On the road to peace? : co-operation and conflict in Southern Africa’s peace parks

Van Amerom, Marloes

How to cite:

Use policy
The full-text may be used and/or reproduced, and given to third parties in any format or medium, without prior permission or charge, for personal research or study, educational, or not-for-profit purposes provided that:

- a full bibliographic reference is made to the original source
- a link is made to the metadata record in Durham E-Theses
- the full-text is not changed in any way

The full-text must not be sold in any format or medium without the formal permission of the copyright holders.

Please consult the full Durham E-Theses policy for further details.
On the road to peace?

Co-operation and conflict in Southern Africa’s Peace Parks

PhD thesis

A copyright of this thesis rests with the author. No quotation from it should be published without his prior written consent and information derived from it should be acknowledged.

Marloes van Amerom
Department of Geography
University of Durham
2005
Supervised by Prof. J.D. Rigg and Prof. J.M. Painter
Marloes van Amerom


ABSTRACT

This thesis critically assesses the political operation of Peace Parks in Southern Africa. The notion that Transboundary Protected Areas (TBPAs) can act as vehicles for peace has become an important argument for their promotion in post-Apartheid Southern Africa. Co-operation in TBPAs has been envisaged to generate international friendship and understanding, for which reason TBPAs are more commonly referred to as ‘Peace Parks’. This notion lacks substantiation however. Concentrating upon the South African-Mozambican-Zimbabwean Great Limpopo Park, this research demonstrates that Peace Parks do not necessarily promote peace and can, indeed, generate additional conflict. In poverty-stricken Southern Africa with its legacy of contested colonial borders, an important motivation driving the Peace Parks agenda is the notion that they will generate sustainable development and more open border policies. However, the domination of national (governmental) interests, insufficient community consultation and problematic cross-border flows hinder the achievement of these objectives. An important underlying cause is that co-operation in Peace Parks has come to both reflect and feed existing power inequalities in the region, making such parks arenas for resistance and conflict. Finally, where TBPAs do generate international friendship and increased cultural understanding at the ground level, the top-down nature of the decision-making process limits the ability of these positive social effects to influence international relations. Frequent cultural clashes and nationalistic sentiments and rivalries further limit the positive political aspects of Peace Parks. Nevertheless, more cross-border co-operation has certainly been achieved and co-operation in Peace Parks is a learning process. The development of conflict mediation mechanisms and reflective monitoring and evaluation procedures could strengthen the peace-building potential of Peace Parks. On the other hand, Peace Parks are bound to remain vulnerable to wider regional political constraints. The development of management strategies that seek to anticipate and contain the effects of political instability is proposed.
<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Table of Contents</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>List of Tables</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>List of Figures</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Declaration</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Statement of Copyright</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Abbreviations and Acronyms</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Dedication</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Acknowledgements</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1 Peace Parks and Transboundary Conservation: 1 Setting the Scene</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1.1 Introduction</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1.2 Setting the scene: Peace Parks and their rationale</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1.3 The rationale for the research</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1.4 Existing literature on TBPAs: origin and focus</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1.5 The optimistic view: perspectives on the political working of TBPAs in the promotional literature</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1.6 A lacking of evidence</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1.7 The doubting outlook: empirical findings on TBPA construction and functioning</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1.8 The political context of TBPAs in Southern Africa</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1.9 Academic findings on Southern Africa’s Peace Parks plan: The sceptical view</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1.10 Emerging research needs</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1.11 Thesis outline</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2 The Emergence of the Peace Parks Concept in Southern Africa</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2.1 Introduction</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2.2 TBPAs and the Southern African Context</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2.3 The Ecological Rationale for TBPAs</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2.4 The History of Conservation in Southern Africa: Tracing the roots of Transboundary conservation</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2.5 Where elephants fight it is the grass that suffers: Obstructions to transboundary conservation during the apartheid era</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Section</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>---------</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2.6</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2.7</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2.8</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2.9</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2.10</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2.11</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>3.1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>3.2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>3.2.1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>3.2.2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>3.2.3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>3.2.4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>3.2.5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>3.2.6</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>3.3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>3.3.1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>3.3.2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>3.3.3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>3.3.4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>3.4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>3.4.1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>3.4.2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>3.4.3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>3.4.4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>3.4.5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>3.5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>---</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>4.1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>4.2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>4.3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>4.4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>4.4.1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>4.4.2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>4.5</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>5</th>
<th>Peace Parks and Development</th>
<th>130</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>5.1</td>
<td>Introduction</td>
<td>130</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>5.2</td>
<td>Disagreements over land use in the Great Limpopo</td>
<td>133</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>5.2.1</td>
<td>Introduction</td>
<td>133</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>5.2.3</td>
<td>Differing land uses in the Great Limpopo</td>
<td>139</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>5.2.4</td>
<td>South African intervention in Coutada 16</td>
<td>142</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>5.2.5</td>
<td>South African-Zimbabwean relations in the Great Limpopo</td>
<td>151</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>5.3</td>
<td>Tensions over the distribution of expected ecotourism benefits</td>
<td>153</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>5.3.1</td>
<td>Introduction</td>
<td>153</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>5.3.2</td>
<td>Southern Africa's tourism sector and the Great Limpopo</td>
<td>154</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>5.3.3</td>
<td>Competition over future park revenues</td>
<td>156</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>5.4</td>
<td>Alienation of local communities</td>
<td>163</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>5.5</td>
<td>Land harmonisation and distribution of ecotourism income in other TBPAs</td>
<td>166</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>5.6</td>
<td>Conclusion</td>
<td>170</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>6</td>
<td>Peace Parks and Border Politics</td>
<td>172</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>---</td>
<td>--------------------------------</td>
<td>-----</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>6.1</td>
<td>Introduction</td>
<td>172</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>6.2</td>
<td>Transactions and cross-border flows in Southern Africa’s borderlands</td>
<td>175</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>6.3</td>
<td>Peace Parks and spatial changes in the border landscape</td>
<td>180</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>6.4</td>
<td>South African security interests and the pursuit of open boundaries</td>
<td>182</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>6.5</td>
<td>The pursuit of open boundaries &amp; fears of veterinary disease spread</td>
<td>190</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>6.6</td>
<td>Boundary disputes &amp; the pursuit of open boundaries</td>
<td>195</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>6.6.1</td>
<td>Introduction</td>
<td>195</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>6.6.2</td>
<td>The Namibian-South African boundary dispute</td>
<td>196</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>6.6.3</td>
<td>Boundary disputes and the pursuit of open boundaries in other TBPAs</td>
<td>203</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>6.7</td>
<td>Conclusion</td>
<td>205</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>7</th>
<th>Pride and Prejudice: Nationalism and Cultural Differences in Peace Parks</th>
<th>210</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>7.1</td>
<td>Introduction</td>
<td>210</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>7.2</td>
<td>Optimistic conservationist and pan-Africanist outlooks on co-operation in TBPAs</td>
<td>213</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>7.3</td>
<td>Cultural dimensions of conservation outlooks</td>
<td>216</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>7.4</td>
<td>Cultural misunderstandings and strife in Peace Parks</td>
<td>218</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>7.5</td>
<td>Cultural differences and national divisions</td>
<td>221</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>7.6</td>
<td>Cross-border co-operation in a context of past conflict and disparate development levels</td>
<td>224</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>7.6.1</td>
<td>Introduction</td>
<td>224</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>7.6.2</td>
<td>Old antagonisms and nationalist sentiments in the Maloti/Drakensberg</td>
<td>225</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>7.6.3</td>
<td>Economic inequalities and cultural misunderstandings</td>
<td>228</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>7.7</td>
<td>The evolution of cross-border contacts and communication</td>
<td>233</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>7.8</td>
<td>Conclusion</td>
<td>238</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>8</td>
<td>General Conclusions</td>
<td>240</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>-----</td>
<td>------------------------------</td>
<td>-----</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>8.1</td>
<td>Introduction</td>
<td>240</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>8.2</td>
<td>Scientific and social relevance of the findings</td>
<td>241</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>8.2.1</td>
<td>Addressing the research questions</td>
<td>241</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>8.2.2</td>
<td>Addressing the research goals</td>
<td>250</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>8.3</td>
<td>Trends and future scenarios: major obstacles and opportunities in Southern Africa’s Peace Parks</td>
<td>256</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>8.3.1</td>
<td>Introduction</td>
<td>256</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>8.3.2</td>
<td>Common obstacles</td>
<td>257</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>8.3.3</td>
<td>Opportunities in Southern Africa’s TBPA's</td>
<td>261</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>8.3.4</td>
<td>Worse-case and best-case scenarios</td>
<td>263</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>8.4</td>
<td>Policy recommendations</td>
<td>268</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>8.5</td>
<td>Emerging research needs</td>
<td>274</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Bibliography 280

Appendix I 323
Appendix II 329
Appendix III 338
### List of Tables

<p>| Table 1.1 | Overview of growth in internationally adjoining protected area complexes' per region 1988-1998 | 3 |
| Table 1.2 | Progress and political impact of TBPA initiatives in post-conflict areas in early 1990s | 3 |
| Table 1.3 | Typologies of transboundary conservation initiatives | 6 |
| Table 1.4 | Categories of literature on the political aspects of TBPAs | 11 |
| Table 2.1 | Share of tourism in GNP, export earnings and employment rates of Southern African countries | 36 |
| Table 2.2 | Land reserved for Protected Areas in Southern Africa 1993/2003 | 37 |
| Table 2.3 | Time frame of ending of colonial rule in Southern African states | 44 |
| Table 2.4 | South Africa’s imposition of Regional Hegemony | 47 |
| Table 2.5 | Land inequality in former white settler colonies | 55 |
| Table 2.6 | Changes in population levels and agricultural land use per Southern African country | 55 |
| Table 2.7 | Stages of development per Peace Park | 68 |
| Table 3.1 | Types of boundary functions | 89 |
| Table 4.1 | Main methods of data collection | 115 |
| Table 4.2 | Guidelines for critical reflection upon level of validity of data | 128 |
| Table 5.1 | Main developments in the Great Limpopo | 138 |
| Table 5.2 | Land use and status of main conservation areas in designated Great Limpopo TFP | 139 |</p>
<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Table 5.3</th>
<th>Main funding sources for the Great Limpopo</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Table 5.4</td>
<td>Possible levels of co-operation between</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>internationally adjoining protected areas</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Table 6.1</td>
<td>Key security issues in South Africa’s borderlands</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>as identified by South African security experts</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Table 6.2</td>
<td>Claims upon South African territory</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Table 8.1</td>
<td>Interests and processes at higher political levels</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>undermining TBPA policy objectives</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Table 8.2</td>
<td>Competing interests regarding spatial</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>organisation and land use in borderlands</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Table 8.3</td>
<td>Political aspects of TBPAs in Southern Africa</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(predicted versus reality)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Table 8.4</td>
<td>Recommended Solutions to Main Shortfalls in</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>TBPA Implementation</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

150 169 179 203 242 243 251 268
### List of Figures

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Figure</th>
<th>Description</th>
<th>Page</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Figure 1.1</td>
<td>The Southern African Peace Parks Plan</td>
<td>3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Figure 1.2</td>
<td>The rationale of how TBPAs become Peace Parks</td>
<td>8</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Figure 1.3</td>
<td>Research focus of the thesis</td>
<td>20</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Figure 2.1</td>
<td>Protected areas in Africa</td>
<td>30</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Figure 2.2</td>
<td>Map of ‘the Peace Parks Dream’</td>
<td>45</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Figure 2.3</td>
<td>The Biosphere Model</td>
<td>46</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Figure 2.4</td>
<td>Land ownership and land owning parties in TBNRM</td>
<td>46</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Figure 2.5</td>
<td>Organisational diagram of the Great Limpopo</td>
<td>47</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Figure 3.1</td>
<td>Boundaries and ethnic groups in Africa</td>
<td>66</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Figure 3.2</td>
<td>Disputed Boundaries in Africa</td>
<td>68</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Figure 4.1</td>
<td>Map of the research area</td>
<td>78</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Figure 4.2</td>
<td>Developing and deriving interview questions</td>
<td>84</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Figure 5.1</td>
<td>Differences in land use between South Africa and neighbouring countries in</td>
<td>134</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>the Great Limpopo Park in 2001</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Figure 5.2</td>
<td>Map of the Great Limpopo TBPA indicating the characteristics of participating</td>
<td>157</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>conservation areas in 2001</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Figure 5.2</td>
<td>International airports nearby the Kruger Park</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Figure 6.1</td>
<td>Dominant patterns in cross-border traffic between South Africa and its</td>
<td>176</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>neighbouring states</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Figure 6.2</td>
<td>Illegal activities and boundary claims in or nearby Southern Africa’s TBPAs</td>
<td>178</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Figure 6.3A</td>
<td>Model of international boundary interaction</td>
<td>180</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Figure 6.3B</td>
<td>The ‘open boundary model’ through TBPA linkage</td>
<td>181</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Figure 6.4</td>
<td>Access points and border posts in the Great Limpopo</td>
<td>187</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Figure 6.5</td>
<td>The Great Limpopo’s ‘selective calendar’ model</td>
<td>189</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Figure 6.6</td>
<td>A 100km arc of the Orange River intersects the park's mountainous semi-desert</td>
<td>197</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Figure 6.7</td>
<td>Map of the Ai-Ais/Richtersveld</td>
<td>200</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Figure 7.1A</td>
<td>Picture used by proponents of Peace Parks to exemplify notion that cross-border contacts in TBPAs will create international friendship and understanding</td>
<td>211</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Figure 7.1B</td>
<td>Originally focussing on relations on the parks level, notions that transboundary co-operation in TBPAs will promote international friendship and understanding have been increasingly applied in the Southern African context to include the upper echelons of political power, as illustrated in this picture of South African president Thabo Mbeki and his Botswana counterpart, Festus Mogae, taken during the opening of the Kgalagadi Park (2000).</td>
<td>212</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Figure 7.2</td>
<td>Boundaries and identity construction in relation to the ‘Other’</td>
<td>224</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Figure 7.3</td>
<td>Different cultural outlooks on ‘doing business’ in Southern Africa</td>
<td>230</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Figure 7.4</td>
<td>Ministers Vali Moosa and Lebohang Ntsoyi return from a walk during a break in one of the bi-national policy meetings on the Maluti/Drakensberg TBPA.</td>
<td>237</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Figure 8.1</td>
<td>Causal Linkages in the ‘Doomsday Scenario’</td>
<td>264</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Figure 8.2</td>
<td>Causal Linkages in the ‘Victory Scenario’</td>
<td>265</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Figure 8.3</td>
<td>Procedures for conflict anticipative planning and management in TBPAs</td>
<td>271</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
Declaration

This thesis is the candidate’s own work and has not been submitted for a degree in this or another university.

Marloes van Amerom
Cover design: Anita Bornebroek

The copyright of this thesis rests with the author. No quotation from it should be published without their prior written consent and information derived from it should be acknowledged.
# Abbreviations and Acronyms

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Abbreviation</th>
<th>Description</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>ART</td>
<td>African Resources Trust</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>AWF</td>
<td>African Wildlife Foundation</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>ANC</td>
<td>African National Congress</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>BSP</td>
<td>Biodiversity Support Programme</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Campfire</td>
<td>Communal Areas Management for Indigenous Resources</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>CBC</td>
<td>Community-based Conservation</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>CBNRM</td>
<td>Community Based Natural Resource Management</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>CI</td>
<td>Conservation International</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>CIA</td>
<td>Central Intelligence Agency</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>DEAT</td>
<td>Department of Environmental Affairs and Tourism</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>ECDEAET</td>
<td>Eastern Cape Department of Economic Affairs, Environment and Tourism</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>ENGO</td>
<td>Environmental NGO</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>EU</td>
<td>European Union</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>DNFFB</td>
<td>Direccao Nacional de Florestas e Fauna Bravia (National Directorate of Forestry and Wildlife)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>FMD</td>
<td>Foot Mouth Disease</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>FSDTEEA</td>
<td>Free State Department of Tourism, Environmental and Economic Affairs</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Frelimo</td>
<td>Mozambique Liberation Front [Frente de Libertação de Moçambique]</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>GEF</td>
<td>Global Environment Facility</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>GKG</td>
<td>Gaza-Kruger-Gonarezhou</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>GLTFP</td>
<td>Great Limpopo Transfrontier Park</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>GNP</td>
<td>Gross National Product</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>GTZ</td>
<td>German Technical Cooperation [Deutsche Gesellschaft für Technische Zusammenarbeit]</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>ICDP</td>
<td>Integrated Conservation and Development Projects</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>InWEnt</td>
<td>Capacity Building International [Internationale Weiterbildung und Entwicklung gGmbH]</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>IRIN</td>
<td>Integrated Regional Information Networks</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Acronym</td>
<td>Full Form</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>---------</td>
<td>-----------</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>ISS</td>
<td>Institute for Security Studies</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>ITTO</td>
<td>International Tropical Timber Organization</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>IUCN</td>
<td>World Conservation Union</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>IUCN-ROS</td>
<td>World Conservation Union-Regional Office Southern Africa</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>JMB</td>
<td>Joint Management Board</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>KfW</td>
<td>Kreditanstalt für Wiederaufbau (German Development Bank)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>KZN</td>
<td>KwaZulu-Natal</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>KZN-CB</td>
<td>KwaZulu-Natal Nature Conservation Board</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>MICOA</td>
<td>Ministry for Environmental Coordination</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>MoU</td>
<td>Memorandum of Understanding</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>NEPAD</td>
<td>New Partnership for Africa’s Development</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>NGO</td>
<td>non-governmental Organisation</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>PAC</td>
<td>Pan African Congress</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>PPC</td>
<td>Peace Parks Concept</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>PPF</td>
<td>Peace Parks Foundation</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Renamo</td>
<td>Mozambique National Resistance [Resistencia Nacional Mocambicana]</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Retosa</td>
<td>Regional Tourism Organisation of Southern Africa</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>SACU</td>
<td>Southern African Customs Union</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>SADC</td>
<td>Southern African Development Community</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>SADCC</td>
<td>Southern African Development Co-ordination Conference</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>SADF</td>
<td>South African Defence Force</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>SAMP</td>
<td>South African Migration Project</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>SANPs</td>
<td>South African National Parks</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>SD</td>
<td>Sustainable Development</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>SDI</td>
<td>Spatial Development Initiative</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>TBC</td>
<td>Transboundary Co-operation</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>TBNRM</td>
<td>Transboundary Natural Resource Management</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>TBPA</td>
<td>Transboundary Protected Area</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>TFCA</td>
<td>Transfrontier Conservation Area</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>TFP</td>
<td>Transfrontier Park</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Abbreviation</td>
<td>Full Name</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>--------------</td>
<td>-----------</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Traffic</td>
<td>Trade Records Analysis of Flora and Fauna in International Commerce</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>UN</td>
<td>United Nations</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>UNDP</td>
<td>United Nations Development Programme</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>ENEP</td>
<td>United Nations Environment Programme</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>USAID</td>
<td>United States agency for International Development</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>WB</td>
<td>World Bank</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>WCPA</td>
<td>World Commission on Protected Areas</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Wits</td>
<td>University of Witwatersrand</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>WRI</td>
<td>World Resources Institute</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>WTTC</td>
<td>World Travel and Tourism Council</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>WWF</td>
<td>World Wide Fund for Nature</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
This book is dedicated to the memory of:

Henk van Amerom

My beloved father and friend

Who inspired in me my love for nature, history and above all people.
Acknowledgements

"If you cross the river in a crowd, the crocodile won’t bite you”

African saying

St. Ambrose (340 - 397, Bishop of Milan) already noted it centuries ago: "no duty is more urgent than that of returning thanks". For this reason, I feel lucky that I can start my thesis with this Acknowledgement page, as there are many people whose support played an essential role in the completion of this thesis. First of all, I would like to express my warm appreciation to my supervisors Prof. J.D. Rigg and Prof. J.M. Painter for their generous and stimulating input. I am also heavily indebted to Prof. G.H. Blake, under whose supervision I started this research and who has kindly continued to provide useful input on this thesis ever since. Furthermore, I would like to thank Dr. E.E. Mawdsley and Dr. E.A. Oughton for their supervisory contribution to my project, which they unfortunately had to leave prematurely, from 2001-2002. In addition, I would like to thank Dr. Lisa Lau for her feedback on my thesis and inspirational presence as well as Dr. T. Islam for kindly helping me to produce a map of Peace Parks in Southern Africa in GIS.

I furthermore would like to put on record my gratitude to all those who assisted me with my fieldwork in Southern Africa and thank them for their great helpfulness, trust and openness. I am particularly indebted to Dr. Leo Braack and Mr. Muleso Kharika Jones. Prof. K. Beavon of the Geography Department of the University of Pretoria furthermore kindly welcomed me as a visiting scholar in his department. I also like to thank Louis Gaigner very much for his help in editing parts of this thesis and Renso Smit and his family for ensuring I never lost my way in South Africa: baie dankie! I also like to extent a warm thanks to Tobilé Dlamini, thanks so much for being such a wonderful host in Swaziland!
In Holland I would like to thank my mum and brother, Diny and Joost van Amerom for their support, and Simone Veld for the support scheme! Furthermore, I am heavily indebted to Prof. W.H.S. Critchley of the Free University for commenting on parts of my thesis, as I am to Prof. R.J. Ross of the University of Leiden for his ongoing support in my research activities.

In my current place of location, Edinburgh, I know myself to be surrounded by wonderful colleagues who are not only hard working and inspirational but also great fun to be with! I also like to thank my friend and flatmate Judy Murison and Nic Murison for being my ‘foster family’ in Scotland and Sherelyn, the tiger in my life!

Finally, I would like to acknowledge the support of my sponsors: the University of Durham, the Newby Trust, the Gilchrist Trust, the Dudley Stamp Memorial Fund, British Airways, the Royal Geographical Society and the H. Muller Vaderlands Fund, without whose support this project would not have been possible.
1: Peace Parks and Transboundary Conservation: Setting the Scene

1.1 Introduction

The number and profile of ‘Peace Parks’, or Transboundary Protected Areas (TBPAs), have multiplied and escalated over the last two decades, particularly in the developing world, as have their goals. This development has, however, not been accompanied by an assessment of whether the environmental, developmental and especially the political outcomes of Peace Parks match this heightened profile. Coupled with the issue of whether Peace Parks have ‘delivered the goods’ is the issue of how to theorise Peace Parks in terms of the wider literature. This thesis aims to make a contribution to both areas, by studying the political aspects of Peace Parks in Southern Africa. This chapter provides insight into the scientific and social rationale for the research and, linked to this, outlines what the research sets out to achieve.

Four years into a new millennium the realisation of world peace and successful international co-operation continue to be listed by many as the top priorities of our time. This is not surprising. We live in an age where terrorism has become a household word, and where peace has become even more fragile and elusive. Furthermore, challenging earlier optimistic predictions in the 1990s that the emergence of a “borderless world” (Ohmae, 1990) was imminent, conflict over territory and borders continues to fuel much of today’s political conflict. No wonder, therefore, that there is so much talk of the need for cross-border co-operation and peace, and of the necessity to find non-violent solutions for conflicts.¹

In the meantime, concern over the state of our natural environment continues to grow. In spite of several costly global conferences such as the United Nations Conference on Environment and Development (Rio de Janeiro, 1994), the 1997 Kyoto Conference on Climate Change and the 2002 World Summit on Sustainable Development (Johannesburg), which were geared towards tackling the issue, environmental problems seem to be increasing, not lessening. Some gloomily speak of an ‘environmental crisis’

¹ The world’s first University for Peace, entirely aimed at discovering ways to further world peace, bears witness to the importance of this phenomenon within academic circles (University for Peace, 2004).
ongoing loss of the earth's biodiversity due to pollution and increased population levels are considered particularly alarming indicators of this trend (terborgh, 1999). it is perhaps not surprising that environmental concerns have become increasingly linked to the pursuit of peace. absence of conflict is an important condition for effective biodiversity conservation (westing, 1993; dudley et al., 2002), and so is international co-operation. since 'nature knows no boundaries', it is often only through cross-border co-operation that environmental problems can be tackled. peace and international co-operation clearly facilitate effective environment management. however, it has now also become increasingly recognised that this link may work the other way around: namely that the pursuit of cross-border environmental co-operation can be used to foster peace, by means of the international co-operation it stimulates (brock, 1991: 413). it is this notion that underlies the notion of peace parks, including those in southern africa.

1.2 setting the scene: peace parks and their rationale

peace parks constitute conservation areas that "straddle the boundaries of two or more countries" (duffy, 1997) and which are collectively managed to varying degrees, by the countries involved. moreover, an explicit aim of their establishment is to "confirm, strengthen or re-establish good relations with a neighbouring state" (shine, 1997: 39). the origin of peace parks is usually traced to the establishment of the us-canadian waterston glacier park in 1932. in the 1980s the world conservation union (iucn) started officially to promote the notion of peace parks for all conservation areas on international boundaries. since then the concept has quickly gained in importance. in less than a decade, the number of adjacent conservation areas more than doubled: there were 59 existing and potential border parks in 1988; by 1998 there were 136 straddling 112 international borders in 98 countries (see table 1.1).

2 In this thesis ‘southern Africa’ refers to south africa and its neighbouring countries: Botswana, Namibia, Zimbabwe, Mozambique, Swaziland and Lesotho. As will be explained in more depth in the next chapter, it is in this geographical area where plans for peace parks are at the most advanced stage.

3 In addition to ecological considerations, the park was created as an enduring monument “to the long-existing relationship of peace and goodwill between the people of and Governments of Canada and United States” (acts of parliament in the US and Canada, quoted in shine, 1998: 37).
### Table 1.1 Overview of growth in internationally adjoining protected area complexes per region 1988-1998

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Regions</th>
<th>Adjoining Protected Area Complexes</th>
<th>Protected area Proposed Complexes</th>
<th>3-country complexes</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Europe</td>
<td>20</td>
<td>45</td>
<td>154</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Africa</td>
<td>20</td>
<td>34</td>
<td>123</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Asia</td>
<td>7</td>
<td>25</td>
<td>76</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Central and South America</td>
<td>7</td>
<td>24</td>
<td>93</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>North America</td>
<td>5</td>
<td>8</td>
<td>42</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Total</td>
<td>59</td>
<td>136</td>
<td>488</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

*Source: Adapted from Zbicz (1999).*

The geographical range of Peace Parks also expanded. Originally a concept functioning exclusively in the global North, the notion of Peace Parks was increasingly ‘exported’ to the South in the post-Cold War era, facilitated by the ending of many conflicts in the global south. Table 1.2 lists some of the TBPA initiatives undertaken in the early 1990s.

### Table 1.2 Progress and political impact of TBPA initiatives in post-conflict areas in early 1990s

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Countries involved</th>
<th>TBPA</th>
<th>Progress</th>
<th>Changes in quality of international relations following Peace Park initiative</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Costa Rica/Nicaragua</td>
<td>Sf-a-Paz</td>
<td>Moderate</td>
<td>Relations remain tense</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Costa Rica/Panama</td>
<td>La Amistad</td>
<td>Moderate</td>
<td>Relations remain tense</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Turkey/Greece</td>
<td>Not Named (NN)</td>
<td>Slow</td>
<td>Still tense</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Bosnia/Serbia-Montenegro</td>
<td>NN</td>
<td>Negligible</td>
<td>Still tense</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Papua/New Guinea/Indones</td>
<td>NN</td>
<td>None</td>
<td>Still tense</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Jordan/Israel</td>
<td>NN</td>
<td>Negligible</td>
<td>Still tense</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Israel/Palestine</td>
<td>NN</td>
<td>Halted</td>
<td>Increasingly hostile</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>North/South Korea</td>
<td>NN</td>
<td>Halted</td>
<td>Still hostile</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

*Source: Brock (1991); Hearns (1997); Westing (1993, 1998a); Zbicz (1998).*

---
4 Protected Areas Complexes comprise not just protected areas, but also other types of nature reserves.
Although one of the last regions to embrace the Peace Parks concept, the most far-reaching Peace Parks plan, both in a spatial sense and in terms of the aims involved, is currently being developed in Southern Africa. Stimulated by the quick improvement in relations between South Africa and neighbouring countries following the end of apartheid in 1994, the notion of Peace Parks has quickly gained momentum in this region. The Southern African Peace Parks Plan\(^5\) encompasses the establishment of six TBPA s between South Africa and its neighbouring countries (Figure 1.1).

![Figure 1.1 The Southern African Peace Parks Plan](image)

The first Peace Park to be established was the Kgalagadi Park between South Africa and Botswana in 2000, whilst the Mozambican-South African part of the Great Limpopo Park, which involves Zimbabwe as well, is already partially connected by means of

\(^5\) The 'Southern African Peace Parks Plan' is not a term in official use. When referring to the six designated TBPA s on South Africa's borders, the South African Department of Environmental Affairs and Tourism (DEAT) speaks of TBPA s and TFCAs, for example, partially because the term 'Peace Parks' is closely associated with the PPF (Jones, Interview, 2003). The PPF does speak of Peace Parks in Southern Africa, but in doing so refers to the whole SADC region. As this thesis concentrates on the planned TBPA s between South Africa and neighbouring countries, as the most advanced ones (Van Amerom and Büscher, 2005) the term 'Southern African Peace Parks Plan' will be used in this thesis.
wildlife corridors to permit joint administration. The remaining four TBPA s are in various stages of progress. 6

The creation of Peace Parks on vast areas of privately, state and community-owned land in a region prone to conflict over land has various rationales. Firstly, such Transboundary Natural Resource Management (TBNRM) initiatives are motivated by the notion that bigger parks will facilitate biodiversity management, allowing for the restoration of traditional wildlife migration routes. Secondly, the creation of such 'superparks' is expected to stimulate eco tourism. On this basis, Peace Parks have been promoted as an important means to further economic growth in Southern Africa's marginalised borderlands. Through Community-Based Natural Resource Management (CBNRM) policies, the economic gains of increased eco-tourism are promoted as benefiting local communities. Finally, TBPA s are expected to act as vehicles for peace. This notion has two main premises. The social processes of cross-border co-operation in parks have been identified as a means of generating international friendship and understanding (Hanks, 2001; ITTO/IUCN, 2003). Also, the creation of TBPA s has been identified as an excellent means to solve border conflicts diplomatically (Thorsell and Harrison, 1990: 58). Table 1.3 displays some of the main terminology used in relation to transboundary conservation in Southern Africa.

Perhaps not surprisingly, given the many predicted benefits of Peace Parks, TBPA s in Southern Africa have attracted a heterogeneous collective of actors. These include national governments, national and international donors and NGOs including the World Bank, the IUCN, the United States Agency for International Development (USAID) and the Southern African Peace Parks Foundation (PPF) as well as local communities. The co-operation between this diverse grouping of actors is often presented as relatively unproblematic. The interests of the participating actors are perceived to be complementary in character (Anon., 2004). Furthermore, each actor is seen to benefit equally from participation, creating a 'win-win situation'.

---

6 Appendix I outlines the key characteristics of each TBPA.
### Table 1.3 Typologies of transboundary conservation initiatives

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Concept</th>
<th>Description</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Transboundary Protected Area (TBPA)</td>
<td>Conservation area that straddles the boundaries of two or more countries that involve some level of common management by the countries involved. Main aims: biodiversity protection, eco tourism, cultural heritage.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Peace Park (PP)</td>
<td>TBPA that in addition to the ‘common’ goals associated with TBPA (see above) explicitly aim to confirm, strengthen or re-establish good relations between the states involved (Shine, 1997: 37). Prevention/solution of tensions over disputed boundaries and the safeguarding of biodiversity areas from military activities constitute also important aims (Sandwith et al., 2002; Shine, 1997: 37).</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Peace Parks Concept (PPC)</td>
<td>The notion that TBPA can act as vehicles for peace.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Transfrontier Park (TFP)</td>
<td>A TBPA/Peace Park with wildlife conservation as the prime focus, which is managed as one integrated unit. National boundaries and other human obstacles are usually removed so that animals can roam freely (adapted from DEAT, 2003).</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Transfrontier Conservation Areas (TFCAs)</td>
<td>A TBPA/Peace Park where the different component areas have different form of conservation status, including private game reserves, communal natural resource management areas and hunting concession areas. Fences and roads may separate the various parts (Adapted from DEAT, 2003).</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Transboundary Natural Resource Management (TBNRM)</td>
<td>Any process of co-operation across boundaries aimed at increasing the effectiveness of attaining biodiversity conservation goals or other natural resource management objectives, including through sustainable usage of natural resources, for both conservation objectives and to promote socio-economic development.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>CBNRM (Community-Based Natural Resource Management)</td>
<td>Method of natural resource management that aims to advance community involvement in the management and/or benefits of protected areas.</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

7 The phenomena of conservation areas straddling international boundaries are known under different names. This table defines the most commonly used concepts and terms in Southern Africa.

8 The ‘Peace Parks Concept’ is not a term in official use. However, the notion of Peace Parks and the idea that TBPA will lead to peace are at the heart of the Peace Parks concept’s rationale.

9 The term TBNRM was introduced in publications by the Biodiversity Support Programme (a joint initiative of the WWF, the Nature Conservancy, the World Resources Institute and USAID) which defined it as “any process of co-operation across boundaries that facilitates or improves the management of natural resources to the benefit of all parties in the area concerned” (see for example Griffin et al, 1999: 1). However, it is hard to determine if transboundary environmental co-operation benefits all the parties concerned or whether this is just the formal policy objective. This definition moreover leaves out the “very important aspect of socio-economic development and the issue of sustainable use” (Sandwith, 2002: 21). For these reasons this thesis has sought to interpret the term in a more extensive manner.
1.3 The Rationale for the Research

The concept of Peace Parks has become highly influential in shaping perspectives on the political aspects of TBPAs. Perhaps because people tend to be positively predisposed to possibilities for peace and increased animal welfare, the Southern African Peace Parks project has attracted wide and highly favourable press coverage, including beyond the region (Warburton-Lee, 1999; Van der Linden, 2000; Godwin, 2001; Bittorf, 2002; Süddeutsche Zeitung, 2002; Pabst, 2002; Michler, 2003).

The belief that Southern Africa’s TBPAs will be successful and deliver positive political outcomes, boosting regional stability and peace, is so great, that - before Southern Africa’s TBPAs are even operational - it has led to a revival of the interest in the concept of Peace Parks as a conflict resolution mechanism. Even a seasoned politician like Nelson Mandela declared: “I know of no political movement, no philosophy, no ideology, which does not agree with the peace parks concept as we see it going into fruition today. It is a concept that can be embraced by all” (Mandela, 2001). Far-reaching claims by both politicians and environmentalists that TBPAs will work as ‘Peace Parks’ helping to bring about a much yearned for ‘African Renaissance’ (Landsberg and Kornegay, 1998; Van Amerom and Büscher, 2005) seem, if public rhetoric is anything to go by, valid.

This dissertation will argue that, altogether, the Peace Parks concept represents more of “a dream” (Draper et al., 2004) than a realistic outlook on the political aspects of TBPAs. The notion of Peace Parks implicitly requires idealised images of the working of power and politics. The following assumptions or beliefs underpin the concept:

- Institutions are efficient actors working in the collective interest of the people they represent
- Unequal relationships between actors in general need not affect democratic decision-making at the project level
- Organisations are coherent groups that share the same interests

---

10 Nelson Mandela made this statement at the ceremony marking the relocation of elephants of the South African Kruger Park into the Mozambican Coutada 16 Park (now renamed the Limpopo National Park) in the context of the creation of the Great Limpopo TBPA on the 4th of October 2001.

11 The pan-Africanist ‘African Renaissance’ notion has been promoted by South African president Thabo Mbeki as a means to promote African unity and peace. Two important components of this concept are a return to African cultural values as well as an intensive interstate co-operation within Africa to tackle poverty and to strengthen its position in the world.
• States exercise full control over their borderlands
• The interests pursued by the actors are those that are officially expressed
• Participation in co-operation is always voluntary (as opposed to being pressured by another party)
• Politics is a transparent process
• There are enough resources to share\(^\text{12}\)

In reality, these political factors are likely to be absent or only partially in place. As a direct consequence, the presence of a political and socio-economic environment receptive to/supportive of the creation of TBPAs is by no means a given. The absence of such favourable political conditions means that TBPAs are as likely to create conflict as consensus and understanding, as is confirmed by the ongoing research on TBPAs (Draper & Wels, 2002; Hughes, 2003; Sotho and Munthali, 2003; Fall, 2003a). The failure to question the existence of these parameters has the effect of virtually depoliticising the whole TBNRM project. Instead, a highly one-sided picture emerges in which the potential positive political aspects of TBNRM feature highly but which glosses over or insufficiently recognises the pitfalls and conflicts of such management. More academic research on the political aspects of Peace Parks is imperative. This project aims to do so with regard to TBPAs in Southern Africa.

In achieving this aim, the dissertation focuses particularly on the interaction between regional politics and the social dynamics in TBPAs. To be able to understand the rationale behind this research focus and appreciate its scientific and social relevance it is necessary to examine the underpinning concepts of and empirical findings on TBPAs. This exercise requires engagement with three different clusters of literature, starting with the policy literature on TBPAs. Perspectives on TBPAs have been greatly shaped by the 'optimistic outlook' on the political working of TBPAs presented in such promotional literature. Furthermore, to test the validity of the PPC as an analytical tool for assessing the political working of TBPAs and to gain more insight into the political issues that might accompany the creation and management of TBPAs, empirical findings on the performance of TBPA initiatives preceding the Southern African Peace Parks plan will be considered, by means of an exploration of relevant academic or 'critical literature' in this area. Altogether, academic studies can be said to represent a 'doubting' view on the Peace Parks concept, questioning its validity. Thirdly, to assess to what extent identified

\(^{12}\) These assumptions and their limitations will be explored in more depth throughout the thesis.
obstacles to the peace-building potential of TBPAs may also feature in the Southern African policy context, an overview will be given of emerging findings on the political aspects of TBPAs in Southern Africa.

1.4. Existing literature on TBPAs: origin and focus

For a policy concept of global importance that is promoted as a means to foster peace, the body of literature on the political aspects of TBPAs is very thin, consisting largely of policy documents. The literature can be broadly divided into two categories, notably the 'promotional' and the 'critical' literatures, which respectively employ an 'optimistic outlook' and a 'critical outlook' on TBPAs:

A) The 'promotional literature' encompasses a diverse body of publications issued by organisations involved in the promotion of TBPAs, such as the World Conservation Union (IUCN), United Nations Environmental Programme (UNEP), the World Bank, the World Wide Fund for Nature (WWF), the United States Agency for International Development (USAID) and, since 1997, the South African-based PPF. Papers on Peace Parks in academic journals by environmentalists (see for example Westing, 1998b; Zbicz, 1999; Hanks, 2001) working for these organisations are another component of the 'promotional literature'. Reflecting the roles of these organisations, it is perhaps not surprising that the views promoted by this literature, including those on the political working of TBPAs, are generally highly positive. Partly as a result of the myriad organisations that seek to promote it, the notion that TBPAs can act as vehicles for peace has also been introduced under other labels. Even when not using the term 'Peace Parks', the literature on TBPAs largely envisages the political working of TBPAs along positive lines as stimulating regional stability and peace (Braack, 2002a: 16). In Southern Africa, the online publications of the Biodiversity Support Programme (jointly published by USAID, the World Bank and the WWF) that promote the notion of 'Transboundary Natural Resource Management' (TBNRM) are of particular relevance (Griffin et al., 1999: 3, 5). As such, there is little difference between the assertions in the Peace Parks concept and in TBNRM (Wolmer, 2003). On the other hand, the latter literature has increasingly strong reservations against the notion that TBPAs will by definition act as Peace Parks (see for example Van der Linde et al., 2001).13

---

13 So do policy assessments of the IUCN Regional Office Southern Africa (ROSA) (Katerere et al, 2001; Jones and Chonguita, 2001; Mohamed-Katerere, 2001) and InWEnt (including InWEnt, 2002;
B) The 'critical academic literature' consists mostly of academic studies on the co-operative processes involved in the creation or management of a given TBPA. Not all the studies within this category explicitly question the optimistic outlook of the promotional literature on the political aspects of TBPAs. However, the findings generally present a critical view. For the purpose of this thesis, the critical academic literature will be considered in two parts: academic studies on the political performance of TBPAs outside Southern Africa and academic works studying the Southern African Peace Parks plan.

Having outlined some key features of the literature on the political aspects of TBPAs, summarised in Table 1.4, the 'optimistic view' on TBPAs in the promotional literature will be considered.

1.5. The optimistic view: perspectives on the political working of TBPAs in the promotional literature

Several ways in which TBPAs can deliver positive political aspects, that is fostering regional stability and peace, have been envisaged in the promotional literature. In essence, these can be traced to three interlinked premises. It is believed that the establishment and subsequent management of TBPAs can contribute to:

- Increased international trust, understanding and reconciliation, or more simply put, international friendship (McNeil, 1990; Thorsell and Harrison, 1990; Blake, 1993; Goldblatt, 1993; Weed, 1994; Sandwith, 2001)
- Increased international co-operation in other policy areas and at numerous geographical scales (Thorsell, 1990, Ramutsindela and Tsheola, 2000)
<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Category</th>
<th>Nature of literature</th>
<th>Outlook</th>
<th>Leading beliefs/ observations</th>
<th>Emerging Research needs</th>
</tr>
</thead>
</table>
| Promotional literature | - Policy documents research published by IUCN, EUROPARC, UNEP, the World Bank, WWF, USAID, INwent and the Peace Parks Foundation.  
- Academic articles environmentalists advocating Peace Parks | Optimistic   | TBPAs will work as vehicles for peace, by reducing conflict/promoting international friendship between states.                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                   | * Test key notions of PPC                                    |
| Critical academic literature | - Academic studies on existing TBPAs or TBPA initiatives | Doubting    | Individual TBPAs may occasionally work as vehicles for better international relations, but on whole PPC lacks empirical backing: TBPAs are not only often affected by, but may also add to/introduce conflict.                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                               | * Expand research base to include conflict potential           |
|                        | - Academic studies on TBPA initiatives in Southern Africa                               | Sceptical   | TBPAs in current set up in Southern Africa carry high conflict potential and could undermine peace, by promoting preservationist and economic agendas of (white) national and international business and conservationist elites at expense rights of local communities. Also high potential for regional tensions, but this issue is as yet relatively under-researched. | * Need to consider political dynamics of TBPAs at micro level and wider regional political dynamics              |

11
The PPC also has a fourth premise, notably the notion that TBPAs will not produce conflict or add to existing conflict. Perhaps because such an outcome would undermine or destroy the peace-building potential of TBPAs, this notion is implicit and it has received little or no thought. Moreover, the other three premises are often merely noted, rather than critically examined. Whilst it is clear that conflict reduction, increased international friendship and more co-operation can foster peace, it is far less clear how exactly TBPAs promote these conditions. Figure 1.2 displays the rationale behind the PPC graphically.

Figure 1.2 The rationale of how TBPAs become Peace Parks

Where no more direct explanations are offered, literature drawing attention to the presupposed potential of TBPAs to act as vehicles for peace frequently refer to an article by McNeil (1990) (see for example Griffin, 1999; Koch, 1994: [1] 36-37). McNeil (1990: 2), however, merely points out that TBPAs have “an unrealised potential for reducing international tensions and for creating conditions, which make peace more likely”. He also claims that “improved prospects of peace” constitute “inevitable secondary effects” where the parks result in improved natural resource management and in “the protection of indigenous minority people” (McNeil, 1990: 25). Finally, he seems to view the peace-building capacities of TBPAs as working relatively independently of the political context in which they function, his position being that “the creation and management of protected
areas need not wait for peaceful conditions nor for agreeable partners on both sides of a border...these parks can precede, lead to, and result in, as well as help to maintain, peace among nations and communities” (McNeil, 1990: 25). While confirming the notion that TBPAs may foster peace, McNeil’s article goes little way towards explaining or supporting these claims. Nevertheless, it is possible to draw some common assumptions and key themes from the general literature.

**Increased security**

TBPAs are perceived to promote security in various ways. Firstly, inter-state co-operation in TBPAs is predicated to foster ‘environmental security’ (Westing, 1993, 1998a), by helping states to peacefully negotiate competing demands on shared natural resources like water, and promote more sustainable natural resource use (Tevera and Moyo, 2000; Halle et al., 2002). This is alleged to significantly reduce the possibility of inter-state armed conflict over these resources (Tevera and Moyo, 2000; Halle et al., 2002). Although TBPAs do not necessarily contain those natural resources over which competition is the fiercest, the notion that TBPAs will prevent inter-state conflict over precious natural resources has been increasingly used by conservationists to argue its case, especially in developing countries (McDowell, 1998: 24-25). Sandwith et al. (2001), for example, recommend that joint anti-poaching patrols in TBPAs could also be used to combat other forms of transboundary crime. Thirdly, it has also been claimed that TBPAs can protect “indigenous minority people” (McNeil, 1990: 25; Westing, 1993), but this notion is, again, little explored and substantiated.

---

14 An overview is given of the various political circumstances in which TBPAs have been established to either reduce conflict or promote peace, but this does of course not constitute proof that these parks have indeed had positive political outcomes. Relatively little is said on the ‘how’ of the process.

15 The notion of ‘environmental security’ is grounded in the belief that human-induced environmental pressures may seriously affect national and international security and that they will increasingly do so as a result of growing population numbers (http://www.library.utoronto.ca/pcs/thresh/thresh1.htm) and particularly over scarce resources like water. The pursuit of environmental security has increasingly become a part of the formal security policies of states (Nathan & Honwana, 1995: 5). However, the notion of environmental security seems often subjected to other state interests (Grundy-Warr and Rajah, 1997), and the linkages between “environmental decline and conflict, and between resource scarcity and political instability” (Grundy-Warr and Rajah, 1997: 150) are weak and, generally, indirect (Ayoob, 1995:10 quoted in Grundy-Warr and Rajah, 1997: 150).

16 In his capacity as IUCN Director-General.

17 Sandwith et al. (2001: 19-21), further explore this topic, listing concrete guidelines for “involving and benefiting local people” (p 19). It remains however unclear why the involvement of indigenous people is considered particularly important (p. 12). Furthermore, the right to establish TBPAs,
Settlement of boundary disputes

One of the most important ways in which TBPAs are expected to promote peace is through their perceived capacity to ameliorate inter-state conflict over disputed borderlands (Griffin et al., 1999, see also McNeil, 1990; McManus, 1994; Ramutsindela and Tseola, 2000). By offering an alternative to military presence in the borderland, TBPAs are thought to encourage demilitarization of sensitive border areas (Brock, 1991: 413). Westing (1993, 1998a) envisages on this premise a Peace Park between North and South Korea, as a first step towards reunification, in place of the current buffer zone between the countries. Such agreements will be difficult to achieve however.18

TBPAs could also play an important psychological role in post conflict border areas, encouraging rapprochement between former belligerent countries. Dr. Anton Rupert, the head of the PPF envisages that the creation of a TBPA on a partnership basis, implying equality with the victorious party, makes it easier for the subjugated government to avoid “loss of face” in accepting defeat. This would in turn reduce tendencies for revenge and retaliation (Rupert, Interview, 200219). Furthermore, the international credit that former belligerent countries are likely to receive for jointly setting up a Peace Park, could, in combination with expected eco-tourism benefits, be used by the governments involved to ‘sell’ the new border settlement to their citizens as a triumph (Rupert, Interview, 2002). Thorsell (1990b) also perceives the very act of agreeing to co-operate as a giant step forwards in the building of goodwill between countries (Thorsell, 1990b: 58). Co-operation in Peace Parks is thought to be most beneficial, however, when it promotes intensive and large-scale inter-state contacts.

Enhancing inter-state communication and contacts

including in areas inhabited by local communities, is taken for granted, and assumed to go ahead regardless of the outcomes of community consultation processes, thereby undermining the negotiating power of this group.

18 Advocates of Peace Parks had arranged for some preliminary and informal discussions on a Peace Park between scientists from these two countries, who indicated their enthusiasm. However, upon hearing of these discussions, the North Korean government forbade its scientists to attend any further meetings, stating that they undermined national safety (Anonymous source, Interview, IUCN). Later on the North Korean government did indicate support for the idea, but withdrew this soon thereafter (Westing, 1998a).

19 An overview of interview dates and positions of interviewees is provided in Appendix II.
TBPAs are expected to generate better international relations, by means of their perceived capacity to boost cross-border co-operation at the inter-state level, including in policy areas unrelated to TBPAs (Ramutsindela and Tsheola, 2000: 201). This notion reveals a strong belief that the international co-operation in TBPAs will by nature deliver satisfactory results for the countries involved. This expectation is sometimes underpinned by functionalist insights perceiving environmental co-operation, as a type of 'low politics' being a relatively easy form of international co-operation (Brock, 1991). More generally, international co-operation is simply assumed to deliver positive political outcomes bringing nations closer together **per se**. This notion is visible in the IUCN/WCPA's definition of Peace Parks, ranking co-operation alongside peace as policy goals:

*Transboundary protected areas ... are dedicated to ... the promotion of peace and cooperation. Peace and cooperation encompasses building trust, understanding and reconciliation between nations, the prevention and resolution of conflict, and the fostering of cooperation between and among countries, communities, agencies and other stakeholders.* ([http://www.iucn.org/themes/wcpa/theme/parks/parks.html](http://www.iucn.org/themes/wcpa/theme/parks/parks.html)).

It is seen as desirable, if not essential, that co-operation embraces the highest possible levels, as "this will .... promote confidence-building measures between states." (Hearns, 1997: 229). Two main ways in which co-operation in TBPAs can promote increased and higher-level contacts between countries are envisaged. Firstly, the 'trickle up' effect implies that the cross-border friendship and understanding generated through cross-border co-operation at the parks level will eventually 'trickle up' to the highest governmental levels (McNeil, 1990: 37; Hamilton et al., 1996). The ability of low-level co-operation between parks to eventually generate the governmental support and involvement necessary for TBPA creation is often accepted as a given. McNeil (1990: 36) for example suggests it is not necessary to "wait for peace" or even "for a partner" in inducing TBPAs. Secondly, extending the 'trickle up' effect horizontally, it has been envisaged that once national governments co-operate on TBPAs they will find the benefits of this co-operation to be so great that it will have a 'spill-over effect' into other, more contested policy areas. Thorsell argues on this basis that co-operation on conservation between Turkey and Greece in the Evros River "may pave the way towards settlement of more contentious issues" (Thorsell, 1990b: 58). Echoing new insights on CBNRM (Buckles, 1999) and reflecting the increased involvement of non-state actors in
TBPAs, co-operation between communities in a cross-border context and the involvement of NGOs is sometimes also perceived to build better international relations, as is also reflected in the IUCN/WCPA’s definition of Peace Parks (see previous page).

**Economic Linkages**

The notion that the economic interests of states in Peace Parks will bind them together and serve as a disincentive for conflict is another important argument underpinning the concept of Peace Parks. It is claimed that TBPAs literally ‘pay off’ for countries, by increasing eco-tourism revenues. Shared interests in maintaining or further expanding this eco-tourism base would allegedly ensure that states will want to continue cooperating in a TBPA. Because TBPAs tend to increase levels of economic interdependency between countries, this notion is furthermore thought to be self-perpetuating.

With its interests intertwined locally with that of its neighbour(s), a country would act against its self-interest to provoke conflict with neighbour(s), and endanger economic gains. It could also be argued that because of its earlier investments in a TBPA a state’s withdrawal from a TBPA will be costly and therefore a last resort (Combrink, Interview, 2002). Whilst this line of reasoning is quite logical, it problematically views the development of the parks as occurring largely in isolation from other political processes influencing the quality and nature of inter-state relations.

**Regionalisation**

TBPAs are also seen to foster peace, through their ability to stimulate regionalization or even regional integration. One way in which TBPAs are expected to do so is through the increase in economic and infrastructural inter-dependency as outlined above. The cross-border contacts at various levels and communication that TBPAs stimulate are furthermore expected to establish regional identities and interests, internalise norms, operationalise routine international communication, and marginalise the acceptability of the use of force, thereby promoting regionalisation (Zbicz and Green, 1998: 204; Brock, 1991: 421). Experiences in Europe, however, indicate that the potential of and scope for TBPAs depend upon the speed of regionalisation, more so than the other way around (Rossi, 1990: 71; Stein, 2002: 18). Nevertheless, TBPAs could contribute to regionalisation and are increasingly promoted for that purpose, especially in the developing world.
1.6 A lack of evidence

Having discussed the rationale behind the PPC, it is time to study its applicability. On the basis of the reasoning outlined in the previous section, the political working of TBPAs is expected to follow and produce favourable political patterns resulting in increased regional stability and peace. Whilst it is conceded that the creation of TBPAs can be difficult, because of, amongst other reasons, “competing interests for the same land” and the “engagement of sovereign states” (Westing, 1998: 91 and Fall, 1999: 252), the PPC predicts that all or nearly all TBPAs, regardless of place and political context, will deliver positive political outcomes fostering peace and regional stability. McDowell (1998) expresses this view when asserting that “TBPAs usually work” [emphasis in original] and that they “justify the label Peace Parks” apart from a few exceptions (McDowell, 1998: 24). This claim lacks substantiation. The promotional literature often merely announces TBPAs to be Peace Parks in the literal sense of the word, for the simple reason that they have been designed to promote such an aim, or these TBPAs are implicitly suggested to work along these lines. Frequently mentioned examples include the Si-A-Paz\(^{20}\) Park and the La Amistad Park in Central America (McNeil, 1990) whilst European TBPAs are also implicitly suggested to have worked as Peace Parks. Over time, regardless of actual performance, the working of such a TBPA as a Peace Park often becomes ‘received wisdom’.

More in-depth (case) studies on the political performance of individual TBPAs indicate, however, that the political working of TBPAs can rarely be assumed to work along the lines of the PPC, but are often conditional on external political factors. Proceedings of an IUCN/PPF conference on “Protected areas as a vehicle for international cooperation” (1998) list various articles considering the political performance of TBPAs. Significantly, many identify great constraints to the peace-building potential of TBPAs in practice, including weak legal and institutional frameworks (Shine, 1998: 37-48), problematic security situations and lack of finances in post-conflict areas\(^{21}\) and a lack of tangible benefits for local communities (Katerere, 1998: 67-74). In assessing TBPA planning between Cameroon, the Congo and the Central African Republic, Gartland (1998: 242-247) identifies an absence of domestic stability, as well as a lack of homogeneity in

\[^{20}\] Literally translated as “Yes to Peace”.

policy outlooks on both sides of the border, and dissimilarity in economic conditions as key obstacles to TBPA construction. In drawing attention to the need for the creation of a Peace Park between North and South Korea, Westing (1998: 234-241), a main instigator of the Peace Parks concept, also testifies to the limiting impact of conflict and hostile governmental relations upon the creation of Peace Parks.

Many more articles stress the positive political working of TBPAs in line with the PPC, confirming their potential for fostering international trust and regional stability (Zbicz and Green (1998); Brunner (1998: 93-116) and Cerovsky (1998: 117-120) on TBPAs in Eastern Europe; and Castro-Chamberlain (1998: 49-60) and Godoy (1998: 248-253) on Central America). However, these optimistic claims are often contradicted by academic assessments of TBPAs’ performance. Table 1.2 also indicates major constraints to the working of the PPC, reviewing progress and tangible political effects of various TBPAs which were established to reduce conflict. The next section summarises the academic insights and findings on the performance of existing TBPAs or TBPA initiatives in regions other than Southern Africa. For analytical reasons, the overview will concentrate on critical accounts of TBPAs displayed as ‘flagship TBPAs’ in the promotional literature. Before considering studies of TBPAs in a particular regional context, the review will first outline the findings of more general enquiries into the political working of TBPAs.

1.7 The doubting outlook: empirical findings on TBPA construction and functioning

When regarded in their entirety, academic empirical findings on TBPA practice tend to question the validity of the PPC, demonstrating instead how the performance of TBPAs is context-dependent and how TBPAs are often endowed with considerable conflict potential.

The most optimistic account is offered by Zbicz (1999). Providing an overview of the various levels of co-operation in TBPAs worldwide and the political factors influencing this process, Zbicz’s PhD thesis gives considerable credence to the PPC. Although it also identifies significant constraints to its operation, this work confirms the idea that co-operation in TBPAs can make a significant contribution to peace, by fostering international understanding and friendship. Based on questionnaires sent out to a wide range of park managers, the work portrays TBPA co-operation as a highly valued and
appreciated exercise, with the potential to establish better international relations. Zbicz perceives the peace-building potential of TBPAs to be often limited by a lack of high level political support for TBPAs, preventing informal co-operation at the parks level from turning into a formalised TBPA, allowing for joint management of a given area. Sovereignty concerns are often used to explain this lack of political support, but Zbicz notes that these often merely function as “propaganda used to justify exploitation of shared natural resources” since TBPAs do not necessarily require the relinquishment of sovereignty, “willingness to cooperate in management decisions and monitoring” (p. 94) being sufficient. Zbicz observes, however, how even in unfavourable political situations where states use territorial sovereignty as arguments against cooperation in TBPAs, “cooperation is still occurring. The bulk of it may still be at the lowest levels, but some has proceeded to even the highest levels” (p. 94). Altogether Zbicz is optimistic about the prospects for co-operation in TBPAs and their ability to deliver positive political effects. Although acknowledging that there is no conclusive evidence as yet, Zbicz accepts the peace-building potential of TBPAs as a given that merely needs more time to develop (see also Zbicz and Green, 1998: 204). Zbicz bases her findings however largely on the opinions and perceptions of park managers and rangers. Cognisance has to be taken of the fact that as relatively low-level operators who are interested in maximising conservation benefits, this interest group tends to greatly favour cross-border co-operation, compared to other and potentially more influential actors like politicians. The lack of face-to-face interviewing and further field-research, introduces the risk that difficulties in co-operation at the parks level and more sensitive issues remain unreported.

Brock (1991) and even more so Koch (1994), present a more critical outlook on the PPC, although both stress the potential of TBPAs to build peace. Highlighting that conclusive evidence for the concept has not been provided thus far, Brock (1991) questions the notion that Peace Parks can work as relatively independent variables in international politics, and urges stakeholders to keep “expectations within bounds when it comes to the possible spin-off effects of ecological cooperation for peace” (p. 414). Koch (1994) underscores these concerns, arguing that the renewed outbreaks of inter-state conflict in borderlands where Peace Parks have been established suggest that the working of TBPAs as vehicles for peace cannot be assumed (Koch, 1994: 40). Unfortunately, Koch’s work does not further assess the underlying reasons for this phenomenon, merely using this observation to caution against manipulation of the PPC by conservationists seeking the speedy advance of the creation of protected areas in post-conflict borderlands areas, at the
expense of community land rights, under the pretext of promoting peace (Koch, 1994: 41).

Hearn's (1997) provides more insight into the limited ability of TBPAs to foster peace in post-conflict areas. Reviewing progress in Central America’s Peace Parks plan as a means of assessing TBPAs opportunities in the South China Sea, Hearn’s study (1997) indicates that effective co-operation between former adversaries in TBPAs often continues to be problematic, in spite of formally signed agreements. Contradicting predictions that Central America’s TBPAs work as vehicles for peace and foster regional stability (McNeil, 1990; Weed, 1997), Hearn finds that a lack of equitable funding mechanisms, disparity in interests and capacities in promoting the TBPA between countries, and historical inertia have significantly hampered progress with Central America’s Peace Parks Plan, with the notable exception of the Panama-Colombian Darién-Los Katios Park. Hearn notes for example with regard to the Si A Paz Park (Nicaragua-Costa Rica) and the La Amistad Park (Costa Rica-Panama) how:

Even though both political will and conservation incentives promote cooperation within the Si A Paz International Peace Park, the lack of a stable funding source and a favourable historical inertia have impeded any real cooperative initiatives. The La Amistad Biosphere Reserve suffers not so much from a lack of funding or historical inertia as from a lack of political will. The necessity for and/or benefits from joint management structures are not readily evident to the governments, and consequently little cooperation occurs (1997: 236).

As a result of the absence of these conditions, many planned TBPAs have failed to materialise. This includes the proposed linkage of the Rio Coco Bosawas Biosphere Reserve in Nicaragua with the Rio Plátano Biosphere Reserve in Honduras, where lack of enthusiasm and confidence on the parts of the governments and local communities hampered co-operation (p. 232). Another and highly significant constraint to effective

---

22 Part of the designated 3,200 km long Meso Central American Biological Corridor, supported by the 1989 Central American Convention for Environmental Protection. See Burnett (1998) for more details.

23 There are also maritime TBPAs. Blake (1997) offers more detail.

24 This notion has been particularly promoted with regard to the Sì-a-Paz Park and the La Amistad Park.
TBPA co-operation in the Americas has been “unresolved border claims” (p. 244), as reflected in the limited progress made on natural resource management between Guatemala and Belize, due to “continued border skirmishes” (p. 244).

Hearns’ findings also point to the possibility of TBPA’s turning into a new source of conflict, by stimulating competition and highlighting policy differences between countries. Whilst it was hoped “that eco-tourism would unite regional cooperation in transboundary resource management in Central America” it turned into “a source of contention in the Si A Paz where Nicaragua feels left out of a growing trade”, the TBPA being relatively difficult to access from that country (1997: 234).25 Conversely, the Costa Ricans have condemned the Nicaragua government for allowing its farmers to settle on its side of the TBPA, placing the watershed at risk (Hamann, 1993, quoted in Hearns, 1997: 233). Although he remains optimistic on the options and extension of the Central American Peace Parks plan, Hearns (1997) concludes that the chances for formalised TBPA’s will be small in regions that continue to be dominated by a “bellicose history between states” and “militarisation” (p. 245). For this reason he foresees few chances for TBPA development in the South China Sea.

Duffy’s research on the political aspects of Peace Parks in Central America, with its focus on the “politics surrounding Peace Parks in Belize” (2001: 2)26 also demonstrates that, far from being straightforward, the creation of TBPA’s in Central America constitutes a long and problem-ridden process, the political outcomes of which are still unresolved (Duffy, 2001). Focusing on the problematic nature of borderlands in the developing world, Duffy observes how “even if arrangements for Peace Parks in Central America are to be successfully negotiated, and appropriate management structures put in place” effective function of these parks might be difficult to achieve. (Duffy, 2001: 41). Whilst international conservation agencies and national governments aspire to extend their control over these areas by means of TBPA’s, local actors often seek to resist this

25 Similar problems besieged co-operation between Kenya’s Maasai Mara National Reserve and Tanzania’s Serengeti National Park, with Kenya standing accused of taking most advantage of eco-tourism at the expense of Tanzania, by allegedly luring their lions over the border with bush meat. Some level of co-operative management was maintained however (Thorsell, 1990) and a new initiative has been started to form a TBPA (Muhanga, Interview, 2002; Mwanauta, Interview, 2002.

26 The outcomes of this research were first displayed in a conference paper in 2001, which was consulted for this PhD (see also Bibliography). They will also be published in 2005 in the Review of International Studies under the title: ‘The Politics of Global Environmental Governance: The Powers and Limitations of Transfrontier Conservation Areas in Central America’. 

21
influence. In areas characterised by lucrative smuggling and all sorts of other cross-border “illegal and unregulated” transactions (Duffy, 2001: 4) and often inhabited by communities seeking to ‘withdraw’ from the central government, the creation of Peace Parks tends to be unwelcome and resisted (Duffy, 2003). Adding another layer of complexity, interests in such illegal transboundary flows are found at the highest governmental levels, as a result of which governments may covertly seek to frustrate co-operation in Peace Parks, under the cloak of fear of loss of sovereignty (Duffy, 1997; Singh, 2000; Duffy, 2001). In reality, TBPAs extend governmental control in borderlands, allowing governments to attract foreign funding for increased patrolling, to establish infrastructure and other measures which increasingly connect the borderland to the central state. In promoting greater governmental control in areas thus far characterised by “dysgovernance” (Duffy, forthcoming), TBPAs might promote increased political stability in the borderlands they cover. On the other hand, Duffy’s research on the Zimbabwean-Mozambican Chimanimani TBPA (2002) illustrates, like Singh’s (2000), how authoritarian governments might seek to suppress the rights of local communities generally not supportive of their regime by means of their increased presence through TBPAs. In such a scenario the creation of TBPAs could spark off armed resistance, thereby undermining political stability and peace.

The notion that problematic regional and borderland contexts can make it more difficult for TBPAs to exercise their presumed potential to ‘build bridges across boundaries’ should not divert attention from the fact that troubled relations at the micro level of TBPA co-operation can also be an important inhibiting factor. Experience with TBPAs in the European Union illustrate that transboundary co-operation at the parks level often functions within its own constraints. As a highly regionalised political entity characterised by generally amicable inter-state relations, Europe can be said to provide an ideal regional context in which to set up TBPAs. Feeding into a favourable environment, the peace-building effects of TBPAs could in theory therefore be used to an optimum in this region. However, experience with TBPAs in Europe indicates that even in relatively favourable political circumstances TBPAs may generate significant conflict and tensions. Stein, the co-ordinator of EUROPARC, a European NGO stimulating and supporting the expansion of the TBPA concept in Europe, identifies a “lack of respect for other cultures and cultural misunderstandings” as a key obstacle to effective and successful transboundary environmental co-operation in Europe (Stein, Interview, 2002; see also Stein, 2002: 18).
Fall’s research (2003a, 2003b) on TBPAs in Europe confirms this notion. Fall assesses co-operation in five European TBPA initiatives, notably the Polish-Slovakian Tatry/Tatra Biosphere Reserve, the Czech-Polish Krkonose/Karkonosze Biosphere Reserve (both established), and the designated Romanian/Ukraine Danube Delta Biosphere Reserve, the Polish/Slovakian/Ukrainian East Carpathians Biosphere Reserve and the German/French Pfälzerwald/Vosges du Nord Biosphere Reserve. Frequently, clashing cultural perceptions and differing national priorities hamper these TBPA initiatives. Fall illustrates, how different cultural perceptions and prioritisations, for example, can easily obstruct both the joint mapping of the reserve in question and the creation of a coherent management unit; the two most crucial stages in land planning in a transboundary context (2003b: 96). Two out of five TBPAs never managed to reach agreement on joint mapping, including the German-French Pfälzerwald/Vosges du Nord Biosphere Reserve, which while “originally designated on the basis of a common zonation, no longer shares one” due to “different understandings of zonation” (2003b: 97). Illustrating the differences in outlook the German park manager notes how “In France, they also want to protect all cultural heritage in core areas, so in their core areas you may find such castles-but this is impossible in Germany” (quoted in Fall, 2003b: 97). The creation of a coherent management unit is even more complex due to administrative problems such as differing legislative networks and conceptualisations of positions of authority between countries.

Inter-agency co-operation within a given country may also pose problems, where the organisations involved pursue competing policies (p. 99). In spite of these complexities, common management of TBPAs is often encouraged without much further thought being given to these complexities and possible solutions.

The findings outlined above indicate grave limitations to the core predictions of the Peace Parks concept. This includes the expectation that TBPAs will not produce new or aggravate existing conflicts. Three problematic political issues stand out, which are mutually interlinked. Firstly, in a context of regional tensions, co-operation in TBPAs can easily become affected by these tensions and further add to them. This risk seems especially great in post-conflict regions with an ongoing high conflict potential. Secondly, and as a direct consequence, the presupposed ‘bottom-up effect’ through which the assumed positive political outcomes of co-operation in TBPAs would foster better international relations and peace often does not come about. Finally, co-operation at the
micro level is often a highly complex process as a result of different outlooks on co-operation and clashing interests.

Having reviewed the experience with TBPAs in regions besides Southern Africa, questions arise regarding the extent by which the observed political patterns might also apply to the Southern African Peace Parks plan, and as such would need to be actively considered as part of the research focus. To facilitate this analysis, it is useful to briefly consider some key political characteristics of the Southern African region that are likely to interact with the political performance of its TBPAs. This will also help us understand the findings of academic research on TBPA performance in Southern Africa.

1.8 The political context of TBPAs in Southern Africa

Considering Southern Africa’s political context, and the nature of the setup of TBPAs in Southern Africa, it seems likely that, rather than only delivering positive political results in line with the PPC, the Southern African Peace Parks plan will be confronted with one or more of the constraints identified in the TBPAs discussed above. In spite of the return of peace to the region and the regional co-operation South Africa and its neighbours pursue in the Southern African Development Community (SADC), Southern Africa remains a region with a relatively high conflict potential (Van Nieuwkerk, 2000). The considerable power inequalities between South Africa, as the region’s dominating economic and military force, constitute a source of tension (Odén, 1998) while low democratisation levels in the region often promote political instability. In states with a relatively high number of white settlers, limited access to land for the black majority is also a source of potential conflict (Bradshaw and Ndegwa, 2000). Moreover, conservation constitutes a highly contested practice in the region, as a result of the relative shortage of land. Finally, the varied and relatively high number of organisations and actors all forward different local, national, regional and international interests and often employ very different notions and worldviews of development which hamper the presupposed ‘peaceful-co-existence’ within TBPAs (Fakir, 2003: 3). Transboundary conservation in Southern Africa therefore takes place in a relatively difficult context and it seems likely that TBPAs might both be affected by, and produce, bi-lateral and regional conflict.

However, TBPAs will have dynamics of their own and predetermined views on their political performance need to be avoided. The Kgalagadi Park seems to have had positive
political effects\textsuperscript{27}, strengthening ties between South Africa and Botswana, thereby living up to its expectation as a Peace Park. The apparent success of the Kgalagadi Park and its swift establishment is often used by proponents of Peace Parks in Southern Africa to justify the creation of Peace Parks in the region in general. However, this conclusion is problematic. Firstly, while the Kgalagadi seems so far to have been successful in fostering better international relations, the application of CBNRM strategies, a vital component of Peace Parks in the Southern African context, has been highly problematic with increasing conflict between the indigenous Bushmen and South African park authorities (Interview, Grossman, 2003). This phenomenon furthermore is not limited to the Kgalagadi Park, but is a general feature of Southern Africa’s Peace Park plan. Secondly, the Kgalagadi Park has been established in uniquely favourable circumstances. Unhindered by great disparities in wealth or foreign policy outlooks, ties between South Africa and Botswana are, on the whole, very cordial and there is a record of intensive co-operation. Thirdly, co-operation between park authorities in the Kalahari goes back several decades and a transfrontier park was already \textit{de facto} in existence. These facilitating factors are largely absent in Southern Africa’s other five designated Peace Parks, which are in various stages of development.\textsuperscript{28} Consequently, these are endowed with considerable conflict potential.

1.9 Academic findings on Southern Africa’s Peace Parks plan: The sceptical view\textsuperscript{29}

In studying the political aspects of Southern Africa’s Peace Parks plan, most academic research has thus far concentrated on the problems surrounding the implementation of CBNRM policies, and the underlying causes of these problems, usually drawing upon the

\textsuperscript{27} Perhaps due to the strong focus on CBNRM policy implementation within academic studies on the Southern African Peace Parks Plan (see next section), the effects of the creation of the Kgalagadi Park upon the quality of Botswana-South African relations has been seldom studied. My interviews with key actors in this process, including Modishe (2002) and Jones (2002) confirm however claims by proponents of Peace Parks that the Kgalagadi plays a positive role in promoting good relations between Botswana and South Africa. After initially tough negotiations over the redistribution of tourism income (Van Amerom, 2002), consensus was soon reached and the TBPA agreement acted out, in the process of which relations between the actors involved seemed to have strengthened (Modishe, Interview, 2002).

\textsuperscript{28} Section 2.10 in the next chapter provides additional details.

\textsuperscript{29} It is beyond the scope of this chapter to present a comprehensive overview of emerging conflicts in the Southern African Peace Parks plan. The remainder of the thesis will explore this issue in more depth. For now, this chapter will list some of the main findings and discuss the way and extent in which these have been researched.
Great Limpopo Park, the second-to-be Peace Park, as a case-study. Although recognised as important, the interaction between TBPAs and regional politics has remained relatively understudied.

Studies of TBPAs in Southern Africa have so far particularly concentrated upon the fate of local communities within Peace Parks, highlighting the following issues:

- The procedures for community consultation and participation in TBPAs are often mere window dressing (Katerere et al, 2001; Mayoral-Philips, 2001; Steenkamp and Grossman, 2001; Draper and Wels, 2002; Hughes, 2002)

- TBNRM tends to be a top-down process in which more powerful interests such as the state, international NGOs and the private sector tend to dominate (Ramutsindela and Tsheola, 2000; Katerere et al. 2001: 55; Hughes, 2002; Singh and Van Houtum, 2002)

- Lack of democratisation and mismanagement at a local level frustrate CBNRM

- Sustainable funding for Peace Parks is lacking whilst advocates of Peace Parks are falsely presenting tourism as a ‘panacea’ for local development (IUCN, 2002), using unsubstantiated and overly optimistic estimates of tourism income (Katerere et al. 2001; Spenceley, 2002)

- Communities, especially those living in borderlands destined for Peace Parks with no formal title to their land may actually suffer from TBNRM through loss of access to land or even direct loss of their land (Steenkamp, 2002; IUCN, 2002; Refugee Research Project, 2002).

As a result, TBNRM has been increasingly criticised as a movement that “represents a resurgence of the protectionist expansionism of the conservationists that to some extent had been curbed by the new discourse around community-based conservation and political realities in post colonial Africa” (Katerere et al., 2001: 60).

While the impact of global actors and the South African white establishment on TBPAs has been an important research focus within the framework of academic studies on Southern Africa’s Peace Parks, the ways in which TBPAs affect and are implicated by inter-governmental relations in the region have been relatively neglected.
In explaining the difficult conditions under which CBNRM programmes in Southern Africa operate, the disproportionate influence of a powerful alliance between global and white South African actors (Draper and Wels, 2002; Singh and Van Houtum, 2002; Büscher et al, forthcoming) within Southern Africa’s Peace Parks has been well established. The South African based Peace Parks Foundation (PPF), a private-sector initiative, is often not only seen to mediate the interests of the global conservation establishment (Singh and Van Houtum, 2002; Buscher et al., forthcoming), but has also been identified as promoting, often covertly, white South African and Western business interests, using privatisation as a means to secure access to valuable land and tourism prospects (Ramutsindela and Tsheola, 2000; Draper and Wels, 2002; Hughes, 2002).

Based upon an article by Ellis (1994) and later Koch et al. (1998) another popular theme running through the academic research on TBPAs continues to be the notion that the Southern African Peace Parks plan may serve the political interests of white interest groups, especially conservative Afrikaners, seeking to secretly secure a future homeland (Ramutsindela and Tsheola, 2000; Draper and Wels, 2002) in easily defended borderland areas. The former membership of the PPF’s chairman, Anton Rupert, of the secret Afrikaner Broederbond movement as well as the employment of former colonial or apartheid officers as game wardens are seen as problematic within this context (Ramutsindela and Tsheola, 2000: 204-206). Whereas in the initial stages a reasonable preposition, this scenario now seems increasingly unlikely, due to mentality changes amongst conservative Afrikaner game wardens, many of whom have been laid off to make room for black personnel (Ellis, Interview, 2001; Koch, Interview, 2001). What is more, these concerns sometimes detract attention from the important role of regional politics in TBPAs, and vice versa. Many of the studies that suggest that TBPAs represent a “continuation of the colonial struggle for control of territory and land resources” tend to downplay the impact of African governments in the process, which are seen as either powerless puppets (Ramutsindela and Tsheola, 2000) or as mere agents of powerful colonising forces (Van Houtum and Singh, 2002). It is perhaps for this reason that the interface between TBPAs and regional politics has remained relatively understudied, in spite of the importance of this factor upon the functioning of TBPAs.

The interaction between regional politics and TBPAs has received attention in several studies. However, these works merely highlight patches within a larger sea of challenges related to interstate co-operation within Peace Parks. Researched areas include the relation between Peace Parks and sovereignty (Duffy, 1999; Singh, 1999; Van Amerom,
2002) and the implication of power inequalities between South Africa and its partner countries (Sotho and Muthali, 2001). Linked to this, it has been argued that Peace Parks seem to aggravate existing tensions related to South Africa’s perceived Big Brother role in the region. Fakir (2000) furthermore indicates that the strategic and economic importance for states and other groups of the borderlands in which TFCAs are inserted, raise a whole number of additional political issues, related to border security, competition over valuable minerals and access to land.

1.10 Emerging research needs

To obtain more of an insight into the social and political realities in which Peace Parks in Southern Africa both operate, and by which they are influenced, it is imperative to connect the functioning of Peace Parks to the wider geo-political context. There is particularly a need to consider how wider political processes at the bi-lateral and regional level are influencing the social processes in Peace Parks and vice versa. At the same time, bi-lateral co-operation at the grassroots level, such as between park authorities and civil servants, will also influence the quality of regional co-operation. The Peace Parks concept predicts that the social outcomes of grassroots TBPA co-operation are highly positive and will have a spread effect to regional relations through a ‘bottom-up’ process. For some TBPAIs this seems, indeed, to apply. Therefore, the interface between wider regional politics and TBPA construction is far from linear. A two-way approach is therefore proposed, whereby constraints and incentives at both the inter-governmental and grassroots level are actively considered in relation to one another, as displayed in Figure 1.3.
This analysis is guided by the following research questions:

- To what extent is the fulfilment of the policy goals of TBPAs facilitated or hampered by economic and political processes at higher political levels and the interests deriving from these with regard to the spatial organisation and usage of land in borderlands?

- What are the tensions between environmental and political goals of African states in their borderlands? How are these resulting policy objectives influenced and mediated by the involvement of non-state actors in the process, including NGOs and local communities?

- What are the goals and interests of the various stakeholders in transboundary conservation and how are these mediated?

- To what extent and under what circumstances do the social processes involved in the creation and management of TBPAs stimulate amicable bi-lateral relations, thereby furthering regional stability and peace?
To illuminate these research questions, a combination of literature research, semi and unstructured interviews, participation in governmental workshops and discourse analysis have been undertaken. The methodology structuring the research is outlined in more depth in Chapter 4.

Aims

In addition to the direct objectives of the thesis, as summarised in the above-described research questions, this thesis has a number of broader aims and goals.

A) TBPA related goals

Contribute to knowledge of the peace-building potential of TBPA

By offering more insight into the conflict potential inherent in TBPA and the underlying causes for this, the research aims to provide more insight into the extent to which TBPA can work as vehicles for peace and the circumstances under which this function can be achieved. This may appear paradoxical. However, policies and adaptive management strategies to eliminate these constraints and optimise the peace building potential of TBPA can only be developed if political constraints are known and accounted for. The need for a more balanced outlook on TBPA through more critical, academic research on the actual political functioning of Peace Parks, as a means to avoid unnecessary or counter-productive establishment of TBPA, has also been increasingly emphasised by ‘first hour’ advocates of the PPC (Hanks, 2002: 32). A list of policy recommendations in the thesis’s conclusion will be an important step towards this goal.

Add to policy insights on TBPA

By contributing to more knowledge on the regional political working of TBPA and how this is affected by various economic and political phenomena, as a relatively understudied aspect of TBPA creation in Southern Africa, the research aims to add to the existing and growing database on TBPA in Southern Africa. Furthermore, by providing insight into policy solutions that could or have been provided in the Southern African context, this case study of TBPA in Southern Africa will also prove informative for people working in existing TBPA. Finally, knowledge of the problems and opportunities of TBPA in

---

30 See for a good overview the TBPA Research Group, 2004 (http://hdgc.epp.cmu.edu/misa/TBPA.htm).
Southern Africa will provide an insight in the suitability of TBPAs in different geographical and social settings, rather than incorrectly assuming that the concept can be used for any purpose and in any given context (see also Petermann and Braack, 2002).

Facilitate insights on Peace Parks as development tools

The view that Peace Parks can function as mechanisms of development has been rather uncritically taken on board by development agencies. A good example is that Peace Parks now officially qualify for development aid by means of national lottery donations in the Netherlands, one of the biggest sponsors of Peace Parks in Southern Africa. However, more information is needed as to what Peace Parks can and cannot do - the efficiency of aid to Peace Parks must be examined. The notion that Peace Parks will alleviate poverty can be selectively used by conservationists as a means to generate funding, after which the funding will be used for the most part for conservation aims rather than for direct assistance to local communities as might be the assumption of the constituency of the development agencies supporting Peace Parks.

Wider scientific goals

Peace Parks operate at a wide range of geographical scales and involve many different policy aspects. Consequently, this study will also make a contribution to the following wider areas:

- Globalisation

In providing an insight into the activities and impact of international NGOs and agencies upon TBPAs in Southern Africa, this study can contribute to our understanding of how the natural environment is implicated in and affected by globalising processes and how environmental issues affect globalisation debates.

- Regionalisation

Case-studies of TBPAs, as a transboundary phenomenon par excellence, can highlight the ways in which political events at the national scale may be affected by spill-over effects and, more generally increased interconnectedness between countries. As such, this study can contribute to a more holistic outlook on African politics, given that national political events in Africa are often a product of wider regional developments, but often continue to be studied in isolation of their wider regional context (Mamdani, 2001: xii-xiii). Conversely, this study can provide more insight into the ways in which the political
considerations of a given country may affect processes of regionalisation, as well as the feasibility of TBPAs as instruments for regionalisation.

- Borderland studies

This research can increase understanding of the ways in which TBPAs can foster or discourage social and economic contacts and integration at a borderland level. TBPAs are often advocated in Southern Africa on the grounds that they promote better relations at the borderland level, both between local communities and nation-states (Moyo, 1996; Hanks, 2001). However, this claim has been relatively little researched, in spite of the increased attention given to the role of environmental co-operation upon cross-border relations within the growing volume of borderland studies (Hocknell, 2001).

1.11 Thesis outline

The thesis is structured as follows: Chapter 2, entitled The emergence of the Peace Parks Concept in Southern Africa, explores the historical and social context of Peace Parks. Linked to this, it indicates how the justification for Peace Parks in Southern Africa is closely interwoven with their capacity to deliver socio-economic development as well as a means to further transboundary political and economic co-operation and integration. Chapter 3, entitled Conceptual Framework, outlines the theoretical framework of the thesis. It provides a critical analysis of the two key elements that together comprise TBNRM: sustainable development and transboundary co-operation. By means of an engagement with political ecology and literature on the operation of borders and transboundary politics it highlights internal inconsistencies in both the notions of sustainable development and transboundary politics. Chapter 4, Methodology, provides an overview of the methodological considerations and strategies underlying the thesis. It describes fieldwork activities in detail whilst also discussing data analysis strategies.

The subsequent three chapters list the main empirical findings of the research. Chapter 5, Peace Parks and Development, highlights the political nature of TBNRM as a development project, through a critical analysis of Community Based Natural Resource Management policies within Peace Parks. It demonstrates how in practice conservation and development interests collide or conflict, and how the spatial requirements of Peace Parks, including the dropping of boundary fences and harmonisation of land use introduce new areas for land-use competition. Having looked into the sustainable
development component of Peace Parks, Chapter 6 -Peace Parks and Border Politics- looks at the political complexities raised by the changes that Peace Parks aim to introduce in the existing operation of boundaries. It discusses how the removal of border fences by means of Peace Parks often induces conflict as a result of vested interests in the existing location and operation of national boundaries, on the side of states and other stakeholders in Southern Africa's borderlands. Chapter 7, Pride and Prejudice: Nationalism and Cultural Differences in Peace Parks, takes us to the micro level of the institutional settings in Peace Parks. It indicates that organisational and personal self-interest often interferes with the official goals of Peace Parks. The main findings of the thesis as a whole are summarised in Chapter 8, General Conclusions. Future areas for research are identified alongside some practical recommendations for policy making in Peace Parks.
2. The Emergence of the Peace Parks Concept in Southern Africa

2.1 Introduction

As was made clear in chapter one, a key notion underlying the Peace Parks Concept (PPC) is that Transboundary Protected Areas (TBPAs) can foster peace and political stability by promoting environmental co-operation across boundaries. The expected contribution that transboundary conservation can make towards peace is therefore an important element in the promotion and justification of Peace Parks anywhere in the world. The precise ways in which the notion of Peace Parks are further conceptualised and operationalised into policy design will be guided by local factors, including the national and regional policy objectives of the countries involved in a given Peace Park initiative, geographical-environmental circumstances, prevalent attitudes towards conservation and available finances.

This chapter provides an overview of the various contexts in which the Peace Parks concept has evolved in Southern Africa. This will allow us to disentangle and recognise the various interests, discourses and perspectives that have become tied up with the concept of Peace Parks in Southern Africa over time. This in turn provides a useful background from which the political functioning of Peace Parks as outlined in later chapters can be understood and analysed. The chapter is divided into two main parts. The first part offers a historical overview, discussing the evolution of conservation in Southern Africa, and important political developments shaping the prospects for transboundary conservation in the region up to the end of apartheid in 1994. This knowledge enables us to understand and appreciate how the concept of TBPAs became moulded into that of Peace Parks in the post-apartheid era and the related consequences for policy design. This topic is explored in the second half of the chapter.

Reflecting new policy priorities in Southern Africa, transboundary conservation initiatives, previously nearly solely informed by conservation objectives, became linked in the post-apartheid period to a quest for socio-economic development and pan Africanist discourses promoting free cross-border traffic within Southern Africa. This shift ensured that Peace Parks could become a post-apartheid policy item, in spite of an initial unpopularity of conservation in the new South Africa due to its colonial
associations. Contemporary global discourses also influenced the policy design of Peace Parks, mainly through the involvement of foreign donors. However, whilst the linkage of transboundary conservation with development and regional integration objectives was instrumental in the acquisition of political support for Peace Parks, it has also increased the number and types of expectations that Peace Parks need to fulfil. This is problematic as both sustainable development and transboundary co-operation constitute highly complex policy areas. Before exploring this argument in more depth, it is worthwhile to briefly survey some key ecological and geographical characteristics of the Southern African environment and how these relate to the quest for transboundary conservation.

2.2 TBPAs and the Southern African context

Southern Africa’s wilderness base has long constituted a prime area for conservation efforts, both at a regional and global level. Africa hosts some of the most species-rich areas in the world (Greenature, 2002). On a global scale, Southern Africa can be called particularly rich in biodiversity (biological diversity). South Africa alone contains almost ten percent of the world’s bird, fish and plant species and over six percent of its mammal and reptile species (Collins, 2004). Furthermore, a large part of the Big Five\(^1\) and other ‘charismatic’ animal species such as giraffe and zebras, all unique to Africa, reside in Southern Africa. A wide variety of landscapes and climatic conditions (Resource Africa, 2004) produce rich and diversified ecological spaces in the region. Southern Africa hosts deserts, savannas, forests, grasslands, mangrove swamps, wetlands, mountain ranges and marine habitats.\(^2\) Southern Africa’s natural assets attract millions of tourists each year. Ecotourism has become highly important for Southern African economies. Although tourism makes up a relatively small percentage of the GNP of most Southern African countries (see Table 2.1), it constitutes an important provision of employment (WTTC, 1999), and foreign exchange earnings. Parks where the ‘Big Five’ reside are particularly popular as ecotourism destinations. South Africa’s Kruger National Park is the most popular wildlife attraction, receiving over a million visitors a year (DEAT, 2004).

\(^1\) The ‘Big Five’ is a colloquial term used to denote the African elephant, the rhino, buffalo, lion and cheetah.

\(^2\) Many of which have been listed as World Heritage Sites, including the Victoria Falls (Zimbabwe/Zambia), the Okavango Delta (Botswana), St Lucia (South Africa), and the Maloti/Drakensberg mountain range (Lesotho/South Africa).
Table 2.1 Share of tourism in GNP, export earnings and employment rates of Southern African countries

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Country</th>
<th>Arrivals in thousands of people</th>
<th>% of GNP (Tourism economy) 1999</th>
<th>% of export earnings (Tourism economy) 1999</th>
<th>% in to employment (Tourism economy) 2004</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Botswana</td>
<td>1,104</td>
<td>12.0</td>
<td>9.7</td>
<td>9.2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Lesotho</td>
<td>186*</td>
<td>4.9</td>
<td>6.4</td>
<td>7.1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Mozambique</td>
<td>n.a.</td>
<td>9.4</td>
<td>n.a.</td>
<td>7.1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Namibia</td>
<td>560*</td>
<td>20.9</td>
<td>9.5</td>
<td>6.9</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>South Africa</td>
<td>6,001</td>
<td>8.2</td>
<td>7.4</td>
<td>11.1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Swaziland</td>
<td>284</td>
<td>8.8</td>
<td>6.5</td>
<td>3.4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Zimbabwe</td>
<td>1,868</td>
<td>12.4</td>
<td>4.3</td>
<td>3.9</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

* 1999


Africa’s wild animals have become internationally known and cherished. International conservation agencies like the WWF, the African Wildlife Foundation (AFW) and CI receive annually millions of US dollars in donations, mostly collected in the North, for the preservation of African animals such as rhinos and elephants. Compared to the Western world where due to fast industrialisation, urbanisation, large scale cultivation and hunting there are little uncultivated ‘wilderness’ areas left, Africa is still endowed with relatively ‘unspoilt’ tracts of land. As a result, it has come to represent a last ‘Garden of Eden’ for many nature lovers in the West and is often perceived as something belonging to all humanity (Anderson and Grove, 1987). However, continued access to this Eden is far from secured. Rising population levels in Africa coupled with increased pressure for crop and herding land are alleged to induce land degradation and soil erosion, whilst also threatening the survival of Africa’s wildlife by decreasing their
natural habitats through increased human encroachment and by poaching. As a result, conservation of African wildlife is often presented as urgent and the safeguarding of even more land for conservation in the context of soaring population levels as a ‘race against the clock’ (Singh et al., 1998; Brown, 2003). Under the influence of globalisation, this “danger discourse” has become expanded from the single nation to a multi nation or global level (Singh and Van Houtum, 2002: 258).

Today, over two million square kilometres in Africa are set aside as Protected Areas, representing seven percent of Africa’s total land surface (US Geological Survey, 2004). This makes Africa the continent with the highest proportion of land allocated to Protected Areas. Furthermore, the percentage of land devoted to conservation is generally on the rise, including in Southern Africa (see Table 2.2).

**Table 2.2  Land reserved for Protected Areas in Southern Africa 1993/2003**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Country</th>
<th>Total Land Area (1000 ha)</th>
<th>Percentage of land reserved for PA</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>1993</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Botswana</td>
<td>39,076</td>
<td>17.2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Lesotho</td>
<td>3,035</td>
<td>0.2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Mozambique</td>
<td>80,159</td>
<td>4.5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Namibia</td>
<td>82,429</td>
<td>12.6</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Swaziland</td>
<td>1,736</td>
<td>2.3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>South Africa</td>
<td>122,104</td>
<td>5.2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Zimbabwe</td>
<td>39,076</td>
<td>7.2</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

*Source: Koch (1994: 11); World Resource Institute (2004).*

---

3 Such neo-Malthusian viewpoints go centuries back and were for long accepted as self-evident, but are now increasingly questioned (Leach, 1996).
However, not all of these conservation areas are effective. Many of Africa’s protected areas have failed in “protecting the biodiversity they encompassed at proclamation” (Hanks, 2002: 58).\(^4\) Due to a lack of funds, civil wars, human encroachment, and commercial poaching in which sometimes government factions are actively involved (Gibson, 1999; Duffy, 2000) the state of many of Africa’s protected areas is dire (Hanks, 2002: 58) and some parks merely constitute ‘paper parks’. The conservation insights that informed the first stage selection of conservation areas have also been increasingly questioned. Some protected areas are not necessarily located in areas that can make the greatest contribution to conserving species whilst others comprise areas “too small to contain populations large enough to sustain most species” (Hanks, 2002: 58). Linked to this, it has been increasingly argued in conservation circles that whilst the (increased) reservation of land for conservation is important, in order for conservation measures to be truly effective it is essential to link existing conservation reserves to create bigger areas. The creation of Transboundary Conservation Areas (TBCAs) is seen as a key instrument in reaching this objective, reflecting the growing popularity of bioregionalism in conservation circles.

2.3 The ecological rationale for TBPAs

The ecocentric bioregionalism discourse (Duffy, 2002b; Fall, 2003b) has its roots in conservation biology (Wolmer, 2003) and maintains that effective conservation requires the creation of large-scale conservation areas, big enough to incorporate a ‘bioregion’. A bioregion encompasses a geographical area defined by natural boundaries such as a river or particular landmarks, which accommodates enough of the original evolutionary and ecological forces to constitute a particular ecosystem.\(^5\) It is argued that where ecosystems are too shattered, the long term attrition of certain species will be hard to prevent, whilst the loss of a certain ecosystem element is likely to induce a ripple effect leading to the loss of yet another species (Braack, 2000: 5). To break this vicious chain, conservation attempts should, according to bioregionalist insights, no longer be aimed at the

\(^4\) As will be explained in more depth later, it is for this reason that support has grown for more progressive conservation models aimed at benefiting local people.

\(^5\) An ecosystem comprises in turn “a dynamic set of living organisms (plants, animals and micro organisms) all interacting among themselves and with the environment in which they live” (Canadian Forest Service, 2003). What constitutes an ecosystem is however contested, as it lacks precise boundaries (Canadian Forest Service, 2003), making the delineation of a given bioregion problematic, a notion which is often little acknowledged by the conservationists supporting this view (Fall, 2003b).
preservation of a particular species, but at the ecosystem as a whole. To reach this objective the creation of bioregions across political boundaries is seen as essential.

In spite of their often relatively large size, few national parks in Africa are large enough to host an ecosystem, favouring linkages with adjacent national parks over the borders, or other types of nature reserve (Braack 2002a). Another main rationale for transboundary conservation is that larger areas with no national boundaries could benefit the conservation of migratory animal species. This argument seems particularly valid for Africa, which has several mammals requiring large areas to accommodate their seasonal transmigratory movements (Hanks, 2001). The removal of national boundaries where these impede their movement could hence assist the conservation of these species (Hanks, 2001).\(^6\) It is also believed that TBPAs would help reduce poaching, by harmonising the various national anti-poaching laws in the process of cross-border co-operation. Poaching control is an important concern in Africa, and especially so with regard to endangered animals like rhinos. Various ecological arguments have thus been presented in favour of the creation of TBPAs in Africa.

Geographical circumstances facilitate the creation of TBPAs in Africa. Nearly one-third of all African boundaries contain a national park on one or both sides (Griffiths, 1995a: 357) with nearly 40% of the continent’s national parks being located on or adjacent to international boundaries. The potential for TBPAs particularly features in Southern Africa. In addition to National Parks and other officially proclaimed Protected Areas, Southern Africa hosts a wide range of nature reserves, which include hunting concession areas, privately owned game farms and increasing numbers of community-owned nature reserves and community areas for sustainable use. A fair proportion of these are located in borderlands. Very large TBPAs can be created in Southern Africa by linking protected areas across boundaries with other types of nature reserves (Griffin et al., 1999).

However, whilst Africa’s ecological and geographical circumstances represent enabling conditions for the creation of large-scale TBPAs, unfavourable political circumstances have long inhabited this process. Before exploring these political factors, it is first useful to consider the history of conservation in Southern Africa in more depth.

---

\(^6\) On the other hand, “it does not follow that migration behaviour will automatically be aroused when the barriers are lifted” (Braack, 2002a: 14). See also section 8.5.
2.4. The history of conservation in Southern Africa: Tracing the roots of transboundary conservation

Conservation in Africa is not a contemporary phenomenon, but has its roots in colonial times, when large numbers of wildlife vanished as a result of rifle hunting (Braack, 2002a). The linkage with colonialism has shaped conservation ideologies and the image of conservation amongst native Africans in today's Southern Africa (Hughes, 2002). It was in Southern Africa, starting off with South Africa, where wildlife conservation policies were first initiated in Africa, in the 19th century. By that time wildlife conservation had become urgent. The introduction of large-scale hunting with rifles by white settlers, enabling for a greater number of wildlife kills per hunt with relatively little risks to the hunter, had greatly diminished wildlife numbers (MacKenzie, 1988; Braack, 2002a). This “killing spree” (Koch, 1994: 3), left several species extinct, including the quagga (a zebra species) and blauwbok (blue antelope), and many others endangered. Whole herds of wildlife had also vanished due to Rinderpest, a viral veterinary disease, which arrived in Southern Africa in 1895 (Braack, 2002a: 11). In the meantime, the continued conversion of land into pastures for cattle ranching or for cropping diminished the space available for wildlife, although some animal species profited from these changing circumstances (Grossman et al. 1999: 29, quoted in Koch, 1994: 3). The fast diminishing numbers of wildlife and resulting limitations upon hunting became a growing concern and the plight of Africa’s wildlife was internationally publicised. For example, a report by the Times of London states:

*It is necessary to go far into the interior to find the nobler forms of antelope, and still further if the hunter wants to pursue the elephant, the rhinoceros, or the giraffe. It is perfectly clear that very soon those animals, unless something is done to prevent their extermination, will be stamped out as completely as the dodo* (Report in the Times of London, quoted in Bonner, 1993: 39-40).  

---

7 In the pre-colonial period there may also have been conservation efforts in Southern Africa. Shaka Zulu is, for example, alleged to have set up a royal game reserve in the Umfolozi district of Zululand in the 1820s (Carruthers, 1995: 7), an assumption that is however questioned by Brooks (2000). On the whole, conservation efforts appear to have been highly exceptional or non-existent in pre-colonial times, perhaps because at this stage wildlife was still abundant. This overview of the history of conservation therefore starts with colonialism.

8 Bonner does not give a date but research into the Times archives suggests that this statement would have been made around 1880.
Under mounting public pressure the first nature reserves were established in the late 19th century. The most important ones include the South African Hluhluwe/Umfolozi Reserves (1897) and the Sabi Game reserve (Braack, 2002a: 11). The latter also served as the foundation of Africa’s first National Park, the Kruger Park, established in 1926 (Carruthers, 1995). The London Convention on the Preservation of Fauna and Flora in their Natural State, held in 1933, further stimulated the gazetting of National Parks or other forms of strict nature reserves (De Klemm & Shine, 1993, quoted in Braack, 2002a). By the turn of the 20th century several National Parks had been proclaimed in Southern Africa, with countries further north soon following suit (Braack, 2000). Over time, the land set aside for wildlife conservation further increased. However, wildlife conservation in Africa occurred at great social cost. In the process of creating National Parks and other Protected Areas, colonial authorities and later Africa’s newly independent governments banned indigenous hunting methods and evicted local inhabitants residing upon land now reserved for conservation, often without any compensation (MacKenzie, 1988).9

Significantly, interest soon grew in cross-border conservation. Conservation efforts in colonial times often took place in borderlands, where land tended to be less fertile and hence less in demand by farmers, including white commercial farmers, a relatively powerful interest group. The remnants of this historical pattern are still visible, with many protected areas being located in borderlands (see Figure 2.1). In direct consequence, the creation of transboundary conservation reserves was quickly considered. Inspired by the example of the creation of a nature reserve on the USA-Mexican border (Draper and Wels, 2002), the Portuguese ecologist Gomes de Soussa first raised the idea of a transboundary park in 1936.10 De Soussa advocated a linkage between the South African Kruger National Park with adjacent portions of land in Mozambique (Braack, 2000: 5), in

---

9 The Makuleke were forcefully removed from their villages in the Kruger National Park for example. Whilst the apartheid legislation in South Africa facilitated such removals from a legal perspective, the forced removal of communities from parks is part of a wider pattern in Africa, and occurred both under colonial administrations and independent black governments. Consequently, protected areas are often looked upon with hostility by the surrounding communities (Gibson, 1999).

10 Belgium proclaimed the Albert Park between its then Ruanda-Urundi state and the Congo in 1925. Van der Linde et al. (2001) refer to this as Africa’s first transboundary park. However, these two countries were claimed by and de facto ruled from Brussels. Since this research interprets a transboundary park as a park between two or more different countries it therefore does not recognise the Albert Park as the first TBPA initiative.
addition to other parks between Mozambique and its neighbours. Meanwhile, in South Africa Jan Smuts established the Dongola Wildlife Sanctuary in the 1940s (Draper and Wels, 2002), with the intention of linking it with adjacent conservation areas in then Bechuanaland and Rhodesia to create a TBP (Marshall/Sapa, 2004). However, under pressure of a powerful lobby of white commercial farmers, the South African Nationalist Party government revoked the proclamation of the Dongola Reserve upon coming to power in 1948 (Carruthers, 1995), whilst also vetoing South African participation in de Soussa’s envisaged transboundary park. Plans for cross-border parks had to be shelved until the arrival of more favourable political times. These surfaced only with the end of apartheid in South Africa, more than 60 years later. Although wildlife conservation soon

Subsequently, in 1973 an article was written by an academic named Clarke who proposed a linking of the GNP, Coutada 16 and KNP with St Lucia Game Reserve by way of the Lubombo Mountains, Maputo Elephant Reserve, Tembe Elephant Reserve and Ndumu and Mkuze Game Reserves (Anon., 2001). This plan may now be realised through today’s plans for the Great Limpopo and the Lubombo SDI and the proposed eventual connection between the two.
became a key priority of the South African government (Carruthers, 1995), new political developments in the region would obstruct the formation of a border park between Mozambique and South Africa, as well as other potential TBPAs in South Africa’s borderlands, for many years. The next section considers this issue in more depth, highlighting the troubled relations between South Africa and neighbouring countries during the apartheid years and resulting impediments to the creation of TBPAs.

2.5 Where elephants fight it is the grass that suffers: Obstructions to transboundary conservation during the apartheid era

The maintenance of racial segregation and apartheid in South Africa until 1994\(^{12}\) against a backdrop of decolonisation in Southern Africa greatly complicated the formation of border parks between South Africa and neighbouring countries. This was because it initiated hostile relations between South Africa and its neighbours, resulting in armed violence and relatively closed boundaries, which in turn impeded options for cross-border co-operation and conservation. Ghana’s political independence from Britain in 1957 marked the beginning of a process of decolonisation for Africa. Southern Africa resisted this ‘tide of history’. Relatively long after most African countries had become independent, white minority rule continued in most Southern African countries (see also Table 2.3). By the 1970s Angola and Mozambique were still ruled by Portugal. Today’s Zimbabwe was still called Rhodesia and ruled by the white Smith regime. Furthermore, South Africa governed South West Africa\(^{13}\). South Africa therefore still found itself largely surrounded by like-minded white governments at this stage, forming a security shield between South Africa and newly independent African countries further north. On the other hand, and much against South Africa’s wishes who had intended to incorporate these countries (Thompson, 1990: 214), Botswana, Swaziland and Lesotho had all obtained independence from Britain between 1966 and 1968. Lesotho and Swaziland were, however, too small to pose a military threat to South Africa, whilst sparsely populated Botswana opted for a foreign policy of neutrality.

Although in theory an option, the creation of TBPAs was little a possibility in this period. Even though the status of South Africa’s white neighbours had not yet changed, the seeds

\(^{12}\) It is beyond the scope of this thesis to discuss the South Africa’s Apartheid policies. See Thompson (1990), Beinart (1994) and Ross (1999) for good overviews of this topic.

\(^{13}\) Today’s Namibia.
for independence were already sown, with black liberation movements waging guerrilla wars for independence in each country, often operating from the bush. As a result, the white minority governments did not control all areas of the country, and especially not conservation areas. Furthermore, within a relatively short time span all of these regimes were dismantled and replaced by the former guerrilla movements, which had a profound effect upon the nature of relations between South Africa and neighbouring countries.

**Table 2.3** Time frame of ending of colonial rule in Southern African states

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Country</th>
<th>Year of Independence</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Angola</td>
<td>1975 (November)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Botswana</td>
<td>1966 (September)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Lesotho</td>
<td>1966 (October)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Mozambique</td>
<td>1975 (June)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Namibia</td>
<td>1990 (March)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Swaziland</td>
<td>1968 (September)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Zimbabwe</td>
<td>1980 (April)</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

By the 1980s all of South Africa’s neighbouring countries were controlled by black governments, usually comprised of the former independence movements, with the exception of South-West Africa. This change profoundly affected South Africa’s regional position. The remaining white South African government suddenly found itself surrounded by hostile black governments aiming to end its *apartheid* policies, which underpinned its power. Reflecting their ideological background, South Africa’s neighbours actively supported the ANC and other South African resistance movements in their struggle for a democratically ruled South Africa. Furthermore, these new black majority governments adopted Marxist/Leninist doctrines, challenging South Africa’s capitalist orientation and aspirations. These changes greatly affected South Africa’s security position. ANC and PAC freedom fighters could now find refuge over South Africa’s borders and were supplied with weapons from there. The overthrow of previously white minority regimes in adjacent countries also provided a significant morale boost to the struggle against *apartheid* inside South Africa (Price, 1991:52). The stationing of Cuban troops in Mozambique and Angola, which had developed close ties with the ANC, seemed to increase the threat of a military attack (Price, 1991).
Partially in response to the perceived militant threats from beyond its boundaries with radiating effects to resistance movements inside, Pretoria embraced a new regional policy of “cooptive domination”. By “forcing its neighbours to recognise South Africa’s hegemony in regional affairs” (Price, 1991: 93) South Africa sought to “neutralize the effects of the regional transformation” (Price, 1991: 93).\(^{14}\)

Attempts by Pretoria to re-assert its regional economic hegemony have also been identified as an important motivation (Adedeji, 1996).\(^{15}\) Price (1991) identifies three main elements to South Africa’s ‘cooptive domination’ policy, which is more generally referred to as ‘Destablisation’ (Dzimba, 1998)

1) Direct military attack - military cross-border incursions by air and by land
2) Destabilization - military and financial support to insurgence movements in neighbouring countries, particularly RENAMO in Mozambique
3) Economic pressure\(^{16}\) - border closures, withholding of goods and outstanding customs payments, strategic control of employment options inside South Africa (Price, 1991: 93)

Table 2.4 lists the various ways in which Botswana, Lesotho, Mozambique and Zimbabwe were each affected by the measures outlined above. South Africa was never attacked in response by neighbouring countries, although support continued to be given to the ANC, now often covertly. Instead, conflict tended to be concentrated in the ‘Frontline

---

\(^{14}\) According to Price (1991) the goal of South Africa’s regional policies was not necessarily to get rid of neighbouring governments but to weaken them. A key objective was to force neighbouring states into signing treaties of nonaggression. In the 1980s several of these were signed, in 1982 for example with Swaziland and in 1984 with Mozambique. Pretoria also sought to establish diplomatic ties with neighbouring countries, not the least because such alignments could help undermine international sanctions. In Lesotho South Africa allegedly supported Major General Justin Lekhanya’s successful coup against the then Prime Minister Chief Jonathan in 1986. Where Jonathan followed an anti-South African course and actively supported the ANC, culminating in a South African blockade of Lesotho’s borders in 1986, Lekhanya adopted a pro-South Africa stance.

\(^{15}\) Southern Africa’s neighbours and countries further north had combined efforts in the Southern African Development Co-ordination Conference, with the primary aim of reducing their economic dependence on South Africa, the region’s main supplier of manufacturing and other goods, by establishing favourable trade regimes amongst themselves and by attracting foreign aid (Dzimba, 1998: 32). On the whole this objective failed.

\(^{16}\) Pretoria applied economic pressure on the basis of its dominant economy. Its access to the sea further added to South Africa’s economic leverage over its land locked neighbours (Hodder et al., 1997).
States’ through armed confrontations between government troops and South African supported or instigated rebel groups. South Africa’s cross-border raids and the presence of insurgence movements in neighbouring countries had major security implications for Southern Africa’s borderlands, affecting the *room for manoeuvre* for conservation.

**Table 2.4** South Africa’s imposition of Regional Hegemony

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Country</th>
<th>Military Attack</th>
<th>Destabilization</th>
<th>Economic Pressure</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Botswana</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>- Delayed Customs Union payments¹⁷&lt;br&gt;- Limitations to use of South African railway network</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Lesotho</td>
<td>- Commando raid on ANC houses 12/82&lt;br&gt;- Commando raid on ANC houses 12/85</td>
<td>- Support for Lesotho Liberation Army</td>
<td>- Border closure 1981, 1984, 1986 (economic blockade)&lt;br&gt;- Delayed Customs Union payments&lt;br&gt;- Cutting of electricity supplies&lt;br&gt;- Limitations to se of South African railway network&lt;br&gt;- Restriction of South African tourists</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Mozambique</td>
<td>- Air strike against ANC houses 5/83</td>
<td>- Support for RENAMO 1979&lt;br&gt;(reduced level of support after Nkomati treaty in 1984)</td>
<td>- Restrictions on migrant labour in South Africa,&lt;br&gt;- reduced use of railroad and ports&lt;br&gt;- Cutting of electricity supplies</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Swaziland</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>- Reduction export opportunities to South Africa&lt;br&gt;- Restriction of South African tourists</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

¹⁷ The Southern African Customs Union (SACU) between South Africa, Lesotho, Swaziland, Botswana and later Namibia is administered by South Africa who therefore also distributes the revenue.
Militarization often greatly affects wildlife and the management of protected areas (Dudley et al., 2002). The Southern African situation proved no exception to this rule. The armed conflicts beyond South Africa’s borders often greatly affected nature reserves across South Africa’s border, reducing the opportunities for cross-border conservation. The threat of violence made these areas highly unsafe, hindering the enforcement of conservation measures whilst poaching by increasingly hungry and destitute civilians increased. Armed violence also had collateral effects on wildlife when animals were killed or maimed by land mines, or accidentally shot during armed confrontations or burnt when armed factions set the bush on fire. Moreover, poaching became an important means of supporting and sustaining the armed conflict. To feed themselves soldiers and guerrilla fighters often lived off bush meat. In Mozambique, RENAMO started to undertake lucrative ivory and rhino horn poaching, to finance the acquisition of South African arms in Mozambique (Ellis, 1994; Potgieter, 1995). With the help of factions of the South African army, ivory and rhino horn was smuggled up to Nairobi, alongside arms and drugs, to be shipped to Asia. The demand for ivory from Mozambique was so great, that ivory and rhino horn poaching started to be carried out on a massive scale, in which also factions of the Mozambican army and Zimbabwean troops stationed between Beira and the border became involved (Koch, 1994: 17). As a result, in many places in Mozambique elephants and rhinos became extinct (Koch et al., 1998). Ivory and rhino horn poaching also constituted a main problem in Namibia, where the Southern African Defence Force supported by armed Namibian factions loyal to South Africa also engaged in it (Anon., 1997; Cock, 1998: 6).

Although not directly drawn into the armed conflict and hence little harmed in terms of maintenance of their wildlife numbers and biodiversity, conservation areas on the South African side of the borders were also affected by the conflict in ways that inhibited transboundary conservation. South Africa had turned its boundaries into fortresses to
contain the armed conflict outside its boundaries and to reduce 'spill-over' effects in the forms of crime and economic and political refugees. This was especially the case with the Mozambican border. Free cross-border traffic associated with TBPAs was therefore impossible. Moreover, although its wildlife conservation continued to be effective and successful in overall terms (Ellis, 1994), South African conservation areas were also affected by the confrontations between the South African Defence Force (SADF) and its enemies. To guard its borders and to prevent cross-border attacks from ANC bases over the border, certain land within national parks and other conservation areas in South Africa’s borderlands was used by the South African Defence Force (SADF) for “testing weapons, training specialist military personnel, training private armies, and sometimes served as a springboard to destabilise neighbouring countries” (Anon., 1997). An illegal army base was, for example, set up in the National Kruger Park (Ellis, 1994) and arms were smuggled to Renamo in Mozambique. The absorption of national parks into political and military conflicts between South Africa and neighbouring countries therefore significantly curbed opportunities to engage in transboundary conservation, by negatively affecting conservation practices and/or the possibilities for cross-border interaction.

This is not to say that no form of transboundary conservation anywhere along South Africa’s lengthy borders was possible. Some important foundations were laid and further developed in the area of transboundary conservation, in areas with low levels or an absence of violence. However, where armed violence did not exercise great constraints on transboundary conservation, South Africa’s ‘pariah position’ prevented the translation of transboundary conservation initiatives into reality. The level of armed conflict between South Africa and its neighbours differed considerably according to country, place and time. Whilst Mozambique was torn by its internal civil war fuelled by South Africa, in other places armed invasions and conflict occurred on a much smaller scale and not on a structural basis. Furthermore, in spite of the declared hostility by South Africa’s neighbours towards South Africa’s apartheid regime, co-operation still occurred, out of economic self-interest or for fear of repercussions. For example, South Africa, Botswana, Lesotho and Swaziland co-operated in the Southern African Customs Union (SACU). This was especially the case since 1983 when Pretoria embarked on a policy of selective destabilisation and diplomacy, in which relatively moderate states such as Swaziland, Botswana and later Lesotho were offered economic incentives to encourage more co-
operation with South Africa (Dzimba, 1998: 39-40). Furthermore, informal transboundary conservation between game wardens from Botswana’s Gemsbok Park and South Africa’s Kalahari Park, which had started from 1910, continued virtually uninterrupted and was further built upon (Modishe, Interview, 2002). Furthermore, the plan for a cross-border park between Lesotho and South Africa (what is now the Maloti/Drakensberg project) was drawn up in this period between the South African Kwa Zulu Natal province and Lesotho (Sandwith, Interview, 2002).

Still, even in places where circumstances were favourable enough to allow for transboundary conservation initiatives to take place, it was not until South Africa obtained black majority rule that the establishment of TBPAs became feasible. Relations between South Africa and its neighbouring countries remained strained and conflict ridden until a beginning was made with the demise of apartheid from 1990 onwards. Although the Gemsbok/Kalahari parks functioned as a de facto transboundary park with no border separating the two parks, it only became politically feasible for the Botswana government to formalise this co-operation as a Peace Park after the ending of apartheid (Modishe, Interview, 2002). In the case of the Maloti/Drakensberg Park with Lesotho, strained governmental relations were less of a problem; being virtually installed by South Africa the then Lesotho government was pro-South African in outlook. However, the necessary funding for the project was difficult to find, with foreign donors shying away from investing in South Africa as part of the UN sanctions whilst the two military coups in Lesotho18 and resulting political instability also delayed the process (Sandwith, Interview, 2002). In spite of the above-described political constraints, the interest in transboundary conservation remained alive throughout the region. This is also reflected in the fact that at the first meeting between Zimbabwe’s President Mugabe and South Africa’s Foreign Minister Botha in 1993, called to highlight a rapprochement between the two countries, the issue of transboundary cooperation around conservation issues across the Limpopo River featured prominently on the agenda (Koch, 1994: [chapter 2]: 1). Altogether, the apartheid era greatly delayed the development of TBPAs in Southern Africa.

---

18 Having ousted Chief Jonathan (see also footnote 14) in 1986, Prime Minister Lekhanya was himself overthrown by Colonel Elias Tutsoane Ramaema in 1991.
2.6 The twilight zone: Opportunities and constraints for Peace Parks in the post-apartheid era

By the 1990s political patterns in Southern Africa had profoundly changed. With the release of ANC leader Nelson Mandela in 1989 a new political era in which apartheid would be formally abolished had come into sight. In this period of transition South African support to insurgence movements in other countries was stopped, which combined with the ending of the Cold War, brought peace to the once war-torn region. The civil war in Mozambique ended in 1992. In 1994 South Africa’s first democratic elections were held and Mandela became South Africa’s first black president. Furthermore, reflecting the fast improvement in their relations, South Africa and its neighbouring countries started to work towards the creation of a joint political and economic union, the SADC, based on its predecessor, the Southern African Development Co-ordination Conference (SADCC). These developments removed the previous obstacles to the establishment of TBPAs: armed violence, hostile international relations and the border cordon between South Africa and neighbouring countries. Anticipating these developments, conservationists and environmentalists picked up existing plans for transboundary parks in the early 1990s. At several levels discussions between Mozambique and South Africa were being opened on the possibilities for a Transfrontier Park. On 27 May 1990, Dr Anton Rupert, the President of WWF-South Africa met with Mozambique’s President Joaquim Chissano to discuss the possibility of a transboundary park between “some of the protected areas in southern Mozambique and their adjacent counterparts in South Africa, Swaziland and Zimbabwe” (Peace Parks Foundation, 2004). The Mozambican Department of Forestry and Wildlife had also picked up de Soussa’s idea and successfully co-opted the World Bank, which financed a feasibility study on the opportunities for transboundary conservation for Mozambique in 1994 (Grossman and Laforte, 1994; Munthali, Interview, 2001). In the meantime, negotiations were opened between South Africa and Botswana regarding the formalisation of the co-operation in the Gemsbok-Kalahari Park. The profile of the planned transboundary co-operation between Lesotho and South Africa in the Maloti/Drakensberg area was also raised including through the increased involvement of the IUCN. Initially tense relationships between the South African and Lesotho governments, seen by the first as ‘traitors’ due to their loyalty to the preceding apartheid regime, complicated this situation however (Anonymous Source Kwa-Zulu Natal Nature Conservation Board, Interview, 2002).
Whilst the political transition in South Africa removed the previous limitations to the creation of Peace Parks, new ones were soon looming. The adoption of Peace Parks as a policy objective in post-apartheid Southern Africa is not as obvious as it may appear in hindsight. Although the ongoing interest in transboundary conservation at several places in the region offered a starting-point from which to develop a regional plan for Peace Parks, these initiatives were for the most part limited to the local level and operated in a context of limited capacity and funding. There often was some level of local governmental support, and sometimes on one side of the border ministerial support. However, to create TBPAs governmental support at the highest levels was arguably needed on both sides of the border. Whilst the quest for regional integration between South Africa and its neighbours following the ending of apartheid in South Africa created an enabling context for Peace Parks several socio-economic and political factors in the post-apartheid era hampered the prioritisation of conservation as a policy objective by national governments. To be able to understand this predicament it is useful to take a brief look at some key economic and political characteristics of post-apartheid Southern Africa. In discussing these constraints and their consequences for the prospects of transboundary conservation in the early 1990s the focus will be on South Africa, as the region’s main power and eventually driving force behind Peace Parks.

2.7 The post-apartheid legacy

The return of peace to the region endowed Southern Africa with bright new prospects. However, Southern Africa was also faced with several problematic political and economic characteristics. The main ones are listed below.

1. Widespread poverty

Although relatively well endowed with valuable minerals like gold, platinum, uranium and diamonds, Southern Africa ranked amongst the world’s poorest regions in 1994. The costly regional conflict during the apartheid years combined with a highly unequal distribution of resources and a culture of mismanagement and corruption (see below) can be identified as important causes for this phenomenon. In the region’s richest country, South Africa, an estimated 51 percent of inhabitants lived below the poverty line in 1995 (UNDP, 2004). Today, about one-third of the SADC population is estimated to live in

---

19 It continues to do so today (World Resources Institute, 2004).
abject poverty (UNDP, 2004). Although agriculture is the main economic activity, the region is not self-sufficient. Furthermore, Southern Africa has suffered from high unemployment levels, including in the more prosperous countries such as Botswana and South Africa, a problem aggravated by the demobilisation of former combatants. Rising population levels largely cancelled out the economic growth the region experienced since the ending of conflict.

Southern Africa was also faced with new or aggravated social ills, in the form of a sharp rise in violent crime, facilitated by the illegal proliferation of small arms in the region and uncovered previous war material, rising corruption levels and an HIV AIDS epidemic (Vines, 1998; Webb, 1998; Beinart, 2001); exacerbating existing poverty levels.

2. Unequal distribution of resources

An important underlying cause for the high levels of poverty is the highly uneven distribution of resources in Southern Africa. South Africa is a case in point with half of its population living on just 11 percent of the National Income (Cashdan, 2002: 160). Other Southern African societies display similar patterns of uneven development, with small elites leading luxury lifestyles, whilst the majority of the population lives in poverty. Mismanagement and corruption at both national and local levels have furthermore hampered efforts to reduce poverty. The uneven distribution of resources and wealth means that the assets held by relatively affluent groups and sectors in society are also demanded by the have-nots, a situation which constitutes a significant potential source for conflict.

The issue of unequal distribution not only plays a role within countries, but also has regional dimensions. Within the region, there exists a great imbalance between the economic weight of South Africa, the region's "economic giant" (Dieter, 1999: 9), and that of neighbouring countries, even when the latter are aggregated. The total sum of the Gross National Products (GDPs) of Southern Africa's neighbouring countries represented only 14.4 percent of South Africa's GDP in 2000. Towards the end of apartheid the regional political economy was structured in such a way that the sharing of benefits and

---

20 As large-scale famines that hit the region in 1992, 1994 and 2002 painfully demonstrated.

21 This estimate is based on data from the WRI, 2004 (http://earthtrends.wri.org/country_profiles/index.cfm?theme=5&rcode=4)
costs in the regional economy seemed highly unevenly distributed, in a way that strongly favoured the South African economy.

Ex- South African President Mandela characterises this position as follows:

The regional economy that emerged under colonialism entrenched the domination of one country (South Africa) and incorporated other countries in subsidiary and dependent roles as labour reserves, markets for South African commodities, suppliers of certain services (such as transport) or providers of cheap and convenient resources (like water, electricity and some raw materials). South Africa’s visible exports to the rest of the region exceed imports by more than five to one. This is a reflection of not just the stronger productive base of the South African economy, but of barriers of various kinds that have kept goods produced in regional states out of the South African market (Mandela, 1993: 90, quoted in Dieter, 1999: 10).

3. Fierce competition for land, due to a relative shortage of farm land

The issue of unequal access to resources comes to the fore in the highly unequal distribution of farm land. These divisions can be traced to colonialism and apartheid when through forced removals and dispossession land that originally belonged to black farmers was seized and given to white settlers. In South Africa, eight million black South Africans were concentrated on just 13 percent of the land, with 86 percent belonging to 60,000 commercial farmers. Land redistribution programmes set up by post-colonial governments, often operating on a “willing seller-willing buyer” (Wongibe, 2002: 19) basis, have been slow to yield results. The ANC aimed to redistribute at least 30 percent of white-owned land within five years upon coming into office, however less than one percent had changed hands by the year 2000 (Cliffe, 2000: 279). Consequently, in

---

22 Through the Black Land Act of 1913 and the 1936 Black Trust and Land Act, white South Africans increasingly gained control over the land, until in the Black Trust and Land Act of 1936 a mere 13 percent of land was allocated to black people, constituting 80 percent of the population. The political rights of blacks could only be exercised in these areas, and these areas were destined to become ‘independent’ from the rest of white South Africa in due course.

23 Various reasons for this policy failure have been identified including bureaucratic incompetence, lack of political prioritisation (Lahiff, 2001), complexities surrounding the verification of land claims (Bohlin, 2001), unwillingness on the side of white farmers to co-operate (Pheko, Interview, 2001) and more generally the continued political power and influence of the groups currently controlling these resources.
especially South Africa, Zimbabwe and Namibia, there exists extreme land shortages and tenure insecurity for the black rural population. Table 2.5 illustrates this issue, displaying the massive differences in land ownership between white and black land owners in each of these three countries. Although these ‘post-settler states’ all formally adhered to a policy of national reconciliation, resource-based tensions and land conflicts along racial lines could easily aggravate racial tensions between whites and blacks in these countries (Maclean, 2001). Issues of race and ethnicity were central features of struggles for independence and black majority rule and the acquisition of land is seen by the majority of the black population as a key priority. 24

**Table 2.5 Land inequality in former white settler colonies**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Country</th>
<th>Land per capita among whites compared to land per capita among blacks</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Namibia</td>
<td>300 times</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>South Africa</td>
<td>480 times</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Zimbabwe</td>
<td>146 times</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

*Source: Van Wyk (2000)*

Due to an overall high population growth, competition for arable land also prevails in other parts of the region, including in mountainous Swaziland and Lesotho and arid Botswana, 80 percent of whose land surface is desert. Table 2.6 displays changes in population levels and agricultural land use per Southern African country. Whilst there is still a relative abundance of land in Mozambique, the settlement of former refugees in conservation areas poses a problem (Culverwell, Interview, 2001). As a whole, Southern Africa has become a region characterised by a relative shortage of farm land, a situation which marks for many places a sharp reversal of pre-colonial trends when land was abundant and the labour to work it scarce (Hall, 1987: 69).

The course of history in Southern Africa and resulting economic and social problems, called for and did evoke radically new policy priorities in the region. Initially, these seemed detrimental to, if not to outright threaten, the prospect of conservation in Southern Africa and therefore transboundary conservation. However, by turning the

---

24 The fact that the productive sector is predominantly also in white hands, is a main contributing factor to this phenomenon.
The concept of Peace Parks into a discourse for development and promoting it as a vehicle for regional co-operation and integration, proponents of Peace Parks successfully managed to make Peace Parks a post-

**Table 2.6** Changes in population levels and agricultural land use per Southern African country

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Country</th>
<th>Total land area (1000 hectares)</th>
<th>Population (in thousands people)</th>
<th>Average annual population growth rate</th>
<th>Cropland 1999 (1000 hectares)</th>
<th>% arable and fixed cropland of total land area in 1998</th>
<th>% of irrigated land 1999</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Botswana</td>
<td>58,000</td>
<td>389</td>
<td>1,564</td>
<td>346</td>
<td>2.9</td>
<td>343.0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Lesotho</td>
<td>3,035</td>
<td>734</td>
<td>2,076</td>
<td>325</td>
<td>2.3</td>
<td>325.0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Mozambique</td>
<td>80,159</td>
<td>6,198</td>
<td>18,986</td>
<td>3,350</td>
<td>2.4</td>
<td>2,950.0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Namibia</td>
<td>82,429</td>
<td>511</td>
<td>1,819</td>
<td>820</td>
<td>2.6</td>
<td>816.0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>South Africa</td>
<td>122,104</td>
<td>13,683</td>
<td>44,203</td>
<td>15,712</td>
<td>0.3</td>
<td>15,360.0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Swaziland</td>
<td>1,736</td>
<td>264</td>
<td>948</td>
<td>180</td>
<td>0.4</td>
<td>168.0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Zimbabwe</td>
<td>39,076</td>
<td>2,744</td>
<td>13,076</td>
<td>3,350</td>
<td>3.7</td>
<td>3,080.0</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>


Confronted with the array of challenging and problematic social and economic realities that faced Southern Africa in the mid 1990s as outlined above, and in line with historical developments, important socio-economic and political priorities in South Africa and other countries were:

- Promotion of socio-economic development to eradicate poverty
- Redistribution of land
- Black empowerment
- Regional co-operation and integration along pan Africanist lines

Within this new policy framework there seemed initially little room for transboundary conservation. Particularly in South Africa conservation was highly unpopular with the masses, it being associated with social exclusion, colonialism and apartheid (Cock and Koch, 1991). A majority of ANC supporters, mostly poor black landless citizens, wanted
National Park land to be redistributed for farming. Two ANC researchers proposed in this context to open up parts of the Kruger National Park for cattle grazing (The Star, March 5 quoted in Koch, 1994: 29-30). Finally, government capacity and financial means were limited and in order to allocate more funds for the pursuit of development, governmental funding for conservation was soon cut dramatically. In the meantime protected areas were increasingly ‘under siege’ from land invasions and encroachment whilst also facing many land claims by historically evicted ethnic communities. For example, the Makuleke, evicted from their land in the Kruger National Park in 1969, launched a land claim in the north of the Kruger Park (Steenkamp, 2002). A high turn over of personnel in SANPs as a result of affirmative action, led to a loss of experienced staff (Hall-Martin, Interview, 2001; Braack, 2002a). The best times for conservation in South Africa seemed to be over.

However, towards the end of the 1990s South Africa had accepted plans for six Peace Parks with neighbouring countries, increasing the land set aside for conservation in the region. Furthermore, this plan was largely instigated by a white conservationist; Dr. Anton Rupert. How was this possible? It is hard to pinpoint one main causal factor. Rather, five factors operating at various geographical scales and working together in a mutually reinforcing way account for the acceptance of the Peace Parks concept in Southern Africa.

1) The rise of community-based conservation
2) The linkage of TBPAs with socio-economic development in Southern Africa
3) The envisioning of transboundary conservation as a means for regional integration on pan Africanist terms
4) International donor support
5) Effective marketing of the concept of Peace Parks in South Africa

These factors and the interaction between them will now be discussed.

---

25 This question does not imply that the acceptance of the Peace Parks concept was largely due to political factors, and not to the merit of the concept itself. However, the concept of Peace Parks had to compete with many other plans and concepts to secure a place in the new ‘policy spaces’ that were opening up and created in the transition period.
2.8. Enabling strategies for the rise of Peace Parks in the post-apartheid era

1) Combining communities with markets: the rise of the community based conservation paradigm

At the beginning of this chapter it was outlined how conservation in Southern Africa had its roots in colonial times and how it was characterised by evictions and by the exclusion of local people. The presence of people in nature reserves, other than game scouts, was considered detrimental to conservation and nature something to be protected from human influence. In the wake of local resistance, conservation areas were set up on the basis of a ‘fortress model’. Militant game ranchers sought to protect the area against local hunters who had in the process been disgraced as ‘poachers’. By the 1980s this ‘fortress’ approach was increasingly replaced by a new paradigm, which stressed that conservation had to benefit local people in order to be sustainable and successful. This discourse is known under various names, including Community Based Conservation (CBC) and Community Natural Resource Management (CBNRM) (Hulme and Murphree, 2001), with the latter being slightly broader in outlook (Turner, 2004).

Reflecting the important role of narratives and paradigms in shaping policy (Roe, 1994), CBC was put forward as the “answer to failing conservation strategies in Africa” (Büsch er et al., 2004: 1). Over time, it had become increasingly visible that notwithstanding all militarised measures, nature reserves in Africa could not adequately be protected from poaching and other forms of local encroachment. Arguing from the premise that if local people would have a stake in the protection of wildlife poaching incentives would fall, CBC linked conservation to local development. Where local people were previously envisaged as ‘poachers’, now they were seen as indispensable allies in the protection of wildlife conservation (Gibson and Marks, 1995) and their ‘indigenous knowledge’ became more valued. Righting the wrongs of the past by assisting local communities with development was sometimes also an important driving force for the notion that local people should benefit economically from wildlife conservation. Integrated Conservation and Development Projects (ICDPs) became popular tools in striving for CBC. By the early 1990s an estimated 50 ICDPs could be found in 20 African countries (Alpert, 1996). Zimbabwe’s Communal Areas Management for Indigenous
Resources (CAMPFIRE) initiative became particularly famous (Murombedzi, 1999; Duffy, 2000).

Partially as a result of the lineage between conservation and development, the rationale underlying CBC reflected contemporary trends in development thinking, including the importance of de-centralisation, the notion of sustainable development and neo-liberal market thinking. Hulme and Murphree (2001) identify the following three premises to CBC or the “new conservation” (Hulme and Murphree, 1999).

A) Decentralisation
Identifying ineffective and corrupt African states as a key factor accounting for the failures in conservation and development planning (see also sections 3.2.5 and 3.3.4.), CBC initiators proposed that conservation should become more rooted at the local level, involving the active involvement of ‘local communities’ in “land-use policy and management decisions” (Hackle, 1999: 727). Moreover, to facilitate the generation of economic benefits support grew for the notion that local people should be given proprietorship or ownership over wildlife resources (Hackle, 1999: 727) through consultative or active participatory measures. As such, CBC became also conceptualised as an important means for community empowerment (Mohan and Stokke, 2000).

B) Sustainable development
The widespread popularity of the notion of sustainable development (see also section 3.2.1.) undermined preservationist views, which seek to centralise nature’s needs over those of humans. CBC is informed by the notion that “both conservation and development goals are achieved at the same time…” (Hulme and Murphree, 1999: 279). This shift was influenced by ‘New Ecology’ insights that “environments are inherently dynamic and not simply moving towards a ‘climax’ or equilibrium position…” (Hulme and Murphree, 1999: 279) as well as the realisation that much conservation thinking constituted ‘environmental imperialism’ with western conservation objectives superseding African development needs (Anderson and Grove, 1987; Hulme and Murphree, 2001: 13, 17). The conceptualisation of conservation as a form of development was furthermore significantly influenced by “neo-liberal thinking about the role of markets” (Hulme and Murphree, 1999: 279).
Free market thinking constitutes the third pillar underlying CBC (Hulme and Murphree, 1999: 279).

C) Free market thinking
The free working of markets is seen as the most effective way to mobilise the economic potential of conservation and ensure the support of local people, and in doing so ensure biodiversity protection (Katerere, 2002). Under influence of economic neo-liberal ideas, ‘use it or lose it’ became the new premium in conservation. The benefits that conservation areas are envisaged to attract through ecotourism have become a particularly important component of this strategy.

The rise of CBC endowed conservation with a different image: instead of a colonial instrument promoting wildlife protection at the expense of local people’s needs, conservation was now presented as a tool for development. This new way of envisioning conservation became a central feature in the promotion of TBPAs.

2) Integration of transboundary conservation objectives with new development priorities in Southern Africa
In the IUCN’s early promotion of Peace Parks (Thorsell, 1990; Hamilton, 1996) the contribution that TBPAs can make through ecotourism earnings to sustainable development is mentioned as one of the many beneficial side effects of TBPAs. Reflecting its developmental context, in the conceptualisation of Peace Parks in Southern Africa the development potential of Peace Parks took front seat. Proponents of Peace Parks stressed how TBPAs could become a mechanism for economic growth, by bringing in much needed foreign currency and jobs through increased ecotourism opportunities (Fakir, 2000; Hanks, 2001). By creating larger wildlife areas TBPAs would multiply the income and jobs associated with ecotourism, it was claimed. Larger wildlife areas with more attractions in them would allegedly attract millions of ecotourists from all over the world. TBPAs moreover represented a ‘clean’ or environmentally friendly form of economic growth, feeding into the SADC’s concern with promoting environmentally sustainable development that which would not endanger a given country’s natural resource base (SADC, 2004). Finally, TBPAs were expected to fulfil their role as vehicles for sustainable development in the areas where this matters the most: Southern Africa’s borderlands, some of the region’s poorest areas. Linkage of the TBPA concept
with Southern Africa’s regional integration objectives further strengthened the leverage of the TBPA concept as a means for development, whilst also opening up new opportunities.

3) Promotion of TBPAAs as a vehicle for more open border policies

A second major theme in the promotion of Peace Parks in Southern Africa was the potential of TBPAAs to promote regional co-operation and integration through their boundary removing aspects. This argument that Peace Parks should pursue some form of regional co-operation and integration underlies their creation in most regions (Thorsell, 1990a; Hearns, 1997; ITTO/IUCN, 2003). Supporters of Peace Parks stressed how collaborative management between neighbouring countries in the field of conservation could promote SADC’s regional integration objectives, by encouraging a harmonisation of national policies in this field. Furthermore, the removal of border fences and other border obstacles which TBPAAs were alleged to facilitate would support SADC’s ultimate objective: the creation of a free trade area within the region. TBPAAs were thus presented and increasingly perceived as important instruments to economic regionalisation.

Reflecting post-colonial realities in Southern Africa, the concept of Peace Parks also became linked in this region to the envisaged ability of Peace Parks to facilitate the “reunification of divided local communities” across boundaries (Hanks, 2002: 31). This enabled a conceptualisation of Peace Parks along pan-Africanist lines (Hughes, 2003). Supporters of Peace Parks stressed how TBPAAs would “rejoin areas” where transboundary ethnic communities were “divided by political borders imposed by colonial powers”. Peace Parks were also said to help “preserve and maintain indigenous traditions, cultures and knowledge as well as to allow for transboundary community based natural resource management”, which was often claimed to originate in pre-colonial times (Singh and Van Houtum, 2002: 258). In Thabo Mbeki’s African Renaissance discourse, which currently shapes pan-African cooperative efforts such as the New Partnership for Africa’s Development (NEPAD) (Nabudere, 2002; Van Amerom and Büscher, 2005), the discrepancy between the distribution of ethnic groups over the continent and the ways in which national boundaries often cut through these, are identified as a key underlying reason for conflict in Africa. The preservation of traditional African knowledge and cultures is another central theme of the African Renaissance discourse, which also officially informs South Africa’s co-operation with neighbouring
countries. As a result of this coinciding of objectives, Peace Parks were soon envisaged and presented as key instruments for the African Renaissance (Van Amerom and Büscher, 2005).

4) Donor support for TBNRM

Partially as a result of their involvement with community based conservation programmes in the region, international donors were receptive to the notion of TBPAs (Wolmer, 2003). TBPAs seemed to represent “a good opportunity to expand these programmes further, both in terms of actual scale and policy goals” (Büscher et al, 2004). In 1996, the Global Environment Facility (GEF), donated through the World Bank a 5 million US$ grant to Mozambique to support a ‘Transfrontier Conservation Area Pilot and Institutional Strengthening Project” for which the testing of ‘new approaches to exploit the synergies between conservation and community development in very poor areas where income earning opportunities are limited’ was a key motivation (World Bank, 1996, 14). A more critical view is that community based conservation programmes have had very mixed results (Hulme and Murphree, 2001) and that international development and conservation agencies simply needed a new paradigm for policy action and the acquisition of funding (Wolmer, 2004). Whatever the reasons, following the World Bank intervention the creation of TBPAs in Southern Africa soon gained the support of a wide range of powerful international donors including USAID, the Ford Foundation, GTZ and the WWF (Singh and Van Houtum, 2002: 258). The development assistance that can be obtained for Peace Parks is an important factor accounting, in turn, for the support of governments (Ramudsindela, 2004).

5) Effective marketing of the concept by the Peace Parks Foundation

Within the continent as a whole, South Africa has been characterised by a strong NGO sector in the area of conservation (Koch, 1994). The South African branch of the WWF had for long played a leading role in this international conservation organisation (Bonner, 1993; Ellis, 1994), under the auspices of then chairman Anton Rupert and executive assistant John Hanks. This network proved a fertile basis from which to promote the concept of Peace Parks in Southern Africa. To support the creation of TBPAs in Southern Africa, Dr. Rupert founded the Peace Parks Foundation (PPF) in 1997, in co-operation with Nelson Mandela and Prince Bernhard of the Netherlands, former chairman of the
Using the existing conservation contacts of Dr Rupert and John Hanks as a starting point, the PPF greatly raised the profile of Peace Parks internationally. The PPF successfully attracted major international donors, like the German Development Bank KfW (Kredietanstalt für Wiederaufbau) and USAID for the sponsoring of Peace Parks (Hanks, 1997). Considerable donations were also secured from the international business community and from the considerable private capital of Anton Rupert, the owner of South Africa's biggest business consortium. Access to capital provided the PPF with considerable economic leverage, allowing it to purchase land for TBPAs (Hanks, 1997). The PPF furthermore played an important role in the establishment of Peace Parks by offering technical expertise to governments.

The PPF set out to promote the creation of seven Peace Parks between South Africa and neighbouring countries, which were later reduced to six (as displayed in Figure 1.1). To facilitate essential political support for Peace Parks, Anton Rupert and other PPF staff directly approached the presidents of South Africa neighbouring countries, which are now all honorary patrons of the PPF (Rupert, Interview, 2002).

Over time several new TBPAs have been dreamt up, all over Africa. The Open Africa Initiative, a tourism organisation closely linked to the Peace Parks Foundation, has so far come up with the boldest and most encompassing vision of adjacent transboundary conservation areas, envisaging a green belt along the African continent nearly linking 'Cape Town with Cairo'. Figure 2.2 displays this vision for the Southern part of Africa. These and earlier plans of the Peace Parks Foundation have however been criticised as a form of neo-colonialism (Singh and Van Houtum, 2002). Problematically, many of the areas destined for Peace Parks contained populated areas and were displayed on maps without prior consultation with local populations in these areas (Duffy, 2002b; Draper and Wels, 2002). The next section explores the organisational set up of Southern Africa's Peace Parks and discusses the advance of Southern Africa's Peace Parks to date.
2.9 The Transboundary Natural Resource Management Discourse

The operationalisation of the PPC in Southern Africa is informed by the Transboundary Natural Resource Management (TBNRM) discourse, a concept developed by the World Bank. TBNRM refers to “any process of co-operation across boundaries that facilitates or improves the management of natural resources (to the benefit of all parties in the area concerned)” (World Bank, 1996). In theory therefore TBNRM explicitly stimulates a wide range of transboundary conservation initiatives that do not necessarily have to include a National Park and can be community-driven (Griffin et al, 1999; Van der Linde et al., 2001; Fakir, 2002). A Transboundary Natural Resource Management Area

**Figure 2.2** Map of ‘The Peace Parks Dream’

*Source: Singh and Van Houtum (2002: 260).*
(TBNRMA) focuses, for example, on community based natural resource management across international boundaries and is largely initiated by these communities (Mayoral-Philips, 2002; Chengeta et al., 2003). However, no TBNRMA has been set up so far in Southern Africa. An important underlying reason may be that contrary to TBNRM rhetoric (see Van der Linde et al., 2001: 7) a tradition of natural resource management between local communities across boundaries in Southern Africa is in fact largely absent (Grossman, Interview, 2001).

The TFCA model is informed by the land use models used in Biosphere planning models (UNESCO, 2003). These distinguish a core zone, which is entirely devoted to biodiversity conservation, various buffer zones, allowing for various types of land use that can be relatively easy combined with conservation goals, and transition areas (see Figure 2.3). Transition areas could be agricultural areas. Local communities living in or nearby could allegedly profit from their proximity to the park by engaging in profit-generating activities, for example through ecotourism projects. In exchange they would make their land available for game. In doing so, the total land available for wildlife greatly increases, which is seen to assist in conservation, whilst the increase in size may also mean the total conservation area could host an entire ecosystem, turning it into a bioregion.

![Biosphere reserve zonation](image)

**Figure 2.3** The Biosphere model

*Source: UNESCO (2004).*
In addition to government owned land in the form of national parks or other nature reserves and community-owned land, TFCAs can also encompass privately owned land. In Southern Africa this mostly encompasses the involvement of white commercial farmers whilst NGOs like the PPF have also started to buy land and use it for conservation. National boundaries may furthermore mark great differences in land use between countries. Consequently, TBPAs often resemble a ‘mosaic of land use’ (Hanks, 2000). Figure 2.4 displays the different types of land ownership in a TFCA. Significantly, Peace Parks in Southern Africa were initially for the main part conceptualised as TFCAs, but over time the accent moved to TFPs\(^2\), reflecting a growing adherence to conservation goals over sustainable development.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Communal Landholders</th>
<th>National Park</th>
<th>Private Landholders</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>(community-based</td>
<td>State Land</td>
<td>(game ranches,</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>conservation)</td>
<td>(facilitates</td>
<td>multi-species land</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>partnership)</td>
<td>use)</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

May include collaboration between landholders within one country

[Figure 2.4](#) Land ownership and land owning parties in TBNRM
*Source: Griffin et al. (1999: 2).*

In most cases, the treaty also specifies the implementing agencies on the ground, such as South African National Parks. Where provinces fulfil a highly important and rather independent role, the tasks of these and their relations to the other national state agencies

\(^2\) The reasons for this shift are discussed in Chapter Five.
involved may be laid out in subsidiary agreements to the treaty. As a result of other aspects involved in TBPAs there is also involvement of other specialist governmental agencies, such as customs authorities. NGOs are usually assigned a specific task, but their involvement is based upon separate negotiations with the various government parties in question. Participating local communities have merely a consultative status. The organisational model of the Great Limpopo Park, displayed in Figure 2.5, is representative of that for most TBPAs.

Figure 2.5 Organizational diagram of the Great Limpopo

2.10 Current status of Peace Parks in Southern Africa

So far, one Peace Park has been established in Southern Africa with another five Peace Parks at some stage in the planning process. No longer hindered by the political constraints of the *apartheid* era, Botswana and South Africa formalised the de facto Gemsbok/Kalahari Park into a TBPA, launching the Kgalagadi Transfrontier Park on 12 May 2000. Situated in the southern part of the Kalahari Desert, this park constitutes the largest conservation area in the Southern hemisphere with an area of almost 38000 km². The park is managed by a Transfrontier Management Committee consisting of the SANPs Board and the Botswana Department of Wildlife and National Parks (Africom, 2000). The Great Limpopo TBPA between South Africa, Mozambique and Zimbabwe is scheduled to be the next TBPA to be opened. On 4 October 2001 a beginning was made with the transfer of elephants from the South African Kruger Park into the Mozambican Coutada 16 Park whilst in April 2003 two openings were made in the border fence between South Africa and Mozambique to create a wildlife corridor. However, it will take at least five years before the Great Limpopo can be opened for tourists (Grossman, Interview, 2002). The other four planned TBPAs between South Africa and its neighbours are in various stages of progress (see Table 2.7).

2.11 Conclusion

This chapter has demonstrated how in order to secure sufficient political support, the concept of Peace Parks in Southern Africa has become conceptualised in a holistic way, whereby it has become explicitly linked to regional socio-economic development and pan Africanist discourses. Peace Parks only gained ground in Southern Africa from the mid 1990s onwards, after many delays and in spite of many potential obstacles. Whilst Southern Africa can be considered highly suitable for the creation of TBPAs on the basis of ecological and geographical factors, up to the end of *apartheid* in South Africa in 1994 political strife and violence halted the creation of TBPAs. Although the improvement in regional relations between South Africa and neighbouring states from 1994 onwards created an enabling context for Peace Parks, changing policy priorities in post-*apartheid* Southern Africa seemed to initially pose new obstacles for the creation of Peace Parks. However, by turning Peace Parks into a development discourse and by presenting TBPAs as a mechanisms for open border policies proponents of Peace Parks successfully

---

27 Mainly due to security issues posed by the connection of these parks. This phenomenon is explored in Chapter 6.
managed to place Peace Parks on the post-apartheid policy agenda. Partially in response to the context of widespread poverty and land pressure in which Peace Parks in Southern Africa are created, Peace Parks were promoted and justified on the basis that they can promote socio-economic development by attracting ecotourism to the region. Furthermore, Peace Parks have been presented as solutions to the hardships of transboundary ethnic groups shattered over two or more countries and as means of fostering economic integration by removing boundaries.

Table 2.7 Stages of development per Peace Park

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Name</th>
<th>Participating Countries</th>
<th>Progress to date</th>
<th>TBP</th>
<th>TFCA</th>
<th>Status border</th>
<th>Level of progress</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Kgalagadi Park</td>
<td>South Africa, Botswana</td>
<td>Officially opened (12 May 2000)</td>
<td>√</td>
<td>open</td>
<td>Established</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Maloti-Drakensberg Transfrontier Conservation and Development Area</td>
<td>South Africa, Lesotho</td>
<td>Memorandum of Understanding signed (11 June 2001), subsidiary agreement</td>
<td>√</td>
<td>closed</td>
<td>Fairly Advanced</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Ai/Ais-Richtersveld Park</td>
<td>South Africa, Namibia</td>
<td>Treaty signed (1 August 2003)</td>
<td>√</td>
<td>closed</td>
<td>Fairly advanced</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Limpopo-Shashe TFCA</td>
<td>South Africa, Botswana, Zimbabwe</td>
<td>Draft Memorandum of Understanding under discussion</td>
<td>√</td>
<td>closed</td>
<td>Medium</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Lubombo TBPA/SDI</td>
<td>South Africa, Mozambique, Swaziland</td>
<td>Trilateral Protocol signed (22 June 2000)</td>
<td>√</td>
<td>closed</td>
<td>Medium</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

On basis of these two social premises Peace Parks have also become linked to the pan-Africanist African Renaissance discourse. Reflecting the new thinking in conservation and development, the development component of Peace Parks has been conceptualised by means of CBNRM discourses. Combining the international dimensions of Peace Parks with Community Based Natural Resource Management across boundaries, the TBNRM discourse has come to inform Peace Parks in Southern Africa. As a result of the multiple
objectives and promises surrounding Peace Parks in Southern Africa the expectations surrounding them are huge.
3. Conceptual Framework

3.1 Introduction

This chapter provides a conceptual map of the research topic. In order to theoretically analyse the political aspects of Peace Parks, the chapter critically assesses the two ‘policy pillars’ of TBNRM: sustainable development and transboundary co-operation and the political aspects surrounding these policy areas. As indicated in Chapter 2, for Peace Parks to maintain essential political support and deliver their various policy aims the delivery of environmentally friendly socio-economic growth and more open border policies are prerequisites. In the TBNRM discourse both policy areas tend to be presented as being relatively straightforward and unproblematic. An important underlying reason for this stance is that both policy areas and the interests of the actors surrounding these are perceived as complementary and mutually reinforcing, creating a ‘win-win situation’. This conceptualisation is however simplistic.

Mainstream approaches to sustainable development (henceforth: SD), of which TBNRM is a product, tend to obscure the political nature of SD, downplaying the tensions that exist between the simultaneous pursuit of conservation and development and the ways in which SD policies may reflect or reinforce wider power imbalances between participating actors and other macro political constraints. A more holistic outlook which actively incorporates the importance of power relations and politics upon environmental and developmental practice is hence required. Furthermore, as this thesis focuses on natural resource management in a transboundary context, the political working of boundaries and borderlands and the ways in which these may affect transboundary co-operation needs to constitute another main area of inquiry.

This chapter sets about constructing a conceptual framework for the research topic in the following way. The next section will first take a closer look at mainstream approaches to SD, and the ways in which these conceptualise the operation of power and politics. Concluding that these offer a too limited outlook on politics and power, the following section seeks to add to these perspectives by engaging with the insights offered by the field of political ecology. Political ecology actively incorporates and researches the ways in which environmental issues are shaped by economic and
political power hierarchies, using actor-oriented and multiple scale analysis and critical discourse analysis. Further building upon this framework and extending it to the realm of boundaries and borderlands, the third section considers the political nature of boundaries and, partially related to this, important social and political patterns in African borderlands, and the possible implications of these for inter-state co-operation. Combining the insights generated on sustainable development and transboundary co-operation, the concluding section of the chapter summarises some important analytical vantage points regarding the operation of politics and power in TBPAs.

3.2 Sustainable development

3.2.1 The mainstream approach
The TBNRM discourse is largely a product and reflection of mainstream approaches to SD. One of the most popular terms of our time, it is not easy to define SD and the concept remains a contested one (Lele, 1991; O'Connor, 1994; Mebratu, 1998; Adams, 2001). This lack of agreement over the meaning of SD has both brought about and is reinforced by a variety of policy approaches. Moreover, many approaches employ similar concepts and catchphrases which often overlap (Redclift, 1987; Kirkby et al., 1995).

Within this continuum of approaches however, it is possible to distinguish a ‘mainstream’ outlook on SD (Adams, 2001).1 This perspective is often taken to be articulated through the Brundtland Commission’s original definition of SD: “development that meets the needs of the present without compromising the ability of future generations to meet their own needs” (WCED, 1987: 43). ‘Needs’ in the Brundtland definition particularly refers to socio-economic needs; poverty being identified as both a key cause and an outcome of environmental degradation. Economic growth, in an environmentally friendly or ‘sustainable’ form (Adams, 1995) is therefore identified as the main solution. Although containing plenty of ambiguities, a key characteristic of this mainstream perspective is its adherence to free market thinking.

---

1 Under the broad categorisation of mainstream SD thinking, approaches and emphasis will differ, reflecting the diversity of organisations involved. Accordingly, there is not a single uniform way in which the concept of politics is engaged with, supposing it is engaged with at all. However, some main trends are identifiable.
(Redclift, 1987; O'Riordan, 1991; O'Connor, 1994; Adams, 2001). As such it "promotes the idea that environmental problems can best be ameliorated by market forces" (Brosius, 1999: 278). Within the conservation sector these commercialising premises have been translated into the notion that conservation should "pay its way" (see McAfee, 1999). The belief in a 'cure-all' form of economic growth is further matched by a strong belief in the power of science, as a means to identify and solve environmental problems (Mebratu, 1998; Adams, 2001). This particular way of thinking about SD has become the most influential one, because it is supported and actively promoted by a mosaic of powerful international organisations. Multilateral donors like the Global Environment Facility (GEF), the UNEP and the World Bank subscribe to this discourse. So do most bi-lateral donors, including the UK's Department for International Development (DFID), the Dutch Directoraat-Generaal Internationale Samenwerking (DGIS), the German Gesellschaft für Technische Zusammenarbeit (GTZ) and USAID, and prominent environmental NGOs, such as the IUCN and the WWF. These organisations have a dominant role in the financing and design of conservation and development programmes in developing countries. As the continent that is most dependent upon development aid (World Bank, 2004) this situation applies particularly to Africa.

The above-outlined characteristics of mainstream SD are evident in its latest orthodox guise, as promoted at the 2002 World Summit on Sustainable Development (WSSD) in Johannesburg, which was marked by a strong adherence to corporate, free market, capitalist, neo-liberal and rational planning principles (Bond, 2003; UN, 2003). The 2003 WSSD furthermore stressed the need for the formation of 'partnerships' between the state, the private sector, local communities and national and international NGOs as the way to implement SD (UN, 2003).

3.2.2. Politics in mainstream SD

The desirability and legitimacy of the goals of SD, including poverty reduction, environmental protection and co-operation based on partnerships, is widely accepted. The strategies and policies embraced by proponents of the mainstream SD discourse to

---

2 Professor Bond is a long-standing critic of neo-liberal policies and the operation of multilateral agencies and globalisation processes more generally.
reach these objectives are, however, contested. The mainstream SD outlook has been variously criticised for its technocratic and managerial outlook (Adams, 1995; Mohan and Hickey, 2004); economic reductionism (O’Connor, 1994; Naughton-Treves and Sanderson, 1995; McAfee, 1999); its positivist outlook on science (Svirezhev & Svirejeva-Hopkins, 1998; Lomberg, 2001; Forsyth, 2003); elusive, imprecise language and definitions (Lélé, 1991; Kirby et al., 1995; Mebratu, 1998); and a relative neglect of the role of culture and race in co-operation (Wels, 2000; Hughes, 2001). These proposed defects point to a more fundamental issue, notably a lack of engagement with politics and power. As a whole, mainstream SD thinking tends to employ a rather a-political outlook. This is perhaps not surprising. Managerial and technocratic outlooks implicitly rest upon the assumption that the external political environment will not interfere with policy. Issues of power, ideology and cultural values are subsequently sidelined (Johnson, 2000: 709).

Such modernist outlooks introduce two basic weaknesses in the SD discourse, notably:

- A tendency to insufficiently account for the problematic political environments in which SD projects often take place, especially in developing countries.
- A tendency to downplay the role of power inequalities between actors

These two shortcomings in turn result in an over-optimistic outlook on policy implementation, leading to:

- A tendency to overlook or insufficiently recognise the conflict potential in pursuing SD
- A tendency to view the operation of partnerships in over-optimistic terms and as unproblematic.

The next section briefly explores these issues.

3.2.3. The policy-making context

Managerial assumptions that project implementation can be undertaken in relative isolation from the wider political context are often based on a tacit assumption that the external political and socio-economic environment is either supportive of the proposed
policy interventions, or can be easily moulded. This view is often rooted in the modernist approaches to development and conservation dating from the 1950s and 1960s. Adams (1995) observes, for example, how the naive political outlook of US conservation movements in the 1950s as summarised by Hays (1959) continues to inform, or be present, in certain slants of mainstream SD thinking. Having as its essence “rational planning to promote efficient development and use of natural resources” these conservationists envisaged the existence of a matching political system “guided by the ideal of efficiency and dominated by the technicians who could best determine how to achieve it” (Hays, 1959: 2).

In practice, such a rational and supportive policy-making environment tends to be imaginary. Environmental governance is often characterised by high degrees of ‘uncertainty’ and ‘complexity’ (Mehta et al., 2001). This phenomenon features particularly in the African context. The failures of modernisation development theories and programmes of the 1950s and 1960s accentuate this point. Instead of the expected relatively stable, receptive and predictable political context, projects were confronted with very different political realities. These include a relatively high frequency of limited capacity, corruption, political instability and armed conflict. These factors undermined development assistance, no matter how meticulously planned (Harrison, 1981; Ferguson, 1990; Crush, 1995; Moore, 2001).

Partially as a result, the socio-economic environment, characterised by widespread poverty, is equally problematic. Limited governmental capacity greatly constrains

---

3 Modernisation models of the late 1950s/1960s confidently predicted that the recently politically independent countries in the South would swiftly catch up with their counterparts in the North. Identifying the persistence of ‘traditional’ societies as the key source of underdevelopment, the modernisation approach envisaged an evolutionary model of development for states, based on the one previously followed by Northern nations. Economic growth, particularly through industrialisation was seen as key way to reach ‘modernity’. This process was perceived as being a relatively straightforward and simple one. Africa’s deteriorating economic position bears witness to the inadequacy of these predictions. The continent’s poverty levels were, overall, higher in the 1990s than in the 1960s (World Bank, 2003).

4 The role of politics was not so much ignored, as underestimated in modernisation theories: just like the socio-economic environment, the political environment was thought to be highly malleable. Whilst this proved a pitfall, the awareness within modernisation theory that socio-economic and political development goes hand in hand remains an important insight. An in-depth analysis of the concept of political development and the key conditions for it remains an essential part of any development theory (Moore, 2001).
project implementation. The observed tendency within mainstream SD thinking to overlook the precarious policy environments in which SD projects take place is therefore a highly problematic one. Because socio-economic and political constraints are insufficiently recognised, chances for implementational success are easily overrated.

3.2.4. Power imbalances and SD

Insufficient engagement with the political and socio-economic contexts in which projects operate is also problematic for another reason. It downplays the important ways in which external power imbalances will cause or aggravate internal power struggles between the actors involved. This feature endows the mainstream SD discourse with an overly optimistic view on partnerships and their performance.\(^5\)

The mainstream SD discourse generally maintains that partnerships are characterised by neutral democratic decision-making (Edmunds and Wollenberg, 2001). Each actor is seen to have a chance to promote its interests. However, just as feminist studies have shown how power relations in the private sphere cannot be considered in isolation from power distribution patterns in wider society (Walby, 1990; Jackman, 1994; Tilly, 1998; Townsend et al., 1999), so too would it be naive to assume that the functioning of environmental governance would not be affected by the overall nature of power distribution between the actors involved.

One area in which this is particularly visible is community participation. The involvement of local communities in decision-making processes is an important aspect of the promotion of partnerships (UN, 2003). However, there tends to be a considerable gap between rhetoric and practice. Empirical analyses of community-based conservation programmes indicate the persistence of top-down patterns of decision-making (Neumann, 1997; Twyman, 1998; Agrarwal and Gibson, 1999; Cooke and Kothari, 2001; Steenkamp, 2002; Adams and Mulligan, 2003). Moreover, these studies point to structural power inequalities, notably between local communities on the one hand and national governments and large environmental NGOs or donors on the other,

---

\(^5\) This inattention to power balances has been noted in other development contexts, e.g. Mawdsley et al. (2002).
as a main underlying cause (Cooke and Kothari, 2001). Generally speaking, the latter organisations possess a lot more power, having more finances and connections at their disposal (including with national governmental elites) and also better access to information (Few, 2001). This comparative advantage is often employed by these parties to curb the power of weaker parties such as local communities. On the other hand, local communities may have hidden agendas and use projects to strengthen their position, even when this violates their aims (Ogura, 2003). Some conservation projects seeking to create economic alternatives to poaching have been noted to unintentionally induce more poaching, for example because recipient local communities use the creation of donor-sponsored infrastructure to expand the local poaching trade (Gibson and Marks, 1995). Adding another layer of complexity, communities usually do not constitute homogeneous groups (unlike their portrayal in most mainstream SD discourses) (Agrawal and Gibson, 1999). This aspect tends to complicate the implementation of SD programmes, especially when these programmes are likely to favour one faction over another. ‘Participatory’ approaches can legitimise particular policies through providing a façade of consensus based on assumptions of ‘community’ social coherence (Neumann, 1997).

3.2.5. The 'good governance' approach

The increased attention or emphasis on the need for ‘good governance’ within development thinking since the 1990s has highlighted the important link between policy performance and macro political factors. Influential international donors such as the International Monetary Fund (IMF) and the World Bank, with in their following USAID and other bilateral donors, have increasingly raised the profile of the necessity for a democratic and transparent political environment at the national level (Hyden, 1992; Brinkerhoff, 2000). Having identified undemocratic and corrupt administrations as key obstacles to markets working to alleviate poverty, this has led to increased attention being devoted to ‘good governance’ and institution building. States that are perceived to exercise ‘good governance’ are now strongly favoured as the recipients of these donors’ grants and loans.

Whilst this policy has productively drawn more attention to the linkages between conservation projects on the ground and the nature of political and power dynamics in
wider society, it remains fairly limited as a way to conceptualise the role of politics and power in SD. One main reason is that this approach skims the surface of political and power relations relevant to SD. The existing official institutions of decision-making are the very institutions that donors engage with and furthermore use as a starting point of policy implementation. Furthermore, the donors themselves are part of the status quo and have a vested interest in its maintenance. The premises of the mainstream SD discourse, such as its emphasis on the free-market, are often closely intertwined with the economic interests and positions of the national elites, transnational organisations and corporations and mainstream environmental organizations that construct and reinforce it (Sklair, 2000: 20; Brosius, 1999). Partially as a result of these vested interests, the global political economy and associated structural power inequalities are relatively glossed over in mainstream SD. The working of SD in developing countries is however greatly affected and constricted by the nature of the wider political economy in which these programmes operate (Redclift, 1987). By taking the economic and political status quo for granted, instead of subjecting it to critical analysis, mainstream SD may reinforce economic and political marginality, as opposed to reducing it.

3.2.6 The conflict potential of SD

Perhaps the most important shortcoming of the approaches of the key institutions involved in promoting and implementing mainstream SD such as the World Bank, USAID, UNEP, GEF, IUCN and the WWF is their tendency to downplay the conflict potential inherent in SD. A scrutiny of some of the key texts on SD reveals several contradictions. The mainstream SD discourse is in itself a convergence of not always compatible concepts (Redclift, 1987; O’Riordan, 1991), some of which borrow from earlier, radical, alternative SD discourses (O’Riordan, 1991). ‘Community participation’ is a good example of this (Nas and Silva, 1999: 6). The initial merging of these originally radical concepts with its core neo-liberal discourse is seldom problematised in mainstream SD circles. However, the meanings of these discursive elements often have connotations that do not correspond with the free market rationale of mainstream SD. For example, whilst an important prerequisite of neo liberal market strategies is free movement of labour and capital, community participation programmes strongly aim to bring economic opportunities to localities and invest the capital there. Such contradictions leave the discourse ridden with conceptual tensions (O’Riordan, 1991; Adams, 2001).
Ambiguous policy language within mainstream SD discourses often obscures these discrepancies. Key policy concepts that underpin the mainstream SD discourse, such as ‘community participation’ and ‘governance’, ‘partnerships’ but also ‘sustainability’ and ‘development’ lack a clear definition (Hewit de Alcántara, 1999: 126). This phenomenon enables an over-easy inclusion of several ideological and political standpoints and interests (Kirby et al., 1995). Problematically, the lack of agreement on the precise meaning of key concepts guiding the implementation of SD projects means that at least part of the agreement that binds the actors at the outset is in principle based on misunderstandings (Hajer, 1995). Over time, these misconceptions are likely to surface more and more. In order to be able to implement a project, the meaning of ill-defined policy concepts will have to be further detailed and decided upon. However, as a result of the actors’ highly different cultural and economic backgrounds and affiliations, the interpretations of such concepts are likely to be very different. Thus actors may clash over how the policy concepts should best be operationalised. At the same time, such ambiguity can aid discussion and open new areas of thought on SD. Furthermore, the breadth of the banner of SD is such that many different parties can associate themselves with the concept, making it a helpful if not indispensable element in getting highly diversified parties ‘around the table’ to promote both conservation and development (Lélé, 1991).

However, instead of optimistically expecting that the co-operation in SD will automatically lead to consensus, it would be more realistic to expect various forms and degrees of disagreement and even conflict, and to start working from that premise. Such a conceptualisation requires a more proactive engagement with the concepts of power and politics, than is common in orthodox thinking on SD (Brosius, 1999; Edmunds and Wollenberg, 2001). Moreover, the economic and political characteristics of developing countries should occupy a key position in such a research focus (Bonner, 1993; Adams, 1995).

This observation takes us to the next section, which discusses the premises of political ecology. Political ecology constitutes an academic critique of the de-politicising nature of mainstream SD thinking. Focusing on environmental policy-making in developing countries (Bryant and Bailey, 1997), political ecology offers some important conceptual
insights and instruments that help us to construct a more nuanced understanding of contemporary conservation programmes and projects in the South.

3.3. Political ecology

3.3.1. Introducing political ecology

Political ecology (henceforth: PE) can be described as an inquiry into the political and social conditions “surrounding the causes, experiences, and management of environmental problems” (Bryant and Bailey, 1997: 1). PE is not a theory (Peluso, 1992), political ecologists having largely "eschewed theory in favour of empirical analytical analysis" (Bryant and Bailey, 1997: 1). Instead, it constitutes a diversified research field, in which political ecologists have approached the subject through a plurality of purpose and flexible explanations (Bryant and Bailey, 1997). Within this broad framework some main trends and perspectives can, however, be distinguished, each highlighting different important political aspects of environmental policymaking. PE emerged as an attempt to explain environmental problems as a function of existing political and economic structures with a focus on the South. At the core (and origin) of PE lies an active engagement with political economy as proposed by Blaikie and Brookfield (1987). For them, PE

*Combines the concerns of ecology and a broadly defined political economy. Together this encompasses the constantly shifting dialectics between society and land based resources, and also within classes and groups within society itself* (Blaikie and Brookfield, 1987:17).

Challenging neo-Malthusian notions and the prominence of neo-liberalism in environmental management discourse, this approach stresses that environmental problems are less the result of poor management and overpopulation than the result of political, economic and social inequalities. Underlying dominant economic and political patterns, which produce and reinforce poverty and political marginality are actively identified and assessed as a key part of the problem. In line with the wide and diversified range of political complexities raised by SD, the approach of Blaikie and

---

6 Greenberg and Park (1994) and Forsyth (2003) also offer good overviews of PE.
Brookfield (1987) has been expanded upon by many other emerging focus areas in PE in the 1990s, including an actor-oriented approach, tracing actor interest at several geographical scales (Bryant and Bailey, 1997); examination of PE questions in the context of socio-economic issues of gender, race, sexuality and class (Shiva, 1989; Rocheleau et al. 1996); research around a particular environmental problem (Thomas, 1994); and exploration of political-ecological problems in a specific region (see for example Peluso 1992; Rigg and Stott, 1996). Meanwhile, the research focus has extended well beyond land degradation to include biodiversity protection, often with a focus on community-based conservation in sub Saharan Africa. Furthermore, transboundary conservation is a growing area of interest (Bryant, 1992; Rogers, 2002).

3.3.2. The post-structural turn

Whilst PE has never been informed by a single theory or understanding, in the research field as a whole it is possible to identify an increased shift from structural to a post-structural notions of ‘situated knowledge’ (Haraway, 1990). Political debates about how we know the environment and how different interests shape this viewpoint have thus increasingly gained recognition as an important area of analysis. Dryzek’s (1997) discussion of ‘environmental complexity’, Peet and Watt’s (1996) ‘liberation ecology’ and Leach and Mearns’ (1996) insights into problematic ‘received wisdom’ in land degradation policies in Africa, reinforce this point about the importance of social constructionalism and discursive approaches to PE (Rogers, 2002). Subsequently, “a concern with tracing the genealogy of narratives concerning ‘the environment’, with identifying power relations supported by such narratives, and with asserting the consequences of hegemony over, and within, these narratives for economic and social development, and particularly for constraining possibilities for self-determination” has become a key feature of PE (Stott and Sullivan, 2000: 2). Engagement with ‘dissident’ or alternative discourses such as non-Western ones constitutes another important analytical tool to imagine the policy reality differently and possibly in a more holistic way (see Escobar, 1999).

7 Adger et al., (2001) distinguish three main areas of engagement in PE within this area of inquiry, notably research on the sociology of science and knowledge, the history of institutions and policies on environment and development, and the globalization of environmental discourses in relation to “new languages and institutional relations of global environmental governance and management” (Peet and Watts, 1996: 11, quoted in Adger et al, 2001: 682). Forsyth (2003) further extends this line of inquiry by applying political analysis to the field of ecology.
The pro-active questioning and reframing of accepted environmental discourses or 'narratives' can act as an important tool to unwrap the underlying power relations and interests in environmental policy-making and make them more visible (see Thompson et al., 1986; Homewood and Rogers, 1987; Leach and Mearns, 1996; and especially Roe's work on narratives and counter-narratives (1994, 1995). These studies furthermore usefully focus attention on the limited capacity of powerful policy discourses to predict the course of events in a given policy area. Mainstream SD thinking is strongly linked to rational choice theory. This perspective

*Implicitly presupposes perfect access to information and wrongly assumes that values, culture and ideology can be rationalised, i.e. have a rational, neutral, value free basis that can be objectively determined* (Kütting, 2000: 14).

However, the construction of policies is far less guided by objective truths and measurable indicators than is assumed in mainstream SD. For one thing, environmental science 'facts' tend to be highly contested and social and political factors frame them. Moreover, policy discourses and 'narratives' (Roe, 1994) tend to employ a universal outlook that allows for little variation between different localities. This is illustrated by the great power of mainstream global environmental discourses (Adger et al., 2001) in shaping environmental policy-making and action in Africa (Roe, 1995) at both the regional, national and local levels. Whilst a certain level of generalisation is unavoidable in order for policy action to occur (Roe, 1994), this problematically means that policy discourses are based on significant oversimplifications or 'storytelling' (Roe, 1994), and are constructed in isolation from the local, national and regional contexts in which they are to be applied.

PE, with its strong emphasis on empirical analysis and location-specific research, is instructive in revealing such contradictions between a given situation as envisaged in a given policy discourse and the situation on the ground. As such, it usefully generates additional insights into the complexities of environmental policy-making that contribute to a more holistic picture. The incorporation of poststructuralist notions in actor-analysis furthers this capacity. As noted by Moore (1993), the structuralist legacy of PE
for a long time induced a rather predetermined outlook on local level conflicts. This focus resulted in a problematic monolithic portrayal of actors, with little attention to the diversified and complex interests and power struggles within these institutions or groups (Bryant and Bailey, 1997: 6; Moore, 1993: 381). Moreover, such analyses tended to be accompanied by rather rigid actor categorisations as ‘villains’ and ‘heroes’. This resulted in problematic expectations of what a ‘good’ political ecology story should tell (Potts, 2000). The increased engagement with the political complexities of ecological interactions at the micro level proposed by Moore (1993) has been further taken on by a wide range of political ecologists (see, for example, the articles in Neumann and Schroeder, 1995). The rich micro politics that underlie and condition environmental conflict in the South (Bryant and Bailey, 1997: 6), and the ways in which these often contrast with global and international discourses consequently became an important theme and area of exploration within PE. Neumann (1997) encapsulates this outlook as follows:

- A focus on local land users and the social relations in which they are entwined
- Tracing the linkages of these local relations to wider geographical and social settings
- Historical analysis to understand the contemporary situation

The merits of this research focus as a means to explore the multi-level connections between local and global phenomena can be further enhanced through engagement with political processes at other geographical scales, including at the regional level (Bryant and Bailey, 1997: 6). Mohan and Stokke (2000) illustrate the importance of political forces and activities at the national and transnational level in shaping local politics and mediating global discourses. In order to obtain the most holistic possible picture it is therefore imperative to extend the research focus to include actors and political processes at geographical scales beyond the local one. Bryant and Bailey’s (1997) research approach is based on these very premises, integrating multiple actors, scales and knowledges.

---

8 This counts particularly for PE research in the 1970s to mid-1980s when economic determinism often prevailed (Bryant and Bailey, 1997: 6).
Bryant and Bailey (1997) focus on the interests and actions of the major players involved in conservation (local communities, the state, NGOs, international donors and private business). Within this framework of actors, the state occupies a key position, in recognition of the fact that in a development context the state remains powerful as a main provider of jobs and other economic goods and continues to have a pivotal role in structuring the actions of the other actors.\(^9\) By allowing for an in-depth exploration of the interests of these actors and the strategies used by them to obtain their goals, the actor centrality in PE is instructive in obtaining more insight into the political agendas and interests dominating the conservation scene.

The outcome of these power struggles is seen to be contingent and context-related. In line with its post-structuralist focus, power in this research approach is conceptualised in multiple ways. At one level power involves the ability to control resource access, involving control over other actors, and to determine which resources will or will not be allocated to certain projects. However, power can also involve controlling or directing discursive representations of environmental problems and subsequently required management strategies. Bryant and Bailey (1997) are careful to stress that the operation of power should not be viewed in absolutist zero-sum terms. Instead, power is a fluid concept and even relatively disadvantaged groups can resort to counter-strategies (Bryant and Bailey, 1997: 191).\(^{10}\) As no actor is seen to have absolute power, alliances with other actors are common as a means to pursue common goals within environmental governance.\(^{11}\)

---

\(^9\) This emphasis on the role and power of the state greatly suits this inquiry into transboundary conservation. As will be illustrated in more detail throughout this thesis, the nature of transboundary environmental co-operation endows national governments with particular power and capacities, as the main decision-makers on border allocation and management.

\(^{10}\) Few's conceptualisation of such power struggles between relatively powerful foreign NGOs and national governments on the one hand and relatively disadvantaged local communities on the other in 'containment' and 'counter-containment' strategies is therefore a more fruitful way of looking at power imbalances, as opposed to relatively rigid neo-Marxist views of the 1970s and 1980s.

\(^{11}\) PE research suggests a tendency for 'natural' alliances between states and businesses on the one hand and grassroots actors and environmental NGOs on the other as a result of their different positions in the capitalist world system.
3.3.3. Non-rational behavioural patterns

In pursuing actor analysis and the power patterns between them, it is also important to critically question the ‘rational’ actor outlook that tends to inform mainstream SD thinking. Mainstream SD thinking has been informed by rational choice theory, viewing individuals as actors driven by the desire to fulfil their self-interests, which is viewed in terms of economic needs. It must not be assumed that actors are completely and consistently ‘rational’ in choice, that is that their behaviour is consistently informed and underlined by an optimisation of self-interest. The assumption that actors are led by ‘rational’ interests and choices has various pitfalls. For one thing, comprehensive information enabling actors to make the best possible choice is frequently lacking (see 3.3.2), with a given subject matter often attracting various and possibly contradictory findings and opinions. Furthermore, economic models based on rationality fail to incorporate the concept of “bounded rationality” (Simon, 1982). This notion states that organisations have multiple objectives in mind when making a decision, not just a single one. Consequently, organisations, like governments, will not be looking so much for the best, or optimal outcome, as for one that ‘suffices’ and can satisfy multiple objectives. Furthermore, selected policy directions are likely to reflect the outcomes of power inequalities and power struggles between various factions in the entity. The impact of this phenomenon is little incorporated in rational actor models, which merely focus on relational power, but with a neglect of “hidden” or structural power (Simon, 1982).

PE offers useful premises, especially with its discursive turn, from which to counter reductionist ‘rational’ actor views. Its focus on power inequalities, on inter-agency struggles and on the multiple layers and interests in organisations offer a useful foundation to engage in such an exercise. It would be useful to further extend this principle of diversification of interests to consider individual actors, an area that has been underplayed to date. Bryant and Bailey (1997: 189) helpfully focus more attention on the individual actor as the unit of analysis, stressing the disparities between the goals of organisations and the interests of the individuals working in these organisations. However, the notion of conflicting interests within individual actors and the ways in which this phenomenon shapes the negotiation of interests and power struggles in natural resource management have remained relatively understudied.
Rational actor models view human action as being led by (economic) self-interest. However, calculating self-interest is but one motivation driving human behaviour (Peters, 2002: 10-11). Psychological studies (Wilson and Brekke, 1994; Lee-Chai and Bargh, 2001) indicate that when co-operating, human behaviour will also be influenced by other goals such as a preservation of individual egos, the quality of inter-personal relationships, personality clashes, cultural outlooks and affinities and idealism. Consequently, individual behaviour in co-operation is unlikely to be motivated by one main interest or motive, but rather by several, potentially colliding ones. Adding another layer of complexity, the prioritisation of these various interests will in many cases be the result of subconscious processes in the mind; people will often not be aware of the underlying reasons for their decisions and behaviour (Wilson and Brekke, 1994). The pursuit of ‘self-interest’ is therefore less straightforward than generally portrayed in rational actor theory, limiting the validity of the predictions of these models.

Further engagement with these notions could usefully help to construct more holistic outlooks on the working of environmental governance. Partnerships hold an “exalted status” (Davies, 2002:190), but there has been little evaluation of their activities (Nas and Silva, 1999; 2002: 190). More attention to decision-making processes in areas that are constructed outside the official procedures and structures of environmental governance, such as ‘backstage negotiations’ would be useful. Such processes play a large role in the functioning and outcomes of environmental governance but have been little studied so far. Furthermore, in informal negotiations the personal element is crucial. In tracing the politics of environmental policy-making, it is thus important to look beyond formal structures and processes of decision-making. This observation takes us to the next section, which discusses another important aspect of non-formal politics: illegal politics.

3.3.4. Illegal politics

Politics is a common activity, not confined to politicians and their officials (Strange, 1996:12), but exercised at all levels of society. Through its concern with grassroots movements and community-based politics, PE actively engages with and incorporates this notion. Another area of politics that would be useful to consider is that of illegal
Illegal politics involve in this context the “criminal, illicit and illegal activities” brought about by “economic and political ‘extra-state’ shadow networks” that seek to influence a state’s behaviour and policy-making through bribing and infiltration (Nordstrom, 2000: 2). The influential role of illegal politics in structuring world politics is increasingly acknowledged (Alexander and Caiden, 1985; Strange 1996; Nordstrom 2000, 2004). In Africa the overlap between such networks and official states tends to be particularly strong, to the extent that Reno speaks of a “shadow state” (Reno, 1995). Informal, ethnically based clientelist networks headed by ‘Big Men’ exchanging economic favours in exchange for political support lie at the basis of this system (Bayart, 1993; Reno, 1995; Bayart et al., 1999).

Illegal politics greatly affect the course of natural resource management (Omara-Ojungu, 1992; Gibson, 1999; Robbins, 2000; Bürgener et al., 2001). Murombedzi notes how community-based conservation in Africa is easily undermined by corruption (2003: 135). Gibson’s (1999) research furthermore indicates that the success rate of conservation programmes tends to run considerably parallel to the ways in which their associated economic and other benefits are channelled to the benefit of ‘shadow elites’ (1999). However, despite “widespread evidence of bribery and illegal exchange in natural resource management” (Robbins, 2000: 423), there is a continued silence on the issue “except as an afterthought, treating corruption as an exception to the rule” (rather than as an overall pattern) (Robbins, 2000: 424). This notion also applies to PE: although political ecologists frequently refer to corruption as an issue hampering conservation, this has thus far been little theoretically analysed.

Having considered some of the key views of PE and suggested possible areas of expansion, the next section will now provide a discussion of the political aspects of boundaries and borderlands. PE can be seen to offer many useful analytical tools from

---

12 Nordstrom actually speaks of ‘non-formal’ or ‘shadow’ rather than ‘illegal’ political networks. However, the term ‘non-formal’ or ‘shadow’ politics can also refer to informal political actions that are not illegal or illicit in character, such as ‘backstage negotiations’ outlined in section 3.3.3. To prevent confusion I subsequently use the term ‘illegal politics’.

13 Where such political systems are marked by an absence of a functioning democracy a fulfilment of the socio-economic and political goals of sustainable development can become further frustrated. Problematically, given that the largely unfinished democratisation of local political systems is a dominant feature in Africa, (Mamdani, 1996) this issue is likely to play a role in TBNRM.
which to assess the operation of SD projects, including TBPAs. However, to adequately conceptualise the political dynamics of transboundary conservation, additional engagement with the nature of political aspects of boundaries and borderlands is necessary. When looking at the environment, PE conceptualises this as both a container of natural resources and social characteristics and patterns, with a lot of attention paid to the interaction between the two. However, owing to the presence of boundaries, the borderland environment has relatively unique features which in turn both affect and are an outcome of inter-state co-operation. In identifying political patterns and themes important to the second policy component of TBPAs, notably transboundary co-operation, an engagement with the political features of boundaries and borderlands, is therefore necessary. Far from static, these phenomena are very context-dependent and different contemporary impacts upon their functioning will therefore be considered.

3.4 Transboundary politics

3.4.1 Introduction

The past decades have been characterised by an international trend towards cross-border co-operation and more open border policies, often as part of wider processes of regionalisation and globalisation. However, the continued political importance of boundaries often restrains the pursuit of these objectives. As the lines that demarcate and enclose state territory, the development and maintenance of boundaries have played a crucial role in establishing and maintaining a state’s ultimate authority in a given area vis-à-vis other states. As such, changes in the location or status of boundaries tend to be politically sensitive and difficult to negotiate, turning transboundary co-operation (henceforth: TBC) into a complex political exercise, including in the area of environmental issues, and in spite of a strong rationale for inter-state co-operation in this area. Before considering these issues in more depth, it is useful to pay some attention to the nature of boundaries and their political significance.
3.4.2 Boundaries: functions and influencing factors

Boundaries and the nation-state exist in mutual dependence. Not only do states beget boundaries but, at the same time, boundaries outline a state’s territorial sovereignty – thereby constituting a prerequisite for the existence of states (Agnew and Corbridge, 1995: 84-85). A state’s power is intimately associated with territory. Boundaries delimit that territory and define the geographical area and therefore the inhabitants that come under its rule. Boundaries are, moreover, simultaneously an expression and function of national identity (Conversi, 1995: 73-85; Hastings and Wilson, 1999). Since the late Middle Ages, the raison d’être of the state has been its supposed representation of and guarding over the ‘national interest’ (Slowe, 1990: 57). Underlying the notion of the nation-state is an implicit assumption that ‘nation’ and ‘state’ coincide, with states allegedly representing and reinforcing the ethno-religious traditions of their subjects. Some have therefore claimed that the preferences of individuals within a given state territory would be to have their interests looked after by the state in question. As such, boundaries underpin a state’s legitimacy, not just in the international system, but also within a given society (Litfin, 1998).

Boundaries have an essential notion of inclusion and exclusion in them, “defining the area from which other authorities and people will be excluded unless they have the permission of the controlling authority” (Allott, 1999: 12). Only those people who are considered to be members of a particular state, through citizenship or other procedures, will have access to certain state benefits. Moreover, boundaries legitimise a state’s exclusive access to the natural resources lying within its territory. This implicitly deprives other states and their nations from the free usage of these resources (Griggs, 1995). Boundaries are furthermore significant for economic reasons because of the tariffs and trade barriers they represent (Slowe, 1990: 129). Table 3.1 displays some of the functions of boundaries graphically. Finally, as the markers of national identity, boundaries play an important role in creating and maintaining the dual categories of the Self and Other (Said, 1993). As such, boundaries “do not exist as separate and independent entities, but persist only to the extent that they are reinforced through social discourse and practice” (Morehouse, 1995: 53).

Furthermore, the impact of boundaries will not only depend upon the ways in which boundaries are negotiated and demarcated but also upon the ways in which they are
thereafter maintained and managed. It is important to realise that in practice boundaries can be highly permeable. This observation is particularly valid in the African situation (Griffiths, 1985) where the financial resources required to effectively manage and guard often lengthy boundaries are frequently lacking (Minaar, 2001). Moreover, an overall dire economic situation incites corruption amongst often-underpaid border officials, facilitating illegal traffic (Coplan, 2001). Where the border separates ethnically similar groups, local people often have become masters in ‘jumping the border’ (Coplan, 2001) to preserve traditional social and economic interaction.

Table 3.1 Types of boundary functions

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Function</th>
<th>Why invoked</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Shell</td>
<td>To establish a territorially based identity</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Net</td>
<td>To establish control or jurisdiction of specified phenomena occurring within a defined space/territory</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Facilitator</td>
<td>To establish or improve administrative efficiency in managing a defined area</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Barrier/Filter</td>
<td>To prevent specified phenomena from crossing a boundary into a defined space</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Gate</td>
<td>To restrict passage into a bounded space to those people or goods that have not met specified transaction criteria (e.g. payment of a tariff)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Conduit/Gateway</td>
<td>To allow passage into a bounded space from which various opportunities, services or goods can be accessed that are unavailable in places across the border</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

3.4.2. Globalisation, regionalisation and the changing face of boundaries

In recent times the function of boundaries can be said to have been considerably changed by globalisation and related processes. This has however not necessarily eroded their importance (Boon-Thong and Bahrin, 1998). Intensive regional cooperation to create regional trade zones uninhibited by internal boundaries between member states has increasingly gained prominence as a way of promoting international organisation, including in Southern Africa. The SADC undertakes regionalisation with the long-term aim of establishing open border policies between its member states (SADC, 2004). Furthermore, at the global level, an increase in ‘economic and information globalisation’ (Anderson, 1997) has undermined the barrier function of national boundaries, with states having relatively little power to regulate the non-nation-state bound movements of international capital and communications (Amin and Thrift, 1995; Held et al., 1999; Scholte, 2000), like the internet. At the same time ethnic groups pursuing self-determination, often in the form of armed resistance increasingly undermine the nation-state from ‘below’ (Agnew, 1997).

The impact of these processes, sometimes called ‘glocalisation’ has been regarded by some as so influential that they would signal “the end of the nation-state” (Ohmae, 1996), and the advent of the borderless world. International environmental co-operation can be seen as part of this ‘erosion of the nation-state’. Due to the borderless character of nature and the transboundary impact of pollution and other environmentally unfriendly activities, effective care for the environment requires international co-operation (see French, 2000) at both a global and regional or bi-national scale. Furthermore, the power sharing with non-governmental agencies in environmental governance is seen to limit the room for manoeuvre of the nation-state (Litfin, 1998). Nonetheless, nation-states continue to be the most influential entities in mastering and dividing global space. This is reflected by the fact that treaties and policies often remain between states, and depend upon them for implementation and monitoring.

Linked to this, the concept of national boundaries continues to remain “as potent as ever” (Blake, 1998: 76). It is true that ‘glocalisation’ has influenced the status of boundaries, but this has largely resulted in a change in their status and functions. Whilst globalisation may have undermined the ‘barrier/filter’ function of boundaries, many of its other functions (see Table 3.1) have remained, or even increased, in importance.
Furthermore, national boundaries may continue to be redrawn, but they are not disappearing. With the vanishing of former states such as the Soviet Union and the DDR from the world map many new ones have also surfaced: since 1990 23 new states and more than 40 new boundaries emerged.\(^{14}\) Where the pursuit of alternative national and ethnic identities is successful, the nation-state becomes once more the preferred organisational and administrative unit (ÓTuathail, 1996).

In addition, even where customs posts and border fences have been physically removed between countries to pursue open border policies, the intrinsic and symbolic function of boundaries as embodiments of national identity remain important. This is, for example, visible in the European Union where nationalism remains an important force in politics, including within and between the Schengen countries that have open boundaries with regard to each other (Bort, 1998). Significantly, the SADC intends to follow similar open border policies in the near future (www.sadc.int). Finally, boundaries continue to play an important role in the economic realm. Whilst the international nature of capital flows has considerably undermined the nation-state as “an effective manager of the national economy”, the nation-state remains an important conduit for investment (Boyer and Drache, 1996: 1). For one thing, commercial law has remained “resolutely statist” (Clapham, 2001). A multinational seeking to set up in a given country will only be recognised as legal in international law after having obtained formal permission of the state in question to do so. Boundaries therefore continue to play an important role in shaping economic and political transactions.

It is perhaps somewhat paradoxical that national boundaries remain particularly important in Africa. African pre-colonial ways of spatial organisation show a remarkable overlap with contemporary ideologies and processes of deterritorialisation and ‘shared spaces’ (Griggs, 2000b). Models of fixed territories and the Westphalia model of territorial sovereignty only reached Africa when it was superimposed through colonialism in the late 19th century\(^{15}\), and visibly established and maintained by means

\(^{14}\) Personal communication [email], Martin Pratt, Director International Boundaries Research Unit, Durham, 2004.

\(^{15}\) The Conference of Berlin (1884/1885) divided up most of sub-Saharan Africa between European nations. In demarcating boundaries, the existing settlement and mobility patterns of the indigenous population were largely disregarded (Touval, 1966; Davidson, 1992).
of national boundaries. As is illustrated in Figure 3.1, these boundaries coincide little with ethnic distributions on the continent. Consequently, a considerable number of ethnic groups have been separated between two or more nation-states. African national boundaries furthermore often greatly disrupt the seasonal movements of (semi) nomadic pastoralist and/or hunter-gatherer groups such as the Masai (in Eastern Africa), Tuareg (Western Africa) and the Bushmen (Southern Africa).^{16}

However, in spite of the fact that national boundaries are only a relatively recent phenomenon in Africa, national boundaries over the continent as a whole have little changed since the end of colonial rule (Clapham, 2001). Pan African ideologies keen to address the socio-economic, cultural and other drawbacks associated with the post-colonial border heritage (Ola, 1976) have so far dramatically failed. In most cases fears of loss of sovereignty by national governments can be identified as the main obstacle. The nature of the nation-state in Africa (or rather the absence of a ‘nation’ or homogenous ethnic group in the state) plays an important role in this process. Whilst the general absence of coherent nationalities that coincide with state territory is one of the main incentives for the removal of national boundaries, ironically this situation may simultaneously stand in the way of boundary removal or even more open border policies.

^{16} Miles (1994) explores this issue in more depth with regard to transboundary pastoralists in Nigeria.
Figure 3.1 Boundaries and ethnic groups in Africa

States that lack legitimacy as a result of the absence of a strong national identity might well be more concerned with the preservation of territorial control, as another important aspect underpinning state sovereignty (Clapham, 1996). This makes "boundaries more important to them, and not less" (Clapham, 2001: 9). The surrender of state power to both a supra-national entity or through decentralisation becomes in such a scenario quickly politically loaded. At the same time, African states have much to gain from regional economic integration; the removal of trade tariffs within a given region is

\[\text{Source: Griffiths (1995b: 92).}\]

\[\text{Figure 3.1 Boundaries and ethnic groups in Africa}\]

\[\text{States that lack legitimacy as a result of the absence of a strong national identity might well be more concerned with the preservation of territorial control, as another important aspect underpinning state sovereignty (Clapham, 1996). This makes "boundaries more important to them, and not less" (Clapham, 2001: 9). The surrender of state power to both a supra-national entity or through decentralisation becomes in such a scenario quickly politically loaded. At the same time, African states have much to gain from regional economic integration; the removal of trade tariffs within a given region is}\]

\[\text{At the same time, it was often the governing elites themselves that frustrated nation-building efforts in most parts of Africa, by exploiting ethnic differences in their competition for power, just as was common under colonial 'divide and rule' systems (Irele, 1998). On the other hand, the limitations that 'artificial' boundaries exercise upon the development of a national identity within a given state should not be overrated. Nationhood is also dependent upon the organisation of the territorial state and a state has considerable power to manipulate the "transformations of ethnic connections and similarities into the affinities of nation-hood" and "generate" nationhood in that way (Slowe, 1990: 86; Knippenberg and Markusse, 1999).}\]
thought to greatly boost internal trade (and in doing so lessen the dependency on expensive Western imports), whilst also attracting increased Western investment (Teunissen et al., 1996; SADC, 2004). There are furthermore strong imperatives for joint management of natural resources, and especially watersheds (Visser, 1989; Campbell, 1994). The relative scarcity of these resources coupled with increased pressures for their usage as a result of expanding human populations and/or industrialisation, means often that joint management of these resources is "not an optional extra" but "a matter of survival" (SADC, 1994). Furthermore, within such (envisaged) regional economic and environmental regimes, there is increased emphasis on the importance of decentralisation of power to the local level, echoing the insights of sustainable development ideologies with regard to the inclusion of local communities (see 3.2.4).

However, the pursuit of open border policies in Africa, such as through the African Renaissance ideology currently being pursued by South African president Thabo Mbeki (Mbeki, 1998a; Mbeki, 1998b; Mulemfo, 2000) is often hindered by macro-political processes hampering such a move and/or realities on the ground that work against further permeability (Griggs, 2000a). These are all contributing factors determining whether boundaries represent barriers (Kristof, 1959; Nkiwane, 1997) or gateways (Herzog, 2000). Whilst international and local geo-political influences inform this process, the formal decision-making around border management takes place at the national level. After having considered the impacts of globalisation and before moving on to the borderland context, the next section will take a closer look at factors and motivations determining a state’s border policies and how these are in turn an outcome of the interaction with adjacent states.

### 3.4.3. The African inter-state setting

As the ultimate decision-makers on boundaries and the actors that arguably stand to lose the most, the actions of states regarding their own boundaries and those of other countries are arguably the most influential factor determining the course and impact of boundaries. These processes themselves will reflect a state’s foreign policy and position in the international system (Anderson, 1996), which is in turn shaped by amongst others military and economic strength and geographical components such as access to the sea and possibly size.
The continued existence of a state is intimately tied up with its ability to exercise (ultimate) jurisdiction over its territory. The desire of states to see boundaries having a security role, that is to prevent foreign invasion, is therefore a key concern in their management. As a legacy of colonialism, the legitimacy of boundaries in Africa could be questioned however. This holds particularly for those situations where boundaries cut across ethnic groups. Indeed, as Figure 3.2 displays, there are various internationally disputed boundaries on the African continent. Not surprisingly, irredentism is a frequent phenomenon. Furthermore, as noted earlier, due to budget constraints few governments in Africa are able to effectively police and guard their often long boundaries, and customs posts tend be understaffed (Hennop et al., 2001).

Despite these constraining circumstances, a massive outbreak of armed inter-state conflict in Africa over disputed boundaries has not occurred. To avoid political meltdown and conflict, African heads of state formally accepted their colonial boundaries in 1964 and signed unto the Cairo Resolution of the Organisation of African Unity (Brownlie, 1979).

The adherence to existing national boundaries by the Organisation of African Unity (OAU) has on the whole rather successfully prevented the breakout of large-scale conflict at the inter-state level. Although there have been various inter-state wars over boundaries (for example between Eritrea and Ethiopia) and continue to be, 70% of the border conflicts in Africa are resolved peacefully. On the other hand, the fact that the 'artificial' nature of African boundaries has not been addressed and changed is often identified as a root cause of the high levels of political instability and armed conflict in Africa (Davidson, 1992), causing both secessionism and imperialism (Griffiths, 1995b). African borderlands are at the frontline of these actions.

---

18 Personal communication, Prof. Gerald H. Blake, founder and former director of the International Boundaries Research Unit, Durham, 2003.
Whilst the adherence to colonial boundaries ensured that the threat of a direct large-scale invasion by a neighbouring state has remained relatively low for the average African state, African governments are nonetheless often confronted with considerable security issues at their boundaries. The nature of governmental security concerns on the African continent tends to be shaped by the fact that the majority of African states constitute 'weak' or dysfunctional states (Jackson, 1990). 'Weak' refers in this context to the limited capacity and reach of the state system to effectively rule its citizens. This situation tends to be particularly prevalent in borderlands or the 'periphery', which is generally situated at great geographical distance from the seat of the central government in the capital. This lack of effective governmental control coupled with the
presence of porous boundaries can easily become highly problematic from a security perspective. The socio-cultural and physical characteristics of African borderlands contribute to this situation. The authority of central government tends to be particularly challenged in borderlands, whose populations may have more ethnic affinity with their neighbours over the border, than with the government in a distant capital. Such local resistance against the central state may take the form of armed resistance. Moreover, the physical features of African borderlands, usually characterised by relatively low population levels and the presence of vast areas of “wilderness” in which it is relatively easy to hide, make it a refuge and guerrilla base par excellence for dissident groups. The presence of boundaries may increase the attraction of borderlands as guerrilla sites. Cross-border smuggling of fire arms and other military equipment can help fulfil a guerrilla group’s need for arms whilst the presence of a boundary may also offer it the possibility to flee over the border when pursued by government troops (Clapham, 1996). The general high level of permeability of African boundaries facilitates such actions.

The presence of rebel groups in its borderlands not only poses a threat to the state from within, but also easily opens the door to foreign intervention. By providing logistic and other support to rebel groups over the border, a state can increase its control over adjacent territory in a neighbouring state. Whilst not being directly faced with foreign invasion, such actions can be seen to undermine a state’s boundaries in a more indirect way. Especially where there are great congruities in religion/political ideology between a dissident group in a given state and the neighbouring state, such a scenario may come into place. Where neighbouring states offer dissident groups the possibility of operating from their territory, thereby curbing the possibility of the central government eliminating these movements, violent inter-state conflicts may eventually break out.

Even in a situation where relations between states are very cordial, security concerns may act against the pursuit of (more) open border policies. A peaceful state can be easily affected and destabilised by internal political unrest and armed struggle in a neighbouring state. Physical proximity coupled with porous boundaries makes neighbouring states highly vulnerable to negative “spill-over” effects in the form of (armed) refugees, arms smuggling and other resulting transboundary flows. Apart from high quality inter-state relations, overall relatively high levels of political stability in the
region tend therefore to be another main condition for the pursuit of more open border policies.

3.4.4. The borderland context

The restrictions that boundaries impose upon transboundary social and economic traffic are felt most strongly by borderland populations (Slowe, 1990:28; Asiwaju, 1992; Miles, 1994; Coplan, 2001; Crush, 2002; Niehaus, 2002; Nugent, 2002). This will especially be the case where there is a history of cross-border trade and strong social linkages over the border. Diverse patterns of trans-boundary interaction may occur, from confrontation and exclusion to co-operation, integration and inclusion (Blake, 2000). The geographical distribution of political and economic power at a national level also plays a key role in the way the border is both perceived and used. This aspect is often important in Africa, where borderland communities tend to occupy a highly marginal economic and political position within the nation-state as a whole, with economic and political power being concentrated in the centre, not at the periphery. However, combined with the generally weak capacities and reach of the African state this often simultaneously means that the power of the central government can be limited or, in extreme cases, even non-existent over its borderlands (Jackson, 1990). Where ethnic identity with counterpart ethnic groups over the border supersedes the national affiliations of borderland populations, the barrier function of boundaries is likely to be greatly contested and resented. Political pressure for a removal of national boundaries or greater porosity is for these reasons seen to correlate to proximity to the border.

This observation lies at the heart of a thesis which views the geo-political forces in borderlands, or the tool of ‘sub-national micro-diplomacy’ (Martinez, 1994a, 1994b; Asiwaju, 1992), as instrumental in stimulating a relaxation or removal of national boundaries. The unit of action in this approach is the border region. Observable geographic, demographic, cultural, economic and historic links between the ‘sub-national areas’ on both sides of an international boundaries would allegedly favour an international transboundary planning approach over a national one. This imperative for planning leads to political pressure from borderland populations upon their national

---

19 On the other hand, borderland populations may also benefit from the presence of boundaries through the smuggling opportunities they offer.
politicians to pursue (more) open border policies. Such 'bottom-up' pressure is in this view seen to ultimately and rather directly influence decision-making at the national level (Hendrikson, 2000).

However, reality complicates this scenario. ‘Bottom-up’ decision-making is easily hindered by the continent’s overall low democratisation levels (Williams, 2002). The disparate ethnic identities that often exist between the elites in the centre and the periphery populations may further stifle the influence of borderland communities at the national level. Clientelist linkages between local communities and national politicians can play an important role in instigating ‘bottom-up’ decision-making, but these linkages tend to based on shared ethnicity (Bayart, 1993). Further aggravating the situation is that in cases where strong political tensions exist between the national government and a given borderland population, and especially so when this process is accentuated through the creation of armed resistance movements, national military and security policies will greatly obstruct an opening of the boundaries. Great economic disparities between countries may further complicate the situation. In that case, (more) open boundaries are likely to increase illegal labour migration, a situation that often causes tensions between the receiving country and the country of departure (see for example Crush, 2000). Moreover, in such a situation an opening of boundaries may also not be favoured by borderland populations, especially where illegal migration is coupled by high crime levels (Kynoch and Ulicki, 2000). Alternatively, removal of boundaries may actually hamper economic development in borderlands, where different price levels and product availability between two or more states stimulate cross-border trade. Partially as a result of the relatively important economic contribution of the ‘informal economy’ in Africa, smuggling activities may moreover create powerful local interests in the maintenance of international boundaries. Furthermore, national identity is not necessary subjected to cross-border ethnic affiliations (Nugent, 2002). The position and influence of boundaries, as barriers or as conduits for transboundary co-operation can hence not be generalised.
3.5 Conclusion

This chapter has provided a conceptual map of the research topic through a critical enquiry into the two elements that together make up the concept of TBNRM: SD and TBC. Whilst for analytical purposes these two policy areas have been separately considered, in reality they will closely interact, overlap and often be interdependent.

When combining the findings on both SD and TBC, it can be concluded that the spatial reorganisation that TBPAs seek to imprint on borderlands is far from the apolitical project it is often presented to be. Together SD and TBC involve a wide range of competing interests and pressures upon borderlands situated at a wide range of geographical scales. Although SD (or sustainable land management more specifically) sounds appealing, the pursuit of SD is complex. Not only are mainstream SD discourses characterised by inherent conceptual contradictions, the pursuit of SD, especially in a development context, often takes place in unstable political environments and amongst great power inequalities. Furthermore, the economic interests of the actors concerned tend to differ, resulting in competing claims upon the land. The pursuit of “nature imagery” (Draper et al., 2004) in a transboundary context is furthermore complicated by issues of sovereignty and territoriality associated with boundaries as well as the unregulated nature of borderlands. This endows Peace Parks in Southern Africa with a relatively high conflict potential: the apparent panacea of TBNRM is actually build on a framework that is riddled with potential problems. Far from creating a ‘win-win’ situation for all whilst in the process also addressing past injustices (see section 1.2), a Peace Park may hence introduce or aggravate disagreements and tensions between the participating parties over the ways in which land is managed in the borderlands that it covers.

Which interests prevail and at what point in time will be context dependent and determined by a complex interplay of highly diversified interests pursued by and within various groups at all geographical scales. Although states can be seen to play a key role, their decisions will be shaped by the interaction with other states and non-state groups. Adding another layer of complexity, actors may wear different hats at different stages or intervals in the process, for example because their interests in SD clash with their interests in more open border policies. Finally, preferences and priorities are likely to
change over time. Considering that decision-making in Peace Parks involves a wide range of actors, and scales, there is a need for actor-oriented and multiple scale analysis, as highlighted in the discussion on PE. It is thereby important that not only formally recognised stakeholders in Peace Parks are included, but all stakeholders, given the importance of informal politics. Furthermore, the interests and political processes at a multitude of geographical scales need to be perceived as existing in close interaction with social and natural processes in borderlands, as the ‘central unit of action’ for TBPAs. Although, using Castell’s words, within the “space of flows” that determine decision-making in Peace Parks, global and national interests can be generally identified as particularly powerful and important, global conservation networks and African political elites can easily collide with local interests in what he calls the “space of places” (Castells, 1997: 123-4). Finally, mapping changes in the development of discourses on TBPAs and identifying whose interests are served by these can be an important way of tracing power dynamics in TBPAs (Van Amerom, 2002). The next chapter demonstrates how these conceptual insights have been operationalised in the research design and information collection, providing an insight into the methodology underlying the research.
4. Methodology

"Strict and rigid adherence to any method, technique or doctrinaire position may, for the fieldworker, become like a confinement in a cage. If he's lucky or very cautious, a fieldworker may formulate a research problem so that he will find all the answers he needs within his cage. But if he finds himself in a field situation where he is limited by a particular method, theory or technique, he will do well to slip through the bars and try to find out what is really going on" (Wax, 1971: 10).

4.1 Introduction

This chapter discusses the methodology of this research project. Any selected methodology is bound to have both advantages and disadvantages. A wide range of methodologies was considered for this research and out of this range a number were eventually selected. The chapter provides an insight into these selected methodologies and the motivations underpinning them and guiding their usage. It first explores some key methodological considerations that arise from an inquiry into politics in the context of conservation policies in Southern Africa and discusses how these concerns were translated into the fieldwork design. After this, the strategies and methods used to generate information are detailed through a narrative description of my fieldwork. The results of qualitative fieldwork do not just depend upon the modus operandi of data gathering, but also on the ways in which they are analysed and translated into the research write-up. This theme is further explored in the final section, which discusses the strategies for data analysis and representation. Before exploring the methodological issues mentioned above, it is useful to briefly consider the positionality of the researcher, as an issue that exercises great bearing on the research as a whole.

4.2 Positionality of the researcher

Researchers must acknowledge the various geographical, historical and social influences that shape their positionality, to avoid the "false neutrality and universality of so much academic knowledge" (Rose, 1997: 306). However, as is now increasingly acknowledged within the Social Sciences, the ways in which personal traits such as race, gender and age imprint upon research are far from fixed and are, therefore, open to contested interpretation (Rose, 1997). It is important not to generalise or simplify the impact of certain personal characteristics upon the research.
Bearing these limitations in mind, I will provide the reader with a brief personal profile and offer my impressions as to how my positionality affected the course of this research.

I am a white Dutch female. At the time of my fieldwork, I was in my late twenties. My home town is called Enschede. It is located in what used to be – up to roughly 1960 – one of the poorest regions of the Netherlands: Twente. Through my origin and upbringing I came to be fully aware of development constraints, but also resulting advantages in terms of greater available space for conservation, which accounts to a great extent for my current interest in sustainable development. Enschede being located along the Dutch-German border, and part of a ‘Euregio’ (Euroregion) I soon also became interested in development in a transboundary context, as well as in forging linkages across boundaries. I first heard about the concept of TBPAs in 1997 when working in the Kruger National Park as a tour leader. My interest in TBPAs stems from that time. I felt excited about the plans to connect South Africa’s Kruger Park with the then Coutada 16 Park in Mozambique from a tourism perspective, whilst the notion that TBPAs could help promote peace also greatly appealed to me. My academic interest was raised when, as a result of talks with game wardens and other officials, I became aware of the many political complexities surrounding the creation of Peace Parks, and found these had been little researched. Eventually, after having tried and secured funding, this interest culminated in registering for this PhD in 2000.

My personal characteristics have in various ways influenced my research, not least by structuring access to respondents. Being Dutch proved a facilitating factor in establishing links in South Africa. I found that as a result of the shared descent of the Dutch and Afrikaners, most Afrikaners were interested in meeting Dutch people, and the active role of the Dutch anti-Apartheid movement tended to be positively regarded by ‘progressive’ South Africans. As a native speaker of Dutch it was also relatively easy for me to understand and speak Afrikaans, further improving access to Afrikaans-speaking respondents. Meanwhile, my stay in England meant that I could relate well to ‘British’ South Africans with family ties and interests in Britain. I also passed as an ‘easy’ conversational partner, because of my knowledge of the tourist sector, parks and other places in (Southern) Africa, the result of my previous work as
a tour leader in South Africa and Swaziland. Previous travel and work experience elsewhere in Africa, including in Lesotho, Ghana, Tanzania and Malawi in both rural and urban settings, meant that I was relatively familiar with some important black African cultural norms and practices, although I was aware that here could be the biggest barriers. Interaction with people from a wide range of backgrounds was also facilitated by the fact that as an international student I have a rather diversified circle of friends and colleagues in terms of nationality, race, gender and age. In short, my Dutch background and international profile resulted in a varied cultural capital of which one or more characteristics were likely to appeal to Southern Africans of all sorts of backgrounds and aid interaction and integration.

There was also a curious sense of ‘home-coming’. In South Africa I felt very welcome; the majority of South Africans that I met were extremely hospitable and helpful. Moreover, despite vast geographical distances there were considerable overlaps in culture. Generally speaking, South Africans can be said to communicate in a rather direct and open way, which is also a main feature of Dutch culture. I also found that there are great overlaps between the South African and Dutch sense of humour, which often worked as an icebreaker during interviews.

Perhaps due to these cultural affinities, race was a far less determining factor in shaping my positionality than I had expected on the basis of South Africa’s Apartheid legacy and my earlier experiences as a tour leader in South Africa’s tourism sector. My experience was that race and ethnicity continue to matter in post-Apartheid South Africa (as they do nearly everywhere!), but not always in the way people might expect. Being white clearly endowed me with a distinguishable feature. However, I never encountered open hostility or racism from non-white respondents in the TBPA

---

1 More so than for example with England, my place of study and in much nearer proximity to my country of origin.

2 Due to space constraints, this account on positionality concentrates on South Africa as the most important country for my research. My research access in Mozambique, Swaziland and Lesotho, the other Southern African countries that I visited, was sometimes also aided by my social network and personal characteristics however. For example, through the international student network in Durham I had good friends in Swaziland. My knowledge of Spanish helped me in finding my way in Mozambique, where Portuguese is the main language. Moreover, the attendance at international workshops in the course of my research meant that I usually already had some valuable contacts in the TBPA scene in these countries by the time I visited them.
scene, including in South Africa where the record of white oppression was most formalised and only relatively recently abandoned. On the whole, I felt my whiteness played a much smaller role than I had initially expected. The conservation scene is often labelled as a sector characterized par excellence by racist attitudes. However, I found that on the whole people of all colours and races worked together remarkably well and that the sector was a lot more integrated than other areas of society in which I would move. This phenomenon may have facilitated my access, just as the overall great hospitality of Southern Africans of all backgrounds to European travellers.

This is not to say that I do not acknowledge that my colour may have considerably influenced my access. Had I been black my reception might have been entirely different with some of my white respondents. It could also be argued that a black African researcher might have found it easier to gain access to ‘black’ networks. On the other hand, just as with access to white respondents, the issue of access to ‘black’ networks for either black or white researchers cannot be generalised. It would be a mistake to think of colour as the decisive or sole factor, and leave ethnicity out. One would perhaps assume that there would be an almost natural strong sense of ‘black brother- or sisterhood’ amongst visiting black Africans and black South Africans. Unfortunately, reality is different. My black African friends from other Southern African countries would frequently complain of fierce discrimination and often open hostility by black South Africans (see also Valji, 2003). In addition, I found that there were sometimes negative perceptions of black South Africans as being arrogant and unnecessarily bossy amongst other black Southern Africans, particularly in Mozambique and Lesotho. These aspects could have influenced a black researcher’s access to the TBPA scene. In short, an evaluation of race in relation to positionality in South Africa indicates various subtleties, making it impossible to draw absolutist conclusions. Whilst race undoubtedly was a factor in determining my positionality, its influence seems not to have been predominant nor by nature negative. On the other hand, possible resistance against working with a white researcher could have been

3 On the other hand, some white conservationists felt that they were unfairly singled out as a target for criticism by white ‘progressive’ South African researchers because of their whiteness. Not being South African, it is doubtful if this phenomenon affected my research.

4 Access refers in this chapter not only to obtaining interviews, but also to the acquisition of the desired information.
expressed in very covert ways, and the withdrawal of certain bits of information can therefore not be excluded as a possibility.

My gender and age also shaped my positionality. The TBPA scene is heavily male dominated. If anything, the combination of being female and young seemed to endow me with a comparative advantage. Observations that young females tend to be considered relatively ‘unthreatening’ and possibly more “intriguing” or a better listening audience by older, more senior male respondents (Schoenberger, 1992: 217) certainly applied in my case, with the latter often adopting a protective role. On a less positive note, occasionally I had to deal with harassment or was initially not taken very seriously. A male researcher might not have had to confront these issues or less so. Being female often also facilitated the establishment of a rapport with fellow females in areas related to TBPA s, inducing a sense of sisterhood, perhaps because the TBPA scene is so male-dominated. My gender therefore often functioned positively.

A researcher’s positionality is also influenced by the socio-economic characteristics of the environment in which she is working. What these socio-economic characteristics constituted was in my case highly context-related. South Africa finds itself on the crossroads; whilst the harsh living conditions of the majority of its population qualifies it as a developing country, it can be classed ‘Westernised’ on the basis of its highly developed economy. The nature of my work meant that most of it took place in the latter arena, though not exclusively. The majority of key policy and decision makers in TBPA s belong to elite groups; those groups in society that have relatively privileged access to economic resources which may be mobilized in the exercise of power or influence (definition based on Woods, 1998: 2108).5 As such, many of the issues that can arise from doing fieldwork in development countries as a Western researcher (Devereux and Hoddinott, 1993) only marginally affected my research.

However, from time to time I would also work in a typical ‘Third World’ context, for example when visiting and engaging with local communities and other economically marginalized actors. This moving between different socio-economic classes,

---

5 Researching elites raises certain research challenges, for example in accessing information. The next section describing my fieldwork discusses this issue further.
combined with my own relatively privileged background as a Westerner, carries with it the danger of an ‘elite bias’. This notion entails that the opinions of relatively articulate and well educated respondents are valued and highlighted more by the researcher than the insights of poorly educated respondents, leading to an under-representation or even omission of the latter’s views. A researcher’s greater identification with the views of the first group on basis of similarities in class or educational background is one possible cause. Whilst the danger of an elite bias is not limited to research in the South (Becker, 1967), arguably it is more profound in this context, due to bigger differences in educational backgrounds (if any at all) and cultural differences. Continued self-reflection upon the ways in which my ‘multi-positionality’ affected my behaviour with individuals from different social classes and the weight I attached to their opinions was an important means to try and avoid this methodological pitfall. 6

4.3. Researching politics

One aspect of fieldwork that is greatly shaped by an inquiry into politics is the choice of fieldwork location. As a result of its fluid and intangible nature, politics is a process that tends to be constructed at several geographical scales. Problematically, interactions between these scales are far from straightforward. Breman notes how “all sorts of relationship patterns tied to different social spheres do not synchronise vis-à-vis distribution, and are not constructed according to the simple patterns of hierarchic or concrete stratification...space is as little uniform as are past and future” (Breman, 1989: 130). One particular location or institution can therefore not be assumed to function as a micro-cosmos in which all these political processes gather (Breman, 1989: 130). This notion certainly applies when considering policy-processes in Peace Parks. Reflecting the centralised nature of decision-making in TBPAs, the main parties and individuals rarely reside at the local scale where TBPA implementation takes place, but tend to be scattered all over the region, clustered around a number of main centres of decision-making and power. It would hence be fruitful to adopt a pluralist perspective towards political decision-making with a bearing upon TBPAs,

6 Avoiding an elite bias is arguably particularly important in the context of researching conservation issues. In spite of the increased attention to ‘indigenous knowledge’, agenda-setting and decision-making, wildlife conservation continues to be largely informed by the so-called ‘expert views’ of conservation agencies and environmental consultants.
viewing it as occurring in a diversified political environment characterised by multiple centres or institutions of influence. The fieldwork then has to cover these power-distribution patterns as much as possible.

This makes it imperative that the fieldworker does not stay in just one or two communities for the entire fieldwork period, but engages in “multi-site ethnography” (Marcus, 1995). The fieldworker must be “mobile covering a network of sites that encompass a process, which is in effect the object of the study” (Marcus and Fischer, 1986: 94). At the same time, it is usually only by spending a considerable amount of time at a particular place that the researcher can begin to distinguish and observe important social patterns and make relevant contacts. Reflecting these various concerns, a dual approach underpinned my fieldwork. I operated from two main bases of operation, from which various travels to other important sites for TBPA construction could be and were undertaken.

Contrary to what may have been expected, I did not locate myself in one of the parks that constitute my case-studies. Gauteng (as the centre of decision-making in Southern Africa, including in Peace Parks) became my base of operation, from which I would then visit various sites in parks that would be part of a TBPA. Naturally, other Southern African countries play a major role in decision-making as well. As in South Africa, decision-making processes and the actors bringing these about tend to be concentrated in the capital. In addition to visiting parks on the other side of the border, I therefore also undertook visits to the capitals of the countries that play a role in the parks constituting my case study areas, notably Mozambique (Maputo), Swaziland (Mbabane) and Lesotho (Maseru). Finally, the Cape Town and Stellenbosch area constituted an important destination, comprising the headquarters of both the Peace Parks Foundation and the Southern Africa branch of Conservation

---

7 Gauteng comprises a relatively small area in South Africa. However, it encompasses Johannesburg (Africa’s largest city) and the capital, Pretoria. Furthermore, it has high levels of industrialisation and constitutes a major centre of international financial transactions and trade. For these reasons Gauteng has been called ‘the beating heart of Southern Africa’. The nature and structures of decision-making in TBPA’s reflect this concentration of power, with many key decisions being taken in Gauteng. The presence of ministries, South African National Parks and other governmental bodies as well as the World Bank and important NGOs involved in TBPA’s made Pretoria important as a fieldwork site whilst Johannesburg was important as the location of workshops and conferences, including the Earth Summit. Furthermore, the fact that the suburbs of Johannesburg constituted the place of residence for a substantial part of the TBPA ‘elite’ favoured spending time in Gauteng.
International.\textsuperscript{8} Figure 4.1 displays the research area with key fieldwork sites indicated. Having identified how the study of a large-scale phenomenon like politics affects choices for fieldwork location and how this worked out in the case of my fieldwork, the remaining part of this section considers some important implications of researching politics for processes of information gathering and information-processing and the strategies developed to deal with these.

\textbf{Figure 4.1} Map of the research area
\textit{Source:} Adapted from Lonely Planet (2004).

\textsuperscript{8} At the regional level SADC would be a possibility. However, this would mean moving to Malawi (where the rotating headquarters were situated) with little opportunity to follow what was going on, on the ground. Moreover, SADC’s role in TBPAs has so far been limited.
Tracking the operation of politics in a given context such as Peace Parks is all about tracing patterns of power and influence. However, this is a far from straightforward process. As Cochrane observes “one measure of power may be the extent to which policy can be influenced or determined without it being clear who has exerted it” (1998: 2128). The full role or power of some actors may hence well remain hidden from the researcher, assuming they are identifiable at all. Consequently, access to actors and certain pieces of information will be complicated. Policy-making is often greatly influenced by decisions taken ‘behind closed doors’ whilst official discourses, for example as expressed in policy papers, generally do not reflect hidden agendas and power struggles. Because “power is such a complex phenomenon, it is extremely hard to capture its course through measurable indicators” (Devine, 1997: 146) and hence through questionnaires. This leaves open-ended interviews and observation, as the most feasible means to identify and illuminate power and political patterns (Devine, 1997: 146).

However, an organization will usually discourage its employees to share information with outsiders that could potentially harm its image or goals. A respondent’s willingness to dispense sensitive information may hence be limited or non-existent. This is likely to be especially true in an interview setting, where the exchange of information “becomes a conscious act”, contrary to everyday interaction (Mohammad, 2001: 107). Problematically, such obstacles to accessing information tend to particularly feature in the first stage of the research, before trust-based relations between the researcher and the respondent have a chance to develop. Alongside the consultation of interview guides, I interviewed two experienced academic researchers specialised in the political aspects of conservation9 before leaving for Southern Africa to gain more insight into possible issues that might come up in accessing information. Their experiences and employed solutions greatly raised my awareness of strategies that could be employed to facilitate the acquisition of sensitive information.

---

9 Dr. Steven Ellis (African Studies Centre, Leiden) and Dr. Rosaleen Duffy (Department of Politics, University of Lancaster). A former journalist and formerly the editor of Africa Confidential, Steven Ellis is specialised in uncovering sensitive political information, whilst also having engaged in research in conservation. Dr. Rosaleen Duffy specialises in politics & conservation, with a focus on TBPAs.
These include the application of a “crab-like” strategy in asking sensitive questions (Jeffrey, 2000: 1022) and probing. ‘Purposeful listening’ can also be used to attain sensitive information. Awareness of self-silencing or resistance to certain questions on the side of respondents can alert the researcher to the presence of a particular issue. Even where the respondent is unwilling to discuss this information there and then, knowing about the issue can be a great advantage. It can then be explored in interviews with other respondents, who may feel freer to discuss it on the basis of their different position or because of the assumption that the researcher knows about the issue already anyway. The set up of the interviews was kept flexible (see next section) and interviews were conducted in such a way that techniques that can be helpful in accessing sensitive information could be easily employed or incorporated. Where new interesting topics were raised or contradictions noted for example, the interview would continue on that ‘avenue’ rather than automatically jumping to the next question, if it was felt the first type of information could be quite critical. Also, where information was extremely sensitive and the respondent got visibly nervous, I would sometimes halt the note taking to encourage information-sharing. The data would then be written down immediately after the interview or when the respondent was answering another question, which was not central to the research.

To encourage the sharing of sensitive information I took the conscious decision to refrain from tape-recording my interviews. I found that the presence of a tape-recorder significantly inhibited the sharing of ‘charged’ information, whilst for ethical reasons secret recording was not an option.\footnote{For example, it was only after I had switched off the tape recorder that one of my first respondents started to share relevant information, often contradicting his earlier, mere rhetorical, statements. At another occasion in the early stage of my fieldwork, my second-hand acquired tape recorder failed to work. My respondent confided afterwards that he would have felt extremely reluctant to share sensitive information if the tape recorder had been running. In the light of these experiences, I decided to refrain from tape-recording the interviews altogether.} Recording interviews through note-taking renders full transcription of interviews impossible, however, with the risk that essential information may get lost. To limit this risk I developed several strategies to allow me to write faster, such as using abbreviations of frequently returning concepts or ideas. Furthermore, interview data would be typed out as soon after the interview as possible, to limit chances of memory loss or misinterpretations. Finally, if I interviewed respondents more than once, I would start off the follow-up interview
with a brief summary of the previous one, to check the accurateness of my representation of their views.\footnote{Additional measures that were taken to optimise research validity are discussed later on, specifically in the conclusion.}

This discussion on accessing sensitive or secretive information would be incomplete without a discussion of the issues that are raised by research on illegal political activities. Actors involved in illegal activities will generally seek to remain hidden and cover up their activities. Attempts to uncover these actors and their activities may affect the researcher’s safety (Jamieson, 2000) whilst limited funding and the time constraints of a Ph.D. have a constraining impact. Direct interaction with respondents involved in these networks is therefore rather difficult. Awareness and the recording of illegal activities is however significant in studying the course of Peace Parks. As will be explained in more depth in Chapter Six, the borderlands in which Peace Parks are inserted are host to a wide range of illegal activities that can easily affect or interfere with the functioning of Peace Parks. More indirect ways of information-gathering can, however, be used, including existing sources of evidence for illegal transboundary flows (Ellis and MacGaffey, 1996). Reports of the Institute of Security Studies on illegal border crossings and transactions (available at www.iss.co.za) proved particularly useful as well as policy documents by the Great Limpopo’s Security Working Group. I also interviewed actors involved in the safeguarding of conservation such as game wardens and local police officers. These were often in a good position to comment on the operation of illegal flows within and around the parks, being confronted on a regular basis with the effects of illegal activities, for example in the form of poached elephants. They might also directly encounter some of the actors of the lower ranks of these criminal syndicates, such as poachers or smugglers, and often have access to a network of informants in the area. Discussions with journalists covering sensitive issues related to or touching upon conservation also provided me with good opportunities to acquire information. Still, due to the secret nature of these operations many dimensions are likely to go unnoticed. Since my research does not focus on transboundary illegal activities as an aim in itself, but on the ways in which their prevalence could affect the functioning of Peace Parks, acquaintance with illegal activities could however stay rather general.
Research on political issues raises some important ethical concerns regarding the ways in which sensitive information is extracted and used in the research. It was not always possible to be fully open about the aim of my research. To facilitate my access to respondents and information, I would often state that my research focused on the *policy-making* aspects of Peace Parks, to avoid using the phrase ‘*political* aspects’, the latter being a more loaded term. This was however the only situation in which I was not fully truthful about the research’s objectives. What I did manipulate sometimes was my positioning towards the respondent, by manoeuvring between different roles: from researcher to interested ex-tour leader to friend.\(^\text{12}\) In all circumstances the respondent was however aware that I was a researcher and what my research was broadly about.

From an ethical viewpoint, the acquisition of politically sensitive information requires that the confidentiality of the respondent can be fully guaranteed where necessary. Since the researcher can easily underestimate the consequences of the revealing of someone’s identity for that person’s position or even safety, the decision-making power was vested in the respondent, not in the researcher. The research adopts the directive that no one is quoted unless (s)he has explicitly given permission to do so. Where the chances of recognition are high, the respondent’s status and employing organisation is disguised, in addition to leaving out his/her name. These measures may appear somewhat drastic. England notes how “exploitation and betrayal are endemic to fieldwork” (England, 1994: 85). Furthermore, it could be argued that elites or other influential groups, to which the majority of the respondent can be counted, are very capable of protecting their interests. Hence they would not require the same level of protection from the researcher as do marginalised groups. Finally, obscuring the names of respondents makes the research less transparent, which can raise serious issues regarding validity. However, it was felt that concerns for the well being of the respondent should outweigh this disadvantage and that it would not be

\(^{12}\) Especially in the latter case, the line between ‘insider’ and ‘outsider’ became blurred, which was sometimes difficult to negotiate. Whilst keen to access information, I did not want to abuse a friendship. I therefore tried to limit my use of the ‘friend’ role as much as possible. However, the more I socially bonded with my respondents over time the more they would share confidential information with me, when discussing work pressures for instance. In some cases it was quite clear that the information was given on an impulse and in a moment in which my position as researcher was temporarily forgotten. This provided me initially with considerable ethical dilemmas. By speaking with my friends about this and ensuring them of confidentiality this issue was more or less resolved although it remained a delicate issue throughout the fieldwork.
morally responsible to favour certain groups of respondents over others (cf. Parry, 1998).\textsuperscript{13}

4.4. The fieldwork

My fieldwork comprised two stages. The first one took place from June-October 2001, whilst the second fieldwork period started in September 2002 and ran through to January 2003. The next two sections will discuss each of the two fieldwork phases, discussing the methods employed to further information gathering, and highlighting emerging research obstacles and the ways these were addressed.

4.4.1 The first fieldwork period

My first fieldwork period lasted roughly four months, from the first week of June until October 2001 and took place in South Africa, Mozambique and Swaziland. Its major objective was to identify the main political issues in TBPAs, and to smooth the path for the second fieldwork period, by establishing relevant contacts and identifying useful fieldwork sites. In order to reduce pre-determinism as much as possible, whilst allowing enough structure to provide a starting point for data collection and analysis, the information-gathering was informed by three objectives that were rather broad in outlook, as follows:

- Identification of the main political issues, local, provincial, national and international, relating to the establishment and management of Peace Parks in South Africa
- Exploration of the ways in which these issues impacted upon and were themselves influenced by the broader political economy of contemporary South Africa, both internally (for example in relation to post-Apartheid social and economic reconstruction and development) and externally (for example, in relation to the regional geopolitics of Southern Africa
- Gaining insights into the different political and environmental discourses of the main institutional actors (amongst others local communities, (inter) national NGOs,

\textsuperscript{13} This discussion of ethical issues is by no means exhaustive, nor can it be due to space constraints. Suffice it to say that as a general rule the British Sociological Association's Statement of Ethical Practice underpinned my approach (www.britisoc.co.uk/index.php?link_id=148& area=item1).
private businesses, park authorities, governmental agencies) in terms of their environmental and political ideologies and goals.

Unstructured interviews were the most important research method, alongside observation. Attendance at workshops combined with field visits were the most important means of observation. These methods were further combined with other research techniques, including the analysis of policy documents, an acquaintance with relevant press reviews on TBPAs and recording data in a fieldwork diary. Table 4.1 lists additional details as to the objectives and usage of these methods.

**Table 4.1 Main methods of data collection**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Method</th>
<th>Objectives</th>
<th>Strategy</th>
<th>Research Output</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Qualitative interviewing</td>
<td>• Acquisition of in-depth/insider information</td>
<td>• Capture diversified range of viewpoints on TBPAs through semi and unstructured interviews with key actors in TBPAs</td>
<td>• Semi and unstructured interviews</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Attend Workshops</td>
<td>• Gain direct insight into ways in which policy is made in TBPAs and which considerations underlie them</td>
<td>• Attendance at GKG workshop I June 2001 • GKG workshop II July 2001 • 'Parliamentarians for the Environment' conference, September 2001 • InWEnt/IUCN/EURO PARC workshop November 2002</td>
<td>• Notes, interview recordings, workshop proceedings</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Fieldtrips and visits</td>
<td>• Gain insight into physical/social realities at ground level • Observation of physical aspects of parks, borders and borderlands</td>
<td>• Visits to Kruger Park/Coutada 16 area • Golden Gate, Royal Natal Park, St Lucia • National Parks in Swaziland</td>
<td>• Notes, interview recordings, photographs</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

115
Using multiple methods has various advantages. Roe (1998) argues that taking social and political complexity seriously necessitates “the use of multiple methods and procedures for the complex issue in question” (Roe, 1998: 5). Although in Roe’s version this notion merely relates to the implementation of development strategies, this observation can also be applied to data collection in this area. Increased efficiency in data gathering is but one advantage of such a ‘triangulation’ strategy. To optimise the benefits of triangulation, methods were often used in a complementary way, whereby one method would often be actively used to check or add to the information generated through another method. For example, the observation of people and decision-making processes in policy workshops on the Great Limpopo was an important way to determine which party had the strongest say in decision-making areas in the Great Limpopo and to observe the quality of relationships between the participating actors. These observations would add to information obtained in interviews in which the importance of their own organisation and the ease of policy-making would sometimes be exaggerated by respondents.14

14 Nevertheless, the benefits of cross-checking data through ‘triangulation’ (i.e. the usage of different methods and comparison of the findings they generate to research a given phenomenon) should not be overestimated. Triangulation is not a panacea to guarantee validity especially when it is not accompanied by further critical reflection upon positionality, both that of the researcher and the

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Literature search</th>
<th>Fieldwork diary</th>
<th>Access documents/media unavailable in Europe</th>
<th>Facilitate interpretation fieldwork data</th>
<th>Record important developments</th>
<th>Policy papers, ministerial reports, press articles</th>
<th>Library visits</th>
<th>Newspaper search</th>
<th>Archive search</th>
<th>Television documentaries/news broadcasts</th>
<th>Daily overview of new developments/new ideas/impressions</th>
</tr>
</thead>
</table>

| Interview personnel on the ground, e.g. game wardens | Borderland South Africa – Lesotho | Borderland Mozambique | Borderland South Africa- Swaziland |

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Literature search</th>
<th>Fieldwork diary</th>
<th>Access documents/media unavailable in Europe</th>
<th>Facilitate interpretation fieldwork data</th>
<th>Record important developments</th>
<th>Policy papers, ministerial reports, press articles</th>
<th>Library visits</th>
<th>Newspaper search</th>
<th>Archive search</th>
<th>Television documentaries/news broadcasts</th>
<th>Daily overview of new developments/new ideas/impressions</th>
</tr>
</thead>
</table>

| Interview personnel on the ground, e.g. game wardens | Borderland South Africa – Lesotho | Borderland Mozambique | Borderland South Africa- Swaziland |

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Literature search</th>
<th>Fieldwork diary</th>
<th>Access documents/media unavailable in Europe</th>
<th>Facilitate interpretation fieldwork data</th>
<th>Record important developments</th>
<th>Policy papers, ministerial reports, press articles</th>
<th>Library visits</th>
<th>Newspaper search</th>
<th>Archive search</th>
<th>Television documentaries/news broadcasts</th>
<th>Daily overview of new developments/new ideas/impressions</th>
</tr>
</thead>
</table>

| Interview personnel on the ground, e.g. game wardens | Borderland South Africa – Lesotho | Borderland Mozambique | Borderland South Africa- Swaziland |

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Literature search</th>
<th>Fieldwork diary</th>
<th>Access documents/media unavailable in Europe</th>
<th>Facilitate interpretation fieldwork data</th>
<th>Record important developments</th>
<th>Policy papers, ministerial reports, press articles</th>
<th>Library visits</th>
<th>Newspaper search</th>
<th>Archive search</th>
<th>Television documentaries/news broadcasts</th>
<th>Daily overview of new developments/new ideas/impressions</th>
</tr>
</thead>
</table>

| Interview personnel on the ground, e.g. game wardens | Borderland South Africa – Lesotho | Borderland Mozambique | Borderland South Africa- Swaziland |

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Literature search</th>
<th>Fieldwork diary</th>
<th>Access documents/media unavailable in Europe</th>
<th>Facilitate interpretation fieldwork data</th>
<th>Record important developments</th>
<th>Policy papers, ministerial reports, press articles</th>
<th>Library visits</th>
<th>Newspaper search</th>
<th>Archive search</th>
<th>Television documentaries/news broadcasts</th>
<th>Daily overview of new developments/new ideas/impressions</th>
</tr>
</thead>
</table>

| Interview personnel on the ground, e.g. game wardens | Borderland South Africa – Lesotho | Borderland Mozambique | Borderland South Africa- Swaziland |
Fifty-two formal interviews were carried out. In addition to this, I had many informal chats with key informants that proved very informative. Appendix I provides the complete interview schedule whilst the most important participating organisations are displayed in Appendix II. Depending on the context and the respondents the interviews were either unstructured or semi-structured.

The respondents involved people specialised in or directly affected by the creation of TBPAs in Southern Africa, such as:

- Policy-makers at local, national, regional and international level, including civil servants with Ministries of Environment and/or Tourism, South African National Parks officials, security officials and World Bank employees.
- Actors belonging to other (potentially) influential interest groups, such as representatives and/or leaders of NGOs, local communities and private businesses.
- Leading opinion-makers, such as prominent conservationists and ecologists.
- A few members of informal groups, including ‘sangomas’ (witchdoctors) and ivory poachers.
- Individuals working in the parks or along borders, such as game wardens, local police officers and customs personnel.

As my research project looked at the South African Peace Parks concept as a whole, interviews were carried out with experts and interests groups from all six proposed TBPAs. However, to allow for a more in-depth focus, a particular case-study was made of the Great Limpopo Park, of which the South African-Mozambican part was (partly) opened during my stay in Southern Africa and which is the most important TBPA in terms of both land area and economic potential. Interviews usually lasted for about two hours and often covered a wide range of topics. The precise contents were dependent on various factors including the role of the organisation, new topics introduced by the respondent and earlier acquired information. To facilitate comparisons and rigour in interview analysis the interviews were connected by

---

respondents. Ely et al. (1997: 35) argue that triangulation needs to be complemented with "crystallisation" which involves considering an issue from as many different perspectives or "angles of repose" as possible. Looking at an issue from various theoretical stands is one way to further crystallization.
common themes, derived from the three leading research questions (see section 1.10), but adapted to the respondent’s positioning in TBPAs (see Figure 4.2).

Figure 4.2 Developing and deriving interview questions

*Source:* Based on Mason (1996: 52).

In line with the identified case-study area my initial plan was to be based at a research centre close to the Kruger Park, namely Wits Rural Facility, for the greatest part of the fieldwork. However, my point of entry was Johannesburg, where I had planned to stay a few days. This stay was soon lengthened because rather unexpectedly Johannesburg provided an excellent interview setting. In accordance with my inductive approach, my initial handful of respondents snowballed into a larger circle of main informants on TBPAs, most of who were based in either Johannesburg or nearby Pretoria. Moreover, my friend and landlord (introduced to me through the Durham network) not only worked as the head of a college specialising in the social aspects of conservation, but his house informally functioned as the centre for discussions on politics. His circle of friends encompassed people from all walks of life and (racial) backgrounds, which is still comparatively unusual in a post-Apartheid South African setting. Although these conversations were often informal and not

15 Part of the University of Witwatersrand.
planned interviews, I was privy to insider information on ANC party politics and the current political climate in general, both in South Africa and in the wider region. My stay in Johannesburg constituted in many ways an excellent springboard for the rest of the fieldwork.

My stay at Wits Rural Facility initially did not fulfil my hopes, mainly because of logistical complexities, but before I had time to despair the course of my fieldwork took several unexpected turns. The most welcome of these was my admittance to a three-day workshop, aimed at constructing a management plan for the GKG, where most of the key decision-makers in Peace Parks were conveniently gathered. Participation in this workshop helped me to extend the geographical range of my work further than I could have hoped to have done in the light of budget and time constraints. Moreover, I was fortunate to have had unexpected access to private meetings dealing with sensitive security issues in relation to cross-border crime in the Great Limpopo area. Through the developed contacts, participation in this workshop also facilitated the attendance at other important workshops later on in my fieldwork.

Meanwhile, in the course of the rest of my stay at Wits Rural Facility I became acquainted with Freddy, an NGO worker. With his excellent contacts in the Shangaan community, he was an important gate keeper. Gaining more insight into some of the views and local practice of the Shangaan is vital, because their code of ethics and their worldview is significantly different from that which forms the reasoning behind TBNRM, which is inclined to operate along 'rational' (read Westernised) premises. Moreover, as a transboundary community they are the main (although frequently unconsulted) occupants of the transboundary space and the way the park will function is partially dependent on the manner in which the Shangaan negotiate the space. A slightly unconventional aspect of my fieldwork included exchanges with individuals which 'good' society would deem rather shady. These individuals have been known to engage in illicit cross-border activities including poaching, arms smuggling and human trafficking. Conversations with people working for a local NGO involved in

---

16 The Gaza/Kruger/Gonarezhou Park, commonly called the GKG, was the previous name for the Great Limpopo Park.

17 The Shangaan belong to the wider Tsonga ethic group. Dispersed over Mozambique, South Africa and Zimbabwe, they inhabit the borderland that the Great Limpopo TBPA will cover.
helping former Mozambican refugees to return through the Kruger road network was also instructive in gaining more knowledge of local cross-border networks and how these could possibly affect the Great Limpopo.

After leaving Wits Rural Facility, additional site visits were taken to Swaziland, Mozambique and the Cape Town/Stellenbosch area to talk to both governmental bodies and NGOs involved in TBNRM. Not only were the activities at the destinations of my travel important for my fieldwork. In the course of travelling I met some important gatekeepers to other networks relevant to TBPAs. The respondents they introduced me to, including former employees of governmental organisations working on TBPAs, were often amongst the most important ones in my research. My introduction to them as a friend of someone they were close to greatly facilitated the building of trust.

Luckily, my stay in South Africa was just long enough to be able to attend the official elephant translocation from the Kruger Park into the Coutada 16 Park, in the context of the creation of the Great Limpopo. This high profile event, attended by amongst others Nelson Mandela and the ministers of tourism from Mozambique, South Africa and Zimbabwe, provided me with the chance to re-establish my contacts with key respondents and meet many new ones. This included persons who were normally not easy to approach, including Dr Anton Rupert, one of South Africa’s wealthiest men and the founder of the Peace Parks Foundation, enabling me to interview him the following year. It also offered me the chance to observe the extent to which local communities were involved in the event. The observation that after their dance performance community members could obtain some sandwiches at the back of the tent in which the proceedings took place but not enter it was rather revealing for example.

All in all the outcomes of my first fieldwork period can be considered satisfactory. The relatively smooth access to respondents greatly aided the fulfilment of the objectives guiding my information gathering. Having identified some of the main political issues and actors in Peace Parks, I felt I had a good basis for further study of the topic, by means of further literature research and the second fieldwork period the following year. Input of my supervisors and other experts on a compiled Fieldwork
Report listing the main outcomes of the research thus far and emerging new routes for research further aided me in this goal. A first fieldwork period moreover enabled me to establish important interview contacts that could be followed up at a later stage in case of absence or unavailability of the respondents the first time.

4.4.2. The second fieldwork period

My second fieldwork period started 11 months after the end of my first fieldwork period, from September 2002 until January 2003. Its set up did not significantly differ from the first fieldwork period. In-depth interviews with individuals were once more used as the main means of information gathering, in addition to attendance at relevant workshops, the analysis of policy documents and press reports and field visits. To keep track of the incoming information, changes in policy or action and my positionality in the field, I once more kept a fieldwork diary. This fieldwork period had three main aims. Firstly, I sought to further explore the main political issues in Peace Parks as identified during the first fieldwork period. Secondly, my renewed stay in Southern Africa would be used to test some propositions regarding the interface between politics and Peace Parks, which had emerged in the course of the analysis of the previous fieldwork data or in literature searches upon my return to the UK. Finally, identification of possible new issues and relevant processes also constituted an important goal. In addition to the Great Limpopo Park, the Maluti/Drakensberg TFCA was selected as a second case study area, to allow for comparative analysis. Furthermore, an analysis of the co-operation between South Africa and Lesotho in the Maluti/Drakensberg TFCA enabled me to consider various political factors relevant to Peace Parks in more depth. Relations between Lesotho and South Africa were relatively strained after the contested South African led SADC intervention in Lesotho (22 September 1998). Combined with South Africa’s alleged intentions to secure access to the water resources in the Maluti mountains (Van Wyk, 2000), and considering the great imbalances in size and power between the two countries, a case study of the Maluti/Drakensberg TBPA was considered potentially instructive in finding out more about the peace-building potential of TBPA's, the regional political economy and sovereignty issues related to Peace Parks.

My base of operation was this time Pretoria. Unfortunately, the rise of crime in my former neighbourhood in Johannesburg (Yeoville) was such that staying there was no
longer an option. Moreover, the first fieldwork period identified the South African Department of Environmental Affairs and Tourism (DEAT), South African National Parks (SANPs) and the Peace Parks Foundation (that also has an office in Pretoria) as one the most influential decision-making coalitions in Peace Parks. This favoured a stay in Pretoria as the location of these organisations. My status as a visiting scholar in the Geography Department of the University of Pretoria meant moreover that I could tap into the approach and knowledge of local academics working on related areas of research. More generally, it enabled me to access academic literature with a knowledgeable target audience consisting of experts or other interested parties.

As a result of some important changes in the TBPA environment and beyond, gaining access to relevant information proved this time more difficult than expected. Partly as a result of Affirmative Action policies the turnover in the TBPA scene is relatively high, which meant that some of my key informants no longer worked in their former positions or had left the TBPA scene altogether. Negative publicity in the Southern African press on the release of the Kruger elephants without prior consultation of local communities in Mozambique and increasingly critical academic reports, meant that the management of the Peace Parks project was increasingly questioned. As a direct consequence I encountered a greater wariness than previously. This necessitated a less circumspect approach towards sensitive interview questions than I would normally use. Instead, on the advice of some of my closest and most key informants I adopted a bolder approach, stressing the social and scientific importance of being able to find out about policy failures as a way to improve TBNRM. I also added more weight to my promise of confidentiality by pointing out that disclosure of the sources of sensitive information would negatively affect my career prospects, both in academia and as a future consultant in TBNRM. Learning to speak and understand Afrikaans fluently was another new strategy I adopted. My stay on the University of Pretoria’s campus, an Afrikaans speaking university, greatly helped in this respect. Although I had learned some Afrikaans before, my knowledge was for the most part limited to an exchange of greetings and small talk. Most of my Afrikaner respondents were more than willing to speak English. However, I soon found that speaking (initially broken!) Afrikaans created a higher sense of informality and intimacy in the interviews. Moreover, when conversations took place during long car journeys or late
in the evening, the respondent was more likely to prefer to talk in his/her own language.

In addition to the changes in the TBPA scene, developments in the wider regional socio-economic and political setting influenced my fieldwork. This was less in method than in direction. Many places in Southern Africa had fallen prey to famines, including in some parts of the planned TBPAs. Meanwhile, President Mugabe’s controversial land redistribution programme in Zimbabwe now directly affected progress in the Great Limpopo. Informal settlements in the north of the Gonarezhou Park had been erected, with the tacit permission of the Zimbabwe authorities, in spite of Mugabe’s assurances that the Great Limpopo would not be affected by the redistribution of land. Likewise, President Nujoma announced drastic land reforms for Namibia. Whilst the press and some members of the public would on the basis of these developments actively question the feasibility of TBPAs (see for example Mail & Guardian, 2002), these changes were little or not at all followed by shifts in policy in TBNRM planning. Broader national and foreign interests of South Africa and other countries seemed to act against an abandoning or major restructuring of earlier made plans. Moreover, a frequently found conviction amongst some of my respondents, and particularly amongst the co-ordinators of TBPAs, was that by means of careful planning and adaptive management methods, park administrators could contain negative political impacts and prevent these from directly affecting the park. The combination of these newly found political dynamics and the management responses, made me aware of the importance of making the interaction between TBPA policy-making at the micro level and wider political and economic changes, and vice-versa, a more central focus area of my research. I incorporated this new focus in my interview questions accordingly.

Possibly as a result of my longer stay and further deepening of my relations with some trusted respondents, I also gained increased insight into the great role that interpersonal and inter-organisational relations play in shaping policy-making in Peace Parks. The TBPA scene can be identified as a highly divided one and is sometimes jokingly referred to as “being all about egos, not eco” (Grossman, Interview, 2003). Increased awareness of this factor further shaped my research design, through an additional focus on the social effects of the co-operation on the ground in TBPAs and
increased attention to the role of inter-personal relations in shaping co-operative processes. These adjustments in my research design and focus reflect how the usage of an inductive fieldwork approach can contribute to the building of informed and ‘grounded’ theory, as was the intention.

The development of my second term of fieldwork also bears witness to the great role that chance plays in directing fieldwork (Wels, 2000: 77-79). Unfortunately, I fell ill due to a parasite. The effects were already felt halfway into my fieldwork in the form of increased tiredness and susceptibility to minor infections. This meant that I could undertake less travelling that originally planned and particularly so to rural areas. In addition to the visits I had already paid to Mozambique and Swaziland, I visited Maseru, but not the Maluti Mountains in Lesotho. Attendance at an InWEnt workshop at the Golden Gate Park (South Africa) had however fortunately enabled me to interview the most important Basotho policy-makers. My stay there also enabled me to view the Lesotho side of the future Park. Unexpectedly, my illness also affected my fieldwork in positive ways. My involuntarily long stay in Pretoria as a result of falling ill considerably deepened my contacts and friendships with some of my key informants in Pretoria. As a result, they increasingly disclosed sensitive and insightful information with me, for example regarding conflicts that emerged during closed meetings. Much of this information was highly important and would otherwise have remained inaccessible.

4.5 Discussion

This chapter has considered some of the main methodological aspects that arise from researching political patterns in Peace Parks in a Southern African setting. Moreover, how these aspects were translated into the fieldwork design and research practice has been outlined. The remaining part of this chapter will provide an insight into the strategies and considerations that have guided the analysis and usage of the fieldwork data. The discussion focuses particularly on the interpretation and usage of the in-depth interviews, as the most significant data collection method.

Data analysis arguably requires three mutually complementary processes: data reduction (Miles and Huberman, 1994), data management and data interpretation.
Following Hammersley and Atkinson's (1983: 178) suggestions I first immersed myself in the data to identify important themes and patterns whilst at the same time staying alert to contradictions and inconsistencies, such as colliding views by different actors on the same issue. Relevant observations and thoughts would be noted down in the margins of the texts under scrutiny. Where information was incomplete or unclear this would also be marked on the text. Unclear statements or observations would usually be checked by going back to the respondents, if possible in person\textsuperscript{18} or else by email or phone. Missing factual data would usually be filled in through a literature search.

A loose form of coding was used to manage and categorise data. The assignment of codes to data can facilitate and structure the process of ascribing meaning to and categorising fieldwork data for usage in a thesis (Miles and Huberman, 1994: 56). The codes that I used reflected for the most part the themes of sections in my preliminary thesis outline, to which further sections were added with the identification of new subject categories, such as ‘Informal Politics’. Each coding category was endowed with a different colour, after which small-sized stickers of the corresponding colour were used to mark interview and other texts. Coding procedures should be used with caution and flexibility. When using rigid sets of codes, precious information falling outside the developed categories may easily remain unused or go unobserved. Coding was therefore used in a flexible way and never replaced in-depth studying of the texts when looking for information.

Due to its subjective nature, qualitative research raises several challenges to research validity. Information is not neutral, but “is constructed, or created, in specific social contexts for particular purposes” (Mosse, 1994: 499). As with the researcher, respondents’ impressions and opinions will be shaped by their background and interests in the research area. Respondents’ accounts are thus likely to give at least to some extent a distorted portrayal of events, even when unconsciously due to memory defects (Keeble, 2001). Furthermore, the corroboration of propositions will significantly depend upon a researcher’s interpretation of the material. “We tend to

\textsuperscript{18} Part of the data analysis was already undertaken in South Africa, with the advantage of still being close to the data and geographically, to my respondents. Data generated in the first fieldwork period could moreover be checked or added to during my second stay in Southern Africa.
make more of the evidence that confirms our beliefs, and pay less attention to any evidence that contradicts them” (Dey, 1993: 222). Miles and Huberman (1994) are even more cynical: “most people are rotten scientists, relying heavily on pre-existing beliefs, and making bias-ridden judgements” (quoted in Dey 1993: 222). The subjective nature of research therefore induces considerable risks of misinterpretation and misrepresentation of the data (Dey, 1993: 117). Clear-cut guidelines to measure a contested concept like validity are moreover lacking in the Social Sciences (Dey, 1993).

Various means were used to try and ensure as adequate an interpretation of the data as possible, of which the most important ones will now be discussed. To start with, I tried to prevent data misinterpretation and misrepresentation by actively considering which biases the research could produce and how these could affect data interpretation. Although the potential of biases was present throughout the research, three main ones can be identified. Firstly, the set up of the research introduced the risk of a ‘South African bias’. I spent most of my time in South Africa and the majority of my respondents are South Africans. Even though my fieldwork certainly also looked into perspectives from ‘across-the-border’, this induces the risk of overt concentration on South African perspectives. Secondly, my research concentrated upon the political aspects of TBPAs at both the inter-ministerial and intra governmental levels. Although I also interviewed some community members and representatives, as a result of the research focus this group remained somewhat under-represented. Finally, the friendships I developed in the course of the research may have led to a ‘preferential bias’. It cannot be eliminated that in some cases my perspectives may have been unevenly influenced by the views of befriended respondents, if only through the increased exposure to their views.

Information-sharing with peers and other experts and information-checking were important methods used to try and optimise research validity. I actively compared perspectives and checked information with fellow researchers working on Southern Africa’s TBPAs, including with researchers based in Mozambique and Zimbabwe, and specialised in the interaction between TBPAs and the welfare of local communities. Furthermore, some of the key findings of the research emerging from the data analysis were published in academic journals (Van Amerom, 2002; Van
Amerom and Bücher, 2005). This introduces the opportunity for the research results to be challenged (McDowell, 1998: 2144), including by my respondents whom I informed of the existence of the articles and who were provided with copies where desired. Individual respondents have also been approached to check whether their remarks and opinions were appropriately used in the thesis text, where there existed some level of doubt.

Furthermore, in order to help determine the strength of a given observation or claim and the weight it could be accorded, including vis-à-vis other fieldwork-based claims, its origin and credibility would be critically assessed. The level of authenticity and replicability of the corresponding “data bits” (Dey, 1993: 117) were, for example, actively considered whilst the amount of time between a given observation and its recording and the likelihood of bias were also taken into account (Alvesson and Skoldberg, 2000: 79). High occurrence of these factors may affect the validity of a given data bit. Table 4.2 displays some of the main guidelines used to promote data credibility. The guidelines were flexibly used. Ultimately, the weight that was given to certain data would also be greatly determined by how plausible they seemed in the light of the other fieldwork findings.

19 All the criteria are derived from Alvesson and Skoldberg (2000: 79). Part of the guiding questions also come from Dey (1993: 224).
Table 4.2 Guidelines for critical reflection upon level of validity of data

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Criteria</th>
<th>Guiding questions</th>
<th>Implications for strength of claim (if high)</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Level of authenticity</td>
<td>- Is the observation genuine or fictitious?</td>
<td>+</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>- Is it based on the own observation, or on hearsay?</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>- How reliable are those making/reporting the observation?</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Level of replication</td>
<td>- Have other people made or reported the same observation?</td>
<td>+</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Criticism of bias</td>
<td>- What are possible biases of the respondent and how can these have distorted interpretations?</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>- What are possible biases of the researcher?</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>- What motivations may have influenced how the observation was reported?</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Criticism of distance</td>
<td>- How long after the observation was made was it recorded, and in which situation?</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Criticism of dependence/ 'narrative contagion</td>
<td>- Can other stories, which the reporting person has listened to, possibly have influenced the structure or content of the report (and the following analysis)?</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Having discussed my approach towards data analysis and the methods employed to try and optimise research validity, the eventual representation of the fieldwork data in the thesis needs consideration. Considering the set up of my research, in which interviews provided the bulk of the fieldwork data and in which case-studies were used to focus the research direction, two issues need particular consideration. Firstly, the ways in which interview data are constructed into theoretical concepts is important to consider (Baxter and Eyles, 1997: 506). To avoid quoting respondents out of context it was carefully considered for each quotation how representative it was of the respondent’s overall viewpoints and if the interviewee would accept it as a reasonable summary or expression of their views. Secondly, the usage of case-studies raises the question to what extent the data derived from these case-studies can and will be generalised into theoretical concepts. Typically, case studies provide a good way to explore certain social phenomena in more depth; however they do so within a given demarcated geographical setting. By comparing and combining the findings of
case-studies to other academic studies their generalisability can however be increased. In my research I also collected material on the various other TBPAs, making it easier to determine to what extent certain developments seem typical for the Southern African Peace Parks project or limited to a particular park. To avoid overstating generalisation of the findings of the case-studies to TBPAs as a whole would only be undertaken after careful consideration and if references to similar developments in other TBPAs or to the registration of such developments in the body of academic literature on the top could be made.

Whilst the application of the above-described guidelines can help to increase validity, it would be a fallacy to believe that fieldwork data can tell an absolute ‘truth’. For one thing, in spite of all efforts we can never be fully aware of, or articulate, our own self-positioning (Rose, 1997) let alone the positioning of our respondents. This awareness raises responsibilities as to how the fieldwork data are written up and represented. The rest of this thesis has been written bearing these issues in mind. Rather than establishing clear-cut truths and solutions, this thesis seeks to offer an overview of a wide range of perspectives on the political aspects of Peace Parks in addition to opening up new avenues for thinking and discussion.
5: Peace Parks & Development

5.1 Introduction

This chapter considers the political aspects of the pursuit of development through Peace Parks in Southern Africa. The promotion of regional sustainable development is a key reason for the creation of Peace Parks (see section 2.8), and proponents of TBPs present co-operation between countries on this basis as a relatively smooth and unproblematic exercise. The transformation of borderlands into ‘zones for development’ by means of TBPs tends to be portrayed as an a-political project, merely involving the joining together of conservation areas in seemingly otherwise ‘empty’ borderlands (Duffy, 2001), and the creation or extension of tourism facilities to cater for the influx of eco tourists. This optimistic view is for example expressed by Anton Rupert, the head of the PPF, when stating that the creation of the Great Limpopo “merely” requires the establishment of wildlife corridors and ecotourism infrastructure and the securing of space (Rupert, Interview, 2002; Rupert quoted in Sunday Times, 2003). Furthermore, the CBNRM component in Peace Parks is seen to ensure that local communities will support the creation of TBPs. The set up of TBPs in Southern Africa was hence initially portrayed as an exercise, which could effortlessly combine conservation and local development needs. Moreover, referring to the stipulations in treaties that TBPA construction will not involve a ceding of sovereignty for states, proponents of Peace Parks have emphasised that the individual parts of a TBPA will continue to fall under the jurisdiction of the government of the country in which it is located (Government of the Kingdom of Lesotho, 2001; Government of Mozambique, 2002; Mpasa, Interview, 2002; Africom, 2003). Together these viewpoints implicitly suggest that land harmonisation would not be a significant issue, would pose few difficulties, and would not induce strife between countries. ‘Land harmonisation’ can in this context be defined as the process of merging, or bringing more into agreement with one an other, differing land uses across a given international boundary for the purpose of creating a TBPA, through adaptations in land use on both sides of the boundary or by adapting the land use in one of the countries concerned to resemble that of the neighbouring country.
By allegedly promoting shared economic interests in the development of TBPAs and the ecotourism income they are expected to generate, advocates of Peace Parks also claim that the joint pursuit of development through TBPAs will promote greater cohesion and integration between countries and to promote regional peace. This is reflected in the words of Valli Moosa (quoted in Keenan, 2000: 10), South Africa’s Minister of Environmental Affairs and Tourism:

*The benefits of TFCAs will transcend national boundaries, much as the animals will as we open up migratory routes. I know of nothing else with the capacity to build as much solidarity and friendship as TFCAs. They will be the first visible steps in the full economic integration of the region.*

In practice, attempts to develop a TBPA and exploit its ecotourism potential are complex and often problematic and may cause considerable conflict between South Africa and neighbouring states. Two main conflict areas can be identified:

1) *Struggles related to a harmonisation of land use*

Whilst South Africa generally favours a preservation-oriented approach, many of its neighbouring countries have adopted a more ‘relaxed’ approach towards conservation, allowing for a sustainable usage of resources¹ and human habitation in their parts of the TBPAs. TBPAs increase inter-state interdependency by establishing or increasing infrastructural connections between countries and by promoting shared economic interests in the development of the area through ecotourism.

This means that differences in land uses and administration between the territory of its neighbouring countries and that of its own could now harm South Africa’s ecological and economic interests by threatening the welfare of its wildlife and/or by limiting its opportunities to exploit the TBPA’s ecotourism potential. As the region’s strongest state, South Africa is in the position to challenge and demand changes in the spatial organisation and administration of its neighbours’ territory. As such, TBPAs may become a means through which South Africa can increase its say in

---

¹ This can for example involve the gathering of water and firewood, herbs for medicines and hunting (Kiss, 1990).
neighbouring territory. Its neighbouring states are however likely to resist South African intervention. They will have vested interests in the current land use and administration of their parts of the TBPA. Furthermore, states will generally resist a ceding of their sovereignty. For this reason, South African intervention is likely to produce fierce power struggles and to put considerable strain upon its relations with neighbouring countries.

2) Competition over expected ecotourism benefits

There is considerable competition amongst South Africa and neighbouring countries over the distribution of envisaged ecotourism benefits. The equitable sharing of benefits is the bottom-line for the participating governments in Southern Africa’s TBPA (Braack, 2002a: 16). However, partially as a result of disparities in power and capacity between South Africa and its neighbours, it has proved hard to negotiate benefit sharing in TBPA in an equitable way.

Altogether, the sharing of costs and benefits in pursuing development in Peace Parks has generated considerable tensions between South Africa and neighbouring countries. Furthermore, the resolving of these issues largely in favour of the strongest state, South Africa, has evoked resentment and hostility amongst South Africa’s neighbours.

This chapter will explore these issues and tensions with a focus on co-operation between South Africa and Mozambique and Zimbabwe in the Great Limpopo Park, the most advanced TBPA after the already established Kgalagadi Park. With the South African Kruger Park attracting over a million tourists a year, the Great Limpopo is well placed to attract ecotourism. This is why it has become the ‘flagship’ of the Southern African Peace Parks project. It has, however, also become the first TBPA in which harmonisation of land use posed major issues and in which the sharing of ecotourism revenue has provoked fierce struggles between the participating parties. These issues moreover continue to be contested. Problematically, there is a high chance that struggles over land harmonisation and the distribution of the ecotourism benefits will also become an issue in other, currently less advanced TBPA.
5.2 Disagreements over land use in the Great Limpopo

5.2.1 Introduction
In the course of developing the Great Limpopo, conflicting preferences regarding its administration and land use have increasingly created tensions between South Africa and Mozambique and, to a lesser extent, between South Africa and Zimbabwe. On the basis of its ecological and economic interests in the Great Limpopo, South Africa regards the continued presence of local communities in the Great Limpopo and the sustainable usage of natural resources as undesirable. Mozambique and Zimbabwe, who both host local communities on their territory in the Great Limpopo, have however vested interests in maintaining more flexible conservation regimes, which do allow for human habitation and hunting.

Although occupying a minority position, South Africa has increasingly intervened with the design of the Great Limpopo. This testifies to the superior economic and political power position its holds vis-à-vis its neighbouring countries. Firstly, to protect its economic and ecological interests, upon joining the Great Limpopo initiative South Africa consistently and ultimately successfully pushed for a downgrading of the initial TFCA concept to a TFP concept for the Great Limpopo, in which conservation supersedes other forms of land use. The size of the TBPA was furthermore significantly reduced. Secondly, South Africa has increasingly intervened with the administration and land use of the Mozambican part of the Great Limpopo, which has resulted in considerable tensions with Mozambique. Tensions with Zimbabwe over the harmonisation of land use in the Great Limpopo, which were for a long time kept to a minimum, seem now also on the rise. Before considering these issues in more depth, it is first useful to explore the Great Limpopo’s institutional aspects and the rationale behind its creation.

5.2.2. The Great Limpopo’s rationale and institutional arrangements
The Great Limpopo Transfrontier Park is a joint agreement between Mozambique, South Africa and Zimbabwe. As noted in Chapter Two its origins date back to the 19th century, when a Portuguese ecologist, Gomes de Soussa, proposed that the Limpopo area, divided by English and Portuguese colonial administrations, should be managed as a TBPA. After the ending of apartheid the idea was picked up again by
the Mozambican National Directorate of Forestry and Wildlife (DNFFB), which proposed the creation of a TBPA between the Coutada 16 Park with the South African Kruger Park across the border. The Banhine and Zinave National Parks located further eastwards in Mozambique would also form a part, as well as private game reserves to the west of the Kruger Park. Over time Zimbabwe was also approached to join the initiative. Its Gonarezhou Park would join the TBPA by means of the Sengwe corridor (see Figure 5.1)².

The TBPA initiative, then still referred to as the Gaza/Kruger/Gonarezhou Park, was first formally recognised and given high level political support with the signing of the International Transfrontier Conservation Agreement between South Africa, Mozambique and Zimbabwe on 10 November 2000. During this occasion the three countries established a tri-national Ministerial Committee and a supporting Technical Committee³, in which senior officials from conservation authorities in each of the participating countries had a seat (Braack, 2002b). By 2001 this organisational structure had been extended with amongst others several working groups, including a community working group on the South African side, and a National Steering Committees. The Great Limpopo’s organisational structure is displayed in Figure 2.5.

As Figure 5.1 indicates, joining the TBPA offers for each of the countries concerned some important opportunities to enhance their conservation and ecotourism profile. As a result of Mozambique’s civil war (1978 – 1992), by the end of the 1990s wildlife in Coutada 16⁴ had been severely depleted (see section 2.5.). The area also lacks tourism facilities. South Africa’s Kruger Park is on the contrary already a well-developed, leading tourist destination with a wide variety of wildlife, including the

² It was initially also envisaged that the Malipati Safari Area, the Manjini Pan Sanctuary and the Savé Valley and Chiredzi River Conservancies would join. The connection of the Gonarezhou Park through the Sengwe corridor seems to be the main priority for now however, which might explain why these three areas are usually not displayed on maps of the Great Limpopo TFCA.

³ Now replaced by an Interim Joint Management Board.

⁴ Renamed the Limpopo Park on 4 October 2001.
popular Big Five (see also section 2.2). It suffers, however, from an overpopulation of elephants.

![Map of Great Limpopo TBPA with characteristics of main joining conservation areas in 2001 indicated](image)

**Gonarezhou Park:**
- Relatively wide range of biodiversity, but underdeveloped eco tourism potential, due to poor tourism infrastructure

**Sengwe Corridor:**
- Subsistence agriculture and hunting. Consumptive tourism already important.

**Coutada 16**
- Wildlife levels very low. No tourism infrastructure. Hardly any visitors, but considerable eco tourism potential and vegetation and space to host more wildlife.

**Kruger Park**
- High levels of biodiversity. Already a major tourism destination. Suffers from elephant overpopulation.

**Figure 5.1** Map of Great Limpopo TBPA with characteristics of main joining conservation areas in 2001 indicated

*Source: Based on Schoon (2004: 23).*

Research at the University of Zimbabwe indicates that for 26 years the Kruger Park’s elephant population consisted of 6000-8000 elephants. Today there are nearly 12 000

---

5 Then still called the Gaza/Kruger/Gonarezhou (GKG) Park.
The Kruger Park’s elephant surplus causes significant environmental degradation, which could in due time threaten the survival of other animal species (Oliver, Interview, 2001; Pienaar, Interview, 2001). Elephant culling is however highly contested and likely to result in international condemnation, whilst attempts to put female elephants on the pill have had only limited success (Hall-Martin, Interview, 2001).

Considering the nature of the limitations and strengths that both conservation areas display, their connection into a TBPA could benefit both countries. The translocation of South African elephants and other wildlife from the Kruger Park into adjacent territory in Mozambique could boost the Coutada 16’s biodiversity levels, whilst South Africa could ‘dispose’ of its ‘excess elephants’ without attracting negatively publicity that might hamper ecotourism to the Park (Oliver, Interview, 2001). Furthermore, a connection to the Kruger Park could promote more tourism to Mozambique’s Limpopo Park, now well off established ‘tourism tracks’ (Storm, Interview, 2001). The same counts to a considerable extent for Zimbabwe’s Gonarezhou Park. Although poaching by army officials and even official conservationists posed and continues to pose major problems (Duffy, 1997), the Gonarezhou Park nevertheless incorporates a wide range of biodiversity. However, its ecotourism potential has remained underdeveloped, partially a result of poor tourism facilities in the Park. At the first sight, the creation of the Great Limpopo therefore appears to constitute a ‘win-win’ scenario for all three countries involved (see also Figure 5.1). It was partially on this premise that the creation of the TBPA has been presented as a vehicle for regional integration and peace. The focus was thereby especially on South Africa and Mozambique, whereby the translocation of Kruger elephants to Mozambique’s Coutada 16 was presented as a South African ‘gift’ to ‘pay back’ Mozambique for its suffering during the apartheid years in order to heal these “old wounds” (Koch, 1994). This spirit is for example reflected in Nelson Mandela’s jest during the first official elephant transfer into Mozambique in October 2001. Mandela joked that the donation of these elephants to Mozambique meant that he had finally paid his lobola (bride prize) for Mozambican wife Graça Machel.

Considering the interests that each of the three countries has in joining the TBPA, it is perhaps not surprising that Ministers of Tourism Helder Muteia (Mozambique), Valli
Moosa (South Africa) and Francis Nhema (Zimbabwe) signed an International Agreement on the TBPA just 13 months after they had first considered the idea (Braack, 2002b), notably on 10 November 2000. However, there existed major disparities in land use and capacity between the three countries, as a result of which the connection of the individual parks and other conservation areas into a TBPA produced increasingly conflicting views regarded the desired forms of land use in the Great Limpopo. In spite of the progress made since then (see Table 5.1), and the sense of harmony that was given off during formal ceremonies, considerable tensions between South Africa and Mozambique and Zimbabwe developed in the course of creating the Great Limpopo as a result.
<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Event</th>
<th>Countries involved</th>
<th>Date</th>
<th>Additional Comments</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Completion of management plan</td>
<td>Mozambique, South Africa and Zimbabwe</td>
<td>August 2001</td>
<td>Drawn up in policy workshops with relatively wide range of stakeholders, including from Great Limpopo working groups</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Translocation of Kruger elephants into Coutada 16</td>
<td>Mozambique, South Africa</td>
<td>4 October 2001</td>
<td>First large-scale translocation of wildlife: 25 elephants translocated from Kruger Park to Coutada 16</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Signing of MoU</td>
<td>Mozambique, South Africa and Zimbabwe</td>
<td>23 October 2001</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Formal acceptance of Joint Management Plan by Technical Committee</td>
<td>Mozambique, South Africa and Zimbabwe</td>
<td>30 April 2002</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Signing of Treaty</td>
<td>Mozambique, South Africa and Zimbabwe</td>
<td>9 December 2002</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Fence cutting ceremony</td>
<td>Mozambique, South Africa</td>
<td>11 December 2002</td>
<td>Involved creation of three openings of 35km, 15 km and 10 km wide in Kruger Park fence</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
5.2.3. Differing land uses in the Great Limpopo

Given the sheer size of this proposed TBPA (99,000 km²) it is perhaps not surprising that there exist a considerable disparity in land use and administration between the individual parts of the Great Limpopo (see Table 5.2).

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Country</th>
<th>Main areas in Great Limpopo Initiative</th>
<th>Status</th>
<th>Human habitation</th>
<th>Land use</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>South Africa</td>
<td>Kruger Park (SANPs owned)</td>
<td>National Park</td>
<td>Limited to a few staff villages</td>
<td>Conservation</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Makuleke Contractual Park Region</td>
<td>None</td>
<td></td>
<td>Conservation, commercial hunting possible on limited scale</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Mozambique</td>
<td>Coutada 16 Hunting area</td>
<td>27000 residents</td>
<td>Conservation, commercial hunting, crops (maize, beans), livestock</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Zimbabwe</td>
<td>Gonarezhou National Park</td>
<td>National Park</td>
<td>Conservation. Since land invasion by Chitsa community in 2001 also subsistence agriculture and hunting in northern part.</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Sengwe Wildlife Corridor</td>
<td>Wildlife Utilization Area</td>
<td></td>
<td>Subsistence agriculture, livestock, conservation, commercial hunting</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Differences exist particularly between South Africa’s territory in the Great Limpopo on the hand, and the Mozambican and Zimbabwean parts on the other. These
distinctions can in turn be traced to different conservation regimes and land ownership systems.

Whereas on the South African side preservationist land use dominates, Mozambique and Zimbabwe host on their parts vast communal areas in which local communities practice subsistence agriculture. Subsistence and commercial hunting also occurs in these areas. These differences in conservation regimes between South Africa and neighbouring countries were initially perceived to be relatively unproblematic. This was the case because in the original plan for the TBPA, as developed by Mozambique’s DNFFB, the Great Limpopo was modelled as a TFCA. A TFCA allows for a multitude of land uses, in which consumptive use of natural resources and areas inhabited by humans areas may complement areas solely dedicated to conservation and tourism (see section 2.9).

A TFCA model for the Great Limpopo was favoured by Mozambique and Zimbabwe, as this was considerable in line with their national priorities. It is relatively common and accepted that local communities can reside in Mozambique (see also section 7.3), as they do for example in Coutada 16 and in the Zinave National Park. Furthermore, Mozambique’s TFCA secretariat was based in the Ministry of Agriculture, for which food provision from land is a central concern. This facilitated an approach towards conservation whereby the sustainable usage of natural resources by local communities was increasingly perceived to be compatible with wildlife conservation, rather than undermining its prospects (Anstey, 2001). Finally, the Mozambican government supported commercial hunting in Coutada 16, as an important foreign exchange earner. Zimbabwe supported Mozambique in this policy position. Campfire (see section 2.8) encourages rural communities to manage, and benefit directly from wildlife on their lands, financially and in the form of meat. The selling of hunting concessions to wealthy tourists are important enabling means (Duffy, 2000; Jonga, Interview, 2002). Because of their firm attachment to Campfire, the removal of the Sengwe community from their lands in the Sengwe Corridor would legally be impossible. In addition, in 2000 President Mugabe started up a programme of radical land reforms. Landless black farmers and ‘war veterans’ were encouraged to occupy farms owned by white commercial farmers on the premise that they were entitled to land. To justify its controversial land reforms, the acquisition of rural support is
important for the Zimbabwean government. This makes it politically difficult for the Zimbabwean government to enforce the country’s relatively strict anti-poaching laws in and around its National Parks (Anonymous Source Gonarezhou Park, 2001). Many rural residents aspire to access the land and natural resources within these areas (Gibson, 1999; Nielsen and Chikoko, 2002). Altogether, Zimbabwe had, like Mozambique little interest in a preservationist regime for the Great Limpopo.

However, fearing that its wildlife would be poached in communal areas across the boundary and to protect its ecotourism interests South Africa consistently pushed for a replacement of the TFCA concept by a TFP model. In a TFP conservation and ecotourism are the prime land uses (Munthali and Soto, 2001: 7). These attempts were ultimately successful: During the second ministerial meeting on the TBPA, on 2 May 2000, the Ministerial Committee abandoned the TFCA concept, at least on the short term, in favour of an initial focus on a much scaled down core GKG Transfrontier Park (De Vletter, Interview, 2001; Grossman, Interview, 2001). In this new set up, the GKG TFP would be limited to Coutada 16 in Mozambique (about 11,000km²), the Kruger National Park with integrated private Game Reserves in South Africa (about 22,000km²), and the Gonarezhou National Park with the Sengwe Corridor in Zimbabwe (about 5,000km²) (see Figure 5.1). Furthermore the project became more preservationist oriented. The Transfrontier Park would be managed as an IUCN category II protected area (Munthali and Soto, 2001). Protected areas within this category have as their prime objectives the protection of ecosystem integrity and the creation of “visitor opportunities”. “Exploitation or inimical occupation … of the area”. (Munthali and Soto, 2001: 2) is however rejected. Although the exact interpretation of the IUCN’s Category II criteria is contested (Grossman, Interview, 2003), the latter consideration paved the path for a discussion as to whether the stay of local communities in the Limpopo Park was still legitimate. Moreover, on the basis of its greater capacity and resources compared to Mozambique and Zimbabwe, South Africa successfully vied for the position of Lead Country for the TFP⁶, which made it responsible for ensuring sustained momentum and drive. This further strengthened its

⁶ After this, co-ordinatorship would rotate, with every two years another country fulfilling the role of co-ordinator (Braack, Interview, 2001).
position to demand changes in land use in neighbouring territories, where these could potentially conflict with the conservation and ecotourism goals of the TBPA.

5.2.4 South African intervention in Coutada 16

South Africa started to particularly interfere with the administration of Mozambique’s Coutada 16. It sought to moderate its land use in ways that would make it more harmonious with that of the Kruger Park. This prioritisation was influenced by the fact that Coutada 16 constituted the prime destination for South Africa’s valuable Kruger elephants whilst South Africa also had considerable ecotourism interests in the area. Mozambique’s relatively weak power position vis-à-vis South Africa, compared to Zimbabwe, can also be identified as an important reason. South Africa did not put pressure on Zimbabwe to change its administration or land use in its part of the Great Limpopo, even when progress on the Zimbabwean side came to a total standstill and when illegal settlers invaded the Gonarezhou Park.

While Mozambique preferred to continue to permit local communities to reside in its Coutada 16 and allow commercial hunting in the area, South Africa put considerable pressure on Mozambique to gazette the conservation area as a National Park and ban human habitation and hunting in the context of creating the Great Limpopo. To understand how and why South Africa developed territorial interests in Mozambique’s Coutada 16 as a result of its participation in the Great Limpopo, it is important to realise that there exist significant disparities in capacity between South Africa and Mozambique. South Africa’s Kruger Park has a well-established and relatively effective management regime. As a weak state (Jackson, 1990) Mozambique has relatively little control over its borderlands, including over the conservation areas in these zones (Duffy, 1997; Singh, 2000). The Kruger National Park has well-trained and well-equipped rangers and scouts, as a result of which poaching is under reasonable control. On the Mozambican side, there had for long been a severe lack of capacity, funding and trained conservation staff. Human encroachment in the area increased and anti-poaching laws were only marginally enforced. Furthermore, government factions and the police in Mozambique, these days jokingly referred to as the ‘Gangster’s Paradise’ on basis of widespread corruption practices involving the highest governmental circles (Vermeulen, 2003; Nordstrom, 2004), are extensively involved in poaching and illegal logging in
wildlife areas (Anonymous sources DNFFB, Interviews, 2001; Sanwild, 2004). There were hence considerable and realistic fears on the South African side that its ivory carrying elephants would be poached upon arrival in Coutada 16. There were also concerns that other South African wildlife might be killed to serve as 'bush meat’ by the impoverished local communities in Coutada 16. These fears were confirmed by the alleged referral by the Coutada 16’s communities to a designated 30 000 hectares sanctuary for incoming South African wildlife in the south of the park as “Valli Moosa’s take-away” (Lemmer, 2001).

The presence of local communities in Coutada 16 also complicated the creation of wildlife corridors for a different reason. The likelihood of wildlife-human conflict in Coutada 16 would significantly increase with the entry of South African wildlife into Mozambique. Human settlements would now become increasingly vulnerable to attacks of wildlife on crops and humans. A possible solution would be to erect fences around communal areas to prevent wildlife from entering the settlements. However, this is often opposed by local community members and local NGOs which view it as a new form of “ecological Apartheid” (Munthali and Soto, 2001: 18; Grossman, Interview, 2003). Moreover, this policy option little reduced South African fears for the welfare of its elephants and other precious wildlife such as lions, as community members could still freely enter the Park from their residential areas. There was also another reason why South Africa pushed for the removal of Coutada 16’s local communities. South Africa has a tacit interest in moving these communities out of Coutada 16, because they take up space that could also be used to build lucrative tourism lodges. To facilitate its administration and the generation of private sector investment the Great Limpopo is to be divided into several zones based on different types of land use in the TBPA. In this respect planning in the Great Limpopo considerably reflects the principles for a Biosphere Reserve (see Chapter 2). Endowed with beautiful scenery and a relatively high density of animals, the bank of the Shinguedzi River is perceived to be the best place in the whole of Coutada 16 to build tourism lodges. For this reason interested tourism developers, the majority of which are based in South Africa (see next section) have been eying up the area and lobby for

7 South Africa’s Minister of Environment and Tourism.
it to be designated a 'tourism development zone' (Theron, Interview, 2002; Van Amerom, 2002).

However, at least 6000 Mozambicans reside on the Shingwedzi River bank, attracted by its fertile soil and water in an overall dry environment. To facilitate the harmonisation of land use between the Kruger National Park and Mozambique’s Coutada 16 and to increase the latter’s ecotourism potential, South Africa pushed for several adaptations to the status, administration and usage of land in Coutada 16. Outlined in an Action Plan in 2000, these included (DEAT, 2001b: 3; Munthali and Soto, 2001: 9):

- A change in the status of Coutada 16 from a hunting’area to a national park
- The development of a management plan for Coutada 16
- The training of game rangers in and for Coutada 16
- The development of a strategic plan for fencing Coutada 16

Furthermore, DEAT, SANPs, Kruger Park authorities and the PPF put increasingly pressure on Mozambique to remove its local communities in Coutada 16.

These envisaged moderations to Coutada 16 did not go uncontested. Mozambiqan authorities did not object to turning Coutada 16 into a National Park and to develop a management plan for the area. However, Mozambique was unhappy with the requested removal of local communities in Coutada 16 and with South African demands that it should be fenced (Munthali and Soto, 2001). The Mozambican government perceived this as an interference with its sovereignty over the area (Grossman, Interview, 2003). Adding to its reluctance, Mozambique had been highly

---

8 It was furthermore agreed that Zimbabwe would make a start with the integration of the Sengwe community into the TFP, fence the Sengwe Corridor, and identify and demine land mines where these were suspected. Also, the development of a joint management plan, and harmonisation of legislation for the TBPA as a whole was proposed, whilst South Africa, Mozambique and Zimbabwe also commited themselves to develop an integrated regional tourism development plan (Munthali and Soto, 2001: 9).

9 South Africa stood very firm on this issue however, including because it perceives fencing as a necessary security measure to prevent an increase in transboundary crime in the Limpopo Borderland. The next chapter explores this issue.
unhappy with the exclusion of its Banhine and Zinave National Parks from the Great Limpopo TFP (see section 5.2.3). It was felt that South Africa merely sought to use Mozambican territory in the Great Limpopo as a depot for its surplus elephants, for which reason it was not very interested in taking on the Banhine and Zinave National Parks, as these areas do not border the Kruger Park. References by South African Minister of Tourism Valli Moosa and by the South African press (Koch, 1994) to the Gaza-Kruger-Gonarezhou Park as the “greater Kruger Park” (Keenan, 2000: 10) further fuelled Mozambican anger over South Africa’s perceived domination of the process and suspicions that South Africa’s involvement in the TFP constituted a form of “conservation expansionism” (Fakir, 2000: 1). South Africa’s pressure on Mozambique to turn the Coutada 16 into a National Park and ban commercial hunting was furthermore perceived as hypocritical in Mozambique (Munthali and Soto, 2001), since South Africa had allowed the commercial hunting of two elephants and two buffaloes in the Makuleke held part of the Kruger Park, who had successfully demanded this concession from SANPs in 2000 (South African National Parks, 2000).10

Finally, the resettlement of local communities that South Africa demanded, claiming that this was necessary for the Limpopo Park to become a National Park and for the Great Limpopo TBPA to become a successful tourism destination is highly contested in Mozambique11. An important consideration hereby is that many of the settlers in Coutada 16 were displaced during the civil war. In the light of their former refugee status, it seemed morally unacceptable to force the inhabitants of Coutada 16 to leave their lands once more. From 2000 onwards, community members from the area that had fled to South Africa had furthermore been explicitly encouraged by the Mozambican government to return to their villages in Coutada 16, through a refugee resettlement programme (Koch, Interview, 2001; Simbine, Interview, 2001). Efforts to remove local communities from Coutada 16 were furthermore little compatible with the Mozambican law, which grant local communities residential rights after they

10 Earning the community US$ 210 000.

11 As well as amongst many NGOs and the progressive press in South Africa.
have lived in an area for over a decade (Munthali and Sotho, 2001). On the other hand, as local communities in Mozambique hold no direct formal titles to land, their removal from conservation areas is also not impossible, from a legal perspective.

Proposals to remove local communities in Coutada 16 were particularly contested amongst DNFFB personnel, which, affiliated to the Ministry of Agriculture, was considerably interested in combining and integrating conservation programmes with local development needs and food security. In 2002 the Mozambican government replaced DNFFB’s TFCA unit with its Ministry of Tourism’s Conservation Department as the leading agency in the Great Limpopo. The increasingly important role of Mozambique’s Ministry of Tourism in the Great Limpopo is both an indication and explanation of how Mozambique’s ongoing agreement with South Africa’s demands is considerably informed by a quest for the expected benefits from ecotourism.

Coutada 16 has increasingly been modelled to resemble the Kruger Park’s land use and administration, in line with the wishes of DEAT, SANPs and the PPF, South Africa’s most powerful conservation parties. On 27 November 2001 Coutada 16 was proclaimed the Limpopo National Park. In accordance with the priorities of a National Park, land use became reserved for conservation and non-consumptive ecotourism. Furthermore, a start has been made with the training of wildlife scouts in the Park under the guidance of a South African park warden (Norman, 2004), whose salary is paid by the PPF. Finally, the Mozambican government has agreed to relocate the removal of the Limpopo Park’s local communities to areas outside the Park. Mozambique co-operation with South Africa’s proposal to hold a formal elephant translocation ceremony on the 4th of October 2001, before Mozambique felt ready to do so12, further indicates South Africa’s great say in the process (Grossman, Interview, 2003). The prospect that a preservationist regime in the Limpopo Park will considerably improve its ecotourism potential after connection to South Africa’s lucrative Kruger Park considerably account for Mozambique’s willingness to comply

12 Many of the translocated elephants seemed not ready either. Within 10 days and rather unexpectedly the majority of the 25 released elephants left their new home and returned to the Kruger Park.
with the outlined South African wishes, including more contested ones (Grossman, Interview, 2003).

Whilst conservation objectives may also play a role in determining Mozambique’s preferences regarding the land use in its conservation areas, economic considerations have generally been to the fore. In 1996 the Mozambican government granted a concession to Blanchart Mozambique Enterprises, an American corporation headed by multimillionaire James Blanchard. Blanchard intended to transform a 234,000 hectares area in Mozambique’s Maputoland region, including 60 miles of pristine beach along the Indian Ocean and the Maputo Elephant Reserve, into a safari theme park, and to import groups of Bushmen to reside in it.

This concession violated existing conservation arrangements in the area, including in the area of TBPAs. Mozambique had earlier agreed with South Africa to connect its Maputo Elephant Reserve with the South African Tuli Elephant reserve to create the Lubombo TBPA. Tempted by the millions of US dollars the planned ‘Mozambican Disneyland’ was alleged to generate in profits, the Mozambican government, which had obtained shares in the project from Blanchard, cancelled this agreement in favour of Blanchard’s plans with the area however (Turton and Church, 1999). It was only when the investments of Blanchard Mozambique Enterprises did not materialise that political support for the plan was withdrawn. The willingness of the Mozambican government to bypass existing conservation arrangements to generate ecotourism income indicates the political preferences for land use in conservation areas in Mozambique are structured by the financial – rather than conservation - gains a given approach is likely to generate.

Its interests in generating income from ecotourism have made Mozambique vulnerable to South African pressure. South Africa is Mozambique’s “largest foreign investor” (Standard Bank, 2004: 4), including in its tourism sector (De Vletter, Interview, 2003). The PPF’s access to major amounts of foreign funding further contributes to South Africa’s ability to influence decision-making in the Limpopo Park and Mozambique’s willingness to concede. The South African based PPF presents itself as a neutral party, which as an NGO is not really linked to any government (Myburgh, Interview, 2001). In reality, the policy priorities of the PPF
and DEAT overlap, with both parties adopting largely similar preservationist positions. Both DEAT and the PPF are against the residence of local communities in Coutada 16, for example, are trying to convince the Mozambican government to remove them from the area. The PPF's access to funding from the German Development Bank (KfW) and other funding and, linked to this, its direct involvement in the planning of the Limpopo Park, facilitated that the area be structured in line with the wishes of the PPF and DEAT.

The PPF obtained in 2002 a €6 million grant from the German government to develop Mozambique's Limpopo Park (Peace Parks Foundation, 2002). As the implementing agency of the KfW funding, the PPF obtained half of the four seats in the Limpopo Park's Project Steering Committee, which supervises its creation, alongside two officials from Mozambique's Ministry of Tourism. This endows it with a considerable say in the process. In addition, to receive the international funding accessed by the PPF the Mozambican government had to fulfil various conditions that promote a preservationist set up of the Limpopo Park. Firstly, in line with the PPF's wishes, the German KfW demanded that no hunting would be allowed in the Limpopo Park, thereby strengthening South Africa's position on this issue (Grossman, Interview, 2003). Secondly, a substantial part of the KfW funding has been allocated to the fencing of the Limpopo Park's eastern side. Finally, through the PPF, the KfW and the EU have together provided vast amounts of funding for the translocation of local communities in the Limpopo Park. The PPF also arranged major sponsorship for the elephant translocation ceremony in 2001 (see also Table 5.3). The KfW's request that no hunting be allowed in the Limpopo Park, coupled with the funding made available for fencing, elephant translocation and the removal of local communities, is likely to account considerably for Mozambican compliance with the South African demands for changes in land use in the Limpopo Park. The available sponsoring for these activities is likely to have made their execution attractive to the Mozambican government for financial reasons. The available funding also made it more difficult for the Mozambican government to resist South African pressure, on the grounds that the finances for the requested spatial adaptations in the Limpopo Park were lacking.
While, or perhaps because Mozambique has eventually complied with South African demands to change its land use, relations between Mozambique and South Africa have continued to be characterised by considerable tensions. Firstly, there remains considerable unhappiness in Mozambique over South African requests to relocate the local communities in the Limpopo Park, which although presented as a voluntary exercise is in reality considerably forced (Grossman, Interview, 2003; Norman, 2004). As outlined earlier, many Mozambicans feel that the moral ground to do is lacking, including government personnel (Anonymous Source DNFFB, Interview, 2002). Mozambican officials are also weary about emerging negative international publicity on the plight of its local communities in the Limpopo Park, fearing this might result in international tourist boycotts to the Park (Anonymous Source SANPs, Interview, 2003). The 2001 release of Kruger elephants into the Limpopo Park without local communities being consulted or warned has received considerable criticism. There existed and exists a realistic chance that some of the elephants would head to community settlements nearby the river to drink (Hall-Martin, 2001), which could damage local crops and endanger human lives. For this reason, the translocation of elephants into Mozambique has been criticised and portrayed as an irresponsible action by South African and other media (see for example Hylton, 2002; Twee Vandaag, 2004). Contested community relocation programmes are likely to further attract negative publicity, given that the negative social effects of these are likely to be more profound and durable (De Wet, 2002).

Secondly, the presence of a large number of South Africans on Mozambican soil is resented by some Mozambicans, who perceive it as “colonising behaviour” (Anonymous Source DEAT, Interview, 2002). The fact that most of the senior park officials in the Mozambican side of the Great Limpopo are South African Whites further adds to these feelings of discomfort. Combined with the eviction of native local communities from the area, the changing regime in the Limpopo Park is perceived by some as an introduction of apartheid to Mozambican soil.

---

13 As they already have in a documentary by 'Twee Vandaag' (2004), a Dutch news programme. Considering that the Dutch WWF and the Dutch National Lottery are main sponsors in the Great Limpopo, the results of this publicity may have significant effects.
Table 5.3... Major funding sources for the Great Limpopo

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Organisation</th>
<th>Amount in thousands of South African Rands(^{14})</th>
<th>Recipient Party</th>
<th>Purpose</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>KfW</td>
<td>65 000</td>
<td>PPF/Mozambique</td>
<td>Infrastructural development Limpopo Park</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>EU</td>
<td>65 000</td>
<td>Mozambique</td>
<td>Resettlement local communities</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Diverse NGOs</td>
<td>10</td>
<td>Mozambique</td>
<td>Demining in vicinity of Limpopo Park</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Absa Bank</td>
<td>10</td>
<td>PPF</td>
<td>Relocation of four elephant families</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>South African government</td>
<td>40</td>
<td>SANPs</td>
<td>Extension of tourism infrastructure in Kruger Park</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>IUCN, the World Bank, the Dutch WWF, NedBank</td>
<td>Over 100 each</td>
<td>South Africa/ Mozambique</td>
<td>Elephant translocation 2001</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>


Furthermore, a new area of friction might emerge. With the increased migration of South African wildlife into Mozambique through openings in the Kruger Park’s fence\(^ {15}\), the question arises who is responsible and will pay for damage caused by the presence of wildlife in inhabited areas in Mozambique close to the Limpopo Park. South African and Mozambican authorities already disagree over the origin of

\(^{14}\) One hundred South African Rands equalled on 22 December 2004 17.64 dollars. Please note that this list of funding sources for the Great Limpopo is far from exhaustive whilst the names of the donors for the funding that has been listed are not always given, as this information is not always freely available.

\(^{15}\) As outlined in Table 5.2, in December 2002 three openings were made in the Kruger Park’s fence to allow for wildlife migration. Much wildlife also enters Mozambique through other openings in the Kruger Park’s electrical fence, in which openings created by elephants or other animals are often no longer repaired (Collins, Interview, 2002).
undesired wildlife in communal areas in Mozambique, with each side accusing the other of having hosted the wild animals in question. According to Alfonso Madobe, head of conservation at Mozambique’s Ministry of Tourism, wandering wildlife from the Kruger Park killed Mozambican cattle and injured people in 2001, including in a suburb of capital Maputo (Iol, 2001). Kruger Park authorities denied, however, that this wildlife has come from the Kruger National Park, suggesting they escaped from a more nearby game sanctuary nearby Maputo instead (iOL, 2001). More recently, in 2004, migrating Kruger wildlife is alleged to have furthered the spread of veterinary diseases Mozambique’s Magude and Moamba regions (Agencia de Informacao de Mocambique, 2004). When the perceived migration of Kruger Park animals into inhabited parts of Mozambique further increases as a result of the wildlife corridors with the Kruger Park Mozambican anger over the damage caused by this wildlife is likely to grow. In this context, provincial or central government authorities in Mozambique may approach South Africa for compensation for the damage this wildlife incurs. Kruger Park authorities are unlikely to be willing to pay for damage in Mozambique caused by wildlife that may not have originated from the Kruger Park. Disagreements between South African and Mozambican authorities over the settlement of damage claims hence have the potential to become a growing source of contestation in the near future, and could further fuel Mozambican dissatisfaction with South Africa’s powerful position in the Great Limpopo.

5.2.5 South African/Zimbabwean relations in the Great Limpopo
While co-operation with Mozambique in the Great Limpopo has progressed, Mozambican-South African relations have become increasingly characterised by tensions and conflict. Zimbabwe has proved a “recalcitrant partner in the scheme”(Duffy, 1997: 446), but this has thus far little affected South African-Zimbabwean relations. The envisaged integration of the Gonarezhou Park to the Great Limpopo by means of the Sengwe corridor came to a de facto standstill. Contrary to what had been formally agreed, the Zimbabwean government failed to open formal consultations with the Sengwe community whose permission is required for the connection of the Sengwe Corridor. This made the Gonarezhou Park’s envisaged connection to the South African-Mozambican part of the Great Limpopo impossible. In the meantime illegal settlers moved into the Northern part of its Gonarezhou Park in 2001, “claiming the land as their natural birth right” (Nielsen and
Despite formal pledges of President Mugabe to remove these settlers to South Africa and Mozambique as soon as possible (Anonymous Source DEAT, Interview, 2001; Olver, Personal Communication, 2001\textsuperscript{16}), these settlements were de facto allowed, conforming to the general aims of Mugabe’s land reform programmes. Altogether, the political crisis in Zimbabwe has negatively affected conservation and tourism practices in Zimbabwe’s designated part of the Great Limpopo (Ferreira, 2004). Zimbabwean stakeholders also ceased to come to many workshop meetings on the Great Limpopo, often due to a lack of sponsorship to do so (Jones, Interview, 2002).

Zimbabwe’s negligence in following up its commitments to the Great Limpopo did not evoke substantial criticism or actions from DEAT or other major South African conservation authorities. DEAT and SANPs consistently maintained that the political crisis in Zimbabwe and the settlements in the Gonarezhou Park would not affect the Great Limpopo (Molefe, 2002: 5). Even after it had become clear that Mugabe did not follow up his promise to remove local communities from the Gonarezhou Park and other commitments towards the Great Limpopo, Zimbabwe’s position led to remarkably little friction with South Africa. Co-ordinators of TBPAs with Zimbabwe were merely told to just “go ahead without Zimbabwe” (Verhoef, Interview, 2002). This reflects how their wider geo-political interests may considerably shape the behaviour of states in TBPAs. Challenging pressure from powerful countries like the US and Great Britain, South African President Thabo Mbeki has been very reluctant to criticise Zimbabwe, a relatively influential state within SADC, for its controversial and violent land reforms and undemocratic practices. In accordance with South Africa’s overall non-confrontational ‘quiet diplomacy’ approach to Zimbabwe, this policy was applied to the area of TBPAs (Anonymous Source DEAT, Interview, 2002, Anonymous Source SANPs, Interview, 2002).

\textsuperscript{16} In an official response (11 July 2001) to a letter by a South African citizen, regarding her concerns that increased poaching levels in Zimbabwe would affect South Africa’s wildlife when the Kruger Park would be connected to the Gonarezhou Park, Director-General of DEAT Chrispian Olver refers to Mugabe’s assurances that local communities in the north of the Gonarezhou Park would be removed.
More recently, South Africa has however started to increase its demands that
Zimbabwe adheres to its earlier commitment to joining the Great Limpopo and put
the necessary infrastructure and procedures for community participation in place.
South Africa’s first priority in the Great Limpopo was to connect its Kruger Park with
Mozambique’s Limpopo Park. With this connection now being well under way, the
attention of South African tourism authorities now seems to be turning to the still
outstanding connection of the Gonarezhou Park into the Great Limpopo.\textsuperscript{17} If
Zimbabwe continues to follow up its commitments regarding the Great Limpopo, its
role in the Great Limpopo might receive increased criticism from South Africa.

It is not just in the area of the harmonisation of land use that tensions have arisen
between South Africa and its partner countries in the Great Limpopo. The sharing of
the Great Limpopo’s expected ecotourism benefits is also an important divisive
factor.

5.3 Tensions over the distribution of expected ecotourism benefits

5.3.1 Introduction

An equitable distribution of benefits can be identified as an important condition for
ongoing harmonious co-operation between countries in regional development
programmes (Kawango, 1998: 169). TBPAs are no exception, the equitable sharing of
benefits and costs being the bottom-line for the participating governments (Braack,
2002a: 16). South Africa and neighbouring countries differ considerably, however,
over what an ‘equitable’ sharing of benefits entails. South Africa argues that the
working of the free market as a main regulatory force will ensure that each country
can more or less equally profit from the TBPA. Linked to this, it argues that each
country should be entitled to keep the revenue from entrance fees to its own
individual part of the TBPA. On the basis of its dominant position on the Southern
African ecotourism market (Bennett, 2000), South Africa is however likely to benefit
disproportionally from a rise in ecotourism to Southern Africa’s TBPAs, unless there
are mechanisms in place that explicitly ensure an equal distribution of benefits. In
TBPAs, the joint sharing of entrance fees to the TBPA would be a main instrument to

\textsuperscript{17} The next section offers additional details.
do so. For this reason, Southern Africa’s neighbours generally contest South Africa’s position, demanding instead that the sum of entrance fees to the TBPA as a whole will be jointly shared. Struggles over the division of ecotourism benefits to the TBPA may be further fuelled by perceived South African attempts to further increase its competitive advantage over neighbouring countries through the creation of new infrastructure facilitating access to the TBPA from the South African side. Competition over the future ecotourism income from TBPAs has thus particularly characterised and affected co-operation in the Great Limpopo.

5.3.2. Southern Africa’s tourism sector and the Great Limpopo

An important motive for Mozambique and Zimbabwe to join the Great Limpopo, and to continue to support the initiative even after the TFCA concept had been replaced by a TFP concept against their wishes, has been the prospect that doing so would significantly increase their ecotourism benefits. However, Mozambique and Zimbabwe have grown weary that while they provide the bulk of land for the Great Limpopo, it will be mainly South Africa who will profit economically from its creation. South Africa maintains that the TBPA will considerably if not predominantly benefit Mozambique and Zimbabwe. However, its strong ecotourism industry combined with the fact that TBPAs are modelled on free market principles gives it indeed an important edge over its neighbours to access the ecotourism capital in TBPAs.

In a context where there exist considerable differences between countries in terms of capacity and economic and political power it is difficult to ensure the distribution of benefits along equal lines in regional co-operative programmes, as the more advanced country will be predisposed to taking the greatest share. This is certainly the case with the distribution of ecotourism benefits in the Great Limpopo. Whilst it seems fairly certain that South Africa will considerably benefit economically from increased ecotourism to the Limpopo borderland, it is far less certain whether this will also be the case for Mozambique and Zimbabwe. Tourist numbers to the Kruger Park are expected to significantly rise on the basis of the TBPA concept, with tourists now being offered the opportunity to explore a bigger wildlife area, which includes several countries. This is reflected in the following statements of Valli Moosa (quoted in Keenan, 2000: 10):
Two jets a day that's what Virgin Atlantic's Richard Branson says he will need to cater for the massive tourist demand generated by a greater Kruger National Park stretching east into Mozambique and north into Zimbabwe.

In the long term, the creation of the Great Limpopo TFCA would moreover allow for a more diversified tourism package, in which not only parks feature, but also Mozambique’s beaches alongside the Indian Ocean. This ‘parks & beaches’ package is likely to attract more tourism to the Kruger National Park, offering tourists the opportunity to combine their ‘safari experience’ in Kruger with relaxing on the beach or exploring marine biodiversity in adjacent Mozambique (Nicholson, Interview, 2001).

Certainly in the initial stages before tourism infrastructure in the Limpopo and Gonarezhou Parks can be built or significantly extended, Mozambique and Zimbabwe are unlikely to experience a similar rise in tourists directly to their parts of the Great Limpopo. However, South Africa argues that its world-famous Kruger Park can in the early stages function as a springboard for increased tourism to all parts of the Great Limpopo. Once the TBPA is operational, Kruger Park visitors are expected to cross the boundaries into Mozambique’s Limpopo Park and Zimbabwe’s Gonarezhou Park. On these premises, South Africa argues that an increase in tourism to its Kruger Park would benefit the Limpopo borderland as a whole.

These expected spill-over effects, in terms of tourists crossing the boundary, are little contested by Mozambique and Zimbabwe, and underpin their desire for co-operation in the TBPA. However, these countries question the extent in which they can economically benefit from such an influx in ecotourism to their territories. With tourism facilities being more developed in South Africa, tourists may prefer to be based in that country, and enter the Mozambican and Zimbabwean parts of the TBPA for just a day trip (Schoon, 2004: 19). In such a scenario they would spend most of their money on the South African side. This would mean that the creation of the Great Limpopo would significantly benefit South Africa, by allowing it to attract more sojourning tourists to its Kruger Park, but far less so Mozambique and Zimbabwe.
Initially, this prospect raised few tensions between South Africa and its partner countries. Mozambique and Zimbabwe implicitly assumed that entrance fees to the individual parts of the Great Limpopo would be all added up and then equally shared, as South Africa had done with Botswana in the Kgalagadi Park (Modishe, Interview, 2002; Van Amerom, 2002). This would ensure that Mozambique and Zimbabwe would obtain a substantial amount of the ecotourism income generated in the Great Limpopo, even if a rise in ecotourism to the Great Limpopo would disproportionately benefit the Kruger Park. An increase in tourism to the Kruger Park with spill-over effects in the wider area of the Great Limpopo was therefore seen as creating a ‘win-win’ situation for all.

5.3.3 Competition over future park revenues

In the Great Limpopo, South Africa has however successfully maintained its position that each country would be entitled to keep its own revenues. Its lack of willingness to compromise in this area is considerably motivated by the fact that the Kruger Park is the region’s most profitable tourist destination. Furthermore, whilst economic relations between Botswana and South Africa are relatively equal, in Southern Africa’s other TBPAs South Africa is by far the most dominant economic player. This provides it with considerable leverage in negotiating the distribution of ecotourism benefits.

Amidst the conservation areas that comprise the Great Limpopo, South Africa’s Kruger Park is by far the most profitable of all, attracting almost one million visitors annually. Mozambique’s Limpopo Park and Zimbabwe’s Gonarezhou Park attract less than 15,000 visitors per annum between them annually (Fakir, 2003: 18). The Kruger Park’s popularity as a tourism destination has been the result of “100 years worth of infrastructure” (Fakir, 2003: 18), whereas Mozambique and Zimbabwe have thus far hardly invested in tourism facilities on their sides of the Great Limpopo. With reference to these differences South Africa argued that it would be unfair if it had to share two-thirds of its Kruger Park’s income with Mozambique and Zimbabwe. Much to Mozambique’s and Zimbabwe’s dismay, South Africa insisted

18 The information ascribed to Fakir (2003) in this paragraph was provided in an editorial footnote in Fakir’s article by L.E.O. Braack (see Braack et al., 2003).
that “revenues should accrue based on the number of visitors to each component area” (Fakir, 2003: 18) and that each part of the TBPA would be responsible for their own investments and profit making. Arguing from free-market premises, South Africa furthermore maintained that this starting-point would give Mozambique and Zimbabwe an important incentive to create visitor attractions on their sides of the Great Limpopo (Fakir, 2003: 18), thereby speeding up the development of the TBPA.

However, even if Mozambique and Zimbabwe would successfully develop tourism facilities on their side of the Great Limpopo and attract substantial tourism, chances are that much of the income generated by ecotourism on their territories would leak back to South Africa. Its dominant position on the regional tourism market, coupled with the fact that TBPA s are modelled on free market principles, gives South Africa an important edge over its neighbours to earn from ecotourism in TBPA s, even in adjacent territory. As is the case for most developing countries (Duffy, 2002), the tourism sector in Southern Africa, with the exception of South Africa, is largely in foreign hands. However, unlike most developing countries in Southern Africa it is not so much Western companies that own the major tourism lodges and are amongst the main tour operators in the country, but South African ones. This is particularly the case in Swaziland, Lesotho and, since the mid 1990s, also increasingly Mozambique. With the ending of apartheid in South Africa, the return of peace to the region and the opening up of Mozambique to the free market, South African tourism businesses have started to steadily develop and exploit Mozambique’s ecotourism potential, in the process often damaging Mozambique’s natural environment (Culverwell, Interview, 2001; Spenceley, Interview, 2001). Although Zimbabwe’s tourism sector is more nationally owned, a considerable part is nevertheless in South African hands.

In the absence of foreign investors, South African companies are likely to successfully claim the Limpopo National Park as new operational terrain, with tacit support of the South African government (Rupert, Interview, 2002). With the commercial sale of tenders in the Great Limpopo being regulated through free competition, chances are that the majority of these contracts will end up in the hands of powerful South African ‘big business’. This could include areas now serviced by Zimbabwean or Mozambican national or local businesses (Munthali and Soto, 2001: 24-25; Fakir, 2003: 20). The fact that existing contracts with regard to ecotourism
operations in these areas may be cancelled in favour of new arrangements in the Great Limpopo increases this risk. The Mozambican government suspended the trophy hunting operations organised by Gaza Safari LtD, which it had awarded a 15 years lease to undertake trophy hunting in Coutada 16 in 1996, shortly before the signing of the Agreement of establishing the Great Limpopo TFP in 2000 (Munthali and Soto, 2001: 25). It has been suggested that the cancellation of the contract with Gaza Safari LtD was an outcome of South African pressure (Anonymous Source SANPs, Interview, 2002). Gaza Safari is specialised in commercial hunting, but has expressed its willingness to adapt its profile to solely cater for ‘game viewing’ tourists. It now demands a monopoly to develop or outsource tourism activities in the Limpopo Park (Munthali and Soto, 2001: 25). On the other hand, foreign businesses can often only obtain governmental permission to do business in Mozambique after they have established partnerships with Mozambican firms. That way, Mozambique’s private sector could still benefit from the Great Limpopo, even when major South African firms obtained the majority of the available tenders. The Mozambican businesses selected for such partnerships tend to be those with close ties to Mozambique’s political elite however, within which there are in turn several competing factions. Consequently while privatisation and commercial ventures in the Great Limpopo might benefit some Mozambican interests groups, at the same time this might harm the economic interests of others by diminishing their ability to economically exploit the area by means of ecotourism.

An altogether different scenario is also possible. In spite of great optimism, the Great Limpopo has had considerable problems attracting private sector investment with companies adopting a ‘wait and see attitude’ (Braack, Interview, 2001; Munthali and Soto, 2001). It is not unlikely that the private sector will invest in the part of the TFP that offers maximum security and returns to their investments, which is generally perceived to be the South African side (Munthali and Soto, 2001: 24). Investors have been worried about the presence of firearms amongst local communities in the Limpopo Park (Sanwild, 2004) and generally shun Zimbabwe because of its political and economic crisis. A concentration of investments on the South African side would
severely diminish the opportunities for Mozambique and Zimbabwe to exploit the ecotourism potential of their areas in the Great Limpopo.\footnote{On the other hand, Mozambique has attracted considerable donor funding to help finance the upgrading of the Limpopo Park. Part of this finance could be used for road creation and other measures likely to improve the attractiveness of the area as a site for investment by private companies keen to exploit its eco tourism potential. This will take considerable time however.}

Considering the characteristics of the Southern African tourism market, it would appear that Mozambique and Zimbabwe stand to gain relatively little from their participation in the Great Limpopo, compared to South Africa. This will be particularly the case in the short term, when their investment costs may still be higher than their returns from ecotourism, as the latter will take its time to develop. In such a scenario the “disadvantaged partner states may feel that their parks are merely complementing the business of the most developed park” (Munthali and Soto, 2001: 24), which is likely to raise significant tensions and reduce their willingness to continue to co-operate. In this context, South African activities that improve tourism access to the Great Limpopo from South Africa have become contested.

Attempts by South Africa to facilitate tourism access to its side of the Great Limpopo has added for many Mozambican and Zimbabwean participants to their suspicions that South Africa seeks to and will benefit the most from the creation of the Great Limpopo, even at the expense of its ‘partners’. South African plans in 2001 to extend its Nelspruit Airport, located closely to the Kruger Park, were viewed with suspicion by Mozambique and Zimbabwe, who saw these plans as confirmation that South Africa sought to further improve its competitive advantage on the tourism market over Mozambique and Zimbabwe. Direct and frequent flights from Johannesburg International Airport can land at the Skukuza Airport within the Kruger Park and at the larger Hoedspruit International Airport further north of the Kruger Park (see Figure 5.2). Private games reserves in the Sabi Sand Reserve to the west of the Kruger Park, such as the Mala Mala Reserve (indicated by ‘black huts’ in the centre of the map displayed in Figure 5.2) also have airstrips where flights from Johannesburg land (Go2Africa.com, 2003).
As such, the Kruger Park can be reached relatively easy by air from within South Africa. Until 2003, it was however not possible to fly directly to the Kruger Park from Europe or other regions where many of the future international tourists of the Great Limpopo are likely to reside. This situation opened up considerable opportunities for Maputo International Airport, located close to the Great Limpopo, to try and become a main entry gate for international tourists to the Great Limpopo.

![Figure 5.2: International airports nearby the Kruger Park’s southern part](http://mala-mala.go2africa.com/mala-mala-reserve/mala_mala_travel.asp)

It has the advantage of being closely located to the Great Limpopo, and, unlike South Africa’s major international airport, Johannesburg International Airport, it did not have a troublesome reputation. Upgrading Maputo airport would take considerable time however. It has only one international flight connection, notably with Lisbon, whilst investors to upgrade the airport still had to be found. Considering the limited capacity of the Maputo airport, and the time needed to expand it, the creation of a major South African international airport nearby by the Kruger Park was likely to vitally harm the prospects for Maputo Airport to position itself as the Great Limpopo’s major international ‘air gate’ (Awkright, Interview, 2001; De Vletter, Interview, 2001).

---

20 Which some international tourists seek to avoid, on the basis of Johannesburg’s reputation as the ‘murder capital’.
In this context, South African plans in 2001 to modernise and extend its Nelspruit Airport, located relatively closely to the Kruger Park, were not received very well by Mozambique, which accused its partner of seeking to undermine its economic opportunities in the Great Limpopo. South Africa claimed, however, that the plans for an extension of its Nelspruit Airport had been on the agenda for a long time, were unconnected to the Great Limpopo and would not affect Mozambique’s ability to generate tourism. Moreover, South Africa eventually abandoned its plans to modernise and extend Nelspruit airport, and even downgraded it to a domestic airport. This action little appeased Mozambique however. This was because instead of extending the Nelspruit Airport, South Africa had decided to build a brand new international airport even closer in the vicinity of the Kruger Park: The Kruger-Mpumalanga International Airport (PMG, 2003), which opened on 20 January 2003. A major aim of its creation is to enable tourists from Europe to fly directly to the Great Limpopo (Rupert, Interview, 2002; Ramutsindela, 2004: 68), the same market as Maputo Airport had hoped to generate tourism from. Consequently, the creation of the Kruger-Mpumalanga Airport is likely to have caused even more friction with Mozambique than an extension of the Nelspruit Airport, whose creation is not linked to the Great Limpopo and which is located less close to the TBPA, would ever have done.

An equal distribution of park revenue would significantly counter Mozambican and Zimbabwean fears that South Africa would benefit the most from the Great Limpopo and reduce anger over perceived attempts of South Africa to ensure such an outcome. It would ensure that Mozambique and Zimbabwe could reap substantial benefits from their participation in the Limpopo Park, even in the initial stage before investments in their ecotourism infrastructure would pay off. It is for this reason that Mozambique and Zimbabwe have not fully abandoned their claims on an equal distribution of park revenue. Mozambique and Zimbabwe have de facto accepted South Africa’s policy position since 2001, when conflicts with South Africa regarding the sharing of park revenue first arose. It is noticeable, however, that procedures regarding the sharing of ecotourism revenue are absent in the Great Limpopo’s Treaty (Government of the Republic of Mozambique, 2002), even though the need for these was recognised at an early stage in the process (Anon.b, 2000). This signifies that South Africa and Mozambique and Zimbabwe continue to disagree over the division of entrance fees to
the TBPA. South Africa is unlikely to comprise however. It now legitimises its position by pointing to the fact that Mozambique does not adhere to an equal division of costs and benefits of operations either. Mozambique has received substantial amounts of aid for the development of the Limpopo Park, which it does not intend to share with its partner countries in the great Limpopo (see also Table 5.3). South Africa, on the contrary, has to bear the costs of ecotourism development on its side of the Great Limpopo largely by itself. Furthermore, Kruger Park staff has provided Mozambican colleagues over the boundary with expertise, equipment and wildlife for free. South Africa maintains on this basis that Mozambique already benefits substantially from its participation in the Great Limpopo, without having made major investments. Many Mozambican stakeholders in the Great Limpopo argue, however, that this assistance promotes South Africa’s conservation and ecotourism needs as least as much as Mozambique’s, if not more (Grossman, Interview, 2001; Vieira, Interview, 2002).

In the disagreements over the sharing of costs and benefits regarding ecotourism development in the Great Limpopo Zimbabwe has also increasingly become targeted. As indicated in section 5.2.5, Zimbabwe has not followed up its commitments towards the Great Limpopo, which for long attracted little criticism from South Africa. However, Zimbabwe’s failure to create the necessary tourism facilities in and enable tourism access to its Gonarezhou Park seems to be increasingly contested by its partners. South African and Mozambican tourism authorities recently criticised Zimbabwe for its lack of commitment to co-operate and help fulfil the TBPA’s ecotourism promise. Zimbabwe argues, however, that it as very limited funds to do so, as most international donors have shunned Zimbabwe since President’s Mugabe contested land reform policies (Jonga, Interview, 2002). On the other hand, Zimbabwean tourism authorities claim that despite these obstacles a start has been made with road development, electrification and an extension of communication facilities, to facilitate the attraction of private sector involvement and investment in extending tourism facilities in the Gonarezhou Park (Chikanga, 2004). Investment security is an important consideration for any investor. In this context, it is questionable to what extent this is a realistic prospect (Warner, Interview, 2002). Zimbabwe’s tourism numbers have steadily declined as a result of its political crisis and there are still no linkages in place between the Gonarezhou Park and the
Mozambican and South African parts of the Great Limpopo. This makes it unlikely that the Gonarezhou Park will in the nearby future become a main entry route to the Great Limpopo. With Mozambique and South Africa seeming to fear that Zimbabwean inability to successfully market Gonarezhou as part of the TBPA will limit tourism to the TBPA as a whole, such a development could increase tensions with its partner countries.

5.4 Alienation of local communities

The creation of TBPAs has important implications for local communities residing in or around TBPAs. This has certainly been the case with the Great Limpopo. Resistance against the Park at a local level is growing, because the park has thus far little involved and benefited local communities, contrary to rhetoric that local communities would be key actors in and the main beneficiaries of the creation of this TBPA. Community participation has merely been a form of window-dressing (Mayoral-Philips, 2001; Steenkamp and Grossman, 2001; Draper and Wels, 2002; Hughes, 2002; Refugee Research Project, 2002). To facilitate community participation, community forums, one per country, would represent the needs and wishes of local communities living in or nearby the Great Limpopo. However, for long such a community forum was only in place on the South African side. Moreover, the powers of this community forum have been significantly limited by the fact that their advice and permission does not need to be obtained prior to decision-making in the TBPA (Van Amerom and Büscher, 2005). Moreover, community forum leaders frequently obtain details concerning governmental plans and activities in the Great Limpopo at the last moment. This further limits their possibilities to influence the decision-making process (Nkatini, Interview, 2001). In addition, not all community groups feel that the forum, which represents many different ethnic groups, adequately represents their needs. This is particularly the case for the Makuleke. Although they are landowners in the TBPA, the Makuleke are only represented in the ‘common’ community forum. However, the Makuleke often have

21 Mozambique has one since 2004.

22 The Makuleke own 22 000 hectares in the northern part of the Kruger Park, in an area between the Levuvhu and Limpompo Rivers, known as the Pafuri Triangle which they manage jointly with SANPs.
on the basis of their differing attachment to the Great Limpopo different interests than neighbouring communities in its creation and operation (Makuleke, Interview, 2001). For this reason, they demanded a place in the Great Limpopo’s Technical Committee, which DEAT declined.23

In addition, and perhaps more importantly, the argument that local communities would economically benefit from the Great Limpopo, in the form of a share in ecotourism income and/or increased employment, has not materialised. Contrary to expectations, the Great Limpopo is still not operational. It is also doubtful if and to what extent local communities could really benefit from a rise in tourism to the Park in the future. For one thing, the income needs to be divided among many people. An estimated six million people live in the areas bordering the Kruger Park to its south and west alone. This makes it difficult for any financial benefits flowing back to local communities to truly make a difference, although carefully targeted allocation and spending might be able to make a local difference to selected groups. Furthermore, it has become increasingly recognised that the initial estimates that the Great Limpopo would generate millions of tourism dollars to be used to promote local development and job creation were overly optimistic (Spenceley, Interview, 2001). Local communities are furthermore not legally entitled to a specific share of the Great Limpopo’s ecotourism income, which significantly affects their power to negotiate access to revenues (Collins, Interview, 2001). Privatisation policies in the TBPA may furthermore undermine employment prospects. For example, in 2001 660 employees were retrenched as part of the Kruger Park’s privatisation strategies (Wildnet Africa 2001). The majority of them were unskilled workers from neighbouring communities (Themba, Interview 2001). In an area where there is not much opportunity for other employment, the impact of these job cuts has been considerable. Having been promised or envisaged access to significant amounts of tourism income and jobs as a result of the Park’s creation, a growing number of local community members living in the Kruger Park’s vicinity feel betrayed (Peddle et al., 2003).

23 Faxed letter of DEAT Director-General Crispian Olver to Mrs. D. Gilfillan (Legal Resources Centre, Johannesburg), the legal representative of the Makuleke Community (29 August 2001).
 Altogether, for the local population, the economic advantages of the TBPA do not appear so great. “Living with wildlife” (Kiss, 1990) often incurs significant costs for community members, with wildlife damaging crops or killing cattle, whilst human lives may also be under threat (Themba, 2001). Moreover, the Park prevents community members from accessing and using natural resources within the Park such as water and wood or will do so in the near future (Riri, Interview, 2001; Erasmus, 2003). As such, the conservation objectives of a TBPA may considerably undermine prospects for local development. In the meantime, most of the funding generated for its creation has been spent on translocating wildlife or building park infrastructure. As a result of the lack of community consultation and tangible economic benefits local support for the TBPA is steadily decreasing (Erasmus, 2003; Grossman, Interview, 2003, Metcalfe, 2003).

Not surprisingly this is particularly the case in Mozambique. The proclamation of the Limpopo National Park, the influx of elephants in their communal areas without advance warnings, and the fence cutting ceremony (see Table 5.1) all took place without prior consultation of the local communities that reside in the Limpopo Park. Furthermore, they now face eviction from their lands. Whilst they have been promised considerable benefits in return, these may not fully compensate for the suffered loss of land. In a country with one of the world’s worst corruption records in Africa (Gastrow and Mossem, 2002), compensation funds may not even reach these communities. Whilst protests have thus far been limited in scale, and subtle in nature, local resistance might in future increasingly obstruct the Park (Migdal, 1974). At one local meeting, several leading community members proposed to block the roads with burning logs to prevent park vehicles getting access. ‘Everyday resistance’ such as theft and poaching also increased (Norman, 2004).

Growing local resistance against the Great Limpopo constitutes a main threat to its development perspectives. Considering that tourists are generally wary of visiting places with low levels of security (Peddle et al., 2003), armed local resistance in Mozambique could significantly affect the Great Limpopo’s ecotourism prospects. On the South African side, growing dissatisfaction amongst the Makuleke with the TBPA could prove a major obstacle. The Makuleke have considerable legal opportunities to try and withdraw their land from the TBPA (Gilfillan, Interview,
It is not unthinkable that they may choose to do this. In addition to concerns that their rights are insufficiently represented, the Makuleke have been dissatisfied with the assistance they receive from SANPs to develop their part of the future TBPA. For example, in 2001 their area was excluded from overall road reconstruction works that were undertaken in the Kruger Park, after severe floods damaged the northern part of the Park (Chitepo, Interview, 2001). An attempted withdrawal by the Makuleke from the TBPA would have major consequences for the creation of the TBPA or its operation, as their Pafuri Triangle connects the Kruger Park with Mozambique's Limpopo Park.

Similar areas of conflict as those discussed with regard to the Great Limpopo may also surface in Southern Africa's other designated TBPAs.

5.5. Land harmonisation and distribution of ecotourism income in other TBPAs

It is not just in the Great Limpopo TBPA that South Africa's conservation regimes and preferences differ from those of neighbouring countries. Whilst thus far conflicts over land harmonisation have been most pronounced in the Great Limpopo, the potential for these in other TBPAs with inhabited parts seems considerable. Powerful South African environmental bodies such as SANPs, the PPF and DEAT\textsuperscript{24} generally argue that the protection of landscape and wildlife should be central, as these natural assets allegedly constitute the main attraction for tourists (Van der Waldt, Interview, 2002). The case study of the Great Limpopo indicates that this position is likely to result in South African demands for a resettlement of local communities where they reside in adjacent territory designated to join a TBPA with South Africa. Problematically, this is the case on the Lesotho side of the Maluti/Drakensberg, whilst in the Lubombo TBPA the Shewula community resides on the Swazi side. Finally, as

\textsuperscript{24} Sometimes supported in this position by international conservation NGOs, as is the case with the IUCN in the Maluti/Drakensberg.
a result of land invasions on the Zimbabwean side in the Limpopo/Shashe there are now many illegal settlements on that side of the TBPA.\textsuperscript{25}

On the other hand, these TBPAs are designated as TFCAs, which allow for multiple land use and the residence of local communities in TBPAs. In practice, the division between a TFP and a TFCA in terms of land use may be loosely applied, including in TBPAs without wildlife corridors. As the preceding case study of the Great Limpopo indicated, the creation of wildlife corridors may be a key instigator for demands for land use harmonisation favouring a preservationist approach. For example, South African conservation parties involved in the Maluti/Drakensberg campaign for a removal of local communities on the Lesotho side, whose residence is seen to endanger the delicate eco system of the area (Derwent et al., 2001; Warner, Interview, 2002). The creation of Lesotho’s first National Park, the Sehlabathebe Park, in January 2002 in the area, is seen as a major first step to achieve this goal.

Moreover, the set up of TBPAs in Southern Africa aim for and require relatively far-reaching forms of integration between countries, unlike for example TBPAs in the Northern Hemisphere, which tend to be separately managed. As Table 5.4 demonstrates, the creation of TBPAs can involve several levels of integration. Although it is important to acknowledge that there may be significant differences in administration and management between TBPAs, Peace Parks in Southern Africa generally fall into the most far-reaching categories (levels 4 and 5 in Table 5.4), because joint administration and management is aspired. While countries officially maintain their sovereignty over their territory,\textsuperscript{26} the notion of joint management clearly enables a country to discuss and demand chances in the land use in the territory of their neighbours, especially when the country in question is more powerful than its counterpart(s).

\textsuperscript{25} This however unlikely to raise conflict in the short term since Zimbabwe’s participation in this TBPA has been halted for an unforeseen period due to the political and economic crisis in that country (Verhoef, Interview, 2002). Given that no communities reside on the Namibian side of the Ai-Ais/Richtersveld, this issue is also unlikely to play a role in that TBPA.

\textsuperscript{26} The Great Limpopo Treaty stresses for example how: “the sovereign rights of each party shall be respected… and no party shall impose decisions on an other” (Government of Mozambique, 2002: 8).
On the other hand, in the TBPAs discussed above, the resettlement of local communities may put less stress on inter-governmental relations than in the Great Limpopo. Swaziland has strict conservation laws in place whilst the Lesotho government is also considerably inclined to adopt a preservationist stand, partially because it is keen to maximise ecotourism benefits from the area (Groenewald, Interview, 2002; Sandwith, Interview, 2002). At the same time, Swaziland, as an absolute monarchy, has a very different governmental system than South Africa. This could lead to conflicts over user rights in TBPAs (Van Amerom, 2002), with the special hunting rights of Swaziland's royal household being unacceptable to South Africa in relation to the international agreement on the TBPA. Furthermore, Lesotho fiercely resists South African meddling with its affairs (see also Chapter 8), which could complicate the harmonisation of land use, as this usually involves some ceding of sovereignty (Van Amerom, 2002). Conflicts over land harmonisation in Southern Africa's other planned TBPAs may, as in the Great Limpopo, be added to or reinforced by conflicts over the sharing of ecotourism between the states involved. The absence of procedures to regulate the distribution of park revenue in these TBPAs hint that the sharing of ecotourism benefits constitutes, as in the Great Limpopo, a contested issue between South Africa and neighbouring countries.
Table 5.4 Possible levels of co-operation between internationally adjoining protected areas

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Phases of transboundary interactions</th>
<th>Levels of co-operation between internationally adjoining protected areas</th>
<th>Characteristics of each co-operation level</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>0. No co-operation</td>
<td>- Hostile or conflict situation</td>
<td>- No communication</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Information exchange</td>
<td>1. Communication</td>
<td>- Sharing information</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>- Communications between administrators</td>
<td>- Low-level meetings</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>- Possibly the duty to notify re: actions which might have transborder effects</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Mutual consultation</td>
<td>2. Consultation</td>
<td>- Both sides agree to consult the other on set items</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>- Duty to consult re: potential transborder threats</td>
<td>- Consultation before action</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Active collaboration</td>
<td>3. Collaboration</td>
<td>- Regular meetings</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>- Programmatic co-operation such as joint research, search &amp; rescue, tourist facilities</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Harmonisation of planning</td>
<td>4. Co-ordination</td>
<td>- Participating countries acknowledge ecosystem as a single unit</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>- Equal levels of protection for both/all protected areas</td>
<td>- Joint Advisory Committee</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>- Co-ordination of planning between the two protected areas</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Integration of planning</td>
<td>5. Full co-operation/International ecosystem-based management</td>
<td>- Co-ordinated management</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>- Joint protected area protection</td>
<td>- Joint long-range planning for two protected areas/ecosystem as a unit</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

*Source: Based on Zbicz (1999: 138).*
5.6 Conclusion

Through a case-study of the Great Limpopo, this chapter has indicated that whilst a key motivating factor underpinning their co-operation in Peace Parks, the joint pursuit of sustainable development in TBPAs may cause considerable tensions between South Africa and neighbouring states. The increased interdependency that TBPAs create by promoting transboundary flows of wildlife and tourists through increased cross-border infrastructural connections increases the stakes that countries have in the administration and spatial organisation of the territory of their neighbours. Where the latter does not fit a given state’s agenda, it may try and influence the spatial organisation or administration of neighbouring territory. This will be particularly the case when one of the countries involved is significantly more powerful, as is the case with South Africa within Southern Africa. However, South Africa’s neighbouring states will generally resist such intervention attempts because of vested interests in the land use that is in place and to protect their sovereignty. Even where they do comply with South Africa’s wishes, South African pressure to follow certain pathways is likely to cause considerable resentment.

Conflicts over the distribution of ecotourism income in TBPAs further increase the likelihood that the pursuit of socio-economic development through Peace Parks becomes a source of conflict between South Africa and neighbouring countries. An important reason for the continued participation of South Africa’s neighbouring countries in Peace Parks, in spite of perceived South African dominance of the process, is the prospect that joining their conservation areas with South African ones will considerably raise their ecotourism prospects. As the country whose ecotourism base is already well developed, including in its conservation areas in borderlands, it would harm South Africa’s interests to share its ecotourism on an equal basis with neighbouring countries however, for which reason it is unwilling to do so. This policy position is however highly contested by South Africa’s neighbours for whom it is difficult to start generating substantial ecotourism benefits from TBPAs if they cannot share in the ecotourism income generated on the South African side. An important underlying reason is that the majority of tourists are likely to mainly sojourn in South Africa as a result of its superior tourism facilities and tourism access to the TBPA. Furthermore, a considerable amount of the ecotourism income that is generated on the
territories of South Africa’s neighbouring countries is likely to leak back to South Africa, whose businesses dominate the regional tourism market. If TBPAs will, contrary to the pan-Africanist rhetoric surrounding the Southern African Peace Parks project, exacerbate economic differences between South Africa and neighbouring countries, struggles over the sharing of ecotourism are likely to continue. When already connected to the TBPA in terms of infrastructure and tourism investments, withdrawal will be costly for countries, although this is possible in legal terms. Another layer of complexity is added by the fact that local communities have also been promised a share in the economic benefits of TBPAs. Especially where communities have had to vacate their land, or where they cannot use it as they please, failure to ensure that they substantially share in ecotourism income introduces the risks that TBPAs will lack local support and that they could be undermined ‘from below’. Problematically, optimistic estimates regarding the millions of income that TBPAs would allegedly attract and their employment options are increasingly recognised as being exaggerated whilst thus far most of the funding donated to TBPAs has been used for conservation purposes, rather than local development. This induces TBPAs with considerable conflict potential.27

The pursuit of open boundaries, the second main policy area of TBPAs, may considerably add to or aggravate inter-state conflicts in TBPAs. Initially presented as a binding element, the pursuit of more open boundaries has increasingly become a divisive factor between South Africa and neighbouring countries, adding to existing sentiments that South Africa is trying to play ‘Big Brother’. It may furthermore fuel local resistance against TBPAs. The next chapter explores this issue.

27 This prospect is explored in more depth in the thesis’s General Conclusions.
6: Peace Parks and Border Politics

6.1 Introduction
This chapter discusses the political aspects of the pursuit of open boundaries between South Africa and neighbouring countries within their TBPAs. As indicated in Chapter Two, Southern Africa’s Peace Parks were widely expected to “bring down the fences” (Michler, 2003), to create “unimpeded movement of animals and people… across previous “no-go” international boundaries” (Peddle et al., 2003). The pursuit of more open boundaries in Southern Africa’s TBPAs was initially perceived as a process promoting increased regional integration and better relations between South Africa and neighbouring countries. As noted in the preceding chapter, unimpeded cross-border access for wildlife and tourists in TBPAs is expected to increase the economic benefits that South Africa and neighbouring countries can derive from ecotourism in their borderlands. More open boundaries could also assist in intensifying social ties between these countries through the co-operation involved and by allowing for the “reunification” of ethnic communities in borderlands which are now distributed over two or more Southern African countries (Hanks, 2002: 31).

Drawing upon pan Africanist notions, the pursuit of more open boundaries in Peace Parks was initially presented as a relatively straightforward process. Proponents of Peace Parks emphasised the ‘artificial’ nature of Southern Africa’s boundaries (Hughes, 2003; see also section 2.8) that were drawn up in colonial times and their disruptive impacts upon social and economic flows in the region. With the ending of hostilities between South Africa and neighbouring countries in the post-apartheid era, political obstacles to the pursuit of open boundaries in Southern Africa seemed to have vanished. The pursuit of open boundaries in TBPAs was hence envisaged as a project that could occur within a relatively short time span. South Africa’s Minister of Environmental Affairs & Tourism (Moosa) voiced this optimism, for example, when he announced in 2000 that the Great Limpopo’s fences could be dropped as early as 2002 (Moosa quoted in Keenan, 2000). This has, however, not proved possible.

As a result of its differing economic and political positioning in the region, South Africa’s interests in boundary management in TBPAs often differ considerably from
those of its neighbours. As the country which suffers most from cross-border crime, it does not always serve South Africa’s security interests to remove fences and customs posts along the international boundary to the TBPA’s outskirts, to allow for free cross-border traffic within the TBPA. Coupled with the increased cross-border infrastructural connections that TBPAs promote such an action could promote a sharp rise in crime in and through the borderland. South Africa may hence want to maintain the boundary fence in TBPAs where this risk is prominent. These differing priorities regarding boundary management in TBPAs can cause friction between South Africa and its partner countries in TBPAs, when the latter continue to adhere to the creation of free cross-border access within the TBPA, as a means to stimulate its ecotourism industry. South Africa’s interests in containing cross-border crime may also induce or reinforce (see previous chapter) South African interference in the spatial organisation of the territory of its neighbour. Such a development will usually further strain relations with the neighbouring state. It is not always South Africa that may have an interest in keeping the boundary relatively closed however.

South Africa’s neighbouring states, and especially those with significant economic interests in the export of red meat, may also be wary about removing boundary fences and customs posts. Where these serve as important veterinary disease checks, a removal of boundary fences could result in a transmission of wildlife diseases through the influx of South African infected wildlife. This reluctance to remove boundary fences out of concern for veterinary disease transmission could produce strife in instances where South Africa is eager to remove internal boundary fences to create wildlife corridors.

In addition to creating new conflict, the pursuit of more open boundaries in Southern Africa by means of Peace Parks may also reinforce existing tensions, in areas where the boundary location is contested. Countries with territorial claims on South Africa may seek to use the negotiations on boundary management in a TBPA as a means to raise renewed claims for a re-alignment of the boundary in their favour. The strategic interests of states usually preside over environmental and economic interests in TBPAs (Van Amerom, 2002), for which reason South Africa is unlikely to agree to adapt the boundary, however.
Altogether, the pursuit of more open border policies in Peace Parks can easily evoke friction and conflict. This will especially be the case when in mediating these conflicting interests in boundary management, South Africa’s interests dominate. Where this is the case, resistance in neighbouring countries against South Africa’s perceived Big Brother role in TBPA creation is likely to increase. Linked to this, it seems important that South Africa continues to refrain from pressuring neighbouring states to open their boundaries where they are reluctant to do so. With boundaries symbolising a state’s independence from a neighbouring state, such interference is politically very sensitive. On the other hand, failure to create open boundaries may increase local resistance against TBPAs, since the promised uninhibited cross-border access in TBPAs is often highly important – in social and economic terms – for local communities in borderlands. Given these conflicting interests in boundary management in TBPAs, arrangements over boundary management are likely to generate conflict, in whatever form it is pursued.

To understand the precise nature of the tensions and conflicts that the pursuit of more open boundary policies in Peace Parks can lead to, it is useful to familiarise ourselves more with the changes that Peace Parks seek to introduce to Southern Africa’s border landscapes. To this end, the next section explores some key characteristics of Southern Africa’s borderlands while the section following provides an insight into the changes that Peace Parks seek to introduce. After this, some of the security dilemmas raised by the creation of TBPAs are discussed. The fourth section considers how these security dilemmas have affected the behaviour of South Africa and neighbouring states regarding the pursuit of more open boundaries in TBPAs and with what consequences for their relations. This leads to a discussion of how outstanding boundary disputes between South Africa and neighbouring countries can affect their pursuit of more open boundaries. The conclusion summarises the chapter’s main findings and reflects on the wider political implications of the observed political constraints for the pursuit of open boundaries in TBPAs.
6.2 Transactions and cross-border flows in Southern Africa’s borderlands

Bordering six countries, South Africa’s 4,862 km long\(^1\) land boundaries (CIA, 2004) run through highly varied social and economic landscapes, from extremely thinly populated desert landscapes in the west to greener and more highly populated parts in the east. Whilst some of these borderlands host large deposits of minerals like diamonds and uranium, or valuable crops like sugar cane, others have poor soils, barely enough for subsistence. In short, the Southern African Peace Parks plan covers a highly varied patchwork of cultures, economies and social systems. Nevertheless, it is possible to identify some key factors that play a role in large parts of the Southern African landscape. As was outlined in Chapter Three (section 3.4.3), borderlands constitute unique geographical areas, due to their proximity to international boundaries. Borderlands in Africa often suffer from one or more of the following:

- Smuggling and human trafficking
- Increased vulnerability to spill-over effects of political unrest/violence in neighbouring countries
- Increased vulnerability to armed insurgence, both from within the country and cross-border
- Claims upon territory by neighbouring states

These pressures overall play a significant role in Southern Africa’s borderlands, often as a result of the great economic disparity that exists between South Africa and its neighbours (with the exception of Botswana). The ways in which each of the above-outlined phenomena play a role in Southern Africa’s borderlands will now be considered.

\(^1\) Divided as follows: Botswana 1,840 km, Lesotho 909 km, Mozambique 491 km, Namibia 967 km, Swaziland 430 km and Zimbabwe 225 km.
1) Illegal cross-border flows

South Africa’s position as a relatively prosperous country in a region beset with socio-economic problems and political instabilities is likely to encourage human mobility and smuggling, leading to considerable pressure on South Africa’s boundaries (Solomon, 2003). South Africa’s industrial goods are in great demand in neighbouring countries with a less advanced industrial base. Furthermore, South Africa functions as a magnet for people from all over the region seeking employment or other forms of economic opportunity. These uneven demand and supply patterns have shaped the nature of cross-border traffic between South Africa and neighbouring countries, with industrial goods overwhelmingly going one way, and raw materials and people going the other (see Figure 6.1).

These transboundary flows are not necessarily problematic. However the fact that much of the traffic is illegal makes them so. Various powerful criminal syndicates specialise in the smuggling of stolen consumer goods from South Africa. Stolen vehicles form a

---

Outside South Africa, only Zimbabwe has meaningful industrial capacity. The latter has however always been significantly lower than South Africa’s and is increasingly affected by Zimbabwe’s political and economic crisis. A shortage of petrol in the country moreover hampers the export of Zimbabwean goods.
particularly important component of this trade. The goods that are ‘exported’ from neighbouring countries into South Africa, often along the same smuggling routes, constitute illicit products, such as dagga\(^3\) (especially from Swaziland/Lesotho) and firearms (especially from Mozambique). Illegal immigration to South Africa is another important component of illegal transboundary flows into South Africa. (Koetzer, Interview, 2001). Ivory and rhino horn smuggling also constitutes a problem in some areas. Where Southern Africa’s borderlands host valuable mineral, including diamond deposits then gem smuggling may be a prominent feature of illegal cross-border traffic. Figure 6.2 depicts some of the areas where illegal activities are particularly prominent.

2) Susceptibility to spill-over effects of political unrest/violence and armed insurgency

With most boundaries in the region being highly permeable, Southern African countries are vulnerable to spill-over effects in the form of refugees, armed violence, an increase in arms smuggling and other effects generated by conflict or political unrest in neighbouring countries (Van Nieuwkerk: 2000: 1; Gastrow, 2001). The effects of the political crisis in Zimbabwe on neighbouring countries in the form of refugees illustrate this phenomenon, as did events during the apartheid era (section 2.4). Although, thus far, large-scale political unrest and conflict has only erupted in Zimbabwe, most countries in Southern Africa are vulnerable to similar developments (Van Nieuwkerk, 2000). For one thing, Southern Africa’s continued susceptibility to the emergence of autocratic regimes and political unrest means that the possibility of armed insurgency in the region remains a real possibility. Borderlands are particularly vulnerable to the effects of anti-state guerrilla warfare. This is partly because of their evident proximity to the border, but it is also accentuated by the generally low population densities and large areas in which insurgents can seek refuge. As such, armed insurgency continues to feature as a distinct risk in Southern Africa’s borderlands and thus influences border management (see also Table 6.1).

\(^3\) The term ‘dagga’ is used throughout Southern Africa to refer to marihuana and hashish.
Figure 6.2  Illegal or hidden activities and goods in and land claims in or nearby Southern Africa’s TBPAs
Table 6.1: Key security issues in South Africa’s borderlands as identified by South African security experts

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Organised/Syndicated Crime</th>
<th>International</th>
<th>Other</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Gun running</td>
<td>Inter-state conflict</td>
<td>Natural disasters</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Drugs</td>
<td>Insurgencies (rebels)</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Vehicles</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Illegal immigration</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Stock theft</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Poaching</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Illegal land settlement</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Smuggling</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

*Source: Peddle et al. (2003).*

3) Disputed boundaries

As displayed in Figure 6.2, Lesotho, Namibia and Swaziland all have territorial claims in South Africa⁴, and demand a re-alignment of South Africa’s boundaries in their favour. South Africa’s boundary with each of these countries is legalised through international treaties signed in colonial times. However, South Africa’s neighbours had no choice but to sign these treaties and sometimes to cede large tracts of land in the process, being unable to challenge South Africa’s/Britain’s superior military power. These circumstances make these treaties invalid in the eyes of the claimant states. In recent years, Swaziland and Namibia have increasingly urged South Africa to re-align their boundaries.⁵ South Africa’s valuable natural resource base further incites these territorial demands. For Swaziland and Lesotho the presence of respectively large numbers of Swazis and North Sotho on South African territory, a result of the boundary agreement, is also a main consideration (CIA Factbook, 2004). Such considerations inevitably deter the removal of boundary fences and customs posts promoted by the

---

⁴ Of these three states, Namibia and Swaziland have launched formal requests to the South African government to revise the boundary.

⁵ For which there initially seemed to be scope, after former President Mandela allegedly promised the Swazis, Basotho and Namibians that South Africa would reconsider their border claims. This promise was, however, never followed up during his presidency.
proponents of Peace Parks. Before discussing these constraints in more depth, the ways in which Peace Parks can impact on the boundary landscape needs further discussion.

6.3 Peace Parks and spatial changes in the border landscape

To be able to appreciate the ways in which TBPAs may alter the border landscape it is first useful to consider a model of typical boundary interaction (Fig. 6.4.)

Figure 6.3A: Model of international boundary interaction

*Source:* adapted from: Peddle et al. (2003: 6).

A boundary fence and customs post hamper free cross-border traffic for wildlife and humans alike from country A into country B, and conversely.

Advocates of Peace Parks commonly envisage a very different situation, notably one in which there is unimpeded cross-border access for both wildlife and people (see Figure 6.3B).
To this end, fences along the international boundary and associated border posts are removed (see figure 6.3B). Furthermore, a cross-border road network connecting the park is put in place, preferably providing access to various parts of the adjacent park.

However, the pursuit of inhibited cross-border access in Peace Parks by means of the measures outlined above is often difficult to achieve. Especially in the light of the earlier outlined problematic characteristics of Southern Africa’s borderlands, boundary fences may play an important role in:

- Restricting the uncontrolled movement of people from one country to another
- Restricting the movement of wildlife in compliance with government regulations to check the spread of veterinary diseases including bovine tuberculosis, Foot and Mouth disease, East Coast Fever, and Brucellosis from wildlife to domestic stock, or between domestic stock based in different countries.
Demarcating the international border between two countries

Perhaps rather obviously, where boundary fences alongside an international boundary fulfil an important barrier or demarcation function a state may resist their removal for security or political reasons, even if it is involved in the creation of a Peace Park. That these powerful reasons for the maintenance of boundary fences should have been overlooked – or at least underplayed – by supporters of Peace Parks is surprising and demonstrates the extent to which the movement was initially detached from the political realities of the region.

6.4 South African security interests and the pursuit of open boundaries

In borderlands where this risk is prominent, fears of an increase in transboundary crime may affect South Africa’s willingness to pursue open boundaries in its TBPA, even if the removal of internal boundary fences has important ecological, economic and social advantages and continues to be desired by its partner country. Problematically, this is frequently the case. Because they are less affected by it, the containment of transboundary crime tends to be far less prioritised by South Africa’s neighbours. Especially when the economic interests of the participating neighbouring state are harmed by a failure to create open boundaries in the TBPA, South Africa’s refusal to continue to adhere to the pursuit of open boundaries may generate severe tensions. An assessment of the political consequences of the abandoning of the pursuit of open boundaries between the South African Kruger Park and the Mozambican Limpopo Park in the Great Limpopo, in favour of a boundary management model limiting uninhibited cross-border access to wildlife at just a few selected places, illustrates this point.

Whilst open boundaries are generally favoured in Peace Parks, uninhibited cross-border access for wildlife and people is on first sight perhaps nowhere more beneficial to South Africa as in the Great Limpopo. As outlined in the previous chapter the creation of wildlife corridors with Mozambique is ecologically important for South Africa, as a means to dispose of surplus elephants. Furthermore, free cross-border traffic in the TBPA is expected to boost ecotourism in the borderland, of which South Africa stands to profit. Free cross-border access over the Mozambican-South African boundary
through the TFP would also be welcomed by Shangaan communities in the borderland, due to the close ties that exist between Shangaan in Mozambique and South Africa.  

For this reason South African policy makers in TBPAs, like their colleagues from Mozambique, initially enthusiastically supported a removal of the TBPA’s internal boundary fence, which is the Kruger Park’s eastern fence. Moreover, the customs post along the TBPA’s internal boundary, located at Pafuri in the northern part of Kruger, was to be removed to the outskirts of the TBPA to allow for free tourism cross-border access within the TBPA. Until 2001 the main actors involved in TBPAs from the South African side were, however, DEAT, SANPs and the PPF which, in line with their priorities, approached the pursuit of open boundaries from a conservationist and ecotourism perspective. As far as security issues were considered, it was assumed that the erection of external boundary posts would be sufficient to prevent the TBPA from being penetrated by criminal networks involved in illegal cross-border trade.

Upon being confronted with the risk of a significant rise in transboundary crime however, the South African government withdrew its support for the pursuit of an ‘open boundary model’ with peripheral border posts (as displayed in Figure 6.3B). Instead, the South African Home Office maintained that the existing boundary fence, the Kruger Park’s eastern fence, and border post remain in place, and even that additional border posts be established along the Mozambican-South African boundary inside the Great Limpopo to monitor tourism flows and handle security risks. South African security experts from the SADF, the South African Police and the Home Office predicted the emergence of severe security problems if the Kruger Park’s electrified eastern fence was removed and a cross-border access road network built to provide unimpeded vehicle access to the adjacent Limpopo Park. The increased flow of vehicle traffic between the Kruger and the Limpopo Park generated by the increase in ecotourism would, it was feared, make it relatively easy for criminal syndicates

---

6 This information was collected at a Shangaan cultural festival near White River, a South African town, on 8 August 2001. At the festival I spoke to Shangaan from both Mozambique and South Africa. My conversational partners emphasised repeatedly the close linkages that exist between these groups (“when our fellow brothers fled to our village from Mozambique during the war and asked the chief for permission to stay and for land he gave it to them even though land is scarce, for they are our relatives”). In addition, the desire for more direct and earlier cross-border access was frequently mentioned.
operating in the Limpopo borderland to smuggle stolen vehicles from South African into Mozambique.

Disguised as tourists, smugglers could enter and exit the park in these vehicles. Suspected "hundreds" of arms caches in the Limpopo Park (Anon., 2001b), remnants of Mozambique's civil war, could furthermore stimulate the movement of illegal arms into the Kruger Park. Illegal migration from Mozambique might also increase.\(^7\) To contain illegal vehicle and arms smuggling through the Great Limpopo, South Africa's border control agencies fiercely opposed the removal of the Kruger Park's eastern fence. The Kruger Park's electrified fence serves as an important barrier against smuggling activities. 'Only' 150 to 300 vehicles are estimated to be smuggled monthly through the Kruger Park (Peddle, Interview, 2001). The main smuggling route for these goods between South Africa and Mozambique currently runs via the Lubombo Flats corridor between Ressana Garcia (Mozambique) and the Swaziland border, below the Kruger Park (see Figure 6.2). South African security officers feared that the creation of improved opportunities for smuggling through the Great Limpopo, through the planned unimpeded cross-border access for vehicles between the Limpopo and the Kruger Park, would mean that the main smuggle route be moved further north, to run through the Great Limpopo. A planned strengthening of security controls along the Swaziland border increased this prospect. To contain the risk, the SADF, South African Police and South Africa's Home Office opposed the removal of the Kruger Park's eastern fence and the Pafuri border post, in the north of the Kruger Park. Furthermore, they insisted on the creation of two extra border posts alongside the international boundary intersecting the Great Limpopo.

The demands of these South African security agencies caused severe tensions with Mozambique. Unlike their South African colleagues, Mozambican border control officials did not perceive it necessary to abandon the planned 'open boundary model' for the Great Limpopo. They maintained that the creation of border posts on the

\(^7\) This prospect was, however, felt to be less of an issue for the South African authorities. Security officers felt that migration through the Great Limpopo would be difficult to contain at the best of times, and that the presence of man-eating predators in the Kruger Park would continue to have a constraining effect (attended discussion of South African and Mozambican security experts during the GKG management workshop, July 2001. See also Peddle et al., 2003).
TBPA's outskirts and additional security checks would be sufficient to contain a possible increase in transboundary crime, as had been the case in the earlier established Kgalagadi Park, between Botswana and South Africa. Their Zimbabwean colleagues supported them in this position.

In the Kgalagadi TBPA, wildlife and people can freely cross the international boundary into the adjacent Park. To check smuggling, the South African and Botswana border authorities agreed that visitors to the Park could only exit the park in the country from which they had entered it, unless they had a visa. To check tourism flows from and to the TBPA to prevent smuggling, Botswana and South African customs authorities erected two border posts on the periphery of the TBPA. Finally, some police officers were trained as customs personnel. Overall, these security measures have thus far proved sufficient to control a rise in transboundary crime. Referring to this example, Mozambican and Zimbabwean security personnel, as well as South African environmentalist and ecotourism interest groups, argue that the creation of peripheral boundary posts in the Great Limpopo would be sufficient to discourage an increase in vehicle and arms smuggling. They also maintain that the removal of the Kruger boundary fence would be safe, although increased patrolling in the area might be necessary.

For their part, the South African Home Office argued, however, that the Great Limpopo is created and will function under very different and less favourable circumstances than the Kgalagadi Park, and that the creation of peripheral border posts and increased patrolling would be insufficient to check the risk of a rise in crime. From a security perspective, the Kgalagadi Park can be said to operate in extremely favourable circumstances, which discourage smuggling and other illegal activities. Relatively equal economic levels of development between Botswana and South Africa reduce the incentive for illegal cross-border trade and migration. Moreover, the hot and difficult desert environment, which (other than on tarred roads) can only be accessed by 4x4s, discourages travel off the road network within the TBPA. Vehicles can only enter the road network through two entrances. Finally, the estimated number of visitors to the Kgalagadi is 'only' 50,000 a year. Control of tourism and local traffic to and from the TBPA by means of external border posts is therefore relatively easy.
In contrast, effectively controlling the movement of visitors to the Great Limpopo solely by means of external border posts would be impossible for South Africa’s border police and customs authorities. An important reason is that this TBPA can be accessed, including illegally, at multiple places, both from Mozambique and South Africa. Coupled with the fact that off-road travel is relatively easy in the Great Limpopo, this means that peripheral border posts could be easily bypassed by criminal elements. The Kruger Park has six entrance gates. Furthermore, the Kruger Park can be illegally accessed by road from the west, as no fences separate the private game reserves along its western boundary from the Kruger Park (see also Figure 6.4).

The Kruger Park’s western boundary is hence “highly porous” whilst Mozambique’s Limpopo Park is not fenced at all. This means that smugglers could illegally enter the Great Limpopo by car from the Mozambican side “drive through the Kruger Park and exit into South Africa via the illegal transit through the private game reserves” (Anon., 2001: 4). Moreover, at several places it would be possible for smugglers to leave the road network and drive to a previously arranged spot across the boundary to meet and exchange illegal goods and passengers with counterparts over the boundary (Koetzer, Interview, 2001). Smugglers could therefore easily avoid erected border posts on the TBPA’s outskirts. Adding to the difficulties for South Africa’s understaffed and under financed border police to control the movement of vehicles and their passengers inside the TBPA are the massive tourism numbers that are expected: over a million visitors each year. With the Mozambican police having even less capacity and being renowned for its linkages with criminal syndicates, co-operation with the Mozambican police was thought to address the problem only marginally.
Figure 6.4 Access points and border posts in the Great Limpopo

Source: Based on map of the Peace Parks Foundation, 2003
For these reasons, the South African Home Office, the ultimate decision-making body regarding boundary management in South Africa, demanded that the Kruger Park’s eastern boundary fence remain in place and two extra internal customs posts be erected in the Park.

Mozambique, and to a lesser extent Zimbabwe, contested this policy position. For Mozambique, the creation of open boundaries was perceived as a crucial enabling factor in attracting tourists from the Kruger Park to the Limpopo Park. With an overwhelming majority of tourists expected to enter the TBPA from South Africa, and with the Limpopo Park currently being largely bereft of the ‘Big Five’, which are the major tourism attraction, the easiest possible cross-border access from South Africa for both animals and tourists would benefit Mozambique. Forcing tourists to go through border posts before they could enter Mozambique was seen as significantly reducing the attractiveness for tourists of entering Mozambique. It was also against the spirit of the TFP, which had already been marketed as a place where tourists could drive unimpeded from one country to the next, just like wildlife could freely move across the boundary. As such, Mozambique saw its envisaged ecotourism income from the TBPA at risk.

Mozambique may also not have wanted to support the plans of South Africa’s security establishment for a different economic reason. The illegal border economy is an important generator of income for Mozambique. Moreover, the Mozambican government is alleged to have direct interests in these smuggling networks, in which the president’s son has been implicated (Anonymous Source, Mozambican Newspaper, 2001). During a policy workshop in July 2001, aimed at the creation of a management plan for the Great Limpopo, the demands of the SADF, the police and the Department of Home Affairs, raised so much controversy that a special policy workshop on the issue was held in August 2001. During this latter policy workshop in Johannesburg, a compromise was eventually reached. However, Mozambique only accepted the proposal with much reluctance, as it overwhelmingly represented the demands of South Africa’s security establishment. The accepted proposal stipulated that the boundary fence would largely remain in place, and tourist flows would be managed through two internal border posts, which were established alongside the roads that would be created in the TBPA to connect the Kruger with the Limpopo Park. To this end, the existing
Pafuri border post between Mozambique and South Africa would be extended, from which tourists could in the future continue to Zimbabwe, through the existing Sango/Eduardo Mondlana Border Post between Mozambique and Zimbabwe. Furthermore, a second border post would be created at Giroyondo (see Figure 6.4), to facilitate tourism between the Kruger Park and the Massingir Dam. Mozambique could then choose to locate their equivalent border post at the same site or at Massingir.

In recognition of the need to create wildlife corridors in the TBPA, South Africa’s security agencies agreed that small openings could be made in the Kruger Park’s fence to allow for the migration of wildlife. However, this would only be permitted in locations where the terrain was relatively inaccessible, such as in parts of the Lubombo Mountains, reducing the chances that the ‘wildlife corridor’ could unintentionally become a smuggling corridor. Figure 6.5 displays this ‘selective calendar model’.

![Diagram of the Great Limpopo’s ‘selective calendar’ model](source: Adapted from: Peddle et al. (2003: 6).)

**Figure 6.5** The Great Limpopo’s ‘selective calendar’ model: removal of parts of the boundary fence to allow for wildlife and tourist corridors with maintenance of internal border posts.
To placate Mozambique and Zimbabwe, and South African proponents of the ‘open boundary model’, the agreement also expressed continued commitment to the removal of internal boundary fences in favour of the creation of peripheral ones. No date was specified, however. Although Mozambique was relatively satisfied with the opportunities offered for wildlife migration, and with the fact that the ‘open boundary model’ remained part of the planning, it nevertheless saw the policy changes in a negative light. The lack of a final date could mean that the ‘open boundary model’ might never become a reality in the Great Limpopo. Combined with the postponed connection of its Banine and Zinave Parks to the Great Limpopo (see section 5.3) to an unspecified future time, Mozambique felt that its interests were far less prioritised and less represented than South Africa’s in the Great Limpopo. Additional security demands by South Africa stipulating that the Limpopo Park be fenced to control and limit access, and that the settlements in the Limpopo Park be removed (because they were seen as ideal bases for illegal activities and hiding places for smugglers and poachers), further strained Mozambican-South African relations. As outlined in Chapter 5, Mozambique perceived these demands as undermining its interests in, and its sovereignty over, its borderland. On the other hand, South Africa’s emphasis that the maintenance of high levels of security in the TBPA would, ultimately, benefit Mozambique’s ecotourism prospects by limiting the risk that tourists might be mugged or hijacked in the TBPA, as happened earlier in the Kruger Park, did help to assuage Mozambique’s disappointment.

6.5 The pursuit of open boundaries & fears of veterinary disease spread
The pursuit of open boundaries in TBPAs may not only promote a rise in transboundary crime, but may also induce a spread of veterinary disease. Contrary to the increase in transboundary crime, the spread of veterinary disease is less a concern for South Africa than for some neighbouring countries, especially those with vested interests in the red meat industry. Consequently, in the Great Limpopo with Zimbabwe, and in the

---

8 Other than security officials, most South African representatives at the policy workshop did initially not see a need to abandon the pursuit of open boundaries in the TBPA.
Lubombo TBPA with Swaziland, South Africa has been willing to pursue open boundaries, but neighbouring countries have not.

This reluctance on the side of Zimbabwe and Swaziland to pursue open boundaries in TBPs, and the resulting delays in the connection of their National Parks and/or nature reserves with those of South Africa, have thus far not led to significant tensions. This is possibly because the countries in question have not outright refused the pursuit of open boundaries. The political and security interests of South Africa discouraging the pursuit of open boundaries in these TBPs might also play a role. As the planning of these TBPs becomes more advanced, different priorities regarding the management of their boundaries between South Africa and the partner country in question might well become more pronounced and cause conflict. These issues will be explored with a focus on the Great Limpopo and the Lubombo TBPA, where fears of transmission of veterinary disease have significantly hampered the envisaged creation of unimpeded cross-border access.

Fears of a transmission of veterinary disease from South Africa account for the considerable delays in connecting Zimbabwe’s Sengwe Corridor with South Africa’s Kruger Park (Wolmer, 2003; Schoon, 2004) (see also section 5.2.5). Although Zimbabwean border authorities did not object to the creation of unimpeded cross-border access with South Africa (see previous section), Zimbabwean veterinary disease specialists from the Ministry of Agriculture opposed a connection of the Gonarezhou Park and Kruger Park, by means of the Sengwe Corridor (observation during GKG management workshop, 2001). Wildlife in the Kruger National Park and other South African parks are suspected of carrying various diseases that could be transmitted to cattle. Zimbabwe feared that the increased influx of South African infected buffaloes into its Gonarezhou Park, might re-introduce Bovine Tuberculosis into the country. Furthermore, it feared for a transmission of Foot and Mouth Disease (FMD), “one of the most contagious animal diseases” (World Organisation for Animal Health (OiE)), 2004). By 2001 Zimbabwe was still FMD free, in contrast to South Africa. The re-introduction of FMD into Zimbabwe would cause the country significant economic losses. The most important market for Zimbabwean beef was the European Union, where the import of red meat is only allowed from countries that have been tested FMD free.
For this reason Zimbabwe’s veterinary disease specialists resisted the connection of the Gonarezhou Park to the Great Limpopo “without further measures” (GKG workshop, 2001). The preventive measures considered during the GKG management workshop in 2001 and proposed by South Africa and Mozambique were, however, found to be insufficient or impossible. A ban on keeping cattle in the Sengwe Corridor was considered. However, Zimbabwe’s veterinary specialists felt that even such a far-reaching measure, providing this was legally possible at all, would be insufficient: even the presence of a few domestic animals or pets could help transmit FMD from South African wildlife into Zimbabwe. Banning these animals would be even more difficult to supervise. The only adequate measure would be to relocate the Sengwe Community and fully fence the Corridor. However, as indicated in Chapter 5, this was unacceptable to the Zimbabwean government. South Africa did not share this policy position. It felt, however, like Mozambique that the ecological and ecotourism benefits of the connection of the Gonarezhou Park by means of the Sengwe Corridor into the Great Limpopo outweighed possible veterinary disease threats. South Africa also risked exposure to veterinary disease from neighbouring countries through the creation of wildlife corridors. For example, in the Great Limpopo South African disease specialists feared a transmission of Rabies from Mozambique.

Overall, however, South Africa has far less to lose, compared with Zimbabwe. It is not a big exporter of red meat, and even imports 15% of its total consumption. In addition to Zimbabwe, Swaziland also stands to lose considerably from a transmission of veterinary disease from South Africa, for which reason it has similar reservations as Zimbabwe against the pursuit of open boundaries in TBPAs.

Fears of a transmission of veterinary disease from South Africa, especially FMD, have constrained Swaziland’s willingness to pursue open boundaries in the Lubombo TBPA. With its boundary fences and border posts functioning as important barriers against the

---

9 Its concerns for veterinary disease transmission from Zimbabwe are likely to have grown with a massive outbreak of FMD in Zimbabwe, which threatens to infect the whole of the region, as the Zimbabwean government lacks the financial means or political will to vaccinate its wildlife against FMD (BBC, 2003).
spread of veterinary disease into the country, Swaziland is reluctant to remove its boundary fences in the Lubombo TBPA. As in many other parts of Southern Africa, cattle embody wealth to the Swazis, and beef exports to the European Union, with its strict regulations regarding FMD free meat, are of growing economic importance. FMD was re-introduced into the country in September 2000, through contacts between South African and Swazi cattle (Swazi farmers had illegally crossed the boundary into South Africa's Kwa Zulu Natal province). After having successfully eradicated the disease, Swaziland is keen to avoid renewed exposure from migrating wildlife from South Africa and Mozambique.

Mozambique and South Africa are not unsympathetic to Swaziland's concerns. However, the South African PPF argues that the removal of the TBPA's internal fences in favour of external fencing would mean that the transmission of wildlife diseases could be sufficiently contained, if not more effectively. Vaccination measures could ensure that the TBPA would be a 'veterinary disease free zone'. Swaziland would, in this scenario, not just have fences and control posts alongside its international boundary to protect it from incoming veterinary disease from South Africa and Mozambique, but a vast buffer zone in the form of the whole TBPA (Myburgh, Interview, 2002).

These arguments have thus far failed to convince Swaziland to agree with a removal of its boundary fences in the Lubombo. For the above-outlined scenario to work, the park's external boundary fences would have to be impenetrable, which is difficult to achieve, especially in parks with large mammals like elephants, which frequently trample or otherwise break through fences. Where wildlife would escape into adjacent communal farming areas they could still pass on diseases to cattle (Reilly, Interview, 2002). Secondly, communal farming settlements will be incorporated into the TBPAs. As mentioned earlier, the presence of livestock or even a few domestic animals in a TBPA introduces considerable risks from a wildlife disease control viewpoint (Zimbabwean veterinary disease specialist, Interview, 2001).

These continued reservations in Swaziland and Zimbabwe have not, however, led to major tensions with South Africa, in spite of the plans to create open boundaries in these TBPAs. A possible explanation may be that whilst South Africa is little deterred by risks of veterinary disease spread, it has tacit political interests in delaying a
connection with Zimbabwe and Swaziland, undermining its enthusiasm to pursue open boundaries. For economic and security reasons it would serve South Africa not to open the boundary with Zimbabwe, at least until political stability has returned to the country (Burger, Interview, 2001). If anything, its border with Zimbabwe has become more closed. Since the political crisis in Zimbabwe South Africa has sharpened its visa requirements to discourage an influx of illegal Zimbabwean immigrants, looking for work and security in South Africa. A heightened guarding of South Africa’s borders also obstructs the pursuit of open boundaries with Zimbabwe in the Great Limpopo. To protect South Africa in the case of an outbreak of political violence in Zimbabwe (Burger, Interview, 2001; Van Wyk, Interview, 2002) SADF troops have still not left their base in the Madimbo Corridor, located closely to the Zimbabwean boundary, as previously arranged.\footnote{The Madimbo Corridor is on the list of areas in South Africa to be joined to the Great Limpopo TFP.} In the Lubombo TBPA such safety considerations could also play a role. Although Swaziland has for long been one of Africa’s most stable countries, opposition against the undemocratic and spending-happy Swazi King is growing and political analysts fear for an outbreak of violence. Nevertheless, this prospect is unlikely to deter South Africa to want to pursue open boundaries in the Lubombo TBPA. Given that Swaziland is a much smaller and weaker country than South Africa, in such a scenario South Africa might simply choose to enter the country to try and re-establish order\footnote{As it did in Lesotho when political violence beset that country in 1998.}, rather than closing its boundaries and adopt a ‘wait and see’ attitude. High levels of transboundary crime, in the form of the smuggling of stolen vehicles, arms and dagga, and persistent government failures to bring it under control, may explain South Africa’s reaction. It is, however, difficult to determine the impact of these South African strategic and security concerns given that these have been little openly discussed.

In future, Zimbabwe’s and Swaziland’s reluctance to pursue open boundaries in their TBPAs with South Africa may become a source of tension between South Africa and neighbouring countries. In 2001 and to a lesser extent in 2002, most of South Africa’s energy was focused on the connection between the Mozambican and South African parts of the Great Limpopo. The Lubombo TBPA received little South African interest.
So did the connection with Zimbabwe in the Great Limpopo. However, active involvement with the Lubombo TBPA has been resumed since 2002 (Rogues, Interview, 2002) and South Africa has invested considerable sums in the Lubombo SDI (see section 6.7.3), of which the Lubombo TBPA is a major component. It is therefore likely to want to see it become operational in the near future. Recent conflict with Zimbabwe over the delays in connecting its Gonarezhou Park to the Great Limpopo (see section 5.3.3), may indicate that South Africa may also start exercising political pressure on Zimbabwe to create open boundary access between the Zimbabwean-South African parts of the Great Limpopo. Considering that such a connection represents a considerable security risk for South Africa, and that Zimbabwe is a relatively powerful neighbour, this criticism is likely to remain limited, however.

6.6 Boundary disputes & the pursuit of open boundaries

6.6.1 Introduction

In borderlands where the location of the boundary is contested, the pursuit of open boundaries in Peace Parks may cause considerable conflict between South Africa and a neighbouring state. Where South Africa perceives the pursuit of open boundaries merely as a technical matter unrelated to existing boundary disputes, its neighbouring states may turn it into a political matter, whereby progress in this policy area is linked and made conditional to a resolution of the boundary conflict in their advantage. Considering that states generally prioritise their territorial and geo-political interests over their environmental and economic interests in TBPAs (Van Amerom, 2002), South Africa is likely to refuse to link the negotiations over boundary arrangements in TBPAs to wider negotiations over the location of the boundary and to comprise in the latter area. The resulting stalemate is likely to hamper negotiations over more open boundaries in TBPAs and to negatively affect relations between South Africa and neighbouring countries. As the latter has not achieved its aim, resentment is likely to increase. South Africa is likely to perceive the actions of the neighbouring country as illegitimate ‘blackmail’, which may induce anger. Economic interests in transboundary co-operation may bring the states close enough again to resume their negotiations over

12 See footnote 26 in Chapter Two.
free cross-border access within TBPAs. As long as the boundary dispute continues to affect wider relations between South Africa and its neighbours, progress in the area of boundary management in TBPAs is likely to remain vulnerable to disagreements over the boundary, however. This section will explore these issues with a focus on the Ai-Ais/Richtersveld, the first TBPA where the pursuit of open boundaries became linked to and hampered by tensions over the location of the boundary. The potential impact of South Africa's boundary disputes with Lesotho and Swaziland upon the pursuit of open boundaries in the Maloti/Drakensberg and the Lubombo TBPA will also be assessed.

6.6.2 The Namibian-South African boundary dispute

A substantial part of the nearly 1000 km-long international boundary between Namibia and South Africa intersects the Ai-Ais/Richterveld Park. The boundary is located along the northern bank of the Orange River, which divides the Namibian and South African parts of the TBPA (see Figure 6.6). This agreement originated in colonial times. Using its military supremacy, Britain pressured the Germans\(^\text{13}\) into agreeing to a boundary that is today very unfavourable to Namibia. South Africa has adhered to this agreement ever since. This is much to Namibia's dismay, which insists that the boundary should be in the middle of the Orange River, as is common international practice\(^\text{14}\).

\(^{13}\) The then colonial powers of respectively South Africa and Namibia.

\(^{14}\) Personal communication [email], Martin Pratt, Director International Boundaries Research Unit, Durham, 2004.
The boundary dispute is “managed” (CIA, 2004); both countries are committed to finding a peaceful resolution. Nevertheless, and contrary to other Namibian claims upon South African territory\textsuperscript{15}, the boundary dispute has proved difficult to settle. Disagreements over the boundary location continue to flare up and to strain relations between the two countries (Barnard, 1994; Graig, 2001).

A factor complicating a resolution of the boundary conflict is the presence of valuable natural resources in, and on the banks of, the Orange River (Jones, Interview, 2002). These include major diamond deposits at the river mouth, and also fish and grazing land on islands in the Orange River. Namibia and South Africa exercise overlapping claims upon these resources. When South Africa still ruled Namibia, it exercised sovereignty over the whole river, which is very wide in places. During this period South Africa granted mineral rights to South Africa’s mining companies to exploit the area’s valuable diamonds, and land rights to the river’s islands to the local communities in and around the Richtersveld. Under pressure from these beneficiaries, South African

\textsuperscript{15} On 1 March 1994, following three years of bi-lateral negotiations, a South African-Namibian dispute over ownership of Walvis Bay, a coastal enclave, and 12 offshore islands was resolved, when South Africa returned these areas to Namibia.
governments have generally been unwilling to release South Africa's access rights to these natural resources. Access to land and diamonds in what it perceives to be 'its' side of the river and river mouth is a key motivation for Namibia's request for boundary re-adjustment, however. Adding another layer of complexity, Namibia maintains that during the two presidencies preceding that of President Mbeki, South Africa had agreed to review the boundary. The premature ending of De Klerk's administration and delays during the Mandela regime meant, however, that the process of identifying what had to be demarcated was never completed (Graig, 2001). Namibia demands that these tacit commitments be followed up. President Mbeki, for his part, does not feel bound by these never formalised arrangements of his predecessors. Moreover, South Africa is alleged to have formally decided that the boundary would not be adjusted during his first presidency, notably in July 2000 (Graig, 2001).

The creation of the Ai-Ais/Richtersveld Park initially progressed relatively rapidly and in isolation from tensions over the location of the boundary. From a geographical viewpoint the South African and Namibian parts can be relatively easily connected. The Ai-Ais and the Richtersveld Park are adjacent and, with the boundary separating them being little demarcated with fences, already de facto connected in many places. Especially in the dry season, when the Orange River separating the Richtersveld from its Namibian counterpart (see Figure 6.5) tends to dry up, uninhibited pedestrian and wildlife cross-border access is a reality. Furthermore, there are no major security issues constraining the creation of unimpeded cross-border access for animals and people alike within the TBPA. An MoU on the Park was signed on 17 August 2001 (Parliamentary Monitoring Group, 2003). However, with the emergence of renewed tensions over the boundary, political support for the Park dwindled on the Namibian side, complicating the further detailing and finalisation of the MoU into a treaty.

Two months after the signing of the MoU on the Ai-Ais/Richtersveld the boundary issue flared up again with Namibia demanding an adjustment. South Africa refused to discuss the location of the boundary once more, claiming that during a presidential summit in 2001, Thabo Mbeki and Sam Nujoma had already agreed on the boundary's present location, for which reason the boundary dispute had not come up since. Namibia countered these assertions and claimed that it had raised its concerns regarding the location of the boundary in discussions between the ministers of trade on a project
around the Orange River later in the year (Graig, 2001). These renewed tensions between Namibia and South Africa over the boundary increasingly obstructed the ongoing negotiations on the creation and formalisation of the connection of the Ai-Ais Park with the Richtersveld Park.

In the process of co-operating Namibia demanded, prior to the completion of the Peace Park treaty, that the boundary should be re-aligned towards the middle of the river. The Ai-Ais/Richtersveld incorporates a substantial part of the contested South African – Namibian border along the Orange River (see Figure 6.7). Furthermore, many of the key South African players in the Ai-Ais/Richtersveld Park, such as the Ministry of Mining and Natural Resources, are also major players in the boundary conflict. This overlap increased the likelihood that Namibia would link negotiations on the TBPA to the outstanding boundary dispute. Moreover, by increasing South Africa’s dependency on Namibia, the involvement in the Ai-Ais-Richtersveld provided Namibia with some leverage to re-negotiate the location of the boundary with South Africa. While Namibia has an interest in developing ecotourism to its Ai-Ais Park by means of the TBPA, the Ai-Ais/Richtersveld is particularly driven, and desired, by South Africa. Namibia provides most of the land for the Peace Park, however (4326 km2 from a total 5921 km2). The involvement of the South African PPF also made it attractive for Namibia to try and politically exploit its participation in the TBPA. As an NGO, the PPF has no major say in the boundary dispute. However, Anton Rupert, its founder and head, can exercise considerable influence in this area, because of his involvement with Transhex, a powerful South African mining company which he founded. Now headed by his son, Anton Rupert still owns a substantial number of shares in the company and Transhex actively supports the creation of the TFP. By refusing to further co-operate with the TFP Namibia could use its participation in the Park as a means of pressurising the Rupert family to give up its resistance to a revision of the boundary. Protecting its exploitation rights to diamonds in the area, Transhex fiercely opposes a settlement of the boundary dispute to Namibia’s advantage, and lobbies the South African government accordingly.
South Africa, by means of DEAT, resisted the Namibian demand however. It refused to link the discussions on the boundary arrangements in the TBPA to wider discussions on the location of the boundary. In response, the Namibian government in mid 2002 “put on hold” all plans regarding the TBPA (Namibian official in confidential correspondence with SANPs official). Namibian officials involved in the negotiations on the Peace Parks were explicitly instructed by their superiors not to organise or attend any meetings on the creation of the TBPA “until further notice” (Namibian Park official, Interview, 2003). South Africa did not respond to these actions however. In fact, DEAT officials denied there was a dispute over the boundary in the TBPA, given that Namibia had “at no stage” launched such a request “through the appropriate channels”, or even at earlier meetings at ministerial levels on the TBPA. Furthermore,
DEAT perceived Namibia’s behaviour as “unacceptable blackmail” (Anonymous Source, DEAT, 2002).

In spite of the lack of South African concessions regarding the position of the boundary, the Namibian government eventually eased its resistance and negotiations on the TBPA were resumed. Three years after the signing of the MoU, the treaty for the Ai-Ais/Richtersveld was eventually signed on the 1st of August 2003. Missing out on the economic advantages of cross-border co-operation generated by the TBPA was an important factor in Namibia resuming transboundary co-operation with South Africa on the Peace Park. Namibia’s withdrawal of support in the Ai-Ais/Richtersveld delivered no results whilst Namibia has considerable ecotourism interests in a linkage of its relatively underdeveloped Ai-Ais Park to the more advanced and better known Richtersveld Park. Economic interests in transboundary co-operation in other policy areas also stimulated a rapprochement between the two countries. Hostile relations meant that lucrative marine diamond mining plans had also to be delayed. Relatively recently discovered gas reserves in the area moreover increased corporate pressure on both governments to bypass the boundary dispute and come to a workable agreement. Prospects of gain from gas finds in the borderland seem to have fuelled Namibia’s willingness to co-operate with South Africa in spite of the outstanding boundary dispute. It is also interesting to note that the treaty of the Ai-Ais/Richterveld was signed following a period of intensive negotiations over the shipping of gas between the two countries. Just a few days after Namibia and South Africa signed the Ai-Ais/Richterveld treaty, an agreement over shipping gas was signed, on the 5th August. Moreover, as part of this agreement the countries committed themselves to negotiate on other policy areas, including environmental ones.

However, as long as the boundary dispute remains unresolved, transboundary co-operation and the pursuit of open boundaries in the Ai-Ais/Richterveld is likely to remain a tension-ridden area. This is reflected by the fact that in spite of the formal opening of the Ais/Richterveld Park, the pursuit of open boundaries has still not succeeded. From a technical viewpoint, it is now possible to cross the Orange River by means of the traditional ‘pontoon’ installed for that purpose at Sendelingendrift on the western boundary of the Ai/Ais/Richtersveld (Dentlinger, 2003). However, Namibian and South African immigration authorities have still not put the "administrative
procedures in place" (Dentlinger, 2003) that would legalise cross-border access. Considering the relatively long time that passed between the signing of the MoU and the treaty, this is remarkable. Furthermore, no definite date has been set for the resolution of these issues. Considering that the Park has been formally declared open and that there are no major security constraints preventing the connection of the two parks, these delays are remarkable. The failure to reach agreement on a name for the Park, in spite of plans to develop one, also hints at remaining tensions. The Ai-Ais/Richtersveld, a combination of the names of the two participating National Parks, has only been taken on as a temporary name, just as Gaza/Kruger/Gonarezhou was the Great Limpopo’s temporary name. Given that Namibian-South African relations are, overall, cordial apart from the boundary issue, these disagreements could indicate that relations in the Ai-Ais/Richtersveld have remained tense as a result of the unresolved boundary dispute. Even after cross-border access has been formalised and the Ai-Ais/Richterveld Park is operational, the Namibian-South African boundary dispute may obstruct the pursuit of open boundaries in the TBPA.

6.6.3 Boundary disputes and the pursuit of open boundaries in other TBPAs

This above case study of the Ai-Ais/Richtersveld indicates that where the international boundary in a Peace Park is disputed, the pursuit of open boundaries in the TBPA may be easily affected by tensions over the location of the boundary between South Africa and neighbouring countries. Problematically, there are boundary disputes in half of the TBPAs comprising the Southern African Peace Parks Plan. In addition to the Ai-Ais/Richtersveld, the boundary in the Lubombo TBPA and the Maloti/Drakensberg is contested, as result of outstanding boundary disputes between South Africa and respectively Swaziland and Lesotho (see Table 6.3).

Although disagreements over the boundary have not yet flared up in the Lubombo TBPA or in the Maloti/Drakensberg, or at least not in a detectable way, this may well occur in the near future, when negotiations over the pursuit of open boundaries are more advanced. It is noticeable that in both the Lubombo and the Maloti/Drakensberg an international treaty still has not been signed. Whilst this delay may be an outcome of various factors, the dispute over the location of the boundary is likely to have played a
constraining role. Considering that anti-South African and strong national sentiments in Lesotho have already affected negotiations on the Maloti/Drakensberg\(^{16}\), it seems likely that Lesotho’s territorial demands upon South African territory might be raised in the process of negotiating the Park. Lesotho requested as early as 1962 in the United Nations (Coplan, 2001: 94) a return of land “usurped by Afrikaners during the Basotho-Boer wars of the 19\(^{th}\) century” (Pule and Matlosa, 2000) in the Free State.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Country</th>
<th>Area claimed</th>
<th>South African province</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Lesotho</td>
<td></td>
<td>Free State</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Namibia</td>
<td>Upper half of Orange River</td>
<td>Northern Cape</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Swaziland</td>
<td>KaNgwane</td>
<td>Kwa Zulu Natal</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Swaziland</td>
<td>Ngavuma</td>
<td>Kwa Zulu Natal</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Swaziland</td>
<td>Nsikazi Area</td>
<td>Mpumalanga Province</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>


Whilst no formal claims have been launched in the post-*apartheid* era, the boundary dispute continues to be an important political issue (Pule and Matlosa, 2000). There exists great bitterness in Lesotho over the ANC’s lack of commitment to the alleged promise of Mandela to return part of the territory in the Free State claimed by Lesotho. Lesotho declined an offer by the preceding white *apartheid* regime to adjust the boundary in its advantage, contrary to Swaziland’s royal ruler who was keen to go along and reduce support to the ANC in the process.\(^{17}\) On the other hand, Lesotho has not launched a formal claim with the South African government to review the boundary, unlike Namibia and Swaziland. Furthermore, the Maloti/Drakensberg being a TFCA, free cross-border access is not necessarily a policy objective, reducing the

\(^{16}\) The next chapter explores this issue in more depth.

\(^{17}\) Kwa Zulu Natal successfully legally challenged this deal, however, so that Swaziland never saw its territorial claims fulfilled (Griffiths and Funnell, 1991).
possibility for Lesotho to use its continued participation in the Maloti/Drakensberg as a means to pressure South Africa into a revision of the international boundary.

This is, however, not the case in the Lubombo TBPA, where connection of the various national parts by means of removing boundary fences is a primary purpose. Furthermore, Swaziland has become increasingly vocal in stating its territorial claims. As such, insiders expect the boundary issue to become part of the Peace Park negotiations at some stage and some claim that this has already been the case (Anonymous Source, Consultancy involved in Lubombo TBPA, 2002; UN IRIN, 2003). With South Africa showing no signs of wanting to concede to the Swazi demand, this disagreement may start to play a constraining role upon further progress. There are rumours that Swaziland seeks to use the creation of the TBPA as a means to reclaim its territories in South Africa. To this end, Swazi chiefs in South Africa, who are loyal to the Swazi King would launch land claims in parts of the TBPA, from which their communities were once forcefully evicted. Once the South African government has granted them this land, these chiefs would allegedly try and give the Swazi King ultimate ownership (Mpumalanga Consultative Group on Land, 2003). Now the owner of land inside South Africa, such a transaction would make it easier for the Swazi King to try and relocate the boundary further into South Africa. It is doubtful that this construction could work, given that South African chiefs have only limited political power and ownership rights. However, if these rumours are true they indicate the willingness of the Swazi government to use the creation of the Lubombo TBPA to gain access to Swazi territories in South Africa. If anything, the involvement of the South African government in the Lubombo SDI, of which the Lubombo TBPA is a part, is likely to constrain South African willingness to revise its boundary with Swaziland. After having invested millions of US $ in new highways and the Greater St.Lucia Wetland Park, destined to join the Lubombo TBPA, it is unlikely to want to see these territories end up in the hands of Swaziland.
6.7 Conclusion

The planned removal of boundary fences in Southern Africa’s TBPAs has proved a complicated policy area, which is endowed with considerable conflict potential. As the country that suffers economically and socially the most from transboundary crime in the region, it would harm South Africa’s interests to pursue the open boundary model in TBPAs prone to transboundary crime. Neighbouring countries may, however, want to adhere to the planned removal of internal boundary fences to allow for free tourists flows, when these are expected to have a stimulating effect on the economy in their borderland. In such a context, the South African change of mind regarding the pursuit of open boundaries may cause considerable tension with the neighbouring country in question. Where South Africa furthermore demands and pushes through changes in the spatial set up of the territory of its neighbour to safeguard its security interests, such as the erection of fences around the Park and the removal of local communities, these tensions may be further aggravated. Perhaps somewhat surprisingly, the opposite scenario, whereby South Africa does want to pursue open boundaries but its neighbouring countries are reluctant out of fear of a transmission of veterinary diseases from infected wildlife, has not led to major conflict. South African political and military considerations, which also argue against the pursuit of open boundaries in these TBPAs, may be an important reason. Finally, the pursuit of open boundaries may cause considerable conflict in TBPAs where neighbouring states want to use the negotiations on boundary management in the TBPA in question to re-open discussions on the boundary’s location with the hope of redrawing the boundary to their advantage. Prioritising its geo-political interests over its environmental and economic interests in TBPAs, South Africa is unlikely to fulfil these requests, however. Remaining disappointment and resentment on the side of the ‘claimant’ state may mean that the pursuit of open boundaries remains a politically sensitive and conflict-prone area, even when co-operation continues.

The complexities and conflicts related to the pursuit of open boundaries may have important consequences for the wider co-operation of South Africa and neighbouring states in TBPAs. Where boundary management arrangements primarily reflect South Africa’s interests, the impression of neighbouring countries that South Africa is trying to play Big Brother will be confirmed. This might make future co-operation more
difficult. Given that boundaries in many ways symbolise a state’s sovereignty, it seems in this context crucial that South Africa continues its current policy, and exercises patience where neighbouring states are reluctant to remove boundary fences, rather than to exercise direct pressure. On the other hand, where the pursuit of open boundaries in TBPAs is obstructed by the political considerations of states, local resistance against them may grow. An important motivation for local communities to support or to accept the creation of TBPAs, alongside the promise that TBPAs would create income and employment, was the prospect that TBPAs would promote uninhibited cross-border access. Transnational communities, in particular, like for example the Shangaan in the Great Limpopo and the Nama in and around the Ai-Ais/Richtersveld, welcome such a development, as interaction with their counterparts over the boundary is very important to them. However, where this is achieved at all, security concerns have meant that free cross-border access in TBPAs has been increasingly reserved for wildlife and tourists and not for local people. Security considerations of South Africa may moreover stimulate a removal of local communities from the TBPA and the erection of new fences, hindering access to the Park, as has happened in the Limpopo Park. Finally, where local communities are entitled to freely move across the boundary, as is for example the case with the South African San in the Kgalahari Park and most likely also for the South African Nama community in the Ai-Ais/Richtersveld, only the South African side is inhabited. Free cross-border access in TBPAs has, therefore, not led to the promised ‘reunification of local communities’ in Southern Africa. Considering that the economic benefits of TBPAs have been lacking for local communities or will take more time than expected to be realised, the overall failure to secure uninhabited or at least facilitated cross-border access for Southern Africa’s transnational communities may further undermine local support for Peace Parks. Given the wide range of conflicting interests involved in the pursuit of open boundaries, it is perhaps inevitable that this policy area will evoke considerable conflict and remain contested.
7: Pride and Prejudice: The role of Nationalism and Cultural Differences in Peace Parks

7.1 Introduction

This chapter considers the political aspects of ‘everyday co-operation’ in TBPAs in Southern Africa, with an emphasis on the tensions and conflicts this can create between the various actors involved. Due to the transboundary context in which it takes place and the involvement of a multitude of governmental and non-governmental organisations, Peace Parks involve the co-operation of actors who can be relatively diversified on the basis of their cultural origin, national interests and institutional attachments. Although cultural, national and institutional differences can complicate co-operative processes (Paasi, 1996; Wels, 2000; Fall, 2003a, 2003b) proponents of TBPAs nevertheless perceive co-operation in Peace Parks in highly optimistic terms. The opportunities for cross-border contacts and communications that TBPAs permit are claimed to “bring people together” (Hanks, 2002: 34) and produce or increase international friendship and understanding between the participating parties. Furthermore, as was explained in section 1.5, envisaged ‘trickle up’ effects are expected to positively affect relations at the highest inter-state levels (see also Figures 7.1A and 7.1B).

However, this optimistic outlook over-emphasises the positive political aspects that Peace Parks may possibly create whilst the tensions and conflicts that interaction in TBPAs may also generate are largely bypassed. In reality, bi-national and cultural tensions and friction characterise Peace Parks in Southern Africa¹, with often detrimental effects on policy making and implementation.

¹ ‘Cultural conflict’ is a rather loose container of conflict explanation which can disguise a lot of other important issues. Cultural conflicts may be overlain with other conflicts that have their roots in issues of class, education, language and so on (Dahrendorf, 1959; Kaschula and Anthonissen, 1995; Back, 1996). It is beyond this chapter to fully explore the extent to which cultural conflicts are linked to such other issues. However, where cultural conflicts are seen to be linked to or caused by other factors this will be noted. Furthermore, to further contextualise ‘cultural conflict’ between South Africa and its neighbours in TBPAs it will be situated in the wider economic and historic contexts shaping co-operation in Peace Parks.
Because of the cross-border context in which it takes place, cross-border interaction in TBPAs can easily evoke and be hampered by bi-national competition and cultural conflicts and prejudices (Gangster et al, 1997; Fall, 2003a). Existing cultural prejudice and national competition are furthermore easily reinforced when there are considerable imbalances in economic capacity and power, as is the case between South Africa and neighbouring countries. Moreover, where prolonged contacts and communication in Peace Parks do result in friendly relations at the project level, the political impact of these upon wider international relations tends to be relatively limited, due to the hierarchical structure of decision-making in TBPAs.

Figure 7.1 A  Picture used to illustrate claim by proponents of Peace Parks that cross-border contacts in TBPAs will create international friendship and understanding Source: Hanks (2002: 34).
In reviewing the dynamics of co-operation in TBPAs, this chapter will first pay attention to dominant views in Peace Parks rhetoric on bi-lateral collaboration. The second section provides insight into the limitations of these expectations. It discusses various examples in which bi-national collaboration in Southern Africa’s Peace Parks has produced and been undermined by cultural clashes and misunderstandings. The third section highlights how previous conflicts between

---

2 Forms of cultural tension are unlikely to be limited to the inter-state level. Given the rich ethnic and racial composition of most Southern African states, these issues could be as pronounced and perhaps even more so at the intra-state level, as Wels’ (2000) work, for example, shows with regard to inter-racial co-operation in Zimbabwe’s conservation sector. However, as this chapter sets out to critically examine the notion offered by the proponents of TBPAs that the cross-border contacts in TBPAs will produce increased cross-border friendship and understanding, its focus will be on the role of cultural tension at the inter-state level.
South Africa and neighbouring countries during the apartheid era and persistent economic disparities between them may further increase the likelihood of cultural conflicts and their effects upon co-operation. The last section considers how binational relations may further develop in a context where there has been considerable cultural friction.

7.2. Optimistic conservationist and pan-Africanist outlooks on co-operation in TBPAs

Proponents of Peace Parks emphasise how the increased cross-border contact and communication will enhance international friendship and understanding. However, with the advancement of dialogue and co-operation in TBPAs in Southern Africa, cultural conflicts and nationalist sentiments have come to increasingly hamper co-operation. An important underlying reason is that participants from different countries will often enter the process with different cultural mindsets and values. This increases the likelihood that the co-operating nationalities will have different wishes and expectations regarding the co-operation, which may lead to misunderstandings and conflict. When persistent, the resulting cultural struggles may increase cultural prejudice, and increase nationalist sentiments rather than decreasing them. This is because national affiliation generally supersedes identification with a regional identity in TBPAs, meaning that cultural struggles and misunderstandings can easily reinforce national divisions (Fall, 2003a, 2003b). In spite of the presupposed ‘neutral’ nature of transboundary environmental co-operation and the emphasis on a shared Southern African cultural identity, Peace Parks in Southern Africa are not exempt from this risk. Partially as a result of their different colonial histories, different racial and ethnic compositions, and also different economic status, significant cultural differences can be detected between South Africa and its neighbours.

Proponents of transboundary co-operation often present environmental co-operation as a relatively ‘neutral’ and straightforward policy terrain compared to other, more “politically charged” (Anon., 2000) ‘higher politics’ arenas, such as
security. It is furthermore stressed that countries have strong mutual interests in managing shared natural resources which implicitly suggests an overlap and similarity in interests in this area. Hamilton et al. sum up this view in their assertion that “protected areas that share common borders share common problems” (1996: 1). This would suggest that it would be relatively easy and straightforward for the co-operating nationalities in Peace Parks to find ‘common ground’, binding them. However, even between adjacent countries sharing natural areas which are largely similar in natural features on both sides of the boundary, it may, in fact, be difficult to construct shared policy outlooks, as is required for successful and far-reaching transboundary environmental co-operation (Fall, 2003a). What countries perceive as environmental priorities and worth conserving may differ between countries, due to different cultural traditions and outlooks on conservation. 3 As noted in Chapter 1, France and Germany, for example, differ significantly in their opinions of what a TBPA should involve. While for the French the notion of conservation can also include cultural heritage, for the Germans it is generally limited to nature conservation (Fall, 2003b: 97).

Pointing to the ‘artificial’ nature of their national boundaries, proponents of Peace Parks in Southern Africa stress the existence of a common African cultural heritage. Linking these presupposed cultural communalities to the shared natural spaces between South Africa and its neighbours, advocates of Peace Parks create the impression that co-operation in TBPA will be straightforward and little hindered by cultural struggles along national lines. For example, at the official translocation of South Africa’s Kruger elephants into adjacent Mozambican territory the South African Minister of Tourism and Environmental Affairs Valli Moosa emphasised how Mozambique, Zimbabwe and South Africa “share a rich history; our people have the same roots” and then underpinned this notion by making reference to their shared natural spaces: “we have the same river, the Limpopo, giving life to the plant and animal kingdoms in our countries”4. The

3 In addition to reasons that are related more to ‘higher politics’, such as differing strategic interests of states in their borderlands, and colliding economic interests in TBPA.

4 Observed in my capacity as an invitee to the elephant translocation ceremony in October 2001.
rooting of shared regional cultures and regional identities in ‘nature’ rather than in race or ethnicity furthermore enables that not just black Africans, but also white and Asian inhabitants of Southern Africa whose linkage to the land does not precede colonialism, can share in this presupposed common regional identity based on shared ‘Africaness’ (Draper and Wels, 2002). This construct downplays the conflict potential between South Africa and its neighbours, considering that the majority of personnel of the environmental and conservation bodies involved in Peace Parks on the South African side are Whites, who, under the previous regime, often held antagonistic relations with black Africans across the border (see section 2.5).

Initiators of Peace Parks suggest that this construct of shared Africaness has been little affected by the ‘artificial’ national boundaries drawn under colonialism (Van Amerom and Büscher, 2005). During the ‘fence cutting ceremony’ in December 2002 in the Great Limpopo, Mozambique’s Minister of Tourism Fernando Sumbana heralded the removal of the border fence between the Kruger Park and Mozambique as a victory of African unity over the attempts by South Africa’s previous apartheid regime to separate the people of Mozambique and South Africa (DEAT, 2002). In addition, proponents of Peace Parks point out that transboundary communities already engaged in TBNRM well before colonialism (Griffin et al., 1999; Van der Linde et al., 2001: 7). Frequent references are also made to the shared cultural traditions and heritage of participating transnational ethnic communities. Altogether, such references give credence to the notion that the co-operation in TBPAs between South Africa and neighbouring countries is a logical if not ‘natural’ continuation of past practices, which were merely interrupted by colonialism. Combined with the fact that the presupposed cultural communalities between South Africa and its neighbouring countries are linked to and seen as reinforced by their shared natural spaces, this creates an impression that it is regional affiliations which will dominate co-operation in Peace Parks, rather than national affiliation. Altogether, the above-outlined references to a presupposed shared African heritage and shared cultural norms by proponents of

5 Of which, however, only very small sections had been removed.
Peace Parks suggest that cultural clashes and misunderstandings and national sentiments will not, or only marginally, affect transboundary conservation in Southern Africa, it being a ‘natural’ outcome of pre-colonial traditions and structures.

7.3 Cultural dimensions of conservation outlooks

Whilst it is certainly true that in Southern Africa cultural differences are not necessarily mainly linked to and defined by the concept of ‘the nation-state’ there nevertheless exist considerable cultural differences between South Africa and neighbouring states that may affect their co-operation in TBPAs. For one thing, contrasting views on that which constitutes ‘good conservation practice’ in parks can partially reflect different cultural mindsets towards conservation, based on different histories and traditions of conservation. As Chapter 5 highlighted, Mozambique and South Africa differ considerably in their conceptualisation of what the Great Limpopo TBPA should look like. While the Mozambicans generally prefer a conservation model allowing for human inhabitation of parks and agricultural land use, South Africa fiercely rejects this idea. These clashing preferences over what a protected area should involve appear rooted in the different conservation models pursued in colonial times and under apartheid in these countries. The Portuguese colonisers of Mozambique became involved much later and were on the whole less active than their counterparts in South Africa in the area of wildlife conservation (Anstey, 2001). While the South African Kruger Park was established in 1926, the Banhine and Zinave National Parks across the boundary were only gazetted in 1972. Furthermore, and contrary to South Africa’s traditions, economic exploitation, for example through timber

---

6 National boundaries drawn under colonialism rarely coincided with ethnic and cultural boundaries (see also section 3.4). In combination with the presence of many different racial groups, ‘nation-state’ can therefore not be assumed to be a surrogate for culture. It is, however, one important defining factor.

7 South African conservation authorities generally perceive this concept as being incompatible with the sustainable usage of resources and oppose the presence of human settlements in these conservation areas. For Mozambican conservation authorities the two are not necessarily in conflict.
concessions in conservation areas, rather than preservationist attitudes tended to inform Portuguese conservationist practice in Mozambique (Black and Schafer, 2003: 2-3). The Banhine and Zinave National Parks were originally designated as hunting areas ('coutadas') for example. The Coutada 16 area was not gazetted as a National Park until after independence. Furthermore, the Portuguese did not necessarily perceive human habitation of conservation areas as irreconcilable with conservation goals (Anon., 2001: 15-16), contrary to the South Africans who evicted local communities in the process of creating national parks.

Post-colonial conservation practises in Mozambique show a strong “element of continuity” (Black and Schafer, 2003: 4) with these pre-colonial practices of conservation, as they do in South Africa (Steenkamp and Grossman, 2001; Steenkamp 2002). For Mozambique, economic exploitation and the human habitation of conservation areas continue to be seen as compatible with conservation practice (Anstey, 2001: 80-81; Munthali and Soto, 2001; Black and Schafer 2003: 4) (see also section 5.2.3 and 5.2.4). Although South Africa’s post-apartheid ANC government has formally adopted a less preservationist approach than its predecessors, preservationist attitudes towards conservation continue to inform conservation practice, as reflected in South Africa’s adherence to a preservationist model of conservation in its Peace Parks with neighbouring countries (Steenkamp and Grossman, 2001; Hughes, 2002).

The impact of cultural differences between South Africa and neighbouring countries is not limited to different ideals as to what the ‘end product’ should look like. Different cultural values and norms between South Africa and its neighbours can also result in conflicting views of what constitutes ‘good co-operation practice’. This is problematic. Where the expectations regarding ‘good co-operation practice’ of a given nationality are not being met by their partners, tensions and distrust may erupt. However, because culture consists of unwritten codes, participants in TBPAs will frequently not be aware of their counterparts’ differing expectations and views regarding the ways in which the co-operation should be conducted. This means that even in a situation where the parties involved enter the process with considerable goodwill, cultural misunderstandings
and conflicts often arise. Tensions surrounding co-operation in the Maloti/Drakensberg illustrate this phenomenon.

7.4 Cultural misunderstandings and strife in Peace Parks

Relations between the Basotho and the South African delegations in the Maloti/Drakensberg were put under significant strain by a cultural misunderstanding. Policy workshops on the Maloti/Drakensberg frequently last for two days while their location tends to alternate between Lesotho and South Africa. During one of the two-day workshops held in Maseru in 2002 the Basotho delegation amicably urged their South African counterparts to sojourn in Lesotho. While this proposal was partially offered for practical considerations, the travel distance to Lesotho being relatively long for some South African participants, the invitation also symbolised a gesture of goodwill and friendship. The Basotho perceived the overnight stay of the South Africans as an important means to further strengthen ties with their partners. However, declaring that their close proximity to Maseru did not require them to stay over in Lesotho, South African delegates from the adjacent Kwa-Zulu Natal province declined the Basotho invitation. The rejection of their friendly offer infuriated the Basotho, who interpreted it as a sign of disrespect and even racism and who perceived that the Kwa-Zulu Natal Nature Conservation Board (KZNNCB) was driven by “hidden agendas” (Anonymous Source Ministry of Tourism, Culture and Environment (Lesotho), 2002). Most KZZNB delegates had no intention of causing offence, however, or to snub their neighbours. Perceiving the invitation purely in practical

---

8 This is particularly true for the informal aspects of co-operation, where as opposed to formal negotiations or 'the official programme', expectations surrounding behaviour and activities tend to be unarticulated and unstructured. The development of good informal contacts between the parties involved is, however, a crucial ingredient in successful transboundary co-operation, including in Peace Parks (Griffin et al., 1999: 35).

9 Especially those coming from Pretoria, such as DEAT representatives. Many other South Africans participating in the Malotì-Drakensberg are provincial delegates from Kwa-Zulu Natal, the Free State and the Eastern Cape, South African provinces bordering Lesotho.

10 The majority of the KZN delegation consists of white British South Africans.
terms, the delegation from adjacent KwaZulu-Natal (KZN) had been oblivious to the hidden message the invitation contained.

The impact of conflicting cultural expectations and mindsets towards co-operation can profoundly affect the relations of the participants in a cross-border context. Problematically, one cultural misunderstanding is likely to lead to another. When the cultural misunderstanding is not resolved or clarified, there may be a ‘domino effect’, with the ‘aggrieved actor’ seeking to ‘retaliate’ to reassert their position. Unaware that there is a problem, the party at which the retaliation is aimed is in turn likely to feel puzzled and angered, further increasing alienation and mutual distrust.

Co-operative processes in the Maloti/Drakensberg seem to have suffered from just such a ‘domino effect’. During the next two-day workshop on the Maloti/Drakensberg TBPA held in Lesotho, most Basotho participants left the hotel where the workshop had been held, and where the South Africans would stay overnight, straight after the meeting, leaving their South African guests to ‘fetch for themselves’. This behaviour was considered rude by the participating South Africans\(^\text{11}\) and indicative of ‘disinterest’. To limit the effects of cultural misunderstandings it is hence essential that they are addressed as soon as possible. Especially in the early stages, before trust and mutual understanding have had a chance to develop between the co-operating parties, dissatisfaction may not be openly communicated and expressed by the ‘aggrieved’ party. This in turn increases the chances that the second party will not immediately recognise there is a problem, by not detecting their partner’s resentment and anger.

Cultural differences between South Africa and neighbouring countries in modes of communication may further complicate the detection and management of cultural conflict. South Africans tend to express and communicate their opinions rather directly. Used to conflicts being expressed ‘on the spot’ and in direct terms,

\(^{11}\) Which now also included the KZN mission as overnight guests on the request of other South African parties in a bridging attempt.
South Africans may assume there not to be a problem if nothing is articulated. This dilemma is, for example, recognisable in the negotiations on the management plan for the Great Limpopo in 2001 between Mozambique and South Africa. Whilst unhappy with the policy position of the South Africans on issues such as the distribution of tourism revenue and security arrangements in the Great Limpopo, the Mozambican delegation did not express their dissatisfaction openly during the policy workshops leading up to the management plan. Feelings of disagreement were expressed in very polite and rather circumspect ways and not necessarily in formal settings. Behind the scenes the Mozambicans frequently complained of being ‘bulldozed’ by their South African partners, however. The lack of fierce or direct opposition from the Mozambicans induced many South Africans to believe that the Mozambicans had agreed with the decisions and were as eager to implement these as the South Africans. The approval by the Mozambican Cabinet in November 2001 of the draft international treaty composed by Great Limpopo’s Technical Committee in which all three countries have a seat (Braack, 2002b) reinforced this impression, as South Africa took it as confirmation that previously contested issues had been successfully negotiated. In reality, there was great resentment on the Mozambican side, with delegates complaining that they felt ignored and sidelined by their South Africans ‘partners’. Left unaddressed, this resentment eventually affected the policy process. For example, the signing of the treaty for the Great Limpopo, which required a presidential signature and ratification by Parliament, was severely delayed by Mozambique for “no apparent reason” (Combrink, Interview, 2001). This had the effects, amongst others, that the Great Limpopo Park could not be

---


13 The lack of Portuguese-speaking translators during the workshops, held in English, furthermore limited possibilities for the Mozambicans to eloquently state their opinions.

14 In this sense, Mozambican-South African co-operation in the Great Limpopo followed similar patterns as their earlier co-operation in the Maputo Corridor (Arkwright, Interview, 2001), where misunderstandings also arose as a result of these different cultural codes of communication.

15 Mozambique only agreed to sign the treaty more than a year later, on 9 December 2002.
promoted and gather international accreditation at the international Earth Summit, which was held in South Africa (Johannesburg) from the 26th of August to 6 September 2001, as South Africa had hoped for (Combrink, Interview, 2002). When Mozambique failed to sign within the expected time frame, many of the South Africans in turn felt cheated and trust in the Mozambicans wavered.

7.5 Cultural differences and national divisions

By highlighting the differences between participating countries and by promoting conflict, cultural misunderstandings can easily deepen cross-border divisions. This will be particularly the case when the cultural misunderstandings feed into the prejudices of the nationalities concerned. Problematically, the chances of this occurring are relatively high. The prevalence is because of two interlinked reasons. Firstly, as several of the examples outlined above indicate, notwithstanding the pan-African rhetoric, in Peace Parks national affiliation tends to override identification with a shared regional African identity with most participants in TBPAs first and foremost identifying themselves with the country they represent. As Brubaker (2004: 116) notes: “Nationhood is not an ethnodemographic or ethnocultural fact; it is a political claim”. At higher levels such divisions are illustrated in the “often very hard and shrewd negotiations [that] accompany the drafting of agreements and treaties, equitable benefits and sharing of costs being the bottom line” for the participating governments (Braack, 2002: 16). Nationalist feelings and loyalties often determine the positioning of individuals involved in formulating and implementing policy in TBPAs at lower levels.¹⁶ For instance, the Botswana and South African governments initially differed regarding the distribution of tourism income in the Kgalagadi Park, with South Africa opposing a division on the basis of a fifty fifty share, as demanded by Botswana (Van Amerom, 2002). This put significant strain on relations

¹⁶ Naturally, representatives of a given Southern African country will also be frequently expected to pursue a policy line in Peace Parks that follows that of their government. Such limitations will particularly apply strongly to civil servants. This is not the sole reason, however. Even in areas where participants in Peace Parks can act relatively independently of the wishes of the governments or organisations they represent and compose policy in a given area in cooperation with their counterparts over the boundary, participants in TBPAs are often predisposed to act in line with the interests and activities of their fellow countrymen, rather than those of their counterparts. Nationalist considerations and sentiments play an important role in this.
between delegates from both countries (Modishe, Interview, 2002). In spite of the generally strong identification with the TBPA project and the existence of considerable goodwill and understanding between the delegates involved, for the duration of this conflict, participants from both countries strongly and increasingly identified themselves in terms of 'us' and 'them', implicitly putting the perceived interests of their country first and above those of their neighbours. The development of cross-border relations at ground level in TBPAs is therefore dependent on wider inter-governmental relations and vulnerable to fall-outs at this level.

Bureaucratic loyalties may further strengthen divisions by national affiliation. Many participants in Peace Parks are part of and represent government bureaucracies, on the basis of which they tend to firmly base themselves on the side of the country they represent, even when they have a different nationality. It was furthermore notable that interviewed governmental officials who held the same ethnic identity as those of their colleagues across the boundary did not perceive themselves as belonging to a similar group with shared interests. Further hindering a demise of nationalist loyalties is that 'the other side' often holds the tacit expectation that the motives and behaviour of a given participant will be driven foremost by national affiliations even when a participant may actually feel connected to both countries involved. The experience of a former Sotho participant in the Maloti/Drakensberg TBPA who was born in Lesotho but grew up in and represented South Africa illustrates this phenomenon. Asked whether her Sotho origin had facilitated her dealing with the Lesotho delegation she indicated that this had been far from the case. Most Lesotho delegates had labelled her as 'South African' in spite of her Lesotho nationality and expected her to act first and foremost in the interests of that country. 17 (Ramoreboli, Interview, 2002).

17 On the other hand, although, on the whole, they do little to challenge the dominant role of national affiliation in Peace Parks, shared ethnic origins between participants from different countries can make an important contribution to the process, making it easier to understand the way the Other across the boundary thinks.
The dominance of national affiliation in co-operation in Southern Africa’s TBPAs increases in turn the chances of cultural conflicts occurring and evoking and strengthening nationalist sentiments. To understand this process it is useful to briefly consider the ‘starting-point’ situation in cross-border co-operation. As a means to function socially and make sense of their world, humans are predisposed to seeking and being influenced by membership of various social groups (Mead, 1934; Goffman, 1959). Whilst identification and social cohesion with fellow group members tend to be strong, this is often far less the case with individuals belonging to other social groups, who tend to be perceived as markedly different and removed from the Self. Furthermore, in the course of this process those belonging to different groups, are frequently categorised as less valuable in order to preserve group identity. The greater the social distance between groups, the sharper the divisions between ‘us’ and ‘them’. Stereotyping the Other is an important way to maintain such divisions (Wels, 2000: 46). In a transboundary context, national affiliation tends to be the most powerful way of distinguishing between Self and Other. Boundaries not only divide space but also people, by creating and reinforcing epistemological divisions between ‘we and the Other’ (Paasi, 1991). Ó Tuathail (1996: 15) aptly observes how:

the struggle over geography is also a conflict between competing images and imaginings, a contest of power and resistance that involves not only struggles to represent the materiality of physical geographic objects and boundaries but also the equally powerful and, in a different manner, the equally material force of discursive borders between an idealized Self and a demonised Other, between ‘us’ and ‘them’.

Transboundary co-operation requires rapprochement and integration between groups. However, due to the previous conditioning, participants in TBPAs are at the start of the co-operation likely to be endowed with considerable prejudices and distrust concerning their ‘partners’ even when they accept the need to cooperate (Wels, 2000; Fall, 2003a). Persistent cultural misunderstandings and conflicts increase the distance between the Self and the Other, making it more
difficult to ‘build bridges’. This will in turn reduce the willingness or ability to successfully negotiate cultural differences.

![Image](image_url)

**Figure 7.2** Identity construction in relation to the ‘Other’


### 7.6 Cross-border co-operation in a context of past conflict and disparate development levels

#### 7.6.1 Introduction

The development of co-operation will depend to a considerable extent on the historical and economic contexts in which it takes place (Wels, 2000). TBPAs are no exception. Problematically, the history of conflict between South Africa and many of its neighbours in the 1990s, coupled with the economic inequalities and power disparities between South Africa and neighbouring countries negatively affect collaboration in Southern Africa’s Peace Parks. Wels (2000) notes how co-operation in natural resource management between relatively powerless and relatively powerful actors is likely to be characterised by considerable distrust on the side of the weaker actors. This is particularly likely when the relatively

---

¹⁸ Free translation from text: (approaching Smurf, first picture) “Listen! From now on I am a Smurf from the North and you’re one from the South! Tell me if...”. (departing Smurf, second picture). “Personally, I don’t really talk with Northern Smurfs!” This source was brought to my attention by Fall, 2003a.
marginalised partner has been exploited or threatened in the past, and these feelings prevail. Consequently, the impact that inequality in economic position and political power between countries can have upon their co-operation in Peace Parks will not just be shaped by the nature of their interactions in the present, but is also likely to be at least partially informed by the nature of past interaction. Remaining antagonism will increase the chances that the parties “look and judge each other with a value-laden perception” (Wels, 2000: 46). On the other hand, Peace Parks are often set up with the objective of “healing” these “wounds of the past” (Koch, 1998: 54). However, the overall inequality in working relationships between South Africa and neighbouring countries coupled with the fact that South Africa is perceived to benefit the most, means that co-operation on this basis is in itself not a guarantee for rapprochement. Altogether, distrust of the stronger party’s intentions by the weaker party and associated nationalist sentiments and fears of loss of sovereignty are likely to feature particularly strongly in transboundary co-operation in a post-conflict situation. Rather than smoothing over existing antagonisms, co-operation may be used as a forum for the weaker actor to reassert its power vis-à-vis its stronger counterpart or even as a means to settle ‘outstanding scores’. Such tendencies can easily hamper collaboration. Co-operation between Lesotho and South Africa in the Maloti/Drakensberg reflects just such a situation.

7.6.2 Old antagonisms and nationalist sentiments in the Maloti/Drakensberg

Lesotho’s actions in the Maloti/Drakensberg have arisen in response to its past experiences with South Africa and its marginal power position vis-à-vis its larger neighbour. Lesotho, sometimes jokingly called ‘South Africa’s tenth province’, has traditionally been dominated by South Africa, both in economic and political terms. The previous apartheid regime often embarked on raids in Lesotho to pursue ANC fighters or stolen cattle from the Free State (Coplan, 2001) and eventually promoted the establishment of a pro-South African regime (see footnote 14, chapter 2). The demise of apartheid did little to improve relations between the two countries. The ANC was initially not favourably disposed

---

19 A good example of the latter is Namibia’s attempt to link its demands over the position of the boundary to the creation of the Ai-Ais/Richtersveld (see Chapter 6).
towards the Lesotho government, which it perceived as a traitor to the black liberation struggle. Furthermore, a South Africa led invasion of Lesotho in 1998 to prevent a coup, made Lesotho “awash with anti-South African sentiment” (Mail and Guardian, 1998). Violent encounters in the Lesotho-South African borderlands during which South African soldiers and tourists were killed illustrate this phenomenon in its most extreme form (Sumner, Interview, 2002; Coplan, Interview, 2003). Although South Africa has in the meantime adopted a reconcilatory approach, Lesotho continues to be very wary of domination by its larger neighbour, and this can be seen reflected in the negotiations over Peace Parks.\textsuperscript{20} The Maloti/Drakensberg’s management model bears witness to these concerns. Contrary to the management model employed in the Great Limpopo, both sides have their own fixed co-ordinator. Whilst this management model is partially dictated by organisational considerations (Zunckel, 2002), an important reason for this choice was that a rotating approach as in the Great Limpopo\textsuperscript{21} was rejected by Lesotho. For the Basotho it was unacceptable to stay under South Africa’s leadership, even if only temporarily (Groenewald, Interview, 2000).

In spite of these ‘institutional safeguards’, asserting and protecting its position as an independent state have remained prime motivators informing Lesotho’s actions in the Maloti/Drakensberg.\textsuperscript{22} This is reflected in the difficulties and delays which preceded the signing of the MoU between Lesotho and DEAT on 11 June 2001.

\textsuperscript{20} Furthermore, the length of Basotho-South African co-operation in the Maloti-Drakensberg, dating back more than a decade, has done little to counter the effects of the more problematic aspects of Lesotho’s relations with South Africa. Most of the trust and friendly relations built up in the course of this co-operation have been lost, as a result of personnel changes on both sides (Sandwith, Interview, 2002).

\textsuperscript{21} See footnote 5 in Chapter 2.

\textsuperscript{22} In the light of historic developments and the organisational set up of the TBPA, this is perhaps not surprising. Peace Parks will increase South Africa’s involvement in Lesotho’s borderland. This is however politically sensitive. South African troops were dispatched to the Katse Dam in the Maloti Mountains during the South African invasion of Lesotho in 1998, allegedly to protect South Africa’s water supply from the area. In this process several Basotho were shot (Bremmer and Gilmore, 2000). Furthermore, institutions on the South African side involved in the TBPA greatly outnumber those on the Lesotho side. Coupled with more expertise and resources on the South African side, this could give South Africa a comparative advantage in decision-making in the Maloti/Drakensberg.
While the outlining of the goals of and strategies for the co-operation in the Maloti/Drakensberg and the responsibilities of each country in this area was an important aim in itself, another important objective of signing the MoU was to enable Lesotho and South Africa to start receiving the GEF funding allocated to the project (Groenewald, Interview, 2002; Warner, Interview, 2002).

Concern over loss of sovereignty and nationalist sentiments on the Lesotho side complicated the signing of the MoU at two intervals. Because co-operation in the Maloti/Drakensberg had been largely between Lesotho and KZN, it had initially been planned that Lesotho would sign another, updated MoU with KZN for which a preliminary date had already been set at the start of 2001. Rather unexpectedly Lesotho changed its mind and held that the MoU be signed with DEAT instead. As “a fellow sovereign state” it was felt that signing a treaty with ‘just’ a province insufficiently reflected Lesotho’s status, requiring that the treaty be signed in South Africa at central government level as well. This required, however, that negotiations between DEAT and KZN had to be initialised and completed, causing major delays.

Sovereignty concerns on the Lesotho side also endangered the signing of the subsequent MoU with DEAT (Government of the Kingdom of Lesotho, 2001), the ceremony of which was to be held in Pretoria. A few days before the ceremony was to take place the Basotho delegation decided against going to Pretoria, since it was felt that it was not in the interest of Lesotho “as an independent state” to travel to South Africa for the MoU to be signed (Groenewald, Interview, 2002). South Africans who had been co-operating closely with the Lesotho delegation requested Lesotho’s prime minister to intervene, who complied with this request. Paradoxically, whilst it is precisely in a context of tense international relations that the peace-building potential of TBPAs can make its biggest impact, it is arguably in this context that reaching this objective is the most difficult.

23 In 1998 an MoU was signed between the Lesotho Ministry of Environment, Gender and Youth Affairs, the predecessor of today’s Ministry of Tourism, Environment and Culture, and the KwaZulu-Natal Nature Conservation Services.
7.6.3 Economic inequalities and cultural misunderstandings

Economic inequalities, together with political inequalities between South Africa and neighbouring countries increase the chances that past conflicts will continue to cast a shadow over present day co-operation. Moreover, the significant economic inequalities between South Africa and neighbouring countries also increase the likelihood of cultural conflict. While the nature of stereotypes and prejudices is influenced by multiple factors, disparities between countries seem to be an important shaping factor. In a context where a country is militarily, economically and politically stronger than its neighbours, citizens of the stronger state may be easily perceived as arrogant" by the citizens of weaker, neighbouring states. For example, citizens of both the United States and South Africa, both regional ‘hegemons’, are frequently labelled and perceived in precisely these terms by citizens in neighboring countries (Schmidt, 1997; Mabuza, Interview, 2001; Vieira, Interview, 2002). Conversely, citizens of the more developed state may be inclined to perceive and label their neighbours as ‘weak’, ‘undependable’ and ‘inefficient’ (Schmidt, 1997; Munthali and Soto, 2001: 23-24). Where cultural stereotypes and prejudices between inhabitants of adjacent countries have their roots in uneven capacities, transboundary co-operation may increase cultural clashes and prejudice by highlighting or reinforcing these different cultural habits.

The cultural prejudices outlined above can be easily reinforced during the process of co-operation between ‘stronger’ and ‘weaker’ states. Firstly, the values and expectations of participants of a given country will be shaped by the existing modus operandi in ‘doing business’ in these countries and by available resources. Because business practice tends to differ between ‘developed’ and ‘less developed’ states, the likelihood that the co-operating states have different cultural mindsets towards co-operation increases.

For example, it is notable that societies that are still very much agricultural tend to have more flexible interpretations of time and deadlines than industrialised ones, where strict adherence to time frames is often considered to be of pivotal importance. In the context of co-operation in Southern Africa, disparate expectations of the manner and time frame may be aggravated by racial
influences. As a society whose economic and political structures were for long
dominated by Whites\textsuperscript{24}, South Africa is generally identified as being rather more
‘Western’, especially in its business practice, than neighbouring countries
(Warner, Interview, 2002). Still largely controlled by whites, the conservation
sector in South Africa can be seen to be particularly informed by ‘Western’
approaches and attitudes towards business, which centralise a rational approach in
which effective planning and time-keeping is seen as crucial (Jang and Chung,
1997: 64). Non-Western or less ‘westernised’ societies, which tend to be less
individual-oriented and more ‘collective’ in outlook, usually do not allocate such
a central place to efficiency, the basic principle of organisations being
‘relationships’. This principle may mean that rather than fulfilling their work
‘targets’, a given individual’s priority is to maintain his or her position in the
collective by maintaining high quality and ‘appropriate’ relationships with fellow
members in the organisation (Globokar, 1997; Jang and Chung, 1997: 64). In
more hierarchically organised societies, seniority tends moreover to occupy a
pivotal role in organisational relationships, whereby respect for or acting out of a
position of seniority may sometimes be more important than ‘professionalism’,
“knowing and doing one’s own task to the best of one’s ability” (Globokar, 1997:
79) and within set time limits. In ‘traditional’ Southern African societies, by
whose norms South Africa’s neighbouring states tend to be still more informed
than ‘modernist’ South Africa, professionalism and keeping to time schedules
may be less of a concern than ensuring that seniority is respected and that all
interested parties have been consulted before undertaking any action (Ross, 2004:
12-15). Figure 7.3 contrasts these different outlooks on ‘doing business’.

When operating from these two different starting-points, South Africans and
citizens of a neighbouring state may follow a very different ‘logic’ and
‘reasoning’ in undertaking business, that can easily generate misunderstanding. A
good example can be found in the Maloti/Drakensberg. To be able to access the
remaining $5 million of their $6 million GEF grant, it was required that Lesotho
finish an audit before a certain point in time. However, due to various unforeseen

\textsuperscript{24} Who although residing in Africa often “tend to represent themselves as First World-oriented
and even actually belonging to the (European) First World” (Wels, 2000: 41).
factors, including the departure of an accountant, missing papers and so on, the audit did not get completed on time. In order to stay eligible for the remainder of their $5 million grant Lesotho had to approach the World Bank, which had been appointed as the facilitator of the GEF grant, and ask for an extension as soon as possible. If this request were not handed in on time, Lesotho would have lost the remainder of its $5 million grant after which the project as a whole would have had to stop.

![Figure 7.3 Different cultural outlooks on ‘doing business’ in Southern Africa](image)

Two days before the deadline the Lesotho delegation attended a policy workshop on TBPAs where various South Africans working on the Maloti/Drakensberg were also present. In informal chats, South Africans enquired how the audit was coming along, but the Basotho mentioned that they had not really had time to complete it. Subsequent pressure from the South African World Bank co-ordinator to receive the audit/or a request for extension was furthermore perceived by the Basotho as ‘intrusive’ and he was reminded that ‘Lesotho is a sovereign
state’. In the end, an extension was filed in time, by two South Africans involved in the project.

From a ‘Western’ perspective the delays on the Basotho side may appear illogical, as access to the grant was in Lesotho’s interest. On the Basotho side other issues played a role, however. To secure the papers needed for the audit the fired accountant had to be contacted, and pride on the side of his former superiors prevented action for long (Anonymous Source Peace Parks Foundation, 2002). Furthermore, Lesotho experienced the pressure from the World Bank in South Africa as ‘inappropriate’ and ‘intrusive’. Far from understanding the motivation of the World Bank, it made the Basotho distrustful of the intentions of this agency (Maloi, Interview, 2002; Warner, Interview, 2002). An important underlying reason is that the Basotho felt that the decision-making power was vested in them, and the World Bank was merely providing them a service. Therefore, over-running the deadlines did not appear a major problem, but something that could be relatively easily fixed. Similar attitudes played a role in Swaziland, where the responsible government officer refused to contact the World Bank office in Washington over the grant possibility, feeling that “if they are genuinely interested, they can contact me” (Anonymous Source Swazi National Trust, Interview, 2001). The World Bank co-ordinator in the Lubombo TBPA had to personally phone the Washington office to ensure that Swaziland obtained its funding for a TBPA project (Anonymous source World Bank, Interview, 2002).

Secondly, in a multicultural context, tensions related to economic and political power struggles are easily “superimposed” upon another (Dahrendorf, 1959) and may reinforce cultural biases and nationalist sentiments. For this reason, tensions that arise as a result of imbalances in capacity and prioritization of policy items between co-operating parties may, in a transboundary context, be translated into nationalist sentiments and reinforce existing cultural prejudices. Uneven development levels between countries will often mean that the ‘weaker’ country has less capacity to follow up agreements. Stronger countries can furthermore often be seen to prioritise transboundary co-operation more than their weaker counterparts, possibly because the latter has more outstanding and urgent policy areas to attend to. The weaker country may also feel that it will benefit in the first
instance far less than its stronger counterpart from the arrangements and therefore will be less motivated (see Chapter 5). Relatively high disparities in capacity and resources between countries increase the risk that one country may slowly start driving the agenda (or being perceived to do so by its partner(s)), which will quickly lead to "resentment and loss of true collaboration and co-operation" putting policy objectives at risk (Braack, 2002: 16). Where these different capacities and prioritisations result in the weaker partner 'lagging behind', the stronger country will often be inclined to interfere. This pattern was, for example, visible in co-operation between South Africa and Mozambique (see Chapter 5). However, by taking the lead, the stronger country may be perceived as 'arrogant' and 'aggressive' by its weaker neighbouring country, especially when the latter feels pushed. Vice versa, confronted by slow delivery rates and broken promises, the stronger party will easily see its existing prejudices of its neighbour as 'weak', 'ineffective' but also 'mercenary' confirmed (Schmidt, 1997). For example, when Mozambique and Zimbabwe failed to follow up agreed preparations, South Africa took it upon itself to draw the final version of the Strategic Integrated Tourism Plan for the Great Limpopo in February 2002 (Anonymous Source DEAT, Interview, 2003). This action was, however, perceived by Mozambicans and Zimbabweans as yet another sign of South African domination of the process and of "South African arrogance". South Africans, for their part, expressed disappointment over the lax attitude and "unreliability" of their partners (Anonymous Source DEAT, Interview, 2003).

7.7. The evolution of cross-border contacts and communication

On the basis of the examples outlined above, thus far cultural misunderstandings and nationalist sentiments have hampered co-operation in Southern Africa's TBPAs. On the other hand, proponents of transboundary co-operation maintain that cultural misunderstandings and tensions will vanish with time when the parties involved learn to better anticipate and understand each other's needs (Hamilton et al., 1999; Fall, 2003a). Indeed, co-operation is a learning process. Testifying to how co-operation improved over time, a former key representative of Zimbabwe in the Great Limpopo remarked that his relationship with the South
African co-ordinator had markedly improved over time as mutual needs became more apparent:

I feel we have come a long way. Don’t know about Leo [South African co-ordinator], but I feel we have become friends. But initially there were tensions. For instance Leo would compile a report in which Zimbabwe’s share was not explicitly mentioned. So I would then say to him: “Why is our contribution ignored?”. But now everything goes much better, we’ve really learned from each other.

The potential for similar developments in less advanced TBPAs seems great. Relations between participants from Botswana and South African in the Kgalagadi Park are reported to have gone through just such a process of confrontation and reconciliation (Modishe, Interview, 2002). An overwhelming majority of the interviewees believed that participation in TBPAs can stimulate better international relations and build bridges between countries. The willingness to do so was particularly strong on the part of the South African respondents. However, whilst increased exposure to the Other may help reduce initial tensions and misunderstandings and foster a sense of shared interests and understanding, this outcome is by no means fixed or a given. The social outcomes of co-operation will depend on contextual factors such as the compatibility of the personalities involved and the history of co-operation in a given TBPA. These factors are difficult to control and tend to be highly dynamic in character.

Furthermore, when not addressed, the vast inequality between South Africa and neighbouring countries is likely to remain an important constraint to rapprochement in Southern Africa’s Peace Parks. The opportunities for a settlement of differences and, following this, the building of international friendship in a post-conflict context will not just depend on historical interaction and present interaction, but is also shaped by expectations regarding the future. Differential power between South Africa and neighbouring countries increases the chance that benefits and costs are unevenly distributed to the advantage of South Africa or that this is perceived to be the case. This will make it harder for tensions to be healed and resolved, there being less incentives to do so. This point becomes
clearer when comparing Botswana-South African interaction in the Kgalagadi and Mozambican-South African interaction in the Great Limpopo. In both cases, negotiations with South Africa over the distribution of tourism revenue were tough and relatively conflict ridden and caused divisions between the two delegations. While South Africa did not want to share eco tourism benefits equally, this was a key wish for Botswana and Mozambique. Mostly because power differences are less pronounced for Botswana and South Africa, compared to South Africa and Mozambique (Van Amerom, 2004), Botswana eventually succeeded in its wish, unlike Mozambique. Partially as a result of this, relations between the Botswana and South African delegations quickly recovered, in spite of previous rifts. In the Great Limpopo however, perceptions and dissatisfaction on the Mozambican side that South Africa was playing ‘Big Brother’ deepened, causing further resentment.

Problematically, where co-operation in TBPAs does bring the various participants closer, the impact of this generated ‘international friendship and trust’ is likely to remain relatively limited and to do little to incite better cross-border relations on a wider scale. This is for two reasons. Firstly, the generated ‘social capital’ may be short-lived, considering that the turn-over in key jobs in TBPAs is relatively high. Reasons include high work pressure and demands coupled with relatively low salaries, fierce competition for jobs within organisations, stress and especially at provincial levels in South Africa, replacement of white personnel by blacks or newcomers from other disadvantages groups. For example, the two interviewees cited on co-operation in the Great Limpopo no longer work on this TBPA. When frequent and high in number, such replacements of participants in TBPAs are likely to mean that the process of getting to know the Other, recognise the needs across the boundary and negotiate cultural differences has to start from scratch. This is, for example, visible in the Maloti/Drakensberg. As illustrated, cultural tensions play a considerable role in this TBPA, despite co-operation dating back more than a decade. Relations with the previous team and the then South African co-ordinator had developed into warm friendships and mutual appreciation. However, personnel changes on the South African side meant that relationships with the South Africans had to be built almost from scratch again, increasing the likelihood of cultural tensions and distrust. More recent personnel changes in the
Maloti/Drakensberg are likely to compound this constraint. The South Africa SDI co-ordinator was laid off and the South African co-ordinator replaced, whilst on the Lesotho side, a new co-ordinator was also in the process of being appointed.

The second reason why friendship and co-operation at a wider level is likely to be limited is the top-down nature of decision-making in TBPAs meaning that friendly inter-personal ties at the ground level have little influence over governmental relations through an envisaged ‘trickle up effect’. Co-operation in the Ai-Ais/Richtersveld illustrates this point. Hostilities at inter-ministerial level over the position of the boundary (see Chapter 6) did not negatively affect relations on the ground. In fact, some interviewees in South Africa expressed considerable sympathy for the policy position of the Namibians, whilst a Namibian delegate blamed the Namibian government for the delay. Based on the co-operation with their counterparts, interviewees from both sides furthermore expressed a strong belief in the notion that TBPAs can build bridges across boundaries. However, decision-making power was vested at ministerial levels and in spite of the great willingness and motivation to resume co-operation at lower levels, it was only after higher political levels had calmed down that this became a possibility, which seemed related to ‘higher’ political considerations. The fact that the ministerial level influences the ground level more than conversely may furthermore limit prospects for the development of friendly relations at the ground level, thereby further limiting the possibility of a ‘trickle up’ effect. For example, during the two policy workshops on the Great Limpopo in July and August 2001 several new issues were raised and it became clear that the search for consensus between the various factions would require further deliberation. Realising this, the co-ordinator pleaded for additional time. However, there was great ministerial pressure, especially from South Africa, to complete the composition of a management plan in time, regardless of the situation. This pressure not only made it difficult to reach a compromise supported by all three parties, but also to recognise and successfully negotiate conflicts that arose due to cultural misunderstandings (Braack, Interview, 2002).

At the same time, TBPAs in Southern Africa allow for direct contacts between ministers through the Inter-Ministerial Committees in TBPAs, as well as directly
between presidents. As such, it could be argued that the contribution that co-operation in TBPAs can make to improved international relations would be far greater than in any other regional context. Although not easy to establish, since ministerial contacts usually take place behind closed doors, the outcomes of these contacts seem have had mixed results at best. For example, given the tensions surrounding the signing of the treaty of the Great Limpopo, it seems doubtful that the co-operation in TBPAs has contributed to better inter-ministerial relations between Mozambique and South Africa. Recent accusations by Mozambican and South African tourism ministries that Zimbabwe was “scuppering” development on its side of the Great Limpopo, also hint at emerging tensions between these two ministries and the Zimbabwean one (Chikanga, 2004). On the other hand, in the Maloti/Drakensberg TBPA the friendly and close relationship between the then South African Minister of Environmental Affairs and Tourism, Valli Moosa, and Lesotho’s Minister of Tourism, Culture and Environment, Lebohang Ntšinyi, was notable (see also Figure 7.5). This ministerial friendship is likely to have facilitated the transboundary co-operative process (Anonymous Source DEAT, Interview, 2003). It is notable that the many unexpected delays on the Lesotho side related to its sovereignty concerns were not met by increased South African pressure and irritation, which contrasts sharply with DEAT’s stand in the Great Limpopo. DEAT furthermore employs an understanding approach towards Lesotho’s sovereignty concerns (Jones, Interview, 2003). The high quality inter-ministerial relations are likely to have played a role in this. On the other hand, the impact of high quality relationships at the ministerial level upon the creation of TBPAs should not be overestimated. For one thing, their duration is limited, with most ministers changing office after four years.
Figure 7.5  Ministers Valli Moosa and Lebohang Ntšinyi return from a walk during a break in one of the bi-national policy meetings on the Maloti/Drakensberg TBPA.

Source: Kevin Zunckel, Program Co-ordinator Maloti/Drakensberg TBPA (for South Africa), Ezemvelo KZN Wildlife, 2003
7.8 Conclusion

This chapter has critically assessed the social dynamics of co-operation in Peace Parks. Contrary to the expectation that co-operation in TBPAs will create consensus between actors and promote better understanding between them, it has been suggested that the co-operation in Peace Parks may also generate considerable tensions, misunderstandings and friction. Particularly in its early stages, co-operation in a cross-border context is easily complicated by cultural differences in work patterns and communication. The uneven capacity and power distribution between South Africa and its neighbours furthermore significantly increases the likelihood of cultural conflicts occurring. On the other hand, with the passing of time, increased cross-border friendship and understanding might develop, depending on such factors as the ability of the participating parties to resolve conflict and the personalities involved. The historical and economic context in which the co-operation takes place may furthermore shape outcomes.

Even when the cross-border contacts of TBPAs do result in increased cross-border friendship and understanding, the effects upon inter-governmental relations at the highest level are likely to be limited due to the top-down nature of decision-making in Southern Africa’s TBPAs and because the individuals in TBPAs are frequently replaced.

The findings of this chapter indicate serious limitations to the popular notion that the transboundary contacts in TBPAs will almost by definition promote proponents’ claim of increased cross-border friendship and understanding, demonstrating that they can also generate considerable conflict. The previous two chapters discussing co-operation in TBPAs in the area of development and the redesigning of boundaries likewise indicated that co-operation in Peace Parks may easily generate conflict between the participating parties. Rather than assuming or hoping that TBPAs will by nature work as vehicles for increased cross-boundary friendship and understanding, it seems therefore more constructive to actively anticipate that they will also generate conflict and consider how this conflict can
best be resolved and mediated. The next and final chapter of this thesis considers this issue in more depth, after a summary of the main findings of the thesis.
8. General Conclusions

8.1 Introduction

This PhD has examined the political aspects of TBPAs in Southern Africa, with a focus on the ways in which TBPAs affect regional politics. An important wider aim of the research has been to establish if and under what circumstances TBPAs can act as vehicles for peace. In researching this issue, developments in the Great Limpopo have been particularly concentrated upon. Altogether, the findings indicate that the Southern African Peace Parks Project has become increasingly characterised by tensions and conflicts. Peace Parks both create new and add to existing regional conflict, as a result of which the environmental, socio-economic and political aims of TBPAs are increasingly difficult to achieve. At the same time, TBPAs have laid some important institutional foundations upon which future activities in TBPAs can build and which could promote the course of regional integration. The future course of TBPAs will greatly depend upon wider political developments in the region as well as institutional developments in TBPAs. Problematically, in their current set up TBPAs reinforce regional power inequalities, making them sites of domination and resistance. In addition, the vulnerability of TBPAs to political instability and violence is increased by the fact that such developments are rarely anticipated, and are met by management strategies that seek to contain the negative impacts of such developments as much as possible. Several policy measures can be developed to aid the development of more equal power structures and limit the negative impacts of wider political developments. Academic research can fulfil a supporting role.

The chapter starts off by linking the findings back to the questions and aims underpinning the research, thereby providing an insight into the scientific and social relevance of the findings. After this, the possible implications of the findings for the future performance of Southern Africa's Peace Parks is assessed and the wider consequences of the parks for conservation and international relations in the region. The final two sections are more practice oriented; listing respectively policy recommendations and the ways in which future academic research could play a supportive role in promoting more effective and balanced policy-making in TBPAs in Southern Africa and elsewhere.
8.2. Scientific and social relevance of the findings

To provide an insight into the scientific and social relevance of the findings this section relates the generated findings back to the research questions and goals (see section 1.6). Reflecting their mutual cohesion, the areas of inquiry concerning the research questions and goals are closely interlinked and may overlap. To avoid repetition, issues that could be discussed under several questions or goals will be outlined at the first opportunity. Later research questions/goals touching upon similar issues will then further build upon and refer back to the earlier discussion.

8.2.1 Addressing the research questions

1) To what extent is the fulfilment of the policy goals of TBPAs facilitated/hampered by economic and political processes at higher political levels and the interests deriving from these with regard to the spatial organisation and usage of land in borderlands?

The research indicates that TBPAs are simultaneously facilitated and hampered by economic and political processes and interests at higher levels. It would appear, however, that over time economic and political processes supporting the creation of TBPAs in a way that supports a realisation of their policy goals have become increasingly outweighed by economic and political processes constraining these objectives. Chapter 2 indicated that the quest for regional integration in post-apartheid Southern Africa coupled with the growing economic interests of Southern African states in ecotourism considerably facilitated the acquisition of high-level governmental support and goodwill for the creation of TBPAs in the region. Furthermore, the available financial support and push for TBPAs from the side of the NGO and donor communities was a crucial element in the acquisition of high-level political support for TBPAs. There are, however, various interests and processes at higher political levels which hamper the pursuit of the policy goals of TBPAs and increasingly outweigh the beneficial influence of the factors outlined above. Such problematic processes and interests are often related to wider struggles over economic power and territorial control between South Africa and neighbouring countries and
the fierce competition for land between landless black farmers and conservationists in Southern Africa. Table 8.1 offers additional details.

**Table 8.1** Interests and processes at higher political levels undermining TBPA policy objectives

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th><strong>Political/economic process</strong></th>
<th><strong>Translated into Peace Parks</strong></th>
<th><strong>Affected policy objective</strong></th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Economic neo-liberal approach to development</td>
<td>Privatisation of land acquisition and free competition regarding exploitation of tourism market</td>
<td>- CBNRM compromised by increasingly forcing communities off their land/denying them access - Poverty reduction limited by giving comparative advantage to already wealthy partners in terms of land access</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>‘Non judicial’ and drastic land reforms</td>
<td>Land invasions, rise in poaching</td>
<td>Effective wildlife conservation and ecotourism</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Importance of ‘shadow economy’ and smuggling for both local economies and some officials and politicians</td>
<td>Peace Parks targeted by criminal syndicates as convenient ‘transit corridors’</td>
<td>Removal of border fences</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Low prioritising of Peace Parks goals compared to other economic or ‘higher’ political interests</td>
<td>Involvement in Peace Parks de facto stopped (Zimbabwe)</td>
<td>No progress in connecting separate National Parks, damage to wildlife in region</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Competition between South Africa and neighbouring countries over economic and political domination of region.</td>
<td>‘Big Brother’ syndrome affects co-operation in Peace Parks</td>
<td>Co-operation hampered by conflict and distrust</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Struggles for land between landless black farmers and large-scale and usually white landowners, including conservationists</td>
<td>Competing interests in land use, Peace Parks’ supporters often seek to relocate local communities. Latter reluctant to co-operate.</td>
<td>Hampers CBNRM</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Differing economic interests and priorities in regional development and competition between ‘stronger’ and ‘weaker’</td>
<td>South Africa seeks greater control over borderlands in neighbouring countries where problematic flows of people</td>
<td>Harmonisation of laws and policy between South Africa and neighbouring countries with the latter reluctant to accede</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
The above-outlined economic and political processes and interests result in considerable strife over the spatial organisation and usage of borderlands, by creating many colliding interests between the collective of stakeholders in Peace Parks. These interests relate both to the ways in which the land is used and the desired approach to border management. Bearing witness to the multi-layered character of states, different state agencies are moreover likely to hold different interests. Table 8.2 provides an overview of the types of land use and border management desired by each interest group.

**Table 8.2  Competing interests regarding spatial organisation and land use in borderlands**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Stakeholder</th>
<th>Desired land use</th>
<th>Desired approach to border management</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Conservationist groups</td>
<td>Setting land aside for conservation, either in core zones only or through a core and buffer zone combination</td>
<td>Dismantling of boundary fences where these are perceived to stand in the way of wildlife migration corridors, removal of customs posts to outskirts of park, dissolving of internal border</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Local communities</td>
<td>Sustainable usage of natural</td>
<td>Free cross-border access</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

"states. and goods threaten its interests and seeks to use economic superiority to its advantage. National governmental interest in and tacit support for illegal cross-border activities Governmental factions opposed to Peace Parks and/or stricter security measures in borderlands Undermines safety and security, a prerequisite for successful ecotourism development Preservationist lobby relatively strong, especially with regard to influence on strongest player, South Africa Limitations on sustainable use. In relation to this, move away from TFCAs in favour of parks concept Hampers CBNRM Limited citizen rights due to mismanagement, corruption, intimidation. Reflected in lack of ability to exercise land rights Hampers CBNRM"
<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Resource Users</th>
<th>Actions</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>National security agencies</td>
<td>Keep land free from local communities in areas with security problems/important for national defence purposes</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Removal of boundary fences only where no security threats, maintenance of internal park boundaries if necessary</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>DEAT/SANPs</td>
<td>Remove local communities in neighbouring parts of TBPA to prevent poaching and/or environmental degradation. Respect rights to land of own local communities where these are legally protected, however with reservations on land use (limited detrimental effects to conservation) where possible</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Removal of boundary fences in interest of free wildlife migration and tourism traffic, but need for security acknowledged</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>PPF</td>
<td>Buy more land for conservation</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Removal of boundary fences in interest of free wildlife migration and tourism traffic, but need for security increasingly acknowledged</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Private sector (involved in ecotourism)</td>
<td>Acquire land most suitable to tourism development</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Removal of boundary fences to allow for free tourism traffic</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Private sector (interest in exploitation of ‘hard’ natural resources, like diamond mining)</td>
<td>Lobby government for mining or other economic activities or continuation of these activities in areas now part of TBPA (Richtersveld case)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Ensure more easy customs procedures facilitating cross-border trade, however ensure high security levels to prevent theft and smuggling of industrial output</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Non-preservationist oriented governments (Mozambique, Zimbabwe, to lesser extent Lesotho)</td>
<td>Mixed viewpoints:</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Agree with removal of local communities on premise of tourism benefits</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Resist South Africa’s attempts to control borderland</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Look after interests of own people</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Generally in favour of removal of border fences unless high chance of foot and mouth disease outbreak</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
2) What are the tensions between environmental and political goals of African states in their borderlands? How are the resulting policy objectives influenced and mediated by the involvement of non-state actors in the process, including NGOs and local communities?

Tensions between environmental and political goals of African states in their borderlands may take various forms. Firstly, where boundary fences fulfil an important barrier function in preventing transboundary crime and/or veterinary diseases from entering the country, a state’s security interests will often act against the removal of boundary fences. This can undermine a state’s environmental interests by hampering the creation of a ‘bio region’ within which wildlife can roam free. Given that natural areas in borderlands often constitute ideal sites for guerrilla welfare, states may also feel reluctant to remove boundary fences out of fear of strengthening armed dissidents by giving them greater opportunity to flee over the border or be provisioned from a neighbouring state. Secondly, a Southern African state’s interests in securing public support for its policies may hamper its environmental interests in borderlands for example by making the allocation of farming land to landless farmers a greater priority than reserving land for conservation or by selecting economic activities that cause environmental degradation, such as mining. Even the goals of states to economically develop borderlands by attracting more ecotourists to the area through the creation of Peace Parks may clash with their environmental interests, for expansion of tourism may undermine the carrying capacity of the environment (Bennett, 2000). Thirdly, fears of loss of sovereignty may deter a state from pursuing its environmental interests in borderlands through inter-state co-operation in TBPAs. The pursuit of transboundary conservation requires a relatively drastic harmonisation of land use and law and policy frameworks across boundaries. Such adaptations could harm or conflict with a state’s internal policy priorities. This risk seems especially great for relatively ‘weak’ states co-operating with a ‘strong’ state (Van Amerom, 2002). Stronger states may also seek to use TBPAs to extend their presence and say in borderlands of neighbouring states, to secure protection of their wildlife or access to other valuable natural resources (Van Wyk, 2000). Whilst in such a scenario the environmental and security interests of the stronger state would coincide and be mutually reinforcing, the weaker state may not want to pursue its environmental interests in TBPAs to protect its territorial interests in its borderlands.
The ways in which the various non-state actors mediate these interests is complex and diverse. Not only do the various non-state actors pursue very different interests, as outlined in Table 8.2, their political leverage also greatly varies. The impact of moneyed preservationist oriented NGOs and aid agencies like the PPF or the KfW upon the process seems the greatest. The lobbying and funding activities of these agencies constitute a key reason for the interest of Southern African states in the concept of Peace Parks (Ramutsindela, 2004: 70), in spite of the above-identified constraining political interests of states upon the pursuit of transboundary conservation. The relative influence of these agencies tends to be particularly strong in relatively poor and weak states, where their financial position buys them influence (Clapham, 1996: 257; Duffy, 2002b). This is for example reflected in Mozambique and Lesotho whose governments are planning a removal of people inhabiting areas now destined for TBPAs. Pressure exerted by environmental NGOs has played a not insignificant role in this (Grossman, Interview, 2003). On the other hand, this influence is partially undone by more development oriented NGOs and aid agencies. These organisations also support the pursuit of a state’s environmental interests in Peace Parks, but only where these do not significantly undermine the welfare of local communities. Whilst NGO influence in the area of sustainable development is considerable, it is fairly limited in the area of border management. States are the ultimate decision-makers in this area and have great territorial and economic interests tied up in borderland management (Van Amerom, 2002). As Chapter 6 suggested, the strategic and security interests of states generally structure their borderland management practices far more than their environmental interests. The postponement or cancellation of the removal of boundary fences in borderlands dominated by illegal transboundary flows and/or by boundary disputes bears witness to this phenomenon. Whilst Peace Parks have been initiated and pushed by NGOs and donors, states are far from passive players and Peace Parks have been “appropriated by the state and the region” (Ramutsindela, 2004).

The postponement or cancellation of the removal of boundary fences in borderlands also bears witness to the limited ability of borderland communities to influence

---

1. The World Bank’s refusal to support plans for the removal of Basotho communities in the Maloti/Drakensberg as long as no proper community consultation has taken place and compensation mechanisms planned is a case in point.
policy-making regarding TBPAs and wider border management. The transnational ethnic groups inhabiting areas destined to be TBPAs generally strongly favour the removal of boundary fences and customs facilities and consequently seek to influence their respective national governments in that direction. Transboundary crime syndicates, which often operate with the tacit support of high government officials (Gastrow 2001; Duffy, 2002b) seem likewise not to have played an influential role in the negotiation of the environmental and political interests of states, given the prioritisation of security interests of states over their environmental goals in borderlands as reflected in the postponed removal of boundary fences.2

The influence of the private sector on the negotiation of environmental and political interests in borderlands is difficult to measure, partly because they have thus far been relatively little involved in TBPAs and, where they have participated, been little consulted by the governments involved (Munthali and Soto, 2001:4). On the other hand, the PPF is a highly influential player in Southern Africa’s TBPAs and has considerable linkages with and the support of South African and to a lesser extent international businesses. The PPF may therefore constitute an important channel of influence for private sector stakeholders from especially South Africa, even when this is not immediately visible. Nevertheless, the impact of private sector stakeholders on the negotiation of environmental and political interests in borderlands, including through connections with the PPF, seems thus far to have been limited. For example, companies interested in exploitation of the ecotourism potential of Southern Africa’s borderlands generally favour a removal of boundary fences to create free cross-border access for tourists3 and have sought to influence Southern African governments –to date in vain- in this regard. On the other hand, the activities and business interests of private sector companies in TBPAs differ considerably. Private companies involved in the management of game reserves may for example not necessarily favour a removal of boundary fences in borderlands where there are risks that this may lead to the spread of wildlife diseases and increased poaching (Reilly, Interview, 2002).

2 On the other hand, delays in following up MoUs and treaties and the low prioritisation of TBPAs in many of South Africa’s partner countries may indicate the influence of this interest group, especially in areas where TBPAs would significantly increase security controls and could interfere with existing smuggling routes (as would be the case in the Maloti/Drakensberg for example).

3 As argued by Andrew Nicholson (KPMG) in charge of outlining business opportunities in the Great Limpopo (GKG Policy Workshop, 14 August 2001).
Finally, the role of Transhax in the Ai-Ais/Richtersveld (see section 6.6) also indicates that powerful private sector companies may exercise considerable influence on the mediation of environmental and political interests in borderlands. On the one hand this company supports the creation of this Peace Park financially. On the other hand, it has also used its leverage to influence or strengthen the decision of the South African government not to change the location of South Africa’s boundary in favour of Namibia. Together with the environmental degradation in the Richtersveld caused by its mining activities this decision poses considerable risks to the pursuit of a TFP with Namibia, as conflict over the location of the boundary continues to pose a risk to their co-operation in the Ai-Ais/Richtersveld.

3) What are the goals and interests of the various stakeholders in transboundary conservation and how are these mediated?

Table 8.2 provides an overview of the highly diversified goals and interests of the various stakeholders in transboundary conservation. The mediation of these goals and interests is an ongoing process that has not yet reached completion. However, thus far, the mediation of interests in TBPAs has both reflected and reinforced existing power imbalances in the region, at both the inter-state and intra-state levels. This pattern becomes apparent when considering the ways in which TBPA planning and policy-making has developed since the introduction of the PPC in Southern Africa in the early 1990s. In line with the linkage of TBPAs to the goals of regional integration and socio-economic development in the early post-apartheid years, the ‘park approach’ was increasingly dropped in favour of TFCAs and other models allowing for the sustainable use of natural resources. Furthermore, it was stressed in policy documents that TBPAs could and should benefit the lives and livelihoods of borderland communities, by providing them with free cross-border access within TBPAs and employment and jobs from ecotourism (see section 2.8).

However, as outlined in Chapter 5, reflecting the growing influence of the DEAT-PPF coalition upon the process, a more preservationist approach has taken hold, as illustrated by the conversion of planned TFCAs into TBPs often to the dismay of neighbouring countries and, linked to this, an abandoning of the notion of sustainable usage of natural resources. Chapter 6 furthermore demonstrated how decision-making
in TBPAs has been increasingly shaped by the interests of South African security stakeholders seeking to maintain boundary fences and maintain or even increase border controls to contain illegal migration and the activities of cross-border crime syndicates. Within this framework, local communities, particularly those that reside in countries neighbouring South Africa, can be identified as the parties that have thus far been least able to influence decision-making. As a direct outcome of the precedence of South Africa’s preservationist and security interests in TBPAs, local communities in neighbouring countries living in areas now designated for TBPAs are increasingly threatened with removal, to secure animal and tourist safety within the TBPA. As such, TBPAs could be said to enforce “a new form of apartheid” (Grossman, Interview, 2003) based on nationality (Metcalfe, 2003: 9-10) rather than race. Whilst the participation of South African local communities has also proved difficult to achieve, these nevertheless often have a much stronger legal position, especially when they have attained land rights after successfully launching a land claim against SANPs, as for example the Makuleke and Nama communities have in the Great Limpopo and the Ai-Ais/Richtersveld respectively. Whereas community rights in South Africa can be partially reinforced or further developed through TBPAs, in neighbouring countries the opposite occurs, creating “disenfranchisement at large” (Dzingirai, 2004).

4) To what extent and under what circumstances do the social processes involved in the creation and management of TBPAs stimulate amicable bi-lateral relations, thereby furthering regional stability and peace?

The findings of this thesis indicate that the contribution that social processes involved in the creation and management of TBPAs make towards more amicable bi-lateral relations is extremely limited, and in many cases non-existent. There are three main and interlinked reasons for this. Firstly, existing regional tensions and conflicts tend to penetrate and affect co-operation in Peace Parks, more than the other way around. Secondly, partially as a result of the preceding issue, co-operation in TBPAs is most likely to stimulate amicable bi-lateral relations in situations where bi-lateral relations are already cordial. Although in this scenario TBPAs do stimulate amicable bi-lateral relations thereby furthering regional stability and peace, the effects of this contribution remain relatively limited, there being no major changes between starting
point and end result. Finally, co-operation in TBPAs, at the ground level, may not necessarily generate consensus, but can also create additional tensions or add to existing conflicts between states as a result of cultural misunderstandings. As Chapter Seven outlined, this risk is particularly present during the early, crucial stages of creating and consolidating a given Peace Park.

Where co-operation at the ground level does deliver positive social outcomes, the hierarchical structure of decision-making in TBPAs often prevents the effects of these from taking hold at the inter-governmental level. The social processes in TBPAs are, however, far from static and may change over time. The findings on social processes in the Great Limpopo indicate, for example, that prolonged acquaintance and experiences with negotiations may stimulate the development of friendly relations, increase mutual understanding and build trust and confidence. The peace-building potential of TBPAs will furthermore depend upon changes at the level of macro politics. Great power imbalances and disparities in capacity between the participating parties, both at the inter state and intra state levels currently constitute major constraints upon the peace-building potential of TBPAs. Were the nature of power division to change at a regional level, TBPAs could increasingly bring their potential for peace building into practice.

8.2.2 Addressing the research goals
The information for this thesis was also collected to increase knowledge in the following six subject areas:

1) Contribute to knowledge of the peace-building potential of TBPAs
The answer to Research Question 4 (see above) already demonstrated that the envisaged positive social aspects of co-operation often do not come about or lack the envisaged capacity to ‘trickle up’ to the level of international relations. The findings of this thesis also indicate great limitations to the other ways in which TBPAs have been envisaged to build peace, including by reducing international tensions over boundaries and by providing improved cross-border access for communities in borderlands. This is displayed in Table 8.3, contrasting the notions of the PPC with the findings of this research on the political operation of TBPAs.
Table 8.3  Political aspects of TBPAs in Southern Africa (predicted versus reality)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Area of Focus</th>
<th>Claims of PPC</th>
<th>Reality</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Tensions over border claims</td>
<td>TBPAs will reduce/eliminate conflicts over borders</td>
<td>TBPAs may become vehicles to reinforce border claims on South African territory in exchange for co-operation over TBPAs</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Community rights/welfare</td>
<td>TBPAs will empower local communities economically and politically</td>
<td>TBPAs undermine rights of local communities (esp. in countries neighbouring Southern Africa)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Positive spill-over effects into other policy areas</td>
<td>Co-operation in TBPAs will enhance willingness to co-operate in other policy areas</td>
<td>This has been the case, especially in the areas of security and veterinary disease control. On the other hand, tensions and conflict in TBPAs decrease enthusiasm for and trust in the cause of regional co-operation, on the side of South Africa’s neighbours.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Regionalisation</td>
<td>TBPA co-operation will enhance regional integration</td>
<td>Possibly, by building more experience in capacity-building and instruments for co-operation. On other hand, tensions may act against regional integration</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Economic interests</td>
<td>Joint economic interests in TBPA and increased interdependence will work as incentive for states to work together in TBPAs</td>
<td>TBPAs increase economic interdependence and economic interests constitute important incentive to co-operate. However, the clashing views over sharing of revenues cause conflict.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Cross-border access</td>
<td>Enhanced</td>
<td>Limited for local communities</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>International relations</td>
<td>Improved</td>
<td>In many cases, growing tensions</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Security in borderlands</td>
<td>Improved</td>
<td>In the short term, considerable risk of less security</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

The findings on the political operation of TBPAs in Southern Africa show great overlap with the results of studies on the operation of TBPAs in Central America (see section 1.7), indicating the difficulties of creating and managing TBPAs in contexts with high conflict potential, limited institutional capacity and funding. In the context of co-operation in Southern Africa, the relatively high disparities in capacity and economic and political power between South Africa and neighbouring countries can furthermore be identified as an important constraining factor by increasing the chance
of conflict and power struggles. The findings also point to the importance of less structural factors, however, such as ‘personality clicks’ between participants (see Chapter Seven).

Finally, the research findings also indicate that the available time to meet TBPA requirements is an important factor influencing the potential of TBPAs to stimulate high-quality international relations (section 7.6.3). Where time frames are flexible, there is more room to attend to newly emerging concerns regarding the creation and management of TBPAs. This is likely to put less pressure upon co-operation at a micro level (section 7.4 and 7.7). Where stronger parties do not use their leverage to force agreements, cross-border relations have a greater chance to prosper. This is for example reflected in relationships between South Africa and Zimbabwe in the Great Limpopo. Although there have certainly been feelings on the Zimbabwean side that South Africa plays ‘Big Brother’, these are far less intensive than in Mozambique, most likely because the very limited progress made on the Zimbabwean side has received a rather understanding and tolerant attitude in South Africa. Conversely, Zimbabwe has been an easier partner to work with than Mozambique regarding the signing of the Great Limpopo Treaty. On the other hand, absence of any pressure upon countries to adhere to the agreements could result in no TBPA being established at all, especially where these delays are due to political unwillingness. In that case, the trust and friendship that was build up in the course of TBPA co-operation could easily be lost.

2) Improve policy insights on TBPAs

In researching the creation and management of Southern Africa’s TBPAs, this study has provided an insight into the effectiveness, constraints and opportunities of existing policy practice in TBPAs. The last section of this chapter, listing policy recommendations illustrates how the findings of the research could be used to create new avenues for policy.

3) Effectiveness of Peace Parks as development tools

The insights that this thesis can provide into the developmental potential of TBPAs has to remain limited, given that most TBPAs are not yet operational and running. Impressions thus far paint, however, a bleak picture. It is increasingly recognised that
initial estimates on the income that can be derived from ecotourism were overly optimistic (Katerere et al., 2001; Spenceley, 2003; Schoon, 2004). The ‘trickle down’ effect, required for equitable development that can truly tackle rural poverty (Critchley et al., 1998) is likely to remain largely absent. With in most cases no legal entitlements to a set percentage of the income generated from tourism and with an increasing number of communities being faced with forced relocation, the chances that economic benefits will trickle down to the poor seem limited. Sustainable usage of natural resources could help local livelihoods. However, this option has been increasingly abandoned in favour of more preservationist models. Where it is envisaged that local communities will abandon their agricultural activities in favour of more environmental friendly ecotourism activities there is a risk that TBPAs may undermine local livelihoods and food security, rather than improving them (Katerere et al., 2001: 19-20). “Tourism does not increase overnight” (Schoon, 2004: 19), meaning that the cash for the “purchase of outside food” (Schoon, 2004: 19) might be scarce. Furthermore, tourism is a fickle industry, easily affected by political unrest or changing travel preferences amongst tourists (Katerere et al., 2001: 20). Finally, within the regional framework of states, it appears as if the poorest states have the most limited ability to profit from economic benefits derived from TBPAs. There is therefore a considerable risk that local economies across the border from South Africa “stagnate” (Schoon, 2004: 19). It is essential that poverty reduction becomes a more important policy aim, not just in theory or as a means to generate funding, but also in practice if TBPAs are to gain any momentum. An important step to achieving this objective could be the allocation of a set percentage of TBPA funding or revenue to popular and successful local developments projects. Furthermore, measures in TBPAs allegedly taken to combat poverty and funded for this purpose, such as mine clearing, should be more critically assessed, by checking how many people benefit from such an action (given that many parts of TBPAs are inhabited) and how this compares to alternatives for development. To further increase the contribution which TBPAs could make to development in Southern Africa, it would be useful if policies for development might consider the ways in which TBPAs could aid in combating the HIV-AIDS crisis and aid those hit by it, as a major strain upon development.

In addition to the research goals directly associated with the working of Peace Parks, this research also facilitated the creation of knowledge on the linkage between
globalisation and environmental action, regionalisation processes and on the applicability of borderland theories.

4) Insight on globalisation-environment interface

This study on TBPAs indicates that management of the Southern African environment is determined to a considerable extent by global actors, most notably in the form of international conservation and aid agencies and corporate organisations. Although states can be identified as the most important actors in TBPAs, as the ultimate decision-makers on boundary and other territorial changes, foreign NGOs and capital play important roles. The ‘global influence’ of NGOs may be greater than expected: Western conservation and development agencies have to adapt their programmes to the needs and perceptions of Western ‘audiences’, despite their geographical dislocation from the areas of concern (see also Duffy, 2000). This influence is not uncontested or without problems. One area where conflict potential is particularly prominent is in the area of elephant culling. Local communities may resort to the introduction of trophy hunting as a lucrative source of income. However, Western conservation agencies are likely to have a hard time ‘selling’ their assistance to projects in that case, especially if radical animal rights groups, with a proven ability to influence public opinion take up the issue (Koch, Interview, 2001; Reilly, Interview, 2002). At the same time, it is difficult to determine the extent of this influence as South African conservation agencies tend to work along similar lines. Moreover, it is important not to generalise, with a great diversity of views amongst Western aid agencies. Even the involvement and influence of one specific agency can differ according to the TBPA in question.4

Whilst highlighting the impact of globalisation on the African environment, this research simultaneously points to the limits of such an approach. Where growing influence of Western NGOs and agencies seem to work against or undermine governmental interests, governments will increasingly intervene (Bratton, 1990; Ramutsindela, 2004). Local resistance or the very threat of it poses similar constraints to the ability of global forces to shape the African landscape. The more pressure or

4 A good example is the World Bank. The World Bank has monitoring power and a highly influential say in the Maloti/Drakensberg, in its capacity as facilitating agency for the GEF, which currently largely funds the project. In the Great Limpopo its role is merely supportive, and limited to the Mozambican side.
far-reaching the proposed changes, the more difficult these will be to implement. In that sense, this research confirms Duffy’s “paradox of globalisation” notion (Duffy, 2002b, see also section 1.7).

5) Insights on regionalisation

Developments in Southern Africa’s TBPAs illustrate how as a result of increased interconnectedness and economic inter-dependence between countries, political developments seemingly confined to one country can have major consequences for policy-making in adjacent countries. Because of the interlinked nature of TBPAs, the Zimbabwean government’s declining interest in conserving wildlife (Sharman, 2000) and in protecting its national parks from human encroachments (see section 5.2.5) did not just affect protected area planning in this country. Because it delayed the planned incorporation of Zimbabwean protected areas into the Limpopo/Shashe TBPA and into the Great Limpopo TBPA, these developments also affected protected area planning in neighbouring countries Botswana and South Africa. Spill-over effects of the political crisis in Zimbabwe in the form of increased illegal migration into Botswana and South Africa have furthermore had implications for the border management strategies of these countries and put severe strains upon Botswana-Zimbabwean relations (UN IRIN, 2004) which may complicate future co-operation in TBPAs. These developments have had a profound effect upon TBPAs, delaying the creation of both TBPAs involving Zimbabwe, due to a reluctance of Zimbabwe’s neighbours to open their borders to try and contain refugee flows, and a de-prioritisation of TBPAs in Zimbabwe itself.

Conversely, this analysis of TBPAs has indicated how cross-border projects can have profound political implications for a state’s borderland territory, especially where there is a discrepancy in power between countries, resulting in a de facto extension of power of the stronger state over the borderland of its weaker neighbour, in terms of spatial and social organisation.

6) Borderland studies

Although TBPAs visibly contribute to increased physical linkages in borderlands, the effects of these upon contracts and economic transactions between populations in the borderland in question have been relatively difficult to determine thus far. As a result
of their co-operation in TBPAs, the level of coordination and contacts between state agencies and other organisations involved in TBPAs in one country with those in another certainly increases. In many cases these also involve local political structures, although in some TBPAs the involvement of these has declined due to the increasingly important role of central governments in TBPAs (Munthali and Soto, 2001; Braack, 2002b). So far, TBPAs have done little to foster contacts between the various peoples or ethnic groups in a given borderland, however. This is because contrary to initial planning, the populations in borderlands have not been given improved access to the road networks and other physical infrastructure linking up the various parts within a TBPA. Admittedly, community forums in TBPAs offer a good opportunity to develop institutional structures and contacts between borderland populations. However, the impact of these contacts is likely to remain limited as long as border procedures for borderland populations are not relaxed. This is, however, difficult to achieve due to security reasons. In fact, TBPAs might undermine the prospects for increased trade and social contacts between borderland populations in the long term, particularly if the resettlement of people living in parks adjacent to South Africa goes ahead. In many borderlands economic and social contacts between populations on both sides of the border are frequent and relatively intensive, especially where similar ethnic groups inhabit the borderland in question (such as Shangaan people in Great Limpopo and the Sotho in the Maloti/Drakensberg). There is a need to gain a greater understanding of the negative and positive contributions that TBPAs can make to the social and economic welfare of the populations in Southern Africa’s borderlands, which often belong to some of the region’s most marginalised groups. Research establishing the access needs of borderland populations and possible economic and political advantages and disadvantages of increased cross-border access would be useful in this respect.

8.3 Trends & future scenarios: major obstacles and opportunities in Southern Africa’s Peace Parks

8.3.1 Introduction

It is extremely difficult to predict how TBPAs in Southern Africa will develop and their political outcomes, given that most TBPAs are not yet operational. This does
not, however, lessen the need to actively reflect on what might happen and what and where problems might emerge. One of the most important conclusions of this thesis is that TBPAs are endowed with considerable conflict potential. This is not surprising. National territory and ‘sovereignty’ are involved, politicians are often reluctant to compromise and the concept of TBPAs is relatively new to Southern Africa. Furthermore, TBPAs involve competition over relatively scarce land. The ways in which TBPAs may create conflict in the Southern African region have, however, been little discussed thus far. As one participant in an Inwent/IUCN policy workshop on TBPAs put it:

Thus far, expectations surrounding the political outcomes of co-operation in TBPAs in Southern Africa have been mainly informed and shaped by a handful of positive examples from TBPAs overseas. There is little information available on problems, conflicts and potential bottlenecks in TBPAs in Southern Africa.

This is highly problematic. As a result, the creation of Peace Parks is being pursued without much thought to the conflict that might follow. Another negative consequence of the neglect of the conflict potential of Peace Parks is that the means of managing and settling conflict have been little studied, which further increases the likelihood of the development and persistence of conflict. To increase the relevance of the findings of this thesis, it would therefore be useful to consider which lessons can be learnt from the political patterns and trends in Peace Parks as observed in this thesis and how these might relate to future conflict in TBPAs. To be able to gauge future directions in Peace Parks, including their conflict potential, it is useful to consider the constraints to, and opportunities for, their development more closely.

8.3.2 Common obstacles

When considering all TBPAs together the Kgalagadi Park and the Great Limpopo Park arguably stand out, as respectively the most positive and most problem ridden cases. Whilst community involvement features as a main problem in the Kgalagadi, bi-lateral relations in this TBPA are of high quality, environmental management runs relatively smoothly and the park has witnessed a rise in ecotourism and attracted
donor funding. The Great Limpopo, on the contrary, is not only characterised by great(er) problems regarding the implementation of CBNRM and local land access, but unlike the Kgalagadi is also affected by security issues due to the prevalence of various illegal cross-border flows and crime, bi-lateral tensions over the distribution of economic benefits and political power, and land alienation of local communities. Last but certainly not least, the political crisis in Zimbabwe and radical land redistribution programmes have prevented the planned connection of the Gonarezhou Park, now increasingly invaded by local communities and poaching. On the other hand, the Great Limpopo also offers great potential, in terms of ecotourism potential (partially thanks to the inclusion of the Kruger Park) whilst as the TBPA with the greatest profile it has attracted substantial donor funding.

Problematically, on the whole the four TBPA's next in line after the Kgalagadi Park and the Great Limpopo are already considerable hampered by similar constraints as those evident in the Great Limpopo and the Kgalagadi whilst being relatively less endowed with their comparative advantages. Six main constraints to Southern Africa's designated Peace Parks can be distinguished:

1) Limited or disappointing economic benefits

Problematically, the ecotourism profiles of the remaining four TBPA's in the Southern African Peace Parks plan are limited, because of their location in relatively remote areas, landscape with less tourism potential (Limpopo/Shashe) and absence of the Big Five (Maloti/Drakensberg, Richtersveld-Ai/Ais), whilst the number of participating parties that can claim income is relatively high. On the other hand, the Lubombo TBPA with its varied landscape (see also Appendix I), the Big Five and already well developed nature reserves has high tourism potential, which may further increase if it is linked to the Great Limpopo as planned. The number of 'claimants' in this TBPA is relatively high however. It is also important to keep in mind that the market for ecotourism has its limits and one TBPA's prosperity may be to the detriment of another, posing limits to the income that the Southern African Peace Parks plan can generate as a whole. There is also the risk that tourists will overwhelmingly stay on the South African side of the border, as the most developed country in Southern Africa. As outlined in Chapter 5, were economic disparities to widen between South Africa and neighbouring countries as a result of the creation of TBPA's, relationships
between South Africa and neighbouring countries are likely to “worsen” (Schoon, 2004: 19). The lack of financial benefits of TBPAs for local communities is likely to increase resistance from this interest group against TBPAs.

2) Problematic cross-border flows of goods and people

With the exception of the Kgalagadi Park, the borderlands covered by the Southern African Peace Parks plan are the scene of problematic transboundary flows, either in the form of smuggling networks for drugs and arms (especially in the Maloti/Drakensberg and Lubombo TBPAs), diamonds (Ai-Ais-Richtersveld), stolen cattle (Maloti/Drakensberg and Lubombo TBPA) or stolen vehicles (Lubombo TBPA). Human trafficking and illegal migration towards South Africa constitute problems in all TBPAs. Due to the crisis in Zimbabwe and the informal job opportunities offered by commercial farms in South Africa’s Limpopo Province illegal migration features particularly highly and is considered to be highly problematic in the Limpopo/Shashe. Chances of veterinary disease transmission are high, especially in the Lubombo TBPA, the Great Limpopo and the Limpopo/Shashe TBPA, where the highly contagious Foot and Mouth disease has already repeatedly crossed boundaries even before boundary fences and veterinary disease checking points have been removed in the context of TBPA creation (Rogues, Interview, 2002; BBC, 2003; Agencia de Informacao de Mocambique, 2004). Problematically, where cattle in one country are infected with a disease due to contacts with the wildlife of another country because these can roam across the boundary, conflicts as to who has to pay for the costs of the loss of wildlife and cattle vaccination might easily erupt (see Chapters Five and Six).

3) Implementation of community based conservation is problematic

All TBPAs are beset with problems related to insufficient community participation. Furthermore, partially as a result of South Africa’s dominant position in TBPAs and its preference for a preservationist course, especially in neighbouring borderlands, communities are under threat of being displaced from their land in countries where their land rights are not legally or de facto protected (Mozambique, Lesotho). In other cases, communities cannot claim back land in TBPAs at all, as a result of national legislation. Whilst in these cases TBPAs do not cause land alienation, indirectly they perpetuate this colonial practice.
4) Political instability, mismanagement and armed conflict/crime

In addition to the Great Limpopo, the political instability in Zimbabwe has brought co-operation with Zimbabwe in the Limpopo-Shashe to a standstill. Whilst the Zimbabwe crisis has clearly and very directly affected TBPAs involving this country, it is by no means the only constraining political influence. Extremely high crime levels in South Africa constitute an important constraining factor upon TBPAs. In spite of an estimated 6.5 per cent rise in tourism to South Africa and the wider region between 2002-2003 (SAMP, 2003), it is undeniable that many potential tourists avoid the country, out of fear of being robbed, hijacked or raped, following various press reports on the high occurrence of these crimes. As an important gateway to tourism in the wider region this also affects tourism levels in Southern Africa as a whole. As indicated in Chapter Six, there is also a risk that the conservation areas included in TBPAs, now relatively crime free, will become penetrated by international crime syndicates should security levels drop. Finally, although Southern Africa is currently relatively peaceful, with the exception of certain areas in Zimbabwe, conflict potential in the region remains high, due to growing resistance against autocratic regimes (Swaziland) and tendencies towards autocracy and violent land reforms such as those already evident in Zimbabwe (Williams, 2002; Cornish, 2003). In more remote areas, such as the Maloti Mountains which is de facto ruled by local chiefs, armed conflict against Peace Parks might occur if local communities are forced to abandon their agricultural practices and their land (Interview, Sandwith, 2002).

5) Tensions due to disparities in economic capacity and power between South Africa and neighbouring countries

The ‘Big Brother’ syndrome already affects negotiations in all designated TBPAs. With no arrangements in place for procedures to share ecotourism equitably, it seems likely that this will continue to be an issue.

---

5 Crime levels are now said to be declining in South Africa but this is difficult to confirm since crime statistics are no longer available to either press or public.
6: Cultural clashes/nationalist sentiments

Relatively little is known regarding the volume of cultural clashes in TBPAs other than the Kgalagadi, Great Limpopo and Maloti/Drakensberg. However, given the difficulties raised by different cultural attitudes across boundaries in TBPAs worldwide it seems unlikely that such issues would not play a role in the remaining four designated TBPAs. This is the more likely since in the Southern African context there are not only considerable cultural differences between countries, but also within countries, due to racial and ethnic variation. Where relations between ethnic groups across boundaries, such as the Swazi and the Zulu in the Lubombo TBPA, are historically tense, this might also introduce tensions in co-operation (Anonymous Source, Swazi National Trust, 2001).  

As a result of the problematic trends outlined above, co-operation in the four scheduled TBPAs has become increasingly characterised by conflict, resulting in delays and in some cases outright political unwillingness to continue.

8.3.3 Opportunities in Southern Africa’s TBPAs

Nevertheless, and despite the above-outlined difficulties discussed, co-operation in Southern Africa’s TBPAs has laid important foundations from which the development of TBPAs could benefit in the future. Furthermore, the creation of TBPAs is a learning process. Mechanisms and institutional measures for co-operation developed in the course of the process could prove valuable in other TBPAs/areas of conservation. Lessons from the Kgalagadi Park and Great Limpopo could be implemented in other TBPAs as a means of avoiding or solving conflict. Consequently, future problems in TBPAs might be more quickly resolved. Whilst co-operation and policy-making in TBPAs has been far from exemplary, particularly in the area of CBNRM, and especially in the Great Limpopo, several useful mechanisms to deal with thorny policy issues, such as the inclusion of security working groups in TBPAs to try and check cross-border crime have been developed. Moreover, a growing number of foreign NGOs and bi-lateral development organisations have taken to sponsor bi or tri national meetings and events organised by local

---

*On the other hand, it is important not to generalise: Relations between Afrikaners and Basotho in the Maloti/Drakensberg -which have been historically tense- are on the whole surprisingly good. The appointment of an Afrikaner as Lesotho’s TBPA facilitator is an illustration of this.*
communities from different countries involved in TBPAs (Agencia Informacao de Mozambique; African Resources Trust, 2003). Such initiatives could assist these local communities in exchanging relevant information and in jointly putting pressure on states to recognise their rights in TBPAs. In addition, the exchange of expertise and technical material between South African park authorities and that of neighbouring countries can make valuable contributions to wildlife management, given that in most neighbouring countries facilities and know-how for conservation are relatively limited (Jones, Interview, 2002). Finally, the growing number of policy workshops organised by SADC, InWent, the IUCN and other agencies aimed at improving TBPA performances and sharing valuable information provide a good means to build expertise on TBPAs (see for example Petermann and Braack., 2002; Braack et al., 2003).

Although Southern Africa’s TBPAs are likely to attract less ecotourism than initially expected, the income and jobs generated by Peace Parks may still make an important difference in marginal border regions, especially in those areas where due to severe aridity there are few options for alternative land uses. Moreover, the investments in TBPAs may have important economic spin-off effects. The international press coverage of the Southern African Peace Parks project has advertised Southern Africa’s wildlife and scenery all over the world, making for valuable PR. Although insufficient to finance each TBPA, TBPAs have also attracted considerable funding from foreign donors, which can and has been used to provide valuable infrastructure, such as road networks and better and faster customs facilities. Investments in the Great Limpopo were for example used to upgrade the road to the Giriyondo border post between South Africa and Mozambique.

As a result of the lessons drawn from the Great Limpopo, the social aspects of cooperation might over time become more positive. South Africa’s relatively patient and understanding attitude towards Lesotho for example already contrasts with its treatment of Mozambique, even though Lesotho constitutes an even weaker partner than Mozambique. As less prestigious projects, less South African pressure might also be brought to bear in other designated TBPAs. Economic conflicts are, however, likely to remain prominent in cases where each country keeps its own park revenues,
rather then sharing them, as this makes South Africa the perceived economic ‘winner’.

Altogether, the working of TBPAs can be said to be highly complex. TBPAs are likely to create simultaneously both co-operation and conflict. Hocknell’s findings apply:

As a developing international norm, the process of managing transboundary resources represents a significant opportunity for the advancement of peaceful cooperation through equitable and sustainable means - and yet, paradoxically, this management process has the power also to create new tensions and reinforce pre-existing divisions amongst interested parties (2001: xiii).

Which of these two dual forces will eventually prove to be the dominating one determining the course of Peace Parks, is difficult to forecast. To gain more understanding of the possible implications of the identified problems and opportunities in TBPAs it is useful to explore two potential scenarios that TBPAs could follow, one negative and one positive.

8.3.4 Worse-case and best-case scenarios

- A ‘doomsday scenario’ whereby Peace Parks perish in the light of the constraints and pressures facing them (see Figure 8.1).7
- A ‘victory scenario’ whereby TBPAs manage to overcome current obstacles, fulfil their policy goals and become a force for peace and prosperity in the region (see Figure 8.2).

---

7 It is important to highlight that these scenarios are extremes and that, given the great variation between TBPAs and political developments in the region, some TBPAs might move more towards the Doomsday Scenario and others towards the Victory Scenario. Furthermore, both scenarios are far from static, given the dynamics of political factors and policy-making. For example, developments in accordance with the ‘victory’ scenario might in the long term introduce new problems, by stimulating migration to a park from adjacent, poorer areas (Scholte, 2003). Naturally, altogether unforeseen or different scenarios would also be possible, including a ‘worse-case scenario’ on the basis of economic setbacks (Schoon, 2004: 19).
Considering that political unrest and violence alongside the continuation of a highly unequal power division within TBPAs can be identified as key constraints influencing the creation and maintenance of TBPAs, it would seem as if relatively equal power relations and an absence of political unrest and violence are two key conditions that need to be in place for TBPAs to be able to deliver their wide and coherent range of promises. In order for Peace Parks to succeed it is essential that they are not halted by unfavourable political developments. Furthermore, an equal division of power in TBPAs seems necessary to ensure continued support of the actors involved. Occurrences in regional politics and the organisational set up of TBPAs therefore play a pivotal role in both scenarios (see Figures 8.1 and 8.2).\(^8\) Whilst the doomsday scenario can be sparked by each of the two factors highlighted in Figure 8.1, i.e. an unchanged organisational set up of TBPAs or unfavourable political developments, it is especially likely to come about where these exist in mutually reinforcing relationships, with the development of TBPAs feeding into existing regional and national economic and political tensions and difficulties and vice-versa.

It is crucial that the Southern African Peace Parks project does not go the way of so many other large-scale regional development projects in Africa (Kawango, 1998)\(^9\) and avoid the doomsday scenario. Project failure would mean that valuable financial resources that could have been used to alleviate poverty would have been wasted, just as the developed social capital and expertise in the area of regional co-operation would go unused. TBPA failure is moreover likely to have serious implications for the areas it is supposed to contribute to the most: conservation and regional economic and political development.

---

\(^8\) Within each scenario several phases or steps can be identified. Please note that these do not necessarily have to occur in the order presented here.

\(^9\) Southern Africa’s SDI’s, the form of regional co-operation preceding and sometimes underpinning TBPAs (see Chapter Two), are already seemingly going in such a direction, with an increasing number of policy objectives remaining unfulfilled. Many of the underlying causes are similar to those causing delays and tensions in TBPAs, such as the ‘Big Brother syndrome’, political intransigence and precedence of national over regional interests (Arkright, Interview, 2001; Cousins and Kepe, 2004). Furthermore, the channelling of economic benefits to the poor is often difficult as is the acquisition of private sector investment (Mabuza, Interview, 2001; Rogerson, Interview, 2001).
ROUTE 1: INTERNAL CONFLICTS + UNDERPERFORMANCE

PHASE 1: The issue of equality between stakeholders remains unaddressed

Tensions and conflict at bi- and intra-state level

PHASE 2: Failure to deliver objectives, e.g. in area of infrastructural requirements.

Reduced willingness to compromise. Increased passive resistance.

PHASE 3: Resistance by marginalised borderland stakeholders

(E.g. criminal cross-border syndicates and local communities seek to sabotage TBPAs process through bomb attacks or by occupying parts of designated TBPAs).

ROUTE 2: MACRO POLITICAL CONFLICTS AND VIOLENCE

PHASE 1: Rise in autocratic regimes, provoking armed resistance. Competition over land and other economic resources rises, and inflames racial and ethnic tensions

Rise in political instability and violence

PHASE 2: Increased armed conflict in or around TBPAs

Armed resistance against autocratic regimes takes form of guerrilla struggle in borderlands as sites for refuge and hiding. Crime levels in borderlands rise dramatically, with central governments increasingly unable or unwilling to protect TBPAs.

PHASE 3: Widespread poaching

Wildlife protection diminishes as result of lack of state interest, armed conflict or land invasions.

PHASE 4: Diminished income and political support

Tourists stay away.
Socio-economic and other objectives fail.
Donor support dries up.
Governmental support for TBPAs being considerably an outcome of donor pressure and support, governmental support for TBPAs dwindles.

PHASE 5: Disintegration of Peace Parks through lack of income and political backing
**Figure 8.1** Causal linkages in the ‘Doomsday scenario’

- More amicable international relations.
- Better biodiversity protection
- Equitable socio-economic development

**PHASE 6: Peace Parks fulfil ecological, economic and political expectations**

- Increased cross-border trust/friendship
- Democratisation
- More regional co-operation in other policy areas
- Increase in eco tourism income
- Continued NGO and donor support

**PHASE 5: Peace Parks**

**PHASE 4: Ecotourism takes off**

**PHASE 3: Removal of boundary fences for wildlife, tourists and local communities**

Cross-border infrastructure in place

**PHASE 2: Successful harmonisation of laws, land use and policies**

**CONFLICT REDUCTION**

- Sustainable use of resources by local communities
- Reversal of land removal plans
- Equitable revenue sharing

**PHASE 1: Egalitarian power division within TBPAs**


**Figure 8.2** Causal linkages in the ‘Victory scenario’

- Absence of armed conflict between or within states and effects of these do not significantly affect Peace Parks. Transboundary crime levels under control.
Possible effects upon conservation

'TBPA failure' may reduce the popularity of integrated conservation and development projects. Having tried the 'sustainable development option' and found it to be unsuccessful, central governments are likely to want to embark on other types of borderland development, including environmentally unfriendly ones such as mining. Conservation in general may even be abandoned as a governmental priority, which is likely to spark an increase in or return to overgrazing and other less environmentally friendly land options given the great pressures on land in Southern Africa. The converse, a return to preservationist fort-and-fortress models could also happen. The failure of CBNRM programmes has been increasingly used by neo-preservationists to plead for greater and stricter conservation measures, regardless of affordability and local circumstances. Even apart from the question of how such militarised conservation 'islands' could be financially maintained and receive political support, (especially in light of the region's turn towards more radical forms of land distribution) they are unlikely to be successful or sustainable, given that the causes leading to the overall failure of the fort and fortress approach would not have been removed.

International relations

Given that TBPAs have been claimed to be tangible representations of the African Renaissance (Van Amerom and Büscher, forthcoming 2005) and to a lesser extent of the New Partnership for Africa's Development (NEPAD), failure of the Southern African Peace Parks project could negatively reflect upon or diminish support, both financial and political, for both. Failure of the Southern African Peace Parks project could also diminish opportunities for economic growth in the region by undermining trust of international business in the stability of Southern Africa’s regional market. Finally, especially in situations where the 'Big Brother syndrome' is a main factor in causing the decline of a given TBPA, unsuccessful co-operation in TBPAs may reduce incentives for regional co-operation in other areas as well.

---

10 Successful local resistance against or sabotage of TBPAs could moreover work as engine for increased resistance of conservation efforts outside the borderland environment, highlighting that participation in conservation poses great risks to land tenure and does not guarantee viable income, even in very big projects.
Problematically, in the current situation, TBPAs are arguable closer to the doomsday scenario than the victory one. For one thing, rather than stimulating more favourable political developments in line with the predictions of the PPC, TBPAs in their current set up feed into the existing conflict potential in the Southern African region, by increasing demands upon land and by often being undemocratic in character, rather than constituting a force for positive change. Already, resistance against perceived South African dominance has led to reluctance to follow up agreements and introduced delays. Secondly, as a result of the token community participation and the thus far limited economic benefits in Peace Parks, the commitment of local communities, many of which were reluctantly drawn into the TBPA process in the first place (Duffy, 1997), is diminishing. Breaking out of this impasse is vital. This raises the question of how Peace Parks could be more effectively managed, including in such a way that their peace-building capacity can be improved.

8.4 Policy Recommendations

Several solutions have been suggested to diminish common problems and constraints in the development of TBPAs in Southern Africa, for example during policy workshops on TBPAs given by the SADC, InWent and in BSP and IUCN/ROSA publications. Recommendations produced by SADC and InWent during a workshop in 2003 display some of the most common problems in TBPAs and possible solutions (Table 8.4).

Table 8.4 Recommended solutions to main shortfalls in TBPA implementation

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>CORE SET OF PROBLEMS</th>
<th>SOLUTIONS</th>
<th>HOW TO INSTITUTIONALIZE</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Inadequate resources (finance, personnel). TBPAs tend to be donor-driven</td>
<td>Effective funding strategy</td>
<td>Negotiation and development of a strategy for funding and capacity building. SADC should set up a Trust Fund.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Conflict situations and poor inter-governmental relations</td>
<td>Effective conflict resolution</td>
<td>Negotiations</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Although there are national strategies for TBPAs in some countries (e.g. South Africa), there is no regional strategy</td>
<td>Formulate within-country strategies and then expand to regional level</td>
<td>Utilize existing mechanisms at various levels</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Issue</td>
<td>Recommended Action</td>
<td>Outcomes</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>----------------------------------------------------------------------</td>
<td>--------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------</td>
<td>--------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Insufficient or ineffective marketing and communication regarding the achievements and benefits of TBPAs</td>
<td>Undertake an aggressive promotion of TBPAs</td>
<td>Through the media expose and promote successful TBPA case-studies</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>There is a lack of recognition and co-ordination of NGOs</td>
<td>Forge an agreement between government and NGOs</td>
<td>Negotiation and acceptance of the protocol</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>There is no coordination of TBPAs at a regional level</td>
<td>Use existing structures e.g. SADC</td>
<td>Establish a Unit/Sector at the SADC Secretariat level</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>There is sometimes a lack of adherence to Memoranda of Understanding</td>
<td>Develop a Protocol/Code of Conduct. Have joint, integrated planning with key performance indicators.</td>
<td>For each TIPA, develop a Protocol/Code and KPIs. IUCN and SADC should do annual monitoring</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>There is still inadequate community participation in the establishment of TBPAs</td>
<td>Develop guidelines for community participation</td>
<td>Appoint task force to prepare guidelines. Undertake social impact assessment.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Definite need for a networking mechanism</td>
<td>Develop a regional hub for TBPAs</td>
<td>Recommend at WPC that an IUCN or SADC team should undertake a feasibility study. Also additional workshops similar to this one at least twice a year.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>There is no mechanism to address or accommodate differences between countries</td>
<td>Record and share Best/Worst Case Practise examples. Enhance capacity through training.</td>
<td>Institutionalize within the transboundary network and publicize through the hub.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>There is a need for guidelines on planning and establishing TBPAs</td>
<td>Develop a generic operational manual on the subject of establishment and maintenance of TBPAs</td>
<td>Appoint a Task Team within IUCN Task Force to take responsibility and to co-opt required expertise.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>There is no regional structure for TBPAs</td>
<td>Establish a regional structure for TBPAs</td>
<td>This will need to align with existing SADC structures. TBPAs must be part of local plans and structures (and will require capacity building within existing institutions)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Weak TFCA co-ordination mechanism currently</td>
<td>Strengthen co-ordination mechanisms</td>
<td>TBPAs must have a focal point for co-ordination (could be an individual or an institution). Different situations may require different co-ordination</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Absence of monitoring and evaluation framework for TFCA performance</td>
<td>Establish a regional TBPA monitoring and evaluation framework</td>
<td>SADC to undertake monitoring and evaluation arrangements.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>---------------------------------------------------------------</td>
<td>---------------------------------------------------------------</td>
<td>-----------------------------------------------------------</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Lack of tested TBPA models</td>
<td>Develop TBPA models</td>
<td>Document case studies and promote research</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Source: adapted from Braack et al. (2003: 12-13).

The remainder of this section seeks to add further to these guidelines and recommendations. Given that unfavourable political circumstances and unequal power relations within Peace Parks can be identified as particularly problematic constraints, this section seeks to explore how these factors can be contained.

A) Actively anticipate and incorporate detrimental impacts of political and social trends upon TBPA\text{s} in policy-making

It has been increasingly recognised in conservation studies that, far from constituting isolated islands uninfluenced by the wider social and economic context in which they operate, conservation areas are shaped by social and economic factors (Hulme and Murphree, 2001). In the wider arena it would be good to recognise the geo-political environment in which TBPA\text{s} operate. Many of the problems in TBPA\text{s} outlined above can be traced back to the fact that Peace Parks in Southern Africa operate in a relatively problematic context, characterised by power inequalities, struggles for land, autocratic tendencies, political instability and economic scarcity. Therefore, TBPA\text{s} could and should become forums for discussions as to how such political developments could affect TBPA\text{s} and how negative impacts can be curbed as much as possible. However, although the need for ‘political impact assessments’ has been increasingly highlighted in studies on TBPA\text{s} (Van der Linde, 2001; Sandwith et al. 2001) in practice TBPA policy continues to be constructed in isolation of wider political developments. The treatment of the Zimbabwe crisis is a case in point. Instead of actively anticipating possible impacts of the political crisis in Zimbabwe upon TBPA\text{s} and seeking solutions to contain possible detrimental effects, the topic was all but ignored in cross-border meetings between policy-makers and during policy workshops. It is, however, imperative to follow and anticipate problematic political developments and other threats to security and safety so that management mechanisms can be developed to curb the negative side effects of these upon TBPA\text{s}.  

271
Figure 8.3 shows an example of the ways in which such anticipative conflict management and planning could occur. To facilitate STEP 1 security files of the Institute for Security Studies discussing political and other threats to security for Southern African countries could be used (http://www.iss.co.za/AF/profiles/afrimap.html). In areas where boundary conflict potential features highly, border expertise groups (such as for example the International Boundary Research Unit, www.ibru.dur.ac.uk) could also be consulted to anticipate and prevent border conflicts.

Figure 8.3 Conflict anticipative planning and management in TBPAs

B) Stimulate meaningful participation and constructive dialogue

The need for more meaningful participation is especially important with regard to the involvement of local communities. To truly make the say of local communities count it is necessary that their consultation prior to the project implementation is secured and legally binding. Furthermore, more research into legal frameworks that can be used to address conflicts between citizens and their state is necessary, litigation being extremely limited as a mechanism for resolving conflict in this area (Mohamed-Katerere, 2001).
There is also a need to promote improved participation and dialogue during policy workshops between the various participating parties. Investing in professional interpreters where not all participating parties can fluently express themselves in English (the language used during workshops) could be a great help, stimulating effective communication and enabling all participants equal access to information and the chance to make a contribution. At the individual TBPA level, it would be worthwhile to invest more in teambuilding and allow ‘the other side’ a say in the choice of key contributors to the process such as co-ordinators, where these are not jointly elected and only work for one country (as in the Malotl/Drakensberg, see Chapter Eight).

C) Slow down!
Whilst arguably necessary in the early stages to get the process underway, high-speed processes of implementation forced by South Africa have created considerable resentment. Continued political pressure by South African actors on neighbouring states is likely to result in even more resistance. Whilst signing all the treaties, countries might not necessarily follow up agreements when dissatisfied with their part in the process. In that sense it is important to not only focus on the end result, but also on the process. Furthermore, as the parties most aware of potential risks on the ground, it is imperative that the voices of actors directly involved in and responsible for planning and implementation are heard and acted upon.

D) Prioritise quality over quantity
Even amongst the advocates of Peace Parks there is a growing unease over the speed with which land is being appropriated for TBPAs (Groenewald, Interview, 2002), conflict over land being the biggest trigger of conflict in Southern Africa. The ongoing identification and announcement of new Peace Parks in Southern Africa by competing conservation NGOs is likewise worrisome. Whilst this creates new opportunities for TBPAs and keeps the ‘funding bandwagon’ going (Wolmer, 2003), these opportunities are unlikely to be translated into viable TBPAs so long as they lack comprehensive funding and political support. The same is true for plans for an extension of existing parks into TBPAs without proper consultation and before the parks are operational. Less incorporation of land would make Southern Africa’s
TBPAs seem less spectacular but might prove easier to manage and to sustain. Instead of going on identifying new TBPAs, it seems wiser to invest in existing TBPAs and learn from and use expertise built up in these TBPAs to the benefit of other, later TBPAs. More generally, rather than assuming that the creation of TBPAs will be beneficial and applying the concept as a blueprint for conservation and development regardless of local and national circumstances, there is a need to assess from the outset whether costs are likely to outweigh potential benefits. Considering that TBPAs may not only incur costs in a financial sense, but also by increasing conflict at local and regional levels, such a cost-benefit analysis should also include social and political parameters.

E) More monitoring, transparency and accountability

There is a need for the development of guidelines by which the level of progress and standard of performance in TBPAs, including with regard to safeguarding social rights, can be assessed. This would increase the extent to which key decision-makers in TBPAs can be held accountable for their actions. The establishment of a regional TBPA monitoring and evaluation framework would offer a good starting-point, although it seems important that, given the great variations in needs and opportunities across the region, that this should be tailored according to individual TBPA needs and opportunities. The creation of a SADC TBPA unit has been recommended (Braack et al., 2003). On the other hand, the SADC is a non-elected organ comprised of national government representatives. This introduces the risk that a SADC TBPA unit would merely reflect and pursue the needs of governmental players. As a means of ameliorating this issue, the SADC could be combined with the appointment of a third monitoring organisation representing or explicitly seeking to support citizen needs. The Legal Resource Centre in Johannesburg might, for example, fulfil such a role.

F) More realistic outlook on the potential of TBPAs to stimulate peace

The findings point to a need to be more realistic about the peace-building potential of TBPAs. This need features particularly with regard to TBPAs in post conflict areas with a continued relatively high conflict outbreak potential, such as the Great Lakes region. As noted by Schoon (2004: 21), the “creation of Peace Parks to create peace where non exists... is radically optimistic”. Although Peace Parks could help to re-establish security in borderlands, this is a long-term process and requires considerable
funding and capacity, as well as trust between participating governments, factors that are currently all lacking in the Great Lakes region. The chances of success seem, therefore, to be low whilst, due to the proneness of borderlands to become bases for guerrilla-activities, the chances that more open borders and connecting infrastructure might increase the impact of armed conflict are relatively high. Furthermore, the notion of Peace Parks could be used as a tool for forced resettlement of local people or refugees, in the name of conservation. Several documents promoting TBPAs already hint in that direction. With this in mind, instead of promoting TBPAs under a false cloak as vehicles for peace, it would be more honest to be realistic about their peace-building potential and discuss their potential merits alongside other and potentially more viable options that could help protect wildlife from the devastating effects of war.

8.5 Emerging Research Needs

A) Alternative institutional models and conflict resolution mechanisms

Considering the obstacles that the prevalence of unequal power structures at the regional level and different cultural perceptions within TBPAs and associated conflict pose to the advancement of the goals of Peace Parks, more research into alternative institutional set ups for TBPAs and into conflict resolution mechanisms is desirable (see also Van der Linde, 2001; Schoon, 2004). The following areas of research would constitute good starting-points:

- Research into the potential and limitations of the organisational set ups that are currently used in TBPAs to try and ensure an equal or more equal division of power. For example, the advantages and constraints of the Great Limpopo’s ‘rotating co-ordinator system’ could be compared to those of the Maloti/Drakensberg’s ‘one country-one co-ordinator’ system.
- Research into collaborative decision-making models promoting ‘solution-based thinking’ and open discussion of feelings and emotions, rather than having these influencing positions and arguments in a covert way (De Bono, 2004: 105). De Bono’s ‘parallel thinking model’ (2004: 89-106), which has been increasingly adapted in the corporate world and within education institutions as a conflict resolution model seems worth investigating for example.
B) Contribution of SADC
It is often seen as desirable that SADC plays a more active and co-ordinating role in TBPAs. However, the precise role and contribution that SADC could make and to what effect has been little thought through, requiring additional research into how SADC’s mandate in TBPAs should best be extended, if at all.

C) Barriers to effective TBPA participation in neighbouring countries
Perhaps because of its leading role in TBPAs, South Africa’s role in TBPAs has been scrutinised and extensively criticised. In contrast, the policies and actions of neighbouring countries have been little assessed, even though most countries have a ‘slow delivery record’. It is important to gain more insight into the stumbling blocks for TBPAs in South Africa’s neighbours. For one thing, it is this lack of initiative or fulfilment of earlier made promises that induces or allows for greater South African pressure, which as reported earlier constitutes a source of tensions. More generally, it is critical to find out more as to the possibilities and constraints in each country to create TBPAs, as a means to gain more insight into the feasibility and timeliness of the establishment of a given TBPA. For development to work, good governance and external political stability, which in the case of TBPAs includes sufficient safety standards at the local borderland level, are required. Depending on the nature of the identified constraints, additional requirements for support could also be identified to help overcome such obstacles, possibly in the form of donor assistance.

D) Alternatives to economic neo-liberalism
In line with mainstream sustainable development thinking (see section 3.1), neo-liberal economic principles underpin TBPAs, as reflected in a strong preference for privatization, private land ownership, free enterprise and open markets as a means to boost regional development and individual liberties. In practice, the neo-liberal development model often “enhances inequalities, perpetuates human deprivation and offers a scaled down version of liberalism and democracy” (Richardson, 2001: 2). These very issues have been identified as significantly hampering TBPAs throughout this thesis. There is hence a need for more engagement with alternative economic models that could be used for TBPAs. Social liberalism, as an ideology which “insists that liberal freedoms and rights extend to all, not just the advantaged” (Richardson, 2001: 205) and which could combine market needs with the need for social welfare is a potential alternative.
There is also a need to explore the options for non-violent ‘radical’ land reform (Lahiff and Scoones, 2001). At a regional level the introduction of capital controls (Epstein, 2003) could possibly help create more economic equality and lessen competition over the revenues of ecotourism. More research into such alternatives would be needed before their implementation could be seriously considered however.

E) Biological claims

Proponents of Peace Parks tend to present the need for bigger parks to incorporate more complete ecosystems and the creation of biological corridors as facts. However, Burnett, (1998: 4) notes how “some biologists question the whole premise of biological corridors because so little science explains what actually happens inside them”. “They are only an idea now, an act of faith” he quotes a prominent ecologist. Instead of uncritically accepting the necessity for wildlife corridors it seems worthwhile to take a more critical stand. Likewise, the potential pitfalls and risks of wildlife translocation need scrutiny. The unexpected return of the Kruger elephants into South Africa (see Chapter Five), wasting millions of US dollars that could have been used for local development, illustrates that the translocation of wildlife is less straightforward than it tends to be presented. The severe health risks that transportation through ‘air lifts’ might pose to animal welfare also needs more consideration. Apart from ethical considerations, resulting animal deaths could easily spark negative publicity, resulting in a decline of ecotourism to TBPAs (Hall-Martin, Interview, 2001). There is also a need to critically assess more generally the contribution to biodiversity that TBPAs can make and whether these are substantial enough to justify the considerable costs of creating a TBPA, especially where economic, social and political benefits are relatively small (Reyers, 2003).

F) Inter-disciplinary approach

Combining social science and natural science approaches and insights, would make it easier to assess how developments in the ‘natural realm’ relate to or influence developments in the social realm and conversely, thereby creating a more holistic picture. Such knowledge would be helpful in gaining more insight into the risks and possibilities surrounding sustainable use of natural resources in TBPAs. Situated in both the social and natural sciences, Geography would be ideally predisposed to engage in or organise such inter-disciplinary research.
**G) Broader research outlook**

So far most academic research on TBPAs in Southern Africa has concentrated on conflicts in the Great Limpopo. There is a great need for more studies on processes in Southern Africa’s other designed TBPAs, which are also endowed with considerable conflict potential. It is also important that academic research does not confine itself to the most ‘striking’ or ‘dramatic’ cases. Although academics have an important function in highlighting frictions and constraints it is equally important to explore where Peace Parks do work and why. In this respect, more research on the state of bi-lateral relations in the Kgalagadi Park is desirable. Bi-lateral relations in this TBPA appear to be of high quality, but the underlying causes have received surprisingly little attention thus far.

**H) Hidden geo-political agendas**

This research has indicated how through participation in TBPAs strong states can extend their influence in their neighbour’s borderland, by influencing its physical and social organisation. Whilst thus far protection of environmental interests seems to underpin such actions, it is not unthinkable that states might want to seek to increase their presence in its neighbour’s territory through TBPAs to safeguard hidden geo-political or economic interests. For example, a state whose economy depends upon access to particular natural resources located in the borderland of a neighbouring country, might want to use TBPAs to ensure closer proximity to those natural resources, out of economic and security considerations (Van Wyk, 2000). The pursuit of such geo-political agendas could aggravate regional tensions and negatively affect the operation of Peace Parks. It is hence important to stay alert to the possible use of TBPAs by states to pursue hidden political agendas (see also Ramutsindela, 2004: 70).

**I) Border claims**

In Chapter Six it was indicated that not only may TBPAs be unable to reduce tensions over borders; TBPAs may add to these when used as a mechanism to re-introduce existing grievances over boundaries. With most of South Africa’s neighbours holding claims on South African territory, it is not unthinkable that similar patterns could emerge.

---

11 As the first findings of Jones’ (2004) PhD research on the emerging conflict between local resource access and conservation in the Lubombo TBPA indicate for example.
in other TBPAs. To optimise the possible contribution that TBPAs can make in resolving border conflicts and to minimise the chances that they might become vehicles for conflict over boundaries, it is essential that the relationship between TBPAs and border conflicts is studied in more depth.

J) Create a more realistic research model from which to assess the peace-building potential of TBPAs

Although often halted by international tensions, TBPAs do have the potential to make a significant contribution to peace. Rather than fully abandoning the PPC it would be useful to change its scope and underlying premises. To gain more realistic and accurate knowledge of the peace-building potential of TBPAs a first requirement is that the constraints on the peace-building capacity of TBPAs are recognised. Firstly, the notion that TBPAs work as vehicles for peace should not be assumed to be a general phenomenon, but rather as a highly context dependent one. Secondly, the quality of existing relations between participating governments needs to be actively acknowledged as an important influencing factor. Thirdly, the very requirements posed to TBPAs in developing countries, whereby they have become vehicles for development, coupled with an often problematic and chaotic political context significantly affect the potential for peace-building. More thought is required as to how the peace-building potential of TBPAs is affected by these factors, and how solutions can be found to constraints in this area. Concepts used in critical academic research on the presupposed peace-building aspects of tourism could possibly be used as starting-points for more critical reflection on the PPC.

There is also a need to assess in more depth the ways in which TBPAs can build peace and under what circumstances. For example, and especially in the Southern African context, in studying the peace-building potential of TBPAs it would be useful to consider if and to what extent Peace Parks could stimulate peace within countries, by bringing people from a wide range of racial and ethnic backgrounds, and from different social groups and classes to the ‘negotiation table’.12

---

12 For example, in Zimbabwe co-operation in TBPAs played an important role in bringing parties to the negotiating table, such as white commercial farmers and war veterans (Verhoef, Interview, 2002). Whilst thus far this social capital cannot be used due to wider political circumstances in Zimbabwe, it might have laid important foundations/networks for dialogue in the future.
Bibliography


Africom, 2000, News Report Launch of Africa’s First Tranfrontier Park. 15 May (released on behalf of the Kgalagadi Transfrontier Park)


1 All of the WebPages referred to in this Bibliography have been accessed in 2004.


Anon., 2001a, Gaza/Kruger/Gonarezhou Management Plan. [draft document]


http://archive.mg.co.za/NXT/gateway.dll?f=templates&fn=default.htm$vid=MailGuard:MailGuardView&npuserame=MailGuard&nppassword=MailGuard


Beinart, W., 1994, Twentieth Century South Africa. New York: OUP


287


Department of Botany, University of the Western Cape, 2001, *Biodiversity in South Africa* [online], Available from: http://www.botany.uwc.ac.za/Envfacts/facts/biosa.htm
Devereux, S. and J. Hoddinott (eds.), 1993, *Fieldwork in Developing Countries*. Boulder: Lynne Rienner


Fall, J.J., 1999, ‘Transboundary Biosphere Reserves: Applying Landscape Ecological Arguments to Protected Area Planning’. Landskabsokologiske Skrifter, Special issue, University of Roskilde, Denmark


French, H., 2000, Vanishing Boundaries, Protecting the Planet in the Age of Globalisation. London: Earthscan


297


Available from:


ITTO/IUCN


Mmegi, 2004, Zimbabwe Cross-border Relations with Botswana [online], 14 May.

Available from: http://www.queensu.ca/samp/migrationnews/index.htm#Botswana


305


Murombedzi, J., 2003, ‘Sharing South Africa’s National Parks: Community Land


307


Omara-Ojungu, P.H., 1992, Resource Management in Developing Countries. Essex: Longman


Parry, B. ‘Hunting the Gene-hunters’. Environment & Planning A 30 (12): 2147-2162


310


Roe, E., 1995, 'Except Africa: Postscript to a Special Section on Development Narratives'. World Development 23 (6): 1065-1069


Ross, R., 1999, A Concise History of South Africa. Cambridge: CUP


\(^2\) Posted in 2003 on this website. Treaty was drawn up and ratified in 1992 by Southern African heads of state.


http://www.standardbank.co.za/research/SAGE_ATRP_061204.PDF


Websites

Department of Environmental Affairs and Tourism: www.environment.gov.za
Europarc: http://www.europarc.org
Go2Africa: http://www.go2africa.com
Southern African Development Community:
http://www.sadc.int/index.php?action=a1001&page_id=mainpage_intranet
The transboundary Protected Areas Research Initiative:
http://hdgc.epp.cmu.edu/misc/TBPA.htm
University of Peace: www.uepeace.org
Appendix 1: Southern Africa’s established and proposed Peace Parks

1) Kgalagadi Transfrontier Park

The first Peace Park to be established, the Kgalagadi Transfrontier Park comprises the Botswana Gemsbok National Park (75% of land surface) and the South African Kalahari Gemsbok National Park (25%). A bilateral agreement between the Botswana Department of Wildlife and National Parks and South African National Parks signed on 7 April 1999, paved the way for the Transfrontier Park’s formal opening on 12 May 2000. The borders being only demarcated by white washed stones, game could already cross the national boundaries without impediment. Since 2000 the Transfrontier Park has been further extended with the addition of the Mabusehube Game Reserve, in southwest Botswana. The park attracts about 50,000 visitors annually.

Size: The TBPA is 37,991 km² in extent.

Natural characteristics: Dry savannah, desert and sand dunes. Rivers are seasonal (Peace Parks Foundation, 2004). Reflecting its arid desert conditions (with lack of surface water and an average of 200 mm of rainfall a year) wildlife is sparsely distributed in this area, but includes lion, cheetah, leopard, springbok, raptors, weavers and gemsbok (DEAT, 2003: 47).

Status of the land: On both the South African and Botswana side land is state owned. On the South African side the Bushmen successfully launched a land claim against the South African State² and were granted several farms in the area. They are for the main part banned from hunting, which has led to resentment and conflicts

¹ This Appendix lists the main characteristics for each of the six (planned) Peace Parks in Southern Africa (see Chapter 1). The TBPAs are ranked according to the level of progress made. Most numerical data were taken from Hall-Martin and Modishe (2002), whilst descriptions of the Parks’ natural features are largely based on data from the PPF website (www.peaceparks.org) and to a lesser extent on Speet’s dissertation (2000). Where information is also based on other sources these are explicitly mentioned in the text.

² Upon the proclamation of the Kalahari Gemsbok National Park in 1931, Bushmen previously resident in the area were forcefully evicted from the Park.
with the park authorities. The Botswana Bushmen also have an interest in the area, but have no legal means to claim back their land.

2) The Great Limpopo Transfrontier Park

Formerly known as the Gaza-Kruger-Gonarezhou Park, the Great Limpopo Transfrontier Park comprises the Mozambican Limpopo National Park, South Africa’s Kruger National Park and Zimbabwe’s Gonarezhou National Park, as well as the adjacent Manjinji Pan Sanctuary and Malipati Safari Area. The Sengwe Communal area in Zimbabwe is to be opened as a wildlife corridor between Kruger and Gonarezhou. The international treaty was signed in December 2002. The planned co-exchange of “technical, scientific and legal expertise” and the opening of wildlife migration corridors has so far merely taken place between South Africa and Mozambique, partially as a result of the political crisis in Zimbabwe. In October 2001 a start was made with the translocation of 25 Kruger elephants into a 35 000 ha sanctuary on the Mozambican side, for which some openings in the border fence were made. The Great Limpopo has not been opened officially yet. On basis of the existing excellent tourism infrastructure of the Kruger National Park, the great variety of wildlife hosted in the area and the fact that it would constitute the world’s biggest game Park, the Great Limpopo is generally recognised as the TBPA with the greatest eco tourism potential. The Great Limpopo Park is the only TBPA with its own up-to-date website: www.greatlimpopopark.com. Originally developed as a Transfrontier Conservation Area, the Great Limpopo was turned into a Transfrontier Park under South African pressure. The long-term objective is still to turn it into a TFCA or ‘Resource Area’, totaling almost 100,000 km², allowing for sustainable use and multiple land uses. In this set up several more areas would be added to a by then existing Transfrontier Park, including the Kruger-to-Canyons Biosphere Reserve, and Mozambican beaches, further raising the Great Limpopo’s profile as a tourism destination.

Size: 35 000 km² (nearly the size of The Netherlands)

3 Previously known as the Coutada 16 Hunting Area.

4 The reasons for this are explored in Chapter Five.
**Natural Characteristics:**
Tropical and moist, temperate and dry savannah types. Great variety of wildlife, including the Big Five

**Status of the Land:** All National Park areas are government-owned, apart from the Makuleke’s land area in the Pafuri Triangle in the north of Kruger. Their land will not be cultivated or inhabited by people, but used for tourism development. The Mozambican Limpopo Park is also government owned, making local communities residing in this park vulnerable to eviction. The Sengwe corridor is community owned. Whilst the Sengwe community is interested in joining the TBPA, delays on the side of the Zimbabwean government to engage in formal consultations prevent them from doing so.

3) **Ai-Ais/Richtersveld Transfrontier Park**
This Transfrontier Park comprises the Namibian Ai-Ais Hot Springs Game Park (69%) and the Richtersveld National Park (31%) in South Africa. A treaty was signed in August 2003. As with the Great Limpopo, there are plans to further expand the area into a Transfrontier Conservation Area.

**Size:** 6,222 km²

**Natural Characteristics**
The area is famous for its floral diversity, which manifests itself during the spring. Other distinctive features include the Fish River Canyon (frequently compared to the Grand Canyon in the US) and the Ai-Ais Hot Springs. The Orange River separates the Park’s two national components. The area is also of significant geological interest.

**Status of the Land**
The Richtersveld Park is a contractual National Park, i.e. the land is owned by the local Nama communities. Land on the Namibian side is state owned.
4) Maloti/Drakensberg Transfrontier Conservation and Development Area

Covering a mountain range on Lesotho’s northeastern border with South Africa, this Transfrontier Conservation Area links several provincial nature reserves and national protected areas in South Africa (including the uKhahlamba Park, the Golden Gate Highlands National Park and the Natal Drakensberg Park) with the recently proclaimed Sehlaba-Thebe National Park in Lesotho. On 1 August 2003 the international Treaty was signed. A US $ 16 million Global Environmental Facility Grant, facilitated by the World Bank, finances the development of the Transboundary Programme. Reflecting the important role of provincial bodies in South Africa and the role of the World Bank, these partners are linked to the MoU through subsidiary agreements. Transboundary activities aim to tackle alien plant invasion, over-grazing, drug smuggling, stock theft and to improve fire management (DEAT, 2003: 48). Linked to this, activities encompass “strategic conservation planning, establishment of protection measures for priority sites, enhanced management of existing Protected Areas, community involvement, nature-based tourism, economic development and institutional development for effective nature conservation management” (DEAT, 2003: 48). Remains of prehistoric Bushmen paintings in the area constitute important cultural assets.

Size: 13,000 km²

Natural Characteristics: The area constitutes a major watershed, which supplies water to both Lesotho and South Africa. Constituting the highest areas in Southern Africa, the mountain range hosts unique mountain and sub-alpine ecosystems. Parts in South Africa have been proclaimed Ramsar sites. (Ramsar, 2004)

Status of the Land: Land in the area is largely government owned, either at the national or at the provincial level. Nonetheless, some nature reserves on the South Africa side such as the Qua Qua Park have been ‘invaded’ by local communities (Collins, Interview, 2002) whilst parts of the Maluti area in Lesotho are de facto run by local chiefs (Sandwith, Interview, 2002).
5) Lubombo TFCA
Located on a plain between the Indian Ocean and the Lubombo Mountains in the west, the planned Lubombo TFCA straddles the borders between southern Mozambique, Swaziland and South Africa’s Kwa-Zulu Natal province. It aims to link the Maputo Elephant Reserve in Mozambique through the Futi Corridor with South Africa’s Tembe Elephant Park and Ndumo Game Reserve. Furthermore, Swaziland’s Hlane Wildlife Sanctuary, Mlawula Nature Reserve and the Ndzinda Reserve will be added as well as communal areas. A Trilateral Protocol was signed on 22 June 2000. The Lubombo TFCA is part of a wider Spatial Development Initiative between the three countries. In the long term the plan is to connect the Lubombo TFCA with the Great Limpopo Park.

Size: 4195km² (66% in Mozambique, 26% in South Africa and 8% in Swaziland)

Natural Characteristics: Wetlands, including in South Africa’s St Lucia, a World Heritage Conservation Site, the Lubombo mountains, coastal and marine natural areas. High animal variety, including in big game.

Status of the Land: The Lubombo Conservancy in Swaziland has some community owned, some privately owned and some state owned land; land on the South African and Mozambican side is largely state owned.

6) Limpopo/Shashe TBPA
Positioned at the convergence of the Limpopo and Shashe Rivers, this planned TFCA comprises the Botswana Northern Tili Game Reserve (28%), South Africa’s Limpopo Valley/Vhembe Dongola National Park as well as various privately owned ranches (53%) and the Tuli Circle Safari Area in Zimbabwe (10%). It includes Mapungubwe Village, recently proclaimed a World Heritage Site, an important archeological site where the famous Golden Rhino and other archeological treasures were discovered. Reflecting the political difficulties in Zimbabwe, Botswana and

---

5 The Maramani Communal land, the River Ranch Resettlement areas and various game ranches might be further added on the Zimbabwean side.
South Africa are currently taking the lead in the process of establishing this Transfrontier Park. A Draft Memorandum of Understanding is still under discussion.

**Size:** 4872km²

**Physical characteristics:** Savannah and riparian forests. Hosts the Tuli elephants and a wide range of other wildlife.

**Status of the Land:** This TFCA includes both privately owned, community owned and state owned land. The South Africa parts hosts numerous Zimbabwean illegal immigrants working on commercial farms.

**References**


## Appendix II Overview of Interviews

### Interviews 2001

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Name interviewee</th>
<th>Position</th>
<th>Organisation</th>
<th>Date</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Anonymous</td>
<td>Poacher</td>
<td>N/A</td>
<td>22/07</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Anonymous</td>
<td>Poacher</td>
<td>N/A</td>
<td>22/07</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Anonymous</td>
<td>Shangoma (witchdoctor)</td>
<td>N/A</td>
<td>22/07</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Awkright, David</td>
<td>Deputy CEO</td>
<td>Maputo Corridor Company</td>
<td>24/08</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Baillie, Alexandra</td>
<td>Earth Summit Organisor</td>
<td>IUCN</td>
<td>23/10</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Braack, Leo (Dr.)</td>
<td>Gaza Kruger Gonarezhou Coordinator</td>
<td>SANPs</td>
<td>17/08</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Braack, Michael</td>
<td>Former SANPs employee</td>
<td>N/A</td>
<td>14/08</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Chitepo, Kule (Dr.)</td>
<td>Co-ordinator</td>
<td>African Resources Trust</td>
<td>09/07</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Clifford Makuleke</td>
<td>Makuleke Community member</td>
<td>N/A</td>
<td>12/07</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Collins, Steve</td>
<td>Officer</td>
<td>GTZ-Transform</td>
<td>15/08</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Culverwell, James</td>
<td>Lubombo Coordinator</td>
<td>DNFFB</td>
<td>30/08</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Da Cruz, Paul</td>
<td>Ecologist/Geographer</td>
<td>N/A</td>
<td>19/07</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Dlamini, Sikumbuzo</td>
<td>Researcher</td>
<td>Swazi National Trust</td>
<td>28/08</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Freddy Riri</td>
<td>Project manager</td>
<td>African Wildlife Foundation (AWF)F</td>
<td>16/07</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Grossman, David (Dr.)</td>
<td>Ecologist, independent consultant. Representative for Bushmen Community</td>
<td>Mafisa Consultancy/David Grossman &amp;</td>
<td>03/07</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

6 All of the abbreviations for the listed organisations in this category can be found in the Abbreviations & Acronyms section of this thesis. Where the names of organisations have not been mentioned in the main text of the thesis, organisational names are given in full. Where respondents held various positions, the first position is the one held in the organisation mentioned under 'organisation'.

7 Training and Support for Natural Resource Management.
<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Name</th>
<th>Position/Title</th>
<th>Organization</th>
<th>Date</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Hall Martin, Antony (Dr.)</td>
<td>Elephant specialist/retired SANPs officer</td>
<td>N/A</td>
<td>17/08</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Hanks, John (Dr.)</td>
<td>Director</td>
<td>TFCA Unit-CTI</td>
<td>17/10</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Jones, Muleso Kharie</td>
<td>TFCA Coordinator</td>
<td>DEAT</td>
<td>10/09</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Kanju, Rest</td>
<td>Tourism expert</td>
<td>African Resources Trust (ART)</td>
<td>09/07</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Koch, Eddie</td>
<td>Director Consultant Free lance contributor/former journalist</td>
<td>Mafisa Consulting</td>
<td>06/07</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Koetzer, Oubaas</td>
<td>Inspector</td>
<td>South African Police</td>
<td>07/09</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Lamson Makuleke</td>
<td>Community leader</td>
<td>AWF</td>
<td>20/07</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Mabuza, Sindi</td>
<td>Lubombo SDI coordinator</td>
<td>Ministry of Finance &amp; Planning</td>
<td>19/09</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>(Swaziland)</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Makuleke, Lamson</td>
<td>Consultant/Tribal Head Makuleke Community</td>
<td>AWF</td>
<td>17/07</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Manning, Ian</td>
<td>Chief Technical Advisor</td>
<td>CITES</td>
<td>31/10</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Mbengashe, Maria</td>
<td>Chief Director Biodiversity and Heritage</td>
<td>DEAT</td>
<td>05/07</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Mdluli, Musa</td>
<td>Director of Tourism</td>
<td>Ministry of Tourism, Environment and Communication (Swaziland)</td>
<td>19/09</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Name</td>
<td>Position</td>
<td>Affiliation</td>
<td>Date</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>-----------------------</td>
<td>-----------------------------------------------</td>
<td>--------------------------------------------------</td>
<td>--------</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Nkatini, N. (Prof.)</td>
<td>Head Community Forum Great Limpopo</td>
<td>N/A</td>
<td>27/07</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Monadjem, Ara (Dr.)</td>
<td>Lecturer Biological Sciences</td>
<td>University of Swaziland</td>
<td>28/08</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Mtele, Jonathan</td>
<td>Swazi Tribal Head</td>
<td>N/A</td>
<td>20/07</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Mtsambwa, Morris</td>
<td>Director of Parks, former delegate for Zimbabwe as its Director-General of Parks and Wildlife Management Authority</td>
<td>Swazi National Trust</td>
<td>28/08</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Muleso, Jones Kharika</td>
<td>TFCA coordinator</td>
<td>DEAT</td>
<td>05/07</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Munthali, Simon (Dr.)</td>
<td>Officer Transfrontier Conservation Areas Project Secretariat</td>
<td>DNFFB</td>
<td>29/08</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Myburgh, Werner</td>
<td>Project Manager</td>
<td>PPF</td>
<td>23/10</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Oliver, Willeen</td>
<td>Assistant to Chief Director Biodiversity and Heritage</td>
<td>DEAT</td>
<td>05/07</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Pheko, Motsoko (Dr.)</td>
<td>Deputy president</td>
<td>Pan Africanist Congress of Azania (PAC)</td>
<td>10/10</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Pienaar, Danie</td>
<td>Head of Scientific Services</td>
<td>Kruger Park</td>
<td>04/09</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Reilly, Ted (Dr.)</td>
<td>Owner</td>
<td>Big Game Parks</td>
<td>28/09</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Rogerson, Chris (Prof.)</td>
<td>SDI expert</td>
<td>Wits University</td>
<td>02/07</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Rogues, Kim</td>
<td>Project Manager Lubombo Conservancy</td>
<td>Swazi National Trust</td>
<td>28/08</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Seelig, Leonard</td>
<td>Conservation Consultant</td>
<td>TFCA Unit-Conservation International</td>
<td>17/10</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Shole, Khepsi</td>
<td>Eco tourism specialist</td>
<td>UNDP</td>
<td>09/07</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Simbine, Caetano</td>
<td>Head Refugee Research Programme (RRF)</td>
<td>IUCN/RRF</td>
<td>17/07</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Spenceley, Anna</td>
<td>PhD student/Tourism Consultant</td>
<td>Institute of Natural Resources (Natal)</td>
<td>30/10</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
Informal conversations held during GKG policy workshops (Skukuza, 24-27 July/Johannesburg 14 August) and GKG Elephant Translocation Ceremony (4th of October 2001) include:

Bartolomeu, Sotho (TFCA Project Manager, DNFFB); Chidziya, Edson (Acting Deputy Director (M & C) Department of National Parks and Wildlife Management, Zimbabwe); De Vletter, Rod (Consultant, World Bank (Mozambique)); Dube, Nokuthula (Tourism Specialist, KPMG Hospitalitz, Leisure & Tourism); Kumagwelo, Guilhermina (Forestry Officer, DNFFB); Jones, Patricia Smith (Officer, Home Affairs (South Africa); Matsule, Salomão (Project Manager Limpopo Corridor Programme); Nicholson, Andrew (Manager, KPMG Hospitalitz, Leisure & Tourism); Peddle, David (Colonel SADF); Tarmamade, Paulo (Project Manager, Maputo Development Corridor).
## Interviews 2002/2003

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Name interviewee</th>
<th>Position</th>
<th>Organisation</th>
<th>Date</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Combrink, Judie</td>
<td>Assistant-director: International Liaison and Co-ordination</td>
<td>DEAT</td>
<td>16/09/02</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Braack, Leo (Dr.)</td>
<td>Independent Consultant in TBPAs/former Great Limpopo co-ordinator (SANPs)</td>
<td>N/A</td>
<td>13/09/02</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Collins, Nacelle</td>
<td>Wetland Ecologist</td>
<td>Free State Nature Conservation</td>
<td>27/11/02</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Collins, Steve</td>
<td>Officer</td>
<td>GTZ Transform</td>
<td>11/12/02</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Coplan, David (Dr.)</td>
<td>Antropologist</td>
<td>University of Witwatersrand</td>
<td>12/02/03</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>De Vletter, Rod</td>
<td>Consultant</td>
<td>World Bank, Mozambique</td>
<td>25/09/02</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Fakir, Saliem</td>
<td>Country Programme Coordinator&lt;sup&gt;9&lt;/sup&gt;</td>
<td>IUCN</td>
<td>19/01/03</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Gastrow, Peter</td>
<td>Researcher</td>
<td>ISS</td>
<td>30/12/02</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Gilfillan, Durkje</td>
<td>Lawyer</td>
<td>Legal Resource Centre</td>
<td>04/09/02</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Groenewald, Gideon</td>
<td>Project Facilitator</td>
<td>PPF</td>
<td>27/11/02,</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Maluti/Drakensberg Transfrontier Conservation and Development Area&lt;sup&gt;10&lt;/sup&gt;</td>
<td></td>
<td>05/12/02</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Grossman, David (Dr.)</td>
<td>Ecologist, independent consultant. Representative for</td>
<td>Mafisa Consultancy/</td>
<td>12/02/03</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

<sup>8</sup> All of the abbreviations for the listed organisations in this category can be found in the Glossary of the thesis. Where the names of organisations have not been mentioned in the main text of the thesis, organisational names are given in full. Where respondents held various positions, the first position is the one held in the organisation mentioned in this Interview Overview.

<sup>9</sup> For South Africa.

<sup>10</sup> For Lesotho.
<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Name</th>
<th>Position/Title</th>
<th>Organization</th>
<th>Date</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Bushmen Community (Kgalagadi Park), and Makuleke community (Great Limpopo).</td>
<td>Executive Director</td>
<td>Conservation International</td>
<td>9/10/02</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Hanks, John</td>
<td>TFCA Co-ordinator</td>
<td>DEAT</td>
<td>15/01/03</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Jones, Muleso Kharika</td>
<td>Chief Control Warden/Regional Manager</td>
<td>Ministry of Environment &amp; Tourism</td>
<td>29/11/02</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Lane, Patrick</td>
<td>Regional Manager Lowveld</td>
<td>Mpumalanga Parks Board</td>
<td>26/11/02</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Maloi, Mabatlokoa</td>
<td>Senior Planner</td>
<td>Ministry of Tourism, Culture and Environment (Lesotho)</td>
<td>29/11/02</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Mayoral-Philips, Andrew</td>
<td>Business Development Consultant/PhD student</td>
<td>Ebony Consulting International/University of Pretoria</td>
<td>21/01/03</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Matolong, Tebogo</td>
<td>Senior Environmental Officer TFCAs</td>
<td>N/A</td>
<td>15/01/03</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Modishe, Sedia</td>
<td>Co-ordinator Limpopo/Shahe TFCA</td>
<td>PPF</td>
<td>27/11/02</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Mpasa, E.K.</td>
<td>Director-General of Tourism</td>
<td>Ministry of Tourism, Culture and Environment (Lesotho)</td>
<td>05/12/02</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Name</td>
<td>Position</td>
<td>Organization</td>
<td>Date</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>-----------------------</td>
<td>-----------------------------------</td>
<td>---------------------------------------------------</td>
<td>-----------</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Muhanga, John</td>
<td>Assistant Director</td>
<td>Kenya Wildlife Service</td>
<td>26/11/02</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Munthali, Simon (Dr.)</td>
<td>Officer Transfrontier Conservation Areas Project Secretariat</td>
<td>DNFFB</td>
<td>25/09/02</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Mwanauta, Abdallah</td>
<td>Game Officer (Project Coordinator)</td>
<td>Wildlife Division (Tanzania)</td>
<td>26/11/02</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Myburgh, Werner</td>
<td>Project Manager</td>
<td>PPF</td>
<td>09/10/02</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Potgieter, De Wet</td>
<td>Journalist</td>
<td>Rapport</td>
<td>05/09/02</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Ramoreboli, Lebo</td>
<td>Former SDI Co-ordinator for Maluti (through DEAT)</td>
<td>N/A</td>
<td>09/12/02</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Reilly, Ted (Dr.)</td>
<td>Owner</td>
<td>Big Game Parks</td>
<td>02/10/02</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Rogues, Kim</td>
<td>Project Coordinator Biodiversity &amp; Tourism Corridors</td>
<td>Swazi National Trust</td>
<td>01/10/02</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Ross, Robert (Dr.)</td>
<td>Reader in African History</td>
<td>University of Leiden</td>
<td>16/12/</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Rupert, Anton</td>
<td>Chairman</td>
<td>PPF</td>
<td>09/10/02</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Sandwith, Trevor</td>
<td>Task Force Coordinator Transboundary Parks/ Ex-Project Officer Maluti/Drakensberg (KZN/IUCN)</td>
<td>IUCN-WCPA</td>
<td>27/11/02</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Name</td>
<td>Position</td>
<td>Organization</td>
<td>Date</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>-----------------------</td>
<td>---------------------------------------------</td>
<td>----------------------------------------------</td>
<td>------------</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Stemmet, André</td>
<td>Senior State Law Advisor</td>
<td>Department of Foreign Affairs(^{11})</td>
<td>13/12/02</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Sumner, Paul</td>
<td>Lecturer Geography</td>
<td>University of Pretoria</td>
<td>12/09/02</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Theron, Piet</td>
<td>Great Limpopo Co-ordinator</td>
<td>SANPs</td>
<td>22/08/02</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Van Wyk, Arrie</td>
<td>Limpopo Park Project Manager</td>
<td>PPF</td>
<td>20/01/03</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Van Wyk, Jo-Ansie</td>
<td>University Lecturer in Political Science</td>
<td>UNISA</td>
<td>29/09/02</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Verhoef, Johan</td>
<td>Limpopo/Shashe Co-ordinator</td>
<td>SANPs</td>
<td>29/09/02</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Vieira, Fatima</td>
<td>Journalist</td>
<td>Vertical, Mozambique</td>
<td>25/09/02</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Van der Walt, Peet</td>
<td>Project Co-ordinator Ai-Ais/Richtersveld Transfrontier Conservation Park</td>
<td>SANPs</td>
<td>25/11/02</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Warner, Chris</td>
<td>Senior environmental specialist/Task Manager Maluti/Drakensberg</td>
<td>World Bank</td>
<td>04/09/02</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Zunckel, Kevin</td>
<td>Programme Coordinator Maluti/Drakensberg Transfrontier Conservation and Development Area</td>
<td>Ezemvelo KZN Wildlife</td>
<td>30/11/02</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

\(^{11}\) Of South Africa.
Informal conversations held during the InWEnt-IUCN-EUROPARC Workshop on Transboundary Protected Areas (in Southern and Eastern Africa): Guidelines for Good Practices and Implementation (25-30 November 2002) include:

Gcabashe, Busi (Head Social Ecology, SANPs); Jonga, Charles (Director, Campfire Association); Khoza, Bhekikisa (General Manager, KwaZulu Natal Wildlife); Kwape, Daphne (Consultant, Ministry of Agriculture (South Africa)); Mapolesa J. Mosenye (Director, Lesotho National Parks); Motsamai Damane, John (Director, National Environmental Secretariat); Mtsambiwa, Morris Zorora (Director of Parks, Swazi National Trust); Stein, Roland (TBBR Coordinator Palatine Forest and Northern Vosges, EUROPARCS).
Appendix III: Major participating organisations - First Fieldwork period

State agencies

South Africa
- Dept. of Environmental Affairs and Tourism
- South African National Parks
- South African Defence Force
- South African Police Service

Swaziland
- Swaziland National Trust
- Ministry of Tourism, Environment and Communication

Zimbabwe
- Dept. of National Parks and Wildlife Management

Mozambique
- Direccao Nacional de Florestas e Fauna Bravia, Ministério da Agricultura e Desenvolvimento Rural

NGOs & Donors
- African Wildlife Foundation
- Peace Parks Foundation
- Conservation International
- Gesellschaft fuer Technische Zusammenarbeit: (German NGO)
- United States Agency for International Development
- World Wide Fund for Nature
- European Commission- Aid Division
- Danish Cooperation for Environment and Development
• InWEnt
• World Bank

Tourism Businesses/Organisations

• Nature Group
• Uitkijk Holidays, Karino
• KPMG, Johannesburg
• Swazi Trails, Mbabane
• Big Game Parks (BGP)
• RETOSA

Community-based organisations

• Community Forum for communities bordering Kruger
• Makuleke Community Forum
• Shangaan Community Festival Organisers
• Shewula Community Trust

Universities

University of Johannesburg
Institute of Natural Resources, University of Natal
University of Pretoria
University of South Africa

Other

Legal Resource Centre
Information Resource Centre (Parliamentary Office)
Institute for Security Studies