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"A CONSIDERATION OF THE VALUE OF PHILOSOPHICAL PHENOMENOLOGY  
FOR SOCIOLOGY WITH PARTICULAR REFERENCE TO METHODOLOGY  
AND THE PROBLEM OF INTERSUBJECTIVITY"

THESIS PRESENTED FOR THE DEGREE OF DOCTOR OF PHILOSOPHY  
IN THE UNIVERSITY OF DURHAM, by C. WRIGHT B.A. (DUNELM)

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EASTER 1975

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## SYNOPSIS

An exposition is given of Husserl's phenomenology. Particular attention is drawn to the epistemological and ontological aspects of this approach and to the method by which Husserl seeks to achieve indubitable knowledge. It is in this context that we elucidate our crucial concepts of horizon and the relationship between meaning and significance.

There follows a consideration of the major objections against phenomenology, most of which are seen to be refutable. In this context we criticise the adequacy of Wittgenstein's objections to essentialism and, implicitly, phenomenology and demonstrate how Wittgenstein has to introduce essentialist concepts into his own philosophy.

From our point of view, the crucial objection against phenomenology is that it is solipsistic. We conclude that this charge is justified in the case of Husserl and that his concept of the lebenswelt is a mystification of the common-sense concept of culture. However, we leave open, at this stage, the possibility of this inadequacy being a consequence of Husserl's use of phenomenology rather than as endemic in this approach.

There follows a critique of attempts within sociology to resolve the problem of intersubjective understanding. These are divided into the nominalist tradition, represented by Winch, Weber and Schutz, and the realist tradition exemplified by Simmel and Scheler. Although the realist tradition is shown to be superior, both are found to be inadequate. This is because both fail to establish intersubjective understanding and tend to substitute ego-aggrandisement and effective solipsism. Consequently, neither can apprehend the experience of the distinctiveness of other subjects or our experience of ourselves as both individual and community. Particularly in the nominalist tradition, this leads to the fallacious perception of the other as totally passive. This discussion



involves a critique of empathic and analogic theories of intersubjective understanding.

Finally, we demonstrate that the problem of intersubjective understanding can be resolved through a revised phenomenology, an essential realism. Our discussion places intersubjective knowledge within the context of a critique of knowledge as such. Genuine intersubjective knowledge is shown to be synonymous with the primordial knowledge of universal rationality and therefore intersubjective consciousness is Transcendental consciousness. Thus intersubjectivity is seen to be prior to subjectivity. We counteract the view that knowledge, including knowledge of others, is the product of a uniquely active consciousness by arguing a reciprocal orientation between consciousness and object which is fulfilled in experience.

The establishment of the inter-relationship between intersubjectivity and subjectivity results in the "Person" being identified as the object of sociological enquiry. Our idea of the priority of sociological knowledge is explained and justified. The critical possibilities of phenomenological sociology are clarified. Finally we define the role of essence in sociology, contrasting it with the ideal type, showing essence to be both the origin and conclusion of enquiry and the means of conveying our knowledge to others.

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INTRODUCTION

The central concern of this thesis is with the possibility of reliable intersubjective understanding. That is, a consideration of the problem of whether such understanding is inevitably limited to self-projection or whether there is any sense in which we can achieve understanding of others in themselves.

Although this problem is critical for sociology, particularly Verstehende or interpretive sociology, we intend to show in chapters 4, 5 and 6 that it has not been resolved satisfactorily within sociology.

It is our contention that we must turn to philosophy in order to answer this problem. This is, partly, because the problem has been more extensively considered in philosophy than sociology but also, principally, because this problem is part of the wider question of the epistemological status of knowledge as such and this typically been discussed within philosophy. This is not a particularly radical departure because all sociological enquiry involves assumptions concerning the possibilities and status of our knowledge of others. We are simply seeking to make explicit what has previously been largely implicit, in sociological discourse, by reference to philosophy, and in doing so we intend to offer a rational solution to a problem which has tended to be only naively, and indirectly considered.

We make no apologies for this philosophical consideration of a sociological problem. All knowledge is one, and it would be a grave error to reify convenient or professional demarcations between different spheres of knowledge to the level of necessary and inviolable distinctions. The problem of intersubjective understanding belongs to both philosophy and sociology. Thus, sociological problems are not ignored, but in our view, are clarified and made amenable to resolution by being considered within the framework of philosophical, as well as sociological, discourse.

Differences in terminology or the respective quality of the debates should not blind us to the fact that the problem is the same for both traditions and that the proffered solutions are comparable, involving commitment to epistemological and ontological positions.

The philosophical tradition through which we seek a solution to the problem of intersubjective understanding is phenomenology. The reasons for this are partly biographical. The author, a sociologist by training, set out to do a conventional piece of research in the sociology of religion bringing to bear the traditional apparatus of such research, questionnaires, interviews, sample surveys etc. I realised that such techniques do not guarantee the adequacy of our understanding of others, that they are based on naive assumptions concerning the unproblematic nature of such understanding and that the air of intellectual respectability and rigour associated with these techniques prevents a thorough investigation of the problem of intersubjective understanding. My slight familiarity with phenomenology at that time (1968-69)\* suggested that it could offer a solution to this problem.

Our claim that this view is confirmed by the present work may seem perverse in view of the persisting criticism that phenomenology is incorrigibly solipsistic; that it cannot account for our experience of other subjects, that it cannot validate our knowledge of other subjects as distinctive from knowledge of self etc. However, this weakness is not limited to phenomenology for it is to be found in all philosophy. Nevertheless we will show, in chapters 3 and 7, that, although this charge can be sustained in relation to the major tradition of phenomenology, it is possible to devise a phenomenological method which can establish intersubjective knowledge, without compromising the phenomenological goal

\* This was just before phenomenology, in its Schutzian version, became popular in sociology.



of basing all knowledge on reliable, fundamental data, thus guaranteeing the reliability and nature of our understanding of others in themselves. This revised phenomenology therefore promises the possibility of a sociology which can, by using this method, apprehend others in themselves, rather than our own self-projections, and thus a sociology which can fully apprehend our social being. At the same time, we will show that our revised phenomenology is truly phenomenological in that it adheres fully to phenomenology's, radical critical programme. Indeed, it will be shown that revised phenomenology avoids those naive assumptions which have compromised the authenticity of current phenomenology and which make it vulnerable to the charge of solipsism.

It is appropriate to begin our enquiry with an exposition of the nature of phenomenology, and this will be done by reference to the ideas of the founder of phenomenology, Edmund Husserl. His work forms the focus of chapter 1.

## CHAPTER ONE

### A CONSIDERATION OF HUSSERL'S PROGRAMME FOR PHENOMENOLOGICAL PHILOSOPHY

In this chapter we intend to discuss the origin of Husserl's phenomenology, as a means of attaining absolutely valid knowledge, in his opposition to the theories of knowledge of relativistic scepticism and naive realism. We will also clarify and comment upon the epistemology on which the phenomenological method is based. Finally, we will consider the phenomenological method itself with a view to clarifying Husserl's special terminology and expounding the logic behind the method.

Although this chapter is largely descriptive and has the principal aim of conveying the nature and logic of phenomenology we will also, when appropriate, criticise Husserl's procedure and present, in a preliminary fashion, our arguments concerning the problems which are raised.

### RELATIVISM

It is important to note that Husserl arrived at his conception of phenomenology by reacting against his initial adherence to psychologistic and relativistic conceptions of knowledge in that he saw these positions as leading to logical absurdities. In particular, that the acceptance of relativism requires a further acceptance of absolute knowledge, the possibility of which is denied in relativistic theories. That is, relativism has to both affirm and deny the possibility of absolute, non-relative knowledge. This is so because, in order for relativistic arguments to be accepted as binding on others, it is necessary for them to be regarded as non-relative. Thus, any relativism asserts the necessary limitation of all knowledge except, and this is purely arbitrary, itself. Therefore, any relativistic conception of knowledge, in order to qualify itself as knowledge, has to assert that all other knowledge is relative, but that the statement that all



knowledge is relative has the privileged position of absolute validity and is therefore non-relative. Thus, statements which claim that all knowledge is relative presuppose that the person making the statement has achieved a totally reliable and non-relative perspective from which the relativistic nature of all other knowledge is clearly and necessarily revealed.

Equally, Husserl saw that relativistic ideas of knowledge resulted in a thoroughgoing scepticism towards knowledge in general. Such scepticism was ultimately self-defeating for it would lead to doubt concerning the origin of the sceptical idea.

From the point of view of our concern with the relevance of Husserlian phenomenology for sociology it is necessary that we take account of his criticisms of relativism within the social sciences as developed in his discussion of Dilthey's Weltanschauung philosophy. Husserl sees this as being based on the idea of history as an ever-changing stream of spirit within which there are no enduring entities, thus all knowledge is seen as located within an inconstant flux. This perception is, in Dilthey's view, reinforced by the existence of competing philosophies and the great variety of historical forms, each one having its own particular and unassailable truths. Thus, in Dilthey's words, "the formation of a historical consciousness destroys .... a belief in the universal validity of any of the philosophies that have undertaken to express in a compelling manner the coherence of the world by an ensemble of concepts"<sup>(1)</sup>.

Husserl's response to cultural and historical relativism as exemplified by Dilthey is not convincing in all its parts. The main objection which he raises against it is, its tendency to relativism and sceptical subjectivism but to simply assert as Husserl does the

unacceptable consequences of a position does not mean that the view opposing that position, in this case the possibility of absolutely valid knowledge, is correct. However, Husserl is correct in asserting that the possibility of a validity in itself as an object for consciousness is not denied by the non-realisation of such validity in history or culture. Developing his critique, Husserl points to the contradiction in historical relativism, which is common to all relativisms, that in its own terms its statements are unreliable because, in time, they may be rejected. Expanding upon this idea of the self-imposed inadequacies of historical relativism, or historicism as he occasionally terms it, Husserl criticises this approach for reaching conclusions concerning the nature of validity which it cannot justify. This is because, in judging the relative validity of an historical form, historicism must use non-historical sources of knowledge and judgements, ie. philosophy and, furthermore, a philosophy which has the ability to make judgements concerning absolute validity and which must therefore possess the idea of an absolute validity. A purely factual approach cannot pronounce on the relationship between the valid, grasped as a concept, and its historical realisations. It cannot decide "whether or not there exists, to speak Platonically, between (the valid and its historical realisations) the relation between the idea and the dim form in which it appears"(2). Thus, in asserting the contingency of historical forms, in denying absolute validity, historicism must assume that absolute validity can be thought and can be realised in order for its statement that no single historical form can be said to possess absolute validity to make sense.

In generalising this argument we realise that if we can refute claims to absolute validity we can do so only on the grounds that we



know what the absolutely valid would look like and that the object under consideration does not fulfill these criteria. In similar fashion the judgement that problems have been incorrectly posed presupposes prior knowledge of the correct mode of asking questions. This is so because relativity, like incorrect procedure and error, is a negative category and therefore in itself it is insubstantial. Such categories are simply denials of certain states of affairs e.g. absolute validity, correct procedure, truth, and are comprehensible only in so far as the conditions whose presence they deny are understood. This is not to state the illogical conclusion that because relativity can be argued, absolute validity exists, but simply that the relativistic argument, because relativity is a negative category, presupposes the idea of absolute validity and if absolute validity is thinkable then its recognition within our experience is a real possibility\*.

Thus, Husserl advances two objections against relativism; the necessary self-contradiction in relativistic statements, that is, the fact that they have to assume the possibility of that which they deny, and the necessary admission, within the relativists argument, of the possibility of absolute validity. Therefore, even if the first objection is overlooked, assertions that knowledge is relative can be regarded only as contingent, not necessary, statements that so far the idea of absolute validity has not been realised in our experience of this sphere of knowledge. As Husserl points out, this tells us nothing about the likelihood of the future realisation of absolute validity.

Husserl further rejects the claim that historicism is able to make

\* The relationship to knowledge of negative categories such as error, can be summed up in the idea that in order to recognise a judgement as false it is necessary to have prior knowledge of the qualities of a true judgement, whereas in order to recognise a judgement as true it is not necessary to know what an erroneous judgement would look like.

comparative judgements through an understanding of a particular form, by grasping not only the form's sense but also its relative worth.

However, every senior science student at school knows as much, if not more, about the universe than Newton, but he was great, they are not.

Situations such as this are taken by Husserl as evidence that the principles of even relative evaluation lie in the ideal sphere which is presupposed by the historian and that the norms for such evaluations lie within the ontology of each region, for the mathematical in mathematics, for the artistic in art etc., and are not reducible to other ontologies such as history or sociology.

Dilthey's response to Husserl, that the latter was, "A true Plato who first of all fixes in concepts things that come and flow and then supplements these fixed concepts with the concepts of "flowing"(3), inadvertently reveals some of the weaknesses of the relativist's position. The crucial term is "fixed", for the implication of Dilthey's criticism is that things come and flow and should not be fixed in concepts, yet it is true that "coming and flowing" is a concept with a fixed, ie. definitive, meaning otherwise Dilthey would not be able to use the expression in the expectancy of being understood. Thus, even if Dilthey's statement is an accurate assessment of Husserl's procedure the latter can be said to be only making apparent what is implicit in Dilthey's own acts of conceptualisation.

It should be noted that although Husserl formally rejected historicism, his account of the history of philosophy and his teleological justification of phenomenology in "Krisis"(4), with its strong undertones of cultural relativism\*, tends to follow the historicist's Weltanschauungen approach. This is partly because, in "Krisis", Husserl

\* This aspect of Husserl's work will be developed further below in the discussion of his concept of the Lebenswelt.



attempts to justify phenomenology on grounds of cultural relevance rather than on pure logic as had been his previous procedure. In seeing the theoretical impulse, which motivates phenomenology's quest for absolute data, as peculiar to the history of Western culture, Husserl implies its irrelevance to other cultures. It is possible that in an attempt to retrieve phenomenology's claim to universal relevance, Husserl identifies European culture as occupying a special place, almost a leadership, in relation to other cultures, based on the belief that non-European cultures have a burning desire to Europeanise.

However, it is not enough, as Husserl recognised, to expose the absurdities of relativism for it could be argued that, due to the limitations of our knowledge, relativism may be absurd but inevitable. In order to demonstrate relativism's redundancy as well as its absurdity, it is necessary to show that non-relativistic, ie. universally valid, knowledge is possible. It is the desire to demonstrate the accessibility of absolute knowledge which is the motivating force behind the phenomenological programme.

Before this programme is described it is necessary to clarify briefly why Husserl's later work shows a tendency to relativism, in particular, cultural relativism, although this discussion will be expanded below. Absolutely valid knowledge is knowledge which is necessarily true for all cognitive subjects and thus such knowledge is universally available. However, in order to establish the community of cognitive subjects it is necessary to demonstrate the accessibility of other consciousnesses. This is the problem of intersubjectivity which Husserl unsuccessfully spent much time in attempting, to resolve. It is noticeable that after his failure to provide an adequate account of reliable intersubjective knowledge in the fifth Cartesian Meditation,

Husserl's work adopted a more idealistic, subjectivist approach, in which emphasis was placed on the acts of the isolated consciousness. In order to avoid the solipsistic tendencies of this approach, he developed the idea of the Lebenswelt or life-world, which when cleared of the surrounding verbiage, is seen to be the idea of culture. However reference to culture cannot resolve the problem of our knowledge of other consciousnesses for the idea of culture does not establish, but presupposes intersubjective knowledge. Thus, having failed to establish intersubjectivity and, as a consequence, falling back on a belief in a common-world which is identified with culture, Husserl reveals tendencies towards that same cultural relativism which he condemned in Dilthey and others. It is indicative of Husserl's failure to realise the extent of this weakness that he made his criticisms of Dilthey at the same time that he developed his concept of the Lebenswelt, and it is clear that Husserl did not realise the extent to which he had compromised his anti-relativism in his work subsequent to the Cartesian Meditations. This argument will be developed below, but the point we wish to emphasise here is the crucial significance of Husserl's failure to establish intersubjectivity in relation to the fulfilment of the phenomenological ideal of revealing absolutely valid knowledge because such knowledge, necessarily, has to be valid for all subjects.

#### THE PHENOMENOLOGICAL PROGRAMME

An initial problem in any attempt to define phenomenology is that there is no single definition of this philosophy which would be acceptable without qualification to all those who consider themselves phenomenologists. Even Spiegelberg's<sup>(5)</sup> contention that although phenomenologists disagree over their results they are more or less in harmony concerning their method is challenged by Edie<sup>(6)</sup>. A comparison



of the idea of phenomenology as expressed by Husserl with phenomenology understood by van der Leeuw as description of what is seen and Heidegger's notion of hermeneutic phenomenology and Sartre's existential phenomenology confirms Edie's opinion. The reason for this fluidity of approach is expressed by Thevenaz<sup>(7)</sup>, thus, "Husserl however, and phenomenology itself, winds and gropes its way constantly retracing its steps, probing the unseen ground before it, continually putting everything in question. We can say that phenomenology paradoxically unites two qualifications reputedly exclusive of one another, it is methodical and groping." Similarly Spiegelberg<sup>(8)</sup> prefers to use the term "phenomenological movement" rather than "school" because of this lack of consensus.

The problem of defining phenomenology is not capable of being resolved by identifying the similarity in approach of those termed phenomenologists for the name has been indiscriminately applied to some who would probably not accept it and arbitrarily withheld from some who would seem to be close to the movement<sup>(9)</sup>. As a consequence no single definition of phenomenology would be uncontroversial, but, if only in terms of the status of its proposers, the statement issued jointly by Husserl, Geiger, Pfänder, Reinach and Scheler is as close as anything available to a formal outline of the phenomenological ideal. The crucial part of this statement reads, "(Phenomenology) is not a system that the editors share. What unites them is the common conviction that it is only by a return to the primary sources of direct intuition and to insights into essential structures derived from them that we shall be able to put to use the great traditions of philosophy with their concepts and problems"(10). This is clearly a declaration of belief in the primacy of direct intuition and the possibility of the grasp of essence but there is a significant absence of an agreed statement concerning the

methods by which these goals are to be realised.

Thus, this "credo" of the early members of the phenomenological movement and can be seen as the establishment of the phenomenological tradition. However, there are certain characteristics of phenomenology as defined by Husserl which are not included in this statement; notably that phenomenology intends a radical departure from the modes of thought of commonsense and its idealisations in the various empirical sciences, as part of phenomenology's procedure of subjecting all ideas, opinions, evaluations and judgements to radical questioning. This is opposed to the uncritical perspective of common-sense, or the natural attitude as it is often termed. The recognition of this aspect of phenomenology reveals its dual function as both epistemology, a theory of the acquisition and status of knowledge and as methodology, a programme of analysis and procedure. These aspects are united in the phenomenological aim of utilising a method through which totally reliable knowledge can be acquired. Phenomenology's method of abandoning the natural attitude has led to it being characterised as mystical, anti-scientific and as introspective psychology. Although these criticisms will be considered in due course it must be remembered that the aim of this phenomenological method is to change "our relation to the world, (to become) more acutely aware of it"<sup>(11)</sup> by adopting an attitude such that, "No opinion is to be accepted as philosophical knowledge unless it is seen to be adequately established by observation of what is seen to be itself given 'in person' "<sup>(12)</sup>.

Even these aims of achieving an intuitive grasp of self-given phenomena as they are presented to or constituted by consciousness\*

\* The relationship between consciousness and its objects expressed in the idea of constitution is unclear in Husserl's work and will be discussed below at greater length.



through the radical elimination of all unreliable data contained in everyday perception do not guarantee extensive common ground among those called phenomenologists. Thus Spiegelberg<sup>(13)</sup>, in addition to the minimal definition above of Husserl et al, provides three further definitions of the nature of phenomenology which increase in rigour and exclusiveness. The first of these is acceptance of the minimal definition including conscious adherence to the movement; secondly, the use of a method which not only refers to intuition and essence but which also takes note of the essential modes of appearance of phenomena in consciousness. The third, and most limited, position is the deliberate use of the processes known as the reductions. Although the nature of the reductions will be clarified below, it is possible that those familiar with the idea will be surprised at Spiegelberg's identification of them with the most exclusive interpretation of Husserl. However it should be recognised that, although the method of reduction is central to Husserl's phenomenology, its use, and the implications of its use, have never been accepted by the movement as a whole.

This discussion has indicated the divergence of ideas concerning phenomenology and has introduced briefly some of the concepts associated with this branch of philosophy. In order for the investigation to proceed it is necessary to specify the idea of phenomenology which will be the object of enquiry. This is phenomenology as understood by Husserl and is, therefore, the most rigorous of Spiegelberg's definitions of phenomenology. The analysis of the potential value of phenomenology for sociology will be based upon Husserl's idea of phenomenology because he is generally recognised as the founder of the movement, although he became increasingly isolated from his earlier colleagues and almost certainly developed his later ideas in near isolation. As phenomenology is, deliberately, foreign to our common-sense thought it is necessary

to consider its origins and this requires consideration of Husserl's work, as has been done in the consideration of Husserl's objections to relativism. Finally, Husserl developed the implications of the phenomenological method to a far greater extent than did any of his disciples, therefore, in order to give the fullest consideration of phenomenology's value for sociology it is necessary to consider the fullest exposition of the method; this is to be found in Husserl's notion of phenomenology.

#### ORIGINS OF PHENOMENOLOGY

It has been seen that Husserl's quest for indubitable knowledge, which he saw as fulfilled in the programme of phenomenology, sprang out of his hostility to relativism and scepticism. This was something of a conversion as Husserl's first major publication, "The Psychology of Arithmetic", was a work of psychologistic relativism, a mode of thought which became Husserl's prime target in his phenomenological writings. The cause of Husserl's change of attitude to relativism and the possibilities of absolute knowledge was his recognition of the logical absurdities of the relativistic position, and its destructive effects on knowledge in general, which he saw as the cause of the "crisis of science", the questioning of the relevance and possibility of science in the light of relativity and quantum theory<sup>\*(1)</sup>. Later, Husserl saw the crisis of science as merely symptomatic of a wider cultural crisis brought about by the abandonment of the origins of Western culture which he located in the theoretical attitude of classical Greece.

Initially the crisis of science meant for Husserl "the unclarified

\* This introduces what is possibly one of three usages of the term science in Husserl. The problems and confusions caused by this varying usage will be discussed below, chapter 2.



status of science and scientific knowledge"(16),\*(1), hence his attempt to establish phenomenology as a rigorous science<sup>\*(2)</sup> which would provide the foundation for particular scientific enquiry.

#### PHENOMENOLOGY AS FOUNDATION-BUILDER

According to Husserl two factors were causing the crisis of science. These were the tendency of science to become an unphilosophical study of mere facts as a consequence of which it had lost its contact with meaning, and its adoption of naturalism which prevented it from coping with problems of ultimate truth and validity. A similar view is expressed by Whitehead "If science is not to degenerate into a medley of ad hoc hypotheses, it must become philosophical and enter upon a thorough criticism of its own foundations"(17). It was to this task of providing science, and practical knowledge in general, with a foundation of unquestionably reliable knowledge, the necessary, a priori, truths, that Husserl devoted his life, taking pleasure in calling himself a "true beginner". In his later work Husserl identified another cause of this crisis which was the estrangement of science from the everyday world of experience from which it derived its value and meaning. Hence, restoring science to its place within the everyday world, showing its dependance on this world, would reveal the meaning of science as a purposive activity. Husserl's attitude to science will be discussed below in relation to the claim that his phenomenology is anti-scientific. However in the present discussion of the relationship between science and phenomenology as perceived by Husserl it is sufficient

\*(1) The German term "Wissen" has a wider connotation than the English "science", often referring to knowledge in general. Thus it would be justifiable to interpret Husserl as seeing the crisis, although acute in the particular sciences, as present in all knowledge, hence the case of the translation of the crisis of science into a crisis of culture in Husserl's later work.

\*(2) The crisis of science was felt less keenly in Britain than in Europe which may explain the persistence of positivism in the former.

to note Husserl's conviction that science was undergoing a crisis because of the attacks of relativism and scepticism and a loss of meaning which its own naturalism and anti-philosophical attitude had produced. Husserl concluded that it could be preserved against these assaults only by being founded on reliable knowledge which was immune to sceptical criticism; such knowledge would be provided by the radical method of phenomenology. Thus Husserl would clearly reject the "under-labourer" conception of philosophy's relationship to science which is established as a tenet of most positivist and empiricist philosophies. It would be reasonable to claim that Husserl would see the triumph of the "under-labourer" conception, in which philosophy is reduced to a supporting role for science, tidying up its concepts etc. as not representing a recognition of the priority of reliable proof over more speculation, but as a disaster for the possibilities of scientific enquiry. This is because the questions considered by philosophy, the nature of truth, the nature of that which we perceive, the adequacy of our concepts, the relationship between our ideas and the objects to which they refer are an inevitable part of any scientific enquiry. If reliable answers to these questions are not sought, the consequence is that the scientific procedure will base itself on naive and unreliable assumptions concerning the status of its procedure which, once revealed, would undermine the whole scientific programme. Thus scientific enquiry depends on a rigorous, reliable philosophy.

Thus, the aim of phenomenology is to provide a reliable basis for knowledge. This is to be achieved by revealing the immanent nature of phenomena in an eidetic intuition which, being ideal and a priori, is not subject to the fluctuations and inherent instability of perceptual experience. Therefore, phenomenology seeks to reveal the meaning of



phenomena and to establish the particular sciences as based on meaning.

Bochenski<sup>(18)</sup>, in his discussion of phenomenology cites three functions of meaning; firstly, what an expression "manifests"; secondly, what an expression "signifies" which can be either the sense or content of the concept or what is denoted by the expression. Thus Husserl distinguishes between the quality of the act of meaning, (conception, doubt etc.) its matter or content and its object. The third function of meaning refers to those acts which bestow and those which fulfill meaning, the latter providing the act's intuitional fulfillment. The epistemological function of these distinctions is to provide a reliable alternative to the contradictions and relativity of naturalism and thus, to permit a solution to the problem of the relationship between an act of cognition, its meaning and its object. This is to be achieved by seeking the essence of cognition in a critique of natural cognition for, in Husserl's view, "Only with epistemological reflection do we arrive at the distinction between the sciences of the natural sort and philosophy"<sup>(19)</sup>. As will become clear Husserl intends by "epistemological reflection" not a vague contemplation but a rigorous, methodical questioning of experience.

#### MEANING - SIGNIFICANCE

Husserl's analysis of acts of meaning into quality (noesis), object (noema) and matter (hyle) is a description of the components of such acts. There is also a need to identify meaning as a quality sui generis and to this end we make the distinction between the meaning and the significance of a phenomenon. The meaning of a phenomenon is its nature or essence. This is immanent to the phenomenon, and is that, without which, the phenomenon would be qualitatively different. Therefore it is that which is necessary in an adequate perception of the phenomenon by any subject. The significance of the phenomenon is its value or practical utility for

an acting, purposive subject. Meaning is synonymous with quality or essence; significance is synonymous with value or utility. The former is a product of theoretical apprehension, the latter is located in the practical activity of individuals. The importance of this distinction will be made apparent in our discussion of a solution to the problem of solipsism in phenomenology but at this stage it is important to note that the actual or assumed apprehension of the meaning of things precedes our identification of these things' significance or utility. That is, the idea of quality is necessarily presupposed in ideas of utility but not vice versa.

It may be objected that this argument overlooks the question of why we seek the meaning of a phenomenon, and that, in fact, we do so because the phenomenon is seen to be significant; therefore the apprehension of meaning is a consequence of significant acts. This objection is inadequate because it fails to realise that in order for a phenomenon to be seen as significant it must be already known. That is, its meaning must be known to the subject prior to the judgement that the phenomenon is significant. Thus, the realisation that a phenomenon possesses certain qualities is implied as prior knowledge in any judgement concerning its value. This is because the significance of an object is the application of its known qualities to practical activity.

The objection may be revised so that it is argued that although we may believe that we perceive the nature of an object prior to judging its significance that, in fact, our plans or significant projects shape our perception of objects. Thus, if we had different plans, the objects would seem to have correspondingly different qualities. That is, our significant judgements shape or determine our perception of the supposed nature of things and thus the idea that there is an objective quality in



things is simply a fiction by which we seek to justify our acts of evaluation as being right or proper. This argument fails because it is not easy to see how it would account for the common-place phenomenon of seeing objects as irrelevant, of knowing what they are and realising that they are of no practical utility. If significance shapes meaning then only that which is significant will be meaningfully apprehended but in recognising a phenomenon to be insignificant we base this judgement on our belief that we have grasped the meaning of the thing. This is not to deny that our plans or projects may, in practise, determine our perception of the quality of a phenomenon and, of course, such perception is erroneous because the subject is in the position of believing that he has grasped objective reality when in fact he has simply projected his wishes onto the phenomenon. Nevertheless, it would be strange to argue that erroneous perception is the norm for all perception. Like all such scepticisms, the objection contradicts itself because it is based on the belief that the idea that we grasp the nature of phenomena is wrong, but if this argument is to demand our assent then it must contain the claim to have grasped the nature of our acts of judging the nature of things. If the argument that the grasp of objective nature is a fiction is accepted then the argument itself must be a fiction and cannot demand our agreement.

The possibility of error in our judgements concerning the nature of things was recognised by Husserl and he saw the natural attitude as being particularly prone to such errors due to its untheoretical and non-radical nature as a consequence of which it could not recognise its errors. Thus the first step in phenomenology is the abandonment of the practical orientation of the natural attitude and the adoption of the theoretical attitude. This latter is a constant assumption of, but

cannot be guaranteed full clarity in, the natural attitude. The sceptical argument, above, therefore simply points to the need of a programme such as that intended by phenomenology, in order to prevent practical interests distorting objective perception. Therefore, before considering how phenomenology seeks to achieve perception of things-in-themselves\* it is necessary to clarify what is meant by the idea of the natural attitude and why it is an unsatisfactory basis for achieving reliable knowledge.

### THE NATURAL ATTITUDE

The natural attitude is the perspective of our common-sense understanding of phenomena. It is inadequate because it is naive, that is, it is based on unexamined assumptions concerning the nature of phenomena and the adequacy of our understanding of phenomena. To question these assumptions e.g. to question whether we can know other minds rather than simply projecting our attitudes onto the other's situation and merely assume that this is how the other sees his situation, is to threaten the stability of the natural attitude. This, in our view, is because common-sense or the natural attitude is practical not theoretical; it is oriented to the goals and purposes of acting subjects and sees the surrounding world in terms of its utility and not as objects sui generis. Thus it tends to deny the distinctiveness of meaning in relation to significance. The practical orientation of the natural attitude prevents us from adopting that attitude of detachment from commitments to the everyday interpretation and evaluation of experience which is necessary if phenomena are to be perceived in themselves rather than naively

\* Kant's argument that things-in-themselves are unknowable makes the similar error in that it, contradictorily, assumes the knowledge of the existence of things-in-themselves in order to claim that such things cannot be objects of knowledge. If things-in-themselves could not be known then it would be impossible to make the distinction between them and things-as-they-appear.



interpreted as correlates of our interests. This naive approach is based on unquestioned assumptions of a theoretical nature which are, therefore, unexaminable within the practical orientation of the natural attitude. Therefore, the natural attitude results in an emptiness of content, vagueness and distance of acts of everyday understanding, which prevents their being used to attain reliable, basic knowledge. Vague perception, not the perception of vagueness, leads to vague and uncertain grasp of phenomena and therefore it is the aim of phenomenology as a method to bring the perceived phenomena to full clarity, which is the apprehension of the self-givenness of the phenomena. This is clearly an act of reflection on experience but, as will be made clear below, the rigorous reflection of phenomenology must be sharply distinguished from those everyday acts of reflection which are carried out within the assumptions of the natural attitude and which, therefore, can only reproduce the vagueness of common-sense. Such everyday reflection is, therefore, incapable of providing the ground of unquestionable knowledge, the lack of which makes the natural attitude vulnerable to the self-destructive assaults of relativism and scepticism.\*

#### NAIVE REALISM

This point is noted by Chapman<sup>(20)</sup>, who despite this, and although claiming to be a phenomenologist, wishes to achieve reliable reflection from within the natural attitude. Thus he supports the position of naive realism. A consideration of the weaknesses of Chapman's argument will clarify why Husserl believes it necessary to abandon the natural attitude, in order to apprehend phenomena, encountered in everyday life.

\* From the point of view of our discussion, the significant weakness of the natural attitude is its inability to establish the reliability of our knowledge of others, thus, resulting in its practical solipsism whereby others are seen as basically the same as self, re below chapters 4, 5 and 6.

Chapman, as in much inferior phenomenological literature, sees the unattended to or taken-for-granted world as the basic theme or problem of the process of conscious constitution in which we apprehend phenomena as objects of knowledge. It is noteworthy that Chapman admits to having jettisoned that aspect of Husserl's work, transcendental consciousness, through which it was intended to reveal the normally taken-for-granted aspects of the world as problems. It must be admitted that a phenomenon cannot be, at the same time, taken-for-granted and problematic.

Although our everyday reflection may recognise what is taken-for-granted it can either accept such knowledge as it is<sup>\*</sup> or reject it as unjustified without being able to justify confidence in the validity of this act of rejection. Neither of these responses can provide a rational critique of taken-for-granted knowledge of the world which would be grounded in the perception of totally reliable knowledge because all their presuppositions originate in the natural attitude which is based on taken-for-granted assumptions. Chapman, unsurprisingly, ignores this puzzle of how we can raise the taken-for-granted world as a problem without questioning taken-for-granted knowledge. Rather he avoids this problem by asserting a copy-theory of knowledge, that is, that the world is a unity and is perceived as such by consciousness which contains all our individual experiences in our one experience of the world. This idea is open to all the usual objections to the copy theory of knowledge, in particular that it fails to explain how error is possible or recognisable. Chapman modifies his position by claiming that whereas a mirror merely copies or reflects images, consciousness apprehends the world but the specific quality of conscious apprehension and its adequacy is not clarified, Chapman contenting himself with the claim that if experience

\* This principle as developed in sociology will be discussed in relation to Schutz.



is genuine awareness then the common-sense world is the real world. This argument is fallacious because common-sense is not experience but an interpretation of experience. Thus the confirming experience to which Chapman refers is experience of the world of the natural attitude ie. experience as interpreted by the assumptions of the natural attitude. Thus the validity of the common-sense world is inevitably confirmed, but the adequacy of such interpretation is not demonstrated by this approach any more than an argument for the existence of God which contains as a basic postulate the idea that God exists would be regarded as adequate.

Chapman categorises all those who deny the reliability of common-sense as empiricist sensationalists who claim that perception is merely a synthesis of external stimuli and that therefore perceiving means having. Chapman rejects this argument on the grounds that if we infer from our sensations the phenomena which caused them, it is the case that the objects of our awareness are phenomena, not sensations, as things which I perceive but do not have. That is, things which are perceived and are perceived as external. Thus, because we never perceive sensations as data but as sensations of something which is the object of our attention and that on reflection our sensations are seen as factors in a cognitive situation, sensations have a cognitive character. This idea of the grasp of the externality of perceived objects is important in relation to our consideration of the problem of intersubjectivity below. At this stage it is simply necessary to note that Chapman bases his argument on the dichotomy that a subject either accepts the real contact of his everyday interpretive acts with their objects or accepts the sceptical position that the objects of such acts are fictional arrangements of sensations from which, Chapman claims, attempts are made to construct reliable knowledge by using special methods.\*

\*This discussion raises the problem of the relationship between consciousness and objects which will be further investigated below. See specially, chapter 7.

Clearly Husserl is implicated in the critique of sensationalism, but Chapman's account is unsatisfactory on a number of points, not least because it sets up a "straw man" as the opposition to the common-sense view of perception which can be criticised on other grounds than empirical sensationalism. The refusal to accept the reliability of common-sense does not entail a denial of consciousness's cognitive function for the aim of Husserlean phenomenology is to ensure a genuine cognitive apprehension of objective reality. Phenomenology does not cut itself off from objects or phenomena; the only aspects of cognition which are de-activated by phenomenology are the inherently unreliable factors in everyday cognition, the presence of which leads to doubt concerning cognition, such as pre-judgements, presuppositions, an uncritical perspective etc. This consideration raises another objection to Chapman's account which is his confusion of perception and interpretation. He seems to believe that common-sense simply presents us with the real object, whereas in fact common-sense is an interpretation of the perception as being a perception of such and such. Thus it is a judgement of phenomena based on uncritically accepted interpretive schemes of the natural attitude, the adequacy of which are nevertheless always open to doubt. This leads to our final criticism of Chapman's attempt to defend the adequacy of common-sense, which is that a principal objection to accepting such adequacy is that common-sense apart from its variability, there being innumerable and potentially conflicting common-senses, is always open to doubt. Chapman seeks to avoid this problem by claiming that the correctness of the inference from consciousness to object is irrelevant but this argument is inadequate for Chapman's own account constantly assumes, and can make sense only in terms of, the reliability of common-sense perception.



Despite his confidence in common-sense Chapman accepts the need for reflection on experience. This is surprising as common-sense itself is not normally reflective and it is a contradiction in Chapman's account that although reflection is said to make apparent the contact of common-sense with the real, the reflective standpoint in Chapman's view initially accepts that perception is in cognitive as well as empirical contact with the real. Thus reflection is established as revealing the reliable acts of common-sense apprehension because it does not question the common-sense claim to reliability. Nor is it clear why, if common-sense is reliable, reflection should be necessary.

The consequences of Chapman's insistence on remaining within the natural attitude are shown in his statement that no act can be described without specifying its object. Thus, it is wrong to state that "I see something", I should say "I see an ink bottle". This latter statement is a judgement concerning the nature of the object and it is the meaning and adequacy of such judgements which is in doubt, and there is little that naive reflection could add to such common-sense judgements. A truly radical reflection, that is a reflection which is not based on natural attitude assumptions would seek to specify the essential nature of the phenomenon without including pre-judgements concerning this nature in the initial questioning of the perception.

The relationship between reflection and common-sense causes severe problems for Chapman and in order to preserve the belief both in the

\* The closest approach to this problem by Chapman is his statement that intentional and real existence must not be confused since an act of intention may be wrong and thus, consciousness would become one with its object in an intentional but not a real sense. This seems to be re-opening a distinction between things-as-they-are and things-as-they-are perceived which makes Chapman's claims in favour of naive realism, insupportable. Husserl aimed at removing this distinction by revealing a level of consciousness, the Transcendental Ego, at which perception is of the thing itself.



reliability of the natural attitude and the value of reflection he states that in reflection the natural attitude is transcended without leaving it, a stepping back in order to survey the world and our experience of it. This statement is as nonsensical, as stating that something is wet while it is dry. Further, if we step back, we step back from something, and this can only be the natural attitude, and towards something else, the reflective standpoint which is thereby distinguishable from the natural attitude. Thus, Chapman's statement that reflection is simply expanding "the horizon of attention so as to include both experience and the world"<sup>(21)</sup> is unacceptable in this context because it is impossible to expand the horizon of attention so as to include acts of experience and remain within the natural attitude which takes for granted the nature of such acts which it presupposes as non-problematic. Clearly, reflection cannot succeed in revealing these acts without the prior awareness of their being problematic. Thus to accept and remain within the natural attitude is to make reflection superfluous. Indeed, Chapman admits a major difference between reflection and the natural attitude when he states that the former, unlike the latter, is aware of its own activity.\*

Chapman concedes this difference in order to avoid the possibility of an infinite regress in reflection. This would be the consequence of seeing reflection as based on the natural attitude which is itself clarified by reflection. Therefore, all acts of reflection require further reflective acts in order that they may be clarified. "Thus, reflecting on my awareness of the world, I may reflect on this reflection and so on without limit, but at no point do I leave the horizon of reflection"<sup>(22)</sup>.

This statement makes it clear that Chapman is avoiding only an infinite regression of standpoints but not of problems and thus the act of reflection

\*This statement is also an admission of the naivety of the natural attitude.

could never be considered complete and therefore nothing reliable or basic can be stated as a consequence of this kind of reflection<sup>\*(1)</sup>. Chapman is unable to finalise reflection, as Husserl does, because he sees perception of the real as attained within the natural attitude, therefore a completion of reflection in the discovery of reliability, as Chapman conceives it, would be in common-sense perception, where the process originated, thus making the whole exercise tautologous.

Chapman finally admits doubt concerning the reliability of the natural attitude and his identity of adequate reflection and common-sense. He notes that the moments of (everyday) reflection in which we all indulge are inadequate because, "they are carried out under the aegis of the natural attitude ... and tend accordingly to be unaware of themselves as reflective and as distinct from empirical thought"<sup>(23)</sup> <sup>\*(2)</sup>. Nevertheless, Chapman insists that this reflective or transcendental consciousness as he terms it does not mean forsaking the world and, although we accept this, Chapman's argument is, as noted above, based on a supposed dichotomy between accepting the validity of our naive perception of the world, which we have shown to be unsatisfactory and rejecting the world which Chapman sees as leading to the position of attempting to create knowledge out of nothing. Thus Chapman's argument in support of his naive realism amounts, in part, to the assertion that the sceptical attitude towards common-sense has unacceptable consequences.

This consideration of the natural attitude has had the intention of demonstrating its inadequacy as a basis for acquiring reliable knowledge.

<sup>\*(1)</sup> Were Chapman to admit a basic level of knowledge it would undermine his belief in the reliability of the pre-reflective natural attitude. It is interesting to contrast this with Husserl's radical reflection which has the intuition of essence as the goal of a radical reflection. Chapman objects to Husserl's idea because he mistakenly believes it to involve a denial of the world.

<sup>\*(2)</sup> My italics.



This is also an introduction to Husserl's phenomenology which we present as an alternative to the positions of naive realism as exemplified by Chapman, and radical scepticism and relativism which have been found to be inadequate. It is firstly necessary to consider Husserl's theory of knowledge on which the methodology of phenomenology is based.

### INTENTIONALITY

Husserl's aim in establishing phenomenology was to devise a method of gaining knowledge which would be totally reliable and which would remain faithful to the "things themselves", that is, phenomena as they are directly given to consciousness. To this end he advocates a procedure which would be totally presuppositionless<sup>\*(1)</sup>, and thus independent of the natural attitude which is the source of our unquestioned assumptions. This raises the problem of how, if phenomenology is to be truly presuppositionless and to accept nothing at face value, it can ever begin. As Husserl says, "If cognition is in doubt how can a critique of cognition start<sup>(24)</sup>, <sup>\*(2)</sup>. The solution to this problem reveals a qualification to the presuppositionless ideal. This is that only those presuppositions which are in principle open to doubt are to be rejected. Therefore the aim is to locate a presupposition which is beyond doubt and the denial of which would lead to absurdity. Thus any theory of knowledge must have concepts concerning the nature of cognitions which are beyond question. This is because in order to doubt the possibility of absolute cognitions which fulfill their objects, it is necessary to have an idea of what a cognition would look like which did attain this goal. Like Descartes and St. Augustine, Husserl sees that the statement "I do not know if I think"

<sup>\*(1)</sup> Husserl's degree of success in realising this presuppositionless ideal will be discussed below.

<sup>\*(2)</sup> It should be clear by now that Husserl's demand that we should return to the things themselves is not to be confused with the empiricist's identity of thing with object of sense experience.



is contradictory, therefore there is without doubt a mental process, there is consciousness, the cogitatio<sup>\*(1)</sup>. The objects of conscious acts, the cogitationes, are seen by Husserl as being beyond question because they are genuinely immanent and point to nothing outside themselves, "The seeing, direct grasping and having of the cogitatio is already a cognition. The cogitationes are the first absolute data"(25). Clearly Husserl is seeking totally reliable knowledge and although he is anti-positivist, in the usual sense of the term, he accepts that his procedure is a positivism in that "we are to mean the absolute unbiased grounding of all science on what is 'positive' i.e. on what can be primordially apprehended, then it is we who are the genuine positivists"(26). Thus, Husserl is claiming the possibility of a real contact between consciousness and its objects; a claim which is based on the doctrine of the intentionality of consciousness which Husserl adapted from Brentano.

The doctrine of intentionality states simply that all consciousness is consciousness of something. We do not just "look" or "believe" we "look at" and "believe in"<sup>\*(2)</sup>.

According to Welch<sup>(27)</sup> the common-sense world exists for a consciousness, it is posited by consciousness thus, it is claimed, that for Husserl Being is not to be equated with reality as commonly understood for this reality is dependant on, recognised through, the Being of consciousness and thus reality is intentional. That is, it is only known consciously,

\*(1) For reasons which will be clarified below, Husserl does not accept Descartes method of radical doubt as a means of revealing the fact of the cogitatio and its acts.

\*(2) This doctrine identifies Husserl as part of the idealistic tradition of philosophy, although it could be argued that he transcended the idealistic realistic dichotomy by attempting, at least in his earlier work, to preserve the objectivity of phenomena within consciousness and it is this interpretation of the position of phenomenology which we will develop in our description of a genuine phenomenological sociology.

represented as an appearance. It is necessary, in terms of our view of phenomenology, to qualify this statement which may be seen as tending towards the extreme idealism which became pronounced in Husserl's work after his failure to establish intersubjectivity and which marked his drift towards solipsism. This statement by Welch makes the common idealistic error of confusing the dependance of reality on consciousness in the sense of reality becoming an object of knowledge with the idea that reality depends for its being on conscious acts. This idea, if accepted would lead to the contradictory conclusion that the acts of consciousness themselves, which Husserl declares to be the reliable source of knowledge, would also have the quality of dependance on intentionality, represented as an appearance, because they themselves are known in conscious acts<sup>\*(1)</sup>.

A similar attitude to that of Welch is found in Kockelman's interpretation of phenomenology in which it is equated with intentional analysis. He claims that it is possible to make statements about consciousness only by paying attention to phenomena given in conscious acts and that therefore questions about an objects essence or nature are reduced to apprehensions of modes of consciousness. As noted above, Husserl distinguished between the object and quality of conscious acts whereas Kockelman's ignores the significance of the fact of consciousness having objective correlates<sup>\*(2)</sup>, thus losing the possibility of the apprehension of the conscious grasp of objects other than consciousness which is itself implied in the doctrine of intentionality. Therefore it is incorrect to state, as Kockelman's does, that questions about an object's essence are resolved in notions of modes of consciousness for

<sup>\*(1)</sup> Our solution to this aspect of the problem of the consciousness object relationship will be discussed below in relation to the later relationship of experience and intention re chapter 7.

<sup>\*(2)</sup> Although it is true that Husserl's later work, subsequent to his failure to establish intersubjectivity, shows a similar radical idealism.



such notions tell us only about the nature of the act of apprehension in memory, sense perception etc. The doctrine of intentionality states that consciousness is directed to objects and that we become aware of objects in conscious acts. This does not require, as Kockelman's thinks that it does, the identity of conscious act and intended object. It would be more accurate to refer to the apprehension of objects as a necessary function of conscious acts. Certainly objects become objects for us through object-oriented conscious acts and, as will be seen below, the act of grasping objective essence, that is the essence of an object, is a conscious act of intuition. This, however, refers simply to our becoming aware of the object as object for us but there is no logical justification to claim, on this basis, that the conscious act is or creates its object. Indeed the doctrine of intentionality indicates the opposite view which is that consciousness is necessarily a reaching out to something other than itself which is then apprehended by consciousness in the form of a concept or idea. The problem therefore is how to ensure that the concept is the product of a full and genuine conscious apprehension of its object\*.

Kockelman's idealistic interpretation of the doctrine of intentionality is probably in part a consequence of his acceptance of the claim by Husserl that consciousness "constitutes" its objects, as is indicated in his statement that essence can be determined only by looking at the acts of consciousness in which the phenomenon is constituted as this or that. The meaning of the idea of constitution in Husserl's work is unclear but if it is understood to mean that consciousness creates its objects then it encounters the objections raised above. This view also encounters further difficulties in accounting for agreement between conscious

\* The radical idealistic view has the problem of explaining not simply how error is possible but how we are able to recognise when our concepts are erroneous.



subjects or consistency between acts. Thus, a possible consequence of this position is the substitution of everyday events by miracles, ie. an acknowledged failure to understand such events.\*

It is possible that Kockelman's idealistic interpretation of intentionality derives from Husserl's statement, noted above, that only acts of consciousness have the quality of indubitability, that is, of total reliability. However, it should be noted that this indubitability applies to all conscious acts only in reference to the existence of the conscious act, it does not apply to all conscious acts in respect of the adequacy of their conceptual grasp of the intended objects. As will be seen below, only those conscious acts of immanent perception of the object are accorded full reliability by Husserl. The fact that this quality is not found in all conscious acts ie. that some acts grasp objects other than the intended object itself, such as the object as assumed, prejudged, preferred etc., and that such inadequacies can be recognised by consciousness, is a further indication that consciousness and object are not to be equated as a matter of course and that the adequacy of conscious acts is dependant upon their mode of apprehending objects. We thus reject Kockelman's view that intentional analysis alone makes explicit the meaning of things, as in his statement "(intentional analysis) is the method of bringing forward meanings and making them explicit, the method of disengaging constituent elements which are implicitly contained in certain actually given meanings"(29). Analysis of the intentional acts of consciousness will not reveal such meanings unless it is directed to the apprehension of the essence of the object of intantion. Such an essential analysis is presupposed in Kockelman's reference to making meanings explicit and the disengaging of constituent elements. These

\*This charge has been implicitly levelled against phenomenology by Wittgenstein re below chapter 2.

essences, which are not apparent in ordinary contemplation of conscious acts, can be made objects of consciousness only by a suitably rigorous critique of naive cognition such as that devised by Husserl in the reductions. Similarly Brand<sup>(30)</sup> notes the need to distinguish between genuine self-givenness and that which is co-intended with the phenomenon but is distinct from it, but he also adopts an idealistic position similar to Kockelmans, although he notes that in uncovering functioning intentionality through reduction we grasp Being intuitively and primordially. However he overlooks the nature of apprehended Being and its relationship to the intended objects. That is, he overlooks the eidetic nature of adequately perceived Being, the essence of the intentional object, by equating intentionality and the possession of meaning. This is inadequate because the intentional acts themselves require clarification in terms of meaning. Thus Brand states, "That a being has meaning signifies that we understand it"<sup>(31)</sup> and that this understanding can be made the object of enquiry. Thus a transition is made from the study of the phenomenon to a study of our understanding of it but Brand fails to realise that this latter aim presupposes the achievement of the former.

Our view of the preliminary nature of the grasp of the intentional nature of consciousness, is supported by Husserl's statement that the philosopher grasps the existing world "as intention and treats it as problematic. Then in the attitude of the epoche\*" (which in the present undertaking is pre-requisite to the achievement of a critical verification of the world) he questions the achievement and range of the naive self-presentation of the world"<sup>(32)</sup>. The reference to a critical verification

of the world demonstrates the belief that phenomenology, through the reductions, is able to attain a real contact with phenomena, a view which

\* This term will be clarified in the next section.



we support and which we oppose to the idealistic interpretation of phenomenology although, for reasons which will become apparent, Husserl, consequent on the development of the idea of the Transcendental Ego, adopted idealism to an increasing extent.

We have thus seen the significance of the doctrine of intentionality as establishing the other-directedness of consciousness, the relationship between consciousness and its objects. However all consciousness is intentional, including the inadequate conceptions of the natural attitude and it has been seen that it is necessary to establish a critique of intentional consciousness so as to enable a distinction between the adequate and inadequate conceptual grasp of phenomena. This introduces us to the methodology through which such a critique is to be achieved, principally, the procedure of the reductions, but before this aspect of phenomenology is discussed it is necessary to justify the idea of the reduction or disengaging of our everyday conceptualisations in relation to one of the criticisms of phenomenology.

It is stated sometimes that phenomenology is mystical, that is, it is unnatural, esoteric and alienated from everyday thought. It is true that phenomenology is alienated from everyday thought in the sense that it does not accept uncritically the adequacy of that thought but this does not mean that it is unconcerned with the everyday, natural attitude. The natural attitude is naively realistic, it simply takes for granted that its concepts are the product of an adequate grasp of phenomena, but this belief is a mere assumption which cannot be defended when questioned by scepticism. It is the aim of phenomenology to establish, through a rational critique of cognition, a reliable conceptual grasp of phenomena, by revealing a priori data of cognition, which, being conceptual, are not affected by the volatility of the material world. As such data is



totally rational any sceptical denial of it is pre-condemned to absurdity.

Thus, far from being irrelevant to the attitude of everyday life phenomenology is the fulfillment of the ever-present intention of the natural attitude, which is the conceptual grasp of phenomena as they are in themselves; what the natural attitude merely assumes, phenomenology seeks to establish in a totally reliable manner.

This argument may seem to raise a further objection against phenomenology which is that although it claims only a foundation-building function in relation to other spheres of knowledge<sup>\*(1)</sup>, such as the particular sciences and the natural attitude, the further claim that it seeks to provide totally reliable knowledge of phenomena must mean that it does, in fact, seek to replace those modes of acquiring knowledge, such as the natural attitude, which it regards as unreliable. Although it is true that Husserl increasingly came to see phenomenology not just as a philosophy but as the philosophical method and in the Vienna Lecture this becomes the explicit statement that phenomenology was the goal to which all historical philosophy had been moving<sup>\*(2)</sup>, he never attempted to argue that phenomenology could replace the natural attitude or the particular sciences. We can understand this self-imposed limitation on phenomenology in terms of our distinction between meaning and significance. The meaning of a thing is its objective nature, its significance is the value of that nature for a purposive subject. Phenomenology is concerned with the adequacy of our concepts, it is, therefore, concerned only with the meaning of phenomena, it is theoretical. The natural attitude however is practical, it is directed and informed by varying practical interests, thus, the criterion by which it judges phenomena is utility. As was noted in the original distinction between meaning and significance,

\* (1) re above p. 12.

\* (2) As would be expected, this view is most clearly expressed in Husserl's teleological account of European history.

judgements of utility or practical value necessarily involve a consideration of the nature of things for a phenomenon is held to be significant because it is believed to be of such and such a nature, the apprehension of this nature is held to be necessary in order that practical goals may be achieved. Thus the practical attitude of everyday life is necessarily founded on conceptual assumptions<sup>\*</sup>, and therefore phenomenology intends to provide the conceptual foundations without which the natural attitude, and its idealisations in the particular sciences, are potentially unreliable even in their own terms of achieving desired practical results. Thus, the desire by phenomenology for apodictic knowledge is not an attempt to replace but to ground everyday interests in reliable concepts. It is now necessary to describe how phenomenology seeks to establish reliable concepts through a critique of cognition in the procedure of the reductions.

## THE REDUCTIONS

### IMMANENCE AND TRANSCENDENCE

The purpose of the reductions is to provide knowledge of an unquestionable or a priori nature. Husserl argued that the existence of the act of intentional consciousness is the one proposition which cannot be questioned and therefore reliable knowledge is that which remains within the intentional act. Such knowledge is referred to by Husserl as immanent, that is, it points to nothing outside itself, it contains its Being totally within itself and therefore is not dependant for the validity of its Being on anything outside its self<sup>\*(2)</sup>. Statements

<sup>\*(1)</sup> The distinction between theory and practise to which we refer became increasingly pronounced in Husserl's later work, especially in his "teleological" reconstruction of European history (Crisis etc.) which attempted to show that the origins of European culture lay in the theoretical attitude. This problem of the relationship of theory and practise is a current problem in sociological theory; we believe that our account of the interdependence of meaning and significance may help to clarify this problem.

<sup>\*(2)</sup> It will be noted that we refer to Being not existence, this is because existence, spatio-temporal appearance, is not a necessary quality of any other phenomenon.



based on immanent perception are valid because of this fact and attempts to cast doubt on this validity are necessarily tautological as they depend for their own validity on the validity of that which they seek to question<sup>\*(1)</sup>

Those factors included in naive perception which are not apodictic, which are not immanent to the phenomenon and which refer to factors other than what is contained in immanent consciousness and are thus open to doubt are termed transcendencies by Husserl<sup>\*(2)</sup>.

One value of immanent perception for Husserl is that it guarantees the existence of the conscious subject. The stream of consciousness is, immanent evidence of the existence of the "I", cogito. Other consciousnesses, "which I posit in the experience of empathy (may not) exist. But my empathy and my experience in general is given in a primordial and absolute sense, not only essentially but existentially ... an essential feature of the thing world (is) that no perception ... gives us anything absolute within its domain ... every experience ... leaves open the possibility that what is given, despite the persistent consciousness of its bodily self-presence, does not exist. It is an essentially valid law that existence in the form of a thing is never demanded as necessary by virtue of its givenness, but in a certain way is always contingent"<sup>(34)</sup>.

Husserl is arguing here for the reliability of immanent consciousness as opposed to empirical observation which is always conceivably other than it appears, but there are two related problems found in this statement, - they are the problem of solipsism and the problem of existence. Although these problems will be discussed at greater length below it is appropriate,

<sup>\*(1)</sup> This is not the same as the claim that reliable data are those things true by definition or which experience has shown to be always the case such as, "all men are mortal" for the former tend to be tautologous and exceptions to cases of the latter can be thought e.g. legends of immortality. The strength of immanent data for Husserl is their ideal nature and the impossibility of contradicting or questioning them. This also indicates Husserl's rationalism and his belief in the rationality of Being.

<sup>\*(2)</sup> This term, referring to the desiderata of perception, leads to a confusion of terminology when Husserl refers to the consciousness which is totally reliable, whose contents are purely immanent, as Transcendental consciousness. The distinctive meaning of this latter term will be



at this point, to indicate certain error's in Husserl's statement. He claims that immanent perception is a guarantee of existence but, contradictorily, existential propositions are seen as unreliable. Further, Husserl claims that attitudes to the existence or non-existence of the phenomenon which is the object of the process should be bracketed or de-activated. It seems that Husserl is attempting to overcome phenomenology's supposed lack of existential relevance by using the term existence to refer to two different ideas. Thus, the statement of the unreliability of existence, its always possibly being other than it appears, refers to existence in the sense of that which is physically present, that which is accessible to sensory inspection and which has spatio-temporal extension. On this definition it is nonsensical for Husserl to claim that immanent perception necessarily guarantees the existence of its object, which as an existent is inherently unreliable and cannot be guaranteed. We can make our fantasies objects of immanent attention but this does not mean that in doing so we guarantee their physical existence, nor is it clear why the existence of my consciousness is guaranteed but not that of other consciousnesses. Husserl seems to be confusing Being and existence, for to have an object in immanent perception is to guarantee its true Being, that is both its ideal possibility and that it is perceived in the fullness of its being, the completeness of its form, ie. we simply see that the phenomenon is and that we perceive it as it is. Existence, however, is simply one mode of Being, that of spatio-temporal presence and although it is possible that Being may be realised in existence it could be equally realised in memory, in fantasy, or it could remain the idea, which is the form through which we grasp any of its realisations. Thus the apprehension of Being does not guarantee existence but the possibility of existence, such that if the idea were to be realised in the mode of spatio-temporal extension

we would be able to recognise and identify its nature.

Thus, in Husserl's view, the a priori, the category of the totally reliable, is only to be found in the sphere of the immanent perception of the acts of intentional consciousness. This sphere of absolute immanence is the sphere of that which is established absolutely and which, being grasped as an idea, is unaffected by subsequent perceptions or empirical evaluation. The world of things is seen by Husserl as having only a presumptive reality, whereas the cogito is an absolute unquestionable reality. Therefore all things can be understood absolutely only in their relationship to the acts of intentional consciousness. All objects of knowledge, perception etc. are therefore necessarily reduced to the level of the pure Idea, which is their Being and which shapes their relations to other phenomena. All genuine understanding of phenomena requires this immanent basis. As Husserl says, "The ideal possibility of a reflection which has the essential character of a self-evident unshakeable existential thesis has its ground in the essential nature of a Pure Ego in general and of an experiencing in general"<sup>(35)</sup>. In contrast empirical proofs are never absolute because doubt as always thinkable as the possibility of non-Being is never, in principle, excluded. Further, the common-sense "real world" which is the background of such proofs is always my real world, and the failure to realise this leads to the false universalisation of self. Similarly, reliance on commonly held assumptions is inadequate for the fact that a belief is generally held to be true is no guarantee of its reliability or of the idea and opinions with which it is associated. This statement clearly indicates the inadequacy of individually held opinions and the necessary universality of truly reliable data which in turn makes imperative the establishment of intersubjectivity. By this we mean the need to establish that there is a universally available world, otherwise



there would be no grounds for the distinction between personal opinions and necessary, universal truths. As a consequence Husserl's failure to establish intersubjectivity, which will be discussed below, undermines his claim to have developed the means of establishing necessary truths.

There is a further weakness in Husserl's account of the nature of immanent data which is that he asserts as a consequence of the primacy of consciousness the fact that consciousness constitutes existence. The ambiguities of the idea of conscious constitution have been noted but it is clear that as Husserl's work progressed and especially with the development of the idea of the Transcendental Ego, that phenomena are seen as mere correlates of consciousness. As will be seen this is a one-sided interpretation of the object-consciousness relationship ignoring the reciprocal relationship between consciousness and an independent but accessible Being. In accordance with our later realistic interpretation of phenomenology we would revise Husserl so as to mean that things other than consciousness have being and possible existence but that things become objects of knowledge, with the resulting grasp of their mode of being and their relationships to other phenomena and our evaluation of them, as the consequence of conscious acts. The problem, therefore is to establish the adequacy of these acts so that their real grasp of phenomena cannot be doubted. The method devised by Husserl to achieve this is the method of reduction.

#### METHOD OF REDUCTION

Deriving from the theory of immanence, the intention of the method of reduction is to strip perception of its transcendent associations leaving only the immanent datum, or essence, of the thing itself. Thus, the starting-point of the method is the act of perception understood as the act which "presents to us the things perceived in their (apparent) authentic reality"<sup>(36)</sup>. The self-givanness of phenomena was initially

regarded as adequate self-evidence by Husserl but on becoming aware of the inadequacies of perception he called for a final critique of self-evidence or, as we would rather say, of our grasp of self-evidence, which is to be achieved in an act of intuition or pure seeing. The status of such intuition changed in the course of Husserl's work. His initial position was that "We will not attribute any special value to such assertions - that this is here etc. - which we make on the basis of pure seeing"<sup>(37)</sup> but with the addition of the theory of immanence to the idea of intuition, such a grasp of phenomena was seen by Husserl as apodictic. Such intuition is pure seeing by which is meant the mere description of the thing itself, "Let one attend to the phenomenon itself, instead of going beyond it to talk about it and interpret it... No inclination is more dangerous to the 'seeing' cognition of origins and absolute data than to think too much and from these reflections in thought to create self-evident principles ... Thus as little interpretation as possible but as pure an intuition as possible"<sup>(38)</sup>. Thus the initial stage of the reductions is the removal of all existential propositions and all naive theoretical interpretations from our perception in order that the being of the phenomena may be clearly grasped.\*

Transcendencies are to be stripped from perception by a series of acts of radical doubting of perception<sup>(39)</sup>. This may seem similar to the method adopted by Descartes and it may suggest that Husserl has compromised his opposition to scepticism by adopting systematic doubting as the methodology of phenomenology and, therefore, that in the dichotomy between naive realism and scepticism Husserl has been forced to opt for the sceptical attitude. This interpretation would be a misunderstanding

\* In our view of phenomenology it must be emphasised that in this process of reduction it is not phenomena which are being changed but our perception of them, re below chapter 7)



of the method of the reductions for Husserl notes that doubt entails doubting Being of some sort, but such doubt does not effect Being itself, but only the constitution, or as we would say, the apprehension of Being.<sup>\*(1)</sup> Also, the Cartesian radical doubt is contradictory in that the attempt to doubt, itself is therefore open to doubt. Against such scepticism Husserl places the suspension of judgement. That is as an alternative to total acceptance (naive realism) or total rejection (radical scepticism) of what is perceived, the method of the reductions merely refuses to pass judgement one way or the other. Such perceptions which are not immanent to the phenomenon, such as whether it exists or not, are bracketed, they are not permitted to intrude on our apprehension of the phenomenon; hence the alternative name, epoche, which is given sometimes to the method of reduction. Such bracketing, as Husserl says, "does not mean that we are simply to forget all about our beliefs in the bracketed reality ... only ... to stop attaching weight to them. We are merely to stop identifying ourselves with such beliefs in the sense of a definite commitment"<sup>(40)\*</sup>(2). In accordance with Husserl's belief that philosophy can grasp the realm of the totally reliable only outside common-sense, the first thing to be bracketed is our natural attitude perception of the phenomenon, including the naive belief that the phenomenon-in-itself is present in our everyday perceptions. It would be absurd at one and the same time, to doubt the adequacy of naive perception of a thing and to act as if it were adequately

\*(1) This suggests that Husserl saw the reality of Being as beyond question, as well as the certainty of the conscious act. Although the reliability of Being is not developed in Husserl, again indicating his growing idealism, this idea plays a central role in our discussion of the Object, consciousness relationship below, and the related problem of inter-subjective knowledge. re chapter 7.

\*(2) We interpret this statement as a demand to abandon our existential commitment to the assumed priority of our individual being in the world. Husserl did not state this specifically as the goal of the reductions but, as will be seen below, this understanding of the method is of major importance in resolving the problem of the possibility of genuine intersubjective understanding.

presented in naive perception. As a further part of this bracketing we de-activate all scientific theories concerning the nature of the object, its utilities and the status of its relationship to other phenomena. Thus, only by suspending judgement on our unexamined propositions can we achieve a radical, reliable reflection. Any act of reflection which does not do this is pointless for it will simply reveal that which is already presupposed in the naive judgement of the perception. It is, therefore, contradictory to claim that reflection can supplement the natural attitude without questioning it.(41)

The reduction of the everyday world has raised a major objection to phenomenology's value for the specialist spheres of knowledge, including sociology. This is that these latter are concerned with the world as perceived in everyday life, therefore is it not the case that by deliberately bracketing this world phenomenology makes itself irrelevant to our understanding of it? This argument reflects a misunderstanding of the purpose of bracketing which is not to think the world out of existence but the refusal to accept as necessarily true our everyday, naive conceptualising of our experience of this world. Far from abolishing the world, the aim of phenomenology is to reveal the world as phenomenon, to achieve a reliable conceptual grasp of the quality of world-phenomena. The argument against phenomenology's relevance to mundane science may be re-adapted so that phenomenology is claimed to be irrelevant because it demands that we ignore the existence or non-existence of phenomena but as far as mundane science is concerned, the question of whether or not its perceived objects are actually there is a vital one. This argument, of course, overlooks what it means to claim that something is really there and it makes the mistake of equating reality with spatio-temporal existence. The relevance of phenomenology is that whether a phenomenon is bodily



present or whether it is believed to be present or whether it is imagined or remembered etc., it is apprehended in the form of a concept. The adequacy of the investigation of the phenomenon will depend on the adequacy of this conceptual grasp and it is, therefore, necessary that all such concepts, including the idea that the thing exists should be critically examined. As seen above, it would be contradictory to attempt to critically examine such concepts while believing in their adequacy or inadequacy. The fact that the natural and social sciences examine the world as naively perceived does not mean that their concepts have to be naive.

The bracketing of the natural attitude is merely the first step in the identification of that indubitable datum, essence, without the perception of which there would be an infinite regress of acts of reflection. The perception of essence is the completion of rigorous reflection. The bracketing of the natural attitude is therefore the act of clearing away the irrelevancies in our perception so that the next stage, the immanent apprehension of the quality of the object may proceed.

It is crucial to our argument that the reductions are seen to be object-orientated in order that we may avoid the solipsistic consequences of the idealistic separation between the knower and that which is known. This is demonstrated in the consequences of Schmitt's claim that the reductions are aimed at achieving a phenomenological description of reflection. Schmitt's<sup>(43)</sup> statement is inadequate because it fails to note that, deriving from the doctrine of intentionality, there is no such thing as reflection, but reflection on objects, including the act of reflection itself, as the mode of consciousness in which the object is given<sup>(44)</sup>. Thus reflection is directed towards objects, the clarification of whose nature is the goal of adequate or phenomenological reflection.

The second stage of the method of reduction is the grasp of the essence of the phenomenon, or its quality. This requires the bracketing of the particular appearance of the phenomenon, the reduction of its apparent belonging to the "here-and-now", the context in which it appears to us in natural perception and which such perception uncritically accepts as part of the phenomenon. This involves such things as location, colour, sensory accessibility etc., although all these things may themselves become objects of phenomenological analysis. This reduction, which effectively removes our perception of the phenomenon from the naively perceived world of fluid inconstant appearances, reveals the thing-itself in that form the being of which cannot be doubted, or affected by empirical change, that is, as the idea, the essence of the phenomenon. The mode of grasping essence, realising it as a content of knowledge is not totally clear in Husserl, but before discussing this point it is necessary to clarify the process of reduction as it has been described up to this point by reference to our understanding of the concept of horizon.

#### HORIZON

It is necessary to make clear that although this chapter is intended principally as a description of Husserl's account of phenomenology the idea of horizon which is expounded below is not Husserl's idea but ours. Husserl\* states that natural attitude perception shows two characteristics. These are that all such experienced objects show a typical familiarity and that the perception of these objects is permeated by anticipations of co-intended features. Thus all natural attitude experience is said to bear with it an indeterminate, open, experiential horizon, the "inner horizon" which refers to the possibility of further determinations of the object. Thus the natural attitude is seen to present objects not as such and such, that is qualitatively, but as existents of a certain type.

\*Our account of Husserl's notion of horizon is derived from Schutz's(45) commentary on Husserl's book "Erfahrung und Urteil" which was not translated into English in time for consideration as part of this thesis.



These objects are therefore seen as pertaining to further genera and species typifications which are structured by pre-acquaintedness and unacquaintedness; such types are merely presumptive. However, this statement gives the impression that notions of typicality are peculiar to the natural attitude and we will challenge this idea in our re-construction of phenomenology.

Our conception of horizon and its relationship to the processes of reduction originates in Kockelman's<sup>(46)</sup> statement that the actual perception of, for instance, a house "has a greater content than what is effectively seen". That is, naive perception places seeing in a wider context than that which is immediately available. Our interest is in the status of this contextual data and this will be considered through an initial distinction between the eidetic field and the non-eidetic context. The eidetic field consists of those objects which are in no way implicated in the everyday perception of the phenomenon but which on eidetic apprehension are seen to belong to the same intentional act as that which grasped the original object because they are all those other possible instances of the essence of which the object itself is one instance. That is, the eidetic context consists of all those other objects in which the same essence as that of the object in question is displayed, it is the species-identity of the object.

By contrast the non-eidetic context of the object consists of those phenomena which are associated with the object in everyday perception but which are qualitatively distinct from it. Kockelmans, misleadingly refers to this context as a necessary quality of the object, "A house that is not found in certain surroundings of which it is a part could never be a real house and could never be perceived as a house"<sup>(47)</sup>. We reject this idea that the quality of an object is dependant on its

surroundings because it is contradictory to, at the same time, recognise a qualitative distinction between one thing (phenomenon) and other things (surroundings) as two distinct ideas and yet claim that the phenomenon could not be itself without the presence of these qualitatively other things<sup>\*(1)</sup>.

We wish to develop this enquiry by distinguishing between two types of non-eidetic context. The first consists of those contingencies which are particularisations of a quality of the object. This may seem contradictory for contingencies have been defined as unrequired and immanent qualities as required, therefore it is necessary to clarify this argument, which we will do using Kockelman's case of "house". "House" necessarily involves the idea of building material but bricks, adobe, concrete etc. are not required in the idea of 'house'. This is because the qualities of an object are species definitions and thus necessity inheres only in the species. Particular instances of the species are not required because the object is compatible with being such and such regardless of its particularisation<sup>\*(2)</sup>. Thus "spatial extension" requires the qualities of size and shape but no particular size or shape can be said to be required in the idea of spatial extension. Thus, this context, the inner horizon, consists of those contingent particularisations of necessary qualities and is the object of the second reduction, noted above, which is that which removes the here and now facticity of the thing which can then be grasped as an idea.

<sup>\*(1)</sup> Kockelmans shows a recognition of our distinction but fails to realise that it cannot be effected on the level of intentionality alone(48). This is because it presupposes a recognition of the difference between the thing itself and qualitatively distinct phenomena which can be made only on the basis of an eidetic reduction of intentionality.

<sup>\*(2)</sup> The a priori reconstruction of the world is prevented by this open range of possibilities which is a product of necessity being a quality only of species.



The second context, or outer horizon, is the object of the first reduction, which is that which removes the perception of the object from the natural attitude, and consists of those objects which have absolutely no qualitative relationship to the phenomenon but which are associated with it in the act of perception. Thus ideas such as 'street', 'garden', 'neighbours' have no necessary relationship with the idea of house but are merely habitually associated with this idea. Thus the outer horizon consists of such things as associated commonplaces, practical evaluations, cultural context etc., whose relationship to the phenomenon is totally contingent. We therefore identify three contextual relationships between phenomena. These are the 'core' of eidetically similar phenomena, the inner horizon of particularisations of what is generically required by the quality of the phenomenon and thirdly, the outer horizon of naive associations which are contingent to the object.

#### EIDETIC INTUITION AND FREE VARIATION

It has been seen that essence is the meaning or quality of an object, thus the grasp of essence is the apprehension of the meaning of the phenomenon. Thus, it is necessary to consider Husserl's account of the mode of the conscious grasp of essence, which he saw initially as being achieved in an act of intuition. When consciousness of an object has been purified of all extraneous material, the remaining content can be nothing other than the object itself or essence. The act of intuition which grasps essence is a purely rational act and it is no more mysterious than the act of sense-intuition which is taken for granted by everyday perception.

However, in KRISIS(49), Husserl attempts to supplement the intuition by a process of free variation of perceptions. In so far as this is seen as an empirical test of the validity of the eidetic idea it undermines

Husserl's justification for seeking pure ideas, that is, their independence from empirical changes. Also it raises the problem of how empirical events can effect our understanding of an idea as such events are dependant on the idea for their recognition by consciousness.

Husserl seems to have two conceptions of the role of free variation. The first is that the free variation of our everyday apprehension of objects reveals limits to the possible range of such variation. That is, we have to recognise that, at a certain point, the variation is no longer compatible with the original object. This leads to the realisation that things do not occur haphazardly but are a priori bound to a certain style. This argument is acceptable in so far as it points to an indication of the necessity of essence in everyday perception and, consequently, indicates that the grasp of essence is the fulfillment of that which is dimly perceived but not understood in everyday life. However, Husserl wishes to go beyond this statement to claim that free variation actually reveals essence, that it makes thematic the variant generality of the intuitive world. Thus, an experienced objectivity is "interpreted as an example of the universal and at the same time a prototype for modifications by a series of free variations in phantasy"<sup>(50)</sup>. Limits are placed on the possible range of variations by the invariant content which identifies all the variations as modifications of a prototype. This is, "that element without which an objectivity of this kind can neither be thought or intuitively phantasised"<sup>(50)</sup> and it is on these variants that intuition of the universal as essence is based. We cannot accept this statement of the role of free variation because it implies the contradiction that the necessity of eidetic perception is established in contingent variation, In fact, the idea of freely varying our perceptions of an object presupposes the prior apprehension of the idea of that object as belonging to such and



such a unity. Thus, the possibility of a rational free variation is dependent on an eidetic grasp of the object and therefore cannot be used as a means of apprehending the essence. We accept that free variation may be used to reveal the range of particularisations of the perceived essence and thus it can act as a check on whether the original object is, in fact, a case of the intuited essence. Husserl's argument indicates his confusion concerning the existential priority of the natural attitude with the epistemic priority of eidetic perception. That is, although natural attitude perception is, in a temporal sense, our first perception of an object, it depends on prior taken-for-granted assumptions concerning the nature or essence of the object\*. Thus, while it would be correct to state that eidetic perception is derived through ordinary perception it would be wrong to hold the view, implied in Husserl, that it is derived from everyday perception.

We also reject the adequacy of the idea advanced by Lauer,<sup>(52)</sup> and supported by Schutz's presentation of Husserl, that the process of free variation replaces the reductions as the method of revealing essence. Such a procedure would introduce contingency into a method whose strength was supposed to lie in its emancipation from the effects of empirical variation. This is because there is always the possibility that the next free variation, which we did not perform, would have changed our perception of the essence of the object. Also, the method of free variation is an inductive process and, therefore, it cannot reveal that necessary knowledge which Husserl saw as a quality of the objectively valid. Equally, it is impossible to state how many free variations must be performed in order to attain reliable knowledge, other than the

\* A similar point is made by Schutz<sup>(51)</sup> who states that if free variation is to be carried out within the natural attitude in order to reveal essence, then there is no qualitative distinction between natural attitude types and essence.

tautological comment, "as many as necessary".

Lauer denies that this method is inductive, "as it in no way depends on a multiplication of actual experimental observations; it is ideal through and through"<sup>(53)</sup>. This assertion however establishes free variation as an imaginary experimental induction as opposed to the more usual empirical experimental induction, but it is still induction.

Free variation cannot replace the reductions for, as stated above, free variation simply reveals that variation cannot be free, in the sense of being arbitrary. Thus, a realisation of the limits of free variation reveals that essence must be, but it cannot reveal the nature of essence because it cannot create those conditions of pure consciousness of which alone essence is the content. This can be achieved only by the method of the reductions as the deliberate attainment of such consciousness.

#### TRANSCENDENTAL CONSCIOUSNESS AND THE TRANSCENDENTAL EGO

The relationship between essence and data of the fact-world requires clarification but this will be deferred until our later re-construction of phenomenology. It is necessary at this point to discuss the next stage in Husserl's account of the reductions which is the development of the concepts of transcendental consciousness and the Transcendental Ego.

In the previous section we referred to the conscious apprehension of essence and it is clear that as a consequence of the reductions, this consciousness cannot be equated with the consciousness of the natural attitude. Thus Husserl seeks to clarify the nature of this reduced, or transcendental consciousness and its subject the Transcendental Ego, which, equally, cannot be equated with the individual naively living within the natural attitude, although, crucially, Husserl fails to clarify the relationship of transcendental to mundane consciousness. It is, therefore, necessary to reject Brand's assumption that the act by which consciousness



becomes an object for itself is the same act by which any phenomenon becomes an object for consciousness. The consciousness which is capable of apprehending the conscious grasp of objects cannot be the same as that consciousness which is not aware of its own acts\*. It is the failure to realise this distinction which commits Brand to an infinite regress of reflective acts, for if we can question the conscious grasp of objects we can also question that same consciousness's grasp of its own acts ad infinitum.

The use of the term transcendental is confusing as in the discussion of the reductions transcendencies were identified as those things which do not belong to a pure consciousness of the phenomenon. The grasp of the phenomenon itself is achieved through an act of immanent perception that is a perception which depends on nothing outside itself for its reliability and is therefore indubitable. However, the consciousness of this a prioristic data is said to be transcendental consciousness and thus it would appear that Husserl is nonsensically claiming this consciousness to be both immanent and transcendent. This problem can be resolved if we understand the immanence of this consciousness to refer to the status of its contents. That is, the relationship between this consciousness and its perceived objects is immanent ie. self-contained and independent of all other phenomena. The transcendence of this consciousness refers to its relationship to mundane apprehension of phenomena. Thus, this consciousness "goes beyond" our everyday consciousness. This raises a problem associated with the usage of transcendence which is that if pure consciousness transcends mundane apprehension does this not

\* Although each new development in Husserl's philosophy was marked by a degree of dissension among those who had previously adhered to his ideas, the development of the theory of transcendental consciousness and the Transcendental Ego was the most controversial of Husserl's innovations.

mean that it abandons such apprehension and becomes alien to it? If this is the case, does it not follow that these respective consciousnesses inhabiting, as it were, different spheres, are irrelevant to each other and that the objects of transcendental consciousness, essences, are not the objects of everyday consciousness and therefore cannot inform us about the nature or reliability of the objects of mundane apprehension? Certain aspects of this objection have been considered above and of particular relevance is our argument that mundane apprehension is oriented to the attainment of the true being, or essence, of its objects, even though it lacks the means to guarantee the reliability of its grasp of this being. The objection does, however, raise the crucial problem of the apparent alienation between transcendental and mundane consciousness and with it the problem of the relationship between pure essence and mundane datum. In particular, that as a consequence of this separation, other subjects, who are phenomena of the mundane world are rendered inaccessible to transcendental consciousness. This is the problem of phenomenology's supposed solipsism which will be discussed fully below, but, at this juncture, we simply wish to point out that the problem of solipsism is a particular instance of the wider problem of the relationship between mundane fact and ideal essence. It does appear that Husserl has, like Plato, been able to establish essence only by isolating it from the mundane world which, nevertheless, is said to be dependant on essence for its meaning. The difference between Husserl and Plato seems to be that whereas the latter was vague about the exact location of the realm of essence, the former especially in his later work places it firmly in the constituting acts of consciousness. However, as Kohler<sup>(54)</sup> has pointed out, the high price of locating the requiredness of essence outside the material world in a realm of agreed reverence is irrelevance to the world of everyday life. Despite Husserl's many references in his later work to the Lebenswelt or life-world, he never established it as an



eidetically grounded or eidetically available world or as the correlate of transcendental consciousness.

Transcendental consciousness is seen by Husserl as inclusive of all Being. As Kockelman's<sup>(55)</sup> states, in peculiar terminology, that every form of transcendence "is an immanent characteristic within the sphere of pure ego" and as all Being falls within "my" transcendental subjectivity, which constitutes all sense and being, therefore there can be no outside of consciousness. The radical idealism which is implied here, the denial of the possibility of things other than self, is echoed in Husserl's<sup>(56)</sup> statement "I, the transcendental ego am prior to everything worldly. I am the I, namely in whose conscious life the world is first of all constituted". This conveys the extent of Husserl's later idealism through which he attempted to remove knowledge from all empirical contingency but it is clear that in doing so he made such knowledge intensely individualistic. The Transcendental Ego is my Transcendental Ego, and as a consequence it leads to either a recognition of the private nature of such knowledge, which therefore can tell us nothing about others, or it denies the other-ness of others, seeing them simply as modifications of self\*. Indeed, Nakhnikian<sup>(57)</sup> interprets Husserl as making the very existence of the world dependent on the Transcendental Ego.

Similarly, Welch argues that reflection on experience convinces us of a self which experiences. Thus, Husserl<sup>(58)</sup> "as soon as I look toward the flowing life in its real present and with it grasp myself as the pure subject of this life ... I affirm plainly and inevitably, I AM ... each of us carries in himself the guarantee of his absolute existence as

\*Although Husserl refused to see the situation in these terms, our analysis of his attempted resolution of the problem of others will show that he opted for the latter position.

a fundamental possibility ... my empathy and my consciousness are originally and absolutely given, not only essentially but existentially". This Ego is not posited as are other selves, it is directly experienced and its existence cannot be contradicted without leading to absurdity. This pure Ego underlies the constant flux of our empirical selves and the idea of the continuity of self is comprehensible only by reference to the pure Ego which unites all such varying experiences into one whole stream of experience. Thus Husserl equated Transcendental Ego with Self as knower of its own acts, Self-in-itself, and there can be no justification for arguing for an identity or even a mutual comprehension between one Transcendental Ego and another and, therefore, solipsism would seem to be inevitable. Thus, as stated above, Husserl has sought to enable us to achieve totally reliable knowledge about phenomena by a systematic withdrawal from the mundane world, as a consequence of which the only information which can be derived from this process is of a totally isolated Self, outside of which nothing exists or can be known.

It must be remembered that Husserl always refused to accept that phenomenology was solipsistic and spent many years trying to establish the phenomenological apprehension of intersubjectivity. We will consider both the vulnerability of Husserl's phenomenology to the charge of solipsism and the adequacy of his attempts to establish our knowledge of others within the phenomenological epoche, attempts which we will judge to have failed\*.

It would be possible to terminate our consideration of phenomenology's relevance for sociology at this point and to agree with Picvecic<sup>(60)</sup> that Husserl's troubles commenced with his idea of transcendental consciousness. Thus phenomenology might have value in helping us to perceive the

\*re below chapter 3.



prejudices which inform the unexamined concepts which we use to interpret the world sociologically, but no more than that; in fact, to give phenomenology an under-labourer function. In our view this would be mistaken and we wish to argue in the remainder of this work, that phenomenology's apparent weaknesses are a product of Husserl's own misunderstandings and taken-for-granted assumptions concerning the phenomenological mode of apprehending knowledge. Further that far from being irrelevant to sociology because of its solipsistic consequences, a properly understood phenomenology is the only means of achieving reliable intersubjective knowledge.

This chapter has been principally a description of the nature of the aims, theory and practise of phenomenology. Certain topics have been omitted, notably the concept of the Lebenswelt but this will be discussed below in the context of Husserl's attempts to resolve the problem of intersubjectivity. It is, therefore, necessary to consider the adequacy of the various criticisms which have been made against the phenomenological programme, culminating in a discussion of the charge of solipsism which is of particular relevance to any evaluation of phenomenology's significance for sociology.

NOTES

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TORCHBOOKS, 1965 p.124
2. HUSSERL op.cit. p.126
3. HUSSERL "PHENOMENOLOGY AND THE CRISIS OF  
PHILOSOPHY" editor's footnote p.124
4. HUSSERL "THE CRISIS OF EUROPEAN SCIENCES  
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NORTH WESTERN U.P. EVANSTON, 1970
5. SPIEGELBERG "THE PHENOMENOLOGICAL MOVEMENT,  
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6. EDIE quoted in  
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7. THEVANAZ op.cit. p.39
8. SPIEGELBERG op.cit., VOL.I p.2-3
9. SPIEGELBERG op.cit., VOL.I p.4-5
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11. THEVANAZ op.cit. p.90
12. FARBER in FARBER  
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E. HUSSERL", HARVARD U.P., 1940 p.4
13. SPIEGELBERG op.cit., VOL.I p.6
14. HUSSERL "THE VIENNA LECTURE" in LAUER (ed)  
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CHAPTER TWO

A CONSIDERATION OF OBJECTIONS TO THE PHENOMENOLOGICAL METHOD

There is no philosophical method which has universal support and this judgement applies equally to phenomenology. Also the novelty of the phenomenological method, emerging as it did when positivism and relativism were major influences, has ensured that its methods and claims have been subjected to close critical scrutiny. It is therefore proposed to consider the validity of the major objections to phenomenology which are the criticism of the pre-suppositionless ideal, the problem of verifying eidetic intuition and the problem of expressing such intuitions in an adequate language. Developing from this latter problem we will discuss nominalist objections to phenomenology's essentialist programme, concentrating in particular on Wittgenstein's critique of essentialism. Finally we will consider the justice of the claim that phenomenology is anti-scientific. Not least of the objections against phenomenology is the claim that in the terms set by Husserl phenomenology has failed to live up to its possibilities. Husserl, especially in Krisis and the Vienna Lecture, attempted to justify phenomenology in terms of the culture and history of Europe. He saw phenomenology as fulfilling and replacing all other philosophies and as providing a revitalisation of the particular sciences by preserving them from the attacks of relativism to which their naive materialism had made them vulnerable and by restoring their relationship to meaning. Despite its wide popularity in continental Europe phenomenology has not replaced all other philosophies and it is a relative newcomer in the world of Anglo-Saxon philosophy which is still dominated by the analytic approach<sup>\*</sup>. Nor, we believe, can this

\* It is noticeable that, despite this claim, Husserl rarely criticised other philosophies except in the widest terms as, for instance, his criticisms of relativism and positivism.

under-achievement be blamed on entrenched prejudices or the slowness of translation for, as will be seen, there are genuine grounds for doubt in relation to Husserl's account of phenomenology. Equally, there is no evidence that the natural sciences have been influenced by phenomenology. The "phenomenology" which is said to have influenced the cultural sciences, sociology in particular, is a peculiar animal which bears little or no relationship to philosophical phenomenology<sup>(1)</sup>. Indeed, the term phenomenology has come to mean no more than anti-positivism and subjectivism in general in sociology<sup>(2)</sup> and although Husserl was anti-positivistic this was but a minor distinguishing feature of his philosophy. Certainly, the generally accepted equation of phenomenology with relativism and the denial of universal rationality in sociology would have been incomprehensible to Husserl<sup>(3)</sup>, as would the claim that phenomenology is concerned with subjective states since the aim of the transcendental reduction was to remove the false air of reliability from the conceptualisations of our everyday individual consciousnesses.

Nevertheless, phenomenology's failure to live up to Husserl's expectations is only partial. We have noted its decisive influence on European philosophy and the list of those who have espoused phenomenology in some form is both illustrious and wide-ranging, including Scheler, Stein, Sartre, Heidegger, Merleau-Ponty etc. Nor is this support confined to philosophy for phenomenology has been influential in certain scientific fields such as the history of religions (Eliade, Wach<sup>\*</sup>) anthropology and, possibly, psychology. It would be naïve to claim, as does Stegmüller<sup>(4)</sup>, that, although Husserl's philosophy was not particularly brilliant, it just happened to attract some of the finest minds in Europe. Similarly, although phenomenology has had no influence

\* Although it must be admitted that the phenomenology used by Eliade and Wach is the pre-reduction, purely descriptive phenomenology of Logische Untersuchungen.



on the natural sciences as such, the philosophy of science<sup>(5)</sup>, especially since Popper's<sup>\*(1)</sup> attempts to establish science as a rational procedure, has been concerned with the quality of scientific concepts and has raised questions, concerning the reliability and origin of these concepts, which are central to a phenomenological critique of science.

One objection to phenomenology, its alleged mysticism has been discussed. It is necessary, at this point, to continue our consideration of these objections beginning with alleged defects in the phenomenological method.

#### THE ADEQUACY OF THE IDEAL OF PRE-SUPPOSITIONLESS PHILOSOPHY

It has been noted that Husserl regarded the reliance of cognition on unexamined assumptions as both typical of the natural attitude and as an inadequate basis for the acquisition of reliable knowledge, hence his demand that phenomenology be pre-suppositionless. Husserl's references to the presuppositionless ideal are misleading and have been interpreted as a demand that philosophising should begin from nothing and the nonsense of trying to achieve reliable knowledge out of nothing is obvious. However, a close study of Husserl's use of the presuppositionless ideal<sup>\*(2)</sup> shows that his aim was to criticise our presuppositions with the aim of revealing those data, the coitations, which are impervious to criticism and which therefore form the basis or presuppositions of the phenomenological enquiry. Thus, Picvecic's<sup>(6)</sup> criticism that the aim of achieving a presuppositionless perspective in philosophy is doomed to failure and that we should, instead, attempt to identify the necessary minimum of presuppositions is in fact a demand that philosophy adopt Husserl's aims in this respect. Significantly, Picvecic, unlike Husserl, fails to

\*<sup>(1)</sup> We are not claiming that Popper was in any way sympathetic to phenomenology, far from it, his total opposition to "essentialism" would make him a critic of Husserl but his attempt to make science rational has the same aim as Husserl's critique of science.

\*<sup>(2)</sup> re below, chapter 1.

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specify how these presuppositions are to be identified and how their status as the necessary minimum is to be established. Thus Husserl implies a distinction between those inherently rational and therefore required presuppositions and purely contingent presuppositions which are either uncritically accepted or which reflect our individual evaluations of desirability utility etc. <sup>\*(1)</sup> Expressing this in terms of dichotomy noted above, reliable presuppositions are the access to the meaning of the object, uncritical presuppositions are a product of the perceived significance of the phenomenon which justify the assumption that our identification of the phenomenon is obvious and unproblematic.

However, the presuppositionless ideal has remained controversial. Farber<sup>(8)</sup> claims that this ideal has itself been called the greatest presupposition and Nakhnikian<sup>(9)</sup> condemns both Husserl's "uncritical" assumption that there are epistemologically absolute data and his presupposition that the everyday process of acquiring knowledge is unclear and indistinct. McGill<sup>(10)</sup> claims that the "I think" on which Husserl bases his presuppositionless philosophy is no more self-evident than the simple propositions of arithmetic and at the conclusion of his analysis Farber<sup>(11)</sup> notes five assumptions in phenomenological analysis; 1) The existence of Consciousness 2) the validity of essential insight 3) the uniformity of the constituting process in consciousness 4) the validity of memory and 5) the egos of various types of construction <sup>\*(2)</sup>.

<sup>(7)</sup>  
<sup>\*(1)</sup> This distinction is sharply indicated in the debate between Lukes whose universal criteria of rationality is challenged by Hollis in the claim that the proposed universal criteria are simply those assumptions which the anthropologist has to make in order to present his investigations as a possibility. This does not prove the adequacy of such assumptions and we would argue that for as long as they are maintained as adequate they prevent the possibility of locating genuine universal criteria, which process involves the questioning of the adequacy of our everyday concept of rationality which is the aim of phenomenology.

<sup>\*(2)</sup> Farber, as a phenomenologist, tries to rescue the procedure from the alleged inadequacies by advocating their subjection to phenomenological analysis. This is plainly circular, especially as the acceptance of the first three pre-suppositions would be a pre-condition of carrying out such an analysis.

It is, therefore, necessary to examine these criticisms in the light of our understanding of the presuppositionless ideal. The criticisms made by Nakhnikian, McGill\* and Farber's first and third points all concern the questioning of the being of totally reliable knowledge and of consciousness which are precisely those data which Husserl's critique of scepticism and relativism has shown can be doubted only at the expense of contradiction. Farber's second point may also be taken as an instance of this type of erroneous criticism but, alternatively, it could be understood not as referring to a presupposition of phenomenology as such but as indicating the lack of clarity in Husserl concerning phenomenology's verification principle. Equally Farber's fifth point does not refer to a presupposition of phenomenology but to its alleged failure to establish the status of intersubjective knowledge. The fourth point made by Farber is simply wrong as it overlooks Husserl's distinction between apodictic retention and non-apodictic memory.

Thus, our consideration of the criticisms of the presuppositionless ideal has not revealed the presence in phenomenology of any presupposition which cannot be justified on the grounds of logical necessity that is, that the denial of the presupposition necessarily leads to absurdity. However we have identified two further objections to phenomenology concerning the problem of verification and the establishment of intersubjectivity and it is to the first of these that we now turn.

#### VERIFICATION AND ERROR

The question which is frequently raised in this context is how phenomenology can prove the accuracy of essential intuition. We intend to show that methods of empirical testing are inappropriate as means of proving the accuracy of phenomenological intuition. In so far as proof

\* McGill is unfortunate in that Husserl does, in fact, see mathematics as an eidetic science.



means the testing of an idea against observations of empirical data the question is misleading because phenomenology is deliberately devised so as to be independent of empirical events in the sense that no empirical observation can prove or disprove the adequacy of eidetic intuition. This is because empirical observation presupposes a prior conceptual grasp of the data which it cannot confirm and which phenomenology seeks to establish. Thus any attempted empirical refutation of phenomenology is based on an acceptance of concepts whose adequacy has been cast in doubt by phenomenology. Nor is it possible to test the conclusions of phenomenology by deducing from them certain empirical events of which the occurrence or failure to occur determines the truth or falsity of the eidetic intuition. This is because, once again, such a procedure is an attempt to make supposedly reliable, a priori truths dependant on empirical events which necessarily bear the hallmark of unreliability, that is, they could be other than they are and it would be absurd to make the inherently unreliable the test of claims to reliability. Equally, such a process presupposes the adequacy of its conceptual grasp of the data and if the eidetic intuition is doubted there must be some other concept, whose adequacy is accepted, by which the data is organised, but how is this acceptable concept established? This would inevitably lead to the contradictory situation of having to accept the adequacy of a concept in order that the concept's adequacy can be tested. The procedure of testing, outlined here, presupposes adequate concepts and, as a test, it is appropriate to existential propositions, that is theoretical statements about the inter-relationship, the processes, between already apprehended modes of Being. It is a test of explanatory theories, not of ideas which seek to describe the nature of Being\*. Finally, this

\* This distinction is frequently overlooked because of the loose usage of such terms as idea, concept, theory and hypothesis.

test, in its common form of the hypothetico-deductive model, is inappropriate to eidetic intuition because empirical events cannot be deduced or predicted from such intuition, to claim the opposite would be to argue for an a priori construction of the world. This is because, as was noted in the previous chapter, essences are necessary, empirical events are possibilities and there is a whole range of possible events which are compatible with the ontology of each eidetically perceived realm of Being. This realisation requires a qualification of our previous statement that eidetic intuition does not lead to prediction of empirical events. This is true in relation to statements about what will happen for a grasp of essence tells us, not what will happen, but what cannot happen. That is, from the perspective of essence anything is possible except that which contradicts the mode of Being which has been apprehended. The purpose of eidetic intuition is not to predict but to provide such reliable concepts, that our various acts of prediction will be seen to be concerned with real or actual modes of Being and not simply as part of instrumental knowledge or as products of mere agreements or as fictions\*. That is, the aim of phenomenology is to give us confidence in the adequacy of our concepts, by which we grasp and interpret empirical events. Husserl's guarantee of the reliability or truth of eidetic intuition lies in the rigorous rationality of the method of the reductions, not in empirical testing. As Welch<sup>(12)</sup> states, "An act of positing ... has its justification when it is reasonable; the rational character is itself the category of rightness which 'belongs' to it not

\* This raises the problem of the relevance of phenomenology for it might be concluded from the foregoing discussion that by protecting the reliability of its conclusions from empirical test phenomenology has to be seen as irrelevant to our understanding of empirical events. This is the reality problem of phenomenology and admittedly Husserl has no clear answer to the charge. This point will be considered below in our revision of phenomenology.



contingently as a fact ... but essentially"; for Husserl "rational" is equivalent to eidetic insight. Since eidetic insight tells us about Being, that which truly is and that which is rationally demonstrable are identical.

However Welch criticises Husserl's account of error for being contradictory on the grounds that, as Husserl believes that experiences are neutral, error cannot be located in them and therefore it must be found in the act of intuition. However, Husserl also claims that intuition cannot deceive since it is not based on a logical process of deduction or induction and therefore there is no possibility of error occurring as the consequence of a mistaken judgement. Welch's argument overlooks the fact that eidetic intuition is achieved through the reductions and therefore the genuineness of an intuition, ie. whether it is in fact an intuition or merely a re-affirmation of our naive beliefs, is dependant on the adherence to the correct procedure of reduction. However, this counter to Welch's argument simply casts the problem of verification in phenomenology in a new light, which is, how do we know that correct procedures have been used?

Husserl studiously attempts to avoid the problem by simply asserting that those who think correctly must agree. This is true but the problem remains of how we are to determine who has thought correctly when we are confronted by conflicting claims concerning eidetic intuition, or, indeed, in such a situation whether it is possible that the method has been correctly used by both protagonists but in relation to differing phenomena. A divergence between such results would be proper and the supposed disagreement would have to be shown to be based on a misunderstanding of each other's intentions. There is also the problem that although objectively valid cognitions ie. true eidetic intuitions, are those with which everyone must agree, this relationship cannot be

reversed into the claim that agreement is evidence for the adequacy of intuition.

Husserl<sup>(14)</sup> uses a further device for escaping from, rather than resolving, the problem of error and this is his claim that what has been grasped from the intuitive perspective can be understood and verified from an intuitive point of view. This is equally inadequate, not only because it fails to resolve the problem of disagreements between phenomenologists but also because it implies a similar, and ultimately self-destructive, justification as that claimed by psycho-analysis, that only those committed to psycho-analysis are in a position to criticise its adequacy. Such an argument, although it renders the method impervious to outside criticism, does so at the price of exposing the irrelevance of the method for non-practitioners. This is particularly apposite in the case of phenomenology for Husserl constantly asserts the value of phenomenology for those who stand outside it in the particular sciences.

Similarly, Husserl<sup>(15)</sup> asserts that as the aim of phenomenology is to bring perception to full clarity, by which is meant the apprehension of the self-givenness of experience, it would seem that only such clear perception can be intuited. This however simply raises the question of how we are to distinguish between the perfect and imperfect perception of self-givenness. Nor does Husserl justify the claim that only perfectly perceived self-evidence can be intuited when on the basis of his argument it would be more reasonable to state that only such perception can be fully or adequately intuited. To express the situation in these terms would be to raise the problem of error in phenomenology in an unavoidable fashion, that is, how can we distinguish between adequate and inadequate intuition? Husserl claims that the unclear phenomenon "does not pass into the circle of light reserved for that which is given



pure"<sup>(16)</sup> but this once again assumes that the reductions by which the "pure" is identified and separated from the "impure" have been properly carried out and this apparent inability to distinguish, in practise, between the distinguishing and necessary consequences of proper and improper procedure is the heart of the problem of error in phenomenology. Husserl does distinguish, in theory, between genuine and false degrees of clarity and obscurity, the former being that which belongs to the mode of being given and the latter being that which is a product of inadequate "seeing". Indeed, in this whole discussion Husserl<sup>(17)</sup> asserts the importance of clarity and non-contradiction in distinguishing between adequate and inadequate perception, but as these terms themselves remain unclarified they are no more than slogans, especially as Husserl refers to the need to destroy the merely apparent harmony between natural perceptions. How, then, are we to distinguish between a genuine and an apparent harmony?

It is noticeable that Husserl employs a constant tactic to avoid confronting this problem and that is to turn problems of phenomenology into problems for phenomenology. Thus the problem of establishing the reasonableness of claims made in the name of phenomenology becomes a phenomenology of reason; the problem of how to distinguish between adequate and inadequate grasp of self-evidence becomes the phenomenology of self-evidence that is, the consideration of vagueness and clarity as qualities of phenomena. This approach could be justified if the aim was, for instance, to clarify the necessary characteristics of the erroneous perception of self-evidence such that the presence of these characteristics would reveal the presence of error. Husserl does not attempt to do this and it could be argued that such a project is impossible because it is circular in that before such an enquiry can commence we must be able to

identify its object is. error. That is before we can discover the nature of error we must know what an erroneous judgement is. This argument clearly assumes that error is empirically established. It could be argued by nominalists that we should analyse what people mean when they use the term error, but this assumes that something definite and definable is meant, but what is to be done if there are conflicting uses of the term in everyday language; whose everyday language do we accept as definitive? Would it then be reasonable to state that we know what error is, or rather would we have to say that we think we know what certain people mean when they use the term error? We therefore propose to resolve the problem of error in phenomenology by identifying the necessary characteristics of genuine intuitions. We intend to avoid the circularity which this implies, which was noted above, by basing the argument on rational necessity and not on empirical observation of supposed erroneous judgements. In order to place the problem of error in its proper perspective in relation to eidetic intuition it must be recognised that the statement that an intuition is wrong is potentially misleading. This is because such a statement implies that the intuition, the idea, is necessarily incorrect, that error is its quality as would be the case in relation to a statement about a square triangle. Intuitions are ideas and rightness or wrongness is not a quality of the idea itself but of our judgements identifying a given phenomenon as a particularisation of the idea. Therefore our problem is not that of locating correct ideas but of correctly locating the idea in the phenomenon in terms of which the phenomenon is adequately known and this is the purpose of the reductions\*.

\* This argument refers back to the inapplicability of conventional illustrations of proof to phenomenology for all these presuppose that the phenomenon is known. Thus the questions, "what is the essence of religion" or "is X the essence of religion" is, to the phenomenologist, nonsensical for it presumes that the phenomena indicated by the term "religion" are particularisations of the one idea, that is, such a procedure attempts to establish a category before it establishes that the category exists or that it contains the intended phenomenon. The phenomenologist would seek to locate the essence of a phenomenon and then by free variation indicate the other phenomena which reveal the self-evidence of the essence, thus establishing the particular ontological



In fact the argument concerning the circularity involved in having to define error in order to find out what error is, which was noted above, offers a possible solution to this problem, for Husserl insisted that enquiry originate in phenomena not judgements and, further, as noted previously<sup>\*(1)</sup> error is merely a negative category, it is non-truth. Therefore we must ask what are the necessary characteristics of reliably apprehended data. This does not break the injunction on refraining from judgement for we are not saying "X is a reliable datum, what are its characteristics" for this clearly presupposes what has yet to be established, that X is a reliable datum. We are saying "if a datum is reliable as an eidetic datum what qualities must it possess?" ie. what is the idea of reliability; and, as noted in the previous chapter, the possibility of reliability is beyond doubt.

Certain qualities of the adequately intuited have been noted above<sup>\*(2)</sup>. Firstly, adequate intuition is immanent, that is, it makes no claims or assumptions concerning other phenomena and thus in order to accept the reliability of the adequate intuition it is not necessary to introduce ideas or assumptions concerning the reliability of other judgements. A further quality of the adequate intuition is its non-contradictory nature, or expressed differently, the idea contained in the adequate intuition must be seen as capable of realisation for only the inherently contradictory cannot be realised. It should be realised that the idea of contradiction is eidetic, that in asserting that the idea of a square triangle is contradictory we are claiming knowledge concerning the nature or quality of squares in general and triangles in general. Further, we know that the idea of a square triangle is contradictory because it demands the simultaneous and identical realisation of two modes of one general species,

<sup>\*(1)</sup> re below chapter 1.

<sup>\*(2)</sup> re, in particular, chapter one.

that of shape, for a mode of being can be particularised, in a single idea, in relation to only one of its possibilities. This is because the various aspects of a mode of being are alternatives to each other. Thus contradiction is the situation where one idea is composed of alternative possibilities. The eidetic status of contradiction is shown in this realisation that alternatives necessarily refer to the same essence, as being particularisations of that essence or, expressed in the language of the Wittgensteinian attempt to avoid using "essence", they belong to the same family<sup>\*(1)</sup> and that we recognise contradiction as such by, however unclearly, recognising the status of the contradictory elements as instances of the one idea. If we may be forgiven the Platonic language, we could express this idea by stating that an essence can be realised in only one of its aspects at a time, contradiction is the necessary error involved in the attempt to realise the idea in more than one of its modes at any one time. That is, it is impossible to identify one phenomenon with multiple particularisations of the same generic essence. Thus the term "square triangle" is contradictory and as a consequence it cannot be conceptually grasped other than by separating its elements, that is, by destroying the term. That is, a square triangle cannot be known. The idea of a hot triangle, however, while it may be regarded as peculiar or puzzling is not contradictory because the terms in the concept refer to different essences ~~is~~. heat and shape, and it is therefore possible to entertain this concept and, by free variation, to identify phenomena to which this description would be appropriate e.g. toast, a heating element etc. Thus that which is contradictory, that is, necessarily inconceivable, cannot be based on a genuine eidetic intuition for essences, as real, as modes of being, can give themselves only in a singular and non-contradictory manner<sup>\*(2)</sup> Equally no essence necessarily contradicts another essence,

\*(1) This could be further expressed in the slogan that contradiction is conceptual incest.

\*(2) This does not preclude the idea of phenomena being essential complexes.



therefore any essential complex is conceivable. In order to take account of the obvious objection to this statement that the idea of error contradicts the idea of truth we simply point out, again, that categories such as error are negative categories, error is non-truth, it is the absence of truth and is known by reference to the essence or idea of truth. The same will be seen to hold for all other supposed instances of contradictoriness between essences.

A further distinctive feature of adequate intuition is its non-derivability. That is, as opposed to naturalistic conclusions which posit the reliability of prior data, adequate intuition cannot be derived from other data. That is, it is impossible for us to posit the existence of knowledge from which the intuition is seen to follow. Thus if the intuition is seen to be non-derivable it must also be seen as basic, as a priori. In order to clarify this idea it is necessary to distinguish between the non-deducible or non-inducible and the wrongly deduced or induced. The latter is that which is a product of the deductive or inductive process but which is inadequate because the rules which govern the process have, in this instance, been wrongly applied. To take an instance of incorrect deduction:- All men are dark-haired; This is a dark-haired being; Therefore This is a man. Thus the data of the wrongly deduced has the quality, nevertheless, of that which is open to deduction. Such data are derivations not definitions, they posit contingent knowledge about the phenomenon in question which, therefore, could in theory be otherwise, hence the need for proof<sup>\*</sup>, or testing. Alternatively, genuinely intuited data, that which grasps the a priori, shows itself to be unamenable to procedures of proving and therefore they present themselves to a cognitive subject as absolute data.

\* Although it should be noted that the deductive method cannot guarantee the adequacy of its definitions or that the minor proposition is in fact a case of the major proposition.

This reference to the inevitable inadequacy of attempts to justify intuition by a logical process may give rise to the conclusion that judgements concerning essence are arbitrary and that, if an intuition can be shown to be non-contradictory, not dependant on other knowledge and non-derivable, it is acceptable. This would be a hasty conclusion for the discussion has, so far, considered only the qualities of genuine eidetic intuition as such; it is also necessary to apprehend the nature of the genuine eidetic grasp of phenomena. This introduces the complex problem of the relationship between fact and essence and the nature of necessity both of which will be discussed below<sup>\*</sup>. At this juncture we can anticipate some of the conclusions in that section and point out that what is achieved in the genuine eidetic grasp of phenomena is an involvement in the being of the object, of no longer remaining on the outside of the phenomenon but, instead, undergoing the experience of an ever-widening grasp of the nuances and implications of the phenomenon, seeing it develop, being led inevitably by the experience of the phenomenon. The genuine grasp of the phenomenon leads to the development of discourse concerning the nature of the phenomenon, whereas an inadequate grasp does not permit the development of knowledge immanent to the phenomenon, but, instead, can develop only by admitting contingency through having to develop by the addition of knowledge concerning other phenomena. This is because ideas concerning the nature of phenomena are the source of all our acts of positing directed to phenomena; apprehensions of essence, whether adequate or inadequate, are the origin of all our derivative acts. The nature and limitations of these acts therefore reveal whether we can achieve, in terms of knowledge, what we should be able to achieve if our original eidetic grasp of the phenomenon had been genuine. That is, if we had located the correct essence.

\* re chapter 7.



Admittedly many of these terms are unclear and require further justification but the point which we wish to make here is that, although the presence of the conditions outlined above would not constitute proof, in the usual sense of the term, of the adequacy of the intuition, they would remove any grounds on which to base a doubt of such adequacy. That is, although we cannot prove the adequacy of a claimed eidetic intuition we have established those conditions in which doubt of the genuineness of the intuition as an eidetic intuition and as a grasp of the essence of the phenomenon in question becomes unreasonable.

There remains the relatively minor problem of how phenomenology can account for error in everyday judgements. The only such judgements which are of concern to phenomenology are those which concern the supposed nature of phenomena. Mistakes in such judgements are accounted for by phenomenology in terms of the unclarity and naivety of the natural attitude and the intrusion of practical interests which deflect the theoretical enquiry. The important point here for phenomenology is that doubt is always possible in relation to natural cognitions and therefore every act of positing within the natural attitude bears with it the possibility of being wrong. It is this possibility of doubt which permits the perception of error although such perception implies the removal of error and therefore the attainment of absolutely reliable data. Thus phenomenology fulfills the intentions of everyday acts of positing. Therefore, the error of everyday perception to which phenomenology is relevant is category error, the incorrect identification of phenomena. As an instance it has been complained that identifying Christianity and the Essenes is like identifying a man and a fish because they are both wet when they come out of the sea. We are not concerned with the correctness of the statement but with the fact that it involves an appeal to essence, that is, it is held that Christianity and the

Essenes can be identified only by reference to contingent non-essential aspects of these phenomena, and therefore such identity is false.

It may be objected by nominalists that this assumption is itself erroneous and that the adequacy of identity is based simply on rules governing the use of the words Christianity, Essenes, man and fish. The statement referred to above indicates merely that the rules governing the use of these words are not clear and unambiguous and therefore cannot function as rules and that the statement, itself, is an attempt to define the rules. Further it would seem that it is believed that such rules can be defined only by a prior grasp of the nature of the phenomena i.e. it is wrong to identify Christianity and the Essenes (rule) because they are qualitatively distinct (essence). Further the statement is implying an imperative, the idea that such an identification must be wrong. The concept of rule-following cannot account for this idea of an imperative. In asserting that a statement is erroneous the rule-following theory claims a status of total reliability for its judgement despite its denial of such reliability because even the rules are seen as arbitrary, having no inner necessity and as vulnerable to change. Phenomenology, however, takes account of the idea of the imperative for it recognises that in order for conceptualisation to be seen as reliable it must merit the imperative. That is, we must be able to say of our identification of phenomena "it has to be so", and as seen above, the aim of phenomenology is to clarify and ground this idea, changing it from assumption into certainty. The presence of the imperative reveals a further weakness in the rule-following idea for it is not clear why we should follow the rules nor why breaking the rules should be considered as error if it cannot be shown that the rules are necessary and as such are derived from reliable knowledge. It is also not clear how we justify the claim that a rule has been broken, unless it is by reference to a further rule which defines the



first rule and this tends towards the prospect of an infinite regress\*.

### LANGUAGE AND PHENOMENOLOGY

The claim that phenomenology could not take into account the possibility of error in the use of the phenomenological method was based partly on the idea that phenomenology's removal from the everyday world had made its procedures untestable in relation to that world. This idea is also advanced in the criticism that by removing itself from the everyday world, seeing the concepts in which this world is known as unreliable and by seeking essences not perceived in that world, phenomenology cannot use the language of the everyday world. Therefore, it cannot express itself to the holders of that naive knowledge which it seeks to correct. Thus phenomenology, even if true, is irrelevant because it is inexpressible in relation to those who would be expected to benefit from it. Thus phenomenology would at best become a closed circle of initiates which could not be extended to the whole of humanity as an alternative to the natural attitude because the outlook of phenomenology is purely theoretical and therefore could not replace the practical oriented natural attitude. At worst, it is possible that, as eidetic intuition is achieved by individuals, it cannot be expressed to other phenomenologist's or even for as long as the phenomenologist has only everyday language at his disposal, to himself.

It must be admitted that Husserl avoided direct contact with this problem by dedicating his working life to an exposition and justification of the phenomenological method. Particular phenomenological analyses were carried out by his students or co-workers and it is probable that Husserl did not therefore recognise the existence and gravity of this problem. His simplistic assertion that "we can make our speech conform in a pure measure to what is seen in its full clarity"(19) has been

\* This topic will be developed further in the discussion of Winch re chapter 4.

justifiably termed naive by Nakhnikian<sup>(20)</sup> "as if language were the sort of thing that the phenomenologist could create at will in the image of ultimate facts". Similarly the significance of this problem is accidentally revealed by Berger<sup>(21)</sup> who tries to explain away the dichotomy between realism and idealism in Husserl's work by claiming that it is merely an apparent problem because Husserl had to use language appropriate to the natural attitude which itself reflects this ambiguity. If this is so, and the discoveries achieved in eidetic intuition are expressible only in terms of natural attitude language then on Berger's account the expression of such discoveries is bound to be distorted\*. Nevertheless, Husserl<sup>(22)</sup> feels able to criticise natural science's shifting concepts and constantly re-defined language, seeing this as a consequence of its groundlessness, but he simply asserts that a definitive scientific language can follow from the analysis of phenomena. Thus, if phenomenology is to provide an answer to this problem it must look elsewhere than to Husserl.

Santayana<sup>(23)</sup> accepts that essences can be identified only by being placed in a natural context through language borrowed from the material or everyday world and a consideration of this claim will enable us to

\* This contention raises the distinction between things as they are and things as they appear in a peculiar form. This distinction is usually understood as referring to the perception of things whereas the implication of Berger's statement is that this distinction is based on the communicability of knowledge, transcendental knowledge being, implicitly, seen as private, natural attitude knowledge as public. As a consequence utterances which can convey transcendental knowledge are impossible. It may be inferred that this inadequacy justifies the nominalist's view that our concepts deal with words not essences and that we can only grasp an idea as a word which is already part of our vocabulary and whose usage we have learnt. It is possible that this does happen but we deny that it must happen because such an account cannot comprehend the acquisition of novel ideas. To say that the acquisition of novel ideas is simply a process of learning new words does not tell us why the idea is accepted or why the idea contained in the word is seen as an appropriate expression of a particular experience, such that when a person is introduced to the word and its definition he can say "Yes, that is what I meant".



offer a solution to the problem of phenomenology's language. Even if a specialised language were possible it would be contradictory for it to be used by phenomenology because phenomenology defines itself as relevant to the everyday world and by using a specialised language it would separate itself from this world in much the same way as, in Husserl's opinion, science had done. In such a situation there would be a need to translate the specialised language into the terms of everyday apprehension\* and, therefore, the problem would remain of how to achieve this without distortion. Thus, phenomenology, in order to achieve its foundation-building aim, cannot afford the luxury of creating for itself a kingdom not of this world through use of a language for initiates only. It should also be understood that the term "specialised language" does not refer simply to the use of terms not found in everyday speech but also to the particular and "un-natural" relevance structures and models which inform these languages. It is therefore not enough to use ordinary words while re-defining their meaning as does the psychologist who tells us that what he means by "intelligence" is not what the non-specialist means by this term. If the non-specialist asks how his understanding of his experiences relate to these scientific terms, why scientists cannot tell him about intelligence as he understands, he is told that he is using such terms in a non-scientific fashion and therefore his question is meaningless. This is true but it does not make the sciences any more relevant or comprehensible to the outsider. If phenomenology is to succeed in clarifying and founding everyday knowledge it cannot build linguistic barriers between it and those who hold this knowledge.

An apparent contradiction emerges here because phenomenology also declares that the natural attitude is partial and obscure therefore how can phenomenology express its reliable knowledge in a manner which is understandable to those in the natural attitude without partialising and

\* By translation into everyday apprehension we do not mean popularisation of the "sociology made easy" type.

obscuring this reliable datum. The answer to this problem requires a clarification of the function of language in phenomenology. The previous discussion of the problem of error showed that intuition cannot be proved, nor as the natural attitude is unreliable, is it possible to assert a direct identity between the intuition and everyday conceptualisation. Our alternative to these positions is in accordance with our realistic understanding of essence and this is that language is indicative, it points to ideas and their realisations. Further, the essence is not alien to the person in the natural attitude for it is that which his acts intend, the grasp of essence would be the fulfillment of the intention. Thus our aim would be to use language so as to lead or guide the person in the natural attitude to a recognition of the essence, as that which is intended by his conscious acts within the natural attitude. Thus, the language used by phenomenology to express its eidetic intuitions would be evocative or poetic. It should re-express the eidetic intuition in terms of its various, possible particularisations so as to "strike a chord" in the experience of the audience\*. The aim of this procedure is to persuade the audience to perceive the essence within their own actual or imaginary experience. Such grasp of essence is self-validating in that it is not imposed on the audience by an external logic but is a personal achievement of the audience. Thus the phenomenologist guides his audience but the actual grasp of eidetic content is an act of the audience itself.

The possibility of this process depends on the adequacy of a large number of assumptions concerning the relationship between essence and object and the nature of intersubjectivity. In particular it requires that essences can be shown to be located in phenomena and are not distinct from phenomena and further that essence is the being of phenomena so that the act of indicating a phenomenon is necessarily an adequate or inadequate

\*Such a process is to be found in the phenomenological work of Scheler  
Re below Chapter 6.



invoking of essence. This to be acceptable would require the demonstration of the falsity of the fact/essence distinction, or, at least, the demonstration that this distinction is analytic not real. This argument also entails the view that the phenomenological reductions simply give us clear perception of what is already there in the phenomenon; they do not create an essence which is then incorporated in the object. In other words, it is necessary to justify a realistic as opposed to idealistic interpretation of essence. The second major assumption in our account of the communicability of eidetic intuition is that such knowledge is not private but is necessarily universal; that it does not belong to a particular consciousness but to all consciousnesses. That is, this knowledge can be grasped by any cognitive subject. The final assumption is that in order to convey the eidetic intuition in the manner outlined above to one who has not experienced it, it is necessary for us to express it in terms such that they can know the experience even without undergoing it. This requires that we establish the possibility of genuine intersubjective understanding. This is the first indication that intersubjectivity is not simply a problem for phenomenology to clarify but is the problem of phenomenology. That is, phenomenology must be able to establish intersubjective knowledge as a reliable datum if it is to achieve its goal of making eidetic intuition generally available as the means of grounding the particular sciences and everyday conceptual acts. If these possibilities can be established as truths then the general availability and communicability of eidetic intuition within the natural attitude is possible. These two basic problems which are unresolved in Husserl, the clarification of the relationship between fact and essence and the possibility of establishing intersubjectivity within the phenomenological epoche, will form the programme of our revision of phenomenology\*. Before this is undertaken

\* see below chapter 7.

it is necessary, to continue the investigation of phenomenology's alleged weaknesses and then to consider how the problem of intersubjectivity, which is as crucial for an adequate interpretive sociology as it is for phenomenology, has or has not been resolved by Husserl or sociology.

It is, however, relevant at this point following the discussion of language in phenomenology to advance an initial justification of our realistic interpretation of essence by contrasting it with the nominalistic position, that is with the idea that only the particular is real and that supposed essences are merely words or names by which a chaotic experience is organised. The nominalistic view, therefore, sees the use of general terms as not being a matter of necessity but of habit or rule-following. Thus, rationality for the nominalist means adherence to rules, not conformity to the nature of things. Undoubtedly if the nominalistic position was accepted phenomenology's language problem would disappear and it would be seen as just one language game among others. We intend to show that such a conclusion would involve the adoption of an unacceptable position. Indeed the very existence of a language problem in the form which it takes for phenomenology indicates that phenomenology is attempting to communicate a reality which is not adequately named. That is, if reality and acts of naming were equivalent it is difficult to see how phenomenology's language problem could arise. Thus the fact that phenomenology finds existing language inadequate implies that the adequacy of this language is being judged by non-linguistic criteria i.e. eidetic intuition, which is seen to confirm or deny language's rationality and on which language therefore depends for its sense. This leads us to ask why existing language is inadequate for the phenomenologist. We would argue that reliance on everyday language is inadequate because it conveys significance, that is, individual interests and perspectives not meaning, that is, the indubitable nature of being. Everyday use of language



tends to confuse significance and meaning, and therefore naively accepts that its particular perspective is universally acceptable and accessible.

This situation has been recognised by nominalists, such as Wittgenstein, but the Wittgensteinian recognition of this common-sense fallacy leads not to the positing of an indubitability which transcends particular perspectives but to an acceptance of the relativistic status of these perspectives or language games each with its own proper and limited sphere. However, like all relativisms this argument contradicts itself for, in the terms of its own argument the Wittgensteinian analysis is merely another language game which is no more able than any other language game to claim priority. Therefore the recognition of language-games has to be seen by the Wittgensteinian as itself part of a language-game and if someone else wishes to play the language-game of indubitable philosophy any attempt by the Wittgensteinian to deny its validity and assert the accuracy of his account of knowledge is, in his own terms, an illegitimate interference in someone else's game\*. That is, the relativistic conception of knowledge implied in the idea of language-games if applied to the idea that there are language games results in the removal of any reason for the non-Wittgensteinian to accept that the idea is binding. Thus this approach is led into the nonsensical position of all relativisms of having to assert that all knowledge is relative except the knowledge that all knowledge is relative, which knowledge must then have an absolute status and thus the initial relativistic proposition is denied.

The solipsism and egocentrism implied in nominalism as a consequence of its confusion of meaning and significance is shown in that it only grants clear being to things according to our ability to name them and

\* It is also not clear how the Wittgensteinian is able to assert the necessity of rules without also undermining his relativism re above chapter 1.

thus it implies that things are real only if we choose to see them as such and there is no conception of our responding to an objective reality and consequently modifying our language.

Thus, we would argue, naming is not knowing where this latter term implies a disclosure of the phenomenon's nature. The act of naming for the nominalist does not even require prior knowledge of the phenomenon in itself for such naming simply refers a thing to its immediate context through its significance for the namer. It is not appreciated that in order to name a phenomenon rationally it is necessary to have prior knowledge of the thing in itself. Naturalistic naming, being a product of significance not meaning, is in constant flux, thus the nominalist's idea of the non-existence of necessity in naming, is a product of the naive acceptance of naturalistic naming. This then forms part of a self-fulfilling prophecy in which inadequate knowledge is used to demonstrate the impossibility of adequate, or necessary, knowledge.

In claiming that in rational discourse the name of a phenomenon is integral to the phenomenon we are not referring to the sound of the word or its status as part of language, we are stating the idea that in meaningful, intersubjectively grounded discourse the name of a thing is seen to indicate its nature or essence. This raises the problem that if this is so, how is it possible that we can give a single phenomenon a range of names e.g. dog, mammal, animal, pet etc. are we to say one name is the true one and all others are false? This objection assumes that a phenomenon is composed of a single essence, and as our clarification of the inner horizon\* shows, this is not necessarily so. Thus an object can be a particularisation of more than one essence, it can express a potentially unlimited range of qualities, that is, perceived objects can be essential complexes. In identifying and naming the phenomenon we would, in rational insight, identify a quality expressed in that phenomenon, holding

\* re below chapter 1.



other qualities in abeyance as the inner horizon, which qualities can themselves be the object of a subsequent eidetic intuition. The identification of one particular quality does not compromise the other qualities of the object, but permits us to identify the class of phenomena to which the object belongs in respect of this particular quality. Thus, in answer to the objection above, we would say that all the names given to a phenomenon could be true, in so far as they indicated qualities contained in the object; that the object can be identified with all these qualities without contradiction.

#### ALTERNATIVISM

The recognition that appearances are eidetic complexes is the basis of our response to the challenge of relativism. Certain thinkers such as Weber have claimed that the fact that a phenomenon can be studied in relation to varying aspects justifies the relativistic position. For instance, capitalism can be seen as an economic system, an attitude to life etc. and therefore one cannot study capitalism as such, only particular aspects of capitalism. Our discovery that phenomena are eidetic complexes reveals the inadequacy of this claim. Weber's belief that the variety of aspects of a phenomenon which can be studied entails relativism is based on a confusion of meaning and significance. That is, in terming a phenomenon capitalism he, and we in the natural attitude, ignore certain revealed essences and concentrate our attention on other essences, but we mistakenly identify the whole appearance with that one aspect which is of significance to us. Thus, we violate the self-givenness of other essences within the phenomenon. We therefore propose in opposition to relativism the notion of alternativism by which we mean the recognition that any appearance being composed of independent, non-contradictory essences, provides alternative possibilities of eidetic intuition. This

differs from relativism in that it does not say that, for instance, one can study capitalism as either an attitude to life or as an economic system but that the complex appearance which we naively term capitalism can be studied in relation to varying qualities which it reveals. We may restrict the term capitalism to one of these qualities e.g. a type of economic system but this is independent of and does not compromise the decision to discuss the phenomenon in terms of its status as a belief system.

#### ESSENCE AND GENERAL TERMS

The reference to the role of qualities in discourse leads us to recognise that essences are not to be equated with general terms but that general terms, if they are to be used in rational discourse presuppose and indicate the essence as that on which their sense depends. Thus, Santayana<sup>(24)</sup> "had a term no individual essence there could be no meaning in predicating it and it could not be predicated of two things in the same sense since it would have no sense".

It could however be maintained that concepts or general terms are products of agreement between subjects and therefore there is no need to posit essence in order to comprehend the consistent usage of terms. In order to examine the adequacy of this idea it is necessary to consider the act of agreeing. In order for this act to have the status claimed for it, that is, for the act of agreeing to be the basis of discourse it must have a necessity denied to other conscious acts in order for it to be seen as the inevitable origin of all discourse. That is, the act of agreeing has to be placed outside the circle of arbitrariness which is seen to apply to discourse in general in order to avoid the contradictory assertion that the act of agreeing is simply a name which we have agreed to give to the act of agreeing (which came first, the agreement or the



agreeing). Thus, if the act of agreeing and the agreement itself are to make sense they must be seen as non-arbitrary, as based on necessity. It must be understood that we are not asserting the necessity of all acts of agreement, such as agreement concerning the use of names, but that the nominalist is forced to admit the existence of necessity, and a limitation to the adequacy of his explanation of discourse as based on agreement, in respect of the general act of agreeing. Thus, the statement "We agree to make arbitrary or convenient choices" is contradictory for although the content of the particular agreement may be arbitrary<sup>\*</sup> the agreement to agree must be seen as binding and as having a universal meaning. We cannot say that the decision as to what constitutes agreement can itself be a consequence of arbitrary or convenient choice for this would make it impossible to state definitively when an agreement had been reached. Thus, the nominalist's claim that the usage of terms is based on agreement implies the possession of knowledge concerning the meaning of agreement for others which in the nominalist's own terms, he could not possess in a reliable fashion. Thus in order for the nominalist's position to be sensible he has to admit the existence of necessity in relation to the act of agreement. Since there is no justification for seeing this act as alone being necessary, this admission undermines the nominalist's whole position and introduces the possibility of necessity as opposed to simple agreement into our use of general terms. Thus, the possibility is raised within nominalism that our agreements concerning the use of terms can be criticised as being right or wrong in relation to the being of the phenomena to which they refer as the only possible origin of necessity, that is, essence.

Our consideration of the problem posed by language for phenomenology has been wide-ranging but we can summarise its conclusions in the

\* This does not mean that it must be arbitrary.

following points. We have demonstrated that Husserl fails to recognise this problem but we have also sought to justify the claim that, despite this, eidetic intuitions can be expressed to those in the natural attitude through the use of evocative imagery. We also noted various assumptions contained in this solution which will be discussed below, Further we argued that in order for language to be rationally grounded it must be based on an apprehension of the qualities of the objects which it invokes. Finally, as part of this argument, we criticised the nominalistic view that language is not based on the belief in the necessity of concepts but on acts of agreement by showing the contradictory nature of this position.

The discussion of naming and the inadequacies of the nominalist position requires us to consider a particularly strong and influential nominalist objection directed against phenomenology's essentialism which was made by Wittgenstein\*.

#### WITTGENSTEIN AND PHENOMENOLOGY

Although Wittgenstein does not refer directly to phenomenology, it is clearly implicated in his general critique of essentialism in philosophy<sup>(26)</sup>, in which he uses the situation of reading as a test for the method and his argument can be summarised as follows. The essence of reading is said to be that which different kinds of reading have in common. Essentialism assumes that essence is hidden and needs a special effort to make it apparent but if we read with the intention of finding out what happens when we read then we are performing a special case of reading which is different from reading in the ordinary sense.

\* Although Husserl never referred directly to Wittgenstein, his attitude to linguistic analysis in general is expressed in his statement, "Away with empty word analyses! We must question things themselves. Back to experience, to seeing which alone can give our words sense and rational justification"(25).



Thus, a description based on such an examination is not adequate for a general description of reading. If we say that the phenomenon comes into pure sight on close inspection, and we are describing how it looks from far off, the description is not made more accurate by describing the object on close inspection. This argument had in fact been considered by Husserl who admitted that a change of perspective is involved in phenomenological reflection but denied the relevance of the change, "We convince ourselves that these experiences retain their meaning and their right even in their reduced form and in a general and essentially universal way we grasp the right of such kinds of experiences generally just as parallel therewith we grasp the right of essential insights relating to experiences in general"<sup>(27)</sup>. This is no more than a blank denial of the problem but Husserl makes a more important point when he states that this type of argument used against phenomenology is self-defeating for if it is true, "We should be maintaining too much when, in self-observation, we set it down that we had just been attending here to his book and are continuing to do so. That held good, no doubt, prior to reflexion. Reflexion however changed the attentive 'experience to be described' and indeed ... in respect of the objective relation". Thus this argument against phenomenology presupposes as valid in its own case what it attempts to show is invalid in phenomenology. If reading and looking at reading in order to understand reading are two such distinct acts that statements about the former which are based on the latter are invalid then, equally, the difference between the act of using the phenomenological method and the act of reflecting critically on it must be such that any such criticisms are also invalid. If Wittgenstein believes that he can reflect on and derive relevant conclusions from this reflection upon phenomenology he cannot criticise phenomenology for believing that it can reflect on objects.

Wittgenstein's second criticism, that a change of perspective is involved in reflection on essence which destroys the validity of our

perception of the original phenomenon, is wrongly placed because it is dependant on a misleading spatial analogy. To state that the seeing of a thing from afar is distorted when it is subjected to close inspection assumes that "close" is being used spatially. This is not so for by close inspection the phenomenologist would not understand physical proximity but a rigorous, exhaustive and reliable investigation of either the act or what is given in the act. Nor would it be reasonable to state that a rigorous, exhaustive and reliable investigation of a vague perception must destroy the original vagueness, for such an inspection would have only the aim of revealing what vagueness is. That is, it does not follow that our conceptualisation of vagueness must itself be vague or, to develop this point, that our conceptualisation of error must itself be wrong. An alternative reformulation of Wittgenstein's objection would be that if we attempt to achieve a reliable, definitive grasp of what was given vaguely or from afar we must add things to it that were not included in the original perception and therefore our understanding will be relevant only to cases of perfect, not vague or removed perception. This argument overlooks the distinction between noesis and noema for, as seen above, if the object of enquiry is the nature of the intentional act then a clear conception does not compromise the nature of the act. However, the objection may seem to be of greater relevance in relation to the situation where the enquiry is directed towards the object of the intentional act because it would seem that if a thing is given fleetingly or indistinctly or vaguely we cannot achieve a clear perception of it without repeating the perception so that it is seen clearly and distinctly. Thus, any subsequent reflection will be irrelevant to the original vague, indistinct perception. This argument raises considerations concerning the problem of perspective in phenomenology which will be considered further below but we can, at this point, demonstrate that this argument is based on a fallacious identity



of the appearing object and essence. That is, it assumes that the resulting eidetic intuition applies to the object in all its aspects. As we have shown above objects are complexes of essence and thus in reflection we consider one of the alternative particularisations of essence which are present in the object, placing the other appearing qualities in the phenomenon's internal horizon of those qualities with which it was given on this occasion. Thus, even in fleeting or vague perception something is given and this something is the object of phenomenological reflection. This is so because the idea of vagueness refers not to the thing given but to the uncertainty concerning the attendant qualities of the phenomenon, but the thing which is given can be clearly apprehended. Thus I may see a red ball but my perception of it may be such that I see only its colour and movement. In which case my reflection can reveal either the nature of redness or in general, of movement in general. If a subsequent perception shows that my initial perception was of a red ball, this merely opens up a wider range of possible objects for eidetic analysis but it in no way compromises the adequacy of my initial intuitions. Qualities do not give themselves vaguely or distinctly, they simply give themselves. If we state that a perception is vague or unclear that is not a statement about the phenomena which are given or even about the adequacy of our perception for it refers simply to a judgement of the object's significance for us. To state that a perception is vague is to claim that a quality which is of value for us as practical creatures has not been revealed or that the presumed relevant features of the object have not become apparent.

The objection to phenomenology which has just been considered is closely related to Wittgenstein's third argument against essentialism. This is that states of mind intervene in our perception of things and therefore what we see as a phenomenon's essence when we are tired will not

be the same as when we are awake and alert<sup>\*(1)</sup> It must be admitted that, at times, Husserl made himself vulnerable to this charge by referring to optimum conditions for the perception of phenomena. However, we are convinced that Wittgenstein's objection is invalid and that there is no need for phenomenology to make potentially damaging concessions towards it. Wittgenstein's objections are appropriate to naive contemplation but not to phenomenology because the latter uses a rigorous method in order to grasp essences or a priori data. Our criteria of adequate eidetic intuition described above<sup>\*(2)</sup>, permits us to check our intuition so that if states of mind have not been reduced and have prevented us from achieving an adequate grasp of essence this can be recognised. Equally, the method of free variation allows us to determine whether the intuited essence is the quality of the intended object. Thus, we accept that there is a possibility of states of mind thwarting eidetic intuition but Wittgenstein's arguments on this point would undermine phenomenology only if it could be shown that such distortion is not detectable and we have shown above that there are procedures through which inadequate intuition can be recognised as such. The remainder of Wittgenstein's criticisms of essentialism are not applicable to phenomenology. They either assume that essence is grasped in mystical contemplation<sup>(29)</sup>, whereas the purpose of phenomenology for Husserl was to enable the grasp of essence in a totally rational intuition the validity of which could not be reasonably doubted, or they concern questions previously considered, such as why intuition should be trusted. Thus, we cannot accept Wittgenstein's conclusion that essentialism, at least in so far as this applies to phenomenology, substitutes "miracles for everyday events",

<sup>\*(1)</sup> It should also be noted that this argument is also self-destructive - in what state of mind was Wittgenstein when he contemplated essentialism?

<sup>\*(2)</sup> re page 68 ff.



if this is taken to mean that everyday events are made inaccessible to human reason since Husserl's intention was to rationalise experience, and Wittgenstein has failed to demonstrate phenomenology's inadequacy in this respect. We will show below that this aim of Husserl can be attained within phenomenology.

It is now necessary to complete our discussion of Wittgenstein's critique of essentialism by considering the adequacy of his attempts to avoid using the concept of essence.

Wittgenstein wished to substitute the idea of family resemblances for essence, but his idea of essence is a straw man and his critique of the idea of essence is irrelevant to phenomenology. Thus Wittgenstein criticises a weak concept of essence when he claims that although we assume that all games have something in common if we try to identify this common aspect we find that it is totally elusive. Thus, some games are ball games, others are card games, some are played by teams and others by individuals, therefore there is no game-ness which can be located in all these different events. Apart from the obvious objection that Wittgenstein has not looked particularly hard to find the "essence" of games, his approach to this problem is open to the phenomenological criticism in that he naively accepts the adequacy of the everyday use of the term "game". That is, he accepts that the everyday understanding of "game" is adequate in that he derives all his instances of game from this category, in order to show that the category of game is not reducible to a single essence. This idea is in fact the starting point of phenomenology for Husserl also recognises the ambiguity and lack of clarity in everyday categorisations although he does not commit Wittgenstein's nonsense of assuming the adequacy of everyday perception in order to demonstrate its inadequacy. Thus, this objection by Wittgenstein to essentialism is really a justification of Husserl's objection to reliance

on naive, uncritical, everyday conceptualisation. As we would say, developing Husserl's ideas, the things which everyday perception terms games, are like all phenomena, essential complexes, that is, they are particularisations of a potentially infinite series of (non-contradictory) essences. Thus, if we accept for the moment that there is a quality common to all games which is the intended object of all game-oriented everyday conscious acts, our naive perceptions of games involves the wider context of other qualities which form the context of each particular game e.g. games plus competition, or co-operation, games plus teamness or individuality, games plus physical or mental effort etc. These, as we have stated above constitute the inner horizon of the intended quality which is, in this case game-ness. As we also noted, the naive attitude typically ignores the existence of this inner horizon, that is it confuses meaning and significance. It overlooks the complex nature of the appearance and identifies it with one quality which is of significance to the naive individual and which may or may not be present, but almost certainly is not the only quality present. Thus the naive conceptualisation is a statement that a particular quality is of interest or significance to the subject, therefore the other qualities of the phenomenon are ignored and the phenomenon is acted towards as if it consisted solely of this one quality. This is significant as opposed to meaningful identification of phenomena. Thus Wittgenstein is correct in claiming that those things termed games cannot be reduced to one quality but this is not as Wittgenstein believes because quality cannot be identified but because the naive categorisation of phenomena does not distinguish adequately between differing qualities given in the one perception. Thus any attempt to discover the quality of game-ness by inductive analysis, that is, by looking at those things usually called games will discover that there are many and even contradictory aspects



to games. This is a consequence of the inadequacy of naive, significant, conceptualisation not proof that game-ness does not exist. Thus, again Wittgenstein's critique simply reveals the necessity of Husserl's denial of the adequacy of the natural attitude.

A third error is also present in Wittgenstein's critique and this is his grasp of the idea of essence which he confuses with generality, hence the inductivist nature of his attempt to discover the essence of games. It is true that essence is common to all those things which belong to the essentially defined category; that is, it is true that all phenomena which are correctly designated as red possess the quality of redness. However our account of the eidetically complex nature of appearances means that we cannot identify essence with all those features common to phenomena which are said to express the essence in question. For instance if we wish to grasp the idea of redness, assuming the adequacy of the everyday conceptualisation of red, and identified this essence with that which all red objects have in common, this would lead to the conclusion that spatial extension is a quality of redness. The non-sensical nature of this conclusion is shown by the fact that if the same process is performed in respect to the quality of green-ness we would again reach the conclusion that spatial extension is a quality of green-ness. Thus we would be faced with the contradictory assertion that spatial extension is essential to, i.e. is immanent and peculiar to, both red-ness and green-ness. Thus, essence is not just generality but also exclusivity, that is red-ness belongs to all red objects and to them alone. It cannot be predicated of non-red phenomena, even though they may share other common features with red objects. Thus the statement that essence is that which is common to all objects belonging to a particular category, cannot be reversed, as Wittgenstein does, into the claim that all things which are common to members of a category constitute the essence of that

category. This was noted by Husserl early in his career when he distinguished between all A's; A's in general; essential A. The exclusivity of essence, as well as establishing the inappropriateness of the inductive method as a means of revealing essence, has a further important consequence in that it demonstrates the inappropriateness of any attempt to reveal essence by a simple inspection of objects. This is so because it is not possible to set about looking at objects in order to find out what is not there, so as to exclude such objects from the essential category without first grasping the essence or idea itself. This reveals the correctness of Husserl's claim that essences are first grasped as ideas, that the idea is the pure realisation of essence and that only when this has been achieved can we recognise the essence in its various realisations. That is, we must know the essence before we can expect to recognise it. Hence Wittgenstein's procedure by which he denies the existence of an essence of game-ness would not be possible unless he had an idea of what game-ness was in order to identify particular games as being games, on which identification rests the appropriateness of his argument.

It may have been this consideration which prevented Wittgenstein from jettisoning the idea of essence completely for he is unwilling to admit that our group concepts are arbitrary. Such a position would in fact undermine his argument against essentialism which is based on the claim that a study of the nature of games reveals the non-existence or unknowability of essence. If group concepts were arbitrary then conclusions derived from their use would be equally arbitrary and Wittgenstein could therefore not claim a definitive or binding status for his denial of essentialism which would have to be recognised as based on arbitrary concepts. At this point the essentialist could refute Wittgenstein's argument by claiming that his failure to grasp the



essence of games is a consequence of his admittedly inadequate conceptualisation of the idea of games. Thus Wittgenstein claims that although there are no essences that there are family resemblances between phenomena, "series of similarities and relationships"<sup>(30)</sup>. This is supposed to indicate the absence of one trait linking members of a conceptual group and to advance the idea that there are a series of overlapping similarities. Expanding the analogy Stegmüller states that "Some members of (a human family) resemble each other in figure, others in the shape of the nose or the colour of the eyes, others in gait, temperament and so forth"<sup>(31)</sup>. This clearly reveals, if unintentionally, the weaknesses of Wittgenstein's position for we do not identify Sally and Billy Jones as being members of the same family because they are both cross-eyed but because we believe them to have an origin which is not shared by non-members of the family, that they are, in this sense, exclusive. Therefore, if family resemblances are asserted to exist between the members of a concept group, these resemblances being similarities, then the resemblances must be peculiar to members of that group. If we find a phenomenon which is placed outside the group which possesses these resemblances then we must include it within the family. The admission of this point reveals that there is no difference between the ideas of essence and family resemblances, except for clarity. That, like essence, family resemblance is the means of identifying phenomena and of placing the boundaries between one type of phenomenon and another. Indeed, the only major difference would appear to be that Husserl identifies single essences whereas Wittgenstein sees family resemblances as multiple, but our conception of phenomena as eidetic complexes would indicate that Wittgenstein simply lacks the clarity of vision to distinguish between independent qualities given in

\* This indicates Wittgenstein's equation of essence with perceptual traits, not ideal qualities as Husserl insists.

the one appearance, and thus he tends to confuse qualities given in this way. Further there is clearly an assumption of single essence or definitive quality in Wittgenstein's account for the family does not in fact consist of all phenomena which share the resemblances. Thus Wittgenstein distinguishes between card-games, ball games, board-games etc. as part of his argument that games are various and cannot be reduced to one quality. This argument depends on the presence of differing characteristics within games e.g. balls, cards, boards. However, a workman clocking-on uses a card, is he playing a game? A demolisher may use a ball to knock down a house, is he really playing bowls? A butcher cuts meat on a board are we to say that this is a game, like someone playing monopoly? We would suggest that these activities would not be included in the common-sense notion of games nor does Wittgenstein himself include such acts but on Wittgenstein's account there is no justification for omitting them. If concept groups are made up of family resemblances, then these activities should be included because they do resemble games, they use balls, cards and boards. It may be argued that these activities are excluded because they do not use the right sort of equipment that is, they do not use game-balls, game-cards, game-boards. This reversal of the Wittgensteinian mode of expression ("card-game" to "game-card") reveals that his argument is based on the implicit assumption that "card" etc. qualify "game", that is, reveal alternative aspects of games. However, the postulated answer to our criticism has to explain the exclusion of certain uses of cards, boards and balls by recognising that 'game' qualifies all these terms. That is, the idea of game determines whether or not certain cards or uses of cards can be included in the family of games and thus we are brought back to the idea of essence. That is, it is not the card-ness of cards that identifies them as belonging to games but the game-ness of certain cards.



It may be argued that we have erected a feeble counter-argument to our position but it is difficult to see how Wittgenstein could justify the exclusion of the cases cited above from the family of games without invoking the idea of the quality or essence of games. Thus, we conclude that Wittgenstein destroyed a straw-man idea of essence, only to re-admit the idea of essence into his theory but under a different name, that of "family resemblance". We would also see Wittgenstein's lack of clarity concerning essences, even in their re-admitted disguise, as the product of the inadequate, groping nature of eidetic perception typical of the naive attitude which thus points towards the rigorous clarity of the phenomenological method. The argument that this unclear perception is a more genuine perception repeats the fallacy of confusing vague perception with the perception of vagueness which was noted above. Thus Wittgenstein's denials of essentialism are shown, on critical analysis, to be indicators for the need, even within Wittgenstein's argument, of the phenomenological method.

There remains one objection to phenomenology to consider before the discussion of the problem of intersubjectivity. Like so many others this problem originates in phenomenology's supposed mysticism and alienation from the real world; this problem is the alleged anti-scientific nature of phenomenology.

#### PHENOMENOLOGY AND SCIENCE

Husserl's anti-psychologism has been noted but this was principally a logical contradiction of epistemological theories derived from psychology and should not be interpreted as a denial of the validity of psychology, if properly constituted. This qualification refers to Husserl's opposition not to science as such, but to its naturalistic prejudices, although North American phenomenology has tended to adopt

a less critical attitude to naturalistic science<sup>(32)</sup>. Thus it is necessary to distinguish between science as an ideal for Husserl, the quest for reliable knowledge, and naturalistic science as currently practised and understood. Husserl criticised naturalistic science because of its inability to reflect on its procedures by its own methods, its acceptance of the adequacy of sense perceptions and its taking for granted the availability of the phenomenal world, and its lack of relevance for everyday understanding<sup>\*(33)</sup>. Husserl recognised that these problems are not unique to science but apply also to common sense. However, so great was the cultural value of natural science, in Husserl's view, that the crisis in the reliability of the sciences, which he saw as caused by relativistic attacks, engendered a crisis in the whole of culture, particularly in relation to the creation of doubts concerning the reliability of knowledge and the adequacy of reason. Husserl believed that the crisis of confidence in science was a product of its own methods which while producing impressive results rested on insecure foundations chiefly due to its total reliance on sense experience, because the very concepts used by science e.g. causality and law, are not sensory phenomena and are therefore inaccessible to the method of natural science. As opposed to this type of science Husserl proposes the idea of eidetically grounded science, that is science rooted in reliable concepts achieved through the intellectual intuition of the epoche. This eidetic method is applicable to all experience not just that acquired through the senses. If positive science should attempt to deny the accessibility of non-sensory experience, in particular that of the world of concepts and meanings, it undermines its own procedure which relies upon concepts. Husserl sees the reliable eidetic procedure as restoring meaning to science by showing it to be rooted in meaning both

\* As has been seen this last is a criticism made of phenomenology itself.



in its use of concepts and in its status as a cultural activity. Thus to attempt to reduce cultural phenomena to natural events, as naturalism does, is to rob of science of that which gives it meaning, in our terminology, significance, and which makes it accessible to human understanding<sup>(34)</sup>. Thus, Husserl criticises natural science for its failure to reflect upon itself as a cultural activity, and the failure to appreciate its status as an act of human achievement involving co-operation and interaction with other subjects. That is, the natural scientist never regards himself as part of his scientific problem. In asserting the inadequacy of natural science and its need to be grounded in eidetic knowledge Husserl is not advocating that phenomenology replace science, but merely that phenomenology can establish adequate concepts for the use of the sciences and can also reveal the range of possibilities, or the ontology, of the phenomena which science studies. Phenomenology does this by establishing the area of non-contradiction in the being of the phenomena in terms of which the science classifies itself as the study of such and such. Thus empirical or natural science would be seen as the investigation of a particular mode of the realisation of the pure possibilities of a general realm of being, that of space and time and, we would add, thereby it is not divorced from the studies of different modes of realisation within the same realm. Thus Husserl claims that "nothing can occur within the existential sphere that is essentially excluded by the structure of the essences particularised therein and ... that everything happening within the empirical sphere must happen as postulated by the structure of these essences as its necessary consequences"<sup>(35)</sup>. It must be understood that, as the reference to pure possibilities shows, this is not an attempt to construct the world a priori but rather it is an attempt to clarify what is, what is possible and what is impossible, ie. contradictory. The function of

empirical science is to investigate the realisation of these possibilities through appropriate procedures by relying upon the eidetic grasp of the phenomena in question. Thus empiricism is not the method of all science, only of those sciences which deal with that which is given in spatial extension. Thus Husserl denies the unity of science in the sense of uniformity of method, claiming that different phenomena must be apprehended by methods appropriate to each. Husserl does accept the unity of science in the sense of the common goal of all methodologically distinct sciences which is the absolute apprehension of phenomena. Thus the unity of science is the ideal or goal of the quest for and utilisation of reliable knowledge and as, in Husserl's view, only phenomenology can provide reliable knowledge, the unity of science, the truly scientific method in general is the method of phenomenology. However, we have noted previously that this is not an argument that science be replaced by phenomenology but that its initial grasp of its subject-matter be grounded in phenomenology. It is on the basis of this argument that Husserl identifies phenomenology as scientific philosophy i.e. as that philosophy which realises the scientific ideal. Thus, in Husserl's view natural science is not scientific enough because it is content to rest on unquestioned assumptions whose reliability it cannot guarantee. This indicates Husserl's occasionally confusing use of the term "science"\*. Possibly in order to win respect for phenomenology Husserl defines its goals as the goals of science and then criticises the empirical sciences for failing to live up to the scientific ideal of phenomenology. That is, Husserl wishes to establish a scientific philosophy and thus terms the philosophy which he develops, "scientific". In so far as empirical science has reliable knowledge as its ideal Husserl's word-juggling is confusing but does not compromise his argument. However it is unclear

\* Husserl, at one point, goes so far as to describe the empirical sciences as "rigorous sciences" PHILOSOPHY AS STRICT SCIENCE op.cit. p.144.



whether Husserl is asserting that empirical sciences do have reliable indubitable knowledge as an ideal or whether they should have it as an ideal. In his early works, especially Philosophy as Strict Science<sup>(36)</sup>, Husserl is concerned with establishing the non-universality of naturalist methods and the possibility of reliable knowledge. At this stage he attempts little more than to remove psychology from the sphere of naturalism and re-establish it as a genuine study of consciousness. Thus, in what was the immature or undeveloped stage of his philosophy, Husserl seems to see phenomenology as only an adequate psychology. However, by the end of Husserl's career in "Crisis"<sup>(37)</sup>, phenomenology has been established as providing reliable knowledge as such about the nature of phenomena in all spheres, not just psychology. Naturalism, in so far as it involves assumptions about the nature of reality, is no longer seen as appropriate to physics but not psychology, it is simply wrong, and the quest for reliable knowledge has been elevated to the status of a cultural imperative. Thus, whether natural science has the ideal of reliable knowledge or not, in the view of the later Husserl it should adopt this ideal and the method of realising it, which is phenomenology, in order to fulfill its cultural-historical role and in order to preserve it from relativistic assaults.

Husserl opposes the scientific ideal to the pursuit of wisdom or practical knowledge declaring them to be irreconcilable and a similar development to that noted above in relation to the idea of science is shown in Husserl's thought in this respect. Thus in "Philosophy as Strict Science" he sees wisdom and the scientific ideal as equally valid aspects of culture which imply each other and therefore neither should be excluded from culture. Thus the choice as to which of these the individual follows is free and a matter of temperament. However, Husserl also claims that the absence of a scientific philosophy in our culture has led to the devaluation of theory, the scientific ideal of

truth in itself. Therefore, the choice between wisdom and science is said to be free but only adherence to the scientific ideal is justifiable. This is shown in Husserl's assertion that we must not sacrifice the future to a specious solution of the problem of knowledge in the here and now because this problem is rooted in science and can only be overcome by science which alone "bears the stamp of eternity"<sup>(38)</sup>. The priority of theory over practical wisdom becomes more pronounced in Husserl's later works such as "Crisis"<sup>(39)</sup> and the Vienna Lecture<sup>(40)</sup> in which theory is asserted as the value of our European culture, Europe's major contribution to mankind, the constant, unifying feature of European history. The loss of the theoretical impulse is said to be responsible for the loss of direction in our culture and the emergence of aberrant destructive forces. The loss of faith in science, that is, the loss of faith in the possibility of true knowledge, and the victory of relativism would be fatal for European culture. It is therefore necessary in Husserl's view to pursue the scientific quest with utmost vigour.

We are not primarily interested in the adequacy of Husserl's teleological account of European culture but in his separation of theory and practice which although initially seen as complementary are increasingly viewed as oppositions. It is noticeable that the gravity of this separation developed in step with the increasing idealism of Husserl's philosophy indicating his difficulty in coming to terms with the everyday world despite his use of the concept of *Lebenswelt*\*. This has serious implications for Husserl's idea of the role of phenomenology for if practice and theory are so distinct it is difficult to see how phenomenology, as theory, can ground the particular sciences which, despite Husserl's sleight of hand re-definition of the sciences, are frequently concerned with the solution of practicality defined problems. It should also be noticed

\* see below chapter three.



that Husserl contradicts himself in his claims for the priority of theory for these claims are justified on practical grounds, in particular the need to preserve the value of European culture. Thus, Husserl's message is clearly, commit oneself to eternal truths and not immediate practical problems, seek absolute not merely useful, knowledge; adopt the theoretical scientific attitude because our present practical interests require it.

Thus, Husserl cannot avoid assuming the harmony of theory and practise but his increasing idealistic separation of theory and practise, essence and fact, prevented him from being able to establish their inter-dependance and this failure undermines phenomenology's claim to ground the particular sciences. Our revision of phenomenology will seek to show how this inadequacy derives from the failure to clarify the relationship between object and essence and will also suggest how this dichotomy can be overcome.

Husserl recognises the objection that his idea of science and philosophy makes it irrelevant to everyday life, that it is an appeal to the ivory tower<sup>(39)</sup>. However, he avoids rather than answers this objection by claiming that it is appropriate to false rationalism which absolutises its imperfect approximation of the ideal of absolute knowledge, adopts a naive objectivism and which accepts the naturalisation of the human spirit. As is clear from our criticisms of Husserl's idea of science his account is more vulnerable to the charge of irrelevance than he is willing to admit. Again we see Husserl's tactic of avoiding difficult problems in his philosophy by deflecting the criticism onto another target. Thus a criticism against phenomenology is not considered but is turned into a problem requiring a phenomenological solution.

The reference to naive objectivism and the naturalisation of the human spirit raises a further criticism which Husserl levels against

natural science and this is its inability, consequent on these inadequacies, to account for the subjectivity which achieves science and which is based in the taking for granted of its surrounding world; "In so far as the intuitive environing world, purely subjective as it is, is forgotten in the scientific thematic, the working subject is also forgotten and the scientist is not studied"(40). Thus, Husserl is pointing to the importance, in any attempt to understand science, of the realisation that although it may believe itself to be objective and de-personalised, it is really an intersubjective achievement. Further, science is carried out within the background of the taken-for-granted assumptions of the wider culture and thus Husserl sees science as incomplete due to its unexplored horizons and unclear theories. However, in Husserl's view, science is distinguished by the existence of a doctrinal core for each science to which all must adhere without room for private opinions and to the extent that such opinions exist the science in question is not established as such but is in the process of becoming a science\* (41).

This raises the problem of the nature of science as a cultural phenomenon which Husserl discussed at greatest length in "Crisis". In Husserl's view natural science derives its hypotheses from the Lebenswelt, that is, the world of everyday life which is the "horizon of all meaningful induction"(44) and is, therefore, always an approximation to an unrealised ideal. In the course of its development natural science has forgotten its dependance on the Lebenswelt or life-world and substituted for it the mathematical idealisations of science and this has caused science to lose its meaning both for itself and for everyday life, including the everyday life of the scientist. Being thus divorced from the source of their meaning, we would say significance, the value of

\* Husserl's anticipation of Kuhn(42) is very noticeable in this idea.



scientific accomplishments become opaque and thus we use science without really knowing why we do so.\* Thus, "(Natural) scientists do not see that from the very beginning they necessarily presuppose themselves as a group of men belonging to their own environing world and historical period ... they do not see that in pursuing their aims they are seeking a truth in itself, universally valid for everyone"(45). Several important points emerge from this statement. Firstly, Husserl criticises natural science for not being sufficiently rigorous, for not being scientific enough in questioning the source of its ideas and thus it is found to be in the contradictory situation of being a culturally specific activity which nevertheless claims a universal, or cross-cultural, adequacy for its conclusions. Secondly, that as Husserl accepts the possibility of truth in itself it follows from his statement above that this truth cannot be equated with any one particular cultural formation as of right; that truth in itself must transcend cultural boundaries. Finally, the idea is proposed that natural science cannot become a genuine science until it is able to reflect on its own procedures in an adequate fashion, that is, until it is able to grasp itself as an intersubjective process. It therefore follows that if phenomenology is to ground the particular sciences it must be able to provide a means of achieving this reflective grasp and that, therefore, it must be able to establish intersubjectivity. If it cannot do this; if, like all previous idealisms, phenomenology is locked in the individual subject, then, in its own terms of what is necessary for an adequate grasp of knowledge, phenomenology will have to be judged as a failure. This reveals that the resolution

\* It could be argued that Husserl's attempt to establish science on totally reliable conceptions of being is equally divorced from the life-world but a full consideration of this criticism requires a clarification of Husserl's varying use of the idea of the Lebenswelt and this will be carried out in relation to the discussion of the problem of intersubjectivity in the next chapter .

of the problem of intersubjectivity, the establishment of knowledge which is seen to be knowledge for all subjects and not just for the reflecting ego, is the critical test of phenomenology's adequacy. This test is engendered from within phenomenology as a necessary consequence of its claim to ground all knowledge for all subjects in indubitable reliability. If it cannot establish intersubjectivity then, in its own terms, phenomenology is as naive as the naturalism which it criticises in contemporary science.

Before considering the crucial problem of intersubjectivity it is necessary to summarise Husserl's view of science. It is clear that phenomenology makes no attempt to usurp science but sees its function as enabling science to attain the goal of reliable knowledge by providing it with adequate concepts which express the nature of the objects of scientific enquiry. Phenomenology thus aims at enabling particular science to conform its procedures to the nature of its subject matter, that is, its mode of being given to consciousness, rather than forcing all phenomena into the strait-jacket of naturalism. Nevertheless Husserl maintains the ideal of the unity of science but bases this unity not on the procedures of naturalism but on the scientific idea of rigorous knowledge which he sees as achieved through the phenomenological method which reliably establishes the nature of all data. This considerably widens the scope of science which, in its phenomenological form would no longer mean the study of objective, quantifiable nature but would refer to any enquiry directed towards the acquisition of reliable knowledge. The procedures used by such enquiries would not be right or wrong according to their conformity to naturalistic methods but would be appropriate or inappropriate in terms of the nature of their subject matter and thus no single procedure could claim to be the only one compatible with the idea of science. Further Husserl demands that as part of its scientific



role, science should reflect upon its own status as a culturally defined, intersubjective activity, and the implication of this in our view, is that science should attain such awareness in order to transcend its cultural limitations so as to establish genuine universal truths in which all cultures could participate in terms of their particular perspectives. Thus, Husserl is anti-scientific only in the sense that he believes that contemporary empirical science cannot realise the scientific ideal but he asserts this ideal as a prime cultural value.

However we reject completely the idealistic conception of knowledge which some commentators and perhaps Husserl himself have supported as this leads to a denial of the independence of objects and to a loss of that very objectivity. It is, therefore, necessary to consider the effect of Husserl's idealism on the possibility of realising the scientific ideal which Husserl seeks by divorcing ideas from objects.

#### HUSSERL'S IDEALISM AND THE SCIENTIFIC IDEAL

Lauer<sup>(46)</sup> clearly states the idealistic view that as objects only become objects through acts of consciousness that the natural sciences are dependant on the psychical world. We reject this idea because it confuses empirical and transcendental consciousness and it also implies a psychologistic reduction of knowledge which Husserl rejected totally as contradictory and destructive of all knowledge. Equally such a position commits the error of which Husserl accused naturalism, that of violating the self-nature of phenomena by imposing one procedure on all enquiry regardless of its adequacy as judged by the nature of the object of enquiry. The statement that everything is "spirit" is just as cavalier in its attitude to the nature of the self-givenness of phenomena as the statement that everything is "nature". It is judicious to emphasise Husserl's own statement that "a thing is what it is and it remains in its identity for ever; nature is eternal"<sup>(47)</sup>. Nevertheless, Husserl's later

philosophy is increasingly idealistic and having realised that to know a thing is to possess it in consciousness he made the illogical jump to the idea that things have their being only in consciousness. Thus, pure consciousness is said to constitute its objects, thus Husserl ignores the self-evidence of objects which is their being other than consciousness. This idealism has two sources in Husserl's work. Firstly his failure to clarify the relationship between ideas and objects while still retaining the objective quality i.e. the being other than consciousness, of objects and his concentration on acts of consciousness to the exclusion of objects of consciousness. Secondly, he never broke completely with his early allegiance to psychology. In *Philosophy as Strict Science*, he presents phenomenology as a means of purifying psychology, turning it into a genuine study of consciousness by purging it of its dependance on physics. Therefore he presents the psychical world as radically different from that of nature, tending to see the latter as fixed, objective and as consisting of intersubjectively available phenomena as opposed to the privacy of the world of consciousness. This would limit phenomenology's relevance to psychology because of the latter's peculiar problems e.g. the presence of intentional phenomena in consciousness but not in nature. Thus in this early pronouncement of psychology's independence of physics, Husserl also declares physics independence of phenomenology; contradictorily Husserl wishes to see phenomenology as the ground of all sciences. It would seem that the only way Husserl believed he could redeem this situation was to declare that in so far as the natural sciences deal in ideas and concepts their activities are "spiritual" but in Husserl's hands this tends to overcome the naturalisation of spirit by spiritualising nature. Despite the perpetual concern with the problems of intersubjectivity, culture and history from "Ideas" onwards, the failure of Husserl as we shall see, to establish intersubjectivity led him into further



idealism, despite the use of a vague notion of culture or Lebenswelt, and with it further one-sided concentration on conscious acts. Thus, although in "Philosophy as Strict Science" Husserl uses contemporary psychology as an instance of inappropriate naturalism, in his later work, "Crisis", he attempts to ground the study of consciousness as the basic science. Although Husserl is in this context referring to the pure consciousness of the Transcendental Ego his failure to clarify this idea leads to an easy confusion with empirical consciousness and thus implies the kind of psychologistic reduction of knowledge which he himself deplored. It must be clearly recognised that Husserl remained implacably hostile to psychologism and totally dedicated to the ideal of absolute knowledge throughout his intellectual career in phenomenology. The point which we are making is that principally through his failure to establish intersubjectivity as a datum of pure consciousness, Husserl was not able to ground the idea of intersubjective achievement which he saw as a necessary part of an adequate grasp of the attainment of knowledge. As a consequence the cognitive subject in Husserl is effectively isolated, the Lebenswelt or culture is simply a host of identical subjects, ego writ large. This coupled with the ambiguities of Husserl's idea of conscious constitution and lack of clarity concerning the distinction between empirical and transcendental consciousness means that his later work in particular<sup>\*</sup> is open to psychologistic interpretation although it is certain that Husserl would not have accepted the validity of an understanding of his work as psychologism. Thus Husserl fails to establish within phenomenology that which he sees as necessary for the development of true science, that is intersubjectivity as a reliable

\*It should be noted that the book in which Husserl discussed science at greatest length, "Crisis", was incomplete and unrevised at the time of his death and was never intended by Husserl to be published in its present form. It is therefore possible that the ambiguities and problems to which we have referred would have been clarified by him in the final version of the book.

datum. This failure results in a growing idealism in his work and a concomitant separation between fact and essence, phenomena and ideas.

In our discussion of the major criticisms levelled against phenomenology it has been found that most of these are misplaced and reflect an inadequate grasp of phenomenology. However, in the course of the consideration of these criticisms, three major problems were located in Husserl's philosophy. These are, the need to clarify the relationship between object and consciousness and the devising of a language which can convey phenomenology's insights into the nature of being. The need to clarify the nature of transcendental consciousness and its relationship to empirical consciousness and finally the problem of acquiring intersubjective knowledge in the sense of knowledge about other subjects and knowledge which is seen to be for other subjects and is not private knowledge restricted to ego.

The first two have been discussed as problems in phenomenology\* and our solutions to these problems will be advanced in our revision of phenomenology. It is therefore necessary to consider the adequacy of the criticism concerning intersubjectivity, which is that phenomenology is solipsistic and cannot establish intersubjectivity and, in relation to our principal interest, this means that phenomenology is irrelevant to sociology<sup>(48)</sup>.

\* re the discussion of transcendental consciousness in chapter one.



NOTES

1. BAUMAN "ON THE PHILOSOPHICAL STATUS OF ETHNOMETHODOLOGY", SOCIOLOGICAL REVIEW VOL.21.
2. NATANSON "THE PHILOSOPHY OF THE SOCIAL SCIENCES" NATANSON (ed) RANDOM HOUSE, NEW YORK 1963 p.273
3. HUSSERL "LOGICAL INVESTIGATIONS"VOL.I. ROUTLEDGE 1970
4. STEGMULLER "MAIN CURRENTS IN CONTEMPORARY GERMAN, BRITISH AND AMERICAN PHILOSOPHY", REIDEL, DORDRECHT, HOLLAND 1969.
5. In particular we are referring to;  
a) KUHN  
b) Von WRIGHT  
c) KEAT  
The principle difference between a phenomenological critique of science and those listed above is that the former would be principally concerned with what science could be in terms of achieving reliability, whereas the latter are more concerned with what scientific practise is. Thus, Husserl would see the suggestions, especially strong in Kuhn, that science is culturally relative as an indication of the "unscientific" nature of current concept formation in science, which could be corrected by the phenomenological apprehension of phenomena.
6. PICVEIC "HUSSERL AND PHENOMENOLOGY", HUTCHINSON, LONDON 1970.
7. a) LUKES in WILSON (ed) "RATIONALITY" BLACKWELL 1970  
b) HOLLIS
8. FARBER "THE IDEAL OF A PRESUPPOSITIONLESS PHILOSOPHY" in FARBER (ed) "PHILOSOPHICAL ESSAYS IN MEMORY OF EDMUND HUSSERL" HARVARD U.P. 1940 p.44
9. NAKHNIKIAN introduction to Husserl "THE IDEA OF PHENOMENOLOGY" NIJHOFF, HAGUE 1964 p.XV11 -XX1
10. MCGILL "A MATERIALIST APPROACH TO HUSSERL's PHILOSOPHY" FARBER (ed.) op.cit. p.239
11. FARBER op.cit. p.62-63
12. WELCH "THE PHILOSOPHY OF EDMUND HUSSERL" OCTAGON, 1933 p.211-21
13. LAUER (ed) "PHENOMENOLOGY AND THE CRISIS OF PHILOSOPHY" HARPER TORCHBOOKS 1965 p.64 (foot-note)
14. HUSSERL in LAUER (ed) "PHENOMENOLOGY AND THE CRISIS OF PHILOSOPHY" op.cit. p.119
15. HUSSERL "NEARNESS AND REMOTENESS OF GIVEN DATA" in KOCKELMANS (ed) "THE PHENOMENOLOGY OF EDMUND HUSSERL AND ITS INTERPRETATIONS", DOUBLEDAY, ANCHOR, 1967. p.105.

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| 16. HUSSERL   | op.cit. in KOCKELMANS (ed) op.cit.   | p.106                   |
| 17. HUSSERL   | "PHENOMENOLOGY OF REASON" in<br>KOCKELMANS (ed) op.cit.  | p.164.                  |
| 18.   | A good instance of a supposedly phenomenological work whose claim to<br>a priori status is denied by the inductive nature of its conclusions is<br>KWANT, "THE PHENOMENOLOGY OF SOCIAL EXISTENCE", DUQUESNE U.P. 1965. |                         |
| 19. HUSSERL   | THE IDEA OF PHENOMENOLOGY" NIJHOFF,<br>THE HAGUE, 1964   | p.24                    |
| 20. NAKHINIYAN  | op.cit.  | p.xx11                  |
| 21. BERGER cited by<br>KOCKELMANS                         | "HUSSERL'S TRANSCENDENTAL IDEALISM"<br>in KOCKELMANS (ed) "THE PHENOMENOLOGY<br>OF EDMUND HUSSERL AND ITS INTERPRETA-<br>TIONS" DOUBLEDAY ANCHOR 1967  | p.190-191               |
| 22. HUSSERL   | "PHENOMENOLOGY AND THE CRISIS OF<br>PHILOSOPHY" LAUER (ed) HARPER TORCH-<br>BOOKS 1965   | p.96                    |
| 23. SANTAYANA   | "THE REALM OF ESSENCE" CONSTABLE 1928.   |                         |
| 24. SANTAYANA   | op.cit.  | p.36                    |
| 25. HUSSERL   | "PHENOMENOLOGY AND THE CRISIS OF<br>PHILOSOPHY" op.cit.  | p.96-97                 |
| 26. WITTGENSTEIN  | "PHILOSOPHICAL INVESTIGATIONS",<br>BLACKWELL 1958  | para<br>165 ff.         |
| 27. HUSSERL   | "IDEAS" GEORGE, ALLEN AND UNWIN, LONDON,<br>1952   | p.222                   |
| 28. HUSSERL   | "IDEAS" op.cit.  | p.227                   |
| 29. a)WITTGENSTEIN  | op.cit.  | paras 165,<br>202 & 233 |
| b)FEYERABEND  | "WITTGENSTEIN'S PHILOSOPHICAL INVESTIG-<br>ATIONS" in PITCHER (ed) "WITTGENSTEIN"<br>MACMILLAN 1968  | p.118                   |
| 30. STEGMULLER  | "MAIN CURRENTS IN CONTEMPORARY GERMAN,<br>BRITISH AND AMERICAN PHILOSOPHY"<br>REIDEL, DOXDRECHT-HOLLAND 1969   | p.461                   |
| 31. STEGMULLER  | op.cit.  | p.461                   |
| 32. As an instance of<br>this:-FARBER<br>in NATANSON (ed) | "VALUES AND THE SCOPE OF SCIENTIFIC<br>ENQUIRY"<br>"PHENOMENOLOGY AND SOCIAL REALITY"<br>NIJHOFF, HAGUE 1970   |                         |
| 33. WELCH   | "THE PHILOSOPHY OF EDMUND HUSSERL"<br>OCTAGON, 1965.   |                         |



34. SCHUTZ "HUSSERL's IDEAS VOLUME 3" in  
SCHUTZ "COLLECTED PAPERS VOLUME  
3, NICHOFF, THE HAGUE 1966
35. SCHUTZ op.cit. p.47
36. LAUER (ed) op.cit.
37. HUSSERL "THE CRISIS OF EUROPEAN SCIENCES AND  
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38. HUSSERL "PHILOSOPHY AS STRICT SCIENCE" in  
LAUER (ed) op.cit. p.142
39. HUSSERL "PHILOSOPHY AND THE CRISIS OF  
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40. HUSSERL " p.186
41. HUSSERL "PHILOSOPHY AS STRICT SCIENCE"  
LAUER (ed) op.cit.
42. KUHN "THE STRUCTURE OF SCIENTIFIC REVOLUTIONS"  
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43. HUSSERL "THE CRISIS OF EUROPEAN CULTURE AND  
TRANSCENDENTAL PHENOMENOLOGY" op.cit.
44. HUSSERL op.cit. p.50
45. HUSSERL "PHILOSOPHY AND THE CRISIS OF  
EUROPEAN MAN" op.cit. p.186-  
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46. LAUER introduct-  
ion to LAUER (ed) "PHENOMENOLOGY AND THE CRISIS OF  
PHILOSOPHY" op.cit.
47. HUSSERL "PHILOSOPHY AS STRICT SCIENCE" in  
LAUER (ed) op.cit. p.107
48. PICVECIC "CAN THERE BE A PHENOMENOLOGICAL  
SOCIOLOGY VOL.6 1972 p.335

### CHAPTER THREE

#### THE PROBLEM OF INTERSUBJECTIVITY IN PHENOMENOLOGY

This chapter is concerned with the problem of intersubjectivity in phenomenology and will examine this problem in the context of the following issues;

1. A consideration of the vulnerability of phenomenology to the charge of solipsism which will be found to be justified. Throughout these discussions solipsism will be seen as a special case of the problem of the relationship between consciousness and objects. The origins of phenomenology's solipsism will be located in its idealism and in particular in the inadequate notion of conscious constitution.

2. This will be concerned with Husserl's understanding of the problem of solipsism, his implicit recognition of the inadequacy of transcendental idealism and a critique of his conception of intersubjectivity and of certain sociological uses of this conception.

3. An account and critique of Husserl's attempts to realise transcendental intersubjectivity within the solipsism of the epoche. Arguments will be advanced as to why this attempt fails and it will be shown that Husserl's "phenomenological" constitution of intersubjectivity is in fact based on naive assumptions originating in the natural attitude.

4. Husserl's final attempt to resolve this problem was through the concept of the Lebenswelt or life-world. This idea will be considered and found to be inadequate on the grounds that Husserl is not consistent in what he intends by the idea of Lebenswelt; that the idea is a mystified conception of culture, and that it presumes but cannot establish intersubjective understanding. It will be seen that Husserl's idea of the Lebenswelt is not phenomenological but naive.

Thus, we conclude that Husserlian phenomenology is solipsistic, that it cannot establish intersubjectivity but that this inadequacy reflects



not on the phenomenological method but on the naive attitude which informs Husserl's solutions. We will also note the assumption of a common world which is seen by Husserl as a necessary requirement in establishing intersubjectivity. Therefore, Husserl's failure is not a failure for phenomenology and leaves open the possibility of a genuine phenomenological grasp of intersubjectivity.

5. We will conclude this chapter by developing the idea that Husserl's attempt to establish intersubjectivity within the epoche is naive in a discussion of the inadequacies of naive methods of gaining knowledge of others. This will lead to a consideration of the inadequacies involved in basing sociology on such methods. This will point to the contents of the next chapter which is concerned with a critique of extant attempts to establish intersubjectivity in the specific context of it being a problem for sociology.

The intellectual point of contact between phenomenology and sociology is to be found in the problem of intersubjectivity. This is so because it is the basic problem for them both. It has been seen that phenomenology must establish intersubjectivity in order to justify its claims to universal and not just personal adequacy. Sociology, at least that aspect of sociology variously termed Verstehende or interpretive, which seeks to understand social action, must be able to claim reliable status for its statements concerning others in order to demonstrate, firstly, that when a claim is made concerning reasons for acting this can be seen to be the actor's reason and not the sociologist's reason and secondly, that the conclusions of interpretation must be communicable to the sociologist's audience in such a way that the content of this communication is not distorted. Thus two stages of communication are involved, between the actor and the sociologist and between the sociologist and his audience. The adequacy, and indeed possibility of

such communication is dependant on the establishment of the possibility of adequate intersubjective understanding. This chapter will limit itself to a consideration of the adequacy of Husserl's phenomenology to establish intersubjectivity for if intersubjectivity can be established as a reliable datum within the phenomenological epoche, interpretive sociology can achieve the adequate intersubjective knowledge which it presumes by basing itself on the procedures of phenomenology.

Our enquiry into phenomenology's ability to establish intersubjectivity as a reliable datum will be an examination of the commonly held view that it fails in this respect and that the phenomenological method is necessarily solipsistic and has no relevance for sociology<sup>(1)</sup>.

#### 1. PHENOMENOLOGY AS SOLIPSISM

Phenomenology's vulnerability to solipsism is said to be a consequence of the method of reduction which increasingly privatises knowledge, taking it out of the public sphere. This means that knowledge is declared absolute within the sphere of the isolated ego. Thus this knowledge is impervious to contradiction or dissent from other subjects but the price of this immunity is that all knowledge refers to and is valid for the self alone and therefore it is inaccessible to others in that it is not their knowledge nor can such knowledge tell us about others in themselves, it can only inform the ego how he perceives others. Even this limitation is generous to phenomenology for it has to be recognised that the only consciousness of which the phenomenologist can be aware of within the reductions is self-perceiving or Transcendental consciousness from which other empirical consciousness are excluded and therefore he cannot conclude that others are conscious subjects. Thus Husserl asserts that pure consciousness is not open to scientific intersubjective verification<sup>(2)</sup>. This may refer simply to the inappropriateness



of naturalistic methods but the reference to intersubjective verification indicates Husserl's belief that the grasp of reliable data is a private matter, that only the individual is implicated in the apprehension of such knowledge. According to Nakhnikian<sup>(3)</sup> Husserl seems to have reasoned as follows, the world can only be thought of as being constituted by the Transcendental Ego's intentional acts, therefore nothing can exist unless it is independent for its existence on the transcendental self. A similar point is made by McSweeney<sup>(4)</sup> who states that Husserl "moved to idealism by making things relative to consciousness. If nothing can be conceived except as an object of consciousness, the object itself must be constituted by consciousness". The isolation of the Transcendental Ego would appear to be confirmed in Husserl's<sup>(5)</sup> claim that "I, the Transcendental Ego, am prior to everything worldly. I am the I, namely, in whose conscious life the world is first of all constituted ... as Transcendental Ego I constitute the world, myself and other selves".\* Thus, Husserl and his interpreters oscillate between two apparently opposed positions, that the Ego is isolated and that Ego is inclusive of all phenomena including other selves. The opposition is merely apparent for the consequence of both positions/ <sup>is the same;</sup> that the Ego knows only itself and thus solipsism is inevitable, whether it be of the modest form which admits the unknowability of other selves or the grandiose version which denies the otherness of other selves, seeing them as expressions of ego's self. It is therefore necessary to clarify the idealism at the origin of these positions and in particular the idea of constitution. This occurs in an unclarified form in all the cited references to the isolation of the Transcendental Ego. Thus Lauer<sup>(6)</sup>, who espouses the radical idealistic interpretation of phenomenology dismisses the possibility of arbitrariness in the isolated Transcendental Ego's grasp of objects, including other selves, as a mere feeling, but he has to admit the existence of a problem concerning the

\* Our Italics.

constitution of other selves. He argues that objectively valid cognitions are compelling for any subject and therefore transcendental subjects whose cognitions are necessarily objectively valid, must agree. This argument does not follow from Lauer's idealistic account of subjective constitution which, like that of Husserl, can establish only the subjective necessity of cognition. Lauer identifies proper thought with rational thought but if such knowledge is to ground intersubjectivity it is necessary to demonstrate that proper thought is universal rationality and Lauer cannot do this without abandoning the subjectivism which derives from his idealistic interpretation of phenomenology. Lauer in fact does abandon his position, without admitting it, by a subtle change in his use of the term objective which in his account of the relationship between thought and object means that which is constituted in consciousness. In the discussion of intersubjectivity, however, Lauer adopts a more usual understanding of objectivity as meaning that which originates outside consciousness and is equally available to all subjects. The contradictory nature of these alternative usages indicates Lauer's failure to resolve the idealist's problem of how to explain the possibility of perceiving other selves, by definition outside our consciousness, if all things have their being only in consciousness\*. Thus, his statement that Husserl's later philosophy is more radically subjective but also more radically objective is meaningless due to Lauer's varying use of "objective". Indeed, Lauer admits that phenomenology, as he understands it, began as a search for objectivity and has simply defined as objectivity that which it found and, as a consequence, expresses fears that phenomenology may have lost a genuine

\* A traditional idealist's solution is to posit a Transcendental Subject, God, who has all things permanently in consciousness and, therefore, all things exist as objects in the mind of God, but this does not help us to understand how we, as mundane creatures, can perceive selves outside our consciousness, as being outside our consciousness.



contact with reality and thus "essential" may mean nothing more than hypothetical.

A similar solipsistic idealism is expressed by another phenomenologist, Kockelmans<sup>(7)</sup>, who terms questions implying the resolution of the apparent gulf between self and its objects as transcendental questions which can be asked only after the performance of the reductions in which we become aware of the pure ego which constitutes all Being in itself, every Being having its own mode of constitution. Therefore every form of transcendence is an immanent characteristic within the sphere of pure ego and therefore every Being falls within my transcendental subjectivity which constitutes all Being in itself. There is, therefore, no realm of Being outside consciousness and therefore an outside of consciousness is nonsensical.

This re-introduces the concept of constitution which in all its noted usages is involved in a logical fallacy out of which the idealistic position develops. The lack of clarity in the idea of constitution means that statements such as those by Nakhnikian, McSweeney, Husserl and Kockelmans can be understood in two ways. Firstly as assertions that objects depend for their existence on consciousness. This idea, which is particularly marked in Nakhnikian is fallacious in that it confuses knowledge of Being and knowledge of existence for the Being of a thing is its nature, existence is an accident of Being that is, it is a possible mode of particularised Being. To assert that things have their Being constituted by consciousness or are known in consciousness in no way requires that their existence or non-existence be dependant on consciousness. Thus Nakhnikian et al make an illogical inference from Being to existence in asserting the existential dependance of objects on constituting consciousness. However it is possible to challenge the claim that the Being or nature of phenomena is constituted by consciousness,

in the sense of being dependant on it if alternatively we understand by constitution the apprehension of objects by consciousness. To argue that the Being of objects is constituted by consciousness ie. created by it involves the denial of that which is assumed in the statement that objects are objective, that is are other than consciousness. If objects were constituted in consciousness, in this sense, there could be no possibility, as Kockelman's notes, of perceiving things other than consciousness but all these arguments assume that there are such objects. That is, they accept that there are objects as part of an argument that there cannot be objects. Thus, Husserl's assertion that the I, the Transcendental Ego constitutes other selves, if constitution is understood in this idealistic sense, is nonsense for if it were true there could be no idea of other selves and if the being of other selves is admitted then they cannot be constituted by "I". An alternative understanding of constitutive consciousness is that consciousness which apprehends objects as they are through being in direct contact with its objects. Indeed, if this were not the state of constitutive consciousness it is difficult to see why Husserl repeatedly insists on the sharp division between it and the empirical consciousness of the natural attitude\*. Similarly Kockelmans in the statement above, compromises his idealistic position by admitting, after claiming that consciousness constitutes all Being in itself, that every Being has its own mode of constitution. That is, conscious constitution conforms to the nature of Being, therefore it would be contradictory to claim the dependance of Being on consciousness. The contradictions of idealism can be avoided if we perceive that "constituted by consciousness" should be replaced by the idea of objects apprehended in consciousness and that pure consciousness is the reliable

\* As will be shown below the idealistic position criticised here develops out of the inadequacies of natural attitude perception and is, therefore, naive.



apprehension of objects including the acts of mundane consciousness that every mode of Being is constituted by, that is consists of, its peculiar qualities. Admittedly this argument re-opens the problem of the relationship between objects and consciousness which will be considered below, but it is clear that the idealistic solution, increasingly favoured by Husserl, which resolves the problem by abolishing objects makes solipsism inevitable, that is, the denial of other selves.

There is a final argument deriving from the idealistic position; if idealism is wrong how can we account for the apparent dependance of objects on consciousness for their meaning? That is, the meaning of objects is peculiar to their relationship to consciousness, and thus it would seem that objects have no meaning other than as conscious objects. This problem can be resolved by reference to our distinction between meaning and significance and a clarification of the act of knowing. The meaning of a thing is its nature which is the object of all positing acts of consciousness and thus the act of knowing is the act of grasping this nature. That is, meaning is not imposed on objects by consciousness but is immanent to the object. The apparent dependance of objects on consciousness is a product of judgements of the significance of objects, the value of the object for the conscious subject. The failure to appreciate the distinction between meaning and significance which results in the denial of meaning, leads to the impression that objects are what consciousness makes them to be, hence the idealist position. The inadequacy of such a position is shown by the fact that all judgements concerning the significance of objects assume meaning ie. they assume that the object has a quality which is of value and that the judgement of significance is thereby justified. Thus ideas concerning meaning, the nature of things, are a pre-condition of significant judging and once this distinction is grasped the idealist's perception of objects as

dependant for their sense on consciousness is seen to rest on an inadequate understanding of the act of coming to know objects as distinct from grasping their value. This error is typical of the naive, natural attitude which, as has been seen, is oriented to practicality, which classifies things according to their value and which takes their meaning of phenomena for granted. This kind of criticism is indicated in Kohler's statement that the view which sees the epistemological subject as the sole substantive being, which is therefore responsible for the existence of all objects and all others, is mistaken because, phenomenally, there is no such entity since, "the phenomenal self is decidedly not felt to be responsible for the existence of its objects"<sup>(8)</sup>. The significance of this feeling in resolving the problem of intersubjectivity will be considered below but it is necessary to consider the objection that our criticism of Husserl's supposed solipsism is misplaced because the subject of the knowing act in Husserl's analysis is certainly not the phenomenal self, nor is it everyday consciousness, it is the Transcendental Ego. It must be recognised that Husserl's notion of the Transcendental Ego is unclear and certainly as Husserl discusses it it seems to be no more than a purified version of individual empirical consciousness. As such it seems as incapable of explaining how we can step outside the island of consciousness and thus is unable to account for the beliefs that our positing acts can have objective significance and that we can grasp the existence and nature of other conscious subjects. Similarly Schmitt<sup>(9)</sup> declares that the Transcendental Ego is rooted in the discovery that whatever has sense or meaning has it for me and that the reduction is called transcendental "because it uncovers the ego for which everything has meaning and existence". This brief statement reveals not only the solipsism associated with the Transcendental Ego but also the confusion



of meaning and significance, being and existence noted above.\* The privacy of the Transcendental Ego is perhaps inadvertently asserted by Welch<sup>(10)</sup> indicating once again the idea that the reductions especially the transcendental reduction, are an increasing retreat within the isolated subject, a retreat into solipsistic subjectivity. A novel feature of Welch's account is his claim that transcendencies are public and do not belong to any particular ego but this indicates that immanence is private. We would argue that as a consequence of this assertion essences, the immanent contents of phenomena and the basis of all reliable knowledge, must be seen as private matters and thus the isolation of the ego is made inevitable - for we would not be justified in assuming that our eidetic perception is shared by other selves. The adequacy of Welch's account of the claimed publicity of transcendencies will be discussed later but the crucial point deriving from his argument at this stage is that because phenomenology sees eidetic perception as solely and totally reliable, that if it is to establish intersubjectivity as a reliable datum it must first establish the publicity of essence, that is, that there is not my eidetic intuition and your eidetic intuition but our eidetic intuition. This would also require a similar revision of the idea of the Transcendental Ego which, as will be seen, Husserl perceives as a purified empirical consciousness. Thus there are for Husserl as many Transcendental Ego's as there are individuals. If essences are public or universal and are the contents of transcendental consciousness, it is necessary to establish the universality, as opposed to individuality, of transcendental consciousness and it cannot therefore be regarded as merely a purer empirical consciousness.

\* Schmitt, in fact, refuses to accept the solipsistic implications of this view but he merely asserts that the "critical detachment" of the Transcendental Ego involves taking the other's point of view and he seems to be supporting an empathic interpretation of our knowledge of others which will be discussed below re chapters 4, 5 and 6.

## 2. A CRITIQUE OF HUSSERL'S CONCEPTION OF PHENOMENOLOGY'S INTERSUBJECTIVE NATURE

Husserl seems to have recognised this need for in Crisis<sup>(11)</sup> he states that the accomplishment of the intentional grasp of an object is intersubjective, the syntheses of accomplishment overlap intentionally and are "interwoven to form a universal unity of syntheses". Similarly he states that "every entity that is valid for me and every conceivable subject as existing in actuality is thus correlatively - and with essential necessity - an index of its systematic multiplicities"<sup>(12)</sup>. These statements are opaque although the suggested inter-relationship between validity and intersubjectivity will be a central feature of our phenomenological establishment of intersubjectivity. It is clear however that Husserl is claiming intersubjective validity for eidetic perception, although it is not clear whether by intersubjectivity Husserl means a shared accomplishment, the product of agreement between subjects or that which is universally and consistently available to all subjects. Whatever interpretation is put on Husserl's idea of intersubjective constitution it fits uneasily with his previous idea of subjective constitution and the tension between these two ideas is clearly revealed in Husserl's subsequent discussion. Thus, he states on the one hand the solipsistic position of transcendental phenomenology to the world, "whose true being I know through my own cognitive structures"<sup>(13)</sup>. Alternatively, in an ambiguous statement, he claims that through the eidetic method alone, "the great task can and must be undertaken of investigating the essential form of the transcendental accomplishments, that is, the total essential form of transcendently accomplishing subjectivity in all its social forms".\* It should be noted that here also Husserl asserts rather than establishes intersubjectivity and he freely admits that a consequence of the epoche is to transform all objectivities into subjectivity.

\* Our Italics.



Nevertheless Husserl claims that in the transcendental attitude the world, and we understand this to include other selves, is seen only as correlate of those subjective acts through which it attains its changeable but unitary sense but, further, the subjective acts in which the world is constituted can themselves become the subject of eidetic enquiry. This latter claim raises a serious problem for the subjectivist idealistic view of knowledge which Husserl is clearly supporting at this point; how can such a conception of cognition meet the demand to make subjectivity itself the object of knowledge? In advancing this goal Husserl is positing the possibility of going beyond subjectivity but then what is it that is prior to subjectivity? In Husserl's view this beyond is "Universal subjectivity (which is) nothing other than mankind"<sup>(15)</sup>. This statement is significant in showing Husserl's recognition of the necessity of intersubjectivity as a requirement to make sensible his account of subjective knowledge. It should also be noted that this statement achieves the required intersubjectivity only by an illogical leap from a purely subjective consciousness from which all attitudes concerning other selves should have been eliminated. Indeed, Luckman<sup>(16)</sup> criticises Husserl for attempting to maintain ideas of human-ness within the epoche, these being in Luckman's view mere socio-historical constructs, although as will be seen Husserl does exclude 'human being' from the realm of pure consciousness.

Husserl considers this paradox in the idealistic position but only in relation to the problem noted above of how consciousness can be both subject and object in relation to the world. Husserl responds to this problem in two different ways in Crisis. Firstly by claiming that the epoche transcends the subject-object distinction by revealing the transcendental subject-object correlation which leads to our awareness that the world takes its meaningful being from our intentional life through a priori acts of accomplishment. This argument persists in the idealist framework and simply repeats the

problem and reveals the confusion of meaning and significance by simply asserting but not demonstrating a subject-object correlation in transcendental consciousness. Husserl's second approach to this problem clearly identifies it as the problem of the constitution of intersubjectivity, who are "we" who constitute the world but are not ourselves constituted phenomena? Thus Husserl recognises the need to raise constitutive acts to the level of a problem by identifying a pre-constitutive being and this effectively denies the total adequacy of his idealistic position because he is attempting to uncover a realm of being which is not ideally constituted, which is prior to all acts of conscious constitution in order to question and grasp such acts. As Husserl wishes to claim reliability for certain constituting acts, those carried out within the transcendental epoche, this pre-constitutive realm must also be unquestionably reliable. In so far as Husserl suggests, as above, that this is an intersubjective realm we agree with him as will be made clear below. However, Husserl encounters a number of difficulties in this respect for he asserts, pace Luckmann, that "human being" is a constituted phenomenon which as such acquires meaning only by reference to correlative intentionality and therefore has no place within the epoche and therefore nothing human is to be found within pure consciousness. This argument is a non sequitur because even if it is accepted that "human being" is a constituted idea it would be incorrect to infer without further question that this was all that could be intended in the notion of human-ness for it is possible that our ideas of human being are particularisations of a quality of human-ness which possesses being independantly of our ideas. In other words Husserl should not have stopped at the particular idea of human being but should have considered further what is meant by being human, by human-ness in general, but his persistence with the idealist framework, even when attempting to transcend it, prevents him from conceiving of a category of humanity which although available to knowledge does not depend for its sense and meaning on conscious acts.



Thus Husserl, despite his affirmation of intersubjectivity, is forced to see world-phenomena within the epoche as exclusively mine, disregarding the contradiction that this implies a me who is human although everything human has been excluded. Therefore Husserl states that the epoche "creates a unique sort of philosophical solitude which is the fundamental methodical requirement for a truly radical philosophy"<sup>(17)</sup>. This may seem like an attempt to make a virtue out of necessity and it would be accurate to term Husserl's approach to phenomena as methodological solipsism. This reveals a contradiction between Husserl's methodology and epistemology for as we have seen Husserl claims intersubjective validity for reliable knowledge although the method used to acquire such knowledge is solipsistic.

#### THE NECESSITY OF GENUINE INTERSUBJECTIVITY IN HUSSERL'S PHENOMENOLOGY

It was possibly the awareness of this problem in his philosophy which resulted in Husserl's claim that although the residue of the transcendental epoche is the "I" for which the world has meaning, this does not deny the notion of transcendental intersubjectivity as constituting the world for all, such that the Transcendental Ego, "starting from itself and in itself ... constitutes transcendental intersubjectivity to which it then adds itself as a merely privileged member, namely as 'I' among the transcendental others"<sup>(18)</sup>. This statement is merely a glib assertion which, transforms 'I' as central subject into 'I' as peripheral subject through the acts of the same 'I'. This formula simply assumes that which it should demonstrate, namely, the accessibility of others, which given its isolation is something which the Transcendental Ego cannot achieve. However, the situation described by Husserl, that of the perception of 'I' as one among a community of other 'I's, is, once established, the situation in which intersubjectivity can be perceived as a possibility.

Husserl attempts to justify his argument by analogically relating the process of constituting other "I"s to the act of constituting a past "I" in memory, despite the fact that Husserl frequently asserts the non-apodictic nature of memory and that he wishes to establish transcendental intersubjectivity a priori. In fact the phenomenon of perceiving self as object or as an other can be interpreted as an argument against Husserl's belief in the inevitability of methodological solipsism since such an act implies a stepping out of the "I" perspective. That is we assume our ability to regard critically our ego's acts as it were from outside, which raises the question that if what we step into in such acts is not "I", what is it? However Husserl's failure to overcome the solipsism of his method renders nonsensical his assertion that "Only by starting from the ego and the system of its transcendental functions and accomplishments can we methodically exhibit transcendental intersubjectivity and its transcendental communalisation ... (and) the correlation between the world and transcendental subjectivity as objectified in mankind"<sup>(19)</sup>. However, we note again Husserl's recognition of the need to establish transcendental intersubjectivity as a community, a harmony or inter-relatedness of "I's".

Further, Husserl recognises a problem in his use of the term mankind. Does it, he asks, include children and lunatics? Once again it is possible to discern the consequence of attempts to derive the world from self-knowledge which is the portrayal of the world and its subjects as an expansion of self and its objects\*. Why should Husserl select children and lunatics as being beyond the pale of mankind if not because it is these two groups which he as an individual living in the everyday world finds most difficulty in understanding, that is, difficulty in seeing their behaviour as basically similar to his behaviour. Despite his recognition of the need to establish intersubjective communality Husserl is prevented

\* This consequence is particularly clear in Schutz, re below chapter 5.



from achieving a clarification of this idea, other than as constitutions of ego-consciousness, due to his assertion that the self-evidence of ego is such as to make absurd any attempt to enquire beyond it. It should be noted that the claimed priority of ego in relation to intersubjectivity is a mere unexamined assumption which will be challenged in our attempt to establish intersubjectivity as a phenomenological datum.

The extent of Husserl's commitment to the ego-perspective can be judged in his statement that "I conceive of the world as it has meaning for me ... To consider the world, that is this one which with its concrete meaning has value for me, in a purely subjective way, means indeed to go back on my subjectivity"<sup>(20)</sup>. Husserl further makes it clear that he is not only asserting that the "I" is real but that knowledge of things outside "I", including other "I's" is unreliable. Thus the realisation of a reliable foundation for knowledge which is the goal of phenomenology, refers only to "I"-consciousness. Husserl is aware of this solipsistic tendency which he attempts to counter by completing the statement above, thus, "I ask how all these manifold experiences of our consciousness of the world meld into the unity of a common achievement by which, across multiple subjective (elements) a unity of one supposedly objective thing is found and by which, universally speaking, a unity of one objective universe continuously manifests itself"<sup>(21)</sup>. Husserl is advancing here a slightly different notion of the nature of intersubjectivity to those considered above and namely this is that intersubjective unity is created out of subjective awareness, and that intersubjectivity is an achievement of individual subjects. Thus Husserl sees subjectivity as preceding intersubjectivity. This may seem an obvious and uncontroversial idea but our clarification of intersubjectivity will be based on a direct challenge to the adequacy of this assumption. It is also noticeable that Husserl grants only a supposed objectivity to the contents of intersubjectivity and this raises a problem in that the higher epistemological status granted

to objectivity as opposed to subjectivity is not based properly on the belief that objectivities are more reliable because they are "out there". In order that things out there be known it is necessary that they become things "in here", that is, contents of consciousness. The claim to the greater reliability of objectivity is based on the idea that these phenomena are available to others in the same mode as they are available to I, that is, such phenomena are intersubjectively accessible. The co-relation between objectivity and intersubjectivity will be developed below but our criticism of Husserl's denial at this point of full objectivity to the contents of intersubjectivity shows that his statement would make sense only if a distinction can be made between a true intersubjectivity, that which unites all subjects into a community of ego's, and contingent intersubjectivity which is either the generalisation of ego, or the accidental coincidence of separate subjectivities. As will be seen Husserl understood intersubjectivity in the second sense, in which case our taken-for-granted confidence in the adequacy of our knowledge of others is simply irrational. This idea results in the precarious view of intersubjectivity and social action which has been seized upon by some social phenomenologists and ethnomethodologists<sup>(22)</sup> as the distinctive feature of our knowledge of others. We do not deny that there is risk-taking and unpredictability in everyday interaction but this raises a problem concerning the statements of those who accept the inevitability of the precarious vision for it is clear that they present such statements for others edification and that such statements are presented as an account of "how it is" or at least "how it is for me". Indeed it is difficult to visualise statements which did not presume that the audience will understand them as intended by the speaker,

\* We are not arguing that intersubjective agreement is equivalent to truth but that the true should be intersubjectively accessible in our first sense of the idea of intersubjectivity.



but how are we to explain such naive faith concerning the possibility of understanding in the behaviour of those who assert the precariousness of interaction?\*. If interaction is necessarily risky and if our knowledge of others is unreliable what is the purpose of creating semblances of order, comprehensibility and reliability in our statements about the nature of precarious social life; would not gobbledygook, the random selection of words, be just as adequate? Indeed would not the necessary consequence of such belief be silence, an admission of the unreliability of our attempts to be comprehensible to others? Thus the very activity of the upholders of this view presupposes that precariousness is expressible in a non-precarious fashion and we see that this view falls prey to the contradictoriness of all relativisms, that of having to assert what it ostensibly denies. However, it is not enough to criticise the adequacy of the perception of social life as precarious for risk-taking, mistakes unfounded assumptions are part of this life. It is therefore necessary to ask how, if at all, the naive faith of the upholder of this view in the adequacy and comprehensibility of his utterances can be justified and this is the major task of our revision of phenomenology below.

The final point on this subject must be considered and that is the argument that reliability in social life is a product of that life itself, that in the process of interaction, interaction itself is made reliable. This, of course raises the problem of how such interaction originates, what is the philosopher's stone which takes the dross of isolated individuals and turns them into the gold of persisting communities? If interaction is unreliable how can it create reliable interaction? One of

\* The argument that intersubjectivity is possible because we simply learn about other people in interaction, or that we learn the rules of interaction is inadequate because we are able to learn in the first place only because intersubjectivity is possible ie. learning is based on the existence of intersubjectivity, therefore learning processes cannot be seen as the genesis of intersubjectivity, although it could be argued that intersubjectivity is fulfilled in social learning.

the few theorists to attempt to resolve this problem was Schütz who postulated that certain assumptions are held by all social actors which permit action to take place and this argument will be considered below, although to anticipate certain of our conclusions, the existence of these assumptions does not explain their effectiveness. That is, there must be conditions as a consequence of which the naive assumptions of everyday life may have the effect of furthering rather than preventing the continuity of interaction.

The discussion has, up to this point, been a consideration of the tendency to solipsism in Husserl's philosophy which we identified as a consequence of his idealism, and a further consideration of the necessity of the establishment of intersubjectivity in this philosophy. We also noted the conflict between Husserl's methodology and epistemology as resulting from this solipsism. Finally there was a preliminary consideration of Husserl's understanding of intersubjectivity from which conclusions were drawn towards critique of certain trends in contemporary sociology. It is therefore necessary to complete this section by an enquiry into Husserl's attempts to overcome solipsism through the establishment of intersubjectivity as a phenomenological datum in which particular attention will be paid to his concept of the Lebenswelt.

### 3. THE CONSTITUTION OF INTERSUBJECTIVITY IN HUSSERL'S PHENOMENOLOGY

The problem of the establishment of intersubjectivity is particularly acute for Husserl since he perceives a multiplicity of Transcendental Ego's, each "human being bears within himself a transcendental "I"(23) and this raises the problem of how one Transcendental Ego can constitute other self-contained Transcendental Ego's. It should also be noted that Husserl's use of the term Transcendental Ego makes it equivalent to "self" and thus is a mystifying term which hides the probability that Husserl's account of the



epistemological relationship between subjects is based on common-sense conceptions. The importance of the problem of intersubjectivity for Husserl is indicated by Lauer<sup>(25)</sup> who points out that in Husserl's later work he sees intersubjective constitution as the ultimate foundation of universal objectivity. It is noticeable that in the discussion of natural science in the Vienna Lecture Husserl uses intersubjective and objective as synonymous terms such that our intersubjective being is the ever present horizon of all our perceptions. This is in marked contrast to Husserl's earlier position, noted above, where intersubjectivity was denied the status of full objectivity. There is a clear tension between this idea of the role of intersubjective constitution and Husserl's practise of regarding the isolated cognitive subject as the locus of reliable knowledge. This can be attributed to Husserl's failure to establish intersubjectivity.

The initial major attempt by Husserl to resolve the problem of intersubjectivity was contained in the second and third volumes of Ideas and a measure of his discontent with the outcome of this work can be judged by the fact that these volumes were not published during Husserl's life-time. However these volumes and the relatively brief fifth Cartesian meditation are the sum total of Husserl's attempts to establish the reliability of intersubjective knowledge. After the Cartesian Meditations Husserl took for granted the possibility of an intersubjective world, the Lebenswelt, which became the leading concept of the socio-historic studies of Crisis and the Vienna Lecture. However, as will be seen, Husserl's failure to establish intersubjectivity as a reliable datum had the result that the idea of Lebenswelt was equivalent to common-sense naïve, ideas of culture, an assumed common world in which others are believed to be the same as I.

This latter idea is seen by Schütz as the basis of Husserl's grasp of

the process of intersubjective understanding\*. Husserl's position is inadequate because it does not tell us why we recognise others as being like "I" when in many respects they are not, for example we can see the differing physical attributes and readily discern the differing attitudes of others. It could be argued that this is so because we could imagine ourselves behaving in the same way as these others but this does not explain how we justify the denial of the status of self to a moving tree a running dog etc., especially as in some animistic cultures the idea of self-hood is attached to such phenomena.

However a more interesting idea advanced by Husserl is that of the communicative common environment which is established in the "personalistic attitude" to others. This means that intentionality is seen as bestowing meaning on environmental objects thus what is seen as causal in the naturalist scheme is replaced by a system of motivations. Ego finds other subjects in its environment who are referred to the same objects as ego. Nevertheless this idea does not help to resolve the problem of intersubjectivity for it is clear that Husserl, as presented by Schütz, is claiming that the common communicative environment is the product of the reciprocal motivation and intentional acts of subjects who thus see each other not as objects but as consociates. Therefore in their interaction they achieve a community but this begs the question of how interaction is initially possible. Nor is it clear at this point how Ego grasps the other as another self rather than as an object and there is an illogical jump from Ego's perception of the other as another self to Ego and alter being consociates for each other which latter uniquely implies the grasping of the other's conscious life.

\* It must be realised that the following consideration of Husserl's attempts to account for intersubjectivity with the exception of references to the 5th Cartesian Meditation are based on Schutz's commentary on Ideas Vol. II and III because these latter books which contain Husserl's major enquiries on this subject have not been translated into English.



Certain assumptions contained in Husserl's argument must also be noted. Firstly he sees intentionality as bestowing meaning on objects thus overlooking the distinction between meaning and significance. The consequence of Husserl's view is, as has been seen, the perception of objects as dependant on consciousness from which position solipsism becomes inevitable. Also it will be noted that Husserl unquestioningly accepts that ego-consciousness precedes intersubjective awareness and although this belief may appear obvious it is our contention, and the basis of our attempt to establish intersubjectivity phenomenologically, that a reliable knowledge of others is possible only if we challenge this common-sense idea. Finally, it is necessary to note that the common-ness of the communicative environment is simply asserted and indeed Husserl's attempt to establish intersubjectivity is fallacious because intersubjectivity is assumed as part of the argument.

If it is asserted that our grasp of others cannot be denied it is only necessary to point out the possibility that we interact with our idea of others, our self-projected image. It is significant that in common with many theorists Husserl assumes that in order for our perception of others to be seen to be genuine it is necessary that we admit the existence of an environment shared by self and other. Furthermore if this environment is to permit the genuine grasp of the other self then it must be the necessary condition and foundation of intersubjectivity. This is where Husserl and other theorists as diverse as Winch and Schutz fail, because they, accepting the primacy of ego-consciousness, see this environment as derived from interaction and located in everyday experience. As the status of interaction and our everyday belief in intersubjectivity is problematic such a derived, shared world must be equally problematic

and therefore cannot found reliable intersubjective understanding. Thus it is necessary to locate a common environment which is epistemologically prior to ego-consciousness.

That this common environment is essentially assumed is recognised by Schutz<sup>(27)</sup> who states, "Nevertheless, the comprehension of the other person occurs merely by appresentation, everyone having only his own experiences given in originary presence (and each person sees the common communicative environment from his particular private world for) ... within the common environment any subject has ... his private world originally given to him alone". Thus our knowledge of others is indirect and this leads to effective solipsism for if it is claimed that I only have originary knowledge of myself and I therefore only know others as mediated by myself, and therefore I do not know others but only my mediation of them and thus my perception of others is a construct of self-recognition. This account also reveals the distinction between knowing that others exist and knowing the others as selves in their own right.

Schutz's reconstruction of Husserl's argument in Ideas Vol.2 emphasises this dilemma which inheres in any attitude, including common-sense, which sees ego-consciousness as primary. Thus the statement that relationships between the person and the environmental object (ie. other) is not a real but an intentional relationship is followed by the claim that the other is capable of motivating the subject of the private world. Therefore Husserl would seem to see motivation as a reaching out of one subject to another and the common environment contains the intended objects of a subject's social acts but the perception of the act as social implies the prior apprehension of the other as a self and this account avoids the problem of whether this environment is or could be actually shared with others. However this idea of the reaching out of subjects to each other is seen by us as containing evidence, that is a self-givenness, of the act of apprehending



other selves. This argument will be developed below in our notion of intrusion<sup>\*(1)</sup>.

The apprehension of others is seen by Husserl as a process of empathy which "is nothing else but that form of apprehension which grasps (the others motivational) meaning"(28). It should be realised that this establishes empathy as a goal, the grasping of the other's mode of understanding whereas what is required of Husserl's account of intersubjectivity is a description of the method for achieving this goal. Husserl fails to do this for the methods which he expounds, and which are basically accounts of analogical inference, can tell us how we as naive individuals in the everyday world construct our ideas of others but not whether these ideas can grasp the other in himself or how it is possible that they could do so. Thus Husserl states that cultural objects, including others, are distinctive because they are perceived as things containing meaning but his failure to realise the distinction between meaning and significance results in his overlooking the crucial question of "what meaning and for whom"? Do we see others as they have meaning for us, that is, significance; or as they are in themselves, that is as quality or true meaning? The uncritical nature of Husserl's notion of empathy is indicated when, after accepting that we grasp others as types, an idea to which we will return, he is said to state, "In terms of these typifications I comprehend the behaviour of my fellow man and its motives. When I co-perform his acts in phantasy his motives become my quasi-motives and thus comprehensible. The Other's comprehensibly motivated spiritual life and its individual typical course, is, thus, apprehended as a variation of my own spiritual life<sup>\*(29)\*</sup>(2)". Overlooking the peculiar idea of individual

<sup>\*(1)</sup> re below Chapter 7.

<sup>\*(2)</sup> Anyone surprised by the Schutzian turn of phrase must remember that this is Schutz's account of Husserl's theories of intersubjectivity.

typicality, this statement reveals the problematic consequences of relying upon an unmethodical idea of empathy. The crucial terms in this statement are "fellow man" and "co-perform" because their use would be justifiable only if the problem of gaining knowledge of others in themselves had been resolved. Again, Husserl assumes what is to be demonstrated as part of the demonstration and thus overlooks the problem of how or if the other can become my fellow in such a way that I can co-perform his acts. The final sentence of the statement clearly reveals the solipsistic consequences of this procedure which solipsism takes the form of ego-aggrandisement. That is, the situation in which the other is seen as a variation of self which is, in effect, a denial of his distinctiveness, his other-ness. This results in the perception of the social world as being composed of nothing but "I" in various locations.

There is however, one particular idea in Husserl's account which is an important pointer to our conception of a phenomenologically based grasp of intersubjectivity. This is the recognition that it is possible for us to step outside our self-identity as in situations when we imagine committing an act and yet not be able to imagine that we would, in fact, commit it. This is not a contradictory assertion for the first statement refers to the imaginative act and the second to the idea that the act contradicts my personal nature. This in effect contradicts Husserl's previous assumption that the other is seen as a variation of self for this phenomenon introduces the possibility of being other than myself in imagination. It is this facility of the natural attitude which we wish to clarify and make rigorous by asking why it is possible. Developing out of this enquiry we will need to ask into what perspective we step if we succeed in abandoning the ego-perspective. Finally it will be necessary to describe the evidence, self-givenness, of this novel perspective and to show how it can be achieved.



The effect of this enquiry will be the establishment of the realm of intersubjectivity.\*

In Schutz's view, Husserl believes that the empathic perception of others, which we see as typical of the natural attitude, is not reliable, but he also claims that the sense of the world as determined by intersubjectivity is preserved after the reduction. This could be so if we regard this intersubjective sense only as an object of attention, that is, we should recognise that the possession of this sense, in itself, does not justify an inference to the correctness of our intersubjective understanding. Thus, in terms of Husserl's egological understanding of the process of reduction, the only thing which could be preserved within the epoche is the conscious act of belief in intersubjectivity as the object of phenomenological clarification. But Husserl wishes to go further than the logic of his position will allow, for the idea of transcendental intersubjectivity means for him the post-reduction state in which; "the fellow-subjects who present themselves as transcendental in my transcendental life can be reached as transcendental fellow-subjects belonging to a transcendental We-community which also presents itself to me ... Transcendental intersubjectivity is thus the one in which the real world is constituted as objective, as existing for everyone"(30). It is noticeable that Husserl reverts to the usage of intersubjective as equivalent to objective but all that Husserl has achieved is a description of what a transcendental intersubjectivity would have to look like and the account is unsatisfactory in that it contains certain unexamined assumptions, such as; the other is assumed to be my fellow and that he and I belong to a common community the existence of which is taken for granted. Husserl's reference to transcendental intersubjectivity suggests that this is a grasp of others which is achieved within the

\* This enquiry will be carried out below re chapter 7.

transcendental reduction and which is therefore an apodictic and reliable datum and undoubtedly this should be the aim of any phenomenological account of intersubjectivity. However, the use of the term does not make knowledge transcendental and the unreliability of Husserl's analogical method of apprehending the other and his acceptance of common-sense assumptions casts doubt on the transcendental status of his conclusions. Indeed, Husserl's account of intersubjectivity is clearly rooted in natural attitude assumptions and thus he is unable to establish a genuine intersubjective knowledge and this also reveals that Husserl's failure is a reflection of the failure of common-sense to establish knowledge of others in themselves.

Thus, Husserl cannot offer an adequate solution to "the painfully puzzling question of how another psychophysical ego comes to be constituted in my ego since it is essentially impossible to experience mental contents pertaining to other persons in actual originarity"<sup>(31)</sup>. It is important to note that even this basic question is framed on the naive assumption of the epistemological priority of the isolated ego in which grasping the other is seen as the incorporation of the other into my ego. There is never the thought that it is the maintenance of the idea of the priority of my ego which creates this painful puzzle. A critique of this idea will form the basis of our phenomenological constitution of intersubjectivity. Thus in both Ideas Vol. 2 and the fifth Cartesian Meditation Husserl seeks to establish intersubjectivity in the radical transcendental reduction which distinguishes between the empirical ego and the Transcendental Ego and which involves a greater isolation of self from things external to it. The aim is to discover intersubjectivity within this egological sphere. The lack of clarity in Husserl's notion of transcendental consciousness has been noted above as has the tendency to see it as merely a purified empirical consciousness but the significant aspect of this process in view of the present discussion is that Husserl seeks the transcendental grasp



of others by further retreat into the "I", "an abstractive suspension of other minds and of all those experiential levels of my world which originate from the belief in the existence of other minds"<sup>(32)</sup>. It is almost inevitable from this that, as has been seen, others are perceived simply as variations of "I" despite Husserl's claim that this process leads to the expansion of transcendental subjectivity into transcendental intersubjectivity, the world for all of us prior to philosophising. We do not deny totally the value of Husserl's procedure for it is our conviction that transcendental consciousness, if properly understood, can provide the basis of reliable intersubjective knowledge and, as Husserl recognises as necessary, the establishment of the intersubjective world as prior to and the basis of adequate conceptualisation.

The fifth Cartesian Meditation<sup>(33)</sup> offers little that is new compared to Ideas Vol 2, although unlike the latter it was published during Husserl's lifetime. The only major novelty in the Cartesian Meditation is that there is an expanded description of how the other is grasped in transcendental consciousness through the act of appresentation, apperceptive transfer or empathy; these terms being used interchangeably. Although Lauer<sup>(33)</sup> recognises that Husserl simply postulates the existence of such an experience and calls it empathy. That is, Husserl attempts to resolve this problem by giving it a name and calling it a solution because he needs to demonstrate an intentional experience oriented to the other's experiences.

In the fifth Cartesian Meditation the sphere of the pure ego is claimed to consist of awareness of my living body and its fields of sensation but that by an apperceptive transfer other objects are seen within this field as other living bodies. This is said to be pairing between my primordially given living body and the non-primordially given

other in the unity of one consciousness. On the basis of this similarity there is a transference of sense in which the sense of my body is transferred to the other body. The basis of this argument is an identity between my experience of my own living body and my experience of another's living body but it is clear that my awareness of my living body is totally distinctive from my awareness of the other's living body. For instance I see the other's facial expressions but I do not see my own face, I can know what my bodily movements and expressions intend, I can only infer the other's intentions from his bodily movements. Despite his claim that this is an investigation of empathy, Husserl's argument is simply inference by analogy although as we will clarify below the empathy argument is no more satisfactory than analogical inference <sup>\*(1)</sup> in terms of giving us reliable knowledge of the other's experiences. Husserl's argument is fundamentally the idea that Evans-Pritchard <sup>(34)</sup> criticised as the "if-I-were-a-horse" type of anthropology and which, far from revealing the distinctiveness of the other, denies it, seeing the other self or as "self-over-there" <sup>\*(2)</sup>. Husserl's attempted solution thus reproduces the natural attitude assumption that for all significant purposes other is likeself. The use of the term significance indicates that the intention of other-apprehension in this attitude is the realisation of a practical goal desired by self and not the reliable grasping of the other's experiences. The adequacy of other apprehension is therefore judged by its facility in aiding attainment of the desired goal and thus cannot guarantee the accuracy of our apprehension of the other in himself. It would also appear that Husserl's argument is contradictory for it accepts the established primacy of ego-experience and

<sup>\*(1)</sup> Although these positions are similar analogical inference is the belief that we identify similar movements to our own in the other and from this infer similar self-activity to ours by the other. Empathic projection is somewhat more sophisticated, the imaginative placing of self in what is seen to be the other's situation.

<sup>\*(2)</sup> Husserl denies that his argument is a case of analogical inference but there seem to be no grounds for his objection.



then denies this view in accounting for our knowledge of others, by asserting that the non-primal experiences of the other's living body and my own living body are given in the same way.

It could also be argued that Husserl's account does not explain why this transference of sense is denied to animals etc. and it could be in anticipation of this objection that Husserl states that for the appresentation to endure it must be confirmed by further appresentations provided in congruent behaviour. This however seriously undermines Husserl's case for it reveals the supposedly transcendental constitution of the other to be a mere hypothesis. Thus Husserl has simply discovered the naive belief that the other is self-if-I-were-in-the-other's-position but is totally unable to establish this belief as anything other than a hypothesis. In view of the fact that this idea, termed by Schutz the "reciprocity of perspectives", plays such a large part in Schutz's analysis of social understanding, it is significant that he describes this process as "neither explained nor intelligible"<sup>(35)</sup>. This is particularly important as he seems to adopt this idea from Husserl's work in a concentrated but unmodified form with the exception that Schutz recognises what Husserl does not, that this idea is naive not transcendental and apodictic. However, as will be seen, Schutz proves as incapable as Husserl of progressing beyond this point to the attainment of reliable intersubjective knowledge.

Husserl's account of the process of apprehending others' experiences can be criticised on the grounds that the inclusion of such assumptions as congruence implies pretypification according to social standards which should have been bracketed. Husserl also makes a further unjustified assumption that all other correlates of the other are given with the appresentation of his body. The existence of these assumptions, the arbitrary limitation of the apperceptive transfer, the use of arguments based on empathy or analogical inference and, finally, the failure of

Husserl to establish intersubjectivity as an apodictic datum indicate that his account of intersubjectivity is not phenomenological but naive, that is, is based on natural attitude assumptions in particular the primacy of ego and the idea that other's are variations of self.

There is one aspect of Husserl's account of intersubjective constitution which remains to be considered and this is his notion of a world common for all transcendental subjects. This notion eventually crystallised in the idea of the Lebenswelt or life-world but we intend to show this concept is simply an assumption of the existence of an homogeneous culture and it cannot be regarded as the level of transcendental intersubjectivity which is the necessary precondition of the possibility of culture. Further a quality of transcendental data or essences is their timelessness and unchanging nature. Cultural worlds are constantly changing and come into and fade out of existence and thus culture cannot be identified with the indubitable realm of essence.

#### 4. THE LEBENSWELT

Husserl initially develops this notion in the context of his account of the personalistic attitude which constantly recreates the surrounding world by transformation of sense and in which world we encounter other subjects who are related to the same objects as ego, although once again Husserl avoids the problem of why we see the other subject as a person and not as another object. Thus Husserl claims that the existence of a common surrounding world leads to the existence of personal associations. It is at this point that we encounter a contradiction in Husserl common to all who attempt to ground intersubjective knowledge in culture; Husserl claims that this common surrounding world is based on "relations of mutual agreement"<sup>(36)</sup> and is relative to those who share it. Firstly it should be noted that the existence of a common surrounding world is simply asserted. If the presence and nature of such a world could be demonstrated as basic



then the problem of intersubjectivity might be open to resolution but Husserl's assertion of such a world and this inability to establish that it is (let alone what it is), is like solving a personal balance of payments crisis by forging money. Secondly, Husserl's account of the relationship of this world to subjects is contradictory because he asserts that the prior existence of such a world permits intersubjectivity and that this world is based on mutual agreement between subjects. That is, this common world is contradictorily claimed to be the prior condition of intersubjectivity and the product of intersubjectivity. Equally Husserl's attempts to ground communality on subjects' acts of reciprocal orientation suffers from the same defect, namely that it presumes prior identification of the other as another subject, which identification is, in Husserl's terms, possible only if communality has been previously established\*. Finally, Husserl's account shows indications of cultural relativism which would undermine his insistence on the quality of universal truth as the hallmark of reliable data. After all these objections there remains the problem of establishing the boundaries of this common world. It is clear that this world itself is solipsistic. This is best demonstrated by considering a problem raised by Schütz, namely whether the epoche performing subject is isolated from other subjects in the performance of this act. He cites two comments by Husserl, separated by a number of years, in the earlier of which the epoche performer is said to be isolated but in the later version he is said to be involved in community with others. However this contradiction is merely apparent for it is clear that Husserl's community is solipsistic, thus he states "There belongs also, of course, the constitution of a philosophy common to 'all of us' who meditate

\* It will be noted that Husserl tends to confuse the problem of how we know the other to be a subject with the related but more intractable problem of how we know the subject's experiences.

together - ideally a single philosophia perennis<sup>(37)</sup>. Thus the community which is achieved in this situation is merely the community of phenomenologists, that is, those who see as Husserl sees; those who are, in terms of the purposes at hand, indistinguishable from Husserl. Thus community means those who are similar to ego and only in so far as they are similar to ego. Thus the concept of community or common communicative environment which is supposed to ground intersubjectivity is itself solipsistic and cannot, therefore, contain within itself the possibility of intersubjectivity.

Husserl's idea of the Lebenswelt or life-world develops out of this notion of community, although an earlier term used by Husserl Kulturwelt or cultural world gives a more accurate impression of the nature of this community. The change in terminology may be significant as the idea of a cultural world reveals problems of relativism and boundary-setting which are avoided although not resolved in the innocuous term life-world. Unfortunately Husserl's most extensive consideration of the nature of the life-world is contained in the fragmentary "Crisis" in which Husserl states as his aim the formulation of "a radical reflection on the great task of a pure theory of essence of the life-world"<sup>(38)</sup>. In the introduction to this work Carr notes that Husserl's use of the idea of the life-world oscillates between identifying it with culture or with a pre-culture which is not merely pre-theoretical but also pre-predicative. However Husserl's frequent references to scientific discoveries becoming integrated into the life-world are not consistent with the idea of its pre-theoretical status. Neither of the ideas is fully acceptable within Husserl's philosophy because the identification of lebenswelt and culture opens the possibility of cultural relativism, whereas the idea of a pre-predicative life-world suggests that it precedes conscious life and this conflicts with Husserl's



idealistic notion of consciousness constituting all phenomena. Thus Husserl's claim that the lebenswelt is "pre-given as existing for all in common"<sup>(39)</sup> could be understood as a description of a naïve assumption or as an assertion of the actual nature of the life-world,

In a direct reference to the epistemological status of the life-world Husserl states that it is "the constant ground of validity, an ever-available source of what is taken for granted to which we, whether as practical men or as scientists lay claim as a matter of course"<sup>(40)</sup>. Here Husserl equates "valid" with "taken-for-granted" and thus would seem to be referring to naïve everyday validity, in which case the adequacy or total reliability of the life-world is thrown into question. This interpretation is supported by Husserl's statements concerning the need to make the life-world a subject of investigation, which requires that there be a stance prior to the life-world in terms of which this world is made problematic. Husserl's contradictory position is indicated in his statement that the life-world is investigated by placing oneself in it which insofar as this implies commitment to the life-world would seem to make impossible the perception of the life-world as a problem. This also implies the abandonment of Husserl's previous injunction to be a disinterested spectator in relation to the life-world.

Further Husserl implies an identity between the lebenswelt and the realm of essence when he claims that the lebenswelt furnishes, through its invariant essential types, all possible scientific topics<sup>(41)</sup>. A consideration of the claimed relationship between science and the lebenswelt reveals clearly the contradictions in this concept. Thus Husserl declares that the life-world cannot be revealed by natural science but that it is verified in experience\* for "is not the life-world as such what we know

\* This experience is said to be subjective-relative which would seem to undermine the universal applicability of the lebenswelt as world for all which Husserl claims for it.

best, what is always taken-for-granted in all human life, always familiar to us in its typology through experience"(42). If this is so it is not clear why phenomenology is needed to reveal this world. However, when Husserl identifies the life-world with pragmatic interests and claims that its assessment of adequate verification is in terms of these interests, it would seem that the life-world is the practical, naively understood world of everyday life or culture. Thus, if Husserl is to be consistent with his demand for reliable knowledge he must regard the clarity and obviousness of the life-world as merely apparent, but there is no statement by him to this effect. Indeed, in developing the idea that the lebenswelt is subjective because it is experienceable, Husserl states it to be the realm of original self-givenness, the thing itself given in intuition to which primary intuition all modes of verification lead back, which would identify the lebenswelt, not with the taken-for-granted world, but with the apodictic basis of all knowledge, the realm of essence or transcendental consciousness. It is clear that Husserl never intended transcendental consciousness and the naive attitude of everyday life to be identified with each other as is testified by his persistent criticism of naivety. Thus in order to contrive consistency in Husserl's idea of the life-world both in its usage and in relation to his philosophy as a whole, it would be necessary to see the life-world as the world of everyday experience and as the world wherein we encounter phenomena but do not grasp them in themselves and thus it is outside the phenomenological epoche. Therefore, this world, which is the ever present horizon of everyday perception, is naive in that it consists of taken-for-granted, unquestioned assumptions concerning the nature of the phenomena and the relationship of the cognitive subject to the contents of the Lebenswelt.

Attention has been drawn to the problem of the relationship of the Lebenswelt to the everyday conception of culture, whether it is equivalent



merely to an unexamined idea of culture or whether it refers to something which precedes culture. The latter view is indicated in Husserl's critique of science as practised by people who belong to a particular culture and time and yet believe that they seek universal truths<sup>(43)</sup>. This implies the distinction between cultural and universal truths and the accessibility of these latter. The idea of a universal life-world or culture of mankind is indicated in Husserl's statement that we can trace history back in a never ending process to all peoples, eras and conditions "To an investigation of this type mankind manifests itself as a single life of men and of peoples bound together by spiritual relationships alone, filled with all types of human beings and of cultures, but constantly flowing into each other\* ". However it is clear that Husserl sees this universal culture in a purely temporal sense as merely a primitive historicity, the first "primitively natural form of cultures"<sup>(45)</sup>, 'a seed-bed out of which historical cultures have developed and from which derive their individual norms. Husserl does not demonstrate the actual historical existence of such a common culture and, more importantly, he does not explain how, granting that in our present condition the common-culture has been superceded, it is possible to explain cross-cultural understanding. Husserl does not doubt that we can enter sympathetically into alien cultures and that on achieving such entry we nevertheless perceive other cultures as being strange to us<sup>(46)</sup>. It is not made clear how we can both sympathise with another culture and still see it as strange, nor does Husserl state how we are to distinguish between this genuine strangeness of the other culture and our failure to achieve sympathetic entry into it which would also result in the alien culture appearing to us as something strange.

\* The depiction of flowing of the universal culture is very similar to Husserl's account of the flowing of the conscious duree.

There is also a sense in which a universal life-world which permanently exists and is not limited to any historical epoch, is required in Husserl's philosophy because, as part of his critique of science, noted above, he demands that science be founded on the life-world, As has been shown, Husserl demands that science, in order to achieve its objectives, must be founded on essential, reliable knowledge, that is knowledge which is necessarily for everyone. If Husserl is to avoid making contradictory demands of science, for example that it be culturally specific and universally valid, and if he is to maintain, as he does, his belief in science as the quest for reliable, universal truths, then he must establish the lebenswelt as a world for all possible rational subjects. Expressed slightly differently the Lebenswelt must be established as the objective correlate of transcendental consciousness.

The extent of Husserl's failure, to do this can be judged by the ease with which he identifies the lebenswelt with the idea of particular cultures or taken for granted worlds\*. Thus, he terms this primitive historicity itself as a universal natural attitude, and therefore clearly perceives it as naive. This historicity, it is said, can be transformed into either higher level practicality, such as communal interests, or into the theoretical attitude, which is the quest for truth in itself. The idea of historicity being transformed into the theoretical attitude means that it is, in itself, distinct from the theoretical attitude and thus cannot be regarded as fundamental, for Husserl sees basic knowledge as the goal of theoria. Further evidence of Husserl's identification of the Lebenswelt with particular, non-fundamental, naive and changing cultures is to be found in his assertion that we perceive geometrical straight lines, "on the

\* A similar fault is to be found in Luckmann<sup>(48)</sup> who takes Husserl's argument to its conclusion and sees the apperceptive transfer applied to all ego's objects but then has to admit his inability to account for modifications of this transfer in varying cultures, that is why some phenomena are believed to be inappropriate objects for the apperceptive transfer.



basis of the life-world self-evidence of straight table edges and the like". In fact, Husserl could hardly have chosen a worse example for straight table edges are the product not the antecedent of the idea of straightness. The crucial point is that in this example Husserl is identifying the life-world with culture and its objects e.g. straight table-edges and the pursuit of this identity would result in cultural relativism. This, like all relativisms, would be subject to Husserl's own criticisms and as shown above would be an effective solipsism because accepting the sole knowability of his own life-world, ego could know others only in so far as they share that life-world. This is especially serious as it could be argued that we all inhabit uniquely individual life-worlds or cultures; that is, I could be said to belong to the Western European, British or academically mobile, Lancastrian ex-working class, Protestant culture. Further evidence of Husserl's occasional identity of lebenswelt and culture is shown by his admission that life-worlds vary and that our established fixed truths are not the same as those of Negroes, Congolese or Chinamen.<sup>(49)</sup> Although Husserl does not question either the adequacy of these categories or the problem of understanding other life-worlds if their established truths are not ours. It is important to realise that Husserl, is here using a device which is common to cultural relativists who wish to preserve the impression of reliability, albeit of limited scope. This is the presentation of the idea that there is "us" and then there are "others" like Chinamen etc. who are different to us. However, if we attempt to clarify the notion of "us" or cultural consociates, we find that it breaks up into, for instance, Protestants and Catholics, town-dwellers and countrymen, middle-class and working-class, male and female, young and old etc. and even these categories can be sub-divided, each category having its own established truths. This illustrates once more the effective solipsism of this position, "us" means "I" and those who in this respect are like "I".

Clearly the idea of lebenswelt as everyday culture does not require the epoche to reveal it nor is it necessary to undergo the "religious conversion" of the transcendental reduction in order to grasp it. Indeed, the lebenswelt as described here by Husserl is the world of common-sense, the world naively perceived before phenomenological analysis, the world of a taken-for-granted homogeneous culture in which it is assumed that "I" is the model for others. This is significant because, as has been seen, Husserl's idea of the lebenswelt arises out of his attempts to establish intersubjectivity within the epoche; the common-sense status of the lebenswelt indicates another failure in this respect by Husserl.

However it has been noted above that Husserl seems unwilling to leave the notion of the lebenswelt at this culturally relative level and he does refer to a "universal life-world"<sup>(50)</sup> or life-world a priori but the nature of this life-world is not clarified. Nor is it possible to see how it can be realised as Husserl advocates the same method for revealing this a priori life-world as for the particular life-worlds or cultures, as we have seen them to be. Thus there are two ideas of the life-world in Husserl, one universal and a priori the other identified with culture, and which is therefore relative. It is clear that Husserl realised that in order to ground intersubjectivity phenomenologically he had to establish an a priori community of all possible subjects. However, every attempt which he makes to achieve this, results in the identification of this supposedly a priori world with an unquestioningly assumed homogeneous culture which is constantly changing, is relative, is not universal and presupposes but cannot create intersubjectivity. Thus the idea of the lebenswelt which Husserl develops contradicts all those features which must be demonstrable in an eidetic intersubjectivity which is the necessary precondition of a reliable knowledge of others in themselves. It would be possible to regard Husserl's account of intersubjectivity as a description of the



perception of others within the natural attitude but this should be no more than a prologue to a phenomenological critique of the natural attitude which would result in the transcending of its limitations and the establishment of universally valid knowledge of others. However, Husserl's acceptance of the natural attitude perception of others, in particular its ego-centrism, prevents him from achieving this goal even though he recognised that the establishment of intersubjectivity as a universal a priori was necessary. It is possible that Husserl was misled by the fact that the universality of the common-sense life-world is an assumption of that world, although this is an assumption which common-sense cannot justify. Thus the possibility of the lebenswelt assumes what it cannot establish, that is, intersubjectivity and universality, and if genuine intersubjectivity that is, a real grasp of other consciousness is to be revealed, it must be based on a critique of the common-sense assumption that intersubjectivity is an unproblematic extension of "my" subjectivity. Thus the perspective of such a critique must be other than the common-sense world for something cannot be at the same time taken for granted and critically understood\*. That is, we must first identify the "universal a priori of the life-world"<sup>(50)</sup>.

A superficial understanding of our criticisms of Husserl's attempts to avoid solipsism and establish intersubjectivity within phenomenology would lead to the conclusion that we have merely confirmed the general opinion that phenomenology is solipsistic, cannot account for intersubjectivity and is therefore irrelevant to sociology as the study of others as social actors. We reject this interpretation of our findings for two reasons. Firstly we have noted that Husserl's attempts to establish intersubjectivity were not genuinely phenomenological, being based on a number of unquestioned

\* A similar problem is encountered in Kuhn's<sup>(51)</sup> idea of scientific paradigms as culturally approved assumptions which inform scientific procedure, but similarly, his account of these paradigms claims to be a description of them as they are, that is, the account if it is to be generally acceptable must be presented as undistorted by paradigmatic assumptions.

assumptions such as the primacy of ego-consciousness, the existence of an homogeneous culture. As a consequence the solipsism in Husserl's phenomenology derives from an uncritical egocentrism. Thus Husserl's failure should not be taken as a failure of phenomenology. Indeed we have seen that Husserl's enquiry points towards a possible solution of this problem, namely the establishment of a priori intersubjectivity or the essence of intersubjectivity as correlate of transcendental consciousness. It is the establishment of such intersubjectivity which will be the goal of our revision of phenomenology. Secondly, to condemn Husserl's attempt to establish intersubjectivity does not remove the problem of how we can guarantee our knowledge of others. Common-sense accepts that there are others and that we can know them but all this is the merest assumption because common-sense cannot tell us whether our understanding of another, even though it makes sense to us, is a genuine grasp of the other or self-projection, either by analogy or empathy, onto the other's situation as we perceive it. Indeed our clarification of Husserl showed the rootedness of his analysis of intersubjectivity in common-sense assumptions and that his failure is a failure of common-sense knowledge of others and not of a true phenomenology. It is therefore necessary to develop further the idea of the natural attitude.

##### 5. THE NATURAL ATTITUDE AND SOLIPSISM

It must be understood that the solipsism of the natural attitude is not theoretical but practical. This means that it does not involve the denial that others exist or that they are knowable but that the egocentric assumptions on which naive apprehension of others is based\* cannot establish knowledge of others. Thus these assumptions result in the perception of others as being the same as "I" if "I" were there and not here. Further indications of this solipsism in relation to the world of

\* see below "reciprocity of perspectives" and assumptions of everyday life chapter 5.



objects in general are found in the naive confusion of meaning and significance, the unquestioned idea that a thing is its value for me and the ease with which the definite article, which denotes the uniqueness and totality of essence, e.g. the triangle, is used to denote particular significance e.g. "the triangle" in the sense of that triangle which has relevance for me. Thus both the natural attitude and Husserl's arguments which are based on naive assumptions can establish only significance, the 'I'-relatedness of others, and presuppose a unity of significance and meaning as all statements of significance involve assumptions about the nature or meaning of objects. Thus such naive understandings of intersubjectivity are based on the contrary assumptions that self-knowledge is primary and yet that we can learn from and be effected by others who thus modify our "selves", i.e. genuine interaction with others as others is possible. The principle, if unintended, value in Husserl's account is that he reveals some of the unfounded assumptions of everyday life without realising them as such for instance, the assumption that 'I' is the model for others' actions. He does not resolve the problem created by the inadequacy of these methods which is how to establish genuine intersubjectivity as opposed to interaction with self as if it were other, especially as the naive attitude and everyday life are based on the unquestioned belief in the accessibility of other subjects. \*

\* Those who accept accounts such as are offered by Husserl and Schutz as the final word on the limits of our knowledge of others are placed in the same dilemma as Durkheim who believed that he had shown that the continuance of society depended on a false belief in the existence of God. Should people realise the truth which Durkheim revealed, society of which he was very fond, would disintegrate. Equally, were we to realise that our belief in the availability of others and the adequacy of our perception of others is a groundless assumption social action would be impossible for it depends on our belief in such assumptions. However it is not enough to twit those who share the Schutzian view for acting in everyday life as if they did not accept their own conclusions, such straw men are easily destroyed and little is achieved by it. The crucial task in our view is to question whether this is the last word on intersubjectivity or whether there are grounds on which we can establish our knowledge of others.

### SOCIOLOGY AND THE NATURAL ATTITUDE

It may be asked why a sociologist should be dissatisfied with such accounts and see them as inadequate. Why not accept that these methods of everyday life do in fact work because interaction does take place on the basis of presumed mutual understanding, therefore why not recognise that these methods are appropriate in sociology? Such an argument is unsatisfactory for a number of reasons; firstly, the critique of these accounts of everyday understanding reveals contradictions and unquestioned assumptions and no investigation of our social experiences can be regarded as rational which countenances such shortcomings. Also, such a method cannot account for its attitude to itself because it perceives our everyday interaction as a personal achievement. As a consequence, there is no requirement for others to accept our construction of reality nor can there be any justification in our claiming other realities to be wrong, for all our social knowledge is based on taken-for-granted assumptions and makes sense only within the framework of such assumptions.\* However, the sociologist's perception of these assumptions and his accounts of social action are presented as reliable knowledge, not as personal achievements. If they were seen as personal achievements there could be no sense of having understood them adequately nor would the addition of the qualification "sociological" convey any real difference between such accounts and those of naivety. As a consequence such an approach, which is found in some versions of ethnomethodology and social phenomenology, is methodologically naive for it claims to present and clarify the methods of everyday life but the methods by which such knowledge is gained and on the adequacy of which the reliability of the presented knowledge is to be judged, remain vague for it offers no alternative to the unfounded methods of everyday

\* This indicates how solipsism leads to relativism.



life through which that life can be apprehended reliably. Thus, a critique of such an approach would reveal it to be as unreliable as the naive attitude which it purports to examine, criticise and explain. Put in an alternative form, a method which holds a relativistic view of knowledge cannot, if it is to be consistent, regard itself as other than partial and not totally reliable.\*

Also, the argument that the fact that methods of everyday lifework should remove any doubt concerning their use as the inevitable basis of sociology, because sociology itself is social action, an achievement by social actors, overlooks the basic difference between the aims of understanding in everyday life and sociology. Everyday life is practical and in this lies the origin of its solipsism, for other people are comprehended, (not understood) by an actor only in so far as it is necessary to achieve the actor's ends. Thus we "understand" in the natural attitude for a reason other than the attainment of understanding itself and the adequacy of our understanding is judged according to its effectiveness in attaining a particular goal of value to us.

Sociology, at least that sociology which sees understanding action as its goal, has the unique task of understanding in order to understand. Thus the practical, partial and limited understanding of the natural attitude is inadequate, for the goal of sociology is to understand the meaning of the action in itself not its value for a person other than the actor. The goal of sociology is therefore conceptual, the goals of the natural attitude are practical and it is therefore incorrect to advocate the use of the methods appropriate to one in the other. In arguing that sociology is conceptual we do not wish to espouse the idea that it is irrelevant to practical life for the difference between a genuine interpretive sociology

\* It should not be necessary to repeat the argument that unreliability, as a negative category, presupposes prior apprehension of the quality of reliability.

and the natural attitude is an aspect of the difference between meaning and significance and it has been shown that a grasp of significance, as achieved in the natural attitude, presupposes prior grasp of meaning, that is the nature of the action in itself, as in genuine interpretive sociology. Thus a sociology directed to conceptual ends, understanding for its own sake, clarifies the world of the natural attitude by questioning that which cannot be questioned from within the natural attitude without undermining that attitude, such as the problem how do we know that we understand others? Thus the natural attitude and all idealisations based upon it are unself-critical, not in the sense that we as naive actors cannot become aware of its assumptions as assumptions or take note of its unreliability but that even this awareness cannot prevent us from erroneously regarding these assumptions and unreliability as inevitable because being in and committed to the natural attitude we can see no alternative to them. It is our intention to show that a sociology which is not committed to the natural attitude, a phenomenological sociology, can create a critical attitude to our private common-sense worlds and in so doing enable us to escape the prison of ego and achieve genuine intersubjective understanding of other acts and their worlds.

The distinction between the different goals and the requirement of different procedures between common-sense and sociology indicates a further cause of dissatisfaction with the naive approach. This is that it maintains the major assumption of the natural attitude, that the everyday comprehension of experience is the only possible mode of understanding. Hence even those who recognise the partiality of naive sociology and insist that the sociologist's world view not be imposed on that of the actor accept this position as final because they cannot conceive of any other mode of intersubjective understanding than common-sense. However, the recognition that we have made certain



assumptions in our perception of the action does not permit us, in itself, to overcome these assumptions, hence the idea of their inevitability. Thus a critique of natural attitude assumptions which is itself methodologically naive cannot provide reliable alternatives to such common-sense, ego-oriented, assumptions; it can recognise them but it cannot transcend them.

This discussion raises further problems concerning the status of claims that the natural attitude perception of others is based on taken-for-granted assumptions even though the common-sense individual does not regard these assumptions as assumptions but as self-evident facts. This means that those who perceive the assumed basis of the natural attitude are claiming that they have discarded their epistemological dependence on the natural attitude<sup>\*(1)</sup>. To state that this is achieved by making the natural attitude anthropologically strange<sup>\*(2)</sup> simply begs the question of how we make it strange but not alien, that is, how we see it as other but as not being outside the possibility of our adequate understanding. Thus, such analyses claim to achieve knowledge which is not available in the natural attitude, even in the reflective natural attitude, and therefore it is necessary to ask, what is the nature of this alternative perspective which can provide such knowledge? Here also we have an indication within the natural attitude, of the need for a perspective other than that of the natural attitude if this attitude itself is to be understandable.

\*(1) To say, as Schutz does, that this is due to reflection on the natural attitude is not an adequate solution for there is no reason why acts of reflection should not be based on naive assumptions. It is important to remember in this context that Husserl did not call for reflection but for radical, rigorous reflection. The difference between the natural attitude and adequate understanding is not that one is reflective and the other is not, but that adequate understanding employs a different type of reflection.

\*(2) This view also demonstrates a naive faith in the superiority of anthropological perceptions.

The realisation of the unproblematic status of intersubjectivity based on naive assumptions for those living in the common-sense world raises the problem of why such naivety persists<sup>\*(1)</sup>. One answer, derived principally from Schutz would be that everyday life is based on assumptions, belief in which makes intersubjectivity possible. Leaving aside the question of how the existence of a generally held belief can be asserted without the prior assumption of intersubjectivity as the source of our knowledge of these general assumptions, this answer is unsatisfactory because it can account only for the belief that others are available. It cannot account for our faith in the confirmation of that belief, or our confidence that we have achieved an understanding of others. These beliefs or methods, such as the reciprocity of perspectives,<sup>\*(2)</sup> would permit interaction in the sense that atoms interact, but their presence cannot account for the persistence of the everyday belief in the adequacy of intersubjectivity, that we do know what others are like.

Those who hold this critical attitude towards intersubjectivity correctly realise that the natural attitude can lead only to solipsistic knowledge but they are placed in a quandary by the persisting belief in the adequacy of intersubjectivity held by everyday actors, because the solipsistic natural attitude itself cannot confirm such a belief. Such sociologists, including Schütz, fail to question whether the natural attitude is the sole source of our social being. As pointed out above, they accept the major assumption of the natural attitude, that is, the idea that the natural attitude is inevitable. It is thus our contention that concentration on the natural attitude based on an uncritical acceptance of the idea that "natural" means normal and exclusive necessarily leads to the failure to establish intersubjectivity because the natural

\*(1) The question could be reversed and expressed in the form why, when everyone else sees intersubjectivity as obvious, do some sociologists, principally ethnomethodologists and social phenomenologists, see it as a problem.

\*(2) re below chapter 5.



attitude is solipsistic. This does not mean that intersubjectivity cannot be established, merely that the natural attitude is an inappropriate means of achieving this goal because it is concerned only with the individual's practical interests and it therefore cannot encompass the social aspect of our being which it nevertheless accepts. Thus, it could be argued that genuine intersubjective knowledge is impossible, that our critique of the natural attitude has established that there is no guarantee of experiencing an other's self within the natural attitude and that we simply project ourselves onto the other's situation by empathy and analogy and thus we interact with our own ego's. Thus there is only a self-here and a self-if-it-were-there. This argument involves a contradiction in that while claiming our limitation to self it admits the possibility of self recognising a "there" as distinct from the present ego location. If we were truly locked in our own egos, there could be no "there", only a continuous "here". Again we note an experience within the natural attitude, "there" as opposed to "here" regardless of the adequacy of the judgement concerning "there", which points to an intersubjective reality which cannot be established by the natural attitude.

Thus a critique of the natural attitude reveals not only the inadequacy of that attitude in relation to establishing genuine intersubjective knowledge but also that it is posited on the possibility of such a reliability in our knowledge of others. That is, the natural attitude is unable to establish genuine intersubjectivity, even though such intersubjectivity is a necessary assumption of the natural attitude. This, of course, is not proof of the real existence of such reliability but it is an indication that the quest for such reliability is implied in the natural attitude and that the natural attitude is unfulfilled in the

absence of adequate intersubjective knowledge. It has also been established that the natural attitude, being solipsistic, cannot provide indubitable intersubjective knowledge and it is therefore reasonable to enquire into the adequacy of phenomenology in this area as it deliberately refuses to base itself on naive conceptualisations. It will be the aim of our revision of phenomenology to expound its potential as a means of providing that reliable knowledge of others without which the programme of sociology, especially interpretive sociology, cannot be fulfilled. In order to clarify the centrality of the problematic status of our knowledge of others in sociology it is necessary to consider various methods to overcome this problem which have been advanced by sociologists and philosophers. Although none of these methods will be found to be satisfactory, the purpose of such an investigation is not simply to reveal the shortcomings of these approaches but through this criticism to identify indications as to where a solution to this problem may be found.

Thus, our enquiry has established the vulnerability of Husserl's phenomenology to solipsism and the inadequacy of his attempts to establish intersubjectivity within the epoche. Nevertheless, Husserl's work in this field has a negative value in that it demonstrates many of the inadequate proposed solutions to this argument. In particular the ideas that we can account for our knowledge of others as others by either analogical inference or projective empathy or that this problem can be resolved by assuming the existence of a common culture\*, have been found to be unsatisfactory. We noted also Husserl's failure to distinguish between genuine and taken-for-granted or naive intersubjective understanding. Developing this theme, we demonstrated that Husserl's proposed solutions

\* Similar attempts to resolve the problem of intersubjective knowledge will be found in our consideration of sociological approaches to this problem below, chapters 4 and 5.



to this problem were not, in fact, phenomenological but were based on naive, common-sense assumptions. In particular, Husserl uncritically accepts that subjectivity precedes intersubjectivity and that our knowledge is ego-centric. Thus, although Husserl is properly criticised for his failure to avoid solipsism this failure is a consequence of his reliance on the natural attitude and therefore does not justify the claim that phenomenology itself is necessarily solipsistic. Therefore, it is reasonable to enquire further into the possibility of a phenomenologically based genuine intersubjective understanding. This discussion revealed also that the problem of solipsism is a case of the more general problem of the relationship between consciousness and its objects and it is in this context that our attempt to establish intersubjectivity as a phenomenological datum will take place.

Following on from the discovery that Husserl's failure is a failure of the natural attitude, we considered in greater detail the reasons for the natural attitude's inability to establish intersubjectivity which we located in its essentially practical attitude. That is, the natural attitude fails to establish genuine knowledge of other minds because it is oriented around the practical problems of the individual ego even though it assumes its capability to achieve such knowledge. From this point we demonstrated the inadequacy of the natural attitude as a means of establishing sociology and considered the detrimental consequences arising from a sociology dependant on the natural attitude. It is therefore necessary to consider various attempts, both phenomenological and non-phenomenological, to confront this problem within sociology and which have attempted to account for our knowledge of others as a means of establishing sociology as the understanding of other conscious selves.

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15. HUSSERL "THE CRISIS OF EUROPEAN SCIENCES AND TRANSCENDENTAL PHENOMENOLOGY", op.cit. p.179



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| 31. HUSSERL         | "IDEAS" VOL.3, op.cit. quoted by<br>SCHUTZ "COLLECTED PAPERS" VOL.3<br>op.cit.    | p.54      |
| 32. HUSSERL         | "THE PARIS LECTURES" NIJHOFF, THE<br>HAGUE 1964                                   | p.34      |
| 33. LAUER           | "PHENOMENOLOGY; ITS GENESIS AND<br>PROSPECTS" HARPER TORCHBOOKS NEW<br>YORK, 1958 | p.153     |
| 34. EVANS-PRITCHARD | "THEORIES OF PRIMITIVE RELIGION"<br>OXFORD U.P., 1965                             |           |
| 35. SCHUTZ          | "COLLECTED PAPERS" VOL.3 op.cit.  | p.70      |
| 36. SCHUTZ          | "COLLECTED PAPERS" VOL.3 op.cit.  | p.71      |
| 37. HUSSERL         | "CARTESIAN MEDITATIONS" cited by<br>SCHUTZ "COLLECTED PAPERS" VOL.3<br>op.cit.    | p.80      |
| 38. HUSSERL         | "THE CRISIS OF EUROPEAN SCIENCES AND<br>TRANSCENDENTAL PHENOMENOLOGY op.cit.      | p.141     |
| 39. HUSSERL         | "THE CRISIS OF EUROPEAN SCIENCES AND<br>TRANSCENDENTAL PHENOMENOLOGY" op.cit.     | p.121     |
| 40. HUSSERL         | "THE CRISIS OF EUROPEAN SCIENCES AND<br>TRANSCENDENTAL PHENOMENOLOGY" op.cit.     | p.122     |
| 41. HUSSERL         | "THE CRISIS OF EUROPEAN SCIENCES AND<br>TRANSCENDENTAL PHENOMENOLOGY" op.cit.     | p.226     |
| 42. HUSSERL         | "THE CRISIS OF EUROPEAN SCIENCES AND<br>TRANSCENDENTAL PHENOMENOLOGY" op.cit.     | p.124     |
| 43. HUSSERL         | "PHILOSOPHY AND THE CRISIS OF EUROPEAN<br>MAN" in LAUER (ed) op.cit.              | p.186-187 |
| 44. HUSSERL         | "PHILOSOPHY AND THE CRISIS OF EUROPEAN<br>MAN" in LAUER (ed) op.cit.              | p.156     |
| 45. HUSSERL         | "PHILOSOPHY AND THE CRISIS OF EUROPEAN<br>MAN" in LAUER (ed) op.cit.              | p.165     |
| 46. HUSSERL         | "PHILOSOPHY AND THE CRISIS OF EUROPEAN<br>MAN" LAUER (ed) op.cit.                 | p.156     |



47. HUSSERL "THE CRISIS OF EUROPEAN SCIENCES AND  
TRANSCENDENTAL PHENOMENOLOGY" op.cit. p.129
48. LUCKMANN "ON THE BOUNDARIES OF THE SOCIAL WORLD"  
in NATANSON (ed) "PHENOMENOLOGY AND  
SOCIAL REALITY" NIJHOFF, THE HAGUE,  
1970
49. HUSSERL "THE CRISIS OF EUROPEAN SCIENCES AND  
TRANSCENDENTAL PHENOMENOLOGY" op.cit. p.139
50. MARX "THE LIFE-WORLD AND PARTICULAR SUB-WORLDS"  
in NATANSON (ed), "PHENOMENOLOGY AND p.69  
SOCIAL REALITY" op.cit.

CHAPTER FOUR

THE PROBLEM OF INTERSUBJECTIVITY IN SOCIOLOGY. THE VERSTEHENDE TRADITION:  
WINCH AND WEBER.

The principal concern of this and the two following chapters is a critical discussion of various solutions to the problem of gaining reliable knowledge of other minds in sociology. These solutions fall into two types the first of which is the nominalist approach of Winch, Weber and Schutz as opposed to the realistic theories of Simmel and Scheler. The nominalist-realist distinction between these groups refers to the former's denial and the latter's affirmation of the existence of objectively real correlates of our concepts in which our apprehension of other mind's is expressed. The nominalist position typically limits reliable knowledge to ego and tends to positivism<sup>(1)</sup>. The realistic approach is typically anti-positivistic and argues that a grasp of objective reality including other minds is possible.

This distinction may be said to be misleading because it could be argued that Winch, Weber and Schutz do not deny intersubjective knowledge and that Simmel, being a neo-Kantian, adopts a nominalistic attitude to knowledge, that is he bases knowledge on a priori structures of knowing not on objects. We intend to justify our distinctions by showing that, although the members of the first group accept the existence of intersubjective knowledge, that in their attempts to establish the means by which sociologists should arrive at conclusions concerning other subjects experiences they succeed either in isolating ego from other subjects or they effectively deny the distinctiveness of others from ego. In either case the idea of intersubjective knowledge as the reliable apprehension of a mind and experiences other than one's own is destroyed. We accept that Simmel was a neo-Kantian but we intend to show that if his theory of our knowledge of others, of the nature and origin of sociation, is stripped



of its Kantian elements, which are shown to be untenable, in particular the form-content distinction, he can be interpreted in such a way as to indicate a realistic interpretation of intersubjective knowledge. This points the way to a genuine grasp of other minds. The aim of this enquiry is to show the superiority, although not the total satisfactoriness, of the realistic over the nominalistic approach.

#### HUSSERL AND SOCIOLOGY \*

Before this enquiry is undertaken it is necessary to complete our consideration of Husserl's phenomenology by giving a brief account of his attitude to the nature of the social sciences. Husserl's interest in the social sciences emerged in his later work as a consequence of the centrality of the problem of intersubjectivity and his attempts to define a crucial cultural rôle for phenomenology. This is in sharp distinction to the attitude of his earlier work, prior to Ideas, in which psychology was his principal concern among the sciences. Nevertheless, Husserl's understanding of the social sciences, including sociology, reveals the inadequacy of his attempts to establish intersubjectivity. He states that after the world of nature has been abstracted there remains individual psychology as the foundation of human science including, "sociology and likewise ... a science of objectified spirit which after all refers, in its own way, to the human being as a person"(2). Thus Husserl's approach to the social sciences is one of psychological reductionism despite his total opposition to such a process in epistemology. Although it is possible to argue that all socio-cultural products point to the conscious acts of those who created, used, knew and lived within them, the recognition that such products are consequences of intersubjectivity, that they have the existence of others as part of their inner horizon, identifies them as belonging to a different ontological realm to that of individual subjectivity and therefore they cannot be reduced to the subjective level.

\* see also Husserl's comments on historicism and Weltanschauung philosophy in chapter 1.

Even if we accept, which we do not, Husserl's claim that intersubjectivity is a product of subjectivity this would not justify the denial of the self-evidence of intersubjectivity in itself, as a distinct category.

Although there is an implied body-mind dualism in this account by Husserl of the distinctiveness of the social sciences he claims this to be an analytic not an essential separation. Further Husserl states that as corporeality and conscious life are not real in the same sense, that is are ontologically and epistemologically distinct, that it is not possible to reduce consciousness to the physical and that therefore it is erroneous to equate psychological data experience with the experience of bodies. Thus we cannot identify the person as such with corporeal existence because the abstraction of the physical leaves, as distinctive, intentional acts which have the characteristic of "real relations between the person and other realities"<sup>(3)</sup>. Nevertheless it must be recognised that Husserl's attempt to establish our recognition of other conscious subjects by acts of appresentation<sup>\*</sup>, is based on the derivation of knowledge concerning consciousness from prior knowledge of corporeal existence and is thus a contradiction of his assertion that consciousness is sui generis. However, this account of Husserl's conception of the social sciences reveals his rejection of naturalistic methods and of all attempts to reduce personal being to corporeality in these studies as being inappropriate in terms of the nature of the subject matter of social scientific investigation. In so doing he asserts the independent being of intentional acts of consciousness and their objects, although it is clear that Husserl avoids naturalistic reductionism only by adopting the equally inappropriate psychologistic reductionism.

Husserl's rejection of naturalism in the social sciences is a crucial aspect of his perception of the cultural role of these sciences which is

\* re below Chapter three.



their therapeutic function in relation to society's sickness<sup>(4)</sup>. In Husserl's view social science has been prevented from fulfilling its cultural destiny through its acceptance of naturalistic methods the failure of which is not to be attributed to the complexity of the required research but should be seen as inevitable. This is because nature for the social scientist is not nature as comprehended in the natural sciences, but is nature as it is lived and experienced, it is the environing world, our representation of the world. In accordance with his criticism of natural science for overlooking its own status as an intersubjective achievement, Husserl argues that far from the cultural or social sciences being reducible to natural science, the natural sciences are themselves a cultural activity based on the community of scientists and as such natural science is part of the problem of culture. Thus the socio-historical phenomenon of natural science cannot be explained by natural science but by a genuine social science of spirit. Therefore, Husserl sees the acceptance of the naturalisation of spirit, the denial of a self-contained science of spirit, as resulting in a distortion of spiritual life and this distortion is partly responsible for the current cultural sickness. This implies that such distortions have become part of the natural attitude of everyday life. A genuine social science, that is a science of the human spirit as expressed in social, historical and cultural formations, is essential if our culture is to realise its true nature. Thus, in this later stage of his work, Husserl defines a similar role for social science as he does for philosophy, indicating that he did not see the resolution of the crisis of European culture, as simply a matter of arriving at adequate concepts, as suggested by Hindess<sup>(5)</sup>, but as requiring also a reliable apprehension, through a non-naturalistic social science, of the teleology of our society

and culture as an achievement of the human spirit. This is the programme which he attempted to carry out in the unfinished "Crisis". Nevertheless, as this programme involves the study of culture as an intersubjective achievement it requires that the possibility of intersubjective understanding be established. As has been seen Husserl fails to do this but in an attempt to make a virtue out of necessity, he claims that phenomenology overcomes the groundless objectivisations of natural science by "beginning one's philosophy from one's own ego"<sup>(6)</sup>. This implies that philosophy begins in one's own ego but is not limited to it but the inevitability of solipsism in his philosophy makes it impossible for Husserl to go beyond the ego to intersubjectivity. Thus, although Husserl condemns naturalism for its false objectivism his approach seems equally doomed to a false subjectivism.

Apart from his extensive discussion of Dilthey and *Weltanschauung* philosophy\*, this is almost the sum of Husserl's ideas concerning the nature of the social sciences and it is readily seen that his consideration of these sciences is very limited and generalised. There is almost nothing on the precise methodology of the social sciences with the exception of the argument that, as our immediate experience goes beyond what essentially is proper to the object, awareness of what is proper can be obtained only within the epoche<sup>(7)</sup>. Husserl claims that as a consequence of this requirement it is necessary that we do not enter into the validity which the person gives his experiences and he concludes from this that the social scientist should be a disinterested spectator of the person's experiences. However, it is not made clear how a disinterested spectator can understand the other when the other is committed to his actions. That is, would not a disinterested spectator be unable to comprehend the crucial aspect of social action, that is that the actor is personally

\* re chapter one.



involved in, is committed to his action? Further, it does not follow necessarily that disinterestedness is the only way of avoiding the naive acceptance of the adequacy of the actor's viewpoint. Nevertheless Husserl would rightly insist on the error of an unquestioning acceptance of the validity of the actor's viewpoint for the idea that this viewpoint cannot be questioned and is as good as anyone else's implies an untenable conception of knowledge. The inevitable relativistic absurdity is made apparent when it is realised that the statement that actor's viewpoints or accounts are inviolate claims an absolute status for itself. Thus, any sociologist, who is merely an actor of a special type, who dares to claim that a certain actor's account of events is wrong, will himself be told that he is wrong to make such a statement. That is, the idea that it is wrong to impose our accounts onto actor's viewpoints is itself imposed on those sociologists whose viewpoints lead them to conclude that other actor's accounts are wrong. This is not to argue that sociologists can criticise or find fault with actor's accounts at will for the accounts of the sociologists must themselves be submitted to critical scrutiny. That is, it is neither necessarily permissible or impermissible for sociologist's to criticise actor's accounts and to present their own accounts as adequate. Such a procedure is permissible only when the sociologist's account is a statement of what is, based on the indubitable perception of the epoche, it is impermissible when it is based on judgements and unquestioned assumptions which reflect not the necessary and universal meaning of the phenomenon but its arbitrary significance for the sociologist as an individual.

The paucity or lack of precision in Husserl's understanding of the social sciences has resulted in misleading statements concerning the nature of a phenomenological sociology. Thus Natanson<sup>(8)</sup> defines phenomenology in sociology as "a generic term to include all positions

which stress the primacy of consciousness and subjective meaning in the interpretation of social action". This view is an inadequate grasp of the nature of a phenomenological sociology for although subjectivism is part of Husserl's idea of the social sciences, the crucial feature of this idea is the use of the epoche which Natanson fails to mention. Thus, his definition of phenomenological sociology would include the anti-essentialism and nominalism, and therefore non-phenomenological, approach of Weber. Equally Tiryakian's<sup>(9)\* (1)</sup> attempt to establish a respectable sociological pedigree for phenomenology succeeds only by re-defining phenomenology almost out of existence. Thus, he ignores Weber's nominalism in asserting a relationship between the latter's Verstehende sociology and phenomenology. He claims that Simmel's form-content distinction parallels Husserl's distinction between noesis and noema, the quality and object of intentional acts. Not only is such a claim a gross distortion of these ideas but we intend to show that Simmel's sociology can be phenomenologically reconstructed only by abandoning his form-content distinction. Finally, Tiryakian's claim that Durkheim's assertion that social facts are things is similar to Husserl's war-cry of "back to the things themselves", shows a mis-understanding of the totally different meaning of "things" for these two thinkers. For Durkheim "thing" is a sensorily perceptible quantifiable object, for Husserl it is mere phenomenon. Nor does Tiryakian have any qualms about combining such radically different ideas of sociology as those held by Mannheim, who was a relativist, Scheler, who denied the adequacy of relativism, Simmel, Weber, Durkheim<sup>\*(2)</sup>

\* (1) The main burden of Tiryakian's argument is that the great, and not so great, sociologists were phenomenologists if they but knew it. It is our intention to show that this is not so, that a genuine phenomenological sociology cannot be said to exist, but that all the past sociologists, especially those who sought to interpret action, should have been phenomenologists.

\* (2) Marx is the only major theorist not defined as a phenomenologist by Tiryakian.



et al, under the rubric of phenomenology. The inevitable consequence of such syncretism, the attempted combination of opposed views, is that in order to avoid contradiction phenomenology has to be defined so as to signify everything and therefore mean nothing, thus effectively denying the value of phenomenology for sociology. Nevertheless it must be admitted that Neisser's<sup>(10)</sup> criticism that philosophical phenomenology has contributed little to sociology is correct, and that extant so-called phenomenological investigations of the social world are inadequate in that the claimed eidetic intuitions of social action are in fact based on empirical induction or deduction<sup>(11)</sup>. However, this should not be taken as a justification for the claim that phenomenology is necessarily irrelevant to sociology, especially, as has been seen, the idea of phenomenology which is presented in sociology is inadequate, despite the occasional deference to philosophical phenomenology made by leading theorists such as Parsons<sup>(12)</sup> who claims a phenomenological status for the action frame of reference\*.

Despite the brevity of Husserl's consideration of the social sciences it is clear that these sciences raise the theoretical problem of intersubjectivity on a practical level. That is they raise the problem of the status of the social scientist's knowledge of others. Thus Husserl states that in the epoche the psychologist has "his own life, in primal originality, but also, proceeding from his own life, those others who also live and their life, whereby each life with its own intentionality reaches intentionally into the life of every other and all are interwoven in different, closer or more distant ways in an association of life"<sup>(13)</sup>, and thus in the epoche every intentional life and every community of subjects is thematically accessible. This is a reference to Husserl's belief that subjectivity precedes intersubjectivity, although the latter

\* This is significant in terms of our discussion of the relationship between Simmel and Weber, below.

part of the quotation implies that the universal life or association of life pre-exists subjective consciousness and is not created by such consciousness\*. However, as has been seen, Husserl fails in the attempt to establish such a common world on this basis. If such an association of life exists it would seem unreasonable and unnecessary to demand, as Husserl does, that the investigator remain disinterested rather than become a participant or co-partner with the other through the common world. Despite his claim that the idea that subjects are inaccessible to each other is naive Husserl fails to establish the grounds which would justify the acceptance of any other view.

Thus, Husserl's idea of the social sciences stresses the qualities of anti-naturalism, subjectivism, the dis-interested position of the observer, its dependance on the method of the epoche and the practical goal of social science of providing a therapy for society's ills. Although these ideas can be criticised because of their vagueness and over-generality, the main weakness in Husserl's account of the social sciences is his failure to establish the accessibility of genuine intersubjective knowledge which is the fundamental social phenomenon, in the absence of which, sociology, as a study of other subjects, cannot claim reliability for its methods or conclusions. It is therefore necessary to consider the attempts to establish intersubjectivity as a reliable datum in various extant ideas of sociology to see if they succeed where Husserl fails.

The theories of Schutz and Scheler who claim their separate approaches to the problem of intersubjective knowledge to be phenomenological will be considered in this survey. It will be seen that their theories have little in common and it will be necessary to decide which of them indicates

\* This (possible) reversal of the ontological status of universal and individual consciousness is novel in Husserl but it lies at the heart of our attempt below to constitute intersubjectivity within phenomenology).



the correct path to a genuine phenomenological sociology. However, it is necessary, firstly, to consider major non-phenomenological approaches to the problem of the epistemological status of intersubjective knowledge\*(1) in order to see whether in order to be made adequate they require the apodictic knowledge which phenomenology claims to provide.

The opposition between Wittgenstein and phenomenology has been noted previously and therefore it is proposed to begin this investigation with a consideration of a major and influential attempt to devise a sociology based on Wittgensteinian principles by Winch.

THE PROBLEM OF INTERSUBJECTIVE KNOWLEDGE AS PERCEIVED IN WINCH'S "IDEA OF A SOCIAL SCIENCE"<sup>(14)</sup>

Winch, like Husserl, rejects naturalism in the social sciences but whereas Husserl bases his argument in this respect on the intentional nature of social action, Winch places greater emphasis on its rule-boundedness. He claims to derive this concept from Wittgenstein's notion of rule-defined language games. However Winch does not define what he intends by the term rule and as will be seen this results in uncertainty in his argument, although he does make it clear that social rules are not to be confused with the laws of natural science because the former alone are normative; that is there is always a right and a wrong way of following a rule but this does not apply to natural science laws. Thus, if a social rule is not followed the fault lies with the social actor for misunderstanding the rule but if a natural law is not followed by an appropriate phenomenon, the fault lies with the law for not being sufficiently comprehensive\*(2). Therefore, the possibility of rule-

\*(1) It is surprising that despite the fact that all sociology makes assumptions concerning the validity of intersubjective knowledge very few sociologists have attempted a critical examination of these assumptions.

\*(2) Winch's notion of a social rule is very similar to Durkheim's idea of social norms although Durkheim is more explicit concerning the ontological status of norms.

breaking is part of social behaviour whereas the possibility of law-breaking is not part of the behaviour of natural phenomena. This raises a further difference between rule and law; the rule is part of the actor's behaviour, a law is not part of the behaviour of natural phenomena. Rules can be reflected upon by actors, laws cannot be reflected upon by natural phenomena. In Winch's view the world is the world as presented in our concepts and thus any attempt to discuss reality, including social reality, must take account of these ideas. We identify our experiences of the world by using the name given to past experience of the same experience and what is to count as the same is decided by reference to a rule which we follow. However, Winch's statement that the world is world as presented in our concepts would be more accurately formulated as "the known world is the world as presented in our concepts". That is, "the known world is the world which is known", revealing the statement to be tautologous. To identify knowing and naming, as Winch does, ignores the fact that the act of naming is based upon and is the completion of, the cognitive grasp of the phenomenon. Naming, being based on this prior grasp, is the seal on apprehension. The fact that a word is not in our vocabulary does not mean that we cannot experience the world-equivalent of that word but that we cannot attribute significance to the word as used by another person. It should also be noted that the establishment of the rule-centredness of social life does not explain that life for it is further necessary that we know why a particular rule is followed. This point will be developed in relation to Winch's ideas concerning the publicity and context-boundedness of rules.

In order to argue that the apprehension of rules fulfills the aim of sociology, which in Winch's view is the understanding of others, i.e. that knowing the rule gives intersubjective understanding, it is necessary that rules should be established as public and not as private. In his



attempts to establish the publicity of rules Winch relies heavily on Wittgenstein's arguments denying the possibility of a private language. In particular Winch argues that if rules were private there would be no difference between applying a rule correctly and merely thinking that one has done so. Also, as we use the same means to make sense of our own actions to ourselves as we do in making them sensible to others, others can judge equally as well as me whether I am following my rule. This however simply makes rules accessible to others, it does not make them social. This aspect is covered by Winch in his argument that rules are originally social, that they are learnt within and as part of a social context. Thus rules belong to a given social context and can only be said to be followed by a subject when others within that context are able to grasp the rule and ascertain whether or not it is being followed correctly. Further it is stated that our idea of rules is derived from our experience of their use within society\*. At this essentially descriptive phase it is necessary only to indicate an ambiguity in Winch's statement that rules have a social setting, for are we to understand by this that particular rules, as opposed to learning the meaning of rules in general, are the possession of individuals but are, by reason of their nature, open to others' understanding or does it mean that rules belong to social contexts and are simply used by the individuals in that context? The consequences of Winch's failure to appreciate this ambiguity will be clarified in the consideration of his cultural relativism. Thus Winch sees rules as normative in that they control behaviour and as public, within a given social context, so that understanding another's behaviour is no more problematic than understanding one's own behaviour. It is the consequences for sociology of these characteristics which we will consider.

\* This implies an acceptance of our view that experience precedes conceptualisation i.e. that we experience rules before we know what the term "rule" means.

RULES AS BASIC ELEMENTS IN SOCIAL ACTION

Our principle concern at this stage is the claim that, due to the normative status of rules, knowledge of the rule being followed is equivalent to understanding action, thus Winch seems to see rules as the origin or source of action\*. We object to this argument on the grounds that, even if we can show that in a particular situation a certain rule was being followed, the claim that we have understood the action is not justified unless we can show why that rule was being followed. Winch's claim that rules belong to social contexts implies that within these contexts action must follow the rule, more or less adequately, but a brief consideration of Winch's examples of rule-following in social life show this not to be so. Thus he states, "Suppose that it is said of a certain person, N, that he voted Labour at the last General Election because he thought that a Labour government would be the most likely to preserve industrial peace. What kind of explanation is this? The clearest case is that in which N, prior to voting, has discussed the pros and cons of voting Labour and has explicitly come to the conclusion, "I will vote Labour because that is the best way to preserve industrial peace". That is a paradigm case of someone performing an action for a reason". This account of the action of voting in terms of following this rule does not give us full understanding of the action. The account is not simply a description of a rule and behaviour appropriate to that rule because it includes the claim that the actor has made the value-judgement that industrial peace is worth preserving. Further there is the assumption in this account that the actor believes this value-judgement to be relevant in reaching his decision. Thus the rule itself, "vote for the

\* The rightness or wrongness of rules refers only to the adequacy of rule-following behaviour, it does not involve the judgement that the rule is the right one to follow, although as will be seen in the discussion of the publicity of rules Winch unjustifiably introduces this latter view.



party which preserves industrial peace", is seen as being appropriate to the situation by reference to the value-judgements of the actor<sup>\*</sup>. Nor can it be argued that the rule is necessary to, or inevitable in the context of voting for it is possible to conceive of voters applying other rules in reaching their voting decision or of even deciding that the question of industrial peace is irrelevant to that decision. This simply reveals the ever-present possibility that in a given situation it is conceivable that actors could have acted differently than they did, or to put it in Winch's terminology, they could have acted according to different rules. Therefore it is necessary to ask why they followed one rule rather than another. Nor is it possible to argue that we have identified the wrong social context, that the rule governing voting belongs to the social context of politically significant others. Such an argument implies that the social community existed before the rule, that rules are a consequence not the cause of sociation and therefore rules cannot be claimed to be the basic elements in social action, as Winch would have it, but are derived from pre-existing communality.

Winch's claim that to know the rule on which action is based is to understand the action is further undermined by his reference to Wittgenstein's instance of a society where wood is piled in heaps of arbitrary height and then sold according to the area of ground covered by the timber<sup>(16)</sup>. We could predict the wood-selling behaviour of this society by reference to the rule as outlined above but Winch correctly notes that we could not claim to understand the situation because we have not grasped the "point

\* It is important to note that Winch cites this example in the context of his discussion of Weber for both he and Weber, as will be seen below, attempt to avoid considering values as part of social action. Thus the kind of action envisaged in the example would be classified by Weber as goal-rational action; that is action concerned with the selection of efficient means to given ends but we have argued that in order to understand this action fully it is necessary to know why certain ends and not others are being pursued.

or meaning" of this practise. We would say that we do not understand the action because we do not know why this rule is being followed rather than another. Thus, in order to understand action it is necessary to know why the rules being followed are acceptable to the actors. Although Winch does not realise it, his criticism of Wittgenstein's example undermines his own reliance on the apprehension of rules as the source of sociological knowledge.

Winch would probably claim this criticism to be misplaced because rules are not separable from meaning in the way we have suggested because they belong to the social context from which the actor also derives his relevance systems and structures of meaning. In support of this we can note Winch's criticism of Weber for attempting to distinguish between "meaning" and "social", although he does not realise that Weber uses the term social in a more restricted sense than does Winch himself. Although this defence of Winch's position has been considered above, this argument introduces a crucial aspect of his case which is the claim that rules are public.

#### THE PUBLICITY OF RULES

Winch's argument that rules are public is based on his understanding of what it means to follow a rule. He sees this as not just doing what one has been told but as involving the idea of continuing in the same way and what is to count as continuing in the same way is derived from the social context in which the rule was learnt. Thus, "continuing in the same way" is seen as a matter of course by all members of that context. Private rules, inaccessible to others, are not regarded as true rules by Winch for the idea of continuing in the same way, which he sees as essential to rules, necessitates judgements as to whether the action is the same. Thus rule-following involves the possibility of making a mistake and only



by asking whether the action has been correctly carried out can we understand it. Mistakes must be seen as a contravention of an established notion of what is correct, thus others are able to point out my mistake to me. In the case of a private rule it is impossible for others to judge if a mistake has been made in the rule-governed action. If I can express the rule to myself and thus understand it, it can be understood by others. That is, a private rule cannot be understood either by the rule-follower or an observer. The notion of establishing standards is seen by Winch as social otherwise we could not have the necessary external checks on rule-defined action.

In order to evaluate this argument it is necessary to consider what is meant by the private rule which is not a rule. Does it refer to arbitrary behaviour which does not make sense to the actor, although it is difficult to conceive what conscious behaviour of this nature would look like, or is it rule-governed behaviour where the rule is invented by the actor alone? It is possible to argue that private rules in this latter sense are in principle capable of being shared and are therefore potentially social but this does not mean that such rules are socially derived nor does it justify the claim that we cannot recognise mistakes in the way we follow such private rules.

It is possible to claim that Winch pre-empts the discussion by defining rules in such a way that they must be social, but his argument does not rest solely on definitional sleights of hand but on the claim that rules are learnt within a social context and are therefore socially established. However, even if Winch's account of rule-learning as the

\* In the Wittgenstein example cited by Winch p.31-32, the imaginary compass user is said to be indulging in behaviour which shows no regularity. Although Wittgenstein is unclear as to whether this means that the action is not rule governed or whether we as observers cannot grasp the rule, Winch has previously shown that one does not see regularities unless one presumes a rule and we would add, a rule of a certain kind with which we are familiar. It could therefore be the case that the use of the compasses is rule-bound but is so different from our rule in the same situation that we cannot identify it.

basis of intersubjective knowledge is accepted, it has to be recognised that, rules being general, in order to be applicable to all relevant cases have to be operationalised in relation to particular situations. This implies an interpretation, if not re-definition, of rules in terms of individual goals and interests. The recognition that the application of the rule to individual situations is itself rule-governed is to open up the possibility of an infinite regress, and it undermines Winch's claim to locate our understanding of others in shared rules for the rule which particularises the general rule must be peculiar to the individual's situation being, like all rules, context bound. Therefore it cannot be shared by others not in that situation. Also Winch's emphasis that rules are learnt casts doubt on his thesis because we cannot learn if we have no concepts through which sense is made of the words which we hear in the learning context, and thus rules concerning learning must precede social relations of learning. Winch seems to recognise this problem when he claims that ideas and social relations are interchangeable terms<sup>(17)</sup>, the only difference between them being one of perspective. However, it would be contradictory to hold this view and at the same time persist, as Winch does, in claiming that ideas such as rule concepts are derived from social relations, unless such a claim is admitted to be tautologous and therefore pointless.

### RULES AND GAMES

It is noticeable that, like Wittgenstein, Winch constantly exemplifies, if not justifies, his argument and attempts to make it plausible by reference to games\*. It is therefore necessary to investigate the validity of this analogy between knowing the rules of a game and knowing the reasons for social action which is based on the assumption that social interaction is game-like. This analogy is difficult to sustain as games exist solely

\* re below chapter 2.



through their rules which define the game situation and which are intended to prevent individual innovation. The rules of the game are publicly known and anyone wishing to play the game agrees to abide by the official rules, and if there is a dispute over game behaviour it is settled by an appeal to the source of official rules, the rule-book, but there is rarely a rule-book to resolve conflict in social life. Most social interaction is governed by expectations rather than clearly defined rules and it is noticeable that Winch and Ryan<sup>(18)</sup>, in his commentary on Winch, derive many of their exemplars of social action from judicial or procedural action, such as voting, which are among the few areas of social life defined by official written rules<sup>\*(1)</sup>. To assert as Winch does that because the rules of interaction are social that the significance of my action is the same for me and others assumes that, either, others know my rule and accept its validity, which is largely true only of games, or that social context determines my rules which makes it impossible to explain surprise and deviance. For these reasons we would expect that an insistence on the game-like, rule-following nature of social interaction would result in an emphasis on harmony rather than conflict and an uncritical acceptance of official or dominant rules and definitions of the situation.

Such an official bias can be seen in Winch and his adherents. Thus Ryan<sup>\*(2)</sup> demonstrates his claim that action can take place only where rules exist which frame the action, by citing the case of U.S. citizenship which can be acquired, but not renounced, because there are rules for becoming a citizen but there are no rules for ceasing to be a citizen. This argument is clearly based on the uncritical acceptance of official, that is State Department, rules concerning citizenship. There is no reason why individuals should not act on the basis of what renunciation

\*{1) This emphasises the need for critical scrutiny of the purpose of choosing particular examples in an argument.

\*{2) Although Ryan is marginally critical of Winch he accepts the latter's understanding of the dependence of action on public rules.

of citizenship means to them by e.g. refusing to pay taxes, denying their obligations to the state, refusing to accept the legitimacy of state authority. It is true that such action is a consequence of the absence of appropriate official rules, and it is necessary that an observer wishing to understand the renouncers' behaviour grasps their attitude to official rules but this does not mean that their action must follow such rules. There is a crucial difference, which Winchians fail to recognise, between recognising that official rules constitute an important element in the horizon of social action and claiming that action can take place only within the officially defined context.

The same official bias can be found in Winch's reference to the case of a pupil making a mistake in following a rule expressed by a teacher, but Winch completely overlooks the possibility that the wrong behaviour is rule defined in that it seems reasonable to the pupil. It is therefore proper to ask why it makes sense rather than to dismiss it as mistaken. It may be objected that this argument misinterprets Winch who is using this example simply to clarify what it means to make a mistake, although his failure to enquire into the rationality or rule-directedness of mistakes is significant. There is, however, a clearer instance of official bias in Winch which cannot be defended in this way. This is the claim that motive statements are statements of rules governing behaviour but Winch then proceeds to make a distinction between reasonable and intelligible behaviour, between reason and motive. Thus, "To say, for example, that N murdered his wife from jealousy is certainly not to say that he acted reasonably. But it is to say that his act was intelligible in terms of the modes of behaviour which are familiar in our society and that it was governed by considerations appropriate to its context. These two aspects of the matter are interwoven; one can act 'from considerations' only where there are accepted standards of what it is appropriate to appeal to."\* (19) It is possible that the vagueness of this statement results

\* It is possible that in this statement Winch is seeking to avoid the



from the possibility that if this argument was developed Winch would have to ask how his model of action can explain the breaking of rules (deviance) and the belief that such behaviour can be understood. It appears that "reasonable" behaviour means socially acceptable behaviour as in Winch's reference to "accepted standards of reasonable behaviour current in his society"<sup>(20)</sup>, but this is an arbitrary and dubious judgement that only officially or dominantly approved action can be understood as reasonable. Similarly Ryan's statement that "it is not sensible to vote for an obvious incompetent or a crook"<sup>(21)</sup>, involves an uncritical reification of the official rule that the purpose of elections is to choose honest persons who can be relied upon to fulfill their duties competently. It would be sensible to vote for an incompetent if one believed the party label to be more important than I.Q. or if one wished to limit the effectiveness of government, or for a crook if one expected to benefit from his dishonesty\*. All these possibilities are based on various evaluations of the political system and the meaning of the act of voting and are sensible as means to achieving desired ends and cannot be dismissed as mere mistakes. The effect of defining official rules as proper rules is to maintain the appearance of a general agreement or an acceptable social standard concerning rules and it is necessary to ask why the belief in such agreement is necessary in Winch's sociology. A consideration of this point will clarify the nature of and possibility of intersubjective understanding as perceived by Winch.

#### RULES AND CULTURAL HOMOGENEITY

A consequence of Winch's claim that rules are learnt within a social context, if one ignores the ambiguities in this statement which have been noted above, is to make understanding<sup>unproblematic</sup> for we all within a given context

\* Such instances can be multiplied almost indefinitely.

learn the same rules and therefore understanding the other is no more difficult than understanding oneself. Indeed the claim that self and other understanding are essentially the same is a crucial feature of Winch's argument. This argument is based on the taken-for-granted assumption of such over-arching social contexts, that is, on the assumption of an homogeneous culture in which, by definition, there is no conflict or variance concerning rules and as a consequence deviance and failure to understand are impossible. Nevertheless Winch's own work is necessitated by the difficulty of reliability in intersubjective understanding for in a situation of cultural homogeneity an interpretive sociology and social philosophy, which arises out of our surprise at others' actions, would not be needed<sup>\*(1)</sup>. In such a situation the problem arises of how we are to recognise that I and other do in fact share a common social context as distinct from merely assuming that this is the case. This also relates to our previous discussion of the difficulties of setting the boundaries of cultures or social contexts and of avoiding the conclusion that each one of us occupies a unique social context. Thus the idea of sociology advanced by Winch, the understanding of action by reference to common rules, is possible only in situations where it is irrelevant, where the understanding of others is non-problematic<sup>\*(2)</sup>.

The inadequacy of Winch's assumptions concerning the culturally shared nature of rules can be demonstrated by reference to that area of social life which seems most susceptible to Winch's argument, that is, games. The game to be considered here is the "odd-man-out" question, where a player is presented with a list of words and asked to nominate the

<sup>\*(1)</sup> This argument can be related to the frequent claim that sociology was a consequence of the break-up of the harmony of pre-industrial Europe. Similarly Durkheim's distinction between mechanical and organic solidarity is posited on the idea of the non-homogeneity of industrial society.

<sup>\*(2)</sup> It is possible that it was an awareness of the self-defeating nature of this ideal in relation to understanding which made Winch see evaluation as a further goal of sociology)



one that does not fit, that is, the player is asked to guess the rule which has been broken by the odd man out. Thus the player could be presented with the following list, "London", "Canberra", "New York", "Lisbon", New York could be seen as odd because it is the only non-capital city in the list, or Lisbon because it is the only non-English speaking city, or Canberra because it is the only inland city. Thus the identification of the initial rule is ambiguous and depends on the assumption that both questioner and player use the same relevance systems in identifying the significance of place-names.\*

It has been claimed<sup>(22)</sup> that Winch limits sociology to an ethnocentric role, that sociology is relative to a given society's rules, but our challenge to Winch's assumptions concerning a homogeneous culture, social context or way of life indicates that he is supporting a more radical limitation of the possibilities of sociological understanding to the "moral community", that is those actors who share the same rule. There is no limitation to how small this group can be. Indeed, in view of the existence of individual perspectives and the mutual inter-penetration of the various social contexts inhabited by an actor, a particular interpretation of a rule or a particular hierarchy of rules may be peculiar to a single actor. The naive assumption of a common community based on shared rules justifies the belief that my rules are accepted by everyone else as members of the same social context. This is a restatement of Schutz's notion of the reciprocity of perspectives, that I understand the other by assuming that for all relevant purposes he and I are alike, and thus the other's actions are reduced to my perspective. That is, the unclarity in the idea of a shared social context results in a situation

\* It is interesting that this type of question is being increasingly omitted from intelligence tests because of the ambiguous relationship between question and answer.

of ego-aggrandisement, whereby the other is seen as a special case of I for, as it is believed that he and I belong to the same context, his reasons for acting must be same as my reasons if I were in his situation. Thus Winch's idea of sociology is revealed as not merely ethnocentric, limiting genuine understanding to our own culture, but as egocentric, restricting such understanding to self and those indistinguishable from self<sup>\*(1)</sup> although the naive belief in cultural homogeneity permits the extension of self to all those defined by self as belonging to the same culture as self.

#### WINCH ON SOCIOLOGICAL METHOD

We have described and criticised Winch's attempt to base sociological understanding of others on the rule-boundedness of social action. It is appropriate to consider at this point Winch's prescriptions concerning sociological methodology in so far as they illuminate further the adequacy of his ideas concerning social action and intersubjective understanding.

Of particular relevance to such a discussion is Winch's surprising rejection of the claim that predictability is a requirement of the social sciences,<sup>(23)</sup> for if social action is based on rules learnt within and belonging to a social context then it would seem that identifying the context should permit us to know the rule which informs the action and thus enable us to predict the action. Winch denies this conclusion on the grounds that rules can be followed in different ways and in the examples which he gives it is clear that this means that rules can be variously interpreted. This admission seriously undermines Winch's claim that rules are the basic data of social action for it makes rules dependant on interpretation, that is dependant on actors' relevance and meaning contexts.<sup>\*(2)</sup> Winch effectively concedes this point when he defines

\*<sup>(1)</sup> re below chapter three, the discussion of natural attitude solipsism.

\*<sup>(2)</sup> re above p.179.



voluntary behaviour, on the existence of which he bases his objection to the appropriateness of predictability in the social sciences, as behaviour to which there is an alternative. Thus understanding action involves understanding its contradictory and the notions (rules) which we use to predict others' actions are compatible with action other than that predicted taking place. It is not clear whether by the term alternative Winch is referring to an alternative rule or to alternative ways of acting in accordance with the rule. In either case, Winch's argument is compromised because in order to claim understanding we would still need to know either why that particular rule was followed rather than another or why the rule was interpreted in that particular manner. In order to answer such questions it is necessary to refer to the actor's perception of the situation and his judgements of the significance of the situation. Thus in order to maintain the idea of the voluntariness and non-predictability of social action Winch must admit that social rules are translated into action subject to the actor's judgements. Winch's argument also undermines his conception of the distinctive nature of a social rule for he sees as a crucial aspect of a rule the fact that it is open to others' judgements in terms of what it means to follow a particular rule, so that mistakes can be identified by persons other than the actor. However, if what it means to follow a particular rule is, as Winch states, composed of various alternatives, the claim that a mistake has been made may mean no more than that the actor and the observer have identified different alternatives of the rule. In which case the adequacy of the claim that a mistake has been made is always open to doubt, especially as Winch does not tell us how we may distinguish between a mistake in applying a rule and an alternative application of the rule.

### DEVIANCE AND ERROR

Consideration of the indeterminateness in the idea of following a rule raises further questions concerning the adequacy of Winch's model of social action as rule-following. It is noticeable that Winch refers only to mistakes in rule-following, and never to error or deviance. Thus Winch states that mistakes can be named only within the context of the category of activity within which the mistake occurs, so that magic is not a mistake but wrongly performed magical ritual is a mistake.<sup>(24)</sup> Thus, again, our understanding and judgements are limited to the purely utilitarian level of what Weber termed goal-rationality, the choosing of appropriate means to given ends.\* Therefore, there is no possibility of discussing values as components of social action, as these are neither rules nor applications of rules. This omission is crucial in Winch's argument for to admit the relevance to understanding of values would be to admit the possibility of value-conflict between actors and between actors and sociologists, thus challenging Winch's assumption of a homogeneous culture. Thus one can understand a religious ritual as rule-governed behaviour and there may even be a book of rules concerning ritual practises but one cannot understand, in the same way, the beliefs held by those performing the ritual. Even if there were a book listing the articles of faith, no one who simply knew these articles could claim to understand what it means to believe and to have one's experiences made comprehensible by the faith. To know the rules of football does not enable one to grasp the fervour of the Kop. Concentration on the rules to the exclusion of the values and significance of social life, makes the sociologist an outsider in social action, one who knows what is going

\* It is important to note that Winch's argument is sustained by an arbitrary definition of context, thus if we were to no less arbitrarily define the context not as magic but as healing or knowledge it would be correct, within Winch's argument, to criticise magic for using incorrect healing or learning techniques.



on but not why, one who cannot grasp what it means to live in the action as opposed to observing it. Ideas and values are the taken-for-granted assumptions in Winch's model of social action for they define the social context in which action occurs but Winch cannot make them objects of sociological enquiry. Thus the idea of making a mistake applies only to acts never to ideas. Therefore one cannot ask within Winch's framework whether an idea or rule itself is mistaken. Winch justifies this view by claiming that logic is context bound but as Winch has implicitly defined context in terms of ideas, values etc., this statement is tautologous, logic and context are defined in terms of each other. A more substantial defence of Winch's position would be the claim that as the sociologist's aim is to understand action, action must be perceived within the actor's frame of reference. Thus one can refer to mistakes for this is how the actor would perceive the action. Condemning the actor's beliefs and ideas as error by criteria not accepted by the actor may reflect the sociologist's prejudices and most certainly would not help us to understand the action. This is an important point and will be discussed below in relation to Winch's ideas concerning the role of evaluation in sociology.

There is one final point to be considered in relation to Winch's notion of making a mistake which is related to his acceptance of official rules and this is his failure to consider the possibility of the deliberate rejection of rules because Winch sees rules as the givens of social action which actors follow more or less adequately. He does not consider the possibility that rules are chosen and that deviance is not mistaken rule-following but the rejection of one set of rules in favour of others, for to do so would undermine his idea of an homogeneous culture. The reference to the situation of deviance as opposed to mistaken-ness

\* We recognise that not all sociologist's do in fact accept this as the purpose of sociology.

reveals a further assumption in Winch's account which is that the rules form a coherent, non-contradictory structure, that following one rule does not necessitate the rejection of another rule. Simple reflection on everyday life reveals the existence of contradictory rules as in the case of the worker faced by an official rule telling him to work fast and an unofficial rule telling him to work at the same pace as his mates. It may be argued that such conflicts are only apparent, that they are resolved by appeal to a more general rule which tells the actor which rule to follow. However this defence raises the possibility of an infinite regress of locating rules of ever increasing generality with an ever growing horizon of alternative modes of action. Also it would have to be shown that the actor accepted that the particular rule is dependant on or is a case of the more general rule\*.

#### UNDERSTANDING IN SOCIOLOGY

Winch's insistence that action makes sense only within the given context means that in order for the sociologist to achieve the goal of understanding he must be socialised into the community of actors, and it is for this reason that Winch sees Verstehen as the core of sociological procedure and not just a useful heuristic device. This merely raises the question of how such understanding is to be achieved. To state that this is to be done by grasping actors' rules reveals the paradox at the heart of Winch's work, for we must belong to the social context before we can learn its rules but we cannot enter the context until we know the rules. This paradox is a direct result of Winch defining rules and social context in terms of each other<sup>\*(2)</sup> and makes understanding impossible unless one has always belonged to that particular context.

\*(1) Winch refers to this point in Carroll's story of Achilles and the tortoise, but fails to see its relevance for his argument.

\*(2) re above p.183.



This criticism reveals again the necessity of the idea of cultural homogeneity in Winch's work and the serious consequences which result from the realisation of the inadequacy of this idea. On Winch's account, sociology is possible only if the sociologist can claim a common social context with his subjects, and the refutation of the idea of cultural homogeneity indicates that such a context may consist of very few people and further, that as sociologist the observer belongs to the sociological social context which is probably alien to his subjects.

The existence of a distinctive sociological social context creates problems concerning the possibility of adequate understanding of actors' in their distinctive social contexts. The sociologist belongs to the community of social scientists and therefore the Winchian sociologist would have to recast his understanding of actors in order to make it conform to the rules of the social scientific community, and this could possibly result in distortion. Winch answers this objection by demanding that the concepts used by the sociologist must be available to the actors as part of their discourse, but this overlooks the possibility of a term having different significance for the two communities as in the distinction between the psychologist's and the layman's meaning of "intelligence", or the sociologist's and the layman's use of "class". Further it is clear that Winch is not confronting this problem for, in view of his definition of contexts in terms of language games, the demand that the sociologist and the actor should possess the same concepts is a demand that they should belong to the same context. This simply avoids the problem of how the sociologist is to gain entry to the actors' social contexts<sup>\*</sup> without ceasing to be a sociologist and how he is to express

\* Winch tends to refer to "ways of life" rather than social contexts at this point in his argument but there seems to be no difference between these two ideas and our objection to Winch's use of the idea of social context apply equally to his use of the idea of ways of life.

this context to other sociologists without having to falsify the actor's community by making it appear to be a variation of the sociological community. This criticism reveals, once again, the ego-centrism of Winch's account of sociology, the idea that we can understand others only if they are similar to us or by presenting them as if they were similar to us.

It is not completely clear why Winch insists that the concepts which the sociologist uses to describe and explain action must be familiar to the actor. It may be in order that the sociologist can be confident of describing action as the actor sees it but how do we know that actors would use these terms to describe the action? The term "deceit" is part of the vocabulary of most actors but this would not justify the sociologist in describing all action as deceitful. Winch refers to the need to use concepts familiar to the actor in the context of a discussion of the sociologist's evaluation of the correctness of the action and this suggests that the demand that sociologists use actors' concepts is advanced in order that the actor may comment on the adequacy of the sociologist's evaluation. However, the actor's response to the sociologist's evaluation may be based not on the adequacy or inadequacy of the evaluation but on whether it presents a favourable or unfavourable image of the actor. Therefore, how is the sociologist to distinguish between genuine and "ideological" or tactical objections?

Winch's demand that sociologists use concepts available to actors indicates the possibility of dual understanding in sociology, that is the sociologist understands the actor and the actor can understand the sociologist. The idea of the problem of understanding in sociology has tended to concentrate solely on the problem of the adequacy of sociological understanding of actors whereas Winch seems to be pointing towards the possibility of dialogue between sociologists and actors. This is an



intriguing point and clearly has implications for ideas concerning the objectivity of the social scientist. Such a dialogue presumes that the problem of bridging the different social contexts of actors and sociologists has been overcome but, as has been seen, Winch fails to establish how it is possible to enter into social contexts other than our own.

Adherents of sociological approaches such as Marxism would object to Winch's demand that we use concepts available to the actor on the grounds that this requires the acceptance of the validity of such concepts, whereas one of the aims of such approaches is to reveal the error in actors' thinking. Winch's relativism would probably result in his arguing that these approaches are appropriate only in relation to those actors who are familiar with such ideas. Thus, a Marxist critique of the actions of someone who does not know the meaning of terms such as alienation and false consciousness, is an imposition of the sociologist's perspective onto that of the actor, and that such an approach avoids the need to understand actors on which basis alone can a rational evaluation of the action be founded. That is, it is senseless to criticise someone for not following a certain rule in their action when that rule is not available to them. We do not intend to comment on the respective merits of these arguments but to point out the significance of the distinction between understanding and evaluating action. Winch sees no tension between these aims, advocating them both as legitimate ends of sociology. It is clear that he sees understanding as appropriate to correct behaviour and evaluation as appropriate to mistakes. That is, we understand the actor's correct following of a rule and explain or evaluate his mistakes in rule-following of the rules are those which are appropriate to the actor's social context. The claim that the rules by which the action is judged are supposed to be the rules of the actor's social context reveals the weakness in Winch's distinction between understanding and evaluation for this requires that

the sociologist apprehend the actor's rules and, as has been seen, Winch fails to establish that this is possible except in situations where the actor and sociologist already share the same context or way of life. This refers back to our critique of Winch's sociology as egocentric. Therefore, in this situation the sociologist would judge an action to be understandable only if he could see himself performing the action in that situation whereas explanation is reserved for strange action, action which the sociologist would not perform, that is action which does not conform to the sociologist's rules. Thus as a consequence of egocentrism, the sociologist establishes his behaviour as the yardstick by which to assess the correctness of others' actions. "Strange" behaviour is redefined as a mistaken form of other phenomena comprehensible to the observer, thus preserving the centrality of his perspective. Winch recognises the dangers of such projection in his statement that judgements appropriate to one context should not be used to evaluate action within another context and in this respect shows more insight than some of his critics.<sup>(25)</sup> Winch, however, sees these contexts as whole cultures in the sense of European culture or Azande culture. Our criticism of Winch's belief in cultural homogeneity reveals that there is a similar problem of misplaced self-projection within cultures. That is if the sociologist must refrain from judging Azande beliefs and action he must equally refrain from judging those whom he naively believes to be his cultural consociates, for the inadequacy of the idea of cultural homogeneity reveals the possibility that such consociates inhabit different social contexts and accept different rules as compared to the sociologist.

We do not deny that social actors follow rules that social action is, in this sense, rational but our critique of Winch has revealed that this alone is not sufficient to guarantee intersubjective understanding. In particular it is important that Winch falls back on an unclarified idea of



homogeneous culture in order to explain how it is possible for the sociologist to understand other actors' rules, and we shall see that this is a common assumption in that type of sociology which has understanding as its goal. This unclarified belief will be developed as an indication of our resolution of the problem of intersubjective understanding. It is also important to note that understanding the rules of social action does not mean just knowing of what they consist for the understanding which such knowledge can provide is merely that of the "if-I-were-a-horse-type".<sup>\*(1)</sup> Genuine understanding, that is understanding the other in himself, achieving an understanding which is not distorted by the perspective of the observer requires a grasp of actor's meaning. That is, a grasp of what it means to accept the rules as binding on action, to apprehend the value of the rules for an actor and to understand why they are seen as proper guides to action. Following from this, it should be noted that Winch defines social action in such a way as to make it conform to his rule-paradigm of action. That is he perceives action in purely goal-rational terms. A further critique of this idea will be developed below.<sup>\*(2)</sup> Winch places himself within the Verstehen tradition of sociology and we intend to continue our consideration of nominalist solutions to the problem of gaining adequate intersubjective understanding in sociology by a critique of the founder of this tradition, Max Weber.

#### WEBER AND THE PROBLEM OF INTERSUBJECTIVE UNDERSTANDING

The critique of Winch's idea of sociology has shown that, despite its inadequacies, it is an attempt to confront directly the problems of acquiring knowledge of other selves and of the epistemological status of such knowledge. It could be argued that although Weber based his sociology on the need to understand actors and declared that sociology

<sup>\*(1)</sup> re above p.141.

<sup>\*(2)</sup> re below p.203 ff.

should be meaningfully adequate as well as causally adequate he failed to consider the precise nature and epistemological status of such understanding. This is because Weber failed to specify whether the significance which is apprehended in understanding is that of actor or observer.<sup>\*(1)</sup> That is, although Weber defines social action as behaviour to which the actor attaches subjective meaning and which is oriented in its course by reference to the behaviour of others, he does not make it clear whether the apprehended meaning is the meaning of the action for the actor himself or for the sociologist.<sup>\*(2)</sup>

It is true that Weber fails to recognise this objection and that the resulting ambiguity between the significant judgements of actor and observer persists throughout his work. However, it would be incorrect to conclude that Weber fails to consider the epistemological status of understanding. It is our contention that much of Weber's methodological enquiries consist of indirect considerations of this problem, and aim at conferring reliability on the sociologist's interpretive judgements. Weber's attempts to achieve such reliability fall under two headings, the rational and the empirical. This is noteworthy as considerations of this problem tend to be either one-sidedly rational, that is establishing common concepts as does Winch, or one-sidedly empirical, establishing common experience as in Husserl's Lebenswelt. Weber's approach is intriguing in that he tries to establish reliability in our understanding of others in both rational and empirical terms. However, as will be shown below, Weber does not attempt to show how these approaches can be combined in one overall solution and thus it is unclear whether they are to be seen as complementary or as alternatives

\* (1) This is the central theme of Schutz's critique of Weber, re below Chapter 5.

\* (2) It is clear that Weber is using the term "meaning" as we would use the term "significance".



It is necessary to make clear that we are not equating Weber's two approaches to this problem with his demand that sociological conclusions should be meaningfully and causally adequate. It is possible that Weber's distinction between meaningful and causal adequacy arose out of his use of both rational and empirical approaches to understanding, but we are here principally concerned with how Weber attempted to establish the adequacy of these approaches in themselves.

A similar reticence is not shown by Rex and his argument reveals why Weber avoided this problem. Rex<sup>(26)</sup> defines meaningful adequacy, that is plausible statements concerning actors' perceptions, motivations etc., as hypotheses to be tested by prediction\*. Causal adequacy is the state of a meaningful hypotheses which has passed such a test. The problem with this account is that what is to constitute a proper test of the meaningful hypothesis is defined by the hypothesis. That is, the categories which define the appropriate test found in a future state of affairs are contained within the hypothesis and should therefore be subjected to test. One way to avoid this is to argue as Weber did that there is no objective reality, that the categories by which the idea of reality is constructed are arbitrary and are based on personal interests and values. However, such a view makes the idea of testing nonsensical because the future event which is the test of the hypothesis is an arbitrary construct of the tester and therefore cannot claim any necessary validity in relation to the hypothesis, that is it does not have to be accepted as a valid test. This raises the second problem connected with Rex's idea of testing meaningful adequacy and this is that the objective event which is used as a test must be interpreted in terms of its meaning before its relevance as a test can be ascertained. That is,

\* Although it could be argued that Weber's reference to the negative and control experiments re below, do imply such a test.

the nature of the objective event has to be determined as a prior condition to the judgement that the existence of this event confirms or denies the meaningful hypothesis. In so far as this event is a test of the meaningful hypothesis then the objective event itself has to be defined in terms of its meaning. Thus the identification of the objective event as proving or disproving the meaningful hypothesis is itself based on decisions concerning the meaning of the event. Thus, the idea and use of the event as a test implies a definition of the situation by the tester. Thus the identification of the event as an adequate test is based upon a meaningful hypothesis adopted by the tester which should itself be tested. For instance, if we conclude that a person joined a strike out of feelings of class solidarity we could predict that if this was the case he would be closely involved in the trades union or similar movement. Such a prediction is based on the assumption that trade union activity is an expression of class solidarity. The fact that the person in question is not involved in such movements may mean that the initial hypothesis was wrong or it could mean that the person does not share the tester's definition of the trade union movement which he may see as a self-interested bureaucracy which is irrelevant to the interests of the workers. Thus, such tests are clearly based on the assumption that if the tester were in the actor's situation he would define that situation in the following way, but in so far as this is supposed to give us information about the actor, the assumption itself is an untested hypothesis. It is therefore simply another way in which the actor's perceptions can be criticised for not conforming to the perceptions of the sociologist.

\* It is noteworthy that Rex constantly refers to an objective reality or or objective facts. We do not oppose the idea of an objective reality but Rex does not propose any method of demonstrating the existence and nature of such a reality. Indeed, his notion of an objective reality would appear to refer to any phenomenon external to the individual and thus would resemble Durkheim's idea of social facts.



In similar fashion Rex's consideration of the ideal type treats this as a hypothesis to be tested. It therefore overlooks the problems of how such hypotheses are generated, their relationship to the actor's perception and their status as constructs of the sociologist. Rex does refer to sociologist's making constructs of actor's constructs, but his notion of the sociologist's testing the actor's constructs suggests that those of the sociologist have a higher degree of reliability. As has been seen there are no necessary grounds for this conclusion. The fact that the sociologist's conclusions are acceptable to other sociologists\* tells us nothing about their adequacy as means of telling us about the behaviour of non-sociologists. Even if Rex is correct about the general consensus concerning the means of resolving disputes among sociologists, the conclusion that an actor's definition of the situation is incorrect as judged by these procedures tells us only that the actor does not see things in the same way as does the sociological community.

#### THE RATIONAL ESTABLISHMENT OF INTERSUBJECTIVITY IN WEBER'S METHODOLOGY.

The meaning of the term rationality has different meanings in Weber's substantive and methodological work. In the former, for instance in his discussion of the distinctive ethos of modern capitalism, the term rational means, variously, the use of planning in the selection of the most efficient means to ends and the growth of concern with short-term mundane interests.

However, in Weber's methodological considerations the idea of rationality is never fully clarified and probably has a different meaning to those listed above. The idea of rationality in this context is intimately bound up with the problem of understanding, thus Weber distinguishes between four types of rational action<sup>(27)</sup> in terms of increasing rationality and a parallel increasing possibility of understanding;

\*It is noticeable that Rex assumes a coherent, homogeneous sociological community.

these are:-

- 1) Affective Rational Action - action motivated by emotion or feeling. This is the least rational type,
- 2) Traditional Rational Action - action motivated by habit or respect for tradition,
- 3) Value-Rational Action (Wert-Rationalitat) - action motivated by unquestioned values pursued for their own sake.
- 4) Goal-Rational Action (Zwerk-Rationalitat) - action motivated by the selection of the most rational means to a given end; by "rational means" Weber refers to the most efficient means, the means most likely to bring about the desired result. This according to Weber is the most rational action and the one which is most readily understood by an observer. This idea of rationality as the common ground between actor and sociologist is fruitful and will be developed below. However, it should be noted that Weber does not define clearly the term rational as used in this context and his argument concerning the relationship between rationality and understanding is tautological in that we are said to understand action which is rational, rational action is that action which can be understood. Such an argument which identifies two unknowns does not help us to grasp what is meant by rational or what is involved in understanding action.

It is also necessary to consider why Weber sees goal-rational action as the most rational form of action and therefore the most understandable. We initially pointed out that the idea of rationality is used by Weber in the distinctive contexts of substantive enquiry and methodology; that is, rationality is for Weber an object of research and a tool of research. However, there is a major interpenetration of these usages of the term because the action which Weber declares to be the most rational and most readily understood that is, goal-rational action, is precisely that which



he identifies with the spirit of capitalism<sup>(28)</sup> which was the permanent object of all his research.

We are not claiming that Weber is attempting to offer a crude justification of capitalism by claiming it to be the peak of rationality but the identity of the spirit of capitalism and that means end type of action which Weber sees as the most rational and the most understandable raises other problems concerning the adequacy of the equation of rationality and understanding. Weber sees the spirit of capitalism as being the distinctive and dominant feature in our culture; it constitutes our everyday world. Thus in claiming it to be an instance of the most rational form of action, Weber is doing nothing more than stating that it is the most familiar kind of action. That is, it is the action which is typical in our everyday world. Thus, we understand the Calvinists, the exemplars of goal-rational action, simply because we are like them. Thus Weber's use of the term rational is misleading. There is nothing inherently more rational about goal-oriented behaviour and thus, instead of rational, Weber should use the term familiar. That is, his argument concerning the greater possibility of understanding goal-rational behaviour, results in the conclusion that we understand best that which is familiar to us. Once again our understanding of others in this tradition is seen to be based on their similarity to us. Thus this approach means that we only understand others in so far as they are like us.

It may be argued that we have done Weber an injustice. We are claiming that Weber seeks to establish the rationality of understanding but that he has simply defined as rational that which we can understand and this is that with which we are most familiar. It may be claimed that we are merely assuming that because the rational is familiar we may ignore its rational character and perceive it as merely that which is familiar.

That is, we live in a rational culture and thus are familiar with it, but this does not make it any the less rational. In defence of our position, we would argue that the meaning of rationality is unclear. Weber's use of the term in relation to the types of action identifies it with the selection of efficient means to a given end. It would be grotesque to argue that only in our culture are means selected as being appropriate to ends, given the available knowledge, and equally, it is not clear why traditional, affective or value-rationality should be seen as less amenable to rational calculation than goal-rationality. This realisation requires us to consider further the nature of the distinctions which are drawn between Weber's types of rational action.

We would argue that there is not a gradual change in the degree of rationality among these types but that the types themselves fall into two qualitatively distinct blocks. Affective, traditional\* and value-rationality are all concerned with the nature of the ends of action, in terms of which, particular acts are justified as being right, that is, with values in its broadest sense. That is, affective action is based on the belief that our feelings are an imperative to action e.g. action which is aimed at helping someone we love because we love them; it reflects a value-orientation to experience. Traditional action, is based on the belief that custom should be respected, that continuity with the past should be preserved. Value-rationality is founded on the belief that one goal has precedence over all others and can never be sacrificed to lesser goals e.g. the belief that universal brotherhood is an absolute goal. All these types of action, display the characteristic of being oriented to values, of implying a critique of the goals of action and of containing an imperative to action. Indeed it could be

\* Weber does introduce a spurious argument concerning unthinking emotional reaction and mere habit as reasons for denying full rational status to affective and traditional action, but these are clearly qualitatively distinct categories composed with traditional and affective action.



claimed that there is only one type of action displayed here and that is value-rationality. Affective and traditional action are thus particular instances of value-rationality.

The second action type is goal-rationality, action based on the selection of appropriate means to a given end. Unlike the previous action-types this is not concerned with values or justification or imperatives; it is simply a pragmatic orientation to action regardless of the nature of the goal and of considerations of value. Nevertheless these two action types are not alternatives nor do they represent opposed ends of a scale of rationality but are complementary. That is, in seeking to realise a value in action the actor will choose what seem to him the most appropriate available means. Equally, the means by which an action is carried out are selected as being appropriate to achieving a goal which is chosen as being valued by the actor. Thus value-rationality refers to the justification of ends as desirable, goal-rationality refers to the selection of means as appropriate. The extent to which these two action types are intermeshed can be illustrated by the fact that any one act can be perceived as being a case of goal-rationality, that is it is a means to a further end, and an instance of value-rationality in that it is valued because it is seen as achieving a desirable state of affairs. We can express this idea slightly differently by saying that a deliberate act, that is an act which is a consequence of the actor's contemplation of his situation\*, is a synthesis of goal and value rationality. It is necessary therefore to consider why Weber chose to separate them and, critically, why he saw goal rationality as more rational and understandable than value-rationality.

\* We introduce this qualification for a sociologist can understand, as opposed to comprehend, only that which is understandable to the actor.

## WEBER AND VALUES

An immediate reason for Weber's granting rational priority to goal-rationality can be found in his political theory in which he distinguished between two alternative approaches to political behaviour. The first of these is the ethic of responsibility or pragmatic attitude which is equivalent to goal rationality. The second is the ethic of ultimate ends which sees one value as solely desirable and refuses to accept compromise in relation to this value and is thus clearly equivalent to value-rationality. Weber himself favoured the ethic of responsibility, although he rejected the Machiavellianism which this attitude implies. He justified this decision on the grounds that the ethic of ultimate ends always leads to the acceptance of behaviour which is contradictory to the end as a short term expedient e.g. the pacifist in refusing to take up arms at time of war must accept that by this decision he may be causing the death of his fellow-countrymen. That is his decision not to kill the enemy means that the enemy has a greater ability to kill the pacifist's countrymen. We are not primarily interested in the acceptability of this argument although it must be pointed out that the decision to adopt the ethic of responsibility is itself a value decision which identifies this attitude as the highest value. That is, the ethic of responsibility is itself an instance of the ethic of ultimate ends, indicating again the implausibility of anything other than an analytic separation of means and values. Our interest is in the relation of Weber's distinction to the problem and nature of understanding in sociology. We contend that the effect, if not the purpose of this distinction, is to eliminate certain values from sociological discourse. That by defining the means of action as more rational than the values of action sociology is encouraged to consider means rather than ends. However, we have seen



that values cannot be separated from means and it is therefore instructive to enquire as to which values are maintained within Weber's sociology.

The claim that Weber's rational understanding in sociology is achieved only by an elimination of values from the subject matter of sociology may be seen as nonsensical and as indicating that we have misunderstood Weber's notion of ethical neutrality, which affirms no more than that the sociologist should not seek to evaluate action as part of the sociological enterprise. It could be argued that Weber's sociological investigations are concerned above all with values, as in the study of the Protestant Ethic. However it has been seen that the values which are clarified in the Protestant Ethic are precisely those of goal-rationality, which values are favoured by Weber himself. The limitation of this enquiry is revealed if we consider the comparative studies of religion which developed out of the enquiry into the emergence of capitalism. These studies culminate in the classification of religion into four groups based on the permutations of the opposed qualities of mysticism and asceticism, inner-world and other-world orientations thus:-

- 1) Inner-Worldly Asceticism exemplified by Calvinism
- 2) Inner-Worldly Mysticism exemplified by Hinduism
- 3) Other-worldly Asceticism exemplified by Confucianism
- 4) Other-Worldly Mysticism exemplified by Bhuddism

The adequacy of these categories, with the exception of the first, has been sharply criticised on the grounds that they are not appropriate to the particular religions. That the categories of inner-worldly, other-worldly, mysticism and asceticism, are appropriate in relation to the Calvinistic world-view only. Thus, non-Calvinistic religions are discussed only in so far as they represent a frustrated or inhibited Calvinism.

Similarly, in the Sociology of Religion, Weber discusses various manifestations of the elective affinity between social being and religious belief, principally in terms of their relationship to the development of economic rationality as exemplified in the spirit of capitalism. We are not simply claiming that the Protestant ethic was the dominant influence in the whole of Weber's work but that all Weber's understanding was limited to the goal-rationality as exemplified in his apprehension of Calvinism. That is Weber understood everything in terms of the Protestant ethic or goal-rationality\*. Thus, although he described orientations other than inner-worldly asceticism, he understood such orientations and their effect on action only in the terms set by inner-worldly asceticism.

The limitation of Weber's understanding to goal-rationality is exemplified further in his study of the types of authority<sup>(31)</sup> of which he located three:-

- 1) Legal-Rational authority
- 2) Traditional authority
- 3) Charismatic authority

These types of authority correspond to three of the types of action. Legal-rational authority is equivalent to goal-rational action, traditional authority is equivalent to traditional action, charismatic authority is equivalent to affective action. The omitted action type is value-rationality. This is significant because an analysis of the three types of action reveals that they are all based on considerations of value-rationality. That is, the perception of certain valued qualities in the charismatic leader as requiring the follower's obedience, the unquestioning respect for tradition or for properly enacted rules which identifies these as justifying the subordinate's position. Nevertheless, Weber's analysis of these types of authority is carried out in purely goal-rational terms

\* It is worthy of note that, although inner worldly asceticism is the equivalent of goal-rational action the other categories of religion have



involving such questions as how the authority is maintained and administered, what tensions it faces etc. The types of authority themselves being presented as based on rules, although only in the case of legal rational authority are the rules rationally and explicitly formulated. Further, as in the case of the sociology of religion, the non-goal-rational types of action, in this case charismatic and traditional authority are depicted as inferior variations of the goal-rational type\*. Thus Weber discusses at great length the internal weaknesses and potential sources of breakdown of charismatic and traditional authority, whereas he concentrates on the stability and permanence of legal-rational authority and its bureaucratic mode of administration. The only reference to the possibility of a break-down of legal-rational authority is a fleeting statement concerning the "unlikely" event of a complete re-orientation in popular values. Overlooking the possibility of such an event being more likely than Weber admits, the significant point here is that Weber thus admits the dependance of even legal-rational authority on value orientations. However, the nature and significance of such orientations are completely omitted from his analysis.

We have noted that this concentration on goal-rational action reflects Weber's own value decision concerning the superiority of this orientation in political life. Further, if the course of Weber's personal life is considered<sup>(32)</sup> we would note his dedication to duty, his capacity for hard work, his perception of the scientific life as a vocation, his constant self-questioning. All these characteristics are principles of that

\* It was possibly the failure to realise the necessity to take into account the value basis of authority which led Weber to overlook the possible disastrous consequences of charismatic leadership in a modern state when he advocated the introduction of the office of a popularly elected president into the constitution of the Weimar Republic. Weber's denial of the relevance of values as opposed to interests to his analysis is clearly shown in his statement that the value difference between Christ and Genghis Khan does not prevent their being seen equally as charismatic leaders.

attitude which Weber termed the Protestant ethic. Indeed, we would argue that Weber was the personification of the Protestant ethic. Thus his explication of this ethic and his perception of socio-cultural phenomena solely in their relationship to this rationale is Weber's projection of his values and interests onto the situation of others. Therefore, in terming goal-rational behaviour as being the most rational and therefore the most understandable Weber cannot claim these to be qualities of goal-rational action for he is, unwittingly asserting no more than that he finds this orientation the most understandable because it is his attitude to experience; it is familiar to him. The category of value-rationality is reserved for those orientations to the world which differ from Weber's own. The claim that they are less rational than goal-rationality and therefore less understandable justifies their minor status as objects of sociological investigation. Indeed, as we have seen, such phenomena are not discussed by Weber in their own terms but as deviations from the norm of goal-rationality. That is as deviations from Weber's perspective. Thus, we see that Weber's attempt to establish understanding through the category of rationality, involves a vague if not spurious notion of rationality, and succeeds only in reifying the observer's ego-perspective, equating it with a position of superior rationality so that other's are understood solely in terms of their being deviations from self. Once again, we see how an attempt to understand others succeeds only by denying the otherness of others and by arbitrarily aggrandising the values and perspective of the observer.

It could be argued that this conclusion is much ado about nothing for is it not the case that Weber clearly recognised and accepted this consequence for sociology in his demand that sociology be value-relevant? That is, that the sociologist's perception of his subject matter is informed by his values which identify that which is relevant for him and that this shapes his perception of the situation.



In answer to this defence of Weber we make the following points.

To recognise a fault is not to remedy it; to say that Weber recognised this aspect of his sociology does not make the problems connected with it any the less. However, the strength of Weber's defence against our criticism lies in the claim that such egocentric perception is said to be inevitable and therefore it is clearly irrational to criticise someone for accepting that which has to be accepted as part of the nature of things. This argument rests on the claim by Weber that reality is chaotic and that any order which is seen in it is the consequence of our conscious acts in which our order is imposed on reality. Therefore in order to say anything about experience we must accept that this experience is necessarily a product of our ego-perspective. Therefore, on the basis of this claim Weber's ego-centric methodology is inevitable and, if we reflect on our acts, we will see that it is the method by which we make sense of things in everyday life. It is clear that this argument is relativistic in that it makes all knowledge relative to individual interests. Indeed, the denial of the existence of a structure immanent to reality is central to Weber's opposition to Natural Law theories. However this argument encounters the contradiction inherent in all relativisms in that it assumes as the basis of the argument that things-in-themselves are unknowable an apprehension of things in themselves. That is, in order for Weber's claim that reality is chaotic and therefore unknowable to make sense it is necessary that we accept that Weber has apprehended the chaotic nature of reality and if this is so, then reality is knowable. Further, the claim that reality is chaotic and that its apparent structure is illusory, being no more than our subjective impositions on this reality, arbitrarily defines subjective consciousness as structured, non-chaotic and knowable. In so far as subjective consciousness is part of reality there can be no justification for

declaring that it alone is non-chaotic. Such a declaration also undermines the consistency of the argument that reality as such is chaotic. If consciousness alone is structured and non-chaotic and that this is the condition of our being able to know the conscious acts whereby non-conscious reality is given the appearance of order, then this must apply to all consciousnesses. That is, "reality" is reality structured by consciousness. The fact that we know this to be the case shows that consciousness, the act of knowing, is knowable<sup>\*(1)</sup>. If this is so, then all consciousnesses are knowable but other consciousnesses form part of the reality which is structured by my consciousness and are unknowable in themselves.

As we have seen, Weber's acceptance of this limitation of the possibilities of cognition based on our value decisions results in an implicitly ego-centric and therefore solipsistic attitude to knowledge. It is therefore clear that this essentially nominalistic view of cognition asserts the contradictory propositions that consciousness alone is structured and therefore knowable but that other consciousnesses, which are also structured and therefore knowable, are part of that reality constituted by my consciousness and are therefore unknowable. That is other consciousnesses are, as other, unknowable but contradictorily as consciousness they are knowable.<sup>\*(2)</sup> Finally there is an element of the self-fulfilling prophecy in the procedure of value-relevance for in defining phenomena in so far as they are significant to us we limit the acceptability of such definitions to us and those like us and, at the same time, render irrelevant the objections of those who perceive the phenomenon through different values.

\*(1) It will be noted that Husserl's later work, with its emphasis on the constitutive acts of consciousness is similar to this position.

\*(2) It is our intention to establish intersubjectivity phenomenologically by overcoming this contradiction through the concept of the Transcendental consciousness. We intend to show that this consciousness not only parallels an immanently structured reality but transcends not only empirical consciousness but also the self-other distinction.



However, it would be incorrect to infer from this that knowledge is necessarily limited to that which is apprehended through the ego-perspective for this assumes the inevitability of the procedure of value-relevance in acquiring knowledge. We have shown that such a belief is based on a contradictory view concerning the nature of the act of acquiring knowledge and of the consciousness-object relationship. We therefore conclude that the attempt to justify the ego-centrism of Weber's methodology on the grounds of the inevitability of value-relevant judgements in acquiring knowledge, has been shown to have failed.

The reference to value-relevance introduces the final section in our consideration of the role of values as elements in understanding in Weber's methodology. This is the idea of ethical neutrality. The claim by Weber that sociological investigations are relevant for value refers, as we have seen, to the idea that discrete elements are selected out of chaotic appearances by reference to what is of value or significance to the sociologist. It does not mean pronouncing on the moral worth of the observed phenomena; such pronouncements would be acts of evaluation. Thus Weber admits value into the selection of material through value-relevance, but denies the propriety of evaluation in the sociological enterprise. The denial of evaluation<sup>(33)</sup> is based on the belief that value judgements, or to be more precise moral judgements, cannot be established by empirical science and thus to include them in sociology would be to undermine its scientific status. Weber's positivistic bias is shown in his unquestioned identity of reliability with that which can be empirically established; as empirical science cannot establish values they are therefore arbitrary and unreliable and have no place within scientific discourse. This is not to deny that the conclusions and findings of the sociologist may have ethical significance for him but that in expounding these ethical implications he ceases to be a sociologist

and becomes a citizen. This argument tends to contradict the argument concerning value-relevance for, in arguing that value judgements, and we see this as applying to both ethical evaluations or judgements or significance, are non-scientific and thereby contradict the scientific integrity of sociology, Weber is denying the scientific nature of sociology which he wishes to preserve. This is because, although it may be possible to exclude value-judgements in this sense of moral evaluations from sociology, but it is not possible, on Weber's own account, to exclude those value-judgements by which relevant phenomena are selected because it is this act which, in Weber's opinion, necessarily initiates the scientific procedure. It could be argued that the mere selection of certain phenomena as interesting does not compromise the scientific validity of the enquiry and this is perfectly correct. However, if one accepts Weber's view that reality is chaotic our initial value-judgements must do more than select phenomena, they must also identify and classify the phenomena. Thus, the categories and concepts with which science operates are selected by non-scientific and therefore, for Weber, unreliable value-judgements. Therefore Weber must admit that the scientific enterprise is, in his terms, unreliably grounded and as its initial conceptions are unreliable the correct usage of scientific procedure is no guarantee of the reliability of the conclusions. Therefore, science itself is relativised. As will be seen below, Weber refuses to accept this conclusion.

#### COMPREHENSION AND UNDERSTANDING

This discussion shows that the term "value free" sociology takes on a significance other than simply meaning an ethically neutral sociology, because Weber's re-casting of phenomena by reference to his values reveals



that his ideal of sociology is not simply value-free, in the sense of avoiding evaluation, but, with the exception of Weber's own values, it is value-less. That is, the only values which are comprehended by this method are those of the sociologist, in this case Weber. That which makes others distinctive is their perspective on reality as achieved in their value-judgements. In excluding these from the outset of the enquiry by perceiving phenomena as informed by the sociologist's values alone Weber excludes other subjects from sociology in so far as their value-judgements depart from those of the sociologist. That is he achieves understanding in sociology by effectively abolishing other subjects and all understanding is ultimately self-projection<sup>\*</sup>. We distinguish between this self-projection and a genuine grasp of the other by reference to the concepts of comprehension and understanding. Comprehension is that situation where the distinctiveness of the other is denied, where the other is seen as a modification of self. Thus the otherness of the other is literally comprehended, that is, overwhelmed by the self-projection of the observer. Opposed to this is the concept of understanding by which we mean the genuine grasp of the other in himself. It is our aim to show that sociology is not limited to comprehending the other but can achieve understanding of the other through the phenomenological method.

Therefore we may conclude that Weber's attempt to establish understanding on the basis of rationality results in ego-centrism, solipsism and relativism and thus cannot establish our understanding of others in themselves. Further, Weber's idea of rationality requires the abolition of values, other than those of the sociologist, from the enquiry, thus removing an essential element from social action and inevitably distorting the perception and investigation of social action, thus making the possibility of genuine understanding even more unlikely. We also noted the confusion and contradictory consequences of Weber's apprehension of the role of

\* This conclusion is only implicit in Weber, it is made explicit in the work of one of his pupils, Schutz.

values in sociology. It is therefore necessary to consider Weber's alternative source of intersubjective knowledge and understanding. That is, the use of the scientific method.

#### THE EMPIRICAL ESTABLISHMENT OF INTERSUBJECTIVE UNDERSTANDING IN WEBER'S METHODOLOGY

The consideration of rationality and values in Weber concluded that he compromised his belief in the reliability of the scientific procedure through his belief that phenomena were defined by arbitrary interests. Nevertheless in true Kantian fashion Weber sees the universality of scientific procedure as overcoming the problem caused by varying value-perspectives. This is shown in his famous statement that, although it is almost inevitable that a Chinaman and a sociologist would disagree over the importance of an aspect of Chinese culture, the sociologist's enquiry is justified if the Chinaman can acknowledge that the investigation has been carried out by using correct procedures. This, despite the fact that he and the sociologist give different evaluations to the conclusions of the research. It is therefore, clear that Weber sees scientific procedure as universal and non-controversial but he fails to appreciate that on his account values not only select but also identify phenomena.

Undoubtedly Weber saw sociology as a science and he held a positivistic conception of science. Weber, as is typical of positivism, accepted the idea of the unity of science. His disagreement with the naturalists who wished to apply the methods of the natural sciences in the social sciences centred around his conviction that such methods could not take into account the phenomenon of consciousness which he saw as inseparable from the idea of social action. Nevertheless he urged an adaptation of the scientific method so that it would be appropriate to the social sciences. Thus, in Weber's view the social and natural sciences utilise the same scientific



method which each adopts to its own specific purposes.

The scientific method in Weber's view consists of proper logical processes, induction and deduction and the use of experimentation. He sought to establish the adequacy of acts of sociological understanding through the use of these methods. The most controversial aspect of this programme is the use of experimentation which Weber saw as not only necessary but inevitable in the social sciences. He noted two such experiments, the negative experiment and the control experiment.

It has been noted that Weber saw personal values as defining what is of interest in a situation, however in his earlier work Weber emphasised his belief that the subject matter of sociological and historical enquiry should be shaped not solely by interest but by the relative importance of the various observed phenomena. The question of relative importance is decided by use of the negative experiment in which the social scientist asks what would have been the likely course of events if a particular event had been different or absent e.g. if the Persians and not the Greeks had won the battle of Marathon. This question is to be answered by reference to a "positive knowledge of the laws of events"<sup>(35)</sup> based on general empirical rules, and such a method gives "objective possibility" to our judgement concerning the significance of the event. The standard objection to this procedure is that it is purely hypothetical and cannot give reliable knowledge but it should be noted that Weber is claiming that the results of this experiment are only a possibility. A more serious criticism is that Weber is vague about the nature of the laws of events and general empirical rules on which the negative experiment is based and it is not possible to rule out the idea that our perception of the importance of events is shaped not by 'laws' but by our interests. Also, it seems probable that the laws of events and general empirical rules,

assuming that they exist, are themselves the products and not just the basis of the negative experiment. That is, if as Weber claims we assess the importance of events by means of the negative experiment then the laws of events and general empirical rules which are presumably derived from the observation of events must be based on prior decisions concerning the significance of these events.

However, in terms of the argument concerning the nature of sociological understanding, greater importance attaches to Weber's idea of the control experiment. This is the origin of the comparative method in sociology but Weber intended it as a test of the adequacy of conclusions which were based on an understanding of action. This experiment requires the identification of a situation which is as similar as possible to that under consideration with the exception that those factors identified by us as crucial in the experimental situation are absent in the control. Thus, Weber initially embarked on his study of world religions in order to test the adequacy of his conclusion that the ideas embodied in 16th century Calvinism were a necessary, although not sufficient, cause of the emergence of capitalism. Thus he identified China and India as societies where the purely material conditions of capitalist development were present. Their failure to develop indigenous capitalist economies could therefore be attributed to the absence of an ethic from their societies which was present in 16th century Europe which did develop capitalism. Again Weber is not claiming total reliability for this method, merely the establishment of a possible or probable relationship. If capitalism had developed in non-Calvinistic India or China, Calvinism could not be seen as a necessary cause of the emergence of capitalism. The fact\* that non-Calvinistic India and China did not develop an indigenous capitalism does not prove that Calvinism is a necessary

\* We recognise that this "fact" is disputed.



cause of capitalism for there is always the possibility that other untested factors are responsible for this relationship, but it increases the likelihood of the correctness of the tested hypothesis. Thus, Weber would argue that this method does not prove the adequacy of our understanding of social action but it does test such understanding in a way that could reveal its inadequacy. However, as our previous discussion of Weber's sociology of religion has pointed out, this process tends to be part of a self-fulfilling prophecy in which our understanding of the action which is to be tested, defines what is relevant in the control situation. Thus the control is defined in categories derived from our understanding of the experimental situation regardless of the appropriateness of these categories. Thus we conclude that Weber's attempts to establish the reliability of our acts of understanding assume the validity of the concepts which express that understanding. The inadequacy of this process reveals that a genuine test of understanding would depend on concepts which are established in themselves, independent of dubitable acts of understanding. This, indicates the necessity for that establishment of indubitable concepts which is the goal of phenomenology.

Thus, Weber's attempt to establish an objective possibility in relation to our acts of understanding through reliance on empirical tests is seen to be inadequate. The basic cause of this inadequacy is that the empirical enquiry is made dependant upon a categorisation of phenomena which is not itself scientific, which originates in the values of the observer. Thus, empirical observation is based on the assumption of the adequacy of this value-perception and, therefore, can give information relevant only to that perspective. More importantly, empirical observation thus based cannot comment upon or criticise the value-perspective which sets the course and conditions of such observation.

Thus Weber, like Winch, creates a sociology which is organised around the inviolability of the perspective of the observer; such a sociology comprehends, it does not understand. The problem posed by the possibility that social actors, being conscious subjects, may have perspectives which differ from that of the observer, is resolved by abolishing other subjects. Thus Weber states that the historian deals "with the explanation of events and personalities which are 'interpreted' and 'understood' by direct analogy with our own intellectual, spiritual and psychological constitution"<sup>(36)</sup>. That is, for Weber, the other is "understood" only by assuming him to be like ego. As Schutz points out, in this situation what we understand is not the other but self if it were in the other's situation. Similarly, Weber recognises a problem concerning a reader's understanding of the historian's account but significantly, he does not see this understanding as based on analogy between the reader and the historian but on the "suggestive vividness" of the historian's account, with which the reader empathises. That is Weber is claiming that the actor is understood by analogy, which we have seen to be a comprehension of the actor, whereas the historian or sociologist can be understood directly, that is, genuinely, understood. Weber gives no reason for the difference in the quality of understanding between observer and actor, and observer and his audience, nor does he clarify what he means by suggestive vividness. This difference does, however, suggest that Weber was dissatisfied with "understanding" by analogy, but only in relation to others' interpretive understanding of him; there is, for instance, no discussion of the possibility of suggestive vividness in the actor's account. One of the aims of our attempt to establish genuine intersubjective understanding between actor and observer will be to clarify the nature of that suggestive vividness



which conveys such genuine understanding<sup>\*(1)</sup>.

We have noted that Weber's account of the nature of understanding in sociology is not systematic and that his ideas on this problem have, in some cases, to be inferred. It is therefore appropriate to complete our consideration of the nominalist view of intersubjective understanding by considering the work of Alfred Schütz who attempted a rigorous enquiry into the status of intersubjective understanding within the context of Weberian sociology<sup>\*(2)</sup>.

\*(1) re below, "metaphor and analogy" chapter 7.

\*(2) It may be objected that our discussion of Weber is incomplete as we have omitted any reference to Weber's concept of the ideal type and the method of imputing motives. These are relevant to the problem of understanding but a consideration of these aspects of Weber's methodology will be deferred until the general discussion of models in sociology. Re below chapters 5 and 7.

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TRANSCENDENTAL PHENOMENOLOGY" op.cit. p.
14. WINCH "THE IDEA OF A SOCIAL SCIENCE AND ITS  
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15. WINCH "THE IDEA OF A SOCIAL SCIENCE AND ITS  
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16. WINCH "THE IDEA OF A SOCIAL SCIENCE AND ITS  
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17. WINCH "THE IDEA OF A SOCIAL SCIENCE AND ITS  
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18. RYAN "THE PHILOSOPHY OF THE SOCIAL SCIENCES"  
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19. WINCH "THE IDEA OF A SOCIAL SCIENCE AND ITS  
RELATION TO PHILOSOPHY" op.cit. p.82
20. WINCH "THE IDEA OF A SOCIAL SCIENCE AND ITS RELAT-  
ION TO PHILOSOPHY" op.cit. p.81
21. RYAN "THE PHILOSOPHY OF THE SOCIAL SCIENCES"  
op.cit. p.137
22. MACINTYRE "THE IDEA OF A SOCIAL SCIENCE" in WILSON  
(ed) "RATIONALITY" BLACKWELL 1970
23. WINCH "THE IDEA OF A SOCIAL SCIENCE AND ITS  
RELATION TO PHILOSOPHY" op.cit. p.91
24. WINCH "THE IDEA OF A SOCIAL SCIENCE AND ITS  
RELATION TO PHILOSOPHY" op.cit. p.99
25. MACINTYRE for instance, claims that Winch's arguments would  
make anthropology impossible, but as anthropology is possible  
Winch must be wrong. This, of course, begs the whole question  
which Winch is raising as to whether anthropologists can achieve  
genuine understanding of other cultures.
26. REX "THIRTY THESES ON EPISTEMOLOGY AND METHOD  
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29. WEBER "THE RELIGION OF INDIA" FREE PRESS 1962
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33. WEBER "THE METHODOLOGY OF THE SOCIAL  
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37. WEBER "THE METHODOLOGY OF THE SOCIAL  
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38. SCHUTZ "THE PROBLEM OF TRANSCENDENTAL INTER-  
SUBJECTIVITY IN HUSSERL" in "COLLECTED  
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39. a) SCHUTZ "THE PROBLEM OF TRANSCENDENTAL INTER-  
SUBJECTIVITY IN HUSSERL" op.cit. p.114
- b) SCHUTZ "THE PHENOMENOLOGY OF THE SOCIAL  
WORLD" op.cit. p.7
40. SCHUTZ "THE PHENOMENOLOGY OF THE SOCIAL WORLD"  
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41. SCHUTZ "THE PROBLEM OF TRANSCENDENTAL INTER-  
SUBJECTIVITY IN HUSSERL" op.cit. p.68
42. SCHUTZ "THE PHENOMENOLOGY OF THE SOCIAL WORLD"  
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43. SCHUTZ "THE PHENOMENOLOGY OF THE SOCIAL WORLD"  
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44. SCHUTZ "THE PHENOMENOLOGY OF THE SOCIAL WORLD"  
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45. SCHUTZ "THE PHENOMENOLOGY OF THE SOCIAL WORLD"  
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| 46. | SCHUTZ | "THE PHENOMENOLOGY OF THE SOCIAL WORLD"<br>op.cit. | p.131-<br>132 |
| 47. | SCHUTZ | "THE PHENOMENOLOGY OF THE SOCIAL WORLD"<br>op.cit. | p.87          |
| 48. | SCHUTZ | "THE PHENOMENOLOGY OF THE SOCIAL WORLD"<br>op.cit. | p.23-<br>24   |

## CHAPTER FIVE

### THE VERSTEHENDE TRADITION IN SOCIOLOGY: SCHUTZ

Although Schütz is by no means the latest representative of the nominalist verstehende tradition in sociology his work is the fullest expression of this tradition in relationship to the problem of intersubjective understanding. It is possible to regard Schutz's work as limited, repetitive and little more than an extended footnote to the first chapter of Weber's "Economy and Society". Such a judgement, although broadly correct, overlooks the significance of Schutz's "extended foot-notes" which raised in acute form those problems of the epistemological status of intersubjective understanding in sociology which Weber, as we have seen, tried to avoid. In so doing, Schutz took the Weberian tradition to its logical conclusions and the ambiguities and contradictions which litter Schutz's work are a product of and a comment upon this tradition. Schutz has further relevance for our discussion for he claimed allegiance not only to Weber's sociology but also to Husserl's phenomenology. Our identification of Weber's sociology as positivistic and relativistic indicates the great disparity between he and Husserl. It is our contention that Schutz could not reconcile these opposed positions and that, as a consequence, he abandoned the more distinctive elements of Husserl's phenomenological method and programme. This claim is particularly important as most of what is claimed to be phenomenological sociology in Britain and America derives from Schütz. It is therefore necessary to consider initially Schütz's idea of intersubjectivity in his critique of Husserl.

We have noted Schütz's trenchant criticisms of Husserl's attempts to establish intersubjectivity\*. In declaring Husserl's argument a failure Schütz expresses the belief that intersubjectivity, as a datum of the

\* re below chapter 3.



life-world must be simply accepted by phenomenology because it is "the fundamental ontological category of human existence"<sup>(1)</sup> and he further claims that intersubjectivity poses insoluble problems for phenomenology's operative concepts<sup>(2)</sup>. This argument is contradictory. If Schutz is correct in asserting that intersubjectivity must be simply accepted he can have no grounds for asserting it to be the fundamental ontological category of human existence because this latter statement presupposes the recognition and classification of intersubjectivity which cannot be achieved if it is merely accepted. Thus, it is necessary to ask what it is that we are accepting if we accept intersubjectivity as a fact, that is, if we admit the impossibility of a critical attitude toward it. Such acceptance being uncritical means adopting a naive, taken-for-granted, common-sense understanding of intersubjectivity<sup>\*(1)</sup>. Our clarification of the naive perception of others has shown it to be based on considerations of significance, that is, it is oriented to the other in respect of the other's relevance to the attainment of ego's goals. It has also been shown to be ego-centric, seeing the other as a modification of "I" which is the situation of practical solipsism. Thus in adopting this position concerning the impossibility of a critique of intersubjectivity Schutz, like Winch and Weber, commits himself to a solipsistic position<sup>\*(2)</sup>. Thus, although we could say that Husserl tried to establish intersubjectivity and failed, Schutz, because he accepted Husserl's failure as definitive, does not even try. Thus Schutz's account of intersubjective understanding in his sociological work is largely a descriptive list of the types of understanding, or rather comprehension, possible<sup>(3)</sup>. Even here Schutz

\*<sup>(1)</sup> The nonsense of claiming to be a phenomenologist while urging dependance on naive concepts should, by now, be obvious.

\*<sup>(2)</sup> It should be emphasised that this position is not solipsistic in the sense of denying the existence of others but in the sense of denying the possibility of an understanding of others in themselves. That is, it denies understanding as opposed to comprehension.

assumes that real grasp of the other, understanding in our sense, the possibility of which he denies. This is because he categorises the types of understanding according to their proximity to a norm of such actual understanding of the other in himself. This requires that, even if Schutz cannot tell us how to attain such understanding, he is claiming that he knows what actual understanding of the other's intentions would look like. That is, Schutz's account can justify the denial of the possibility of genuine understanding only on practical grounds ie. that it is very difficult to achieve. He cannot consistently deny it on theoretical grounds, ie. that such knowledge is necessarily unavailable, because he is forced to assume that he possesses such knowledge.

#### THE RECIPROCITY OF PERSPECTIVES

It is therefore necessary to consider Schutz's account of the nature of naive intersubjectivity which he claims to be based on the general thesis of the other which is accepted by all those within the naive attitude or Lebenswelt in order to contrast it with his idea of sociological understanding. This thesis is that the other exists and that his mode of perceptions is the same as ego's. This belief results in the assumption of the reciprocity of perspectives which is the belief held by ego that if he were in the other's situation ie. "there" he would perceive the situation in the same way as the other. Equally, if the other were in ego's situation ie "here" he would perceive the situation as does ego.

It will be seen that this idea is identical to Husserl's notion of the establishment of intersubjectivity by transference of sense or apperceptive transfer between self and other \*. There is one major difference between these ideas and this is that, unlike Husserl, Schutz does not see the reciprocity of perspectives as providing reliable data.

Thus, in his critique of Husserl, he states that the experience of "you

\* re below chapter 3.



can" and "you could" cannot be achieved by transferring the sense of "I can" and "I could". This is so because my being here and your being there involves necessarily, "I can from here but you cannot from there!.... (nor can the problem be overcome by saying) were I there then I would be able to do what you can from your here', since this extension by no means admits the converse, 'if you were here, then you could do what I can from here' "(4). Equally it is not possible to derive "you can" since the notion of everyone originates in intersubjectivity and the problem here is that of establishing intersubjectivity.

It is therefore necessary to consider Schutz's attitude to the relationship between the reciprocity of perspectives and sociology which will be seen to be ambivalent<sup>\*(1)</sup>. It has been noted that Schutz criticises the adequacy of this idea as used by Husserl and it would be expected that he would demand that sociological understanding should not be based upon it, and this he does<sup>(5)</sup>. However, Schutz also affirms that sociology uses the same methods as everyday life to disclose another's motives<sup>(6)</sup>. Although this part of the analysis is couched in terms of the inter-relationship of "because" and "in-order-to motives"<sup>\*(2)</sup> ie. my in-order-to motives become the other's because motives, it is clearly the same idea of the reciprocity of perspectives, expressed in motivational language, with the exception that it is assumed that the knowledge required for successful reciprocation is available. However, it is not made clear how such knowledge is to be obtained other than by use of the assumption of the reciprocity of perspectives. It should also be noted that Schutz's critique of the reciprocity of perspectives contradicts his statement, noted above, that phenomenology, and presumably sociology, should simply

<sup>\*(1)</sup> re below, this chapter passim.

<sup>\*(2)</sup> These terms are clarified below

accept the fact of intersubjectivity. If Schutz is correct in asserting that the reciprocity of perspectives is the basis of intersubjective knowledge, consistency would require that he urge its acceptance by sociology. That is, in correctly rejecting the adequacy of the reciprocity of perspectives Schutz is implying a critique of intersubjectivity, the possibility of which he denied in his comments on Husserl. This raises the further point that Schutz, perhaps unwittingly, implies a reliable alternative to the reciprocity of perspectives for he presents his account of how naive subjects gain knowledge of each other as being true for all subjects. However, if the reciprocity of perspectives is the basis of all knowledge of others, Schutz can assert it to be so in his case alone because, as he admits, the reciprocity of perspectives can tell us nothing reliable about others including how they achieve intersubjective understanding. That is, in asserting the reciprocity of perspectives to be the method used by all subjects, Schutz is claiming a knowledge of other subjects which on his terms cannot be provided by the reciprocity of perspectives. However, if Schutz is renouncing his denial of the possibility of a critique of intersubjectivity he should state the nature of this non-naive and reliable method of understanding and this he does not do. Indeed, far from this, Schutz equates the sociological mode of understanding with a particular type of everyday naive understanding, that of indirect social experience.<sup>(6)</sup> It will be seen that the distinctive nature of sociology for Schutz does not lie in a special and reliable method of understanding but in the detachment of the sociologist from the course of action and the peculiar nature of sociological types; both of these ideas will be considered below. Thus Schutz asserts the necessity to avoid basing sociological understanding on naive procedures such as the reciprocity of perspectives but his failure to identify an alternative method and his



eventual equation of sociological and naive procedures results in the conclusion that despite his intentions Schutz could do no other than to see the reciprocity of perspectives as both inadequate and inevitable\*. (1) The consequences of this are either a sociology indistinguishable from common-sense in the quality of its understanding or a sociology which studies self and abandons others, despite the fact that it expects to be understood by others. Both positions imply effective solipsism. It will be seen below that Schutz, at different points in his analysis, opted for both these alternatives.

There is a further solipsistic tendency in Schutz's approach to the analysis of intersubjectivity. Schutz's principal sociological concepts are developed in relation to action in the context of the isolated individual or, occasionally, in relation to social action, the situation of the isolated individual oriented to anonymous and passive others. (7) However, sociology is concerned with social interaction which Schutz sees as merely a quantitative development of action. Thus, despite all his subsequent references to the we-relationship Schutz lacks the concepts to account for the intersubjective community; the other in the we-relationship is for Schutz a copy of ego. Therefore, interaction for Schutz is the simultaneous occurrence of a number of courses of action which, although he describes them as mutually oriented, he can analyse only by reference to, and by isolating, a particular actor, "ego". That is, Schutz attempts the nonsensical procedure of accounting for communality and sociation through concepts derived from consideration of the isolated individual. (2) It will be seen that Schutz fails to correct his concepts and break out

\*(1) As noted above, the perception of the inadequacy of the reciprocity of perspectives implies a prior conception of an adequate procedure. That is, the recognition that the reciprocity of perspectives is inadequate means that it cannot be inevitable on a theoretical as opposed to practical level.

\*(2) The consequences of this for Schutz's idea of sociology are discussed below.

of this solipsistic position and therefore fails to study interaction sui generis. It is therefore necessary to consider Schutz's account of intersubjectivity and the idea of sociology which derives from it in order to assess its adequacy and to suggest the causes of its failure, some of which have been referred to above.

#### THE NATURE OF INTERSUBJECTIVE UNDERSTANDING IN SCHUTZ

The first question to be answered in a consideration of the problem of intersubjective understanding is what is the knowledge which we must acquire in order to achieve such understanding? In Winch's view this is knowledge of social rules, for Weber it is knowledge of subjective meaning. Schutz, in clarifying Weber's ideas defines this necessary knowledge as the knowledge of motivation.\*

Schutz distinguishes two motivational phases of action, the in-order-to-motive and the because-motive. The in-order-to motive states the intention of the action in terms of the completed act; e.g. "I went out of my house in order to see my friend". Thus the in-order-to motive states the goal of the action in terms of a completed state of affairs. This refers to Schutz's distinction between Act and action, that is between a completed Act, which is always seen by Schutz as an observable state of affairs, and the action or process which culminates in the Act. In Schutz's view, sociological interpretation is directed to observable Acts. This distinction is inadequate because, despite Schutz's claims to the contrary, there is no qualitative distinction between Act and action. Every action can be seen as Act in relation to that which precedes it; every Act can be seen as action in relation to that which succeeds it. Thus, to take the example given above, we could say "I went out of my

\* It is true that Schutz claims that motive is not meaning but a context of meaning (Phenomenology of the Social World p.216). However, due to his denial of the possibility of understanding intended meanings Schutz in practise equates meaning, objective meaning-content and Act.



house and visited my friend in order to discuss business matters with him". Here the former Act, visiting my friend, is perceived as action that is, part of the process of achieving the goal of discussing business. This indicates that the question "why?", which elicits the response of the in-order-to motive, is potentially infinite. Thus, we need to ask why is one goal cited as the in-order-to-motive rather than another goal which actually precedes or follows the stated goal? The crucial point which Schutz fails to note is that the stated in-order-to motive is a product of the description of the Act, e.g. "visiting a friend" or "discussing business", and it is this which defines the extent of the action and therefore specifies the in-order-to motive. Thus, for us to know why a particular in-order-to motive is given it is necessary to enquire why the Act is described in that particular way. This, in turn, requires a consideration of the reasons for enquiring into the Act which Schutz fails to carry out. This reveals the inadequacy of discussing motives in relation to the solitary ego as Schutz does, for motives are made the subject of enquiry in a social context in which an other sees the action as problematic<sup>\*(1)</sup>, and thus the questioning of motives is unreal outside a social context in which the questioning occurs. The social context also provides the definition of the limits of the action because in responding to an enquiry about his motives the actor will seek to identify that aspect of the action which will satisfy the assumed interests of the enquirer as well as serving the actor's own interests.<sup>\*(2)</sup> Take the case of someone reading a book. He is asked by his young child why he is reading and gives the answer that he is reading in order to learn what the book says. He is asked the same question by a colleague and gives

\* (1) The only exception to this is where ego enquires into the motives behind his own action, when he is surprised by that action ie. when he sees this action as strange or alien.

\* (2) Schutz recognises that motives are made explicit by another's questioning but he does not realise the significance of this fact for his theory.

the answer that he is reading the book in order to prepare a lecture.

Thus two different in-order-to motives have been given in explanation of the same action but we could not argue that only one of them is the real motive because both answers are true in that they both refer to actual intended results of the reading. The reason for the different statement of motives lies in the social context of the question. The reader gives answers derived from the various intended consequences of his action which he believes will satisfy the interests of the questioner\*. Thus if a sociologist enquires into an actor's in-order-to motive the answer which he receives, assuming no deceit by the actor, will not be a statement of the motive of the action but an identification of an intended consequence of the action which the actor believes will satisfy the sociologists' curiosity.

The second type of motive and the most important in terms of Schutz's overall theory is the because-motive. However Schutz uses this term in a number of different ways. The principal meanings given to this idea by Schutz, are, firstly the formal idea that the because-motive refers to the preceding conditions in which the action took place. There is also a second usage by Schutz of the idea of the because-motive which he does not explicitly recognise and this is the idea of this motive as the justification of the action in terms of its value for the actor. We will clarify below why Schutz does not formally recognise this aspect of motivation even though he uses it. However, it is necessary to justify our claim concerning the various ideas of the because motive; we will do this by reference to Schutz's distinction between a genuine and a pseudo-because motive.

According to Schutz the genuine as opposed to the pseudo-because-motive cannot be translated into an in-order-to motive. It is unclear

\* This does not cover the possibility of the presentation of false motives by the actor.



whether this refers to the translatability of the idea of the motive or the form of words in which it is expressed. Thus the statements "I stole the bread in order to ease my hunger" and "I stole the bread because I was hungry" express the same idea in different tenses. It would appear that the latter is a genuine because motive for it refers to a past state as opposed to the former sentence which refers to a future goal. However Schutz would seem to disagree with this for he claims that the statement "I open my umbrella because it is raining" as a pseudo because-motive on the grounds that it can be translated into "I open my umbrella in order to keep from getting wet"<sup>(8)</sup>. This argument reveals Schutz's confusion concerning the nature of the because-motive for the latter statement is not simply a translation of the former since these statements give different information. The so-called pseudo because-motive is a statement concerning the surrounding environment or context of the action whereas the in-order-to motive is a statement of reaction to those conditions. Also Schutz's reference to the hypothetical because-motive of a murderer<sup>(9)</sup> indicates an alternative view of the nature of the because-motive as an external force which creates dispositions to act in a certain way. Thus Schutz, in the idea of the because-motive, confuses the distinctive notions of causes of action and reasons for acting. We do not decide to commit murder because we had bad companions nor does rain necessarily create a disposition to umbrella raising. Further, neither of these ideas of the because-motive is adequate as a means of enabling us to understand why the actor behaved in that particular way. This missing element is most clearly demonstrated in Schutz's instance of raising an umbrella. He takes it for granted that my perception that it is raining is the cause of my raising my umbrella. This is not so. I raise my umbrella because I dislike getting

wet. This reveals that element which is omitted by Schutz; that is, the fact that the actor judges the significance of the situation and this is done by reference to a general orientation towards experience in terms of which, situations are seen as relevant or irrelevant, goals are identified as appropriate or inappropriate and projects are defined. That is, motivated action is based on a perception of the nature of the situation and judgements concerning its significance which is determined by reference to general values held by the actor. In view of Schutz's omission of the value-basis of motivation it is unsurprising that he defines goal-rational behaviour, as understood by Weber<sup>\*</sup>, as peculiarly sociologically significant behaviour. Therefore, in this instance it would be more accurate to state that the project of the Act, raising the umbrella, is initiated by the actor as reasonable behaviour in terms of the general goal of keeping dry in so far as this is seen not to frustrate other, higher values. Unlike the project, generalised goals or values are not located in a particular time, such as the past or future-perfect tense but are part of our permanent present, our being-in-the-world.

It may be argued that Schutz recognises the value-basis of action in his notion of the meaning-context of action. However, his reference to meaning-context is misleading for clarification of his idea that meaning-context is a synthesis of discrete lived experiences results in an unequivocal identification of meaning-context and Act, or completed deed<sup>(10)</sup>. That is, the Act is a meaning-context because its achievement unites all the preceding phases of action which culminate in the Act. There is no need to repeat our dissatisfaction with the Act-action distinction, but it is necessary to note that in his discussion of intersubjectivity Schutz bases the grasp of subjective-meaning, which he sees as the goal of sociology, on knowledge of the meaning-context<sup>(11)</sup>.

\* re above Chapter three



Thus for Schutz the meaning of an action is equivalent to the purpose of action, this latter being understood as an objective Act, and tautologously meaning-context is equivalent to goal (or purpose). Thus the claim that motive and meaning-context coincide is a product of definition. It probably seems eminently reasonable that the answer to the question "why was this action performed?", should be seen as being couched either in terms of precipitating conditions (because-motive) or desired goals (in order to motive), but Schutz's denial of the knowability of intended meaning and his identification of meaning with Act makes this question not worth asking. This is because in Schutz's terms, the answer to this question can either be, "because it was projected" or "in order to achieve the Act". We would suggest that when a sociologist asks why an action occurred he is not seeking a statement of the goal of the action in terms of a completed deed. That is, he is not concerned with tautologous statements that the actor acted in order to achieve a goal because he wished to achieve it<sup>\*</sup>, but he desires to know why the action is seen as reasonable by the actor, what values it fulfills. As we have seen, when Schutz gives an instance of a because-motive he surreptitiously includes within this account assumptions concerning the actor's values, even though he attempts misleadingly to identify the value and the motive statements. Therefore Schutz's notion of meaning-context is simply a re-expression of his idea of the in-order-to and because-motives and like them, seeks to avoid the distinctively subjective element in action of values and intentions, in terms of which alone, can we perceive the meaning or reasonable causes of an action. As a consequence this relationship between because and in-order-to-motives is unclarified due to the fact that Schutz regards the unity between the causes or conditions which

\*This statement is not only tautologous but also dubious, as it ignores the possibility of failure or frustration in goal-attainment.

precede action and the goal of action as taken for granted. He fails to realise that this unity is achieved through judgements concerning the nature and value of situations; that is, as seen above, he ignores the basic role of values as the source of significant action, action which is reasonable to the actor.

This brief consideration of Schutz's conception of action has been concerned with clarifying his apprehension of the subject matter of interpretive sociology which has been seen to be motivated Acts. The adequacy of this conception has been criticised both in relation to the confused meaning of motivation and the failure to recognise the crucial role of values and significant judgements in action. It will be seen below that this definition of action results in Schutz adopting a behaviouristic conception of sociology which he is able to reconcile with the demands of interpretive sociology only by limiting sociologically relevant action to the goal-rational form. That is, to action which does not require interpretation because it is value-less and because its meaning is contained solely in the completed, observable Act i.e. to action which needs only to be observed in order to be understood. However, before commenting upon the adequacy of these ideas of Schutz it is necessary to consider his conception of meaning in relation to interpretive sociology, beginning with his perception of the respective relationship to meaning of actor and sociologist. We will particularly note the attempt to establish understanding as objective knowledge.

#### SUBJECTIVE AND OBJECTIVE MEANING

Schutz notes the basic problem of the difference between my interpretation of my acts and my interpretation of another's meaning, although we note the further distinction, not explicitly made by Schutz, between my



interpretation of another and the other's self-interpretation. This omission is consistent with Schutz's view that only the other's Acts are given to an observer, not his intentions<sup>(13)</sup>. Nevertheless, Schutz implies a denial of the limitation of sociology to observation. Thus he claims that sociology goes a step further than common-sense, which makes the other meaningful to the observer by placing his action in a meaning-context regarded as appropriate by the observer, by taking into account the actor's past and future in order to locate an intelligible meaning-context for the Act. This distinction implies that, despite his continuous denial that sociology is concerned with the apprehension of actor's intentions, Schutz is attempting to locate the meaning of the action for the actor<sup>\*(1)</sup> ie. the other's self-interpretation. Further Schutz's argument is not in fact directed against reliance on observation but only reliance on observation of the present because our knowledge of the actor's past and future is equally dependant on observation.

In insisting that sociology take the actor's past and future into account Schutz implicitly adopts a consistency model of action. That is, the idea that action over time is informed by the same motives so that if we take a sufficient time span certain meanings will emerge as the only ones which could have informed the observed action. Clearly, this view ignores the possibility of change or development in the other's motives, or to be more accurate, in his value-orientations. However, it could be argued that Schutz's reference to the need to take the future into account removes this objection because we can test the adequacy of our meaning-context by seeing whether future action conforms to it.<sup>(14)</sup>

This raises many of the points discussed in relation to Rex and Weber,<sup>\*(2)</sup>

\*(1) Schutz's claim that intentions are inaccessible contradicts his stated aim to study the "invariant unique a priori structures of mind" p.44, as this implies statements concerning all minds, not just Schutz's.

\*(2) re above Chapter 4.

and we need simply to reiterate the point that the future action is not self-evident and must itself be interpreted through a meaning-context. Thus, there is always the possibility that this predictability test is a self-fulfilling prophecy.

The claimed inaccessibility of the actor's intended meaning means that the observer can only assume that his meaning is the same as that of the actor and Schutz clearly sees this as unsatisfactory, "observational understanding is simply the understanding we exercise in daily life in our direct relations with other people. Precisely for that reason, however, the inference from the overt behaviour to the intended meaning behind it is anything but a cut and dried matter"(15). Here, Schutz is clearly expressing a dissatisfaction with the methods of everyday life. Against this naive method he proposes that sociology use the procedure of motivational understanding which he declares to be independent of the common-sense world. However, the distinctiveness of motivational understanding rests simply on the claim that it can have as its object the world of contemporaries, predecessors or successors and that it deals with completed Acts. Schutz is surely wrong in implying that everyday understanding ignores the past and the future and he also overlooks the fact that the objection to naive understanding is its unjustified assumption of the identity of self and other's meanings and this objection persists whether the spurious identification is made with a consociate, a contemporary, a predecessor or a contemporary. The second distinctive feature of motivational understanding, its concern with completed Acts, is equally unsatisfactory, because it assumes what it should establish. That is, Schutz is wrong in believing that the completion of an Act is uncontroversial for the judgement that an Act is completed\* is a subjective

\* There is also a contradiction between Schutz's belief in completed Acts and his belief that action, like consciousness in an undifferentiated flow.



judgement that an intention has or has not been fulfilled. If the completion of the Act is decided by the actor it implies the necessity of an understanding of others' intentions which Schutz declares to be impossible. If the observer is the judge of when an action is a completed Act, then we are returned to the situation of observational understanding. Nevertheless Schutz states that objective meaning, presumably achieved in observational understanding, is merely an indication of the existence of a subjective meaning acquired in motivational understanding which gives a higher degree of scientific clarity and exactitude<sup>(16)</sup>. It should be noted that although Schutz criticised observational understanding for its inadequate grasp of the other's intentions, his claim that motivational understanding gives access to subjective meaning is not a claim to have succeeded where observational understanding failed for subjective and intended meaning are not the same in Schutz's vocabulary. In order to clarify this point it is necessary to consider Schutz's distinction between subjective and objective meaning.

In our view it is necessary to distinguish between three types of meaning or rather, significance-subject relationships. Firstly, the significance of action for the performer of the act, secondly the significance of an act for an observer, thirdly, the significance of an act for the actor as this is interpreted by an observer. Schutz uses the term subjective meaning to refer to both the first and third definitions although the term intended meaning refers to the first alone. Objective meaning refers to either the second definition or to the status of an Act as an object or thing or finally to conventional meanings which can be understood without reference to the person using them e.g.  $2 \times 2 = 4$ . As would be expected from this plethora of usages Schutz's idea of the relationship between objective and subjective meaning is confused. He

defines the objective context of meaning as indicators of consciousness and further claims that this realm of objective meaning is invariant "with respect to every consciousness which has given it meaning through its own intentionality"<sup>(17)</sup>. This appears to be an assertion that every consciousness constitutes the objective world in the same way; a re-expression of the idea of a common culture which is made necessary by Schutz's claim that I can look at objective meaning ie. indicators of consciousness or "I can ... look over and through these external indications into the constituting process within the living consciousness of another rational being. What I am then concerned with is subjective meaning"<sup>(18)</sup>. Thus Schutz is using the idea of objective meaning in two distinct fashions, firstly as data which can be understood without reference to actor's intentions and secondly as indicators of actor's conscious acts, without reconciling these uses.

The latter statement by Schutz would seem to mean that another rational being's intended meaning is available to an observer, despite his rejection of this view. However, Schutz redefines the term subjective meaning so that enquiry into the subjective meaning of an objective meaning content means simply the referral of constituted objectivities to the consciousness of others. That is, objective meaning equals thing, subjective meaning is seeing the thing as a product of consciousness, although it is not clear how we should understand the idea of referring objectivities to the consciousness of others without implying our ability to apprehend that consciousness; that is, without implying knowledge of intended meaning. Equally it is not clear how we can look at the constitutive acts of consciousness without also being able to know the intended meaning which is the product of such acts. Thus Schutz would appear to assume a common objective world to which each constituting consciousness has given its own significance. We therefore note once



again how a supporter of the verstehende tradition falls back on the assumption of a common world in order to justify the plausibility of his programme.

Schutz's claim that subjective meaning is an approximation of the actor's intended meaning, indicates that he does in fact accept a three-fold division of meaning into intended meaning, that is the actor's own meaning, subjective meaning, an observer's interpretation of intended meaning which is based on a perception of objective meaning, or, the nature of the act irrespective of subjective constitution\*<sup>(1)</sup> The doctrine of intentionality shows this idea of objective meaning, in so far as it implies knowledge independent of consciousness, to be misleading. However Schutz is not consistent in his usage of these terms especially in relation to subjective and intended meaning. Thus he defines the subjective meaning of a product (objective meaning) as the situation when "we have in view the meaning-context within which the product stands or stood in the mind of the producer. To know the subjective meaning of the product means that we are able to run over in our minds in simultaneity or quasi-simultaneity the polythetic Acts which constituted the experience of the producer"<sup>(19)</sup>. This indicates an identification of subjective with both intended and objective meaning. The identity with objective meaning is based on the reference of subjective meaning to polythetic Acts, that is completed objectivities. The crucial term in respect of the identity between subjective and intended meaning is the statement that we "have in view" the meaning context within which the product stands in the mind of the producer\*<sup>(2)</sup>. This could mean that we perceive the other's meaning.

However, in view of Schutz's denial of the accessibility of intended meaning

\*<sup>(1)</sup> In so far as objective meaning means necessary and therefore universal meaning, this is similar to our formulation of a phenomenological sociology but Schutz means by the term objective meaning the physical appearance of the Act.

\*<sup>(2)</sup> This is tautological as in Schutz's vocabulary meaning-context is equivalent to product.

it would appear that this statement means that in achieving subjective meaning we are directed by the object towards the intended meaning. This involves the nonsensical idea that we know we are directed towards something about which we know nothing. If we cannot know intended meaning how can we know that we are being directed toward it? It should also be noted that Schutz's statement above implies a direct unequivocal relationship between intention and objective Act; that is the Act, the observable event, is the intention made accessible to others. This is the basis of Schutz's regarding objective Acts as signs for intended meaning, but there are a number of inadequacies in this approach<sup>\*(1)</sup>. Firstly, even if this idea is accepted, it can tell us that an Act was intentionally meant but not why it was intended. Secondly, it assumes that there is never any failure or frustration of intentions. Thirdly it assumes that the observer's judgement as to when an action becomes a completed Act is the same as that of the actor and finally it is appropriate only to a goal-rational, value-less model of action, the deficiencies of which were noted above<sup>\*(2)</sup>. Thus, Schutz's account of the relationship between intended, subjective and objective meaning reveals that despite his use of subjectivist, verstehende terms like understanding, intention, meaning etc., that his was a behaviouristic approach to sociology in that he believed that all that is given to the sociologist is objective Acts e.g. lip movements, artefacts etc. From this he adopted a broadly symbolic interactionist perspective seeing these Acts as signs of intentional processes. The aim of the sociologist is to interpret these signs, this interpretation being the subjective meaning. This however raises a further problem, for this may give the impression

\* (1) re above Chapter 4

\* (2) re also above p.237.



that, as intended meaning is inaccessible, one interpretation is as likely as any other and therefore interpretation is arbitrary. Schutz clearly is not willing to accept this and his account of the understanding associated with the world of consociates, contemporaries, predecessors and successors is a classification of these areas in terms of a declining approximation of interpretation to intended meaning. However, the claim that our understanding of consociates is more genuine than our understanding of contemporaries assumes a knowledge of intended meaning which Schutz declares to be unobtainable. That is, we can only claim knowledge of consociates to be a closer approximation to intended meaning than other forms of understanding if we already know what the intended meaning is. If we cannot know what the intended meaning is then the claim to greater or lesser approximation to this meaning is gratuitous. It is true that Schutz bases his claim to the greater genuine-ness of our understanding of consociates, that is, the face to face situation, in terms of the greater number of e.g. winks, nods etc. This argument however confuses quantity and quality. To say that there are a greater number of observable events available in the face to face situation than in any other only means that we can make a greater number of interpretations. There is no justification for claiming that any one of these interpretations is of greater accuracy than an interpretation made from the position of contemporary or predecessor.

This raises a further problem which is that there is nothing about objective Acts, or observable events, which declares them to be intentional products. Thus, because Schutz declares intended meaning to be inaccessible he can have no grounds for claiming that observable Acts are products of and signify intended meaning for this requires prior knowledge of the nature of intended meaning and its evidence. Schutz's solution to this problem is to declare, as a matter of principle, that

all objective Acts are meaningful<sup>\*(20)</sup>.<sup>\*(1)</sup> Hence his hostility to Weber's distinction between meaningful action and meaningless behaviour, for to accept this distinction would require that the sociologist justify why he sees an event as action rather than behaviour and this could be done only by asserting that the sociologist has perceived that the action is intentionally directed. However Schutz's solution is inadequate both because it is simply asserted and crucially, that it implies that it is based on knowledge which he sees as inaccessible. In order for Schutz to declare that all Acts are meaningful in the sense of being intentional products it is necessary that he have knowledge of the evidenz in Husserl's sense, of intention in general, but Schutz has declared that an other's intentions are inaccessible. Therefore one only knows the appearance of one's own intentional acts and therefore the statement that another's Acts are meaningful for the other, ie. intentionally meaningful, is not in fact a statement about the intentional status of the Acts but is merely a claim that these Acts look like one's own intentional Acts. This is basically the method of analogical inference which Schutz identifies as the naive practise of the reciprocity of perspectives which he declares to be unreliable. We will see below that at this point, despite his disclaimers, Schutz does in fact adopt this naive approach.

Indeed, Schutz's argument that all experience is meaningful is based on a subtle redefinition of the term meaning so that it refers not to significance or objective appearance but to attention, to say that an experience is meaningful is to say that it is an object of attention. Thus Schutz's criticism that Weber's separation of action or experience<sup>\*(2)</sup>

\*<sup>(1)</sup> Schutz makes a distinction between meaning-endowing experiences and merely passive experiences only in relation to self-knowledge, (Phenomenology of the Social World p.54) although he may on this point be confusing meaning and knowledge of meaning.

\*<sup>(2)</sup> It is noticeable that in this stage of the argument Schutz refers not to Acts or action but to experience.



and meaning is contradictory is a product of Schutz's identifying the ideas of awareness and meaning. We find this inadequate for when we predicate the meaning of behaviour we do not refer, as Schutz believes, to the way of attending to the behaviour but to why this experience became an object of attention, what its value was for the attending person. That is, attention is a means of becoming aware of meaning, but it is not that meaning. Thus, when Schutz states that, "action is only a linguistic hypostatisation of experiences of which we have become heedful and whose meaning ... is nothing more than the particular 'how' of the heeding"<sup>(21)</sup>, he is overlooking the fact that this "how" is dependant on a prior awareness of "why". The limitation of Schutz's approach is revealed if we ask why the particular experience for the perception of significance is the reason why attention is directed to a attention rather than some other experience. It is this question of significance which is intended when we refer to the problem of interpreting another's meaning. Similarly, Schutz's account of attention assumes significance as a given, when the establishment of significance is part of the problem of understanding. In effect Schutz has said that the problem of establishing an Act's meaning is insoluble, therefore let us look at a different problem and call it meaning.

The problem of why certain experiences rather than others are attended to cannot be avoided but Schutz attempts to resolve the problem of the relationship between significance, attention and his usage of meaning by referring to the searchlight of attention falling on consciousness as if in a haphazard manner and as if independent of subjects choices or decisions\*. Again, Schutz's solution to the problem of

\* This is similar to a further confusion in Schutz where he sees consciousness as an undifferentiated flow made up of distinct phases which flow and meet into each other while retaining their distinctiveness.

subjectivity is to abolish subjects. However, it must be emphasised that, as we have seen, this is typical of the verstehende tradition.

The extent of Schutz's abolition of subjects can be gauged from a consideration of his idea of the role of reflection which he sees as the method of apprehending Acts. Schutz claims that we cannot reflect upon a personal core which is inaccessible to memory. This core consists not only of bodily sensations but also of "those psychic phenomena ... 'moods' as well as 'feeling' and effects (joy, sorrow, disgust etc.)"(22). This belief is simply asserted and it certainly fails to explain the subjective assent which we give to the work of those such as Scheler, who studied such supposedly inaccessible data. Equally, how can we account in Schutz's terms for our remembering a mood of misery and reliving the experience of that mood, the experience of isolation, believing that the burden of misery is ours alone to bear; of seeing the evidences of other's happiness as re-enforcing our misery by impressing on us that we cannot share that happy state. Therefore, it is necessary to ask why does Schutz make this claim? Schutz in effect identifies this core with subjective phenomena in general and states that the recollection of internal perception is incomparably more difficult than the relatively clear recollection of experiences of the external world. In view of Schutz's claim that meaning is established in reflection it is clear that, as subjective phenomena cannot be made accessible, they cannot be seen as meaningful. Thus, "the limits of recall coincide with the limits of 'rationalisability ... in the sense of giving a meaning ... Recoverability to memory is ... the first pre-requisite of all rational construction. That which is irrecoverable ... can only be lived but never thought"(23). This claim is contradictory in that it asserts the unknowability of subjective phenomena while accepting the adequacy of our knowledge that



they exist . As a consequence, this view divides the human subject into an inaccessible subjectivity and an external appearance which is meaningful to an observer because it tells him about this inaccessible subjectivity. Also, as has been shown above, in accepting the idea of a universally meaningful external world Schutz has to recognise, contradictorily, that this meaning depends on subjects, as in his recognition that meaning endowing experience is an Ego-act.

### ACT AND ACTION

The problem of asserting that an observer only perceives objective meaning, observable events, and yet is able to claim that these events signify intentional processes, reveals the reason for Schutz's insistence on the unity between Act (event) and action (process). The action is always subject-bound but the Act is a complete objectivity which belongs to the public domain and can therefore be considered independent from the acting subject. We may wish to look at the process of the constitution of the Act, the phases which went into it, but this does not imply a consideration of actor's intended meaning. Thus, Schutz attempts to resolve the problem of meaning in sociology by abolishing the other's intended meaning and declaring that meaning can be predicated only of completed, finished Acts or Acts which are finished in anticipation, while retaining the idea of action, or rather Act-ion. It is our contention that this argument is unwarranted because it is not possible to separate the perception of the Act from assumptions concerning intended meaning. For instance, if we describe an Act as A waving to B, we are assuming that A intended to attract B's attention, that the Act was deliberate etc. all statements of the intended meaning of the Act. The only way to avoid this would be to devise a purely neutral behaviouristic language which, if such a language is possible, would go beyond Schutz and abolish

subjective meaning, that is, the observer's interpretation of the actor's meaning. In sum Schutz attempts to abolish subjects while retaining subjectivity.\* Schutz is correct in asserting that meaning, significance in our usage, can be predicated only of Acts seen as completed but this again overlooks the problem that the perception that an Act is completed is a subjective judgement and is therefore part of the problem of apprehending the other's meaning and is not a solution to this problem. Equally, as noted above, we cannot assume that the completed act is the meaning of the action, that is we cannot equate meaning and achieved goals unless we assume that the realised goal was the intended goal. More crucially, in so far as we refuse to ask why this goal was intended, we cannot grasp its value or significance for the actor. This latter question can be answered only by accepting the separation of meaning and goals ie. that the meaning of goals lies in their selection on the basis of value for the actor. Schutz cannot do this without undermining the adequacy of his idea of motivational understanding. However, even his account of motivated action assumes that the goal of the completed Act was desired by the actor, although in order to justify this assumption Schutz would have to show why the goal was desired, what value it served. Thus he would have to step outside his motivational paradigm. The only alternative to this approach is to posit an infinite progress of Acts. That is, that Act A was desired because it enabled the achievement of Act B which in turn enabled the achievement of Act C. Not only is such a process never-ending but it undermines Schutz's distinction between

\* It will be noted that although Schutz has attempted to redefine other's intended meaning as a knowable datum out of existence he does not deny the propriety of subjective meaning in the sense of an observer's, ie. A. Schutz's, interpretation of this unknowable intended meaning. Yet this subjective meaning is Schutz's intended meaning and as such should be inaccessible to his audience. Schutz's very act of expecting to be understood by his audience, like that of Winch and Weber, undermines his claim that intended meaning is unknowable.



observable objective Act and subjective action because Act B, is an objective Act only in relation to Act A for in relation to Act C it is a subjective action. Thus we are asked to believe that a given phenomenon can be both action and Act, that is, it can be both subjective and private and objective and public. This clearly supports our previous argument that the Act-action distinction is not something inherent in the action but, as Weber recognised, is the observer's categorisation of the action in terms of what is of interest or value to him. This does not of itself invalidate the enquiry into the meaning of action but it does require that the study of action, if it is to be a genuine study of the other and not ego-aggrandisement, should be independent of the observer's value-perspective. This was clearly recognised by Weber, although he failed to establish such a method of enquiry\*, but Schutz fails to even recognise the existence of the problem. Finally, a consequence of the infinite progress of this procedure is that the question why was Act A desired can never be finally answered in motivational terms. Schutz's attempt to preserve the Act-action distinction against this criticism only serves to underline its inadequacies. Thus he states that in thinking about rising from a chair and closing a window we phantasise only the completed Act of closing the window and that if we were to phantasise all the intermediate actions e.g. putting one foot in front of the other, then each of these phantasies would on fulfillment be completed Acts. This is true, but it is an admission that the distinction between Act and action is one of subjective evaluation for Schutz admits that phases of action can be regarded as Acts and he describes these phases as if they were Acts. It could be argued that it is wrong to see, e.g. putting one foot in front of the other, as an Act because there is no account of the purpose of this

\* re below Chapter 4.

action ie. that goal, which when achieved is the Act. However, Schutz's own example of a genuine completed Act, closing the window, is open to the same objection because there is no account of why the actor wanted to close the window. It has been seen above that it is inadequate to answer this question by pointing to further Acts.

This discussion helps us to understand the nature of the idea of means-end relationship as it is used in everyday life and in the sociological notion of goal-rational action. Our criticism of Schutz's distinction between Act and action has shown that means are ends to other means, and ends are means to other ends, therefore what sense can we give to the idea of a means-end relationship? Schutz claims that only completed Acts can be reflected upon. This is, in our view an inversion of the true situation for it implies that completed Acts exist as such prior to reflection when in fact it is the act of reflection which completes the Act. That is, the completed act is seen as completed only because it has been made the object of reflection. This as noted above raises the acute question of why we reflect on one act rather than another. It is necessary to note that Schutz takes reflection for granted, seeing intention falling on objects in a more or less random manner and therefore fails to raise this question, consideration of which, may have caused him to revise his Act-action distinction. We reflect on an Act because it has value for us and we understand why we see a certain Act as the completion of an Action process by grasping the value which was the reason for the Act being made an object of reflection.

However there is a revised usage of meaning in Schutz and this is the idea that the meaning of experiences is the frame of interpretation which sees the experience as behaviour; behaviour is experience referred



to the Activities which produced them. This results in a tautology. Meaning is said to be the act which apprehends behaviour as meaningfully interpreted experience. Thus Schutz confuses the act by which meaning is apprehended with the meaning which is apprehended as value or significance. Schutz does come close to the latter idea of meaning, the idea of significance, in his statement that meaning does not lie in experience but that experiences are meaningful ie. significant, which are grasped reflectively. However Schutz again confuses meaning and reflection, the act of apprehending meaning, when he asserts that meaning is the way in which Ego regards its experience. That is, as if reflection created rather than revealed significance. Indeed our previous discussion has shown reflection to be dependant on prior judgements of significance.

Thus, we can see how Schutz attempts to establish the possibility of understanding consequent upon his denial of the possibility of intentional understanding. We have shown that despite this denial Schutz has to assume that others' Acts are intentionally directed and even that knowledge of intentional understanding is possible in order to assess the degrees of approximation of our understanding of others and as a condition of the comprehensibility of his account of the denial of intentional understanding. It has been seen that Schutz attempts to establish understanding in this situation by asserting the motivational character of action which is always directed to completed Acts. Schutz sees these as observable events and which are therefore as accessible to the actor as to an observer; this is the objective meaning or meaning-context of an Act. We criticised this account for its purely instrumental conception of action and for its failure to take into account the value-basis of action. We also criticised this idea of action because of the misleading Act-action distinction made by Schutz which he fails to realise

is not a subjectively neutral phenomenon but is itself the product of significant judgements and is therefore part of the problem, not the solution, of understanding.

We argued that Schutz supports this idea of action for it permits him to claim the possibility of some degree of understanding even though the other's intended meaning is supposedly inaccessible to us. Thus Schutz can claim that even though subjective meaning, the observer's interpretation of the action, is not as direct as the actor's own interpretation, it is directed towards the same object, the Act, and therefore there is the possibility of some degree of approximation between them. The observer, having grasped the Act can trace back the constitutive process of action which led to the Act. The advantage which the actor has over the observer is that he perceives his Acts in advance of their realisation whereas the observer must wait for the fulfillment of the action process in the performance of the Act. We can criticise this idea, on the grounds that it cannot reveal meaning. Even if successful, this approach can only inform the observer about the sequence of events, it cannot tell him why these events occurred as a deliberate act. That is, this approach cannot answer the question which must be answered if a meaningful account is to be given and that is why the actor saw his action as reasonable. Further, it has been shown that the motivational understanding advocated by Schutz can provide only tautological knowledge. It can avoid this only by going beyond its own limits by making assumptions concerning the value-orientation of the actor.

We noted that Schutz seeks to establish understanding by identifying an objective world shared by observer and actor. Thus, he states, "The first community which exists between me and the ... Other ... is the



community of Nature ... There is however the difference that the Other's world of Nature is seen as illic from my point of view which is to say that the Other gets that aspect from it which I myself should get if I myself were not hic but illic"(25). It will be noted that this statement could be interpreted as an acceptance of the validity of the reciprocity of perspectives, despite Schutz's earlier characterisation of this process as an unreliable common-sense assumption, especially as in this context Schutz refers to this appresentation of the other as transcendental intersubjectivity\*. Schutz tries to justify this claim but succeeds only in creating confusion. Thus, he states "transcendental intersubjectivity exists purely in me, the meditating ego. It is constituted purely from the sources of my intentionality, but in such a manner that it is the same transcendental intersubjectivity in every single human being in his intentional experiences"(26). This statement expresses two opposed ideas; firstly that others are self writ large and secondly that there is a level of subjectivity common to all human beings. However, Schutz does not clarify this statement although his subsequent assertion, "These Others are not merely related (to my subjectivity) by means of associative pairing to my psycho-physical being ... rather it is a question of an objective equalisation, a mutual inter-relatedness of my existence and that of all Others", inclines to the later view. However he fails to show how this common subjectivity can be reconciled with the idea that it is "purely mine". This latter idea shows that for Schutz all knowledge has "I" as its subject and therefore knowledge of Others means not knowledge of Others in themselves but knowledge of my perception of Others. Thus Schutz sees the need for "mutual inter-relatedness" but is unable to establish it. However, the contradiction in Schutz's

\*It is important to note that this apparent acceptance of the reciprocity of perspectives ante-dates his rejection of this procedure in Husserl which has been noted above.

argument reveals a paradox of everyday life. That is, how we can perceive ourselves as both individuals and as constituent parts of a community; how we can be, at the same time, both "I" and "We". If, as Schutz asserts, there is a common subjectivity, how can we account for the experience of ourselves as individuals? Equally, if, as Schutz also claims, the everyday belief in common subjectivity is based upon an inadequate procedure, how can it be sustained, how is the experience of community or common subjectivity possible? The problem of intersubjectivity will be resolved only when an account is given which reconciles these apparently opposed aspects of our social being.

It is therefore necessary to clarify Schutz's understanding of intersubjectivity.

#### INTERSUBJECTIVITY IN SCHUTZ

In considering the implications of the belief that others intended meanings are inaccessible Schutz comments that this means that the meaning I give to the other's action and the others self-interpretation will never precisely match<sup>(27)</sup>. That, although I am unaware of the other's meaning contexts, I can know the meaning context into which I place my experiences of the other and this gives an "approximate value of the other's intended meaning"<sup>(28)</sup>. But how approximate is approximate? Also Schutz's introduction of this term suggests that the distinction between intended and interpreted meaning is not particularly great but its use is gratuitous as no grounds are given for regarding interpreted meaning as an approximation of intended meaning<sup>\*</sup>. Further, as noted above, Schutz's statement that interpreted meaning approximates intended meaning if it is to make sense presumes prior knowledge of intended meaning. If intended meaning could not be known by an observer, as Schutz claims, there could be no way of establishing that it is approximated by interpreted

\*It may be argued that Schutz's idea of a common world shared by actor and observer justifies this term but even if this world is accepted we need to know why it gives "approximate" understanding.



meaning.

Schutz regards the other's consciousness as transcendent to ie. outside, mine and therefore I perceive his consciousness through signs. Thus it is claimed that I see the other's body but assume that there is a consciousness within it and thus regard body movements as signs of other's conscious lived experiences. This would appear to be a circular argument of inference. I assume that the body movements which I see are signs of conscious activity from which assumption I infer that these movements are movements of a conscious being. Schutz denies that this is an argument by inference, in the usual sense, although he overlooks the circularity of the argument. He claims that in this process, "What is involved is a certain intentional Act which utilises an already established code of interpretation directing us through the bodily movement to the underlying lived experience"<sup>(29)</sup>. It is not clear how this differs from an inference because, in terms of Schutz's analyses of the isolated ego, it would appear that this code originates in the self<sup>\*</sup>. Thus in interpreting the Other's body movements I use the same interpretive scheme as if I were reflecting on my own movements. This contradicts Schutz's criticism of Husserl in which he states that my body is given to me in a totally different way to that in which other's bodies are given to me, therefore the two experiences are not comparable or interchangeable. It is also interesting that Schutz appears to be claiming direct knowledge of other minds. Thus he states "my gaze goes right through these outward symptoms to the inner man of the person who is speaking to me. Whatever contact of meaning I light upon when I am experiencing these outward indications draws its validity from a corresponding context of meaning in the mind<sup>\*(2)</sup> of the other person".<sup>(30)</sup>

\*It is possible that in the idea of a code Schutz is referring to culturally shared interpretive conventions, but the possibility of such conventions is part of the problem, not the solution, of intersubjectivity.

\*(2) Our Italics.

However, following this argument, there is a subtle change in Schutz's vocabulary. He ceases to refer to body movements and writes instead of experiences. That is, he assumes the perception of others' experiences in order to show that others' experiences can be perceived<sup>\*</sup>. Thus he states that both I and Other observe our own experiences although they have the Other's lived experiences as their object, which implies the availability of the Other's lived experience. However, it is clear that by experience Schutz simply means Act. Thus by this re-definition of terms he assumes that which he cannot establish, that is, that Acts are unequivocal evidence of particular lived, conscious experience. Therefore, Schutz gratuitously refers to our perception of other's consciousness, viz "I see, then, my own stream of consciousness and yours in a single intentional Act which embraces them both"<sup>(31)</sup>. Although the idea of the simultaneity of consciousnesses is later qualified as a necessary and basic assumption, even this modest proposal is superceded by the claim that, "Not only does each of us subjectively experience his own duree as an absolute reality in the Bergsonian sense, but the duree of each of us is given to the other in an absolute reality"<sup>(32)</sup>. This simultaneity is the experience of growing old together. This latter idea goes beyond the claim that we believe the other's consciousness to be available, to the assertion that it is actually available. We can relate this difference to the tension between "I" and "We" in Schutz's work, noted above. Thus Schutz has two models of intersubjective understanding. They are, firstly that of analogical inference which makes community inexplicable, and secondly there is the idea of an empathic merging of consciousnesses which makes error concerning the other and the recognition of the Other as distinct from self inexplicable.

<sup>\*</sup> This phase of the argument shows how Schutz tends to identify perceiving and knowing.



ANALOGIC AND EMPATHIC UNDERSTANDING IN SCHUTZ

The proximity of Schutz to the analogic model of understanding is indicated in his statement that "everything I know about your conscious life is really based on my knowledge of my own lived experiences"<sup>(33)</sup> and in his citing of Husserl to the effect that "From the phenomenological point of view, the other person is a modification of 'my' self"<sup>(34)</sup>. In contradiction to this view Schutz states that the "Other's consciousness whose intentional Acts I see as occurring as other than, yet simultaneous with my own"<sup>(35)</sup>. In these statements Schutz is claiming, contradictorily, that the Other is a modification of self but that the other's Acts are seen as distinct from those of self.

In describing genuine intersubjective understanding, Schutz states that we understand the observed action by determining how we would carry out the action or recall a similar action of ours. We project the Other's goal as if it were our own. Schutz recognises that he could be accused of describing the process of projective empathy, but denies the charge on the grounds that he, unlike supporters of the empathic method, recognises the inaccessibility of other's consciousness and that empathy claims greater knowledge than does Schutz's method which he terms "structural parallelism"<sup>(36)</sup>. This does not prove that Schutz is not using the empathic method, but that he is not making the usual claims for its possibilities. Further, Schutz's modest claims for this method contradicts his statement of the nature of genuine intersubjective understanding, in which context he makes these remarks. He states that genuine understanding is concerned with what goes on in other minds and yet he claims that structural parallelism, the method of such understanding, is based on an acceptance of the inaccessibility of other minds. The practical distinction between empathy and structural parallelism is not noticeable for there are a potentially unlimited number of interpretive

schemes which could be used, in relation to a particular action, by both empathy and structural parallelism. Nor is it clear how their interpretive schemes differ. It has been shown above\*, that attempts to test interpretation are inadequate as they are circular and involve a static conception of the other. Thus empathy believes it is always right; structural parallelism cannot be shown to be wrong. Further Schutz's denial that he is using an empathic explanation of intersubjectivity is weakened by his claim that understanding self is essentially the same as understanding others with the proviso that self-knowledge is richer than knowledge of others<sup>(37)</sup>.

Thus Schutz claims, on the one hand, that our understanding of others is based on our own subjective experiences but also that the knowing subject is merely aware of the existence of others and understands them through his constitution of them<sup>(38)</sup>. These statements are not the same. The first is an affirmation of empathic projection, the recognition of "I" in "Thou". The second is the "softer" claim of analogical inference, that "the Other" is a reconstruction of "I". Thus empathy claims some knowledge of the other, even if only in relation to that area where "Thou" is similar to I ; analogical inference claims no knowledge of the other, should the other be like our construction it is coincidental. This brief description also reveals the basic weakness of both these methods in relation to the attainment of intersubjective understanding. Despite their differences they both can be certain only that they provide knowledge of self not of the other. That is, they are both located in the ego-perspective and their understanding of the Other is adequate only in so far as he resembles ego. Thus, they can grasp all aspects of the Other except those that make him Other ie. distinct from self. The

\* re above Chapter 4.



problem of intersubjective understanding is how to grasp the Other-ness of "Thou". Thus both analogical inference and empathic projection provide intra-subjective rather than inter-subjective knowledge.

Schutz fails to resolve the distinction between these two approaches and thus the meaning of intersubjective understanding in his work is unclear. However, a resolution of the usage if not the adequacy of these models is suggested in his example of my Thou-relationship with one playing cards. In the situation of the direct social relationship I guess what is going on in his mind<sup>(39)</sup>. That is, I project my perceptions onto his activity, a case of analogical inference. Schutz recognises that this understanding is in fact only an interpretation of my perceptions but he claims that as I become familiar with the Other, as he loses his anonymity, I no longer see him as merely a man playing cards, because I become aware of the way he plays the game. This indicates that, as noted above, Schutz is claiming greater accuracy for understanding gained in the face to face situation. It would therefore seem that Schutz reserves his "softer" analogic understanding for the non face to face situation and the empathic method or structural parallelism for the face to face situation. However, the distinction between these modes of understanding as exemplified in Schutz's instance of card-playing is a sleight of hand. My categorisation of "man playing cards" is not qualitatively distinct from my categorisation of the way he plays cards e.g. "man who plays poker cautiously" because both are based on my constructions of these situations. That is, if I played poker in the way which the other does, I would consider myself to be cautious. It could be that the other see his play as sensible and would regard my play as reckless. Thus the reference to the others consciousness which is implied in the perception of cautious play is

not qualitatively different from the judgement that the other is playing cards rather than idly handling them. We therefore see that Schutz's attempts to account for intersubjectivity fail because there is a confusion of analogic and empathic methods in his work and because intersubjective understanding, as variously described by Schutz, remains firmly rooted in the ego-perspective. This latter criticism is not a demand that Schutz should have attempted to achieve total certainty in our knowledge of others but that his idea of intersubjective understanding cannot account for its own assumptions. That is, Schutz's account cannot tell us why he believes that certain external objects are other selves that are nevertheless distinctive from our self.

It has been noted above that Schutz attempted to account for our intersubjective existence by positing the world of completed Acts as a world common to all subjects. It is therefore necessary to give further consideration to Schutz's attempts to establish an objective, intersubjective world and to discuss the limits which he places on it.

#### LEBENSWELT AND A COMMON WORLD

We intend to argue that, like Husserl, Schutz's meaning of the term lebenswelt is ambiguous. However it is clear that Schutz used it to refer to the intersubjective world; thus "the basis of meaning in every science is the pre-scientific life-world which is the one and unitary life-world of myself, of you and of us all"<sup>(40)</sup>. Schutz further affirms the life-world to be the correlate of transcendental subjectivity but there is nothing in his account of this world which is not available to common-sense. Thus, he states, "If the life-world as viewed with the natural attitude remains the basis of meaning of transcendental phenomenology then not only I but also you and everyone else belong to this life-world ... all that constitutes our own social world in its



historical actuality and all other social worlds concerning which history gives us knowledge"<sup>(41)</sup>. The idea, which Schutz is here advancing, of maintaining the natural attitude within the phenomenological reduction is clear nonsense, and the latter part of this statement shows that the knowledge of the lebenswelt is empirically, not phenomenologically, derived. There is also the suggestion in Schutz that the lebenswelt is pre-conceptual experience but this idea repeats the fallacy of the Ding-an-sich, that we know that there is something which is unknowable. Also it is not clear how we can understand such experience without destroying its pre-conceptual nature. It is more likely that this idea of the lebenswelt means, for Schutz, our taken-for-granted or common-sense existence. However, it should be noted that although taken-for-granted assumptions are unquestioned they are not unquestionable or indubitable and, further, such assumptions are conceptual in form. Thus, the lebenswelt, the world for us all is the taken-for-granted world. However, it takes little reflection to realise that not all subjects adhere to the same taken-for-granted assumptions. Thus, this common world of the lebenswelt is common to all who share the same assumptions. It is, therefore, a culturally defined world.

Schutz's equation of lebenswelt and culture<sup>\*</sup> is shown in his statement that this post-reduction world is intersubjectively accessible and that cultural objects point back to other subjects, their activities and conscious intentions but that "Of course, this is only true 'for everybody' who belongs to the corresponding community of culture"<sup>(42)</sup>. We have criticised the reliance of intersubjectivity on cultural homogeneity above, both because it effectively limits understanding to ego as it overlooks the potentially minute size of the cultural group

\*This identity strongly suggests that Schutz's idea of the lebenswelt is not the product of a phenomenological enquiry but is an instance of naturalistic or naive conceptualisation.

and above all, because the idea of culture presupposes intersubjective understanding and therefore cannot be the origin of such understanding. One problem which is caused by the identification of lebenswelt and culture is the possibility of understanding subjects which belong to other cultures. Schutz's identification of the lebenswelt as establishing the possibilities of understanding would appear to make cross-cultural understanding impossible. However, although Schutz claims that understanding other cultures is difficult, it can be achieved by reference to a common Nature<sup>(43)</sup>. By this he means physical nature, which is the object of the natural sciences. However, Schutz is not claiming that the natural sciences are the basis of cross-cultural understanding because nature in the everyday attitude is a mental construct and natural science is a system of idealisations of the lebenswelt. Schutz is here making the important point that nature is not alien to mind but in so doing he undermines his argument that nature is the basis of cross-cultural understanding. It is necessary, if Schutz's thesis is to be sustained that nature be the same for all possible subjects. Schutz's contention that natural science is an idealisation of the lebenswelt ie. everyday, cultural existence and that nature is a mental construct, indicates that nature is a culturally approved construct and is, therefore, culturally specific. It could be argued that there is an underlying perception of nature which is implied in and precedes all cultural conceptions of nature but Schutz does not demonstrate such a level of knowledge. Indeed, given his identity of lebenswelt and culture he could not do so without abandoning his conception of the lebenswelt as basic to all knowledge. Thus we see that Schutz has two major concepts of the nature of the lebenswelt or world for all. The first is the common-sense or taken-for-granted



world; the second is a world of common physical nature. To these can be added a less emphasised notion of the lebenswelt in Schutz's work and this is the idea of pre-conceptual experience. All these ideas have been criticised and found to be inadequate as means of accounting for intersubjective understanding. It is noticeable that both Gurwitsch<sup>(44)</sup> and Marx<sup>(45)</sup> in their commentaries on Schutz's notion of the lebenswelt, initially identify it with a universal, pre-conceptual world, but both eventually identify it with culture although, like Schutz, they fail to question the assumed intersubjective nature of the life-world.

Thus, the lebenswelt, in any of the senses given to this term by Schutz, cannot be regarded as the basis of intersubjectivity but rather as a product of intersubjectivity. This means that it can be investigated by methods based on a reliable method of intersubjective understanding but a condition of such a method would be the abandonment of our dependence upon the lebenswelt. A related idea is familiar among social phenomenologists and ethnomethodologists. This is the procedure of raising everyday life as a problem by making it anthropologically strange. However, there is no statement of how this is to be achieved. Is it not possible that in persuading ourselves that something familiar is strange that we have merely referred to other of our taken-for-granted assumptions which must themselves be questioned, ie. made anthropologically strange, before the initial investigation can continue? This process also assumes that the anthropologically strange is nevertheless understandable but it would seem that a quality of the genuinely strange is its inexplicability. In such a situation we aim at making familiar the strange. The normal method of achieving this is to reformulate that which is strange as being really identifiable with what we already know by reference to e.g. a common-sense or scientific theory. However

it is these mechanisms of constructing sense in everyday life which are being questioned here and it would be contradictory to use them as the means of providing answers to their own problematic status. That is, how can we question common-sense without using common-sense assumptions, or why should we place greater reliability on the critical perspective than we do on common-sense? The value of the strategy of making everyday action anthropologically strange is that it could identify a range of problems which have hitherto been overlooked. That is, a sociologist is surprised by people who handle poisonous snakes as part of a religious ritual, he is not surprised by a man handling snakes as part of his job as a zookeeper. He therefore sees the first situation as a problem requiring explanation and the second as obvious and unproblematic. However, assuming that we succeed in making the handling of snakes as part of a job anthropologically strange, it will be seen that this action also poses problems of sociological understanding. However, just as seeing the ritual snake-handlers as odd is, in itself, no guide as to how we can achieve understanding so making things anthropologically strange does not, of itself, guarantee understanding. That is, this procedure is a problem locator not a problem solver; it is methodologically naive and incomplete.

Our conclusion that the naive questioning of common-sense attitudes can give no greater reliability than these attitudes themselves raises a number of possible strategies. We can abandon the project and decide to do something useful instead. We can accept that all questioning and knowledge is based on unquestioned assumptions and simply adopt those

assumptions which we find satisfactory. Thus, our conclusions will be acceptable only to those who share our assumptions\*, and the growth of

\* This is basically Weber's method re below chapter 4.



knowledge will be restricted to like-minded persons. There can be no suggestion that our perception of the situation is more reliable or accurate or should be preferred to other perceptions. This, too, would tend to raise the question of why we should bother with a time-consuming sophisticated enquiry when our initial impressions are just as reliable, or unreliable. The fact that we may use scientific tools in our sophisticated enquiry simply means that we get a scientifically produced unreliability as opposed to a common-sense produced unreliability. The third strategy is to deny the inevitability of the infinite regress and unreliability by demonstrating that basic, unquestionable data are available and that these provide the criteria by which the adequacy of the course of enquiry is judged. However it is also necessary to demonstrate that such data is intersubjectively available, that it constitutes the grounds of universal rational judgements. This is the approach which we adopt and which we intend to justify as an application of the phenomenological method below\*.

Although we have noted that Schutz's concept of the lebenswelt fails to establish intersubjective understanding it is necessary to complete this part of our enquiry by considering Schutz's references, other than in the context of the lebenswelt, to the nature of a world common to all subjects. We have noted above Schutz's attempts to establish the world of completed deeds as common to all subjects and we have criticised its inadequacies and its behaviouristic implications. Nevertheless, this idea is a persistent theme in Schutz's work. Thus he states that the thou is "that consciousness whose intentional Acts I see as occurring as other than, yet simultaneous with, my own"(46) However, it has been shown that in terms of Schutz's account the features

\* re Chapter 7

of otherness and simultaneity are mutually exclusive. Thus Schutz states that we each see this simultaneity from our respective standpoints, these subjective standpoints being transcended by reference to the same objects which he associates with Husserl's idea of an intersubjective Nature. We therefore see that Schutz implicitly recognises the intriguing phenomenon of how we can be both individuals and also members of an intersubjective community. However Schutz's formulation of the problem preserves the priority of the individual perspective and thus leads to the contradictory position of asserting a simultaneity which is no simultaneity because each "partner" sees it in his own way. Schutz bases this simultaneity on a common world of objects but our previous criticisms have shown that the establishment of intersubjectivity depends on a common consciousness of objects. That is, Schutz asserts only common objects of knowledge but this is quite distinct from establishing common knowledge of objects which is what is assumed in the idea of intersubjective understanding. The confusion is hidden in Schutz's work because he uses the term experience in two distinct ways.<sup>(47)</sup> Thus he asserts a genuine understanding in which the centre of attention is the other's lived experiences as actor and raises questions concerning the spontaneity of action, the nature of the project and the in-order-to motive and the meaning-context of the experience for the actor. Such questions are clearly not concerned with observable events or completed deeds. Thus Schutz uses the term experiences to mean both observable events and, when in the discussion of genuine understanding, as that which belongs to the inner life of the subject. Therefore by not clarifying the fact that he is using the term experience in these two senses Schutz is able to regard experience, depending on the needs of the argument, as a component of both subjective and objective worlds.



Indeed Schutz goes beyond the type of community which can be established on the basis of a mutual orientation to the same objects. Thus he states that, in the face-to-face situation, "to the extent that you and I can mutually experience ... growing old together for a time, to the extent that we can live in (simultaneity) together, to that extent we can live in each other's subjective contexts of meaning"(48). This assumes the possibility of a we-consciousness, that I am attending "to your actual conscious experiences themselves and not merely to my experiences of you ... I can be aware simultaneously of what is going on in my mind and yours living through the two series of experiences as one series - what we are experiencing together"(49). It could be argued that this simultaneity of experience refers only to ego and other's attending to the same objects. More crucially the reference to awareness of the other's mind indicates either a rejection of Schutz's claim that other minds are inaccessible or, as is more likely, the idea that Acts are evidences of intended meaning. This latter view in fact leads only to the banality that actor's mean to do what they do. This completely overlooks the possibility of varying interpretations of the Act, the possibility of failure or frustration and above all it cannot raise the question as to the value of the situation created by the Act for the actor other than by pointing to an infinite progress of future Acts which are achieved on the basis of the Act in question. Also this idea does not justify Schutz's references to a common stream of consciousness between ego and other(50).

We noted above that Schutz's idea of an intersubjective world can be equated with culture. The extent of Schutz's perception of understanding as being culture-bound is indicated in his remarks that our understanding of predecessors is tenuous because I cannot assume, "a

common civilisation, a common core of knowledge between predecessors and myself as I can between myself and contemporaries"<sup>(51)</sup>. We have identified, above, the inadequacy of relying on ideas concerning culture as a guarantee of intersubjective understanding, but our interest at this point is in the situation of understanding supposed cultural outsiders. Although Schutz regards the understanding of such outsiders as difficult he does not regard it as impossible. This undermines his implicit equation of lebenswelt, culture and the conditions of understanding. Schutz attempts to establish our understanding of predecessors, and we would extend this to include all cultural outsiders, by identifying the experience of such people as belonging to human experience in general<sup>(52)</sup>, "the essence of human experience as (the idea of) such". To question, as we have done, the validity of culture as the basis of understanding is to raise the possibility that such human experience in general is the root of all our knowledge of others and this establishment of this idea will be the main burden of our definition of a phenomenological sociology. However, Schutz does not pursue this idea of a universal human experience and it seems that he regards it as a residue. The nature of this experience is not made clear nor is the manner of our apprehending it.

We have criticised Schutz's account of intersubjective understanding and his attempts to base this understanding on a common world as inadequate. It is therefore necessary to consider the nature of the sociology which Schutz derives from his account of understanding.

#### SCHUTZ'S CONCEPTION OF SOCIOLOGY

Schutz's failure to come to terms with the problems previously discussed is indicated in his remark that the social sciences take the social world, intersubjectivity, the existence of others and the life-world for granted<sup>(53)</sup> which effectively means that sociology, as perceived



by Schutz, is naive. Nevertheless, Schutz as noted above claims a distinction between the natural attitude and "scientific sociology. This difference would appear to rest on the following factors. Firstly that, unlike the natural attitude, sociology recognises that its interpretations of the other are constructed, that the other's intended meanings are inaccessible. This has been criticised above. Secondly that there is a major difference between the method of type-construction in sociology and the natural attitude; this will be discussed below. Finally, the importance of the reliance of sociology on reflection. Thus Schutz states, "For in a certain sense I am a social scientist in everyday life whenever I reflect upon my fellow men and their behaviour instead of merely experiencing them"<sup>(54)</sup>. However, reflection is a vague term and although it is implied that it is more rigorous than taken-for-granted knowledge, this is not established. In particular Schutz does not establish the critical capacity of reflection; that is, its competence in establishing a critique of the natural attitude and thus its ability to go beyond the natural attitude. In so far as Schutz sees the common-sense world as taken-for-granted by sociology, such a critique would seem to be unavailable. Thus, in drawing a distinction between reflecting on experience and mere experiencing Schutz is not drawing a distinction between sociology and the natural attitude for it would appear that this reflection is naive, that is, based on natural attitude assumptions. Thus, such reflection is part of common-sense. If reflection is to advance beyond common-sense it can do so only by being rigorous, that is by being grounded in totally reliable knowledge. This is the goal of phenomenology and it is strange that Schutz, who claimed to be a phenomenologist, did not realise its potential value in this situation. Schutz's argument that reflection is a distinctive feature

of sociology as opposed to the natural attitude is tenable only if we regard the natural attitude as the non-thinking and non-conceptual mode of social being. As soon as it is realised that the natural attitude, or common sense, is not mere experiencing but is the application of a particular unclarified, range of concepts, ideas and beliefs to experience, Schutz's distinction between it and reflection breaks down, for how can these concepts be applied other than in reflective acts?

This conclusion entails the consideration of Schutz's distinction between naïve actor and sociological observer. This distinction is particularly crucial for, when the actor is passive in the course of social action, he is attending to that action as an observer. Schutz distinguishes between the passive actor and the sociological observer on the grounds of the latter's detachment, but this does not clarify the distinction between "scientific" sociologist and the ordinary non-participating observer. In effect Schutz denies any such difference. The sociologist in Schutz's view, is in the position of an indirect observer of social action<sup>(55)</sup>, that is, one who observes action but is not involved in it. It is not clear why this should be so although it may be connected with Schutz's notion of the scientific status of sociology. That is, by being detached from action the sociologist is being objective, the other is seen as an anonymous "one", and objectivity is a quality of science. If this is so then this idea of scientific objectivity is quite different from any of Schutz's previous uses of the term, "objective". It is also possible that Schutz asserts this detached position of the sociologist because if the sociologist were to establish a face-to-face relationship, or even a direct social



relationship\*<sup>(1)</sup>, he would, or could, be drawn into the course of action under consideration, thereby effecting its course. Thus, he could not be said to be observing the course of action in its "natural" state but only as it has been distorted by his intervention. This of course assumes a 'natural' state of the course of action which indirect social observation cannot establish. This results in a major contradiction in Schutz's account of a scientific, interpretive sociology. Schutz, in distinguishing between various types of understanding, argues that the we-relationship gives the greatest insight into the motives of the other. Thus his identity of sociology with indirect social observation means, in Schutz's own terms, that sociology is less reliable than a major form of everyday understanding. Thus, Schutz's emphasis on scientific objectivity has the effect of making available to sociology a second or third best knowledge, compared to common-sense\*<sup>(2)</sup>. It would be expected that the reason for demanding that sociology be scientific would be to guarantee the greater adequacy of its understanding, compared to common-sense, but, on Schutz's account, common-sense has a greater possibility of reliable understanding than scientific sociology. Therefore, there would seem to be no point in adopting such a scientific sociology.

Schutz therefore distinguishes between naive indirect social observation and sociological observation on the grounds that the sociologist has no available direct social relationships, as social scientist his world is solely the world of indirect social observation.

\*<sup>(1)</sup> The difference between direct and indirect social relationships is unclear in Schutz, although it seems that the latter is, ideally, totally anonymous, whereas, in the former the other is bodily present, ie. the distinction is geographical rather than social. Schutz's equation of sociology with the indirect social relationship, thus implies that the sociologist should have no direct experience of his subjects.

\*<sup>(2)</sup> It has been said that sociology can be either correct and irrelevant or relevant and wrong. Schutz appears to have produced a sociology whose conclusions would be probably wrong and almost certainly irrelevant.

The purpose of this would appear to be the need to ensure that nothing is accepted into the sociologist's world without criticism.<sup>(56)</sup> This appears to be Schutz's obeisance to phenomenology's pre-suppositionless ideal, but unlike Husserl Schutz does not describe the method of criticism to be employed. Nor is it clear how the sociologist, from the perspective of indirect social observer, is to criticise the data of everyday life, as this perspective according to Schutz, is not particularly reliable. That is, the identification of reliable data which are alone to be admitted into the sociologist's stock of knowledge cannot be achieved from within the sociologist's perspective as defined by Schutz. Indeed, Schutz frequently states that the we-relationship, to which the sociologist is denied access, is a means of checking interpretations derived in direct or indirect social observation. Indeed he contrasts the "probability" of understanding in direct social observation with the "certainty" of the we-relationship<sup>(57)</sup>.

Schutz's confusion on this point can be best examined by considering his notion of questioning the other. Thus he states that knowledge concerning predecessors is inadequate compared to that of contemporaries (direct social observation) and consociates (face-to-face observation) because we can never be sure that the predecessors interpretive schemes coincide with mine. Whereas, in the situation of understanding contemporaries and consociates we can interrogate the actor, "and so settle the question once and for all\*"<sup>(58)</sup>. Similarly, Schutz answers the question as to how an observer knows that a social relationship exists between two persons by claiming that certain indications in their behaviour establish a presumption that this is the case. This presumption can be turned into a certainty by questioning the actor's,

\* We have previously criticised reliance on questioning actors in order to understand as such questioning, in order to be appropriate, presupposes prior understanding. Our criticisms here are aimed, not at supporting the adequacy of questioning, but at revealing a contradiction in Schutz's work.



but this requires entering into a relationship with the actors<sup>(59)</sup>, "Whatever judgement the observer may make concerning the probability, possibility or conceivability of the existence of any social relationship derives whatever validity it has from the possibility of thus questioning the person or persons who may be involved in that relationship". This Schutz sees questioning, the entering into a direct relationship with the actors, as part of the observer's criteria for the existence of a social relationship, yet as has been seen, sociologists are debarred from fulfilling this criteria by the demand that they retain the perspective of the indirect social observer. Thus, Schutz's "scientific" sociology, unlike common-sense, cannot, in the terms of Schutz's own argument, establish with certainty the existence, let alone the nature, of a social relationship.

Schutz sees the goal of scientific judgement as "knowledge of the world with a maximum of explicit clarity and distinctiveness ... (and every social science) including interpretive sociology ... sets as its primary goal the greatest possible clarification about what is thought about the social world by those living in it"<sup>(60)</sup>. It is noticeable that Schutz refers to "clarification" not "probability", "accuracy", certainty or, the ultimate unmentionable, "truth", although he uses some of these terms in relation to common sense understanding. However, Schutz's notion of clarification stands in need of being clarified. In view of our overall critique of Schutz, "clarification" would seem to be equivalent to the idea of making others comprehensible, that is, fitting them into the observer's existing world-view. This is a product of the procedure of seeing others as manifestations of self. It does not understand others, it annihilates them. Such a procedure may give intellectual satisfaction but it can have no claims to either truth or relevance concerning others and yet it is clear from the latter

part of Schutz's statement that he expects it to tell us about others' perceptions of the social world in which they live.

Thus, Schutz's attempts to distinguish between the knowledge available to the sociological and naive observer of action is seen to fail. Both sociologist and naive observer, in Schutz's view, see Acts as indications of the actor's mental processes. The external observer interprets his experiences of these signs, "in such a way as to establish the meaning-context in which the conscious experiences must exist in the minds of the observed persons"<sup>(61)</sup>. However this "must", in conformity with the ego-centrist model of action which Schutz adopts, refers only to the observer's interpretation, that is he cannot or will not admit any alternative interpretation\*. Nevertheless, the observer's interpretations are "consistent with his experience and social world and his knowledge of the other"<sup>(62)</sup> and this, being based on other-orientation, makes possible the comprehension of subjective meaning. It is important to note that Schutz sees knowledge of the other as relevant to interpretation for this indicates that, as the other is the object of the interpretive act, that such interpretation should tell us about the other. Also, knowledge of the other is lacking in the perspective of the external observer. On Schutz's account the observer can have no knowledge of the other as other. Therefore, Schutz should clarify how knowledge of the other, as opposed to self-projection, is possible without compromising the position of the external observer. This he does not do.

The observer, in Schutz's view, seeks to interpret motives and to establish primary and intermediate goals but this, as noted above, raises the problem of the infinite progress, that is all goals can be regarded as intermediate therefore how does the observer establish one Act as

\* This point is developed in our notion of the postulate of obviousness re Chapter 6.



the goal of the actor's action? Equally Schutz's reference to the apprehension of subjective meaning, which in its formal definition would mean no more than observing the other's Acts or keeping in view his lived experiences as they occur, and this conveys merely the idea of a recognition of the other's completed Acts. This presumes that the Acts are motivated, which knowledge cannot be gained within the perspective of the external observer. It is also based on a false Act-action distinction and presupposes a knowledge of the significance of the Act for the actor. All these points have been made above. Thus Schutz's notion of comprehending the other in so far as it cannot establish knowledge of the other as a distinct person, that is his quality of otherness, tells us nothing about the other. We could just as well be dealing with subjective phantasies rather than with other persons for despite Schutz's rejection of the adequacy of the reciprocity of perspectives, all that can be comprehended by the external observer is not the other, but the observer himself if he were in the other's position.

Schutz, as has been seen, tries to salvage the value of this operation by arguing that the degree of accuracy in our interpretive judgements is dependant on our familiarity with the other. The contradictions which this causes in Schutz's account have been noted but it is also important to recognise that this argument by Schutz results merely in the truism that the adequacy of our knowledge of the other depends on how well acquainted we are with his subjective states. Thus the problem persists of how we are to establish adequate knowledge of an other's subjectivity. It could be argued that Schutz's argument concerning familiarity does not require knowledge of the other's subjective states because we simply need to know that in a given situation the other is likely to behave in a certain way; we base this belief on the fact

that this is the way he has behaved in the past in similar situations. Two criticisms can be made concerning this argument. Firstly, it overlooks the distinction between everyday and sociological projects. That is, everyday understanding is limited by the requirements of the reason for understanding, the practical purpose served by understanding. There is therefore no need to understand the other in himself but simply to gain that degree of understanding which serves the purpose at hand. Everyday understanding is shallow because it does not need to be deep. However, the goal of the sociological project is no more and no less than understanding the other; its adequacy is judged not by its efficiency in relation to an ulterior goal, or by the acceptability or coherence of the interpretation as judged by the observer<sup>(1)</sup> but by its proximity to the mode of perception and evaluation of the actor. Schutz, as has been seen, recognises this point, but cannot guarantee or give meaning to the idea of an approximation of the actor's intended meaning. Therefore the criteria of adequacy must be different in everyday and sociological interpretations, the former being concerned with practical value, the latter with truth. Thus, the argument above is sociologically inadequate because it does not answer the question why the action is the same in that situation.

The second criticism of the argument above is that it is simply wrong in believing that the judgement it describes is independent of questions concerning intended meaning. This is because the argument hinges on the idea of the situation being the same and it implies that the actor sees it as the same<sup>\*(2)</sup>. This does not mean simply the same

\*<sup>(1)</sup> This point will be discussed in greater detail below in relation to types in sociology re this chapter and chapter 7.

\*<sup>(2)</sup> We have discussed above in relation to Wirth the adequacy of the view that similarity is determined by rules, re below chapter 4.



in terms of its appearance but also in terms of its significance for the actor. This is crucial because no two events are, phenomenally, the same, there is always some difference between them even if it is only the fact of the events happening in different times and places. Thus the judgement that the situations are the same is a qualitative judgement which seeks to distinguish between the essentials and the accidents of the two situations and, in so far as it is made by an observer, it presupposes an identity between the observer's and actor's judgements concerning the nature and significance of the situations. That is, the judgement that two situations are similar involves a subjective judgement of significance. Therefore, the argument, above, that our understanding of others can be established without reference to intended meaning or actor's interpretations is shown to be based on taken-for-granted assumptions concerning the identity of observer's and actor's intended meanings and significant judgements.

We have criticised Schutz's conception of action, meaning, the nature of understanding and the relationship between everyday and sociological interpretive understanding of the other. It is therefore necessary to complete our discussion of Schutz by considering the nature of the sociological methodology which he derives from these arguments. We intend to concentrate upon Schutz's notion of typification because, as noted above, the final distinguishing feature for Schutz of "scientific" sociology as opposed to everyday knowledge is its special mode of organising knowledge in types.

#### TYPES AND UNDERSTANDING

Although the main consideration of the notion of sociological types will be deferred\*, a consideration of this idea is relevant to the apprehension of Schutz's grasp of understanding in sociology. Schutz

\* re below chapter

asserts that typification is not simply a method of the social sciences but is a feature of everyday understanding. It is therefore necessary to clarify Schutz's grasp of everyday typification and to consider his claim that sociological typifications are more scientific than those of everyday life. Schutz associates everyday typification with the relationship between contemporaries.

The subject of everyday typification is an anonymous "one", not an actual person and, as noted above, it is clear that Schutz sees this as a second-best mode of apprehending the other. The other's ego is a possible or supposable individuation of the type, but the ego of the typical actor is the creation of the type-producer and user. Schutz sees the type as built up out of a synthesis of the type-producer's interpretations of any number of his experiences. This is the synthesis of recognition in which the personal ideal type is constituted and thus the subjective meaning context has been abandoned as a tool of interpretation and replaced by a complex series of inter-related objective meaning contexts, the number and complexity of which determines the other's anonymity. It is clear that this process is based upon initial direct experience of an instance of the type of action and thus Schutz is describing, not typification, but inductive generalisation which assumes the adequacy of direct experience and overlooks the need to justify the categories in terms of which the individual direct experience is apprehended.

Schutz sees such types as being made part of the stock of knowledge through which the world is interpreted including the face-to-face situation of the we-relationship. However these types can be modified by the we-relationship, that is, typification precedes the we-relationship which is initially typically identified. This raises the problem of what the distinction is between the we-relationship and the anonymous they-



relationship with contemporaries if both are based on typical knowledge especially as the former alone is equated with genuine understanding. Schutz distinguishes between these situations in terms of the greater use of typification in the they-relationship. However we would argue that the difference between these situations is that the face-to-face relationship has a greater variety of typifications available to it than is the case with relationships between contemporaries. We suggest therefore that Schutz has inverted the relationship between typification and anonymity and that anonymity in social relationships is a product of the relative paucity of typical knowledge which is available. Schutz fails to appreciate this because he assumes that typical knowledge is an imprecise derivation of particular perception and thus he does not recognise that all knowledge is based on universal concepts. That is, the particular situation is apprehended by concepts which are not necessarily limited to that situation but which have a potentially infinite range within the ontological realm to which they belong; only thus is the knowledge of novel situations and comparison between situations possible. Schutz's view of the limited role of typification is a product of his perception of types as generalisations from particular instances and not as universals. As a consequence he confuses face-to-face and contemporary social relationships with the perception of an individual and a group respectively. This is shown in his instance of card-playing, cited above, where the change from the contemporary to the face-to-face situation was marked by a change in perception from card-players in general to a particular card-player.

Schutz identifies two types which correspond to his distinction between objective and subjective meaning respectively. The first is the course of action type which describes the typical behaviour. Once this

is established it is possible to construct a personal type, that is a typification of one who is motivated to perform the typical course of action. For instance, Schutz says it is possible to construct a personal type of a postman once we know the postman's job, that is the course of action of a postman.<sup>(64)</sup> Schutz however overlooks the fact that the definition of a postman is a definition of his job and thus a personal type can add to the course of action type only the trivial information that this action is performed by a person. In Schutz's view the distinctive feature of the personal type is that we "imagine the corresponding subjective meaning contexts which would be in (the actor's mind)"<sup>(63)</sup>, which simply means that we imagine that the actor is motivated to perform the action ie. that he has these Acts as his goals. Nevertheless we would suggest that our everyday typifications involve, where appropriate in terms of ego's purpose in typifying the other, a consideration of the actor's motive in the sense of why he performs these particular Acts; that is a reference to intended meaning. Schutz has declared intended meaning to be inaccessible and his account of sociological types, which are basically similar to everyday typifications, deliberately omits any reference to the living actor's intended meanings. Thus Schutz, far from making sociology resemble common-sense, attempts to make common-sense resemble sociology. Further Schutz's account of the relationship between personal and course of action types makes him vulnerable to the criticism which he levelled against Weber of seeing actor's subjective or intended meaning as something which is somehow attached to a course of action. Thus, even for Schutz, intended meaning is a ghost in the machine; a necessary fiction which we accept in order to explain our experiences of other persons.

However it is possible to discern two kinds of personal types used



by Schutz. The first, and most commonly referred to, is the person who is disposed to perform a certain course of action, as in the case of the postman. Thus the course of action defines the personal type. The second personal type derives from Schutz's reference to "miser" as a personal ideal type and is a conceptualisation of actor's dispositions and attitudes, implying a general mode of orientation to the world and in terms of which the course of action type is identified. That is, a personal type which defines the nature of the course of action. It is this latter personal type which alone refers to reasons for the action but it cannot be established by simply looking at objective Acts for such Acts are identified as such and such by reference to the mode of orientation. Thus the nomination of a mode of orientation e.g. 'miser' presupposes a grasp of the other's subjectivity whereas the "postal clerk" type, or objective personal type, is simply a personification of an action and requires no grasp of subjectivity. Only this latter type is consistent with Schutz's claim that intended meaning is inaccessible, but, as has been seen, it simply adds a superfluous ghost in the machine to what is already known concerning the course of action. It is clear that "subjective" personal types such as the miser, should not enter into Schutz's discourse for he sees the process of typification as beginning with the perception of a manifest Act, the motives of which are deduced by identifying the constantly achieved goal of the Act\*, after which an agent is postulated who typically intends the typical Act. Thus the person of the action is, for Schutz, a mere residue and his personal types never leave the objective, that is observer's sphere. Schutz's account completely overlooks the fact that the initial identity of the Act as such and such, which presupposes the reasons for the action and thus the understanding contained in the personal ideal type, ignores the

\* It will be seen that this is a description of goal-rational action i.e. the action is the means to the end or Act; the motive is the Act.

actor's dispositions and replaces them with those of the observer. It could be argued that Schutz is describing here only the methods of everyday life but as will be seen this is basically the same procedure which he advocates for sociology. Further Schutz claims that this account is based solely on the "general thesis", that is on the belief that the other exists, but this account assumes not only that the other exists but that his intentions are identical to those of the observer, and thus we are brought back to the reciprocity of perspectives which Schutz claims to be an unreliable assumption. The alternative position is to accept the behaviouristic implications of Schutz's account and to argue that we see moving shapes about which we can state only what is observable. Any attempts to locate meaning, motive or intention in these shapes must be accepted as the observer's self-projection. The problems associated with this approach have been discussed above, but it is clear that any claim that we interpret or understand these shapes cannot be permitted as such claims assume that there is something other than objective appearance and it is this which is to be understood and interpreted. Thus the 'objective' personal type tells us only how the typifier perceives and identifies the typified action\*. As regards actors' meanings these types are inductive generalisations which assume what they claim to reveal. The 'subjective' personal type is the only one which can tell us about the other, but its possibility cannot be established by Schutz's objectivist approach. This point is recognised by Schutz who states that, "the personal ideal type is itself always determined by the interpreter's point of view. It is a function of the very question it seeks to answer. It is dependant upon the objective

\* The contradiction in this idea, that it arbitrarily grants the observer's meanings a privileged status in accepting that they can be understood by an audience, has been noted above.



context of meaning which it merely translates into subjective terms and then personifies"(65). Nevertheless, Schutz also claims that it is necessary that the use of the ideal type be appropriate to the actor in question. However he does not pursue this point and it is clear that to do so undermines his whole theory. In posing this point Schutz is recognising two factors, firstly, that such types, and this includes sociological types, should be appropriate to the actor and yet there is no means compatible with Schutz's approach of establishing such appropriateness. Secondly, that in assuming that this appropriateness can be established it assumes that the actor's intended meaning can be grasped in some form so as to compare it with the typical meaning of the type which must itself be regarded merely as a hypothesis; to be checked by the test of appropriateness. A similar confusion is shown in Schutz's famous assertion that sociologists construct constructs of actor's constructs. This statement implicitly assumes a direct relationship between actors' and sociologists' constructs, 'that the sociologists' constructs have the actors' constructs as their object. In view of Schutz's analysis, and taking into account our criticisms of the goal-rational model of action used by Schutz, it would be more accurate to say that the sociologist constructs constructs of observable events which he believes to be the object of the actor's constructs.

Nevertheless, Schutz does believe that these types can have their adequacy checked. This is to be achieved in direct social experience<sup>(66)</sup>. We have criticised above Schutz's belief that direct social experience, as he describes it, is reliable and we have considered the problems of questioning actors. We wish to simply emphasise that Schutz's belief that types can be checked by direct social experience makes even more peculiar his assertion that, in the interests of its scientific status

sociology should adopt only the anonymous, they-orientation of indirect social experience.\*<sup>(1)</sup> Indeed Schutz refers to the knowledge of the contents of the other's consciousness believed to be acquired in the we-relationship which modifies the ideal-typical interpretive schemes, "All our knowledge of our fellow men is in the last analysis based on personal experience"<sup>(67)</sup>. Schutz does not explain how such personal experience of the other is possible if we are, as he suggests, limited to knowledge of our own consciousnesses.\*<sup>(2)</sup> It is possible that the knowledge to which Schutz refers in relation to the we-relationship is derived from indications of the other's consciousness but he gives no reason why our interpretation of these indications should be more reliable than ideal typical constructs. Although Schutz affirms that the ideal type is appropriate to the understanding of contemporaries he also claims that even in the direct social relationship we use a stock of personal and course of action types which we vary in order to keep up with change in the other and thus "grasp him in his living reality." This reveals a contradiction in Schutz's conception of the relationship between typification and the face-to-face relationship. He sees the face-to-face relationship as a means of checking the adequacy of typification but, contradictorily, accepts that the face-to-face relationship is itself typically apprehended.\*<sup>(3)</sup> There is a further ambiguity in that Schutz, at times, describes types as inductive generalisations derived

\*<sup>(1)</sup> It should also be noted that, by this argument, Schutz perceives the personal ideal type as a hypothesis.

\*<sup>(2)</sup> This phenomenon of being effected by the other, to which Schutz obliquely refers will be a crucial theme in our revision of phenomenological sociology.

\*<sup>(3)</sup> This confusion is only increased by Schutz's suggestion that the direct relationship commences on the basis of typifications which are then abandoned and replaced by "knowledge - based on personal experience", and indicates Schutz's confusion of generalisations and universal concepts.



from direct experience, hence the persistence of subjective meaning contexts in the type whereas, at other times, he sees it as a hypothesis which is to be verified by reference to direct experience. That is, tautologously, the direct social relationship is both the origin and the test of the type and we would argue that these characteristics are mutually exclusive. That is, if the test is to be a genuine test the datum of the test should not be included in the hypothetical construct, for, if this is the case, the test itself is hypothetical. Also Schutz occasionally sees types as containing hypotheses or as hypothesis generators which indicates that typical understanding is merely provisional<sup>(68)</sup>, which raises the problem of how reliable understanding can be achieved from the sociologist's position as defined by Schutz.

These confusions originate in Schutz's desire to assert a fit between types and the reality to which they refer while also asserting that this reality, the intended meaning, is inaccessible. Thus, he claims that the objective meaning contexts which I use to understand others will show the effects of the original subjective meaning contexts in the actor's mind. This claim is not supported nor is it clear why, if this is the case, it should be necessary to check the type against direct experience. Nevertheless, Schutz asserts that it is necessary that the observer never forget that the typical actor is his construct for there is always the danger, as Schutz expresses it, of the observer substituting his types for those in the mind of the other. Thus, in order to recognise this danger we must know that the other is not as he is typified but this assumes a knowledge of the other which Schutz declares to be inaccessible. Again we see Schutz having to accept that we know the other is intentionally motivated in order to deny that we can know intentional motivations.

## TYPES IN SOCIOLOGY

We have claimed that there is a basic similarity between Schutz's conceptions of everyday types and those of interpretive sociology.

However he claims that interpretive sociology goes beyond everyday understanding by "constructing personal ideal types for social actors which are compatible with those constructed by the latter's partners"<sup>(69)</sup>.

Again this suggests that the adequacy of the ideal-typical they-orientation is dependant on its compatibility with a we-relationship. However, Schutz does not clarify the nature of such compatibility. When he refers to the requirement that the personal ideal types of the partners must be congruent with each other and with the ideal-typical relationship he is asserting no more than that the type should not be self-contradictory.

It is difficult to see how this notion of the sociological ideal type is an advance on common-sense for the latter also strives for non-contradiction.

A further difference between sociology and common-sense, in Schutz's view, is that, as noted above, the sociologist has no we-relationships as sources of knowledge. Thus sociological knowledge is based exclusively on, "constituted ideal objectifications, that is to say on conclusions of thought and never on prepredicative Acts of laying hold of the other person himself"<sup>(70)</sup>. This raises the problem of what such a procedure can tell us about actors in themselves. However Schutz expresses the problem as how a science of subjective-meaning contexts is possible. These problems are not the same because, as used here, subjective meaning context is simply the constitution of the Act in a series of actions and thus does not tell us about the reasons for the enactment of the Act.

Schutz bases his claim that sociological constructs are scientific as opposed to the constructs of everyday life, on the grounds that they accord with the established conclusions of all sciences and explain the



subjective experiences to which they refer in terms of motivation. The claim that sociological ideal types accord with the conclusions of other sciences assumes the relevance of these sciences for sociological understanding. It is necessary to justify this assumption which Schutz fails to do. Further, in so far as these sciences are relevant to sociological understanding, it is possible that their conclusions have been achieved by the same ideal typical method and therefore cannot constitute an independent assessment of the adequacy of this method. Schutz's second point overlooks the reference to motivation in everyday constructs. Therefore reference to motivation is not a distinguishing feature of sociological types.

Schutz recognises that the meaning contained within the ideal type is a theoretically conceived pure type of intended meaning which is attributed to the hypothetical actor. Schutz himself uses meaning in the sense of either intended or ideal typical meaning in a random fashion and thus fails to consider in any depth the relationship between the two. That is, he does not specify whether ideal typical meaning is derived from intended meaning and if so how is this possible if, in his terms, intended meaning is inaccessible and if the sociologist cannot enter into a we-relationship with the actor or whether ideal typical meaning is independent of intended meaning in which case how can it tell us about real actors?

In so far as Schutz expects ideal types to be used in predicting action he clearly expects it to be relevant to our understanding of real actors. If the actual action does not correspond to the ideal type then another type is sought. This, in effect makes the ideal type a hypothesis and Schutz does not tell us how we select the appropriate hypothesis, if more than one ideal type fits the action. As noted above in relation to Rex, this approach overlooks the problem that the ideal type does not

simply explain, but also defines, the action.

Schutz believes that the criteria of meaningful and causal adequacy ensures the relevance and probability of the ideal type, the inadequacies of this argument have been clarified above in relation to Rex, in particular how this approach converts the type into a hypothesis but in so far as the type is constructed according to the perceptions of the observer any coincidence between the type and the action is accidental. However, Schutz meets this objection by claiming that, "there is no distinction between the meaning context of the observer and that of the actor. The reason is simple, if there is a real person corresponding to the observer's postulates then he will by definition intend what the observer has in mind" (71) The problem which Schutz overlooks is that of identifying such a person. Further, in this declaration Schutz, far from using experience as a test of the type, uses the type as a test of experience.

Thus Schutz sees sociological constructs as "objective meaning-contexts of subjective meaning-contexts"(72). In this context this phrase would seem to mean an outsider's view of insider's experience. Thus, social science cannot understand the actor as a real living person but only as one who exists within an impersonal and anonymous objective time of which no-one has or ever can experience(73) and thus it is not the function of the social sciences to understand others in the sense of the inter-personal understanding of the we-relationship. This clearly conflicts with Schutz's earlier statements that sociological ideal types are compatible with those of the actor's partners. It is clear that, in our terminology, this is not understanding but comprehending the other.

Nevertheless Schutz persists in asserting a fit between type and living actors when he claims that objective meaning is constructed out of subjective meaning in which process a sense of objectivity is given to



the actor's meaning through which it may be understood by an observer. However, in the context of typification, Schutz affirms that this process can be understood by an observer only through his own typifying model. Thus, we would argue, the observer understands not a living person but a conceptual model and therefore the actor's meaning is not given a sense of objectivity but is replaced by an objective, ie. observer-originated, construct. For these reasons, Schutz claims the anonymity of the ideal typical actor to be total, although Schutz's notion of anonymity is inadequate. Thus, he states that "businessman" is less anonymous than "consumer" who is anyone and everyone<sup>(74)</sup> and this indicates that Schutz is confusing anonymity with generality. That is a type is increasingly anonymous in direct relation to the number of people who could be included in it. The idea of businessman is different in its lack of personal predicates than is the idea of consumer and this is what anonymity should mean.

The archetypal social sciences for Schutz are economics and jurisprudence<sup>(75)</sup>. Both of these are based on assumptions concerning the goals of actors. The economic actor is motivated by a desire to maximise his economic advantage, the legal actor is oriented towards legal institutions and their definitions. If these sciences are to serve as models for interpretive sociology it is necessary to ascertain the goal of social action. It is probably in order to identify this definitive and common referent of social action that Schutz emphasises the preference of interpretive sociology for rational action. This is a different justification of rational action in sociology than that advanced by Weber but it is no more acceptable. Whereas economics and jurisprudence specify the goal of appropriate action, the idea of rational action as efficient action, which seems to be adopted by Schutz, specifies only the

means of action. In order to claim that we have understood action it is necessary to grasp its goal, for an action can be deemed efficient only by reference to its goal and the means available. Thus whereas economics can ignore the question as to why the individual wishes to maximise his economic advantage, sociology cannot ignore the question of the purpose served by rational calculation.

Schutz's references to jurisprudence\*<sup>(1)</sup> give the clearest indication of the consequences of his approach, thus, "the root of the problem is that the human acts which are the subject matter of jurisprudence have their own immanent subjective meaning which may or may not coincide with the objective meaning that accrues to them in the legal system to which they belong, and by the basic norm postulated by the theory governing the system"(76). This is clearly a case of judging the adequacy of actors' definitions of legal terms by reference to the established rules of jurisprudence. This argument is setting up an objective, ie. codified meaning as a yardstick for the adequacy of subjective meanings, or more precisely, for particular uses of terms established in jurisprudence. Thus, it is assumed that the actors are oriented in their behaviour by the categories of jurisprudence, and the investigation of the actor's behaviour is simply a matter of looking up the official definitions to see if they are using these categories correctly. The situation in relation to sociology is totally different because jurisprudence created the legal world and established the definitions within which legal action occurs. However, sociology did not create the social world, interaction occurs independently from sociology, therefore sociology cannot establish official definitions of the social world, it cannot judge the adequacy of action by its conformity to a sociological type.\*<sup>(2)</sup> Thus

\*(1) It is noticeable that Schutz, like Winch in his search for objective definitions of the social world, regards legal procedure as a suitable model for social action. This legalism has been criticised above re chap.4.

\*(2) Even terms used by sociology frequently have a legitimate non-sociological usage.



some, but not all, the subjective meanings of legal actors can be said to belong to the system of jurisprudence; the same is not true of the relationship between sociology and the subjective meanings of social actors.

It is clear that Schutz overlooked this distinction. Thus he states that "Subjective meaning-contexts are apprehended by means of a process in which that which is scientifically relevant in them is separated from that which is irrelevant"(77). Our previous discussion has shown the reference to science to be gratuitous and in so far as Schutz sees the scientific status of sociology as inhering in its typifications this means that the sociologist accepts those subjective meanings which conform to his type and rejects as unscientific those which do not. This is a clear position of the imposition of the sociological observer's definitions onto those of the actor, justified by a spurious idea of science, and therefore clearly contradicts Schutz's injunction against replacing the social world with a fictional world constructed by the scientific observer(78). Thus far from social reality being the test of the adequacy of sociological constructs as is implied in Schutz's statement that the "primary task of (interpretive sociology) is to describe the processes of meaning-establishment and meaning-interpretation as they are carried out by individuals in the social world"(79), sociological constructs are made the test of social reality.

This process is anticipated in Schutz's categorisation of the personna of the ideal type as a homunculus, a puppet;<sup>(80)</sup> one who has no history, motives or consciousness other than that given by the sociological observer. That is, it is in all probability a self-projection of the observer.\* Thus the sociologist investigates only his own

\* The only real value of this type would be as a problem locator and even here it is not totally satisfactory as the problem is a problem for the observer; it need not be so for the actor. Also, although this type may locate our problems, it is a positive hindrance to their solution in so far as this is oriented towards an understanding of the other.

constructs, in view of our earlier statement that, for Schütz, the initial attempts to understand the other result in the effective abolition of the other and his replacement by a creation of the sociologist's imagination. It is not possible to perceive this as merely the starting point of sociology because Schutz gives no indication as to how this puppet is to be replaced by a perception of the other in himself without breaking his own rules concerning sociology and also abandoning the mode of indirect social observation. Thus the supposed rationality of the ideal type is nothing more than the statement by the sociologist, "if I could reliably understand the other's action it would have to be like this".

The realisation that Schutz eventually treats sociological constructs as real and everyday reality as hypothetical leads us to reconsider the nature of Schutz's conception of everyday interaction. It is clear that Schutz's conception of the everyday world is modelled on his conception of sociology. This is not simply because he equates everyday indirect social observation and the sociological perspective but involves more fundamental reasons. The conception of everyday action adopted by Schutz is that of goal-rational action, which is also his ideal of sociologically comprehensible action. It has been seen that this model totally ignores the role of values and the selection of goals, concentrating on means alone and thus avoids consideration of that which makes the other distinct from self. Further, the conception of interaction between actors is basically the same as the interaction between the sociologist and his homunculus. This is so despite Schutz's reference to such phenomena as growing old together, for although he recognises the existence of such events he cannot account for them, largely because of his declaration that other's intended meaning is inaccessible. This is,



despite the fact that, as has been seen, Schutz does occasionally imply the apprehension of intended meaning. We claim that Schutz used the sociological (homonculus) model as the paradigm for a model of interaction for two reasons. The first, and relatively minor reason is that Schutz describes our apprehension of the other in indirect social observation in exactly the same terms as he describes the nature of the homonculus<sup>(81)</sup>. This may be justified on the grounds that Schutz explicitly adopts indirect social observation as the method of sociology. However our second and major point, although deriving from the first cannot be objected against in this way. This is that throughout Schutz's description of everyday interaction he adopts the model of an active ego confronted by a passive other who simply responds in the appropriate manner to ego's initiatives.

This is precisely the relationship between the sociologist and his "homonculus" and ignores the possibility of the other's initiative or dissension. The model of the everyday social actor which is adopted by Schutz is that of an isolated self-contained individual living in a social world which he has created. The contradiction in this assertion of an isolated individual in a social world is only apparent for although Schutz states that he intends no consideration of the constitution of 'Thou' in the 'I', it is impossible to conduct an enquiry into intersubjectivity without reference to such constitution. If a rigorous analysis of this constitution is not undertaken it will be replaced by taken for granted, inadequately considered assumptions. This is what occurs in Schutz's consideration of intersubjective understanding in which he assumes that the idea of 'Thou' is totally dependant on the constituting activities of 'I'. In such a world there could be no novelty or surprise or learning; in short there could be no others. This is a product of the attitude which seeks to understand the social world by detaching itself from it.

Thus when Schutz affirms the inaccessibility of intended meaning he is simply accomplishing the self-fulfilling prophecy contained in his assumption that we are all isolated individuals.

We have previously noted Schutz's dependance on the reciprocity of perspectives and our clarification of his model of the social world reveals that this reciprocity operates in one direction only. That is, in the reciprocity of perspectives I assume that, for all relevant purposes, the other is like me and also that I am like the other, but in this latter part of the assumption I stay the same. Thus the second half of the assumption is dominated by the first. The other is perceived as being like I, and I believe myself to be like the other, as I have perceived him, that is, like I\*. Thus the idea of the reciprocity of perspectives as used by Schutz resolves the problem of our knowledge of others by seeing 'I' as the model for all others. This is the procedure of ego-aggrandisement which comprehends but does not understand the other. This situation persists not only in the they-orientation which Schutz sees as dealing not with real living persons but with anonymous types which have neither freedom or duration but also in the face-to-face relationship. This relationship is said to be based on ego's in order to motives becoming the because motives of the other. That is it is based on the assumption that the other is contentless, that his only motivations are those given to him by ego and that his plan is simply a delayed copy of ego's plan. There is no possibility in Schutz's analysis of apprehending the phenomenon of ego being affected by the other, of the adaptation of ego's plans to the intrusion of the other upon them as something outside the plan and not entertained within it. That is, the phenomenon of reciprocation is

\* It is significant in this context that Schutz's account of our typical understanding of others e.g. priests and soldiers and farmers "everywhere and at every time" is simply an account of role analysis(82).



absent from Schutz; interaction is solely ego imposing his motivations upon the other who is perceived as passive and totally receptive, one whose consciousness consists only of what ego has placed there. The idea of the other as an independent actor is overlooked.\*<sup>(1)</sup>

There is however one point in Schutz's account of the we-relationship where the other seems to be regarded as an independent actor and this is in his consideration of the criteria for actor's recognition of a social relationship. The first two criteria refer to ego's perception of the other, that is his awareness of being affected by the other or of ego's turning his attention to the other and being aware of the other's turning his attention to ego. In both these cases Schutz claims that it is ego's act of attention which constitutes the relationship. This is inadequate as the idea of the relationship presupposes the other's consciousness as its co-constitutor. Again we see the difficulty of Schutz's attempt to constitute social relationships from a solipsistic perspective. However, Schutz postulates a third mode of ego becoming aware of a social relationship which does not encounter these problems. This is the phenomenon of the formulation by ego of a project which requires the other's attention for its completion. We understand this to mean that the completion of the project is evidence of the other's attention,\*<sup>(2)</sup> although Schutz emphasises that this is concerned only with how a social relationship is generated, but not how it is known. Nevertheless, Schutz considers how ego can become aware of the reciprocation of his other-oriented acts. This is crucial for it conveys the implication of an independent other which, if pursued, would lead to a questioning of the adequacy of the

\*<sup>(1)</sup> This also reveals a weakness in the programme of motivational analysis as outlined by Schutz and this is that this procedure overlooks the derivation of motives from contexts of relevance and evaluation and assumes that the action in question has the same significance for the other as it has for ego.

\*<sup>(2)</sup> A similar idea will be encountered in Scheler and in our notion of intrusion re below chapters 6 and 7,

general thesis of the other as developed by Schutz which results in the perception of the other as a reconstruction of self. However, Schutz fails to come to grips with this problem. He refers vaguely to ego living in or contemplating the other's reciprocal acts but does not tell us how ego sees these acts as originating in another consciousness nor how the other can be seen as initiating or directing action as opposed to merely reciprocating ego's action. Thus Schutz refers simply to "our grasping the fact" of awareness which leads to intentional modifications on the part of actors. This idea is not only unclear but would also seem to be underivable from the general thesis<sup>(83)</sup>.

Thus, we see that Schutz makes his account of sociology plausible as a means of understanding social action by re-defining social action as sociological action. That is, he overlooks the different projects of sociological and everyday life, defines social action as it appears to the Schutzian sociologist and declares that this is how it appears to everyday actors. In doing so he distorts both the projects and experiences of everyday life, in particular the experiences of learning from others, as opposed to learning about them, surprise and novelty. Thus Schutz overcomes the divergence between everyday and sociological conceptions by abolishing everyday life and social actors and treating all subjects as if they were Schutzian sociologists. This is the reciprocity of perspectives with a vengeance.

#### THE NOMINALIST TRADITION

We are now in a position to indicate the principle weaknesses of the nominalist tradition as exemplified in the work of Weber, Winch and Schutz in relation to the problem of establishing intersubjective understanding. It has been seen that this tradition denies the immanent structure of interaction which it attempts to reduce to the level of action. This



results in the perception of social actors as being fundamentally isolated from each other and thus interaction is explained as a fiction created by such actors' taken-for-granted assumptions. When applied to the sociological understanding of action this leads to ego-centrism and ego-aggrandisement in which genuinely understanding others is dependant on their similarity to us. This process reaches its furthest development in Schutz's effective abolition of the social world. Various attempts are made to avoid the consequences of this position and these attempts frequently take the form of the establishment of a world common to both actor and sociologist. However such a world is predicated upon the prior apprehension and real possibility of intersubjective understanding and therefore cannot establish such understanding. Consequently, the notion of a common world tends to become an unclarified adaptation of the common-sense notion of culture. The second device of attaining intersubjective understanding in this situation is to specify the range of understandable action. This takes the form of presenting goal-rational action as the ideal action from the point of view of intersubjective understanding. However, it has been shown that this involves a distortion of action by denying the relevance of values, modes of orientation etc. all those things which define the otherness of the other. Thus the insistence on goal-rational action has been shown to be a device whereby the sociologist can impose his values, perceptions, definitions and modes of orientation onto the actor's situation. This simply leads back to the situation of ego-aggrandisement and the annihilation of others. Therefore, it is noticeable that the supporters of this tradition rely heavily on analogical inference and projective empathy. Those aspects of action, therefore, which do not fit this model are declared to require explanation rather than understanding or are dismissed as irrational.

The tendency in this procedure to replace the social world of others with the sociologist's own perceptions reaches its clearest expression in Schutz who makes the sociologists' constructs the object of sociological enquiry and who defines the social world as if it were a sociological model come to life. Thus, far from testing the adequacy of sociological constructs against the social world, the social world itself is declared to be adequate or inadequate according to its conformity to the sociologist's model. It is significant in this respect that both Schutz and Winch, the latter especially, rely heavily on examples taken from the field of law, as if sociology defines the conditions to which social action must conform if it is to be regarded as proper social action. This attitude is particularly pronounced in Schutz, as testified by his parallel between sociology and jurisprudence.

Thus this tradition understands the social world by replacing it with the sociologist's constructs; it apprehends actors' meanings by abolishing the actors and replacing them with self-projections of the sociologist. This is not understanding but comprehension.

It would be possible to derive from this conclusion the belief that sociology is necessarily limited in this way, that it cannot achieve an understanding of the other in himself. Thus the sociologist can only present an account of how he sees a situation, without making any claims concerning the perceptions of the actors involved in that situation and in the hope, nothing more, that his perceptions will be understood by his audience. We do not accept this conclusion and we will continue our consideration of the problem of intersubjective understanding by considering an alternative tradition in sociology which also does not accept this conclusion and which admits the possibility of, and which attempts to establish, genuine intersubjective understanding. That is, a tradition which does not ultimately limit all knowledge to self-knowledge.



This is the realist tradition.

NOTES

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8. SCHUTZ "THE PHENOMENOLOGY OF THE SOCIAL  
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11. SCHUTZ "THE PHENOMENOLOGY OF THE SOCIAL  
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12. SCHUTZ "THE PHENOMENOLOGY OF THE SOCIAL  
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13. SCHUTZ "THE PHENOMENOLOGY OF THE SOCIAL  
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14. SCHUTZ "THE PHENOMENOLOGY OF THE SOCIAL  
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15. SCHUTZ "THE PHENOMENOLOGY OF THE SOCIAL  
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16.	SCHUTZ	"THE PHENOMENOLOGY OF THE SOCIAL WORLD" op.cit.	p.31
17.	SCHUTZ	"THE PHENOMENOLOGY OF THE SOCIAL WORLD" op.cit.	p.37
18.	SCHUTZ	"THE PHENOMENOLOGY OF THE SOCIAL WORLD" op.cit.	p.37
19.	SCHUTZ	"THE PHENOMENOLOGY OF THE SOCIAL WORLD" op.cit.	p.133
20.	SCHUTZ	"THE PHENOMENOLOGY OF THE SOCIAL WORLD" op.cit.	p.42
21.	SCHUTZ	"THE PHENOMENOLOGY OF THE SOCIAL WORLD" op.cit.	p.42
22.	SCHUTZ	"THE PHENOMENOLOGY OF THE SOCIAL WORLD" op.cit.	p.53
23.	SCHUTZ	"THE PHENOMENOLOGY OF THE SOCIAL WORLD" op.cit.	p.53
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29.	SCHUTZ	"PHENOMENOLOGY OF THE SOCIAL WORLD" op.cit.	p.101
30.	SCHUTZ	"PHENOMENOLOGY OF THE SOCIAL WORLD" op.cit.	p.104
31.	SCHUTZ	"PHENOMENOLOGY OF THE SOCIAL WORLD" op.cit.	p.103
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33.	SCHUTZ	"PHENOMENOLOGY OF THE SOCIAL WORLD" op.cit.	p.106
34.	SCHUTZ	"PHENOMENOLOGY OF THE SOCIAL WORLD" op.cit.	p.104
35.	SCHUTZ	"PHENOMENOLOGY OF THE SOCIAL WORLD" op.cit.	p.104
36.	SCHUTZ	"PHENOMENOLOGY OF THE SOCIAL WORLD" op.cit.	p.115
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41.	SCHUTZ	"PHENOMENOLOGY OF THE SOCIAL SCIENCES" IN KOCKELMANS (ed) op.cit.	p.453
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47.	SCHUTZ	"PHENOMENOLOGY OF THE SOCIAL WORLD" op.cit.	p.109
48.	SCHUTZ	"PHENOMENOLOGY OF THE SOCIAL WORLD" op.cit.	p.106
49.	SCHUTZ	"PHENOMENOLOGY OF THE SOCIAL WORLD" op.cit.	p.169- 170



50.	SCHUTZ	"PHENOMENOLOGY OF THE SOCIAL WORLD" op.cit.	p.167
51.	SCHUTZ	"PHENOMENOLOGY OF THE SOCIAL WORLD" op.cit.	p.210
52.	SCHUTZ	"PHENOMENOLOGY OF THE SOCIAL WORLD" op.cit.	p.210
53.	SCHUTZ	"SOME LEADING CONCEPTS OF PHENOMENOLOGY" in NATANSON (ed) "ESSAYS IN PHENOMENOLOGY" NIJHOFF, THE HAGUE, 1966	
54.	SCHUTZ	"PHENOMENOLOGY OF THE SOCIAL WORLD" op.cit.	p.140
55.	SCHUTZ	"PHENOMENOLOGY OF THE SOCIAL WORLD" op.cit.	p.221
56.	SCHUTZ	"PHENOMENOLOGY OF THE SOCIAL WORLD" op. cit.	p.222
57	For example in SCHUTZ	"PHENOMENOLOGY OF THE SOCIAL WORLD" op.cit.	p.173 - 174
58.	SCHUTZ	"PHENOMENOLOGY OF THE SOCIAL WORLD" op.cit.	p.210
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60.	SCHUTZ	"PHENOMENOLOGY OF THE SOCIAL WORLD" op.cit.	p.222
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62.	SCHUTZ	"PHENOMENOLOGY OF THE SOCIAL WORLD" op.cit.	p.153
63.	SCHUTZ	"PHENOMENOLOGY OF THE SOCIAL WORLD" op.cit.	p.184
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66.	SCHUTZ	"PHENOMENOLOGY OF THE SOCIAL WORLD" op.cit.	p.191

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## CHAPTER SIX

### THE REALISTIC TRADITION IN SOCIOLOGY: SIMMEL AND SCHELER

In the previous two chapters we have been considering the nominalist tradition in sociology, as it relates to the problem of the status of sociological understanding of others, through the work of three of its major protagonists. This approach has been seen to be consistently inadequate as the basis for reliable understanding in sociology; indeed it cannot account for its own faith in the possibility of its being understood by an audience. It has been seen that this approach rejects the idea of an objective reality\* and accepts ego-consciousness as primary. This has been seen to lead firstly to the comprehension of others, rather than understanding, in which the distinctive otherness of the other is denied. This is the situation of ego-aggrandisement in which "I" becomes the model for all others. This is most clearly seen in Schutz who, despite his recognition that this procedure, termed by him the reciprocity of perspectives, is inadequate, has been shown to base his idea of intersubjective understanding upon it. Also, this approach, accepting as it does the primacy of ego-consciousness, does not accept social interaction as a category sui generis but as derived from individual action. This view tends to the reductionism of perceiving interaction as merely a complex of action. As a consequence, reliable understanding, whether in everyday or sociological understanding, is held to be limited to self-understanding. Understanding of others is achieved by either an analogic or empathic self-projection onto the situation of others. Neither of these approaches can establish a genuine understanding of the other and can express only my understanding of the other, not his understanding of himself.

However, it has also been seen that none of the previously

\* By this we mean a meaningful reality which is the same for all subjects and which precedes our individual perceptions.

considered writers is willing to accept the consequences of this argument but believe that our understanding of others is not just an arbitrary self-projection but is somehow related to or is an approximation of the other's self-understanding or intended meaning. Implicitly, this means that the sociologist can be understood by his audience in the sense which he intends himself to be understood. All these writers locate the possibility of such understanding in the existence of a world shared by actors and sociologists. For Winch this is the linguistic community; for Weber, the realm of scientific procedure and for Schutz, the world of objective events. However, we have seen that in all these cases, this shared world is indistinguishable from the idea of culture. This has two consequences. Firstly, cultural consociates are those others who are like I and thus there is no essential difference between understanding self and others. This is a potentially valuable idea but as self is perceived as the mundane, isolated ego this idea becomes a justification for the practise of ego-aggrandisement. Secondly, the idea of a common world, as expressed by these writers, presupposes the achievement of intersubjective understanding. That is, these notions of shared worlds cannot account for intersubjective understanding because they are dependant for their realisation upon the prior achievement of intersubjective understanding. Thus, the possibility of these worlds presupposes that which they should explain ie. intersubjective understanding. Therefore in order to demonstrate that such worlds exist, in the sense which these writers believe them to exist, it is necessary to establish the independent being of intersubjective understanding. We therefore claim that the failure of the nominalist tradition to realise the necessity of intersubjective understanding as a category sui generis, a failure which derives from its reduction of interaction to action, results in its



inability to establish a genuine understanding of others. As a consequence, this tradition fails to admit the existence of others who may be distinctive from self.

### THE REALIST TRADITION

The distinguishing feature of the realist tradition in sociology is that it recognises the non-reducible nature of intersubjective understanding and interaction; that it argues for the existence of an objective reality whose being is not dependant upon acts of individual consciousnesses but which is the predicate of the acts of all conscious beings, including their social acts.\* As will be seen below, this aspect of the realist tradition permits the possibility of reconciling our experience of being both individuals and members of a community, "I" and "We", which proved a major stumbling block of the nominalist tradition. We intend to examine this realist tradition in the context of the work of Simmel and Scheler. However, it must be recognised that this is the least developed of the two traditions and, admittedly, Simmel's allegiance to it is only implicit. Indeed, as will be seen, there is a tension between Simmel's nominalist account of everyday social perception and his realist account of sociological social perception.

### SIMMEL AND SOCIATION

Similar to Schutz, Simmel makes a distinction between everyday and sociological knowledge. Although he implies a much sharper distinction between them than does Schutz, we shall see that Simmel is unable to give a clear account concerning the establishment of sociological understanding of others.

We have claimed that the realistic tradition is concerned to

\*This should make clear that this objective reality is not to be equated with social facts, in the Durkheimian sense, which are the products not the conditions of our intersubjective being.

establish interaction as a category sui generis. This Schutz does in his notion of sociation which is the basic datum of social as opposed to individual existence. It is the unity which is created in interaction. To reduce interaction to discrete courses of action would therefore destroy that unity which is its distinguishing feature. We will consider below the source of this unity but it is necessary to firstly consider how the idea of sociation is used by Simmel to account for the perception of ourselves as being both members of society and at the same time, individuals.

Simmel's account of our everyday apprehension of other's<sup>(1)</sup> is basically similar to that of Schutz. In the act of constituting the social world we perceive the other as an independant actor but although we see the other as independant of our representations, what we see is our representation of him. Therefore, how is it possible that processes of individual consciousnesses are also processes of sociation?<sup>\*</sup> According to Simmel we see the other as a generalised other, not as a distinct individual, and our recreation of the other is determined by our similarity to him. We use our individuality as a means of recognising and identifying the other. In so far as the other has a unique individuality he cannot be perfectly recreated by us and our relations with the other are determined by the degree of incompleteness. We thus orientate our action to our distortion of the other's individuality in this typical apprehension. This argument expresses the same idea of typification as that held by Schutz and Weber in their notion of the ideal type. As such it is inadequate for it cannot account for sociation, that is the experience of belonging to or being united with one whom we perceive as being other. It is clearly erroneous to believe, as Simmel does at this point, that we perceive others only in respect of our similarity to each other, for reflection on everyday experience shows that we can apprehend

\* This implies a psychologistic and relativistic reduction of sociation. This confusion in Simmel's work will be considered further below.



others in respect of their dissimilarity to us. I am not poor but another person's poverty is known to me; it is not a blank space in my perception of him. Thus, this aspect of Simmel's account of apprehending the other can present sociation only as a fiction.

However, our experience of being both individual and social is most clearly explored in Simmel's development of the nature of such typification. He claims that as a consequence of the partiality of typification parts of the individual are not involved in sociation, even to the point where these non-sociated elements determine the type of sociation e.g. the mode of exclusion from society of the stranger, the enemy etc. Therefore no-one is to be totally identified with their social role, as defined by others. Thus Simmel claims that individuals, groups and social situations are differentiated by the degree to which non-socialised and sociated elements co-exist. Therefore, at one extreme are relations of intimacy or of near total identity with the social role; at the other extreme are relations of anonymity e.g. economic exchange where the individual personality is not implicated. This is basically similar to Schutz's distinction between "we" and "they" relationships, although Simmel opposes Schutz in seeing intimacy as involving greatest typification and anonymity least. That is, he, correctly, does not equate typification and anonymity. However Simmel draws a crucial implication from this argument. The presence in action of non-socialised elements of the individual means that the actor can at any time turn away from or dissociate himself from the action by returning to his individuality, that is the aspects of himself not implicated in sociation. Thus "society", the unity between actors, is not all-embracing because actors can stand both inside and outside it. Thus relations can be said to exist between individuals and society for a necessary corollary of being part of a society is the awareness of self as an individual separate from society(2). This is

the basis of our perception of ourselves as being both members of society and free individuals. Thus the whole content of life, which can be explained in terms of social antecedents can also be seen as something exclusively oriented to and part of the individual.

However, there is a tension between this idea and Simmel's prior account of typification. We saw that in his idea of typification Simmel perceives individuality as a residue, that part of self which cannot be known by another because it is outside the "society" created between actors. However in discussing individuation he regards social identity as a variable aspect of individuality. This may support the idea that Simmel's distinction between sociation and individuation is merely one of perspective. That is, individuation is my perception of my self, sociation is my perception of other selves\*. Simmel denies that these two aspects represent differing perspectives although certain of his statements tend to this view. There is good cause for Simmel's denial because the phenomenon which he is concerned with clarifying is the experience of each person that they are at the same time, individual and social, that they exist both for society and for themselves. That is, individuation and sociation are not related to self and other perception respectively but are both equally valid modes of self and other perception. Thus, Simmel argues that our existence is not solely individual or social but is a fusion of the two thus implying that sociation is a distinct category and not derived from individual existence. These are the basic elements which constitute our social being and our capacity of feeling ourselves to be both totally social entities and totally personal entities and which makes possible the distinctive form of human society. Simmel fails to consider in adequate depth the nature of this inter-relationship

\* This view is implicitly found in Schutz and other representatives of the nominalist tradition.



and, as has been seen, he tends to vary between seeing individuation as a product of sociation and sociation as a consequence of individuation.

However Simmel has noted an apparent paradox<sup>\*(1)</sup> of our everyday existence which is our being, at the same time, individual and social. In so far as this paradox is not a contradiction, i.e. that we do not see these aspects as mutually exclusive, we would argue that it is a pointer to the integration of individuals with each other. That is, the fact that 'I' and 'We' are not necessarily contradictory indicates that those others who constitute 'We' are not alien to 'I'. This is not a re-statement of the nominalist idea that others are perceived simply as 'I' there instead of here for this could account only for our perception of a social world consisting of other ego's identical to mine, whereas in recognising our membership of a community with others we recognise that these others are not identical to us but are seen to be distinctive individuals with their respective perceptions and value-orientations, but with whom 'I' form a unity.<sup>\*(2)</sup>

Simmel however pursues the implications of this paradox in relation to the conditions which permit the creation of a society by discrete individuals. It will be noted that, like the writers considered previously, Simmel at this point, unquestioningly accepts the priority of individuality and the derivative nature of inter-subjective existence<sup>\*(3)</sup>.

Simmel derives from the fact of individual uniqueness the idea that society is composed of unequal elements. Equality between individuals does not relate to their total social existence as this would lead to the indistinguishable nature of their respective individualities. Thus,

<sup>\*(1)</sup> The use of paradox is a distinctive feature of all Simmel's work; see his essays on "The Stranger" and "The Secret".

<sup>\*(2)</sup> We are not using unity in the sense of harmony. Embattled enemies are engaged in a unity of interaction with each other.

<sup>\*(3)</sup> This assumption by Simmel, Schutz et al will be challenged below.

being the creation of differing individuals, any society contains irrational and imperfect elements. Nevertheless our everyday social cognition is based on the premise of the pre-established harmony, inter-relatedness and mutual dependence between our individuality and our sociability. This belief, although unfounded, is seen as self-evident and unchallengeable. Social conflict is seen as a frustration, not a denial, of this ideal which is summed up by Simmel in the concept of "vocation", whereby individuals believe that they have a specific relationship to and role in society<sup>\*</sup>. It can be readily seen that this naive assumption provides the model on which functionalist analyses of social relationships are based.

#### POSTULATES OF EVERYDAY LIFE

Thus we can identify two assumptions by which, it is claimed, individuals create a society. These are the reciprocity of perspectives as defined by Schutz and Simmel's idea of vocation. To these we would add two more assumptions which we believe to be naively accepted by the writers so far considered and as such belong to common-sense perceptions. The first of these is the postulate of consistency. That is, naive or ego-centric understanding of the other is based on the assumption that the other's behaviour is consistent in terms of our interpretation of it. The ego-centric approach also resolves the problem of understanding by the postulate of obviousness. That is, the belief that there is no inherent problem in the other's behaviour. This assumption retrieves the breakdown of the reciprocity of perspectives for it is believed that although the other may perform an action which is so different from mine

\* It is possible that Schutz is describing here the roots of alienation. That is, the condition created when this basic assumption is frustrated and the sense of individual uniqueness and individual value for society is lost.



as to appear odd or weird, there was a reason or cause for the action which, if made plain would be understandable to me as the obvious cause of the action. This postulate is the basis of the method of empathic projection whereby it is held that although an action is odd in the sense that I would not do it, if I did do it it would be for a certain reason. The puzzling action is thereby made reasonable, that is, it is obvious that the other performs the action for the same reason because this is the only sensible cause of action. Thus the postulate of obviousness asserts the accessibility, though not the acceptability, of the other's action. Therefore any confusion concerning the action is temporary and can be resolved by e.g. the method of empathic projection which is effective in this situation because, for reasons cited above\* (1) it cannot be falsified and because its aim, in everyday life, is not to aid understanding of the other but to de-mystify his action. My actions are not seen as problematic so I identify the other's action with my motivations if the action were mine\*(2). Just as the postulate of vocation leads to functionalism, so it can be seen that the postulates of consistency and obviousness lead to rationalist reductionism.

This could be considered the end of our critique of the nominalist tradition for, up to this point, Simmel's analysis of social action has been in some parts similar to those already considered. The major realistic category in his account has been the idea of sociation, the unity of interaction, as the basic datum of social life which cannot be reduced to the level of individual action and it is this alone which permits his distinction between unity of individual and community.

However, we have seen that in his account of everyday understanding of the other Simmel tends to slip into that unquestioning acceptance of the priority of individual over social being, which typifies the nominalist

\*(1) re chapter five.

\*(2) The significance of the idea of believing that we know the motives of another's action even though we would not accept such motives in our own action will be shown in our idea of intrusion, re below chapter 7.

position. Nevertheless in his account of sociation as the subject matter of sociology Simmel clearly adopts the realistic perspective and seeks to establish intersubjective knowledge on an entirely immanent basis, which does not require assumptions concerning, or reduction to the level of, individual consciousness. This purely intersubjective realm of knowledge is articulated by Schutz in his development of the distinction between form and content in social interaction.

### FORM AND CONTENT

It has been noted that sociation is regarded by Simmel as the basic datum of social life. In defining the role of sociology he distinguishes between two components of sociation; these are form and content. The least important of these two aspects in terms of the sociological perspective, as defined by Simmel, is content which is made up of individual action systems e.g. drives, motivations, emotions and knowledge. Such contents are not, in themselves, social. They are made part of the social world by being structured in a form. Sociology, as the study of society is unique among the social sciences in being concerned with form in general rather than with particular contents.

It has been claimed that Simmel's notion of form is simply an unclear version of Weber's nominalist notion of the ideal type<sup>(3)</sup>. We intend to show that this view is incorrect and that Simmel's idea of form is basically realistic and is novel in interpretive sociology.

The nature of Simmel's distinction between form and content shows that form is the basis of society which cannot therefore be reduced to the level of separate individual action systems ie. contents. However, as will be seen below, Simmel's ambiguous references to psychological reduction could be interpreted as contradicting this view.

Simmel is unclear on the precise nature of forms but he defines them in terms of two characteristics. They are the constants in sociation



and they are the principles of unification and organisation of contents. Simmel's adherence to neo-Kantianism is shown in his perception of contents as structureless and forms as empty. Thus the distinction between them is analytic. We can only experience forms filled with content, we can only experience contents structured by form. Therefore, form and content cannot be experienced in themselves. Thus Weingartner<sup>(4)</sup>, criticises the idea of using phenomenological analysis to grasp pure contents, "for we cannot know a content outside a mental act; therefore contents are only approached, not arrived at, by an analysis of experience". This criticism indicates a misunderstanding of phenomenology for mental acts, in the sense of intentions, are its subject-matter<sup>\*(1)</sup>.

We have discussed forms as if they were real and not simply arbitrary constructs of individuals. We would argue, that Simmel in fact sees them as real. We can note two features so far discussed which support this view. Firstly, Simmel identifies contents alone as belonging to individual consciousnesses and he emphasises the idea that forms persist when individual actors come and go. Thus, it would seem, forms are not products of individual consciousness. Secondly he identifies form as the subject matter of sociology. We have argued that nominalism regards its ideal types as analytic tools, although in Schutz it would appear that the sociologist can study only these types. Simmel however equates form with the objective reality of social phenomena<sup>(5)</sup>. Thus he refers to social relations which receive "a relatively stable external form"<sup>(6)</sup>. It is important to note that social relations receive, they do not create or achieve, form. Society exists only through the forms of interaction, therefore form is sociation<sup>\*(2)</sup>. The term society as commonly used is,

\*<sup>(1)</sup>It is interesting that Weingartner places Simmel in between Kantianism and phenomenology and sees this aspect of Simmel's philosophy as the point of separation between him and Husserl.

\*<sup>(2)</sup> There is some confusion in Simmel as to whether form is equivalent to sociation or whether it is the foundation of sociation.

from the viewpoint of formal sociology, a general concept referring to all forms. There is no society as such, there is no interaction as such, there are only forms of interaction. Forms are the permanent element in sociation. They cannot be equated with any particular, historical realisation and have a validity independent of their historical appearance. Formal structure exerts a constraint on action and transcends culture. Thus no culture is entirely free to define its formally typical situations. The difference between the idea of form and Simmel's account of everyday typification is obvious.

The independence of forms from history and culture leads Simmel to posit the idea of the pure form. This must not be confused with Weber's ideal or pure type for although Simmel is not exhaustive in his consideration of the pure form certain relevant points emerge. As with the ideal type the pure form is grasped by exaggerating certain features of the historical appearance. However, the selecting principle in the construction of the pure type is not the interests of the observer but the "intrinsic evidence" of the form itself. Secondly, as has been seen Simmel clearly accepts that pure forms do exist. Thus it would be more accurate to refer to the sociologist discovering rather than constructing pure forms. Simmel therefore refers to the purpose of sociology as the cognition of typical laws referring to the necessary structure and relations of reciprocal orientations or forms.

It must be admitted that Simmel no more demonstrates the real existence of forms than Weber demonstrates the arbitrary nature of ideal types and it is therefore necessary to consider the method by which the nature of such forms are to be revealed. However, before this subject is discussed it is necessary to consider a major implication of the argument so far for Simmel's theory as a whole.



We have noted a tension, if not a confusion, between nominalist and realist interpretations of sociation in Simmel's discussion of the nature of social reality. When considering everyday typification Simmel saw sociation, not as an objective category, but as achieved by actor's through their individual typifications. Thus we interact with our idea of the other. However, in discussing the phenomenon of our being both individuals and members of society, Simmel regards sociation as a category in itself which is not dependent on or derived from individual consciousness. Thus our social being is as real and distinct as our individual being. Similarly in his discussion of the sociological perspective on social existence Simmel maintains the realistic position of defining sociation as having independent and objective meaning by identifying it with the forms of social life which are real, which constrain action and which are therefore, the origin of our social being.

There are three possible ways of overcoming this confusion. The first, nominalistic position, is to argue that forms are arbitrary creations of consciousness, that is they do not give us definitive knowledge concerning things-in-themselves, but that as we all, as cultural consociates, think alike we use the same forms and therefore sociation is possible as the product of the coincidence of individual consciousnesses. The inadequacies of this approach have been noted above particularly the fact that it assumes knowledge that there is an extra-mental reality, a world of phenomena, including other persons, in order to prove that such a reality is not knowable. Also this idea is not compatible with Simmel's idea of a real, pure form which is independent of its various historical and individual realisations, or with his assertions of the real existence of forms for, as has been seen, Simmel's account of the genuineness of our social being is based on the real existence

of forms. Further the nominalist idea, while denying knowledge of other minds contradictorily asserts that other minds construct reality in the same way as I do.

The second and purely realistic approach is to deny that the typifications of everyday life are inherently arbitrary or constructed but that they intend the objective quality of the social relationship, that is, the form. The problem for the actor therefore is not how he chooses to construct the other but how he is to ensure the fulfillment of the intention and a correct identification of the qualities exhibited by the other in the social relationship. The role of sociology in such a situation is to clarify and make available these objective qualities. This is not a satisfactory description of Simmel's position because he clearly sees everyday typifications, unlike forms, as distortions which reveal, not the objective social relationship, but our representation of the other. Nor can it account for the fact that knowledge of the forms is not part of everyday knowledge.

The final resolution of the problem is a synthesis of these two positions, although it tends towards the realistic interpretation, and is adapted from Husserl. This is the argument that the use of the nominalist model is appropriate in relation to everyday perception because it reflects the naive ego-centrism of that perception. The realist model is appropriate in discussing the forms of interaction and sociation as apprehended by sociology because a radical, rigorous reflection has revealed the objective nature of these phenomena. This argument maintains Simmel's distinction between constructed, distorting everyday typifications and the sociological apprehension of forms as real structures of sociation. However this argument depends on the demonstration of a method which establishes such forms and their role in structuring sociation,\* thus

\*It is our intention to use this final position as the basis of our account of the nature of phenomenological sociology.



maintaining the integrity of the notion of sociation. This, therefore, raises the question of the nature and adequacy of Simmel's method of apprehending forms. It will be seen that this is the weakest part of his programme for sociology.

Simmel's neo-Kantianism is also apparent in this aspect of his work. Although Simmel does not doubt the real existence of pure forms they become the "ding-an-sich" of his theory. This is because Simmel claims that it is impossible to positively isolate forms because they always appear in a historical context. Thus we can attempt to apprehend the pure form only through the inductive procedure of comparing various historical situations\*. Thus Simmel is forced into the contradiction of asserting that forms exist but that they can never be the object of reliable knowledge. In which case, it would seem to us, that there are no grounds for asserting their independent and necessary existence as against the possibility of their non-existence and their being merely figments of imagination. This problem results in Simmel placing the same restrictions on sociology which Kant placed on philosophy. That is, there can be no means of teaching formal analysis, in certain situations formal analysis is impossible and, finally the formal viewpoint can, for the present, be conveyed only by examples. There is also the more serious problem that Simmel's failure to isolate the pure form means that the integrity of his basic concept of sociation is compromised.

The method which Simmel advocates for revealing forms is thus inductive. Tenbruck<sup>(7)</sup> notes that this process must rely on "something else" for the selection and exaggeration of the features of the historical situation. It is significant in relation to the interests of this thesis that Tenbruck sees the pure form as composed of essential and typical

\* Comparison of various historical situations presupposes identification of these situations as being of the same type. That is, it presupposes knowledge of the pure form.

features<sup>(8)</sup>. Simmel himself notes that forms cannot be revealed by logical procedures alone and that it is necessary to adopt, at least temporarily, a procedure of intuition no matter how odious it might be. Thus, at least initially, Simmel bases the apprehension of forms on intuition, thus qualifying his dependance on inductive procedure although it is unlikely that he had in mind the Husserlian idea of rigorous intuition.

A consideration of the relationship between forms reveals further confusions. Simmel distinguishes between different levels of forms ranging from the simplest, e.g. concepts, to the complex world-form, e.g. common-sense, art, religion etc., which are in theory capable of organising all contents and lower-level forms into a single system. Simmel distinguishes between form and content on the grounds that form structures content and content is that which is structured or organised by forms. The admission that forms structure other forms reveals that the form-content distinction is not qualitative as Simmel infers because any element in sociation, with the exception of simplest contents and world-forms, can be both form and content. That is, if a concept is used to locate an experience it organises that experience and thus is form. However, if this same concept is part of a wider theory it is organised by that theory and thus is content. Thus the supposed form-content distinction is merely an assessment of the function of the phenomenon in relation to other phenomena. Thus the distinction which Simmel drew between form and content as the basic elements of sociation collapses into incoherence.

This confusion is repeated in a crucial aspect of Simmel's analysis. Contents were initially defined as components of individual action systems, forms were defined as the inherently social aspect of sociation. Thus the social interaction of individuals is formally structured. This



raises the question of where forms originate. If the two individuals are not involved in interaction there is no form, but on their interacting a form is realised; where did it come from? Thus Simmel encounters the besetting problem of all realisms which is to locate the real elements. Simmel's answer to this question indicates the breakdown of the form-content distinction for he apparently locates forms in individual consciousness which is, as has been seen, the distinguishing feature of contents. This view further implies the untenability of sociation as a basic datum and the reduction of sociology to individual psychology, thus raising once again the problem of how society is possible. However, it is our contention that Simmel's attitude to this problem can be understood in an alternative and more fruitful fashion. Thus, it is necessary to consider Simmel's attitude to psychological reductionism.

It is clear that forms are not to be understood in the sense of Platonic ideas which inhabit a super-human realm. Thus Weingartner states that "the content of cultural products is that which is experienced by their creators; the formal characteristic of such objects is a function of the structuring power of human experience"\*(10). This locates forms in human experience but does not rule out the possibility that, despite Simmel's assertions to the contrary, forms are arbitrary constructs of actors. Similarly, Simmel asserts that all social processes are based in minds and that sociation is therefore a psychical phenomenon. Thus psychic phenomena do not simply bear external relations but are their essence, that which, "really and solely interests us."(11)

Nevertheless Simmel refuses to accept the inevitability of the

\* This statement indicates a possible resolution of Simmel's two models of social understanding. That is, that actor's experience only contents. However, it does not make clear how sociologists are able to experience forms as well as contents; also it involves the contradiction of stating that forms are components of experience but are not experienced.

reduction of sociation to psychology, although the reasoning behind the objection is unclear. Simmel proposes two arguments in this context, without distinguishing clearly between them. Firstly, that sociology and psychology adopt different perspectives on the same phenomena. Secondly, that the phenomena studied by sociology and psychology are different. Simmel clarifies this point by citing the situation of a geometrician who draws a figure on a blackboard. The object of his interest is the idea of the figure expressed in the drawing. It would, however, be possible for a physicist to describe this drawing in terms of the composition of the chalk marks but this in no way compromises or comments upon the geometrical idea. Thus, although the geometrician's and physicist's enquiries are represented by the same object they are different and independent. If Simmel is applying this argument to the relationship between psychology and formal sociology it is necessary that he specify the distinctive nature of consciousness for sociology.

That Simmel does make such a distinction is shown in his statement that when the whatness of an act has been isolated "we obtain an objective mental content which is no longer anything psychological... A content is the objective element of a mental act which is independent of the quality of the act"(12) although this would appear to require the modification of Simmel's assertion that social phenomena are basically psychic. Thus Simmel seems to be arguing that formal sociology studies the social aspect of consciousness, that is not the social acts of individual consciousness but the inherently social nature of consciousness in general. This idea is similar to Husserl's distinction between psychological phenomena and consciousness. Thus, forms and objective contents of mental acts do not belong to individual psychology but to consciousness in general. Therefore, they are common to all social actors. This view is supported



by Tenbruck<sup>(13)</sup> who sees sociation as belonging to a special layer or level of consciousness which is not part of the individual action system. This would mean that for Simmel, the processes of consciousness which constitute sociation belong to the sphere of sociation. They are the possession of individuals but are possessed equally and identically by all individuals; they are "ours" rather than "mine". Thus, the synthesis in consciousness between the psychological data of different consciousnesses is not itself psychological but inherently social or, rather, intersubjective. Thus the idea of sociation as a basic datum is preserved.

In view of Simmel's adherence to neo-Kantianism it has been generally accepted that social forms are a priori structures of consciousness and are therefore distinguished from psychological data. It would appear that Simmel resolves the problem of how general and intersubjective forms can structure particular and individual contents by locating them both in consciousness. This is an intriguing idea but it simply changes the context of the problem rather than resolving it. Thus, we would need to know how the a priori structures of consciousness are integrated with mundane, individual consciousness or how consciousness can be general and individual\*. Also Simmel's assertion that pure forms cannot be reliably known, leads to the peculiar conclusion that the means by which we know are themselves unknown therefore how can we know that they are a priori for all subjects? This raises the problem of the reliability of formal structures. Simmel simply accepts that forms are in contact with the contents of individual action systems but fails to demonstrate that the a priori conveys phenomena in themselves. That is, he fails to show that forms do not distort content. It is our contention that these problems

\* The fact that this question can be asked suggests that Simmel shifts the problem of the congruity of our social and individual being from the level of everyday existence to that of consciousness but fails to resolve it in relation to this latter level.

can be overcome within the phenomenological framework, especially through a consideration of transcendental consciousness; this will be developed below.

Simmel's value for a resolution of the problem of intersubjective understanding is that he shows that this problem can be overcome only on the level of intersubjectivity. That is, in order to account for and achieve reliability in intersubjective understanding it is necessary to demonstrate that intersubjectivity is a reliable datum in itself and not reducible to other phenomena e.g. action. Hence the importance of his justification of the concept of sociation. Further, Simmel also demonstrates that this quest requires the reliability of our understanding in general, hence his attempts to locate intersubjective understanding in a priori and universal structures of consciousness. Hence also his attempts to demonstrate that the categories which provide such understanding are themselves intersubjective. Thus we find in Simmel the reasons for the rejection of the primacy of individual action in the sphere of intersubjectivity and a recognition that our knowledge of others in sociology, must be a genuine grasp of the other and not our representation of him. This latter goal is seen as fulfilled by Simmel in the dual role of the form as that which makes action social and that which is basic to our acts of social knowledge. That is, Simmel seeks to establish sociology as a genuine study of interaction and intersubjectivity by demonstrating a synthesis between the foundations of social knowledge and social interaction; the same categories are used and are used by all in our thinking socially and acting socially.

Simmel's programme is inadequate because of the incoherence of his key distinction between form and content, because of the problems connected with perceiving forms as Kantian a priori categories and crucially because



of his almost total neglect of methodology. Thus even if the form content distinction could be salvaged and the intersubjective reliability of formal categories demonstrated we would not know how to identify forms or apply them in sociological analysis. Nevertheless Simmel clearly demonstrates the course which must be taken in order to achieve genuine intersubjective understanding within sociology. Our attempts to realise this goal within the phenomenological programme will follow Simmel's prescriptions concerning the nature of the requirements for achieving this goal although not his attempts to fulfill these requirements.\*

It is our contention, as we intend to demonstrate below, that the realistic approach which we have discerned in Simmel can be fully utilised only by replacing his Kantian approach with phenomenology. It is therefore appropriate at this point to consider the existing realistic approach to intersubjective understanding within the phenomenological perspective in the work of Max Scheler.

#### SCHELER AND NON-RELATIVISTIC INTERSUBJECTIVE UNDERSTANDING

Whereas Simmel is primarily concerned with the structure of social understanding, Scheler is concerned with the problem of the epistemological status of our knowledge of others. In particular, and in conformity with the phenomenological ideal, he wishes to establish the possibility of a non-relativistic intersubjective understanding and thus directly opposes those theories which attempt to base such understanding on analogical inference and empathic projection. In developing his argument Scheler draws a crucial distinction between our knowledge of the existence of other subjects and our knowledge about their subjectivity. We will commence our analysis by considering Scheler's argument concerning our knowledge of the existence of other subjects.

\* It may be said of Simmel that his work is widely respected but little used. One of the few contemporary sociologists whose work could be considered to be in the Simmelian tradition is Goffman.

Scheler accepts that knowledge of self in others necessitates a prior awareness of self derived from one's own case but denies that this makes knowledge of others a product of self-consciousness. He also accepts, as do many phenomenologists, that our knowledge of others is directed towards the unity of their animated body; the ideas of an outer physical life and an inner consciousness is an analytic distinction based on a prior grasp of this unity. Finally, Scheler claims that our knowledge of others should be understood in relation to essential group forms, thus indirect knowledge presupposes direct knowledge of others. Our knowledge of others is stated to be limited by what cannot be construed (ie. understood) and by the other's sphere of personal privacy\*. The tautology in this statement is obvious, it simply rephrases but does not resolve the problem of how we discern the limits of intersubjective understanding. The degrees of intelligibility of understanding are closely connected to the relevant form of group-relationship e.g. friendship, ties of marriage, clan, nation etc.<sup>(14)</sup>

Thus far, Scheler offers nothing new concerning our understanding of others, what is surprising is that Scheler, from this position, develops a non-relativistic conception of intersubjective knowledge. Thus, he criticises previous attempts to establish our intersubjective knowledge on the grounds that they have been appropriate only to a certain type of community, viz. the community of educated North Europeans, and thus have only a relative validity within the particular group-structure. Therefore, implicit in this criticism, Scheler is asserting that our everyday knowledge of others is a function of our group identity with the other but that our knowledge of the process of gaining knowledge of others is not limited in this way. Such knowledge applies with equal validity,

\* The idea of a purely personal sphere of the individual is related to our notion of typification, see below.



in our view, to all instances of group defined knowledge, as the grounds of the possibility of such relativistic knowledge. Thus, Scheler states that a recognition of the relativism inherent in previous theories "does nothing, of course, to imply that such relative theories are all we can look for. On the contrary there is certainly an absolute theory as well".(15) \*(1) Scheler's analysis also indicates that such an absolute grasp of intersubjective knowledge must be applicable to all social modes of knowing and therefore independent of and prior to these modes. Thus, Scheler does not deny the existence of social limitations on intersubjective knowledge but denies the fundamental nature of such limitations. That is, arguing on the basis of the inherent absurdity of relativism, he perceives such limited knowledge as a pointer to the existence of an absolutely valid knowledge of others in terms of which alone, however unclearly perceived, we can recognise these particular modes as partial \*(2)

#### KNOWLEDGE OF OTHERS

Scheler identifies three inadequate approaches concerning our knowledge of the existence of other selves, these are objectivism, idealism and the derivation of such knowledge from the phenomenon of ethical duty. Objectivism is similar to the attitude which we identified in Schutz, which seeks to account for our knowledge of the other's existence by reference to certain objective data which are seen to be products of other consciousnesses. As Scheler points out, this approach necessarily begins by assuming what it should demonstrate, that is that there are other minds which are accessible and communicable to us in an

\*(1) This assertion of an absolute theory probably derives from Husserl's demonstration of the necessary inadequacies of all relativisms re above chap.

\*(2) This parallels Scheler's sociology of knowledge in which he saw the social specific ideas or Weltanschauungen as "functionalisation" or splinterings of the absolute Weltanschauung. In Scheler's view, material forces are like "sluice gates" which permit certain aspects of the absolute Weltanschauungen to flourish and inhibit the development of other aspects(17) Thus his statement, "There are many different truths but they all spring from the one ultimate realm of ideas and value orderings"(16)

intelligible fashion. Equally, such an approach cannot justify its perception of certain objective phenomena, and not other data, as being the product of consciousness without again assuming what it should demonstrate. Even if this approach could justify its selection of conscious data, it cannot encompass the deliberate with-holding of expression by subjects. This is as much a conscious act as is overt behaviour, and is distinct from doing nothing.

The opposite position to objectivism is termed epistemological idealism by Scheler, in which category he includes Husserl. This approach, like objectivism, fails to account for intersubjective knowledge and thus its supporters must either accept intersubjectivity as an unaccountable miracle (the leap from "I" to "Thou") or else lapse into solipsism or adopt the inexplicable view that within consciousness in general there should still be awareness of individual consciousness.\*<sup>(1)</sup>

The last tradition criticised by Scheler is that deriving from Kant and Fichte which sees the consciousness of duty as the core of the Pure Ego and which argues for the existence of other selves as objects of this duty. Scheler rejects this approach because of its fallacious identification of the good and the existent but it is from this tradition that Scheler derives his resolution of this problem. In Scheler's view such moral acts demonstrate "that the community is in some sense implicit in every individual"<sup>(18)</sup> ie. that duty is based on an other-directed intentional act. Thus the social bond is an intrinsic part of the individual and the existence of values is seen as evidence of our social existence, presumably, on the dubious grounds that value-orientations are possible only if others exist in a community with us. Thus Scheler redefines values as patterns of sympathetic attitudes.\*<sup>(2)</sup> Developing this theme of the role of an

\*<sup>(1)</sup> The final idea criticised here is similar to that which we will develop below. We intend to show that Scheler's criticism is misplaced and, indeed, that his account of intersubjectivity also encounters this problem.

\*<sup>(2)</sup> This is the basis of Scheler's criticism of those, such as Weber, who believe that value and existence are separable.



other-directed duty in intersubjective awareness, Scheler claims that even the totally isolated individual would be led to postulate a community of which he was a member by a consciousness of emptiness in respect of his intentional acts. This emptiness would be felt when the individual engaged in "intellectual or emotional acts which can only constitute an objective unity of meaning in conjunction with the possibility of a social response"(19)\*. This sense of intentional non-fulfillment would lead him to posit a sphere of the Thou with which he is unacquainted. The crucial point made by Scheler is that the evidence for the existence of the other precedes the fulfillment of the act. We would qualify this argument by stating that the non-fulfillment of certain of the isolated individual's intentional acts would lead him not to posit the real existence of others but to posit the qualities of that which is absent from his experience and whose presence would fulfill these intentions.

Scheler fails to note this distinction and as a result his argument is vulnerable to the knock-down objection that he confuses real and desired existence. However, an overhasty acceptance of this objection would cause us to overlook the truth in the argument. While it would be true to say that a starving man's desire for bread does not, directly, create bread, his intention is such that he knows the desired object before he experiences it. That is, eating bread is a fulfillment of the qualities of the previously intended object. Thus, the isolated individual's intentions which remain unfulfilled because of his isolation do not create other consciousnesses but establish the qualities of that which is necessary for the intention to be fulfilled i.e. the presence of another consciousness. Thus fulfillment of the intention is evidence of the presence of another conscious subject. Thus, the isolated individual's

\* At this point, Scheler's argument is similar to that advanced by Schutz re above chapter 5.

experience of another conscious subject would simply be an existential grasp of what was already ideally known.

It could be argued that our development of Scheler's argument makes the same mistake as that made by Husserl and Schutz of attempting to achieve intersubjectivity from the solipsistic position. However, the effect of Scheler's argument is to establish firstly the inherent incompleteness of the solipsistic situation which is completed by attainment of a community with others and secondly, the fact that the isolated individual is isolated existentially but not intentionally. That is, the idea of an intersubjective community is not achieved in the solipsistic situation by a projection of that situation but that the recognition of the necessity and evidences of a community is engendered by the incongruity between the individual's solipsistic situation and his intentions within that situation. Thus, social existence is found within the solipsistic situation in the intentional acts of the individual. Therefore, far from Scheler attempting to achieve evidence of intersubjectivity by some miraculous leap from the solipsistic position, our development of his argument shows, by separating knowing and experiencing, that evidences of intersubjectivity are necessarily contained within the solipsistic situation of a conscious, ie. intentionally-directed subject. This indicates the priority of intersubjectivity for Scheler, an idea which becomes more explicit in his consideration of the status of our knowledge about other minds. However, before considering this aspect of his work it is necessary that we make clear that Scheler is not claiming that the idea of community is an innate idea. We understand Scheler to be arguing that certain experiences lead to the recognition of community and that such recognition is inevitable because these experiences are rooted in the nature of our intentional activity. Thus, for Scheler, the



world of community with other subjects is an independant sphere of essential being and as such it is given prior to the positing of any object within it.

#### KNOWLEDGE ABOUT OTHER SUBJECTS

It follows from his establishment of the incompleteness of the solipsistic situation that Scheler sees the problem of the status of our knowledge about the acts of other subjects as engendered by the assumption that each of us sees our own experiences as primary but that only a few of these experiences relate to other subjects. This raises the problem of how we distinguish between experiences related to self and those related to others and how these latter experiences succeed in making us acquainted with the others' existence and experiences. In this context, Scheler discusses and rejects theories of analogical inference and empathic projection for similar reasons to those given above\*. In developing his criticism of these positions Scheler declares that we grasp the other as a person not as a sum of experiences or a consciousness in general or in terms of a dualistic mind-body distinction. By uniting this claim with the idea that intentional experiences are evidences of the other self, Scheler concludes that I do not apprehend mere isolated experiences but, "the individual's mental character as a whole in its total expression"(20) It is therefore necessary to consider how Scheler justifies this claim to direct, personal knowledge of the other.

It has been noted that Scheler objects to the idea of consciousness in general but it is clear that he accepts the idea of a common consciousness. The difference between these two ideas is that the first is an aggregate consciousness, like Durkheim's "conscience collective", whereas the second is a universal, non-individuated mode of knowing. However,

\* re chapter 3, 4 and 5, passim.

if reliable and basic knowledge about other conscious subjects is to be acquired it is necessary to demonstrate the priority of common consciousness and that it does not exclude the possibility of individual consciousness. It is clear that Scheler understands these problems in a purely temporal sense. That is, the common-consciousness is, in Scheler's view, our first mode of knowing. However, he fails to demonstrate the existence or nature of this common consciousness being satisfied to repeatedly assert its reality<sup>\*(1)</sup> in the phenomenon of sympathy. About the only argument advanced by Scheler in this respect is his re-interpretation of child development theory and notions of the savages pre-logical mentality. That is, having understood this common-consciousness to be temporally prior Scheler seeks to establish its predominance in those whose mental state he regards as undeveloped.

However, the temporal identity of the common-consciousness is significant in that Scheler uses it to overcome the problem of how we can possess both common and individual consciousness, "We" and "I". That is, in childhood our consciousness is common, non-individuated but in the course of our development "stable vortices" emerge within this common consciousness, these are individual consciousness. There are two problems with this account. Firstly, Scheler identifies common-consciousness with our earliest stage of development. Therefore it would appear that any sympathetic grasp of others would be related solely to experiences of this stage. Therefore, it could not tell us anything about the other in respect of his experiences once this common consciousness had been outgrown.

\*(1) Nevertheless, in the course of these claims, Scheler points to the groundlessness of the belief entertained by common-sense and the empathic and analogical theories that whereas our own self is given to us, only the other's bodily appearance is given to us. The implications of this idea will be pursued below.

\*(2) Scheler's temporal account of common consciousness has the effect of making such consciousness temporary.



Secondly, Scheler confuses non-individuation and communality and in so doing overlooks the distinction between consciousness in general and common consciousness. Non-individuation is the situation of non-awareness of selfhood but communality is a unity of selves. That is, our non-individuated understanding cannot contain the idea that we understand other selves, as Scheler admits in his statement that this understanding is based on a flow of experience which is "undifferentiated as between mine and thine" which actually contains both our own and other's experiences, intermingled and without distinction from one another".<sup>(21)</sup> It is this phenomenon which is the heart of the problem of intersubjective understanding; how we can understand others and yet still perceive them as being different from self, that is how we can understand others without destroying their otherness. It is clear that Scheler's account does not distinguish between awareness of self and awareness of others but between an ignorance of self-hood as such and knowledge of our own self. Thus, making the opposite error to that of the nominalists, Scheler attempts to understand the other by abolishing self, but he does not abolish the individual self as such but the general phenomenon of self-hood. Thus, if a recreation of the state of primal innocence such as posited by Scheler is able to give us understanding it cannot be understanding which is seen to refer to other selves\*. Nevertheless Scheler is justified in criticising the procedure which we have located in the nominalist tradition of constituting the other's experiences from our own acts onto which we then impute

\* It could be argued, although Scheler does not do so, that understanding the other is a purely pragmatic problem. That is, we assume our ability to grasp the other's consciousness and plan our action on the basis of this understanding or in other terms, we make predictions concerning the future behaviour of the other. If our plans or predictions are fulfilled then our understanding of other can be regarded as adequate. It should be noted that this argument establishes only the subjective adequacy, not the inter-subjective accuracy of understanding. This may satisfy the projects of common-sense but it cannot fulfill the sociological project of understanding the other in himself. Further this argument overlooks the problem that the future behaviour which is used as a test is itself problematic and must be interpreted before it can comment on the accuracy of understanding. This would presumably involve making further predictions ad infinitum.

foreignness. Also, his notion of achieving understanding of the other by abolishing our own self, will, with modifications, constitute the starting point of our account of reliable intersubjective understanding. Thus Scheler notes a fundamental error of everyday understanding which is the tendency to see others' experiences as our own rather than our own experiences as other, that is a failure to recognise that although the experience belongs to the other it could also belong to me. However, Scheler answers the question as to how we can experience other minds by merely asserting that inner perception embraces the other's inner life and "the whole existing realm of minds - initially as a still unorganised stream of experiences"<sup>(22)</sup>. Scheler does not consider the possibility of a permanent intersubjective perspective although such a perspective is implied in his statement above. Thus he states that we apprehend our own self "against a background of an ever-vaguer all embracing consciousness in which our own existence and the existences of everyone else are presented in principle as included together"<sup>(23)</sup>. This is termed by Scheler, the great collective stream of universal consciousness. Thus we discern two competing notions in Scheler concerning the nature of the common consciousness on which our intersubjective existence is based. The first is temporally restricted to our first mode of knowing, and this, as has been shown above cannot explain how we perceive others as other selves nor what the value is of the limited knowledge which it can give. That is, we wish to understand others in whom a sense of individuality has developed and who have grown out of the stage of common consciousness. The second notion is that of an ever-present all-embracing common consciousness which, if accepted, raises the problem of how we distinguish between self and other in such a way that we can see certain experiences as originating from a self which is both individual and other. Scheler simply refers to a discernment



between what is ours and what is others but fails to establish the nature or reliability of such discernment. Undoubtedly he fails to reconcile the possibility of this discernment with the existence of a common consciousness in the second sense. Thus Scheler's reference to discernment assumes what it seeks to demonstrate. That is, discernment is possible only if we accept initially that there is something which is "mine" as distinct from "thine" and "ours".

Scheler criticises those theories which base knowledge of others on prior self-knowledge because they under-estimate the difficulties of self-knowledge and over-estimate the difficulties of intersubjective knowledge. Scheler bases this argument on the claim that we attend to both our own and other's thoughts in so far as they effect bodily states. The idea that self-understanding is problematic is valuable and, as Scheler states, commonly overlooked. However, the claim that there is a common origin of the questioning of our own and other's thoughts is irrelevant to the problem of the relative status of our understanding of such thoughts. Also, we attend to both our thoughts and those of others when such attention serves a practical purpose but there is no reason to limit such practical purposes to body movements. Indeed Scheler increasingly modifies this argument towards accepting the idea that observation is determined by interest, or as we would say, practical value. Nevertheless Scheler concludes, although his argument is unclear, that intra-mental self-perception is a fiction. This indicates that Scheler attempts to resolve the problem of intersubjective knowledge by declaring that there is no basic difference between self and other knowledge and, implicitly, that as self-knowledge is difficult but possible, therefore knowledge about others is possible. The idea of the basic similarity of self and intersubjective understanding will be developed below in our

revision of phenomenological sociology. However Scheler's account in relation to this claim is inadequate because he fails to establish the priority of intersubjective over self understanding, and also he fails to account for the possibility of individuality if all consciousness is basically intersubjective.

It may appear that in making understanding dependant on the apprehension of bodily states that Scheler is simply repeating the analogical theory of intersubjectivity. However, he asserts that we can experience any element of an other's experiences except his experience of his own bodily states. That is, we can experience the other's sorrow but not his pain. This argument is related to Scheler's notion of a hierarchy of values<sup>(24)</sup> but it seems to be at odds with his contention that understanding is based in the apprehension of the effects of thoughts on bodily states. Further, Scheler's argument at this point is a non sequitur; the fact that others' experiences cannot be known through bodily states does not require that the experience of bodily states cannot be known, and certainly he appears to be re-opening a body-mind dualism. However Scheler's development of this claim reveals that he is not discussing bodily states as such but significant as opposed to non-significant experiences. Thus, we as humans can experience only what is experienceable to a subject.

Thus Scheler asserts the direct accessibility of other minds and denies that consciousness is private. However his attempts to justify this claim by reference to statements such as, "The populace was seized with a common joy, a common grief, a common delight"<sup>(25)</sup> and the existence of intersubjective phenomena such as custom, language and religion are inadequate. This is because he regards such statements as "common joy" etc. as accurate and not as mere empathic interpretations



or as referring to an accidental coincidence of minds. Equally his reference to intersubjective phenomena merely assumes that such phenomena are genuinely intersubjective. The problem at hand is that of establishing that these phenomena are, in fact, genuinely intersubjective. We would argue that as intersubjectivity is a basic datum which is assumed in acts called intersubjective that reference to these acts as proofs of intersubjectivity is pointless. It is better to use the interpretation of these phenomena as intersubjective phenomena as an indication of the reasonableness of the idea of intersubjectivity as their origin. However, the existence, nature and mode of becoming aware of intersubjectivity must be established a priori as the necessary pre-condition of the experience of such phenomena.

Thus Scheler seems to be arguing that having established the absurdity of relativism and the failure of empathic and analogical theories to account for our intersubjective knowledge that his absolutist position, based on sympathetic perception, must be correct. Thus he fails to establish the adequacy of his position but simply asserts it. As a consequence Scheler overlooks the problem that simply because relativism is absurd, mere claims to absolute knowledge are thereby not necessarily guaranteed. Therefore, he fails to consider the possibility that his idea of sympathetic perception may be as unreliable as analogy and empathy. That is, claiming a theory to have absolute validity does not guarantee such validity. Scheler should have established the essence of the absolutely valid\* and then showed that his idea of sympathetic intersubjective understanding conforms to that essence. As it is, his negative approach of trying to establish the validity of sympathy by showing the inadequacy of empathy and analogy cannot contradict the possibility of sympathy being equally invalid. Scheler's procedure is

\* We intend to do this below in our discussion of necessity.

rendered more dubious by the fact, as demonstrated above\*, that empathy and analogy are used in order to make others comprehensible. Thus Scheler states "I do not merely see the other person's eyes ... , I also see that 'he is looking at me' and even that 'he is looking at me as though he wished to avoid my seeing that he is looking at me'(26), without considering the problem of the reliability of such conclusions which, incidentally, are amenable to empathic interpretation. Indeed, Scheler merely high-handedly dismisses the idea that everything that he describes in terms of sympathy can be accounted for by inference. It would appear that Scheler uses the notion of sympathy as a convenient label to avoid questions concerning the reliability of our judgement's about other's experiences.

Scheler's realistic interpretation of intersubjectivity is valuable in that he shows the necessarily social mode of our becoming aware of others. He does this by reference to the evidences contained in the other directedness of intentionality. Although these evidences are discerned in the solipsistic situation they derive from and lead to a recognition of the incompleteness of that situation. Thus, Scheler establishes social existence as independent from, and the fulfillment of, individual existence. Therefore the distinction between self and other is not fundamental nor is it necessary to see our social identity, the idea of "we", as a dubious derivation from this distinction. The idea of the other-directedness of intentionality which is found in Scheler will be a crucial aspect of our description of a phenomenologically-grounded interpretive sociology.

Further, Scheler reveals the absurdity of relativism and solipsism which we have seen as typical of the nominalist tradition and he also

\* re the discussion of postulates of everyday life, above p.315.



demonstrates the inadequacy of empathic projection and analogical inference as a means of acquiring intersubjective understanding. This indicates the value and necessity of locating an absolute non-relative mode of intersubjective understanding.

However, this is the weakest aspect of Scheler's account as has been shown in the consideration of his ideas concerning the sympathetic acquisition of knowledge about other subjects as distinct from knowledge of their existence. Scheler inverts the nominalist tactic of abolishing other selves by abolishing individuality through his notion of the common consciousness. This may explain why he gives such consciousness only a temporal priority. This has been seen to limit the possibility of intersubjective understanding to that (hypothetical) period of life before individuality emerged.

Finally, Scheler fails to establish the absolute, as opposed to relative, validity of sympathetic perception and as a consequence there seems little difference between the practise of sympathy and empathy. This inadequacy is due to Scheler's failure to consider the nature and evidence of absolutely valid cognitions. Thus although Scheler demonstrates the inadequacy of relativistic and solipsistic approaches\*, he fails to establish the nature of an absolute and intersubjective mode of gaining knowledge about others.

The realist tradition, as exemplified by Simmel and Scheler, has certain advantages over nominalism in relation to establishing intersubjective understanding. It recognises that intersubjectivity cannot be reduced to the acts of individual persons without destroying its essential social character. Thus the subject matter of the realist tradition in sociology is interaction not action. It is not even concerned with any idea of interaction as the coincidence of individual

\* That is approaches which assume the priority and sole reliability of ego-consciousness.

courses of action, but with interaction as a category sui generis. As a consequence the realist tradition is concerned with a common realm of experience which precedes individual subjectivity as opposed to the nominalist tradition which, although forced to posit such a realm, sees it as an enlargement of the ego-perspective. Thus the realist tradition sees the common realm as basic to our social existence and is not therefore committed, as is nominalism, of making an impossible leap from solipsism into intersubjectivity. This is the basis of the realistic tradition's assertion that we can understand others in themselves as opposed to projecting our self-understanding onto their situation. However, the realist tradition, as it exists at present, has been shown to be unable to give an adequate definition of this common realm, whether it be seen as the a priori forms of consciousness or an original state of non-individuation, or an adequate account of the means by which we can apprehend others through this realm. As such it has failed to offer a reliable alternative to the inadequacies of nominalism's relativism and solipsism.

It is our intention to use the insights of the realist tradition within the context of phenomenology, in order to establish the nature of intersubjectivity and a reliable means of understanding others.

In particular, we have noted two sources of the realist tradition in sociology. These are Kantian formalism, as exemplified by Simmel which has been shown to be inadequate, and essential realism as exemplified by Scheler. This aspect of Scheler's approach has not been emphasised up to this point but it is clear that he more than any other proponent of phenomenology interpreted this method on the lines of Platonic realism. That is he saw essences as having real being. Thus, Lauer states that Scheler, "sees essences as verified in reality and discovered by an



essential intuition which is somehow in tune with the world of being wherein it operates"(27). Thus, as opposed to Husserl's opaque idea of essences being constituted by consciousness, Scheler sees them as the objective structure, the quality of phenomena and as such they are recognised by consciousness. It is not our intention to consider the problems which Scheler encountered as a consequence of this notion of essence(28). However, it is our intention to resolve the problem of intersubjective understanding through phenomenology by developing this radically realistic notion of essence.

NOTES

1. SIMMEL "HOW IS SOCIETY POSSIBLE?" in WOLFF (ed)  
"ESSAYS ON SOCIOLOGY, PHILOSOPHY AND  
AESTHETICS " BY GEORG SIMMEL et al  
HARPER 1959
2. SIMMEL "HOW IS SOCIETY POSSIBLE?" op.cit. p.348
3. REX "SOCIAL STRUCTURE AND HUMANISTIC  
SOCIOLOGY" IN REX (ed) "APPROACHES TO  
SOCIOLOGY", ROUTLEDGE and KEGAN PAUL  
1974 \* p.191
4. WEINGARTNER "FORM AND CONTENT IN SIMMEL'S  
PHILOSOPHY OF LIFE" in WOLFF (ed) op.cit. p.38
5. SIMMEL "THE PROBLEM OF SOCIOLOGY" in WOLFF (ed)  
op.cit.
6. SIMMEL "SOCIAL FORMS AND INNER NEEDS" in  
LEVINE (ed) "GEORG SIMMEL ON INDIVIDUAL-  
ITY AND SOCIAL FORMS" CHICAGO U.P. 1971 p.351
7. TENBRUCK "FORMAL SOCIOLOGY" in WOLFF (ed) op.cit. p.80
8. TENBRUCK "FORMAL SOCIOLOGY" in WOLFF (ed) op.cit. n.75 and  
89
9. SIMMEL "THE PROBLEM OF SOCIOLOGY" in WOLFF  
(ed) op.cit. p.324
10. WEINGARTNER "FORM AND CONTENT IN SIMMEL'S PHILOSOPHY OF LIFE"  
IN WOLFF (ed) op.cit. p.55
11. SIMMEL "THE PROBLEM OF SOCIOLOGY" in WOLFF  
(ed) op.cit. p.329
12. SIMMEL "SOZIOLOGIE UNTERSUCHUNGEN UBER DIE FORMEN  
der VERGELLSCHAFTUNG" p.559 quoted by  
WEINGARTNER "FORM & CONTENT IN SIMMEL'S  
PHILOSOPHY OF LIFE" in WOLFF (ed) op.cit. p.38
13. TENBRUCK "FORMAL SOCIOLOGY" in WOLFF (ed) op.cit. p.70
14. SCHELER "THE NATURE OF SYMPATHY" ROUTLEDGE AND  
KEGAN PAUL 1954 p.219
15. SCHELER "THE NATURE OF SYMPATHY" op.cit. p.220
16. SCHELER "WISSENFORMEN" p.26, cited by STAUDE  
"MAX SCHELER: AN INTELLECTUAL PORTRAIT"  
FREE PRESS 1967 p.159

\* However, Rex modifies this view of Simmel in Rex "DISCOVERING SOCIOLOGY"  
ROUTLEDGE AND KEGAN PAUL, 1973 p.194 ff. although we clearly reject Rex's  
understanding of the form content distinction, in particular his claim  
that forms are devoid of meaning and also his equation of simmelian forms  
with common-sense conceptualisations.



17.	STAUDE	"MAX SCHELER: AN INTELLECTUAL PORTRAIT" op.cit.	p.174
18.	SCHELER	"THE NATURE OF SYMPATHY" op.cit.	p.229
19.	SCHELER	"THE NATURE OF SYMPATHY" op.cit.	p.235
20.	SCHELER	"THE NATURE OF SYMPATHY" op.cit.	p.244
21.	SCHELER	"THE NATURE OF SYMPATHY" op.cit.	p.246
22.	SCHELER	"THE NATURE OF SYMPATHY" op.cit.	p.250
23.	SCHELER	"THE NATURE OF SYMPATHY" op.cit.	p.250
24.	SCHELER	"FORMAL ETHICS (3), "FORMALISM IN ETHICS AND NON-FORMAL ETHICS OF VALUES" NORTH-WESTERN U.P. EVANSTON 1973	
25.	SCHELER	"THE NATURE OF SYMPATHY" op.cit.	p.258
26.	SCHELER	"THE NATURE OF SYMPATHY" op.cit.	p.261
27.	LAUER	"PHENOMENOLOGY: ITS GENESIS AND PROSPECTS" HARPER, NEW YORK, 1965	p.164
28.	re STAUDE	"MAX SCHELER: AN INTELLECTUAL PORTRAIT" op.cit.	p.210- 211

## CHAPTER SEVEN

### THE RESOLUTION OF THE PROBLEM OF INTERSUBJECTIVE UNDERSTANDING THROUGH A REVISED PHENOMENOLOGY

In the previous chapters we have established the inadequacy of major existing nominalist and realist attempts to achieve reliable intersubjective understanding and thus to account for a sociology which claims to understand others. It is our aim in this chapter to establish genuine intersubjective understanding through a revision of Husserl's phenomenology. This necessitates that we overcome Husserl's tendency to solipsism and demonstrate that this is not an inevitable component of phenomenology. Further, although our principal concern is with intersubjective understanding, we intend to consider this problem within the context of understanding in general because, as has been seen, considerations of the problem of intersubjective understanding are based upon general epistemological theories. It is therefore necessary to establish the possibility of attaining reliable, apodictic and non-relative, knowledge as such as a prior condition of outlining the means of acquiring reliable intersubjective knowledge. This is because knowledge of others is a particular case of the general problem of knowledge of things external to self. Further, we intend to demonstrate that reliable knowledge and intersubjective knowledge are synonymous\*. It is therefore necessary that we clarify what is meant by reliable knowledge.

#### NECESSITY

Reliable, knowledge is that which demonstrates the quality of necessity; that is, knowledge which is required by the nature of phenomena. Such knowledge must be basic and non-derivable and although the adequacy of our apprehension of it may be questioned the reality of necessity

\*In referring to this relationship between reliable and intersubjective knowledge we are not proposing the familiar argument that reliable knowledge is that which has gained the assent of various subjects but, as will be demonstrated below, that reliable knowledge is that which belongs to our intersubjective as opposed to subjective being.



cannot be questioned without contradiction. An indication of this phenomenon to be found in everyday life is the feeling, however unclear, that we should reach certain decisions or that a conclusion imposes itself upon us simply because it is inevitable. This idea of necessary knowledge is fundamentally similar to Husserl's idea of apodictic knowledge. However, we must consider the problem of demonstrating the nature of necessity in our perception of things.

It has frequently been the case that the idea of the necessity of our conceptions of phenomena is given substance by being located in a realm of agreed reverence outside the ever fluctuating world of appearances. Thus, Plato posited an ethereal realm of pure ideas or essence and Kant located necessity in the structures of the human mind. Such approaches seek to resolve the problem of necessity by locating this quality in a particular place but are then confronted by the problem of demonstrating the necessity of the location i.e. why the mind should have those particular structures, why phenomena are apprehended through a particular a priori form rather than another. A further problem concerning such approaches is that they identify necessity by separating it from the phenomenal appearance to which it refers. This raises the problem of the reliability of the perceived relationship between necessary structures and phenomena. This results in the irreconcilable dichotomy between "things-in-themselves" and "things-as-they-appear".

Husserl, in his more realistic writings, attempted to overcome this dichotomy by identifying necessity with the essence of phenomena, that which is immanent to phenomena. That is he perceived phenomena as being given with order and form, thus necessity is identified with conformity to this eidetic order. This encounters the problem of the reliability of the contact between consciousness, which perceives this order, and the

phenomena which contains it. Husserl saw this contact as established in intentionality. However, intentionality itself is an activity of consciousness and thus it is necessary to consider the adequacy of this activity which Husserl attempted to establish by locating a pure or Transcendental consciousness which is directed towards the essence of phenomena; that is, a mode of consciousness which has necessity as its object. It would appear that Husserl, like Plato and Kant, attempts to resolve the problem of necessity by locating it in a respected realm, in his case that of pure consciousness. Nevertheless, this shifts the frame of reference of the problem but does not resolve it for it is possible to ask how this Transcendental consciousness, even if we accept that it has been stripped of extraneous data, can guarantee its contact with its objects.

As has been seen, Husserl's failure to answer this question resulted in his later work in an increasing idealism in which he effectively denied the objectivity of phenomena, seeing all things as constituted by Transcendental consciousness. In this respect he came closer to Kantianism and abandoned his earlier realism. The inevitable consequence of this was the privatisation of necessity. This principle, in being applied to other selves as objects, resulted in solipsism. It is our intention to re-establish the reciprocal relationship of intersubjectivity and necessity by developing Husserl's realistic position, which he held prior to his development of the notion of the constituting function of Transcendental consciousness. Thus, we accept the Husserlian idea that necessity has to be located within phenomena, that is, necessity is to be equated with the essence of phenomena. Adequate discourse is that which has essence as its object. Essence is the ontological identity of phenomena, its being or quality. It is therefore a demarcation principle which distinguishes the phenomenon in question from other



phenomena. It is therefore necessary to clarify the relationship between essence and fact. That is, we must come to terms with the so-called reality problem of phenomenology in which its concentration on essence is claimed to lead to its irrelevance in relation to the everyday world of facts.

### ESSENCE AND FACT

The ideas of Essence and fact, are typically seen as opposites. The eternal and unchanging world of pure ideas or essence is contrasted with the chaotic volatility of the factual world. Thus essence is seen as animating facts, of translating inert matter into meaningful phenomena. This view reaches its clearest expression in the separation of fact and essence into two distinct realms, as in Plato, or in Scheler's notion of Being as composed of an all-encompassing but impotent Spirit (essence) and an all-powerful but blind matter. In these views facts are believed to obscure essence and must be disregarded in eidetic apprehension. Therefore the quest for essential knowledge requires a turning away from the factual world. As well as reflecting a patrician distaste for the everyday world this view encounters numerous logical problems. Principally, although essence and fact are held to be distinct, they are not said to be separate since they combine with each other because the realm of essence is said to animate the factual world. It is not clear why fact and essence should combine nor how it is possible that such contradictory elements could combine. That is, essence is seen as necessary, eternal and static, facts are seen as accidental, fluid and of temporary duration. If the known world is said to be composed of these elements then it is clear that essences must cease to be essential and/or facts must cease to be factual. That is, the known world can be either fluid or static, it cannot be both, and if it is one or the other then either the nature of essence or fact has been compromised. Deriving from this is the argument that as

necessity inheres in essence alone it cannot be predicated of the factual world. Therefore necessity is an inappropriate category to be used in relation to our knowledge of the everyday world of facts\*. We accept that as a consequence of these arguments the idea of trying to identify essence may be seen at best, as a waste of time and at worst a deliberate attempt to avoid the problems of the real world in the pursuit of metaphysical chimeras. Nevertheless, as has been seen, the abandonment of the idea of a necessity which inheres in phenomena themselves and in our apprehension of phenomena leads to self-destructive relativism and scepticism.

This problem has been traditionally discussed in terms of the relative status of universal concepts and individual phenomena. The various positions in this debate polarise around two opposed standpoints(1). These are, in broad terms, the nominalist position which admits the reality only of individuals and thus sees species concepts as definitions only and, alternatively, the realist position which claims that essences alone are real and are independent of subjective thought and that individual objects are simply particular realisations of essence. Thus nominalism sees general concepts as more or less arbitrary and therefore tends to the denial of necessity in our conceptual acts. Realism sees individual phenomena as either obscuring an inner essence or as a distortion of the eidetic ideal.

In so far as nominalism implies the acceptance of relativism because it sees concepts as arbitrary, we reject it. In so far as realism implies the possibility of necessary knowledge because it acknowledges the objective existence of fundamental data, ie. essence, to which our concepts can conform, we accept it. Therefore our position in relation to this problem could be termed essential realism. However, on a more basic level we

\* We do not wish to dwell on the contradictoriness of this particular argument in particular that although it denies necessity its own procedure accepts the necessity of logic.



reject both realism and nominalism. A noticeable feature of this debate has been the fact that although it goes back to the dawn of philosophy it has never been satisfactorily resolved. Thus, even though nominalism is dominant in Anglo-Saxon analytic philosophy, its position is not unchallenged. It is our contention that the failure to terminate this debate is due to the fact that both the contending positions are wrong. That is, both realism and nominalism as traditionally presented are unacceptable. It is noticeable that nominalism and realism, despite their differences, agree on one fundamental assumption. This is that facts (Individuals) are different from essences (species); the debate between realism and nominalism concerns the relative priority of these distinct phenomena. It would seem that the assertion that fact and essence are different is so obvious as to be true by definition. It is our intention to challenge both realism and nominalism by calling into question this "obvious" idea.

Thus, the argument which we wish to advance is that facts and essence are not distinct in themselves. This necessitates that we qualify our acceptance of realism. We reject that realism which perceived essence as somehow embodied or realised in facts as if essence is the force which structures material dross or is the means of ordering a chaotic existence. This version of realism is unacceptable because it encounters the objection that since only essence, as the source of necessity, can be known reliably, it establishes a realm of unknowable existents or facts. The contradiction in asserting that something, in this case the factual world, is known to be unknowable has been noted. Further, essences are always referred to as being essence of a particular class of facts which is itself identified as such and such by being identified with an essence. Thus, the adequacy of the separation of fact and essence into two realms is

compromised by the recognition, even within the terms of this realism, that we apprehend essences in factual appearance and that facts are identified by reference to their essential attributes.

The impossibility of maintaining a distinction between an eternal world of essence, whether real or merely conceptual, and the flux of existence is shown by the realisation that if existence were totally separate from essence we would not recognise it as flux because we simply would not recognise it. This is because we cannot conceive of a non-essential existence since the act of conceptualisation is the act of adequate or inadequate eidetic identification. "Flux" is an essential category as much as is "redness", "beauty" etc. That is, change is recognisable only because we are able to identify the qualitative shifts, ie. "it was that, it is now this". Thus the separation between essence and fact involves the absurd claim that existence is distinct from essence because its essence is flux.\*

It may be argued that we are taking advantage of a particular use of words and that the conventional "separatist" position is acceptable if we refer to existence as chaos, that is, the situation of an absence of essence or concepts. This argument is acceptable only if we accept the legitimacy of the removal of essence from existence. Such a procedure would be similar to the argument that if we ignore the faculty of sight, mankind is blind, which is true, but to then argue that mankind is actually blind would be absurd. Equally to argue that if we abstract essence, existence would be chaotic would be absurd for it deliberately overlooks that necessary characteristic of existence, ie. essence, which permits us to know it as existence rather than chaos. That is, to state that existence is chaotic is unacceptable because in the idea of existence we are positing

\*We are not implying that we accept the idea that existence is flux. Indeed we intend to challenge this idea below.



a definable quality, but chaos is the denial of quality. Therefore, how can that which possesses quality be identified with the denial of quality?

We have criticised the view which denies eidetic necessity in our critique of relativism\*, and also the argument that essence and fact inhabit separate realms. Putting these two arguments together it follows that we accept that essence is real and that essence is not distinct from fact. That is, in opposition to the view which sees essence as placed in inert fact we see essence as fact. To make the association with phenomenology more apparent, we see essence as phenomenon. We intend to demonstrate that this does not mean an acceptance of phenomenalism or the denial of necessity which we posited of essence alone. Nor are we committed to accepting the absurdity of asserting the identity of such clear contradictions as the timelessness and stability of essence and the temporality and flux of existence. We intend to show that such characteristics of essence and fact are based not on the respective perception of ideal and phenomenal objects but on a false objectification of the distinction between adequate and inadequate perception.

We derive this insight from Husserl who sought to make reliable data available, not by annihilating an unreliable factual world, but by a process of perfecting cognition. Unfortunately, Husserl maintained an implicit opposition between essence and existence and thus his work was taken, particularly by the existentialists, as evidence that the apprehension of essence required a turning away from the factual world. We intend to show that this view is incorrect and that grasp of essence reveals the full nature of phenomena through our critique of the fact-essence distinction. Thus, we shall demonstrate that the phenomenological quest for essence does not mean abandoning the world of existence but

\* re below chapter 1.

permits us to perceive it as it really is and, as we shall show below, as it really is not for "I" but for all cognitive subjects.

In denying the distinction between fact and essence, we are not stating that essence is to be identified with phenomenal appearance. The idea of such appearance is, as will be seen, a particular and incomplete apprehension of the nature of the phenomenon. Further, in our view, essence is not simply part of a thing but is the totality of the phenomenon. Thus essence and phenomena are not distinct entities.

An immediate objection to our identity of fact and essence is that essence is a universal, species-identity whereas facts are individual and specific; therefore they cannot be identified with each other. Our consideration of this point will clarify what we consider to be the source of the inadequate fact-essence distinction in a misleading reification of fact.

We have claimed that the fact-essence distinction is really a distinction between inadequate and adequate cognition. We, therefore, perceive appearances as not so many facts with an essence superimposed upon them but as eidetic complexes, that is as combinations of essence. We have referred to the common view that essences are stable whereas facts are fluid. Our re-definition of fact as essential complex does not mean that we have to assert either the static nature of phenomena or to deny the possibility of change in phenomena. Essences, being qualitatively independent and non-contradictory, are free to combine with each other. Thus no essence is either required to or prevented from forming a complex with any other essence. Further, the independence of essences guarantees that in any complex an essence remains the same quality and always presents itself as the same in any complex appearance.

The argument that the factual world is in a state of flux and is



therefore to be differentiated from the stability of essence is inadequate in so far as flux is held to be the absence of necessity. It is true that eidetic complexes change and come into and go out of existence but this does not mean that they are arbitrary. That is, the stability of essence is not compromised by the fluidity of eidetic complexes nor is the freedom of essence compromised by the assertion of necessity and the denial of arbitrariness in eidetic complexes<sup>\*(1)</sup>. This is because stability, in the sense of permanence, necessarily inheres in essences but not in their inter-relationships, to argue the contrary would be to deny the freedom and immanence of essence. Equally, although eidetic complexes are fluid they are not arbitrary because they are structured by the ontologies of the combining essences. Thus, necessity inheres in the fluctuating world of facts, or eidetic complexes, which is therefore knowable in a definitive manner. The possibilities of existence or non-existence of a complex, and judgements that the complex has changed are all dependant upon perception of the qualities which constitute the complex and through which it is known.

This argument should make it clear that we are not arguing the feasibility of an a priori reconstruction of the world. The freedom of essences to combine means that no particular combination is inherently more likely to occur than any other combination. Therefore, the apprehension of essence does not give us grounds to predict, a priori, essential inter-relationships in any field of experience. In so far as essence is the quality, the true nature of phenomena, and this ontological status of phenomena involves a system of open-ended possibilities, we can state only what cannot be, by reference to the principle of non-contradiction which is always immanent to the essence in question<sup>\*(2)</sup>,

\* (1) That is, "free" is not to be equated with "arbitrary".

\* (2) re below chapter 1.

not what must be. The problem of the inter-relationship of qualitatively distinct phenomena is an empirical problem but such empirical approaches must be grounded in prior apprehension of the essences which are the object of enquiry. Thus, essence is not the basic promise from which we can infer all knowledge. However, essence is that which is required as a prior condition of empirical understanding. That is, empirical relationships are based on necessity because they are grounded in the nature of the inter-related essences.

This is distinct from Husserl's rejection of a priori methods in empirical study which are based on the claim that the laws of nature, which are the subject matter of empirical enquiry, are founded on induction and therefore remain contingent and merely probable. This is said to be the essence of fact and therefore attempts to reduce natural laws to a priori laws would do violence to the essence of fact<sup>(2)</sup>. This argument reveals a further inadequacy in the fact-essence distinction on which it is based. The argument demonstrates not the separateness of the natural and the a priori but their independence of each other because it defines the natural as contingent and the a priori as necessary and contingency cannot be founded on necessity. The effect of this would be not only to make phenomenology irrelevant to the goals of empirical research but would also deny the possibility of harmonising the concepts of science with its observations. In opposition to this view we perceive the a priori not as imposed on an independent reality but as that reality. The apparently phenomenal world is, properly perceived, an essential world. Thus there is no distinction between fully apprehended phenomena and essence. We are not, therefore, positing essence as a ghost in the factual machine.

This argument raises the question of why the idea of the brute fact existing in a state of flux or of the isolated particular which alone is



real, is taken for granted in discourse<sup>\*(1)</sup>. In everyday, uncritical perception when we identify that which we perceive as a fact we really seek to identify one of the essences which are presented to us while ignoring the other available essences. This is a crude form of the phenomenological reduction but it is inadequate because it is oriented to the phenomenon in terms of its value for the person. Thus, the phenomenon is not seen as it is but is identified with its utility. That is, natural attitude perception confuses meaning and significance<sup>\*(2)</sup>. It is based on a purely egoistic perception which refuses to accept the independent being of the phenomenon which is equated with its value for ego. This not only prevents the person from apprehending the nature of the phenomenon sui generis but creates a barrier between his world and the world of others who detect different utilities in the appearing eidetic complex. It is precisely this mode of apprehension which leads to the fact-essence distinction and equally to that cognitive isolation which is the basis of effective solipsism. The arbitrariness of such judgements is falsely concretised into the belief that either reality consists of discrete individual facts which are conceptually ordered or that it consists of an eternal, essential world which stands behind the arbitrary factual world to which it gives order and meaning. Thus, the erroneous nature of everyday judgements is hidden through its transposition onto a theory of the nature of being. The rational inadequacy of these judgements is transformed into a belief in the rational inadequacy of the objects of

\* It is noticeable that the common distinction in essentialist literature between essence and accident maintains the opposition between fact and essence. If only by implication, Husserl's distinction between reliable immanent data and transcendences tends to echo the imagery of a pure essential world and a discardable material world.

\*(2) re below chapter 1.

such judgements which are equated with the whole of being, in the case of nominalism or, in an attempt to preserve the idea of rational necessity, with part of being, in the case of realism. Thus, concretisation of inadequate perception results in the belief in an arbitrary, non-rational, fluctuating factual world.

In everyday perception, things are recognised and accorded nature only if they have utility and their nature is equated with that utility. Phenomena which appear with the valued object are defined as having no utility and are therefore disregarded; their nature is denied. Thus the whole complex of appearing qualities or essences is incorrectly identified with one quality, the perception of which is itself distorted by ego-centric judgements.

The social isolation which is caused by this approach, to which reference was made above, is frequently resolved by the attitude of "Nothing-But" which is a means of justifying the reduction of the complexity of the perceived phenomena to that of one of the assumed qualities. Thus, the whole complex is said to be "Nothing-But" that aspect which is of value to us as individuals. Therefore, those who claim to detect other qualities can be disregarded as being in error. Should these other persons persist in their contrary claims we might admit that they and we are simply adopting differing perspectives and that one perspective is as rational (or irrational) as another. Thus the claims of these persons can be disregarded, if not for being erroneous, for being irrelevant to us. In this way, the attitude of Nothing-But can lead to either dogmatic assertions or relativism. Therefore, at best the whole eidetic complex may be identified with only one of the available qualities; at worst it may be identified with a valued quality which is not even present.

The fact-essence distinction and the realism-nominalism debate are



based on the naive attitude which takes for granted the unity of objects of our experience. That is, both accept that the fact, as the object of naive perception, is a thing. The error contained in this assumption leads to a constant disjunction between the idea and our experience of it. Our critique of the fact-essence distinction reveals that the separation between the idea of the quality of a phenomenon and our experience of that phenomenon is the product of the failure to make a distinction between the phenomenon itself and those other phenomenon with which it is presented. The whole presentation is thus, misleadingly seen as a thing which is then identified with the one valued phenomenon. Thus, attempts to locate the phenomenon in other experiences leads to its identification with distinctively different presentations of qualitative complexes. Hence the tendency to deny the permanence of quality and the assertion of an unstable, fluctuating phenomenal world, which is really based on a confused identity of dissimilar phenomena. This mistake is the basis of the nominalist argument which claims, for example, that our idea of red is an induction from red things in general. Such a position overlooks the difference between the generality of a thing, which is inferred from a prior identification of the thing, and the essence of a thing which is its quality and which is therefore that prior knowledge on which all subsequent acts of inference, generalisation etc. must be based.

Thus, every full, adequate experience<sup>\*</sup> of a phenomenon is the same; red perceived in one setting is the same as red perceived in another setting. The difference between these experiences of red-ness must be accounted for, not by positing the instability of our idea of red, but by reference to the qualitative differences between the contexts

\* This use of the term "experience" will be clarified below.

of these experiences. Therefore, we equate phenomenon and essence and, in the method of the reductions, we perceive essence as the phenomenon. This argument should prevent the misconception that we are equating essence with individuals. That is, in our view, essence is not to be equated with fact in the sense of a unique individual event but that essence, or phenomenon, is a universal quality and can be presented in any number of eidetic complexes which we naively concretise and refer to as facts, and be recognisable as the same in every instance. Differences between "facts" are recognisable because of variations in the component qualities of eidetic complexes. The problem of the false distinction between essence and fact is aggravated because phenomena are apprehended through particular modes each of which has its own essential nature e.g. that of memory, imagination, sense perception etc., which is not that of the presented phenomenon. Equally, every mode of apprehension is perceived through its presentation of an object which is other than the mode of apprehension itself. Thus, in order to avoid confusion it is necessary to be aware of the distinction between the apprehended phenomenon and the act of apprehension. Such awareness is to be found in Husserl's distinction between noesis and noema.

Thus, we always experience essence, that is fully perceived phenomenon, things-as-they-are, within a complex of other essences and through a particular mode of apprehension. Therefore we can have the essence as the sole object of attention only through a deliberate act of abstraction in consciousness such as the process of reduction. However this does not create a distinction between phenomena as they appear in eidetic complexes and phenomena as they are conceptually grasped as isolated essences. This is because essences, being non-contradictory and being free to combine with any other essence, remains the same in all complexes. That is, the independent



nature of essence is not compromised by its inclusion in an eidetic complex. Thus, the only difference between the conceptual isolated essence and the essence within a complex of other essences is that the context within which the essence appears, in the latter situation, is not present in the former, but this makes no difference to the nature of the essence; it is the same in both situations. This consideration indicates the mode of perception which avoids the errors which lead to the fact-essence distinction.

#### HORIZON<sup>\*</sup>

We are able to overcome the erroneous fact-essence distinction by applying the concept of horizon to our perceptions. It has been noted that the naive attitude maintains the superstition of the fact by perceiving the eidetic complex as a single unit which it identifies with a valued quality which may or may not be present. This is as much an infringement of the dignity of the aggrandised essence as it is of those qualities whose being has been arbitrarily denied. It is true that we can attend to only one essence at a time and that in any eidetic complex we cannot contemplate all the available qualities at once. It is also true that we direct our theoretical attention to that which interests us. However, this does not mean that our interests must determine the nature of what we perceive or that we must deny the presence of other essences.

The application of the concept of horizon enables the distinction between the phenomenon which is the object of attention and those phenomena with which it appears and also our culturally derived expectations of the phenomenon. This is the outer horizon. The phenomenon is also to be distinguished from its inner horizon of phenomena which are generically required in the phenomenon in question e.g. as "house" requires

\* This concept is described and justified below in chapter 1.

the notion of building material but whose modes of appearance, in. their own horizons, are not required\*, e.g. particular building materials such as cement, plaster, brick etc. For instance, all phenomena which are accessible to sight require spatial extension but no particular spatial extension is necessary. Thus, associated phenomena, whether belonging to the inner or outer horizon of the phenomenon in question and which in naive perception are not distinguished from the phenomenon, are isolated and placed on one side. This is achieved in the process of reduction. Since we are not committed to the equation of phenomenon with phenomenal appearance, which we have seen to be a complex, we do not need to annihilate or deny the independent Being of those qualities of the appearance which are not the object of our attention. These other phenomena are qualities in their own right and subsequently can become objects of attention.

To summarise our view, essence is fully perceived phenomenon, it is the thing as it is in itself. Therefore essence is not distinct from phenomenon. Further, phenomena are thus revealed as universal and immanently structured and therefore the idea of formless, individual factual existence is misleading, being based on inadequate perception of phenomena. Therefore, necessity can be said to inhere in our experience of things.

It could be argued that we have resolved one problem only to encounter another. We have overcome the disjunction between fact and essence by showing that it is based not on an apprehension of the nature of two distinct realms, but on the reification of the distinction between adequate and inadequate perception and that therefore essence is existence perceived as it really is. However, is it not the case that by this

\*This aspect of the argument is given in fuller form below in chapter 1.



argument we have replaced the gulf between fact and essence with a gulf between consciousness and phenomena? Although Husserl's notion of the conscious constitution of essence maintained the fact-essence distinction it did have the effect of justifying the belief that consciousness was in real contact with its objects. That is, essence, which is constituted in consciousness, is always essence of an object ie. essence mediates between consciousness and objects because it is proper to both of these. It must be admitted that as a consequence of this argument objects themselves were increasingly seen by Husserl as constituted in consciousness and that it could be argued that Husserl overcame the problematic relationship between consciousness and objects by denying the essential objectivity of objects and making consciousness all embracing. Nevertheless, it would seem that in equating essence and phenomenon we have abandoned the possibility of building upon what is potentially a valuable aspect of Husserl's work which is his demonstration that consciousness can be in direct and full contact with phenomena. It is therefore necessary that we establish, within the terms of our equation of fact and essence, that totally reliable knowledge of phenomena is possible. That is, we have claimed that essence is fully apprehended phenomenon; it is necessary that we demonstrate the possibility of such full, unquestionable knowledge which constitutes the basis of necessity in our knowledge.

#### INTENTION, SELF-GIVENNESS AND EXPERIENCE

It has been noted that Husserl accounted for a reliable contact between consciousness and its objects through the doctrine of the intentionality of consciousness, that is, the claim that consciousness is always directed to objects. The subsequent development of this argument was the establishment of a pure or Transcendental consciousness

which has as its object the phenomenon in itself. The weakness in this approach is that intentionality is a conscious activity. Thus, the relationship between consciousness and objects is established purely as a conscious phenomenon. It is but a short step from this position to the argument that intentional consciousness constitutes its objects and this was the form of Husserl's later radical idealism. Thus, the contact between consciousness and objects is preserved only at the expense of denying that objects are external to consciousness, whereas the heart of the problem of establishing full, adequate cognition is that intentional consciousness is directed towards objects other than itself. Hence our conclusion that Husserl makes objects fully accessible by abolishing their nature as objects.

We accept the doctrine of intentionality but we intend to show that it is incomplete and that by completing it we can assure full adequate cognition without destroying the nature of objects.

Intention is the act whereby consciousness reaches out to things other than itself. Often this is referred to as the experience of these things as if experience was a conscious act which is to be equated with intention. We wish to argue that this view is mistaken and that experience is a state of affairs which is not just a conscious act but is also a predicate of phenomena. That is, experience belongs to phenomena as well as consciousness. We justify the claim that experience is a predicate of phenomena because of its relationship to the self-givonness of phenomena. This notion of the 'self-givenness'\* of phenomena, involves a major ontological shift compared to intentional analysis. Intentional analysis conceives of knowledge as purely an act of consciousness; thus it is based on the idea of an active consciousness which reaches out to

\* This idea is found in Husserl's concept of the "evidentz" of phenomena, although he failed to demonstrate its inter-relationship with intentionality.



passive phenomena. The equation of intention and experience is a presupposition of this position. We have noted the consequences of this argument in its application to our understanding of others; that it leads to the ego-aggrandising belief in an active self confronted by passive others who are then constituted as images of the active self. We cannot accept the idea of passive phenomena as it is inconsistent with our idea of phenomena and essence being identical and thus phenomena is qualitatively known in itself. We conceive of the relationship between consciousness and Being as an inter-relationship between mutually active consciousness and phenomena in which subject and object are transposed. That is, self-giving phenomena are the object of intentional consciousness; intentional consciousness is the object of phenomena's self-givenness. Thus objects and consciousness are reciprocally related to each other because intentionality is the reaching out of consciousness to things other than itself, which are given in the self-presentation of the phenomena to consciousness.

The conjunction between intentionality and self-givenness is experience which is the conscious act of apprehending that which is self-given. Thus, experience is the fulfillment of the mutual orientation of phenomena and consciousness. Since things cannot deceive, that which is self-given can be only the nature or essence of phenomena. That is, phenomenon, literally, can present only its self. Thus, in experience, consciousness becomes its object.

Only this recognition of active, self-presenting and qualitative phenomena can account for the quality of necessity in our judgements concerning the nature of phenomena which is our sole defence against the absurdities of relativism. That is, necessity in the sense that such and such has to be so regardless of our wishes or the awareness of being compelled by the object.

Our notion of experience as the fulfillment of intentional acts in the apprehension of self-given phenomena is not meant to undermine Husserl's claim that intentional acts of consciousness are the sole source of immanence, and therefore reliability, because his claim is made within the context of naive consciousness. The question which Husserl asked was what is there in the flux and unreliability of our everyday existence which stands as unquestionably reliable? His answer was, and we agree with this, intentional consciousness. However, it is possible that Husserl, and almost certainly his followers and commentators, ignored the importance of the origin of this perception, for it is derived from the natural attitude which we have shown to be ego-centric and solipsistic. Thus intentionality of consciousness is that mode of reliability which fits the natural attitude, that is, it does not contradict the characteristic solipsism of the natural attitude. Hence, our equation above of intentional analysis and ego-aggrandisement in our perception of others. Thus, intentionality gives access only to the solipsistic modes of cognition. The mistake which phenomenology has made is that of assuming that the mode of reliability proper to the natural attitude, intentionality, is the sole characteristic of necessity. We have attempted to overcome the solipsistic tendencies of this approach, which would as a consequence make necessity a private concern, by demonstrating that necessity inheres in experience as the union of conscious intentionality and the self-givenness of phenomena. Further, the need for such a completion is indicated in the doctrine of intentionality itself which declares that consciousness is consciousness of something other than the conscious act itself. Thus intentionality is fulfilled and completed in the apprehension of this other object in the experience of its self-givenness. Thus, each intentional act identifies itself as partial and, further, identifies the apprehension of that which completes it.



We refer to the self-evidence or self-givenness of phenomena as their distinctiveness; that which in being presented reveals the nature of phenomena. It is evidence because it reveals phenomena to consciousness; it is self because it is the nature of phenomena. It therefore, like the acts of intentional consciousness, is immanent. As intentional acts of consciousness are indubitable expressions of ego, the presentation of self-evidence is indubitable expression of phenomena. This would seem to raise an insoluble problem because that which is immanent, and therefore indubitable, refers to itself and nothing else. Thus, it may appear that we have succeeded only in re-asserting our initial problem of the distinction between what is and what we think is, because have we not established the distinct immanent existence of the realms of consciousness and phenomena? That is, the reliability of evidence concerning these two realms is purely immanent to each realm and therefore, it would appear, cannot be transferred into a reliable datum of the other realm. We have asserted that experience is the integration of these two realms, it is therefore necessary to demonstrate that despite the immanent reliability of consciousness and phenomena that experience is possible.

It is our contention that consciousness and phenomena are, by their nature, directed towards each other because they require each other. It has been noted that consciousness is consciousness of and equally phenomena's self-evidence is evidence for that which apprehends evidence. This is what is meant by the statement that the self-evidence of objects is presentational. That which has the quality of apprehension in its nature is consciousness. This is the positing quality of consciousness which is based on the intentional nature of consciousness, that is, conscious acts necessarily involve the positing of an object. Therefore, the presentation of an object's self-evidence is presentation to an

object-directed consciousness, and that which is intended in conscious acts is the self-evidence of phenomena. Kant stated that the "I think" must accompany all our presentations. This is a solipsistic, i.e. naive, distortion of the basic transcendental truth which is expressed as "it can be thought accompanies every phenomenon's self-evident presentations".

Thus we have demonstrated not just the immanent relationship of intentionality and consciousness and the immanent relationship of presentation and the self-evidence of phenomena but also the immanent inter-relationship, the necessary belonging, of each of these pairs for the other. Therefore, intentional consciousness and presentational self-evidence are of themselves, for each other. Thus, there are two inter-related spheres which are directed towards each other and which are fulfilled by each other. Consciousness intends qualities or phenomena; phenomena are self-evidently presented to consciousness. Without the self-evidence of phenomena the intentional acts of consciousness could not be fulfilled; without the intentional being of consciousness, objects could not be realised. Thus consciousness is consciousness of objects, and objects are objects for consciousness. Only if the truth of this statement is recognised can we know that our perceptions are perceptions of something rather than nothing.

The fulfillment of consciousness and object in each other is the experience of the being of the phenomena in which this being is realised as a content of consciousness. Thus consciousness lives in the being of the object; in Schutz's terminology they grow old together. In this experience the object is qualitatively grasped, and its qualities are thus open to conceptualisation and presentation as ideas. Thus, experience is the situation of the conscious realisation of an object's self-givenness; object being understood in the sense of essence or fully apprehended phenomenon.



An obvious question in relation to this account of the inter-relationship of consciousness and phenomena is why the experience, the conscious grasp of essence, is not an everyday matter. That is, how is error or doubt possible, how is it that this inter-relationship is frustrated and experience not attained? This topic has been discussed above\*, is relation to the effects of interests, presuppositions etc. on our cognition but one final point requires clarification. Phenomena can present only their selves, they do not deceive, therefore there is no need for a new set of reductions of the object to parallel the reduction of consciousness. It is necessary that we understand that the aim of the reductions of consciousness is a grasp of the self-evident, which is achieved in unhindered perception. If we are deceived concerning the nature of phenomena it is because we deceive ourselves by failing to realise those conditions in which our intentions can be fulfilled. These are the conditions of transcendental consciousness.

We have established the epistemological grounds of our quest for reliable intersubjective knowledge by overcoming the dichotomy between essence and fact and by demonstrating the necessary inter-relationship of consciousness and phenomena. In so doing we have also clarified our position on the ontological status of consciousness, phenomena and essence. It is therefore necessary that we deal directly with our main problem which is the establishment of the possibility of reliable knowledge of others. In so doing we intend to demonstrate the intimate relationship between reliability and intersubjectivity and to establish the epistemological status of intersubjectivity as fundamental knowledge. The first step in this argument is a clarification of the means by which experience is to be assured.

\* re Chapter 1.

### A REVISION OF THE METHOD OF REDUCTION

Our argument that the attainment of experience, the indubitable, conscious grasp of self-evidence, is dependant upon a critique of consciousness is basically similar to Husserl's position. We therefore accept the inevitability of the method of reduction. However, in the previous sections of this discussion we have criticised Husserl for maintaining naive assumptions which prevented him from realising the full value of the phenomenological theory and method; his notion of the reductions is no exception. It is the reductions and, above all, their culmination in Transcendental consciousness which is held responsible for Husserl's solipsism. This view is correct, but we wish to demonstrate that Husserl's decline into solipsism was a consequence of his misunderstanding the nature of the reductions and Transcendental consciousness. It is our contention that, far from being inevitably solipsistic, the reductions and Transcendental consciousness, if fully understood, are the means of establishing intersubjectivity as a reliable datum.

The naive assumption contained in Husserl's notion of the reductions concerns not their operation but their ontological status. Husserl recognises that conscious acts, including the reductions, not only have objects but also subjects, that is, consciousness itself. However, Husserl does not apply the same searching examination to the subject of the reductions as he does to their objects. Thus he naively assumes that the subject of the reductions is consciousness and that consciousness is individual. That is, consciousness is the consciousness belonging to ego, an isolated individual such as "you" or "I". This naive assumption is the source of Husserl's solipsism.

As in previous considerations this naive assumption may seem to be the merest common-sense. Is it not the case that consciousness is always



my consciousness and that I am an individual, albeit living in a world of other conscious individuals whom I understand by projecting my consciousness onto their acts? Therefore consciousness belongs to an individual subject. This belief is commonsense and that is why it is never questioned within the natural attitude and therein lies the danger of our being misled by it. It is true that within the natural attitude consciousness is perceived as individual and this is a consequence of the practical orientation of the natural attitude which recognises phenomena in terms of its utility or value for self. However, we wish to argue that consciousness is not necessarily individual and that, indeed, consciousness is not even primarily individual.

We propose to justify this claim by considering the objects of the reductions, that is, the nature of those things which are bracketed. We have identified the objects of the reductions as the unquestioned assumptions which we hold concerning the nature of the phenomenon. Further, the reductions also aim at bracketing the phenomenon's outer horizon of qualities which appear with it in the eidetic complex or which are commonly associated with it, and the inner horizon of specific instances of the appearance of the phenomenon. The one thing which these bracketed phenomena have in common is that they are all predicated of self. Thus, the bracketed unquestioned assumptions are mine, they belong to my identification of the phenomenon. Their unquestioned status, the absence of the confirmation of their necessity, identifies them as being reliably only mine. I cannot posit that they are held by others. Indeed, these assumptions identify the phenomenon as phenomenon as it is perceived by me. Similarly, the outer horizon of the eidetic complex, excluding the phenomenon which is the object of enquiry, is a particular, perhaps even unique appearance of the phenomenon. That is,

because essences are free to combine, the phenomenon in question could appear to others within a totally different eidetic complex. Thus the reduction of the outer horizon is the reduction of the particular context of the appearance of the phenomenon to me. There is no necessity that this context be present in the appearance of the phenomenon to others. Thus, the only reliable assertion concerning the connection between the eidetic complex and the phenomenon is that this was the context in which the phenomenon appeared to me. Finally, the reduction of the inner horizon is the reduction of the particularisations of qualities which are generically required in the ontological status of the phenomenon. Thus, these particularisations are peculiar to my perception of the phenomenon, they cannot be posited as necessary for all perceptions of the phenomenon. Once again, the only reliable assertion concerning the relationship between the particularisations and the phenomenon is that this is how the phenomenon appeared to me.

Thus, the effect of the reductions is to eliminate those aspects of the appearance of the phenomenon which pertain to my perception as the distinctive act of an individual consciousness. That is, anything which reliably belongs to the sphere of "I" is to be excluded. Thus the reductions are a removal of commitment to and reliance upon the idea of a self-here and the false identification of the phenomenon with the mode of its appearance to a self-here. Therefore, only through this process of a reduction of this commitment to a self-here can we distinguish between the experience of the object itself and the experience of a subjective projection onto the appearance of the object.

Thus the reductions bracket self-consciousness i.e. the consciousness which belongs to self. We will call the consciousness which remains after this process Transcendental consciousness, following Husserl's terminology. It is therefore necessary that we clarify the nature of



this consciousness and in particular that we expound the subject of Transcendental consciousness which we will show to be nothing other than all rational beings and thus establish Transcendental consciousness as the ground of intersubjectivity. This is in marked contrast to Husserl for whom Transcendental consciousness was a clarified naive consciousness and the Transcendental Ego was the contemplative individual who was the subject of Transcendental consciousness. Thus there was a multiplicity of individual, distinct Transcendental Ego's. Thus Husserl states that the aim of transcendental knowledge is the explanation of structural typicality by analysing, "the system of possible objectivities and their inner and outer horizon. Eidetic universals precede all conceptualisations e.g. factual ego is only a possible modification of the a priori Transcendental Ego"<sup>(4)</sup>. If this is taken to mean that the Transcendental Ego is the essence of factual ego then it implies, that the Transcendental Ego is universal because the factual ego is only one possible appearance of the Transcendental Ego. That is, my ego is only one possibility among an infinity of egos, each of which is a modification of, and thereby contained within, the Transcendental Ego. Thus, the Transcendental Ego is the basis of all possible ego's and therefore to speak of my Transcendental Ego, as Husserl frequently does, is a nonsense. Again, this is evidence of Husserl's failure to grasp the full meaning of the phenomenological method.

#### TRANSCENDENTAL CONSCIOUSNESS AND INTERSUBJECTIVITY

Transcendental consciousness is that which has necessity as its object; that is, it is that which is intentionally directed to essence or phenomena-in-themselves. We must therefore consider the ontological status of the Transcendental Ego, the subject of Transcendental consciousness. We propose to establish Transcendental consciousness as intersubjective consciousness and the Transcendental Ego as the species-identity

of all rational beings. We do not propose to achieve this by claiming that as the reductions bracket self-consciousness, the only consciousness which can remain must be not-self, that is intersubjective. This conclusion would not prevent us from equating the Transcendental Ego with culture or other social groups and the problems associated with such a position have been noted above\*. Equally, we do not propose to rest our argument on the justifiable claim that the acceptance of the intersubjective nature of transcendental consciousness would avoid Husserl's decline into solipsism because we must firstly establish the reasonableness of accepting such a claim. The fact that solipsism is unacceptable does not guarantee the reliability of any particular anti-solipsistic argument. Nevertheless these two arguments have some value. The avoidance of solipsism justifies the attempt to establish the identity of genuine intersubjectivity and transcendental consciousness with each other. Equally, the recognition that the reductions bracket self-consciousness raises the possibility that the residual Transcendental consciousness could be intersubjective. That is, these arguments establish the desirability of the identity between Transcendental consciousness and intersubjectivity and that such an identity is possible.

We base the justification of our equation of intersubjectivity and transcendental consciousness on a consideration of the meaning of necessity. We have affirmed that necessary knowledge is knowledge which is required by the nature of the phenomenon; that necessity is immanent to phenomena. This means that necessary knowledge is fixed and invariable. Thus, there can be no sense in the idea that there is my necessary knowledge as opposed to your necessary knowledge. There is simply necessary knowledge for us all. We have previously described the inter-relationship of consciousness

\* re especially below chapter 4.



and phenomena, is that consciousness is of phenomena and phenomena are for consciousness. It is therefore clear that as necessity is always the same that it can be grasped only by a consciousness which is not one among alternative consciousnesses. That is, there can be no individual differences in the apprehension of necessity. Thus, my apprehension of necessity must be in every way identical to your apprehension of necessity. Therefore, in grasping necessity the distinction between me and you is transcended. As a consequence, there can be no possibility of positing distinct individual consciousnesses in the apprehension of necessity. Thus, transcendental consciousness, ie. the consciousness of necessity, is intersubjective consciousness.

It could be objected that this argument is inadequate because it uses the vague term "us all" to refer to the inter-subjective community of Transcendental consciousness. In clarifying this term we will be clarifying the nature of the Transcendental Ego.

Thus,

the Transcendental Ego is the community of those who can apprehend necessity. Necessity is apprehended in theoretical contemplation, in a rational intuition. Therefore, the Transcendental Ego is the community<sup>\*(1)</sup> of rational beings<sup>\*(2)</sup>. This reveals Transcendental consciousness as the

<sup>\*(1)</sup> We use the term "community" to refer to that intersubjectivity which cannot be reduced to a complex of differentiated subjectivities. The term "association" is reserved for the common idea of intersubjectivity as that which proceeds from and is a sum of, differentiated subjectivities.

<sup>\*(2)</sup> It could be argued that our equation of intersubjective and rational is not new or satisfactory because much of human action is irrational. Therefore, we are limiting understanding to the rational. This criticism confuses my use of "rational" with that found in the rationality debate in sociology and anthropology in which rationality is taken to mean either the use of efficient means or as the outcome of correct logical or empirical processes. Rationality, as we have defined it, precedes all of these, being the recognition of necessity in my perception, the apprehension of essence on which all these other notions of rationality are predicated. It is true that not all our perceptions are rational because they may be distorted by naive assumptions. This, however, does not make rationality, as we have defined it, any less universal because a) all intentional acts seek the status of necessity, they all have eidetic apprehension as their object. Including those acts in which actors contemplate their action, either in prospect or retrospect, (b) the rational world of eidetic necessity not peculiar to particular consciousnesses but is freely available to all.

ground of all rational positing and therefore as universal rationality. The Transcendental Ego is therefore the undifferentiated community of rational beings in their rational positings.

Thus, the intersubjective community consists of all those who can apprehend necessity that is, all rational beings. We term this "genuine" intersubjectivity because it is not a temporary and incomplete sharing or coincidence of individual consciousnesses but is originary intersubjectivity.\* That is, because of the priority of necessity, this intersubjectivity which has necessity as its object is prior to and the condition of individual subjectivity and those associations of individual subjects which are commonly referred to as intersubjective.

Thus, we equate genuine intersubjectivity with the universal rationality of the apprehension of necessity. This is the cognitive parallel of our clarification of the inter-relationship of consciousness experience and the self-presentation of phenomena. That is, the consciousness referred to is transcendental consciousness which has the genuine intersubjective community as its subject or Ego; the experience of phenomena is a rational apprehension of phenomena which present themselves, that is, they present their necessary qualities, their self. Thus objective knowledge, that is knowledge of phenomena in themselves, is identified with genuinely intersubjective, and therefore universally available, knowledge.

Further, the problems of solipsism and error are both resolved in Transcendental consciousness. We have identified the genuine intersubjective nature of Transcendental consciousness, therefore error, in the sense of the inadequate apprehension of necessity, the unfulfilled experience of phenomena, is the failure to achieve the intersubjective grounds of reliable knowledge. Thus the judgement of the truth or error of our grasp of the nature of things is grounded in intersubjectivity.

\*It should be clear by now that Transcendental consciousness is not to be equated with common consciousness or group mind, in the sense of a consciousness which replaces individual consciousness.



### INTRUSION AND LEARNING

It should be noted that our own and other subjects' conscious acts are included in the category of objects and which therefore are apprehended in their self-presentation. The significance of this is not simply that it establishes the accessibility of other subjects. As noted above, experience seizes the object in its necessary qualities, in its species-being ie. that which identifies the phenomenon as such and such. Thus, the eidetic grasp of other subjects' conscious acts is the species-contemplation of rational self-conscious being because this reveals the various modes of being of rational contemplative subjects as a species, including both the subject and object of the eidetic apprehension. Thus, in apprehending the other's mode of being as a rational subject we also realise the possibilities of our own being; that is I perceive that this mode of being is available to and possible for me. Therefore, the eidetic apprehension of other subjects is unique in that the position of subject and object of this act of transcendental consciousness is interchangeable; he could apprehend in me the same self-presentation which I apprehend in him. This provides the self-evidence of both the existence and apprehension of other subjects because in the eidetic apprehension of other subjects we also apprehend our selves as we could be. That is, we learn about the possibilities of our mode of being; what they are, we could be. A supposed apprehension of other subjects' mode of being which has no consequence for the growth of our self-knowledge is inadequate because either the subject is no subject ie. is not capable of rational contemplation or our apprehension is inadequate and the self-evidence of the other subject has been overlooked and thus what we apprehend is our self-projection onto the other's acts.

Thus, it could be possible to follow Scheler and argue that our knowledge of others is primordial because the grasp of the species mode

of being presented in the other subject's acts conveys its immediately available self-evidence. Thus, the adequacy of our grasp of essence could be guaranteed by considering the possibility of the perception of the object by other subjects. This does not mean simply reaching an agreement with others but establishing that the perceived essence or mode of being of the object is intersubjectively available ie. establishing that our perception of the object is eidetic and is an instance of rational apprehension as such. This is relevant to our contention, in relation to our critique of relativism and of existing methods of attaining intersubjective knowledge within sociology, that the crisis of knowledge is the crisis of establishing the intersubjective availability of what is naively seen as private knowledge. That is, we have shown that Transcendental consciousness, the consciousness which has genuine intersubjectivity as its subject, is prior to individual consciousness in that it establishes the basis of all the positing acts of individual consciousness, in the same way in which meaning is prior to significance.

This procedure enables us to achieve intersubjective understanding as the process of revealing the "I" in "Thou". This indicates our basic disagreement with empathic theories of our knowledge of others which because of their solipsistic assumptions invert the self-evident relationship between self and species; "I" and "We". That is, empathic theories see self as primordial, others as derived, therefore the other is self writ large. The possibility of the growth of self-knowledge is denied because if self is basic there is no source from which self can learn about itself. Equally, the empathic approach cannot account for the other-ness of the other, that is why we do in fact perceive him to be not I although, within the natural attitude, we may be forced to assume that the quality of otherness is irrelevant. That is, the empathic approach



has to deny the otherness of the other which it assumes in initially identifying the other as not being self.

This indicates an evidence for both the otherness of the other and the possibility of genuine intersubjective understanding in a phenomenon for which empathic theories find it difficult to account. This is the experience of intrusion, that is the experience of being effected by an other. Examples of this experience are surprise, the recognition of novelty, "news". That is, these are phenomena which present themselves as foreign to ego's knowledge or expectations and whose presence cannot be accounted for by ego in terms of his intentions. Thus, the person who sees a tramp and feels pity does so because he believes that he knows what it is like to be destitute even though he may never have been destitute himself. Therefore, the recognition of intrusion convinces ego that he is not the only possible subject and further that other subjects cannot be regarded merely as "ego-there" as opposed to "ego-here". However, it could be argued that intrusion alone cannot provide evidence of intersubjectivity because is it not the case that the surprising, the novel etc. are made comprehensible by being defined as a particular instance of an already familiar type of knowledge. We accept that this is possible and that, indeed, this is the method of empathic understanding. However, against this we set the phenomenon of learning, that is, the addition to knowledge as opposed to the expansion of existing knowledge. In the case cited above, the person perceiving the destitute tramp gains knowledge which contemplation on his own experiences could not provide. This is confirmed in contemplation when we recognise a new understanding, a mode of apprehension which had previously not been available to us. If all our understanding was empathic there could not be any possibility of such learning. It will be one aim of our subsequent discussion to clarify how

such learning is possible; how we can learn from others, that is how we can acquire as part of our own knowledge, experience which belongs to another person. Thus, the phenomena of intrusion and learning contradict the views that either others are simply projections of self or that knowledge of others as distinct from self is not possible.

Thus, genuine understanding is to be achieved in a situation of participation with the other, in which we place ourselves in the situation of learning from the other by permitting his experiences to intrude onto us. We therefore reject the validity of the idea of the disinterested spectator as expressed by Schutz and Husserl. It is clear that learning can be achieved only by a denial of the priority or all-inclusiveness of our ego-perspective and by the attainment of a basic communality which unites self and other. This situation is guaranteed by the elimination of reliance upon our ego-perspective in the reductions and by the adoption of the universally rational perspective of the Transcendental Ego.

Therefore, there is a sense in which claims to have apprehended primordial data are intersubjectively verifiable. We do not mean by this the process of persuading others of the truth of something outside their experience by showing that our procedures have conformed to rules which we all accept. In this type of verification we are telling our audience that if they had investigated the phenomenon they would have reached the same conclusions because they would have used those procedures which we used; the fact of our different personalities is therefore irrelevant. Such a notion of verification is inappropriate to phenomenology because mere rule-following cannot reveal essence. It is true that there are procedural rules in phenomenology e.g. the reductions, but these are intended only to create the conditions in which eidetic intuition can take place. The priority of Transcendental consciousness and its



affinity with intersubjectivity indicates that the appropriate method of intersubjective verification in phenomenology is not that of persuading someone of the truth of an alien experience but, based on the fact that primordial data are intersubjectively accessible, of persuading others to identify the essence within the possibilities of their own experience. That is, we seek to intrude the primordial knowledge into their experience. Thus, intersubjective verification is guaranteed when the other recognises his experience of the primordial datum. The failure to produce this response is not evidence of the inadequacy of the initial eidotic perception but does require that this perception be closely examined<sup>\*(1)</sup> The means of achieving such intrusion and verification will be clarified below.<sup>\*(2)</sup>

Our account of intersubjectivity, by revealing universal rationality and therefore the accessibility of other's mode of being as that which is not ours but which could be ours, permits us to maintain the otherness of other subjects but prevents this otherness from being regarded as alien to self, that is, as being inexplicable in terms other than self-projection. Thus, our account of genuine intersubjectivity does not destroy the distinctiveness of the other but makes this quality accessible to us; we preserve the otherness of the other without making it alien to our understanding. Thus, it should be clear that in denying the necessity of the approach to intersubjectivity which seeks to understand the other by self-projection i.e. affirming that he is like I, we are not simply inverting this position by attempting to reduce self to other i.e. affirming that I am like him. Our aim in establishing the realm of intersubjectivity in universal rationality is to establish intersubjectivity as prior to

<sup>\*(1)</sup> re below section on error in chapter 2.

<sup>\*(2)</sup> re the discussion of models and metaphors below p.408.

subjectivity. Thus our idea of genuine intersubjectivity is based on the affirmation that we can be like each other.

It could be objected that our idea of genuine intersubjectivity does in fact destroy the other's distinctiveness. That is, in understanding the other by reference to universal rationality, we must destroy the fact that there is an other because the only possible subject of universal rationality is "we", therefore any sense of "you" must be excluded.

There is some measure of truth in this argument, but it fails because it is based on an inadequate apprehension of the relationship between "I", "you" and "we". That is, in asserting the mutual exclusion of "you" and "we" it infers from the recognition of the distinctiveness of "you" the belief that such distinctiveness is to be equated with alien-ness or inaccessibility. This is clearly false and is a version of the general belief in the existence of unknowable phenomena, because in asserting the other to be distinct we are claiming to have apprehended qualities of the other which are not found in self. That is, the recognition of the other as being distinct from self necessarily implies the recognition of qualities specific to the other and therefore is based upon an implicit recognition of the accessibility of the other. Indeed the approach which does annihilate others is that, typical of empathy and the naive attitude, which fails to recognise the distinctiveness of others from self. Similarly, this objection to our argument is based on this idea of an intersubjective community, "we", which consists of a multiplication of my particular "I". As opposed to this we have established genuine intersubjectivity as the communality of different "I"s. Further, apart from overlooking the fact of the distinctive horizon in which the other is presented, the objection fails to recognise the significance of our learning from others as a consequence of the apprehension of others in



Transcendental consciousness. If we were as isolated from others as the objection suggests there could be no possibility of learning; that is, of acquiring a development in self which originates outside self. It must be remembered that learning is always learning from a source external to self. Only in this sense can we speak of a self which develops and changes. That is, the idea that what the other is, I could be, which is consequent upon transcendental apprehension, is possible only if the other is seen as not "I". Thus, in our view "we"-ness does not refer to identity but to the common basis of all individual subjectivity, to the common possession of possible modes of being. That is "we" includes but does not destroy "I" and "you".

It is possible that this objection to our argument is based on the belief that since the apprehension of "we" is gained within transcendental consciousness, we cannot derive knowledge concerning "I" or "you" from such apprehension because these categories belong to naive consciousness. Such an objection overlooks the fact that the phenomenological reductions bracket but do not destroy naive consciousness but it does raise the important question of the relationship between naive and transcendental consciousness.

#### TRANSCENDENTAL CONSCIOUSNESS AND NAIVE CONSCIOUSNESS

It must be emphasised that we are not urging the replacement of the natural attitude by transcendental consciousness; we do not see naive subjectivity and the Transcendental Ego as opposed or contradictory. Such a view would be ridiculous because naive and transcendental consciousness have their own distinct but not unrelated spheres. The natural attitude is practical and ego-centric, it is concerned with the self living in the world. Transcendental consciousness is theoretical, intersubjective and is concerned with knowing the world. Thus transcendent

and naive consciousness cannot replace each other. The relationship between these modes of consciousness is complementary. Naive consciousness selects phenomena on the grounds of interest and thus the transcendental apprehension of the phenomena is relevant to practical values. Transcendental consciousness clarifies the natural attitude world of objects and thus provides that reliable knowledge which is presupposed in naive, practical activity. However, it must be noted that this does not abolish the precariousness of everyday life because precariousness is the quality of this life, it is a necessary aspect of our practical living in the world which is an imposing of self on the world. Our goals, values, interests etc. by which we orientate the world to our selves are not immanent to world-phenomena. Thus, we do not deal with the world just as it is, this is the realm of reliability, but as it has significance for us. It is this distinction between meaning and significance which creates precariousness, which opens up the possibilities of change. However, it is the fact that meaning is implied, however unclearly, as prior in significant judgements which permits us to make sense of our precarious, though not chaotic, existence and to feel secure within it.

We must take this argument further. Transcendental consciousness is intersubjective, naive consciousness is individual. Transcendental consciousness is the realm of meaning and reliability, naive consciousness is the realm of significance and precariousness\*. We have established that genuine intersubjectivity is prior to individuality and that, therefore, intersubjective understanding is possible in the same way in which meaning precedes significance. Thus, our naive consciousness is one of the possibilities contained within Transcendental

\* The failure of empathy, and similar theories, is that they try to make the natural attitude attempt theoretical speculation to which it is not suited.



consciousness. <sup>\*(1)</sup> This is why self, the naive ego, changes but self, Transcendental Ego, always remains the same ie. this is why we can recognise changes in our self but recognise also that these were always changes in the same self. That is, changes in our individual being are always within the possibilities of our species being which latter is always part of our self-identity.

It could be objected that we have created a dualism within the individual who contradictorily possesses two consciousnesses, one of which is individual and unreliable, <sup>\*(2)</sup> the other of which is intersubjective and reliable. We admit the general accuracy of this statement but we deny that our position is contradictory. In order to clarify our position in relation to this problem, it is necessary to consider our concept of the person.

#### THE PERSON <sup>\*(3)</sup>

In this section we intend to develop the precoding argument in such a way as to offer a solution to the problem of our individual and social nature. That is, the problem of how we are, at the same time, "I" and "We" and the nature of the relationship between these identities.

There is a tendency to equate the human person with the notion of the individual. This, as will be seen, is naive and reflects the solipsistic assumptions of the natural attitude. We do not intend to claim that

<sup>\*(1)</sup> It could be objected that, in fact, we cannot understand the other, because his actions are oriented to precarious, individual significance and not to intersubjective, reliable meaning. This argument 1) overlooks the fact that actors contemplate their actions and therefore intend meaning, 2) projects the unreliability of knowledge based on significance onto the reliability of knowledge of (ie. about) significance. That is, all significant acts are phenomena and therefore have their own distinctive self-evidence through which it can be apprehended as such and such. Once again we see the dangers in the ambiguity of the term "of".

<sup>\*(2)</sup> We must emphasise that the unreliability of the natural attitude refers only to attempts to have it usurp the theoretical role of Transcendental consciousness.

<sup>\*(3)</sup> This notion derives, initially, from the concept of Person in MARITAIN "THE PERSON AND THE COMMON GOOD" UNIVERSITY OF NOTRE DAME PRESS, 1966.

this view is wrong but that it is one-sided and incomplete because it ignores the intersubjective dimension of our existence with which the natural attitude cannot cope.

Our re-appraisal of the reductions has revealed two levels of intentional consciousness and, correspondingly, two levels of subjectivity. These are, firstly, that which is consciousness of something as it has significance for me; this is the mode of consciousness of the natural attitude. Secondly, that which is consciousness of something in itself for all rational beings (the Transcendental Ego); this is the mode of transcendental consciousness. We tend to assume that there is only one mode of consciousness because consciousness is my consciousness, and as there is only one "me" there can only be one consciousness, that of mundane life. This is an important point because consciousness has not only an object, but also a subject i.e. the knower. Are we then to believe that one subject, "me" has two modes of consciousness and therefore two egos and if so which is the real ego?

We accept this argument but not its absurd implications because we perceive these two ego's as not distinct, but as complementary and interlocking and which together constitute the Person.

The attainment of genuine intersubjectivity, the apprehension of modes of possible being for all rational subjects in transcendental consciousness, is an act of the Person in which the individual identity of the Person is literally transcended, that is contained in and risen above, by the intersubjective identity of the Person; that is, the Person's species identity as a rational contemplative being. Thus 'I' is not opposed by but is contained in the idea of 'We'. Hence we refer to the individual and the intersubjective as two modes of consciousness of the Person, rather than as two distinct consciousnesses. Thus the



Person can perceive phenomena in either of these modes although, as established above, the individual mode is dependant upon the mode of transcendental consciousness. The crisis of knowledge to which Husserl frequently referred originates in the failure to recognise the transcendental mode of consciousness and the complementarity between it and the mundane consciousness of the Person in its individual aspect. This complementarity is based on the fact that genuine intersubjective consciousness, in transcending the individual, contains it. Thus "I", the individual aspect, is a realisation or particular application of "We", the intersubjective mode of the Person. Therefore "We" is not derived from, but is prior to, "I" and is immanent in the Person. Also "We", as the subject of transcendental consciousness, is universal and stable. Thus, the notion of self which persists in all our contemplations is the intersubjective being of "We", whereas the notion of self which we recognise as constantly changing is the individual being of "I". The notion of the reality of our individual being, although constantly changing, does not disintegrate because each phase of the "I" is a particular application of a universally intersubjective mode of rational being which is prior to "I" and which is contained in the Person as "We". Thus the unity between the individual and intersubjective aspects of the Person can be expressed in the idea that every action performed by any Person is to be conceived of as the situation of "We-here", that is, as a mode of universal intersubjectivity in this particular situation.

Thus, a sociology which seeks to understand others must direct its enquiries towards the other as Person, initially in its intersubjective mode as the common ground between the observer and the actor as Persons. Thus, the action must be understood as a particular instance of a universal possibility which the observer shares with the actor. This is not a distortion or generalisation of the actor's self-understanding

because he understands his action in the same way in which an observer understands it, that is by identifying its universal species identity. That is, the actor like the observer seeks to understand his action by identifying the mode of universal possibility to which it belongs. Thus, like Wittgenstein, although for different reasons, we deny the possibility of a genuinely private language. This is because in contemplation the actor perceives his action as he would perceive another actor's action or as the observer perceives the action, that is, as an object.\* Thus, we do not rule out the possibility that the observer's understanding may be superior to the actor's own understanding, although such a judgement must be based on the guarantee that both actor and observer are seeking to understand the same presented quality in the action. We respect the view held by many interpretive sociologists that for the sociologist to claim the superiority of his understanding of the action is in fact an arrogant imposition of his perspective onto that of the actor. However, such a position is tenable only if the sociologist cannot guarantee the reliability of his understanding. That is, this humble sociology is appropriate only to sociology which relies upon the natural attitude. A sociology which is founded upon reliable transcendental apprehension would be guilty of bad faith if it distorted the possibilities of its method by accepting such limitations. Further, such transcendentially grounded or phenomenological sociology would offer the possibility of advancing beyond the sterile descriptiveness which seems to be the hallmark of much interpretive sociology, to a genuinely critical sociology. That is to a sociology which does not crudely tell the actor he is wrong

\*Of course, the action is an eidetic complex and thus actor and observer may select different, presented qualities as the object of contemplation but it would be mistaken to infer from this that one or other has to be wrong, to do so is to confuse difference and error. see below ALTERNATIVISM v RELATIVISM chapter 1.



because he does not accept the prejudices on which the sociologist bases this judgement, but which creates the possibility of sociologist and actor learning from each other; the possibility for both of them of advancing beyond their present level of understanding.

This clarification of our understanding of the concept of the Person and its implications for sociology should make apparent our objection to the methodological individualist approach to sociological understanding which is posited on the uniqueness of individuals.

Thus, we see the principal obstacle to the attainment of understanding in sociology, as not simply the growth of relativism occasioned by the application of Wittgensteinian principles or the agnostic approach of ethnomethodology but the individualist work of Schutz\* who attempted to base understanding on solipsistic premises based on the assumption of the priority of "I". The effect of this was to substitute understanding with comprehension, thus making knowledge of others in themselves unreliable. Such an approach is appropriate to the practical natural attitude but a sociology which claims to understand others and which expects to be understood by others must adopt the transcendental method.

Our discussion shows that it is possible to conceive of the notion of "we" in two senses. The first sense, that of the natural attitude, is of "we" as a collection of "I"'s who happen to be in spatio-temporal proximity or who share each others' ideas, interests and perspectives. In this notion "we" is derivative and the idea of "we" as an entity in itself is regarded as spurious or artificial. The second idea of "we", that of transcendental consciousness, is of a community in-itself; the universal modes of rational being of which particular modes of being are possibilities. We support this latter idea because, as well as

\* re below chapter 5.

partaking in the reliability of transcendental data, it establishes the pre-condition of our recognition of other "I"s in themselves by making accessible a community which is common and basic for all our individualities. The implication of this idea is that anyone who wishes to understand "I", must first of all grasp "we", whether or not the "I" under consideration is one's self or an other self. This process is unclearly attempted in the everyday contemplation of our own actions but in so far as it remains committed to the priority of the individual perspective and the belief that "I" is the paradigm for all other "I"s, it attains practical, not rational, knowledge. Thus, intersubjective consciousness is not only possible but is the condition for the full apprehension of individual consciousness, including our own. It is not a group mind but is the mode of species-consciousness in relation to which individual consciousnesses are not mere reflections, but equal possibilities. Finally, we have shown the identity of transcendental and intersubjective consciousness. It was the major failing of Husserl's work that he never recognised this relationship and unquestioningly assumed that all consciousness is individual. That is, he failed to realise that the transcendental reduction, transcends and fulfills not only the individual object of the reduction but also the individual subject which performs the reduction. Thus we can conceive of the Person not as an individual rational being but as a rational individual, that is, our rational being, our communal life, is prior to, and the condition of, our individual existence.

We have located in the universal rationality of the Transcendental Ego that intersubjective mode of being which Husserl identified with the Lebenswelt, or life-world of us all. However our notion of universal

\* In accepting the idea of such a community, our position is similar to that of Scheler, re above chapter 6. However, he perceived this community as being eventually superceded by individuality, whereas we have argued that the community is always available and is the permanent ground of individuality.



rationality does not suffer from the cultural relativism and ego-aggrandisement which we have seen to be implied in Husserl's notion. As a consequence we can affirm that, unlike the Lebenswelt, the world of universal rationality is both intersubjective and primordial and, indeed, that these terms are intimately connected as they are united in the idea of transcendental consciousness. That is, primordial data can be apprehended only in Transcendental consciousness which is the genuinely intersubjective mode of cognition, and that the only possible objects of genuinely intersubjective cognition are the primordial data of transcendental consciousness. We can express this inter-relationship in the idea that intersubjectivity (the Transcendental Ego) and primordial data (essence) are the subject and object respectively of Transcendental consciousness; that the universal quality of the rationality of Transcendental consciousness refers to the universality of both its subject and object.

Our objection to identifying universal rationality with culture extends to Scheler's \* idea of a communal world which is gradually replaced by individual worlds and to the idea of an historically located primitive culture from which all distinct cultures have emerged. The world of universal rationality is, in distinction from these ideas, the persisting ground and condition of all subjectivities and all cultures; it is not outgrown by these phenomena but is the prior condition of their possibility.

We have therefore achieved the principal purpose of our enquiry. We have shown how a reconstituted phenomenology can guarantee our understanding of others. As a consequence the programme of revised phenomenology replaces those inadequate extant methods of interpretive sociology, both nominalist and realist which fail to guarantee either

\* re above chapter 6.

intersubjective understanding or their belief in the accessibility of their findings to an audience, and which replace perception of the other with ego-aggrandisement, and understanding with comprehension.

The value of phenomenology as the foundation of an interpretive sociology which is grounded in the attainment of true intersubjective understanding is beyond doubt. We wish now to indicate briefly some further consequences, than those already noted, for the status and methods of sociology which are to be found in revised phenomenology.

#### SOME IMPLICATIONS OF REVISED PHENOMENOLOGY FOR SOCIOLOGY

Our discussion has shown the inter-relationship of intersubjectivity and primordial knowledge. If we define sociology as the study of intersubjective being<sup>\*(1)</sup>, the clarification of our species existence as rational, conscious subjects, then sociology is studying that which is the necessary condition for apprehending all other modes of our being. Thus, as a source of knowledge, revised phenomenological sociology is primary for its object is the condition of fundamental knowledge. We are not arguing in support of the imperialistic, relativistic conception of the sociology of knowledge which holds that since all knowledge is acquired within a social context it is a product of that context. Our position is rather that sociology deals directly with the source of reliable knowledge and therefore it has as its object that which is presupposed in all other enquiry and which makes possible rational enquiry in general. Therefore the knowledge acquired in sociology is prior to other knowledge.<sup>\*(2)</sup>

<sup>\*(1)</sup> We are not claiming that current sociology is the study of intersubjectivity but only that we are offering the outline of a programme in which it could achieve this end.

<sup>\*(2)</sup> In a rather roundabout way we seem to have discovered Simmel's<sup>(5)</sup> idea of the fundamental nature of sociology, although he limited this to the social sciences and probably his idea of this fundamental quality is not identical to that which is outlined here.



It may be claimed that this view of the role of sociology effectively denies any autonomy to other forms of study and thus we would encounter one of two problems. Either sociology as a term would be so embracing as to be meaningless, we would have to make distinctions between various spheres of study within "sociology" and, in fact, to regard them as autonomous. Alternatively, all other phenomena could be reduced to expressions of social phenomena. This would be a clear case of the "nothing-but" approach to phenomena which has been criticised above, and which would be an arbitrary denial of non-social quality in phenomena.

Against this view we argue that the aim of our programme of phenomenological sociology is to lay the conceptual foundations for empirical enquiry. This has a beneficial consequence for other areas of enquiry. We have discussed Husserl's idea that knowledge in general is suffering a crisis of human relevance. The crisis lies in the fact that even though our statements are true they have no human relevance; we believe them without understanding them. The recognition of the intersubjective character of basic, reliable knowledge gives us the means of resolving this problem without denying the validity of knowledge. Intersubjective knowledge is that which is available to all as the expression of species-experience. It is therefore necessary for the sciences, including empirical sociology, to overcome this crisis by presenting their investigations as encounters with the phenomenon in which all can participate. Thus, developing our notion of participation, the sciences must abandon the ideal of detachment and become involved in the phenomena in transcendental experience. The true ideal of detachment should be separated from the notion of de-humanising with which it is often confused because the common notion of detachment frustrates the attainment of intersubjectively grounded knowledge. This is because the common idea of detachment implies

the non-involvement of the researcher in his subject matter. The aim of this is to avoid the eventual presentation of the subject matter in a manner which is acceptable to the researcher alone, reflecting his values, interests and presuppositions and therefore being unacceptable as valid knowledge for others. The weakness of this idea is that it assumes that what is not individually relevant must be universally relevant; that is, if the researcher's values and interests are de-activated his research is available and relevant to all<sup>\*</sup>. There is, however, an alternative to the opposition of particular and universal relevance and that is particular and universal irrelevance. The common ideal of detachment intends universal relevance but achieves general irrelevance. This is because the requirement that the researcher be totally detached means that he does not approach it as a Person but as a monitor of measuring equipment, a calculating machine, an appendage to a tape-recorder. Relevance is a quality which can be found only in rational beings; in denying this quality of their rational being scientists create the conditions of irrelevance or, better, non-relevance.

We understand the term relevance in two ways, corresponding to the distinction between meaning and significance. Firstly, in common usage, as that which has significance for me or us as a particular social group. Secondly, that which is self-apparent, that which is the basis of knowledge and is therefore relevant to any understanding of phenomena, that is, relevant for knowledge.

Defining relevance in the first sense makes it dependant on prior perspectives, values, goals etc. and therefore no thing is generally relevant unless we happen to share the same apprehension of the significance of the thing; that is, unless it stands in the same position in respect to

\* It is possible that Husserl's pre-suppositionless ideal makes this error, re above chapter 1.



every individual's non-theoretical purposes. Even such general significance is unreliable because it is conceivable that our judgments of relevance could change. It is commonly this view of relevance which is accepted and from it derives the notion of the scientific community as the community of those who share a relevance pattern based on those taken for granted theoretical assumptions which define the community. Kuhn's<sup>(6)</sup> scientific revolution can be seen as the re-structuring of the scientific community's taken for granted assumptions and therefore its very community being. Such revolutions are possible because of the unreliability of the assumptions which define the community. Their unreliability is due to their relationship to phenomena being based on significance. Thus the scientific mode of understanding is that which has relevance for the members of the particular scientific community, and then only in their position as members of that community. Once outside the community, the relevance of science is as problematic for the scientist as it is for anyone else\*.

The second meaning of relevance, that which identifies it with meaning, as relevance for knowledge, the self-presentation of phenomena, is quite different from this. It has been established that the perception of phenomena in themselves is achieved in Transcendental consciousness which is intersubjective because its subject is rational being. Thus the meaning of transcendently apprehended phenomena is meaning for all rational beings. This is the quality of universal relevance as opposed to general relevance. It has been noted that the apprehension of the quality of an object is achieved in lived experience in which we as rational beings

\* The shortcomings of "pop" sociology are well known but it would be accurate to see such work as the product of the inadequacy and the relevance crisis of sociology, and as attempts, however inadequate, to make sociology relevant to non-members of the sociological community.

encounter phenomena. Thus, in order for science to achieve universal relevance, transcending the precarious unity of the scientific community, it is necessary that the objects of science be apprehended in lived experience of the interplay of learning and intrusion. This requires that the scientist be not detached from his subject matter but grasp it at the level of universal rationality, that is, transcendental consciousness, which, in the case of sociology, is equally available to the object of enquiry. Thus, the immediate perception of the object is the perception which is available to us all in our necessary mode of rational being. At the risk of seeming grandiose it could be stated that in apprehending phenomena in this way, the scientist experiences the object not from the position of a duplicating machine, or as an individual, nor even as a member of the scientific community, but as a rational being. Thus, the phenomenon as apprehended is accessible to all not just to the scientist himself, or to the partisan community to which he belongs. Of course, this universal perception will be put to different uses by different communities, but, in transcendental perception, these are seen as variations on a universal theme. Thus the different communities, including the communities of sociologists and actors, are not divorced from and mutually incomprehensible to each other but are united in the availability to them all of the basic grounds of knowledge. Thus, the nature of transcendental apprehension is a denial of the adequacy of the ideal of detachment and of the inviolability of the distinctions between communities. The method of attaining reliable knowledge through transcendental apprehension enables an openness to phenomena, the ability to learn from phenomena; in the case of sociology, the ability to learn from other subjects. Above all, it enables us to transcend our shifting individual and community identities in the attainment of universal



rationality which we share with all rational beings. We cannot understand others by maintaining a detachment from them or by imposing our perspective upon them but by learning from them, becoming intimately involved in their situation by apprehending the self-presentation of that situation in transcendental consciousness which unites us as Persons.

We would deduce from this a crucial and particularly appropriate task for sociology. The natural attitude should not be confused with everyday experience because it is a particular interpretation of that experience which is organised, around the achievement of the individual's practical goals. Thus, we urge the bracketing of the natural attitude in order that we may grasp everyday experience, as it is. Further, only by bracketing the natural attitude, by abandoning our commitment to it, can we raise it to the level of a problem as opposed to naively accepting its taken for granted status\*. In this context the natural attitude can be regarded as false consciousness, that is the false application of practical consciousness to theoretical problems. The intentional acts of everyday life are directed to the object itself but the practical interests which direct attention to the object are not reduced and therefore cognition is based on the natural attitude of taken for granted assumptions and effective solipsism. Thus, in everyday life we confuse knowing and using, universal and individual, we and I. Therefore our intentions are liable to frustration and non-fulfillment in the natural attitude; indeed it is these qualities which constitute the self-evidence of the natural attitude. A consequence of this is the

\*It should be clear by now that bracketing the natural attitude does not imply destroying either it or our everyday experience, although this view is sometimes asserted.(?)

precariousness of our naive existence which is based upon the knowledge that other modes of existence are possible, that actions cannot bear too close inspection otherwise their problematic status becomes apparent and,, within the natural attitude, irresolvable.

Therefore, one task for sociology is the study of this precarious existence. The demonstration of the way in which ideas of reliability are achieved, the techniques by which precariousness is effectively denied and in which potentially disruptive aspects of existence which are incompatible with our taken for granted assumptions, are avoided or disarmed of their threat. It would be possible to examine the ways in which rules of social action define the group of rule followers whose behaviour towards each other, for that reason, seems stable, secure, predictable and, above all, obvious so that any questioning of the obvious is taken as an indication of irrationality, trickery, stupidity etc.

It is true that this task has been long recognised in sociology. We need think only of Goffmann's rituals of behaviour or Garfinkel's device of "making trouble" in order to observe the recreation of the appearance of a stable reality, and of ethnomethodology and social phenomenology in general. However, all these approaches are themselves naive and inadequate because they are part of their own problem. Ethnomethodology, social phenomenology etc. are no less precarious than the social behaviour which they observe. There is in all these approaches a distinct theoretical naivete based on the fact that they cannot account for their own techniques and yet claim to be studying such techniques in others. We may accept what they say without knowing why we accept it. Perhaps the conclusions make sense to us, but do they make sense to others? For instance, Garfinkel's device only makes trouble for others. He sees himself as in command of the situation with actor's unwittingly responding to the stimulus which he provides. The absurdity of the situation is



false, it is a trick played on the actor by the sociologist who knows what is really happening. He is being devious but assumes that actors are being open, but is it possible that actors, being tacticians, may be creating trouble for Garfinkel? This idea of making trouble achieves a spurious air of reliability by distinguishing between the controlling sociologist and controlled actors who resemble nothing so much as performing dogs. There is no possibility of learning in such a situation; actors always remain "they" as opposed to the "we"-community of omnipotent trouble-making sociologists. What the actors do has no relevance for the sociologist, other than as data. Were the sociologist to admit the relevance to him of the techniques which actors use to create stability out of trouble he would be led to question the techniques which he uses to create stable conceptions out of the actors' reactions to his trouble-making. That is, he would be led to recognise that these reactions are a kind of trouble for him which he neutralises through the use of devices and techniques which are acceptable to the sociological community. Thus, would we not require a Garfinkelising of Garfinkel, a trouble-making for the sociologists, ad infinitum?

It is, therefore, no surprise that these approaches have shown marked tendencies to relativism and naive descriptiveness and the maintenance of a spurious detachment of the sociologist from the actor. How can precariousness be recognised as such except from a non-precarious, reliable position which is able to account for itself and which is not to be found in these approaches?\*

Thus the claim that social life is precarious implies a position of epistemological reliability. The burden of our argument has been that such reliability is to be found in the eidetic intuitions of transcendental consciousness and that, therefore, only transcendental sociology can fulfill the task outlined above.

\* "If the blind lead the blind, shall they not both fall into the ditch".

We have shown that the goal of phenomenology is the apprehension of essence or phenomena in themselves. As a final consideration of the value of phenomenology for sociology we intend to demonstrate the role of essence in sociology by contrasting it with the ideal type.

#### IDEAL TYPE AND ESSENCE

The concept of the ideal type has been considered above in relation to Schutz<sup>\*</sup>. However, we wish to clarify the role of essence by contrasting it with the ideal type as it is most familiarly known, that is, in the work of Weber.

The ideal type, as initially intended by Weber, was a construct of that particular aspect of the world which was the object of the sociologist's enquiry<sup>(8)</sup>. Thus it defined the enquiry's subject matter. Weber's conception of the ideal type is clearly nominalistic. It is a pragmatic construction, its adequacy being assessed by the value or utility of the knowledge which is gained from its use. The ideal type is dependant on our interests in the selection of those empirically observed traits which are to be included in it. Thus although the ideal type must be internally consistent, it is so from our particular point of view<sup>(9)</sup>. As a consequence the ideal type is one-sided.

This conception of sociological models, and its relationship to our essentialism, is expressed in Popper's statement that the use of these models explain and destroy essentialism, "It explains them for the model is of an abstract or theoretical character, and we are liable to believe that we see it, either within or behind the charging observable events, as a kind of observable ghost or essence. And it destroys them because our task is to analyse our sociological models carefully in descriptive or nominalist terms viz. in terms of individuals, their attitudes,

\* re above Chapter 5.



expectations, relations etc., a postulate which may be called 'methodological individualism'"(10). It is clear that this statement contains numerous erroneous assumptions concerning the nature of essentialism as we have defined it. Firstly, Popper assumes that reality is in flux as opposed to our fixed concepts; we have shown this to be a false idea. Further, he equates the relationship between essence and phenomena as that of a ghost in the machine and we have shown, in our identity of essence and phenomena that this is not required of essentialism. Finally, he assumes that the nominalist position is unique in being able to take individuals into account. As our notion of the Person has shown, essentialism does not have to overlook individuals nor does it encounter the solipsistic implications of methodological individualism.

However, we wish to go beyond this and show that the nominalist conception of ideal types is internally unsatisfactory and that, despite Popper, essentialism can overcome these deficiencies. The principal problems which beset the notion of the ideal type are its relationship to the reality to which it refers, Popper's statement above indicates the unreliability of this relationship, and the status of different typological apprehensions of the same phenomenon e.g. the materialist and idealist typifications of the development of capitalism.

The uncertainty and ambiguity of Weber's notion of ideal types is shown in his clearest statement of the nature of the ideal type in which he deals with the first of these problems, that of the relationship between the type and the events to which it refers. Thus he states "We can make the characteristic features of this relationship pragmatically clear and understandable by reference to an ideal type ... The ideal type concept will help to develop our skill in imputation in research; it is no hypothesis but it offers guidance to the construction of

hypotheses. It is not a description of reality but it aims to give unambiguous expression to such a description ... An ideal type is formed by the one-sided accentuation of one or more points of view and by the synthesis of a great many diffuse discreet, more or less present and occasionally absent concrete individual phenomena which are arranged according to those one-sidedly emphasised viewpoints into a unified analytical construct ... When carefully applied these concepts are particularly useful in research and exposition. In very much the same way one can work the "idea" of handicraft into a utopia by arranging certain traits actually found in an unclear state in the industrial enterprises of the most diverse epochs and countries into a consistent ideal-construct by an accentuation of their essential tendencies\*. Inasmuch as the 'points of view' from which (phenomena) can become significant for us are very diverse, the most varied criteria can be applied to the selection of traits which are to enter into the construction of an ideal type view of a particular culture", but Weber claims these traits to be, "meaningful in their essential features"(10).

There are two competing ideas concerning the nature of the relationship between ideal type and observed event contained in this statement. There is a clearly nominalist view, reflected in such notions as the one-sided accentuation of phenomena and the great variety of points of view in terms of which traits are selected for inclusion in the ideal type. It is also clear that types are constructed not discovered, However, against this there is Weber's use of such terms as "characteristic" and "essential". Nor is such terminology unusual in Weber. Thus, on another occasion, he defines the 'state' as an idea which binds together discrete phenomena which are united in a common belief concerning

\* Our Italics.



legitimate authority, not as something imposed on the data, and refers to the "conceptually essential elements",<sup>(12)</sup> of the ideal type. However, even on this occasion it is stated that the ideal type must be distinguished from reality.

We do not regard the use of these essentialist terms as a slip of the pen because Weber is using them to refer to the contents of the ideal type as if to avoid the charge of arbitrariness in type construction. That is, this initial formulation of the ideal type leaves it open to the charge that when we construct a type, we can decide what is or is not included, by any criterion which we choose. Thus, the events to which the type refers are simply storehouses of data which we raid in a random manner in order to construct our types. As Weber's use of the term "significance" suggests, such types are of interest to the person who constructs them, nor do they permit the development of knowledge. Such hypotheses as they generate may well be of interest to the type-user alone. Weber uses essentialist terms in order to imply that there is some necessary connection between the type and the events to which it refers; that the connection between the two is not private and arbitrary.

Further, Weber explicitly recognises a role for essence in sociology. Thus, "we can state on the basis of our previous discussion that the construction of type concepts, in the sense of the exclusion of the accidental, also has a place in the analysis of historically individual phenomena<sup>(13)</sup>" and "The goal of ideal type concept construction is always to make clearly explicit not the class or average character but rather the unique and individual character of cultural phenomena"<sup>(14)</sup>. However, Weber's discussion of this point makes it clear that he misunderstands the nature of essence and eidetic apprehension. Thus, he mistakenly regards the discovery and description of essence as dependant on subjective views.

Further, he regards essences as ideal types of only relative validity, that as historical circumstances change so will the essential structure of e.g. Christianity. This is a clear failure to distinguish between phenomena and their horizon. The changing of historical circumstances is a change of context not of essence, as Weber recognises in his implicit view that one can still refer to Christianity as such despite changing historical circumstances.

This essentialist aspect of Weber's notion of types is overlooked in the literature. This is not surprising because Weber failed to ground these essentialist terms and when he came to develop his ideas concerning the means of assuring the reliability of ideal types he, true to his nominalism, conceived of this problem in positivistic terms. We therefore agree with Rex<sup>(15)</sup> that Weber's ideal types became increasingly positivistic, although we do not accept his implicit approval of this trend<sup>(16)</sup>. There is a current mindless opposition to positivism in sociology where the mere mention of the term is enough to damn. Our objection to Weber's development of the ideal type is not based on dogmatic anti-positivism but on the belief, which we will justify below, that this development made redundant the ideal type. Thus, those like Hempel<sup>(17)</sup> who claim that the ideal type must be subjected to tests of verification and falsification are not distorting this notion but are merely drawing out the consequences of Weber's development of it.

The additions which Weber made to the ideal type in order to make it more rigorous fall into two categories. The first of these is the demand that the ideal type be internally consistent and produce fruitful hypotheses. These aspects do not imply a positivistic development of the ideal type, but neither do they help to resolve the problems noted above. The demand for internal consistency is reasonable because the



ideal type must be an object of thought, it should make sense in order to aid enquiry and it must be, in principle, capable of existence. Therefore, the ideal type must not be internally contradictory for if it were, none of these conditions could be met. However, consistency pertains only to the structure of that particular ideal type. In the absence of an overall ontology, it does not tell us anything about the adequacy of the relationship between the type and its objective referents nor does it exclude the possibility of other types of the same events which may not be consistent with the original type but which are also internally consistent. Similarly the criterion of the production of fruitful hypotheses may establish the utility of the type but not its reliability. That is, the type constructor may define the results of the hypotheses generated by the ideal type as fruitful, that is as useful for him, but such judgements do not imply a necessity binding upon others. Thus, these criteria are essentially solipsistic and do not validate the necessity or non-ambiguity of the type.

The second category of additions which Weber made to the ideal type do deal directly with these problems and also result in a positivist definition of the type. These are the criteria of causal and meaningful adequacy.

The notion of meaningful adequacy, as has been seen above<sup>\*</sup>, avoids the question of whose meaning is located in the type. Weber's attempts to clarify this idea through the notion of rationality, which although presented as an intersubjective concept, is based on a spurious notion of efficiency, and by ignoring the problem of values permits the substitution of actor's values by those of the type-constructor. Thus, the type is basically a self-projection of its constructor onto the situation of others.

\* re above chapter 4.

As such it is ego-aggrandising, and in so far as it can perceive only the self-identity of its constructor, it is effectively solipsistic.

The claim that types must be causally adequate means that they are to be justified as reliable by being subjected to empirical test. That is, whether or not the situations and events depicted in the type do, or did, exist or whether, as Rex emphasises, predictions made on the basis of the type are or are not falsified. This clearly transforms the type into a hypothesis to be applied according to the rules of positivist procedure.<sup>(18)</sup>

We do not object to the idea that hypotheses are to be tested. Indeed we accept the demand that hypotheses should be tested and that if an ideal type is a hypothesis then every claim made in it must be examined and verified or falsified. However, our dissatisfaction with this re-definition of the ideal type lies in the fact that calling a hypothesis an ideal type adds nothing and calling an ideal type a hypothesis loses the crucial element in enquiry. The initial concept of the ideal type identified it with that which guides and gives meaning to empirical research by identifying that aspect of reality which is to be the object of research. However, Weber's positivist conception of knowledge leads him to justify the reliability of the ideal type in this role by reversing the relationship between it and empirical enquiry. That is, the ideal type is no longer the ground and origin of empirical enquiry but is its outcome. This means that the unique value in research of the ideal type, its ability to define the reality which is to be examined and thereby its role of determining the course of enquiry, is lost. This is because the ideal type cannot be, at the same time, the origin of empirical enquiry and yet dependant on such enquiry for its contents. The positivist revision of the ideal type, at most, turns the ideal



type into an inductive model and in so doing undermines its own origins. This revised ideal type can be nothing more than a summation of research, similar to Durkheim's average type. The problem of grounding empirical enquiry persists, but the positivist revision of the ideal type make it irrelevant to a solution of this problem. Thus, the revised ideal type has no explanatory value, as Rex claims; it is only a compression of what is already known.

It is intriguing that Rex<sup>(19)</sup> argues that Weber's positivistic conception of the ideal type was not the final stage in the career of this concept but that, in his later work, Weber seems to have been close to using a version of Simmel's idea of social forms. If this is so then, as our previous discussion has shown, this transition from a positivist nominalist conception of models to the a priori realism of Simmel's forms was a remarkable about turn. However, it is noticeable that Weber never formulated the ideal type in Simmelian formal terms. Rex's argument concerning this last phase of the ideal type is based not on what Weber said but on what he did in his comparative studies. It could therefore be argued that, if he abandoned the positivist ideal type in his comparative studies, Weber acknowledged its inadequacy without being able to articulate a reliable alternative.\*

Further, Weber's failure to overcome the problem posed by the possibility of a multiplicity of internally coherent typifications of one phenomenon leads to relativism, and the acceptance of the view that all such types are equally legitimate; we simply choose whichever 'point of view' is most acceptable to us. This leads to the acceptance of the nonsensical belief that the same phenomenon can be identified with opposing types, that the claims that the phenomenon is both A and not-A

\* re our comments on Weber's comparative studies above, chapter 4, which argues that Weber did not abandon the solipsistic and ego-aggrandising consequences of his nominalism and positivism.

cannot be challenged. Thus, although types constructed by different people may be internally coherent, in relationship to each other they are plainly inconsistent, but on Weber's analysis, nothing can be done about this. As in the political field, we are supposed to choose our own God or devil and fight for it as if it were the only acceptable choice, even though we cannot justify such exclusivity to ourselves as anything but arbitrary.

The use of essence, instead of the ideal type, would avoid all these problems. Firstly, the identity of sociological models with that which is necessary in our cognition of phenomena, phenomena in itself, avoids the relativistic and sceptical consequences of Weberian ideal types. Further, the use of essence overcomes the problem of the possibility of multiple types through the application of the concept of horizon. This permits us to distinguish between ontologically independent phenomena which are presented together, to identify our naive associations of phenomena with each other, and particular instances of generically required phenomena. Thus, because essence is identified with phenomena in itself there can be only one essential type of the phenomenon. If there appears to be more than one such type of the phenomenon we are able to determine whether in fact the types do refer to the same phenomenon or whether one or both retain the self-evidence of inadequate perception\*. Also, the problem of varying perspectives and of each ideal type being constructed in accordance with the particular perspective of the type constructor is overcome through our distinction between meaning and significance. Significant judgements do refer to the particular value of the phenomenon for an individual but such judgements presuppose perception of the phenomenon in itself, that is, perception of the meaning of the phenomenon. Thus our eidetic categorisations of phenomena will not be limited to our

\* see below, this chapter. Also "error" in chapter 2.



particular perspectives because they are based on the meaning of phenomena which is prior to all perspective limited judgements. Further, as the essence of phenomena is not only intersubjectively available but is the object of the intersubjective mode of apprehension, essential types are not private and therefore there can be no question of either presenting them to others on a take it or leave it basis or of limiting the range of persons with whom we can enter into a dialogue, based on the typification, to those who share our value-judgements.

The perception of essence is necessary perception concerning the nature of things. Thus, the essential type can fulfill that function of the ideal type which was abandoned in Weber's search for positivistic reliability in relation to the type. That is, the essential type defines the nature of that which is the object of empirical research. As a result, the essential type grounds empirical research in necessity. Above all, the essential type overcomes the Weberian dilemma of attempting to justify the ideal type in terms of that which it is supposed to ground. This is because the perception of essence, being based on the rational intuition of self-evident phenomena, is completely independent of the positivist procedures of verification and falsification which are used in empirical research. Thus the reliability of essence is not established by those empirical procedures which it seeks to ground.

It is necessary to complete this consideration of the opposition between essence and ideal type by briefly indicating a further role for the essential type in sociology.

#### MODELS, METAPHORS AND ANALOGIES

We base this part of the discussion on Ramsey's<sup>(20)</sup> distinction between two kinds of model. The first is the picturing or scale model which aims at the manipulable reproduction of the phenomenon or its

relevant features. The aim of this model is to remain faithful to the structure of the phenomenon in relation to the purpose at hand. The scale model aids understanding by placing the phenomenon in a more familiar context, reducing it to convenient proportions or by relating it to an already familiar phenomenon. This model is descriptive but distorting.

The second model is the analogue or disclosure model which, "deals in hints rather than identities"<sup>(21)</sup>. This model retains a structural similarity with the phenomenon but according to Ramsey is not a complete reproduction of it, although, strangely, he claims that there is an isomorphic identity between model and phenomenon. Further the disclosure model is said to be generated in a sense of participation or insight and crucially, this model does not reproduce our knowledge but adds to it.

In our view the disclosure model is based upon a vague understanding of essence. Undoubtedly Ramsey would deny this but his understanding of essentialism is based on Popper whose inadequate conception of this subject has been demonstrated above. Further, like Weber, Ramsey initially sees the disclosure model as justified by empirical investigation but on this topic he is extremely vague, referring to "empirical fit" and the need of the model to "chime-in" with the phenomenon. Nevertheless, Ramsey's notion of the model which deals in hints and, although not identical to phenomenon is isomorphically identified with it, indicates a grasp of essence which is compromised by the failure to distinguish between horizon and essence. As such Ramsey's disclosure model, despite his endorsement of Popper, is in the position of positing something which is the object of the model and which stands behind the phenomenon. That is, Ramsey's notion of a disclosure model implies the notion of essence but since Ramsey's notion of essence is crude and unclear it cannot be made explicit. Further, Ramsey's notion that the model adds something



to our knowledge of the phenomenon can be clarified by equating it with essence which adds to our mundane knowledge of the phenomenon, an awareness of the nature of the thing itself, its species identity and its possibilities. It is the fact that such knowledge is not apprehended in mundane perception which leads to the mistaken idea that such knowledge distorts the phenomenon. In fact it distorts i.e. corrects our naive apprehension of the phenomenon. Such knowledge is fundamental to all our positings concerning the phenomenon.

This last point is crucially important when we consider the development of Ramsey's argument in which he describes the respective role of these models in language. The scale model is identified with the simile because they both have a limited descriptive role in relation to a relevant feature of that which they model, e.g. "he is as strong as an oak". The crucial point is that there is only a minimal possibility of developing discourse from this model. For example, it is no use asking what the man in the above example does when his leaves fall off. It is therefore hazardous to draw further inferences from this model because the relationship between the two phenomena which are being compared is not required. That is, strength is not required of either men or oaks, it is not a necessary aspect of their being but is part of their familiar horizon.

The disclosure model is identified with the metaphor. Ramsey is not particularly clear on the distinctive features of the metaphor; much of what he says about it applies equally to the simile. However, he argues that the metaphor is distinctive in that, like the disclosure model, it is born in insight, reveals novel aspects and enables further discourse and is typically used when words fail us. The clearest definition of metaphor given by Ramsey is that, "metaphorical expressions

occur when two situations strike us in such a way as to reveal what includes them but is no mere combination of them both"(22). There is certainly a strong hint of essence in this statement. However, Ramsey finally bases his distinction between metaphor and simile on grammatical structure; the former is the statement A is B, the latter is the statement A is like B. We reject this argument. There is no difference in terms of enabling further discourse between saying "Old age is the autumn of life" and "Old age is like autumn". The true difference between simile and metaphor is that only in the case of the latter is there an essential relationship between the compared phenomena. That is, only in the case of the true metaphor do these phenomena belong to each other's inner horizon.

Thus, the true metaphor is a linguistic expression of eidetic insight. This reveals the form of communication of transcendental sociology. Every essence has a range of possibilities; in metaphor we seek to convey the nature of essence by describing realisations of its possibilities. That is, we express the essence as it appears in varying contexts. In this way we seek to lead our audience to a recognition of essence, as a possibility of their own acts of experience. We enable them to discover essence for themselves. Thus the linguistic form in which the findings of transcendental sociology are expressed is that of metaphor.

We can therefore summarise the role of the essential type in sociology. Firstly, it is reliable knowledge concerning the nature of things, thus it defines the nature of the phenomenon under investigation. Deriving from this, the essence is a description of the ontological structure of phenomena and therefore establishes the course of empirical enquiry, that is, which questions and procedures are or are not appropriate.



Eidetic insight is based on the self-evidence of phenomena, therefore it avoids the contradiction of the Weberian ideal type of both grounding and being dependant upon empirical research. As a consequence, the essential type is a model for reality as opposed to being abstracted from reality. Finally, essence, as the object of intersubjective consciousness is available to all. The conclusions of research based on the nature of things is expressed metaphorically, as realisations of the possibilities of essence. Thus, essential types are the beginning and end of investigation; they define the nature of the object of research and are the means of conveying our understanding to an audience. Thus, all understanding between an actor and a researcher, between a researcher and an audience is rooted in, begins in and ends in, universal rationality as the apprehension of necessity in transcendental consciousness.

NOTES

1. STEGMULLER "MAIN CURRENTS IN CONTEMPORARY GERMAN, BRITISH AND AMERICAN PHILOSOPHY" D. REIDEL, DORDRECHT, HOLLAND 1969. p.68
2. LEVINAS "INTUITION OF ESSENCES" IN KOCKELMANS (ED.) "THE PHILOSOPHY OF EDMUND HUSSERL AND ITS INTERPRETATIONS", DOUBLEDAY ANCHOR 1967.
3. re HUSSERL "THE CRISIS OF EUROPEAN SCIENCES AND TRANSCENDENTAL PHENOMENOLOGY" NORTH-WESTERN U.P. EVANSTON 1970 p.166
4. HUSSERL cited in SCHUTZ "TYPE AND EIDOS IN HUSSERL'S LATER PHILOSOPHY" COLLECTED PAPERS VOL.3, NIJHOFF, THE HAGUE 1964 p.110
5. SIMMEL "THE PROBLEM OF SOCIOLOGY" in WOLFF (ed) "ESSAYS ON SOCIOLOGY, PHILOSOPHY AND AESTHETICS BY GEORG SIMMEL et al" HARPER 1959.
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7. re REX "DISCOVERING SOCIOLOGY" ROUTLEDGE AND KEGAL PAUL 1973 p.120-122
8. WEBER "ECONOMY AND SOCIETY" VOL.I Bedminster Press 1968  
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9. WEBER "THE METHODOLOGY OF THE SOCIAL SCIENCES op.cit. p.91
10. POPPER "THE POVERTY OF HISTORICISM" ROUTLEDGE AND KEGAN PAUL 1957 sec.29
11. WEBER in NATANSON (ed) "PHILOSOPHY OF THE SOCIAL SCIENCES" "Objectivity in Social Science and Social Policy" RANDOM HOUSE 1963 p.396-397
12. WEBER "THE METHODOLOGY OF THE SOCIAL SCIENCES op.cit. p.100
13. WEBER op.cit. in NATANSON (ed) op.cit. p.404
14. WEBER op.cit. in NATANSON (ed) op.cit. p.407



15. REX "TYPOLOGY AND OBJECTIVITY" IN  
SAHAY "MAX WEBER AND MODERN  
SOCIOLOGY" ROUTLEDGE AND KEGAN PAUL  
1971
16. re REX's own "THIRTY THESES ON EPISTEMOLOGY AND  
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ideal types in AND KEGAN PAUL 1973  
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ff
17. HEMPEL "TYPOLOGICAL METHODS IN SOCIAL  
SCIENCES" in NATANSON (ed) op.cit.
18. A clear account of KOLAKOWSKI " POSITIVIST PHILOSOPHY"  
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in
19. REX op.cit. in SAHAY op. cit. p.30-31
20. RAMSEY "MODELS AND MYSTERY" OXFORD U.P. 1964
21. RAMSEY op.cit. p.12
22. RAMSEY op.cit. p.53

### CONCLUDING REMARKS

In this thesis we have shown the necessity of reliable knowledge, the methods by which such knowledge is to be acquired and, above all, the inter-relationship between such knowledge and genuine intersubjective knowledge. In so doing, we have clarified the nature of the inadequacies of current work on intersubjective understanding in sociology and shown how the method of revised phenomenology replaces the solipsistic ego-aggrandising consequences of such approaches with genuine understanding of the other. We have shown that this understanding, expressed in eidetic form as the basis of all knowledge, is the basis of communication not only between social actors and the sociologist but also between the sociologist and his audience.

It should therefore be clear that in order for phenomenology to fulfill its value for sociology it must be more narrowly defined than has previously been the case. The tendency to identify phenomenology with interpretive sociology in general, must be resisted. This is because such identification makes phenomenology so general as to be useless. Further, we have shown the sociological value of phenomenology to lie precisely in an application of its distinctive methods and theories, such as the reductions and Transcendental consciousness, to problems of sociology. A broadening of phenomenology to include such theorists as Winch and Weber<sup>\*</sup>, must inevitably result in the loss of those distinctively phenomenological aspects which are of prime value to sociology.

It is necessary to emphasise that in advocating a phenomenological sociology we are not urging the replacement of empirical enquiry by purely theoretical questioning. In conformity with the foundation-building goal of phenomenology, we see a phenomenological sociology as

\* In addition to the cases already cited, this attitude is found in Roche "phenomenology, Language and the Social Sciences".



establishing the nature of the object of empirical enquiry and the proper course of such enquiry. That is, the application of phenomenology in sociology establishes but does not replace empirical enquiry, it enables us to understand others it does not claim to be able to predict what the content of such understanding will be.

This indicates that our account of a phenomenological sociology is partial in that it does not include instances of empirical enquiry based upon what we regard as proper phenomenological procedures. This is true, and this is the next task which our phenomenological sociology, having established its own reasonableness, must set itself.

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