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IN DEFENCE OF NAÏVE REALISM

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Durham University
For my Grandmother,
'Betty' Wilson
Acknowledgements

I would like to express my deep gratitude to my supervisor, Jonathan Lowe. His help was essential in this project. Although in great demand, he always made time to sit and talk. His patience, insight and skill as a philosopher were inspiring and an excellent demonstration of philosophy done at its best. It was a privilege to have had an opportunity to work with him.

I would also like to thank the staff and postgraduates of the Department of Philosophy in Durham University for endless discussions and support throughout my time there. Special mention needs to go to Philip Meadows.

Sections of this thesis have benefited from conversations at conferences. Many thanks to the participants at the Philosophy of Psychology, Neuroscience and Biology Conference, Bristol 2007, and in particular Susan Hurley, and to the participants at the 2nd Postgraduate Conference, CEU 2008, and in particular Tim Crane, Nenad Miscevic and Howard Robinson.

Special thanks need to go to Beth Hannon and my parents, Margaret and David Conduct, my sister, Sophie Ward, and my brother, Pete Conduct, for their financial support, patience and hot meals.

My PhD was supported by an AHRC Doctoral Award and a Royal Institute of Philosophy Bursary, without these it would not have been possible for me to have engaged in this project.
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Abstract

This thesis offers a defence of naïve realism. As I understand it, naïve realism involves a claim about the structure of perception, and about the nature of perceptual experience, that is, the sensory experience that one enjoys when perceiving something. It claims that perception is psychologically direct, in that perceptual experience, in its very nature, suffices to put one in contact with normal, mind-independent objects. And it understands this nature in terms of it being presentational of these objects.

After explaining the core commitments of naïve realism and presenting the salient alternative views of the nature of perceptual experience and perception, I go on to consider motivations for why it is a position that is worth defending. I discuss epistemological, metaphysical and phenomenological reasons for why naïve realism should be the place where we begin our theorising about perception, and why we should defend it as strongly as we can.

I then present the two main challenges to the naïve realist view, the arguments from illusion and hallucination. The possibility of these two kinds of sensory experience is held to make the naïve realist view of the nature of perceptual experience untenable. I present a modified form of adverbialism as the best way for the naïve realist to understand the nature of perceptual experience if they want to successfully accommodate the possibility of illusory experience. On this approach, perceptual experience is the sensing of the object of perception by a subject.

Next I consider the disjunctive response to the challenge that hallucination presents to the naïve realist, according to which we should conceive of perceptual and hallucinatory experience as having fundamentally different natures. I argue that such a disjunctivism needs to take an extreme form in which the only positive nature to hallucinatory experience is its being subjectively indiscriminable from perceptual experience. This position is rejected on the grounds that it maintains an implausible view about the nature of sensory experience.

Finally, I consider an alternative way in which the naïve realist can deal with hallucination. This is to claim that perceptual and hallucinatory experience can share the same nature, while at the same time perceptual experience can be understood as presentational of the objects of perception. This strategy will require the naïve realist to adopt a stance about the metaphysical nature of the entities to which one can be related in experience.
Naïve realism is at once a claim about the structure of perception and the nature of perceptual experience. It takes perceptual experience, thought of as the sensory experience that one enjoys when perceiving, to be, in its nature, the presentation of the objects of perception to the mind of the perceiving subject. It takes perception to be psychologically unmediated, in that perceptual contact with the world is achieved through a psychological state that is, in itself, perceptual. These two claims are related. In conceiving of perceptual experience as having such a nature, the naïve realist thereby adopts a conception of perception that takes it to be psychologically direct. In the first part of this chapter I set out the theoretical and terminological landscape within which the claims of the naïve realist are made. In the second part I will return to the claims themselves, clarify them and present the salient alternatives.¹

1. The landscape

1.1 Seeing: perceptual and experiential aspects

A distinction can be made between a subject's seeing something and the visual experience the subject enjoys when seeing. The visual experience is an episode in the subject's conscious life, while the seeing is a relation that obtains between subject and thing seen. To talk about the visual experience of something, is to talk about how that thing visually appears, or looks, to the subject of the experience. To talk about the visual perception of something, on the other hand, is to talk about the relation that obtains between perceiver and thing perceived, such that that thing, however it is described, however it looks to the perceiver, is available to the perceiver.

¹ My discussion is limited to visual experience and visual perception. It should not be assumed that what is true of vision will be true of the other sense modalities, but an attempt to provide an account of perception and experience in general is beyond the scope of this work. For better or for worse philosophers have tended to focus on vision when discussing perception and I will be no exception to this.
We can justify this intuitive distinction by drawing attention to different senses of 'seeing.' Warnock (1965), for example, makes a distinction between seeing things, events and qualities on the one hand, and seeing relations, states or facts on the other. Contexts involving the former allow for substitution of co-referring terms *salva veritate* while those involving the latter do not. So, for example, if ‘John sees the tree’ is true, and the tree is the oldest tree in the garden, then ‘John sees the oldest tree in the garden’ is true. On the other hand, if ‘John sees that the tree is in leaf’ is true, and ‘the tree is the oldest tree in the garden’ is true, it does not follow that ‘John sees that the oldest tree in the garden is in leaf’ is true.

We can also discern a distinction between a sense of ‘see’ which entails that that which is seen exists, and a sense of ‘see’ which does not. For example our intuitions regarding the truth or falsity of the sentence ‘Macbeth saw a dagger in front of him,’ when Macbeth hallucinates a bloody dagger before him, will depend upon which sense of ‘see’ we are operating with.

We can say that we take the claim to be true when we regard the object of Macbeth's seeing as an *intentional object* and false when we take it to be a *material object*. The intentional object of a perceptual statement is just what it is that the statement says is seen. The material object of a perceptual statement is what it is that is seen, no matter how described. In answer to the question ‘What did Macbeth see?’ we can either give the intentional object, which is ‘a dagger before him’ or the material object, which is ‘nothing.’

Whether or not ‘Macbeth saw a dagger’ is true will depend on whether we take the expression ‘a dagger’ to give a material object, or an intentional object.

When we say ‘Macbeth saw a dagger’ in the latter sense, which does not imply the existence of that which is seen, we are saying something about Macbeth's conscious life. We are saying something about the sensory experience that he enjoys. We are focusing on the experiential aspect of his seeing. When we say ‘Macbeth saw a dagger’ in the former sense, which does imply the existence of that which is seen, we are conveying something about how Macbeth is related to the world around him. We are focusing on the perceptual aspect of his seeing.

These differences between senses of 'see' have led some philosophers to think that there are two kinds of seeing, so called simple seeing, and seeing as/seeing.

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facts/epistemic seeing, and that it is then a substantial question as to whether one is more fundamental than the other.\(^3\)

However, rather than thinking that we have here a reason to support two different kinds of seeing, we could say we can look at seeing in two different ways, or as having two different aspects. A statement about what a subject sees that identifies a particular thing supports the substitution of co-referring terms. There are, however, perceptual statements that make reference, in part, to the subjective character of the perceptual episode, and as such are sensitive to how the thing seen is described.

What attention is being drawn to is not, then, a different kind of seeing, but that seeing has two aspects to it. These aspects are different in so much as one is *subjective*, involving the conscious life of the subject, and the other *relational*, involving a relation between subject and object. In relation to seeing, I shall also refer to these as, respectively, the *experiential* and the *perceptual* aspects of seeing. It is this that is the source of the differing senses of ‘seeing.’ The ‘perceptual’ sense of seeing draws attention to the thing that is seen, the thing that is available for thought and action, while the ‘experiential’ sense of seeing draws attention to the way in which that thing is available, to how it appears to the subject.

1.2 The perceptual aspect

When we say that a subject sees something, and are intending to draw attention to the perceptual aspect of this state of affairs, we are saying that the subject stands in a relation to that thing, such that it is available for them in thought and action. When we talk about perception making things ‘available’ for the subject, what exactly do we mean? Perception provides us with practical knowledge of things in the world, propositional knowledge of things in the world, and provides us with justifications for beliefs, and reasons for action.

In perceiving things, those things are available for us to focus upon and to demonstratively refer to. We can pick things out as ‘that person,’ ‘that car,’ ‘this pencil’ and make judgements about those specific things, that ‘that person is riding in that car.’ In perceiving an object a subject is in a position to demonstratively refer to that object and to make demonstrative judgements about that thing.

\(^3\) For example Dretske (2000).
The object is available for the subject to think about in the numerous ways in which we can think about the world. In perceiving an object a subject can fear *that* thing, desire *that* thing, love *that* thing, believe that *that* thing is his and so on.

Furthermore, the object is available in a way that provides justification for judgements, and reasons for actions. When a subject judges of something that it is such and such a way, he can appeal to his perception of that thing to justify that judgement. And the objects that subjects see and their being in this relation to them can justify actions, and explain behaviour.

At least, the sense of 'perception' that we are concerned with describes a relation that holds between subject and object such that the object is available in these ways. When a plant moves towards the light it may be fair to say that it perceives the light, in the sense that it moves in response to it, or is sensitive to it. But neither the light nor its sensitivity to the light can, for example, be a reason *for which it moved*, although they may be reasons *why* it so moved in the sense of featuring in an explanation of its movement. Plants do not do things for reasons, but there are explanations for why they do things. Nor do plants think, make judgements, focus upon things and so on.

Or again we may want to interpret blindsight patients as perceiving the objects that they can identify with greater than chance reliability, but deny that their perceptions provide reasons for which they act or think. We may want to deny that the object that they are in some sense connected to is available for them in any important sense.\(^4\)

We can say that the sort of perception that we are interested in is one in which, if a subject, S, perceives an object, x, then x is available for S to think about, act towards, focus upon, and so on. I shall refer to this relation that obtains between subject and object, such that the object is available to the subject in these ways, as *perceptual contact*. I will also sometimes use the expression *cognitive contact* to refer in general to the relation that a subject is in with some object such that it is available to the subject in these ways. This expression is neutral as to whether the relation should be thought of as a perceptual relation.

Finally, I should say something about what the things are that perception makes available to us. I am assuming that realism about perception is our default position,

and that realism should be rejected only if no plausible picture of perception and perceptual experience can be provided against the background of this assumption. Realism about perception is the claim that what we perceive, the objects of perception, have an existence independent of our perception of them.

1.3 The experiential aspect

If the perceptual aspect of a subject’s seeing something is the subject’s standing in a relation to that thing such that it is available to the subject in the ways described above, the experiential aspect is that in virtue of which this relation holds.

It is a feature of the subjective, experiential aspect of seeing that when a subject (consciously) sees some normal object, then that thing appears a certain way to them.

The language of appearing is complex. It is customary to distinguish at least three senses of ‘appears’: the comparative, the epistemic and the phenomenal. In distinguishing these senses it will be helpful to make use of David Smith’s notion of a ‘focal’ object or state of affairs. The focal state of affairs, or object, of some appearance statement is the state of affairs that appears to obtain, or the object that is said to appear (Smith 2002: 37). So, for example, if it appears to someone that the man in the dock is guilty then the focal object of this appearance statement is the man in the dock, and the focal state of affairs is his being guilty.

Examples of the comparative use of ‘appears’ are appearance statements such as ‘French Bulldogs look like Gremlins,’ ‘Edward Burns looks like Ben Affleck,’ or ‘that thing on the horizon looks like a sailing ship.’

In statements such as these, a comparison is being made between the focal object and how something else appears to be. This comparison is relative to both the circumstances and the subject to which things so appear. In order to understand the comparisons made above these must be made explicit. So what we are presumably meaning to say by ‘French Bulldogs look like Gremlins’ is something like ‘French Bulldogs look like Gremlins look to normal observers in normal viewing conditions,’ where a ‘normal observer’ is an average human being with a visual system operating as a normal human being’s visual system should operate, and ‘normal viewing

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5 Numerous philosophers have made the distinction between different senses of ‘appears,’ with minor differences between each formulation. For examples see Chisholm (1957), Smith (2002), Maund (2003), Jackson (1977).
conditions’ are some standard specification of illumination conditions, angle of viewing, and the distance from which something is viewed.

The comparative sense of ‘appears’ clearly depends upon another sense of ‘appears’ that is non-comparative. If $x$ comparatively looks like $y$, then $x$ non-comparatively looks the way $y$ non-comparatively looks when viewed in certain conditions by certain observers.

If something epistemically appears some way to a subject then it appears to be some way that is expressible by a proposition. Epistemic appearances have propositional content in that it appears that such and such is the case. In the case of the epistemic sense a distinction can be made between a purely epistemic sense and a perceptual-epistemic sense of ‘appears.’ In the purely epistemic cases the focal object/state of affairs is not perceived, and expresses the content of a judgement that the perceiver would be willing, or inclined, to make on the basis of some evidence. So for example it may pure-epistemically appear, from what a reliable source tells you, that the house market is collapsing. The focal state of affairs in this case, the house market collapsing, is not something that is perceived. In the perceptual-epistemic case, on the other hand, the focal object/state of affairs is perceived. So, to use an example from David Smith, someone to whom an island appears inhabited in virtue of perceiving smoke in the distance and footprints in the sand is perceiving the focal object of the appearance statement, the island. When that person says that the island perceptual-epistemically appears inhabited to them, they may be expressing a belief that is based upon perceptual reasons, or, as Jackson puts it, ‘visually acquired evidence’ (Jackson 1977: 30). However, it need not be the case, for something to appear a certain way to someone in this perceptual-epistemic sense, that they believe, even tentatively, that things are that way. An island may appear inhabited to someone, in this sense, even though they know that it is uninhabited (perhaps because a reliable source has informed them so). It is best to think that what is meant, then, by the appearance statement is that there is visual evidence to support the claim that the island is inhabited, rather than that they believe the island is inhabited upon the basis of visual evidence (Jackson 1977: 31). Of course, it is often the case that if something perceptual-epistemically appears a certain way, then the subject which is appeared to in this way in some sense believes that things are that way.

The perceptual-epistemic sense of ‘appears’ assumes a non-perceptual-epistemic sense of ‘appears.’ To say that it perceptual-epistemically appears as if it will rain is
to say that something non-perceptual-epistemically appears in such a way that this appearance supports the perceptual-epistemic appearance statement.

As well as the comparative and the epistemic (perceptual and non-perceptual) senses of 'appears,' we can identify a phenomenal sense. This phenomenal sense of 'appears' is more fundamental than the perceptual-epistemic or comparative senses, in that something's perceptual-epistemically or comparatively appearing a certain way depends upon it phenomenally appearing some way. That something perceptual-epistemically appears to be a certain way depends upon the focal object or state of affairs phenomenally appearing some way as the support for things being that way. Something's comparatively appearing some way depends upon the focal object or state of affairs phenomenally appearing the same way as what it is being compared to.

It is this phenomenal sense of 'appears' that someone has in mind when they describe the phenomenal character of their experience in terms of things appearing such and such a way. The phenomenal character of experience is 'what it is like' to enjoy an experience. Because of this connection with phenomenal character, phenomenal appearance statements are ambiguous between saying something about the way an object appears, that it appears to have a certain property, and saying something about the way in which a subject is appeared to, that the character of one's experience is a certain way.

On the one hand there are phenomenal properties of experience, properties of being appeared to in such and such a way. On the other hand there are the properties that objects appear to have. When we say 'x looks F to S' and 'looks' has its phenomenal sense, we can take 'x's looking F' to characterise the way in which S is appeared to, as characterising the phenomenal character of their experience. But we can also take we take 'x's looking F' to characterise the thing that appears to S, as being F.

I shall use the expression phenomenal appearance to refer to the way in which someone is appeared to when they enjoy a perceptual experience. We must be careful not to confuse the way in which a subject is appeared to in experience, the phenomenal appearance of something, and the properties that appear to a subject in experience (the ways in which things can appear to him).

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7 For the importance of keeping this distinction in mind, see Martin (1998). He does not discuss this using the terminology of different senses of 'appear.'
Within the range of phenomenal appearances we can make a distinction between those in which the sensible qualities of an object phenomenally appear to a subject and those in which non-sensible qualities of an object phenomenally appear to a subject. Following Smith (2002), we can say that sensible qualities are those qualities which, if an object appears one of those ways to a subject and their experience is veridical (things do not appear to them other than they are), then the thing that appears to them has that quality. While it may be the case that objects phenomenally appear to have other qualities, they will do so in virtue of phenomenally appearing to have sensible qualities of some sort.

Visual sensible qualities include, plausibly, shape and colour. Examples of phenomenal appearances in which non-sensible qualities phenomenally appear might be those such as a face appearing sad, a coin appearing metallic, or a toy appearing new. In each of these cases it might be thought that there is a distinctive phenomenal appearance to the appearing of the object, and that they are genuine cases of phenomenal appearing. But in each of these cases there is clearly a sense in which one may perceive the focal object veridically, yet it not be the case that the focal object has the property in question. We want to say that things might look exactly the same to one, even if the person is not sad, the coin is not metallic, or the toy is not new. Furthermore, these objects phenomenally appearing as they do depends upon them phenomenally appearing to have sensible qualities. If, for example, the face did not appear a certain shape and a certain colour it is plausible that the subject would not be aware of the face at all, let alone be aware of it as sad. But the converse of this is not true. If the face does not appear sad, or appear in any emotional way at all, the subject could still be aware of the face.

I shall call the way in which someone is phenomenally appeared to in experience, where this is the basis of other forms of appearing, the core phenomenal character of the subject's experience. Phenomenal appearances, understood as the way in which sensible qualities appear to us, should be taken to form the core phenomenal character of perceptual experience. But this should not be taken to obscure the fact that there are other ways in which objects can appear to us and that go toward making up the complete phenomenal character of a perceptual episode.

This acceptance of phenomenal appearances, and indeed of core phenomenal appearances, should not be objectionable to anybody. To say that there is a core phenomenal character of any perceptual experience, which is the character of the
phenomenal appearing of the sensible qualities of some object to a subject, is not, for example, to say that there is a sensuous, non-conceptual, non-representational component to perceptual experience as well as a representational component. Nor is it to say that there are intrinsic subjective qualities to experience. It is only when we try and understand the nature of phenomenal appearances that such claims may arise. For all we have said so far, phenomenal appearances could be understood as representational states, the immediate presentation of objects to a subject, or as modifications of a subject's consciousness. To understand the experiential aspect of a subject's seeing something we must be able to explain what it is for an object to phenomenally appear a certain way to a subject, for at the core of perceptual experience is phenomenal appearance. But we have not yet said anything to suggest one understanding of this appearance rather than another.

I have been talking so far only of the experiential aspect of seeing. We can call this experiential aspect, the myriad of ways in which the subject is appeared to when perceiving, the sensory experience that someone enjoys when seeing something. When a subject perceives some object then that object appears a certain way to a subject, and the subject enjoys a sensory experience of the object. We can mark out the role of this sensory experience in perception by referring to it as perceptual experience. But we cannot rest simply with the notion of the way in which one is appeared to when perceiving something.

We must recognise that experiences can be illusory, and that they can be hallucinatory. Things can appear to be other than they are, and it can be with a subject such that it is as if something appears to them when actually no normal object does. These possibilities require us to recognise a range of different kinds of sensory experience.

The possibility of illusion introduces us to the notion that perceptual experience can be veridical or non-veridical - things can appear to a subject as they are or other than they are. The possibility of hallucination introduces us to the idea that it can be with a subject as if something appears to them a certain way. We can combine these ideas together to produce four different but related categories of sensory experience.

There is veridical perceptual experience, where a normal object appears a certain way to a subject and is that way. There is non-veridical perceptual experience, where something appears a certain way to a subject but is not that way. These are illusions. There is veridical non-perceptual experience, in which no object in the world appears
a certain way to a subject. It is for the subject as if an object in the world appears that way to them, and there is, in fact, such an object that has that property in the scene before the subject’s eyes. These are veridical hallucinations. An example would be an experience in which it appears to me as though there is a red apple on the table, though my optic nerve has been severed, and there is no chance that I am in fact having a veridical perceptual experience. However, coincidentally, there is a red apple on the table. Finally, there is non-veridical non-perceptual experience, in which it is as if an object in the world appears a certain way to a subject, no object in the world does appear that way, and no object in the world is that way.

We need a way of referring to the phenomenal core of sensory experience that is neutral as to whether the experience is perceptual/non-perceptual or veridical/non-veridical. I shall use the following locution:

It is with S as if x phenomenally appears F to S.

In all of the four kinds of sensory experience described above if a subject enjoys such an experience then it will be true that it is with them as if something phenomenally appears a certain way to them. ‘It is with S as if’ is meant to enable us to remain entirely neutral as to how it is that S is appeared to as they are. There will be a story to give as to the nature of this appearing, but this locution does not imply anything about it. It should also be noted that it is not an epistemic notion. The statement does not say that S cannot discriminate their state of mind from a perceptual experience. Rather, it says only that S is such a way, whatever way that might be, such that it would be natural for S to characterise their situation (if they were capable of such characterisation) as one in which there is an x that phenomenally appears F to them.

A question that this categorisation of sensory experiences raises is as to whether the state of affairs which comprises the neutral characterisation of all the different kinds of sensory experiences is to be understood in the same way for all these kinds. That is to say, must all the kinds of sensory experiences be understood as having the same fundamental nature?

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8 For the classic portrayal of this possibility see Grice (1988).
9 It may also be the case that something comparatively or perceptual-epistemically appears a certain way to them, but what is essential to them enjoying a sensory experience is that they are phenomenally appeared to a certain way. (It may, of course, turn out that one cannot be phenomenally appeared to in the other ways, but this would express further, as yet unargued for, commitments.)
When a subject consciously perceives an object that thing appears to the subject. There are many different senses in which an object can appear to a subject. I have distinguished the comparative and the epistemic (both perceptual and non-perceptual) senses in which an object can appear to a subject. These senses all presuppose a sense of appears which is fundamental to the subject having an experience of the object at all. This is the sense in which the object phenomenally appears to the subject, where this can be understood as characterising the way in which a subject is appeared to – the subjective character of their experience when having an experience of an object. The fundamental nature of perceptual experience is the core phenomenal appearance of such experience, which is that way of being appeared to by the sensible qualities of the object of perception. The critical question that we must ask ourselves is as to what entities and relations this phenomenal appearance involves. What is the nature of this phenomenal appearance?

1.4 Conclusion

When a subject see something, then that thing is available to them for thought and action. They can entertain beliefs about it, make judgements concerning it, focus on it, make demonstrative reference to it, put it to use, orientate themselves in regard to it, and so on. They are in perceptual contact with that thing. As well as this, the subject enjoys a visual sensory experience that explains this perceptual contact that obtains between them and the object. It is in virtue of the object’s appearing to them a certain way that the object is available to them in this myriad of ways. The sensory experience that a subject enjoys in virtue of which they are in perceptual contact with some object is a perceptual experience.

But how, exactly, does perceptual experience establish this relation? How does the sensory experience a subject enjoys fit together with the perceptual contact that this experience makes possible? Our explanation of this will reside in the account that we give of the nature of such experience. At the core of any perceptual experience is the object of perception phenomenally appearing to have certain sensible qualities. The way in which a subject is appeared to when something phenomenally appears to have certain sensible qualities comprise the core phenomenal character of that subject’s experience. The account that we give of these ‘ways’ in which a subject is appeared to, or the phenomenal properties of their experience, will be an account of
the nature of such experience. We might hope that the answer to the question of the relation between perceptual contact and sensory experience lies in the details of what this nature consists in. Does the explanation of the connection between perceptual contact and sensory experience lie in the very nature of such experience?

But the story that we will ultimately give of this is complicated by the recognition that there are more kinds of sensory experience than perceptual experience. The possibility of illusion and hallucination reveals that sensory experiences can vary in their veridicality and whether or not they put someone in perceptual contact with something. How are these kinds of sensory experience related to one another? In particular, do they form a common kind in as much as they share the same fundamental nature, that is to say, the same phenomenal nature?

2. Naïve realism

The position that I am advocating as naïve realism consists of the following three claims:

(i) Perception is not psychologically mediated.
(ii) Perceptual experience is presentational in nature.
(iii) The objects that we perceive have an existence independent of our own, or anyone else's, perception of them.

The first is a metaphysical claim about the nature of perception. The second is a claim about that which determines the way in which one is appeared to when perceiving. The third claim represents the basic realist commitment. I am of the opinion that realism should only be rejected if no realist account of perception can be made to work. As the issue of whether naïve realism should be rejected or not is prior to the assessment of all other realist positions the realist commitment will operate as a background assumption and I will not consider it here. I shall explain both of the other claims, and how they are related, before going on to justify why I combine them, together with the realist commitment, under the title of 'naïve realism.'

2.1 The metaphysical claim

A distinction can be made between two different senses in which we can think of perception as being direct or not. A subject's perception of some object might be
indirect in the sense that they perceive that object in virtue of perceiving something else. But another way that we might think of a subject's perception of some object as being indirect is in the sense that we might think that the subject's sensory experience, their conscious visual experience, is only a component of his or her perception of something. Following Foster (2000), I shall refer to these two different ways of thinking of directness within the context of perception as perceptual and psychological mediation, respectively.¹⁰

It is worth mentioning Austin at this point, for he doubted the very cogency of the idea of 'directness' that is applied during philosophical discussion of perception:

> It is quite plain that the philosophers' use of 'directly perceive,' whatever it may be, is not the ordinary, or any familiar, use; for in that use it is not only false but simply absurd to say that such objects as pens or cigarettes are never directly perceived. But we are given no explanation or definition of this new use – on the contrary, it is glibly trotted out as if we were all quite familiar with it already. (Austin 1962: 19)

Austin's worries are directed against the direct/indirect distinction that is put to use by the sense-datum theorists he is arguing against, and he is insensitive to the distinction between perceptual and psychological mediation. Nevertheless we can view him as laying down a challenge to make good any concept of mediation that is put forward in arguments concerning the nature of experience and perception, where it does not have its 'ordinary' or 'everyday' usage. Can we arrive at a fairly robust and agreed upon technical conception of what both perceptual and psychological mediation consists in?

### 2.1.1 Perceptual mediation

As already mentioned the notion of perceptual mediation, roughly speaking, is that a subject, S, perceives an object, x, perceptually indirectly iff S perceives x in virtue of perceiving some object, y, and x is not identical with y. The philosophical point of this notion is that there is a question as to whether our perception of normal objects in the world around us is mediated in this way by our perception of objects of some

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¹⁰ As will become evident, much of what follows and in particular the metaphysical categories that are open to the perceptual theorist (who is a realist) are owed to Foster's conception of the
other kind. And this question is important because dependent upon our answer to it is our account of our epistemic position in relation to the world of normal objects around us that we take ourselves to be in. We are not trying to merely capture in more precise terminology what we ordinarily mean when we say that we perceive such and such a thing indirectly. We are trying to come up with a concept that has some significant philosophical work to do. So an important point to bear in mind is that the worth of this concept should not be judged by its success at satisfying our intuitions about whether or not such and such a case of perception is direct or not.

The technical definition as it stands is only as good as the notion of 'in virtue of' which it employs. What we are trying to capture is the thought that there is a significant asymmetry in the relation that holds between the perception of something indirectly in virtue of the perception of something else. When S sees x in virtue of seeing y, S’s seeing x depends upon his seeing y, but not vice versa. In order to understand this dependency we must understand what grounds it. What is it about the perceptual situation that makes it the case that the two perceivings, the perceiving of x and the perceiving of y, are related in this way? In what way does the perception of x depend upon the perception of y? It is important to note that to talk about the two perceivings, of x and y, is not necessarily to talk of two acts of perception. There could be one act of perception in which two things are perceived, one in virtue of the other.¹¹

It seems to me that the best way to understand this asymmetry is in terms of the contribution that the different things seen make to the phenomenal character of the experience enjoyed by the subject in seeing them. The phenomenal character of an experience is the way in which a subject is appeared to. The idea, then, would be that something is immediately seen only if it fixes, or determines, the way in which a subject is appeared to. Something is indirectly seen when it does not play this role, but is related in the right kind of way to something that does play this role. So when S perceives x in virtue of perceiving y, y fixes how things appear to S, but x does not:

The immediate objects of sight will then be those that not only look some way, but which, in so looking, fix the way in which all objects we perceive look to us to be. Other objects will count as being seen (and hence as being seen...

¹¹ See Foster (2000).
mediately) through their relations to the objects immediately seen. It is through the immediate object of perception, and the way it looks, that these mediate objects come to look some way to us. (Martin 2005: 707) 

To illustrate this position, consider two examples in which, according to this conception of perceptual mediation, one thing is seen in virtue of seeing another thing.

The first kind of example is perceiving something by perceiving it on television. John sees Ronnie O'Sullivan in the process of winning the snooker world championship on television and he perceives O'Sullivan indirectly, because he perceives him in virtue of perceiving images on the television screen. And we will explain this claim in terms of the fact that it is the images on the screen that fix how John is appeared to, rather than O'Sullivan. John could, unbeknownst to himself, be watching a television screen whose images are generated, not by O'Sullivan, but by a computer program that has modelled the appearance of O'Sullivan perfectly. In both cases, whether watching the live televised event or the computer generated simulacrum, it is the images on the screen that fix how John is appeared to. In the case of watching the live televised event, John counts as having seen O'Sullivan in virtue of the relationship between the image on the screen and O'Sullivan himself, which is, quite plausibly, that of causal dependency of the former upon the latter.

The second example of indirect perception is that of perceiving a three dimensional object in virtue of perceiving its facing surface. When Sally sees an apple, she will see the apple in virtue of seeing its facing surface. This is because it is the facing surface of the apple, rather than the whole apple, that fixes the character of how Sally is appeared to. Were the rest of the apple to be removed, leaving only the facing surface, the character of Sally's experience would remain the same. It is because the facing surface is a part of the apple that the apple is seen. So in this case the relation between facing surface and apple is quite different to that between image on the television screen and person. So there is not just one relation that must obtain between two things in order for us to be able to see one in virtue of seeing the other. Whether a relation can do the job of linking two things together in such a way that one

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12 Bermúdez (2000) advances a similar idea.
counts as being perceived in virtue of perceiving another is probably best determined on a case by case basis.\textsuperscript{13}

The philosophically interesting question that this technical notion of perceptual mediation allows us to ask is whether our perceptions of normal things in the world are always mediately perceived through the perception of non-normal things.

Consider the television example. It is of no real philosophical interest that there are cases such as this in which one thing, Ronnie O'Sullivan, is perceived in virtue of perceiving another thing, the image on the television screen. What is of interest is whether, in John's seeing of O'Sullivan, the most immediate thing that John perceives is a normal object in the world external to John, that exists independently of his perception of it, and is something that he would pre-reflectively take to be a normal object of sight. According to what we can refer to as the perceptually indirect realist, the most immediate thing that John perceives is not a normal object, but something quite unlike that which John would pre-reflectively take to be the objects of sight.

We can say, following Foster, that a subject S \( \phi \) terminally perceives a normal object, x, if and only if S perceives x and there is no other normal object, y, such that S's perceiving of x is perceptually mediated by their perceiving of y.\textsuperscript{14} What is philosophically interesting, then, is whether \( \phi \) terminal perceiving is mediated by the perception of some non-normal object.\textsuperscript{15}

At this point we must pause to make mention of Austin again. Even if we accept that we have elucidated a clear technical notion of perceptual mediation, we can worry about whether the philosophical use to which we are trying to put it makes good sense. In particular, can we clearly articulate what is meant by something being a non-normal object? One of Austin's criticisms of the arguments put forward by sense-datum theorists was that this notion of the most immediate object of perception being non-normal, or non-physical, or in some way not a part of the external world, is unsatisfactorily obscure.

\textsuperscript{13} A minimal constraint is plausibly that the thing indirectly seen is available for the subject in thought and action.
\textsuperscript{14} See Foster (2000: 6).
\textsuperscript{15} It should be mentioned that some indirect realists do not like referring to the relation that obtains between subject and non-normal object as 'perceiving.' They are worried that if they conceive of the relation as being the same relation that obtains between subject and normal object when perceiving, then an infinite regress will be generated. For perceiving a normal object would imply perceiving a non-normal object, but then perceiving a non-normal object would imply perceiving another non-normal object, and so on. This fear is unfounded. To perceive a normal object is to perceive a non-
There are two strands of thought to Austin's criticism. The first is that an illegitimate distinction is being made by advocates of indirect theories of perception. They argue that we must accept that objects and properties that are not real are the immediate objects of perception. And so a distinction is made between the 'real' and the 'unreal' that, in fact, we are not licensed to make because, as Austin puts it, the word real is 'substantive hungry' (Austin 1962: 68-70). Whenever we say that something is real, or ask of something whether it is real, then we can always ask the question 'a real what?' But, when philosophers use the word 'real' in connection with perception, it is clear that there is no such question in the offing, and consequently, that the word as they use it has no real meaning.

The second, related thought is that advocates of the direct/indirect distinction try to understand what they take to be perceived directly in terms of what they take to be perceived indirectly and also try to understand what they take to be perceived indirectly in terms of what they take to be perceived directly. But no genuine understanding of what is being talked about can be achieved this way. Once again, or so the accusation goes, language is being used that is inherently mysterious, and that we cannot make good sense of.

Both of these objections to the direct/indirect distinction (as it is construed in its philosophically interesting form) are typically met by the claim that (a) the question over the nature of the immediate object of perception is a question about whether the object is mind-dependent or not, and so (b), what is meant by 'real' in this context is just 'mind-independent,' and considerations about illusions and the rest are supposed to encourage us to think that the objects and properties we are acquainted with in experience are not real in this sense. 'Real,' in this sense, is not substantive hungry at all.\(^\text{16}\)

While I accept that this is part of the story about what is at issue in discussion of direct versus indirect perception, I do not believe that it is the whole story. In particular this account of what it is to be a normal object excludes a possible conception of the nature of non-perceptual experience. Recall that non-perceptual experience is sensory experience that does not put the subject of such experience into cognitive contact with the normal objects of perception. That is to say, it does not put

\(^{16}\text{See Locke (1967).}\)
the subject of such experience in a position to think about and act towards normal objects like chairs, tables, mountains and the like. If we think of the normal objects of perception purely in terms of their being mind-independent, then this rules out the possibility that non-perceptual experience could involve mind-independent objects to which we are related. It rules out the possibility that there could be non-perceptual experience that puts us in cognitive contact with objects whose existence is independent of such experience. It excludes the possibility that there might be experience of objects that are not 'real' but which nevertheless have an existence that is independent of one's awareness of them.

The sort of possibility that I am envisaging here is one in which a subject is plugged into some giant artificial reality device. I want to leave open the possibility that we can understand such a situation as genuinely involving objects that the subject of the experience comes to be aware of. This seems to be at least intuitively plausible. In such a case the computer in charge of the artificial reality creates a virtual environment, populated with virtual objects that one can become aware of and interact with through one's virtual body. These objects would certainly seem to have some claim to be awareness-independent. They are dependent for their existence, not upon the subject's awareness of them, but upon the operations of the computer. It is possible for the same object to be seen by more than one subject, whether at once or at different times. It is possible for one subject to see the same object at different times, and there is a distinction between how an object really is and how it appears to be.

In such a scenario a subject would be enjoying non-perceptual experience, but his sensory experience would put him into cognitive contact with objects whose existence transcends his awareness of them. The objects that the subject could become aware of are independent of their awareness of them, but are in some sense unreal, or non-normal.17

I propose, then, to add to this conception of what we take ourselves to see, not only mind-independence (in the sense of being independent of our acts of awareness)

17 We could adopt the strategy of saying that in this situation the subject does perceive normal objects in virtue of the sensory experience that he enjoys. From his perspective, the objects of his sensory experience are the real, normal objects that exist in the world. To this I can only say that were such a subject to be removed from the matrix/influence of the evil demon he would surely come to the conclusion that what he was now perceiving were normal objects and that what he used to perceive were non-normal objects.
but also the idea that they are in some sense fundamental. By this I mean that we take the things that we \( \phi \) terminally perceive to not depend for their existence upon anything other than themselves or their parts. This would rule out the objects that the subject in the virtual world is aware of as being normal, because they depend for their existence upon the computer, and the computer is not a part of those objects. Now of course, there are some things that we might claim to see that are not fundamental in this way, such as holes or shadows. But, we might say that we do not really see holes or shadows, but only the things whose existence the holes and shadows depend upon, or, that if we do see such things it is only in virtue of seeing things that are fundamental. That is, they are not \( \phi \) terminal objects of perception.

The idea would be then, that the philosophically interesting question of perceptual mediation is as to whether we \( \phi \) terminally perceive normal objects in virtue of \( \phi \) terminally perceiving non-normal objects, where a normal object is an object whose existence is independent of the subject's perception of it and whose existence is fundamental.

We are close, then, to coming to a clear understanding of the technical notion of perceptual mediation. There is, however, one further worry about it that I wish to clear up. This is that there is something objectionable about the thought that we perceive three dimensional objects in virtue of perceiving their facing surfaces, and so any account of perceptual mediation which leads to this conclusion must be rejected.

What is objectionable is that the technical definition of mediation seems to lead to the conclusion that the most immediate objects of perception could not be three-dimensional objects. At best they could only be the facing surfaces of such objects. And so, by mere definition, we have rendered the objective, three-dimensional world, beyond the scope of perceptual contact. And, in doing so, we have made it problematical as to how we have knowledge about such a world.

What is the source of our resistance to this idea? One explanation is that we are illegitimately incorporating aspects of the informal notion of perceptual directness into our assessment of the adequacy of the formal notion.

Normally, when we talk about seeing one thing indirectly by seeing another thing, the two things are entirely distinct. And we bring this intuition with us into our attempts to elucidate a philosophically interesting formal concept of perceptual mediation. And so we balk at the claim that our perception of things is mediated by
our perception of their facing surfaces, because this makes it sound like we are creating two things that are seen, where we know there is only one thing to be seen. But, in fact, if we attend to the formal notion we can see that we are doing nothing of the sort. The uncomfortable feeling that we are doing something like this is the unfortunate consequence of our using expressions that have a common, everyday meaning. We are forced, by our technical notion, to say things like ‘we never immediately perceive three-dimensional objects,’ which, given that the reasons for supposing this are meant to be prior to a commitment to indirect theories of perception, as philosophy has traditionally conceived of them, sounds rather shocking. But it is not. We can rephrase it as ‘we never perceive three-dimensional objects except by, or in virtue of, perceiving parts of those objects,’ and this does not sound nearly so shocking when we bear in mind what we mean by ‘in virtue of and also parts of those objects.’ It is the use, I think, of the word ‘immediately’ that puts us on our guard. It is not as if there is one thing, the object, and then there is another thing, a part of the object, that in some sense ‘gets in the way’ of the object.\(^\text{18}\)

Perception of something is immediate if it does not obtain in virtue of the perceiving of something else, just as the notion of perceptual mediation tells us. But in addition to this, we can consider whether our perception of something is such that it is available for immediate demonstrative identification. A lot of the time when we talk about perceiving something indirectly, we are talking about cases in which we are in a position to only demonstratively refer to that thing through being in a position to non-dependently demonstratively refer to what we directly perceive. So a sonar operator, we might say, can indirectly see the submarine by seeing the blip on his radar screen, and, what is more, he can demonstratively refer to the submarine, but he can only do so by demonstratively referring to the blip on his screen. But in the case of indirectly seeing some object in virtue of seeing its facing surface, what we are in a position to non-dependently demonstratively refer to is the object that is indirectly seen. At least, that is the intuition before considerations about illusions and the like set in. But it is important to note that this intuition is not challenged simply by our technical notion of perceptual mediation. We have not somehow put objects further away from us, epistemically speaking, by a mere technical definition. But I think it is precisely that worry that motivates suspicion of this notion of perceptual mediation.

\(^{18}\) But some people do seem to think this. See, for example, Broad (1929: 149-151).
Perception and Experience

To say that S perceives x indirectly in virtue of perceiving y does not have any epistemic implications. The epistemic significance of this fact of perceptual mediation will lie in the nature of the objects perceived directly and indirectly and their relation to one another.

2.1.2 Psychological mediation

Having dealt with the notion of perceptual mediation we can now turn to that of psychological mediation. It is far easier to provide a straightforward account of this concept, quite possibly because it has not attracted as much attention in the literature as perceptual mediation.

When someone sees something then that thing is available for them in thought and action. They can direct their thoughts at that object in entertaining, for example, beliefs about that object. They can also direct their actions towards that thing in, for example, walking around that object or picking it up. Whatever state of affairs that some subject’s seeing of some object consists in, it is what explains and makes possible this object-directedness of their thought and behaviour.

As well of the notion of seeing, we can also distinguish the notion of visual sensory experience. Experience is the conscious subjective episode that we enjoy when we see something. It is what we are referring to when we talk about the way in which things appear to us, as old or shiny, blue or sad, flat or voluminous.

The claim that perception is not psychologically mediated is a claim about the relation between perception and the experience one enjoys when perceiving (perceptual experience). It is the claim that perceptual experience does not fall short of perception. It is, in itself, that which puts us into perceptual contact with the world.

John Foster defines the notion of psychological mediation in the following way:

S’s perceiving of x at t is psychologically mediated by his being in S if and only if

1. S is a psychological state;
2. S is not, in itself, x-perceptive (i.e. being in S does not, on its own, logically suffice to put one in perceptual contact with x);
3. S’s perceiving of x at t breaks down into his being in S at t and certain additional facts;
And
(4) These additional facts do not involve anything further about S's psychological condition at t (anything over and above what is already covered by S's being in Σ). In other words, in combining with the fact of S's being in Σ, they do not add any further psychological facts, about S at t, to the constitutive base. (Foster 2000: 10)

Belief that perception is psychologically mediated in this way seems to be an expression of the belief that perception is essentially conjunctive in nature. The conjunctivist maintains that the psychological episode that is the subject's conscious experience features as an element in perception. What does it mean for experience to feature as an element in perception? The having of experience, in conjunction with the obtaining of certain other conditions (such as a particular sort of causal relation between said experience and the world) is what perception of the world consists in. Here, for example, is Paul Coates' understanding of perception, which is a typical conjunctive picture:

At a first approximation, a subject S sees a physical object X, if and only if:

1. X exists
2. S has an inner visual experience E, comprising:
   a. a visual phenomenal state
   b. a perceptual taking, an episode that involves the exercise of concepts
3. The object X causes E, in the appropriate manner for seeing.

(Coates 2007: 57)

And we can find similar sorts of account in Vision (1997), Grice (1988) and Strawson (1988). The key feature of these accounts is not the particular way in which they break down the perceptual episode, but that the episode is broken down into a visual experience, which is not in itself perceptive of the world, plus a set of other factors. I say 'in itself' because there is a sense in which, on this kind of view, the experiential component of perception is the perception of something. But it is the perception of something not because of its intrinsic nature. Its counting as a perception is a relational property of the experience to be explained by some suitable account of the relation between the experience and the thing perceived. And this is commonly, as in

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19 Most conjunctive accounts are causal theories of perception, in that they take perception to break down into experience plus a causal relation of the right kind to the object perceived.
the case of Coates' view above, to be understood as a causal relation between experience and object.

2.1.3 Naïvety about mediation

We can, then, make a distinction between S's perception of x being perceptually mediated, and its being psychologically mediated. We can say that S's perception of x is perceptually mediated if S's perception is constituted by, or obtains in virtue of, their perception of some non-normal object. We can say that S's perception of x is psychologically mediated if their perception has, as a component, a psychological state of affairs which fully exhausts the psychological aspect of S's perception of x but is not in itself perceptive of x.

This recognition of there being two senses in which we can speak of perception as being indirect gives us four different possibilities as to the metaphysical structure of normal object perception:

(i) Perception of normal objects is neither psychologically mediated nor perceptually mediated.
(ii) Perception of normal objects is psychologically mediated, but not perceptually mediated.
(iii) Perception of normal objects is perceptually mediated, but not psychologically mediated.
(iv) Perception of normal objects is psychologically mediated and perceptually mediated.

Position (i) represents the naïve realist conception of the structure of perception.

To advocate position (ii) is to adopt some form of what is usually called direct realism but, on this approach, is best thought of as perceptually direct and psychologically indirect realism. ∅ terminal perceiving is not perceptually mediated, but it does break down into an experiential component plus other factors. Because perception is not perceptually mediated on this account, the experiential component of perception is not, in itself, the awareness or perception of anything. Adverbial accounts and (most) intentional accounts of experience are versions of this.20

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20 McDowell (1982; 1986) is arguably an intentionalist whose view of perception is such that it is neither psychologically nor perceptually mediated.
While position (iii) is a logical possibility it seems quite implausible. If terminal perception is mediated, then we only ever perceive normal objects by perceiving non-normal objects. But if perception is not psychologically mediated, then visual experience is not a component of perception. So, we perceive normal objects by perceiving non-normal objects, and this perception of non-normal objects does not constitute visual experience, for if it did, it would have to play a psychologically mediating role. But now it is starting to look as if visual experience and perception are coming apart. We want to say that to consciously perceive something is to have an experience of that thing, but this present account makes it entirely mysterious as to how they are connected. The implausibility of this picture allows us to conclude that if perception is perceptually mediated, then it must also be psychologically mediated.

Position (iv) is that of what has been traditionally referred to as indirect realism, but under this taxonomy must be referred to as perceptually and psychologically indirect realism. This is to maintain that perceptual experience is in itself the awareness or perception of some object, but this is not a normal object. It is traditionally associated with sense-datum accounts of experience. Terminal perceiving is perceptually mediated, because it breaks down into awareness of some non-normal object, and it is psychologically mediated because it is this awareness plus other non-perceptual factors that is the experiential component of perception.

2.2 The presentational claim

The presentational claim represents a particular way of understanding the psychological immediacy of perception. It is the claim that the objects we perceive in an episode of perception constitutively contribute to the way in which those objects appear to us in such an episode. I shall understand this as the claim that perceptual experience is presentational in nature, in that something is literally present in experience and, furthermore, that this thing is the object of perception. To say that something is literally present in experience is to take a stance about the nature of the object of experience when one enjoys a perceptual experience of some object.

What is the 'object of experience'? As well as a subject being appeared to in a certain way in perceptual experience, there is also that which is present in experience. When we enjoy a sensory experience something appears to us a certain way. This
'something' is what I shall refer to, following J. J. Valberg (1992), as the 'object of experience.' He describes it as follows:

By an 'object of experience' we shall mean something present in experience: something which is right there, available for us to pick out or focus on, and refer to demonstratively. (Valberg 1992: 7)

The object of experience is something that is present in experience in the sense that it is available to the subject of the experience to focus upon and demonstratively refer to. This expression should not be thought of as meaning that there is some object or entity that appears to us. To say that what appears to us is in an experience is an entity of some kind is to express a substantial commitment as to the nature of that experience. But that there are objects of experience in the sense that something appears to us when we consciously perceive is something that seems apparent. For we can understand by this merely that there is an answer to the question ‘what appears to you in your experience?’

It seems highly plausible that there are objects of experience in this sense. When one consciously perceives some normal object and it appears to one a certain way there is clearly something present to one, right there, that one can focus upon and which appears to one as being a certain way.

The presentational claim is a particular view as to the nature of this object of experience. It takes this object of experience to be, firstly, something actually present in experience, and secondly, to be the object of perception, that is, that which is perceived in virtue of the subject enjoying the experience. To say that the object of experience is something literally present in experience is to say that it is some entity that is present to one in an 'ontologically immediate way,' as a constituent of the experiential episode. In claiming that the object of experience in perceptual experience is the object of perception, the presentational nature of perceptual experience is taken to be such that the experience, in itself, provides for perceptual contact with the world. In this way the presentational claim embodies a particular conception of the way in which perception can be psychologically direct.

There will be various ways of fleshing out the presentational claim. A distinction can be made between two differing attitudes to understanding the role of the objects

of perception in determining phenomenal character. It seems to me that on the one hand there is a popular way of understanding this according to which the ways in which we are appeared to in perceptual experience are the very ways that the objects we perceive are. There is an identity between the phenomenal properties of experience and the properties of the objects we perceive.\textsuperscript{22}

On the other hand, we could try and understand the determining role of the objects of perception in some other way. Whatever way this is, it would have to be such that the objects of perception play a constitutively determining role in the determination of phenomenal character. At the moment we should just acknowledge that the presentational claim that the naïve realist makes is merely that the objects of perception play a constitutive role in the determination of phenomenal character. That is, they are intrinsic elements of perceptual experience that determine the phenomenal character of such experience. It is not a part of this claim that they fulfil this role in virtue of an identity relationship between the qualities instantiated in experience and the qualities instantiated by those objects. This is just one way of working out the details of how the presentational claim may be true. Chapter five is devoted to laying out an alternative to this picture on behalf of the naïve realist.

2.3 Why is this ‘naïve’?

What are we intending to convey by describing someone’s conception of perception as ‘naïve realist’? The usual sense of this expression is to denote the pre-theoretical nature of one’s approach to perception. The naïve explanation is something the ‘common man’ would believe, who has not yet reflected in any great depth upon the position that he assents to. It is naïve because it is not born out of considered reflection.

Such usage of the term ‘naïve’ is quite often intended pejoratively, in which case to say that a position is naïve is to say that it is mistakenly simple, or mistakenly unreflective. Alternatively, we need not consider it to be something negative that an opinion is ‘common,’ ‘simple’ or ‘unreflective.’ Rather, we might use ‘naïve’ to indicate of some explanation that it is where enquiry begins, and as such not

\textsuperscript{22} This view seems prevalent amongst both critics of naïve realism and its proponents. See, for example, Smith (2002) and Brewer (2008).
something that need necessarily be incorrect. This is how I intend to use the term 'naïve' – as expressing the beginning of reflective enquiry.

When we speak of someone as being a naïve realist, we could mean to imply that there is something naïve about the realism that they adopt. They are 'naïve' in so much as they are a particular kind of realist. Alternatively, we could think of 'naïve,' not as something that offers a description of the kind of realism that a theorist employs, but as something separate and additional to their realist commitments.

To be a realist within the domain of perception is to believe that the objects of perception have an existence independent of their being perceived. It is a claim about the nature of that which we perceive. Naïvety in regard to this claim might be construed as being naïve about the extent to which the objects of perception, and the properties that they appear to have, exist independently of our perception of them. This would be to think of 'naïve' as describing the kind of realism that someone adopts with regards to the objects of perception.

This is certainly one of the ways in which 'naïve realism' has been used. Jonathan Dancy, for example, uses 'naïve realism' in this sense when he writes:

The naïve direct realist holds that unperceived objects are able to retain properties of all the types we perceive them as having. By this he means that an unperceived object may still not only have a shape and size but also be hot or cold, have a colour, a taste and a smell, be rough or smooth and make a noise or keep silent. The naivety of this position lies in the word 'all.' The position becomes less naïve as 'all' retreats to 'nearly all' and then to 'most' and so on. (Dancy 1985: 147)

The other sense in which 'naïve realist' is used is that which attributes an opinion about something in addition to the scope of one's realism about the objects of perception. On this reading, naïvety applies, not to our conception of the nature of the objects of perception, but to our conception of the nature of the subjective episodes that we enjoy when we perceive.

An illustrative example of this is a recent presentation of the naïve realist position by A. D. Smith:
What [...] is essential to Naïve Realism as I am construing it is the claim that *that which gives sensory character to perceptual consciousness is a public quality of some physical object.* (2002: 43-44)

For Smith, then, naïvety is expressed in how one tries to explain the sensory character of perceptual consciousness. One is naïve if one thinks that some public quality 'gives' perceptual consciousness its sensory character, as opposed to, say, the qualities of an inner object of awareness. It is this sense of naïvety that is expressed in the phenomenal claim that I regard as one of the commitments of the position I refer to as ‘ naïve realism.’ But note that, as mentioned in the previous section, the sense in which the object perceived 'gives' experience its phenomenal character is not yet explained if we only restrict ourselves to the presentational claim. And the naïve realist should restrict themselves in this way, as it is too early in the stage of enquiry to commit oneself to anything stronger about the nature of this presentation — that perceptual objects explain, or give, phenomenal character to experience through an identity between the qualities of such character and the qualities of the objects.

When characterising naïve realism in terms of naïvety with respect to the nature of perceptual experience, it is normally expressed in terms of a commitment to the relation between experience and the mind-independent world. For example:

Visual and tactual sense-data are parts of the surfaces of physical objects. (Price 1950: 55)

If an experience E is a genuine perception by a subject S of object O then the occurrence of E places S in such a relation to O that were S able to entertain demonstrative thoughts (and was equipped with the necessary concepts) then S could entertain the *true* demonstrative thought ‘that is O.’ (Snowdon 2005: 138)

But the kinds of commitments illustrated here as to the relation between experience and the mind-independent world are consequent to some serious thought about the nature of experience. Really, what these philosophers are saying is that naïve realism is committed to a certain claim about the relation of experience to the world, *given certain facts about the nature of experience that have been argued for.* Let us take each example in turn.
To the sense-datum philosophers of the early twentieth century, such as Price, naïve realism was a certain position with regards to the nature of that which is immediately given in sense experience: sense-data. Given that there are sense-data, to be naïve about them is to identify them with external things, or, to be more specific, surfaces of physical objects. Incorporated into the conception of naïve realism is the notion of sense-data. Once we accept that experience is a relation to something that is ‘given’ in experience, to be naïve about experience is to identify what is given with tracts of the physical world. But to accept the basic claim about experience one must already have travelled some distance down the road of enquiry.

For Snowdon, naïve realism is to be characterised in terms of our capacity to entertain demonstrative thoughts about objects in the world. If we think about experience from this perspective, then naïvety is expressed through taking immediate non-dependent reference to objects of experience to be referring to physical objects in the world.

What philosophers like Price and Snowdon are offering us are ways of elaborating any pre-theoretical stance we have towards perception and experience in terms of what reflection upon perception and experience reveals to us. All these characterisations are reconstructions of what the naïve realist is committed to in terms of a more worked out theoretical vocabulary. There is nothing incorrect about any of this, and indeed, it is only proper that naïve realism should be articulated in a way that fits in with how a philosopher talking about it views the philosophical landscape. My worry is rather that the heart of the naïvety is being overlooked. The claims given above are claims that the naïve realist should accept because of his naïvety, and so leave the essence of his pre-reflective intuition untouched.

In my opinion naïve realism should be expressed as a commitment to the relationship between perceiving and experiencing and the presentational claim, rather than the relationship between experience and mind-independent objects. It is the former that makes the position naïve, while it is the latter that makes it realist. It has a naïve view of the relation between perceptual contact and sensory experience because it takes sensory experience to be, at least sometimes, itself perceptual. Sometimes, when a subject is having an experience, the experience simply is their perceiving. It has a naïve view of the nature of sensory experience because it takes it to be presentational. The realist thought is that the objects of perception do not depend upon the subject for their existence.
Naïve realism should, then, be considered a combination of two thoughts – naïvety with regards to the relation between perception and experience, and the presentational nature of sensory experience, and realism about the objects of perception.

Naïve realism, as I understand it, is the claim that when a subject, S, perceives a normal object, x, the sensory experience in virtue of which S stands in this relation to x is, in its nature, such that this perceptual contact is explained. There is, on the naïve realist picture, nothing more to be added to such an account in order to provide an account of perception.

The purpose of this discussion is not to get to the bottom of what we actually, or should, mean by ‘naïve realism.’ It is rather to explain what I mean by ‘naïve realism,’ and to offer some justification for according it this title. I call it ‘naïve’ because I think that it is where we start – it is the intuitively correct answer to the first question that occurs to us when considering the nature of perception, namely, ‘what is the relation between experience and perception?’

3. Varieties of non-naïve realism

If one rejects the idea that perceptual experience is presentational of the normal objects of perception, then one must adopt some form of non-naïve realism. Forms of non-naïve realism can be distinguished according to their differing attitudes towards psychological and perceptual mediation. There can, then, be psychologically direct non-naïve realism, psychologically indirect and perceptually direct non-naïve realism, and psychologically indirect and perceptually indirect non-naïve realism. There is only one non-naïve form of psychologically direct realism because, as it may be recalled, conceptions of perception according to which it is both psychologically direct and perceptually indirect are not plausible.

3.1 Psychologically indirect and perceptually direct realism

This form of realism maintains that perceptual experience has a nature such that in itself it falls short of being perceptual of the world. It does, however, claim that we do not φ terminally perceive things in the world in virtue of perceiving anything else. There are two main varieties of this approach, intentionalism and adverbialism.
The intentionalism that falls under this category is a view of the nature of perceptual experience according to which perceptual experience is an intentional state, but in which the content of this state, that specifies the way that the world is, is independent of the object of perception. The core phenomenal character (and indeed, usually the whole phenomenal character) of experience is to be explained in terms of the representational or intentional content of this state.

To understand phenomenal appearances as intentional in nature is, typically, to understand them as representing the world as being a certain way.23 Perceptual experience will be a kind of intentional state, where this is thought of as a state of affairs in which a subject is related to some content that specifies how the world must be in order for the experience to be veridical. As Siegel puts it, the sensory experience will have 'accuracy conditions' (Siegel 2006: 485). This content is typically thought of as a proposition to the effect that the world is such and such a way. What will make the intentional state a visual experience will be the peculiar way in which this content is entertained, or in the special nature of the attitude that the subject takes towards this content. Intentionalism, or representationalism, is the claim that the fundamental nature of perceptual experience, the core phenomenal character of a subject’s experience when they perceive something, is determined by a representational content.24 Here, for example, is Dretske:

The way things phenomenally seem to be (when, for instance, one sees or hallucinates an orange pumpkin), are – all of them – properties the experience represents things as having. (Dretske 2003: 67)

Now, according to the intentionalist account the object of experience can still be thought of as a normal object, just like for the naïve realist, but for the intentionalist this normal object is not actually present in experience – it is present as an intentional object of the experience. So we can think of the intentionalist as maintaining that the object of experience is an intentional object. In this way the intentionalist can claim that perception is psychologically direct, for they can claim that, when a subject

23 An intentionalist does not have to think that it is the world that is represented in phenomenal appearance. They could (but invariably do not) maintain that non-normal objects of some kind are represented in this way.

24 Proponents of this view include Tye (2002), Dretske (2003) and Harman (1999). It can come in a strong or a weak variety according to whether it is just the claim that phenomenal character supervenes upon intentional content or that the very nature of such character is to be understood in terms of this content.
perceives, the object of experience is the object of perception. But, because they understand the object of experience intentionally this does not mean, as it does for the naïve realist, that it is literally present to the mind of the subject. The perceptual experience is not itself a relation between subject and object perceived. Rather, the object perceived is represented to the subject.

Adverbialism, on the other hand, is a picture of phenomenal appearance according to which it is mode of the perceiving subject. To be appeared to in a certain phenomenal manner is to have one's consciousness modified in a particular way. It therefore eschews a picture of phenomenal appearance in which there is something that appears to the subject. Phenomenal appearance does not, in itself, consist of anything appearing to a subject. Naïve realism, intentionalism of any form and, as we shall see, the sense-datum theory all conceive of phenomenal appearance in terms of something appearing to a subject. In the case of naïve realism and the sense-datum theory this object of experience is an actual object that the subject stands in a genuine relation to, while in the case of intentionalism, this object of experience is an intentional object. It rejects the claim that phenomenal appearance is presentational in the sense explained earlier.\(^{25}\)

3.2 Psychologically direct non-naïve realism

This account of the nature of perceptual experience and the structure of perception agrees with the naïve realist that perception is not composed of sensory experience plus a set of other factors. That is to say, perceptual experience is, in its very nature as experience, perceptual of the world around us. Where this account differs from the naïve realist's is as to its conception of the nature of such experience. It does not believe that such experience is, in its nature, a presentation of the object of perception. It does not believe that phenomenal appearances are to be understood in such a way.

Generally, the way in which this account is fleshed out is in terms of the nature of phenomenal appearances being understood in intentional terms.\(^{26}\) Someone could adopt an intentionalist understanding of the nature of phenomenal appearances that gives a psychologically direct view of perception by taking the content of the mental

\(^{25}\) For the adverbialist position see Ducasse (1942; 1951).

\(^{26}\) This is only one way that someone could be a non-naïve realist and maintain that perception is nevertheless psychologically direct, and so there is, of course, space for someone to adopt a different
state that is the phenomenal appearance to be object-dependent. The way in which the world appears to be, the way the world is represented as being, includes the object of perception as a part.

The intentional content of such an experience would be something like 'that is red' or 'this is square,' demonstrative propositions whose content is object-dependent.

On this account experience is a relation to the object of perception only in so much as it consists in the subject being related in a certain way to a certain content that contains that object as a constituent. The object of experience, that which is present in experience, is the object of perception, but it is present intentionally. When a subject enjoys a perceptual experience the object of perception is not present to the subject in an ontologically immediate way, but rather present in the content that represents the world as being a certain way. So experience is in itself a relation to the object of perception, is in itself perceptual, as the naïve realist maintains, but this intrinsic relationality is achieved via a representational content. 27

3.3 Psychologically indirect and perceptually indirect realism

This position is occupied by what I shall refer to as sense-datum theories of perception. It is in agreement with naïve realism to the extent that it conceives of phenomenal appearances as genuinely presentational in nature. The object of experience when one perceives some object is a genuine entity that is a constituent of the experience in an ontologically immediate way. That is to say, it is not just represented in experience. But unlike naïve realism it does not take the object of experience to be the object of perception. Instead it is a mind-dependent object, or sense-datum, which is typically taken to determine the phenomenal character of perceptual experience by instantiating the properties that characterise the way in which a subject is appeared to when enjoying such an experience. 28

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27 For articulations of this kind of view see Foster (2000), Campbell (2002) and Brewer (2006).

28 It should be noted that while the term 'sense-datum' is generally taken to have the meaning given in the text within contemporary philosophy, it once had a usage in which it was a term that was neutral between naïve and non-naïve theories of perception, and was taken to refer to whatever entity was the object of experience. In the course of my discussion I shall maintain the current usage of the term as referring to a mind-dependent object of experience. For a classic sense-datum account see Price (1950). For an example of the more modern approach see Jackson (1977).
In conceiving of the object of experience in perceptual experience as a mind-dependent entity the sense-datum theory takes perception to be both perceptually and psychologically mediated. Terminal perception is mediated by awareness of a sense-datum, and the perceptual experience is not in itself perceptual as it has its fundamental constituted by the awareness of this entity.
I have presented naïve realism as a stance on the relation between experience and perception and the nature of perceptual experience. The naïve conception of perceptual experience is that the subjective element of some object's appearing a certain way to a subject, that which explains a subject being appeared to a certain way when they consciously perceive some object, consists in the presentation of that object to the subject in an 'ontologically immediate' way. In this way the naïve realist also offers an account of the structure of perception. Perceptual experience is, in its very nature, perceptual of the world, and so nothing needs to be added to our account of the subjective episode involved in consciously perceiving something in order for us to have an account of what conscious perception is.

I have not said, however, anything about why naïve realism, as I have characterised it, should be the default position as far as theorising about the nature of conscious perception is concerned. This is significant, for in saying that it holds such a position, one is demanding that it needs to be argued against, and intellectual honesty makes a demand of us to defend it as vigorously as possible.

1. Motivation one: phenomenological considerations

Introspection on the character of one's experience pulls us in two directions that are incompatible only if naïve realism is false.¹ When we introspectively reflect upon our experience it appears (a) weakly transparent and (b) presentational. Experience appears weakly transparent if, upon reflection upon it, we do not become aware of objects other than the normal objects of perception. Experience appears presentational upon reflection.

¹ This account of the priority of naïve realism when considering the phenomenology of experience is heavily based on Martin (1998; 2002a; Forthcoming). Martin does not only believe that experience appears presentational, however, but that a thesis he refers to as actualism appears to be true. As we shall see, I think that the actualism claim that Martin formulates, and the similar sorts of claims that inspire it such as the 'phenomenal principle' or the 'sense-datum inference' are all too strong, and go beyond what phenomenal reflection encourages us to accept. Strictly speaking, experience appears presentational upon reflection.
if, upon reflection on it, it seems as if we are confronted with something that seems to be a constituent of our experience.

1.1 Transparency

As implied in the passage above, transparency claims come in a strong and a weak form. The weak claim is that reflection upon perceptual experience reveals only the normal objects in the world around us. Perceptual experience appears *strongly* transparent if, upon reflection on it, in addition to our not becoming aware of objects other than the normal objects of perception, we also do not become aware of properties other than the properties that normal objects appear to have. As will become clear, I do not believe that the strong transparency claim is something that can be supported. The weak transparency claim, however, seems true, and it is perceptual experience's appearing weakly transparent that lends support to naïve realism, in conjunction with it appearing presentational.²

The claim that experience is transparent is frequently used to (a) challenge accounts of the phenomenal character of experience that suppose it to be determined either by sense-data or qualia, and (b) support intentionalist/representationalist accounts of the determination of phenomenal character.

Advocates of claim (a) suppose that reflection upon experience does not reveal either non-normal objects of awareness (sense-data) or intrinsic qualitative aspects to experience of which we can become aware and through which we perceive the world, but which are not ordinarily objects of awareness (qualia). Indeed, when we reflect upon experience it seems to us that we are reflecting on nothing other than the very objects and qualities that we perceive. This is then used to support claim (b), in that it supports the thought that when we reflect upon experience in the perceptual case we really *are* reflecting upon the very objects of perception themselves, and an intentional understanding of experience is the best way to understand this.

There are several sorts of observations about phenomenal reflection that we might make to support claim (a). It is arguable that it would falsify the phenomenology of experience were we not to characterise it in terms of objects of perception.³ If asked

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² For the observation that commitment to transparency often involves the two claims of what I am referring to here as strong transparency see Crane (2006).

³ Remember that the expression 'object of perception' is intended to pick out only those normal objects (entities/things) that we are aware of in virtue of enjoying sensory experience.
to characterise one’s experience as faithfully as possible then the statement given would have to be something like the following:

I had a visual experience such as it would have been natural to describe by saying that I saw, etc. [...] were it not for the obligation to exclude commitment to propositions about independently existing objects. (Strawson 1988: 95)

And so perceptual judgements such as ‘I see a cow,’ ‘I see a tree’ and so on must be internal to the characterisation that we give of our sensory experiences: ‘our sensible experience itself is thoroughly permeated with those concepts of objects which figure in such [perceptual] judgements’ (Strawson 1988: 96).

A faithful characterisation of experience, it seems, must make mention of the things that we perceive. Here is Mike Martin describing the process that we go through when reflecting upon the character of our experiences:

When I stare at the straggling lavender bush at the end of my street, I can attend to the variegated colours and shapes of leaves and branches, and over time I may notice how they alter with the seasons. But I can also reflect on what it is like for me now to be staring at the bush, and in doing so I can reflect on particular aspects of the visual situation: for example that at this distance of fifty metres the bush appears more flattened than the rose bush which forms the boundary of my house with the street. When my attention is directed out at the world, the lavender bush and its features occupy centre stage. It is also notable that when my attention is turned inwards instead to my experience, the bush is not replaced by some other entity belonging to the inner realm of the mind in contrast to the dilapidated street in which I live. I attend to what it is like for me to inspect the lavender bush through perceptually attending to the bush itself while at the same time reflecting on what I am doing. So it does not seem to me as if there is any object apart from the bush for me to be attending to or reflecting on while doing this. (Martin 2002a: 380-381)

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4 It needs to be in such a form so as to guarantee that one’s characterisation would remain true no matter what way the world turned out to be. Experiences do not carry with them, available to reflection, the sign that in virtue of enjoying them, one is perceiving.
Reflection on experience does not, then, in any way reveal entities other than those which I take myself to perceive, or properties other than those that objects appear to have. Indeed, it seems as if I am reflecting upon the objects that I perceive and their qualities, when asked to reflect upon my experience.

Finally, here we have Gilbert Harman comparing our perception of the objects depicted in a painting with the visual experience of some object:

In the case of a painting Eloise can be aware of those features of the painting that are responsible for its being a painting of a unicorn. That is, she can turn her attention to the pattern of paint on the canvas by virtue of which the painting represents a unicorn. But in the case of her visual experience of a tree, I want to say that she is not aware of, as it were, the mental paint by virtue of which her experience is an experience of seeing a tree. She is aware only of the intentional or relational features of her experience, not of its intrinsic non-intentional features. (Harman 1999: 478)

These various considerations offered by Strawson, Martin and Harman about how our experience appears to be when we reflect upon it show us that perceptual experience does not appear to be perceptually mediated by any non-normal objects.

Now as Harman himself acknowledges the sense-datum theorist will not be impressed by all this. They will claim that Eloise is aware of the 'mental paint,' or sense-data, when she has an experience as of some object, and it is precisely because she is aware of this 'mental paint' that her experience has the character that it does. It is just that in the case of the painting, if one attends to the paint on the canvas in a detached manner one can become aware of it as paint on a canvas, but in the case of experience, we cannot become aware of the qualities of experience as mere qualities of experience. They must always, as Strawson observed, be characterised in terms of objects of perception.

But Harman seems to take this as a decisive point against the sense-datum theorist:

When Eloise sees a tree before her, the colours she experiences are all experienced as features of the tree and its surroundings. None of them are experienced as intrinsic features of her experience. Nor does she experience any features of anything as intrinsic features of her experience [...] Look at a
tree and try to turn your attention to intrinsic features of the presented tree. I predict you will find that the only features there to turn you attention to will be features of the presented tree, including relational features of the tree 'from here.' (Harman 1999: 478)

It is taken to be a decisive point because Harman has earlier in his article argued against the argument from illusion as providing any support for sense-data. As reflection on the phenomenal character of experience does not give any support to the sense-datum theorist, they are left without any real reason to advocate sense-data. But it is important to note that the exercise in phenomenal reflection that Harman outlines does not in itself reveal anything that counts against the sense-datum theorist. It is neutral about the nature of experience. It is important to remember this, for if it is neutral in this way, it only counts against the sense-datum theorist if the argument against the argument from illusion holds up, and if the argument from illusion is really the only thought behind the advocacy of sense-data.

So what conclusions about the nature of experience is it really possible to draw from observations about the apparent character of experience? Strawson is trying to show that a veridical characterisation of our experience requires us to employ concepts of the objects of perception, and then uses this to argue against anyone who thinks that perceptual judgements have the status of a theory with respect to some data, namely sensory experience. But he does not think that this has any implications for how we are to understand the nature of sensory experience, other than that if experience is not the 'immediate' awareness of the objects of perception (in the sense of requiring no inference from sensory experience), then we are mistaken as to the nature of our sensory experience. Harman’s argument, as we have seen, only allows phenomenal transparency to be decisive against sense-data if the argument from illusion is taken to fail, and if there is no other support for sense-data, both of which are contentious claims.

What can we say then? Well, it certainly seems as if we can say that when we come to characterise the character of our experiences we intuitively do so in terms of objects of perception, and we do not encounter any object that is manifestly not such a normal object, such as a sense-datum. And so any theory of perception which makes

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5 Recall that as I am using the expression, 'sense-datum' is taken to refer to a mind-dependent object that is the most perceptually direct object of awareness when we perceive. Where it has its other
it a mystery as to why this is the case should be regarded with suspicion. But, as long as any theory acknowledges this fairly minimal constraint, it is entirely open as to what the nature of experience is.

So we simply cannot, as some advocates of the transparency claim seem to wish, get a denial of sensory intermediaries from the observations that the phenomenal character of experience must be characterised in terms of objects of perception, and that we do not encounter anything that is manifestly not an object of perception when we reflect upon it. This is a burst of over-enthusiasm on their part. What we can get, from considerations of transparency, are two thoughts. The first is that there is a minimal constraint upon accounts of experience to the effect that they should allow us to understand how this is the natural way to characterise our experience. The second is that if the phenomenal character of experience can be explained without reference to the objects of perception, as advocates of sense-data and qualia maintain, then our initial impression is wrong.

And this leads to the real force of the appeal to phenomenal transparency, if we set aside over-enthusiastic claims that it immediately shows there to be no sense-data/intrinsic qualitative properties of experience:

Given our initial reports of experience, a sense-datum account of perception could only be correct if those initial impressions were incorrect, or at least seriously misleading. (Martin 2002a: 379)

And so, if we can give an account that can retain those impressions then, all things being equal, it should be preferred to those that do not. This, I think, is the only right way to try and use observations about transparency. \(^6\)

I would now like to look at some clear limitations of the transparency claim. Some philosophers take reflection upon experience to never reveal qualities of

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\(^6\) It is worth mentioning that not everyone would agree with how I have formulated the transparency claim. According to some philosophers, reflection upon experience never reveals any properties other than the properties that objects appear to have, but says nothing about the nature of such objects. In this way even a sense-datum theorist can endorse the transparency thesis, providing he takes 'sense-datum' to be a theory neutral term that refers to the objects of experience, whatever they may be. Hence we see philosophers who advocate a sense-datum theory of experience such as Moore apparently endorsing the transparency claim in saying that experience is diaphanous (or at least some version of it), and intentionalists such as Tye being quite clear that to accept that experience appears transparent is not a point against the sense-datum theorist. See Tye (2002) and Moore (1903). This
experience itself. This is to make what I earlier referred to as the strong transparency claim. The strong transparency claim is that it is impossible to come to be aware of properties of experience itself.

It seems to me that it cannot be the case that experience is strongly transparent. Indeed, one could worry that it is hard to understand this claim at all. If reflection upon experience never reveals qualities of the experience itself, and only qualities of the perceived world, how is it that we are even able to make a distinction between our experience of the world and the things that we experience? Tye maintains that as well as the qualities of the perceived world, we are also aware of the fact that it is a visual experience that we are reflecting upon (1992: 166-167). We are aware of objects and qualities in the world, but aware that we are having visual experiences. Some sort of move like this is required in order to respect the evident fact that we are aware of ourselves as having experiences.

But even if we accept that this is not a real problem for those who endorse the strong transparency claim, there are surely examples of qualities of experience that we reflect upon all the time. When one's vision is blurred, or confused, for example when drunk, and one recollects one's drunken experience it is surely the qualities of the experience that one is remembering. Experiences can be disjointed, confused, blurred, intense or indistinct. Surely when we describe what our experiences are like in these terms we are not describing the world, but our very experiences of the world? The world cannot be confused or disjointed, unclear or distinct, but one's experience of the world can be.

Nevertheless, some have maintained that what we are attending to in focusing on such phenomenal properties are objects in the world, and the phenomenal property of, for example 'blurriness,' is simply a result of the way in which these objects are represented:

Whether one is seeing clearly, seeing blurrrily, or seeing clearly something blurry, the qualities of which one is directly aware are all experienced as qualities of the surfaces and edges represented by one's experience. (Tye 2002: 149)

And this is explained in the following way:

latter notion does, however, lead to problems for the adverbialist. It is explored in more detail in chapter five.
In the case of seeing sharp objects as blurry, then, one’s visual experience comments inaccurately on boundaries. It ‘says’ that the boundaries themselves are fuzzy when they are not. In the cases of seeing blurrily, one’s visual experience does not do this. It makes no comment on where exactly the boundaries lie. Here there is no inaccuracy. (Tye 2002: 148)

Tye is objecting to the idea that the phenomenal difference between experiencing something as blurry and having a blurry experience requires an explanation in terms of intrinsic properties of experience. When one screws up one’s eyes there is a phenomenal difference between one’s experience and the experience one enjoys when one’s eyes are open normally. But if one is looking at the same scene in both cases one will not say that the content of one’s experience is different in the two cases. One will say that one’s experience is blurry when one screws up one’s eyes, rather than that things appear to be blurry. Tye’s response is intended to locate the difference between experiencing things blurrily and experiencing things as blurred in a lack of content in the first case as opposed to an inaccurate content in the second case.

Now, whether or not his response can deal with such an objection, there is a further problem with this account. Tye’s explanation of blurriness seems to imply that prior to putting on glasses for the first time, a (for example) short-sighted person’s experience of the world is blurry. But this, I think, is false and mischaracterises the character of their experience.

If someone whose visual acuity is not all it should be puts on glasses for the first time it would be a mistake to characterise their experience, prior to putting on glasses, as blurry. It is only after they have put glasses on, and then compared how they see things with glasses on compared to glasses off, that they come to regard their experience without glasses as blurry. We can support this claim with the following sort of thought experiment. There are creatures, such as eagles, whose visual acuity is far in excess of that of a human being. And it is not inconceivable that a device could be created that would enable a human being to see the things around them with the same acuity that an eagle does. Now imagine some human being who has what we would regard as perfect vision. We would not want to describe the character of their experience as blurry, but, clearly, we must think that their visual acuity would increase dramatically upon putting on the device. I contend that such a person, if they wore the device for a long enough period of time, would come to regard their
experience when they are not wearing the device as blurry. Things would seem indistinct without the device that, prior to their introduction to it, seemed as clear as could be. The character of their experiences without the device before they were introduced to it would be different to the character of their experiences without the device after they were introduced to it. The former experiences were clear, but the later experiences would be blurry. But, presumably, these experiences would not change in their representational content.

The problem, then, for Tye's attempt to explain the blurriness of vision is as follows. Let us accept, for the moment, the claim that a person who is short-sighted and without glasses looks at a shape on a page and has an experience whose representational content specifies the environment in the following way: while the edges of the contours of the shape are definitely represented as falling between two points, the exact location of the edges of the contours of the shape are not represented at all. And this will presumably be true no matter if they have ever worn glasses before. So before someone puts on glasses for the first time their experience fails to represent some aspect of the environment and, after they start wearing glasses and then view the world without them, their experience similarly fails to represent some aspect of the environment. In the latter case it is this failure of representation that Tye uses to explain the blurriness of their experience. But in the former case it would be false to describe their experience as being blurry, while in the latter case it would be true. And so two experiential states with the same representational content would have different phenomenal characters, which, on the representationalist account is not possible.

And this points to the thought that the awareness of a lack of distinctness in one's perception of something is not the awareness of a failure of one's experience to represent the environment. It is the awareness that one is not clearly, or distinctly, experiencing the environment. In other words, it is awareness of a property of one's experience – that it is not allowing one to experience the objects as one should be, that there is something wrong with one's experience itself. Another way of looking at the point is this: there is no level of content that, in itself, underspecifies the environment. Clarity of experience must be explained in terms other than content.

We can conclude from all this that observations about the transparency of experience should not be taken to include the observation that in reflecting upon
experience we are never aware of the qualities of experience itself, as this seems to be simply not the case.

We can still, however, accept that perceptual experience appears weakly transparent upon reflection, in that in reflecting upon experience we do not become aware of objects other than the normal objects of perception. And it is only this weak transparency claim that an objector to perceptual mediation need appeal to.

Considerations about transparency, if taken on their own, do seem to lend support to the claim that perception of normal objects is not mediated by perception of non-normal objects in as much as accounts of perception that assert that perception is so mediated must (a) maintain that reflection upon experience is misleading, and (b) explain why such reflection is misleading.

The acceptance of the significance of transparency observations in this way does not, in itself, require one to adopt naïve realism. It amounts to a rejection of the idea that perception is perceptually mediated in the sense described earlier. It is, however, consistent with this rejection of perceptual mediation that perception of normal objects is psychologically mediated.

1.2 The presentational thesis

We might think that reflection upon experience reveals it to be presentational in nature, in the sense that was given in chapter one. Experience is presentational if it has an object of experience, available for immediate demonstrative reference, and which is a constituent of the experience in a non-intentional way. It is an actual, rather than an intentional, object.

If we endorse something like what has been variously referred to as 'the sense-datum inference' (Chisholm 1957) and 'the phenomenal principle' (Robinson 1994) then when something phenomenally appears to be a certain way then there must be something that actually is that way. Here are some formulations of this view.

The phenomenal principle:

If there sensibly appears to a subject to be something which possesses a particular sensible quality then there is something of which the subject is aware which does possess that sensible quality. (Robinson 1994: 32)

The sense-datum inference:
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Whenever something perceptually appears to have a feature when it actually does not, we are aware of something that does actually possess that feature. (Smith 2002: 25)

Actualism:

Whatever qualities one senses, some actual instance of those qualities and the object which bears them must exist and be sensed. (Martin 2000: 218)

There are really two claims that are being put together here. First, that if a subject enjoys an experience then the object of that experience, in the sense of the thing that phenomenally appears to be a certain way to the subject, must exist. Second, that if a subject enjoys an experience then the way that the object of that experience appears, the properties that characterise this object, must exist and the subject be aware of them. The truth of this complex claim is supposed to be supported by reflection upon the character of experience. So for example:

There is the seemingly obvious fact that when one seems to see an object with a certain quality, such as redness, nothing could be plainer than that one is aware of red. (Robinson 1994: 40)

But surely this is not something that the sense-datum theorist can come to know through introspection. All that reflection upon experience supports is the idea that in experience objects appear to us certain ways. What is obvious to one is that there is something that phenomenally appears a certain way to one. What is revealed is surely not actualism, or anything that might motivate the phenomenal principle or sense-datum inference. It is that which appears, the object of experience, actually exists and is present to the mind of the subject. It is the presentational thesis that is supported by introspection, not actualism.

Actualism involves a claim about the determination of phenomenal character, about that which explains why one is appeared to a certain way when enjoying a conscious visual experience. Reflection upon the phenomenology of experience is silent about that which determines the phenomenology of experience. In visual experience something appears to one, and it appears to one in certain ways, and this

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7 Smith ultimately rejects this on the grounds that experience possesses intrinsic qualities that explain the apparent plausibility of this inference but which we are not in fact aware of when we perceive.
thing and its properties are available to one for demonstrative reference, and in so doing are available for one in thought and action. Any further move that tries to explain any of these phenomenologically supported features is going beyond what is available to one through simply reflecting upon the character of our experience. In seeking to explain phenomenal properties of experience by identifying them with properties of that which is presented in experience, actualism is trying to explain why it is that one is appeared to as one is in visual experience. And this is not supported by reflection. On the other hand, the claim that visual experience is presentational, that there is something in experience in a non-intentional way, available for demonstrative reference, is supported by reflection. This is how experience appears to be when one reflects upon it.

1.3 The phenomenological support for naïve realism

The idea, then, is this: introspection gives support to both the presentational thesis and transparency. If experience is transparent, then perception is perceptually direct. And if experience is perceptually direct and presentational in nature, then the objects of experience, that which is presented in experience, must be the objects of perception. In which case perceptual experience must be, in itself, perceptual and it is so in virtue of the objects of perception being actually present in experience. And this is the position that I refer to as naïve realism. Indirect non-naïve realism rejects the transparency intuition while holding onto actualism. Direct non-naïve realism rejects actualism while holding onto transparency. Naïve realism accepts both. Non-naïve realism is led to reject one or the other because it regards experience as falling short of perception. If one takes both intuitions to accurately reflect experience, as the naïve realist does, then one takes experience to be in itself perceptual, i.e. presentational, and of normal objects. Once one rejects naïve realism, then actualism and transparency cannot both be true of experience, and the non-naïve realist must offer some account of why at least one of them, depending upon his or her particular orientation, seems to be the case but is not.

2. Motivation two: epistemological considerations

The question of the nature of perceptual experience is relevant to concerns regarding our capacity to have knowledge of, and thoughts about, the mind-independent objects
that we take conscious visual perception to put us in contact with. It is surely the case that conscious perceptual experience puts us in a position to know things about the world (assuming that we have not yet surrendered to the sceptic). More fundamentally, perceptual experience puts us in a position to have thoughts about the world. These are two things that an account of perceptual experience must be able to explain. Our capacity to know things about the world, and our capacity to have thoughts about the world. I shall refer to these two constraints as, respectively, the epistemic and intentional constraints upon any satisfactory account of perceptual experience.

There is a line of thinking according to which experience must be object-dependent in order for it to satisfy both of these constraints. I want to outline exactly what this object-dependency claim amounts to, and what reasons there are for accepting it. It is important, however, to recognise that there is some scope for disagreement over what the claim that experience is object-dependent amounts to. In particular, naïve realism as I have presented it conceives of perceptual experience as being object-dependent in virtue of the nature of perceptual experience being presentational. Alternatively it is possible to think of perceptual experience as being object-dependent in virtue of it being propositional in nature, where the proposition to which a subject is related to in perceptual consciousness is object-dependent. I shall refer to such a conception of perceptual experience as 'object-dependent intentionalism.'

I shall argue for two points. Firstly, that any account of perceptual experience that embodies an object-dependent picture of perceptual experience satisfies the epistemic and intentional constraints more easily than those that do not. It is not my intention to argue that the only way to satisfy the intentional and epistemic constraints is to conceive of experience in object-dependent terms. My point is the more limited one that object-dependent accounts more easily satisfies these constraints. Secondly, I shall argue that the naïve realist understanding of perceptual experience as presentational is superior with respect to satisfying the intentional constraint than the object-dependent intentionalist account.
2.1 Object-dependency

What does it mean to say that perceptual experience is object-dependent? Here are some articulations of this view:

According to the relational conception, when I see something, for instance a book on the table in front of me, I have an experience that is essentially relational in that it would not be that very experience unless the book were there on the table. (Millar 2008: 330)

Some of the objects of perception – the concrete individuals, their properties, the events they partake in – are constituents of the experience. No experience like this, no experience of fundamentally the same kind, could have occurred had no appropriate candidate for awareness existed. (Martin 2004: 39)

I think it is possible to extract the following sort of account of the dependency that is in play here. To conceive of perceptual experience as object-dependent is to say that the perceptual experience depends for its existence upon the object that is perceived in virtue of having the experience. We want to limit the dependency to the object of perception because we do not want to say that experience is object-dependent if it depends for its existence on any object at all. After all, no parties to the debate will want to deny that experiences are dependent for their existence upon the subjects of those experiences. Furthermore, unless we limit the dependency claim in this way a sense-datum conception of perceptual experience has a claim to be an object-dependent account of the nature of such experience, because it takes it to be essentially a relation between subject and mind-dependent object. Likewise it is possible to be an intentionalist who believes that the proposition that is the content of perceptual experience is object-dependent, but for which the object is not the object of perception (one could be an intentionalist and believe in sense-data, unusual though it may be). In what follows, whenever I talk about object-dependency this should be taken as short hand for object-dependency where the objects in question are the objects of perception.

What does it mean, quite generally, to say that one thing depends for its existence upon something else? Perhaps the most general sense in which something, x, depends

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8 The following discussion of object-dependency draws heavily on Lowe (1998; 2006) and Thomasson (1999).
for its existence upon another thing, y, is if it is necessarily the case that if x exists, then y exists. This is perhaps too broad an understanding of dependency, because it will include things as cases of existential dependency that we might not want to accept. For example, if y exists necessarily, then for any x it will necessarily be the case that if x exists, then y exists. But we would not want to say that x is existentially dependent upon y. But what is important for our purposes is not a precise definition of dependency, but just acceptance of the claim 'if x depends for its existence upon y, then necessarily if x exists, then y exists.'

What we take this to mean is going to depend upon the sense of 'necessity' that is in play here, and the time at which x and y exist. The necessity involved could be logical, metaphysical or nomological.

We may say that the acceleration of one object is dependent upon a force acting on the object. Necessarily, if an object accelerates, then there must exist some force that acts upon it. The necessity involved here is nomological, pertaining to physical laws that are discoverable empirically.

Or we may say that the proposition 'A and B' where A and B are themselves propositions, depends upon the proposition A for its existence. It is logically necessary that if the proposition 'A and B' exists, then the proposition A exists.

The existential dependence we are concerned with is a metaphysical dependence. So for example we might say that properties depend for their existence upon the objects that bear them, or that valleys depend for their existence upon hills. The kind of necessity that we are interested in when formulating the object-dependency claim is metaphysical. Someone who talks about perceptual experience being dependent upon the object of perception is making a claim about the nature of such experience.

An object may be existentially dependent upon experience in the causal, non-metaphysical sense. So for example the world could be such that sheep are caused to explode, and hence cease to exist, whenever no-one is experiencing them, and so the existence of sheep could be said to depend upon subjects experience of them. But this would not mean that sheep are existentially dependent upon experience in any sort of metaphysical sense. It is not a part of their nature.

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9 See, for example, Lowe (1998: 28-57) and Thomasson (1999: 24-34).
10 See, for example, Thomasson (1999: 24-34).
11 This (rather bizarre) example is taken from Martin (Forthcoming).
We must also be sensitive to the issue of the time at which the object of perception exists, relative to the perceptual experience which is said to depend upon it. Of some dependency relations it makes sense to suppose that if x depends upon y, then necessarily if x exists at time t, then y exists at time t. It would seem that this cannot be the case for the dependency relation between perceptual experience and object of perception, however. It is a familiar observation that the processes involved in seeing something take time, and, in particular, that it takes a finite amount of time for the light from the object of perception to reach the eye of the perceiver. In certain cases, for example when seeing stars, it is quite possible that the light from the star reaches the eye of the perceiver at a time when the star itself no longer exists. If we suppose that the perceptual experience of the star depends upon the star for its existence, we cannot maintain that if the perceptual experience of the star exists at time t, then the star exists at time t. So instead we must say that necessarily, if the perceptual experience of x exists at time t, then x has existed at some time, u. The dependency of perceptual experience upon the objects of perception is not necessarily alone in displaying this feature. Another example might be the dependency of universals on their instances. David Armstrong, for example, in his *Universals* seems to maintain that if a universal, x, exists at some time t then an instantiation of this universal must exist at some time, u.\textsuperscript{12}

The account so far has not yet captured the sense in which perceptual experience is claimed to be dependent upon the object of perception. This is because, while it is the case that if a perceptual experience involved, in its very nature, the object of perception, then it depends upon that object in the sense described, we have not yet captured the sense in which it is the nature of the experience that dictates that this must be so. Mike Martin, for example, raises the following sort of example in which we may accept that necessarily, if the perceptual experience exists then the object of perception must have existed, but we would not want to regard as a case of the experience depending upon the object in the sense that advocates of the object-dependency claim wish:

\textsuperscript{12} Armstrong writes, for example, that if we accept that every universal should be instantiated:

\begin{quote}
We certainly should not demand that every universal should be instantiated now. It would be enough if a particular universal was not instantiated now, but was instantiated in the past, or would be instantiated in the future. (1989: 75)
\end{quote}
Someone may claim that for any given event it is essential to it that it should have had the very causes that it did, and that it should have had the very effects that it does. From this, it follows that the event could not have occurred had not some of its distal causes occurred. We can make such a claim without supposing that the causes in question are constitutive of having the event. Someone who accepts both this view of event identity and also accepts the causal theory of perception would therefore endorse the modal dependence of a state of seeing on the object seen. On that account, a necessary condition of being the object of perception is that an object be among the causes of the seeing of it. We may suppose that an object can be the cause of some event through itself being a constituent of some event which causes that event. Combining these two sets of commitments we end up with the view that a given perception could not have occurred without the object of perception existing. For had the object not existed, then the event of which it was constituent would not have occurred, but then one of the causes of the seeing would not have existed, and hence that event too could not have occurred. So one may have reason to assert this conclusion without thereby claiming that it is constitutive of the episode of sensing that there is an object sensed. (Martin Forthcoming)\(^{13}\)

What needs to be incorporated into the notion of object-dependency is that the object of perception is itself a *constituent* of the experience. Martin expresses this as a comment on the nature of the experience. It is of the essence of the experience that the object of perception is what one is aware of. Part of what makes the experience the experience that it is is the object of perception.

The naïve realist thinks, then, that:

The objects of perception are to be understood as constituents of the event in question. The naïve realist supposes that it is an aspect of the essence of such experiential episodes that they have such experience-independent constituents (Martin 2006: 357)

Martin understands talk of essence in the following way:

\[^{13}\text{See also Martin (2002b), and Snowdon (1990)}\]
For all such entities [objects and events] there is a most specific answer to the question, ‘What is it?’ In relation to the mental, and to perception in particular, I will assume that for mental episodes or states there is a unique answer to this question which gives its most specific kind; it tells us what essentially the event or episode is. (Martin 2006: 361)

To be told what fundamental kind of thing something is, is to be told something about the identity criteria of that thing. It is to be told something about what makes that thing the thing that it is. In the account that Martin describes above, it is not of the essence of the experience that it is caused by the object that brings it about. The identity of the experience does not depend upon the cause. What makes the experience the experience that it is, is nothing to do with the object that causes it, although that experience could not have occurred without it. As Kit Fine might put it, the necessity in this case does not have its source in the identity of the objects involved (Fine 1994).

It should be clear that any account of perceptual experience that regards it as psychologically direct will thereby regard it as object-dependent in the sense described. Perceptual experience is psychologically direct if it is, in itself, perceptual. There is nothing more that needs to be added to our account of what such experience consists of, in order to have an account of what perception consists of. And as perception is uncontroversially dependent upon the object of perception for its existence—and its identity, perceptual experience must also be so dependent if it is psychologically direct.

2.2 The epistemic constraint

Perceptual experience puts us in a position to know things about the world. We can come to know things about the world around us by experiencing those things. We can call knowledge arrived at in this way perceptual knowledge. Our account of the nature of perceptual experience must be able to explain this possibility of arriving at knowledge through the senses, unless we want to accept the position of the sceptic. I take it that we would rather not be sceptical about our perceptual knowledge claims. As a consequence, in theorising about the nature of experience we must try, if at all possible, to provide an account which can answer the sceptic, or at least provide the foundations of doing so.
McDowell sums up the sceptical problem, and its relation to the object-dependency of experience as follows:

Consider situations in which a subject seems to see that, say, there is a red cube in front of her. The idea is that even if we focus on the best possible case, her experience could be just as it is, in all respects, even if there were no red cube in front of her. This seems to reveal that perceptual experience provides at best inconclusive warrants for claims about the environment. And that seems incompatible with supposing we ever, strictly speaking, know anything about our objective surroundings. (McDowell 2008: 378)

By the 'best possible case' McDowell means a situation in which a subject enjoys a perceptual experience, an experience in virtue of which one perceives something in the world. The problem is that if such experience is conceived of as being independent of its perceptual object, it provides only an 'inconclusive warrant' for making perceptual knowledge claims. Why should this be the case? And why should that mean we would never be in a position to know anything about the world, on the basis of such experience?

The idea is that the justification that experience provides for a perceptual knowledge claim when experience includes the object of perception is not defeasible. If my experience of a red apple in front of me is dependent upon the red apple in front of me, then I could not have that very experience in the absence of the red apple in front of me, and so it provides indefeasible justification for the judgement 'there is a red apple in front of me.' If, on the other hand, one has an object-independent conception of perceptual experience, such experience can only ever provide, in itself, a defeasible justification for such judgements.

It might be thought that the theorist who maintains that experience is object-dependent is no better off, epistemically speaking, than the theorist who takes it to be independent. After all, both should accept that perceptual experience does not make its perceptual nature manifest to the subject of such experience. Conceiving of the nature of such experience as object involving does not change our epistemic status in respect of knowing that such experience is perceptual. We cannot know, on the basis of experience alone, that we are perceiving, and hence that our experience is perceptual.
Whether or not we think that the object-dependent theorist has no greater warrant than his object-independent counterpart in making the perceptual judgements that he does, the former has to invoke less in order to explain how his beliefs amount to knowledge than the latter.

The naïve realist can accept that they are in the same position as the psychologically indirect realist in as much as both have as much claim to know that the experience that they are enjoying is perceptual. The difference between them lies in the consequences of the experience that one enjoys being a perceptual experience. In the case of the naïve realist, if a subject’s experience is perceptual then the perceptual judgements that they may make are based upon the world itself, while for the indirect realist they are not. The latter account needs to connect the experience, that is the ground for the judgement, to the world. The justification is, then, in a sense, indirect.

When I make a perceptual judgement, such as 'I see that there is a cat on the mat,' and I justify this judgement by an appeal to my experience, on the object-dependent account this is all I have to do. When I judge that the cat is on the mat I do not go beyond what is available to me in my experience. In judging that the cat is on the mat, on the basis of my experience, then the basis of this judgement includes the cat being on the mat (if my experience is perceptual).

On the object-independent account, however, it is not the experience, in itself, that is appealed to in justifying my claim, because the experience in itself is not perceptual. What I am appealing to in justifying my claim is not just my experience, but my experience and some sort of relation that it stands in to the world.

The point is that in itself, such experience cannot be enough for justifying a claim about the world. Extra considerations have to be brought in, if we wish to justify such claims. Philosophers like McDowell think that such extra considerations cannot be successfully brought to bear, but for our purposes whether they can or cannot is not important. All that is important is that if we think of experience as object-dependent, then we need look no further for our justifications. It is simpler, to explain how experience justifies claims to knowledge, to think of experience as object-dependent rather than independent.

2.3 The intentional constraint
There is a deeper issue than the question of how we are justified in making knowledge claims upon the basis of our experience. This concerns how such claims can even be about the mind-independent, normal objects of the world around us. When a subject makes a judgement that the world is a certain way, on the basis of their experience, what makes their thought 'the world is such and such a way' directed at, or about, the world?

The more fundamental appeal to object-dependency, then, is to the effect that such thoughts can only be about the world if our experiences are dependent upon the world in the sense described earlier. Now, just as with the claim about the justification of our claims to perceptual knowledge, I do not wish to maintain that we simply cannot maintain that such thoughts are possible if experiences are object-dependent.\(^{14}\) This may or may not be the case. The more limited claim that I want to make is that if we think of experience as object-dependent it is easier for us to explain the possibility of such thoughts. And so this is a motivation for why we should begin with such a conception of experience and abandon it only if we have to.

The problem is sometimes expressed in terms of object-independent conceptions of perceptual experience failing to explain how we can be in 'cognitive contact' with the objects of perception, such that those objects can be thought about, and perceptual knowledge claims made about them.

The argument runs something like this. Perceptual knowledge depends upon perceptual demonstrative thought. Perceptual demonstrative thoughts are those demonstrative thoughts that experience makes possible, such as the thought that 'that apple is red.' Where the demonstrative 'that apple' refers to something experienced. Perceptual demonstrative thought depends upon experience being world involving:

\[\text{It is in virtue of enabling us to pick out objects in thought that visual perception puts us in cognitive contact with those objects and enables us to take in facts about those objects. If via perception there were no demonstrative thoughts about objects there would be no cognitive contact with those objects.} \]

(Millar 2007: 189)

If we think of experience as not object involving, then the experience itself, on its own, cannot explain our capacity to have demonstrative thoughts about the object of

\(^{14}\) This, I take it, is the claim of McDowell (1982; 1986). See also Child (1994).
perception. Such an experience, in not being dependent for its identity upon the
object of perception, is of a kind that could occur in the absence of the object of
perception. If an experience with the same nature could occur in the absence of the
object of perception, then the capacity to frame demonstrative thoughts about that
object must derive from something other than the nature of the experience.

Again, some philosophers want to say that the extra that is needed to explain this
capacity is an impossible goal for the object-independent theorist. I do not need to
argue for any such claim, however. That naïve realism does not have to search for
these extra factors in order to explain this capacity is enough to provide a motivation
for beginning with naïve realism. Experience itself makes such demonstrative
thoughts possible by including the objects of perception as part of its nature.

2.4 Different ways of explaining object-dependency

So far I have looked at reasons why we should begin with an account of the nature of
perceptual experience which regards it as dependent upon the object of perception, an
account which, in other words, conceives of perception as psychologically direct. If
we think that perceptual experience in itself suffices to put us in perceptual contact
with the world, then we can more easily satisfy the epistemic and intentional
constraints than if we think of perceptual experience as falling short of the world. But
this is not yet to offer any support for starting our enquiry into the nature of perceptual
experience— with naïve realism. For the naïve realist position is a combination of a
psychologically direct view of perception with a presentational view of the nature of
perceptual experience. But all we have support for so far is the claim that we should
defend a psychologically direct view of perception, if possible. And naïve realism is
not the only way to conceive of perception as direct in this way.

It is open to someone who adopts an intentionalist conception of the nature of
perceptual experience to take such experience to be object-dependent. According to
the intentionalist, experience is a relation between a subject and a content, where this
content is a proposition that expresses the world as being a certain way. When an
object phenomenally appears a certain way to a subject, the way in which the object
phenomenally appears is to be explained by the content of the intentional state that the
subject is in.
This content can be thought of as either object-dependent or object-independent. If the content is object-independent, then the experience psychologically mediates a subject’s perception of the world. It is not in itself perceptual, and for it to count as perceptual the content must be appropriately connected to things in the world. A conjunctive account must be adopted that sees experience as a necessary but insufficient part of perception. If the content is object-dependent, however, then the experience itself can be thought of as providing perceptual contact with the world.

This form of non-naive realism, in conceiving of perception as psychologically direct, is as equally supported as naive realism by what has been said so far. For in embodying an object-dependent account of perceptual experience, just as naive realism does, it can more easily satisfy the epistemic and intentional constraints than object-independent accounts.

2.5 The advantage of the naïve realist account

The objection to the object-dependent intentionalist account is that it does not explain how experience gives us the capacity to think demonstratively about things in the world. Instead it assumes this capacity, for experience is just a way of thinking about things in the world demonstratively (albeit a very special way of thinking).

Campbell expresses this view as follows:

Experience of objects has to be something more primitive than ability to think about objects, in terms of which the ability to think about objects can be explained. (Campbell 2002: 122)

But on the object-dependent intentionalist view:

The claim that the object is a constituent of the experience is taken to amount to the idea that the object is a constituent of the proposition which gives the content of the experience [...] But if we think of the matter in this way, then experience can play no role in explaining how it is possible for us to understand propositions about our surroundings. Experience of objects simply presupposes, and so cannot explain, our ability to think about objects. (Campbell 2002: 123)
This objection questions the object-dependent intentionalist's ability to provide a fundamental answer to the question as to how thought about the world is possible. And so we might think, all things being equal, that we should prefer an account of object-dependent experience that offers a fundamental explanation of object directed thought to one that does not.

John Campbell advances this objection to the object-dependent intentionalist account in his defence of what he refers to as the 'relational view':

On a 'relational view,' the qualitative character of the experience is constituted by the qualitative character of the scene perceived. I will argue that only this view, on which experience of an object is a simple relation holding between perceiver and object, can characterise the kind of acquaintance with objects that provides knowledge of reference. (Campbell 2002: 114-115)

Here we have two claims. One is that the phenomenal character is 'constituted' by the character of the objects perceived. The other claim is that experience is a 'simple relation holding between perceiver and object.' This looks like the presentational claim that I attribute to the naïve realist, but the former claim is something that I have been careful to distance the naïve realist from. I regard it as a particular conception of how a presentational account of experience might explain how the character of experience is determined by that which is presented. But we do not have to think that this is the only way to explain phenomenal character, on a presentationalist picture.

Given this difference between the naïve realism that I have formulated and the 'relational view' of Campbell, one might worry that the claim about how the character of experience is determined by the object of experience is important to experience's capacity to enable us to have thoughts about the world. It is to this thought that I now turn.

We can see in Campbell's 'relational view' a link with the discussion of the phenomenal principle, or actualism, of the earlier section. Recall that while actualism is supposed to derive its support from phenomenological reflection I argued that it goes beyond what reflection upon experience seems to reveal to us. It is one thing to observe that experience seems to be presentational of some object, available for immediate demonstrative reference, but it is an additional claim to then suppose that the character of experience is to be identified with the character of this object. This further claim, unlike the presentational claim, does not seem to me to have
phenomenological support. Instead, experience seems to me to be silent upon this matter. Experience seems to be, on reflection upon it, presentational in nature. It does not seem to be the presentation of something whose character simply is the character of one's experience.

Campbell's 'relational view,' then, seems to be an extension of the belief that if we accept that experience is genuinely presentational, and so relational in nature, then its character is 'given,' or 'constituted,' or more simply 'identified' with the character of that which is presented. As is clear, I think that this is unwarranted without the offering of some reason why phenomenal character must be determined this way, if experience is presentational in nature. What is more, it is an unnecessary assumption from the perspective of what it is that Campbell is trying to do, which is to explain how experience provides us with knowledge of the reference of demonstratives:

It seems as though it ought to be possible [...] to extract the conception of a mind-independent world from an experience which has a mind-independent object as a constituent, which is what the 'relational view' ascribes to us. (Campbell 2002: 121)

But if what is important in explaining the explanatory role of experience is just the claim that experience must have the objects of perception (mind-independent objects) as constituents, in a non-relational and presentational way, why embellish this with an additional phenomenal claim to the extent that the phenomenal character of experience must be 'constituted' by these objects?

It is the normal-object-presenting nature of perceptual experience that grounds our capacities to think about the objects that we perceive. An explanation of the object-dependent nature of perceptual experience in terms of object-dependent content still leaves the explanation of these capacities unfulfilled. If we think of the object-dependency of perceptual experience as being grounded in its having a presentational nature, then we have a more complete explanation of our capacities for object directed thought. But the claim that perceptual experience is presentational should not automatically bring with it the further phenomenal claim that the character of experience is simply the character of the objects presented in experience. This thought is something passed on from the discussions of sense-data and the phenomenal principle/actualism, but it should be resisted. It may be correct, but we cannot assume it just because we take experience to be presentational in nature.
The important aspect of the 'relational view,' as far as satisfying the intentional constraint, is, as I understand it, something like this:

Experience must be relational, in that the existence and identity of perceptual experience is dependent upon the objects of perception. But more than this, the objects of perception must be constituents of perceptual experience in this sense: that they are actual objects that are available to the subject of experience for immediate demonstrative reference and determine the character of experience.

The demand that our theory of perception must explain how we can have knowledge of reference is met by the presentational claim, that 'experience of an object is a simple relation holding between perceiver and object,' where this object determines the character of one's experience. But it is open to someone to try and accept this way of satisfying the constraint while rejecting the phenomenal claim, that 'the qualitative character of the experience is constituted by the qualitative character of the scene perceived.' In later chapters I will explain this possibility in greater detail, but for now I just want to point out that if one takes the intentional constraint seriously, then we can consider the question of whether or not this is satisfied by our acceptance of the presentational claim, and we can, for the moment, remain silent about claims about how exactly this presentational view conceives of the determination of phenomenal character.

3. Motivation three: metaphysical considerations

In claiming that there is no more to perceiving the world than having experience of a certain sort, the naïve realist gives us the simplest possible account of the structure of perception. The realist who thinks of perception as psychologically mediated must give us a comparatively complex account of perception in that experience is a component of that account. For the naïve realist, the account of experience is the account of perception.

The complexity of psychologically indirect realist accounts can be seen in their requiring a conjunctive account of perception. Perception must be thought of as experience plus a set of other factors. So the naïve realist provides a simpler picture than the psychological indirect realist in respect to the relation between perception and experience when perceiving.
There is a problem with this, however. For the psychologically indirect realist could respond by saying that while the naïve realist does indeed provide the simplest account of the relation between perception and experience, certain other considerations concerning the possibility of illusion and hallucination compel him to provide a more complex account of experience across perceptual and non-perceptual cases. I shall return to this point later, when discussing disjunctivism in chapter six. For now it is enough to recognise the point that a naïve realist account gives us a *prima facie* simpler view of the nature of perception than psychologically indirect realism.

This motivation is the weakest of the three that we have looked at, because it seems as if any account of perception that takes it to be psychologically direct will conceive of the relation between perception and experience more simply than those that must adopt a conjunctive account. But if this is the case, then the object-dependent intentionalism that we looked at in the last section has an equal claim to be supported by this metaphysical consideration as naïve realism. For just like naïve realism it thinks of perception as psychologically direct, and perception will not be conceived of as experience plus a set of other factors. This is why I have restricted the claim to an advantage that the naïve realist holds over the *psychologically indirect* realist, rather than the *non-naïve* realist.

4. Conclusion

The purpose of this chapter has been to argue that naïve realism is a position worth defending, from a phenomenological, epistemic, and metaphysical perspective. Basically, naïve realism offers simple answers to certain questions. Non-naïve accounts, on the other hand, require us to answer these questions in a more complex fashion. We should, then, defend naïve realism as strongly as we can. It is only if, through philosophical reflection, we come to the conclusion that naïve realism must be abandoned, that we should start pursuing these non-naïve avenues of thought.
Chapter Three
The Attack on Naïve Realism: The Significance of Illusion and Hallucination

1. Introduction

Illusions and hallucinations are held to be two sorts of experience the possibility of which rules out the naïve realist understanding of the nature of perceptual experience. The common characterisation of illusion is of a situation in which, while a subject genuinely perceives some object, it appears other than it really is. Hallucinations, on the other hand, are situations in which a subject is having an experience but not perceiving anything. The possibility of illusions and hallucinations can both be used in different ways in order to try to reject naïve realism. That is, they can both be used to try and show that perceptual experience is not, in itself, perceptual.

The arguments from illusion and hallucination as I present them are directed against naïve realism. This is to be distinguished from those formulations of the argument that are directed against direct realism, where 'direct' is taken to mean 'perceptually direct.' In this chapter I present the possibility of illusion and hallucination as potential starting points not against direct realism of this kind, but as against what I have been referring to as naïve realism. This is a position that regards perception as being, in its nature, presentational of the actual objects of perception.

Furthermore, it is often the case that the arguments from illusion and hallucination are put to use in support of some positive conception of perceptual experience, such that it is a relation to a mind-dependent object, or a purely intentional state. These positive theses are, strictly speaking, further claims that are made by proponents of the arguments and should not be held to be integral to the arguments themselves. So we must be careful not to reject the arguments just because we find the positive conceptions of experience that they are sometimes used to support objectionable.

1 See, for example, Smith (2002).
Having said this, I do not want to focus too narrowly on the negative use of illusion and hallucination as a means of arguing against naïve realism. If they are genuine categories of experience then their possibility must be incorporated into any satisfactory account of the nature of our awareness of things, and not just naïve realism. The purpose of this chapter is, then, not only to present the arguments to which naïve realism must find a response, but also to present the constraints that any understanding of perception must satisfy.

The argument from illusion argues that illusions are perceptual experiences that cannot derive their perceptual status from the nature of the experience alone. Illusions do not, in themselves, put us in contact with the world. The way in which the naïve realist conceives of veridical perceptual experience cannot apply to non-veridical perceptual experience. It then generalises from illusory to veridical cases and so establishes the falsity of naïve realism for all experience.

The argument from hallucination claims that perfect non-perceptual experiences have the same nature as perceptual experiences. It then claims that non-perceptual experiences are not relations to objects whose existence is independent of experience and concludes that this also must be true of perceptual experiences as they have the same nature. And so perceptual experience cannot be thought of as a relation to a normal, mind-independent object, as the naïve realist wishes to do so in conceiving of it as being presentational of the objects of perception.

The argument from illusion adopts the strategy of asserting that naïve realism must be false of certain experiences and then generalising this to all experiences. The argument from hallucination asserts that perceptual experiences and non-perceptual experiences must be of the same kind, and that given a certain understanding of the nature of non-perceptual experience naïve realism must be false.

The purpose of this chapter is to articulate and explain these two different argumentative strategies for the rejection of naïve realism.

2. The significance of illusion

2.1 The argument

As mentioned above, my formulation of the argument from illusion will be, first and foremost, an argument against naïve realism rather than against perceptually direct realism. Any argument against perceptually direct realism will, a fortiori, also be an
argument against naïve realism because the latter conceives of perception as both perceptually and psychologically direct. But the reverse is clearly not the case. An argument against naïve realism is not necessarily an argument against perceptually direct realism. The following argument is not intended to work against perceptually direct realism. Its target is naïve realism and its cogency should be measured in terms of how well it presents a problem for that position. It is also worth mentioning that the argument from illusion that I present is not an argument for some particular positive conception of perceptual experience. It is sometimes used to argue to the conclusion that the experiences we enjoy when perceiving things are to be understood as involving the immediate awareness of sense-data (things that are quite different in nature from the normal objects of perception). As I conceive of the argument from illusion, however, it is intended to show that naïve realism simply cannot be true, and it remains neutral as to what we should put in its place.

The basic structure of the argument from illusion is simple. Naïve realism must be rejected because:

AI (1) If naïve realism is correct, then perceptual experience involves the presentation of the objects of perception to the perceiver.

AI (2) It is possible for things to appear other than they are. It is possible for there to be non-veridical perceptual experiences.

AI (3) Non-veridical perceptual experiences cannot be understood as the presentation of the objects of perception to the perceiver.

AI (4) Veridical perceptual experiences must have the same nature as non-veridical perceptual experiences.

AI (5) Veridical perceptual experiences cannot be understood as the presentation of the objects of perception to the perceiver (from AI (4)).

AI (1) is just the expression of naïve realism. The purpose of AI (4) and AI (5) in the argument is to prevent the naïve realist from limiting his account of the nature of perceptual experience to only veridical perceptual experience. I will briefly defend

See, for example Price (1950).

For various recent versions of the argument from illusion see Maund (2003), Robinson (1994) and Smith (2002).
This generalising step before looking in more detail at AI (2) and AI (3), which are the central claims of the argument.

**2.2 The generalising step**

There are two things that I want to say about the generalising step. First, it seems to me to be highly plausible. Second, even if it could be denied, it would be a dialectically weak move for the naïve realist to make, as it would strengthen their opponent's position. It is better for the naïve realist to accept AI (4), and attack AI (2) or AI (3).

In support of the generalising step it is common to point out the evident continuity between veridical and non-veridical experiences.\(^4\) This continuity can be exhibited over time with the same object, or at a single time with different parts of the same object. So for example the colour that something appears to be is sensitive to the surrounding context. A grey object that appears a certain shade of grey against a light background may appear a lighter shade of grey against a dark background. Such illusory experiences can be exhibited over time, as when the background to the grey object is altered from one time to another, or at the same time with different parts of the object, as when different parts of the grey object have different backgrounds.\(^5\) To say that my veridical and non-veridical experiences are of different kinds in such cases is rather hard to believe, given the subjective continuity of, in the first case, my experience of the object over time, and in the second case in my experience of the different parts of the object at the same time. If we are naïve realists, this puts pressure on the claim that we are presented with the same object over time, or, in the other case, that it is the whole object that is present to us and not just a part of it.

While considerations such as these are persuasive, they are not yet compelling. One could still insist that it is not necessary for this continuity of experience that the experiences have the same nature. By using the notion of what David Smith refers to as 'sense-datum infection,' however, it can be argued that no account of a difference in kind between veridical/non-veridical perceptual experience can be successful.

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\(^4\) I have not yet considered what common illusions should count as non-veridical perceptual experiences for the purposes of the argument from illusion. This will depend upon our understanding of what the argument from illusion means when it says that 'it is possible for things to appear other than they are' and an assessment of whether any examples of illusion satisfy this meaning. Here I will restrict myself to illusions that I do regard as falling into this category, but for a justification of this the reader must wait until the next chapter.
Smith presents the notion of sense-datum infection against the background of a version of the argument from illusion that argues for a rejection of perceptually direct realism and for a positive conception of the nature of experience according to which it involves the immediate awareness of non-normal objects (sense-data):

Suppose that we see a red tomato that looks black as a result of unusual lighting. We conclude [according to Smith’s version of the argument from illusion] that we are aware of a black sense-datum distinct from any physical tomato. Now although in this situation the shape of the tomato is not, we may suppose, subject to illusion, we cannot maintain that we are directly aware visually of the tomato’s shape, because, simply in virtue of one of the visible features of the tomato being subject to illusion, a sense-datum has replaced the tomato as the object of visual awareness as such. For the shape you see is the shape of something black, and the tomato is not black. I shall refer to this as ‘sense-datum infection.’ (Smith 2002: 26)

This argument can be used against the idea that veridical and non-veridical perceptual experiences have different natures. In the above example it seems correct to say that the tomato appears to have a colour that it does not possess, and a shape that it does possess. We have a veridical perceptual experience of the shape of the tomato and a non-veridical experience of its colour. According to the naïve realist who wants to deny the generalising step, the experience of the colour has a different nature to the experience of the shape. In the latter case, the experience involves the actual presentation of the tomato, but in the former case it does not. In the passage from Smith, the theorist explains the nature of the illusory experience in terms of awareness of a sense-datum, a mind-independent object that actually instantiates the property that characterises the way in which the subject is appeared to, colour wise, when viewing the tomato. The problem is that we seem compelled to regard the awareness of the shape that is present to the subject in the same way, because the shape is the shape of something black.

This problem would seem applicable, not just to those theorists who try to combine naivety of the awareness of some properties in experience with a sense-datum view of others, but to any naïve realist who tries to resist generalising from the

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5 For this latter kind of example see Figure 1 below.
nature of illusory experience to the nature of veridical perceptual experience. The objection would be just as applicable to someone who claimed that illusory experience is the representation of properties that objects do not possess, while veridical perceptual experience is the immediate presentation of the object to the subject. The heart of the problem here for the naïve realist is any attempt to separate out visual experience of, say, the shape of something from visual experience of its colour. Whatever account we give of the nature of the experience of the colour of a thing, we must give the same account of the nature of the experience of the shape of that thing, because the shape is always the shape of something coloured.

Even if the above argument should fail, it is still advisable for the naïve realist to accept the generalising step. If the naïve realist takes non-veridical perceptual experience to have a different nature to veridical perceptual experience then they are admitting that there is a kind of perceptual experience that is not both presentational in nature and intrinsically perceptual. Its status as perceptual must be determined by factors external to it. The naïve realist must accept, in other words, that there is a kind of perceptual experience that can be understood in the sort of way that his non-naïve opponent wishes to understand all perceptual experience. But if both the naïve realist and his opponent accepts that subjects can and do perceive things in this manner the onus is now on the naïve realist to show why all perceptual experience does not have this nature. The non-naïve realist can appeal to simplicity and maintain that their conception of perceptual experience is all that is required, for why should it be necessary to introduce another kind?

The naïve realist should, then, direct their attention to AI (2) and AI (3). According to these two claims there is a class of perceptual experience which cannot be understood in the way in which the naïve realist wishes to understand perceptual experience.

2.3 The problem for the naïve realist

In his book *Perception*, Howard Robinson gives the following list of illusory experiences:

Mountains look purple when they are not and the sky looks blue when there is nothing actually blue there; clearly defined objects look fuzzy to the short-sighted; different lights make objects look different colours, though the objects
don't actually change; distance makes objects look the wrong shape; a hot hand and a cold hand feel the same water as being of different temperatures; Müller-Lyre lines look different lengths when they are not; objects appear to be different shapes from different angles - e.g. a round penny from the side looks elliptical; science shows that physical objects are almost entirely different from how they appear. (Robinson 1994: 31)

As this example illustrates there is a great range to those experiences that we are willing to regard as, in some sense, illusory. And so there is, unsurprisingly, scope for a great deal of disagreement as to what should be included in the list as relevant to considerations about the nature of perceptual experience.

There are various reasons for why one might wish to rule out cases of perspectival variability such as the round penny seen from an angle as being instances of illusory experiences. David Smith, for example claims that it is false to say that the coin appears elliptical - really, if we are to be faithful to the phenomenology, the coin appears round and tilted away from one (Smith 2002: 181-182). Or one could accept that the coin appears elliptical, but deny that this is a property that the coin does not have. One could claim that it is an apparent property of the coin, where this is understood as a relational property of it. One might think that objects do not really appear fuzzy to the short sighted, in the sense that this is a property that they appear to have, but rather that they do not appear in as much detail as they do to normally sighted people. Or again, one could argue that illumination conditions do have an effect upon the objects illuminated, in that the wavelengths of light that their surfaces reflect are dependent upon these conditions.

I am sure if we went through all the candidates on Robinson's list, or indeed anybody else's, we would be able to find some philosopher who has at some time questioned its status as illusory. What is important is not so much whether a given experience should be counted as illusory, but whether there is some clear class of experience that we are trying to come up with examples of, and whether this kind of experience is a genuine possibility.

In chapter one I elucidated a common distinction between different senses of 'appearing,' and concluded that the issue that interests us is as to the nature of

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6 See, for example, Noë (2004).
7 See Armstrong (1968: 283-284).
phenomenal appearances. When someone consciously perceives something that thing appears to them a certain way, where this 'way' is a characterisation of what it is like for them to perceive that object. The phenomenal character of their conscious visual experience is the way in which they are appeared to. We also identified a core phenomenal character of experience. This is the way in which a subject is appeared to when an object's sensible qualities appear some way to a subject. So when an object appears a certain shape and a certain colour to someone, then the core phenomenal character of their experience is the way in which they are so appeared to. But when an object appears, say, sad to someone, as a face may do, then while there is plausibly a genuine phenomenal character to such an appearance, a distinctive way of being appeared to, this in not a part of the core phenomenal character of the subject's experience.

It should be clear that it is this phenomenal sense of 'appears' and its application to the sensible qualities that the argument relies upon. It is precisely this sense of 'appears' that the naïve realist conception of perceptual experience tries to explain in terms of the presentation of the object of perception to the mind of the perceiving subject.

In the next chapter I will look at some recent attempts to generate a response to examples of illusions understood in this sense, and argue that they fail. For the moment, however, let us accept the possibility of such illusions and examine their significance for naïve realism.

The problem for the naïve realist is this: if the character of perceptual experience is determined by the presentation of the object of perception to the perceiving subject, how is it possible to explain any illusory character that this experience might have? If we grant that illusory experience has a presentational nature, and that to be appeared to a certain way consists in the presentation of some object (let us call it the object of experience) to the mind of the perceiver this object cannot, so it is claimed, be identified with the object of perception. This is because in a case in which an object appears to be other than it is the object of experience has a property that the object of perception lacks. So, on the plausible principle that two objects are identical only if they share all properties, the object of experience cannot be identified with the object of perception. And this, as we have seen, is central to the naïve realist position, as they conceive of perceptual experience as being the presentation of the object of perception to a subject. So, at least for illusory experiences, the naïve realist position
must be false. And then, of course, if we accept that we must generalise from what is true of illusory experience to what must be true of perceptual experience in general, the naïve realist position must be incorrect for all perceptual experience. An example will help to illuminate the difficult for the naïve realist, as well as revealing the relative ease with which his non-naïve opponent can accommodate the same possibility.

Consider a situation in which a subject perceives a grey ring of uniform reflectance that is set against four different backgrounds of varying lightness. The perceptual experience that the subject enjoys will be such that the portions of the grey ring whose background is darker than the other portions will appear lighter than those other portions, even though they are of the same objective lightness. This is an example of simultaneous lightness contrast, and is presented in the figure below.

![Figure 1](Simultaneous Lightness Contrast. From Palmer (1999: 106).

In such a situation it is true to say that the subject perceives the ring, and that the ring appears to be composed of portions of varying degrees of brightness. But the ring is in fact uniformly bright and so appears to the subject other than it is. The subject is therefore enjoying a non-veridical perceptual experience of that ring. How are we to explain the fact that the ring appears other than it is?

For the non-naïve realist this is straightforward. Simplifying for the moment, let us assume that the causal theory of perception is the only plausible non-naïve realist position to have regarding the nature of perception. According to the causal theory of perception, perception is composed of object, experience and a causal relation between the two such that the former causes the latter. So, in an illusory case such as
the one under consideration the theorist can explain the illusory appearance in the following way. The subject enjoys an experience whose phenomenal character, the way in which the subject is appeared to, is determined by things external to the uniformly grey ring that he perceives. What it is that determines phenomenal character may be the content of a representational state, a non-physical sense-datum, or whatever, depending upon the theorist's understanding of the nature of experience. The fact that the ring is uniformly grey, but does not appear so, is not a problem. The discrepancy between phenomenal properties and properties of the object perceived is explained by the content of experience not matching the object, or the sense-datum having a property that the object lacks.

According to the naïve realist, on the other hand, perception does not break down into experience plus a set of other factors. And so given his view of the determination of phenomenal character, as being determined by some object, this object must be identified with the object of perception. The phenomenal character of the subject's experience must be determined by the grey ring. But if the grey ring is of uniform brightness, but appears to him as if it is has portions of varying brightness, what explains this fact of appearance? The objection is that the naïve realist just cannot explain this, as the only resources they have to explain the subject being appeared to in that way are the properties of the ring, which does not have the property of varying degrees of brightness.

This objection rests upon ascribing to the naïve realist a certain principle about the determination of the core phenomenal character of perceptual experience. This is that the phenomenal properties of one's experience are to be identified with the properties of the object of experience, which instantiates or possesses these properties. This commits the naïve realist to accepting what has been referred to as the 'sense-datum inference,' or the 'phenomenal principle.' According to this principle, when someone is appeared to in a particular way then the object of that person's experience must actually possess the property that characterises the way in which they are appeared to. It is the thought that the naïve realist accepts this principle that leads to the objection that they just cannot explain the phenomenal character of non-veridical perceptual experiences given their identification of the object of experience with the object of perception.

There are two strategies that the naïve realist might take in objecting to the argument from illusion. They can reject the claim that things can phenomenally
appear other than they are (AI (3)), or they can reject the claim that they must subscribe to the phenomenal principle, which supports AI (4). I shall look at the first of these strategies in chapter four, and the second in chapter five.

3. The significance of hallucination

3.1 The argument

The possibility of perfect non-perceptual experience, like the possibility of non-veridical perceptual experience, places a constraint upon accounts of perception. Any account of perception must explain what the nature of such experience is, otherwise our understanding of perception is incomplete. More than this, if an account is silent about perfect non-perceptual experience then it has not yet shown that it is coherent. For it may be that we are forced to think in certain ways about the nature of perfect non-perceptual experience and its relation to perceptual experience that places yet further constraints upon how we conceive of the latter. Indeed, this is the main point of the various formulations of what has become known as the argument from hallucination.

The basic structure of any argument against naïve realism that is based upon the possibility of hallucination is as follows:

AH (1) If naïve realism is correct, then perceptual experience involves the presentation to a subject of an object the existence of which is independent of its presence in experience (a mind-independent object).

AH (1) is the expression of the naïve realist commitment to the nature of perceptual experience as presentational of the objects of perception. These objects are, given the naïve realist’s realist assumption, mind-independent objects.

AH (2) It is possible for there to be hallucinatory experience the nature of which is such that it does not involve the presentation to a subject of a mind-independent object, but which has the same subjective character as perceptual experience.

AH (3) It is necessary to give the same account of the nature of perceptual experience as the type of hallucinatory experience referred to in (2).
AH (2) says that a certain kind of experience is possible, and the possibility of this kind of experience places a constraint upon any account of perceptual experience. This constraint is expressed in AH (3) and is to the effect that the account given of hallucinatory experience in premise AH (2) is the account that we must give of perceptual experience. It follows from AH (2) and AH (3) that:

AH (4) Perceptual experience does not involve the presentation to a subject of a mind-independent object.

And if this is the case then:

AH (5) Naïve realism cannot be correct. (By Modus Tollens from AH (1) and AH (4))

This is the outline of the argument against naïve realism. There are a number of details to fill in. Firstly, what exactly is the kind of experience that is being referred to in AH (2), and why should we think that it is a genuine possibility? Secondly, what reason is there for thinking that AH (3) is correct? Why should the possibility of the experience introduced in AH (2) mean that we should generalise our account of it to perceptual experience?

3.2 The possibility of hallucination

3.2.1 Philosophers' hallucination

The kind of hallucinatory experience referred to in the argument above has three key features: (a) It is a kind of experience that does not put the subject into perceptual contact with anything – it is not the case that in virtue of enjoying the experience one is perceiving something. In other words it is a non-perceptual experience; (b) It is a kind of non-perceptual experience that is subjectively indiscriminable from perceptual experience; (c) It is a sensory experience, in contrast to mental imagery or visual memories. Let us describe a non-perceptual experience that is subjectively indiscriminable from perceptual experience as being perfect. The hallucinatory experience talked about in the argument above, and which I shall sometimes refer to as philosophers' hallucination (for reasons that will become clear) is, then, perfect, non-perceptual experience.
What is it for a mental state to be genuinely sensory and experiential? A useful way of understanding this notion is through understanding the sorts of states of mind it stands in contrast to. These are mental episodes that are not sensory and experiential at all, or not genuinely sensory but that are likely to be taken as so by the subject of them.

Paradigm cases of mental states that are not sensory at all will be cases such as believing that such and such is the case. There are two reasons as to why they should not be regarded as experiential. Firstly, there seems to be no phenomenal character to beliefs, and more generally speaking propositional attitudes, that are non-occurrent. It may be true of a subject at a certain time that they hold all manner of beliefs, such that Neil Armstrong was the first man on the moon, or that the earth is not flat, but this need not contribute in any way to the conscious life of the subject at that time. Secondly, even if a subject holds an occurrent belief, say, that the clumsy man will drop the dishes, there is not any phenomenal character that this mental episode essentially has. Which is to say that the fact of the subject holding that belief does not depend on exactly what it is like for the subject to be so believing, even though there may be something it is like for the subject to so believe. In the case of having an experience of, say, something red however, the phenomenal character of one’s state of mind seems essential to its being an experience of something red.

The second kind of mental episode is harder to get a handle on. They are not sensory, where this is to be understood as meaning they are not cases in which ‘one seems to be confronted with an actual instance of a perceptible quality’ (Smith 2008: 183-184). A sensory experience is one that has a presentational phenomenology, in that in enjoying such experiences it at least appears as if there is an object which is presented to one. Non-sensory experiences are not like this. Nevertheless, unlike belief or knowledge, it is plausible that there is essentially ‘something it is like’ for the subject to undergo them. They are perhaps best understood as states that can seem to be sensory, in virtue of their nature. That is, when one is under hypnosis, it can seem to one as if one seems to be acquainted with an actual instance of a perceptible quality. They are of such a nature that they can be taken to be sensory by the subject of them. I will therefore refer to them as ‘pseudo-sensory’ experiences. Such experiences might include imaginings, visualisations, and dreams.

I refrain from referring to these episodes merely as non-sensory experiences, as Smith (2008) does, on the grounds that the class of episodes in a subject’s life that we
are willing to call experiential but that are not sensory, is somewhat wider than the class of episodes that we are trying to capture. So for example we are willing to talk about the experience of crossing the Alps, or of being divorced, but these are not sensory experiences. The kind of experience which is being talked about when we refer to hypnosis or dreams, however, has a closer relationship to sensory experience than the experience of crossing the Alps, or of being divorced. 'Experience' is not being used in a different sense to the sense it has when we talk about a subject's perceptual experience of chicken when we talk of a subject's experience of a chicken when under hypnosis. Rather, they are in a state of mind that they mistake for a sensory experience of a chicken. I propose, therefore, to call these cases pseudo-sensory experiences, where 'experience' has the meaning it has when talking directly about sensory experiences, and not when talking about events undergone that one was experiencing (in the sensory sense) at the time of undergoing them.

Another feature of philosophers' hallucination is that it is non-perceptual. This is to say that it is not the case that in virtue of enjoying such an experience one is in perceptual contact with any normal object. It is not the case that there is a normal object that one can pick out, think about, or act toward in virtue of one's experience. An experience's status as non-perceptual will ultimately depend upon the nature of the positive account that is given of perceptual experience. When we understand what it is for a subject to enjoy an experience that does put them in contact with some normal object we will we understand what a non-perceptual experience lacks.

Finally, philosophers' hallucination is experience that is subjectively indiscriminable from perceptual experience. This is an epistemic notion that is to do with what a subject can know on the basis of their own experience.

The general epistemic notion of indiscriminability can be thought of as follows:

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\text{a is indiscriminable from b for a subject at a time if and only if at that time the subject is not able to discriminate between a and b, that is, if and only if at that time the subject is not able to activate (acquire or employ) the relevant kind of knowledge that a and b are distinct. (Williamson 1990: 8)}
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What this means when we apply this idea to the claim that a non-perceptual experience is indiscriminable from a perceptual experience is that they are not discriminable if and only if it is not possible for a subject to come to know, in virtue of their experience alone, that their experience is not perceptual. Note, then, that the
'relevant kind of knowledge' that the subject cannot come to acquire is restricted to knowledge that the experiences are distinct that is based upon the experiences alone. To come to know that a non-perceptual experience is distinct from a perceptual experience in some other way is not to subjectively discriminate the two experiences.

While this notion of subjective indiscriminability is an epistemic one, it is open to a theorist to explain the epistemic position that one is in when one enjoys such an experience in any way they like. In defining subjective indiscriminability in this way nothing substantial has been said about the nature of such non-perceptual experience.

3.2.2 The possibility of philosophers' hallucination

Before we can even advance the argument from hallucination as I have laid it out above, it is necessary to accept that the kind of experience that the argument is appealed to is a genuine possibility. There is a tradition of supporting this claim by appealing to cases of hallucination as reported by the empirical sciences. I shall refer to these as actually occurring hallucinations. In contrast to this I will refer to the kind of perfect non-perceptual visual experience discussed above as philosophers' hallucination.

Paul Coates, for example, points to the visual hallucinations that are constitutive of Charles Bonnet syndrome (to be explained below) as a clear example of what he refers to as 'complex indiscriminable hallucinatory phenomena' (Coates 2007: 66-69). Likewise J. R. Smythies discussion of the hallucinogenic results of consuming Mescaline suggests that he believes that they give support to such a claim. (Smythies 1956: 81-105) C. W. K. Mundle takes a particularly strong line in thinking that the argument from hallucination requires evidence from actually occurring hallucinations. He writes that 'it would be frivolous to present as a reason for rejecting Realism [direct realism] the mere fact that the occurrence of hallucinations is possible' (Mundle 1971: 35-36) and that while acknowledging that the appeal to such phenomena has its difficulties, does not regard them as insurmountable (Mundle 1971: 36-39).

It is my belief that while we should accept the possibility of philosophers' hallucination we should not do so on the basis of any such appeal to actual occurring hallucinations.
There is a tradition of questioning this appeal to actually occurring hallucinations to support the possibility of perfect non-perceptual experiences. R. J. Hirst, for example, suggested that:

Hallucinations are vivid, and especially eidetic, mental imagery; and where the subject is deceived by this imagery it is being confused with genuine perception owing to various disposing factors. (Hirst 1959: 44)

And Austin thought that there was a 'grotesque exaggeration of the similarity between "delusive" perceptions [non-perceptual experiences] and "veridical" ones' (Austin 1962: 54).

I interpret this dissenting tradition as claiming that one or more of the features of philosophers' hallucination are lacking in the examples given of actually occurring hallucinations that help motivate the argument from hallucination. If an actually occurring hallucination should be considered a perceptual experience, then it can be accounted for in whatever way we account for veridical or non-veridical perceptual experiences. If an actually occurring hallucination is not indiscriminable from a perceptual experience, then there is straightaway a reason to doubt that we should give the same account of that experience as we would give of perceptual experience. Our explanation of that experience would not place any constraint upon our explanation of perceptual experience, because of this subjectively detectable difference. Finally, if an actually occurring hallucination is not a sensory experience, then it is just not relevant to our understanding of perceptual experience, which is a sensory experience. There would be no way our account of the actually occurring hallucination could generalise to the account we ought to give of perceptual experience.

To illustrate the difficulties with appealing to actually occurring hallucinations as revealing the possibility of philosophers' hallucination, I will consider a number of examples in which a case can be made for their failing to satisfy one of the three criteria given. My aim in doing so is not to show that no actually occurring hallucination is a case of philosophers' hallucination, but that it is so difficult to show that there are such cases that any argument that depends upon such a claim is rather weak.

Many hallucinations are plausibly not sensory experiences. Or at least, it could be argued that we are not licensed to say that they are, given peculiarities in the
The occurrence of such experiences and the capacities of the person undergoing them. Hypnagogic hallucinations are relatively common hallucinations that occur in the state of drowsiness that a subject may be in prior to falling asleep. The fact that one is in a state of drowsiness when one enjoys such experiences should make us careful in saying, either that such experiences are sensory, as opposed to imagistic in nature, or that they are indiscriminable from perceptual experiences. Such experiences and perceptual experiences may be quite different, but the subject may not be able to tell that they are different because of his diminished state of awareness. Likewise, hallucinations associated with degenerative neurological disorders such as Alzheimer's disease are not evidently sensory in nature, given the impaired cognitive condition of the subjects of such experience and the possibility that this impairs their discriminatory capacities.

It is possible to argue that some hallucinations are not non-perceptual experiences, even if we grant that they are sensory. It is possible, for example, to argue that those hallucinations that begin with an awareness of colours and geometric shapes (form constants) and progress through a sequential development into more complex experiences are perceptions of phenomena occurring in the retina or at later stages of the visual system. The experience of the simple geometric forms could be thought of as perception of phenomena in the eye or elsewhere in the visual system (entoptic events or objects), which then, through some sort of process of interpretation by the subject, become experiences of a more complex nature, such as experiences of objects and scenes. Such phenomena could include 'floaters,' retinal blood vessels and phosphenes. Migraine related hallucinations, as well as hypnagogic hallucinations could also be interpreted in this way, as they can both display the progression from hallucinations of simple forms to complex phenomena.

Charles Bonnet syndrome (CBS), on the other hand, consists in hallucinations that clearly lay good claim to being sensory and non-perceptual. In such cases, usually occurring in those with impaired visual systems, subjects enjoy complex

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8 Manford and Andermann (1998).
9 See Siegel and Jarvik (1975: 141-144) and Horowitz (1975: 180-183).
10 See, for these examples as well as a more extensive list of hallucinatory phenomena that can display this progression, Siegel and Jarvik (1975: 109-111). It should be noted that this interpretation of the evidence is controversial (Siegel and Jarvik for example reject it, however Horowitz is more favourable towards it), but my point is just that the correct interpretation of these matters is an empirical matter. It could be the case that such experiences should be explained in terms of entoptic perceptions (as indeed some have tried to, see Siegel and Jarvik for details), and as such, philosophers should be wary of appealing to them to support their metaphysical arguments.
visual hallucinations. They lack the characteristic progression of hallucinatory experiences that could be thought to reveal their foundation upon perceptions of entoptic phenomena, and the subjects are usually cognitively unimpaired. They are invariably, however, accompanied by insight into their non-perceptual nature, which at least offers *prima facie* support for the thought that they are subjectively discriminable from perceptual experiences.\(^\text{11}\)

For any actually occurring hallucination to properly feature in our considerations regarding the argument from hallucination we must be able to give positive answers to all of the following questions. Is it a genuinely sensory experience? Is it a genuinely non-perceptual sensory experience? Is it genuinely indiscriminable from perceptual experience? It can of course be argued, for all of the cases that I have briefly described above, that they do in fact provide support for the possibility of philosophers' hallucination. My point in bringing up the alternative ways of understanding them is just to emphasise that it is no straightforward business to appeal to actually occurring hallucinations in support for this possibility.

My discussion above, then, is intended to show that it is difficult to give definite answers to these questions, let alone positive answers to these questions. I am therefore loathe to appeal to any real examples of hallucination in order to understand the nature of non-perceptual experience. What we, as philosophers, are interested in is a possibility that may very well not find expression anywhere in the natural world. We should not feel ourselves constrained by what is or is not the case with regards to the phenomenon of hallucination as it is commonly understood, because it is not this phenomenon that we are interested in. Actually occurring hallucination might inspire us to think about the possibility of philosophers' hallucination, but it should not constrain us.

It seems to me that the possibility of perfect non-perceptual experience is more than adequately revealed by the epistemic limitations that exist with regard to what we can claim to know through the senses.

Mike Martin, for example, writes:

As far as I can tell, it seems a genuine possibility that I could have been in a situation which was not one of actually perceiving my environment for how it

\(^{11}\) I shall return to the fascinating cases of CBS in discussing counterexamples to the extreme disjunctivist conception of sensory experience in chapter six.
was but which I would not have been able to tell apart from this, my actual situation, just through introspection and reflection on my experience. (Martin 2004: 47)

This possibility is simply that which is recognised by Descartes in the First Meditation when he conceives of the possibility that he is being constantly deceived in his experiences by an Evil Demon:

I will suppose therefore that not God, who is supremely good and the source of truth, but rather some malicious demon of the utmost power and cunning has employed all his energies in order to deceive me. I shall think that the sky, the air, the earth, colours, shapes, sounds and all external things are merely the delusions of dreams which he has devised to ensnare my judgement. (Descartes 1641: 79)

To reject the idea that it is not possible for there to be experience subjectively indiscriminable from perceptual experience is to think that Descartes' attempt to adopt an attitude towards his experiences as if they were entirely delusive is manifestly wrong. But whatever else might be wrong with Descartes' philosophy, it is surely not that perceptual experience is in fact manifestly perceptual, such that in virtue of just enjoying such an experience one is in a position to know that one is not hallucinating. Descartes is surely just articulating a possibility that is inherent in what we know is knowable to us through experience alone; we cannot know, just upon the basis of our experience alone, that we are not hallucinating.

If this epistemic point is not enough, we can also support the idea that perfect non-perceptual experiences are possible through considerations about how experiences can be brought about.

If we accept that there is a physical basis for perceptual experiences, such that there is some tract of physical reality that is sufficient for a subject to enjoy a perceptual experience, then to claim that perfect non-perceptual experiences are not possible is to make the claim that however we conceive of this physical basis of perceptual experience, it is not possible to remove the object that is perceived from this basis and plausibly have an experience that is sensory, non-perceptual, and indiscriminable from perceptual experience. But given what we know about the physical basis of perceptual experience this claim will strike us as just too far fetched.
There is a causal story to be told, no doubt very complex, involving the object perceived, light reflected from its surface and the stimulation of our sensory organs by such light, and thereby the brain. That the object of perception can play an irreplaceable role in such a system is just too strong a claim, no matter how we conceive of the details of such a system.\(^{12}\)

### 3.3 Motivating the generalising move: the causal argument

Recall that considerations about continuity between veridical and non-veridical perceptual experiences provide us with good reason to think that they have the same nature. Why should we think that perfect non-perceptual experience and perceptual experience have the same nature? One way to motivate this generalising move is to appeal to the sameness of subjective character between perceptual experience and philosophers' hallucination. That the two kinds of experience are subjectively indiscriminable does at least provide a *prima facie* reason for taking the two sorts of experience to be identical in nature. Generally speaking, if two things are subjectively indiscriminable, then in the absence of anything to suggest the contrary, it is perfectly reasonable to take them to be of the same kind. Indeed, it would seem somewhat unwarranted to take them to be of different kinds.\(^{13}\) But in the case in question there *is* a reason to take the subjectively indiscriminable items to be of different kinds. One is a perceptual experience and the other is a non-perceptual experience, and so we might think that this difference in whether or not the experience puts us in perceptual contact with normal objects is significant enough to justify the claim that they have different natures in spite of being indiscriminable. The fact that philosophers' hallucination is indiscriminable from perceptual experience is not, then, sufficient in itself to support the claim that they share the same nature.\(^{14}\)

The most promising argument for the generalising step is to be found in what can be referred to as the causal argument from hallucination. The causal argument from hallucination has the basic structure of the argument from hallucination given above,

\(^{12}\) This is a point that has been made by numerous philosophers. See, for example, Foster (2000: 23-28), Robinson (1994: 151-152), Valberg (1992: 9-11) and Crane (2001: 134). We should be cautious, however, about appealing to actually occurring hallucinations that have been brought about through scientific experiment. There is some disagreement over their status as perfect hallucinations. See Noë (2004: 210-211) and also Fish (2008: 147-149).

\(^{13}\) See, for example, Huemer (2001: 59)

\(^{14}\) Many philosophers have expressed this point. See, for example, Robinson (1994: 87-89), Pitcher (1971: 18-20), and Locke (1967: 110-112).
but is supplemented by the following sort of argument for acceptance of the generalising step:

CAH (1) In a case of perception there is a physical state/process that is sufficient for a subject’s perceptual experience. It is theoretically possible to reproduce that physical state/process in the absence of any object of perception, in which case the subject will enjoy a perfect non-perceptual experience.

CAH (2) Because the perfect non-perceptual experience and the perceptual experience have the same cause, we must give the same account of the nature of both kinds of experience.  

CAH (2) appeals to the possibility of such causally matching perfect non-perceptual experiences to support what I will to refer to as the strong hallucinatory constraint:

*The strong hallucinatory constraint:* Perceptual experience and causally matching perfect non-perceptual experience have exactly the same nature. Whatever nature causally matching perfect non-perceptual experience has, perceptual experience also has, and vice versa.

And if we accept this constraint then naïve realism must be rejected on the grounds that as hallucinatory experience is not presentational of mind-independent objects, neither is perceptual experience.

The causal argument from hallucination as presented so far is too strong, however. The naïve realist need not accept that perceptual experiences can have the same physical basis as perfect non-perceptual experiences. They do, however, need to accept that the physical basis of perfect non-perceptual experience can feature as a part of the physical basis of perceptual experience, and so they must acknowledge a weaker form of the hallucinatory constraint.

There is no incoherence in supposing that the physical basis for perceptual experience includes the object of perception, the subject of visual experience, and the various causal relations that obtain between them. The naïve realist could claim that rather than seeing the visual experience that one enjoys when perceiving as an event

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15 This is the causal argument from hallucination as formulated by, amongst others, Robinson (1994), Valberg (1992), and Foster (2000).
that is subsequent to, or dependent upon, only the neural activity of the subject, we might look at it as being ‘materially constituted’ by the whole process stretching back to the object seen.\footnote{See, for example, Johnston (2004) and Foster (2000).}

And in fact this is something that the naïve realist should see themselves as committed to quite independently of considerations pertaining to the possibility of hallucination.\footnote{For this point see Foster (2000: 38-42).} In thinking of perceptual experience as being in itself perceptual, the naïve realist conceives of such experience as depending for its existence upon the object of perception. The experience is itself a relation between subject and object perceived, in which case the object of perception is necessary for the obtaining of the perceptual experience in which it enters as one of the relata. If in addition to this we think that there is a physical basis for perceptual experience that is sufficient for its occurrence, then as the object of perception is a necessary condition on the obtaining of the perceptual experience, it must be necessary for the obtaining of the physical basis of such experience. And it is most plausibly necessary for the obtaining of this basis in virtue of being an essential component of it.

This commitment of naïve realism is seen by many as implausible. Mundle, for example, takes it that it would result in unpalatable consequences, such as that ‘my seeing the sun takes about eight minutes, the time taken for light to travel from sun to earth’ and even worse that ‘my seeing a star takes a much longer time than I have lived’ (Mundle 1971: 44-45). It is a physical fact that the processes underpinning vision, and in particular the transmission of light from the surfaces of the objects that we see, takes time.

The related concern of what is known as ‘the time lag argument’ has it that as a consequence of the finite speed of light, the time at which an experience takes place, the time at which something is seen, can be a time at which the object seen no longer exists. So how can this object be a part of my experience? What the naïve realist must reject is that the time at which an experience takes place is the time at which the physical basis of that experience takes place. And this coheres with other commitments that the naïve realist has. They are committed, for example, to the
claim that it is possible to make immediate demonstrative reference to things that do not exist at the time at which such demonstrative reference is made.\(^{18}\)

Given this commitment to the nature of the physical basis of perceptual experience the naïve realist will insist that contra to CAH (1), it is not possible to reproduce the physical basis of perceptual experience in the absence of the object of perception of that experience, because that object is either a necessary condition for the obtaining of this basis or is a part of this basis itself. This response on behalf of the naïve realist would allow them to maintain that there is a difference in the physical basis of hallucinatory and perceptual experience that allows them to coherently claim that perceptual experience possesses properties, or has a nature, that hallucinatory experience does not.

It does seem clear, however, that the physical basis of non-perceptual experience can be a part of the physical basis of perceptual experience. If we consider a case of perceptual experience whose physical basis, according to the naïve realist, is the causal chain between object and visual system of the subject, it is clearly possible for a part of this chain, say that which takes place after light impinges on the retina, to occur on its own. This tract of physical reality could then plausibly be thought of to form the physical basis of a non-perceptual experience subjectively indistinguishable from the perceptual experience. At least, that is our intuition, and seems supported by the empirical facts.\(^{19}\) This commits us to what I will refer to as the weak hallucinatory constraint:

*The weak hallucinatory constraint:* Whatever nature causally matching perfect non-perceptual experience has, perceptual experience also has.

Given acceptance of this constraint, the possibility of hallucinatory experience that causally matches perceptual experiences presents the following problem for the naïve realist. How is it possible for the core phenomenal character of perceptual experience to be explained in terms of the presentation of the object of perception if whatever

\(^{18}\) See Snowdon (1992: 75-77). He refers to the position committed to this principle as direct realism. This should be understood as any position that takes perception to be psychologically direct. Naïve realism, in my understanding, is committed to the principle because it is a form of psychologically direct realism.

\(^{19}\) There is a question here as to the significance of dynamic approaches to understanding the processes underpinning vision. Such an approach would eschew the linear sort of picture of the physical basis of experience presented here. The problem for the causal argument from hallucination is as to whether this might raise the possibility that the physical basis of non-perceptual experience could not be properly understood as a part of the physical basis of perceptual experience. I do not pursue this issue here. For dynamic approaches to understanding cognitive processes see Van Gelder (1999).
explains the core phenomenal character of a causally matching philosophers’ hallucination is also present? Possible answers to this question will be the concern of chapters six and seven.
1. Introduction

The possibility of illusion offers a challenge to any account of perceptual experience. How is it possible for something to appear other than it is? The argument from illusion is an attempt to show that naïve realism cannot give a satisfactory answer to this question. The naïve realist is in something of a dilemma. Either he gives the same account of non-veridical perceptual experience as he does of veridical perceptual experience or he does not. He cannot give the same account, as in the case of veridical perceptual experience he seeks to identify the object of experience with the object of perception. But in the non-veridical case the object of experience possesses/lacks a property the object of perception does not. Therefore the two objects cannot be identical and so the object of experience in non-veridical perceptual experience cannot be identified with the object of perception. He cannot give different accounts of non-veridical and veridical perceptual experience, as the evident continuity of veridical and non-veridical cases seem to compel him not to do so. The naïve realist position must, therefore, be abandoned.

If we accept that there are convincing reasons to give the same account of veridical and non-veridical perceptual experiences, the naïve realist is left with the option of rejecting the argument to the effect that they cannot give the same account of the two types of experience. Recall that this argument relies on two claims: that it is possible for there to be illusions in which something phenomenally appears other than it is, and that the naïve realist must subscribe to the phenomenal principle, that is, to a conception of the core phenomenal character of experience according to which it is to be identified with the properties of the object of experience. There are, then, two strategies remaining for dealing with the argument from illusion. The first is to deny that such illusions are possible, while the second is to deny the phenomenal principle.

Strategies of the first kind accept, along with critics of naïve realism, that naïve realism is committed to explaining the phenomenal properties of one's experience in terms of properties that the object of perception possesses. They deny that illusions
present any problem for the naïve realist because they deny that any illusions are cases in which something phenomenally appears other than it is. The second strategy accepts that subjects may be appeared to in ways that do not characterise the object of perception, but denies that this prevents the object of perception from being the object of experience. The problem for the naïve realist appears so intractable because it rests on a certain conception of how, if we adopt a presentational notion of experience, we must view the relation between the object of experience and the phenomenal character of experience. It is this conception that I will challenge in the next chapter, and in so doing provide the naïve realist with a reasonable response to the argument from illusion. In this chapter I wish to present, and reject, the other strategy for defending the position.

2. The position

Bill Brewer and Charles Travis have both recently argued that error is to be located in the judgements that we make on the basis of our experiences:

The locus of error in cases of illusion is the subject’s judgements, or expectations, about the world, rather than any aspect of perceptual experience itself. (Brewer 2004: 70)

Things are not presented, or represented, to us as being thus and so. They are just presented to us, full stop. It is in making out, or trying to, what it is that we confront that we take things, rightly or wrongly, to be thus and so. (Travis 2004: 65)¹

It is worth pointing out that, strictly speaking, this conception of perceptual error is perfectly consistent with sense-datum theories of perception.² If, as a matter of fact, error lies in the judgements we make on the basis of what is presented to us, this says nothing about the nature of that which is presented to us. As it happens, both Brewer and Travis appear to be naïve realists about what is presented to us in experience. Brewer subscribes to what he calls the 'object view':

¹ Travis' and Brewer's target is invariably the intentionalist who understands illusion as a situation in which the world is represented as other than it is. On such an account, it is experience itself that is in error as it misrepresents the world. I am not concerned with their arguments against the intentionalist explanation of illusion, but with their positive account of how perceptual error is to be understood.
The core subjective character of perceptual experience is given simply by citing the physical object which is its mind-independent direct object. (Brewer 2008: 171)

And Travis takes his lead from Austin:

Austin's idea is that, rather than representing anything as so, our senses merely bring our surroundings into view; afford us some sort of awareness of them. It is then for us to make of what is in our view what we can, or do. (Travis 2004: 65)

Any such commitment to naïve realism must stem from elsewhere than their arguments in favour of this explanation of illusion. In what follows I will focus on Brewer's articulation of the position as it is worked out in more detail than Travis' is, and he is more explicitly committed to naïve realism.

We can summarise Brewer's account as follows:

(1) The core phenomenal character of experience, how one is phenomenally appeared to when one perceives something, is constituted by the object of perception.

(2) The kinds of illusion that are put to use by the argument from illusion are not cases in which something phenomenally appears other than it is. They are cases in which the direct object of one's experience (what I have been calling the 'object of experience') is judged to be other than it is.

(3) The direct object of one's experience is judged to be other than it is because of similarities between it and the way it is judged to be. That is to say, these similarities make it intelligible why the direct object is judged to be other than it is.

Claim (1) expresses Brewer's naïve realism together with his acceptance of the phenomenal principle. The core phenomenal character of experience is to be identified with properties possessed by some object present to the mind, and this object is identical to the object of perception. So for example he writes:

Perception is an openness to, or acquaintance with, mind-independent empirical things themselves, whose basic natures and perceptible qualities constitute what it is like to be presented with them in this way. What it is like for a person, perceiving the world as she is, is to be characterised by citing the perceptible

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7 And, in fact, is how it is understood. See, for example, Price (1950).
features of the specific mind-independent empirical things that are accessible to
her in perception, given her point of view on the world and the relevant
perceptual conditions. (Brewer 2004: 69)

Claim (2) presents what he hopes to be a general strategy for dealing with alleged
cases in which something phenomenally appears other than it is. It is worth pointing
out that this talk of judgement might be misleading. I take it that what people like
Brewer and Travis are saying is not that what is going wrong in illusion is a mistaken
inference that we make from what is present in experience to what is in the world.
Rather, the core of experience is being taken, or interpreted, or accepted, in the wrong
way, where what results is a complete perceptual experience in which the world
appears as being such and such a way when it is in fact not that way.³ If it is correct
to talk of judgement here, such judgement must be internal to the experience and not
something based upon it. To suppose otherwise seems incorrect. Things can appear a
certain way to a subject even when there is no inclination upon the part of the subject
to judge that things are that way.⁴ Claim (3) seeks to explain why the direct object of
experience is taken to be other than it is.

To support this strategy Brewer looks at several different examples of illusory
cases which he maintains can be explained in this way. His three main examples are:
(a) The Müller-Lyer illusion; (b) The bent-stick-in-water illusion; (c) A white piece of
chalk that appears red under certain illumination conditions. It is worthwhile
providing a brief reminder of these experiential phenomena.

In the Müller-Lyer illusion, two lines of equal length have arrow heads at the end
points of each line. On one line the arrow heads point outwards, while on the other
they point inwards. (See Figure 2 below)

⁴ I take it that the view of visual experience according to which it is a belief is incorrect. For this
kind of account see Armstrong (1968).
As can be seen, despite the lines being equal in length, the presence of the arrow heads make the line in which they point inwards appear longer than the line in which they point outwards.

The bent-stick-in-water illusion has something of a philosophical pedigree and turns up in numerous discussions of the significance of illusion. It is simply the experience one has when one places a stick with half its length submerged under water and the other half above water. There is at least some sense in which the stick appears bent.

The colours that objects appear to have, despite the best efforts of our colour constancy mechanisms, can vary with changes in illumination conditions. A good example of this is how a red object will appear black under sodium lighting. In the example Brewer has us consider, a white object, in this case a piece of chalk, can be made to appear red under certain lighting.

Now it might seem at first glance that Brewer's account of illusion must be rejected because it fails to do justice to the phenomenology of the situation. The Müller-Lyer lines genuinely do appear different lengths. The chalk in red light genuinely does appear red. And the bent-stick-in-water really does appear bent. Any account that says otherwise is simply ignoring what it is like to enjoy such experiences. Brewer responds to this charge the following way:

I claim that, although 'unequal in length,' for example, is really a part of how the (ML) [Müller-Lyer] lines look, it is right to regard this as the product of a more basic subjective presentation of those very lines themselves, along with an account of how they may intelligibly strike us, from that viewpoint, in those conditions, given our training, conceptual endowment, attention and interests at the time. (Brewer 2007: 96)

I take it that Brewer is saying something like this: the lines genuinely appear different lengths, but they also, in a different, more basic sense of 'appears,' appear the same length.

In terms of my earlier discussion of different senses of 'appear,' the claim is that the lines do genuinely phenomenally appear different lengths, but at the most basic level of appearance they phenomenally appear just as they are, namely, the same length. And as it is only of phenomenal appearances that make up the core of phenomenal character that the phenomenal principle holds, there is no assignment of
conflicting properties to both object of perception and object of experience. The phenomenal appearance of the lines as having different lengths is a result of the more basic phenomenal appearance of the lines as having the same length, together with the subject taking, or judging, them to be different lengths.

Brewer also appeals to the phenomenon of aspect shifts, such as those which may occur when viewing ambiguous figures like the duck-rabbit image, in order to explain how, in cases like the Müller-Lyer illusion, it is a feature of the phenomenology that the lines appear different lengths while at the same time the core phenomenal character of such experiences is constituted by the actual lines themselves.

Describing shifts in aspect perception he writes:

The difference in how things are for us phenomenologically [when we shift from, say, seeing the image as a duck to seeing it as a rabbit] is no change in the core subjective character of the experience; it rather concerns our classificatory engagement with what is presented to us in it [...] this is the further phenomenology of actual and intelligible categorisation, or recognition, not that of basic experiential presentation, which is common throughout. Still, it is aptly titled phenomenology, all the same. (Brewer 2008: 175)

So Brewer is not saying that it is not a genuine feature of the perceptual experience that it phenomenally appears as if the lines are of unequal length. Rather, the core phenomenal character of the experience is not to be characterised in this way. I should mention that this seems particularly plausible with illusions like the Müller-Lyer. It is certainly not the case, in my own experience at least, that one line appears longer than the other in the same way that two lines without hashes may appear unequal in length.

I can only really capture this by saying that there is something ‘weird’ about the experience. The lines appear different lengths, but it is not really true to say that they appear different lengths in the same way that lines that are actually different lengths appear to me when I view them under normal viewing conditions. There are many other illusions that are like this. The Café Wall illusion is a particularly good example (see Figure 3 below). Here we describe our illusory experience as one in which the parallel lines appear to converge. But what it is like to experience this illusion is most unlike what it is like to experience lines that actually converge and that appear to one
to do so. Perhaps I can only speak for my own case, but the experience that I have when I look at this image is one which, for want of a better word, is just 'weird' (in fact, I also find it a little uncomfortable). It is almost as if, in describing how the lines appear in terms of them converging, I am reaching for the closest kind of veridical experience in order to try and articulate how I am appeared to, rather than accurately describing how I am appeared to.

Such considerations as this may give some support to the thought that, in the Müller-Lyer case for example, the lines appear both the same length and different lengths and this is what explains the 'weirdness' of the experience. It should be noted that, whether or not this is plausible, it does not seem to apply to the other two kinds of illusion that Brewer appeals to. The bent-stick-in-water and the white chalk that appears red under red lighting are not illusions that carry this feature of 'weirdness.'

In any event, the point that Brewer is making is that he is denying that the Müller-Lyer lines phenomenally appear different lengths at the core level of phenomenal character, but not that they genuinely phenomenally appear different lengths, and that their so appearing has a distinctive phenomenology. In what follows, to avoid confusion I will refer to cases in which something phenomenally appears a certain way, where this does not characterise the core phenomenal character of the subject’s experience, as something phenomenologically appearing that way. So we can say that to adopt Brewer’s strategy in order to maintain naïve realism in the face of the possibility of illusion is to claim that such illusions are cases in which something phenomenologically appears other than it is, rather than phenomenally appears other than it is.
3. The general strategy

There are two ways to understand this general strategy for dealing with illusions, given different accounts of how we are to understand why one is misled in the illusory cases.

One way to understand the strategy is as follows. The lines phenomenologically appear different lengths because of similarities between the way the lines phenomenally appear in this context and the way lines of different lengths phenomenally appear, in some context. ('Context' here refers to the viewing conditions). As non-phenomenal appearances can have a distinctive phenomenology, the theorist can maintain that, phenomenologically, the lines appear different lengths, but not phenomenally. This is how I understand Travis’ conception of illusion:

In the Müller-Lyer, two lines are contrived (by means of accompanying wedges) to have a certain look. They do not just seem to have that look; that is actually the way they look. (Witness the ‘robustness’ of the illusion.) Two lines may well have that look because one is longer than the other. That is a familiar way for things to be. Depending on circumstances, that look may thus indicate that it is two lines of unequal length that one confronts [my emphasis]. Or one might take it to. Unequal length might be what is to be expected; or at least what is expected. Thus may someone be misled by a Müller-Lyer. False expectations arise here in the wrong view of what something (a look) means, though perhaps a right view of what it ought to. What one gets wrong is the arrangement of the world: how the misleading seen thing in fact relates to other things. That mistake neither requires, nor suggests, that in this illusion one line is represented to us as being longer than the other, or that anything else is represented as so. (Travis 2004: 68)

It is the phenomenal appearance of the Müller-Lyer lines that misleads the perceiving subject, and these lines phenomenally appear just as they are. It is the ‘look’ that indicates to the subject that the lines may be of unequal length. It is the ‘look’ that misleads. In his (2004), Brewer seems to hold something similar when he writes of the Müller-Lyer illusion that ‘the subjective character of her experience evidently

\[^{3}\text{I am interpreting Brewer's position in such a way that it fits into the view of the philosophical}\]
makes the mistaken judgement of inequality in length natural and explicable' (Brewer 2004: 71. My emphasis).

In his later work on the subject, however, Brewer means something quite different in his use of ‘visually relevant similarities’ to explain illusion:

Two objects have visually relevant similarities when they share sufficiently many common properties amongst those which have a significant involvement in the physical processes underlying vision. Thus, and very crudely, visually relevant similarities are identities in such things as the way in which light is reflected from the objects in question, in the given circumstances, and propagated to the subject’s viewpoint. (Brewer 2007: 92)

According to Brewer’s later position, it is not the appearance of the object that misleads us in illusory cases such as the Müller-Lyer lines, but similarities in the ways in which, at the physical level, objects of different kinds appear to us.6

4. Explaining the illusions

I will now look at how Brewer utilises this strategy in explaining the three different illusory examples that he focus upon: the Müller-Lyer lines, the bent stick in water, and the white chalk in red light. I shall argue that while the position may be plausible in respect to the Müller-Lyer illusion, it does not work well with the other cases. It is possible, however, for the naïve realist to appeal to alternative explanations of these cases that satisfy both his commitment to the phenomenal principle and his identification of the object of experience with the object of perception. The failure of Brewer’s account in respect of these kinds of illusion is not, then, fatal for the naïve realist who accepts the phenomenal principle.

Brewer explains the Müller-Lyer illusion in the following way:

A plausible account along these lines cites the visually relevant similarities between the Müller-Lyer diagram and a configuration of two unequal lines, one

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6 I want to mention some unease that I have in the way that Brewer expresses his position. At one point he talks about the applicability of the incorrect interpretation of the sensory core of experience as jumping out at one, or capturing one’s attention. But how can something jump to my attention, or be captured in attention, if the sense in which my experiential situations are similar is to do with a relationship between the complex physical processes involved in seeing objects of different kinds. Features of this physical process cannot ‘jump out’ at me (Brewer 2007: 93-94).
longer and behind its plane, the other shorter and in front, projecting equally onto the plane of the diagram itself. These are objective similarities between the direct object of the viewer's experience and a configuration of two unequal lines, which are visually relevant, crudely, in virtue of the similar projection of light onto the plane of the viewer's eyes. They are made salient by the hashes, bringing paradigms of unequal lines to mind. Thus her experience, with the Müller-Lyer diagram as its direct object, is misleading as to the relative lengths of its lines. (Brewer 2006: 169)

As mentioned earlier, this approach to the Müller-Lyer seems plausible. It accords with the phenomenology of the situation and offers a way for the naïve realist to accept such illusions without having to admit that the object of experience possesses properties that the object of perception lacks. But there are many different kinds of illusion, and for this approach to be successful it must show itself to be capable of application to a range of illusory phenomena.

Brewer uses it to explain the bent-stick-in-water illusion in the following way:

I claim that the mind-independent things whose actual features and distribution in space constitute the subjective nature of this experience are the upper, unsubmerged, part of the stick, and the image from the subject's point of view of the lower half of the stick, refracted, as it is, through the water. Perfectly respectable optics ray diagrams allow the entirely mind-independent construction of the relevant refracted image. The 'illusion' consists in the error in judgement of taking that image to be identical to the lower half of the stick itself. (Brewer 2004: 73)

But the explanation of error in the bent-stick-in-water illusion is slightly different to that in the Müller-Lyer illusion. In the former case, one of the direct objects of the subject's experience is claimed to be a refracted image, which the subject mistakenly takes to be the stick in the water. This is what explains the stick perceptual-epistemically appearing bent. In the latter case, the direct objects are the Müller-Lyer lines, but they are taken to be other than they are.
How should we understand this talk of being aware of refracted images? If in the bent-stick-in-water case the stick is not the direct object of perception, but instead some image is, why is this not applicable to all cases of object of perception? Air, after all, is a medium through which we see things, no less than water, and will refract light. Why, when I look at the stick out of water should I think that the direct object of my experience is the stick and not a refracted image? What seems more plausible to say here is that one is mistakenly taking a certain kind of relational property of the stick to be an intrinsic property of the stick. Or, alternatively, that the phenomenal character of the experience is to be explained by a property that the stick actually has.

This kind of understanding can be seen in Noë (2004) and Hyman (2006) and is perhaps what Price (1950) referred to as the multiple location theory of appearing.

This strategy for dealing with perspectival appearances appeals to the objects of perception having relational shape and size properties in addition to their actual shape and size properties. Noë, for example, writes that:

P-properties – the apparent shape and size of objects – are perfectly ‘real’ or ‘objective’ [...] That a plate has a given P-shape is a fact about the plate’s shape, one determined by the plate’s relation to the location of a perceiver, and to the ambient light. The P-shape is the shape of the patch needed to occlude the object on a plane perpendicular to the line of sight. The P-size of the trees is, in turn, a fact about how the trees look, with respect to size, from the location of the perceiver: it is identical to the size of a patch we can imagine drawn on the occlusion plane. (Noë 2004: 83)

When a coin appears elliptical when viewed at an angle to one, what explains this is one’s awareness of a P-property of the plate itself, in this case its P-shape.

We can speak [...] of perspectival properties (or P-properties). P-properties are themselves objects of sight, that is, things that we see. They are visible. From where you stand, you can see the P-shape of the plate, and you can distinguish this from its actual shape. (Noë 2004: 83)

These perspectival properties or occlusion properties are things we can perceive, and so genuine, relational properties of the normal things in the world around us.

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7 See also Hyman, who refers to these as occlusion properties of objects (2006: 75-79).
When the stick appears bent to us in the bent-stick-in-water illusion what explains this is our awareness of the P-shape of the stick, which is the shape that would occlude the stick on a plane perpendicular to the line of sight. And what explains this shape is the variance in refractive index of water and air, the stick’s being part in water and part in air, illumination conditions, and the location from which the stick is viewed. The naïve realist does not need to, and should not, attempt to explain this illusion through our awareness of any sort of ‘image.’

This strategy for dealing with perspectival illusions can accept that in the case of, say, the bent stick in water that the stick phenomenally appears bent, but deny that in doing so it appears to have a property that it does not possess. The mistake that we might make, in undergoing such an illusion, is to conflate an intrinsic property with a relational one. So, while Brewer’s explanation of the phenomenon is not of use to the naïve realist, there is this alternative explanation available.

The final kind of illusion that Brewer considers is that in which something may appear a colour other than it is due to ambient lighting conditions.

A white piece of chalk illuminated with red light looks red. Again the (OV) [object view] proposal is that the core of the subjective character of such illusory experience is constituted by that very piece of chalk itself: a particular persisting mind-independent physical object. From the viewpoint in question, and given the relevant perceptual circumstances – especially the abnormally red illumination – it looks red. This consists in the fact that it has visually relevant similarities with paradigm red objects: the light reflected from it is like that reflected from such paradigms in normal viewing conditions. (Brewer 2007: 92)

The problem for the strategy is this. If we take ‘visually relevant similarities’ as being the basis for the error, then we are saying something about the physical basis of experience; that is, the physical basis of a subject’s experience of the object of perception is similar to the physical basis of the experience they would enjoy were they perceiving something else of a certain kind.

But then the worry is that while this strategy may be plausible for the Müller-Lyer case it is difficult to make sense of it in the case of the chalk that appears red. It is the case that the chalk genuinely phenomenologically appears red. Under the current proposal, this is to be explained by similarities in the causal processes
underlying the experience of the chalk and paradigm experiences of things phenomenally appearing red. We are to suppose that the chalk phenomenally appears just as it is, that the core subjective character of the experience of a subject undergoing the illusion is constituted by the chalk and its properties. But are we to suppose that it makes sense to suppose the chalk phenomenally appears white while phenomenologically appearing red? In the case of the Müller-Lyer lines it seems to make sense to think that we could be presented with the lines just as they are, that at some basic level they appear the same length, even though there is another sense in which they appear different in length. And in the cases of aspect shifts we can make sense of the thought that, in some sense, what we are presented with does not change when we shift from perceiving one aspect to another. But in the case of the white chalk that appears red, it seems to defy the phenomenology of the situation to claim that the chalk appears just as it is, that at the subjective core of one’s experience the chalk appears white. So the problem for this strategy is not that it denies that, in these illusory cases, there is a sense in which things genuinely appear other than they are, but rather that it asserts that things phenomenally appear just as they are.

Even if the strategy that Brewer advocates should fail to provide an adequate explanation of such illusory experience, it might still be possible for the naïve realist to accommodate it by claiming that changes in the illumination conditions bring about genuine changes in the colours that things have. Consider this quote from Foster:

> Suppose I look at the snow at sunset, when it is illuminated by a reddish light. Again this affects the colour-appearance – perhaps in much the same way as [...] tinted glasses. But there is also a sense in which it affects the colour of what is illuminated too. Of course, the pigment of the snow does not change, and, in that sense, the snow remains white. But there is also a familiar and unproblematic sense in which the surface of the snow can be thought of as actually tinted by the light which falls on it, and, in that sense, its colour-appearance would be deemed veridical – an appearance in line with how things really are. (Foster 2000: 62-63)⁸

So the suggestion on behalf of the naïve realist could be that in cases such as the chalk appearing red under red lighting, while the chalk does phenomenally appear red, it

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⁸ See also Armstrong (1968: 283-285).
really is red, at least in those circumstances. And so this would not be a case of something phenomenally appearing other than it is after all.

But while this explanation of the phenomenon is available to the naïve realist in the case of illusory colour experience when this is a result of changes in illumination conditions, it will not apply to those illusory colour experiences that are independent of such conditions. Simultaneous colour contrasts and simultaneous lightness contrasts (of which Figure 1 in chapter three is an example) are illusions in which something appears to be a colour/shade that it is not, where the explanation of this lies in the colour or brightness of its background and the nature of our visual system. Illusions such as these present the strongest challenge to the naïve realist who endorses the phenomenal principle.

5. Conclusion

As a general strategy for explaining illusory experiences in a way compatible with naïve realism, the sort of account offered by Brewer fails. It is just not plausible to suppose that in all cases of illusory experience we can explain the illusory experience in terms of a judgement, or taking, that is based upon the core phenomenal character of such experience which is itself constituted by the properties of the object of perception. This may be plausible in cases such as the Müller-Lyer illusion, but it faces real difficulties in dealing with some other core examples of illusory phenomena. While it is still possible for the naïve realist to explain the other kinds of illusion that Brewer considers in a way which allows them to preserve their identification of the object of experience with the object of perception, there is, I believe, a kind of illusion which such a naïve realism cannot accommodate. These illusions are simultaneous colour contrast effects, and simultaneous lightness contrast effects.
Chapter Five
A Naive Adverbialism

The naïve realist needs to be able to explain the possibility of illusory experience, that is, experiences in which things in the world appear to be other than they are. I have looked at and rejected one strategy for the naïve realist to take. This strategy was to explain the illusions appealed to by the argument from illusion as perceptual experiences in which something phenomenally appears just as it is, but phenomenologically appears other than it is due to how the object of experience is taken. This approach failed because of the implausibility of supposing, in the case of illusions such as the white chalk seen in red light, that the chalk phenomenally appears just as it is. Furthermore, while the naïve realist could still try to accommodate this illusion in terms of variation in illumination conditions bringing about a change in surface properties of the chalk, there is a class of colour illusions for which this is not a viable strategy. These are simultaneous colour contrast effects, in which something appears a certain colour because of the surrounding colour context.

This whole approach to dealing with illusion accepted a claim about the phenomenal character of perceptual experience that is pivotal in the argument from illusion against naïve realism, namely, that it is constituted by the properties of the object of experience.

In this chapter I will argue that it is through a rejection of this central principle of the argument from illusion that the naïve realist can accommodate the possibility of perceptual error. By appealing to a form of adverbialism, the naïve realist can offer a picture of the determination of phenomenal character that allows them to maintain their commitment to the presentational nature of perceptual experience, and the psychological immediacy of perception.

Adverbialism is an account of the metaphysical nature of experience according to which experience is a mode of consciousness of a subject. It is motivated by a desire to undermine the necessity of explaining experience in act/object terms. The act/object account combines two thoughts. First, that experience is presentational, in the sense that it is an essentially relational affair consisting in a subject sensing some
object. Second, that the core phenomenal character of experience, understood as the
phenomenal properties of one's experiential episode, are determined by the objects to
which one is related in that experience, in the sense that these properties simply are
the properties of said object. The act/object account is, then, a combination view of a
presentational understanding of the nature of perceptual experience together with a
certain conception of what determines the phenomenal character of such experience.
It is this second aspect of the act/object account that is so deadly for the naïve realist.
For it leads to acceptance of the phenomenal principle, according to which, if one's
experiences has a certain phenomenal quality, then there must be something that has
that quality, to which one stands in the relation of sensing. And if we then recognise
the possibility of illusion it seems we are committed to the existence of non-normal
objects of sense in at least some perceptual cases. Which, together with the
generalising claim, means that we are always aware of such objects whenever we
perceive, and hence that naïve realism cannot be the case. According to adverbialism,
experience is not an essentially relational state of affairs, but a mode or property of
the experiencing subject, and the core phenomenal character of experience is not to be
explained by the properties of some object to which one is related, but by the manner
in which one senses. And so the phenomenal principle can be rejected and non-
normal objects of sense avoided.

It is the aim of this chapter is to argue that there is space for a modified form of
adverbialism according to which phenomenal character is constituted, not just by the
way in which one senses, but by the way in which one senses an object. The presence
of a particular phenomenal quality in experience is explained in terms of the manner
in which some object is made present to the mind. So this adverbialism accepts the
presentational claim of the act/object account, but rejects its phenomenal claim.
Furthermore, this modified adverbialism can be seen as a version of naïve realism that
is capable of defending itself against the argument from illusion.

1. The act/object account

I take the act/object account of the nature of experience to be a combination of two
thoughts:
(1) Perceptual experience has the following nature: a subject stands in the relation of sensing to some object (the presentational thesis).12

(2) This object of experience determines the core phenomenal character of experience, in that the sensory qualities of the experience simply are the qualities of this object (the phenomenal thesis).

Acceptance of the phenomenal thesis entails acceptance of the phenomenal principle:

(3) ‘If there sensibly appears to a subject to be something which possesses a particular sensible quality then there is something of which the subject is aware which does possess that sensible quality.’ (Robinson 1994: 32)

According to the presentational thesis there is some object that is a part of perceptual experience and that is presented to the subject. What is it for experience to be presentational in this way? When enjoying a visual experience an object is before the mind in such a way that it is directly available for demonstrative reference. So the presentational thesis maintains that when we enjoy an experience there is something right there, available for demonstrative reference. Furthermore, this object is directly available for demonstrative reference. That is, it is not the case that this object is only available for demonstrative reference in virtue of the fact that something else is available for demonstrative reference.3 This is the object of experience. But this does not exhaust the content of the position. The presentational thesis needs to be distinguished from a weaker relational claim that is consistent with there being an object of experience as so far described. This is the claim that the object that one perceives in virtue of having an experience is a necessary condition on the obtaining of that experience. While this is something that the presentational theorist should accept, this is best seen as a consequence of his fundamental view of the nature of experience, which is that there is an object of experience that is itself a constituent of the experience, to which the subject stands in the relation of sensing.

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1 Recall that as I am using the term, 'perceptual experience' denotes only those experiences that we enjoy when perceiving objects. A hallucination, on this usage, would not be a perceptual experience, but a non-perceptual experience.

2 This should be distinguished from the presentational claim of the naïve realist as described in chapter one. Recall that this is the claim, not only that experience is presentational in nature, but that what is presented is the object of perception. The presentational thesis of the act/object account, as I have presented it, leaves open the nature of the object of experience.

3 For a fuller explanation of this notion of 'non-dependent' demonstrative reference see Snowdon (1992).
As an example of someone who adopts the weak relational claim without the presentational claim, we can consider an intentionalist for whom the content of perceptual experience is object-dependent. The intentionalist conceives of experience in the following way: it is a representational state that possesses a certain content. This content specifies the way the world must be in order for the experience to be veridical. According to some, this content, or at least some of it, is object-dependent. On this picture perceptual experience of, say, a green cup as a green cup, is an intentional state with the content ‘that is a green cup.’ It then follows that one could not have the very same experience in the absence of that particular green cup, because the content of the experiential state is that that very cup is green.4

How, then, does this intentional account of experience differ from the presentational thesis? On the intentional account, what is available through experience for demonstrative reference are things in the world, which are, from the subjective perspective, right there. When we reflect upon experience we find nothing between us and the world and are in a position to pick out and focus upon the things we perceive directly. So perceptual experience, on this intentional view, would have objects of experience in the sense described, and the things that we perceive would be the objects of experience. Furthermore, such experience would be relational, in the sense that it could not obtain in the absence of the things that we perceive. But, crucially, what is demonstrably available to us, through this experience, is not present in experience, but represented in experience. There is nothing in experience for us to demonstratively refer to.

Another way of saying this is that, on the presentational view, the object of experience is a constituent of the experience, whose presence in experience is to be explained by its being literally a part of the experience. On the relational intentional view, on the other hand, the object is not a constituent of the experience in this sense. The content of the experience involves the object in the sense that it is that very object that is represented.

We can now understand what the presentational theorist means by ‘sensing.’ It is simply the name for that relation that holds between subject and some object when that object is available to the subject in the way described above, and this availability is explained by the object being a constituent of the experience.

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4 For this kind of view about the nature of experience, see McDowell (1998).
So far I have explained what a perceptual experience consists in, *qua* experience, on the act/object account. But what makes it a *perceptual* experience? Quite simply, the object of experience must be appropriately related to some external (mind-independent) object, such that, it is precisely in virtue of being so related that this external object is seen. Following H. H. Price, we can refer to this relation as ‘belonging to’ (Price 1950). An experience is a perceptual experience of some external object if and only if there is an object of that experience which belongs to that external object.

When a subject sees some external object then that object appears some way to the subject. I use the expression ‘the phenomenal character of experience’ to refer to the way in which a subject is appeared to when perceiving something. So we might say that something appears blue to some subject at some time, and the subject being appeared to in that way (we can call it the ‘blue’ way, or we can say that ‘blueness’ is a phenomenal property of their experience) is a feature of the phenomenal character of their experience at that time. The phenomenal thesis, then, is a claim about why some subject is appeared to in a certain way. The claim is that a subject is appeared to in a certain way because there is an object of experience which *constitutes* the way that the subject is appeared to. What is meant by ‘constitute’ here? Well, typically this is taken to mean that the object of experience has, or instantiates, the properties that characterise the way in which the subject is appeared to by some external object.

It is important to note that the phenomenal thesis only applies to what we can think of as the *core* phenomenal character of experience. Within the range of phenomenal appearances we can discern those appearances that are of what we can refer to as *sensory qualities*. There are some qualities the appearance of which, if veridical, entails that that which appears to possess such qualities must possess them. So, if something appears red, and this appearance is veridical, in that we are not misperceiving that thing, then that thing must actually be red. On the other hand, if someone appears sad, then it does not mean that they must actually be sad if we are not misperceiving them. Their appearing sad may properly feature in the phenomenal character of an experience, but not in the core of such experience. Sadness, unlike redness, cannot be a sensory quality. The phenomenal thesis is taken to apply only to this kind of phenomenal property.

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5 Except, perhaps, in cases of non-conscious perception such as blindsight. I am concerned here only with an account of conscious perception.
Let's put all this together in a concrete example that can serve to illustrate the act/object position. John consciously sees a table, and the table appears brown to him. John enjoys a visual experience of the table, which is to say that John senses some object. What this means is that John is related to some object in such a way that this object is available to him for demonstrative reference and is a constituent of John's experience. This object is related in some appropriate way to the table, such that in virtue of being related in this way to the table, the experience counts as a perceptual experience of the table (the object of experience belongs to the table). Furthermore, the table appears brown to John. We are to explain this fact in terms of the object of experience actually instantiating this quality.

The phenomenal principle follows straightforwardly from the phenomenal thesis. If a subject S is appeared to in the F way, then there must be something that is F to which S stands in the sensing relation, because to be appeared to in the F way is to sense something that instantiates F-ness. And it is the phenomenal principle, together with the possibility of illusion and/or hallucination, that encourages us to think that we are related to objects in experience that are not the normal objects of perception.

I have presented the act/object view as a combination of two thoughts, the presentational thesis and the phenomenal thesis. The former is a thesis about the metaphysical structure of experience, while the latter is a thesis about the phenomenal character of experience. A crucial question is as to whether these are independent. Can one hold one and reject the other? They are quite frequently run together, and it is often assumed that to adopt a presentational conception of experience is tantamount to viewing the determination of phenomenal character in this way. Before assessing whether this is the case, I shall now present the traditional adverbial response to the act/object view.

2. Adverbialism

If one accepts the phenomenal principle, then one is going to accept, at the very least, that illusions and hallucinations are experiences whose nature is to be explained in terms of a relation between subject and non-physical object. And, if one is persuaded by the argument from illusion, one will think that all experiences are like this. A

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6 See, for example, Brewer (2008), Foster (2000) and Campbell (2002).
popular way of avoiding this conclusion is to give an account of the nature of experience that does not adopt an act/object structure.

Intentionalism is one version of this strategy, according to which an experience is an intentional state, and hence an intentional relation to some object, rather than a genuine relation. In a genuine or non-intentional relation, the relata need to exist. It is a feature of intentional states, however, such as beliefs, that their objects need not exist. Adverbialism, like intentionalism, rejects a genuinely relational conception of experience. It does this by providing an account of the determination of phenomenal character that does not explain it in terms of qualities that objects of sense possess.

When x appears blue to S, this need not be explained in terms of S's standing in the relation of sensing to some object. S's being appeared to in the 'blue' way is not to be understood as awareness of the instantiation of blue, but as a way in which S is conscious. In so doing, support for the phenomenal principle is cut away, and the conclusion of the argument from illusion/hallucination avoided. An analogy is usually drawn here between the adverbial understanding of visual experience and how we understand certain activities such as smiling, or dancing. We may say that someone has a broad smile, or is dancing a waltz, but, fundamentally, to have a broad smile is just to smile in a particular way, and to dance a waltz is just to dance a certain way. Here is Ducasse describing the position:

To sense blue is then to sense bluely, just as to dance the waltz is to dance 'waltzily' (i.e., in the manner called 'to waltz') to jump a leap is to jump 'leapily' (i.e., in the manner called 'to leap') etc. Sensing blue, that is to say, is I hold a species of sensing - a specific variety of the sort of activity generically called 'sensing.' (Ducasse 1942: 232-233)

As further refinement to the position, one could hold that the difference between, say, sensing redly and sensing bluely, is to be explained in terms of different modes, or determinations, of consciousness that are reliably caused, in normal observers, by distinct properties of external objects. Perceptual experience, on this traditional adverbialist conception, is a modification of the subject brought about, in an appropriate way, by an external object.

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7 Ducasse (1942; 1951) first put forward this particular alternative to the act/object structure.
8 See, for example, Chisholm (1957).
3. Criticisms of adverbialism

3.1 The complexity of experience

The adverbialist contends that experiential statements such as ‘it seems to me as if I see something red’ do not express a relation between the subject and some entity, but are in fact reports of the manner in which the subject senses. The phenomenal character of experience is to be explained by this manner. There are two main objections to this picture, ‘the many property problem’ and ‘the complement objection,’ both of which utilise the complexity of experience to criticise the adverbialist.

The many property problem runs as follows. Firstly, appearances are frequently to be characterised in terms of multiple qualities. That is, appearances are rarely, if ever, is to be characterised by only one phenomenal property. So, if something appears red to some subject it will not just be the case that that thing appears red, rather it will appear both red and square, for example. The objection is that adverbial theories cannot respect this simple fact. Secondly, it is quite common for subjects to be appeared to by several things at any particular time, and these simultaneous appearances may be characterised by incompatible phenomenal properties. Something can appear round to a subject at the same time that something else appears square. Like the issue of multiple properties, it is argued that the adverbialist cannot accommodate this feature of experience either.

If it is true to say that it (phenomenally) appears to Jill as if there is something red and round, then it follows from this that it appears to Jill as if there is something red. The act/object theorist can explain this entailment straightforwardly because they take the state of affairs of it appearing to Jill as if there is something red and round to consist in Jill sensing some object that instantiates redness and roundness. Things are not as simple for the adverbialist, however. They have two options at this point. They can say that the phenomenal character of Jill’s being appeared to is determined by Jill sensing redly and roundly. In which case it follows straightforwardly that Jill senses redly, and thus that it appears to her as if something is red. Alternatively, they can introduce a new adverb ‘red-roundly’ and say that the character of the experience is determined by Jill sensing red-roundly. It must then be taken to be part of the meaning of ‘red-roundly’ that if someone senses red roundly then they sense redly and they sense roundly. But it seems that neither account will do. The adverbialist cannot
say that its appearing to Jill as if there is something red and round consists simply in Jill's sensing redly and roundly. This would leave them without the resources to distinguish between the following two states of affairs: it appearing to Jill as if there is something red and round, and it appearing to Jill as if there is something round and some other thing which is red. In both cases the adverbialist would have to say that Jill senses redly and roundly, collapsing the evident distinction between them. It would seem as if an object is required, in order to accommodate facts of this kind.9

In response to this the adverbialist could claim that in the case of it appearing to Jill as if there is something that is both red and round, we should understand Jill's consciousness as being modified in a way that is distinct from saying that is modified redly and roundly. We should say instead that she senses red-roundly.

I take the central objection to this account that it seems to challenge the intuitive thought that, when it seems to Jill as if there is something both red and round, the redness and the roundness are distinct aspects of her experiential state. But if the character of her experience is to be understood as sensing red-roundly, the apparent distinctness of these elements are lost.10

The complement objection is based upon the following principle:

Just as it is not possible for something to be F and non-F at the same time, it is not possible for a person at a given time to V both F-ly and non F-ly. (Jackson 1977: 69)

As it is evidently possible that it can appear to someone as if there is something that is F and as if there is something that is not F, it is not possible to understand this adverbially as it would require us to say that that person senses both F-ly and non F-ly at the same time, violating the above principle. It is far from clear, however, that the above principle is a good one. In particular, it will not be true of those activities for which it is possible to engage in that activity more than once at the same time. Writing is one such activity. If one is ambidextrous it is possible to engage in two acts of writing at the same time.11 In which case one could write clearly and illegibly at the same time, to the contrary of the above principle.

10 See Jackson (1988: 122).
11 Jackson considers the possibility of someone writing with both his left and right hand at the same time but does not consider this a counterexample to the principle. He does not, however, seem to
By distinguishing between acts of sensing, and allowing that a subject can engage in many acts of sensing at the same time, the adverbialist can straightforwardly avoid the complement objection by basically denying that the principle upon which it depends applies to sensings. The failure of this principle allows us to see how the adverbialist can respond, not only to the complement objection, but also to the many property problem. If it appears to Jill as if there is something both red and round, then this is to be understood as Jill sensing redly and roundly, where it is a single act of sensing that is modified by the adverbs ‘redly’ and ‘roundly.’ If, on the other hand, it appears to Jill as if there is something red, and it appears to her as if there is something else that is round, this is to be understood as Jill engaging in two different acts of sensing, one which is modified by the adverb ‘redly’ the other by the adverb ‘roundly.’

It would seem, then, that the adverbialist does have the resources to deal with the complexity of experience, as long as he introduces the notion of acts of sensing that can occur at the same time. We can, however, extract something useful from this debate, in the form of (yet another) constraint which any account of sensory experience must satisfy. What motivates this whole line of objection to the adverbial theory is the thought that experience is complex, in that typically when someone enjoys visual experience they are appeared to by multiple things and in multiple, sometimes incompatible, ways.

This complexity of experience has to be explainable by any adequate account of sensory experience. Whether we take the core of experience to be a sensing, or the presentation of an object, or a representation of the world, the fact that experience is typically complex needs to be explicable. And as we have seen, the adverbial theorist is able to satisfy this constraint if they take sensings to be acts or events that can occur simultaneously.

3.2 The phenomenological problem

The second kinds of criticism are phenomenological in nature. When we reflect upon our experience, it seems to us as if we are reflecting upon objects present in our experience:

recognise that there are two different acts of writing going on the same time in such a case (see Jackson 1988: 125-126).
We are always aware of this core as the sensing, or sensory awareness, of some item [...] and are aware of the sensible qualities involved as aspects or elements of this item. (Foster 2000: 179)

It does not seem as if, in so doing, we are aware of properties or modes of consciousness. If the adverbialist objects to this that it is possible that reflection upon our experience is misleading in this regard, this is possibly too much to accept, given that we never arrive at this through reflection on experience:

To suggest that, in the case of sensory experience, we simply have no procedure for getting a correct introspective view of the basics of the situation, even though we focus on the nature of our experience in the relevantly detached way, know exactly what we are looking for, and are fully aware of all that might mislead – this seems to have no rationale other than that of preserving, at all costs, the adverbialist’s position. (Foster 2000: 181)

In a related objection Mike Martin (1998) argues that our knowledge of the character of experience requires experience to have a subject matter that we can attend to. That is, we can only gain knowledge of what our experience is like ‘through directing one’s attention over the actual or putative objects of awareness’ (Martin 1998: 172) It is only through attending to what appears to us that we can come to know what our experiences are like.

When we reflect upon experience we are confronted with an object, with something that appears to us, and this is essential to our experience having the phenomenal character that it has. The phenomenal properties of experience are not independent of this ‘object of experience’ or ‘subject matter,’ but the adverbialist is committed to claiming that they are. Phenomenal properties, for the adverbialist, are objectless ‘ways of sensing.’

On the adverbial account, experience does not intrinsically have a subject matter, as it is a mode of the subject. It is at odds, then, with the observation that we come to know what experience is like by attending to some such subject matter. The transparency of experience is a point against the adverbial conception of experience.

12 See Foster (2000: 175-178) for this solution on behalf of the adverbialist.
3.2 The perceptual problem

The final kind of objection is that the adverbial account of the nature of perceptual experience fails to allow for a plausible account of how the world can genuinely appear to us. In perceptual experience things appear to a subject as being certain ways. Any adequate account of perceptual experience needs to explain what it is for something to phenomenally appear a certain way to a subject. If the apple appears red and round to John, then we need to explain what its appearing red and appearing round consists in.

For the adverbialist, what explains the way in which a subject is appeared to is a mode of sensing, a property of the consciousness of the experiencing subject. So the apples appearing red to John, as opposed to blue, consists in differences between the way in which John is sensing. But how can the adverbialist explain things appearing to the subject in experience? How can the adverbialist explain how the apple appears to John? The act/object theorist can explain this in terms of the subject taking, or interpreting, what is present in experience as belonging to things in the world.

4. The independence of the presentational thesis and the phenomenal thesis

In many discussions of the nature of experience there is no significant distinction made between the presentational thesis and the phenomenal thesis, and they are often described together. Here, for example, is John Campbell talking about the relational view of experience:

On a Relational View, the qualitative character of the experience is constituted by the qualitative character of the scene perceived. I will argue that only this view, on which experience of an object is a simple relation holding between perceiver and object, can characterise the kind of acquaintance with objects that provides knowledge of reference. (Campbell 2002: 114-115)

Here we have two claims (we can ignore, for our purposes, Campbell's claims about the necessity of this view of perceptual experience in explaining our epistemic capacities.) One is about the phenomenal character of experience, to the effect that this is 'constituted' by the character of the objects perceived. This is what I have been
referring to as the phenomenal thesis.\textsuperscript{13} The other claim is a metaphysical one, that experience is a 'simple relation holding between perceiver and object.' From the rest of what Campbell has to say it would seem that this is the presentational thesis (or something very close to it).\textsuperscript{14} The two claims are closely entwined in Campbell's thinking.

As a second example here is Bill Brewer's 'object view':

The basic idea is that the core subjective character of perceptual experience is given simply by citing the physical object which is its mind-independent direct object. This is what I earlier called the early modern empiricist insight, that perceptual experience should be conceived as a relation between a perceiving subject and the object presented. (Brewer 2008: 171)

The two views that Brewer puts together here are the presentational thesis together with a particular version of the phenomenal thesis which takes a stance on the relation between presented object and object perceived, namely, that they are identical.\textsuperscript{15} And again we see the two views being regarded as more or less equivalent.

The thought that I take to be implicitly expressed in both of these passages is that a phenomenal property, such as 'blueness,' needs to be explained as the instantiation of this property by some object, if we understand experience to be a presentational state of affairs. But why should acceptance of the presentational thesis and acceptance of the phenomenal thesis go together?

One way of arriving at this position is that presented by Moore (1903). Moore presents the act/object view in this way: we can distinguish the awareness, or sensing of, say, red, and the instance of red that is so sensed. The difference between sensing

\textsuperscript{13} For example: 'we have the ordinary notion of a "view," as when you drag someone up a mountain trail, insisting that he will "enjoy the view." In this sense, thousands of people might visit the very same spot and enjoy the very same view. You characterise the experience they are having by saying which view they are enjoying. On the relational picture, this is the same thing as describing the phenomenal character of their experiences' (Campbell 2002: 116). I take this to mean that what one describes, when one describes the view, and what one describes, when one describes one's experience of that view, are the very same thing, namely, the objects and properties of the scene before one's eyes.

\textsuperscript{14} For example: 'on the relational view [...] In the case in which there is a dagger [to which you are consciously attending], the object itself is a constituent of your experience' (Campbell 2002: 117). And later, he explains that 'constituency' must be something other than the object entering into the content of perceptual experience: 'on the Relational View, experience of objects is a more primitive state than thoughts about objects, which nonetheless reaches all the way to the objects themselves' (Campbell 2002: 122-123).

\textsuperscript{15} A further, minor difference is that Brewer takes perceptual experience to be a three place relation between subject, presented object and conditions of perception, whereas I have just been assuming a two place relation between subject and presented object.
red and sensing blue is in the nature of the thing that is sensed. For sensing is in common between the two. Given that when something appears blue to one, one's sensing something cannot feature in an explanation of why that thing appears 'blue' as opposed to 'red,' the only resources we are left with is to explain this fact in terms of a difference between what one senses. The sensing component of sensing red and sensing blue are the same, and so, given the difference in phenomenal character between the two experiences, this difference must be explained in terms of the object that is present in experience in the two cases. One object instantiates redness, and the other blueness. But why on earth should the 'sensing' component (that which is in common between the two cases) be exactly the same in the two cases? What Moore is outlining is, really, a particular understanding of the presentational thesis, and not the only one available. The thought that the contribution of 'sensing' to the phenomenal character of experience is the same in all cases, is just an assumption.

A second reason for putting the presentational thesis together with the phenomenal thesis might be that we are first committed to the phenomenal thesis as a result of phenomenological observation, and then committed to the relational nature of experience as a consequence of this. It is clear that the phenomenal thesis entails the presentational thesis. If the phenomenal character of experience is constituted by some object, then experience is presentational, for there must always be some object that is a part of experience and which constitutes its character. On such an approach the presentational thesis would not require the phenomenal thesis, but the evident truth of the phenomenal thesis requires us to accept the presentational thesis, and this explains why they are often run together. The following passage from Price represents the claim that reflection on experience reveals the presence of instances of certain qualities:

When I say 'This table appears brown to me' it is quite plain that I am acquainted with an actual instance of brownness [...] This cannot indeed be proved, but it is absolutely evident and indubitable. (Price 1950: 63)

But one could object that this is a quite fundamental mistake, and that reflection on experience does not straightforwardly reveal this at all. When we try to refer to the character of our experiences, we can be referring to at least two very different kinds of
things. We might be referring to that, which we are aware of, the object of experience, or, we might be referring to our awareness of that object. We can be referring to the sensing, or we can be referring to that which is sensed. Now, according to the phenomenal thesis the sensing does not contribute to the phenomenal character of experience, so when I reflect on an aspect of the character of my experience I must be reflecting on the object of my experience. In which case, when I think about the character of my experience it will just seem obvious to me that I am acquainted with things that have the properties that characterise what my experience is like. But, if we are neutral as to the truth of the phenomenal thesis, it is a possibility that when I focus on this instance of red, I am focusing on the sensing of something, rather than the thing sensed. The line of thinking, then, assumes the truth of the phenomenal thesis and so cannot be used as a way of supporting it.

The final reason for combining the two theses together is that the phenomenal thesis provides the best explanation for the core phenomenal character of experience, given the truth of the presentational thesis. This seems to be the position that Broad, for example, adopts:

When I look at a penny from the side I am certainly aware of something; and it is certainly plausible to hold that this something is elliptical in the same plain sense in which a suitably bent piece of wire, looked at from straight above, is elliptical. If, in fact, nothing elliptical is before my mind, it is very hard to understand why the penny should seem elliptical rather than of any other shape. (Broad 1965b: 89-90)

Here we see that the actual instantiation of a particular shape property is appealed to as the best explanation for why the experience has the character that it does. In which case there is space for alternative explanations of phenomenal character that reject the phenomenal thesis, for the presentational thesis and the phenomenal thesis are independent.

4.1 Filling the space (1): the theory of appearing

Broad himself acknowledges a competing explanation for the character of experience that denies the phenomenal thesis but upholds the presentational thesis. It has been variously referred to as the multiple relation theory (Broad 1965b), the multiple
relation theory of appearing (Jackson 1977) and the relational theory (Robinson 1994). Its most common name is, perhaps, the theory of appearing, and I will from now on refer to it as such (see Price 1950; Alston 1999; Langsam 1997). On this account, phenomenal properties of experience are not instantiated in some object, but in a relation between subject and object. This is in sharp contrast to the act/object views of the sense-datum theorists and modern day naïve realists for whom phenomenal properties are intrinsic properties of the objects to which we are related in experience.

Here are some recent articulations of the position:

The theory of appearing [...] takes perceptual consciousness to consist, most basically, in the fact that one or more objects appear to the subject as so-and-so, as round, bulgy, blue, jagged etc. (Alston 1999: 182)

And according to Langsam (1997) experiences are ‘relations between material objects and minds’ where this is understood as the claim that ‘phenomenal features [phenomenal properties] are relations between material objects and minds’ (Langsam 1997: 35).

The theory of appearing is, then, an example of a position that endorses the presentational thesis but denies the phenomenal thesis.

The theory of appearing could be used by the naïve realist to explain illusion. The nature of perceptual experience can be thought of as presentational, but the naïve realist can deny that the phenomenal character of experience simply consists in the properties that this object has. Instead, the character of such experience consists in the relation that the object of experience and the subject stand in. It is this relation of ‘appearing’ that gives experience its phenomenal character, and so there is no problem with supposing that the object of experience appears to have properties that it lacks.

The fundamental objection to the theory of appearing, in my mind, is that it leaves phenomenal character unexplained. In virtue of what, exactly, is it the case that the tomato looks red to John? To say that there is no more fundamental explanation than just ‘the tomato stands in the “looks red” relation to John’ is deeply unsatisfying, and indeed, there is a feeling here that nothing has been explained. I do not, now, on being given this explanation, have an understanding of what the difference is between looking red and looking blue, or why there should be such a difference. We are brought back to the point that all parties are going to want to say that when x looks F
to S, then S is related to x, and that to say that that is all we can say is not to explain what looking F is.

The theory of appearing is unsatisfactory, then, because it fails to provide us with an explanation of phenomenal character – it does not tell us what makes an experience the experience that it is. We might say, to say that something appears yellow to someone tells us something about the kind of experience that they are enjoying, but as yet says nothing about what it is that makes the experience of that kind.

The theory of appearing is a failure, then, but not because it rejects the phenomenal thesis. It is a failure because the appeal to a relation alone cannot explain, to any degree of satisfaction, the phenomenal character of our experiences.

4.2 Filling the space (2): a modified adverbialism

Adverbialism rejects the relational conception of experience, in order to avoid a conception of experience according to which it is a relation to a non-physical object. But the presentational thesis is only one part of the act/object account. The other is that the core phenomenal character of experience is determined by qualities of the object to which one is related in that experience, in that these qualities constitute that character.

Adverbialism is often presented in response to sense-datum theories, and as opposed to the presentational thesis. But perhaps it is better thought of, first and foremost, as a position that seeks to avoid the phenomenal principle, and the objectionable objects of sense that it brings in its wake as a consequence of the possibility of illusion. And as the phenomenal principle is a consequence of the phenomenal thesis, which is independent of the presentational thesis, there is no need for the adverbialist to deny the latter. What options are there available for the adverbialist who wants to retain the presentational thesis?

An object's appearing red is to be understood in the following way: as sensing that object redly. But the object need not feature as a contingent element in this sensing, as it does on traditional construals of adverbialism, but could be thought of as a constituent of the sensing. The model to be adopted is not that of ways of dancing, or smiling, which are non-relational activities, but of ways of grasping, pushing or pulling, which are relational and hence require an object. A grasping, pushing or
pulling is always a grasping, pushing or pulling of something. Sensing, then, is conceived of on this picture as a relational activity.

I shall use gripping as an example. There is an optimal grip for the human hand depending on the shape of the object to be gripped. Whether or not a grip should be considered optimal or not will be relative to some goal. So for example, to securely grip something in order to minimise the chance of its falling from your grasp, there is an optimal way in which one’s hand must be formed. For different shapes there will be different optimal grips. Let us call the optimal grip for picking up a sphere the ‘spherical’ grip and the optimal grip for picking up a cube the ‘cuboid’ grip. The optimal grip for a sphere and the optimal grip for a cube will be at once similar and different. They are the same in that they are both grips, and, what is more, they are both optimal grips. But the grips have different characters, in that they involve different shapes of the hand around the object gripped.

Now let’s look at particular acts of gripping some object. A subject, Sam, grips a sphere in the optimal way, so Sam grips the sphere in the spherical way, which is to say, the grip Sam has of the sphere is the spherical grip. Now, what is the source of the character of this grip? Is it determined solely by the object gripped? No. The character of the gripping, the way in which Sam grips the spherical object, is clearly not determined solely by the nature of the object gripped, because clearly it is possible for Sam to grip the sphere in the spherical way on one occasion, and in a non-spherical way on another. The way in which Sam goes to grip the sphere, the way in which Sam shapes his hand in going to grip the sphere, contributes to the character of the grip Sam actually takes of that thing. But is the character of Sam’s grip on the sphere independent of the character of the object gripped? No. The character of the grip is clearly shaped and moulded by the actual shape of the thing gripped. The spherical shape of the object partly determines the kind of grip Sam takes of it. The shape of Sam’s hand in moving out to grip the sphere does not survive contact with the sphere, but accommodates, and settles into, its spherical shape.

It is important to note that the object is an essential constituent of the grip. One cannot grip nothing. A failed grip is like a failed push, or a failed touching, in that just as a failed push is not a kind of push, and a failed touching is not a kind of

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16 See, for example, the experimental use of ‘Blake shapes’ in determining efficiency of grasp in test subjects (Goodale and Milner 2005: 24-27).
touching, so a failed grip is not any kind of grip. For something to be a gripping, there must be something gripped.

This model can be extended to the sensing of the object of experience. When a subject senses red-ly, this is to be understood as sensing something in the red way. The determination of the character of experience is not to be thought of in terms of the object of experience alone, but in terms of the way in which one senses that object. But neither is the way in which one senses an object independent of that object. The object of experience plays a role in determining the character of the sensing of it. It shapes, or moulds, the act of sensing directed upon it. Like traditional adverbialism, the phenomenal character of experience is to be explained in terms of a mode of sensing, but unlike traditional adverbialism this mode of sensing is in part determined by an object that is sensed. The traditional adverbialist might respond to this by saying that on his view, the mode of sensing is determined by the object that is sensed. On their account, the external object that is perceived causally determines the mode of consciousness.

What is crucially different between the traditional adverbialist account of sensing and this modified adverbialism is that on this latter view the object of sensing is an essential part of the act of sensing, whereas on the former view it stands external to the act of sensing itself, as its cause.

This picture requires us to think of the relationship between the object of experience and the phenomenal properties of experience in a different way to how traditional relational conceptions of experiences conceive of it. The object of experience is a constituent of the experience that is available for demonstrative reference. The phenomenal character of the experience does not, however, consist simply in the presence in experience of the qualities that this object possesses. Rather, a particular phenomenal property is the sensing of this object in a particular way. On this picture, then, experience is presentational, but the phenomenal thesis is not true.

This modified adverbial conception of perceptual experience copes well with the criticisms that are directed at its traditional counterpart. There are three criticisms, each of which exploits the lack of an object in the adverbialist account of the determination of the phenomenal character of perceptual experience. According to the modified adverbialist, the way in which one is appeared to in perceptual experience is determined by the way in which one senses an object. So the issue of
complexity is easily accommodated. Any adequate account of phenomenal character must be able to capture the difference between it appearing to someone as if there is something that is both F and G and it appearing to someone as if there is something F, and as if there is something else that is G. The modified adverbialist can respect this because in the former case there is something present in experience that is sensed F-ly and G-ly, while in the latter case there are two things present in experience, one of which is sensed F-ly and the other which is sensed G-ly. In the same way the theorist can accommodate the fact that it can appear to a subject as if something is F at the same time as it appears to that subject that there is something that is not F. In such a case there will be two objects present in the overall experience of the subject. One of these is sensed F-ly while the other is sensed non-F-ly.

The account also preserves the phenomenological data. It can fully allow that we come to know what experience is like only through reflecting upon the objects of experience, because there are such objects, presented to the conscious subject. To the charge that we never become aware of 'modes of sensing' when we reflect upon what our experience is like, the theorist can respond that while this was a problem for the traditional adverbialist who maintained that phenomenal character is determined by an objectless mode of consciousness, our being aware of objects of experience is our being aware of the way in which we sense these objects.

Finally, this modified adverbialism does not have the same problem of explaining how we can be perceptually conscious of an external world that faces the traditional adverbialist. There are two possible ways in which they can conceive of this coming about. The first would be to conceive of perceptual consciousness (its appearing to some subject as if there is something with such and such a quality somewhere) as having a sensory core, that determines the phenomenal character of the experience, and which is taken, or interpreted, by the subject. There is no more problem to understanding how this is taken to be of the world than there is for the act/object account, for there is something present in the experience which is, actually, a part of the world. The second would be to think of perceptual consciousness as not consisting of sensory core plus interpretation of this core. Rather, a subject is appeared to in perceptual experience simply because they are sensing some object in the world, where this sensing is to be understood as an engagement with that object, and so could already by thought of as 'of' that object. Something appears to the object because something is sensed.
5. The explanation of error

This modified version of adverbialism can be seen as a version of naïve realism that answers the problems posed to it by the argument from illusion, as it rejects the phenomenal thesis that such an argument relies on.

Recall that the presentational theorist is committed to ‘objects of experience’ that are present in experience in the sense that they are available for demonstrative reference and are constituents of experience. When a subject sees an object then that object appears to them, and it does so in virtue of the subject being aware of, or sensing, some object of experience that is appropriately related to the object seen.

Let us understand naïve realism in the following way – it is the claim that the object of experience that one is aware of, or senses, in virtue of which one sees some external object, is that external object. The awareness of the object of experience does not, therefore, fall short of awareness of the object seen. When a subject, Sally, sees an object, lets say an apple, then that apple appears to her. Let us say that one of the ways the apple appears to her is red. What is the explanation we should give of the phenomenal feature, redness, which characterises the way that the apple appears to Sally? The naïve realist claims that the state of affairs that is Sally being appeared to in the red way, is the same state of affairs that is Sally seeing the apple. There is a single state of affairs that we can think of as having two aspects. When we say ‘Sally sees the apple’ then we are reporting what we can call the perceptual aspect of this state of affairs, and when we say ‘Sally is appeared to in the red way,’ we are reporting what we can call the phenomenal aspect of this state of affairs.

The modified adverbialism described above is a version of naïve realism. The phenomenal character of the apple appearing to Sally is to be understood in terms of Sally sensing red-ly. But Sally’s sensing red-ly is the same thing as the apple’s appearing red to her – they are the mental and object centred counterparts of the same state of affairs. The object that Sally senses in the red manner, which is the object of experience, is the red apple. Like the adverbial theory, phenomenal character is determined by the manner of Sally’s sensing. Unlike the adverbial theory, Sally’s experience is presentational, because sensing F-ly is always sensing some object F-ly.
But now let's take a case of illusion. Sally sees a red apple, but this time the apple appears blue to her. The challenge for the naïve realist is to show how it is possible in such a situation for Sally's seeing the apple and the apple's appearing blue to her to be different aspects of the same state of affairs, when the apple is not blue. For a naïve realist wedded to the phenomenal thesis, this is a serious difficulty, because the phenomenal aspect of the state of affairs must be explained only by reference to the object of experience, which, according to the naïve realist, is the object that is seen. But the object that is seen in the illusory case does not have the property that the object of experience has. So how can it be identical with this object? It is plain that for the naïve realist position to be tenable it must be able to explain the source of perceptual error in such a way that it is not located in a discrepancy between properties the object of experience has, and properties the object perceived has.

The modified adverbialism described above can be used to show how this is possible. The source of perceptual error, on this account, is in the sensing of the object. And the sensing of the object is determined both by the object of experience and the way that object is sensed.

The blue manner of sensing is the sensing of something in the blue way. Just as the shape of an object determines the correct grip we must adopt relative to some goal (say in order to pick it up securely), so the colour of an object determines the correct sensing we must employ in order to have the colour of the object available for us in thought and action (i.e. in order to have thoughts about that colour instance and act towards it). Now, just as Sally might grip a round object in the square way, and so make a mistake in the gripping of the object, she can sense a red object in the blue way. The locus of perceptual error is, then, sensing in the wrong way, and not a discrepancy between the properties of the object of experience and the object of perception.

6. Conclusion

I have argued that acceptance of a presentational conception of experience does not bring with it acceptance of the view that the core phenomenal character of such experience is simply to be identified with certain aspects of the character of the object involved in the relation. Once we accept this, it is open to a theorist to reject the latter while maintaining the former. I presented a modified adverbialism that occupies this.
logical space and respected what I regard as the fundamental insight of adverbialism, namely that phenomenal character can be, at least in part, determined by the way in which one senses. According to this form of adverbialism, experience is the sensing of some object in a particular way, rather than just sensing in a particular way. This modified adverbialism can be regarded as a version of naïve realism. What is more, it is a version of naïve realism that is well placed to accommodate the possibility of perceptual error.

It does not, however, provide the naïve realist with an answer to the argument from hallucination. That will require a different strategy. It is my purpose in this chapter only to outline a defence of a particular conception of what the experience one enjoys when perceiving consists in. The consideration of non-perceptual experience and naïve realism will be the subject of the next two chapters.
1. Disjunctivism

It is commonly thought that the only way naïve realism can accommodate the possibility of hallucination is to adopt a position called *disjunctivism*. Broadly speaking, disjunctivism is any position that denies that we must give some sort of common account of perceptual, illusory, and hallucinatory experience. And if this is the case, then the fact that the sensory experience subjects enjoy in hallucination have a certain nature has no implications for the account we want to give of perceptual experience. This is what the disjunctive move offers the naïve realist.

It is certainly true that for a range of phenomena we call hallucinatory, the naïve realist should be willing to assert that they are very different states of affairs to genuinely perceptual experience. As we saw in chapter three, this is something that could very well be the case, given the empirical evidence, and as such, something that any theory of perception should remain neutral on. It may, for example, turn out that the best explanation of certain actually occurring hallucinations is to construe them as imaginings or visualisations that are particularly vivid, and mistaken to be experiences by a subject, possibly due to a confusion in their state of mind.

There is a class of hallucinations, however, that no satisfactory account of the nature of perception can remain silent on. Philosophers' hallucination is genuine conscious experience that is subjectively indistinguishable from perceptual experience, but in which no object is perceived. Its possibility seems to be inherent in the notion of perceptual experience, and our epistemic limitations with regards to the perceptual status of our experience.

There are three key features to this class of hallucinations. First, they are genuinely sensory and experiential. Second, they are not perceptual. Thirdly, they are indiscriminable from perceptual experience. It is in regard to philosophers' hallucination, or perfect non-perceptual experience, that the tenability of a
disjunctivist account is most problematic. The argument against naïve realism that proceeds through a rejection of disjunctivism has three stages:

1) The naïve realist needs to adopt disjunctivism with regard to philosophers’ hallucination.

2) For at least a certain class of philosophers’ hallucinations, namely those that causally match perceptual experiences, the naïve realist must adopt extreme disjunctivism, according to which there is no more positive characterisation to give of philosophers’ hallucination than that it is subjectively indiscriminable through reflection from perceptual experience.

3) Extreme disjunctivism is not a workable position.

I shall not consider stage (1) of the argument here, but I do not believe that the naïve realist is in fact forced to accept this. This will be the subject of the next chapter. For now, I want to deal with the cogency of the disjunctivist defence of naïve realism. I will argue that (2) and (3) are correct, and thus that if, for whatever reason the naïve realist must be a disjunctivist, then naïve realism should be abandoned.

1.1 Varieties of disjunctivism

Disjunctivism in the philosophy of perception is not a single position, with a single concern. This generates considerable scope for confusion, and so it is worthwhile delineating the different strands of thinking that have fallen under the heading ‘disjunctivism,’ with the aim of articulating the position that the naïve realist should be concerned with.

First of all it should be noted that disjunctivism is an approach that is not limited to the realm of perception, although it originated with considerations to do with it.¹ There are now disjunctive positions in the theory of action, for example.²³ My concern here is primarily with disjunctivism as it features in philosophy of perception, although as we shall see there is some crossover with the theory of knowledge.

¹ It tends to be acknowledged that disjunctivism originated in the work of Hinton (1973). For an illuminating discussion of the origins of the idea prior to Hinton, and its connection with naïve realism, see Snowdon (2008).
² David Ruben, for example, talks about disjunctivism in respect to denying that there are intrinsic events to basic actions. Every bodily movement is either an action or a mere event (Ruben 2008).
³ For a survey of different debates in which a disjunctive approach can be adopted see Dancy (1995). Haddock and Macpherson (2008a) contains works on disjunctivism in perception, action and theory of knowledge.
Hereafter when I talk about disjunctivism this should be taken to refer only to disjunctivism as it features in considerations about perception.

A useful place to start is with Haddock and Macpherson (2008b). They distinguish three different varieties of disjunctivism: epistemological, experiential, and phenomenal. I will concentrate here only upon the latter two, as it is disjunctivism as it features in arguments pertaining to the nature of perceptual experience and its phenomenal character that I am concerned with rather than its epistemic significance.

Let us say, for the sake of brevity, that a good case and a bad case of sensory experience 'match' each other if and only if they are subjectively indiscriminable. Experiential disjunctivism denies that matching 'good' and 'bad' experiences must have a common intrinsic nature. And phenomenal disjunctivism denies that matching 'good' and 'bad' experiences must have a common phenomenal character.

There is a shared thinking involved in disjunctive positions. Each of the above denies that something in common between 'good' and 'bad' cases of sensory experience follows from their subjective indiscriminability. What does it mean to say that sensory experience is a 'good' case or a 'bad' case? The good case/bad case distinction simply draws a distinction between experiences at what the disjunctivist takes to be a significant point. There are, broadly speaking, four different kinds of

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4 Byrne and Logue (2008) also articulate a position that they refer to as Austinian disjunctivism (which can also be found in Thau (2004)). According to Austinian disjunctivism, nothing follows about the nature of the object of experience from the subjective indiscriminability of experiences. It is compatible with this view that good and bad cases of experience (see below for an explanation of this distinction) have the same fundamental nature, and that the difference between them resides in the nature of the object of experience. This position is, ultimately, the one that I believe the naïve realist should adopt. I refrain from including it in a discussion of the main disjunctivist positions because, while it is a disjunctive position of sorts, it is not what is usually understood to be what disjunctivism is all about, which is far more commonly expressed in terms of a commitment to either experiential or metaphysical disjunctivism. It shall be discussed in greater detail in chapter seven.

5 According to epistemic disjunctivism, nothing follows about what a subject knows on the basis of the indiscriminability of perceptual from non-perceptual experience. The point of adopting disjunctivism is to defend the view that in the perceptual case, what a subject knows does not fall short of knowledge about the world external to them. In the perceptual case, what a subject knows is a fact about the world, that is made manifest to them, while in the non-perceptual case this is not the case. Epistemological disjunctivism in the sense put forward here is consistent with a neutral stance towards either phenomenal or experiential disjunctivism. One could plausibly maintain that the experience one enjoys across good and bad cases is of the same metaphysical or phenomenal nature, but that its epistemic significance differs. It is not entirely clear to me that the epistemological disjunctivism laid out here can really be attributed to any incarnation of McDowell, as many authors wish to do. See Snowdon (2005), Byrne and Logue (2008) and Haddock and Macpherson (2008b). Irrespective of whether or not McDowell holds this position, it is one that is available and salient in current discussions of disjunctivism.
sensory experience from the perspective of veridicality and perceptual contact which everyone should agree upon. There can be veridical perceptual experience, non-veridical perceptual experience, veridical non-perceptual experience and non-veridical non-perceptual experience. The line between good and bad cases will be drawn somewhere within this range of kinds of experience. This will depend upon what the focus of the theorist is.

The phenomenal disjunctivist, for example, is interested in the phenomenal character of one’s sensory experience and so draws a distinction between experiences on the basis of whether they have the same phenomenal character, or have their character determined in the same way. The experiential disjunctivist, on the other hand, will draw distinctions based upon the ontological make up of sensory experiences.

But even within a particular area of interest, opinion about what counts as a ‘good’ case or ‘bad’ case varies from theorist to theorist. For example, for the experiential disjunctivist the division between experiences that he is interested in is in terms of whether they intrinsically involve the objects of perception. A ‘good’ experience is one that involves these objects, and a ‘bad’ one is one that does not. Both veridical and non-veridical non-perceptual experiences are taken as being bad cases because such experiences do not, in themselves, put one in perceptual contact with something in the world. Veridical perceptual experience is taken to be a good case, different in intrinsic nature to the bad cases in that this nature includes the object of perception. But what of non-veridical perceptual experience? Theorists committed to experiential disjunctivism differ in their attitude to such experience. Snowdon, for example, takes it to be a good case (it includes the object of perception as part of its intrinsic nature) while Martin seems to regard it as a bad case (it does not include the object of perception as part of its intrinsic nature). There is general agreement that veridical perceptual experience counts as a good case, and that veridical and non-veridical non-perceptual experience counts as a bad case, from the experiential,

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6 Assuming, of course, that they accept the notions of perceptual contact and veridicality.
7 Martin writes:

The disjunctive theory of perception claims that we should understand statements about how things appear to a perceiver to be equivalent to statements of a disjunction that either one is perceiving such and such or one is suffering an illusion (or hallucination); and that such statements are not to be viewed as introducing a report of a distinctive mental event or state common to these various disjoint situations. (Martin 2004: 37)
epistemological, and phenomenological perspective. There is disagreement, however, over whether non-veridical perceptual experience belongs with the good case or the bad case.

As discussed in chapter three, I do not believe that the naïve realist should advocate a view of non-veridical perceptual experience that takes it to have a different nature to veridical perceptual experience. Such an account would face problems with resisting the highly plausible generalising step from the nature of illusory experience to the nature of veridical perceptual experience. Furthermore, it makes good dialectical sense for the naïve realist to regard such experience in the same way as we regard veridical perceptual experience. If instead we take it to be of the same sort as non-perceptual experience then the naïve realist hands their opponent a kind of experience that is perceptual, but not in the same way as veridical perceptual experience. They admit that there can be, and in fact are, such experiences. In doing so they give their opponent the basis of a unified account of experience to use against them.

1.2 Experiential disjunctivism

This position is particularly associated with the work of Paul Snowdon (1980/81; 1990/91; 2005). It claims that the intrinsic nature of experience need not be the same across perception and hallucination. In a case of seeing something, the thing seen is part of the intrinsic nature of one’s perceptual experience, and as hallucination is a case in which nothing is seen, one’s experience in such a case must have a different intrinsic nature. What is denied, then, is that the indiscriminability of perceptual from non-perceptual experience means that perceptual experience must not involve, or include, the normal object that is the object of perception in the perceptual case.

Here is Snowdon articulating what he means by ‘disjunctivism’:

It [disjunctivism] represents the thought that the experience in a genuinely perceptual case has a different nature to the experience involved in a non-perceptual case. It is not exhausted, however, by the simple denial of a common nature, but involves also the characterisation of the difference between the perceptual and the non-perceptual in terms of the different
constituents of the experiences involved. The experience in a perceptual case in its nature reaches out to and involves the perceived external object, not so the experience in other cases. (Snowdon 2005: 136-137)

This kind of disjunctivism, as Snowdon comments in a footnote to this passage, seems to divide experiences according to whether or not they are psychologically mediated. Good cases are experiences that, in themselves, put the subject in perceptual contact with the object of perception.

As we have seen, to take a stance on the issue of psychological mediation is not yet to commit oneself to a particular view of how the phenomenal character of experience is determined. When something appears to a subject to be a certain way, the subject's experience is in part constituted by the object that appears to him, on the experiential disjunctivist's view. But what determines the way in which the subject is appeared to is not commented on.

Haddock and Macpherson express this possibility as follows:

It seems to be consistent with the fact that an experience [...] 'intrinsically involves' public objects that these objects do not explain the phenomenology of the experience. Nor need an experiential disjunctivist think that the phenomenal character of the hallucination and of the veridical perceptual experience are different [...] An experiential disjunctivist could hold that the phenomenology of veridical visual experiences is determined by a content or mind-dependent object common to the hallucinatory case but claim that, nonetheless, the state in toto is partly constituted by mind-independent objects. On such a theory, the fact an experience intrinsically involves an object is compatible with its making no difference to the experience's phenomenal character. The phenomenal character of an intrinsically object-involving perceptual experience and the character of an object-free hallucination would have the same explanation, and could actually be the same, if the experiences

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8 I will omit reference to the distinction between veridical and non-veridical non-perceptual experience as all parties to this debate think they should be given the same treatment

9 Snowdon writes: 'I think that the thesis that I am suggesting "disjunctivism" stands for is more or less the idea that John Foster calls Strong Direct Realism in Foster 2000' (Snowdon 2005: 136n14). Foster takes Strong Direct Realism (SDR) to be an account of perception that takes it to be psychologically direct, so that the psychological state of experience does not fall short of perceptual contact with the object of perception. While Foster takes SDR to require disjunctivism, and Snowdon follows him in this, it does not follow from a commitment to the position.
shared the appropriate content or sense-data. (Haddock and Macpherson 2008b: 17)

While I agree that on the experiential disjunctivist’s account the fact that experience intrinsically involves the object of perception is compatible with it making no difference to the phenomenal character of the experience, it is not clear to me that it is compatible with just any view of the determination of phenomenal character. If one thinks that perception is psychologically direct, then one will not think that it is perceptually indirect. But, if one thinks that how one is appeared to in an episode of perception is determined by the character of some experience-dependent object, then it would seem as if one takes perception to be perceptually mediated by awareness of this object. In which case experiential disjunctivism will not be compatible with this picture of phenomenal determination. So perhaps the right thing to say about the experiential disjunctivist is that the object of experience need not determine the phenomenal character of one’s experience, or, rather, that it is no part of the disjunctive claim that such character is determined in any particular way. So while it is open that there may be ways of viewing the determination of phenomenal character such that perceptual and non-perceptual experience share this characteristic, we can accept that there will nevertheless be particular conceptions of the determination of phenomenal character which are incompatible with the central claim of such disjunctivism. The question of the determination of phenomenal character, and the question of whether or not perception is psychologically direct, are not entirely distinct.

The problem for the experiential disjunctivist who accepts that the phenomenal character of good and bad cases is determined in the same way is as to how, in doing so, they can preserve the idea that perceptual experience is intrinsically object-involving. If we have to explain the phenomenal character of perceptual experience in the same way as that of perfect non-perceptual experience, then the worry is that what we invoke to explain this phenomenal character will prevent the experience from being truly psychologically direct. Let us suppose that we conceive of the character of the philosophers’ hallucination as being determined by the presence to a subject’s mind of an object whose existence depends upon its presence in that experience and whose properties simply are the phenomenal properties of the experience. How, then, can we plausibly suppose that this state of mind does not mediate our awareness of
the object of perception? Alternatively, we could think of the character of philosophers' hallucination as determined by some representational content that the subject is related to. How can the presence of this state of mind in the perceptual case fail to constitute something that mediates our awareness of the world? So it is not clear to me that experiential disjunctivism is a stable position unless it carries with it some sort of commitment to how phenomenal character is determined.

1.3 Phenomenal disjunctivism

Haddock and Macpherson (2008b) make a distinction between experiential disjunctivism and a closely related position that they call phenomenal disjunctivism. Phenomenal disjunctivism is a position they attribute to Mike Martin (2004; 2006). It adopts the basic disjunctive approach in regards to the phenomenal character of one's experiences.

There are two versions of the position. The first is that what explains phenomenal character need not be the same in matching 'good' and 'bad' experiences. The second is that the phenomenal character itself need not be the same in matching 'good' and 'bad' experiences. So on the first formulation of the position, two experiences may have the same phenomenal character, but the explanation of this similarity need not lie in a similar understanding of what explains phenomenal character in the two cases. On the second formulation, it is the phenomenal character itself which need not be considered in common between the cases, even though they match. I must confess that I am not sure as to what this stronger claim actually consists in and what the reasons for making it are. I will therefore restrict discussion to the conception of phenomenal disjunctivism according to which the claim is that what determines the phenomenal character of a matching pair of perceptual and non-perceptual experiences need not be the same.

Let us remind ourselves about what the phenomenal character of experience is supposed to be. It is often said that the phenomenal character of some state of mind is 'what it is like' for a subject to have that state of mind.

The naïve realist makes a claim about the way in which phenomenal character is determined; when an object phenomenally appears a certain way to a subject that

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10 For an articulation of this concern see, for example, Smith (2002: 207).
Naive Realism and Hallucination

object and its properties help determine this phenomenal appearance in an
'ontologically immediate' way. A disjunctive defence of naïve realism needs,
therefore, to be a form of phenomenal disjunctivism. The argument from
hallucination will be answered by the claim that we need not conceive of the
determination of phenomenal character in matching good and bad cases in the same
way.

Harold Langsam (1997) is an example of someone who adopts phenomenal
disjunctivism in response to the possibility of hallucination. He advocates a form of
the theory of appearing in which the phenomenal properties of perceptual experience,
the ways in which a subject is appeared to when perceiving something, are constituted
by the appearing relation in which a subject stands to the object of perception.
Langsam accommodates the possibility of matching hallucinations by claiming that
perceptual experience and its matching perfect non-perceptual experience instantiate
different phenomenal properties that are nevertheless indistinguishable from one
another. We are to suppose that for every phenomenal property that is the
instantiation of an appearing relation between subject and normal (what he calls
material) object, there is a corresponding phenomenal property for the matching
hallucinatory experience that is instantiated in some other way. Langsam expresses
this in terms of there being a determinable notion of each phenomenal property that
has different determinations. As he writes of the example of something appearing red
and its hallucinatory counterpart:

We might say that the phenomenal features of redness₁ [the appearing relation
that obtains between subject and normal object] and redness₂ [the phenomenal
property of the hallucinatory counterpart] are determinate properties of a
determinable to which only they belong. (Langsam 1997: 40)

Langsam is, then, a phenomenal disjunctivist who conceives of the way in which
phenomenal character is determined as varying between good and bad cases:

According to the Disjunctive conception that I am defending, a phenomenal
feature [phenomenal property] is either a relation between a material object
and a mind (if it is the kind of phenomenal feature that is instantiated in

11 Although he does not describe himself as such.
perceptual experiences) or it is something else (if it is the kind of phenomenal feature that is instantiated in hallucinatory experiences). (Langsam 1997: 41)

As this last section illustrates, the phenomenal disjunctivist need not give any particular positive account of the nature of perfect non-perceptual experience. The disjunctivist can remain silent on such matters.12

1.4 Extreme disjunctivism

Within the category of phenomenal disjunctivism we can discern a position that I shall refer to as 'extreme disjunctivism.'13 It is motivated by the thought that the disjunctivist cannot remain silent about the nature of hallucinatory experience. Extreme disjunctivism is committed to the claim that, at least for some cases of perfect non-perceptual experience, no more can be said of their psychological nature than that they are subjectively indiscriminable from perceptual experience. They can be characterised only in relational terms, and have no intrinsic psychological nature.

Mike Martin is the leading advocate of this position. He says of such disjunctivism that according to it:

There are certain mental events, at least those hallucinations [philosophers’ hallucinations] brought about through causal conditions matching those of veridical perceptions [veridical perceptual experiences], whose only positive mental characteristics are negative epistemological ones – that they cannot be told apart by the subject from veridical perception. (Martin 2004: 74)

I can discern three motivations for the naïve realist who is a phenomenal disjunctivist to adopt extreme disjunctivism.

2. Motivations for extreme disjunctivism

2.1 The causal argument from hallucination

12 Langsam later writes that the theory of appearing 'need not commit itself to any particular account of the ontological character of hallucinations' (Langsam 1997: 46).
13 This expression is from Smith (2008). Sturgeon refers to it as 'Reflective Disjunctivism' (2006; 2008).
Perhaps the most important motivation for the extreme disjunctivist position on behalf of the naïve realist is as a response to the causal argument from hallucination. The naïve realist cannot just rest with being a phenomenal disjunctivist.

The possibility of a certain class of perfect non-perceptual experiences, namely, those that causally match perceptual experiences, present the naïve realist with a real problem. This problem presents itself in the form of a constraint upon any adequate account of perceptual experience. This constraint comes in a strong and a weak variety. The strong hallucinatory constraint has it that perceptual and causally matching perfect non-perceptual experience must have exactly the same natures. The weak hallucinatory constraint has it that perceptual experience must share the same nature as perfect non-perceptual experience. In particular, that which determines the phenomenal character of philosophers' hallucination and perceptual experience must be present in the causally matching perceptual experience. The strong hallucinatory constraint can be undermined by the thought that the extra conditions that obtain in the case of a perceptual experience can contribute to the nature of the experience in a way that makes the perceptual experience intrinsically perceptual.

We can reject the idea that, just because the physical basis of non-perceptual experience is present in the perceptual cases, it follows that they are psychologically of exactly the same nature. For it could be said that the normal object of perception is a part of the physical basis of the perceptual experience, and so we have two different physical bases for matching pairs of perceptual and non-perceptual experiences.

We are not forced, then, to conclude that whatever nature perceptual experience has, causally matching non-perceptual experience must also have. The problem for the naïve realist is how to accommodate the weak hallucinatory constraint. For it does seem clear that whatever is sufficient for the occurrence of a non-perceptual experience with a certain phenomenal character is present when the causally matching perceptual experience takes place.

The naïve realist must augment their phenomenal disjunctivism by accepting that perceptual experiences and philosophers' hallucinations share the same determination of phenomenal character, but also claiming that this is consistent with there being more to the determination of phenomenal character in the perceptual case.

The weak hallucinatory constraint tells us that whatever determines the phenomenal character of philosophers' hallucination is also present in perceptual experience. But this leaves open the possibility that the two share what determines
the phenomenal character of perfect non-perceptual experience, and that there is more to the determination of phenomenal character in the perceptual case.

But if what determines, in its entirety, the phenomenal character of philosophers’ hallucination is, for example, the characteristics and presence to mind of an experience-dependent object, how could this object and its presence to mind fail to determine, in its entirety, the phenomenal character of perceptual experience?

Furthermore, the naïve realist conception of perceptual experience seems to be irrelevant to explanations of consequences of that experience, given that these consequences can be explained by what is in common between this experience and causally matching perfect non-perceptual experience. If a subject enjoys a causally matching perfect non-perceptual experience of, say, a red apple in front of them, they will tend to come to believe that there is a red apple in front of them. If what explains the tendency of the occurrence of this belief in the non-perceptual case is also present in the perceptual case, then why is it not this common element that explains the belief that the subject would have in the perceptual case, rather than any uniquely perceptual properties of this experience?\(^\text{14}\)

How can what is common to both perceptual and perfect non-perceptual experience fail to 'get in the way' or 'screen off' what is special about the perceptual case?\(^\text{15}\) It seems as if the common element threatens the naïve realist picture of perceptual experience as providing, in itself, perceptual contact with the world. If the naïve features of perceptual experience are explanatorily redundant, then we can seriously doubt the claim that the experience the subject enjoys is genuinely world-involving.

In order to respond to this line of thought the naïve realist needs to say how causally matching non-perceptual experience can have a nature that is shared by perceptual experience, without this preventing us making sense of perceptual experience as having a nature such that it is presentational of the objects of perception. The naïve realist must, it seems, have something to say about the nature of some philosophers' hallucinations, namely, those that causally match perceptual experience.

\(^{14}\) See Martin (2004). Martin takes the problem to do with the explanation of phenomenal character to be the more difficult to answer.

\(^{15}\) See Martin (2004) and Johnston (2004).
Extreme disjunctivism is a formulation of phenomenal disjunctivism motivated by the thought that the only way to accommodate the weak hallucinatory constraint is to deny that causally matching cases of philosophers' hallucination have any positive nature to them other than their being indiscriminable from perceptual experience. The phenomenal character of perfect non-perceptual experience is constituted purely by its indiscriminability from perceptual experience. This is a property that the perceptual experience of course possesses (for everything is indiscriminable from itself) but in addition its phenomenal character is constituted by a presentation to mind of the normal objects of perception. And the indiscriminability property that the perceptual and non-perceptual experiences share does not 'screen off' what the naïve realist supposes are the positive properties of the perceptual experience from being explanatorily relevant to both its character and consequences. This is because the indiscriminability of an experience from a perceptual experience is explanatory in virtue of the explanatory capacity of what it is indiscriminable from, namely, perceptual experience.

2.2 Metaphysical simplicity

One of the appealing features of naïve realism is that it offers an ontologically simpler account of perception than psychologically indirect forms of realism. Such a non-naïve realist, in accepting that perceptual experience falls short of providing perceptual contact with the objects that we perceive, must regard perception as a state of affairs that includes experience as a part. The naïve realist, on the other hand, regards perception and perceptual experience as merely different aspects of what is fundamentally the same state of affairs. Perception does not need to be broken down into experience plus anything else. In denying the need for a conjunctive account of perception with experience as a part, the naïve realist can maintain that their understanding of the perceptual situation is simpler and more elegant than their psychologically indirect rivals, and, as such, a position worth defending.

This advantage is lost, however, if the naïve realist adopts any form of disjunctivism that regards perfect non-perceptual experience as having its own intrinsic nature. For if this were the case, then while the naïve realist provides a simpler account of perception than the psychologically indirect realist, they provide a more complex account of sensory experience in general. There will be more than one
way in which a subject can have an experience with a certain character. If one is an extreme disjunctivist, however, the character of perfect non-perceptual experience is parasitic upon that of perceptual experience. There are not multiple ways in which something can count as being a sensory experience with a certain character. Instead there is how the naïve realist conceives of the character of perceptual experience being determined by the objects of perception, and there are states that are indiscriminable from this.

2.3 Cutting off the common kind move: a dialectical strategy

A disjunctivism that posits a positive nature to perfect non-perceptual experience that can be cashed out in terms independent of perceptual experience provides non-naïve realists with a candidate for a common element to perception and hallucination. The worry is that if the disjunctivist explains the nature of non-perceptual experience in positive terms, then it is at least possible for this explanation to generalise to the perceptual case. If we accept the subjective indistinguishability of perfect non-perceptual experience from some perceptual experience, and we explain the non-perceptual experience in a certain way, then why not simply explain the perceptual case in the same way as the non-perceptual one?

If the disjunctivist account of philosophers’ hallucination is capable of generalisation to the genuinely perceptual case, then the non-naïve realist can at least appeal to the indistinguishability between perception and hallucination as a reason to maintain that what goes on in hallucination goes on in perception as well. Essentially the problem for the disjunctivist is that if what goes on in hallucination is sufficient for taking the world to be a certain way, then it is a candidate for being sufficient in the perceptual case as well.

For the naïve realist who does not endorse extreme disjunctivism, experience can be a world-independent state of a subject that presents the world as being a certain way for the subject in virtue of its nature, namely when the subject is hallucinating. And once we admit that this is how hallucination works, we need to provide a reason for why this sort of state can never count as perceptual experience. After all, if the state presents the world as being a certain way, the world is indeed that way, and then we suppose that the world’s being that way causes the presentation of the world as being that way, don’t we then have a plausible account of perceptual experience? The
onus is then on the disjunctivist to explain why, even though in hallucination a subject is in a certain state in virtue of which the world appears to be a certain way, no such state obtains in the perceptual case. Given that we can be the subject of a state that presents the world as being a certain way, why isn't this state part of the explanation of our perception of the world? If the naïve realist does not give philosophers' hallucination a positive nature, they avoid the intuitive pull of this line of thinking.

If we accept that there are good reasons for the naïve realist to avoid a disjunctivism that posits an intrinsic nature for non-perceptual experience, we are left with the possibility of a disjunctivism in which no intrinsic characterisation of perfect non-perceptual experience can be given. This is the only way we can resist the threat of generalisation from the nature of the bad case to that of the good case. If the bad case has an intrinsic nature, then it can be argued that this nature is shared by the good case. And, because of ‘screening off’ effects, this excludes whatever features make the good case a good case as being part of the intrinsic nature of the good case.

3. Criticisms of extreme disjunctivism

It seems as if there are compelling reasons for a disjunctivism that seeks to defend naïve realism to take the form of extreme disjunctivism. The weak hallucinatory constraint can only be plausibly accommodated if the determination of the phenomenal character of perceptual experience is thought of as different to that of causally matching perfect non-perceptual experience. And the only way in which this can be accepted is to claim that there is nothing more to the determination of phenomenal character in the non-perceptual case than its being indiscriminable from perceptual experience.

Martin characterises extreme disjunctivism the following way:

For certain visual experiences as of a white picket fence, namely causally matching hallucinations, there is no more to the phenomenal character of such experiences than that of being indiscriminable from corresponding visual perceptions of a white picket fence as what it is. (Martin 2006: 369)

Extreme disjunctivism regards at least some perfect non-perceptual experiences as having no positive psychological nature. Instead, they can only be understood in relational terms as being episodes in a subject's conscious life that are subjectively
indiscriminable from veridical non-perceptual experiences. Accordingly, it must be sufficient for a subject to enjoy a sensory experience that they be in a state that is subjectively indiscriminable from a veridical perceptual experience, and, furthermore, that this state has no more positive psychological features than this negative epistemic fact. This move has its roots in the notion that sensory experience in general can be explicated in terms of indiscriminability: 'the concept of perceptual [sensory] experience in general is that of situations indiscriminable from veridical perception' (Martin 2004: 65).

There are three difficult objections to extreme disjunctivism that together make a very good case for rejecting the position. First, that there are certain counterexamples to its conception of sensory experience. Second, that it cannot give an account of how perfect non-perceptual experiences can be 'matched' with perceptual experiences. Third, that it cannot explain certain positive epistemic facts that seem to follow from the negative epistemic fact used to characterise the special kind of perfect non-perceptual experience.

But first it is worthwhile considering how the position hopes to deal with what, at first appearance, seems to be most problematic with it – that it denies that there is 'something that there is like' for the subject of at least some kinds of perfect non-perceptual experience.

3.1 The Phenomenological Objection

Extreme disjunctivism faces the following accusation: if the only characterisation of perfect non-perceptual experience is in terms of its not being discriminable through reflection from perceptual experience, then this is really to deny that perfect non-perceptual experience has any phenomenal character at all. But this is patently false. It is obvious that the kind of experience we are considering is not at all like the kind of state of mind a person is in who finds themselves with mere beliefs about the way the world is, such as those people suffering from unilateral neglect who exhibit the phenomenon of blindsight. Yet, so the objection goes, this is precisely what the extreme disjunctivist maintains, in denying that there is any positive mental characterisation to give of causally matching perfect non-perceptual experiences.
Martin’s response to this criticism is that ‘the subject’s perspective on her own sense experience constitutes sense experience being that way for her’ (Martin. 2006: 392) and that:

The disagreement relates not to any denial or affirmation of the presence of phenomenal consciousness in the case of some hallucinations, but more the kind of self-awareness or introspective knowledge that one can have of phenomenal consciousness. (Martin 2006: 397)

This is the problematic thought that the disjunctivist must reject:

In coming to make judgements about how things phenomenally appear to one, one makes judgements about a subject matter that obtains independently of one’s being in a position to make those judgements. (Martin 2006: 377)

For otherwise, the extreme disjunctivist is indeed denying that there is any phenomenal character to philosophers’ hallucination. But in fact, or so Martin claims, we are not being asked to suppose that in cases of philosophers’ hallucination, the subject lacks sensory experience, but is unable to tell this. Instead:

A subject’s perspective on his or her own experience is not distinct from their perspective on the world [...] Those who find disjunctivism incredible suppose it obvious that we just recognise introspectively something which must be present in order to have experience, and so must be present for the hallucinating subject to recognise. (Martin 2006: 404-405)

The move that the extreme disjunctivist makes is to assert that, in focusing on the indiscriminability of one’s experience from a perceptual experience, one is also thereby focusing on the sensory features of the situation. It is sufficient for one’s state of mind to be sensory, for one to have a perspective on the world, that one’s situation be indiscriminable from a perceptual experience, because whether or not a state of mind is sensory is not independent of one’s perspective on it.

The picture that this is being presented as an alternative to is as follows:

One may conceive that the facts about phenomenal consciousness are fixed independently of whether a subject has any perspective on his or her own conscious states and is thereby self-aware of them [...] In coming to make
judgements about how things phenomenally appear to one, one makes judgements about a subject matter that obtains independently of one’s being in a position to make those judgements. (Martin 2006: 377)

3.2 Counterexamples

The extreme disjunctivist, then, adopts what we can call the ‘modest’ or ‘minimal’ conception of sense experience:

We need not look for some further characteristics in virtue of which an event counts as an experience of a street scene, but rather take something to be such an experience simply in virtue of its being indiscriminable from a perception of a street scene. Nothing more is needed for something to be an experience, according to this conception, than that it satisfy this epistemological condition [...] some event is an experience of a street scene just in case it couldn’t be told apart through introspection from a veridical perception of the street as the street. (Martin 2004: 48)

It follows from this that there are two kinds of counterexamples to extreme disjunctivism: sensory experiences that are discriminable from perceptual experience, and non-sensory experiences that are indiscriminable from perceptual experiences. If it can be shown that there are possible or actual instances of either of these kinds of cases, then extreme disjunctivism must be rejected as false.¹⁶

The first kind of counterexample is supposed to be ruled out by the thought that one’s state of mind must be indiscriminable through reflection from some perceptual experience, in order for it to be genuinely sensory. The claim here is that if one limits oneself to what is available through reflection, genuine sensory experience that is not perceptual cannot be discriminated from perceptual experience.

The second kind of counterexample is supposed to be ruled out by a distinction between different kinds of discriminability. It is only if one’s state of mind is impersonally indiscriminable from some perceptual experience, that it is genuinely sensory. So troublesome cases are ruled out on the grounds that they are only

¹⁶ For criticisms of extreme disjunctivism that are based upon counterexamples, see Siegel (2004), Sturgeon (2006; 2008), Smith (2008), and Hawthorne and Kovakovich (2006).
personally indiscriminable from perceptual experience, and not impersonally indiscriminable.

3.2.1 Sensory experiences that are discriminable from perceptual experiences

We might think that there are numerous examples of sensory experiences that are discriminable and indeed discriminated from perceptual experience, for example, any instance of someone coming to realise that they are hallucinating. Now, it may of course be said that it is plausible that many such experiences are cases of non-sensory experience that are mistaken for sensory experience, but that the subject’s situation was such that, if they had properly reflected on their experience, its status as non-sensory would have been detectable. But it also seems indubitable that there are many actually occurring hallucinations which are both sensory in nature and discriminated by their subjects from perceptual experience. Subjects who suffer from Charles Bonnet syndrome (CBS), for example, clearly enjoy sensory experiences and, in some cases, possess insight into the hallucinatory nature of their experience.

In these cases subjects who are severely visually impaired or even blind, and who are cognitively unimpaired, experience vivid and complex hallucinations that can last for prolonged periods of time, sometimes for hours. They are also often characterised by the subject of the hallucinations having insight into the non-perceptual nature of their experiences.17

Here is a useful passage describing what such sensory experiences are like for their subjects, taken from a study of sixty patients with CBS:

The frequency of hallucinatory episodes varied from several times daily to only twice a year. In the course of time, frequency had decreased in ten patients, had increased in two, and had remained unchanged in 48. Hallucinatory episodes had lasted from a few seconds to many hours. The patients described the content of their hallucinations as people, animals, plants, a large variety of inanimate objects, and sometimes complete scenes. Often, the content of hallucinations was mundane (an unfamiliar person, a bottle, a hat), but it could be funny (two miniature policemen guiding a midget villain to a tiny prison van), ghostly (translucent figures floating in the hallway),

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17 A very useful overview of Charles Bonnet syndrome can be found in Menon et al (2003).
bizarre (a dragon, people wearing one big flower on their heads), as well as beautiful (a shining angel, wonderful bunches of flowers). Most patients described a large variety of hallucinations, differing in each hallucinatory episode. Sometimes the sensation of specific objects returned, but stereotyped hallucinations (identical in every respect) were uncommon. Hallucinations contained both familiar and unfamiliar images. The hallucinations occurred both in black and white or colour. They could be clearer, equally clear, or less clear in comparison to reality. They could show intrinsic movement, a movement of the total image, or be motionless. Sometimes the hallucinations moved along with the eyes. Most patients hallucinated only with their eyes open. Some perceived hallucinated objects as floating in the air or projected on a wall or ceiling. Others reported that the objects fitted well into the surroundings (eg, an unreal person sitting in a real chair). Patients hallucinating while their eyes were closed perceived hallucinations in the dark subjective space in front of the eyes. [...] 49 patients (82%) stated they were always immediately aware of the unreal nature of their hallucinations. 11 (18%) had sometimes been deceived for a short period, but this had happened only when hallucinated objects looked ordinary and fitted realistically in the surroundings. The patients were always easily corrected by others while hallucinating. A woman told us she once sat at her window watching cows in a neighbouring meadow. It was actually very cold and in the middle of winter, and she complained to her maid about the cruelty of the farmer. The astonished maid, however, saw no cows. Embarrassed, the patient then admitted that her eyes were no longer to be trusted. (Teunisse et al. 1996: 795-796)

It seems clear that we must understand subjects of CBS to be enjoying genuine sensory experience, as we cannot plausibly claim that they are confusing a non-sensory state of mind with a sensory one through some impairment on their part. It is characteristic of subjects of CBS to be cognitively fully functional. Furthermore, CBS subjects usually (indeed in the study quoted above they all do) have insight into the non-perceptual nature of their experience.

Now, in order to resist the claim that there can be genuine sensory experiences that are discriminated from perceptual experiences, the extreme disjunctivist would
have to interpret such situations as those referred to above as ones in which the knowledge that one is not perceiving is not arrived at in the right sort of way. They claim that the general claim about sensory experience that is couched in terms of indiscriminability is to be understood as a claim about indiscriminability through reflection, and so perhaps the CBS subjects violate this constraint in their discriminations.

The extreme disjunctivist take it that they can respond this way to the following kind of counterexample that might be put forward. You are hooked into a machine that will replicate the physical basis of an experience as of an orange, and are told that as a consequence of being so hooked up that you will enjoy such an experience. You thereby come to know that the sensory experience you have of an orange is not a perceptual experience. What rules this out as a counterexample to extreme disjunctivism is that the discrimination is effected in the wrong sort of way. Martin characterises what is wrong with this method of discrimination in the following way - one has not come to discriminate one's experience from a perceptual experience through reflection:

We need to bracket the relevance of the additional information you have acquired through testimony. This is what the appeal to 'through reflection' is intended to do [...] if we bracket that additional information, then what is available to you otherwise, i.e., what is available to you in simply reflecting on your circumstances, does not discriminate between the two situations. (Martin 2006: 364-365)

To respond to the case of CBS subjects, the extreme disjunctivist needs to say that they are effecting their discrimination through the use of information that needs to be bracketed. To do this it is necessary that we know what information should be bracketed. But it is not clear that there is any principled way that we can specify what information should be bracketed and what should not, at least on the extreme disjunctivist view of hallucinatory experience.

I suppose there are two ways to try and limit the information. The first is to think that an experience is to count as sensory if reflection upon the character of the experience alone would not enable one to come to know that one's experience is not perceptual. The second is to think that an experience is to count as sensory if
reflection upon one's epistemic context would not enable one to come to know that one's experience is not perceptual.

The first way of understanding the limitation is to restrict the basis of discrimination to how things are in one's experience. This is typically how the notion of subjective indiscriminability is understood. Two experiences are subjectively indiscriminable from one another only if, on the basis of reflection upon the character of the experiences alone, one could not tell that they were different. The problem with this is that the extreme disjunctivist cannot adopt this notion of 'reflection on experience.' For the character of the experience itself is supposed to be determined by the inability to discriminate the experience from a perceptual experience. So this inability had better not be explained in terms of an inability to discriminate on the basis of the character of the experience. That it is with one, visually speaking, as if one were seeing an orange in front of one, is supposed to be determined by the fact that one cannot discriminate one's situation from a perceptual experience of an orange in front of one.\(^\text{18}\)

It should be noted that even if we could understand the 'through reflection' limitation in terms of reflection upon the character of the sensory experience, it is not at all clear that when CBS subjects discriminate their experience from perceptual experience that they are achieving this through sources of information external to how it is with them, experientially.

It is true that when people consider cases in which a subject discriminates their situation from one in which they are perceiving, this is sometimes to be attributed to the subject observing a disparity between what they experience and what they believe to be possible. This explanation is cited by both those who study such cases, and the subjects of such experiences themselves.

And, if this is the case across the board, it gives good grounds for thinking that when a subject discriminates their experience from a perceptual experience in such instances, this discrimination is not based upon the subject's experience in itself. Rather, it is based upon the experience and other beliefs that the subject may hold, such that cows do not normally reside in one's living room, or that things do not disappear if you approach them. And so it could still be maintained that the subject's experience is indiscriminable through reflection from a perceptual experience, and

\[^{18}\text{For this point see Sturgeon (2008: 131) and Hawthorne and Kovakovich (2006: 163-164).}\]
hence the general conception of sensory experience in terms of such indiscriminability not refuted. If one comes to realise that one is hallucinating on the basis of what it is that one is experiencing, then the extreme disjunctivist could respond that it is not the experience itself that is the basis for one discriminating one’s experience from a perceptual one.

But it is not the case that insight into the hallucinatory nature of one’s experience is always achieved in this way, through a dissonance between the content of one’s experience and beliefs about the world. As well as subjects of CBS who gain insight into the hallucinatory nature of experience in this way, there are also subjects who just know that their experience is not perceptual. There are two ways in which we could interpret what is going on here. We could think that the obtaining of this epistemic state is something that does not arise through the subject’s experience itself. Or, we could think that it comes about through some experiential cue of which the subjects themselves are unaware. The extreme disjunctivist is committed to allowing only the first interpretation.

The claim that all sensory experience is indiscriminable from perceptual experience would rule out, however, the otherwise seemingly plausible possibility that in at least some cases of actual hallucinatory experience the best explanation to give of the phenomena is that the subject enjoys a sensory experience that is, in itself, discriminable from perceptual experience. A sensory experience whose intrinsic nature is such that, by reflecting on their situation, the subject can come to realise that their experience is non-perceptual. At the very least, it is perhaps worrying that the adoption of extreme disjunctivism should have the result of rendering impossible a plausible looking understanding of hallucinatory subjects’ discriminatory capacities. This is surely a matter for empirical research.

In any case, the extreme disjunctivist is left with trying to understand the limitation ‘through reflection on experience’ in terms of reflection on one’s epistemic context. The limitation, then, is perhaps this. For a subject’s situation to be a sensory experience as of an orange in front of them, then it must be the case that for all they know they are perceiving an orange in front of them. There is nothing the subject knows that rules out that subject’s situation as being one in which they are perceiving

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19 This fact was confirmed to me in correspondence with Anu Jacob.
an orange in front of them. The limitation 'through reflection on experience' is meant to limit the range of things known by a subject that rules out their situation being perceptual.

The problem for the extreme disjunctivist is how to exclude certain things from the epistemic context in a principled way. What is the principle according to which the belief that one is hallucinating, when one is merely informed of this fact by a reliable source, is not to count as meaning that one has discriminated one’s situation from a perceptual experience through reflection? The subject knows that they are not perceiving, but this piece of knowledge has to be excluded from that which is admissible as a proposition that can rule out that they are perceiving. That a reliable source informs them of the fact that they are not perceiving has to be ruled out as a legitimate way in which they can come to know that they are not perceiving. In the absence of being able to appeal to the phenomenal character of experience I am at a loss as to how such knowledge can be ruled out of the epistemic context upon which one can reflect.

Furthermore, when we look at the sorts of sensory experiences that CBS subjects enjoy, it is clear that the range of beliefs that must be bracketed is very wide. There are all manner of background beliefs that must be excluded when considering whether their experience is indiscriminable from perceptual experience. As well as testimony, as in the case of the old woman and her maid, there will be sorts of beliefs already mentioned, about what is normal and what is not. There will be innumerable background beliefs about the world that will be a source of information to subjects of hallucination that they are, in fact, hallucinating. Scott Sturgeon takes it that this means that extreme disjunctivism (what he calls reflective disjunctivism) is committed to the claim that 'background beliefs do not generally make for reflective knowledge' (2006: 209). But, or so Sturgeon argues, extreme disjunctivism is also committed to the claim that 'background beliefs generally make for reflective knowledge' (2006: 210). If one has, say, a hallucinatory experience as of an orange in front of one (and this is all that one is experiencing) then this means that there are innumerable sensory experiences that one is not having. One is not having a sensory experience of a red apple, a brown dog, and so on. Now, if one's experience is

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70 A. D. Smith (2008) makes a similar claim about lucid dreamers who just know that they are dreaming. I am just not clear what entitles him to the assumption that the obtaining of this epistemic state is external to the subject’s experiential situation in this way.
indiscriminable from a perceptual experience as of a red apple, a brown dog and so on, then, according to the extreme disjunctivist, one would be enjoying a sensory experience as of all these things. So in order to have a hallucinatory experience as of an orange in front of one, and nothing else, one must be in a situation that is discriminable from this host of perceptual experiences. But, quite plausibly, one is only in a position to be able to effect these discriminations if 'background beliefs' are, after all, considered an admissible part of the epistemic context.

It seems that we must abandon the idea that if an experience is sensory, then it is indiscriminable from perceptual experience. But does this claim really have to be part of the extreme disjunctivist position? Can't they just settle for the claim that if one's situation is indiscriminable from a perceptual experience, then it is sensory?

After all, if it is the case that the naïve realist position is only threatened by generalisation from the case of philosophers' hallucination, then that there are other sensory experiences that are discriminable from perceptual experience, and so have a positive nature distinct from that of perceptual experience, is not a worry for the naïve realist. Even if we cannot think of the notion of sensory experience in general in terms of indiscriminability from perceptual experience, perhaps the extreme disjunctivist can still maintain that if one's situation is indiscriminable from a perceptual experience as of an orange in front of one, then one is enjoying a sensory experience as of an orange in front of one. In which case the possibility of causally matching non-perceptual experiences can still be explained as the possibility of a situation which can be given no more positive mental characterisation than this negative epistemic fact.\(^{21,22}\)

\(^{21}\) Martin argues for the conception of sensory experience as that which is subjectively indiscriminable from perceptual experience on the grounds that this provides the best starting point for theorising about sensory experience. Any theory that starts off with a positive conception of what it is to be a sensory experience has 'weightier' epistemic commitments than one that does not. I do not consider this argument here. See Byrne and Logue (2008) and Hawthorne and Kovakovich (2006). The problems I discuss here for regarding sensory experience in this way makes me doubtful that any such strategy could be successful.

\(^{22}\) One further objection to the thought that sensory experience is necessarily indiscriminable from perceptual experience is that not all genuinely sensory experiences have a corresponding possible perceptual experience. It may be possible for one to have an experience of an 'impossible' object (such as the Escher triangle) which, in virtue of the object of experience being impossible, could not be indiscriminable from any veridical perceptual experience as such an experience would itself be impossible. Martin deals with such possibilities by claiming that the experiences of the various constituent parts of the impossible object are indiscriminable from perceptual experiences, rather than the experience of the object as a whole. See Siegel (2004).
3.2.2 Non-sensory experiences that are indiscriminable from perceptual experiences

Let us turn now to the second kind of counterexample, in which a subject is unable to discriminate their situation from one in which they are enjoying a certain perceptual experience, but it is not the case that they are enjoying a sensory experience.

A. D. Smith objects to extreme disjunctivism by appealing to counterexamples of this kind. The structure of his argument runs as follows:

1) There are experiences that are indiscriminable from perceptual experiences, but that are not sensory. Candidates for such experiences includes dreams, hypnotic suggestions, and states which subjects think are momentary sensory experiences, but that are neither perceptions nor hallucinations. If a bad case is a non-perceptual sensory experience that is indiscriminable from a veridical perception, then a very bad case is one of the above mentioned examples in which a non-sensory experience is indiscriminable from a sensory experience.

2) The extreme disjunctivist thinks that it is sufficient for an experience to be sensory, that it be indiscriminable from a perceptual experience (a good case). Call this the negative epistemic criterion. But very bad cases are indiscriminable from good cases and so satisfy this criterion, but they are not sensory.

3) The extreme disjunctivist strategy for dealing with such very bad cases is to make a distinction between personal and impersonal discriminability, and then claim that bad cases are impersonally indiscriminable from good cases, while very bad cases are only personally indiscriminable from good cases. A case is sensory, then, only if it is impersonally indiscriminable from a good case.

4) Very bad cases are, however, absolutely impersonally indiscriminable from good cases, because there is no possible situation in which they can be discriminated.

The objection is, then, that:

In virtue of meeting the negative epistemic criterion very bad cases are lumped together with hallucinations, and their non-sensory character is not recognised. Alternatively, the sensory character of hallucinations is not recognised, since
they are characterised in a way that applies to the non-sensory very bad cases. (Smith 2008: 186)

Smith provides the following three examples of very bad cases: dreams, hypnosis, and the belief that one has, for a very brief moment, perceived something, but has in fact neither perceived nor hallucinated anything. These latter cases can occur when a subject is being presented with visual stimuli by a tachistoscope. This is a device that flashes images on a screen for very brief periods. Subjects sometimes report that they have actually seen something when nothing has flashed on the screen, and so they have not perceived any such flash. Smith takes it that it would be 'unusual' for these cases to be hallucinations (Smith 2008). It is not really clear why this should be so, but perhaps the thought has some motivation in considering the frequency of the phenomenon that experiments with a tachistoscope pick up on. We all, from time to time, think that we may have briefly seen something, perhaps at the periphery of our vision. In such cases where it is not true that we are seeing something, were we to suppose that we nevertheless enjoyed a genuine sensory experience for a brief moment, we would be supposing that the phenomenon of hallucination is much more widespread than we usually think.

Dreams are quite plausibly understood as mental states similar to imaginings or visualisings that can be, due to the often disorienting and trance like nature of the dream state, mistaken for perceptual experiences, even though they are not sensory.

The claim is, then, that these three kinds of experience present a strong case for thinking that there are mental episodes that are deservedly thought of as experiential and non-sensory, but which are nevertheless impersonally indiscriminable from perceptual experience. Extreme disjunctivism would wrongly consider them as sensory experiences, as the position takes it that it is sufficient for an experience to be genuinely sensory that it be impersonally indiscriminable from some perceptual experience.

Smith talks about the very bad cases as examples of the occurrence of experiences that are indiscriminable from perceptual experiences, but that are not sensory. As discussed in chapter three I think it is better to refer to the cases Smith has in mind as 'pseudo-sensory' experiences, rather than just non-sensory experiences.
Smith is keen to maintain that these states are not just beliefs that are irrationally formed:

A hypnotised subject's visual experience may, we suppose, be constantly as of an empty room. When, however, he starts to 'see' a pig before him, he does not start to have false beliefs that are an irrational response to this continuing perceptual experience of an empty room; he begins to experience in a certain way. (Smith 2008: 186)

The criticism of the extreme disjunctivist position is not, then, that 'it allows mere beliefs into the class of sensory states' (Smith 2008: 187). The experiences Smith describes, while not being sensory, fulfil the requirement of there being 'something it is like' to undergo them.

Martin hopes to respond to the possibility of non-sensory experience by making a distinction between 'personal' and 'impersonal' notions of the ability to discriminate. For a state to be sensory in nature the kind of discriminability at work must be the impersonal variety. The sorts of worrying cases like dreams/hypnosis/tachistoscopic experience can be explained as non-sensory (if needs be) in virtue of their being personally indiscriminable from veridical perceptions, but impersonally discriminable.

The distinction also serves to alleviate a worry concerning 'cognitively unsophisticated hallucinators' (Siegel 2008). If one lacks the capacity to make judgements about what one does or does not know, then granted that such a subject enjoys sensory experiences, these experiences would be indiscriminable from every other veridical perceptual experience. A dog, for example, could never know that it was having a sensory experience indiscriminable from some perceptual experience. But, if phenomenal character in the case of perfect hallucinations is purely a function of indiscriminability properties, this would mean that there would be no scope for differentiating the experiences a cognitively unsophisticated hallucinator has.

By appealing to impersonal indiscriminability Martin hopes to show that such a subject's perfect non-perceptual experience could have a determinate phenomenal character. The cognitively unsophisticated hallucinator is unable to discriminate their experience from a perceptual experience, but this is not to say that their situation is not one that could be so discriminated by someone capable of reflective awareness. The limitation on what they can or cannot do does not have its basis in the object of
discrimination, but upon a capacity that they lack. The dog, for example, lacks the means to discriminate its experiences, but not, we might say, the basis for such discrimination.

Another problem that this appeal to impersonal indiscriminability hopes to deal with is that of the apparent non-transitivity of indiscriminability. Take three different colour samples, A, B and C such that a given subject cannot tell that A is different in colour to B, or that B is different in colour to C, but they can tell that A is different in colour from C. If we take this to show that the subject's experience of A is indiscriminable from their experience of B, and their experience of B is indiscriminable from C, then, according to the extreme disjunctivist the character of all three experiences of A, B and C must be the same. If the experience of A has the same character as the experience of B, and the experience of B has the same character as C, then the experience of A must have the same character as C, as identity is transitive. But this leads us into contradiction, for we are supposing that the experience of A and the experience of C are discriminable, and hence that they have different characters.

By appealing to the notion of impersonal indiscriminability, the extreme disjunctivist can avoid this problem by insisting that the subject's experiences of A and B are in fact discriminable, from an impersonal perspective. Had the context been different, or had the subject been different, the experiences could have been discriminated.

So the notion of 'impersonal indiscriminability' has a lot of work to do for the extreme disjunctivist. It must explain how cognitively unsophisticated subjects can nevertheless enjoy distinct experiences, how the intransitivity of indiscriminability can be reconciled with the transitivity of appearances, and how non-sensory experiences are to be kept separate from sensory experiences.

It will be useful to introduce some terminology for discussing abilities. We must introduce a term for the conditions in which an ability may be exercised. Let us call these opportunity conditions. One may have the opportunity to do something, but be unable to do it, because one lacks the ability. So, if I am in a library, I have the opportunity to read War and Peace, but will be unable to read it if I lack the ability to read. Conversely, one may have the ability to do something, but be unable to do it

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because one lacks the opportunity. So, I may be able to ski, but cannot do so because there is no snow.

The ability/opportunity distinction marks a difference between factors internal and external to an agent. Whether or not someone possesses an ability is a fact internal to that subject, whereas whether or not someone has the opportunity to exercise an ability depends on circumstances external to the agent. Abilities can, however, be suspended or diminished by factors internal to an agent. So, for example, it makes sense to think of the drunken ballerina as still having the ability to dance, but this ability is diminished, or suspended, by her intoxication. Her drunkenness is an internal impediment to her exercise of the ability to dance.

Martin's claim, then, is presumably that cognitively unsophisticated hallucinators have the opportunity to discriminate one experiential situation from another, but lack the ability to do so. Subjects of dreams, hypnosis and the like have the opportunity to discriminate their situation from a perceptual one, and do have the ability to do so, for it presumably still makes sense to say of them that they have the ability to reflect upon their conscious life. Unlike the cognitively unsophisticated hallucinator, they have the ability to do so, but due to an internal impediment this ability is diminished or suspended.

Smith argues that Martin cannot exclude the very bad cases as being sensory through appealing to this notion of impersonal indiscriminability. The argument (at least as I interpret it) proceeds in two stages. First Smith argues that the very bad cases are, in fact, absolutely impersonally indiscriminable from perceptions – there is 'no possible situation in which they could be discriminated: no possible "optimal" situation' (Smith 2008: 187). Secondly, if such experiences are absolutely indiscriminable in this way, then even if the extreme disjunctivist claims that subjects still have the ability to discriminate such experiences from perceptual experiences, then there must be some explanation for why the subjects of these experiences are unable to exercise this, and the extreme disjunctivist is unable to give one.

The most plausible example of a non-sensory experience that is absolutely indiscriminable from veridical perception is that of the situation in which it seems to one that something flashed on a screen for a split second, but nothing did in fact flash on the screen, nor did one hallucinate a flash on the screen. In other words the sort of situation where one enjoys the sort of non-sensory experience that is allegedly manifested during experiments with a tachistoscope, and is quite plausibly a common
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enough feature of waking life. In order to rule this out as a sensory experience, the extreme disjunctivist needs to maintain that the experience one enjoyed was in fact discriminable from a perceptual experience. It was just that, because of the brevity of the experience and/or the limitations of one’s vision, one failed to notice the difference. But in such a situation it is quite plausible to suppose that it was absolutely impossible for one to have discriminated one’s experience from a perceptual experience, in the sense that it is not possible to conceive of a situation in which one could have made this discrimination.

If we suppose that had the experience taken place over a longer time than it did, one would have been able to discriminate it from a perceptual experience, it could be objected that we are changing the subject. Such an extended experience would not be the same momentary experience that we could not discriminate from a perceptual experience – it would be some other experience. It might be supposed that we can appeal to such an experience because it includes the momentary experience as a part, and we are just imagining this part ‘homogeneously’ extended through time. But the extreme disjunctivist cannot appeal to this possibility. For they are then guilty of assuming a picture of the phenomenal character momentary experiences that extreme disjunctivism does not allow them:

A homogenous extension presupposes a fact of the matter concerning the phenomenal character of the experience to be extended, when this fact itself consists of possibilities of discrimination in relation to just such a homogenous extension. (Smith 2008: 194-195)

If, on the other hand, we suppose that had one’s eyesight been vastly more powerful, then one would have been able to discriminate one’s experience from a perceptual experience, then the same kind of problem surfaces. For in saying that one could have had an experience with the same nature, and one would have then been able to discriminate it from a perceptual experience with one’s superior visual acuity, one is again taking it that there is a fact of the matter as to the nature of the experience that one originally enjoyed.

It is still possible for the extreme disjunctivist to claim that while it is absolutely impossible for subjects to discriminate such momentary very bad experiences from perceptual experiences, they nevertheless still have the ability to do so. Something may have the ability to do something even though it is impossible for it ever to
exercise that ability. So, to use an example of Smith's, a substance may be soluble in water even if it is also such it exerts a tremendous repulsive force on water, to the extent that it is not possible for the two substances ever to come into contact. In such a case it makes sense to suppose that the substance is still soluble in water, even though it can never exercise this power or ability. Another reason why it might be impossible for the substance to dissolve in water is if it such that whenever it meets the opportunity conditions for manifesting this ability it loses the ability.

In order for it to make sense that something has an ability which it is impossible for it to exercise, then there must be an explanation along one of the above lines for why this is so. It would be entirely unjustifiable to assert that something had an ability that it could never exercise, if there was no explanation for why this is so. It would also be difficult to make sense of something possessing an ability that it was unable to manifest, but for which there is no reason as to why this is so. For abilities essentially have opportunity conditions which, if satisfied, give the possessor of the ability the opportunity to exercise the ability. Without some reason for why these opportunity conditions cannot be realised, then it does not make sense to suppose that something has that ability.

The final stage in Smith's argument is that the extreme disjunctivist cannot explain why the ability to discriminate such momentary very bad experiences from perceptual experience can never be manifested. This is because such an explanation would need to appeal to the intrinsic nature of such experiences, something that the extreme disjunctivist denies that they have.

4. Conclusion

Extreme disjunctivism, then, faces powerful objections against its attempts to understand the phenomenal character of hallucinatory experience in terms of indiscriminability from veridical perception. I am not saying that it is not possible to mount a detailed a defence of the position that answers all these lines of criticism, but that the sheer weight of objectionable lines of thought means that the position is always on the back foot. The naïve realist who endorses extreme disjunctivism seems condemned to spending the rest of his days defending the position in the face of numerous criticisms. The adoption of any theoretical position that faces such
challenges should be questioned. Opponents of the view could reasonably say that solutions to the criticisms facing non-naïve versions of realism offer a better avenue of research.
1. Introduction

The naïve realist can accommodate the possibility of illusion by construing the nature of perceptual experience adverbially. According to this modified adverbialism, the sensory experience we enjoy when perceiving is a sensing of the object of perception. The core phenomenal character of such experience is determined by the way in which one senses this object, which is determined both by the object and the sensing of the object. In this way the naïve realist can maintain his commitment to the normal object presenting nature of perceptual experience in the face of the possibility of illusion.

While this provides a satisfactory position for naïve realism with respect to the possibility of illusion, it still leaves the problem of the possibility of philosophers' hallucination. At this point, phenomenal disjunctivism is a position that is often put forward in order to reconcile naïve realism with this possibility. Perceptual and perfect non-perceptual experience can be thought of as being different in phenomenal nature while being subjectively indiscriminable. But the possibility of philosophers' hallucination that shares the same physical basis as perceptual experience seems to compel us to generalise what is true of the hallucinatory case to what is true of the perceptual case (but not vice versa). And if this is the case the phenomenal disjunctivist must be an extreme disjunctivist and deny that such hallucinatory experience has any phenomenal nature other than being subjectively indiscriminable from perceptual experience. But if this is the only way to preserve naïve realism then we must ultimately reject naïve realism because the extreme disjunctivist position is unworkable.

In this chapter it is my intention to show that the possibility of non-perceptual experience that is subjectively indiscriminable from perceptual experience need not compel a naïve realist to adopt a disjunctive conception of experience. Instead, they can maintain that the intrinsic nature of perceptual and hallucinatory experience is the same, while still claiming that perceptual experience is presentational of the objects of
perception. On such a view the difference between perceptual and non-perceptual experience will lie in the nature of the objects that are so presented.

There are two problems for this line of thought. First, it might be objected that a picture of the objects of experience in cases of perfect non-perceptual experience as being both actual and mind-independent is just too implausible to accept, given what we know about how such experiences can be brought about.

Second, given the weak hallucinatory constraint, if the physical basis of non-perceptual experience is sufficient for the occurrence of the awareness of some entity, then the causally matching perceptual experience must involve awareness of the same entity. But how can this be consistent with supposing that in the perceptual experience one is presented with the object of perception? It seems as if the naïve realist who accepts a common view of the nature of perceptual experience and philosophers' hallucination faces a problem that is just a variation on that facing the phenomenal disjunctivist. In both cases problems arise for the naïve realist from the thought that if what is true of the nature of hallucinatory experience is true of the perceptual experience, then what is in common must 'get in the way,' or 'screen off' the objects that we perceive from being what one is most immediately aware of. But where the problem for the phenomenal disjunctivist took the form of the question 'how is it possible to conceive of perceptual experience naively if perceptual and causally matching perfect non-perceptual experience share the same natures?' the naïve realist who endorses the strategy advocated here is faced with the question 'how is it possible to conceive of perceptual experience naively if perceptual and causally matching perfect non-perceptual experiences share the same object?'

In my mind this latter concern is the most significant one facing the naïve realist. I intend to outline what sort of strategy the naïve realist needs to adopt, and consider one particular way of implementing it. But first I will look at what reasons there are for thinking that the naïve realist must reject a common view of the nature of perceptual and non-perceptual experience.

2. The common nature of perceptual and non-perceptual experience

2.1 Naïve realism and the common kind assumption

The naïve realist conception of the nature of perceptual experience does not automatically rule out a conception of hallucinatory experience according to which it
shares the same nature. There is no inconsistency in supposing that both perceptual and non-perceptual experiences have the same kind of fundamental nature. Recall that by 'fundamental nature' I mean that which makes the experience the experience that it is – its essence. According to the naïve realist, what makes a perceptual experience the experience that it is, is the subject of the experience standing in a special relation (the sensing relation) to some object. What makes it a perceptual experience is the fact that this object is something in the world. If the naïve realist also thought that what makes a hallucinatory experience the experience that it is, is the subject of the experience standing in the same relation to something, then they are conceiving of hallucinatory experience as having the same fundamental nature as perceptual experience. What would make the experience hallucinatory would be something about the kind of entity to which the subject was related in experience.

The fact that there is no immediate conflict between naïve realism and giving a common account of perceptual and non-perceptual experience is not widely recognised. This is probably because it seems incredible to most people that a story could be given of the nature of hallucination that could generalise to perception in a way that does not threaten naïve realism. Nevertheless, the possibility is clearly there.

To conceive of the difference in the nature of perceptual and hallucinatory experience to lie in a difference in the nature of the object that is presented in such experiences is to adopt what was earlier referred to as 'Austinian disjunctivism,' or disjunctivism about the objects of experience.¹

One of Austin's objections to the argument from illusion (which is in fact a criticism of the argument from hallucination as I have laid out the debate) is that the generalising move from hallucinatory to perceptual experience is motivated by a suspect principle to the effect that qualitatively indiscriminable things must have the same nature:

If we are prepared to admit that there may be, even that there are, some cases in which 'delusive and veridical perceptions' really are indistinguishable, dose this admission even require us to drag in, or even to let in, sense-data? No.

For even if we were to make the prior admission (which we have so far found

¹ Byrne and Logue refer to it as 'Austinian disjunctivism' and Thau (2004) talks about 'disjunctivism about the objects of experience. There are affinities with what Price (1950) called 'The Selective Theory.' Martin expresses the position in his (1997: 95-96), and links it with Austin.
no reason to make), that in the ‘abnormal’ cases we perceive sense-data, we should not be obliged to extend this admission to the ‘normal’ cases too. For why on earth should it not be the case that, in some few instances, perceiving one sort of thing is exactly like perceiving another? (Austin 1962: 52)

The argument that Austin is criticising is this: if the objects of two experiences are indiscriminable, then they must have the same nature. The objects of hallucinations are sense-data (the notion of sense-data that Austin is operating with is that of a non-material thing). The objects of at least some hallucinations are indiscriminable from the objects of perceptual experiences. Therefore the objects of at least some hallucinations have the same nature as the objects of perceptual experiences. Therefore the objects of perceptual experiences are sense-data. Austin responds to this argument by advocating a disjunctivism about the objects of experience. It is consistent with such a picture that the objects of experience in the two cases are of a different kind. One need not think that if one is related to a non-physical object in the hallucinatory case, then one is so related in the perceptual case, because, quite generally, things of different kinds can appear to have the same qualities.

Unfortunately for Austin most advocates of the argument from hallucination do not have a conception of the nature of hallucination that allows this response to it. What they are claiming is that how one is appeared to in the hallucinatory case is the same as how one is appeared to in the perceptual case, and that this is incompatible with the naïve realist conception of how one is appeared to in the perceptual case. They do not just have a picture of the nature of the object of experience in the hallucinatory case and then claim that the object of experience in the perceptual case must have the same nature because the experiences are indiscriminable. Rather, it is the very nature of hallucinatory experience itself that they have a conception of, which they seek to generalise to the perceptual case.

The failure of this argument, however, reveals the strategy that the naïve realist can adopt in the face of the possibility of hallucination. This is to accept that perceptual and causally matching perfect non-perceptual experiences have the same fundamental nature, but have different kinds of object.

Mike Martin has argued that the naïve realist cannot avail themselves of this possibility. His reason is that the following two claims:
1. Whatever kind of thing perceptual experience is, hallucinatory experience is also that kind of thing. (The Common Kind Assumption)

2. Experiences are 'part of the natural causal order, subject to broadly physical and psychological causes' (Experiential Naturalism). (Martin 2006: 357)

are inconsistent with:

3. Perceptual experience is a relation between a subject and a mind-independent object (naive realism)

This is because experiential naturalism commits us to rejecting hallucinatory experience as a relation to a mind-independent object. By the common kind assumption, whatever kind of thing perceptual experience is, hallucinatory experience is also that kind of thing. If perceptual experience were a relation to a mind-independent object, then so too would hallucinatory experience. But hallucinatory experience is not a relation to a mind-independent object. So naive realism must be false. As experiential naturalism is not easily contestable, the naive realist must reject (1), the common kind assumption, and so adopt disjunctivism about experience.

Let's look at the argument for why Martin doesn't take it to be plausible that non-perceptual experience could be a relation to a mind-independent object.

First, such a position maintains that non-perceptual experience is relational. If this is the case then it is a necessary condition for the obtaining of non-perceptual experience that there is some object to which the subject is related.

Second, the commitment to experiential naturalism in turn commits us to something like the following claim:

Appropriate stimulation of the various sensory areas of the cortex should be sufficient to bring about a visual, auditory or tactual experience, or at least to fix the chance of its occurring. (Martin Forthcoming)

These two conditions generate the following constraint: If neural stimulation is sufficient for the occurrence of a non-perceptual experience as of an object with a certain character, and the existence of an object that appears to have that character is necessary for the experience, then it must be the case that whenever the neural stimulation obtains, the object obtains.
Martin then claims that if we suppose the object to have an existence independent of the experience of it then the mind-independent objects of non-perceptual experience have some sort of objectionable role to play in determining whether the physical conditions sufficient for the occurrence of such experience obtain.

He raises three ways we might conceive of satisfying the constraint, while maintaining that the experience has a mind-independent object. The first is that there is a multitude of non-perceptual objects such that whenever a subject is caused to have a suitable pattern of neuronal excitation there is always a non-perceptual object of the right sort for him to be related to. This should be ruled out on the grounds of its extravagance in postulating a non-perceptual object of every kind that there could be, in every location that there could be. The second option considered is that 'non-perceptual' objects prevent the neural stimulation that would result in an experience in all situations in which there is no non-perceptual object appropriately placed. The third option is that the obtaining of the neural excitation, as well as being sufficient for the obtaining of a non-perceptual experience, causes the obtaining of the non-perceptual object of that experience. As Martin puts it:

The physical causes of acts of sensing are also causally active in bringing appropriate sensibilia into a position to be sensed [...]. the causes of sensing are causally sufficient for them because they are also causally sufficient for the acts of sensings independent objects. (Martin Forthcoming)

The second and third options are questionable on the grounds that they posit causal relations between perceptual and non-perceptual objects that we have no supporting evidence for other than the need to preserve a conception of non-perceptual experience as a relation to such objects. I suppose the thought here is that, if there are non-normal objects of non-perceptual experience then the postulation that they are dependent upon non-perceptual experience is all that is reasonably supported by what we know about the world. To claim that they are experience independent is to go further then we need to, given that we know that neural stimulation is sufficient for non-perceptual experience.

And, given this, the simplest, most parsimonious account to give is one in which the object depends for its existence upon the experience. Other accounts, while not being impossible, are more extravagant in postulating causal relations between normal and non-normal objects, and so, all things being equal, should be ruled out. If we are
trying to explain the apparent relationality of non-perceptual experience, given what we know about how such experiences can come about, we should consider such experience as either a relation to a mind-dependent object, or not relational at all.

Once we accept this, then if we are to be naïve realist about the nature of perceptual experience, we must reject the common kind assumption and embrace disjunctivism. For it seems that the naïve realist cannot give an account of hallucination in terms of it consisting in the same relation between subject and object that they maintain occurs when perceiving, as this is highly implausible. There are two options left to the naïve realist at this point. The first is to maintain that hallucination is a relational state of affairs, but of a very different kind to that involved in their conception of perceptual experience. In hallucinatory experience the object is constituted, in some sense, by the relation in which the subject stands to it. In the perceptual case the object is independent of this relation. The alternative option is to reject the idea that hallucination is relational. Either way, the naïve realist has denied the common fundamental nature of perceptual and hallucinatory experience.

2.2 Hallucination as presentational

Perfect non-perceptual experience will seem presentational upon reflection upon it. This follows from it being subjectively indiscriminable from perceptual experience. Perceptual experience appears both transparent and presentational to introspective reflection. It seems to us as if we are presented with some item in an ontologically immediate way, and it seems as if this item is a normal object. It seems as if we are presented with the object of experience, and that the object of experience is a normal object. When one hallucinates and one is unable to discriminate one’s experience from perceptual experience, then such experience will also appear presentational of some normal object, or else it will be discriminable from perceptual experience. Such experience cannot be transparent because it is not the case that in virtue of enjoying a non-perceptual experience one perceives a normal object. So no positive account of such experience can regard it as transparent.

If the object of experience were a normal object it would be the case that one perceives that object. Such experience can be presentational, however, as a conception of the nature of experience as presentational expresses no commitment to the nature of the object of experience that is presented to the subject. To think of such
experience as being presentational in nature is, then, to be less revisionary about how such experience appears to us to be than an account that does not regard it as presentational. We might say that we have a ‘naïve conception of hallucination,’ and that a presentational construal of the nature of such experience is in accord with this conception.2

2.3 Why the object of experience must be mind-independent

Some of the earlier proponents of the sense-datum theory wondered whether it made sense to think of sense-data as dependent upon the act of awareness of them. H. H. Price, for example, remarked that:

To say that anything, even so humble an entity as a sense-datum, is dependent for its existence or for any of its qualities upon our being aware of it, is to deny that there is any such thing as awareness; and thereby to contradict oneself. (Price 1950: 44)

Price understands awareness to be a relational notion, and this is the problem with trying to construe an object of awareness as dependent for its existence upon that awareness. How can there be such a relation between subject and object, if the object is supposed to be dependent upon said relation? Price is willing to accept that sense-data are mind-dependent, in the sense that their existence depends upon minds, but not that they were awareness-dependent, in the sense that their existence depends upon a subject’s awareness of them.

John Foster offers a recent rejection of the intelligibility of a state of affairs in which a genuine entity is present to a subject whose existence is not independent of this state of affairs. We cannot make sense of this being a genuinely relational state of affairs between subject and object, for the object threatens to ‘vanish’ into the experiential episode (Foster 2000: 164-170). But for a visual experience to be genuinely relational the object of experience (what he refers to as a sense-datum) must have ‘a form of existence which transcends its standing in that presentational relationship’ (Foster 2000: 170).

He considers three ways in which we might make sense of the notion that the episode of awareness ‘constitutes’ its object.

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(i) The object may be constituted by the fact of its presentation to a particular
subject on a particular occasion
(ii) The object may consist in the fact of its presentation to a particular subject
on a particular occasion
(iii) The object and its presentation to a particular subject on a particular
occasion are constituted by that subject's being in a further psychological
state on that occasion. This state would not involve the occurrence of its
object. (Foster 2000: 169)

Foster takes the first possibility to be 'manifestly incoherent' and the second to be
incoherent at least upon first reflection. If we think that the object of experience is
constituted by the presentation of that object to a subject at a particular time, we are
already assuming its existence in explaining how it comes to be.

The second approach is that which, presumably, reflects how most philosophers
would conceive of the awareness-dependence of objects of experience. And the
intuitive problem with this is as to how, in the object of experience deriving its being
from an act of awareness, it can be available as the object of that awareness, as that
which the awareness is directed upon.

The last alternative which Foster considers for the sense-datum theorist to take is
the view that the object of experience and the presentational episode are both
constituted by some other, more fundamental fact. Foster takes this further
fundamental fact to be a psychological one, and accordingly rejects it on the grounds
that, firstly, we have no idea what this psychological fact would be and secondly, that
this would mean that the sense-datum account of experience is not getting to grips
with what the fundamental nature of experience really is. The basic nature of
experience would be given by an account of what this mysterious further
psychological episode is.

But why should Foster think that this further fact is a psychological one? If one
maintained that the object of experience and the presentational episode were both
constituted by the same non-psychological episode, then one could explain the
transcendent nature of the objects presented to us in experience and still have an
account which offers an explanation of the fundamental nature of visual experience.
One would have an account of what visual experience is, at its most fundamental
psychological level. It is this kind of approach that I suggest the naïve realist should
appeal to in understanding the nature of hallucinatory experience along the same lines as perceptual experience.

2.4 Accommodating experiential naturalism

It might be thought that even if there is introspective evidence for causally matching hallucination being presentational, and hence relational in nature, and even if a relational conception of causally matching hallucination requires us to think of the objects of such experiences as being mind-independent, if such a position violates our commitment to experiences being part of the natural causal order, then we must reject one of the two claims that has led us to this violation. Either such experience is not relational, and appearances are misleading, or there is some way of making good the thought that experience can be genuinely relational even thought the objects of that experience depend for their existence upon it.

It is not clear to me, however, that a denial of experiential naturalism is necessitated by an attempt to conjoin the common kind assumption with naïve realism. It seems clear that neither of the first two strategies that Martin considers are satisfactory. The first because of its postulation of every kind of non-normal object wherever someone might enjoy such an experience, and the second because of the causal interaction of these non-normal objects with the physical world, in the sense that they must play a role in preventing the obtaining of the physical conditions that will generate a hallucination in any situation in which there is no suitable non-normal object to be sensed. The third strategy that Martin considers, however, is by no means as unpalatable as the others. According to this picture, the physical basis of a causally matching perfect non-perceptual experience brings into existence the object of that experience, which is then sensed by the subject.

We should recognise that there is, at least on the face of it, nothing obviously implausible about the thought that objects can be generated out of, or depend for their existence upon, physical processes and events that are not parts of those objects. So one might take seriously, for example, the thought that virtual objects are genuine objects that depend for their existence upon the physical processes and states of the computer that we quite naturally think of generating them. Of course it is open to someone to argue that these are not genuine objects, perhaps along the lines that they do not exist independently of our awareness of them. But to advocate that virtual
objects are genuine objects would not be to violate a naturalistic understanding of the world. Such objects would have a place within the natural causal order. They would depend for their existence and characteristics upon the operations of the computer that generates them. We could appeal to the notion of supervenience in order to reconcile the existence of such objects with naturalism. Virtual objects would then be conceived of as entities that supervene upon the physical realm. It seems, then, at least plausible that we have a perfectly good example of objects being generated, or brought about, or depending upon, physical goings on in the world, in such a way that does not necessarily violate a naturalistic world view.

3. The Common Element

In maintaining that the nature of perceptual and causally matching non-perceptual experience is the same, the naïve realist need not be violating any commitment that we might have to experiential naturalism. Furthermore, there is phenomenological support for the thought that philosophers' hallucination is presentational, and hence relational, in nature. If there is good reason to suppose that for experience to be genuinely presentational, the objects of experience must be independent of their presence in experience, then to satisfy this phenomenological intuition that hallucination is presentational, we should think that the objects of such experiences are awareness-independent.

So far, so good for the naïve realist. There is one major obstacle remaining to their being able to provide a satisfactory account of hallucination.

According to the naïve realism that I am advocating, when a subject perceives something then they sense that thing a certain way. The subject's being appeared to in a certain way, the phenomenal properties of their experience of that thing, are constituted by the way in which they sense that thing, a state of affairs comprising both sensing and thing sensed. Now, to suppose that perfect non-perceptual experience has the same nature as perceptual experience will be to suppose that it too is a sensing of something. The difference between the kinds of experience, what makes one perceptual and the other non-perceptual, will lie in the nature of that which is sensed.

In rejecting disjunctivism the naïve realist no longer faces the problem of how to conceive of perceptual experience as being of the same kind as causally matching
perfect non-perceptual experience but not of the same fundamental kind. But this worry is just replaced by a very similar worry as to how the naïve realist can understand the objects of causally matching perfect non-perceptual experience as being present when one enjoys a perceptual experience. For it seems as if, in accepting the weak hallucinatory constraint, he must accept that a causally matching pair of perceptual and non-perceptual experiences must involve awareness of the same entity.

David Smith expresses this worry as follows:

If such stimulation [a replication of the stimulation that would occur in some perceptual experience] is regarded as causing a real entity or process to exist, it can hardly be supposed that giving this same type of stimulus one rather than another type of causal antecedent can annihilate or prevent occurrence of this sensory entity, and the consequence awareness of it. (Smith 2002: 235)

But if the perceptual and non-perceptual experiences involve awareness of the same entity, how can the naïve realist maintain that the perceptual experience is also an awareness of an entity that is a normal object in the world? To put it another way, the naïve realist supposes that the object of experience in a perceptual experience is the object of perception, a normal object in the world. But how is this possible, if the object of experience in such a case is also the object of experience in a causally matching non-perceptual experience, which is not a normal object?

In what follows I will outline the general sort of strategy that the naïve realist must adopt in order to satisfy this concern. I cannot yet offer any conclusive reasons for supposing that this strategy will be a successful one, but I will offer one picture of how it might be adopted in practice.

3.1 The strategy

The naïve realist can hope to solve the problem facing them by taking a particular stance as to the nature of the object of experience in the hallucinatory case. The answer for the naïve realist will lie in how they conceive of the nature of the entity that is the object of experience in cases of causally matching perfect non-perceptual experiences. To illustrate this strategy I will look at one particular way in which the

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naïve realist can do this that offers them a way of generalising from the non-perceptual to the perceptual case. It will consist in them conceiving of the object of experience in the hallucinatory case as an uninstantiated universal.

One important point to mention is that that we should not be confused by the fact that we refer to that which is present in experience as the 'object of experience' and we more generally use the term 'object' to denote a kind of entity. But by 'object of experience' we do not actually mean 'object' in this other sense. Reflection upon experience leaves it open as to what metaphysical category the entity that is the object of experience belongs to.

Mark Johnston (2004) offers an account of the relation between perceptual and hallucinatory experience that, with some minor modifications, can be adopted by the naïve realist. The essence of the account is illustrated in the following passage:

Just as the constitutional basis for a hallucination can be a proper part of the constitutional basis of another, subjectively indiscernible act of seeing so also the objects of a hallucination can be proper parts of the objects seen in another, subjectively indiscernible act of seeing. (Johnston 2004: 139-140)

Johnston fleshes this out in the following way. In enjoying a sensory experience a subject is aware of a sensible profile, 'a complex, partly qualitative and partly relational property, which exhausts the way the particular scene before your eyes is if your perceptual experience is veridical' (Johnston 2004: 134). When one is perceiving the world, one is aware of the particulars that instantiate aspects of this profile. When one is hallucinating, one is aware only of the sensible profile.

The objects of hallucination and the objects of seeing are in a certain way akin; the first are complexes of sensible qualities and relations while the second are spatio-temporal particulars instantiating such complexes [...] When the visual system misfires, as in hallucination, it presents uninstantiated complexes of sensible qualities and relations, at least complexes not instantiated there in the scene before the eyes. (Johnston 2004: 135)\(^4\)

\(^4\) Or, more precisely, in hallucination one is aware of a sensible profile, but not aware of an instantiation of a sensible profile. This modification is intended to accommodate the possibility of veridical hallucination. See Johnston (2004: 178-179n16).
So the naïve realist can say that one possibility for the naïve realist is to conceive of the entities that are the objects of experience in the hallucinatory case as uninstantiated sensible profiles. These entities are present when one perceives something, but in such a case are instantiated by the thing perceived. The object of experience is an instantiated sensible profile, and also, the thing that instantiates this profile. In hallucination you are sensing a certain sort of entity, and in perception you are sensing the same sort of entity, but this time it is a part of a normal object. The entity does not get in the way of the object in the perceptual case. In the hallucinatory case, one is not presented with an object, understood as a bearer of properties. Rather, one is presented with a complex of properties. In the perceptual case, one is presented with a complex of properties and an object which bears, or possesses these properties. But the properties that are in common between the perceptual and the non-perceptual case do not get in the way of the awareness of the object; they do not render the awareness of the object indirect.

The difference between the account that Johnston offers and the strategy that I am advocating for the naïve realist is that Johnston regards hallucinatory experience in act/object terms. I take him, therefore, to simply equate the phenomenal properties of a subject’s hallucinatory experience with the uninstantiated complex universal that is the sensible profile the subject is aware of in enjoying such an experience. The naïve realism that I am advocating regards perceptual experience, not as having a character that is simply constituted by the character of the object of experience, but that is constituted by the sensing of the object of experience in a particular way. If the naïve realist wants to adopt Johnston’s strategy for accommodating the possibility of hallucination, then they must regard the sensory experience one enjoys when hallucinating as the sensing of a universal in a particular way. When one hallucinates, one senses a complex uninstantiated universal in a particular way. In this way the entity that is present to one’s mind when one enjoys a perceptual experience, the object of that experience, is also the entity that is present to one’s mind in the causally matching non-perceptual case.

There are, of course, many potential problems with such an account. In particular, does it really make sense to suppose that the entities that we are aware of in hallucinatory experience are not concrete, in the sense that they do not exist in space, as we seem to be committed to if we think of them as uninstantiated universals. Alternatively, if we do not wish to think of the object of experience as being an
uninstantiated universal, perhaps we could think of it as being a particularised property, or trope. In this way the object of experience in the perceptual and non-perceptual experience can be of the same kind, but the object in the perceptual case, as well as being a particularised property, is also a normal object, for the trope could be thought of as being possessed by this object. But then we would just be faced with the new problem of explaining how this particularised property can occur unattached to any object, in hallucinatory experience.

The general worry is that this strategy would require the naïve realist to make some substantial metaphysical claims. And the problem with this might be that an adequate conception of the nature of perceptual experience should be one that does not require any specific story about what kinds of entity that there are (universals, tropes, and so on). The appeal to such a metaphysics to make the naïve realist position work might strike us as ad hoc. On the other hand, the naïve realist could respond to this charge by pointing out that a metaphysical response here is appropriate because what it is that they are presented with is a metaphysical challenge. How can the nature of the object of experience in causally matching perfect non-perceptual experience be such that its presence in perceptual experience does not prevent the object of perception in such cases from being the object of experience?

4. Final Conclusion

The attempt to defend naïve realism has reached its final obstacle. It has been able to overcome the challenge presented to it by the possibility of illusion through construing the character of such experience in terms of the sensing of the object of perception in a particular way. The possibility of hallucination, however, presents it with a much bigger problem. The causal argument from hallucination, to the effect that the nature of causally matching philosophers’ hallucination must be shared by perceptual experience presents the naïve realist with two options. One of these is extreme disjunctivism, the view that there is nothing more to the phenomenal nature of such hallucinatory experience than its being subjectively indiscriminable from veridical perceptual experience. As we saw in chapter six, such a position faces considerable objections, to such an extent that a theorist could claim that it makes better sense to pursue a form of non-naïve realism rather than to try and make extreme disjunctivism work. In this chapter, I have looked at the other option available to the
naïve realist. This is to conceive of causally matching philosophers' hallucination as having the same fundamental nature as perceptual experience. Just as perceptual experience is the sensing of something that is not dependent for its existence upon the act of awareness of it, so too is causally matching perfect non-perceptual experience, at least according to this view. While such a position is not as implausible as it may at first seem, issues to do with the shared physical basis of such experience and perceptual experience again threaten the naïve realist’s understanding of the nature of perceptual experience. As a consequence of this the naïve realist will be forced to make some fundamental metaphysical claims about the nature of the objects of experience, of that which is present in both perceptual and non-perceptual experience. It is only by doing so that they can hope to maintain that the same entity can be the object of experience in both, without this rendering awareness of objects in the world indirect. The success of naïve realism will ultimately depend upon the cogency of this strategy.


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