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Chapter 5

Settlement Schemes

The previous chapter suggested that far from being attracted to or retained in their centres of settlement by economic opportunity, the Armenians were confined in these centres partly at least by their inability to move and settle elsewhere. What is certain is that the Armenians were stagnating in the cities, many in squalid "camps" or shantytowns, at a time when the cultivated area was expanding. The various efforts made by the philanthropic organisations to combat this situation by encouraging new industries could have only a temporary palliative effect. A redistribution of population was necessary. To this end, one remedy was emigration, and this has already been described in Chapter 2. No doubt the motive behind this movement was largely economic. Another remedy was redistribution of the Armenians within the country. This chapter describes and assesses the various attempts made to achieve this redistribution.

First Attempts

Early French Attempts at Redistribution

The first effort to distribute the Armenians in accordance with the economic opportunities in the country came in 1921 when, during the evacuation of refugees from Cilicia to Syria and Lebanon, the French authorities found themselves obliged to take charge of those refugees who were initially unable to
secure their own livelihood. Plans to receive these refugees were outlined by M. Robert De Caix, Secretary-General to the French High Commission, in December, 1921. At Mersin in Cilicia, where the refugees had accumulated, they would be listed according to confession, livelihood, craft and preference concerning destination. After transport to Syria by boat those with an assured livelihood would be left free in their choice of residence. For the others camps would be created using army-tents, reed-huts or monasteries. These would be on the coast of Lebanon, at Latakia, or in the State of Damascus. For political reasons, and because refugees were arriving there spontaneously, no camps would be created at Alexandretta and Aleppo. For the refugees in these camps, building-sites would be opened where they would be obliged to work for wages lower than those current in the country. In this way they would be encouraged to find work in local industries while their labour would prove beneficial to the Levant States, which would thus be induced to reimburse to the High Commission the money expended on the employment of this labour, which would be regarded as a loan made towards their public works. The labour of the refugees would also be offered to individuals and local industry while demands for refugee labour would be centralised. The cost of maintaining the refugees would be reduced by a stoppage on their wages to persuade them to become self-sufficient. It was vitally important to assure their dispersal from the camps as soon as possible. De Caix noted further the importance of operating outside Lebanon, in order to reduce the number of refugees who would fall into French care. He envisaged out-placing
amongst the land-owners who were complaining of lack of
labour, and noted the possibilities of the Bekaa and perhaps
the plain of Homs-Hama. Agricultural colonies would not
however be established, in order to avoid expense. The
refugees who settled on the land would be those engaged by
local landowners, or requested for experimental stations by
the agricultural adviser of the High Commission, or left free
to settle, with the aid of their community, on rented lands.

It is evident that dispersal according to economic absorp-
tive capacity was a principal element in this French plan.\(^2\)
The extent of the redistribution which had taken place (by
French means) by January 21, 1922, is shown in Table 5.1, which
may be compared with Table 3.2. Of these refugees, only
1,421 remained in French care. The extent of French dispersal
of refugees to the villages of Lebanon is not known, but the
dispersal seems confirmed by Burnier,\(^3\) who notes that the
1,200 (sic) Armenians who had arrived by sea at Saida in
December 1921 remained until September, 1922 in the care of
the French Administrator of the region, who gradually found
the means to distribute them in the country according to their
crafts.

When, despite their own efforts, the French were faced
with a large accumulation of Armenians at Alexandretta, they
again found themselves obliged, as much for economic as political
reasons, to pursue a policy of dispersal. The appalling
condition of the refugees at Alexandretta attracted the concern
of the "Friends of Armenia" who in March, 1922 advised the
Foreign Office of French inaction in the face of an agglomeration
Table 5.1

Distribution of refugees transported from Cilicia to Syria and Lebanon by French means, at January 31, 1922

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>City</th>
<th>Number</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Beirut</td>
<td>4,562</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Djounich</td>
<td>1,700</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Zahlé</td>
<td>100</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Tripoli</td>
<td>1,432</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Saida</td>
<td>1,352</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Damascus</td>
<td>4,000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Alawi Territory</td>
<td>2,266</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Total</strong></td>
<td><strong>16,412</strong></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Source: De Caix to M.A.E., Jan. 31, Arch.Dip., S-L-C., Vol. 124

of "20,000" refugees. The question was taken up by Lord Curzon who reported this total to both M. Poincaré, the French Prime Minister, and General Gouraud, the High Commissioner, at the Peace Conference. De Caix was immediately instructed to communicate more precise information to the Quai d'Orsay, but by this time he was himself due to leave for Alexandretta on a tour of inspection with Dr. Melkonian, effective representative of Armenian interests in Syria. This was possibly as a result of pressure from Mr. McAfee, Director of the Near East Relief, who was also reported in March, 1922 to be bringing pressure on the government to remove the refugees from Alexandretta. 4

On April 1, De Caix wired his report on the situation to General Gouraud at Paris, 5 he estimated that there were
He thought it necessary to evacuate as soon as possible to the south 4,000 or 5,000 of them who could not find work. About 2,000 agricultural workers could be settled at some expense on unoccupied land. 1,500 could be absorbed by Alawi Territory and 1,500 by the Tripoli-Hama region. That, however, was the limit, as there was already unemployment at Beirut and Damascus. The evacuation, which could only be undertaken by persuasion and through offers of work, and by assuming the cost of transport, would be organised in collaboration with Dr. Melkonian and the Armenian leaders. He concluded with a bitter jibe at British hypocrisy:

"Toute la difficulté vient de la fermeture aux réfugiés des pays dépendant de nations qui nous accourent maintenant de n'avoir pas soin des Arméniens pour qui elles ont beaucoup moins fait que nous. À moins de défaire des sommes (énormes) qui serviraient surtout à dégrader les réfugiés il n'y a qu'à essayer de répartir dans les régions où ils peuvent s'employer des gens qui ne sont pas plus mal installés à Alexandretta que les Français du Nord arrivant pour relever leurs foyers dévastés."

It is evident that in execution of these desires some dispersal of refugees from Alexandretta did take place, although their exact destination is obscure. Some certainly reached Latakia and Beirut, while others may have reached Damascus. They included, for example, the Armenians from Ekhba who had moved to Alexandretta as early as 1920, and who were transferred to Latakia in May, 1922.6

It was partly similar economic considerations which led the French authorities to disperse from Aleppo to Beirut and Damascus, about 4,500 of the refugees who arrived there in
The financial burden assumed by the French was, however, soon dropped. After their initial, and incomplete, dispersal, the Armenians were left to their own resources, and their absorption into the economic life of the country was left incomplete. It is evident nevertheless that French policy was largely responsible for such dispersal of refugees as did take place from their arrival points. In so far as the objective of this policy was to enable the economic absorption of the refugees, it must be admitted that it was manifestly unsuccessful. As observed, the economic plight of the Armenians who had been dispersed, especially in, for example, Damascus, appears not to have been significantly better than that of those who remained at their arrival points, though what the situation in the arrival-points would have been without dispersal one shudders to consider. In this respect, the net effect of the dispersal policy was, to be fair, beneficial, that is, to have spread the poverty of the Armenians more evenly over a country which simply was not able to absorb them without large injections of capital.

Karen Jeppe

In recognition of the need for a more radical solution efforts were made to encourage agricultural colonisation. The first positive steps were taken in this respect by Miss Karen Jeppe, League Commissioner at Aleppo for the Protection of Women and Children in the Near East, supported by the Swedish branch of the International Fellowship of Reconciliation. This latter organisation had already, as early as 1922, endeavoured to interest the League of Nations in a colonisation scheme, but its efforts failed. In 1923, however, at the
international conference of the Reconciliation in Denmark, the question of the establishment of an agricultural colony was discussed on the initiative of the Swedish branch, supported by Paul Berron, Director of the "Action Chrétienne en Orient", and in the presence of Karen Jeppe. As a result, the Swedish branch was asked to organise the work, while Karen Jeppe was appointed as their representative to look for a site and make preparations.

The first colonies (Tell es Saméne Missak and its twin, Tell Armen) were established in 1924 in the valley of the Nahr el Belkh, between Raqqa and Tell Abiad. (Fig 5.1) The Armenian peasants from Garmudsh near to Urfa had been driven out of Turkey in the winter of 1923-4. As soon as they had reached Aleppo, the great landowners had tried to induce them to settle in their villages as their tenants. The Armenians were afraid to accept these offers, but trusted Miss Jeppe who had previously been working in the Urfa Region for about fifteen years. The landowners therefore turned to Miss Jeppe who considered their proposals and finally selected those of Hadjim Pasha, the hereditary chief of the Anezeh tribe. Thus were established the twin colonies of Tell es Saméne and Tell-Armen. In February, 1926, Miss Jeppe was envisaging the further settlement of refugees from the Urfa region in this district, while she thought that other refugees, from the mountainous part of Cilicia, might be settled in Alawi Territory. This latter idea she dropped as the French authorities did not consider it advisable, so she turned instead to a new colony in the valley of the Nahrel Belkh at Charb Bedros (Kheurbet er Riss) which was founded in Spring,
1926. Other refugees appear to have been outplaced by Miss Jeppe in small groups in other villages, for in February, 1926, she sent out four families, whose settlement depended on money provided by the "Friends of Armenia", to be settled at the village of Ali Begdjili (El Bajilye?) near Tell Abiad. With the establishment of the Nansen Office settlement scheme, Miss Jeppe lost much of her freedom of action, but continued to carry on her work on its limited scale. By 1934, the Tell es Saméne colony had apparently failed for, after the death of Hadjim Pasha, his heirs adopted a less conciliatory attitude to the Armenians, limiting their agricultural possessions to the extent that it was impossible for them to subsist. Accordingly, Miss Jeppe appears to have founded a new colony, at Tinj, this time founded on the principle of colonising the Armenians in common with the Arabs.

Although Karen Jeppe's scheme was designed largely to relieve pressure in the towns, and to resettle agricultural workers, there were other motives behind it; to reduce costs for her Rescue Home, and to create centres of international reconciliation. The colonies themselves took in a number of the Armenian boys rescued from the Arab and Kurdish tribes. The scheme itself involved a relatively small number of Armenians. In 1925, Joseph Burtt of the Society of Friends noted that the sister villages of Tell-Armen and Tell es Saméne together had a population of 270 people, while in mid-1926, the population of Khourbet or Rizz was 40 Armenian families plus 30 of the older rescued boys. At Tell es Saméne, the original tenancy agreement was that Hadjim Pasha would supply the land and seed free and take in return half the
produce, so that the Armenians were, in fact, metayers. A
dyke was constructed to regulate irrigation and a tractor
brought with much difficulty across the Euphrates. Burtt
reported in 1925 that the colony was growing maize, millet,
wheat, cotton, onions, melons, etc. 1500 mulberry trees
had been planted, and there were horses, cattle and sheep.16

The need for large-scale schemes

Laudable as Miss Jeppe’s schemes were, they remained on a
small-scale only. To solve the problem, plans were required
on a much larger scale, and such schemes found their
propagandists in the philanthropic societies, who realised
that

"At the best...individual benevolence, or even the
corporate humanitarian gifts of Churches, can only
relieve the existing suffering. They cannot really
deal radically with the problem. Governmental
action guided by far-sighted statesmanlike policy
can alone grapple with and solve the root problem,
which is the resettlement of these people."17

Foremost in the advocacy of such schemes were Karen Jeppe,
Joseph Burtt, and Paul Barron. Karen Jeppe persistently
endeavoured to interest the League of Nations in a settlement
scheme.18 Joseph Burtt, who visited the area in 1925, came to
the same conclusion. Significantly he drew attention to
Karen Jeppe’s colonies, and advocated three centres where the
Armenians might be settled on the land; the Antioch region,
the region of Homs and Hama, and the Saida region.19 Paul
Barron, Director of the "Action Chrétienne en Orient" and his
fellow-workers had become interested in colonisation as
early as 1922. In 1926, Barron prepared a report which
noted the problem and urged agricultural colonisation as the
best solution, again drawing on the example of Karen Jeppe. In this report he urged settlement along the coast, and suggested three particular areas: the Soueidiye district, Qassab district, and the district of Latakia-Tripoli. The first two suggestions were derived from a report by Mr. A. Oshan, "patented agronym", communicated to Berron by the local Armenian Doctor P. Sevian, himself an advocate of agricultural settlement. The four villages involved were in three cases formerly prosperous communities now partly depopulated, and in one case situated on swampy land, requiring drainage to support a larger population. The third area suggested, the coast between Latakia and Tripoli, Berron believed to be neglected, to the extent that it would be easy to establish small colonies of Armenians, whether to make up new villages or to extend those already existing.

Such proposals initially fell on deaf ears in the official quarters from where the backing and finance would be necessary. It has already been observed that the French authorities were reluctant, at the time of the 1921 migration from Cilicia, to involve themselves in agricultural colonisation schemes, hoping to rid themselves of the financial burden of the Armenians as soon as possible. Mr. Hekimian, representative at Aleppo of the Near East Relief, reports how, when the Armenian Catholicos requested from General Billotte, Delegate of the French High Commission to the State of Aleppo, that land from the domain of Sultan Abdul Hamid about Hama and Homs be given to the Armenians for colonisation, the General replied that the State of Aleppo was too poor to give any land.21 He further advised the Armenians to disseminate in Syria, but
this would appear to have been difficult for the Armenians on the grounds of security. Later, Hekiman reported that the French authorities had been repeatedly requested officially to authorise settlement by the Armenians on State domain land, and to grant loans for the purchase of equipment. Instead, they had attempted to scatter small groups of ten to twenty Armenian families in Arab villages to be employed by rich landowners. Caustically he observed that "they desire to reap a harvest in Syria without sowing". The Mandatory authorities were clearly anxious to limit their financial commitment.

Here it will be appropriate to comment on the budgetary system of the Mandated territories which was as complex as their administrative organisation. Each separate State had its own Budget, supported especially by direct taxation. In addition the French-administered Common Interests organisation collected the revenue from certain departments of common interest, such as the Customs, and allocated this revenue to the various Services (Health etc.) maintained throughout the territories, to certain other interstatal charges, and as subventions to the budgets of the separate states. The expenses of the High Commission, and the French forces in the territory, however, devolved upon the French treasury. The States' budgets were intended to be self-supporting, thus "firmly (but not deliberately - author) limiting the pace of possible development in beneficial State activity." That the territory pay its way without financial assistance from France was a cardinal principle of French policy. Indeed, the cost of the Mandate came under frequent fire in France.
To pay for comprehensive Armenian refugee settlement would have required either precisely such an objectionable injection of capital from France, or an extraordinary financial commitment from the limited resources of the territory, not only financially embarrassing but potentially politically so, especially at the level of the State budgets.

It is understandable, therefore, that official financial commitment to Armenian settlement was initially minimal. Consequent attempts to encourage small-scale dispersal met with Armenian opposition on the grounds of security, and, as already observed, do not appear to have been successful. M. De Caix, then French spokesman at the Permanent Mandates Commission, reported in November, 1926 that some Armenians who had been placed with Syrian or French landowners had left agricultural employment to become pedlars as soon as they had saved a little money. He concluded that the Armenians were not on the whole an agricultural population.24

In fact, the authorities appear to have been rather confused as to the number of agricultural workers (and hence potential agricultural colonists) amongst the Armenians. At Genoa in February, 1926, M. De Caix had to accept that there was a contradiction in the report of the Mandatory Power for 1924, concerning the manner in which immigration was regarded:25

"In the second paragraph it was stated: ""To sum up, the Christian immigrants of Anatolia, ... now...constitute a remedy, to a large extent, for the lack of labour resulting from the traditional emigration of the inhabitants of Lebanon to the two Americas," while two paragraphs further on, the report stated: ""...They replaced them in quantity but not in quality for, while the emigrants belong for the most part to the peasant classes, the great majority of immigrants are artisans.""
The Carle Proposals

If the French reaction to large-scale settlement proposals was disappointing, the League of Nations provided more hope. On September 25, 1924, the Assembly passed a resolution inviting...

"the I.L.O., in collaboration with Dr. Nansen (the League High Commissioner for Refugees - author), to institute an enquiry with a view to studying the possibility of settling a substantial number of Armenian refugees in the Caucasus or elsewhere...." 26

In view of the various representations made to this Commission regarding the situation of the Armenian refugees in Syria, one member of the Commission, M.Carle, was invited to proceed to Syria for the purpose of submitting a report on the Armenian refugee problem there. He concluded from his investigation that the refugees should be encouraged in every way to settle on the land if a final and permanent solution of the problem was to be found. 27 He noted the failure of the French authorities to persuade the Armenians to do so. Even in requesting Armenian landowners to encourage poor Armenians to settle on the land, both General Gouraud and M.Auchard, agricultural adviser to the State of Syria, had seen several attempts fail. A Frenchman who owned a vineyard in the Bekaa had set up an Armenian as steward at Chtaura, only to see him desert to become a pedlar. No doubt it was this example cited by Carle which had prompted De Caix's remarks to the Permanent Mandates Commission, but it has already been suggested that the failure of French attempts at dispersal was due to their small-scale. Now, however, M.Carle found French officials willing to consider larger-scale settlement.
Lépissier, Assistant Secretary-General to the High Commissioner, was devoting his attention to the problem. M. Carle drew his attention to the possibilities existing at the head of the Ghab, scheduled for division into lots, and for which an improvement-plan had recently been prepared. He obtained the agreement of M. Fontana, Director of the Land Service, to a proposal to establish an Armenian village in this area, and M.W. Carle and Melconian (almost acting Armenian "consul") addressed a formal request to the High Commissioner to decide this question. Carle envisaged that capital of about a million francs would be required to allow the future landholders to obtain agricultural implements, livestock and seed. This would be provided by a loan at low interest, administered by the Crédit Agricole, involving funds from the interested local governments. He raised the question of the Nansen Office providing 500,000 francs to assist in the establishment of the first settlements. He envisaged that the million francs would provide for about 1500 hectares at about ten hectares per family, i.e. by implication the settlement of about 150 families, but in a letter to Major Johnson, Secretary-General of the League Refugees Office, he foresaw the settlement of five to eight thousand refugees in the Ghab, and noted too that the High Commission intended to endeavour to populate the region to the east of Aleppo beside the Euphrates. The question was discussed at a meeting of the League Refugees Advisory Committee in September, 1925, 28 when Dr. Nansen rightly pointed out that a settlement scheme in Syria could only be carried out with the permission of, and in co-operation with, the French authorities. Almost at the same time, however,
the political situation in Syria deteriorated rapidly, and plans had to be shelved.\textsuperscript{29} The Druze Rebellion, which was responsible for this inconvenience, erupted in August, 1925, and was not finally stamped out until 1927. Though affecting primarily the southern part of Syria, it produced insecurity and fear even in the far north where the rebels secured no firm hold.\textsuperscript{30}

**The Nansen Office Settlement Scheme**

**Initial Proposals**

Paradoxically, it was as an indirect result of the fighting in Syria that the question was revived.\textsuperscript{31} In November, 1925 M. Schlemmer had been sent by the International Red Cross Committee to study the refugee problem caused by this conflict. He was replaced the next month by M. Burnier. At the beginning of April, 1926, Burnier accompanied Dr. Duguet, director of the health service of the "armée du Levant," on a tour of inspection, during which they observed the necessity of intervening more particularly on behalf of the Armenian refugees. On April 12, Burnier wrote to the Red Cross asking if Dr. Nansen, the League High Commissioner for Refugees, might be interested in co-operating in a solution, offering to act as negotiator. His letter was accompanied by a report which stated that the problem was that the great majority (6-7,000 families) of the Armenians were agriculturalists who, unlike the traders and shopkeepers, were unable to obtain work. The solution to this problem was the creation of agricultural colonies. These proposals were taken under consideration by the League. When he heard that Dr. Nansen might perhaps be
disposed to co-operate, Burnier informed the French authorities and after two conferences with M. de Reffye, Secretary-General to the High Commissioner, and M. Lépissier, his assistant, drew up the broad outlines of a plan, which was approved by M. de Jouvenal, the High Commissioner, for submission to the I.L.O. with a request for the formal participation of that organisation. This he presented to the I.L.O. Refugees Office on his return to Geneva on May 11, 1926.

The report\textsuperscript{32} began with an outline of the problem. It noted that, while many refugees (especially businessmen, artisans and workmen) had been able to establish themselves in Syria, many others (above all peasants) had not. A distinction was drawn between the refugees at Beirut and those in other localities. At Beirut, the material situation of the refugees was relatively satisfactory, and the local population was not hostile. Elsewhere, especially at Damascus, Hama, Homs and Aleppo, the situation was much less favourable. At Damascus and Hama the population was absolutely hostile to the Armenians, who were having difficulty in making a living. At Aleppo, Syrian-Armenian relations were better, but the town could not support its Armenian influx. Out of 45,000 refugees at Aleppo, 35-40,000 were living in unstable conditions, and according to local relief committees most of these were peasants. The solution lay in the creation of agricultural colonies, the guiding principle of which should be the transfer to a predominantly Christian region of the Armenians living in predominantly Muslim regions. More specifically it was proposed that the Armenian agricultural workers in the interior towns be transferred to southern Lebanon.
where the Mandatory authorities were ready to provide, in the villages of Hasbaya and Merdjayoun, land and houses for 1,500 families (8,000 persons), and, in the region of Tyr, domain land (formerly property of the Sultan) able to hold about 4,000 families (20,000 persons). It was because the French authorities and the State of Lebanon could not afford the cost of establishing these colonies that they were addressing themselves to the High Commissioner for Refugees. These costs would, however, be in the form of loans to the refugees, reimbursable after an agreed period. A trial installation of 50 families was proposed to establish the cost of such a scheme.

A number of observations may be made on these proposals. First, they entirely supplanted those of M.Carle, made the previous year and which, concerned with settlement in the interior, would be excluded under the new proposals. Second, although established in collaboration with Burnier, they reflected French policy, from which political considerations were not absent. Third, the basis of the proposals was that the majority of the Armenians requiring assistance were peasants. This was in direct contradiction with earlier French statements and suggests that economic assessments were partly matters of political convenience. It is unfortunate that our knowledge of the former occupational structure of the Armenians is too imprecise to enable critical comment on these assessments. Fourth, following the Carle proposals, they represented a continuing French interest in large-scale solutions, no doubt related to the provision of finance by the League.
The vital condition for the acceptance of participation by the Office was a formal request from the French government. Such a request was not initially forthcoming, as the proposals for the mass transfer of refugees were criticised at the Quai d'Orsay on political grounds. It was not until June 30, 1926 that M. De Jouvenal addressed a request for intervention to the Director of the I.L.O. and suggested the sending of an envoy to Syria charged with the establishment of a general plan of settlement, in collaboration with the local authorities. Burnier was nominated to this task, as joint representative of the I.L.O. and the I.R.C. C.

Once in Syria, Burnier resumed co-operation with the French authorities, and gradually developed the principal features of a settlement plan which was in several respects different from that originally foreseen. It was decided, because Beirut and Aleppo together contained two thirds of the Armenian refugee population, to concentrate on solving the problem in those two settlements before considering other centres. The situation in Beirut camp would be relieved by the construction of a new quarter, a project already under study in April, and for which the French High Commission allocated a sum of three million francs. It is clear that such measures of urban improvement, while relieving conditions in the camps, would not fundamentally alter the economic position of the Armenians in the country. However, an experimental agricultural colony of about 50 families would be established in Southern Lebanon. On the inquiry of the "Service de Renseignements," some landowners of Saida and Tyr declared themselves willing to take Armenian métayers, and Burnier
believed the region to be especially favourable to métayage, having large, fertile landholdings, adequate water-supply, a shortage of labour, and an indigenous population of Metwalis, (Shi'i Muslims) who had remained calm during the revolt. In the State of Syria, the reorganisation of the Aleppo camp was foreseen, and the installation of agricultural colonies. These could be on the coast or in the Euphrates Region, but the Euphrates region was ruled out, at least initially, for economic, political and financial reasons. The political reasons will be considered later. Of more direct concern is that in sparsely inhabited country, with poor communications, the refugees would lack markets. Further, the costs of installation would be too high, and could only be undertaken by a rich company, well provided with engineers and equipment, wishing to organise specialised cultivation, for example of cotton or cereals, over thousands of hectares. By contrast, for reasons of security, the coastal region of Antioch-Sousidiye, containing a large indigenous Armenian population, was more acceptable. Some entire Armenian villages were the property of one or several Armenians, and the Armenian "Société de Secours" at Aleppo had already sent an agronomist to the region to make inquiries.37 Not only the Armenian landowners but Greeks and Muslims too had expressed their willingness to take Armenians either as farmers or métayers. Many of the villages had been partly depopulated, and installation would be inexpensive. It was Beirut, however, which would take first priority; on October 12, 1926, three cases of plague had been reported in the camp.

It is clear that, compared with Burnier's original proposals (also worked out in collaboration with the French),
there were significant changes in the new arrangements. The large-scale transfer of refugees from the interior to southern Lebanon was no longer envisaged. Southern Lebanon would now receive refugees from Beirut, while there would be some stabilisation of the refugees at Aleppo, and their colonisation would be within the State of Syria, possibly in the Sanjak of Alexandretta. Beirut and Aleppo were selected for priority treatment; Damascus was, for the time being, ignored. The whole conception of the original plan had been altered, and more piecemeal proposals substituted.

At Geneva, meanwhile, the Consultative Committee for Refugees had decided to set up an Armenian sub-committee, charged with gathering the necessary funds for the scheme and advising the High Commissioner for Refugees as to their use. The only positive action of this sub-committee at its first meeting on November 1 was to approve in principle the plan for an experimental colony of 50 families, and to invite Major Johnson to visit Syria in order to be able to submit concrete proposals to the committee.

In his report on this visit Johnson outlined the problem. Out of an estimated total of 86,500 refugees, he believed that the solution would involve the evacuation and resettlement of no fewer than 20,000 refugees (Table 5.2). In addition the settlement elsewhere of the 10,000 refugees in the region of Damascus should be regarded as a practical necessity if and when the military effectiveness in that area should be appreciably diminished. The immediate problem consisted of 2,000 agricultural families (10,000 refugees), whose settlement, he
### Table 5.2

**Major Johnson's appreciation of the Refugee Problem in Syria**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Present installation</th>
<th>Total no:</th>
<th>Situation and urgent action recommended</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Beirut camp</td>
<td>22,000</td>
<td>1,000 agricultural families (approximately 5,000 refugees) should be established on the land as soon as possible, either in colonies or as metayers. A further 1,000 families of unskilled workers engaged in casual labour should be evacuated as soon as possible to dwellings which could be constructed on the outskirts of the town.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Aleppo camp</td>
<td>28,000</td>
<td>800 agricultural families (approximately 4,000 refugees) should be transferred to the land in the regions of Antioch-Sceuidiyé and of Aleppo-Ménbidj-Meskene. The evacuation of a further 800 families of unskilled workers employed in casual labour would substantially liquidate the original Aleppo camp.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Alexandretta camp</td>
<td>5,350 (1,350 families)</td>
<td>450 families are destitute and a further 650 families are in a very precarious situation. 1,000 families therefore require transfer elsewhere, to the Jebel Moussa for instance, or should be employed on draining the Alexandretta marshes where they are at present installed</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Beilane &amp; district</td>
<td>1,350 autonominous Armenians</td>
<td>Only 15 families are destitute and require establishment.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Kirik-Khane</td>
<td>1,800 (440 families)</td>
<td>60 destitute families and 240 indigent families require assistance</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
believed, would pave the way for the assimilation, in various capacities, of a large proportion of the remaining 10,000 refugees. In considering settlement proposals, he first excluded schemes for the Euphrates Valley, for the same reasons as Burnier. He then proposed a number of schemes which he believed to be acceptable; that is resettlement at Beirut and settlement in the Sanjak of Alexandretta and in southern Lebanon, all for the same reasons as stated by Burnier. In southern Lebanon, 50 families could be placed forthwith as métayers, while, in the event of this experiment proving successful, the High Commission was still willing to consider placing certain State lands in the same region at the disposal of the Office. Johnson also presented two additional proposals. One was for settlement on marshes to be reclaimed at Alexandretta, the other for settlement in the caamas of Bab
and Menbidj, within sixty to seventy kilometres of Aleppo. In this latter area, Johnson was informed by General Billotte that there were large tracts of vacant land and even abandoned villages which could be made available to the Armenians on advantageous terms. Furthermore, extensive irrigation works were being contemplated, with a view to the exploitation of large tracts of fertile land between Neskene and Aleppo, which would not only afford employment to considerable numbers of Armenians, but would open up further areas for their settlement. Aleppo would provide a market, while security would be assured by the concentration of troops in and around Aleppo. Detailed proposals in this respect were provided by General Billotte. The interesting new aspect of Johnson's overview of the situation was an acknowledgement of the necessity to act to alleviate the situation at Alexandretta town.

Johnson's proposals were presented to the next meeting of the Armenian sub-committee, when support was expressed for the settlement of Armenians in the Sanjak and southern Lebanon, in preference to the proposals for settlement in Aleppo Vilayet, on the grounds of security.\(^4\) In the meantime, however, a new "Comité Central de Secours aux Arméniens" was formed in Beirut involving Burnier, the French authorities and other interested parties, under the presidency of the Secretary-General of the French High Commission, to study the possibilities for settlement. Sub-committees would be constituted working under the control of the French delegate in each state. Henceforth, therefore, there was a certain dualism in administration, with the Beirut and Geneva committees sometimes
at cross purposes, with Geneva losing some of its control over the allocation of finance, and Burnier finding some of his proposals, approved in Beirut, rejected by Geneva. This dualism was well represented by the preparation of a general plan by Duguet. This plan, based on an appreciation of the problem similar to that of Johnson (Table 5.3), laid down that the initial operations should be the construction of a new quarter at Beirut, along with agricultural colonisation, the immediate possibilities being the establishment of 50 families as métayers in southern Lebanon, and the settlement of 150 families as owner-occupiers in the Antioch region. It clearly duplicated the proposals of Johnson.

Ras ul Ain

One scheme which did get under way was that for the establishment of the experimental colony in southern Lebanon. Twenty-one families, in fact, were eventually placed as métayers at Ras ul Ain near Tyr. Agreement was reached with an Egyptian who was farming domain land leased from the government. The Armenians would provide oxen, tools and half the seed, (in fact supplied by the Beirut Committee), while the manager would provide lodging, land, food for the livestock until the harvest, the remaining seed and a kitchen-garden for each family. The Armenians would receive 55% of the harvest. They would in addition have available as much work as they could manage as day-labourers at 25 piastres per day. The experiment ended in failure, the Armenians being taken back to Beirut whence they came by the end of 1927. Already in July, 1927, the refugees were reported to be suffering from malaria.
Table 5.3

Duguet's appreciation of the Armenian refugee problem in Syria, Dec. 29, 1926

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>No. of families in the camps:</th>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td>at Beirut</td>
<td>2,500 families</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>at Aleppo</td>
<td>3,000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>at Alexandretta</td>
<td>1,000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>TOTAL</td>
<td>6,500 i.e. about 40,000 persons</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

of which:

- 60% agriculturalists: 24,000
- 10% rural artisans: 4,000
- 30% urban artisans, "commercants," intellectuals: 12,000
  - 40,000

At Beirut: 2,500 families. Envisage

(a) definitive urban installation of 1,000 families
(b) rural installation of 1,500 families.

At Aleppo: 3,000 families. Envisage

(a) urban improvements
(b) rural installation of 1,500 families of agriculturists or rural artisans.

At Alexandretta: 1,000 families comprising above all women and children at present dependent on charity. Each agricultural centre created by us should receive several of these specially needy families.

Source: N.A., C1429
This was true, but according to Duguet it was due partly to the imprudence of the Armenians, who had destroyed an irrigation-dam in order to have a greater quantity of water for cultivation, without considering the possible consequences. The eventual liquidation of the colony was due, according to Burnier, not to malaria, but to the system of métayage, which the Armenians viewed as unjust, the lack of organisation amongst the Armenians, who had no leader, and the system of recruitment, which paid no attention to place of origin.

This abortive scheme was the only planned Armenian settlement in southern Lebanon. In fact, while at the time of Johnson’s visit it had been intimated that, in the event of the experiment proving successful, the High Commission was willing to consider placing certain tracts of State domain in the region at the disposal of the Office, Burnier was already reporting in December, 1926 that it was not expected to find large outlets in Lebanon. Settlement at Ras ul Ain was, however, proposed again in May, 1928, when the same land reverted to the Government, but this was then regarded as the sole remaining Government estate available in Lebanon for settlement purposes. Given low priority at Geneva, it was eclipsed by other schemes. The large scale colonisation of southern Lebanon envisaged by De Jouvenal never really began.

Proposals for settlement in the interior

Less fortunate still were the plans suggested for settlement in the interior of Aleppo Vilayet. There, the French Delegate, M. Reclus, wished to keep within the Vilayet those Armenians who had settled there, regarding them,
according to Burnier and Duguet, as an element of prosperity in the country. He was in favour of the establishment of large agricultural colonies, and believed it would be necessary to settle 800 families of peasants. It was therefore proposed to create a first colony of 200-250 families at Qirate, 10 km north-east of Qalaat el Mudik, on two tracts of state-domain, of 1600 hectares, on a plateau overlooking the Orontes Valley. Water-supply was insufficient, comprising unusable wells and cisterns, but M. Vitalis, an agricultural engineer, who undertook trials, found water-bearing rocks at little depth able to provide an adequate supply. The scheme was approved in principle by Johnson, despite the preference of the Geneva Committee for settlement in coastal rather than interior regions, Burnier arguing (as Johnson had in his report) that security in the interior could, in certain cases, be assured. Nevertheless the plan then ran into the opposition of "an important Armenian organisation" which, notwithstanding the success of M. Vitalis, still protested that the settlement would be deficient in water, and generally unhealthy. To avoid possibly embarrassing discussions with this Society, the Scheme was dropped. Burnier accepted the decision bitterly, protesting that the scheme had been carefully studied from the technical and security aspects, while not a single Armenian notable had actually bothered to visit the proposed site. He could not understand why the Armenians, having originally supported settlement in the Ghab, should now veto settlement in a nearby region.

Two other schemes involving settlement in the interior also came to grief. One concerned land in the southern Hauran
around Qouneitra, near to some Circassian villages established by the Sultan to create a dam between the Druze of the Jebel and those of the Hauran and Hermon. Johnson did not consider that this would appeal to the Geneva Committee given their preference for settlement in coastal regions. The other plan involved a resurrection of Carle's plan for the Ghab which, it will be recalled, had fallen into abeyance at the time of the Druze Revolt. Burnier however considered that the lack of progress with work on the Ghab and its general unhealthiness made other schemes preferable.

Settlement in the Sanjak of Alexandretta

One area, advocated by Burnier and Duguet, which was acceptable to Geneva, was the Sanjak of Alexandretta. The area had been suggested for settlement by both Burtt and Berron, and Mr. Oskan, an agronomist, had made a study of the possibilities for settlement on behalf of the local Armenians. In this region, a number of landowners had expressed their willingness to take Armenians either as farmers or métayers. It was believed that in the many depopulated villages of the area installation would be inexpensive. Detailed proposals for the settlement of 150 families in five farms in the region were annexed to Duguet's plan, based on a study made by the chief officer of the "Service de Renseignements" of Antioch. All were lying fallow with their houses in ruins. In these farms would be placed, not métayers as at Ras ul Ain, but owner-occupiers, Burnier regarding the placement of owner-occupier in the Sanjak as more advantageous than that of métayers in Lebanon. In Geneva, it had been thought that
métagage would achieve the best results, but Burnier argued against it on the grounds that the financial risks involved were too great, it achieved no definitive settlement and it was socially undesirable, arguments which were eventually accepted in Geneva. Further, while originally the Sanjak had been proposed as a centre of settlement for the refugees of Aleppo, in view of the plans for the settlement of Armenians in the interior of Aleppo Vilayet (which never, in fact, came to fruition), the Armenians to be sent there would be chosen by preference from Alexandretta itself and Beirut.

Money was sent from Geneva to Burnier for the purchase of these five farms, but before the purchase could be completed, objections were raised by certain Armenian notables. A new study was ordered, this time by M. Vitalis, which confirmed the conclusions of the first. However, in the meantime, the price of two of the farms had decreased so that their purchase was abandoned. Ultimately, only one of these farms was purchased, that of Ikiz Keupru, in the Jebel Noussa on August 10, 1927, half the money to be paid to the owners in Antioch, the other half to owners in the United States. Two other farms were, however, purchased by Burnier. The first was Souk Sou in the Amouk plain purchased at the end of 1927 from an elderly indigenous Armenian no longer able to assure its exploitation. He sold it to his compatriots despite the fact that higher offers had been made by Muslins. The second was Bey-Seki eventually purchased in 1930. In addition, a number of Armenians were aided in their establishment on two plots of land in the developing town of Kirik Khane, also
in the Amouk plain. 63

As an alternative to lands in private-ownership, a detailed list was drawn up of available state domain and escheat land. Investigation of these lands revealed three large tracts of land, all possessing fertile alluvial soils in the Amouk plain, and all of which could be used immediately, without preparation. Agreement in principle to settlement on these lands was communicated to Burnier in October, 1927, who obtained a lease on the property of Pré-Militaire, for three years, during which time it would be possible to sign a new agreement with the authorities. This land, of 650 hectares, was formerly used to quarter each year two regiments of Ottoman cavalry. It was considered suitable for the settlement of 150 families. 64

More domain land was obtained in 1927 from a quite different source. This was a property at Kirik Khane of over one hundred hectares belonging to the Mission des Lazaristes. 65 The Lazarists found that they had not the resources to administer all their land and decided to surrender it to the Settlement Committee. The Lazarists themselves had apparently earlier been installed at Kirik Khane as part of a deliberate policy. They had been offered a tract of domain land at Kirik Khane in 1923 in order to reconstitute there their Mission from Ekebs, presumably in accordance with the French policy of dispersal, for the project had the full support of the authorities. It had also, initially, the support of the local Apostolic notables who encouraged the Lazarists to found their Mission at Kirik Khane, possibly because such an
action offered an additional guarantee of security. When the land was ceded, already inhabited, to the Office by the Lazarists, it was on condition that only Catholic families should live on it, a condition which proved unacceptable to an important Armenian organisation. However, Burnier was able to report in April, 1928, that 14 of the 36 families already settled had merely declared themselves Catholics although Apostolics in order to take advantage of the land, while he made it clear to the refugees settled there that they depended on the Office and no-one else.

Massiaf (Mouchachène Armène)

Further proposals for settlement in the Sanjak in 1928 and 1929 failed to materialise as the finance available was not sufficient. One other agricultural colony was, however, founded before the end of 1929, in Alawi Territory. The question of settlement in this region was raised with Burnier in 1929 by the High Commissioner. Settlement was envisaged initially in the north between Latakia and Qassab, on unpopulated lands, offering security, health, and low costs of installation. In April, 1929, Burnier submitted definite proposals for settlement in the Territory, involving one village near Qassab in the zone mentioned, as well as 100 hectares near Djeblé on the coast, and 2,000 hectares in the Massiaf region, for the creation of two villages. While all these propositions were agreed in principle by Geneva, it was ultimately the proposals for the Massiaf region alone which were accepted. By contract of August 30, 1929, the Alawi State let to the League the whole of the disposable domain lands of El Grayate and Joubb Ramlé in the Massiaf region. Thus, in the final analysis,
the property acquired was not in the northern part of the Territory near Qassab, but in the interior.

The Adoption of Alternative schemes of Urban Resettlement

The progress of agricultural colonisation was increasingly retarded by the adoption of alternative schemes for urban resettlement. Resettlement at Beirut had been studied by the French authorities as early as April, 1926, and endorsed by the Johnson Report. It was, however, given a low priority by the Geneva committee who preferred rightly, in view of the economic situation, to give priority to the agricultural colonisation of agricultural refugees rather than to the urban settlement of artisan refugees. However, as Burnier made clear, the three million francs granted by the French High Commission to the settlement scheme were always destined for urban resettlement at Beirut, and construction went ahead in any case. Further schemes, however, were dictated by events. A number of rehousing crises developed in the principal centres of Armenian concentration, such that Burnier found himself obliged to participate in the construction of urban quarters as a rapid response, instead of carefully planned agricultural settlements. Thus, approval was given in 1928 for the construction of new quarters at Aleppo, Alexandretta and Damascus, where in each case the refugees were faced with expulsion from the land on which they had settled. More construction was begun also at Beirut, where, after the first initiative of the Mandatory authorities, the situation appears to have become the same as at Aleppo. In this way, the problems of excessive local concentration were forcing their own solutions before the considered plans for dispersal could be implemented.
That this was so is evident from the vigorous defence of agricultural as opposed to urban resettlement made by Burnier in response to criticisms made of the state of health in the agricultural colonies. Burnier argued in reply that the health situation was no better in the towns than in the villages. Further, from the economic point of view the presence of the refugees in the towns had caused a crisis of poverty between 1921 and 1924. Since that date a building boom in Beirut and Aleppo had alleviated the crisis. Burnier correctly prophesied, however, that in a few years this boom would be over, bringing unemployment in a situation where there was no (sic) industry and where none (sic) could be created. To abandon the agricultural programme on the basis of this temporary prosperity, he believed, would be a severe error of judgment. It was, he claimed, socially an error to retain in the towns those agriculturalists who wished to return to the land. Their children were growing up to be nothing but workmen or labourers, to form a future army of rootless paupers, perpetually dependent on public charity, while the indigenous population feared the creation in the cities of unassimilable foreign colonies. The solution still lay in agricultural colonisation, which to be achieved at all would have to be achieved quickly. In a few years the scheme would become impossible. Perceptively, he prophesied that in that case...

"nous aurons non seulement confirmé l'instabilité de ces populations Arméniennes en Syrie, mais nous les aurons irrémédiablement fixées dans leur misère et dans la promiscuité immorale et dangereuse de leurs quartiers. Nous ne voyons pas que l'œuvre poursuivie par le H.C. pour les réfugiés puisse être conduite ainsi et de telle façon qu'elle aboutisse à un résultat diamétralement opposé au but qu'il s'était proposé à l'origine."
The revival of plans for large-scale colonisation

At the end of 1929 the question of large-scale agricultural colonisation was revived. As will be apparent hitherto the scheme had been hindered by inadequate finance. To meet this situation, the Office raised the possibility of the Armenian and philarmenian societies obtaining a loan for the settlement scheme which would be guaranteed by the Mandatory Power. Such a guarantee was opposed on political grounds, but eventually the Mandatory Power agreed on a credit of three million francs to the Rolling Fund,71 (a significant departure from previous French budgetary procedure, stressing the importance they attached to the scheme). Presumably as a consequence of this decision, the Armenian sub-committee decided to invite the French government to appoint a representative to the committee.72 The French appointed M. Pierre LeNail who immediately began a reappraisal of the whole settlement scheme. After conversations with M.Ponsot, the High Commissioner, he envisaged large-scale colonisation of the plains of the Euphrates and Khabour, now pacified and incorporated into a zone of civil administration.73 It is significant that, this time a new wave of migration was bringing Armenian refugees into the north-east of Syria direct, but it is evident that the proposals for settlement in the Euphrates Region pre-dated the new influx of refugees. The large scale of operations envisaged by Le Nail was made clear to the Geneva committee at a meeting of December 2, 1929, 74 where he noted that the lands involved could be used not only for agriculture and cattle-raising, but also for cotton and for the raising of sheep for wool. He had discussed this
question with industrialists in France who had expressed their readiness to afford every assistance to the Armenian refugees in this connection. He believed that 100,000 (sic) refugees could be settled on these lands, so that Aleppo, which would become the principal market for the produce of the refugees, would greatly profit by the scheme. This would result in the revival of the commercial prosperity of Aleppo, which would ensure the support of the indigenous population. Furthermore, the Mandatory Power contemplated the construction of railways and roads for the opening up of the Euphrates Valley.

It is clear from Le Nail's statements to the meeting, that he envisaged that the newly arrived refugees could be included in this scheme. The necessity for such action was recognised also by Burnier, who wrote on December 4, 1929, 75 that every effort would be made to prevent the refugees from concentrating again in the towns, and that the High Commissioner would endeavour to settle them in northern Syria where they had arrived. However, no action could be taken in this respect until the question of the competence of the Office with respect to the new refugees had been resolved, and it was not until April 22, 1930, that Johnson could communicate to Burnier agreement in principle to participation in the settlement of the new arrivals. 76

In the meantime, consideration of Le Nail's scheme had gone ahead, and it was resolved at Geneva on December 19, 1929 to continue the programmes for the Alawi Territory (Massiaf) and Beirut, but to abandon the outstanding projects concerning
the Alexandretta region in favour of Le Nail's proposals for the Euphrates. Le Nail himself visited the region between April and June, 1930, and reported to the Committee on August 26, 1930. In his report, he now not only proposed settlement in the Euphrates and Khabour Valleys, but also in the Palmyra area. Here the competent authorities had made over 25,000 hectares of land six kilometres out of the town. The engineer M. Vitalis was organising irrigation in this area where lucerne fields and sheep-breeding would be the principal agricultural undertakings. In response to repeated requests money had already been despatched for this scheme, but the Committee's recommendations were required as to its use. In fact, the scheme was to progress no further.

**Reappraisal**

It seems that already, as early as June 27, 1930, there was a divergence between the plans suggested by Le Nail and those favoured by M. Ponsot, the French High Commissioner. This was pointed out at a meeting of the Administrative Committee of the Nansen Office on April 28, 1931, when the President, Max Huber, noted that there were deep divergences between the view of the French High Commissioner, who desired to renounce international aid from January 1, 1933 (according to a statement by the French representative) and those expressed by the French representative on the Central Armenian Committee (i.e. Le Nail) who envisaged a large scale work of settlement even permitting the introduction into Syria of a large number of Armenian refugees from other countries. The situation clearly required clarification, and to this end a meeting was
held in Paris on June 24, 1931, attended by Ponsot, Burnier, and representatives of the Nansen Office. At this meeting, Burnier argued in favour of the installation of the remaining refugees in the towns, for financial reasons. He had already observed to Geneva that reimbursements from the refugees resettled in the towns were more satisfactory than those from the rural settlements. Nevertheless, in view of his earlier forthright defence of agricultural settlement as opposed to urban resettlement, this represented a considerable volte-face. He also argued that, by dealing only with those refugees in distress, a solution to the problem could be achieved in 1933. In fact, he was clearly endorsing the views expressed earlier by the High Commissioner, and it was these which triumphed in the resolutions adopted. It was resolved that:

I The present arrangements, whereby the Office is responsible for the Armenian settlement work in Syria, shall be maintained in force until Dec. 31st, 1933.

II The settlement work to be accomplished by the Office concerns the 15,000 Armenian refugees still remaining in refugee camps, principally those of Aleppo and Beirut.

The settlement of those refugees shall be confined to urban settlement, in view of the cheapness of that form of settlement as compared with agricultural colonisation, and of the greater rapidity with which it can be executed.

Thus the ambitious plans for settlement in the regions of the Euphrates and Palmyra were abandoned. A scheme which had begun in 1926 as essentially one of agricultural colonisation, but which had progressively become one of urban resettlement in response to a series of rehousing crises, was now devoted solely to this latter objective.

Ultimately the settlement work of the Office was to last
until the end of December, 1937 after which, with the problem still not completely solved, the final settlement operations were left in the hands of the AGBU.\textsuperscript{84} During the whole of this period, there were only two departures from the agreed policy of resettlement of refugees in Beirut and Aleppo. The first concerned Banias, on the coast in Alawi Territory.\textsuperscript{85} At the end of September, 1932, 26 families from Beirut were engaged by a landowner of Banias to cultivate his property. The other exception was not even considered an "agricultural settlement". This was at Rihaniyé, in the Sanjak of Alexandretta where the Office bought land for a new "urban" quarter (comparable with the small "urban" quarter created earlier in the nearby settlement of Kirik Khane). The circumstances of these exceptional arrangements are not known, but their importance was minimal compared with the large resettlement efforts in Beirut and Aleppo.

**Private initiatives**

Further schemes of agricultural colonisation were the result of private initiatives. Two settlements are noted in the reports of the Mandatory Power.\textsuperscript{87} These are twin villages at Tell Brack, and a number of houses constructed at Hassatcho. Neither of these settlements were sanctioned or assisted by the Nansen Office according to available reports and correspondence. Nothing more, beyond the statements in the reports of the Mandatory Power, is known about the houses at Hassatcho, of which, by the end of 1930, 232 had been built. Tell Brack is better documented. Here the twin settlements lay at the confluence of the Jagh-Jagh and the Rad. It appears that land had been offered free by the Mandatory Power, and funds
were provided by foreign charitable organisations, principally Armenian, such as the A.C.B.U., whose agent was a refugee committee at Aleppo, which operated independently of the Nansen Office's Beirut committee. By the end of 1930, it is reported that 160 houses had been built, and 60 more were projected. Wells had been sunk, gardens and fields were irrigated by pumps, and the efforts of the Armenians were even encouraging sedentarisation amongst the local bedouin. However, the colony suffered severely from drought in 1931, following which its irrigation canals were destroyed by floods. Several appeals for assistance with water supply were made, notably to the Nansen Office, but nothing could be done by the Office, and the colony, which was already reduced to 60 families by the end of 1932, was apparently already abandoned for lack of water at the time of the visit to Syria in 1933 of Mr. Werner, the President of the Office.

Another colonisation scheme, also in the north-east, was planned by the "Action Chrétienne en Orient". In this case the motivation was the critical situation of the refugees in Aleppo, and the need to find a home for those Armenians who had escaped from Arab homes, and who then found it difficult to find a place in life in Aleppo. It was intended that the colony would at the same time serve as a missionary centre. The land, on the banks of the Jagh-Jagh near Hassechohé, was bought in 1936, and the missionaries sent out. The work of preparing the land was given over to the Arab who had been farming it, until the colony should be ready to receive the Armenians. It was envisaged that a motor-pump should be
installed, and irrigation canals constructed, for the cultivation of cotton. However, during the troubles at Hassetché in July, 1937, the fields around were burnt. Then in 1938, the A.C.O. had to renounce this land altogether, because of a law which forbade religious societies from acquiring land outside agglomerations. 94

The fortunes of the Nansen Office settlements

It remains to consider the fortunes of the dispersed settlements established by the Nansen Office 95 (Plates 5.1 - 5.4) The growth of population in these settlements is presented in Table 5.4. Two of these, Kirik Khane and Rihaniye, were classed as "urban", and were in fact new quarters added to pre-existing population centres. Information on their economic prosperity is lacking; by November, 1936, reimbursements to the office of loans made to the refugees for their settlement in these two centres had barely started, but this situation was regarded as unjustified. (Table 5.5).

The remaining centres were classed as "agricultural" settlements, that on the land of the Lazarists at Kirik Khane being classed exceptionally as "half agricultural, half urban". Their organisation was based on the experience gained from the failure of the Ras ul Ain metayage experiment. It was decided to try to create true Armenian centres, each comprising a minimum of thirty families. This would permit the creation of an administrative organisation, recognised by the authorities, involving a headman and Council of Elders with sufficient authority to permit the success of the scheme. The system of recruitment was in principle as follows. When the Committee entered into possession of some land, then according to its
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Explanation: F : families, P : persons

Source: Reports in N.A., C1429, C1583, C1584, R5638, C1598, and S.P., MS Vol 216
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</tr>
<tr>
<td>Baniaq</td>
<td>25,000</td>
<td>-</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Kirik Khane (&quot;urban&quot;)</td>
<td>34,317</td>
<td>1,324</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Rihaniyé</td>
<td>20,300</td>
<td>-</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>**TOTAL</td>
<td><strong>3,570,974</strong></td>
<td><strong>21,274</strong></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Source: Nicolsky Report, N.A., R5638
importance, geographical situation and the type of cultivation appropriate, the Armenian region of Anatolia whose former inhabitants would adapt themselves most easily to the land acquired would be determined. The former headman or notables would then be consulted, and would carry out a census in all the concentrations of their former villages, and study the possibility of reconstituting their village. If they envisaged this as possible, and accepted the financial terms offered by the office, the land would be put at their disposal. Initially work would be on a communal basis, but the land would be subdivided once all the houses had been built and the land put into production. The base of the system was that the Armenians should recognise that all funds expended on their behalf represented not a gift but a loan requiring reimbursement. To minimise financial commitment, all requests for financial assistance would be handled at village, not family level. They would then be channelled (at least those concerning the settlement in the Sanjak) through an Armenian representative nominated head of the Armenian villages in the Sanjak, who clearly had an influential position in the scheme. Initially, at least, this role was filled by Moses Der Kaloustian, a prominent member of the Dashnak party.

The agricultural settlements thus involved a degree of community reconstitution. One village, originally called Ikiz Koupru, was renamed Nor Zeitoun, as it consisted of former inhabitants of Zeitoun (Zeytun) in Cilicia and their children. The population of Souk Sco was drawn largely from Dortyol, that of Pré-Militaire from the vilayet of Harput, while those in Kirik Khane, already installed by the Lazariats, were largely from the Lazariats' former missionary centre of Ekbos (Table 5.6).
Table 5.6

Origin of Families settled by the Nansen Office at Kirik Khane and Soouk Sou

**Kirik Khane (agricultural settlement)**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Origin</th>
<th>No. of families</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Ekbes</td>
<td>21</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Hassan-Beyli</td>
<td>4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Marag</td>
<td>3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Dortyol</td>
<td>2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Sis</td>
<td>2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Teyeg</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Urfa</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Kirik Khane</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>TOTAL</strong></td>
<td><strong>35</strong></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

**Soouk Sou**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Origin</th>
<th>No. of families</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Dortyol</td>
<td>25</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Keller</td>
<td>8</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Ekbes</td>
<td>2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Chakrak</td>
<td>2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Kirik Khane</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Nadjarli</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Zeytun</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>TOTAL</strong></td>
<td><strong>50</strong></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Sources: lists of families installed dating from C. December, 1927 in N.A., C1429, C1431.
It is evident, as far as the position of these refugees within Syria is concerned, that they were not always drawn from the principal centres of Armenian concentration, as laid down in the settlement plans. In fact, those settled in the Sanjak appear to have been drawn from all the nodes of Armenian population in northern Syria. Thus, while the population of Haiachène was drawn from Aleppo, that of Abdal Huyuk came from Kirik Khane, that of Nor Zeitoun from Kirik Khane, Alexandretta, Sousseidiye and Aleppo, and that of Souk Sou from Kirik Khane, Beilane, Alexandretta and Qassab. (Table 5.7) The population of the Lazarists' colony of Kirik Khane was, of course, already established there.

Table 5.7

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Origin</th>
<th>No. of Children</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Kirik Khane</td>
<td>15</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Alexandretta</td>
<td>7</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Qassab</td>
<td>3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Beilane</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Souk Sou</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Unspecified</td>
<td>12</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>TOTAL</td>
<td>39</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Source: List of families installed dating from C. Dec., 1927. (N.A., C1431)

Economically, the villages were never a success. They were subject to the whims of both the Syrian climate and the Syrian economy, with its price instability. Thus they suffered from
poor harvests between 1929 and 1931, and between 1934 and 1936, due partly to insects and droughts. They suffered further from the fall in prices of cereals, silk-cocoon, tobacco and cotton, and had to adjust their produce accordingly, the raising of silk worms, for example, being largely abandoned. The most profitable line appears to have been the sale of market-garden produce and fruit, (see Tables 5.8 - 5.14) while numerous colonists supplemented their income, through enterprise or necessity, by working as artisans in the neighbouring towns. Though in general the villages were adjudged capable of providing their own subsistence by Nicolasky in November, 1936, reimbursements of loans made by the office were poor.

Disillusioned, a number of colonists, complaining on occasion that their plots were too small, left the new settlements of Souk Sou and Haiachene. The greatest exodus, however, was from Nor Zeitoun, where the population was reduced from 43 families at the end of 1928 to 16 at the end of 1930. These settlers had lost many of their goats through ignorance or laziness in the severe winter cold of 1929, though according to Burnier they had been worked on by elements hostile to the scheme living at Aleppo. They went back to Kirik Khane and Aleppo to "regain their liberty", and could not easily be replaced. Thus, when Ellen Chater, of the Save the Children Fund, suggested to an Armenian mother at Aleppo that she move to Nor Zeitoun to fill one of the vacant places, she replied,

"We had relatives who went to a village and came back very sick having lost all they had saved. Besides, the children got no opportunity to learn in the villages. It is better to stay here."
Table 5.8

Soouk Sou Harvest and Livestock, 1928-1934

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Harvest (Quintals)</th>
<th>1928</th>
<th>1930</th>
<th>1931</th>
<th>1933</th>
<th>1934</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Wheat</td>
<td>N.E.</td>
<td>144</td>
<td>24</td>
<td>390</td>
<td>300</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Oats</td>
<td>&quot;</td>
<td>36</td>
<td>18</td>
<td>130</td>
<td>95</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Tomatoes</td>
<td>&quot;</td>
<td>84</td>
<td>N.E.</td>
<td>140</td>
<td>370</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Maize</td>
<td>&quot;</td>
<td>3.6</td>
<td>9.6</td>
<td>N.E.</td>
<td>N.E.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Chilis</td>
<td>&quot;</td>
<td>60</td>
<td>24</td>
<td>&quot;</td>
<td>&quot;</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Water-melons</td>
<td>&quot;</td>
<td>18</td>
<td>18</td>
<td>&quot;</td>
<td>&quot;</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Silk-worm cocoons</td>
<td>&quot;</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>N.E.</td>
<td>&quot;</td>
<td>&quot;</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Cucumbers</td>
<td>&quot;</td>
<td>12</td>
<td>&quot;</td>
<td>&quot;</td>
<td>&quot;</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Beans</td>
<td>&quot;</td>
<td>2.4</td>
<td>&quot;</td>
<td>&quot;</td>
<td>&quot;</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Apricots</td>
<td>&quot;</td>
<td>6</td>
<td>3.6</td>
<td>&quot;</td>
<td>&quot;</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Apples</td>
<td>&quot;</td>
<td>2.4</td>
<td>0.96</td>
<td>&quot;</td>
<td>&quot;</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Peaches</td>
<td>&quot;</td>
<td>1.92</td>
<td>0.96</td>
<td>45</td>
<td>90</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Plums</td>
<td>&quot;</td>
<td>1.2</td>
<td>0.96</td>
<td>&quot;</td>
<td>&quot;</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Sorghum</td>
<td>&quot;</td>
<td>N.E.</td>
<td>14.4</td>
<td>120</td>
<td>190</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Barley</td>
<td>&quot;</td>
<td>&quot;</td>
<td>N.E.</td>
<td>210</td>
<td>60</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Lentils</td>
<td>&quot;</td>
<td>&quot;</td>
<td>&quot;</td>
<td>32</td>
<td>35</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Chick-Beans</td>
<td>&quot;</td>
<td>&quot;</td>
<td>&quot;</td>
<td>90</td>
<td>60</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Aubergines</td>
<td>&quot;</td>
<td>&quot;</td>
<td>&quot;</td>
<td>75</td>
<td>270</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Garlic</td>
<td>&quot;</td>
<td>&quot;</td>
<td>&quot;</td>
<td>30</td>
<td>N.E.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Red Peppers</td>
<td>&quot;</td>
<td>&quot;</td>
<td>&quot;</td>
<td>N.E.</td>
<td>120</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Livestock (Population)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>1928</th>
<th>1930</th>
<th>1931</th>
<th>1933</th>
<th>1934</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Beef-cattle</td>
<td>38</td>
<td>40</td>
<td>20</td>
<td>48</td>
<td>24</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Cows</td>
<td>47</td>
<td>62</td>
<td>50</td>
<td>60</td>
<td>112</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Calves</td>
<td>62</td>
<td>42</td>
<td>35</td>
<td>59</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Horses, asses, etc.</td>
<td>23</td>
<td>19</td>
<td>24</td>
<td>7</td>
<td>10</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Sheep</td>
<td>N.E.</td>
<td>N.E.</td>
<td>10</td>
<td>N.E.</td>
<td>N.E.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Poultry</td>
<td>&quot;</td>
<td>300</td>
<td>400</td>
<td>350</td>
<td>600</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Sources: as Table 5.4

Note: Entries for harvest of 1930 and 1931 converted from Okea.

Explanation: N.E. = No entry.
Table 5.9

Nor Zeitoun, Harvest and Livestock, 1928-1934

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Harvest (Quintals)</th>
<th>1928</th>
<th>1930</th>
<th>1931</th>
<th>1933</th>
<th>1934</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Wheat</td>
<td>N.E.</td>
<td>26.4</td>
<td>N.E.</td>
<td>N.E.</td>
<td>15</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Potatoes</td>
<td>&quot;</td>
<td>36</td>
<td>10</td>
<td>&quot;</td>
<td>N.E.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Onions</td>
<td>&quot;</td>
<td>60</td>
<td>8</td>
<td>&quot;</td>
<td>&quot;</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Garlic</td>
<td>&quot;</td>
<td>1.44</td>
<td>N.E.</td>
<td>&quot;</td>
<td>&quot;</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Diverse vegetables</td>
<td>&quot;</td>
<td>a large quantity</td>
<td>13</td>
<td>&quot;</td>
<td>&quot;</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Tobacco</td>
<td>&quot;</td>
<td>N.E.</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>&quot;</td>
<td>4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Oats</td>
<td>&quot;</td>
<td>&quot;</td>
<td>N.E.</td>
<td>&quot;</td>
<td>12</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Livestock (Population)</th>
<th>1928</th>
<th>1930</th>
<th>1931</th>
<th>1933</th>
<th>1934</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Beef-cattle</td>
<td></td>
<td>6</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>N.E.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Goats</td>
<td>550</td>
<td>350</td>
<td>280</td>
<td>&quot;</td>
<td>450</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Horses, asses, etc.</td>
<td></td>
<td>2</td>
<td>7</td>
<td>7</td>
<td>&quot;</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Cows</td>
<td>N.E.</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>10</td>
<td>&quot;</td>
<td>3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Calves</td>
<td>&quot;</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>7</td>
<td>&quot;</td>
<td>N.E.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Poultry</td>
<td>&quot;</td>
<td>N.E.</td>
<td>N.E.</td>
<td>&quot;</td>
<td>250</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Sources & Explanation: as Table 5.8

Note: Entries for harvest of 1930 converted from Okes.

Entries for harvests of 1931 and 1934 converted from Kg.
Table 5.10

Kirik Khane ("agricultural" settlement) Harvest & Livestock, 1928-34

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Harvest (Quintals)</th>
<th>1928</th>
<th>1930</th>
<th>1931</th>
<th>1933</th>
<th>1934</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Wheat</td>
<td>N. E</td>
<td>N. E</td>
<td>N. E</td>
<td>30</td>
<td>25</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Barley</td>
<td>&quot;</td>
<td>&quot;</td>
<td>&quot;</td>
<td>15</td>
<td>6</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Tomatoes</td>
<td>&quot;</td>
<td>&quot;</td>
<td>&quot;</td>
<td>75</td>
<td>40</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Aubergines</td>
<td>&quot;</td>
<td>&quot;</td>
<td>&quot;</td>
<td>60</td>
<td>60</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Onions</td>
<td>&quot;</td>
<td>&quot;</td>
<td>&quot;</td>
<td>35</td>
<td>45</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Garlic</td>
<td>&quot;</td>
<td>&quot;</td>
<td>&quot;</td>
<td>6</td>
<td>N.E.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Potatoes</td>
<td>&quot;</td>
<td>&quot;</td>
<td>&quot;</td>
<td>N.E.</td>
<td>N.E.</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Livestock (Population)</th>
<th>1928</th>
<th>1930</th>
<th>1931</th>
<th>1933</th>
<th>1934</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Goats</td>
<td>88</td>
<td>350</td>
<td>150</td>
<td>N.E.</td>
<td>N.E.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Beef-cattle</td>
<td>N.E.</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>N.E.</td>
<td>&quot;</td>
<td>14</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Cows</td>
<td>&quot;</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>&quot;</td>
<td>&quot;</td>
<td>25</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Calves</td>
<td>&quot;</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>&quot;</td>
<td>&quot;</td>
<td>N.E.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Horses, asses, etc.</td>
<td>&quot;</td>
<td>7</td>
<td>&quot;</td>
<td>&quot;</td>
<td>&quot;</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Poultry</td>
<td>&quot;</td>
<td>N.E.</td>
<td>350</td>
<td>&quot;</td>
<td>400</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Sources & Explanation: as Table 5.8
### Table 5.11

**Pre-Militaire. Harvest and Livestock, 1928-34**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Harvest (Quintals)</th>
<th>1928</th>
<th>1930</th>
<th>1931</th>
<th>1933</th>
<th>1934</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Wheat</td>
<td>N.E.</td>
<td>624</td>
<td>710</td>
<td>1200</td>
<td>820</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Barley</td>
<td>&quot;</td>
<td>276</td>
<td>550</td>
<td>250</td>
<td>170</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Lentils</td>
<td>&quot;</td>
<td>76</td>
<td>100</td>
<td>30</td>
<td>20</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Sorghum</td>
<td>&quot;</td>
<td>60</td>
<td>N.E.</td>
<td>150</td>
<td>220</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Chick-peas</td>
<td>&quot;</td>
<td>82</td>
<td>110</td>
<td>30</td>
<td>18</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Cotton</td>
<td>&quot;</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>28</td>
<td>N.E.</td>
<td>150</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Maize</td>
<td>&quot;</td>
<td>78</td>
<td>N.E.</td>
<td>65</td>
<td>40</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Garlic</td>
<td>&quot;</td>
<td>12</td>
<td>150</td>
<td>40</td>
<td>6</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Onions</td>
<td>&quot;</td>
<td>408</td>
<td>240</td>
<td>80</td>
<td>90</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Beans</td>
<td>&quot;</td>
<td>78</td>
<td>N.E.</td>
<td>80</td>
<td>N.E.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Vetches</td>
<td>&quot;</td>
<td>144</td>
<td>N.E.</td>
<td>&quot;</td>
<td>&quot;</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Sesame</td>
<td>&quot;</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>&quot;</td>
<td>&quot;</td>
<td>&quot;</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Shallots</td>
<td>&quot;</td>
<td>6</td>
<td>&quot;</td>
<td>&quot;</td>
<td>&quot;</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Shallot seeds</td>
<td>&quot;</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>&quot;</td>
<td>&quot;</td>
<td>&quot;</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Tobacco</td>
<td>&quot;</td>
<td>N.E.</td>
<td>28</td>
<td>&quot;</td>
<td>&quot;</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Tomatoes</td>
<td>&quot;</td>
<td>&quot;</td>
<td>N.E.</td>
<td>150</td>
<td>490</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Aubergines</td>
<td>&quot;</td>
<td>&quot;</td>
<td>&quot;</td>
<td>80</td>
<td>170</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Red Peppers</td>
<td>&quot;</td>
<td>&quot;</td>
<td>&quot;</td>
<td>20</td>
<td>180</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Fruits</td>
<td>&quot;</td>
<td>&quot;</td>
<td>&quot;</td>
<td>15</td>
<td>25</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Cucumber</td>
<td>&quot;</td>
<td>&quot;</td>
<td>&quot;</td>
<td>90</td>
<td>110</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Cabbages</td>
<td>&quot;</td>
<td>&quot;</td>
<td>&quot;</td>
<td>20</td>
<td>60</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Water-melons</td>
<td>&quot;</td>
<td>&quot;</td>
<td>&quot;</td>
<td>50</td>
<td>N.E.</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

**Livestock (Population)**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Horses, asses, etc.</th>
<th>14</th>
<th>35</th>
<th>N.E.</th>
<th>17</th>
<th>23</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Beef-cattle</td>
<td>71</td>
<td>235</td>
<td>160</td>
<td>160</td>
<td>160</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Cows</td>
<td>7</td>
<td></td>
<td>495</td>
<td>125</td>
<td>110</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Calves</td>
<td>N.E.</td>
<td>113</td>
<td>148</td>
<td>120</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Goats</td>
<td>160</td>
<td>N.E.</td>
<td>N.E.</td>
<td>.14</td>
<td>N.E.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Poultry</td>
<td>N.E.</td>
<td>2625</td>
<td>1600</td>
<td>1050</td>
<td>1320</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Pigs</td>
<td>&quot;</td>
<td>45</td>
<td>30</td>
<td>N.E.</td>
<td>N.E.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Sheep</td>
<td>&quot;</td>
<td>N.E.</td>
<td>N.E.</td>
<td>10</td>
<td>30</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Sources & Explanation: as Table 5.8

Note: Entries for harvest of 1930 converted from Okeas.
Table 5.12

Mouchachene, Harvest and Livestock, 1930-1934

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Harvest (Quintals)</th>
<th>1930</th>
<th>1931</th>
<th>1933</th>
<th>1934</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Chick-peas</td>
<td>N.E.</td>
<td>14.4</td>
<td>15½</td>
<td>31</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Lentils</td>
<td>&quot;</td>
<td>14.4</td>
<td>N.E.</td>
<td>N.E.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Wheat</td>
<td>&quot;</td>
<td>N.E.</td>
<td>289½</td>
<td>587</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Barley</td>
<td>&quot;</td>
<td>&quot;</td>
<td>135½</td>
<td>379</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Djelban</td>
<td>&quot;</td>
<td>&quot;</td>
<td>6</td>
<td>23</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Dari</td>
<td>&quot;</td>
<td>&quot;</td>
<td>25½</td>
<td>N.E.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Cotton</td>
<td>&quot;</td>
<td>&quot;</td>
<td>½</td>
<td>&quot;</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Oats</td>
<td>&quot;</td>
<td>&quot;</td>
<td>N.E.</td>
<td>37</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Livestock (Population)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>1930</th>
<th>1931</th>
<th>1933</th>
<th>1934</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Beef-cattle</td>
<td>17</td>
<td>32</td>
<td>52</td>
<td>50</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Cows</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>11</td>
<td>55</td>
<td>38</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Calves</td>
<td>5</td>
<td>N.E.</td>
<td>22</td>
<td>45</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Horses, asses, etc.</td>
<td>41</td>
<td>22</td>
<td>52</td>
<td>56</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Goats</td>
<td>130</td>
<td>412</td>
<td>350</td>
<td>328</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Sheep</td>
<td>74</td>
<td></td>
<td>150</td>
<td>157</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Poultry</td>
<td>550</td>
<td>800</td>
<td>973</td>
<td>1380</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Rabbits</td>
<td>20</td>
<td>N.E.</td>
<td>N.E.</td>
<td>N.E.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Buffalo</td>
<td>N.E.</td>
<td>7</td>
<td>8</td>
<td>3</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Sources & Explanation: as Table 5.8

Note: Entries for harvest of 1931 converted from Okes, and for harvest of 1934 from Kg. Unit for entries for the harvest of 1933 is the Kaniar, which may not be identical with the metric quintal used for other years and in related tables.
Table 5.13

Bey-Sekî, Harvest and Livestock, 1933-1934

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Harvest (Quintals)</th>
<th>1933</th>
<th>1934</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Wheat</td>
<td>95</td>
<td>43</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Oats</td>
<td>29</td>
<td>45</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Sorghum</td>
<td>25</td>
<td>15</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Tomatoes</td>
<td>110</td>
<td>80</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Aubergines</td>
<td>20</td>
<td>15</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Fruits</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>6</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Maize</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Cucumber</td>
<td>10</td>
<td>16</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Water melons</td>
<td>15</td>
<td>10</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Melons</td>
<td>10</td>
<td>6</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Gourds</td>
<td>60</td>
<td>N.E.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Onions</td>
<td>N.E.</td>
<td>12</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Bey Sekî (Livestock)</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Beef-cattle</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Cows</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Horses, asses, etc.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Goats</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Poultry</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Sources & Explanation: as Table 5.8
Table 5.14 Trees planted in the Hansen Office settlements at Dec. 31, 1930 and Dec. 31, 1934.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>Soouk Sou</th>
<th>Nor Zeitoum</th>
<th>Kirik Khane</th>
<th>Pré-Wilitaire</th>
<th>Moucharchene</th>
<th>Bey Seki</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>1930</td>
<td>1934</td>
<td>1930</td>
<td>1934</td>
<td>1930</td>
<td>1934</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Poplars</td>
<td>4,000</td>
<td>6,000</td>
<td>N. E.</td>
<td>N. E.</td>
<td>some</td>
<td>350</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>4,500</td>
<td>10,000</td>
<td>N. E.</td>
<td>N. E.</td>
<td>1,350</td>
<td>1,200</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Feaches</td>
<td>N. E.</td>
<td>350</td>
<td>450</td>
<td>500</td>
<td>500</td>
<td>100</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Apricots</td>
<td>450</td>
<td>130</td>
<td>500</td>
<td>100</td>
<td>5,150</td>
<td>3,700</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Apples</td>
<td>N. E.</td>
<td>300</td>
<td>50</td>
<td>250</td>
<td>535</td>
<td>2,500</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Plums</td>
<td>120</td>
<td>90</td>
<td>10</td>
<td>250</td>
<td>170</td>
<td>1,000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Vines</td>
<td>N. E.</td>
<td>6,300</td>
<td>5,000</td>
<td>1,300</td>
<td>N. E.</td>
<td>6,000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Pigs</td>
<td>70</td>
<td>130</td>
<td>N. E.</td>
<td>820</td>
<td>3,350</td>
<td>60</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Pomegranites</td>
<td>90</td>
<td>40</td>
<td>90</td>
<td>2,115</td>
<td>300</td>
<td>60</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Mulberries</td>
<td>N. E.</td>
<td>500</td>
<td>9,000</td>
<td>9,900</td>
<td>1,300</td>
<td>N. E.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Walnuts</td>
<td>35</td>
<td>N. E.</td>
<td>N. E.</td>
<td>200</td>
<td>2,000</td>
<td>N. E.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Eucalyptus</td>
<td>N. E.</td>
<td>N. E.</td>
<td>N. E.</td>
<td>370</td>
<td>N. E.</td>
<td>N. E.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Olives</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>505</td>
<td>N. E.</td>
<td>N. E.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Plane-trees</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>770</td>
<td>N. E.</td>
<td>N. E.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Rose-trees</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>790</td>
<td>N. E.</td>
<td>N. E.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Willows</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>50</td>
<td>N. E.</td>
<td>N. E.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Lemon-trees</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>52</td>
<td>N. E.</td>
<td>N. E.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Orange-trees</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>N. E.</td>
<td>N. E.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Tree Type</td>
<td>Source (1)</td>
<td>Source (2)</td>
<td>Source (3)</td>
<td>Source (4)</td>
<td>Source (5)</td>
<td>Source (6)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>----------------------</td>
<td>------------</td>
<td>------------</td>
<td>------------</td>
<td>------------</td>
<td>------------</td>
<td>------------</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Medlars</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>110</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Cherry-trees</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>50</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Quince</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>70</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>&quot;Various&quot;</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>70</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Auranticae</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>80</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Sumacs</td>
<td>N.E.</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Casuarinas</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>2,000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Forest-trees</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Pears</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Pistachio-trees</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Sources & Explanation: as Table 5.8
The most spectacular failure, however, was the village of Mouchachene in Alawi Territory. Here the results obtained were much inferior to expectations, probably due to a lack of water, and the colony was liquidated towards the end of the period.

The most strident criticisms of the scheme were not, however, made on these grounds, but on the grounds of health. The settlements in the Amouk plain (Souk Sou, Kirik Khane, Haichene and Abdal-Huyuk) were strongly susceptible to malaria, the most notable outbreak being in Haichene in 1928, according to Burnier due to the action of the neighbouring village in damming a stream. At Souk Sou, because of malaria it was necessary to move the temporary houses of the refugees from their initial location on the plain to a hill nearby which was bought in the course of 1928. At Nor Zeitoun, there was an attack of dengue-fever in 1928 which at one time affected 50% of its inhabitants. Not surprisingly, outbreaks of malaria in settlements whose sites had been selected by the Nansen Office exacted some criticism that these sites had been poorly chosen. It is clear, however, that from the beginning Burnier was aware of the problem, but considered it outweighed by the fertility of the Amouk plain and by the fact that the marshes of the Amouk plain were due to be dried out to make the plain healthy. He pointed out that Cilicia itself, the origin of many of the refugees, was malarial, and that many refugees had arrived in this state, or had contracted the disease in their places of refuge at Alexandretta or Kirik Khane. Furthermore, better conditions of hygiene were hardly to be found in Beirut, Alexandretta or Aleppo.
Nevertheless, emergency action was required for the settlements at the end of 1928 when the harvest was not sufficient for the refugees already settled for the coming winter, and still less so for those who would be installed before the next year's harvest. The administration lacked adequate means to provide food and the necessary health facilities until the next harvest, and it was agreed that funds for the provision of food supplies and health measures be placed at the disposal of Burnier by the League of Red Cross Societies. The agreement, which was to last from March 15 to July 31, 1929, provided for a systematic distribution of food supplies to Haiachêne, Abdal-Huyuk, Soouk-Sou, Kirik Khane and Nor Zeitoun under the control and supervision of two French Red Cross nurses, who were also to conduct health visits. In the course of these visits the nurses brought about a marked diminution of malaria by supplying mosquito netting and quinine. After this service was discontinued, on July 31, 1929, arrangements were made for two nurses of the French Red Cross to continue health visits to the villages of Soouk Sou, Kirik Khane and Nor Zeitoun, an arrangement which came to an end at the end of 1931. The health service in the other villages was assured from February, 1930 by a nurse provided by the Near East Foundation (formerly N.E. Relief), and clinics were established at Haiachêne, Abdal-Huyuk and Mouchachêne (Massiaf). At Pré-Militaire, the location of the worst outbreak of malaria in 1928, the situation was improved by the construction of 10,000 metres of drainage and irrigation canals. Despite these measures, however, cases of malaria were being registered as late as about 1936 at Pré-Militaire, apparently as a result of lowered resistance to disease resulting from under-nourishment.
The success or failure of the settlements in the Sanjak ultimately proved immaterial. The refugees were all obliged to flee again with the cession of the Sanjak. Already, at the end of 1937, the villagers were reluctant to reimburse any payments to the Office for fear of having to abandon their fields. By 1938, Rihaniye and Scout Sou were largely abandoned, and many Armenians left Kirik Khane. When, in July 1939, the exodus was completed by the transfer of the remaining Armenians to the south, the work of the Nansen Office in village settlement had been entirely ruined.

Conclusion

It is evident that the various efforts made to redistribute the Armenians were not very successful. They had been made in order to avoid, and subsequently in response to, the stagnation of the Armenian population in the cities where economic opportunities were limited. The first efforts were made by the Mandatory Power in response to the immigration of 1921, the accumulation of refugees at Alexandretta, and the accumulation of refugees at Aleppo in 1922-24, but the dispersal was left incomplete because of the lack of commitment of finance. In recognition of the need for a more radical solution, efforts were made by philanthropic organisations to encourage agricultural colonisation. The first steps were taken by Karen Jeppe, but remained on a small scale. To solve the problem, plans were required on a scale which would require governmental action, and were persistently advocated by the philanthropic societies. The Mandatory Power was initially
unwilling to commit finance to large-scale agricultural colonisation, but later accepted the co-operation of the League in a settlement scheme, the critical factor being probably the provision of finance by the League. Once begun, however, the scheme, which envisaged large-scale agricultural settlement, was increasingly retarded by the adoption of alternative schemes of urban resettlement, largely dictated by the development of housing crises in the principal centres of Armenian concentration. The agricultural colonisation scheme was also hindered by inadequate finance, and in 1931 it was decided for financial reasons finally to concentrate on urban rather than agricultural settlement. Even the villages which were created by the Nansen Office were never an economic success, although this ultimately proved immaterial, as the villagers in the Sanjak were obliged to flee with the cession of the region to Turkey. Thus apart from a few isolated settlements, the only work of settlement which remained intact in 1939 was that of urban resettlement in the principal centres of Armenian concentration. Far from redistributing the population on a national basis, the settlement scheme undertaken by the Nansen Office ultimately had the effect of reinforcing the existing pattern of population. The schemes for agricultural colonisation had failed essentially for lack of finance. The lack of success of the Nansen Office's colonies illustrates the need for substantial injections of capital. Lacking this capital, little was achieved before the alternative "solution" of urban resettlement was imposed by necessity. Thus at the level of planned settlement, the Nansen Office was the victim of the same economic constraints as the refugees themselves.
Chapter 6

Social and Political Constraints on Settlement

This chapter considers social and political constraints on settlement, which it has proved desirable to group together for purposes of explanation. It begins with a discussion of Armenian social aspirations and political divisions, considering in turn the Armenians' eventual acceptance of permanent settlement in Syria and Lebanon, their desire for security, and the relationship between their settlement and their internal religious segregation and political rivalries. It continues with an analysis of the attitude of the indigenous population towards the Armenian immigrants, and of the political motives and social constraints behind French policy towards Armenian settlement. The repercussions on settlement of all these social and political forces are discussed separately, but the chapter concludes with an overview of political and social constraints on settlement in relation to the conflict of interest between French, Arab, and Armenians. The documentation on these constraints is variable. It is best (though woefully incomplete) on French policy, but less sound on Armenian and Syrian aspirations and attitudes, which have to be gleaned to a large extent at second-hand, though the archives preserve a number of primary statements by Armenians regarding their settlement preferences.

Armenian Social Aspirations and Political Divisions

The Acceptance of permanent settlement

When the Armenians entered Syria and Lebanon they (or at
least their leaders) did not initially see themselves remaining there indefinitely. Their political future was not then as certain as it seems with the benefit of hindsight. For a number of years their 'leaders' in Paris, of the Armenian National Delegation and its successor organisation, the 'Comité Central des Réfugiés Arméniens,' retained the idea of ultimate resettlement in Soviet Armenia of the refugees scattered throughout the eastern Mediterranean. It followed that permanent settlement in Syria should not be encouraged as it would reduce the number of refugees who would be prepared at a later date to uproot themselves again and migrate to Armenia. Nevertheless, within the country, there were, as already described, various Armenian proposals for agricultural colonisation, indicating a desire for permanent settlement. By 1925 even the leaders of the C.C.R.A. seem to have given way to the conclusion that the refugees in Syria might be encouraged to settle permanently, a change of opinion due probably to the difficulties involved in transfers to Soviet Armenia, and the desire to avoid even greater dispersal to the Americas. Thus in 1925, the C.C.R.A. were prepared to encourage the transfer of Armenian refugees to Syria from Greece, their representative W. Pachalian writing that Syria and France were the two countries outside Armenia which appeared to his organisation to be the most appropriate for refugee settlement. It is evident that these proposals of transfer from Greece to Syria were partly, if not wholly, instrumental in prompting the initial investigation of Armenian refugee conditions in Syria by Mr. Carlo for the I.L.O., and it was Dr. Melконян, former representative of the Armenian National Union at Beirut, who, concurrently with Carlo's visit,
applied for a grant of 3,000 hectares for the purpose of establishing an agricultural colony. When the definitive settlement scheme was begun by the I.L.O. in 1926, the C.C.R. A. were prepared to support it. They had not abandoned hope of resettlement in Soviet Armenia however. They still considered that this was the only plan which could ultimately bring a solution of the Armenian problem. Nevertheless, they realised that the Yerevan scheme could not possibly bring substantial results for some considerable time to come, and could at the best only provide for the settlement of a portion of the refugees in Greece. For this reason they welcomed the Syrian scheme. Thus, Armenian desires for settlement in Armenia rather than in Syria were expressed in lack of financial support, rather than in deliberate obstruction. Dr. Nansen himself seems to have been even more committed to resettlement in Armenia than the Armenian leaders themselves, and would not yield in his opposition to the Syrian scheme until absolutely convinced of its necessity. The rapid rate of emigration from Syria was, however, a telling factor. In seeking to persuade Nansen of the merits of the scheme in January, 1927, Albert Thomas stressed that since March, 1926, an average of 2,000 (sic) refugees per month were reported to have left Syria, and that unless effective measures were taken to enable the Armenian refugees to support themselves in Syria, there would be a few remaining to take advantage of the National Home, when the scheme for its establishment should finally be put into execution.

This exaggerated picture in itself suggests that the views of the refugees themselves as to the desirability of emigration
from Syria may have differed substantially from those of the C.C.R.A. at Paris. This at least was the opinion of Mr. Childs, I.L.O. representative at Buenos Aires who reported that the Armenians who had migrated to Argentina felt that they were better off there than in Syria or in any other country where they might be sent. He accused the Armenian organisations in general of being unreliable as regards representing the real desires of their people, and of being always willing to sacrifice people for politics. This they could do with impunity as on account of language difficulty it was difficult to get direct contact with the bulk of the people. Childs observed tautly with regard to the Yerevan scheme that "very few of the leaders and the sponsors of this movement show any desire to go to Soviet Armenia themselves." 9

This contentious point will be considered further below. By the end of 1929, with the collapse of Nansen’s Yerevan scheme, however, Pachalian was enthusiastically supporting Le Nail’s proposals for settlement in the Euphrates region and Palmyra,10 while previously settlement in the interior had been regarded as unacceptable. There seems to have been thus a new commitment to settlement in Syria, which was so positive that it was even felt that there might be a political motive behind it. The view was expressed that the Armenians may have been trying to establish a foothold, even a "National Home", in Northern Syria, and that the contemporary exodus of Armenians from eastern Turkey at the end of 1929 may have been at least partly prompted by Armenian propaganda.11 This seems highly unlikely, as the Armenians had their "National Home" elsewhere. More likely, they saw the possibility of stabilising the Armenians of Syria and Lebanon. Their commitment to settlement
in Syria did, after all, continue after Le Nail's scheme had been rejected. Thus the A. O. B. U. once more advocated the transfer of refugees from Greece to Syria, and from the end of 1931 began increasingly to assume the financial burden of the settlement work, such that, as already observed, by the end of the period they had acquired responsibility for its completion. The financial commitment from 1931, contrasted with earlier reluctance, no doubt reflected the difficulties confronting any transfer from Syria to Armenia.

Security of Culture and security of life

More important to the distribution of the Armenians within Syria than the political aspects of Armenian nationalism was the preservation of Armenian national identity in Syria itself. Within Syria the Armenians constructed their own schools, their own churches, and ran their own charitable, cultural and athletic societies. In their desire to preserve their own culture, they were frankly non-assimilatory, conserving "une solidarité ethnique sans rivale au monde." "The Armenians", wrote Marshall Fox "as "the Scotch of the Near East" remind one often of the Scotch in their clannishness, thrift, and an independence bordering upon arrogance...." The Jesuit Father Jalabert was more charitable (and sentimental) than his Protestant rival:-

"Pieusement, presque religieusement, les Arméniens gardent leurs vieilles traditions comme le seul trésor qui leur demeure. Bien qu'ils parlent couramment, les uns l'arabe, la plupart le turc, ils ont pour leur langue Arménienne un culte vraiment filial. Ils conservent leurs costumes traditionnels, leurs danses nationales, leurs chants patriotiques, et les yeux se mouillent lorsque, sur une scène de collège, des enfants paraissent revêtus des costumes de Bitilia, que des fillettes dansent l'exquise "danses de la lune" ou chantent ces complaintes d'une mélancolie si poignante que la phrase semble se briser dans un sanglot...."
The preservation of former life-styles involved in some cases the reconstitution anew of old communities in Syria and Lebanon. This has already been observed in the case of the villages established by the Nansen Office in the Sanjak. It was also demonstrated by the formation of Compatriotic Unions in the towns,\(^{17}\) whose activities are considered in the following chapters. Community reconstitution was in any case favoured by the structure of the migration, which generally involved movements by communities rather than by individuals,\(^{18}\) as has been seen for example in the case of the Lazarists' flocks from Ekbes and the convoy from Urfa noted in a previous chapter.

Not only were the Armenians concerned to preserve their own communities and national culture, however. They were also genuinely concerned about their own security. The effect which this feeling had on attitudes to settlement emerges clearly from an examination of the Armenian attitude to redistribution through resettlement schemes. It has already been remarked how French efforts to disperse the Armenians in small groups in the early years of the period met with little response. General Billotte even claimed "that the Armenians were hesitant to settle in Syria and that the fault lay with the priests who were not encouraging them to disperse."\(^{19}\) Yet at the same time the Catholicos himself was, as noted, despite reservations in some quarters about the desirability of permanent settlement in Syria, requesting agricultural resettlement, but on a large-scale. Later too Armenian support was forthcoming from the Armenian 'representative' Dr. Melkonian for Carle's proposals for large-scale settlement in the Qhab.
It is evident that the Armenians were not opposed to agricultural colonisation per se, but only when it involved dispersal in small groups. Karen Jeppe reported that the Armenians of Aleppo were afraid of committing themselves to the landowners who tried to induce them to settle in their villages. 20 It was only special trust in Karen Jeppe herself which persuaded the refugees to settle in her colonies. Once the Nansen scheme had been initiated, Burnier summed up the feeling of the refugees, noting how, as a result of the events which brought the Armenians to Syria they remained fearful and mistrustful, and that this spirit led them to concentrate in great herds as at Beirut or Aleppo. They preferred to live in poverty rather than to disperse. Their settlement in the villages, even Christian, as individuals or in small groups would be difficult, if not impossible. The security of recent years was not enough to wipe out old memories. Burnier had spoken to notables and village-elders who all desired the resumption of peasant life, but in sufficiently large groups to allow them the feeling of security. He concluded that it was on this basis that it would be necessary to plan. 21

Johnson, who met the Armenian leaders on his visit to Syria, noted likewise in 1926 that the refugees had declined various offers made to them of transfer elsewhere, but that this refusal was quite understandable, given that these offers had involved the dispersal of the Armenians among Muslim populations who did not disguise their enmity for the refugees. No proposal for settlement would receive the support of the refugees unless adequate provision was made for security. As a result, Johnson felt that his settlement committee's
field of choice was limited to areas contiguous to large towns enjoying adequate military protection, to land within easy reach of the sea, which had previously enabled the rescue of Armenians in times of crisis, and to establishment among other friendly Christian populations.22

When Johnson's report was considered by the Armenian subcommittee a preference was expressed by the philarmenian organisations for settlement in coastal regions,23 which continued to dominate the implementation of the Nansen scheme. Thus the Ras ul Ain experiment was approved while particularly favoured by the Armenians was the Sanjak of Alexandretta.24 This region had already been the subject of an investigation by an Armenian agronomist, and was additionally favoured from the security aspect by its indigenous Armenian population (in Alexandretta town, the Jobel Moussa and the Jobel Aïra). The communal organisation of these settlements in the Sanjak has already been described. It took due account of the community structure of the Armenians, for Burnier had already recognised the weakness of the métayage experiment in this respect. He argued that métayage, outplacing families on their own or in small groups, involved complete dispersal of refugees used to living as a community, made it impossible for them to follow their religion, and above all made it impossible to organize teaching in their own schools to maintain their national culture. It was much better therefore to buy lands able to support thirty to sixty families or more, to create a normal village, with its own church and school. By buying lands near each other in the Sanjak, he argued, there would be created a true Armenian centre, which would then attract those Armenians
capable of settling by their own means. Settlement in this manner would assure both prosperity and security.\textsuperscript{25}

While settlement in coastal regions received the Committee's approval, settlement in the interior was rejected, not only in the Euphrates Region\textsuperscript{26} and in the southern Hauran,\textsuperscript{27} but also in the more immediate vicinity of Aleppo.\textsuperscript{28} In rejecting settlement in the interior the Committee thus took a more extreme line on settlement preferences than the Armenians in Syria had done themselves; earlier Armenian settlement schemes proposed by the Catholicos and Dr. Melkonian, had concerned the interior. The explanation may lie in the events of Damascus, of which more below. Burnier himself rejected the absolute necessity of settlement on the coast, believing that large groupings of Armenians would provide in themselves adequate security. Thus large concentrations of refugees even in the interior would be better able to defend themselves than métayers dispersed in the coastal regions, who could not count on foreign assistance quickly enough to assure their security.\textsuperscript{29} On this basis he urged the Qirate plan, but, as already seen, this plan was killed by a protest from an Armenian organisation. The only colony in the interior to be approved by the Committee was the unsuccessful colony of Mouchachene (Massaïf). Only in 1929 did M. Pachalian, of the C.C.R.A., at last offer support for the creation of Armenian colonies in the interior, that is for Le Nail's scheme in the Euphrates region and Palmyra, previously considered too risky from the security point of view. But this scheme came to naught as shortly afterwards it was decided to concentrate exclusively on urban resettlement. This volte-face undoubtedly
reflected the better conditions of security then prevailing in the north-east of Syria, but it may also have been related to political considerations. Elsewhere, the Committee was reluctant to agree to resettlement in Alexandretta town, as this was in a sensitive zone near to the Turkish border. This argument also was rejected by Burnier, and action was eventually required in any case by the development of a rehousing crisis in the town.

It may be assumed that the considerations of security of life and culture which influenced the settlement scheme in this manner operated also in the more spontaneous decisions made by the Armenians to encourage concentration rather than dispersal. It seems that these social constraints must have been partly responsible for the tendencies observed in Chapter 3; the relative lack of dispersal from arrival points, the tendency to cluster in the principal towns and desert secondary centres, and possibly also the rural-urban shift which accompanied the migrations. It is ironic that the one area in which there was successful planned dispersal of Armenians - the Sanjak of Alexandretta - was deserted by them at the end of the period, again through fears for their security.

Religious Segregation and Political Rivalries

In principle, it has been assumed that the Armenians acted as a homogeneous unit. In practice, it is possible to identify divisions within the Armenian community with implications for settlement, for as well as their nationalism and their fears, the Armenians also brought into Syria and Lebanon their divisions of religion and party.
Although the analysis of inter-communal segregation in Chapter 3 showed relatively little difference in general between the (regional) distribution of Apostolics and Catholics, the question of internal religious segregation certainly deserves further investigation. Urban religious segregation is considered briefly in later chapters. Otherwise the sources permit few insights. However it is possible to point to the reconstitution of the Lazarista mission at Kirik Khane as an example of favouritism towards Armenian Catholics on the part of the Mandatory authorities producing a segregated Catholic community.

The documents are more revealing with regard to the manner in which political rivalries may have influenced settlement. Politically the Armenians in Syria were divided in loyalty between three principal parties: \(^{32}\) the Dashnak, Hentchak, and Ramgavar parties. The Daanaks and Hentchaks were descendants of the revolutionary parties, but differed bitterly in their attitude to Soviet Armenia. The Hentchaks, whose links with the Communists were strong, tended to see Armenian aspirations realised by the establishment of the Armenian Soviet Republic, while the Dashnaks, who had been the ruling party in the independent Armenian Republic before their expulsion by the Soviets, were bitterly anti-Soviet. The Ramgavar party, lacking the popular base of the other two parties, but influential among the more wealthy Armenians and the A.O.B.U., while eschewing the political principles of the Hentchak party, supported the maintenance of good relations with Soviet Armenia, and the idea of repatriation. In addition, Armenians were prominent in the founding of Communist
cells in Syria and Lebanon between 1925 and 1930, during which time they dominated the party in the region. This was not without significance for French policy, which is discussed below. To return to the main point, however, it is apparent that Armenian politics in Syria and Lebanon under the mandate were dominated by Dashnak-anti-Dashnak rivalry, and sullied by violence and murder. This political rivalry appears to have influenced Armenian attitudes to the Nansen Office settlement scheme.

The settlements in the Sanjak of Alexandretta, for example, soon attracted hostile Armenian criticism, albeit working on fertile ground. It has already been observed that Burnier attributed the partial desertion of Nor Zeitoun in part to the action of elements hostile to the scheme living in Aleppo. Criticisms were made also in the Armenian journal Yevren, published in Aleppo, of the malarial state of the inhabitants of Haiachène. A letter from Dr. E. Altounyan, an indigenous Armenian resident of Aleppo, which came to the attention of Major Johnson at Geneva, urged urban resettlement at Aleppo, claiming, "The number of agriculturally minded families in this group of refugees is entirely negligible." Another letter, which also came to Johnson's attention, from the Protestant pastor Manoogian, after criticising the state of health at Krik Khane, Souk Sou and Pré-Militaire, went on to criticise the settlements from the points of view of health, education, religion and security:

"My humble objection is against dispersing the Armenians. They must not be far from the larger cities at all. At Ekiz Keopreu they are in a higher place. Malaria is not very near. Also they are near Bitias, so that they can be sheltered in the mountains easily. But Soghook Sou and Soldiers Field will be ready to be swallowed by the enemy at any time. No, there is not
any fear to-day but who knows the to-morrow? We have trusted the English and French people's good intention, but can we forget that in spite of all their good intention they massacred us in Damascus in the presence of the French army and in Aleppo in the presence of the English army. If they have done this in big cities, what will be the condition of small villages among the hostile neighbour and being separated from each other?

In short this kind of separation is dangerous for the health of the people because of malaria; dangerous from educational point of view; dangerous from religious point; dangerous from political point of view. Therefore it is better to leave them free in the places that they live at present, and help them to buy a piece of land to build their houses instead of the huts that they make of reeds and plaster with mud as they have done in Soghoock Sou.  

Faced with these criticisms, Burnier rejected Altounyan's claim, maintaining that the number of peasants in Aleppo camp was not negligible. He did acknowledge the educational problem raised by Manoogian, but in his devastating reply to Manoogian's criticisms he suggested strongly that political motives might lie behind them. It was necessary, he said, to ask who would gain and who would lose from the settlement scheme. The winners, he claimed, would be the impoverished refugee working population: the losers would be the notables, the speculators and the clergy. While at Geneva and London it was the voice of the latter which was always heard, Burnier was living amongst the former. He was urged not to disperse the camps, yet in the camp of Aleppo alone he had more requests for settlement than places available on the land acquired. The Armenian notables had forbidden settlement in the interior, saying that this was dangerous. In reality, he claimed, it was to prevent the dislocation of the camps. These notables, he said, were doctors, politicians and priests. By the
break-up of the camps they lost their clientele, their votes and above all their flocks. The Armenian clergy, he claimed, were not priests by vocation but by trade. They were supported by the impoverished refugees over whom they would struggle with all their means to keep their influence, the source of their profits. Thus the organisation of the Nansen colonies worried them. The notables were also annoyed because the organisation of the settlement work was being carried on independent of them, directly between the refugees and Burnier himself. They had thus lost an influence which they believed assured. 39 This reply was undoubtedly unfair to Manoogian, an evangelical pastor, and in fact the letter was not directed against him personally. It is evident, however, that Burnier was in political conflict with a number of the Armenian notables.

Further clues as to the nature of this conflict are provided by William Jessop of the Near East Foundation and by the British Consul at Damascus. Jessop reported in November, 1931 that the Armenian notables were dissatisfied with Burnier, claiming that he never consulted them, that he was arbitrary in his judgement, and that they suspected his agent of taking bribes. Worst of all, they claimed that he was in the hands of the Dashnak party. 40 Consul Mackereth likewise reported from Damascus, in March, 1935 that Burnier was coming in for a good deal of contumelious criticism from the refugees, for "he is accused of favouring the "Dashnaks," who are feared and disliked by the Orthodox Armenian clergy." 41 Now, Burnier's condemnation of the Armenian notables does read in places rather like a Dashnak tract, and it is evident from a statement
by Duguet, that the Dashnaks, who had no sympathy for the Soviet Armenian regime, were critical of those Armenian notables who preferred to retain their capital for ultimate settlement in Soviet Armenia rather than use it to facilitate permanent settlement in Syria and Lebanon. In short, the Dashnaks had a greater commitment to settlement in Syria than the anti-Dashnak parties. It is not therefore surprising that Burnier should come to be identified with them, and possibly come under their influence. Thus this difference in outlook may also have lain behind the criticisms of the Nansen scheme and should be added to the allegations of self-interest made by Burnier in his reply to Manoogian's criticisms. Furthermore, Moses Der Kaloustian, whom Burnier chose as representative of the Armenian villages established in the Sanjak of Alexandretta, was a prominent member of the Dashnak party. Significantly the attack by Yerapad, a Ramgavar newspaper, on the situation of the settlements of Haïachène and Nor Zeitoun also contained personal criticisms of Der Kaloustian. It seems that in attacking the settlements in the Sanjak, the anti-Dashnak parties attacked Der-Kaloustian by implication. It seems also that, by virtue of his position, Der-Kaloustian acquired a new clientele for his party which had formerly fallen under the control of the notables in the towns, and that for this reason the urban Armenian notables may even have desired to see the failure of the scheme for settlement in the Sanjak. This would set in context Burnier's allegations against the Armenian notables. Ellen Chater at least was suspicious of Der-Kaloustian's role, feeling that his interest in the villages was perhaps more political than humanitarian.
But Burnier defended him loyally against these allegations. Efforts to undermine the settlement work in 1931, attributed by Burnier to the desire to spread discontent, may also have been designed to weaken the position of the Dashnak party. Burnier wrote in December, 1931, that "Bolshevik" agents were carrying on a propaganda campaign at Beirut and in the Nansen Office villages, and had achieved some success. They were encouraging the refugees not to settle in Syria, not to pay for the construction of their homes, and not to reimburse the loans made by the Office. This, he claimed, was solely in order to maintain the refugees in a state of indecision and discontent. So far they had successfully persuaded fifteen families to leave Massiaf and one to leave Abdal-Huyuk.

Conclusions

To resume, then, the impact on settlement of Armenian social aspirations and political divisions, it appears that an initial reluctance to settle in Syria, because of a desire for transfer to Soviet Armenia entertained at least by the Armenian 'leaders' at Poria, was followed by a more positive commitment to settlement in Syria when transfer to Soviet Armenia became practically impossible. Within Syria, a desire for security of life and culture encouraged concentration and discouraged dispersal. With regard to the Nansen Office scheme, it led to a preference for settlement in coastal regions, and rejection of plans for settlement in the interior, with the exception of Le Nail's abortive proposals of 1929. The tendency to concentrate represented the ethnic solidarity of the Armenians. Within Armenian society, however, there was a degree of religious segregation between Apostolics and
Catholics, while political rivalries between Dashnak and anti-Dashnak parties appear to have influenced attitudes to the Nansen Office settlements.

The attitude of the Indigenous Population

The attitude of the indigenous population of Syria and Lebanon to the settlement of Armenian migrants was cool, sometimes openly hostile. It is idle to blame this reaction on "Muslim fanaticism." The immigration gave rise to genuine political and economic fears on the part of the indigenous population. Nevertheless, the hostility was based partly on "ethnic" grounds, the criterion for distinction being not simply religion but linguistic, cultural or "national" identity. While Syria and Lebanon were together composed of a mosaic of confessional groups, the overwhelming majority of the population of both territories (Muslim or Christian, including the indigenous Armenian population) was Arabic-speaking. The strength of "Arabism" as a cultural-political force among the Syrian and Lebanese population at this time is however difficult to evaluate. Confessionalism continued to dominate Lebanese politics while French policies (deliberately or not) perpetuated confessionalism in the State of the Alawis and the Jebel ed Drouz. Within interior Syria traditional religious allegiances could hardly be expected to die overnight in the face of the new nationalist politics. The nationalist struggle was directed essentially, of course, against French control. Within the nationalist movement it is possible to identify elements of both pan-Arabism and a specifically Syrian nationalism. To a specifically Syrian nationalism shorn of
cultural overtones, the Armenian immigration would only be objectionable in so far as it resulted from French control (i.e. the objection would be political rather than "ethnic"). But, in so far as Syrian nationalism was identified with Arabism the Armenians inevitably ran the risk of being treated as foreigners:

"Toute la population de ces Etats parlant la langue arabe est aussi en grande majorité d'origine arabe. Sans doute les diverses nations qui ont conquis la Syrie, y ont laissé des sujets de leurs races. Mais il suffit de mentionner que, quoiqu'il en soit, les Syriens forment aujourd'hui une unité ethnique et linguistique incontestable. Entre tous existe à présent un fond de même origine et un réel sentiment de solidarité...... Il y a bien quelques milliers d'Armeniens immigrés après l'occupation française et des tcherkesses qui habitent le pays depuis longtemps. Mais ces deux éléments ne peuvent, étant donné leur petite proportion, changer l'aspect de la nation syrienne, composée d'Arabes et autres Orientaux syrianisés."

The only way that the Armenians could avoid such antagonism was to shed their own "national" allegiances. In fact, they were in a cruel dilemma, elegantly expressed by Paul Sorren:

"Des conflits éclateront si les Aréniens restent fideles à leur passé. S'ils renoncent à leur caractère particulier, ce sera le massacre volontaire et sans que le sang coule, de la plus grande agglomération des réfugiés arméniens de Turquie."

"Ethnic" antagonism was by no means the only cause of friction between Armenians and Arabs, but its importance was fundamental, for the ethnic label provided the basis for the identification of inequalities and the perpetuation of other grievances and fears.

Ethnic antagonism was encouraged by the non-assimilatory tendencies of the Armenians themselves, in particular their tendency to concentrate in compact groups. M. De Caix observed
to the Permanent Mandates Commission in November, 1926 how this tendency might lead the indigenous population to regard the Armenians as a foreign entity which refused to blend with the other inhabitants of the country. And Burnier wrote in April, 1928 that the indigenous population viewed with fear the development and growth in the cities of foreign colonies which would never be absorbed or assimilated. These comments were no doubt prompted in part by views expressed when the Lebanese Chamber was invited to participate in plans for Armenian settlement. When the High Commissioner requested that the State of Lebanon allocate three million francs to the resettlement of Armenians in Beirut, objections were raised, particularly by a Muslim deputy, that the resettlement envisaged would concentrate the Armenians in a particular quarter, instead of dispersing them and aiding their assimilation. It was felt also that it was unacceptable to vote a credit of three million francs in favour of the Armenian refugees without at the same time organising aid to the indigenous victims of the Druze revolt. The refusal of the Lebanese Chamber to meet this demand ruined the efforts of the High Commission to obtain finance from the local states for the Armenian settlement scheme, and indirectly therefore contributed notably to the perpetuation of the settlement pattern then existing. Furthermore, this inability of the local States to participate in the work of Armenian resettlement (based partly on ethnic prejudice and partly, it must be stressed, on legitimate financial considerations) threw the Armenians back into dependence on the French, with consequent political repercussions.
Indeed, hostility towards the Armenians had a strong political basis. While Syria and Lebanon united contained an overwhelmingly Arab Muslim population, at the local level the establishment of a sizeable Armenian population could profoundly alter the confessional balance. While the Christian leaders in Lebanon might view such an alteration with favour, the majority population viewed local Armenian concentration with suspicion. There was opposition to Armenian naturalisation and fears about the Armenian birth-rate which was believed to be extraordinarily high. When it was felt that the Armenians were being used or favoured by the French Mandatory authorities, hostility was particularly intense. Allegations of favouritism could of course thrive in a situation where the inability of the local States to contribute to Armenian resettlement had thrown the Armenians back into dependence on the French. For example, the French scheme for the colonisation of Armenians in the Euphrates region was proposed by Pierre Le Nail, its enthusiastic protagonist, in terms of an Armenian "home" ("patrie"). When inaccurate reports of the scheme reached the attention of an Arab population outraged by the development of Zionism in Palestine, there was a series of violent protests across Syria. The subsequent abandonment of this scheme was probably related to these protests. Again, the Armenians were in an unenviable situation, owing their loyalty both to the Syrian population and the French authorities. What, for example, was their duty in the elections? To vote for the pro-Mandate candidates, and risk the wrath of the Nationalists? Or to vote for the Nationalists against their French "protectors"?

The most important basis for hostile Arab feeling was,
The Armenians were accused of lowering the wages of the indigenous labour force by accepting lower wages themselves. Contemporary observers were certainly of the opinion that the Armenians with their imported skills, industry, and willingness to work for lower returns proved formidable competition for the locals. In the report of the Mandatory Power for 1937 it is stated that the Armenians had lowered wages by 20-25% in industries where their numbers were sufficiently high. The most reliable account of their economic impact concerns the province of Latakia.

An official report stated that there it was incontestable that Armenian labour had supplanted indigenous labour in numerous trades. More industrious, and better organised than indigenous labour, and having a deep feeling of communal aid, Armenian labour had gradually succeeded in forcing out indigenous artisans from those small trades which required just a little capital and the shrewd use of cheap labour. It was impossible, the report continued, to estimate exactly the influence of Armenian labour on wages, other deeper causes having provoked a decrease in wages. However, it was undeniable that the better organisation of the Armenian workshops and consequent lower prices had effectively competed with indigenous producers, and obliged the latter to lower prices by cutting wages.

As Marshall Fox pointed out, the Armenians were once more in a predicament. Employers would naturally prefer to employ workers to whom they could convey instructions in their own language, so the non-Arabic speaking Armenians were at a disadvantage. To earn a living, therefore, they had to offer
some additional inducement, for example, working longer hours for less money. In this case even indigenous employers could be prepared to use the Armenians as a lever to bring down wage-rates, as "they all want cheap labour when they are employing." 61 It must be stated too that, if there was a depression in wage-rates which the Armenians encouraged, ultimately this resulted not (obviously) from the desire of the Armenians themselves, but from the flooding of the labour-market resulting from their immigration. In fact, the precise economic impact of the Armenian immigration must remain in doubt: it might form the basis of a separate study. Suspicions were certainly felt by the local population, however, and these were all that mattered in terms of arousing hostility.

The most striking manifestation of Arab hostility to the Armenians occurred during the Druse Revolt, a local rebellion which broke out in 1925 and assumed partly the character of a nationalist uprising. To meet this crisis the French authorities established auxiliary units in which a number of Armenians were enlisted.62 It appears that there was no collusion between the French and Armenians, but the French desperately needed troops to quell the uprising, and the Armenians, who needed employment, could not resist the attractive financial incentives which were offered. Consul Hough puts the responsibility for this recruitment firmly in French hands.

"... it is impossible to hold starving men back from taking any employment which guarantees them regular pay. The whole responsibility is on those who engage them, and if it resulted later in attacks on this unhappy people the responsibility would be heavy". 63

The irregular troops were soon accused of excesses in the
oasis of Damascus. Not surprisingly then, when in October, 1925 the rebels attacked southern Damascus, the first people they attacked were the Armenians in the refugee camp of Kaden. Consul Smart, here rather less sympathetic to the Armenians than his colleague, explains the Arab point of view. 64

"No doubt the Muslims exaggerate both the numbers of the Armenians enrolled in these irregular formations and the extent of their misdeeds. Yet, the fact remains that some Armenians are in these formations. These Armenians came here as pitiful refugees from Turkey. By their better craftsmanship and by the lower wages they accepted they caused economic prejudice to the natives. Yet these foreign Christian intruders had not been subjected to any bad treatment by the Muslims. A revolt breaks out which quickly assumes a nationalist character and is only directed against the French. The most elementary prudence and recognition of hospitality should have enjoined on the Armenians complete abstention from any participation in the hostilities. Instead of adopting this attitude of abstention, a number of them joined these irregular formations and fought against their Muslim hosts, who regard themselves as fighting for their native land....."

Notwithstanding this disaster, the French continued to use the Armenians as irregulars, and in February, 1926, the Armenians themselves were involved in severe excesses during clearing-up operations in the Meidan quarter of Damascus. Arab hostility was now so fierce that the Armenian Catholicos wrote to the French High Commissioner begging him to discharge the Armenians who had been recruited. 65 The clashes meanwhile had encouraged the movement of thousands of Armenian refugees from the camps of Damascus to Beirut.

The Damascus clashes were, it is true, the most bitter clashes which occurred between Arabs and Armenians in Syria in the course of an uneasy relationship which was not in general marked by violence. The movement from Damascus to
Beirut which they encouraged was atypical in that it was the direct result of a specific disturbance. Otherwise Arab hostility was more subtle in its influence on Armenian settlement. In leading the local States to refuse to participate in a solution of the Armenian problem it encouraged the perpetuation of the status quo and the rule of economic constraints while throwing the Armenians back into dependence on the French for resettlement. Subsequently it inhibited the implementation of French-inspired schemes for Armenian resettlement suspected of political bias. Perhaps most important, however, though impossible to measure (especially in view of the Armenians' pre-Syrian experience) was the effect which this hostility must have had on Armenian attitudes to settlement. It can only have increased their insecurity, especially after the events of Damascus. Paradoxically, the concentration and segregation encouraged by this insecurity would itself stress the ethnic separateness of the Armenians, increase their impact on local economies and increase their dependence on French protection, all of which would increase Arab hostility still further. One may identify a process which was essentially self-perpetuating. It was also clearly complicated by the French interest, and it is on French policy towards the Armenians that attention will now be focussed.

The political motives and social constraints behind French policy

The Armenians constituted in Syria and Lebanon an additional element in the complex ethnic mosaic which made up those countries. It was a mosaic which had encouraged the Mandatory authorities to carve up the region into what Longrigg
aptly refers to as a "strangely fragmented pattern" of states and territories. In view of this fragmentation, and the obvious temptation to use additional minorities as political chess-pieces, it is pertinent to ask whether or not the French authorities endeavoured to control Armenian settlement for political purposes. Such a question is based on the realisation that, while the Mandated territory was divided into a number of States with their own government, the reality of control lay with the Mandatory authorities. The independence of the Levant States was notoriously incomplete. The States applied laws which in many cases not they but the High Commissioner had enacted, and often after little consultation with them. Every act of their own Chambers required a French countersignature. Important Departments, including the Common Interests, were entirely outside their control. Whole provinces were directly French-administered. Throughout the State administrations French advice, inspection and de facto control rendered local powers often no more than nominal.66

It might be expected, if the French wished to use the Armenians for political purposes, that they would have viewed the Armenian immigration with favour. In answering this question then, it is necessary first to examine the attitude of the authorities to the migrations. It is evident in fact that as early as March, 1921, when there was the possibility of an Armenian exodus from Cilicia to Syria, the French were concerned about the financial burden and the political complications it would bring.67 When, in October, the possibility of an exodus was raised again, these concerns of
a political and financial nature were retained, and the French endeavoured to persuade the Armenians to remain in Cilicia. However, with other ports closed, and the necessity to avoid disease and disturbances at Mersin and Dortyol, where the refugees had accumulated, they were obliged to accept their moral obligation to receive the refugees whom they had gravely compromised by a contradictory policy, and the evacuation and transport of the Cilician refugees to Syria was reluctantly agreed. De Caix gave early expression to the political misgivings consequent on this action, arguing that the Armenians' political habits could only be embarrassing for the French, especially as those who had apparently arrived in Cilicia from America and the Caucasus after the armistice of 1918 would have "Bolshevist" tendencies. The mischievous influence of their political committees, suggested the French Consul-General at Ankara, should be eliminated at any cost.

The migrants of 1921 were thus clearly only accepted reluctantly, despite financial and political considerations. The same considerations were also felt with regard to the migrants who arrived between 1922 and 1924. For the first time, it is true, the potential political advantage of the Armenian immigration was acknowledged by General Weygand, the High Commissioner. He recognised the advantage in increasing in Syria the number of Christians who were favourable to the French presence and who would tend in certain towns to counterbalance the Muslims who were politically more "difficult". However, he went on to restate the financial and political objections, observing that the earlier influx of Armenians had caused protests because it had made the housing crisis more
acute and reduced wages. A new influx would exacerbate this feeling, especially as all the refugees from the previous influx had still not been absorbed.\textsuperscript{73} It was considerations of this order which continued to dominate French policy towards the immigration. Even in 1929, when the Nansen Office scheme was well under way, the fresh migration of refugees was viewed as the same financial and political burden,\textsuperscript{74} and some refugees were initially refused entry at the border.\textsuperscript{75}

This attitude towards the forced or induced migrations was not contradicted by French policy towards the various suggestions which were made for orderly transfer of refugees to Syria. It has been observed that Armenian desires to transfer about five to six thousand refugees from Greece to Syria may have lain partly behind the mission of Mr. Carle to Syria to examine settlement possibilities there. Agreement to this proposal was apparently given in principle in Paris, subject to the approval of the High Commission.\textsuperscript{76} The attitude of the High Commission is not known, but in any case the Druse Revolt intervened to prevent any action being taken. Subsequently, once the Nansen Office scheme had been agreed, Johnson reported that during his visit, in November, 1926, he received the informal assurance of the High Commission that every facility would be afforded the Office for the establishment in Syria of Armenian refugees from other countries, as soon as substantial progress had been made in the settlement of the unemployed refugees already in Syria.\textsuperscript{77} It is unlikely that these developments really represented a change in policy. If so, it was extremely brief. When, probably as a result of Johnson's statement, the French ambassador to Turkey received
a Turkish protest concerning a press report that the transport of Armenians from Europe to Syria had been discussed at Geneva, it was met with a strong denial. The impossibility of transfer was stated again in June, 1927 at a Refugee Conference in Geneva by Count Clauzel, the French representative, and to the Armenian sub-committee at Geneva by Duguet, who stated that it would be premature to consider this question, given the difficulty of solving the problem of the refugees already in Syria. Such attitudes were justified by the hostile Syrian reaction to rumors of mass immigration which appeared in September, 1928. At the Paris Conference in June, 1931, however, which determined the future shape of the settlement work in Syria, and at which M. Ponsot, the French High Commissioner, was present, it was agreed that some refugees might be transferred to Syria from Greece. However, this movement could only be contemplated when definite provision had been made for the settlement of the 15,000 refugees remaining in the camps of Syria. Moreover, such transfers could only be made initially on an individual basis, and in favor of those refugees who already had relatives or friends in Syria who would be prepared to receive them, and who would not therefore become a charge on public funds. For political reasons, the Mandatory Power could not allow the impression to gain ground that it contemplated a further Armenian colonization in Syria. Burnier was charged by the Office with studying the transfer question, and it is evident that the policy above was carried out. While a small number of refugees were admitted, it is clear that the French authorities were reluctant to admit refugees who were penniless or had no relatives in Syria to assure their subsistence.
In so far as evidence is available, it seems therefore that French policy towards transfers was consistent with their policy towards the major refugee influxes. Indeed, some emigration was actually assisted. This was of orphans to France in co-operation with the N.E.R., and has been described already. On the other hand, a statement by Johnson suggests that the authorities were keen to prevent emigration to South America from assuming large proportions, and the motive may have been political.

It is clear that the French cannot be accused of deliberately introducing Armenians into Syria for political purposes. On the contrary, in general they viewed Armenian immigration as financially and politically embarrassing. Nevertheless, once the refugees had arrived, did they endeavour to influence their settlement for political purposes? Initially it is apparent that lack of finance ruled out large-scale resettlement schemes whether politically based or not. Thus, in so far as political considerations influenced the dispersal of the 1921 refugees which did take place, these were wholly negative. The authorities were anxious to avoid an accumulation of refugees in the State of Aleppo and Sanjak of Alexandretta, where their presence would worry Turkey. It was felt that the increase of the Armenian element could cause difficulties in the "Turkish" region of Alexandretta for which a special regime was foreseen under the Ankara agreement. Therefore it was decided that the impoverished refugees at Alexandretta should be transported to the south. For the same reason, it was decided that the evacuation of the
refugees who were waiting to move into Syria from Dortyol should be carried out by sea to the southern coast, instead of by land to Alexandretta. However, even this negative policy misfired, and the refugees at Dortyol, whose transport was envisaged by sea to the Syrian ports, were eventually received by Alexandretta. The subsequent dispersal of refugees from Alexandretta, while consistent with the policy stated above, seems nevertheless to have been carried out in response to pressure from relief organisations rather than for political reasons. Turkish susceptibilities seem again, however, to have influenced the dispersal of the refugees who arrived in Aleppo after 1922. When an article appeared in the Turkish press about the Armenians in Syria, the High Commissioner, Weygand, wrote indignantly that far from attracting the Armenians, he had been more concerned about the financial burden they imposed, the economic difficulties they provoked, and the political danger they represented, as much from the point of view of relations with Turkey as from the point of view of internal politics. Moreover, far from concentrating them in the Aleppo region, the Mandatory Power had endeavoured to disperse them in Syria and Lebanon, as much to avoid offending Turkish susceptibilities as to assure their subsistence. (Turkish complaints about alleged bad behaviour of Armenians in the regions of Aleppo and Alexandretta had in fact been made as early as April, 1923.) Apart from these measures of redistribution from Aleppo, French efforts towards refugee redistribution after 1922 concerned only the encouragement of small-scale dispersal, which did not even receive Armenian support. There was no question of large-scale colonisation which continued to be ruled out for financial
reasons. Mr. Hekimian, N.E. R. representative at Aleppo, was critical of French inaction in this respect, but Consul Smart considered him unfair, as the French Authorities "would easily arouse a storm of Arab opposition if they promoted too obviously Armenian colonisation in Syria". A regard for Arab susceptibilities would have been consistent with French policy towards the immigrations, so that negative political considerations may have been acting once again.

The Turkish government, however, believed the High Commission to be deliberately concentrating Armenians in villages in the Sanjak, and communicated these views to Paris. These allegations were denied by General Sarrail, the High Commissioner who pointed out that a large number of refugees had been transferred to the interior "dans le but précisément de decongestionner la région Nord." The Turks however remained concerned so that Sarrail decided in future not to permit the residence of refugees from Turkey within thirty kilometres of the frontier. While this provision may have been applied temporarily to new installations, it does not appear to have been retrospective, nor to have remained in force, as refugees subsequently settled immediately next to the border. There is also some evidence of French involvement in the establishment of refugees at Kirik Khan. Here the government provided land for the re-establishment of the Lazarists' Mission of Ekkba, and 50 to 55 families of their former flocks. In addition they provided transport for these families from Latakia to Alexandretta, and it is clear that the operation involved co-operation at the highest levels of the French administration. Apart from the clear favouritism towards the
Catholic Armenians which this move entailed, it suggests also that Turkish allegations may not have been unfounded. The motive, to reinforce the pro-Mandate element in an area whose political future was in doubt, was certainly not lacking, but such considerations in French policy seem excluded by the statements already recorded, which favoured dispersal from the Sanjak and accord with Turkey. It seems that the French were merely unwilling to deny themselves the opportunity of dispersing some Armenians in the Sanjak, despite political considerations, when the problem in the centres of Armenian concentration was so acute. A definitive answer, however, must await the opening of the archives of the High Commission.

More light on French policy comes from an investigation of the official attitude to the colonisation work of Karen Jeppe. The first statement located on this subject was made by M. Painlevé, the French representative at a meeting of the Council of the League in September, 1925, in which he noted the humanitarian work of Miss Jeppe but stressed that colonisation was a matter which lay solely within the competence of the Mandatory power. The motive behind this statement is revealed in a letter from Briand, the Foreign Minister, to De Jouvenal, the High Commissioner, in 1926. Recalling the discussion at the League in 1925, he revealed that certain facts related by General Sarrail (the previous High Commissioner) and his predecessors on the subject of disorders provoked by Miss Jeppe in the Aleppo region had led the Department to wish to put an end to her mission which risked involving the Mandatory Power in difficulties with the indigenous population. However, the favour which this pro-Armenian work enjoyed with
the feminist and evangelical associations, which exercised an undeniable influence on the League Secretariat and on certain of the principal delegations to the Assembly, had not permitted the French delegate to bring about such a radical solution. He had had to content himself with limiting the autonomy of Miss Jeppe in relation to the High Commission.97 The disorders referred to probably concern the murder of an agent of Miss Jeppe in connection with her rescue work for women and children.98 In other words, the French authorities were concerned to limit Miss Jeppe's freedom of action because they feared incidents with the indigenous population, a concern consistent with the policy already inferred. At the same time, Miss Jeppe continued to believe that she had French support for her settlement schemes, even into 1926.99 Consul Hough, at Aleppo, therefore asked her what she thought lay behind Painleve's statement to the League. She replied that she had been given to understand that General Sarrail had sent in an unfavourable report on her work, probably because she had enjoyed the confidence and support of French officials for whom he had a personal dislike. (This, felt General Hough, would be quite in accordance with the "demoniac" personality of the late High Commissioner.) The subsequent effect had been that though unable to continue colonisation schemes for the benefit of Armenian refugees as League of Nations Commissioner, she had been in touch with De Jouvenal, and received his authority to continue them in her personal capacity, and on condition of her responsibility to the French in the matter.100 In fact, there appears to have been no great inconsistency between the policies of the two High Commissioners. De Jouvenal's approval of the scheme was consistent with a desire
to disperse the refugees, but he had also established French supervision of the work. Furthermore, at the same time as
De Jouvenal was approving Miss Jeppe's schemes, he was writing to Paris, urging that her work be attached to the relief
committee established in Syria by the International Red Cross
to aid the victims of the Druse Revolt, in order to limit her autonomy. These preoccupations subsequently received
satisfaction at the League Assembly which passed a resolution which,

"Seeing that the work of Armenian colonisation..., undertaken by Miss Jeppe..., (falls) within the class of work entrusted by the Mandatory Power, in the general interest, to a central organ representing the Refugee Service at the I.L.O. and the direction of the I.R.C.C., invites Miss Jeppe to come to an understanding as regards the general direction of the work mentioned..., with the liaison organisation established by the Mandatory Power."  

Burnier was requested by Johnson to give effect to this resolution, and in his report of his meeting with Miss Jeppe he gave an interesting summary of French preoccupations. He noted that the French complained that Miss Jeppe worked independently of the Mandatory authorities, and that she had never been to see the Delegate. They suspected her of having political tendencies contrary to the interests of the Mandate. Her agricultural colonies caused concern to the authorities. They were located in a region of nomadism, not far from the Kurds, and based on a contract established with a local chief - a small guarantee. Also they were too small to provide for their own security. Up to the time of writing there had been no incident, because the colonies were poor. But should they become prosperous, the bedouin tribes could
well attempt a raid, and a single rifle-shot at an Armenian
would have most unfortunate consequences. Finally, the latest
reports from the region's Intelligence Officer noted that the
Armenians had a tendency to behave unreasonably and look down
on the indigenous population, as they believed themselves to
be under the special protection of the League. Burnier asked
her to abstain from all new attempts at colonisation and to
limit her activity to aiding the poor in Aleppo camp. Johnson
then at least considered directing some of her funds through
the Geneva Committee, so that she would be obliged to act in
accordance with the instructions given her. Subsequently, the
affair disappears from the correspondence, but, with the
exception of Tîné, Miss Jeppe did not found any new colonies.
The affair illustrates two principal elements of French policy
towards Armenian settlement; the desire to control the
settlement work, and the desire to avoid antagonising the
indigenous population, both consistent with the negative
political considerations in French policy already inferred.

In 1925 the League intervened for the first time with the
mission of Mr Carle to Syria, and the French reaction to the
Carle proposals is interesting. For the first time they were
willing to consider large-scale settlement, in fact in the
Ghab and even east of the Euphrates. The reason for this
change of policy was most probably the apparent willingness of
the League to commit finance to the scheme, which the High
Commission was reluctant to provide. There is no suggestion
in the records consulted that political considerations lay
behind this reversal of policy. French agreement was still,
however, to be conditional on French control of the scheme,
General Sarrail signalling that, being responsible for law and order, the High Commission must choose not only the sites, but also the most favourable time for the execution of the plans. Moreover, according to a statement by M. Pams, French representative at the Fifth Committee of the League Assembly, no action could be taken until the Armenian 'leaders' had determined their attitude to settlement in Syria. Until this had been done, Syria could not incorporate a large part of the Armenian people without either endangering the equilibrium of a possible future Armenian nation, or the equilibrium of Syria, if later a reconstituted Armenia was suddenly to withdraw from Syria more than 100,000 Armenians. Ultimately, the scheme was dropped on the outbreak of the Druse Revolt. The French response to it illustrates again their concern for control of settlement operations and their need for finance.

When the question was revived by Burnier, his initial report to Geneva was prepared with French co-operation, and may be assumed to have met the requirements of the High Commission. It envisaged the transfer of the Armenian population from the interior, due to the bad relations existing there between Armenians and the indigenous population, a proposal consistent with the negative political considerations behind French policy inferred above. On the other hand, the counterpart of this proposal, their resettlement in southern Lebanon, taken in conjunction with proposals to stabilise the Armenian population of Beirut, suggests more positive political considerations. Correspondence in the Archives Diplomatiques confirms that in supporting Burnier's proposals, the High Commissioner, De Jouvenal, was supporting the increase of the Christian majority in the
Lebanon which would result from them.\textsuperscript{109} The figures of the 1925 Civil Register which, however inaccurate, were those available to the authorities and on which they had to base their policies, reveal that it was, in fact, only the presence of the Armenians which brought the Christian proportion of the Lebanese population to over 50% (Table 6.1).

Table 6.1

The impact of Armenian settlement on the proportion of Christians in the Lebanon, according to the Civil Register of 1925.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Population in Lebanon</th>
<th>Total %</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Armenians</td>
<td>32,859</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Christians</td>
<td>326,890</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Christians less Armenians</td>
<td>294,031</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Total Population</td>
<td>597,799</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

There was clear advantage to the French in stabilising this population and increasing it. Locally, the suggested colonisation would have had a dramatic impact on the population balance in the areas of southern Lebanon where the Christian population was weak. (Table 6.2) For the first time, positive political considerations lay behind French settlement policy. This might explain the dramatic change in the way the Armenians were viewed by the French. The assertion in Burnier's report that the majority of Armenians requiring assistance were peasants was in direct contradiction of earlier French statements. Lack of finance was cited by Burnier.
Table 6.2

Impact of proposed Armenian population transfer on the population balance in the cazas of Tyr and Merdjayoun, based on the Civil Register of 1925.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>Tyr</th>
<th>Merdjayoun</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Population in 1925</td>
<td>34,588</td>
<td>24,645</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Christian population in 1925</td>
<td>5,574</td>
<td>8,424</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Christian population as % total population 1925</td>
<td>16.12</td>
<td>34.18</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Proposed increase in population through transfer of Armenians</td>
<td>8,000</td>
<td>20,000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Population after transfer of Armenians</td>
<td>42,588</td>
<td>44,645</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Christian population after transfer of Armenians</td>
<td>13,574</td>
<td>28,424</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Christian population as % total population after transfer of Armenians</td>
<td>31.67</td>
<td>63.67</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

as the reason for the French request for outside assistance, despite their desire to control settlement work. Possibly too, given the political basis of the scheme, participation by the I.L.O. would provide a useful umbrella from criticism.

The plan encountered strong opposition in Paris. A long unsigned memorandum urged its abandonment, the principal reasons being itemised as follows:

1. There were no regions in southern Lebanon where 30,000 immigrants could be introduced without displacing the local population.
2. Given the number of inhabitants in these regions and the
structure of land-ownership, it would have been impossible to settle the Armenians without proceeding to expropriations.

(3) The governmental action which this project would have required would have contradicted the whole Mandate policy, which had consisted of creating local governments. It was inconceivable that these governments would approve and execute measures tending to substitute Armenian immigrants for a part of the Lebanese population.

(4) Armenian colonisation was only acceptable if made spontaneously without expropriations, i.e. in the regions of the Mandated states which had no or virtually no population. To proceed otherwise would have compromised the Mandatory Power gravely and justly in the eyes of the local population.

Thus the High Commission was advised to take no action until the plan had been studied in depth. The ensuing discussions held up the commencement of the scheme. Burnier, who was sent to Paris to hasten the negotiations, reported the opposition of the Ministry to the transfer to southern Lebanon, observing that the Ministry would have preferred the settlement of the Armenians within the states in which they were living, which would not provoke the accusations and discussions which might be provoked by a policy of transfer. It is evident that the Ministry favoured a more cautious line than the High Commission, more in accordance with the earlier policy of avoiding upsetting local susceptibilities. The question was still not resolved when at last the I.L.O. received a formal request for participation.
Subsequently general plans were drawn up by Duguet and by Johnsen, with similar recommendations, following negotiations resulting from Burnier's mission. That of Duguet provides an interesting statement of French policy and may be compared with the original proposals contained in Burnier's memorandum. The most significant change is that Duguet's proposals no longer envisaged the mass transfer of refugees from the interior to Lebanon. Instead the refugees of Aleppo should be resettled within the State of Syria. This fundamental change reveals the abandonment of the grand political design of De Jouvenal, and the substitution of the more cautious approach advocated by the Ministry. The southern Lebanon scheme was not wholly abandoned, but was greatly modified and now envisaged on a smaller, more discrete, scale. The failed experiment of Ras ul Ain was ultimately the only attempt made at Armenian colonisation in this region.

On the other hand, the Beirut scheme was given first priority. This was partly because of the embarrassment caused to the government by the state of the camp, but also because the High Commission still saw the political advantage of stabilising the Armenian population of Lebanon, as W. Reffye stated clearly.

"En dehors de ces raisons d'ordre moral, nous avons le plus grand intérêt, du point de vue politique, comme du point de vue militaire - les événements récents nous ont fourni l'occasion de la constater - à essayer de maintenir au Liban les Arméniens qui s'y ont réfugiés et qui renforcent si utilement l'élément chrétien."

Burnier noted the necessity to halt emigration as a reason for hastening settlement operations, and he was probably here reflecting French concern. It is evident that while, as has
been described, the High Commission was reluctant to encourage Armenian immigration, by 1926 it was at least aware of the possibilities of stabilising the Armenian population which had already arrived. Furthermore, while the policy of stabilising the Armenian population of Beirut conformed to the original design of De Jouvenal, it did not contradict the more cautious policy which sought the resettlement of the Armenians in the states in which they had accumulated. There was a further advantage to the High Commission in giving priority to Beirut. In so far as finance for the scheme would be provided by the Levant States, it was hoped that it would emanate from the individual states, not from the High Commission. This was in accordance with the preoccupations of the Ministry with regard to the autonomy of the local states, and with the reluctance of the High Commission to commit finance to the scheme itself. It was hoped that the Lebanese Chamber would vote a credit of three million francs to the Beirut scheme, and that the example of Lebanon would facilitate the acquisition of a similar credit from the State of Syria. This arrangement, incidentally, enables one to understand more clearly why the French authorities should accept the participation of the I.L.O. while they had previously been reluctant to concede control over settlement operations to external agencies. It is evident that the participation of the I.L.O. would provide a moral lever with which to obtain finance from the local states, while the allocation of that finance once obtained could be controlled more easily from Syria than funds emanating from Geneva, which were viewed as supplementary to the funds to be provided by the local states. In the event, it proved impossible to obtain the
approval of the Lebanese Chamber to a credit of three million francs, and this money had to be provided by the High Commission directly.121

The Beirut scheme was given low priority by the Geneva committee, but was able to proceed as the High Commission controlled the requisite funds. Plans for the settlement of Armenians in the interior of Aleppo Vilayet, however, did not receive the approval of the committee, despite French intentions, as in this case, the High Commission had no funds of its own available. After the failure to secure finance from the Lebanese Chamber, no funds were forthcoming from the local states. Thus the High Commission became more dependent on finance from Geneva, and lost the control over the scheme which it had envisaged. It was only then able to implement schemes which had met Armenian aspirations at Geneva. Thus schemes for settlement in the interior were rejected, while those for settlement near the coast in Alawi Territory and the Sanjak of Alexandretta went ahead. It is evident that in approving these plans the High Commission was paying attention to the demands of the Armenians.122 In the case of the Sanjak, it has been suggested that political considerations were also involved. Not only did the High Commission approve the creation of Armenian villages in the Sanjak, but proposals were made for the resettlement on the reclaimed Alexandretta marshes of the refugees camped at that town. These proposals were opposed by the Geneva committee on the grounds that they were in a region whose future was not absolutely clear from the political point of view, objections which were rejected by both Burnier and Duguet, in statements obviously made with the
approval of the High Commission. In view of previous French reluctance to risk offending Turkish susceptibilities in this region, it is pertinent to ask whether there had been a reversal of policy and if there was now a positive commitment to encourage Armenian settlement in the region. This at least was the view of Consul Hole at Damascus who wrote of the Armenian settlement scheme in a rather ill-informed report in November, 1928 that "while the philanthropic aspect of the scheme has uniformly received the greatest publicity, its principal object has always been to create an Armenian enclave in a centre of internal disaffection or on an exposed frontier." His views were, however, contradicted by Consul-General Satow, at Beirut, and Consul Monck-Mason at Aleppo. Monck-Mason drew attention to the socio-economic advantages of settlement in the Sanjak already discussed. He felt, however, that these considerations certainly coincided with reasons of political convenience. The Sanjak, with a population which was largely Turkish, was, and was likely to remain for a long time, a hotbed of Turkish propaganda. An Armenian element dotted about the Sanjak, enjoying the support of the Mandatory authorities and rapidly increasing in numbers, would be in the nature of a safeguard against a reactionary Turkish population. The final word however comes from the High Commission, when, in 1928, it was suggested by the French Finance Ministry that France had a political interest in settling Armenians along the Turkish frontier, the High Commission denied this categorically, recalling to the Department that it had always been opposed to such a policy which would arouse Turkish susceptibilities, and would be more likely to compromise the security of the frontier than to guarantee it. There does not therefore appear to have
been any change in French policy. It is suggested again that Armenians were settled in the Sanjak in accordance with economic opportunity and social necessity, despite reluctance to offend Turkish susceptibilities.

The High Commission was clearly hindered in the achievement of its objectives with regard to Armenian settlement by lack of finance. It has already been observed that France was unwilling to consider guaranteeing a loan to be made to the scheme. Such a guarantee would, according to French policy, have had to come from the local states in Syria, and in view of the earlier example of Lebanon, Ponson considered it inadvisable to endeavour to obtain a guarantee from these states. Ultimately, however, in 1929 France itself agreed on a new credit of three million francs to the Rolling Fund, an act which was accompanied by the designation of a French representative to the Geneva committee. The High Commission thus regained some of its freedom of action with respect to settlement. The new scheme presented by their appointee, M. Le Nail, envisaged large-scale settlement in the Euphrates region and later in Palmyra. This represented a departure from previous policy which had eschewed settlement in the interior and preferred coastal locations. This was made possible by the pacification of the region and its incorporation into a zone of civil administration. Nevertheless, the sudden commitment of French finance to the scheme, together with the volte-face in the Armenian attitude to settlement in this region expressed at the Geneva committee, lead one to suspect political collusion. Certainly Le Nail's initial outline of the scheme to Johnson at Geneva had considerable political
overtones.

"Le Gouvernement français, en déléguant un représentant au comité central et en appuyant son geste d'une subvention de 3 millions, a voulu marquer son désir de voir la S.D.N. entreprendre un programme de plus grande envergure.

" Il ne s'agissait plus seulement de secourir les réfugiés mais de leur refaire un Patrie.

" Nous désirons grouper, autant que faire se pourra, les Arméniens chasses de leurs villes et villages autour de leurs chefs civils ou religieux, leur rendre non seulement la terre et la maison, mais le temple, l'école, la mairie, l'hôpital, etc."129

Whatever the case, the scheme was abandoned when, in June, 1931, it was decided at the Paris Conference to concentrate on a more limited programme of urban resettlement. There would appear to have been several reasons for this rapid revision of policy and the abandonment of the Le Nail proposals. First, whatever the political motivation behind the Le Nail proposals, they had aroused a storm of opposition amongst an Arab population already outraged by the development of Zionism in Palestine. That this feeling influenced the policy of the High Commission, which had hitherto had to take account of Arab susceptibilities, seems likely from a passage in the Deuxieme Bureau's report on the Armenian Question, prepared in 1932.

" L'idée d'un «FOYER ARMÉNIEN» à créer en Syrie est une erreur car une autonomie de race dégénérerait rapidement en rivalité violente avec la population indigène, chrétienne ou musulmane. Il faut plutôt envisager l'amalgame progressif des émigrés arméniens aux autochtones."130

In addition, even when Le Nail was proposing his scheme, he was urging that the refugees should not be settled close to the Turkish border, in order not to offend Turkish susceptibilities.
He himself had ordered southwards a group of refugees who had hoped to settle permanently at Kamichliyé, near the border. Settlement there, he felt, would have provided a powerful temptation to anyone with a view to raiding across the border. These concerns were also felt by High Commissioner Ponsot. He noted that the progress of settlement in the Upper Jezira was largely due to foreign charities such as the A.G.B.U., which operated through an Armenian committee at Aleppo which had so far remained independent of the committee set up at Beirut to handle settlement work. This autonomous activity was all the more difficult to control as it concerned isolated regions in the steppe, far from the regional centre of Hassetché, and where adequate communications were lacking, especially in the rainy season. The two villages of Tell Brack were situated close to the bridge on the new road from Hassetché to Démir Kapou, at a point of great strategic value. Further, the Armenians had settled close to the Turkish frontier, and might be tempted, especially under foreign influence, to launch raids into Turkish territory, a source of considerable concern to the High Commission. Thus Ponsot felt that he should insist that it was absolutely necessary for the High Commission to control this charitable activity completely, and he had this question in mind in studying a new formula for co-operation with the League. There is a clear link here between the necessity to control Armenian settlement near the Turkish border and the convening of the Paris Conference. Both the desire to control settlement schemes, and the need to avoid offending Turkish susceptibilities were consistent with earlier policy. Furthermore, just before the Paris Conference, De Caix reported to the Permanent Mandates Commission that the Turkish government was
demanding, in exchange for the disarmament of the population of the frontier, that the Armenian refugees in the north of Syria should be removed from that region, a demand which would have increased French awareness of the problem. Such concern for Turkish feeling was revealed by the continuation, even hardening, of a cautious policy towards settlement in the Sanjak. Thus Le Nail regarded a large settlement at Alexandretta as inadvisable, given the closeness of the Turkish border, while at the Paris Conference it was decided that further settlement operations should concern only Beirut and Aleppo, not Alexandretta. Turkish protests against the presence of Armenians on the border in any case prompted Catholicos Sahag II himself to write to Ponsot claiming that, "Connaissant bien la psychologie turque, nous avons prié tous les Hautes Commissaires, à commencer du Général Gouraud, d'installer les Arméniens loin des frontières pour éviter les critiques lancées contre l'hospitalité cheveluresque de la France et les Arméniens de nouveau amertumes et dangers...." It is possible also that links which developed between the Armenian Dashnak party and the Kurdish Hoyboun embarrassed the French and that they wished to stop this collaboration after Turkish protests. Thus the desire to avoid offending Turkish susceptibilities, as well as Arab, lay partly behind the decision to abandon Le Nail's scheme. Certainly this attitude found expression several times after 1931. Thus, in 1932 the French authorities advised against settlement projects in the region proposed by Miss Edith Roberts and by Karen Jeppe. Twice, in 1933 and 1936, the High Commission advised against the development of Tell Brack. The Action Chrétienne were several times advised by the authorities to advise the Armenians not to
remain in the region near the border, stressing the protests received from the Turkish government.\textsuperscript{140}

The positive decision taken at the Paris Conference to concentrate on urban resettlement rather than continue with Le Nail's scheme was also, of course, a response to the development of urban rehousing crises, and to the relative cheapness of urban settlement. It is also possible, however, that one critical factor was French fear of the spread of Communism among the Armenian refugees. The dominance of the Armenians in the early Communist cells in Syria and Lebanon had already been noted. It was certainly a preoccupation of Ponsot shortly before the Paris Conference, when he wrote that Communism had found its most ardent propagandists amongst the impoverished Armenians of Beirut, and it was therefore necessary to decongest the camps as soon as possible.\textsuperscript{141} Concern had already been expressed as early as 1921 by De Caix, and in 1927 Duguet was urging speed in installation, lest the Armenians become completely demoralised. The nature of demoralisation was then made clear.

"....Le Délégué de la Grèce à la Conférence du Travail m'a appris en effet que ce sont les Arméniens, réfugiés à Salonique qui, aidés des Juifs, sont les principaux agents des troubles bolcheviques...."

"M.Kraft Bonnard a insisté sur la nécessité de ne pas perdre trop de temps pour les mêmes raisons...." \textsuperscript{142}

Subsequently the same concern appears in several statements by French officials.\textsuperscript{143} It seems likely that it encouraged the desire for a rapid solution of the refugee problem and thus for cheaper urban resettlement rather than agricultural colonisation.
No fresh initiatives in Armenian settlement appear to have been taken by the French authorities after 1931. Though this may reflect gaps in the archival record, it is unlikely that a major initiative, if proposed, would have received no reference at all in the available sources. It remains, then, to resume the evidence available concerning the political aspects of French policy towards Armenian settlement throughout the study-period. It is evident that initially political considerations in French policy were wholly negative. The High Commission viewed the Armenians as a financial and political embarrassment, and any politically inspired population movement was carried out in order to avoid offending Arab or Turkish susceptibilities. Positive political considerations were not considered until 1926, when De Jouvenal suggested the mass transfer of refugees from the interior to southern Lebanon. This scheme however was not put into operation, again in order not to offend Arab feeling. Only the non-controversial stabilisation of the Armenian population of Beirut could be allowed. The same negative political considerations dominated settlement policy until in 1929 proposals were made for large-scale settlement in the Euphrates region, which may have involved some political collusion between French and Armenians. This scheme was also discarded however, once again partly to avoid difficulties with Turkey and the indigenous population. The High Commission was also hamstrung by its unwillingness to commit finance to Armenian settlement, and by the development of rehousing crises in the principal centres of Armenian concentration which ultimately ruled out any carefully planned agricultural settlement, whether politically inspired or not. The alternative rapid urban resettlement, however, at least
met French concern about the spread of Communism amongst the Armenians in the squalid and crowded conditions of the camps.

**Conclusions**

It is evident that the attitudes and policies of Armenians, Arabs and French towards Armenian settlement were intimately related. The Armenians had moved from one situation of competing nationalisms in the Ottoman Empire to Mandated Syria, where they again found themselves embroiled in a triangular relationship between French, Arabs and Armenians, all with conflicting national aspirations. The Armenians themselves were concerned with security of both life and culture, an attitude which tended to encourage concentration and discourage dispersal. The Arab reaction to the immigrants was cool, sometimes openly hostile, an attitude based on ethnic, political and economic grounds, which was particularly intense when the Armenians became identified with French interests. In leading the local States to refuse to participate in a solution of the Armenian problem, Arab hostility encouraged the perpetuation of the status quo and the rule of economic constraints, while throwing the Armenians back into dependence on the French for resettlement, with consequent political repercussions. It also increased the Armenians' need for security and thus for concentration, stressing their ethnic separateness, increasing their impact on local economies, and at the same time increasing their dependence on French protection, all of which paradoxically increased Arab hostility still further, so that the process of concentration became self-perpetuating. Faced with such a situation of Arab-Armenian hostility, the French were obliged
to proceed cautiously with their settlement plans, paying due regard to Arab susceptibilities, and the Armenians' desire for security. Where they did endeavour to use the Armenians for their own political interest, whether in settlement schemes or not, this increased Arab fears and exacerbated Arab-Armenian hostility. French intervention in this manner acted as a catalyst to Arab-Armenian hostility and indirectly therefore to the process of concentration and segregation.
Urban Settlement: Introduction

The following chapters consider the processes involved in settlement in the four principal centres of Armenian concentration—Aleppo, Beirut, Damascus and Alexandretta—and offer some preliminary conclusions on urban settlement. They consider the initial settlement of the Armenians, their distribution between town and refugee-camp, their living-conditions and social structure within the camps, their subsequent transfer from the camps to new quarters, and their living-conditions and social structure within the new quarters. As with the distribution of the Armenians on the regional level, so with their distribution within the towns, the documentation available is very uneven. Thus the bulk of the documentation on the settlement process in fact concerns the process of transfer from camps to new quarters, and is contained particularly within the archives of the Nansen Office and the journals of the philarmenian associations. Documentation on the initial settlement process, including the formation of the camps and the extent and nature of official involvement in this process, is by contrast very limited. Otherwise much of the available data concerns the structure of Armenian settlement, from which process must be (undesirably and cautiously) inferred. The best of this documentation concerns the living conditions of the Armenians within the camps which, apart from the implications it contains regarding the initial settlement process, provides the necessary background for understanding the transfer process. Again by contrast information on the Armenians who settled within the towns themselves is very limited. It was the camps which attracted most attention from the philanthropic
organisations, for they provided by far the most spectacular manifestation of the Armenian presence, while the transfer from camps to new quarters was the most important feature of the settlement after the initial settlement. Consequently the Armenians who settled within the towns attracted correspondingly less attention. Even the basic facts concerning proportional distribution between town and camp are often in doubt, and clarification of the situation is not made easier by the often conflicting and confusing estimates available concerning the total number of migrant arrivals at each city.
Chapter 7

Urban Settlement: Aleppo

Armenian refugees arrived at Aleppo from Turkey in 1920, 1921, and 1929, and from the Sanjak in 1938-39, but by far the greatest influx to Aleppo was in the period 1922-24. As has been observed, it is difficult to reconcile estimates of migrant movement with estimates of the total number of refugees in Aleppo town. (See Table 3Y6) This makes interpretation of statements concerning the distribution of the refugees within Aleppo doubly difficult. Both Burnier and Shirajian estimate that about half the refugees lived in the city itself, half in "camps" outside the city, but it is difficult to judge the truth of this assertion.

Distribution within the City

It is not possible to judge accurately the number of refugees within the city, some comments may be made on their accommodation. A number were installed in khans rented by the local Armenian National Union. According to Mr. Hekimian, the local representative of the Near East Relief, there were about 4,000 Armenians in June, 1923, living in khans. They were shortly obliged to move, as funds no longer remained to the A.N.U. to pay the rent, and at the end of August, 1923, Hekimian reported that the various khans rented by the A.N.U. had been emptied, and the refugees were building mud-brick huts in the camps of Ram and Meidan outside the city. Shirajian, in April, 1925, noted in 11 khans only 1,600 refugees. Clearly, the
establishment of Armenians in khans in the commercial quarter of the city would involve some dispersal from an ideal pattern of ethnic segregation. The settlement of Armenians in these khans might represent some gravitation towards employment, but more likely it represented a response to the availability of cheap accommodation. Other Armenians settled on waste-ground within the city, like those from Gürstem, who rented land direct from the owner in the quarter of Kastal-Harami on the north of the city, below Hamidié Street. (Their is the only camp which still remains to this day). Others lived in rented houses, "several families willing to rent a house, one room being deemed sufficient for a family, although in some cases two or even as many as five families are crowded into the same room." These were, in general, "des artisans, commerçants ou ouvriers qui ont des moyens d'existence leur permettant de payer un loyer." Otherwise they were lodged by their employer, this being especially the case for the women employed as domestic servants. The distribution of these refugees, housed in private accommodation, is obscure. Burnier notes them in all quarters of the city - an impression of dispersal which might have resulted from the distribution of some Armenians in the khans in the commercial quarter - but this seems unlikely. The migration of numbers of the more wealthy Christian population to Azizieh and other developing quarters of the west would have left accommodation available in the old Christian quarters on the north of Aleppo in the vicinity of the long-established Armenian church, and it might be expected that most of the Armenian refugees within the city were to be found here amongst
their compatriots.

**The Camps**

Within the camps a total population of the order of 15,000 refugees is generally quoted for the period before the resettlement process began (see Table 7.1). The subsequent diminution of the population of the camp was interrupted by the new arrivals of 1929, many of whom settled in Zeitoun (Zeytun) Khan 12 (Essad Pasha Camp), by the arrivals from the Sanjak in 1938-39, and by refugees who moved from the city to the camp, such as those expelled from the city khans. The bulk of the refugees appear to have been allocated vacant land by the French authorities, to the north-west of the old city, close to the Christian quarters and the old Armenian churches. This land belonged to private owners, who seem to have been obliged by the French to receive the refugees. The Armenians were to be charged rent for this land, apparently of only two Syrian piastres per square metre per year. The Municipality appears to have been charged with the responsibility of collecting the rent. This arrangement, it seems, had the approval of the French authorities, although initially they intervened to stave off the claims of the owners. The Camp of Gürün, within the city, was apparently an exception, in that the refugees there paid their rent direct to the owner, without the intervention of the Municipality. The location of the camps, close to the Christian quarters and the Armenian churches, suggests that the desire to locate the refugee Armenians close to the indigenous community may have been a primary factor in the location of the camps. Although such considerations of security and solidarity
Table 7.1

Armenian Refugees in Aleppo Camp before its Demolition

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>TOTAL</th>
<th>DATE</th>
<th>Source and Comment</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>16,100</td>
<td>1925</td>
<td>Shirajian Report, April 10, 1925, (F.A., no. 97, 4Q, 1925, p. 15) Author's summation; excludes 1,600 refugees in Khans. Shirajian an Armenian Protestant Pastor in Aleppo.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>&gt;15,000</td>
<td>1926</td>
<td>Sisag Manoogian (Armenian evangelist), (F.A., no. 100, 4Q, 1926, p. 14.)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>c15,000</td>
<td>&quot;</td>
<td>Edith Roberts (British phil-Armenian philanthropist working in Aleppo), (F.A., no. 101, 4Q, 1926, p. 10).</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>c12,200</td>
<td>&quot;</td>
<td>Burnier (1926)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>28,000</td>
<td>&quot;</td>
<td>Johnson Report, (N.A. C1429) This figure undoubtedly refers to all refugees in Aleppo although the camp is cited.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>17,000</td>
<td>&quot;</td>
<td>Karen Jeppe to Albert Thomas, Feb. 26, 1926 (N.A., C1430)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>3,000 families</td>
<td>&quot;</td>
<td>Duguet, &quot;Programme Général&quot; etc (N.A., C1429).</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>3,799 families</td>
<td>&quot;</td>
<td>&quot;Rapport&quot; (1926)</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Note: As there were several camps, it is unfortunately not always clear whether the sources include all the smaller camps as well as the principal camp within their totals. Some totals may also include the Syrian refugees in the Barakat quarter, who are not considered in this thesis.
may have been important, such an explanation in itself is facile, and a fuller enquiry should take account of the landholding situation, and the relations between the immigrant and indigenous Armenian communities. While the camps were not therefore disadvantageously situated on the north-west of the town with respect to the commercial-industrial sector of the town, compared with any other location on the urban periphery, commerce being concentrated especially to the west of the Citadel, there is no evidence to suggest, in the absence of documentation, that the location of industrial employment played any part in the choice of location. There was subsequently a concentration of industry in the area to the north of what was the camp, but this concentration, a feature of the establishment of modern industries, postdated the construction of the camps. Industry had not yet become segregated into special quarters.

Shirajian describes the distribution of the Armenians within the camps in 1925. 15

"About one half of the refugees live in the city.... The other and poorer half live in camps on the outskirts of the city, the largest of these being on the north side, and known as the Suleimanie, Hamidie or Ram Camp. This has a population of more than 13,000 and is divided into six sections, Nos. 1, 2, 4, with 1,900 huts occupied by refugees from Marash, Kilis, Jibin, etc. Nos. 3 and 5 with 1,348 huts occupied by Ourfa refugees. One mile north of this large camp is Goul-Maydan Camp with 900 people from Harpout, Erzroum, etc., living in the ruins of some old military barracks. Of the famous and valiant natives of Zeitoun, a dispirited and broken remnant of 500 live in some half-built, deserted wretched buildings with the lordly name of Bassad Pasha Camp. Bagdad Station camp is made up of Syrians from Ourfa. In addition to these there are four smaller camps with a total number of 1,700 people from Aintab, Harpout and Gurun. Also 11 Khans, each one sheltering from 500 to 22 persons, in all 1,600, besides several small groups numbering 15 or 20 persons each."
This picture is confirmed by other sources, notably by Mecerian, who also describes the distribution of the Armenians by camps. The area indicated to the writer as forming the area of the old camps in Aleppo is marked on Fig. 7.1, a broad belt on the northern outskirts of Aleppo extending from Suleymanie Street in the west to the Turkish Military Hospital in the east. Zeitoun Khan and the Meidan building were to be found further to the north. The camp of Gurün, as already observed, lay within the city. A more precise indication of the location of the camps may be obtained from the French map of Aleppo prepared in 1931, on which buildings made of wood are distinguished from others. (See Fig. 7.1) The area of wooden construction marked is considerably smaller than the area of the camp indicated above, but it is clear from the sources that even at an early stage, parts of the camp were constructed in brick or stone (see below), while the 1931 map must exclude those huts demolished at the time of the movement to the first sector of the new Meidan quarter (see below), which is already marked on the map. Another indication of the area of the old camp emerges from a comparison of the French maps of 1931 and 1941 (Fig. 7.2). This comparison now reveals a larger area of camp (though still smaller than that indicated to the writer), and this should again be extended by the addition of the area of the huts demolished to make way for the first sector of Meidan, and by the area of ground formerly occupied by huts but subsequently built-over, for example in the north of Suleymanie camp. It is evident, however, that the wedge-shaped quarter of Djabrié should be excluded from the area of the camp, this apparently being constructed by
Armenian Refugee "Camps" in Aleppo 1920-1930

- Built-up area 1930
- Wooden buildings 1930
- Built-up area 1918

Maximum area of camp indicated to writer

R Ram
M Turkish Military Hospital
S Suleyman St
H Hamidi St
D Djabri St

Fig. 7.1
indigenous Christians, before and simultaneously with the establishment of the Armenian camps. 18

Social Structure of the Camps

The most remarkable feature of the distribution of the Armenians within the camps, which emerges from the descriptions of Shirajian and Méchérian, was the existence of spatially distinct communities based on town or district of origin. There seems in addition to have been some grouping of Catholic refugees around the Franciscan Monastery of Ram. This was in proximity to the camp of Maraq, from whence had come a relatively large number of Catholic Armenians. According to Méchérian, those of Latin rite were permitted to support their huts against the walls of the enclosure of the Franciscans. Community reconstitution itself is indicative of some degree of segregation from the indigenous Armenian community, and more light may be cast on the degree of segregation by an investigation of the distribution of Armenian churches and schools in Aleppo. Integration seems to have been especially lacking within the Armenian Catholic and Protestant communities. Thus there was a separate wooden Armenian Protestant church-school ("Bethel") to serve the camp, while the reconstructed Protestant church in Azisieh ("Emanuel") appears to have served only the Protestants in the city. 20 The division was more marked within the Catholic community, for the indigenous Arabophone Armenian Catholics were unable to look after the Turkish-and Armenian-speaking migrants. In these circumstances the Jesuits stepped in. 21 They reconstituted their expelled "Mission d'Arménie" in Syria, and established a chapel and school near to Ram, in Suleymanié camp, which served as parish church for the Catholic Armenians of the camp, while the old
Armenian Catholic church in Salibé continued to serve the Arabophone indigenous community. An Armenian, as distinct from Latin, Catholic presence was not established in the camp until the Jesuits surrendered their camp chapel (St. Barbara) to the Armenian Catholics, when they themselves acquired impressive new premises in Bustan Pasha (1936). Apart from their intrinsic value, the provision of such church and school facilities reflected a certain competition between Catholics and Protestants for the allegiance of the refugees, with consequent influence on community structure. The situation regarding the Armenian Apostolics is more obscure, but the community division within the camps appears to have been reinforced by the provision of, for example, a wooden church for the Armenians from Maraş. 22 There were apparently separate priests for the refugees from Gaziantep and Maraş, 23 and the refugees from Gaziantep were able to use the chapel in the grounds of the old Armenian church in Salibé which they had been using for years before the troubles. 24 Such a regrouping on community lines obviated the necessity for a more complete integration between migrant and indigenous Armenians. It is not known how clearly the refugees within the city were related to the indigenous community. An examination of their relations also with the Armenians of the camps would be particularly interesting but information is lacking.

Living Conditions within the Camps.

Within the camps, living conditions were unsatisfactory, even dangerous, and remained so as long as there remained any huts (see Plates 7.1 - 7.4) Poor housing, poor roads, poor
drainage, poor water, formed the background to life in the greater part of the camps. It is apparent that housing conditions were not uniformly bad, but it is never made clear exactly how many refugees enjoyed the better conditions. Initially, some at least were housed in tents, which suffered particularly in the harsh Aleppo climate, but in 1925, for most, home was a hut built of wood or earthen bricks. "The largest is 4.50m (long) x 3.50m. (wide) x 2.60m. (high); the smallest 3 x 2.50 x 2.25m. There are an average of five people per hut." These dwellings were not only cramped, but the more flimsy structures were vulnerable to the Aleppo climate, the winter rains penetrating the roofs, entering the huts and causing earthen walls to crumble. In the winter of 1923-4 in particular, a number of refugees were caught with the roofs of their mud-brick houses incomplete. In summer, the refugees baked under their low overheated sheet-iron roofs. Some of the worst conditions were to be found in Zeitoun Khan, where in each of the rooms four or more families made their homes.

Although certain sections of the camps were relatively well laid-out, with large and well-aligned roads, the winter rains could turn the camp into a vast sea of mud, making the paths almost impassable. Dr. Duguet noted this inadequacy in October, 1926, but the Municipality objected to undertaking the necessary improvements. Instead, Duguet was obliged to suggest to the Armenian notables that they organise in the camp road-maintenance teams, constituted by the inhabitants themselves. This was apparently done, but the effects do not appear to have lasted until 1929.
Sanitary conditions within the camps were clearly inadequate too. There were only 165 W.C.'s for 13,000 people, and the camps were served only by an open-sewerage system. This deficiency was also observed by Duguet, who indicated that the open-sewers already laid down should be repaired and the network linked to the large collector-sewer of the town. Again, it appears that nothing was done, the Municipality again raising objections, as no doubt they were concerned that such measures would implant the Armenians permanently on the land they had occupied. Thus the health menace remained, and as late as 1937, Shirajian could report that there were no proper drains in the surviving camp. The Armenians were not alone in this, however. Outside the new quarters, like Azizieh, the sewerage system of Aleppo remained very primitive until the end of the Ottoman period, and although under the Mandate an effort was made to provide an adequate system, by 1938 one third of the houses of the town were still not connected. Consul Hough could well report in 1926 that, while sanitation was the blackest spot in the housing situation, sanitary conditions in the Muslim quarters were hardly much better.

As regards water-supply, it appears that at first the camps were relatively well supplied, receiving water from the supply which served the city, "but this was cut off on account of non-payment and wells are now used." Gertrude Patterson, of the Friends of Armenia, speaks of the resulting problem of water-supply for the inhabitants of Zeitoun Khan; 

"... they have to walk a long distance for their water, as the well on the ground is of such a depth that with the primitive arrangements for drawing the
water, it takes such a long time to get a small supply, and in this one building there are between 200 and 300 people."

Dr. Kennedy, the representative of the Lord Mayor's (Armenian) Fund, who reported on conditions in the camp in December, 1927, noted the danger to health:

"... the water supply consists of surface wells of which there are over 200 in the area... These are not springs, just holes in the ground where water accumulates by percolating from the surrounding soil. The situation is very disturbing, and the camp remains a menace to the community."

In view of the inadequate drainage of the camp, these wells clearly did constitute a serious health menace. They represented one traditional method of water-supply in Aleppo which was to tap the subterranean nappe under the town, itself supplied by the Kouek, which was again itself a receptacle for effluent. By the opening of the Mandate period, even with this source of supply, the other sources serving Aleppo (the Heylânê canalisation system and Aîn Têlî) were already inadequate to meet the city's needs, and despite the efforts of the Electricity Company to improve the situation, Aleppo experienced a water-deficiency throughout the Mandate period. This was, of course, felt mostly by those who could not afford to be linked to the Aîn Têlî system, as the refugees clearly could not, so to the insanitary state of the water-supply was added water-deficiency. Clearly, once the decision had been taken to transfer the Armenian refugees, the authorities would not spend money on remedying this situation, and the system remained inadequate and unhealthy until the end of the period.

In view of the insalubrity of the water-supply and sewerage system, and the poor housing conditions, it is not surprising
that there was a high incidence of disease in the camps. Particularly important were consumption (pulmonary tuberculosis) and trachoma, an eye-disease which could entail complete blindness. The situation was exacerbated by undernourishment amongst the poorer refugees, the babies especially suffering from lack of milk from their debilitated mothers, so that infant-mortality was high. The secretary of the "Friends of Armenia" reported that in 1923, amongst the refugee babies, 500 cases of fatal dysentery occurred in three months. Soup-kitchens were established at times of particular hardship to combat hunger, notably by Karen Jeppe and the Action Chrétienne en Orient, while to combat disease, aid came from various philanthropic organisations. Particular notice should be made of the clinic run by the Armenian Red Cross, the help provided by the A.C.O., and the Milk Depot run by Mrs. D.S. Altounyan, with the aid of the "Friends of Armenia."

The philanthropic societies had also to cope with the social problems endemic to the harsh living conditions of the camp; nervous maladies, alcoholism, delinquency, political extremism, as a partial remedy to which a summer camp was established by the A.C.O. at Aatik in the Amanus mountains. Delinquency was one result of the lack of schooling available. The schools serving the camp children, which have been described above, were by no means adequate to meet the need. There was not the school accommodation available to admit all the refugee children, nor were there the funds available to permit free entry. Consequently there were hundreds of children (over 1,000 in the year 1923-24, according to Hekimian; 2,000 in 1925, according to Shirajian) who received no schooling and, if unemployed, had no alternative
to roaming the streets except their miserable huts. Even
the existing schools were described as "inadequately equipped
and under-staffed." 40

The persistence of the Camps

Why then did the refugees remain in the "camps" in these
conditions? Initially one may assume (though information is
lacking) that accommodation within the city for such a large
number of refugees at rents they (or their sponsors) could
afford was simply not available. Subsequently the camps
appear to have persisted partly by choice, partly by necessity.
It seems that in general the refugees in the camps formed the
poorer part of the refugee population, that is those unable to
rent accommodation in the town, or for whom accommodation was
not provided by their employer. 41 As observed, the Armenians
living in khans within the city itself soon found themselves
expelled to the camps once the Armenian National Union was no
longer able to pay their rents. By contrast, in the camps,
the rent had apparently been fixed at a nominal rate, while
the French authorities were initially prepared to stave off
the claims of the land-owners. Thus the camps provided an
insecure refuge for the poorer Armenians. Evidently too, as
the transfer of population from the camps to the new quarters
went ahead it was increasingly the poorest refugees who were
left behind in the camps. 42 However, in 1926, Burnier felt that,
"Beaucoup des habitants du camp pourraient aussi vivre en ville,
mais préfèrent y habiter pour économiser les loyers et vivre au
milieu de leurs compatriotes...." 43 No doubt, at the time,
this suggestion that the Armenians were reluctant to pay rent
by living in the city was in some cases true, but the social
constraints on movement are also understandable. The Armenians probably saw security in their concentration in the camps, and especially in their community reconstitution. Such a community structure would in any case tend to inhibit individual movement, leading to inertia in the settlement process as long as the bulk of the community saw advantages in the maintenance of the status quo. Furthermore, Burnier's comments were made at a time of relative prosperity for the refugees; a prosperity which was not constant, and which could change rapidly with each fluctuation of the economy, to which the refugees were extremely vulnerable. Moreover, it was the economically weakest who suffered most from the crises in employment and the rise in the cost of living, and it was the economically weakest who tended to be concentrated in the camps. Furthermore, as the process of transfer went ahead, it was these people who increasingly came to constitute the core of the camp population, that is, those who were least able to move; those who were genuinely condemned involuntarily to unacceptable conditions of social deprivation.

The Transfer to New Quarters

Between 1928 and 1938, the camps of Aleppo were virtually completely demolished and their inhabitants moved to new quarters in the north. By the end of this period there were barely a hundred huts left standing. For the most part this movement was not voluntary, but was the result of a demolition policy carried out on the orders of the Municipality. Where movement was voluntary, this seems to have been merely to avoid forced demolition. At other times, the demolitions actually left some refugees homeless or with their new homes
incomplete. In particular, in 1935, some families whose houses were demolished by order then experienced delays in obtaining building permits for their new homes, a case of particular lack of foresight and consideration. While delays in demolition were occasionally granted, Isabel Merrill, a member of the American Mission in Aleppo, describes just how callous the demolition procedure could be:

"Only yesterday I heard that the men appointed to tear down a bakery came while dough was in the kneading trough and bread in the oven. The baker begged for delay, but it was not granted, and the walls soon came tumbling down over everything... A grocer who had objected to having his large shop torn down was rewarded for his delay by having the police thrust his walls through and through with spears until they fell in."

It is apparent that the real motive behind these demolitions was the desire of the landowners to regain their property, on which the Armenians through their inability or unwillingness to pay rent, had become in effect de facto squatters. The insecurity of the Armenians had, in fact, already been demonstrated before 1928. In 1926, the refugees in Zeitoun Khan were at least threatened with expulsion, while interesting correspondence in the archives of the Armenian Catholicosate of Cilicia concerns the proposed expulsion of Armenian refugees in 1925 from an unfinished building in the Meidan area, which was required by the Gendarmerie. Towards the end of 1926, some refugees from Gaziantep were threatened. Miss Edith Roberta, a British philarmenian relief worker, observed that the Armenians concerned had apparently been living without paying any rent for their land, that the owner had previously agitated for rent, but that the French authorities had staved off his claim.
The owner, however, had appealed to Paris, and the decision had been given in his favour. The rent was 3½ Syrian Piastres per square metre, and the rent for the whole of the past three and a half years was being claimed. The claim was being made upon the camp quarter by quarter, and a quarter in which there were some very poor families had been started upon. Previous to this legal decision the refugees had apparently been protected by the French authorities, in case of arrears, but Burnier observed, in October, 1926, that the camp refugees would henceforth have to pay rent, presumably as a result of this decision. The landowners would then be able to take action against them over arrears, and indeed Burnier foresaw difficulties when the question of the ownership of the land on which the camps were situated should be determined by the courts, and when the inhabitants would have to reach agreement with the owners. The question seems to have come to a head at the end of 1927, when certain quarters of the camp under private ownership were required to be evacuated. A letter written by Burnier on 6th April, 1928 put clearly the attitude of the owners and the authorities. He observed that the Armenians had settled on land belonging to individuals who had been forced to receive them for an insignificant rent. This situation had lasted for seven years and no refuge, whatever his financial situation, had made the least effort to find lodgings outside the camp. The government could not oblige the landowners to keep the Armenians indefinitely for this would be simply theft. Moreover, the quarter, which had originally been only a provisional installation, and which one had thought would be absorbed quickly, had been constructed contrary to all laws of hygiene,
cleanliness and urbanism, so that to retain it in its present state was impossible. The competent authorities, he continued, had not yet taken any obligatory measures, but had made it clear to the refugees that this situation could not continue indefinitely, in order to persuade them, or at least those possessing the means, to go to live elsewhere. This had had no results as the refugees had an interest in remaining in the camps as long as possible as they were then able to pay only a derisory rent and escape taxation. We have already commented upon the extent to which the Armenians were capable of moving out of the camp by their own means and on the social constraints involved. Here, it is important to observe that, whatever the concern of the authorities for the poor conditions of the camps, the determining factor in their taking action was the desire of the landowners to evict the refugees. The same desire seems to have been behind all the subsequent demolitions carried out by order of the Municipality. It has been observed, indeed, that one of the interested landowners was a senior member of the Municipal Council. A delay in demolitions between 1932 and 1935 was apparently due to a legal action brought by the refugees against the landowners, during which time they were not able to demolish the huts. But in 1935, the court ruled that the Armenians should have one year to buy land and leave the huts, and after this, the demolitions resumed.

Thus the refugees, who in many cases had not the resources to escape from the environment of the camps, found themselves obliged to move in the face of a government demolition policy. Had they been completely alone, the social consequences might have been appalling. Fortunately solutions were already being put
forward in 1925 by various relief agencies to the question of the camps at Aleppo, encouraged by the employment crisis of that time. Drawing on the example of Karen Jeppe's work in establishing agricultural colonies for Armenian refugees in the valley of the Nahr el Belkh, they advocated colonisation of the unemployed refugees on the land. When, in 1926, the Nansen Office took the problem of the settlement of Armenian refugees in Syria under its wing, this idea was retained.

When Major Johnson, the Assistant High Commissioner for Refugees, visited Aleppo, he reported that the solution to the problem lay there in improvements to the camps and the colonisation of 800 agricultural families on the land, after which "the problems of the Armenians in the Aleppo camp could be regarded as solved," and this view was restated by Duguet (although he envisaged the settlement of not 800, but 1500 agricultural families). Significantly, Johnson's visit was made at a time of economic recovery for the refugees in Aleppo, following the crisis which had provoked the rather more strident calls for agricultural settlement by the philanthropic organisations in 1925 and early 1926. Significantly too, neither Johnson nor Duguet envisaged the transfer of the refugees en masse from the camps to new quarters: any transfers to be made would be to agricultural settlements. A plan was considered involving the settlement of Armenian agriculturalists on state domain land at Qirate, near Qalaat el Mudik in the vilayet of Aleppo, but this came to nought through opposition from an important Armenian organisation. At this point, at the end of 1927, the first refugees in the camps were obliged to leave their homes. They accordingly addressed themselves
to the representative of the Nansen Office in Syria, who inaugurated the first negotiations by this Office for the purchase of land within Aleppo itself. Henceforth the problem for the Office became one not of colonisation of an agricultural minority, but of the large scale resettlement of Armenians within Aleppo.

Purchases of land by the Office were made in 1928, 1930 and 1931 in the Meidan area of Aleppo, and agreement reached whereby the refugees should construct their houses themselves, and pay off the price of the land by annual instalments. Later the Office confined itself to making loans for house-building. Meanwhile, the refugees endeavoured to meet the crisis by their own means, however limited these might be. A Voluntary Settlement Committee was formed, and the refugees also formed themselves into compatriotic unions, based on their town of origin. A number of agreements with the Office were made by these unions such that some, at least, of the reconstructed communities of the camps were transferred en masse to continue their separate existence in the new quarters. Thus the Office's purchases of 1930 were made jointly with refugees from Marag, from Urfa and from Gaziantep, and the land designated to receive refugees from these communities.

Cheapness and administrative ease were primary considerations in the purchase of land by the Office. Once the decision to transfer the refugees had been taken, there was danger of speculation in land, a danger identified clearly by Dr. Altounyan, who wrote advocating that the authorities take an active part in securing a large tract of land on the basis of a flat rate, to be reserved for the refugees to
purchase in lots as money became available. Burnier too
was well aware of this problem, but was unable in 1929 to
take advantage of an offer from the Vali and the Director of
the 'Waqf Property Administration' to facilitate the purchase
of some Waqf land at exceptionally favourable prices, as there
was no finance available at that time from the Office. The
lands neighbouring the tract bought in 1928 had meanwhile
quadrupled in price. Administrative inconvenience and expense
led to the rejection of the initial proposals for purchase by
the refugees who originally asked for settlement. The tracts
of land purchased in 1928 instead, for which title deeds are
available, presented fewer administrative problems. They
were classed as "amiryé" land, and were transferred to the
Office from the possession of a group of private owners.

These purchases by the Office were made in the initial
stages of transfer. When, in 1935, the process had to begin
again, and the Office was no longer able to purchase land, a
number of purchases were made by individual Armenian notables, the land to be allotted to the refugees under rent-purchase
agreements similar to those of the Refugees Office. These
purchases included Cheikh Naksoud and Davidié (Achrafie). Other
refugees reached agreements directly with individual landowners
without the intervention of an intermediary such as the Nansen
Office or one of their own notables. Some of these refugees
risked becoming heavily indebted in the crisis provoked by the
fall of the franc. This was increasingly the case too as the
refugees remaining in the camps in the later stages were the
poorest; those who had been unable to move earlier. In fact,
the last 200 families to be moved were all considered destitute,
and their settlement was left, at the end of 1937, in the hands of the Armenian General Benevolent Union, the organisation which progressively took over the work of the Nansen Office. The process had been prolonged by the settlement in the camps of poor families who previously lived in the city (presumably because they were now unable to pay rent), as well as young couples founding their homes there.

When the refugees arrived from the Sanjak of Alexandretta in 1938 and 1939, therefore, the final settlement had not been attained. Some of the poorer refugees had meanwhile found escape by taking accommodation as sub-tenants (see Table 7.4) among the newly-settled future-owners in the new quarters, an arrangement which also helped the future-owners to pay off the debts they had contracted for the purchase of their plots. As in the earlier purchases by the Office and the Compatriotic Unions, the poverty of the refugees again dictated that the sites bought should be cheap. By the end of the period, speculation had sent land prices soaring, and it was necessary to buy sites relatively far removed from the city centre. Thus, amongst the cheapest sites were Davidié and Cheikh Maksoud, both situated on small hills far removed from the town centre.

Tables 7.2 and 7.3 show the development of the new quarters between 1930 and 1937. Table 7.4 shows, in more detail, the situation at November 15, 1936. It shows, in particular, the significant number of sub-tenants who came to live in the quarter. It also indicates the huts still standing in November, 1936. This is no indication of the situation at the close of the study-period, however, for, as will be apparent from Table 7.3, there was at that time considerable movement in progress, following the recommencement of expulsions after 1935. On
Table 7.2

Armenian refugees settled in the new quarters of Aleppo, 1930-1937.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>DATE</th>
<th>1930</th>
<th>1931</th>
<th>1932</th>
<th>1933</th>
<th>1934</th>
<th>1936</th>
<th>1937</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>FUTURE OWNERS</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Persons</td>
<td>?</td>
<td>4,416</td>
<td>?</td>
<td>7,680</td>
<td>8,400</td>
<td>9,354</td>
<td>15,996</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Families</td>
<td>450</td>
<td>870</td>
<td>1,200</td>
<td>?</td>
<td>?</td>
<td>2,069</td>
<td>?</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>SUB- TENANTS</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Persons</td>
<td>?</td>
<td>2,743</td>
<td>?</td>
<td>4,438</td>
<td>5,800</td>
<td>6,310</td>
<td>4,885</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Families</td>
<td>200</td>
<td>410</td>
<td>700</td>
<td>?</td>
<td>?</td>
<td>1,052</td>
<td>?</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>TOTAL</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Persons</td>
<td>3,000</td>
<td>7,159</td>
<td>9,417</td>
<td>12,118</td>
<td>14,200</td>
<td>15,664</td>
<td>20,881</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Families</td>
<td>700</td>
<td>1,280</td>
<td>1,900</td>
<td>?</td>
<td>?</td>
<td>3,121</td>
<td>?</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Sources: Nansen Office Reports in N.A., C1583, C1584, C1524, C1598, and S.E.M. Vol 1216
Table 7.3

Progress of the Settlement Work in the new quarters of Alempo

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>QUARTER</th>
<th>At Nov. 15, 1936</th>
<th>At end of 1937</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Houses</td>
<td>Persons</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Meidan 1</td>
<td>460</td>
<td>4,450</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>&quot;  2</td>
<td>200</td>
<td>1,850</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>&quot;  3</td>
<td>177</td>
<td>1,410</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>&quot;  4</td>
<td>366</td>
<td>3,200</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Bustan Pasha</td>
<td>180</td>
<td>1,115</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Parcell 2896/7</td>
<td>267</td>
<td>1,335</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Cheikh Maksoud</td>
<td>30</td>
<td>150</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Cabbabé</td>
<td>114</td>
<td>600</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Davidié</td>
<td>65</td>
<td>350</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Myassaér</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Obégi</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Dr. Subai</td>
<td>104</td>
<td>635</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Victor Gurulli</td>
<td>106</td>
<td>700</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Brimo</td>
<td>?</td>
<td>-</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Adjour</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Diverse</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Sources: Tables in N.A. C1524, C1598

These tables a number of lots are registered under the names of their previous owners. The names by which the new quarters were known by the Armenians, however, were quite different, and it has unfortunately not been possible to match the lots recorded under previous owners' names against the map.
Table 7.4

State of settlement operations in Aleppo at Nov. 15, 1936

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>LOCATION</th>
<th>Houses</th>
<th>Future-Owners</th>
<th>Sub-tenants</th>
<th>Total Population</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Neidan 1</td>
<td>460</td>
<td>460</td>
<td>2,200</td>
<td>450</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Neidan 2</td>
<td>200</td>
<td>200</td>
<td>1,000</td>
<td>170</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Neidan 3</td>
<td>177</td>
<td>177</td>
<td>885</td>
<td>105</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Neidan 4</td>
<td>366</td>
<td>366</td>
<td>1,800</td>
<td>270</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Bustan Pasha</td>
<td>180</td>
<td>180</td>
<td>900</td>
<td>43</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Dr. Subai</td>
<td>104</td>
<td>104</td>
<td>520</td>
<td>23</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>V. Gurulli</td>
<td>106</td>
<td>106</td>
<td>530</td>
<td>34</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Parc 2896</td>
<td>40</td>
<td>40</td>
<td>200</td>
<td>-</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Parc 2897</td>
<td>227</td>
<td>227</td>
<td>1,135</td>
<td>-</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Cheikh Aksoud</td>
<td>30</td>
<td>30</td>
<td>150</td>
<td>-</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Gabbane</td>
<td>114</td>
<td>28</td>
<td>114</td>
<td>600</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Davidie</td>
<td>65</td>
<td>215</td>
<td>65</td>
<td>350</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Myassar</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Obégi</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Jéppe</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Veillards</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>A.C.O.</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>St. Grégoire</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Hamidie</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Djabrié</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Sulaimanié</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>&quot;Ourfaltes&quot;</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Ramazmê</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Gurrin</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>TOTAL</td>
<td>2,069</td>
<td>356</td>
<td>9,354</td>
<td>1,052</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Source: N.A., C1524
Two oblique aerial views of Aleppo, dating from about 1934, show the progress of the construction of the Meidan quarter to that date (see Fig 7.2), this being the quarter purchased by the Office and the Compatriotic Unions. Fig 7.2 shows areas of northern Aleppo built-up between 1931 and 1941, and these areas represent approximately the extent of the new Armenian quarters. The greatest concentration of new building is still in the Meidan quarter, of which the first sector was already built by 1931 and is marked as such. To the east are a number of new quarters, while to the north lies Bustan Pasha. Across the river to the north-west are the two eccentric quarters of Cheikh Maksoud and Davidié, both constructed on small hills far removed from the city centre. To these should be added the far northern quarter known as "Heulluk" or "Kermanik", beyond Bustan Pasha on the road to Ain-Tell. A large-scale plan of a sector of the Davidié quarter bought by the A.C.O. is available (Fig 7.3), and its location within the quarter marked on Fig 7.2.

Social Structure of the New Quarters

One notable characteristic of the new quarters was the reconstitution of the community structure. As has been observed, the Armenians in the camps had been grouped according to town or district of origin and Compatriotic Unions were formed to aid the poorer members of the community. When the movement to the new quarters took place, the Compatriotic Unions played an important role in the transfer process, at least initially, so that land was purchased in the Meidan area for the refugees of Maraş, Urfa and Gaziantep, for example.
In this way the former grouping by town or district was at least partly re-established. As the huts were gradually demolished, so too were the old camp school-and church-huts. The churches were then re-established in the new quarters and reinforced the process of community reconstitution. Ultimately, for the Apostolic community, specific churches with schools attached were to be created for the various communities, for example St. Krikor (the church of Urfa), with its school "Sahagian". Throughout the study-period, however, St. Krikor was the only Armenian Apostolic church in the Weidan quarter, and probably served all the local refugees. Apostolic schools were established more quickly, but a considerable number of the children of all denominations were still obliged to seek their schooling in the old town (see Table 7.5). The Catholic and Protestant churches were also transferred, the Protestants moving to a new church-school near the old camp of Suleymanié and just south of the new quarters, so that the Protestant community would appear to have remained divided between old town and new quarters. (Even the community in the new quarters was actually split by faction.)

Table 7.5

<p>| | | | |</p>
<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>3 schools</td>
<td>1,124 pupils</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Apostolic</td>
<td>1 &quot;</td>
<td>360 &quot;</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Protestant</td>
<td>1 &quot;</td>
<td>80 &quot;</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Catholic</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Frequenting the schools of the town</td>
<td>323 &quot;</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>TOTAL</td>
<td>1,887 pupils</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Source: Report in N.A., C1584
The division of the Catholic community seems to have broken down somewhat, however. The Jesuits did indeed move from the old chapel-school to impressive new premises in Bustan Pasha. But the old chapel (St. Barbare) was ceded to the Armenian Catholics, who also ultimately opened chapels in Heulluk and Davidié, thus breaking down the division between the Jesuit-administered Catholics of the camp and the Armenian-administered Catholics of the city.

**Living Conditions in the New Quarters**

The living conditions of the Armenians were not, of course, transformed overnight with the transfer to the new quarters. The refugees had still, in many cases, to be aided in building their houses. The sources abound with references to refugees facing winter in unfinished houses, and the Nansen Office and the Action Chrétiennne made many loans to refugees for building materials. Again, this seems to have been more necessary in the later stages, after 1935, when the transfer involved the poorer refugees, than in the earlier stages when the relatively wealthier or better organised refugees moved in anticipation of demolition. By this time, the Nansen Office was waiting for the reimbursement of earlier loans before consenting to further loans, so it was the poorest refugees, those who had remained in their huts as long as possible, who were least aided. Nevertheless the small houses which were put up were considerably more habitable than the ramshackle huts which were evacuated and destroyed. (Plates 7.5 - 7.8).

It was still impossible to admit children free to the schools, despite the creation of new schools in the quarters, so a number of children continued to receive no schooling, or
or to leave school early in order to learn a trade and support their parents. In the Weidan quarter, sewerage appears to have improved on the camp, for, by the end of 1933, the inhabitants of the quarter had installed a complete network at their own expense but under the supervision of the Municipality. Water was once again initially obtained by wells, which, as in the camps, clearly risked contamination as long as the open sewerage-system remained. Once an adequate sewerage-system was provided, the problem was no longer as serious as it had been in the camps but, at the end of 1934 (six years after building began), the Weidan quarter was still not supplied with piped water although the question was under review. Of the peripheral quarters, information is available concerning the situation at Davidié, and it is apparent that in terms of sewerage and water-supply, Davidié was even less privileged than Weidan. According to Paul Berron, the Director of the Action Chrétienne, the Municipality initially desired to avoid responsibility for this peripheral quarter. This desire appears to have been overcome but, because of the rocky nature of the terrain at Davidié, the provision of an adequate sewerage system was considered too costly. By contrast, water was initially supplied free to a central supply point in the quarter, piped from the neighbouring barracks of the French spahis (Quartier Vingt), but this arrangement came to an end when the spahis found their reservoir emptying too quickly. The water company was then asked to install a conduit to Davidié and to construct a reservoir there, but refused to do so, fearing non-payment from the impoverished refugees of Davidié. In response to this, the Action
Christienne had the conduit and reservoir constructed at their own expense, but the water-company still cut off the supply because of non-payment of bills. Thus the refugees at Davidié were obliged to turn to a single well forty-five metres deep, which, even when deepened, was not adequate for the population. Furthermore, as there was still no adequate sewerage system, there was a constant danger of contamination.

It was the inhabitants of the peripheral quarters, such as Davidié, who also suffered most from the distance between the new quarters and the centre of Aleppo which, if it extended to all quarters, was at least relieved in the more advantageously located Meidan quarter by the provision of a regular auto-car service between Aleppo centre and Meidan. Thus another vicious circle of social deprivation was established. It was the relatively wealthy and better organised refugees who were able to settle first. The poor refugees, who were settled later, were obliged to accept the cheapest land, which was then further cut from the city centre, as at Davidié or Cheikh Maksoud. They thus became relatively under-privileged in terms of distance, and because they could not then afford to pay for amenities whose provision was made more expensive by the distance from the town. This was all the more so because they were the poorest refugees in the first place. A self-perpetuating process of social deprivation was established.

Conclusions

The Armenian refugees who arrived at Aleppo settled partly in the city, partly outside. It is not possible to judge the
exact proportional distribution. Within the city they occupied rented khans and houses, or vacant tracts of land, or were lodged by their employer. Outside the city they were lodged in "camps" which effectively developed into shanty-towns. Here the most remarkable feature of their distribution was the existence of spatially distinct communities based on town or district of origin. Living conditions in the camps were unsatisfactory, even dangerous, but the refugees appear to have been confined there by both economic and social constraints. Between 1928 and 1938 the camps were virtually completely demolished and the inhabitants transferred to new quarters in the North. This was the result of a demolitions policy carried out by the Municipality often under unnecessarily harsh conditions. The real motive behind the demolitions was the desire of the landowners to evict the refugees from the property on which they had become de facto squatters. To meet the crisis, purchases of land in the Meidan area of Aleppo were made by the Nansen Office and the Armenian Compatriotic Unions, in which cheapness and administrative ease were primary considerations. Later, after 1935, the purchases were made by Armenian notables, while other refugees reached agreements directly with individual landowners. The sites bought in this latter stage of development were also required to be cheap and consequently were far removed from the town centre. Within the new quarters the community structure was reconstituted. Living conditions were improved, but not completely transformed. Information from Davidić suggests that particularly deprived were the poorest Armenians who had been settled last in the peripheral quarters. One may conclude of the resettlement process that it was not voluntary, except in so far as it was
a voluntary anticipation of compulsory demolition. It was not a carefully planned resettlement operation by an international agency, but a spontaneous response to an emergency situation. For the Armenians, it could be said to have been yet another forced or induced migration, of which they had already had too much experience since 1915.
Chapter 8

Urban Settlement: Beirut

Beirut received refugees in 1920 and at the end of 1921 from Cilicia, and also in 1922 and 1923 by transfer from Alexandretta and Aleppo. More came as a result of the troubles at Damascus in 1925-26. Again it is difficult to reconcile the estimates of migrants arriving at Beirut with the total number of refugees recorded there.

Distribution

The refugees were divided between town and "camp", but the relative proportion in each cannot be easily ascertained. Poidebard (1926) assigns 10,000 to the town itself and 12,000 to the camps of the Quarantine; Fox (?1924) 10,000 to the town and 7,000 to the camps (within the city-limits).

The 1932 Census sheds some light on the distribution of the Armenians within the administrative limits of the city and their degree of segregation from the rest of the population. (Tables 8.1 - 8.5, Figs. 8.1, 8.2) The Census yields an Index of Dissimilarity of 52.1 between the Armenians and the non-Armenian population, but this figure rises to 72.0 between Armenians and non-Christians and falls to 45.1 between Armenians and non-Armenian Christians. Relative to the non-Armenian population, the Armenians were over-represented in three quarters; Medawar, Acharafie and Reseil (and also in the group "Diverse"). Medawar alone contained 48.0% of the Armenian population, and all three quarters lay on the east of the city. The Armenians were moderately (but under-) represented in three quarters of the
Addendum

Key to Fig. 8.2
Location Quotients

- More than 2
- 1-2
- 0.5-1
- 0.25-0.5
- 0-0.25
Location Quotients for Different Population Groups in Beirut 1932

1. Armenians vs non-A's
2. Non-A. Chr's vs other non-A's
3. A. Cath's vs A. Apost's
4. Non-A. Cath's vs other non-A. Chr's
5. A. Cath's vs non-A's
6. A. Apost's vs non-A's
Table 8.1

**Distribution of Armenians in Beirut according to the 1932 Census of Lebanon**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Quarter</th>
<th>Armenians</th>
<th>Total Population</th>
<th>Armenians as% total Population</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Moussaytbeh</td>
<td>592</td>
<td>17,122</td>
<td>3.46</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Bachoura</td>
<td>1,014</td>
<td>10,486</td>
<td>9.67</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Ras Beirut</td>
<td>175</td>
<td>6,480</td>
<td>2.70</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Zokak el Blat</td>
<td>1,454</td>
<td>7,778</td>
<td>18.69</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Achrafie</td>
<td>2,870</td>
<td>12,180</td>
<td>23.56</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Ain-el-Mreisse</td>
<td>327</td>
<td>3,605</td>
<td>9.07</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Remeil</td>
<td>1,900</td>
<td>8,008</td>
<td>23.73</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Mazraa</td>
<td>259</td>
<td>17,081</td>
<td>1.52</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Minet el Hoen</td>
<td>531</td>
<td>6,197</td>
<td>8.62</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Port</td>
<td>389</td>
<td>3,026</td>
<td>12.86</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Es Saife</td>
<td>725</td>
<td>4,306</td>
<td>16.84</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Medawar</td>
<td>10,493</td>
<td>14,275</td>
<td>73.51</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Diverse</td>
<td>1,151</td>
<td>2,860</td>
<td>40.42</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>TOTAL</strong></td>
<td>21,883</td>
<td>113,404</td>
<td>19.20</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Note: The table concerns only those inscribed as "Présents" in the Census.

Source: Arch. Dip., Dossiers in course of classification.
Table 8.2

Percentage distribution of population groups in Beirut by quarter, 1932.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Quarters</th>
<th>Armenians</th>
<th>Non-Armenians</th>
<th>Non-Armenian Christians</th>
<th>Non-Christians</th>
<th>Armenian Catholics</th>
<th>Armenian Apostolics</th>
<th>Non-Armenian Catholics</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Moussaytbeh</td>
<td>2.71</td>
<td>18.06</td>
<td>14.48</td>
<td>20.42</td>
<td>3.43</td>
<td>2.54</td>
<td>7.57</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Bachoura</td>
<td>4.63</td>
<td>10.35</td>
<td>6.56</td>
<td>12.84</td>
<td>8.21</td>
<td>3.82</td>
<td>10.54</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Ras Beirut</td>
<td>0.80</td>
<td>6.89</td>
<td>4.28</td>
<td>8.60</td>
<td>1.13</td>
<td>0.72</td>
<td>3.14</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Zokak el Blat</td>
<td>6.64</td>
<td>6.91</td>
<td>3.09</td>
<td>9.42</td>
<td>5.32</td>
<td>6.95</td>
<td>4.26</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Achrafie</td>
<td>13.12</td>
<td>10.17</td>
<td>20.33</td>
<td>3.50</td>
<td>22.10</td>
<td>11.07</td>
<td>14.78</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Ain-el-Mreisse</td>
<td>1.49</td>
<td>3.58</td>
<td>2.03</td>
<td>4.60</td>
<td>1.11</td>
<td>1.58</td>
<td>2.71</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Remeil</td>
<td>8.68</td>
<td>6.67</td>
<td>16.37</td>
<td>0.30</td>
<td>8.95</td>
<td>8.62</td>
<td>17.03</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Mazraa</td>
<td>1.18</td>
<td>18.38</td>
<td>5.19</td>
<td>27.05</td>
<td>3.06</td>
<td>0.76</td>
<td>2.65</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Minet el Hosn</td>
<td>2.44</td>
<td>6.19</td>
<td>5.54</td>
<td>6.61</td>
<td>2.37</td>
<td>2.46</td>
<td>7.73</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Port</td>
<td>1.78</td>
<td>2.88</td>
<td>0.93</td>
<td>4.16</td>
<td>1.68</td>
<td>1.80</td>
<td>1.09</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Es Saife</td>
<td>3.31</td>
<td>3.91</td>
<td>9.05</td>
<td>0.54</td>
<td>8.55</td>
<td>2.12</td>
<td>14.06</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Medawar</td>
<td>47.95</td>
<td>4.13</td>
<td>8.78</td>
<td>1.08</td>
<td>28.19</td>
<td>52.45</td>
<td>10.50</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Diverse</td>
<td>5.26</td>
<td>1.87</td>
<td>3.36</td>
<td>0.88</td>
<td>5.91</td>
<td>5.11</td>
<td>3.95</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Source: as Table 8.1
Table 8.3

Location quotients for different population groups in Beirut, 1932.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Quarters</th>
<th>Armenians vs non-Armenians</th>
<th>Non-Armenian Catholics vs non-Armenians</th>
<th>Armenian Apostolics vs non-Armenians</th>
<th>Non-Armenian Catholics vs non-Armenian Christians</th>
<th>Armenian Apostolics vs non-Armenian Christians</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Mousseytbeh</td>
<td>0.150</td>
<td>0.709</td>
<td>1.348</td>
<td>0.352</td>
<td>0.190</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Bachoura</td>
<td>0.447</td>
<td>0.511</td>
<td>2.148</td>
<td>4.209</td>
<td>0.793</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Ras Beirut</td>
<td>0.116</td>
<td>0.498</td>
<td>1.566</td>
<td>0.576</td>
<td>0.165</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Zokak el Blat</td>
<td>0.961</td>
<td>0.328</td>
<td>0.766</td>
<td>2.262</td>
<td>0.770</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Achrafie</td>
<td>1.290</td>
<td>5.809</td>
<td>1.997</td>
<td>0.559</td>
<td>2.173</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Ain-el-Mreisse</td>
<td>0.416</td>
<td>0.441</td>
<td>0.701</td>
<td>2.034</td>
<td>0.310</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Remeil</td>
<td>1.301</td>
<td>54.567</td>
<td>1.037</td>
<td>1.085</td>
<td>1.341</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Nazraa</td>
<td>0.064</td>
<td>0.192</td>
<td>0.403</td>
<td>0.340</td>
<td>0.166</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Minet el Hosn</td>
<td>0.394</td>
<td>0.838</td>
<td>0.963</td>
<td>2.340</td>
<td>0.382</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Port</td>
<td>0.618</td>
<td>0.224</td>
<td>0.931</td>
<td>1.391</td>
<td>0.582</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Es Saife</td>
<td>0.847</td>
<td>16.759</td>
<td>4.032</td>
<td>3.578</td>
<td>2.187</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Medawar</td>
<td>11.610</td>
<td>8.130</td>
<td>0.537</td>
<td>1.494</td>
<td>6.826</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Diverse</td>
<td>2.813</td>
<td>3.818</td>
<td>1.157</td>
<td>1.425</td>
<td>3.163</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Source: as Table 8.1
Table A.4

Indices of Dissimilarity between the distribution of population groups in Beirut, 1932.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>Armenian</th>
<th>Armenian Catholics</th>
<th>Armenian Apostolics</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Non-Armenians</td>
<td>52.1</td>
<td>46.9</td>
<td>54.4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Non-Armenian Christians</td>
<td>45.1</td>
<td>28.4</td>
<td>50.1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Non-Christians</td>
<td>72.0</td>
<td>67.4</td>
<td>73.1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Armenian Apostolics</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>25.9</td>
<td>-</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Armenian Catholics</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>25.9</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Non-Armenian Catholics</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>29.0</td>
<td>45.5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Non-Armenian, non-Catholic Christians</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>39.0</td>
<td>55.4</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Source: as Table 8.1
Table 8.5

Percentage distribution of population groups in Beirut by zone, 1932

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>East 1</th>
<th>Centre 2</th>
<th>South &amp; West 3</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Armenians</td>
<td>69.75</td>
<td>18.81</td>
<td>6.18</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Non-Armenians</td>
<td>20.98</td>
<td>30.24</td>
<td>46.91</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Arm. Caths.</td>
<td>59.24</td>
<td>26.12</td>
<td>8.72</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Arm. Apostolica</td>
<td>72.14</td>
<td>17.14</td>
<td>5.60</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Source: as Table 8.1

Note: 1. East = Medawar, Acharifie & Remeil
2. Centre = Bachoura, Zokak el Blat, Minet el Hoan, Port and El Saife.
3. South & West = Moussaytbeh, Ras Beirut, Ain-el-Mreisse, and Mazraa.
"Diverse" excluded

centre (Zokak el Blat, El Saife and Port), and little represented in the others, especially the outer quarters of the south and west. Significantly, the eastern quarters (Medawar, Acharifie and Remeil) were all dominantly Christian quarters. In the centre, however, the picture was more complex. While non-Armenian Christians were certainly heavily concentrated in El Saife, neither Zokak el Blat nor Port were quarters favoured by them. Apart from El Saife they preferred in the centre the quarters of Bachoura and Minet el Hoan, neither of which were favoured by the Armenians. Thus, within the centre
there was little correspondence in residence between the Armenians and the non-Armenian Christians.

Segregation between Armenian Apostolics and Catholics was low (I.D. = 25.9), but there were variations between the distributions of the two groups. Thus, in the eastern quarters, relative to each other the Apostolics were more highly concentrated in Medawar, the Catholics in Achrafieh and Remiz. In the centre, the Apostolics were more highly concentrated in Zokak el Blat and Port, the Catholics in Es Saife and Bachoura. Overall the Catholics were less concentrated in the east than the Apostolics, particularly so in Medawar. Compared with the non-Armenian population the Armenian Catholics (I.D. = 46.9) were slightly less segregated than the Apostolics (I.D. = 54.4). Both groups were highly segregated from the non-Christian population (I.D. = 67.4 for Catholics, 73.1 for Apostolics), but in relation to non-Armenian Christians the Armenian Catholics (I.D. = 28.4) were significantly less segregated than the Apostolics (I.D. = 50.1). Interestingly, while there seems to have been greater segregation between Armenian Catholics and non-Catholic non-Armenian Christians (I.D. = 39.0) than between them and non-Armenian Catholics (I.D. = 29.0), segregation between Armenian Catholics and all non-Armenian Christians was still lower than that between them and non-Armenian Catholics. The lower segregation between Catholic Armenians and non-Armenian Christians (compared with that of Apostolics) seems attributable to their lesser concentration in the eastern quarters (especially Medawar) and their concentration within the centre, relative to the Apostolics, in quarters of high Christian representation (i.e. Es Saife and Bachoura). Es Saife and
Bachoura were both in fact also areas of high non-Armenian Catholic representation. But the same correspondence was not true of the eastern quarters where Armenian and non-Armenian Catholics displayed opposing preferences with regard to Madawar and Achrafié.

How should these figures be interpreted? It is apparent that of the three eastern quarters, Madawar contained the two principal refugee camps (of which the western one was already depleted by 1932), as well as the non-Armenian quarter of Nor-Hadjin (see below), accounting together for its Armenian population. Remeil on the contrary contained no camps, and cannot have contained more than about 150 Armenians settled by the Nansen Office. Achrafié, by contrast, contained a number of Nansen Office quarters established by 1931 which must account for at least 2,000 of its Armenian population recorded by the Census. If the Armenians known to be living in camps or new resettlement quarters are then deducted from the 1932 total, the calculation reveals that less than half the Armenians were actually living in the city, i.e. that the relative proportions suggested by Poidebard via-à-vis the camps and the town may have been close to reality. Such a deduction also then reveals that the Armenians who lived in the city rather than in the camps or the resettlement quarters were actually more highly concentrated in the city centre than in the eastern quarters. This is partly explained by the presence of the indigenous Armenian population, dominantly Catholic, which no doubt helps to explain the greater concentration of Armenian Catholics than Apostolics in the central quarters recorded by the Census. Otherwise, in the absence of any further evidence,
it is difficult to comment on the reasons for the location of the Armenians within the town. Their quarters of residence were mixed in social status, though the quarters of the centre contained much housing in course of deterioration. It seems quite possible that many Armenians, like impoverished migrants elsewhere, occupied run-down residential accommodation in the inner-city.

The Camps

The various estimates of the number of refugees who settled in the camps are presented in Table 8.6. Land appears to have been designated by the authorities, and tents provided by the French military. The refugees were settled mostly on vacant land to the north-east of the town. According to one source it was owned by the Maronite church, and was apparently obtained for the refugees by Dr. Melkonian of the local Armenian National Union. Without documentary evidence it is difficult to attribute much significance to the location of the camps next to quarters dominantly Christian, although the same phenomenon was observed at Aleppo. Similarly, while the eastern quarter of Beirut contained already in 1922 an assortment of industrial establishments, there is no evidence to suggest that this industry played any role in the choice of location.

According to Mesérian, the limits of the camp were: to the west the headquarters of the Tramways Company, to the east the Maronite church of St. Michel and the railway station, to the south the road from the town to the bridge of Beirut, and
Table 8.6

Estimates of Armenian Refugee Population in Beirut camp

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Date</th>
<th>Estimate</th>
<th>Source</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1922</td>
<td>c.5,000</td>
<td>Arthur A. Bacon, Beirut Chapter, American Red Cross, Nov.28, 1922 (Arch. A.R.C.)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1923</td>
<td>75,000</td>
<td>E.St. John Ward, n.d. (1923) (Arch. A.R.C.)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1924</td>
<td>12-15,000</td>
<td>Jean Comber, Friends of Armenia, Jan.21 1924 (F.A., 91, 2q, 1924, p.8)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1924</td>
<td>c. 8,000</td>
<td>Mary G. Webb &amp; Hilda B. Phelps, Central Turkey Mission, May 2, 1924 (F.A., 92, 3q, 1924, p.4)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1924</td>
<td>13-14,000</td>
<td>Basil Matthews, 1924 (S.F. F.P.M.A. Syria S/3)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1924</td>
<td>7,000</td>
<td>Marshall Fox, in comment on above, (S.F. F.P.M.A. Syria S/3)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1926</td>
<td>7,000</td>
<td>Berron Report</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1926</td>
<td>22,000</td>
<td>Johnson Report, Dec.18, 1926, loc.cit. This figure probably represents in reality all Armenian refugees in Beirut</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1926</td>
<td>2,500</td>
<td>families. Duguet, &quot;Programme General etc.,&quot; Dec.29, 1926 (N.A. C1429)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1926</td>
<td>12,000</td>
<td>Poidebard (1926)16</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1926</td>
<td>c. 15,000</td>
<td>&quot;Rapport&quot; (1926) 102</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1928</td>
<td>c. 9,000</td>
<td>Miss Patterson, Friends of Armenia (F.A., 106, 1q, 1928, p.2)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1929</td>
<td>15,000</td>
<td>Ross, Fry &amp; Sibley (1929)263</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
to the north the sea and the quarantine buildings. This description is rather ambiguous. Photographic evidence confirms the existence of a large camp to the east of the Tramways Co. in 1925. Referring to Fig. 8.3, this would occupy the vacant land shown on the 1922 map between the Tramways Co. and St. Michel. This camp was separated by houses (marked on the 1922 map) from a second camp to the north, between the railway station and the quarantine buildings. The extent of this camp is indicated on the 1935 map, where the representation of the Armenians' huts is unmistakable, and on air photographs of 1934, but new building in this area since 1922 suggests that the camp was originally even more extensive. The area of both these camps is embraced by Méberian's description, and other descriptions confirm that the camp by the sea was in fact divided into two separate parts. It would appear that a large number of the Armenians in the Quarantine camp (i.e. the eastern part of the sea-shore camp) were only settled there c.1924. These were the Armenians from the Amanus mountains, who settled initially on the hill of Achrafié, which dominates the camp, and which is also described as housing a party from Alexandretta and Aello. The Amanus Armenians would presumably have been amongst those dispersed from Alexandretta. Their camp was at first located on rented land in the neighbourhood of the Army Convalescence Hospitals. Under pressure from the Service de Santé, the Municipality obliged the camp to move, and they then settled near the sea, apparently forming a large part of the Quarantine camp. Near to them, by the sea, were installed, at about the same time, the Armenians from Yozgat, that is in May - June, 1924. Carle's Report,
Changes in the Built-up Area of East Beirut 1922-1935

Fig. 8.3

- Areas built-up 1922
- Areas built-up 1922-25
- Areas of camp 1925
- Conjectural maximum extent of camps
- Camp destroyed by fire 1923
- New Armenian quarters 1934
  1. Pavilions
  2. Gebeili
  3. Parcelle 603
  4. Non-Marache
  5. Trad
  6. Non-Adone
  7. Non-Haddij
  8. Khalil Bdeiriy
  9. Non-Sis
  10. Parachina
  11. Gullabchaine
M  St Michel church
P  Tir aux Pigeons
Q  Quarantine buildings
T  Tramways Ca.

Sources: Town plans at 1:10,000 d.d.d 1922 and 1925, Air photos c.1934 from SF Vol 218
although presented in 1925, would appear, in describing two
camps by the sea and one on a hill, to reflect the situation
a short time before 1925, that is before the movement of the
Amanus camp from Achrafieh. If the later arrivals from
Alexandretta and Aleppo were in this way accommodated in the
eastern part of the main camp (Quarantine camp), it seems
logical to infer that the western half, nearer to the city
(Camp St. Michel), contained the migrants who arrived earlier
direct from Cilicia. Other refugees are described living under
the railway viaduct, and established across the Nahr Beirut
in a camp known as "Tiro" after its location near a shooting-
range ("Tir aux Pigeons"). This camp is also marked on Fig. 83.
It is not known how early it was established. When the
refugees from the Damascus troubles arrived they were settled
initially in the huts of the Quarantine Service and in tents
supplied by N.E.R. and the military in the camp.

The situation of the camps with respect to rent and tax
is rather obscure. It appears that in 1925 the French High
Commission decided to make the refugees themselves pay for the
measures of improvement necessary for their installation. The
camps were then placed under the administration of the town, and
a decree was passed to oblige the Armenians installed in the
camps to pay the rent for the land on which they had built their
huts, as well as a municipal tax to cover the expenses of
improvement. The collection of this money by the municipal
authorities, apparently retrospective, encountered some
difficulties (see below) and it was necessary to reduce the
amount demanded by half.
The sources do not tell much about the community structure of the Beirut camps. There was, however, certainly some community reconstitution, as in the case of the Amanus Camp, which grouped the refugees from the villages of Kharne, Hassan-Beyli and Lapache in the Amanus. That such grouping did exist elsewhere in the camps is suggested by the subsequent development of the new quarters on community lines. As at Aleppo, schools and churches were established by the various denominations, reinforcing the community structure within the camps. Apostolic churches were established in the main camp, in Amanus camp and in "Tiro", with schools attached caring for about 1,200 pupils in about 1931. Two school-huts, with 300 pupils in 1923, were run by the Armenian Protestant Mission in the camp, where Protestant services also took place. The Jesuits appear, as at Aleppo, to have been charged with caring for the Catholic Armenians of the camps. They at first used the Maronite church (St. Michel) next to the camp, then, in 1923, a hut built on land let by the railway company, and finally a new church which opened in 1924. Parallel to this the Jesuits opened a double school (École St. Grégoire) next to the church, which in 1928 provided education for 527 children, of whom over 300 were Catholics. The camps would appear then to have had their own religious institutions, plus some school facilities. However, numerous children attended the schools of the various denominations within the city, so that, as in Aleppo, in this respect the town and camp communities were at least partly integrated. Where schools, churches and reconstituted communities did exist in the camps they would
clearly provide considerable constraints on individual movement. These constraints would be reinforced by the establishment of shops in the camps, the beginnings of a rudimentary economic system providing even more social cohesion and vested interests in inertia.

**Living Conditions**

Living conditions in Beirut camp were comparable with those in Aleppo. The tents rotted and soon gave way to the same ramshackle huts. (Plates 8.1 - 8.2) According to Joseph Burtt, the refugees were not permitted to erect any permanent buildings on the camp-site, even if they had the means to do so. Roads were narrow alleys, clogged with mud in the winter rains. In 1924, the authorities opened some principal arteries across the camp, such that many huts were torn down, but the situation of the mass of the refugees was scarcely thereby improved. Drainage and sanitary conditions were appalling. By contrast, the question of water-supply did not draw the attention it did at Aleppo.

The incidence of disease, however, certainly did draw comment. When the migrants arrived by sea from Cilicia at the end of 1921, they were automatically showered, deloused and vaccinated on their arrival. These energetic measures taken by the French authorities could not, however, offset the ultimate effect of poor housing, poor nutrition and poor sanitation. The diseases commonly experienced were the same as those in Aleppo; tuberculosis, eye-diseases, and the effects of undernourishment, especially on the children, and more particularly on the babies with debilitated mothers.
More spectacular were the three cases of plague reported in October, 1926, and a case of cholera at the end of 1927. However, the medical problem facing Beirut in particular was malaria. This was especially fierce in the summer of 1923, and affected in particular the refugees coming from Alexandretta. No doubt this was in large measure due to their stay in the malarial marshes there. But the valley of the Nahr Beirut, before its improvement, was a breeding-ground for malaria, and the original camp of the refugees from Alexandretta, before their move to the Quarantine Camp, was situated on the eastern slopes of Achrafié overlooking the river valley. The malaria was therefore partly generated and sustained by the malarial conditions of the camp-sites in Beirut. The French military were ultimately obliged to evacuate their barracks next to the camp each summer to avoid the danger of an epidemic. To meet the medical needs of the refugees two clinics were initially established in the camps by the Armenian Red Cross, subsidised by Near East Relief, but these were unable to continue beyond 1923. They were superseded by a clinic established by the Jesuits at their Mission in 1923, and one established by the Near East Relief, financed by the Protestant "Beirut Relief Committee", in premises obtained directly opposite the Jesuit Mission.

Danish Protestant workers also maintained a small clinic in the camp, while there was also a clinic in the Amanus Camp, both before and after its move from Achrafié, where anti-malarial injections were given. A sanatorium at Maâmeltofno, established in 1923 with the aid of N.E.R., accommodated about thirty sufferers from tuberculosis. However, this site was
not suitable and the air was unhealthy for the patients, and it was not until 1938 that the sanatorium could be moved to a healthier site at Azounich.

As at Aleppo, the Christian and philanthropic organisations had also to combat social disease. Prostitution, begging, and crime attract attention in the sources, while in Aleppo attention focusses on nervous maladies, alcoholism and delinquency:— perhaps the more cosmopolitan port of Beirut provided more social traps than Aleppo. Delinquency was, however, a problem at Beirut, exacerbated again by the lack of school facilities available. Common to both cities also were the embarrassing excesses of political violence. In February, 1929, the Armenian Catholicos, Sahag II, wrote despairingly to the French High Commissioner and to the President of the Lebanese Republic begging them "ne pas tenir responsable tout le peuple arménien pour un crime de vengeance personelle ou de parti." Much of the expressed concern for social disease and decline in moral standards at Beirut seems, however, to have been in reality based on a fear of communism, and this fear was great enough in official circles to influence government policy towards the camp. The High Commissioner, Henri Pontot, wrote in January, 1934 that it was necessary to decongest the Armenian quarters as soon as possible as Communism was finding there its most ardent propagandists.

The economic weakness and vulnerability of the Armenians at Beirut has already been described, and again it appears to have been the poorer refugees who were concentrated in the camp. On November 28, 1925, Catholicos Sahag II wrote to the Governor of Lebanon describing the difficulty encountered
by the Armenians in paying their rent and tax. He complained that the collectors, aided by the police, were using undue severity towards the Armenians of the camps in demanding from them sums of 10, 20, 30 or even 60 Syrian pounds per family. He complained that if all the sums demanded above were really collected they would easily surpass the expenses due, i.e. the rent for the lands for the years 1924 and 1925, the contribution to the cost of improvements, and the wages of the clerks and supervisors. That at least was the conviction of most of the inhabitants quite apart from their complaints concerning the unfair distribution of the payments demanded, which bore no relation to the capacity of each person to pay. Those who asked for the slightest explanation on this subject or those not quick to pay were being maltreated and even imprisoned. To help relieve the distress, the NER established a Girls' industrial establishment, which employed 469 girls in needlework at the end of 1928. The Jesuits also ran a workshop for young Armenian girls, their embroidered products to be sold to women of French and Lebanese society. They also ran an employment bureau, placing refugees as domestic-servants, in the factories of Lebanon and France, and exercising some surveillance over emigration. The work of the NER in placing orphans in France has already been observed.

The Transfer to New Quarters

Between 1928 and 1939, as at Aleppo, the greater part of the Armenian refugees were transferred from the camps to new Armenian quarters. The reasons for this move were similar, but not identical. The question of a landowner -refugee
confrontation, which appears to have been dominant at Aleppo, does not appear to have been the initial motive behind the transfer in Beirut. It is true that in May, 1926, Burnier observed that the necessity to move the Armenians from the Beirut camp had arisen because the railway company desired the land for the extension of the station, but this is the sole reference to such a motive at this stage. The initial moves would appear to have been influenced rather by political motives, and made by the French authorities who, as observed, had an interest in stabilising the Armenian population of Lebanon. Within Beirut, such a stabilisation would necessarily involve the transfer of the refugees from the squalid conditions of the camps, from which there was considerable emigration, to new quarters presenting more satisfactory conditions for permanent occupation. Such a scheme appears to have been envisaged even before the intervention of the Nansen Office. Furthermore, even after the Nansen Office had become involved, the finance for the initial settlement at Beirut came from the French High Commission, again suggesting a strong political commitment to the scheme. The motive was not, however, wholly political. The authorities were undoubtedly afraid of epidemics, a fear which in Beirut had the additional inconvenience of threatening the summer-holiday trade, wealthy Egyptians apparently refusing to come to Beirut for fear of infection. There seems to have been also a fear of disorders in the camps, no doubt to some extent disguising the fear of communism, expressed above by the High Commissioner, M. Ponsot, in 1929. Whatever the motive, the result was that, in the case of Beirut (unlike Aleppo) the initiative for the
new settlements seems, in the early stages, to have lain with the Settlement Committee rather than with the Municipality, such that more consideration could be shown in the transfer, since demolitions could be co-ordinated with housing available. The sine qua non of this arrangement was the early commitment of finance to the scheme.

Initial plans, it will be recalled, established by the Nansen Office in co-operation with the Mandatory authorities, envisaged the transfer to the land of about 1,000 "agricultural" families. As at Aleppo, this scheme ultimately came to nought. Alongside agricultural settlement there would, however, be a reorganisation of the Camp, involving the creation of roads and sewers and the decongestion of the overpopulated quarters. The inhabitants dislodged by these operations would be transported to a new quarter to be allotted to them. In the event, even in Beirut, the first transfers were to take place in a crisis situation. An outbreak of plague on October 12, 1926, led to the burning of 150 huts in the camp on the orders of the Health Service. The unfortunate inhabitants were temporarily lodged in the buildings of the Quarantine Station (as distinct from the Quarantine Camp). They joined there a number of widows, orphans and old folk without shelter, as well apparently, as the remaining refugees from Damascus. Such a situation could not last as the Station was required for the early summer to accommodate the Mecca pilgrims. Nothing had been achieved by that time, so the inhabitants of the Station were temporarily transferred to tents on Achrafic in the summer, before being readmitted. Their permanent settlement meanwhile became a priority for the Settlement Committee. Purchases of land were
made in February, 1927 ("Pavillons" and "Parcelle 603") and in April, 1928 ("Gebeili"), all three plots being situated on Achrafieh, overlooking the valley of the Nahr Beirut. Nothing is known concerning the previous ownership of the plots purchased in 1927, but the Gebeili plot was in private ownership (Gebeili Frères). On the larger plot purchased in 1927, twenty large buildings ("Pavillons") were constructed to be let to a total of 160 refugees, that is eight in each building. This form of arrangement was later abandoned in the other two quarters, and a rent-purchase agreement substituted, under which the refugees would build their own homes, albeit with some financial assistance from the Office; i.e. the arrangement pursued at Aleppo. The "Pavillons" were, in fact, virtually the only houses actually built by the Office in urban settlements in the whole period. The abandonment of construction work resulted from its high cost, and from the preference of the refugees to live in their own individual homes rather than in rented apartments.42 Priority in settlement was naturally to be given to the plague victims. Parcelle 603, however, appears to have been reserved exclusively for Armenian Catholics. In view of the fact that the money for the purchase of this plot came from the French High Commission a certain favouritism towards the Catholic Armenians may have been involved. If so, it had the effect of formalising the split between the religious communities by planned spatial segregation. It is not clear what became of the poor widows and old-folk who had been housed in the Quarantine Station. In a letter written on June 5, 1928, Burnier refers mysteriously to 250 widows, old-folk and children settled in huts to the west of the...
"Pavillons" quarter, beside the railway. Such a location, as is evident from the map, is impossible, unless for "ouest" should be read "est." Elsewhere, Burnier refers to five huts for 250 people beside the Nansen Office quarter. Now, it is apparent that by the end of 1931 there existed in Gebeili quarter, 5 "pavillons" for widows and old-folk established by the British and Swiss Friends of Armenia. It is tempting to explain Burnier's earlier references in terms of these buildings in the Gebeili quarter, as there is no evidence of the establishment of similar homes anywhere else on Achrafié before 1936, except the small homes of the Armenian Catholic quarter.

From 1929 onwards, the Settlement Committee appears to have lost the initiative in the resettlement process. The Municipality then appears to have begun to implement a systematic demolitions policy, to be carried out quarter by quarter, beginning in August, 1929. According to Suzanne Ferrière of the International Red Cross, these demolitions were to take place because the landowners concerned wished to evict the refugees. There is no other confirmation in the written sources (not even in the Nansen Archives) of this situation, but Ferrière had just visited the Beirut camp, in May 1929, in the presence of M. Burnier, so she ought to have been well informed. If so, then the subsequent resettlement in Beirut becomes a copy of the parallel resettlement in Aleppo. Certainly the refugees were faced with the same determined implementation of the demolitions policy as at Aleppo.

The demolitions process was hastened by one event, exceptional but not unforeseen. On the evening of January 30,
1933, fire broke out in a bakery in the camp, and within five hours had burnt down about 450 huts (other reports claim 600 huts destroyed, and 3,000 made homeless). The flames destroyed the whole of the remaining part of the Camp St. Michel, that is the western section, adjoining the buildings of the Tramways Company. Miraculously there was no loss of life, and the authorities were thereby saved considerable embarrassment. Some of the victims found shelter with friends in the city; the remainder, about 1,800, were housed temporarily in the Quarantine Station, continuing its role as an emergency relief camp. But because the arrival of the Mecca pilgrims was imminent a rapid solution had to be found to their settlement. Fortunately, this part of the camp was in any case apparently due to be demolished, and a site had been purchased by the Office for the refugees there. The demolition of their huts had already been delayed by the intervention of the Armenian religious authorities, concerned for the plight of the unemployed. Two months after the fire, therefore, all the victims had been installed in the new quarters either as sub-tenants, or in houses built by the Office.

Apart from the exceptional clearance brought about by the fire, the demolitions, as remarked, were carried out systematically sector by sector. The area destroyed by the fire is described as the last remaining part of the Camp St. Michel, and its approximate extent is marked on Fig. 8.3. It follows that the large area of the camp to the east of this had been already demolished, that is by about the end of 1932. By contrast, the Quarantine camp appears to have been still largely standing in 1935, so that it seems that the demolitions began in the east
of the Camp St. Michel, were completed in that camp by the fire of 1933, and were only extended to the Quarantine Camp afterwards. A table drawn up in November, 1936 shows the huts remaining at that date (Table 8.7). Some of them (in Nor-Hadjin, Nor-Marach, Trad, Nor-Sis, and Nor-Aduna) were within the new quarters, but by far the greatest number were in the Quarantine camp. There were smaller numbers in "Tir aux Pigeons," and in quarters described as "Shell", "Senn-el-fil" and "Dahr el-DjómaT. It has not been possible to locate precisely the huts of Senn-el-fil, but they must have been across the river and possibly represented huts transferred under threat of demolition. The same might be true of "Shell": hut-like buildings appear on the 1935 map to the south of the Shell Depot, east of the river. Of the original camps within the city limits, huts remained standing only in the Quarantine camp. By June, 1938, the situation had not greatly improved, as is evident from a table drawn up by Burnier representing the situation of the huts at that date (Table 8.8). Amanus Camp, as observed, formed a part of the Quarantine camp. The camp of "Tir aux Pigeons" was, according to Burnier, installed on rented land in Bourj-Hammoud, and there was no disagreement between the refugees and its owner. As long as the demolitions were confined to the limits of the Municipality of Beirut, therefore, these refugees were relatively secure in their huts. The same would presumably be true of the "Shell" camp. However, when the process of demolitions in Beirut Municipality was nearing completion, with the notable exception of the Amanus Camp, the Municipality of Bourj-Hammoud was by the end of 1937 likewise requiring the demolition of "Tir aux Pigeons" for reasons of hygiene and urban improvement. As is
Table 8.7

Huts remaining in Beirut, Nov. 9, 1935

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>QUARTER</th>
<th>Owners</th>
<th>Tenants</th>
<th>Total</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Families</td>
<td>Persons</td>
<td>Families</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Hadjin</td>
<td>10</td>
<td>53</td>
<td>-</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Marach</td>
<td>45</td>
<td>218</td>
<td>-</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Quarantine</td>
<td>482</td>
<td>2411</td>
<td>96</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Trad</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>9</td>
<td>-</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Sis</td>
<td>24</td>
<td>150</td>
<td>-</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Adana</td>
<td>10</td>
<td>49</td>
<td>-</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Benn-el-fil &amp; Dahrel-Djazal</td>
<td>32</td>
<td>150</td>
<td>-</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Tir aux Pigeons</td>
<td>140</td>
<td>314</td>
<td>34</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Shell</td>
<td>16</td>
<td>66</td>
<td>-</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>TOTAL</strong></td>
<td>761</td>
<td>3420</td>
<td>130</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Source: N.A., C1524

* 578 on original table.
Table 8.8

Huts remaining in Beirut, June 20, 1938.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Camp</th>
<th>Huts</th>
<th>FAMILIES</th>
<th>Total</th>
<th>FAMILIES</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>Owners</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Amanus</td>
<td>301</td>
<td>301</td>
<td>50</td>
<td>351</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Senn-el-fil</td>
<td>45</td>
<td>45</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>47</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>&quot;Tir aux Pigeons&quot;</td>
<td>125</td>
<td>125</td>
<td>48</td>
<td>173</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>TOTAL</td>
<td>471</td>
<td>471</td>
<td>100</td>
<td>571</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Source: Nansen Arch., C1598.
apparent from the table, nothing had been achieved in this respect by June, 1938, and both "Tir aux Pigeons" and "Shell" camps are both still marked as standing on a French map of 1945 (Fig 8.4). As regards the Amanus Camp, Annie Davies, of the Friends of Armenia, wrote on October 17, 1938, that a few months previously an order had been given that all the old huts in the camp should be demolished. This order had been obeyed, but about a month ago, word had been given that the refugees might stay for another six months. Directly those who had pulled down their huts heard this news, they started to re-erect them again in the old camp. Thus the Amanus Camp survived into 1939, by which time new refugees were arriving from the Sanjak. Again, there are still huts shown standing on the French map of 1945.

The response to this enforced demolition policy was similar to that in Aleppo. The refugees formed Compatriotic Unions, for example from Marag, Hadjin and Adana, and made purchases direct from private-landowners on the outskirts of Beirut. In general, these purchases were made without the intervention of the Office, although in the case of Hadjin the Office was inscribed as owner of the new land having contributed a substantial amount of the purchase price. The Office limited itself to loans to the refugees for the purchase of property, or, most frequently, for the construction of their houses. Other purchases were made by groups of refugees irrespective of origin, for example the Trad quarter. A number were made by individual, more prosperous, refugees, so that already, before 1929, when camp clearance began in earnest, Armenian homes had been constructed in the neighbourhood of the new quarters of Achrafieh.
Changes in the Built-up area of East Beirut 1934/5-1939/41

Areas built up 1934/5
Areas built up 1934/5-1939/41
Areas of Camp 1939/41
Camp demolished 1934/5-1939/41

Sources

A Town plans at 1:10,000 dated 1935 and 1941
B Plan of East Beirut at 1:10,000 dated 1939 and air photography ca 1934 in S.E Vol 216
The Armenian General Benevolent Union, acting either through the Office, or on its own accord, contributed substantially to the transfer of population, providing funds for the quarters of Gullabachène and Parachène.\(^{53}\) It was in one of these quarters, Gullabachène, that the Office built 26 apartments for the refugees, the only venture by the Office in construction after the heavy expense of the "Pavillons" of Achräfî. The intervention of the Office had to cease on December 31, 1937. On that date the work for the poor and destitute refugees was transferred to the A.G. B.U., an organisation which had already provided a substantial amount of the finance received by the Office, and which was to work in close collaboration with Jacob Künnler, of the Swiss Friends of the Armenians, who had already provided a number of small houses for widows with children in the new quarters.\(^{54}\) It appears that Künnler was then able to purchase a piece of land in Bourj-Hammoud, on which he constructed 101 simple "pioneer houses." Not all the refugees were able to move smoothly to their new quarters, however. The delay in moving the inhabitants of the Amanus Camp has already been noted.\(^{55}\) These refugees had paid the deposit on a piece of land in 1935, but were unable to take possession of it as a neighbour was claiming the right of pre-emption. When, in 1937, the demolition of the camp was due to take place, they still had not obtained possession of their land, and on the intervention of the Armenians, supported by their ecclesiastical authorities, the Lebanese government annulled the municipal decision and put back the demolition until later. The refugees then won their case on March 1, 1938, but an appeal was made against this
decision, which then had to return to the courts. Meanwhile
the camp was again threatened with demolition, but again the
Armenian religious authorities intervened and a further delay
of six months was accorded, as has been described. As at
Aleppo, those refugees who were not able to build a house for
themselves in the new quarters were in many cases able to
rent accommodation from the newly settled owners and future-
owners. (Table 8.9). Jalabert describes how this arrangement
benefitted the future-owners: 56

"Avoir une maison à étage est le rêve de tout nouveau
propriétaire, car, du jour où il y a logé un locataire
tout souci d'avoir est écarté, l'amortissement de la
maison est assuré : ce sera le locataire qui aura payé
pour le propriétaire."  

In November, 1936, out of 14,759 refugees installed in the new
quarters 3598 were sub-tenants. 57

Table 8.10 shows the progress of the settlement work in
the new quarters up to the end of 1937, the last date for which
reliable data are available. To aid in the identification of
these quarters on the ground, three useful aids are available.
There is, firstly, a map drawn up by Burnier, showing the
outlines of the quarters constructed (and projected) at the
end of 1931, to accompany his annual report on the installation
of the refugees. 58 This indispensable map is not always accurate,
but may be usefully employed in conjunction with a series of
vertical air photographs of the new quarters contained in an
illustrated album presented by Burnier to Marshall Fox of the
Society of Friends. 59 This album contains also Burnier's annual
report on the installation of the refugees to the end of 1934,
and it is apparent that the aerial photographs are contemporary.
### Table 8.9

**Sub-tenants in the Armenian quarters of Beirut, Nov., 1936**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Quarter</th>
<th>&quot;owners&quot; (Persons)</th>
<th>sub-tenants (Persons)</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Nor-Hadjin</td>
<td>772</td>
<td>823</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Khalil Badaouy</td>
<td>203</td>
<td>27</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Nor-Marach</td>
<td>2906</td>
<td>1185</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Gebeili</td>
<td>1603</td>
<td>223</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Parcelle 603</td>
<td>196</td>
<td>72</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Pavillons</td>
<td>701</td>
<td>105</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Lea Pentes</td>
<td>62</td>
<td>31</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Quarantine &amp; Diverse</td>
<td>387</td>
<td>166</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Trad</td>
<td>1150</td>
<td>461</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Gullabachène</td>
<td>463</td>
<td>99</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Sis</td>
<td>513</td>
<td>93</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Parachène</td>
<td>212</td>
<td>150</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Adana</td>
<td>815</td>
<td>163</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Gullabachène 2</td>
<td>311</td>
<td>-</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Tomarza</td>
<td>183</td>
<td>-</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Aghabios</td>
<td>411</td>
<td>-</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Senn-el-fil &amp; Dahr el-Djemal</td>
<td>257</td>
<td>-</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Tir aux Pigeons</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Sholl</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Nedjib Araman</td>
<td>16</td>
<td>-</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>TOTAL</strong></td>
<td><strong>11,161</strong></td>
<td><strong>3,598</strong></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

*Note: Persons inhabiting huts excluded.*

*Source:* as Table 8.7
Table 8.10

Progress of the Settlement Work in the New Quarters of Beirut.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>QUARTER</th>
<th>No. of persons installed</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>1931</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Pavillons</td>
<td>607</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Gebeili</td>
<td>1248</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Parcellle 603</td>
<td>322</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Nor-Marach</td>
<td>2193</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Trad</td>
<td>578</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Nor-Adana</td>
<td>64</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Nor-Hadjin</td>
<td>203</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Khalil Badaouy</td>
<td>131</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Les Pentes</td>
<td>-</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Nor Sis</td>
<td>-</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Parachène</td>
<td>-</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Gullabachène</td>
<td>-</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Diverse</td>
<td>-</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Norachène</td>
<td>-</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Senn-el-fil</td>
<td>-</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Tomarza</td>
<td>-</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Yozgat</td>
<td>-</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Gullabachène No 2</td>
<td>-</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Nedjib - Araman</td>
<td>-</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Aghabios</td>
<td>-</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Quarantine</td>
<td>-</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>TOTAL</td>
<td>5346</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Sources: Nansen Office Reports and Tables in N.A., C1584 C1524, C1598 and S.F., M.S. Vol 216
Thirdly, in the archives of the Nansen Office are available large-scale plans of the quarters of "Pavillons", Trad, and Gullabachene. Used in conjunction these three sources enable the precise location of the new Armenian quarters constructed in Beirut by 1934. These quarters are identified on Fig 8.3 which shows the extension of the built up area of east Beirut between 1922 and 1935. It is less easy to locate the quarters built after 1935, but they are probably represented by all the new constructions to the east of the Nahr Beirut marked on Fig 8.4. With the exception of the houses grouped as "Diverse", which appear to have been grouped in or near the Quarantine Camp, the only new quarters built by 1934 which were actually within the city limits were Pavillons, Parcelle 603, Gebeili, Khalil Badaouy and Lea Pentes. All the others were in the limits of the Municipality of Bourj-Hammoud. Thus the transfer of the refugees from the camps to new quarters to the east involved the transfer of the bulk of them across the Nahr Beirut to the neighbouring municipality. Of the new quarters in Bourj-Hammoud, the location of one, Parachene, is uncertain, but the most likely location has been indicated, ascertained by process of elimination. It is not certain whether the area of building to the south-west of Parachene and to the west of Nor-Sis, adjoining both quarters, forms part of Parachene or of Nor-Sis.

It is clear from the Nansen Archives that, as at Aleppo, in the purchase of the Office quarters, cheapness was a primary consideration. The economic plight of the refugees, and their receipt of loans from the Office towards their own purchases and the construction of their houses indicates that this criterion
remained important throughout the transfer process. This may explain why again, as at Aleppo, the new quarters were constructed at a considerable distance from the centre of the city, in the Municipality of Bourj-Hammoud, with the exception of those on Achrafié and near the Quarantine Camp. Significantly perhaps, while the initial purchases by the Office, drawing on finance provided by the French High Commission, were made at Achrafié, the refugees turned to Bourj-Hammoud when purchasing for themselves. The Achrafié sites could, however, be purchased relatively cheaply for another reason. The new settlements straddled the malarial valley of the Nahr Beirut, and the eastern slopes of Achrafié, where the first Nansen quarters were established, were precisely those slopes from which it had already been necessary to move the Armenian refugees to the Quarantine Camp. The siting of the new quarters was therefore not without criticism on these grounds. Burnier was aware of this situation, but stressed that the river was due for improvement, subsequent to which the quarter of Achrafié should become one of the healthiest in the city. Thus the Office was wisely buying malarial land cheaply in anticipation of urban improvement. This did not come soon enough to prevent a violent epidemic of malaria in the Gebeili quarter in 1930, which extended to all the quarters of Beirut under construction at Achrafié, and held up building and letting. By 1932, malaria had considerably diminished, owing to preventive measures taken by the authorities but there were still sporadic outbreaks up to 1936. Apart from cheapness, another motive for the purchase of land in Bourj-Hammoud may have been that, residing
then outside the Beirut city-limits, the refugees would gain immunity from Municipal demolitions policy and would be able to put up their huts again until they were able to afford to build more substantial homes. In November, 1936, there still remained a large number of huts in the new quarters (45 containing 218 inhabitants in Nor-Marach alone), and it was not until a year later, as has been seen, that the Municipality of Bourj-Hammoud began to require their demolition.

A remarkable feature which emerges from Table 8.10 showing the progress of the settlement work, is the apparent decline in numbers settled between 1936 and 1937. This immediately casts doubt on the validity of the figures, possibly reflecting errors of tabulation, differences in the classes of inhabitants recorded, or the possible exclusion of some quarters from the 1937 totals. Otherwise, the decline would imply some movement out of the new quarters, possibly of those refugees now sufficiently wealthy to live in the city. An analysis of the development of the individual quarters throws more light on the nature of this decline. (Table 8.11, Fig 8.5) A number show the expected continuous increase in population. The others are examined using the information available concerning the number of houses built, and the number of families and persons of both owner-occupiers and sub-tenants. The apparently erratic development of Nor-Adana (after 1934), of "Khalil Badaouy", and of the houses listed under the title "Divorce" defies explanation without further information. In Parachone, the anomalously low population total in 1936 is not explained by the small reduction in the number of houses standing. It must rather be explained in terms of a reduction
Fig. 8.5. Development of the new Armenian Quarters of Beirut 1931-37

1. Nor Marache
2. Gebeili
3. Nor Sis
4. Pavillons
5. Trad
6. Gullabachene
7. Parcelle 603
8. Parachene
9. Nor Hadjin
10. Khalil Badaouy
11. Balamo
12. Nor Adamu
13. Les Pontes

Source: on Table A.10
Table 8.11

The Development of the New Quarters of Beirut

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Sources: as Table 8.10

In mean family-size from 4.2 (1934) to 3.3 (1936), possibly resulting from a tabulating error. In fact, according to the data presented, mean family-size for owner-occupiers in 1936 was only 2.8 (c.f. 4.5 in 1934). Similarly, in the case of "Parcelle 603", there does appear to have been a reduction in the number of houses standing in 1934, but this alone cannot explain the decrease in population in 1934, which again must be explained in terms of a dramatic decrease in mean family size between 1933 (4.7) and 1934 (3.6) and 1936 (3.5). Such a dramatic decrease might possibly have resulted from a malaria epidemic, but may more likely be attributed to inaccuracies in
the figures. The anomalously high population of "Pavillons" also reflects a change in mean family size from 3.9 (1934) to 4.7 (1936), and might again be attributed to inaccuracies in the figures. In three quarters, however, (Nor-Marash, Trad and Nor-Sis) there does seem to have been a decrease in the number of houses standing sufficient to account for the fall of population in these quarters towards the end of the period, that in Nor-Sis being particularly dramatic. With the strong reservation that the figures may be misleading, it does seem that there was an exodus in the latter part of the period from these quarters, possibly a result of the more wealthy refugees (those perhaps who had been profiting longest from sub-tenants) moving out of Bourj-Hammoud into the city. The economic status of the refugees in the new quarters will be discussed shortly.

Social Structure of the New Quarters

A remarkable feature of the structure of the new quarters was the reconstitution of communities based on town or district of origin, as a result of the participation in the resettlement process of the Compatriotic Unions. This was even more marked in Beirut than in Aleppo, the names of the new Armenian quarters (Hadjin, Marash (Waraq), Sis, Adana etc.) reflecting the town of origin and striking the attention of the observer. The community structure was reinforced by the opening of churches and schools in the new quarters. Table 8.12 lists the churches established in the new quarters. A distinction may be drawn between the quarters in Beirut city whose inhabitants did not construct their own churches but used the churches of the town, and those new quarters in Bourj-Hammoud possessing their own churches. The distinction is not absolute. Within the city,
Table 8.12

The construction of churches in the New Quarters of Beirut

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Quarter</th>
<th>1930</th>
<th>1931</th>
<th>1932</th>
<th>1933</th>
<th>1934</th>
<th>1936</th>
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<td>-</td>
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</tr>
<tr>
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</tr>
<tr>
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</tr>
<tr>
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<td>3(ACP)</td>
<td>3(ACP)</td>
<td>3(ACP)</td>
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</tr>
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<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
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<td>1(P)</td>
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</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Explanation:  
A  Armenian Apostolic  
C  " Catholic  
P  " Protestant

Sources: Nanuan Office Reports in N.A., C1584, C1524, and S.F., N.S. Vol 216
the quarters of Quarantine, Gebeili and Nor-Hadjin had their own churches, while within Bourj-Hammoud, no church existed at Nor-Adana by 1936, and the inhabitants of Trad used initially the churches of nearby Nor-Marach, until 1933 the only Armenian churches in Bourj-Hammoud. The most recently established quarters in Bourj-Hammoud also still had no churches. It is interesting to note that, as at Aleppo, the Armenian Catholic church, which had previously ceded care of the Catholic Armenians to the Jesuits, succeeded in establishing itself in Nor-Marach in Bourj-Hammoud. The opening of schools in the new quarters resembles that of the churches (Table 8.13), with the same distinction between the quarters of Beirut city and Bourj-Hammoud. In general, however, schools were opened first and sometimes existed (as at Nor-Adana) where churches did not. It is interesting to observe that, when the refugees moved from the "Camp St. Michel", the Jesuits moved their schools from the camp to Achrafieh, that is near to the new Armenian Catholic quarter ("Parcelle 603"). It is clear, as regards schools and churches, that the transfer of the refugees from their high-density concentration in the camps to more extensive and more scattered quarters required the provision of an increased number of both. A further indication of community structure comes from an index of retail-provision which may be calculated for each of the new quarters in 1936 (Table 8.1) and generally, the highest index values (denoting low retail-provision) are recorded by the quarters in Beirut city, suggesting the use of existing retail facilities in the city. The exceptions to this rule are Gebeili, Quarantine and Nor-Hadjin quarters, all of which also had greater provision of churches and schools than other quarters in Beirut city,
Table 8.13

The construction of schools in the New Quarters of Beirut

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Quarter</th>
<th>1930</th>
<th>1931</th>
<th>1932</th>
<th>1933</th>
<th>1934</th>
<th>1936</th>
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<td>1(A)</td>
<td>1(A)</td>
<td>1(A)</td>
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Explanation:  
A Armenian Apostolic  
C " Catholic  
P " Protestant  
X Private

Sources: as Table 8.12
### Table 8.14: The Provision of Workshops, shops and bakeries in the New Armenian Quarters of Beirut.

<table>
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<tr>
<th>Quarter</th>
<th>1930</th>
<th>1931</th>
<th>1933</th>
<th>1934</th>
<th>1936</th>
<th>Total</th>
<th>Index of retail provision</th>
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<td>?</td>
<td>29</td>
<td>53.7</td>
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<td>?</td>
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<td>?</td>
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<td>Nor-Warsch</td>
<td>?</td>
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<td>?</td>
<td>50</td>
<td>120</td>
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<td>2</td>
<td>12</td>
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<td>?</td>
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<td>3</td>
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<td>8</td>
<td>19</td>
<td>25.5</td>
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<td>?</td>
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<td>3</td>
<td>137</td>
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<td>1</td>
<td>10</td>
<td>9</td>
<td>10</td>
<td>49.5</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

**Sources:** as Table 8.12

**Note:** Index of retail provision = \( \frac{\text{population of quarters}}{\text{total(shops+bakeries) in quarters}} \)
suggesting more segregated communities. High index values are also recorded for the most recently established quarters in Bourj-Hammoud, where presumably an adequate retail structure had not time to be established. By contrast, low index values (denoting high retail-provision) characterise the long-established quarters of Bourj-Hammoud suggesting the necessity of establishing adequate retail provision in quarters far removed from the pre-existing retail facilities of the city. The exceptions in Bourj-Hammoud are the quarters of Trad and Nor-Adana. It is interesting that both of these quarters were also underprivileged in terms of church and school provision. One must assume that their inhabitants used the churches in the neighbouring Armenian quarters of Bourj-Hammoud, rather than the Armenians in Beirut city used the existing facilities there. Only Nor-Marach was under construction in Bourj-Hammoud before those two quarters, and its role in retail provision as in church and school provision would therefore appear very important. One may conclude as regards the spatial structure of the new quarters, that the quarters within the city were in general less segregated from the indigenous population than the quarters in the Municipality of Bourj-Hammoud, where the communities were in general more self-sufficient, by implication more segregated, and where community reconstitution reached its fullest expression.

**Living Conditions in the New Quarters**

As at Aleppo the living conditions of the refugees did not change overnight with their move to the new quarters. Refugees are reported falling into debt, being obliged to borrow money to build their houses, according to Berron often at 10 to 20%
interest. Ellen Chater of the "Save the Children Fund" wrote in August, 1930, "I heard only praise of the urban settlements from Armenians themselves except once or twice a statement that the houses were costing the refugees more than was really necessary." The Armenians, in fact, continued to be vulnerable to economic fluctuations, leading to some delay in the payment of rents to, and the recuperation of loans from, the Nansen Office. This, at least, is the more generous view of a situation which was also blamed on communist propaganda and economic shrewdness. Burnier reported at the end of 1932 that a certain number of the Office's tenants, though possessing sufficient resources, were making difficulties or even refusing to pay the amount due. They wished to pass as indigent and profit from the facilities which it was necessary to make available to those in trouble. At Beirut certain quarters had even wished to suspend all payments until an improvement in the situation. There was a propaganda campaign to persuade the tenants not to pay. This action was hardly succeeding, but it had been necessary to take action against sixteen of the most troublesome offenders for considerable delay in their payments.

In view of the difficulties of finance encountered by the refugees in building their houses, it is not surprising that these should have been subject to criticism. Mr. Henry R. Aldridge, a contributor to "The Illustrated Carpenter and Builder" visited first the ready-built apartments of "Pavillons", then a quarter containing houses built by the refugees themselves: "I was duly asked to approve of this as an excellent example of thrift. But, instead I noticed the poverty of the conceptions of the people....concerning the value of the two types of dwelling I had no doubt." This is rather unfair to the
Armenians. The ready-built "Pavillons" proved unpopular, while the new houses built by the Armenians (Plates 8.3 - 8.6) were considerably more substantial than the ramshackle huts from which they had moved. A number of them did, however, as observed remain in huts even in the new quarters, until at least as late as 1936. Information concerning water-supply, sewerage and health in the new quarters is unfortunately minimal, but this probably reflects the absence of criticism of arrangements which appear to have been relatively satisfactory. The exception was, as noted, the malarial nature of the sites chosen, excusable on financial grounds. Otherwise, by 1936, all the new buildings were provided with septic ditches, a complete network of piped water was established in Achrafieh by the end of 1933, and even by the end of 1931 the new quarters of Nor-Marach and Trad were receiving piped water from public fountains supplied by the Water Company. The supply of piped water, in particular, enabled the avoidance of the excesses of Aleppo, where an inadequate sewerage system existed alongside wells tapping groundwater.

**Conclusions**

To conclude, then, the settlement experience of the Armenian refugees at Beirut mirrors that of the refugees at Aleppo, with minor differences. Whereas at Aleppo the transfers from camps to new quarters were the result of a confrontation with the landowners, at Beirut they appear initially to have been planned as a response to considerations of politics and hygiene. At this stage the Settlement Committee should
have held the initiative, but in the event the initial transfers were made as a response to the need to rehouse refugees temporarily lodged in the Quarantine buildings. After 1929 the Settlement Committee appears anyway to have lost this initiative, the Municipality now carrying through, as at Aleppo, a systematic demolitions policy. Within the new quarters, community reconstitution was even more marked at Beirut than Aleppo, and living conditions were more satisfactory, the provision of a piped water-supply at Beirut avoiding the most obvious risk of disease at Aleppo.
Chapter 9

Urban Settlement: Damascus, Alexandretta, and Conclusions

Damascus

Damascus received Armenian refugees from Beirut, in 1921, and from Aleppo and Alexandretta in 1923. Subsequently there was a mass exodus of refugees to Beirut at the time of the Druse revolt, whose effects were as significant for the distribution of Armenians within the city as they were for the numbers remaining. In this respect the settlement of the refugees at Damascus differs from that at Beirut and Aleppo; in other respects it was similar.

Distribution

Once again, the Armenians settled partly in rented houses and khans in the city, and partly in camps on the outskirts. (see Fig 9.1). There is some doubt, however, about the relative proportions in town and camps. Burtt (1925) notes 5,000 in the camps, 8,000 in the city, Consul Vaughan-Russell (1926), 6,500 in each, while other sources note only about 10% of the refugees in houses, the rest in tents and huts. Information on the installation of the refugees is again inadequate. Tents appear to have been provided by the French, but there is no information on the extent of official participation in the establishment of the camps. Within the city, Armenians are noted settling in Bab Touma, and in Bab Charki near the Armenian church, both quarters lying in the Christian sector in the east of the old town. Vaughan-Russell describes the distribution of the refugees before the events
Armenian “quarters” in Damascus 1920-1939

Fig. 7.1
of 1925 (Table 9.1).

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Location</th>
<th>Number</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Bab Charki (Outside the East Gate)</td>
<td>4,200</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Kadem (South of Damascus)</td>
<td>1,000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Soufanié (East of Damascus)</td>
<td>800</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Bustan el Salib (East of Damascus)</td>
<td>500</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

The remaining Armenians were scattered throughout the city in rented houses or Khans  

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Number</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>6,500</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>13,000</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Source: Report by Consul Vaughan-Russell, Damascus, May 31, 1926 (F0374/11550)

4 Móčérian describes Armenians also in the area of Baramké on the west of Damascus. The Bab Charki camp was located close to the Armenian church; the others close to the Christian quarter outside Bab Touma. The exceptions are Baramké (about which little is known except that it was the station for the railway-line from Beirut) and Kadem, by the first railway-station south of Damascus, on a site which had previously been used as a trans-shipment point during the deportations of 1915. At the time of the troubles, those camps were abandoned, the Armenians taking refuge inside the city, or fleeing to Beirut. 5 Soufanié camp, however, was not totally abandoned; out of 800 Armenians, 200 — those who were too poor to leave — remained, to be joined by several others when barbed wire defences were erected around the city. 6
Social Structure and Living Conditions

Living conditions in the camps resembled those in Aleppo and Beirut. Their community structure is more obscure, but it is interesting that within the city there was again a strong Jesuit presence alongside the Armenian Catholics, the Jesuits running a boys' school. The camps on the east of the city were close to the old Armenian Church of Bab Charki, and partly for this reason, and partly because most of the camps were soon extinguished in the troubles, the camps do not appear to have developed strongly their own community institutions. Shops were, however, established in the camps at an early date.

The Nansen Office Quarter

Most of the camps, as observed, disappeared with the troubles, but a number of Armenians remained in camps in the Kassaa district. In 1929 over 100 families from Kassaa were transferred to a new quarter purchased by the Nansen Office. The circumstances of this transfer are relatively well documented. Joseph Burtt had already, in 1925, observed that in one (un-named) camp at Damascus, the "Arab owner wants to turn out Armenians now they have put up houses." In December, 1927, Consul Parr at Damascus received a letter from the lawyers of Mr. Phillip Habra, a naturalised British subject, in reference to certain land owned by Habra in Kassaa near Bab Touma. "He instructs us that he let this land to an Armenian for cultivation purposes some years ago, but shortly afterwards huts were erected thereon and these huts were occupied by other Armenians. Although our client has protested more huts have been built and occupied and at the present moment..."
there are about fifty huts on the land occupied by different families of Armenians.

"Our client has made repeated applications for possession so that he can build on the land and develop the same. Proceedings were taken on his behalf in the Local Courts and we understand an order has now been made directing the occupiers to give possession on the 1st March next. "Our client instructs us that representations have now been made by the Armenians to the French High Commissioner who has instituted enquiries locally...." (The Consul was then asked to protect the interests of Mr. Habra in the matter).

The reference to "repeated applications for possession" suggests that Mr. Habra is the same owner as described by Burtt in 1925. He was not apparently the sole owner requesting eviction, but according to Burnier, he was the most intransigent. It appears that the British Consul did intervene on his behalf, and as the Armenians had also appealed to the High Commission, the local delegate of the High Commission asked the government of the State of Syria to take measures to enable these families to establish themselves on domain land fulfilling the necessary conditions of hygiene and security. While the eviction of the refugees appears as a result of this intervention to have been held in temporary abeyance, the government of the State of Syria set up a committee charged with finding a solution. This committee was slow in coming to a decision, but following the personal intervention of M. Burnier, the Nansen Office delegate, who had an interview with the Syrian head of state, Cheikh Taje ed Dino, on July 17, 1928, the committee reached a decision on July 21. It was resolved, firstly, that there was no land belonging to the state which would fulfill the necessary conditions (an opinion with which Burnier agreed), so that, secondly, the government would buy the necessary land in the Christian quarter, from an owner who would be prepared to
sell. The land would therefore be bought for the refugees by the Syrian state. To aid in the establishment of the new quarter, Burnier suggested to Geneva the allocation of £300 sterling for the construction of houses. An immediate decision at Geneva was not possible, however, given the unfavourable views previously expressed by the settlement committee towards the settlement of refugees in the Damascus region. The grant was not approved until Burnier could report to the settlement committee direct on August 31. According to the report presented by Duguet and Burnier to this meeting the land envisaged was near the Christian quarter, and very close to the Armenian church and schools. Ultimately the Syrian government did not itself make this purchase, as it was not able, for political reasons, to concern itself specifically with the Armenians while being at the same time materially unable to respond to the requests from thousands of local families who had suffered grave losses during the Druze revolt. The money was therefore put at the disposal of M. Burnier, and a title-deed records the purchase of land in Damascus by Burnier on January 17, 1929. This land, outside the city walls, just south of Bab Charki, does appear to be the land originally envisaged by the Syrian government. (See Fig 9.1)

By the time that this purchase was made, the refugees were being threatened with expulsion, but the refugees were slow in leaving the Habra lands. Up to June 25, 1929, only three refugees had rented lots on the Nansen land. It appears that they were concerned about security, for on June 25 an Armenian deputation approached Consul Parr and protested that
they were afraid to settle on the land outside the town limits allotted to them by the Government, because many of them had assisted the French during the rebellion and they feared the vengeance of the Syrians. This feeling of insecurity was also reported by Dorothy Redgrave of the "Friends of Armenia." Burnier took a more cynical view. The delay, he argued, was caused by the hope of more favourable terms, which was held out by a priest and others coming from the Gregorian bishop, and by a certain individual (no details given). All this time, the eviction of the Armenians was being postponed by the French authorities. In these circumstances, Habra's lawyers again urged action by the British Consul. Despite the purchase of new land for them, they insisted that the Armenians were still in occupation of the Habra land and had paid no rent or compensation for the use and occupation of the land to their client. Their client therefore desired to claim compensation in respect of the loss he had sustained by reason of the refusal of the French authorities to comply with the order made by the Courts. Such action was not, however, necessary. The Damascus Police Commissioner was eventually given instructions to evict the Armenians from Habra's property on July 15, 1929. According to Burnier, faced with this deadline the refugees asked those who had fed them promises to fulfil them. They were unable to do so, and within a week all the lots on the Nansen land were taken. An additional bonus to the scheme came later when a survey made of the extent of the property revealed that an error had been made in its measurement and an additional tract of land was obtained in compensation from the former owners, which was made available for the settlement of sixty more families who were evicted from
another quarter of the town. Table 9.2 shows the progress of settlement in the Nansen Office quarter.

Table 9.2

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>1931</th>
<th>1932</th>
<th>1934</th>
<th>1937</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td><strong>Future-owners</strong></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Families</td>
<td>110</td>
<td>109</td>
<td>107</td>
<td>?</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>persons</td>
<td>353</td>
<td>?</td>
<td>550</td>
<td>641</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Sub-tenants</strong></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Families</td>
<td>68</td>
<td>76</td>
<td>52</td>
<td>?</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>persons</td>
<td>256</td>
<td>?</td>
<td>150</td>
<td>163</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Total</strong></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Families</td>
<td>178</td>
<td>185</td>
<td>162</td>
<td>?</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>persons</td>
<td>609</td>
<td>737</td>
<td>700</td>
<td>804</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Sources: as Table 7.2

Apart from the Nansen Office quarter, there was another notable attempt to provide accommodation for the refugees which, however, is less well documented. Mr. Hatcher Guendjian rented land in Zablatani on behalf of his refugee compatriots, and then sub-let it to the refugees such that this camp was named after him. In the annual report by Burnier for 1930, reference is made to one camp still providing accommodation for about 70 families who are likely to be turned out. It is likely that this statement refers to the refugees in Hatcher's camp, which was however still standing at the end of the period.

Social Structure and Living Conditions in the Nansen Office Quarter

So little is known about the community structure and living
conditions of the Armenians in Hatcher's Camp and within the city that comments should be confined to those within the Office quarter. Even this quarter has not attracted in the literature as much comment as the major centres of Aleppo and Beirut, but in the absence of criticism, it may be assumed to have been relatively successful. The site of this quarter, as has been noted, was close to the Armenian church of Damascus in the east of the Christian quarter of the old town, (see Fig 9.1) but too much significance should not be attached to this, as the criteria of purchase of the Syrian government are not known (Burnier's purchase being apparently merely the purchase foreseen by the Syrian government). The agreement made between the Office and the refugees was the rent-purchase agreement familiar from Aleppo and Beirut. Although the £300 intended to aid the Armenians in building their new houses seems never to have arrived, loans were made for building purposes to the most unfortunate Armenians, as "it was found that, for the most part, the population were in a very poor state due to the hardships they had suffered during recent years." As in the new quarters of Aleppo and Beirut, the new houses were a great improvement on the ramshackle huts. (Plate 9.1) By the end of 1931 too water was supplied by three public-fountains and most of the houses were supplied by the Damascus Electricity Company. There were no schools and churches in the quarter, the inhabitants using the nearby schools and church in the old town (as did the inhabitants of Achrafieh in Beirut). Basic services were however assured by the establishment of shops within the quarter, twenty being listed in 1930.
Conclusion

To conclude, the situation of the refugees at Damascus was fundamentally similar to that at Aleppo and Beirut, though at Damascus most of the camps were actually vacated during the troubles of 1925. A new quarter subsequently established by the Nansen Office was created in response to the eviction of Armenians remaining in the camps who had become de facto squatters as at Aleppo. Otherwise, in the establishment of Hatcher’s camp, there is evidence of the same inter-Armenian assistance already witnessed in Aleppo and Beirut.

Alexandretta

Alexandretta, which had a substantial indigenous Armenian population, received refugees in 1920 and 1921, but many of these refugees were dispersed elsewhere in 1922, so that, as at Damascus, a large section of the camps disappeared soon after their establishment.

Initial Settlement and Living Conditions

It is apparent that in 1920, there was official participation in the installation of the Armenians, a special camp being created for the refugees. Among these refugees were those from Hkbes, in Cilicia, whose Lazarist priest, Vincent Paskes, has left an account of their settlement. They were initially made to camp outside the town near a large spring, the Military Governor of the town, Colonel Mensier, putting large military tents at their disposal. Later, the local authorities asked that the refugees leave this location for reasons of hygiene,
and they were moved to a new camp to the east of the railway station where a dozen huts, 30 metres long, were provided for them. When, in 1921, the number of refugees in Alexandretta increased dramatically, the newcomers seem to have practically all settled in camps surrounding the town. Unlike at Beirut and Aleppo (where the evidence is still weak), at Alexandretta there are no references to refugees living inside the town immediately after their arrival.

The conditions under which the Armenians at Alexandretta were expected to live were appalling, even after the French-encouraged dispersal of refugees elsewhere. (Plate 9.2) The refugee camps had, in fact "the disadvantage of being situated on a malarial swamp," a state of affairs which applied as much to the camp constructed in 1920 as to the others established later. While the French had provided tents and then huts for the arrivals of 1920, it appears that they provided virtually nothing for the arrivals of 1921. This was despite the appeals of Rev. W. Lytle of the Irish Mission at Alexandretta, of the British Consul, petitioned by Annie Davies of the "Friends of Armenia," of the Near East Relief, and also apparently despite the instructions of the High Commissioner. Unable to find accommodation in the town, the Armenians camped in the surrounding marshes, in the middle of the winter rains. Shelter was improvised, with tents sometimes made out of blankets. The "Friends of Armenia" provided wooden boards to put under mattresses to keep them dry, but some refugees lacked even a mattress. Pastor Manoogian describes the scene in April, 1922:
"...the Armenian refugees...had to pitch tents and build petty huts in the muddy, swampy plain around. ...Any small pieces of boards have been used to build the skeleton of these huts. Some with reeds or just anything to give some support. Any large or small piece of canvas, or common waterproof, or dirty sack or rusty tins have been good enough to cover parts of the huts. Most of the refugees have covered the roof as well as the side walls with reeds, or tied hay together or patched with canvas. You have to jump across or walk around a pool of green water in order to go from one tent to the other. To make passage from one hut to the other, several stones or boards or rusty tin water bottles of the soldiers have been placed to step on. If you stoop low enough to enter one of the huts you may see several boards used as a floor to save the bedding from the mud. Even now the ground of the tents is so near water that if you dig only one-third or two-thirds of a yard you reach it."

Such conditions appear to have persisted among the refugees in the camps as long as they were built on the marshes. There were still Armenians lodged in miserable reed-huts in February, 1929, while in 1930 there were at Alexandretta "wretched housing conditions relieved by space and air lacking in other camps." As late as 1932, the majority of the refugees at Alexandretta were still installed in these camps.

"L'état sanitaire est bon," reported M. De Caix in April, 1922. This extraordinary statement is contradicted by virtually every report on conditions in Alexandretta, which are unanimous in condemning conditions there as the most unhygienic in any of the urban camps in Syria. Camped on the marshy ground surrounding the town, the refugees not only suffered from fever and rheumatism, but were extremely susceptible to malaria, for which the marshes provided an ideal breeding ground. This malaria was of a particularly virulent kind which sometimes proved fatal, especially to children.
Births were in any case reduced by the debilitating effect of malaria on the women. Some medical care was provided in the early days by the Armenian Red Cross, and the Friends of Armenia. The camp appears to have remained in this unhealthy state at least until 1930.  

Information is lacking on the community structure of the camps, so it is not possible to evaluate the social constraints involved. The economic constraints confining the Armenians to the camps appear to have been considerable. Unlike at Beirut, Damascus and Aleppo there seems to have been virtually no available accommodation within the town of Alexandretta which the Armenians could afford. Confined therefore almost all to the camps, they could anticipate little improvement in their condition. Alexandretta town seems to have been quite unable to provide work for the thousands of refugees who descended on it, and this was one reason for the subsequent dispersal of refugees from the town. Even after this, however, out of 1350 refugee families in Alexandretta in 1927, 1,600 were described as destitute and 650 in need of aid.

Resettlement

There is no reference found to any rent paid by the Armenians for their land at Alexandretta, but they appear to have been at least partly settled on private land, unoccupied and marshy. Problems arose when this land was scheduled for reclamation. In December 1926, Duguet noted the precarious situation of the refugees. One part of them was situated on the large marsh to the east of the town. Reclamation work was due to begin in Spring 1927, on this marsh, which was in
private ownership. By contrast, the south-west marsh, where other refugees were camped, was not yet under regular ownership, and this would fall to whoever should carry out the reclamation. When Major Johnson, of the Nansen Office, visited Alexandretta on his tour of inspection he considered an arrangement offered by the French Delegate to the Sanjak, M. Durieux, whereby the Office and the government would each contribute 50% to the cost of this reclamation, but no prompt action was taken. Thus, by May, 1927, when the works of reclamation were under way, the situation, as elsewhere, had become one of crisis. The reclamation of the marshes was obliging the refugees either to move their homes or to pay rent to the owners of the reclaimed land. This was creating endless difficulties and discussions which were embittering relations between the locals and the refugees. Burnier therefore submitted proposals for an urban quarter at Alexandretta, which had clearly been drawn up in close co-operation with the French authorities. The quarter would be constructed on the site of the former military camp known as the "Camp des Marais," which had already been reclaimed. The land, of 75,000 square metres, would be made available by the town for the price of 375,000 francs, representing the cost of reclamation. But this plan could not be approved by Geneva, given that Alexandretta lay within "une zone dont la situation n'est pas absolument nette au point de vue politique," despite the fact that such objections were not only rejected by Burnier, but also by Dugast, on behalf of the Mandatory Power. The question appears then to have been dropped until fresh proposals were presented by Burnier in May, 1928, which
were again given lowest priority by Geneva. Notwithstanding this decision, however, this time Burnier went ahead and made the purchase, without the prior approval of Geneva. Again, this was as a response to a crisis created by the process of urban improvement. In accordance with its policy of improving the salubrity of the town, the Municipality was planning to dam the stream which crossed it. This operation would necessitate the expulsion of 200 families whose huts were constructed on the banks of the stream, and who would then only be able to settle in the middle of the marshes. Burnier's emergency action was eventually approved by the Geneva committee. The land acquired was on the periphery of the town and bordering the roads from Aleppo and Arsouz. This was the only settlement work in Alexandretta undertaken by the Office, for in 1931 it was decided that urban settlement would henceforth concern only Beirut and Alexandretta, the refugees of Alexandretta "se trouvant actuellement dans des conditions relativement favorables." 51

The refugees were slow to take possession of their plots in the Nansen Office quarter, claiming that they were too poor to build new houses with their own resources, and collection of rent was initially difficult. This reluctance was overcome by August, 1930 but "the source of this diffidence was never satisfactorily traced." 52 It may possibly have been political. Table 9.3 shows the progress of the settlement work at Alexandretta. Although the new quarter appears to have been flooded during the winter rains of 1928, living conditions were improved, with more substantial dwellings replacing the former huts. Information on amenities is lacking, though the quarter had its own school and church by 1930. A number of
Table 9.3

**Progress of the Settlement Work in the Nansen Office Quarter of Alexandretta**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>1928</th>
<th>1930</th>
<th>1932</th>
<th>1936</th>
<th>1937</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td><strong>Future owners</strong></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Families</td>
<td>?</td>
<td>?</td>
<td>57</td>
<td>?</td>
<td>?</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Sub tenants</strong></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Families</td>
<td>?</td>
<td>?</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>?</td>
<td>?</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Total</strong></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Families</td>
<td>?</td>
<td>63</td>
<td>59</td>
<td>64</td>
<td>?</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Persons</td>
<td>137</td>
<td>?</td>
<td>211</td>
<td>277</td>
<td>329</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>


Shops were also established in the quarter, but the economic situation of the Armenians did not improve overnight. In mid-1938, out of the 64 heads of families in the quarter, 20 were unemployed, although by that time the economic situation in the Sanjak had, of course, been disturbed by political uncertainty. The parallel history of the remaining camp is rather obscure. There were certainly huts still standing in 1938, but there is some evidence of participation by the authorities in reclamation and even settlement work. But all was, in any case, to no avail. With the cession of the Sanjak to Turkey, its Armenian population, including that of Alexandretta town, fled southwards to constitute a new refugee problem elsewhere, among them the inhabitants of the Nansen Office quarter.
Conclusion

The refugees to Alexandretta had, it appears, initially settled virtually entirely in camps outside the town, there being no references to initial settlement inside the town. It seems that, as the influx of Armenians to Alexandretta was greater in proportion to the number of inhabitants in the town than at Beirut, Aleppo or Damascus, there was no accommodation available to the refugees within Alexandretta itself equivalent to that offered at the other three centres. Conditions in the camps were the worst encountered in any of the urban refugees camps in Syria and Lebanon, due to their situation on malarial, marshy land. These conditions persisted even after the French dispersed some refugees from Alexandretta in 1922. A new quarter was founded for the Armenians by the Nansen Office in 1928 in order to accommodate families threatened with expulsion by Municipal drainage operations, while other Armenians shifted their homes as the progressive reclamation of the marshes obliged them either to move or to pay rent to the owners of the reclaimed land. Thus, Alexandretta demonstrates once again the involuntary movement of the Armenians caused by Municipal improvement (as at Beirut) and the demands of the landowners (as at Aleppo and Damascus). The flight of the Armenians from Alexandretta upon the cession of the Sanjak ultimately rendered useless the work there of the Nansen Office.

Urban Settlement: Conclusions

The refugees who settled at Aleppo, Beirut, Damascus and Alexandretta seem to have been distributed initially almost evenly between town and "camp", though precise figures are
lacking. The exception would appear to have been Alexandretta where it seems that, the influx being greater in proportion to the number of inhabitants than in other centres, there was no comparable accommodation available in the town itself, so that virtually all the refugees were obliged to settle in camps. Information is very limited on settlement within the towns. The Armenians found accommodation there in rented khans or houses or were housed by their employers. There may have been a tendency to occupy run-down accommodation in the city-centre. Much more information is available on those who settled in the camps which provided the most spectacular manifestation of the Armenian presence and attracted most attention. Here a remarkable feature of their social structure was the existence of spatially distinct communities based on town or region of origin which were most noticeable in the camps of Aleppo, but also of Beirut. Living conditions in the camps were unsatisfactory, even dangerous, reaching their worst expression on the malarial marshes of Alexandretta. While information on the formation of the camps is acutely lacking, settlement in these conditions appears to have resulted from the absence of available accommodation in the town at rents which the Armenians (or their sponsors) could afford. Subsequently the refugees appear to have been confined to the camps by both economic and social constraints. In general the refugees in the camps appear to have formed the poorer part of the refugee population, that is those unable (or possibly unwilling) to rent accommodation in the town and who enjoyed the freedom from rent and tax which their situation in the camps as de facto squatters initially gave them. Their attachment to the camps was reinforced by their community reconstitution and by
the provision of basic services in the camps, that is the beginnings of rudimentary economic systems, providing even more social cohesion and vested interests in inertia.

During the inter-war period, the great bulk of the refugee population in the camps of Aleppo and Beirut was transferred from the camps to new quarters on the outskirts of the towns, while new quarters were established also in Damascus and Alexandretta. The transfers resulted from the desire of the landowners to evict from their property those refugees unable to pay rent, and from municipal improvement schemes. Only the initial transfers in Beirut could be regarded as part of a well co-ordinated demolition and resettlement scheme. Elsewhere the transfers often involved unnecessary hardship. Apart from the participation of the Nansen Office, one notable feature of the transfer process was inter-Armenian aid, especially the participation of Compatriotic Unions. One result of this was that the community reconstitution apparent in the camps was re-established in the new quarters, receiving its clearest expression in Beirut. The land acquired for re-housing the Armenians was required to be inexpensive, and consequently at Aleppo and Beirut was often far removed from the town centre. Living conditions were improved, although, particularly in Aleppo, some of the new quarters remained deprived of urban amenities. In the transfer of the quarters the economic status of the refugees was not transformed, and the deprivation they had previously experienced in terms of the squalid living conditions of the camps, was now expressed in terms of distance from the town centre and lack of urban amenities.
Conclusions

This final section brings together the conclusions of the individual chapters of the thesis to produce a model of the processes involved in Armenian settlement. This model forms the basis for a discussion of the ideas put forward in the Introduction concerning the significance of economic, social and political constraints on settlement and the extent of their interdependence. The principal weaknesses of the study are then discussed and proposals made as to how it might be improved or extended. Finally, the applicability of the conclusions of the study to other cases is considered, and suggestions are made regarding the approach to research in the general field of minority settlement in the Middle East.

First, however, it is necessary to recapitulate on the approach adopted to the study. The thesis has investigated the settlement of Armenian refugees in Syria and Lebanon between 1915 and 1939. It was conceived not so much as a refugee study, but as a study of the processes of minority settlement in the Middle East, for while the importance of the ethnic mosaic pattern in the area has long been recognised, there have been few studies of the processes involved in the evolution of this pattern. A study of the processes of Armenian settlement would enable an assessment of the relative significance of ethnicity, economic status and political manipulation in determining the settlement pattern as well as test the writer’s assumption of the interdependence of these constraints. It was judged impracticable to use field-survey techniques in the study and it was necessary to rely essentially on the documentary sources, which are numerous.
but in some cases of doubtful reliability. The approach adopted was part deductive - part inductive, involving the investigation of the sources for respectively economic, social and political constraints on the settlement process. In this investigation the Armenians were treated as a homogeneous unit although internal differences in settlement preferences were identified when revealed in the documents. While for purposes of analysis the principal constraints on settlement were investigated separately, and regional and urban patterns were differentiated, the object of the study was not to test one by one the significance of the various constraints discussed, but to construct an overall picture of the processes in operation against which their significance could ultimately be tested. It is this overall picture which will now be constructed.

Armenian refugees arrived in Syria and Lebanon in 1920, 1921, 1922-24 and 1929. They came principally to the coastal towns, especially Beirut, and to Alexandretta and Aleppo, the first two large towns on the routes from the north. Some of the 1929 arrivals came, however, directly to the growing settlements of North-East Syria. Some of the 1921 arrivals were dispersed to the interior by the French High Commission, in order to relieve congestion in the arrival points, and to spread them according to the economic absorptive capacity of the country. For similar economic reasons, and possibly also to avoid offending Turkish susceptibilities, the French authorities dispersed more refugees from Alexandretta in 1922, and again dispersed some of the 1923-24 arrivals from Aleppo to Beirut and Damascus. This government-inspired dispersal
was largely responsible for such movement of refugees as
did take place from their arrival points during the period.

The pattern thus established, with its strong relationship
to arrival points, its overwhelming concentration of Armenians
in urban rather than rural settlements, and in particular
their concentration in the principal centres of Aleppo,
Beirut, Damascus and Alexandretta, persisted to a large
extent for the rest of the study-period. This concentration
and lack of dispersal seems to have been a function of both
economic status and ethnicity. The Armenians had arrived
in an economy which simply was not able to support them in
the cities where employment in industry was actually decreasing.
They were obliged there to accept employment, if available,
in jobs of low economic status, where they were highly
vulnerable to economic crises, and they seem to have been
unable to afford the expense of movement and reinstallation
on the land where, given the capital, the real opportunities
lay. Within these cities, as an economically weak population
they were obliged to find accommodation where they could.
Inside the towns they found accommodation in rented khana and
houses. Those unable or unwilling to do this settled in
camps outside the towns which developed into shanty-towns
where living conditions were unsatisfactory and even dangerous.
The Armenians who thus settled in the "camps" appear to have
formed the poorer part of the refugee population, that is
those unable to rent accommodation in the town and who enjoyed
the freedom from rent and tax which their situation in the
"camps" as de facto squatters initially gave them.

Concentration was maintained by the Armenians'
reluctance to disperse in small groups, due to their preoccupation with security and their desire to preserve their culture and community structure, which was maintained in the "camps" by the reconstitution of communities of origin. The provision of basic services in the "camps", that is the beginnings of a rudimentary economic system, provided even more social cohesion and vested interests in inertia. The Armenians' need for security was increased by local hostility. The Armenians had moved from one situation of competing nationalisms in the Ottoman Empire to a country where they once again found themselves embroiled in a triangular relationship between French, Arabs and Armenians, all with conflicting national aspirations. In these circumstances, the Arab reaction to the Armenians was cool, sometimes openly hostile, an attitude based on ethnic, political and economic grounds which was particularly intense when the Armenians became identified with French interests. The relationship between Arabs and Armenians was consequently uneasy, although not in general marked by violence. The most bitter clashes, which occurred at Damascus and encouraged a mass movement of Armenians from that city to Beirut, were atypical in nature and effect. Generally, local hostility was more subtle in its influence on Armenian settlement. By increasing the Armenians' need to concentrate for security it helped to stress their ethnic separateness, increase their impact on local economies and increase their dependence on French protection, all of which increased local hostility still further so that, other things being equal, the process of concentration became self-perpetuating. French attempts to use the Armenians politically increased Arab fears and exacerbated Arab-Armenian hostility,
thus acting indirectly as a catalyst to the process of concentration and segregation.

One solution to the problem of overconcentration in urban "camps" was emigration, and a number of Armenians took this course. In addition, various schemes were suggested to settle the Armenians on the land, but these met with little success. Initial proposals of the Mandatory power, envisaging the small-scale dispersal of the Armenians, were frustrated by the Armenians' reluctance to disperse. Karen Jeppe had more success with small-scale settlement, but to solve the problem plans were required on a scale which would require governmental action, and were persistently advocated by the philanthropic societies. The Mandatory Power was initially unwilling to commit finance to large-scale agricultural colonisation, but later accepted the co-operation of the League in a settlement scheme, the critical factor being probably the provision of finance by the League. Once begun, however, the scheme, which envisaged large-scale agricultural settlement, was increasingly retarded and finally extinguished by the adoption of alternative schemes of urban resettlement, largely dictated by the development of housing crises in the principal centres of Armenian concentration. The scheme had anyway been hindered by lack of finance. The High Commission had not the necessary financial resources to commit to the scheme, while the local states had not the political will to commit them, even if available. Agricultural colonisation was expensive, and its abandonment in favour of urban resettlement came before a full programme could be implemented. The scheme had been
partly influenced by considerations of French policy, but any ambitious schemes of population transfer were quickly ruled out in order not to offend Arab susceptibilities and ultimately, of course, by the switch to urban resettlement. Those settlements which did go ahead were located according to potential economic viability, and the Armenians' desire for security. Thus the principal grouping of settlements was in the Sanjak of Alexandretta, a coastal region which was also an area of historic Armenian settlement. These villages were never an economic success, although ultimately this proved immaterial as the villagers in the Sanjak were obliged to flee with the cession of the region to Turkey.

Thus the problem of overconcentration in the main cities continued, and indeed seems to have increased throughout the period. In these circumstances the Armenians in the "camps" came under increasing pressure to move, either from the landowners, who desired to evict from their property those refugees unable to pay rent, or from municipal improvement schemes. There was also a fear on the part of the Mandatory authorities that the squalid conditions under which the Armenians were living in the camps would encourage the growth of Communism. Thus the great bulk of the refugee population in the "camps" of Aleppo and Beirut was transferred from the "camps" to new quarters on the outskirts of the towns, while new quarters were established also in Damascus and Alexandretta. Only the initial transfers in Beirut could be regarded as a well co-ordinated demolition and resettlement scheme. Elsewhere, despite the participation of the Hansen Office, the transfers often involved unnecessary hardship. The land for re-housing the Armenians
had to be inexpensive and consequently at Aleppo and Beirut was often far removed from the town centre. Living conditions were improved although, particularly in Aleppo, some of the new quarters remained deprived of urban amenities. In the transfer of the quarters the economic status of the refugees was not transformed, for there was no real economic progress made in the country to permit this. The transfer was no real solution to the problem, and the deprivation which the Armenians had previously experienced in terms of the equal living conditions of the "camps" was now expressed in terms of distance from the town centre and lack of urban amenities. One encouraging feature of the transfer process, however, was inter-Armenian aid, notably the participation of Compatriotic Unions, which resulted in the community reconstitution apparent in the "camps" being re-established in the new quarters, a tendency which received its clearest expression in Beirut. While the transfer process radically altered the position of the Armenians in the cities, its effect on the regional distribution was, of course, to perpetuate the status quo, that is to maintain the overwhelming concentration of the Armenians in the principal cities.

What light does this model of the settlement process shed on the hypotheses put forward in the Introduction regarding the significance of economic status, ethnicity, and political manipulation in determining settlement patterns, and their mutual interdependence? It is evident that severe economic constraints were operating to maintain ethnic concentration by inhibiting dispersal from the cities, while
within the cities poverty relegated many of the Armenians to the "camps" from which they were subsequently unable to resist their expulsion and resettlement. Indeed it is appropriate to compare the situation of the Armenians in the "camps" not with the situation of an ethnic group like, say, the Jews of Damascus, but with the inhabitants of the bidonvilles of French North Africa who ironically were also attracting attention for the first time from French scholars in the 1930's.\(^1\) In almost every respect, the situation of the Armenians in the "camps" was a classic bidonville situation, with the same problems of insecure or unregulated tenure, dismal living conditions and forced resettlement which have been observed in the Middle East and elsewhere in so many situations.\(^2\) One may carry the comparison further in noting that the concentration of the Armenians in the cities made their migration to Syria and Lebanon, for a substantial but indeterminate number, like that of the inhabitants of the North African bidonvilles, a rural-urban migration. The migration appears in fact to have acted as an agent for social change, accelerating and condensing into a few years processes of urbanisation which would otherwise have taken much longer to accomplish. Apart from their larger urban component before migrating, only in the circumstances and manner of their arrival did the Armenians differ fundamentally from the inhabitants of the bidonvilles. Viewed in this light the settlement experience of the Armenians was essentially a function of their low economic status within an economy whose capacity to support its members was weak even without their presence. This is, of course, what one would reasonably expect from an impoverished
refugee population. Whenever their "camps" became shanty-towns and part of the urban scene, whenever they ceased to be "refugees" and came to be regarded and regard themselves as Syrian or Lebanese Armenians, are matters of individual perception and political definition. The point is that, whatever the uniqueness of their titular status as "Armenians" or "refugees", from the moment of their arrival in Syria and Lebanon the Armenians were inextricably linked to, and part of, the economic system of the receiving states, and subject to the constraints imposed by that system.

The indigenous population of equivalent economic status was of course subject to the same constraints. Thus to commit finance to a scheme to aid the Armenians was to accord them, in comparison with the more impoverished members of the indigenous population, preferential status. Seen in this light one may view with more understanding the reluctance of the local population to allocate financial support to Armenian settlement. Indeed, this raises an important humanitarian question in cases of refugee relief. Should one endeavour to raise the level of the refugee population to that which it formerly enjoyed, possibly privileged in comparison with the mean level of the receiving population? Or should one aim for a lowest common denominator, assuring subsistence, but ensuring a harsh struggle for economic well-being? Or should one give any assistance at all? After all, there is something at worst hypocritical, at best inconsistent and irrational, in the selective compassion shown in refugee relief, when thousands may die anonymously and uncared for from the malnutrition perpetuated by the
normal operation of the world's economic system.

If economic constraints acted powerfully to inhibit dispersal and maintain concentration, they were, of course, not alone in this. As is apparent from the model presented, social constraints were operating in the same direction. Both were restrictive. But while economic constraints were wholly negative in character, social constraints exercised a more positive function. Thus, in terms of continuity of life-style and inter-aid the reconstitution of old communities, a characteristic of the "camps" which was maintained and solidified in the new quarters, was beneficial to the members concerned. This positive force for social cohesion should be contrasted with another force, that of insecurity, which also encouraged concentration. While in the Compatriotic Unions original regional or urban identity divided one Armenian from another, insecurity was a property common to all Armenians irrespective of origin. Just as past persecution had been directed at all Armenians collectively, just as the hostility of the local population was not directed specifically at the community from Marash or Gaziantep, but at all Armenians, so insecurity was felt by all Armenians collectively. There were in the clustering of the Armenians therefore two dimensions; the fear felt by all Armenians, and the inter-aid and continuity offered by the Compatriotic Unions. Without detailed sociological research it is not possible to assess the extent to which these dimensions were interdependent, but it does seem likely that the insecurity felt by the Armenians collectively would have helped to maintain the regional sub-groups, or indeed that the principal vehicle by which the Armenians sought the security they all
required was the regionally-exclusive Compatroitic Union.
The relationship between allegiance to ethnic group and sub-
group is a fascinating question worthy of more research.

The existence of community groupings was, one might add,
not an exclusive characteristic of the Armenians, but has been
observed in many other bidonville situations. Once again
the relationship between the Armenian settlement and the
"normal" processes of settlement of rural-urban migrants under
rapid urbanisation is emphasised. In the bidonville
situation "ethnic" sub-groups have been recognised as
transient features by some writers, characteristic of "rural"
life and disappearing with increasing urbanisation.3 Adopting
this viewpoint, the persistence of the Armenians' community
groupings after the resettlement might be regarded perhaps
as an indicator of the additional cohesion provided by their
status as Armenians. An alternative view, however, and that
preferred by the writer, would see these sub-groups not as
transient features due to disappear with the last vestiges
of "rural" life, but as a vital element in the process of
migrant adjustment, contributing in time to a new urban
synthesis, in which ethnic sub-groups persevere as long as
they have this useful "urban" role to play.4 This
contradiction in views, of course, contains within it the
very basic question of how much the social organisation of
the immigrant ethnic group is conditioned independently by
the desires of its members, how much by the constraints
imposed by the society into which it moves. In fact, the
question is redundant when ethnic social organisation is
seen as the product of the interaction between the two, i.e.
the aspirations of the minority group and the demands of the
social environment. In the Armenian case, they imported their own insecurity, nationalism, culture and community structure, but within the host society they encountered both hostility and the problems of adjusting to a new life. Their concentration and refusal to disperse was partly a response to the interaction of these social forces.

Political manipulation, which the writer had postulated as potentially vital in a situation of such conflicting national aspirations, was less significant, being limited by the necessity for the French authorities to pay due regard to both Arab susceptibilities and financial considerations. The possibility of population juggling was eventually ruled out by the abandonment of the plans for agricultural resettlement and by the adoption of alternative schemes of urban resettlement. These schemes however at least met French concern about the spread of Communism amongst the Armenians in the squalid conditions of the camps, considerations which seem to have been partly responsible for their adoption.

While economic constraints and ethnicity therefore played the dominant role in determining the Armenians' settlement pattern, it is evident that these constraints were mutually interdependent. Both economic and social constraints, by acting in the same direction to inhibit dispersal and reinforce concentration, were mutually reinforcing. Thus, increasing concentration helped to foster Arab hostility to the Armenians not only as a compact ethnic group, but also because being concentrated, the Armenians had that much greater effect on the local economy. As already observed
Arab hostility perpetuated Armenian insecurity and consequent concentration. Similarly, increasing concentration perpetuated the imbalance between the number of Armenians and number of economic opportunities, and hence the operation of economic constraints. Ultimately it was this situation which led to the demolition of the "camps" and the transfer of the Armenians to new quarters, a process which not only solidified the social structure and concentration which already existed, but also diverted funds from proposed plans of dispersal. In brief, while both economic and social constraints acted in favour of concentration rather than dispersal, concentration itself reinforced both constraints. Similar interdependence extended also to political action which as observed was severely curtailed by both economic and social constraints. Where attempted its effect was in general to exacerbate Arab-Armenian hostility (i.e. to reinforce social constraints) and thus to increase the desire for concentration and segregation. Otherwise social and economic constraints seem to have partly dictated political action, for it was partly fear of the growth of communism in the squalid conditions of the "camps" which prompted the French to switch their settlement policy from agricultural to urban settlement. Thus in all respects the social, economic and political constraints on settlement were interdependent, and their principal effect was to maintain a self-perpetuating process of concentration and segregation.

The acknowledgement of this interdependence is related to a way of conceptualising the settlement process in which the Armenians are seen in their settlement as accommodating to the constraints and selective opportunities offered by the
socio-economic environment into which they moved, and of which they formed a part. It is not intended here to ignore the Armenians' decision-making process. It is acknowledged that the Armenians, where they acted independently, acted in accordance with their own perceptions of the socio-economic environment. But it is argued, through a study based where possible on an investigation of the decision-making process, that the mass behaviour of the Armenians was essentially dominated by certain constraints and opportunities generated by the interaction of all members of society as a whole. It is clear that the initial settlement pattern of the Armenians, being largely related to migration paths, was essentially unrelated to the opportunities and constraints presented by the socio-economic environment. The subsequent internal migration history of the Armenians may be therefore viewed as an attempt to achieve the most harmonious balance between the distribution of the Armenians and these constraints. This balance was not necessarily harmonious, it must be stressed, in terms of ethnic relations and conflict minimisation. Since the aspirations of the different decision-makers, French, Arab and Armenian, were to a certain extent mutually conflicting, the balance achieved in response to their interaction might in fact satisfy few aspirations, and might even generate conflict itself.

The achievement of an optimal balance between the distribution of the Armenians and environmental constraints was not, in fact, a realisable goal, for each time the
Armenians moved location they modified the environment of which they formed a part, generating new attitudes and aspirations which had to be accommodated by more change. Change indeed was essential to the whole system. Thus, while the system might be always moving towards an optimal balance, this situation could never be attained. In the Armenian case, this dynamism was represented by a self-perpetuating movement towards increasing concentration as time went on. While never static, therefore, the distribution of the Armenians had achieved an element of stability in that it was reinforcing itself. This did not mean that the ultimate situation was one of 100% concentration and segregation, however, for the degree of concentration might generate new attitudes and constraints before this stage were reached.

These, then, are our conclusions concerning the processes of Armenian settlement in Syria and Lebanon. How might they be refined? The major weaknesses of the study have already been acknowledged in the Introduction; the inability to use field-survey techniques, the inability to use Armenian sources, and other sources lost or still closed, and the weaknesses of the documents consulted in accurately reflecting the decision-making process. It is clear that some, if not all, of these weaknesses could be eliminated by future students working in different circumstances. The major weakness of the study conceptually, however, seems to be the assumption that the Armenians behaved as a homogeneous unit. The danger of this assumption was acknowledged in the Introduction, and indeed, where possible, internal variations in settlement behaviour have been
observed, based on politics, on religious divisions, or on regional sub-groups (Compatriotic Unions). However, systematic investigation of sub-group behaviour would only have been possible through the use of field-survey techniques, ruled out as impracticable. This is particularly unfortunate in the case of socio-economic class groups. While the conclusion that the Armenians were essentially a population of low economic status seems justified it must be acknowledged that the data available are heavily biased towards the Armenians in the "camps" or shanty-towns, subsequently resettled in the new quarters. Thus the effect of economic constraints on Armenian settlement may have been overestimated. The Armenians clearly varied in status, as labourers, skilled artisans, or even doctors and dentists, for example, and it is unfortunate that it has not been possible to investigate the differential settlement preferences of these groups, leaving unanswered the questions raised in the Introduction regarding the assumed contemporary tendency for segregation to break down with increasing economic status. It would also have been desirable to investigate the role of the family in settlement. Little has been revealed beyond observations about the process of physical family reconstitution. The investigation of all these facets of Armenian behaviour would entail not only the use of field-survey techniques, but also a sharpening of focus, so that it is suggested that the best follow-up to the present thesis would be a study of the processes of settlement in one city (either Aleppo or Beirut) paying particular attention to the internal variations in settlement behaviour within the Armenian community, through the use of field-survey techniques.
With regard to minority settlement in the Middle East as a whole, it is really too early to generalise on the applicability of the processes identified. The relationship identified between ethnicity and economic status may occur in other Middle Eastern refugee situations, but this remains to be demonstrated. The study certainly shows the continued vitality of ethnicity as a social force in the Middle East in the early twentieth century. Equally it shows that the settlement pattern of a minority group must also be related to the situation of the members of that group within its regional economy. What is most important is that the study illustrates the benefits of focusing on process, and shows how this may be investigated in terms of the interaction of the minority group and the socio-economic environment into which it moved. More specifically certain useful areas for research might be identified.

First and foremost, studies of minority settlement patterns should focus, through the study of process, on the temporal development of those patterns. They should investigate at what time, by what route, and in what circumstances, the minority group in question arrived in the study-area, and the processes involved in its subsequent dispersal from its arrival points. They might consider if an existing pattern is long-established or not. If so they might ask if the processes which sustain it are the same as those which created it, or whether the same pattern remains, but sustained by new processes. Studies of contemporary processes should reveal the direction in which the settlement pattern is moving; whether it is in process of complete transformation or if it is stable and self-perpetuating. If
it is stable, they should ask if stability is likely if
current processes continue, by investigating what counter-
processes current processes will generate in the future. It
seems doubtful that the processes identified will be unique
to the Middle East, but cross-cultural comparisons are
essential to verify this assertion.

In investigating process, studies should carefully
define the exact basis of ethnicity in question, be it
confessional group, tribe, township or region of origin or
extended family. They should identify, where they exist,
ethnic units functioning at different levels and establish
how these are inter-related. The relationship between
socio-economic class, ethnicity and segregation should be
investigated and how this changes with progressive improvements
in economic status. Studies should consider the
repercussions on settlement of the process of assimilation
or rejection, or of the emergence of a specifically local
(possibly national) minority-group identity, e.g. Lebanese
Armenian as opposed to Lebanese Maronite or Soviet Armenian.

Studies might also consider the relationship between
ethnic concentration, segregation and conflict. They might
investigate which settlement situations are likely to
generate conflict, which to preserve peace. They might
ask whether segregation is harmful or beneficial, whether it
is a response to conflict or a cause of conflict, or if the
same degree of segregation could have the opposite effect in
this respect. If a self-perpetuating situation of ethnic
concentration and segregation were harmful to community
relations, one might study how it could be reversed, or
indeed, if this has even been done successfully. Finally one might ask if members of minority groups concentrated in large masses really are more secure than small dispersed groups.

The essential need in future studies, which underlies all these questions, however, is the study of process. The priority should be to investigate not past but current trends, and attention might usefully be directed towards the Palestinians and the diverse groups in the Lebanon. These studies of process should pay particular attention to the exact ethnic basis on which decisions are made, and should therefore use where possible field-survey techniques to investigate the decision-making process, and to enable where possible statistical analysis using techniques applied in social geographical studies outside the Middle East. All sorts of practical problems however stand in the way of the researcher trying to study contemporary processes. Thus, while it is dangerous to assume uniformity of process in past and present, studies such as this one, on settlement in the relatively recent past, may yield useful points of comparison and lines for investigation. In this respect attention may be drawn once again to the use in this study of several documentary sources relatively unexploited by geographers (and unavailable to the researcher working in the present); the League of Nations archives and, in particular, the records and archives of the various philanthropic and religious societies involved in aid to the refugees and concerned with the welfare of the Christian minority populations. These sources of course may have useful
applications to other aspects of social and economic geography. Whatever the sources used, however, particular attention should be focussed on investigating the vital relationship between economic status and segregation which so far has attracted some comment but little detailed attention, and on the permanence or otherwise of ethnicity as a social force in the Middle East, a sociological question with considerable import for the geographer, who through his role in the study of the relationship between segregation and ethnic conflict maybe able to make some contribution in this area.
Appendix

Orphanages for Armenians in Syria and Lebanon, 1920-1939

This list is not complete but contains the principal institutions noted in the sources.

Ain Anoub: Annie Davies of the "Friends of Armenia" temporarily established here an orphanage for children she brought from Alexandretta. In 1922 these orphans were moved to Broumana (F.A., 84, 22, 1922, p.2 and 85, 34, 1922, p.1)

Aleppo: An orphanage for girls was run by the Armenian Catholic Sisters of the Immaculate Conception and was functioning in 1928 (Nasilian, Vol 2, 675-6, Mecarian (1928) (1) 161). The Armenian National Union supported a large number of orphans in Aleppo immediately after the migrations with the support of N.E.R. Many of these orphans were removed to Lebanon by N.E.R. However a number of orphans remained at Aleppo, and an orphanage was certainly run by the A.O.B.U. until ca 1930. Other institutions were "Badesparen", a refuge for rescued Armenian girls, and an orphanage run by the Diyarbakir Compatriotic Union. (Baurain, 274, 277, F.A. passim, Arch. A.U.B., FO 374/9098, Ross, Fry & Sibley, 265, Burnier (1926) 101, and personal communication).


Beirut: In 1924 Annie Davies moved her orphans from Broumana to the Jessie Taylor Memorial Orphanage at Beirut, which continued to function throughout the inter-war period (F.A. passim). The Kelewan-Bissanoun Orphanage was maintained by A.O.B.U. (Mecarian (1928)(2) 112, Nasilian, Vol 2, 350, Ross, Fry & Sibley 265, Kraftt-Bonnard). An Armenian Catholic orphanage also functioned at Beirut (Nasilian Vol 2, 673-5, Ross, Fry & Sibley, 270).

Broumana: Annie Davies housed her orphans from Ain Anoub here temporarily before their move to Beirut in 1924. (F.A. passim).

Bacumar: Refugee orphans from Cilicia were temporarily housed in Bacumar by the Armenian Catholic church before being transferred to the Kelewan Orphanage at Beirut (Nasilian, Vol 2, 345-50).

Chemloun: An orphanage was run here by Miss M.W. Pearson from 1920 until at least 1938 (F.A. passim).

Djouni: An orphanage at Djouni was run by the Armenians themselves (Ross, Fry & Sibley, 265, personal communication). The N.E.R. also supported an orphanage there (N.E.R. Report 1922, and personal communication).
Jbail: An N.E.R. orphanage functioned at Jbail until 1926. In 1928 the property was transferred to a Danish Mission which moved there its orphanage from Saida (Mécérian (1925) 440, Ross, Fry & Sibley, 270, Union etc., 93, Pallis, E.A., 109, 42, 1928, p.2, and personal communication).


Nahr Ibrahim: A N.E.R. orphanage for boys functioned here until 1924 when it was obliged to close due to a malaria epidemic. The orphans were taken to Jbail and Antelias (Mécérian (1925) 440, N.E.R. Report 1922, and personal communication).

Qassab: After the closure of N.E.R. establishments in 1929 the Lepalus Deutsche Oriental Mission took charge of about a hundred orphans who were still at Rhazir and transferred them to Qassab in 1930 (Bazantay, 49).

Rhazir: The N.E.R. orphanage was founded in 1919. When the orphanage was closed in 1929-30, the children who remained were moved to Jbail and to Qassab (Mécérian (1925) 440, Ross, Fry & Sibley, 270, Maslian, Vol 2, 350, Burtt Report, Ilamuddin, passim, N.E.R. Reports, personal communication). The Swiss Friends of the Armenians continued work at Rhazir for the blind (Le Levant & E.A., passim, Burtt Report, Pallis, Ilamuddin, 135, Masier, 5-6).

Saida: At Saida were two orphanages, one run by N.E.R. closed by 1927, the other run by the Danish Mission. The latter had been transferred from Zouk. In 1928 it was once more moved to the buildings of the former N.E.R. orphanage at Jbail (Ross, Fry & Sibley, 270, Burtt Report, Union etc., 93, N.E.R. Report 1922, personal communication).

Zouk: The Danish Mission temporarily established an orphanage here before its transfer to Saida.
Abbreviations

A.C.A.S.R. Bulletin: AMERICAN COMMITTEE etc.
Arch. A.C.C. : Archives of the Armenian Catholicosate of Cilicia
Arch. A.N.U. : Archives of the Armenian National Union of Damascus
Arch. A.R.C. : Archives of the American National Red Cross
Arch. A.U.B. : Archives of the American University of Beirut
Arch. Dip. S-L-C : Archives Diplomatiques, Série E, Levant, Syrie - Liban - Cilicie
Arch. L.R.C.S. : Archives of the League of Red Cross Societies

B.C.R. Erzerum (1911) etc : GREAT BRITAIN. HOUSE OF COMMONS. SESSIONAL PAPERS. Report for the year 1911 on the Trade of Erzerum etc. (i.e. British Consular Reports)

Berron Report : Present Situation and Future of the Armenians in Syria. Report and Project to be submitted to the friends of the Armenian People by Dr. Paul Berron (N.A. C1429)


Carle Report : LEAGUE OF NATIONS (1925) Report by Dr. Fridtjof Nansen etc. Appendix I. Report by Mr. Carle on the Present Position of Armenian Refugees in Syria

"Commission" : LEAGUE OF NATIONS. Commission for the Protection of Women and Children in the Near East

Deuxième Bureau : FRANCE, COMMANDEMENT SUPERIEUR etc.

F.A. : The Friend of Armenia

F.O. : GREAT BRITAIN. Foreign Office Records

G.B. Correspondence etc. 1898 : GREAT BRITAIN. HOUSE OF COMMONS. SESSIONAL PAPERS (1898) Correspondence respecting etc.

G.B. Turkey No. 3 etc. : GREAT BRITAIN. HOUSE OF COMMONS. SESSIONAL PAPERS. Turkey No. 3 etc.

Gracey Report : Report by G.F. Gracey on his mission to Syria as overseas representative of the Lord Mayor's (Armenian) Fund and the Save the Children Fund, 1930 (N.A. C1584)
L.o.N. Doc. : League of Nations document. For full reference see under LEAGUE OF NATIONS in the bibliography where League reports are followed by their numbers.

M.A.E. : Ministère des Affaires Etrangères

Min. Guerre : FRANCE, MINISTÈRE DE LA GUERRE etc.

Murray's Handbook : Handbook for travellers etc.

N.A. : Archives of the Nansen Office for Refugees

N.E.R. Report : UNITED STATES SENATE. Report of the Near East Relief etc.

Nouvelles : "La détresse"...etc

O.J.L.F. : LEAGUE OF NATIONS. Official Journal

P.M.C. Minutes : LEAGUE OF NATIONS. Minutes of the Sessions of the Permanent Mandates Commission

"Rapport" : FRANCE. HAUT COMMISSARIAT etc.

S.F. : Archives of the Society of Friends

Weakley : GREAT BRITAIN. BOARD OF TRADE (1911) etc.

W.O. : Great Britain. War Office Records
References

Introduction

1. For a general survey of the refugee problem in the Middle East, see (for the inter-war period) Simpson (1939) Chapters 2 - 4, and 18, and (for the post-war period) Holborn (1975) Pt 4, Ch.31, 804-822.

2. The literature on the Palestinian refugees is enormous. For geographical studies see Blake (1972), Bopst (1968) and Hacker (1960). For geographical studies of the resettlement in Greece of "refugees" involved in the Greek-Turkish population exchange see Kolodny (1974) Vol 1, 201-227, and Fischer (1976). On the settlement of Balkan Turks in Turkey see the studies by Adatepe, Altug, Ari, Eren and Turgay in Integration, Vol 6 (3) (1959), as well as studies by Barkan(949-50),Kostanick (1955) Schechtman (1963) Ch 4, 54-67, Tanoglu (1955), and Tuna (1951-2)


3. "Ethnicity" is a term which has been used freely by academics to embrace allegiances based on tribe, religious sect, nationality, language, region of origin, and "culture". The term is used in the discussion in this broad sense, from which it is clear that within Syria the Armenians would form a distinct "ethnic" minority.


For further discussion of the position of minorities in the Middle East, see Hourani (1952),(1961), Baer (1964) pp 70-118, and Marix (1972). More specifically on the Christians of the Middle East see Rondot (1955) and Betta (1975).
8. See the standard studies of the Middle Eastern city, listed above under note 4.


10. These studies are too numerous to mention here in toto, but those wishing to take a fresh look at the evolution of ethnic "quarters" in Middle Eastern cities could do worse than look at the following studies, some of which have been available for a good number of years; Adam (1974), Ben-Arieh (1975), Benesch (n.d.), Dickmann (1974), Flament (n.d.), Goltein (1971), Vol 2, 289-93, Harrison (1967), Hill (1973), Hirschberg, (1974) 197-98, 204, 370-71, 389-91, Mansur (1972), Marty (1948) (1), (1948) (2), (1949), Sebag (1959), Thoumin (1931), Weisselser (1934)


12. e.g. Lee (1973)


15. Price (1963), Hugo (1975), Peach (1966)


18. Connell (1973)

19. Jones & Xyles (1977) 177

20. e.g. Burnley (1972), Rowland (1972)

21. e.g. Roseman & Knight (1975), Rowley & Tipple (1974)

22. e.g. by Roseman & Knight (1975), Rowley & Tipple (1974), Kearsley & Srivastava (1974)


24. e.g. Morrill (1965), Rose (1970), Mansell & Clark (1970)

25. e.g. Burnley (1972), Macdonald & Macdonald (1964)

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5. Hovannisian, loc. cit.
8. For a description of the Armenian population of Cilicia, see especially Brésol (1911) 334-54
9. See e.g. Min.Guerre (1916) 31-32, 210
10. Atesian (1955) 46
12. Lynch, Vol 2, 427
14. Macler (1911) 106, Guerain (1897) 652-53, 659-60
15. Macler (1911) 106, B.C.R. Erzerum (1901) 7, (1907) 10
16. Macler (1911) 106, B.C.R. Erzerum (1908) 4, (1911) 3,4
19. although there already existed the Armenian Catholic Catholicosate of Cilicia, installed in Lebanon, the first specifically Armenian Catholic Catholics being recognised by the Pope in 1742.
20. See Arypee (1946) on the Armenian Protestants.
24. Chalet, 60, 64
25. Lynch, Vol 2, 153


28. B. Foreign Office (1919) 64, Hodgetts, 121, Swane (1926) 26,64, Allahah, 323

29. Barkley, 35,180, Weakley,69,72. This also seems true of agriculture; see Cuiinet (1890-95) Vol 1, 674, and B.C.R. Erzerum (1909) 5.


31. Carson, 21, 40-41, Macler (1911) 107-08, Cuiinet (1890-95) Vol 3, 357. See also Krikorian (1964)

32. Carson, 34-35, De Contenson (1901) 53

33. Macler (1911) 105-09, Carson, 21, 40-41, Murray's Handbook (1895) 77-78.

34. Fresol, 338


36. Carson,37,Barkley,277, B.C.R. Erzerum (1894) 3


38. Carson, 36-37, Buxton & Buxton, 45-46


42. Weakley, B.C.R. Aleppo (1896) 10, (1897)5, (1899) 11, (1903) 4, (1904) 3-4, (1906) 5-6, Erzserum (1896) 4, (1877) 4, 10, (1893) 16


44. Murray's Handbook (1895) 77-78

45. B.C.R. Erzerum (1908) 4, (1911) 4, (1907) 10, (1909) 8

46. See e.g. Bryce (1896) 463 and Cholet, 84

47. See e.g. Carsou, 34-35, 39-41, and Garnett, 176-79, 185

48. Apart from Cuinet, other sources estimate the Armenian population as follows: 4,000 (Pallie n.d.) 3, 5,000 (De Contenson (1901) 23), 10,500 (Weakley, 40), 15,000 (De Vaumas (1955) 533), 20,000 (Min. Guerre (1916) 205).

49. On the history of the Armenian community at Aleppo, see Sanjian (1965) 46-53

50. The higher estimates are cited by Cuinet (3,784), Min. Guerre (1916) 201 (3-4,000), and Weakley, 39 (3,000); the lower estimates by Jaquot (1931) 313 (1,000), and Fuzantion (110 families; see Table 1.6)

51. Jaquot (1931) 313-14, Weulersee (1934) 50, Brésol (1911), 45-46, 133, 308-09, 356, 374, 376

52. See Sanjian, 56-57

53. See in particular Table 1.6. For the Jebel Novasa, other estimates are about 6,000 inhabitants (G.B. Turkey No. 8 (1896) No. 163) and 1,200 families (Bryce Report, 321); for Nassab, 700 families (Fuzantion in Brésol, 54) about 3,000 persons (G.B. Turkey No. 8 (1896) No. 163) and 6,500 inhabitants (Mashtian (1955) 322); for Beilane, conflicting estimates of 300-400 or 100 Armenian houses (Alishan, 503) and a population of 2,000-5,000, half-Armenian, half-Turkish (Min. Guerre (1916) 206); for Kirik Khane, conflicting estimates of 20-25 Armenian families and 60 Armenian houses (Brésol, 54-55)

55. See Atamian (1964) VI
56. See Sanjian, 57-59, Krikorian, 191-92, and Atamian (1964) V-VI
57. Estimates are as follows; 500 (Weakley, 27) 569 in casa (Table 1.5), 600 (Cuinet), 750 (Pallis, 3)
58. See Sanjian, 61-66
59. Murray's Handbook (1895) 298
60. Sanjian, 59-66, and Varzapetian, cited in Krikorian, 192
61. Sanjian, 55-56
63. See Krikorian
64. B.C.R. Aleppo (1902) 5, (1913) 7, Weakley, 69, 72
65. Sanjian, 52. Baedeker (1912) 377 notes 2 photographers in Aleppo, one of whom was Armenian
66. Baedeker, 280
67. Baedeker, 377
68. Cuinet (1896) 128
69. Verney & Dambmann, 18, Charmant (1896) 31. For reports of tension in these communities, see G.B., Turkey No. 3 (1896) No. 111, Turkey No. 6 (1896) Nos. 182, 234, 356, 430, 438, 453, 500, 504, Turkey No. 2 (1896) Nos. 80, 134, 143, 172, 233, 272, 433, Turkey No. 8 (1896) Nos. 42, 118, 136, 138, 147, 163, Turkey No. 3 (1897) No. 53, and O.B. Correspondence etc., 1898, Nos. 63, 111, 234, 245
70. Sanjian, 280-81, Brézol, passim
71. B.C.R. Aleppo (1909) 5, (1910) 3, Weakley, 10
72. This section is largely based on Carsou, and Kovannisian, 13-38
73. On the conflict of opposing nationalisms, see Chakhmadjian, 99-108, and on the problems of multi-confessional societies in the Middle East see Corn (1971), especially 207-30.
75. See Dyer (1976)

77. For the movement of Armenian deportees into Syria, see Bryce Report, 547-59, Naslian, Vol 1, 332, 409-11, 417, 421, Andonian, passim, Néspage (1917?), passim, Ararat, 1915-18, passim, Kerr (1973) 24-27, Captainian (1919) 95-142

Chapter 2

1. F.O. 382/2032, W.O. 95/4372
2. F.O. 371/3657
3. F.O. 371/4177
5. Kerr, 43-45
6. W.O. 95/4373
9. Archives of the Armenian National Union of Damascus
10. Du Vécou, 49
11. "Rapport" (1922) (1922-23) 17
13. On the French occupation and evacuation of Cilicia, see Mandelstam (1926), Du Vécou, De Remusat (1931), Brémond (1921), Kerr, and Naslian, Vol 2.
14. A more detailed discussion of these figures is contained in the following chapter
15. "Rapport" (1922-3) 18, 19
16. "Rapport" (1922-3) 19, 20
17. "Rapport" (1922-3) 20, (1923-4) 27, Arch.Dip., Turquie, Vols 58, 258
18. In "Rapport" (1922-3) 20, it is stated that, of the 27,308 arrivals up to July, 1923, about two-thirds were Armenians, one-third Greeks, and 1,000 Assyro-Chaldeans. This proportion of Armenians is confirmed by monthly figures of immigrant arrivals in Arch.Dip. Turquie Vol 258 which record 6,472 Armenians out of a total of 9,817 Christian immigrants in the period July, 1923 to April, 1924.


20. Weygand to M.A.E., March 8, 1924 (Arch.Dip., Turquie Vol 258)

21. For the circumstances of this migration, see; Burnier to Johnson, Dec.4 & Dec.22, 1929 (N.A., C1583), and correspondence and reports in F.O. 371/13827. For possible political motives see Memo. by K.O'Moloney (N.A. C1583) and report from Sir G. Clerk, Constantinople, March 6, 1930 (F.O. 371/14567).


24. On arrivals from Anatolia in 1928, see "Rapport" (1928) 69. The Hансен Office assisted the transfer of a number of Armenians from Greece to Syria in 1930 and 1931, but only Armenians with relatives or sponsors in Syria were admissible (N.A., C1586). Pallis notes recent immigrants from the Caucasus who had arrived via Persia, and states that these refugees formed the bulk of the 4,000 refugees in Lebanon said by the Armenian Archbishop of Beirut not yet to have taken Lebanese citizenship. Liepmann (1938), after criticising the figures of Pallis, estimates a total of 4,000-6,000 arrivals after 1931, from Turkey and the Caucasus, but does not give a source for these figures. In 1934, the Hансен Office representative at Beirut noted that the very poor situation and the famine prevalent in Soviet Armenia were provoking a fairly considerable emigration. At his Beirut office alone, 25 families had asked for aid. Most of these refugees were Armenians who had been transported from Greece or Bulgaria to Yerevan. This observation does not confirm a migration of the order of 4,000 and it is perhaps significant that the totals cited by Pallis and Liepmann are not repeated in other sources.


26. F.O. 371/21915

27. Mecérian (1965) 108

29. On the situation when the allies overran Syria, see Reports by Sir Mark Sykes, Dec 2, 1918 (F.O. 371/3405) and by General Clayton, Dec 30, 1918, with minute by T.E. Lawrence (F.O. 371/3657)

30. "Commission" Reports, passim, and N.A. R3017

31. Report by Miss Jeppe, March 14, 1929 (N.A. R3017)

32. See regular reports in F.A.

33. Lelevant, 11e ann., no.7, juillet, 1934, 4

34. Pallis, 4-6, "Rapport" (1925) 44, Arch.Dip. Documents in course of classification

35. References to emigration are too numerous to cite individually, but for official statements see "Rapport" (1924):50, (1926):104-105, 132, (1928):69


38. For outplacing from the Friends of Armenia Girls' Hostel at Aleppo and from Miss K. Freareon's orphanage at Cheilan, see regular reports in F.A.


40. N.A., C1428

41. Duguet (1928):54, Statement by Le Mail to Central Armenian Committee, Aug. 28, 1930 (N.A., C1586)

42. Poulleau (1930):62-63

43. Néérian (1928):1146

44. Liepmann (1938)

45. This estimate is based on a summation of the mortalities noted in the monthly reports on the situation of the Nansen Office settlements in the Sanjak of Alexandretta, contained in N.A., C1429, C1431.

46. Barton (1930): 178

47. Barton, 214

48. Poidebard, 20-21

49. Liepmann (1938)
50. N.A. C1429, C1431
51. N.A. C1428
52. Barton, 267-76
53. France, Ministère du Travail (1923), "Le recensement" etc. Avis Francaise (1924), and Recensement de la Syrie et du Liban (1921-22) établi à la date du 15 juillet, 1923 (Arch.Dip., 8-L. Vol 256). There are inconsistencies between these tables, but the figures presented by the Ministère du Travail and in the Arch.Dip. are identical and have been accepted in preference.

54. See the "Rapports", especially 1930 and 1931.
55. For another discussion of Armenian population totals, see Liepmann (1938)

Chapter 3

2. P.A., 77, July, 1920, pp 1,7,15, Idem, 80, April, 1921, p.5. In January, 1921, there were under N.E.R. care at Beirut 1,025 Armenian orphans, chiefly refugees from Aintab (Arch. A.U.B. Mas MEI) Miss Fresson brought 200 orphans, subsequently settled at Chemlén.
7. The following figures are quoted: 16,500 ("Rapport" (1922-23)), 16,405 and 16,412 (Arch.Dip., 8-L-C Vol 141), 14,535 (Arch.Dip., 8-L-C. Vol 142), 16,151 (Arch.Dip., 8-L-C. Vol 142)
8. See Arch.Dip. 8-L-C. Vols 138-39
9. "Rapport" (1922-23), 19
10. Arch.Dip. 8-L-C. Vols 139, 142
11. Arch.Dip. 8-L-C. Vol 142


19. Arch. Dip. Documents in course of classification


21. This paragraph is based on information in Longrigg (1958) passim

22. In the compilation of Table 3.1q, the totals from the 1926 "Rapport" have been used. In fact, the totals for Lebanon and Alawi Territory appeared also in the "Rapport" (1925). A tabulation error involving the case of Nassif has been corrected.

23. The distribution may, however, be distorted by the presentation of totals for specifically Armenian Protestants for Antioch case only. It is possible that the Protestants recorded in the other cases may have been largely Armenian.

24. In a footnote to the figures for Dec. 31, 1937 (Arch. Dip., Documents in course of classification) it is stated: "ces chiffres, fournis par le Service de l'État Civil ne peuvent pas être considérés comme rigoureusement exacts. En effet, certaines inscriptions ne correspondant pas à la réalité, le Conseiller pour l'Intérier fit faire en 1935, une enquête auprès des officiers locaux de l'État.
Civil, des Chefs religieux, des Moukhtara, etc...., pour savoir à quoi s'en tenir au sujet de certaines inscriptions qui lui semblaient fantaisistes. Notamment les différences suivantes, entre les chiffres de l'état civil pour 1937 et ceux de l'état établi pour 1935, à la suite de la dite enquête, méritent d'être signalées."

(There follows a list of these differences, including:)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Damascus town</th>
<th>Esté 1937</th>
<th>Esté 1935</th>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Arm. Orth.</td>
<td>16,362</td>
<td>5,582</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

25. See statement by Duquet to Armenian subcommittee of Nansen Office, June 17, 1927 (N.A., C1430) Duquet also presents a table in his text giving overall estimates of Armenian refugees in the separate states, which yield a total of 88,200. However, using the population: family ratio of 3.8 it is possible to derive a total based on the individual totals presented on his map i.e. refugee population of Alawi Territory (2,063), Lebanon (23,782) and Syria (3.8 x 13,506) less non-Armenian refugees cited in text (3.8 x 958) and indigenous Armenians shown on map (3.8 x 480) = 71,680, i.e. c. 71,500 Armenian refugees in Syria.

26. Apart from Table 3.39 see also Carle Report (1925)6, & Khansadian (1926)44.

27. It is strange that after noting 5,000 refugees at Damascus in his first table, Burnier should revert to this high estimate.

28. Ross, Fry & Sibley (1929)263-64.

29. Evidence from Arch. A.N.U. suggests that there were, in fact, some deportees from Aleppo itself during the war, or possibly some refugees who sought security further south.


33. See notes 3.11; 3.12.

34. See notes 2.18, 3.15.

35. "Rapport" (1922-23)22, (1923-24)27. See also the reports of Hekimian, loc.cit.

37. "The Near East Relief in Syria" (Arch.A.U.B. Mes MEI)

38. See note 3.17

39. See note 3.20

40. See above on the rescue work

41. Burnier to Johnson, April 10, 1928 (N.A. C1431)

42. According to Jacquot (1931) 582, there were 1,000-1,200 indigenous Armenians in Qenayé, but these were almost all of Latin rite and so would not appear as Armenians on the Register. By contrast, about half the Armenians at Yacoubie were Apostolics (personal interview)


45. Poidebard (1927) 204

46. See report from Consul Hough, Aleppo, May 17, 1928 (F.O. 371/13074)

47. See Ch. 5

48. Despite assertions to the contrary e.g. by Gen.Sarrail (Arch. Dip. E-L, Vol 177) and by "Rapport" (1927).

49. Jalabert (1934) 112

50. See Arch.Las.

51. See also F.A., 89, 4Q, 1925, p. 16

52. Possibly some of this population had settled during the war. For concentration of deportees near Homs & Hama see Kerr, 26-27, Atasat, Vol 3 (1915) 11, Vol 4 (1916) 103, Vol 6 (1918) 219-20


54. Naslié, Vol 9, no. 1, Dec. 1936-Jan. 1937, p. 8, notes 25 Armenian families at Selemiye, most of whom were refugees from Qarantaye and Maraq.

55. Arch. Las.
57. See Ch. 5.
58. "Rapport" (1922-23) 22, St. John Ward to Bicknell, Nov. 29, 1923
(Arch. A.R.C.), P. O. 374/7873, P. O. 374/9098, P. O. 374/10195.
59. See "Rapport" (1925) 76, (1926) 103, Néérian (1961) 153, Ross, Puy & Sibley (1929) 266, Néérian (1928) (1) 147, Duguet (1928) 53,
F.A., 96, 14, 1926, p. 5 and 99, 24, 1926, p. 20. Also P. O. 374/11550
60. From the Armenian bishopric of Damascus, dated Dec. 9, 1930
(Arch. A.C.C.), it notes 30 families at Dera'a, 15 at Scucida and 15 at Qoméitra.
64. "Rapport" (1922-23) 22, F.A., 89, 42, 1923, p. 19., & reports of
Néérian, loc. cit.
65. Bacon to Forster, Nov. 28, 1922 (Arch. A.R.C.), Burnier to
Johnson, Oct. 31, 1926 (M.A. C1429), Kytle to Russell, Feb. 18,
1922 (P. O. 374/7874), Néérian, Vol. 2, 358, and F.A. 131, Feb.,
1935, p. 8
66. Apart from references previously cited see Barton (1930)
passim, B.E.R. Reports & Pallie, 28.
67. Dewdrey (1972) 136

Chapter 4
1. See Herschlag (1964) 249-56, ed. Himadeh (1936) passim, Longrigg,
271-282; Weulersee (1946), Lewis (1955).
2. Longrigg, 271
3. Generally speaking, Armenian names end in -LAN or -YAN. The
procedure followed has been to select all names with these
endings, from which have been omitted those obviously not
Armenian. This procedure can therefore only give an approxi-
mate picture, as Armenian names not ending in -LAN or -YAN
are excluded, while some names selected will clearly not be
Armenian. In particular the indigenous Armenian population
had often acquired Arabised Armenian names which would not
be selected.
5. The total number of entries have been selected for Table 4.2.
In a number of cases entries are duplicated. Where this
occurs, they have been counted twice. This is because, while
it would be possible to eliminate duplication in a
consideration of entries of Armenians alone, this is clearly
an impracticable consideration when all entries (over 10,000
in 1928-9) are considered, as is necessary for comparison
with entries of Armenians.

The sub-classification is the author's and should be treated
with reserve given the complexity of Middle Eastern commerce.
A number of occupational groups listed in the "Indicateur"
have been excluded as they do not in general contain names of individuals but of business concerns. These are; Abattoirs, Agences, Assurances (Cie d'), Bains de Mer, Bains Turcs, Banques, Cafés, Cafés-Concerts et Bars, Cassinos, Caisses d'Epargne, Cercles, Cinématographes, Chemins de FER, Coffres Forts (location de) Dispensaires, Eaux, Fondations de Caractères d'Imprimeries, Garages, Hôpitaux, Hospices, Asiles et Ouvriers, Hôtels, Imprimeries, Journaux et Revues, Lithographie, Maisons de Santé, Navigation (Cie de), Pétrole et Bensine, Pensions, Restaurants, Théâtres, Tir aux pigeons.

6. Throughout this chapter the term "preferred occupations" is used in the sense of occupations in which the Armenians were disproportionately concentrated. It is not meant to suggest that the Armenians were free to choose their occupation, or that they enjoyed a "preferred" occupation more than any other.

7. "Rapport" (1937) 218-19. Unfortunately the "Rapport" does not define what exactly is meant by "new" and "old" industries. One might cautiously assume a definition on the basis of the mode of production as suggested in the introduction. Again it is regrettable that employees of the concessionary companies are not listed by location so that the picture is distorted.


11. "Rapport" (1937) 26-27, Moussalli (1933) 50

12. Jalabert (1934) 122-23, 2e Bureau, 13, MER Report 1924, 8

13. "Rapport" (1924) 45, Pallis, 10

14. Moussalli, 50

15. Médérian (1928) 146-47

16. Pallis, 4, 7, 9, 10

17. PMC Minutes, 3rd Mtng, Feb 17, 1926, 18 & 10th Mtng, Nov. 15, 1926, 125


[Text content as shown in the image]
<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>No.</th>
<th>Reference</th>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td>43</td>
<td>See e.g. St. John Ward to Bicknell, n.d. (1923) and Dodge to A.R.C., Dec 22, 1923 (Arch.A.R.C.)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>44</td>
<td>Burnier to Johnson, April 10, 1928 (N.A. C1431)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>45</td>
<td>Statement by De Caix, P.M.C. Minutes, 13th Sess., 20th Mtng, June 25, 1928, pp 154-55</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>47</td>
<td>Pallis, 13</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>48</td>
<td>N.A., 25638. See also correspondence from Burnier to Geneva, Feb.19, March 6 and April 17, 1936 (N.A. C1598)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>49</td>
<td>P.A., 138, June, 1937, p.4</td>
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<tr>
<td>50</td>
<td>N.A., C1524</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>51</td>
<td>P.M.C. Minutes, 18th Sess., 11th Mtng, June 26, 1930, pp.107-08</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>54</td>
<td>Le Levant, 13e Ann., no.4, fèv-mars, 1936, p.4, &amp; 15e Ann., no.1, Oct, 1927, p.3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>55</td>
<td>Méérian (1928)(1) 146, Jeppe to Thomas, Feb 26, 1926 (N.A. C11430), Burnier to Johnson, Oct 7, 1926 (N.A. C11429)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>57</td>
<td>Le Levant, 15e Ann., no.5-6, mai-juillet, 1938, p.6</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>


69. P.A., 89, 4Q, 1923, p. 16, Id. 91, 2Q, 1924, p. 6 & Id. 96, 3Q, 1925, p. 6.

70. Hekimian Report, Dec. 11, 1923 (P.O. 371/10195)


74. N.A., C1524

75. Burtt Report

76. Report by Consul Hough, Aleppo, May 17, 1928 (P.O. 371/13074)
78. *P.A*. 137, Feb., 1937, back-cover, & 140, Feb., 1938, p.6
79. Jacquot (1931) 36, 162
80. Enquête, 94
83. *P.A.*, 127, Oct., 1933, p.6
84. Burnier Report, on May, 1926, loc.cit.
85. Bacon to Forster, Nov. 28, 1926 (Arch. A.R.C.)
87. Burnier to Johnson, Oct. 31, 1926 (N.A., C1429)

Chapter 5

2. "Rapport" (1922-23) 18-19
3. Burnier to Johnson, Oct. 31, 1926 (N.A. C1429)
5. De Caix to Gouraud, April 1, 1922 (Arch.Dip. S-L-C, Vol 143)
6. Arch. Las.
7. See in Arch.Dip; De Caix to M.A.E., March 11, April 26, & May 8, 1923, & Weygand to M.A.E., May 12, 1923 (Turquie, Vol 58), & Weygand to M.A.E., March 8, 1924 (Turquie, Vol 258) & Sept 20, 1924 (S-L, Vol 176)
11. *P.A.*, 101, 42, 1926, p.4


17. Memo. by Basil Matthews, 1924 (S.F.F.P.M.A. Syria 8/3)


21. Hekimian Report, June 26, 1923, loc.cit. State domain land was land formerly the property of the Sultan, which became the property of the Levant States after the collapse of the Empire. It was thus at the disposal of the Mandatory Power, and could be used for attempts to create a new agrarian structure.


28. N.A. C1402


30. See Longrigg (1958) 154-69

33. Memo. by Johnson, May 15, 1926 (N.A. C1429)
34. De Jouvenal to Thomas, June 30, 1926 (N.A. C1429)
36. Correspondence from Burnier to Johnson, Aug.-Oct., 1926 (N.A. C1429)
37. Probably a reference to Dr. Oken whose report is annexed to the Barron Report.
38. N.A. C1430
39. N.A. C1430
41. N.A. C1430
42. Burnier to Johnson, Dec. 29, 1926 (N.A. C1429)
43. N.A. C1429
45. Golden to Johnson, July 11, 1927, Johnson to Burnier, July 19, 1927, Burnier to Johnson, July 30, 1927 & Duguet to Johnson, Aug. 8, 1927 (N.A. C1429)
46. Burnier (1928) loc.cit.
47. Burnier to Johnson, Dec. 29, 1926 (N.A. C1429)
48. Burnier to Johnson, May 1, 1926 (N.A. C1429)
50. Burnier to Johnson, April 3, 1927 (N.A. C1429) & Armenian sub-committee, Minutes of 3rd Mtg, June 17, 1927 (N.A. C1430)
51. Burnier to Johnson, April 3, June 6, July 17 & Sept. 18, 1927 & Feb 22, 1928 (N.A. C1429, C1431)
52. Correspondence between Burnier & Johnson, Jan., 1927 to Feb., 1928 (N.A. C1429, C1430, C1431)
54. Johnson to Burnier, Aug. 20, 1927 & Burnier to Johnson, Sept. 18, 1927 (N.A. C1429)
55. N.A. C1429


57. Burnier to Johnson, Dec.29, 1926 & April 3, 1927 (N.A. C1429)

58. Johnson to Burnier, Feb.22, 1927 (N.A. C1430)


60. Burnier to Johnson, Aug.16, 1927 (N.A. C1431)

61. Burnier to Johnson, Oct.30, 1927 (N.A. C1431)


65. Barsanay (1935) 46, Tallem (1932) 221, Arch.Las. Also Burnier to Johnson, July 17, 1927, April 4, 1928, & Johnson to Burnier, March 13, 1928 (N.A. C1431)

66. Reports, Minutes & Correspondence in N.A. C1429, C1430, C1431


68. Johnson to Burnier, Jan.21, 1927 (N.A. C1430)

69. Burnier to Thomas, Jan.16, 1927, & Burnier to Johnson, Jan 26, Jan.29, Feb.12, 1927 (N.A. C1429, C1430)

70. Burnier to Johnson, April 10, 1928 (N.A. C1431)


72. N.A. C1430

73. Le Mail to Johnson, Nov.3 & Nov.14, 1929 (N.A. C1430) & Le Mail to Massigli, Nov.24, 1929 (Arch.Dip. Arménie Vol 21)
546

74. N.A. C1430

75. Burnier to Johnson, Dec. 4, 1929 (N.A. C1428)

76. On the question of the competence of the Office see Minutes & Correspondence in N.A. C1428, C1429, C1430, C1583, C1584


78. N.A. C1584, C1586

79. See correspondence between Le Mail, Burnier & Geneva, May-July, 1930, in N.A. C1583, C1584


81. Administrative Committee, Report of Meeting of April 28, 1930 (N.A)

82. N.A. C1584

83. Burnier to Johnson, Feb. 16 & June 9, 1930 (N.A. C1583, C1584)


85. "Installations etc....1933" (N.A. C1584)

86. As note 85.

87. "Rapport" (1930)52, (1931)54.


89. "Rapport" (1930)52

90. Arch.Dip. Documents in course of classification

91. Arch. A.C.C.

92. Administrative Committee, Report of Mtg of April 20, 1932 (N.A.)


95. References to the development of these settlements are too numerous to cite individually. See reports, minutes & corresp. in N.A., C1429, C1430, C1431, C1583, C1584, C1585, C1587, C1596. See also P.A., 118, 19, 1931, p.5, Id. 122, April, 1932, p.1, Id. 124, Oct., 1932, p.2, Id. 125, Feb., 1933, p.5., Burnier (1928) 401-05, & Ferrière (1930) 11-14.


97. On the question of health see again reports & correspondence cited in note 95. See also Ligue des Sociétés de la Croix-Rouge (1929)


Chapter 6

1. See MASSIE, passim, Corby, 605, Néérian (1928)(1) 150, Bercot Report, Jeppe to Thomas, Feb.26, 1926 (N.A. C1430). See also statements at the meeting of the International Near East Assoc., April 4, 1927, by Mr. Khatissian (Delegation of the Armenian Republic), Mr. Sinapian, (A.C.B.A.U.) and Mr. Papajanian (Comité de Secours pour l'Arménie)(all in Arch. L.R.C.S.).


3. Kotelnikoff to Kverner, April 2, 1925 (N.A. C1427) & Minutes of the Mtgs of the Refugee Advisory C'tee, March 9 & Sept.10, 1925 (N.A. C1402)

4. Burnier to Johnson, July 5, 1926 (N.A. C1429)

5. Armenian sub-c'tee, Minutes of Mtg of Nov.6, 1926 (N.A. C1430)


8. Thomas to Nansen, Jan.6, 1927 (N.A. C1430)

9. Childs to Johnson, Jan.16, 1929 (N.A. C1428)

11. Memo. by O'Molony, Jan. 4, 1930 (N.A. C1585)

12. Administrative C'tee, Record of Mtg of April 28, 1931 (N.A.) Also Gubemkin to Huber, July 23, 1931, Malezian to Huber, Sept. 10, 1931 (N.A. C1585) & Kotelnikoff to Johnson, Nov. 20, 1931 (N.A. C1586)


14. Neurath (1940) 72-73

15. Fox to Johnson, May 11, 1928 (N.A. C1429)

16. Jalabert (1934) 131

17. Néérian (1924) 229

18. Balian (1972) 44


20. Joppe to Thomas, Sept. 14, 1925 (N.A. C1430)


23. Armenian sub-tee, Mtg of Jan. 11, 1927 (N.A. C1430)


25. Burnier to Johnson, Feb. 12, 1927 (N.A. C1429)


29. Burnier to Johnson, Jan. 29, 1927 (N.A. C1430)


31. On the persistence of religious divisions amongst the Armenians in Syria & Lebanon, see; Charles (1929), Jalabert (1934) 127-28, Tallon, 223-27, & Le Levant, 16th Ann., no. 1, Jan., 1939, p. 2

High Commissioner & the President of the Lebanese Republic, both Feb.2, 1929 (Arch.A.C.C.)


34. Pachalian to Johnson, Oct.23, 1928 (N.A. C1431)
35. Altoumian to Kennedy, date unknown (N.A. C1430)
36. Manoogian to Gracey, March 1, 1928 (N.A. C1431)
37. Burnier to Johnson, April 6, 1928 (N.A. C1430)
38. Burnier to Johnson, April 4, 1928 (N.A. C1431)
39. Burnier to Johnson, April 10, 1928 (N.A. C1431)
45. Burnier to Johnson, Nov.3, 1930 (N.A. C1524)
47. On political developments in Syria & Lebanon during this period, see Longrigg (1958) passim, and Petran (1972) 45-79.
48. Djabry (1934) 74-75
49. LE LEVANT, 13e Ann., nos.6-7, juillet-aôgt, 1936, p.2
50. P.W.G. Minutes, 10th Sess., 19th Mtg, Nov.15, 1926, p.125
53. Nesserian (1928)(1)151
54. Pallia, 7, Rondot (1947)55, 2e Bureau, 14

55. Burnier to Johnson, Aug. 7, 1926 (N.A. C1429), & Pallia, 5


58. Karadja (1932) 6-7


60. "Enquête" etc., 95

61. Fox to Buxton, June 20, 1924 (S.F. F.P.N.A. Syria 8/3)


64. Report of Consul Smart, Damascus, Dec. 30, 1925 (F.O. 371/11517)
65. Catholicsos Sahag II to De Jouvenal, note delivered verbally, March 5, 1926 (Arch.A.C.C.)


67. See Arch.Dip. S-L-C Vol 137

68. On French policy towards this migration see Arch.Dip. S-L-C Vols 137-140


72. See Arch.Dip., Turquie Vols 57, 258, S-L Vol 169

73. Waygand to M.A.E., March 6, 1924 (Arch.Dip. Turquie Vol 258)

74. Fonsot to M.A.E., Nov.19, 1929 (Arch.Dip. Arménie Vol 21)

75. D. Altounyan to Burton, Nov.29, 1929 (P.O.371/13827), & Roberts to Johnson, Dec.3 & Dec.4, 1929 (N.A. C1628)

76. Kotelnikov to Zwerner, April 2, 1925 (N.A. C1627)


78. Daeschner to M.A.E., March 4, 1927 (Arch.Dip. Arménie Vol 21)


81. Mtg of June 17, 1927 (N.A. C1630)

82. Arch.Dip. Arménie Vol 21

83. Conference in Paris, June 24, 1931 (N.A. C1584), Sec.-Gen. to Kotelnikov, July 24, 1931 (N.A. C1586) & Administrative C'tee, Record of Mtg of July 1, 1931. (N.A.)

84. See N.A. C1586

85. Johnson to Burnier, Nov.20, 1928 (N.A. C1631)


89. Mougins to M.A.E., April 5, 1923 (Arch.Dip. Arménie Vol 17)

90. Report by Consul Smart, Aleppo, Jan. 29, 1924 (F.O. 371/10195). See also comment by Berron in Le Levant, 2e Ann., no. 6, juillet-aout, 1925, p. 7


94. Sarrail to M.A.E., March 18, 1925 (arch.Dip. Arménie Vol 18)

95. Arch.Las.

96. O.J.L.M. (1925) 1339


98. L.O.N. Doc. A32.1925.IV


100. Report by Consul Hough, Aleppo, April 24, 1926 (F.O. 371/11518)


102. L.O.N. Doc. A32.1927.VIII


104. Burnier to Johnson, April 3, 1927 (N.A. G1429)

105. Johnson to Burnier, May 5, 1927 (N.A. G1429)

106. See Ch. 5. See also Racca to Clausel, Sept. 11, 1925, M.A.E. to H.C.F., Sept. 12, 1925, Sarrail to M.A.E., Sept. 17, 1925, & M.A.E. to Consul General, Geneva, Sept. 18, 1925 (all Arch. Dip. Arménie Vol 18), & Refugee Advisory C'tee, Mtg of Sept. 10, 1925 (N.A. G1402)

107. Sarrail to M.A.E., Sept. 17, 1925, loc.cit


110. A fact which has been pointed out by several writers, e.g. De Vaumas (1955) 585, Pallis, 7, & Rondot (1947) 27

111. Unsigned memorandum, May 19, 1926 (Arch. Dip. Armenie Vol 19)


113. See correspondence in N.A. C1429

114. Burnier to Johnson, June 18, 1926 (N.A. C1429)


118. Burnier to Johnson, Oct. 22, 1926 (N.A. C1429)

119. Burnier to Johnson, Aug. 18, 1926 (N.A. C1429)

120. Burnier to Johnson, Sept. 21, 1926 (N.A. C1429)

121. Burnier to Johnson, Aug. 7, Aug. 18, & Sept. 25, 1926 (N.A. C1429)


125. Report by Consul Monck-Mason, Aleppo, April 16, 1929 (F.O. 371/13803)


128. Ponsot to Thomas, Feb. 8, 1928 (N.A. C1429). This policy was also noted by Burnier in Burnier to Johnson, Nov. 4, 1928 (N.A. C1431)

129. Le Nail to Johnson, Nov. 14, 1929 (N.A. C1430)

130. 2e Bureau, 28


132. Ponsot to M.A.E., Jan. 8, 1931 (Arch. Dip. Documents in course of classification)
133. P.M.C. Minutes. 20th Sess., 5th Mtg., June 11, 1931, p.46
134. Le Mail Report, 1930, loc.cit.
135. Sahag II to Ponsot, Dec.17, 1931 (Arch.A.C.C.). See also Sahag II to Ponsot, Dec.24, 1931.
138. Record of Joint Mtg of Finance & Admin. C'tees, Feb.6, 1932 (N.A.)
140. Le Levant, 10e Ann., nos 6-7, aout,1933, p.4, & 16e Ann., no.3, jan., 1939, p.2
141. Ponsot to N.A.E., Jan.8, 1931, loc.cit.
142. Letter from Duguet, June 29, 1927 (Arch.Dip. Armenie Vol 21)

Chapter 7

1. Burnier to Johnson, Oct.7, 1926 (N.A. C1429)
2. Shirazian Report, April 10, 1925 (F.A., 97,43,1925,p.15)
6. Shirazian Report, 1925, loc.cit. But he noted these refugees in discussing the "camps" so the total may be misleading.
7. Table dated Nov.15, 1936 (N.A. C1524)
11. Burnier (1926)101
12. F.A., 114,19,1930, p.5 & 115, 20, 1930, pp.5-6
17. by members of the Armenian community of Aleppo
18. Opinions differ on this point however amongst local Armenians.
22. Photograph in possession of the writer
23. Mégréian (1928) (1) 153
24. Personal communication
29. F.A., 139, Oct., 1937, inside front cover


33. L.A., 114,1Q, 1930, p.5


35. Hamidé (1959) 115-22


40. L.A., 105, 4Q, 1927,p.8


42. Le Levant, passim

43. Burnier to Johnson, Oct.7, 1926, loc.cit. See also "Rapport" (1926) 104, & Burnier to Johnson, April 6, 1926 loc.cit.

44. On the demolitions see L.A. & Le Levant, passim

45. Le Levant, 16e Ann., no.8, août-sept., 1939, p.5


47. L.A., 102, 1Q, 1927. p.9

48. It is not clear if the building in question is again Zeitoun Khan or Geul-Meidan camp. See also Burst Report.

49. Roberts to Gracey, Oct.31, 1926 (L.A., 102,1Q,1927, p.8)


52. Burnier to Johnson, April 6, 1928, loc.cit.

53. Personal communication

54. Personal communication
55. See Ch.5


57. On these purchases by the Office see N.A. C1429, C1430, C1431, C1583, C1584, C1585, passim.

58. F.A.A. 115, 2Q, 1930, p.6

59. Altounyan to Kennedy, March 24, 1928, loc.cit.


61. In N.A., "Installations etc...1933", (loc.cit.) & Table of Nov.15, 1936 (loc.cit)

62. Burnier to Director, Hansen Office, March 31, 1938 (N.A. C1598)

63. Le Levant, 13e Ann., no.1, oct., 1935, p.2 & 13e Ann., no.8, Sept., 1936, p.3. Also Burnier to Director, Hansen Office, Jan.11, 1938 (N.A. C1598)

64. See N.A. C1598

65. Le Levant, 9e Ann., no. 5-6, mai-juin, 1932, p.5


67. "Illustrated Report etc.1934" (S.P. MS Vol 216)


69. Personal communication


71. Le Levant, & F.A., passim, & N.A. C1598

72. Le Levant, 15e Ann., no.2, nov-dec., 1937, p.2


74. "Installations etc...1933", loc.cit. à "Illustrated Report etc...1934", loc.cit.


76. "Illustrated Report etc...1934", loc.cit.
Spain's were French colonial cavalry.

78. See "Installations etc...1933", loc.cit. & "Illustrated
Report....1934", loc.cit.

Chapter 8

1. See Ross, Fry & Sibley, 264, Néérian (1961) 148, Poisnard
Fox, ca 1924 (S.F., F.F.M.A., Syria. 8/3)

2. "Illustrated Report etc...1934 " loc.cit.


4. Balian (1972) 218

5. See Naslian, Vol 2, 343, & Néérian (1961) 148


7. Photographs contained in "Illustrated Report etc...1934",
loc.cit.

122

9. Néérian (1928) (2) 111. See also Jalabert (1934) 122, 126


14. Keuroghlian (1970) 15. On this question see also Burtt
11350), Burnier to Johnson, Aug. 7, 1926 (N.A. C1429) &
Behag II to the Governor of Lebanon, Nov. 28, 1923 (Arch.
A.O.C.)

15. Néérian (1928) (2) 111

228, Néérian (1928) (1) 157, Burtt Report, & Table of Nov. 9,
1936 (N.A. C1524)

17. Néérian (1924) 227, Ross, Fry & Sibley, 264, & L.A., 89,
44, 1923, pp. 14-15

18. Néérian (1925) 449-50, (1928) (1) 161, Naslian, Vol 2, 355-
56

19. Néérian (1924) 228


22. "Rapport" (1922-23) 19


29. E.A., 119, 2q, 1931, p.7, Id. 125, Feb., 1933, p.4


34. Arch.A.C.C.

35. N.E.R.Report, (1921) 7, (1928) 17, Ross, Fry & Sibley, 270


37. Burnier Report, ca May, 1926 (N.A. loc.cit.)
38. Burnier to Johnson, Aug. 7, 1926 (N.A. C1429)
40. Burnier to Johnson, Aug. 7, 1926, loc. cit.
41. On the evolution of the settlement plans of the Nansen Office concerning Beirut, see N.A. C1429-C1431, C1583-C1585, C1524, C1598, R5638, and also "Illustrated Report etc. 1934" (B.P. loc. cit.)
42. Jalabert (1934) 122-23
43. Burnier to Johnson, June 5, 1928 (N.A. C1429)
44. Burnier to Johnson, June 5, 1928 (W.A. C1430)
45. "Installations etc. 1931", loc. cit.
46. That a systematic demolitions policy was pursued emerges especially from F.A., passim, from 1929. See also Le Levant, 10e Ann., nos. 6-7, août, 1933, p. 2. Massis, Vol 3, no. 3, Jan., 1921, pp. 66-67, Report by Wm. Jessop of N.A. Foundation, Nov. 5, 1931 (B.P. MS Vol 174), and in N.A. see correspondence in C1598 and letter from Annie Davies, June 20, 1929 (N.A. C1424)
47. Ferrière, 9-10
48. On the fire and the response to it see Mésérian (1933), F.A., 125, Feb., 1933, 3, 7-8, and "Installations etc. 1933" (N.A. loc. cit.)
49. Burnier to Coroni, Nov. 10, 1937 (N.A. C1598)
50. F.A., 143, Feb., 1939, p. 6
51. See references in N.A. under note 41
52. F.A., 110, 1Q, 1929, p. 4
53. For a description of Parachènes see Jalabert (1934) 125
55. On the difficulties of the Amanus Armenians see (in addition to F.A., 143, Feb., 1939, p. 6) N.A. C1598
56. Jalabert (1934) 125
57. Table dated Nov. 9, 1936 (N.A. C1524)
58. N.A. C1585
60. "Pavillons" (N.A. C1431), Trad (C1598), Gullabachène (C1585)
61. Extract from a letter out of Beirut, dated Aug. 30, 1927, which came to the attention of Johnson (N.A. C1429). See also Rept. by Dorothy Redgrave, of the Friends of Armenia (n.d. ca. 1928) (N.A. C1430)

62. Burnier to Johnson, Nov. 24, 1927 (N.A. C1430)

63. Report by Burnier, 1930 (N.A. C1583)

64. "Installations etc. 1932" (N.A. C1584)


66. Table dated Nov. 9, 1936 (N.A. C1524)

67. e.g. Jalabert (1934), 124


70. P. A., 116, 34, 1930, p. 11


72. "Installations etc...1931", Id. 1933, loc. cit. Also Central Armenian C'ites, Mtg of Aug. 26, 1930, Progress Rept. on the Settlement work in Syria (N.A. C1584)

73. Burnier to Johnson, Dec. 4, 1931 (N.A. C1584)

74. "Installations etc... 1932," loc. cit.

75. Extract from The Illustrated Carpenter and Builder, Feb. 28, 1930, quoted in P.A., 115, 24, 1930, p. 17

76. "Installations etc... 1931", Id. 1932, 1933, loc. cit. Also "Rapport du Président etc." (1936) loc. cit.

Chapter 9


2. Rept. by Consul Palmer, Damascus, Sept. 8, 1923, (F.O. 371/9057)


6. Rept. by Consul Vaughan-Russell, Damascus, May 31, 1926, loc. cit. Mécérian (1928) 147, also notes the camp of Kassaa partially remaining.

7. See references cited under note 1, Also Poulleau, 62-63


9. Burnett Report


12. Idea

13. Johnson to Burnett, Aug. 9, 1928 (N.A. C1431)


15. N.A. C1430

16. Burnett to Johnson, Jan. 30, 1929 (N.A. C1429)

17. N.A. C1431


19. "Rapport mensuel etc.", July 17, 1929 by Burnett (N.A. C1429)

20. Parr to Henderson, June 23, 1929 (F.O. 371/13805)


22. "Rapport mensuel etc.", July 17, 1929, loc. cit.

23. Good, Good & Co., Sol'rs to British Consul, Damascus, June 6, 1929 (F.O. 371/13805)

24. Consul Parr to Good, Good & Co., June 20, 1929 (F.O. 371/13805)


However Consul Mackereth, Damascus, reported 350 shacks still standing in Damascus in 1935 (F.O. 371/19676)

29. Pachalian to Johnson, March 15, 1929, loc. cit., Burnier to Johnson, April 4, 1929 (N.A. C1431)


33. Du Véou, 259. And see F.O. 371/5210

34. Arch. Las.

35. Newman (1927) 488

36. Arch. Las.


38. F.A., 83, 1Q, 1922, pp.8-10, Id.84, 2Q, 1922, p.4.

39. F.O. 371/7874

40. Le Levant, 6e Ann., no.6, juillet - aout, 1929, p.2.

41. F.A., 118, 1Q, 1931, p.5.

42. 2e Bureau, 12

43. De Caix to N.A.E., April 1, 1922 (Arch.Dip. S-L-C Vol 143)


46. F.A., 83, 1Q, 1922, p.8. See also Ch.4

47. Duguet to H.C.F., Dec. 10, 1926 (N.A. C1429)


49. On the establishment and development of the Nansen Office quarter see correspondence and reports in N.A. C1429-C1431, C1583-C1585, C1524, passim

50. Johnson to Burnier, June 14, 1927 (N.A. C1431)

Conclusions


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2 manuscript note-books prepared by Father Vincent Paskès entitled "Quelques souvenirs Rétrospectifs, Autobiographie, d'une vie de nomade ou de Bédouin, disons mieux de missionnaire"
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