in the identity debate about Turkey and could be found useful for further research in the future.
Part III:

Antithesis-The ‘Eastern Question’ and the ‘Great Game’ of the Median Space: ‘Disunited’ Heartland, Northern Wing and the West

“The regional alignments in Eurasia are an important dimension in the emerging international politics of Eurasia. As such, they need to be further discussed, analyzed and managed. The lack of this could make the deterioration of relations in case of regional crises, and ultimately the risk of escalation of hostilities more salient than it already is today”

1 Cornell, ‘Geopolitics and Strategic Alignments in the Caucasus and Central Asia’, p. 11
CHAPTER FIVE
The Heartland-Northern Wing Relations and the ‘Eastern Question’: A Macroscopic Analysis

5.1 The Byzantine and Russian Medieval Period (9th-15th c.)

Eastern Europe, where the Byzantine Orthodox Commonwealth was fighting for its survival, must be seen as a single whole, if the actions and the reactions of its individual member-states are to be understood in their proper context. This period could be divided into two major sub-periods, the UHMS (800-1071) and the DHMS (1071-1453) periods. During the first period, BE reaches its peak and controls the whole territory, which is comprised of the HMS. Byzantium, as the dominant Eurasian power, exerts its leverage to all the regional geopolitical groupings of its environment. The Semitic SW has been contained and retreats after three hundred years of bitter conflict for domination in the Heartland. The Slavic NW is being formulated under the protective auspices of the cultural, spiritual, economic and political influence of Byzantium. In the West, a separate identity is gradually formulated due to the Byzantine focus in the Balkans and in the east. The Pope finds a new protector in the Frankish Kingdom. Iconoclasm and the Photian Schism are concluding the picture of a diversion of interests between HMS and the West. The proclamation of an emperor in the West is just the visible sign of this division.

5 See, Savvides, Byzantium-Medieval World-Islam, pp. 119-140
Moreover, Venice is transformed from a Byzantine province into a fully independent city-state and acquires wealth through its political and economic cooperation with Byzantium. The Venetian power is based on a sea-trade in the Straits, the Aegean and the Adriatic – the Black Sea is still a Byzantine exclusive “lake”. Venice’s activities are being developed under the auspices of the Byzantine naval supremacy and the Venetian fleet. Therefore, a unified Byzantine Heartland was able, paraphrasing a well-known expression, to keep the NW (Russians) in, the SW (Arabs) out and the West (Pope, western empire, Venice) down.

The two major strategic commercial roads of that era indicate the major importance of the unified space of the lands that surround the BSSA. The North-South axis connects Heartland with the NW. The famous route “from the Varangians to the Greeks”, from the Baltic sea through the rivers of Russia and Ukraine to the Black Sea and Constantinople served as the dominant geopolitical/geocultural link between the Heartland and the NW. The Russians were “fighting a national crusade … to keep open at all costs the economic life-line of Russia, the water route to Byzantium”. Even Kiev’s foundation on the specific region which “was more accessible to any hordes of mounted nomadic warriors” thus, it was “hardly a propitious spot”, was a necessity for the Russians and this necessity was dictated by the need to have open communications with the Black Sea and Constantinople. Russians appeared in the Straits through a surprise sea-born attack (860). Wells correctly observed that, “Never before had Constantinople been attacked by a naval fleet from the north”. Since that

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6 See, Nicol, D., M. Byzantium and Venice (in Greek) (Athens, 2004)
7 See, Wells, Sailing from Byzantium, p. 220; Meyendorff, Byzantium and the Rise of Russia, p. 3; Obolensky, The Byzantine Commonwealth, pp. 25, 39-41
8 Ibid., p. 41
9 Wells, Sailing from Byzantium, pp. 226-227
10 Ibid., p. 179
year, the NW power launches its eternal efforts to access the warm waters of the Heartland. One hundred years later, Svyatolav (967) storms Bulgaria and intends to make Little Preslav in Bulgaria his new capital. Moreover, he urges the Byzantines to “withdraw from Europe … and retire to Asia”. The issue was settled once and for all with a victorious Byzantine campaign (971). The conversion of the Russians to the Greek-Orthodox faith and their multilevel affiliation to the Heartland solved the security issue from the north, since as loyal subjects firstly and allies afterwards of Byzantium they functioned in a way to keep the trade route open and to compete the Turanic hordes of the Kentron of MS that were advancing Westwards. The Russians were actually serving Byzantium in keeping the Black Sea under direct Byzantine rule. So, “By the year 1000” NW is dominated by Heartland, and as Obolensky observes “there had come into being a community of states and nations, extending from the Gulf of Finland to the Southern Peloponnese, and from the Adriatic sea to the Caucasus, all of which owed allegiance to the Byzantine Church and empire. At that time, too, this East European community acquired an unprecedented hitherto cultural and political cohesion.”

The second route is the East-West axis. The Silk Road passes from the Byzantine Empire and via the Aegean and Adriatic reaches Venice and then the rest of Europe. Venice, from its establishment (6th century) until the 11th has acted as a province, a protectorate, an ally, and finally a partner of the BE. Moreover, from the 9th century,

12 See, Schlumberger, G Emperor John Tsimisces and the Byzantine Epopee, (in Greek) (Athens), pp. 73-203
13 See, Obolensky, The Byzantine Commonwealth, pp.188-200
15 Obolensky, The Byzantine Commonwealth, p. 203
16 Nicol, Byzantium and Venice, pp. 21-99
the Byzantines, by signing treaties with the West secured on behalf of Venice all the
necessary conditions for this small city to flourish and develop its overseas commerce
without any security concern.\textsuperscript{17} In a few words, as Obolensky notes in a farsighted
passage, “The Byzantine Empire, which was a sea-power during much of its history,
inherited the trade relations which since remote antiquity had linked the
Mediterranean with Asia and continental Europe” thus “Destined – or condemned –
by its geographic position …”\textsuperscript{18} the Byzantines believed that the “Roman pride was
its Imperial Fleet”.\textsuperscript{19} The re-conquest of Crete by the Byzantines from the Arabs (961)
demonstrates the reality of these words. In the largest amphibious attack since the era
of the …Trojan War and up until the D-day the Byzantines gathered 3,306 ships –
2,000 warships and used them for liberating the island.\textsuperscript{20} In other words, a UHMS
exerted full control of the BSSA and up until the 11\textsuperscript{th} century the Byzantine Imperial
Fleet was the main guarantor of this geopolitical reality.

The DHMS period could also be split into two. The era (1071-1341) that could be
characterized with fragmentation of the Heartland between the Byzantines and the
Turkish Emirates accompanied with a strong penetration of the Western factor. It is
followed by a period (1341-1453) that designates the gradual Ottomanization-
reunification of the Heartland and the expulsion of the Western powers once more.

The year 1071 signals a turning point for Byzantium. The fall of Bari in the west and
the battle of Manzikert in the east demonstrate the visible decline of the Empire. As a
result of these events, the last stand in Italy was lost by the Normans and Byzantium

\textsuperscript{17} Ibid., p. 42
\textsuperscript{18} Obolensky, The Byzantine Commonwealth, p. 277
\textsuperscript{19} Kargakos, I., S. The Byzantine Navy: The Impact of Naval Power in the Heyday and Decline of the
Byzantine Empire (in Greek), (Athens, 2007), p. 115
\textsuperscript{20} Ibid., pp. 82-83; Norwich A Short History of Byzantium, pp. 296-301
was permanently expelled from the West. In addition, the whole AM was ruined and its eastern-central half was permanently lost to the Turks. Byzantium loses its direct contact with the West and Byzantine Heartland is being divided into a Byzantine and a Turkish half. Byzantium becomes more receptive first to the economic and then to the political, military and cultural penetration by the West. Five Western poles in different combinations are affecting the Heartland. The Pope, the Venetians and Genoese, the Normans of South Italy, the German Emperors, and of course the Crusaders are interacting in the Heartland with the weakened Byzantines. From the Kentron of the MS the Mongol-Turanic element that moves westwards and occupies vast spaces constitutes the major threat against the HMS, the NW and the SW. In the early 13th century, the Byzantine Heartland and the Russian NW experience almost simultaneously a serious setback. The forth ‘crusade’ (1204) ‘diverts’ towards Constantinople and the Greek lands focused on the Aegean whereas the Mongol invasions conquered the Russian space. Kiev falls (1240) to the Mongols and the Tatar kingdom of the Golden Horde is being established with its center in the lower Volga. The liberation of Constantinople (1261) by the Byzantines along with the temporal revitalization of the empire focused mainly on the western AM and the mainland of Greece, but that did not change the main picture of a fragmented HMS. The year 1341 signifies the beginning of a devastating Byzantine civil war that puts an end to any hope of a true revival and demarcates the irreversible process of the Ottomanization of the HMS for the next one hundred years.

During the DHMS period, the Byzantine ‘half’ turns to the West with mixed feelings. The Byzantines, especially after 1204, are adopting a distinct ‘Hellenized’ identity in order to be distinguished from the ‘Latins’ or the ‘Franks’, namely from the West. At
the same time, despite the differences and the mutual animosity, they acknowledge common elements and they are asking for aid against the Turkish and Muslim tide. The West, having evaluated through centuries of interaction the enormous strategic and geopolitical advantages of the HMS is looking forward to replace the ‘schismatic’ Roman Empire with a westernized ‘righteous’ one. What was happening was that, when the one half of the Heartland was asking for aid against the other half, then the West was conditioning its help on the issue of ‘Westernization’/‘modernization’. For the West of that era the issue of ‘Westernization’ meant only one thing, subjugation to Papal authority. The Byzantines would find help only when they became Catholics. 21

So, it could be observed that from the 11th century the West widely adopts and actively puts forward as a prerequisite of any help the concept of ‘Westernization’ – whatever this concept entails in each era for the people of the MS. Ever since, this diachronic conceptual western ‘arrogance’ became the main legitimizing force for intervention in the HMS, usually in order to keep the HMS disunited and under control, and for the best service of the Western interests. This was mostly happening when the Heartland was divided.

The main factor that demarcated the weakening of the Byzantine Heartland was the Western penetration into the seas and the subsequent Byzantine loss of control of the economic and military activity in the BSSA. The numerous commercial treaties with Venice and Genoa that took the form of preferential treatment towards them, their privileges, their bitter competition along with the weakening of the Imperial and the mercantile fleet had a negative result for the Byzantines: they lost the complete control of the cohesive element of the Heartland, the sea. Brehier pinpoints that

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21 See, Nicol, Byzantium and Venice, pp. 82-84
Byzantium’s peak “was when it was projecting sea supremacy, when Byzantium lost this monopoly, its misfortunes are starting. The inefficiencies of its naval forces … should be considered among the grave causes of its collapse”. 22 When the sea was lost, Byzantium fell to the ‘Crusaders’ and when the Byzantines needed fleet to regain Constantinople they allied with Genoa and in return they ‘opened’ the Black Sea to them. The vicious circle of alliances and counter-alliances resulted in constant and gradual economic and military dependence on the Western sea powers, and when the Byzantines realized what was really happening, they were unable to regain the control of the seas. 23 On the contrary, as long as the West was penetrating and exploiting the fragmented Heartland, the NW was demonstrating a remarkable loyalty towards its core mother-region, Byzantium. 24 Under the Tatar yoke, the Russian lands were fragmented to many principalities with competing interests. The only cohesive element between them was the “Metropolitan of Kiev and All Russia” which was a direct appointee of Byzantium. “The national unity of Russia”, Meyendorff notes, “was, in fact, inseparable from the nation’s ties with Christian universalism, represented by a metropolitan appointed from Byzantium”. 25 Thanks to this cultural affinity, Russians managed not to be more scattered and to preserve their national distinctiveness. 26 Despite the loss of direct economic and political contact during these grave years, the Byzantine Heartland and the Russian NW were developing strong spiritual bonds.

22 Kargakos, The Byzantine Navy, p.23
24 Obolensky, The Byzantine Commonwealth, pp.230-32; Meyendorff, Byzantium and the Rise of Russia, p. 5
25 Meyendorff, Byzantium and the Rise of Russia, p. 17
26 Ibid., p. 3; Wells, Sailing from Byzantium, p. 249
During the second period of the DHMS era, there is a total transformation of the fragmented Heartland into one coherent revitalized but under a different identity geopolitical/geocultural unit. Throughout this period, the moribund BE, comprised of scattered pieces in the Balkans and the Aegean, is struggling for survival with the help of the West. The West, having ‘squeezed’ Byzantium for centuries, and having nothing else to take now, sides up with the ancient Empire and tries to help it stop the Ottoman expansion. Of course, now it’s too late. Nevertheless, the sea powers of the West are constantly engaged in wars in order to gain or keep the control of the BSSA.27 Despite the generally good relations between the two sides, even in this last hour, Papacy with the synod of Ferrara-Florence (1437-39) presses the Byzantines to yield to Rome.28 The favorable outcome for the Catholics (1439) is nullified due to the absence of any significant help towards the Byzantines, along with the strong opposition of the Byzantine and Russian Greek-Orthodox population.29 During these sad, for the Byzantines, years, the NW demonstrated an amazing loyalty even on the issue of emperor political supremacy.30 Despite the limited political abilities, Byzantium, with its deliberate actions, contributed decisively in the nomination of the Principality of Vladimir and of Moscow as the major heir of the Kievan Russia and as the leading political entity of the Russian nation.31 Moreover, the Russians adopted the main spiritual Greek-Orthodox trends of the Palaeologian period through the teachings of Hesyhasm.32 The only time that the Russians felt betrayed by the Byzantines was with the ‘unification’ of the Churches (1439). Even then they reacted  

27 See, Laiou, ‘Marino Sanudo Torsello, Byzantium and the Turks’, pp. 374-392; Nicol, Byzantium and Venice, pp. 333-350  
28 See, Norwich, A Short History of Byzantium, pp. 353-355; Vasiliev, History of the Byzantine Empire (volume 2), pp. 393-399  
29 Meyendorff, Byzantium and the Rise of Russia, pp. 268-69; Obolensky, The Byzantine Commonwealth, pp. 267-268  
31 See, Meyendorff, Byzantium and the Rise of Russia, pp. 145-172  
32 See, ibid., pp. 96-144
mildly towards the Byzantines and they simply abrogated the union in practice.\textsuperscript{33} The last Roman Emperor dies on the walls of Constantinople along with the Roman Empire (May the 29\textsuperscript{th} 1453). A new era starts for the HMS.

The major issue for the BE was the lack of sea power. Indicatively, in the year 1347 the Genoese from their colony in Galata, opposite of Constantinople, and by controlling the grain trade from the Black Sea arrogantly claimed that “only them could decide if the citizens of Constantinople would starve to death or not”. In addition, their revenues in Galata were eight times higher than those of the Byzantines.\textsuperscript{34} The Byzantine effort to reverse the situation by building a new fleet resulted into a war against Genoa (1348-1349) however the lack of experience in the sea affairs led very quickly these efforts to failure.\textsuperscript{35} By the year 1354 the situation reached to “a point of no return”.\textsuperscript{36} The main focus since was shifted to the Genoese-Venetian friction for the occupation of the … Byzantine Tenedos. This island outside Dardanelles was offering early warning and secure-storing base against the Ottoman rising naval activity and the trade from/to the Black Sea respectively. The dispute led to wars and international treaties, to the appointment of puppet Emperors by the western sea powers, to civil wars, and ended up (1381) with the proclamation of the island as a “neutral zone”, the deportation of all its population and the destruction of all the facilities on it!\textsuperscript{37} The treaty of Turin (1381) that ended the Venetian-Genoese war, with its provisions about Tenedos demonstrates the enormous geopolitical

\textsuperscript{33} See, Obolensky, \textit{The Byzantine Commonwealth}, pp. 267-270; Wells, \textit{Sailing from Byzantium}, p. 275
\textsuperscript{34} Nicol, \textit{Byzantium and Venice}, p. 333
\textsuperscript{35} See, ibid., pp. 336-341; Nicol, D., M. \textit{The Last Centuries of Byzantium, 1261-1453} (in Greek) (Athens, 2001), pp. 331-394
\textsuperscript{36} Nicol, \textit{Byzantium and Venice}, p. 355
\textsuperscript{37} See, ibid., pp. 341-354, 368-370, 371-394, 417, 433-434
importance of the BSSA for the Western sea powers. Its unprecedented provisions demonstrate the evils that the lack of unity in the HMS brought to its indigenous population. The dispute was only solved with Tenedos’s incorporation to the new UHMS and the OE. Niciforos Gregoras, a late Byzantine scholar, recapitulates the essence of the whole historical process in geopolitical terms and epitomizes the whole argument by saying that “It would have never been possible for the Latins [West] to be so audacious towards the Greeks and the Turks would have never seen the sand of the sea if the Greek naval power was dominating like the old times”.

5.2 The Ottoman and Russian Imperial Period (15th – 20th c.)

Modern Russia … was the force turning Turkey to the West. Also its challenges led the West … to extend help in modernizing the Turkish military institutions.

This period could be divided into two sub-periods. The first one (1453-1683) could be characterized as the UHMS period, whereas the second one (1683-1918) could be described as a gradual fragmentation process towards a DHMS. During the first period, the united composite early nature of the OE signals a new era for the Heartland’s hegemonic Eurasian aspirations. The West retreats, and only keeps some insular ‘bastions’ (Crete, Cyprus, Ionian sea). This unification mostly benefited the Greek element, since it took under its control the sea-routes and the economic activity that it had been lost during the last DHMS Byzantine era. Nevertheless, during the DHMS Byzantine era, the West acquired a naval and economic power along with the

38 The magnitude and the repercussions of the dispute over the island of Tenedos, the ‘guard’ of the Dardanelles, bring to mind the friction over the Cretan issue in the 19th century or the Cyprus issue in the 20th century
39 Kargakos, The Byzantine Navy, p. 132
40 Berkes, The Development of Secularism in Turkey, pp. 24-25
41 See, Nicol, Byzantium and Venice, pp. 505-508
42 Kitsikis, Greek-Turkish Comparative History in the Twentieth Century, pp. 58-59
ability and the ‘right’ to infiltrate into HMS through commercial agreements and naval projection of power, something that it was not easy to change. Thus, the Ottomans affirmed and expanded the rights of the Venetians and Genoese. Moreover, a series of capitulations were bestowed to the new naval powers of France, England and Holland. Therefore, the Ottomans, unlike the Byzantines, never managed to ‘sterilize’ HMS from the Western intervention. They managed to contain it through their naval power, which was challenged in the siege of Malta (1565) and collapsed with Lepanto (1571). The signs of the Ottoman retreat were first acknowledged through the economic collapse of the empire late-15th century and the subsequent increasing dependence on the Western sea-powers. The beginning of a new Western advance could be signified through two events. The treaty of Zsitvatőrok (1606), when the Ottomans signed an agreement between two equal sides and with the Venetian occupation of the islands of Lemnos and Tenedos (1656) that triggered the first ‘Westernization’ period of the Köprülüs era.

At the same time, the Russian NW is emerging, claiming Heartland’s cultural and political heritage. There is no official enmity against the new occupier of the HMS, but the matrimonial linkages of the Russian ruling dynasty with the Palaeologian family, the adoption of the Byzantine Imperial insignia and court protocols, along with the enormous cultural and religious affinities with the Byzantine mother-culture created an environment that favored the creation of a “charming” unofficial mytho-history of the “Third Rome”. This attitude was developed during the 14th-16th

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43 See, Kitsikis, History of the Ottoman Empire, pp. 194-201; Berkes, The Development of Secularism in Turkey, pp. 53-55
44 See, Kinross, The Ottoman Centuries, pp. 319-321, 331-334; see, chapter 4
45 Hughes, L. Russia in the Age of Peter the Great (in Greek) (Athens, 2007), p. 106
centuries and created a legitimizing ‘excuse’ for a new thrust southwards. Since the times of pagan Svyatoslav, NW never questioned HMS’s supremacy. The Russians willingly converted to Christianity, incorporated into the Byzantine Commonwealth and acted as guards of the HMS. The collapse of the mother-culture allowed them to repeat their efforts to expand towards the BSSA under the mantle of their ‘benevolent mission’. For the time being, Ottomans and Russians are following a common path and their similarities are striking. During the 16th century both the Russian and the Ottoman political structures were based on the Byzantine prototype. Their universalistic ideologies, their claim of the Byzantine political and cultural heritage, their legislative codes and their type of autocracy are a clear reminiscent of their mother-culture.\textsuperscript{47} HMS and NW constitute a clear common geocultural unit, which disassociates itself from the West. For the West, “both the Ottoman Empire and Russia” were perceived as “two Eurasian states”\textsuperscript{48}. Between them their point of tangency was the steppe in the north of the Black Sea that the Tatar element was functioning as the first line of defense of HMS against the rising power of the NW.\textsuperscript{49} Although Russia had developed the ‘theory’ for legitimizing its thrust towards the South, it had not yet developed the power to implement it.\textsuperscript{50} Since then, the West was not concerned about any threat against the HMS except of its own and definitely not a threat from the North. Until 1683, the West, not the NW, was for the HMS the main challenge. As always, at the time when HMS is ready to collapse, a suitor appears in the form of an internal MS power. For the Byzantines after the 1204 it was the

\textsuperscript{45-60; Meyendorff, Byzantium and the Rise of Russia, pp. 262-278; Obolensky, The Byzantine Commonwealth, 362-370; Vasiliev, ‘Was Old Russia a Vassal State of Byzantium?’, pp. 359-360}
\textsuperscript{49} LeDonne, The Russian Empire and the World, 1700-1917, pp. 10-13
\textsuperscript{50} Hughes, Russia in the Age of Peter the Great, pp. 104-107
Turanic element of the EK. For the Ottomans after the 1683 it was the Slavic element of the NW. The Venetians and the Genoese in the first case, the English and the French in the second case are defending Western ‘rights’ in the HMS against the ‘alien’ threat. By ‘Westernizing’ Heartland’s inhabitants they promise security, protection and well-being.

The second period signals the gradual fragmentation of the HMS. The treaties of Karlowits (1699), Passarowitz (1718) and Küçük Kaynarca (1774) signify the end of the Ottoman expansion, the demonstration of the Ottoman inferiority towards the West and the Ottoman inferiority towards the NW, respectively.\(^{51}\) The implementation of the 1774 treaty launched the debate for the EQ, in its conventional form.

Starting in 1687, and having annexed Kiev (1677)\(^{52}\), the Russian factor feels that the Ottomans, after their major setback in the second siege of Vienna, are weak so the circumstances are favorable for the attempts to reach the Black Sea coast.\(^{53}\) A series of Russo-Ottoman wars (1687-1689, 1695-1696, 1710-1711) gradually allow the Russians to reach the Black Sea, through the Sea of Azov. Meanwhile Armenia-Georgia and Azerbaijan became another point of friction between Ottomans, Persians and Russians. A new Russo-Ottoman war (1735-1739) and a constant friction in Caucasus (1740s-1750s) manifested a Russian constant move southwards. The major development was the Russian official manifestation, for the first time, of their ambitions for the Black Sea. The Russians claimed unsuccessfully (1737) Crimea, the

\(^{51}\) See, chapter 4
\(^{52}\) LeDonne, The Russian Empire and the World, p. 89
\(^{53}\) Ibid., p. 90
Black Sea coast up until Danube in the west and Kuban in the east. However, the Russian breakthrough to the area came with the wars of 1768-1774 and 1787-1792. For the first time the Russian fleet appears in the Aegean (1770), the Christian Ottoman elements, especially the Greeks are fighting with the Russians (1769-1774), the Straits are opening to commercial ships sailing under the Russian flag (1774), the Russian border reaches Moldavia and the Russian army reaches Poti in Georgia. In Azov, Russia could not build a navy. However, with the annexation of Crimea (1783) Russia has the ability to create a naval base in Sevastopol and build a fleet. Until then, the Western powers, mostly England and France, were not sensing any threat against their interests. The British permission to the Baltic fleet to reach the Aegean in the 1768-1774 war was not reaffirmed in the 1787-1792 one. The English were alarmed when they realized that Russia could control the BSSA. The various Russian partition plans of the OE (1775, 1782, 1787) were confirming the Western fears. The Russian provisions for occupying Aegean islands for the “security and facility of commerce” along with the ambition to create a Russian-controlled BE transformed the British policy. Initially, London believed (1770) that Russia was “impossible” to become a “rival capable of giving us jealousy either as a commercial or as a warlike maritime power”. The developments however made them claim (1790) that if British “friendship has made [the Russians] what they are, our enmity can easily reduce them to what they ought to be”. In the midst of the EQ debate, four (1806-1812, 1827-1829, 1853-56 and 1877-78) major Russo-Ottoman wars took place with the direct intervention of the Western powers and with the result of a constant Ottoman

54 See, ibid., pp. 99-100; Kinross, The Ottoman Centuries, pp. 386-390
55 See, Kinross, The Ottoman Centuries, pp. 395-413; LeDonne, The Russian Empire and the World, pp. 104-111; Macfie, The Eastern Question 1774-1923, pp. 1-9
56 LeDonne, The Russian Empire and the World, p. 107
57 See, ibid., p. 108; Kinross, The Ottoman Centuries, pp.406-409; Macfie, The Eastern Question, p. 8
58 LeDonne, The Russian Empire and the World, p. 296
59 Ibid., p. 299
weakening and the further fragmentation of the HMS. The main three issues in all wars was the Russian military build-up in the Black Sea, the status of the Straits - are they open or not for warships and for whom and under what circumstances - and the domination of the Aegean – who is going to control Greece and what is going to happen with the islands, especially with Crete and Cyprus. A ‘collateral damage’ of the rather unsuccessful Russian efforts in the HMS was St. Petersburg’s diversification of its efforts towards the EK, Central Asia and the triggering of the so-called ‘Great Game’ (from 1860s). What could be observed from the actions and counteractions of the competing parties was that a “political and moral barrier” which if crossed would cause “a passionate reaction in Britain and a grim determination to call a halt to Russian expansion” was Danube and the Straits. The Roman/Byzantine *limes* of the HMS had become once more a practical/psychological and ideological dividing line between two geopolitical camps. Moreover, the Russian contemporary notion of ‘Near Abroad’ (NA) was actually articulated long before. Karl Nesselrode argued (1816) that, “Asiatic affairs were in fact Russia’s “domestic affairs””. From the mid-19th century, the whole situation was further complicated through the entrance of the German factor in the region. This ‘revisionist’ power was gradually taking control of the OE, namely the UHMS. This could be a lethal danger for both the ‘status quo’ Western powers and the NW. Facing this new challenge, for the first time in history the ‘traditional’ players of the EQ reached an agreement that could divide the HMS and allow Russia to acquire the Straits. England and France would be compensated with large parts of the rest of this space. The Russian Foreign Minister observed (1913) the geopolitical reality, namely that the Straits constitute a central

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60 Ibid., pp. 130-138  
61 Ibid., pp. 124-125  
62 Ibid., p. 117  
geopolitical/geocultural core area that “once possessing” it the Russians “would be in the same position as the Ottoman Turks in the fourteenth century. From that strategic channel … they could expand east and west and claim the legacy of the Ottomans within the Heartland from Bosnia-Herzegovina to the Persian border and … in the eastern Mediterranean”.64 This attitude was the main reason for the Ottomans “to afraid of Russia more than any other country” and to fall to “Germany’s arms”.65 The Bolshevik Revolution (1917) canceled these plans. Neither the German nor the Slavic factor managed to unite HMS under their auspices. The essence of the whole diachronic geopolitical situation around the BSSA could not be more clearly demonstrated than in the following words of Prince Czartoryski, Deputy Minister of Foreign Affairs in the midst (1804) of the Napoleonic wars

…Ottoman Empire … touches on the most essential interests of Russia … Our objective [is] … of preserving [it] … in its present state and hindering its partition. The advantage of having a weak and peaceful neighbour, and the facilities which our trade on the Black Sea has recently obtained, are sufficient reasons for containing ourselves with the present state of affairs and preferring it to any opportunities which the future might offer … However, … the facilities which the Black Sea trade has obtained … which are … an object of the highest importance, result only from the extreme weakness of the Turkish government … As a result, the facilities and the incalculable advantages … must still be regarded as not entirely assured since we should lose them as soon as the Porte succeeded in regaining its former strength or if … it changed its policy and threw itself into the arms of France [or any other power], or if finally any European power succeeded in taking possession of Greece, of its archipelago [Aegean] and soon after of Constantinople … the safety of the Russian Empire would be deeply compromised and one of the most essential outlets for her trade would find itself at the mercy of another power … [in that case] the fate of the Ottoman Empire will … remain very uncertain … 66

Throughout this period of conflict, both Russia and the OE use the West as a tool for acquiring the necessary abilities. It was Peter the Great who first introduced his enormous ‘Westernization’/‘modernization’ program with the aim to acquire the

64 LeDonne, The Russian Empire and the World, p. 144
65 Morgenthau, Ambassador Morgenthau’s Story, pp. 77-78
66 Macfie, The Eastern Question, p. 85
knowledge of navigation and shipbuilding in order for Russia to be able to accomplish its goals. “We are in Amsterdam” Peter writes to the patriarch “in order to learn how to navigate with the intention to defeat Christ’s enemies and to liberate the Christians that live under their yoke”. It is not a coincidence that Peter issues the first degree for shipbuilding (1696) three months after Azov fell in Russian hands. The powers of the West realized their ‘mistake’ to allow the NW to become a sea-power only when they understood on what region this Russian effort was focused. At the same time, OE sees the Russian comparative advantage and follows the same path in order to increase its defensive abilities. In the minds of the Ottomans, Peter had imposed “crazy” (1725) and “strange fashions” (1757). Soon, however, the Ottomans changed their minds and saw that “an intelligent and informed ruler … among the Moskofs; … studied and learned the methods of other nations” and the outcome for Russia was that it became a “powerful state of great renown”. Finally, after many devastating wars, the Ottomans acknowledged Peter the “mad” as Peter “the Great” and compared him with Mahmud II. However, the crucial ‘detail’ in the common path of these MS powers that made a huge difference was the fact that “the Ottoman reforms were retarded by a full century”. In fact, despite the lagging in the timing of “Westernization”, both sides were identifying this process and its outcome in the same way and they were observing a common cultural/systemic bond between each other. After the inauguration of the Ottoman constitution (1877), a Russian diplomat complaint that for Russia the “Ottoman constitutionalism is a challenge; we shall make the Turks pay … for the shame they have imposed on us of remaining the only

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67 Hughes, Russia in the Age of Peter the Great, p. 520
68 Ibid., p. 28
69 Ortayli, ‘Reforms of Petrine Russia and the Ottoman Mind’, p. 221
70 Berkes, The Development of Secularism in Turkey, p. 45
71 Ortayli, ‘Reforms of Petrine Russia and the Ottoman Mind’, p. 222
country in Europe without a parliament and constitution”. 72 Similarly, “After the defeat of Russia by Japan in 1905” when “Sultan’s officers congratulated him on the defeat of his old enemy … he replied that he did not … consider the result a matter of congratulation, because he and the Czar were the only autocratic monarchs in Europe, and the defeat of the Czar meant a blow to the principle of autocracy”. 73 For both of them, the Western ideology was not suitable for their countries. It is not a coincidence to notice the fact that the main Ottoman Westernization/modernization efforts were taking place or promulgated a little before or a little after a major Ottoman calamity. The Tulip period (1718-1730) came after the treaty of Passarowitz (1718), the Transformative period (1774-1789) came after the Küçük Kaynarca (1774). The Tanzimat period (1839-1908) is characterized by a series of initiatives, such as the Imperial Charter (1839) promulgated after the Greek independence war (1821-1930), the subsequent Russo-Ottoman war (1827-29), and the two Egyptian Crises (1833, 1839). The Reform Edict (1856) was promulgated after the Crimean War (1853-56) and the Ottoman Constitution was promulgated in order to avert the coming Russo-Ottoman war (1877-78) due to the Bulgarian crisis. Moreover, the purpose of the YT Revolution (1908) was to prevent the final Ottoman collapse (1911-1919). It would be worth mentioning that all the abovementioned Ottoman initiatives resulted directly from the diachronic Russian threat against the Ottomans. The HMS power was reacting towards the NW threat by ‘luring’ the Western naval powers through promises of ‘Westernization’ in the exchange of their active support. Both the Ottomans and the West expected that these efforts would have a favorable outcome in revitalizing the OE and keeping it united in order to serve as a ‘bulwark’ against the Russians. Nevertheless, the internal Ottoman deficiencies along with the Western

72 Ibid., p. 217
innovations had the opposite results. OE was fragmented and soon afterwards the Western powers started to follow a dual policy: on the one hand they were trying to satisfy tactical advantages by allying themselves with the various emerging HMS states, while on the other hand they were trying to apply the basic strategic aim, namely the repulse of the Russian factor.

5.3 The Kemalist and Communist Period (1918-1990)

Being a *mariage de convenance* … it could retain no hold on the parties when the particular international situation that led to it had passed away. The Turks … looking to Russia for … munitions, diplomatic support and gold … while a settlement with the Western Powers is … coming nearer, they are beginning to remember their relations with Russia in the past and to look forward with increasing uneasiness to the future [Arnold J. Toynbee, 1923]74

This period could be divided into two main sub-periods: the Interwar and WWII (1918-45) period and the Cold War (1945-1991) period. The first period starts with the end of WWI that brought to the HMS and the NW a state of instability. The demise of the Ottoman, Austro-Hungarian and Russian empires and the emergence of the nation-states would create a DHMS. An ‘enlarged’ West – adding US, would try to create a new settlement. A new multinational formation of the NW, Bolshevism and Soviet Union (1922), would try to resist the Western penetration. The focus of this friction was the BSSA along with the Caucasus region. The main regional actors that participated in this struggle for power were ‘expansionist’ Greece and ‘nationalist’ Turkey. The new DHMS would emerge and a new equilibrium would be reached through a devastating Greek-Turkish war (1919-1922).

74 Gökay, *A Clash of Empires*, p. 145
England was trying to control the HMS by supporting Greek W-GI while Bolsheviks were backing Turkish W-O. Moreover, British support of the Transcaucasian Federation (February-May 1918) and afterwards of the Armenian irredentism was aiming to create a *cordon sanitaire* that would separate nationalist Turkey and socialist Russia and would establish the control of the oil fields of Azerbaijan.\(^75\) A US report (1919) demonstrates the geopolitical reality of the region along with the Western ambitions, indicating that “A power which should undertake a mandatory for Armenia and Transcaucasia without control of the contiguous territory of Asia Minor … and of Constantinople, with its hinterland of Rumelia, would undertake it under most unfavorable and trying conditions, so difficult as to make the cost almost prohibitive”.\(^76\) For the English the mandate should be given to US or the alternative “would have been the placing of the Greeks in control of the Straits”.\(^77\) Naturally, this Western infiltration into the HMS via Greece frighten the other ‘tenant’ that found significant help from the NW. Atatürk, in his first official letter to Moscow (26 April 1920), proposes to “join the fight of Soviet Russia … against the imperialist governments” and affirms his support to the Soviet plans in Caucasus since “the Turkish government accepts the responsibility of compelling Georgia … and Azerbaijan … to enter into union with Soviet Russia … and [we are ready] to undertake military operations against the expansionist Armenia.”\(^78\) Similarly, according to Gökay, the “Bolshevik leadership” correctly “believed that Greek operations were directly controlled by the British Empire and Greek expansion in Asia Minor was … a threat to Soviet regime. A powerful Greece … could have

\(^{75}\) See, Sönmezoğlu, F. ‘Diplomacy During the Period 1919-1922’, in Sönmezoğlu, F. (ed) *Legend and Reality: An Analysis of the Turkish Foreign Policy* (in Greek) (volume one), pp. 88-89; Gökay, B. *A Clash of Empires*, pp. 22-23

\(^{76}\) Howard, N., H. *Turkey, the Straits and U.S. Policy* (Baltimore, 1974), p. 78

\(^{77}\) Ibid., p. 72

\(^{78}\) Gökay, *A Clash of Empires*, pp. 79-80
Chapter 5  The ‘Eastern Question’

blocked Soviet access to the Mediterranean in the long term” moreover “the frontiers
of the Greek expansion … would not necessarily stop only at western Anatolia. For
Moscow, it was dangerous that the Greeks would ‘try to create the Great Armenian-
Byzantine state’ in eastern and northern Anatolia which ‘could serve as a gable to
hold on the fire of capitalism’ on the borders of Soviet Russia.”\(^79\) Obviously, the NW
was afraid of the creation of a revitalized UHMS power that would be controlled
exclusively by the West. However, despite the Greek marsh towards Ankara and the
limited level of foreign acknowledgement of their regimes, the issue of Caucasus, for
both the Russians and the Turks, was of so “vital importance” that no treaty could be
signed between them up until Georgia surrendered to Soviets (14 March 1921). Two
days later they joined forces against the main threat, which was the Western
infiltration through the Greek expansion on both shores of the Aegean and the
Straits.\(^80\) The war ended with the treaty of Lausanne (1923), which neutralizes,
internationalizes and demilitarizes the Straits.\(^81\) USSR supported the Turkish position
regarding the Straits, both during the Lausanne negotiations and during the Montreux
convention (1936) that revised and remilitarized the Straits.\(^82\) HMS is now being
fragmented into two main pieces, with the BSSA shared mainly by Greece and
Turkey that maintain a balanced position in order to develop a rapprochement.\(^83\)

During this period an interesting movement towards the ‘East’, that could be
strengthened by Pan-Turanism as well, could be observed in Turkey. From the chair
of the National Assembly, Besim Atalay wondered “We are at a point where two

\(^79\) Ibid., p. 64
\(^80\) See, ibid., pp. 101-112
\(^81\) Macfie, The Eastern Question 1774-1923, p. 70
\(^82\) See, Akgün, M. ‘The Status of the Straits as a Significant Geopolitical Factor in Turkish Foreign Policy ’, in Sönmezoğlu, F. (ed) Legend and Reality: An Analysis of the Turkish Foreign Policy (in Greek) (volume one), pp. 520-21; Howard, Turkey, the Straits and U.S. Policy, pp. 146-55
\(^83\) See, chapter 4
great floods are meeting … of the East … of the West … Which one shall we join? …
Will you remain under the bayonets of Gladstone’s sons? Or will we go to the hands of the power extended to us? (“to the East, to the East,” from the floor”). For the Asiatic people also, Turkey and Russia represented an ‘Asiatic’ hope for combating Western colonialism. Shun Yiat Sen’s – the “father of Chinese Republic”, speech in Tokyo (28 November 1924) expresses the “Panasiatic” feeling of that era. “Nowadays Asia has only two independent states, Japan in the East and Turkey in the West … are the eastern and western roadblocks of Asia … Nowadays Russia … unites itself with the East and breaks up with the West …”.

Despite these affiliations, the eternal suspicion and mistrust between them is always present. Even after their accord on the Caucasus settlement and during the implementation of this agreement many incidents not only threatened the alliance, but nearly led to an armed conflict. Molotov advices (October 1921) a Soviet envoi to gather information whether “Turkey remains … an efficient military factor but also whether there are any grounds to consider that it [the Turkish army] intents to turn against us as a result of an agreement with the allies”. Moreover, the Soviets never stopped perceiving the Pan-Turkic designs as a constant threat. Atatürk, on the other hand, when the pressure was relieved from the West suppressed brutally any Communist movements in Turkey. Despite the adoption of the Soviet five-year economic plan system and an emerging military cooperation, Kemalism drove gradually the country towards the West and the Russo-Turkish animosity once more reappeared. During WWII, Turkey tried to

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84 Berkes, The Development of Secularism in Turkey, pp. 437-38
85 Kitsikis, Greek-Turkish Comparative History in the Twentieth Century, pp. 234-35
86 Gökay, A Clash of Empires, pp. 90, 113-15
87 Ibid., p. 113
88 See, ibid., pp. 67, 120-22
89 See, ibid., pp. 105-09, 148-51
negotiate with National-Socialist Germany its entrance into the war with the creation of Turkish states in Soviet occupied lands (Caucasus, Crimea, Black Sea region). On its side, Soviet Union demanded (November 1940) in return to enter the Three-Power Pact (Germany-Italy-Japan), “an exclusive sphere of influence in Bulgaria and the area of the Straits”.91

The Cold-War period is geopolitically characterized by the global competition of an ‘enlarged’ West and an ‘over-expansionist’ NW. Naturally, their focus and the first seeds of this antagonism could be traced in the HMS. Churchill (11 May 1945), following the traditional ‘Mackinderian’ stance, observes that the Soviets had reached the Baltic – Adriatic ‘line’, a “fact unprecedented in European history”.92 In the Yalta conference (4-11 February 1945) the Soviet Union aggravates the situation by officially posing the issue of the Straits and Caucasus. For Stalin the Montreux Convention was “outmoded” and “Turkey had a hand on Russia’s throat”. Thus, The USSR demanded bases in the Dardanelles and the creation of a joint Soviet-Turkish defense system in the region. Moreover, Stalin demanded the cession of the Kars – Ardahan regions of Turkey in the Caucasus since they were parts of Georgia and Armenia. The propaganda of the Soviet press and the denunciation of the Turkish-Soviet non-aggression agreement (1925) made the situation worse.93 In addition, the Soviets were supporting the short-lived Iranian Kurdish Republic of Mahabad (1945-46), something that created further uneasiness to the Turks.94 So far, the US were not objected to Soviet plans at that time. The Potsdam conference (17 July-2 August,

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91 Macfie, The Eastern Question 1774-1923, p. 78; Howard, Turkey, the Straits and U.S. Policy, p. 210; Harris, ‘The Russian Federation and Turkey’, p. 5; see chapter 4
92 Papasotiriou, C. American Political System and Foreign Policy 1945-2002 (in Greek) (Athens, 2002), p. 49
93 See, Howard, Turkey, the Straits and U.S. Policy, pp. 211-219
94 Harris, ‘The Russian Federation and Turkey’, p. 6
1945), however, marks a change in the US attitudes.\textsuperscript{95} Truman records that Stalin “wanted the Black Sea straits for Russia, as had all the czars before him”, while Churchill “was determined that Britain should keep and even strengthen her control of the Mediterranean”.\textsuperscript{96} The official Soviet notification (7 August 1946) about its demands alarmed Britain and US. Truman perceived the geopolitical repercussions of these demands exactly as they were. “This was an open bid to obtain control of Turkey … To allow Russia to set up bases in the Dardanelles or to bring troops into Turkey … would in the natural course of events result in Greece … falling under Soviet control”.\textsuperscript{97} In any case, HMS was perceived as a unity and had to be kept under Western influence, thus Truman believed that Soviet demands should face an “iron fist and strong language” since “another war is in the making”.\textsuperscript{98} Moreover, the Turkish side was willing to reach a Greek-Turkish security arrangement for the safety of the Black Sea.\textsuperscript{99} The whole debate ended (26 October 1946) with a Soviet statement: any new settlement for the regime of the Straits was “premature”.\textsuperscript{100} A series of events took place during that period and the US were able to adopt the British geopolitical stance against Soviet Union. The issue of the Straits, in conjunction with Stalin’s anti-capitalist speeches, Kenan’s ‘long dispatch’, Churchill’s ‘iron curtain’ and most importantly the British notification (21 February 1947) that from 1 April 1947 Britain wouldn’t be able to help Greece in her struggle, having the form of a civil war (1946-49) against Communism, made the US “enter European politics”.\textsuperscript{101} As Ferrell notes, “it was the Greek issue that moved the United States” to take a path that resulted to the promulgation of the ‘Truman Doctrine’ (12

\textsuperscript{95} See, Howard, \textit{Turkey, the Straits and U.S. Policy}, pp. 219-23
\textsuperscript{96} Ibid., p. 225
\textsuperscript{97} Ibid., p. 244
\textsuperscript{98} Ibid., p. 241
\textsuperscript{99} Ibid., p. 237
\textsuperscript{100} See, ibid., p. 258
\textsuperscript{101} See, Papasotiriou, \textit{American Political System and Foreign Policy 1945-2002}, pp. 55-58
March 1947). “If Greece and Turkey had succumbed to the increasing pressure … Western Europe might have followed in the wake of such disaster”. The ‘Truman Doctrine’ to ‘Westernize’ the HMS led to the ‘Marshall Plan’ (5 June 1947) that would provide support to Western Europe. The natural consequence of both projects was the creation of NATO. The major Western aim was the incorporation of Greece and Turkey, as a unified geopolitical unit, in NATO (18 February 1952) and the unification of the BSSA under a Western-controlled HMS. Omar Bradley (1893-1981), Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff (1949-53) gives an illuminating evaluation (15 January 1952) of the importance of the Greek-Turkish ‘strategic unit’ for NATO.

From a military viewpoint, it is impossible to overstate the importance of these two countries … Greece and Turkey occupy strategic locations along one of the major east-west axes [HMS] … both occupy key positions in a sound Atlantic defense system [Rimland]… Allied with the free nations [West], they would compel a diversion of the forces of Soviet Russia [NW] and her satellites in any aggressive move against the West. Located as they are – and allied with the free nations - they serve as powerful deterrents to any aggression directed toward Southern Europe, the Middle East, or North Africa [HMS controlled by the West, prohibits NW to occupy the rest of MS, that is EK and SW] … Greece and Turkey block two avenues to the Mediterranean which an aggressor might endeavor to use … Greece … presents a barrier along the overland route … Turkey … guards the approach by water [Both of them are complementary in deterring any NW advance to the MS territories “up until Suez Canal and Egypt farther south”, thus, whoever controls the HMS controls the MS itself]

Obviously, due to the EQ, the US policy adopts the British paradigm and enters world politics by accepting some geopolitical realities. The manifestation of this new situation was best demonstrated with Kennan’s words, which actually display the classical Anglo-Saxon/Insular status quo approach

We can see that our [US] security has been dependent throughout much of our history on the position of Britain … Britain’s position … depended on the maintenance of a balance of power on the European Continent. Thus, it was

103 See, ibid., pp. 257-61
104 See, ibid., pp. 292-98
105 Howard, Turkey, the Straits and U.S. Policy, pp. 265-66; brackets added
essential to us, as it was to Britain, that no single Continental land power should come to dominate the entire Eurasian land mass. Our interest has lain rather in the maintenance of some sort of stable balance among the powers of the interior, in order that none of them should effect the subjugation of the others, conquer the seafaring fringes of the land mass, become a great sea power as well as land power, shatter the position of England, and enter ... on an overseas expansion hostile to ourselves and supported by the immense resources of the interior of Europe and Asia ... we have had a stake in the prosperity and independence of the peripheral powers of Europe and Asia ... those countries whose gazes were oriented outward, across the seas, rather than inward to the conquest of power on land.

Stalin’s death (1953) normalized the Soviet-Turkish relations up to a certain point. USSR denounced the territorial claims over the Straits and Caucasus. Moreover, the Cuba Crisis (1962) and the trade off between the deployment of missiles in Cuba and Turkey made Turks to start reconsider their stance towards Soviet Union. The Cyprus issue that raised anti-American feelings, along with the Soviet receptiveness to Ankara’s “friendly moves”, created a feeling of détente. Nevertheless, the growing Soviet Black Sea fleet and its appearance in the Mediterranean Sea raised further concerns. During the ‘70s, a more touchable relation is being developed. The exchange of visits, the Soviet economic aid, the frequent commercial exchanges along with the signing of bilateral treaties (1972, 1978) contributed to a better atmosphere. Once more this rapprochement was not without hidden suspicion and hostility. For Turkey, the USSR was helping with arms the Greek-Cypriots and was supporting the leftists and Kurdish groups of the country. Moreover, the invasions of Czechoslovakia (1968) and Afghanistan (1979) created new fears and enmity. The Soviets were accusing Turkey for facilitating the US in spying Soviet territories and they were of course were suspicious in every contact between the Turks and the Soviet Turkic republics. The major dispute however, was the Soviet full support of

106 Kennan, F., G. American Diplomacy: Expanded Edition (Chicago, 1984), pp. 4-5; emphasis added
107 See, Howard, Turkey, the Straits and U.S. Policy, pp. 267-68
108 See, Harris, ‘The Russian Federation and Turkey’, p. 7
109 See, Howard, Turkey, the Straits and U.S. Policy, pp. 273-78
110 See, Harris, ‘The Russian Federation and Turkey’, pp. 8-9
the Greek-Cypriots. As Harris correctly observes, “Soviet diplomacy formed an irritant background, diminishing the chances for real harmony and enhancing friction between Greece and Turkey”.\textsuperscript{111} Once more, NW tries to take advantage of the differences of a DHMS in order to harm the Western influence and expand its own leverage. During the 80s, the USSR cooled its relations with Turkey due to the coup (1980). Despite the political disassociation, there is a natural gas deal (1984) that launches a closer economic cooperation. Overall, a huge discrepancy appeared again in their strategic moves. The Soviet support to Greece and Cyprus, the Soviet-Syrian military agreement, the Soviet deployment of the troops from the west closer to Turkish borders, along with the disagreement over facilitating the allied forces during the first Gulf War (1990-91) filled the Turks with uncertainty. Because of this Turkish willingness to help the invasion in Iraq, the Soviet media accused Turkey that it wanted “to take advantage of the situation to annex the Mosul and Kirkuk oil fields”.\textsuperscript{112} Moreover, the major point of conflict was Caucasus. Questions about the fate of Nagorno-Karabakh have been rising since 1988. The repression of the Azeri revolt in Baku (January 1990) and the redeployment of Soviet troops into the region demonstrated the Soviet inconvenience. Azerbaijani request for Turkish military aid and political voices in Turkey of adopting a more firm pro-Azeri stance were reminding the Soviets that the Pan-Turkic ideals had never eclipsed from the scene of the Russo-Turkish conflict. Ozal’s government characterized these developments an “internal affair” of the Soviet Union but Moscow could not trust Turkey, therefore they rejected any humanitarian aid to Azerbaijan since it was thought to conceal

\textsuperscript{111} Ibid., p. 10
\textsuperscript{112} Ibid., p. 15
“political aims”. The whole scene was fully settled for the new face of HMS-NW relations during the contemporary era.

5.4 The Modern Period (1991-Present)


... Turkey and Russia have been perennial archrivals in the vast region stretching from the Balkans to the Caucasus. “It is no secret” ... “that the Turks have for centuries perceived the [Russian] empire, communist and post-Soviet Russia as elements of a serious foreign threat in this part of the world”.

With the collapse of the Soviet Union (1991), there were no common borders between Russia and Turkey for the first time since the 16th century. During Yeltsin period the bilateral relations became more complex. The economic and commercial relations were further facilitated but the eternal political differences emerged to the surface. Fuller correctly underpins that any “potential conflict today between Turkey and Russia has nothing to do with NATO, but most likely with Caucasian or Central Asian politics”. So, the eternal battle between the HMS and the NW, with the active involvement of the West emerged again on its pre-Kemalist, pre-Soviet framework.

The trade figures between Russia and Turkey during the 90s demonstrating a dynamic relation. The Turkish imports and exports to/from Russia represented approximately

113 See, ibid, pp. 10-16
the 6% of the Turkish commercial activity. Around 60% of the total imports and exports to/from the CIS countries originated from Russia. This data clearly demonstrates that the economic relations with Russia were more advanced compared to the Turkic former Soviet states.\footnote{See, Turan, G & Turan, İ. ‘Turkish Relations with the Turkic Republics’, in Sönmezöğlu, F. (ed) Legend and Reality: An Analysis of the Turkish Foreign Policy (in Greek) (Volume 1), pp. 556-558} Turkey also became a major natural gas consumer with increased dependency from Russia.\footnote{Torbakov, ‘Turkey-Russia: Competition and Cooperation’} In political terms, the initial (1991-92) pro-NA Russian approaches along with the cautious Turkish attitude allowed the creation of large optimism towards the situation, especially in the Caucasus. Analysts believed that “the possibility of a rapprochement and partnership between Russia and Turkey could ultimately transform the politics of the Southern Caucasus even more than any dramatic change in US-Russian relations”.\footnote{Ibid.}

This short break didn’t last long. Two main events occurred (1992) that changed the situation. Russia adopted the notion of NA for the former Soviet republics, especially the ones in Caucasus, Central Asia and Ukraine.\footnote{Russell, W. ‘Russian Relations with the “Near Abroad”, in Shearman, P. (ed) Russian Foreign Policy Since 1990 (Oxford, 1995), p. 53} By the early 1993, the NA was officially adopted as the first priority of the Russian foreign policy. Moscow manifested its “special interests” and its determination to undertake leading peace-keeping operations role by dispatching Russian troops in conflict areas.\footnote{See, ibid., pp. 60-67} Moreover, some other principles were declared during that time, for example that Russia, still being a great power, was the successor of the Soviet Union and that the Russian economic and political interests in Caucasus and Central Asia were vital.\footnote{See, Saikal, A. ‘Russian Policy Toward Central Asia and the Middle East’, in Shearman, P. (ed) Russian Foreign Policy Since 1990 (Oxford, 1995), pp. 268-269} At about the same time, Turkey develops a Pan-Turkic ideology targeting the young Turkic
republics. Turkey was the first country that officially recognized these states.\(^\text{123}\) Ozal stated that the 21\(^{st}\) century would be the “Turkish century”, whereas Demirel foresaw the “creation of a Turkish world expanding from the Adriatic Sea to China”. In other words, the Pan-Turkic vision of the 90s was ‘prophesizing’ “the creation of a new Turkish world, stretching in a vast area, with the ability to independently act and being able to acquire its appropriate place in the global system”.\(^\text{124}\) Obviously, the concepts of Pan-Turkism and NA “overlap in areas such as the Caucasus and Central Asia”\(^\text{125}\) and this resulted in “numerous clashing interests … from the Central Asia to the Eastern Mediterranean”.\(^\text{126}\)

In an effort to systematize this complex relation three overlapping and closely connected fields of this competition emerged and could be observed since the early 90s. In Central Asia, Turkey made an effort to create this ‘Turkic world’ and Russia attempted to organize its NA. In Caucasus the concept of Pan-Turkism and neo-Ottomanism clashed with the Armenian factor, which was supported by an active Greek and Russian factor. Finally, in both areas the energy competition for the control of resources and routes interplayed with the cultural, racial rivalries and created two main conflicting camps. Moreover, the energy game included not only Central Asia, but also the BSSA, along with all the countries that occupy nowadays the region of the HMS and the NW.

When the Turkic republics declared their independence, Turkey was the first to recognize them. However, Ankara “refused to exchange ambassadors with Armenia”

\(^{123}\) Turan & Turan ‘Turkish Relations with the Turkic Republics’, p. 536
\(^{124}\) Ibid., p. 537
\(^{125}\) Torbakov, ‘Turkey-Russia: Competition and Cooperation’
\(^{126}\) Uslu, ‘The Russian, Caucasian and Central Asian Aspects of Turkish Foreign Policy in the Post Cold War Period’, p. 169
until the Armenian territorial claims were renounced. Within this environment, the Pan-Turkic ‘project’ passed three main phases. The year 1991 and 1992 was an era of optimism. Turkey engaged with the organization of the newborn republics. It provided diplomatic assistance, facilitated the development of the communications and transportations, founded educational institutions and fostered the cultural ties. Most importantly, Turkey, with the help of the West, promoted the ‘Turkish Model’, the secular moderate western-oriented Sunni-Islam, as superior to the Iranian alternative and urged the newborn republics to follow it. Behind these policies, as Harris argued, “lay the unspoken premise that Turkey did not want the Russians to recreate the Soviet Union by dominating the Near Abroad”. In 1992 and with the official articulation of the Russian NA doctrine the first signs of the difficulties for the fulfillment of the Pan-Turkic ideals appeared. The Russian minorities in the Turkic republics, especially in Kazakhstan, along with the economic and energy dependence on Moscow could not leave any room for other thoughts. For the Russians of the mid-90s Turkey was described as “an aspiring regional power that supports “Muslim movements” and cherishes “pan-Turkic ideas;” … Turkey might move into the “geo-strategic niche” in the Caucasus … [and] supporting …the Chechen separatists”. These developments led to the third phase of the Pan-Turkic dream (late 90s), which was degraded to the level of “ordinary relations” between states. According to Torbakov, there were six main reasons for this failure. The post-Soviet states didn’t want Turkish tutelage, they wanted to construct their own identities and interact on an equal basis with Ankara. Turkey was a relatively poor country passing severe

127 Harris, ‘The Russian Federation and Turkey’, p. 16
128 See, Turan & Turan ‘Turkish Relations with the Turkic Republics’, pp. 537-544
129 Harris, ‘The Russian Federation and Turkey’, p. 17
130 See, Turan & Turan, ‘Turkish Relations with the Turkic Republics’, pp. 544-547
131 Torbakov, ‘Turkey-Russia: Competition and Cooperation’
132 See, Turan & Turan, ‘Turkish Relations with the Turkic Republics’, pp. 553-56
economic crisis, so it was not in a position to materialize its grandiose plans and promises. The ‘Turkish Model’ was not compatible with the former communist ruling elites. The Russian articulation of the NA doctrine along with the Russian economic leverage and the Russian minority presence was also another factor. Moreover, the outcome of a Russian-Turkish clash through the Armenia-Azerbaijan conflict demonstrated the inefficiencies of the Turkish policies. Finally, the emerging energy game and the direct Western involvement allowed the Turkish republics to interact with EU and US without mediation. Additionally, Russian energy leverage in these countries was dominant and decisive.\(^{133}\) The victory of NA over ‘Pan-Turkism’ in Central Asia led the Russian policy makers of the late 90s to perceive Turkey as a “weakening competitor, preoccupied with internal political instability and economic troubles”.\(^{134}\)

The focal Russo-Turkish dispute on Caucasus laid its roots on “Stalin’s poisoned gift to Azerbaijan”.\(^{135}\) Nagorno-Karabakh with its Armenian majority was transferred to Azerbaijani administration. Consequently, the break up of the conflict after the demise of Soviet Union was the logical outcome of Stalin’s move. Nagorno-Karabakh represents a test case for the limits and the actual nature of the Russo-Turkish relations.\(^{136}\) By the early 1992 the Armenian forces started to overrun the Azeri army and bombed the Nakhichevan enclave near the Turkish borders. Due to the Turkish threats of military response, Russia warned about the eruption of a Third World War due to a NATO attack to a CIS member – Armenia. A pro-Turkish coup in Azerbaijan (June 1992) accelerated the Azeri efforts to disassociate themselves from Russia by

\(^{134}\) Torbakov, ‘Turkey-Russia: Competition and Cooperation’
\(^{135}\) Harris, ‘The Russian Federation and Turkey’, p. 5
\(^{136}\) Ibid., p. 17
ousting Russian troops, denying to participate in CIS and rejecting Russian mediation for the problem. Despite the efforts for reaching an agreement, the continuous Azerbaijani defeats in the battlefield led to the replacement (June 1993) of Abulfaz Elchibey with Haidar Aliyev, who followed a more balanced polity. Ankara, in order to demonstrate its dissatisfaction, stopped temporarily the arm shipments to Azerbaijan. Azerbaijan entered CIS but refused the return of the Russian troops. Simultaneously, Ankara offered (1993) troops to act as peacekeepers in the region, something that annoyed Moscow once more.\textsuperscript{137} The whole situation was so dangerous and the threat of an open armed confrontation between Russia and Turkey was so touchable, that all the former Soviet Turkic republics were keeping a neutral if not hostile stance towards Ankara and Baku.\textsuperscript{138} Russia, on the other side, requested (1993) the exception of north Caucasus from the Conventional Armed Forces in Europe (CFE) treaty and published the new military doctrine, which predicted the possibility of the first nuclear strike as a preemptive move to conventional threats. Turkish reaction and nervousness was evident through the violent verbal reaction of the head of the Turkish General Staff, General Dogan Gures (1994). Further Turkish accusations that these Russian moves were actually blackmailing Azeri government to accept the presence of a Russian base like the one in Armenia were demonstrating the Turkish uneasiness towards the practical application of the NA doctrine in Caucasus.\textsuperscript{139} The equation in the Caucasus region also included an at least moral and financial Turkish support of the Chechens during the first war. An ‘unofficial’ reception of the Chechen leader Dudaev in Turkey (1993) resulted to a series of PKK events in Moscow, including conferences and the third session of the Kurdish

\textsuperscript{137} See, ibid., pp. 16-18
\textsuperscript{138} Turan & Turan, ‘Turkish Relations with the Turkic Republics’, p. 550
\textsuperscript{139} See, Harris, ‘The Russian Federation and Turkey’, pp. 19-20; Uslu, ‘The Russian, Caucasian and Central Asian Aspects of Turkish Foreign Policy in the Post Cold War Period’, pp. 166-67
parliament-in-exile (19 October 1995) “in a building attached to the Russian Duma”. These moves further strained the Russian-Turkish relations and solidified an unofficial division between Russia-Armenia-Kurdistan and Turkey-Azerbaijan-Chechnya. These two camps would expand to more areas and would obtain more participants, as the next major issue was emerging, in order to solidify the creation of two main large geopolitical/geocultural trends in the divided HMS region.

The next major interconnected issue in the Caucasus, Central Asia and BSSA regions that transforms them in the modern era into a single geopolitical unity is the energy competition. With the collapse of the Soviet Union, Turkey feared of losing its geopolitical importance for the West. The EU difficulty to accept her as a candidate member along with the fear that Russia was expanding its ties with the West forced the Kemalist elites to seek for a new ‘holy grail’ that would legitimize Turkey in the Western eyes, mainly at the expense of Russia. The answer was found on the emerging issue of the exploitation of the energy sources, oil at the beginning, of the Caspian Sea and its exit routes towards the West. As Uslu clearly states during the 90s, “Turkey wanted all pipelines … pass through its territories because only in this way it could become one of the most important countries of the world, on which the other states were depend”. The initial Turkish activity towards that direction along with the specific angle that the West was approaching the issue – exclusion of Russia – led the analysts to label again this country as “probably the most geo-strategically

140 See, Uslu, ‘The Russian, Caucasian and Central Asian Aspects of Turkish Foreign Policy in the Post Cold War Period’, p. 166; Harris, ‘The Russian Federation and Turkey’, pp. 20-21
142 Uslu, ‘The Russian, Caucasian and Central Asian Aspects of Turkish Foreign Policy in the Post Cold War Period’, p. 176
important piece of real estate in the world”.\textsuperscript{143} This combined Turkish and Western approach gave to the Kemalist elite very strong self-confidence that enabled them to “aggressively promote” and actually “gamble” on issues “risking” the violent reaction of both Russia and the West.\textsuperscript{144} This “gamble” included four main actions during the 90s. Firstly, they were pressing by all means and for “strategic” reasons – bypassing Russia, the construction of the Baku-Tbilisi-Ceyhan Main Export Pipeline (BTC-MEP), which was economically and politically inefficient and risky. Second, in order to prove the necessity of the project they included in the picture the urgent need to bypass the Straits due to environmental and security reasons in the Bosporus. For this reason, Turkey enacted (1994) regulations that limited the traffic through the Straits. The Turkish unilateral act was characterized by Russia as violation of the Montreux Convention.\textsuperscript{145} This could effectively cut the Russian energy exports and could force the Russians divert their exports towards the BTC MEP. Of course, a ‘collateral damage’ on the Black Sea sea-traffic could be the Russian-Ukrainian dispute and “paranoia” over the Black Sea fleet and its base in Sevastopol. Russia considering this fleet a “strategic” asset, acquired, through “bitter” negotiations (1994), the 80% of it along with its base.\textsuperscript{146} Once more, a Russian-Turkish competition over the exit to Mediterranean and the militarization of the Black Sea was in motion. Third, Turkey and Azerbaijan, by promoting the BTC MEP pipeline, were combining also their Pan-Turkic ideals by bypassing Armenia since they diverted the pipeline to Georgia. Tbilisi wanted independence from Russian tutelage and accepted willingly the offer. Gradually, the two camps around Nagorno-Karabakh conflict were further enlarged by adding in the picture Georgia and Greece/Cyprus since the BTC MEP were

\textsuperscript{143} Torbakov, ‘Turkish Foreign Policy in the Post-Soviet Space’
\textsuperscript{144} Sasley, B. ‘Turkey’s Energy Policy In the Post-cold War Era’, Middle East Review of International Affairs, Vol. 2, No. 4 (December 1998), p. 35
\textsuperscript{145} See, Sasley, ‘Turkey’s Energy Policy In the Post-cold War Era’, p. 32
\textsuperscript{146} See Harris, ‘The Russian Federation and Turkey’, pp. 57, 63-64
directly moving against their interests in the region. Moreover, Turkey believed that Russia’s thrust into the south Caucasus through Chechnya, Abkhazia and Ossetia could “gain the control of Azerbaijan and Georgia to a great extend ... [and] will close the important land corridor between Turkey and Central Asia (Pan-Turkist ideals) and will threaten to prevent the construction of oil and gas pipelines, which will connect the Caspian region with Turkey and Europe”.  

In order to prevent this event, Turkey tried to foster a military alliance between Ankara-Tbilisi-Baku, by offering a multidimensional military aid to these countries. Furthermore, GUAM (Georgia, Ukraine, Azerbaijan and Moldova) was considered to “forming a joint battalion of troops, whose primary mission would be to guard pipelines running across the South Caucasus”. These thoughts were never officially adopted by Turkey however, its close connection with these anti-Russian grouping could definitely place her on a side that has diametrically different interests from Russia. The Greek factor in the energy field definitely took a pro-Russian stance and started promoting the construction of the Novorossiisk-Burgas-Alexandroupolis oil pipeline, which was bypassing Turkey. Fourth, by fulfilling energy agreements with Iran and even Russia, Turkey was also implementing a policy of satisfying urgent domestic needs and started to mitigate up to a point the acute differences with some important geopolitical actors. Overall, according to analysts, the prospects for the new century were obvious. There was going to be a clash over the pipeline routes that would “serve to keep the Turkish-Russian relationship far from warm”, something that was going to be accompanied

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147 Uslu, ‘The Russian, Caucasian and Central Asian Aspects of Turkish Foreign Policy in the Post Cold War Period’, p. 170
148 See, ibid., pp. 172-173
149 Ibid., p. 174
150 Ibid., p. 174
151 Harris, ‘The Russian Federation and Turkey’, pp. 22-23
with a clash over the delivery of gas in Ukraine that will allow “disagreements to grow”.\textsuperscript{152}

Furthermore, Turkey’s hostile stance toward Serbia and Ankara’s effort to activate an east-west “Muslim arch” in the Balkans collided with the north-south “Greek-Orthodox block” and the Russian interests as well. The close military alliance with Israel, along with the efforts even to have some saying in the Uighur problem in China, ‘stretched’ definitely the Pan-Turkic world from the Walls of China to the Adriatic, but on the other hand these efforts created more enmities than amities for the Turks.\textsuperscript{153} The Russian revival during Putin’s period was rising accompanied with the formation of two large camps of conflicting interests from Central Asia to Eastern Mediterranean. The dawn of the 21\textsuperscript{st} century found the MS and the HMS divided into two main camps under geopolitical and geocultural lines.

\textbf{ii. Putin Period (2000-2008)}

While the economic dimensions of relations between Turkey and Russia, were framed in “win-win” or “non-zero-sum” game terms, their political relations were formulated in “win-lose” or “zero-sum” game terms.\textsuperscript{154}

The dangerous situation that had been developed due to the Nagorno-Karabakh issue along with the verbal bickering shocked both countries, especially Turkey. Moreover, Western receptiveness towards Russian demands for modifications in the CFE treaty (May 1996) for Caucasus “came as a cold shower” for Turks and “convinced” them

\textsuperscript{152} Russell, ‘Russian Relations with the “Near Abroad”, p. 67
\textsuperscript{153} See, Fuller, ‘Turkey’s New Eastern Orientation’, pp. 37-98
\textsuperscript{154} Tanrisever, F., O. ‘Turkey and Russia in Eurasia’, in Martin, G., L. & Keridis, D. (eds) The Future of Turkish Foreign Policy (Massachusetts, 2004), p. 135
that “it was in the interest … to normalize … relations with Moscow”.\textsuperscript{155} Actually, this event acted in the exact same way that the Cuban Crisis missiles trade off functioned in the Turkish mind. West was not trustworthy and would sacrifice Turkish security needs on the table of Western-Russian rapprochement. Furthermore, the actual Turkish internal political and economic difficulties, along with Russian revival, caused the pan-Turkic ideas to collapse. Thus, the Russian threat perception about Turkey changed. Turkey was not a serious threat anymore. The 9/11 events created a new perspective of Russo-Turkish rapprochement under the pretext of the fight against terrorism.\textsuperscript{156}

The framework of this relative convergence of interests had settled down with the visit (1997) of PM Victor Tchernomyrdin in Ankara.\textsuperscript{157} Since then, successive visits of high ranking officials of both countries created an environment that developed the fields of economy, tourism, military, and energy cooperation in unprecedented levels.\textsuperscript{158} The Russian ambassador in Turkey observes that for 2001 “mutual trade amounts $9 billion … what is not included … is that the Turkish companies earned some $9 billion in construction” and adds that the “present volume of trade … is comparable with China” and that so far “because of our gas imports to Turkey the trade is slightly in favour of Russia”.\textsuperscript{159} By 2004, the bilateral economic exchanges reached the level of $6.5b, and with the addition of tourism and baggage trade the amount reached the $12b. During Putin period, Russia is for Turkey the second

\textsuperscript{155} Ibid., p. 143
\textsuperscript{158} See, ibid.
largest trade partner after Germany. The culmination of this effort came with Putin’s visit to Turkey (5-6 December 2004) that represented “the first visit of the Russian leader to Turkey from the moment of the establishment of diplomatic relations in the XV (1492) century”. Seven important documents were signed, among them the “Joint Declaration on Strengthening of Friendship and Multiplan Cooperation”. There was a detailed discussion, at a political, military and secret services level, on all spheres and regions of political interests were discussed, and there was a debate on the further cooperation in the economic and energy sphere. There was an agreement on the “re-export of the Russian gas by Turkey to Syria and Israel”. Moreover, after the reciprocal visit of PM Erdoğan to Moscow (January 2005), Russia announced that it “will increase deliveries of gas to Turkey, and is going to build there distributive networks and gasholders”, based on the Blue Stream (BS) pipeline (2002). This relationship led the Turk PM and the Russian President to officially meet each other four times between December 2004 and July 2005. The major issue on which both sides focused was the issue of energy. The BS project in 2005 was covering only the one forth of its actual capacity. From the planned 16 billion cubic meters per year (bcm/y) it was transferring only 4.7bcm/y. The gradual increase of the volume of gas was “the permanent issue on the bilateral negotiations of the Russians with Ankara”. By 2007 the attainable goal was

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161 Moustakis & Ackerman ‘September II’, p. 424
163 Ibid.
165 Ibid., p. 2
16bcm/y.\textsuperscript{166} Future estimates were that by 2010 the volume of gas exported to Turkey should be 30bcm/y. By mid-2005 all these intentions and plans in motion led the analysts to the conclusion that “Putin is pursuing a further deepening of the Russo-Turkish energy cooperation with additional oil and natural gas transportation plans through the Turkish soil, along with his persistency for upgrading the efficiency of Blue Stream”.\textsuperscript{167} The outcome of this situation was for Turkey to base almost two-thirds of its consumption gas needs on Russia and to envisage itself as a hub for Russian energy exports to the West.\textsuperscript{168} Moreover, the Russo-Turkish “shared displeasure”\textsuperscript{169} concerning US action in the Middle East enabled analysts to claim (2005) that an axis between Russia-Turkey-Iran and Syria was formed in the region.\textsuperscript{170} One could observe a “secretly, but insistently” Turkish effort to “counteract American policy” and an action “in unison with Moscow”.\textsuperscript{171} Thus, the NW along with the one half of the DHMS have “become partners and coordinate their actions, aspiring to limit the influence of the West”.\textsuperscript{172} The most touchable effect of the Russo-Turkish cooperation is the large Turkish dependence on Russian energy sources, especially, gas. By 2008 the outcome is that “Turkey needs Russia more than Russia needs Turkey”.\textsuperscript{173}

\textsuperscript{167} Filis, ‘Assessment of the Russian-Turkish Relations Under the Prism of the Greek Interests’, p. 2
\textsuperscript{168} Ibid., p. 2
\textsuperscript{169} Torbakov, ‘Making Sense of the Current Phase of Turkish-Russian Relations’, p. 10
\textsuperscript{170} See, Oku, A. ‘Russia and Turkey in the Middle East’, [http://www.axisglobe.com] 2 May 2008
\textsuperscript{173} Oku ‘Russia and Turkey in the Middle East’
In this framework, it would be of the highest importance to try to “concretize this rapprochement”\textsuperscript{174} in order to understand the actual nature of it and forecast the future of the Russo-Turkish relations. During Putin’s period, the concept of Neo-Eurasianism played an important role in legitimizing this ‘unholy’ alliance (\textsuperscript{7}). Tanrisever observes that “Ankara and Moscow have sought to project their regional hegemony over Eurasia”, a region that in the past “had a history of political dominance” thus, they have developed “different versions of Eurasianism, which claims that Eurasia constitutes a geographical region whose populations can be united and empowered by a “specific” synthesis of European and Asian cultures”. Of course, this “specific synthesis was developed … according to who is articulating the ideology”\textsuperscript{175} Obviously, the two versions are not similar but there is a common starting point that unites them. “Eurasianism is a very relevant example of a prolonged “post-imperial trauma” that both Turkey and Russia have suffered due to their historically geographical and cultural dilemma vis-à-vis the West”.\textsuperscript{176} For Torbakov, the West was visualizing the “Turks and Russians … as “significant others” in the process of the construction of … identity and to this day have remained largely uncertain as to how they relate to Europe” thus, their relations with them were always at least “problematic”.\textsuperscript{177} Once more, the HMS along with the NW understands their ‘similarity’ against the West and tries to find a modus operandi in order to prevent West from infiltrating into their geopolitical/geocultural space.

\textsuperscript{175} Tanrisever, ‘Turkey and Russia in Eurasia’, p. 128
\textsuperscript{176} Laruelle ‘Russo-Turkish Rapprochement through the Idea of Eurasia: Alexander Dugin’s Networks in Turkey’, p. 3
\textsuperscript{177} Torbakov, ‘Making Sense of the Current Phase of Turkish-Russian Relations’, p. 3
Certain events that are taking place during the last eight years could unfold the real extent of this ‘partnership’ and signify its limitations and constrains. The Russian ambassador to Turkey stresses (2001) the “unique” nature of both countries “as they both are Eurasian” 178 and refers to a study, which suggests that out of 500 years of bilateral relations only 25 years were of direct armed conflict. “We also set up alliances in the past against the British and the French”, he adds. 179 In 2002, during the conference “How to establish a Peace Belt around Turkey” held by the Military Academies Command, General Tuncer Kilinc, the then general secretary of the National Security Council (MGK) stated that Russia and not EU should be understood as a “strategic potential partner”. 180 Despite the fact that this speech was characterized as a “personal view”, commentators stressed the fact that “it is out of the question” that the General could have said something “without prior approval of his superiors” since these views “reflect a tendency that prevails entirely at the higher ranks of the Turkish Armed Forces” and mainly this was a “message … to the European Union”. These statements were further embraced in the political field. Parliament Speaker Omer Izgi said that ‘Turkey is a great power around its own axis. It is a great state. It does not need to seek anything. If obstacles on behalf of the EU continue in the same way … Turkey will find it possible to unite with other forces around it”. Moreover, politicians like Bulent Akarcali identified Russia and Iran as “extremely appropriate” for aligning with Turkey. 181 The most impressive incident that signifies this trend was

178 Sariibrahimoglu, ‘Having Nostalgic Moments in Sarikamis, Russian Ambassador Alexander Lebedev says’
179 Torbakov, ‘Turkey-Russia: Competition and Cooperation’
180 See, Laruelle ‘Russo-Turkish Rapprochement through the Idea of Eurasia: Alexander Dugin’s Networks in Turkey’, p. 7; Torbakov, ‘Eurasian Idea Could Bring Together Erstwhile Enemies Turkey and Russia’
181 See, Torbakov, ‘Eurasian Idea Could Bring Together Erstwhile Enemies Turkey and Russia’
the posting of Putin’s notorious speech delivered in Munich’s Security Conference in the official website of the General Staff of Turkey on the next day of its delivery.\footnote{See, Torbakov, ‘Making Sense of the Current Phase of Turkish-Russian Relations’, p. 4}

The most interesting case that indicates the true nature of this relationship is a brief examination of Alexander Dugin’s ideas in relation to Turkey along with the networks that he has established there. During Yeltsin’s era, when Turkey was perceived as a potential threat to Russia, Dugin’s views were hostile and negative. His views started to change “around 2000” with the collapse of the immediate Turkish threat to NA and the direct western incursion to Central Asia after 2001. Since then, Dugin had been developing networks to Turkey itself in order to “take Turkey away from the United States” as ambassador Lebedev would have said.\footnote{See, ibid., pp. 4-8} He visits Turkey regularly, promotes his books and writes (2006) articles preaching the creation of a “Moscow-Ankara axis”. His activities include conferences and symposiums with the attendance of high-ranking Turkish officials. He has even paid a visit to the occupied territory of northern Cyprus (2004), where he was welcomed by the self-proclaimed ‘leadership’ “as if he were an official figure of the Russian state”.\footnote{Ibid., p. 8} Moreover, many Islamic pro-AKP institutions support Dugin’s ideas as well.\footnote{Ibid., pp. 4-8} Dugin’s International Eurasianist Movement (IEM) first visit to Turkey (2003) was broadly covered by the Turkish media since Dugin was accompanied by the famous Turkish poet, writer and journalist Atilla Ilhan (1925-2005), who “over many decades … consistently wrote on the subject of the Turkish-Russian alliance, even during the Cold War”.\footnote{Ibid., p. 8}

\footnote{See, Torbakov, ‘Making Sense of the Current Phase of Turkish-Russian Relations’, p. 4}
\footnote{Sariibrahimoglou ‘Having Nostalgic Moments in Sarikamis, Russian Ambassador Alexander Lebedev says’}
\footnote{Laruelle ‘Russo-Turkish Rapprochement through the Idea of Eurasia: Alexander Dugin’s Networks in Turkey’, p. 8}
\footnote{Ibid., pp. 4-8}
\footnote{Ibid., p. 8}
The abovementioned amities and neo-Eurasian solidarities should not lead to over-optimism since the “term strategic partnership is abused and exaggerated”. The main issues that make the two Eurasianisms incompatible are two. First, “there is an obvious disconnection between Turkey’s and Russia’s “anti-Occidentalism””. Russian anti-Occidentalism incorporates a real anti-Western element, since it has adopted the classical Anglo-Saxon status quo approach, whereas the Turkish one is being derived mostly from its disappointment with the West that is not assisting in the Turkish security dilemmas and regional ambitions. In Tanrisever’s views, Turkish Eurasianism is not actually anti-western. Second, Russian and Turkish relations “take shape to reach the “strategic depth” … meaning the actual return to historical spheres of influence” through the “unity … of the Eurasian historical commonality”. On the first issue it could be observed that anti-westernism by itself and as a sole power of unity could not serve as a strong bond. Both powers perceive each other as the main enemy for domination and they unite only when the western incursion has taken great proportions. The Turkish views could be perceived more as blackmail, in order to earn Western support, than as a real strategic conscious choice. Thus, the ‘Western threat’ as an “ideological basis” for the Russian-Turkish rapprochement “remains too swallow” and as such, it could not “serve as a serious philosophical platform”. This observation could be fostered if someone includes the second issue into the picture. The Russian and Turkish “strategic depth” is overlapping and mutual exclusive. In Turkey different kinds of Eurasianism suggest

187 Sariibrahimoglou, ‘Having Nostalgic Moments in Sarikamis, Russian Ambassador Alexander Lebedev says’
188 Torbakov, ‘Making Sense of the Current Phase of Turkish-Russian Relations’, p. 11
189 See, Tanrisever, ‘Turkey and Russia in Eurasia’, p. 129
190 Oku, ‘Russia-Turkey: The New Eurasian Alliance: the Quest for the Lost Empires’
191 Torbakov, ‘Making Sense of the Current Phase of Turkish-Russian Relations’, p. 3
different foreign policies. Left-wing Eurasianism could be labeled actually as ‘Asianism’ and is indeed anti-western. Dogu Perincek, the leader of the communist Turkish Worker’s Party (IP) in his meeting with Dugin (2003) expressed the idea that “Romanov and Ottoman empires competed for several centuries precisely because they had so much in common: Both were situated on the “fault line” between Europe and Asia, between Orthodoxy and Islam … only a Eurasian conciliation can enable … the intrinsic unity of the Old Continent’s median space and the need to resist Western cultural standardization”. However, the right-wing Eurasianism could be divided into an ultra-nationalist and extreme Islamic ‘Pan-Turkism’ and a more moderate nationalist and Islamic ‘Neo-Ottomanism’. Ahmet Davutoglu, Turkish minister of foreign affairs, believes that “Turkey is a country with a historical and geographical depth … [has] certain rights … it has no chance to be peripheral, it is not a sideline country of the EU, NATO or Asia … is a centrally positioned international player … with a close land basin, the epicenter of the Balkans, the Middle East and the Caucasus, the center of Eurasia … in the middle of the Rimland belt”. This unconscious intuitive HMS theory, mixed with the classical Anglo-Saxon school, is opposite to Dugin’s Anglo-Saxon Heartland “Eurasianism”. For Dugin, since pan-Turkism has collapsed, “there is no obstacle now for the improvement of Russian-Turkish relations”. Turkey has to “abandon its Atlantic bonds and become the “little partner” of Russia in the Middle East”. Furthermore, Turkey has an “interest neither on Caucasus nor in Central Asia, and only serves the Russian interests … in this case, the Eurasian option is not Turkey’s anymore”. When Russia expels the Anglo-Saxon powers from WI “there would be some interest struggles, which will be determined by

192 See, Tanrisever, ‘Turkey and Russia in Eurasia’, p. 130
193 Laruelle, ‘Russo-Turkish Rapprochement through the Idea of Eurasia: Alexander Dugin’s Networks in Turkey’, pp. 8-9
194 Torbakov, ‘Making Sense of the Current Phase of Turkish-Russian Relations’, p. 14; Turkey besides the effort to create a MS ideology accepts that it is a “Rimaland” power, see chapter 1
geopolitics itself”. Therefore the Russian-Turkish alliance is “ephemeral” and “as Dugin emphasized thousand times, the Turkish-Russian antagonism is also determined by geopolitics itself”.\(^{195}\) Obviously, Russian and Turkish Eurasianisms are incompatible in bilateral terms and even differ in the views towards the West. DHMS depicts as its main enemy the NW and the West is being perceived as a friend or foe, depending on the level of its intrusion into the region. NW wants to dominate MS so it perceives the DHMS as a minor partner serving only its interests, while the West is being described as the main rival. In this framework, Torbakov is right when he underlines the fact that “the Russo-Turkish “partnership”, “to say nothing of an “alliance””\(^{196}\), during the Putin era, “remains a pretty precarious affair”\(^{197}\). The clash of Russian-Turkish interests “stemmed from their differing visions of the regional order in Eurasia”\(^{198}\) so, “the bottom line is that … Turkey’s and Russia’s strategic goals don’t sit well together, and the most recent “pipeline battles” are a good proof of this”.\(^{199}\) The resulting emergence of two clearly visible camps, connected also with the energy game, during the post-cold war period, in the regions of Central Asia, Caucasus and the BSSA that divide the HMS and allow the NW and the West to control the most important area of the MS is going to be described into the next and last chapter of this research.

\(^{195}\) See, Karpat, C. ‘Opportunity for Turkish-Russian Partnership Against the West’ Axis Information Analysis [http://www.axisglobe.com] 3 May 2008; see chapter 3

\(^{196}\) Torbakov, ‘Making Sense of the Current Phase of Turkish-Russian Relations’, p. 14

\(^{197}\) Ibid., p. 3

\(^{198}\) Tanrisever, ‘Turkey and Russia in Eurasia’, p. 137

\(^{199}\) Torbakov, ‘Making Sense of the Current Phase of Turkish-Russian Relations’, p. 8
CHAPTER SIX

The Heartland-Northern Wing Relations and the ‘Great Game’: A Microscopic Analysis

6.1 The War of the Worlds of the ‘Great Game’: The ‘ENERGY-Security’ Component

i. Energy Security of the ‘Great Game’

For Russia and for Turkey … the pipeline issue is vital … mainly due to the opportunities that the pipeline network offers in acquiring and maintaining political influence in Caucasus and in the Central Asian regional system.¹

The energy security developments of the MS during the Yeltzin and Putin periods could reveal the emergence of two main geopolitical/geocultural groupings that divide HMS and Eurasia along clearly detectable lines. Energy security is a much more complicated issue than a mere economic project, since it includes “political, economic, societal and environmental components” along with a “military dimension”. Energy security “focuses on the imperative for governments to secure adequate supplies of energy at affordable prices”. Therefore, the governments, in order “to reduce the vulnerability of a state to the possible disruption of energy supplies” should “seek to diversify their suppliers”. Over-dependence “could enable the energy supplier to exert political and economic leverage over the energy consuming state”. Energy security also “concerns access to energy” thus, “it is important that natural gas and crude oil … is safely delivered to consumers along

pipelines”. But “this is a particular problem in the Black Sea-Caspian region due to unresolved and ongoing ethnic conflicts”.\(^2\)

Nowadays, the HMS and EK represent the crucial field where an energy security analysis must be implemented. Central Asia and Azerbaijan act as the energy producer, whereas western Caucasus and the BSSA act as the transit region. These interconnections are presented in Sheehan’s observation below

A general balance of interests has created two loose alliances in the region. On the one side is Russia, Armenia and Iran on the other side is Turkey and Azerbaijan. Additionally, the dispute concerning the [oil] pipeline route has introduced Caucasus geopolitics to the Greek-Turkish differences. Russia and Greece have suggested the usage of a pipeline from the Bulgarian port of Burgas in the Black Sea to Alexandroupolis, bypassing Turkey … This project connects the geopolitical developments of Caucasus, Eastern Mediterranean and the Russian-Turkish rivalry in the Caspian region with the Greek-Turkish rivalry in the Balkans and in the Aegean.\(^3\)

There is a rivalry between the NW, which is trying to exert control over the Kentron of the MS, and the West that tries to exert its leverage in the same region. Both of them managed to divide HMS into two main camps in order to secure ‘bastions’ in the region and promote their interests. EK is valuable for both, since “it has been estimated … [that] Caspian basin might emerge as the largest supplier of oil and natural gas for Europe and Asia with greater potential than this of the Persian Gulf”.\(^4\) HMS is equally important too, since “the friction for the pipelines is going to determine the major factor of geopolitical leverage in Trans-Caucasus and in Central Asia”.\(^5\) Therefore, the connecting bond, between the producing countries of the EK, the transit countries of the HMS and the consuming countries of the West, are the

\(^3\) Sheehan, ‘From the Aegean to the Aral Lake’, pp. 70-71
\(^4\) Ibid., p. 69
\(^5\) Ibid., p. 71
pipelines. Thus, the energy security concept could be the most accurate framework in which a complex analysis could take place.

Putin took office (May 2000) shortly after the signing of the BTC-MEP project, which was considered a “political and economic defeat for Moscow”. Moreover, the increased influence of the West in the Caspian, the expansion of NATO to Poland, Czech Republic and Hungary, along with Kossovo-Metohja intervention accumulated the Russian sense of dissatisfaction towards the West. Consequently, Putin’s first priority was to “restore Russia’s great power status” and the main tool for this revival effort was the energy security policies. His first official visit abroad was in Turkmenistan and Uzbekistan. Putin’s statements in the Russian Security Council (21 April 2000) were clear of the future orientation of Russian policies. “We must understand that the interest of our partners in other countries – Turkey, Great Britain, and the United States – towards the Caspian Sea is not accidental. This is because we are not active … This is a matter of competition and we must be competitive”, he said. Of course, analysts back in 2000 were wondering “how effective Russia’s policy can really be” because “until now Moscow’s policies have been disjoined and ineffective”. However, eight years later, the comprehensive Russian energy security policies resulted in an amazing outcome. In economic terms, Gazprom was developed as one of the largest companies in the world with its market capitalization “surpassing the 350 billion dollar” and its contribution to the state budget to account “for nearly 20 percent” of the total. Towards the end of 2007, the oil and gas incomes are going

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7 See, Tanrisever, ‘Turkey and Russia in Eurasia’, p. 151
8 Saivetz, ‘Caspian Geopolitics’, p. 58
to reach up to $220 billion and “Russia’s oil and gas exports are expected to total 893 billion dollars in 2000-2007.” The profits of the Russian enterprises from energy during this period reached $150 billion, whereas the companies “will pay 700-730 billion dollars of taxes and duties to the government”. Putin proudly stated (February 2008) for ‘Russia’s Development Strategy Through to 2020’ that “Our children will no longer have to pay our old debts. The state foreign debt has shrunk to 3 percent of our GDP – one of the lowest rations in the world”. With its energy profits Russia paid its foreign debt and simultaneously managed to create substantial foreign currency reserves “which stood at a little over $484 billion” (beginning-2008). In addition, Putin was able to declare that, “Russia has returned to the world stage as a strong state … that can stand up for itself”. The geopolitical revival of the NW through its comprehensive energy security policies facilitated a further aggressive rhetoric towards the West in response to Western “unilateral” initiatives. Moreover, a clear renunciation of the so-called ‘colored revolutions’ signified the geopolitical field of the new NW-Western competition. “Today’s world is not becoming any simpler” Putin stresses, “it is becoming ever more complicated and tougher” and he continues “We have seen how lofty slogans of freedom and an open society are sometimes used to destroy the sovereignty of a country or an entire region. We have seen how, behind the veneer of clamorous rhetoric about free trade and investment, the most developed countries step up their protectionist policies”. Finally, Putin unfolds the ‘means’ of this geopolitical/geocultural competition along with the ‘battlefield’ and the ‘end’ of it.

A fierce battle for resources is unfolding, and the whiff of gas or oil is behind many conflicts, foreign policy actions and diplomatic demarches.

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In this context, it is understandable that the world should be showing growing interest in Russia and in Eurasia ... The result is that we are running against repeats of the old ‘deterrence’ policy more and more often. But what this usually boils down to, essentially, are attempts to impose unfair competition on us and secure access to our resources.12

Putin’s decisive move as a President and a clear signal of the Russian policies up until 2020 was the nomination of Dmitri Medvedev as his successor, who was holding also the chair of Gazprom, except for being a PM. Moreover, there are indications that Putin “will continue to call the shots in most areas of strategic importance”13. So, Medvedev’s relevance to the energy security policies, Putin’s firm control from the office of the PM of the administration along with the possibility of being the actual driving force behind the new President14 guarantee that his speech about Russia of 2020 was not a closing remark but a vision of a statesman that is going to affect Russian policies for at least the next ten to fifteen years.15 President Medvedev’s first official visit abroad was in Kazakhstan in order to confirm the “strategic partnership” of the two countries in the energy and military sector. “Astana did not become the first foreign capital that I have visited as president of Russia by chance”, Medvedev stated.16 A comparison with Putin’s first official visits is striking and illuminating of the Russian energy security diachronic priorities.17

12 Ibid..
The other two major suitors for the EK and the HMS comprise the Western camp. This camp however, is not homogeneous since it faces different kinds of needs and challenges in pursuing energy security. US’s most illuminating paper on energy security policies is the *National Energy Policy* report (May 2001) of the National Energy Policy Development (NEPD) Group signed by US Vise-president Dick Cheney and the Secretary of State, Colin Powell. This paper deals with US security policies for the next twenty-five years. Kleverman notes that, “During the meetings of this committee the identifications of the participants were recorded and proceedings were kept, something that occurs only when the national security is at stake”. NEPD Group’s major observations were listed as follows. “America … faces the most serious energy shortage since the oil embargoes of the 1970s.” So, “America 20 years from now will import nearly two of every three barrels of oil – a condition of increased dependency on foreign powers that do not always have America’s interests at heart”. Thus, “Energy security must be a priority of U.S. trade and foreign policy”. According to the authors of this report, any “significant disruption in world oil supplies could adversely affect our economy and our ability to promote key foreign and economic policy objectives, regardless of the level of US dependence on oil imports”. Apart from the Gulf, US have to be engaged in “emerging regions that will have a major impact on the global energy balance”. And one of these regions is the Caspian, which “can also be a rapidly growing new area of supply”. Cheney’s words (1998) are characteristic: “I cannot think of any other period in global history

18 Kleverman, L. *The New Great Game: Blood and Oil in Central Asia* (in Greek) (Athens, 2005) p. 17
20 Ibid., p. x
21 Ibid., p. xv
22 Ibid., p. 8-3
23 Ibid., p. 8-5
24 Ibid., p. 8-7
that a region acquired so suddenly such a strategic importance like Caspian region”. Therefore, the NEPD Group recommends a series of measures that could consolidate US domination in the region. The US President should support the BTC-MEP and integrate Kazakhstan. Furthermore, Azerbaijan’s gas should be exported via Georgia and Turkey to Europe. A Turkish-Greek connection with a gas-pipeline would facilitate this route. In general and as far as the President is concerned, the NEPD Group urges him to “consider further appropriate steps to ensure the implementation of the workshop’s recommendations” and advice him again to “make energy security a priority of our trade and foreign policy”. It should be paid attention to the fact that this report was issued four months before the 9/11 events and that a relative underestimated attitude towards the Russian factor depicts mainly the Western experiences form the Yeltsin period. Since 2001, the US President had to “consider” all the “further appropriate steps” in order to realize NEPD Group’s “recommendations” and one of the first priorities was to address the issue of EU’s energy problems in the broader stance of a new competition for the domination in the MS.

What is Europe’s problem? According to the EU’s Green Paper (GP) (2006), there are four main facts/challenges that have to be met/answered. First, “There is an urgent need for investment [upgrades, pipelines, infrastructure etc] … over the next 20 years”, second “Our import dependency is rising … in the next 20 to 30 years around 70% of the Union’s energy requirements, compared to 50% today, will be met by imported products”, third “Reserves are concentrated in a few counties” and fourth,
Russia is “EU’s most important energy supplier”. As Cohen points out, “Europe is hungry for energy” and “EU energy security … depends heavily on Russia”. More specifically, EU is the world’s largest importer of hydrocarbons. It imports 82% of its oil and 57% of its gas. Over the next 25 years imports are estimated to rise to 93 and 84 percent of its oil and its gas needs, respectively. From the hydrocarbon consumption EU imports half of its natural gas and 30% of its oil from Russia. In order to deal with this situation, GP “has set out the new energy realities facing Europe, outlined questions for debate and suggested possible actions at the European level”. The “suggested possible actions” however, resemble NEPD Group’s strategy in many respects. For example, GP calls EU for creating an “integrated approach” and “diversifying sources and routes”. Furthermore, GP confirms that “EU’s strategy towards Russia … is essentially rooted in a position of weakness” therefore, EU is not an “equal partner” in this relationship, something that is unacceptable since it is “Russia’s largest energy buyer”. Finally, regarding the effort of the diversification of routes, Turkey and Ukraine play a crucial role and are characterized as “essential strategic partners”. Since 2006, some steps have been taken towards GP’s directives, on the creation of an integrated interoperable market and on the diversification of resources, but until 2008 these moves could not be characterized as effective, mainly due to the Russian counterstrategies.

31 See, ibid.
32 ‘Green Paper’, p. 17
33 Ibid. p. 18
35 ‘Green Paper’, p. 15
36 Ibid., p. 16
The danger for the West as a common geopolitical/geocultural unit is eminent. NEPD Group’s observation that “significant disruption in world oil supplies could … affect … our ability to promote key foreign and economic policy objectives, regardless of the level of US dependence on oil imports” actually demonstrates the American fear for the vulnerability of EU towards Russia. Cohen expresses the US fears: “Many European countries depend heavily on energy imports and are highly vulnerable to global energy shocks” and “if current trend prevails, the Kremlin could translate its energy monopoly into untenable foreign and security policy influence in Europe to the detriment of the European – American relations”. More specifically, Cohen links energy directly with IR and warns that the European dependence on the Russian energy monopoly will “affect the geopolitical issues … such as NATO expansion to Ukraine and Georgia, ballistic missile defense, and the European influence in the post-Soviet space”\(^{37}\). The Western response to this threat lies directly on NEPD Group’s abovementioned recommendations that “will ensure that rising Caspian … production is effectively integrated into world … trade” through a “U.S. – supported East – West pipeline routes”\(^{38}\) both for oil and gas. This means only one thing. Under the pretext of diversification at the production and transportation level, “U.S. and Europe should work to support new transit lines that bypass Russia”.\(^{39}\) Europe should coordinate with Washington otherwise “Europe’s strategic drift away from the United States will continue unabated”, which will destroy the “transatlantic relations, common values, goals, strategic objectives, and security policies”.\(^{40}\) If Americans lose the energy game of the EK and the HMS, they may become estranged from Europe, they may even be expelled form Eurasia, since EU could be aligned with

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\(^{37}\) Ibid., p. 12  
\(^{38}\) ‘National Energy Policy’, NEPD, p. 8-12  
\(^{39}\) Cohen, ‘Europe’s Strategic Dependence on Russian Energy’, p. 13  
\(^{40}\) Ibid., p. 1
Russia. This could only mean the realization of the Anglo-Saxon/Insular fear or the Eurasian/Continental hope of the emergence of a Eurasian block that controls the WI. This is an accurate and adequate reason to understand why the contemporary energy security competition of the MS has been named the “New Great Game”.

Consequently, Lords’ Curzon’s statement that “Turkestan, Afghanistan, Persia, Caspian Sea countries, for the vast majority of the people these names recollect strange stories and fictions. For me, however, these lands are merely pawns on a chessboard, were a play of world domination is being performed”\(^\text{41}\) is always relevant and depicts a geopolitical situation, in which only some names of some actors have changed, but the substance remains the same.

i. Through the ‘Silk Road’ or Through the ‘Varangians to the Greeks’? The Oil Pipeline Competition

NW and the West have developed (late-90s) in the HMS two major, rather competing transportation-communication corridors, one formal the other informal. US and EU have developed the east-west corridor, while Russia is developing a north-south one.

As Hill states, “the development of the East-West corridor is viewed as a tool for reorienting the broader Caspian region away from its former dependence on Russia,

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\(^{41}\) Kleverman, \textit{The New Great Game}, p. 14

\(^{42}\) Parakhonsky, B. ‘Geopolitics of Transport and Energy Corridors: A View From Ukraine’ \textit{Marco Polo}
and for cementing Turkey’s position as a bridge between the new states of the Caucasus and Central Asia and Europe”. 43 In this framework, the report of the NEPD Group simply reemphasized the ‘Silk Road Strategy Act’ (1999) issued by the US Congress with the intention to provide “a mandate for the support of the economic and political independence of the countries of the Caucasus and Central Asia”. This bill emphasized on the east-west axis and included many financial and political provisions. This strategy was closely followed by the European initiative for the creation of the Transport Corridor Europe Caucasus Asia (TRACECA) (1993). A project aimed to fund the integrative efforts between West and the HMS and the EK. 44 Therefore, the east-west axis successfully described as the ‘Silk Road’ incorporates a whole package of projects, which would enable the West to acquire the ‘riches’ of the ‘orient’. Like in the past, the main factor that controls the modern ‘Silk Road’ is once again the ‘Turanian’ element and West is trying to cooperate with and/or manipulate this element.

Russia reacted to this official Western policy. Russian policy has been taking its formative, unofficial but clearly detectable steps during the last three-four years and is concentrated on the creation of a north-south axis that counterbalances the east-west one. This axis focuses on the energy routes and pipelines thus, it might be less comprehensive in ‘economic’ and ‘communications’ terms, but it is much more advanced in ‘political’ and ‘cultural’ ones. The element that NW is trying to cooperate with in order not to become isolated from the rest of Eurasia is the ‘Aryan’ one, namely the Iranian in the EK and the Greek in the HMS. The cultural, military, political and now energy ties with the Greek element, along with its ‘utilization’ to

44 See, ibid., pp. 219-220
open mainly the Western – EU, markets brings to mind an also equal important medieval trade “life-line” for the Russians, the road “from the Varangians to the Greeks”.

In any case, it could be observed that the Western-led east-west ‘Silk Road’ axis and the NW-led north-south ‘from the Varangians to the Greeks’ axis converge into the BSSA of the HMS and in a way create two competing formations centered on the two halves of the HMS, Greece and Turkey. Pipeline competition depicts most clearly this ‘War of the Worlds’ and demonstrates the DHMS condition, to the detriment of its peoples. This split is caused due to the Western-NW friction and due to the inability of the natives to unify their space again.

As far as the oil transportation is concerned, four major projects emerged and clashed since the early-90s. Two of them were scheduled to carry the “Early”\(^{45}\) oil and the next two referred to the “main” oil transportation quantities. A consortium of major international oil companies (AIOC) signed (September 1994) the “contract of the century”\(^{46}\) ($7.5 billions) with Azerbaijan’s state oil company (SOCAR). The production was planned to reach the amount of 800,000 to 1 million barrels per day (bpd) near the end of the next decade. So, in the interim production had to be referred as the ‘early’ oil until it will reach the ‘main’ oil capacity. For the early oil, two routes were chosen (October 2005): the Baku-Supsa and the Baku-Novorossiisk. The first one ended to the Georgian port of Supsa, following the east-west axis.\(^{47}\) The second one passed through Chechnya and ended to the Russian port of Novorossiisk.

\(^{45}\) Borisocheva, ‘Analysis of the Oil – and Gas – Pipeline –Links between EU and Russia’, p. 9
\(^{46}\) Sasley, ‘Turkey’s Energy Policy In the Post-cold War Era’, p. 29
following the north-south axis. For the first time AIOC implements the first steps of
the ‘bypassing’ Russia ‘project’.

In the years 1995-1999, there was a great debate concerning the route of the Main
Export Pipeline of the Azeri fields. There were three main options. The Baku-Supsa-
Samsun (Turkey, Black Sea)-Ceyhan (Turkey, Eastern Mediterranean) line, the Baku-
Tbilisi (Georgia)-Ceyhan pipeline and the Baku-Armenia-Ceyhan pipeline. The third
option was rejected due to the Armenian-Azeri conflict in Nagorno-Karabakh.
Turkish and Azerbaijani policies were aiming at ‘bypassing’ Armenia too. Turkey,
backed up by the US, was actively supporting the Baku-Tbilisi-Ceyhan route. Three
were the main problems for materializing this route. First, the cost of the construction
was high with the probability of excessive cost to be prohibitive. Second, the price of
oil during that period was too low and it was uncertain whether Azerbaijan’s
production would make the pipeline economically viable. Third, Russia’s opposition
and ethnic conflicts could damage the project. For these reasons, Turkish policies on
the promotion of this project were characterized with a high level of propaganda,
“aggression”, “gambling” and strong doses of “threats” on various issues. “Turkey’s
pressure was broad-ranging … ordering oil refineries to boycott oil from international
companies seen to be blocking the construction of the pipeline, and threatening to
impose unilateral restrictions on tanker access to the Bosporus”.48 Foreign Minister
Ismail Cem’s statement (1998) is indicative of the way that the Turks perceived the
negotiation process.

We warn those who are contemplating such calculations that they will face
serious difficulties in transporting not only existing oil shipments but also future
ones through the Turkish Straits starting in the year 1999. To this end, Turkey
will start implementing all possible means … I would suggest that companies
who are in a position to transport their Caspian oil either via the Baku-Ceyhan

48 Ibid., p. 222
pipeline or through the Black Sea and the Turkish Straits to take the above-mentioned facts into consideration.\textsuperscript{49}

Despite legitimate rights of a state to protect the environment, the cultural heritage and the safety of a population, Turkish attitude was indicating a clear geopolitical agenda which could be achieved by the use of any mean.\textsuperscript{50} Turkish government declared that would cover all the excessive costs for the pipeline construction and started even not to invite Russia to its energy initiatives.\textsuperscript{51} By 1998, despite all these political efforts the AIOC still was not “convinced of the workability of the Baku-Ceyhan line”.\textsuperscript{52} A decisive factor for the implementation of the project was the Azerbaijani support of the Turkish side.\textsuperscript{53} The intergovernmental agreement supporting the construction of the pipeline was signed in Constantinople/Istanbul (18 November 1999). The first oil was pumped on 10 May 2005 and reached Ceyhan on 28 May 2005. The first shipment to a British tanker left the port on 4 June 2006.\textsuperscript{54} The BTC MEP final cost was $3.9 billion, almost double the amount of what it was presented by Turkey ($2 billion).\textsuperscript{55} Its operation, however, actually followed Turkish predictions in reducing the shipments through the Straits and unblocking the heavily populated Bosporus.\textsuperscript{56} Moreover, according to estimates, the pipeline will pump 1,000,000 bpd of oil by the end of 2008 and “there is a plan to raise the capacity of the pipeline up to 1,600,000 bpd in 2010-2012”.\textsuperscript{57} Despite all the difficulties and

\textsuperscript{49} Sasley, ‘Turkey’s Energy Policy In the Post-cold War Era’, p. 32
\textsuperscript{50} See, ‘The Turkish Straits’, Republic of Turkey Ministry of Foreign Affairs [http://www.mfa.gov.tr]
\textsuperscript{51} Ibid., pp. 34-35
\textsuperscript{52} Ibid., p. 35
\textsuperscript{53} Ibid., p. 30; Hill, ‘Caspian Conundrum’, p. 222
\textsuperscript{55} Sasley, ‘Turkey’s Energy Policy In the Post-cold War Era’, p. 34
\textsuperscript{57} See, ‘Baku-Ceyhan Pipeline’s Capacity Currently Marking up 875,000 Barrels per Day’, [http://www.today.az] 2 April 2008
shortcomings, the BTC MEP is the world’s second largest oil pipeline, 1,768 km long, behind the ex-Soviet Druzhba one.  

The second phase in the development of the BTC MEP is its connection with the oil-rich Kazakhstan. The economic viability of the BTC MEP project could only be ensured by securing the transportation of Kazakh oil through it. So, in accordance with the NEPD Group’s prescripts, the West originally supports the shipment of oil from Kazakhstan to Azerbaijan though the Caspian Sea and then envisages the construction of an underwater Trans-Caspian Pipeline (TCP) connecting these two countries on a permanent basis. Initially, Kazakhstan agreed (June 2006) on the shipment of oil to Azerbaijan. Kazakhstan’s Senate finally ratified (April 2008) the treaty and announced a multibillion project, the Kazakhstan Caspian Transportation System (KCTS), for the upgrade of its transportation infrastructure, something that would enable Kazakhstan to support the shipments to Azerbaijan. It has been estimated that Kazakhstan would deliver 23 million tons of oil per year with the possibility to raise the amount to 38 million in the future. Concerning the much more complicated TCP project, it is definitely going to gain some momentum but this plan could not be materialized in the near foreseeable future.  

The Russian project for the transportation of the “main” bulk of the Caspian oil is focused on the north-south axis. The Tengiz (Kazakhstan, oil-field near the Caspian Sea) – Novorossiisk (Russia, Black Sea-port) 1,510 km long pipeline, was designed after “pressure from Moscow” to the Chevron-led Caspian Pipeline Consortium

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Starting from Tengiz, a pipeline crosses Kazakhstan and Russia and ends to the oil facilities of Novorossiisk. From there, through shipments across the BSSA, it exits to the West. The construction of the CPC pipeline begun in 1999 and the pipeline started to operate fully in 2001. The fully expanded line is planned to transfer 1.34 million bpd by 2012 compared to the current 700,000 bpd. This means that it is going to have almost the same capacity as the BTC MEP, which carries almost 50 million tons per year (tpy) and there are plans to increase this quantity. In any case, both the BTC MEP and the CPC are going to export from 1.3 to 1.6 million bpd after 2012. It should be noted that Kazakhstan’s commitments to both consortia (AIOC and CPC) are important, but the main emphasis is placed on the Russian-oriented project.

Kazakhstan plans to source the BTC MEP with an amount of oil ranging from 23 to 38 million tpy, when its KCST project will be in full operation. At the same time, its contribution to the CPC pipeline will rise from 35 to 67 million tpy, an amount that almost equals to county’s current total oil production (70 million tons for 2008). The completion date for both projects is the same year, 2012. Thus, through these parallel negotiations some secure results could be reached on the final orientation of the main bulk of Kazakhstan’s Caspian oil. Obviously, the construction of the CPC “strengthened the Russian hold of the regions energy supply routes further”. However, the problem with this route was to secure its exit to the Mediterranean. Turkish policies, backed by the West, were actually blocking the exit of more oil through the Straits, meaning that the CPC pipeline could not be upgraded since its transportation would have been delayed, thus the oil would become expensive and

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61 Hill, ‘Caspian Conundrum’, p. 220
63 ‘Baku-Ceyhan Pipeline’s Capacity Currently Marking up 875,000 Barrels per Day’
64 Lillis, ‘Kazakhstan: Astana Set to make an Energy Export Break With Russia’
65 Borisocheva, ‘Analysis of the Oil – and Gas – Pipeline –Links between EU and Russia’, p. 11
inefficient. Russia found the solution by utilizing the other important HMS factor, Greece. Instead of succumbing to Turkish demands, Russia followed the Greek plan of sending CPC oil through the Bulgarian and Greek territory to the Aegean directly, bypassing the Straits. Thus, the Burgas (Bulgaria, Black Sea port) – Alexandroupolis (Greece, Northern Aegean port) pipeline (BAP) plan has emerged. A protocol signed in Athens (2004) and a political memorandum in Sofia (2005) gave the necessary push to the project. The signing ceremony (15 March 2007) took place in Athens as well. A shareholders agreement was signed in January 2008 and according to the Greek PM, Konstantinos Karamanlis, (25 April 2008) the project “is being realized in line with the set schedule” and will be completed in 2011. The reaction of the US was at least neutral and the US interpreted the BAP as a significant contribution to the “multiple routes” of the energy transportation that would not harm its strategic interests. EU also welcomed the project and characterized it as an issue of “pan-European interest”. The BAP is 303km long with an initial capacity of 35 million tpy and potential increase to 50 million in the near future. It will have large storage facilities especially in the Alexandroupoli port and is definitely going to enable the CPC consortium to “increase crude oil supplies” by allowing the abovementioned upgrades in the CPC pipeline without fears that this extra oil is going to be stopped

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69 ‘Shareholders Agreement was Signed for the Burgas-Alexandroupolis Pipeline’, [http://www.in.gr] 18 January 2008
73 ‘Shareholders Agreement was Signed for the Burgas-Alexandroupolis Pipeline’
74 Ibid.
Chevron and Kazakhstan, in a clear demonstration of their interests, are negotiating their entrance into the consortium and the Greek shipowners are bargaining the utilization of the large Greek commercial and tanker fleet for the transportation of the oil in the Black Sea and from the Mediterranean to its markets. The CPC BAP is directly competitive to the BTC MEP, since it absorbs large quantities of Caspian oil not allowing the east-west corridor to further expand with the creation of the TCP. Furthermore, it verifies a ‘tactical’ and not ‘strategic’ nature of the Russo-Turkish relations. According to Turkish commentators, “Moscow’s … decision to go ahead with the Burgas-Alexandroupolis bypass oil line … clearly illustrates the realistic limits to Turkish-Russian relations, even in the field of energy”. Kazakhstan’s stance on this issue is crucial and since Russia has ‘embraced’ it very warmly, the north-south axis seems to have established a relative balanced situation. Blagov’s observations show clearly the whole situation:

The opening of the US-backed … (BTC) pipeline in 2005 broke an effective Russian pipeline monopoly linking the Caspian Basin and Western markets … The CPC route can be seen as the chief Russian competitor to BTC. Some analysts say heavy Kazakhstani participation in BTC is needed to make that export route profitable … The Kazakhstani pledge to boost its CPC export volume is causing concern among some Western analysts that Astana’s commitment to BTC will end up being relatively minor, threatening the pipeline’s economic viability.

Putin’s statement in Athens about the urgent need for the project to be materialized is indicative of the whole spirit behind it. “The Baku-Ceyhan [pipeline] has been built … All routes will bypass us. And this will mean lost profits, both political and economic”. The economic and political feasibility of the project, along with its low

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75 ‘Wrap: Russia, Bulgaria, Greece Sign Pipeline Deal, highlight Security’
77 Torbakov, ‘Making Sense of the Current Phase of Turkish-Russian Relations’, p. 8
79 ‘Excerpts from the Press Conference Following the Russian-Bulgaria-Greek Summit’
cost ($1 billion) and in contrast to the BTC MEP economic (cost $3.9 billion), political and security problems, even after the enormous increase in the prices of oil, could not guarantee the long-term sustainability of the oil component of the east-west axis. Hill is clear when she warns that, “The success or failure of U.S. government policy in the Caspian, and the extent of Turkey’s influence in the region, will be determined by the ultimate fate of the MEP, the Baku-Ceyhan pipeline” 80 since “serious obstacles remain and many factors will affect the outcome” 81.

ii. Through the ‘Silk Road’ or Through the ‘Varangians to the Greeks’? The Gas Pipeline Competition

... the European-Russian relationship is of a long term nature, since over the next couple of decades Russia will remain Europe’s primary energy (especially natural-gas) supplier... and Europe will remain the largest customer for Russian energy supplies... 82

GP underpins the need for EU to “speak with a common voice” addressing its energy security problems and asks how member states could “promote diversity of supply, especially for gas”. 83 Of all the energy sources, natural gas is “the most strategically significant”, since it “generally must be transported through pipelines – physical routes starting in the supplier location and ending at the consumer location” thus “is much more subject to geopolitical considerations, particularly in Eurasia”. 84 Unlike oil, which could travel by sea much easier and with less costs, natural gas is a much more land, geography-based commodity thus, much more vulnerable to ‘external’ factors and requires more stable ‘alignments’, if not ‘alliances’. Gas crises were quite

80 Hill, ‘Caspian Conundrum’, p. 225
81 Ibid., p. 236
82 Boriscocheva, ‘Analysis of the Oil – and Gas – Pipeline –Links between EU and Russia’, p. 19
83 ‘Green Paper’, p. 5
a few during the last years. The Russian-Ukrainian (2006) dispute led to gas
decreases in Europe. This Russian-Ukrainian dispute “served as a catalyst” for the
expression of European fears over Russian energy dependency. Since almost 90% of
the total Russian gas carried towards Europe crosses Ukraine, this dispute affected
EU as a whole and launched the debates for a more independent EU energy policy
towards Russia. Moscow also realized the detrimental effects of the ‘median’ states,
especially the unfriendly ones, between Russia and its clients in Europe. 87 In another
case, Turkmenistan halted the gas shipments (December 2007) to Iran, due to
technical problems and weather conditions, which in its turn reduced the volume
exported to Turkey, something that forced Ankara to halt the gas flows to Greece. 88
Athens managed to overcome the crisis by using alternative suppliers from Russia
and Algeria. 89 The Hungarian government (2006) managed to overcome and reverse
its unpopularity only after it managed to achieve a very low gas purchase price from
Gazprom. Since then, Hungary demonstrates a much friendlier attitude towards
Russia. 90 By examining these examples, it could be argued that gas is an essential
policy regulator for both the internal and the external policies of an energy gas
consuming society. Thus, it would be of the highest importance for EU to be able to
achieve its optimum energy security, especially concerning its gas policies, and for
Russia to continue hold the first place in the European gas market.

85 Boriscoheva, ‘Analysis of the Oil – and Gas – Pipeline –Links between EU and Russia’, p. 11
86 Ibid., p. 3
87 Ibid., p. 11
As it has been mentioned earlier, EU’s and US’s principals on the gas policy are converging towards the notion of the diversification of resources, which means bypassing Russia. The realization of the ‘Silk Road’ is the imperative of this policy. The Turkish PM Recep Tayyip Erdoğan expresses the essence of Western policies through his statement that “The silk route will also become an energy route linking East and West, through Turkey”. The practical application of this policy is as follows: West is trying to develop a pipeline complex having a westwards orientation that will bring the gas from central Asia to Europe. This route is planned to have four distinct but clearly interconnected branches and is expected to use the gas resources of two regions. The gas sources will be Azerbaijan during the first phase and Kazakhstan, Uzbekistan and mainly Turkmenistan during the second phase. The plan pledges the connection of Turkmenistan with Azerbaijan through the TCP. From there, the gas is going to follow the ‘South Caucasus (Shah Deniz) Natural Gas Pipeline’ that runs parallel with the BTC MEP. The Baku-Tbilisi-Erzerum (Turkey) Natural Gas Pipeline (BTE NGP) pipeline brings Azerbaijan’s gas (from Shah Deniz field) to Turkey through Georgia. According to this plan, Turkey acts as a hub that ‘bifurcates’ the gas pipelines towards two directions through the ‘Southern Europe Gas Ring Project’ which connects Turkey, Greece and Italy, the ‘Interconnector Turkey-Greece-Italy’ (ITGI) pipeline and through a Northern branch which passes from Bulgaria, Romania, Hungary and Austria, referred to as Nabucco. In a few words, four pipeline projects TCP, BTE NGP, ITGI, Nabucco along with two deposit acquisition plans in Azerbaijan and mainly Turkmenistan are the forefront of the Western Energy policy and the materialization of the energy ‘Silk Road’. Russia, having also evaluated the situation, has elaborated its own energy plan, consisting of

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two main gas resources and two main pipeline projects, which follow in general a north-south orientation. Russia plans to use its own deposits along with the central Asian deposits of Kazakhstan, Uzbekistan and mainly Turkmenistan in filling its pipelines. Through the ‘Pre-Caspian Gas Pipeline’ (Prikaspiiski) Russia will gather the central Asian deposits and bring them to Russia. Then Moscow plans to transfer them with the Russian network to the Black Sea port of Novorosiisk. From there, a pipeline network, the ‘South Stream’ (SS), will send gas to Bulgaria by an undersea connection crossing the Black Sea. Bulgaria will act as a hub that will ‘bifurcate’ the pipeline towards two directions, a southern branch through Greece and Italy and a northern branch through Serbia, Hungary and Austria. Putin commented on the project that it “is of strategic importance for Europe’s energy security”.92 Thus, Russia’s main policy in the realization of the new ‘from Varangians to the Greeks’ energy path consists of acquiring central Asian deposits and creating two pipelines networks, the Prikaspiiski with a south–to-north orientation and the SS, which goes “to the Greeks”. Despite the ‘politically correct’ statements that these projects are complementary, this brief presentation reveals something different. Both projects are planning to use the exact same sources for filling the pipelines, namely the sources of Central Asia and mainly Turkmenistan. Both projects are heading towards exactly the same market which is EU and both projects follow almost the same route, with various alliances and by ‘bypassing’ projects. Consequently, these two projects are absolutely and directly competitive in the manner of a pure ‘Zero-Sum-Game’.

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According to analysts, the implementation of SS “would kill Nabucco”\textsuperscript{93}, since they are “mutually exclusive projects”.\textsuperscript{94}

As stated earlier, both plans consist of many sub-projects which are on a different level of preparation. Regarding the ‘Silk Road’, the BTE NGP is operational (2007) and the Greek-Turkish connection pipeline was inaugurated the same year. The Greek-Italian connection is under construction. However, the Nabucco project remains a theory and in the papers, despite the fact that EU has created a coordination department and there is sound political support rhetoric.\textsuperscript{95} On the other hand, the TCP plan is at the level of good intentions. The TCP uncertainty is directly connected with Turkmenistan’s unwillingness to make a firm deal with the West, something that endangers the whole project, since only Azerbaijan’s deposits are committed to the plan, something that of course is not enough. The ‘from the Varangians to the Greeks’ road does a little better, since it seems to have secured the central Asian consent on the plan by committing the sufficient gas sources and constructing the Prikaspiiski pipelines. Moreover, Russia, in the last half of 2007 and the first of 2008 has achieved deals with Bulgaria, Serbia, Greece, Hungary and Austria that might enable SS to materialize and the North-South axis to became a reality.

So, why the ‘Varangian’ seems to outmaneuver the ‘Turanian’ and how is this done? According to Cohen, the Russian strategy follows a very consistent and

\textsuperscript{94} Socor, V. ‘Hungary’s MOL Stays With Nabucco, But Prime Minister Weights South Stream Also’, [http://www.jamestown.org] 19 December 2007
comprehensive approach that has been proven very effective.\textsuperscript{96} In a schematic approach, Russia is trying to “lock in”\textsuperscript{97} the energy sources (supply), the market (demand) and the transportation route (pipelines). As far as the sources are concerned, Russia is trying to create a state monopoly in the internal sector by absorbing all private companies and putting them under few large state conglomerations.\textsuperscript{98} In the external field, there were two decisive moves that allowed Russia to consolidate its power to central Asian gas deposits. First, Russia signed an agreement (20 December 2007) with Kazakhstan and Turkmenistan on the renovation and further extension of the Prikaspiiski pipeline network that transfers Caspian gas to Russia.\textsuperscript{99} Second, Gazprom announced (11 March 2008) that since 2009 Russia would start paying the central Asian states in “EU market prices” for the gas that is going to purchase, meaning a substantial increase in the price that Russia buys from these states.\textsuperscript{100} According to analysts, the “possibility of selling gas at higher prices than those offered by Russia was the main economic reason for the Central Asian states to join the Nabucco project as potential suppliers … now there is no economic reason, as world market gas prices minus transportation costs would make the price offered for Turkmen gas equal to the Russian one”\textsuperscript{101} Moreover, this Russian central Asian alignment has raised suspicions about the possibility of an emerging gas-cartel in the paradigm of OPEC including Iran also.\textsuperscript{102} “If realized”, Borisocheva observes, it “would control world’s first, second and fourth largest gas reserves, which hold approximately 73 percent of total natural gas reserves, and would have significant

\textsuperscript{96} See, Cohen, ‘Europe’s Strategic Dependence on Russian Energy’, pp. 3-11
\textsuperscript{97} Ibid., pp. 3, 4
\textsuperscript{98} See, Borisocheva, ‘Analysis of the Oil – and Gas – Pipeline –Links between EU and Russia’, p. 18
\textsuperscript{102} See, Socor, ‘Russia to Increase Purchase Prices for Central Asian Gas: Outlook and Implications’
influence over the price of natural gas”. 103 In a gesture of courtesy, on the next day of the price-agreement announcement Russia released in Turkmenistan Soviet data on its actual gas deposits that were “kept under tight control” in Moscow. 104 This move could also demonstrate Russia’s confidence that it had managed to secure the necessary quantities from that country, one of the largest gas producers, and there nothing or too little more to bargain. 105 Tomberg believes that these two Russian moves “will finally bury the US and EU-promoted trans-Caspian Nabucco project”. 106 Moving now towards the market field, Russia has outperformed any other competitor with a “blitzkrieg capture” of five EU countries and Serbia in the last twelve months. 107 Among these countries, Bulgaria, Hungary and Austria are participating in the Nabucco group whereas Greece was part of the ITGI. In a few words, Austria’s state-controlled OMV agreed (25 January 2008) with Gazprom “to turn Nabucco’s designated terminus and storage center … into a Gazprom-OMV 50%-50% company”. Moreover, there is a possibility “of a Gazprom-backed takeover by OMV of the private-owned MOL, the Hungarian partner in the Nabucco consortium”. 108 Hungary agreed (25 February 2008) to enter the SS project by creating a state company in a 50%-50% partnership with Gazprom. 109 In Serbia there was a complete takeover of the energy sector by an intergovernmental agreement (25 January 2008). 110 The deal was not beneficial in economic terms for Serbia but it was a strategic agreement due to its urgent need to find support over the Kosovo-Metohja

103 Borisocheva, ‘Analysis of the Oil – and Gas – Pipeline –Links between EU and Russia’, p. 18
104 Lillis, ‘Russia Makes Financial Gamble to Retain Control of Central Asian Energy Exports’
106 Tomberg, ‘Check to Ukraine and Checkmate to Nabucco’ [http://www.rian.ru] 5 March 2008
Bulgaria entered the SS project (18 January 2008) during Putin’s visit in Sofia that completed a whole series of agreements including cooperation into the nuclear field. In the Nabucco group these were some serious “defections” since only “Romania seems to be the one remaining loyal participant”. Regarding the ITGI branch, all the countries seem to hold a positive stance towards the SS project. Italy was actually the driving force behind the SS deal since ENI SpA signed the SS agreement with Gazprom (22 November 2007) and they are going to cooperate on building the undersea pipeline in the Black Sea. Finally, Greece sealed its participation on the project (29 April 2008) by signing an intergovernmental agreement during PM Karamlulis’s visit to Moscow. Having secured the supply and the demand, Russia also aims to dictate and control the transit routes of the gas flow as well. In other words, instead of being bypassed, with all the abovementioned developments Russia outflanks the major Western-led obstacles in its effort to reach the European markets directly. By establishing the “from the Varangians to the Greeks” road, Russia avoids crossing the Ukrainian ‘steppe’ and the Turkish ‘Straits’. As Socor notes, “Russia’s rationales behind South Stream is to bypass Turkey, just as bypassing Ukraine”. As mentioned earlier, 90% of Russian gas that goes to EU passes from Ukraine. From the Russian point of view the “transit flows, during the last couple of years have been under threat of Ukrainian ‘high jacking’”. Moreover,

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111 See, Soccor, V. ‘Moscow Exploiting the Kosovo Context to Take Over Serbia’s energy Sector’ [http://www.jamestown.org] 10 January 2008
113 Socor, ‘Nabucco Gas Project Facing a Cascade of Defections’
116 Socor, ‘Gazprom’s South Stream Project Can Be Halted in the Black Sea’
117 Boriscoheva, ‘Analysis of the Oil – and Gas – Pipeline –Links between EU and Russia’, p. 11
a constant series of “gas wars” and political accusations bring the two sides into the position of cutting off the gas supply, a situation that has been deteriorated after the ‘Orange’ revolution.\textsuperscript{118} While the Ukrainian case is rather simple, the Turkish one deserves some more focus due to the initial close Russian-Turkish energy cooperation.\textsuperscript{119} When the first plans for the construction of TCP progressed (1998) and Turkmenistan made its first commitments for the plan (1999), Russia came up with a “competing proposal” and urged the speed up of the negotiations for the construction of the Trans-Black Sea under-water pipeline, the BS project. The Russian-Turkish agreement (1997) would facilitate the direct shipment of gas to Turkey, by bypassing the previous Ukraine-Moldova-Romania-Bulgaria line.\textsuperscript{120} The official inauguration (November 2005) of the project brought a new momentum to the Russian-Turkish relations that could actually lead to a truly strategic alliance. BS’s designed capacity amounts to 16 bcm/y. This pipeline, however, is underused. In 2006 the deliveries amounted to 8 bcm/y.\textsuperscript{121} The frequent meetings between Putin and Erdoğan (2005) allowed the two leaders to start planning a further strengthening of their bonds by doubling the BS’s capacity to 30 bcm/y. This would be the BS-2 project that would allow Turkey to act as an energy hub of the Russian ‘camp’. The plan was to create two branches, one moving towards Europe crossing Bulgaria and Serbia and ending to Hungary, and the other moving southwards towards Lebanon and Israel.\textsuperscript{122} Hill observes that “Initially” Turkey “had actively supported both the Blue Stream project and the Trans-Caspian gas pipeline”\textsuperscript{123} so Ankara, as Torbakov says, “in its desire to become a transport hub … engaged in a very delicate balancing

\textsuperscript{119} See, chapter 5
\textsuperscript{120} Hill, ‘Caspian Conundrum: Pipelines and Energy Networks’, p. 223
\textsuperscript{122} Borisocheva, ‘Analysis of the Oil – and Gas – Pipeline –Links between EU and Russia’, p. 16
\textsuperscript{123} Hill, ‘Caspian Conundrum: Pipelines and Energy Networks’, p. 224
This balance was upset when Azerbaijan’s Shah Denz’s deposits were found and the Nabucco project emerged. The direct competence between the east-west corridor and the BS-2 Russian-backed plan forced Turkey to reject the BS-2. This happened because Turkish westwards ambitions seek “to promote … an energy corridor that would help Europe to diversify its supplies – which basically means to lessen its heavy dependence on Russian gas”. So, as Baev states at the time that the BS-2 project “was nearly sealed” Russia was observing “Turkey’s active involvement in the Nabucco project”. The Russian reaction was immediate. Putin’s meeting (June 2007) with PM Karamanlis in Constantinople/Istanbul during the summit of the BSEC resulted in the launch of the SS project and in the Russian decision to recreate the road “from the Varangians to the Greeks”. Consequently, as analysts observe, the SS plan was designed to “replace previous plans to extend Blue Stream pipeline” and that the “South Stream project has superseded Blue Stream in Gazprom’s strategic planning”. The Turkish moves brought unfavorable results to Ankara’s strategic ambitions and Turkey “appears now to regret its policies towards Russia. President Gül’s warning (January 2008) that “It is always said Turkey is an energy terminal but if we don’t take care, we can be bypassed … therefore, we should keep … (energy) issues alive” is more relevant than ever.

How the West reacts to this Russian avalanche? While the EU is trying to save the market and the transit routes, the US are trying to penetrate the sources field. The

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124 Torbakov, ‘Making Sense of the Current Phase of Turkish-Russian Relations’, p. 9
125 Hill, ‘Caspian Conundrum: Pipelines and Energy Networks’, p. 224
126 Torbakov, ‘Making Sense of the Current Phase of Turkish-Russian Relations’, p. 9
128 Borissocheva, ‘Analysis of the Oil – and Gas – Pipeline –Links between EU and Russia’, p. 16
129 Socor, ‘Hungary’s MOL Stays With Nabucco, But Prime Minister Weights South Stream Also’
130 Torbakov, ‘Making Sense of the Current Phase of Turkish-Russian Relations’, pp. 8-9
main EU legal weapons to halt the Russian expansion are two. Through the so-called ‘Gazprom Clause’, EU is aiming to keep the market away from Russian touch. Through the ‘Energy Charter’, EU is hoping to influence the transit routes. ‘Gazprom Clause’ is the unofficial name of the amended ‘Gas Directive’. The directive has taken this nickname because it is actually a reaction to the fear that “the entry of … Gazprom, into local markets would undermine local control of vital assets”. This directive requires that “no supply or production company active anywhere in the EU can own or operate a transmission system in any member state of the EU”. Despite this “direct attempt to avert Russian penetration” Gazprom through “subsidiaries and other legal forms” plans to increase its control to the market.¹³² The ‘Energy Charter’ (1998) “will allow the Caspian countries to use Gazprom’s gas transit network to export their energy resources directly to the EU energy markets”.¹³³ Obviously, the “ratification of the Energy Charter by Russia would effectively break up Russia’s monopoly on gas pipelines to Europe, allow access to Russia’s energy deposits, and force Russia to price its own gas more competitively in relation to other suppliers”. However, Russia is not going to ratify the Charter “in its current form” but only after EU would “offer assets comparative in value”. As demonstrated before, energy sources are Russia’s “main source of budget income”, so its persistence on this issue “has become a crucial element in the worsening relations between EU and Russia”.¹³⁴ US are focusing more on securing the sources side of the ‘sources-routes-markets’ equation, since this has to do more with IR and projection of power. Matthew Bryza’s, Deputy Assistant Secretary of State for European and Eurasian affairs, comments (25 March 2008) could serve as an accurate guide for outlining the US responses to the latest developments. On the issue of the price agreement between

¹³³ İpek, ‘The Aftermath of Baku-Tbilisi-Ceuhini Pipeline’, p. 14
¹³⁴ See, Borisocheva, ‘Analysis of the Oil – and Gas – Pipeline –Links between EU and Russia’, p. 18
Russia, Kazakhstan and Turkmenistan, Bryza sees a triumph of market economy but he also notes that “I would guess that the Central Asian producers, especially Turkmenistan understand how important their gas supplies are going to be to Gazprom meeting its contract obligations over the next decade or so”. With these words, the US official more or less urged these states if not to ‘blackmail’ surely to exert ‘pressures’ to Russia through their gas deposits. Bryza added that ITGI and Nabucco could provide Europe with enough gas “to replace about a quarter of what Gazprom now supplies”. US’s aggressive and even ‘blackmailing’ attitude toward Greece proves the seriousness of American intention towards these two projects.

Bryza, in a question about the possibility of the riparian Black Sea states, Ukraine and Romania, to halt permanently or temporarily, the undersea part of the SS project due to legal and environmental issues he replied that this “was a question that Washington was interested in” and that “some lawyers are taking a look into that”. However, he admitted that Gazprom would find a routing “that will make” the project work. Obviously, the initial strategy of the US is mainly to delay the project.

Therefore, as it has been demonstrated, in the oil competition the two roads seem to have acquired a relative balanced situation. Both the east-west BTC MEP and the CPC BAP are going to curry Azeri and Kazakh oil respectively by bypassing the Straits, the first through Turkey and the other through Greece. The first is operational, the other is under construction. The problem for the first is that it’s economical

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136 Kucera, ‘US Diplomat’
138 Kucera, ‘US Diplomat’
viability is uncertain, since, with the exception of the Azeri oil, the contribution of the Kazakh quantities are very small. Furthermore, the unstable political situation and the regional conflicts that torment the involved territories is not a good sign for the future. Even if one excludes Georgia’s Abkhazian-Ossetian dispute, along with Turkey’s Kurdish problem, “from Azerbaijan’s point of view “the pipeline will pass close to the Armenian border … 40 km away from the front line in Karabakh”.

On the other hand, the CPC BAP is still under construction and, as Matthew Bryza has implied in an interview, there are Western-backed projects that could be directly competitive by exporting oil from the Black Sea bypassing the Straits and bypassing Greece too. There are actually four other projects the Samsun (Black Sea port, Turkey) – Ceyhan, the Odessa (Black Sea, Ukraine) – Brodi – Plock – Gdansk (Poland), the AMBO (Bulgaria-FYROM–Albania) and the Constanta (Black Sea port, Romania) – Trieste (Italy). The problem with these projects is that Russia is not planning to transfer oil through these routes, so once again the oil has to come either from Kazakhstan or from Azerbaijan. There are clear signs of the increasing direct involvement of these two states into Black Sea energy infrastructure. Azerbaijan’s SOCAR, in addition to the Supsa oil terminal, has expanded the Kulevi oil terminal, which is Georgia’s second largest at the Black Sea coast, near the port of Poti, and plans to build a refinery there. Meanwhile, Kazakhstan has bought (5 February 2008) the Batumi’s port oil terminal in Georgia and is completing the acquisition of the Romanian oil company Rompetrol. In addition, Kazakhstan plans to

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139 Barakhonsky ‘Geopolitics of Transport and Energy Corridors’, p. 5
142 See, Borissocheva, ‘Analysis of the Oil – and Gas – Pipeline –Links between EU and Russia’, p. 13
invest in a Romanian refinery near Constanta and build one in Batumi. So, Azerbaijan through Poti, and Supsa and Kazakhstan through Batumi could ship oil directly to Europe. However, if this is the case for Azerbaijan, Kazakhstan is in a more delicate situation. Therefore, as an answer to the Ukrainian requests for a commitment to the Odessa-Brodi-Plock-Gdansk pipeline, the Kazakh President Nazarbayev said that the issue is “open” but “We have to agree with Russian oil transportation organizations to supply the necessary volumes to Ukraine”. 

As far as the major gas competition is concerned, it seems that the north-south axis has taken a decisive advantage at the expense of the east-west option. The situation is so unbalanced, that Putin even mocked the Western project by saying that “You can build a pipeline or even two, three, or five. The question is what fuel you put through it and where do you get the fuel. If someone wants to dig into the ground and bury metal there in the form of a pipeline, please do so, we don’t object … there can be no competition when one project has the gas and the other does not”. So, “many EU officials experience “a sense of failure” and even “near despair” over the failure to develop a common energy policy in response to Russia’s strategic advances”. However, the last developments for Nabucco demonstrate a kind of regrouping. RWE, the second largest German energy company, has entered the project and Gaz de France is also planning to join the project something which is acceptable from all the partners but one. Despite the European pressure, Turkey rejects the French appeal

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146 See, Socor, ‘Azerbaijan Can Rescue the Odessa-Brody Pipeline Project’
147 Lillis, ‘Russia Makes Financial Gamble to Retain Control of Central Asian Energy Exports’
148 Socor, ‘South Stream Gas Project Defeating Nabucco By Default’
on the ground that France has recognized the Armenian genocide.\footnote{See, ‘Gaz de France to Sign Up to Nabucco Project as ‘associate’, [http://www.turkishdailynews.co.tr] 5 February 2008; ‘Gaz de France Won’t Be Involved in Nabucco Project By Reason of Armenian Genocide Issue’, [http://www.panarmenian.net] 8 February 2008} Turkey’s general position on the project is being characterized from “a spirit of short-sighted opportunism risking to delay Nabucco”\footnote{See, Socor, ‘Nabucco Gas Project Facing a Cascade of Defections’} since it has “infuriated” both EU and Azerbaijan by its demands to act as a seller in the transportation of gas and not as a transit country.\footnote{See, Socor, ‘Nabucco Gas Project Facing a Cascade of Defections’} Furthermore, due to its “fears of losing the opportunity to become a transit and hub” it demonstrates a “loss of confidence in Nabucco”\footnote{‘Turkey Says Nabucco May Take Iranian, Russian Gas’, [http://www.turkishdailynews.co.tr] 19 March 2008} and calls for Russia and Iran\footnote{‘No Russian Involvement in Nabucco’, [http://www.turkishdailynews.co.tr] 8 May 2008} to join the project. EU, however, has officially denied the possibility of Russia to join the project.\footnote{Ismayilova, K. ‘The Future of Nabucco Pipeline Up in the Air’, [http://www.eurasianet.org] 5 December 2007} So, as Ismayilova indicates, “the answer to whether Nabucco becomes a reality may ultimately be found in … Turkmenistan”\footnote{See, Pannier, B. ‘Caspian: Baku-Ashgabat Thaw Could Have Energy Impact’, [http://www.eurasianet.org] 7 February 2008}. Two issues are dominant. First, the possibility of connecting Azerbaijan and Turkmenistan through the planned TCP has to be examined. Apart from the Russian and the Iranian reactions, there are territorial and economic disputes between these two countries. The relations, under Western and Turkish auspices, have been warming up but there is no commitment towards the realization of the plan.\footnote{See, Pannier, B. ‘Caspian: Baku-Ashgabat Thaw Could Have Energy Impact’, [http://www.eurasianet.org] 7 February 2008} The second and equally important question is how much gas Turkmenistan has and if it could honor any potential agreement with the west, since it commits the lion’s share of its deposits to Russia, it has entered into a large deal with China and negotiates
with India too.\textsuperscript{159} Jane’s analysis is clear. Turkmenistan tries “to play Russia, the US and China off against of each other … However, the true competition for future influence … will be between Moscow and Beijing”\textsuperscript{160} since “No matter how enlightened, US policy will only have a marginal effect of minimizing Russian or Chinese presence in the region, as geography … gives each more leverage”.\textsuperscript{161} For all these reasons, Nabucco bloc has started “looking south”. The Iranian and Arab option was examined and some decisions were taken in Brussels (5 May 2008).\textsuperscript{162} Iraq and the Arab Gas Pipeline Consortium (Egypt, Jordan, Lebanon and Syria) enter the picture.\textsuperscript{163}

The HMS through this competition has acquired once again its ancient luster and the medieval commercial-cultural roads have been re-designed around the BSSA. After fifteen years of competition, Turkey managed to have two main transit projects both western-backed, the oil BTC MEP and the gas BTE NGP. Greece managed to finalize three agreements: the CPC BAP for oil and the SS for gas, which are Russian-led, as well as the ITGI for gas, which is western-led. Bulgaria, on the other hand, has acquired so far two Russian-projects: the CPC BAP and the SS. At a first glance, it seems that despite Davutoğlu’s statements that “Turkey will be at the cross-roads of the East-West and North-South energy corridors in the upcoming period”\textsuperscript{164} it is Greece that fully materializes its position into the HMS. It would be interesting to note that the CPC BAP project “will be the first Russian-controlled pipeline on EU

\textsuperscript{160} ‘US Seeks Caspian Energy Reserves’, \url{http://www.janes.com} 1 February 2008
\textsuperscript{161} Kureca, ‘Washington Seeks to Steer Central Asian States Toward South Asian Allies’
\textsuperscript{162} See, Lobjakas, A. ‘EU: Nabucco Looks to Middle East for Gas’, \url{http://www.eurasianet.org} 6 May 2008
\textsuperscript{163} Lobjakas, ‘EU: Nabucco Looks to Middle East for Gas’
\textsuperscript{164} ‘Gül Takes energy Agenda to Washington’
territory”165, whereas the ITGI will make “Greece the first EU member state that will receive gas from Azerbaijan”.166 The overall evaluation of the pipeline diplomacy is that the stakes are mainly geopolitical and not merely economic. For example, SS’s initial plan was to cross Romania. The inclusion of Serbia and the exclusion of Romania indicate the priority given by Russia to politics rather than to economics. Serbian willingness to enter the block demonstrates how the transit states understand their role.167 Similarly, the Nabucco project “is a political undertaking” so it “will be realized even if there will be no other supplier but Azerbaijan”.168 So far, it could be argued that Greece and not Turkey, is emerging as “an important regional hub” in the HMS.169 A ‘regional hub’, of course, not a ‘global hub’ but if this region functions as a ‘Heartland’ then the meaning of ‘regional’ acquires larger geopolitical dimensions. Therefore, Greece’s potentials create fears to Turkey, the other half of the HMS. The former Commander-in-Chief of the Turkish General Staff Ismael Haki Karadayi had expressed the opinion (1997) that any potential pipeline construction in Greece “is a disastrous event for Turkey”.170 In general, analysts believe that the “energy arm wrestling Moscow-Washington” threatens to “demarcate new dividing lines in Europe with unpredictable consequences for its own integrity”. Consequently, “some broader alliances are being formed” with the “basic aim” of the states be “to upgrade their geopolitical role”.171 It could be generally argued that the recent developments that give to the NW a clear advantage into the unfolding modern GG “do not mean
that the “big Eurasian oil and gas war” is over. A sharp rise in hydrocarbon prices is
drawing the world’s attention to the oil and gas reserves of the central Asian states.
The regional countries will definitely use this chance to play on contradictions among
potential consumers”.172 These “contradictions” of the regional countries that are used
in order to promote specific interests in the GG could be demonstrated by a recent
serious tension in the Nagorno-Karabakh region. In the beginning of March 2008 and
for almost ten days “some of the fiercest fighting” between “Armenian and
Azerbaijani troops” was taking place “since the 1994 cease-fire pact”. Azerbaijani
analysts correlate these events with the simultaneous aforementioned rapprochement
with Turkmenistan and the mobilization towards the materialization of the TCP plan.
Ilgar Mammadov is clear by claiming that “An agreement on a trans-Caspian pipeline
is against the strategic interests of both Russia and Armenia. It is possible that by
showing this hostility at the frontline, Russia is trying to [undermine] the negotiations
on the Nabucco and trans-Caspian pipelines … [aiming to] discredit the South
Caucasus as a reliable source and transit point for Central Asian gas”.173 Since
Armenia is being constantly and deliberately bypassed from its neighbors, the
observation bears a serious weight of validity.174 These main regional challenges and
disputes that affect, form and refer to the alliances of the GG are going to be
examined in the next part of this chapter.

6.2 ‘The War of the Worlds’ of the ‘Great Game’: The ‘Energy-SECURITY’
Component

… what is happening on the Eurasian continent is
… the subtle emergence of two opposing blocks …
the web of relations that is emerging is in its early

172 Tomberg, I. ‘Caspian Pipeline Seems to Have Defeated Nabucco’, IRR: Institute of International
173 Ismayilov, “Baku and Ashgabad Solved Long-Lasted Problem While US is Pushing for Trans-
Caspian Deal”
174 See, Torbakov, ‘Ankara’s Post-Soviet Efforts in the Caucasus and Central Asia’
This observation reflects the situation that has been developed in the MS during the last two decades. As it has been stated, two main corridors have been developed, the north-south and the east-west with the HMS being their point of convergence. Via the east-west corridor the West dominates the HMS and enters the EK, whereas via the north-south corridor the NW tries to ‘break’ the horizontal ‘chain’ that links the West with the ‘Turanian’ element of central Asia. Focusing on the ‘Security’ aspect of the ‘Energy-Security’ equation, there is a definite place from which someone could start with. The long ‘Silk Road’ “chain” across HMS and the EK has a weak spot and since “a chain is no stronger than its weakest link”\(^{176}\) the whole architecture depends mainly on that point. So, where is that point? “A glance at the map speaks clearly” that “the Turkish-American alliance’s influence into Central Asia depends on the rather tiny wedge that Georgia and Azerbaijan form between Russia, Armenia and Iran. Armenia’s geographical location is crucial in that forms a wedge in the otherwise unbroken ‘Turkic’ chain that theoretically stretches from Istanbul to Chinese Xinjiang”. Therefore, the weakest point of the ‘Silk Road’, the ‘thinnest’ one, the region where the “chain” could break, is the Caucasus region. Exactly that place should be the departure point in unfolding the complex situation that is being developed in the MS.

Therefore, a series of amities, alignments and alliances is being developed and extends from the HMS and the BSSA to the whole MS. This complex situation

\(^{175}\) Cornell, ‘Geopolitics and Strategic Alignments in the Caucasus and Central Asia’, p. 5
\(^{176}\) Ibid., p. 9
incorporates both the notions of cooperation and confrontation in cultural, political and economic terms. Thus, by creating a three level analysis there is going to be a brief examination of the eastern-corner of the HMS, the Caucasus region, of the water-channel in the center of the HMS, the BSSA, and of the MS, Eurasia, in general. Despite of the ‘Energy’ interdependence that was analyzed in the previous part, this part will demonstrate the close connection of these spaces also in the terms of ‘Security’. The creation of two main detectable camps that dominate the HMS and the MS could also be detected in this case. Until 2003, the whole situation was quite clear and one could claim that the two camps were quite impermeable. Since then, some important and relatively recent developments have created a rather more complex situation. Nevertheless, these two ‘Security’ camps still exist and are more or less ‘compatible’ with the two ‘Energy’ camps, at least in their hard-core. The examination of the Caucasus region and the water-channel axis clearly demonstrates once more the notion of the DHMS. The vicious NW-Western competition to HMS’s mountainous eastern edges and the sea-based center of the core-region of the MS causes the detriment of its inhabitants.

i. The Collision and Amity in the Caucasus Region

In … Caucasus, none of the conflicts that raged between 1988 and 1994 have found a lasting solution, but are merely frozen along cease-fire lines. Being the land that separates Russia, Turkey and Iran … the region has to a certain degree reverted to the situation in the eighteenth and nineteenth centuries when it was the scene of the struggle between the Tsarist, Ottoman and Persian empires.\(^\text{177}\)

\(^\text{177}\) Ibid., p. 1
The question of ‘Security’ in the region of Caucasus depicts the fierce NW-Western competition for domination in the HMS and must be answered in a multidimensional way. This friction encompasses mostly regional “frozen” conflicts - Chechnya (Russia), Abkhazia, South Ossetia and Adjaria (Georgia), Nagorno-Karabakh (Azerbaijan), regional “hot” conflicts - Kurdish issue (Turkey, Iraq, Iran and Syria) and a large political issue named Iran.

**Chechnya:** In Chechnya, after the Russian defeat of the first war, the peace treaty (August 1996) only served as a “prolonged ceasefire” for the Russians to regroup, counterattack (October 1999) and finally win the war. During the first war, Russia blamed the Turkish side for its unofficial support of the Chechen forces. Therefore, the Chechen crises “became a critical issue in Russia’s relations with Turkey”. However, the capture of a ship full of Russian tourists in Turkish waters (January 1996) by Chechens with Turkish citizenship brought the bilateral tensions to “an apogee”. Russia accused Turkey that supports the rebels with “clandestine activities”. In ‘energy’ terms, Chechnya was traversed by the Baku-Novorossiisk pipeline. When the ‘early oil’ started to flow, the Russians and the Chechens agreed (September 1997) that the income received by the local government would be exactly as anywhere in the RF. However, the supply of oil was disturbed (1999) by accidents and disputes over transit payments. The supply was cut off during the

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178 Hill, ‘Caspian Conundrum’, p. 230
180 Tanrisever, ‘Turkey and Russia in Eurasia’, p. 138
181 Oku, ‘The Geopolitical Zigzag’
182 Tanrisever, ‘Turkey and Russia in Eurasia’, p. 139
183 Tsakiris, ‘Back to the Future’, p. 390
outbreak of war. As a consequence, Russia bypassed Chechnya by constructing a
280km pipeline through Dagestan (operated 2000).\textsuperscript{184}

\textbf{Georgia:}\textsuperscript{185} Abkhazia in the north coast of the Black Sea with Sokhumi as its capital,
Muslim Adjaria in the south of the Black Sea coast, encompassing the port of Batumi,
South Ossetia in the north of Tbilisi and an Armenian autonomous community to the
south did not leave many options to the Georgian majority. However, the main
problematic regions that border with Russia are two, Abkhazia and South Ossetia.
From 1989 till nowadays there were many devastating armed conflicts in these two
regions. The defeated Georgians were forced to accept (December 1993) the presence
of the peacekeeping CIS forces in Abkhazia, mainly Russians, nominated as United
Nations (UN) forces later on (July 1994). An embargo was imposed in response to
Abkhazia. Moreover, under the pressure of military defeat, Georgia joined the CIS.
Since then, a stalemate has been created in both the Abkhazian and the South Ossetian
dispute that could be characterized by various and frequent incidents of violent
friction. This “no war-no peace” situation was characterized as a “frozen conflict”,
with the possibility to easily become a “hot” one.\textsuperscript{186} The situation deteriorated during
the “rose revolution” (November 2003).\textsuperscript{187} Georgian President Mikhail Saakashvili
has adopted a hostile and aggressive rhetoric and activity towards Russia. For
example, he claimed (2004) that “We are very close to a war with Russia, people
should be ready for that”.\textsuperscript{188} Moreover, Georgia withdrew (2006) from CIS’s defense

\textsuperscript{184} See, Hill, ‘\textit{Caspian Conundrum}’, pp. 230-231
\textsuperscript{185} This part was written and completed few weeks before the August 2008 Russian-Georgian war.
Intentionally, is being left in its original form since its whole ‘spirit’ was in accord with the dramatic
events that took place that days
\textsuperscript{186} See, Mazis, T., I. ‘\textit{Geostrategic and Defense-Political Parameters of the Abkhazian Crisis},’ \textit{Defense
Analysis Institute} (issue 35) (11 January 2005), pp. 2-5 [\texttt{http://www.iaa.gr}]
\textsuperscript{187} Ibid., p. 4
\textsuperscript{188} ‘\textit{We Are Very Close to a War With Russia: Saakashvili Says},’ [\texttt{http://www.in.gr/news}] 24 August
2004
structures. This kind of attitude led Putin make the following comment on the Georgian leadership: “these people believe that with the foreign protection can feel safe”. After Kosovo-Metohja unilateral declaration of independence, Russia felt ‘obliged’ to retaliate by implementing the same policies in Abkhazia and South Ossetia. Russia declared (6 March 2008) that it is not any more bound to the embargo restrictions against Abkhazia. The same day, South Ossetia, supported by Russian North Ossetia, sends an appeal to the Russian parliament, demanding its recognition as an independent state. Saakasvili’s plan of “unlimited autonomy” proposal (28 March 2008) coincided with Abkhaz commander’s announcement that “We are preparing for war, really and seriously”. Putin’s next step was to issue a decree (16 April 2008) “authorizing direct official relations” with the Abkhazian and South Ossetian authorities something which constitutes “the first overt Russian move to change the post-1991 internationally recognized borders”. Since then, both sides are gathering forces and are accusing one another for planning invasions – Russian saying that “foreign experts” are participating in Georgian preparations. UN adopted (15 May 2008) a resolution supporting Georgian position, while both sides are following an escalating course. The Russian Foreign Ministry officially adopted

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190 ‘The Split is Deepening Between Moscow and Tbilisi After the Russians’ Officer’s Arrest’, [http://www.in.gr] 1 October 2006
appeals for the unification of North and South Ossetia under Russian auspices\textsuperscript{196} while the Georgian leadership claims that they will use “all means and all ways”, something that includes “even to go to war, if necessary”.\textsuperscript{197} Georgian unsuccessful appeal to enter the NATO was the culmination of Tbilisi’s westwards orientation. Tbilisi’s stance resulted in a deeper US interference with the security status of the BTC MEP.\textsuperscript{198} Moreover, within the east-west energy corridor framework, the Baku-Supsa ‘early oil’ pipeline, the BTC MEP along with all the recently developed Azerbaijani and Kazakhstan’s investments into the Georgian ports of Batumi, Supsa and Poti for oil and gas transportation to the West have increased the geopolitical validity of Georgia and have further ‘endangered’ its integrity. The Baku-Supsa pipeline along with the BTC MEP “runs 40 kilometers south of Abkhazia”, whereas the Batumi port is in Adjaria.\textsuperscript{199} Obviously, the Georgian policy aims at engaging the West to Georgia’s disputes with Russia. However, its geographic position along with the actual general feeling that was explicitly expressed in NATO’s Bucharest Summit (April 2008) confirms Mazis’s observation that it would be a “lethal mistake” for that country “to presume that will enjoy NATO’s political and military aegis” in the case that will “instigate a direct clash with Russia”.\textsuperscript{200} The Russian ambassador to Georgia speaks eloquently about Tbilisi’s western orientation. “Potential consequences of this decision should be thoroughly considered. It is not simply a geopolitical move. It deals with important historical legacy, which cannot but be cherished. It should be

\textsuperscript{198} Mazis, ‘Geostrategic and Defense-Political Parameters of the Abkhazian Crisis’, p. 12
\textsuperscript{199} Hill, ‘Caspian Conundrum’, p. 231
\textsuperscript{200} Mazis, ‘Geostrategic and Defense-Political Parameters of the Abkhazian Crisis’, p. 14
clear that Georgia’s NATO membership will be a heavy burden on its bilateral relations with Russia".  

**Nagorno-Karabakh:** The conflict over Nagorno-Karabakh could directly engage Armenians, Azerbaijanis, Turks, Kurds and Russians. At a second level, Georgians, Greeks, Iranians and Israelis could interfere and the whole situation could end up to a direct confrontation between blocks in a Eurasian level. As Blandy pinpointed, “external aspects in the Nagornyy Karabakh conflict are being conditioned by a continual growth of the confrontation between the interests of regional and global forces, thus increasing the scale and scope of a possible future conflict, and as a consequence leading it way beyond a simple bilateral confrontation”. Therefore, this dispute is the most important one at the present time in the HMS and constitutes “a considerable danger to international security, which no other conflict in the region does to the same extend".

The roots of this problem are dating back to the time when the Soviets rearranged the borders of the Soviet republics (1920s). The Bolsheviks, by trying to approach Turkey favored ‘Turanian’ Azeris at the expense of ‘Aryan’ Armenians. Nagorno-Karabakh, became an Armenian enclave in the middle of Azerbaijan. The overt conflict started with Nagorno-Karabakh’s demand (1989) for unification with Armenia or independence. The Armenians, 78% of the total population, after six years of fighting, managed to control the territory. When the cease-fire was agreed (May 1994), they

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201 “Georgia’s NATO Membership Will be a Heavy Burden on its Relations With Russia”- Russia’s Ambassador Extraordinary and Plenipotentiary to Georgia Vyacheslav Kovalenko’, [http://en.rian.ru](http://en.rian.ru) 1 April 2008


203 Cornell, ‘Geopolitics and Strategic Alignments in the Caucasus and Central Asia’, p. 11
occupied almost 15% of the Azeri land, which only the one third of it was Nagorno-Karabakh. Nagorno-Karabakh gained a *de facto* independence and was linked directly with the metropolis by incorporating the Lachin corridor. The time passed with the ‘Minsk Group’ (MG) (France, Russia and US), authorized by OSCE, trying unsuccessfully to facilitate a solution since the key issue of the Lachin corridor “has undermined the process”. Yerevan supports that “the very existence of Nagorno-Karabakh can be guaranteed only if it has a secure land connection with Armenia” thus, the status and the width of the Lachin corridor is of vital importance.

Since 1994, Azerbaijan is consolidating its basic ideological and political alignments. Baku is favoring the ‘Turanian’/‘Pan-Turkish’ ideology in cultural terms, however, is supporting the ‘Azeri’ identity that will make the distinction from the Turkish identity, speaking in political terms. Moreover, Baku is promoting the Turkish secular model of Islam in religious terms and is following a pro-Western stance in energy and geopolitical terms. These choices are directly conflicting with the ‘Aryan’ Armenian element, which, due to its geographical location feels threatened by the ‘Turkish sea’ that surrounds it. The ‘Azerization’ of the political ideology has confirmed the aforementioned fact of the bankruptcy of the Turkish-backed political Pan-Turkic dream. Baku, following a more ‘realistic’ policy and meeting also US

206 Ibid., p. 6
208 See, Asgharzadeh, A. ‘In Search of a Global Soul: Azerbaijan and the Challenge of Multiple Identities’, MERIA (Vol. 11, No. 4) (December 2007)
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objections to mottos such as “one nation two states”,\(^\text{211}\) is trying to promote Ilham Aliyev as the new leader of Turkish world”.\(^\text{212}\) This new policy of ‘Azeriness’ has spread to the vast Azeri-origin populations, “20 to 30 million”, of northern Iran, something that endangers Persia’s territorial integrity.\(^\text{213}\) It is also at odds with the actual Azeri Iranian-based Shi’a doctrine, while it supports the Turkish ‘secular’ one.\(^\text{214}\) Finally, Azerbaijan causes great problems to Russia since the main geopolitical choices between these countries are diametrically opposite.\(^\text{215}\) Armenia has followed a diametrically opposite direction by basing its alliances to the Aryan factor of MS, Russia, Iran and Greece. For Armenia, Russia constitutes the major economic and political ally. In the economic, energy and communication fields Russia constitutes Armenia’s major partner. Yerevan bases its gas supply to Iran and Greece’s investments are placing this country into the first places of this list. In the political field, Azerbaijan’s policies have automatically created oppositional alignments, mainly between Tehran-Yerevan-Moscow and Athens. According to Armenian analysts “Turkey, Azerbaijan … are aspired for the role of regional hegemon. In the absence of retaliatory measures, their activity can be transformed into a cynical “blocking of oxygen” against those who don’t support them … frequent meeting of the Russian, Armenian and Iranian leaders will produce effect and promote implementation of joint projects”.\(^\text{216}\) For Russians “losing Armenia, Russia will lose the way to South Caucasus”\(^\text{217}\) thus, “Armenia is Russia’s only strategic

\(^{212}\) Daly, ‘The Rebirth of Pan-Turkism?’
\(^{213}\) Asgharzadeh, A. ‘In Search of a Global Soul’, p. 7
\(^{214}\) ‘Azerbaijan: Independent Islam and the State’, pp. 5-9
ally’ in the region. Greece has created a ‘strategic partnership’ (1996) with Armenia and a trilateral defense cooperation, including Teheran under Russian auspices, was completed (July 2000). Armenian recent elections (19 February 2008) were marked by riots (1 March 2008) and many deaths, when the opposition didn’t acknowledge the results. The Armenian leadership along with Russian media claimed that these events were instigated by foreign powers based on past ‘color revolutions’. Pravda’s report is indicative: “the centuries old friendship and alliance with Russia is unshakable” while the “Empire”, US, “wins no friends among the Armenians for its consistent policy of Genocide denial … the US base in occupied Western Armenia, under control of Turkey and their alliances with Armenian enemies Turkey, Israel and Azerbaijan. And then there are the oil pipelines … constructed to bypass Armenia…” Moving to the issue of ‘genocide’, Armenia, has successfully managed to internationalize it. A bill passed (10 October 2007) from the US Congress Foreign Affairs Committee but it was not put under vote only after intensive government’s pressure. Ankara which “condemns” ‘Armenian Genocide’

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221 ‘The Oil Game of Athens’ [Infognomon Center of Political Analysis: Turkish Media Report], 29 August 2001
226 Daly, ‘U.S.-Turkish Relations’, p. 10
“decision”\textsuperscript{228} is strongly backed by Azerbaijan,\textsuperscript{229} which threatens even Israel in case that Tel Aviv legitimizes the Armenian claims.\textsuperscript{230}

In the years after the cease-fire in Nagorno-Karabakh, Azerbaijan has managed to utilize its energy resources. The raising oil and gas prices allowed Baku to expect energy revenues of about $150 billion by 2015.\textsuperscript{231} Country’s GDP raised by 25% in 2007 and state revenues in 2008 increased by 42% forcing the government to modify the annual budget. Baku’s main priority for allocating the extra revenues is the defense expenditures, which are approaching the $2 billion.\textsuperscript{232} President Aliyev pledged “to make it equal to Armenia’s entire budget”.\textsuperscript{233} The comparison with the $280 million of the Armenian defense budget is devastating. However, Yerevan “can acquire armaments on much better terms from Russia and preserve the military balance due to its membership in the Collective Security Treaty”.\textsuperscript{234} The mutual self-confidence has led (beginning-2008) both leaderships to verbal jousting, reminding everyone that they “remain formally at war”.\textsuperscript{235} Aliyev’s threats that “The war is not over. Only the first stage is complete”\textsuperscript{236} and that Yerevan is an “old Azerbaijani town”\textsuperscript{237} resulting to Armenian warnings that “If Azerbaijan wants 2 million refugees,
it will get them".\textsuperscript{238} As it was stated, on early March (2008) the actual fight was resumed and it was characterized as the “heavier” incident since the cease-fire.\textsuperscript{239} A UN resolution (14 March 2008) moving closer to Azerbaijani interests, not supported by the MG though, resulted in Armenian moves towards the consolidation of the defense ties with Nagorno-Karabakh and the initiation of efforts towards its international recognition.\textsuperscript{240} Azerbaijan, on its side, following a consistent policy against separatism, withdrew its soldiers, which were attached to the Turkish force,\textsuperscript{241} from Kossovo-Metohja, despite the fact that US policy-makers were stressing that the Serbian province was a \textit{sui generis} case.\textsuperscript{242} On the recent “unusual outbreak of cease-fire violations” Azerbaijani sources believe that it “allowed Moscow to scare off the potential consumers of the Azeri and Turkmen gas” since the violence erupted immediately after “Aliyev traveled to Hungary and expressed … interests in joining the Nabucco … project”. Thus, this “clear provocation” is “pushing Azerbaijanis … toward a military solution to the long-running conflict”.\textsuperscript{243} When will the time be ripe for such an action? According to an alarming report drawn by the Crisis Group, “The riskiest period could be around 2012, when Azerbaijan’s oil money is likely to begin to dwindle, and a military adventure might seem a tempting way to distract citizens from economic crisis”. The report continues by observing that, “Important oil and gas pipelines near Nagorno-Karabakh would likely be among the first casualties of a new

\textsuperscript{243} Ismailzade, F. ‘Are Karabakh Skirmishes Meant to Draw Attention From Yerevan?’, [http://www.jamestown.org] 11 March 2008
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war”.244 The fact that BTC MEP pumping stations “runs in less than 20km from the frontline” validate Armenian threats that “[the] first thing that would be destroyed in case of Azerbaijani aggression is its oil capacities”. As the de facto Nagorno-Karabakh president said “If we find that Azerbaijan’s actions pose a direct threat to the security of the people of Nagorno-Karabakh, we may launch a preventive military action to address the threat”.245

Kurdish Issue: According to analysts, “For the first time in their history Kurdish interests are coinciding with the designs of the prominent members of the international community – the European Union and more importantly, the US.”246 Consequently, through Western intervention “the consolidation of the Kurdistan Regional Government (KRG) in Iraq is of huge importance” since the Kurds now “have an unprecedented opportunity to define their own future and influence other Kurds in the region”.247 The roots of the creation of this autonomous entity go back to the movement (mid-40s) of Mullah Mustafa Barzani (1903-1979). Barzani establishes the Kurdistan Democratic Party (KDP) (1961) while Jalal Talabani founds the Patriotic Union of Kurdistan (PUK) (1975) and together they control the Kurdish northern Iraq. Massud Barzani, Mustafa’s son, takes the lead (1979) of KDP a few months before Saddam Hussein (1937-2006) became President of Iraq. During the Iraq-Iran War (1980-88) both KDP and PUK ended up in supporting Iran. Saddam’s revenge with campaigns and the use of chemical weapons (1988) along with Gulf War I created refugee waves towards Turkey’s borders. After that, there was no Western support to the Kurdish population thus, a large humanitarian crisis emerged.

244 ‘Nagorno-Karabakh’, p. i.
245 Ibid. p. 14
247 Ibid., p. 1
In response, the allied forces established (April 1991) the “safe heaven” territory in northern Iraq. With Western aid Kurdish Militia, the Peshmerga, started to control the territory. The Iraqi government retaliated by imposing an economic blockade (October 1991) to the Kurdish regions. A “de facto autonomous Kurdish region” was established in northern Iraq. Elections (May 1992) and a KRG (July 1992) composed by an equal number of KDP and PUK members solidified the situation. However, an armed friction between the two parties with Iraqi participation stormed the area (May 1994 – September 1998) and ended only after an official compromise was signed in Washington. Since then and up until the Gulf War II, KDP and PUK were gradually joining their forces and were officially aligned with US forming (March 2003) a KDP/PUK “joined supreme leadership”.248

Turkey, observing closely the developments in a neighboring country and experiencing an internal armed insurrection approaches the Kurdish issue under a dual prism. ‘Neo-Ottoman’ and ‘Sèvre-Phobia’ ideologies coincides and depict the emerging opportunities and hopes along with the visible challenges and fears that the new situation creates for Ankara. ‘Neo-Ottoman’ ideology concerning Iraq includes diachronic territorial claims on the Kurdish territory and the energy rich districts of Mosul and Kirkuk, using as a main ‘tool’ of pressure the indigenous Turkmen element.249 However, the optimistic views about its size, homogeneity and possibility to organize it, in political and militarily terms, to such a level that could decisively influence the course of events were false.250 As early as a few weeks after 9/11, reports were stating a forthcoming US attack against Baghdad using Turkey to invade

249 Ibid. pp. 7-15
from the north.\textsuperscript{251} Turkish General Staff had already decided (2002) to participate with the hope to exploit the situation.\textsuperscript{252} Throughout this period that the Turks were hoping to gain whatever they could, a definitely much stronger feeling, that of ‘Sèvre-Phobia’ begun to raise fear and uncertainly about the actual reasons of Western aggressiveness and the final arrangements in the region. As Kirisci explains, “a fear the Treaty of Sevres drawn up by the victorious powers at the end of World War I which carved up the remaining Anatolian provinces of the Ottoman Empire into small states and occupation zones, will be revived”. The exact US policy especially towards the Kurds of Northern Iraq makes Americans “seem like an enemy state rather than an old strategic ally”.\textsuperscript{253} Since the mid-90s, it was evident in the official Turkish reports that the Turks were aware or afraid of the US and Israeli activity in the region. According to the same reports, Turkey declared (May 2001) through unofficial channels that the emergence of an independent Kurdish state is a \textit{casus beli} for Ankara. Of course, the rhetoric question was against whom?\textsuperscript{254} This ‘schizophrenic’ situation naturally led to the “fateful” March 1, 2003 decision. The Turkish parliament did not allow the creation of a second northern front by preventing 62,000 US men to pass through Turkey.\textsuperscript{255} With this decision, Turkey was emphasizing the ‘Sèvre-Phobia’ component and was undermining the ‘neo-Ottoman’ one. With this move, the Turks abrogated a series of beneficial US concessions, such as the establishment of a

\textsuperscript{251} Costantakopoulos, D. ‘North Iraq the First Target’, \textit{Epenitis} (30 September 2001) p. 33
\textsuperscript{252} Jenkins, ‘Turkey and Northern Iraq’, p. 15
\textsuperscript{253} Kirisci, K. ‘Turkey and the United States: Ambivalent Allies +’, \textit{MERIA} (Vol. 2, No. 4) (December 1998) p. 23
buffer zone, a “de facto border” inside Iraq for monitoring the PKK activity, the Turkish military presence in Kirkuk and Mosul and the actual undermining of the Kurdish element by ensuring that no extensive rights would have been given to the KRG.\textsuperscript{256} Turkey’s decision was interpreted by the US as a betrayal.\textsuperscript{257} For the US, the Kurds entered the picture only after the Turkish “betrayal”, that is “three weeks before the attack”.\textsuperscript{258} Moreover, Post-War, “US policy failures”\textsuperscript{259} made the strong, well equipped and moderate KRG an indispensable comrade for the allied forces.\textsuperscript{260} In this environment, the US promoted a largely more decentralizing constitution than it was originally planned, creating “a form of federalism that comes closer to confederacy”.\textsuperscript{261} As analysts observe, this constitution designates “three distinctly separate and internally homogeneous regions with very little commonalities” which setting the base “for a centrifugal drive to separate Iraq into three different states … and even precipitate regional wars between Arabs, Iranians and Turks”.\textsuperscript{262} Moreover, this constitution makes a special provision, about the status of oil-rich (11 billion barrels of proven reserves)\textsuperscript{263} Kirkuk, the so-called “Jerusalem of Kurdistan”.\textsuperscript{264} A local referendum will decide its fate. Some believe that “the key of independence lies with Kirkuk”. Whenever Kirkuk comes under Kurdish administration it will provide

\textsuperscript{257} See, Kapsis, ‘The Failure of U.S. – Turkish Pre-Iraq War Negotiations’, p. 40
\textsuperscript{258} Rafaat, ‘U.S.-Kurdish Relations in Post-Invasion Iraq’, pp. 80-86
\textsuperscript{259} Ibid. p. 82
\textsuperscript{260} Rafaat, ‘U.S.-Kurdish Relations in Post-Invasion Iraq’, p.82; Stansfield, Lowe & Ahmadzadeh, ‘The Kurdish Policy Imperative’, p. 3
\textsuperscript{262} Ibid., p. 123
\textsuperscript{264} Jenkins, ‘Turkey and Northern Iraq’, pp. 14, 17
sufficient resources to secure the income of an independent Kurdistan.\(^{265}\) For the time being, the KRG controls the Kirkuk’s education system and law enforcement units.\(^{266}\) The referendum that was scheduled to take place last December (2007) has been postponed, but Barzani, having the comparative advantage and actual control in the region, does not seem to press towards this direction. Another point of the US positive stance towards the Kurds is the oil-law provisions (February 2007), which give a relative freedom and autonomy for the regions to develop and negotiate oil exploration contracts, leaving to Baghdad only the approval of the agreement.\(^{267}\) The Kurdish activity raised fears to Baghdad who issued warnings about the validity of the Kurdish deals. The Kurdish answer (September 2006) stressing the ‘confederate’ nature of Iraq leaves no space for misunderstandings.\(^{268}\)

The Kurdish strengthening in Iraq created great uneasiness to Turkey and hostility towards the US to the point that between them there is “the absence of an accord on a strategic relationship” and that they are having “an alliance in name only”.\(^{269}\) The “devastating blow” to their relations was inflicted when “U.S. troops detained Turkish special forces”, using “standard procedures by cuffing and hooding them” in northern Iraq (4 July 2003), on suspicion of plotting assassinations.\(^{270}\) In retaliation, Turkey threatened to close its airspace to US air-force along with expelling Americans from the Incirlik Air Base.\(^{271}\) Moreover, novels (‘Metal Storm’, 2004) and films (‘Valley of

\(^{265}\) See, Khalil, ‘Strategic implications for Northern Iraq’s Kurdish Oil Industry’; Kalaycioglu, ‘Iraqi Constitution’, p. 122

\(^{266}\) Jenkins, ‘Turkey and Northern Iraq’, p. 17


\(^{269}\) Schleifer, ‘US-Turkish Relations’

\(^{270}\) Jenkins, ‘Turkey and Northern Iraq’, pp. 16-17

the Wolves’, 2006) in Turkey depicted the US-Turkish animosity and the American brutality in Iraq.272 US officials accused Turkey for the continuation of the resistance in Iraq273 and have published in Journals and conferences maps of a dismantled Turkey.274 Turkey accused Israel that trains Kurds guerillas275 and US that supplies the Kurds with arms.276 Concerning the internal Kurdish element, the Kurdish Democratic Society Party (DTP) managed to enter the parliament.277 PKK’s attacks continuously inflict heavy losses to the army.278 A Turkish large scale offensive (21-29 February 2008)279 forced US to issue statements urging the Turks to terminate their operations. Moreover, Ankara, in order to receive assistance against PKK, was forced to de facto recognize the KRG.280 Official US-Kurdish contacts281 compelled Turkey to officially approach the KRG (28 March 2008).282 An indication that Turkey feels cornered on the Kurdish issue is the official public, pessimistic for the future of Turkey, aggressive for its neighbors and towards the West, statements of the retired commanders of the Armed Forces.283

272 See, Daly, ‘U.S.-Turkish Relations’, p. 14
274 ‘Crisis Between Washington and Ankara Due to the Map of the Partitioned Turkey’ Was Avoided the Last Minute’, [http://www.in.gr] 28 September 2006
278 Indicatively see, Daly, ‘U.S.-Turkish Relations’, p. 20
In the terms of ‘Security’, both the BTC MEP and the BTE NGP are crossing Turkish Kurdistan. However, the PKK’s attacks in the pipelines are not frequent while the KRG-Turkish cooperation through the Kirkuk-Ceyhan pipeline perhaps minimizes the possibility of an attack. Nevertheless, this does not alter the fact that the Turkish pipeline system is vulnerable and could be directly affected by the “most serious domestic security problem”.284 Moreover, there is always the possibility for the KRG to suspend the oil supply to Ceyhan as retaliation to the Turkish activities in northern Iraq. The PKK has also threatened even to “strike oil tankers heading for Turkey” and to prove Kurdish “acute awareness of the vulnerabilities of Turkey’s energy imports”.285

So, Jenkins’s concludes that “Turkey’s Kurdish policies … have not been successful. Nor is there any indication that they will be any more successful in the future”286 and he is right. Moreover, the post Gulf War II, Iranian and Syrian re-alignment287 with Turkey on this issue simply demonstrates the fact that “Whatever happens in the short to medium term, some Kurds are now able to influence outcomes in a manner that the Kurdish negotiators of the 1920s failed to achieve. There is no imminent prospect of an independent Kurdish state but it is possible that one may in time emerge as a late addition to the post-1918 political map”.288 Obviously, Sèvres-spirit is returning to the HMS since “The late twentieth and early twenty-first centuries have seen developments that question the durability of the post-1918 boundaries”.289

284 Hill, ‘Caspian Conundrum’, p. 231
285 Daly, ‘U.S.-Turkish Relations’, p. 21
286 Jenkins, ‘Turkey and Northern Iraq’, p. 4
288 Ibid., p. 8
289 Ibid., p. 2
Iran:伊朗的立场涉及东部边缘的复杂局势。HMS可以分别从三个不同的但相互关联的角度来处理。这里有库尔德问题，它是在伊拉克入侵后出现的，有高加索问题，它通过阿塞拜疆-亚美尼亚冲突出现，也有能源问题，涉及到利用潜在资源和石油和天然气的路线。库尔德语占伊朗人口的10-15%，并对其构成了挑战。290 例如，Mahabad的库尔德起义被伊朗军队残酷镇压（2005年7月）。PKK，创建于2004年，被称为“伊朗”分支，名为PJAK（库尔德自由党）。291 伊朗和土耳其认为PKK和PJAK是一个组织，并试图在完成条约（2006年2月和2008年4月）后进行联合行动。292

在PJAK成立之前，德黑兰“容忍”了PKK293，其立场已经改变。例如，德黑兰积极支持土耳其在伊拉克北部的行动（2008年2月）294，也轰炸了PKK的阵地（2008年3月）。295 关于美国的立场，可以认为它帮助了“伊朗PKK”，避免了“土耳其PKK”，容忍了对伊拉克山地的轰炸，试图保护PJAK阵地。296

The Kurds “make up around 10-15% of Iran’s population and have made repeated challenges to the Iranian state”.290 In example, in Mahabad a Kurdish uprising was brutally suppressed by the Iranian forces (July 2005). PKK, created (2004) the ‘Iranian’ branch named PJAK (Party of Free Life in Kurdistan).291 Iran and Turkey considered PKK and PJAK as a single organization and are trying, through the completion of treaties (February 2006, April 2008), to react in a joint manner.292

Before the creation of PJAK, Teheran was “tolerating” PKK293 a position that now has changed. For example, Teheran actively supported Turkish operations (February 2008) in northern Iraq294 and bombs PKK’s positions (March 2008).295 About Washington’s position, it could be argued that it helps the ‘Iranian PKK’, averts the ‘Turkish PKK’, tolerates the bombing of the PKK bases in Iraq’s mountains, and tries to protect the PJAK bases.296

290 Stansfield, Lowe & Ahmadzadeh, ‘The Kurdish Policy Imperative’, p. 6
295 Jenkins, ‘Turkey and Iran Expected to Boost Security Cooperation’
296 See, ibid; Renard, ‘PJAK in Northern Iraq: Tangled Interests and Proxy Wars’
On the Caucasus issue, Teheran’s position depends on the Pan-Turkic Azerbaijani-Turkish aspirations. Baku, due to the close cultural, historical and religious links with Teheran could be a great asset for Iranian policy. However, its orientation towards Turkey along with the sizeable ethnic Azeri minority comprising “at least 25 percent of Iran’s population” makes Teheran see Azerbaijan as a potential threat rather than as an advantage. Consequently Iran developed a close “strategic” relationship with Armenia, extending from trade exchanges, energy supplying (gas pipeline operated in 2001) to military cooperation. US recent plans to “beam Azeri-language radio broadcast into Iran”, Iranian espionage case in Baku along with the incident of the temporal Azeri prohibition regarding the shipment of nuclear material to Tehran from Russia (March-April 2008) depict clearly the whole situation.

On the energy issue, the Iranian case could be defined by two main facts. First, Iran is an important energy producer, since it ranks forth and second globally in oil and gas reserves respectively. Moreover, it is in a great need of foreign investments to revitalize its own energy sector. The US have impeded the development prospects through their ILSA (1996, 2003), which initially had some effects. The second fact is that Iran “is the cheapest, most efficient, and most secure route for transporting of

298 Ibid.
301 Allnutt, ‘Iran/Azerbaijan: Faith, Oil, and Power Threaten Historic ‘Brotherhood’’
Chapter 6  The ‘Great Game’

Caspian oil to world markets”. Consequently, TotalFinaElf (France) and Eni/Agip (Italy) have entered the oil (April 1999) and gas (March 1999) sector, while Iran has concluded oil swaps with Turkmenistan and Kazakhstan. Many states, among them Turkey, and companies have signed agreements especial in utilizing the enormous South Pars field. Despite the increasing level of commerce and communications between Turkey and Iran, the major field of cooperation is energy. A series of deals such as a natural gas agreement (1996), and the recent (July 2007) “Turkish investment of $3.5 billion in Iran’s South Pars” field along with the (August 2007) electricity and (December 2007) mining and industrial minerals deals have elevated this cooperation. Despite the fact that Ankara’s policies seem to disregard US directives, the January (2008) gas crisis “put into question … the whole nature of the Turkish-Iranian relationship” since there were speculations for a Russian-Iranian “blackmail” to Ankara in order not to be receptive to US interventions. Iran and Russia are closely cooperating, especially through the Gas Exporting Countries Forum, despite their potential competitive relationship. Within this framework there are indications that Tehran and Moscow are trying to divide the ‘market’ since “Russia wants to prevent its potential rival from reaching out to Europe by re-orienting Iranian gas eastwards – to India, Pakistan and China”. Since Moscow’s policies seem to have halted the anti-Russian projects to Europe and since US position

304 Hill, ‘Caspian Cumundrum’, p. 232
305 Country Analysis Briefs: Iran’, pp. 4-9
307 Jenkins, ‘NIE Report Eases Pressure on Turkey Over Ties With Iran’
towards Iran is not expected to change in the short-run, it would be more profitable for Iran to focus on the East.\textsuperscript{312} “Gazprom is very enthusiastic” about the projected Iran-Pakistan-India pipeline which could act directly against the Trans-Afghan, Western-led pipeline, which starts from Turkmenistan and crosses Afghanistan, Pakistan and India. Moreover, Russia is ready to promote another option to Iran and India, by bypassing Pakistan in a way similar to North-Stream undersea pipeline, which bypasses Poland and the Baltic states on its way to Germany.\textsuperscript{313}

The common denominator of the Iranian policy in the region is its convergent agendas with Russia in the energy and security issues focused on the Armenian-Azerbaijani issue and at a broader extend on the Turanian Turkish-Azerbaijani aspirations. Moreover, there is a completely divergent agenda towards the US on every aspect and there is an interesting emerging complex relationship with Turkey. Before 2003, Ankara and Tehran were following completely different paths on the energy and security issues. After the emergence of the Kurdish issue with US invasion in Iraq and the Russian outmaneuvering of the western-led energy plans there was a gradual convergence both in the Kurdish issue and in the energy cooperation. Nevertheless, any Iranian progress in the utilization of its energy resources and in the creation of stronger bonds with the West “may pose a threat to Turkey” and “will undercut” its “role” since, as it is stated, Iran’s route is more efficient.\textsuperscript{314} On the Kurdish issue, the analysts believe that the recent agreement will be stalled, like it happened with the 2006 one, and “both countries are likely to remain competitors” since they are “regional actors with divergent agendas”\textsuperscript{315} due to their “longstanding historical and


\textsuperscript{313} ‘Will Gas OPEC Have Final Say on Pipeline Plans?’

\textsuperscript{314} Hill, ‘Caspian Conundrum’, pp. 233, 232

\textsuperscript{315} Renard, ‘PJAK in Northern Iraq’
cultural rivalries, in addition to the sectarian divide between the Shia regime in Tehran and the committed Sunni Muslim who dominate the AKP”. In any case, “in many ways the two are not natural allies”.316 On the other hand, the emerging alliance between Moscow and Tehran was to create “a strategic partnership…aimed at securing stability in Central Asia and the Transcaucasus”.317 This emerging alliance incorporates Armenia too, because Iran is “Armenia’s only promising partner, given the … economic blockade imposed by Azerbaijan, Turkey’s hostile attitude and continuing chaos in Georgia”.318 This alliance is directly opposing the Turkey-Azerbaijan-Georgia common position towards the ‘Energy Security’ issues in the region.

The most intriguing and alarming outcomes of this analysis could be derived through a brief examination of the indications suggesting a possible interconnection of the regional conflicts and the secret alignments between the actors in the HMS. Crisis Group reports that in Azerbaijan (August 2003) “security forces arrested a group of 23 … who planned to fight in Nagorno-Karabakh”. The interesting part, however, is that the “Karabakh partisans” had “received training in Georgia’s Pankisi Gorge and some fought in Chechnya”. There are repeated “report arrests or deaths” (2006, 2007, 2008) of Azerbaijani warlords and militants affiliated with radical Islamic brotherhoods in the North Caucasus regions of Dagestan and Chechnya.319 The Second Chechen War was used by Moscow mainly “to increase its pressure on Georgia and Azerbaijan” to stop supporting the North Caucasus rebels.320 The

316 Jenkins, ‘NIE Reports Eases Pressure on Turkey Over Ties With Iran’
318 Ibid., p. 42.
319 ‘Azerbaijan: Independent Islam and the State’, pp. 6-7
320 Tanrisever, ‘Turkey and Russia in Eurasia’, p. 152
aforementioned Turkish support of the Chechen cause was counterbalanced by a positive Russian attitude towards the Kurdish issue. Analysts are stressing that “Russia’s war in Chechnya and the PKK problem in Turkey “are linked more closely than is generally realized and acknowledged”.321 The two main ‘extra-regional’ characteristic examples of involvement in the Caucasus region are Israel and Greece. Israel, despite its close but recently loosen relations with Ankara, plays an active role in the economic and military development of Azerbaijan and Georgia, as well.322 The close relationship, especially with Baku, could be explained from their mutual concern to control Iran. In addition, according, to reports, Israel took part in Öcalan’s capture in Kenya323 and in the prevention of the deployment of the Russian S-300 surface to air antiaircraft-antiballistic system in Cyprus.324 The Israeli initiatives in the region, according to the Russian analyst Sergei Arutiunov, might have negative consequences because “First a mutually acceptable solution about Karabakh must be found and only then a Turkish-Israeli cooperation may start to be realized in the Near East and the former USSR states. Otherwise it may trigger Russian-Iraqi, Russian-Iranian, Armenian-Iranian rapprochements [sic]”.325 The Iraqi invasion, however, brought two main results, first, as it has stated, Israel is supporting the Kurdish element and second, in combination with the Islamic AKP rise in Turkey, Israel has loosen its ties with Ankara. Greece has demonstrated an active role in the region, its close alliance with Armenia and its positive disposition towards the Kurds have raised many Turkish accusation.326 Despite these well-known interconnections, there is one more thing that could cause a real ‘chain-reaction’ in the HMS, with devastating

321 Ibid., pp. 139-140
323 See, ‘Mossad Arrested Öcalan in Nairobi’, Vradini (22 March 1999)
325 Ibid., p. 58.
effects for the whole Eurasia. In the early 2008, Turkish and Azeri media complained, through “unverified reports” that there are PKK camps in Nagorno-Karabakh, especially in the Lachin corridor. Irrespectively if this “forgotten threat” is “real” or just “propaganda” and a “pretext” for a common Azeri-Turkish movement against the Armenians and/or Kurds, it could undermine the whole region and involve all the countries of the HMS. More specifically, the Azerbaijani press reports that a “special mountain-infantry regiment based in Naxcivan” is going to engage in “anti-PKK military operations”. Azerbaijani officials have declared PKK as a “terrorist organization” and they are ready “to offer all kinds of political and material support to Turkey” because “they are seriously concerned about the activities of the PKK against the Turkish people” and for the “security of the Baku-Tbilisi-Ceyhan pipeline” too. In the past, Armenian ASALA and Kurdish PKK have cooperated in order to attack Turkish targets worldwide and have participated in the Armenian war against Azerbaijan. Additionally, the common Armenian-Kurdish stance regarding the pipeline infrastructure is being encompassed in the words of Murat Karayilan, leader of PKK, that “since pipelines that cross Kurdistan … provide the economic resources for the Turkish army’s aggression, it is possible the guerillas will target them”. Most worryingly, according to Turkish media, “US approved”

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327 Daly, ‘U.S.–Turkish Reports’, p. 26
328 See, ibid.
333 Daly, ‘U.S.–Turkish Relations’, p. 26
335 Vasiliev, ‘Reviving a Forgotten Threat: The PKK in Nagorno-Karabakh’
this operation\textsuperscript{336} since they are “worried about the threat the PKK poses to the energy infrastructure”\textsuperscript{337}. Therefore, if, quoting Azeri official’s words, “anti-terrorist operations in Karabakh” take place with the participation of Turkey, then, as Valiyev indicates, this “would automatically bring Russia into the conflict as the guarantor of the security of its southern ally” and any “Russian involvement in a conflict with a member of NATO is a nightmare scenario for the international community”.\textsuperscript{338} The collision and amity in the Caucasus region generates a series of rapprochements that clearly depict the ‘Energy Security’ concept of the GG. This reality of a DHMS could not have been presented better than in Aras’s conclusion that

A series of geopolitical relationships are emerging in Eurasia. On the one side are Russia and Iran along with…Greece and Armenia. On the other side are Turkey, Azerbaijan, Georgia … and…Israel. Also on the rise in the region is the influence and engagement of the United States and the European Union… The emerging security environment is thus one in which two blocs of states are in increasing competition with one another…. In geopolitical environments in which competition rather than cooperation is the rule of the day…all players are likely to view events in a zero-sum fashion in which a gain by one side is perceived as a loss by the other…. The Caucasus … emerging as such an environment\textsuperscript{339}

\textbf{ii. The Competition and Alignments in the Black Sea-Straits-Aegean Axis}

The status of the BSSA constitutes the eternal EQ and is directly connected, through the notion of the ‘Energy Security’, with the GG of the EK. In this area, the NW-Western friction, along with indigenous historical animosities and amities, creates conditions of competition. General alignments emerge, based on the same principles that were applied in the Caucasus region as well. A special attention is going to be given to the internal challenges of Ukraine and Turkey that affect not only their


\textsuperscript{338} Vasiliev, ‘Reviving a Forgotten Threat: The PKK in Nagorno-Karabakh’

\textsuperscript{339} Aras, The New Geopolitics of Eurasia and Turkey’s Position, p. 96
external policies but their internal future stability as well. Moreover, a special focus to Greece’s and Cyprus’s general strategic realignments that set the new ‘rules’ of the geopolitical game of the HMS space is going to be assessed.

**Ukraine:** There are four main issues about Ukraine that a researcher has to take into account while he is trying to assess its main geopolitical orientation. The first one is the historic dimension. As Mazis has correctly indicated, “Ukraine from Kyiv to Crimea, from Sevastopol to Don’s outfall possesses a sensitive place in Russian temperament, interwoven with a more than a thousand years historical course.” In Crimea the Russians were baptized by the Byzantine priests (988), Kyiv “the mother of all Russian cities” was in the middle of the “life-line road” ‘from the ‘Varangians to the Greeks’, its fall meant the Mongol, Turanian yoke, and only an internal national strife between Russian princes gave the priority to Moscow during the 14th century. ‘Little Russia’, Ukraine, was simply a border land of Russia, not an alien territory.

The second one is the geo-cultural dimension. Almost one-third of the population, around 17 million people, gathered in the Eastern parts of the country including Crimea and Odessa, identify themselves as Russians and they are Greek-Orthodox. There is also another third of the population located in western Ukraine, named as Halitchina, that incorporates populations forcibly embodied in Ukraine after Poland’s division (1939). These populations are Uniats and “are representing an extremist Ukrainian nationalism which is fundamentally anti-Greek-Orthodox and anti-Russian”. Recent, logical, researches are verifying these observations. This split

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341 See, ibid. pp. 2-3; Mazis, T., I. ‘One or Two Ukraines ?’, Defense Analysis Institute (issue 37) (14 January 2005), pp. 6-7 [http://www.iaa.gr]
342 Mazis, ‘Ukraine’, p. 4
could be clearly observed on the two sides’ effort to ‘rewrite’ history. In a few words, incidents such as the 1932-33 famine, the battle of Poltava (1709), organizations such as the Ukrainian Insurgent Army or personalities such as Stalin, Stepan Bandera and Poman Shukhevych are interpreted differently.\textsuperscript{344} Most importantly, party division has taken a “geographic”/cultural dimension through the clash of the eastern against the western part of the country.\textsuperscript{345} Third, there is a geo-economic dimension. The Eastern industrial, rich part produces almost the 80% of the country’s GDP, while the Western agricultural, poorer part cannot survive alone. Eastern Ukrainians believe that Ukraine’s economic deficiencies could be remedied through “reintegration of the Ukrainian and Russian economies” and add that if western Ukraine objects, then they “want greater political and economic independence from Kiev”\textsuperscript{346} The Ukrainian economy is closely connected with Russia in every aspect, especially in energy matters. Almost all of Ukraine’s oil imports and 80% of its natural gas demands are coming from Russia.\textsuperscript{347} By 2008, while Ukraine has almost “no other alternative” in satisfying its needs, especially in gas, Russia has created the necessary infrastructure to bypass Ukraine by exporting gas through South and North-Stream. Fourth, there is a geo-strategic dimension. Crimea, and most precisely Sevastopol, where the main bulk of the Russian Black Sea fleet is based, “constitutes the only substantial Russian

\begin{footnotes}
\footnote{345 See, Mazis, ‘Ukraine’, pp. 6-10; Shulman’s survey demonstrates clearly, in statistical data, this division Shulman, ‘Asymmetrical International Integration and Ukrainian National Unity’, pp. 913-939}
\footnote{346 Shulman, ‘Asymmetrical International Integration and Ukrainian National Unity’, p. 930}
\footnote{347 See, Mazis, ‘Ukraine’, pp. 4-6}
\end{footnotes}
exit in the Black Sea from a commercial but most importantly from a military point of view”.

The turning point for internal-Ukrainian and Ukrainian-Russian relations was Ukrainian’s pro-Western government’s appeal (16 January 2008) to enter NATO’s Membership Action Plan (MAP) with the aim to become a full NATO-member in the future. US and the ‘new’, former Warsaw-pact, member-states were supporting Ukraine along with the Georgian appeal, whereas the “old” NATO member countries “seem inclined to drag their feet in deference to Russia”. A fierce struggle between east and west started in the Ukrainian territory. Anti-NATO protestors, for example, using slogans such as “NATO wages wars on Slavs!” clashed, in Crimea, with NATO supporters, Russophiles are demanding the presence of the Russian Black Sea fleet and city councils of Eastern Ukraine are declaring their cities as “NATO-free territories”. Russian analysts through Kyiv’s move see Ukraine’s effort to “control the Black Sea and hydrocarbon routes from Central Asia to southern Europe, jointly with Turkey, Bulgaria and Romania (and possibly Georgia)” adding that “This group will be able to put pressure on the countries of the Caucasus, the Middle East and Central Asia that dare to displease Washington and Brussels”. Putin’s statement that “It is horrible to say and terrifying to think that Russia could target its

348 Mazis, ‘Ukraine’ p. 2
missile systems at Ukraine” along with predictions/threats that Ukraine shall be “destroyed, divided” constitute the initial verbal reaction. However, an immediate result of Ukraine’s move was the Russian claims, from official lips, over Crimea and the naval base of Sevastopol. Ukraine’s position against any extension of Russian presence in Sevastopol, after 2017 was confronted with statements that “The Black Sea Fleet … will not simply remain, but will develop” to reach 100 warships and 25,000 personnel. The main conclusions of this brief analysis is that the recent political turmoil has brought to the surface “the richer, industrial and Russophile Ukraine, east of Dnieper, and the poorer, agricultural and Russo-phobic, west of Dnieper” consequently, “even if Kyiv wishes to play the role of a geopolitical makeweight against Russian power in the ‘Near Abroad’ benefiting US, cannot do that without endangering Ukraine’s dismantlement from inside”.

Turkey: Mustafa Akyol’s words that “If they [State authorities] insist on preserving this system of organized injustice, then they will be undermining the very foundation of this country: The consent of the citizens … I love Turkey with all its history, people, culture, but I can’t find a way to sympathize with its authoritarian state” accurately represents the late developments within that country. A war of annihilation between rising Islamism, covered with Neo-Ottoman ideologies, and Kemalism, the

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359 Mazis, ‘One or Two Ukraines ?’, p. 3
360 Mazis, ‘Ukraine’, p. 10
Western-type of CUP nationalism is taking place. Turkey actually experiences almost the same friction as the 19th and early-20th century OE, but from the opposite. Today the power lies on the CUP-nationalistic side while it is Islamic-Ottomanism that tries to overthrown it. Cengiz’s observation that “many things are alive today coming from the Ottoman Era, for example … the Unionist mentality”\textsuperscript{362} verifies the previous statement. As Kalenderides has correctly observed, in a briefing memorandum to the Greek Government, the war between the two ideologies for the time being is being externalized by “two procedures” that “run in parallel” “through the judicial” pillar. Kemalism is trying to ban AKP, while the Islamic government runs an investigation on unfolding and neutralizing the so-called ‘Deep State’ (\textit{Derin Devlet}).\textsuperscript{363}

In a car accident (1996) near Susurluk “a prominent police chief”, “a wanted mafia hitman”, also member of ultranationalist groups who was cooperating with the Turkish secret services (MIT), and a pro-Turkish Kurdish-origin member of the parliament were found in the same vehicle. The investigations “uncovered enough evidence to demonstrate that the victims … were just part of a vast matrix (the ‘deep state’) of security and intelligence officials, ultranationalist members of the Turkish underworld and renegade former members of the PKK” who were pursuing assassination campaigns against Kurds, Armenians and anti-“secularist” forces under the high protection of state and military authorities.\textsuperscript{364} On January 2008, a mass-arrest operation against “an ultranationalist gang called Ergenekon”, which was accused of provoking an “armed revolt against the government” and preparing “high level

\begin{footnotes}
\footnotetext[363]{Kalenderides, S. ‘Turkey Between Democracy and Kemalist Autocracy’ [Briefing Memorandum] 11 April 2008, p. 9}
\end{footnotes}
assassinations” including the President and the PM, took place.³⁶⁵ The persons behind this gang, including a retired Gendarmerie General, military personnel, lawyers, academics having connections with Dugin’s Eurasian movement,³⁶⁶ and mafia members were also named during the “parliamentary investigation into Susurluk” case.³⁶⁷ Moreover, Turkish columnists notice the aforementioned, “psychology of Sevres” which acts as an “official ideology” and “nurturing … paranoia”,³⁶⁸ Kemalism “is becoming a more and more reactionary and isolationist force, which sees the EU membership as a threat to its existence”. This happens because “If Turkey becomes an EU member, Kemalism will inevitably cease to be the official ideology” thus, in the “eyes of the guardians and apparatchiks of our semi-autocratic regime, democracy is a “counter-revolution” that should be avoided at all costs”.³⁶⁹ So, there is a series of alarming violent events, murders of Christian priests and non-Turkish nationals, committed by young-boys and justified through the “Armenian” threat in east or the “Greek” threat in the Black Sea (‘Pontos’) coast. Clues of communication between the murderers and security authorities are available.³⁷⁰ Incidents like the (March 2007 and January 2008) banning of YouTube because there was insulting material about Atatürk³⁷¹ and some students initiative (January 2008) “to paint a

³⁶⁶ See, Turkone, ‘Will Ergenekon, the Turkish Gladio, be Eliminated?’
³⁶⁷ Jenkins, ‘Susurluk and the Legacy of Turkey’s Dirty War’
Turkish flag with their own blood” and send it to the Chief-of- the-General Staff\textsuperscript{372} demarcates the tragicomic of the situation.

The early elections (July 2007), due to the Kemalist refusal to support the AKP-candidate for the office of the president, strengthened AKP\textsuperscript{373} and allowed Abdullah Gül to become the new president. Moreover, Erdoğan’s move (January 2008) to re-initiate the debate on lifting the headscarf ban “even if the women regarded their headscarves as a political symbol”\textsuperscript{374} and the constitutional amendments (9 February 2008) towards that direction raised waves of reaction in the judicial, military and political Kemalist elite.\textsuperscript{375} The institutional Kemalist reaction however, came with Chief-prosecutor’s application to the Constitutional Court (14 March 2008) to ban AKP along with 71 members including the PM and the President of the Republic on the ground that AKP promotes the Islamic state and “would use jihad as required by Shariah” in order to implement it.\textsuperscript{376} The AKP has submitted its initial defense (31 April 2008)\textsuperscript{377} and so far (Summer 2008) has entered a ‘war of nerves’ against judiciary.\textsuperscript{378}

Pro-AKP press connects the banning process with the disclosure of Ergenekon, and with the attempts of the authoritative-Kemalist elite to prohibit any discussion with the Kurds, the Alevi and the Greeks and to facilitate the path towards the EU,

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\item \textsuperscript{373} See, Bahar, H. ‘The Real Winners and Losers of Turkey’s July 2007 Elections’, MERIA (Vol. 11, No. 3) (September 2007) pp. 68-74
\item \textsuperscript{374} Jenkins, G. ‘Statements By State Officials Highlight the Paradoxes of Turkish Secularism’, [http://www.jamestown.org] 18 January 2008
\item \textsuperscript{375} See, ‘Will Muslim Veil Split Secular Turkey?’, [http://en.rian.ru] 14 February 2008
\item \textsuperscript{377} Şahin, Ö. ‘AK Party Submits Defense to Court’, [http://www.todayszaman.com] 1 May 2008
\end{itemize}
\end{footnotesize}
something that could create “an overall revolt in the … Southeast” that will destroy the country. AKP critics blame it for actually ‘Islamizing’ the country, showing also a selective, focused on Sunni-agenda, democratic sensitivity. However, the main indication about the direction in which the AKP leads the country could be the government’s link with the Gülen movement. Gülen movement could be recognized as “the world’s leading Muslim network” and its critics claim that “It is a political movement” aiming to “turn Turkey into a center of a religious world” while “There is no other movement to balance them in society”. Moreover, the AKP is being accused that is not honoring the agreements in order to proceed with EU-accession negotiations. Additionally, the issue of the amendment of Article 301 of the constitution that permits the prosecution of people for “insulting Turkishness” was ‘solved’ by replacing the word “Turkishness” with the expression “Turkish nation”. Jenkins’s correctly observes that “Turkish politicians … placating their foreign listeners with promises of democratizing reforms and then failing to implement them when they return home”.

Overall, the fight between Kemalism and Islamism creates a “polarization in almost Manichaean terms”. The AKP focuses only in its Islamic agenda, while the Kemalist military and judiciary elites ignore any rule of law with the most indicative example being that of the Şemdinli town bombing case (2005).

This internal unrest is being exteriorized through Turkey’s foreign realignments as well. Turkey’s foreign policy was moving along “three axes”: the relations with EU, US and Israel. Today, apart from the rapprochement with Iran and Syria there is also an increasing relationship with rigid Islamic Sudan to the point to deny the events in Darfur. Moreover, some ‘unnecessary’ impolitic (?) initiatives such as Ankara’s interference in the archaeological excavations nearby the al-Aqsa mosque, the hosting (February 2006) of the Hamas delegation in Turkey and Ankara’s continuous criticism of Israel’s policies against the Palestinians infuriated Israel. Israel’s aerial strike (6 September 2007) “on a suspected Syrian nuclear site” and the discovery of aerial refueling tanks on Turkish soil along with Knesset’s moves towards the recognition of the Armenian genocide worsened the situation. Turkish recent mediation efforts in the Palestinian and Syrian disputes with Israel (November

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390 Daly, ‘U.S.-Turkish Relations’, p. 40
391 Jenkins, ‘AKP’s Islamism One of Values and Identity Rather Than Shari’a’. This incident has caused great damage to bilateral relations who “reached the lowest levels of the last five years”. See, Mihas, Z. ‘Breach in the Turkish-Israeli Axis’, Strategy (Vol. 138, March 2006), p. 38
393 See, Daly, ‘U.S.-Turkish Relations’, p. 41
have not changed the feeling of mutual suspicion, something indicated by Turkish-Israeli loosening of their military bonds and defense industry cooperation, especially in the satellite and intelligence projects. Moreover, an increasing, much more advanced than that with India, military and political cooperation with Pakistan could be observed. In general, the AKP policy confirms Davutoğlu’s argument that “prior to 2002, Turkish foreign policy had been unbalanced and that an over-emphasis on ties with Western Europe and the United States had resulted in the neglect of its relations with other countries, particularly those in the Middle East”. However, as Jenkins observes, “AKP’s underlying motivation is not so much redressing an imbalance” but through “a combination of Muslim solidarity and Ottoman nostalgia” the aim is to put Turkey in its “rightful place as the dominant regional power and the leader of the Islamic world”.

For Turkey the play has been set. A feeling of “xenophobia”, especially against the West and “nationalism” is being promoted while there is a trust towards the army and a simultaneous Islamization of the country. These contradictory stressing tendencies could be summed up in the observation that only 24.9% of the Turks see EU as a solution, 12.2% are looking to alternatives towards Asia, and 55% are of the

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395 See, Daly, ‘U.S.-Turkish Relations’, pp. 41-42
397 Jenkins, ‘Sudanese Presidential Visits Renews Suspicions About Ideological Dimension to Turkey’s Foreign Policy’
398 Jenkins, ‘Poll Suggests Military Still the Most Trusted institution in Turkey’ [http://www.jamestown.org], 8 February 2008; Akyol says that “there is a politically driven Christophobia … based on … secret plots … to tear Turkey apart or … to reclaim Istanbul as the capital of a “new Byzantium”” Akyol, M. ‘Yes, Muslims Are Indeed ‘Christians’’, [http://www.turkishdailynews.com.tr] 24 November 2007
opinion “that Turkey could solve its social and economic problems by itself”.399 These recent (April 2008) survey-results are also explanatory about the tendencies of Turkey’s foreign policy alignments. Since 2005, where EU alternative was uniting 70% of the population, there has been a significant turn towards more ‘Eurasian’ alternatives. Recent results depict AKP’s Islamic neo-Ottoman self-sufficient options at the expense of Kemalist ‘westernization’ or pan-Turkic ‘Asianism’.400 Turkey turns to a HMS–type ideology, however, it seems that it repeats late-OE’s fatal fault by adopting the W-O form with the risk of dismantlement. Turkey tries to replace the non-synthetic, Western-type nationalism (CUP’s Kemalism) with an equally non-synthetic Western-type neo-Ottomanism (Sunni-Islam). Erdoğan’s “famous” declarations (early-90s) “Praise be to God, we support Shari’a law” and that democracy is “a vehicle that you ride as far as you want to go and then get off”401 are indicative of AKP’s initial agenda. Actually, the reverse process of what happened a century ago is taking place now. CUP-secular supporters used ‘westernization’ as an ‘alibi’ demolished Sunni-Ottomanism and established their authoritarian Kemalist regime. Now, Sunni-Ottomanism uses “EU accession negotiation process” to demolish the CUP-secular regime. Turkey tries to replace the non-synthetic, Western-type nationalism (CUP’s Kemalism) with an equally non-synthetic Western-type neo-Ottomanism (Sunni-Islam). Obviously, the confrontation between these two approaches “is increasingly less like one between democratic and undemocratic forces

400 Burak Bekdil depicts the troubled nature of Turkish foreign policy by indicating that “if a capital that is 10 hours flight away from Beijing can have “ethnic” disputes with the Chinese – over China’s Turkic Uighur minority – all that complex picture should be understandable” Bekdil, B. ‘Why Our Beloved Country is Such a Troubled Land’, [http://www.turkishdailynews.com.tr] 7 March 2008; Kucera, J. ‘Uighur Activist: China is Making “A Frontal Attack on Our Ethnic Identity”’, [http://www.eurasianet.org] 7 March 2008
401 Jenkins, ‘AKP’s Islamism One of Values and Identity Rather Than Shari’a’
but between two authoritarian ones\textsuperscript{402} and this is the most important observation on Turkey’s contemporary internal and external polity. Once more, the EUR-Asian ideology is classing with the eur-ASIAN one creating inflammable situations within the country with unpredictable consequences for its future internal cohesion, and regional stability of the HMS in general.\textsuperscript{403} The true EURASIAN UHMS synthetic ideology is ‘buried’ once more.

**Greece-Cyprus:** This is the third main branch of the BSSA. The Greek ‘arch’ Peloponnesus-Crete-Cyprus controls the ‘traffic’ in the Eastern Mediterranean and the Greek Aegean archipelago constitutes the ‘yard’ and the ‘doorstep’ of the Straits and the Black Sea. Within this framework, the aim of this analysis is to indicate the main recent foreign policy moves and initiatives, especially outside the NATO and EU institutionalized common policies that have set new parameters in the geopolitical architecture of the HMS.

EU’s South-Eastern Europe Hellas-Bulgaria-Romania-Cyprus Battle Group (HELBROC BG) with Greece being the ‘core nation’ and Cyprus to participate for the first time in a military international alliance uplifted Greek regional potentials.\textsuperscript{404} Moreover, under NATO orders, Hellenic Air-Force assumed the “tactical control” of the Bulgarian and Romanian air space (June 2007) signifying once more the Western effort to further integrate HMS under its control by creating a common defense

\textsuperscript{402} Jenkins, ‘Polarization Deepening Ahead of Constitutional Court’s Preliminary Decision in AKP Closure Case’

\textsuperscript{403} Mehmed Ali Birand intuitively notes that through this fatal struggle of the two regimes “Ankara is digging its own grave”, see Birand, A., B. ‘EU Must Claim Turkey, Before it is Too Late’, [http://www.turkishdailynews.com.tr] 1 April 2008; his statement in an interview to a Greek TV Station that if AKP is banned “we are going to be drown in our blood” is indicative (MEGA Channel, Ereuna, 20 May 2008)

space. However, the major Greek initiative that is utilizing the country’s major comparative advantage, that is the world’s largest commercial fleet, is the creation of the Athens Multinational Sealift Coordination Center (AMSCC) (2005). Its mission is to provide support for the realization of EU, NATO, UN military or peace operations. Its contribution in the evacuation of Lebanon (Summer 2006), the transportation of equipment to Iraq and the aid to devastated areas (i.e. Typhoon ‘Katrina’, US) is indicative of its importance. EU’s underlined absence of strategic transportation capabilities, an ability that perhaps confirms the global status of a power, compared to US and NATO, is making AMSCC the most valuable EU asset. Italy joined the AMSCC and many more EU states are cooperating with the AMSCC and are gradually transforming it into a real EU power-multiplier.

Concerning the Greek unilateral, besides the traditional relations with US and EU, movements towards the consolidation of broader alliances and alignments four main developments are resettling the chessboard of the region. The Russian-Greek relation that has been dating since the Byzantine era has been developed into a full-fledged geopolitical alliance, which is manifested mainly through the ‘Energy Security’ concept. During the last years, both the former-president Putin and the PM Karamanlis have acknowledged the “strategic” nature of the relationship. Despite the energy cooperation, a less ‘advertised’ sector is the military one. Greece, following Cyprus’s path, purchases state-of-the-art military equipment from Russia. Greek purchase (December 2007) of 420 (+30) Infantry Fighting Vehicles (IFV)

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406 AMSCC webpage, see, [http://www.amscc.mil.gr]
BMP-3M for the mechanized infantry battalions consist the largest European procurement of major Russian equipment that upsets the balance of power in land-systems in the region.\textsuperscript{408} Putin’s statement regarding the Greek-Russian military-technical cooperation that “there are no restrictions”,\textsuperscript{409} in contrast to the policy towards Ankara,\textsuperscript{410} is indicative of the situation and leaves room for speculation, always in relation to the developing Turkish military upgrade that focuses on ballistic missiles and nuclear technology programs.\textsuperscript{411} The fact that Karamanlis was the last foreign leader that met Putin before he delivered his office to Medvedev and the first that met Medvedev during the same visit underlines the Russian view on relations with Greece, since, according to reports, Putin had decided “during his last days in Kremlin to meet with the leaders that consider them as strategic allies”.\textsuperscript{412} The Greek-Chinese discussions on the transformation of the Greek ports, mainly the ports of Piraeus and Thessaloniki as the major ‘door’ for Chinese goods to the West, is another significant move. There is also an increasing interest to build a port (in Crete) in order to exclusively facilitate the Chinese needs. Actually, 90% of EU-Chinese trade is done by sea and 80% of this volume uses eastern Mediterranean as the main route.\textsuperscript{413} Thus, the China Ocean Shipping (Group) Company (COSCO), world’s second largest shipping company,\textsuperscript{414} whose volume of trade in Piraeus has been

\textsuperscript{408} See, Petrides, J. ‘BMP-3M Hellenic Army’s New IFV’, Strategy (Vol. 160, January 2008), pp. 6-17
\textsuperscript{409} ‘Press Statement and Answers to Journalists’ Questions Following the Talks Between Russia and Greece’
\textsuperscript{410} See, ‘Moscow: Is Reluctant in Selling S-400 to Turkey’, Strategy (Vol. 142, July 2006), p. 32
\textsuperscript{412} ‘Karamanlis’s Visit to Moscow Just Before the Change of Leadership is of Special Importance’, [http://www.in.gr] 8 April 2008
\textsuperscript{413} Apostolopoulos, F. ‘The Chinese Parameter of Greek Aegean Strategy’, Strategy (Vol. 144, September 2006), pp. 112-113
\textsuperscript{414} On COSCO see [http://www.cosco.com/en/index.jsp]
enormously increased,\textsuperscript{415} made the best offer in the competition on the use of the port’s facilities.\textsuperscript{416} The final agreement was signed (25 November 2008) in the presence of the Chinese President.\textsuperscript{417} Undoubtedly, Sinno-Greek marine privileged partnership is creating a close alliance in geo-economic terms that will affect the geostrategical scene too, since the Chinese factor is entering the HMS through its main weapon for the time being, its commercial competitiveness. Valery Giscard d’Estaing’s words that Turkey “is not a European country”, its entrance in the EU will signify “the end” of the union and that most EU members privately admit that but “they never say it to the Turks”\textsuperscript{418} were true until Nicolas Sarkozy assumed the office of the President of the French Republic. Sarkozy’s views like “I have to state that there is no place for Turkey in the EU”\textsuperscript{419} were expressed publicly and repeatedly. This position is a part of a comprehensive policy resulting Paris’s dynamic re-entrance into the HMS at the expense of the Anglo-Saxon Powers. The main tool for this policy is the Greek element and the gradual realignment of Paris and Athens-Nicosia towards a close cooperation, mainly on the sector of defence. The culmination of this policy that has taken the form of a “strategic corporate defence and security relation” as a common declaration indicates (6 June 2008),\textsuperscript{420} was voiced with

\textsuperscript{415} See, ‘COSCO, the Chinese Colossus, Expresses its Willingness to Invest in Greek Ports’, [http://www.in.gr] 4 June 2008

\textsuperscript{416} ‘COSCO With its 4,3 Billion Euro Offer Has the Advance in Using the Post of Piraeus’, [http://www.in.gr] 3 June 2008

\textsuperscript{417} See, ‘Chinese Gate in Greece: The Cooperation With China Has Been Strengthened After the Deal With Cosco’, Kathimerini (26 November 2008); ‘Official Statement That COSCO Will be Piraeus’s Port Contractor’, Kathimerini (26 June 2008), p. 28

\textsuperscript{418} Torbakov, ‘In the Aftermath of Turkey’s Elections’ [http://www.eurasianet.org] 2 January 2008. D’Estaing’s intervention through an article published simultaneously (25 November 2004) into eight large circulation European newspapers into eight different countries most explicitly supports a “privileged relationship” between EU and Turkey. See, ‘Turkey’s Accession is a Burden for Fragile EU’ Fleutherotypia (25 November 2004) pp. 16-17

\textsuperscript{419} ‘Sarkozy, Merkel Speak With One Voice Against Turkey’s EU Membership’, [http://www.todayszaman.com] 1 February 2008

\textsuperscript{420} See, Samara, V. ‘What the Common Declaration Signed By the Two Leaders Say’, Apogeamatini [http://www.army.gr] 7 June 2008
Sarkozy’s speech delivered on the same day in the Greek Parliament.™ Against all the challenges … I want you to understand that we have chosen Greece and we are not going to change our position™ is only an indicative part of his speech. Moreover, these words have been accompanied with touchable deeds, since Athens has the opportunity to be equipped with arms that the US releases only to UK and maybe Israel.™ This political and defence cooperation has been further solidified and has taken a clear shape with the parallel Paris-Nicosia developing security relations. The conclusion (28 February 2007) of a defence treaty allowed French forces to station in Greek-Cypriot naval and air-force installations. One of the ‘collateral’ results of the Lebanon war was the emerging of Cyprus as a strategic point of assembling and stationing. Greek-Cypriot installations were also used by Germany, something that resulted to London’s and Ankara’s uneasiness. French and Germans actually ‘bypassed’ the British bases as well.™ During Sarkozy’s visit to Athens and the delivery of his speech in Greek for the first time in history, the Greek-Cypriot and French forces were performing military exercises (2-6 June) in the international waters between Cyprus and Crete, something that attached more validity to the Greek-French alliance and more uneasiness to the Turkish side.™ According to Israeli intelligence sources, the close relationship between Athens and Tel-Aviv was upgraded to the level of a “strategic agreement” between the two sides.™ With the

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™ Sarkozy’s grandfather was of a Jewish-origin Greek citizen from Thessaloniki and the President of France is not failing to declare his Greek roots wherever he goes even when he is taking position concerning the negotiation process about FYROM’s name.  
™ See, ‘Strategic Alliance Between Greece and Israel?’, *Strategy* (Vol. 134, November 2005), p. 113
gradually strained Israeli-Turkish relations, such a move could have a rational on political and security ground. The implementation of this new relationship that could reshape the architecture of the eastern Mediterranean came with the exercise “Glorious Spartan” (22 May-12 June 2008). “A co-training exercise, that was never done before … between the larger part of the Hellenic and Israeli air-forces took place under conditions of high secrecy. After Israeli demand all the scenarios were characterized as classified”. More than 100 Israeli F-16s and F-15s with more than 100 Greek F-16s engaged in training exercises in the broader eastern Mediterranean and used Greek exercise fields in the mainland. According to New York Times, the aims of this unprecedented exercise are targeting Iran. According to Greek side, the drill was done within the Greek-Israeli military cooperation and was not targeting anybody. The focal point for this analysis however is the fact that Israel did not performed exercises with Turkey which could be more profitable since a potential Iranian terrain is much closer to the Turkish one than to the Greek sea-dominated one. In any case, if it is a real rehearsal for attack to Iran, Turkey was not preferred; if it is a clear bilateral activity, it confirms the tremendous upgrade of the Greek-Israeli security bonds. Greek-Israeli cooperation underlines the distrust to the new Islamic-oriented Ankara regime.

427 “Glorious Spartan” Top Secret, Large Scale Exercise between the HAF and the IAF” Strategy (Vol. 166, July 2008) p. 31
429 Ibid.
431 Israelis asked from Greece to activate its air-defense state-of-the-art systems, especially the Russian ones something which Greece did not accept. This signifies the possibility that Tel-Aviv would like to confront systems that are operated by Iranian forces too. The Greek denial signifies the actual reluctance to ‘release’ the sensitive electromagnetic ‘footprints’ of this important systems to a power that also have close relations with Turkey. See, “Glorious Spartan” Top Secret, Large Scale Exercise between the HAF and the IAF”, p. 31
Cyprus has also taken important steps to strengthen its position. The intention of the analysis is not to deal with the complex Cyprus problem, but to indicate some important geopolitical steps that have been taken since 2004, the year that the republic of Cyprus entered the EU. The Turkish attitude towards Cyprus could be accurately summarized through Özveren’s words that permanent Turkish military presence could “serve the United States to contain Europe by less costly means”.\footnote{Özveren, E. ‘Geo-Strategic Significance of Cyprus: Long-Term Trends & Prospects’, Centre For Strategic Research: Perceptions, Vol. 7 (December 2002-February 2003) p. 6 [http://www.sam.gov.tr]} Moreover, the emergence of Ceyhan as an important oil terminal in the Gulf of Alexandreta north of Cyprus raises island’s strategic importance for Turkey.\footnote{Ibid., p. 7} Obviously, according to these views, Turkey could not accept any solution that would anticipate the withdrawal of the troops since Ankara should “safeguard and not to sacrifice long term-interest for the sake of merely conjectural concerns”.\footnote{Ibid.} This task should be kept even if the price was not to enter EU. For the author “The coincidence of strategic interests of the United States, Israel, Turkey”\footnote{Ibid., p. 6} should be the main priority. These words written back in 2002 could not reflect the situation that emerged after the Iraqi invasion, but depict the Kemalist view towards the Cyprus problem, which is mostly perceived as “a continued process of mutual containment between Turkish and Greek sectors of the island”.\footnote{Ibid., p. 7} The Cypriot integration to the European defence architecture through the HELBROC BG along with the recent European decision (March 2007) to instruct Nicosia to control “the air traffic of the Middle East and of South Mediterranean”\footnote{‘Ankara Sees Tension in its Relations With Nicosia’, [http://www.in.gr] 9 March 2007} has upgraded Cyprus’s position. The recently resumed negotiations\footnote{See, Jenkins, G. ‘Cyprus: Toward Reunification or a More Cordial Separation?’, [http://www.jamestown.org] 24 March 2008} resulted to army’s intervention informing that it “dismissed
suggestions” which could “lead to the withdrawal of the Turkish troops”. In the meantime, Cyprus concluded the delimitation of the sea-borders and shelf with Egypt and Lebanon and started issuing exploration licenses. These developments caused a Turkish reaction while Greece and EU dismissed all the Turkish allegations. Moreover, During President’s Christofias meeting (June 2008) with the British PM while President Sarkozy was delivering his speech in the Greek parliament and the two aforementioned exercises were taking place in the eastern Mediterranean, UK was signing a statement denouncing (actually the October 2007 statement with Turkey) the support of any initiative leading to the partition of the island.

**Bulgaria-Serbia-Romania-FYROM-Albania:** Serbia, facing Kossovo-Metohja’s unilateral declaration of independence supported by prominent members of the West automatically placed itself on the Russian camp. This situation enabled Russia to acquire Serbia’s energy installations and incorporated Belgrade into SS project. President Tadic’s words (January 2008) that “Without Russia’s position Serbia would face much greater difficulty in defending its interests” are indicative. Putin’s response that “the Serbian people can be certain of having a reliable friend and partner in Russia” was accompanied by a Russian leading TV-program transmission (21 February 2008, on the event of Kosovo-Metohia declaration of independence) that

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439 See, Jenkins, G. ‘Turkish Chief of Staff Rules Out Troop Withdrawal From Cyprus’, [http://www.jamestown.org](http://www.jamestown.org) 31 March 2008
actually applauded the assassination of the Serbian Zoran Djindjic “who got a well-deserved bullet” acting as a “Western puppet”. In this environment, reports informing about the construction of two Russian military bases, one in Serbia and the other in the Serbian territory of Bosnia, should not amaze anybody if they are true.

Romania, FYROM and Albania are moving within the Western pro-US block. The first due to its inclusion in almost all the aforementioned energy US-backed programs and its exclusion from the Russian ones, the other two mainly due to their security problems. Bucharest has also agreed (December 2005) on the establishment of four US bases in its territory. Albania and Kossovo-Metohja Albanians are trying to find a western aid to confront Serbian vengeance and to help the economically moribund self-proclaimed state. FYROM on the other hand, in its effort to usurp the name and the identity of ‘Macedonia’, is facing a firm and very effective Greek reaction, which blocked any attempt from Skopje to enter NATO and EU. However, the major urgent problem that makes this multiethnic state to turn towards the US is the internal Albanian unrest that once (2001) led to the eruption of an internal armed conflict and today the danger is always eminent, especially now that its Euro-Atlantic ambitions are fading and Albanian irredentism seems to be awarded by the West through the Kosovo-Metohja independence.

Bulgaria is perhaps the most peculiar case since Sofia is being engaged into a double-play with Moscow and Washington. On the one hand, Sofia is developing full-fledged energy cooperation with Russia, garnished with rhetoric of “common Slavic roots and spiritual traditions”. On the other hand, Sofia has agreed (April 2006) on the installation of three US bases in its territory. One of the US facilities is near the Burgas port, the major oil and natural gas terminal for the CPC BAP and the SS pipeline respectively. The Russian-American ‘coexistence’ into such a sensitive region along with the presence of a sizable Turkish-origin minority that always participates in the Bulgarian governments makes Bulgaria a very ‘sensitive’ chain of the BSSA and the ‘Energy Security’ game in the HMS.

Two Diachronic Issues That Strain the Existing Alignments: Despite the aforementioned alignments, there are two permanent issues, one geopolitical and the other geocultural, that under certain conditions could change the balances in the HMS. So far, an ‘eternal’ Russian-Turkish competition and an ‘eternal’ Russian-Greek cooperation have been indicated. The Aryan-HMS-‘Aegean’ actor is cooperating with the Slavic-NW-‘Black Sea’ actor against the Turanian-HMS-‘Straits’ actor. This cooperation is based on geocultural affinities and geopolitical common interests. However, in one geopolitical and one geocultural case this bond could break and the Slavic actor could even cooperate with the Turanian one. Both cases are being instigated by the Western intervention and policies in the region. The geopolitical issue has to do with Russian and Turkish firm willingness to keep at any cost the Western naval forces, namely the US, away from the Black Sea. The geocultural issue

is the direct and increasingly overt Greek-Russian competition over the leadership of
the 300 million Greek-Orthodox populations of the world.

In the first case, Russia and Turkey are following the aforementioned dictum that no
Western power is to be allowed to enter the Black Sea. Whenever, the West managed
to infiltrate into the area it was due to Byzantine, Ottoman, Greek or Turkish inability
to develop a UHMS condition. So, in response to the imminent Western US-led
penetration through the expansion from the Mediterranean into the Black Sea of the
anti-terrorist naval patrolling project Operation Active Endeavour (OAE) Turkey
initiated a process of creating ‘The Black-Sea Naval Cooperation Task Group’
(BLACKSEAFOR) (2 April 2001). Russia and Turkey, along with the rest of the
riparian states, participated in that force. Moreover, Turkey launched the ‘Black Sea
Harmony’ (2004) to patrol the Southern Sectors of the Black Sea.\(^{450}\) Having created
these two institutions both Russia and Turkey refused first any attempt of the OAE to
enter the Black Sea and second despite the lobbying of the rest, when Russia blocked
(2005) the US request to get observer status in the Black Sea Economic Cooperation
Organization “Turkey “Washington’s “strategic ally” did not raise a finger to help”.\(^{451}\)
Obviously, Ankara and Moscow want to “preserve the status quo in the region” since
Ankara is afraid any “erosion of the Montreux convention” and Moscow does not
want the westerners to interfere to its plans concerning mainly Crimea, Georgia and
the pipeline projects.\(^{452}\)

\(^{450}\) See, Ulusoy, H. ‘A New Formation in the Black Sea: BLACKSEAFOR’, Centre For Strategic
Research: Perceptions, Vol. 6 (December 2001-February 2002) [http://www.sam.gov.tr];
‘BLACKSEAFOR’, Republic of Turkey Ministry of Foreign Affairs [http://www.mfa.gov.tr]
\(^{452}\) See, ibid.; The case of the August crisis is indicative and confirms the previous lines. Turkey was
held responsible by both the West and Russia for allowing or prohibiting, respectively, the entrance of
the Western forces in the Black Sea. The dilemma that Ankara faced was crucial and it would have
become a larger one if the crisis had been escalated. Indicatively see, ‘Russia Warns Turkey on U.S.
Under the Russian state’s auspices, the Russian Orthodox Church (ROC) and the Russian Orthodox Church Abroad (ROCA) were united (17 May 2007) after almost 90 years of division. Putin characterized the agreement as an event that “affects all Russians” since “The restoration of unity in the Church is an essential prerequisite for the restoration of the lost unity of the entire Russian world in which the orthodox faith has always acted as a spiritual foundation”. Putin also claimed that, “this unity … always allowed the Church to take active part in constructing and strengthening the thousand-year old Russian statehood”. Adopting this stance, the state is expecting the ROC to “fulfill” its ‘Rousseauian’ duty, namely is to “cultivate a spirit of patriotism based on service to their homeland and a sense of civic responsibility”. Consequently, analysts indicate that “Not since Tsar Nicholas II has Russia had a leader so keen to embrace religion”. Putin following also public preferences has chosen religion as a major internal unity and external policy tool.

Exactly on the point of ‘political religion’ Russian-Orthodoxy collides directly with the Greek-Orthodoxy and most specifically with the Ecumenical Patriarchate in Constantinople (EPC). The position of the EPC is precarious since it is located in a predominately Sunni-Muslim and generally hostile nationalistic Turkey. Any serious

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453 The ROCA established (1919) after the Bolshevik and it refused (1927) to declare loyalty to the Soviet regime. Since 2003 reunification talks were resumed. See, ‘The Ceremony for Signing the Act on Canonical Communion of the Russian Orthodox Church and the Russian Orthodox Church Abroad. Events Celebrating the Reunification of the Russian Orthodox Church’, [http://president.kremlin.ru] 17 May 2007


456 See, ‘Speech at a Meeting With Russian Orthodox Clergy to Mark the Nineteenth Anniversary of the Patriarchate’s Restoration’, [http://president.kremlin.ru] 19 November 2007


harm of this 1,700 years religious institution could lead the predominately Slavic-Orthodox populations to Moscow. This is something unacceptable for the Greek founding element of Orthodoxy and for the West\textsuperscript{459} (US, EU, Vatican) as well. West prefers the Orthodoxy’s spiritual leadership to remain in Greek hands, which are much more controllable.\textsuperscript{460} Turkish negative stance, includes: allegations that the EPC wants, to create a Vatican-style entity in Constantinople/Istanbul,\textsuperscript{461} the unfolding assassination plan of the Ecumenical Patriarch by nationalistic circles,\textsuperscript{462} the difficulties raised to Pope’s visit (2006),\textsuperscript{463} the questioning of Patriarchates ‘Ecumenical’ status,\textsuperscript{464} the confiscations of its property and not allowing the Halki seminary to reopen prohibiting the Patriarchate to educate new personnel.\textsuperscript{465} This position constitutes a serious threat to Greek-Orthodoxy, something that actually helps the Russian one. The Greek government engaged EU in a negotiations process to convince the Turks to loosen their pressure to the Patriarch. The last Turkish response about the reevaluation of the situation leaves some room for optimism, keeping always in mind the actual internal Turkish constrains.\textsuperscript{466}

\textsuperscript{460} See, Mourtos, A., G. The ‘Un-Orthodox’ of Orthodoxy and the Greek Geopolitical Illiteracy (Athens, 2008), pp. 205-370
\textsuperscript{461} See, ‘Fanari is not Going to be Transformed Into Vatican the Patriarch Says’, [http://www.in.gr] 1 December 2005
\textsuperscript{464} The ‘Ecumenical’ title which is used the last 17 centuries and implies the spiritual supremacy of the Archbishop of Constantinople among at least the other Orthodox Hierarchs globally is not recognized by the Turkish State which perceives the Ecumenical Patriarch as the leader of the dwindling Greek-Orthodox community of Turkey.
Within this environment, an internal split between Constantinople/Istanbul and Athens over some internal issues created an Athens-Moscow axis. The Greek government, however, intervened and the order was restored. The recent talks between Athens and Constantinople further strengthened the undivided bonds to the level that they are going to form a joint representation office in Brussels. Karamanlis’s meeting with the deceased Patriarch of Moscow and all-Russia Alexii II (December 2007) stressed the “fraternal bonds between the Russians and the Greeks” but he mentioned that these bonds “root in Byzantium and have as a connecting bond the Ecumenical Patriarchate which is the mother-Church of both people”. The last ‘episodes’ of this conflict was the dispute over the creation of an independent Singapore and Estonian Churches. Despite the initial threats, this controversy did not result in Moscow’s abstention from the pan-Orthodox synod (October 2008) in Constantinople/Istanbul. The EPC, by establishing new Churches in Singapore and Estonia, actually weakened the ROC since China is under its control and of course Estonia was a former Soviet space. As an analyst noted, “The Estonian issue is just a pretext because the real issue is the Ukrainian” since “a large part of the Ukrainian people seeks ecclesiastical independence from Russia”. Obviously, except for a geopolitical NA there is a geocultural one as well and in this field the Greek-Russian interests are directly opposing.

469 See, Alexopoulos, T., D. ‘Bartholomew and Ieronimus are Inaugurate a New Era’, Aixia (17 May 2008), p. 15/47
471 ‘Moscow’s Provocative Allegations Against the Patriarchate: Moscow Cultivates a Conflicting relation With Fanari’, Kathimerini (26 June 2008), p. 4; see the warm welcome of the Ecumenical Patriarch to Ukraine (summer 2008)
The ambivalence of this Greek-Russian spiritual relationship is being demonstrated by a Russian state-television-film (January 2008) under the title *The Fall of an Empire: The lessons of Byzantium*, which created “a heated debate about the role that the West played in the collapse of the Byzantine empire, whether modern Russia faces similar dangers, and whether the Russian Orthodox Church could help prevent a similar collapse” within this framework “from the first time, the average television viewer heard that the Eastern Roman Empire was neither an “evil empire” nor a center of dark obscurantism and superfluous luxury, but the largest civilization of its time and one that has something to offer modern Russia”. For the producers, both Byzantium and Russia are “situated between Europe and Asia” so they are “unique in relation to the rest of the world” and they face an “eternal battle with the West” based almost on an Occidental “irrational hatred … on a genetic level”. According to an analyst, the “obvious message” of this film was the acceptance of a “complete loyalty to the Russian Orthodox faith as the true form of Christianity” and that if Russia adopts the Byzantine “model of society” it will survive and even thrive.\(^{472}\) This film is an overt propagation of the existence of a MS-society (Russia) which traces its ‘core-culture’ into another MS-civilization (Byzantium), has the same ‘eternal’ enemies (West) and acts as its legitimate ‘successor’. In a few words, the revitalized, even state-backed ‘Third Rome’ ideology, mostly externalized through the Constantinople-Moscow friction, once more underlines the theoretical premise that the HMS is not in natural alliance with anybody and only when it is divided, the West or the NW are trying to take advantage of the situation. Obviously, ‘Third Rome’s’ mentality that the ‘Second Rome’ has fallen and must be replaced does not fit with the Russian-Greek ‘strategic

alliance’. Consequently, under the DHMS condition, there could be a major point of friction between Athens and Moscow.

iii. The Confrontation and Alliances in the Median Space

New ‘dividing lines’ – political, military and economic groupings in Northeastern Eurasia (the former post-Soviet space) – have already emerged and demand a corresponding change in the policy of the great powers.473

The division of the MS in general follows the major trends observed in the Caucasus region and in the BSSA of the HMS. The confrontation in Eurasia takes a systemic shape through the emergence of formal alliances. The establishment of political, military and economic institutions follows either the NW or the West, and divides the HMS and the EK into confronting alliances. As Nikitin observes, through the CIS’s common political, economic, military and cultural ties and communications there was the initial impression that the post-Soviet space “maintained parameters of unity or at least uniformity”.474 However, the CIS mechanisms could not resemble the USSR space, since the Baltic States from the beginning were following their Euro-Atlantic path almost unhampered, whereas many of the remaining newly independent states were developing bilateral or multinational relations and forums that were competing, substituting and eventually nullifying the CIS. Consequently, “in the mid-2000s cracks within the post-Soviet space became too wide to allow the rest of the world to continue regarding this region as one geopolitical entity”.475 CIS’s mechanisms, agencies and policies were weakened, paralyzed and ceased to operate respectively. Most importantly, in the terms of ‘energy’, an “emergence of large-scale

474 Ibid., p.2
475 Ibid., p. 3
macroeconomic projects” could be observed “that openly compete with one another” whereas in ‘security’ terms there was a “juxtaposition of opposing groups … (Baltic States vs. the CIS, GUAM vs the Collective Security Treaty Organization and so forth)”.476 Furthermore, the notion of the ‘Energy Security’ game was further instigated through the not always widely established fact that “When the Soviet Union collapsed, only 16 percent of the borders between its former republics had been delimited and demarcated”.477 Consequently, with the ‘Energy Security’ issue emerging and the 84% of the border awaiting ‘clarification’, the MS became once more the terrain for a revitalized GG. Despite the actual, internal systemic and to a large extend natural inefficiency and instability of the region after such a great change, two more reasons contributed to the emerging complex and highly polarized contemporary situation. First, “a special role” in the deconstruction and reconstruction of the “post-Soviet space has been played by the ‘colour revolutions’ in Ukraine, Georgia, and (to a lesser degree) Kyrgyzstan”.478 Second, the extra-regional influences, such as those of the West (US in a more consistent manner) and of the East (China) along with the internal MS ones (Turkey and Iran) further contributed to the creation of even automatic groupings towards specific directions with specific cultural and ‘Energy Security’ goals as the ones that they were mentioned earlier in this research.

The organization for Democracy and Economic Development-Georgia, Ukraine, Azerbaijan, Moldova (ODED-GUAM) was launched in Kyiv (23 May 2006) but its history goes back in the 90s since the four-parties meeting in Strasbourg (10 October

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476 Ibid.
477 Ibid.
1997) and its formal establishment at the Yalta Summit (7 June 2001) as GUUAM – the second ‘U’ corresponds to Uzbekistan which was member of the association (1999-2005). According to GUAM’s official documents, the primary aim of the organization was to create a “Euro-Asian Trans-Caucasus transport corridor” task, which extended (2007) towards the creation of “a common space of integration and security in the GUAM region … based on European standards, criteria and practice”. 479 Obviously, the aim is to facilitate the Western-led ‘Silk Road’ and seek “security through Western security mechanisms –mainly NATO”. Probably the main common characteristic of these four states is the existence in their territory “of a separatist autonomous minority … which they perceive Russia as supporting”. 480

GUAM’s externalized security concerns are based on combating terrorism in a close relationship with US. 481 However, for GUAM officials “Conflicts in the GUAM states hinder the complete use of the rich potential of these countries. The militaristic regimes of Nagorno Karabakh, Tkhirvali, Abkhazia and Transdniestria are units of terrorism”. 482 For GUAM the minority unrest of Armenians, Abkhazians, South Ossetians and Russians of Moldova along with the aforementioned issues of Crimea and Eastern Ukraine are ‘terrorist’ threats and have to be faced as such. The efforts in creating defense capabilities are dated back in 1998 with the aim to create a common peacekeeping battalion “under UN aegis”, the cooperation of border troops and the Georgian suggestion to “promote regional security and guard the … export oil pipeline for Azerbaijan’s Caspian oil.” Moreover, GUAM’s not always successful,

480 Cornell, ‘Geopolitics and Strategic Alignments in the Caucasus and Central Asia’, p. 4
efforts to be perceived as a common unit in its relations with NATO along with Azerbaijan, Georgia and Ukraine US/NATO bilateral military cooperation constitutes the major strategic development in the region. Within the ‘Energy Security’ framework, GUAM countries are promoting all the integrative EU and US-led projects such as the BTC MEP, BTE NGP and the recently inaugurated (November 2007) Baku-Tbilisi-Kars (Turkey) Railroad (BTK). Their policies not only bypass Russia but also lead to a deliberate policy that aims to the isolation of Armenia, something that leads to direct confrontation and enmity with Yerevan. Furthermore, Turkey acts as a “tacit supporter” of GUAM through its policies such as aiding Azerbaijan and Georgia even in military terms. Besides Ankara’s well established effort to back Baku, Ankara is financially helping Tbilisi as well. Yerevan protested that Ankara by modernizing Marneouli airfield has created a Turkish air base in Georgia and in reaction it deployed S-300 anti-aircraft missiles in cooperation with Russia. The integration of GUAM members especially the Caucasian ones with Turkey in energy, transportation and security terms, that is in ‘Energy Security’ issues is so much developed that according to analysts “a potential East-West Transport Organization or WTO could not only maximize the advantages of the corridor’s

483 Cornell, ‘Geopolitics and Strategic Alignments in the Caucasus and Central Asia’, p. 4. The major overt gesture that confirmed GUAM’s links with NATO was the decision of the five countries, including Uzbekistan, to form the GUUAM organization during the 50th NATO anniversary celebrations in Washington D.C. in the midst of the Kossovo-Metohjia’s crisis. See, Tanrisever, ‘Turkey and Russia in Eurasia’, p 146
485 See, Petersen, ‘Integrating Azerbaijan, Georgia, and Turkey with the West’, pp. 5-7. On the BTK railroad project President Gül commented that “The railroad scheme does not only link Baku with … Kars … but it will also connect China to London”. Sariibrahimoglu, L. ‘Former Soviet Republics and Turkey Back Economic Zone in Caucasus’, [http://www.jamestown.org] 30 November 2007
development, but serve as a regional mechanism” as well.\textsuperscript{488} For the time being, GUAM has announced (April 2008) the creation of a “single bank” and of an “international consortium to implement investment projects”.\textsuperscript{489}

Sergei Lavrov, Russian foreign minister, sketches the Russian perception about Western actions by saying (March 2008) that “Washington is infiltrating more and more actively in the post-Soviet space. Ukraine and Georgia are graphical examples … We witness how work is proceeding with Central Asian states, Azerbaijan in order to deliver their energy resources bypassing Russia, and along some routes which are controlled all the same by governments sharing the U.S. position”\textsuperscript{490} and he adds that “We are certain that the geographical expansion of NATO cannot be justified by security concerns … But it is clear that NATO is building up its military potential around our borders and its new members continue to increase their defense budgets”.\textsuperscript{491} For these reasons, Russian defense budget increases more than 20% per year a figure that corresponds to almost 15.5-16% “of aggregate federal budget expenditure” for the years 2008-2010.\textsuperscript{492} Additionally, Moscow is further promoting the CSTO as the main exponent “for the military and political integration” of the pro-Russian alliance.\textsuperscript{493} CSTO (7 October 2002) includes Russia, Belarus, Armenia, Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan, Tajikistan and Uzbekistan, from 2006, and is actually replacing Collective Security Treaty (15 May 1992) the security branch of the CIS, which, due to the defections of the 90s, proved to be ineffective. Ukraine’s absence

\begin{thebibliography}{9}
\bibitem{petersen1} Petersen, ‘\textit{Integrating Azerbaijan, Georgia, and Turkey With the West}’, p. 15
\bibitem{guam} See, ‘\textit{GUAM Countries to establish Single Bank}’, [\url{http://www.today.az}] 30 April 2008
\bibitem{lavrov} ‘\textit{Time of Alliances Based on Discipline of Blocs Passed-Lavrov}’, [\url{http://www.itr-tass.com}] 31 March 2008
\bibitem{russia} ‘\textit{Russia Concerned Over NATO Military Buildup Around its Borders}’, [\url{http://en.rian.ru}] 23 January 2008
\bibitem{russian} ‘\textit{Russian Defence Spending to Grow 20% in 2008, to $40bln}’, [\url{http://en.rian.ru}] 26 February 2008
\bibitem{nikitin} Nikitin, ‘\textit{The End of the ‘Post-Soviet Space’ The Changing Geopolitical Orientations of the Newly Independent States}’, p. 7
\end{thebibliography}
along with the withdrawal of Uzbekistan, Georgia, Azerbaijan and the solidification of GUAM signaled the need for a Russian reaction that came with the much more effective CSTO. CSTO’s aim is to “establish a fully-fledged coordinated military/security machine involving the armed forces of all the member states”. The regular summits of the various security Councils, the creation of the Russian-Belarussian and Russian-Armenian “operational brigades” along with the Collective Rapid Deployment Forces for central Asia are demonstrating the efficiency of this institution. Moreover, the establishment of a collective air defense system, a collective protection of “key rail links”, along with the low pricing policies in re-arming the forces with mainly Russian equipment has created a sentiment of collectivity which is further instigated by the Russian nuclear protection guarantee under CSTO’s article 4.

Except for CSTO, the Russian-oriented CIS states have developed the Eurasian Economic Community (EAEC) (10 October 2000). Russia, Belarus and the four central Asian CSTO members, with Uzbekistan entering the scheme at a later time (2005), have declared their willingness to form a common economic and energy market space by promoting a customs union and by coordinating their activities in energy matters. The agreed (August 2006) customs union between Russia, Belarus and Kazakhstan will be implemented by 2010 in order to serve the EAEC’s aims. Georgia’s and Turkmenistan’s refusal to join, and with Ukraine, Moldova and Armenia acting already as observers, the further integrative efforts could not be

494 Ibid., p. 10
495 See, Ibid., pp. 6-7
prohibited, since there are voices for upgrading the ‘Community’ to a ‘Union’. In any case, as Putin stated, EAEC “is a robust and fast growing organization … developing the integration process in the post-Soviet area”.

GUAM’s main geopolitical partner lies on the West US/NATO, whereas CSTO’s focus lies on the East. Shanghai Cooperation organization (SCO) with its establishment (15 June 2001) was actually replacing the Shanghai Five (26 April 1996) organization. Russia, China, Kazakhstan, Tajikistan and Kyrgyzstan, the ‘five’, were accepting Uzbekistan and renaming the alliance into SCO. As analysts correctly observe SCO is the “major vehicle for a Chinese-Russian strategic cooperation” and is “mainly focused on security issues, namely the Chinese tri-fecta of “terrorism, separatism and extremism””. Moreover, ‘energy security’ is one of the major issues for the alliance. “The energy sector is an important promising area” Kazakhstan’s President said in Bishkek SCO summit (2007) “The existing network of pipelines within the SCO area … lays the foundations for setting up a single SCO energy market”. China’s aforementioned energy demands and energy deals with central Asian States along with Russian-led gas-OPEC initiatives give a legitimate reason for the existence of SCO as a mechanism of “regulating” central Asia’s energy exports in relation to Chinese demands and Russian plans. Iran, being an observer to SCO

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499 ‘Press Statements Following a Meeting of the Eurasian economic Community Inter-State Council’
along with India, Pakistan, Afghanistan and Mongolia, and its appeal for full membership is creating great Western hardships. If Tehran enters SCO then the gas-OPEC could be realized and implemented under the umbrella of a security alliance that covers “a quarter of the planet and every third human being” and forms “the world’s largest producer of energy and a very formidable bloc of economic and military power”. Putin’s observation that the level of the Sino-Russian relations is “unprecedentedly high” is consistent with SCO’s raison d’etre, which is the US containment in Asia and the creation of “a multipolar international system that would ensure equal security and opportunities for all countries”. The rejection of US’s application to join the SCO (2005), Uzbekistan’s demand the same year for the US forces to vacate the Karshi-Khanabad (K2) base along with the “first-ever” bilateral joint exercise between China and Russia make very clear the main aim of SCO. “The SCO nations have a clear understanding of the threats faced by the region and thus, must ensure their security themselves” Putin said, supported by his Chinese counterpart who said that “security for Central Asia was best left to the nations themselves”. The two presidents were simply verifying the Sino-Russian main geopolitical view about SCO’s importance that

It must be understood absolutely unambiguously that the world has to maintain a definite balance of forces. The North Atlantic alliance is very active in Asia, and it is perfectly understandable that it is essential for the SCO countries’ security to develop military political approaches that can ensure the defense of their national interests … today not a single structure … can act effectively without taking into consideration military mechanisms to ensure regional security. The countries that

508 See, Cohen, ‘What to Do About the Shanghai Cooperation Organization’s Rising Influence’
509 McDermott, ‘The Rising Dragon’, p. 6
510 Ibid., p. 21
belong to the SCO possess powerful potential both economic and military. They are developing intensively, and they too want to have a voice in solving all problems of a global nature.\footnote{Ibid., pp. 22-23}

Through this brief analysis so far, the researcher should have noticed Uzbekistan’s rather peculiar stance. Uzbekistan initially participated in the CIS’s formations and then practically withdrew from CIS (1997). Almost simultaneously, Tashkent joined (1999) GUAM which became GUUAM but soon returned to CSTO (2005), then entered EAEC (2005) and enhanced its participation in SCO (2001). In general, the central Asian States could be divided into two groups, the ones that “deviate only marginally from Russian policy”\footnote{Cornell, ‘Geopolitics and Strategic Alignments in the Caucasus and Central Asia’, p. 3} such as Kazakhstan, Tajikistan and Kyrgyzstan and the ones that deviate more from the Russian policies but are still are in some limited frames, such as Turkmenistan and Uzbekistan.

Kazakhstan, despite its significant cooperation with NATO in exercises, peacekeeping operations, and oil-fields security missions,\footnote{See, Daly, C., K., J. ‘NATO Weights Protection of Kazakh Oil Facilities’, [http://www.jamestown.org] 15 April 2008} bases its security and its defense industry on Russian protection, while it actively participates in the CSTO’s and SCO’s activities.\footnote{See, McDermott, R. ‘Nazarbayev Watches for Sings of Medvedev’s Leadership Style’, [http://www.jamestown.org] 3 March 2008; the close deep-rooted Russian-Kazakh military relation is indicative through Kazakh’s airborne officer’s words expressed during a common drill (2007) under SCO auspices. He said that “We met our brothers-in-arms and friends”. McDermott, ‘The Rising Dragon’, p. 17} Kazakhstan’s alignment with Moscow on Kosovo-Metohjia issue is indicative of country’s obligations based mainly on the sizable Russian community of the country.\footnote{See, Sharip, F. ‘Kosova Issue Points to Russian Sway Over Astana’, [http://www.jamestown.org] 1 April 2008} Moreover, energy policies and the close interconnection with China and Russia are placing Astana firmly within the CSTO and SCO
framework. Tajikistan’s main source is water. Russian heavy investment (2005) in the hydroelectric and aluminum sector, the one million Tajik laborers in Russia along with the close security and military cooperation do not allow Dushanbe any space for independent action. Indications that the relations were strained (August 2007) due to Russian delays in the investment project seem to be baseless, since the launch of the construction programs took place recently (January 2008). Moreover, the last harsh winter (2008) shook the country’s economic and social stability and increased significantly its debt. Uzbekistan’s hostile attitude to cut off the gas supply during this winter and the suspicion that Tashkent was behind the Russian delays in developing the hydroelectric power abilities of the country made Dushanbe to come closer to Russia and China. Russian 201st Motors Rifle Division (MRD) based in the country keeps Dushanbe under Moscow’s strict control and according to Russian officials, is of a “growing strategic importance” since “It ensures the territorial integrity of not only Russia, but also of other member countries of the CSTO”. Kyrgyzstan’s weakness is evident through Bishkek’s decisions to relinquish territory to China (2001) and Kazakhstan (2008). Its energy sector, which is heavily controlled by Astana and Moscow, is based on water resources, something that may cause further friction and territorial demands in the future, especially with Uzbekistan. Bishkek’s dependence on the CSTO and SCO was demonstrated further by its

diametrically opposite attitude towards the US Manas and Russian Kant military air bases. For Manas Bishkek raised the annual rent from $2 to $17.5 million, whereas for Kant it is for free due to the CSTO provisions.\textsuperscript{523} Further raise of environmental issues for Manas installations put the US in an even more difficult position\textsuperscript{524}, while agreements for more Russian top-classified bases for conducting naval experiments have been revealed.\textsuperscript{525} Through Kant which is characterized as the “centerpiece of Russian efforts to maintain a ground and air presence in and around Central Asia”\textsuperscript{526} Bishkek is tightly embraced by Moscow and the CSTO.

From Turkmenistan’s declared political neutrality and its energy and economic dependence on Russia and China that allows little space for independent anti-CSTO and anti-SCO policies, the focus will be placed in Uzbekistan. Uzbekistan being the most populous and homogeneous country of the region with no borders with Russia and hosting no Russian troops “is a regional player in its own right”.\textsuperscript{527} Since 2005, western analysts have been interpreting Tashkent’s pro-Western policies under this perspective and were rather hastily suggesting “to turn Uzbekistan into a kind of Israel in Central Asia: a leading American-supported regional power”.\textsuperscript{528} The brutal, causing numerous deaths, suppression of the Andijan uprising (May 2005) and the Western, especially Washington’s, harsh critic resulted in Tashkent’s decision to expel the US forces from K2 base, in the signing (November 2005) of the Russian-Uzbekistan alliance treaty and finally in Uzbekistan’s formal entrance in CSTO with

\textsuperscript{527} Cornell, ‘Geopolitics and Strategic Alignments in the Caucasus and Central Asia’, p. 7
\textsuperscript{528} Ibid., p. 8
a simultaneous withdrawal from GUUAM, which became GUAM once more.\textsuperscript{529} Since then, the economic and energy deals have further brought Tashkent closer to Moscow.\textsuperscript{530} Nevertheless, recent signs of an attitude deviating once more from Russian directives caused concerns in Moscow.\textsuperscript{531} The last months (first half of 2008) there is a visible reestablishment of cooperation with NATO and US concerning logistical support of the Afghanistan forces both by land and by air.\textsuperscript{532} Moscow’s temporal ban of Uzbekistan’s agricultural exports to Russia, something that cause great damage to Tashkent’s economy, has been characterized as a “retaliatory” step.\textsuperscript{533} In any case, the analysts’ views converge on the observation that the revival in the US-Uzbek relations simply indicates Tashkent’s interests to stabilize Afghanistan and prevent a further spill-over of fundamentalist Islamism in its territory therefore, “Western policymakers should avoid misreading the signals”.\textsuperscript{534}

As it has been stated, Uzbekistan’s attitude towards Kyrgyzstan, by raising territorial claims and towards Tajikistan by prohibiting it to utilize its water deposits in energy projects, has created an automatic anti-Tashkent sentiment, which is externalized by Kazakhstan’s policies support. Astana’s recent suggestion for the creation of a Central Asia Union has been supported by Dushanbe and Bishkek, while it has been rejected by Tashkent. Tashkent’s reluctance to develop the economic relations with Astana and Astana’s warm embrace of the two weak states simply indicated the

power-game played for domination in the Turanic world of central Asia between Kazakhstan and Uzbekistan.\textsuperscript{535}

The last couple of years US policy-makers (i.e. Brezinski) have urged specific countries, Romania, Poland and Turkey to enter GUAM officially.\textsuperscript{536} Despite the fact that the Turkish case clearly supports GUAM countries even in security matters, Romania seemed to consider the possibility (2006), mainly due to the cultural affiliation with Moldova,\textsuperscript{537} whereas Poland has developed a close relationship (2007) giving emphasis on GUAM’s “special role” as a “transit corridor bridging Asia and Europe”.\textsuperscript{538} Warsaw’s aforementioned interest in the Odessa-Brody-Plock-Gdansk pipeline confirms this statement. Moreover, Azerbaijan’s ambitions that were manifested mainly in the energy field through SOCAR’s investments in all GUAM countries, including Turkey, “reinforce” Baku’s political positions making Azerbaijan a potential “leader” of the grouping.\textsuperscript{539} However, GUAM follows a rather inconsistent policy in terms of security. Despite the fact that there is a GUAM-US “Framework Program” that focuses on the fight against terrorism\textsuperscript{540}, Georgian and Ukrainian NATO-bid in bilateral terms is not followed by Azerbaijan who feels that “the present standard of … cooperation with NATO suits” Baku’s needs better.\textsuperscript{541} Baku’s reluctance to further approach NATO is accompanied with Moldovan overt


\textsuperscript{536} Uslu, ‘The Russian, Caucasian and Central Asian Aspects of Turkish Foreign Policy in the Post Cold War Period’, p. 174


\textsuperscript{538} ‘GUAM-Organization for Democracy and Economic Development’, p. 7

\textsuperscript{539} On SOCAR’s major energy investment projects in GUAM countries and Turkey as well that make Azerbaijan the GUAM’s major economic power see, Ismayilov, R. ‘Azerbaijan: SOCAR’s Westward Expansion Could Hamper Russia’s Caspian Plans’, [http://www.eurasianet.org] 4 February 2008

\textsuperscript{540} See, ‘GUAM-Organization for Democracy and Economic Development’, p. 2

\textsuperscript{541} See, Ismayilov, ‘Despite Potholes, A Relatively Smooth Road For US-Azerbaijan Military Cooperation’
questioning about “the future of GUAM” which sees it rather “vague”. Chisinau’s realization that the planned Odessa-Brody-Plock-Gdansk pipeline “bypasses” Moldova along with the understanding of the Russian revival, resulted in the suggestion for the international community to recognize Moldova’s “permanent neutrality” and its commitment to “never join military alliances”.\textsuperscript{542} The Moldovan question “why do we need” GUAM depicts the new realities in the region.\textsuperscript{543}

CSTO is following a completely different path by further solidifying and enhancing its structures. It continues its build-up by declaring its peacekeeping forces operational in 2008; it has announced (January 2008) the creation of a joint institution facing emergency situations and is creating (May 2007) a joint army group in addition to its rapid deployment forces.\textsuperscript{544} Moreover, Russia is reinforcing, upgrading and expanding the military bases in central Asia, focusing mainly in Kant and in the 201\textsuperscript{st} MRD. These two installations are “giving greater security to the CSTO member countries in Central Asia”.\textsuperscript{545} In the operational field, Russia has revived (August 2007) the long-range patrols of its strategic bombers practice which led to the first close ‘encounters’ with the US fleet in the Pacific (February 2008). Moreover, CSTO’s exercises in Armenia serve as “an apparent affront to pro-Western” Tbilisi and Baku.\textsuperscript{546} However, the most important exercise took place (April 2008) in a region spreading “from Central Europe to the border with China”, within the CIS framework, CSTO and Ukraine conducted a “massive Air-Defense-Systems” drill.

\textsuperscript{546} See, Blagov, ‘Kremlin-Backed Security Grouping exerts Greater role in Eurasia’
with the participation of thousands of military hardware demonstrating mainly CSTO’s anti-ballistic capabilities.547

Moreover, SCO and CSTO have completed a plan of joint action in order to pursue and “achieve shared foreign policy goals” for 2008.548 However, the major development was SCO’s exercise ‘Peace Mission 2007’ (9-17 August 2007), which has been characterized as “anti-terrorist”. It based its scenario on the events in Andijan (2005) and was conducted in Russian and Chinese soil, Southern Russia and in the Xinjiang province. For the first time in history, entire combat units of the Chinese armed forces were deployed abroad.549 SCO conducts military exercises since 2002. ‘Peace Mission 2005’ (19-25 August 2005) constituted “the first ever” Sino-Russian exercise which was labeled as “antiterrorist” or “peace support mission” but included 10,000 Chinese and 1,800 Russian troops along with strategic bombers, missile destroyers, submarines, AWACSs and culminated with a “conventional all-out assault”.550 This time the drill did not include so many major hardware but the 6,500 troops and 2,000 pieces of equipment cannot leave any room for doubts about the actual meaning of it.551 According to analysts, the 2007 drill “sent a strong signal to the Uyghur separatists in Xinjiang” that in such an occasion “the militaries of the smaller SCO members will control the external borders of the conflict zone, while Russian and Chinese troops will try to solve the problem”.552 Irrespectively of SCO’s official line that it conducted an antiterrorist exercise553 and that SCO is a not being

548 Blagov, ‘Kremlin-Backed Security Grouping exerts Greater role in Eurasia’
549 See, McDermott, ‘The Rising Dragon’, pp. 3-5
550 See, ibid., pp. 6-7
551 Ibid., p. 13
552 Ibid., p. 16
553 Ibid., p. 23
transformed into “military alliance”\(^554\), evidence suggests that SCO is combating 
“phenomena” such as “color revolutions” and such operations could “involve 
thousands of personnel, warplanes, helicopters etc.”\(^555\). Moreover, SCO is “sending 
signals to the West” since it has used during the drills “formations and assets not 
necessary associated with antiterrorist operations”\(^556\) but absolutely appropriate for 
responding to any major military attack from a well-organized conventional force. A 
few months later, SCO’s solidarity and operational abilities were put to testing due to 
the Tibet riots (started in 10 March 2008). Russian position that Tibet is “an 
inalienable part of China”\(^557\) and statements that Tibet case was linked to recent 
Kossovo-Metohja’s developments (February 2008, Albanian unilateral declaration of 
independence), thus the unrest happened “not by chance”, confirmed Sino-Russian 
solidarity towards Western criticism and policies. Western analysts did not fail to 
notice the similarity of the recent aforementioned drills with the actual events and in 
an implicit demonstration of Western little ability to intervene they have 
characterized the Sino-Russian SCO as Eurasia’s “Gendarmes” or a modern version 
of the 19\(^{th}\) century ‘Holy Alliance’ in Europe.\(^558\)

In a few words, the post-Soviet space has been effectively divided “into two camps”: 
‘anti-CIS’ or ‘anti-Moscow’ ODED-GUAM and the ‘pro-CIS’/’pro-Moscow’ CSTO 
camp. However, as Nikitin correctly observes, “although GUAM has significantly 
developed its political infrastructure … While they share the objective of freeing 
themselves from ‘Moscow net’ … objectively speaking, [they have] too few common

\(^{554}\) Ibid., p. 18
\(^{555}\) Ibid., p. 16
\(^{556}\) Ibid., p. 23
economic interests and too divergent political agendas to create a coherent alliance”. The aforementioned ways of achieving security and integration with the West confirms the assertion that “While they all base their current strategies on intensifying ties outside the former post-Soviet space, they do so individually rather than collectively”\textsuperscript{559}. Conversely, the Russian-led integrative architecture is taking a solid and definite shape through the consolidation in the economic sphere with the EAEC and in the security sphere with the CSTO. Moreover, the rising of SCO adds another important parameter in the geopolitical Eurasian sphere by bringing the NW closer to the East through the interaction in the EK of the MS. In any case, CIS practically has been “neutralized”\textsuperscript{560} and is used as a ‘battle ground’ between the two major camps, the loose, weak, Western-oriented GUAM and the firm, strong, NW-oriented CSTO and EAEC. In this environment, NATO on the one side and China (SCO) on the other complement the ‘chessboard’ of the GG which is based in the concept of the ‘Energy Security’ that is being unfolded in the EK and the HMS.

\textsuperscript{559} Nikitin, ‘The End of the ‘Post-Soviet Space’ The Changing Geopolitical orientations of the Newly Independent States’, p. 8
\textsuperscript{560} Cornell, ‘Geopolitics and Strategic Alignments in the Caucasus and Central Asia’, p. 5
EPILOGUE

This research has started with the observation that “By 2025 the international system will be a global multipolar one” and most probably is going to resemble “a 19th century-like scenario of arms races, territorial expansion, and military rivalries”. Moreover, within this international system there is going to be a “decline” to “US leverage” while this turbulence or better saying transformation is an open-ended story “with no clear outcome”. Hopefully, this thesis’s long journey to geopolitical theory, history and IR has demonstrated exactly these trends in an innovative and comprehensive way with some academic value.

Throughout this research three questions were approached and there was an effort to be answered. Part I approached mainly the theoretical research question about the nature of the geopolitical theory. The exact limitations of what is geopolitical analysis were set on the first chapter. Geopolitical reasoning is applicable and compatible with the contemporary era since geopolitical thought flourishes during turbulent periods and periods of transformation. However, the major limitation is its eternal division into status quo and revisionist approaches, with the first being defined as the Anglo-Saxon school while the second being represented by the Continental approaches. However, the main emerging point that was derived from this analysis was twofold. First, critical geopolitics in this research were approached as an ‘under-cover’ status quo, an Anglo-Saxon-led globalization approach, which do not constitute an alternative to the dominant paradigm, but they rather support it and instigate it by nullifying any alternative voice that is raised asking for change. Their Derridian approach of deconstructing nearly everything, except of their own ideas of course,
aims only at demolishing the whole field of IR and leaving an Anglo-Saxon globalization ideal as the only ‘suitor’ for the domination of the planet. As Deleuze pinpoints, “For me, the text is merely a small cog in an extra-textual practice. It is not a question of commenting on the text by a method of deconstruction, or by a method of textual practice, or by any other method; it is a question of seeing what use it has in the extra-textual practice that belongs to the text”.¹ So, the critical method of deconstructing texts is not the ‘end’ but the ‘mean’ to achieve an ‘end’, which is no other than the status quo paradigm’s perpetuation. Second, since critical approaches do not constitute a real alternative, there is an urgent need for the emergence of a theoretical approach, which will challenge directly the dominant Anglo-Saxon/Insular paradigm. Obviously, the theoretical approach taken on this part constitutes a rather original view dealing with the aforementioned limitations of the geopolitical reasoning.

The second analytical question emanates directly from the aforementioned theoretical one. The ‘Integrated Geopolitical/Geocultural Theory of the Median Space’ first aims to give an answer to the contemporary limitations of the geopolitical theory. Second, it constitutes an original fresh approach that attempts to promote an explanatory framework of contemporary and future IR, focusing of course in Eurasia and more specifically on the people that constitute the HMS and have been ‘manipulated’ by the NW and the Western factors. The suggested solution to the problem of the DHMS might crab some people. Is a closer cooperation between the Greeks and the Turks possible? Of course there is, as it has been demonstrated, and recent anthropological studies suggest exactly that. National identity construction is an ongoing process

therefore it might be further developed as the years are passing by. The only prerequisite for a Greek-Turkish rapprochement is the people of the HMS to learn and understand what is happening and how their composite MS formations were destroyed and replaced by antithetic ideologies due to external intervention. Arnold Toynbee writes and explains the whole situation since the years in the midst of the devastating Greek-Turkish war of 1919-1922.

The shadow upon the rest of humanity is cast by Western civilization, but it is difficult for either party to comprehend the whole situation … most observers are probably struck by the fact that that their Greek and Turkish acquaintances … agree in the conviction that Western politics turn upon the Eastern Question … Either the overshadowing figure must turn its head, perceive the harm that … it has been doing, and move out of the light; or its victims, after vain attempts to arouse its attention and request it to change its posture, must stagger to their feet and stab it in the back.

Toynbee, in his influential work the process of “Westernization” of the Turks and the Greeks, which “is one of the most remarkable phenomena in the intercourse between civilizations” has perpetuated the friction in an area like the Aegean that its “physiographical unity … without distinction of continents”, allowing the observer to find “no boundaries there”. This process alienates the indigenous populations from their actual *ecumene*. The Greeks for example, with respect to the Russians who have kept their “spiritual individuality” since they “refused to surrender” to the West entirely could look to Moscow and think that “what Russia has preserved and created gives the measure of what Greece has lost, or failed to win and enables us to find a formula for the curse which the West has set upon her. It is spiritual pauperization”. So, for the great Englishman, the populations of the HMS do not “suspect that, in the

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2 Toynbee, J., A. The Western Question in Greece and Turkey: A Study in the Contact of Civilizations (London, 1922), pp. 1-2
3 Ibid., p. 8
4 Ibid., p. 333
5 Ibid., pp. 351-352. These lines were written at a time when very serious riots were taking place in Greece (December 2008) with the youth underlining exactly this “spiritual pauperization”, in the midst of a European cultural, political and economic decline and recession.
long run, it may prove no disadvantage to a non-Western people to have remained ‘radically alien to Western civilization’”. 6 Obviously, Toynbee sees that the populations of the HMS have nothing to do with the West but along with the Russians constitute a different *ecumene* since “So long as a civilization is fulfilling its potentialities and developing in accordance with its genius, it is a universe in itself”7 and of course this is not bad. Thus, he envisages the emergence of the UHMS condition since he expects Greeks and Turks once more to come together

the likeness between the positions of the Greeks and the Turks have now become greater than the difference … namely, their respective relations to Western civilization … they have an identical interest in composing their ancient quarrel … in order to leave one another a free hand to work out their particular *modus vivendi* in their own way. The shadow of the West has been causing increasing discomfort to both peoples … 8

Of course, this unity will not come only by stressing the “shadow” of the West but also, as it has been aforementioned mainly in chapter four, from to the common cultural, spiritual and perhaps racial roots.

The third research question dealing with the empirical evidence on demonstrating the contemporary situation is actually consistent with the DHMS condition. As the theory of the MS predicts, during the period in which the DHMS condition is the dominant paradigm in the region the “shadow” returns and along with the NW it actually perpetuates the division and the friction in the area at the expense of the indigenous populations.

In short, it could be argued that a special effort has been made to create and demonstrate a coherent argument that in the first part emphasized on the theoretical

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6 Ibid., p. 350
7 Ibid., p. 362
8 Ibid., p. 322
issues – value of engaging geopolitical theory, what its limitations are, a suggestion of a new approach that could positively contribute to the existing ‘drained’ theoretical geopolitical environment. The second part emphasizes on the conceptual analytical questions engaging mainly historical, sociological and anthropological approaches and its purpose was to prove the existence of the Median Space, which constituted the first proposition of the introduced theoretical framework of chapter 2. The third part, which emphasized on the empirical historical and IR evidence, approached and tried to prove the second theoretical proposition of the theory of the MS, by first using the macroscopic view of historical review of regional IR and then by engaging in a microscopic scrutiny of the major current developments dealing with the ‘energy’ and ‘security’ components of the IR equation of Eurasia.

More specifically, Part I represents the actual ‘Thesis’ of the research since it is making the basic assumptions. This part attempts to demonstrate some theoretical issues that might enable the observer to see through a different and hopefully fresh angle the geopolitical field. Chapter 1 claimed that geopolitical methodology, as an explanatory tool of IR, is now à La Mode. Its composite ability flourishes during transformative periods exactly like in our own contemporary era, since it is able to give a ‘grand narrative’, a meaning to discursive phenomena, therefore it can provide intellectual and practical security. Having established the ‘compatibility’ of the geopolitical reasoning in the modern era, by taking a closer look on its diachronic views and schools, in a sense a kind of ‘literature review’, demonstrates the one and only universal common approach detected to all debates. Irrespective of the specific stance that a geopolitical theory takes regarding power, geographic and ideological issues, there is only one division that exists diachronically in the specific field. All the
Epilogue

approaches could be divided either into status quo theories or to revisionist ones. These major groupings have also more or less permanent ‘tenants’. The Anglo-Saxon/Insular approaches are occupying the status quo camp whereas the Eurasian/Continental ones are moving within the revisionist side. It has also been demonstrated that both camps have adopted at a certain extent the same analysis and have reached common results. However, since they are opposing each other the one’s ‘blessing’ is the other’s ‘curse’ therefore the ‘Anglo-Saxon/Insular fear’ is the ‘Eurasian/Continental hope’. In the relatively short vita of the geopolitical reasoning today is the first time that the Anglo-Saxon status quo camp, consisting also by the ‘critical’ approaches that actually facilitate its power perpetuation, is not facing an alternative ‘grand narrative’. In short, this chapter concludes with the articulation of the need for the emergence of a new alternative theory, which will be able to contribute to the plurality of ideas in the specific field and to confront the dominant view. Due to this demand, the theoretical framework suggested in this thesis enters the picture. Chapter 2 introduces the ‘Integrated Geopolitical/Geocultural Theory of the Median Space’, which consists of two major propositions. First, it has demonstrated the existence of a MS between the East and the West, both of which existed as an autonomous ecumene in political and in historical terms. Second, a permanent pattern in the development of IR exists especially between MS’s main parts and the West. The HMS stands in the center of this process and consists of the region of eastern Mediterranean based on the southern Balkans and the AM space. The whole pattern demonstrates the importance of this region and the eternal struggle to be controlled either by the ‘alien’ Western forces or by the ‘indigenous’ MS ones. Thus, this process, under the DHMS condition, brings only wars and friction that keep the indigenous populations disunited and therefore controllable. However, in the case
of a UHMS, the whole process is reversed and the indigenous population creates political formations that could bring peace and prosperity in the region and make its voice ‘heard’ in the whole WI. Consequently, the only choice for the people of the HMS is unity against both the ‘internal’ (Russian) threat and the ‘external’ (Western) tutelage and control. Therefore, the only solution is the reemergence of the UHMS condition.

Part II, the ‘Synthesis’ chapters, represent the actual MS mentality of the populations used for the case study, Russia and Turkey. Their ‘quest’ for identity reveals the existence of a synthetic Eurasian, thus MS, mentality which was never disappeared despite the formal articulation of other ideologies equally important like the Western-centered ones. Actually, these two chapters verify the first major proposition of this thesis, namely the claim for a Median Space ‘reality’. The identity crisis that these countries face is presented in the beginning of both chapters. The following debate on the history of their ideas, especially the MS ones, actually brings the researcher to the lysis. The salvation on both cases is not just to acknowledge the existence of a vibrant MS group, but to let this group become the dominant ideology. The Russian case has been proven an easier task to touch upon, since this process is in motion especially during the last decade. However, the Turkish case is a much more complicated and challenging issue, which required a thorough examination of the whole historical process of the ‘Turkish’ element in the HMS. Surprisingly or not, this journey leads the researcher to the outcome that the contemporary Turkish nation is maybe the most synthetic formation in Eurasia. It consists mainly of Greek-Turkish, or, to put it more appropriately, Byzantine-Ottoman ingredients, thus by its very nature it underlines the fact that he ‘natural’ state of reality is a Greek-Turkish union rather than the
contemporary disunity and friction. By demonstrating the synthetic stance of these two elements, the Greek and the Turkish, which seem antithetic at first, the UHMS proposal also further strengthens itself, at least in academic terms.

Part III represents the ‘Antithesis’ part of this thesis, since it scrutinizes the actual IR of all the abovementioned factors and demonstrates that, despite the existence of the synthetic approaches, the dominant ones are actually the antithetic approaches, especially in the HMS. Consequently, the outcome is a large Western and Russian infiltration in the region. Chapter 5 examines in a macroscopic way the IR of the spaces of the HMS (Byzantine and Ottoman Empires – Greece and Turkey) mainly in respect with the NW (Kievan Rus – Muscovy - Russian Empire – Soviet Union – Russian Federation). The pattern is always the same. Whenever the HMS was united it was the dominant power was Eurasia, whereas whenever it was divided either the Russian or the Western factor infiltrated the region in order to control it, especially its central water-route, the BSSA. Chapter 6 concludes the thesis by transferring further the elaboration of this trend in the contemporary era. This microscopic approach actually demonstrates the ‘reality’ of the suggested pattern and touches upon two main and interconnected issues in order to further elaborate on this. First, it briefly represents the energy factor and competition in Eurasia by demonstrating the two major camps, the Russian and the US ones, along with the competing pipeline routes, political initiatives, frictions and competitions. Once more, this approach signifies the conflict of interests that make the HMS the ‘battlefield’ for the pipeline ‘war’ which follows exactly the diachronic precepts that have been observed in the area. Second, there is an overview of the major security developments in the region dealing first with the Caucasus then with the BSSA and then with the MS as a whole. The outcome
of this approach is the indication of a clearly observable, formal and informal process of creating alliances in the region. Moreover, it explicitly demonstrates the fact that a major conflict could emerge from the discursive Russian and Western initiatives in the broader region of the HMS.

Following all of the aforementioned analyses, it has been demonstrated, hopefully, that the aim of this research is first to contribute to the IR theory by introducing the suggested theoretical framework and second to cast some light in a highly complex and transformative situation of the contemporary world. Hopefully, the reader might detect the effort that this research places towards the direction of contributing to the field of knowledge since the whole thesis attempted to approach its multidisciplinary challenging, difficult but always ‘charming’ topic under a specific original angle. In general, the effort was heading towards the discovery of knowledge, the connection of previously unrelated facts, the development of a new theory and the engagement with a new analysis of older views. In all cases, the verification of this claim, as it has also been mentioned in the introductory remarks, is up to the reader’s opinion.

Finally, regarding the views that the adopted approach might be a war-like, aggressive or not ‘politically-correct’ the answer is one. Sir Halford Mackinder wrote convincingly in a letter (1942) that, “When I started teaching geography at Oxford in 1887, I was opposed by quite a few Liberal thinkers on the ground that the study of geography lent itself to the growth of militarism and imperialism. They did not realize that defense postulates understanding of the attack”. Moreover, despite the obvious advantages of engaging geopolitical theory this research actually tries to overrule war.

9 Weigert, Generals and Geographers, p. 5
Up to this point it must be clear that the *raison d’être* of this effort is to demonstrate that in the HMS, which is divided and scattered, therefore it operates under the DHMS condition, there are no “barbarians”. The great Kavafis, in his poem “Waiting for the Barbarians” is speaking of an imaginary society. Actually the poem resembles directly the Byzantine state and described that the population of this imaginary state, form the emperor to the peasants, stop doing anything else but “waiting for the barbarians” since they are “coming today”. However, at the end of the day, the “night has fallen and the barbarians haven’t come” since “there are no barbarians any longer”. As Kavafis’s poem suggests, the people of the HMS should stop seeing each other as “barbarians”, there are no barbarians at the borders. If they understand that then the DHMS condition may collapse, the friction may stop and the *raison d’être* of the ‘alien’ penetration that aggravates the situation will cease to exist. When the DHMS condition collapses, then, by definition, the indigenous populations will ‘reinvent’ more composite alternatives, which are actually the canon and not the exception, for the HMS. Only the UHMS condition could create the necessary framework for the indigenous populations to prosper and flourish. Consequently, the aim of this research is to contribute to Kavafis’s last verses. The major victory for the HMS is its people to wonder “Now what’s going to happen to us without barbarians?” The HMS, if its indigenous populations manage to ‘speak’ again with the ‘same language’ to each other, will cease to ‘invent’ at least the indigenous “barbarians”. So, after this transformation, the “barbarians” who, according to Kavafis, “were a kind of solution”, to the shortcomings and the internal ‘artificial’ structures of these societies, will be found exactly where they really are and ‘hide’. The ‘real’ “barbarians”, for the people of the HMS will be found ‘hiding’ in the conflicting artificial Western-rooted ideologies that have divided their sea and their
PP, a space that always operated as a bridge for people that are brothers and not as a barrier that was forcing brothers to fight each other.
APPENDICES

Appendix 1: Mackinder’s Pivot-Area/Heartland
Appendix 2: Mackinder’s Initial “Heartland Theory” (1904)
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Mackinder’s Pivot-Area/Heartland

Mackinder is defining the “pivot-area” in 1904 as the Eurasian landmass that its river drainage system is useless for human communications. Mackinder observed that the rivers are moving either towards the Caspian and the other closed lakes/seas of Eurasia (i.e. Aral and Baykal) or towards the Arctic but definitely not towards the warm seas. Due to this isolation from the warm seas and the navigational routes that the sea-powers are using, this area is unapproachable thus invulnerable to external pressure. This fact along with the technological advances could transform the power that occupies it, in this case Russia, in a formidable potential rival to the Anglo-Saxon sea-power. Pivot-state, due to its central position and its actual volume in all aspects, could strike all over Eurasia without the sea-powers being able to do much to avert it.1

In his *Democratic Ideals and Reality* (1919), Mackinder is further elaborating to the 1904 ideas. Due to the lessons of WWI and “for the purposes of strategic thought” is wondering if he has to give to the Pivot-Area “a somewhat wider extension”.2 Thus, is expanding the “pivot-area”, for which now uses the word “Heartland” in technical terms, further to the west by incorporating Eastern Europe from the Baltic to the Black Sea with a special reference to the Straits, Aegean, Asia Minor and the Balkans.

In his book Mackinder first, describes Heartland in geographic terms,3 like he did in 1904 paper and second, he is making an ‘addition’ to the west4 including the abovementioned areas.5 Finally, in his *The Round World and the Winning of Peace* (1943) again due to the current developments and the WWII he is further evolving his views about Heartland by somewhat reducing it, compared to the 1919 version, since he excludes the “Lenaland” the vast area that stretches east of the Yenisei River.6

Overall due to the two World Wars Mackinder gradually ‘dragging’ the Heartland towards the west by incorporating Eastern Europe in a permanent manner and the Black Sea-Straits-Aegean axis (BSSA) in a temporal manner based on who is controlling it while he excludes the eastern Siberia, “Lenaland”, off the picture.

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1 See, Mackinder, ‘The Geographical Pivot of History’, in Mackinder’s *Democratic Ideals and Reality*, pp. 251-253, 260-262
2 Mackinder, *Democratic Ideals and Reality*, p. 109
3 Ibid., pp. 73-74
4 Ibid., p. 105
5 Ibid., pp. 104-114
Mackinder’s Initial “Heartland Theory” (1904)\(^1\)

\(^1\) Mackinder, Democratic Ideals and Reality, p. 261
Mackinder’s Refined “Heartland Theory” (1919)¹

¹ Mackinder, Democratic Ideals and Reality, p. 105
Mackinder and the Book About Spykman’s Ideas

As it has been aforementioned Spykman died in June 1943, Mackinder’s article was published in Foreign Affairs in July 1943 and Professor Dunn’s introduction was written on November 1st, 1943.

Thus, the editors are fully aware of what the British Geographer wrote and to this essay. Actually Mackinder’s article is referenced once in the book about Spykman. There is a possibility that the aforementioned impressive similarities, found in Mackinder’s article and the book about Spykman’s ideas to be in a sense ‘taken’ from Mackinder.

The following example is indicative, the authors of the book about Spykman write that the Pivot-Zone “in reality, is going to be corresponded to the space that Soviet Union exerts political leverage”2. Mackinder in his article writes that “For our present purpose it is sufficiently accurate to say that the territory of the U.S.S.R. is equivalent to the Heartland …”. The similarity of the abstraction and of the idea is evident. Mackinder presented it in a journal that certainly could not be missed by the editors of Spykman ideas especially when they were planning to write a book about a scholar that was so obviously influenced by Mackinder. The article was published months before the completion of the book about Spykman and obviously this specific idea was taken by this article since Mackinder for the first time is making this statement. The reference, however, is missing.

In any case this note is not to render any accusation to anybody but simply to underpin the conscious or unconscious deep similarities between the two views. Thus, it could be argued that it is inaccurate to assert that Mackinder’s views differ from the ideas of the book about Spykman. In reality there is a good chance to be exactly the same since the American editors have heavily borrowed the British view. And definitely it is inaccurate to say that Mackinder differs from Spykman since Spykman never wrote the book that the whole debate on this issue is based. For sure it could be argued that the American editors ‘wanted’ on the one hand to stress their ‘differences’ with Mackinder but on the other hand to ‘utilize’ his grand narrative as much as they could.

1 Spykman, The Geography of the Peace, p. 108
2 Ibid., p. 96
3 Mackinder, The Round World and the Winning of Peace’, in Mackinder’s Democratic Ideals and Reality, p. 269
Kitsikis’s “Intermediate Region”\(^1\)

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\(^1\) Kitsikis, History of the Ottoman Empire, p. 43
THE INTEGRATED GEOPOLITICAL / GEOCULTURAL THEORY OF THE MEDIAN SPACE

Compiled by the Author with the help of Dr. Panagiotis Ritsos
Chapter 2

The Median Space

Slavic

Northern Wing

Western Kentron

Eastern Kentron

Aryan & Turanic

Southem Wing

Semitic

East:
The Central Kingdom, India & Japan

West:
Anglo-Saxon, Teutonic & Frankish

The Median Space

Heartland of Median Space

Aryan
Mackinder’s Focus on the BSSA-axis During the Heartland-Boundaries Debate in 1919

1 Mackinder, Democratic Ideals and Reality, p. 107
Russia-Turkey & the West: Conflicting Ideologies in the Kentron of the Median Space

Kentron of Median Space:
- Caucasus & Kurdish space
- Westen Kentron: Balkans-Asia Minor
- Eastern Kentron: Central Asia

Neo-Ottoman approach
Turanic approach

East Question

Anglo-Saxon, Teutonic & Frankish West

Great Game
Chapter 3  Appendix 10

Russian Geopolitical Debate: The Influences

Revisionist/Continental Russian School: Eurasianism with traces of Pan-Slavic & Pan-Asiatic elements

Revisionist/Continental Teutonic School; German Realpolitik & ‘Haushoferian’ approach

Intellectual elements that Russian Geopolitical Schools are using in various levels in order to form their narrations

Anglo-Saxon/Insular status quo School: ‘Mackinderian’ Heartland Theory, Spykman’s Rimland Theory & Mahan’s Sea Power Approach

Contemporary Russian Geopolitical Debate

Eurasian/Median Space School

Atlanticists/Zapadniki School

Westernizers

Civilizationists/Isolated Imperialists

Classical Eurasian Group

Expansionists/Expansionist Imperialists

Stabilizers

Critical Eurasian Group

Geo-economists

Anglo-Saxon/Insular status quo Critical School: ‘Mackinderian’ Heartland Theory, Spykman’s Rimland Theory & Mahan’s Sea Power Approach

Revisionist/Continental Russian School: Eurasianism with traces of Pan-Slavic & Pan-Asiatic elements

Anglo-Saxon/Insular status quo School: ‘Mackinderian’ Heartland Theory, Spykman’s Rimland Theory & Mahan’s Sea Power Approach

Revisionist/Continental Teutonic School; German Realpolitik & ‘Haushoferian’ approach

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Intellectual elements that Russian Geopolitical Schools are using in various levels in order to form their narrations

Anglo-Saxon/Insular status quo Critical School: ‘Mackinderian’ Heartland Theory, Spykman’s Rimland Theory & Mahan’s Sea Power Approach
## Russian Geopolitical Debate: The Contemporary Schools

### Contemporary Russian Geopolitical Schools

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<td>Civilizationists/Isolated Imperialists</td>
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<td>(v) Main Allies</td>
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<td>Friendly; West-shaped interdependence; globalization</td>
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### Critical Eurasian Group

- **Stabilizers**
- **Geo-economists**

- **Russian cultural distinctiveness; Geopolitical entity; ‘Intersection’ of cultures, economics, trade and energy**
- **Russian cultural distinctiveness; Geopolitical entity; Interrelated economic and cultural bonds**
- **Survival through stabilizing the Eurasian continent**
- **Survival through the economic development of the region that will bring stability**
- **Contemporary post-Soviet borders**
- **Trans-regional economic development through state and private initiatives; Political balancing**
- **Equal distances from all; realistic multi-vector foreign policy**
- **Selfish nation state; interdependence and pluralism**
- **Various geopolitical and geo-economic**
- **Mainly geo-economic**
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<th>economic pressures from West and East</th>
<th>challenges from West and the East; the geopolitical parameter is not underestimated also</th>
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<tr>
<td>(2) School’s Political &amp; Social Expressions of their Narratives</td>
<td></td>
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<tr>
<td>(i) Political Support</td>
<td>Yabloko, URWK</td>
<td>CPRF; ‘Fatherland’</td>
<td>‘Eurasia’; CPRF; LDPR</td>
<td>‘Fatherland’</td>
<td>‘Unity’; Yabloko</td>
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<tr>
<td>(ii) Political Orientation</td>
<td>Old and Neo-Liberalism</td>
<td>Old Conservatism; Communism</td>
<td>Right; Left; Conservative Revolution</td>
<td>Conservative &amp; Liberal synthesis</td>
<td>Liberal &amp; Conservative synthesis</td>
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<tr>
<td>(iii) Intellectual Roots</td>
<td>Critical geopolitical views</td>
<td>Russian Eurasianist school mixed with Anglo-Saxon geopolitical theory</td>
<td>Russian Eurasianist school mixed with Anglo-Saxon and Teutonic geopolitical theory</td>
<td>Russian Eurasianist school mixed with Anglo-Saxon and critical geopolitical theory</td>
<td>Russian Eurasianist school mixed with Anglo-Saxon and critical geopolitical theory</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>(iv) Representative Authors</td>
<td>Dimitri Trenin; D. N. Zamyatin</td>
<td>Gennadii Ziuganov; Nikolai Nartov; V. L. Tsymburskii</td>
<td>Aleksander Dugin; Aleksander Prokhanov; Aleksander Panarin; Vladimir Zhirinovskiy</td>
<td>Kamaludin Gadziyev; Konstantin Pleshakov</td>
<td>Vladimir Kolosov; Nikolai Mironenko; K. E. Sorokin; E. Kochetov; R. Turovskiy</td>
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<tr>
<td>(v) Socio-economic Support</td>
<td>West-oriented private sector; part of the public administration</td>
<td>Politico-Military industrial and state elite</td>
<td>Hard-line politico-military industrial elite</td>
<td>Main part of the state public administration and private sector</td>
<td>State bureaucrats along with private nationally and regionally oriented private section</td>
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The Intellectual Debate on the Nature/Identity of the Early Ottoman Empire

Through scrutinizing the most representative sources on the Ottoman identity three main schools with some thin but observable variations, concerning the degree of ‘Eurasianism’, might be depicted. These are:

<table>
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<tr>
<th>The Three Schools</th>
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<tr>
<td>EUR [-] asian</td>
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<td>EUR-Asian</td>
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<td>EURASIAN</td>
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<td>eur-ASIAN</td>
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All the scholars on various degrees are supporting actually the ‘Eurasian’ identity of the Ottomans. There are some slight variations though. The codification is as follows: Three main schools with the capital letters depicting the dominant cultural/racial component. In the first and third group there are two subgroups. The group that has the [-] implies that the ‘Eurasian’ identity was not completed so there was a no synthetic stance but actually a relation of dominant and inferior culture. The group with no [-] implies the existence of a dominant culture/race, since one component is with capital letters, but there is an effort for the creation of some short of synthesis. The EURASIAN group implies the harmonic coexistence of two cultures and races under a new synthesis

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Philipps¹</th>
<th>Diehl²</th>
<th>Gibbons³</th>
<th>Langer &amp; Blake⁴</th>
<th>Köprüülü⁵</th>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Pears⁶</td>
<td>Iorga⁷</td>
<td>Wittek⁸</td>
<td>Kramer⁹</td>
<td>Giese¹⁰</td>
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<tr>
<td>Arnakis¹¹</td>
<td>Lindner¹²</td>
<td>Kaldy-Nagy¹³</td>
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<tr>
<td>Vryonis¹⁴</td>
<td>Heywood¹⁵</td>
<td>Fodor¹⁶</td>
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<td></td>
<td>Kafadar¹⁷</td>
<td>Imber¹⁸</td>
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² Diehl, C. History of the Byzantine Empire: Splendor and Decay (4 volumes) (in Greek) (Athens, 2002; Kafadar, Between Two Worlds, p. 34
³ Gibbons, The Foundation of the Ottoman Empire, pp. 49-50 It is considered to be the major and ground-breaking work concerning the Ottoman early identity. His views that the early Ottoman state was a Byzantine-Turkish ‘enterprise’ has influenced the synthetic views of the modern scholarship
⁵ Köprüülü, The Origins of the Ottoman Empire; Köprüülü, The Seljuks of Anatolia He represents the major proponent of the Asiatic-Turkish-centered ideology of the Kemalist nation-building process
⁶ Pears, E., Sir The Fall of the Constantinople: Being the Story of the Fourth Crusade (New York, 1975), pp. 110, 125, 197; Pears, E., Sir The Destruction of the Greek Empire and the Story of the Capture of Constantinople by the Turks (in Greek) (Athens, 2004)
⁷ Kafadar, Between Two Worlds, pp. 32-34
⁸ Wittek, P. The Rise of the Ottoman State (London, 1938), pp. 18-19, 35. He is the major reason why the post-war Ottoman studies flourished. His views created a lot of debate something which resulted to the launch of a whole discourse concerning the Ottoman identity
⁹ Kafadar, Between Two Worlds, pp. 34-35
¹⁰ Ibid.
¹¹ Arnakis, G. G. The Ottoman Empire and the Balkan States to 1900 (New York, 1969), pp. 56-88
¹² Lindner, P., R. Nomads and Ottomans in Medieval Anatolia (Indiana, 1983), pp. 1-51
¹³Lowry, The Nature of the Early Ottoman State, p. 10
¹⁴ For further information see his works provided in the references
¹⁶ Lowry, The Nature of the Early Ottoman State, p. 11
Chapter 4  Appendix 12

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Lowry</th>
<th>Emecen</th>
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<td>Kitsikis</td>
<td>İnalçik</td>
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17 Kafadar, Between Two Worlds. One of the leading Turkish intellectuals taking a rather synthetic Eurasian view and definitely opposing the exclusive Kemalist ideology
19 Lowry, The Nature of the Early Ottoman State; Lowry, W., H. Fifteenth Century Ottoman Realities: Christian Peasant Life on the Aegean Island of Limnos (Istanbul, 2002) The professor of Princeton represents the major modern advocate of Gibbons’s synthetic view. His book is considered to be a ground-breaking approach on the issue
20 Lowry, The Nature of the Early Ottoman State, p. 12
21 His work has been adequate presented and in previous parts of this research
Heartland of the Median Space and ‘Islamochristianity’

Islamochristianity’s nature and peculiarity could be accurately and convincingly recapitulated through Vryonis’ valuable remarks that it is the religiosity of the masses, that is to say popular Christianity and especially popular Islam, that require attention…. the large-scale Islamization that transpired in Anatolia, as well as the dense Christian environment of Balkan Islam, meant that popular Islam was heavily affected by the Christian practices of the converts. This was particularly true where large or compact groups converted or in areas where Muslims took Christian wives and concubines on an extensive scale. The popular Islam that the dervishes preached also accommodated itself to syncretism. At the level of folk religion Christianity and Islam in the two peninsulas were strongly permeated by the phenomenon of hagiolatry. The Byzantine saints and Islamic dervishes belong to the same category of religious phenomenology. The local holy man who caters to the immediate needs of the local populace and who intercedes with God or the state on its behalf. It is therefore not surprising to find that Christians frequently visited the shrines of Muslim holy men, and that even more frequently Muslims sought the benefits dispensed at the shrines of Christian saints, a phenomenon studied in such detail by Hasluck, that one needs not expand upon it. There arose, also, in certain cases, an equalization between certain Muslim and Christian holy men in the eyes of the populace, with interchangeability of the two and on occasion with double religious shrines. In such a fluid environment many Christian cult practices passed into popular Islam, perhaps the most spectacular of which was the practice of baptism among Muslims on an extensive scale. But there were other Christian and even pre-Christian practices discernible in popular Islam which were brought into Islam by the conversion of the Christians: iconolatry, certain types of animal sacrifice, certain holy days, and a variety of practices associated with the seasonal cycle. Consequently, although the formal aspects and appearances of life in the Balkans and especially in Anatolia underwent substantial religious change, behind the appearances and formality there was a strong and vital continuity in the popular religious life of the area during the transition from Byzantine to Ottoman rule … Studies of political, economic and cultural institutions have indicated that the same pattern obtained there as observed in the change and continuity of religious life: change at the formal level, substantial continuity at the popular level1

1 Vryonis, S., Jr. ‘Religious Change and Continuity in the Balkans and Anatolia from the Fourteenth Through the Sixteenth Century’, in Vryonis, S., Jr. (ed) Islam and Cultural Change in the Middle Ages (Wiesbaden, 1975), pp. 139-140. There are numerous cases on the equating of Saints (the most indicative examples were St. Georgios and St. Theodore who were equating with Khidir Elias, St. Amphilochous and Plato as Eflatun, St. Nicholas and St. George, again, as Sari Saltic and St. Charalambous as Hacci Bektaş), cases of double sanctuaries (in example, in Nevşehir, Kappadokia the sanctuary with the relics of St. Mamas had an altar and a … mihrab [a niche in the wall indicating were Mecca is for Muslims to pray] accommodating a priest and a dervish! Moreover, the Muslim tomb of Ghazi Shehid Mustafa near Bendereğly/Heraclea Pontica [Northern Asia Minor] was worshiped by the Orthodox as the tomb of St. Theodore Stratelates [Marshal] with offers of money and candles!), of the icon and crosses worships along with popular painting and heroic literature (the ninth-tenth century heroic epic of Digenis Akritas that represents the so-called ‘Acritic Cycle’ resembles the Turkish epic Kör-öğu in many respects of its plot) depicts clearly the situation of the Greek-Turkish cultural and national space. See, Vryonis, The Decline of Medieval Hellenism in Asia Minor, pp. 483-496; the monumental work of Hasluck, Christianity and Islam under the Sultans; Vryonis, S., Jr. ‘The Byzantine Legacy in the Formal Culture of the Balkan Peoples’, in Yiannias, J., J. (ed) The Byzantine Tradition after the Fall of Constantinople (Virginia, 1993), pp. 17-44
Chapter 4

Mehmed II the Conqueror

Grasping the opportunity of using Lord Kinross’ concise words about Sultan’s *vita*, some interesting outcomes concerning Mehmed’s cultural background in particular and some relevant issues of interest in general might be reached and presented in the form of complementary annotations.

The Conqueror showed himself well enough disposed toward the Greeks in the city, who represented its largest, richest, and most cultured non-Moslem community. He saw clearly that they could be an asset to his empire, having an aptitude for industry, commerce and seamanship, which the Turks did not share. He had moreover a respect for Greek learning. In the course of his studies he had acquired a deep knowledge of the Greek history. He may even have had Greek blood in his own veins, from his mother. He showed an especial respect and concern for his stepmother, Murad’s half-Serbian, half-Greek widow, the Lady Mara – who had been considered, on her husband’s death as a possible bride for Emperor Constantine [last Byzantine Emperor]. He thus lost little time in providing the Greek Church with a new Patriarch … Sultan’s choice fell upon the monk Gennadius – otherwise George Scholarius, a scholar of considerable eminence. Gennadius had led the opposition to the union between Greek and Roman churches, proposed as a last attempt to secure Western aid for the city, and was thus unlikely to intrigue with the Christians of the West … In January, 1454, Gennadius was enthroned as Greek Patriarch under the auspices of the Sultan, exercising the prerogative of the Byzantine emperors and carrying out much of their traditional ceremonial … From the outset the Conqueror treated Hagia Sophia … with reverence, preserving his figural mosaics in defiance of the Islamic prohibition of all representations in art of the human form1… With Gennadius, Mehmed established a close relationship, engaging, with him in amicable discussions on theological matters, and in his quest for knowledge displaying a marked interest in the Christian religion. At his request Gennadius wrote for him a statement of the Orthodox faith, which was translated into Turkish. This gave rise in the West to pious hopes that the Sultan might emerge as a potential convert to Christianity… Pope Nicholas V is said to have prayed for the conversion of the Sultan, after suitable instruction, following an alleged exchange of letters in which Mehmed, referring to himself as the successor and avenger of Hector,2 hinted at this possibility.

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1 This heterodox perception of Islam and his “freedom from Islamic inhibitions” [Kinross, P., B., Lord. The Ottoman Centuries: The Rise and Fall of the Turkish Empire (London, 1977),p. 155] enabled him towards the end of his life to request from the Italian artist “Gentile Bellini, whom he brought from Venice, to decorate the Palace walls with frescos in the Italian style and paint his portrait (something unthinkable for a Muslim ruler).” See, İnalcık, The Ottoman Empire, p. 181. Kinross [p. 156; brackets and Italics added] adds that “Bellini decorated the internal apartments of the Seraglio [palace] … All these works of the Renaissance were to be removed as “indecent” after Mehmed’s death by his iconoclastic son Bayezid II, who sold them on the open market … Mehmed had asked also (from the Venetian Doge) for a good sculptor in bronze … Costanzo of Ferrara, who made a medallion of the Sultan”. In general Mehmet was fluent in six languages –Turkish, Greek, Arabic, Latin, Persian and Hebrew and as Kinross [p. 155] stresses he “was well grounded by his numerous tutors in Islamic and Greek literature, in the study of philosophy and to a lesser extend of the sciences”

2 The Byzantine chronicler Michael Kritovoulos (beg.15th c.-1470) wrote that when Mehmed passed from the area of Troy (1462), and examined the legendary “tombs of the heroes” he said that “God has reserved for me … the right to avenge this city and its inhabitants. For I have subdued their enemies and have plundered their cities and made them the spoils of the Myssians. It was the Greeks and Macedonians and Thessalians and Peloponniesians who ravaged this place in the past, and whose descendants have now through my efforts paid the just penalty, after a long period of years, for their injustice to us Asiatics at that time and so often in subsequent times”. See, Kritovoulos, M. (trans. &
Later and more credibly Pope Pius II, alarmed lest the Sultan became responsive to Orthodox doctrines, wrote to him expounding the superior wisdom and truth of Catholic doctrines and offering him baptism, so that he might become, under papal protection, the greatest of Christian princes. In Constantinople itself a Greek philosopher, George Amioutzes, elaborated up a study for the Sultan, showing the common ground between Islam and Christianity, suggesting that they should be combined in synthesis as one religion, or at least that each should recognize the other in sisterly fashion…

As Babinger, F. Mehmed the Conqueror and his Time, (Princeton 1978), p. 210; brackets added, correctly observes the Conqueror by condemning the Greeks demonstrates “the influence of his Italian preceptors, who persuaded him that Teucros, first king of Troy and ruler over the Teucri [Trojans], was his ancestor, for the Latinists of the time did not hesitate to designate the Turks as “Teucri” … his retinue included Italian humanists, who on this occasion regaled him with stories from the Homeric epics and described the past glories of Troy”. However, through this passage, it could also be argued that the Sultan proves his reputation regarding his knowledge of Greek literature, especially in mentioning geographical and national names, which were not very common but were so accurately connected with the historical realities of his times, such as ‘Mysians’ The Mysi (Mysians) were the eponymous inhabitants of Mysia, a region in northwest Asia Minor- exactly the Byzantine Bithynia from where the Ottomans were originated. Herodotus wrote that they were brethren of the Carians and Lydians [Herodotus (trans. & ed. by De Sélincourt, A.) The Histories (London,1972), Book 1.171]. According to, Homer, (trans. & ed. by Pope, A.) The Iliad (London, 1966), the Mysians fought in the Trojan War on the side of Troy [Iliad, 2.858]. The fact that Kafadar [p. 9] and Kinross [p. 112] says that he visited Troy as a “sultan, khan and Caesar” or seeing himself as “Khan, Ghazi, and Caesar” respectively is indicative of the above-mentioning comments.

Spandounes [pp. 52-53; Italics and brackets added] notes the “He [Scholarios] often read out of it [the book that wrote] to Mehmed, so much so that some say that the Emperor adhered more to the Christian faith than to any other, especially in the years before his death. He always kept by him some relics of saints with lamps burning before them … out of a genuine devotion to them”. This close connection with his mentor made Pope fear the emergence of a new revitalized Byzantine Emperor thus, in order to avoid this possibility he wrote to the Sultan a letter (1461). On the issue of Mehmed’s real religious tendencies there is an intriguing incident recorded in Greek sources that has been taken from two Turkish ones, which are considered to be reliable. During the reign of Abdulhammit II (1876-1909), some reconstructions were taking place in the Fatih Camii [Conqueror’s Mosque] that was built (1463-1470) by Mehmed and replaced the demolished by the Ottomans Church of Agioi Apostoloi, the burial place of many Byzantine Emperors. Abdulhamid ordered the opening of the Conqueror’s tomb in order to see if it required any restorations. A corridor was found in the tomb, leading to the old foundations of the Orthodox Church, where the tombs of the Emperor’s were discovered along with the tomb of Mehmed, who had been buried as a Christian like the rest of the Byzantine Kings. Thus, the tomb was sealed and it has not been reopened yet. See, Chilandakis, N. Arcane Turkey (Thessaloniki, 2002), pp. 133-134. Moreover, on the same pattern the high circulation Turkish weekly Journal Aktüel in its issue (December 19, 1991) published an article with the title “Was the Conqueror Christian? The Historians are not in a Position to Solve this Mystery, 500 Years After His Death”. See, ibid., pp. 134-135.

3 Babinger, F. Mehmed the Conqueror and his Time, (Princeton, 1954), pp. 181-182. ed. in English from Riggs, T., C.) History of Mehmed the Conqueror (Princeton, 1978), p. 210; brackets added, correctly observes the Conqueror by condemning the Greeks demonstrates “the influence of his Italian preceptors, who persuaded him that Teucros, first king of Troy and ruler over the Teucri [Trojans], was his ancestor, for the Latinists of the time did not hesitate to designate the Turks as “Teucri” … his retinue included Italian humanists, who on this occasion regaled him with stories from the Homeric epics and described the past glories of Troy”. However, through this passage, it could also be argued that the Sultan proves his reputation regarding his knowledge of Greek literature, especially in mentioning geographical and national names, which were not very common but were so accurately connected with the historical realities of his times, such as ‘Mysians’ The Mysi (Mysians) were the eponymous inhabitants of Mysia, a region in northwest Asia Minor- exactly the Byzantine Bithynia from where the Ottomans were originated. Herodotus wrote that they were brethren of the Carians and Lydians [Herodotus (trans. & ed. by De Sélincourt, A.) The Histories (London,1972), Book 1.171]. According to, Homer, (trans. & ed. by Pope, A.) The Iliad (London, 1966), the Mysians fought in the Trojan War on the side of Troy [Iliad, 2.858]. The fact that Kafadar [p. 9] and Kinross [p. 112] says that he visited Troy as a “sultan, khan and Caesar” or seeing himself as “Khan, Ghazi, and Caesar” respectively is indicative of the above-mentioning comments.

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4 Georgios Amioutzes of Trebizond (d. 1475) a Greek leading scholar on philosophical and theological matters initiated the Sultan “into peripatetic philosophy – or Neoplatonism” [Babinger, p. 246] and to geographical studies through Ptolemy’s manuscripts and maps. His two sons, Mehmed and Skender were raised as Muslims. It is said that the elder son, Mehmet, requested from “the future patriarch Maximos III (1476-1482) to prepare an exposition of the Christian faith for his master, explaining that the sultan wished to be converted to Christianity…” (Mehmed also commissioned by the Sultan) to translate the Bible into Arabic”. [Babinger, p. 247] Moreover, there is also a testimony of the Italian-Jew Jacopo of Gaeta – Mehmed’s medical adviser that was for “over a period of thirty years a predominant influence at the Sultan’s court”, [Kinross, p.157] to the Venetian bailo – representative in Constantinople, that the Sultan “had become a Christian” [Babinger, p. 248]. However, another great scholar of his time tried to promote Sultan’s dialectic tendencies in a more intensive manner. Georgios Trapezuntios, a Greek from Crete and teacher of the Pope Paul II (1464-1471) in fine arts and grammar, initiated Mehmed to Ptolemy’s cosmic system work. Trapezuntios had visited Constantinople (1465) in order to write a report to the west on the conditions that prevailed in the OE; instead, he “informed the sultan on the “developments in the West and the dissatisfaction of its
people”, encouraging the “Turk” to hasten his invasion of Italy. He already referred to the sultan… as “emperor of the Romans and of the terrestrial globe””. [Babinger, p. 248] Trapezuntios wrote two letters one dated from 1466 and the other shortly thereafter. In the first he praises the Sultan as “infinitely greater than Cyrus, Alexander the Great, and Caesar … and exalts him high above all other sovereigns” [Babinger, p. 249]. The second letter is more illuminating due to his proclamation that “there was no man alive—that there never had been and … never would be any man— who, with God’s help, could lead the people of the whole earth into one faith and one church and build a single empire of all mankind more easily than Mehmed” and he continues that the Sultan since the conquest of Constantinople “Let no doubt that he is by right the emperor of the Romans. For he is emperor who by right possesses the seat of the empire, but the seat of the Roman Empire in Constantinople: thus he who by right possesses this city is the emperor. But it is not from men but from God that you, thanks to your sword, have received this throne. Consequently, you are the legitimate emperor of the Romans … And he who is and remains emperor of the Romans is also emperor of the entire earth”. [Babinger, p. 249; Kinross, p. 112] Thus, somebody is not being surprised when reads Trapezuntios’s Greek treatise “On the Truth of the Christian Faith”, written a couple of months after the conquest of Constantinople, July 1453, trying to prove that “there was no fundamental difference between Islam and Christianity.” Thus, “The Sultan, he declared, could easily reconcile the two religions and would so be enabled to rule over all the nations professing either faith” [Babinger, 251]. At this point, it should be worth-mentioning that the three main influential Greek Scholars in Mehmed’s court Geogios Schollarios Gennadios – the Patriarch, Georgios Amirutzes and Georgios Trapezuntios were some of the most prominent personalities that escorted Emperor Ioannes VIII Palaeologos in the Council of Ferrara-Florence (1437-1439) for the unification of the churches and were among the persons that signed the joint declaration something which due to the reaction of the Greek congregation and due to the inability of the Pope to provide any help against the Ottomans remained dead letter.

3 Kinross, The Ottoman Centuries, pp. 113-115; brackets added
Bektaşi’s habits resemble strongly the Christian Orthodox rituals. Vryonis eloquently presents these similarities by indicating that

Christian baptism is paralleled, as a cleansing of sins, by the Bektashi practice of ablution with its accompanying formulas before the aynicem. Chrism is parallel to the Bektashi anointing with rose water and the accompanying ceremony. The Holy Eucharist of the Christians as a symbol of Christ’s death is similar to the use of wine and bread in the aynicem in memory of Husayn’s death, in either case only the initiate partaking in the rite. Both among Bektashis and Christians there were celibate and married priests and babas. Christian confession and penitence were similar to the Bektashi practice of baş okutmak, while Christian excommunication was not unlike the Bektashi dükünülük. Other items are more obviously incidental or accidental parallels that the Bektashis employed to good propaganda advantage among Christians. They equated the twelve imams with the twelve apostles; the virgin birth of Christ with that of Balı̇m Sultan, the second founder of the order. They considered Hadji Bektaš a reincarnation of St. Charalambous. As the Christians had Trinity, so did Bektašis, consisting of God, Muhammad, and Ali. And, of course, Bektaši mysticism as was true of most Islamic mystical orders, ultimately derived much of its mystical doctrine from Neoplatonism in which the Godhead created the world by emanating from itself. It is obvious how eclectic and syncretistic Bektashism was, and how accommodating and latitudinarian it was.¹

Bektaşi pious institutions were spread all over the AM and the Balkans either by founding new shrines and monasteries or by ‘usurping’ the existent Christian and ‘Islamizing’ the local Christian Saint or legend.² The most indicative is that of the Albanians, who have demonstrated the greatest level of receptiveness towards this heterodox doctrine at such an extent, that they virtually adopted it as their official religion, especially in the Southern territories.³ Because the “Mohammedanism of any short in Albania is of comparatively recent date, the Turkish conquest having been late and partial. Before it the population was Christian. There was little or no colonization of the country by genuine Turks … the Moslem Albanians to-day thus represent to a very large extend Christians converted at various dates”.⁴ The affiliation between Albanians and Bektaşi is so strong that “even at the central tekke [gathering place of Bektaşi for delivering their rituals] of Haji Bektaš in the heart of Asia Minor the majority of the dervishes are Albanian”.⁵ Concerning the actual spread of this sect in the OE, İnalcık, based on contemporary Ottoman sources, indicates that “in the mid-seventeenth century … there were seven hundred Bektaşı tekkes in the Ottoman Empire … and at the beginning of the nineteenth century … one-fifth of the population of Istanbul were Bektaşı and that they had fourteen tekkes.”⁶ So, “Bektaşi-ism was a major factor in spreading Islam among the native

¹ Vryonis, The Decline of Medieval Hellenism in Asia Minor, pp. 371-372
² See, Hasluck, Christianity and Islam under the Sultans , pp. 500-596
³ The declarations of Albanian independence during the 19th and early-20th century indicate that their efforts for emancipation were based mainly on Bektaşi maxims and ideology. See, ibid., pp. 552-563
⁴ Ibid., pp. 438-439
⁵ Ibid., p. 161. Brackets added
⁶ İnalcık, The Ottoman Empire, p. 199
Christian populations of Rumelia\(^7\) and AM too, since this is where it was first developed.

\(^7\) Ibid., p. 197
Djalal al-Din Rumi’s Funeral

The most illuminating picture of this reality has been given by the Muslim chronicler Eflaki on his account regarding the funeral of Djalal al-Din Rumi in Iconio (Konya), the capital of the Seljuks in central AM. His narration is striking.

The members of the different communities and nations were present, Christians, Jews, Greeks, Arabs, and Turks. They marched forward, each holding on high their sacred scriptures. In accord with their customs they read verses from the Psalms, the Pentateuch, and the Gospels, and uttered funeral lamentations. The Muslims were not able to restrain them either by blows from clubs or from swords. There arose an immense disturbance, the news of which reached the sultan … and his minister. [Accordingly] they summoned the chiefs of the monks and priests and demanded what possible connection this event could have with them, since the sovereign of religion [Rumi] was the director and imam of the Muslims. They replied, “In seeing him we have comprehended the true nature of Christ, of Moses, and of all the prophets such as we have read about in our books. If you Muslims say that our Master [Rumi] is the Muhammad of his period, we recognize him similarly as the Moses and Jesus of our times. Just as you are his sincere friends, we also are one thousand times over his servants and disciples. It is thus that he said it. ‘Seventy sects hear from us their own mysteries. We are as a flute that, in a single mode, is in tune with 200 religions’. Our master is the sun of truth which has shone upon mortals and accorded them favor: all the worlds love the sun which lights their abodes.” Another Greek priest said: “Our master is much like unto bread which is indispensable to all the world. Has a hungry man ever been seen to flee from bread?”

Rûmî closeness with Christian priests is well-known. Disciples of the order visited Christian monks and Christians sought out the leader of the order in Iconio.

1Vryonis, ‘Religious Change and Continuity in the Balkans and Anatolia from the Fourteenth Through the Sixteenth Century’, pp. 136-137; one of the Mevlevî’s salient characteristics were the sema ritual that through the “musical and dancing performance …attained spiritual ecstasy …usually performed in the tekke after Friday prayers. The dervishes gathered here with their guest for a common meal, the guests often included the leading members of the leading classes. Through this ritual …the participants attained a spiritual union with God enabling them to see one of His attributes” [Vryonis, The Decline of Medieval Hellenism in Asia Minor, p. 383]. Their whirling movement of their bodies during the sema made them known as “the ‘whirling dervishes’. [İnalcik, The Ottoman Empire, p. 201]. Moreover, as Hasluck stress [vol. 2, p. 371] Rûmî “assigned to Christ as a prophet a much higher position than his strictly orthodox Moslem contemporaries”.

2 Rûmî was staying to the Greek monastery of “Plato” (St.Chariton) near Iconio that “was also the sight …of some of the miracles that Rumi worked. In the nineteenth and twentieth centuries there were three churches and a small mosque within the monastic complex. …the mosque was build by Muslims in honor of St. Chariton … The leader of the Mawlawis spent one night each year in prayer at this mosque”. Vryonis The Decline of Medieval Hellenism in Asia Minor, p. 387. Rumi’s relation with the monastery as Hasluck [vol. 2, p. 374] added “represents Jelal-ed-din as at least half converted to Christianity”. Moreover, in the great convent of the Mevlevî at Iconio, in the most reverent sanctuary, Rumi’s tomb, another person lies buried side by side with him. It is said by Christian and Turkish sources that this is the tomb of “a Christian who gave Jelal-ed-din such proofs of friendship and faithful service that the latter insisted that they should be buried side by side” [Hasluck, vol.2, p. 375]. The second person in Mevlevî hierarchy and worship is Shems-ed-din. This person was “the saint Schenisis, who was first an Infidel priest [dervish], and was secretly baptized [Christian]” [Hasluck, vol. 2, p.376; brackets added]

3 Vryonis, The Decline of Medieval Hellenism in Asia Minor, p. 387
## Appendix 17

### Ottoman Vizir-i A’zams between the years 1453 and 1516

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Name</th>
<th>Time of Service</th>
<th>Source of Affiliation to the Ottomans/ Nationality</th>
<th>Notation</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Zaganos Paşa</td>
<td>1453-1456</td>
<td>Renegade or Devşirme / Greek-Byzantine</td>
<td>Vezir of Sultan Murad II, tutor and father-in-law of Mehmed II, advisor of the Conqueror, one of the two leaders of the army during the siege of Constantinople. The one that convinced the Sultan to launch his last attack to the walls, by reminiscing Alexander the Great, and not withdraw due to the Ottoman casualties and the stubbornness of the defence. He was the governor of all the European provinces and armies of the empire [Beylerbeyi of Rumeli]. Some stress that he was of Albanian-origin.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Mahmud Paşa</td>
<td>1st term: 1456-1468 2nd term: 1472-1474</td>
<td>Renegade / Greek-Byzantine Imperial Family of Angeloi, Kantacouzenoi and Palaeologoi connections with aristocratic family of Philanthropeni and with Serbian royal family</td>
<td>Historically the most powerful Grand Vezir with the longest holding of this office. Son and nephew of Byzantine Emperors, Caesars and high ranking officers. He was born in Serbia from a branch of his family that ruled, through intermarriages, Serbia too. He was Zaganos's son-in-law and Mehmed’s II brother-in-law. For fourteen years he was Grand Vezir and Beylerbeyi of Rumeli. Great general that “his Byzantine descent …proved to be very convenient in the conquest of Christian lands in the Balkans and Anatolia [Serbia, Bosnia, Peloponnesus, Lesbos, Empire of Trebizond]”. With his cousin the Trebizondin scholar Georgios Amiroutzes, negotiated the surrender of the Empire of Trebizond to the Ottomans. With his brother Michael Angelović [means of the Imperial family of Anggeloi] which was one of the three deputies of the throne of Serbia after king’s Lazar death [along with Queen Helena Palaiologina, and kings Lazar’s brother Stephen which was blind, which means that two Byzantines of Ang geloi and Palaeologoi were ruling Serbia] negotiated the submission of Serbia to the Ottoman rule. Great protector of the Greek-Orthodox population and great benefactor of arts and sciences since his mother and his brother remained Orthodox. Kritovoulos, the Byzantine chronicler, writes about Mahmud when he became Grand Vezir that he was a man “who had formerly belonged to the Roman [Greek] nation on both his father’s and his mother’s side. His paternal father, Philaninos [obviously Philanthropinos], had been ruler of Hellas, with the rank of Caesar [probably he was the grandson of the Byzantine commander of Central Greece, Caesar Manuel Angelos Philanthropenos]. This man had so fine nature that he outshone not only all his contemporaries but also his predecessors in wisdom, bravery, virtue, and other good qualities. He was very quick to recognize spontaneously what needed to be done, even when another told him of it, and still quicker in carrying it out. He was also eloquent in addressing a crowd, able in commanding men, and still more clever in making use and in finding a way out of…</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

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1 Stavrides, T. The Sultan of Vezirs: The Life and Times of the Ottoman Grand Vezir Mahmud Pasha Angelović (1453-1474) (Leiden, 2001), p. 3
difficulties. He was enterprising, a good counsellor, bold, courageous, excelling in all lines, as the
times and circumstances proved him to be. For from the time he took charge of the affairs of the
great Sultan, he gave everything in this great dominion a better prospect by his wonderful zeal and
his fine planning as well as by his implicit and unqualified faith in and goodwill towards his
sovereign. He was thus a man of better character than them all, as shown by his accomplishments”.2
Obviously, when Mehmed vested with high powers this office had in his mind Mahmud that
according to contemporary sources (1461) “Mahmud Paşa was now at the height of his glory. It was
as though the Sultan had renounced the sultanate and bestowed it on Mahmud”!

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Name</th>
<th>Term 1</th>
<th>Term 2</th>
<th>Role/Origin</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>İshak Paşa</td>
<td>1468-171</td>
<td>1482-1483</td>
<td>Devşirme / Greek-Byzantine Vezir of Murad II, advisor of Mehmed II, during the siege of Constantinople one of the two leaders of the army. Some stress that is not the same person in the two terms and he might be of Croatian origin.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Rum Mehmed Paşa</td>
<td>1471-1472</td>
<td></td>
<td>Devşirme / Greek-Byzantine Captured in 1453 at the conquest of Constantinople. Responsible for many conversions in the city and Mahmud’s Paşa major rival.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Gedik Ahmed Paşa</td>
<td>1474-1476</td>
<td></td>
<td>Renegade / Greek-Byzantine Palaeologus Imperial family One of the three nephews of the last Emperor of the BE. Since the Emperor did not have children he “could have been succeeded by one of the three sons of his deceased elder brother”! He was also connected with the Serbian nobility [the Palaiologoi were connected with the Serbian royal family]. Successful general [Crimea, Otranto (1480)], Beylerbeyi of Anatolia, admiral of the fleet and son-in-law to İshak Paşa.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Hoca Sinan Paşa</td>
<td>1476-1477</td>
<td></td>
<td>Sunni Turkish-origin Son of the first kadi [judge] of Constantinople.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Karamani Mehmed Paşa</td>
<td>1477-1481</td>
<td></td>
<td>Heterodox Turkish-origin From Iconio in Anatolia, descendant of Maulânâ Jalâl al-Dîn Rûmî and the Melevî order. Raised in the office through clerical service in the court, codified the kanunname under the Byzantine protocol and he was criticized “for instituting unpopular reforms [for the orthodox Muslims], which abolished pious foundations”.</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
| Mesih Paşa       | 1481-1482 | 1500-1501 | Renegade / Greek-Byzantine Palaeologus Imperial family The second nephew of the last Emperor of the BE. He became admiral of the Ottoman fleet and in 1481 Grand Vezir. Mesih’s brother, the Byzantines’ Emperor’s third nephew, Has Murad Paşa was appointed in 1472 Beylerbeyi of Rumeli. Spandounes, the Byzantine aristocratic origin chronicler, always well informed, writes “Mehmed [the Conqueror] also sent a force to lay siege to Rhodes [1480]. It was led by one Mesih Pasha (‘Mesus bassa’), who was of the house of Palaiologoi [that year, 1480, his brother Gedik Paşa was in Otranto in Italy leading another army]. He was a

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2 Kritovoulos, History of Mehmed the Conqueror, pp. 88-89; brackets and italics added
3 Lowry, The Nature of the Early Ottoman State, p. 124; italics added
4 Stavrides, The Sultan of Vezirs, p. 66; brackets added
brother of my father’s mother. At the capture of Constantinople he had been taken by the Turks along with his two brothers. He was only ten at the time, and they were made Turks. Mesih rose to the rank of Pasha”.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Name</th>
<th>Years</th>
<th>Father/Gender</th>
<th>Origin</th>
<th>Information</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Davud Paşa</td>
<td>1483-1497</td>
<td></td>
<td>Devşirme / Albanian-origin</td>
<td>Of humble origin.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Hersekzade Ahmed Paşa</td>
<td>1st term: 1497-1498 2nd term: 1502-1506 3rd term: 1511 4th term: 1512-1514 5th term: 1515-1516</td>
<td>Renegade/ Bosnian Nobility</td>
<td>The former prince Stjepan Hersegović, son of Duke [Herceg/Herzog in German, from this comes Herzegovina] of St. Sava in Bosnia. He went unbidden to the Ottomans. He married one of Bayezid’s II daughters. Beylerbeyi of Anatolia. Spandounes also was relative with Ahmed Paşa because Ahmed’s brother, “Ladislas [he was Christian] was married to a sister of my grandfather called Anna”.</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Çandarlı İbrahim Paşa</td>
<td>1498-1499</td>
<td></td>
<td>Muslim Turkish-origin / Veziral family</td>
<td>Last in the line of Grand Viziers of this family from Asia Minor</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Koca Mustafa Paşa</td>
<td>1511-1512</td>
<td></td>
<td>Devşirme / Greek-Byzantine or Slavic-origin</td>
<td>Of humble origin.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Dukaginzade Paşa</td>
<td>1514-1515</td>
<td></td>
<td>Renegade / Albanian Nobility</td>
<td>Son of the Albanian Duke of Menebor. His name ‘Duk (duke) agin (John) zade (son) / Dukes’ John’s son’ obviously is an Islamized Christian one. He went unbidden to the Ottomans. He was married twice, a grand-daughter and a daughter of Sultans Bayezid’s II and Selim’s I, respectively.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Hadim Sinan Paşa</td>
<td>1st term: 1515 2nd term: 1516-1517</td>
<td>Christian Eunuch / Bosnian Nobility</td>
<td>Aristocratic family of Borovivić</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

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5 Spandounes, *On the Origin of the Ottoman Emperors*, p. 46; brackets added
6 Ibid., p. 44; brackets added.
The Geographical Locus of the Early Ottoman State

A macroscopic view on the Ottoman pattern of conquest is going to reveal some striking results about the Ottoman identity.

A simple perusal on the conquests of the Sultans from Osman (1280-1324/1326), the founder of a small emirate, to Selim II (1512-1520) the conqueror of the Muslim Arab lands of Syria and Egypt is going to indicate some interesting facts. The emirate was born within the Byzantine territory of northwest AM (Bithynia) and it occupied its first big urban centers when it conquered the Byzantine cities of the region. Moreover, this emirate was strengthened through its expansion to the Byzantine Balkan interior and from there acquired its manpower and its necessary strategic space to regroup and survive after the disaster of Ankara (1402) which was inflicted by Tamerlan and caused almost the complete loss of its Asiatic territories.

A simple view on the chronological events and the map suggests that western AM was reunited again, after the Tartar attack, under Ottoman rule due to the use of European troops since the balance of power of the state had been transferred there. The movement of the capital from Prusa (Bursa) to Andrianople (Edirne) is indicative. When Constantinople fell (1453), the Ottomans were the sovereigns of almost the whole Balkan Peninsula but only of the western region of AM, a space equivalent to the revived BE of 1261, in other words a space where the Greek-speaking element was predominant. Only after Mehmed II the Ottoman rule was permanently established in central and eastern AM. As Gibbons successfully said, “the Osmanlis crossed the Balkans more than a century before they crossed the Taurus [mountains in south-eastern AM]”.\(^1\) This point implies a relatively little influence of the ‘Asiatic’ element on the Ottoman effort for creation, stabilization and expansion. On the contrary, it underpins the existence of a vivid ‘European’ element that supported decisively the progress of the Ottoman formation. It also clearly demonstrates the slow growth of the Ottoman progress in AM, in contrast with its rapid expansion in Europe.

In any case, two things are clear. First, the Ottomans were not the successors of the Seljuk rule, since they had never appeared before in a former-Seljuk territory. Second, the Ottomans were not the strongest political formation in AM, since there were emirates that flourished and resisted them even for half a century after the collapse of Constantinople. Third, the main Ottoman power was based on the Bithynian and the European territories. These regions enabled them to survive the Tatar attack and the assistance of the European populations helped them expand to the former Seljuk-AM after the “inheritance of the Byzantine Empire was regarded in Europe as a *fait accompli*”.\(^2\) Therefore, one might suggest that Osman (1280-1324/1326) created a Greek-Turkish ‘race’ in the Byzantine north-western AM, Orkhan (1324/1326-1360/1362) founded a Greek-Turkish ‘state’ by expanding his territory in the Asiatic urban Byzantine centers and towards the north-western Asian coast of the Aegean, and Murad (1360/1362-1389) created a Greek-Turkish ‘empire’ by conquering almost completely the Balkan peninsula.

\(^1\) Gibbons, *The Foundation of the Ottoman Empire*, p. 302; brackets added
\(^2\) Ibid.
Something similar was also happening in the ‘Byzantine’ case.

The ‘Byzantines’ called themselves Ρωμαίοι/’Romaioi’/’Romans’ and after a point ‘Greeks’ but never ‘Byzantines’. In the formative ‘Byzantine’ years the word ‘Greek’ was not acceptable since it was denoting the notion of a ‘pagan, not Christian’. In the 7th century and with Emperor Heraclius (reign 610-641) the whole situation gradually changed and the word ‘Greek’ started to be acceptable. The culmination and the most eloquent and dramatic externalization of this ‘identity’ comes through Emperors’ Constantine’s last speech before the final Ottoman assault to the walls of Constantinople. According to his closest friend and witness of this historic moment, protovestiario Georgios Sfrantzes, Constantine said «Και ούτως λογίσθητε ως επί άγριους χοίρων πληθύν κυνήγιον, ίνα γνώσωσιν οι ασεβείς ότι ου μετά αλόγων ζώων, ως αυτοί, παράταξιν ἔχουσιν, αλλὰ μετὰ κυρίων και αυθεντών αυτῶν και απογόνων Ελλήνων και Ρωμαίων» / “You should hunt the infidels in the same manner you do to wild boars and to the other beasts, and made them think that they are not fighting against equals with them but against their masters and against the descendants of Greeks and Romans”.

The ‘transformation’ and ‘degrading’ of the ecumenical ‘Roman Empire’ to a national ‘Greek Empire’ was promoted by the West after the emergence of the Holy Roman Empire as a rival empire to the ‘Byzantine’ regarding the acquisition and legitimate use of the title ‘Roman’. Moreover, this dispute was further instigated during the gradually worsening relations between Papacy and Greek Orthodoxy and culminated during the Crusades and the ‘Crusader’s’ attacks on Byzantine ground. In other words, the West used the term ‘Greek’ in order to ‘undermine’ the ‘Eastern Romans’ who claimed that they were the legitimate inheritors of the ‘Roman’ Empire, especially after the Schism (1054) of the churches. Eastern Romans started using the term broadly from the 7th century and actually adopted it during the crusades as a distinctive element between themselves and the West, denoting mainly a cultural and ethical superiority. The turning point for the rise of the ‘Greek’ national identity was the sack of Constantinople (1204). Since then, the ‘Romans’ became ‘Greeks’ with the ultimate goal to expel the western ‘Latin barbarians’ from their lands. It should be noted that the ‘significant other’ for the ‘Byzantines’ that reshaped their identity was not the ‘Turk’. The hordes of Asia didn’t make the Byzantines feel ‘Greeks’. It was the ‘stray’ but always ‘brother’ from the west that inflicted a ‘trauma’ to the Byzantine identity and worldview. It was the western aggressiveness that made the Romans re-adopt the notion of ‘Greekness’. It was during the Crusades that the Eastern Romans actually understood that they did not have much in common with the western part of Christianity; on the contrary, they were facing a grave danger for their very existence. However, when they understood that, it was too late for them.

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1 Sfrantzes, G. Chronicon (volume 2) (in Greek) (Athens, 2002), p. 189; emphasis added
2 See, how the contemporary Byzantines were using the word ‘Greek’. Akropolites, Chroniki Seggraphe, p. 453
3 See the classic work of the Greek former chancellor of the University of Sorbonne Ahrweiler, The Political Ideology of the Byzantine Empire, pp. 87-147; Savvides, G., C., A. Byzantium, Medieval World, Islam : Twenty-five Essays in History and Education (in Greek) (Athens, 2004), pp. 99-140
The cooperation and friendship of these two nations and the realization of a new Byzantine state required immense efforts and a candidate to embody this ideal. To this end, there was none more suitable than Murad … He possessed a noble temperament, was favorably disposed to the idea of freedom, was capable of hard work, and was ready to bestow freedom upon his people through a constitution. In addition to this, Murad had the attribute of being a Freemason. It was therefore not difficult for Scalieri to prepare the Prince for his ideas. Having obtained the authorization of the French Obedience, Scalieri convened the notables of the lodge of Proodos [Πρόοδος/’Progress’ in Greek] of which he was the president, and inducted Murad on October 20, 1872. Later he introduced … and other dignitaries of Turkish society to this lodge … Then, following the coup d’ état Murad … ascended the throne on May 18 [30] 1876 … The preliminary measures in the implementation of these policies were undertaken by Scalieri, who was assisted by our brother [the author is a Freemason] Francis L. Aimable, then lawyer in Istanbul and later mayor of Paris, by our brother A. Holinsk, a former diplomat, by the former Grand Vizier Midhat Pasa, by S. G. Elliot, then British ambassador in Istanbul, and by our brother Malcom, Persian ambassador. Furthermore, we had to contend with the reaction of the populace … it was necessary to teach the basis [of our program] to a group that had influence over the population. But we also had to win more adherents. With this in mind Scalieri established under the auspices of the French Obedience the Envâr-i Şarkiye [The lights of the East] the lodge became famous by virtue of its membership, which included several distinguished politicians and high-ranking religious officials. From this nucleus the faction of the Young Turks was born.

The role that the Greek and international Freemasonry played in the transformation of the OE that culminated with the YT revolution could be best expressed by François Thual’s words that “the only revolution that acquired a real Masonic coloration was that of the Young Turks in Thessaloniki … the three quarters of the conspirators were Masons”. Hanoğlu also verified this claim by pointing out that “By 1906 palace intelligence channels had noted the increase in the number of Freemasons traveling to Istanbul from Athens … the palace maintained … contact …to learn about Freemasons activities in Salonica … fact that the … Committee of Progress and Union had been based in two important Masonic lodges”.

1 Pollatos, M. Two Hundred Years of Greek Masonry (in Greek) (Athens, 1952), pp. 51-52; the first two brackets added; the same passage is being presented in Hanoğlu, The Young Turks in Opposition, p. 34; on the general issue of the Greek and Western Freemasonry and its efforts towards the Greek-Ottoman rapprochement see, also Lukas, The History of the Greek Free-Masonry and the Greek History, pp. 157-158; Kitsikis, History of the Ottoman Empire, pp. 252-253; Hanoğlu, The Young Turks in Opposition, pp. 31-38; Mazis, Geopolitics, pp. 506-507
3 Hanoğlu, The Young Turks, p. 40
Exordium

By Author


Part I: Thesis-Geopolitical/Geocultural Theory Revisited

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