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REFUGEES AND SETTLERS: GEOGRAPHICAL IMPLICATIONS
OF THE ARAB-ISRAELI CONFLICT
1967-1978

by

W.W. HARRIS M.A.

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A thesis submitted for the degree of Doctor of
Philosophy in the University of Durham, November 1978.
This thesis examines the implications of the post June 1967 phase of the Arab-Israeli conflict for settlement patterns in the affected territories, both to elucidate important aspects of the world's most dangerous regional dispute and for the broader purpose of illustrating the geographical impact of war.

Two major aspects of the transformation in local settlement geography are considered:

a) Part I examines the effects of both the June 1967 War and subsequent secondary hostilities (1967-70) on the Arab population of the West Bank, the Golan Heights and the East Jordan Valley. The main issue is refugee out-movement from the conquered areas and the new border zones, a subject which is pursued through analysis of a survey of 944 displaced persons conducted by the author in an East Jordan refugee camp.

b) Part II shifts the focus to 'the other side of the coin' - the Israeli colonization of occupied territory in the decade after the June 1967 War. The author's account combines consideration of the physical establishment of the new settlement structure with analysis of responsible political processes, the two being bound together in the framework of a model developed from General Systems Theory. The Golan Heights and the West Jordan Rift are given particularly detailed treatment as case studies.
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The work contained in this thesis would not have been possible without the help and co-operation of numerous individuals and institutions.

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ABBREVIATIONS

fig. = figure

GSC = Golan Settlement Committee

GST = General Systems Theory

I.L. = Israeli Lira

Indep.Lib. = Independent Liberals

J.D = Jordanian Dinar

Km = kilometre

Km² = square kilometre

Lab. = Labour

loc. = location

mill. c.m.p.a. = million cubic metres per annum

M.K = Member of the Knesset

m.m. = millimetre

NRP = National Religious Party

NS = Not Significant

OPEC = Organization of Petroleum Exporting Countries

PLO = Palestine Liberation Organization
<table>
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<tr>
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<th>Definition</th>
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<td>P.M</td>
<td>Prime Minister</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>ref.</td>
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</tr>
<tr>
<td>UN</td>
<td>United Nations</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>U.S</td>
<td>United States</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>UNDOF</td>
<td>United Nations Disengagement Observer Force</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>UNRWA</td>
<td>United Nations Relief and Works Agency for Palestine Refugees</td>
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(i) Currency

a) Jordanian Dinar (JD) to the Pound Sterling

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<th>£1 =</th>
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<tr>
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</tr>
<tr>
<td>1968</td>
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<tr>
<td>1969</td>
<td>0.87</td>
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<tr>
<td>1970</td>
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<td>1971</td>
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<tr>
<td>1972</td>
<td>0.87</td>
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<tr>
<td>1973</td>
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<td>1974</td>
<td>0.76</td>
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<td>1976</td>
<td>0.60</td>
<td>(average)</td>
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<tr>
<td>1977</td>
<td>0.59</td>
<td>(average)</td>
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</table>

b) Israeli Lira (IL) to the Pound Sterling

<table>
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</tr>
<tr>
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<td>1971</td>
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<tr>
<td>1972</td>
<td>10.94</td>
<td></td>
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<td>June 1973</td>
<td>10.42</td>
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<td>June 1974</td>
<td>10.04</td>
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<td>June 1975</td>
<td>13.59</td>
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<td>June 1976</td>
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<td>16.20</td>
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(ii) Area

1 Dunam = 0.25 acre = 1000 square metres
CHAPTER ONE

INTRODUCTION
I. The Geographical Impact of War

This thesis examines the implications of the June 1967 Arab-Israeli War for settlement patterns in the affected territories. Three dimensions are considered:

a) Refugee outflows from affected territories during and immediately following the initial hostilities.

b) The origins and effects of secondary hostilities along the new boundaries.

c) Colonization of parts of the conquered territories by the victorious power, colonization causing major changes in the local cultural landscape.

The three dimensions are bound together in an overall view of the geographical impact of war. The author considers that the demographic and landscape consequences of war can be divided into a number of categories:

a) Landscape devastation and population displacement directly caused by hostilities or by an ensuing collapse of law and order.

b) Re-organization of the cultural landscape for defensive purposes by the combatant powers, whether in home territory or in occupied areas. The aims are generally to make terrain less hospitable to an enemy and to reduce the vulnerability of areas to capture or infiltration. There is a wide range of relevant facets, including paramilitary colonization, "scorched earth" policies, and the neutralization of populations of suspect loyalty, by development policies, by removal and/or by geographical concentration.
c) Re-organization of the cultural geography of conquered territory, primarily to strengthen ties with the new metropole. Motivation here may be to benefit the home economy, to benefit the local population (perhaps preparing the ground for annexation) or simple territorial expansion. Again there is a range of relevant phenomena. Examples include population transfers (colonization again being a possibility) and the re-orientation of trade patterns and infrastructural ties.

d) Multiple cycles of demographic and landscape alterations arising when the same territory changes hands more than once, either through continued war or a peace agreement.

The new phase of the Arab-Israeli conflict inaugurated by the June 1967 War has already exhibited examples of the changes postulated in the first three categories. The geographical impact has been particularly marked not because of the scale of the initial hostilities, which was comparatively modest, but because of the extent of densely settled territory which changed hands, the length of time that the Israeli occupation has persisted, and the ferocity of the intermittent secondary hostilities along the new boundaries.

(ii) As a general theme the impact of war received very little attention from geographers before the mid 1960's. For example the March 1960 issue of the Journal of Conflict Resolution, entirely taken-up with the 'Geography
of Conflict' did not include a single paper concentrating on landscape effects of war. Even historical geography, where one might have expected some treatment of the theme, proved no exception - as illustration H.C. Darby's work on the Domesday Book (The Historical Geography of England Before 1800, 1936 The Domesday Geography of England, 5 vols. 1952-67) provides some mention of military activity associated with the Norman Conquest of England as an agent of regional landscape devastation, but the main contribution here is left to an historian (R. Weldon-Finn The Norman Conquest and its Effects on the Economy, 1066-1086, 1971).

The situation has altered somewhat since 1965. In particular, reflecting the concurrent upsurge of irregular warfare in Asia and Africa, several studies have been made of the impact of guerrilla campaigns on settlement patterns, most notably as regards the re-location of rural population to deprive guerrillas of potential support. One may cite here Sandhu's "Emergency Resettlement in Malaya" (Journal of Tropical Geography, 1965) and Sutton's "Population Resettlement: Traumatic Upheavals and the Algerian Experience" (The Journal of Modern African Studies, 1977).

Signs of a broader concern are also evident. For example Urlich's 'Migration of the North Island Maoris 1800-1840' (New Zealand Geographer, 1972), which analyzes the introduction of fire-arms into Maori tribal conflict as a factor triggering massive migration and population loss, provides an excellent case-study of the disruptive implications of a new technology of warfare. Further, the August
1978 special issue of the *Transactions of the Institute of British Geographers*, devoted to the theme "Settlement and Conflict in the Mediterranean World" explores at length the important general question of the relationship between war and evolving settlement patterns. Wagstaff ("War and Settlement Desertion in the Morea, 1685-1830") examines a case where violent conflict simply aggravated settlement desertion already being caused by long term socio-economic processes whereas Harris ("War and Settlement Change : The Golan Heights and the Jordan Rift 1967-1977") considers an instance where war has been the primary force in disrupting and moulding settlement patterns. This thesis is an enlargement of the latter paper.

Nonetheless, despite such studies the impact of war remains a little investigated field in geography. Up to the present the main interest has undoubtedly come from historians; from the late 1960's such writers as Henry Kamen (*The Iron Century*, 1971) and Theodore Rabb (*The Struggle for Stability in Early Modern Europe*, 1975) have laid great stress on war as a dynamic agent of social, economic, demographic and landscape change, and earlier traces of the same emphasis can also be found, as evidenced by Smail's *Crusading Warfare* (1954), giving some attention to cultural landscape re-organization for strategic purposes, sections in Braudel's *The Mediterranean and the Mediterranean World in the Age of Philip II* (1949) and Boutruche's challenging 1945 paper "The Devastation of Rural Areas during the Hundred Years War and the Agricultural Recovery of France" (in P.S. Lewis (ed.) *The Recovery of France in*
the Fifteenth Century). The theme ranks as a central aspect in the recent interest of some historians in examining the fate of the mass of the population rather than "the gilt glittering on the surface" (1) for crucial periods of crisis and upheaval, and it incorporates many matters of great relevance to geographers such as spatial differentiation in population disruption, in material devastation and in rates of recovery, with implications for changed balances of power between regions and nations. Of special significance here is Wachtel's The Vision of the Vanquished: The Spanish Conquest of Peru through Indian Eyes (English translation, 1977). Using contemporary Indian and Spanish documentation Wachtel considers in great depth the impact of the conquest and of subsequent revolts and civil wars on the mass of the conquered population, geographic variation in economic, social and demographic disruption being an integral component of the analysis.

II. Refugees and Settlers

By placing the out-movement of Arabs from the 1967 war zones alongside the subsequent infusion of Jewish settlers into the same territories the author deliberately presents 'both sides of the coin' as regards the implications of the June 1967 War for local settlement geography. The objectives of the dual analysis are as follows:

a) To demonstrate, by means of the example of a relatively small-scale war, the decisive role violent conflict can play in disrupting and transforming settlement patterns over extensive areas. In so doing the author hopes
to contribute to a deeper understanding of war as a dynamic agent in demographic and landscape change.

b) To explore two critical aspects of the Middle East conflict. Although post 1967 Arab refugee flows and Israeli colonization activities are major elements in the current configuration of the conflict they have received only limited attention in academic writings. The author believes that they deserve detailed examination as phenomena in their own right.

c) To consider, in the case of the Israeli colonization of occupied territory, the emergence of a new settlement structure as a physical manifestation of underlying responses in a national political system to opportunities opened-up by territorial conquest. The author proposes a model adapted from General Systems Theory as the most useful framework for analysis here, a model integrating decision-making processes and their landscape effects into a single operating entity.

(i) The existing literature on refugee flows caused by war consists, on the one hand, of a vast array of case-studies of particular instances of flight but, on the other, of only one major attempt to develop a "workable theory of refugee movements based on a fruitful typology". In addition there has been a tendency to consider refugee movements either as distinct phenomena or as an appendage to the general subject of migration - not as an aspect of the impact of war. Only amongst historians can hints of the latter orientation be found, but here the refugees tend
to be lost amid the wider social and economic dimensions (see, for instance, Kamen's 'Economic and Social Consequences of the Thirty Years War' Past and Present, 1968). By restricting the impact of war to implications for settlement patterns the author hopes to be able to do full justice to a particular refugee flow yet at the same time to place it in a broader setting as one of two major facets of war associated settlement change.

Kunz's "The Refugee in Flight: Kinetic Models and Forms of Displacement" (International Migration Review, 1973) ranks as the sole comprehensive effort to create a general typology of refugee movements, whether resulting from war or other forms of political upheaval. Kunz's analysis proposes several major points of relevance to this thesis.

a) The refugee can be separated from the voluntary migrant on the basis of differences in weight between 'push' and 'pull' factors - the refugee leaves his home primarily because he is pushed out by circumstances beyond his control, with 'pull' from potential destinations being of minor significance only.

Examination of the origins of the 1967 Palestinian exodus from the West Bank supports this concept in overall terms but some qualification needs to be made. First, as outright expulsion was a relatively minor element in the outflow most refugees had freedom of choice as to whether to stay or flee, though geographically extensive hostilities and the rapid Israeli advance of course exerted
a major pressure to leave. As a result such 'pulls' as family connections and interests at the prospective destination, the East Bank of Jordan, when added to the 'push' sometimes made the crucial difference between remaining and going. In addition it may be noted that in one district (Nablus P.68) many people stayed despite the 'push' owing to the unattractiveness of the prospective destination from the political viewpoint. Because of these factors the author believes that refugee links with prospective destinations prior to flight deserve more consideration than Kunz is evidently willing to give them.

b) Refugee movements may be categorized as 'anticipatory', involving flight before a deteriorating political or military situation becomes critical, and 'acute' taking place as a response to the crisis itself. The movements discussed in this thesis are overwhelmingly of the 'acute' variety, though some small-scale 'anticipatory' migration did take place in the days immediately preceding the June 1967 War (P.404).

c) The train of events involved in an 'acute' refugee movement takes one of several courses. The term 'pressure' refers to the political, economic and psychological forces bearing down upon the refugee in his initial temporary destination, often an emergency camp.

1. **Push-pressure-plunge.** In moving to a new long-term place of residence subsequent to flight the refugee, instead of enthusiastically reacting to the pull of a final destination, takes a 'plunge' to escape deprivation, frustration
and harassment at the initial place of asylum. For Palestinians one may cite here those who fled from present-day Israel to West Bank refugee camps in 1949 and then moved on to the East Bank or to other Arab countries between 1949 and 1967.

2. **Push-pressure-stay.** Some refugees are fortunate in having a relatively amenable first place of asylum, perhaps because of wealth or ability to quickly find an economically profitable niche. They thus make no further move. For Palestinians one may include many who fled direct to Amman in 1949.

3. **Push-pressure-return.** At some stage the political and military circumstances may alter sufficiently to allow refugees to return home. In the Middle East conflict the only major example is the return of people to areas devastated in the 1968-70 War of Attrition (East Jordan Valley and Suez Canal Zone).

One notable feature of the Palestinians relative to the Kunz scheme is the refusal of the great bulk of refugees, even those from the 1948-49 War, to accept the notion of permanent resettlement in any new country. The hope and the expectation continues to be return to the lost homeland, a hope which has shown no signs of diminishing. This is particularly marked in the case of refugees from the June 1967 War, most of whom remain locked in the 'pressure' phase - also termed 'midway to nowhere' - whether or not they live in refugee camps.
d) When a conflict persists over a long period several refugee movements are probable. People belonging to one movement in such a chain are defined as being of a particular 'vintage'. Thus in the Middle East conflict one has 1949, 1967 and War of Attrition vintages, and post 1949 movements have generally comprised at least two such elements. For example the 1967 West Bank exodus included both newly displaced persons and 1949 refugees fleeing for a second time.

e) Within the 'acute' refugee category distinct forms of displacement can be detected. Kunz suggests a three-fold classification.

1. Displacement by flight. Movement is by the refugee's own decision, albeit under great pressure. The main element is mass flight "impelled by immediate fear, often accompanied by shock caused by the sudden turn of events, and --- not infrequently augmented by hysteria". (3)

2. Displacement by force. The refugee has no choice - he is expelled.

3. Displacement by absence. The refugee is already absent from the zone of conflict at the time of crisis and is either unable or unwilling to return thereafter.

The author's case-study predominantly involves mass flight, though expulsion and absence are also evident (p.98). As regards the internal composition of the three forms Kunz further proposes that they tend to display distinct
socio-economic characteristics. Certainly in the Palestinian series of movements the 1967 mass-flight represented a full cross section of the source population (P. 78) whereas forced displacement from occupied territory after 1967 has apparently been largely confined to the leadership class. (4)

Turning from general theory to the case-study topic itself - refugee movements consequent on the June 1967 Arab-Israeli War and the 1968-70 War of Attrition, especially as regards the West Bank and the East Jordan Valley - there is only one major study based on systematic survey work. This is Dodd and Barakat's River Without Bridges: A Study of the Exodus of the 1967 Palestinian Arab Refugees and it concerns the West Bank movement alone. Nothing at all has yet been published on the impact of the War of Attrition, whether in the Jordan Valley or along the Suez Canal. Furthermore, for the West Bank the Dodd and Barakat study fails to consider two inter-related issues of major significance: geographical variation in the West Bank population losses and the historic context of the exodus. Here it is the author's contention a) that variations from place to place in the historic experience of village communities determined to a great extent local reaction to the 'push' exerted by the war-time situational pressures and b) that this theme, ignored in most refugee studies, should be accorded a more prominent place in broader discussions of the factors underlying refugee flows.
The territorial conquests of the June 1967 War presented Israel with twin opportunities which quickly produced irresistible demands within the Israeli political system:

a) To absorb land to establish new defence lines under direct Israeli control in highly suitable terrain.

b) To absorb land to implement perceived 'historic rights' to possess parts of the occupied territories. Jewish settlement, which would provide a physical anchor to the desired areas, was viewed as the best means of capitalizing on the twin opportunities.

Establishing 'defensible boundaries' in the context of continuing conflict with the Arabs served as the principal initial rationale. A settlement pattern with a strong paramilitary orientation would not only secure land politically but would also itself provide an obstacle to attack. This type of landscape response to the results and exigencies of war has been a frequent feature of international conflict and it is not difficult to find mention of other instances in academic literature, though nothing at all for the twentieth century. For example, the Elizabethan colonization of eastern Ireland to secure a vulnerable flank against Spain, treated in depth by Canny in *The Elizabethan Conquest of Ireland* (1976) makes a close parallel to Israel's post 1967 strategic settlement policies. Sir Henry Sidney's pressure for the introduction of collonys of English and other loyal subjects, whereby a perpetuall inhabitation would have ensued to the recom-pense as well of that which was spent, as for
a yerely and continuall profit — and strength of the country against all foreyne invasion (5)

exhibits a combination of strategic and (subsidiary) economic argument little different from that evident in the first phase of agricultural settlement on the Golan Heights (P.195).

Similar comment could also be made regarding the Habsburg use of colonization as dynamic forward defence on the military frontier with the Ottoman Empire.

"— a whole new system was organized. The core of it was the chain of fortresses, the garrisons of which were generally German; while the population of the areas round and between the fortresses, this consisting largely of Serb and Croat refugees from the Balkans was — given free land in return for a perpetual obligation of military service" (6)

Finally, a somewhat bizarre case is described in Burns, 'Immigrants from Islam : The Crusaders Use of Muslims as Settlers in Thirteenth Century Spain' (American Historical Review, 1975). This concerns the importation of Muslim settlers to bolster Valencia after its capture from the Moors, in the wake of a disappointingly slow influx of Christians.

The Israeli colonization of lands conquered in June 1967, however, had a second base for which few parallels can be found in other instances of strategic settlement - the temptation to re-establish the biblical Jewish presence on The West Bank. In the beginning it formed only a subsidiary element in Israel's settlement policy but the very existence of the territorial opportunity to implement 'historic rights' quickly produced a steadily strengthening surge of religious nationalism in the Israeli political system. Ten years later this had gained such a hold that, in Menahem Begin's first year, it dominated official activity on the West Bank.
Perhaps only in the Crusades and in the Spanish 'reconquista' can one find echoes of colonization with such dual foundations - built on the strange but potent combination of cold military logic encapsulated in mystical millenial vision. Certainly in the last two centuries the post 1967 Israeli colonization stands alone - there is nothing to relate it to except its own background in the history of Zionism and Zionist settlement in Palestine (for detailed comment here see P. 146). Above all its distinctive bases make it a quite different phenomenon from European colonization of the New World and any comparisons would be both facile and futile. In short one is dealing with a phenomenon unique in modern history and as this thesis is the first substantive analysis of it what follows is to a large degree a voyage through uncharted waters.

III. The Thesis Structure

After a brief description of the author's activities in gathering primary materials the remainder of the introduction is devoted to describing briefly the physical and cultural environment of the principal areas considered in the thesis - the West Bank, the Jordan Rift and the Golan Heights. Thereafter, with the regional setting provided, the main analysis of settlement change resulting from war and boundary shifts breaks into two parts.

a) The Refugees

Chapter II provides an overview of the various refugee movements caused by Arab-Israeli hostilities between 1967 and 1970. It also incorporates a critique of the published
statistical sources.

Chapter III opens a detailed consideration of the 1967 flight of native West Bankers to the East Bank of the Jordan. Topics examined include the existence of two types of movement, the reliability of the data base, possible reasons for spatial variation in the scale of settlement desertion, and the paradox of a lack of correlation between the geography of the flight and the geography of the June 1967 fighting.

Chapter IV continues the analysis of the flight of native West Bankers by presenting the results of a survey of 944 displaced persons conducted by the author in an East Bank refugee camp. This provides an opportunity for deeper discussion of some of the topics raised in Chapter III as well as for a detailed description of the actual mechanics of the 1967 exodus.

Chapter V considers the immediate sequel to the June 1967 War - the War of Attrition in the Jordan Rift. The strands linking the 1967 West Bank exodus, the beginning of secondary hostilities, the generation of new refugee flows, and the origins of the Jordanian Civil War are examined in some depth, as also is the impact of the War of Attrition on the general cultural landscape of areas bordering the new cease-fire lines.

b) The Settlers

Chapter VI shifts the scene from settlement desertion to the creation of new settlement structures - from out-movements of Arabs to in-movements of Jews. First a frame-
work for analyzing Israeli occupied territory colonization in the context of underlying political processes is established. The author then proceeds to review the origins of the colonization in the light both of Israel's historic experience and the geo-strategic opportunity created by the territorial conquest.

Chapter VII presents the first of two case studies exemplifying the steady growth of the new settlement structures in the decade after the June 1967 War. On the Golan Heights, because of near-total settlement desertion by the Syrian population, Israeli colonization implied a complete transformation in the regional cultural landscape. The progress of the transformation, encompassing agricultural activities, a new physical infrastructure and the progressive extension of the settlement pattern, is documented and associated planning analyzed. The impact of the October 1973 War between Israel and Syria is also considered.

Chapter VIII examines the establishment of the new Jewish settlement structure in the Jordan Rift. The Jordan Rift case is significant owing to its centrality in the Israel Labour Party's concept of 'defensible boundaries' and also because of resource conflict between the new structure and the residual Arab population, as regards both lands and water.

Chapter IX returns to a general consideration of the Israeli colonization in all the occupied territories, moving from the overview of the first six years presented in Chapter VI to an overview of developments between the October 1973 War and the end of the first fifteen months of the Likud
Government (September 1978). Central themes include the strengthening of 'historic rights' and religious mysticism as a major motivation for colonization between 1975 and 1978 and the fluctuating influence of factors acting against settlement programmes, the latter assuming particular prominence in 1974-75 and, above all, in the wake of the September 1978 Camp David Summit. To conclude the author attempts to briefly assess factors relevant to the future of the colonization. Will this war associated landscape feature survive or prove merely ephemeral? Could its fate differ from area to area?

IV. Gathering Research Material

To obtain the necessary data for the thesis the author made two field expeditions to the Middle East; the first to Jordan and Israel between March and November 1976 and the second to Israel alone between November 1977 and February 1978.

On the 1976 visit the author spent four and one-half months in Amman and three months in Jerusalem. Amman was used as a base for work both on 1967 displaced persons and on the effects of the War of Attrition in the East Jordan Valley. The author received considerable assistance from the Supreme Ministerial Council for Displaced Persons, the Jordan Valley Commission, UNRWA and the University of Jordan and used records kept by the first three institutions. Regular short excursions were also made into the East Jordan Valley, and in July the author conducted a sample survey of displaced persons in
Baq'a emergency camp, on the East Bank plateau north of Amman (figure 24). The survey procedure is described in full in Chapter IV.

In mid-August 1976 the author moved to Jerusalem, to continue work on the West Bank refugees in the 'source' region and to initiate the study of Israeli settlement policy. Institutions from which information was gathered and whose personnel aided the author included the Jewish Agency, the Jewish National Fund, the United Nations Disengagement Observor Force and local offices of UNRWA. The author also travelled extensively in the Golan Heights, the West Bank, the Jordan Rift, Sinai and the Gaza approaches, making useful contacts with both Arab residents and Israeli settlers.

The 1977-78 visit involved a stay of two and one-half months in Jerusalem, which the author devoted almost exclusively to deepening his understanding of Israeli settlement policy. Further valuable assistance and information was obtained from the Jewish Agency and the Jewish National Fund and much time was spent in perusing such sources as the Knesset debates and the Hebrew Press. The author was also aided by staff at the Hebrew University, the University of Bar Ilan and Tel Aviv University and interviewed Knesset members. Several excursions were made to Israeli settlements on the Golan Heights and the West Bank.

Finally, the author has invested much time and effort in learning both Hebrew and Arabic, especially in
1976-77. Without some command of the two languages the work in this thesis would have been impossible.

V. The Regional Setting

(i) Historical Background

Figure 1 shows the regions examined in the thesis. The pre June 1967 boundaries were established as a result of the 1948-49 Arab-Israeli War, which saw the emergence of the state of Israel on 77% of the territory of mandatory Palestine. Of the remainder the bulk (20%), thereafter known as the 'West Bank', became attached to the Hashemite Kingdom of Jordan while Gaza (3%) passed under Egyptian control. More than 700,000 Palestinian Arabs fled from lands incorporated into the state of Israel, including c.180,000 to the West Bank, c.190,000 to the Gaza Strip and c.170,000 to East Jordan. Because of the unreliability of the relevant statistics (discussed in Chapter II) it is difficult to assess what proportion of the total populations of the West and East Banks these refugees and their children represented in early 1967, but in each case it would appear to have been at least one-third. By 1967 large numbers were living outside the UNRWA refugee camps, principally in the main West Bank towns and in Amman.

The Six Day War of June 1967 has been the most important episode of Arab-Israeli fighting to date as regards geographical coverage and the most dramatic of the post 1949 confrontations as regards effects on settlement patterns. During the campaign Israel captured territories amounting to three times her own size -
70,000 km² including Sinai, Gaza, the West Bank and the Syrian Golan plateau. Figure 1 shows the cease-fire lines established on the eastern front, lines only slightly modified by the October 1973 War. The new territorial status-quo has now persisted for more than eleven years.

(ii) Environmental Context

From the geo-strategic aspect perhaps the single most important feature of the regions under study is their relatively small scale. Israel's entire eastern front from Hermon in the north to Eilat in the south is only 550 km in length, and none of the relevant capital cities (Jerusalem, Amman and Damascus) is more than 50 km from the zone of confrontation. Furthermore, Jordan's main belt of settlement is everywhere within 60 km of Israeli military positions while, for Israel, the distance from the front to the coast at Tel Aviv is a mere 80 km. In this highly compact space the two sides can muster an awesome and highly sophisticated military arsenal, including up to 6000 tanks (comparable with NATO's total strength in Western Europe) and more than 1000 modern strike aircraft.

Such considerations of small scale and concentrated force, with populated heartlands acutely vulnerable to surprise attack, make both sides super-sensitive to the military value of any topographical feature which can offer the slightest advantage either in delaying or speeding an offensive. Thus, on the one hand, Israel is desperately unwilling to surrender the terrain benefits accruing from her post 1967 military presence in the West Bank mountain
block and on the Golan plateau; above all she has refused to return to the pre-June 1967 boundaries (figure 1) which 1) were dominated by the afore-mentioned two features; 2) restricted the width of Israeli territory to 12 km in her central heartland; 3) imposed a need to defend 984 km of land frontier as opposed to 673 km after June 1967. Equally, from the opposite viewpoint, Jordan and Syria are deeply fearful of Israel's current commanding position, especially as Israel has the more advanced and powerful armed forces and has a well-known propensity for making anticipatory offensives.

Against this geo-strategic setting the author now briefly surveys the various regional environments.

a) In central Palestine the area considered comprises three physiographic units - the humid uplands of Judea and Samaria (West Bank Highlands), the semi-arid Jordan Rift, and the humid East Bank plateau (Transjordan). The two upland units, as divided from the Jordan Rift by the 300 metre line (figure 1), are broadly similar in landscape, climate and settlement characteristics. Fertile basins and valleys alternate with barren limestone hills, average annual rainfall varying between 400 and 750 millimetres and concentrated into the months November-March. Both units are densely settled, the populations immediately prior to the 1967 War being c. 760,000 in the West Bank Highlands (c.136 per km²) and c. 800,000 on the East Bank plateau (c.130 per km²) (7)

Turning to the West Bank alone, including the western side of the Jordan Rift, post 1967 settlement
density varies considerably in detail, both between the Highlands and the Rift and within the Highlands (figure 36). The variations were markedly accentuated by geographic differentiation in the population reductions caused by 1967 refugee out-movements, movements which generally affected peripheral districts disproportionately (see Chapter 3).

Such losses opened the way to Israeli strategic colonization in large areas. This especially applied to the Jordan Rift and, outside the West Bank, to the Golan Heights. Discussion now concentrates on these two territories, which receive special attention in the thesis.

b) The Jordan Rift, the entire west side of which has been under Israeli rule since 1967, is a great trench descending from 210 metres below sea level at Lake Tiberias to 398 metres below sea level at the northern end of the Dead Sea. South of Beit Shean the floor of the Rift consists of the narrow entrenched flood-plain of the Jordan River (the Zor), the bordering bands of dissected saline wastes (the Katar) and the higher plain (the Ghor), by far the largest component and the locale of the great bulk of Rift agriculture. On each side the floor is flanked by mountain walls. To the east the hills rise directly to the Transjordan plateau, between 800 and 1300 metres above the Rift bottom. To the West the transition to the highlands of Judea and Samaria is more complex. It generally comprises a first range flanking the Ghor, an intermediate series of mountain basins, and a final rise to the watershed. In West Bank territory the entire ascent takes place over a distance of 15-25 km, involving an average difference in
level between floor and watershed of c.1000 metres. The transition area, termed 'wilderness', is almost entirely devoid of substantial vegetation, partly because of low rainfall and partly because of destructive grazing practices.

Both flanks of the Rift provide excellent topography for military defence, though the more complex West Bank ascent gives a greater opportunity for defence-in-depth (plate 1).

In climate the region varies from semi-arid to arid, due to the rain-shadow effect of the West Bank highlands. Rainfall (figure 4), 400 m.m. per annum at Lake Tiberias, declines rapidly as one moves south, being only 100 m.m. per annum at the Dead Sea. Consequently, in the Lower Jordan Valley, irrigation is essential for all but the most extensive forms of agriculture. Furthermore, temperatures increase as rainfall decreases, both from north to south and from flanks to floor, reaching their highest in the vicinity of Jericho where the mid-winter mean is 14°C and the mid-summer mean 32°C. This all year-round green-house environment provides opportunities, if irrigation is available, for continuous cultivation and, in particular, for a lucrative investment in winter vegetables. The only hazards are strong winds and occasional inversion frosts.

Figure 5 is a simplified soil map for the western side of the Rift, in occupied territory. The best soils for agriculture are the brown alluvial deposits found in the Zor, along the sides of the Ghor and in the mountain
Plate 1

West Jordan Rift - final ascent to the Highlands (view north from the Ramallah - Jericho road).
Plate 1

West Jordan Rift - final ascent to the Highlands (view north from the Ramallah - Jericho road).
basins. These have the lowest salt content, the highest mineral content and are the easiest for working. Intensive cultivation, whether Arab or post 1967 Jewish, follows their distribution closely (figure 5 and 64). However, since 1967 the western Zor, declared a security zone by the Israelis, has been almost entirely deserted. Away from the alluvial deposits soils are either thin, stony lithosols and rendzinas or, on the Rift floor, saline serozems. The latter require considerable effort and investment in washing out the salts if they are to be utilized, but this can and has been done by some of the new Jewish settlements, in particular by Qalia on the Dead Sea shore (figure 60).

The eastern side of the Rift has remained Jordanian, but local settlement patterns have been a hostage to the repercussions of Israel's occupation of the West Bank throughout the period under study. Jordan has exploited the 'green-house' potential of the area under her control by building the East Ghor irrigation canal to convey water southwards from the Yarmouk. The canal, on which construction began in 1958, is the focal point of an integrated water scheme for the whole length of the East Valley, a scheme which will draw water from a Yarmouk barrage, from side valley reservoirs and from springs and artesian bores. By 1967 the project was already well-developed as far south as Damiya.

c) The area under Israeli control on the Golan Heights, as set by the Israel-Syria Disengagement Agreement of June 1974, covers 1150 km², with a north-south length
of approximately 65 km and an east-west dimension varying from 12 to 25 km (figure 3). Of the region's physiographic components the most important is the basalt plateau which rises from 300 metres above sea level in the vicinity of Lake Tiberias to 1200 metres in the far north, where it is crowned by the Hermon massif. Four cross-sections of the plateau are depicted in figure 6, representing its northern, central and southern portions. In general it is a tilted table-land, the main body sloping down towards Israel at an average angle of 4°30'.

To the east the watershed is marked by a prominent range of volcanic hills (plates 2 and 4) which, together with the Hermon shoulder (Ketef ha Hermon) and the Rouqad ravine, form the logical base either for defence or attack. This is because the watershed line offers downhill access to both Galilee in the west and Damascus in the east. On the one hand Israel has been extremely reluctant to surrender the strategic advantage conferred by her post 1967 possession of the volcanic hills. Conversely Syria regards an Israeli presence only 35 km from Damascus as completely unacceptable.

As qualification it should be noted that, despite the line's evident positional advantages, a major weakness exists in the twelve kilometre gap between Rafid and the upper end of the Rouqad ravine (figures 3 and 6d). Here there are no dominating terrain features and the South Golan plateau continues unbroken into Syria. It was in this area that the Syrian Army made its major penetration in October 1973. (Figure 51).
Plate 2

North Golan - volcanic peaks and Hermon
(view north across Druze village of Buqata)
To the west the plateau presents a steep scarp to neighbouring portions of metropolitan Israel. Prior to 1967 control of the scarp gave the Syrians a commanding military position over the Hula Valley and the Tiberias basin, a situation which Israeli Governments have been determined to prevent recurring. From north to south the feature may be divided into three parts (figure 3).

1) In the Hula Valley the scarp towers 400-800 metres above Israel (plate 3). Further, its strategic dominance is enhanced by the fact that the Baniyas spring, a major Jordan source, is located on its lower slopes. In this sector Syria, as well as engaging in sporadic bombardment of the Hula settlements, made open preparations for diverting a vital component of Israel's water supply.

2) Between the Bnot Ya'aqov bridge and the northern shore of Lake Tiberias the scarp is less prominent, though still quite steep (13°25'), and is faced by equal or greater heights on the Galilee side of the Jordan. Israel's pre 1967 position here was not particularly disadvantageous.

3) In the Tiberias basin the scarp again dominates, rising 400-500 metres above the lake. Before 1967 the city of Tiberias lay open to bombardment while valuable agricultural areas from Ein Gev to the Central Jordan Valley lay directly beneath Syrian artillery.

Israel has made it abundantly clear that she regards her retention of the scarp to be a vital security interest; a position which stems from the psychological as
much as from the physical benefits of not being visibly over-looked by Syrian forces - after all from their current locations Syrian missiles, if not artillery, can still strike deep into Upper Galilee. Further, Israel feels she needs a large part of the plateau to act as a 'cushion' against attack, giving time to bring reinforcements up the scarp and to stop any Syrian offensive bursting into metropolitan territory. This does not however mean that Israeli forces can make no withdrawal at all from the plateau crest. As noted the watershed line has its defects and there are alternative, though less satisfactory, possibilities. For instance, a line could be drawn from Hermon through Har Odem (figure 6a and plate 18) to Har Shifon (foreground, plate 4) and thence to Afiq, bisecting the Central Golan (figure 3). Indeed, with comprehensive demilitarization of sufficient territory to maintain the security 'cushion', even larger withdrawals could be made.

The Hermon shoulder, western-most peak of the Hermon massif (2224 metres), is also of great geo-strategic value to whichever power occupies it. It is a commanding observation point, giving excellent views of southern Lebanon (especially over Palestine guerrilla concentrations in neighbouring 'Fatahland'), the Golan plateau, much of southern Syria and northern Israel.

In climate the Golan is generally humid and, in the north, relatively cool (at Quneitra the average monthly temperature range is -2.6°C to 13.6°C in January and 14°C to 35°C in August).(8) Average annual precipitation is 800 millimetres, though as elsewhere it is
Plate 3

Golan scarp - Looking down into the Hula Valley (telephoto view west across Nimrood castle)
PLATE 4
Plate 4

Central Golan plateau - telephoto view north-east to volcanic hills west of Quneitra
concentrated into the November-March period. In addition there is great geographic variation (figure 7), rainfall on the southern plateau being only 450 millimetres per annum, runoff is rapid and above 1000 metres winter snowfall can be heavy (figure 7). As regards the north it is often asserted that the intense winter rains, with blizzards, mud and freezing temperatures being frequent conditions, inhibit mobile warfare. Such European examples as the 1944 Ardennes offensive, however, would suggest that this is not necessarily the case.

Figure 8 depicts the region's soil distribution. In the south and in the Batiha (Bethsaida) Valley there are considerable tracts of rich alluvium and grumusols, while in the north the Quneitra basin and its immediate surrounds contain a valuable alluvial pocket. There are, however, two factors which militate against a high density of agricultural settlement, certainly at Israeli living standards.

1) Apart from the above areas most soils are thin and stone-strewn, particularly in the centre and north.

2) The south, where the most productive land is located, is the lowest rainfall area, leading to water supply problems.

In sum, although the cool wet climate of the north has offered opportunities for crops hitherto little known in Israel, the Golan's physical environment dictates that any large scale Israeli colonization include an urban-industrial component.
(1) Kamen, H. *The Iron Century* Foreward P.XIV


(3) Ibid. P.141.


For the reader's convenience it should be noted that this thesis contains several aids to a full comprehension of the text, in addition to the specified appendices, tables and figures. Such aids may be classified into five categories.

a) Maps are provided locating virtually all place-names (figure 1 - general, figure 2 - West Bank, figure 3 - Golan Heights, figures 10 and 12 - West Bank areas, figure 26 - Jordan Rift).

b) Three special maps locate all Jewish settlements in the Golan, the Jordan Rift and the Rafiah approaches (figures 40, 60 and 70).

c) Appendix I is a full glossary, in particular explaining all Hebrew terms used in Part II (e.g. political faction labels, technical vocabulary for colonization).


e) The front pages of the thesis contain:

1. Tables for converting Israeli lirot and Jordanian dinars into sterling.

2. Acre and square metre equivalents of the Israeli/Jordanian area measure known as the dunam.

3. A list of abbreviations.
PART I

THE REFUGEES
CHAPTER TWO

FUGITIVES FROM CONFLICT, 1967-1970
Demographic upheaval is a frequent though not an invariable consequence of war. The occurrence, scale and character of a refugee movement depends on the circumstances of the relevant hostilities - on the image an invaded population holds of its enemy, on the extent and location of the fighting, and on the discipline of the armies.

Perception is perhaps the most important consideration. If because of a long history of friction populations have little contact and hold distorted and unfavourable images of one another conflict between them is likely to lead to massive refugee out-movements from invaded territories. The operation of this factor may be seen as substantially responsible for the difference between events like the 1866 Austro-Prussian War, which caused relatively little population displacement, and an event like the 1974 Turkish invasion of Cyprus, which led to widespread settlement desertion. In the former case one had populations of similar language and culture with a high degree of pre-war contact and virtually no pre-war animosity - in the latter one had populations with little in common and divided by generations of bitter antagonism.

I. June 1967: The Arab Exodus from Occupied Territory

The Arab-Israeli War of June 1967 was an example of the second type of conflict. All the territories occupied by Israel during the June War experienced an immediate and substantial out-movement of their Arab residents, both of the
native population and of persons who had fled present-day Israel in 1948 (table 2:1).

Details, however, varied considerably from place to place. On the Golan and in the West Jordan Valley, which neighbour lands untouched by the fighting, there was near total settlement desertion. In contrast Gaza, Sinai and the West Bank Highlands, where most population centres are widely separated from territories lying beyond the 1967 war-zone, experienced a relatively moderate exodus, nowhere in excess of 30% of the source population. A distance constraint is clearly evident, with Gaza being particularly affected (table 2:1) and Sinai providing evidence of both extremes. In parts of the peninsula with direct access to mainland Egypt, from East Kantara south to Et Tur, most residents fled, as on the Golan, whereas in the remote and mountainous centre little population loss occurred.

Overall, out of a pre-war occupied territories population of c. 1.4 million between 320,000 and 500,000 left their homes in the period June - December 1967, the vast majority in June. (1)

The discrepancy of 180,000 largely arises from uncertainty regarding the magnitude of the out-movement from the West Bank, the largest of the 1967 refugee flows. According to a Jordan Government estimate 355,000 people had left the West Bank by December 1967. (2) The figure was based on the number of ration cards issued and consisted of two elements - c.180,000 West Bank natives (Jordanian responsibility) and c.170,000 second-time refugees (United Nations Relief and Works
The estimate of 355,000, however, differs very considerably from calculations based on official West Bank enumerations conducted before and after the hostilities (table 2.2). Jordan's 1961 census gives a West Bank population of 805,450, which, when projected forward to 1967 (assuming a continuation of 1952-61 trends) increases to 843,263. Israeli enumerations of the West Bank and East Jerusalem, taken between 17 and 27 September 1967, record a post-war residual of 661,739. Comparison with the pre-war projection indicates a population loss of 181,524 - only 52% of the December Jordanian estimate.

A small fraction of the gap can be accounted for by emigration between September and December, but in the main one has to look elsewhere for an explanation. In theory there are two possibilities.

First, the Jordanian out-movement figure of 355,000 may be a gross inflation. This could arise from such factors as families obtaining more than one ration card, which would exaggerate family sizes, and continued registration of deceased persons. The author has personal knowledge of cases of West Bank refugees holding several ration cards, generally as a device to extract additional support from the authorities, while both the above noted faults are known to affect United Nations statistics for 1948 refugees, many of whom fled for a second time in 1967. UNRWA continues to warn that registration numbers do "not necessarily reflect the actual refugee population --", (3) its 1960-61 report observing that "at least
100,000 dead persons must now figure in the Agency's rolls" (para. 41). The 1967 ration-recipient total for Jericho (97,233), which exceeds the estimated 1967 population of the entire West Jordan Valley by 12,454, provides a graphic demonstration of the implications for statistical credibility. As the rolls remained unreformed after 1967 there seems little doubt that such inflation crossed the river with the exodus — indeed in the chaotic situation prevailing on the East Bank in late 1967, with tens of thousands of West Bank displaced persons being registered and shuffled from place to place, the distortions could easily have been not just perpetuated, but reinforced. (Appendix IIIb, 1968 and 1969 reports).

Second, with regard to the census based out-movement total of 181,524, there may be errors in one or both of the quoted enumerations, errors tending to depress refugee numbers. Specifically, either the Israeli census exaggerates the post-war West Bank population or the Jordan census understates the 1961 situation. The position in Hebron district (table 2:2), where pre-war and post-war figures are almost identical despite Jordanian statistics to the effect that Hebron stood second only to the West Jordan Valley as a displaced person source (figure 12), would certainly seem to indicate that something is amiss with at least one of the censuses. Indeed the projection of the 1961 population to 1967 leads to the ludicrous conclusion that Hebron numbers actually increased through mid-1967.

Concerning the Israeli census it might be hypothesized that some Hebron people, anxious to have Arab numbers as large as possible, inflated family sizes when answering the
questionnaire. Nonetheless when dealing with the West Bank as a whole it is difficult to see how this or any other possible bias (see census publication No. 1. "Limitations of the results and possible errors", XXX - XXX11) could account for more than a fraction of the monumental gulf between the exodus estimates of 181,524 and 355,000. Israel's census, though organized in haste and conducted amongst a population which was partially hostile, appears to have been efficiently and honestly implemented, not least because accurate results were desirable for military government purposes - for the planning of public services and for the issuing of identity cards. The only plausible dissent comes from UNRWA, which alleges that 1948 refugees are under-estimated owing to a restrictive Israeli definition of refugee status. However, any under-estimation of refugee numbers is almost certainly not accompanied by an undercount of the total population, as UNRWA charges not present in the refugee category are presumably included with the native community. In any case even if an overall undercount took place the effect of a correction would be to widen the gulf between alternative out-movement totals, not to narrow it, because inter-censal loss would shrink. In fact if the Israeli census is taken alone the gulf can only be explained, in full or in part, by a deliberate over-count of massive proportions. It is impossible to imagine how such an over-count could be either concealed or be in Israel's interests. Consequently it may be assumed that the answer to the numbers problem does not lie in the Israeli figures.

Difficulties posed by the Jordan census are both more tangible and more serious. Here ambiguities in the
introduction, including contradictions between the English and Arabic texts, raise some question as to whether several West Bank refugee camps, particularly those in urban areas, are enumerated. Section 6.2 of the English introduction observes "fully urban includes the population resident in all localities of 10,000 inhabitants or more (excluding localities inhabited only by Palestinian refugees)" and "mainly rural includes the population resident in all other localities (including Palestinian refugee camps lying outside towns)". As these are the only "mode of living" categories (apart from scattered tents) there is immediate uncertainty as to whether urban refugee camps are counted at all, despite the general claim for major geographical divisions that "the entire population of the district is included." The implications are far-reaching - for example if the census excludes Hebron urban refugees and so substantially under-estimates the real 1961 district population the impossible phenomenon of a 1967 "increase" immediately becomes explicable.

Generally, then, the possibility arises that the Jordan census is an under-count.

The uncertainty is intensified when the English and Arabic introductions are compared. In a footnote to section 6.2 the English reads "no data were collected on refugee status" whereas a direct translation of the Arabic states "no particular data were collected on refugees". There is a considerable difference between "refugee status" and "refugees" and the Arabic could be interpreted as implying that camp residents are entirely excluded from the census. There is
also the divergence between

The inhabitants of Palestinian refugee camps are a distinct category, but cannot be presented as such because of a commitment by the department not to reveal the numbers reported. (English - implies that refugee camps are incorporated, but not independently listed). (6)

and

The inhabitants of the refugee camps form a distinct category, but an exposition of particular data on them is not possible because the department has undertaken not to publish their number (translated Arabic - vague as to inclusion). (6)

The above-mentioned footnote is appended to this statement - ambiguity compounded by contradiction. A studied avoidance of the term "Palestinian" in the Arabic text may also be noted.

Three possibilities exist concerning the position of the West Bank refugee camps in the 1961 census: total exclusion, partial exclusion or total inclusion. (7) No clear-cut statement is provided and because there is no "refugee" category conclusions from the district data can only be inferences.

Camp populations, if present, are buried in the rural residuals and in urban and village totals. In towns where numbers are large relative to likely camp totals, for example Nablus and Jerusalem, no inferences are possible. For an answer, at least as regards detectable cases (mostly rural), one thus has to rely on rural residuals and the Jericho district statistics.

With regard to rural residuals there are two cases - Qalandia and DeirDibwan - where quoted figures are very substantial relative to area populations and where the only
conceivable explanation is that the residuals represent the two local refugee camps. In Qalandia the residual figure is 63% of the total and its size (5734) is almost exactly equal to the 1967 UNRWA estimate for Qalandia camp (5471).

Jericho is a slightly more difficult case, though again an inference can be made with some confidence. A population of 10,166 is quoted for Jericho town, the total for the remainder of the district being 53,814. It is of course unknown what proportion of the latter figure is taken up by the outer fringe of the urban area, but there are two strong reasons for suspecting that the 53,814 does in fact include the three large refugee camps (Aqabat Jaber, Ain as Sultan and Nuweimah - figure 2 ). First, because of the desolate environment and the paucity of rural settlement it is absolutely certain that the native farming population could not have been more than a small fraction of the figure. Even if one assumes the inclusion of several thousand urbanites there would probably still be a gap of at least 30,000. Second, Jericho differs from most other enumeration districts in that no statistics are given for individual villages. In view of the introductory comment distribution data are presented for all principal administrative and census divisions, except where such would have cast light on the population enumerated in Palestinian refugee camps or Jordan Army encampments (English) (8)

it may be assumed that an element is incorporated which the Jordan Government wished to conceal. Although there were several small army bases in the vicinity in 1961 the only element which could conceivably inflate the "remainder of district" figure to 53,814 would be the camp refugee population.
An age-sex profile which closely follows that for the Jerusalem governorate as a whole, unlikely if there was a substantial military component, supports this conclusion (table 2:3). (9)

On the basis of the above remarks the author is forced to one (or a combination) of three conclusions concerning the Jordan census.

a) That all refugee camps are included but, in view of the fact that the total indicated for the Jericho camps (c. 30,000) is substantially below the corresponding UNRWA estimates (c. 50,000), (10) are deliberately concealed owing to fears regarding the political repercussions of revising Palestinian refugee figures downwards. Such revision could have caused friction between the Jordan Government and UNRWA on the one side and Palestinian organizations on the other (see Appendix IIIb for cases of hostile reaction to UNRWA's own attempts to rectify anomalies in refugee registration) or might have been used by Israel to discredit UNRWA and intensify attacks on Arab estimates of 1948-49 refugee flows. A hint that the census-takers did in fact find some camp populations to be lower than UNRWA reports and Government sources had suggested is given in the note -

of those normally resident in camps some were temporarily absent on Census Day in part-time jobs. To present data on size of refugee camps would substantially understate their numbers. (6)

the absentee excuse is possibly a diversion tactic - in reality it could apply to any population centre.

b) That some urban refugee camps have been entirely excluded from the final census tables. This suspicion arises
from the confusion in the 'mode of living' categories and from the fact that exclusion of urban as opposed to rural camps would be extremely difficult to detect, especially as no statistics are provided for internal sub-divisions of major West Bank urban areas. (11) The Hebron case has already been noted and in Jericho exclusion of Ain as Sultan camp (on the fringes of the town) would provide an alternative explanation for the incompatibility between the census derived estimate for Jericho refugees and the UNRWA statistics. Reasons for dropping some urban camps, if this has occurred, can only be surmised - perhaps the Jordanians wished to keep the number, and hence the percentage of Palestinians in the national total, as low as possible without manipulation being too obvious.

On the other hand the author's comments on the matter of rural residuals indicates that most, if not all, rural refugee concentrations are definitely included in the census tables.

c) That, if all camps are included (as the Jordanians strenuously insist), the census as a whole is an undercount, both for 1948 refugees and for the native population. This possibility is suggested because, if one assumes all camps are present and the 1967 Israeli census is substantially accurate, a general 1961 undercount is the only explanation remaining for the difficulties arising when one compares, for example, the 1961 and 1967 Hebron totals. (table 2:2).

There are thus severe problems with the Jordan census, but because of the impossibility of coming to a
definite conclusion about the exact nature of the defects on the evidence available, the author has had no choice but to use the census figures as they stand as one of the data sources for the analysis conducted in Chapter 3. Difficulties are, however, alleviated by two considerations:

a) most geographical distinctions discussed in Chapter 3 are of such magnitude that there can be little doubt that they reflect reality.

b) for the central part of the West Bank the author has a second source entirely independent from Jordanian official statistics, a source which supports the comment made in (a) (P. 59 and Appendix IIIa). The main warning that needs to be made, therefore, is that calculations partially based on the 1961 census should not be seen as exact reflections of real world circumstances, but merely as approximate indications of reality - in many cases the only indications possible. Much the same may also be said regarding the detailed Jordanian statistics for displaced persons (P. 58 and Appendix IV a).

To conclude, insufficient information is available for an exact apportionment of responsibility for the gap of 180,000 between the highest and lowest estimates for the 1967 West Bank exodus. Two observations can, however, be made. First, because the evidence for inflation in the Jordanian official estimate of c.355,000 is clearer and of more obviously far-reaching effect than is the evidence for census error, it is probable that the actual scale of the exodus was closer to the census derived figure of 181,524. On this basis a compromise estimate would place the true
out-movement total at approximately 250,000. Second, any census error that does exist is more likely to accrue from a Jordanian undercount than from an Israeli overcount, if only because doubt is more readily cast on the 1961 census than on that for September 1967.

It should be stressed that revision of the Jordanian official figures does not in any way detract from the magnitude of the human tragedy or from the scale of settlement desertion, which in some parts of the West Bank was almost total. A loss of 250,000 from a population of only 843,000 (30%) remains a very significant event.

II. The War of Attrition: Secondary Population Movement

The 1967 refugee flows were only the first of two sets of demographic upheaval associated with the new phase of the Arab-Israeli conflict. In the atmosphere of intensified bitterness the new border-lines quickly became the scene of a second stage of hostilities—the War of Attrition. The War of Attrition, which lasted from late 1967 to August 1970, proved a quite different phenomenon from the June war which preceded it and the Yom Kippur War which followed it. Instead of short mobile engagements it involved prolonged periods of in-situ fighting, generally of low intensity but occasionally flaring-up into major clashes. In both the Suez Canal zone and the East Jordan Valley the aerial and artillery
bombardments quickly created conditions intolerable for the local populations. As a result 1968 and 1969 saw the almost complete evacuation of these two areas - a displacement of almost one million people.

Population movement caused by the War of Attrition differed from that caused by the June War in several major respects. First the displacement was much larger - the exodus from the Canal cities of Port Said, Ismailiya and Suez was greater than any of the out-movements of June 1967. Second the displacement was essentially short-term, lasting only until tolerable security conditions were restored. Repopulation (Jordan Valley 1971 - 72, Suez Canal 1974 - 75) has occurred because, unlike the June War, "attrition" did not lead to a change of ruling authority in the regions it affected. Hence there was no intervening barrier erected like that which still precludes the return of the people who fled the occupied territories.

III. The Golan Exodus

The West Bank exodus has been the most publicised of the out-movements sparked by the events of 1967-1970. Yet, putting it into a wider perspective, it involved lesser absolute numbers than did the Suez Canal shifts and, even when analysis is restricted to 1967, it takes second place to the Syrian exodus in terms of
magnitude relative to source population (table 2:1). Out-movement from the Golan Heights deserves comment both for itself - an extreme case of settlement desertion - and as an introduction to themes explored in greater depth in following chapters.

Discussion is here based on a comparison of the 1960 Syrian census with the August 1967 Israeli count. Again there is the possibility that the enumerations do not give an entirely accurate portrayal of reality. Concerning the Syrian census the sensitive location of the Golan must raise some question as to whether village totals include military personnel and their families, despite an introductory comment asserting that

"all persons found in one place at the time of the enumeration were counted, whether they were residents or temporary visitors." (12)

Furthermore if there is any truth in the observations made in the United Nations Gussing report ( p. 46 ), the possibility arises that Israeli figures may not include residual populations regarded as inconvenient and hence liable to be encouraged to leave. Certainly, although a cross-check between the out-movement estimate obtained by census comparison and the post-war refugee counts made by UNRWA does not reveal any discrepancy equivalent to that existing in the West Bank case, the official statistics need to be treated with some caution.

The 1960 Syrian census indicates a Golan population of 91,933, distributed as depicted in figure 41.
Despite several obvious concentrations no part of the region could be said to have been poorly peopled. It is assumed that the pattern includes c. 17,000 1948 Palestine refugees registered with UNRWA.

Israel's 1967 enumeration shows a drastic change - total desertion of all parts of the Golan with the exception of six villages in the north, five of them Druze. This is the situation depicted in figure 42.

Calculation of the difference between the two enumerations gives a population fall of 85,537, 93% of the 1960 census total, though this must not be interpreted as being synonymous with the war-provoked exodus. To represent it as such one has to make two dubious assumptions - that there was no change between 1960 and the war and that the two censuses are entirely reliable. Nonetheless the calculation provides a strong indication as to the scale of the out-movement, if not an actual figure, and it accords reasonably with the subsequent counts made of refugee concentrations in and around Damascus, counts which pointed to an exodus of approximately 100,000.

Unfortunately even this degree of confidence vanishes when one comes to the matter of the exact fate of these people during and after the fighting and the reasons for the near-totality of settlement desertion. Here official accounts are entirely contradictory.
Israel claims that all except 5875 Druze, 385 Alawis and a few hundred others, mostly Circassians in Quneitra, were either evacuated before the fighting or fled with the retreating Syrian army in 9-10 June. (13) According to a Ha-aretz report (13) even the Quneitra residual rapidly declined after the war, with 90 crossing the cease-fire line in July, departees being obliged to sign concerning their "voluntary departure". The scale of the movement is accounted for, at least in part, by the assertion that the bulk of Golanites depended on the region's military system for their livelihood and so could be expected to leave immediately that system collapsed.

Syria, though not denying a panic-stricken exodus during the battle itself, hotly disputes the Israeli version. Syria claims that large numbers remained behind in agricultural villages after the cease-fire and these were gradually forced to move by the Israeli Army, through physical and psychological pressure, in following months. The implication is that, as the relative size of the displacement was much greater than on the West Bank, intimidation was also more extensive. (14)

Tentative observations by the United Nations Special Representative (on the Golan 7-8 August 1967) incorporate elements of both views. The Gussing Report notes "there are strong indications that the majority -- had left before the end of hostilities" but then goes on to indicate the presence of a residual population (size unspecified) in the post-war period, a residual which gradually disappeared. Some allusion is made to residents being --

"frightened by incidents such as shooting in the air and the rounding up of civilians -- the Special
Representative felt that it was likely that many such incidents had taken place and that the Israel Defence Forces had not viewed unfavourably the impact of such incidents on the movement of the population" (15)

However, concrete evidence is not provided and hence, as with the West Bank exodus figures, a final conclusion is impossible. The relevant point is that the Israel Government had from an early stage an almost deserted territory with which to work - on which to impose its own population pattern. Figures 41-44 depict the continuing demographic and settlement transformation on the Golan, a process given detailed attention in Chapter 7.
(1) See analysis of refugee camp survey results, P. 80
88.3% of the sample left either during the
war or immediately beforehand.

(2) Supreme Ministerial Committee for Displaced Persons
(Amman - also = Joint Ministerial Committee for
Relief) - reports for May and June-July 1968. An
estimate of 361,000 for June 1968 is given (both
first and second-time refugees), from which 5,938
January - May arrivals are here subtracted.


(4) Elaboration in Buehrig, The U.N. and the Palestinian
Refugees P. 40.

(5) A similar result would ensue if the pre-war West Bank
population was slightly lower than indicated
in the author's projection from the 1952 and
1961 censuses, owing to an acceleration in out-
migration after 1961. The possibility of such an
acceleration is discussed by Uziel Shmeltz in
Shmueli, Grossman and Zevi (editors), Judea and
Samaria - Studies in Settlement Geography
P.82-92 (Hebrew).

(6) Jordan Census, 1961. Arabic and English Introductions,
section 6.2. (Volume 1, Final Tables).

(7) One passage in the census Methods Report comments that
due to the 'commitment' not to reveal camp numbers
"special attention was paid to them (the camps)
during all phases of the census". The phrase
'special attention' clearly has ominous overtones.
(Volume 4, Methods Report, P. 41).

P.XV.

(9) In fact the Jericho military encampments do have a
slight influence on the table 2:3 figures, as may
be seen from the proportions in the male age-
groups 15-24, 25-29, and 30-39 - somewhat higher
for Jericho rural than for Jerusalem in general.

(10) The 1967 UNRWA ration recipient total for the three
camps = 53,645.
(Source - UNRWA, Ramallah).

(11) Except such crude distinctions as 'Old City' and 'New
City' in Jerusalem.

(12) Census of Syria, 1960 - Damascus Muhafaza

(13) Ha-aretz 16-8-67 P.4., 12-9-67 P.1. (on 'evacuees')

(14) United Nations - Report of the Secretary General under
General Assembly Resolution 2252 (ES-V) and Security
(15) Ibid., P. 9.
CHAPTER THREE

THE 1967 WEST BANK EXODUS: GENERAL THEMES
I The Highlands: Short and Long-range Movements

As on the Egyptian and Syrian fronts the most notable feature of the June 1967 Israeli campaign on the West Bank of Jordan was the extraordinary speed of execution, largely owing to overwhelming Israeli air superiority. Fighting lasted less than three days. The first Israeli thrusts were launched at 5 p.m. on Monday 5 June, following eight hours of Jordanian sniping and shelling along the West Bank border. These were directed at East Jerusalem and the surrounds of Jenin, where Jordanian artillery was threatening the Ramat David air base. The development of the campaign through 6 June and 7 June is depicted in figure 9. On Tuesday the Israelis captured Jerusalem and pushed north to Ramallah, the Jordanian headquarters. Ramallah was also the target of an up-hill thrust from the Latrun area in the west. Further north, Qalqilia and Jenin were taken and a two-pronged drive on Nablus was set in motion. By the following afternoon the West Bank highlands were completely overrun, fighting being concluded on Wednesday evening with swift advances on the Damiya and Allenby bridges in the Jordan Valley.

The character of the campaign affected the scale of the refugee out-movement in several significant respects. First the local population had not expected either war or an Israeli victory. The speed of the Israeli advance thus had a severe demoralizing effect. In their report on a survey conducted among 1967 refugees three months after the
The sudden, unexpected and rapid defeat threw many people off-balance. A state of turmoil existed and very few knew what to do. It is relevant here to recall the case of the woman who picked up a pillow and ran away with it, thinking it was her child -- Arab civilians simply were not prepared for the war -- nobody was available to give advice. (1)

Psychological pressure was reinforced by intensive Israeli aerial activity, terrifying to a people unused to this type of warfare. Villages adjacent to main roads, along which the Israelis harried the retreating Jordanian army, were particularly liable to air attack.

In such conditions of extreme stress it is not surprising that large numbers abandoned their homes and sought safety in flight. On most parts of the West Bank Highlands, however, the initial movement was not in the direction of the Jordan bridges, but merely involved a shift to places away from actual or potential axes of fighting: to hills, orchards, caves or villages at a distance from the main roads. Beit Ur Tahta (1400 people), on the line of the Israeli thrust from Latrun to Ramallah town, illustrates the point well. This settlement was one of 39 localities visited by Antranik Bakerjan, UNRWA area officer at Ramallah, in the fortnight after the war. Here he noted -

was fighting in and around village and one woman killed. Whole population fled for safety with exception of some elderly people who stayed behind. No houses demolished. Villagers who fled returned after four days. Village was searched - considerable looting has been reported. (2)

Qalandia, a camp for 1948 refugees on the Jerusalem-Ramallah highway (5,500 people), was similarly affected. Here several artillery shells fell around the mosque minaret, causing an
immediate evacuation.

The border town of Qalqilia (14,000 people), where numerous Jordanian troops and artillery pieces had been concentrated, was the largest centre to experience such temporary desertion. Three-quarters of the residents left before or during the Israeli assault on Tuesday 6 June, the remainder being advised to depart by the Israeli military commander after the town's capture. Those on foot took refuge in nearby hills and caves while those with vehicles proceeded to Nablus.

Of course once the population had been destabilized in this fashion further movement quickly followed. Large numbers, fearful of dishonour coming to the family through molestation of its women -- of young men in the family being arrested -- and of massacres such as the one at Deir Yassin, headed for the East Bank almost immediately and by the late afternoon of 6 June streams of Highland refugees were crossing the Jordan Valley floor.

At the forefront went the people fleeing Jerusalem. Jerusalem was the scene of the earliest and most intense fighting and, as the city and its environs had their back to the Wilderness of Judea little local refuge existed for those wishing to escape the bullets and shells. Israeli advances through Abu Tor and Silwan (figure 9), during which many men were taken into custody, produced mass panic in these suburbs, and as residents fled eastward they generated further movement. Their destination was Jericho, nearest haven on the route away from the invasion (35 kilometres), and from Jericho the final shift across the Allenby bridge was a short and logical step.
The first refugees were soon joined on the East Bank by many who had left villages and UNRWA camps for temporary shelter in the fields and thereafter by others who had remained in their homes throughout the war but who were frightened by the behaviour of the Israel security forces in the initial weeks of the occupation. With regard to the post-war refugees it should however be noted that although out-migration between the cease-fire and mid July involved considerable numbers in absolute terms its significance relative to the war-time exodus is problematic and probably secondary, its proportion of the total possibly being less than 20%. (4)

Gussing makes some hints as to factors responsible for the continuing outflow, but as with the Golan exodus he is unable to arrive at a definite conclusion -

There are persistent reports of acts of intimidation by Israel armed forces and of Israel attempts to suggest to the population, by loudspeakers mounted on cars, that they might be better off on the East Bank. (5)

At the local level the pattern of war-time events on the West Bank was extremely complex, village experiences varying greatly over short distances. Again Antranik Bakerjan's 39 village record provides excellent exemplification. In Kharbata, five kilometres from the frontier, where residents fled into the countryside on the first day of the invasion "because of the danger of fighting" 600 out of a pre-war population of 1100 soon left for the East Bank, despite the fact that "no looting was reported and no damage to houses". Kharbata's neighbour to the west, Deir Qaddis, target of much firing owing to "the existence of a military
post" within the built-up area, also experienced an early temporary evacuation (for three days) and a permanent reduction in numbers amounting to approximately half the pre-war total. In contrast at Kufr Ni'ma, six kilometres to the east, people stayed in their homes throughout the fighting and virtually no population loss occurred, "with the exception of a few married women who escaped to join husbands working on the East Bank". Hostilities did not affect Kufr Ni'ma, which is set back from the main roads, and "no looting was reported".

From these cases it is clear that some correlation existed between temporary settlement desertion and the occurrence of large-scale permanent movement - once destabilized people were more likely to flee to the East Bank. However, the one did not always lead to the other. For example Beit Ur Tahta, subject to wholesale desertion during the war, eventually lost only 350 people out of 1400. A similar recovery took place in Qalqilia. Initially the Israelis tried to prevent the town's repopulation, claiming that many buildings were in danger of collapse and that there was a public health risk. Qalqilia people travelling back from Nablus were thus stopped at Azun, but after the Mayor had seen the Minister of Defence in Jerusalem the military authorities allowed resettlement to proceed, albeit reluctantly. The road-blocks to the east were lifted at 5 a.m. on 28 June and by the end of the month most of the 14,000 residents were back. They returned to a town which had suffered large-scale looting and which was in part reduced to rubble. Of 2000 houses the Mayor claimed that 850 had
been demolished - 830 after the occupation.\(5\) It is possible that the Israelis had at one stage toyed with the idea of clearing the entire Qalqilia area, perhaps in similar style to the bulldozing of three villages in the Latrun salient, so paving the way for de-facto incorporation into metropolitan Israel.

II. The Emptying of the West Jordan Valley

One of the notable features of the West Bank exodus was the contrast in magnitude between the outflow from the Highlands and that from the West Jordan Valley. Even on the most inflated estimates the Highlands could not have lost more than 37% of their pre-war population (probably c. 20%) whereas in the West Valley, according to census based estimates (table 2:1) 87% left. This is particularly curious as virtually all the fighting took place in the Highlands, which, except in the north, lie between the Valley and Israel. On the Highlands themselves frontier districts suffered the greatest demographic upheaval (figure 11), both for short distance flight within the West Bank and for out-movement across the Jordan river. Why then should the reverse apply in the relationship between the Highlands and West Valley outflows?

Three factors peculiar to the West Valley go some way toward providing an explanation. First, because of the immediate proximity of the bridges, much of the movement that on the Highlands never developed beyond temporary settlement desertion internal to the West Bank was in the Valley transferred to the East Bank, from which there was little prospect of return after 10 June. In distance terms the West Valley
equivalent of a Qalqilia-Nablus shift is a Jericho-Amman one and hence a comparison between out-movements which does not take account of shifts within Highland districts may well be invalid.

Second, as intermediate zone between Highland sources and East Bank destinations, the West Valley experienced in full the psychologically disturbing effect of being an area of passage for large refugee flows. In such conditions the fact that it saw none of the major ground fighting merely rendered its inhabitants especially prone to rumours and exaggerations, presumably including highly coloured accounts of evictions and atrocities. As a result it may be assumed that the West Valley exodus was at least in part a chain-reaction response to the larger eastward movement from the Highlands.

Third, in the huge UNRWA camps surrounding Jericho town, the West Valley housed the West Bank's greatest single concentration of persons who were already fugitives from conflict - from the 1948-49 war. Aqabat Jaber, Ain as Sultan and Nuweimah supplied at least 65% of the region's refugees, being abandoned by the vast majority of their 53,645(7) residents on Wednesday, 7 June, despite the fact that no hostilities occurred in their vicinity. An examination of the peculiar conditions of mounting psychological insecurity which precipitated the abandonment, accounting for perhaps 25% of the overall West Bank exodus, is highly instructive. (8)

Jericho's first view of the war was unsettling. On the afternoon of 5 June three local army bases were bombed and napalm victims were evacuated via Jericho to Salt
on the East Bank. On 6 June the refugee flows from the Highlands began to reach the town, on which all three roads leading to the Allenby bridge converge (figure 2). Mixed in with this human flood was the retreating Jordanian army, which had evacuated its Ramallah head-quarters at 11 p.m. the preceding night.

Thus on the morning of 7 June Jericho was host to tens of thousands of Highlanders, bearing all sorts of lurid tales. The consequent apprehension was further reinforced by concurrent Israeli bombing of ripening crops round-about the town, creating a "ring of fire" impression; whether or not this was a deliberate tactic it was executed at an obviously critical moment.

The breaking-point for the camp residents came at 11 a.m., when the UNRWA area officer, who had experienced the Gaza occupation of 1956 fled Jericho in an UNRWA car. At about the same time another UNRWA vehicle was commandeered at gun-point by the town's police chief, who made a similar exit. These two departures, known throughout the neighbourhood almost immediately, finally sparked the mass flight. With Karameh on the East Bank only 12 kilometres away the distance constraint was minimal and by the late afternoon the three Jericho camps were virtually empty.

III. Problems with Numbers

In structural terms the 1967 West Bank exodus had three components: native West Bankers, residents of the UNRWA camps, and 1948-49 refugees who lived outside the camps. For each component estimates of the numbers who crossed the
river are suspect, though to differing degrees.

The UNRWA figures are perhaps the most distorted, principally because of the accumulated errors of nearly two decades. Although ration recipient numbers are available for each UNRWA district (Jericho, Hebron, Jerusalem and Nablus) for before and after the war such factors as families holding several ration cards and the continued registration of thousands of dead persons inflate the totals so seriously that it is impossible to conduct an inter-regional analysis of the out-movement of "second-time refugees". (Appendix IIIb).

In consequence one is restricted to the native West Banker component - "first time refugees" or "displaced persons". Numbers by origin and destination region were obtained from the Jordanian Supreme Ministerial Committee for Displaced Persons in Amman, the complete table being given in Appendix IVa. These figures depict the situation existing in September 1973, but can reasonably be assumed to depict the origin-region pattern of December 1967. First, post 1967 births are excluded. Second, additions and subtractions resulting from post 1967 movement to and from the West Bank are relatively minor. Third, there is no reason to suppose that losses through death vary proportionately between the origin-regions - in fact as with earlier UNRWA statistics such losses may not have been recorded at all. Finally, the December 1975 table is included with that for September 1973 to show how little the figures change through time, so buttressing the above observations.

Yet although the origin region statistics of September 1973 may be little different from December 1967
equivalents, (9) there remains the question of whether the displaced person registration built up by December 1967 in fact reflected the actual numbers who crossed the river in that year. Here one must assume considerable inflation, for despite the fact that it represents only one major element in the exodus the September 1973 displaced person figure (181,856) equals the out-movement total derived from the comparison of the Jordan and Israel censuses (181,524 - though this is probably itself a grossly inaccurate measure) and is not far below an early combined estimate for first and second-time refugees (c.200,000). (9) Sources of inflation are presumably similar to those cited in the UNRWA case; for example there is the factor of second-time refugees illicitly obtaining displaced person identification to collect extra rations. On the other hand defects are probably of lesser magnitude simply because of the shorter time-period and, despite shared distortions, Jordanian displaced person figures have major advantages over UNRWA second-time refugee totals from the point of view of geographical analysis - they offer much greater detail as regards origin-regions and for one major West Bank district they can be checked against an independent source.

In Ramallah district village population reductions recorded in the Bakerjan survey (full details in Appendix III a) may be used to give estimates for out-movement from various areas, estimates which can be weighed against the Jordanian Ramallah statistics. Taking Deir Qaddis nahiya (figure 13) as an example, the population losses from the five villages visited by Bakerjan
are added together, the losses as a proportion of the pre-war village totals calculated, and, assuming that the five cases are typical, the same proportion used to derive a general displaced person figure for the nahiya. In Deir Qaddis the Bakerjan based figure is thus 4174 (47.6% of the pre-war population) as against a Jordanian statistic of 6749 (76.9% of the pre-war population).

Similar results for Nabi Saleh nahiya and for the remainder of Ramallah may be seen in table 3.1. The Bakerjan and Jordanian figures agree in indicating a very large population loss in Deir Qaddis, a frontier territory, compared with lesser outflows elsewhere, but for two of the three Ramallah areas Jordanian numbers are much greater in absolute terms. As the Bakerjan survey, taken soon after the war, may be assumed to be reasonably reliable this is yet further evidence pointing to an inflationary distortion in the Jordanian displaced person statistics. Hence it is only safe to draw broad conclusions from the spatial pattern depicted in table 3.2 and figure 11, as one has to make the assumption that the degree of distortion is similar between the origin-areas.

IV. Displaced Person Origins

Figure 11, together with table 3.2, is a representation of the magnitude of the exodus of first-time refugees - native West Bankers - for seventeen West Bank areas and it is entirely based on Jordanian official statistics. It is re-emphasized that second-time refugees are excluded from the analysis.
Unfortunately the source population used - non-refugee camp West Bankers - is not exactly congruent with the actual displaced person source - native West Bankers. However, as no figures are available to enable a subtraction of 1949 refugees living outside camps, it is the best possible approximation.

Three features are of interest. First the prominence of the West Jordan Valley as a region of massive out-movement persists even with the exclusion of second-time refugees. Second, on the Highlands, there is a clear distinction between the areas surrounding Nablus, which generated relatively small outflows, and districts to the south, particularly Ramallah and Hebron, where the exodus was substantially greater. Third, within both Ramallah and Hebron districts the magnitude of the exodus appears to have been especially massive in the vicinity of the border with Israel.

Hebron and the West Valley will be dealt with at length in the next chapter, in the analysis of the author's East Bank refugee camp survey, but one important theme can be discussed immediately - the extent to which geographical variation in the magnitude of the out-movement from the West Bank Highlands can be attributed to flight from frontier areas.

V. Ramallah: flight from the frontiers

Figure 12 shows the seventeen areas of figure 11 reduced to five major divisions. Four of these are on the Highlands and here the average reduction of the non-refugee camp population caused by the displaced person outflow is 24.6%, according to the Jordanian statistics. Jerusalem stands near the average, with Nablus below and Hebron and
Ramallah above. As already noted Hebron and Ramallah exhibit a marked contrast between frontier and interior. With regard to Hebron the geographical differential is not enough to account for the high overall outflow, as even without the Dura frontier villages the relative loss remains well above the Highland average. In Ramallah however events along the border with Israel hold the key to the district's high ranking as a displaced-person source, for if abnormal out-movements from the Latrun salient and a few villages in Deir Qaddis nahiya are discounted the district as a whole is immediately reduced to the Jerusalem mean (table 3:2). Ramallah border events thus merit close attention.

The geography of the Ramallah exodus is depicted in figure 13, based on Bakerjan's village survey. Bakerjan estimates allow more detail than do Jordanian statistics and, being on-the-spot assessments, are less suspect. Heavy population losses along the border are the most notable feature of figure 13, particularly the total abandonment of the Latrun salient.

(i) In the pre-1967 period the Latrun hills, a small finger of the West Bank jutting eight kilometres into central Israel, had considerable strategic significance, perhaps greater than that of any other stretch of the 1949 Israel-Jordan armistice line. Rising 150 metres above the adjacent Lowlands the salient commanded the northern approach to the Israeli corridor running inland to Jerusalem. In 1948 an Arab Legion detachment in the police fortress was able to close the main highway from Tel Aviv, cutting Israeli access to the capital and forcing the construction of a detour road
to the south. The Israelis made five abortive attempts to capture the position between May and August 1948, at a cost of 700 dead, 10% of the Israeli losses in the 1948-49 War.

Not surprisingly, when presented with their next opportunity in June 1967 the Israelis determined to eliminate the strategic irritant once and for all. Latrun and its environs were captured in a quick thrust on the night of 5 June and at 4:30 a.m. the next morning, according to displaced persons, the 5000 people of the three Latrun villages - Umwas, Yalu and Beit Nuba - were called to assemble by Israeli officers and then ordered to leave in the direction of Ramallah town. Some did not go further than the second-line, settlements of Beit Liqya, Beit Sira and Beni Hareth, but most walked up to Ramallah itself, being joined on the way by numbers of people from localities they passed through or near, as the story of their experience had an unsettling effect. After three days at Ramallah groups of villagers tried to re-enter the salient but were stopped at the second-line settlements.

On 13 June Israeli bulldozers levelled the Latrun villages - the most far-reaching act of demolition carried out on the West Bank under the occupation. Gussing notes -

The Minister of Defence (Moshe Dayan), in his meeting with the Special Representative, stated that he had ordered the destruction of these damaged villages for strategic and security reasons, as they dominated an important strategic area. (11)

It was abundantly clear that Israel intended to absorb Latrun - part of a policy to buttress the country's coastal waist - and that not the slightest prospect existed of the
Arab residents being allowed back.

Faced with this hopeless situation the great majority of the people from Umwas, Yalu and Beit Nuba made the final shift across the Jordan. Only a week after the initial flight to Ramallah UNRWA estimated that at least three-quarters had already moved on to the East Bank, and by January 1968 most of the remainder had followed suit.

(ii) To the north of the Latrun salient, in Deir Qaddis nahiya, the permanent population loss was also of unusual dimensions — in proportionate terms the largest for any administrative unit on the Highlands (figures 11,13). It did not of course compare with the totality of the Latrun expulsion but it was nonetheless extraordinary considering eviction was not a significant factor.

Here, the explanation is probably historical and psychological. On 14 October 1953, in retaliation for the killing of a woman and her two children in Yahud, near Lod, the Israelis made a night attack on the border village of Qibya, in the centre of the Deir Qaddis area. During the raid forty-five houses were dynamited, generally while the occupants were still inside. The final civilian death-toll amounted to 65, with 75 wounded — for Palestinian Arabs an atrocity ranking second only to Deir Yassin. In Israel there were immediate repercussions. Foreign Minister Moshe Sharett, who had noted in his diary concerning the Yahud murders "the Jordanians are shocked and will certainly do something — under such circumstances is it wise to retaliate?", (12) was horrified. He referred to the 18 October,
when a Cabinet discussion was held on the Qibya events as a "bitter, cursed day", and thereafter his rift with Ben Gurion widened rapidly, leading ultimately to his resignation (June 1956).

In the villages surrounding Qibya itself the psychological legacy of the raid was an image of Israel in which the central elements were massacre and mayhem. Direct experience presumably etched such perceptions much deeper in the local consciousness than was the case elsewhere on the West Bank, predisposing Deir Qaddis people to similarly greater degree of fear, panic and out-migration in June 1967.

Certainly no readily available alternative explanation exists for the unusual extent of flight to the East Bank from this nahiyah. First, although much of Deir Qaddis has a notably barren physical environment and several villages have lost lands across the 1949 armistice line, circumstances which could be used to sustain arguments that the holding-power of the local resource base was less than elsewhere, the same applies to frontier areas further north which, in sharp contrast, had relatively low out-migration losses. Second, Deir Qaddis did not see any major fighting (note axes of Israeli thrusts depicted in figure 9 as they relate to area boundaries in figure 10) and little evidence for looting or expulsion exists.

Finally, and perhaps decisively, it may be observed that abnormal out-migration declined steeply with distance from Qibya - in figure 11 Deir Qaddis is sharply differentiated even from neighbouring territories. This is
exactly the pattern one would expect if a fourteen year old local event is assumed to have been the operative factor.

(iii) It remains to complete the Ramallah mosaic with a description of conditions elsewhere in the district and with a brief comment on the wider impact of the frontier exodus.

The Ramallah interior exhibited local variation in out-migration levels similar to that between Latrun and Deir Qaddis, though on a much reduced scale. A major contrast quickly emerged between villages on the Latrun-Ramallah-Jericho alignment, with more substantial losses (c. 20%), and those elsewhere (c. 10%). Here there is no problem in finding responsible factors. The Latrun-Jericho axis, incorporating an important east-west highway, was the route of the Israeli advance into the district and carried the great bulk of the refugee stream generated near the border. The latter factor may be interpreted as having a chain reaction effect - people being demoralized by the movement already in progress as well as by rumours spread by passers-through and so in turn rendered liable to displacement.

Bakerjan's survey contains several useful descriptions of the frequently traumatic experiences of villages which served as transit points for displaced persons. With regard to Ain Arik, five kilometres west of Ramallah town, he notes -

"it is said that the village was a stopping-point for people evicted from Umwas, Beit Nuba and Yalu. This caused considerable damage to the groves of the village--"

At Taibeh, on the descent into the Jordan Rift, he observes -

The village is on the road to Jericho and was therefore the stopping-point for all escapees. The groves of the
village and its fields are reported to have suffered considerably from the fleeing people. The village maintains there is considerable need for assistance.

Clearly, in some cases the economic destruction wrought by "fleeing people" would have been itself enough to cause secondary flight from the affected villages, especially if combined with looting by Israeli soldiers - as appears to have occurred at Ain Arik. (Appendix IIIa).

VI. A Geographical Paradox

Turning from Ramallah to wider inter-district and frontier-interior comparisons one comes to the most curious feature of the West Bank displaced person exodus; the fact that the geography of the flight was in large measure the inverse of the geography of the fighting. In the Jerusalem and Nablus sectors, where Israeli forces were concentrated and where fighting, particularly on the borders, was fiercest, one would have expected both the most substantial out-movement and the strongest frontier-interior contrasts. In the Ramallah and Hebron districts, subordinate theatres where relatively little fighting took place, one would have expected the opposite - a lesser exodus and a lack of frontier-interior differentiation.

Instead the situation is reversed (figure 12). In Jerusalem district, which because of the limited space between the border and the Judean Wilderness (figure 36) can be considered entirely "frontier" the displaced person exodus was little above the average, this despite the fact that the area saw the most intense battles of the June War,
including the two-day struggle for the Old City of Jerusalem.

The pattern in Nablus is even more interesting. Here the Israeli thrusts through Jenin and Qalqilia (figures 9,10) produced some sharp local engagements, yet almost everywhere population losses were below twenty percent and in one case (Salfit) are down to the ten per-cent level (figure 11).

Political factors provide a possible explanation. Under Jordanian rule Nablus had a well-earned reputation for radicalism and Palestinian nationalism, unsurpassed by any other West Bank district, a characteristic which may have exerted a powerful restraining influence on June 1967 out-migration. Considerations here include the role of radical nationalism in intensifying attachments to home localities, but primarily concern the bitter psychological legacy left by the vigorous Hashemite counter-measures against nationalist upsurges. In particular it could be hypothesized that, because of their unfortunate experience of Jordanian rule, Nablus region people had much stronger inhibitions against fleeing to the East Bank during and after the war than did people in other districts, owing to a more pessimistic perception of what might await them in the Hashemite heartland.

Aside from the political factors there are also special wartime conditions which may have acted to constrain out-movement from the Nablus border areas of Jenin, Ya'bad, Tulkarm and Qalqilia. In particular the Israeli push south from Jenin quickly produced a battle-zone intermediate between west Nablus villages and the East Bank, a battle-
zone which probably discouraged people from making the relatively long journey to the river, so keeping much of the demographic disruption purely short-range.

Indeed far from stimulating high outflow rates intense hostilities in both the Nablus governorate and the vicinity of Jerusalem may actually have led many people to lie low and stay at home. None of this is of course to imply that out-migration from either Nablus or Jerusalem was miniscule in absolute terms - even a proportion as low as ten per-cent of a source population involved large numbers of people.

Hebron and Ramallah, where minor military engagements were combined with high levels of population loss, confirm the spatial paradox. Here it was conclusively demonstrated that the chain-reaction consequences of such local events as the Latrun eviction and, more broadly, the geographically varying psychological legacy of the past, as symbolized in the impact of the Qibya incident on Deir Qaddis nahiyah, generally played a more important role in shaping differential out-movement patterns than did the geography of the war itself.

(2) Bakerjan file, UNRWA, Ramallah. See Appendix IIIa.

(3) Dodd and Barakat P.45.

(4) For evidence from the Baga'a camp survey see P. 404.


(6) Ibid P.15. Also see Ha-aretz 29-6-67 P.9.

(7) UNRWA camp statistics for Jericho district, June 1967 (Source - UNRWA, Ramallah).

(8) Source for Jericho account - Antranik Bakerjan (On the West Bank throughout the June War)

(9) *Die Welt* 30-10-67

   a) Gives a Jordan Government figure of 177,165 refugees for the period 5 June - 1 July 1967. This probably refers to displaced persons only, as others were an UNRWA concern, and if so its closeness to the 1973 displaced person total strongly supports the author's back-dating of the 1973 numbers. Source - Department of Statistics, Amman.

   b) As the figure of 200,000 is also supplied by the Jordan Government it too may exclude many UNRWA refugees who fled across the river in 1967. Hence it could well under-state the total exodus by a wide margin.


(11) Ibid., P.16. Also see *Divrei ha-Knesset* Vol.49. P.2814 1-8-67 (Question. U. Avneri to Minister of Defence)
CHAPTER FOUR

WEST BANK DISPLACED PERSONS: RESULTS OF A SAMPLE SURVEY
I. The Survey Method

(i) Purpose and Setting

The principal objective of the sample survey of displaced persons conducted by the author on the East Bank in July 1976 was to assess whether inter-regional differences in the magnitude of the West Bank displaced person outflow were paralleled by differences in the personal characteristics and migratory behaviour of the departing population. If so, can the latter differences be used to help explain the differences in out-movement magnitude, so adding to the interpretation outlined in Chapter 3?

Baq'a, the largest East Bank camp for 1967 refugees, was chosen as the survey site, partly because it provides the largest single concentration of displaced persons and partly because of its proximity to the author's base in Amman. Plate 6 gives an aerial overview of the camp, which comprises six residential blocks and a central market and services area. The population as of March 31 1976 was 54666 (7781 families), made up of 44066 second-time refugees and 10,600 displaced persons. Accommodation currently consists of densely packed concrete huts, in general one for each family unit. The huts contain between one and three rooms and living conditions vary from the extremely primitive to the moderately affluent (ownership of a television set or a refrigerator), depending on whether household members hold jobs and on the nature of the jobs.

It was decided to take a ten per-cent sample of the displaced persons in the camp. In the final form this covered
Plate 5

Baq'a emergency camp, East Jordan.
163 family units (out of 1061), encompassing 944 persons who had crossed from the West Bank as a result of the Israeli occupation. Extension of results obtained from such a sample to the generality of displaced persons is obviously problematic. Baqa'a residents, simply because they are still in a camp, are likely to be somewhat over-representative of poorer rural strata. However in view of the logistic impossibility of surveying non-camp displaced persons on the East Bank information from the Baqa'a survey was the best obtainable.

(ii) The Questionnaire

An English translation of the questionnaire may be found in Appendix V, which also provides reasons for individual lines of inquiry where these are not self-evident.

In broad terms questions are of three types:

a) those designed to establish a profile of June 1967 family characteristics, a profile here used as a base for exploring inter-regional differentiation.

b) those designed to test possible "push" and "pull" influences.

c) those designed to elicit information on the mechanics of the exodus itself.

Questionnaire layout was determined by the need for speed of interviewing, for one item to lead logically to the next, and for easy transfer of data to computer punch cards.

On 11 July 1976 a pilot survey was conducted by the author and the camp leader to test the questionnaire. Four families in C block, originating in Jericho and Ramallah
districts, were interviewed. The pilot led to two modifications in the questionnaire. First, because only vague estimates of 1967 property values could be obtained, provision was made for house sizes (in rooms) and land areas (in dunams) to be recorded. Second, a "military vehicle" category was added to the "mode of travel" question. This addition was initially prompted by the discovery that some families with military attachments crossed to the East Bank with the retreating Jordanian Army, but later also proved useful in identifying persons transported to the river in Israeli Army vehicles.

The main survey began on 14 July and continued until 28 July. As assistants the author employed an official from the Ministry of Social Welfare and three camp residents (students at the American University of Beirut, then closed by the Lebanese Civil War). Permission for the exercise was obtained from the Supreme Ministerial Committee for Displaced Persons and from UNRWA, the support of the Executive Secretary of the Ministerial Committee, who took an active interest in both the organizational and academic aspects of the survey, being particularly valuable here. Interviews were conducted between 5 p.m. and 8 p.m. each evening, when household heads were most likely to be at home. The five interviewers (including the author) split into three groups, each operating in a different residential block. The questionnaire was administered to the household-heads, who answered solely on the basis of the situation existing in the family unit in June 1967 and during the period prior to their arrival at Baq'a (January - March 1968, in 71% of the cases for which data are available).
Although nine years had passed memories concerning the events of 1967-1968 remained vivid and responses to most questions were excellent. Significant difficulties only arose with regard to 1967 property values, West Bank house sizes and dates for secondary movement on the East Bank.

In the first case, although there were few failures to respond, considerable inaccuracy is suspected. Camp residents tended to interpret property value questions as having some vague relation to future compensation and were consequently tempted to exaggerate. Fortunately their estimates can be checked against the detailed property characteristics (house size and land area), a check which shows, for example, that seven of the nine cases giving values of J D 100,000+ are plainly ludicrous.

On the matter of dates for secondary movement failure to respond became a significant feature, leading to missing value figures of 20.9% of total cases for the "second East Bank destination", 23.3% for the third and 12.9% for the fourth. As people often have poor memories regarding the timing of secondary events such results are not unexpected. In addition a missing value figure of 16.0% was recorded for "number of rooms at (West Bank) place of residence".

Otherwise failures to respond were nowhere above 3.1% and out of 56 questions 34 recorded no missing value figures at all.

(iii) Sample Selection

The most important criterion in sample selection, in view of the purpose of the survey, was to achieve both a
reasonable coverage of all origin regions and a reasonable spread of origin points within each origin region (figure 15). Because it is dubious whether Baga'a is representative of displaced persons in general the author considered that this would be at least as likely to achieve a result characteristic of the wider displaced person population as would a slavish adherence to the principle of a sample representative of the camp. Indeed the latter would have been directly inimical to the over-riding imperative of geographical spread – it was discovered in the course of the survey that resident origins were heavily biased in favour of the West Jordan Valley.

A register of all Baga'a residents, held in the camp leader's office, was the sole available source for sample selection. The register gives separate listings of hut numbers for each of the six blocks and distinguishes between displaced persons and second-time refugees. There is no alphabetical ordering of names and each block contains a mix of origin-regions.

A severe problem immediately arose regarding the achievement of a good spread of origin points – in many cases the register either did not give precise displaced person origins or gave obscure place names (location unknown even by the camp leader). Hence it was impossible to discern before the survey was actually underway exactly how the regional balance would work out. In this situation it was thought best to take a systematic sample of one in eight from the register's record of displaced person hut numbers (family residences). This gave a total of 201 families, 38
more than the ten per cent coverage aimed for. It was hoped that a reserve of six for each block would provide sufficient back-up in the event that representation of some Highland origin regions proved deficient.

Theoretically the problem could have been circumvented by the running of a large-scale pre-survey test to give some indication as to the pattern of origins, but political and financial constraints militated against this. The Civil War in Lebanon had produced a tense atmosphere in the camp, as the Jordan authorities were then supporting the Syrian offensive against the Palestinians. Consequently there was the ever present possibility of operations by the Jordanian security forces, operations which might render the survey impossible. In such conditions it seemed best to complete the main task as quickly as possible.

Interviewing thus began on the basis of the one-in-eight systematic sample. Origin bias soon emerged - after three days it became clear that the sample would heavily over-emphasize Jericho district and the Jiftlik area of Nablus, (figure 2 ), even with the reserve. It was immediately decided to put a ceiling (c.50) on numbers taken from the West Jordan Valley and to concentrate on increasing the representation of Highland districts (especially Hebron, Bethlehem, Ramallah and western parts of Nablus). A list of all persons who could be identified as coming from these districts was obtained from the camp register and hut numbers from this list (from all blocks) were progressively fed into the sample to replace people found to have originated in Jericho or Jiftlik. It was not considered likely that a mid-stream
elimination of Jericho would cause a bias toward particular origin-points in that district beyond bias that might be inherent to the camp, largely because sampling proceeded in all blocks simultaneously. It may be noted that such distortion would have emerged if all initial interviewing had been conducted in one block, as people from particular villages tend to concentrate. (1)

A second difficulty was the lesser problem of household heads who had displaced person identification but who were in fact second-time refugees. These household-heads had generally acquired displaced-person cards in order to collect additional rations, and they were identified either by information from neighbours or by their regional accents. For instance there was one person who purported to be from Beit Liqya in Ramallah district but who in fact had an intonation characteristic of the Lod area. When encountered such people were removed from the sample, one of the reserve being put in their place.

Overall co-operation from the sampled population was excellent, there being very few who refused to be interviewed. The fact that students living in Baqa'a were actively involved in the survey clearly minimized suspicions, (2) although any disturbance in the external political environment might have negated this. The origins of the final sample of 163 are depicted in figure 15. As may be seen the requirement for a good spatial spread, both within and between West Bank regions, is well satisfied.
II. The Survey Results

Computer analysis of the sample and its responses involved the use of the FREQUENCIES, CROSSTABS, and DISCRIMINANT programmes from the Statistical Package for the Social Sciences.

The investigation proceeds in two steps. First, the sample is described as a whole, with particular reference to the issue of whether displaced persons are fully representative of the pre-1967 West Bank population or derive disproportionately from classes prone to locational instability. Second the sample is divided by origin-district to enable an examination of regional differentiation, especially concerning factors which may have contributed to the spatial variation in out-movement.

III. Full Sample Analysis

Appendix V gives a detailed record of results for the full Baqa'a sample, results which enable conclusions to be drawn regarding the sample's relationship with both the pre-war West Bank population and the overall displaced-person exodus.

A central finding of the Dodd and Barakat survey of 1967 refugees was that they comprised genuine cross-sections of source communities -

"-- there is no disproportionate number of poor people, and there is little basis for alleging that most of the 1967 refugees were poor people -- lacking in close ties (to home areas) and therefore potential migrants -- this finding is relevant to our central question, why did they leave their homes? It rules out the answer that they left because they had little or nothing to lose." (3)
Evidence from the Baqa'a survey gives no reason for doubting such observations. Two Baqa'a data sets which can be directly related to the 1961 Jordan census (table 4:1) - those for question 4 (education levels) and question 5 (employment) - as well as the information derived for property ownership (question 7) may be used here.

With regard to education levels there is admittedly a significant tendency for survey household-heads to score less well than the general 1961 population (70.6% without formal education compared with a census proportion of 59.7%). This can however be largely attributed to the fact that the household heads, with an average age of 39.8 years in 1967, were children in a period when the education system was much less extensive than in 1961 and thus could not have been expected to have attained the same levels as a subsequent generation. The only surprise is that the proportions completing elementary school are so close (23.9% to 28.8%), which would not have been the case had the Baqa'a household-heads all been from the lowest socio-economic strata in their home communities.

Similar observations can be made regarding the two sets of employment statistics. Baqa'a household-heads, with a limited showing for professional, administrative and clerical classes if military personnel are discounted and with a relatively high proportion in the "miscellaneous labourer" category, seem to be somewhat over-representative of lower socio-economic levels, but again the main surprise is that the divergence from the general population is so limited.
After all, with a time-span of nine years in which wealthier displaced persons could leave the camp for more salubrious surrounds, chiefly in suburban Amman, one would expect some bias toward the poorer fraction amongst the refugees. Thus, for instance, Baqa'a camp contains virtually no Christians, in general more highly placed in socio-economic terms than Moslems. This is not because there were no Christians in the West Bank out-movement, but because Christian refugees prefer not to live in the emergency camps.

Conclusive support for Dodd and Barakat comes from the survey data on property ownership. Despite the fact that the Baqa'a sample is probably biased toward poorer elements in the exodus 83.4% possess immovable property in their original place of residence and 51.3% hold agricultural land, the average plot size being 46.3 dunams. If this is true of its poorer strata quite clearly the exodus as a whole involved people who had plenty to lose in their home communities. The riff-raff hypothesis that the bulk of refugees lacked real property and steady jobs and thus were especially prone to panic and flight is confirmed as substantially false.

Further, the survey data also point to an out-movement almost entirely comprised of full nuclear family units, with no detectable age or sex bias (average 1967 family size for sample = 6.16, average number fleeing = 5.65).

Turning to the mechanics of the out-migration question 8 (date of move) indicates that 88.4% of the sample families left the West Bank before the end of the war (June 10 1967). Although the figure only refers to native West Bankers such a finding must throw doubt on the relative significance some, including Dodd and Barakat, have attached to
post-war experience of the occupation regime as a precipitating factor. Comment made earlier (p. 74) about poor memories with regard to dates referred entirely to secondary events - one would expect recall concerning the primary migration to be considerably clearer, a supposition supported by the 100% response rate on the question.

Other salient features are that 93.2% considered the move purely temporary, 85.9% had no East Bank destination in mind when they fled their homes, 75.5% reached the Jordan crossing-points by walking and 96.3% had no thought of moving before the war, a figure which counts against the notion that the 1967 exodus can be linked to pre-war west-east migration.

Finally, after arrival on the East Bank the average sample family made 2.3 additional shifts before settling in Baqa'a, generally in February - March 1968. Major destinations for the first shift within the East Bank were the East Jordan Valley, Amman and Suweilah (Baqa'a), reflecting either early moves between Plateau and Ghor or the later move to Baqa'a. Accompanying dates confirm this, moves being concentrated into the periods June - July 1967, September 1967 and February - March 1968. For later shifts the penultimate Baqa'a stage naturally becomes more and more predominant, with dates showing a progressively greater emphasis on early 1968. This question is explored in depth in Chapter 5.

IV. Regional Analysis

For regional analysis of the sample two forms of organization are employed, the West Bank being split first into two units and then into five.

The two unit division, producing a wide range of statistically significant regional differences, provides more
clear-cut results than does the more complex investigation. This division - a simple comparison between people originating in the West Bank Highlands and those originating in the West Jordan Valley - has two powerful advantages. First, by preserving large sub-samples for each region it has a greater chance of yielding results representative of real-world differences in the generality of displaced persons than have the necessarily much smaller sub-samples for the five region division. Second, it faithfully reflects the West Bank's greatest environmental and human contrast - between the humid uplands of Judea and Samaria with their larger, wealthier more educated more urbanized populations, and the hot dry wasteland of the Jordan Rift, with its poor oasis based settlement clusters, dominated between 1949 and 1967 by the huge Jericho refugee camps. Some fundamental divergence in the personal characteristics and migratory behaviour of the displaced person sub-samples from the Highlands and the Valley is thus to be expected, irrespective of variation in such things as perception of Israel and wartime experience.

Such inherent contrast is more subdued within the Highlands and so the five unit analysis, designed to examine the area's internal variation, cannot be expected to produce the sharp divergences which should be evident in a Highland-Valley comparison. This is especially the case as the Highland subdivision is of necessity based on administrative districts with artificial boundaries, the only spatial units for which comprehensive displaced person statistics are available.
On the other hand, the five unit analysis proves valuable in highlighting those differences between displaced person populations which have no apparent link with "natural" variation, particularly differences in historical experience and hence in the psychological legacy of past events.

(i) Highlands and Valley

A comparison of the displaced person out-movements from the West Bank Highlands and from the West Jordan Valley (figure 12) exhibits the geographical paradox discussed on page 67 in its most extreme form. Even when second-time refugees are excluded the West Valley outflow figure still represents a much greater proportion of the source population than does that for the Highlands - c. 59% compared with c. 25%. Yet virtually all the fighting of 5-7 June 1967 took place on the Highlands, with only a limited amount of Israel Air Force activity extending down into the Jordan Rift. Clearly in the West Valley and Highland out-movements one has distinct phenomena, with or without the special case of the Jericho refugee camps.

It was hoped that the two unit analysis of the Baqa'a survey population would allow some firm conclusions to be drawn regarding the detailed character of the Valley-Highland distinction. Dividing the population gave sub-samples of 51 families (311 persons) for the West Valley and 113 families (699 persons) for the West Bank Highlands.

Much of the explanation for the greater relative magnitude of the West Valley displaced persons exodus probably lies in the already noted fact that on the Highlands
only part of the demographic upheaval amongst native residents involved movement across the river. Whereas on the Highlands short-range shifts were confined to the West Bank, with an extensive return home after the war, in the Valley short-range settlement desertion as well as more deliberate eastward movement was transferred across the river, to areas from which return was extremely difficult. Examination of the first destinations of people in the divided survey population lends support to this interpretation. Figures 17-21 depict origin-destination patterns and the contrast between largely long-range shifts from the Highlands and largely short-range shifts from the West Valley is plain. 60.8% of West Valley families moved entirely within the Jordan Rift, while 58% of Highland families moved direct to the East Bank Plateau.

Table 4:3, which lists the detailed differences between the two sub-samples and provides $\chi^2$ tests assessing the statistical significance of the results, indicates further inter-regional contrasts. One of the more prominent features is the disproportionately rural character of both groups. The Valley sub-sample is undoubtedly the more extreme, in part reflecting a more agriculturally oriented economy and in part a consequence of the short-range rural settlement desertion. That this rural emphasis has a real-world base and is not just a Baqa'a bias is demonstrated by a comparison of the general pre-war non refugee camp population of the West Valley with the post-war residual (table 4.2). The area's rural rump of September 1967 amounted to only 20% of the pre-war figure whereas Jericho town retained 59% of its original residents -
despite the emptying of the nearby camps.

The rural emphasis is reinforced when the occupational structure of the Valley sub-sample is considered. In the comparison with Highlanders table 4:3 indicates a much higher proportion of Valley household heads involved in farming. It is also worth noting that Valley rural refugees tended to be poorer than their Highland counterparts, as evidenced by the proportions of landless.

Further inter-sample differences, some of considerable magnitude, are evident when one examines migratory behaviour. More of the Valley sub-sample travelled by foot, though foot-travellers were a definite majority in both sub-samples, and more crossed the river at fording points as opposed to bridges. Some of this may be attributed to the immediate proximity of the East Bank - with refuge from the war only a few kilometres distant wheeled transport was of less relative advantage than for Highlanders. Also in the poorer Valley economy it was probably less readily available.

For both sub-samples there is an interesting distinction between the move to the river and immediate subsequent travel within the East Bank. The move from the river to the first East Bank destination involved substantially less foot traffic than did the exodus itself, the main increase being in the proportion travelling by taxi (table 4:3). Obviously cab owners from Amman and elsewhere saw financial dividends in being on-hand to meet the refugees at the bridges. Other lesser changes included a rise in the fraction ferried by bus and truck and a decline in that carried by military vehicle, the number travelling
in private cars remaining at near-zero.

On a rather different dimension of the migration itself - the question *were you attacked during your move?* West Valley people gave a more positive response than did Highlanders. This probably stems from the fact that a much greater proportion of the Valley flow occurred during the war and presumably refers to Israel Air Force activity in the vicinity of the bridges.

Finally a clear proximity effect may be discerned in the tendency for the Valley sub-sample to have had more pre-war ties with the East Bank. Specifically this refers to the figures for families with one or more workers outside the West Bank and for household heads with property outside the home-region - usually land just across the river. Such ties may have been a secondary factor in the greater relative magnitude of the West Valley exodus.

On all the survey questions not recorded in table 4:3 (Appendix V) there is no substantial divergence between the two regions. Concerning such considerations as family size and number of rooms in house one seems to be dealing with essentially the same population regardless of geographical origin.

Nonetheless the numerous and substantial divergences that do exist leave no doubt that the two unit survey analysis bears out the proposition that the out-movements of native West Bankers from the West Valley and the Highlands must be viewed as separate phenomena. Among other things the greater magnitude of West Valley settlement desertion, the incorporation of short-range flight which on the Highlands was confined
to the West Bank, and the substantially different rural-urban proportions all point to a considerable dichotomy. This is not to deny the critical significance of the exodus from the Highlands in triggering a similar exodus from the West Valley nor to deny that the two movements shared many features.

(ii) Five Regions

The five unit analysis is based on the geographical division depicted in figure 12, foundation for much of the discussion in Chapter 3*. The West Valley is retained as above but the Highlands are split into four areas - Nablus, Ramallah, Jerusalem with Bethlehem, and Hebron. This allows individual sections of the Highlands to be contrasted both with one another and with the Valley. Variations are fewer and less dramatic than in the two unit analysis but some interesting intra-Highland differences emerge. The relevant variables are displayed in table 4:4, with \( \chi^2 \) tests for the inter-regional contrasts and a list of sub-sample sizes.

Perhaps the most significant feature of table 4:4(a) is the variation uncovered in the perception of Israelis as a "threat", a variation founded on differences in historic experience. This emerges in answers to the question Did you have special reason to fear the Israelis because your home region had a history of strained relations with the Jews? Here Hebron, which suffered the greatest relative population loss of the four Highland regions, gives by far the highest positive response. Explanation almost certainly lies in the fact that Hebron's historic experience is distinguished from that of all other West Bank districts by the atrocity
committed against the local Jewish community during the 1929 Arab riots, an event leaving Arab Hebronites with an unparalleled fear of revenge. The Royal Commission set up to investigate the 1929 disturbances gives a graphic account of what took place.

About 9 o'clock on the morning of 24th of August Arabs in Hebron made a most ferocious attack on the Jewish ghetto and on isolated Jewish houses lying outside the crowded quarters of the town. More than 60 Jews — including many women and children — were murdered and more than 50 were wounded. This savage attack — was accompanied by wanton destruction and looting. Jewish Synagogues were desecrated, a Jewish hospital — was attacked and ransacked—. (5)

Thereafter the surviving Jews left Hebron and the Jewish community ceased to exist. Nonetheless a psychological legacy persisted amongst the Arabs, as evidenced by the response to the survey's fear question, and it seems reasonable to relate the unusual extent of flight from Hebron in June 1967 to this legacy. In brief the Israeli invasion provoked a widespread terror of belated reprisals, leading to panic-stricken multitudes streaming out of the district.

Extra impetus was possibly given to the flight by some activities of the occupying authorities immediately after the war. Along the north-western border Gussing reported instances of village demolition almost as severe as at Latrun, though in Hebron these were not accompanied by permanent eviction.

"At Beit Awa in the Hebron area, out of some 400 houses, more than 90 per cent have been completely demolished and the remainder partly damaged. A second village in the area, Beit Mersim (original population approximately 500), was completely destroyed.

The Special Representative visited Beit Awa on 11 August. The Arab Mukhtar stated that Israeli troops entered the village on 11 June at 5.30 a.m. The inhabitants were then asked to take two loaves of bread
and to go to the hills surrounding the village. At 7.30 a.m. the Israeli troops started to demolish the houses with dynamite and bulldozers. Groves around the village were burnt. The belongings of the inhabitants were also burnt since they were unable to take them along. The population stayed in the hills for a week. They were then authorized to return by the military governor. Out of the original population of 2,500 some 300 had left——

The Mukhtar said he presumed that the reason for the demolitions was that the Israel authorities believed that there were members of the 'El fatah' organization coming from the village —— In this connexion the Israel authorities informed the Special Representative that this village was an 'El fatah' base where members of this terrorist organization used to stay overnight and where they received ammunition and supplies. (6) 

Concerning economic factors interesting results come from both Hebron and Ramallah, the two highland districts with out-movement numbers above the West Bank average. Hebron stands out on total value of property at place of residence, recording a markedly lower average than any other district, so hinting at comparative weakness in home community ties. Ramallah records the leading highland score for family with one or more workers outside the West Bank. As noted in the West Valley case the fact that some Ramallah family members were already on the East Bank may have acted as a "pulling" force, because of the fear of being cut off from income earners under Israeli occupation.

Aside from such historic and economic considerations the main source of inter-regional differentiation is the migratory behaviour of the sample. Much highland detail emerges and this can be discussed from three viewpoints — route to the river, mode of transport and first destination on the East Bank.

Routes taken by the 944 people in the Baqa'a sample are depicted in figure 16. Outflow patterns from each
region are largely as expected, people taking the nearest road down to the river crossings, but there are some peculiarities which deserve comment.

First, in the north the Toubas refugees used the direct road to the Valley, though this ran very close to the Israeli border and brought them to a ford rather than a bridge, involving some risk even in Summer. Some then braved the ford, producing a Nablus fording proportion exceeding that for any other district (table 4:4(a) ) while others preferred to walk south to the Damiya bridge. Why none of those crossing at Damiya took the slightly shorter Nablus road, more distant from the frontiers, is a mystery.

Second, in Hebron and Bethlehem districts most refugees, deterred by the presence to the east of the Dead Sea and the forbidding Judean Wilderness, headed north to Jerusalem and took the main highway down to Jericho and the Allenby bridge. This of course meant a long journey through areas which were either active war zones or controlled by Israeli troops. Only a minority took "short-cuts" through the Judean Wilderness, either by a rough secondary road through Mar Saba to Nabi Musa or by a track running north from Hebron to Nabi Musa (figures 2,16 ).

Third, with the exception of the West Valley there was little cross-country movement from any of the regions. This may be explained by the fact that away from the established highways the descent into the Jordan Rift is an extremely arduous undertaking, especially for people with little food or water. Conditions were difficult enough on the roads themselves, but people chose to keep to them, even at
the risk of bombing and strafing.

Concerning mode of travel there are several features of interest. On the matter of foot traffic as against wheeled transport considerable differentiation emerges within the Highlands, quite apart from the broader Highland-Valley contrast. Ramallah stands out as the region where the greatest proportion of sampled refugees moved to the river by some form of motorized transport (42.1%), principally by truck (21.1%) or taxi (15.8%). If this reflects significantly greater mobility for Ramallah people as compared with people elsewhere it may be a further element in explaining the high rate of local outmovement - the friction of distance being less of a constraint here. Jerusalem (including Bethlehem) stands at the opposite end of the Highland spectrum with only 22.9% moving on wheels. There may be some connection with the fact that almost one quarter of the local sample were tent dwellers, without exception extremely poor. This is a higher proportion of bedu than for any other district except the West Jordan Valley. It should of course be reiterated that in all districts, even Ramallah, the motorized were in a distinct minority.

Within the motorized category one also finds some interesting inter-regional variation according to the weighting of individual modes. For instance Hebronites showed the strongest tendency to travel by bus (13.6%) whereas people from Nablus and Ramallah used taxis most (13.9% and 15.8%). Such variation probably reflected differences in what was physically available rather than actual refugee preferences. There were even some instances of refugees
travelling in Israel Defence Force vehicles, particularly from western border areas. A Tulkarm grocer told of being taken to the river in an Israeli truck with four other members of his family while a Qalqilia blacksmith reported a three stage journey - by foot to Nablus, by Israeli vehicle to the Damiya bridge and by Jordan Army truck from there to Karameh.

First destinations on the East Bank for people from each of the four Highland districts appear in figures 18 - 21. A contrast is immediately evident between Nablus, with a majority making an initial stop in the East Jordan Valley, and the other districts, with first destinations primarily on the East Bank Plateau. Two factors seem to have been operative in the Nablus case. First the distance to the major Plateau attraction - Amman - was greater than for any other West Bank region. Second the North Ghor, with its irrigation schemes and modern development, was more potent as an intervening opportunity than was the largely barren central Ghor, which stood opposite the southern West Bank regions. Ramallah gave the largest proportion moving directly to the Plateau, as would be expected from the most motorized group.

On the East Bank Plateau the major destination for all origin districts was the Amman-Zerqa area. Amman's dominance was, however, substantially less for Jerusalem and the West Jordan Valley than for Ramallah, Nablus and Hebron. This largely stemmed from the presence in the sample of numbers of Bethlehem and Jericho bedu with connections in Madaba and Kerak, rural localities to the south of Amman.
(iii) **Discriminant Functions Analysis**

Discriminant analysis is used here both as a check on the regional variation discussed above and to derive deeper insight into that variation. The aim of the analysis is to identify those variables contributing most to spatial differentiation and to assess in what manner and to what extent the origin-regions differ on the basis of such variables alone.

A number of qualifications must be made before proceeding further. First, discriminant analysis can only handle variables based on continuous data or on two-alternative answers (i.e. yes - no). In consequence all variables employing categorical information (e.g. type of transport) have to be excluded, reducing the number of survey variables that can be considered to 21 out of an original 59. Second it is desirable that the data set for each variable be normally distributed and that within group co-variance matrices should exhibit homogeneity. In many instances survey data do not fulfill the former condition and it is difficult to tell whether the latter is adequately satisfied. (7)

Two analyses are employed - one for the two-region division and one for the five regions. Because of the exclusion of all cases recording missing values for any relevant variable the number of survey families examined in each analysis is reduced from 163 to 147 (regional totals in table 4:5), covering 894 individuals. This means that for some regions in the five unit division the case numbers are very limited, with the result that extreme values recorded on certain variables, for example property size, may have a distorting effect.
For the Highland-West Valley (two region) comparison, seven variables are found to contribute significantly to regional differentiation (table 4:6), before the F level becomes insufficient for further computation. Out of these a single discriminant function emerges (table 4:6), with strong loadings for family with workers outside the West Bank (WOREXWB), connections at intended East Bank destination (CONPLAC) and home attacked before move (HOMATT). On this function the two regions are strongly differentiated (figure 22), so giving support to the observations made earlier about a fundamental divide between the West Bank Highlands and the West Jordan Valley. Furthermore the list of discriminating variables includes several already discussed as powerful inter-regional differentiators - especially family with workers outside the West Bank and attacked during move (MOVATT).

After deriving discriminating variables and functions, the analysis makes provision for a predicted classification of cases into the relevant groups (here the two regions) on the basis of case behaviour on the discriminating variables. For the Highlands-West Valley division the prediction gives a classification of the 147 families which is 60.54% accurate. Further indication as to the extent of the inter-regional difference. West Valley families emerge as a particularly distinct and homogeneous group, with a prediction which is 95.5% correct. The Highland families on the other hand, are shown to be without any coherent identity - here the prediction is only 45.6% correct. Clearly there is profit to be had in a subdivision of the Highlands, as produced in the five region analysis.
For the five regions eleven variables contribute significantly to differentiation and four discriminant functions are derived. The functions and associated variable loadings are given in table 417. Function I is heterogeneous, with high loadings for attack on family before move (FAMATT), perception of local history of poor relations with Jews (REGPRJ) and family with workers outside the West Bank; function II is a property/employment factor; and function IV is the most sharply defined, being very strongly oriented toward three variables — poor relations with Jews, attack on home village before move, attack on family before move.

Functions I and II are of much greater weight in terms of accounting for variance amongst the eleven discriminating variables than are III and IV (eigenvalues in table 417) and hence discussion of regional differences is restricted to the former two. Figure 23 depicts the position of region centroids (9) on a graph of function I and II scores. Measures of the statistical significance of the divergence between regions are given below the graph.

Three comments can be made. First, samples from Ramallah and Jerusalem, comprising the geographical core of the West Bank, appear to have a great deal in common, performing similarly on both functions. For most variables with strong loadings on I or II the core districts give intermediate results, the extreme generally being taken by the outer regions.

Second, the three peripheral districts — Nablus,
Hebron and the West Valley - appear to be distinct, whether from one another or from the West Bank core. Nablus and the West Valley do, however, have a limited amount in common with the core, particularly as regards function I, presumably in part because of a joint tendency to score on or below average for poor relations with Jews, the most powerful discriminating variable with a high function I loading.

Third, Hebron emerges as the most distinctive district, sharply and significantly differentiated from all others. In terms of variables with strong function I loadings Hebron takes the extremes, rating highest on poor relations with Jews by a wide margin, lowest on family attacked before move, lowest on family with workers outside the West Bank (no positive responses) and highest on home village attacked before move. As the district saw relatively little fighting "attack on home village" is probably a reference to house demolitions and looting observed by the 14% who left after the cease-fire.

On function II, considered alone, Hebron has a close affinity with the West Valley, its extreme opposite on function I. Important variables here are family members employed with the Government (GOVT) and amount of land at place of residence (LANDA). On the former neither region records any positive response and for the latter both stand at the bottom of the regional list. Hebron and the West Valley have the poorest and least sophisticated economies on the West Bank, local displaced person samples scoring accordingly. The third peripheral region, Nablus, stands at the upper end of the function II scale, primarily because the Nablus sample
gives the largest number of Government employees. GOVT is the most potent of the eleven discriminating variables. Ramallah and Jerusalem, though recording intermediate results on II as a whole, in fact give the most substantial landholding figures. The core-districts, especially Ramallah, have long led the way in wealth, and the local samples, despite their small size, again seem to be economically representative.

Turning to case classification (table 4:8) the five region analysis produces a prediction which is 44.9% accurate. The West Valley and Hebron samples (predictions 60% correct) appear to be the most homogeneous, followed by that for Ramallah. Those for Nablus and Jerusalem, however, display little internal coherence.

In sum, although certain desirable conditions for discriminant analysis are at best only partially satisfied, the results obtained here can be defended on the basis that they both reflect what has been said earlier and are intuitively reasonable. Furthermore, beyond buttressing findings already made the discriminant analysis gives additional insight into the character of the regional sub-samples, for example pointing to a West Bank core - periphery contrast amongst displaced persons and emphasizing the role of images of Israel, as represented by perceptions of poor historic relations with Jews, as a powerful differentiating factor.

(iv) Reason for Move

In the final section of the questionnaire household heads were asked to give reasons for their flight from the West Bank. The question was open and unstructured, to enable
an uninhibited answer. 394 responses resulted, some people giving as many as five reasons, and these were later classified into seventeen categories, as listed in table 4.9. The seventeen categories comprise two groups of factors - reasons of fear and reasons stemming from concrete events or situations. Examples of the former are fear of massacre and fear of arrest and the latter include such conditions as forced to move by the Israelis, looting, shelling of home neighbourhood (events) and head of household out of the West Bank at the time of the war (situation).

Fear factors were overwhelmingly predominant, making up 87.9% of the total response. Fear of rape, fear of massacre and unfavourable perception of Israelis take pride of place, in descending order (respectively 29.2%, 23.4% and 16.8% of total responses). Such reasons derived, at least in part, from memories of past events, the 1948 massacre of Arab villagers at Deir Yassin being specifically mentioned several times.

Superficially war-time and post-war events and situational pressures, heavily stressed in the Dodd and Barakat survey, appear to have been of subsidiary significance. In fact, because many of the "fear" answers may have had their origin in concurrent events not mentioned by respondents, the present survey probably understates their actual importance. Nonetheless as the majority of the Baqa'a survey sample fled during the war itself, before the full weight of occupation was brought to bear, the undoubted strength of pure fear provides further testimony to the potency of the historic legacy and of inbuilt perceptions of the enemy.
Inter-regional differentiation appears to support this view. Regional ratios of response numbers involving the two principal fear factors, fear of rape and of massacre, to response numbers involving "event" or "situational" pressures are given in table 4.10. Fear factors receive strongest emphasis amongst people from Hebron and the West Valley, districts of very high out-migration. Hebron in particular stands out, not surprising considering both its position in the discriminant analysis and the comments already made regarding perception of poor historic relations with the Jews. Of course for both Hebron and the West Valley much can be attributed to the relatively late arrival of the Israelis and the consequent absence, at least initially, of some of the more concrete conditions affecting areas which experienced fighting and occupation in the first two days. 86% of the Hebron sub-sample and 94% of the West Valley sub-sample left their homes before 10 June.

People from Nablus, Ramallah and Jerusalem, where the chief battles took place, give event and situational pressures greater prominence. These pressures encompass phenomena ranging from forced movement (three Jerusalem families) and physical attack to such special circumstances as the household-head being in the Jordan Army.

V. Conclusion

There have been only two major surveys of 1967 West Bank refugees for the purpose of investigating the conditions of the 1967 exodus - the present exercise and the Dodd and Barakat survey of September 1967.
Dodd and Barakat lay heavy emphasis on situational pressures arising both out of the war itself and out of post-war events.

Pressures were generated by the aerial attacks upon a defenceless country -- the occupation of the West Bank villages by the Israeli army, and the actions of the occupying forces. Certainly the most drastic of these actions was the eviction of civilians and the deliberate destruction of a number of villages. Other actions, such as threats and the mass detention of male civilians, also created pressures.

-- the Arab villages were not well-equipped to resist these pressures. They were caught by surprise, ill-informed and unfamiliar with the terrifying nature of aerial bombardment. Their family centred social structure decreased attachment to community and nation. They fled to protect their families, including -- the honour of their womenfolk. (10)

That such conditions played a notable part in precipitating flight is undeniable. However the analysis presented in the past two chapters, primarily for native West Bankers, indicates that the chain of causation was much more complex than Dodd and Barakat suggest, and varied substantially between the various parts of the West Bank. Hence, although the Latrun case evidenced strong situational pressures the Hebron district, where early large-scale out-migration occurred in the absence of such pressures, shows the Dodd and Barakat interpretation to be gravely inadequate.

The author's displaced person analysis attempts to rectify the central deficiency in the earlier work - the failure to give in-depth attention to either geographical variation or historic context. Geographical differentiation in historic circumstances is here held to have been of immense significance in rendering some district populations either more or less prone to flight than others. Hebron provides
clear evidence of the role of a locally poor Arab-Jewish historic experience in triggering relatively high out-movement during the Israeli advance, while Nablus indicates the possible influence of locally poor historic relations with the defending Jordanians in discouraging flight to areas still controlled by the Hashemites.
(1) B block contains a noted cluster of families from the Jiftlik area, near the Damiya bridge.

(2) Such suspicions ranged from the comment that the author was a Jew to the fear that the survey might be an UNRWA device to track down household heads holding excess ration cards.

(3) Dodd and Barakat, River Without Bridges P.29 and 37.

(4) First place where respondent stopped for one night or more.


(7) SPSS version 6 has not yet implemented Boxes M, which tests the homogeneity of within-group co-variance matrices.

(8) Variables are accepted or rejected according to the value of the F ration of between/within group variance. In the present study the point at which variables were no longer accepted was set at 1.

(9) Centroid = mean for region case scores on a particular function.

(10) Dodd and Barakat P. 54.
CHAPTER FIVE

THE WAR OF ATTRITION IN THE JORDAN RIFT
The West Bank exodus of June-July 1967 was but the first, albeit the greatest, of a succession of demographic upheavals provoked by continued hostilities along the Israel-Jordan border. These hostilities, involving three years of intermittent fighting between Palestine guerrillas and the Jordan Army on the one hand and the Israel Defence Forces on the other, came to be known, together with more severe exchanges along the Suez Canal and occasional clashes on the Golan plateau, as the "War of Attrition". On the eastern front the principal theatre was the Jordan Rift between Lake Tiberias (Kinneret) and the Dead Sea. The restriction of major clashes to a relatively restricted area stemmed in part from Arab inability to launch a war of movement and in part from external political constraints on Israel.

In large measure the War of Attrition in the Jordan Valley may be seen as a direct outgrowth of the refugee flows set in motion by Israel's occupation of the West Bank. The existence of large and extremely bitter new refugee clusters on the East Bank quickly led to a massive expansion of Palestine guerrilla organisations, determined to take revenge for the sufferings of their people. More coolly the Palestinians also saw the abject failure of regular Arab arms as leaving them little choice but a reliance on their own resources in a long irregular campaign. The humiliation of the exodus had thus provided both the means and the will for the inauguration of fresh fighting.

This fighting led in its turn to additional economic
PLATE 6
Plate 6

Attrition in the East Jordan Valley - Karameh after the Israeli raid, March 1968.
dislocation and population movement. The East Jordan Valley, the northern section of which irrigation water from the North Ghor Canal had converted into a highly productive farming region, accounting in 1968 for c.20% of Jordan's agricultural income, was almost completely evacuated between 1969 and 1971, temporarily reverting to its former wasteland condition.

I. Jordan and Israel : from War to War

In 1967 the population of the East Jordan Valley was approximately 95,000 - 60,000 in the North Ghor, where the canal project had reached as far south as Ardha, and 35,000 in the Central Ghor. Some 60% of the farmers settled in the project area were 1948 Palestine refugees, so demonstrating a degree of refugee re-integration. The refugee proportion was of course much greater further south, where Karameh camp contained at least 20,000 fugitives from the first Arab-Israeli War. In general terms the years since the 1961 opening of the Ghor canal, when the balance between the northern and central sections of the East Valley had been 31,152 to 33,775 \(^2\), had seen both a rapid absolute growth and a considerably increased weight for the project area.

The Six Day War cast a long shadow over all that had been achieved. Although the East Valley remained under Jordanian rule and although little fighting spilled across the river the whole area was now a frontier zone on a hostile border - not a propitious situation. Henceforth the East Valley became a hostage to events flowing from the Israeli occupation of the West Bank, the first of these
being the new refugee movements.

Between June 1967 and March 1968 those refugees from the West Bank who did not quickly integrate into the East Bank cities, perhaps 30% of the total, experienced a complex series of local shifts, encompassing both the Plateau and the East Valley, before finally settling in various Plateau localities. The shifts can be simplified into a four-stage process, though it should be emphasized that there were wide variations in the detail of individual participation. A central feature of the process was the concentration within four months of at least 60,000 1967 refugees in the East Valley, a concentration which triggered the initial clashes of the War of Attrition.

As indicated in the survey analysis the first stops of the 1967 refugees were widely scattered, people from the various West Bank regions tending to make for different destinations depending on their mobility, the location of their origin-districts, and the existence of family connections. The great majority, however, either moved directly to the Plateau or arrived there after a brief period, perhaps a couple of days, in the East Valley. It should be noted that June conditions in the Valley were not encouraging for the fugitives, particularly outside the canal area. The Summer heat, rising to 40°C or more at mid-day, is severe, especially for Highland people, water is scarce, and the small scale of settlement, even after six years of canal development, meant a strictly limited capacity for absorbing outsiders.

Hence the Plateau towns - Irbid, Salt, Madaba and
above all Amman - Zerqa, bore the brunt of the tide from the West Bank, taking in more than 200,000 people by the end of June. In Amman most public buildings were opened to the refugees, thousands crowding into schools, mosques, churches and Ministry compounds in addition to the thousands more who descended on friends and relatives. The capital, a city of only 300,000, could not long endure such a burden and the Jordan authorities, in co-operation with UNRWA, soon went into action to establish a more stable arrangement.

This arrangement, the second phase of refugee movement within the East Bank, involved the setting up of a system of "emergency camps", both on the Plateau and in the Ghor, the chief immediate purpose being to relieve the pressure on urban facilities and services. By July 1 there were five such camps on the Plateau, located as shown in figure 24, into which 20,000 people occupying urban public buildings were persuaded to shift. 1948 refugee camps in Amman and elsewhere had already received an influx of more than 50,000. (3) Estimates of the numbers involved for the individual sites, old and new, are given in table 511.

Furthermore, within two weeks of the end of the War UNRWA had set up four tent camps in the East Valley - Ma'adi, Shuna Janubiya, Ghor Kabid and Karameh new camp (figure 24). The Government was determined to have these filled and in late June it put severe restrictions on movement to the Plateau. Road checks and patrols were instituted and people without specific destinations were
turned back westwards. Both these people and earlier refugees who had remained in the East Valley were directed to the Ghor emergency camps.

In early July matters moved a step further. Negotiations with Israel for displaced person repatriation, using the Red Cross as an intermediary, were getting under way and Jordan anticipated a successful outcome. In consequence the Government ceased encouraging 1967 refugees to re-locate within the Plateau and began compulsorily trucking people direct to the Valley, to the vicinity of the cease-fire line. The Ghor camps, now conceived as mass transit points, steadily expanded.

The repatriation scheme, however, turned out to be a charade, collapsing in mutual recrimination. It began on 18 July in a highly selective fashion when the Israelis allowed a mere 150 to return across the Allenby bridge, mostly women and children, a disproportionate number of them from wealthy families. At this stage only special cases were considered - families split by the War or the old and sick. It was of course hoped that a more comprehensive operation would follow after a short interval, but there were successive delays, principally caused by a dispute over the appropriate heading for the application form to be distributed amongst the family heads. The Jordanians strenuously objected to any reference to the "State of Israel". It was not until the second half of August that the main scheme finally came into operation and, as with the preliminary paper-work it proceeded with painful slowness. For example on 19 August only 361 people crossed
the river, 203 at the Allenby bridge and 158 at Umm Shurett. Israel, proclaiming itself ready to receive 3000 a day, blamed Jordanian "red-tape and defective administrative procedure." (5) Jordan in turn accused Israel of refusing to accept people from the 1948 West Bank refugee rolls or from Jerusalem district. Then, after the ludicrously short period of two weeks, everything ground to a permanent halt. Israel had named 31 August as the deadline for refugee return and on this point she adamantly refused to budge. The position is summed up by Buehrig in The U.N. and the Palestinian Refugees

By resolution 237 of 14 June 1967 the Security Council unanimously called on the government of Israel to facilitate the return of those inhabitants who have fled --- return was begun in 1967, but the scheme soon aborted -- Amman reported submission of some 40,000 applications, covering approximately 170,000 persons, while Israel acknowledged receiving some 32,000 applications relating to about 100,000 persons. The number of returnees by 31 August --- was reported by Jordan at only 14,150 and by Israel at 14,056. Though in response to a request by the Secretary-General Israel extended the deadline for those not yet returned whose applications had been approved; only a few succeeded in crossing --- Response to the Security Council resolution of 14 June 1967 was little better than a fiasco. (6)

Thus the East Valley emergency camps remained and by the Autumn, still containing at least 30,000 refugees, they were taking on semi-permanent form. It was at this time that the third phase of refugee movement commenced, a phase of critical significance in the development of the military situation along the Jordan-Israel front, particularly when considered together with the failure of repatriation. The precipitating factor was the onset of the 1967 Plateau
Winter - early and severe. On 19-20 October heavy rainstorms swept the country from Irbid south to Kerak, turning the Plateau emergency camps into quagmires. A flash-flood forced the evacuation of Souf, this being quickly followed by the emptying of Wadi Dleil, Zizzia, Marka and Salah-ad-Din. Between mid-October and mid-December a further 25,000 people shifted down into the Ghor, where the dry and equable winter weather offered a refuge from the mud, snow and freezing winds of the uplands, quite a different situation from that obtaining in June. Fortunately the capacity of the East Valley camps had somewhat increased, with the establishment of new tent sites at Ghor Nimrin and Damiya (figure 24).

This third major shift inflated the East Valley population to at least 160,000, compared with only 95,000 five months before. West Bank refugees, concentrated south of Deir Alla, made up almost half of the revised total, even leaving aside the indeterminate numbers squatting in local villages.

Border hostilities on a substantial scale were now a near certainty. The new UNRWA camps, seething with discontent against all established authority, provided the impetus, opportunity and physical cover for the setting up of a Palestine guerrilla infrastructure in the Jordan Valley - a base for the infiltration of occupied territory and for assaults on Israeli military and civilian positions. Co-operation from the deeply embittered new refugees, who had lost virtually all that they had, was assured, especially in recruitment drives. Assistance from the Jordan Army, both overt and covert, could
also be expected, first because the general state of Arab 
opinion left the authorities little choice and second because 
Jordan, with territory to recover, had a clear interest in 
maintaining great power interest in the area, if necessary 
by provoking fresh crises. By late 1967 these factors had 
paved the way for the emergence of a greatly expanded guerrilla 
force, using UNRWA camps, North Ghor villages and neighbouring 
hills as base areas and staging points.

Guerrilla operations against Israel across the 
Jordan river began in earnest in October, 1967, as increasing 
difficulty was encountered with attempts to promote resistance 
within the West Bank. Although the UNRWA camps were 
principally located in the central Ghor, activity was from 
an early stage conducted along the full length of the Valley. 
In fact the first attacks occurred in the far north, where the 
Kibbutzim and Moshavim of the Beit Shean region came within 
reach. On 1 October an Israeli was killed by raiders at 
Kibbutz Hamadiya and on 14 October "about 200,000 lirot of 
damage was caused by Fatah sabotage at Kibbutz Ma'oz Haim." (7)

In early November Jordanian forces began to lay 
down covering fire for guerrilla forays, and on 19 November 
took independent action against an Israeli patrol north of 
Damiya. The Israeli response was to bombard the Ghor Nimrin 
refugee camp, which Israel regarded as a "terrorist" 
sanctuary. A Jordanian military spokesman reported 14 killed 
and 28 injured. After this incident conditions rapidly 
deteriorated.

January and February 1968 saw a considerable
escalation of both Palestinian and Jordanian activities, culminating in heavy tank and artillery exchanges in the area of the bridges on 8 February, causing six Israeli deaths. Strong Israeli warnings immediately followed, from both the Prime Minister and the Defence Minister. Levi Eshkol talked of "a limit to our patience" and Moshe Dayan went on, in a Knesset review,\(^{(8)}\) to threaten "Jordan will suffer serious consequences if it does not observe the cease-fire along the whole line." The period of occasional skirmishing was clearly over - the East Valley now stood on the threshold of true border warfare.

In military terms the civilian structure existing in the Jordanian Ghor in early 1968 was terrifyingly vulnerable. Its population swollen by more than 70,000 transients, it consisted of a series of agricultural settlements and refugee camps strung along a one hundred and fifty kilometre front, hemmed in by the barren eastern hills to within twenty kilometres of the Israeli guns. This narrow strip included the whole East Bank citrus crop and its best vegetable growing areas, all dependent on elaborate irrigation works which could be easily disrupted or destroyed by bombardment.

II. The West Bank Refugees: The final flight

On February 15 - 16, using air-power and artillery, Israel struck. There was heavy shelling and bombing in the canal project area, in the vicinity of the Allenby bridge, and along the edge of the uplands, causing at least 200 Jordanian
casualties. The eruption proved the breaking-point for the residents of the Ghor emergency camps, as well as for many villagers. In five days (16-21 February) 70,000 people streamed out of the Valley (9) (table 5:2), heading once more for Amman and other Plateau centres. The exodus included c.20,000 from Karameh old camp and represented the fourth and final phase of the East Bank wanderings of the West Bank refugees.

On the Plateau the Government faced a repetition of the situation of June-July 1967; once again Amman's public buildings were thrown open and once again there arose the problem of finding locations for new refugee camps. The difference was that while hostilities continued there could be no return to the Ghor - everything would have to be on the Plateau.

A quick decision in favour of a system of six sites ensued, (fig. 24), several being at some distance from the capital, in part for security reasons. Amman, with a Palestinian majority and a substantial residual from the first 1967 influx, was volatile enough without further accretions to its discontented multitudes. High officials, fearing for the stability of the regime, favoured dispersal as a means of limiting the strength Palestinian Organizations could bring to bear at the centre of power.

Three of the locations chosen - Marka, Zizzia and Souf - were simply resurrections of 1967 emergency camps. Zizzia, twenty kilometres south of the capital, provides an interesting case-study in the mechanics of site selection,
owing its June 1967 origins to some astute political manoeuvring by the Beni Sakhr, a powerful bedu tribe. Shortly after the Six Day War the Iranian Red Lion had offered to sponsor an emergency camp, financing all facilities. The Beni Sakhr, seeing a chance to acquire cheap agricultural labour at little cost to themselves, immediately donated land in the midst of their huge Madaba holdings. With a Minister in the Cabinet acceptance of their gesture was assured; Zizzia camp being the outcome. Precedent, and a continuation of the strong vested interest, similarly assured Zizzia's restoration in March 1968.

Entirely new camps arose at Baqa'a, Jerash and Husn. Considerations governing site selection, apart from the internal security factor, included availability of land and water. Baqa'a, which became the largest concentration, arose on a large block of Government land originally intended for a prison compound. This was in the highly fertile 'Ain el Basha depression, within commuting distance of Amman but easily insulated in case of trouble. Jerash camp, designated in the main for Gaza refugees, resulted from land offers by Jerash district landlords. Motivation was probably mixed - an element of generosity, a desire for government rents, and an awareness of the prospect of revenue generation by suing the authorities whenever a camp resident walked across a crop. Finally, Husn's location near Irbid reflected first a policy to use camps as an economic stimulus to outer governorates and second the operation of the internal security factor.

Not surprisingly the actual setting up of the six camps did not work out quite as intended. To begin with there
were severe problems at both Baqa'a and Husn. At Baqa'a Spring mud caused much misery while the Husn camp had to be moved ten kilometres because of dust-storms. (10) More important, the Government failed to effectively control the growth of the Amman area camps, for example Marka, and these became considerably larger than initially planned, thwarting to some extent the aim of dispersal.

The early populations of the new sites (table 5:3) totalled approximately 60,000, about one-quarter of the overall number of 1967 refugees. The other three-quarters either resided in 1948 East Bank camps or had integrated into the Plateau towns, especially Amman. This latter fraction had been less involved in the shifts to and from the East Valley, the bulk remaining on the Plateau throughout. Moreover except in Zizzia, the best equipped site, emergency camp populations were disproportionately composed of second-time refugees, from 1948 West Bank camps, these people generally being poorer and more used to camp life than displaced native West Bankers.

Growth of the new system up to 1976 is illustrated in the Appendix IV tables, which also indicate changes in the numbers of 1967 refugees living in older camps. Rations for native West Bankers are paid for by the Jordan Government, while those for second-time refugees, who were on UNRWA's West Bank rolls, continue to be financed by the Agency. The day-to-day administration of relief has been conducted by UNRWA.

Figure 25 depicts the movements of two displaced person families caught up in the East Valley experience, as
revealed in the Baqa'a sample survey. One household head was a bedu farmer from Beit Ta'am al in Bethlehem district, the other a soldier from Toubas, near Nablus. It is an excellent summary of the four-stage process outlined above - the arrival on the Plateau, the shift to the first emergency camps, the flight to the Ghor with the coming of Winter, and finally, the return to the Plateau under pressure of Israeli bombardment. (plates 7-10 give a pictorial overview).

III. The Desolation of the East Valley

In the East Valley itself much of the settled population remained - after the desertion of Karameh old camp c.75,000 people - but not for long. For both the canal area and the villages of the central Ghor the fighting of 14-15 February 1968 had a shattering effect. In the north, where the Israeli air-raids were popularly termed the "Eight-hour War", the Jordanians reported 56 dead and 82 seriously wounded. Further south many villagers, seeing the desertion of local UNRWA camps, joined the flight to Amman.

Only one more push was needed to set the Ghor on the path to complete depopulation. This was provided by the 21 March Israeli assault on Karameh, their largest ground incursion onto the East Bank. The Israelis had long regarded Karameh as the chief guerrilla centre and an upsurge in infiltration and terrorism in early March, despite the February reprisals, led to a decision to take firm action. The operation involved 1500 Israeli tropps, including armoured and parachute units, and comprised thrusts across both the Damiya and Allenby bridges as well as a separate push south of the Dead Sea. Fighting lasted twelve hours, the Israelis clashing with both
PLATES 7 - 10
East Bank Movements of West Bank Refugees.

Plate 7 The Arrival from the West Bank, Allenby Bridge June 1967.


Plate 9 Flight from the Valley to the Plateau, February - March 1968.

Plate 10 Final Location on the East Bank Plateau, Baqa'a Camp February 1969.
the guerrillas and the Jordan Army and briefly occupying much of the East Valley between Damiya and the Dead Sea. Karameh town was reduced to rubble and on both sides casualties were relatively heavy - according to the Israelis 150 "saboteurs" died for a loss of 21 of their own men.

After Karameh there was complete destabilization: regular hostilities along the full length of the front, leading to the desolation and depopulation of the whole East Valley. The exodus of permanent residents, including canal project farmers, immediately accelerated, there being a steady stream up to the Plateau over following weeks. By 1969, which was to be the worst year in the Valley, no more than five per cent remained. The movement differed from the preceding camp exodus in being spread over a longer period, but again it cannot have involved fewer than c.70,000 people.

The geography of the War of Attrition - patterns of fighting, flight and economic disruption - will now be examined for each section of the East Jordan Valley: for the North Ghor, the Central Ghor and Ghor-as-Safi. Figures 26, 27, 28 and 31 should be consulted with the written account.

(i) The North Ghor

After June 1967 the Ghor Canal Project was clearly living on borrowed time. First, with the Israeli capture of the Syrian north bank of the Yarmouk (figure 1) work on the Khalid Ibn al Walid (11) dam, designed to provide water for southward extensions of the canal, came to an abrupt halt. Second, although normal activity continued relatively undisturbed through the remainder of 1967, the growing concentration of Palestine guerrillas in project villages and in the
hills to the east left little doubt about the outlook for 1968.

The triple blow of the 15 February Israeli air attacks, the Karameh battle and the first disruption of the canal by artillery bombardment on 29 March inaugurated the period of desolation. For the next two and a half years the North Ghor was hit hard and often, though the details varied somewhat from place to place.

Hostilities were most ferocious in that zone where Jordan faces metropolitan Israel, a zone containing almost 40% of the East Valley's settled population. The main reason was the special popularity of the locality for guerrilla activities - innumerable Israeli targets were immediately accessible and cover proved better than elsewhere. Consequently it was also the locality where the fiercest Israeli reprisals took place and where Jordanian forces were most frequently involved. In addition Israeli attacks could achieve most effect here - wrecking the canal at its source paralysed the entire Ghor.

Nowhere were Jordanian settlements more concentrated or more vulnerable. In the far north the hills come to within two kilometres of the river and villages are very close to Israeli positions (in 1961 the average distance between local settlement sites and the river was 1.08 km, compared with 2.20 km in the vicinity of Deir Alla, just to the south(12)). Rifle fire could reach farmers' homes and hence settlement desertion after February 1968 was rapid and total.
Below Ghor Fara, where the East Valley borders the occupied West Bank, conditions proved slightly better. First, villages stood at some distance from the river, particularly near Deir Alla. Second, with less to attract guerrillas reprisal shelling tended to be less severe. Third Deir Alla, as government base, retained a substantial residual population - perhaps 1,500 through 1969. Even here however the residual amounted to no more than ten per cent of the original. The area was undeniably front-line and for most residents the risk was unacceptable.

In all c. 58,000 people left the North Ghor in 1968-69, the main refuge being the adjacent Irbid district. Those settlers who had originated from Irbid generally stopped in Plateau edge villages where they had relatives and contacts or still possessed lands. Others, particularly the 1948 Palestinians, became completely destitute and were forced to go onto government ration rolls. More than 1000 entered Husn emergency camp. (13)

Of course although by early 1969 farmers on the canal project had ceased to live in the Ghor, they did not entirely abandon their crops. The distance from the Plateau to their holdings was generally less than twenty kilometres and many returned perhaps once a week to take whatever irrigation water might be available and to try to maintain a semblance of production. Some even made early morning expeditions to the Zor, the lower flood plain, perilously close to the front.

Nonetheless few dared sleep in the Ghor and in general
the cause was hopeless. With the canal system under constant attack water supply was usually grossly inadequate and sometimes ceased altogether. On 23 June 1969 Israeli commandos crossed the Yarmouk and sabotaged the canal's main channel. A week later Prime Minister Golda Meir noted that Arab cease-fire violations were being deliberately repaid "seven-fold" and made non-interference in repair-work on irrigation installations dependent "on the Government and Army of Jordan preventing saboteurs from attacking in this area."(14) On 31 December the Israelis again struck the main channel. The intake was blown up and the whole project area left without water for more than six weeks.

Through all this the frantic efforts of the 600 Jordan Government employees (largely National Resources Authority personnel stationed at Deir Alla) had little effect. No sooner would one irrigation feeder be put back into operation than another would be destroyed. For instance on 29 April 1969 the Hasah flume was damaged for the second time in a week, and then on 1 May a storage basin in Wadi Zerqa was bombed. The latter took five days to repair.(15)

Furthermore, local security conditions were everywhere chaotic. With disagreement over strategy and increasing Palestinian questioning of Hashemite authority, friction quickly developed between the guerrillas and Jordan Army units along the front. Consequently the guerrillas took control of most of the Ghor and local police, fearing for their lives, hardly dared leave their posts. National Resources Authority staff were left to deal personally with
endless disputes, including numerous cases of water stealing.

In water allocation priority went to citrus and bananas but even so 25% of the orange bushes and more than 60% of the banana plants were lost - not surprising considering that neither can survive for more than a few weeks without water and that canal flow was on several occasions cut for at least this period. By 1970 production of both had descended to less than one-third of the 1967 level. A similar position prevailed with regard to vegetables. Even if a farmer managed to obtain sufficient water to raise a tomato or eggplant crop he was lucky if it survived the artillery exchanges.

(ii) The Central Ghor

Below Deir Alla, beyond those areas served by the Ghor canal in 1967 is the region of the bridges, where agriculture still depended on wells and springs. As in the far north fighting here was relatively heavy. The emergency camps had drawn early Israeli attention and substantial guerrilla activity continued after their elimination.

Again there was much to attract the guerrillas. Targets included the headquarters of the Jericho military district and Israeli installations at the river crossing points. In addition the region served as base for infiltration of the Judean Wilderness, which offered access to Jerusalem.

After the Karameh battle most permanent residents who had not fled either with or before the refugees packed up
and departed. In this case the main destinations were Amman and Salt. Only in the Kafrein-Rama sector, where village sites are set back from the river, did appreciable numbers remain. Hence one has a pattern superficially similar to that which emerged in the North Ghor - a relatively confined territory which was regularly pummeled and totally abandoned grading into a broader zone where bombardment was less intense and where a small population survived.

Destruction in the Central Ghor was very great. In some parts highly saline layers in the sub-soil meant that a single bomb or shell could wreck much of a crop simply by spraying salts over the plants. Damage arising from such factors is reflected in the amount recently awarded to the region by the Ghor Damages Committee - 700,000 J.D. (c.£1,200,000). For comparison the North Ghor farmers, in an area with a larger 1967 population and a broader economic base, are to be given approximately 1,000,000 J.D. (c.£1,700,000).

(iii) The South Ghor

Events in the South Ghor - Ghor as Safi and the Lisan peninsula - differed markedly from those experienced elsewhere. First, hostilities were more restricted both in space and in intensity. Second, in part because of this, the nature of the accompanying population shifts also differed.

Israeli activity took the form of occasional ground incursions, the intervening periods being largely calm, apart from intermittent air assaults. Clashes were generally sparked either by guerrilla raids in the Arava (including
mine-laying), on the long desert border between the Dead Sea and Eilat, or by mortar and rocket bombardment of the Sedom potash works. Israel regarded Ghor-as-Safi as a "saboteur base" and took steps accordingly.

The first incursion occurred as an adjunct to the Karameh operation, including a brief occupation of Safi village and the destruction of police stations in Safi and Fifi. Israel reported killing 74 guerrillas and Jordanian soldiers at no loss to herself. After this there was a lull of more than a year, finally broken on 21 May 1969 when Safi was again attacked by a Tzahal motorized force. Amman reported five homes destroyed and an Israeli stay of about 4½ hours. By far the worst fighting, however, came in January 1970. A chronology of the month's events is given in Appendix IVc. Attacks began with artillery bombardment in the first two weeks, climaxed with a twelve hour occupation of Safi village on 20-21 January, and graded away with further air and artillery activity.

Population movements caused by the hostilities were conditioned by three factors. First, the fighting only affected Ghor as Safi, the Lisan being practically untouched and hence available as a sanctuary. This spatial limitation, which did not exist in the North and Centre, resulted in a migration within the Ghor itself, a unique event. For instance during the May 1969 battle approximately 4000 Ghor-as-Safi residents trekked to relatives at Mazra', 20 kilometres to the north.
Second, flight to the adjacent plateau was in any case discouraged by suspicion that the reception by Kerak people would not be particularly favourable - Kerakites regarded the dark-skinned inhabitants of the Ghor as inferior, an attitude compounded by feudal tutelage, a lack of family ties and a strained history. Such socio-ethnic divisions between Plateau and Valley were much less pronounced further north. Hence with Mazra' pulling, Kerak repelling and distance restraining, only a few hundred Ghor-as-Safi people ventured up the mountain road.

Third, with hostilities sporadic rather than regular there was considerable coming and going between Ghor as Safi and the Lisan. After each incursion most people returned to their lands, fleeing again on the next attack. The resultant pattern of ebb and flow was again somewhat different from behaviour further north, where farmers tended only to commute to the Valley, continuing to live on the Plateau.

Damage in the South Ghor was similar to that suffered in other areas. Safi village became a heap of rubble, irrigation installations were blown up, and much destruction occurred to trees and crops. The Ghor Damages Committee eventually awarded Ghor-as-Safi c.250,000 J.D.(c.£420,000) - 10% of the Valley total for 8% of the 1967 population.
IV. Israeli Strategy

Israel's post-June 1967 struggle with the Palestine guerrillas began within a few weeks, when Fatah and Popular Front operatives attempted to organize a network for subversion and sabotage amongst the Arab population of the West Bank Highlands. In this phase the Israelis quickly gained the upper hand. The guerrillas were inexperienced, tenuous supply routes across the Jordan were swiftly throttled, an official policy of liberality combined with harsh punishments (e.g. house demolition) soon deprived them of an active popular base and, last but not least, the open sparsely vegetated terrain proved ill suited for guerrilla activity. In consequence by early 1968 the Israeli General Security Service had been able to eliminate most West Bank cells, reducing internal resistance to the occupation to mere nuisance value.

Having lost all prospect of a viable base within occupied territory the guerrillas were forced back on cross-border operations. These took two forms - attempts to infiltrate the West Bank and assaults on Israeli targets within the Jordan Rift. Together with supporting activity from Jordanian and Iraqi regular forces and the ever more vigorous Israeli reprisals such operations provided the dynamic of the War of Attrition.

Seen from the western side of the river the geographical pattern of incidents was a mirror-image of the pattern of devastation in the East Valley. Table 5.4 gives numbers of incidents involving casualties for three sectors of the West
Valley during the period 1967-1970, as derived from daily Ha-aretz reports. As expected the occurrences were spatially concentrated, 45% being in the far north, in metropolitan Israel (Beit Shean and South Kinneret) and 45% being in the Jericho military district. The type of incident varied considerably, most casualties in the north resulting from attacks on Israeli civilian settlements, ranging from mine-laying to artillery and rocket shelling, while in the vicinity of Jericho interception of attempts to infiltrate populated areas of the West Bank bulked larger. There was also a marked temporal concentration, 1969 being the worst year for all three sectors.

Israel responded to the Arab challenge with both defensive and offensive measures. The principal element in the defensive system is a complex anti-infiltration barrier running the full length of the Valley, from the Yarmouk to the Dead Sea. Constructed in 1968 and 1969 the barrier is located as depicted in figure 29. It comprises a double fence, electronic listening devices, minefields and dust patrol roads on which footprints can be readily detected and by early 1970 it had drastically reduced guerrilla penetration. In addition the Israelis quickly organized an efficient system of daily patrols and pursuit tactics. On finding a suspect trace small units would be sent by foot, jeep and helicopter "to search wadis and caves within a semi-circle drawn from the crossing-point". The guerrillas were in any case disadvantaged by the breadth of wilderness they had to climb through to reach the Highlands and thus, even after a
successful negotiation of the Valley floor, their tracks were often discovered long before they had been able to reach populated territory. In sum, on many occasions guerrilla infiltration ended in a bloody fire-fight somewhere in the barren eastern hills of Judea and Samaria.

In its offensive response to raids and bombardment from the East Bank Israel saw little use in occupying more Arab land. Government leaders were well aware that this would only mean facing the same problem all over again some distance to the east, at the cost of stretched logistics. When asked by Beit Shean farmers to let the army take the Irbid mountains from which Iraqi guns were shelling their settlements Levi Eshkol is reported to have laughed and offered the cynical comment -

"Comrades I know you well. If I let the army take the Gilead you would settle there and be shelled again. Before long the army would have taken all the land right to the edge of the desert" (20)

Instead Israel relied on a retaliatory system aimed at damaging Jordan to such an extent that "the regime would develop an interest in calming activities." (21) In more specific terms the strategy was to force Jordan to control the Palestine guerrilla presence for the sake of its political and economic survival, regardless of external Arab opinion. From the course of events and from the declarations of Israel's leaders one can detect two distinct intentions. The first was to drive the entire guerrilla apparatus eastward into the population centres of the East Bank Plateau, from which access to occupied territory would be more difficult and where the guerrillas
could be expected to become increasingly embroiled in a struggle for authority with the Hashemite structure. The second was to exert economic pressure on Jordan by means of strategic bombardment, chiefly of the vulnerable East Ghor Canal Project.

Offensive activity took a number of forms. There were, for example, graduated reprisals for specific incidents. These ranged from the small arms level to air raids and cross-border incursions, depending on the degree of provocation — "when border villages were shelled, Israeli artillery shelled Jordanian army positions; when the town of Beit Shean was hit by rockets, the Israelis used long-range guns to shell Irbid--". The main effort, however, went into an ongoing air offensive against the guerrilla bases, activity which often bore no direct relation to particular provocations. When, in the wake of Karameh, the guerrillas began to put more emphasis on fringe portions of the East Bank Plateau as supply points and back-up zones, Israel adjusted its campaign to fit. On 4 August 1968 Israeli planes struck Salt and its surrounds, bombing ammunition dumps, training camps and command posts. Taken in conjunction with the occasional bombardment of Irbid district this indicated Israel's readiness to pull Plateau areas into the battle-zone whenever deemed necessary.

Through 1968 and 1969 the application of Israeli power began to pay its intended geo-strategic dividends. First, the guerrillas were forced to move much of their infrastructure from the Valley to the flanking hills and then, after the Salt
bombing and subsequent raids, to Plateau urban areas and refugee camps. The process is shown in figure 30, indicating three stages of guerrilla retreat eastwards. Second, under the incessant Israeli pressure, the interests of the guerrillas and the Jordan government started to diverge strongly. The Jordanians, wearying of the destruction and worried about the development of a "state within a state" which the guerrillas shift to the Plateau presaged, wished to cut their losses and take up the June 1970 cease-fire plan of U.S. Secretary of State William Rogers. The Palestinian leadership had no interest in the Rogers proposal, viewing it as a Zionist-Hashemite plot aimed at their neutralization. Such differences of outlook, together with a steady erosion of Hashemite power as the guerrillas took effective control of refugee populations in Amman and elsewhere, led by mid 1970 to frequent armed clashes between guerrilla bands and the Jordan Army.

Finally, during the years of "attrition" Israel endeavoured to maintain the flow of commodity exports from the occupied West Bank to the Jordanian East Bank. One even had the extraordinary spectacle of undisturbed civilian movement across the Damiya and Allenby bridges in the midst of artillery barrages. This "open Bridges" policy was pursued for practical as much as for altruistic reasons: if the West Bank agricultural surplus was not disposed of by continued transfer to the East Bank and the wider Arab world it would either have to be largely marketed in Israel, which some feared would ruin many Israeli farmers, or it would not be marketed at all, precipitating a catastrophic depression in
the occupied territories with serious political and security implications. Furthermore there is the intriguing possibility that "open bridges" may have provided an opportunity for Israel to infiltrate some of its own produce into the Arab world.

V. Recovery in the East Valley

In the devastated East Jordan Valley mid 1970 marked the turning of the tide. For several months guerrilla activity had been slowly declining as the Palestinians became more embroiled with the Jordan Government and as Israeli counter-measures became more effective. Israeli shelling now slackened in sympathy and on 21 August the Rogers cease-fire ended hostilities between Israel and Jordan.

In late 1970, after the September Civil War between Palestinian forces and the Jordan Army, the last guerrillas were withdrawn from the Valley. Military interest was diverted to the Plateau which, ironically, had become more dangerous than the Ghor. Because of the reversal of roles Ghor farmers commuting down from the uplands began to spend longer periods in their old homes - perhaps a week at a time. Then, as confidence concerning border security increased, many returned permanently. The demographic recovery accelerated in mid 1971. In May full-scale repair work commenced on the canal and in July government authority was restored to the country at large with the crushing of the guerrillas.

Production rose steadily through 1971, 1972 and
1973 (the East Ghor orange harvest climbed from 4,153 tonnes in 1971 to 8,556 tonnes in 1973 (23)). Within the surprisingly brief period of four years the pre-1968 position was regained and thought could again be turned to expansion plans - the building of a new Yarmouk dam at Maqarin, east of the occupied Golan, and the extension of the canal toward the Dead Sea.

The accompanying demographic recovery (fig. 31) has been substantial but even today is incomplete. A 1973 survey (24) counted 47,389 in the North Ghor, 15,000 less than 1967 estimates. The shortfall was even greater in the Central Ghor (16,042 in 1973, against 35,000 in 1967), largely owing to the non-return of Karameh residents. This situation can be attributed partly to a persistent failure to provide elementary amenities such as electricity and domestic water supplies, and partly to the continuing shadow of war in a border region.

Yet, apart from the continued dereliction of Safi village (25) today's traveller in the Valley would be unable to find much visible trace of the War of Attrition. Settlement patterns can clearly display great resilience in the face of military devastation.
VI. Attrition: The Wider Phenomenon

Paralleling the hostilities along the Jordan, devastation and depopulation also occurred on the Suez Canal front. A comparison between the two episodes helps place the Jordan Rift in a broader perspective.

There are many superficial similarities between the Jordan and Suez cases. Both involved regular in situ fighting along a water-course leading to substantial economic and demographic dislocation on the Arab side, which for both Egypt and Jordan happened, unfortunately, to be a region of major economic significance. In addition the two Arab heartlands to the rear - the Irbid-Amman axis and the Nile delta, especially Cairo - experienced similar strains, in terms both of absorbing refugees and of enduring deep penetration Israeli raids.

On more detailed analysis, however, considerable differences in character, inception and scale emerge. First, the territories on the Israeli side of the front are entirely dissimilar. The Sinai desert is quite a different proposition from the populated West Bank and the fertile Beit Shean Valley, and this had several implications for Egypt - on the one hand there were few refugees from occupied territory to complicate the situation and no Palestine guerrillas to cause internal disruption and military inconvenience, but against this there were no readily available Israeli towns and villages to harrass and strike back at.

Second, in part because of the absence of guerrillas,
Nasser had much greater control over the course of events than did the Jordanians. Thus he could hold back for almost two years before launching his "attrition" (Istinzaf) campaign, to a time when the East Jordan Valley had already been virtually deserted for more than a year. Naturally some population loss had taken place from the canal cities as a response to sporadic but occasionally severe hostilities in late 1967 and late 1968, but it was not until April 1969 that a general exodus, principally in the direction of Cairo, occurred. Furthermore, in direct contrast to the East Ghor evacuation the Suez exodus was officially orchestrated as a deliberate tactic, designed to "clear the decks" in the confrontation zone.

Third, the scale of hostilities in the Suez theatre dwarfed anything happening in Jordan, essentially a side-show. The scale of the desolation was similarly greater, the impact of the fighting being intensified by the fact that the population at risk was an urban one - not a scattered rural community as in the East Ghor. Hence much larger numbers and a much more sophisticated economic apparatus were involved. 600,000 people had to leave their homes as against less than 100,000 in the East Ghor, and the damage figures amounted to an altogether higher order of magnitude, with major urban centres like Suez city and Port Said substantially reduced to rubble. Losses here included oil refineries, factories and transport facilities, not to mention the crippling effect on Egypt's economy of the prolonged closure of the canal.

Another scale difference involves the duration of
of the period of desolation. Whereas farmers began returning to the East Jordan Valley in late 1970, in part propelled by civil disorders on the Plateau, the Egyptian Government would not allow canal zone residents to re-settle while Israel held the opposite bank, as re-settlement in such conditions would merely cramp Egypt's freedom of military manoeuvre. Not until mid 1974, after Egypt had retaken the east bank of the canal in the October 1973 War and had acquired additional buffer territory in the January 1974 Disengagement Agreement, did an officially sponsored re-settlement programme get under way, with massive financial aid from Saudi Arabia. By this time Egypt's economy was in a desperate state, the burdens imposed by non-use of the canal zone assets and by the need to support 600,000 refugees in the delta hinterland having become absolutely intolerable.

Only when one comes to problems encountered in the recovery process do the Suez and East Ghor experiences demonstrate detailed convergence. In both cases the demographic revival has so far been incomplete, large numbers of old residents continuing to live in hinterland refuges, particularly Amman and Cairo. Along the canal as well as along the Valley there is an understandable reluctance to become hostages to fortune in what remains, even with the Israelis 50 kilometres distant, a potential battlefield. Yet, again in both cases, the numbers that have returned, substantial in absolute terms, have severely overtaxed the limited capacity of the authorities to make proper provision for them, whether in accommodation or in public facilities. Of course the scale of the difficulties is very much greater in the canal zone, reflecting the general
difference in scale.

In sum the parallel Suez events reduce attrition and its effects in the East Jordan Valley to the proportions of a side-show. There are both similarities and differences, depending on the depth of analysis, but the overwhelming impression is that of a dwarfing of the East Valley.
(1) Jordan Valley Commission estimate. Source - Tuma Hazou, Director of Public Relations.


(3) Includes Karameh Old Camp.


(5) **Ha-aretz** 20-8-67. P.1.

(6) Buehrig P.41-42.

(7) **Ha-aretz** 16-10-67. P.1.

(8) **Ha-aretz** 13-2-68. P.1., 14-2-68 P.1.

(9) Also see interview of a Hebron notable returning from a visit to Amman **Ha-aretz** 26-3-68 P.1.

"the roads leading to the capital are packed (with people) and travelling from Amman to the Allenby bridge took long hours."

(10) The Government initially selected a locality known as Nueimah. Dust storms and lack of water and amenities quickly caused the people placed there to ask for a transfer. When this was refused the people moved themselves.

(11) Construction had begun in 1965, using a joint Jordanian-Egyptian work force. It was intended that the dam should take water from a Syrian diversion of the Baniyas spring, one of the principal sources of the Jordan, as well as from the Yarmouk. This made it exceedingly unpopular with the Israelis, who launched a mortar attack on the site in April 1967. When abandoned the Project was about 20% complete. Source - Jordan Valley Commission, Amman.


(13) There were still 556 in Husn in late 1971 (UNRWA Field Record, 31-9-71)

(14) **Ha-aretz** 1-7-69, P.1.

(15) National Resources Authority correspondence Deir Alla to Amman - in Arabic.

(16) Estimate by Khalil Khayyat, National Resources Authority co-ordinator in the Valley during the hostilities. No precise data exist. The Department of Statistics (Amman) notes in the preface
to its 1971 "Agricultural Sample Survey in the Ghor" that "unfortunately the department was not able to undertake any kind of agricultural sample survey in the region during the year 1967 - 1970 for security reasons, due to the continuous aggression of the Zionist forces."

(17) 1 Jordanian Dinar = c. £1.70 (Aug. 1976) Compensation is partial, not total. There is a sliding scale -

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<th>Damage Type</th>
<th>Compensation</th>
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<td>Complete destruction of 1 dunum of citrus</td>
<td>70 J.D.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>&quot; &quot; &quot; &quot; of bananas</td>
<td>50 J.D.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>&quot; &quot; &quot; &quot; of vegetables</td>
<td>10 J.D.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>&quot; &quot; &quot; &quot; of cereals for 3 years</td>
<td>.3 J.D.</td>
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<td>&quot; &quot; &quot; &quot; for 3 years</td>
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(18) Discussion between author and Mazra' resident, Mazra' July 1976.


(20) Davar, 22-11-72

(21) Comment to author by M.K. Meir Pa'il. 2-11-76.

(22) Luttwak and Horowitz, p.309.

(23) *The Agricultural Sample Survey in the Ghors*

(24) *Social and Economic Survey of the East Jordan Valley*

(25) As observed by the author, July 1976.
PART II

THE SETTLERS
CHAPTER SIX

ISRAELI SETTLEMENT ACROSS THE 1967 BORDERS:
GENERAL, 1967-1973
I Underlying Processes: An Analytical framework

Through the eleven years after the June 1967 War nearly 40,000 Israeli citizens settled in the newly conquered territory, generally under the official colonization policies of the various governing coalitions, whether dominated by Labour or Likud, but also as a result of occasional private initiatives. Up to June 1977, under Labour rule, official programmes were restricted, apart from East Jerusalem, to areas which had either been substantially depopulated in the June 1967 fighting or had always been largely desolate, areas which also happened to be those most desirable to Israel from a strategic point of view. After June 1977, in the first year of Likud government, religio-historic factors took a stronger hold, with official settlement being tentatively extended into the populated core of the West Bank, the biblical heartland of Judaism. (see Table 9:2 for general demographic results).

Discussion of the Israeli 'in-movement' will concentrate on two aspects:

a) landscape transformation resulting from the imposition and elaboration of the new settlement patterns.

b) the political processes responsible for the landscape transformation.

With regard to the impetus behind the colonization, the June 1967 War provided the territorial opportunity - interacting elements within the Israeli political system and impinging on it from outside then determined how, where and when advantage was taken of the opportunity. Such elements
seem to have included:

a) the psychological legacy of historic experience
b) philosophies, attitudes and strategies of leading decision-makers.
c) shifting balances between political factions.
d) public pressures and the activities of interest groups.
e) resource constraints.

f) international factors, particularly moves by Israel's Arab neighbours and the relationship between Israel and the United States.
g) the detailed physical and human environment within the occupied territories.

To organize the elements and the interactions between them into a single analytical structure the author proposes a model based on General Systems Theory (GST) (figures 32 and 33). GST defines a system as "anything formed of parts placed together or adjusted into a regular and connected whole". Its chief advantage lies in bringing order and coherence to extremely complex phenomena, emphasizing the "inter-connectedness of all factors and events".

GST has been found of considerable value as an analytical tool in political science, whether in examining domestic or international questions. Its potential was first recognized by Easton in his pioneer paper "An Approach to the Analysis of Political Systems" (World Politics, 1957). The approach has been further developed in case-

Cohen and Rosenthal suggest that political geographers turn more directly to political processes and to the spatial consequences than has heretofore been the case, and that their efforts be cast within a political-geographical system framework. (2)

This is one of the author's principal purposes in the following four chapters.

Figure 32 presents a general outline of a political system and its externalities. The independent variables in any such framework appear to comprise:

a) **actors**, along with their perceptions of realities.

b) **structures**, being formal and informal associations between actors, for example political factions.

c) the broader **environmental realities** within which the system operates,

d) **processes**, being patterns of interaction between actors, structures and environment.

**Demands** constitute pressures within the system for certain policies and actions, and **support** indicates the strength of these pressures in terms of backing from actors and within structures. Images of environmental realities held by actors may either encourage or discourage attempts to implement certain policies, whereas the realities themselves determine the physical results - the success or
otherwise of the attempts. In the author's study the dependent variable, the object of attention, is of course the origins and evolution of the Israeli settlement programmes in the occupied territories.

Figure 33 gives the adaptation of the general outline used by the author, depicting core elements and the links between them.

External realities (environmental factors) are envisaged as consisting of a number of distinct components.

a) Historic context may be divided between the fundamental attachment of the Jewish people to biblical 'Eretz Yisrael', covering much of the occupied territories as well as Israel itself, the perceived lessons of the preceding century of Zionist land settlement in Palestine, and the legacy of Israel's general historic experience. The first two and their implications are given special attention in the following section 'Links with the Past'. The third, general historic experience, encompasses both the long centuries of exile, marked by intermittent persecution culminating in the 1938-45 Jewish Holocaust in Europe, and the more recent history of Arab hostility to the emergence of the Jewish state, owing to the displacement of Palestinian Arabs. For most Israelis, including the political leadership, the psychological legacy has been one of deep insecurity and intense distrust of outsiders, with the Arabs being viewed through 'holocaust spectacles'. Occupied territory colonization has directly expressed this siege mentality, being in part designed to fix 'defensible borders', the rationale for which has been
suspicion that the Arabs are irreconcilable, that allies are unreliable, and that Arab moderation is either dissembling to gain positional advantage or, even if sincere, a temporary phenomenon liable to be overthrown by the deeper feeling of antipathy.

b) The occupied territory environment, physical and human, has heavily conditioned the location of colonization. Its integration, along with the historic context, into decision-maker images, is treated in detail in the sections on the Allon Plan and its rivals. As will be seen, terrain of strategic significance, particularly where devoid of population, tended to be given first priority under Labour Governments. In addition conflict within and between various colonization schemes, conflict stemming from the dichotomy between pragmatic appreciation of physical and demographic realities in the occupied territories and aspirations toward the biblical 'whole land of Israel', provides a significant and recurrent theme.

c) International influences come under two headings: activities of Israel's neighbours and the super-power (American) factor. They receive particular attention in the Golan case study (Chapter 7) and in the analysis of colonization after the October 1973 War (Chapter 9), where there is very clear illustration of their alternate accelerating and delaying effects on settlement construction.

d) Domestic forces include movements in public opinion and the activities of lobbies and interest groups originating outside the political system or possessing public followings independent of party structures. As
unauthorized colonization attempts by settler pressure groups have demonstrated, 'domestic forces' can produce action without involving the official policy system at all - indeed sometimes in opposition to official policy objectives. The potency of their demands is, however, greatly augmented if they can also generate support within the political system, perhaps using direct action as a supplement. The activities of the Golan Settlement Committee, particularly between 1973 and 1976, and the post 1974 Gush Emunim offensive on the West Bank, which encompassed unofficial site foundations, subversion of the National Religious Party and efforts to influence government personalities, provide the most prominent examples.

e) **Available economic and demographic resources** have been the most important constraints on the actual realization of Israel's settlement decisions. They serve to indicate that, whatever may be the demands within the political system or the images and will of decision-makers, the real-world results of attempts to implement settlement policies depend on whether or not the requisite means can be obtained.

Images held by decision-makers (the top level political actors, principally the Cabinet Ministers) are the filters through which external realities influence the formulation of policy, and hence action. For the individual decision-makers these images are built up from personal experience, personality traits, political ideology and sensitivity to the external realities, including the historic context. Contrasts such as those between Sapir's
sensitivity to Israel's limited capacities, Allon's combination of nationalism and pragmatism, Eban's internationalism and Begin's biblical fundamentalism, together with the shifting weight of such outlooks in the political system, are crucial for understanding different phases in the colonization. Here it should be emphasized that party labels are not necessarily a good guide to images concerning the occupied territories. The Labour Party has always contained a broad spectrum of views and even Begin's Herut, though generally following a hard-line, has its more conciliatory elements.

The political system provides the institutional arena within which demands for particular policies and action appear, whether from political actors or as input from domestic forces outside the system. It comprises Israel's formal political and bureaucratic apparatus, including the Cabinet, the government machinery, the Knesset, the parties and factions, the semi-autonomous Jewish Agency, and all actors involved in this apparatus.

Demands, reflecting various images of external realities, compete for support within the political system, and those which generate the greatest support have the greatest influence on political decisions. As noted by Easton, support encompasses both acts in favour of a particular demand and "supportive states of mind" (3) - i.e. where does the world-view underlying a particular demand stand with regard to the whole range of images held by actors and decision-makers? For example the great strength of the Allon Plan and the reason it became the
informal framework of Israel's settlement actions between 1967 and 1977 lay in the fact that it stood near the centre of gravity amongst decision-maker attitudes and outlooks during that decade.

To summarize, the input in the author's model could be held to consist of demands and support, influenced by domestic forces and the images of external realities held by political actors. Output, being decisions and action, would appear to depend on the shifting balance of power between decision-makers and hence between different world views. However it is posited that the effectiveness of decisions and action in terms of realizing goals and in terms of actual impact on the landscape has nothing to do with the responsible images, but is determined by the external realities and by the degree to which these have been correctly gauged by the decision-makers.

Harold and Margaret Sprout (Journal of Conflict Resolution, 1960) hold this view very strongly, though perhaps too dogmatically with regard to the explanation of decisions, about which outside academic observers can never be entirely certain -

What matters (appears to matter) in the explanation of decisions and policies is how the actor imagined his environment to be, not how it actually was, whereas what matters in the explanation of accomplishments is how the environment actually was, not how the actor imagined it to be. (4)

Brecher (The Foreign Policy System of Israel 1972) is more cautious and in Decisions in Israel's Foreign Policy (1974) supports his outlook with exhaustive exemplification -

To the extent that decision-makers perceive the operational environment accurately their -- acts
may be said to be rooted in reality and are thus likely to be successful. To the extent that their images are inaccurate, policy choices will be unsuccessful, that is, there will be a gap between elite defined objectives and policy outcomes. (5)

In Israeli settlement policy the chief instance of lack of congruity between images and reality has been the seemingly persistent over-optimism of decision-makers regarding Israel's demographic capacity to implement large-scale settlement projects. The consequence has been a regular failure to achieve planned settlement populations, often by very wide margins. Cases are given in chapters 7 and 9. In addition settlement decisions have occasionally been unrealistic with regard to international factors, leading to delay and re-orientation. One example is the programme contained in the August 1973 Galili Document (p. 180), which had to be postponed or rethought in the wake of the Arab military offensive of October 1973 and the American political pressures of 1973-75. With these exceptions, however, Israel's leadership, one of the best informed in the world throughout the period under discussion, appears to have been generally well attuned to changing external realities and has adjusted tactics swiftly to take account of new contingencies.

Finally, the author's model should be treated as dynamic. External realities, images, personalities and power balances all change through time, whether as a result of factors unconnected with the colonization or as a result of feed-back from previous decisions and actions in settlement policy. Such change produces shifts in action and its landscape implications, these in turn having further feed-
back effects on the system and on inputs. In consequence the settlement pattern at a particular moment is a mosaic of imprints of a whole series of permutations of the model.

II  Links with the Past

Before all else Jewish settlement across the June 1967 boundaries should be seen not as a radically new phenomenon but as a development arising out of trends and philosophies well-entrenched in Israel's past. Three historic themes are relevant here: a) the desire for the completion of the biblical 'Land of Israel' (Eretz Yisrael) b) the long-standing belief, derived from pre-state experience, that settlements have intrinsic military value as forward defence lines and c) the pre-1949 use of agricultural colonization as a political tool, both to expand the ekumene of the Yishuv and to secure frontier zones protecting areas already settled.

In practical terms the 1949 armistice seemed to relegate to the realms of political fantasy widely held ambitions for an extension of Israeli sovereignty over the full historic domain of the twelve tribes, including the West Bank, the Golan and much of Trans-Jordan. Nonetheless as an ideal the 'whole land' continued to be firmly supported by many elements in the Israeli political spectrum. Menahem Begin's Herut movement, built around Vladimir Jabotinsky's revisionist Zionism, which had stridently opposed socialist tendencies as a diversion from the prime goal of securing territory, proved particularly vociferous in this respect, but the 'whole land' also remained a
guiding philosophical tenet for many in the Labour factions. The 1967 conquests of course re-opened the question as a practical matter, especially with regard to Gaza and the West Bank. Annexationist groups within the principal parties immediately pressed their opposition to withdrawal from territories to which the Jewish people had an 'historic right'.

This outlook--- penetrated the ranks of Mapai, Rafi, Ihud ha Kevutzot ve ha Kibbutzim, Ha Kibbutz ha Meuhad, and possessed many sympathizers in the Moshav movement. The number not believing in the traditional split between the 'fanatical' right and the 'progressive'-- left grew. The attitude concerning extended boundaries for the State of Israel, that was mockingly considered up to then (1967) to be a 'concession' of the Herut movement and the revisionists, suddenly took hold of many staunch members of the Labour movement. (6)

Demands for rapid and unrestrained Jewish settlement through large parts of the occupied territories quickly followed and although proponents of this course did not achieve control of the Government during the years of Labour domination their views gained expression in a number of unauthorized colonization attempts by private bodies, particularly after the October, 1973 War.

On the pragmatic issues of settlements as defence lines and, more broadly, of settlement policy as a land anchor for strategic or other purposes, the whole history of the Yishuv serves as illustration. Faith in the former concept was considerably boosted by the resisting power of the kibbutzim in the Gaza area during the Egyptian attacks of May-June 1948, while the latter is well demonstrated by the 118 'tower and stockade' villages established between 1936 and 1947 to ensure de facto possession of
Jewish National Fund tracts in peripheral regions, for instance in Upper Galilee and the Beit Shean Valley. Despite shifts in military technology which, arguably, reduced the efficacy of colonization for such purposes these geo-strategic themes left a powerful mental legacy amongst decision-makers. After June 1967 they fed directly into the official settlement programme in the occupied territories, the chief functions of which were to politically anchor to the State of Israel limited areas seen as critical for the State's security and, to a lesser extent, to form 'defence lines' in these areas.

III Aftermath of the War

Decision-making after the June War was in the hands of a Government of National Unity, founded in the crisis atmosphere of late May and headed by Levi Eshkol. This Government, though dominated by the Labour core of Mapai, Rafi, and Ahдут ha Avoda, incorporated almost the full political spectrum, ranging from Mapam on the left to Gahal (Herut - Liberals block) on the right (Appendix II), a situation which did not augur well for clear policy formulation concerning the future of the conquered territories. The range of images, world views and consequent opinions was too broad for there to be any possibility of an immediate consensus, or even a majority, in favour of one line of action, especially as attitudes on these subjects differed within the major factions as much as between them.

Gahal, faithful to its vision of the 'whole land', and heedless of the demographic reality of large Arab populations in Judea, Samaria and Gaza, immediately took
a maximalist stand on the retention of territory, even in Sinai. Such thinking, principally championed by Menahem Begin, was diametrically opposed by several leading personalities in the Labour factions, for example Pinhas Sapir (Ministry of Finance, Mapai), Abba Eban (Foreign Minister, Mapai) and even Ben Gurion (Rafi - see p. 165). These people took a more pragmatic view of local and external realities, being worried about the implications for the Jewish State of incorporating large Arab populations and, especially Eban, being concerned about the possible effect on Israel's world image of an excessive flaunting of expansionist ambitions. In territorial terms they did not envisage boundary revision going beyond the unification of Jerusalem, imperative on historical and emotional grounds, and the partial retention of the Golan Heights, imperative on geo-strategic grounds. Otherwise, possibly excepting minor frontier adjustments in the vicinity of Israel's narrow coastal waist, all the territories could be returned to the Arabs with the conclusion of a peace treaty, security problems being settled by mutually acceptable demilitarization arrangements. (7)

Other Ministers and leading figures in the governing factions were either still uncommitted or evolved positions between the Begin and Eben/Sapir extremes, perceiving that Israel's long-term defence required the absorption of land additional to Jerusalem and the western Golan, but realizing that 'not an inch' stands on territory would mean permanent warfare and probable international isolation. In the Labour factions the intermediate spectrum ranged from Dayan, who advocated permanent Israeli security control over the West
Bank (8), to Allon and Eshkol, who envisaged some more limited territorial adjustment. The existence of such a multiplicity of divergent images almost inevitably implied a willingness to delay; to freeze the 10 June status-quo for a period and to wait for an initiative from the defeated Arabs, Moshe Dayan's 'telephone call'.

There was only one major exception to the looming paralysis in decision-making - the unification of Jerusalem. Here even the National Unity Government could agree and take immediate action. On 28 June 1967, only two weeks after the war, East Jerusalem and a wide swathe of surrounding land was formally annexed to Israel (figure 37), the new municipal boundary being set to include heights commanding the Arab suburbs but to exclude several large Arab villages, minimizing the accretion of Arab population. Unification and the creation of new Israel landscapes had not been in doubt from the first days of the conquest; immediately after the cease-fire barriers separating the Arab and Jewish sections were removed and on 11 June the Moghrabi Quarter of the old City was demolished to provide open-space in front of the Western (Wailing) Wall. (9)

In retrospect the annexation of East Jerusalem, accompanied by calls for substantial Jewish colonization in the vicinity, marked an important point of departure. It established an exclusive claim to which the Arabs could never be expected to agree and thus helped pave the way toward further years of mutually reinforcing belligerence.
IV. The July 1967 Allon Plan

(i) Through late 1967 Eban/Sapir minimalism represented the strongest single outlook in the Government, and its influence could be clearly detected in enunciations of policy. Eban himself stated the official line on territory in September: "Israel sees the old city of Jerusalem as a part of Israel' but if talks take place every other area - the West Bank, Sinai and the Golan Heights - is open to negotiation". He later asserted that this in fact meant the Arabs could have obtained a 98% restitution of territory in 1967 if they had been prepared to fully recognize the Jewish state, a comment confirmed from the other side by General Saad el Shazli, Egyptian Chief of Staff in the October 1973 War.

After their military humiliation, however, the Arabs were in no mood to accept Israel and instead adopted an extremely militant standpoint, looking forward to a forcible 'liquidation of the consequences of aggression'. Israel's annexation of East Jerusalem only strengthened the Arab attitude, deepening the feeling of frustration and bitterness.

In this context, faced with what seemed to be complete Arab intransigence, Israel's minimalists experienced a steady erosion of their position. At the 20 August Cabinet meeting Eban submitted a gloomy assessment of the outlook of Israel's neighbours: "no movement has occurred in the position of the Arab states -- they continue in their hostile and belligerent policies against Israel, as in all
previous years". (13) Such perceptions made the Government increasingly vulnerable to various demands, both from within the Labour factions and from the wider public, for more hard-line policies on occupied territory - demands encompassing the absorption of considerable areas into Israel, for strategic and/or religio-historical reasons, combined with extensive Jewish colonization across the old boundaries. Figure 34 depicts the impact of the demands and the support they generated on the political system, the influence of external factors, and the eventual results on the ground.

The earliest and most notable demand was the July 1967 Allon Plan. The Allon Plan is of great significance because, without ever being formally accepted, it gradually became the territorial and ideological base for large-scale official settlement programmes in the occupied territories, continuing in this role for almost a decade. Its potency was twofold:

a) It represented a position mid-way between minimalism and maximalism, and so could command considerable support as the least evil for both camps.

b) It took as its fundamental premise a combination of assumptions which drew their strength from contemporary Arab militancy and, at a deeper level, from the historic insecurity of the Jewish people, so closely reflecting the prevailing state of Israeli public opinion - the assumptions that Arab regimes could not be trusted even after a peace treaty, that the 1949 boundaries were indefensible, and that demilitarized zones and other devices not entirely under Israel's control were unreliable. On these assumptions
it built a simple logical structure of considerable power: Israel must retain direct rule over parts of the occupied territories which conferred clear strategic advantages and, to buttress her bargaining position with regard to such regions, she must go beyond setting up military sites and immediately implement a comprehensive policy of Jewish colonization.

(ii) Yigal Allon, Minister of Labour and a senior spokesman for the Ahdut ha Avoda faction, presented the first version of his scheme to the Cabinet on 26 July 1967 (text in Appendix VI), only six weeks after the war. The aim was to break the paralysis in decision-making which afflicted the National Unity Government, due to a fear that internal drift would invite external intervention, particularly from the United States.

Allon’s outlook was characterized both by the militant self-reliant nationalism of Ahdut ha Avoda and by a tendency toward intellectual pragmatism. (14) His ideas derived directly from his 1948-49 experience when, as Commander of the southern front, he had a) pressed Ben Gurion to allow an offensive to capture the Sinai approaches to the Gaza Strip, trapping Egyptian forces and establishing a block across the southern route into Palestine and b) urged measures to prevent Judea-Samaria being retained by the Hashemites.

If we recognize the fact of the Hashemite invasion of Eretz Yisrael this -- will lead to the political annexation of these areas to the Hashemite Kingdom -- not possible to draw a border more sound that the line of the Jordan for the full length of the land.
The advantages of the Jordan line rest not just in its waters, which are not a decisive obstacle against a modern army, but in the Jordan Rift for its full length, including the steep and continuous mountain slopes. (15)

Central to Allon's plan was the concept of a territorial compromise to maximize Israel's security while minimizing additions to Israel's Arab minority - "the unity of the land from the geostrategic point of view and a Jewish state from the demographic point of view". (16)

On the West Bank, the major territory involved (figure 36), the strategic and demographic objectives dovetailed neatly, with the Jordan Rift being both the logical defence line and the least populated zone. In the Rift Allon proposed the incorporation into Israel of a strip 12 - 15 kilometres wide running south to the Dead Sea which, with the inclusion of the mountains to the west, would form a defence wall against any assault from the east. Hence the whole centre of Israel, especially Tel Aviv and the narrow coastal plain, would be given a hitherto undreamt-of strategic depth. Furthermore the strip would militarily neutralize densely peopled Arab Samaria, by cutting it from the wider Arab world. Israel could then safely give this area political autonomy, perhaps with confederal links to Jordan and/or Israel, so avoiding annexation and an uncomfortable accretion to Israel's Arab numbers. (17)

For the Hebron region Allon proposed two alternatives. In one Hebron would be annexed to Israel in full, incorporating an area of great historic significance to the Jewish people at a high though possibly acceptable cost.
in addition of Arab population. In the other Hebron would be split between the populated core, which would join the autonomous entity, and the Judean Wilderness, which would act as an extension of the Jordan Rift defence barrier. The latter would compromise the historic interest but avoid the demographic cost.

Apart from the Rift Strip and the undetermined Hebron question, lesser territorial adjustments were also suggested in the vicinity of Jerusalem and the Jerusalem corridor. First a connection would be established between Jerusalem and the Rift, easing access from central Israel and cutting the Palestinian entity in two (if it consisted of both Samaria and Hebron). Second, the Jerusalem corridor would be fattened in the Gush Etzion and Latrun/Beit Horon sectors (figure 36), so providing security insurance for Jerusalem if part of the Rift strip, for example between Damiya and Jericho, had to be sacrificed in peace negotiations.

Away from the West Bank the July 1967 submissions only mentioned Gaza. Guidelines for Sinai and the Golan were not yet fully formulated, though it was understood that the same principles of strategic buffers would apply to future borders with Egypt and Syria. In Gaza a gradual removal of the 1949 refugee population was posited, refugees to be resettled either in the autonomous West Bank entity or in North Sinai, towards El Arish. (18) With the local population thus reduced to manageable proportions Gaza would be annexed to Israel, eliminating a base for invasion.
As a necessary accompaniment to these territorial aspects Allon also pressed for the immediate implementation of a comprehensive programme of Jewish colonization in the occupied territories.

In the areas that I have discussed—there is a need for the early erection of rural and urban settlement points and permanent military bases according to security necessities—is need to establish Jewish urban estates in East Jerusalem in addition to the rapid restoration and re-population of the Jewish Quarter in the Old City. (19)

As a beginning he proposed "the establishment of a line of settlement nodes by means of Nahal along the Jordan Rift, in the surrounds of Jerusalem and on Mount Hebron". (20)

He saw colonization as the only sure means of anchoring the security zones to Israel and as the best instrument for resisting external political pressures for concession within the zones. The argument was succinctly summarized in a later speech to the Labour Party Congress.

A security border that is not a state border is not a security border—-a state border that is not settled along its length by Jews is not a state border. (21)

(iii) The different standpoints regarding the West Bank indicate the Allon Plan's position in the minimalist-maximalist spectrum. Allon proposed the absorption of c.40% of the area (figure 36) whereas minimalists stood for near-total withdrawal (except East Jerusalem) and maximalists for outright annexation. Allon opposed the minimalists as risking Israel's security, holding that mere demilitarization of a West Bank returned to the Hashemites could easily be flouted. For example surface to air missiles might be placed in the eastern mountains,
ostensibly defensive but in fact threatening Israel's airspace. Similarly, though himself a firm believer in Jewish rights to the 'whole land', he viewed the maximalists as ignoring demographic realities.

In their turn both minimalists and maximalists questioned the viability of Allon's ideas. Eban and Begin were at one in suspecting that the Allon security belts, covering land that all Arabs considered absolutely inalienable, would never be accepted by Israel's neighbours, though the lessons each drew from this were diametrically opposed. Particularly scathing comment came from former Defence Minister Pinhas Lavon, an extreme minimalist.

The Allon Plan is truly brilliant if you are playing chess with yourself. If there is a chess board before you and you are moving his and your pieces according to your will and your best needs and the bare minimum of the second side's needs, it's a marvellous concept. If Allon and the Foreign Minister and the government will secure the agreement of any Arab government to this plan it will be a revolution. It will be the days of the Messiah. (22)

Because of such conflicts of images and personalities the Cabinet response to Allon's July 1967 proposals was, in effect, to decide 'not to decide'. Up to the 1969 Unwritten Agreement no formal policy existed concerning the issue of whether or not to extend Jewish settlement across the green line (the pre-June 1967 boundaries).

The lack of a formal policy, however, did not mean lack of activity. The Allon Plan was only one expression of a powerful series of expansionist demands and pressures and, in this setting, government division merely rendered it liable to being pulled out, not unwillingly.
into an increasing number of de-facto decisions to set up individual settlement points in the occupied territories. Allon's ideas, representing a central position between divergent Ministerial viewpoints, provided a convenient informal framework for the early 'fact creation', a role which strengthened as 'fact creation' intensified.

V Towards Colonization

After the June 1967 War border-area activities by the Settlement Department of the Jewish Agency, responsible for the physical implementation of settlement policy, proceeded with some caution. Preparations were made for the establishment of paramilitary outposts along the West Bank boundary and in the former Israel-Syria demilitarized zones but, reflecting the Government's indecision, it was stressed that all were to be inside metropolitan Israel.

In reality only one such outpost came into existence - Nahal Snir at the north-east end of the Hula Valley (26 September 1967 - figure 40). (23) This was not because the Settlement Department lacked vigour but because by the time of Snir's founding plans based on respecting the pre-war lines had already become redundant. Within weeks of the war it was clear that powerful undercurrents in Israeli society were pulling towards the absorption by colonization of extensive tracts of occupied territory.

Apart from the Allon Plan and the maximalism of
Gahal and others three indications of such pressure can be detected during the Summer of 1967. First, before the end of July the Northern office of the Settlement Department, possibly with approval from higher levels, produced a document proposing "the settlement of 1800 families in the Petzael region" (Lower Jordan Valley). (24) That this suggestion could appear so soon after the West Bank's capture, while the public emphasis was still on the old boundaries, implies urgent pressure within the bureaucracy to colonize occupied territory.

Second, in July and August children of former settlers in the Etzion block, which had been taken by the Arab Legion in 1948 and become part of the West Bank, petitioned senior officials to allow them to re-establish a Jewish presence in the vicinity. As the area was legally Jewish property and as the 1948 capture had been accompanied by a massacre of settlers the petitioners aroused considerable public and official sympathy - another potent factor in eroding the decision 'not to decide'.

Third, and perhaps most important, the same period saw a well-organized campaign aimed at forcing the Government to settle the Golan Heights. Here an extremely determined group exerted influence at a point where official resistance was particularly weak, as most elements in the National Unity Government viewed the absorption of portions of the Golan as a strategic necessity, a degree of consensus which did not exist regarding the West Bank, Gaza or Sinai. Success in precipitating de facto Government activity on the Golan plateau would naturally set a
precedent for other regions, whether or not the agitators had wider ambitions.

Figure 34 indicates the role played by the Golan group and its supporters in the context of the general political environment.

The agitation was set in motion by members of farming communities in the Hula Valley and adjacent parts of Upper Galilee, communities which had been sporadically bombarded through the previous eighteen years by Syrian batteries on the Golan scarp. Only 48 hours after the 10 June cease-fire representatives of local kibbutzim and moshavim met in the ruined dining-hall of Kibbutz Gadot, a settlement which had been heavily shelled by the Syrians in the first four days of the war. They discussed "what to do to prevent the return to Syria of the twenty kilometre wide strip which Tzahal has conquered on the Golan" (25) and resolved that the most effective step would be to take unilateral action to colonize the Heights.

Implementation of the Gadot resolution came on 15 July when eight young people from Hula localities shifted into the deserted Syrian camp of Alaikah, east of the Bnot Ya'aqov bridge on the main road to Quneitra (figure 49). They obtained tacit approval from the Agriculture Department and the military authorities, ostensibly to round-up stray cattle. Encouraged by the semi-official protection they then engaged in investigating lands for possible agricultural exploitation and in using the proceeds from the sale of the cattle to provide for increases in
By late August numbers were up from eight to thirty-five. As the nucleus was not yet under the aegis of any single settlement movement the newcomers came from a variety of backgrounds, including some new immigrants.

Simultaneously with reinforcing the settlers the Upper Galilee elements backing the colonization attempt extended their support within the political system. Apart from contacts with sympathetic elements in the bureaucracy and in Tzahal's Northern Command, for instance the commanding officer David Elazar, the main thrust was directed through the Kibbutz movements and associated political factions.

Ha Kibbutz ha Meuhad, to which a majority of the settlers belonged, recognized the Alaikah outpost in September and Ahdut ha Avoda Ministers were openly sympathetic. Particularly useful encouragement came from Yigal Allon, who prompted the Prime Minister to approve the idea of Jewish Agency support for the settlers "until a final decision will be taken by the Cabinet". In addition, in his capacity as Ministry of Labour Allon assisted the settlers with wages out of the unemployment fund.

Private pressure was also exerted within Ha Kibbutz ha Artzi, the largest Kibbutz organization and a source of concern because it forbade its members to colonize across the green line in advance of clear Government authorization. Several of the Hula kibbutzim involved in the Golan venture were Artzi affiliates and 'Kibbutz Golan' members actively proselytized among young people on
Artzi Kibbutzim elsewhere, sometimes without consulting Kibbutz secretaries. Subsequent pressure on the Artzi general secretariat from its own 'young guard' even led in late 1967 to a visit by secretariat officials to 'Kibbutz Golan'. (28) Here the settlers succeeded in extracting an assurance that no obstacle would be put in the way of Artzi people wishing to live on the Heights, in return for a commitment that information work would in future be conducted only in co-ordination with Kibbutz secretaries.

Nonetheless the position at Alaikah remained insecure through the first two months. Despite moral and financial backing from within Israel the settlers were few and their formal raison d'etre was purely temporary. As noted by the Jewish Agency official who later took charge of co-ordination in the region, much of the public was "still thinking in terms of the Sinai campaign when we pulled back after a few months", (29) though this attitude did not last long.

The real breakthrough to a long-term settlement presence came in September, when lobbying via the Tzahal Northern Command achieved final Government approval for a transfer from Alaikah to Quneitra and for the exploitation of 6,000 dunams in the rich Quneitra basin. (30) Over-crowding at Alaikah was one of the main reasons for the request and the shift to Quneitra's villa quarter took place on 12 October, the settlement then being renamed Merom Golan. Late Summer was also decisive in a wider
sense, for on 26 September the Gush Etzion petitioners finally extracted Government authorization for their bid to settle across the old border south of Bethlehem.

Hopes that private pressures could drag a vacillating administration into de-facto decision taking had thus proved well placed, for both the Golan and the West Bank. After all most Ministers were to some degree sympathetic - it was not disagreement over whether or not Israel should expand at all that prevented the formulation of general policy concerning territories and settlement but disagreement, albeit very wide-ranging, over the extent of the expansion. Opposing attitudes were not entirely irreconcilable, especially with regard to limited areas which had a high perceived strategic value.

Furthermore the broader political environment inside and outside Israel gradually propelled the Government toward harder-line positions.

a) In the wake of victory domestic opinion became self-confident and more intensely nationalist, the private moves for settlement being merely the visible expression of a deeper expansionist urge. (31)

b) Heightened support from world Jewry and temporarily favourable world opinion, both legacies of the war, meant a lack of any pressure on Israel to maintain a minimalist stance.

c) The neighbouring Arab states refused to alter their position vis-a-vis the existence of the Jewish State and in August 1967 the Arab summit at Khartoum united
around the rejectionist formula of "no peace, no recognition and no negotiations". Naturally such Arab absolutism in turn increased the domestic weight of Israelis favouring large-scale territorial expansion. (32)

Because of these external realities it seems reasonable to assume that the political system would sooner or later have produced decisions in favour of some colonization of occupied territory beyond East Jerusalem, regardless of specific private pressures. However, Merom Golan and Kfar Etzion accelerated the process, determining both the timing and the detailed beginnings. Also, whether or not special cases, they set a crucial precedent, opening the way for systematic colonization. Certainly recognition for 'Kibbutz Golan' was swiftly followed by intensive surveys and planning for a settlement pattern covering the whole Golan up to the new cease-fire line with Syria. (33) Caution persisted for a few months in other more controversial areas, but with restraints minimal and with the Etzion activity on the West Bank, the momentum could not help but spread.

In early November the vocal expansionist element in public opinion received formal expression with the emergence of the Whole Land of Israel Movement. The movement's inaugural proclamation stated

The Western Land of Israel is now in the hands of the Jewish people and just as we have no authority to make concessions with regard to the State of Israel, so we must hold what we have received from its hands - the Land of Israel. We are obliged to be faithful to the completion of our Land - for the sake of both the past and the future of the people - and no government of Israel has the right to compromise on this completion. The
borders of our land today are also a surety for security and peace. The signatories see the mobilization of the public for this purpose and the sketching out of routes and means for its achievement as a central duty in this hour. (34)

Supporters derived from the Labour factions as much as from Gahal - indeed the new organization owed its beginnings to a reaction by senior Rafi adherents against Ben Gurion's call for all the territories except East Jerusalem to be returned to the Arabs. (35) With a wide range of well-known personalities behind it, (36) the Whole Land of Israel Movement quickly became an influential interest group, adept at string-pulling within major political factions, which vigorously championed unlimited settlement across the green line.

Between November 1967 and February 1968 the first officially sponsored settlement outposts appeared in various parts of the occupied territories: four on the Golan, two in the Jordan Rift, and one in North Sinai. These comprised small paramilitary plantings established on temporary sites, their members drawn from the army's pioneer youth corps (Nahal). The process of implementing the geographical concepts contained in the Allon Plan had begun.

VI Decision-Taking in Settlement Policy

(i) Under the Labour dominated Governments decisions concerning acts of settlement in the occupied areas lay in the hands of various Ministerial bodies, the most important being the Ministerial Committee for the Territories up to 1970, which dealt with political aspects of Israel's relationship with local Arab populations as well as with
Jewish colonization, and the more specialist Inter-Ministerial Settlement Committee from 1970 onwards. The early transfer of responsibility to the latter reflected the increasing significance of the settlement process, with Prime Minister Levi Eshkol feeling that the matter was placing too great a burden on the Committee for the Territories. In addition to these primary institutions the Government also established two regional settlement bodies - the Supreme Ministerial Committee for Jerusalem and, for a few months, an ad-hoc Committee for Hebron.

Throughout the ten years colonization sites received individual consideration by the different committees, which in theory meant the Government remained uncommitted to any specific map, so avoiding open conflict within or between coalition factions. In practice there were of course overall guidelines - various versions of the Allon Plan, shifts between them reflecting the evolving balance between the Cabinet's maximalists and minimalists.

Planning of non-urban settlement projects and the execution of Ministerial decisions on the subject have been the responsibility of the Settlement Department of the Jewish Agency. As regards the occupied territories the Settlement Department has been involved in investigating the detailed practicalities of colonization from the beginnings of the settlement process. It has co-ordinated surveys, received ideas from Settlement Movements and interest groups, formulated spatial concepts and submitted recommendations on all these subjects to the Government. Once a Government decision has been made the Department has then
seen the relevant project through to physical completion, thereafter lending support as long as deemed necessary. Paradoxically, as an arm of the Jewish Agency the Settlement Department has always been institutionally separate from the Government structure - a situation which has encouraged a degree of independence and even occasionally led to friction.

Mobilization of groups for Jewish Agency colonization programmes has largely taken place within the frame of the established Kibbutz and Moshav federations. This is primarily because the bulk of settlement sites across the pre-1967 borders have been agricultural, continuing the land anchor tradition, but also reflects the fact that non-agricultural villages have themselves been organized along co-operative lines. Indeed up to the end of Labour rule the only settlements outside the Kibbutz-Moshav system were four urban projects, three area centres, three unauthorized Gush Emunim encampments and, of course, the East Jerusalem developments.

In Aharon Bier's 1976 register of Footholds and Settlements in the occupied territories 50 of the 67 sites are identified as stemming from one or other of the institutional settlement movements. The movements most involved included: Tenu'at ha Moshavim (Moshav Movement, Labour, 9), Ha Po'el ha Mizrahi (Eastern Labour, Religious Moshavim, 8) Ha Kibbutz ha Meuhad (United Kibbutz Movement, Labour, 6), Tenu'at Herut-Beitar (Herut Moshav Movement, Likud, 6), Ihud ha Kevutzot ve ha Kibbutzim (Union of Kibbutzim, Labour, 5) and Ha 'Oved ha Tzioni (Zionist Labour Moshavim, Independent
Liberals, 5). As regards political affiliation of the 50 villages, the Labour Alignment led with 23, followed by the religious parties (12) and the Likud (6).

To attract candidates for new sites the settlement movements operate in urban areas and overseas as well as in their own rural communities, principally through their youth organizations. The process frequently begins with the formation of a nucleus (gar'in) of young people, either by spontaneous initiative or by encouragement from above. Thereafter, with the foundation laid, the movement makes an application to the Settlement Department, proposing the nucleus as a base for colonization.

The Golan Meuhad Kibbutz of El Rom (figure 40) is a useful example. In this case the nucleus came together while those concerned were in their last year at school, the original group numbering c. 45. Members then did army service in the pioneer youth corps (Nahal), the instrument generally employed by the Jewish Agency to establish a settlement presence in new territory. As a Nahal unit the group at first considered going to Gilgal in the Jordan Rift but, with a majority opposed, it was instead assigned to the Golan site, to which it moved in July 1971, evolving into Kibbutz El Rom when members completed their military service.

(ii) Figure 35 is a diagrammatic representation of the decision-taking system for colonization, whether involving rural schemes, channeled through the Settlement Department, or urban projects, channeled through the
Ministry of Housing. The operation of the system, little changed since 1967, may be illustrated by describing the path followed by an agricultural settlement proposal.

Such a proposal may originate within the Settlement Department, probably from one of the regional offices, or may come in the form of pressures from a Settlement Movement or a private body. The Settlement Department investigates the relevant practicalities - costs and benefits, compatibility with general planning and, if the proposal comes from an external factor, whether the applicant can muster the necessary manpower. If the Department reaches a positive decision a recommendation goes to the Government. For instance on 26 February 1968, in reply to a question as to whether factors were being refused permission to settle in the 'liberated areas' Prime Minister Levi Eshkol stated in the Knesset that "twenty-four bodies have up to now applied to the Settlement Department - seventeen answered in the affirmative - seven remaining are not big enough to ensure settlement stability. (37)

The Inter-Ministerial Settlement Committee has served as the primary Cabinet institution for dealing with colonization proposals since its inception in 1970. It has consisted both of Ministers and of representatives from the Jewish Agency and has usually been the final decision-taking body, though particularly controversial questions may be debated by the full Cabinet. It has always been chaired by a senior Government figure - between 1970 and the Labour collapse in 1977 by the two Ahdut ha Avoda leaders, Yigal Allon and Yisrael Galili.
Regarding procedure, the rural settlement proposal appears as an item on the Committee agenda some days before the relevant session, giving members a chance to acquaint themselves with the issue. The session itself is addressed by the relevant specialists (land settlement, Arab affairs, security affairs etc.) and may even adjourn "to the very area, to see for ourselves -- and not only to trust experts." (38)

Under the Labour Government a proposal would become operational only if approved by a large majority. If one member or Minister expressed strong opposition provision existed for referral to the full Cabinet, though as a Cabinet offshoot the Committee was normally considered to act on behalf of its parent body. The Committee also had to report its deliberations to the Foreign Affairs and Security Committee of the Knesset, where the Parliamentary Opposition would have a chance to examine decisions.

After approval by the Government and the Knesset the rural settlement proposal proceeds to the Agricultural Planning Board, which contains representatives from the Settlement Department and the Ministry of Agriculture and which determines the settlement form (kibbutz, moshav etc.) and the mix of economic activities. The issue of permanent site is then dealt with by the Location Committee, which includes members from several institutions. (39) Possibilities within the area concerned are carefully examined, each member guarding his organization's interests. For instance the Ministry of Defence may object to a hill as being too close to the cease-fire line, while the
Antiquities Department may have reservations about proximity to a potential excavation. The final choice is often a compromise between conflicting viewpoints.

Finally the proposal returns to the Settlement Department for detailed site planning. This includes such matters as field distribution (decided in conjunction with the Lands Authority), architecture, and internal drainage and water supply. Finance for implementation comes out of the Jewish Agency budget, stemming in part from Government grants and in part from Agency (World Zionist Organization) sources, both local and international.

On the wider infrastructural setting for colonization schemes the Settlement Department is in constant communication with Government Departments and Public Corporations. There is a host of working and bridging committees for everything from electricity reticulation to regional water supply. Constant detailed changes in regional plans result, quite apart from larger scale shifts that may be occasioned by the adoption of a new settlement proposal.

VII The First Six Years: An Overview

Shortly after the emergence of the Allon Plan, by mid 1968, Defence Minister Moshe Dayan formulated his own ideas regarding borders and occupied territories settlement. The chief difference between the two concepts involved the West Bank, where Dayan favoured large scale Jewish settlement on the populated Highlands. This settlement
would be undertaken within the framework of several territorial blocks, principally to establish a Jewish urban presence alongside the main Arab towns. (40)

For Dayan, any compromise with the Arabs would be functional rather than territorial - the local population could have self-administration, perhaps under Jordanian auspices, but Israel would retain a free hand in security matters and there would be no constraints on Jewish settlement or access. Sovereignty could remain undetermined. The aim was to maintain the unity of Western Eretz Yisrael, (31) de facto, while simultaneously resolving the demographic problem by avoiding annexation.

Most Labour Ministers, however, were sceptical. Sapir, Eban, Eshkol, Allon and even Galili and Golda Meir were united in viewing the activities Dayan proposed for the Highlands as incorporating an Arab minority of 35% into Israel. This minority, because of its high natural increase rate, might become a majority within forty years, converting Israel into a Lebanon style bi-national entity and destroying the democratic Jewish state. Sapir, in particular, also feared that the 'natural' Jewish employment structure would be almost immediately subverted by low paid Arab wage labour. In consequence the Cabinet tended to prefer the Allon concept, based on the geographic fact that Arab population concentrations on the West Bank Highlands and in the Gaza Strip can, in military terms, be effectively neutralized and 'defensible boundaries' against external forces achieved without any need for absorption into Israel.
Support for Allon was divided between those who saw independent merit in his 'territorial compromise' and minimalists who moved toward the Allon Plan to hold off Dayan's ideas rather than out of positive enthusiasm. Regarding the latter a large portion of the Cabinet, in 1968 including Eban, Sapir, the Mapam Ministers and perhaps even Levi Eshkol, preferred to see implementation of the settlement aspect of the Allon Plan not as a means of permanently anchoring territory but as creating a bargaining position to be liquidated in exchange for concessions from the Arabs on demilitarization, Jerusalem and minor border rectifications. For example in the Jordan Rift the 'minimalist camp would probably have been content if the 'colonization card' enabled Israel to secure Arab agreement to a series of military outposts along the mountain crest-line, providing a strategic border on the Jordan without any need for the sort of territorial adjustment suggested by Allon. (41) Unfortunately for the minimalists, far from inducing Israel's neighbours to negotiate the beginnings of occupied territory colonization only infuriated the Arabs and strengthened their perception that Israel was a fundamentally expansionist entity with which compromise was impossible and negotiation pointless. (41)

In 1969, as part of its platform for the Knesset elections, the Labour Party attempted to synthesize the views of its minimalists, maximalists and centrists in an extremely vague formula termed the Unwritten Agreement (otherwise known as the Oral Law, Torah she Ba' al Peh). The only territorial adjustments clearly discernible in the Unwritten Agreement concerned limited areas on which no
strong disagreement existed: Israeli control over East Jerusalem, the Golan, Latrun, the Gaza Strip and Sharm ash Sheikh, linked to Eilat by an Israeli supervised corridor. There would also be a "security frontier" on the Jordan River, though its precise character remained undefined. With regard to all other areas (i.e. the bulk of Sinai and the West Bank) the platform made no final commitment. Dayan supporters, Allon supporters and minimalists could thus each interpret the Unwritten Agreement and its implications for colonization whichever way they liked.

In practice settlement activities from 1968 onwards proceeded within the framework of the middle-way interpretation - the Allon Plan. The full Allon Plan for the occupied territories, in its 1972 form, is depicted in figure 38, with sites of settlements established between 1967 and October 1973. A very close correspondence between the Allon security belts and the geographical spread of official colonization is immediately apparent, though the security belts never received formal endorsement. On the eastern front Galilee and the coastal plain would be protected by a natural defence buffer using the Hermon Massif, the crest of the Golan plateau and the mountain wall flanking the Jordan Rift; second line insurance would be provided around Jerusalem; and in the south a second buffer would cut the invasion route from Egypt, broaden the Negev, and assure navigation through the Straits of Tiran. Concerning the latter, a presence at Sharm ash Sheikh would give Israel a position from which she could exert counter-blackmail on both Egypt and Jordan if the
Arab side closed the Red Sea entrance (Bab el Mandeb).

Once these various strategic goals were achieved Arab population clusters in Judea, Samaria and Gaza, separated from one-another and from Arab states by Israel's 'defensible borders', could be awarded self-rule, subject to demilitarization.

Colonization established a political anchor and a domestic political commitment to the security belts. By October 1973 forty-four settlement sites had been founded, involving a total investment of 500 million lirot. (42) These sites contained c. 4000 people (c.13000 if the East Jerusalem housing estates are included). It was the greatest settlement surge since the mass immigrant flow of the 1950's and stood in marked contrast to the stagnation of the preceding five years, especially as the development merely laid foundations for more rapid expansion after the October 1973 war.

In the first two years work almost entirely concentrated on the Golan and East Jerusalem, where the early political consensus was firmest. Late 1969 represented an important turning point, seeing a simultaneous broadening of the programme in three directions - a plan appeared for settlement in the Rafiah approaches to the Gaza Strip, implementation commencing immediately; the slackening of the War of Attrition allowed an intensification of work in the Jordan Rift; and colonization and tourist development began in the Sharm ash Sheikh region, with the founding of the new town of Ophira. Minimalist geographical limits were clearly loosening, a process which was to continue
alongside accelerations in the growth of the overall settlement structure.

Early developments even included some projects which could be interpreted as executing aspects of the Dayan conception, though without violating Allon's guidelines. On the West Bank these comprised the Upper Hebron urban settlement, officially approved in 1970, and the Etzion group of villages, seen by some (42) as the first of Dayan's highland settlement blocks. Beginning with Kfar Etzion in September 1967 Gush Etzion had expanded to three sites with c.200 inhabitants by October 1973.

Events in East Jerusalem itself had several distinct dimensions, each with a somewhat different purpose (figure 37). First, in 1968 work commenced on repopulating the Jewish Quarter of the Old City, a project whose connotations were chiefly historical and religious. Second, a suburban ring of Jewish housing estates gradually took shape through the period, designed to enclose the main Arab built-up area. The ring consisted of two giant pincers: a northern arm arcing round from Ramot (1973) through Ramat Eshkol (1968) and French Hill (1969) to Mount Scopus, and a southern counterpart incorporating Gilo (1973) and East Talpiot (1973). (43) Each pincer was set on ridge-tops dominating the metropolitan region, part of the purpose evidently being to buffer and protect West Jerusalem from any future harassment. Thus in a sense the pincers formed an 'outer wall', with their massive fortress style construction. Third, after 1972 ground preparation began for industrial estates beyond the housing estate ring, even beyond the
Plate 11

The Old City of Jerusalem - telephoto view into the rebuilt Jewish Quarter, Jan. 1978
annexed area. These included Atarot and Anatot in the north and Ma'ale Adumin to the east, the latter two implying a geographical link with Allon's Jordan Rift strip. Overall, according to the 1972 Israel census the Jewish population involved in the various East Jerusalem projects amounted after 5 years to 8704, approximately two-third of the Israeli movement across the old borders.

Although apart from East Jerusalem all the security belts were regions of limited Arab population, the early colonization faced intermittent difficulties with regard to Arab occupancy and land ownership. In the Jordan Rift there were a number of clashes over land and water rights after 1970 (see Chapter 8), while in the Rafiah approaches bedu encampments were cleared and water-holes stopped up in a controversial 1970-71 army operation conducted, apparently without Government approval, by Ariel Sharon's Gaza command. East Jerusalem of course experienced expropriations and under-cover land deals on an extensive scale,\(^{(44)}\) some of the proceeds from accompanying property speculation disappearing into the web of corruption which was eventually to help bring down the Labour Government. Only on the Golan, because of the near totality of the refugee exodus, did Israel have a virtually clean slate, as long as the relatively small zone of Druze proprietorship (figure 50) was not encroached upon.

\(^{(ii)}\) In late 1972 Dayan began a further major effort to influence the direction of settlement policy.\(^{(45)}\) First, on 24 August Ha-aretz reported that he was preparing a
private plan for the building of a large city in the Rafiah approaches to the Gaza Strip (figure 38) following this on 24 October with a detailed description of the plan. The city would be named 'Yamit' and would have 18000 inhabitants by 1977, eventually growing to a population of 230,000. The chief economic base would be a deep-water port, equivalent in capacity to Haifa and Ashdod. Second, at the opening of the 1973 election campaign, the Defence Minister demanded that Jews be given unrestricted rights to buy lands anywhere in Eretz Yisrael, particularly on the West Bank Highlands. He even spoke of it in terms of 'Zionist obligation'.

Some in the Labour Party suspected that Dayan's aim was to overturn the limited settlement map (figure 38) or, at the least, to have a harsh version of the Unwritten Agreement formally built into the 1973 election platform. Although the proposed Yamit site came within the accepted settlement area (figure 70) a city of 230,000 would oblige an extension of the limits deeper into Sinai, to ensure a reasonable distance from any future frontier, while free land purchase would quickly make any 'territorial compromise' on the West Bank impossible. Dayan was supported by most of his Rafi faction, which tended toward territorial maximalism, including his Cabinet colleague Shimon Peres.

Outside Rafi, however, in the larger Mapai and Ahdut ha Avoda factions of the Labour Party, Dayan's ideas and tactics met a frosty reception. He quickly discovered that a large majority of the Cabinet were hostile
and so decided not to make a formal presentation of his original demands. Particularly strong opposition came from Finance Minister Pinhas Sapir, who argued that money go to development towns inside Israel - not to new cities in occupied territory.

Instead, in July 1973, the Defence Minister put forward a very much scaled-down version of his ideas as part of a ten point paper. This Dayan Document (Mismakh Dayan) is given in full in Appendix VI. As may be seen, the Yamit of 230,000 was reduced to a "regional and urban centre for the Rafiah approaches" and free private purchase of lands had become "the acquisition of lands and ownership by companies and individuals will be to some extent allowed and will be done for constructive needs and within the political and security conception". The other eight points were already part of the Government consensus, some being in the process of implementation. Indeed on 24 December 1972 the Government had even authorized a regional services centre near Dayan's Yamit site as part of a long-standing intention to establish such centres on the Golan, in the Jordan Rift and in the Rafiah approaches.

Why then did the Dayan Document arouse considerable public controversy? First, even in their reduced form the demands for a Yamit port and for private land purchase retained some potential for expanding the territorial coverage of the Allon Plan. Second, although the bulk of Dayan's points concerned matters within the Government consensus, it was the first time such matters had been brought together in a single paper. With regard
to occupied territory settlement this gave the illusion that acceptance of the document would mean a harsher settlement policy. In reality, of course, the gap between Dayan and Sapir was now greatly reduced and a compromise formula for the election platform, ensuring Rafi's continued participation in government, would not be difficult to draw up. If such a formula maintained the illusion of harshness it would considerably augment the Defence Minister's prestige, possibly a major consideration when Dayan launched his ten points.

Prime Minister Golda Meir asked Yisrael Galili, head of the Inter-Ministerial Settlement Committee and senior Ahdut ha Avoda Minister, to draft a bridging statement. Approved by the Labour Party leadership on 17 August 1973, the Galili Document (Mismakh Galili) comprised thirteen points as set out in Appendix VI. A preamble assured all factions, especially the Mapam minimalists, that the document as yet only represented a recommendation to be presented to the formal policy making bodies of the Labour - Mapam Alignment. In detail the "outposts and settlements" component followed the four year Settlement Department proposal (2 August 1973) for 36 new sites, their distribution as portrayed in figure 38.

The Galili Document further eroded Dayan's demands concerning land purchase and a deep-water port at Yamit. A decision on the port was postponed until a thorough investigation had been undertaken, while private land acquisition on the West Bank would be approved "only in those cases where the Lands Authority is unable or not
interested in such purchases" and when they came "within the framework of Government policy." Nothing could now be construed as over-throwing the settlement and territorial dimensions of the Allon Plan (figure 38), and to this extent the Galili Document was undoubtedly a successful upholding of existing Government policy as represented by the Allon Plan, the Unwritten Agreement and individual Cabinet decisions.

Yet, at the same time, none of the principles of the Dayan Document had been rejected outright and, because the Galili Document was a clear, harsh and written interpretation of the existing concept, Dayan had also made his point with some success. Furthermore in some significant locations, particularly in the Tulkarm-Qalqilia region (figure 10), the Galili Document could be seen as slightly expanding the territorial bounds of the Allon Plan. Certainly much of the press and public viewed Galili's compromise as toughening occupied territory settlement policy and as involving movement by Sapir rather than by Dayan (46) - a remarkable result considering the fate of Dayan's original standpoints of late 1972/early 1973.

In the view of the author the main reason for such an outlook was probably that Sapir and other minimalists, by accepting the colonization aspect of the Allon Plan to resist Dayan's 1968 maximalism, had already moved a considerable distance away from their initial willingness to return everything to the Arabs except East Jerusalem and part of the Golan. The shift had not, however, been immediately apparent to the public, as Government policy
had never been clearly defined on paper before 1973. Consequently perhaps the chief significance of the Galili Document lay in the fact that it gave the first comprehensive written confirmation to six years of gradual minimalist retreat, especially within Mapai.

Such was the position when the Yom Kippur War intervened.

(iii) One problem for the Allon/Galili outlook, a problem hidden before 1973 but more apparent in following years, was that it involved more than the 'defensible boundaries' which were its principal public justification. Most Labour leaders, including Allon and Galili, believed in the fundamental rights of the Jewish people to the undivided 'Land of Israel', the only difference with Dayan and Begin being that they held, some more firmly than others, that demographic conditions imposed a need for pragmatic territorial compromise. This situation had significant implications:

a) because the security belts, especially on the West Bank, were themselves bound up with the 'ideal' of the Jewish people redeeming their historic land, they and the settlements planted on them were even less amenable to negotiation than if they had been based on military strategy alone.

b) because the historic heartland of Judaism is largely congruent with those populated areas on the West Bank which the Allon/Galili outlook sought to exclude from absorption into Israel, a conflict existed between the
concept and the feelings of those formulating it. Allon's vacillations concerning the Hebron district, detailed in Chapter 8, provide good exemplification.

The lack of geographic congruity between the security belts and the bible belts meant that after 1973 the Labour Government found it increasingly difficult to prevent Jewish settlement spilling over into regions of dense Arab population. Furthermore, as the political balance in Israel slowly shifted toward the right - toward the new Likud coalition - the viability of the whole Allon/Galili package came into question.
(1) Frankel, J. Contemporary International Theory and the Behaviour of States. p.33 and 34.


(4) Sprout and Sprout 'Geography and International Politics in an Era of Revolutionary Change'. Journal of Conflict Resolution, March 1960, p.147.


(6) Ha-aretz MusafShevu't 11-11-77, p.26 "Pact of the faithful : A Decade of the whole Land of Israel Movement".


(8) Ha-aretz 15-8-67 p.1. ref. to "Moshe Dayan's declaration at the Rafi congress, in which Dayan said 'as a private person' that Israel needed to hold the West Bank and other areas."

(9) Ha-aretz 12-6-67 p.7. "Feverish work in enlarging the square near the Western Wall" - "In the Old City -- bulldozers were engaged all the night before last and yesterday in the preparation of access to the Western Wall and in the creation of a large expanse in front of it, where thousands will be able to pray".


(11) Eban on I.T.V. programme 'Weekend World' (U.K.) 19-3-78.

(12) Shazli interview with U.P.I, Lisbon 19-6-78. Reported in The Times (London) 20-6-78 p.6. "In the darkest days of our 1967 defeat Israel was ready to evacuate all the territories it had occupied just to gain a peace agreement in which the Arabs would recognize it as an independent state --- but today they won't accept that." (Shazli presumably omits East Jerusalem here)
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(14) See Brecher, M. The Foreign Policy System of Israel Chapter 14 for some supporting detail.


(17) Allon assumed here that it would be unthinkable to incorporate territories into Israel without ultimately giving their inhabitants full citizenship rights.

(18) Hatsa'at Tokhnit le Yishuv 10,000 Mishpahot Plitim be El Arish - Ra'anana Weitz, Sept. 1967.


(20) Allon to Government 26-7-67.

(21) Tokhnit Allon P.96.

(22) Davar 20-12-68. From Becker, A. Israel and the Palestinian Occupied Territories. P.30.

(23) Sited to overlook the Baniyas spring, one of the main Jordan sources. Other Nahal footholds were planned for El Hamma and the vicinity of Kfar ha-Nasi, but neither eventuated.


(25) Ha-aretz 15-12-67 P.9. Also see Ot 2-8-73 P.5.

(26) Ha-aretz 15-12-67 P.9.

(27) Yigal Allon in Appendix VII, P. 423.

(28) Ha-aretz 19-2-68 P.11. Notes that "in recent months" high level representatives of all three major Kibbutz movements had gone up to the Golan.
(29) The Jerusalem Post Magazine Rosh ha-Shana supplement, 12-9-77.

(30) Ha-aretz 15-12-67 P.9.

(31) a) Note Nov. 1967 emergence of the Whole Land of Israel Movement (P.164). Also May 1968 comment on settlement enthusiasm among school-children. Divrei ha-Knesset Vol. 51 P.1780, 7-5-68 (Q - Uri Avneri to Minister of Education 22-3-68) Secondary school pupils creating nuclei for settlement. Ministry of Education "appreciates the stirring of pupils to go out to new footholds".

b) One well-informed observer noted "Israeli public opinion, press comment and government attitudes are daily becoming more intense in their determination that there can be no return to the pre-war boundaries -- Each day that passes without tangible indications of a major change in Arab policy -- whets Israeli appetites for retaining larger slices -- of the new territories" Don Peretz in Foreign Affairs, Jan 1968, P.336.

(32) Divrei ha-Knesset Vol. 52 P.2654 10-7-68 S.Mikonis - Minister of Defence (Moshe Dayan) reported as saying to sitting of Knesset Labour faction, -- that not now any possibility of reaching a peace agreement with any Arab state - also that he was "in general opposed to dividing Western Eretz Yisrael by a state line".


(34) Ha-aretz, Musaf Shevu'i 11-11-77 P.27.

(35) Ibid - Musaf Shevu'i 11-11-77 P.27. Ben Gurion expressed some displeasure concerning the capture of the Golan, which he thought might bring Soviet intervention.

(36) For example Rahel Ben Tzvi (wife of the second State President and one of Mapai's founders), Eliazer Livna (a former Mapai leader), Yosef and Moshe Tabenkin (influential Ha Kibbutz ha Meuhad figures) and Ya'acov Dori (first Tzahal Chief of Staff). Rabbi Tzvi Yehuda Kook, later spiritual head of Gush Emunim, refused to sign the initial declaration because the movement only identified itself with the 'Western Land of Israel'.

(37) Divrei ha-Knesset Vol.51. P.1169 26-2-68 (Q - S. Tamir to Prime Minister, 12-9-67).

(38) Yigal Allon in Appendix VII, P.429.
(39) The Settlement Dept., the Ministry of Agriculture, the Ministry of Finance, the Regional Defence Dept. of the General Staff (and of the relevant Military Command), the Ministry of the Interior, the Ministry of Health, the Israel Lands Authority, the Ministry of Housing, the Ministry of Education, the Jewish National Fund, the Nature Reserves Authority, the Agricultural Centre, the Farming Committee of the relevant settlement movement.

(40) a) Yehial Admoni (head of Jewish Agency Settlement Dept.) comment on Dayan's 1968 ideas "In his plan Dayan sought strongholds on the watershed (Nablus-Hebron line) that would be linked to the domain of the State of Israel by access roads, electricity and water -- proposed to erect 4-5 such strongholds. Each needed to contain a military camp and a number of settlements of diverse character." (Ha-aretz 24-1-73 P.13)


(41) a) Ha-aretz 28-9-67 P.1. Eban referred to the first settlement outposts on the Golan and the West Bank as "steps of a military character in a strained situation -- nothing in them to harm talks on territorial questions in the framework of negotiations for peace".

b) Al Ahram (Cairo 26-9-67) took a different view of the Cabinet decision on Gush Etzion - that settlements were proof of expansionist intentions and that they "contradict the fake arguments of Israel that she truly wishes peace" - as reported in Ha-aretz 27-9-67 P.1.

(42) Minister of Agriculture, Haim Givatai, in Ot 9-8-73 P.6.

(43) Ha-aretz 24-1-73 P.12.

(44) Dates given are for building starts.

(45) For accounts of the later stages see Yediot Ahranot 11-1-77 (Taufiq Khoury) and Ha-aretz 15-2-77 P.9 (Yehuda Litani)
(46) For further reference see a) Ron Kislev articles in Ha-aretz.
  19-8-73 p.9.

b) Efraim Torgovnik in Arian, A.(ed.) The

(47) Jerusalem Post headline on Galili Document,
    17-8-73. "Sapir moves close to Dayan".
CHAPTER SEVEN

CASE STUDY: THE GOLAN HEIGHTS, 1967-1978
I. Israel and the Golan, 1967

For Israelis Syria is the most disliked and distrusted of the neighbouring Arab states. This attitude has its origins in deep historic fears of a northern enemy sweeping down through Galilee to Haifa and the coastal plain, fears derived from biblical experience and reinforced by post 1949 perceptions of Syria as the most militant enemy of the Jewish state.

In consequence before 1967 Israel was extremely sensitive regarding both the inferior topographic position of the Hula and Tiberias settlements, all within fifteen kilometres of Syrian gun emplacements on the Golan scarp, and the vulnerability of the Jordan water sources to Syrian interference. Syria's exploitation of her geographic advantages to shell Israeli villages, whether in response to Israeli moves in the demilitarized zone or on her own initiative, and to make plans for diverting the outflow of the Baniyas spring, the largest Jordan source, greatly intensified such sensitivities.

Israel's capture of the Golan on 9-10 June 1967 immediately relieved the various security problems. At a local level the Upper Galilee population was freed from the threat of bombardment while in the national context Israel's most important water sources were secured and a defensive buffer provided for the whole of Galilee. The perceived strategic gains were immense and it is thus hardly surprising that the majority of Israel's leaders, heavily conditioned by military logic and fundamentally suspicious of Syria, soon determined on the permanent
retention of the new region.

In line with the Allon concept such retention would be assured by extensive Jewish colonization programmes. Allon submitted his Golan proposal to the Government within a few weeks of the presentation of his main plan (July 1967), following discussions with the Prime Minister who "was convinced that our control of the Golan Heights was vitally important strategically."(1) Kibbutz Golan pressures undoubtedly forced the pace, but the direction was clear.

The Golan Heights were so important, so indispensable -- therefore I not only recommended establishing settlements from immediately after the Six Day War but in fact I helped to establish them. (1)

The rationale behind the Golan colonization was primarily, but not entirely, strategic. Many "whole Land of Israel" supporters viewed the region as part of the historic domain of Eretz Yisrael, because it had intermittently come under Jewish control in biblical and Hashmonean times, while historic precedent for Jewish settlement could be uncovered fairly readily. Traces of a Jewish presence up to the Byzantine period, together with attempted renewals in the early twentieth century, have thus figured prominently in most recent Israeli writings on the Golan.

II. Regional Planning 1967 - 1968

Through late 1967 intensive survey work was conducted on the lands, soils, climate and water resources of the Golan, in preparation for colonization. Agencies
involved included the Settlement Department, the Ministry of Agriculture, the Volcani Institute, Tahal and the Jewish National Fund, the research being in part original and in part an inspection of Syrian records, captured in Quneitra during the June fighting. The first general settlement plan to result appeared in November - *The Golan Heights: An Early Planning Proposal for Agricultural Development*, put together by the Galilee office of the Settlement Department. This document combined caution and optimism in a highly pragmatic appraisal of Golan opportunities.

Agriculture, the traditional instrument of pioneer colonization and the exclusive initial pre-occupation of the planners, was clearly to be the main economic base for the early stages of settlement. It was seen both as establishing the firmest hold on territory - the land anchor - and as offering the best prospects for rapid revenue generation.

Caution, however, surfaced in comments that survey data remained inadequate for firm conclusions and in warnings that, with many branches of Israel's agricultural sector close to market saturation, the integration of yet another agricultural region into the national economy would have to be handled with great care. The range of choice regarding a Golan agricultural base was seen as severely limited; many mainstays of kibbutz and moshav farm production, for example chicken rearing, dairying, deciduous fruits and a range of vegetables, being excluded from consideration by the market factor.

Despite this the planners believed that an
economically viable structure could be devised. The Golan seemed to offer physical conditions ideal for a number of products Israel unquestionably needed more of, whether for export earnings or import substitution. Table 7:1 details these products and indicates their suggested geographical assignment, in line with environmental considerations. The planners note "all the mentioned branches suit different parts of our region, more than that, we specifically aimed for adjustment to the particular conditions of our region (which are not found in other parts of the State)". (2) The Golan even had advantages when viewed as a whole - for instance the broad temperate well-watered plateau opened up excellent opportunities for sheep and cattle pasturage.

In any case it was seen as imperative that colonization should begin without delay. Perceived strategic necessities dictated both speed and the over-riding of economic arguments, if these stood in the way of the fundamental objective of anchoring the Golan to Israel. "The political-security factor is likely to justify activities which are not necessarily economic but liable to contribute to expansion of population."(3) Implementation should even get under-way before survey work was completed - practical trial and error would itself provide valuable additional data and help enable verification of planning concepts.

The "planning proposal" called for the establishment within c.15 years of 20 agricultural villages populated by 1400 family units (c.7000 people). As regards geographical distribution, a concentration on three sub-
regions was suggested, each with a somewhat different economic base (table 7:1, figure 45). The Central Golan, where thin stone-strewn soils rendered agricultural development prohibitively expensive, would be left empty, presumably to await industrial settlement projects. A major quandary arose on the question of balance of emphasis between the northern and southern sections of the plateau: the north possessed the major water sources but had only limited areas which could be worked without prior land preparation, whereas in the south extensive lands were immediately available but local water sources were inadequate. Colonization could either be based on intensive high-water demand farming in the north, with a major investment in supporting infrastructure, balanced by extensive low-water demand farming in the south, or it could involve only limited northern development with water transfer allowing more intensive southern settlement.

As an ultimate objective the decision went in favour of the former division, but for the first five year phase the south was to be absolutely dominant (figure 45). In this sub-region the most could be done for the least cost, as it contained 60,000 dunams out of a Golan total of 70,000 able to be worked without land preparation. It thus suited the planners ideally, in their dual purpose of colonizing immediately yet avoiding heavy investment before all requisite data had been collected. The South Golan would enable experimentation and an early creation of facts without implying a parallel commitment to a particular line of regional development. Large scale expenditure on
water projects and land preparation, especially in the north and in the Batiha Valley, could wait several years.

Agriculture, though of fundamental initial significance, was not of course to be the only major factor in long-term colonization. Even the November 1967 plan hinted briefly at a role for Quneitra as a resurrected urban centre - "it has to be thought about -- from the point of view of its future function in the organic structure of the region"\(^{(4)}\) - and held out particularly high hopes for tourism. Because of the Golan's special attractions, ranging from the Hermon snows to the El Hamma hot springs, providing for tourists and holiday makers might become "a branch of great weight contributing much to the opening and populating of the region". \(^{(4)}\)

(ii) Non-agricultural aspects were explored further in the January 1968 Golan Master Plan, which subsumed the earlier agricultural proposal in a comprehensive regional development scheme. This ranked as an altogether more grandiose and ambitious document than that discussed above, aiming at a Jewish population of 45-50,000 within ten years - 15-20,000 in "villages" and 30,000 in a regional urban centre. In all between seventeen and twenty-two settlements were to be built based on the "exploitation of natural resources"\(^{(5)}\) supplemented by industry and tourism, and these were to cover the whole region, including the Central Golan.

The spatial distribution suggested in the plan spread along the principal axis of the Golan, in a north-south direction, with the distances between settlements planned to be 5-10 kilometres -- the physical alignment of the settlement system and its infrastructure
was planned to be set back 5-10 kilometres from the border (5)

The concept of an unbroken line of kibbutzim and moshavim, running from the Yarmouk to the flanks of Hermon, pervaded the Master Plan.

Such targets, however, clearly exceeded Israel's limited financial and demographic capacities and the first years saw a return to the more pragmatic ideas put forward in the November 1967 Early Planning Proposal for Agricultural Development. In terms of numbers of settlement points the Master Plan held firm, but behind the facade the real scale of activity and its geographical spread were of comparatively modest dimensions, albeit considerably in advance of work elsewhere in the occupied territories.

III. Chronology of Developments, 1968-1977

Up to 1973 thoughts of settling throughout the Golan receded in favour of a more economically rational concentration on two sub-regions - the South Golan and the vicinity of the Quneitra basin. Agriculture dominated during this phase and with their friable fertile soils the two areas required only small initial investments. (6)

There were no settlements "purely of a security character" (7) - and the idea of a regional urban centre quietly faded.

Overall the pragmatic approach sought to reconcile the perceived strategic imperative - fettering the Golan to Israel - with the reality of scarce resources and the intention that the settlement system be an asset rather
than a liability to the national economy. Avoidance of the Central Golan, where strategy and agricultural economics clashed fundamentally, was the price of such an approach. Central Golan land reclamation costs were prohibitive yet this was the core of the territory Israel wished to bind to herself. Up to 1973 agricultural economics carried the day - in a situation of minimal external pressure the strategic inconsistency could be ignored.

Between late 1967 and early 1969 eleven settlements were founded, only two of which were outside the South Golan - Quneitra basin frame (figures 3, 46). Five began as Nahal camps and six were purely civilian. Most of the c.300 settlers came from Kibbutz and Moshav movements favouring the anchoring of large tracts of occupied territory. At this stage the settlement structure had a very tentative air - population turnover was rapid, sites were temporary and accommodation largely consisted of Syrian huts and bunkers.

Primitive conditions naturally encouraged grumblings and impatience among the colonists. After a second Winter in huts and prefabs (plate 15), with successive delays in promised housing, the feeling grew that the Government was still not seriously committed to the Golan, especially as the 1969 Knesset elections approached.

The settlers say: at the start every public figure wanted to prove that it was in his power to create settlements. Now no-one is really interested in us --- the secretary of the Moshav movements, who aspires to become Minister of Agriculture, fears engaging
in unpopular activities concerning settlement establishment lest leaders of his party (Labour) consider him "undisciplined" -- As for the Kibbutz movements Mr. Ya'cov Hazan (Ha Kibbutz ha Artzi) calls for thinking before creating facts. The heads of Ha Kibbutz ha Meuhad have their eyes on the Jordan Rift and Ihud lacks manpower -- representatives of these movements stand at the head of the Settlement institutions and block the way to other factors wishing to settle, Beitar (Revisionist Youth Organization - Herut) asked permission to set up a settlement in the South Golan. They were advised to wait a few months. It was hinted that Beitar's going up to the Golan at present would be used as propaganda for Gahal's election. (8)

Such comment offers a tantalizing insight into the byzantine complexities of Israel's political process. Caution, vacillation and minimalist influence clearly survived, in some quarters even flourished, despite the increasingly evident dominance of those favouring large scale territorial expansion.

In fact, however, the settlers need not have worried - as time passed and Israel's attachment to the new territories slowly strengthened the pull towards "creation of facts" grew. On the Golan the period 1969-1973 witnessed a substantial consolidation of the existing system, although there were fewer new foundations (figure 47). Population grew to 1727 (9) and became more cosmopolitan, many newcomers being city dwellers or foreign immigrants (principally American, British and Russian Jews). In addition the system took on a more sedentary character - Nahal plantings became civilian, several groups shifted into expensive and spacious permanent quarters (plates 14, 15) and the proportion of families, though still modest, was steadily rising. Of course, in qualification, it should be observed that such
PLATES 12 - 15
Golan Heights - four stages in Settlement foundation (also see figure 40)

Plate 12 Nahal Geshur - temporary site, 1968

Plate 13 Nahal Golan (Afiq) - temporary site, 1968

Plate 14 Merom Golan - construction of permanent site, 1971

Plate 15 Neve Ativ - construction of permanent site, 1974
stabilization sometimes only came after successive upheavals, including multiple location shifts, the complete replacement of original groups and even, in three cases, temporary disbandment. Examples of location shift, a phenomenon which has continued throughout the colonization process, are depicted in figure 49.

Paralleling the demographic consolidation the settlement structure also began to acquire both a more diversified economy and a more sophisticated spatial organisation. By 1973 it was becoming clear that with Israel's high living standards and capital intensive farming practices the Golan environment could not readily support more than c.2500 agricultural colonists. (10) As a Jewish population of 45,000 remained the goal thought turned to the alternatives of tourism and light industry. In October 1971 a Nahal group commenced work on the Hermon ski village of Neve Ativ and in August 1972 a community centred on an Israel Aircraft Industries factory was inaugurated in the South Golan (Bene Yehuda - plate 17).

As regards spatial organization a group of settlement "blocks" slowly emerged. A block would consist of several villages of similar social and political affiliations oriented toward an area centre, designed to provide common services. By 1973 there were three such blocks in the South Golan, encompassing 70% of the Jewish population, and one on the western fringes of the Quneitra basin (figure 47).

The Yom Kippur War of October 6-24 1973 interrupted this process of steady expansion. In the face of the
great Syrian tank surge of 6-8 October the whole structure immediately collapsed. All the sites had to be evacuated on the first day of the War, diverting a significant proportion of Israel's available military capacity, and although a rapid return to normality followed the successful counter-offensive significant aspects of Labour's Golan strategy had been brought into question, including the neglect of the Central Golan and the long-standing notion that civilian settlements were of military value.

Even so the basic policy of holding occupied territory for strategic reasons did not become a matter of serious controversy. Whereas many on the outside saw the war as the predictable Arab reaction to Israel's pursuit of creeping annexation, the Israeli leadership tended to view it as flowing from a continuing Arab rejection of Israel's very existence, particularly as far as Syria was concerned - a war which would have occurred regardless of the occupation. Hence the perceived need for the buffers afforded by areas like the Golan was reinforced rather than shaken. On the Syrian front the lesson the Labour Alignment took from October 1973 was that the anchoring of the Golan was more necessary than ever - precisely the opposite of the conclusion drawn in much of the rest of the world.

Controversy largely concentrated on the implementation of the fettering process and on the efficacy of existing settlement policy in this context.

One important tenet of planning which came under assault was the idea that the kibbutzim and moshavim had
an intrinsic defensive value. Opponents asserted that though this might continue to hold true for the cutting of guerrilla infiltration routes, the October experience had graphically demonstrated the idea's bankruptcy in the face of massed tank formations. Some even argued that as the Golan settlements had proved an embarrassment to the army it would be better if their budget was reduced and more reliance put on purely military lines for holding the region. However the Government remained unshaken in its belief that civilian plantings were the best means of securing "defensible borders" and as a result it determined on the retention and expansion of the settlement programme. This was rationalized by the assertion that the system had collapsed because the sites had not been properly fortified (the villages had no heavy weapons) - not because they were inherently indefensible. Work to rectify the deficiency was immediately put in hand.

A second major effect of the war and its aftermath was enormously increased sensitivity regarding the Central Golan gap. The gap now emerged as a crucial political-military weakpoint - it was the zone of the Syrian breakthrough and in 1974 it appeared possible that the Americans would use its emptiness as an opportunity for pressing Israel into returning it as part of a second disengagement agreement. Inroads here would severely damage Israel's Golan policy, for the tenability of the settled northern and southern flanks would quickly become problematic.

In consequence the spatial orientation of settlement policy shifted markedly in the period between
the October War and June 1977, when the Likud took over the Government. The central hinge became the focus of both planning and construction, the first concern being to close the 27 kilometre stretch between Ramat Magshamim and Ain Zivan. (figs. 40, 47). Admittedly there was little progress through 1974 and 1975, partly because of resistance from left-wing Cabinet members (chiefly the Minister of Housing), who saw such activity as an undesirable constraint on Israel's negotiating position, and partly because of a novel American interest in the Israel-Syria border. However with the diversion of American attention in the run-up to the November 1976 Presidential election and with Palestinian inroads at the United Nations through late 1975 and 1976, reaction to which sapped domestic dissent, the eighteen months after November 1975 saw considerable movement (figs. 43, 44).

The central Golan programme had three interconnected dimensions – a forward line of semi-agricultural settlements covering an industrial village block oriented toward the now resurrected urban-centre scheme (Qatzrin). In 1976-77 four sites were established in the forward line, one industrial village was inaugurated to the rear and the first 500 housing units were built at the urban-centre. Simultaneously two additions were made to the South Golan cluster and one outpost was established in the far north, part of a strategy to close the smaller gap between the Quneitra basin and Mt. Hermon (figs. 47, 48).

In consequence the Golan's overall Jewish population had expanded to 3,850 by December 1977 (table 7:2) –
much less than the ten year target of 45,000 aimed for in January 1968, but a figure which made the settlement system the largest project in occupied territory after the East Jerusalem schemes.

IV. Agricultural Patterns

Agriculture, as the initial base of Golan Jewish colonization, and the most important component of the regional economy throughout the first decade, deserves special consideration. This section will review developments up to the October War, conduct a detailed analysis of the Golan agricultural structure in 1974, and make some brief comments concerning more recent trends.

In the first three years the main goal was to extend the Jewish agricultural presence over as much readily cultivable land as possible. Such a strategy exactly followed the November 1967 recommendations and by 1971 the bulk of the 70,000 dunams not needing special preparation had been allocated to settlements, being used overwhelmingly for unirrigated field crops, especially cereals. After 1971 strategy shifted toward intensifying cultivation within the existing agricultural zone, extending irrigation as the major water projects came into operation and diversifying crops in line with the natural advantages of the various sub-regions. The new period saw heavier investment, capitalizing on experience gained during the pioneer rush, though much of the planting remained experimental. Remarkably even at this stage progress deviated from the November 1967 plan in
PLATES 16, 17
Plate 16

South Golan - Ramat Magshamim (loc. figure 40), Oct. 1976

Plate 17

only two significant respects - one geographical and one structural. First, early development proposed for one of the three promising sub-regions - the Batiha Valley (figure 45) - did not eventuate to the extent anticipated, though whether the neglect stemmed from drainage and soil problems or from priority being given to tracts nearer the cease-fire line is unclear. Second, to establish a viable economic base for colonization branches were introduced which had originally been disregarded, due to fears concerning marketing - for example apple orchards in the Quneitra basin (instead of nuts) and poultry farming more generally. Here strategic imperatives took control.

1974 marks a good point at which to take stock of Golan Jewish agriculture - a point when agriculture had become well-established in the initial South Golan/Quneitra basin limits but immediately before the shift in emphasis to the Central Golan and to non-agricultural activities. Figure 50 and tables 7:3, 7:4 and 7:5 provide the requisite data. 52,880 cultivable dunams had been allocated to the thirteen settlements in the two principal settlement groups, labelled 'South Golan' and 'North Golan', 73% to the former and 27% to the latter with the detailed distributions as shown in figure 50. The territorial balance between the major sectors was 62% unirrigated field crops, 32% irrigated intensive cropping and 6% fruit plantations. Irrigation water came from two large-scale supply systems, both of which had reached an advanced state of construction. Pastoralism, second only to field cropping as an income source on most settlements, used c. 300,000 dunams of
unimproved natural pasture throughout the Golan, with beef production predominating and sheep rearing in a supporting role. The grazing blocks, allocated to outside factors as well as to the Golan villages, shifted annually, rotating with military reserves.

Substantial differentiation existed between the farm economies of the two settlement groups (table 7:5). The North Golan showed a relatively strong concentration on intensive agriculture, especially irrigated cultivation and deciduous fruit orchards, while in the South Golan somewhat more emphasis went to field crops and pastoralism, with sub-tropical fruit (citrus) on the warmer slopes towards Lake Tiberias. Higher water consumption per settler in the North Golan reflected this difference in balance between intensive and extensive branches.

Ecological factors, all recognized in November 1967, were primarily responsible for the differentiation. First continuous expanses of soils not needing special preparation were largely confined to the southern plateau. In consequence this area, which had an ancient reputation as a granary, became the natural focus for extensive field cropping. Second, on the North Golan higher precipitation and the relative scarcity of good working land both pointed toward the development of intensive cultivation. In particular, with the added advantage of a cooler year-round temperature regime than any other part of Israel or the occupied territories, the North Golan offered an excellent opportunity for growing certain types of seed vegetables and flower bulbs, whether for export
or for import substitution. Seed potatoes and tulips had become noted specialities by 1974, for which export openings were almost unlimited.

In contrast South Golan irrigated agriculture was more conventional, largely an extension of farm economies normal to various parts of the Galilee. These involved cotton, sugar-beet, dairy fodder and industrial vegetables (e.g. tomatoes) on the plateau and the beginnings of mango and avocado plantations in the Batiha Valley.

With regard to the geographical relationship between settlement sites and their lands the 1974 situation varied considerably, both within and between the two settlement groups.

Moshavim, with individual families operating their own plots, require most working areas to be within comparatively short distances of the living quarters, because if farm branches are widely scattered the family units become unmanageable. Hence up to 1974 all Golan moshavim were placed in one block in the far south, where the extent of cultivable land enabled the above condition to be fulfilled.

Kibbutzim and moshavim shittufim on the other hand are not constrained by this division into semi-independent units - their communal organization allows greater spatial flexibility, a valuable characteristic in environments where it is not possible to conduct a major part of the farm economy in the immediate vicinity of the settlement site. The North Golan, with usable tracts
smaller and more scattered than in the south, is a case in point. Here three kibbutzim and one moshav shittufi were established by 1974. Kibbutz El Rom, for example, was two kilometres from its seed potatoes, eight kilometres from its apple orchard and thirty kilometres from its fish pond and beef cattle - all in different directions from the settlement site.

Since 1974, with extension of the cultivated zone running-up against massive land preparation expenses and with irrigation aided intensification similarly limited by ever higher water project costs, agriculture's relative significance in the expanding regional economy has begun to decline. The decline has, however, been slower than might have been expected for two reasons.

First, settler pressures discussed in depth on P.231 have forced Settlement Department proposals for the Central Golan to be more agriculture oriented than initially intended, despite the Department's total lack of enthusiasm. It was grudgingly admitted that up to 70,000 Central Golan dunams might be cultivable, but only after great investment.

Detailed surveys revealed that these lands are difficult to exploit by conventional means. Soils are stony and shallow, in parts hydromorphic --- the designated lands are blobs of 100-150 dunams each and are scattered in various places --- the area has no climatic advantages. (11)

Second, the agricultural sector has received further stimulation from the Settlement Department's own renewed keenness regarding sub-tropical plantation on the eastern slopes of the Batiha Valley. Expanding opport-
unities for avocado marketing have been chiefly responsible for the re-assessment of colonization possibilities in this sub-region, although the capacity for population absorption is limited.

V. The Impact of the October War 1973-1975

Two examples are used here to illustrate the implications of the Yom Kippur War of October 1973 for the process of colonization on the Golan - the case of changes in Settlement Department planning between 1972 and 1975, which both reflected and influenced changing realities, and the case of the effect of the October War on the military logic underpinning the settlement structure.

The period 1973-1975 marked a watershed in Israel's Golan planning, with a definite shift in emphasis from an almost exclusive concentration on agricultural settlement in the South Golan and the Quneitra basin to a more varied programme incorporating a strong orientation toward industrially based settlement in the Central Golan. A major role in the thematic and geographic re-orientation must be ascribed to the war, but this influence was a complex one of decisively sharpening trends already in existence rather than of simple cause and effect.

By 1973, with 54% of the land suitable for agriculture under some sort of cultivation to support a mere 1727 colonists it had become evident that any large scale population increases would have to involve a more diversified economic base. Although tourism could play a significant local role, especially on Hermon and the shore
of Lake Tiberias, industrialization offered the only realistic supplement on the scale required, and once this was accepted inhibitions about colonizing the Central Golan because of agricultural costs soon disappeared. Indeed in 1973-1974 the turnover from the 12 existing industrial enterprises already amounted to 29% of the total economic turnover of the Golan villages (table 7: 6), despite problems involved in a peripheral location, away from national foci of transport, services and labour supply, problems which generally affect industry more than agriculture.

Clear indication of a new direction in settlement policy emerged in the Golan Heights General Development Plan 1973-1977, completed in July 1973. The document was unequivocal about the course ahead - "the first signs of industry exist in a number of settlements and the purpose is to extend industrialization after the exploitation of productive possibilities in agriculture". (13) Although agricultural expansion in areas already colonized also received much attention the planners pursued the spatial opportunities opened up by their consideration of industrial development and, in their principal innovation, proposed a completely new type of settlement - the industrial village.

Golan settlement is concentrated in two blocks -- between these remains an expanse covering 400 square kilometres that is not suggested for any agricultural colonization. To populate the expanse it is proposed to establish two settlement structures: a regional centre and a block of industrial villages. The latter is a new form of village settlement that will conserve the conventional values of existing colonization, though employment will not be agriculture but industry, tourism and services. This settlement form will be able to act as an instrument for the colonization
of regions lacking agricultural resources and so sets a challenge to groups of settlers, locals or immigrants, who aspire to a village life-style and are faithful to existing settlement principles but who are chiefly interested in non-agricultural employment. The suggested principles for industrial villages are (initial concept requiring additional clarification):

1) The industrial village is a closed community -- and able to control membership.

2) The management is elected by the members.

3) The profits will be divided between investment in production and transfer to community services.

4) The means of production in the village are owned by the workers or the workers participate in determining ownership.

5) As a closed society it will maintain a balance between paying incentives for skill and keeping socio-economic gaps small relative to the situation outside - to be achieved mainly by using profits and service development to give a better balanced living standard than that given by Government social policy.

6) Industrial Democracy - village to have a range of medium size industries (30-100 workers), to facilitate worker mobility between plants and to maximize managerial job prospects. (14)

Hence Central Golan colonization and a new settlement idea to meet the geostrategic challenge in the area, both prompted by awareness of agriculture's inability to provide the scale of Golan colonization Israel required, had in fact reached the drawing board several months before the October War highlighted the area's emptiness. As may be seen in figure 52 the Settlement Department had in mind a compact alignment of three industrial villages, one kibbutz and a "regional centre", eventually to contain c. 3000 people, in the core of the empty zone.

In the author's view, however, the Central Golan section of the July 1973 plan amounted to a vague statement of intent rather than to a detailed blue-print for immediate implementation. In particular, no urgency was
evident about the new structure, no dates being proposed for starting work or for the completion of different stages. Consequently, if external circumstances had not intervened, the entire planning period (1973-1977) might well have passed without much actual activity.

Furthermore, the suggested developments were in any case to be of only modest scale. The regional centre concept, for instance, posited a mere 1500 inhabitants, far removed from the city of 30,000 referred to in the January 1968 Master Plan.

The War transformed the fate of the Central Golan from a matter of no pressing urgency into a matter of vital national significance, so producing planning which was both more pragmatic and set on a much larger scale. The April 1975 Planning Proposal for Settlement on the Central Golan powerfully represented these two facets. Here the settlement structure was to cover a considerably greater territory than envisaged in the 1973 document (figure 53 ), comprising a border defence screen of four mixed agriculture-industry settlements, an inner group of four industrial villages and a Golan City to the rear, and it was to involve similarly greater populations. For example the non-urban structure would alone contain upwards of 4,500 people, three times the equivalent 1973 figure.

More important, concentrating on the border settlements, the 1975 Plan discussed practical detail in depth, sketching out water supply lines and suitable
agricultural tracts, and treated everything as a matter of urgency - in contrast to the pre-war outlook. All four border settlements, one industrial village and one moshav on the western slopes were to be fully populated by 1978 (table 7:7). Admittedly in much of this the impact of the war was indirect rather than direct, being channeled through intensified settler pressures.

(ii) In the afternoon and evening of October 6, 1973, as soon as the scale of the Syrian armoured assault (fig. 51) became apparent, all the Golan settlements were evacuated with no heavy weapons and little fortification any attempt at resistance would merely have led to pointless settler casualties. The evacuation operation cost Israeli units time and, as immediately available defence capability was comparatively limited, it diverted significant resources from the front. On the face of it the collapse of the settlement structure provided classic exemplification of the validity of comments made by Erwin Rommel thirty years before, in his essay Rules of Desert Warfare:

Non-motorized infantry positions are only of value against a motorized and mechanized enemy when occupying prepared positions. If these positions are pierced or outflanked, a withdrawal will leave them helpless victims of the motorized enemy -- they cause terrible difficulties in a general retreat -- for one has to commit one's motorized formations merely to gain time for them. (15)

Certainly the idea of ranks of kibbutzim and moshavim as defensive positions, an historic concept which had on occasion served Israel well, provided part of the under-pinning for Golan colonization. In consequence, during the inevitable post-war controversy the concept and
the settlement structure stood, in a sense, on trial together. The year after the war saw frequent press attacks, real unease in the army and some erosion of public support for Golan settlement, all described by one settler leader as "the feeling of weakness and failure which revealed itself in the State in the period after the war." A major strand of criticism proceeded from the hypothesis that in modern warfare colonization creates rather than solves security problems, because civilian settlements cannot stand against "masses of soldiers with murderous weapons and are turned into a burden and a nuisance --". Proponents of the security value of colonization did not let the criticism go unchallenged. They maintained that the need to evacuate the settlements had arisen not because the notion of defence lines was untenable but because the Golan kibbutzim and moshavim had never been properly organized to fulfil their military function. In Rommel's terms the colonists had not been occupying "prepared positions" and the remedy for this was simple - they should in future be equipped with anti-tank weapons, light artillery and mines for rapid sowing around settlement perimeters. In was argued that relatively cheap year-round defence would result, capable of rapid mobilization; that a pattern of fortified sites would greatly hinder any armoured assault, giving Tzahal time to concentrate for counter-attack; and that once a counter-attack had begun the sites could act as rear security, guarding supply lines. Interestingly, much the same
logic had permeated Crusader strategy.

When Latin Syria was invaded, the border castles enabled the Franks to meet the enemy before he had penetrated too deeply into Christian territory. The field army was normally mustered at a point behind the frontier, where it was joined by contingents from the strong places --- once they knew his direction of attack the Frankish commanders attempted to make contact with the enemy without delay and on such occasions a border stronghold could be of the first importance. It offered shelter, water and supplies. (20)

In the end the defence line advocates carried the day, though less because of merit in their argument than because, in the Government's view, the settlement system had to remain and be strengthened for the rather different purpose of establishing political underpinning for the military presence in a vital buffer zone. According to the Government the fact that the Syrians had been contained before making any penetration of northern Israel had proved the defensive worth of the Golan. The argument that the very existence of a buffer zone established on someone else's land itself invited war was rejected by those who saw Syrian enmity as an inescapable fact of life.

Hence with the continued dominance of the buffer concept there was no real threat to the colonization process, as long as it was perceived essential to the buffer's political viability. Furthermore, once the initial post-war crisis had passed public opinion again consolidated behind the Government outlook. Nationwide sample polls in May 1974 and May 1975 indicated a rise from 45.6% to 63.1% in the proportion opposed to any territorial concession on the Syrian front. (21) It was
in this context that defence-liners survived and flourished and their opponents lost ground. The practical effect can be seen both in the post-war efforts to convert the settlement points into strongholds (22) and in the border screen of villages proposed and progressively implemented in the Central Golan - the defence line answer to the Syrian breakthrough from Rafid. In addition it may be noted that the Golan City of 1975 was some distance to the rear of the proposed regional centre site of 1973 (figures 52,53). Defence-liners viewed kibbutzim and moshavim as the most appropriate settlement types for integration into the Tzahal alignments, owing to their social cohesion and the relatively small numbers of non-combatants; whereas urban colonization near the front invited severe refugee problems.

In Golan circumstances the writer feels that it is hard to consider the defence-line arguments without a measure of scepticism. Whatever the validity of defence-line logic in more rugged terrain, on the westward sloping Golan plateau the settlement structure would seem easy prey, many sites having little local terrain advantage, if the Syrians ever again manage to cross the low watershed ridge. Also, if large numbers of civilians remain in the battle zone they may act as a severe constraint on the Israeli Army's freedom of manoeuvre, reducing the Golan's advantage for Israel as a free-fire zone covering the Galilee frontier.

(iii) In sum, taking the examples discussed above, the effects of the October shock seem rather puzzling. First, far from causing doubts about the settlement process on the
Golan the war pointed the way to an eventual acceleration, foreshadowed by shifts in planning and intense settler pressure. Second, with regard to the military logic buttressing settlement, where a shift in direction might have been expected, the only impact was a strengthening in historic defence line logic. "The lesson we learned was - and still is - that every single settlement should be fortified as if it were a military fortress". (22)

The mystery abruptly disappears, however, when one turns to the fundamental geo-political base for colonization, the idea of absorbing territory to provide defensible boundaries, to find that it survived the hostilities not merely intact but reinforced. From this reinforcement all else followed.

VI. Qeshet, Qatzrin and the Central Golan: Settlement and Politics

In the two years after the October War a long, complex and occasionally heated political struggle took place over the issue of intensified Golan settlement, a struggle which had both international and domestic ramifications and which, although it was eventually resolved in favour of accelerated colonization, caused significant delays in the implementation of planned new development. Between October 1973 and November 1975 the Golan Jewish population only grew from 1800 to 2100, despite ambitious rhetoric from certain quarters, and only three new sites were added to the sixteen in existence before the war. Figures 54 and 55 give a diagrammatic representation
of the political struggle at two stages, first when delaying forces were most prominent (late 1974) and second when accelerating forces finally triumphed (Nov. 1975). Externalities, images, competition within the political system and the geographic consequences are all depicted in the context of the general scheme outlined in figure 33.

On the one side were the political forces pushing toward a long term peace arrangement between Israel and Syria and hence toward Israeli withdrawals and at least partial abandonment of the Golan settlement structure. These forces included (a) a major external component and (b) a lesser component internal to the Israeli political system. Both opposed new colonization ventures. From the outside came a powerful and extremely active American interest, organized by Secretary of State Henry Kissinger and prompted by America's urgent need to build up her position in the Arab world following the newly revealed potency of Arab oil wealth. Simultaneously within Israel's ruling Labour Alignment the key post of Minister of Housing passed after May 1974 into the hands of a leading territorial minimalist, Avraham Ofer, who combined with the leftist Mapam faction to exert an intermittent blocking influence. Domestic dissent had of course been evident before the October War, but the unprecedented American pressures greatly heightened its impact in 1974-1975.

On the other side stood the forces pressing for continued and accelerated settlement. These remained dominant in domestic politics and, like the retarding
forces, were considerably stiffened by the events of late 1973.

Amongst the Labour Party leadership war-weariness was offset by deepened distrust, suspicion and pessimism regarding Syria: Yigal Allon viewed the war as confirming Israel's need for defence buffers politically secured by colonization, while for Golda Meir the war apparently ate away her last bit of trust.

There is no doubt that she was repenting for the sin of complacency in the days before -- and the memory of the first days -- when the Syrian Army was at the foot of the Golan Heights, haunted her like a nightmare.

Similar images were held by Rabin and Peres, as well as in the ranks of the Herut, the largest opposition party, where absolutist "not an inch" resolve remained as uncompromising as ever.

In addition, as Labour power slowly decayed, discredited by failures in the early days of the war and weakened by seemingly ineffectual government under Rabin, new occupied territory settler organizations, became highly activist, reacting both against American pressures and perceived Government vacillation. The settler organizations, principally the Golan Settlement Committee and the religio-nationalist Gush Emunim, rapidly gained strength and experience in influencing party machines and in disseminating propaganda, especially as Israeli public opinion drifted towards more hard-line positions, providing more propitious national settings.
The Golan Settlement Committee (henceforth termed GSC), a private interest group established to articulate the views of Golan colonists and to press the centres of power for continuous expansion of the settlement structure, comprises representatives from most settlement points in the region. It existed before the October War but only became visibly effective in the critical 1974-75 period. The Committee's leadership has tended to come from Merom Golan, the senior kibbutz (secular) and Ramat Magshamim, the senior moshav shittufi (religious).

GSC pressures strengthened even before the end of the October War (ref. Appendix VII). Representatives headed by Yehuda Harel (Merom Golan) met Yehial Admoni, a senior Settlement Department official, while the Israeli Army was still engaged in its counter-attack against Syria, and agreed on four post-war targets: doubling the Jewish population within a year, erection of a Golan City, colonization of the Central Golan and the building of a regional defence system.

Contacts with members of the Inter-Ministerial Settlement Committee followed and then, when the Minister of Finance Pinhas Sapir visited the Heights in late October, the GSC also converted him to its plan. These activities led, on 13 November, to Government approval for an extension of village settlement and for the establishment of an urban centre (the GSC "Golan City"). At this stage the Golan settlers assumed that they would not merely be able to retain the pre-war territory, but to absorb parts of the newly
conquered salient as well. Permission was obtained from the front commander, Rafael Eitan, to cultivate lands across the old cease-fire line and there were hopes that the valuable Beit Jinn springs might be kept as a water source.

It was soon apparent, however, that external forces were such that Israel would be lucky to preserve the old lines on the Golan. Considerable pressure for territorial concession emanated from both America and Europe, then being strongly influenced by OPEC, and on the front itself Syria launched a war of attrition. Israel's economy desperately needed substantial demobilization and a respite from the fighting, a point fully realized by interested external parties. The first disengagement agreement with Egypt, negotiated by Kissinger in January 1974 and involving Israeli withdrawals from some areas held before the war, thus seemed to indicate the character of negotiations for the Golan as much as for Sinai.

The struggle to achieve a cease-fire on the Syrian front, yet to avoid withdrawals detrimentally affecting the settlement structure and the Golan's ability to act as a strategic buffer, went ahead on two inter-connected levels. On the higher diplomatic plane the Israeli Government conducted a campaign of dogged political resistance against Kissinger and the Syrians. Israel had a very clear idea of the final border she could accept - the pre-war cease-fire line with minor concessions in the Quneitra sector - and here she used the settlement structure as a political weapon. The message to Kissinger was that any uprooting of settlements might cause a domestic upheaval capable of bringing down the
Government, and this stood as a political rock blocking any significant erosion of Israel's position on the Heights. Hence settler demonstrations outside the Prime Minister's office during the negotiations and other signs of internal rebelliousness, though a nuisance, directly served to strengthen the Government's hand, lending credibility to the upheaval argument.

Of course, with Israel internationally isolated, the primary factor which allowed such manoeuvering to carry any weight at all was Syria's fundamentally weak military situation. Damascus lay within artillery range of the front and, less obviously, Assad heeded some early territorial dividends to shore-up his own internal standing. Syria lacked either the diplomatic or the military strength to overcome the settlement block, and in this context, although Israel also needed stabilization, the eastern margins of Jewish colonization marked the effective limit of withdrawal.

On the purely domestic level Israel's leaders stood in apparent confrontation with the settlers and their sympathizers, a source of friction which, as noted, the Government found of utility as a diplomatic card. It is the author's view, however, that despite such utility the pressures from below were a truly independent phenomenon, not in any way stage-managed. They had existed before the disengagement talks began and were intensified by real fears that the Government and the wider public lacked backbone in standing up against external factors (see Appendix VIII). In addition the expansionist mentality of the GSC and its
insistence on the full maintenance of the pre-war line as an absolute last resort were, by early May, out-of-tune with Government thinking, the Government having to take account of realities which the GSC could safely ignore. Hence settler protest, whether orchestrated on the streets or inside party machines, proved a real embarrassment as well as a convenience.

From the outset the GSC sought support from rising religio-nationalist elements. Shortly after the war Harel and another member met a group of twenty at the home of Rabbi Haimqa Drugman, a meeting which apparently laid the foundations for the Gush Emunim. Here identity of views was reached and a strong link established between the Golan activists and Gush Etzion, on the West Bank. Then during the Winter months the GSC worked hard throughout the political system, seeking to limit any withdrawal entirely to the October salient. Activities included meetings with all Government Ministers, two sittings with the Foreign Affairs and Security Committee of the Knesset, the achievement of sympathetic decisions from Ha Kibbutz ha Meuhad and the Regional Councils, publicity in the newspapers and the youth movements, and two assemblies of all occupied territory settlements (in Kfar Etzion and Neot Golan). Merom Golan people were particularly involved, and it was later claimed that "we knew for certain that our work prevented a deep withdrawal on the Golan and damage to the settlements". (28)

In April 1974 the GSC received hints that Quneitra might be subject to concessions and so, with the "requisite approval" (29) settlers began clearing buildings in the
deserted city and implementing "land preparation", presumably for an extension of Merom Golan's agricultural area. Whether or not "requisite approval" (ha ishurim ha darushim) meant that someone at a high level in either the Army or the bureaucracy felt that fact-creation might help Israel to hold Quneitra, and whether or not demolition work by settlers accounted for a major part of the destruction evident after disengagement, are both unknown.

In the event the Government decided early in the May negotiations that all Quneitra would be given up. It had little strategic value, it was of considerable prestige significance to the Syrians, and a street-by-street bartering process would probably enable Israel's positions in the volcanic hills to the rear to be preserved. Without the volcanic hills, dominating the Golan watershed (plate 4), there would be no "defensible boundary", and their retention was thus adjudged vital. The kibbutzim of Merom Golan and Ain Zivan, whose sites and fields surrounded the cones, were also pressed into service as a diplomatic blocking mechanism - the cause célèbre of Golan settlements used as a political instrument. (30)

Merom Golan settlers, however, were determined that even Quneitra should not be given up. At 1.00 a.m. on 11 May, two days after a Ha-aretz article noting "it looked as if Israel and Syria would agree 1) the whole of Quneitra handed over to Syria, with the U.N. occupying the suburbs facing the heights" (31) -- had clarified Government thought, a GSC assembly in the Kibbutz's
PLATE 18
Plate 18

Kibbutz Merom Golan - view north to Har Odem (mid-distance) and Hermon, Jan. 1978.
restaurant shelter resolved to impede any retreat by immediately setting-up an unauthorized settlement nucleus in Quneitra. At dawn the same day a small group, largely from Merom Golan, implemented this decision by moving into the city's hospital bunker. A sympathizer in the Jewish Agency's Tzefat office supplied a generator for electricity and the group occupied itself making footwear (Kibbutz Dafne support) and continuing "land preparation." The ease of establishment makes it difficult to believe that there was not substantial collusion from, at the least, the local army command and bureaucracy.

A critical problem facing the new settlement, named Qeshet, was that of raising group size to credible numbers. Initially the GSC hoped Qeshet could be joined to the neighbouring Ha Kibbutz ha Meuhad block (El Rom, Merom Golan, Ain Zivan) but the Meuhad secretariat refused to back a Quneitra settlement and attempts to mobilize recruits in Galilee kibbutzim failed completely. Instead salvation came from the religio-nationalists, particularly from Hanan Porat, later to be a major personality in Gush Emunim, and the demonstrators besieging the Prime Minister's office in Jerusalem.

The demonstrations against withdrawal, in part organized by occupied territory settlers and in part spontaneous, took place regularly during the Israel-Syria disengagement talks. They primarily comprised young "whole land of Israel" enthusiasts who made themselves particularly prominent and noisy whenever Henry Kissinger appeared. They eventually created such a disturbance that some were
arrested and temporarily jailed, an action which prompted attacks on the Government from both the Likud and the National Religious Party. (32)

As soon as news arrived in Jerusalem about the establishment of Qeshet, spread amongst the demonstrators by pamphlet, numbers began leaving for the Golan, appearing in Qeshet in ones and twos over the following fortnight. This ensured the settlement's viability, pushing its population up to c. 30 by late May, and simultaneously transformed it into a largely religious community, for which Hanan Porat took responsibility.

On 31 May the Disengagement Agreement was signed. The new lines (figure 56) transferred the bulk of Quneitra to Syrian civil administration, but left the western outskirts and all the surroundings of the volcanic hills under Israel. Qeshet's bunker stood exactly on the margins of Israeli jurisdiction, though its role in detailed boundary determination is uncertain and it clearly could not remain on its initial site. Haggling with the Army enabled a shift to alternative accommodation in a tree nursery just outside Quneitra in early June. This was after settler honour had been satisfied by some illicit adjustment of the barrels marking the new border, so bringing the hospital bunker inside the Israeli area.

At this stage, of course, Qeshet's very existence remained officially unacknowledged and full analysis of its significance, as a manifestation of domestic discontent, in aiding the Government to resist Kissinger can only be
made if and when the relevant documents are released.

With their Quneitra adventure over the Qeshet group urgently needed a new raison d'être to keep itself together. After several months in which the settlement experienced considerable population turnover members fixed on the Central Golan gap as their replacement cause - strengthening the settlement structure at its most vulnerable point in anticipation of further American pressure. Assured of GSC backing they campaigned vigorously through the late Summer for transfer to a permanent site in the Central Golan. Here they faced the opposition of some senior Army officers, who did not favour settlement in an area reserved for exercises and who possibly shared some of the thoughts then current about colonization being a liability rather than an asset in military terms. To overcome the opposition the Qeshet members applied heavy pressure on Government Ministers, including Prime Minister Yitzhak Rabin, and spent long hours arguing with northern commander Rafael Eitan, eventually achieving their objective. On 17 October 1974 Qeshet was permitted to make its second move - to the Hushniye military camp in the forward sector of the Central Golan.

(ii) Although the 13 November 1973 decision in favour of an urban-industrial centre theoretically committed the Government to accelerated colonization, especially in the Central Golan, the close American interest and the delaying tactics of the Minister of Housing, Mapai's Avraham Ofer, held back effective implementation until late 1975, when
the majority finally triumphed. The history of the Golan urban-industrial project well illustrates the impact and ultimate impotence of minimalist resistance within the Government.

Ofer, as a protege of Pinhas Sapir, a close confidant of Yitzhak Rabin and a skilled party operative, had considerable power within the Cabinet. Both Ofer and the Mapam Ministers, jointly opposed to major territorial adjustment outside the Jerusalem area, viewed the creation of an urban community on the Golan as a dangerous departure in the colonization process. Mapam's supporting settlement movement, Ha Kibbutz ha Artzi, had only recently managed to persuade itself that agricultural colonization across the green line could be justified as a bargaining counter, presumably on the dubious premise that the process could be reversed if a peace treaty seemed in prospect. However, what could be argued concerning kibbutzim could hardly be sustained with regard to a city which, on some projections, would eventually contain 20,000 people. The latter, once it had progressed past the first stages of development, would amount to an almost irreversible commitment to absorption of substantial parts of the Golan, transforming the diplomatically convenient notion that Israel was "a prisoner of its own facts" into a potentially inconvenient reality, seriously limiting manoeuvre in negotiations with Syria. This characteristic of course made the proposed urban centre a highly popular scheme amongst the settler lobbies.

Ofer, whose Ministry bore full responsibility
for all urban building development, was ideally placed to obstruct the Golan city (named Qatzrin after the site chosen in July 1974). Settler suspicion that he was using his position for this purpose first became apparent in early November when a GSC meeting noted, in very critical terms, that "the Minister of Housing has not yet begun actual activity to create the urban centre on the Golan although in the current budget year more than 80 million lirot have been allocated to infrastructure works". (35) When the issue arose in the Knesset in December Ofer brushed it aside, citing technical excuses.

Because of the importance of the region from many points of view - in chief security, climatic -- it was a difficult task to achieve a siting common to all institutions -- on 17 July 1974 the Committee for Urban Building finally confirmed the agreed area and detailed planning immediately began, but for the needs of planning surveys the area had to be cleared of thorn bushes -- this needed a number of weeks -- the actual works began in December and soon road construction and the building of a large shelter will be started. Building of housing structures will begin at the opening of Spring because -- there is no sense in large scale works in Winter -- (35)

Similar inquiries early in the New Year, one noting a slow-down in the infrastructural development, were treated in the same manner. (36)

Not until several months later did Ofer's opposition to the city idea become more open, when on 27 May 1975 he flatly informed a hostile GSC delegation that no city would be built - a small urban estate of 200 residential units would be the maximum. (37) The latter comment reduced even his own December 1974 estimate, in which he had spoken of 300-400 units within two years as a first stage. (35) Reaction came swiftly. On 6 June Ma'ariv began a series of
articles on the controversy, the opening piece entitled "Minister of Housing - Against the Golan Heights", and on 17 June Zevulun Hamer of the National Religious Party, now returned to the governing coalition, raised "delay in the erection of the urban-industrial centre on the Golan" as a matter for debate by the full Knesset. Hamer poured scorn on excuses involving surveys, thorn-bushes and the lack of a suitable director for the project, claiming that when one man had volunteered to head the team Ofer had had refused, indicating that he should volunteer to help populate Tzefat, and that when an architect had presented a Qatzrin plan the Minister had commented that the plan would not be executed on the Golan, but inside the green line.

If from the standpoint of politics, conscience or some other factor the Minister of Housing cannot establish the city - and it is perhaps possible to understand that it is difficult for a man to perform a task he does not identify with - and if the quotation that 'he does not plan to build a city on the Golan' is correct will he please transfer the job to others. (38)

Ofer retorted that the original Government decision had not mentioned the word "city" and then postponed further discussion by having the issue diverted into the Knesset Works Committee.

Such tactics remained effective for some time, with Ofer receiving tacit backing from various quarters. Amongst these were elements in the Jewish Agency and in Galilee local authorities who viewed Qatzrin as an unwarranted diversion of resources from the existing urban structure in the Hula Valley and the Tiberias basin. In particular,
the Mayor of Qiryat Shemona asserted that Qatzrin would
hurt North Galilee development projects. (39)

More significantly, the Government remained
sensitive about American attitudes. For example Hamer's
proposal for a Knesset debate was at first delayed a week
because of Government fears that it might have a detrimental
effect on a concurrent Rabin visit to Washington. Here
Yigal Allon stressed "the difficulties Rabin would have
with the United States if the media headlined stories from
Israel about intentions to build a city on the Golan". (40)

Finally, however, Ofer was over-ridden. Two external
events decisively tipped the balance against minimalism in
settlement policy: on 20 November 1975 a guerrilla incursion
in the South Golan led to the murder of three yeshiva
students at Ramat Magshamim and on 30 November, as her price
for extending the UNDOF mandate, Syria extracted American
acquiescence in a PLO attended U.N. Security Council debate
on the Middle East conflict. Israel's leadership was
infuriated and the reaction massively buttressed the position
of 'hard-liners', both in the Government and amongst the
wider public. Furthermore by early 1976 fear of Ford/
Kissinger hostility to new colonization projects was
lessening, as American attention became distracted by the
approach of the Presidential election campaign. Ofer could
hold out no longer - the urban-industrial centre was
officially upgraded to a "city" and the Government took
determined steps to ensure rapid implementation. In
January 1976 a co-ordinating team was set up for Qatzrin
and this quickly adopted plans positing 5000 residential units, a commercial complex and an industrial estate, the whole entity covering 2,500 dunams and accommodating a population of at least 20,000. The settler lobbies had triumphed.

(iii) Qatzrin comprised only one aspect of the wider Central Golan issue. There was also the matter of agricultural and industrial village colonization, designed both to secure the eastern border by bridging the Ramat Magshamim gap and to fill empty space behind the 'bridge'. Here the Qeshet episode led into a trial of strength between moderates and settlement enthusiasts which paralleled and complemented the Qatzrin debate, drawing in the same protagonists.

In July 1974, only one month after disengagement, the GSC demanded the erection of five new settlements in the frontier sector of the Central Golan, a demand which formed the basis for negotiations with the Settlement Department of the Jewish Agency. The Settlement Department, itself closely interested in Central Golan village colonization, proved sympathetic and by the end of the year planning had reached the stage of site details.

Here two problems arose whose resolution graphically demonstrated GSC influence. One concerned the permanent site for the Qeshet group, counted among the GSC five. Qeshet representatives, in co-ordination with the Regional Planner, decided on a hillock two kilometres south of Hushniye, at a point which offered a superb view of the Tiberias basin and which was deemed sufficiently close (five kilometres) to the cease-fire
line to hinder further Kissinger style withdrawals. The Army, worried that the village would be too exposed to allow easy evacuation in the event of renewed hostilities, objected strongly. Qeshet, backed by the GSC, immediately responded by appealing to Defence Minister Shimon Peres. Peres, fulfilling expectations, over-ruled the military and the settlers kept their original choice.

The second problem involved disagreement between the GSC and the Settlement Department over the economic base of the proposed villages. The authorities, with an eye to costs, wanted to avoid expensive land reclamation and so suggested a largely industrial orientation. Golan settlers, on the other hand, wanted a significant agricultural component. Two reasons underlay their insistence - a) the historic view of agriculture as a "land anchor", in Golan circumstances the best insurance against political manoeuvrings for village removal, and b) the fact that the available settlement nuclei, being of predominantly religious persuasion, had a strong ideological attachment to the concept of redeeming the land by working the soil. After an adamant stand the settlers again got their own way.

A detailed Settlement Department scheme for the GSC sponsored Ain Zivan-Ramat Magshamim bridge appeared in the April 1975 Planning Proposal for Settlement in the Central Golan, already discussed on P. 210. The four mixed agriculture/industry villages proposed for the frontier axis (figure 53) would each contain c.100 families. Village siting would be at least in part
determined by the desire to minimize distances to suitable lands (i.e. those requiring least stone-clearing).

Intensive studies for the individual villages quickly followed, a Programme for Moshav Qeshet being completed as early as July 31. The Qeshet plan presented suggestions for area and type of building structure, monthly work schedules and monthly water requirements. Agricultural lands amounting to 1500 dunams would be assigned to the settlement, divided into eight parts and scattered over an area of 20,000 dunams. It was observed that "the lands in the allocated zone are stone-strewn and require special preparation chiefly with regard to scouring and annual stone clearing." (42) In the industrial sector initial activities would comprise such specialities as carpentry and sewing, with provision for an electronics plant. Agriculture and industry were each intended to provide 50% of Qeshet's final income, though, owing to Central Golan environmental difficulties, the agricultural investment would be much greater (agriculture/industry investment ratio = 2:1 in one option, 3:1 in another). Details concerning the two branches are depicted in table 7: 8, indicating the depth of analysis. In accord with the wishes of nucleus members, numbering c. 60 by mid 1975, Qeshet would be organized as a moshav shittufi, on similar lines to Ramat Magshamim.

However, as soon as the GSC - Settlement Department ideas passed from the bureaucratic to the political level they ran into trouble - opposition from Avraham Ofer and caution on the part of several other
Cabinet figures. The Inter-Ministerial Settlement Committee deferred discussion on the proposals, perceiving possible American disapproval, and this caused impatience and irritation in settler circles.

By late August the GSC had come to the conclusion that action had to be taken to force the pace. For some time it had maintained a second settlement nucleus in "training" at Merom Golan, a small religious group linked to Gush Emunim, and on the night of 27 August, after checking with sympathetic elements in Tzahal Northern Command, it inserted the group into empty bunkers on Tel Fares, without the approval or even the knowledge of the Government or the Settlement Department. In this way Yonatan appeared; a unilateral planting only two kilometres from the Central Golan border "in the middle of an empty area rumoured as negotiable for return to Syria."(43) The GSC organizers were buttressed in their defiance of the state by the success of similar Gush Emunim tactics on the West Bank, and in turn the Gush ranked among the most enthusiastic supporters of the Yonatan operation.

The Government, deeply divided and not wishing a public confrontation with the settlers, took no steps to reverse the fait accompli, but neither did it make any move to approve the Tel Fares occupation or to activate the broader scheme. Only in September did the Inter-Ministerial Settlement Committee examine the April Settlement Department plan for the first time, and at Ofer's request it deferred the matter for debate by the full
Cabinet. Here he and Rabin were at one in favouring delay, though for Rabin this was largely a matter of sensitivity over timing with relation to international factors. In a significant comment to kibbutz secretaries the Prime Minister held that there had been "no change in Government policy about (retaining) the Golan, but -- inadvisable to start new settlements before the expiry date of the U.N. mandate (November 30)." (44)

Through October the Yonatan settlers consolidated their Tel Fares position, bringing in bulldozers to level ground for housing and securing electricity and water supplies from the military - all evidence of under-cover support from senior officials in the Defence Department and perhaps from Defence Minister Shimon Peres himself. The Mapam young guard, in a memorandum to Mapam Ministers observed

All this is proof that there are security or settlement factors lending a hand to deviations which have not been approved by the Government in order to force on the Government things and acts which it has never decided upon. (45)

As with Qatzrin the deadlock was broken and the inhibitions swept aside by the two external irruptions of November 1975. After the Ramat Magshamim raid hard-line Ministers immediately demanded a decision on the four settlement plan.

The circles who re-raised the issue said such an act would express the Government's resolve to hold on to parts of the Golan needed for security purposes. The four settlements would help tighten the security belt in the Ramat Magshamim area. (46)
A full Cabinet discussion followed on 23 November and the scheme was made operational, though lingering hesitation led to actual implementation being temporarily deferred. Final doubts, however, did not survive Syria's price for the renewal of the UNDOF mandate and the prospect of the PLO addressing the Security Council. On 2 December the Inter-Ministerial Settlement Committee ordered an immediate start to official construction on the four settlements, as a "practical reaction to Syrian success in the Security Council". The chief impetus came from Committee Chairman Yisrael Galili - Ofer abstained and the two Mapam Ministers voted against the decision.

Events now moved ahead rapidly. Qeshet and Yonatan were immediately legitimized and in January 1976 two other settlement groups, the nuclei for Moshav Gamle and the Moshav Shittufi Sha'al, also established themselves on the Central Golan. Qeshet, Yonatan and Sh'al joined the Ramat Magshamim block (figures 40,48), following the frontier axis concept, while Gamle, established on the Batiha slopes, formed part of the strategy to occupy the central hinterland.

(iv) In sum, by early 1976 the post-October War interlude was over and a new phase in the settlement process was beginning - a transition depicted diagrammatically in figure 55. First, with the defeat of the domestic minimalists, the Arab provocations, and the diversion of the United States in the beginnings of the Presidential election campaign, the internal and external constraints
on colonization were slackening decisively. Second, after two years of effort, the settler lobbies had entrenched themselves as never before in public consciousness and in the political system. These two changes in political realities, domestic and international, led directly to an acceleration in Golan settlement, which had been in prospect since the majority of the Government had drawn their hard-line conclusions from the October War, but had been postponed by unfavourable post-war circumstances.

VII. Infrastructural Foundations

As an essential element in the creation of a new cultural landscape on the Golan Heights the Labour period saw the expanding settlement structure buttressed by a considerable infrastructural investment - in roads, water supply, electricity reticulation and sewage systems. The investment amounted to 21% of the total Golan investment up to 1977 (48) and probably bulked larger in some earlier years, as progress beyond the initial rudimentary level depended on the parallel creation of a substantial infrastructure. Two critical dimensions are examined in this section - the road network and the water supply.

(i) Roads. Israel inherited a skeletal system of paved highways from the Syrians, consisting of a north-south spine running from Baniyas through Quneitra to Rafid, Fiq and El Hamma, with one major east-west link between Quneitra and the Bnot Ya’acov bridge (figure 57). Initially little was done to extend this net but after 1969, when several major schemes were set in motion, work proceeded
continuously and in some cases vigorously.

Objectives included the building of further east-west connections to improve access from Israel and the establishment of a new north-south axis at a safe distance from the cease-fire line. Motivation was transparently strategic, though military strategy operated in association with such lesser concerns as the opening up of new agricultural lands and the requirements of tourism.

Good exemplification is provided by the most expensive and spectacular of the early projects - the blasting of twin highways to the Hermon shoulder. This was prompted by the growth of Palestinian bases across the border in Lebanon (Fatahland) and subsequent guerrilla infiltration of the Hermon slopes, craggy and difficult to patrol. Fears arose that Israel might lose effective control of the vicinity and Northern Commander David Elazar repeatedly stressed the need, on security grounds, for a border highway. Implementation began in 1969 with the opening of an eastern link from Majdal ash Shams to the Israeli held summit (2050 metres), the intention being to reduce the vulnerability of the military outpost on the shoulder, hitherto entirely dependent on helicopter transport. The fact that the road also gave access to the new Hermon ski-field was a welcome 'bonus'. Then, after guerrilla attacks on Metulla, Qiryat Shemona and Ghajjar, a Lebanon border highway was pushed through to Har Dov and beyond in Spring-Summer 1970. Guerrilla opposition created arduous conditions for the Jewish National Fund work parties, with
mine-layings and attempted ambushes, but Israel's power and determination made the result a foregone conclusion - Fatahland was overshadowed and the accomplishment followed by the expression of wider ambitions: "Hermon will be ours not only as a military fact but also as a civilian reality, with access for civilian traffic, tourists, sports fans."(49)

On the plateau itself four new east-west roads had appeared by 1973 (figure 57). These bound the Golan and its new settlements more closely to Israel and served as alternative military approach routes. Two (Gonen-Wasit, Hushniye-Batiha) upgraded existing tracks and two (Mazra'at Quneitra-Kursi, Bene Yehuda-Kursi) were entirely new creations. The Bene Yehuda-Kursi link gave the southern settlements their first secure direct access to Israel: prior to 1970 the only local access had been the El Hamma road, adjacent to the Jordanian border and under constant threat of attack during the War of Attrition.

In contrast work on a safer north-south axis running up the centre of the plateau, called for as early as January 1968, did not begin in earnest until after the October War. Action was in part prompted by the Disengagement Agreement, which increased the political and military vulnerability of the existing Quneitra-Rafid axis, and in part stemmed from the infrastructural needs of Central Golan colonization.

Concerning overall development figure 58 indicates improvements in the connectivity of the Golan all-weather road network between 1970 and 1975. Connectivity is
defined as the degree of inter-connection between all the vertices (nodes) in the network when the network is abstracted as a graph. It is measured here by the $\alpha$ index, a ratio measure of the number of actual circuits in the network to the maximum number possible.

$$\alpha = \frac{\text{actual circuits}}{\text{maximum circuits}} = \frac{e - v + 1}{2v - 1}$$

where $e = \text{edge (link)}$, $v = \text{vertex (node)}$

The index ranges from 0 for a minimally connected network to 1 for maximum connection.

For the Golan road system the results are as follows -

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Year</th>
<th>$\alpha$</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1970</td>
<td>0.064</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1972</td>
<td>0.134</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1975</td>
<td>0.134</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

A major increase in sophistication is evident in the first two years, especially in the far north, with the Hermon effort, and in the far south, with the Kursi link and an intensification of the agricultural service system. Failure to sustain the rate of improvement in the second period (1972-1975) may in the main be attributed to linkage reduction in the Quneitra and Rafid sectors caused by disengagement. Such losses were balanced by new routes in the Central Golan, which enabled the 1972 connectivity level to be preserved but not increased. As a cautionary comment it should be noted that the 1:100,000 maps used as a data base are not entirely accurate, either for
road standards or for the exact extent of the network. This emerged from detailed inspection of the recently released 1:50,000 series (52) and from field investigation.

(ii) Water Supply. Projections of the water requirements of the Golan settlement structure, overwhelmingly bound up with irrigation assisted cropping, have traditionally been as ambitious as population projections. The agricultural plan of November 1967 proposed consumption of 15.9 million cubic metres per annum (mill. cm. p.a.) with ten years, equivalent to c. 1% of Israel's total 1968 consumption, while the 1973 general plan looked ahead to a 1978 supply of 26.7 mill. cm. p.a. In fact known sources on the Golan can only produce c. 7 mill. cm. p.a. and, although this can and has been supplemented by bores and by reservoirs to store Winter precipitation, at least 50% of the production necessary to fulfil the above planning must come from metropolitan Israel - in other words, from Lake Tiberias.

The actual situation existing on the Golan after six years of water project construction is depicted in figure 59 and table 7:9. Two major systems had been built up, one for the south and one for the north, each consisting of a grid of pipes, pumping stations, springs, bores, reservoirs and ponds. Excluding the Druze villages, total Golan supply in 1973-74 amounted to 4.4 mill. cm.

In the South Golan the principal source was Lake Tiberias. Although this meant pumping the water up a 500 metre scarp (53), imposed pipe distances of up to 40 kilometres and caused competition with the National Water
Carrier, there was no real choice if a settlement structure of any size was to be established on the southern plateau. Despite intensive utilisation of springs and the establishment of reservoirs and storage ponds to preserve Winter run-off local sources could not possibly carry the main burden. By 1974 the South Golan system had reached the dimensions shown in figure 59 and was supplying 2.7 mill.cm.p.a. to eleven agricultural villages, 37% from Lake Tiberias. Extension plans predicated an ever increasing dependence on the lake.

The North Golan system on the other hand, operating in more propitious terrain, relied entirely on the local sources. Construction work was initially tardy, partly because the Syrians did not cut the flow across the cease-fire line from Beit Jinn until May 1968, but from 1969 onwards it proceeded with vigour. The pivot was the natural reservoir of Brekhot Ram, from which pipes went north to Neve Ativ and the three Druze villages, drawing in the output of two large Druze owned springs, and south to the three Quneitra basin kibbutzim. In 1974 production ran at 3.7 mill.cm.p.a., from the origins depicted in table 7:9, making the enterprise somewhat larger than its southern counterpart, albeit with Jewish settlements consuming only 47% of the supply. Considerable potential still existed for growth, by sinking more bores and by further ponding of the heavy Winter rainfall, but not at the rate envisaged for the South Golan scheme with its Lake Tiberias base.

Both systems are to be extended into the Central
Golan as part of the support for the area’s colonization programmes, the main load being borne from the south. Within the Central Golan there are also possibilities, at great expense, for rainfall collection and for bores, particularly at Tel Bazaq, although the local springs are so deficient in Summer that they are of little general value except as drinking water sources.

VIII. New Directions 1976-1977

"The political situation and the relative quiet from the security and political aspects demand and facilitate the use of the time at our disposal for developing, deploying and filling out land settlement in the Golan at the fastest possible pace. The regions where settlement efforts should be concentrated are in the Central and Northern Golan ---".


Between early 1976 and December 1977 the Golan Jewish population increased from c. 2200 to c. 3900, while the number of officially recognized settlement sites expanded from 20 to 27, increases of 75% and 35% compared with 25% and 18% for the preceding two years.

In the village sector the path ahead was set by the July 1976 Plan for the Development of Additional Settlements on the Golan Heights. This concentrated on the Central Golan, visualizing an alignment of five industrial villages and four mixed industry/agriculture settlements for c. 1980. Elsewhere it called for two new industrial villages in the North Golan and one new kibbutz on the
Implementation of the new programmes, comprising both the village plan and the Qatzrin city development, had two dimensions. On the one hand significant progress had undoubtedly been made by early 1978. At Qatzrin, which dominates this phase in Golan colonization, building proceeded at great speed, the first of eight housing estates reaching an advanced stage of construction by July 1977, when settlers began moving in. Thereafter the city's population grew from zero to more than 500 within six months, making it the largest Golan settlement and the most formidable new Israeli project in the occupied territories. The initial employment base consisted of light industry, with an industrial estate being built on a separate site, and service activity, primarily for Golan villages and military camps. It remains to be seen whether Qatzrin can attract enough people beyond the relatively small pool of fervent nationalists to sustain its current rate of expansion. However, if it can - and the 1978-80 programme calls for an urban infrastructure investment of 455 million lirot to ensure that it can (plate 18,19) - it will, for the first time, make long-standing Golan population targets of 40-50,000 realistic and so severely reduce the short-term likelihood of a negotiated peace with Syria.

Regarding village settlement late 1977 also saw several of the main proposals well on the way toward fulfilment (figures 40,48). On the Central Golan frontier Qeshet, Yonatan and Sha'al had been joined by Nahal Parag,
Plate 19

Qatzrin - Urban construction,

Plate 20

Qatzrin - Urban construction,
near Rafid, and kibbutz Ortal, near Ain Zivan. None of the five were yet on permanent sites but spacious new quarters for Qeshet, which had expanded from 80 people to 120, including 50 children, were almost complete. In addition the new kibbutz proposed for the far south - Avni Eitan - had been inaugurated, while in the far north a secondary ten kilometer gap between El Rom and Neve Ativ was being attended to by an incipient cluster of industrial villages, beginning with the Har Odem nucleus.

On the other hand, to set against the progress, the very pace of development only made the underlying financial and demographic resource constraints more obvious. In particular the intense concentration on Qatzrin implied a certain debilitation in the execution of new construction throughout the rest of the Golan. One casualty seems to have been the industrial village block suggested for the Central Golan interior. Up to 1978 the sole evidence of activity was the erection of Ani'am, a permanent village for a group of Russian immigrants stationed at Ramot. The neglect presumably stemmed from the priority given to closing gaps on the eastern frontier, which received more settler attention, as well as from that given to Qatzrin, to which the industrial villages were subsidiary. Even on the frontier, however, one notes significant delays in providing new settlements with permanent housing. (56)

More broadly the resource constraints were also evident in the fact that a decade of fluctuating effort had established only 3,500 Israelis on the Golan, less than
50% of the population of the residual Arab villages. This was all the more striking in view of the determination of Israel's leadership concerning Golan colonization. The constraints thus provide good exemplification for Brecher's point that although external realities only affect decisions via the images of decision-makers, the same realities directly determine the fate of efforts to put the decisions into practice. (57)

Nonetheless the strength of the political will and the potency of political pressures should not be underestimated, as may be seen in the over-riding of both environmental and diplomatic obstacles in the drive to settle the Central Golan. Local agricultural projects, water scheme extensions and the new industrial village concept can only be interpreted in a political and strategic context. Seen from an economic or an environmental standpoint the author feels that the emerging Central Golan structure makes little sense: the area has only a very limited agricultural potential (see P.206), it has no resources for industry and it is distant from existing industrial concentrations.

Indeed it is instructive to note that the whole effect of the October War was to accelerate the shift away from an economically rational Golan settlement pattern, limited in both scale and spatial coverage, to a pattern which sought to be spatially comprehensive and to breakthrough to large scale colonization by either overcoming environmental difficulties (Central Golan agriculture)
or by finding ways round them - (industrial villages). As observed, such moves to strengthen the settlement anchor followed an erosion in Israel's diplomatic position.
(1) Allon to author, March 1978 (for further reference see Appendix VII).


(3) Ibid, P.29.


(5) *Tokhnit Pituah ha Golan* (Settlement Dept., 1975) P.3.

(6) Average per annum investment for the whole Golan was c.23 million 1.L for 1967-1970 (*Ha-aretz* 15-7-69 P.9) and c. 212 million 1.L for 1970-1977 (*Tour of the Zionist Congress Delegates*, Settlement Dept. 23-2-78) when Central Golan development began. As qualification this note does not take account of large-scale inflation and devaluation after 1973.

(7) *Ha-aretz* 26-7-68 P.23.


(9) *Ma'ariv* 11-11-73 p.15.

(10) One senior army officer even spoke of a ceiling of 2000 people if agriculture remained the main economic branch - *Ma'ariv* 20-3-73. P.13


(12) For a Ministerial view on the matter see Yigal Allon's comment, Appendix VII P.425.


(15) *The Rommel Papers* P.198.

(16) See, for example, Philip Gillon in the *Jerusalem Post* 23-5-74.


(19) Ibid.

(20) Smail, *Crusading Warfare* 1097-1193 P.208-209.
(21) Ha-aretz 28-5-75 i.e. in the frame of a peace agreement.

(22) Yigal Allon in Appendix VII, P. 424.

(23) Comment by Allon to author, 23-12-77.
Q. How did the Yom Kippur War affect your ideas?
A. It only strengthened them.

(24) i.e. regarding Arab intentions.


(28) Leidata shel Qeshet Appendix VIII P. 434-435.

(29) Ibid. Appendix VIII P. 435.

(30) Ha-aretz 17-5-74 P. 1 "In Wednesday night meeting the Cabinet decided by a majority to reject a Syrian demand for about 1,500 dunams of Merom Golan land". Golan, M. The Secret Conversations of Henry Kissinger P. 195 "The strategic problem was El Quneitra's proximity to Kibbutz Merom Golan -- to defend the kibbutz Israel wanted to keep it as far as possible from the Syrian lines. Having already said he was against the establishment of settlements in the first place Kissinger did not think that Assad would be impressed -- he preferred to leave the settlements out of the discussion altogether -- But this was something the Israeli negotiators couldn't afford to do."

(31) Ha-aretz 9-5-74 P. 1


(34) Decision by Ha Kibbutz ha Artzi secretariat June 1973. Al Hamishmar 20-6-73 P. 2. "argument centred round the question - does creating colonization facts in Golan bring longed-for peace any nearer, or does it do the opposite -- the vote taken at the end of the meeting unequivocally shows that the
vast majority of the members -- are not prepared to relinquish their part in the settling of the Golan."

(35) Divrei ha-Knesset Vol.72 31-12-74 Erection of Urban Centre on Golan Heights.

(36) Ibid. Vol.72 P.1552 3-2-75 (Q-A. Vardigar to Minister of Housing 15-1-75).

(37) Yediot Ahronot 28-5-75 P.4.

(38) Divrei ha-Knesset. Vol.74 P.3101 17-6-75. Z. Hamer (Proposal for the day's agenda).

(39) Ma'ariv 1-6-75 P.12.

(40) Ibid 12-6-75 P.4.

(41) Settlement Department, Tzefat.

(42) Programma li Moshef Qeshet (Settlement Dept., 1975) P.2.


(44) Ma'ariv 19-10-75. P.4.

(45) Ha-aretz 17-10-75. P.1.


(47) Rabin - reported in Ha-aretz 2-12-75. P.1.


(50) For a more extensive discussion of connectivity indices and associated terminology see Taafe and Gauthier, Geography of Transportation, Chapt.4 'Structural Analysis of Transportation Networks' P.100-115.


(52) Survey of Israel, 1:50,000 sheets for Golan Heights - various dates after 1974.

(53) In 1974 the electricity load required for the operation was 6000 kilowatts, 40% of the total Golan load (15,050 kilowatts) Tokhnit Pituah ha Golan, Matzai (Settlement Dept., 1974) P.29.

(54) Ha Tokhnit la Pituah Yishuvim Nosefim ba Ramat ha Golan (Settlement Dept., 1976) P.1. No precise date is given, though the plan expresses the intention that all required land and water resources be located for use "within 2-3 years".
(55) **Tour of the Zionist Congress Delegates Settlement Dept., 23-2-78. P.19.**

(56) a) According to the April 1975 'Planning Proposal for Settlement in the Central Golan' all four frontier villages were supposed to be nearing completion (and full population) by late 1978. In February 1978, however, even Qeshet (the earliest community) had not yet moved into its permanent quarters.

b) Concerning the Golan as a whole *Ha-aretz* reported on 9-6-78 (p.8) - "it has become known that the Golan settlements charge that they have been deprived in comparison with West Bank and Rafiah Salient settlements -- that settlement factors neglect Golan settlements as against other regions."

(57) Brecher, M. *The Foreign Policy System of Israel*, P.5.
CHAPTER EIGHT

CASE STUDY: THE JORDAN RIFT, 1967-1978
I. The Rift Strip: Refining the Allon Plan

Of all the colonization programmes in the occupied territories the settlement system in the West Bank section of the Jordan Rift is the most visible expression of the Allon Plan. It realizes the plan's central concept that the defence of Israel's heartland should rest not on minor border adjustments between the West Bank and the coastal plain but on the absorption into Israel of a security zone running the length of the Jordan Rift, so giving true geographic depth at the same time as containing areas of dense Arab population. Figure 36, which depicts both the original version of the zone and the September 1967 West Bank population distribution, illustrates just how convenient for Israel was the disproportionately large Arab exodus from the West Jordan Valley.

Allon's ideas regarding a Rift strip were his chief original contribution to the Israeli debate on retention of territory for strategic purposes, and they did not reach their final form until early 1968. Before going on to the settlement process itself it is useful to examine the detailed ramifications of these ideas, which gave the settlement process its spatial and ideological base.

(i) In the expanse between the Beit Shean Valley and the Dead Sea (figure 60) the Rift strip would form a formidable topographical barrier against any assault from the east. The Jordan River, with its entrenched meanders, would serve as the initial anti-tank ditch, although Allon recognized that it could not be decisive against a modern army. The main defence line would thus
be positioned between 500 and 1000 metres above the Valley, in the Samarian mountains. The mountains are an extremely impressive topographical feature (plate 1) and Allon calculated that relatively small forces, armed with sophisticated and appropriate weaponry, could hold the "wall" even against an Arab army assisted by outside powers.\(^1\) Any passes through the mountains, the principal example being Wadi Fari'a, leading up to Nablus, are long and narrow and could be turned into death-traps for advancing armour.

After July 1967 Allon's proposals for the Beit Shean/Dead Sea expanse were refined in two important respects. First, as the original idea for a strip 10 - 15 kilometres in breadth did not take the defence line far enough back into the Samarian Wilderness to give the maximum possible height and terrain advantage the breadth was adjusted to 15 - 20 kilometres.\(^2\) The final line, as indicated in the August 1975 Jordan Rift Development Plan (figure 60), took the western border of the strip to the very margins of Arab cultivation on the West Bank Highlands. Its detailed alignment "was determined by political/demographic considerations above all else" and "was fixed on the limit of worked lands in the vicinity of the (Arab) villages, at an average distance of 2 - 3 kilometres from the site of the villages themselves.\(^3\)" It also closely followed the 400 m.m. rainfall line, which marked the transition between the Mediterranean climate of the heavily populated Highlands and the semi-arid climate of the sparsely populated wilderness. The overriding consideration was to keep the Arab population inside the security strip to a minimum. The only exception came in the south, where the village of Duma had to be brought
within the proposed Israeli area, if terrain suitable for a north-south highway (the so-called "line of settlement" road) was to be incorporated.

Second, Allon quickly reconsidered the desirability of one major implication of his original plan - the territorial severance of the West Bank Arabs from the wider Arab world.

A couple of months after I proposed my plan, when I studied it again, I reached the conclusion that it would be wrong not to provide those two interconnected territories (the West Bank and the East Bank) with an Arab controlled and even sovereign access or corridor. He thus formulated the notion of a corridor following the Ramallah-Jericho road, permitting the free movement of Arab civilian traffic to the Allenby bridge. The corridor would be five kilometres in width (figure 69) and would have the added advantage of removing Jericho, the West Valley's major population centre, from the Israeli area. No Jewish settlements would be erected in the vicinity.

(ii) In Judea the original Allon Plan was very tentative, even leaving open the possibility of incorporating the entire West Bank south of Jerusalem into Israel. However, within weeks Allon decided to exclude the populated areas, making this clear "in my remarks at Cabinet sessions as well as in my talks with the Prime Minister, fellow Ministers and Members of the Knesset." Hebron and Bethlehem districts would thus be treated in the same way as Samaria, with the Judean Wilderness between the Dead Sea and the fringes of the densely populated areas becoming part of the Rift Security strip.

In early 1968 the Judean Wilderness proposal became bound up with an unauthorized attempt by a group of settlers to re-establish a Jewish community in Hebron town. On 10 April a group of 73 religious fundamentalists, headed by a Rabbi Moshe
Levinger, booked in at Hebron's Park Hotel, ostensibly to celebrate the Passover. To the consternation of the authorities they then announced that they had come to stay. The National Unity Government was deeply divided over the issue, eventually deciding to postpone any decision by shifting the settlers to the military administration compound, thereby reducing the likelihood of clashes with the Arab population, and by setting up a commission to consider the question of Jewish urban settlement in the area.

The Hebron settlement bid exposed the fundamental conflict in the Allon Plan between belief in the right of Jews to the whole historic land and arguments that this could not be implemented because of demographic dangers to the Jewish State. Hebron, the city of Abraham, ranked second to Jerusalem as a Jewish holy site and Allon, with the majority of Ministers (only Sapir, Eban and the Mapam representatives were openly opposed), tended to sympathize with the settlers. Yet how could a Jewish presence be established without absorbing 40,000 Arab Hebronites into Israel? Allon resolved the dilemma, by late 1968, (6) with the concept of a dual city, similar to Nazareth, involving the building of a separate Jewish quarter on the hills immediately to the east of the existing Arab city. This quarter would form an integral part of the Jordan Rift security strip with the Arab city excluded, the line of separation between the two sections marking the western border of the strip.

Government approval for the first stage of the project, involving 250 housing units, came in September 1970. The victory of the settlers, who had not dispersed after the move to the military compound as some Ministers had hoped
but had instead increased in number to c. 200, set a significant precedent for later years, for Qeshet and Yonatan on the Golan Heights and for the Gush Emunim on the West Bank. As regards the Allon Plan itself the new entity, named Qiryat Arba', represented an uneasy compromise between security, demography, emotion and history. Friction between Jew and Muslim, both at the tomb of the Patriarchs and in Hebron as a whole, was deepened rather than lessened.

(iii) Unofficial Government acceptance of the refined Allon Plan for the Jordan Rift and consequent implementation of coherent settlement programmes took longer than did agreement and action concerning the Golan Heights, largely because the degree of Ministerial consensus differed between the two cases. In brief, the range of opinion was much greater for the more complex West Bank issue, which subsumed the Jordan Rift, than for the Golan. Minimalists, for example Eban and Sapir, perceived the Rift scheme as covering too substantial a territory (30% of the West Bank) to be a plausible negotiating stance, while maximalists, here including Dayan as well as the Gahal Ministers, saw it as a diversion from their ideas of establishing Jewish urban settlements on the West Bank Highlands.

However, simply because of the range of opinion, the Allon Plan tended to gather strength as the least objectionable alternative for the largest number of Ministers. On the one hand minimalists could use it as a time-wasting device to stave off Jewish intrusion into Arab populated regions, hoping that settlement facts in the Rift would not become of such a scale to trap the Government into positions it could not withdraw from, but might nonetheless pressure
the Arabs to negotiate. Maximalists, on the other hand, could rationalize it as a first step toward more comprehensive colonization. In consequence, as time passed and pressure increased to 'create facts' in response to perceived Arab intransigence, the different sides gravitated toward the Allon Plan for their different, even diametrically opposed, reasons.

Clear evidence of such gravitation was apparent by mid 1968. On 6 June the Labour Party's Political Committee considered the matter, with Allon's ideas receiving support from Eban (minimalist), Dayan (maximalist) and Eshkol (moderate). Thereafter support widened and by the end of the year it could be observed that "a majority of the Ministers are in favour of the settlement dimension of the Allon Plan". On the far right Menahem Begin had no objections "because he sees it (the plan) as the beginning of a colonization process which his party requires on a broader scale" while on the left support came from Mapam's Minister of Housing, Mordekhai Bentov, although the main body of Mapam remained opposed.

Thus, eighteen months after the Six Day War the stage was set for the realization of the operational aspect of Allon's proposal for the Jordan Rift - the settlement system.

II. The Settlement Alignment: Chronology of Development 1968-1977

Allon's settlement concept for the Jordan Rift involved two forms of activity. To begin with Nahal outposts would be erected as quickly as possible along the full length
of the Rift, both on the Valley floor and in the mountains, these to be gradually converted to civilian agricultural villages and provided with necessary economic and social services by area centres. Then at a slightly later stage, the village development would be supplemented by the building of two urban-industrial communities - Upper Jericho and Upper Hebron. The idea of the urban dimension was "to attract greater masses" (10) to the region.

The paramilitary phase in Rift settlement began even before the Allon concept had gained widespread support, with the founding of Nahal Qalia (February 1968), Nahal Mehola (February 1968) and Nahal Argaman (November 1968). However in this early period most Ministers, probably including Prime Minister Levi Eshkol, preferred not to view these outposts as permanent establishments, attaching little more significance to them than to normal army camps. They came largely in response to guerrilla incursions and the intensifying War of Attrition with Jordan, each being located at or near major axes of infiltration. Nahal Argaman, for instance, overlooked the Far'a Valley leading up to Nablus, while Nahal Mehola covered a ford used by guerrillas as well as the northern road to the highlands.

Definite signs that Israel intended to stay became evident only in 1969 - 70, when settlement points multiplied and the Allon Plan, incorporated into the Unwritten Agreement between the Labour factions, emerged as the unofficial guideline for overall colonization. As Allon himself notes the War of Attrition had an accelerating effect - it helped reduce Ministerial doubts about extending Golan style policies
to the West Bank and "only encouraged us to establish these settlements." (11)

By 1971 the number of settlement points had grown to ten, including six Nahal, three civilian villages and one urban estate (Qiryat Arba'). Figure 61 depicts the distribution, indicating a concentration of effort on creating a line of settlement on the Valley floor. Only two agricultural sites had been founded in the mountains, and one of these (Petzaz) eventually intended moving down into the Valley, where it had been allocated lands and to which its members commuted daily. There were two reasons for the uneven spatial development. First the Valley floor, where mid-Winter mean temperatures of 12 - 14°C allow the production of lucrative out-of-season vegetables for export to Europe, offered greater agricultural opportunities. Second, the settlement movements involved in Valley activity (table 8:1) proved more dynamic in organizing nuclei for colonization.

Between 1971 and 1975 several major changes occurred in the settlement structure as it acquired a more elaborate form.

Concerning geographical orientation all five new settlement foundations were made in the mountain area, creating a second series of sites behind the Valley line (figure 62, table 8:1). Whereas the Valley line was designed as much to exploit environmental advantages as to serve a military purpose, the new mountain line had an exclusively strategic function. Unlike the Valley sites, some of which would be dangerously exposed in a conventional
Paralleling the territorial expansion of colonization the incipient Jewish economy became more properly adjusted to local environmental conditions as the settlement Department acquired further experience and rectified early mistakes. First, by 1974 it was clear that Rift water resources would not support full agricultural development on the basis of irrigated field farming, which demanded very large supplies owing to high evapotranspiration rates in the hot dry Valley climate. As a result a reorientation toward more water intensive agriculture took place, with plastic cover and glass-houses becoming increasingly prominent as devices to cut down on evapotranspiration. Second, at some locations it was quickly discovered that wind strengths had been seriously misjudged. At Mekhora, for example, the original plastic cover structures were destroyed and the covered-agriculture branch had to be entirely re-located to more sheltered surrounds. Other Mekhora problems, including failure to provide a farmyard
branch (poultry or dairying), soon found necessary to supplement the economy, and a shift from moshav shittufi to moshav organization, combined with the wind difficulties to produce what has since been recognized as the Settlement Department's biggest single planning error in the Rift. (12)

Finally, this period saw the decisive shift from paramilitary outposts to predominantly civilian colonization - in other words from a tentative structure to a more permanent one. By 1975 paramilitary camps accounted for only four out of the fifteen sites, as opposed to six out of ten in 1971.

(ii) Even in 1975, however, the Rift's Jewish population remained tiny, numbering a mere 1800 (table 8:1) as against a residual Arab population of 22000, which had increased by c.8000 since late 1967. (13) Furthermore if the Qiryat Arba' urban estate is excluded the total for village settlement shrinks to 620, less than the annual growth rate of the Arab population.

Clearly the Rift settlement structure still lagged behind the Jerusalem and Golan programmes, themselves only just beginning to inject a substantial Jewish presence into their respective regions. On the Golan the population per village in 1975 was 106, compared with 45 in the Rift, and the construction of permanent housing was considerably more advanced. The tardiness can be attributed in part to early Cabinet disagreement over Rift policy and in part to the severe environmental difficulties. In contrast to the temperate and relatively well-watered Golan, the most attractive region in the occupied territories for Jewish
colonization, the Lower Jordan Valley experiences an oppressively hot Summer (temperatures up to 50°C), when agricultural working conditions are abominable, and has an average annual rainfall below 400 mm over its entire territory, being extremely arid in its southern section (ref. Chapter I, P. 23). These environmental problems had two implications. First, aside from the professional pioneers of the Nahal movement, it was difficult to attract people to settle in the Jordan Rift. Second, progress was slowed by the necessity to install a piped water network prior to any substantial colonization. In 1974 each colonist in the Rift north of Jericho required a piped water supply three times greater than his equivalent on the Golan, while 6800 irrigated dunams north of Jericho consumed the same amount as c.13000 irrigated dunams on the Golan. Presumably such differences stemmed both from the physical combination of lower rainfall and higher evaporation rates in the Lower Jordan Valley and from the fact that the area's Jewish economy remained almost exclusively agricultural, whereas the Golan economy already incorporated a significant light industrial component with minimal water demands (compare table 7:6 and 8:2a).

In the Rift strip as a whole, including Qiryat Arba', the years mid 1975 - mid 1977 saw a similar process to that occurring on the Golan: the beginnings of an attempt to break through to mass colonization, with a 67% growth in the number of sites (from 15 to 25) and an 80% increase in population (from c.1800 to c.3300). By late 1977 the village settlements contained just under
2000 people, almost evenly divided between the Valley and mountain lines, with an additional 1400 in Qiryat Arba'. The settlement distribution is depicted in figure 63, indicating the various settlement types.

A notable feature is the almost complete disappearance of the moshav shittufi, initial settlement form for one-third of the 1977 civilian agricultural villages. This decline may be linked to the increasingly lucrative character of Winter crop production in the Rift, the proportion designated for export rising from 20% in the early 1970's to 80% in 1977.(17) As income prospects expanded there was a growing desire amongst settlers for independent smallholdings, rather than for collective farming, so that a family might be free to make as much money as possible on its own account. In 1977 moshavim accounted for a majority of the civilian agricultural villages (8 out of 15, table 8:1) - as opposed to the Golan where they were greatly outnumbered by collective settlements (only 6 out of 22, table 7:2). Apart from the income consideration, the terrain and soils of the Jordan Valley and adjacent mountain basins have generally enabled enough workable land to be accumulated in the immediate vicinity of living quarters for family farming to be a viable option.

Another trend evident in 1975 - 77 was the founding of several non-agricultural sites, with several purposes.

First, the village settlement process had reached a point which both enabled and required the establishment of area centres, to furnish social and economic services. Here the most significant project is Ma'ale Efraim, intended
as a central focus for the region north of Jericho. Detailed plans call for a regional secondary school, shopping facilities and municipal services, as well as light industry to support additional population. The project has been located in the hills (figure 63) for climatic reasons - to avoid the heat of the Valley floor. In addition to Ma'ale Efraim, where 50 dwelling units were under construction by late 1977, work also began on two small unpopulated centres, designed to provide economic services for the agricultural settlements (e.g. machine repair sheds, spare parts stores) - one for the Petzael Valley concentration and one adjacent to Hamra, for the far north.\(^{(18)}\)

A second objective was to create a base for more rapid population growth by extending urban - industrial development. This role takes in Ma'ale Efraim, Ma'ale Adumim and Qiryat Arba', all in the mountain line. Ma'ale Adumim (Allon's Upper Jericho), for example, has a number of functions - to add to the general Jewish presence in the Rift, to take industry away from the immediate surrounds of Jerusalem, to guard the eastern approaches to the capital, and to establish access and a Jewish controlled territorial link between central Israel and the Rift. It received Government approval in November 1974, though no settlers arrived until December 1975, when an unauthorized Gush Emunim group camped on a neighbouring hill-top; and only in 1977 did work start on constructing the first industrial plants. Initial plans, drawn up before the October War, had a grandiose flavour, calling for an industrial estate containing 700 enterprises and employing 14,000 people.
Such forced acceleration in the growth rate of the Rift settlement system entailed some problems. In particular rapid population expansion in the village sector could often only be achieved by importing people who had not undergone any preliminary preparation.

Youth movements cannot mobilize settlement candidates on a large scale -- absorption of new settlers in the settlements today lacks the natural selection that used to operate in the preparation of youth groups -- in the existing method such a process comes into existence in the settlement itself and so turnover of members is higher than desirable. (19)

Furthermore it was recognized that even with the acceleration the total Jewish population of the Rift still amounted to only c.15% of the Arab population and that the fall in migration into Israel did not bode well for the future "-- growth must come from migration from other regions. Today it is difficult to foresee that the immigration of the 1970's will bring crowds to Rift settlements." (19)

III. Jews and Arabs : Resource Conflict

A major consideration guiding the Cabinet, when it gave the Allon Plan for the West Bank precedence over Moshe Dayan's Plan, suggesting blocks of Jewish settlement in the densely populated Highlands, was sensitivity concerning the massive conflict over land and water resources which would most certainly eventuate if the Dayan Plan became operational. (20) The advantage of the Jordan Rift as a locale for colonization arose not just from the strategic argument but also from the fact that extensive areas seemed to lie open to Jewish settlement without entailing friction with the local population.
Even in the Rift, however, ownership problems soon emerged regarding both land allocation and the use of water sources. The situation, though not as potentially serious as that on the West Bank Highlands, differed from the Golan Heights case in that the residual Arab population was both larger and more dispersed; villages and individuals on the Highlands also having extensive rights within the Rift. No "clean slate" existed here.

(i) Beyond the domain owned and worked by Arabs still resident on the West Bank after June 1967, which in 1975 covered the relatively restricted areas depicted in figure 6.4 ("Arab working lands") the Israeli Government saw four types of domain as being potentially available for Jewish colonization:

a) lands which had been under the jurisdiction of the Jordanian Government, and which thus passed directly to the Israeli military administration (henceforth termed 'government lands')

b) lands owned by persons who fled to the East Bank during or after the June 1967 war, which also passed to the Israeli military administration in its capacity as "custodian of absentee property."

c) lands without any owner.

d) mountain lands belonging to villages situated to the west of the Rift strip, but only cultivated in years of good rainfall.

The most valuable tract of government land was in the
Petzael Valley, where 14,400 dunams of fertile soil provided an agricultural base for five settlements (figure 64), while "lands without any owner" were prominent south of Jericho, in the territory used by Qalia and Mitzpe Shalem.

During the Labour decade (1967 - 1977) land conflict in the Rift had two chief dimensions. To begin with Israeli and Arab perceptions of the categories described above differed markedly, particularly concerning government and absentee lands. What Israel viewed as government property, in strict legal terms justifiably, the Arabs frequently used as 'common', whether for pasturage or other purposes. Hence even here the Israeli intrusion sometimes displaced a pre-existing Arab presence. Absentee lands caused greater problems. Israel's use of the fact that owners resided outside the West Bank as an opportunity to take their lands for colonization purposes tended to be fiercely resented by the Arabs, while Israel's official stand that "the State has full right to lay its hands on absentee tracts" (20) was clear and firm throughout.

In addition, in the Samarian mountain basins and on the Valley floor north of Damiya Israel had little option but to secure Arab private lands if enough workable tracts were to be accumulated to provide a viable base for Jewish agricultural villages. The Settlement Department's tactic here was to offer an exchange of government and/or absentee property for the desired private tracts, a process termed "land concentration". This would either
take place entirely within the Jordan Rift, or, where a Highland village beyond the Rift strip owned territory within the strip, absentee property outside the Rift would be offered.

It is true that absentee lands belong, in the final analysis, to someone; but in the concentration of about 15,000 dunams (i.e. throughout Judea and Samaria) out of hundreds of thousands belonging to the villages the State of Israel is executing a plan vital to its security and its existence - the barrier on the Jordan --- (absentee) lands are given to Highland villages and in exchange areas are taken on the (eastern) fringes at the rate of one for three. (20)

The main effort of the official in charge of abandoned and government property in Judea and Samaria is now directed to the finding of additional tracts on the first level going down from the Highlands to the Jordan Valley, in concentrating and acquiring lands. All tracts found and concentrated up to the present have been handed over to the Settlement Department -- the official in charge of government property on the West Bank holds more than 1,000,000 dunams - includes 350,000 dunams of unregistered desert (and) 328,000 dunams of abandoned property. (21)

Up to 1973 c.9000 dunams of Arab private lands were 'concentrated' for settlement within the Rift itself - including 4000 dunams in the Mehola area, 1600 dunams in the Bekai'a basin and 1800 dunams belonging to the village of Aqraba (20) (c.f. figure 64 ). In the first two cases the exchanges seem to have proceeded without trouble, though also without choice. For instance villagers at Tel el Baida, near Mehola, themselves observe that the owners were given fair compensation for lands taken - about the same amount at a similar quality. (22)

The celebrated Aqraba affair, however, exemplified Arab-Jewish land conflict in its most severe form. (23) By 1971, after negotiations with "settlement
factors", this Highland village (figure 64) had apparently made an informal agreement to hand over c.5000 dunams in the Samarian Wilderness in exchange for all absentee lands within the village domain outside the Jordan Rift. It was clear from the outset that the Israelis wanted the Wilderness tract for colonization purposes and this is confirmed in comments by both the Head of the Settlement Department (Yehial Admoni) and the Minister of Agriculture (Haim Givatai). The Minister later observed in the Knesset that "on a rather long list of additional settlement proposals there was also found a proposal which mentioned the matter of creating a settlement here" (Tel Tveil).

Then, in the wake of the 1970-71 clearance of bedu in the Rafiah approaches to the Gaza Strip and the subsequent Israeli public debate over the issue of sequestering Arab lands, the Aqraba people had second-thoughts about the exchange arrangement and became unwilling to proceed. The Ministry of Defence responded by closing the whole 5000 dunam Wilderness tract for "military training purposes"; an action followed in early 1972 with the destruction by aerial spraying of an Aqraba wheat crop located inside the new military reserve. These moves evoked considerable criticism in the Hebrew Press, but the authorities were not deterred. In a night operation on 24 August 1972 Nahal Gittit established itself on the fringes of the closed area, thereafter being allocated 800 dunams for agricultural working. The direct and intended effect of the military reserve device was thus the expropriation of part of the Aqraba land for Jewish settlement.
dunams remained in Israeli hands, the rest (3200 dunams) eventually being returned to the village.

Military reserves also arose in other parts of the Jordan Rift with the same long-term intention of gathering together territory for colonization - territory which could not be readily obtained by other means. One prominent example was the Ma'ale Adumim site, where the Army closed off 70,000 dunams in October 1972, ostensibly to enlarge a firing range but in fact for the purpose of erecting a Jewish industrial estate.

(ii) Despite its largely arid climate the Jordan Rift is considered relatively rich in water resources, in part because of surface and subterranean flow from the neighbouring Samarian highlands, where precipitation is 600 - 800 m.m per annum; and in part because of a geological structure favouring the storage of large quantities of water. It has been estimated that 98 mill.cm.p.a. is available for exploitation - 56 mill.cm.p.a. for the Arab sector and 42 mill.cm.p.a. for the Jewish sector(25) (in total, c.2 of the amount used by the Jordanian East Ghor canal in 1975). In 1975 the Jewish sector exploited only c.20% of the potentially available resources (table 8:2a).

For several reasons, however, the water situation has been less favourable than such statistics might indicate. On the one hand 1975 Arab sector consumption already amounted to 73% of estimated potential, which did not leave much room for further expansion. Arab water usage has been extremely inefficient, with perhaps 11 mill.cm.p.a. being wasted because of such factors as
open canal channels vulnerable to both leakage and evaporation; but complicated tenureship has made it difficult for the Israelis to institute any major improvement. On the other hand, in the Jewish sector it is doubtful whether the full 42 mill. cm.p.a. potentially available can in fact be exploited, owing to project expenses and water quality restraints. In any case, because of the high water demands of Jewish agriculture, even the 42 mill. cm.p.a. is not enough to enable all suitable lands to be farmed.(26)

In certain localities these conditions - the appetite of the Jewish sector and the fact that the Arab network is not far below its supply ceiling - have already come together to produce a situation in which Israeli pumping has lowered the water-table to the detriment of Arab supplies. Figure 65 indicates both the 1975 extent of the Israeli water system and the distribution of Arab springs. The juxtaposition of the two patterns in the Bardala and Auja localities is to be particularly noted, as it was at these places that Arab-Jewish strain first became evident. The 1975 Jordan Rift Development Plan observes "these (Jewish) bores are liable to harm to some degree the flow of springs, chiefly in the Bardala and Jericho areas, as a consequence of the lowering of the water-table", while the 1974 Water Supply Plan comments concerning the Bardala 1 bore that "drawing will cause a partial drying of springs which now supply the surrounds."(27)

Indeed Bardala, in the far north of the Lower Jordan Valley, provided the most acute case of water conflict on the West Bank during the Labour years.(28) Difficulties
began in 1973, when it became apparent that the bore put down for the moshav shittufi Mehola was drying up wells and springs used by the local Arab villages, especially Tel el Baida. In 1975, when Mehola accounted for 40% of total Jewish consumption in the Rift north of Jericho, Tel el Baida's irrigation sources failed completely. As a temporary solution Mekorot, the Israeli water company, proposed a diversion of part of the Mehola output, but the settlers were hostile, arguing that they were themselves 30% below their requirement. The result for Tel el Baida was two dry seasons in which no crops could be sown, fruit trees had to be uprooted and even drinking water had to be brought in from the outside.

IV. Israel in the Rift: Future Planning

After 1975 Israeli activities in the bulk of the Jordan Rift were guided, at least in their broad outlines, by two Settlement Department Master Plans - the August 1975 Jordan Rift Regional Development Plan and the 1974 Master Plan for the North-West Dead Sea. Together these covered the Valley line from Mehola to Mitzpe Shalem and the northern section of the mountain line, the zones of agricultural village settlement (figure 6-0,66). The southern section of the mountain line, a zone of incipient urban-industrial development, was partially excluded. Discussion here first concentrates on village settlement north of Jericho, and then shifts to a brief consideration of the urban-industrial zone.

(i) The August 1975 Jordan Rift Plan, covering the territory depicted in figure 6.4, envisaged that the
population of the northern settlements, c. 550 in 1975, would be raised to c. 3300 by 1980 and c. 8000 by 1995. It suggested massive investments, the financial input of 1968-75 being increased by 300% for 1975-80 and by a further 240% for 1980-95. Existing and projected investment, output and employment statistics for 1975, 1980 and 1995 are set out by economic branch in table 8:2. The most important feature of these statistics was that they evidenced a clear determination greatly to intensify settlement, a determination undiminished in late 1977 despite Israel's constrained economic circumstances.

Up to 1995 agriculture would remain the dominant element in the economy of the planning region (table 8:2b). Figure 6:4 shows both the distribution of the lands handed over to Jewish settlements by 1975 (36,000 dunams) and the projected expansion of this domain (24,000 dunams). Comparison with figure 5: indicates the close correlation with tracts of reasonable soils, principally alluvium, outside the Arab private domain (itself under pressure in some localities). In 1975 areas actually being worked encompassed only 19% of the Jewish sector territory and hence, unlike the Golan, there remained considerable room for expansion.

Particularly high hopes were held for the export of Winter and early Spring vegetables (e.g. egg-plants, peppers, melons, onions), which could be grown up to 50 metres above sea level in the natural hot-house environment of the Valley floor. This would provide valuable foreign exchange for the hard-pressed Israeli balance-of-payments and so, for
easier access, work was begun after 1972 on a road to give a direct connection between the Petzael area and Ben Gurion international airport at Lod, running across central Samaria.

Mountain basin villages, where Winter temperatures are 4°C or more below the Valley averages, could not share in the early crop business, and had to be based on somewhat different agricultural foundations. Here the 1975 Plan proposed industrial crops (e.g. peanuts), olives, grapes, deciduous and citrus fruits (e.g. grapefruit), and livestock production. No dramatic climatic advantage for agriculture existed in the mountains but, as perceived strategic necessities made mountain villages vital, agricultural branches had to be found to underpin their economies regardless of environmental conditions - a clear contrast to the Valley floor situation where, as time passed, agricultural economics took greater and greater precedence over military requirements.

One major intention was to postpone industrial village construction in the planning region for as long as possible, to await the outcome of industrial settlement experiments at Tefen in the Galilee. This could be afforded because pressure to find alternatives to agriculture for continued village colonization were not as urgent as on the Golan. Nonetheless the 1975 Plan recognized the need for non-agricultural projects in the planning region if mass colonization were to be achieved. In the long-term, agriculture could not support more than 8,000 people; and owing to the water supply constraint, could not use more
Comparison of the size of the region (1.5 million dunams) with the area of the state (21 million dunams) and its Jewish population (3 million) raises the possibility and the necessity of increasing the Jewish population above that suggested here, by urban development dependent on neutral (30) industry and services -- this also as a balance against the Arab population, numbering today more than 20,000 -- the directions given to the planning team restricted the frame to village settlements only -- necessary to assume that in future there will be a place for planning urban settlements. (31)

(ii) The non-agricultural presence, on which work commenced in 1976 - 77, was to be located in the mountain line from Ma'ale Efraim southward, comprising part of the urban-industrial zone indicated in figure 66. Here, between Ma'ale Efraim and Qiryat Arba', possibilities for agriculture or tourism were almost non-existent and 1977 activities had more in common with Qatzrin and associated developments on the Central Golan then with the village system in the rest of the Rift strip.

In the part of the zone covered by the 1975 Plan two projects were proposed - the regional centre at Ma'ale Efraim and the Kokhav ha Shaher block of settlements, to include a moshav and, after 1980, two industrial villages. Ma'ale Efraim was expected to reach a population of 400 by 1980 with a further 240 people in the Kokhav ha Shaher block. It was a tentative beginning and neither project ranked in scale with the ideas put forward for Ma'ale Adumim and Qiryat Arba'. Furthermore the Kokhav ha Shaher block in particular did not lack critics, who were sceptical about it ever becoming anything more than an additional commuter belt for greater Jerusalem.
(1) Cohen, Y. Tokhnit Allon. P. 82
(2) Ha-aretz 10-6-68 P.1.
(3) Tokhnit Pituah Aizarit Kolelet-Aizar Bqa'at ha Yarden (Settlement Dept., 1975) Section 2.1.
(4) Yigal Allon in Appendix VII, P. 425-426.
(6) Ha-aretz 12-12-68. P.1.
(7) Ibid 10-6-68. P.1.
(8) Ibid 12-12-68. P.1.
(10) Yigal Allon in Appendix VII, P. 425.
(12) Comment to author by regional planner 19-12-77.
(14) For a study in Jordan Valley human bio-climatology see Schar, Shoenfield and Shapiro Tnaei Aglim ve Orah Haim be Bqa'at ha Yarden in Shmueli, Grossman and Ze'ev Zehuda ve Shomron P.640-643.
(15) Tables 7:3, 8:2 - also see Tokhnit Av le Haspaqat Maim ba Bqa'at ha Yarden (Tahal, 1974)
(16) Comment to author by regional planner Dec. 1977. An independent check is provided by detailed figures for three village settlements:

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Settlement</th>
<th>1975</th>
<th>1977</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Mehola</td>
<td>85</td>
<td>120</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Hamra</td>
<td>88</td>
<td>157</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Gilgal</td>
<td>30</td>
<td>84</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Total</strong></td>
<td><strong>203</strong></td>
<td><strong>361</strong></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

78% increase


(17) Comment by regional planner, Dec. 1977
(18) For a full treatment of central place planning in the Jordan Rift, see Marqvski, N. Ha Hityashvut ha Yehudit ba Biga'at ha Yarden in Shmueli, Grossman and Zeevy Yehuda ve Shomron P.630 - 639.

(19) Tokhnit Pituah Aiz'orit Kolelet-Aizor Biga'at ha Yarden (Settlement Dept., 1975) Section 9.5

(20) Yehial Admoni (head of the Settlement Dept.) interviewed in Ha-aretz, 24-1-73 P.12.

(21) Ha-aretz 13-2-73 P.8.

(22) Author in Tel el Baida, 21-12-77.

(23) The Aqraba account is built up from three separate Israeli sources.


b) Davar, 8-11-72, 28-11-72.

c) Ha-aretz 24-1-73 P.12 Yehial Admoni interview extract - "Aqraba is an example of what happened as a result of the Ptihat Rafiah trauma. At Aqraba there was in fact an agreement between the village people and settlement factors, even before the Ptihat Rafiah affair, on the transfer of all village absentee land on the Highlands to the village private domain - in exchange for the possibility of concentrating 4000-5000 dunams on the eastern fringes of the village territory for settlement requirements".

(24) There seems to be confusion over the precise status of the relevant tracts. The Ministry of Agriculture referred to them as "absentee lands" (Divrei ha Knesset, Vol 66,P.1242-43) whereas Yehial Admoni implies that they were non-absentee private lands (Ha-aretz 24-1-73). To the Arabs the difference is of course purely technical.

(25) See Marqvski, N. Ha Hityashvut ha Yehudit ba Biga'at ha Yarden in Shmueli, Grossman and Zeevy, Yehuda ve Shomron P.631 Also Tokhnit Av le Haspaqat Maim ba Biga'at ha Yarden (Tahali, 1974).
(26) Marqovski estimates that available lands enable c.2000 30 dunam units to be established - but that water supply is only sufficient for c.1500 such units (assuming a requirement of 30 - 35,000 c.m.p.a. for each unit) Yehuda ve Shomron P.631.

(27) a) Tokhnit Pituah Aizorit Kolelet - Aizor Biga'at ha Yarden (Settlement Dept., 1975) Section 2.4.1.

b) Tokhnit Av le Haspagat Maim ba Biga'at ha Yarden (Tahal, 1974).

(28) Source for account - author at Tel el Baida and Mehola 21-12-77.


(30) i.e. industry not using local raw materials or relying on the local market (neither capable of supporting an industrial structure).

(31) Tokhnit Pituah Aizorit Kolelet - Aizor Biga'at ha Yarden (Settlement Dept., 1975) Section 9.3.
CHAPTER NINE

ISRAELI SETTLEMENT ACROSS THE 1967 BORDERS:
GENERAL, 1973-1978
The purpose of this Chapter is to examine general trends in occupied territory colonization from the October 1973 War to October 1978, using the analytical framework outlined in Chapter 6 and developed in the Golan case study.

Three distinct phases may be detected in the period:

a) an immediate post-war phase when settlement activity, especially new site establishments (table 9:1), slowed down considerably.

b) the final two years of Labour rule, when a massive acceleration in development occurred, leading to an unprecedented expansion of the settlement system.

c) the first sixteen months of Likud rule, which brought new dimensions to official settlement policy, in both geographical and ideological terms.

I. The October Trauma

Shock and recrimination characterized the months following the October War. Although Israeli public opinion was highly confused and it is difficult to draw simple conclusions as to the effect of the hostilities on public attitudes, it seems clear that the early Arab successes and the collapse of the Golan settlement system temporarily sapped confidence in the efficacy of defensible boundaries and the associated colonization policies. Fears expressed by Golan settlers that national support for their position had declined are discussed in Chapter 7 and Appendix VIII.
Certainly within the ruling Labour-Mapam Alignment November and December 1973 saw a considerable protest movement amongst the lower echelons, aimed against occupied territory policies as well as against individuals seen as responsible for mistakes connected with the war, particularly Moshe Dayan. The view of one member of a Labour party group terming itself 'Etgar' (Challenge) represented an opinion widespread amongst dissenters: "until the war I accepted what was said - that borders guaranteed peace. We were wrong and now need to try a new path." (1)

In early December, reflecting the criticism, the Labour leadership drew up a new policy statement to take precedence over the pre-war Galili Document. This Fourteen Point Document laid much heavier stress on efforts for peace, mention of settlement being reduced to one extremely vague passage: there would be action to "strengthen and continue settlement and colonization according to Government decisions from time to time, giving precedence to security considerations." (2) To some extent the shift in emphasis and the less specific content amounted, in the view of the author, to window-dressing - to preserve party unity and to give Israel a flexible international image for the projected Geneva peace talks. As has been pointed out in Chapter 7 the Cabinet had only three weeks earlier (11 November) approved an urban centre for the Golan Heights, and for most Ministers the war had confirmed the need for buffer zones rather than the reverse. On fundamentals the new document explicitly stated that Israel would not return to the 1967 borders and that there would be no
Palestinian state on the West Bank.

Nonetheless the fourteen points also represented an attempt by a powerful minimalist block comprising Sapir, Ofer and Rabinowitz to negate the concessions made to Dayan and his Rafi faction in the Galili document. Matters came to a head on 5 December, when the new statement was presented to the Labour Party Central Committee for approval. (3) Yigal Allon, presumably unhappy with the aggressive explicitness of Galili's interpretation, opened the main debate by expressing support for the fourteen points. The pre-war settlement programme then came under extensive criticism from the floor as incapable of bringing security, in the light of events, and Sapir went as far as to claim that the fourteen points completely cancelled the Galili document. He asserted that in any case the more constrained financial position following the war made schemes like a Yamit port-city impracticable.

A direct confrontation followed between Sapir on the one side and Galili and Golda Meir on the other. Golda Meir refused to accept the financial argument, saying each project should be considered independently, and she demanded a vote on whether or not the fourteen points cancelled the Galili document. Sapir, fearful of a party split, then backed down commenting that everyone could interpret the fourteen points and their relationship to the previous statement how they liked. In consequence Golda Meir, Galili, Dayan and Peres could, if they wished, regard the Galili document as still standing, while the dissenters and minimalists could take the opposite view. The vagueness
of the fourteen points, finally approved in the early morning of 6 December, made either interpretation viable.

Despite the controversy the real effect of the October War on settlement policy was thus minimal, even in the immediate post-war period.

a) The only impact of public disquiet, party criticism and intensified international concern was to cause the Labour leadership to cloak pre-war policy in more conciliatory semantics. Certainly Sapir felt that his control of the budget would, in practical terms, enable him to eliminate parts of the Galili programme which he considered undesirable; but within six months he was no longer Minister of Finance.

b) The strategic ideas articulated in the Allon Plan survived the war unchanged as the basis for majority thinking in the Cabinet. There is no evidence that the war altered the various images and convictions held by the leading Ministers, except to strengthen them (Chapter 7, p.217).

c) More difficult financial circumstances and a less amenable international environment, together with stronger individual opposition to certain projects by minimalist Ministers, indicated that in the short-term there would be a slow-down in colonization, regardless of general policy. However, because the concepts underpinning colonization remained firmly held by any likely Cabinet majority any loosening of constraints imposed by post-war external realities promised to open the way for renewed and accelerated activity.
In June 1974, after the Syrian disengagement negotiations, the Golda Meir Cabinet finally resigned, paying a delayed price for the mistakes associated with the war. Golda Meir, Moshe Dayan, Pinhas Sapir and Abba Eban retired to the back benches and a new leadership headed by Yitzhak Rabin (Prime Minister), Shimon Peres (Defence Minister) and Yigal Allon (Foreign Minister) took control.

Table 9:1 provides a guide to the progress of colonization through the three years of Rabin's Government. Up to mid 1975 few new sites were established and population growth in the settlement system came almost to a halt. In October 1973 c. 4000 Jews lived in the occupied territories outside East Jerusalem - in February 1975, according to one source, the number stood at 4158. The reasons for the slow-down have already been analyzed in depth for the Golan Heights and the responsible external realities and political system factors depicted in figure 54 hold for the general situation as much as for the Golan case. Detailed circumstances of course varied somewhat from region to region. The 'freeze' was most marked on the Golan and in the Jordan Rift, whereas in East Jerusalem and the Rafiah area new construction was less affected. The latter regions came under less intense American scrutiny in 1973-75 and Housing Minister Avraham Ofer, hostile to new Golan developments, proved an enthusiastic proponent of East Jerusalem projects.
After mid 1975, in sharp contrast to the 1973-75 phase, the final two years of Labour rule saw the official settlement system expand more rapidly than at any other time since 1967. Excluding East Jerusalem, the number of sites rose from 53 to 77 (45% increase) and the population involved more than doubled to at least 10,000. (5)

This section attempts to explain the 1975 change, which took place in all the Allon security belts, and examines the simultaneous effort by the private settlement movement known as Gush Emunim to overturn the geographical limits of the Allon Plan and extend Jewish colonization throughout the West Bank Highlands.

Figure 67 portrays the factors either permitting or actively encouraging an acceleration in colonization throughout the Allon Plan territories in 1975-76. It may be compared with figure 55, which indicates the same transition for the Golan alone. Changes favouring an acceleration occurred in both the inner workings of the Israeli political system and in the external realities.

The relevant political system shifts had in fact taken place in 1974, but were not enough to counteract external realities which continued to be seen as unfavourable. They may be divided into three categories:

a) Reduction of minimalist strength with the departure of both Sapir and Eban from the Cabinet in June 1974. These two senior Ministers had acted as a significant balancing influence against the Rafi faction led by Dayan and Peres, especially as Sapir controlled the Labour Party machine. Their place was taken by Avraham Ofer, but he did
not possess equivalent seniority.

b) **Corresponding gains by Rafi.** Like Dayan the new Rafi Defence Minister, Shimon Peres, was a vigorous proponent of a hard-line settlement programme, going beyond the geographical limits of the Allon Plan; he apparently did not share Allon's sensitivities regarding Arab populated areas, conceiving that demographic problems might be circumvented by cutting Palestine west of the Jordan into Jewish and Arab cantons, with a built-in Jewish majority at the 'federal' level. Further, Peres enjoyed a stronger position within the Cabinet than had Dayan, partly because he had built up a large following among Mapai adherents and partly because in 1974 there were fewer strong counter-balancing personalities. Bearing in mind the distance Sapir had moved to effectively resist Dayan, all this had disturbing implications for the viability of the Allon Plan on the West Bank.

c) **Maximalism in the National Religious Party.** The National Religious Party, Labour's traditional partner, rejoined the Government in November 1974 after a seven month absence. During this period the NRP youth faction, headed by Zevulun Hamer and militantly attached to the 'whole Land of Israel', had gained considerable power at the expense of the old leadership. In consequence the NRP exerted much greater pressure within the coalition for extensive colonization, especially on the West Bank.

Such shifts meant that the natural balance in the Rabin Cabinet, both of images and of policies, tended towards more aggressive settlement than hitherto. By
early 1975 this tendency was only held in check by Ofer's delaying tactics at the Ministry of Housing, by the moderating influence of Rabin, Allon and Galili and, above all, by the unprecedented American interest in the occupied territories between the October 1973 War and the August 1975 Israel-Egypt agreement.

Movement continued through 1975, this time in the decisive external realities. Again three types of change occurred:

a) **In the domestic political environment.** As noted in the Golan study, pressure groups championing accelerated settlement were gaining increased support both within party machines and in public opinion as the October War receded into the past. In particular the religio-nationalist Gush Emunim gained public prominence by attempting to force the Government's hand with unauthorized settlement bids from late 1974 onward, primarily on the West Bank Highlands. Added to the political system shifts these domestic pressures helped produce the beginnings of an intensification in official colonization after June 1975.

b) **In the Israel-America relationship.** After August 1975, with the signing of the second Sinai Disengagement Agreement, the heavy American pressure on Israel to make concessions to the Arabs began to slacken. The Golan and Sinai accords stabilized the post-war situation in the Middle East for the short-term, thus achieving the immediate American objective, and in 1976 the Presidential election campaign gave Israel greater leverage within the United States, due to the significance of the American
Jewish community. America also became diverted by other foreign policy issues in 1976-77, such as the Lebanese Civil War and Southern Africa. All this was decisive for Israel's official settlement policy because it removed the major block, both actual and perceived, (ref. p229) to accelerated colonization. The Government now saw its chance to implement new programmes without intervention from Washington, for the first time in two years, and thus proceeded to act with great speed.

c) In the activities of the Arab States. A surge of Arab support for the PLO after the October 1974 Rabat summit, at which responsibility for the West Bank was transferred from King Hussein to Yassir Arafat, caused a strong reaction in Israel which further strengthened the hard-liners and reduced the credibility of minimalism on territory and settlement. The Government viewed events from Arafat's U.N. speech (13 Nov. 1974) to the General Assembly vote equating Zionism with racism (Nov. 1976) as a diplomatic campaign aimed at Israel's isolation and as a series of provocations which required answers in the domain of 'fact creation'. The direct relationship between the Syrian sponsored Security Council debate on the Middle East (Jan. 1976) and new Golan settlement has already been remarked upon.

Thus by late 1975 all six 1974-75 changes were operating together and, with the Rabin Government holding a more militant world image than its predecessors (figure 67) little now stood in the way of a massive building effort in the occupied territory security belts. In 1974 and
the first half of 1975 residents moved into 5 new sites (civilian and paramilitary), compared with 14 for June 1975 – December 1976 and 8 for the last five months of Labour rule. (6)

Acceleration on the Golan and in the Jordan Rift has already been discussed.

In the Rafiah approaches Yamit provides particularly striking illustration of the transition. Through 1974 and early 1975 little was done beyond some site preparation. Then, in Summer 1975 the Ministry of Housing upgraded Yamit from a 'regional centre' to a town, (7) designed for a population of 25,000, to be achieved in several stages. Thereafter construction quickly moved ahead; the first settlers arrived in October 1975 and by mid 1977 350 housing units had been finished with a further 1000 either on the drawing boards or in various stages of building. The mid 1977 population totalled c.1500.

For East Jerusalem the increase in activity was less marked, as work had not been constrained during the slow-down. Construction concentrated on consolidating the suburban ring, work commencing on the southern arc comprising Gilo and East Talpiot in 1973-74 and with simultaneous new building starts in the north at Ramot and Neve Ya'akov (figure 37). After 1975 the scope broadened with discussion of several plans to 'thicken' Jerusalem by establishing Jewish suburbs beyond the annexed area, perhaps to form an outer ring. In one version (Ministry of Housing (8)) it was proposed to erect urban estates at
Giv'on (near Ramallah), Ma'ale Adumim and Efrat (near Bethlehem) (figure 37) - an obvious extension of Dayan's 1973 suggestions (Appendix VI). Another version (Israel Lands Administration (9)) proposed major developments in the Allon zone between Ramallah and Latrun, to realize the long-standing intention to widen the Jerusalem corridor on its northern side (figure 36). None of these plans advanced beyond the drawing-board under the Rabin Government, presumably in part because of the financial and demographic constraints to be discussed in the next section (p. 302).

It should be noted that all official developments and proposals for 1975-77 continued to respect the ideas set out in the Allon Plan, and only in the western foothills of Samaria can an extension of Allon's geographical limits be detected (compare figure 38 with figure 39). The extension had been foreshadowed in the Galili Document (Appendix VI c.P. ref. to 'Qalqilia and Tulkarm areas). During the same period, however, the entire official concept was under strong pressure from the Gush Emunim movement, which twice successfully defied the Government through the planting of unofficial settlements outside the Allon/Galili belts.

(ii) Gush Emunim (block of the faithful), a settler pressure-group founded in February 1974 by young 'whole Land of Israel' enthusiasts from the National Religious Party, aimed to reestablish a Jewish presence throughout the densely populated West Bank Highlands, core of biblical Israel. This goal automatically put the Gush in conflict with the Rabin Government, whose settlement policy
specifically avoided the Highlands on demographic grounds (p.172). Even so, by hard work within the political system and by exploiting deep religious and nationalist sentiments emotionally shared by many Israelis, including senior Ministers, the Gush was able progressively to subvert the Government's stand. Figure 67 indicates the position of Gush Emunim in the author's model of the post 1975 transition towards more rapid and extensive colonization - as a group external to the political system and acting unilaterally, yet also seeking to manipulate the system. On a broader stage the Gush played the same role performed by the GSC on the Golan Heights (figure 54).

Three matters are considered here: historic antecedents, the Gush as a reaction to the October War, and the character and impact of the illegal settlement attempts in Samaria from late 1974 onward.

Gush Emunim united a religious dogma with a secular vision. On the religious plane it held to the view propagated by Jerusalem's Merkaz ha Rav Yeshiva, headed by Rabbi Tsvi Yehuda Kook, that the Zionist return to Eretz Yisrael represented the beginning of the Messianic redemption of the Jewish people. Colonization of the biblical heartland of Judea and Samaria was thus a religious duty, which even took precedence over peace with the Arabs. Furthermore in the secular sphere the Gush strongly emphasized the historic right of the Jewish people to the 'whole Land of Israel', so linking with the Whole Land of Israel Movement.

As already noted in Chapter 6 these convictions
pre-dated the founding of the state and had long been strongly held by many in Herut, the largest opposition party, in the NRP, and even in the Labour movement. Between 1967 and 1973 the chief effort of the religious fundamentalists and the 'whole Land of Israel' adherents had been devoted to two projects in Judea, south of Jerusalem - the re-building of the Etzion settlement block and the re-establishment of the Hebron Jewish community (Qiryat Arba'). With some judicious line-drawing both could be reconciled with the Allon Plan (figure 36), being located on the peripheries of the local Arab population concentrations, and by 1973 both seemed securely rooted.

Gush Emunim crystallized out of this background as a reaction to the October 1973 War and to the threat the post-war disengagement negotiations appeared to pose to the 1967-73 status quo. (10) Israel's territorial retreat in the first agreement with Egypt (Nov. 1973) was viewed by religio-nationalist elements as opening the way to withdrawal even in Judea-Samaria, an eventuality which had to be vigorously resisted. Qiryat Arba' and Gush Etzion settlers were particularly concerned and Gush Emunim arose largely at their initiative, the founding convention being held at Kfar Etzion and a disproportionate number of the leading personalities coming from Judean settlements, for example Rabbi Moshe Levinger (Qiryat Arba') and Hanan Porat (Kfar Etzion). The purpose was to carry the settlement process into the Arab populated areas of Samaria, largely excluded from the official programme, and to create facts as rapidly as possible to block any concession on Eretz Yisrael.
At first the Gush operated entirely within the political system, building up its position in the NRP through the youth faction, which it controlled. The youth faction had in January 1974 induced the NRP leadership to demand, as a condition for joining the Government, that there be no decisions on returning territory in Judea and Samaria without new elections, a condition which the Labour Party accepted. Thereafter the Gush and its sympathizers, championed by Zevulun Hamer (Minister of Social Welfare in the Rabin Cabinet), gradually gained a dominant voice in the NRP, also receiving considerable support from the opposition Likud alignment and, of course from the Whole Land of Israel Movement, which possessed a substantial following in the Labour Party.

After June 1974 the Gush began to take direct action on the ground in Samaria. Early settlement attempts generally ended in removal of the squatters by the army but from 1975 onwards there were several major successes. Although only small numbers took part in these ventures the public impact of defiance of a divided and vacillating administration had by 1977 made official 'limited' settlement an object of derision.

Three cases may be used to illustrate the progress of unofficial colonization attempts in the Samarian Highlands (figure 69) -

a) Alon Moreh (Qaddum). The most significant Gush effort was that aimed at planting a Jewish settlement in the vicinity of Nablus, to be named Alon Moreh. At first the Government stood firm and used the army to remove Gush
plantings within twenty-four hours of their establishment, as at a military camp south of Nablus (5-6-74) and at a disused railway station to the east (26-7-74). The settlers, however, proved persistent and on 30 November 1975 tried yet again at Sebastiya, a biblical site two kilometres north of the Nablus-Tulkarm highway (Shomron in figure 69). By this stage they had greatly increased their influence within the political system, benefiting from the same domestic and external shifts encouraging the acceleration in official colonization (figure 67) — for instance tacit support now came from, among others, Defence Minister Shimon Peres. As a result the Government hesitated, being divided on what action to take, and ultimately used the army only to move the settlers from Sebastiya, where they had incurred the hostility of surrounding Arab villages, to the nearby Israeli military camp at Qaddum, where they were less visible (9-12-75). A permanent decision on what to do with the group was postponed, in the first instance for three months.

The transfer amounted to a Gush victory, with the settlers remaining in the heart of Samaria, and the matter produced sharp dissension in the Government throughout 1976. On one side Allon, Galili, Rabinowitz and Ofer, along with Rabin himself, viewed the situation as making a mockery of Government policy, while on the other the Gush were protected from expulsion by Peres and the NRP Ministers, the latter hinting that they might leave the coalition. (11) Allon and Peres clashed sharply over Qaddum at a Labour Alignment session in March 1976 (11)
and Appendix IX gives the text of a stormy 5 August Cabinet discussion, as 'leaked' to Yediot Ahronot. Meantime various Ministries, presumably with authorization from higher levels, openly assisted the settlers to consolidate their position.

--- branches of the Prime Minister's office, of the Ministries of Defence, Labour, Transport, Health and Interior, and of the Jewish Agency, are party to what is being done at Qaddum - and not in secret. One specific case: an enterprise at one of the Jordan Rift settlements has for years been producing metal products for the defence establishment; members of the settlement are supporters of Qaddum and the enterprise decided to sub-contract to Qaddum -- the Defence Ministry gave its approval, once it emerged that this action was in full compliance with the Cabinet's first resolution on Qaddum-(12)

The Defence Ministry also provided the Gush caravan cluster with electricity and piped water and by December 1976 the number of settlers had grown to 200. It was now clear that the Government either could not or would not remove the outpost, and that a Qiryat Arba' style fait-accompli had been created in the Nablus district.

b) Ofra. This settlement was important in two respects: it marked the beginnings of Gush Emunim intrusion into the Ramallah district (south Samaria) and represented the first case of open assistance from the Defence Ministry, the most powerful arm of Israel's bureaucracy. The latter factor greatly enhanced Gush Emunim's capacity to resist its numerous foes and to realize schemes aimed at overthrowing official policy.

Gush success in gaining a foothold inside the Defence Ministry became apparent in the early months of 1975, when members of the Ofra nucleus, who hoped to settle
near biblical Ephron (Taibeh), about ten kilometres north-east of Ramallah, became employed on 'security work' in the vicinity. The 'workers' then arranged with Shimon Peres for 'overnight lodging' at a Jordan army camp adjacent to the Arab village of Ain Yabroud, shifting into the camp on 20 April 1975. Peres had thus permitted a new settlement without a Cabinet resolution and even without an inter-Ministerial Settlement Committee discussion. He later stated in the Knesset that he had approved the 'overnight lodging' after "I consulted with whom I thought it necessary to consult". (13)

Although 'overnight lodging' theoretically implied temporary rather than permanent status the Government made no subsequent move to terminate the settlement and in December 1975, after pressure from Zevulun Hamer of the NRP, it was even upgraded to a 'work camp'. By December 1976 Ofra's population had expanded from an initial few dozen to 150, additional prefabricated buildings had been supplied, several small industrial workshops had been set up, and a small orchard had been planted on Ain Yabroud lands.

c) Mesha. Alon Moreh and Ofra were only the beginning of Gush Emunim's ambitious master-plan termed Tokhnit Yesh (14), for Judea and Samaria. The plan covered c.60 proposed settlements, some already being implemented in the Allon Plan areas as official policy, and others, like Alon Moreh and Ofra, suggested as violations of the Allon Plan. With regard to the latter the next stage was to create a presence in West Samaria, in an arc from Jenin in the north to Nabi Saleh in the south (figure 69).
Plate 21

West Samaria - Gush Emunim hill-top site at Nesha, Feb. 1978 (bulk of settlement on other side)
Unilateral implementation began in 1977, with moves to establish 'Faris' (February and May) and 'Dotan' (May).

For 'Faris' the Gush wanted to take over a Jordanian police station on a hill overlooking the Arab village of Mesha. After a discouraging response from the authorities 40 members of the 'West Samaria nucleus' took direct action, arriving on the site with building materials on the morning of 27 February. Initially the Government adopted a firm line, flying in troops to evict the squatters at noon the same day. However within three months the Ministers had given way and on 1 May the Gush returned to Mesha, this time with authorization from the Inter-Ministerial Settlement Committee.

III Likud in Power: Fundamentalism and Reality

(i) In the May 1977 Knesset elections Labour fell from power after twenty-nine years of rule. For settlement policy, especially as regards the West Bank, the advent of the new Likud Government headed by Menahem Begin (coalition composition in Appendix II) seemed to mark a further major shift within the political system towards an unyielding hard line. The romantic religio-nationalist drive to redeem the entire historic 'Land of Israel' by Jewish colonization, a drive which had posed such a threat to the credibility of the Labour Government in its last years, now dominated the apparatus of state. Certainly Begin's June 1977 outlook was uncompromising: Judea, Samaria and Gaza were not 'occupied' but 'liberated' and there would
be no territorial compromise in these areas. On the face of it two significant implications for official settlement policy followed.

a) There would be a major extension in the rationale underlying occupied territory colonization. Settlement based primarily on establishing defensible boundaries in thinly populated areas, 'historic rights' only being realized where they did not imply absorption of large numbers of Arabs, would be superseded by settlement particularly aimed at implementing 'historic rights' in areas of dense Arab population. In short bible belts would overshadow security belts.

b) The changed balance between biblical and pragmatic considerations would be accompanied by a shift in the geographical orientation of colonization. Development would no longer be overwhelmingly concentrated on the Allon/Galili areas, primarily the Golan, the Jordan Rift, the immediate surrounds of Jerusalem and the Rafiah approaches, but would take second place to movement into the Samarian Highlands, explicitly avoided in the Allon Plan (ref. p.154).

In fact, however, the first sixteen months of the new Government witnessed a more complex juxtaposition of seemingly contradictory trends. On the one hand, in the first year, legalization of Gush Emunim activity and the beginnings of major official colonization programmes in central Samaria carried the move toward an increased role for religious fundamentalism evident in the Rabin period to its logical end-point. Yet against this, with President Sadat's 'initiative' and journey to Jerusalem making a
separate peace with Egypt a real possibility for the first time there were signs from late 1977 onward that the new Government would be prepared to make significant concessions on settlement policy, especially in Sinai.

The reality behind the contradictions was that both the forces favouring extended colonization and the forces undermining the bases of settlement policy achieved hitherto unprecedented potency simultaneously in 1977-78. Figure 68 depicts the balance between these forces and the implications of their joint operation for occupied territory colonization.

Forces pushing toward a continuation of moves for extended settlement on the West Bank chiefly comprised the entrenchment of religio-nationalist ideology in Israeli domestic politics. The composition of the new Government, dominated by the revisionist Zionism of Herut (ref. p. 146), graphically represented this entrenchment, although it should be stressed that Greater Israel nationalism and biblical fervour for 'redeeming' Judea and Samaria were not equally shared by all elements in the new coalition and that occupied territory considerations were almost certainly not a decisive factor in determining the outcome of the May 1977 election. Nonetheless the Begin Cabinet had a more hard-line appearance as regards colonization than had any preceding Labour administration - in particular the new Chairman of the Inter-Ministerial Settlement Committee, Minister of Agriculture Ariel Sharon, was an open and enthusiastic settlement maximalist, a consideration encouraging high expectations and intense political activity from Gush Emunim.
Forces acting against colonization programmes may be classified into three groups.

a) International factors which since 1975 had encouraged accelerated colonization were in 1977 again become a restraining influence. First the new American administration took an early interest in the Middle East and began an uncomfortable probe of Israel's intentions concerning the occupied territories just as the Likud came to office. Second secret contacts with Egypt in late 1977, culminating in President Anwar Sadat's sensational November journey to Jerusalem seemed to indicate the best ever chance for achieving an agreement with the Arab World's largest state.

Intensified American concern, leading toward the Camp David summit meeting of September 1978, possibly reflected anxiety held both by Washington and conservative Arab states (principally Egypt and Saudi Arabia) regarding a significant strengthening in 1977-78 of the Soviet Union's position on the eastern, western and southern flanks of the Middle East - in Afghanistan, Libya, Ethiopia and South Yemen. Certainly from the American viewpoint constructing a strong and stable Middle East core to safeguard western oil supplies was becoming a more urgent requirement and the Arab-Israeli conflict stood as the main block to this goal. It seemed America could less and less afford to continue treating such destabilizing elements as accelerated Israeli settlement across the 1967 borders with the same neglect evident through the whole preceding decade, only excepting the aftermath of the October 1973 War.
The interests of the Egyptian Government, perceiving its domestic difficulties to be greatly accentuated by the economic burden of the confrontation with Israel and fearful of Soviet advances, were also in a stabilized Middle East core and hence in peace with Israel. Yet as a minimum for his own people Sadat had to have a full Israeli withdrawal from Sinai, a vital aspect being the dismantling of the Rafiah settlements (figure 39), as well as some West Bank arrangement which could pave the way for eventual participation by other 'core' states, particularly Jordan. In launching his 'peace initiative' Sadat's strategy was presumably to expose the more rigid dimensions of Likud policy, its stand on colonization being one of the foremost examples, and to place the Americans in the position of having to intervene decisively if such rigidity threatened to bring Israel-Egypt negotiations to a state of collapse. It may be hypothesized that Sadat was aided here by the 1978 turmoil in Iran and on the Middle East peripheries, which added to the crisis atmosphere created by the apparent failure of the 'peace initiative' to lead anywhere but deadlock by August 1978. In any case at this point the Americans had little option but to make their own 'rescue' move by calling the Camp David summit at which they became, in Sadat's terminology, a 'full partner' in the Israel-Egypt negotiations. This may turn out to be the chief significance of the accords reached at the summit - Sadat's achievement of a full commitment of the power and prestige of the American Presidency to the success of the peace process. Never before had any American President remotely approached the investment of personal time and
effort in the Arab-Israeli problem that Carter made at Camp David. The likelihood now existed that the Americans would take an unprecedentedly unfavourable view of continued Israeli settlement activities which might threaten the Presidential investment.

b) The major international shifts of 1977-78 played a direct role in stimulating intensified reflection within Israel on the ideological basis of settlement policy, whether strategic or religio-nationalist. Here Sadat's visit to Jerusalem was crucial, as for the first time and in a highly dramatic way it made the choice between absorbing land and achieving peace a practical rather than an academic matter for a wide body of Israeli opinion. War-weariness suppressed since 1974, at least at the public level, resurfaced strongly and colonization moves that had before mid 1977 been acquiesced in by many simply because there had seemingly been no-one to talk to on the Arab side quickly came under more critical scrutiny. The re-assessment could be detected at two levels:

1) Amongst the wider public the emergence of the 'Peace Now' movement in early 1978 expressed an amorphous but widely felt view that Herut and Gush Emunim claims for a Greater Israel west of the Jordan should not be allowed to become an irremovable obstacle to successful Israel-Egypt negotiations. By September the Movement had grown to a point at which it could mobilize a demonstration with an estimated attendance of 100,000 on the eve of Begin's departure for the Camp David summit.
2) Within the Government continued extension in colonization after the Sadat visit provoked division and a conflict of images between pragmatists and dogmatists in the various coalition factions, even in Herut and the NRP. Perhaps the most notable new pragmatist was the Herut Deputy Leader and Defence Minister Ezer Weitzman, who established an early personal rapport with Sadat and viewed provocative settlement foundings during the negotiations with mounting impatience (16) (for further discussion see P.327).

Some qualification should however be made when discussing the domestic debate. First despite the dissension it should be remembered that by 1978 irredentist religious nationalism regarding the West Bank had become more deeply embedded both on the land and in Israeli political life than at any time since 1967 and that, in contrast to the issue of strategic settlement in North Sinai, the future of Israeli colonization on the West Bank after the Camp David summit thus remained highly indeterminate, with no visible national consensus in favour of settlement disbandment. Certainly there were indications by mid 1978 that the new atmosphere created by direct talks with Egypt might reverse the post 1967 trend toward more support for hard line territorial maximalism and give renewed life to the position that although Israel had God-given rights to hold and settle occupied territory such rights should be compromised for peace, but up to October 1978 the indications remained far from decisive. Further, it would even appear doubtful that the bulk of opinion in 'Peace Now' is yet ready for a withdrawal on the West Bank and the Golan Heights to anything approximating the 1967 boundaries, especially in view of the
support given the movement by prominent Labour figures, for example Yigal Allon. Away from Sinai, the easiest issue, the central tendency in 'Peace Now' would seem to be toward a diluted version of the Allon Plan.

c) Finally, and of perhaps critical significance for the future, the post 1975 attempts to accelerate colonization made it increasingly evident, whatever the international and domestic political factors, that the settlement programmes faced serious resource limitations. Above all, whether or not her economic capacity can support a rate of colonization much in excess of that pursued by the Rabin Government, Israel in 1977-78 came up against the probability that she would not be able to find the population to permit truly large scale settlement in the occupied territories - that in the midst of a large Arab population the whole process might well be fundamentally unviable. As noted, even in 1977 Labour's 77 settlements beyond East Jerusalem contained only 10,000 people - c.130 per site - and this had been during a period of considerable immigration, with a major influx of Russian Jews in the early 1970's. Ominously, in the year the Likud came to power the number of immigrants (11,336) amounted to only 25.8% of the 1973 figure (43,880), expressing a progressive decline throughout the period following the October 1973 War, and there were few signs that Israelis living on the coastal plain would be prepared to come forward in sufficient numbers to compensate for the reduced immigrant contribution. After all, despite subsidization, shifting to the occupied territories has often entailed a drop in living standard (especially
in the initial phase) living in a less pleasant physical
environment (the Jordan Rift), distance from urban amenities
and increased physical and psychological insecurity, either
because of a hostile surrounding Arab population (Samaria)
or a front-line location (Golan). The insecurity is
partially evidenced in the selection of hill-top sites (19),
particularly noticeable on the populated West Bank Highlands
(plate 21) and in the erection of floodlit perimeter
fences for settlement outposts. In such conditions Israel
faced a dilemma: there was little chance that an influx
sufficient to exceed the West Bank Arab growth rate would
materialize, from domestic or external sources, while conflict
with the Arabs persisted, yet the only way to achieve peace
and remove the disincentive was substantially to abandon the
occupied territory settlement programme for which the influx
was needed.

For the Begin Government, as for its predecessors,
the danger thus existed that founding large numbers of new
settlements would, after a certain point, simply mean lower
and lower average populations per site, reducing the
exercise to a farce. As a warning the consequences of
financial investment exceeding population capacity were
already evident in Qiryat Arba' and the East Jerusalem
housing estates, where hundreds of apartments stood empty.
At Qiryat Arba' 1977 vacancies amounted to one-third of
available accommodation (20) and in Jerusalem, where the
largest colonization investment across the June 1967
boundaries has taken place, the proportion of Jews in the
total municipal population actually fell from 74.3% in 1967
to 73% in 1975. Against this background worried Jerusalem
planning officials have advised that the Defence Ministry's proposed outer-ring urban estates, intended to accommodate 75,000, may simply draw-off people from the capital itself, among other things detrimentally affecting the Ramot and Gilo inner-ring projects (figure 37). (21)

To conclude, the demographic constraint is a decisive external reality and unless it alters calls by Sharon and others for new Jewish towns on the West Bank are as void of meaning as the original ten-year plan for 45,000 people on the Golan Heights. The issue is discussed further on p. 331, in general comments concerning the future viability of the colonization.

(ii) In negotiations with Egypt and the United States over future arrangements for the occupied territories the central requirement of the new Israeli Government, as formulated by Prime Minister Menahem Begin in conjunction with Foreign Minister Moshe Dayan, has been clear and consistent throughout the first sixteen months, with little apparent alteration as a result of the Camp David summit. Begin has always had a deep ideological commitment to preserving, in some form, the unity of Western Eretz Yisrael, here incorporating metropolitan Israel, the West Bank and the Gaza Strip (i.e. coterminous with mandatory Palestine). Within such a unity civil self-government could be rapidly conceded to the Palestinian Arab population in Judea, Samaria and Gaza but there were three fundamentals on which Israel under Begin would find it almost impossible to compromise:
a) Israel would maintain defence lines in the West Bank mountain block and in the Jordan Rift as national security insurance against assault from the east. Thus although internal security responsibility might be conceded to Jordan and/or West Bank local authorities conventional issues of defence and foreign affairs would remain under ultimate Israeli control even after a transitional period.

b) Israel would retain settlements throughout the West Bank, above all in the Judean and Samarian Highlands. Jews and Arabs would 'live together', the Jewish presence being justified by 'historic right' in the ancient core of the Jewish homeland.

c) Jerusalem would remain united under Israeli rule.

In the author's view the eventual Begin-Dayan concept was a radical inversion of the geographical and ideological emphases of colonization under the Labour Governments. Away from Jerusalem the Labour emphasis had been on fixing security belts, principally in the Golan, the Jordan Rift and North Sinai, and in avoiding the Highlands of Judea-Samaria; in contrast the main thrust of Likud settlement policy was towards establishing a presence on the West Bank Highlands, primarily for reasons of 'historic right' (figure 69 demonstrates the inversion). To secure recognition of this presence the Labour security belts in much of the Golan and the whole of Sinai could be used as bargaining counters, to be 'sold-off' if this would bring agreements with Egypt and Syria holding out prospects of permanence for Israeli settlements in Judea-Samaria.
The evolution of the above approach up to October 1978 took place in three steps, each permutation being a pragmatic adjustment to shifting internal and external pressures, but with preservation of the essentials.

a) The first development was the formal abandonment of the Labour concept of a West Bank territorial compromise, as represented by the Allon Plan, in favour of Dayan's concept of a functional compromise, with Jewish and Arab settlement and authority mixed throughout Judea-Samaria rather than segregated between an Israeli Jordan Rift Strip and an exclusively Arab Highland entity. For the West Bank the July 1977 Dayan proposals contained much that was similar to the 1968 version (ref. P. 171) - administrative self-rule for the Palestinians, with the option of a Jordanian link, alongside continued Israeli control over security matters, a defence line of Israeli military outposts in the eastern mountains and, most significantly, a continuation of Israeli colonization. For Sinai and the Golan there were the first hints of readiness to give up settlements - in particular the offer of a Golan withdrawal which would entail some (unspecified) movement of settlement sites.

b) In late 1977, in the course of the Israel-Egypt contacts at Rabat, Jerusalem and Ismailiya additional concessions on Sinai were made. These became public in the December 1977 Begin Plan. Here Israel offered to restore Egyptian sovereignty to the whole Sinai peninsula, up to the 1967 international boundary. The offer was, however, quickly qualified by a refusal to disband Yamit and other
Jewish settlements in the Rafiah approaches (figure 70), the idea being that these would remain under de facto Israeli military protection, along with the four Israeli air bases in eastern Sinai (the northernmost pair being Yamit's largest single employer). The most significant shift in the Israeli position was in southern Sinai where the Labour idea of an Eilat-Sharm ash Sheikh corridor was completely given up and the need to evacuate the settlements along the Gulf of Aqaba coast (figure 39) tacitly accepted.

On the West Bank the Begin Plan refined the 'functional compromise', suggesting a removal of military government in most civilian spheres, Palestinian 'autonomy' and discussion of competing claims for sovereignty at the end of a five year transition period. There would be dual civil authority for Jewish settlers and Arab residents - even triple if Jordan could be involved. Of course it may be questioned whether such an arrangement, implying separate but overlapping bureaucracies and inviting continuous friction (for example over the expansion of Israeli settlements) could ever be made to work.

c) Nine months later the Camp David accords produced the ultimate concession in Sinai, depending on a free vote in the Knesset Israel would vacate the Rafiah settlements and the air bases. The whole east Sinai 'security belt' (figure 39) was now abandoned, for a full peace treaty with Egypt and the institution of normal inter-state relations. At first sight the accords seemed an enormous achievement for Israel - agreement with the largest Arab
state had been attained while Israel's fundamental requirements in Judea and Samaria had not been at all compromised. Full Arab self-administration would be implemented in the West Bank and Gaza with negotiations after two years on the final status of the areas, but Israel had made no detectable retreat from her stand regarding the maintenance of the West Bank Jewish settlements or on the need for a Tzahal defence presence in the Jordan Rift. Liquidation of the Sinai settlements was a small price for public Egyptian acquiescence in all this.

Concerning the path ahead it may be presumed with some confidence that the outlook held by Begin and Dayan is quite different from that held by the Egyptians and the Americans. As regards Israel all public utterances by the Prime Minister and the Foreign Minister both before and after Camp David indicate that the Sinai arrangement and adjustment of West Bank details make further concession less rather than more likely - that Israel has paid the present price not as a first step but as the means of obtaining a separate peace with Egypt to finally cement the fundamentals of Israel's position on the West Bank and, if Syria is unwilling to join Egypt, the Golan Heights as well. In contrast the American-Egyptian outlook would appear to be that the precedent provided by Israeli withdrawal in Sinai and disbandment of Sinai settlements would make it easier to accomplish a general and decisive erosion of the whole Israeli position in all the occupied territories over the coming two to five years. In particular once an operating Palestinian autonomous entity, as suggested in the accords, is set up on the West Bank and
1967 displaced persons begin returning a dynamic will have been created that will make the maintenance of the Israeli settlement structure in Judea-Samaria virtually untenable.

It seems reasonable to assume that the clash between the two outlooks will cause serious difficulties between the three parties in the near future unless, as the Israelis may hope, the schism between Egypt and other Arab states becomes so deep that it overshadows events in the occupied territories and allows the Israeli outlook to prevail by default.

(iii) Likud colonization in the occupied territories between June 1977 and October 1978 comprised several contrasting aspects, reflecting both the contradictions in underlying forces and the progress of the general strategy outlined above. Labour programmes on the Golan, in the Jordan Rift and around East Jerusalem continued but were overshadowed by official authorization for increased Gush Emunim penetration of central Samaria and the concentration of attention on the fate of Israel's presence in the Rafiah area. The central Samaria and North Sinai questions provoked clashes within the Cabinet, especially between Agriculture Minister Ariel Sharon and Defence Minister Ezer Weitzman, as well as friction between Israel and the United States, and such conflict was reflected on the ground in the erratic nature of activity, with a tendency for sharp alternation between bursts of construction and complete halts to expansion (figure 68).
a) **Samaria**

Gush Emunim viewed the 1977 election result as a great victory, removing the last obstacle to comprehensive colonization on the Samarian Highlands. Its leaders hastened to present Begin with a scheme for the speedy erection of 12 new outposts, 10 in populated Samaria. (22) The Prime Minister proved highly sympathetic but, because of the newly intensified American interest and the atmosphere later created by the Sadat 'initiative', he had to proceed slowly and with caution. As a result the Gush colonies were only approved two or three at a time and efforts were made to disguise them as 'army camps'.

Figure 69 serves as a guide to the subsequent activity. In August Alon Moreh, Ofra and Ma'ale Adumim received official sanction and three new sites were approved near the western border, though the latter were merely a continuation of Labour security belt policy. In December Gush Emunim nuclei were permitted to establish Giv'on and Beit Horon, again still within the Allon Plan area. The major move into the heart of Samaria took place in January 1978 when, after a debate in the Knesset Foreign Affairs and Security Committee, (23) the Likud and the NRP secured parliamentary confirmation for four additional sites already approved by the Inter-Ministerial Settlement Committee - Qarnei Shomron, Haris, Tapuah and Dotan. The new year also saw outposts arise at Nabi Saleh and Shilo, where Gush Emunim extracted permission to make an 'archaeological dig' (plate 22).

The impetus for the steady spread came from Ariel
Plate 22

Sharon, backed by the Prime Minister. Sharon's objective was to establish a north-south strip of Jewish settlements between the Nablus and Tulkarm-Qalqilia areas (on hill-tops at some distance from Arab urban centres), along a line from Dotan to Beit Horon (figure 69), which would be intersected by an east-west strip through Mesha and Tappuah to the Jordan Rift regional centre at Ma'ale Efraim. (24) The central Samaria road from the Jordan Rift to the Tel Aviv area ('Hotzeh Shomron' - 'Samaria bisector'. see p273.) would give the east-west strip concrete expression in the landscape. A large urban centre at Haris, projected to achieve an ultimate population of 50,000 would stand at the intersection of the 'cross' (figure 69).

Such a framework had major implications:

1) Samaria's Palestinian population would be cut into four unconnected blocks, separated from one another by the Sharon lines, from Judea by a Jewish outer ring around Jerusalem, and from the outside by the pre-existing Jordan Rift strip. On a West Bank segmented in this fashion it would be difficult to imagine any genuine self-government beyond the municipal level being a practical possibility.

2) Because areas affected by the Sharon lines contain numerous Arab villages Jewish settlement of the extent envisaged could not be implemented without considerable expropriation of Arab private lands. Using the fact that much of the local terrain is rocky and hence unfit for intensive agriculture the Government has made it clear that any land not actually cultivated is open for take-over, irrespective of ownership. (25) For example at Haris, where 5000 dunams
would be required for the urban estate, few 'government lands' (i.e. property not registered as belonging to someone, according to Jordanian law) are available and 312 dunams of hill-top have already been closed by the standard 'security needs' device. (26) Similarly an attempt has been made to expropriate 200 dunams of cultivated farmland at Nabi Saleh, to establish permanent housing for the Neve Tsur Gush Emunim colony, though the order has been temporarily over-ruled by the High Court in Jerusalem following an appeal by Nabi Saleh residents. (26) Villagers on the Samarian Highlands naturally fear that the above cases merely represent beginnings and that Israel will continue to use all available legal devices (technical suzereinty over 'miri' farmland (27) 'absentee property', 'military reserve', 'waste', lack of full registration) to acquire ever larger portions of their working lands.

From the outset Sharon's approach aroused great controversy, with dissent coming from several quarters.

1) For some Gush Emunim activists even the Sharon policy was not enough. They opposed the idea of keeping settlement away from Nablus, viewed the general pace as too slow and favoured comprehensive land expropriation. In September 1977 one group attempted to outrun the Government programme by unilaterally establishing an outpost near Jericho. Begin, who did not appreciate the open defiance of his authority, had the army eliminate the site.

2) Defence Minister Ezer Weitzman disapproved of Sharon's methods. He viewed the proliferation of new sites during the Israel-Egypt negotiations of early 1978 as
particularly tactless and, in March, when bulldozers began land preparation at Nabi Saleh while he was conducting talks in Washington, Weitzman threatened to cut short his visit if the work was not stopped. He also opposed the dissipation of effort involved in founding numerous tiny outposts, apparently preferring a small number of comparatively large urban estates - similar to Dayan's settlement blocks. In May 1978 his Ministry launched a plan for six such estates (figures 69 and 37), three in Samaria (Qarnei Shomron, Haris, Nabi Saleh) and three as an outer-ring for Jerusalem (Giv'on, Ma'ale Adumin, Efrat). Interestingly the Jerusalem outer-ring was little more than a restatement of suggestions mooted in the Ministry of Housing under the Rabin Government, while the Samarian sites could be interpreted simply as a reduced and concentrated version of Sharon's west Samaria scheme. Thus on the fundamental question of whether the West Bank Jewish presence should survive at all the six town plan would appear to indicate that, despite his opposition to the activities of settlement enthusiasts, Weitzman remained in favour of large-scale colonization in the region. It is of course possible that the whole thing was simply a political manoeuvre, advanced in full awareness of its impracticability.

3) Comment from the Labour opposition consisted of attacks on geographically extended settlement, re-assertions of the idea of a West Bank territorial compromise and sharp criticism of the use of 'army camps' and 'archaeological digs' as a front for colonization. Much of this came strangely from a party some of whose spokesmen were simultaneously asserting that Begin's autonomy plan opened the door for
a Palestinian state, which had allowed breaches in its own limited settlement policy in 1975-77, and which had itself resorted on occasion to the 'military reserve' tactic to acquire Arab land for colonization (p.269). Such contradictions made it very difficult to tell where Labour under Peres differed from the Likud on substance as opposed to procedure.

By March 1978 there were, in total, twelve Gush Emunim sites in Judea-Samaria containing c.2,000 people (table 9:2) compared with four sites containing c.500 in May 1977. Yet despite the expansion the Gush structure remained extremely flimsy. First, the population per settlement remained low, reflecting the fundamental demographic constraint discussed above. Second, the settlers were almost entirely in temporary accommodation, either in Jordanian buildings (military,police) or in caravans and prefabricated housing. Third, in economic terms the settlements were to a large extent merely commuter outposts of Jerusalem and the coastal cities, with many residents travelling daily to work inside Israel. As such people also maintained homes inside Israel the economic commitment to living on the West Bank was not great, in contrast to the agricultural settlers on the Golan and in the Jordan Rift. The ideological commitment, however, was not to be underestimated and the multiplication of sites had already been quite sufficient to introduce yet another exacerbating factor into Arab-Israeli relations, both inside and outside the occupied territories.

The potential problems raised by the Gush presence
on the West Bank Highlands were well evidenced immediately after the Camp David accords. Presumably under strong American pressure, the Government agreed to suspend all new construction during 'negotiations', Weitzman taking strong action to prevent protest moves by religio-nationalist zealots from in any way threatening progress toward the Israel-Egypt peace treaty. Nonetheless Begin quickly made it clear that no commitment had been made to evacuate any settlement and that the freeze would last a mere 90 days, settlement expansion resuming immediately thereafter. A sharp clash with the Americans seemed inevitable.

b) Rafiah

Moshe Dayan played a central role in both the creation and abandonment of the North Sinai settlements. In 1973, before Israel's complacent immobilism and her illusion of unassailable power were shattered by the October War, Dayan had pushed strongly for the development of the southern approaches to the Gaza Strip as a huge port-city complex (ref. P.178); in 1978, as Foreign Minister, he was apparently instrumental in persuading a reluctant Menahem Begin that, painful though it might be, the entire settlement block would have to be given up as the price of a peace treaty with Egypt. Dayan thus demonstrated considerable tactical flexibility in seeking to secure the fundamental requirements on the West Bank.

Right up to the Camp David summit, however, it seemed that the Prime Minister's insistence on maintaining the Rafiah presence under some sort of de facto Israeli control would destroy the chance of a breakthrough in
negotiations with Egypt. On any appreciation of Israel's objective national interests this was an absurd situation, but it well illustrated the psychological power of settler maximalism after ten years of occupied territory colonization.

Following the Sadat Jerusalem visit and the commencement of peace talks Sharon and the Settlement Department of the Jewish Agency determined that no time should be lost in cementing Israel's hold in the area separating Sinai from the Arab population of Gaza (figure 70). (29) In line with Begin's assertion that conceding sovereignty to Egypt did not necessitate an Israeli retreat from the Rafiah settlements Sharon, in late December 1977, presented a plan for 25 new 'farming outposts' to the Inter-Ministerial Settlement Committee. The aim was to buttress the colonization, filling gaps between existing sites and extending the area of settlement deeper into Sinai.

Because the Ministerial Committee could not reach a decision the matter went to the full Cabinet. What then happened is unclear, but Sharon apparently extracted limited approval for strengthening existing settlements. Putting a liberal interpretation on this the Minister of Agriculture then had the Settlement Department begin work on clearing new sites and importing prefabricated housing, in some cases ten kilometres or more beyond existing sites.

Major repercussions follows, as the Egyptians naturally viewed the activity as Israeli bad faith,
especially after the sovereignty concession. By February 1978 the Rafiah activities, prompted by the imminence of the Israel-Egypt negotiations, had helped bring those negotiations to a standstill; an interesting case both of how shifts in external political realities can produce shifts in action on the land, and how the new action on the land can feed back and produce an external reaction (figure 68).

At this stage Weitzman, who feared that the political consequences of bulldozer operations might damage the new peace hopes beyond repair, acted in the Cabinet to have Sharon restrained. His intercession quickly brought an almost complete freeze on activity, re-opening the door to negotiation in the Summer.

Two interpretations may be put on these curious events between Sadat's Jerusalem visit and the Camp David summit.

1) The brief spurt in construction was stage-managed to demonstrate the strength of Israel's position. There is, however, no concrete evidence for this hypothesis.

2) More likely, in view of previous statements by Israel's new leaders and indications of the shock caused in Likud circles by the later decision to give up Rafiah, is that the North Sinai military buffer argument had become so seductive that Israel determined to keep the area whatever the cost right up to the final days at Camp David, only being dissuaded at the last minute by personal pressure from President Carter and erosion in Egypt's demands regarding the West Bank and Gaza.
The decision to evacuate the Rafiah settlements, confirmed by an $\frac{64}{120}$ majority in the Knesset on 27 September and to be implemented over a two year period, was little short of an earthquake in Israeli domestic politics. Whatever now happened on the West Bank and the Golan Heights, the general colonization process had entered a new era - the insistence that Israel would never uproot a civilian settlement had been broken, cherished and deeply held strategic arguments had been painfully comprom- ised and 25% of the settlement structure (table 9:2) outside Jerusalem had been surrendered. To settlers in the other territories it seemed like a first glimpse of doom and their agitation and fear of impending betrayal were amply displayed in the rush of Gush Emunim protest squattings and in a descent on Jerusalem to demonstrate and picket Government buildings. If the Government wished to save the settlement structure on the West Bank and the Golan from major population defections due to despair regarding the future the signs were that it would have to act quickly to buttress and expand the colonization once the Egyptian peace was safely concluded.

(iv) In sum 1977-78 has been a year of transition for settlement policy, though the direction of the transition is not yet clear. Up to 1977, under Labour, the colonization was established and expanded, at varying rates, in all the occupied territories without any hint of reversal. 1977-78, bringing changes in the ideological and geographic bases of colonization, the dropping of the Allon Plan, the accord with Egypt, and the decision to abandon the Sinai
settlements, ended all that - ironically under a Government which began as the most expansionist-minded in Israel's history. Looking beyond 1978 there appear to be two possible future perspectives:

a) The critical resource constraints, the revolutionary new American commitment at the heart of the peace process and changes in the main body of Israeli opinion occasioned by the new prospects for peace will together act to overcome religio-nationalist tendencies and to ensure that the precedent set by the loss of the Rafiah salient becomes a prelude to a steady withering-away of the settlement structure in other areas. This outlook of course relies absolutely on the assumption that Jordan, Syria, the Palestinians and Saudi Arabia will eventually be persuaded to join negotiations, that American resolve will be maintained and that an atmosphere will thus be created which makes Israel amenable to security guarantees on her eastern front which do not have to rest on holding and settling Arab land.

b) As a warning against excessive expectations the alternative is exceptionally bleak for prospects of peace in the Middle East. This takes into account the possibilities that Israel's strategic and religio-nationalist arguments for holding her present assets on the eastern front (West Bank and Golan) are unbreakable, that they will be reinforced by strong and long-term rejection of the Camp David accords by Syria, Jordan and the majority of Palestinian opinion and that Egypt's influence and interest in events on the eastern front will wane with isolation in
the Arab World and a closer relationship with Israel. Here Israel's agreement to retreat from Sinai would be merely the prelude to Likud efforts to reinforce a more compact West Bank/Golan settlement structure—in other words, following the Begin-Dayan strategy to its logical conclusion. This may even occur in defiance of America and against the risk that Egypt will abrogate the peace treaty; giving up everything in Sinai has undoubtedly been a deeply traumatic personal experience for Menahem Begin and the urge to compensate by vigorous colonization activity elsewhere may prove irresistible. Here it is possible, given sufficient ingenuity, that the underlying demographic constraint could be alleviated; the Rafiah residents have to be found new homes, a separate peace with Egypt might assist immigration, and increased subsidization and other financial devices could be employed to increase the pool of potential West Bank/Golan settlers.

IV. Settlement Policy: Issues for Debate

In 1978 the landscape and demographic consequences of Israeli settlement in the occupied territories varied greatly from region to region (table 9:2 and figure 71). In the Allon security belts, location of the two case-study areas, an entirely new cultural landscape had emerged, with Jewish colonists already forming a substantial proportion of the local population. With regard to the Golan Heights and the Rafiah salient the new landscape was dominant; in the Jordan Rift and around East Jerusalem, where the Arab presence remained the major element, it had become increas-
ingly prominent. On the other hand, throughout the areas of dense Arab population in Judea-Samaria and the Gaza Strip Israeli colonization remained a mere ripple in an Arab sea: a scattering of makeshift Gush Emunim outposts, paramilitary camps and a few villages sanctioned by Labour administrations.

Yet whatever its scale and wherever it was introduced the Israeli settlement structure in the occupied territories had an exacerbating influence on the Arab-Israeli conflict, the world's most dangerous regional dispute, out of all proportion to its size. Perhaps nowhere else has such a small process (by 1978 involving c. 40,000 people - equivalent to 1.3% of Israel's Jewish population and c. 3% of the occupied territory Arab population) had such potentially serious ramifications for the international order. It was here that the true significance of the settlements lay, rather than in their local landscape and demographic impact. With this in mind the author now considers two questions: the validity of the military security theme which has provided a major part of the ideological support for colonization and the broader issue of the future viability of settlement policy in the territories unaffected by the prospective peace treaty with Egypt - the West Bank and the Golan Heights.

(1) As already noted (P. 308) Israel's prospective withdrawal from Sinai should not necessarily be taken as a guide to intentions for the other territories - indeed rather the reverse. First, Israel's strategic problem on the eastern front is considerably more difficult than in
Sinai; whereas no Israeli population centre except Eilat lies within 20 km. of the 1967 boundary with Egypt, major Israeli population concentrations are immediately adjacent to occupied territory on both the West Bank and Golan borders. Second, it is to be strongly suspected that the Sinai concession, involving some perceived military risk and enormous costs in relocating settlers and military infrastructure, has been made with the idea of actually improving the tenability of Israel's colonized buffers and other settlement structures elsewhere, which are based on historical as well as security arguments.

On the eastern front, bearing in mind the realities of small scale, vulnerability of metropolitan territory, concentration of force and the strategically dominant position of the West Bank and Golan uplands, it is difficult not to sympathize with Israel's unwillingness to trade a military presence and a colonized security zone for demilitarization and other devices not under her direct control. Israel appears to fear that, in a situation where she has been reduced to her 1967 boundaries and has turned over the West Bank to an independent Palestinian state, she may again one day face an emergency. Arab governments and their intentions may change, a renewed desire to eliminate the 'Zionist entity' may emerge and Israel may face a combination of massive conventional assault with guerrilla attacks from the West Bank - a combination which, in view of the topographic defects of the 1967 lines and post 1967 technological advances in warfare, she might well be unable to handle. Further, in the far north, the Israeli population concent-
ration contained in the Hula and Tiberias areas is to some degree separated from the rest of Israel by steep hills and might be easily over-run by a quick thrust from a Golan returned to Syria.

On the other hand, can a colonized buffer on the West Bank and the Golan itself grant real long-term security? Here there are two major problems -

a) The concept of buffers to contain enemy attack before it reaches settled metropolitan territory becomes a logical fallacy when the buffers themselves have to be politically secured by settlement. This particularly applies to the Golan where colonization has gone beyond establishing chains of rural outposts, which could be conceived as components of a defence system, to include vulnerable urban development. In such circumstances the army's freedom of manoeuvre becomes cramped by the need to defend and/or evacuate civilians, just as in metropolitan territory, and as a result the buffer in turn needs a buffer which, if it is to be anchored by civilian settlement, needs yet another buffer. The implications have been noted by prominent Israelis, for example Levi Eshkol, for the Jordan Rift (see P. 126) and Abba Eban, in comments on Sinai which could easily be transferred to the eastern front.

There is a versatile range of methods by which (strategic depth) can be achieved - sometimes, but not always, by territorial change. The problem can be aggravated if we think of erecting vast population centres in Sinai - and then look for additional strategic depth to defend them - and so on into infinity or absurdity. (30)
b) The absorption of Arab land and the denial of Palestinian aspirations to a truly independent entity on the West Bank necessarily involved in strategic and 'historic rights' colonization mean that the policy almost certainly guarantees, for obvious reasons, endless conflict with Israel's eastern neighbours. Regardless of any separate peace with Egypt continued settlement on the West Bank and the Golan would thus seem to consign Israel to a permanent future as a garrison state. Of course, with Egypt removed from the equation, the 'garrison' would be relatively much stronger, but this does not change the essential feature of long-term insecurity - not long-term security.

The chief alternative to strategic colonization and a permanent Israeli military presence is comprehensive demilitarization on the eastern front, with a near-total Israeli withdrawal from occupied territory (including East Jerusalem). Proponents (31) argue that this would offer a chance of Arab consent and hence of lasting peace while at the same time preserving for Israel the defensive security position acquired in June 1967, by preventing any re-appearance of a substantial Arab military presence in terrain dominating metropolitan Israel. Israel's leaders, both Labour and Likud, have however been thoroughly sceptical of 'demilitarization with international supervision' as the primary security element in a peace agreement for the West Bank and the Golan. First it is pointed out that historic experience with the device has not been particularly propitious; what for instance became of the
demilitarized Rhineland between France and Germany? Second, it is easy to see where demilitarization could break-down in territories not possessing Sinai's depth, if Israel's eastern neighbours became determined to subvert it. Although the bare open terrain of the Jordan Rift means few heavy armaments could be smuggled into the West Bank, ways could probably be found of infiltrating lighter and medium-sized weaponry, including missiles. (32) Similarly, on the Golan a Syrian assault across the demilitarized zone, if the zone only comprised present occupied territory, might arrive at the plateau edge long before substantial Israeli forces managed to push up the scarp from the west. (33)

The author, however, feels that such reservations may be outweighed by four basic propositions:

a) that present Israeli policy almost certainly cannot bring peace on Israel's eastern front.

b) that Israel has, in the Camp David accords, already accepted demilitarization to preserve the Sinai buffer. Here, whatever the wider strategy, it is implicitly acknowledged that, in the new atmosphere created by peace with Egypt, a colonized security zone like Rafiah would become redundant, a feature the raison d'être for which would disappear. (34) By definition Israel's own action regarding Sinai thus weakens the argument it continues to put forward for the other territories (also, having seen Israel agree to disband the Sinai settlements it is improbable that Syria, Jordan and the Palestinians will accept anything less in their own areas).
c) that even the most adventurous administration in Damascus or Amman would hesitate to take direct hostile measures against international forces holding lines between the two sides, certainly if such forces included a large American element.

d) that any Palestinian state on the West Bank would be far more vulnerable to Israeli attack than vice-versa, considering Israel's power and the ease with which links across the Jordan could be cut. (35)

Argument and counter-argument can of course continue at length, but something like comprehensive demilitarization, for all its imperfections, would appear the only way of reconciling real Israeli security fears with irreducible Arab requirements regarding the return of territory on the West Bank and the Golan - including the removal of settlements and the restoration of lands absorbed by the settlement structure. Demilitarization might be combined with a detailed redrawing of the 1967 boundaries, free civilian movement, a limited continuance of Jewish urban settlement on the West Bank under Arab rule, and provision for Israeli monitoring stations in strategic locations, for instance the Jordan Rift and the Hermon shoulder - but, when this is added to recognition of the Jewish state, it is unrealistic to suppose that Israel's eastern neighbours could agree to anything more.

(ii) One of the most important questions yet to be answered in the Middle East conflict is that of the future
viability of Israeli settlement policy on the West Bank and the Golan Heights. Here the regional and international background is so enormously complex and the possibility of unforeseen irruptions so great that any consideration can only be tentative and unsatisfactory. Perhaps the best means of approach is to identify a number of potentially relevant factors, examining how each may operate for or against a long-term survival. The factors should be seen as interacting components of the same general systems framework as has been used in analysis up to this point. (figure 68).

a) The balance of forces in Israeli domestic politics: how might it develop?

In the author's opinion Israel's settlement policy has always been chiefly dependent on shifting balances of personalities, attitudes and world-images within the domestic political system, these as affected by shifting domestic and external economic and political realities. On such an interpretation three phases may be detected between 1967 and late 1978, the third as yet incipient and uncertain.

1) 1967-1968: Balance probably favoured a view of settlements as a bargaining counter, but the view gradually lost strength with an apparent unwillingness to bargain on the Arab side.

2) 1969-1977: Shift in the balance toward progressively greater strength for the concept of colonization as a permanent strategic and, later, religio-nationalist commitment. It could be asserted, with hindsight, that the shift
was only an elevation of bargaining tactics to a higher plane: to give a convincing demonstration to the Arabs that if they did not 'come to the table' extensive fact-creation would render a return of the bulk of conquered territory impossible and that, in any case, there might be some permanent changes. There is of course no reason why sincere commitment and bargaining logic could not have existed side by side, especially as few Israelis, at any level, saw final agreement with any Arab state as at all likely, regardless of colonization. However all the author's evidence (gathered in an extraordinarily open society) points to the growing commitment to permanency in this period as being genuine and predominant - further, seemingly immutable Arab rigidity provided a perfect opportunity for 'creeping annexation' behind a screen of protestations that everything was negotiable (harmless as there appeared little chance that the bluff would be called).

3) 1978: Egypt 'comes to the table' and the trend toward settlement permanency is fundamentally shaken by the removal of one of its chief 'external reality' props: the perception of general Arab intransigence.

There can be little doubt that the prospects of a radically new Israel-Egypt relationship are having a traumatic effect on Israel's political system. For some important personalities, for example Defence Minister Ezer Weitzman, there are signs that hard-line convictions on territory and settlement held in the context of pre-existing realities are being gradually modified with the shift in circumstances. Now that the largest Arab state
is seen genuinely to want full co-existence with Israel
the choice between colonization, with all the associated
assumptions and logic, and progress toward final peace
treaties, previously not a practical issue, is causing
deep schisms in the major political factions. The
division is between those whose commitment to settlement
for security or historic reasons remains little affected
and the assorted ranks of pragmatists, those whose world-
views are altering, and those who have always opposed
permanent colonization beyond very limited areas. As
'Peace Now' (P. 300) demonstrates the latter have gained
markedly in political and public weight through 1978 and
one may have here the beginnings of an internal dynamic
which will cause any attempt to expand the West Bank/Golan
settlement structure to be stillborn and leave the
settlers and their supporters with only minority sympathy
in the nation at large.

Certainly the Knesset vote on disbanding the
Sinai settlements has produced some very curious new
political alignments, with traditional left-right
differences becoming meaningless. (see Appendix II,
sections 11-14 and figure 68).

1) In the Likud opposition and disquiet concerning
prospective evacuation includes half the Herut members
and most of La'am, these being joined with the vociferous
Gush Emunim group in the NRP (headed by Zevulun Hamer)
and, surprisingly yet consistently, with the socialist
Kibbutz and Moshav movements and the Ahdut ha Avoda
section of the Labour party, (headed by Yigal Allon and
Yisrael Galili). The latter harbour deep fears about the implications for their own heavy investment on the Golan and in the Jordan Rift. (36)

2) Support for the Camp David accords comprises Herut pragmatists led by Begin, Weitzman and Dayan, theLikud Liberal block (representing powerful business interests alarmed by the deterioration in Israel's economy), the pragmatic wing of the NRP led by Interior Minister Burg, most of the opposition Labour party and various small factions on the extreme left of the spectrum. It is strange indeed to see such figures as Begin, Dayan, Eban and the Sheli members, traditionally outright antagonists on the colonization issue, lined up together.

Against this colonization on the West Bank and the Golan is a vastly different matter from the Sinai case and until final decisions have been made here the real potency of irredentist religious nationalism will not have been fundamentally tested. Indeed Begin's publicly declared strategy is to reinforce the West Bank/Golan presence alongside withdrawal from Sinai and on this matter Herut and other ranks may well close again behind him (the Labour party cannot be expected to oppose continued settlement in, for example, the Jordan Rift). Nonetheless 1) the precedent for withdrawal has been set, 2) the 'bubble' of ever-expanding colonization has been pricked, 3) the dynamic of new Egyptian and American roles may interact with changing Israeli perceptions to produce slow erosion in Israel's West Bank/Golan position, 4) the chance for peace makes the ultimate madness of the alternative more
obvious, if West Bank/Golan colonization is pursued. If the 1977-78 Sadat initiative had never taken place the current outlook within Israel would probably be very different.

b) Does Israel have the demographic capacity to support a credible long-term colonization programme?

An important element in assessing the future prospects of Jewish settlement, above all on the West Bank, is Israel's severely constrained demographic capacity in relation to the rapidly increasing Arab population. In the period 1967-72 alone West Bank Arab numbers grew by 59,000 (from 661.7 thousand to 720.8 thousand\(^{(37)}\)), compared with a total Jewish in-movement of c.32,000 for the whole decade 1967-77, and if East Jerusalem is excluded the 1978 Jewish presence is not even equivalent to one year's Arab growth (table 9:2). Only on the Golan has Israel not been fighting a losing demographic battle, a fact which must raise the suspicion that Israel is incurring grave risks in absorbing areas with a large and hostile native community.

One must however cite several important qualifications. First, a separate peace with Egypt may produce circumstances encouraging a new wave of Jewish migration to Israel, allowing rapid and major infusions of population into the West Bank. Certainly the new urban schemes for Jerusalem and Samaria are based both on hopes for such a "wave" and an increase in the Jewish natural increase rate. Second, if the 'wave' coincided with a return to a settlement policy concentrating on less densely populated areas
(Jordan Rift, Gush Etzion, Judean Wilderness) it is quite possible that long-term viability for a less extended structure might be achieved. Third, as long as Israel's overall military superiority is not endangered the West Bank/Golan structure can be easily maintained by 'force majeure'; whatever its proportion of the local population.

c) How potent is settler influence in Israeli politics?

Disengagement from the West Bank/Golan settlements would undoubtedly be an extremely painful process for Israel - much more so than the prospective withdrawal from Sinai. This is both because of the weight of the ideological and physical commitment and because of the likely furious reaction of the settlers and their supporters within the political system. Here the Sinai and West Bank/Golan issues stand in relation to one another as the peripheral to the central - the political resistance from the eastern front settler lobbies would be of an altogether greater magnitude than that seen in the Rafiah salient case. Even so, if peace treaties on the eastern front were perceived by the bulk of Israeli opinion to involve advantageous elements for Israel there is little doubt that a determined government (also probably under great external pressure) could impose its will, especially if evacuation turned out to be partial and piece-meal rather than immediate and total. The West Bank/Golan settlements have not yet become large enough to be a definite political trap from which escape is impossible though even now the outcome of a political struggle between settler lobbies (here uniting religio-nationalist Greater
Israel supporters with the Kibbutz and Moshav federations), and forces favouring even partial retreat would be highly uncertain if a peace package proved in any major respect controversial. The relevant point is that, in any consideration of the colonization on the eastern front the settlement structure itself should not necessarily be assumed to be a neutral object.

d) How might the American role evolve?

American attitudes and actions will both influence and be influenced by change in the political balance within Israel. In particular the fact that the general prestige and effectiveness of the Carter Presidency is so heavily committed to a successful implementation of the Camp David arrangement implies that heavy American pressure may be forthcoming if Israel moves to reinforce the West Bank settlements, as such reinforcement would instantly eliminate any prospect of progress toward peace on Israel’s eastern front. In October 1978 it remains to be seen whether the mere likelihood of such pressure will encourage shifts in Israeli opinion, whether an actual confrontation will eventuate, or whether American policy will once again become ineffectual.

Theoretically the American factor should sooner or later weigh decisively against extensive West Bank/Golan settlement. First, the United States views the colonization as a contravention of international law and as an element which must not be allowed to prejudice negotiations. Second, as long as confrontation on the eastern front
persists (and it will not abate until there is some definite hint of Israeli retreat from the settlement structure). Israel will be substantially dependent on the United States, whether via public or private sources, for armament requirements and to support its economy. Third, America's considerable economic and strategic interests in the Arab World outside Egypt gives Washington added incentive to continue working for a general peace in the Middle East core.

In practice, however, matters may prove much less straightforward. First, much depends on the future posture of the eastern front Arab states, principally Saudi Arabia, Jordan and Syria. A flexible approach from this quarter, perhaps coupled with a cautious display of the oil weapon, may encourage deeper American involvement over the next two to three years - a posture of belligerence and rigid rejection may prove counter-productive and thus allow Israeli colonization to proceed more readily. Second, there is the matter of Israel's influence within the United States through the 'Jewish lobby', though if Israel implements new settlement programmes she may find her traditional allies reluctant to support her on this particular issue. Third, America's supposed economic and military stranglehold over Israel is more apparent than real as regards short-term effects of any sanctions - Israel has considerable independent strength in both domains and may react to intervention by defiance and a resolve to 'sit out' the Carter Presidency.

In sum it is probable that the United States
will exert substantial pressure against continued Israeli settlement on the eastern front, but the practical effect of such pressure on the Israeli political system is more uncertain.

e) Future Arab roles: Egypt, the Palestinians and the eastern front states

The future strategies of Egypt and the eastern front Arab states and the attitude taken to the Camp David accords by Palestinian opinion on the West Bank will affect all the factors discussed above (and vice-versa). Both the Palestinians and Syria view the West Bank/Golan colonization as a steady erosion of their fundamental landholding rights and an eating away of the vital territorial base for Palestinian statehood: their hostility to it is absolute and likely to remain so. Two major possibilities appear to exist for the next few years, assuming the Israel-Egypt peace treaty is signed. These are to some extent congruent with outlooks discussed on p. 319. (38)

1) Sufficient West Bank Palestinian opinion may be mobilized behind the idea of autonomy to enable an elected West Bank authority to be established, perhaps with tacit Jordanian and Saudi backing. The elected authority would then join with the Egyptians and the Americans to undermine the Israeli colonization by political and public relations pressures. This would certainly make the Israeli position difficult and might achieve its objective simply by creating such an atmosphere of psychological insecurity that the West Bank settlements would be unable to maintain or reinforce their populations. (39)
2) On the other hand there might be so little support for 'autonomy' amongst West Bankers that it may prove impossible to create a credible Palestinian authority. Such an eventuality would almost certainly be coupled with similar lack of support (if not outright hostility) from all the eastern front states. Paradoxically this situation would probably allow expanded Israeli colonization to proceed unhindered. Eastern front rejection of Camp David might lessen American interest in pressuring Israel (especially if Egypt acquiesced, as it may if subjected to prolonged propaganda attack) and would buttress pro-colonization forces within Israel at a time when their hold seems to be slipping. Certainly Syria's current objective appears to be a 'wrecking' one but this cannot have a detrimental effect on Israeli colonization unless Syria can assemble sufficient pan-Arab force to attempt a 'military solution', exceedingly unlikely in the foreseeable future (at the least it is conditional on full reconciliation with Iraq).

In short Arab hostility to the eastern front colonization will have no effect on Israeli construction activity unless the Arabs can bring the requisite power to bear on Israel. There are three means of exerting power, each entailing great risk for the Arabs:

1) Diplomatic co-operation with the United States. This is the present Egyptian strategy and may bring an erosion of the colonization if a viable elected authority is established on the West Bank. On the other hand it may gravely underestimate Israel's power and determination and hence both
emphasize Arab weakness and pave the way for a successful implementation of Sharon's strategy to cut the West Bank into isolated segments by belts of Jewish settlement (p. 311), perhaps the final trap for Palestinian nationalism.

2) Use of oil and economic pressure on the West. This could merely provoke anger and retaliation against the Arab oil states and so buttress the colonization. The latter was in fact the eventual effect of the last display of oil power in 1973-74.

3) The military option. If Egypt is tied to Israel by a durable separate peace this may cease to be a credible alternative for a very long period.


(3) Ha-aretz 6-12-73, P.1 and P.3. Detailed account of Central Committee debate.

(4) a) Oct. 1973 estimate of 4000 - based on Golan figure of 1727 (Ma'ariv 11-11-73 P.15) for 17 settlements. It is assumed that the average population per settlement for the occupied territories as a whole was somewhat less than that for the Golan, where development had advanced most rapidly.

b) Feb. 1975 figure of 4158 - Yediot Ahranot 25-2-75. See also Ha-aretz 25-2-75 P.15.

(5) Ariel Sharon (Minister of Agriculture) in Jerusalem Post 10-2-78 P.2. If this and the note (4) estimates are combined with official Israeli numbers (East Jerusalem excluded) first published in the 1977 Abstract of Statistics (Central Bureau of Statistics, Jerusalem) the 1975-77 acceleration becomes graphically evident.

Population of West Bank, Golan, Sinai settlements

- Oct. 1973 4.0 thousand (author's estimate)
- Feb. 1975 4.1 thousand (Ha-aretz)
- Dec. 1975 5.7 thousand (official)
- Dec. 1976 7.1 thousand (official)
- June 1977 10.0 thousand (Sharon)

As qualification 1) it is not known what exactly the official numbers comprise - for example do they include paramilitary (Nahal) sites? It is thus possible that the various statistics may not, at a detailed level, be measuring the same thing.

2) Any statistic is only approximate, as the population of occupied territory settlements fluctuates markedly from month to month, with the comings and goings of temporary groups superimposed on a small permanent base.

(6) The difference between these numbers and the table 9:1 data is accounted for by the fact that total sites (table 9:1) include both inhabited settlements and uninhabited area centres/ industrial zones.

(7) Al Hamishmar 22-8-75 statement by Avraham Ofer (Minister of Housing).

(8) Ha-aretz 2-10-75 P.9.

(9) Ma'ariv 6-8-76.

(11) Ha-aretz 2-4-76 P.14.

(12) Yediot Ahronot 6-8-76 P.2.

(13) Ha-aretz 29-12-76 P.12.

(14) Yesh-acronym for 'Yehuda ve Shomron' (Judea and Samaria).

(15) Observers were unanimous in treating corruption and the parlous state of the domestic economy as the main factors.

(16) Weitzman's outlook, apparently reflecting a reappraisal of his previous 'hawkish' outlook, is surveyed at some length by Uri Avneri in Der Spiegel 28-8-78 P.98-102 (Vom Falken zum Friedens apostel)

(17) Monthly Bulletin of Statistics
Vol. XXIX No.6 June 1978, Central Bureau of Statistics (Jerusalem). Immigrant numbers for each year after
1972 : 1973 - 43,880
1974 - 23,348
1975 - 12,573
1976 - 11,222
1977 - 11,336
1st 5 mths.1977 - 4,059
1st 5 mths.1978 - 5,610
A slight recovery is evident since 1976.

(18) There are notable exceptions in the Rafiah approaches and the Jordan Valley. Many Rafiah settlers have become extremely prosperous in a short time, on the basis of out-of-season vegetable farming combined, in some cases, with cheap Arab labour from the Gaza Strip.

(19) Hill-tops, generally the most barren land, are also selected to reduce conflict with Arab cultivation. Further, choosing high ground for security reasons is of course an old tradition in the area, being a characteristic of many Arab village sites dating from periods of weak central government authority.

(20) Jerusalem Post Magazine 12-9-77 P.21 Ha-aretz 7-7-78 P.10. In an article on the proposed town of Efrat (figure 37) Yehuda Litani notes the possibility that 850 appartments in Qiryat Arba' (current pop. c.1400) will stand empty in early 1979. Questions the wisdom of building new cities when there seems little prospect of filling existing accommodation.
(21) Jerusalem Post 30-5-78, P. 3.
(22) Ma'ariv 1-7-77, P. 21.
(23) Ma'ariv 10-1-78, P. 3.
Jerusalem Post 8-8-78, P. 2.
Ha-aretz 27-7-78, P. 1. Description of plans for the 'Samaria bisector'.
   a) Haris - note government argument that though state-owned tracts are inadequate for the scheme there is sufficient land 'not fit for cultivation'.
   b) NRP (Major coalition partner) mid-May resolution calling for the seizure of rockyland.
(26) a) Ha-aretz 26-5-78, P. 13. War of the Jews on the Lands of the West Bank: "The erection of new settlements leads to the need for requisitioning (or closing or taking) of land from Arabs. According to spokesmen for the Ministry of Defence and the Military Government most of the lands are state-owned or rock strewn. But within these lands - state or waste - there are pockets of private land that the army seeks to seize."
   b) At both Haris and Nabi Saleh the villagers have 'tapo' certificates authenticating their ownership of the tracts closed for 'security needs' or fenced off by Gush Emunim. (Quiring, P., Middle East International, Sept. 1978 P. 10 and P. 12)
(27) Miri - c. 70% of the West Bank. Under Ottoman and Jordanian law it can technically revert to the state if it is not being actively cultivated at a particular moment. The state may then use it as it sees fit. Significantly, within Israel all 'miri' land is considered private property to which the state has no rights (for an account of this and other aspects of land seizure for West Bank Jewish colonization see Quiring, P. 'Israeli Settlements and Palestinian Rights' (Middle East International, Sept. 1978 Pp. 10-12 and Oct. 1978 Pp. 12-15).
(28) In many cases the 'prefabs' are substantial buildings with solid foundations. For example the cost of units for Nabi Saleh is estimated at 150,000 lirot (c. £7,500) each - Jerusalem Post 19-4-78, P. 2.
(29) *Jerusalem Post* 14-2-78 P. 2

(30) Eban address to Conference of Presidents of North American Jewish organizations - Jerusalem, 27-11-73. As reported in *Jerusalem Post* Magazine 30-11-73 P. 5.

(31) See, for example, McPeak M.A. "Israel : Borders and Security" (*Foreign Affairs*, 1976, Pp. 426-443)

(32) The only certain prevention would involve international search and patrol procedures along the Jordan of similar rigour to those currently employed by the Israelis. As the present Israeli system is complete anathema to Palestinians travelling between the East and West Banks this would be neither feasible nor desirable in the context of a general peace agreement.

(33) Some in Israel who favour returning the entire Golan to Syria (with evacuation of settlements) in exchange for a peace treaty argue that Israel's existing position should be used to bargain for a much wider demilitarized zone (perhaps 40 km.) - M.K. Meir Pail in discussion with author, Nov. 1976.

(34) Under the Camp David arrangement no major Egyptian armed forces would be permitted east of the Giddi and Mitla passes - 200 km. from the border with Israel.

(35) The argument is elaborated in Khalidi, W. "Thinking the Unthinkable : A Sovereign Palestinian State" (*Foreign Affairs*, 1978, Pp. 695-713)

(36) *Jerusalem Post* 20-9-78 P. 2. "Settlement Movements worry about withdrawal demand".
   a) Galili at Kibbutz ha Meuhad Secretariat meeting - abandoning 'defensible border' with Egypt a 'terrible risk' and precedent for concession in the Rift and on the Golan.
   b) Unease also noted in Kibbutz Artzi and Ihud ha Kevutzot ve ha Kibbutzim.

   *Census of Population and Housing, 1972* (Central Bureau of Statistics, Jerusalem)
(38) Yehuda Litani also discusses the West Bank's future in Ha-aretz 6-10-78 P.13 "What will happen on the West Bank?: Four possibilities 1. Persistence of the present situation 2. If Jordan joins the (Camp David) agreement 3. If Jordan does not join the agreement 4. If Egypt and the United States actively co-operate in the establishment of autonomy."

(39) The unease was already strongly evident in October 1978. In a revealing report on 'Settlement: Life in the Shadow of Autonomy' Ha-aretz (Musaf Shevu' i) 20-10-78 P.6 quotes the Head of the Committee of Jordan Rift Settlements on one of the chief concerns: what would happen to lands seized for colonization from absentee owners if autonomy opened the way for a return of displaced persons?

"Before all (problems) are the lands. Here in the Rift we work thousands of dunams of agricultural land which - why is the truth not said? - are Arab lands. What Arabs? - above all absentee, inhabitants of Nablus and Toubas who fled to the East Bank in the Six Day War. These people cannot return to Judea and Samaria because a list of their names is kept at the bridges -- Now there will be autonomy -- what if these absentee will return? -- they will go in a procession to the courts."
CHAPTER TEN

REFUGEES AND SETTLERS: CONCLUSIONS.
The processes set in motion by the June 1967 War have affected the settlement geography of all the regions which came under Israeli rule. There has been, however, a very marked spatial differentiation in the extent of the change, in the main because regions which experienced particularly heavy population losses as a result of the June-December 1967 refugee movements (losses > 80% source population) have also been the regions most substantially transformed by the establishment of new Israeli settlement structures. On the other hand regions where Arab settlement concentrations were less affected by out-movement (losses < 30% source population) tended, until the advent of the Likud Government, to be placed outside the bounds of Israeli official settlement policy. The great exception has of course been East Jerusalem, where the historic pull on the Jewish people was so great as to overcome, from the outset, any qualms about incorporating a large new Arab population into the state of Israel.

Geographical unevenness in the impact of change was most visibly evident in early 1978, after a decade of spatially selective Labour colonization policy. Figure 71, which plots the position of the various regions against the two dimensions of settlement pattern transformation considered in this thesis (scale of refugee outflow and scale of Jewish settlement), depicts the six regions divided into three groups. Gaza, the West Bank Highlands and Sinai form the minimum transformation group on both measures while the Jordan Rift and the Golan exhibit maximum change, again on both. The gap between the two groups is very great.
largely due to the fact that, as regards Arab out-movement, there were no intermediate cases between near-total settlement desertion and minor to moderate population reductions. As may be seen Gaza and the Golan form the extremes while East Jerusalem occupies the peculiar position of major Jewish population infusion in the midst of dense Arab settlement. Indeed East Jerusalem, with c. 25,000 Israeli settlers, has alone accounted for 63% of the Jewish settlement movement across the 1967 boundaries. Significantly the Camp David accords deal specifically only with the 'less transformed' regions while territories where demographic and landscape change since 1967 has been particularly marked are either not mentioned at all (Golan), or remain the subject of acknowledged disagreement (East Jerusalem and colonized areas of the West Bank, the Jordan Rift being the most important such area).

Recently there have been signs that the above noted divisions may be beginning to diminish:

a) The tendency toward geographically extended Jewish colonization on the West Bank, heralded by Gush Emunim and fully inaugurated in the Likud's first year, would seem to indicate, if the process continues, a considerably augmented Jewish presence on the West Bank Highlands. If this occurred the East Jerusalem case would become less 'peculiar' than it has been hitherto.

b) In the Jordan Rift a high growth rate amongst the residual Arab population is already starting to compensate for 1967 settlement desertion.
c) A decision has been made to liquidate the settlement structure in Sinai.

As a result only the Golan (excepting the Druze area) appears likely to survive as a substantial area of entirely Jewish settlement. Elsewhere, in the West Bank and East Jerusalem, Jewish and Arab settlement patterns will be geographically mixed with a tendency for the Jewish presence, its current magnitude relative to the majority population being barely equivalent to the position of the European minority in Rhodesia, to become ever more dwarfed by resurgent Arab numbers.

None of this, however, is to imply that the impact of the June 1967 War will necessarily be negated. Rather it is that, away from the Golan, the recent direction of change has been more complex than any simple substitution of Jewish for Arab settlement — it has been toward an ever more intricate territorial mixing of the two communities of Palestine. Hence, if the Camp David arrangements do not quickly reverse the tendency, territorial re-partition may prove increasingly difficult and the ultimate implications for Israel's survival as a primarily Jewish state may well be disastrous.

(ii) The post 1967 phase of the Arab-Israeli conflict has also affected settlement patterns beyond the new cease-fire lines. The impact has been of two types:

a) Border-area hostilities of 1967-70 were catastrophic for settlements in both the East Jordan Valley and the Suez Canal zone. Although a rapid recovery occurred as soon as security conditions had returned to normal the threat of
another disruption remains as long as the overall conflict on the eastern front persists. As events in South Lebanon in March 1978 have indicated, all border areas away from Sinai are still very much 'hostages to fortune'.

b) Palestine refugee concentrations in the states neighbouring Israel, especially in East Jordan, were greatly supplemented by the arrival of c.400,000 new refugees in June-December 1967. Even with some necessary deflation of official estimates (refugee statistics should only be used after making the sort of qualification the author discusses in Chapters 2 and 3) the scale of the 1967 out-movement remains very great. In East Jordan, where it added c.15% to the total population, it had a clearly discernable destabilizing influence, both in promoting continued hostilities between Jordan and Israel up to 1970 and in simultaneously threatening the integrity of the Hashemite power structure. Although the Jordanian Government has managed to preserve itself by a combination of rigorous internal security operations and astute political manoeuvering the existence of a deeply frustrated and embittered Palestinian majority threatens further instability, again as long as there is no peace agreement with Israel which goes some way toward satisfying Palestinian aspirations. In such circumstances, and with Lebanon as an example, any faltering of Hashemite authority could have drastic disruptive implications, being one of a number of contingencies which could lead directly to an Arab-Israeli war on the eastern front.
(iii) In sum, in both Israeli settlement policy and the repercussions of the 1967 Arab refugee movements one is dealing with processes, the implications of which have not yet been fully realized, even eleven years after the June 1967 War. Indeed, if a comprehensive peace agreement resolving their future is not soon reached both 'refugees' and 'settlers' have the potential to cause future hostilities, leading in turn to further disruption in the settlement geography of the Levant.
Sources are listed in two groups - primary and secondary. Each is in turn subdivided into published and unpublished categories. Detailed information regarding locations of material is given where necessary. Language is specified for all Hebrew and Arabic sources.

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a) **Official**

(i) **Israel**

Settlement Department of the Jewish Agency
(Jerusalem, Haifa and Tzefat)

Planning material for Jewish settlement on the Golan Heights and in the Jordan Rift 1967-1977. Reports contain accounts of existing situations as well as proposals for further activity, and include maps, tables and diagrams. Proposals have not necessarily been implemented but are nonetheless interesting as indications of changing intentions through the period considered here.

All reports are in Hebrew

1967

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1973

Ramat ha Golan: Tokhnit Pituah Kolelet la Tzaf 1973-1977

1974

Tokhnit Av le Haspaqat Maim ba Big'a'at ha Yarden (Shetahim Mshuhrarim)
(Master Plan for Water Supply in the Jordan Rift - Liberated Areas)
Haifa, April 1974.

Tokhnit Pituah ha Golan - Matzai
(Golan Development Plan - Inventory)
Tzefat, 1974. 34p.

1975

Tokhnit Pituah Aizorit Kolelet - Aizor Big'a'at ha Yarden
(General Regional Development Plan - Jordan Rift Region)
Haifa, 1975.
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Hatza'at Tokhnit le Hityashvut ba Golan ha Tikhon.
(Planning Proposal for Settlement in the Central Golan)
Tzefat, April 1975, 21p.

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Tzefat, 1975, 28p.

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Ha Tokhnit le Pituah Yishuvim Nosefim ba Ramat ha Golan ; Ha Tokhnit ha Mesheqit ve Haluget Emtza'ei ha Yitzur

(ii) Jordan

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Register of numbers of displaced persons from the West Bank and the Gaza Strip - by place of origin and East Bank place of residence ; Lists for 30 September 1973 and 31 December 1975.

(iii) United Nations

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Contains population statistics for East Jordan Valley refugee camps.

b) Private

(i) Israel


Card index of Israeli settlements in Golan, West Bank, Gaza and Sinai - contains brief descriptions of social and economic characteristics of individual settlements. Held by Mr. Ephraim Orni, Jewish National Fund, Jerusalem.

(ii) Jordan


c) Interviews (including date of interview)

(i) Israel

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Knesset Member Meir Pa'il (Shefi faction, former head of Tzahal officer's training). November 1976 and February 1978.

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(ii) Jordan


Khalil Khayyat, National Resources Authority co-ordinator in the Jordan Valley (Deir Alla) May 1976.

Nimra Tannous Es Said, Executive Secretary - Supreme Ministerial Committee for Displaced Persons (Amman). Regular contact April - August 1976.

(iii) United Nations

Antranik Bakerjan, UNRWA field Officer (Ramallah) August 1976.

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a) Official

(i) Egypt


(ii) Israel


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- *Yediot Ahranot* (Tel Aviv) Daily newspaper.

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(ii) Others

*The Jerusalem Post* (Jerusalem) Daily newspaper

*Ot* (Tel Aviv) Israel Labour Party weekly 1972-1977. In Hebrew

c) Maps

(i) Survey of Israel

1:50,000 series - sheets for various dates 1973-1977
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(ii) Jordan Lands and Survey Dept.

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