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Transnational Mobility and European Belonging: A Demos without an Ethnos?

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Abstract

We are presently witnessing a global environment develop in which domestic and international spaces are becoming increasingly conjoined. This occurs as increased movement of people underscores the combined cultural and political ramifications of migration and the presence of Otherness. Micro- and macro-mobilities create subjective, cultural, social, political and practical turbulence in addition to any economic and cultural benefit that may be gained. Movement is unsettling and casts taken-for-granted assumptions about culture(s) into sharper relief. Globalization and its associated migrations and transnational flows bring the formerly tacit dimensions of cultural belonging and distinctiveness to prominence and increasingly unsettles them. Such unsettling is not just an issue for static ‘host’ cultures but is also reflected in the social activities of lives lived in transit and transition, which develop ways of dwelling in transient spaces and places of mixture where seemingly nothing can be fastened into a permanent place. Movement, despite being emancipatory for some, exemplifies tensions of all kinds in multicultural environments where cosmopolitanism and transnationalism pervade the domain of the national.

A burgeoning interdisciplinary literature addresses the social and cultural processes involved in globalization, as well as the political consequences, bringing sharply to the fore a cavalcade of collective and subjective tensions amongst global populations. This thesis suggests that there is a need to bring these tensions together, into a new conceptual framework that addresses processes of displacement in the context of relations between people(s) and conventional notions of time, community and territory: shifting senses of home, roots and belonging; the effects cultures have as exclusionary forces in producing senses of Otherness; and the persistence of emotive pathologies manifesting as sedimented attachments to national and ethnic enclaves. The thesis will show how dimensions of belonging through shifting temporalities and territories require the development of new ethnographic practices of listening and translating, remembering and retelling, within cultural and political geography.

The framework of the thesis is placed within the ‘European project’ of ever closer social and political union. It investigates two samples— one British, one Greek. The approach to the project, especially with regards to its citizenship dimension is placed in relation to
issues of identity and belonging. The groups were chosen as representing possible alternate strands within the Union with regards to its integration, cohesion and democratic legitimacy.

Both groups are the beneficiaries of the European project in the sense that they are part of a mobile professional population of Europeans able to capitalize on opportunity structures engendered by the project. Their markedly incompatible cultural identities make them perfect candidates for the study as to whether a sense of cosmopolitan Europeanness is promoted through trans-European mobility.
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Chapter One

Introduction

The nature of Europe and its future have been at the heart of political debates across member states for more than two decades. These debates have been marked by ongoing struggles over the scope and purpose of the EU and its institutions. Recent issues encompass the Maastricht treaty, that nearly destroyed the Major government and British conservative party, the move from 12 to more than 25 members, the stalled and contested attempts to develop a constitution and ongoing arguments over the eventual size of the Union and the admission of Turkey. All these events suggest that in defining the balance of citizenship, rights, responsibilities and loyalties between nations, the EU and Europeans in general are in a state of profound flux. In the midst of this the EU is seen as suffering a profound deficit in legitimacy and failing to stimulate the imagination of the European people -- reflected in opinion polls that show a mere 20% attachment to the EU across the twenty five members (Eurobarometer (EB No 64)). In this context the location of civic rights, citizenship and belonging are all rendered contestable in the emerging European space. This study considers whether a sense of cosmopolitan Europeanness is promoted through trans-European mobility.

This thesis suggests we might examine the changing effects on citizenship and belonging through a study of the changes wrought in the emergent rights of EU citizenship, focused around pan-European mobility, and the forms of life this encourages. It examines whether and in what ways national belongings and sensibilities become modified in the emergent pan-European space of social mobility. It does so through an examination of two mobile groups of European citizens who are taking advantage of the single market for labour. At a time of high anxiety about flows of cheap workers from principally newly acceded post-socialist states it is common to see newspaper accounts about labour mobility between states. Generally there is great debate across Europe about the effects of mobility on ‘host’ communities. This thesis poses the question the other way round – what is the effect of this dislocation and transnational work pattern on the sense of attachment and belonging among those moving. Overall the EU average is that 3.1% of its population anticipate moving to another member state in the next 5 years – although that figure doubles in the Baltic states -- which fits with a long term average of around 4% having done so (European Foundation for the Improvement of Living and
Working Conditions 2006). Given we have just had the European Commission designated ‘European Year of Workers’ Mobility’ (2006), we might well investigate whether this fosters a sense of being European as opposed to national belonging. This thesis examines Greek and British workers in the opposite country reciprocally – one group from a Greek state that has received net payments, whose accession to the Union is identified with post-dictatorship democratization, which has been a long standing ‘emigrant society’; and the other from a British state marked by disputes over its net payments to the Union, and often seen as hostile to the EU for its functional deficiencies in administration and finances, its lack of democratic accountability, and a long standing ‘immigrant society’.

Both Britain and Greece sit at the margins of Europe. Both have an ambivalent relationship with Europe, prescribed by history and culture. This is reflected in the ways in which most Greek and British nationals relate to terms such as ‘Europe’ and ‘European’. For example the British commonly understand these terms as referring to a geographical area or a certain culture or to the institutions of the EU and generally to some kind of collective ‘European’ characteristics totally distinct from the British. The Greeks on the other side of the continent are ambivalently positioned in representations between Europe and the Orient and are apprehensive of many European representations.

Both states have different frameworks for preserving their cultural distinctiveness amidst the flows of human and other capital. For example their approaches to migration, and to the social and cultural changes this generates, differ markedly. Britain traditionally sees integration of migrants as a question of managing public order and promoting relations between majority and minority populations, thus allowing ethnic cultures to mediate in this process. Greece hitherto seems to rest on the Universalist idea of integration, which is transforming migrants into full Greek citizens.

Cultural, social and political differentiation among different states thus tempers the integrationist agenda of the Union. The free movement, however beneficial it may be for many, creates social inequalities, is unsettling for guests and hosts alike and casts the taken-for-granted assumptions of cultures into sharper relief. This accentuates notions of peoplehood that by implication tend to rebuff any inclusive tendencies to a polity that is not grounded in ethno cultural ties. The renewed focus on national peoplehood is reflected in the absence of a European Demos - embedded in an idea of Europe as a space of civility and modernity that is inscribed by rights and civil obligations rather than by ethnicity - or what would otherwise constitute a European polity. This lack of European
demos precludes the democratization of the Union, and requires ongoing mediation by
the institutions of Member states rather than a sense of direct European citizenship and
representation. European integration may have involved a transfer of certain state
functions to the Union but this has not been followed by the redrawing of political
boundaries. In the absence of thus creating a European Demos, the Union and its
institutions suffer from an authority and legitimacy deficit.

This landscape of the Union, an amalgam of Community and of member states.
lacks the sense of a cohesion the individual citizen and their national community enjoy.
grounded in ethno-cultural notions of peoplehood, which form the basis of the legitimate
authority of the structure of European nation states.

When Jean Monnet (1976) realized the problem of Europe’s lack of cohesion, he
said that if he were ever to envision the idea of the Union again he would have started
with culture. The implication of a European sense of belonging is that it may lead to the
tempering of the pull of nationalism, which still evokes collective fate and destiny by
responding to people’s existential yearning for belonging that goes beyond mere
existence. A sense of shared Europeanness effectively may signal a move from people’s
identification with polities grounded in ethno-cultural notions of peoplehood to a
European civic demos coexisting side by side with national ethno-cultural ones: ‘Maybe
in the realm of the political…this understanding of Europe [is what] makes it appear so
alluring to some, so threatening to others’ (Weiler 1995: 256).

One of the problems faced by European policy makers is clearly how to deepen
and further the European project between the different European polities and demois.
Top-down policies have certainly inaugurated change but are also difficult for Europeans to
absorb into the culture of their daily lives. This project therefore sought to develop an
understanding of multicultural diversity in the context of the most generic effect of
European citizenship, that of freedom of movement within the single market. Therefore it
investigates how notions of territorial belonging are affected by trans-European mobility
and experience, and by the economic mobility engendered by trans-European workforces.
In this context the project examines whether this mobility fosters a cosmopolitan ethos of
shared European experience or amplifies pre-formed identities, by exploring two ways of
encountering Europeanness: the banal (everyday encounters with ‘European
dimensions’), and the spectacular (specific rituals dedicated to European belonging).
Additionally the project will also assess whether there is an emerging sense of European
identity.
Hence the overall research questions that frame the context of this investigation can be consolidated into the following key aims:

1. How do different forms of mobility affect people's sense of national and European belonging and in what ways?
2. To what extent is increased trans-European mobility generating cosmopolitanism, nationalism, or new forms of 'rooted Europeanism' and does this vary between types of people and their mobility?
3. How far does mobility foster an openness to difference or reinforce existing senses of national identity, or does a new shared identity emerge within transnational groups?
4. How do the Greek and British samples appropriate the host place? Do they, or do they not, move beyond the boundaries of their transnational networks by forging relations with the locally based networks and how may this be explained?
5. What is the effect upon each group of their encounters with both the banal and spectacular symbols of (a) Europeanness, and (b) Greekness or Britishness?
6. How do migrants and sojourners from unequal regions of the EU get affected by their differential insertion into the socio-cultural networks found in particular sites?
7. How far does the notion of European belonging emerge through transnational groups: and what is the role of local cultural practices for shaping this sense?

Finally it was considered that these questions raise issues such as:

- the role of essentialist assumptions of homogeneity, uniqueness and fixity of identity formations and whether these are confined to popular sentiment and political discourses: and or how these are aggravated by conflicts between the principles of the common market and national identities. It was logical to surmise that this may point to the paradoxical possibility that the EU space could isolate or generate new European communities through notions of European belonging possibly having a catalytic effect upon the developing role of citizenship formation. The limitations of European transnational mobility could transcend territorially defined societies through an open 'space of flows' or remain rooted in identity formations anchored in ethnicity. Further the ways in which differential power and democracy in the host places affects the processes of negotiating difference in accommodating migrants and sojourners who live in the EU could redefine the meanings that constitute peoples' cognitive orientations towards identity and belonging. The above aims consequently formed the backbone of the research subsequently conducted and were tackled through gathering qualitative data and then attempting to answer the demanding questions hitherto outlined.
In the study’s seven chapters the second chapter sets out the theoretical framework of the project. It examines the concepts of mobilities, difference, citizenship, multiculturalism, and belonging. It considers the challenges to the EU set by increasing mobility of citizens and the absence of the European wide demos. The management of diversity is complicated by national belonging and ethno cultural ties as these are encoded through modes of inhabitation. Finally, emerging European identities are questioned.

The third chapter focuses upon the methodology: unpacking subjective accounts concerning issues of national, ethnic and cultural identity, citizenship and belonging. It relates how the researcher’s account of the problems and dilemmas this fieldwork encountered, whilst investigating Greek and British white collar mobile workers, shaped the psychoanalytic approach taken.

The fourth chapter argues that Britishness is seen by the British sample as the ‘stereotyping of pragmatism’. As such it manifests as a tangible cultural heritage that reinforces a sense of being part of the British team, thus asserting as such its difference vis-à-vis the rest of the world.

In chapter five the Greek sample discussed the enacting of tradition, transmitted across generations and notions of home and family. Sedimented transcendental beliefs reinforce Greek identity, thus making the notion of Greekness an emotive entity, resistant to change.

Chapter six discusses both samples’ experience of European citizenship as EU passport holders. It is suggested potential amelioration of cultural overlaps could occur through improvements in European living.

In chapter seven, notions of Europeanness seem minimal due to historical divisions. Both samples unite under shared notions of European heritage however when specifying their divisions and when against the non European Other. To temper entrenched attitudes a Pan European education is suggested. The thesis comes to a close with a summary of the main findings of this investigation.
Chapter Two

The Challenges of Europe: Theoretical Approaches to Mobility, Difference and Citizenship

2.1 Introduction

This initial chapter sets out the conceptual groundwork of the thesis. Firstly, the chapter outlines the increasing prevalence and banality of difference introduced by global mobilities, suggesting the challenges posed for conventional political and cultural categories. Secondly, it addresses this in the context of European space and institutions, looking at a range of models of citizenship that may be said, or desired to characterize, the European polity—a polity which so far has failed to gather popular support. This, it is argued, is due to the absence of European-wide Demos that would legitimize its authority. Demos, as a concept is drawn from political theory and describes the peoplehood of a polity that is grounded in ethno-cultural ties. The demos of ancient Greece was thus focused around those entitled to participate within the city, whereas in the modern era it has been the basis for a nation state.

Thirdly, the chapter then assesses the effect of cultural fragmentation on such a Demos by addressing multicultural citizenship and living with difference and the varying approaches to the management of diversity in increasingly multicultural societies. Fourthly it discusses cultural belonging and identification with a nation as encoded in everyday practices through the inhabitation of national heritages, what we might call ‘Ethnos’ as a mode of belonging. This implies a privileged engagement or claim upon the state and territory as a right of shared belonging in a community defined by birth—an identity formed by blood and soil. The chapter will begin to suggest that through inhabitation ‘civic’ values and national belonging become deeply entangled. The final section questions whether mobility in trans-European spaces opens new possibilities for newly emergent European identities.

2.2 Mobilities, Citizenship and Transcultural Connections in Transient Spaces

Recent literature on flows of human capital has argued that movement is becoming the dominant form of social life (e.g., Castells 1996: Bauman 2000: Robertson
et al. 1994; Urry 2000, 2004). In this context mobility is seen as destabilizing identity and community, thereby detaching identity from place (Chambers 1994). Arguably this process enables the creation of nomadic identities (Braidotti 1994) or leads to a creolization of global culture (Hannerz 1987, 1996; Featherstone 1995). Transmigrant networks intermingle with the contested politics of place, local practices and identities (De Soto 1998; Cowan 2000), transforming both migrant and host practices and identities in a very heterogeneous manner (Portes 1999). Smith (2001) argues that the dispersal of transmigrants’ culture opens up new social spaces that are trans-local, multi-faceted worlds of cross-cutting social networks, formed by trans-nationals engaged in a (re)territorializing politics of place construction. This suggests that contrary to claims about the (de)territorialization of place in the context of a post-national global cultural economy (Appadurai 1990, 1996) there is a more complex refiguring and entanglement of territorial belongings. Exploring ambiguous and contradictory processes and outcomes form the core of this thesis.

This new mobile world challenges conventional models of economically driven migration leading to acculturation. Global mobilities are creating different kinds of migrants and sojourners who have differential relationships to host and home cultures (Soysal 1996; Faist 1998; Portes et al. 1999; Sennett 1998). No longer are migrants necessarily embedded in fixed host cultures for extended periods of time, cut off from their originary cultures. Martinotti (1999) argues that the pervasive mobility of modern societies complicates scales of belonging, leading to a transnational middle class that dwells in transit (Urry 2000), becoming neither placeless nor localized. As such its way of being in transit and practices of identity do not fit analyses that see migration simply based upon the primary mechanisms operative among ethnically homogeneous migrants in a new host culture, such as reciprocity between small groups, exchange within circuits and solidarity in communities (Faist 1998). Instead migrant movement may be as much about a desire to learn about other cultures (Lazzaridis and Wickens 1999) be that coupled with a strategic economic motivation (Hansen 1999; Papanagos and Vickerman 2000) that may be about acquiring specific skills or connections available in a specific host milieu as part of an ongoing project that may lead them elsewhere (Beaverstock 2002), or indeed it may even be a lifestyle choice (Noy 2004; Zvivas et al. 2003; King et al. 2000; O'Reilly 2000, 2002). Yet differential mobilities also encompass migrant settlers, refugees, exiles and the formative makers of diasporas, as well as occupational travellers such as working class labour migrants. All of these inevitably must engage in
social processes of ‘opening up to the world’, even if that world is still relatively circumscribed culturally’ (Werbner 1999: 18). The exclusive transnational networks that connect the ‘surrogate home’ (Hannerz 1992) with ‘home’ are increasingly easy to maintain due to the growth of global communications and travel that have compressed distances. Such connectivity reinforces the ‘encapsulated cultural worlds’ (Werbner 1999) in which most transnationals move and which they build around them in order to deal with the adversities mobilities generate.

In this context, from middle class sojourners, to blue collar migrants, to refugees (Burkner 2000; Derek 2000; Gallagher et al. 2000) transnational subjectivities problematize languages of integration assumed within national frames, which conveniently ‘disconnect’ host nations from the historic and ongoing entanglements of colonial, postcolonial, and neo colonial relations of power. Yet, as Werbner (1999) shows, the encapsulating cultural world of such a transnational cohort does not preclude the possibility of familiarisation with the other culture and learning how to move in-between cultures. In other words it is possible to move within such culturally bounded worlds and be a cosmopolitan. We might go so far as to suggest that all this ‘opens the possibility of a Europe of multiple and mobile identities, a Europe moving irreversibly towards cosmopolitan attachments’ (Amin 2004: 8).

Canonical theories of immigrant assimilation and ethnic pluralism, have relied upon a container view of politics and culture that ‘sees culture as essentially territorial, based on shared language and somewhat static…In an extreme version, it imbues a hypostasized notion of places as bounded and unchanging spaces with a fixed meaning, identified with rather strong communities’ (Faist 2000: 215). Such theories have seen national polities and cultures as congruent, bounded territorial entities. Yet such a view breaks down when relations are stretched by a pervasive mobility that eludes such neat categorizations and localization. The cultural diversity such mobility creates, not only of persons but also of cultural practices, meanings and symbols (Hannerz 1996), results in cross border expansion of transnational spaces complicating state centered projects, that are already troubled by new scales of governance and regulation (Jessop 1994; Hudson 2000), and notions of belonging on all scales. Against this backdrop Duncan and Duncan (2004) argue for the need to rethink the concept of culture in the context of understanding empirically how cultural stabilities and unities are produced out of flow, and out of the dynamic of time-space compression. They seek to understand how people conceive the coherence of cultures, of boundedness, and why cultures as exclusionary forces are
desired and practiced in a heterogeneous world of border crossing and strong transcultural connections. They thus suggest that the varied spaces of mobility may thus produce cosmopolitan understandings or exclusionary imaginings.

Despite their different trajectories transnational elites, economic migrants, or third country nationals are all drawn into national spaces that are still circumscribed by the categorical principles of the first age of modernity – namely collectivity and bounded territoriality (Beck 2000a). In this context their access to the host polity is mediated by and apprehended through the vertical and horizontal dimensions of citizenship, in which notions of ‘ethnos’ encoded in *ius sanguinis*, *ius soli* and *ius domicile* still rule supreme, and would entail a dissolution of communal identities into the uniform identity of the nation. The continuing organization of states and political discourse around these assumptions highlights the notion of citizenship

‘not only in legal sense, but as a key word in debates over desirable combinations of rights, responsibilities and competences…in the…21st century, world. These are debates over the limits of uniformity as well as diversity, over the difference between nationalism and patriotism over what it means to identify with one country or with two countries, or with humanity, or with oneself and one’s credit cards. Clearly a large part of what is being said about citizenship also has to do with culture.’ (Hannerz 1999: 403)

Citizenship is commonly understood as the preeminent political institution of the nation state. Its development since the 18th century involved the acquisition of increasing civil, social and political rights by more and more sectors of society. Such a rights-based approach to citizenship, as developed by (Marshall 1950), still remains a reference point for works on citizenship. This is despite the criticisms it has attracted for its unitary character, that glosses over several distinct forms of citizenship as the etymological development of the concept itself demonstrates (Turner 1990). Citizenship is defined as a membership of a political community and as such prescribes a political but also a cultural identity. Its *de jure* dimension -- emphasized by liberal theorists -- attributes formal rights and duties to the former and its *de facto* dimension -- emphasized by communitarian theorists -- demarcates a sense of belonging to the latter, manifesting through an imagined community of people (Painter and Philo 1995).

Citizenship is the conceptual space that demarcates a territorial congruence between the imagined community of the nation (Anderson 1991), and the institutions of the state. In this space however both the relation between citizen and society, in terms of
membership, and what constitutes a political community can be problematic (Kymlicka 1995; Kymlicka and Norman 2000; Beiner 1995; Dauenhauer 1996). The ability to exercise one’s own de jure rights can be compromised by the de facto memberships structured around cultural identity. Formal rights can all too readily be undercut by the national community’s refusal to accept someone as being part of its ethnic or cultural identity (Kofman 1995).

Many theorists (such as Mouffe 1992; Lister 1997a, b; Isin and Wood 1999; Oldfield 1990a, b; Heater 1999; Kymlicka 1995, 1996) have attempted to find ways of uniting the liberal emphasis on individual rights, equality and due process of law, with the communitarian emphasis on belonging, often linking them through a civic republican focus on processes of deliberation, collective action and responsibility. At the centre of much contemporary writing is the need to conceptualize citizenship as both a status, which accords to a range of rights and duties, and an active practice (Lister 1997; Oldfield 1990a; Kymlicka and Norman 1994; Mouffe 1992; Barnes 1999).

Such attempts however are problematized by the ‘modern Janus-faced’ nature of nationalism (Nairn 1997) whose two faces stem out of the very distinction between the ethnic and civic definition of the nation (Alter 1994). The de facto sense of citizenship holds that states should be culturally homogeneous, meaning that multicultural states are aberrations (Breton 1988). A contrary view holds that cultural homogeneity and nationhood rarely occur in practice and are not necessarily linked. This distinction is often seen as underscoring two conflicting interpretations of the world, that is, between the western values of liberalism, democracy and secularism and ethnocentric values on identities and belongings that sit outside a Western value framework. However this distinction between ethnic and civic projects of nationhood has been criticized as too rigid (Smith 1983; Brubaker 1998) for it ignores the fact that no nation state and its society is either purely ethnic nor purely civic (Breton 1988; Brubaker 1998). The ratio between ethnic and civic tendencies colours public discourse on issues of cultural and political identities, and by implication the terms and conditions of membership to a community of people. In this context Nairn (1997) argues for the democratic necessity of nationalism in the modern world. While insisting that nationalism is as inescapable as ever, Nairn shows how its forms and contents are shifting. He argues that the ethnic definition of the national is shifting to the civic definition.

Nairn (1997) suggests that today’s more civic and secular nationalism is a key feature of modernity. He proposes that people’s internalization of a world created by
Macdonalisation and breakfast television has irreversibly re-enchanted their (national) cultural domain. This in a sense that people --modern urbanites-- have attained a level of civic nationalism which allows them to engage with differentiated identity politics without relapsing into ethnic nationalism. He argues this has occurred so extensively that this requires a differentiated character of society, one that would depend upon an equivalently differentiated state apparatus. In other words, a civil social order that would underpin a civic form of national identity and not the other way around (ibid. pp. 72-87):

‘Differentiated civil identity seems to be what peoples want; its attainment and maintenance demand modern ‘identity politics’. the same thing as politicized or state-configured nationality.’ (op. cit. p. 89).

Many have looked to a European scale of citizenship which might moderate national attachments and also promote a more civic or cosmopolitan ethos. In this sense, the hope might be for a ‘new Idea of Europe, playing on ‘cool loyalties’ to the state and ‘thin patterns of solidarity’ (Turner, 2000: 28 cited in Amin 2004: 8). Alternatively this could be an idea of Europe as a space of civility and modernity that is inscribed by rights and civil obligations rather than by ethnicity. However it is not at all clear that simply reimagining citizenship on a European scale will necessarily lead to such a ‘civic’ sense of belonging. Differences, for example, within Europe are clearly evident:

‘human rights tribunals in Europe...point to larger divisions within Europe over questions of identity and belonging. They suggest a far-reaching split between a rights and ethnicity-based foundation for inclusion within the emerging...entity. a split which manifests itself in debates over dual nationality, naturalization criteria, language and dress requirements in state schools and a wide range of other issues.’ (Bhabha 1999c: 21)

Although Soysal (1995) sees the potential of a European citizenship which would make a virtue of the separation of rights and identity or polity and belonging, by making Europe the locus of rights and the nation of cultural belonging, this outcome is clearly not inevitable:

‘Europe is as much a site of longings rooted in tradition –regional, national and European – as it is a site of transnational and trans-European attachments. The latter attachments are not just held by so-called third-country communities and cosmopolitans living in the fast lane of global travel and hybrid identities, but also by native Europeans, now increasingly enmeshed in plural and global consumption norms and patterns’ (Amin 2004: 2).
So for this thesis the issue becomes how to unpack a new scale of belonging and citizenship. On the one hand it must examine how senses of ‘civic’ or thin attachments may be engendered and whether these attenuate former ethnic solidarities. On the other, it has to ask whether such thin associations do challenge deeply sedimented feelings of cultural loyalty even if those cultures are no longer territorially bounded. Moreover these issues are not created by recent or not so recent immigrants to the EU, but are endemic to its members. Rather than follow the xenophobic focus upon Others as the proximate cause of destabilising otherwise firm European national cultures and attachments, the issue is to look at the internal instabilities being generated within Europe. That easy xenophobic response can be found when despite the fact that most EU citizens overall have relatively balanced views with regards to immigration, the presence of people from other ethnic groups becomes a cause for insecurity (42% EU 25) especially in relation to the view that such presence increases unemployment (46% EU 25).

Greece and the UK on a scale from 1 to 3 with 3 the most positive attitude towards immigrants, scored low on the question as to whether ‘non EU foreigners bring benefits’ scoring (1.68) and (1.95) respectively. 55% of the respondents from the UK and 74% from Greece consider that migrants’ presence increases unemployment. 53% from the UK and 63% from Greece find that their presence increases insecurity; 33% of UK and 57% Greeks that they do not enrich cultural life; 40% in the UK and 49% in Greece that they are not needed in certain sectors of the economy and 54% of UK respondents and 61% from Greece that their arrival will not solve the problem of ageing in Europe.

While these worries are reflected to a considerably lesser extent in questions regarding integrating foreigners: only 6% in the UK and 8% in Greece (Special Eurobarometer (EB No 273) there is still the sense that in both these countries the effect of mobility is read more strongly through figures of fear and danger. This seems more evident in these countries at the margins of Europe than elsewhere in Europe.

2.3 Mobility, Citizenship and European Space

Against this backdrop, an identification with a European polity is a tall order in the particular context of the emerging category of EU citizenship – with its legal underpinning in economic considerations and regulations. This section therefore discusses the various ways in which European citizenship has been envisaged and experienced by different actors, especially as far as they enable mobility in Europe. It
begins by outlining the dynamics affecting citizenship, before looking at the different forms of citizenship and their ideologies and tracing how these are read into and enacted by European treaties and laws. It thus depicts a terrain of competing conceptual versions of European citizenship, competing agendas regarding enacting treaties and contending readings of them by discussing their implications once enacted.

In regard to European citizenship, Verstraete (2003) argues that it is difficult to dissociate the politics of the market from citizenship. This means that the notion of unlimited mobility exposes the generalized position of the individual as a European citizen defined in terms of market rights, indeed their relationship to the Union itself is that of a consumer (Beasley 2006). This is also reflected in the ambiguity of the term ‘European citizenship’ that according to Painter (2003b) is unclear as it does not specify whether it denotes a ‘citizenship of Europe’ or a ‘citizenship in Europe’ (emphasis added). In his words, the former links people with a specific European polity and the latter with the complex landscapes of citizenship evolving out of European political space. For Verstraete, this configuration of European political space is such that far from producing a uniform citizenship, it uncovers the ethnic dimensions of the so called ‘civil’ nation states of Europe. This even occurs at the level of the European polity -- as introduced by Maastricht -- and is demonstrated in the strategies implemented by EU members with regards to the terms and conditions of access to which they subject the nationals of other European member states, as well as those imposed on those of non member states. In this light Verstraete views the European political space as a variably invisible and visible geometry, which depending upon a person’s position, can be restrictive or not of individual freedom of expression, movement or even with regards to active participation in the micro- and macro- processes of place and space configuration by the host.

This, according to Verstraete, poses questions of how racial and ethnic bodies are structurally produced at the conjuncture of the national and European space, as the concept of unlimited mobility at the heart of EU citizenship framework is interpreted and incorporated variably through the labour market agendas of different nations in the context of the single market. This can be illustrated by numerous examples brought to attention by empirical research with regards to the admission of the non-European migrant, or even with regards to structural and other barriers that variable interpretations of citizenship frameworks in some cases raise for the actual European national who, as a European citizen resides, domiciles or works in another member state. For example
different aspects of the non-European migrants’ status such as gender, race, age, class, ancestry, marital status, residence, occupation, dependents, impinge on their ability to access rights in the host member state. This is regardless of their legal status: as the member state upholds the power as an enforcer of individual rights and, as Bhabha and Shutter (1994), Bhabha (1999a, b, c) discuss, acts as a conduit to political, economic and social entitlements. Yet the 1987 Single European Treaty stipulates ‘that Member States shall collaborate to promote democracy on the basis of fundamental human rights, thus marking a significant shift in the self-conception of the community as more than a mere ‘Common Market’’ (ibid. 1999c: 15). At present according to Bhabha (1999c) EU citizenship operates effectively as an internal divider between those who are granted its status and those who are not. But also as Shore (2000: 164-5) discusses despite the rhetoric of free movement and equality there is discrimination directed at the European citizen as well who needs to register as a foreigner so that (s)he can obtain a resident’s permit in order to be able to live or work in Belgium, or in Greece for that matter (as discussed later). The invisible and visible inhibitions many European citizens enumerate regarding their experiences with reference to the public and private services’ sectors of the host apply across the board to their places of work as employees, or in businesses where they work as entrepreneurs or free lance professionals, or in regard to interactions with state and local bureaucracies, or just in terms of populist attitudes to foreigners, and so on so forth.

Traces of both liberal and communitarian versions of citizenship with their variations are reflected in the implicit concepts of European citizenship (Bellamy and Warleigh 1998) (see box 2.1) given its quasi-statehood and the limited but actual formal rights then attributed to citizens of member states.

These different interests and positions are reflected in the main complex and contradictory developments found in the balance of EU and national sovereignty. At one level we might see a struggle between communitarians, who see identities and loyalties fixed around the nation, with that of welfare liberals, who see EU institutions as a means to promote economic growth through effective state action. Although, for instance, the 1965 Luxembourg accord enshrined the national veto protecting sovereign powers, reflecting communitarian views, the gradual increase of majority voting within the EU Council represents the functional needs of the EU polity in making effective joint policy override specific partial interests. This reflects the successful development of the agenda of welfare liberals. Conversely, the ability of member states to derogate from common
positions on these grounds has also increased reflecting ongoing communitarian resistance.

**Box 2.1**

**Definitions of liberal and communitarian versions of citizenship**

Neo-liberal versions of citizenship regard economic integration as the principle method of forging an ‘ever closer union’. Such views primarily link the European citizen with consumption and production within a single market, perceived favorably for as long as it promotes economic competition between sovereign states and ensures minimum regulation within the trade area. In this context these views support a European project that promotes enlargement rather than the deepening of the Union – increasing the number of citizens enjoying the current limited rights, rather than increasing the rights of citizens.

Such views are contested by welfare liberals who -- notwithstanding their support for the free trade area -- are in favour of an EU regulatory framework that enhances the trade zone and see that as entailing a social dimension for the EU. These ‘welfare liberals’ are in favour of a democratic federal Europe with a written constitution that includes a monitoring role for the European Court of Justice that strengthens the position of the European Court of Human Rights. They see the EU as a way of improving and protecting the rights of EU citizens by reducing the partiality of states in favour of their own members. Thus they are in favour of an inclusive form of EU citizenship with a more open agenda on migration within the EU.

The Communitarian view on European citizenship is also plausible and prevalent. Ethnic nationalists consider that any attempt to construct a European polity is by default flawed since it would lack the cultural, linguistic and historical ties that underpin nation states. Understandably they are in favour of a fortress Europe in terms of migration from without but their overall support for the European project, and mobility within, is rather limited.

Civic nationalists who perceive national communities as fabrications are more in favour of the European project. They consider that a pan-European political identity with its own symbolic markers and notions of belonging is possible. Yet they reject the idea that this could surpass national political identities. As for European cooperation, they are cautious about advocating that the EU should remain a confederation and state that any transfer of sovereign powers must be provisional so that whenever vital national concerns are at stake nations should be able to reciprocate that transfer. Both approaches (with their variations) to citizenship, view the European project at best with caution. Their support for the project is provisional.

The Amsterdam Treaty (1997) claims to reconcile these positions by maintaining that the cosmopolitan values of ‘liberty, democracy, respect for human rights and fundamental freedoms and the rule of law’ are ‘principles which are common to the member states’ (Article F1, Amsterdam Treaty). The Union can thus respect both the fundamental rights of individuals and the national identities of its member states. This fusion of a ‘communitarian cosmopolitan’ approach implies that the member states share
basic political values around Roman law, humanist recognition, liberalism and Enlightenment Reason (Amin 2004: 5). However Bellamy and Warleigh (1998) argue that this position is problematic because beyond this core European states' variegated framework of agencies and competences reflects the divergent priorities and values of different groups of people that are inseparable from their identities and commitments. This persistence of particular national state practices is mirrored and sustained by public attitudes across the Union. National political cultures possess a legitimacy the Union presently lacks. Yet as the EU progresses into a multilevel system, the forces which drive the member states together challenge their own integrity.

The version of citizenship enshrined in the Maastricht treaty is atypical of EU agreements (Meehan 1991), with a strongly neo-liberal framework, and to this day is ambivalent as to which pattern of rights' framework should be more appropriate (Roche 1992) for the EU's developing variable geometry. With regards for example to non EU nationals, should such rights be linked to residence, occupation, nationality, age, marital status, geographical area or should they safeguard the equal treatment of all citizens living across the EU space? At present from the rights accorded to EU nationals only the right to petition the European Parliament and to complain to the European Ombudsman are available to non-EU citizens (Kingston 1997). But even amongst EU citizens, as was noted earlier, visible and invisible dividers are constantly raised due to firstly ambivalence in the language of EU citizenship framework (Painter 2001, 2003) and secondly to the quintessential position of the member state within the EU space as its gate keeper (O'Keefe 1994; O'Leary 1996). Member states enforce their own customized red tape reserved accordingly for non nationals, whether they be EU citizens or not. This undermines the EU emphasis put forward by the Treaty about the equality of rights. Thereby it undercuts any notions of post national belonging that may be developing. Instead it can be argued the equal treatment of all citizens been enforced within the EU space, post national belonging would have been fostered. Bhabha argues belonging is the precondition as well as the product of such a treatment.

Maastricht emphasized the legal basis for citizenship in an attempt to build a notion of European identity manifesting in a legal order, and its representations (Wiener

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2 These are the right to vote and stand as a candidate in European and municipal elections, rights to free movement and residence, to diplomatic and consular protection by any member state if the national's member state is not represented in a particular country, the right to petition the European Parliament and to complain to the European Ombudsman.
1997) following in the footsteps of the Holy Roman Empire (Bellamy and Castiglione 1997). Maastricht, when interpreted from the angle of liberal Realpolitik, aimed to avoid instability in an era of increasing economic interdependence by promoting unification of consumer and labour markets. Conversely, seen from a communitarian stance, it could be seen as the result and exacerbation of globalization that has undermined national cultures (Caglar 1995). In this context of labour mobility, the resulting permeability of national polities and hybrid configurations of belonging make people perceive themselves as citizens of more than one country (Brewin 1997) thereby exerting pressure on political structures which are thought to be both constitutive of and able to respond to discrete national communities.

Maastricht citizenship thus accentuates the inherent paradox in the conception of the nation state that is based on the territorial congruence between the imagined community of the nation and the institutions of the state. A variety of solutions to this paradox have been advocated, from Habermas’s (1996) appeal for constitutional patriotism, Weiler’s (1995a) advocacy of the de-coupling of citizenship from nationality and most pertinent here a number that adopt a supra-national body as a ‘spatial fix’ or institutional bridge. Thus Soysal (1996) argues for a European citizenship which separates political rights from national identity and belonging. For others (such as De Burca 1995; Pinder 1994; Twomey 1994; Everson and Preuss 1995; Teague and Grahl 1990), EU citizenship has the possibility to become a positive source of an European identity as a guarantor of civil rights and social justice. In this context it would gradually link people and structures in a legitimate framework of action (Shaw 1997a), and thence delineate a ‘Europolity’ vis-à-vis the rest of the world with some sense of commonality and solidarity amongst its members, which could potentially forge a new sense of belonging. In this reading of citizenship, the issue of identity emerges as an attempt to foster an affective common (political) identity that would mobilize the legally equal consumers and workers created by the single market around an identity of market citizenship (Everson 1995; Shore 2000, 2001).

Yet the actual extent and status of any shared rights is contested and circumscribed. The EU confers limited new rights to its ‘citizens’ focused around the economic arena (Shaw 1998b; O’ Keeffe 1994). It would be a step further if member states were to treat Maastricht as increasing citizens’ freedom of association, assembly and expression in the Union context (Marias 1994b). In contrast to this possibility, Magnette (1998) argues that consequent IGC processes have curtailed some of
Maastricht's initial promise in this area and Shaw (2000) suggests that what remains is a diluted ideal of the European social model. Although the Treaty acknowledges that political community construction requires more than economic rights (Everson and Preuss 1995), it is unclear in its provisions whether European nationals are citizens in the Union or citizens of the Union (Painter 2003b). Commentators such as Springer (1994) would argue that they are of the Union, albeit in the making. She advocates that in the handling of the issues covered by the first and third pillars of the Treaty (such as the environment, the new regionalism, the politics of policy-making in the EU, cross-border employment issues, as well as social and cultural considerations and the processes and the politics that develop around them), there is a Europolity in the making. That means, the propensity for individual and group allegiances at the European level transgressing the national, is already in place. This is contrary to what O'Leary (1996) contends, when he questions whether a direct relationship can be said to exist between Union citizens and the Union. But we might concede that even if some direct relationships of nationals of member states and the Union exist, the variable geometry of EU citizenship undermines its integrity (D' Oliveira 1995).

One reason Maastricht citizenship is contested is because of its complex multifaceted construction (Meehan 1993; Garcia 1993; Soysal 1994, 1996; Close 1995; Habermas 1995; Kofman 1995; Gamberale 1997; Delanty 1996, 1997; Lehning and Weale 1997; Shaw 1998a, b; Painter 2000, 2001). Despite this, it has the propensity to expand beyond its current status (Meehan 1993) and to underpin a flexible Union of multilevel, multilayered environments of coexisting demoi (Soysal 1994; Twomey 1994; Weiler et al. 1995; Chrysochoou 2000). That is, it creates multiple 'publics' of citizens with rights in respect to the different scales of powers of state actors. It nevertheless, at least as it is currently operated, fails to create a consistent, direct link between the citizen and the Union. This is because, other things being equal, citizens of member states are firstly not identified in the Treaty as the source of legitimacy within the Union and, secondly, despite the status of citizen the Union has conferred upon them, they remain aliens in all member states but their own (Everson and Preuss 1995; Shaw 1998b). In this context it is a second-order citizenship (Delanty 1997), or an added value to national citizenship, depending on one's perspective; and hence a formal citizenship both limited and subordinate to national citizenship. Viewed from this angle Closa (1998) argues that by linking nationality to EU citizenship, what the Treaty achieved is the reinforcement of the former.
Normatively speaking EU citizenship is seen as lying at the heart of the democratization of the European project, shifting the emphasis from a union of member states towards a Europe of the people. Academic literature argues that the long term future of the EU project depends on democratization, and thus on European citizenship. The Single European Market and European Monetary Union would require a sense of solidarity to confer popular support for cohesion policies (Shaw 2000). But there is little public support for a Europe-wide demos that subsumes or replaces national ones (Bellamy and Castiglione 1998; Shore and Black 1994; Shore 2000, 2001). So far, despite its legal importance and salience in political discourse at the time, Maastricht citizenship has failed to capture the imagination of European citizens (Guild 1996; Everson 1995; Delanty and Rumford 2005).

One reason that Maastricht has not fostered a common political identity for European citizens is how it is refracted through nation state administrations to produce differentiated outcomes. In many instances Maastricht has generated inequalities between EU citizens residing in another member state. For example with regards to the apparently equal granting of municipal voting rights. EU citizens may have more political power in a foreign country than in their own due to the differing power allocated to local level politics throughout the EU. For instance Koslowski (1994) argues this is the case for French nationals living in Germany, given the political leverage the Lander hold in that country as opposed to the lack of such leverage on the local level existing in France. The experience of these variations in citizenship only enhances the sense of a democratic deficit in the Union. Daily life within the Union reinscribes national, ethnic, cultural and other differences (Everson and Preuss 1995), so that guests and hosts intermingle under the umbrella of a common citizenship that lacks transnational solidarity. This is evident, for example, in the ways in which the existing red tape (in public and private sectors) in Greece, interferes with the principle of EU citizenship regarding the unhindered movement of people, goods, services and ideas, and by implication restates the priority of local cultural belonging rather than transnational commonalities. This also has impacts on the market place in spaces guests and hosts unavoidably share. Hence the EU project is undermined partly because of entrenched attitudes towards foreigners in general, nurtured by a mentality that has developed as a response to the spatial and historical dimensions of the region, and partly because of the inflexible nature such red tape has evolved, and out of the insular ways in which Greek state apparatuses have been constructed (Spanou 1996). Either way, the fact is that such an environment resists the
penetration of its workings and infrastructure by the European citizenship framework and of its principles, thereby generating deficits of all sorts in everyday activities.

Yet many political actors may see advantages in reinforcing Maastricht citizenship. Groups with agendas regarding gender, or sexual or other discrimination or rights’ issues, or those NGOs working on issues ranging from the environment to children’s welfare, trade unions, or in local or regional governments can use Maastricht as the platform for addressing case specific issues that their national state structures are otherwise unwilling to support (Vogel 1997; Silverman 1996; Laffan 1996; Meehan 1997). These disparate views about the import and implications of Maastricht provisions reflect the conflicting demands and pressures on EU citizenship in the absence of a clear framework (Springer 1994). However, for all the legal and conceptual ambiguity, everyday practice proves that citizens can and do function at multiple levels simultaneously (Roche 1992). Thus such multilevel practice may shape a political identity if it is perceived as a useful tool for individual, group, or for social and market orientated agendas (Wiener 1996) thereby affecting perceptions of identity among European nationals of member states (Cram 1997). The extreme version of this would see a post national framework in which member states are responsible only for the implementation of legal and normative principles which rest at Union level (Soysal 1994). A parallel can be drawn here between national/post national frameworks where in the UK’s framework of governance means that the local government implements but hardly sets any laws, compared to the German federal system with its sixteen Land where the Lander hold legislative as well as administrative power, and also a pivotal role in the formation of Germany’s European and foreign policies (Gunlicks 2003).

Focusing on building Union based rights, Weiler (1995) argues that the Treaty already contains elements of a social contract that might serve to bind the disparate Europolity in a way that can function independently from cultural identity (in the manner Habermas (1996) suggests). Such a view of building the Union is based on political rights and links with what we might term a cosmopolitan communitarian approach of Bellamy and Castiglione (1998) that brings together liberal and communitarian perspectives. In this vision the Union is a civic entity, defined through political belonging, comprised of different nations, which are defined through cultural belonging. In this approach postnational citizenship would imply simultaneous membership of different communities. It would be a differentiated, flexible citizenship tailored to individual, corporate and state needs (Roche 1992) which would not diminish the central
role of member states (Dehousse 1994). Such a citizenship should be able to deal with difference (D’Oliveira 1995) as a means of fostering common political identity through protection of group diversity (Mouffe 1992; Kymlicka 1995; Young 1995) in keeping with Habermas’s (1996) notion of constitutional patriotism. Recognizing and protecting diversity is vital for the success of citizenship (Vogel 1997; Kymlicka 1996; Kymlicka and Norman 2000). This attentiveness to and recognition of diversity could make EU citizenship popular amongst its diverse stakeholders and cultivate participation with European affairs (Bellamy and Warleigh 2001). This, theoretically speaking, could shape perceptions of belonging (Baubock 1994) and civic mindedness (Habermas 1995), however in practice multicultural identities are complex and shifting in nature.

2.4 Citizenship in a Multicultural Context

Such a civic or constitutional patriotism has often been argued as especially necessary in circumstances of multicultural pluralism. Such circumstances increasingly characterize both Europe and nations within Europe. Multicultural formations must include increasing cultural diversity and fragmentation within member states, alongside increasing movement between member states, and foster a growing movement then of those with complex cultural identifications with either host or home culture. Increasingly then the European polities and daily lives must face issues of reconciling multiple cultural identities and rights claims.

Consequently the lack of resonance of this civic belonging or the continued purchase of ethno-identifications might seem surprising. One explanation is to suggest that such a constitutional sense of belonging requires a society of reasonable and rational agents (Rawls 2005) who link the issue of membership to a community with its legal and political definition rather than to its definition as an imagined community of people (Anderson 1991). This also requires agents of universalist disposition that do not discriminate against any identities whether cultural, racial, class, gendered or sexual.

Assuming that a large part of what is being said about citizenship involves shared culture (Hannerz 1999), this might seem implausible. This might be doubly so because the western liberal tradition that frames civic approaches might be characterized as agnostic to difference, while accommodating to diversity. As Bhabha (1988: 206-9) has argued.

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3 The discussion on citizenship in the multicultural and cosmopolitan context draws extensively from the writings of Stevenson (2001, 2002).
diversity and difference are two competing concepts. Hence diversity is an epistemological instrument describing an emancipatory west of liberal values and ideals— which for those opposed to such ideals and values represents an instrument for glossing over contentions. Whereas difference describes systems of cultural identification that for western liberal majorities tend to undermine the authority of their cultural synthesis in general. This was all too apparent and widespread in the crises around ethnicity and belonging in France, Demark, Sweden and the UK—to name merely those countries where widespread violence has erupted in the last decade over these issues—and suggests that claims to universalist tolerance and liberalism belie the ethno-cultural foundations of those liberal regimes. As increasing mobility leads to more populations mingling from both within and without the European Union, there are increasing pressures to think through a citizenship that acknowledges multi-cultural attachments.

These pressures spring out of the fact that in today’s world multiculturalism cannot simply be answered in the old language of race relations that implies a simple relationship of singular host and singular guest identities: instead there are calls for a language of equality where individuals and communities need to engage and communicate with one another within an agreed legal, political and social framework. However, how such a common framework could be found without being underpinned by a common culture is problematic. Indeed the concept of a benignly, uniform identity, free of culture might be said to actually encode the pedigree of the ethno-cultural foundations of liberal democratic politics. And yet the quest for a neutral commonality throws into relief all the trivial markers of difference in daily existence. These debates stake out the contest between preserving multicultural diversity and pressing for integration into one culture.

Whilst, generally speaking, main stream politics and the majority of people do not advocate either a devaluing of cultural difference or deny the need for a shared code, the relationship of multiculturalism and integration is problematic. Just as multiculturalism becomes an issue every time the power bids of dominant groups upset ratios of participation or representation in social, cultural, political, or economic activities, or repressive traditions come to the fore within minority communities, so an appeal to integration can be used to enforce wider social conformity to contested values.

Thus to establish a meaningful politics of recognition between conflicting understandings and competing visions is a difficult task as it refers not only to juxtaposed cultures but also views that challenge mainstream presuppositions of what the national
community might be. Not only does the politics of recognition stumble over, generally speaking the aversion people have for forms of Otherness, it is also problematized by the particular ways in which western universal liberalism interprets the world. That is when, for example, Taylor (1992) attempts to link the politics of recognition to the politics of multiculturalism from within the tradition of liberalism, he argues for the politics of universalism as non-discriminatory. This according to Hesse (1997) however is problematic from the start because it preserves interpretations of universalism embedded in Western liberalism which, as Said (1993) argues, presuppose exclusions in public discourse over how difference should be negotiated and represented.

In response to these embedded assumptions, there has been a move beyond discourses that assume binary oppositions in terms of ethnic, national, racial, gendered or sexual identities. Instead there are arguments for a polity that does not mask group and individual difference in the name of an overarching cultural identity, purportedly needed to maintain social unity. In this context, a politics of difference (Young 1990) aims to subvert binary oppositions by suggesting the implementation of differential citizenship rights (Hull et al. 1982). This kind of politics deconstructs essentialist assumptions about the constitutiveness of group or individual identities founded on binary oppositions of inclusion and exclusion (Seidman 1997; Hall 1992). It studies identity formation as ongoing processes, responsive to the spatial, politico-economic, cultural and historic dimensions of their temporal modalities. This according to Young (1989) is imperative for underpinning social cohesion in an age of increasing interconnectedness, since the current citizenship frameworks remain in practice exclusive, regardless of their de jure aspirations to distribute rights equally to those granted the status. To counteract this Young argues for institutional procedures that would ensure that the voice of the Other -- in her case the oppressed working classes, ethnic minorities and gay people -- would be heard (ibid. 1996). In a similar vein Kymlicka (1995) argues for a group-differentiated citizenship -- in his case with regards to national and ethnic minorities -- that would promote social unity by recognizing diversity on the grounds of cultural difference instead of amalgamating it into the larger (majority) whole.

Such approaches however have been criticized on the basis that by converting politics into affirming group difference, they tend to redefine and reinscribe what constitutes a group (Faulks 2000; Phillips 1991) and by defining what groups have in terms of political identity they seem to accept the view that cultures are confined only to national or ethnic groupings (Waldron 1999). Instead hybrid developments, tend to depict
and reinforce the notion of separate well-defined and discrete sub-groups. In some cases where the state formally recognizes difference this has tended in European cultures to both create and enforce hierarchies within recognized groups but it has also been set in terms of the dominant culture. Thus the Swedish state supports minority cultures through the same approach as majority cultures – focusing upon folk dance, song and festivals. The effect is to enshrine a fixed version of difference rather than examine daily plurality (Alsmark 1996). The balance of what differences count and how diversity should be recognized are highly debatable. Thus with concerns for social unity uppermost, Touraine (2000) argues that multiculturalism should not be turned into unrestricted pluralism because such a framework would be unmanageable. In response to this Parekh (2006) argues for a multicultural society that is not based on the pre given cultural realm of diversity, that is, the overarching liberal framework that confines multi-cultures and other deviations from the norm, but rather on an inter-cultural recognition of difference based on dialogue. This would aim to create a common culture of differential universalism (Lister 1997a) that would provide the overarching adhesion of multicultural societies. Yet to date such a proposition has not gained traction with European nationalism, as this responds to the complexities transnationalism brings about, whether global or European.

Hence in summary, we might draw out three key points from this discussion of multicultural citizenship. While it is generally cast in terms of ethnic minority or immigrant rights within a nation state, looking to the European level it reveals a number of parallel trends and issues. Initially, we have seen in previous sections how the European polity has often been appealed to as a scalar fix to the paradox of national ethnic and territorial definitions. The institutional and scalar fix suggested by a civic universalist Europe is to stand above the nation as a wider guarantor of rights. However, this does not take into account Europe’s own histories of exclusions and identifications. The framing of this universalist position is just as problematic as at the national level. So in the end, for the present and increasingly mobile and plural Europe we need to see multicultural elements introduced and complexified by a European scale. Cultural diversity and multi-culturalism need not be about Europe and its Others, but Europeans as Others within a national context, and then national minorities may further move between European states. The effect then is that European belonging does so much bypass national paradoxes as insert new complications into their patterns.
2.5 Mobilizing Tradition in Creating ‘Ethnos’

This section discusses why nations are perplexed by the complexities transnationalism brings about, whether global or European, as these force a confrontation with multicultural effects within the domain of the national. It does this against the backdrop of the theoretical conception of the nation that establishes how national entities came about as autonomous and autochthonous and how this has been internalized by people over time. It then goes on to explain from a psychoanalytic angle how amidst such complexities the nation reinvents itself as the focal point for cultural belonging and identification. It then discusses the counter process that undermines such attempts, namely the capacity of the globalizing market trends to dislocate meaning, thus disrupting the appeal of the national as the mode for belonging and identification. The discussion comes to a close by showing how such processes may work in favour of projects such as the European one which tries to steer the European publics away from the politicization of life towards its marketization so that a supranational Europe, freed from its divisive past, muscles its way into the global markets as one distinct entity.

In the era of globalization the domain of the national is under strain. The aforementioned complexities provoke a confrontation by disrupting conceptions of a smooth historical progress that sustain the ‘national plots’ for national, ethnic and cultural identities, and the self-identities of agents, possessing and possessed by them (Fardon 1995 cited in Kelly 1999: 241). Such national genealogy ‘contents itself with establishing a causal connection between various moments in history…[that] became historical posthumously’ (Benjamin 1979: 265) and as such is deployed systematically by the historiographical campaign of the state to remind everyone of antique events which are now inscribed as ‘family history’. Such a notion of history depends upon a temporality that can be interpreted as a ‘homogeneous, empty time’ (ibid. p. 263) based on ‘simultaneity…marked…by temporal coincidence, and measured by clock and calendar’ (Anderson 1991: 24) in which ‘[t]he idea of a sociological organism moving calendrically through [the aforementioned] time is a precise analogue to the idea of the nation[], which…is conceived as a solid community moving steadily down (or up) history’ (ibid. p. 26). The nation is conceived as a broadly exclusive group which has persisted through time and thus has a shared history and trajectory. Such temporality becomes the site of fostering a national ‘historical consciousness’ (Benjamin 1979: 264) which manifests as a communally constructed selfhood or else as a solid cultural identity.
Nationality has come to be something natural (Gellner 1983: 6), despite the fact that nationalism is the product of the modern age (Anderson 1983; Gellner 1983, 1987; Nairn 1977, 2001).

This conception of autonomous, autochthonous national entities moving more or less unchanged down the ages is challenged by multicultural or cosmopolitan conceptualizations of identities as fluid and changeable or as constructions evolving out intercultural dialogue. Despite the intensification of global flows of people, ideas and symbols, the concept of national heritage remains the ‘home ground’ of ‘banal nationalism’ (Billig 1995) that is ‘less empathetic than... jingoistic... but... all the more powerful for that reason’ (Schwarz 1986: 176-7). This sense of solidly rooted, not routed, to use Clifford’s (1997) phrase, sedentary belonging creates resistance to the political and economic forces of multiculturalism and cosmopolitanism. Nationhood reinforces its self-identity in a self-fulfilling manner by drawing upon a past ‘safe in the Utopianism of a mythic memory of a unique collective identity’ (1988: 206). Its mythic roots, all too often unchallenged still, justifies its authenticity in the midst of the push and pull forces of the contemporary world (Ang 2000). Its appeal to ‘sameness’ and continuity still for many addresses the angst of the global age (Gilroy 2000).

Alternatively, instead of seeing nations spawning polities to represent them, one could see ‘with[in] the regulatory authority... of the national state... expressed in a vision of societies as...state societies’ (Beck 2000b: 23), where the state fosters senses of nationhood. These identities are fostered by the myths that nationalism has created about the pre-modernity of nation states (Hobsbawm 1983) that are institutionalised and repetitively reinscribed in the representations of every day living - through schooling, symbols, calendar, media, sports, and so on. These practices of the flagging of nationhood have become familiar features of the social environment (Korblum 2003) which require and sustain sedimented assumptions about the naturalness of nationalism (Langer 1989).

Our lived relationship to assumed, shared national history is a temporal modality described by Billig (1995) as ‘inhabitation’, where patterns of social life have become habitual or routine, and in so doing they embody the past. The process constantly reminds the collective memory of its nationhood, through the recitation of myths about the pre-modernity of the nation state, thereby turning background space into homeland. He argues that the emphasis on modeling society on this homeland has both reified and concealed nationhood, which is read by most as the ‘emotional attachment to one’s
people’ (Connor 1993: 374). Civic society seems to be created in the space of a narrative that constructs a unified discourse which addresses ‘the people’ as singular and establishes connections with the lived popular culture which are by default exclusive (Schwarz 1986: 183).

Yet civic societies or else Western liberal societies are also organized around a consensual definition of the nation -- in the context of, as Renan put it (1823-1892), the ‘daily plebiscite’ -- that does not equate cultural homogeneity with nationhood. Instead it insists on the territorial and legal dimensions of a nation, seen as a community of laws (Smith, 1991) whose only prerequisite for membership is the individual’s commitment to a political-legal framework. Yet, even this framework is exclusive because it has emerged out of, inescapable, according to Hesse (1993, 1997a, b). Western interpretations of modernity ‘structured around a gaze which goes from Europe towards the periphery’ (Sayyid 1994: 277). Hesse (1997a) qualifies this by arguing effectively -- in the context of his interrogation of multiculturalism -- that civic virtues are equally bound to the narrative that constructed the nation, and as such their multicultural constitutiveness is articulated through the same parameters that demarcate such a narrative; that is race, gender and religion. In other words civic virtues are culturally specific western values underpinned by the same white governing mentality that legitimized western nations’ domination of the world. This entanglement of the national and of the civic, Hesse argues, is inescapable because of the ideological meaning invested in the former feeds into western interpretations of modernity, and detraditionalisation. He suggests that the era of globalization, flows and interconnectedness, represses the nation which reacts by articulating itself as multicultural. In other words multiculturalism and by implication civic (secular) values are the symptoms of the symbolic (re)structuring of the national. That is we might interpret them as symptomatic products of the psychosocial effects of globalization. In that context the national is the key signifier that circumscribes a ‘unified discourse which addresses ‘the people’ as singular and establishes connections with the lived popular culture’ as aforementioned, as well as a ‘condensed metaphorical representation of European civilization’ in the face of the instability of globalization.

Žižek (1989: 55-84) argues that when any key signifier, such as the nation, is undermined or questioned, a certain void is created in the symbolic order of its structure. This interrupts the ‘enjoyment’ of the signifier and the circuit of communication through it and when this happens the signifier returns as a symptom that rises as the traumatic
real. The 'repressed world articulates itself in a coded, cyphered form' (ibid. p. 73). The symptom of the repressed nation comes to life as a real multicultural discourse which despite its interpretation or interrogation does not dissolve as it ought to theoretically. This is because according to Lacan it generates 'enjoyment' in itself which allows those involved and implicated with it to organize themselves around it, in the shape for example of new forms of subjectivity or new ways of communication. In either case the symptom gathers momentum as a 'signifying formation [per se], a binding of enjoyment, an inert stain resisting communication and interpretation, a stain which cannot be included in the circuit of discourse, of social bond network, but is at the same time a positive condition of it' (Žižek 1989: 75). While seemingly unrelated to any previous discourse this more positive outcome obscures the presence of the lurking world that sparked it off initially. For example the Notting Hill carnival in London that seemingly celebrates multiculturalism, seen in the light of the above discussion, obscures the problem of integrating second and third generation West Indian migrants by marketing itself as the invention of British liberal multiculturalism.

Through this process the symptom itself is rendered with consistency, thereby giving a new lease of life to national enjoyment under the requisition of civility and modernity. It is in this context that Hesse’s interrogation of multiculturalism raises questions with regards to its context, content and intent since it effectively offers absolution to the nation’s nationalist or imperial past as a ‘resolved historical deviation from the inevitable ideals of western liberalism’ (Hesse 1997a: 383). Thus Hesse suggests the multicultural aspect of the Western (civic) nation and by implication Western civic (secular) society can be seen as a strategy to re-define the parameters of national space in an effort to conjure up a racialized singularity out of an actual racialized heterogeneity (Hesse 1997b). This means that even the current rediscovery of: ‘Multiculturalism is the return of the national repressed’ (Hesse 1997a: 384).

In other words when the symbolic order of the structure of each nation, and by implication, the society organized around it, is threatened then the nation (re)articulates itself around the emerging cultural, economic and political configurations that respond to particular historic and spatial dimensions. These responses or (re)articulations develop into idiomatic national, social and mono- or multi-cultural imaginations. Žižek argues these are different ways of organizing the enjoyment of national belonging through unspoken performativities. We might see these different national imaginations as examples of what Haraway (1991) calls situated knowledges. Such knowledges give rise
to different approaches to ethnic or civic components of nationalisms which underpin the framework of contemporary societies in the Western world and beyond, and by implication they set the context in which public discourse is conducted. The pervasive mobility of modern societies mingles these different imaginations in places and spaces of mixture where transnational urbanism operates for example, thus complicating scales of belonging and of identification, leading to new subjectivities that are neither placeless nor localized. Transmigrant networks intermingle with the contested politics of place, local practices and identities, affecting both migrant and host practices and identities in a very heterogeneous manner. This suggests a complex refiguring and entanglement of modes of belonging and identification. The movement of people within the EU can thus be seen to challenge not just which polity people belong to, but also tacit assumptions of how polities are enacted, how people 'do' or perform national belonging and how nations are enacted. That is, the mode of belonging is challenged as well as the object of identification.

By implication pervasive mobility challenges the framework of liberal multiculturalism when it conceives nations in terms of cultural majorities/minorities and identifies cultural difference in terms of social inequalities. These social inequalities are correlated with unequal opportunities in accessing resources (Kymlicka 1989; Rawls 1999). Although such a conception of the nation is emancipatory for some, it is nevertheless underpinned by an underlying crucial cultural component (Brubaker 1998) that pervades the civic component of the nation in question and circumscribes the terms and conditions of membership to such a community of people. That is to gain civic rights and social equality requires cultural incorporation. And this is where mobility contests such a framework of governance. Because as discussed earlier, notwithstanding the calls for the need for a shared code, in the view of many this implies integration which is seen as an enforcement of wider social conformity to contested values that devalue cultural difference thus undermining social equality. For example, with regards to the liberal, multicultural British model one could argue that its crucial cultural component is that of a self-styled British secular pragmatism that sets the terms and conditions of membership. However every time this component is challenged by multicultural communities in Britain over such issues as the diversifying views on the secularization of British society and the relationship of equality to religious choice, as in the case of the Catholic Church with regards to their adoption policy, exclusionary tendencies lurking within the establishment come to the fore. Anything that disputes the liberal, secular pragmatic
interpretation of the world as accepted by British established tradition is dismissed as intolerably deviant on the basis that any such interpretation may undermine the civic foundation of British society and by implication its cohesion (Sarup 1996; Seton-Watson 1986; Schwarz 1986; Laclau 1986). Here the values of 'civic' citizenship, seen as such, are invested with meanings associated with cultural belonging. This type of belonging, not only signifies patterns of social life that are inhabited and founded on the 'crucial cultural component', but most importantly they signify a concerted process of shared rememberings and forgettings that gloss over contentions which tend to undermine the coherence of such belongings around which national unity is organized. This, coupled with the current processes of the de-territorialization of communal affiliations, fill the efforts of nation-building with a new urgency -- engendered by the exacerbation of contradictions between the dominant ideological discourse of globalization and alternative discourses of identity politics -- to combat the dissolution of its national unity (Laclau 1986).

These pressures may lead to the sharpening of either exclusive or inclusive tendencies in the nationalist project (Bauman 1992) as it reacts to a liquid modernity (Bauman 2000). Globalizing markets trend, not only to undermine national unities, communal affiliations and the commitment, identity and security of individuals, they also dislocate meanings (Bendix 2000). For example the thinking underpinning the European project as it has been developed by a political vanguard of politicians, bureaucrats and marketing professionals, attempts to steer ordinary Europeans away from their national heritage to a European one, on the grounds that the hegemony of national heritage in popular discourse is an obstacle to the Union’s cohesion. Heritage, in that sense of national story and shared history, according to Bendix has, amongst all terms associated with culture, a dominant place in public discourse. It is associated with efforts to preserve and celebrate ethnicity, locality and history. Yet as a term it is unstable and ambiguous like others that have been used in the realm of public culture to justify ethnocentric heredities or political agendas. Because of this very ambiguity, it is a very useful term in mobilizing people. In this context, the invention of a European public culture attempts to dislocate heritage from national ownership to a European one so that the complexities of national history and politics hidden in it are concealed from public view.

Bendix argues that the process of depoliticizing heritage, like any other capitalist invention, dissociates the present from troublesome pasts, and steers it towards consumption. In so doing it thereby deflects the attention of the (European) public from
the politics of preserving a national heritage to the mechanics of its preservation, thus making it more appealing for purchasing, appropriating or even furthering the internalization of it as their own ‘European’ heritage. This is why representations of national cultures enter the EU iconography as representations of ‘European culture’ (Shore 2000: 40-65).

Under conservation projects for example the Parthenon’s symbolic order in time and space is reconfigured as European heritage in order to reflect the ‘European dimension’ in the tourist’s gaze. Bendix suggests that such moves reflect the erosion of the politicization of life in favour of its marketization, that is. private solutions are given to what would formerly have been public issues pursued through democratic politics. Hence in turn this may lead to the diminishing of the national monopoly on defining history and hence force identity building outside the compound of the nation state. The loss of the state’s monopoly on defining heritage could point to more plural arbiters in future – offering both opportunity and fragmentation. If such pluralisation is tied to marketization, as Bendix suggests, it may also lead to a market led repositioning of cultural heritages in terms attractive to other Europeans in a European tourist market.

In summary we might draw four points from the discussion on the appeal of the national as the mode for belonging and identification in a world of multicultural effects. The argument has been made that the cultural belonging and identification with a nation are encoded in everyday practices through the inhabitation of national heritages. While these may be becoming more pluralized and less under state control they remain deeply embedded notwithstanding accounts of postmodern rootlessness. Through these everyday practices even ‘civic’ values and national belonging become deeply entangled. Multicultural nationalism can then be seen as having limits in its inclusivity. It remains a question for the next section whether mobility in trans-European spaces opens new possibilities for newly emergent European identities.

2.6 Cosmopolitan Ideals, Being at Home in the World and the Experience of European Mobility

So far this chapter has worked through Europeanization by juxtaposing the liberal principle of cosmopolitanism, with constructivist theories on identity formations and nationalist accounts of the congruence of tradition, culture and territory. This section will discuss Europeanization as a conflict of two different forces: the first being a conflict
underscored by the uneven processes of globalization, that undercut the boundedness of societies and communities by means of migration, mobility of people, goods, services, information technologies and communications; and the second force, one that is underscored by the drive of cultural homogeneity, which attempts to tame these flows by the use of norms and regulations.

Such conflicts complicate conventional concepts of community, culture and milieu as well as questioning the assumption of a post national world. They also complicate interpersonal relations and transcultural connections. Research shows that contemporary people, more often than not, find it difficult to apprehend cross-cultural communications (Baumann 1996; Esses et al. 1998; Valins 2003; Burgess and Wilson 2005; Lynn-Ee Ho 2006; Reitman 2006; Peach 2006; Butler and Lees 2006; Winders 2006; Cinnirella and Hamilton 2007; Gans 2007; Phillips et al. 2007). This however does not exclude formations of new subjectivities (Qureshi and Moores 1999) and forms of cosmopolitanism emerging in the European project.

So far the process of Europeanization has been subjected to multiple theoretical efforts seeking to account for its social impact. In this context and against the backdrop of the processes of globalization and of transnationalism this section will discuss mobility vis-à-vis instability and cosmopolitanism versus rootedness, in order to answer the question as to whether in trans-European spaces there is a possibility for an emerging European identity. In so doing the ensuing discussion will engage in examining various arguments: disembedding versus notions of rootedness: the breaking up of communities versus the reiteration of localism; the decline of national belonging as an issue or as a possibility; the new spaces of contact generated by marketing and economic production and finally the management of hybridity in such spaces.

The European project plans not only for the positive intermixing of cultures through free movement of capital, services, goods and people and in doing so to transcend national entrenchments, but also to allow these changes to lead to a more dynamic economy. This logic underpins much of EU policy as the route to the Europeanization of the continent. The aim is that new levels of interconnectedness between people, cultures and localnesses will eventually amplify cosmopolitan attitudes which by implication would foster an emerging European identity. However as noted before repeated surveys and empirical findings have problematized the claims of such a normative approach with regard to how people react to political ideals of democracy, institutions and effective authority being enacted beyond the level of the nation state.
Such findings call for an intrinsic functional requirement linking cosmopolitanism to issues of cultural identity and cultural policies, especially when considering how the current and future prospects of global environments are shaping individual and collective lives.

Although aspects of globalization have the potential to generate more cosmopolitan attitudes people and states have often been, individually and collectively, pursuing defensive responses towards increased interconnectedness and the propinquiies globalization brings about. This is especially evident in European attitudes towards migration for example, reflected in the building of a fortress Europe that undermines any notion of the European project becoming geared towards a welcoming approach to mobility outside its borders. This notwithstanding, the European project is characterized by the unbundling of territory within its borders through its economic and monetary union, functionally differentiated networks of communication and trade, and by its institutions that effectively enact multilateral democracy through European law (and the protection of individual rights and national autonomy).

Yet social integration between the component societies of the EU is stalled. Parochial views of nationhood are founded on concepts of homogeneous societies and unitary state structures built on a single language, religion, ethnicity, nation and common land. These views underwrite the negotiations between cultural identities and political citizeships, that are engaged in a constant (re)making and sustaining of the trajectory of national identity in the European space. From such a starting point cosmopolitanism is identified with the loss of national identity and cultural values. Cosmopolitanism here becomes a threatening form of deracinated, unplaced non-identity associated with a global elsewhere. This identification of cosmopolitanism affects the quantitative aspects (transactions) and qualitative aspects (cohesion) of transnational (social) integration within the EU.

Despite the aforementioned perception of cosmopolitanism, the impact of new European populations on domesticated national lives is considerable; quantitatively in economic terms as well as qualitatively in terms of working conditions and changing habits. When the three basic features of the Single European Market (hereafter SEM) -- worker mobility, student exchange and freedom to market products -- are considered, the vast majority of EU citizens think that it has had a positive effect on the economies of their countries. 70% at the EU (25) level- varying from 57%-90% at a country level think the impact is positive with regards to workers' mobility; 84% at the EU (25) level-
varying from 63%-98% at a country level think so with regards to student exchanges: 75% at the EU (25) level- varying from 66%-90% at a country level think so with regards to freedom to market products, leading to 61% at the EU (15) level satisfaction with the selection of products available in shops and supermarkets: 67% at the EU (25) level, with regards to increased competition. and so on (Special Eurobarometer (EB No 254)). Overall in the UK, for example, people think that businesses, consumers and labour conditions benefited, although not equally, from membership (78% see businesses, 68% see exporters, 63% consumers and 51% workers as benefiting from membership (Flash Eurobarometer (EB No 185)). Equally in the Euro zone at EU (12) level, 58% believe that the Euro has influenced their spending habits (Flash Eurobarometer (EB No 193)). Yet none of this translates into political engagement by nationally resident citizens involved with European institutions and so does not provide an indication of an emergent European demos (Favell 2004; Shore 2000, 2001; Tsoukalis 2004).

Unlike North America, where the long distance mobility of the professional middle class is a commonplace fact of life. Europe’s distinctive way of life has been marked by entrenched national and cultural enclaves with high identification with place. In the USA, with a common language and government, gross regional mobility flows amount to 3.05% of the working age population. However a similar spatial scale shows ranges from 2.28% in the UK down to only 0.14% in Slovakia (European Foundation for the Improvement of Living and Working Conditions 2006).

Favell (2004), investigating middle class professionals moving between cities in the EU, captures a dimension of Europeanization that diverges markedly from what EU politicians envisage as well as from the macro trends of life theorized by scholars; a sojourner mentality amongst the mobile Europeans, that may have little connection with a sense of formal civic or political participation. Favell documents manifestations of entrenched place-bound identities that both hinder mobility and result from lower mobility. His research encompasses encounters with Others both vis-à-vis Europeans and non Europeans. These senses of emplaced identity underpin the informal barriers to participation that people encounter in forging middle class lives in foreign environments. The accounts from the mobile European middle class, according to Favell, do not describe experiences of cosmopolitan intermingling: on the contrary they talk about the coercive and assimilatory national norms of behavior and of social life in the (urban) sites that undermine tendencies to cross cultural boundaries.
This brings to the fore the issue of cultural identity with its particular bearing on the need to rethink democratic governance. The idea of a multiply located, plural identity and cosmopolitan citizenship collides with investments in localities, roots, sanctified heritages, and memories (Stevenson 2001, 2002). Findings such as the above show clearly that the cultural contradictions fostered by mobility are echoed at the macro-level by the pressure to break away from national forms of governance to transnational ones. Yet the securing of democratic legitimacy through local electorates also runs alongside, creating a counter pressure of its own. Such local investments contradict a Kantian vision of a cosmopolitan order in which individuals are considered as the citizens of the earth rather than as citizens of states, open to global cultures, being at home anywhere in the world (Brennan 1997) and free from the circumference of the nation states (Abbas 2000).

“Cosmopolitanism’ means- as Immanuel Kant argued 200 years ago- being a citizen of two worlds- ‘cosmos’ and ‘polis’. (Beck 2002: 18) Clearly such a vision has a contemporary urgency in the midst of new tensions arising around the globe as a result of the social transformations engendered by globalization (Habermas 1997; Held 1995; Honneth 1997). But this vision challenges Habermas’s view (2001: 71-3): one which argues that cosmopolitanism can no longer be handled from within a social integration framework rooted in nationalism, but instead must be dealt with from within a practice of self-legislation in a way that includes all citizens who should be treated on equal terms. This discursive process, Habermas continues, may generate a political understanding that would make redundant any previous consensus derived from cultural homogeneity as being the quintessential prerequisite for a democratic process. This proposition is grounded in Habermas’s earlier call for a nation of citizens that may replace the nation state defined by ethnic identity and that constitutional patriotism could replace nationalism as the foundation of civic solidarity (Habermas 1998).

This definition of citizenship shifts the emphasis away from the commitment to a bounded notion of democracy, in which democratic authority is derived from the self-imposed nature of legal norms (Benhabib 2006) and toward a process of ‘internal globalization’ (Beck 2002: 17), which Beck develops in his ‘cosmopolitanization thesis’. Beck argues for a transformative process of national societies from within, where the global becomes an integral component of the daily trivia and thereby the Other becomes internalized.

An era of ongoing transformation Benhabib (2006) argues, produces a tension between the universal and the particular. the cosmopolitan and the local. A tension that
must be addressed as our political future becomes more unified and integrated through increasingly shared global institutional networks. In her discussion where she draws attention to the distinction between the standpoint of the generalized Other and the concrete Other, Benhabib (1992: 158-9, 1994: 179-87) posits that a cosmopolitan perspective is incorporated into the thinking of even sedentary groups about themselves as well as the Other:

'According to the standpoint of the generalized other, each individual is a moral person endowed with the same moral rights as ourselves; s/he is capable of a sense of justice, of formulating a vision of the good, and of engaging in activity to pursue the latter. The standpoint of the concrete other, however, enjoins us to view every moral person as a unique individual, with a certain life history, disposition, and endowment, as well as needs and limitations.'(Benhabib 1994: 179)

In other words Habermas (2001), Beck (2002) and Benhabib (2006) all advocate—albeit from different positions—a framework of socialization that transfigures individuation: A 'path of socialization, growing into an intersubjectively shared universe of meanings and practices, [wherein] can persons develop into distinct individuals.' (Habermas 2005: 17). 'This process could continue to the point where, under the banner of political democracy and the recognition of human rights and of individual freedom, national particularisms dissolve into a comprehensive and varied world civilization' (Beck 2002: 37).

This kind of cosmopolitanism has an emancipatory potential to liberate the individual from the collective and the categorical (Rapport 2007), that is from the chafings of the aforementioned national particularisms that prescribe frameworks of socialization as currently experienced by people. However according to Pieterse (2006) all these versions of cosmopolitanism are founded upon claims of universality that reflect a regional parochial order anchored in the normative abstraction of western centric thought and from which they need to be decoupled if they are to succeed. The opposition of a rooted local and the freedom and openness associated with mobility is only one rendering of global flows, conditioned by a particular geographic, class, gender and racial perspective and experience. As globalization is multipolar, Pieterse argues so cosmopolitanism is multicentric and as such it can be a source of tensions between individuals, cultures and societies. Beck (2002: 42) suggests that such tensions could be resolved in the space of political experimentation at the level of ‘cosmopolitics’
(Commissiong 2007), that could be interpreted by Beck as national - global movements and cosmopolitan parties.

Such a motion may cater for Werbner’s (2006) ‘vernacular cosmopolitanism. an oxymoron that joins contradictory notions of local specificity and universal enlightenment’ (ibid. p. 496), in the context of transnational mobility and cultural intermingling framed by the proliferation of propinquities of all sorts that globalization brings about. Equally it applies to the interpretation of international relations from within a Kantian normative framework - which political theorists such as Pogge (1994), Beitz (1999), O’Neill (2000) and Nussbaum (2002) advocate.

In contrast however - with regards to the latter - political theorists of national relations - such as Cochran (1999), Hutchings (1999) and Shapcott (2001) who each defend the status quo (whereby the state is the basic agent of international relations) argue that the theorization of international relations in the abstract is utopian (Jackson 2005).

Nevertheless the Kantian normative interpretation of international relations persists in academic debate. In this context Held (2004) discusses human rights at the level of international relations and does so in the context of a global covenant between states, thereby suggesting a substantive transformation in global democratic processes. And Cabrera (2004) argues for an institutionalization of cosmopolitan norms at the level of a world state that would, amongst other things, enforce such rights across states. Pensky (2000) deems the above as problematic because the states would have the power to enable or disable any rights, thereby by implication undermining conditions for the growth of global democratic institutions. And Beck (2002: 37) argues that this transnational humanism could be easily turned into a military humanism as recent history can demonstrate, and that the what he calls ‘international law - human rights dilemma’ could be resolved in the Kantian spirit of a transnational legal order that hinders unilateral interventions, or as put by Dallmayr (2003) by viable global ethics anchored in or supplemented by a global political praxis shaped by, for example, Held’s aforementioned global covenant, or Cabrera’s world state.

Honig (2006) and Cheah (2006) argue however that because globalization has taken on board the legacy of the liberal framework of nation states what would actually happen is that the shortcomings of the latter in regards to its sensitivity to respond to cosmopolitan norms, would simply be amplified at international level. Thereby this would spread injustices of all sorts to other social, political, economic and geographical
spaces. Following this line of argument in practice, cosmopolitan norms that seek to resolve tensions between individual rights, group rights, identities and difference in general, by placing the articulation of rights and their execution closer to the individual, are deemed unworkable as these rights are compromised the very moment they enter different social, political and economic structures. This would perpetuate the displacement of injustice (Minow 1990) and by implication aggravate existing tensions or create new ones.

Delanty (2006) shifts the emphasis to internal developmental processes within the social world itself rather than seeing globalization as the primary mechanism for the rise of cosmopolitanism. He argues the latter is a socially situated form of cultural contestation where the logic of translation plays a central role. In this context cosmopolitanism is (re)articulated through social transformations that constitute the social world and as such it can rise anywhere in any guise, thus eluding fixed or canonical forms of ways of life. This signals, in his words, a post-universalistic kind of cosmopolitanism, which is not merely a condition of diversity but is articulated in cultural models of openness to the world (or the lack of it) through which societies undergo transformation. This situation of cosmopolitanism, in multiple daily practices, calls for the intellectual undertaking of redefining cosmopolitanism as a transdisciplinary object that renders the empirical investigation of border crossings and other transnational phenomena possible (Beck and Sznaider 2006).

The application of cosmopolitanism in the above context provides a promising new framework for understanding the nexus between cosmopolitan dispositions and global interconnectedness across cultural, political and economic realms in variable geographical spaces. For example, Woodward et al. (2008) using data from a representative social survey of Australians, investigated the negotiation of belonging under the conditions of globalization. They show how cosmopolitan outlooks are shaped by social structural factors and how forms of identification with the foreigner and global governance are fractured by the boundaries of Self and Others, of opportunities or the lack of them, or of economic variables which have little to do with personal experiences of mobility per se. But on the contrary, Mau et al. (2008), investigating the growth of border-crossing social relations and the emergence of transnational social spaces based on a representative survey of German citizens, found that it is border-crossing interrelations that actually do foster the development of cosmopolitan attitudes with respect to foreigners and global governance.
Both the above examples as well as the preceding discussion illustrate vividly why, in a world of increasing transactions whereby different expansions of human interaction are introduced, the debate over the nature and significance of cosmopolitanism comes naturally to the fore. More specifically it is particularly relevant to this study that investigates Europeanization from within the framework of European citizenship whose tacit understandings are framed by the idea of cosmopolitanism implicit in the conceptualization of the European project: ‘When we discuss cosmopolitanism today, we always start from tacit understandings of citizenship. The imaginary figure of Everyone is a citizen. At issue remains whether...[we] are prepared to face the other as a citizen, which is a matter of methodology, morality and politics.’ (Stade 2007: 233)

In the wake of global transformation the moral emphasis on the theory and practice of cosmopolitanism persists since it concerns all human beings regardless of location or birth. Its eminence lies in its particular contribution as expressed in what its Stoic forebears argued: that by virtue of logos and will, all human beings posses a fundamental dignity that should not be compromised by any state or individual.

Cosmopolitanism is often cast as the humanist counterpart of globalization (Yeoh 2004) in the context of global democracy and world citizenship (Cartier 1999). It encourages diversity and denounces the malaise of nationalism so that multicultural societies and emerging civil spaces are reconfigured by transnationalism. As a cultural idea it therefore ‘avoid[s] pitfalls of essentialism or some of zero-sum, all-or-nothing understanding of identity issues within a nation-state’ (Vertovec and Cohen 2002: 3).

Yet the problem is that cosmopolitanism is not ingrained as an adopted position in individual and collective responses to notions of difference or indeed in regard to accepting Otherness. This is because, firstly, according to Touraine (2000), the individual has yet to learn how to successfully negotiate its situatedness and positionality between/within the global networks of production and consumption. Secondly, problems need to be addressed when the increased mobility of some, counteracts and even undermines the place bound identities of others and their notions of familiarity and homeliness (Bauman 1999; Castells 1996).

Rising mobility in large sections of contemporary society results in a post modern environment where ‘[s]imultaneity [has] replaced history as the location of meaning’ (Bauman 1992: 694) and ‘[t]he urge of mobility, built into the structure of contemporary life, prevents the arousal of strong affections for any places; places we occupy are no
more than temporary stations' (ibid. p. 695). According to Bauman (1992) this predicament could be interpreted positively as an identity-building occurring outside the nation-state through the wanderings of individuals between unconnected places. Yet he acknowledges collective identities have become more distinct as a result of mobility/globalization throwing them into relief. This makes their maintenance in the changing face of the world become more difficult. Yet precisely for this reason for many, such identity has become all the more striven for, and even more intensely sought, due to the hybridization of identities and the creolization of global culture. In this context disputes over multiculturalism, in policies, political and social schemes happen when they collide with resurgent nationalisms.

In a similar vein Hannerz (1990) argues that experiencing diversity and transforming it into a cosmopolitan experience are worlds apart from one another. It is a matter of personal character to be able to construct the cosmopolitan Self, manifesting in the space of a reflexive discourse as generated by contact with the Other. The proliferation of transnational cultures and social networks certainly facilitates such a discourse and yet does not guarantee the proliferation of cosmopolitanism. Although mobility is a privileged gateway to experiencing the wider world, the unavoidable encounters of personal trajectories make qualitative differences come sharply to the fore in the complex landscapes mobility engenders. For Hannerz, the real significance of the growth of transnational cultures does not lie with the cultural experience they offer, but rather with their mediating possibilities for entry into other territorial cultures. Mobility allows contact with globally diverse cultural meanings which means that gradually such experiences can be incorporated into personal perspectives. Yet, because different transnational cultures relate differently to these opportunities, there is no guarantee that the meanings generated by these encounters could or would necessarily transform the expatriate or the intellectual into a cosmopolitan (Favell 2004).

Anthias (1998), Vertovec and Cohen (1999) argue while it is clear that transmigrants disrupt notions of homogeneous national, ethnic or gendered identities, and thereby pave the way for a more cosmopolitan perspective, this does not imply a denial of any cultural attachments or identities. Rather it means that in today's world cultural identity may not in fact be simply delineated by bounded or homogeneous cultural enclaves. In this context Kofman (2005) argues that the over celebratory tone surrounding cosmopolitanism should be questioned in the light of the continuing national realities that demand proof of allegiance to the uniform identity of the nation. Such
realities problematize the normative linking of mobility and rootlessness with cosmopolitanism.

Robbins (1998) and Harvey (2000) both outline the complicity of celebratory accounts with an empty cosmopolitanism which reinforces the hegemony of a certain class of people (Yeoh 2004: Beaverstock 2000, 2002) who can capitalize on unfettered movement (Sklair 2001) and the consumption of places (Vertovec and Cohen 2002). While new mobilities not only exemplify new forms of individualism amongst the mobile middle classes, which by implication enhance their freedom, they also engender new social inequalities (Bauman 1998; Touraine 2000). Further to that cultural or religious orientations shape perceptions of cosmopolitanism that may differ from Western interpretations of cosmopolitanism and this in turn may generate conflict (Said 1973).

Hence returning to the Kantian cosmopolitan order mentioned previously, in this context Connolly (2000) contests the morality of what constitutes a Kantian cosmopolitan ethos. Instead he argues that a plural matrix of cosmopolitanism is needed, to supersede the transcendental and universal, so that creative lines of connection to other cosmopolitan orientations could be explored. These arguments suggest that far from being deracinated or rootless ‘cosmopolitanism…does not necessarily imply an absence of belonging but the possibility of belonging of more than one ethnic and cultural localism simultaneously’ (Werbner 1999: 34). Hence it is not the mere emptying of former associations but the assimilating of new ones. Cosmopolitanism is ‘a complicated political sphere variously inhabited by…a host of…issues to do with what is sometimes naively called a post-national condition’ (Law 2002: 1642). In this context the ‘cosmopolitan society that we have been dreaming of ever since the Stoics and throughout the Enlightenment will not be possible…At most this will lead to a more or less conflictual cohabitation of nations and of various social groups that will live with and against each other.’ (Kristeva 2001: 39)

This living ‘with and against Others’ in transient spaces of everyday sociality and networks, of dwelling, work or leisure, is the reality experienced by the ‘actually existing cosmopolitanism’ (Robbins 1998: 1). Migrant groups, (Werbner 1999; Vertovec and Cohen 2004), of the working class, (Lamont and Aksartova 2002) or of the mobile professionals detached from the everyday sociality and networks of the host (Favell 2004; Kennedy 2004: Hardill and MacDonald 1998; Beaverstock 2002) cohabit, overlap and barely touch each other (Eade 1997). In this context the cosmopolitan discourse becomes one about multiple modalities engendered by mobility, juxtaposing one another.
in transient spaces and places that combine different forms of the universal and the particular (Baban 2003 cited in Koffman 2005: 92) that (may or may not) act as a pivot between xenophobia and cosmopolitanism (Kristeva 1991: 54).

In summary three key points from the discussion of cosmopolitanism can be drawn out regarding the cultural idea implicit in the conceptualization of the European project. While cosmopolitanism is generally cast as the human counterpart of globalization empirical findings show that the impact of the increased mobility of people, goods and services on domesticated lives does not translate necessarily into more cosmopolitan attitudes. The link of mobility and rootlessness with cosmopolitanism is tempered by parochial views on national identities and the resilience of varied attachments that form the bedrock of domesticated lives. This is especially true of local attachments. These basically dominate any negotiations between cultural identities and political citizenships; as well as reinforcing senses of emplaced identities that in turn underpin the informal barriers to participation that people encounter in forging their lives in foreign environments. Mobility brings about its own set of social inequalities. It also combines with diversifying perceptions of the morality of the cosmopolitan ethos as well raising questions as what actually constitutes the cosmopolitan. These issues may, by definition, generate conflict that is reflected in the locales where people must live ‘with and against Others’.

2.6.1 Living in Transnational Milieu and Places

In this subsection transnational mobility is discussed in the context of the spaces where transnational urbanism operates: where life under global conditions complicates traditional concepts of social and cultural constructs, albeit still circumscribed by the nation state. Smith and Guarnizo (1998), Schein (1998) argue that nation states and transnational practices are constitutive, rather than mutually exclusive social formations. Examples of the transnational experience in transient spaces and places are discussed in order to draw some conclusions with regards to the impact such a modality has on temporal living. It examines the possibility or not of the decline of national belonging, on emplaced identities in places of mixture as well as the management of hybridity in such places and the uses of it in marketing and economic production.

The discussion in this final section comes to a close by assessing -- in reference to examples from research on work-led migration and economic sojourners -- whether the
dynamic construction of new transnational subjectivities may result in cultural exchange and to new forms of cosmopolitanism. In the context of this study such indications could be translated as evidence of an emerging European identity in trans European spaces and places. It proceeds by introducing theoretical issues of globalization that put forward a range of considerations regarding the disembedding of social relations from local settings and their reconstruction across space and time. It then moves to unpack the differential dynamics produced by sojourners and economic migrants in places of mixture such as the urban setting. Firstly, it discusses transnational urbanism as a contested site for notions of citizenship and community and how this throws into sharp relief identity politics that become detrimental for cultural exchange. It then discusses formulations of group and individual transnational subjectivities and forms of cosmopolitanism in the context of the dynamic construction of identities in a globalizing world. The discussion comes to a close by pulling together a number of points that problematize cultural transgression in places of mixture.

Globalization and transnationalism differ in the making of key assumptions about the role of the state in the production of meaning, identity and social outcomes. While globalization draws attention to the decentering of social processes from national territories (Castells 1997), or to the shift from the nation state to transnational or supranational in political institutions such as the IMF and the EU (Amin 1994), or from the nation state to the city state (Friedmann 1997). transnationalism generally refers to multiple scales coinciding. These are economic. political, cultural. personal and social connections requiring sustained contacts anchored in and transgressing nation states (Portes et al. 1999; Basch et al. 1994).

Appadurai (1990) contextualized globalization by linking ethnoscapes (global cultural flows) to technoscapes (global worlds of technology and corporate organizations) which both create and are constituted through the availability of unskilled and skilled labour. Against this background Dickens (1992) argues that the global shift of economic activity is stretching beyond the processes of the internationalization of trade. He suggests that migration no longer carries the same meaning when residence and work away from home or abroad is a way of maintaining social relations at a distance. This sort of ensuing multiculturalism affects the state management of societies, as such regularly maintained social relations complicate concepts of locality, community and even citizenship. The theorization of everyday life under global conditions effectively introduces a range of considerations about the trajectories of social change (Albrow et al.
1994; Robertson 1992 1995; Harvey 1989; Giddens 1990, 1991). These theories do not fit the classic conceptual framework of local cultures, linking people, places and communities to each other where assimilation was the only option for those who wanted to be part of such communities.

From another angle Giddens (1990, 1991) argues that the disembedding of social relations from local structures and their restructuring across time and space is as vital to late modern societies as differentiation (class) was to early modern ones. Disembedding is the current framework of time-space and social stratification which encodes inequalities of access to resources, masking the realities of class which are no longer conditioned by nation state processes. It argues for the possibility of new cultural configurations taking place locally, overlapping and yet barely touching each other and stretching beyond locality thereby reconfiguring notions of the local, culture and community (Eade 1997). This does not imply that images of tranquil communities do not pervade globalized localities. Mobility becomes both the principle and the medium through which locality can be converted into a resource or a consumption item.

This varying but overlapping spatial scope of movements and separateness are social formations defined as sociospheres by Albrow (1997), through which individual constructs of the concept of locality counter pose traditional concepts (whether this is about place, culture, community and /or ethno solidarity). In his discussion on globalized localities from the context of globalization theory, the sociospaces, which people inhabit and give life to, are constituted at the intersection of sociospheres which have different extensions in time and space. Yet according to Albrow the composite of socioscape is not to be equated with the social and cultural diversity that replaces the old style community as the basis for everyday social life in a locality. For Albrow, disembedding and time-space compression operate very differently for different groups. One of the key effects of globalization on locality, namely that people can reside in one place and have their meaningful social relations in another, what Durrschmidt (1997) describes as spatially stretched individual milieux, means that people can use the locality as a site, a resource for social activities, or as a commodity in widely differing ways according to the extension of their sociosphere. Thus they can negotiate the space of their milieu to minimise contact with strangers, by relying upon relations across physical locations. In other words transnational social formations that involve migrant networks of enmeshing, sending and receiving localities and their people (Guarnizo and Smith 1998) (re)territorialize the notion of localness in particular ways. This exemplifies barriers
between different social groups making cultural exchange difficult, despite border
crossings and transcultural connections.

The bottom up operation of social networks through mechanisms of transnational
migration and political mobilization provides answers as to how sociocultural, political
and economic forces articulate with the politics of the everyday at local regional national
and transnational scales across the world (Smith and Guarnizo 1998). In places of
mixture, such as in the urban setting (Soja 1989, 1996), the socio spatial consequences of
new cultural politics brought about by difference, reflect transnational social practices
engaging with the contested politics of place making, the social construction of power
differentials and the reconfiguration of identities and their corresponding fields of
Multicultural, multiethnic and multinational influxes into familial modes of sociality and
urban space define, Benhabib (1995) argues, the postmodern urban condition (Davis
1990; Soja 1989; Jameson 1984). When different histories appear, their presence disrupts
the urban experience and its morphology as well as complicating citizenship (Martinotti
1999). The amalgamation of inhabitants, commuters, users, immigrants, as well as new
urbanites 'constituting a transnational middle class living not in a city but rather in cities
or between cities' (Martinotti 1999: 165) redefine the conditions of belonging in host
societies, thereby reshaping so called 'world cities' (Friedmann and Wolff 1982: Knox

In this context the meanings of citizenship and community become contested sites
running alongside the contradictions inherent in their conceptualizations. As a result
identity politics come to the fore in sharp contradictions mapping new cartographies of
living, knowing and acting (Reagon 1981). These are generated from new ways of
interconnectedness and interdependence (Hooks and West 1991; West 1993; Delanty and
Rumford 2005). In such an environment Young (1990) argues, culturally pluralist
democratic ideals need to be brought into the framework of the governance of cities,
regions and states, providing a platform for equal citizenship (Karst 1986) that would
accommodate the increasing hybridity of populations (Bhabha 1994). In spaces of
mixture such as transnational urbanism (Smith 2001), the articulation of social relations
is located within, as well as stretching beyond, cities connecting the latter with the wider
world (Massey 1994; Amin 2004). In such transient spaces communicative action could
be the path to a strong sense of local citizenship (Habermas 1984, 1990), informed by the
need for connection to the cultural other (Fisher and Kling 1993).
This posits a different understanding of globalization, as it relates to economics, transnationalism and ethnic diversity (McEwan et al. 2005) and is contrary to the modernist discourse of late capitalism (Jameson 1984; Harvey 1989) that frames global and local social processes as antagonistic binary oppositions. According to Smith (2001) the modernist discourse fails to recognize that constructions of global and local are constructed positionalities appropriated and deployed by specific social forces at particular times. He argues that these are cultural metaphors embedded in historical time and stand for global and local operations mobilized by social actors and forces as these extend to the networks of flows -- commodities and people -- from the local through to the regional and to the global at different scales (Low 1997). For example the professionals that took part in this project in London and Athens, as economic sojourners are engaged in multiple activities that require sustained contacts anchored in and transgressing nation states (Portes et al. 1999; Basch et al. 1984). Their professions take them to new industrial spaces, networks and commodity chains, in which transnational urbanism operates. Such movements McEwan (2005) argues, apart from having their economic value, also implicate these individuals with the cultural value of these spaces. These involve not only economic but also transnational networks that constitute transnational spaces -- 'combinations of social and symbolic ties, positions in networks and organizations, and networks of organizations...found in at least two geographically and internationally distinct places' (Faist 1998: 216) -- and possibly cosmopolitan ones.

Yet this engendered cultural hybridity. McEwan argues, is constrained by the polarizing effects of global capitalism in terms of creating particular and fixed versions of ethnicity and multiculturalism within an emancipatory Western value system. This is detrimental for cultural exchange, as Amin (2004) discusses because evidence in everyday urban negotiations reveals undercurrents of cultural tensions and social conflict inflamed by ethnic difference and inflected by class practices, cultural habits and ingrained norms. These are reflected, to name but a few, in the debates on the privileges of the citizen vis-à-vis the non-citizen and the constitution of an 'ideal ratio' between locals and foreigners. .

For example even in places like Singapore, with its strategic marketing or the adopted economic approach (which deploys culture as a multipurpose tool that would develop the cultural infrastructure to market Singapore as a cosmopolis), tensions abound, reflected in debates of the 'cosmopolitan' versus the 'heartlander' (Yeoh and Chang 2001; Yeoh 2004). Yeoh discusses these tensions emerging between disparate
landscapes in Singapore. On the one side of the landscape of persons, this ‘ethnoscape’ (Appadurai 1990), is a shifting world of tourists, immigrants, refugees, exiles, guest workers, and other moving groups and persons. On the other side the ‘heartlanders’ are the relatively stable communities and networks, of kinship, of friendship, of work and of leisure, as well as of birth, residence and other affiliative forms. The tensions are caused by the increasing sense amongst the ‘heartlanders’ of being peripherialized in ‘their’ city resulting from the constant introduction of imported people and provisions that are designated to accommodate the shifting needs of international capital. but also by the ways in which the spaces and places of ‘their’ city are territorialized by particular groups in different ways. These problems are clearly also mirrored in the EU and consequently the present example has highly relevant parallels to issues arising in the present project.

While national identity is arguably in a nascent state in Singapore, the rapid influx of foreigners has sharpened the local–foreign divide. Controversy exists over who ought to be the beneficiary of economic and cultural changes in general. Again the example of Singapore demonstrates that even habitual contact framed by the urban politics such as the above does not guarantee cultural exchange. The significance of the local gets in the way of the processes of the global (Qureshi and Moores 1999). It shows that when this significance is perceived as diminishing it may engender antagonisms over access to resources, or signal the emergence of entrenchments of all sorts through repetitions of cultural and or ethnic practices relating to gender, class or, racial issues. This occurs even in places of mixture such as London and-- to a lesser extent-- Athens, not just Singapore, with a global vision to develop a cosmopolitan urban ethic.

Perhaps a normative approach of surpassing such tensions would be to facilitate cultural transgression with a new urban politics of cultural innovation-- where the forces of tradition are negotiated in contemporary practices of translation (Robins 1991) occurring as a result of cultural mixes and confluences (Hannerz 1996) -- and inaugurated around existing sites of banal interaction that require civic agreement on how to reconcile intercultural differences in environments of variegated citizenship (Amin 2004). However such reconciliation requires an understanding of transnational communities as different categories, with their distinct imaginations which are ‘here’ for a reason (according to Portes (1998, 1999) these communities in a real sense are ‘neither here nor there’ but in both places simultaneously).

Case studies show that the intensity and complexity of their presence in the context of transnational flows impacts on local imaginations, as such communities
arguably reconfigure, differently over time, the spaces they operate in and the places they occupy, as well as the articulation of social relations in bounded spaces and places of dwelling. O’ Reilly (2000) considers that one way of reconciling such an impact would be if transnational groups were approached in terms of relationships rather than as racial, cultural or linguistic entities. This approach focuses on the structural boundaries that define them, raised by the communities in question and makes allowances for more identifications than merely ethnicity. In such a context a double consciousness may formulate as a result of inhabiting another culture, and that needs to be translated (Gilroy 1993), in order to fashion individual and group identity amongst the tensions or considerations arising. Examples of this approach resulting from the cross fertilization of genres are mirrored in the ensuing chapters as both Greek and British participants discuss their transnational experience.

O’ Reilly’s case study of the community of Britons in Spain -- an affluent sojourner group that takes advantage of the single market -- demonstrates how a community can be loosely organized around ethnicity rather than a single ethnic group. In this case the sense of community exists in the consciousness of its members but means different things to each one of them. It allegedly evokes values and cultural connotations from British society and yet it draws on imagined Spanish traits that are actually provided by the community itself. Its boundaries -- symbolic, shifting and ambiguous (Cohen 1985) -- are in flux and can be negotiated, imagined or denied according to the time, space and opportunity structures available. In sum, the community operates through an exchange: where membership symbolises status, place, belonging and reflects community values, namely the ethos of leisure and commitment to community, caring and responsibility. British sojourners in Spain are seasonal or peripatetic visitors with no desire to assimilate or integrate, nor to give up their identity, in favour of a more European or Spanish one.

The above example shows one response to the experience of transnationalism in the context of living under global conditions. Although the myth of return and the idealization of home affects participation and reinforces ethnicity (Anthias 1992), this does not preclude subtle variations in their filiation to Spanish culture. For them, ethnic identification is rather about ‘us’ rather against ‘them’. Hence while identifying ethnically with other Britons, the shared common ethnic identity itself is not an identity with Britain, but with the escapee Britons which nevertheless are exclusive of the Other. In this context many modern identities are seen not merely in terms of ethnicity but also
as products of travel via package tourism (Urry 1990) or along migratory routes (Clifford 1997).

O’ Reilly’s case study parallels many aspects of the transnational experience of the British sample of this project although the migratory routes of these two samples differ markedly; further the British sample of this project did not have or portrayed any strong sense of belonging or affiliation to a single distinct community of Britons in Athens. The Greek sample however deviates from O’ Reilly’s findings; while identifying ethnically with other Greeks, their shared common ethnic identity was an identity with Greece and not with the Greeks in London. As a result in many instances, contrary to the Britons- their ethnic identification was coming out in their accounts as more about ‘us’ against ‘them’. They also did not have or portrayed any strong sense of belonging or affiliation to a single distinct community of Greeks in London and were also exclusive of the Other.

However not all formulations of transnational subjectivities can be analysed in the context of lifestyle choices as the above example demonstrates, or in the context of work led migration which is the case for the participants of this project. Quite a contrasting but useful approach to looking at formulations of transnational group or individual subjectivities comes from postcolonial feminist theorists who argue that the greatest movements often occur within the Self, within the home or within the family. In this sense mobility has to do with the changes in personhood that occur through time and are part of the human condition. In this context long standing categories of difference addressed in feminist work become important in new ways, when approached in relation to notions of belonging in the context of migration and inhabitance (Anzaldua 1987; Ifekwunigwe 1999; Kaplan et al. 1999). Ifekwunigwe (1999) draws attention to how identities are painfully shaped not only by race but also by ethnicity, gender, class and locality in the context of the dynamic construction of identities in a globalizing world. Again a parallel to this project can be found in the many ensuing references both samples make to their pasts and how it shaped the way they faced transnational experience.

Ganguly’s (1992) exploration of the ‘migrant moment’ prescribes it as the particular site of experience and representation where personal memory authenticates versions of migrant selfhood. In so doing, disjoined and conflicting narratives of the past become reformulated with coherency. Thereby narratives acquire a significant meaning that can justify the displacement many categories of migrants experience. Ganguly argues migrant identity is an artifice, manifesting through the articulation of systems of origin.
The discourses that migration brings about are those which set the conditions for the formulation of the migrants’ subjectivity. Because migration heightens the experience of displacement people resort to their own devices to contest dominant meanings and modes of cultural identification in order to deal with the adversity migrant status bears. This adversity exemplifies more often than not, the dissonance between past and present internalizations in the making of migrants’ subjectivity, manifesting as scattered belongings (Ifekwunigwe 1999), and to multiple ties.

Yet depending from which angle the aforementioned experience of the ‘migrant’s moment’ is investigated, and notwithstanding similarities in procedural forms of hybridization and creolization, results vary accordingly. The literature reviewed so far and in the ensuing discussion illustrates the problems of different groups being immersed in different environments. In the context of living under global conditions, the inhabiting of plural cultures needs to be translated in order to fashion individual and group identities to mediate tensions, but this in turn generates different subjectivities and new forms of cosmopolitanism.

This project will show how the mobility engendered by the work led migration within the Single Market, in this case study of the mobile, articulate middle class, with its strong and weak ties, determines the formation of new transnational subjectivities and forms of cosmopolitanisms. From within those formations this project attempts to identify any traits developing into newly emergent European identities from the possibilities the mixture of trans-European spaces generates.

From the literature other research conducted follows a similar vein. Werbner (1999) looked at a working class sample and discusses this movement in terms of labour migration. She finds that new transnational pathways are opened up by working class migrants, engaging with the cultural ramifications of the wider world. In doing so she shows that the formation of new transnational subjectivities are no longer the prerogative of mobile elites. These new transnational cosmopolitans challenge neat notions of boundedness without negating their notions of belonging to multiple ethnic and cultural localisms. She talks about mobile and articulate people who are primarily transnationals and yet can engage with other cultures. Her research shows how networks that ultimately develop in diasporas are transnational in essence, and act as the spatial extensions of their cultural origins, sustained by flows of goods, remittances, familial patterns of living, relating and consumption. In other words she explains how the emergence of complex transnational worlds, are created by the flows of labour migration that maintain their
ethnosolidarity. Yet she also argues that these networks, although implying similar procedural forms of hybridization and creolization as those involving elite networks, generate different modalities of cosmopolitanism circumscribed by customized sets of issues.

Yet beyond the reach of the kind of migrants Werbner describes is the inherent propensity of transnational elites to negotiate access to resources (Mitchell 1999, 2001; Ong 1999). This more often than not precludes communication with locals as discussed below and alongside other factors Sassen (1991) believes it leads to the polarization of social worlds within spaces of mixture such as the global city. The overlapping of social worlds that barely touch each other, as well as the empirical claims discussed in this section in reference to forms of hybridization, to tensions and considerations rising from the exigency to translate plural cultures in order to fashion identities and belongings, with or without similarities, may be similarly recognized in the problems encountered by the Greek and British samples in the ensuing chapters.

Other things being equal, transnational subjectivities diversify because the structures of migrant groups differ as well as their migratory routes. In the context of this discussion and of this project, the white collar professional with the sojourner mentality moves on transnational pathways that are not available to those filling the ranks of blue collar labour migration. The structures, the ability to access and negotiate resources, the communication highways made available to them, the ties to cultural origins, the connecting networks, all differ. In sum, despite any similarities to procedural forms of hybridization between groups or individuals that may occur across the transnational pathways, different migrant groups are effectively moving in different worlds, with their customized sets of issues, which by implication affect the ways in which they form their transnational subjectivities.

Beaverstock’s (2000) work on the relationship between globalization, transnational co operations and transient professional migration in the context of global city international financial centres, shows how such a framework reinforces and reproduces itself through the mechanisms of variation in cultural capital that spring out of a range of global postings. In particular his work on British finance professionals in Singapore (ibid. 2002) illustrates these processes. It has also showed how ethnic identity, local knowledge and social relations are intertwined with capital accumulation processes, based on networks which are embedded within a broad transnational community. These networks are mobilized by the ability of expatriates to make contacts in specific social
and physical sites within the global city (Willis and Yeoh 2002). Such a community is circumscribed by global-local relations in the workplace and the business orientated social sphere through interaction with local Singaporeans of Western orientation and education; though it is not embedded in local social spaces due to the absence of the local population in their interactions. Yet he argues that even this world of flow, fashioned in the logic of Castell’s network society, is not frictionless. Relocations involve dislocations and discomfort. Although transnational elites epitomize processes at a global scale, they are also subjected to the constraints that local spaces exert on individual actions (Mitchel 1997) (and this is especially true in Europe, marked as it is by national and cultural enclaves with a high identification with place and lots of red tape). However by implication, these difficulties can also be found across the world, problematizing transnational flows, subjectivities, and hindering cultural exchange.

From the preceding discussion on transnationalism in places of mixture we can draw a number of points. The significance of the local is not diminished by processes of global transnational flows that reconfigure the places they operate in, the spaces they occupy and the articulation of social relationships. Yet this engendered cultural hybridity is constrained by the polarizing effects of global capitalism in terms of creating particular and fixed versions of ethnicity and multiculturalism. It is for this reason such places are not frictionless. Because of their economic as well as their cultural value they become contested sites where identity politics may come sharply to the fore. Depending on the ways in which cultural hybridity is managed in such places considerations and tensions vary. Cultural transgression more often than not remains problematic as transnational worlds overlap but also barely touch each other. Yet empirical findings suggest that cultural mixes and confluences in many instances do happen and when they do they manage to engage the forces of tradition with contemporary practices of living. In the context of the dynamic construction of identities in a globalizing world, race, ethnicity, gender, class, locality, types of capital accumulation, of travelling and of migratory routes, are all variables reflected in the shaping of new transnational subjectivities and forms of cosmopolitanism.

Research postulates that migration is about relocations which entail dislocation, discomfort and more often than not dissonance between present and past internalizations in the making of the migrants’ subjectivities. Depending on the combinations of the aforementioned variables research records formulations of transnational subjectivities that vary markedly. The study of transnational identities examines forced migration or
work led migration or sojourner communities, or diasporas and whether these reveal
similar forms of hybridization and creolization yet generate different modalities of
cosmopolitanism circumscribed by different set of issues. Transnational worlds are sites
of heightened experience of displacement and as such manifest in the processes of
dealing with the adversities such displacement bears. Transnationals invariably evoke
their systems of origin without in many cases negating their notions of belonging to
multiple localisms. This may result in formulations of scattered belongings or of double
consciousness, depending on the particular set of circumstances the individual migrant
experiences.

Overall transnational networks act as the spatial extensions of their cultural
origins that are circumscribed by practical necessities and the limitations these exert on
groups or individuals. These networks are often guided by the presence of the past. more
often than not, hindering people from seeing cultures as adaptable concepts. This
problematises cultural transgression especially in places of mixture where the meanings
of citizenship, of community, of localness are still underscored by the circumference of
the nation state and become contested sites. The implications for interpersonal relations,
transcultural connections and the governance of cities, regions and states are therefore
vast. The lack of culturally pluralist democratic ideals intertwined in individual lives as
well as in politics is reflected in daily trivia in the persistence of representations of
entrenchments of all sorts, varying from bounded notions of cultures as exclusionary
forces, to indifference towards or unwillingness to acquaint the Other, and to xenophobia
or even racism. Such themes may be seen to emerge in varying ways through the volume
of empirical studies available. The present study will demonstrate that transcultural (dis-)
connections come at a price, and this is reflected in debates of citizenship,
multiculturalism, communities, and modes of belonging and identification. It is in this
context that this project will discuss the possibilities of newly emergent European
identities in trans-European spaces and places of mixture.

2.7 Conclusion

The five sections of this chapter set out the conceptual framework of the thesis
whose core issue is how to unpack new scales of belonging and citizenship in the context
of an evolving EU under global conditions.
It began by outlining the increasing prevalence and banality of difference introduced by mobilities, suggesting the challenges posed for conventional political and cultural categories. It then addressed this in the context of European institutions, looking at the various ways in which European citizenship has been envisaged and experienced by different actors, especially in the context of mobility in Europe. It outlined the dynamics affecting citizenship, before looking at different forms of citizenship, their ideologies and how these are read into and enacted by European treaties and laws. In so doing it delineated a terrain of competing conceptual versions of European citizenship that may be said, or desired to characterize, the European polity that so far has failed to gather popular support. This, it was argued, is due to the absence of a European-wide Demos that would legitimize its authority.

This was followed by an assessment of the effect of cultural fragmentation on European polities and daily lives by addressing competing conceptualizations of multicultural citizenship that attempt to give solutions to the reconciliation of multiple cultural identities and rights claims in increasingly disparate multicultural societies. It suggested a shift of perception on diversity and multiculturalism such that would bypass national paradoxes, pointing out that this would not be without new complications for European polities and societies.

The chapter went on to demonstrate why multi-cultural nationalism can be seen as having limits in its inclusivity. In so doing it set the discussion against the backdrop of the theoretical conception of the nation that establishes how national entities came about and how this has been internalized by the people over time, through inhabitation. Thus it was argued that notions of national belonging and ethno cultural ties remain deeply embedded, notwithstanding accounts of postmodern rootlessness. It explained from a psychoanalytic angle how amidst such complexities the nation reinvents itself as the focal point for cultural belonging and identification. It was then discussed how the processes of globalization may undermine the appeal of the national as the focal point to belong and identify with, and suggested that this may ultimately work in favour of the European project which tries to steer the European publics away from a divisive past, and muscle its way into the global markets as one distinct entity.

In its final part the chapter questions whether mobility in trans-European spaces opens new possibilities for newly emergent European identities. It did this by discussing Europeanization, in the context of cosmopolitanism and transnationalism, as a conflict of two different forces underscored on the one side by the uneven processes of globalization
that undercut the boundedness of societies and communities by means of migration.

mobility of people, goods, services, information technologies and communications, and

on the other by the drive of cultural homogeneity and attempts to tame these flows by the

use of the norms and regulations. It argued that although cosmopolitanism as the cultural

idea is implicit in the conceptualization of the European project it does not translate

necessarily into more cosmopolitan attitudes because its link to mobility and rootlessness

is tempered by: parochial views on national identities; the resilience of varied local

attachments, the bedrock of emplaced identities; the contesting interpretations of its

morality by non Western interpretations of universalism mirrored in the indifferent,
apathetic or frictional symbiosis of people in locales where they must live ‘with and

against Others’. It thus argued that this amalgam of views, attachments, contesting

interpretations and conflicting perceptions, as well as the fact that mobility brings about

its own set of social inequalities, hinder cultural transgression and affect the dynamics of

political citizenships, as well as reinforcing senses of emplaced identities that in turn

underpin the informal barriers to participation that people encounter in forging their lives

in foreign environments.

The chapter comes to a close by discussing transnational experience in the context

of living under global conditions in the urban setting where a dynamic construction of

identities takes place shaping (re) formulations of group and individual transnational

subjectivities and forms of cosmopolitanism. In so doing it put forward a range of

considerations regarding the disembedding of social relations from local settings and

their reconstruction across space and time. It then unpacked the differential dynamics

produced by sojourners and economic migrants in places of mixture such as the urban

setting, and argued that this, other things being equal, throws into sharp relief identity

politics, that in turn become detrimental for cultural exchange. It further argued that the

significance of the local is not diminished by processes of global transnational flows. It

also suggested that the inevitable cultural hybridity that such flows generate is further

constrained by the polarizing effects of global capitalism in terms of creating particular

and fixed versions of ethnicity and multiculturalism, and thus spaces and places of

mixture are not frictionless. Because of their economic as well as their cultural value they

become contested sites where identity politics may come sharply to the fore. Depending

on the ways in which cultural hybridity is managed in such places considerations and

tensions vary. Cultural transgression more often than not remains problematic as

transnational worlds overlap but also barely touch each other.
Hence in a world where the breaking up of communities as well as the survival of localism is a fact, translation across political, cultural, social and ideological boundaries places many global migrants in uneasy situations. Yet this, it was argued, does not preclude cultural mixes and confluences that engage the forces of tradition with contemporary practices of living, thereby generating new transnational subjectivities and forms of cosmopolitanism. Studies in transnationalism problematize conventional concepts of community, culture and milieu as well as questioning the assumption of a post national world (Rouse 1991; Eade 1997; Westwood and Phizacklea 2000). Ethnographies of transnational circuits (Eade 1997; Ong 1999; Inda and Rosaldo 2002) reveal the fluidity and diversity of these exchanges and complicate unilateral relationships between belongings and locations as new forms of political and cultural belongings are reconfigured in multi local ties (Lewitt 2001) and deterritorialized notions of citizenships (Soysal 1994).

It is clear that interpersonal relations invoking family regimes, familial ways of living, lifestyles, opportunity structures, sedimentations of all kinds, national, ethnic and cultural demarcations, belief systems, cosmopolitan affiliations, spring out of transcultural connections. But these affect normative notions of culture, identity and citizenship (Gilroy 1987, 1993, 2000; Hall 1990, 1991; Bhabha 1994; Brah 1996) by exerting pressure on the language of integration assumed within national frames. The tensions thus produced are the result of the juxtaposition of contrasting people and cultures. Living in globalized localities tensions and considerations abound, created by differentiated transnational mobilities of bodies, knowledges, capital and access to resources. In such transient spaces there is little contact between strangers (Guarnizo and Smith 1998). Pervasive mobilities engender this mode of living ‘with and against Others’ in the sense that they are overlapping and barely touching each other, and these spark off uneven processes that affect both hosts and guests alike. They may range from complications, to scales of belonging, affecting the dynamics of identity politics, introducing social inequalities, and so on. Or they may act as a pivot between cosmopolitanism, which combines different forms of the universal and the particular and parochial views on the boundedness of societies, cultures, territories and the claims placed upon them.

Such diverse sociospheres as discussed in this chapter produce the experience of the local as the generalized facility, in which local culture is dissolved and where the newcomer may be the local and the cosmopolitan the long term resident (Eade 1997). Yet
this does not imply that identities are unaffected or that the politics of belonging are not problematized (Alexander and Mohanty 1997; Lowe and Lloyd 1997; Hyun Yi 2002). due to constraints imposed by the specificities of the local. It merely suggests that the pressures to accommodate shifting and deterritorialized forms of social relationships within globalized localities sparks struggles over identity or belonging. According to Hall (1992) though, this articulation of the global and the local could fortify local identities, or it could lead to their hybridization as the former are being relativized by the uneven processes of globalization.

Yet these uneven processes are also responsible for the acclaimed relativization of cultural identities. at the same time also bringing culture as a theme or as an abstraction, responding to such relativizations, into prominence (Eagleton 2000). While Duncan and Duncan (2004) argue that because culture refers to structured practices based on shared values and meanings that interrelate and are guided by the presence of the past, people find it problematic to see cultures as adaptable concepts. For them the meanings and ideas that culture generates are reified as real entities. The latter interact with the banal and spectacular objects of the everyday and become material culture. That is why for most people the claiming of their culture is empowering because culture is seen as a space that not only marks their identity but seizes their destiny. Culture exists because people believe they have a culture, thus bring it into existence through their collective practices and taken for granted assumptions. This, Duncan and Duncan argue, makes people realise their culture as a set of sedimented practices that are not specifically cultural, but which have a cultural dimension. Thus culture is an unintended, but relatively coherent and continuous outcome and condition of collective action.

This becomes all the more relevant in the ensuing chapters as culture, as an unintended condition for collective action, becomes embedded in notions of identity and belonging affecting the sample in diverse ways. In this context one of the issues continually seen as hindering cultural transgression in Europe and discussed in this chapter is that of the problem of Otherness. Cultural conditioning becomes prevalent in the persistence of Otherness that manifests as difference or as unwillingness or lack of ability to accept new modalities of Otherness (Kristeva 1991). The ‘intimacy constructed between those of the same group, passed on by the ancestors’ (Irigaray 2002: 131) pervades sedimented attachments to notions of identities, belongings, localness or to all sorts of ‘niche’ enunciations as these have been constituted by national ‘genealogies’ and as such rule supreme in people’s imaginations. Yet Kristeva (1991) argues such ‘emotive
pathologies’ (Nairn 1977. 1988. 1996. 2001; Billig 1990. 1992. 1995) underpinning enunciations of difference are not only national or ethical but essentially subjective and as such insurmountable (ibid. p. 2). For Kristeva this disposition of difference evolves around the Freudian notion of uncanny strangeness. That is the stranger from within: ‘There is much that is strange, but nothing that surpasses man in strangeness’ (Sophocles, Antigone, vv. 332-3, cited in Irigaray 2002: 3) people in general do not acknowledge this and yet it prescribes every single action as it lies at the core of their very notion of personhood.

In other words, mobility confronts the individual with the problem of their own shifting sense of selfhood. This sparks off a sense of insecurity that has its own destabilizing effect and creates tensions with those who are perceived as having caused it. A wealth of interdisciplinary literature addresses the social and cultural processes involved in globalization, as well as the politics it entails, bringing sharply to the fore a calcavade of collective and subjective tensions amongst global populations. There is a need however to bring these tensions together, by addressing conceptually the issue of time and of disrupted community; of dislocated or scattered belongings, of the persistence of cultures as exclusionary forces, of the persistence of Otherness, or the persistence of emotive pathologies manifesting as sedimented attachments to national and ethnic enclaves, as these have been cultivated by the grand narratives of national genealogies and internalized.

This need is exemplified in the following chapters through examining the experiences and conflicts encountered by the two samples in their exigency to translate plural cultures in order to fashion their identities as migrant workers within the EU. In so doing the investigation remains focused on how it feels for the participants to be in that position in transnational locations amidst the push and pull forces of transnational flows and circuits of communication.
Chapter Three

Discussing Methodology

3.1 Introduction

This chapter tells the story of a research process that has been shaped by post-structuralist theories of subjectivity as well as by conceptualizations of the production of knowledge as situated, an argument to which feminist geographers are committed. It takes up some of the themes that problematize social research outlined by the burgeoning literature of humanistic, feminist and non-representational geographies in order to question the production of knowledge in this project.

In summary, the fieldwork for this project involved conducting semi-structured, in-depth interviews in Athens and London. The respondents were Greek and British white collar professional ex patriates and the core of the interviews was around changing notions of host and homeland as the two samples moved in and out of the transnational spaces. The interviews evolved around life-histories, within the context of the intertwining of national, ethnic and cultural identities with notions of citizenship and of belonging and questioned how these might fit (or not) with the integration agenda of the European project.

In this context the chapter critically approaches the negotiations of the multiple and (de)centred identities of participants as well as of the researcher’s efforts to generate meaning (McDowell 1992b), in the spatial context of the in-depth interview, as resources of social analysis. In doing so it develops a reflexive account of qualitative research that emphasises the research process as an intrinsically interpersonal and relational enterprise in which research, researchers and research subjects are all problematically immersed.

At the core of the argument is what this project identified as tensions around the relationship between theory, practice and the subsequent acts of interpretation in doing qualitative research. It is argued that despite the range of innovative methodologies that attempt to locate and theorize subjective experience, there is much that evades and eludes representation (Thrift 1996, 1999, 2004; Thrift and Dewsbury 2000), thus further problematizing interpretation (Lorimer 2005) and frustrating research (Gibson-Graham 1994).
In elaborating this concern this chapter addresses the tension between approaches to qualitative research that focus on issues of representation and those that focus on elusive forms of representation\(^4\), such as the non cognitive, non reflective affects, that underpin every stage of the research process and are immersed in the production of knowledge. Drawing attention to the limitations of- and yet necessary- cognitive reflective monitoring of doing qualitative research, the chapter then discusses the psychoanalytic direction this research project has taken and the method employed.

In the light of the above, the chapter begins with an account of the problems and dilemmas this fieldwork encountered and how this shaped the research method that was employed for interviewing.

It then proceeds, in the context of the inherently interactional, reflexive and intersubjective dimension of interviews, with a discussion of what Rose (1997a) calls ‘transparent reflexivity’ or else ‘double reflexive gaze’ which has often been utilised as the alternative source of legitimacy to positivist approaches to knowledge production. It argues that although reflexivity is problematized by the inherent situatedness of knowledge (Haraway 1991) it is nevertheless imperative for any knowledge production to be aware of its positionality, and to be sensitive to power relations.

It then suggests, drawing on literature from the field of psychotherapies\(^5\), that many of the dilemmas researchers encounter and that form the inherent uncertainty of fieldwork, such as concerns about positionality and situatedness or the emotional or affective dimensions of relationships that are (re)formulated during the research and permeate all stages of investigation, could be addressed by psychotherapeutic theory and practice. Psychotherapy is not an individualistic or narcissistic enterprise: instead it is intrinsically interpersonal and relational (Bondi 2003b) and as such it may offer important insights especially in areas of research around elusive knowledges of affect and relational knowledge.

\(^4\) Non representational theory offers a relational dialogic approach to understanding contingencies of space and of actant behaviour. It examines how style, affect (emotions, desires, imaginations) and politics intersect in improvised practices or performances, see Thrift (2007).

\(^5\) The term ‘psychotherapies’ is used as ‘an inclusive descriptor of a range of related practices that include counseling, psychotherapy, psychoanalysis, analytic psychology, arts therapies and many more, informed by humanistic, psychodynamic and cognitive-behavioural theoretical orientations.’ (Bondi 2005: 445 n. 1). The literature evolving around the engagement of the field with human geographies is burgeoning and the topic is hotly debated. For a clarifying reading on the connections between the field and human geography as well as the relatedness and overlaps of the aforementioned practices especially of psychoanalysis, counselling and psychotherapy and the theories informing them see Bondi (1999, 2003a, b, c 2005). For an overview of the attempts to engage psychoanalysis and geography as well as the contentions regarding this engagement see Pile and Parr (2003; Callard 2003; Sibley 2003; Kingsbury 2003).
This is followed by the laying out of the method employed and its conceptual schema. The discussion continues with the effect the research process had on the interviewer and illustrates its affect as a transformative experience. The following section delineates the technicalities of interviewing, transcribing and translating the material. The chapter comes to a conclusion by arguing for the engagement of the field of psychotherapies with geographic research.

3.2.1 Entering the Inherent Uncertainties of Fieldwork

The choice of sample in this thesis was deliberate and theoretically informed to address transnational labour flows and identity. I chose a mobile articulate work force, a group of people which the European project is keen to accommodate as they represent a highly skilled human resource. The study was based on fifty-six recorded interviews selected from in excess of seventy recorded interviews, several of which were off the record interviews. The research questions focused around the participants’ experience of mobility through the lenses of their evolving careers as mobile professionals taking advantage of the opportunity structures generated by the European project.

The choice of using in depth, biographical interviews, covering the pre/post Maastricht period, was also deliberate as it was considered that this would provide rich, in-depth information about people and their life worlds. This, compared to the information the Euro barometer interviews generate, allows the story of movement to unfold by throwing into relief the role of the biography in illustrating the choices made regarding mobility. It also allows access to a discussion of the past and of far off places in relation to the transient spaces and places of contemporary living; all of which, I suggest are as/more important than ‘actual’ events.

The aim of using such interviews was that through recounting the trajectory of their choices in a professional context, the participants would talk about themselves, their encounters with their hosts and the cultural ‘ins’ and ‘outs’ of these encounters; and in so doing they would provide glimpses of their life worlds as these were affected by the practice of living in transient spaces and places of work, leisure and dwelling. This was then used as the springboard to investigate their views on the impact of the open ended agenda of the EU on issues such as national, ethnic, cultural and political identities so

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6 See appendix one for draft profiling of the Greek and British participants.
that conclusions could be drawn regarding the process of integration amongst the people of Europe.

At this point it needs to be stressed that this research project was not designed to investigate the dynamics of the British and Greek communities in Athens and London respectively. Instead it targeted British and Greek professionals as individuals, and investigated them as such regardless of the presence or absence of their affiliations to any expatriate community.

The interviewees were recruited in a number of ways. Some of them were identified using snowball sampling (Bernard 1988), others were recruited by ‘cold calling’, followed by an introductory letter and a brief draft of the aim and topics in the research. The criteria were that the sample had to have worked, or be working at the time of the fieldwork, in the respective cities and be from either or both of the respective national backgrounds. Anyone who was willing to participate was welcome. In line with ethical guidelines the participants were informed of their right to withdraw at any time before or during the interview. To corroborate and validate accounts, on a number of occasions ‘long term’ expatriates who had spent considerable time in the host country or were domiciling there, were approached for ‘back up’ interviews, which were then used as a ‘filter’ for the information that was coming through from the majority of ‘short term’ respondents. Likewise quantitative corroboration as to the typicality of responses could be derived from results from official quantitative polling data. This allowed the researcher to also use this general picture as a ‘common place’, and a position from which to initiate the investigation and questions.

3.2.2 Encountering Rehearsed Accounts

Starting with the assumption that this sample would be cosmopolitan in outlook, I initially approached them under the impression that we would be discussing issues of a very ‘public’ nature. I was confident that I would be collecting data that was free of the inhibitions and logistical problems that case sensitive research projects encounter. I soon found this premise to be very wrong. Once I had inducted myself into the world of both samples it quickly became apparent that the subject matter of the project was out of their ‘comfort zone’ and responses were of a ‘personal’ nature. Although I eventually found a rich and varied sample the initial slow recruitment and excuses I heard during the stages

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See appendix:two for the introductory letter sent to potential participants.
of identifying and approaching prospective informants, gave me warning signs of what I
would later encounter entering the fieldwork. Such reluctance in itself began to offer
some clues that the topic was framed by respondents in ways that challenged the
assumption that this was a ‘public’ matter for debate, as with Mountz et al. (2003: 39)
reluctance and hesitation became a form of information.

My perception with respect to the issues this project raises as public, obviously
informed by my situatedness and positionality, had led me to presume that a mobile
socially advantaged sample like this would have already immersed itself in
cosmopolitanism. Hence they would somehow enjoy participating being given the
opportunity to explore these issues in a civilized and cosmopolitan manner- in the context
where a supposedly open self-reflexive, social practice might mean they had already
engaged in these thoughts privately if not in public discussions. I was surprised to
discover that although the communication with them sprung from publicly debated issues
across all walks of life -- therefore everything was already out in the open -- the sample
was reticent in moving beyond well rehearsed accounts regarding the issues under
investigation. My first response to this reluctance was that either the subject matter of
this investigation was a disincentive to them or that these people were accustomed to
rehearsed interviews a part and parcel of moving upwards in the career ladder. Either
possibility could lead to the conclusion that they would therefore lack the skill to discuss
ad hoc issues such as identities or belongings or be able to discuss concepts of citizenship
and how these interrelate, simply because such issues were sitting outside their interests
and their usual genres of relating to the issues. Except other research with migrants in far
more problematic circumstance, such as illegal immigrants or in low status jobs had
found them willing to discuss issues of identity, belonging and transnational attachment
even in public focus groups (e.g. Pratt (2001) with immigrant domestic workers). So this
reticence prompted me to look for ways of creating a breathing space for the interviewees
to move beyond the superficiality of what I perceived as somewhat cliché rehearsed
accounts of what they had evidently heard about such issues in the media and what they
thought I wanted to hear.

Being unaccustomed with in depth interviewing, that is not contained within the
rehearsed experiences of job interviews, was not the only reason for the reticent initial
reactions. Whilst there were many hackneyed responses to the issues raised, it emerged
that if the interviewees were prompted to engage emotionally with the topics that lurking
deep underneath were powerful feelings about notions of identities, belongings and
citizenships. So far from being indifferent or professionally detached, as I had expected, I found that even for these groups, reactions were heart felt and deep seated. This disparity between cosmopolitan outlooks and bounded affiliations and attachments recurred time and again. So an interviewing technique was adopted to try and draw out -- or at least to get closer to -- the emotional experiences of the sample.

For example the British interviewee Christine found the context of the interview interesting yet the experiencing of it distressing as she recalled past experiences, about which she was sad. The person in question held a managerial post abroad in an internationally renowned NGO. She had recently lost this post due to internal politics, played out within the organization with another person who had returned to his home country and had, according to her, been fast tracked to the rank of manager solely because the people pulling the strings in running this particular branch in Athens wanted to see someone of their own in this position. Up to this moment in the interview, this interviewee had portrayed herself as a person having no qualms with working or interacting with foreigners in any place anywhere in the world. She had even distanced herself from her own family which, in her words, were blatantly oscillating between xenophobia and racism:

‘I think no matter where you go in the world and I’ve travelled a lot in Africa and in Asia...I’m very open to look...Some of my family are completely xenophobic and racist...and I have been trying to explain to my children, and raise their awareness, of what is going on in the different parts of the world.’ (Christine)

When however the conversation touched upon discussing how transnational labour migration might affect the mood on foreigners generally, in a sudden change of tone, the cosmopolitan outlook she had professed cracked, to reveal the anxieties of working in transnational spaces and the grievances caused by the struggles between different cultural, racial and other groups. Suddenly her account, informed by her personal negative experiences reiterated stories of generalised cultural, racial and other boundaries that clashed with her cosmopolitan views. Alongside this, these negative experiences which were compromising her views, were also impacted by the affective impressions of some of the patterns in her personal life underpinned by xenophobic attitudes which were coming through in her subsequent relationships when these were ‘stretched’ by the competition she encountered by her transnational work environment, despite her own best efforts to counter them. These feelings were not invited by the interviewer but instead emerged naturally, presumably because she was able to express
them in what became a quasi-therapeutic relationship (Bondi 2005) that was established between interviewer and interviewee which encouraged the spontaneous self exploration that moved beyond familiar or rehearsed accounts (Bondi 2003a). The emotional register broke through:

‘we positively discriminate for black or Asian or other cultures, and I’d say actually almost discriminate against British. And I wouldn’t be the only person to say that. Other people have said that...Well. I feel quite emotional. actually. Excuse me. (TEARS) This is a very interesting discussion. I’ve never been asked these things before, actually.’ (Christine)

I had to stop the recording until the interviewee was able to compose herself and continue; and it was a long and poignant break. The interviewee did not wish to withdraw; in fact the outburst of emotions seemed to be acting as a catharsis for her. Nevertheless I had not anticipated this reaction, as up to that point we had been talking in the measured and dispassionate terms of a self portrayed cosmopolitan who lived and worked in transnational spaces.

Conversely, throughout the interview with Γιάννη, this Greek interviewee remained subtly sardonic regarding the context of the interview as a whole; especially every time the conversation was touching upon Greek identity or culture regardless of the context. This was despite my efforts, in Mullings’s (1999: 340) words, to ‘seek shared spaces that were not informed by identity-based differences, so that they could be used as failsafe indicators of the interviewee’s positionality, thus avoiding the break down of cooperation and communication’. But attempting to create such spaces was simply unworkable in a situation like this, an infrequent but nevertheless recurring theme of the fieldwork I had undertaken. The interviewee somehow identified the content of the interview, especially with regards to probing questions -- about how Greekness manifests in a modern world -- as some kind of threat resulting in subtle but powerful projections that were stalling the interview. These were manifesting beyond words in pauses and nuances of the voice, thus exposing the discursive boundaries of the interview (Rose 1997b: 184-202) and troubling my attempts to establish the ‘psyche space’ for which Bondi (2003a) argues.

It is imperative here to stress that I had followed with Γιάννη, as with every other would-be participant, the standard routine: informing the would be participant prior to the interview about its context, outlining the guidelines for its conduct; and in no way coercing anyone in any way to participate. In the case of Γιάννη this procedure was just
as strictly adhered to as in any other case. Further, before the interview I had also stressed that he was free to abort the interview at any moment if he felt in any way uncomfortable or to refuse to engage or answer with any question or point put forward.

But problems were evident even from the outset with this particular case. When I turned up for this interview, there were already other people in the apartment and as it became apparent to me later, word had gone around regarding the subject matter of the project. Upon arrival I was asked — after the interviewee had already given his consent, if the others (I presumed they were his friends) could attend the interview as an audience. Culturally having friends around even when doing a job, is common in Greece, so I too readily said I did not mind for as long they did not interrupt. I had not anticipated what would follow. During the interview more people walked into the flat and silently joined the others. Meanwhile I was becoming increasingly wary of a feeling of agitation growing in the room. Given the benefit of hindsight it is perhaps it was not surprising that by the end of the interview an acrimonious argument had broken out in the flat between the two camps that apparently had already formed in the audience, arguing the pros and cons of the political correctness of the questions I was asking. The one group was supportive of my line of questioning whilst the other abruptly, after the interview came to a close, accused me for having set up a biased interview that disparages Greek culture and Greek identity.

Hence far from issues of European identity and belonging being topics of cool reflexive debate, they were the subject of deep emotive responses and were emotionally, as well as than verbally, articulated. This heated discussion had apparently been provoked during the interview by questions addressing how modern Greekness manifests itself amidst the push and pull factors of globalization. Reference to some ‘unfortunate’ as it was put post interview by the aggravated group outbursts of homophobia, racism and xenophobia that had emerged into the Greek public domain (regarding the post 1989 migration to Greece)\(^8\) meant my questions surrounding this were construed as putting a slur on a fundamentally civil Greek essentialism! I left the flat feeling ambushed and shaken. Essentially it was implied that I was anti-Greek, and by implication I had joined ranks with all those foreigners who basically tar Greekness.

\(^8\) These recurring incidents however were serious enough to provoke a public denouncement in October 2000 by K. Stefanopoulo the then President of the Republic who stated (quoting Socrates), at the dismay of a substantial and very vocal volume of Greek population, that in his view Greek is considered anyone who has a Greek education.
The confined nature of the apartment replicated in a metaphorical way the contentious space of the Greek family as a site of relations of power enacted in the rejections and assertions of contesting ideologies between its members. Away from public view the conflicting ideologies on the nature and applications of Greekness were dealt with by the parties involved in a typically Greek fashion of managing a ‘family dispute’ as a ‘family affair’ whereby the ‘management of any discourse’ reflects a corresponding discourse constituting or manifesting in the macro geographies of public arenas.

In dissecting the reasons for such an event it was clear that context plays a major role in the interview process. This was especially evident in the Γάλλης interview where the workings of interview sites emerged as the material spaces for the enactment and constitutions of power relations (Elwood and Martin 2000: Sin 2003) and can be aptly illustrated by the following quotation:

‘The location where the interview... takes place... represents a microscale of sociospatial relations, manifesting the intersection of broader power dynamics... with the social relations constructed in the interview setting itself. The microgeographies of the interview reflect the relationships of the researcher with the interview participant, the participant with the site, and the site within a broader sociocultural context that affects both researcher and participant.’

(Elwood and Martin 2000: 650)

It seemed that methodologically the space of the interview far from simply being a prosaic factor regarding comfort, security and audibility, or even being one where its ambience contributed to discussion, had become a potent psycho-spatial symbol enacting the emotional dynamics of the issues discussed. The sense of insideness and outsideness permeated the dialogue, and in light of this I began to attend to other psycho-spatial figures being produced in the interviews.

3.2.3 The Border: Neither Insider or Outsider

At this point in the context of what has been discussed above it would be fair to point out merely that the knowledge I gained from studying methodology manuals and attending research practice seminars on a theoretical level was unable to match the pitfalls lurking in fieldwork. While many manuals and accounts emphasised the importance of possessing knowledge of the culture prior to interviews to facilitate
dialogue over, around and across the border, and between interviewer and interviewee (Miles and Crush 1993), the history of each interviewee is unique to that individual, so no one can ever pre-empt all the eventualities that can occur in an interview setting. Increasingly, it was the ambivalent location of myself as interviewer, insider and outsider⁹, same and different, collaborator and interlocutor that served as the emotional engine of discussion.

That said, as Thien (2005a) argues in her discussion of how the process of naming and norming frames research outcomes, positing questions by necessity sets researcher and researched apart from the start, forcing them into different positions regardless of any incurring commonalities. The argument is that interviewing per se is a staged site of differences whereof by default ‘terrible asymmetries’ (Rosaldo 1989: 175) are created. The framing of interviewer and respondent distances the interviewer from the interviewee and vice versa. Seen from this angle, the whole process of setting up and defining the geography of the interview prior to ‘inviting’ the people to participate renders redundant most of the advantages of a researcher’s insider status forcing them into a (temporary) outsider position (Crush and Miles 1993: 87).

In this context I would argue that the question of insider/outsider status, in terms of shared social identifiers, is of secondary importance for the resulting knowledge: and one may quite often make assumptions too easily as to who is the insider/outsider. The ways in which this occurs thereby ‘obscure the diversity of experiences and viewpoints between and within various groups’ (Valentine 2002: 118). ‘These categories, like pronouns, are empty and shifting, filled with meaning contextually by those who ‘wear’ them. In this way I can be both an ‘insider’ and an ‘outsider’; and both ‘insider’ and ‘outsider’ in the same place and/or time’ (Benveriste 1971 cited in Mohammad 2001: 112). In other words, the methodological implications of outsider/insider status are not a clear cut (Frank 1985).

For example with the Greek sample as I mentioned above, at least from the outset, there was not a problem since I was seemingly an insider and I had the authority, credibility, and tacit knowledges to undertake this kind of research. In practice however it was a different scenario as our seemingly shared commonalities were undercut by other differences (Gilbert 1994 cited in Valentine 2000: 118). Most of the interviewees

⁹ An ex-pat myself, unlike economic or other kinds of migrants, I moved to Britain to enhance my cultural capital: domicile in London and Athens simultaneously, living and working between cities, across Europe, neither placeless nor localized; being both insider and outsider of British and Greek living; in and out of communities and in and out of cultures.
perceived me as an outsider. firstly due to the artificial nature of the interview and secondly because of the subject matter of this enquiry which covered topics that have been seen in Greece as inherently divisive. Any initial presumptions. on their part. of sameness between us with regards to ‘where I was coming from’ in relation to the topics discussed, quickly shifted to assumptions of difference (Valentine 2000):

Αντώνης: When a country has a Royal Family. I think it presents a certain image. and you see this from the tourists who don’t have something like that in their culture, like mainly the Americans, who come with the sole reason of seeing it, that’s something I really like, you see the beauty of it, you see a marriage, you see a carriage…

Interviewer: Ok, but what do you think about the Republican argument, which states that the Royal Family is an unelected elite institution, the pedigree of feudalism and so on…doesn’t that bother you at all? Do you regard it as part of the tradition of the entire nation?

Αντώνης: No! I’ll disagree with you there! Now is not the time to start talking politics but I can see it happening! Um…the Royal Family in this country didn’t come and do the things you think they did, naturally there were wars among other things, but you have to compare that to what happened in other civilisations that didn’t have a monarchy, but had other things like the Greeks had the Turks…I’d like you to compare how it works in Spain for example, where it is much more low profile. ok?…go to Denmark, the King there rides a bicycle!

Hence in this light, reticence, or distance creeps in destabilizing the interview (Mullings 1999). With the British sample the experience was of a different inflection since my cultural immersion of twelve years prior to this fieldwork could not compensate for the lack of shared rememberings wherein I could negotiate, contest or resist the participants’ positions (Mohammad 2001). In other words my commitment to, and belonging in, a multicultural British identity was not enough for the ‘coming together with them into a space of experiential sameness’ delineated by the familiar trajectories drawing from the pool of the mobile migrant’s experience. The lack of a shared past manifested as difference or distance as the following extract illustrates, in this case, in the accent:

‘How people perceive you. So for instance, if although your English is very good, you have an accent obviously. so if you were born here, and you had that
accent, you would still not be thought of. even though you were British, you would not be thought of as British.’ (Christine)

was pertinent and applied to even the few occasions, where a rapprochement naturally occurred from the beginning, due to a certain chemistry, or shared ideological disposition, or, as in a couple of instances, similar path ways that I shared with some of the professionals in the British sample.

In my view, based on the experience of the encounter throughout the fieldwork, both positionalities (insider/ outsider) face the same problems of representation and interpretation. Both approaches basically attempt to frame peoples’ memories, reflections, interpretations and presentations, into a narrative form that would facilitate the consequent stages of coding and analysis (Mason 1996).

In sum therefore the sameness or difference between the interviewer and interviewees (re)constituting around, under or across the insider/outsider boundary or border - are part and parcel of the problematic nature of qualitative research because whatever the position of those in the interview setting the environment of the interview itself as artificial compromises the outcomes. However it is argued that with respect to the whole sample this border did not contribute to significant withholdings of ‘accessing the material’ (Delph-Janiurek 2001).

3.2.4 Coming to Terms with the Situatedness of the Research Process

Whilst it is usually the case that the inherent uncertainty of fieldwork shifts the positionality of the researcher, the disquieting episodes that punctuated the fieldwork accentuated the in depth self questioning regarding mostly questions as to how information could be extracted regarding the subject matter of the investigation -- without compromising trust and cooperation between myself and the interviewees-- and consequently elicited, evaluated and analyzed.

In line with what was discussed in the first section, assuming that all knowledge is situated (Haraway 1991) -- theirs as well as mine -- self reflection was inevitable. The unanticipated intensity of the encounter both intellectually and psychologically threw me off course. In this process the very act of being reflexive kept changing what was being reflected upon in the first place. That is, the ever shifting positions of both myself and the interviewees within the interpersonal setting of the interview, whereby we both constructed particular versions of ourselves that occurred in the *ad hoc* negotiations
around interviews, generated yet more articulations of situated knowledge. In my attempt
to constantly (re)assess my position, I was experiencing a persistent spatiotemporal
spatiality of displacement. I was set adrift by myself, as the fabric of my identity, was unwound,
pulled in different directions between theory and practice; between the withering
intricacies of an internal dialogue, and a dialogue between myself and the interviewees.
In my attempt to reflexively keep up with this landscape of displacement I was
essentially cast into a grey area, elaborating on the articulations of situated knowledges and then speculating on those elaborations, thereby shifting gradually my own as well as
their positioning from what was reflected upon in the first place.

During the fieldwork this unavoidable mediation or processing accentuated my
frustration regarding the handling of the ways in which knowledge is generated. That is,
the process of ‘positioning’, through transparent reflexivity underpinned by a process of
elaboration-speculation-elaboration, was ‘the key practice [for] grounding knowledge’
(Haraway 1991: 193). In this context I had to come to terms with the situatedness of the
whole research process, and this was out of my ‘comfort zone’. That is, there was a sense
in which too much ‘processing’ was taking place of the raw material, and as such that I
might end up generating knowledge regarding the subject matter of this project of a
‘second order’ (Bochner and Ellis 1996: 26). Moreover, much of the material of interest
about all these displacements seemed phonological rather than verbal- that is the ways in
which, the speech, sounds and verbal accounts were produced and are contrasting to one
another in tone and hue.

I therefore began to cast about for approaches to analyse the reflexive
understanding of the interviews and those that unpacked the affective and emotion-
charged nature of the process.

3.3 Strengths and Limitations of Transparent Reflexivity

The shift in human geography away from unproblematic assumptions of objectivity
in the study of human experience has opened the door to a range of novel methodologies
whose roots are to be found in humanistic, feminist and most recently non-
representational geographies. Such theoretical orientations informing approaches to
qualitative research provide rigor and create new areas for research into phenomena that
are difficult to measure (Ellis and Flaherty 1992; Ellis 1995; Ellis and Bochner 1996:}
Increasing numbers of manuals address the procedural and substantive aspects arising out of this process (Burgess 1982; Robson et al. 1989; Glesne et al. 1992; May 1993; Robson 1993; Mason 1996; Flowerdew et al. 1997; Hughes et al. 2000; Limb et al. 2001), and linking their many prescriptions, tends to be a common interpretivist understanding of theory and practice (Geertz 1973; Geertz et al. 1979; Denzin 1989a, b; Denzin et al. 1994). They put forward an agenda for the conduct of qualitative research that is interactional, reflexive and intersubjective 'saturated with relations of power knowledge...[that] stretch[] between the field, the academy and beyond' (Cook and Crang 1995: 6-7). That is, research is itself seen as a social process overlapping all areas of investigation whose relations of power, are seen as ultimately shaping the specific circumstances from which any knowledge is produced (Haraway 1991). As such the emphasis is laid upon depth, complexity and roundedness in the collection and elaboration of data, as well as upon the apprehension of theory and how this is interrelated with methods of research, given that theory is intimately linked with issues of problem, method and substance (Graham 1997).

Feminist geographers drawing from post-structural ideas that challenge concepts of Self and Knowledge implicit in the Cartesian understanding of subjectivity (Young 1990) critique binary structures in geographical thinking (Rose 1999; Bondi 1993; Massey 1994; McDowell 1999; Longhurst 2000) and instead focus upon the dialogic interactional context of research (McDowell 1992c; Radcliffe 1994; Katz 1992, 1994; Nast 1994; England 1994; Moss 1995a, b). This approach situates knowledges through evoking concepts of positionality and reflexivity (Rose 1997a) with the intention of making knowledge production as transparent as possible (McDowell 1992c; Farrow et al. 1995; Nast 1994; Katz 1994). This thereby avoids the concealment of the interplay of power relations in the research process and provides the study of human experience and of social relations with an alternative source of legitimacy to the positivist one, that is underpinned by the values of objectivity, neutrality and reliability (Mohammad 2001) or else the 'view of infinite vision...[the] god trick' (Haraway 1991: 191).

Yet this approach to research is problematic for a number of reasons. The intention to gain a greater understanding of the research subject’s reality cannot escape the fact that it is framed into spaces of betweenness (England 1994; Katz 1994; Nast 1994) with 'position[s] that [are] neither inside nor outside' (Marcia-Lees et al. 1989
cited in Katz 1994: 72) manifesting a spatiality of displacements, which prescribe and underpin the research project in and outside the field (Katz 1994). In this spatiality, in Rose’s (1997a) words, differences are (re)constituted as distances between the parties involved in the research process – distances that, as Moss (1995b) and Mohammad (2001) argue, cannot be bridged. Attempts to eradicate them by experiencing ‘sameness’ (Mohammad 2001) through the web of differences that make duets between cultures may risk imposing as true one’s own voice, and thus overwriting the voice of the researched.

Recognizing the Other’s voice as not one’s own, let alone being able to pinpoint to what extent it intersects with one’s own in some situations is hard to know (Hamera 1996: 201-5). This alone, other things being equal, contaminates the research (Mohammad 2001: 103). Thus in this context, developing a particular kind of reflexivity which Rose (1997a) calls ‘transparent’, and defines as the ‘visible landscape of power, external to the researcher, transparently visible and spatially organized through scale and distribution’ (ibid. p. 311), ‘gives no space to understanding across difference’ (op. cit. p. 313) and cannot be considered a solution either. In short, Rose suggests that the task of developing Self knowledge of this kind as a tool for addressing the aforementioned problem is a chimera. Despite this, Falconer Al- Hindi and Kawabata (2002) who argue for the establishing of commonalities between researchers and researched, in Crang’s (2003) words, attempt to bypass such criticism by separating positivist reflexivity— that is transparency through introspection— from a transformative feminist reflexivity where both sides reflect on their mutual (mis)understandings. However the work-ability of the latter reflexivity as a research strategy is questionable according to Crang: ‘too often exhortations to reflexivity and disclosure tend to depend upon and reproduce problematic notions of a stable, tightly defined, unchanging research project conducted by a singular researcher, with one stable essential identity, both between locations and over time, and suggest the latter is also true of the researched.’ (ibid. p. 497)

In this light the limits of transparently reflexive positionality are exposed to what Mohammad (2001) calls the ‘border’ between the researcher and the researched. A border in his words, that is constantly celebrated and reaffirmed with every statement made by the ‘technologies’ that try ‘to see from below [it]’ (Haraway 1991: 191) and across to the other side. And yet the safeguarding of the inherent situatedness of knowledge (Haraway 1991) from many of the trappings of the positivist approach to the production of knowledge, demands reflexivity as a research tool. Arguably though.
reflexivity is easier said than done. Further to that there are salient aspects of positionality that evade conscious awareness. As such they cannot be disclosed, thus exposing the limits of reflexivity to claim fuller knowledge than it is possible (Rose 1997a; Gibson- Graham 1994).

In sum, although reflexivity cannot fully resolve all the issues thrown into relief by the critical approach to knowledge production, as situated and positioned, it nevertheless ensures the vitality of the research process (Bondi 2003a). So while the continual (re)valuation of levels of consciousness argued for by feminist geographers (McDowell 1992c; Radcliffe 1994; Katz 1992; England 1994) is imperative. it is arguable whether the researcher can attain the necessary levels of transparency at all times especially in regards to elusive forms of representation such as the non cognitive, non reflective affects that underpin all stages of the research process.

Transparent reflexive monitoring undertaken by researchers throws into sharp relief the inescapable feelings and emotions in the process of research (Moss et al. 1993; England 1994; Gibson- Graham 1994; Gilbert 1994; Rose 1997a, b: Parr 1998; Davidson 2001; Avis 2002). In the light of these writings Widdowfield (2000), Laurier and Parr (2000), Meth and Malaza (2003), Burman and Chantler (2004), Bennett (2004), Bondi (2003a, 2005) focus on emotional geographies permeating through research relationships and practice.

The problem this research project encountered was that although the researcher consciously sought to navigate through the ways in which his positionality was implicated with the research and vice versa, this then further coloured his conduct with the researched (McDowell 1992c: 403, 407). In Rose’s terms (1997a: 309-13) the double reflexive gaze-- that is, in the sense of transparent introspection-- with its spatial division between inside and outside was hard to perform in practise. Transparency is framed within certain notions of agency (considered as conscious) and power (as context) and as such it is situated itself, precisely because of assumptions about agency and context. Thereby even this disposition does not alter fundamentally the reflexive landscape of power between the researcher and the researched since like any other practice of conducting research it cannot escape situatedness, regardless of the intentions of the researcher. In this context the search for positionality through transparent reflexivity is bound to fail (Rose 1997a). If we see emotions as fluid, embodied and relational (Ettlinger 2004; Bondi et.al. 2005) and thus according to Bondi (2005) not to be equated with individualized human subjectivity but instead located and theorized more broadly.
one way of addressing this, as well as all those salient aspects of research that evade disclosure, is by drawing as Bondi (2005) suggests from the field of psychotherapies, which the following section explores.

3.4 Introducing Psychoanalytic Inroads into Geographic Research

The discussion in this section is underpinned by the feminist concept of relational autonomy, which moves beyond the feminist deconstruction of autonomy as an inherently masculine property, and challenges debates about agency, identity, and moral responsibility (Mackenzie and Stolar 2000). As a concept it theorizes autonomy in the context of social interdependency. It advocates that the abilities required for appropriately self-reflective and self-directed lives are formed through relationships—that is, such abilities do not develop independently of others—and as such they are conditioned by them and the contexts through which these relationships formulate. These inescapable conditionings affect connections between autonomy and other aspects of the agent, including self-conception, self-worth, memory, and imagination. In short the Self is (re)shaped and (re)situated through relationships in particular contexts.

The particular concern for this thesis therefore was to address in relation to the above concept the specific contexts delineated by the questions this project sought to investigate. The following discussion, drawing on a burgeoning literature from the field of psychotherapies, illustrates why related practices such as counseling, psychotherapy, psychoanalysis, analytic psychology, arts therapies and so on, may resolve some of the issues and dilemmas confronting researchers in the context of the inherent uncertainty of engaging with fieldwork. This, it is argued, is especially the case when it engages with formations of subjectivity, society and space in the particular contexts engendered by the banal and spectacular politics of the everyday.

The concept of relational autonomy according to Bondi (2003b: 864-8) attributes the Self with the capacity to be as much autonomous as relational. That is, both independent and dependent, both resisting and seeking the influence of others. This coexistence of autonomous and relational selves resonates with the duality in which everyday lives are lived and holds the potential for the (re)shaping and the (re)situating of the Self in relation to others within particular contexts and peopled environments. This concept, when applied to qualitative research methods, broadens the understanding of the interaction between researchers and researched, as (re)shaped and (re)situated
individuals. For instance this sample enters the interview setting from a multitude of their own relational avenues and they respond *ad hoc* to the relational and intersubjective context the interview setting generated. ‘In this account reference to relationships coexists with an unambiguous ‘I’ voice, through which the interviewee articulates agency and personal autonomy.’ (Bondi 2003b: 865)

Hence, this approach links the understanding of selfhood and personhood, with debates about qualitative research methods, and the demand for more complex methodological understandings concerning the intertwining of the individual with the society in general, and its effects on the research process in particular (Pile 1991, 1996; Sibley 1995, 2003). It also links to the ‘psychoanalytic turn’ in geographical thinking and suggests this may have much to offer, precisely because it possesses its own vocabulary and cues, for observation and analysis, which are uniquely placed in order to get to grips with difference (Sibley 1995). Pile (1993) has argued for the inextricable link between agency and structure, and particularly regarding the practice of qualitative research. He argues that the practice of qualitative research could benefit from psychoanalysis because ‘nowhere has the relationship between questioner, questioned and the lived world been more closely examined than in the psychoanalytic literature... and much of this debate concerns power relations in the nexus of knowing, communicating and the personal’ (Pile 1991: 460). In his words (ibid. p. 462-7) the practice of research would be enhanced from the recognition of the power relationships that exists between the analyst and analysed, and indeed in therapeutic discourses as a whole. Further to this, by admitting to the idea of transference and counter-transference the researcher can refuse the objective of capturing the Other. This makes research an intersubjective process constructed within a third ‘register,’ that is the social and signifying order governing the everyday. In this context research no longer claims to articulate the reality of the subject on the behalf of the subject, instead by admitting its voice, makes space for the subject’s reality to come through with the least possible mediation. For Pile (1993) psychoanalysis not only addresses the relation between power and language but also contribute to the debates on the politics of identity, by articulating a politics of movement and responding to the demand for a politics of desire (ibid. p. 136-7). Yet importantly Pile (1996) warns that psychoanalysis can only help the progress of social and cultural geographical theory and practice if is informed by a politics of resistance, position and subjectivity.

10 For an outline of the workings transference/counter transference see Bondi (2005: 440-3).
In this context it is evident that psychoanalysis and the related practices, when applied, tap into emotions surrounding for example the construction and maintenance of group identity and its boundaries within an unfolding European project. In other words it can be said that in the field of psychotherapies (psychoanalysis being one practice amongst many) therapists are dealing with difference, which is not only a personal matter—dealing with the uncanny, the stranger from within—but also inextricably linked to cultural, social and political realities (Bell 1999; Segal 1995; Philo and Parr 2003: 290; Kristeva 1998, 2000, 2001). Sibley (2003) argues, drawing from Phillips (1995), that psychoanalysis consists of several ‘languages’ that look for ‘confirmation or a further articulation of an idea that has come from elsewhere. maybe a feeling that something is missing in sociological or geographical accounts of a problem’ (ibid. p. 394).

Consequently several geographers using psychoanalytic insights as a spring board, challenge socio spatial relations. For example Nast’s (1998, 2000) concept of ‘the heteronormative Oedipal’ seeks to understand how versions of heterosexuality inform modern socio-spatialities, from every day practices to social, political and economic imaginaries and language immersed at varying scales, from home to the nation and beyond. She approaches psyche as a ‘structured and libidinized spatial effect’. the repository; the body space, the unconscious domain outside language, in which memories, desires and actions associated with the aforementioned spatialities are incorporated and internalized. Callard (2003) in her discussion on the ‘psychoanalytic turn’ in geography argues for the positive contribution of the psychoanalytic approach in thinking through questions of subjectivity and spatiality. Bingley (2003) implementing the psychotherapeutic technique of sand play from the perspective of object relations theory shows how the tactile underpins perceptions of the landscape. She does this by creating Winnicott’s ‘facilitating environment’ (ibid. p. 330) for her research subjects which allows them to access their inner ‘potential space’ (Winnicott 1967 cited in op. cit. p. 331) and by doing that she is able to examine the complex conscious and unconscious relationships at different sensory levels between the Self and the Other (in this case the landscape). Kingsbury (2003) discusses the suitability of concepts that could be applied to interpret every day psycho-spatial phenomena immersed in the banal and spectacular realities of the life world.

Thien (2005a), exploring the figure of the Farmer’s Wife as a categorical subject of rural research, draws on Butler’s examination of the psychoanalytic workings of power to look for alternative ways of thinking through the politics of the naming and
norming\textsuperscript{11} -- that is the ways in which the researchers understand and frame the research subjects in the presence or absence of the effects of power in these encounters -- processes that pervade social research. She engages with Butler's theories of subjection\textsuperscript{12} within the practice of in depth interviewing to demonstrate how the figure of the research subject\textsuperscript{13} cast as an unproblematic categorical subject within this field, disintegrates and instead a contingent subjectivity comes to the fore once a psychoanalytic approach is introduced to the practice of qualitative interviewing. This confirms Pile's (1993) suggestion -- in relation to structure- agency -- that the reworking of an idea or a figure as in Thien's case, through psychotherapeutic theories and practices\textsuperscript{14}, may lead to the reworking of social theory and practice. Yet despite these discoveries Callard (2003) recounts all the reasons for the, generally speaking, suspicious response or unwillingness of geographers to engage with, psychoanalytic insights into their research practice.

One of the few who has engaged with psychoanalytic insights in research practice is Bondi (e.g. 2003a) who draws on object relations psychoanalysis\textsuperscript{15} as a source for reflecting on fieldwork relationships from the perspective of feminist geography research. She argues research can no longer afford to ignore psychotherapeutic ideas as resources for addressing some of the dilemmas facing researchers in the context of qualitative research. She suggests for example that the exchanges that take place\textsuperscript{16} in the interplay between identification\textsuperscript{17} and empathy\textsuperscript{18} within qualitative interviewing cannot be avoided and thus ought not to be silenced by the conventional tools of social research.

Since this approach draws attention to the possible confusion between the Self and the Other in the context of these exchanges it thus addresses problems about what belongs to whom. This is especially relevant when we need to decide how to interpret the data -- do we focus upon the spoken words captured by the recording devices, or the interviewees' written accounts, or those elusive voices that evade representation and

\textsuperscript{11} See Thien (2005a: 78, n. 5).
\textsuperscript{12} See Butler (1997) \textit{Theories of Subjection}.
\textsuperscript{13} This figure operates as a part of the explanation of how the subject is produced (Butler 1997: 3-4).
\textsuperscript{14} The use of the term refers back to footnote n. 5.
\textsuperscript{15} For an outline on object relation theory see Bondi (2003a: 68).
\textsuperscript{16} In the context of the concept of relational autonomy -- as this was outlined at the beginning of this section -- identification and empathy are processes that are triggered in any contact of the Self with peopled environments. The latter in this case is the qualitative interviewing process, which once it is commenced, mean that these processes are initiated regardless of the conscious intentions of the parties involved with regards to the methods adopted for tackling the investigated topics, or the choices made on the spot of what is to be revealed or how much of it.
\textsuperscript{17} The term is described 'in terms of unconscious processes of introjection and projection, which operate as dynamic exchanges within all interpersonal relationships.' (Bondi 2003a: 64)
\textsuperscript{18} The term is described 'in terms of receiving, processing, and making available unconscious material transferred from one person to another.' (Bondi 2003a: 64)
pervade all stages of research such as feelings and emotions vested in oral and written accounts. It also raises questions about the ability of the researcher to engage with these exchanges and how open (s)he should be to the unconscious components of the participants’ realities submerged in the topics that are investigated (Sibley 1995).

Such exchanges enable the creation of interpersonal and intrapsychic spaces in which similarities and differences can be mobilized and explored. The interviewer needs to have the capacity to understand the other person’s feelings while simultaneously being aware of the difference between her/his feelings and those of the interviewee’s. In Bondi’s (2003a) words this is attainable through a process of empathy which gives the interviewee back, in a different way, what (s)he has brought into the investigation in the first place. The process provides a space for difference thus avoiding the blurring of the boundary between both parties which would undermine the capacity of the interviewer to differentiate between the unconscious emotional experiences of Self and Other. Without this Bondi relates how the interviewer’s compensation for any emotional experiences in the interview may lead to reducing the intersubjective space made available for the interviewee’s self expression. In this context, empathy. Bondi continues, can be thought as a psychic space where the oscillating between observation and participation is made possible.

In this space emotions are, according to Bondi (2005). the relational connective medium in which research, researchers and researched are immersed. In the context of the concept of relational autonomy, which as stated at the beginning of this section, underpins this discussion, feminist geographers have problematized the distinction between human beings and peopled environments (Rose 1993). In this context the role of emotions has attracted attention in methodological debates. The idea of the detached objective researcher is relinquished, as questions of positionality and situatedness now occupy a centre stage.

In sum, the field of psychotherapies with its capacity as the general descriptor for a range of practices and theoretical orientations, as argued at the beginning of this chapter, could potentially address some of the problems researchers encounter as they enter the inherent uncertainty of fieldwork, which unavoidably engages in a dialogue the ‘psychogeographies’ of all parties inevitably encounter in the research process. Hence in the light of the discussion in the preceding two sections the chapter proceeds with an

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19 The term is cited from Sibley (2003: 396) in her discussion on how psychoanalysis as a theoretical and practical tool deals with difference.
account of the problems and dilemmas this fieldwork encountered (as discussed later) which resulted in the research method that was employed for interviewing.

3.5 The Method: Locating Butler’s Concept of the Process of Subjection into Kristeva’s Concept of Analytic Time

What has been discussed so far resounds with the responsibilities and the obligations of the researcher. In the process of completing the research, all going well as Bondi (2003a) puts it, the researcher will be as much able to get the story right all the way through from the interview intimacies to the academic dialogue, as to highlight the difficulties of research relations between the parties involved.

In the light of the difficulty the subject matter of this project seemed to pose for communication with the participants from the recruiting stage onwards a psychoanalytic approach to the interview emerged. This approach to interviewing was framed by the employment of Butler’s (1997) psychoanalytic critique on theories of subjection and the interviewing technique crafted from Kristeva’s conceptualization of time20, which is outlined in the ensuing discussion further below.

Butler’s (1997) examination of the psychic forms of power in her critical reading of theories of subjection suggests simply that our coming into being is intertwined with power, and that as such the condition of subjection is an exercise of power in itself. According to this -- and in the context of the workings of power relations in the production of Knowledge in an interview setting -- the figure of the subject is always in the process of becoming through moments of interpellation21 or discursive production22

20 For the elaboration on time see Kristeva (1979) in ‘Women’s Time’. In short, Kristeva’s elaboration of time is that time acts as a signifying space rather than as a chronology. As such it can be viewed as a conjunctive space designated by the antinomies between cyclical (repetitive) and linear (history) time in which subjectivity is recomposed continuously. Although Kristeva’s conceptualization of time is confined within female subjectivity and reproduction, in my view the concept can be applied to any subjectivity, as well as to any mode of production and reproduction. In this context it can be suggested that all subjectivities are embodied through social activity which already is organized as a chronological space anyway, inhabited by gendered social roles that permeate every day living and institutions alike. What differs, as Kristeva argues, is the ways in which each subjectivity experiences and interprets time. Henceforth when I refer to time, I will do this in connection to any (gendered) subjectivity in any mode of production or reproduction. Bearing in mind that notwithstanding Kristeva’s approach to time as a signifying space, for the people in general, and for this sample in particular, I would argue, time is experienced as a chronology.

21 That is Althusser’s moment of the formation of the subject every time it is called into being (Butler 1977: 4-5, 106-31).

22 Yet Foucault ‘insists that the subject is not “spoken” into existence and that the matrices of power and discourse that constitute the subject are neither singular nor sovereign in the productive action.’ (Butler 1977: 5, 83-105)
and as such subjectivity cannot be treated as static. This ongoing process of becoming, in
the constant repetition of subjection that is (re) articulated at moments of interpellation or
through discursion can be aptly illustrated as follows in an extract from one of the
interviews with a Greek participant:
‘er... I consider myself as a part of this country...a part of this land if you prefer... the
belonging thing you know...I’ve been moulded by it...yeah yeah it’s a part of me, now the ways they [Greekares] interpret these elements...you know: it’s not me, but what can I say...er... look it’s the spirit of not being content [with what I’ve got]. I consider this element as Greek...that Greek element of soul
searching...what can I say...don’t make much sense what I’m talking about.’
(Αμήλιος)

As such this discussion creates a psychic excess wherein ‘the significance of the
unconscious (the unknowing subject, versus the knowing subject of the rational self)...
(dis- integrates) the notions of rationality on which the knowing self is predicated’ (Thien 2005a: 83) and thus the subject according to Thien might (or not) become something more than what is named, thought or called initially. Adapting Thien’s vision to this
project, the categorical subjects of Greek or British are figured in speech not as literal representations but as tropic figures (Haraway 1997 cited in Thien 2005a: 83) and as such displace categorical identities and trouble (misplaced) certainties: ‘when I came over here...I was...you know...that thing: “We Are Greeks”...thereafter I sobered up... and I’m glad.’ (Νάσος)

Thus the material and theory discussed so far it is argued, seems to show that the
Greek or British as categorical subjects of national, ethnic or cultural identities are
disintegrated through their experiences and that their potential as contingent subjectivities then become pervasively clear. According to Thien this throws into relief what is not positioned or located, that is, it creates the conditions for the chance of a glimpse across the border and as such is unsettling for normative interpretations of the world. Thus, Thien continues, employing this approach to investigation proves instructive for
interview encounters, (and the subsequent stages of analysis and interpretation) as it makes possible to access areas of research that are difficult to measure using conventional methods. In sum, the interviews are seen as indicative of an interaction

23 See appendix three for an example of the workings of interpellation in interviewing. The excerpt is the material of substance that was extracted from pp. 10-27 (which took over forty five minutes to conduct) of a forty two page interview transcript.
between the interviewer and interviewees that are part of a process of mirroring power relations and are constantly affecting the positionality and the situatedness of both the researcher and the researched.

Superimposing on the above context Kristeva's concept of time I then used her concept as the springboard for drafting questions that would address the possibility (or not) of an emerging Europeanness, within the broader theme of transnational mobility, and how this affects (or not) national/ethnic identities and notions of belonging and implicate concepts of citizenship. In summary, Kristeva conceptualizes time as a signifying space rather than as a chronology. A person's sense of time is altered by their experience. As such, time can be viewed as a conjunctive space designated by the antinomies between diagonal (monumental), cyclical (repetitive) and linear (history) time in which subjectivity is recomposed continuously.

Monumental time designates present temporality into which the subject enters and into which by default the subject's cyclical and linear temporality is intercepted, diagonally according to Kristeva, by the temporalities of peopled environments. It is this interaction with others that further alters the individual's perception. At this moment the figure of the subject turns back on itself in the process of becoming according to (Butler 1997), or else according to Kristeva is when the individual experiences the praxis of cyclical and monumental incisiveness. Kristeva describes this as analytic time, through which the aforementioned process (framed by the intertwining of linear and cyclical time) may or may not be problematized by the experience of the aforementioned interception. In other words people's interaction through social activity in the signifying space of time may have altered their perception or notion of themselves. By drawing upon psychoanalytic approaches, I sought to echo this analytic time in an interview setting.

For example, in the space of analytic time the interviewee's notions of identity that underpin her/his account on her/his Greekness or Britishness are open to revision. This of course is subject to the willingness of the interviewee to engage in such a process or to resist it. This does not imply any coercion on the part of the interviewer, it just means that in the space of the interview the questions act as a catalyst for analytic time whereby the interviewees may reflect upon their positionality and situatedness and even evolve notions they have not hitherto considered. Most of the interviewees confessed to

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24 See appendix four for the questionnaire templates for the Greek and British samples upon which the interview questions were based.
never having had the time to deeply consider the way they themselves were challenged by the changes mobility imposed on them. However, interviewees also had the choice, not to engage in the process initiated by the questions, and most often this occurred by the interviewee blocking out the experience and just being content within the parameters of her/his cyclical and linear temporalities, in Kristeva’s terms.

It is in this space in the interview where the unspoken psychology of routines (articulations of linear and cyclical time manifesting as sedimented meanings interlinked by mechanisms of metaphor and metonymy) are discursively approached in the psychic space created by the interviewer. The aim was to bring the interviewee to the point of psychic excess (not in the sense of stressing the participant), but in the sense of providing enough listening space whereby (s)he might be able and willing to reflexively approach what was initially named, stated or called for in her/his line of argument. The aim of this approach of providing a space of active listening and using empathetic prompts to encourage the interviewee, was to enable most of the sample to move beyond a well rehearsed account of an impersonal nature concerning the themes under investigation. In this interpersonal and relational course of interviewing the subject is recomposed continuously as well as with the other notions of (her/his) Self and as such their sense of being a ‘person’ or ‘individual’ come to the fore. In such an environment moments of interpellation stimulate discursive activity in which the figure of the subject, depending on the cooperation of the interviewee, turns on itself and in the process of becoming displaces categorical and troubled misplaced certainties about for example prescriptions of her/his Britishness or Greekness. Further to this, such an enterprise stimulates a plethora of non cognitive or non reflective affects which as noted earlier not only stretch the discursive boundaries of the interview as a tool for social research they also enrich the incisiveness of the interviewer into diverse understandings in the quest to address the limits of knowledge (Bondi 1999) during and beyond the research process.

To turn this conceptual framework into an interviewing technique works as follows: one of the set questions for both samples was ‘what makes one Greek or British?’ In most cases the interviewees would come up with stock answers with regards to what delineates Greek or British national, ethnic or cultural identities. To break through this pattern I intercepted the interviewee’s linear and cyclical narration with comments or questions that were problematizing such narrations in many different ways.

\[25\text{ For the workings of mechanisms for the construction of meaning see (Husserl 1970; Sayyid 2003; Zizek 1989).}\]
depending on the mood of the interview, and in accordance to its flow and in relation to the personality of the interviewee. For example, in one instance I would challenge such accounts by bringing in examples from everyday life or by counter posing them with other accounts or facts that stimulated dialogue and encouraged a thoughtful response on the part of the interviewee. If I saw that this was causing any sort of discomfort or angst, or that the interviewee was experiencing any kind of cognitive conflict 26 or particular difficulty in approaching the enquiry discursively then I would divert the conversation to allow for breathing space and then return to it as the mood allowed. This kind of dialogic approach gave the interviewee the necessary time to surmount, at will, her/his initial position regarding the particular topic and thereafter we would normally revisit it from a different angle, thus entering in the experience of analytic time. This engendered responses, that were more considered. This is because through this discursive process the interviewee was given the time and the space to make up her/his own mind by reflecting over the range of disparate viewpoints presented to her/him with regards to the topic of discussion, and as such the outcome was deeply personal and affirmative. If the interviewee was fully engaging with the conversation then the aforementioned was not necessary and the moment of analytic time was easy to reach27. However it was perhaps due to the nature of this well educated and informed sample and the professional nature of their work meant their initial responses at interview were often unconvincing. being based on the expectations of work based interviews. A more in depth interview that allowed the interviewee to engage with the interviewer more fully meant employing a more relational approach.

26 Whereas Piaget used ‘Cognitive Conflict’ as a term to describe the process of learning occurring between ‘Assimilation’ and Accommodation’ I use this term to describe the process of cognitive conflict experienced with reference to thinking about ‘Schemas’ that do not match. See Piaget (1969) (Constructivist theory) and Vygotsky (1962) (Social Constructivist theory). Both Piaget and Vygostsky were concerned with learning and the development of children. ‘Cognitive Conflict’ was considered to be part of the process of learning. Piaget advocated that ‘Assimilation’ was when knowledge was absorbed from the environment and that when any knowledge did not fit with prior assimilated ‘schemas’ of knowledge, then cognitive conflict occurred provoking ‘Accommodation’ or a new stage in learning with the casting aside of old knowledge. I suggest that that cognitive conflict can also occur without learning. Adults may be resistant to change (learning) yet still experience the initial state (cognitive conflict) because there is a ‘lack of matching’ between knowledges. The relationship between emotion and cognition is to this day is hotly debated. It is probable that emotion can cause cognition and vice versa. Cognitivists believe that cognition comes prior to emotion and psychoanalysts advocate the opposite.

27 See appendix five for a full transcript.
3.6 The Effects of Doing Research: During and Beyond

In the light of the aforementioned co-production of data, continual (re)evaluation of levels of consciousness argued for by feminist geographers, is imperative. Researchers are encouraged to look into how intersubjectivity affects their inner landscape (Madge 1993; Kobayasi 1994, 2001; Kolker 1996; Widdowfield 2000). Such a process cannot merely be cathartic when dealing with research (Meth and Malaza 2003); it is also meant to be a quest for meaning (Danforth 1989 cited in Foltz et al. 1996: 301) that may provide a research resource (Stanko 1997).

Especially with research whose subject matter evolves within or around identities, regardless of degrees of impartiality, no researcher can walk away from the fieldwork unaffected. In other words there is affect in the process (Meth and Malaza 2003: 155-7), not merely in the topic studied, and it permeates into the aftermath of the fieldwork and through to the stages of analysis, interpretation and to the presentation of data and then beyond. This affective aspect of research further colours reflexivity, thereby articulating new forms of situatedness and positionality.

The critic might argue that the accentuation of non-cognitive, non-reflective affects depends on degrees of experience, familiarity and compatibility with the psychological profile of the researcher and with the subject of investigation, and success or failure in managing the distances between researcher/researched. I would agree, in the sense that experiencing the interpersonal and relational aspect of the interview was a challenging experience, as I believe it was, for some or even many of my interviewees who were unused to this type of interview. Working alongside my interviewees towards the praxis of analytic time in the relational setting of the interview meant every single aspect of my identity as well as what lies within my own social fabric played games with me, both during and post the fieldwork. Before surmounting the reticence, inhibitions, lack of knowledge, and emotivity of my interviewees I had to surmount mine. With every single interview, my reflexivity shifted further, thereby affecting my positionality and situatedness in the sense of generating more articulations in positions and situated knowledge. As I accrued experience my speech patterns changed, and even the terminology I used with respect to the issues covered by the project changed the way I used language in my everyday conversations.

Before the fieldwork I was largely dismissive of entrenched notions of belonging relating to ethnic, cultural or national utterances. I was normative in my approach to these
notions in the context of the unfolding EU space, thereby compromising my awareness of what people would really opt for if they were given the choice. From below, to formulate their own version of the EU project. But during and after the fieldwork, the more I became aware of how people respond to issues related to the subject matter of the project, the more cautious I became not to unwittingly cause upset to the interviewees, and people in general. I became more aware of people's hidden emotions and able to admit that previously somewhere in my quest for understanding the notions of myself, as the person I am turning into or the individual I have become, I had lost sight of the fact that many people generally speaking with respect to the aforementioned belongings, feel more often than not comfortable with who they are.

As a kind of guarantor of identity a sizeable majority of people prefer the failsafe spaces wherein one would rather be than not, as these are the cocoons that guarantee the enunciation of difference: 'as a whole I think your chances are better...it's what we know...Better the devil you know.' (Alistair)

In this context difference is a key part of people's identities:

'I don't want us to be a homogeneous state...I see each country having its own culture and its own personality and traits...we're all very different, and although you might meet the parameters at the outset... There is a danger of that, because the EU is trying to impose certain things and we are all operating in a certain sort of environment that is the same and that has the danger of dampening down people's own individual cultures I feel.' (Margaret)

it is a 'state-of-being-in-the-world' that is craved for. In this context drilling holes into the levees of the aforementioned states-of-being became some times, especially in the interviews where 'all was not going well', an uncomfortable experience and that left me at the end of the field year with more questions than answers.

Moreover the non-cognitive, non-reflective affects such as feelings, emotions and desires of these moments are difficult to represent. The attempt to represent what is unarticulated during the exchanges that take place in the interview, such as the subtle variations of breathing that precede uncomfortable words, the fidgeting, the twitching of the facial muscles under the wafer thin crust of a phlegmatic posture, the sullen emotivity that is not spoken but you sense it in the air, the silences and the pauses, expose the impossibility of representing what lies beyond discourse and thus eludes representation (Rose 1997b). Yet these cannot be ignored (Thrift 2004). They are immersed in the data.
troubling its processing every time the researcher tries to ignore it during the stage of analysis.

Therefore in approaching research as an interpersonal and relational enterprise that challenged the limits of my knowledge I was left with what I might call portraits of memory. These are ‘portraits’ that cannot simply be transcribed, as they exceed discussion, and yet they are truly representative of what really went on during those interviews. They served as an uncomfortable reminder of the limitations of cognition and discourse as the tools for social research. Their affect however, even stretches beyond that stage (Thrift 2007; Thien 2005b); it changed my dismissive approach to such phenomena as homophobia, xenophobia and even racism. In my (re)viewed approach these are beyond being merely phenomena of stirred up nationalism, naiveté, ignorance or meanness. Instead I would now argue that people, generally speaking, are affected by the aforementioned phenomena because these play into their fears, anxieties or senses of loss.

At the same time I was affected by the extent of the numerous refractions of such lurking maladies on the grounds that almost every single aspect of our social, cultural and political lives is steeped in them. Before the field year for example every time I was passing by the ‘St. George’s Tavern’ in my local high street I would not have taken any notice of the white rowdy indoor or outdoor crowd, and I would walk through them. After the field year I caught myself walking onto the opposite side of the road especially when a many people were outdoors drinking. For the first time I found any flags, on any occasion, anywhere, an aggressive intimidating statement, even threatening. Before, I was dismissive of all this nostalgic pageantry as ‘mere visually kitsch rituals’ that embellish national and local mythologies or events ‘littering’ daily trivia in its ‘spectacular’ moments. Now I treat this visual flagging with a lot more ‘respect’ and even fear!

In sum, I became more understanding in my approach, precisely because I realized that most issues could not be considered in an ‘all or nothing’ approach, as all negative or all positive. There are simply a plethora of variables feeding into any phenomena and one has to take them into account before (s)he passes judgement.

28 This learning curve falls anew within the constructivist approach to learning as the active process where experience is critical. As learning is contextualized as an integral part of social activity, over time reflection and maturity enhances understanding and affects performance.
3.7 Writing into the Project

Due to the interpersonal context of this type of interview which in turn may significantly effect the content and nature of the emerging information (Miles and Crush 1993), it became apparent that the collected data should be treated and interpreted as an 'interactive text', and that its narratives should be treated as the product of a complex series of interactions between the interviewer and interviewees (Silverman 2001). Especially when charged topics are investigated, it is an illusion to think that the collection of facts is objective (Rosaldo 1989). After all, the interviewees as well as the interviewer are situated (Herod 1999).

As was noted in section 3.2.2 the assumption that this sample would be cosmopolitan in outlook and that the subject matter of this investigation was of public nature and therefore easy to discuss-- in the sense that generally speaking people are accustomed to professional pollsters targeting issues such as identities, belongings and citizenships, and thus the interviewees would be familiar with these and thus able to discuss from a public angle-- was greatly misconceived. The fieldwork revealed that the issues discussed and the topics covered had been internalized by the subjects to such an extent that they had formulated a positionality that was deeply subjective, and that it merely bore the mask of the public persona.

This realization compelled me to approach the data as an aggregate of personal narratives (Marks 1989). Scholars in other disciplines have suggested several advantages in using techniques to decode the sub-stratal meanings inherent within interviews that generate such accounts. To summarize, they point out that these narratives are an effective way of re writing from below the silences and ethnocentrisms of formal narratives. The collection of such narratives however requires a thorough knowledge of the culture in which one is working.

The actual structure of the interview used a frame of fixed topics that would cover the issues out of which pivotal questions could be pulled. However there was no fixed schedule. This was specifically to avoid inadvertently shaping the discussions. Instead, I sought to spark off dialogue, and then whenever possible to allow the interviewee to lead the discussion further. Sometimes this was achieved successfully, with the interviewees taking over the discussion and the transcripts reveal that I said little. Sometimes when the discussion started to flag, prompts were needed. Then I would raise the topic for the interviewee to consider. Because the discussions were open-ended, some interviews were
longer than others. Sometimes I had to divert the discussion from drifting away from the topics in hand. However due to the nature of the topics as well as the implemented interview technique the discussions were rarely halting. Demographic questions about age, occupation and educational background were included in the beginning of each interview as a general familiarizing practice and as a means of opening into the ensuing conversation. Then there was a progression towards discussing ethnic origins, which gradually moved the discussion towards issues of nationality, citizenship, identity and belonging.

In this way the interview inevitably becomes an open conversation including an exchange of information which is both personal and public. It involves not merely stated words but rather mood swings, body language, and, or else the ‘alternative voices’ which McDowell (1992a) has argued geographical work should include and hear. However none of the above mood swings were possible to transcribe. Further to that, due to the fact that what is built into the interview situation are ad hoc occurrences taking place, certain hierarchical dispositions and certain questions on sensitive issues had to be pursued differently.

It was important to stimulate certain phrases and ideas that would indicate inner thoughts, or even emotions and sentiments in the interviewees while ensuring there was no break down of cooperation and trust. The query had to be carefully phrased in a manner that did not suggest interpretative avenues to the interviewees but rather allowed them the necessary space to form the vocabularies that could illustrate their views. Certain areas were simply inaccessible so that I had to be content with the information they volunteered. Because of the non cognitive, non reflective affects springing out of some areas I was constantly wary not to give offence. Quite frequently narratives quickly crossed into the recounting of recollections of events, feelings, emotions, desires and perceptions based on interviewees’ experiences and they used the opportunity of narration in an almost pedagogic fashion. The interviewees seized such an opportunity, for instance responding to the concept of a future European demos submerged in this research project to enumerate all reasons why such a concept is an unrealistic scenario. This was explained with reference to the politics of the EU that was in their opinion positively contradicted by its record so far. Even more, many from the sample imparted their understanding of the ways of the world using their own experiences to suggest how things should be run in light of the prospect of an ever enlarging union into a more or less functioning coherent entity.
Despite the fact that surveys regularly cover topics concerning identities, notions of belonging and citizenship; through listening closely to the conversational talk that is coming through the data, it is clear that such topics go well beyond common sense thinking framed by the patterns of attitude, surveys basically target. The semi-structured interviews gave respondents the opportunity to express their individuality. Individual ideology was revealed within those patterns of common sense thinking which cut across class, age and gender distinctions. This meant looking for commonalities in what was said. Just as importantly, it meant looking for the common patterns in what was not said. The silences or the unspoken gaps between words can be as ideologically revealing as spoken words. In this sense the unspoken or the non discursive, became as significant as the discursive, ‘pointing out the silences, pointing out the unspoken, un described others’ (Spivak 1990:16).

It is inevitable that the search of commonalities affects the presentation of the material. Thus the analysis is organized in terms of those commonalities that are prescribed by underlying sub-themes. These are organized in terms of particular controversies such as views on ancestral roots, sanctified heritages, institutions, their symbols, transnational mobility and its effects, cosmopolitanism and Otherness, notions of belonging, community and locality. The aim behind such a presentation was not to discover who takes which position on such issues; that can be left to the opinion surveys. Instead, through uncovering these themes the investigation also catches glimpses of ordinary living and perceived experiences, which as suggested at the beginning of this chapter, was just as or even more important that ‘actual’ facts. Moreover the conversational modus operandi of the interviews is a functioning method for gaining the sorts of insights into life worlds, which are not usually produced from survey research.

Furthermore all interviews were conducted in locations familiar to the subjects. Yet the focus on the happenings in the psychic space of the interview did not allow the overall physical micro-geographies of the interview setting to play a significant part in the ensuing data. The analysis involves presenting a number of extracts from these interviews conducted in places of work, home and leisure. Two principal ways are used here to illustrate this. There are extracts which are taken verbatim from the transcripts, whereby the use of the conventions of conversation analysis is employed in order to indicate hesitations. interruptions discursive overlaps and pauses. Then there are extracts which are not taken verbatim to frame individual remarks made in the course of the unfolding moments occurring in the course of the interview.
The ability of the majority of the overall sample to yield usable information about the impact of the social forces that influence their living experiences, made this sample more than others, attractive to research. In my view this is due to the nature of the career orientated mobile lifestyle that makes it imperative for the sample to understand, interpret, and contextualize incoming or outgoing data. Nevertheless this was not free from frustrations, mainly for the reasons discussed so far, as well as for reasons relating to the use of language by both samples. It needs to be stressed that both samples were not attentive to language as a valuable tool to be carefully fashioned and put to use in the communicating of their ideas. This was especially acute with respect to Greek narratives. Greek language spoken by contemporary Greeks is not always comprehensible even to other Greeks - like myself - who have a different approach or use of language. Between Greeks differences in the learning of language have emerged due to the location and time they are brought up and to the individual ways each one of us has evolved. This problem occurred in the use of language as shared between the participants and myself - and the experience of interaction in social contexts and cultural practices meant that commonly shared words were linked to differing connotations of meaning with regards to the issues investigated.

The Greeks produced narratives that at times gave me no choice but to translate them in the target language (English), on the assumption that words must be translated differently according to the context. I tried to avoid neologisms that would correspond to every single terminological nuance. The result is that the Greek extracts at times are not taken verbatim; instead readable translations were produced, that preserved or emphasized a comprehensive rendering of the sense of their narratives. Naturally I have tried to be as consistent as possible but this possibility at times was limited. This sometimes resulted in some terminological innovations.

For example in the case of lengthy noun compounds I have used a phrase instead of a noun. I have broken down complex sentences embellished with lengthy adjectival clauses that ‘move reciprocally’ in the space of the topic under discussion - the Greeks are fond of this way of speech - into separate sentences, in order to preserve the sense of the narrative. Greeks, unlike the British who are articulate in their speech but reticent, talk with many asides, afterthoughts and qualifications. They euphemistically prescribe this fashioned communication as a ‘lateral thinking mode of communicating’ which nevertheless produces sentences that do not hang together logically or even grammatically. Thus I have been forced to intervene in the text on many occasions.
sometimes with bracketed words or phrases and sometimes by translating the sentence I think they must have meant to say. In this context some of the Greek extracts- in parts- are more of an interpretation, than a translation.

As in all forms of discourse language plays its role in the interpretative approach to the data. Language uses varying sets of concepts to attune to the nuances of subjectivity required, whereby this experience can be understood and interpreted. This requires that language reveal the connections between experience and what people make out of this experience. People are the centre of concern since language expresses and creates reality in different ways (Spradley 1979). As such it was crucial that I had the linguistic ability to interpret how the sample categorizes experience and uses customary thought processes, and how to ask and direct questions so that I could approach attentively what lay behind in the often apparently every day discourse. This ability was instrumental in increasing awareness of the contingency of meaning. Additionally the ability to speak the native language certainly plays a crucial role in any act of translation representing research material. Muller (2007) argues that the translating geographer is an active agent who moulds the production of meaning; this by implication situates meaning, and thus makes translation a political and subjective act. Nevertheless this problematizes understandings of the research (Smith 1996 cited in Muller 2007: 210), and heightens the sense of responsibility for transferring meaning from one language to another in academic discourse. The constant learning curve of apprehending the semantic and linguistic nuances, which quite often I would argue are simply intractable, is an experience commonly felt by all those who like myself have been based and socialized during their academic lives outside their country of origin.

In this case the collection of the data was done in either English or Greek or a combination of both depending upon what the interviewee preferred. This was critical, for it prevented the interviewer from imposing a format on the interview that controlled the unfolding of the narration. Therefore a common sense understanding of the language was needed to be employed in order to apprehend differences between vocabularies used, structure and idiom, and in some instances even between concepts.

By conceding the interviewees the right to narrate their views in the idiom of their own choosing it was inevitable that unfamiliar idioms, expressions and meanings would intrude into the narrative. The preferred choice was not to intervene at the time for clarification, thus interrupting the flow of the narrative, but rather to leave issues of meaning and interpretation for the stages of eliciting, analyzing and comparing the data.
This approach however introduced a new set of problems namely that of the need to regress literally to the mood swings of the interview in order to avoid paying an injustice to what had been stated. This further exposed the weakness of the proffered methods of the conceptual schema of social analysis.

Despite these difficulties which had to be approached sensitively in order not to alter the original meaning of the interviews the method used for eliciting, analyzing, and comparing the data was nevertheless framed by the grounded theory approach to qualitative research. This involved formally identifying themes, deciding upon these themes’ relationships to each other and selecting important ones that would lead to theoretical ideas. The primary data consisted of transcripts from the recorded interviews and field notes from the diary, that is, anything adding to the context in which the data of each interview was constructed as the project moved on.

The framework of processing this data in the context of what has been discussed so far in this chapter was based on a twofold approach. On the one hand the search for commonalities in what was said and on the other commonalities in what was not said. These were then weighted against one another so that the non discursive, non representational aspects of each interview would not be missed during the phase of interpretation and presentation of the material.

As intimated earlier when discussing the problem of transcribing in both languages, considerable effort was made to transcribe the recordings as soon and as accurately as possible. The transcripts were numbered by page, by line, with each page marked with the source of the material. A tentative overview from the working ideas at the time in consultation with the notes from the diary would then be drafted and stored in a separate document.

The first stage of the analysis was initiated by reading each transcript (from an A3 copy) a sentence at a time and on the right margin jotting down in a circled annotation what was going on in that sentence - if there was anything of any significance it was given an initial code or codes as applicable to any segment from the text.

Once this cycle of open coding with the entirety of transcripts was completed it was followed by the second stage of coding. That involved the rereading of the material where similar themes, actions, events and sentiments were grouped together and relabelled. In this process the initial coding was consolidated. At the same time in the left margin notes were made as to whether the coded categories that were emerging were
found or invented; this is in the sense of whether those categories emerged from the interviewees’ view of the world in the context of the investigation (‘emic’ categories) or from some composite of my own representation of their views (‘etic’ categories).

At this stage in a different document the coded categories were noted down so that a clearer picture emerged. This entailed the number of categories, their similarities and also gave a clearer overview as to the nature of those categories as noted above. The latter however, in the context of the discussion in this chapter regarding the intersubjective and relational framework of interviewing, was by no means a straightforward process. During this process in another document, codes, abbreviations and symbols were explained in the sense of what they stood for, so as to trace the record of the categories when needed.

During the third stage of the analysis a further document was created where the tentative linkages between the aforementioned categories and their frameworks of relating to the issues concerning this investigation were delineated and underscored with a colour that connoted mood. For example the generic theme of identity and its sub themes such as national, ethnic, cultural, or European identity were linked to notions for example of belonging (with its sub themes that is, national, cultural, ethnic or any other), of citizenship (national, transnational, European and so on) or to notions of Otherness and of the Other. This was when, for the reasons discussed earlier, it was necessary to go back over the original interview again repeatedly listening to the recordings of the interviews. The linkages I made through this approach then related to the feeling associated with the theme, for example cultural notion of belonging could connote attachment to a culture and would get an orange colour to represent it. Each colour was then given a number on a scale of one to ten according to the extremity of the non cognitive non reflective affects resulting from the conversation, one being the least emotional response and ten being the most extreme.

These linkages I now identified with a given mood, as communicated through the interview, would then be further interpreted as follows. Each mood was marked with a cluster of abbreviations and symbols like those usually used by cartoonists, to highlight the non cognitive non reflective affects of the interview. Meanwhile in another document the most prominent connections in the sense of density regarding the aforementioned affects or recurrence were noted down, each one with annotations that linked any ideas coming through those at the time.
In the fourth stage the emerging categories and their connections were then brought together in cumulative chains thus formulating the basin for the ideas that were starting to come through.

At the final stage the above connections and relations between statements were merged and from this stage onwards the focus of analysis shifted from individual statements to the ways in which these related to one another. This resulted in the drafting of charts (box 3.7.1). Each one of these charts contained the finalized conceptual headings that stood for the connections made and their relationships to one another throughout the processing of the data with regards to the particular concepts underscoring the aims and objectives of this project. The finalizing ideas represented by these charts were then linked to one another in theoretical frameworks that were deemed suitable to support the conclusions reached by the project in the context of its key aims and objectives as these were laid out in the first chapter.

‘Off cuts’ from transcripts that expressed most explicitly the formulated connections were grouped under the coded banner of each connection. That is under the coded banner for example of ethnic identity, the relevant ‘off cuts’ were grouped under different sub piles, each one of them relating to sub themes that linked ethnic identity to the issues affecting it as discussed in the interviews. From these piles of off cuts the excerpts included in the chapters came from, and were considered the most elucidating way of displaying the views and moods of the interviewees.

These accounts were believed to be representative in the sense that they reflected the concerns, beliefs and cultures of a mobile educated sample from the two countries under investigation. While the Greek sample mostly came from the Greek mainland some were the children of immigrant parents who had lived abroad but held a Greek passport. Due to the nature of shared values and beliefs inherent in Greek culture these people were also deemed representative of Greek mobile migrants. Equally in the British sample those who identified themselves as British represented a spread of people who can call upon other ethnic origins but who held a British passport and felt themselves to be linked to British identity. In the interviews they not only portrayed their personal views, but most importantly they reflected the perceptions and moods of a Greek and British community in transit of mobile, motivated individuals willing to take advantage of the structural and other opportunities presented to them by the European project.
The basin of Britishness, the basin of Greekness:
The common place
Of
People

CONNECTION

Senses \(\leftarrow\) through people through \(\rightarrow\) emotions

to the

banal \(\rightarrow\) CULTURE OF 'RITUALS' \(\leftarrow\) spectacular

banal and spectacular associations to localized and nationalized contexts depend on connections to specific activities and events people related to the latter two and to the objects incorporated in these and their representations

CULTURAL ENVIRONMENT
(people, activities, events, objects, representations)

\(\downarrow\)

Feeling of Home (negotiable)

\(\downarrow\)

Felling of Belonging (negotiable)

CULTURAL ENVIRONMENT
(Insider's notion of the 'ritual' (senses & emotions))

emotional entanglement

Greek \(\leftarrow\) Sense of being comfortable \(\rightarrow\) British

Notion of Belonging
3.8 Conclusion

According to Ellis et.al. (1996: 26) qualitative research produces ‘written realities’ [of] a second-order…that reshape[] the events [they] depict[].’ This is inevitable as qualitative research operates from within an environment of ‘double hermeneutics’ (Giddens 1976, 1984) which describes the (dis)connection between the language used in social theory and the language people use in attributing meaning to their social environment, since ‘[o]nly experience is sensitive’ (Hoeg 1994 cited in Robbins and Krueger 2000: 636) with respect to the phenomena under investigation. This constant slippage between the two languages is inevitable when drawing deeper into the reflexive gaze required by the research process. This thereby accentuates the limits of qualitative research, generating more questions than answers about its conduct. This notwithstanding, geographers must make claims about what is on peoples’ minds (Lorimer 2005).

Research, especially with regards to sensitive issues, deals with a disparate disposition between the transcript and actual interview happenings. The standardized practices of social analysis fail to capture the ‘alternative voices’ (McDowell 1992a) that hover around and beyond the textual intricacies of common sense thinking. This is not because of the lack of accurate concepts, but rather due to the constitutive resistance within those voices to interpretation and representation and to the tools of analysis that social science has in its arsenal. In this context transparent reflexivity is imperative for safe guarding the research process and the knowledge gleaned from the homogenizing effects of positivist approaches to human behaviour and societal functioning. This notwithstanding, reflexivity can also complicate things further by introducing an exhaustive elaboration on the actual happenings that in turn are not immune from speculation.

Finally the solution to such problems seemed to lie outside conventional methods of coding, thematization and discourse analysis. Putting aside the conceptual schema of social analysis and regressing to the portraits of memory that depicted the mood swings ‘aired in spaces beyond the limits of what is normally taken to constitute academic work’ (Bondi 1999: 11). I interpreted verbal accounts as closely as possible and thereafter analyzed them. Without this ‘transgression’ process the transcripts did not seem to ‘link’ with the affectivity of the interpersonal ways of being, which were occurring within the interview situation.
Put simply, the transcripts post interview did not communicate to me what had taken place during the interviews. My memory of those affective portraits simply kept undermining the facts I had collected. Listening to the audio tapes and reading the transcripts were two worlds apart. By simply coding the sighing of relief, the laughter or distress and even occasional tear when recalling some emotional episode from the past, such codes were unable to convey the real disposition of myself and the informants. The transcripts were unable to capture the momentum or the moods that were constantly sifting in real time through the interview, generating instantaneously more articulations of situated knowledge.

The phonological aspect of the data is a living witness to that. It raises questions about the problems researchers face when they do everything by the book as the researcher may well find that (s)he sets her/himself adrift to the push and pull factors of double hermeneutics. It can be argued that being reflexive during the research process merely makes sure that the researcher and the knowledge (s)he produces will not fall into any essentialist trappings. One albeit controversial way, for some, that has been suggested to address this and other failings of qualitative research, is by engaging in the psychotherapeutic theories and practice Bondi (2005) argues for, with reference to the field of human geography so that geographers can access what lies beyond cognition and discourse. This is what critical cultural geography calls for as a means to benefit knowledge production.
Chapter Four

Britishness: A British Idiom

4.1 Introduction

This chapter argues that self-conceptions of Britishness are located in a stereotype of pragmatism and that this stereotype underpins the ideological construction of British meaning, imagery and practice.

The chapter develops this position in three sections from the responses of the British sample through the connections the participants make with an identity framed by ‘British’ empiricism and coupled with practical action.

In the first section Britishness is discussed as a process of change and continuity, which (re)articulates according to changing times and adapts to contemporary spaces and meanings. This gave the participants in this sample a sense of being part of a form of civilization that stands out as a tangible heritage. The second section examines how Britishness is articulated as a disavowal of nationalism. Instead Britishness is portrayed as a factual entity versus any Other which portrayed as unruly and chaotic. In the final section Britishness is investigated as the ‘common place’ wherein the individual, society and nationhood are conflated through processes of codes of practice and conduct thus creating the experience of being British.

The chapter concludes with the claim that because of the ways Britishness manifests itself, it is able to outwardly metastasize and metamorphose, colonizing more domains and more spaces. This asserts its difference while its malleability and practicality enables its dominant positioning in the world, generating amongst the British, a sense of being part of a superior group.

4.2 Britishness: Continuity: Being Part of the Team

The discussion in this chapter starts by arguing that Britishness is a habitus (Bourdieu 1990) animated by a particular belief in continuity and as such it acts as the generative mechanism for structuring spaces able to respond to novel situations of constant change and innovation. In this context Britishness is marked by:
‘a vision of constant change which seemingly displaces that of perpetual continuity; all appears transient and nothing stable. Change and continuity are played off against one another...change can be visualized as a sequence of events that ‘happens’ to something that otherwise retains its identity...continuity makes change evident.’ (Strathern 1992: 1)

This enables structures of seemingly invariant and unchanging nature for example the institution of the monarchy, to connect with notions of modern British identity through the ritualized practices that surround substantial action, as for example: ‘The State Opening of Parliament’, or through notions of identity seen as encoded in tradition, as explained by Margaret.

‘Yes, they’re elite. They’re not living the same life as ordinary people in Britain, but you’re always aware of them. They’re a very important part of the cultural and the social history in the UK...I’ve always found the history of it very interesting to study...I like visiting their stately homes. I find that all very interesting. I think in my...for the history of the Royal Family in the last century. in the 20th Century, they’ve more been figureheads, and you’ve got a separate political system. So neither me nor my family...the last few generations. have suffered in any shape or form from the Royal Family. It’s been more a figurehead for pomp and ceremony. That’s what I like about it...Yes, I mean, what you’re talking about, feudalism and everything, is...a thing of the past...It’s difficult to say what it is. But it’s something that I’ve always been aware that I felt. I like the Royal Family. I find them interesting to watch, to follow...It’s something that seems to be quite ingrained within British society. And most people when they see the Royal Family and the ceremonies and different things feel proud...they all say they’re proud to be British when they see it...You don’t have to look that deeply if you don’t want to...Yeah, I like that. And I find it quite interesting to...you follow the news about what’s happening in the Royal Family. And I’m not looking too deeply into all that. History of the Royal Family. I find that quite interesting again. Henry 8th and his six wives, and all that sort of thing. I don’t look into it and start thinking what that means for me as a human being and the history of family and land.’

This combination of incorporating both traditional and contemporary elements is one factor that: ‘determines British against other Europeans or Americans for example.’ (Margaret) When the British sample talks about continuity. it talks about the ability to
process a flexible customary adherence in relation to these rituals while at the same time continuing to innovate in practical procedures relating to pragmatic every day living.

The spectacular and banal markers of this tradition are, in the view of the respondents here, the signifiers over which the seamless line of British continuity runs, framing the canvas of Britishness. This canvas stretches back well beyond the 'age of nationalism' (Gellner 1983) as British identity has been isolated from the mainstream notions of nation building by its early formation and historic stability. The depth of the canvas reinforces the impression of continuity that conveys in Adrian's words, a sense of 'reliability and dependability', which underwrites their notion of Britishness:

'If you're asking me personally, it's a sense of unity, a sense of belonging, a sense of rebellion, but also conformity. Everything's very balanced, there's sort of a bit of luxury, and a bit of abstinence. Everything's balanced. and I think it's quite a balanced culture. And there's a sort of expectation, but also the satisfaction of expectation and achieving expectations. Whatever it be. It's part urban, it's part rural. It's a bit of everything. We do have hot summers, we do have hot weather in the summer. Equally we have snow in the winter, and I think it's a country of compromise is my personal view. Everything about it is about compromise. You get that little bit of everything...It's that level playing field. This is the middle ground... It's experiences...It's clearer in my mind that it's an identity based on experience.' (Adrian)

In the above context and in other statements made by the sample, what transpires when the participants talk about their notions of continuity in the context of British cultural identity, is that they are arguably referring to a notion of Britishness as the outcome of everyday cooperation and teamwork. This is grouped under an accommodating symbolism: 'It's something we've had for thousands of years. I don't think that we have...I think we're a much more structured society in Britain. I think we've got an identity which is much more clear and it defines how they live and what they expect and what they want to do. And what they did with their friends' (Adrian) rather than being specifically about the development of the British state, which subsequently fostered the general need for a national identity.

The kind of collective identification and allegiance to British cultural identity witnessed in this sample reaches beyond the symbols of nationalism to the unity and political legitimacy the sample experiences in the way they organise contemporary

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practical activities: 'where everybody is very cool, very calm, and there's almost a value placed on your indifference to things.' (Adrian) This comment it can be suggested refers to a notion of Britishness described as the 'poetry of national existence' found in an apparently 'intuitive decency' (Nairn 1988: 94), that underpins the construction of the British thing as portrayed quite literally in the excerpt below. It lays the foundation of tangible Britishness as being able to engender and link seemingly unrelated responses to many situations and thus being capable of generating new spaces for (re)articulating itself in the form for example of new products such as markets, services, commodities, ideas and fashions.

In the excerpt below we find articulated the view that the essence of Britishness manifests as an effective management of the discourse of living and that it is this which animates British identity:

'If you're talking about a British thing...there is a standard...And you've got to have a level of attaining it...is that you set procedures and laws and regulations...You use that as...your code of practice...And that's the thing, we've got the vision to isolate the issue and get a solution. Let's record what we've agreed and go and do it. They don't like that. They don't like being pinned down.' (Jeremy)

Here Britishness is defined around a modus Vivendi or habitus that is described in terms of transparency and rationality. Understandably writers like Sarup (1996) interpret this British thing as the traditionalist definition of Englishness that emphasizes empiricism as the value that exalts common sense. Such an underpinning of Britishness, organized around a work ethic, confers respectability as much as social and self discipline and the following excerpt illustrates this:

'I like to draw the analogy between the British army and the American army, because it does typify a little bit the way that Britain works. Class structure comes into it a bit. In the British army most of the people in the army know what their aspiration is, what their job is going to be, and what the maximum they can be is. Because we have the split structure. officers, junior ranks, and then the NCO's and warrant officers. They know what they can get to, you see. So it's a little bit class system, officers go to Sandhurst, they get trained, and the guys join in the ranks and they might make it to corporal sergeant, and the ones who are really good are going to go to...They're never going to be leading combat troops as officers. But they are going to be squad leaders, as corporals, leading sections of the troops, whatever. And that works, because everybody knows what their job is. Look at
the Americans. Because it's start at the bottom, fight your way up the whole way. And it's almost an absolute meritocracy. People are always adverse to taking decisions because they've always been judged on that. And therefore when you compare how the two armies operate, we've all seen it in the last two months. the Yanks have come over with a very blinkered approach. do this. my job. you know. The English thinking, OK here's your troop, go up, give it your best shot. if you get into difficulties give us a call and we'll come back and help you out with any extra resources. So the corporal takes his boys off, he's got his section, goes off, sorts it out. And it's a little bit the same with sending somebody off to be an expat. Here's your job, here are your resources. get out there. give it your best shot, if you get into difficulties, come back to us. If you don't, great. And that sort of initiative belief is...I don't know where it comes from. is it public school. is it...I don't know. But I think there is a belief, and I do think we make good travellers as a result.' (James)

Evidence of this mind frame underpinning Britishness embellishes the accounts of the British sample. Notably Englishness is then conflated with Britishness:

Interviewer: When we say British, we mean...?
Alistair: English. White English...I could use either expressions to be honest. I think a lot of people actually confuse them, so I think of English as, or British as English.

Yet such confusion does not indicate a lack of national consciousness. On the contrary, it is the key feature of English nationalism, asserting its hegemonic position over the rival Celtic and other nationalisms of the UK whilst not appearing to do so (Nairn 1988).

Such a mindset is viewed as capable of dealing with adversity, of inculcating initiative, of having self belief geared towards effectiveness, precision in execution, punctuality; in other words a British habitus that is capable of incorporating the Anglo, Celtic, Jewish- Polish, Franco, Italian, Spanish and Greek British composite of this sample (see appendix one). Effectively this British thing is touching upon the notion of balanced identity that bears a close resemblance to the political balance, associated with the middle class (Sarup 1996). This is in keeping with what Adrian said earlier, when he effectively describes British identity as balanced. Equally it is verified by James's above extract and also described by Jeremy below who makes the analogy between the balanced underpinning of Britishness as a team and the successful performance of a
football team or the construction of a company based on careful balancing of resources and outcomes. This identification with teamness generates a unique sense of belonging:

'I would try and give... yeah, I was using the football example. see now that's saturation. And what you've got to do is get the right balance... what you want to have, you want to have an organisational unit. [where] you belong to the family. whether it be the company... because if I want to go and build, why don't I just go and set myself up as a postbox. and say right, I need x number of engineers. architects, blah de dah, put them all together, and if I pick good managers it will make it work. And then the job finishes, and it all dissolves. But the company's a different structure, isn't it? The company gives a feeling of belonging. You belong to that family, the company, and you feel the company... They'll look after you, and... Now that's building a knowledge base... You understand what I'm talking about? You've still got to keep that balance... I'm not parochial in my attitude. Sometimes I can slip into things like... but there's a disconnect sometimes when I talk to my family... the hair's up on the back of my neck when my mother will say something "Ah, but the English." and I think "Well, what do you mean?". [Laughs]. But that's really a habit of possession rather than a premeditated... against the English.' (Jeremy)

The concept of 'balance' in Sarup's words has a crucial function in middle class ideology underwriting the political authority of 'consensus', or the 'middle ground', by representing as irrational extremism whatever refuses to be gathered into the middle ground' (ibid. pp. 136-7). Against this investment in transparency and balance is the general Other: 'It's other people who make you feel different' (Clare) and this is depicted as the antithesis of the British. The continental European in particular, was described by the respondents in terms of having a lack of self and social discipline: 'looking out for themselves, whatever they've got to do is the most important thing... Yeah, without a thought to anyone else' (Alistair), or as in Margaret's words:

Margaret: I think generally, this side of Greeks where they like to go out, eat late and have music and dance... I think that's really good. I like that. I think the way they are generally to each other, I get the impression they're very selfish. Each man is for himself and to heck with everybody else. Lack of consideration for others. That appals me.

Interviewer: But isn't the same happening back in Britain, in London?
Margaret: I feel not, from my own experiences. I mean, there’s a bit of a dog eat dog attitude in the tube...I mean, the driving here is so selfish. People just dump their cars wherever they want to. If they’re driving along, whatever they’re doing is more important than being mindful of what’s happening around them.

Interviewer: But back in London we’ve got the so-called road rage thing.

Margaret: You have road rage, but then it’s a different thing. The driving is generally more ordered, I think.

Interviewer: Because it’s regulated...

Margaret: ..more regulated to the double yellow lines, or the red routes where you can’t park. Places cannot be built, unless they’ve got proper car parking facilities. But here it doesn’t matter. You’ve got a supermarket in the middle of...It doesn’t matter that nobody can park anywhere. That drives me...that’s one of the things I find. that it’s not an easy, nice place to walk about.

Interviewer: But you still consider it as a European place, although it’s so unruly.

Margaret: Yes, because I think you’ll probably find some other things in Italy or Spain. Southern Europe.

The excerpts above and below throw into sharp relief the contrast between the continental and British mind set that ‘lik[es] things to be done properly. logically’ (Margaret). Jonathan experiences this as an argument and a conflict that haunts his everyday living in Athens:

‘Having to argue my way through even simple things. The challenge of walking down the street. There’s always conflict in this country. That’s what keeps this country going. Because you have to fight for the simplest thing. I remember in London walking up and down the street, going for a walk. It was so easy, I hardly knew I’d done it. Here, just going to the next block, you have to go around parked cars, you have to get angry because motorbikes are in front of where you want to be, everything is a challenge in this country.’ (Jonathan)

And Harry’s words describe how his ‘honeymoon’ with the ‘holidaying Greece’ came into an abrupt end once he immersed himself with its daily trivia:

‘I think the first few months still felt like being on holiday. I came in the summer, I enjoy...most of my time. I think the difficulties that I encountered really started to come after that period, and then I think I had...I bought a car – this is an
example – I’d driven it three times, and one morning it was parked in the street outside my house, and a drunk off-duty policeman smashed into it. I called the police, he called the police, the police didn’t arrive. And he promised…he took my car, promised he was going to fix it, and he never did. And I’m still in court over it, three years later.’ (Harry)

Against this chaotic outside world the respondents were keen that Britishness preserves ‘the middle ground’ (Adrian) -- seeking consensus versus adversarial conflicts-- which in the minds of the sample is the expression of the underlying structure of the British persona, that connotes ‘a sense of unity, a sense of belonging, a sense of rebellion, but also conformity’ (Adrian), for those of course who subscribe to this persona. This subscription was in numerous instances contrasted against the foreign, as when Adrian commented: ‘People, continental Europeans, appear to be being direct when they’re in fact being quite indirect…disingenuous.’ Furthermore they were also keen to emphasize that their Britishness epitomizes the ‘a-national nationalism of a multi national entity’ (Nairn 1988: 11) that is inclusive of and tolerant to difference. This can be illustrated by the following extract:

Interviewer: Now…what are the symbols of the state that define you British? When you see the Union Jack, do you say “Wow, that’s my flag?”

Margaret: Yes.

Interviewer: All right. But what about the St George’s flag?

Margaret: Well, I believe in Britain…I’m pro-Britain. I don’t think of just England. I think of Britain.

Interviewer: All right. Would you consider yourself as a patriotic?

Margaret: Yes.

Interviewer: Yes. Are you aware of the differences between patriotism and nationalism?

Margaret: Yes…to me patriotism is being proud of your country, and things that it stands for and the way it is. To me, nationalism is about keeping out everybody else who’s not British…and I think nationalism is a very narrow and damaging, and it doesn’t seem to embrace…to me nationalism doesn’t embrace other cultures.

Interviewer: Yes, it’s based on exclusion. And you claim that patriotism is based on inclusion, yeah?
Margaret: Yes.  

Such assertions can be linked to an accommodating symbolism that connotes ‘in the memory of the ordinary’ (op. cit. p. 92) a sense of cultural and political continuity, embodied by institutional markers such as Oxbridge, or the Royal Family:

‘I think the Royal Family is the bedrock of Great Britain. It’s a very central core of defining the way the country operates. We don’t have a written constitution. We have a series of legislation that defines a way of life that has evolved over time. I think any thought of some European constitution is going to be difficult to sell in GB because it goes so much against that historical context. The reality of the Royal Family – yes, it’s gone through a lot of problems...[is that] they represent a continuation on a theme and a line...Cambridge and Oxford and everything like that...it’s...part of a continuation of hundreds and hundreds of years...those institutions teach certain values.’ (Tim)

Tim’s words describe what Naim would call the ‘informing spirit of UK’ or else ‘Ukania’, that transcend the component identities of the British multi national entity on to that ‘higher plane’ (op. cit. p. 11), which has proved to be a very effective and functional solution to the making of national identity, thus enchanting the imagination of those who subscribe to it and thereby grounding their notion of belonging in this identity.

Thus in the view of the above continuity thriving on the cultivated instincts of British empiricism, historically fostered to replace theory, is vital in retaining British identity. It is an identity which is made palpable through exemplifications. These proclaim for instance, a successful history: ‘[our] history...make[s] a big, big difference’ (Tim), or in regards to a functioning infrastructure; ‘Excellence in journalism. Excellence in public broadcasting. Excellent I think in democratic structures and traditions. Excellent legal system.’ (Paul); or a ‘code of conduct’ (Francis) rooted in ‘old value[s]’ (Francis).

Further assertions highlight the ramifications of the aforementioned British empiricism made visible for example in the: ‘set procedures and laws and regulations’ (Jeremy) governed by a ‘code of practice’ (Jeremy) that demarcate the British form of civilization.

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The above excerpt illustrates what seemed typical in this sample of the British disposition of asserting itself vis-à-vis the rest of the world through a process of disavowing and disclaiming. (This will be made more explicit in the proceeding discussion as well as in the last two chapters). It essentially highlights a mind set which on one hand disavows anything that threatens to undermine Britishness and considers itself as a unifying inclusive identity and by implication a tolerant to difference national/cultural identity. Yet such disposition often contradicts itself by expressing intolerance and discontent, for example vis-à-vis continental Europe. In chapter six Margaret explicitly states that she does not want to see Britain being further incorporated into the EU in terms of integration because that would temper British distinctiveness.
All this delineates the character of a nation manifesting as a culture of ‘compromise’ (Adrian), of being ‘cool, calm and collected’ (Margaret) or possessing a level-headedness that places ‘value...[on the] indifference to things.’ (Adrian). It also delineates a cultural ‘mind set’ (Margaret) fired up by an ‘initiative belief in doing things, things done properly, logically, at a level of organisation’ (James).

Such apparently incontestable exemplifications that ‘British moral virtues’ are rewarded, subtend images like that of monarchy for example. The notion of Britishness then is located in a practical way of being, focusing upon the tangible rather than an abstract cause or ideal: ‘Brits do have their own culture. If you just think of things like stiff upper lip, or behaving very properly, makes you feel...determines British against other Europeans or Americans for example.’ (Margaret)

In sum, like a process of amanuensis, the sample recites a belief in British empiricism that underpins in their view British national performance, based on compromise and conciliation. That is, a valuing of the common sense, middle ground, ordinary vis-a-vis extraordinary, market structures vis-a-vis state structures. Because of its continuing effectiveness in managing the discourse of living, such markers of cold empiricism engendered affection in the hearts and minds of the British respondents, thereby sedimenting British identity with a specific habitus.

This it is argued forms an animating principle that lives on, somewhat inadmissibly, mutating and metamorphosing every time adversity forces it to invoke a new strategy for survival. According to the sample against the acclaimed achievements of other nations’ cultural heritages the British thing lines up as a tested and tried code of practice, a tangible heritage. Thus from examining the evidence given by the participants it is considered that this is where the sense of being part of the team is grounded and by implication the sense of Britishness as described by this sample. In other words the participants talk about an identity animated by cold empiricism grouped together under an accommodating symbolism. The combination of the two generates the sense of teamness the participants talk about, in this and the following section, which manifests as Britishness.
4.3 Britishness: ‘Loyalty to a common British homeland, devotion to the British crown and pride in the British form of civilization’ (Seton-Watson 1986: 113)

Anderson (1983) and Gellner (1983, 1987) put forward the view that nations as imagined communities are essentially modern creations. Hobsbawm (1983) argues that nationalism as an ideology is paradoxical; it is a product of the modern age but it creates myths about the pre-modernity of nation states. Cannadine (1983) has illustrated the changing faces of monarchy through elucidating the process of inventing traditions and the new use of old rituals. Nairn (1988) and Billig (1992) talk persuasively about the unique contribution of the monarchy to the imagining of the British (national) past which the participants share, using several argumentative themes that bound the symbol of monarchy to a national belonging: ‘Royal Family or the British monarchy provides a strong element of what it means to be British...we define ourselves by it...and also we feel that...it’s something that binds the whole country together. I suppose.’ (Les); ‘It’s one of a number of aspects that are part of our history’ (Harry). ‘If we didn’t have them, we’d have to have a president. And...you start getting into presidential elections, conflict’ (Jonathan).

But this imagination according to Billig needs a mirror, in order to exist. It is through the eyes of the non-British as well as those British who are critical of monarchy that this special element underpinning Britishness lies, as it is what distinguishes it from the rest of the world. Views like the aforementioned are supported by interpretations of events across the channel over the last three centuries where other nations operate without the possession of such special elements in their national arsenal, as Les discusses: ‘And I have various European friends who believe that too. And some of them were Portuguese friends of mine who were quite royalist, and are equally left-wing but believe it’s a good thing to prevent countries from being too politicized and fragmented.’ Les’s words resonate with Billig’s classic structure of the workings of British imagination regarding monarchy which frames a mindset of ‘we are too modern/sensible to believe in this, but the fact is that this institution must be good according to what the others who don’t have it, say about it’.

This rationalising of the role of monarchy as a positive surplus to the nation in historic and social terms, or benefiting either the economy or international relationships however, is not free of resentment: ‘Well, to be honest, I think the Royal Family is a little bit irrelevant. They’re stuck out on a limb. They’re like performing monkeys in a way. It gives something nice for when foreigners come. They perform a function...It’s almost
like a glorified receptionist.’ (Jonathan) It nevertheless often slips into a deeper sense of nationality. This is confirmed by the participants’ responses when for example rejected Billig’s claim, put to them, that the royal family organizes people’s ideas of family, morality, equality, privilege, nationality and so forth, bar the points raised on nationality: ‘I don’t think they organize my thoughts on anything. Certainly not equality…Morality not at all. Family not at all, either. The nationality, yeah.’ (Les) and on privilege: ‘My ideas of privilege? Umm…not directly, but completely indirectly…you do feel a little element of privilege there.’ (Nigel) The equation of monarchy and nation, according to Billig is implied by adding together the equation of their view of themselves with that of the nation, and this according to Seton-Watson (1986) is not only confined to the middle class or to middle age, as the overwhelming majority of this sample confirms. By doing this they, according to Billig, claim superiority. As Cliff, one of the two people in the whole sample who opposed monarchy vividly suggests this can be traced back to the legacy of the empire; yet Cliff confines this psychology only within the working class:

Cliff: Listen, first of all, it’s the same as with all empires. Empires will spread, the fruits of that empire will be enjoyed by the few. And those families and those slightly larger extended partnerships in the UK are still there with phenomenal wealth. But at the same time, and this is perhaps another aspect of why you say “why is it when they’re all so oppressed?” they didn’t reach out and see what was a richer form of life abroad? I don’t know whether it’s genetic, if it’s Anglo-Saxon roots, or if it’s cultural, if its industrial revolution roots…stratified societies, or…and there is no doubt in this…you would say by an equal token, why didn’t they reach out to embrace what was going on abroad, take a look at the French and the French Revolution, why under the remnants of an ex-feudal society did it not overthrow the monarchy? But there is absolutely no doubt that the monarchy is supported from the roots up. It is not opposed from the top down. If you wanted to abolish the monarchy now, you would find that the people opposing it would be the lower classes and certainly not the middle merchant classes. And I believe that in the British psychology, the monarchy somehow feeds a self-image of greatness, and even the average person thinks he’s greater by being part of that psychological picture…It’s hard seeing beyond the small picture…But it’s the British self-image. I
believe it’s hard for them to actually get a picture, and a feel and a taste of something else…

Interviewer: Yes, but now they travel.
Cliff: Who travels?
Interviewer: British people?
Cliff: Do they? Do they really travel?…You’ve been a slave. but to put it in blunt terms, to be the slave of a dominant empire almost gives you the feeling that the dominance rubs off on you, and you are also a dominator. After all, go and talk to the average American. What a crap life he’s got in terms of life experience, diversity, outlook. But he believes he’s the best in the world.

Interviewer: Therefore?
Cliff: Well, because being part of the most dominant culture, or the most dominant empire, gives you a feeling of superiority. even within your own daily life experience you are down the ladder of what is available within your own culture.’

Paul takes the argument against the institution of monarchy even further by suggesting that behind its role as the accommodating symbolic underpinning of Britishness it epitomizes divisions within British society, and as such it conditions people’s psychology within an artificial class system, which he arguably implies has a negative impact on the psychology of the nation as a whole:

‘My attitude of the royal family is that it's iniquitous…There's people in Britain who actually believe that the Royal Family are intrinsically better. It creates an artificial division…people justify the Royal Family by saying well it doesn't cost that much, and it's good for tourism and it's harmless. But I think it's actually very iniquitous on the impact it has upon people's beliefs.’ (Paul)

These two isolated views were in a distinct minority, and in sharp contrast with the views of the majority of this sample, who despite their generally critical attitude to British historic bigotry, they nonetheless felt that the symbolism of the monarchy was quintessential for British identity, as illustrated by the following extract:

‘If the people you spoke to found their sense of morality guided by the Royal Family, then God help other people…I would not like to see the Royal Family disappear…Because it’s something special. It’s something unusual. It’s something unique. It doesn’t have any intrinsic value, if you want to be very
objective about it. But it has a subjective and social value, and I think that’s very important. Human beings are not motivated and not guided by a logical sense of what is sensible... though. I’m not Royalist, but in a way I’m very happy to see them... To actually define it is very difficult.’ (George)

When this sample discussed or reflected upon other cultural markers underpinning Britishness they appeared to oscillate between seemingly contrasting positions from an ethnocentric thinking to a decentred one. Both approaches were employed not to criticize assumptions of national superiority but to articulate them. The former was tempered with the claims of tolerance and open mindedness that embellishes the accounts so far, and often disavowed the possession of such a mindset.

In the extract below James practically claims that the ability of the modern professional British person to conduct business successfully against any odds anywhere in the world is informed by historically conditioned virtues cultivated in the culture of empiricism. By James invoking the aforementioned he effectively articulates assumptions of national superiority whilst disavowing anything that resonates with nationalism. This approach delineates a British identity grounded on tangible history imbued with intrinsic values, and this can be seen in the following excerpt:

‘I think there are certain characteristics of the nation. Whether they are nurtured or nature I don’t know. But there are certain characteristics... and as I said at the beginning, I have worked in Belgium... Netherlands... South Africa... And in all of them... the ones that get on with the job fastest, are the English. I don’t know if that’s something to do with the legacy of an empire, if it’s the fact that we have a nurtured stiff upper lip, as we say, approach to dealing with adversity. I think they probably all are factors. I don’t think it’s coincidence, but even in the post-imperial age, that most of the banking across Africa was done... It was almost a joke in B****. You give somebody the head office manual, here you are, send him off in a rowing boat, go and start a bank. In some countries only found on a map before we left, but OK, that’s the job, that’s what I’ve got to do, get out there and do it. Sort it out. And also, there’s an element of initiative, if you like. We have a certain belief in doing things, just getting on with it. Some of this sounds very arrogant, and I’m trying to avoid being jingoistic, but’ (James).

This approach which disclaims association with national themes, contributed to the articulated feeling of national superiority without invoking national symbolism. That is, by focusing on the performing capabilities of British nationals, they disclaimed
associations with mind sets underpinned by notions of national chauvinism. and yet at the same time they articulated a claim for national superiority by exalting the successful performance of nationally marked institutions. This is also exemplified in the following example:

Paul: I read about attitudes towards the Royal Family, the death of Princess Diana and the Queen Mother, and it makes me feel like it's a different country. It's not my country.

Interviewer: What are the most representative elements of modern Britain that represent you as well?


The net outcome was that in both ways of thinking there was ample evidence of expressions of national pride demonstrated in the extracts above. Both ways of reasoning interestingly and very effectively, articulate what they deny. Both approaches deal with a rhetorical problem that they need to disclaim the prejudices of pride; and in its place talk about how the nation effectively is realised through its performative achievements, or through its pomp and ceremony, deploying a common sense knowledge that both are unique. They underline that it is not the British who claim this, it is the various European friends who believe it too as above, or by their reference to 'the American' who says so:

‘You’ve got this finite military precision...to the death of the Queen Mother. He said, “One thing about you Brits, you can put a show on.” I said “what do you mean?” This guy’s an ex-GI. Vietnam. He says, “No, no. That is class. When it comes down to troops even we as yanks can’t do that.”...That is an American concern, that they do everything best.’ (Jeremy)

Here the non acknowledgement of superiority is displaced onto others, rather than being a nationalist claim; each statement in the three extracts above purports to deal with evident facts. The statements describe different expressions of realisation about British contemporary experience. Whether one is referring to markets, or infrastructure, or institutions, or as in the last quote to the exemplifications of spectacular nationalism, the uniting theme is that the sample ends up talking about successful performances of collective action. Thus the last extract does not merely focus upon a national ceremony but its efficient and effective performance. And by claiming it is not just the British who have realised this unique dimension of Britishness, but locating the claim with various Others who point this out, the facts are made to apparently speak for themselves. Thus in
denying the relevance of pride the British make a claim about reality: they are talking about facts. Hence the British demarcate their positionality vis-à-vis the rest of the world. But it is deeper than that; what effectively the British do by talking facts is to assert and depict a unique national subjectivity, where Britishness is the factual entity encoded in concrete actions whereas other national identities are made to appear less factual and more ideological creations. The discussion in this section raises the question to which we now turn, of why the majority of this sample come to be depicting Britishness in this disavowed fashion.

4.4 'Invertedness' and the 'Common Place' of Britishness

One way of answering the above enquiry is to suggest that the particular mind sets that seemed to dominate the data, and produced by this sample, arguing for a British habitus manifesting at present as ‘a different outlook on life’ (Margaret) are largely unquestioning of the historical contexts that fostered such views (Hall 1978): ‘Well, the simple answer is, I never questioned it. I grew up with it.’ (Nigel)

Thus despite the historically specific roots and its institutional cultivation, this British habitus is cast as an independent outcome freed from its origins. Britishness exudes a form of authority grounded on ‘a very concrete manner of being-in-the-world, a way of taking hold of reality, language and thought’ (Walder 1990 cited in Sarup 1996: 138) and thus asserting its difference. By disavowing the historical circumstances that created current day Britain, the participants portray a snapshot of the nation state in much the same way as an outsider would receive in entering Britain. In doing so, they can focus on only what they find the appealing aspects of Britishness, namely its performative assets par excellence in examples such as excellence in journalism, in public broadcasting, in democratic structures and in traditions, to name but a few.

This appears to be the core foundation that underpinned the articulation of Britishness in the participants’ accounts. The focus of the sample was orientated towards the outer world of performative collective outcomes; inner feelings were subordinated to the outer reality. British rationalism was firmly anchored within a British grouping and the sample reflected on the descriptions of British embodiment in the world in a way that could and is perceived by the Other. Their sense of reality had shifted to a reality based on the notion of ‘invertedness’ (Lacan 1977) which, applied in this case, is about the ways in which the British see the Other in seeing her/his own reality. In other words the
image of British reality was being inverted within the gaze of other nations, as when responses frequently mobilised a trope of outsider’s views, adopting a formulation like James who commented: ‘looking at it from the outside through the eyes of other people and other cultures...it made me feel more British.’

The British embodiment in the world as unique, encounters its realisation by being reified through its performative functioning. This is something that is visible; and there is a tangible proof through the ways in which others see it. The availability of such facts permits ethnocentric tendencies to be denied, thereby fortifying and (re)articulating Britishness. However in terms of how Britishness is constituted in the British heart, what is happening is more complex than this. Unlike other imagined communities who imagine themselves from ‘within’- that is their own gaze- laying claims of difference, superiority, fear of incorporation, based on sanctified heritages, mythologies, and so on, the British in this sample ‘registers’ her/his community through their recitation of examples in the imagination of the rest of the world. Most importantly (s)he can rationalise national identity, not merely by emphasizing the pragmatic character of the nation, but rather by appropriating-- and internalizing as such-- the qualities of the British national character in its performative profile evidenced by those from other nations.

In other words, the performative theme, which presupposes rationality, for this sample could be interpreted as the Lacan’s quilting point, wherein the nation with the signifiers of nationhood becomes conflated. Furthermore it provides the dialectic between the rational and the national argument regarding national entity, for it assumes that the naturalness of the national character is to rationalise and thus to perform. By doing this, it imagines its own mythology of a unique historic destiny (Schwartz 1986, 1990) thereby suggesting its superior status in the world. Hence it can be suggested that it is through this assumption regarding the superior status of this identity that the difference from the foreign (as the abstract), is being asserted.

Thus conflating into their notions of Britishness rationality and nationality the British ascribe the emphasis of their identity onto a functioning society, rather than through the markers of British nationhood, thus concealing nationhood from critique as well as pre-empting emotive irrationality which in their mind constitutes a threat to the nation. For seemingly this is how they consider nationhood, as not so much the result of, but as somehow having arrived as an independent outcome from any historical context, as noted at the beginning of this section. So that the very making of British society is
seen as a kind of by-product, evoked by a vision the British have: ‘that sort of initiative belief in doing things. things done properly. logically. at a level of organisation’ as the excerpts from James’s interview have so far illustrated.

In this way this sample abdicated responsibility for any of the predicaments of Britishness that did not correspond with the process whereby the British acquires that ‘level of attaining the standard’ that is the ‘code of practice’ which the excerpt from Jeremy’s account argues for in the first section, effectively referring to the set procedures, laws and regulations that form the nation and reflect the society itself. This obscures nationalism by subsuming it under general terms such as norms, values, regulations, standards. The sample fused the code of practice of a society with that of nationhood, thus referring to the term the British thing as discussed earlier, as a way to summarise Britishness, thus according to Nairn and Billig, concealing it from criticism.

It can therefore be surmised that this kind of embodiment that infuses the individual within society, perpetuates notions of social and national identities, as well as informing the narrative of the experience of being British. It is logical to consider that such notions of identity are actually passed down the generations by being inscribed in the individual memory and both cognitively and emotionally embodying the individual’s responses to the experience of being British. It is in this context that the characteristics of being a British individual and part of society and nation are conflated, and so in this process the bedrock of the concept of Britishness is created.

At this point it needs again to be underlined, however, that the aforementioned applies only to that British society and that British nation whose culture, regardless of ethno-cultural inflections, subscribes to performative accomplishment underpinning Britishness. This attitude was typical of the expatriate professional taking part in this study, who reiterated again and again sentiments praiseing and claiming transparent and effective conduct, such as: ‘it’s the code of conduct, yeah...And if you’re good, you play. If you’re a blagger, if you’re a bull-shitter, then you won’t play...So, it’s black and white. If you can’t play you won’t play. Do you see?...I like directness...I think it’s an old value.’ (Francis)

In other words the emphasis is upon the nature of a society that is regulated by a code of conduct implicitly modelled on people’s (national) values. Firstly this code acquires the profile of civic nationalism, and thus can be a national contender for a functional European citizenship - as the political creed that defines common citizenship (Ignatieff 1993): ‘because I see myself primarily as being British rather than as a British
Secondly this assertion correlates this kind of civic nationalism with patriotism rather than nationalism: which can vary from being proud for one’s own national achievements to ‘tribal’ alignments in sport, for example. Thirdly such assertions evoke a constitutive relationship between society and nation, which is reifying for one another, whereby society-- performative (code of conduct)-- represents Britain-- the old values tempered with the universal aspirations of liberalism-- and vice versa. In this context nationalism is disavowed and routinely ascribed to those in the UK who do not fall into the definitions of Britishness this sample ascribed to:

'I think there has been a greater degree of nationalism...in the last 10 years...Maybe it's a bit of a reaction to devolution in Wales and Scotland...It's a bit of a reaction to the European thing. But certainly when I left in 1995 you rarely saw St George's Cross. Now it's all over the place...Sport I think has played an enormous part of that.' (Tim)

Or else to nationalism seen in those other than the British:

Interviewer: You talked earlier about your sense of belonging to the motherland. Why motherland and not fatherland?

James: Because fatherland smacks of being German I'm afraid...You have to conceptually define that in some way.

Furthermore nationalism within Britain is depicted as only coming to the fore when special occasions arise, such as in the politics of devolution, over the integrity of national territory and of course sports, but again for the reasons discussed so far, this is consistently downplayed by the participants, as in James’s words below:

'I'm a pro-Union. But don't get me wrong, if you want to tell me a joke about the Welsh, I'll laugh my socks off...So, yes, we like to have a bit of a fight amongst ourselves, but woe betide anybody that attacks us from outside...nationalism only really comes to the fore, when... things are not being done fairly...that's when you find people suddenly get ultra nationalistic about everything. Outside of sports, of course. Because that is totally different. Then we're allowed to be ultra nationalistic, because we're probably playing Scotland at football. We like being the bastard.'

Or as demonstrated in Jeremy's vivid account:

Jeremy: I'm a Scot by birth. I'm very patriotic, I see myself as being, probably, well realistically. I see myself as being a British national. Being British.

31 On the building of the nation state’s diluted image into that of society’s see Kornblum (2003).
but a Scot by birth. Reasonably patriotic about that...Because I see myself primarily as being British rather than as a British national. My nationality is still British, I still believe...I believe in a Union...the countries in the UK.

Interviewer: Have you ever questioned this identity?
Jeremy: Yeah, I was assaulted at the England-Argentina game when Beckham got sent off. I got off of a train one night, and because I was...I was asked a question, got off the train and I was attacked by four yobs.

Interviewer: Why?
Jeremy: Because I was Scottish. And because they had been put out by Argentina. they thought I was a Scots but anti-English. So it was a racist attack.

Interviewer: Where did this happen?
Jeremy: This happened at Hayes at the end of the train line. When I was going home one night from a function.

Interviewer: How did they recognise that you were a Scot?
Jeremy: Because they asked me. I was looking for a taxi to go, because I got out of the function late, and to get a train and then get a taxi, and I asked where a taxi office was, and the guy said to me 'you’ll be happy with the result tonight'. And I was saying, “no, it was a bit disappointing really”’. And they said: “oh. you’re a fucking Scot and all this”. And I said: “yeah, yeah, but I was quite sorry to see England go out actually”’. And then they started shoving me. And the next thing was a bit of a battle. So I got a knocked shoulder against a wall. I’m a big fellow. but I couldn’t handle four of them, and they were all younger guys...But that’s the way that it is. But that’s...I’ve been travelling around the world, and that’s the first time I’ve ever been assaulted.

Interviewer: By your own people.
Jeremy: By English people...It made me annoyed and angry, and I got the wound for it, but it doesn’t put me off...I can’t say that that’s typical of everybody.

Thus what we see from the above excerpt is that Britishness, in the context it has been discussed in this chapter, remains unshaken to its core in the hearts and minds of this sample. This is regardless of any incidental (or not) drawbacks or shortfalls occurring in its domain, such as in the above incident that obviously made the participant question this
identity. Despite any obviously conflicting evidence to the contrary, anything that seems to disturb the orderliness of the British self-concept is disavowed or downplayed.

Such assertions of Britishness are repeated routinely so that they become habitual patterns of social life, in what Billig (1995) describes as ‘inhabitation’, and in doing so they embody the past in what Bourdieu (1990) describes as ‘habitus’. They are ingrained into people’s consciousness so effectively that people overlook their nationalism whilst projecting it as the property of the Other, and thereby disclaiming their own beliefs.

However in the case of this sample there was also an acute awareness about the acknowledged risk of a surging forth of nationalism concealed in the linking of common sense assumptions about the naturalness of nationalism and patriotism:

‘The risk to me, it seems... that there’s a very fine line between pride in your nationhood and racism. It’s a very fine line... pride in your nationhood is great. nobody says it's wrong to be patriotic. But if you start defending that patriotism rigorously, you become exclusive. You become xenophobic and all the rest of it.’ (James)

In this context they were critical of ways of identifying with a nation that effectively engenders sentiments that serve only as reminders of nationhood with no real substance behind them, as the following extract demonstrates:

‘Yes. It is. the logic is you see you get stirred up with the all the nice patriotic stuff, but if you look at what patriotism is actually about. It hasn’t been for centuries about supporting your own country. it’s about the attacking of another. And these lovely stories about victories...well what is bloody victory anyway? Sorry I’m a bit of a Buddhist...it’s just the theatre...in which life is played out. It’s unimportant...half of me instinctively reacts to it, because it’s part of what I grew up with. It’s part of my background. I feel secure with it. I don’t have a problem with admitting that. But my intellect tells me that it might make me feel secure, but that’s actually the thin ice of philosophy. that’s the thin ice of truth. because there’s no substance behind it.’ (George)

In sum, contrary to the widely held view that reminders of the national character embossed in routines operate mindlessly rather than mindfully (Langer 1989), for this professional white-collar sample this is not entirely the case. Although a ‘dramatic’ psychology of emotions combined with the ‘banal psychology of routines’ (Sarup 1996) in some instances was invoked to explain national identity, and/or the surging forth of sentiments of patriotic emotion. British inhabitation manifested in diverse ways. It
invariably impressed individual psychological landscapes, cognitively as well as emotively. Further to that, due to the legacy of pragmatism, any expression of nationalism avoided coarse ethnocentrism. This was not only because it conflicted with the assumptions of liberal tolerance and therefore had to be disavowed, but also because there was an awareness that at any moment it can return as a special subject to haunt established ways of living. In other words nationalism can effect performative functionality. Assertions of national uniqueness are however present, accompanied by utterances of superiority which are not easily made, for they conflicted with the sample’s assumptions of liberal tolerance as mentioned above.

4.5 Conclusion

When the participants in this sample refer to their ways of doing things they are essentially talking about a very specific form of being in the world that shapes beliefs, values, practices and ideas. Hence their accounts on Britishness are underpinned by the underlying theme of how they as British, manage the discourse of life vis-à-vis the rest of the world which effectively articulates assumptions of Britishness without invoking its national symbolism. Thus Britishness is portrayed as a tangible identity and as such able to (re)articulate itself according to the context(s) in space and time; thus redefining Britishness within contemporary spaces and meanings. This is illustrated by the data; every time the sample tries to put the finger on how it feels to be part of the British thing it automatically resumes to a literal mode of apprehending the enquiry: ‘Oh I see. Umm.. Well, it would clearly depend on the context, wouldn’t it?’ (Les)

Thus it is argued that the notion of Britishness delineated by this sample is manifested, through this particular kind of relationship, that is, by valuing anything that has proved itself to be functional. It is through this that the shared notion of being part of the team thrives. It is also through this that Britishness is able to colonize inwardly the hearts and minds of those people who ascribe to the attributes of the aforementioned relationship.

In sum it is this relationship that enables Britishness outwardly to metastasize and metamorphose, colonizing more domains and more spaces, thereby asserting the type of Britishness this sample adheres to within a multiethnic, multicultural Britain and around the world: ‘we’re all individuals, but part of the nation of Great Britain.’ (Tim)
Chapter Five

The Greek Idiom: Greekness

5.1 Introduction

This chapter locates Greekness at the intersection of the notion of family, a historic narrative particularly pertinent to the Greeks and the notion of home. The underlining theme of the chapter is that Greekness is not solely an amalgam of somehow fixed, stable coherent ‘cognitive mappings’ (Jameson 1988), locked by concrete manifestations to a specific place and time. On the contrary it is primarily a mobile emotional ‘topography’ that retains its contours when it encounters contemporary experience.

In the first section the notion of the family as a locus of Greekness is discussed. The second section suggests that the Greek cultural identity is sedimented in a privileged access to heritage with a sanctified status. This process of sedimentation encompasses what Husserl (1970) called the routinization and forgetfulness of origins. The more effective the routinization is, the more entrenched the sedimentation gets in respect of those identities. Furthermore the process of sedimentation casts aside any alternative ‘interpretations’ regarding the formulation of identities and as such Laclau (1990: 34) argues that it means that a sense of belonging ‘tends to assume the form of a[n]...objective presence...not immediately visible.’ The Greeks of this sample confirm this when they talk about their-- particular to the Greeks-- sense of belonging. The third section discusses the notion of Greek home as the spatiality that incorporates personal and local histories and biographies and is transmitted vertically from generation to generation as well as shared horizontally across an assumed Greek national community. It is shown how Greekness operates across spaces regardless of embeddedness in locales, life styles or backgrounds.

The chapter concludes with the claim that Greekness is the fount of emotive bearings for the Greek and because of the style with which it operates, Greekness asserts its difference in the world as unique sui generis, thereby making Greek identity resistant to change.
5.2 Family and Greekness

For many of the respondents the Greek family, and their relationship to it, is constitutive of contemporary Greekness. This, it can be argued, is due to its role as the corroborator and interlocutor of the constellation of cultural, religious and historic referents which the Greek environment offers, and the Greek consequently inhabits. Respondents quickly pointed to the centrality of families in notions of personal identity:

Στέλλα: In Greece they’re harping on about lots of things [perceptions, attitudes]. It’s like a form of brainwashing, yet these perceptions and attitudes inhibit us from developing.

Interviewer: What are these ‘things’ that inhibit a person like you?

Στέλλα: The family…this narrow minded self centred, uncaring attitude, self-fulfilment…they don’t even know themselves or where they stand…that’s why they can’t inspire their kids with anything of real value other than [the usual crap] you know.

Equally Νάσος points to the same direction:

‘For me the Greek family is detrimental to Greece’s development…with the cushioning…everything being handed to you on a platter…the moulding…I appreciated it but I believe if there was less of it, and more of a “come on get ready to embark on your own ventures” approach, I would be more independent…also the “country-religion-family” motto for me is, you know.’

In this context, the family works as the interlocking mechanism for the normative regulation of behaviour: ‘they throw you into the system via family, religion, what we’ve said before, and unavoidably you become like them’ (Φώτης). These assertions made by the Greek sample show how the family animates Greek living by providing the bridge that connects members with notions of Greekness prevalent in Greek society and culture. That is, the family in its aforementioned role reinforces Greek ways of living, and by implication Greekness. As such it conditions its members from the start to a certain mode of living as described above in Φώτης’s words.

This however is not merely done didactically, as Δημήτρα further below illustrates, but also actively in the sense that it nurtures its members into the mind set of Greek living which has been described by Herzfeld (1987) as the culture of ‘Romiosini’ based on ‘personal influence and graft’. The workings of this Greek living can be illustrated in the following hypothetical example: a member of the family will do the
mediation to find a job for his nephew by ‘rain checking’ people in ‘high places’ to return favours: or in the absence of the latter he would make himself ‘available’ to them for future ‘rain checking’ from their side, and so on. In doing so this family member makes the nephew eternally indebted to him and, through him, to the people who satisfied his request. In this way a structure of obligation is built around the nephew which locks him into a recognizable, by the wider society, mode of behaviour. This in turn informs what is discussed in this chapter as ‘Greek living’, which ultimately shapes Greek cultural identity. (A further illustration is vividly recounted further below by Νάσος and Αποστόλης).

This structure of obligation is not merely confined to close family members; it extends further afield to the edges of family kinship, incorporating in its web all the people who associate with the family in question; in numerous dealings of all sorts varying from social engagements, to economic ones, and through them with the people the latter associate with; and so the practicing of Greek living that fosters Greekness continues. Thus it is suggested, the family is the locus of a concentric circle that interlocks an ‘ensemble’ of people expanding outwards- transgressing localities and social, cultural and political stratifications, linked with one another by means of interdependent networking based on ‘personal influence and graft’.

Many responses indicated the centrality of each person’s family and what this sense of the centrality of the family in general signifies: a cultural state-of-being-in-the-world that demarcates the space in/or through which Greekness manifests, for example:

Interviewer: What are the elements that define the profile of your Greekness?
Παναγιώτα: I would define it as a very family based kind of culture.

In this space both emotive bearings are grounded and cognition is channelled to support an ethnocentric identity fused with the notion of the family. In other words according to Δήμητρα the respondent claims below that when talking about Greek identity or Greek family the Greeks effectively talk about the same thing:

Δήμητρα: Greek family has got lots of negativities...however they are there for you... the helping hand reaching out from both sides at you causes us as their children to feel the obligation to call our mum.

Interviewer: Therefore do you consider the family as a part of your Greek identity?

Δήμητρα: [I consider them as] ONE.
Through the process of fostering family connections, the notion of Greekness is reified by being inextricably linked to a constellation of family representations. Evoking layers of interdependence that entwine networking with all the cultural markers to which the family is associated. Thus through the family link a bond is created between family members, and in turn between them and their sense of identification with their Greek cultural heritage. (framed as it is by the legacy of Antiquity. Orthodox Christianity and a turbulent, heroic, history) thus making the Greeks feel a sense of rootedness to their Greek cultural identity which is reinforced specifically by and through the family.

In this context contemporary Greekness, unlike the idealized Hellenism that aspired to be universal, is concrete and particular in regard to its manifestations because the family notion that underpins it, I would argue, is fundamentally exclusive. The root of this exclusionary mentality is nurtured in the Greek notion of family and originated in the prolonged and turbulent periods of Greek history. In the trajectory of this history this family notion was effectively transformed into a hermetic, in the sense of being sealed entity, which on the one hand preserved the markers of Greekness, as pointed above, and on the other shut out any alternative interpretations of the world in general, thus fostering concrete manifestations of Greekness as in Στέλλα's response to the interviewer's expressed doubts:

'It's the history of our predecessors, COME ON. Don't be cheeky...it's a history...that is passed on...carrying within it the idea of family. the idea of the small closed circle...you could say that Belgium is small too, but they've got open ideas. With us? NO. It's. we are a small country, and the ideas are shut within it.'

Effectively this notion of closedness then itself becomes part of a Greekness that is seen as comprising an interlocking bounded spatiality which frames as well as undercuts individual, as well as collective action, as the first two extracts at the beginning illustrated. This is also confirmed by Δόμνα:

'but more or less all of us grew up under the same...umbrella OK?...and maybe it's this that brings us closer and makes us understand each other better. OK? However I also see that it is this that doesn't allow you to come out, to go further. OK? Where you can learn something more...and for me...I found it here in London. I like this differentiation of the people, the variety of the humanscape.'
As such Greekness as an umbrella confines within it a shared understanding amongst the Greeks versus the outside but also provides a notion of continuity that has been inhabited as kind of an unbroken umbilical cord that connects the Greek with what is considered as familiar and the homely, which in Αντώνη’s words, where its closure is portrayed as affording refuge:

‘The fact is that although here...I’ve got a very good deal...a very good career God bless, yet, my topos is my topos. And can I put it differently? My job for the last 12 years has taken me to Greece almost every week. I don’t know if I’d carry on in this place if I didn’t travel there so frequently. For me London is a civilized base that enables me to do the things I want to do in my life and the fact that I travel frequently…to my topos makes me feel that I’ve got the best combination.’

Here it should be explained that Αντώνη uses the term (τόπος) topos, connecting its connotations of localness and locatedness, to indicate the cultivation in the Greek heart and mind of connectedness, the inhabitation of or dwelling within Greekness which engenders systems of faith that sustain living memory, such as the notion of the family, and by implication therefore he connotes with this the Greek culture in general.

Such a sense of connectedness is reinforced through contact and it renders distance redundant:

Interviewer: You’ve been in London all this time how frequently do you contact your family in Greece?

Μαρία: Every day by phone.

Interviewer: Do you call them or do they call you?

Μαρία: It depends. If I don’t call them by a certain hour they’d call me.

Interviewer: Do you maintain the same contact with your brother in Aberdeen?

Μαρία: yes, yes the same.

As Vertovec (2004) noted the development of cheap international telephony has changed the modalities of being a transnational migrant, enabling ongoing participation in a spatially extended home community. Otherwise the significance of these affiliations was expressed through numerous references to family biographies and activities, mentions of daily interventions in conversations, routines and on practical matters or even by appeal to moral grounds. This is illustrated by Δόμαν’s remarks such as:

‘of course, the thought always comes up in your mind…The ways in which family and its ties are getting involved with you. OK? Even when you’re a grown up…in my family it’s still like my grandma influences my mum, my mum
influences me - do you understand?...my French mother in law says to me

“haven’t they cut the umbilical cord yet?” do you understand? Yeah.’

Here a transnational worker in London, with a multinational family finds their style of family life becomes an explicit and remarked upon signifier of Greekness to French members of their family. Perhaps most importantly, the family operates as the bridge or the screen, depending on individual circumstances, between its nucleus and the wider social group or the state, which in Nάσος’s words can be captured as: ‘the ‘country-religion-family’ motto’ depicted a scaled hierarchy of belonging. It has become the cornerstone for the development of nepotism, the salient characteristic of contemporary Greek culture, or else as put by Herzfeld of a ‘roguish Romiosini...embodied in the orientalized image of a nation that can do nothing except by means of personal influence and graft’ (Herzfeld 1987: 153).

Examples from the respondents referring to the need to belong via family connections and to locate oneself through a family network abounded: ‘the fact that if I returned to Greece, I’d have to have a ‘circle’ in order to find work, I’d have to change manners and so on, that is, how I perform as a professional doesn’t count, what counts are the ‘other things’’ (Αποστόλης); ‘in Greece you have no chance. If you don’t know someone you’ve had it’ (Νάσος). The role of familial and personal ties is considered by many as inescapable: ‘I’ll always remember that in the conversations I had with my dad he kept telling me “grow up this IS the situation. OK?”’ (Δημήτρια) Finally Φώτης recounts how anyone who challenges or critiques this interlocking and bounded spatiality of the Greek life world, is rejected by the other Greeks as a non-Greek. This phenomenon of what it takes to be an insider comes in various guises and goes under many false pretences, but fundamentally it amounts to the same thing, for those within the Greek culture contemporary Greekness is threatened by those Greeks capable of making the leap across cultures. As such they are singled out as intolerably deviant:

Φώτης: I don’t identify with the Greeks over there. I identify with Greeks who have similar experiences and ideas, that is, have lived abroad, have engaged with the foreigners, not with the Greeks in Greece who discriminate against other Greeks.

Interviewer: Where did you see this?

Φώτης: Both Δημήτρης and I were born and raised in Greece, and afterwards we went abroad to study and work. When Δημήτρης’s girlfriend, a ‘little girl’ who has basically spent all her time in Greece, came over here for the first
time. we were talking and using English words amongst our Greek which is a bad habit of ours and she said, "you lot here" and I said what do you mean "you lot here?" she said, "you're NOT Greeks". Do you understand? She said, "Greeks are those who live in Greece, you live abroad you're not Greeks, if you wanted to be considered Greek you should be in Greece". But it's not like that. How more Greek can you be when you've done your military service for twenty eight months when those who live in Greece try to avoid it, how more Greek can you be? Do you understand?

Despite this excerpt concerning how some transnational Greeks felt they were seen as different by those Greeks that remained domiciled in Greece, they remained connected to their family ties:

Interviewer: If you didn't have any people down there to connect you [with Greece], would you say you would be...
Φώτης: I would be more distant.
Interviewer: Would you have become less Greek?
Φώτης: Yes I would be even more distant...
Interviewer: So you're saying that it's the frequency of contact...
Φώτης: ...it's because I still have parents...
Interviewer: ...and does that keep informing your ethnic identity?
Φώτης: It brings you closer to Greece, yes I would be more distant from Greece if I didn't have people [friends and relatives] there.
Interviewer: I understand that. So do you think you would be even more distant [alienated] from your Greekness if you didn't have people to visit, even if only once a year?
Φώτης: Yes I wouldn't have any contact with Greece, so I'd become a foreigner.
Interviewer: So it's the people who inform your notion of ethnic identity?
Φώτης: It's the people, YES.

The Greek sample as a whole described their notion of Greekness as deriving their bearings from a common pool of textual, visual, verbal or sensual narratives grounded in images, symbols and mythologies. For example the sample referred to a sense of inclusion in and ownership of the legacy of an idealized Hellenism 'which makes ancient Greece the fount and origin of all civilization' (Herzfeld 1987:93-4):
I catch myself feeling proud because Λεωνίδας fought the Persians for example and blocked their advancement into Europe. He did it. I didn’t. and yet I’m proud.

Interviewer: Anything else?

Mainly for the mind frame of that era; they founded mathematics. they almost reached perfection…I admire all this, to use the right word I am in awe of that era, and of course I’m like the English on this. I’m stuck in that era…it’s the history.

Interviewer: You said that your pride is founded in history, however you are referring to a history that is long gone, more precisely to Antiquity, and between then and now a great deal of time has elapsed.

Enormous.

Interviewer: Two thousand years and counting, OK in between we have been under Ottoman rule for about twelve generations.

You’re not going to bring up Fallmerayer now are you?

Of course not. I just challenge what you said about identifying with a past that is so very old. We both know that over the centuries there has been an incredible amount of movement of populations in the area and even you, ethnically speaking, you might not have

Any connections.

Yeah, no ethnic connection with this thing.

When we had this kind of conversation with my colleagues we discussed that we are not the Greeks, the Greeks of the Antiquity were.

Exactly.

And if we were to take it genealogically, well, our genes wouldn’t have anything to do with those of the Greeks at that time, yeah, OK, I’ve even read about that in an article, and a colleague at work turned around and

32 In 1830 Johann Philipp Fallmerayer in his ‘History of the Peninsula of Morea’ caused a stir by questioning the origins of the Modern Greek. Briefly, he claimed that the Slav invasions and settlements of the late sixth and seventh centuries resulted in the expulsion or extirpation of the original population of a peninsula in Greece. Consequently the medieval and modern Greeks were not the descendants of the Greeks of Antiquity, thus their Hellenism was artificial. The political significance of this assertion was perceived as dangerous by the then newly risen state of Greece. This is not only because it emphasized the political solidarity of the Turks and their right to authority over Balkans, but most importantly it proposed that the Balkan peninsula was Slavonic in essence, thus any Balkan could lay a claim on it. Even today such tendencies are considered dangerous by the Greek state.
said to me: "what I am doesn’t interest me. I may be Bulgarian. I may be Turkish. what’s important is what I feel I am."

Here although the respondent knows intellectually that they have no especial possession of the Hellenic past, and indeed is willing to concede the version they have is filtered through contemporary, nationalist institutions – yet still the felt commonality persists.

Such narratives of affiliation, are acted out through the habitual practicing of living through both implicit and explicit references. As such they become affective and experiential spaces, in which the rootedness of the Greeks is immersed. In that pool, the family as the corroborator and interlocutor of the referents that signify Greekness, that is, Greek civilization (of Antiquity), Orthodox Christianity, history and ‘Romiosini’. is the epicentre of the concentric ripples that reaffirm the existence of this ‘Greek ensemble’. As Maria put it: ‘let’s say we’re bound together, like a family, a Greek is bound together with another Greek.’ Remarkably from the evidence of this sample this model of national consanguinity seems to expand outwardly, transgressing localities, and in complete disregard of distances or other differences:

Κασσάνδρα: What makes me Greek is the topos where I was born; I’ve got my memories, it’s the fatherland… I’m terribly connected to Ηράκλειο- where I was born - I can’t get away from it. Then the circle expands to include my connection to Athens. Of course there are disagreements and discriminations against the Θεσσαλόνικοι [the one who is from Thessalonica] for example, you know between northerners and southerners, do you understand?

Interviewer: Yes, yes.

Κασσάνδρα: Yeah, we are the Athenians, they are the Θεσσαλονικοί, yet the circle continues to expand, covering Greece in its entirety; do you understand how it starts? This is how I feel about Greece and being Greek. When the circle begins it is very small but gradually in concentric circles it reaches outwards incorporating Greece [and Greeks].

This association not only exists in Greek territory but also to those Greeks who live abroad. It is the umbrella Δόμνα mentioned earlier that encompasses Greekness regardless of location or distance.
5.3 The Greek Idiom

To further the understanding of the backdrop of Greek cultural identity and how this manifests as Greekness this section locates the discussion to the ways in which contemporary Greeks integrate what they consider as their past into a meaningful experience that provides the emotional residue where notions of belonging are moored and so underpinning their notions of Greekness The excerpt below from Αριάδνη’s account demonstrates this vividly:

Interviewer: You said that Greece’s history is what makes the country what it is. however one point of view is that history is constantly re-written according to the politics of the time and that there is no objective history: what do you have to say about that?

Αριάδνη: The history that I learnt independently very simply made me re-evaluate Greece historically, and I’m talking about history relating to the Antiquity and perhaps some more recent history as well. Thankfully, Greece didn’t experience the Medieval Period in the same way that Western Europe did.

Interviewer: It experienced the Ottoman Medieval Period.

Αριάδνη: Greece experienced the Ottoman Medieval Period which for better or for worse had established a regime of religious tolerance. No Christian was ever prosecuted because the Church, um... shall I put it simply now?

Interviewer: Yes, yes, simply.

Αριάδνη: The Church had formed an ‘alliance’ with the Turks. The Greeks didn’t have any problems whatsoever. So the one good thing that religion, that is the Church as an establishment, provided the Greeks with was protection and a focal point, that’s the only good thing that I attribute to the Church. However, the Church also played a negative role in the way in which education developed in Greece. Ultimately though, if I were to compare the role of the Greek Church with that of the Catholic Church in Europe, I believe that the positive contribution of the Greek Church to the people outnumbered the negatives. The people may not have learnt about the Ancient Greeks, but the evidence was there to see. Once the people were liberated, both Greek and foreign academics who had been living abroad came to Greece, bringing with them the Age of Enlightenment. Many
things started to fall into place. A lot of written evidence was brought to light by these people.

Interviewer: One point of view is that those academics brought to light whatever evidence suited them at the time.

Ἀριάδνη: Yes, that’s what I meant to say, alright? We don’t even know we were really black.

Interviewer: ‘Black Athena’?

Ἀριάδνη: ‘BLACK ATHENA’. Alright, we don’t know for sure, but it’s possible. We may believe other things but deep down inside we know, because there’s something inside us, it’s not only what other people tell us. I believe that our history isn’t as far back as they want us to see it. There’s that thread which may be interrupted but there’s never a knot which we can’t untie. I believe that these things somehow flow like a river.

Interviewer: What is inside us?

Ἀριάδνη: I don’t know if I should talk about ideals, but I can’t explain it any other way. I can’t locate it unless I talk about ideology which often becomes completely distorted, but a visible hub still remains.

Interviewer: What is this hub?

Ἀριάδνη: First of all, survival. – You’re going to say, isn’t that the same with the Jews, the Armenians, the Kurds, isn’t their history with them, isn’t there the same thread? It’s everywhere. And that’s why for that very reason I believe the Greeks have deep roots which they draw from. It’s not even clearly only about topography; do you understand what I mean then? Something must be there, like a set of ideals.

Interviewer: You haven’t yet identified what it is though.

Ἀριάδνη: No, I haven’t yet, but I’m searching.

Interviewer: So more simply, you are talking about a set of ideals which you are emotionally aware of existing somewhere.

Ἀριάδνη: It’s like the spinal cord.

Interviewer: Ok, I understand. Can you tell me now how you would define your Greekness?

Ἀριάδνη: It’s mostly tradition.

Interviewer: What does this tradition comprise of?
Aριάδνη: It's two things that are very um... talked about. I believe in family and in the theme of religion. I mean what exists in Greek tradition. I mean, I can feel myself as a part of this tradition. Shall I put it more simply? I want to celebrate the festivals [religion and national] because I can feel them. Is it an issue of tradition? Of belief? I feel that I am Greek because I belong to this country.

Aριάδνη' s words convey the depth of the appeal of a historic trajectory with a sanctified status whose the locus of religious practice has kept the Greeks in a close affinity to rituals and practices that, in so doing have fostered an awareness of Greekness. Her account develops from the axis of interaction initially occurring between the Church and the Byzantine Empire, and consequently pin-pointing its role as the focal point for the Greeks under Ottoman rule. Despite highlighting the ambivalences and compromises that position entailed, she reiterates its success, in capturing the Greeks' hearts and minds. She demonstrates by assessing benefits and costs from Orthodox Christianity- her inability to escape the centrality this locus ascribes to Greek identity. The effect is that even when scrutinized or debated its appeal and role is enhanced.

At this point clarification is needed regarding this recurring theme of the Church and its connection to Greekness. My respondents related to the Church as one of the three core referents of Greek identity - the other two being Antiquity and the notion of family - strands that form an integral part of the fabric of the Greek life world. However, the overwhelming majority of this sample are peripatetic Orthodox Christians, and in this I would argue they are typical of the contemporary Greek population especially those born at the second half of the 20th century. That is, their contact with the Church is mainly through attending the occasional christenings, marriages and funerals, as well as the three major ecclesiastical celebrations such as Christmas, Easter, and to a lesser extent the Assumption, because basically this coincides with the summer holidays and possibly some of the celebrations that are conflated with national celebrations such as for example those on the 25th of March (discussed in the following section). In other words they are neither regular Church goers, nor do they worship daily. Rather they are talking about the role of the Church as a historic signifier bound to the performance of community which has framed Greek living through its incorporation in traditions and customs and has been inhabited to the point where it has become an inseparable part of the Greek life world. This role the Church has is quite regardless of religious intensity, or degrees of attendance at the ecclesiastical rituals that form the Greek cultural calendar. In other
words the Church is not a mere institution; it is an entity that permeates the fabric of Greek living, and even debate over its deviations and vicissitudes mark it out as something that matters.

This strong sense of identity and belonging to a fixed, bounded and historic sense of ethnos that has survived against all odds functions as a bridge between Greeks, and as a screen between them and the world. In Bhabha’s (2004a) words ‘survival, is an in-between state that we all share. The fabric tears every day, you stitch it back, and carry on’. The purely emotive stratum of such a narrative, presented by literal, linguistic, visual and sensual interjections, flavours the historic and cultural utterances of contemporary Greeks. As captured by the respondents, this historical trajectory with its locus in religious practice connects them to what they consider as their past. This gives them a seamless sense of affiliation from which the Greeks derive their, according to them, unique sense of belonging- and through this one can see how the notion of continuity is formed. This connection to a ‘set of Ideals’ is perpetuated as described by Αρτάδη, by what she terms the ‘thread’ that transmits what links them (present day Greeks) to what contemporary Greeks generally experience as the security of a connection with the meanings they attribute to their forebears. From a different perspective however this thread can also be interpreted as the cause of much chaffing at the chains of Greece, hindering the contemporary Greek from transgressing that past: ‘the historic legacy the Ancient Greeks left in their wake has tied today’s Greeks down to the point that they do NOTHING.’ (Αθηνά)

At this point it needs to be clarified that when respondents talk about the Greek legacy and how this intertwines with contemporary culture and the way that it informs Greekness, they are referring to two differing embodiments of contemporary Greekness, which are at logger heads with each other. One is represented by the overwhelming majority of this sample and is an embodiment of what is critical of the normative behaviour of contemporary Greekness and the belief systems that inform contemporary Greek thinking, that they see as dominated by an attitude of ‘whoever is not ours is against us’.

The majority of this sample talks critically about what they perceive as type of contemporary Greek termed as Ελληναράς (or else in the commonly used Greeklish idiom ‘Greekaras’ (in singular), being a linguistic combination of Greek and English and used as a derogatory term in vernacular speech) which has the meaning the ‘great’ Greek. That is, the one who feeds on a false consciousness of greatness or else the ‘εθνική
ντόπιο (the national dope) (Kar. Ι. 2004b) manifesting as a Greek ‘clique of “we are this and that”’ (Νάσος), as well as being dismissive of and insensible to others (Σωκ. Π. 2005)

This assertion of greatness can be aptly illustrated by the following excerpt:

Γιάννης: I feel rather superior (LAUGHTER) to the British...er... not as an individual, but as a Greek, yes I feel superior.

Interviewer: How do you qualify that?

Γιάννης: I consider us Greeks, we are er... we have a flexibility that they lack, we have better upbringing, um...

In other words, they talk about a Greek who always ‘returns to oneself and one’s home to judge or laugh at one’s peculiarities and limitations’ (Sarup 1996: 9):

‘other guys who came over here with me...they didn’t take back anything at all. They had their passport and ticket in their breast pocket and they kept saying: “look pal whatever happens to me I’m going to leave”. I thought that was unacceptable... that’s why I think that I belong to that 5% [of Greeks who have managed to break away from this attitude]...that is my identity.’ (Αμήλιος)

Most respondents had a reflexive awareness of two conflicting inhabitations of Greek cultural identity:

‘First of all to be a Greek you have to have a coherent way of thinking. The majority of contemporary Greeks can’t boast of being Greek. For me, these people are just inhabiting a region that is called Greece. Having said that I’m not claiming the title of being a Greek either OK? I’m just trying to be one. You see it’s the Ideal I’m talking about. A true Greek has an open mind is pioneering, restless and lively.’ (Δημήτρης)

According to Θρασύβουλος this Other Greek, the Greekaras, was ‘born’ during the political changeover that followed the collapse of the military coup in Greece in 1974:

‘well, Andreas [Papandreou] arrived [in Greece], a great demagogue, a populist in the sense of the ‘charming’ populist...Andreas danced the zempekiko in the bouzoukia of London, ask any one and they’ll tell you about it; the notion of Greekness was deep rooted within him. At the time, there was political liberation but the economy hadn’t been sorted out. That, in combination with the fact that the EC was pouring money into Greece. meant that the Greek who had come from a background of big time deprivation and hunger believed that the money would never end, and the politicians did nothing to contradict that impression. I can quote from an article with the title ‘Sisyphus’ (1995) in the Economist or the FT
which showed Sisyphus pushing the rock uphill and this was referring to Andreas - 2-3 days after he died - it was basically saying that no politician and his ‘gang’ - a bunch of uncultured people who were his mates - had ever before dominated the political life of a place for so long. Andreas expressed what the people wanted, that is, he saw the people’s weakness [that is, that they wanted to improve their lives and gain a feeling of importance, and so he played upon this].’

For Θρασύβουλο this is the era where the false consciousness of greatness was reawakened\(^3\) once again and enhanced, due to the populist attitudes of a period. It was when democracy had to be reinstated and most importantly rebuild the confidence of the nation. This consequently according to Φώτη created a sense of pseudo-reality in which effectively the Greekaras deludes her/ himself with false consciousness: ‘Being a Greekara is not a reality: my friends and I have seen that being a Greekara and having the point of view that “everything is Greek and so on”, or that “we did it all” isn’t a reality.’

For Αμηλιο the Greekaras is ‘the one who doesn’t take the blinkers off, who feels: “I’m fine here, I’ve got everything laid out for me; my dad has sorted everything, I’ll be OK. I’ve got my ‘little’ house, my mum cooks and irons”, you know: “I’m having a good time, I’m cool, why should I start soul searching?”’ And to that I would reply, hey pal, cut the crap.’ Hence the participants’ reflexive understanding of Greekares (in plural) is that their sense of inadequacy—due to their fear of thinking deeply or committing to any kind of soul searching—which makes them engrossed in a compensatory false consciousness of their superiority vis-à-vis others.

Interviewer: What is a Greekaras then? Is he a European, a Balkan, what is he?

Πάρης: Um... he’s a bit of everything. He doesn’t know who he is. It depends on the individual OK? Most of them don’t have a sense of identity, no. They think: “I’m Greek because I speak Greek, because I’m an Orthodox Christian, because I fancy Greece and I despise all foreigners. Anyone who isn’t Greek is a barbarian.

Despite this reflexive critique of claims for Greek exceptionalism, the same historic legacy informs both Greek inhabitations:

‘Look it’s like I said before. Deep down, I’m proud of being Greek though many things do bother me and annoy me, and I’d like to shut my eyes to many things

\(^{3}\) For the majority of this sample it is a common place that the narrative of superiority and greatness of Greek identity was always there, if dormant, in history books -- permeating nationalist sensibilities since the establishment of the Greek nation state in the 1830’s -- and generating narratives that have been (re)formulated over and over again in response to the turbulent geopolitics of the region.
like an ostrich hides its head under the sand, to [pretend] that I know nothing about it.' (Κασσάνδρα)

It is argued therefore that regardless of divisive claims on the ‘ownership’ of Greekness, the fact of the matter is that both manifestations of Greekness draw from the same historic narrative that conveys to Greeks the sense of greatness, and that it is then only a matter of degree whether that sense of greatness produces what are seen as overblown claims of superiority or just a sense of national pride. Thus despite the continual reconstruction of Greekness, this narrative offers the claim of a connection with a heritage of a sanctified status, that incorporates Hellenic civilization, heroic history and the transcendentalism of Orthodox Christianity and the identification with these fixed markers has kept Greeks close to one another, as with the emotional investment around the family: ‘Greece, Greece, only Greece exists for me. Here [in the UK] the people only look out for themselves - this originates from the family...in Greece...at least there are ties between friends and within the family...there are many negatives about us but overall I think that over there things are better.’ (Πάρνης)

Therefore when the respondents discuss Greece and Greekness - the former in the context of everyday life and current affairs, the latter as the pedigree of the aforementioned heritage that demarcates Greek identity - they talk effectively about one Greece and one Greekness with two dispositions, the Grekares and the Greeks, different and yet similar, contradictory and yet the same, as they both derive their bearings from the same pool or collective resource of constructed identity:

Σοφοκλῆς: I wouldn’t want to live anywhere other than Greece, what more can I say? The country’s beauty, its history, the fact that I think the Greeks have so much more to give and that their idiosyncrasy and character is such that even when barriers obstruct the way, they will always succeed and move forward. All this makes me believe that I’ll never want to be anything other than Greek.

Interviewer: In other words, you don’t have any qualms with today’s Greek culture, i.e. the contemporary Greeks?

Σοφοκλῆς: Of course I do, of course I do, well, because, um... however easily a Greek can pass on their character and ideas and influence [others] they can just as easily be influenced themselves. You see, Greeks have the bad trait that very often they want to be carried along by other cultures...but of course, having had the experience of living here [in London] for two
years. I’ve seen that although there is a superficial influence. Greeks always retain their identity. their Greekness, more than others.

Interviewer: When you say “I’m proud of being Greek” do you say it with the collective sense. i.e. I’m proud of being a part of the ‘ensemble’ of history, of the landscape and of the contemporary people or do you feel separate from today’s Greek attitudes?

Σοφοκλής: No, I don’t feel separate, but I do think that many things concerning the subjects we discussed earlier could be better, of course, well, of course I’m proud, but not withstanding this. I still have my disagreements.

Interviewer: So you’re saying that the modern day Greek culture is part of the whole package [of your Greekness.]

Σοφοκλής: Exactly.

So in this excerpt we see the first invocation of a timeless identity embedded in the landscape and a fixed national character. which is then qualified by relations to contemporary Greek life. However, the thread binding Greekness to Greeks is continually reasserted, with current dissatisfactions blamed on the dilution of Greekness or the influence of other cultures. More generally respondents had some difficulty in illustrating their cultural specificity, trapped between using the ethnocentric idiom of the Western notion of people’s boundedness and fixity in a personal identity which sees ‘both self and culture…belonging to a particular place, bounding and shaping the beings therein’ (Mathews 2000: 12), and their experience of mobility in today’s world whereby ‘one can put together elements of the complete ‘Identikit’ of a DIY self’ (Sarup 1996: 125)34. This difficulty is demonstrated below by Αμηλάο:

‘er… I consider myself as a part of this country….a part of this land if you prefer… the belonging thing you know…I’ve been moulded by it…yeah, yeah

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34 This proposition originates from the phenomenological attempt at offering a possible resolution to the apparent conflict between the two theories of meaning, cognitivism and mutualism that each delineate a contrasting approach to social psychology. According to cognitivism the process of constructing meaning is generated by ‘plausible hypothes[es] on the basis of fragmentary evidence’ (Blakemore 1973: 51). This may be based, as Locke advocated, on innate mental structures, or may be constructed through experience: either way cognitivism advocates that people live in a world of meaning, but one that is of their own construction. Mutualism dictates that individual psychology emerges out of a meaningful social environment through lifelong development (Still and Good 1992). Thus, according to mutualism, meanings are social rather than individual, conveyed by allusion and metaphor, and as such derived from action within a social context rather than thought (Dewey 1929; Wittgenstein 1953; Rorty 1982). Husserl (1970) emphasized that the starting point for all knowledge, and therefore for meaning to occur, lies in everyday experience in what he called the ‘life world.’ In this context, mutualism and cognitivism are seeking to explain the production of meaning, the former describing meaning as an essential part of the life world, the latter as the psychological or physiological structure necessary for participation in the life world.
it’s a part of me, now the ways they [Greekares] interpret these elements…you know; it’s not me, but what can I say…er… look it’s the spirit of not being content [with what I’ve got]. I consider this element as Greek…that Greek element of soul searching…what can I say…don’t make much sense what I’m talking about.’

Such accounts, when taking on board what has been discussed in the preceding sections, prompted this investigation to look into another salient aspect of Greek cultural identity in its attempt to locate Greekness, that is, the notion of home.

5.4 Greek Home

In Sarup’s (1996: 3) words the ‘concept of home in some ways is tied to the notion of identity- the story we tell of ourselves, which is also the story that others tell of us’. The concept of home incorporates attachments and connectedness to a people, to a place, to a possession, to an idea and to a narrative. This of course is mediated by individual circumstances and as such, because it connotes different things to different people, its referent may change over time. Thus what home signifies can gradually change until it becomes a volatile notion, constantly negotiated. According to Berger (1991: 56) home - once upon a time - meant the centre of the world in an ontological sense: ‘Home was the place from which the world could be founded’. For Berger, the ability to consider home as the centre of the world has been irretrievably lost. Instead mobile people preserve their notion of home by sheltering their habits, whether old or new ones. Consequently the disruption of familiar patterns of living due to pluralization of life has affected all private and public spaces alike, and the home is no exception (Maffesoli 1996). Alternatively, Bauman (1998) argues the sense of home as an abode has been reconfigured to become the sense of home as the practicing of living, which leaves people with the symptoms of homesickness. For those however who most enjoy the effects of cultural pluralization, homesickness manifests as a privileged nostalgia. But for many it feels a more acute erosion of home, an increasing the need for one, and the uprooting of people (Berger 1974; Jackson 1995).

These readings suggest a yearning for home expressed, for example, through nostalgia for its ‘toposmia (place and smell), which describes the spatial location of odours and their relation to particular notions of place’ (Drobnik 2002: 33) that has been
inhaled and thus become intimately bound with the body' (ibid. p. 33)\(^3\): or through frustration for the missing socializing that home signifies, embodied in the seasons and hues and textures prescribed by light and scent. In this context home is an inescapable abode whose sensorial tends ‘to evoke associations more emotional than rational’ (ibid. p. 33). A plethora of examples corresponds with the above readings:

Δήμητρα: for me with Greece it’s colour is the first thing that comes to mind it’s blue, light and blue...the smell of the summer thyme, that dry heat. you know, even the summer siesta with the curtains shut, in the Island of the Hare... I’ve spent my beautiful moments there. more than that it’s that the Greeks can get together pretty quickly creating a lively atmosphere from nothing. It’s all those moments, my family, all these come to mind quite frequently...

Interviewer: What about the chaotic traffic?
Δήμητρα: Yes it’s, the smog is Greece, is Athens.
Interviewer: The brawls, the verbal abuse?
Δήμητρα: Yes, yes.
Interviewer: The abuse of your personal space?
Δήμητρα: Yes, yes that they’ll jump the queue, it’s Greece. One moment it infuriates you and the other makes you laugh, and it has happened to acquaint people whom I’d almost engaged in a brawl with because they took my place in the queue, and you discover, all sort of things come up, this ‘alaloum’ [hullabaloo] of Greece is Greece.

Interviewer And does that characterize you?
Δήμητρα: The unexpected [yeah]...I’ve got a side that is very organized. [therefore I appreciate it being here in UK]...and another that gets awfully bored with order [that represents life in UK] and I want the unexpected. In Greece

\(^3\)We should not believe, however, that this sense of discontinuity finds only unfocused and vague expression. Paradoxically, distance demands the rapprochement that negates it while giving it resonance. Never have we longed in a more physical manner to evoke the weight of the land at our feet, the hand of the devil in the year 1090, or the stench of eighteenth century cities. Yet only in a regime of discontinuity are such hallucinations of the past conceivable. Our relation to the past is now formed in a subtle play between its intractability and its disappearance ... How can we but see our taste for everyday life in the past a resort to the only remaining means for restoring the flavours of things, the slow rhythm of past times - and in the anonymous biographies of ordinary people' Nora (1989:17).
you may suffer but you’re not bored, here you don’t suffer but you’re bored, the days are the same, they resemble unbearably.

Accounts such as the above suggest that the yearning for home as abode is strong enough to erase all contradictions embedded in what home actually might be, so it operates as the flexible signifier for rootedness. This suggests that despite the challenges facing the notion of home, the need for rootedness is so overwhelming that people constantly seek to ‘subscribe’ to one. This yearning causes people to engage in a process of competitive ‘root-making’ from the array of materials available in host societies, through which these roots may be re-imagined, proffered in the social arena, and possibly even believed in.

Hence as discussed in the second chapter the pervasive mobility of modern societies complicates scales and notions of belonging, thus accentuating more often than not the aforementioned yearning. This is because as noted in the same chapter rootedness is people’s existential need that goes beyond mere existence. It not only signifies patterns of social life that are inhabited and founded on the ‘crucial cultural component’ (Brubaker 1998), but most importantly these patterns signify a concerted process of shared rememberings and forgettings. These gloss over contentions which may tend to undermine the coherence of such rootedness, around which such communities are organized.

This nostalgic sense of home was contrasted by those who identified with a cosmopolitan sense of belonging especially for those in this sample who are transnationals by birth or upbringing. Such people are not engaged in competitive root making. They view the entire world as their potential home since they are not impressed by a single locality, background, or lineage. These people feel the need for home less since their sense of home is the product of their own making, rather than that of their forebears and environmental backgrounds. As a result, any notion of home, tied to a taken for granted world, becomes foreclosed; to them all the world is home since homelessness is a given thing: ‘home it was always split...we see it like this, that it’s us the little mongrels, split, another country, another language...and I say why not. this is enriching us’ (Kalλλόση); ‘you feel that you’re expanding...literally you’re head, expanding...you end up having this network of people that they’re literally in hundreds’ (Παναγιώτα).

But home was yearned for by most. It has an emotive resonance; for the majority it is a sanctuary, a refuge, a reference point, even an Ideal; in other words home is tied to
a correlation of interlocking meanings and interpretations and as such is the anchor of people's life worlds. Mathews citing Berger argues that 'home, roots are not just in place but in time as well: it is one's particular point of being vis-à-vis friends, neighbours and strangers in space and ancestors and descendants in time...but is gone...in a world flooded with choice' (Berger in Mathews 2000: 193). Although this may be the case for some, it does not seem to sum up the experience of the Greek sample. Undoubtedly the Greek sample has been affected in many ways by a world flooded with choice, upon which necessity reigns (Giddens 1991), in terms of habits and sets of practices. However their notion of home and belonging is firmly tied to their cultural identity which in turn is firmly rooted in the Greek cultural niche. To them there is a cultural home to return to, quite contrary to ideas such a return is impossible. The Greek home cannot be separated from the Greeks and their Greekness.

This applies to both inhabitations of Greekness, that is the Greekares, succumbing to the contemporary populist Greek discourse as they were pejoratively described by this sample earlier, and also to the educated mobile Greeks who were represented in this sample and who were at logger-heads with the above inhabitation and all that it stood for. Despite the fierce criticism of the Greekares's approach to Greekness which permeates and implicates the notion of Greek home as well, the critical Greek still resembles the Greekares in their acknowledgement of a sense of cultural identity with respect to this notion of home. Both embodiments of Greekness within the context of home behold in their references the accretion of the interactions that reflect rootedness in what they subjectively sense as the set ways of Greek living. Here, it needs to be emphasized, this varies according to the point in time this conception is set in (relating to the age group of the sample) and to the context, as well as in regard to the individual biographies concerned.

For the Greek mind the notion of home stands for existence and for cultural identity, it exists amidst the social worlds that push and pull Greeks in various directions. It is thus argued that both embodiments of Greekness, that is the critical Greek or else the non-Greekares-Greek and the Greekares, both feel that their sense of Greekness, emotionally and sentimentally charged as this may be, the interactions that imply rootedness and the notion of home. This encompasses and exudes a cultural tradition sui generis, to which, it is generally assumed by this whole sample, all Greeks belong. That this tradition may have been invented or accrued as a strategy of survival is beside the point, the fact is that it is clearly defined and distinctly identified by any Greek who
draws their emotional bearings from it. It enables the Greeks to have a sense of home wherever they are.

In this context the critical Greek as well as the Greekara are convinced they possess a fundamental cultural identity, *sui generis*. This claim is justified by the very practicing of Greek living entwined and identified with the culture of rituals.

‘it's the mentality of people. A people who appreciates and honours its word. There is dignity, the family, religion. there is this tradition of your country. so to speak; from the kite flying, to the shrove Monday feast, to roasting the lamb on the spit, EVERYTHING.’ (Ἀντώνης)

The Greeks do not ‘imagine home’ by shutting [their] own and others’ eyes for long enough to make it real’ (Mathews 2000: 197); the Greeks live in a notion of home through connection with the culture of rituals.

It is necessary to clarify that this point refers to the particular aspect of an entire culture of rituals that implicates the notion of home. This is best explained by highlighting that it is the culture that is generated and sustained by a construction of a kind of almanac, whereby religious and national commemorations and events are interwoven with the biography of home through personal and local histories. In present times this kind of culture could be read solely as generated from an invented tradition whose common characteristic is invariance, orchestrated by the Church and the State, and one which is based on norms and values of behaviour through repetition. This implies continuity with a suitably historic past.

Alternatively, this culture could be read as their own response to novel situations which take the form of attempts to structure parts of social life as unchanging and invariant. This is in sharp contrast with the constant change and innovation of the modern world. However tradition in this sense must not be confused with custom. Hence one way

of interpreting the participants’ accounts about ‘interactions that reflect rootedness’ is that they essentially talk about custom. That is, custom that precedes state, a custom that is accrued out of strategies of survival which have evolved out of necessity. Custom, according to Hobsbawm (1983) cannot afford to be invariant since it is a combination of flexibility and customary adherence to precedence; it is what people do. As such it is built up from the bottom up, it has found its ways of expression around the invented tradition or else the ‘emotionally and symbolically charged signs of…membership…[whose] significance lay precisely in their undefined universality’
(ibid. p. 11). of both a clerical and secular history that stands for being the ‘legitimator of action and cement of group cohesion’ (op. cit. p.12)36.

In other words tradition has undeniably been conflated with custom in this culture of rituals that sustain the notion of home. What is argued however is that the significance of this custom, contrary to tradition, lies precisely in its clearly defined and distinctly identified particularity, which has no other real role than in keeping people close to one another, and still echoes the need of previous generations to support each other through the adversities of war and poverty. This echo lies dormant under the surface but never quite fades, brought forth by the culture of rituals whose function is to reassure and remind the Greek to pay homage to such traditions. Both custom and tradition have ritualized practices immersed in Greek living, however in the Greek case tradition encases the action of custom. The reason for this is that culture reaches well beyond the formation of the contemporary Greek state. It is a culture that links to turbulent localized histories of survival based on the ongoing development and modification of ritualized and customized interdependent ways of living that continued despite and throughout the continuous geopolitical changes in the region. Its function in the present day world however, is to present the contemporary Greek with a construction of the ‘true dwelling’ or else a ‘home world’ (Berger 1974: 64) that serves as a meaningful centre in a ‘plurality of life words’ (emphasis on the original) (op. cit. p. 62) which according to Berger relativises the identity of the individual.

Yet this sample is not affected by ‘a deepening condition of homelessness’ (emphasis on the original) (op. cit. p. 77) but rather by a condition of frustration directed against contemporary realities that chip away familiar features of familiarity and homeliness:

‘Greece is home. But I do not feel it as a home now. We have moved now to the block of flats culture; the friends, games, primary school. the simple way of living that used to be then in Greece...now I go back and I feel a foreigner...those things that bonded me...don’t exist now. so the place is not felt as home...it’s not so much that I feel a foreigner as that I feel infuriated essentially.’ (Αργυρής)

Despite the changes participants describe the loss of many past references does not and cannot totally undermine their connection to the Greek home worlds these people recall as their own. These are, it is suggested, a cast of mind that linger in a process whereby

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36 See Nora’s (1989) account on the tradition/history divide.
individuals are inscribed, based upon a communication that is inextricably interconnected with the place of origin.

As pointed out earlier, the participants were not, generally speaking, regular church goers; instead the customs and tradition ingrown into their home worlds were what mattered. In the following paragraphs an example of how contemporary Greeks reinforce their Greekness and are connected to an 'all Greek life world', should aptly illustrate this point. It needs to be emphasized, that it is not the purpose of this study to question the historicity of the events recounted in the following example, but rather to draw the attention of the reader to the functioning of this culture of rituals in the perpetuation and reinforcement of the Greek home world which regardless of distance or circumstance fortifies Greek cultural identity.

The 25th of March is a date of celebration for both the Greek State and the Church. The date marks the beginning of the uprising against the Ottoman rule in 19th century as well as the celebration of the Immaculate Conception by the Church. On dates like this, through the deliberate fusion of the secular and cosmological aspects of the nation's legacy, the state projects its future to the Greeks as eternal. In doing so, it prescribes the immortal character of a nation that spans from an immemorial past to an eternal future.

That is, the State and the Church with the aid of 'historicism' (see Benjamin 1979: 265) construct a tradition of an 'all Greek home world' which from the outset seemingly appeals 'horizontally' to all Greeks who take part in its customary adherences. And yet these customs, despite the fact that they are conflated with the tradition in question, preceded this tradition vertically.

This shackling together of cosmology and history is a deliberate contrivance. Prior to 1830, which is the year the modern Greek state was inaugurated, celebrations of the Immaculate Conception were taking place at a different times of the year within the then existing ecclesiastical calendar. It is also historically proven that the uprising against Ottoman rule did not start on the 25th of March. Post 1830 the Church and the State aligned these events to orchestrate deliberate reminiscences of the national and by implication cultural identity across the nation in evoking the theme of an eternal Greek spirit, freedom, and of course of Christendom. But it is not the intention of this discussion to expound historical detail.

For Greeks this date in March is therefore a day for celebration. It occurs within their individual home worlds and across the world linking to other Greeks' home worlds.
with whom they are connected. It is essentially a day that evolves around a socializing *su generis*. Its focal point revolves around the men who were given a name that is the male equivalent of Mary and the women, who have been named after the Virgin Mary. But it essentially reinforces cultural ties, through (re)connecting, remembering and celebrating through this amanuensis: ‘and I’ve also discussed this with the American Jews in the States who tell me that even though the Greek ethnos has changed significantly, our customs and tradition are what make us remain Greek.’ (Nixo) This to them is therefore a day of a present, as the ‘time of the now’ (ibid. p. 265) it does not just concentrate on the historical materialism that historicism supplies of an ‘all Greek home world’:

Δήμητρα: I’m moved by these festivals because I have the chance to celebrate them again as an adult, organise them for the kids and teach them the significance of the 28th October and MOST IMPORTANTLY of the 25th March, OK?… [these celebrations] connect me to the people I love.

Interviewer: In other words, what do these festivals/celebrations mean to you? What do they symbolise?

Δήμητρα: My love for Greece.

Undoubtedly the celebrations by the State and the Church on this day reiterate the connection of the present with earlier times. Yet people use the occasion to meet with one another, to renew their contacts, rendering redundant the meaning of the term distance. In other words wherever the Greeks are that day they would be connected somehow with the event, and through that to the people who intercept at this focal point. This also confirms the claim that social practices are essentially mobile practices that are imported to any places (Urry 2000). Hence, places are fused with one another as people, regardless of their location on the day or their varying customary adherence to this tradition, meet in the signifying space of this temporality. From the outset it seems that the ‘all Greek home world’ radiates outwards. Customs like celebrating 15th March are embedded in people’s personal biographies but are focused upon celebrating contemporary social networks and yet they draw upon a rootedness to a clearly identified home world, and its invented traditions.

The significance of this is that the focal point on contemporary sociality is of secondary importance to the identity it seemingly animates. What is of primary importance is that the interaction between or across people becomes a custom that

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37 Shared performance of rituals is at the heart of Anderson’s (1991) account – simultaneous performance among the nation effectively means knowing unknown others through being linked in doing the same thing.
animates tradition, and so this custom ‘causes’ the tradition to exist. Whereas conventional chronology would say the historical events and tradition gave rise to the custom, we might rather say it is the custom that recreates the notion of a traditional cause. Custom gives a deeply personal meaning to the day, and although from the outset it seems conflated with the meaning attributed to the day by the historic materialism that is mobilized (see Benjamin 1979: 265), it is nevertheless quite distinct and clearly identifiable. Practices like this for the Greeks as a whole have come to represent something unique in which Greek cultural identity is immersed.

Hence the ‘accretion of interactions that reflect rootedness’. acted out by people on such high days and feast days, gives rise to a cycle of life that encompasses Greeks and Greekavers as a whole; alive and dead alike. The reassurances these intersections offer to the Greeks have allowed them the choice of saying this is home, this is the centre of the world, that is, Greekness. This experience of belonging to such a ‘hub’ is laid in the Greek heart. It is constituted in simple and constantly repeated events upon which enormous edifices of practice and custom are constructed. As such it can become modular and inhabits other spaces to make itself at home anywhere in the world. And this is where its strength lies and as such it captivates the Greek imagination or chaffs at the chains of Greece, depending from which angle one experiences the Greek home world: ‘when I came over here...I was... you know...that thing: “We Are Greeks”...thereafter I sobered up...and I’m glad.’ (Νάσος)

5.5 Conclusion

In this chapter Greekness was investigated through three areas where the Greek life world is manifesting; namely the notion of family. rootedness to historical origins giving rise to a notion of Greek identity and the notion of home. The discussion showed that Greeks, regardless of how they inhabit individually their Greek cultural identity, share an intrinsically distinctive way of life which constantly reaffirms their Greekness, thereby demarcating and fortifying this identity in the world. Through the cycle of life such a life world animates, Greeks are firmly rooted to their Greekness yet at the same time they have the capacity to inhabit other spaces, whilst continually reaffirming their cultural identity. It was shown that Greekness does not lose its capacity to communicate with what it stands for through and across any space.
This, it was argued, is because firstly it is underpinned by a particular narrative and secondly it is supported by structures that animate Greek living; which renders redundant of meaning the commonly understood terms such as distance, time and territories. It was argued that Greekness is firmly rooted within concrete manifestations generated by strategies of survival upon which enormous edifices of practice and custom are constructed and as such it is an exclusive, seemingly self sustaining entity. The net outcome overall is that Greekness is the fount of emotive bearings for the Greeks and due to the style in which Greek people and customs operate, this legacy asserts its difference. thereby making Greek identity resistant to change.
6.1 Introduction

This chapter investigates how British and Greek participants relate to the framework of EU citizenship as EU passport holders. In doing so it focuses on their experience as white collar professionals in the context of their daily transactions with the individuals, communities and institutions of the host country. In the first section a brief outline of what constitutes EU citizenship is laid out. This, it is considered, is the top down instrumental strategy for providing the European project with legitimacy and the people of Europe with a space where they can move about freely and, hopefully through contact, relate to one another on a European scale. The second section illustrates how the local factor undercuts tangible benefits existing within the framework of the citizenship of the Union. The final section discusses how EU citizenship, within the wider context of mobilities reconfigures proximities and how this complicates relations between people, communities and cultures. This leads to the question as to how such a complication might be tempered. It is suggested, that European living has the potential to generate a heterotopic space of cohabitation that goes beyond a limited concept of tolerance.

6.2 The Citizenship of the Union: A Market Citizenship

On 1st of November 1993 the TEU (Treaty of the European Union) came into force introducing into its ‘Part Two’ a new legal category that of ‘European Citizenship’. This was typically justified as a response to ‘a need which was widely felt by public opinion and political circles in Europe’ (Shore 2000: 67). Overnight citizens of EU member states became automatically the holders of rights and bearers of duties article A 8 of the TEU38 (now A 17 in the consolidated versions of TEU and TEC (Treaty of the European Community)39. Articles 8a- 8e (now A 18-22) set out in more detail the principal rights associated with EU citizenship but crucially there is no further reference to duties which, broadly understood in citizenship theory, are binding for individuals’

membership of a polity. The principal objectives of the ‘Citizenship of the Union’ ensure freedom, security and justice, promote economic and social progress, and assert Europe’s role in the world. And yet European citizenship has not supplanted national citizenship, nor is it likely to do so. However it adds to, and in some ways complicate, traditional understandings of citizenship.’ (Painter 2003b: 6)

As noted in the second chapter, Maastricht created the space that could give democratic legitimacy to the Union. Redefining Europeans as citizens of the Union legally gave the European project a notion of statehood, thus making citizenship the conceptual tool of legitimizing a neo liberal form of EU governance. Underlying this was the aspiration of the Maastricht drafters that in the course of time EU citizenship, as an instrumental strategy of the project, could eventually nurture a European consciousness (De Clercq 1993) that would support a sense of European belonging. This was considered paramount for the success of the project (Shore 2000). Yet any attempts to create euro-sentiment amongst European nationals have not been a great success (Leonard 1998). This lack of sentiment can be aptly illustrated by the following excerpt from a Greek respondent:

‘Yeah the EU has entered our lives in the sense that...I can work in London...but besides that...Nothing!...yeah OK at the airports you show your passport and you can come and go as you please ha ha [sarcastically]...nothing else really...Come on!...let’s be serious now!’ (Θανάσης)

Fourteen years on since the TEU came into force, there is no tangible European public. The cultural construction of the citizen of the Union is yet to be seen. The significance of EU citizenship-- the fact that it establishes an important principle and its legal framework provides a base for its enlargement (A 8e (now A 22)) -- eludes the attention of most Europeans. Instead there are mobile workers and entrepreneurs who utilize a ‘passport Union’ to achieve their objectives, despite the intentions of the drafters of Maastricht to strengthen the EU’s ‘democratic legitimacy’ (COM (90) as cited in Shore 2000: 67) by ‘making the process of European integration more relevant to individual citizens by increasing their participation’ (CEC 1997 cited in ibid. p. 67). To remedy this, Shaw (1998a,b), proposes ‘an active conception of social citizenship based on a politically defined community’ (Shaw 1998b: 263) prescribed by sets of political values and principles constitutive of modern democracy, rather than merely understood in terms of legal status and set of rights (Mouffe 1992: 8). That is, Shaw

40 http://europa.eu.int/abc-en.htm
I 998b) argues for a contextual approach to citizenship sensitive to the conditions of European integration concerning the rights, membership and participation and even broader understandings of the relations between individuals, communities and institutions. In other words EU citizenship should be seen as 'a set of discursive practices' in which the 'European condition' can be studied (ibid. p. 310). This however leaves open the question as to what form EU social citizenship would take and what it would entail in a post welfare neo-liberal order, since it is not clear how it could accommodate national, regional, ethnic differences (Painter 1999, 2001), or identity groups’ rights (Kymlicka 1995, 1996; Kymlicka and Norman 1995, 2000; Doppelt 1998; Nussbaum 2000).

Against this backdrop this chapter investigates how the British and Greek participants experience what is fundamentally a market citizenship (Shore 2000: 84) that both empowers and constrains the EU citizen (Shaw 1998b: 301). It approaches the participants in their capacity as mobile white collar professionals, who take advantage of their status as EU passport holders, and then discusses their views on how they experience European living as guests and hosts at the level of the European citizen.

### 6.3 European Citizenship and the Local Factor

The legal aspect of European living- A8 of the TEU (Maastricht Treaty) now article 17 of the consolidated Treaty of Rome- comes about with possession of a European passport which represents different things to the European guest and the European host. For the guest, understandably, as the following excerpts illustrate it expands the scope of choice in the sense of the economic and cultural benefits available as Greek and British participants state:

‘The EU was God’s gift to the Greeks: it opened doors...I would be the first to say that I consider myself lucky that we’re [the Greeks] in the EU.’ (Avtòvni;)

‘I went into work one morning, and was asked by one of the managers if I would like to spend some time in the Greek office...To me it was an opportunity not to miss, basically.’ (Alistair)

However it clearly also brings with it its own set of challenges and tensions especially those created by the social, cultural and political frameworks of the host. This issue is illustrated in the material in this chapter that shows the problems participants faced.
integrating into the receiving country. But although the participants’ views regarding the framework of EU citizenship differ markedly, nonetheless all agree that free movement is beneficial, in the sense that anyone, theoretically speaking, can pursue their aspirations. This was understandable from the point of view of this sample since the participants were the prime beneficiaries of the ‘Citizenship of the Union’. Yet the hurdles that host environments raise for the guests -- through their different mechanisms of sociality, politics, social structures, mind frames and attitudes-- are also considerable, and clearly undermine their de jure equality as citizens of the Union. as the Greek participants below commented on regarding the cultural and logistical difficulties involved in moving from one country to another:

‘theoretically, yeah I’ve got more freedom to move about within Europe compared to an African or an Asian; however packing up your things and moving to another member state well, culturally a lot is...[it’s a different ball game].’
(Nádoç)

‘they may say to you that you’re free to move about as you please...[however this] freedom is non existent.’ (Πάρηç)

‘despite what they say about everyone having access...well that’s bollocks.’
(Nádoç)

The reason that such freedom was felt to be only ‘theoretical’ or even ‘non-existent’ was that although the statutory rights of the citizen of the Union are guaranteed anywhere within the EU, in practice these are undercut locally. Thus expatriates felt at a disadvantage not just socially but felt no equality before the law, as these British respondents commented on dealings with local legal systems:

‘Yes, I’ve got rights as an EU citizen. but I haven’t. If somebody in a court of law can just throw a case out like that [Elizabeth refers to a dispute with a Greek company which ended up in Court but, due to the way in which Greek justice operates which Elizabeth is convinced is corrupt, her case was dismissed as ungrounded.]...I’ve got no rights at all.’ (Elizabeth)

‘I feel certainly that my human rights are being abused here. and I’ve done things about it, but it hasn't helped me at all...it has affected my own character, living here.’ (Georgina)
the last time I went to one. it was the P*** police station. they treated me with such contempt, I mean such contempt, the way they spoke to me, it was so disgusting that when I walked out of there I said I am never going back again. and I never did. I resent being treated...treated with the same contempt that they were treating the Albanian people in the same room. “Come here, sit down.” Like a dog.” (Jonathan)

Experiencing EU citizenship in the above fashion undercuts the top down aspiration to build up a de facto element in the citizenship of the Union by somehow engaging the Europeans’ sentiment in innovative ways, so that an affiliation to the Union would evolve, ‘it is...important that people feel psychologically attached to Europe’ (European Commission 2001 cited in Painter 2003b: 5). But crucially it is this ‘local factor’ -- socially or culturally, instrumentally or structurally -- that undermines the development of such a psychology:

‘There was a time when...before I actually had this job, because here I speak English all the time at work. Before that, when I was only doing classroom teaching, I would spend 20 hours a week in the classroom, speaking classroom English, which is very restricting. At home I would speak in Greek. All my friends were Greek, my relationship was Greek. so I only spoke Greek outside the classroom. And there, I found myself saying “we” meaning “we the Greeks”. So I was identifying very strongly, and some of my anger at the racism is because I was identifying with the Greeks, but in the end I was pushed away, in a way.’

(Jonathan)

So far the above excerpts amply illustrate how the EU’s democratic deficit, manifests itself not so much through lack of formal citizenship rights or democratic rights at a European scale as through exclusions located among the daily trivia which emphasises a lack of shared belonging. In other words, policies designed to create equality among Europeans are not implemented at ground level. This lack of implementation is most acutely felt by those citizens who are mobile workers as they are fully aware of how things should work in theory.
6.4 Mobilities: Reconfiguring European Propinquities

Hence, as pointed out in the second chapter, EU citizenship both empowers and places constraints on European nationals. This is evident from this sample's views when they discuss opportunity structures created by the EU, as well as their lives as guests in host EU member polities and societies. Essentially their talk conflates the impact of transnational flows on individual lives, groups, communities and familiar places and spaces of living, with that of the citizenship of the Union, which despite some tangible benefits existing, in their view complicates the congruence of ethnic/cultural and political territories as well as the seemingly unilateral relationship between belonging and localities (Levitt 2001).

When the participants discuss EU citizenship from the point of view of being the guest, as illustrated above, they describe a situation where national citizenships, constantly undermine the notion that both host and guest are in a shared polity. This is in the sense that the de facto aspect of national citizenship, as this manifests in public and private attitudes, remains the most powerful modality of belonging and thus resists integration. This is evident for example in the ways in which national red tapes undermine the status of EU citizens as discussed in the third section of chapter two, as where despite assertions of freedom of movement requirements for residence permits still present a differential and practical barrier to non-national's participation as further illustrated as follows:

Interviewer: Have you ever voted here for the municipal elections?

Jonathan: I tried to. I tried, because it said in the Athens News that we could go and do that. You just had to go and...no, but you couldn't. I went. I was told I had to go to an office, I had to have papers from this office and that office...And I realised it was going to take me days, days.

Peter: In Greece I think they're more than accountants. They're...I think the term is facilitators. They are here to interface...

Interviewer: ..these facilitations vary, as I'm sure you are very well aware...

Peter: ..no comment! [LAUGHS]...It's very common...There's specific people. There's the people who do this...do the resident's permits. That's their job... Customers' broking.

41 See appendix six for a photocopy of residence permit.
Such difficulties that even highly articulate professionals have in host places results, as Favell (2004) documents, from manifestations of entrenched place-bound identities that both hinder mobility and result from lower mobility. This was fully discussed in the sixth section of the second chapter and can be seen in the next extract:

Jonathan: Let me tell you this. This is an example. Here we are doing German lessons, and it’s funded by the Department of Employment. The Inspector from the Department of Employment came to our German lessons. checked that all was OK.

Interviewer: Department of Employment of which?...

Jonathan: ..what’s it called, um...

Interviewer: ..the local one, the Greek one?

Jonathan: Yeah, the Greek one. Um… So this person’s…official, representative of the Government, because he’s working for the Government, came in. The teacher speaks German and English and spoke to him in English. The man turned around and said, “I don’t speak any foreign languages, I’m proud that I don’t speak any foreign languages. If anyone writes to me in my office in a foreign language, I send it straight back. I’m proud to be Greek, and I don’t know what you are,” to the more Greek-looking people. And he said to me and to the teacher, “I want all foreigners out of Greece.” And I said, “That’s racism.” Here in my, our building, here in the A*** A*** U***. In a language institute, a binational language institute. a representative of the Government came in and said I want all foreigners out of Greece, he repeated it. And I said “You’re being completely racist,” because I got angry. And he said, “I don’t care. I want to be racist. This is what I believe. You should all leave my country.” Now that could never happen in another European country without that man losing his job. But here, what did all the Greeks say? They said to me, “Be quiet. Because we don’t want to make any fuss.”

Interviewer: What? The Greek staff said that to you?

Jonathan: Just to…Maybe I should be doing this off the record.

Jonathan describes a situation which is not uncommon in public domains in Greece. As was noted in chapter three, and as we shall see in this chapter and the following final one, xenophobia and even racism have always tended to lurk in Greek attitudes, and the Greek participants in this chapter and the next one acknowledge this
and make their views abundantly clear. However xenophobia and racism, under the 
veneer of Greek hospitality, came to the fore with the post 1989 immigration wave. Most 
of the British participants have had personal experience of this and commented upon it-
rather bitterly in some instances.

However in the above excerpt from the outburst by the Greek official, as 
recounted by Jonathan, what also comes through allows us a glimpse of the reaction increased 
 mobilities caused. Generally speaking it can be asserted that mobilities transform the 
specificity of any place from one, experienced as a ‘long internalized history’, to one 
becoming the ‘meeting place’, the construct of ‘a particular constellation of social 
relations, at a particular locus’ (Massey 1997 cited in Hyndman 2003: 2). This is 
confirmed below by Paul and Φωρη:

‘For example there is an event run by the British Embassy every year. It’s called 
Boxing Day Walk…It reminds me a little bit about going to a meeting, a hunt, or 
something, and you get people with green Wellington boots, in Range Rovers, 
and I get a very strong sense there of class.’ (Paul)

‘and I thought [for a moment] that [here in London] I am in the square of my 
neighbourhood [in Athens]; you know. coffee shops where everybody speaks 
Greek (Φωρη)

However such transformations cause frustrations to those affected by them and 
this is evident in the accounts in this chapter so far. Such feelings are also evident in the 
next chapter, as participants talk in their capacity as guests, as well as from the 
alternative point of view in their capacity as hosts, about European living in the context 
of the transnational flows that globalization brings about. Racist overtones are evident in 
the accounts of both samples as we shall see.

Hence these changing geographies of social relations introduced by mobilities to 
the host’s territories usually problematize relations between the host and guest. The 
hitherto congruence of being a member of an imagined community of people and the 
subject of its political identity, which so far has been definitive for formulations of 
notions of identity and belonging, is affected by the presence of guests with rights to 
work and participate (non Europeans who have been granted the right to live and work in 
the host’s ‘backyard’ but especially Europeans enjoying those rights automatically) 
because they too can in theory equally exercise their de jure status within such a
community. This confounds the hitherto clear distinction between the physical and immaterial spaces of citizenship (Painter and Philo 1995) as the following excerpts illustrate. Yesterday’s distant fellow European appreciated until now for the consumption of its difference as the host, confined in a distant location or commodified as a tourist, student, sojourner, peripatetic migrant or any other category of guest, becomes today’s not so distant, indeed co-present Other European. This change, due to transnational flows in general and the construction of new scales of governance and regulation is one amongst many which could it be argued is exacerbated by a EU citizenship that complicates state centred projects. In this tangle of transnational flows and of constructions of new scales of governance and regulations the respondents viewed other Europeans as fellows and yet consider them as incompatible with one another. This problem, discussed in chapters four, five and which is addressed again later in chapter seven, means that fellow Europeans tolerate one another because necessity, opportunity, and personal gain takes precedence. Yet at the same time it means they are intolerably predisposed to one another because the cultural precedence of the one way of life over the Other is part of the cultural proximities within places. As Massey argued above this disfigures what is known as familiar and homely:

Peter: Sometimes on the train I feel strange...but I think also the Greeks are starting to feel strange. Especially as half the people are speaking Russian. Last year they authorised 300,000...I think, it’s really bad to be racist, but in England you do not see white faces...All the employees are black in the shops, Indians, people like this. It’s happening all over Europe. Of course they’re taking jobs from local citizens. I think here [Athens] will...become like Chinatown, which you would not see before. And I think we’re beginning to realise later that you’re losing something.

Interviewer: From your...um... identity?

Peter: Yeah, yeah.

The above shows that another dimension, that of the presence of third country nationals, is adding to a situation where people compete with the host for resources and services. consuming spaces and places, which the host considers as domestic. Unreachable in their difference, language and adherence to the precedence of their customs, this issue throws into sharp relief the tensions contained within neo liberal forms of governance:

‘To start with, I’m not a racist...those English who were not originally racist have had such experiences with the Blacks that they have unwillingly become so...you
walk into an office and all the public services are full of Indians, Pakistanis, Blacks; low cost, low mentality, low morality. 09.00-17.00 [working mentality]... compare this to an English secretary... quick, bright and lively or a granny... the original British - the bright one though ... she'll have you sorted in a matter of seconds [have dealt with your enquiries quickly, efficiently].

Such reactionary thinking, understandably disavowed so it matches the profile of the civilized mobile professional, nevertheless expresses the angst felt by the participants caused by the increase of flows and transactions of human capital as well as the introduction of new scales of governance and regulation as noted above. It supports what has been discussed in chapter two regarding tensions in places of mixture and it draws attention to the emotive and corporeal experience of the people as they are in the middle of such tensions. Their discontent however it can be argued -- and this is also illustrated in the next chapter -- is not so much about keeping non Europeans out of Europe but rather it is about preventing the alienation of European people from what they consider as their civilization, their placeness, their localness, their homeliness within what is commonly perceived as European space.

In the excerpts above and in the following excerpts below, emotions and sentiments regarding Otherness shoot into prominence. These delineate the entanglement of different consciousnesses embodied in different spaces at different times as they encounter one another in spaces and places of mixture:

'I think Greek people can come across as quite aggressive, and it's not intended necessarily... but they can certainly come across in the wrong way. I mentioned before that I think there can be a lack of honesty, or a lack of willingness to express that they may be at fault in some way. That is I think a big problem. Even when it’s blatant, they’ll swear blind that it’s not. A lack of politeness. I think very selfish... looking out for themselves, whatever they’ve got to do is the most important thing... Yeah, without a thought to anyone else who may also... they were all negative, weren’t they?' (Alistair)

'The English do not make any attempt whatsoever at accepting the Greeks as their fellow ‘country men’, or at least as Europeans; they clearly consider us as third world nationals, like we consider the Albanians; they think that they are the best and that there is nobody else like them; like the French do; the British [as a
whole] are the same, the [British] Blacks and Indians have the same attitude. "yeah we’re the greatest", it’s the pride thing they have for British empire. all of them have it.” (Aðeyú)

In this context the experience of European living at the level of the European citizen undermines the top down aspiration of an emerging notion of shared Europeanness that lies behind the very concept of European citizenship. The everyday reality does not make concessions towards the ‘abstract and heavily political conception of European identity’ (Leonard 1998 cited in Painter 2001: 9) that underpins the formulation of EU citizenship. In the eyes of both Greek and British expatriates, a ‘passport Union’ or the overseeing jurisdiction of the European Court of Justice or the embedded potential in the principle of EU citizenship, or the increasing volume of legislation generated in Brussels and superimposed on national legislations do not seem to temper cultural differences amongst Europeans. Indeed the flows created through Europe produce propinquities which accentuate differences. These are clearly coming through Margaret’s and Mapia’s accounts below. Here frustrations caused by the perceived incompatibility of British and Greek cultures, in terms of mind frames, daily trivia, codes of conduct, and so on: when translated in the context of the top down agenda of the European project with regards to integration amongst Europeans, seems to be foreshadow its future:

Margaret: Er. gosh. The thing is that you want to fit in, you want to be happy here, and you just have to be flexible really about the way you see things...I wouldn’t say there’s been changes in my behaviour. but I’m more aware of myself having moved out here. I’ve become more aware of what sort of person I am...And I live in London and not the north of England, so I expected to find it pretty easy to move here. But I found it very hard. And that says a lot of things about me as a person. But I don’t think I’ve coped with the change particularly well. Or I’ve found it a big struggle. the change, which surprised me. And emotionally it’s challenged me because there are times when I’ve just thought I can’t cope any longer. I want to go back to the UK. But it’s not that easy to move back, so you’ve got to keep on, and motivate yourself and enjoy the positive sides of it...I accept other cultures, and you become more aware of them and you’re more accepting I find of other cultures, and you can see the differences in the cultures. But
it makes me definitely feel even more firmly that I’m anti a European state.

Interviewer: Why is that?
Margaret: Because I just think we’re all so very different.

‘I can’t adapt to the…culture [here in London] I can’t…I can’t follow it: I can’t understand their logic.’ (Mapia)

Such frustrations, caused by the fundamentally different mentalities that govern structures within European cultures, are amplified through everyday living:

David: I’m sorry to say this, because I know you’re a Greek. OK? I identify with a lot of things that happen here, but a lot of things really, really get up my nose here…“Me, and I couldn’t care anything about anyone else.” Really. It’s so frustrating…You want to kick people up the backside…I can’t get into that.

Interviewer: What you’re saying is that nothing’s changed since the Maastricht Treaty was signed…


In sum the excerpts so far illustrate not only the bottom up experience of the EU project reflecting the overall view this sample has with regards to its stature and functioning. They also bring into prominence tensions and frictions caused by mobilities in general, which are not only about competition for resources, but they are also about cultural competition. Both Greek and British participants attribute a great significance to their nationalities and by implication the cultural identities embedded in them. The top down assumption that this would be surpassed through experiencing the EU market citizenship simply does not resonate with this sample:

‘I think citizenship – which is the passport – is becoming less of an issue in Europe…You could argue…whether there’s any reference to Great Britain or anything like that…I think the passport potentially could be more Europeanised over time…I think nationality is something that’s going to take a long-long time to change.’ (Tim)

The current European reality is such that cultural markers are stubborn reminders of who is who, and from where (s)he comes. The ways in which mobilities in general and the citizenship of the Union in particular operate, according to the earlier excerpts as well as the excerpts below, challenge the taken-for-granted cultural dominance of the host in
the sense that they destabilise pre existing social contexts and cultural practices which are
inextricably linked with identity formations.

Thus it can be argued that what mobilities effectively do, whether these are
engendered by the citizenship of the Union or by any other transnational flows, is that
they challenge the dominance of the host in familiar places by rendering familiar and
habituated patterns of dwelling both visible and thus open to question. Hence mobilities
and the instrumental strategies that facilitate them disrupt the hitherto relationship
between local identities and local spaces (Shields 1999: 308).

The hosts’ notion of cultural ownership of practices of living framed by
‘sanitized heritages’ (Massey 1994) and demarcated by the physical and immaterial
spaces of national citizenship is contested by the guest. When the participants’ discuss
cultural distinctiveness, in relation to mobilities regarding instrumental strategies that
facilitate them, as for example the extension of Euro zone commented below by
Margaret, there appears to emerge a fear that the appropriation by the guests of the hosts’
domestic spaces, may inaugurate the possibility of a blending of the hosts’ memory and
temporality with their respective guests. This is considered by the majority of this sample
as detrimental for the survival of cultural (national) distinctiveness. As we see from the
excerpts below this also applies to blurring such boundaries with the European one:
Margaret:  I couldn’t see anything. I feel there is a fear. I think that we are going to
lose our identity…it sounds a stupid thing, but there’s all this talk about
going over to the Euro, and people in Britain are concerned about losing
their currency that’s got a picture of the Queen on it…I’m not so bothered
about using the Euro, but I just don’t want our economy to be on a par
with all the other economies. Generally, Sterling has been a strong
currency.
Interviewer: Yes, but basically this makes exporting more difficult.
Margaret: You could say it makes it very good for the banks as well. Because they’re
making a lot of money on the exchange trade.
Interviewer: Yes, but while the financial sector is happy, the manufacturing sector is
very unhappy…The manufacturing sector basically wants to drop all
Sterling transactions, to open up the market to the rest of Europe…
Margaret: …I think I quite like us being different, having our own currency.
Interviewer: That’s the point. Therefore you like to be different.
Margaret: I like the differences because that's one thing about embracing other cultures. I like the differences. I mean, not all differences are good, but you have to accept that as being part of somebody's culture. But I like the differences. And I don't want us to be a homogeneous state [meaning a European super state].

Thus it can be argued that mobility in the context of transcultural exchanges, enriching as it may be for localized cultures, nevertheless infiltrates practices of living by interrupting notions of familiarity and homeliness with one's own accustomed ways of living. Viewed from this angle mobility then heightens senses of localness and embeddedness, thereby inevitably leading to contestation over place\footnote{Place is used here in the context of the 'ongoing matrix and record of social processes' (Shields 1999: 308).} - since dwelling-in-transit entails forms of belonging (Urry 2000). These contestations are characterized by differential power relations maintained by opposition to the outsider (Asad 2000). Due to this opposition, the contextual belongings of hosts and guests alike are accentuated, exposing cultural friction which is generated by 'the changing geography of social relations.' (Massey 1994: 167):

'They talk about me [negatively] behind my back, about me! a Greek! [a European] and I mutter to myself “who are you to talk? Just because you came here 30 years ago from Jamaica? How are you integrated? Just because you were born here?" er... anyway these people have a British identity.’ (Aθηνάδ) Furthermore Αθηνάδ account illustrates that the issue of race is not fading in the wake of increased communications and cultural exchanges, especially in places of mixture such as London with its multiracial base. Theoretically speaking, one would expect that by now-- in global cities like London-- people would have familiarized themselves with the racial mosaic of global population and thus become, at least on an individual level, more tolerant to one another. On the contrary in the account above, the European versus Britishness-- the participant brings up-- is sharply thrown into relief by race (this is illustrated further below and again in the next chapter). Again in Cliff's account below, race I would suggest underpins his concerns with regards to the increased transcultural transactions that seem to be perceived as a threat to cultural distinctiveness in general, especially when these are taking place within the places of ‘internalized histories’ and of shared ‘rememberings’ where identities are formed:
‘seeing the cultures of the world thrown into a melting pot which doesn’t come out with any real strong identities other than one of comfort and consuming.’

(Cliff)

When cultural Otherness infiltrates ‘familial’ locations, the ‘desecration of homelands’ as a prospect generates ‘reactionary responses [that range between] certain forms of nationalism, sentimentalized recovering[s] of sanitized ‘heritages’ and outright antagonism[s]’ (Massey 1994: 147) With this prospect in sight the ethnocentered Self becomes alarmingly aware of the future contours regarding its identity. In this context identities become exclusive of the Other.

This, it is argued, affects people’s approach to mobilities in general because despite people’s capacity to reposition themselves within new contexts and practices they nevertheless need that space to be preserved in one way or other because in these pre-existing contexts and practices, as mentioned earlier, they consider that their identities are formed. The following extracts however, illustrate just how complex the issue of such identity forming is and how it is problematized by the changing geographies of Europe. culturally, politically, instrumentally, as they expose perceptions regarding stereotyping and internalized histories that blur and problematize European nationals’ vision of an all inclusive Europe. Mobilities impact on the politics of cultures, religions and on people’s attachments to bounded notions of identity. As discussed in the second chapter and throughout the accounts so far in this present chapter. this places considerable strain upon notions of European (Western) civilization and its values in general. The individual European, having inhabited the aforementioned civilization at a national level, struggles to reposition her/himself amidst the currents of transnationalism:

Georgina: I would say that the way that they live, which is very much within their own Muslim community, is not European. But, since they are so...I don't know what percentage of the European community is Muslim. for example, perhaps they are European. Perhaps Europe is no longer...perhaps you can no longer define Europe as we used to define it. or as I am defining it.

But I can't see that they are European if they don't assimilate themselves into...

Interviewer: ..why should they assimilate ?...they pay their taxes...they’re law-abiding citizens.
Georgina: No, I don't think they're doing anything wrong. They can do what they like. But I wouldn't say that they're European. European to me means the history and culture of Europe, which is not the culture that they come from. In another 1000 years, maybe nobody will say that any longer. because the migration of the Muslims to Europe...in the same way as we have the migration here of the Balkan countries and ethnic minorities will change Greece beyond description. In the same way. right now I think that it's not essentially European. For me, they're Muslim. And I suppose if you asked them the same question they would probably say the same thing.

Interviewer: What about the Jewish people who came...in London for example...the fundamentalists. Are these people European? Are they British? They contribute a lot to the society.

Georgina: Yeah. Pause. Yes, they're more European than the Muslims.

Interviewer: Why, what makes them more European...than the Muslims? I mean, at a glance, many of them look like really hardcore fundamentalists. What makes one more European than the other?

Georgina: I think the history and the cultures, for me.

Interviewer: What about the Christian fundamentalists, here in Greece for example? You see all sorts of demonstrations of this type of fundamentalism...promoting obscurantism. Is that European?

Georgina: No, no. I think what's hard here in the questions that I'm answering is there's a mix...is the division between religion and citizenship.

Interviewer: Yes, but they're...

Georgina: ..they're entwined. I know they are. But I suppose that...I don't know what it is. I find it very hard to answer the question. You're quite right to ask it.

Although Georgina seemingly defines Europe as the pedigree of the Enlightenment (rooted in Greek Antiquity and Roman Law) and of a common Christendom there is an underlying vagueness in her account of what the present Europe stands for, amidst the transnational flows and the forces of globalization. Her emphasis on difference exposes incoherencies in the account evident in her hesitation on how to position European Jews vis-à-vis European Muslims within European heritage. This brings to the fore not only the compatibility or not of certain religions existing within European Christendom but also immersed in the account I would suggest there is an implication of racial
incompatibilities within European ethnic populations. On whole her account is a cry for the feared loss of the hitherto embeddedness of European cultural identities in spaces demarcated by the congruence of imagined communities and their political identities as these are challenged by transnational flows and new projects of governance and regulations.

Hence when under duress, against the backdrop of the aforementioned concerns that provoke tensions and frustrations, even racism, lurking backstage, comes to the fore as in the excerpt below:

Alan: When we do make contact, and we’ve argued about different points, I think my family is very biased towards … foreigners. In their perception there are British people, and there are foreigners. But I don’t think I am biased, I think perhaps I am balanced … I think it’s part of the darkness of my own character I’m afraid.

Interviewer: No, it’s not. (CHUCKLES)

Alan: No, it is. For example, a couple of days ago I was on my motorbike and a street seller selling handkerchiefs came to the bike, and my girlfriend was on the back of the bike. And he was African in origin, and he was very insistent, very, very insistent. And after a while my natural reaction was “piss off, you…” Not “you annoying person”, but I made a very …

Interviewer: … racist …

Alan: … remark.

Interviewer: Everybody makes one from time to time.

Alan: I think they do, but that’s probably coming from my Britishness.

In sum the many conflicts and constraints placed upon individuals unearth moments of frustration that dwarf cosmopolitan dispositions. Europe has encountered difference throughout its turbulent history. Yet with every new wave of migration or the prospect of incorporating what hitherto has being registered in popular imagination as non European, Europeans seem to feel the pressure. This however does not necessarily translate into the fostering of an albeit exclusive, European identity (for reasons discussed at greater length in the next chapter). Nevertheless the citizenship of the Union as the corroborator of free movement, as the excerpts in this chapter illustrate, accentuates this pressure and make Europeans think that it may undermine singular groups’ attachments to singular places as well as notions of unitary citizens (Connolly 2000). This, it appears, generates adverse reactions. Its significance is felt by guests.
hosts and nation states alike which struggle to moderate the strains that increased mobilities place on societies and their conventional polities.

Even for those respondents who sit comfortably around the issue of migration in the sense that on principle they object to any fortress notions of governance. when they discuss the issue of the political representation of the guest in the host country they by default link it with cultural representation. In their view – either implicitly or explicitly - the distribution of political rights to those guests, who would choose as their country of residence and domicile the country of their hosts, would upset over time cultural ratios of representation within the political domains of the host. This unavoidably would raise issues of ideology, power and control over the nation’s destiny with regards to its cultural distinctiveness, thereby affecting in the long run the host’s collective identity.

The right of the guest to be represented in the host country on an equal basis with the host, in the minds of most, equates with a move from a cultural homogeneity -- that implies singular attachments to singular places and notions of a unitary citizenry which -- to a cultural amalgamation that in the view of many may undermines the host’s cultural dominance. This, they uphold, will lead to a ‘weak culturization of cultural identities’ (Lofgren 2000; Klein 2000) of hosts and guests alike - rather than forging any new coherent identities, let alone forging new senses of belonging:

'I do not think that just anybody on the basis of paying taxes and owning property...should have the right to vote in a country. I don’t think that’s right.
You can’t just buy votes...Yeah, you’ve got enough money, you can go and live anywhere you like, and you can just sort of say right. I’m voting in this country.
Isn’t that a sort of logical to the extreme...I’m not sure what I think about that...I don’t like the idea of nationalistic closed border, anti-immigration policy [but]...

(Les)

However for those in this sample who fall into the category of guest just as described in this excerpt, this line of argument is unacceptable. This clash exposes the limitations of the conventional concept of citizenship, and the exclusion of guests frames them indefinitely into this typology of the ‘denizen’ (Garcia 1993), who is fit enough to generate revenues for the host, but not quite fit to have a say in state policies that affect her/his life:

Interviewer: One point of view is that European culture is about tolerance and acceptability, and openness.
Jonathan: Well, there isn't here. In fact, I get a funny image as well, because with the taxi drivers, they're always asking where you're from, and I always say from Ireland. And then I get a long, long diatribe about England, how cold the English are. You know, they have all these stereotypes for other nations. I think really, this is nothing new. If you looked at ancient Greece it was exactly the same. If you weren't from the Polis...

Interviewer: ...it was worse.

Jonathan: Yes. You had no rights whatsoever. But it's the same now. I have no rights to vote in England, because I have no property there. I have no connection with England. But I have no right to vote here.

Interviewer: Therefore you are saying that you want to be able to vote here ...since you are paying your taxes here; no taxation without representation?...

Jonathan: But I strongly resent the fact that I can't also vote for national elections.

These participants from the perspective of being migrants viewed citizenship not as a mode of identity structured around religion, culture or ethnicity but as a mode of living, that needs to be consolidated *de jure* in the polity of the host so that they can exert some influence. In other words their self conception does not fit the category of 'denizens' in the usual understanding of the term, as describing people as guests living but not belonging in a foreign country and who merely remain in that country because their vested interests reside within it (Hussain and Bagguley 2005; Klopp 2002; Gowricham 2002).

In their view being cast as a denizen deprived them of the sense of belonging they felt they had the right to possess. To them transnational citizenship should entrust people's loyalties to multiple states since loyalties are linked to forms of belonging which in their view can spread to multiple states, at multiple scales:

'As much as I feel English, I'm Greek. But, the way I feel does not alter the fact that I'm unable to operate in one's surroundings to the best of my abilities, and in the English surroundings I'm certainly able to operate far more effectively.'

(Nigel)

This was without each belonging being compromised by the other as Tim put it:

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43 Like myself: an active member of a British political party and thus implicated in its policies, how and by whom it is run, and yet as a European non British citizen without the right to vote for it in national elections.
'Maybe that's partly because of the way I treat where my home is. Because I've de-coupled my home, and my feelings of being at home, from my material possession of bricks and mortar.' (Tim)

or as in Φόρης said:

'in essence this is my home; I may have [links with Greece], but my life is here. my home is here, my interests are here; if a war breaks out...although I'm Greek I'll fight for the UK; I'll act. I'll protect my interests here in the UK.' (Φόρης)

In other words transnational citizenship could be decoupled from nationality and ethnicity. It was their belief that transnationals of this category should be granted full political rights without the need to be naturalized as British or Greeks respectively.

However the idea of being allowed to become the subject of the political identity of the host nation whilst still being effectively perceived as a guest by the host is more complicated than it seems as the earlier excerpts illustrated; since belonging to a 'community'...is never simply [about] a recognition of cultural similarity or social contiguity. It is instead a categorical identity that is characterized by various forms of exclusion and constructions of otherness' (Gupta and Ferguson 1997: 13). In other words regardless of how tolerant or inclusive the host might be, this categorical identity, that is the host, is unwilling to transcend in the sense of becoming inclusive beyond the 'limited concept of tolerance'(Probyn 1996: 5). The overwhelming majority of participants subscribe to this premise as hosts and yet express their discontent with it as guests. Either way it has been accepted as a paradoxical component of modern day Europe which nevertheless continues to draw dividing lines between Europeans and non Europeans as Δήμητρα vividly delineates:

'London specifically is a place which has managed to fit us all in. I'm a foreigner but no more [of a foreigner] than my next door neighbour who's of Italian descent and engaged to a Czech, or from my other neighbour, who's Indian, or from the black lady who lives opposite me. They may feel British, 'we are from here'. however they are not, we are all here now; you want to call it Europe, you want to call it England...London, Greenford, we're still all different, and we fit in here only because we have learnt not to annoy each other: I'd like for all of us to be a bit closer. but I've accepted that for example, neither the Indian nor the black lady will befriend me. (Δήμητρα)

The persistence of difference is underpinned as the following quote suggests by the intertwining of place and power in the conceptualization of culture:
particular place[s] [that are] set apart from and opposed to other places...the construction of difference is neither a matter of recognizing an already present commonality nor of inventing an ‘identity’ out of whole cloth but an effect of structural relations of power and inequality. Questions of identity therefore demonstrate with special clarity the intertwining of place and power in the conceptualization of ‘culture’. Rather than...sharing the ‘same’ culture, community, or place, identity emerges as a continually contested domain.” (Gupta and Ferguson 1997: 13-4)

The presence of difference frustrates guests and hosts alike because not only does it lead to contestation over the politics of political, cultural and any other representation in public domains, most importantly it complicates notions and spaces of belonging. The importance of belonging to the place and understanding its tacit rules, of in short feeling at home, is further accentuated by patterns of living between places and communities - a shared experience between the participants of this sample - that fortifies for most their ‘longing for belonging’ (Ilcan 2002) to familiar and homely places. Since:

‘none of the groups...[into which they] enter [they] belong ‘fully’: there are parts of [their] modular persons which ‘stick out’ and cannot be absorbed or accommodated by any single group, but which instead connect and interact with other modules. Each act of self-ascription is therefore subject to contradictory, centripetal and centrifugal, pressures. All forms of togetherness are in effect vulnerable and fragile, while the modules remain poorly integrated. In no group do [they] feel ‘fully at home’; in whatever group [they] happen to be at a time-being there feels more like an overnight stay...because the only...homes known to [contemporary individuals] are also increasingly...places of temporary sojourn...The condition of ‘modularity’ is therefore...the triple bane of uncertainty, insecurity and lack of safety [and as such] is a constant source of tension. The tensions tend to coalesce into a longing for great simplification...[a] one-to-one link [with accustomed ways of living a] longing...encapsulated in the idea of ‘belonging’” (Bauman 1999: 161).

In other words the ‘places of temporary sojourn’ that seem to have become an integral part of mobility patterns do accentuate the importance of belonging since mobile people are reminded constantly of their difference and the temporariness of their stay. in the places they enter. And yet this longing for belonging does not necessarily need an
identity- as discussed above in the context of transnational citizenship. It can be argued that all people seek is a niche in which they can live, and influence through participation the processes that affect their lives:

Φωτης: I don’t care about the passport itself, I care about having the right to vote...so I’m applying for it [the British passport] for this right: since I live here I want to be able to vote, to have that small say once every four years...if I could vote, as I do in the municipal elections...I wouldn’t apply for it, I would keep the Greek one; [the British passport] doesn’t offer [me] anything more...

Interviewer: Therefore you’re applying for the passport in order to be represented in the political community...

Φωτης: ...yes and also to belong...from the moment that I live here, I should [feel that I] belong to this community...

Interviewer: ..but you do belong don’t you?

Φωτης: Not fully, do you understand?

In the context of the discussion so far, the sample frequently exposed the strains inherent in conventional frameworks of citizenship that struggle to contain and manage increasingly diversified and complex questions raised by the current realities of the EU. and by mobilities in general, such as processes of ‘unsettlement’ and ‘unhomeliness’ (Bauman 1999: 160), which complicate conventional notions of relating to people, their notions of localness, identities and homelands.

From the host’s point of view what is projected is the fear that known ways of living that underpin the essential reference points of any cultural identity - would be infiltrated and diffused to the detriment of cultural distinctiveness. The guests’ view reflected the inadequacy felt, confined as they are by their passports within a space of ‘neither here nor there’; their temporality locked in the temporal modality of the host. Both positions ultimately refer to their right to belong as this ‘captures...the desire for some sort of attachment to modes of being and the ways in which individuals and groups are caught within wanting to belong...a process that is fuelled by yearning rather than the positing of identity as a stable state’ (Probyn 1996: 19).

Ultimately the interview data suggests the experience of EU citizenship as a market citizenship does not form any particular kind of belonging for the overwhelming majority of this sample. It is perceived as a quintessentially political construct, a product of historical and political negotiations amongst the elites of Europe generated from
consensus, firmly rooted in vested interests and choices of state and private apparatuses that benefit certain categories of Europeans, such as the sample under investigation, and excluding others: ‘There are losers in the race. There’s no doubt about that.’ (Cliff). In this light the participants’ approach to EU citizenship, despite some tangible benefits it creates, is sceptical about outcomes that seemingly complicate ways of living between culturally diverse people, in the sense that it may reconfigure propinquities which are conducive to implications of notions of localness and placeness, thereby problematizing identities and notions of belonging.

In this context it could be argued that the European project is an ambivalent space such that on the one hand it may increase the politics of polarity of us and them, locals and guest, insiders and outsiders, that diverse cultural enunciations bring about, and on the other in its space the act of hybridity is operational at least for those willing to transgress such polarity.

Hence this raises the question of how European citizens can surpass such ambivalence. How can performing one’s own culture be (re)worked to elude the aforementioned polarity so that the European subject can emerge as the Other of her/himself. The answer to this, it is suggested here, lies in the concept of knowledgeable identity, a new form of cultural enunciation, which is constructed through encountering the Other.

The space for this knowledgeable identity, according to the excerpt below, is expanding, by incorporating an ever increasing amount of scope for experiencing the European and the non European Other, brought about through European living. In this space this project has found some evidence of a developing notion of bottom up Europeanness:

Παναγιώτα: I think there’s a new rhythm because people know that they can move about... because they are more educated, more open... meaning one can choose what’s best for them and just go [for it].

Interviewer: Do you define this as European [trait] then?

Παναγιώτα: Yeah.

It has to be noted however that at present this form of Europeanness is not the product of European living as such, it is rather an individual disposition underpinned by the capacity to negotiate differences, to articulate and manage multifarious forms of belonging, and is motivated by the desire to engage actively with the wider world. However the potential of European living -- underpinned by the multifarious webs of
citizenship relations in which Europeans are enmeshed (Painter 2003b) -- in the context of the above excerpt is necessary if not sufficient to generate knowledgeable identities regarding new forms of cultural enunciation. This should not be underestimated, for therein lies its potential to engender notions of Europeanness: ‘I would like to define myself as Greek primarily: however [in the light of new possibilities] I must define myself as European first!’ (Σοφοκλής) Notably then the space is not opened by the actuality of European identity but rather by the possibilities opened by Europe, even if unrealized, creating reflexive room to rethink belonging.

One could imagine a future ‘architecture’ of such a European identity could evolve around certain singularities ‘[the] point[s] of dense connections…[to] the local and the global, that singularizes specificities into…momentary structure[s] of belonging’ (Probyn 1996: 69) that could be marked by a citizenship sensitive to the conditions of European integration, as Shaw (1998b) argues for, where European attachments stand alongside and outside of local ones, thus leaving them relatively undisturbed. In this context the citizenship of the Union could be registered in the popular imagination as a way of life ‘living on the outside’ (op.cit. p. 5) that does not threaten cultures or communities. This would entail proximity to others as well as compelling people to instigate an adequate language to account for the fractured and plural identities of those who are committed to their cultural situatedness and yet participate in several cultures.

In the context of the European project, inextricably linked as it is with transnational flows, circuits of communication and new scales of governance and regulations brought about by the push and pull forces of globalization, this sample is enmeshed in increasingly complex forms of cultural cohabitation. In a ‘citizenship in Europe’ (Painter 2003b:1) this cohabitation, according to the excerpts above, has the potential to generate a heterotopic space ‘that goes beyond the limited concept of tolerance’ (Probyn 1996: 5) where knowledgeable identities would grow out of increased mobility that necessitates dealing with diverse cultural enunciations. Hence a European space designated by EU citizenship could potentially embrace the ‘coexistence of different orders of space, the materiality of difference, forms of social relations and modes of belonging’ (op.cit. p. 10) in a form of Europeanness that would subsume in the course of time individual identities beyond the scope of national, ethnic and cultural identities.
6.5 Conclusion

According to the sample the European project has failed so far to captivate the imagination of most people, in meaningful ways. The implementation of the Citizenship of the Union at the level of European living, as it stands within the wider context of mobilities despite tangible benefits, problematizes the European citizen. The assumption that the experience of a market citizenship would somehow surpass bounded identities has overlooked notions of belonging rooted in such identities. In Probyn’s (1996) words this mode of subjectification ‘designates a profoundly affective manner of being…within and in between sets of social relations…[and as such] belonging cannot be an isolate[d] and individual affair.’(ibid. p. 13).

While the nation-state has had ample time to cultivate notions of collective belonging through the cobweb of social contexts and cultural practices evolving around national histories, local biographies and practices of living, the EU does not have this resource. Structures that amplify opportunities, for those able to utilize them, are not a sufficient backdrop for developing contexts and practices that would prescribe identities to people, the way nationalities have done hitherto. Thus it is argued, in the open ended agenda of the European project, identities and notions of belonging have to be accommodated in innovative ways. This could generate a heterotopic pan European space in which notions of Europeanness might evolve. What the data in this thesis indicates implicitly is that the sense of experiencing the freedom of moving about within the EU space has the potential to topple the incompatible relationship that exists hitherto between a political European and national cultural identities. This however requires time to mature at the level of European living where cross cultural fertilizations and communications take place.
Chapter Seven

Europeanness to Come

7.1 Introduction

This chapter investigates the potential European living has to generate notions of Europeanness through encounters taking place within European space. In so doing it discusses manifestations of Otherness amongst the participants through their examining views on their encounters with the European and non-European Other. In the first section it is argued that despite the lack of a communal bond amongst Europeans due to the cultural boundaries that distinguish them from one another they nonetheless recognize one another as a fellow European. This sense of profound difference creates tensions amongst them however, that hinder the development of a psychology that would see a stronger shared affiliation developing. At the same time they are united in their views on how they perceive the presence of the non European Other, who due to transnational flows coupled with changing scales of governance and regulations, is now living in their backyards.

The discussion in the second section evolves within the context of the changing geographies of Europe that gradually transform what is considered familiar and homely within the European space. This is demarcated vis-à-vis the rest of the world by a European culture and civilization that is imbued by the invariably national cultural mosaic of Europe. In this context European Otherness comes to the fore as a consolidation of European differences, a state of being in the world that is in stark contrast with the non European Other. It does not however translate into a notion of Europeanness.

The section and the chapter comes to a close with the suggestion that although encounters amongst Europeans as well as between them and the non Europeans do ‘soften the edges’ of Eurocentric and ethnocentric orientations which have been internalized by the people and manifest outwardly as biases and exclusive attitudes towards European and non European Others they nonetheless do not eliminate them. A
notion of Europeanness, as well as an inclusive attitude towards the non Europeans in general, would only be feasible through a pan European education becoming an integral part of the European project. This also needs to be sensitive to the European condition which is under duress, caused by the push and pull forces of globalization that triggers changing scales of governance and regulations, as is reflected in the concerns raised in the accounts of this sample.

7.2 Otherness Equals Difference

The discussion in the preceding chapters has illustrated that Europeanness, despite top down aspirations implicit in the European project, to generate coincident spaces of European governance and belonging, is not developing to the extent envisaged originally. Europeans firmly inhabit their cultural (national) pasts, with continuing and entrenched notions of identities and of bounded societies, which maintain the dividing lines between them. Yet, they do seem to possess a shared European orientation that consolidates their differences into one European space that is demarcated from the rest of the world. This is visible every time, for instance, transnational flows or new scales of governance and regulations make an impact, perceived by both British and Greek participants alike as potentially undermining European culture and civilization in general, causing concerns to be raised and discontent to be made explicit.

Yet the sample's conviction regarding the uniqueness of their national and cultural identities with respect to any other, as shown in the fourth and fifth chapters, means they still proclaim their difference versus other Europeans as well as to the rest of the world. Their sense of Self as Other is constituted in its relation to any Other. This is shown through experiences of contrasts: 'it's other people that make you feel different' (Kalliopi); 'I do feel as...It's other people who make you feel different' (Clare). This mode of Otherness (their sense of Self as Other) -- manifesting as difference -- applies equally vis-à-vis the Europeans and non Europeans. Yet the aforementioned manifestations differ markedly as the ensuing discussion will demonstrate. That is, when it is about other Europeans, Otherness manifesting as difference is fuelled by the cultural/national antagonisms inherent in historical legacies between the nations of Europe. When it is about the non Europeans, the antagonism is between what this sample calls European culture and civilization -- based on shared values of representative democracy, civil rights and the rule of law underpinned by the thought and values of Renaissance and
Enlightenment, the pedigree of the thought and values of Antiquity -- and the non European Other. In both types of antagonisms, the pattern of asserting difference is the same. Every time respondents felt the need to argue for the distinctiveness of their cultural/ national or European identities vis-à-vis the rest of the world, they often resorted to disclaiming or disavowing that any negative characterisation are the result of their judgement or actions:

Mapiâ: I’ve got a problem…with Albanians who have created a bad name for themselves by thieving, raping old women and so on…

Interviewer: Who has created this bad name, the Albanians themselves or [political opportunists and the media?]

Mapiâ: The Albanians themselves of course.

When comparing themselves to the other Europeans, they reasoned on the basis of what they perceived as undisputed facts with regards to their cultural/ national identities, and what they considered made them unique amongst the other Europeans be those their collective achievements as nation states, or some unique national character or essence as discussed in chapters four and five. However when the comparison was between them as Europeans and the non Europeans then the themes shifted to their commonly shared European culture and civilization; such as its unparallel record as the beacon of democracy, of high culture, high values and so on.

The reader may recollect at this point, that the British for example had pinpointed their unique civic nationalism as a descriptor of British identity which has been developed over time and is manifested through a structurally visible society:

‘It's something we've had for thousands of years...I think we're a much more structured society in Britain. I think we've got an identity which is much more clear and it defines how we live and what we expect and what we want to do. And what we did with our friends. And we're not trying to do something else.’

(Adrian)

And the Greeks equally pointed to an unparallel notion of identity that draws from transcendent values of civility rooted in Antiquity, whose pedigree is (Western) European civilization:

‘it’s what Alexander the Great said when he reached India, that “from now on when [people] talk about the Greeks [in effect] they will be talking about the virtuous and virtuous can be any ethnos [which realises their potential]”. This is what I like about the Greek spirit: do you get it?’ (Avðpxava)
Either way, Greek and British Otherness vary in subtlety and context according to which of the two samples is narrating. Hence their depiction of Otherness is coloured by nationality and personal character but at its core the essence of what they are saying remains the same for British and Greeks alike. That is, that although these are narratives of separateness, drawing from ethnocentric references that frame one another as inferior, as illustrated in chapters four and five and in the excerpts below, both samples also recognize one another as their European counterpart, when asked to comment on each other:

‘I think there’s a culture of hospitality…which is quite European…on the other hand…They’re always grabbing for something to give them status, or to show that they are Western…The best way of explaining, is you watch people eat, and they don’t know how to eat…that level of pretension…when you see people sort of shovelling food into their mouth – there’s a restaurant which purports to be the best French restaurant in Athens, and they don’t know how to behave when they’re there.’ (Adrian)

Here it is interesting to note how the participant Adrian switches from recognising the Greeks as European, and then shifts to explaining how inferior they are in the way they behave. The quote below illustrates the view of how difference can still exist as people from the North or South may have different modes of behaving, and yet still be recognizably European:

‘it depends…the Northerners…you know from Leeds, Manchester, the Scottish, the Irish… I think we’re similar… their kind of humour, the way they socialize, the companionships they form, you know, are like… ours: they are like us… here [in the South] people are different; they are English, I don’t know how to explain it…they’re cut off…they’re distant…you can even see it in the way they form personal relationships…nonetheless they are Europeans.’ (Αποστόλης)

In other words for the majority of the participants the Other, Greek or British, is an insider and outsider one has to live with; a product of European histories, religious, ethical, and with structural propinquities that have usually been contested, yet even so, European of ‘some sort’. Hence both samples felt that although they have different heritages they are all bound up within this broad Europeanism which according to them consolidates values and principles of civility that throw into relief European superiority.

This sense however of being part of the European group is not enough to waive -- at least between Europeans -- the ‘negative reference grouping’ syndrome which all my
European respondents seem to posses. Eurocentric and ethnocentric internalizations beset the assumptions they made about their identities and colour their perceptions of any Other --which more often than not translates into exclusive attitudes. Consequently any attempts to reach out to any outsider were at best approached with scepticism. In this context they argued that any attempts to eliminate cultural barriers by the use of inclusive instrumental strategies are doomed to failure without the aid of a structured education that would address the constitutive relationship that exists between manifestations of Otherness and the Other. According to the participants the patterns of the Self-Other relationship could only be reworked through educating new generations of Europeans ‘outside’ the framework of national or European essentialisms, thereby cultivating mind sets that affiliate directly to the wider world, and in our case to the European dimension of the local, ethnic, national and regional niches (this is discussed further in the next section).

‘I would like [to see] the establishment of a [European] Academia which would compile the best qualities from each nation in Europe...that would promote [the spirit] of agonism between [for example] the Greeks and Italians...education is imperative to unite the people of Europe...when I come into contact with people who are intellectually aware is when I feel [truly] European.’ (Aθηνά)

‘Now, we’ve got to get our act together. Because kids need to be taught this [the wider picture]...and feel comfortable with it, from a very young age... – I’m very proud of this – we introduced Development Education into Greek schools. And we had official approval by the Ministry of Education...to include our A*** A*** Citizenship Programme, in Greek schools...This is why people don’t feel European here [in Britain]... the curriculum up until now. The fact that it is now is not a minute too soon. A few decades too late, but better late than never. I guess.
And that’s why people have this problem. And it’s only the young kids now, that are starting off, that will feel differently. And they will feel much more European. But I think there’s also this language issue. I think if everybody spoke...a bit of Spanish, a bit of Italian, you would feel more European...[now] we operate in Europe...I just don’t feel the mechanisms are there to deal with this. We are

46 On the role of the Other as the signifier constitutive for the manifestations of Otherness see Sayyid (2003: 41- 9)
always on the defensive...even my husband says “What about all these people coming in taking jobs?”...It’s all going to happen, and therefore we’re running behind to try to create something to cope with this huge movement of people around the place. I think it will seriously challenge us...language is a key to immersing yourself in a culture ... [it] affects feelings, it affects things that threaten you, it affects understanding, it affects so much. Hinges on communication.’ (Christine)

Ideas inherent in the interviews conducted provide a key as to how a greater integration could be achieved that would thereby gradually attune people to a wider picture of the world in the sense of increasing awareness of the existence of the Other, not so much as contrasting to the Self but rather as a partner in European and global domains, one that one has to get to know in order to be able to work effectively. In this light education coupled with increased encounters in spaces and places of mixture as well as the wider issue of competences and attitudes informing the professional requirements that increasingly expanding markets require could invert ethnocentrism and even Eurocentrism, by tempering the negative framing of the Other.

Christine: Some of my family are completely xenophobic. And racist...in terms of understanding what’s going on around you, it’s something I have become much more conscious of because of my job, and I have been trying to explain to my children, and raise their awareness, of what’s going on in different parts of the world.

Interviewer: Do you succeed?

Christine: With the girl, who’s more receptive. With the boy, who has very tunnel vision about what he wants to do, he’s not really interested, and that saddens me actually, because at some point, like now, when he’s applying for graduate jobs, what is interesting to me and has shocked him is that the application is not just about his Degree. The application is about, “Are you a team player? How do you communicate?...Interacting. Answer these questions about globalisation”. And he’s going, “Oh, my God! I don’t know anything about that! What do they mean?” I think well, why don’t you read a paper, listen to the news? So it’s suddenly come as a big shock to him that this job isn’t going to be...just because it’s here in England...just about engineering, it’s going to be the wider picture.
When I first arrived in the UK, I...considered myself as superior. [being the Best] you know. but I soon discovered it’s not like that [we are not the best] so I said to myself chill out...escape [from the Greek influence] and find out what’s really going on...[now I’m in the process of job hunting again] it has been a very enlightening experience - they ask you questions like “what is your biggest non academic achievement”: hmm...you know. stuff like that makes you take a good. honest look at yourself, and makes you ask yourself ”are you that person?”- you learn things about yourself.’ (Nάσος)

As illustrated above, the push and pull forces of globalization open up new spaces of interaction which the individual cannot avoid if (s)he wants to remain employable. This illustrates how flows and the pressures these exert on people, markets and states inevitably trigger change at multiple scales, individually as well as collectively.

In this context it could be argued that the repudiation of the Other concerning such hitherto operations of Eurocentric and ethnocentric essentialisms, immersed in the ideologies that underpin high and low politics, is bound to succumb to the flows and pressures that globalization engenders. However the repudiation of the Other also lies within the nature of Otherness per se, which by default draws attention to the ‘edge of things’. by pointing to things that inwardly would rather not to be acknowledged such as the uncomfortable feelings that Otherness can evoke as described by the sample, and outwardly by reacting negatively to the changes in everyday life that used to be known and familiar. Arguably to alter such intransigence is much more difficult.

The term ‘edge of things’ is used to refer to points of friction formulated in the unavoidable interaction between hosts and guests, due to the introduction for example of a new code of morality or a new practice of living. For instance migrants’ customary adherence to their cultural or religious practices creates sharp contrasts in daily trivia that are impossible to overlook. These cultural insertions can no longer be ignored because they are ‘here to stay,’ and as such they make their presence felt. Take for example artifacts, eating and drinking habits in the making, vocabularies in the making and fashion outlooks in the making; all these are everyday realities in Britain and Greece. For example the way garlic and olive oil are making their way onto the British plate. cafes and wine bars are settling in amongst pubs in Britain, how the Greek palette now gets accustomed to houmous and coriander: and the steady stream of ‘club reps’ from Britain to British ‘club lands’ in Greece are becoming a permanent feature of the Greek Summerscape -- much to the dismay of locals who have difficulty comprehending the British
concept of ‘having fun’. But alongside this the Greeks have been modifying their
drinking habits and tastes regarding ‘having fun’ too, and so the exchanges continue. In
other words through sleight of image or colloquial phrases other than one’s own.
differences are becoming part of local vocabularies or life styles and either have an
appealing influence or generate discontent.

In this context the Otherness of the Other, depending on the mood of either the
collective or individual Otherness of the host, can either be perceived as enriching the
social experience of the host society or causing tremors in the evolving socio-scape.
Hence it can be suggested that Otherness is a kind of symbiosis that imbues the everyday,
by calling upon the ordinary to recast itself, or the tarnished to be burnished, and that
through this process the potential is created for some people to make the leap across
cultures, or to simply enhance understanding,

‘When I went to see the Big Fat Greek Wedding movie. [before] I didn’t know
what they were talking about, you know, everything’s derived from Greece. And I
thought…Every day I get this…Yeah I understand that. That’s a history lesson.
What’s the point of arguing, because the point of this now is to get these guys to
put helmets on. Every day is about [this].’ (Jeremy)

In contrast, others barricade themselves in their culturally centred life worlds, to
the detriment of communication, tolerance, and working relations, as Nikoç in the excerpt
below discovered from his experience at his workplace in the UK. Accounts like Nikoç’s
give considerable cause for concern, when bearing in mind that this particular participant
was invited by the British Government—running a pilot scheme at the time that required
highly specialized scientific personnel— to recruit one of its newly set up establishments.
Nikoç, to his amazement, found that despite his high status he became locked into a
biased working environment and invariably subjected to British and even Commonwealth
prejudiced attitudes that cut across educational and ethnic backgrounds and working
ranks:

Nikoç: In the states if you’re foreigner it’s even better because everybody is a
foreigner…everyone is a migrant…in the UK at the beginning you feel
European…[however as time passes by you start to notice]
discrimination…there is…um…a negative attitude [which] is socially
[ingrained].

Interviewer: Do you continue to encounter this negative attitude here at your work
place?
Nikoς: Oh yeah! Both from the English, the coloured [British] and people from the Commonwealth.

Interviewer: Doesn’t the fact that you’re also an American citizen exempt you from this discrimination?

Nikoς: What I have noticed is that the English have a complex of inferiority with the Americans, and they hate them, right? With the Greeks they have a complex of superiority...for them I am something in between: those who are more educated are less biased, but those with lesser education are more negatively predisposed...this [attitude] has made me outwardly declare myself as a Greek to rub it in their faces when they are biased against me..

Nikoς’s account describes vividly his experience as the (insider/outside) Other living and working in Europe. Because of his American and Greek nationality he was simultaneously repudiated by his British colleagues as a European Other (inferior), and as a non European Other (American-superior). He talks how his European and non-European Otherness were perceived, the difficulties this caused to him on a professional and personal level and how he was forced (unwillingly) to react. He talks ultimately about the tensions and contestations such manifestations of European (national) Othernesses trigger, and perpetuate attitudes that effectively are in no one’s interest.

Such manifestations constantly undermine transformative possibilities of spaces and places of mixture because they resist more often than not, the ‘recasting’ of old accepted ways of being. They thereby entrap the collective and individual cultural identities into a struggle for separateness. This imbues the politics of representation which demand recognition and power whether on a local, national, regional or European level. The excerpt below discusses this:

Cliff: And that they will say that they were European, but if you actually ask them I’m not entirely sure they would say they’re European. They would probably that they belong here, and that maybe they feel British, or they feel French, but if you bothered to peel back what was going on in their homes, you’d actually find that they were a bit like a typical...elsewhere. a member of the Greek [diaspora] ...in America or Australia, or a member of the Armenian...or a Jew, who would not have too much trouble saying they were Australian or American, when it suited them. But exactly at the same time reverting it when it suited them to say they weren’t. So
it’s...things are complex. You can’t always break things down into black and white. But certainly societies are less homogenous than they used to be, and I’m not entirely sure that that’s healthy. And then you start looking at things in a very large historical picture, and saying, well, nothing is ever...things do for a while in a snapshot appear to experience a degree of stability. But that’s just a snapshot, you look in the bigger picture, and you find everything is in a state of flux.

Interviewer: Therefore, when we’re talking about Europeans, would you include Muslims, agnostics...the Jews?

Cliff: Do I? Of course I do.

Interviewer: They are Europeans, then?

Cliff: Oh, are they Europeans? Do I fit them in a sense do they have acceptance to live here, and have their...and practise their faith and their values, live unmolested, have a voice? Of course, absolutely. I think the difference comes in whether...in the proportionate voice you give to a group. That minorities should have total toleration and support, but they shouldn’t have equality...

Interviewer: Why shouldn’t they have equality when...they pay taxes, shouldn’t they be represented?

Cliff: No, no. Proportionally, not equally...Because the strength of any culture, the strength of any culture in a more philosophical sense that strength also has inbuilt characteristics of fragility to it, and that its strength comes from its shared parts. Those that subscribe to central tendencies, central characteristics. And nevertheless, the sheer strength of that shared aspect, say, comes from the acknowledgement, daily reaffirmation of those shared characteristics. Which also means that it’s remarkably fragile. Because as soon as things aren’t daily reaffirmed, reflected in your institutions and your family structure, then the overall thing actually can be quite undermined. And you tread on very difficult ground here, because people start liking these observations to supremacies, and races, and...these questions are far more philosophical than that. I believe that the most healthy societies are homogenous. The strongest are the most homogenous. The most homogenous society should show a tolerance for its minorities. It should never admit that a minority has an equal voice.
because if it has an equal voice then it’s disproportionate to its place within the whole. And there’s nothing more dangerous than a disproportionate voice.

Cliff’s views illustrate vividly the complexity of troubled relations between cultures as these are framed by inhabitations that have evolved in opposition to any Other and are conditioned by obscurantist essentialisms of all sorts. He basically states very clearly that the ratios of representation within the host societies should be carefully managed so that multiculturalism is accommodated. However the racial or cultural Other should not be given a disproportionate voice that might dilute the cultural distinctiveness of the host.

Such problems dwarf any potential for rapprochement between cultural identities. The repudiation of the Other runs deep in both collective and individual consciousness. This is not only because it complicates, according to Cliff, the politics of representation and may lead to a weakening of cultural identities as discussed in the previous chapter, but it also implicitly points to the fact that seemingly for most people clear lines of differentiation are needed, because obviously this is one way of feeling content and at home.

In sum, all excerpts so far, in both the preceding and present chapter, point to one fact: that Otherness, manifesting as difference, has a state of embodiment in the world. When stretched beyond incorporating capacity to accept or tolerate the Other, initiatives to bring the Other in contact with the host whether intentional or unintentional, have the tendency to backfire because, as discussed above, more often than not they resist any recasting. This chapter argues that in terms of integration and tolerance when this occurs it is only to the detriment of the functioning of civil societies. This of course also applies to the functioning of the European project as well. Throughout this thesis this has been amply illustrated by the accounts of the participants where they expressed their views on one another, on their identities, on the functioning of the EU and ultimately on transnational flows and changing scales of governance and regulations that put a strain on their distinct identities and notions of belonging and of placeness.

7.3 European Otherness, European Culture and the non European

In the previous chapter it was shown why many of this sample were disenchanted by any rhetoric promoting Europeanness and the possible implications of this regarding
citizenship of the Union. The fact that they are the ones who really experience the impact of the political identity of the EU means that, apart from some tangible benefits it enables, they are the ones who experience the daily grind of negotiating ‘being European’ and therefore the ones who find many of the supposed benefits are in practise lost at the level of daily living. In this chapter and in the preceding discussion it was shown however that one way to surpass this is by introducing a pan European education. This, it is suggested by some of the participants, might enable new generations of Europeans to accomplish new modes of communication with one another so that the hitherto lack of communication between them (due to the ways in which the structured mythologies and histories in which European nations have nurtured their nationals hitherto) would not overcome as happens now any ‘renewed’ sense of affiliation to any top down notions of Europeanness. Such European ideals as far as they do exist in the implicitly created framework of the European project, are still far removed from those originally envisaged by its drafters:

Anyone who embraces European history and culture can feel European in any European country in which they reside. Now let me ask the opposite: when Czechoslovakia enters the European Union if I go to live there for three years will I feel European? What I’m trying to say is that I don’t know much about Czechoslovakia because the European history [we were taught], stopped at the Iron Curtain.

The fact that you’re European doesn’t change anything when you’re in the Czech Republic.

I don’t have anything in common to share is what I’m saying. I don’t feel [that they are a part of Europe] because they haven’t had the time to adapt [to Western culture and history].

The participants do express that they feel they do share a sense of connection with other Europeans, and this is true for the overwhelming majority of this sample bar their misgivings about one another as the excerpts so far illustrate: ‘I believe that the womb of all civilization is Europe...despite differences between the Northerners and the Southerners we are alike.’ (Aσηνά)(Aσηνά)

This is the ‘leaven’ according to Kristeva (2001) of the existence of European civility founded on a ‘European vision of freedom...[and a]...concept of human dignity’ (ibid. p. 43). Kristeva’s metaphor certainly seems to encapsulate what Cliff says below
about a common European cultural component that all Europeans possess, despite as Kristeva (1991) argues, the peculiar difficulty Europeans have in living with one another:

Cliff: Certainly. Without a shadow of a doubt, I have to be European. In outlook, in religion, in culture. I think to a great degree, these things transcend national boundaries, and status... boundaries because for instance one of the most astonishing things I’ve ever seen, and I’ve experienced it many, many times, is when you can put seven European nationals in one room with limited language abilities to communicate with each other, and then also put an English person in there, and an American, and you will find that the Europeans including the English person sits on one side of the room and the American sits on the other.

Interviewer: Do you have any empirical proof?

Cliff: Absolutely. I can remember one Christmas many years ago, I came over on my own, and it was Christmas day, and I was staying in a youth hostel in Omonoia Square. And we got up on Christmas day, and we were about to go out, and the hostel manager announced that he’d made a Christmas lunch for everybody, totally on their own initiative. Didn’t have to. So everyone was a bit enthusiastic, and they all sat down, and there was at least one person from every European nation at that table, and there was also a group of four or five Americans. The Americans took a slightly sneering attitude towards what food there was. And a kind of critical discussion... starting from a few Europeans as well, “They decided to provide us with this. How can you sit there and snigger? Nobody has to do this.” Things became a little bit tense. At which point the Americans did all go to one side of the table. All the Europeans including a few English people there, Dutch, French, Spanish, Italian, went to the other. And there was complete and utter consensus between the Europeans even though they couldn’t all talk to each other. And even though most of them could speak English in one way or the other, nobody really warmed to, or felt in the slightest way kindred to the Americans. Now I don’t know if that’s some kind of shared idea of politeness or manners, but it was a great indication to me that there’s a great consciousness to the Europeans, even when they’ve got language barriers.
This common cultural component is thrown sharply into relief in instances such as the one described above by Cliff manifesting as European Otherness versus the non European Other. This is in spite of the linguistic ‘Babel’ and the barriers that draw long standing dividing lines between Europeans, including the grievances that European history is so full and the sedimented beliefs of sanctified histories that dismiss any other European as inferior. Hence despite all these barriers, nevertheless:

‘there is a shared central tenet. A certain common characteristic to an idea of identity, that isn’t destroyed by saying there are also competing elements on the fringes, or even within...you know that phrase, it’s hard to define an elephant, but you know what, when you see it...maybe we can’t say we all share a real common characteristic. But what we share are the remnants of common characteristics. And they’re all a little bit more blurred.’ (Cliff)

Or as Δημήτρης put it:

‘we can say that we have common elements...I don’t imagine that we’ll get to the stage that we say ah we’re all the same...Europe is like a big house, each room has got a functional character and a specific purpose ok...and it has got its own specificities as well; however we’re all in one Spiti [home].’

It could therefore be argued that this element of commonality manifesting as European awareness described in the excerpts above has the potential, under the right circumstances, to develop into a social experience that would draw Europeans closer to one another. One possibility would be that through the European project a togetherness might develop, as Shaw (1998b) argued for in the previous chapter, through a project sensitive to the conditions of European integration concerning rights, membership and participation and even to broader understandings of the relations between individuals, communities and institutions.

However it can also be argued that such ‘leaven’ as Kristeva put it, could reinforce exclusive attitudes towards the non European Others, as well as towards other religions of the world, and particularly Islam, as the forces of globalization affect domesticated lives. The traces of such tendencies have been illustrated clearly in the excerpts so far and what these highlight is that even a pan European education as envisaged by Αθημελά, Christine so far or Tim further below-- if not geared towards the nurturing of a truly cosmopolitan ethos as envisaged by (Kristeva 2001), would not otherwise succeed in not repudiating any Other (European as well as non European). Such difficulties have the potential to seriously undermine the development of the EU
and would mean it would become bounded with its spatiality writ large, in which an exclusive Europeanness would try to uphold its own versus the rest of the world.

What we have seen so far through the excerpts is that this ‘leaven’-- or sense of European communality-- which can be cultivated, could grow both ways, that is Europeans could become more alienated versus non Europeans, or become more cosmopolitan. These concerns are animated every time the participants discuss for instance what they perceive as the overcrowding of European space by non Europeans: or the potential risk that the European nations and by implication the EU run into by losing- - due to flows, increased networks of communications and changing scales of governance and regulations-- control over their national/ European cultural distinctiveness. Not least of these is what the participants view as important concerns raised by the inevitable contestation over access in markets, services. welfare. housing, and education. All the above problematize the European citizen as (s)he experiences the European condition, and this manifests in their accounts about the European versus the non European. This has also been pointed out in the previous chapter and Δημήτρης’ s excerpt is similarly cautionary:

‘Let me be more specific: when I was talking earlier about every day life I was saying that in order to feel good as a European in the European space you must feel certain things... you must feel secure... about your future, that it won’t be changed beyond your recognition... you must have some stability, some things that are easy in our lives, ok? This is what the EU must work on, on the fear of immigration and not of the immigrants themselves. [The fear of] the economic migrant, the Ukrainian, we were talking about before, has been created precisely because I do not feel that my own position is secure. I do not feel that my future is promising and therefore he is seen as the threat.’

The excerpt exemplifies the discontent and resistance of the ordinary European citizen, at odds with the tendency of the EU to change the map of Europe.

Having said that, it needs to be pointed out again, as discussed in the previous chapter, that bar some hardened dispositions with regards to migration which were generally speaking limited to some of the respondents with very ethnocentric and entrenched cultural identities, the discontent of the majority was not so much about trying to establish a fortress Europe but more about preserving what is familiar and homely:

‘There are some changes which are essential for European unity. And I think anyone can live with that. Some things are not essential, and I think the
bureaucrats get megalomania and they just go and go. I would like to see there being somewhat more accountability in terms of the people that are there.

Yes. I don’t mean the people standing in the parliament. I mean the people who actually are wielding enormous clout, and they’re not the elected and they’re not accountable. That is very worrying. I don’t like that at all...what we need is something that works and is there for everybody. We in the Western world, we can sit back very comfortably and let the status quo carry on. Billions of people...It isn’t right, you can’t change overnight, but you have to start moving the goalposts somewhere, to get people to have a reasonable life. You cannot have no country because people have to have...it’s a security thing. They have to have a sense of belonging, an identity of some kind. But it doesn’t need to get in the way of unity, and it shouldn’t get in the way of people being able to have a reasonable life.’ (Nigel)

In the above excerpt ‘bureaucratic’ (ir)rationality or megalomania in the logic of the European ‘state’ is opposed to people ‘getting on’ with a reasonable life’ orchestrated around existing and functioning senses of belonging. Alterations to the map of Europe, such as the designated inclusion of Turkey, threaten to transfigure Europe beyond recognition because of what many of the sample viewed as the incompatibility of value systems. The following excerpt asserts:

‘I would have an objection to Turkey joining, but it’s nothing to do with being Muslim or Christian...I think it's to do with value systems. I don't think Turkey is a civilised country, in the sense that they've established democracy, respect for human rights. Nothing to do with religions. So I don't think it's ready...No. And I think if you look at the past. at what Turkey has done, they have a lot to answer for. Massacre of the Kurds, never mind what happened to the Greeks in 1922. and I don't think, I don't regard it as an established democracy which respects the values, particularly human rights. You need to, to be a member of the EU. So that's my blunt answers.’ (Paul)

Similarly the lack of acceptance of cultural or religious differences, as already indicated by some of the excerpts in the previous chapter, is aggravating biases already lurking European awareness as explicitly illustrated in the excerpts below and discussed throughout the thesis:

Aθηνα: Look. what’s happening is that us Greeks have got a racism problem.

Interviewer: The Greeks? We’re racists? [Chuckles]
We are, very much so indeed, but we hide it.

Interviewer: Do you identify with this racism?

Aθηνά: Yes but only with the Albanians...from personal experience...when they started invading [migrating to Greece en masse] all hell broke loose in Athens. They were breaking into lots of houses...that's why I'm racist against them. It's not something I got from my paitheia [education]...logically speaking I don't have a problem with them, yet somewhere inside me is the thought "you are Albanian, you're bad", which I try to fight off.

Interviewer: If you didn't have this experience would you feel the same?

Aθηνά: Maybe not

Or as in Αμήλλος' words:

Αμήλλος: I'm not at all at ease with what is going on in Greece...perhaps I might be a bit racist...it's a mind set...although I know that the Greek economy needs them...I do not like the fact that entire neighbourhoods in Peristeri [municipality in Athens] consist only of Albanians...they don't integrate.

Interviewer: Isn't it perhaps a little bit early for that to happen?

Αμήλλος: Um... I guess it is...and maybe the roles they've been assigned [by the media and populist politics] hinder their integration...

Interviewer: ... then why don't feel about them?

Αμήλλος: It may be that I'm negatively predisposed towards them.

The fact of the matter is that in the above excerpts whether the sample are talking about the incompatibility of value systems, negative personal experiences engendered by the contact with the Other or certain biases they have, they ultimately talk, in the context of the rise of flows of human and other capital, about the compression of European space. They refer to increased intensification and densification, and the propinquitites arising as a by-product of the cross fertilization of ways of life in and around particular places. The result of produces a retroactive 'intensive' reality at the level of European living, which for the majority of this sample is a call for concern: 'I'm not sure how Europe would accommodate all this, because there is a big difference. having lived in Turkey, and travelled extensively in Turkey, there's a big difference between Istanbul coming into Europe and land in the Far East.' (Tim)

This concern is also raised by Cliff who is talking in the wider context about the impact of globalization on domesticated lives and cultures and particularly the European
one. He states that the European ‘culture which has given...great wealth...both culturally, economically, to Europeans...a genuine European identity in terms of culture and religion’ and that it might be ‘supplanted by a more kind of amorphous...consuming identity.’ Hence this sense of European Otherness is arguably constituted as an exclusive force, in opposition to the non European Other.

Some of European mobile professionals however from this sample approach their European Otherness from a different angle. They see it as the ability to accommodate differences, gaining a broader perspective and greater awareness of life:

‘I think professionals now, whether it's a Greek professional, a British professional, they make an effort to become aware of the differences. and accommodate. This is what a European does. Accommodate the differences. And this is what I do in Greece. I accommodate the differences. No, on a deeper level, that doesn't mean to say that I dropped, or changed my values, because those values are deep-rooted. But at least you are more tolerant and have greater understanding of why people's values are different, why they behave differently.’

(Rosemary)

Nonetheless even amongst these Europeans, the non European Other remains the contrasting experience for the European:

Rosemary: I think it's a broader perspective when you're European, and tolerance of other cultures. I've worked in European programmes, in educational European programmes, so I’ve worked with people from Belgium, France, Finland and the UK. And I think that you have a wider perspective of where other people come from, and a greater understanding of – for example in education – educational systems, because that's what you're working on. That we had to really understand...that every representative there is going to have a different view, and that we would have a lot of difficulty in working together.

Interviewer: Is a greater perspective the result, the outcome, of the proximity you felt with the people of Europe?

Rosemary: I think so, yes. The more you do, the more you understand about their background. I think you're able to not exactly integrate more, but understand more about their backgrounds.

Interviewer: Give a couple of examples of the elements that make up the profile of a European.
Rosemary: Aah, yes. Very difficult. Profile of a European. I don't know. Let me see. No, it's difficult. I think I'd have to have time to think about that. There is something...

Interviewer: Take yourself for example. You have decided that you have a European identity that takes precedence over everything else, what is...?

Rosemary: It's a greater awareness. And that's what I see when I go to the States. Again, you can't make generalisations, because I have colleagues in the States who come to visit us here, and they have a cultural awareness because they travel. They're not...

Interviewer: ..the standard American?

Rosemary: No, they're not. They're intellectuals. When they talk with us they understand how difficult it is out here, and if they want to co-operate with us they have to be aware of certain things which are different.

Interviewer: They could equally be called Europeans then?

Rosemary: Yes, although I don't...only to a certain extent they can. I'm one step further because I live here.

The aforementioned shows that European living has the potential to re-contextualize the relationship between insiders/outsiders, Europeans as hosts/guests, or between Europeans as hosts and the non Europeans as guests. But it also highlights how ingrained binary oppositions are in the European psyche with regards to manifestations of European Otherness. In Rosemary’s words this is underpinned by an ability to accommodate differences, by a broader perspective on life in general, a greater cultural awareness, all of which make the European stand out from the rest of the world.

Equally, indifferent dispositions of Europeans regarding the European project are well documented:

Paul: The sum construct as I say of Europe leaves me cold, I'm not excited by it.

Interviewer: Why aren't you excited by it?...you can reap the benefits of having an EU passport

Paul: That's true...I think it's a communication problem between the heart of decision-making in Europe and the average European citizen...I suppose part of it is understanding. As I say, I don't really understand the way Europe works. I certainly don't feel I have any influence whether I vote or don't vote...Whereas I watch British politics rather like you watch a soap opera, and I don't vote in the British elections either. But I understand
what the Conservative party is doing, the Labour party is doing... I think there's something wrong if even well-educated people who follow news like me don't know the difference between the European Commission and the European Parliament, and how the EU works.

The above points regarding the sense of not merely detachment from European politics but disengagement might well be remedied if the European project became sensitive to the European condition, as Shaw (2003b) has argued, or if it created a functional environment that enabled Europeans to relate to something outside binary oppositions. thus easing tensions and appeasing conflict:

Jeremy: I see myself primarily as being British rather than as a British national. .. I believe in a Union.
Interviewer: Because it functions?
Jeremy: It functions, yes... because I don't believe that Scotland could function on its own. I think that that would be a retrograde step. And I believe that if there wasn't so many barriers to Europe, yes it would be the next progression... if it could be done... Possibly. I'm still sceptical about Europe overall per se.
Interviewer: I understand that, because there are far too many problems. You are saying that if, for example, the European Union managed to function like Britain, you wouldn't have any objections?
Jeremy: No. If you had as I said before...
Interviewer: .. one foreign policy... one unified market. You wouldn't have any problem there, identifying with... How would you go about that then? If it was functioning, would you say that you were ethnically a Scot? Nationally British?
Jeremy: And functionally European.

Internalized dispositions such as the binary oppositions between hosts and guests are more difficult to deal with because they are so deeply ingrained. For instance Rosemary's comments made from the vantage point of a mobile professional, as well as of a self-professed intellectual, are nonetheless framed by the presence of the Other as the contrasting experience of her Europeanness. This puts into greater perspective the discontent implicitly and explicitly expressed so far by other participants, with perhaps a less cosmopolitan view of the world. The frustrations of these participants are directed at those Europeans, as well as at non Europeans, whom they see gradually transforming
Europe from one previously defined in terms of binary oppositions to one of ‘contradictory unity with differences and profound overlaps’ (Ahmad 1987: 80), that puts under pressure what was hitherto known as familiar and homely.

To overcome this hurdle for the benefit of a functioning cohabitation in Europe, Amin (2004) argues for a notion of mutuality, put forward by Kristeva (2001), ‘as the keystone of cultural constitution’ (Amin 2004: 15) that would move the relationship between guest and host ‘beyond the intersubjective as the framing condition for the latter through its incorporation into a new political philosophy for Europe’ (op.cit. p.17). In other words this mutuality involves incorporating the Other, not as the contrasting experience that needs to be visible in order for the European host to have a counterpart to measure up to, but rather as the counterpart that enhances the potential of the host environments. In Parekh’s (2000) view (cited in Amin 2004: 17) the solution lies with liberalism and dialogic multiculturalism as the answer to ease the stand off between hosts and guests. This could create a public sphere that acknowledges the right of difference, as theorists of radical democracy have suggested and which as Amin puts it would be implemented: ‘so that cultural politics can be played out as a contest between friendly enemies (agonism) rather than antagonists’ (op.cit. p. 18). However this model, were it possible to implement, would stumble upon the realities of Europe -- a far cry from a Europe run by ‘minor politics’ (ibid. p.18) organising living ‘outside’ the mind sets of territoriality. What Amin suggests is a process of radical socio-political restructuring that could move beyond the intersubjective to a radical rapprochement of the host to the guest and vice versa. Nevertheless he himself acknowledges that ‘this is a tall order, calling forth a certain ethical or behavioural consciousness to which few will wish to commit or know how to commit’ (op.cit. p. 17).

The fact that people in Europe have been nurtured into essentialist national cultures imbued with the logic of Western centrality that connotes superiority vis-à-vis the rest of the world for so long, hinders any ‘ideology of membership which [could] celebrate the uncertainty of belonging’ (Turner 2000 cited in Amin 2004: 20). The data clearly suggests that without a concerted programme of education that would remove the aforementioned essentialism and the cob web of ethnocentrisms associated with it, any integration between Europeans in particular and the appeasing of tensions between them and the wider world in general, would be enormously problematic. Difficulties of the kind mentioned so far would significantly hinder the potential of the European project to generate notions of Europeanness inclusive of any Other.
Tim: What you're taught at those early ages really pretty much defines your view, your outlook. Yes, you can balance it, but I don't think you'll ever change it...it's so ingrained. And as you grow older and more mature, you rationalise it. There were two sides to the First World War and the Second World War. But I think if you look at Europe, a lot depends on what the kids are being taught at school about Europe. The next generation. They're the people who have to be influenced or guided. Really. people like me, my age, yes we become more rounded as we grow older, we can balance things, and we become more rational. But if you really want to make Europe as a European...

Interviewer: ..integrated thing...

Tim: ..you want to start at the earliest age. You have to start then.

As discussed in chapter four and reflected in the excerpts by the British participants in the subsequent chapters, Europe continues to be identified with the Continent, and perceived as the, albeit friendly. Other in contrast to British exceptionalism. At least at the discursive level, it is still contentious to speak about transferring any political authority to Brussels. Such a problem is mirrored on the other side of the Continent. The Greeks are well aware of their own cultural hybridity and have developed a sense of European Self that does not fit comfortably into the duality of Europeans versus Others, especially as they themselves are ambivalent about the extent to which they are Europeans. ‘Local claims to European identity clash with European claims of Greek Otherness’ (Herzfeld 1987: 2).

For the majority of both British and Greek samples in this case the EU is portrayed as an economic domain that predominantly promotes the model of liberalism with aspirations to assimilate distinctly varying European cultural identities into its project. Or as put by Kristeva (2001), it aspires to set itself free from the ‘European vision of freedom...that is deeply ingrained in our social experience as well as in our way of thinking’ (Kristeva 2001: 43) based on cultural traditions and memories that have a ‘different vision [of life]...one that privileges the individual singularity over the economic [one]’ (op. cit. p. 41). That is, by transcending the distinct cultural and historic memories of European nationals -- defined as ‘symbolic denominators’ (Kristeva 1979) - - an EU ensemble could emerge, which over time could formulate an overarching community amongst the people of Europe based on a cosmopolitanism, generated by opportunity structures, patterns of consuming and dwelling. The overwhelming majority...
of the sample is skeptical of such a possibility, and thereby is in agreement with Kristeva who argues that a cosmopolitan European society of this sort -- without the aid of a pan-European education and the establishment of a functioning civic infrastructure as some respondents advocated -- is unlikely to occur. Instead it is argued there will be a cohabitation of conflictual natures underpinned by the presence of the nation state.

Europeans, Kristeva (1991) argues, have a peculiar difficulty living with one another. This, she asserts, is firstly due to the unique ways that European nationalism have evolved since the 18th century. That is -- in the context of the discussion in this chapter -- they all attempted to assimilate the Other or erase her/him under their 'common denominators'. Secondly, this difficulty is due to people's psychological need to have a stranger as the boundary and this manifests outwardly with the jealous attitudes people have in guarding their individual and collective identities (ibid. p. 2). In today's world this Other in the social sphere has become a permanent feature in the lives of European citizens at the level of European living. Hence in a world wherein, according to cultural theory and postcolonial writing, identities are mutually constituted in the cross fertilization of genres, the contemporary European is confronted with a conflicting reality, which is framed between notions of ethnocentric particularism, and the appeal of the world of opportunities that is not compatible with such particularism. The former isolates the foreigner, turning its 'otherness...into a thing' (op. cit. p. 3); the latter forces the contemporary European to embrace her/him under the duress of the compelling demands of globalization.

Kristeva suggests that a 'changed attitude of mind is necessary in order to favor the best harmony in such versatility' (op. cit. p. 195). An attitude that would draw from the 'ability to persuade [the Self to]...live with unresolved differences' (Parekh 2000: 340); however as Irigaray argues this is a 'new agenda, for which we lack the training' (ibid. 2002: 141).

In other words with regards to this sample, the foreigner remains as ever rooted in her/his Otherness -- uncanny for the British and ξένος (xenos) for the Greek. In this context this chapter is in agreement with Kristeva's view on the problematic nature of Europe and that these problems lie located in the historico-psychological realm, existing prior to any current political, cultural or economic interventions.

Europe is a difficult terrain, culturally and politically. Its European tag posits cultural, religious and economic interdependence stretching back in history and yet at the same time its diversity constantly undercuts any belonging even for European migrants..
Yet Europe for the first time in its history somehow has to become all inclusive. As mentioned earlier it has to learn to live with 'contradictory unity of differences and profound overlaps'.

If it were feasible to transform Europe into a space that redeems distinct particularities whilst transforming them into outlooks on life is as yet unknown. For some this is a liberating and enriching prospect, for the majority of this sample however it poses cultural, social, economic and political problems and problematizes their subjectivities.

Pragmatically however in the current situation, under the economic pressure, everybody is called upon to live together in an effectively multinational entity called Europe. There are constant calls for greater integration amongst institutions, cultures and people, in order that these may respond to the challenges of a changing world. Amidst those calls however the views of this sample are clear. Firstly they are attached to their cultural and other particularities. Secondly despite the recognition that there is an overarching European culture that connects all Europeans there is no tangible bond that would bring them closer to one another. Having said that, they do acknowledge the potential existing in the developing social experience of the European project for the genesis of a future Europeanness that would not only put in perspective Eurocentric and ethnocentric ideologies and attitudes, furthermore it might be able to turn them around and dissolve them into a truly cosmopolitan Europe.

7.4 Conclusion

The following accounts display how mobility enriches and enlarges the viewpoints of those who experience it. It also shows how the respondents themselves are personally transformed by the places and spaces they encounter:

'If you take everything into account I've benefited, changed. I've improved, become a better Greek from my experience of living in London...I've become more European in the sense that now that I'm returning to Greece and will be surrounded by all the 'ethnoi of Israel' [referring to the immigrant flow to Greece- post 1989], I can't be prejudiced anymore.' (Δημήτρα)

Christine: I actually valued home a lot more...the grey, horrible, miserable weather, and, as you come down over Heathrow, and you think, I'm coming home.
thank God. Even though it's actually foul weather, and...Being able to talk to English people...It made me understand why people that come to this country always try and group together. It actually opened my eyes in that respect. So immigrants have a cluster together, and then you get this immigrant population in a whole area, which makes the others feel threatened. But actually when you are in that foreign environment, how hard it is...

Interviewer: And when you returned did you bring anything of that experience with you?

Christine: Frappe (kind of coffee)...I make frappe here though you can’t make it the same...I think I [have become] more flexible. More adaptable. Less rigid. So it softened the edges a bit. It also made me appreciate things that I had taken for granted.

Even more pertinently the encounter with the Other at the level of European living, although it does not translate into a notion of Europeanness, does powerfully impact the sample’s daily lives. Such encounters could potentially prescribe the contours of a future European demos, held together by differences and profound overlaps. Such a loose affiliation however would not take the European project very far towards the integration envisaged originally by the drafters of Maastricht. Ultimately therefore an adequate pan-European education that would redefine and re-contextualize Eurocentric as well as ethnocentric ideologies for the future generations of Europeans is deemed necessary by some in this sample if the EU remains serious about its integration agenda.

For the current generation of Europeans the lack of a European communal bond amongst them is a fact of life and all that exists, albeit the recognition of some affiliation to one another through what they call European civilization and culture. Tensions and antagonisms between them are as present as ever. This is further aggravated by their concerns that the European project is not sensitive enough to the European condition as it unfolds under the duress of the push and pull forces of globalization. By implication the sample considers the EU is not attentive to the needs of its citizens.

This lack of EU attention to the needs of mobile citizens, other things being equal, reinforces ties to home and belonging and is therefore to the detriment of any notions of Europeanness developing. Hence the experience of the European citizen at the level of European living hinders its European cultural genesis, which would add that de facto element currently missing from the de jure space demarcated by the citizenship of the
Union, that is so vital for the integration agenda of the Union. Despite this, there is willingness from bottom up to cooperate with one another for the benefit of everyone, to engage with the changing geographies of Europe, and to gain a greater understanding of other Europeans and non European peoples and cultures.
Conclusion

‘Men make their own history but not of their own free will; not under circumstances they themselves have chosen but under the given and inherited circumstances with which they are directly confronted.’ (Marx and Engels 1991 cited in McEwan 2003: 739).

This quotation seems to aptly describe the experience of the European citizen at the level of European living (since the 1st of November, 1993) when the TEU came into force and the ‘Citizenship of the Union’ was inaugurated. The European citizen has been implicated in the processes of the European project which was envisaged and executed top down, and which alongside massive capital mobility, economic and geopolitical stability and some tangible benefits for those individuals able to take advantage of the opportunities it has created, has also complicated political and cultural identities resulting in bottom up tensions and discontent.

In real terms the European Union can effectively be seen as a ‘passport Union’ or useful for the overseeing jurisdiction of the European Court of Justice that strengthens the position of the European Court of Human Rights, or with regards to generating the increasing volume of legislation and superimposed on national legislations, or the handling of the issues covered by the first and third pillars of the Treaty (such as the environment, the new regionalism, the politics of policy-making in the EU, cross-border employment issues, as well as social and cultural considerations and the processes and the politics that develop around them).

All the above however, in spite tangible benefits for the populations of Europe, have also problematized the member states, and individual Europeans alike. Particularly concerns are raised relating to issues brought about by transnationalism that intermingles the forces of tradition with contemporary practices of living in places of mixture. In the context of the dynamic construction of identities in a globalizing world, race, ethnicity, gender, class, locality, types of capital accumulation, of travelling and of migratory routes, are all variables reflected in the shaping of new transnational subjectivities and forms of cosmopolitanism.

Yet bounded cultural identities and notions of belonging seem to persist and become increasingly uncomfortable in the reconfiguring of physical and immaterial spaces of political identities due to changing scales of governance and regulations and of transnational flows. These changes of scales and increasing flows also bring into
prominence issues of security in terms of employment, housing, welfare and services, which in the face of the unhindered movement of ever increasing European migration due to an enlarging EU and to the non European immigration, further exacerbates these problems.

The investigation focused upon those who are considered to be the beneficiaries of the European project as part of a mobile population of Europeans and are thus best positioned to capitalize on the opportunity structures engendered by it. This was in order to examine whether new scales of belonging and citizenship are emerging, and whether these attenuate former ethnic solidarities.

Many have looked to the European project and in particular to a European scale of citizenship as the means that might moderate national attachments and also promote a more civic or cosmopolitan ethos. However, this investigation has shown that in the face of changing scales and increasing flows even this sample, are sceptical about the ways in which the project affects them. They demonstrate concern over a range of issues: from notions of identities; of placeness and localness; and also with respect to the contextual intermingling of cultures that reconfigure European, national and local spaces and places.

The investigation showed that although free movement amplifies the criss-crossing of ideas, thereby affecting life styles and mind sets; personal or collective memory and internalized histories retain their strong hold on the hearts and minds of most people. These attachments manifest at the level of European living in myriad ways. The participants demonstrated that despite their life styles, that foster the potential for cosmopolitanism, they nonetheless operate from within the clichés of the language of separateness. This language has hitherto divided Europeans with its anecdotes, symbolisms and idioms that have evolved out of essentialist ideologies fostered in the period from 1789 to 1914 during which the development of the modern nation state took place. These are reinforced in every encounter with the European, the non European Other, or any Other per se.

Having said that, the participants also demonstrated their awareness that in an era of globalization one has to learn to live in environments where a contradictory unity of differences and profound overlaps operates. This is certainly descriptive of the space of the Europe of the Union today. Yet the sample suggested that this should not be allowed to undermine people’s attachments to their communities or to their notions of placeness and localness. They also believed it should not overturn cultural ratios of representation within the public domains of the host polities, beyond what is deemed necessary for
securing prosperity and peace within host societies in the face of the economic pressures of globalization.

In other words the participants of this sample did not object to the presence of the European and non-European Others in their backyards provided that what they consider as familiar and homely is not transformed beyond recognition by mobilities and changing scales of governance and regulations. Mobilities can be empowering as well as constraining for the migrant depending on a variety of factors. This sample appeared to reflect on a micro-scale a whole gamut of responses to the impact mobilities have on migrants and how these affect characters and understandings that may or may not foster cosmopolitan attitudes. Equally they may or may not reinforce ties to home cultures and homelands and localist identities. In this context the participants’ views on mobilities varied across the full spectrum from: ‘you feel that you’re expanding...literally you’re expanding...you end up having this network of people that they’re literally in hundreds’ (Πανορμώτακα), to: ‘travelling doesn’t broaden the mind. Some of the most narrow-minded people I've met have been people who are expatriates’ (Paul). More moderate views highlighted that despite attentions and pretensions from the part of most of the participants to reach out and to make the leap across cultures, the overwhelming majority remained confined within their migratory routes. Although mobilities suggest intermixing, it seemed from the data that people’s memories and internalized histories rarely really crossed one another in spaces and places of mixture.

Furthermore, more often than not as this investigation illustrated, as Europe becomes increasingly multicultural the many differences encountered by Europeans inevitably become sources of friction. This raises the question as to whether the ‘market citizenship’ of the Union and other initiatives that promote integration have the potential to generate notions of Europeanness that would overcome the dividing lines between Europeans as well as the tensions and concerns raised by the participants in this project.

The answer from the respondents here is positive, provided that the European project becomes sensitive to the conditions of European living. Europeans are affected by the functioning of the EU as well as by the forces of globalization: ‘I would like Europe to work beyond the big ideas, because these ideas unite us and destroy us; I would like it to work more on the idea of every day life of the citizen; it’s there where I would like it to focus’ (Δημιουργία). This and other comments by the sample suggest that practical initiatives could enable people to inhabit the European space more willingly. The
participants of this project in particular would like to feel at home everywhere within the
EU.

This study establishes that despite the inevitable cultural exchange that currently occurs due to mobility or due to cultural activities designed to ‘introduce’ Europeans to one another, or by means of opportunity structures that inevitably increase human transactions at places of work, leisure, travel, and markets: overall collectively and individually entrenched attitudes continue to thrive. It is suggested by the data that existing structural frameworks undercut the potential of the European project to inspire the affiliation of Europeans.

The structural investment that is taking place across Europe, with the support of European funds, in transport, housing, health, and in other areas, does however improve the quality of life of a very large number of people. This study suggests that if the European project is really serious about its integration agenda, a parallel investment is needed in a cultural infrastructure. Rather than cultural spectacles such as cities of culture, some of the participants in the sample persuasively suggest that this could be in the form of implementing across member states a pan European education that would make Europeans realize that they have ‘far more in common with each other than they do that really separates them’ (Clare). This could potentially transform the ‘European character’ from one nurtured to live in binary opposition to any Other to one learning how to live in a world of contradictory unity of differences and overlaps.

For some, as this investigation illustrated, this may mean rethinking old divisions based on supremacies, sanctified heritages, and so on and they may welcome instead a wider conception, an ‘outlook of life’ not merely confined within the myths and traditions of the nation but also one with myriad significations and ramifications that can manifest outside the nation, and by implication generate affiliations to an all encompassing Europe.

For others however such significations and their ramifications manifesting outside the nation would be met with revulsion at their perceived losses, hence reinforcing ties to their homelands. Thus care needs to be taken to ensure that, should greater integration occur, this be done without undermining affiliations to cultural/national identities, notions of placeness and localness and ultimately to notions of belonging. Were a long view taken, ensuring that future generations are nurtured to affiliate more with the closeness of the European idea rather than just focusing on differences, then it is possible that a pan European demos could be feasible. Any approach of this kind would however
need to allow the process of change to occur organically, allowing for the differences and profound overlaps that would be simultaneous to an emerging European unity.
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Appendix One

British sample

Total: 28
Average age: 39.8
Men: 18
Women: 10


Adrian: Born in 1975 in Doncaster, Yorkshire. Primary and secondary education at a boarding school. Read Geography at Huddersfield University. Professional area: ‘Management in investment relations’. Lower middle class background. He has a Scottish father and English mother. Grandparents from both sides of the family were born in India. Working posts held in London and Athens.

Clare: Born in 1965 in Liverpool. Completed primary and secondary state education up to eighteen. Working in: ‘Management in Business relations’ (on cultural and educational projects). Working class background. Parental origins: father, English (with some Irish blood). a Welsh grandmother and an Algerian great grandfather. Her mother is English of Jewish background from Austria. Working posts held in Britain, in several European countries and Athens.

Georgina: Born in 1956 in London. Completed primary and secondary state education before reading Comparative Religion and Social Anthropology at Lancaster University. Profession: businesswoman, based in Athens. Married to a Greek. She did not wish to be categorized in a social class. Both her parents are British, Jewish refugees from Central Europe: one from Poland, one from Germany. Worked in Britain and Athens. Travels extensively due to the nature of her business.

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the Institute for Chartered Surveyors. Profession: businessman based in Athens. He did not wish to be categorized in a social class. His father is British (Irish father and French mother) while his mother is English with some Russian in her background. Travels extensively due to the nature of his business.


Nigel: Born in 1975 in Athens. Primary and secondary private education took place at St Catherine’s British Embassy School and Campion International School in Athens. Read Nursing at Thames Valley University. Profession: hospital nurse. Married to a Greek. He did not wish to be categorized in a social class. Both his parents are English. Worked in Athens and London.

Jane: Born in 1961 in London. Throughout her primary and secondary education she was partly state and partly privately educated. Read Medieval and Modern History. Works in the Foreign Office. She did not wish to be categorized in a social class. Mother is Scottish, father is British Polish. Working posts held in Poland, Romania and Athens.

Johathan: Born in 1961 in Liverpool. Completed primary and secondary education in a private Catholic school. Read Archaeology at University of Leicester. Profession: teacher. He did not wish to be categorized in a social class. Both his parents are Irish. Worked in Britain and Athens.
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William: Born in 1965 in Athens. Completed primary and secondary education in a boarding school in England. Read Classics at Oxford University. Profession: publisher and poet based in Athens. Married. He did not wish to be categorized in a social class. His father is English, born in Gibraltar. Mother is Greek, born and brought up in Sudan, Khartoum.

Christine: Born in 1949 in Bristol. Completed state primary and grammar school education. Profession: manager of a major NGO. Married. Working class background. Both her parents are English. On her father’s side some of the great grandparents were Jewish. Working posts held in Britain, African countries and Athens.

Peter: Born in 1974 in Liverpool. Completed primary and secondary private education at St Catherine’s British Embassy School and Campion International School in Athens. Gained qualification in Business Studies at Middlesex University. Profession: businessman based in Athens. He did not wish to be categorized in a social class. Both his parents are English.

Cliff: Born in 1964 in London. Completed primary and secondary state education. Read Law at Kings College London. Profession: maritime lawyer. He did not wish to be categorized in a social class. Both his parents are English, on his mother’s side there is some Irish blood. Worked in London and Athens.

Elizabeth: Born in 1964 in Malta. Completed primary and secondary state education in a convent at Wickersley, Sheffield. Read History at Leeds University. Profession: Manager in one of the UK’s governmental organizations operating abroad. Married. She did not wish to be categorized in a social class. Both her parents are English. Working posts held in Britain, the Far East and Athens.

Rosemary: Born in 1947 in Wales. Completed state primary and grammar school education in Wales. She read English at the College of Education in Wales. Profession: Manager of one of USA’s governmental organizations operating abroad. Divorced, previously married to a Greek. She did not wish to be categorized in a social class. Mother is Welsh; father was born in Canada. (His father was of Scottish Canadian
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descent, but he had an English mother). Working posts held in the States, Canada, various European countries and Athens.

Alan: Born in 1965 in North Wales. Completed primary and secondary state education before reading Mining Engineering at the University of Leeds. He holds a masters in teaching English. Profession: teacher. Divorced, previously married to a Greek. He did not wish to be categorized in a social class. Father is Welsh. mother is English. Worked as a mining engineer in South Africa, and as an English teacher in London and Athens.

James: Born in 1963 in Hampshire. Went to a private primary school and then went through public school education. Read Economics and Geography at the University of Exeter. Profession: banker. Married. Upper middle class background. Both his parents are English. On the father's side the great grandfather was Scottish. On the mother's side, one of the grandparents was South African of English descent. Working posts held in London, South Africa, various European countries and in Thessaloniki, Greece and Athens.

Harry: Born in 1975 in Much Wenlock, Shropshire. Went to a primary state school and then onto a private preparatory school and public school. Read Land Management at the University of Reading. Profession: land and property chartered surveyor. He did not wish to be categorized in a social class. His father is Welsh with some Irish blood. Mother is English with a French great grandfather. Worked in London and Athens.

Les: Born in 1964 in Lisbon, Portugal. Educated both in primary and secondary state schools and in English private schools. Read Law at Kings College London. He then completed a Masters in Maritime Economics, Law and Policy at the LSE. Profession: maritime lawyer. Middle class background. Mother is English from South Africa. Father is English of German Jewish descent. Worked in London, Lisbon and Athens.

Jeremy: Born in 1956 in Campbell Town, Scotland. Completed state primary and grammar school education. Read Civil Engineering at Glasgow College of Technology.
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Profession: Profession: civil engineer. Married. He did not wish to be categorized in a social class. Both his parents are Scottish. Worked in London, Far East, Turkey and Athens.


George: Born in 1949 in Barking, London. Completed primary and secondary state education up to eighteen. Profession: maritime insurance broker. He did not wish to be categorized in a social class. Both his parents are English. Father's side came from the Huguenots. Worked in Britain and Athens.


Alison: Born in 1948 in Athens. Completed primary and secondary state education in London up to eighteen. Working in management in the tourist industry. Working class background. Her father is English; mother is Greek. Working posts held in Athens. Travels extensively due to the nature of the industry she works in.

Robert: Born in 1960 in Cheshire. Went to a primary state school in Cheshire and then onto a secondary boarding school in Redcliff, Leicestershire. Read History at Southampton University. His second degree was from Cambridge University in Land Economy. Works as a commercial property valuer and agent. Middle class background. Both parents are English of Scottish, Irish and Welsh descent, as the surnames of grandparents and great grandparents indicate. Working posts held in Britain and Athens.

Wendy: Born in 1967 in Cheshire. Completed state primary and grammar school education in Northamptonshire. She read Music at Birmingham University. then went onto the Royal Academy of Music to study the cello. Professional
cellist. Middle class background. Scottish mother and English father: from the father’s side the grandmother was German. Worked in Britain and Athens.

Susan: Born in 1962 in Middlesbrough. Completed primary and secondary state education in Redcar, in North East England. Read Sociology and Social Policy at Durham University, and holds a Ph.D from Edinburgh University. Works as an editor and publisher. Divorced, previously married to a Greek. Working class background. Both her parents are English. Worked in Britain and Athens.

This sample is representative of three different groups operating within the British community in Athens.

The people in the first group do not consider themselves as properly ex-pats because they are open to and actively engaging with Greek culture and Greek people. They distance themselves from the third group.

The second group is made up of people who have ‘gone local’, through marriage, relationships, or long term business activity based locally. Their commitment to the place they now live in differs from the first and third group. Despite the existence of a ‘little bit of a rub’ in operating socially and professionally in the Greek environment, they maintain good relationships with the culture and with the locals. They do also distance themselves from the third group.

The third group find themselves as having fallen back onto the interface created by the short term ex-pat posting community in Athens with whom the avenues of communication and networking facilitation are in place. They make no attempt to interact outside this community of ex-pats. Their Greek posting is experienced as culturally shocking.
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Greek sample

Total: 28
Average age: 33.8
Men: 15
Women: 13

Αμήλιος: Born in 1976 in Athens. He completed private primary education at St Catherine’s Embassy English school and secondary school at Campion International school in Athens. Read Civil Engineering at Kingston University, England. Holds a Masters in Construction Economics and Management from University College London. Professional area: Management of construction projects. Father is British of Greek Cypriot descent; mother is Greek. Working posts held in Greece and London.

Αθηνά: Born in 1956 in Tripoli, Greece. Completed primary and secondary state education in Athens. Read Law at the University of Athens. Profession: insurance broker. Divorced. Both parents are Greek. Her mother is a direct descendant of the Kolokotronis family that led the uprising against Ottoman rule. Worked in Athens and in the City of London.


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systems. Both his parents are Greek; born and bred in Jerusalem, Israel. At the time of the interview he was seeking employment in London.

Πάρης: Born in 1962 in Athens. Completed primary and secondary state education in Athens. Went to the Teaching Academy in Athens and did a teacher’s training at the University of Athens. Profession: teacher. Both his parents are Greek of Kurdish descent. Worked in Greece and London as a teacher in the Greek schools around the capital.


Νίκος: Born in 1969 in USA. Completed primary and secondary state education in Athens. Read Paramedical Sciences at Boston University USA; read medicine at Kings College Medical School in London. Profession: consultant cancer specialist. Both his parents are Greek. Worked in USA and in Britain.


Κασσανδρά: Born in 1965 in Athens. Completed primary and secondary state education in Athens. Went to the Teaching Academy in Lamia, Greece and did a teachers’ training at the University of Athens. Profession: teacher. Married. Both her parents are Greek. Worked in Greece and in London as a teacher in the Greek schools around the capital.

Αποστόλης: Born in 1971 in Athens. He completed primary and secondary state education in Athens. Read Communications Systems at the University of Athens and did a Masters in Communications at Kings College, London. Profession: communications engineer. Both parents are Greek. Worked in France, Japan and Britain.

Δημήτρης: Born in 1966 in Lamia, Greece. Completed primary state education in Athens and secondary state education in Lamia Greece. Went to the Teaching Academy in the University of Athens and did a teachers' training. Profession: teacher. Married. Both his parents are Greek of Roman Sarakatsanoí-Vlah descent. Worked in Greece and in London as teacher in the Greek schools around the capital.


Βασίλης: Born in 1965 in Athens. He completed primary and secondary state education in Halkitha Greece. Holds a degree in Biomedical Engineering from Manchester University. Profession: businessman. Both parents are Greek. He worked as a freelance broadcaster for BBC London and the Greek-Cypriot radio in London before his return to Greece to set up his business.

Γιάννης: Born in 1967 in Thessaloniki Greece. He completed primary and secondary state education in Thessaloniki. Went to the Teaching Academy at the University of Athens to do a teachers’ training. Profession: teacher. Both parents are Greek of Pontiako descent (Greeks living around the Caspian sea in Turkish and former USSR territories). Worked in Greece and in London as a teacher in the Greek schools around the capital.

Θανάσης: Born in 1974 in Athens. He completed primary and secondary state education in Athens. Read Computer Engineering at the University of Patra, Greece; did a
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Masters in Finance at Imperial College London. Profession: Financial Applications Consultant. Both parents are Greek. Worked in the City of London.

Antónis: Born in 1967 in Athens. He completed primary and secondary private education in Athens and then continued at the Hellenic College in London. Profession: broker. He categorized himself in terms of social class as upper middle. Both parents are Greek. Worked in the City of London.


Dhmētria: Born in 1967 in Athens. Completed primary and secondary education in partly private and partly state institutions in Athens. Went to the Teaching Academy in Athens to do her teacher’s training in the University of Athens. Holds a Masters in IT in Education at Reading University. Profession: teacher. Both parents are Greek: the mother is of Albanian descent. Worked in Greece and in London as a teacher in the Greek schools around the capital.

Sofía: Born in 1974 in Athens. Completed primary and secondary private education in Athens. She read Law at South Bank University, London and then did a diploma in Shipping Law and a Masters in Banking and Finance at University College London. Profession: maritime lawyer. Married. Both parents are Greek. Worked in the City of London.

Kleito: Born in 1967 in Thessaloniki Greece. Completed primary and secondary state education in Thessaloniki. She went to the Teaching Academy in Florina, Greece and then read Economics at the University of Macedonia in Thessaloniki. Holds a Masters at Reading University in IT in Education. Profession: teacher. Married. Both parents are Greek. Worked in Greece and in London as a teacher in the Greek schools around the capital.

Arváðnη: Born in 1966 in Sithno near Thessaloniki Greece. Completed primary and secondary state education in Sithno. She went to the Teaching Academy in
Mitilini island, Greece and then read English Literature at the University of Macedonia in Thessaloniki. Profession: teacher. Married to an English British national. Both parents are Greek. Worked in Greece and in London in the Greek embassy as well as a teacher in the Greek schools around the capital.

Ανδρέα: Born in 1963 in Athens. She completed primary and secondary private education in Athens. Holds a first degree and a Masters in Marketing from Bristol University. Professional area in corporate and NGO management. Both parents are Greek. Worked in Britain and Athens.

Αργύρης: Born in 1966 in Karthitsa Greece. Completed primary and secondary state education in Karthitsa. He went to the Teaching Academy in Thessaloniki: did his Teacher’s Training at University of Macedonia in Thessaloniki. Profession: teacher. Married. Both parents are Greek. Worked in Greece and in London as teacher in the Greek schools around the capital.


Στέλλα: Born in 1972 in Thessaloniki Greece. Completed primary and secondary private education in Thessaloniki. Read Medicine at the Medical School in Thessaloniki. Profession: hospital doctor. Both her parents are Greek of Roman- Vlah descent. Worked in London as a hospital doctor and as Lecturer of Medicine at the University of London.

Δόμνα: Born in 1965 in Rothos island, Greece. Completed primary and secondary private education in Kos and Rhodes islands. Went to the Teaching Academy in Rhodes and then read English Literature at the University of Athens. Holds a Masters degree in Child Development and Psychology in Education from the Institute of Education in London. Profession: teacher. Married to a French national. Both her parents are Greek. Worked in Greece and in London as a teacher in the Greek schools around the capital.

Αργυρό: Born in 1978 in Larisa Greece. Completed primary and secondary private education in Larisa. Read English Literature at the University of North London. Profession: teacher. Married. Both her parents are Greek; the mother is of
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Karagouna- Vlah descent. Worked in London as a teacher in a British state school.

This sample reflects the amalgam of multiple Greek pathways in London. They are individually cast by their affiliation to Greek localities as well as having their own particular cultural bearings. As such these people are defiant not only of their distinctiveness vis-à-vis the non Greeks but also vis-à-vis the other Greeks too.

The sample is not representative of a Greek community as a distinct cultural entity in London. Rather the sample portrays groups of people (re)formulating mainly through their profession or through study, or around modalities that reflect Greek ‘cobwebs’ (networking structures) that link localities to cultural trends and also to other affiliative forms of networking.

The social and cultural activity of the sample, despite the rhetoric or intentions to actively engage with the British culture or British people, remains focused on communication with Greeks. The entire sample- bar those from mixed families- is characterized by the longing to return. As such there is no commitment to the place, and there are no signs of hybrid affiliative connections developing with the British culture or people. There are of course variations depending on the kind of connections made with a place and these occur mainly through varying means of consumption, or through varying aspects of cultural exchange.

The reader will notice that in the brief biographical profiles of the Greek sample their particulars do not contain any information relating to class stratification, bar in the case of the participant Άντώνης who categorized himself in terms of social class as upper middle, on the grounds that his father is a wealthy industrialist. This is because generally speaking the Greeks have not been nurtured into an attitude of deference or to considering themselves as being part of a class system, common in British attitudes. Instead a good salary and a good job is synonymous with their status, hence there is no reference to class structure but to socio-economic gains, being either rich, comfortable or poor is what matters. The Greek sample’s profession in itself was enough to define this. Thus the interviewer did not ask specifically.
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questions about class knowing that this might have obstructed the interview in the sense that it would provoke long diatribes on the absurdity of the concept of class and so on.
Appendix Two

See overleaf
27/11/02

Mrs
11 Vas Sofias Ave & Sekeri St
Athens 10671

Dear

Since I am currently working on a research project at Durham University (UK) into European Citizenship and Identity, I am gathering evidence about questions of European Citizenship and Identity by interviewing a group of white-collar (ex-pat) workers in UK and Greece. I enclose some information about the project on a separate sheet.

I would be most grateful if you were able to provide me at your convenience with the contact details of any member of your staff of Greek or British nationality who might fit into the following categories:

a) who have taken up a transfer post or about to take up such a post to UK or Greece respectively,
b) or who have returned from such a post,
c) or for those for who frequent travelling between the two countries is an integral part of their job,
d) or for those who currently are working with you under any kind of exchange scheme, agreement for training, consultative purposes between your company/ organisation or other companies/ organisations, institutions or NGOs.

In short anyone pursuing flexible career pathways engaging with the market structures of the aforementioned countries would be a potential candidate.

Each one will be contacted individually, and asked whether they would be willing to participate in this project.

Any candidates' contact or personal details are subjected to the strict rules of the 'Data Protection Act' as enforced by Durham University.

Obviously your company/organisation will be credited for its contribution to the project in the publication of the findings. I therefore hope that your company/organisation will be willing to take part in the research.

Unless I hear to the contrary I will contact you by phone next week.

I look forward to hearing from you at your soonest opportunity,

Yours Sincerely,

George Begos

Postal address in Greece
58 M Alexandrou St
Athens 12132
Appendix Three

A: Αποστόλης

G: Interviewer

A: ...we are red-blooded, all these feelings create problems too...it has to...do with upbringing...I know the extent of the phenomenon...it's a part of my identity. I like it. I'm Greek.

G: Good, you said the key word, when you say: part of my identity because I'm Greek.

A: Yeah

G: What makes a Greek Greek? That is to say, what are the aspects which make up the profile of Greekness?

A: You mean I have to define it with words now? That's hard.

G: Yeah, many people say that language prescribes one's identity.

A: Um... you want me to tell you whether he has a big dick? Does that interest you or not?

G: No, I'm not interested in a Greek's dick.

A: (LAUGHTER) Now I'm just pissig about. I'm talking bollocks.

G: What I'm interested in is what the aspects of Greekness are...That is to say, when you say, it's my identity mate, I can't change it it's my identity, what does that identity mean to you?

A: To never be able to speak proper English because of the heavy accent. no. I'm talking bollocks now. wait.

G: Take your time.

A: Um... to fancy all the women playing the field, even if you're in a relationship.

G: that's international

A: it's not really, that much. no. with Greeks it's to the point of being ridiculous ... I don't know what's with us.

G: Ok. But the Italians and Spanish would say the same about themselves. all Mediterranean's say the same thing.

A: nah, it's not to that extent.

G: something more to the point?
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A: // um… mainly that we are more, not red-blooded, hotheaded! How am I supposed to know!?
G: But that’s what the Italians and the Spanish say about themselves… when the Spanish have a tequila or two, they become totally //
A: // yeah, we’re like the Spanish in that way…
G: Is that an aspect of one’s identity though? Or is it an aspect of one’s culture?
A: Of culture? Or of the wider culture?
G: Of the Mediterranean.
A: Yeah, that’s an aspect of Mediterranean culture, but it’s not an aspect of a Greek’s character.
G: Ok, I want the aspects which best describe the Greekness of a Greek.
A: Well then, a Greek is… I think generally a bit abstract by nature… a bit whiny…basically, just as everything’s going fine he’ll start to whine and complain, he’ll put on some sad music, for no reason and I don’t know why.
G: Do you do that?
A: Yeah I do it, so do my friends.
G: (LAUGHTER)
A: (CHUCKLES) Why are you laughing?
G: Ok then that’s a part of the emotional side of a Greek. anything else? Because that’s exactly what an Italian would say, he listens to some operetta and he goes nuts.
A: Nah not so much, not so much. the Italians are more light-hearted, generally happier than us, we’re more melancholic //
G: // how could one not be? //
A: // alright. because of our history, but I’m just telling you that aspect exists. I’m not telling you why… the Portuguese are like us again, more melancholic… the Spanish are have more pride than we do.
G: Really?… ok, any other aspect of Greekness?
A: I think we’re more lazy. is that an aspect?
G: Being laid back let’s say.
Appendix Three

A: Yeah, more laid back...and we have...this aspect of what can I do?
G: You mean I can’t be bothered or what can I do?
A: No it’s the what can I do...the bigger picture of life isn’t that important.
G: What’s important in the life of a Greek then?
A: Sex?
G: For you, what’s important other than sex?
A: Um...that’s what I’m trying to think of. I don’t know...Probably the relationships we have with other people more generally...I don’t know though. I don’t know if that is it either?
G: Good, well what many Greek’s do is start with history, say they are Greek and once you start to ask them more specifically, they can’t give you an answer about what makes them Greek. Is that a Greek, the modern day Greek, the one who has lost the plot?
A: Now what can I say? Personally. I’ll just tell you my story, that could help. Yeah //
G: // yes your story will help.
A: Why did we start saying all this? To find the aspects of a Greek?
G: Yeah ...
A: Yeah. I...CONTINUES TO RECOUNT HIS LIFE STORY.
G: Ok. You still haven’t given me an answer apart from the emotionality of Greekness...what else makes one Greek, what makes you Greek rather than what we call an international citizen, what makes you different, because for me as someone who doesn’t know you, I see you as an international citizen.
A: Yes, yeah, it’s very possible: I’m just claiming to be Greek, Greek. Greek //
G: // when you say you’re claiming to be Greek, what does this mean to you?
A: What I’m saying may be complete nonsense...um... (SILENCE)...for me though. um... (SILENCE)what do I know?...look. I’m talking crap again ...
G: Ok. You’re continuing to go around in circles about Greekness //
A: // maybe. no I don’t know ...
G: It’s just that you still haven’t answered me ...
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A: I could have just been talking crap... I'm not trying to avoid the question now, nothing like that, ok?
G: I know.
A: I may not know. I may be dumb, that's what I'm saying, because I've never thought about it in depth //
G: // no you're not dumb //
A: // that's why it's interesting.
G: Ok, let me ask you again then, all Greeks do the same thing; you ask them what makes them Greek //
A: // um... (SILENCE)...um... //
G: // and they start telling me, I don't know, family, and that kind of stuff //
A: // yeah that stuff's standard everywhere... I don't know. I don't know.
G: So basically, we've concluded that you don't have an answer for what makes one Greek?
A: Yeah that's it.
G: That's very interesting, thank you.
A: Yeah, you must tell me more some time. this stuff interests me and I'd like to learn more about it, that would make me think.
G: Yeah we can meet up again since you are interested.
Appendix Four

Greek sample questionnaire template

1. Questioning about their name, age, date and place of birth.
2. Discussing their education and profession.
3. Reasons that made them migrate. That is professional opportunities, economic/cultural motivations, and so on.
4. Family background and history in terms of ethnicity, nationality, professions, localness, migratory routes if any, from both sides of the family.
5. Their migratory route to the UK and any background in terms of family in terms of connections that might facilitate the move, in terms of the culture of traveling within the family if any, and or in terms of existing social or other networks between the two countries that facilitated or motivated this move.
6. First impressions of settling down in London.
7. Their views at the time of the interview regarding their daily encounters with the banal and spectacular aspects of British culture. The ways in which they interact with it, whether they felt integrated, if at all.
8. Their perceptions of British culture. their perceptions of the British.
9. How if at all the host environment affects their attachment to Greece. How such attachments if any impact their daily routines in the host country.
10. Would they consider themselves as politically aware citizens?
11. Do they vote in the municipal elections and the European ones in the host country? Do they do that in Greece? Do they travel to Greece to vote for the national elections?
12. What are the factors that made them define themselves as Greeks? Education, family, location, history, language, memories, or other.
13. What are the main factors that inform their Greekness? Do they define it in terms of reference points (education, culture, or other) or in relation to the Other, or in terms of a combination of the two.
14. What are the main characteristics in their view that make one Greeks? Factors to consider might be education, family, location, history, language, memories, or other.
15. How they define difference? That is in terms of culture, language, ethnicity, nationality, other?

16. Do they make a distinction between their Greekness, Pontioness, Vlahness, Kurdishness, Frenchness and or any other?

17. How might such an identity be manifested in their daily routines in Greece and abroad?

18. How do they perceive the Other Greeks? As a part of the whole? As different?

19. Do they perceive themselves as a part of the Greek whole? As different?

20. What is their definition of home?

21. Where do they locate their notion of home?

22. When they think of Greece as home do they think of it in its generic term that is, as culture, or in terms of the other Greeks, specific locality, specific social enclaves, or other?

23. Do they consider Greece and the UK European countries? Do they consider the Greeks and the British as Europeans?

24. How do they present themselves in the host country? As a Vlah, Pontios, Kurd, French or other, as a Greek, as a European citizen, or as just a professional working abroad?

25. Living in London, do they feel they are living in a European space? Does the cosmopolitan aspect of London connote in their minds a European space?

26. In the hypothetical case they participated in an international conference somewhere in Europe and were asked where they came from, how would they present themselves? As a Vlah, Pontios, Kurd, French or other? As Greeks? As Europeans or other?

27. If the same scenario was located outside the continent how would they present themselves then?

28. In the context of their experience as mobile professionals would they consider themselves as cosmopolitan citizens in the sense that wherever they are is home to them?

29. If asked to define their identities in terms of cultural percentages proportionally being Vlah, French, Pontios, Kurd or other, Greek or European, or cosmopolitan how would they prioritize them?
30. How often are they in contact with the Greek environment back in Greece? What is the nature of that contact? Do they associate with other Greeks living in London, if yes: what is the nature of this contact?

31. Does their mobile life style impact on their immediate environment in Greece and if so how, in terms of affecting perceptions, attitudes and so on.

32. In the context of their experience as mobile professionals living abroad has this experience fortified or not fortified their Greekness?

33. How do they relate to terms such as European space and Europeanness in terms of geography, history, identity, culture?

34. Do they feel a part of a European ensemble?

35. How do they define the concept of Europeanness? Is there such a thing as European identity?

36. How do they rate the European Union and or the Euro zone in its propensity to be a platform that could generate a sense of Europeanness?

37. Does the generic aspect of European citizenship, that is the freedom of movement and the introduction of the Euro, enhance such a sense?

38. What are their views on an inclusive Europe and on a fortress Europe.

39. What do they think of European enlargement? Of deeper integration?

40. What do they think of the non Orthodox Christian Greeks. of other Europeans, the non Europeans, the Muslims of Europe?

41. What do they think of national and European citizenships? With regard to their frameworks and contexts in the wake of globalization in general. and specifically in the context of the European project?

42. Their views on the progress of the European project as they experience it in their daily routines. Is it visible?
Appendix Four

British sample questionnaire template

43. Questioning about their name, age, date and place of birth.
44. Discussing their education and profession.
45. Reasons that made them migrate. That is professional opportunities, economic/cultural motivations, and or other factors.
46. Family background and history in terms of ethnicity, nationality, professions, localness, migratory routes if any from both sides of the family going back as long as they remember.
47. Their migratory route to Greece and any background in terms of family, in terms of connections that might facilitate the move, in terms of the culture of traveling within the family if any, and or in terms of existing social or other networks between the two countries that facilitated or motivated this move.
48. First impressions of settling down in London.
49. First impressions of settling down in Athens.
50. Their views at the time of the interview regarding their daily encounters with the banal and spectacular aspects of Greek culture. The ways in which they interact with it, whether they feel integrated, if at all.
51. Their perceptions of Greek culture, their perceptions of the Greeks.
52. How if at all the host environment affects their attachment to the UK? How such attachments if any, impact their daily routines in the host country?
53. Questioning about their channels of communication with the UK. The nature of contact with family, friends, wider social networking or other and the frequency of communication? Their contact if any with other British in Athens?
54. Where do they locate their notion of home?
55. How do they define home?
56. When they think of the UK as home do they think of it in its generic form, that is culturally, or in terms of the other British relating to specific localities, specific social enclaves or other?
57. Would they consider themselves as politically aware citizens?
58. Do they participate in municipal and European elections in the host country? In the UK?
59. Would they consider themselves as cosmopolitan citizens in the context of their experience as mobile professionals or would they consider themselves as cosmopolitan citizens in the sense that wherever they are is home to them?
60. How do they define their Britishness? Do they define it in terms of reference points (education, culture, or other) or in relation to the Other, or in terms of a combination of the two.
61. What are the main characteristics in their view that make one British? Factors to consider might be education, family, location, history, language, memories, or other.
62. How do they define difference? In terms of culture, language, ethnicity, nationality, other?
63. Do they make a distinction between their Britishness/Englishness/Scottishness and or any other?
64. How are such identities manifested in their daily routines in the UK and abroad?
65. How do they perceive the Other British? As a part of the whole? As different?
66. Do they perceive themselves as a part of the British whole? As different?
67. How do they present themselves in the host country? As an English, Scottish or other, or as British, as a European citizen, or just as a professional working abroad?
68. Does the experience of living in Athens fortify or not fortify their Britishness and or fortify their Europeanness if at all?
69. Does their mobile life style impact on their immediate environment in the UK and if so how, in terms of affecting perceptions, attitudes and so on?
70. Living in Athens do they feel they live in a European space?
71. Do they consider the UK and Greece as European countries? Do they think of the British and the Greeks as Europeans?
72. In the hypothetical case they participated at an international conference somewhere in Europe and were asked where they came from, how would they present themselves. as English or other? As British? As Europeans or other?
73. If the same scenario was located outside the continent how would they present themselves?
74. If asked to define their identities in terms of cultural percentages proportionally being English or other, British or European, or cosmopolitan, how would they prioritize them?
75. Do they feel a part of a European ensemble?
76. How do they perceive the freedom of movement and the Euro in terms of a platform that would make the European project more integrated, more functional?
77. How they perceive enlargement and deeper integration?
78. What are their views about the Other Europeans and non Europeans? What do they think of the British Muslims, the non Christian Europeans, of other Europeans and non Europeans?
79. What are their views on an inclusive Europe and on a fortress Europe?
80. How do they relate to terms such as European space and Europeanness in terms of geography, history, identity, culture?
81. How do they define the concept of Europeanness? Is there such a thing as European identity?
82. Does the introduction of the Euro and the freedom of movement enhance such sense?
83. What do they think of national and European citizenships regarding their frameworks and contexts in the wake of globalization in general, and specifically in the context of the European project?
84. Discuss their views on the progress of the European project as they experience it in their daily routines. Is it visible?
Appendix Five

See overleaf (pp. 279-312)
My name is James Smith, born 18th June 1963 in Hampshire, England.

Which schools did you attend for your education?

My prep school from the age of 13. C*** in Oxfordshire, and my secondary school was W***I in Warwickshire, up to the age of 18.

Was that a state school, or a public school?

It was a public school.

And after that, when you graduated from the public school?

I left Warwick, I did one year travelling, working for B*** Bank in South Africa, from 1980 to 1981. And after that I did a Degree in combined honours economics and geography at the University of Exeter, and graduated in 1985. After graduating I joined the graduate programme of B*** Bank. It's a four year management training programme.

Do both your parents come from the same area?

That's not really relevant in my family history, to be honest. My father was in the navy. My uncle was in the navy, and through that my father met my mother (INNAUDIBLE)... So they didn't meet because of a shared geography, they met because of a shared profession between my mother's brother and my father. They were all from the south of England, but it happens that the connection was not geography.

And as far as you know from the narratives within the family, were there any other ethnic connections from the father's side?

His grandfather was Scottish. And on my mother's side, one of the grandparents was South African.

So both parents would characterise themselves as ethnically English?

Definitely. Even the South African connection was an English heritage. Came back because of the war.

What is the age of both parents approximately?

Seventy five.

You've talked about shared geography. Are you familiar with the subject of geographical boundaries, limitations?
J: My Degree was in geography and economics, so reasonably familiar. nation states and all that stuff.

G: Ok. Since you went back to work and carried on working in B*** Bank. when did you decide...was it your decision or the institutions' decision to move to another country, to take the post down there?

J: The way that the training programme in B*** worked at that time, obviously it evolves, but at that time the third year of the four year programme was generally an attachment to either a specialist division, say property management, or an overseas posting. Because of the fact I had already travelled, I had already worked for the bank overseas, my parents also being expats, and therefore there was inherent mobility in the family. I obviously requested an overseas posting. The fact is that I asked for Australia, but I got sent to Athens.

G: How familiar were you with the contemporary Greek culture before you went down there, if at all?

J: Not in the slightest.

G: And when was the year you went to take the post in Athens?

J: About 1988 for the first time.

G: How long did you live down there?

J: One year.

J: I think it would help at this stage to talk a little bit about my career, because it puts it a little more in perspective. After one year in Athens. I did a short period of about eight or nine months back in the UK, then in 1989 I went back to Greece for three years to Thessaloniki, to open a branch up there. After Thessaloniki I worked for two years in Belgium, four years in Paris, and then another three years in Athens. I've done seven years in Greece, but a total of three different attachments.

G: So far, how would you consider yourself? As a cosmopolitan citizen for example?

J: You are quite mobile.

J: Umm, I'm not really sure what you mean by cosmopolitan, to be honest.

G: Well, cosmopolitan is the person who basically finds his place wherever he or she is. feels familiar, associates with elements, absorbs elements...

J: Yes, I would say that.
Would you consider yourself at all as an EU citizen?

Well that's the nub of the study isn't it really? I think it's very difficult. Do I consider myself as a European citizen? No I don't. I consider myself as a British citizen.

Why is that?

I think one of the things that I wanted to talk about in the scope of what you put down as the project, is that...it's the definition of an expatriot. Now, to me an expat is someone on what would be considered as an expatriot contract, not somebody who happens to be non-resident from their home country. Because if you are an expat, and everybody in the environment in which you're working knows you're an expat, by definition you are a temporary visitor. If you're somebody that has gone local, with a local contract, and has committed their future to the country in which they're working, then I think the perspective of citizenship changes. This is just my view.

The reason I say that is, when I was in Thessaloniki, that is where I met my wife, and she was committed to – at that time – settling in Greece. And as a result, her perspective on people you meet, where you go, who you associate with, and as a result mine too through association with her, was a lot more integrated than the period I spent in Athens where everybody knows you're going to be an expat three, four years maybe maximum, then you've gone. So people don't make the same commitment to you, to sort of integrate you into the culture, if you are, and I use quote marks, 'the expat package.'

Is your wife Greek?

No, no. She's English.

Some people would doubt you, and say that three to four years in a place is quite a long time.

Oh yeah, don't get me wrong. It's plenty of time to understand the culture and to meet people, but for all that, throughout that period, you know and most of the people you meet know, that at some stage in the future it's adios amigos, you're gone. You're going on to somewhere else.

All right, but...

That changes. You might take the step and say, ok, I want to stay here where I am. I feel this is my home now, not just a place I live. This is my home, and I want to
become resident. And that is generally contractually recognised, and all this sort of
thing. So those circumstances can of course change. but I would venture to suggest
that in the majority of cases, certainly in the financial sector that you're looking at.
the expats come and go.

G: But don't we live behind networks of communications?

J: Yes, sure, but many of those networks as well are often expat based.

G: So from your personal experience there was very little outside of the expat base
network.

J: From the period I spent at Thessaloniki I would say that's very true. Sorry, sorry. the
period I spent in Athens that's very true. The period I spent in Thessaloniki I had a
completely opposite experience.

G: Could we talk about this experience?

J: One of the reasons is that my wife was local. She was English, but she had emigrated
to Greece. She had decided she was going to stay there and work. We had a network
of friends that was out and out Greek. We can use the word (INNAUDIBLE). I had a
Greek (INNAUDIBLE) in Thessaloniki. Whereas in Athens, because of the fact that
both of us were in...and we knew what the contract period was...the
(INNAUDIBLE) was very much an expat one, based around many of the business
institutions that do exist. the Anglo Hellenic Chamber of Commerce, the British
Bankers' Association, the Commonwealth General Managers' Association. If you
haven't spoken to these organisations, I would suggest that you do, because they are
where you will find all the expat managers in Athens.

G: Well, I have tried with the British and Hellenic Chamber of Commerce, and I'm
coming across to (INNAUDIBLE) and unless it's for employment reasons
(INNAUDIBLE)

J: But the Hellenic Chamber of Commerce has got a website (INNAUDIBLE)

G: The point is that I did that, and they turned me down for various reasons, and said
they're not interested, and suggest I should have gone through official channels. And
then I found Mrs K***, who was a *** //

J: // I know *** very well.
G: And she gave me some other names outside of this frame. But still I have a problem. I find that people refuse to talk.

J: Right, but *** a very good case in point, you see. Because there's somebody who has created her future in Greece and has committed her (INNAUDIBLE) and I am sure she would view herself as more of a European citizen than many of the people who that come through transient through Athens. and are members of the Chamber for two or three years and go on.

G: I would agree with that, but the point is I'm targeting the (INNAUDIBLE) right now. Anyway...therefore you had two different experiences. You've experienced the (INNAUDIBLE) Thessaloniki, a completely different experience from Athens.

J: I think the people are different as well. I think that has an influence on it.

G: Ok, what sort of difference?

J: Ok, you're obviously Greek I guess, from your name.

G: Yes.

J: All right, (INNAUDIBLE). Well, I'm a (INNAUDIBLE) But I'm sure it doesn't need me to talk really about the cultural aspects between Thessaloniki and (INNAUDIBLE). They're typified throughout most nation states, sort of capital city, second city, kind of a little bit of friction. They talk about...well, the Athenians talk about the big village up in the North, and the Thessaloniki talk about those cosmopolitan city dwellers down in the South. And there's a little bit of a rub, isn't there. But I've generally...it's typified in sports interaction and things like that. I generally find that in the capital cities, the pace of life is two gears higher than in the second city. In my experience of Thessaloniki the people had a more open approach towards foreigners, for maybe inherent cultural reasons, or maybe for the reason I've stated - that foreigners or expats – let's not use the foreigners, we're talking all about European (INNAUDIBLE) but expats come and go – but for all that people in Thessaloniki were very much more open, receptive, a more laid back lifestyle, slower pace and much more interested in finding out about people who were visiting their city.
G: Were there any specific elements in the local culture in Thessaloniki that you associated with more than Athens, that appealed to you more. Apart from having the (INNAUDIBLE), things that made you feel more at ease there. more at home?

J: Well, it's the people more than anything.

G: More the people?

J: Yeah, they do have a more open approach to life. So many things are easier. it's not such a big place to get around, and shopping. The people have more time to interact and communicate, socialise, go for a stroll or (INNAUDIBLE) whatever it takes. Whereas when you're in a capital and you're spending two hours a day commuting. you haven't got time for that. Gotta run. So people were just generally more easy going and more welcoming. I've been invited to many people's homes in Thessaloniki, I felt much more integrated.

G: And you didn't feel like most of the British nationals I've interviewed so far, a little bit ill at ease with this kind of emotional openness? Because they are a bit emotional.

J: I think we're touching on two different subjects here. The openness is about being prepared to share your life, parts of your life. They all say an Englishman's home is his castle. But it's true anywhere in the world. And an invitation to a home in Greece is something to be valued. And by that I mean the openness. I think if you start talking about emotion, that's a question as to whether you get used to talking with your hands perhaps, or accept the fact that men kiss, or things like that. I don't see that as being the same thing as being welcoming. You can be welcoming without being emotional. I think Greeks are emotional, don't get me wrong. I do agree with you, with the fact that when you first go there, if you're not used to it, and not open yourself, then that can be threatening. But I don't think...I think there's two different issues there, welcoming and emotional. (INNAUDIBLE).

G: And you did not feel your personal space invaded sometimes?

J: Yeah, sure, but that's the cultural difference. If you can't live with that, you shouldn't be doing the job.

G: Excellent. Going back to Britain, going back to the education, etc, etc. the grand narratives talking about formations of identity and the way these profiles formulate.
They're talking about schooling, language, and everything that comes with this package. What are the elements from this schooling, i.e. the education, and the language, that you think gave you that British national profile? In your opinion, if at all.

J: Well, I'm sure there were loads. But I wouldn't really know where to begin. It's just the way you're brought up.

G: I mean ok, (INNAUDIBLE) just experiences and language.

J: I've no idea to be honest. We're going into...what are the component parts of anybody's nationality? There's a bit of history, there's a bit of...Greeks are very proud of (INNAUDIBLE) Day. The rest of the world says hey, big deal. So you said no to the Italians, well we all said no to the Italians. But no, that's not the point, the point is it's a big deal for Greece. You look at the English...and it doesn't matter whether it's football world cup or tales of the empire, and great battles when you're reading history. I don't know what makes the English...that's a very big subject.

G: Yes, but I would like us to talk a little bit more about this, because all the English nationals, ethnically English, I've met so far. they have the same difficulty to define what makes an Englishman an Englishman, or an English woman an English woman. But they were quite prepared to define what makes a Scotsman a Scotsman, and a Welshman a Welshman. A couple of them identified what makes them proud to be British, and associated with nationality. and one of them said rugby and the other one said football. And nothing about the spectacular symbols of the country here, which is flag, royalty, legacy of the past, etc. What does it make you? How would you define Britishness?

J: I think there are certain characteristics of the nation. Whether they are nurtured or nature I don't know. But there are certain characteristics. I happen to think the English do make good expats. I happen to think...and as I said at the beginning, I have worked in Belgium, I also was covering the Netherlands, and I've been in South Africa. I've probably worked in about six or seven countries, mostly in Europe. And in all of them, the easiest I think, expats, the ones that get on with the job fastest. are the English. I don't know if that's something to do with the legacy of an empire. or if it's the fact that we have a nurtured stiff upper lip, as we say, approach to dealing
with adversity. I think they probably all are factors. I don't think it's coincidence. but even in the post-imperial age, that most of the banking across Africa was done (INNAUDIBLE). It was almost a joke in B***. You give somebody the head office manual, here you are, send him off in a rowing boat. go and start a bank. in some countries only found on a map before we left, but OK, that's the job. that's what I've got to do, get out there and do it. Sort it out. And also, there's an element of initiative, if you like. We have a certain belief in doing things. just getting on with it. Some of this sounds very arrogant, and I'm trying to avoid being jingoistic. but...

G: It doesn't matter. you give me your own views. If you feel like that //

J: // I like to draw the analogy between the British army and the American army. because it does typify a little bit the way that Britain works. Class structure comes into it a bit. In the British army most of the people in the army know what their aspiration is, what their job is going to be. and what the maximum they can be is. Because we have the split structure. officers, junior ranks, and then the NCO's and warrant officers. They know what they can get to, you see. So it's a little bit class system, officers go to Sandhurst, they get trained, and the guys join in the ranks and they might make it to corporal sergeant, and the ones who are really good are going to go to (INNAUDIBLE). They're never going to be leading combat troops as officers. But they are going to be squad leaders. as corporals, leading sections of the troops, whatever. And that works, because everybody knows what their job is. Look at the Americans. Because it's start at the bottom, fight your way up the whole way. And it's almost an absolute meritocracy. People are always adverse to taking decisions because they've always been judged on that. And therefore when you compare how the two armies operate. we've all seen it in the last two months, the Yanks have come over with a very blinkered approach, do this. my job, you know. The English thinking, ok here's your troop, go up, give it your best shot, if you get into difficulties give us a call and we'll come back and help you out with any extra resources. So the corporal takes his boys off, he's got his section, goes off. sorts it out. And it's a little bit the same with sending somebody off to be an expat. Here's your job, here are your resources, get out there, give it your best shot, if you get into difficulties. come back to us. If you don't, great. And that sort of initiative belief
is...I don't know where it comes from, is it public school, is it... I don't know. But I think there is a belief, and I do think we make good travellers as a result.

G: Oh yes you do.

J: You look around the world, and was the empire a good thing or a bad thing. Well a lot of people say it just oppressed majorities all around the world. But on the other hand, you look at the countries that benefited from legal systems, policing, education...all that sort of stuff.

G: Transport.

J: Yeah, the whole of the far east network of rail transfer was built by the (INNAUDIBLE). Things like that are a legacy which I think is something to be proud of.

G: Therefore you are proud of all this?

J: Yeah yeah. Don't get me wrong. I'm proud to be English. Sorry. The way you said that...(LAUGHS).

G: Ok, it's fine by me. (LAUGHS). You've mentioned class. You know the class theme/issue in this country, which is very well established. Do you identify with this at all, as a social theorem, as a social framework?

J: What do you mean, do I identify with it?

G: For example, many British nationals define themselves. They say: "I'm middle class"; "I'm upper class," "I'm working class," and they go along with it.

J: That's whether you identify with it or not. That doesn't escape from it. You can say I don't recognise class, but that's crap. Somebody's going to tell you what class you are if you don't recognise it.

G: Yes, but we have seen recently, in the past twenty or thirty years, especially after the Thatcher years, that due to the (INNAUDIBLE) deregulation of the market... incomes, revenues in this country, many working class people became rather more wealthy and you can't call them working class anymore, for example...

J: I suppose you could say that there has been an evolution of the class structure, because of the fact that there's so much less manual labour. You've got the demise of the cloth mills and the coal mines, and all that stuff. There's a lot less manual labour going on, and I'm sure it's a subject you want to touch on in the future. There's a far
greater percentage of immigrant labour filling positions which perhaps originally would have been the working class preserve. And so yes, OK, the class structure has evolved. But to say that we don't have it anymore is a long, long way off reality.

G: Therefore, how would you define yourself, as middle class, upper middle, lower middle, upper?

J: I would probably say on the upper side of middle. Certainly not upper class. I don't know people with titles. I don't own horses or. I don't go to polo matches or play golf or any of that crap. But on the other hand, you can put other factors in. Yes, I went to a private school, my parents paid for my education. Yes, I now own my own house. Yes, I go on holidays. Upper middle... if you feel the need to give me a classification.

G: (LAUGHS). No, I don't feel the need, just asking... Let's have a more provocative question. When some people say for example that they identify with the flag, or they identify with the legacy of the empire in this country. Some others would say that the symbol of the flag was created by the elite, the empire was created by the elite, and all the history of this country and the system that exists now are the product of the elites. How come for example, people who didn't come straight from the aristocracy feel proud of this legacy?

J: Personally, I don't think it was built by the elite. It might have been led by the elite, but you can bet your bottom dollar that the people who were sweating away working for Wellington in Peninsular Wars, or sailing on the ships that went to India, they were men of oak. It was their blood and sweat that built the empire. It might have been initiated and led by people of wealth, but I don't buy it to be honest. I don't buy the argument. I think if we try and look at that now, we're looking at it with a perspective that belies the reality of how it was at the time. Yeah. we can put a socialist slant on things and say ah. it was all about exploitation, because looking back in hindsight, we can just highlight the aspects that are exploited. But I think that if we'd been there at the time it would have been a great adventure, lads. let's join Nelson's navy. let's go join Clive in India. Or whatever it happened to be. go and have a good laugh. Better than working down the pit. let's go and seek fame and fortune and adventure. I don't believe that it was just a lesson in exploitation.
All right. Do you identify at all with any of the spectacular symbols of today's Britain? Like...

The Union Jack? Yes sure. Monarchy, yeah.

Would you like to qualify this a little bit?

At the end of the day it comes back to, there's a certain basic want, and one of them is a sense of belonging. Nobody wants to be drifting along... we've all. I'm sure you have, from the geography department we've all looked at (INNAUDIBLE) at some stage in our life. And if a sense of belonging are the instruments of your national identity, ok, so be it. I think the interesting thing about the English in particular is that we are very self-deprecating. I think we are, I like to think we are. We can laugh at ourselves. And we have a national habit of putting people on pedestals, and knocking them down. In other words we don't recognise achievement until it comes down to the crunch. In other words, football managers say, "You're the best thing we've ever had, thank you very much". Lose two games and you chop them down.

And it's like... particularly when it comes to war. I think if you look at the polls of Blair prior to post the Iraqi conflict... now, before that we were getting (INNAUDIBLE). "What the hell are you doing? What are you doing?" We don't want to be in this, (INNAUDIBLE). Do we want British troops going out there dying for a cause that we're a little bit "etsy ketsy" about anyway? And what was it – I can't remember - about 64% against or something, at one stage. But once it comes down to it, so ok we're in, everybody starts rallying around, sort of in the Blitz kind of approach, that when your back's against the wall, then things like pride in the monarchy, the flag, doing it right, doing it the British way, they come to the fore. I think many other nations have a much greater pride in their national characteristics on a continuous basis than we do.

And why do you think this?

I don't know.

The achievements of the nation are greater than great. It's the nation that basically set up industrialisation, invented capitalism, basically pushes ahead constantly the scientific boundaries. How do you justify this? And the financial sector is a....
J: Financial sector's a good example. Music industry, Formula One racing cars. But I think it's because of the fact that we're prepared to take a little bit of risk as well.

G: It's not only that. You're prepared to debate. It's within your culture (INAUDIBLE) debating.

J: I'd agree with that as well. I think pop music is an interesting one, because there's no technological reason why it should be here at all. It's just that people are prepared to experiment with their own artistry if you like. Create sound, so ok, let's make a record. I think there's a little bit...this is moving into a very different area though, as to whether people are creative or not. I think we're probably creative, but not that artistic.

G: That's not one of our points here. But the point is that for as long as you're prepared to debate and argue and push forward constantly you're bound to create by default. You can't escape from that. But my question is, I have so far two different sets of British people. If you ask, they say I'm proud of this, that and the other. And the others who say, yes, but we are down-grading because of this, that and the other, so far. And we will have to wait and see how things are/

J: //the ones that think that it's been degrading, what is their background and experience?

G: What background? Um...coming from both working, upper class and the in between, and they say that socially we are going back. Ok, the institutions are giving in, due to the global pressures, and all the values and norms of this society's (INAUDIBLE)

J: I think the value system is deteriorating, but I don't think that (INAUDIBLE) You look at the content of TV over 40 years, and it's clear that the moral boundaries have been expanded beyond recognition. But one of the things I do think is that it sometimes takes a period of working overseas...one of the real benefits to me of being an expat is actually stepping back from being in the country, being in the motherland, and looking at it from the outside through the eyes of other people and other cultures. The question then becomes, what does that do for you? I did think about this yesterday, as to whether working overseas made me more or less European. I actually think it made me feel more British, because as I said, when you're living there, and you're in the country... the Americans are worse than this
than the British, because they never leave their own country. So most of them don't even know where Europe is on the map, let alone a given country in Europe. Which is a huge generalisation, but it's still a good one. My point is that when you step outside, and you see the role Britain plays in the global community, or the European community, from outside the UK you suddenly think wow, this little island does actually well and you know it does have some influence. Probably a disproportionate amount of influence for the contribution it will make financially. Or... But, that doesn't alter the fact that in – ok, there's the coalition in Iraq – Britain's role, good or bad, but the fact is it had a role. I don't know whether it's fair to say that the first person George Bush called is Tony Blair. But it certainly wasn't Costas Simitis, with all respect to the man. And so, standing outside the country and travelling... I have travelled quite a lot (INNAUDIBLE) when I've had the opportunity. They say that something like 98% of all Manchester United fans have never been to Old Trafford. I believe that. You go to India, and there's huge fan clubs. And I think, well that's bizarre. Why are there huge fan clubs for Man United and not Barcelona. But there aren't. There are loads of Manchester United fans around the world. And you somehow think, this is a huge influence. Why is that? I don't know. But stepping outside of it, and looking back in, you think ok, people around the world do listen to what we say. Whether you agree with it or not, they still listen. Just to come back to the original question, that kind of does make you feel a bit prouder, because you think... oh, ok. You look at the structures of the world organisations, and you say why do we have a G7 and a G10 (INNAUDIBLE) Actually, we've got an enormous input. Trade and military. Etc. Etc. So, I think stepping out of England helped me see that. That's why I said being overseas... the core of your paper being a period spent working outside of the UK, made me I think in many circumstances more British, or more proud to be British. But only because I was able to open myself up to other cultures.

G: Excellent. You say more proud of being British. You mean being British, or English?
J: No, I mean British. I'm a pro-Union. But don't get me wrong, if you want to tell me a joke about the Welsh, I'll laugh my socks off. That's the way the English are. And it's the same with the Scots. I mean, yes. When we sit in the pub, and England's playing...
Scotland at football, we'll probably end up in a fight. But threaten our island, and they're as solid as a rock. And the Scots are an integral part...I mean. England without Scotland is half. Do you know what I mean. They're (INNAUDIBLE) We like to fight amongst ourselves, but once there's a challenge from the outside then I think you see a far greater...You look again at the Gulf troops. And who's in the forefront. Black Watch from Scotland, and the Irish cavalry, fighting alongside the Marines. It is a co-ordinated effort. Nobody's going to knock any of those guys and say, we're not supporting you because you're Scottish. It's not going to happen. So. yes, we like to have a bit of a fight amongst ourselves, but woe betide anybody that attacks us from outside. We get very defensive (INNAUDIBLE) G: But why? J: Why? I don't know. G: Why, with all this historical achievement (INNAUDIBLE) Why the English nationals (INNAUDIBLE) more tight-lipped (INNAUDIBLE) the Scottish, Irish and Welsh, seem to be more emotionally (INNAUDIBLE). J: I think English nationalism only really comes to the fore, when they feel that things are not being done fairly. by which I mean...I think it needs at to the (INNAUDIBLE). There are people, we can only talk in generalisations, or we have been so far. But of course there are people who don't agree. and think that we should evolve into different separate countries. I know there's the whole Northern Ireland question, which has been going on for thirty years, forty, eighty. one hundred years anyway, as to whether it should be a separate country or part of the British Isles. And when you get somebody that advocates that argument and says. we should be independent. We don't need you. Somebody starts saying hang on. That's nonsense. We're all much better together. Which is the European argument of course as well. but we're much better together than separately. so why say that? It is a very interesting analogy between the British Isles and the EU. There's no doubt that the British Isles is stronger. Great Britain is stronger together than it would be independent. But then English nationalism generally ends up being finance as well. We start saying to the Scots, we've been paying for you for years. If you want to go independent, then fine. we'll stop paying for your roads, and your parliament and all
the rest of it. I think that's what brings it out a little bit. Not that people are... I would
be surprised if you met many people that advocate an independent England.

G: No they don't. They don't.

J: We're not bothered by it, but it only comes to the surface when faced by people
shouting about an independent Scotland or Wales or Ireland. Then people say, well,
you really want to talk about it, you really want to know what an independent
Scotland... I'll tell you what it would be like. And that's when you find people
suddenly get ultra nationalistic about everything. Outside of sports, of course.
Because that is totally different. Then we're allowed to be ultra nationalistic because
we're probably playing Scotland at football. We like being the bastard.

G: You talked earlier about your sense of belonging to the motherland. Why motherland
and not fatherland?

J: Because fatherland smacks of being German I'm afraid. The Germans use the
expression of fatherland. I don't think that motherland is actually a common English
word either. It's not even a word that many English use, unless you've been away
from home and you've been longing for green and pleasant land. You have to
conceptually define that in some way. I wouldn't use the word fatherland. I don't
think I would use it. I don't think that's too overt. I just think it has overtones of
(INNAUDIBLE) and all sorts of things that I wouldn't really want to get involved in.

G: You have received a certain type of schooling, a certain type of language, and a
certain type of experience so far, as a human being and a citizen of this country. And
with all the social and political structures in place, which you have experienced... if
the social and political and economic structures were in place as they are within the
UK, values wise, norms wise, the whole thing, but you had received a slightly
different kind of schooling. On the other hand you had the same neighbourhood, the
same kind of parents, etc, etc. Would that have made you the same type of British
national?

J: If I'd had a different schooling?

G: Different schooling with a different background. But the rest of the system was in
place, because what comes across in the interview so far is that your sense of
belonging is based mostly on the value achievement basing of the system. When you
talk about a sense of belonging, normally you're talking about the values. you're
talking about the achievements, that make you proud.

J: I think if I'd had a different upbringing... I don't believe that they're any less proud of
the values of the country. The thing is that what you said about debating earlier on, is
perhaps true. That I have had an opportunity to think about the value structure, and
even if you're looking at the paper that you sent me before having this discussion
does make me thing about (INNAUDIBLE). But for all that, we are still a democracy
where the majority rule, and I think that national identity as a majority
(INNAUDIBLE). Some of the staunchest defenders of the flag is the common man,
is the majority. By class, by definition virtually is a pyramid shape. So would it have
been any different if I'd been brought up in a different way. Probably not so
articulated, not so specific, but I don't see that I'd be any less proud. I mean, I was
talking to a guy literally a month ago in a pub quite near where I live. You're familiar
I'm sure with English counties. He said to me, why do I want to go outside of Kent?
I've got everything I want in Kent. I've got beaches. I can go and see the sea, it's got
nice rolling hills, good food. Why do I want to leave Kent? Not England, not
Britain, but Kent. We're talking about somewhere that's the size of a couple of Greek
islands. But no, he was happy in Kent. And so had a different perspective, but was
very proud of what he'd got. He didn't have the (INNAUDIBLE) that I think is one
of the huge benefits of travelling. And to me one of the things that I seek and cherish
is to have a cultural exposure. But not having that cultural exposure doesn't make me
any less proud of what's gone. So I think really the answer to your question is a
resounding 'no'. I'd still have the same set of values.

G: If your language was not English, because other (INNAUDIBLE) English people told
me that language did not play any major role in the formation of their own sense of
belonging and identity. What did play a role, was the memories, experiences, the
immediate cultural environment, the every day...

J: I don't think that's true either. People that do not appreciate the benefit of being
English, in the sense of having English as a mother tongue, have not travelled far.
Frankly, it is not until you try and get around the world as an Englishman when you
realise how easy it is compared to being Greek. And every Greek I know that has
travelled the world has done it on English, not on Greek. And so, yes, it’s true to say
that language has no part of your cultural upbringing, but that’s because you don’t
know any different. So, surely the opinion is really based on ignorance. Up to a
certain age, every other language is taught as a foreign language to us. English are
terrible at languages anyway. We’re all absolutely hopeless at it, because we’re never
forced to learn another language. We’re not brought up being told if you want to get
to along in the world, if you want to get along in business, you’ve got to learn
English. We’re never taught that at school. and it’s not until you start travelling
overseas, and you go across the whole of the Far East. America and Australia, you’re
just thinking, God, I’ve got a common language with half the countries of the world.
Not half the population... END OF SIDE ONE. One of the reasons that we’re now
able to continue travelling, if that makes sense we continue to make...expatriotism
becomes easier.

G: Therefore do you consider the British Isles as a part of Europe?
J: (LAUGHS). Fog in the channel, continent cut off. Is the British Isles a part of
Europe?
G: Geographically it is, but is it?
J: Well not even geographically really. is it?
G: Is it not?.
J: Yeah, but we’re an island, and I think the question of the English island mentality is a
very, very deep one. Coming back to the fact that we haven’t been invaded for a
thousand years. That does have an impact on your psyche, because it develops
continuously. You haven’t had the Nazis in Paris, or the Ottomans in Greece. England
has not been invaded principally because of its geography, not through any great
achievement (INNAUDIBLE). Because it was an island.
G: (INNAUDIBLE) downgraded English history. You had military achievements.
J: (INNAUDIBLE) pushed back the French and the Spanish.
J: Yeah, we sacked the Armada and all that sort of stuff, yeah.
G: And Nelson.
J: Yes, absolutely. But Nelson achieved what he did because we are an island. We had a
waterway to defend //
G: // I'm sorry. I have to defend Nelson here. He was a great, great strategic mind. the way he formed his naval //

J: // I've no doubt about it all, but he would not have had the opportunity to achieve if we had been connected to the mainland. Because the armies would not have needed ships...

G: Wellington did the same in Waterloo. No sea there.

J: Yeah, absolutely, but do you see what my point is. that the island still does define a lot of the mentality? So geographically, I think we are split off.

G: But does that define you as well. because you are a mobile...you have travelled the world.

J: Yes, but am I representative of the British public? I don't know. I don't think I am. No. I think I'm more European than many of my countrymen. To come back to the question of whether you're British or European, and I said to you that I felt I was more British as a result of being overseas. But I'm definitely more European as well.

G: This is what I would want to hear from the professionals. (LAUGHS) What makes in your opinion a European European? Are there any common norms and values? Any common foundation. because again history and (INNAUDIBLE) talk about common ancestry and conflict and philosophy, and the legal system, (INNAUDIBLE) from the Roman empire. Do you buy this stuff at all?

J: No I don't. I think there's a lot of logic, if you like. to the European ideal. And there's a lot of very eminent thinkers who have put this together. But I don't believe at this stage that any...no, that's probably not true, the majority of European residents have bought into the idea that the European entity is greater than their own national entity. I personally believe that a Greek will say to you that he's first and foremost a Greek. He's secondly European. And I think that applies...again, I can't really talk about some countries, particularly for example the Belgians. Because in a sense Belgium as a state is two different countries, if not three if you count Brussels. They don't have such a strong cultural cohesion, but I'm absolutely sure that a Frenchman is a Frenchman first. A Greek is a Greek first. And that's why I say that I don't really think that the European ideal has been bought into in the true philosophy which it was intended originally.
G: Thank you. So you're saying that all European nationals are part of one Europe, despite their cultural, historic and other divisions...and that since they share common borders they are all part of Europe. So if we were to apply that logic to a different circumstance would you, for example, consider Turks or the Ukrainians that might enter later on, or even Russians in the future as Europeans because they have common boundaries with other European countries? If at some point they met the technical and economic criteria for the EU membership should be allowed to join in?

J: Well, I think we're moving to a whole different question here obviously. And that relates to the nature of the future structure of Europe compared to what we've been talking about to date, which is the evolution up to the present time. For what it's worth, my personal view is that the more states that exceed, the more diluted becomes the European ideal and the less probability it will have of achieving its long term aims.

G: Therefore you don't agree with the European policy of the Labour party (INNAUDIBLE) to keep British sovereign powers in place.

J: No, on the contrary I do agree with it.

G: You do agree with it?

J: Because a more diluted sovereignty reduces the power of Brussels over the sovereign states.

G: Yes, but on the other hand it makes a much looser European Union.

J: Which is what I said. It dilutes the ideals, the core of developing this integrated country. I think that as soon as...up until now there's been a certain hegemony, and I think as soon as you devolve that and we start bringing - not bringing, that sounds very separatist - as soon as the club expands to include multiple ethnicity, multiple religion, when we see the core Western European ethnical outlook, and then we see Slavs, we see Muslims, we'll see...Russia just expands that, how far? If Russia joins, then we're going out as far as the pacific, aren't we? Is that Europe? I think part of the glue will be diluted, and it's a bit of a Trojan wars approach, some of the British parties have. I think many of the people who are pro-Europe see it as making Europe stronger by making the club bigger. I frankly think it will implode in the long term. I
don't see it surviving. Because there will be so many other people calling on the
resources of the community...
G: So take for example French, or Greeks which are on the other side of Europe, or even
Austrians. Do you feel closer to these people?
J: Well, the Austrians are always an interesting one, because they were the original
free-trade area, which... I'd like to discuss that, but just to come back to the point
before about expanded membership. If we have an expanded membership, why is
there – I don't know whether it's at this stage concrete, but it's certainly being
discussed in the papers – a reforming of the original axis? Why are France, Germany,
Belgium (INNAUDIBLE) reforming a core axis? We're going to have what, a power
group within the EU. Why? Because the answer is that it's going to become so
unmanageable, that they're going to have to be going back to first principles, and
saying why did we do this? Coal and steel wasn't it? Let's get back to trading coal and
steel again, and who cares what's happening in the Czech Republic, because
otherwise...All I'm saying is that this redevelopment of the new core axis supports
the argument will eventually cause the Union to break apart.
G: Therefore would you like to see a fortress Europe at some point, somewhere to draw
the line?
J: I don't feel that strongly about it. I don't think we have something that's working
100% yet anyway. And I think we're moving to something new yet again. It may
actually move much closer towards what Britain thought Europe was all about, in the
sense that it's a trading entity. You must remember that most people, and this does
account to some extent for the British perspective on Europe, at the time that they
elected to - which if I remember rightly was '74 but I could be wrong on that – it was
a vote to join the EEC, not a vote to be (INNAUDIBLE) to a Brussels commission or
parliament. It was a trade discussion, technique and all the rest of it. We were talking
about trading with Europe. This was going to be our new marketplace, a common
market we were all joining. And here we are 15 years later, nearly 20 years later, and
it's a whole different ballgame. And I think many people still join it with suspicion.
We signed up for what we thought was...because we're a trading nation by
(INNAUDIBLE) because of the ships and all that sort of thing, and there's a bit of
nature coming into it, as a trading nation we thought we joining a trading entity. And
a lot of English politicians have had to temper this view about the loss of national
sovereignty with the trading aspect of it. And so that's probably why the two British
parties, I believe, endorse the expansion of Europe, because it matches very much
with the British psyche and a less political interference. So, that's why. I think that's
the way it's going. I don't know whether that will ever be proven true or not. I
thought the Warsaw pact would never break, but anyway...

G: The national governments in Brussels are forcefully represented. and basically they
put forward their positions quite ferociously. Where's the submersion there?

J: You don't think that the more people are having an argument, the less chance you
have of having a resolution?

G: Are you sure about that? You're a nation of debaters.

J: Yes, we are a nation of debaters. But if two people have a debate, you've got a chance
of finding a consensus. 22 people are having a debate, you've got no chance of
finding something that keeps everybody happy at all. It's never going to work, so you
end up with selective vetos, you end up with some people carrying more votes than
others...and you get more members of parliament than you, because you've got this
many people, and this size of land area, and in the same you end up stratifying the
whole thing, and you're back to a set of nation states again.

G: So your whole scepticism is not so far about losing sovereignty/

J: //I never said I was sceptic, me?

G: (LAUGHS)

J: Oh no. Ok, I am a little bit sceptic. I admit. But I do like to think that working
overseas has given me the ability to form a reasonably rational look at things, and not
just accept that oh, because it's says in the Sun newspaper that we've got to hate the
French, therefore we hate the French; I don't support that approach. But I think if
you look at it in a reasoned way, there are certain conclusions that you are led to.

Yes.

G: But the point is. if it were to function, the whole thing, in Brussels or from elsewhere.
for as long as you could get a solution of something, you wouldn't be having any
problem of basically (INNAUDIBLE) a little bit?
J: (LAUGHS) (INNAUDIBLE)

G: Well I don't know. This is what we're researching. We're trying to find out formulas for the future, for the functioning, to make the whole thing functional. We, as an academia, basically our aim is not to dilute the national or ethnic identities within a massive melting pot. It did not even happen in the States after 250 years of (INNAUDIBLE). What we are concerned with is the potential. it's the capacity for functionality, to function. You as an English, and blah blah as a Greek, (INNAUDIBLE) being able to interact with each other without the conflicts and all that...

J: Yeah, I see no problem with co-operation. But it's always going to be based on... people look after themselves, that's a fact. And therefore I think one of the reasons for the cynicism of the majority of the British public is that they look at the things like the common agricultural policy. and they say. hang on a minute. Everybody chucks a load of money into this, and the French take all of it. OK, it's a huge (INNAUDIBLE). I'm talking the language of the tabloid newspaper. And much as I love Greece, and I honestly do, I know, and I'm sure you know, that many European laws, if they don't suit them, they're just ignored.

G: Yes, I know.

J: There have been...I don't know how many times Greece has been taken to the European Court on //

G: // several //

J: // but on the same issues. Things like (INNAUDIBLE) Foreign owners of (INNAUDIBLE)

G: Stamp duties.

J: Exactly, the list is long and merry. Ok, I'm sure it's the same, like TV's into France years and years ago, things like that, it is done in the interests of that particular...um... //

G: // do you mean elite?

J: No, I wasn't going to say elite. I was going to say that particular grouping of people. Now, at the moment that grouping is based around lines of nation state. but even if we didn't have those lines, you would still have groupings. You'd still have...
(INNAUDIBLE) ... in Britain, we'd probably (INNAUDIBLE) geographically, and
Iberia, and Greece, because it //
G: // (INNAUDIBLE).
J: The fact that we have minority groups within nations, the Basques, the
(INNAUDIBLE) the Scots, however you want to view it, there are minority groups.
So if people are going to have their own representatives, and at the end those
representatives are judged on what they get out of the central pot for their people.
And that's never going to change, whether we have nations or whether we have
cultural groups, or whether... I don't think it's ever going to change. I don't see how it
can. It's human nature that the people want their representative to do the best for
them. Otherwise they'd change their representative. And that applies to the whole of
the EU, and the representatives of their nations. People want to see that they're being
looked after, and frankly it's Darwin's survival of the fittest out there. If we can get
more out of the pot than anybody else, you do it. And I don't see how you ever get
around that.
G: By changing our cultural experiences, because you went to Thessaloniki, you came
back richer in many ways. Greek people are coming up here to start work, they go
back to Greece and when they are confronted by that (INNAUDIBLE) they find
themselves feeling uncomfortable. Things, they're trying to change things. And by
having people coming into contact, and basically transgressing cultural boundaries.
well we are talking about change.
J: Yeah, and the core of your study in terms of the benefits of cross-border working are
that you get an understanding of the needs and the wishes and the want list of other
people in the Union. But you can do that whether you do it within the Union or not.
G: Agreed. But my field is the EU.
J: I know. I know. I'm sorry. We're probably going wider than we want to be
discussing.
G: No, no, it's fine, it's fine.
J: So I think cross-border working is essential, and I do agree with you that I'm
immensely lucky, fortunate perhaps, to have had those experiences. But like you
said, it led me to a far greater understanding of the components of the Union, but it
didn't make me European.

G: When you came back from Greece, what did you bring with you, for example when
you close your eyes and think of your years down there. Did it make you less of an
Englishman, more of an Englishman, more of a European? Do you miss anything
from down there at all?

J: When I came back...I think, you find yourself, and I'm sure this applies in both
directions (INNAUDIBLE) Greeks returning to Greece...you find yourself in a
certain limbo. You have experience of both cultures, and to be honest, having been
away for, for what was for my wife 12 consecutive years out of the UK. for us it was
just another posting. It was a new culture to learn, where fortunately we'd studied the
language. But for all that, I think you try and draw the best out of both cultures. You
take with you the bits you want to remember about it. maybe more subconsciously
than deliberate, but having said that you are therefore much more aware of the
strengths and weaknesses of your own culture. If people were antagonistic towards
Great Britain, anywhere, I'd be defending it to the hilt. But on the other hand, I am at
a loss to talk to the guy who doesn't want to go outside of Kent. Because I want to
say to him, "But you're never going to see the Acropolis, you're never going to see
the Taj Mahal." He doesn't care. So, I think you do become a little bit dislocated from
your own culture as well, but still, because you have got wider experience. you are
able to appreciate what is good about it. And perhaps a better understanding of what's
bad too.

G: The issue of EU citizenship. This is a major issue (INNAUDIBLE). Some
(INNAUDIBLE) advocate that there should be a de coupling of citizenship from
national identity. because the way it goes so far is that you are ethnically English.
basically that makes you automatically a British national, that gives you
automatically a British passport. Some say that for all those people who come into
the country, for as long as they meet technical and economic criteria, and they reside
or domicile here, regardless of ethnicity or their nationality. they should
(INNAUDIBLE) for functional reasons an EU member state passport to be able to
operate within the EU. What are your views about this?
J: My first reaction, I have to say, my first reaction is to say does it matter? But that's perhaps not really addressing the issue. If there were no nation states in the EU and it was the United States of Europe, what would people want then?

G: To be able to prosper. This is what people want across the globe.

J: I think that there's all sorts of economic arguments, and jobs that people don't want. People assimilate themselves into the bottom of the chain, and there's plenty of studies of migration to America and things like that. So therefore on the one hand, economically yes, it's good, yes, it helps. Does it matter what passport they carry to do that? Er, I honestly don't know. The risk to me, it seems, is that there's a very fine line between pride in your nationhood and racism. It's a very fine line. Because pride in your nationhood is great, nobody says it's wrong to be patriotic. But if you start defending that patriotism rigorously, you become exclusive. You become xenophobic and all the rest of it, and it's a very short step from there to say “We don't want you in our country. And we don't want you because of these reasons. Or this because you're from (INNAUDIBLE) background.” I don't know where the line's drawn...I don't even know where my own line is drawn. But it's a very difficult argument. It's easy to see people at both extremes, and say (INNAUDIBLE). But even if you have that, surely people would naturally locate to the area that they felt most culturally at home, so that the outsider is still an outsider. But then that was an argument used by the apartheid regime. So, the passport issue...I don't really know what the answer is. Wherever you come down on it, somebody's going to call it divisive. Somebody's going to say it's a tool for integration. I can't give you the answer. though. I really don't know.

G: How would you like to see Europe go on from now on, for the next 10 to 20 years? Ideally what would you like to see the European project developing?

J: I think the European project is rather, as we touched upon earlier, it's rather gone off in a different direction certainly to what the English envisaged. Perhaps not so far from the direction originally envisaged by France.

G: (INNAUDIBLE)

J: I think we as a nation, and I certainly go along with this, I think we would like to see more liberalised...I think the whole project needs to take a step back and say, are we
going down the road we really want to be going down? I happen to think we haven't achieved trade harmonisation. We haven't achieved tax harmonisation. To start looking at greater political integration, I think is the cart coming before the horse. But I don't think it's important. There's nothing wrong with national governments trying to get rid of red tape. I think we've got more rules, more regulation and more barriers to business than we had before. There's so many regulations, hundreds and hundreds, thousands, all printed in multiple languages. And if you were a little exporting company, based anywhere in Europe, you are lost. You haven't got a clue. are you allowed to export your cheese into Holland, or not? I don't know. How are you going to find out? We've got a whole industry growing up to help people to do something that was meant to be eased and not made tougher. That's one thing. I think the other thing, if it doesn't get addressed very soon, is just going to (INNAUDIBLE) and that is the finances. because that's a shambles. The fact that Brussels cannot produce books that balance to me as a banker is unbelievable.

G: It's still at an early stage, isn't it?

J: But they don't have double-entry book-keeping. They can't get the books signed. They don't have an audit. The money just haemorrhages, as far as I can see. I'm no expert, and I certainly haven't seen any of it. but there's so many projects, and money gets chucked at stuff. Which part of Greece are you from?

G: Athens.

J: Have you ever driven from Thessanoliki towards the border?

G: Yes.

J: How many half-completed factories are there up there?

G: This is due to the corruption.

J: OK, but what happened was the Mediterranean Coastal Improvements, or Border Regions (INNAUDIBLE) //

G: // (INNAUDIBLE) //

J: // they built half the factory, they gave them the rest, and the money disappears. Dozens of half-built factories up there in the remote border area. Now, how can that happen? How can you expect to be taken seriously if you cannot turn around to your members and say "Last year you spent x billion Euro, and here's where it went." It's
not like that. It's "You contributed this. you got this back." That's it. Now, this may
be the banker in me talking, not the Englishman, but I find that astonishing. I find it
amazing that we expect companies to, we expect large multi-national, multi-
European, all these companies, to follow quite rigid guidelines on performance, on
book-keeping and regulations, and we don't set any example for them to follow. How
can that be right? //

G: // Excellent. Therefore as a banker, how do you experience all this information, the
communication platform of the EU? Do you see it in your daily life here in the bank?
Do you find it straightforward, confusing, complicated?

J: Sorry, when you say information, you mean...?

G: I mean the communication, directives, regulations. When you work in the bank, do
you feel that you work within an EU space?

J: Because at the end of the day as well, each country has its own central banking
regulations, so OK there are certain multi-national directives coming out, but OK the
second banking directive was huge. No doubt about that, and that leads us into your
project, because without it we wouldn't be swapping cross-border staff
(INNAUDIBLE). But banks are more impressed by things like the Basle Accord.

Those are the things that influence us. But they're not really driven out of
(INNAUDIBLE) they're driven out of the need to have an agreement as to what is an
acceptable standard for an international bank. //

G: // All right. And //

J: // Sorry, just the other thing to say on banking is that each country has its own
regulator, as I said, so we have the SFA here. And the interesting thing about that is
that the regulator governs the home... each bank is governed by the regulator of its
home parent company. But with recognition of the local regulator as well. So here
we are in Greek banking. We have to link to London regulatory authorities, but
actually if it all goes pop, our regulator is actually the Bank of Greece. So, that's
quite interesting, but from that point of view yes. But really, we're talking about
(INNAUDIBLE) the local market.

G: Your employer is the G*** bank now. As a professional are you (INNAUDIBLE)?
J: No, I'm a local employee. At the end of the day nearly every bank in every country, the local employees are paid the relevant local market rate. Otherwise you can't attract any staff. If you came to London and said 'I'm going to pay you what your job's worth in Greece' you wouldn't have anybody applying for the job. It's still happening in the N*** B*** of G***, for example. They are paid in Greek salaries.

G: But many of those are Greeks, aren't they?

J: Ok, and they're expecting to return. I don't know whether they're on full expat deals or if they're on secondment. We have staff occasionally that have been seconded from Greece to UK, but I consider that to be an expat arrangement. And that is the same for an Englishman going to Greece, nearly always. If your base salary is set by the home country, but then there is a cost of living adjustment which in some countries is (INNAUDIBLE) because you're already overpaid. But the cost of living adjustment is something normally in terms of looking at how housing is arranged, and that is a principle function. Therefore you are...there's whole industries on how expats should be paid, but (INNAUDIBLE). If you're a local employee at the local market, whoever is your employers, you're going to get the local going rate. They just wouldn't attract any staff.

G: What are your views about the Euro?

J: I think it's been a huge success actually. Perhaps I say that with slight surprise. I was in Greece at the time that the Euro was launched, and rather like the... (INNAUDIBLE) and rather like the millennium bug, everybody thought it was going to be catastrophic. and actually it turned out to be quite a smooth implementation. The funny thing is, though. that even though payments are made in Europe, I know that many Greeks still value items, particularly things like houses and salaries, are still valued quoted in drachmas. Which is a bit strange. I haven't worked in France since the Euro was introduced, so I'm not really able to comment, but certainly as far as Greece is concerned, if you ask somebody for the value of their land or their house, and the other one is the salaries are always concerned. it's in drachmas. That is odd. Maybe it will take a generation to evolve. I don't know. Maybe the younger
generation, who I'm not aware of having come through. can see. or are used to
discussing things in Euro. We actually. interestingly. and I don't know if we
(INNAUDIBLE) we will be doing our accounting here in this office in Euro's fairly
soon.
G: Will you?
J: Yeah. It's not really that strange, because as a G*** bank our results are consolidated
in Athens, and if you think...if somebody has a loan, if they have a dollar loan now,
we just convert it and say in our books, what's the loan recorded at? The loan's
recorded in pounds to balance the books. So the home accounting will just be done
in Euros. But that's not such a big step really. You know. it's not like saying you
have to use Euros. We have all of our sterling loans. we'll just keep it
(INNAUDIBLE) into a Euro balance sheet, rather than a sterling balance sheet.
G: Apart from its functionality, do you see any differences (INNAUDIBLE) which are
symbolic (INNAUDIBLE) Is it important to define Europeans, the fact that they have
a Europe (INNAUDIBLE).
J: I'd like to say yes, but I don't really have any evidence of that. I'm sure it has helped
people move across boundaries. Certainly from my point of view, having travelled
around a fair bit. It's obviously much easier carrying one wallet full of Euros, than it
is to have left pocket for drachma, right pocket for sterling, jacket pocket for francs.
other jacket pocket for...that's how we used to work it.
G: Does it make you feel that you move across the same land?
J: Well, no, because whilst we have currency uniformity we don't have tax uniformity.
and we don't have price uniformity. And arguably you never will. because
delivery...even in the UK (INNAUDIBLE) is the same in every country. the same
item costs more at the border because you've got to transport it that much further. So
it's a slightly bizarre situation where you can immediately compare prices and say ah.
I've just paid this many Euros for an Audi Quattro in Paris, but if I'd bought it in
Düsseldorf. it would have cost me half the price. So yes. you can do that. but if
anything that in some respects has accentuated the differences, because people are
able to compare prices so much more easily.
Very interesting indeed. And does currency in your view bear any meaning other than its obvious function?

Does it have any symbolism at all?

I think yes. I mean, two years ago I would definitely have definitely said I'd be sorry to see the pound go.

What about now?

One of the reasons for that was the fact that the Bank of England, I think, as a monetary regulator is extremely good (INNAUDIBLE) and I know many, many Greeks said, ooh we don't want to lose the drachma, but on the other hand, benefited enormously from a currency stability from joining the Euro. So the two different views are probably not actually representative, either of them, of the majority.

Because the Greeks had an economic benefit. whereas the British I'm pretty sure would have an economic loss. And I think that has been borne out in the last three or four years with quite severe recessions in France and Germany, and the English economy moving ahead really quite strongly. Would we have had the same level of growth if we'd joined the Euro? I don't think we would, no. We wouldn't have been able to control our interest rates. So I am a monetarist (INNAUDIBLE)

If sterling changed to Euro, would you feel that you lose something of your own identity, pride? Because (INNAUDIBLE)

Perhaps...not now. Perhaps...not now. I don't feel as strongly about it now as I did before. But the thing is, though, I don't feel strongly about it as a symbol, so I'm not sure that's a view that's representative of the majority. I have to say. Because I have worked in Euros and...I don't feel as strongly about it as the loss of a symbol. I do feel much more strongly about it as the loss of a monetary instrument. I think that the British government and the Treasury is able to control our economy far better than Brussels ever would. So I'd probably still be against giving up sterling for that reason.

but not for any symbolic reasons. Whereas, I think as I say, the majority are (INNAUDIBLE)

Yes, of course, they did say that //

// I would probably still vote no, but not for the reason I suspect that you alluded to. I think another interesting thing actually, which is an area that the British feel very
strongly about, and again I have no problem about, is actually identity cards. Because ever since I've worked overseas I've been carrying an ID card, because it just becomes a way of life. And I can honestly say that apart from official issues, job permits in Belgium, or paying rent in France, they said come to the office and bring your ID card. Fine, you produce it. I've never, in 12 years, been stopped and asked to produce my identity. The English have a big reservation about carrying identity with them. They don't feel they should have to carry it. Fine issue it, but we'll leave it at home if we want to. And so the funny thing is, I've carried identity for 12 years and never been asked for it. And I say to my friends, it doesn't make any difference. Thing is, you carry a credit card now, you carry a driving licence, an English driving licence is no different to the French ID card frankly. (INNAUDIBLE) you're ever going to need. So why the big thing about identity cards? I don't understand that at all. But that's only because I've been there and seen it in other countries.

G: Exactly. The last two questions here. You've mentioned about Britishness, ethnicity, etc. Do you define yourself as a British national in relation to what it is not to be a British national? Or do you define yourself according to what you told me so far? That is, memories, experiences, time, etc, etc?

J: I think, I'm not sure it's really... I'd be surprised if anybody answers differently. I'm sure you get the same answer. I mean, everybody identifies with the positive. I'm able to see the negatives. I'm able to say... All right, say what are the characteristics that you like being? And they say, we believe that we have a sense of fair play, or a sense of humour. We always identify with them. We don't say, because we've got no sense of humour, and I don't want to be that country because it's got no sense of humour, or I don't want to be them because they're bullies, and I don't want to be them because they've got no sense of what's right and wrong. They'll screw you anyway they can. I don't think anybody does that, surely.

G: Well, I have in some cases.

J: Ok. Well, I would define myself on the positives. But I know what the negatives are. I'm quite happy to recognise them, but I don't think you define them.

G: Would you define yourself as a religious person? Atheist, or agnostic?

J: On balance between those three choices, I'd say I was a religious person.
G: When you said earlier motherland, etc, etc, how do you define the meaning of home?
What it is home for you? Does it incorporate cultural stuff?
J: Umm, what is home? I think home is the space in which you feel most secure.
relaxed, protected. Now if that space is one you create in a particular location, there's
nothing wrong with that being home. However, I think the majority of things that
make it feel safe and secure are that you feel in the bosom of your cultural group. So
I feel that home is in England because I share a value set here. My nationality is
British, but my home happens to be in England. But the value set is fundamentally
shared with the people around me. You know, we drink beer in the pub, we like to
watch cricket. These are things that you share with the people around you, and
therefore that makes your personal space feel calm, secure, protected. That's home.
G: Therefore would you say that this space of home consists of all these elements, or
mainly it is the people who make the home, home?
J: I don't think you can separate because...um...
G: You talked about shared values, shared values with people.
J: Yes, but it's the history, and the upbringing, and the nature and the nurture and the
national that create those shared values in the first place. So you can't really say...but
that comes back to the point that we touched on before, the thing about expats
overseas tending to be a bit together. a bit tighter. Ok, you may not choose them as
your friends, but you know that the majority of them have a value set that they're
going to identify with. Maybe you watched the same TV programmes when you were
a kid, and you can sit and chat about that. Have a laugh? You know, it creates a
social interaction, because you have shared experiences and things like that. So it's
not...yes it's the people, but the people are also a product of their own environment.
surely. I don't think you can just say. take a load of people that are all white anglo-
saxon, definitely going to be home, because yes it will be good, and you'll feel
secure, but they're all driven by commonality, that they all came out of the same root
originally.
G: Therefore it is the beefing up of the cognitive knowledge of a certain area
around...you know we came out of history...
Yeah, I think that's probably true. It's a bit like asking whether crime is a product of geography or poverty. You can't ever separate the two, because poor people live in poor areas, and if you had the money you'd go and live somewhere else. So you wouldn't have any crime. So yes, all the thieves live in an area that's one area, but the area's economically depressed.

The last question is this. When you travel across Europe, you obviously become aware of crossing borders; How do you experience this...change? Is it just a crossing of a natural boundary, moving for example from England to Greece or to France, or is it your contact with the visual and other aspects of the culture you come into contact with, that make you aware that you are moving from one place to another within Europe?

I think it's the latter. I don't think crossing...cross boundaries. yeah, it's fine. You get a stamp in your passport, well you used to. But that sort of, collector kind of approach. But if you drive south through France, and you're going to go through the Alps and wine regions, those are all geographical and cultural changes that are experiences.

And how does this make you feel? For example you have (INNAUDIBLE)

The UK driving licence? Well, we just touched on this. As far as I'm concerned, it's an ID card //

// no, no I don't mean that. It's the symbolism (INNAUDIBLE) by the European

Union flag.

Oh I see.

It took me by surprise, because I got this one about two months ago...

I really don't feel strongly about it. The thing is, I hadn't even noticed. So that's really...it doesn't really affect me, but I think what is interesting is if you look at car number plates around Europe, there are some nations where the circle of stars has been widely adopted, and there are other nations that will persist in their national letters, and that's as good a representation as you're ever going to see.

And the last one is, in your daily life here in London and back in Greece. how aware are you of all the European symbols around you, if you take any notice of them?

Flags, stamps, car plates...
Here in London, absolutely none. I can't think of a European logo that I've seen in the UK, apart from the one you've just shown me on the driving licence. Well, unless I go out of my way...
Appendix Six

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