The development of the concept of authority within the Russian Orthodox Church

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The Development of the Concept of Authority within the Russian Orthodox Church

Vitali Ivanovich Petrenko

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PhD Thesis

University of Durham
Department of Theology
April, 2005
Abstract

This study attempts to answer the question as to 'how and what type of authority was developed within Russian Orthodox Church during its turbulent and controversial history and how does this affect its operation today? This objective required the investigation of the historical contexts and events, which led to a particular concept of authority being formulated in the Russian Orthodox Church within the wider framework of time, geography, theology and philosophy.

The thesis is organised chronologically. Since Russian Orthodoxy derived from Byzantium and from the beginning shared its spiritual and ecclesiological outlook, the first two chapters discuss the ecclesiological and ideological principles that held sway within the Byzantine Church and became the modus operandi for the Russian Church. This in turn was set against the wider historical, theological and ideological setting of Roman and Hellenistic civilization.

Whilst the Russian Church reflected Byzantine’s ecclesiological structures, the actual exercise and development of this authority took place in reaction to different historical and theological controversies and events such as the union of Florence, the collapse of the Byzantine empire and the ascendency of the Muscovite kingdom between fourteenth and sixteenth century. In this regard the Muscovite period with its ecclesiastical conflicts and the autocratic State proved determinative. The subsequent three chapters discuss different controversies and developments, which took place in time and space between Kievan Rus' and post-Soviet Russia. The actual development of the authority within Russian Orthodox Church was formulated and shaped by Church’s relationship with the autocratic Muscovite State, the handling of the Judaizers’ and the Strigol'niiki’s controversies, Possessors’ and Non-Possessors’ movements. Further, it was affected by Nikon’s raskol, the reforms of Peter the Great and the events of the twentieth century with its historical 1917-18 Sobor and the changes in the political system and its ideological orientation at the beginning and the end of the twentieth century.

The uniqueness and the significance of Russian developments in relation to mystical authority is noted and discussed in its appearance of the Third Rome formula. It will be argued that within Russian Orthodoxy mystical and apocalyptic perceptions of authority came to play and to exercise a much greater role than in Byzantium, leading to the appearance of the notion of Moscow as Third Rome and a neo-messianic self-consciousness of Russian people. I conclude that the twentieth century did not bring about a finalisation of the development and the actual perception of the authority. It rather emerges as a period of transition during which the actual type of authority within Russian church was largely hijacked by the State and affected by the tragic events of a wider Russian history.
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5.4. The apocalyptic developments throughout the 20th C

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5.6. Anti-Semitism

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Declaration

No part of this thesis has previously been submitted by me for a degree in this or any other university.

Signed: [Signature]

Date: 27/04/05
Acknowledgments

The debts of gratitude which I wish to acknowledge are great and numerous.

I would like to express my appreciation and thanks to Prof. Andrew Louth, my supervisor, for all his patience, comments, suggestions and corrections during the writing of this thesis.

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Last, but not least, my special thanks goes to my beloved wife, Ester for her loving support and encouragement. Your love, care and company helped me in a tremendous way throughout the writing of this thesis. You are a star in your own right!
IN MEMORIAM

This work is written in loving memory of my beloved

father Ivan Ivanovich Petrenko (1932-1976)
and
mother Valentina Antonovna Petrenko (1932-1999)

whose righteous life, unshakeable faith, dedication to Christ and readiness to suffer for His name's sake throughout the Soviet period taught me the real meaning of being a Christian.

....'consider the outcome of their way of life, and imitate their faith'.
(Heb 13:7, RSV)
List of Abbreviations

**In English and other languages**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Abbreviation</th>
<th>Title</th>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td>AHR</td>
<td>The American Historical Review</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>ANF</td>
<td>The Ante-Nicene Fathers</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>BRL</td>
<td>Bulletin of John Rylands Library</td>
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<tr>
<td>BS</td>
<td>Byzantino-Slavica</td>
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<tr>
<td>CASS</td>
<td>Canadian-American Slavic Studies</td>
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<tr>
<td>CAH</td>
<td>Cambridge Ancient History</td>
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<tr>
<td>CH</td>
<td>Church History</td>
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<tr>
<td>CHR</td>
<td>Catholic Historical Review</td>
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<tr>
<td>CM</td>
<td>Classica et Mediaevalia</td>
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<tr>
<td>DOP</td>
<td>Dumbarton Oaks Papers</td>
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<tr>
<td>DR</td>
<td>The Downside Review</td>
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<tr>
<td>EA</td>
<td>Ex Auditu</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>EPS</td>
<td>Ecumenical Press Service</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>ET</td>
<td>The Expository Times</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>CP</td>
<td>Classical Philology</td>
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<tr>
<td>CQ</td>
<td>Classical Quarterly</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>FOG</td>
<td>Forschungen zur osteuropäischen Geschichte</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>GELT</td>
<td>A Greek-English Lexicon of the New Testament</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>GOTR</td>
<td>The Greek Orthodox Theological Review</td>
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<tr>
<td>HSS</td>
<td>Harvard Slavic Studies</td>
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<tr>
<td>HTR</td>
<td>Harvard Theological Review</td>
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<tr>
<td>HUS</td>
<td>Harvard Ukrainian Studies</td>
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<tr>
<td>ICMR</td>
<td>Islam and Christian-Muslim Relations</td>
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<td>IOS</td>
<td>Israel Oriental Studies</td>
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<tr>
<td>JBL</td>
<td>Journal of Biblical Literature</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>JEA</td>
<td>Journal of Egyptian Archaeology</td>
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<tr>
<td>JEH</td>
<td>Journal of Ecclesiastical History</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>JHI</td>
<td>Journal of the History of Ideas</td>
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<tr>
<td>JGO</td>
<td>Jahrbücher für Geschichte Osteuropas</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>JMH</td>
<td>Journal of Modern History</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>JRS</td>
<td>The Journal of Roman Studies</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>JSP</td>
<td>Journal for the Study of the Pseudepigrapha</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>JSR</td>
<td>Journal for the Scientific Study of Religion</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>JSOT</td>
<td>Journal for the Study of the Old Testament</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>JTS</td>
<td>Journal of Theological Studies</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>MRC</td>
<td>Medieval Russian Culture</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>NPNF</td>
<td>Nicene and Post-Nicene Fathers</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>NTS</td>
<td>New Testament Studies</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>OCD</td>
<td>The Oxford Classical Dictionary</td>
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<tr>
<td>OCP</td>
<td>Orientalia Christiana Periodica</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>OW</td>
<td>Orthodox Word</td>
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<tr>
<td>RCL</td>
<td>Religion in Communist Lands</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>REE</td>
<td>Religion in Eastern Europe</td>
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</tbody>
</table>
RR - The Review of Religion
RusR - Russian Review
RSS - Religion, State & Society
SEER - The Slavonic and East European Review
SP - Studia Patristica
SR - Slavic Review
SJT - Scottish Journal of Theology
SMRH - Studies in Medieval and Renaissance History
ST - Studia Theologica
SVTQ - St. Vladimir’s Theological Quarterly
UBHJ - The University of Birmingham Historical Journal
UR - Ukrainian Review
VC - Vigiliae Christianae
YCS - Yale Classical Studies

In Russian
BO - Blagodatnyi ogon’
BT - Bogoslovskiie trudy
VF - Voprosov filosofii
VKhITs - Vestnik Khristianskogo Informatsionnogo Tsentra
VRkh - Vestnik Russkogo Khristianskogo Dvizheniia
EO - EvraziPiskoie obozrenie
IE - Istoricheskii ezhegodnik
ZhMP - Zhurnal Moskovskoi Patriarkhii
IZ - Istoricheskiie Zapisiki
KA - Krasnyi Arkhiv
LN - Literaturnoe nasledstvo
MN - Moskovskiie novosti
MTsV - Moskovskii Tserkovnyi Vestnik
NE - Novaia Evropa
NZ - Novyi zhurnal
NS - Nash Sovremennik
OG - Obshchaia gazeta
PM - Prawoslavnaia mys’
PR - Prawoslavnaia Rus’
RV - Russkoie vozrozhdenie
SovR - Sovetskaia Rossia
TiV – Tserkov’ i vremia
TsV - Tserkovnyi vestnik
TsO - Tsarskii oprichnik
TODLIRL - Trudy Otdela Drevnerusskoi Literatury Instituta Russkoi Literatury
ChIODR - Chtenia v imperatorskom obshchestve istorii i drevnosti rossiiskikh pri Moskovskom universitete
System of Transliteration

The transliteration system followed is that of the Library of Congress. Where Russian words are in common English use, the English equivalent has been used, e.g. perestroika. The names of the authors, however, differ according to either Russian or English sources, e.g. Pospelovskii and Pospelovsky.
Introduction

A general note on Russian Orthodoxy: the twentieth century.

Anyone attempting to study and to understand the history of the Russian state, of the Church and the society at large, would be overwhelmed by the sheer size of this task. The country and the nation which overthrew the seemingly unstoppable hoards of Mongolian medieval tribes; that largely on its own account was able to defeat the victorious march of the Third Reich across Europe and yet was largely responsible for the 'export' of a Communist 'plague' across the globe, has provoked both fascination and resentment on the part of many researchers. The twentieth century brought about some monumental changes in the course of history of this country. It produced a major ideological shift and a change of political system on an unprecedented level: from an Empire ruled by God's anointed, to the Soviet Union led by an all-wise 'Father of the nations' and his Communist successors, to the subsequent collapse of the Soviet empire and a move towards greater freedom and democracy; from a society which was supposedly characterised by its adherence to a Christian worldview expressed through the system of beliefs of Eastern Christianity, to a utopian vision of homo sovieticus at its core, the latter being based upon scientifc-materialistic values designed to replace and to eliminate all religious features within the consciousness of its citizens. This century witnessed both the unchecked despotism and authoritarianism of Stalin and the chaotic, neo-democratic freedom of Yel’tsyn's years, reverting yet again to the neo-democratic, but authoritarian-like leadership of V. Putin at the end of the century. ¹ It also produced an unstoppable quest for power and suppression, and a thirst for freedom, and the apocalyptic reality of wars and the imagined bright future of tomorrow. The pendulum of history swung back and forth affecting the lives of the succeeding generations. Thus the state of affairs can be summarised as that of Russia's journey with all of its apparent contradictions and complications. It is again in search of its own self-identity, as has happened on several occasions throughout its history.

Russia still continues to provoke different, indeed, contradictory reactions at the point of one's encounter with its history within the early period of the twenty first century. This is best described in a well-known phrase of the nineteenth century Russian poet F.I. Tiutchev: 'You cannot understand Russia, you can only believe in her'. If one were to take this characterisation of Russia and its nation seriously, then, it would become imperative to make the inquiry in the realm of belief. That brings one inevitably 'face to face' with Russian Orthodoxy, its beliefs and set of values, which sustained Russian society in its turbulent history and moulded in many ways its worldview.

In a similar way to the rest of the Russian society the Russian Orthodox Church as a 'corporate' entity went through a turbulent and violent history throughout the twentieth century. Like the rest of the Russian society it went through an 'identity' crisis and was subject to terrors and challenges from a godless regime throughout this eventful era. Its actual existence was under threat owing to the brutal pressure and supervision of the State and the pastoral negligence on the part of its compromised hierarchy. Yet it survived and has risen 'from the ashes' by the end of the twentieth century and is increasingly starting to play an ever more dominant role in the life of the nation.

However, it must be admitted that the issue of the self-identity of the Russian Church goes beyond that of the Communist era. As we shall see from our study, the Russian Church hardly enjoyed any period of freedom throughout its existence when it was essentially free from the 'shackles' of the State, and would have been free to develop on its own accord. Thus, there is an essential historical parallel running between the beginning and the end of the twentieth century. It presents us with the picture of the Russian Church emerging from the period of State domination, either that of the Synodal or the Soviet period, attempting to find its place, to reform itself and to express its opinion within the socio-political setting of Russian or post-Soviet society. In the case of the latter scenario, it is the unlimited freedom of the post-Soviet political system which presents the Church with apparent blessings and unprecedented challenges.

During the last decade of the twentieth century Russian Orthodoxy has been propelled to the forefront of social and political life. Being always identified and portrayed as the Church of the Russian nation, it took a defensive stance in the face of the rapid changes and challenges which were coming into Russia from different directions and on different levels. On a socio-political level, the country was facing a transition from a society of the perceived ‘equality’ of all of its citizens and a controlled economy, to the pro-Western reforms which led to the acquisition of Western values in the economic sphere and resulted in the creation of a class society. The socio-political ‘experiment’, however, ran out of steam by the late nineties, and resulted in general disillusionment, the rise of rampant nationalism and widespread poverty. On a socio-religious level, in the aftermath of Gorbachev’s perestroika and glasnost’, Russian Orthodoxy came to face the increasing missionary activity of either indigenous or foreign Protestant and Catholic churches as well as that of different religions and sects. The combined missionary or proselytising activity was perceived to be a tangible threat to the Russian way of life, culture and faith, which was claimed to be shaped entirely by Russian Orthodoxy. These combined threats brought about a particular reaction from Russian Orthodoxy and warranted some extraordinary theological and literary speculations. Support for its policies sometimes came from unexpected factions within Russian society such as the Communist party, resulting in a combined effort between some representatives of Russian Orthodoxy and the Communist party through the virtue of Russian nationalism.

On the part of a certain faction within the Russian Church and society, some authors perceived the unfolding day to day post-Soviet reality and identity crisis through the ‘high’ perception of apocalypticism. In this vision post-Soviet Russia came to be seen as existing within an end of the world scenario, being involved in a cosmic struggle between the forces of good and evil; Christ and Antichrist. The apocalyptic themes of the Third Rome were invoked in order to present Russia as a ‘neo-messianic’ kingdom fulfilling its role at the end of the world. The literary evidence of Slavophiles and a neo-Slavophile, like F.M. Dostoevskii, was brought to bear in order to give a warrant for and to reinforce the overall vision of this ‘neo-messianic’ role for Russia. The nineties witnessed the publication of a two-volume Rossiia pered vtorym prishestviem (Russia before the Second Coming), a collection of different prophecies, startsy’s predictions.
and legends in which the apocalyptic motifs were mixed up with clearly monarchist aspirations and ideals. In some cases these publications revealed an inherent anti-Semitism; in others it brought the Russian Church and the Patriarchate of Moscow, in particular, to the 'helm' of world Orthodoxy. On occasions, this resulted in a direct confrontation with the Ecumenical Patriarchate of Constantinople to a lesser or greater degree throughout the twentieth century.

On a 'lower' level of perception, the Russian Church and Orthodoxy as a whole were perceived to be an organic and essential element of Russian identity and therefore the only legitimate and desirable set of beliefs for the Russian nation. The Church was re-enforced as the national Church of the Russian nation which alone had pastoral and spiritual authority over the Russian nation. In relation to other Christian confessions and Churches either indigenous or Western, the Russian church and Orthodoxy as a whole were firmly re-affirmed as the true Church and the only true belief which was perceived to be essential to Russian national identity. On the other 'front', in relation to other Orthodox churches or groups such as the Old Believers and the Katakombnaia tserkov' (The Catacombs' Church), this essentially underlined the projected perceived authority of the Russian Orthodox Church (Moscow Patriarchate).

From the standpoint of the early twenty first century, one theme tends to recur again and again in different and sometimes contradictory reactions in the life of Russian Orthodoxy in relation to the outside world – that of the perceived authority of Russian Orthodoxy and the Church. In the face of different ideological, sociological, religious and political challenges Russian Orthodoxy is attempting to re-assert its authority not only over the soul or mentalitè of the nation but also beyond its boundaries, on the international stage. In view of these considerations, the question arises as to what constitutes the perceived authority of Russian Orthodoxy? Where does this perceived authority derive from? What are the essential 'ingredients' of the perceived authority in its external and internal elements? What could unite the proponent of the Communist ideology and a representative of the high-ranking hierarchy of Russian Orthodox Church and what could

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be the common denominator for their views? What is the central thread of their aspirations and beliefs?

**Structure and Themes**

As we investigate these issues our thesis falls broadly within four major areas of discussion: spiritual/mystical authority, hierarchical and institutional authority, the principle of *sobornost'* and the charismatic authority of the *starets*. The first two chapters constitute an essential, foundational background for all subsequent chapters which will discuss developments and perceptions within Russian Christianity. Our thesis will revolve around two major questions: how and what? Whilst the first question seeks to investigate the way the concept of the authority developed within Russian Orthodoxy, the second will be pre-occupied with discussion as to what type or mode of the authority developed within Russian Orthodoxy within a period of time.

Chapter I is intended to ‘set the scene’ by discussing the wider issues of pre-Constantinian Christianity which will be relevant to our discussion of Russian Orthodoxy in chapters III, IV and V. Themes such as the *Pax Romana*, eternal Rome, Jesus and the *Pax Romana*, the attitude of the NT writers towards the State and its authority, the Church Fathers’ perception of the State, the concept of the *translatio imperii* and the Messianic kingdom, the Church as the New Israel are presented as the essential ‘ingredients’ which contributed to the creation of a spiritual/mystical concept of authority. This initial discussion takes place in order to identify and to reveal the understanding of the nature of the relationship between State and Church as it emerged through the writings of the evangelists, other NT authors and the Church Fathers. We will attempt to answer the question as to what was their understanding or attitude towards the State and its subsequent implications for the authority of the new emerging Church. This discussion, in itself, will be placed within a wider context of the *Pax Romana* which contained relevant ideas like eternal Rome and lead to a subsequent discussion of the spiritual/mystical authority of Moscow as the Third Rome.

The first chapter will look into the background of the ideas mentioned above through a historico-theological investigation. We will be primarily concerned with the early period
of Christianity within the *Ante-Nicene* period. Our investigation will bring us into considerations of issues such as the *pax Romana*, the concepts and ideas which went into formation of this notion, its origin and development. Alongside the *pax Romana*, attention will be drawn to the notions of the eternity of the empire and its nature and of Rome in particular. The assessment of these issues will be brought together in order to present the make-up of the Roman empire as it was understood in its pre-Constantinian outlook. Further, we will discuss the understanding of the relationship between the Church and the State within the wider framework of the *pax Romana*. We will investigate the way Jesus, the apostles and the Church Fathers dealt with the issue within the designated period.

Finally, in our last section within this chapter we will investigate the notion of the *translatio imperii*: its origin and evolution. We will look into the ways in which the concept of the moving empire was perceived by the book of Daniel and transmitted into Christian understanding of history and theology. Additionally, the concepts of the Messiah and the Messianic kingdom will be discussed in relation to the issue of the *translatio imperii*. This will be done in order to determine the significance and the meaning of these concepts in a Jewish context. We will also consider its implications or influence upon Christian understanding of God’s kingdom and the Messiah. This will enable us to understand the way in which Christian interpretation of Danielic four-fold schema of history was intertwined with Roman and Jewish understanding. The chapter will end with an assessment of the changes within early Christianity in its theological and sociological aspects in order to present the evidence showing in what way the changes within the theological and sociological realms could have had an impact upon the self-perception of the Byzantine empire.

The second chapter will take us into Constantine’s era, which essentially represents an entirely new development in the life of the Christian Church and still continues to be the major issue of contention between different Christian traditions. If one is to take into consideration that a significant number of Protestant scholars perceive generally Constantine’s era as the period of the Church’s apostasy, whilst Orthodox scholars and Tradition honour the emperor Constantine as *ravnoapostol'nyi* (equal to the apostles),
then it becomes imperative to investigate the issues relating to the sphere of Church and State relationship. We will investigate the development of the corresponding concepts of authority between the Church and the State as they evolved during the Constantinian settlement and beyond. Further, bearing in mind the fact that Filofei’s Third Rome formula made its way into an official declaration at the establishment of Moscow’s Patriarchate in 1589, we will attempt to answer the question as to how one is to understand Moscow’s Third Rome terminology and its sense of succession.

We will concentrate upon the issue of the Messianic kingdom and the creation of an imperial ideology, which became a crucial tool for the fusion of several ideas. Having established in chapter I the origin of the ideas and a wider setting of theological concepts within the political milieu of the pax Romana in the period before the emergence of the Christian empire in the fourth century, we will proceed by investigating the developments of the Byzantine period which in many ways became foundational and prescriptive for perceptions and concepts found within Russian Orthodoxy. We will attempt to pose and answer the questions: who was responsible for the emergence of Christian imperial ideology and how did these new speculations affect the self-perception of Byzantine Christianity? Was the formation of a Christian empire under the Christian-Roman emperor Constantine in itself a providential act of God or a further step towards ‘secularisation’ and a departure from the ideals of the parousia-preoccupied generations of earlier Christianity? What were the significance and the impact of the theological speculations regarding Israel in God’s plan of salvation for the emerging ‘State’ Christianity and the Byzantine nation? How was it possible to identify the actual historical formation such as the Byzantine empire with a supra-historical vision of the messianic kingdom? What was to become of the ecclesiastical authority of the Byzantine Church in the light of the post-Nicene perception of the emperor as an ‘external bishop’?

In this connection, a considerable degree of discussion will revolve around the historical and controversial figure of Eusebius of Caesarea. It is important to point out at this stage

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that one will seek in vain for any serious discussion of such a controversial figure as Eusebius of Caesarea among Russian scholars/historians in relation to the issue of the Church/State relationship in Russia. Yet, as our study will demonstrate, he played an important role in the formulation of the socio-theological ideas which were applied in this sphere first in Byzantium and later in Russia. In this regard our discussion of Eusebius is directly related to the overall theme of our study – the development of the concept of authority within Russian Orthodoxy.

We will attempt to demonstrate that he became the main protagonist for the imperial ideology which made its impact upon the relationship between Church and State, and the respective perception of authority on both sides. This is important in view of the fact that Russian scholarship has paid insufficient attention to this historical figure perhaps due to his questionable Orthodoxy. It will also be crucial at this stage to make an assessment of the perception of authority of both the Christian emperor and that of the Church and to determine the nature of that relationship. This, as we shall see, became foundational for Byzantine and later for Russian Orthodoxy. Subsequently, we will discuss the impact of the socio-political changes involved in the conversion of the Roman empire and the parallel emergence of Christianity as an official religion upon Byzantine apocalyptic perception.

Historically, Russian Orthodoxy manifested an anti-Western orientation. This antagonism can be detected within all historical periods beginning with the dawn of Christianity in the Kievan Rus’, deepening throughout the Muscovite period and later being expressed by such diverse groups and individuals as the Old Believers, Slavophiles, post-Soviet Orthodox and secular writers, the hierarchy of the Russian Orthodox Church and Communist protagonists. Thus, the question arises as to what lies behind this anti-Western antagonism and rejection? In what way can the earlier conflicts of the Byzantine era shed some light on the present-day claims of Russian exclusivity, Russia’s claims to represent the True Church and to exercise its inherent authority as against either Catholic or Protestant Churches within Russia and beyond?

Chapter III will bring us to the discussion of Kievan Christianity, being followed by an investigation into the Muscovite kingdom, the Russian church and the historical developments which have taken place in the sphere of the Church/State relationship. We will pay some attention to Kievan Christianity which, though it represents only a ‘transitional phase’ within our investigation, in many ways became foundational and ‘gave birth’ to the Russian Orthodoxy of the Muscovite kingdom. We will investigate the ecclesiastical and the ideological ‘make-up’ of Kievan Christianity in the aftermath of the ecclesiastical conflicts between East and West. We will attempt to demonstrate the legacy of Byzantine’s perceptions of authority within Kievan Orthodoxy. Further, we will analyse the development of authority within the Russian Orthodoxy of the fifteenth and sixteenth centuries mainly on two levels. On one level, we will investigate the development of authority as it was encapsulated within the concept of Moscow as the Third Rome. Here we will consider the issue of the spiritual/mystical authority of the Muscovite kingdom in relation to the outside world - both East and West. This will be followed by discussion of the development of authority within Russian Orthodoxy within this specified period. Our aim within this subsection would be to detect and discuss the development of the hierarchical notion of authority as it was manifested throughout ecclesiastical controversies and disputes within Russian Orthodoxy. In conjunction with this, some attention will be paid to the importance of the authority of Tradition and traditions as they came to play a significant role within these struggles. Following this, special attention will be paid to the controversy which ensued between Possessors and Non-Possessors, taking into account that the result of this controversy had far-reaching implications for the concept of authority within Russian Orthodoxy.

The rationale behind this chapter is to trace and discuss the developments of the concept of authority within the Russian Orthodox Church throughout the crucial ‘Muscovite phase’ which in many respects ‘set the pace’, sometimes with disastrous consequences, and assumed a normative character for Russian Orthodoxy in the centuries to come. Whilst dealing with the general history of the Russian Orthodox Church, the majority of Russian as well as Western scholars/historians either of a pre-revolutionary period or the Soviet or post-Soviet period tend either to by-pass the issue of the development of the concept of authority in the Russian Orthodox Church or only to treat it within the general
course of history, thus pushing it 'behind the scenes'. Yet the issue of perceived authority within the Russian Orthodox Church appears to be one of the crucial underlying notions, which shaped a particular Muscovite religious outlook. Such an approach will allow us to construct the particular developments and the perception of authority as it evolved throughout this crucial phase of the Russian Orthodox Church of a Muscovite makeup. This will enable us to see the similarity and the dissimilarity of the development of the concept of the authority to that of the Byzantine and Kievan phases of Russian Orthodoxy.

Chapter IV will discuss further developments which took place during and after the so-called Nikon's raskol. The process of the fragmentation of Russian society which was promulgated by Nikon's reforms during the seventeenth century gave birth to the appearance of a Russian dichotomy. Russian society came to be characterised by divisions within itself, which though externally united under one Tsar, religiously and socially was developing in different directions throughout the seventeenth and eighteenth centuries. The constant interaction with the West, which began during the sixteenth century and deepened during the seventeenth century, as pointed out by Kazakova, was even further accelerated by the innovative policies of Peter the Great. The impact of this process and its effects upon Russian society at large were succinctly expressed by Denis Fonvizin at the end of the eighteenth century: 'How can we remedy two contradictory and most harmful prejudices: the first, that everything with us is awful, while in foreign lands everything is good; the second, that in foreign lands everything is awful, while with us everything is good?' Fonvizin highlighted the continuity of political and religious struggle within the Russian nation which tried to define itself in relation to the historical and geo-political circumstances within and outside towards West and East. This struggle included, among others, the issues of the Third Rome ideology and the concept of authority, which came to play a significant role in this eventful era.

5 D. Pospelovskii, Pravoslavnaia Tserkov' v istorii Rusi, Rossii i SSSR, 84, regards the times of Troubles (Smutnoie vremia) as the beginning of the period when a process of fragmentation started within Russian society.
6 See N.V. Kazakova, Zapadnaia Evropa v Russkoi Pis’emnosti XV−XVI vekov, Leningrad, Nauka, 1980.
7 As found in G. Hosking, 'The Russian national myth repudiated', in Myths and Nationhood, 198.
In this chapter, then, we are going to explore Nikon’s reforms and the raskol from the standpoint of the development of the concept of authority and its significance for Russian Orthodoxy and society at large. It is our opinion that the raskol cannot be adequately assessed and understood without the investigation of the issue of authority, which in many ways became crucial in this historical dispute and represented the continuing development from the previous centuries. Our goal in this chapter is to build upon the previous study and to discuss the new developments in the context of the overall investigation. This chapter will cover the period beginning with Nikon’s reforms within the seventeenth century, followed by the Synodal period and ending with the nineteenth century considerations.

Although each sub-period represents a separate individual development of its own, we will treat these different periods within the space of one chapter due to the limitations of our study. Furthermore, it is desirable in our view to treat these distinctive periods within one chapter because we understand that they are intrinsically interlinked with one another and to do otherwise would have introduced an a-historical break. We will be able to discuss the major developments within each of these periods and to analyse the significance as well as the implications for the concept of the authority within Russian Orthodoxy. Thus, this chapter falls within three areas: Nikon and the raskol, its aftermath and the era of Peter the Great; it concludes with a discussion of the Slavophile ideology, or at least some of its themes which were ‘resurrected’ in post-Soviet Russia by secular and ecclesiastical thinkers alike. It is our contention that the issue of authority, namely the ‘spiritual’ authority of Russian Orthodoxy as embodied by the Third Rome belief ‘gave birth’ to multifaceted theological/philosophical perceptions in Russian consciousness which were expressed through Russian apocalypticism, messianism, Slavophilism, Panslavism and anti-Semitism. Within this chapter particular attention will be drawn to the concept of sobornost’ which became significant for the ecclesiastical debates within Russian Orthodoxy during the second half of the nineteenth century and the beginning of the twentieth century. In this regard we employ the term ‘sobornost’ as referring to the Slavophile idea of an organic unity of free people within the Russian Orthodoxy, which in relation to the issue of authority would imply the power-sharing within the ecclesiastical structure.
The thesis will be concluded in Chapter V by the discussion of the developments throughout the twentieth century which presented an unprecedented challenge to the Russian Orthodox Church. This eventful century began and ended with the disintegration of the political systems: at the beginning the collapse of imperial authority and the end of the Russian empire, at the end, the collapse of the Communist regime and the disintegration of the Soviet empire. Both these events had implications for the Russian Orthodox Church. On the first occasion, a 'helping hand' was given by an infamous 'pseudo-starets' G. Rasputin who through his religious influence upon the Tsar and Tsaritsa made an important 'contribution' towards the demise of the political system, simultaneously usurping ecclesiastical authority into his hands. Thus, in this subsection we will investigate the issue of the charismatic authority of starets as an integral part of the wider concept of authority within Russian Orthodoxy. In our discussion, the phenomenon of G. Rasputin will be used as a negative yet fateful example of the charismatic authority of the institution of starchestvo within Russian Orthodoxy with the unique character of authority. Further, we will investigate the character of the historical Sobor of the Russian Church in 1917-18 which marked a new, albeit short-lived attempt to reform Russian Orthodoxy according to a different understanding of authority after the stagnating Synodal period. This will be followed by attention to the Soviet period and a discussion of the concept of authority as it developed between the Russian Orthodox Church (Moscow Patriarchate) and the State as well as between different factions within Russian Orthodoxy under Stalin. Subsequently, some attention will be paid to the importance of the 're-assertion of Third Rome ideology' by the Moscow Patriarchate and the ideological debate between the twentieth century neo-Slavophiles and neo-Westernizers. The issue of anti-Semitism within Russian Orthodoxy will be discussed on the basis that it represents an 'offshoot' of the perceived spiritual/mystical authority emanating from the Third Rome formula. As such it still represents a significant phenomenon within some factions of contemporary Russian Orthodoxy. This chapter will conclude with an assessment of the Moscow Patriarchate's perceived authority in the post-Soviet period.
Parameters and Methodology

Since the famous proposition of the monk Filofei in the early sixteenth century, the Third Rome motif has been in the consciousness of Russian people and has reappeared throughout the time of Nikon, in the writings of Slavophiles and in the neo-Messianic ideals of F.M. Dostoevskii, and in the speculations of the clergy and the intelligentsia throughout the Soviet and post-Soviet period in the twentieth century. Whilst the themes and the ingredients of this formula such as the Messianic kingdom, the translatio imperii, and the terminology of Rome are acknowledged and widely discussed there has been no attempt to analyse these concepts from the angle of the authority within the Russian Orthodox Church. It is our view that the theme of Moscow as the Third Rome can be better understood if one were to place it within the context of authority, its development and the way it 'underpinned' this mythological concept. Bearing in mind, that this formula appeared in the ecclesiastical circles, and as such represented a particular theological vision/understanding of history, the Russian Orthodox Church and the temporary powers, one is led to investigate these concepts from a theological point and in relation to Russian Orthodoxy. In order to understand such a powerful symbol as Moscow the Third Rome one needs to unpack its 'ingredients', to dissect them, tracing their origins and to analyse the way each one of them contributed towards the creation of this symbol and made an impact upon the Russian mentalité. These themes, then, will be discussed within the space of five chapters which are arranged chronologically in line with the historical developments which contributed distinctively towards the development of authority within Russian Orthodoxy.

We need to emphasize that our study is not pre-occupied primarily with ecclesiastical or historical issues per se and is not restricted to the Russian Orthodox ecclesial community. This study is primarily theological and is concerned to elucidate the nature of authority in the Russian Orthodox Church as it evolved during its long history. As it is generally accepted that the pattern of relationships between temporal and spiritual authority in the Muscovite principality onwards is profoundly determined by its inheritance from Byzantium, the thesis begins by a lengthy attempt to explore the nature of authority, and in particular the way in which the spiritual authority of the Christian hierarch is related to the temporal authority of the Emperor. This study involves much
historical discussion, as authority in the Church is exercised within the society in which the Church finds itself, but the primary focus is always theological, and the ultimate aim of the thesis is to advance a theological understanding and a critique of the inherited and developed patterns of authority in the Russian Orthodox Church. In the light of this, the terms such as 'messianic' and 'messianism' are employed throughout our thesis mainly in order to underline the theological significance of one's chosenness and the implication of such perception as it was manifested throughout Byzantine and Russian history.

Further, the term 'caesaro-papism' is used throughout our thesis in order to designate the occurrences of the abuse of the authority by the Byzantine Emperors and the Russian Tsars. As such, it indicates the temporary nature of such exercise of authority rather than the permanent state of affairs. This concept implies the exercise of spiritual authority over the Church by the secular ruler that took place throughout Byzantine and Russian history. Despite the criticism by some Western scholars such as J. Canning, E. Herman and D.M. Nicol, this term was widely used by Western and Russian scholars alike, including Russian Patriarch Tikhon in the twentieth century.

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Chapter I
The emergence of Christianity: Ante-Nicene period

1. Pax Romana: its origin and the significance for Christianity

1.1. The origin and the development of the pax Romana

Zampaglione points out that the origin of the concept of the pax Romana\(^9\) lies in the idea of making a treaty between the Roman state and another state which presupposed 'the unconditional surrender of the defeated state'.\(^{10}\) This indicates that the pax was actually placed within the Roman terminology of war and peace and was achieved through the Roman war machine and the power of the Roman army. On the state level, the pax, as the condition for the prosperity and expansion, assumed a new meaning with the coming of Augustus and the formation of Roman Empire under his reign.

The previous years of civil strife and political instability made a strong impression upon the minds of philosophers and poets. They expressed their long awaited dreams in their treatises and poems, thus laying the 'prophetic-like' aspirations at the ideological foundations of a new era and imperium. The ascension of a shrewd\(^11\) Augustus to political power was perceived as the beginning of a new age contrasting his rule with the previous years of chaos.\(^12\) The careful policies of appeasement of the Senate and the populus Romanus paid off and brought about a radical change for the whole of the Roman state.\(^13\) The artists and the poets alongside the Stoic\(^14\) philosophers as well as Augustus’ own writings\(^15\) were used by the Augustan establishment as the propagandists of his ‘ecumenical’\(^16\) ideas among the educated classes of the imperium Romani.\(^17\)

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\(^9\) We will be primarily concerned with the evolution of historical and ideological aspects of the pax Romana in relation to religion and authority in the Roman empire. See G. Zampaglione, The idea of peace in Antiquity, 133-7, concerning the development of the etymological and the administrative meaning of pax. Cf also S. Weinstock, ‘Pax and the ‘Ara Pacis’, JRS, 50, (1960), 44-5.

\(^10\) Zampaglione, Peace, 133.

\(^11\) Tacitus, Annals, I, 2.

\(^12\) Aristides, referring to this period in ‘Eulogy of Rome’, 99, 103.

\(^13\) See Augustus’ own account of his achievements in F.W. Shipley (trans.), Res Gestae, 13.

\(^14\) Zampaglione, Peace, 134, 142-52.


\(^16\) C. Nicolet, Space, Geography, and Politics in the Early Roman Empire, 41-5.

\(^17\) E. Ferguson, Backgrounds of Early Christianity, 87.
Virgil, one of the main proponents of Augustus’ ideology, prophesied the coming of a new era under the reign of Augustus.

Here is Caesar, and all Julius’ seed, destined to pass beneath the sky’s mighty vault. This, this is he, whom thou so oft hearest promised to thee, Augustus Caesar, son of a god, who shall again set up the Golden Age amid the fields where Saturn once reigned, and shall spread his empire past Garman and Indian, to a land that lies beyond the stars, beyond the paths of the year and the sun, where heaven-bearing Atlas turns on his shoulders the sphere inset with gleaming stars.

The Roman empire, then, through the aspirations of Virgil assumes a vision of a universal kingdom which is ruled by a semi-divine ruler with a ‘neo-messianic aura’. Augustus has the rights of an autocrator and represents the supreme authority designed to hold everything together and to constitute the condition for peaceful co-existence in the pax Romana. The Roman nation, whose land and domain is ‘beyond the stars’ through the writings of poets and philosophers was portrayed as predestined to rule the world: ‘...remember thou Roman, O Roman, to rule the nations with thy sway – these shall be thine arts – to crown Peace with Law, to spare the humbled, and to tame in war the proud!’ These and alike aspirations from the world of art and philosophy were passed on to the population and moulded the consciousness and self-perception of a Roman nation. The steady progress on the path of war and a growing confidence through numerous victories resulted in the expansion of the Roman territories by the time of Augustus, which in turn, helped to create a desired image of Rome and of the Roman nation. His achievements were considered to be ‘the accomplishment of a divine will that had assigned to Rome the destiny of conquering, of dominating, but also of

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19 E. Stauffer, Christ and the Caesars, 83.
21 Nicolet, Space, 30, points out, however, that the notion of Rome’s universal domination was not invented by Virgil at the time of Augustus. Cf. also, P. A. Brunt, ‘Laus Imperii’, in P. D. A. Garnsey, C. R. Whittaker (eds.), Imperialism in the Ancient World, 168.
22 Ferguson, Backgrounds, 87, who ascribes to Virgil the ‘messianic’ expectations of people in the Augustan age. Eclogues, IV, 4-52. This messianic ideal was propagated by Plutarch and Stoicism. See H. A. Wolfson, Philo, vol. II, 419.
23 See especially Seneca, De Clementia, I, 4.1ff., 369. Ad Polybium, II, 12,3-5, 393-4. Cf. also a cynical remark by Tacitus concerning Augustus receiving the divine honours to himself, Annals, I, 10.
24 Virgil, Aeneid, VI, 851-3; I, 278.
pacifying and organizing the whole world. Accordingly, the Romans perceived themselves to be ‘at the center of the inhabited universe and that it was their manifest destiny to supervise its development’. Augustus achieved his political goals through *Victoria* which brought about the *Pax* and prosperity. Rome came to be seen as the eternal and the last city (*Urbs aeterna*), assuming the quasi religious character of a ‘politico-ecclesiological institution’ of a future Byzantine empire.

The concept of the *pax Romana*, being the product of ‘empirical ideas’ of previous generations before Augustus, was modified through his wide-spreading reforms. The peace of the Roman empire came to be indissolubly connected with the emperor Augustus and represented a ‘political goal of the Roman emperor’ within the boundaries of the ‘universal empire’. It was determined from ‘above’ – the emperor himself, and provided by the use of force of his legions demanding the total subjection and the absorption of other nations into the Roman state. His victorious return to Rome prompted the Senate to institute a new religious festival Augustalia and the consecration of a new altar *Ara Pacis Augustae* which later became part of the personality cult with religious attributes, thus becoming the object of worship – the *Pax Augusta*. Augustus’ victorious reign and the position of the *imperator* presupposed a position of religious authority which elevated him above the ‘merely human level closer

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26 It was succinctly described by Seneca in *Ad Polybiun*, II, 12,3, 393.
28 R.A. Markus, points out that *Roma aeterna* had a literary history and a life in the consciousness of Romans, Latin and Greek. See ‘The Roman Empire in early Christian Historiography’, *DR*, LXXXI, (1963), 341; cf also C.N. Cochrane, *Christianity and Classical Culture*, 28-9.
30 Zampaglione, *Peace*, 137.
31 Seneca, *De Clementia*, I, 4.1ff., 369-70. Later Pliny the Elder, *Natural History*, XXVIII, 3. Tacitus, however, appears to be more cautious concerning the peace of Augustus. See *Annals*, I, 9,5.
33 Ibid., 17, Wengst points out that the peace of the ‘universal empire’ had its limitations – the geographical boundaries and thus was limited to the nations under the Roman rule.
34 Ramage, *Nature*, 65, 71, asserts that the depiction of the Temple of Mars Ultor, where Roma is seen as reclining on a pile of arms shows the means by which the Roman peace has been achieved.
36 *Res Gestae*, 47.
to the gods'.

His religious position contributed towards creation of the imperial, personality cult that was endowed with the virtues such as Victoria, Concordia, Clementia, Pax which were personified and came to be seen as supernatural beings capable of bestowing their benefits upon humankind.

Further, through the Roman genius for warfare, the Roman army accumulated victories on a scale that contributed to Roman self-perception as a special race with a special role and destiny. That self-perception assumed a religious character within the religious and philosophical syncretism of Roman society. This, combined with the literary compositions from the world of art, poetry and philosophy, resulted in a specific perception of the Roman nation, the state and the condition for its existence – the pax Romana.

The Roman understanding of the pax Romana was confined within their general understanding of history, geography and beliefs. The peculiar Roman view of history, which represented a revisionist version of Greek historical thought, was based upon the world of poetry and philosophical speculation. It resulted in a distorted and a ‘Roman-like’ shortening of historical perspective. The Romans understood history within their own frame of reference which stood for the existence of illusory eternal Rome and Roman civilization. These dreams and claims about the universality and eternity of Rome and the Roman empire survived the collapse of Rome in the fifth century and entered into the philosophical and theological realms of East and West.

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38 Ibid., 99, Ramage points out that such a perception can be deduced also from other sources. See Tacitus, Annals, I, 10; Virgil, Elogues, I, 6-8; Georgics, I, 24-35; Horace, Odes, I, 12-49; III, 5,1-3; IV, 5,32; Epistles, 2.1.5-17, presents Augustus as the one who already surpassed gods also Odes, 3.3.9-12, where it is only a future possibility. However, Tacitus, Annals, XV, 74, seems to attribute the divine veneration to a ‘prince’ only after his death. Wengst, Pax, 47-9, argues that there was a difference in divine veneration of the emperor by his subjects between Rome and the provinces of the Roman empire.
39 Ferguson, Backgrounds, 165.
40 One can not disregard the fact that the geographical knowledge of Romans was limited to their explorations mainly around the Mediterranean basin. See D.W.J. Gill, C. Gempf (eds.), The Book of Acts in Its Graeco-Roman Setting, vol. 2, 491.
41 J. Pelikan, The Emergence of the Catholic Tradition (100-600), 37.
42 Brunt, ‘Laus Imperii’, 168-69. These claims were also endorsed by Christians in the Christian empire. See R.A. Markus, Saeculum: History and Society in the theology of St Augustine, 26.
43 Florovskii, Dogmat, 260.
The *Pax Romana*, which became a personified object of worship alongside with other virtues, constituted a symbiosis of a political ideology and religious convictions developed by Augustus’ reign. It tied indissolubly the political and religious aspects of Roman conception of state and life into one inseparable union. This particular understanding of the empire as a union of the political and religious domains survived all the cataclysms of pagan empire and entered later, though with some modifications, into the concept of the Christian Roman empire.

1.2. Jesus and the *pax Romana*

Wengst argues that Jesus’ life and ministry at its core represented a counter-reality to the *pax Romana*.⁴⁴ Whilst arguing that there are only a few direct references in the Gospels concerning Jesus’ attitude⁴⁵ towards Roman peace, he nevertheless asserts that implicitly ‘the central content of his proclamation, the imminence of the Kingdom of God amounts to a questioning of the *pax Romana*’.⁴⁶ Jesus contrasts the values of his kingdom with the existing reality through ‘a way of negation’ which brings about a different vision which is in ‘sharp contrast to the surrounding reality’.⁴⁷ This negation is seen in His ironic attitude towards contemporary rulers.⁴⁸ His messianic claims about the kingdom of God as a present reality⁴⁹ which were manifested through His miraculous work and exorcisms represent the dawn of a new age with political and religious overtones.

The preaching of Jesus about the transformation of the society in which the social structures are abolished,⁵⁰ being followed by His *praxis*,⁵¹ proves the radical nature of an already present kingdom of God and the order of an alternative society.⁵² The eschatological dimension of the Kingdom of God which was proclaimed by Jesus

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⁴⁴ We will deal with the issue of the *pax Romana* here on the presupposition that in the gospels *pax Romana* stands for the Roman political system.

⁴⁵ Wengst tends to extract his evidence of a Jesus’ negative attitude from Jesus references to the earthly rulers who were represented either by Jewish or Roman authorities. See Mk 10:42; Lk 13:31ff; Mt 11:8/Lk 7:25. *Pax*, 56-7.

⁴⁶ Ibid., 55.

⁴⁷ Ibid., 56.


⁴⁹ Mt 12:28; Lk 11:20.

⁵⁰ Mt 5:3ff. Lk 6:20f.

⁵¹ Mk 2:15-17.

⁵² Wengst, *Pax*, 64-5.
presupposes a duality on the part of the believer: disloyalty towards the earthly πόλις and a total commitment to the heavenly kingdom.\textsuperscript{53} The fact that Jesus died through the means of crucifixion points in the direction of confrontation with the \textit{pax Romana} - the contemporary dominant political system. He was subjected to a trial and sentenced to death by the Roman political system - the provincial governor Pontius Pilate. The actual execution in the form of crucifixion with 'two robbers'\textsuperscript{54} signalled a certain perception of Jesus by Roman authorities as a political rebel\textsuperscript{55} and the form of punishment which was designated for these kind of criminals.\textsuperscript{56} The notice of Jesus' guilt "The King of the Jews"\textsuperscript{57} pointed in the same direction. It follows, then, that in the eyes of Roman administration Jesus was a rebel who endangered the existing peace. Wengst concludes that not only Jesus' understanding of peace was different, but that above everything else, His activity cannot have conformed to the \textit{pax Romana} and must have been contrary to it.

Whilst agreeing with Wengst's propositions concerning the nature of Jesus' claims concerning himself, His ministry and the conceptual framework of the Kingdom of God, nevertheless, one ought to question whether Wengst's perception of Jesus as the one who opposed the \textit{pax Romana} does justice to Jesus' views concerning the nature of the Roman civil power and its authority or Luke's presentation of Jesus' views.

The birth of Jesus is recorded by Luke\textsuperscript{58} with a historical reference to Roman civil authority being represented by Augustus\textsuperscript{59} and surrounded by supernatural events. Jesus' baptism was accompanied by a supernatural phenomenon of the opening of the heavens, the descent of the dove and the heavenly voice declaring the sonship of Jesus.\textsuperscript{60} This

\textsuperscript{53} Ibid., 55. Cf. also H.W. Attridge, G. Hata (eds.), \textit{Eusebius, Christianity, and Judaism}, 64, who points out that the idea that God was the real ruler of Israelite society was one of the prominent features of Jewish literature of late Second Temple.
\textsuperscript{54} Mk 15:27.
\textsuperscript{56} Wengst, \textit{Pax}, 2.
\textsuperscript{57} Mk 15:26.
\textsuperscript{58} It seems that among the evangelists only Luke presents a historical perspective upon the life and ministry of Jesus here and in Acts as in relation to \textit{pax Romana}. This can be explained perhaps by the theological interest of the writer.
\textsuperscript{59} Lk 2:1.
\textsuperscript{60} Mt 3:16-17; Mk 1:9-11; Lk 3:21-22; John 1:32-3.
event, being ‘reminiscent of Isa. 42:1 and Ps. 2:7’, manifested the new age in human history and the relationship between God and humankind.\textsuperscript{61} The story of the temptation presents Jesus as the one who is not willing to assume the role of a politico-messianic figure like ‘Judas Maccabeus’, but through his obedience and trust in God at this point lays down a precedent and a principle for his earthly ministry.\textsuperscript{62} His ministry is marked by the total rejection of earthly kingship\textsuperscript{63} and the determination to fulfil His divine mission by announcing the fulfilment of messianic hopes.\textsuperscript{64} The rejection of the imposition upon Him of the earthly political kingship and a theocratic ideal, however, did not imply either the rejection of, or a disloyalty to a contemporary political system, nor did it undermine in any way the view of Jesus on the nature of the Roman authority. Being confronted by His opponents with the issue of paying taxes to Caesar,\textsuperscript{65} Jesus betrays a certain view upon the civil authority and the service to God, thus laying ‘a paradigm for the relation to the Roman administration’.\textsuperscript{66} He makes a distinction between the duties to Caesar and to God\textsuperscript{67} and recognises a ‘relative autonomy of the civil authority’, as recorded by Mark.\textsuperscript{68} He also positively affirms the view which placed the existing political system within overall history as determined by God. Yet, He does not define exactly the boundaries of each realm of Caesar and God, thus leaving a certain ambivalence and uncertainty about the whole issue. What can be assertively stated is that the civil authority and the State, which they represent, assume a provisional and a temporary character.

Further, during the trial before Pilate Jesus, according to John, repudiates the exclusive claims of the \textit{pax Romana} to assume the features of a theocratic state and, instead, puts the authority of Pilate into a different perspective. Whilst Pilate has the \textit{τέρατόν} from

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\textsuperscript{61} W.H.C. Frend, \textit{The Rise of Christianity}, 60.
\textsuperscript{62} Ibid., 61.
\textsuperscript{63} Jn 6:15.
\textsuperscript{64} Isa 61:1-2; Lk 4:18ff.
\textsuperscript{66} Mauser, ‘Community’, 53. C.E.B. Cranfield, referring to Jesus’ answer in Mk 12:13-17 points out that it was ‘a piece of teaching of abiding and general significance’ which was recognised later by the early Church. See ‘The Christian’s Political Responsibility According to the New Testament’, in \textit{SJT}, 15, (1962), 178.
\textsuperscript{67} Mauser, ‘Community’, 53, commenting on Mt 22:15-22 asserts that ‘the spirit of the whole Gospel forbids this question because it is axiomatic in it that the supremacy of God’s rule on earth suffers no infringement’.
‘above’ ‘for the performance of his office’, his authority, nevertheless, is limited in its nature by God, who has an overall authority. Jesus, on the other hand, without having an earthly power or office, holds and exercises κυριεύω of the kingdom of God which ‘is not of this world’. This presupposes ‘a universal and overall authority over Caesar’ by virtue of His sonship. That, in turn, transcends the temporary κυριεύω of the Roman civil authority. Thus, Jesus, according to John, implicitly asserts that whilst acknowledging the earthly power of the Roman state and displaying loyalty and duty towards the pax Romana, the kingdom of God being revealed through Jesus brings a different perspective.

We can suggest, then, that this perspective can be perceived as operating in a twofold way. On a human level, it calls the followers of Jesus to a submission to earthly authority. On the level of the kingdom of God by the virtue of eschatology, it calls believers to a primary loyalty and duty which supersedes, but does not deny their allegiance towards the state. Thus, the attitude of Jesus towards Roman political system leaves one to conclude that His attitude and perception of the pax Romana was based on the eschatological perspective of the kingdom of God and submission to the overall control and the will of God. Whilst the two concepts of loyalty and obedience to the κυριεύω of the Roman state and the worship to God alone are closely combined in the life of the believer they, nevertheless, can never be merged with one another due to the nature of the latter. It is a relationship of the eschatological tension and the duality without contradiction.

1.3. The NT and the pax Romana: Church/State

The world of the NT represented the amalgam of different factors and ideas which shaped the worldview of the contemporary writers of the NT. The latter were forced to

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68 W.L. Lane, The Gospel according to Mark, 424.
69 C.K. Barrett, The Gospel according to St John, 542.
70 Jn 18:33ff.
71 L. Morris, The Gospel according to John, 797.
72 Jn 18:33.
74 We will be mainly concerned here with the Epistles and the Revelation of John.
engage themselves with the understanding of the Greco-Roman and Jewish world from the realms of philosophy and theology and to place it in the light of the Christ-event.

Morrison argues that one of the aspects of the Christian worldview which was shared with the rest of the Greco-Roman and Jewish views was that of the understanding of the universe.\textsuperscript{75} The Greco-Roman world, being highly syncretistic in its nature concerning the realm of ideas and religion, experienced the evolution of its philosophical ideas, which by the time of Christ, brought about a certain perception of the universe. The universe was perceived to be a kind of cosmic unity which embodied the physical and spiritual elements in such a way that they were inseparable and intertwined with one another.\textsuperscript{76} The notion of the unity of the cosmos brought about a certain perception of the ruler in the universe as being under one monotheistic god and emphasised the place of the ruler in the universal order. Whilst a `Pythagorean could say that the king is to the world (empire) as God is to the universe, and that he is a deity among men' perceiving the emperor as being deified, others expressed a more conservative view namely that `Rulers are ministers of God for the care and safety of mankind, that they may distribute or hold in safe keeping the blessings and benefits which God gives to men'.\textsuperscript{77}

The Jewish Hellenistic world also paved the way for the Christian understanding of the universe by means of its political theology. Whilst refusing to share the syncretistic religious system of the Greco-Roman world, the Jewish worldview, nevertheless, shared common aspects of cosmology, namely the notion of the cosmic order under the rule of one God.\textsuperscript{78} Jewish understanding perceived humankind as being part of God’s creation and Jewish history as the history of the relationship between Israel as a chosen nation predestined to have the world dominion and Yahweh, her supreme ruler. The notion of a special election resulted in a political doctrine `which was inseparable from the cosmological-eschatological framework of their nationalistic religious hope'.\textsuperscript{79} This political doctrine placed the ruler and the succession of world powers throughout Jewish

\textsuperscript{75} C. Morrison, The powers that be, 99.
\textsuperscript{76} Ibid., 98.
\textsuperscript{77} Morrison, Powers, 79.
\textsuperscript{78} Ibid., 97.
\textsuperscript{79} Ibid., 20.
history under Yahweh’s control and sovereignty – the ruler’s appointment was seen as a
divine and the empire having its place within the providential cosmic order. 80

The Christian writers, then, came into the existing world of Greco-Roman and Jewish
writings which partially paved the way for the emergence of a Christian worldview. This
worldview was destined both to confirm and to disapprove of the existing mode of
ideas. Bearing in mind the fact that the first generation of Christians was predominantly
of Jewish background living in the Greco-Roman world, one should not underestimate
the legacy of the Jewish ideas and the historical circumstances of the congregations to
whom the New Testament writings were addressed. 81

The apostle Paul wrote the epistles to his congregations answering their immediate
needs and problems as they arose. Christianity, being in its embryonic state, needed a
clear guidance on its principles, ethics and morals. On the one hand, the life of
Christians and their worldview was shaped by the fact that the new age of the Kingdom
of God had arrived and they ought to live in the anticipation of the parousia, thus having
a spiritualistic and a world denying outlook. On the other hand, Christians were not
living yet in the Kingdom of God and had to redefine their attitude to the world
surrounding them – the world of the pax Romana.

Despite the numerous persecutions which Paul suffered at the hands of Roman
authorities 82 and the negative connotations in relation to the authorities 83, he maintained
a positive view with regard to the existing order. In his address to the congregation in
Rome, Paul admonishes his recipients to be ‘subject unto the higher powers’. 84 This
power, which is represented by the existing pax Romana, originates in God and is

80 Ibid., 97. Morrison cites Philo as the best representative of Hellenistic Judaism of this period. See also

81 Frend, Rise, 148, asserts that Christian attitudes towards the empire were following the attitudes of
Jews.

82 2 Cor 4:8-9; 6:5; 11:26, 32-33; Gal 5:11; 6:12.

83 This led some scholars to believe that Paul could not have been positive in his attitude to the pax
Romana, Wengst, Pax, 72-77, or that Rom 13:1-7 is interpolation and does not belong to Pauline thought

84 Rom 13:1. E. Käsemann, New Questions of Today, 204. The rationale of the passage finds its closest
orchestrated by Him alone. Whilst highlighting the origin of the existing authorities, Paul, nevertheless, does not discuss the nature of the authority of a particular ruler, nor the nature of the state which he represents. His admonition to the Church to be subject to the authorities is based 'on the God-ordained character of the government' with its function and lays down a general principle for Christian attitude towards the political rulers.

Paul's statements concerning the appropriate attitude to authorities betray a certain worldview which portrays the world as God's creation being placed under his control and ordinances. This essentially Jewish tradition is placed by Paul within his understanding of his mission which seeks 'to bring wider realization of the eschatological rule of the one God through Christ over all creation'. Thus, political authority is ordered/permitted by God and is subject to limitation by virtue of its subjection to the higher authority. The state itself assumes a provisional character and is placed within the overall understanding of history, in which the Church is perceived to be the distinctive ontological entity by virtue of being the expression of the Kingdom of God in its eschatological outlook.

Additionally, the rulers are perceived to be the διάκονοι of God who administer justice for the well-being of the citizens. The resistance to the power which is administrated by the authorities is perceived by Paul as rebellion against God's will and

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85 However, even this is expressed only in general terms presenting the vision of the social order.
86 H. Ridderbos, Paul, 321.
87 Dunn, Romans, 760, points out that the term άρχοντα has the restricted sense of 'official power or authority' and also means the bearers of such authority, namely government officials.
89 Dunn, Romans, 760.
90 Wolfson, Philo, 381.
92 Dunn, Romans, 764, points out that this term is well attested in the sense of 'civic official or functionary' without any indication of a sacral or cultic reference.
93 This in itself appears to be Jewish and Hellenistic understanding already expressed by Philo. See H.A. Wolfson, Philo, II, 335-37.
94 V.P. Furnish, The moral Teaching of Paul, 129, points out that Paul himself was a beneficiary of pax Romana during his travels.
invites judgement from the authorities. The submission of the Christian is required via the means of his/her conscience. It shows the voluntary action in which one’s conscience is understood to be the ‘capacity to reflect critically upon what is appropriate given the realities of existence in the world’. This voluntary way of action is demanded despite the current troubles of Roman Jewish Christians with the Roman authorities and the sensitivities surrounding the issue of paying taxes.

Paul’s positive view of the pax Romana is furthered even more in his epistles to Timothy and Titus. The apostle presents to Timothy a clear perception of Roman authority and of one’s attitude to it by exhorting Christians to become intercessors in prayer. In this passage prayer for the kings is directly connected with the pax Romana which becomes the essential condition for the preaching of the gospel. The Church, being the multi-ethnic community of believers, is encouraged to exercise the will of God by interceding for the civil authorities. The Church prays for the welfare of the rulers who, in turn, create the peaceful conditions for the existence of the Church and the proclamation of the gospel for the salvation of the world. This prayer has a twofold meaning: it is a recognition of the social order and the legitimacy of its authority as well as its limitation. The grounds of such a prayer are perceived to be in the will of God, which also implies that God desires the rulers and the state to be the means of achieving His goal – the salvation of the whole world. Thus for Paul, the pax Romana becomes ‘indispensable to the missionary work of the Church’.

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95 Ibid., 130. The attitude ‘for conscience sake’, however, gives a certain freedom for the believer which leads one either to be subject to the authority or to his non-compliance with its demands. Morrison, Powers, 128.
96 For the historical circumstances of Roman Christians and the problems concerning paying tax, see G. La Piana, ‘Foreign groups in Rome during the First Century’, HTR, XX, (1927), 183-403; M. Borg, ‘A New context for Romans XIII’, NTS, 19, (1972-73), 205-18; G. Theissen, Sociology of Early Palestinian Christianity, 42-43; Tacitus, Annals, II, 42, XIII, 50-51; Dio Cassius, Histories, XXXVII, 17.1, Josephus, Antiquities, XVIII, 81-4; Suetonius, Claudius, XXV, 4; Cicero, Pro Flacco, 28 66-70.
97 Titus 3: 1. We are aware of the disputed authorship of the Pastoral epistles. On that issue see G.W. Knight, The Pastoral Epistles, 4-52.
98 1 Tim 2: 14.
100 1 Tim 2:3. G.W. Knight, The Pastoral Epistles, 113.
Similarly, the apostle Peter admonishes his congregation to be subject to the authorities.\(^{103}\) Whilst generally agreeing with Paul’s\(^{104}\) proposition concerning the place of the authorities within the social order (vv. 13-14) and the attitude towards authorities, Peter seems to put more emphasis upon the ethical behaviour of the Christian (v. 15), which is seen as a ‘model for the non-Christians’.\(^{105}\) The appropriate attitude towards the βασιλεύς, which consists of that of honour (v. 17), is implied by God’s will for the ordering of the social order (v. 15). This attitude, however, is appropriated in relation to God (v. 17) by virtue of ‘fear’ and in relation to the βασιλεύς by means of ‘honour’.\(^{106}\) Thus, it appears that the apostle Peter differentiates between the realm of Caesar, his authority and the obedience it requires, and the realm of God, His sovereignty and the worship which is due to Him alone. The function of the ruler is perceived to be in the maintenance of order and the punishment of the wicked — a negative duty which is necessitated by the imperfect state of the society. The Christian community is seen as two-dimensional. On the horizontal level, it exist within the social order and subjects itself to this order. On the vertical level, it is essentially the manifestation of the eschatological Kingdom of God and ontologically goes beyond the existing social order.\(^{107}\) The relationship, then, between the Church and existing authority can be characterised as that of the eschatological tension due to the nature of the former and its existence in the End times.\(^{108}\)

In contrast to the epistles of Paul and Peter,\(^{109}\) who present a holistic worldview in which the relationship between the Church and authorities is perceived in a positive way, the Revelation of John depicts a very different picture. The rest of the NT passages are mainly concerned with the administrative tasks of the magistrate and his authority in

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\(^{103}\) 1 Peter 2:13-17. We are aware of the disputed authorship.

\(^{104}\) Whilst there is no evidence to suggest that Peter relies upon Paul, it seems plausible to accept the similarity between them on the basis of common Jewish Hellenistic tradition as well as the teaching of Jesus. Knox, ‘Church’, 29.

\(^{105}\) G. Theissen, Social reality and the Early Christians, 284.

\(^{106}\) J.R. Michaels, 1 Peter, 131, asserts that Peter was probably influenced either by Jesus’ saying in Mk 12:17 or by Prov. 24:21.

\(^{107}\) This claim can be substantiated by Peter’s statements in Acts 4:19 and 5:29.

\(^{108}\) The eschatological tension can be deduced from the double nature of the ‘End times’ as something present and yet to come, which is shown by the use of ἐσχατον in 1 Pet 1:5, 20. See H.P. Owen, ‘Eschatology and Ethics in the New Testament’, SJT, 15, (1962), 370.

\(^{109}\) T.M. Parker, Christianity & the State in the light of History, 19, asserts that Rom 13 and 1 Peter 2:13-17 became loci classici in later Christian theology on this subject.
the social order without explicit reference to the nature of this authority. The Revelation
of John, by contrast, depicts a different theological understanding which is ‘rooted in a
different socio-political experience and view of the world’. This worldview presents
the dynamic concept of a God who intervenes into human history for the purpose of
salvation and judgement. The political system and the social order of society are placed
within the larger scenery that encapsulates the events on a cosmic scale.

The universal, cosmic vision of the book of Revelation is grounded in first-century Asian life
and necessarily entangles itself in all power structures in all dimensions of human society. But
it entangles itself as opposition. It opposes the public order and enters the fray as other
‘deviant’ groups in the empire, not by joining rioters in the streets but by a literary vehicle, a
written genre – in John’s case, a genre offering revealed knowledge as an alternative to the
knowledge derived from the public order.

Following the literary methods of the Apocalyptic genre, John depicts a certain
historical reality through the interplay of imagery. The Roman empire is perceived to
oppose God’s kingdom through its claims, pretensions and actions and is essentially
allied with Satan himself. Christians, on the other hand, whilst being a part of the
Roman social fabric, belong to the Kingdom of God and are called to follow Christ
whose universal kingship demands ultimate loyalty and obedience. In contrast to the
blasphemous and universal pretensions of the Roman rulers (13:1-7) to be ‘divus
Augustus’ and the ‘saviours’ of the pax Romana, Christ’s Lordship is seen on a cosmic
scale – He is the παντοκράτωρ. Hence, there is a conflict of the two realms, between
the Roman empire claiming its ‘divine’ right and a submissive worship of its citizens to
its emperor, and Christians whose ultimate loyalty lies elsewhere. This cosmic
conflict in heaven (12:7-9) and on earth (13:7), between God versus Satan, is resolved

110 E.S. Fiorenza, Revelation, 57.
111 L.L. Thompson, The Book of Revelation Apocalypse and Empire, 195-96.
112 For the characteristics of the apocalyptic literature see Fiorenza, Revelation, 24-6. Cf. also J. Sweet,
Revelation, 1, 40-1; G.B. Caird, A Commentary on the Revelation of St John the Divine, 9-10; S. Laws, In
114 Rev 13:1,5. See the historical evidence concerning the divine claims of the emperors through the
emperor-cult throughout Asia Minor. Dio Cassius, Roman History, 67.13-14; Suetonius, Domitian, 13;
Martial, V.8; M. Hammond, ‘Ruler Cult’, in The Oxford Classical Dictionary, 782-4. Sweet, Revelation,
87; M.E. Boring, Revelation, 18, 21, 103, 187, V.A. Fedosik, Tserkov’ i Gosudarstvo, 174ff. Laws,
Lamb, 20, points to the reserve on the part of some rulers in relation to the divine claims: “Vespasian
expressing ironically ‘I think I’m becoming a god’. Cf. also Suetonius, De vita Caesarum, 23.
through the final harvest of the earth (14:15,18-19). It results in the destruction of Rome/Babylon and of the *pax Romana* (ch.18) in everything which it stood for in its political, social and economic aspects. The whole of the apocalyptic drama ends with a magnificent vision of a new eternal city (21:10-22:5), thus presenting the cosmic counter-reality to the *Urbs aeterna* of Roman imagination.

Additionally, the whole of the apocalyptic drama is set within the eschatological understanding of history: the beginning (1:1) and the end (22:20) highlight the significance and the meaning of the time boundaries for the Johannine Churches. The Christian communities are given a perspective in which the consummation of the Kingdom of God is at hand. They are living in the time of tension which results 'from the contrast between the vision of the future and the experience of the present'. That, in turn, highlights the need for a certain understanding of the reality and the appropriate ethical conduct on the part of the believers who are confronted by the 'divine' authority of Rome/Babylon. However, despite the demonic nature of the Roman empire Christians are admonished not to rebel, but to stand firm in face of persecutions, injustice and oppression, maintaining their witness to Christ unto death. In other words, John appears to call Christians to a non-violent resistance to the power of evil, thus achieving the victory of Christ by virtue of faithfulness to His Lordship and the Kingdom of God.

It appears, then, that the NT writings present a diverse picture of the world and of the existing social order. Whilst operating within the oppressive political system of the *pax Romana* of their time, the writers, nevertheless, generally do not question the actual existence or the structure of this system *per se*. Theirs is essentially a vision of peaceful

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co-existence in which the Church is to be subject to political authority whenever it does not infringe upon the right of the Church to express its ultimate allegiance to God alone. The difference, however, between the writings of the epistles and the Revelation of John is seen in the actual presentation of the existing political system, the nature of political authority and the actual perception of it. Jesus himself, as presented by evangelists, and the apostles Paul and Peter, limit themselves\footnote{This can be explained by the specificity of the situation (Jesus) and by the historical circumstances and the nature of problems to whom the writings were addressed (Paul and Peter).} by addressing the audience calling for the acceptance of the authority due to the existing creation order. John, however, portrays prophetically the same creation order, but sets it within the cosmic scale and vision of the spiritual realm. Like the rest of the NT, the Apocalypse does not negate the \textit{pax Romana} to the extent of Christian complete withdrawal and separation from it. But, unlike other NT writings, it does not affirm it either. It does not urge the Christian community to the uncritical acceptance of its political claims and to integration within the religio-political structures of the \textit{pax Romana} due to the spiritual nature of the latter. Whilst not accepting the divine claims of the \textit{pax Romana}, the Church is, nevertheless, part of the Roman social world and continues to live in the world through a spiritual separation\footnote{Sweet defines this separation from the world in moral terms. \textit{Revelation}, 34. Cf. also J. Moffatt, \textit{The Revelation of St John}, 364; P.E. Hughes, \textit{The Book of the Revelation}, 190; Boring, \textit{Revelation}, 189, W. Hendriksen, \textit{More than Conquerors}, 174. Against Laws, \textit{Lamb}, 42, and Fiorenza, \textit{Revelation}, 84, who argue for a Christian separation from the contemporary society, though not clearly identifying what kind of separation is meant.}, as well as being eschatological in its outlook, manifesting the values and the coming of the Kingdom of God.

It is plausible to suggest, then, that the NT authors laid tentative guidelines for the relation between the Church and political authority. The two-fold character of such a perception of the existing authority, namely conservative \textit{versus} apocalyptic, left a legacy of ambiguity. This ambiguity, depending upon the historical circumstances and the character of certain individual(s), was manifested in the literary writings of the Church Fathers in the subsequent centuries.
1.4. The Church Fathers\textsuperscript{121} & the pax Romana

During the centuries succeeding the apostolic period, the Church Fathers were obliged to express their opinions on a variety of topics. Their attitude to the pax Romana is found in writings which reflect the peculiarity of the historical context, the contemporary realm of thought and the specific nature of problems in the Christian communities. These writings can be generally\textsuperscript{122} defined as standing within various literary traditions which reflect a particular view, namely conservative versus apocalyptic.

1.4.1. Conservative view

Following the affirmative views of the writers of the NT, the sub-apostolic writers admonished Christian communities to establish the attitude to the political authorities appropriate to a new ecclesia. Clement encourages Christians to pray for those in the position of the authority:

...to us and all mankind grant peace and concord, even as thou didst to our forefathers when they called devoutly upon thee in faith and truth; and make us to be obedient both to thine own almighty and glorious Name and to all who have the rule and governance over us upon earth. For it is thou, O Master, who in thy supreme and ineffable might hast given to them their sovereign authority, to the intent that we, acknowledging the glory and honour thou hast bestowed upon them, should show them all submission. Grant unto them then, O Lord, health and peace, harmony and security, that they may exercise without offence the dominion which thou hast accorded them.\textsuperscript{123}

This essentially positive\textsuperscript{124} attitude and action towards the pax Romana is firmly rooted in the order of creation which requires a certain perception and the response on the part

\textsuperscript{121} Due to the limitations of our study we will be selective in our approach and limit ourselves to the period before the formation of Byzantine empire. All references to Ante-Nicene, Nicene and Post-Nicene Fathers and writings, unless specified, are from T&T Clark American reprint of Edinburgh edition, 1996.

\textsuperscript{122} This characterisation can be proposed only conventionally due to the fact that some authors don’t always clearly stand within the designated tradition.

\textsuperscript{123} Clement of Rome, The First Epistle of Clement to the Corinthians, in M. Staniford (trans.), Early Christian Writings, 60-61. Tertullian’s prayer, Apology, 30, 39 2; Cyprian, Ad Demetrianum, 20.

\textsuperscript{124} L.W. Barnard, Studies in the Apostolic Fathers and their background, 16, asserts that Clement goes one step further in his perception of pax Romana than NT authors in that that he even models the discipline of Christians upon the Roman soldiers despite the persecutions of Nero and Domitian. See Epistle, 37. Cf also Knox, ‘Church’, 28-9. See Wengst criticism of Clement, Pax, 105-12, which, however, does not justice to the specific nature of Clement’s epistle.
of the Christian community. This response towards the political system, whilst echoing the NT perception of the social order, does not stop short of negating the aspects of the Roman system which relate to the domain of faith, thus repudiating pagan claims of the emperor’s divinity and the divinization of virtues. Thus, the two realms are kept apart and distinctive – that of Caesar and of God; the human and the divine.

The taxes (tributa) and dues commanded by you we hasten to pay before all others, following the Master’s commandment, Render to Caesar the things that are Caesar’s, and to God the things that are God’s. So we pray to God alone. But in other things we serve you gladly, and confess that you are kings and lords over the children of men, and pray therefore that you may be found to be such as possess, along with royal power, an understanding mind. But if you despise our prayer, it is not we who will suffer from it.

Further, in addition to the biblical overtones, the writings also present a peculiar perception and understanding of history by the Church Fathers. The Roman empire, being formed under Augustus, assumes a providential character by uniting in itself different kingdoms and preparing the conditions for the coming of Christ. Thus, the empire becomes the indispensable tool for the spread of the gospel.

This affirmative view of the empire and condition, which is created for the spread of Christianity as the fulfilment of the OT prophecies, coincided with the pagan belief concerning the place of the empire in the world and the imperium aeternum. The existence of the Roman empire came to be seen as the only possible mode of existence of the humankind; the fall of the empire would precipitate the coming of the parousia. This betrays a specifically Roman framework of reference which places Rome and the Roman empire at the centre of the universe, having a specific mission and

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126 Irenaeus presents the purpose of the state as a consequence of the Fall which brought the disorganisation and conflict into the life of the humankind. Irenaeus, Against heresies, V, 24.2.
127 Tertullian, Apology, 33-4.
128 Tertullian, On idolatry, 15; Apology, 32-3; cf. also Justin, Apology, 17.
129 Justin, Apology, 17. Cf. also Arnobius, Against the Heathen, IV, 1.
130 See Origen, Against Celsus, XXX. Cf. also, Bishop Melito of Sardes in Eusebius, (A. Louth, ed.), The History of the Church from Christ to Constantine, 134, (henceforth HE), Tertullian, Apology, 26.
131 See pp. 16-18.
destiny. The Church, then, is seen as existing within the existing political structure and under contemporary political authority as manifesting the values of the Kingdom of God and fulfilling its own mission in the world.

Additionally, Baynes pointed out that during the four centuries of the formation of the Christian Church and consequently of the Christian empire, there was a constant continuity with and a legacy from the pagan past. This was expressed in a certain perception of the emperor and his role within the empire in relation to religious matters, as well as the acceptance by Christian thinkers of Roman perception of Rome’s place and role within the universe. Roman belief in Providence, which governed 'the progress of the Roman Empire', being fused with the peculiar understanding of the Church Fathers of the applications of the OT prophecies within their life time, resulted in a characteristic perception of history which saw it in the theological terms of salvation history, the promise-fulfilment and praeeparatio evangelica. There appeared a possibility for Origen to conceive the coming of a single polity which would heal the fragmentation of the ancient and sinful world.

Following some of the literary traditions of Roman poets and writers, the empire came to be endowed at the hands of Christian writers with the sense of a universal and divinely ordained sacral entity which identified the state as ‘God’s instituted system and instrument’. These particular views received a new impetus at the time of Eusebius, who formulated the pro-Roman theology of a new Christian state that embodied within itself in a new creative way overtones of the politico-eschatological features of the Roman empire.

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133 N.H. Baynes, Byzantine Studies and Other Essays, 53-75.
134 Cochrane, Christianity, 219, points to the external organisation of the Church as well as to some aspects of its internal structure as being modelled upon the secular society.
135 Baynes, Studies, 362.
137 Such a view was widely endorsed in the fourth century by the writers in the East and West. Markus, Saeculum, 50, refers to John Chrysostom, Diodore, Theodoret, Cyril of Alexandria.
138 Origen, Contra Celsum, VIII, 72.
139 See Jerome’s perception of Rome after its fall. Letter 127.12 and Letter 128.4.
1.4.2. Apocalyptic view

Alongside the conservative view of the *pax Romana* there existed another trend of tradition which perceived the existing political system in negative terms. This trend of thought stood in the apocalyptic tradition of Jewish apocalyptic thought which was expressed by John in the *Apocalypse*.

In contrast to the conservative view, which regarded the empire as something providential and possibly useful for the existence of the Church, the apocalyptic tradition regarded the Roman empire as essentially evil. It was opposed by its actual existence to the Kingdom of God and the Church. That, in turn, required from the Church if not opposition to the State, then, at least, a measure of some withdrawal. In other words, the identity of Christians, whilst being Roman citizens, and of the Church, was defined radically not in sociological terms by virtue of belonging to the Roman empire, but according to the eschatological orientation of the community against the values of the surrounding world.

The fact that Christ rejected an earthly kingdom should be enough to convince you that all secular powers and dignities are not merely alien from, but hostile to, God. Accordingly, there can be no reconciliation between the oath of allegiance taken to God and that taken to man, between the standard of Christ and that of evil, between the camp of light and that of darkness...it is impossible to serve two masters, God, and Caesar...\(^\text{141}\)

Cochrane\(^\text{142}\) points out that Tertullian appears to advocate the secession of Christians from the Roman order.\(^\text{143}\) He perceives the surrounding world and the Church in contrasting apocalyptic terms of Christ and the devil, the darkness and the light. Whilst the former belongs to the realm of Satan, the latter exists in the domain of Christ.\(^\text{144}\) The actual mode of existence of the *pax Romana* is due to Roman military expansion and the

\(^{141}\) Tertullian, *On idolatry*, 18, 19.

\(^{142}\) Cochrane, *Christianity*, 213. Cochrane points out that Tertullian was inclined towards eccentricity and his views certainly reflect the time of crisis.

\(^{143}\) Tertullian, *Apology*, 38; *On the spectacle*, 7, 28-9. *An Answer to the Jews*, IX. *Against Marcion*, III, XIII. It seems, however, that Tertullian incorporates in his writings two aspects of traditions, namely conservative and apocalyptic. *Apology*, 30. This was perhaps conditioned by the historical circumstances and the need to present the appropriate response. Cochrane, *Christianity*, 213; Pelikan, *Tradition*, 129-30; Parker, *Christianity*, 39.

use of force. The whole of the history of Rome is prefigured in Babylon and it follows, then, that the nature of the State is diabolically opposite to the nature of the Church. Therefore, Tertullian does not conceive either the possibility for co-operation between the State and the Church, or the historical rise of the ‘Christian state’.

Similarly, in the fourth vision of Shepherd of Hermas one can discern the absolute contrast between Christianity and the world. The realities of the present world appear to be condemned on the basis of the pagan idolatry which brings about antagonism and the withdrawal of Christians from the Roman empire. Christian teaching appears to be incompatible with the demands of the ‘earthly city’. Whilst in the fourth vision the world is painted in black and is doomed to destruction, the Church appears to be depicted in gold, portraying Christians who withstood persecution and who subsequently inherit the new age of the white colour in ‘which the elect of God will dwell’. The Church in the visions of Hermas exists within the eschatological framework of already/not yet of the last times and expects the coming of the parousia which will inaugurate the judgement over the world. The empire is perceived to be the ‘devouring dragon’ and the heathens ‘would be burnt because they did not know their Creator’.

Hippolytus’ understanding of the present reality is based on the ‘apocalyptic sense of history’ which is perceived through the interpretation of the book of Daniel. He interprets the last of the four beasts (chapter 7) as representing the Roman empire. The main difference from the previous three beasts is conceived to lie in the fact that whilst the three represent the single kingdoms of a particular historical period, the

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145 Ad Nationes, 1.17; An answer to the Jews, IX; Against Marcion, iii. 13.
146 The popularity and the acceptance of the Shepherd of Hermas can be demonstrated by Irenaeus. Against Heresies, IV, 20.2.
147 Parker, Christianity, 37-8.
148 Similitudes, I 3ff, F. Crombie, Donaldson, Roberts (trans.), The Writings of the Apostolic Fathers.
149 Vision, 3, 2.1, in F. Crombie, Donaldson, Roberts (trans.), The Writings of the Apostolic Fathers.
150 Vision, 4.2, 3.
151 Similitudes, IV.4.
152 Frend, Rise, 29.
154 Frend, Rise, 418, points out that with Hippolytus there begins a tradition in the West of identifying Rome with Babylon.
fourth beast/kingdom gathers the power from every nation and assumes universal size and dominion. For Hippolytus, unlike for other Christian writers, the fact of the emergence of the unified Roman empire under Augustus which coincided with the coming of Christ and the proclamation of God's universal kingdom does not represent a sign of the divine providence. He perceives the Roman empire to be the Satanic imitation of the Kingdom of Christ by virtue of its claims to its unity, universality and unlimited duration, and as such being governed by the Antichrist. That, in turn, implies the separation of the Church from the State, a notion which found its adherents in the Donatist Church of Africa.

It appears, then, that the Apocalyptic tradition depicts the relationship between the State and the Church in contrasting colours. Following the apocalyptic tradition of Jewish writers and that of John's Revelation, some of the Church Fathers seem to go a step further in their conception of the surrounding world and the attitude which is required on the part of the Church. Whilst John in Revelation depicts the Church as existing in the empire and withdrawing from it predominantly in 'eschatological terms', the writers of the subsequent generations tend to advocate withdrawal from the world in 'sociological terms'. Such perception requires a relationship of eschatological tension at best, or the existence of the two separate and distinctive entities at worst.

Having considered the issue of the pax Romana, its origin, development and the significance for the relationship between the Church and State we will proceed on exploring the issue of the transfer of empire translatio imperii - the perception of which appears to play a significant role for the self-perception of the Byzantine empire and later in Russian perception of the Orthodox kingdom.

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155 Hippolytus, Treatise, 5.
156 Treatise, 6, 25. Cf. also W.H.C. Frend, 'Church and State', in SP, XVII, (1982), 43-4; cf. also Frend, Rise, 149, who quotes the Apocalypse of Peter, in which Rome is spoken as 'the capital of corruption whither Peter must go'.
158 Hippolytus, In Daniel, iv, 8-9.
159 Pelikan, Tradition, 128. Hippolytus, Treatise, 14, 25.
160 Markus, Saeculum, 110-32; Frend, Rise, 290; Zampaglione, Peace, 259-62.
1.5. The *Translatio imperii*

1.5.1. Origin

The idea of the transfer of Empire, the *translatio imperii*, leads one into the realm of history which presupposes a perception of history and its development within a certain concept of time. The book of Daniel encapsulates historical, political and theological aspects of the development of human history on a cosmic scale. It betrays the characteristic features of the Jewish apocalyptic genre which operates in a two-dimensional way.\(^{161}\) Thus, on the one hand there is a perception of the empires in a purely historical sense, as placed within the geographical and time boundaries. On the other hand, there is a cosmic and eschatological dimension. It portrays the empires under God's overall control and sovereignty in relation to the saving activity of the people of Israel. Daniel's world view presents a dualistic picture in which the 'events on earth represent, and play some part in, the mighty, cosmic struggle between the forces of good and evil'.\(^{162}\)

Fröhlich asserts that the idea of the succession of four empires – the *translatio imperii* - seems to originate in the Near East and was introduced into Jewish literary writings through the book of Daniel.\(^{163}\) The basis for the Danielic prophecy (chapter 2), which comes in a dream characteristic of the Mesopotamian practice,\(^{164}\) in reference to the four kingdoms, may have been the Neo-Babylonian and Persian dynastic oracles and traditions.\(^{165}\) The statue of Daniel's vision consisted of the four kingdoms which succeeded one another in the historical succession of the ruling empires. The perception of the succession of the empires, which was communicated via the enigmatic means of a dream, being followed by a kingdom with an eschatological character, left a legacy of ambiguity. This ambiguity led the ancient, as well as modern interpreters of Daniel's

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161 A. LaCocque, *Daniel in His Time*, 125-6, asserts that Daniel was a typical representative of the Jewish apocalyptic genre which originated in Israel in the sixth century BC and portrayed the events in Israelite history both *in* history and *beyond* history in their unlimited significance. This is certainly supported by Jewish historian Josephus who connects the real historical events with Danielic prophecies. See *Antiquities*, XII, 7, 6.

162 Parker, *Christianity*, 69.


164 Fröhlich, 'Time', 29.
dream, to identify the empires vaguely as Babylonia, Media, Persia and Greece. These four empires were perceived to be placed in the human realm, thus having only a limited time of existence. The period of the existence of these empires was followed by divine judgement over these empires with a subsequent appearance of the everlasting kingdom. The judgement is presented (2:34-5) through the imagery of the stone ‘cut out without hands, (2:34) which ‘struck the image’ and ‘grew into a great mountain filling the whole earth’ (2:35) which appears to resemble the everlasting kingdom. The possibility of the rise of the eternal kingdom with the change in size and time orientation after the Hellenistic period, according to Fröhlich, indicated the completion of the ‘metamorphosis’ of the translatio imperii which came to be perceived as the concept with the ‘historical perspective’, being grounded in concrete historical realities.

Daniel disclosed that ‘in the period of those kings the God of heaven will establish a kingdom which shall never be destroyed; that kingdom shall never pass to another people; it shall shatter and make an end of all these kingdoms, while it shall endure for ever’ (2:44). Another scene depicts the divine judgement over the last, fourth beast/kingdom in which the dominion is taken away and given to the ‘Son of man’.

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165 See the summary of different theories provided by Fröhlich. ‘Time’, 28-35.
167 Anderson, Signs, 83-4, points out that Daniel stands within the prophetic Hebrew tradition which envisaged the coming of God’s judgement over Israel (Amos 2:6ff; Mic. 6:1-8) as well as for the nations of the world (Ps. 9:7-8; 82; 98:9; Zeph. 2:11). Cf also R.H. Charles, A critical history of the doctrine of a future life in Israel, in Judaism and in Christianity, 87-165; W.J. Ferrar, From Daniel to St John the Divine, 23-25.
168 Fröhlich remarks that Daniel’s portrayal of a new, ‘benevolent’ eternal rule echoes the historical perception of Babylonian and Mesopotamian inscriptions on the role of Cyrus’ invasion in relation to the collapse of Neo-Babylonian empire. ‘Time’, 31-32. Fröhlich presents the historico-literal interpretation of the stone and identifies it in Daniel as referring to Cyrus and the world rule which followed his conquest, 33.
169 Fröhlich, ‘Time’, 35, asserts that the concept of translatio imperii acquired the world historical significance from the third century BC onwards.
(7:13-14) and to the ‘people of the saints of the most High’ (7:27). The whole of the scenery in both chapters is depicted with eschatological overtones and denotes events in ‘the latter days’, thus, setting the historical events between the two ages: the present historical age and the eschatological age to come. The culmination of the imagery of the four empires seems to be in the coming of the ‘Son of man’ who inaugurates the everlasting Messianic kingdom which will be inherited by the faithful, ethnic Israelites.

It appears then, that Daniel was expressing the long-awaited dreams and prophecies of the Israeliite prophets who were expecting the coming of the ideal Jewish state at the end-times. In the beginning, these dreams were expressed within a definite historical framework and were related to the particular promises God had made to Israel. However, later, owing to the realisation that both Israel and Judah failed to bring about the perfect kingdom of God, expectations of the ideal world ‘shifted to the end times and a golden age of peace, righteousness and prosperity’. Thus, at the hands of the apocalyptic writers like Daniel this hope came to be expressed through the coming of the divine judgement and the inauguration of the ideal kingdom by the Messiah.

However, the fluidity of the apocalyptic language in relation to the identity of the stone and the everlasting kingdom left a certain ambiguity concerning the time of the fulfilment of this prophecy as well as the identity and the actual meaning of this kingdom. The eschatological culmination of visions in the uncertain future which was attached to the ‘latter days’ and the complex imagery concerning the actual historical

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170 We are dealing with this passages on the presupposition of structural unity in the book of Daniel which leads towards continuity between chapter 2 and 7 and the gradual development of the identity of the empires between them. This does not depend upon the issue whether chapters 2 and 7 ‘were glossed during the Maccabean age’ or not. See bibliography in Fröhlich, ‘Time’, 34-5, on the proponents of that view. On the issue of continuity and discontinuity between Dan 2 and 7 see Collins, Imagination, 78-9.

171 Flusser, ‘Empires’, 156.


empires left a possibility of applying the fulfilment of Daniel’s prophecies to different historical periods. This legacy was manifested in the subsequent generations through literary writings of Jewish apocalyptic as well as pagan writers before and after Christ’s advent.

1.5.2. The evolution: the pre-Christian era

Owing to the fact that Jewish expectations of the Danielic prediction were not fulfilled, there came the need for an adaptation of the prophecy according to the change in the political situation. The fourth Greek empire, which was perceived to be the last before the coming of the Messianic kingdom, was replaced by the emerging Roman empire which was rising to power at the time of the decline of the former. Whilst the identity of the fourth Hellenistic empire shifted to the Roman empire, the Jewish writers, nevertheless, retained it within their apocalyptic understanding of the political changes. The Roman empire came to be seen increasingly as the last empire and its collapse will signify the coming of the Messiah and of the new messianic kingdom.

The ‘prophecies’ of Jewish apocalyptic writers, following the Maccabean period, testify to the shift in the perception of the empire’s identity as well as the existence of Jewish messianic expectations as a ‘fluid and diverse phenomenon’.


Fröhlich, ‘Times’, 36, remarks that Herodotus already discussed the schema of the change of Assyrian, Medean, Persian reigns in the fifth century BC. This idea, according to which the monarchy descended from the heavens at the beginning of historical times, and then after being wrenched away from one city state it was given to the other (or rather to their rulers), appears already in Sumerian king list of the third millennium BCE. It is interesting to point out that this idea will re-appear in the writings of Filofei in Moscow in the sixteenth century.

Rowley, Darius, 76.

See Swain for the Roman writings concerning the translatio imperii who advocates non-Jewish influence upon the Roman idea of the translatio imperii which was identified by Romans as the fifth Roman empire. ‘Theory’, 1-9.

Rowley, Darius, 74.

Flusser, ‘Empires’, 157-8, asserts that Rome was added into a four-fold schema by Romans as a result of changed political reality and Roman political ideology.

Montgomery, Commentary, 62.

J.J. Collins, The apocalyptic vision of the book of Daniel, 38, points out that Roman writers widely used the four-fold schema for Roman propaganda in which Rome assumed the world dominion from the previous empires. See Tacitus, Histories, 5.8-9, Dionysius of Halicarnassus, Roman Antiquities, 1.2, 1-4; Polybius, Histories, 38.22, 1-3, Appian, Roman History, Praef. 9; See Swain, ‘Theory’, 13-14.

expectations, being the ‘aftermath’ of the post-Maccabean era, increased in the first century BC and resulted in a widespread belief in the rise of the Messiah in the first century AD.  

Following Daniel, the concept of the four empires was spelled out by the literature of the apocalyptic genre. The book of 4 Ezra, following others, through its fourth and fifth visions, identifies the fourth rule as the Roman empire in which Rome is perceived to be the fourth and the last anticipating its coming punishment. The primary focus of the eschatology of these writings seem to be centred on the restoration of Jerusalem by a Davidic Messiah. This Messiah will set up the Messianic Kingdom in which the ethnic Israelites will exercise the primary role in relation to other nations. Additionally, the facts that the Romans destroyed the Second Temple in 70


Tacitus, Histories, V. 13; Suetonius, Vespasian, 4. Josephus, Antiquities, XVII, 6.3; 9.2; 10.1-10; XVIII, 1.6; 3.1-2; 4.1; XX, 5. 1-3; 8.5.

The issue of the identification of the fourth empire with Rome seems to be largely influenced by Roman self-perception and comes into Jewish understanding via Josephus who combines the interpretation of Daniel with the perception of historical reality. Antiquities, X, 276-7; X, 209-10; XV, 385-7.

Although chronologically the book is placed toward the end of the first century, we discuss it here for the sake of convenience concerning the apocalyptic Jewish genre. 4 Ezra, 10:60-12:35; Shepherd of Hermas, Vision V. See R.H. Charles (ed.), The Apocrypha and Pseudepigrapha of the Old Testament, vol. II, 561-624.

The book of Ezra is representative of the apocalyptic genre which echoed the Daniestic concept of the translatio imperii and presented a ‘fluid’ and exalted concept of the Messiah and his kingdom, contrasting it with the Roman reign. The actual existence of the Messianic Kingdom on earth or in heaven varies in different writings. See the Book of Jubilees (105B.C.) which presents the coming of the Messiah from the House of Judah (XXXI, 18,19). The Testaments of the XII Patriarchs (~2BC), is looking for a Messiah from the House of David, (Test. Benjamin, X, 5ff; Test. Levi, 4.1; 14.2; Test. Asher, 7.3). The Psalms of Solomon, envisages the coming of the warrior messiah. (XVII, 23-25); 2 Baruch, 35-46; Fröhlich, ‘Time’, 190-1; Sybilline Oracle, 4. 49-101; 5: W. J. Ferrar, Daniel, 28-78; P.W. Flint, ‘The Daniel Tradition at Qumran’, in Evans, Flint (eds.), Eschatology, 41-60; Collins, Imagination, 74; W. Horbury, Jewish Messianism and the Cult of Christ, 12, G.K. Beale, on the use of Daniestic tradition in Qumran and other Jewish writings, The use of Daniel in Jewish Apocalyptic Literature and in the Revelation of St. John, University Press of America, 1984. The book of Enoch, 83-90, however presents the Messianic kingdom without a Messiah and the one who is born after the judgement.


This sequence will be reflected later in the fourth and subsequent centuries in the literature of the apocalyptic genre such as The Tiburtine Sibyl. See B. McGinn, Visions of the End, 43-50.

Ferrar, Daniel, 64, points out how indeterminate the conception of the Messiah was and how general was the expectation of a deliverer in Judaism before the coming of Christ. Simon, Israel, 8, points out that Messianism was not fundamental to Judaism in the Roman period.

Flusser, ‘Empires’, 156.

See Collins, Imagination, 114.
AD\textsuperscript{193} and suppressed the rebellion of Bar Kochba (135AD), as well as expelling Jews from their land, contributed even further towards the identification of the Roman empire with the fourth kingdom of the Danielic schema.\textsuperscript{194} Thus, Jewish writers interpreted the political events in the life of Israel as the fulfilment of the Danielic prophecies. This method and the interpretation was subsequently adapted by Christian exegetes and applied to their own understanding/interpretation of the sacred history.\textsuperscript{195}

\textbf{1.5.3. Christian era: Ante-Nicene period}

The coming of Jesus marked a new impetus for the interpretation of Danielic prophecies. Early Christianity was inclined to interpret the OT prophecies in the light of the Christ event.\textsuperscript{196} The preaching of Jesus and his actions were presented as the inauguration of the new era. The Kingdom of God was perceived in a two-dimensional way. In one sense, it had already arrived and was present\textsuperscript{197} in history through the person of Christ and in those who believed in Him – thus being a spiritual Messianic kingdom.\textsuperscript{198} On the other hand, the Kingdom of God remained a future possibility which will be fully realised only after the \textit{parousia} and it will unite within itself the new heaven and earth.\textsuperscript{199}

Baldwin\textsuperscript{200} asserts that during his earthly mission Christ’s use of the Danielic term of ‘Son of man’\textsuperscript{201} points towards the identification of this term with the Danielic usage as

\begin{itemize}
  \item \textsuperscript{193} See Josephus, \textit{Antiquities}, 10.11.7.276.
  \item \textsuperscript{194} Anderson, \textit{Signs}, 22. Cf also Garnsey, \textit{Imperialism}, 271, who points out that the identification of Rome with the fourth beast was widely accepted by rabbis.
  \item \textsuperscript{195} Baldwin, \textit{Daniel}, 175, asserts that Josephus’ interpretation of Daniel’s seventy weeks (Dan 2:31-45), \textit{(Antiquities, 10.10.4)} became standard Jewish teaching and passed into Christian exegesis. Cf also Montgomery, \textit{Commentary}, 62.
  \item \textsuperscript{196} Acts 2:29-36, Peter presents Christ as a new David.
  \item \textsuperscript{198} Ferrar, \textit{Daniel}, 80.
  \item \textsuperscript{199} Mt 8:11; 26:29; Mk 9:1; Lk 13:28, 29; 14:15.
  \item \textsuperscript{200} Baldwin, \textit{Daniel}, 153.
\end{itemize}
well as the fulfilment of Danielic prophecy\textsuperscript{202} in the person of Christ. This term was used by Christ in the context of His sufferings, death and the Second coming. Whilst differing from the Danielic picture of the ‘Son of man’ by virtue of suffering and death, the glorification of the Son of Man in his \textit{parousia} conformed to the majesty of the ‘Son of man’ in Daniel 7.\textsuperscript{203} Subsequently, Christians, unlike Jews, understood the fulfilment of the OT prophecies in the person of the suffering servant figure of Isaiah and Zechariah.\textsuperscript{204} In contrast to varied Jewish perception of the Messiah,\textsuperscript{205} Christians identified this figure with Christ.\textsuperscript{206} His death and resurrection\textsuperscript{207} ‘brought an end to the old order and the beginning of the new’\textsuperscript{208} This resulted in the restoration of a ‘true’ Israel through the foundation of the ‘new’ Israel – the Church.\textsuperscript{209} This new Messianic community was perceived as having a corporate identity,\textsuperscript{210} meaning and a universal dimension in Christ.

Further, Christ’s allusions to the Danielic predictions concerning the destruction of the Temple in Jerusalem (Mk 13:14), being in itself the sign of the End, signified the nearness of His return within the ‘existing generation’.\textsuperscript{211} That, in turn, implied that the first generations of Christians were to live in the expectation of the coming \textit{parousia}. This perception contributed towards the identification of the fourth empire of the Danielic scheme with the Roman empire. Christian exegetes, following contemporary Jewish interpretation of Daniel as well as the Roman systematisation of history, identified the fourth kingdom with the Roman empire which came to be seen as the last before the coming of \textit{parousia}.

\textsuperscript{202} Mk 14:62. The Son of Man in a Messianic sense also appears in Jewish \textit{Parables of Enoch}, 37-71; 2 Ezra, 13.
\textsuperscript{203} Baldwin, Daniel, 153.
\textsuperscript{204} Isa 52:13-53:12; Zech 12:10.
\textsuperscript{205} Horbury, \textit{Messianism}, 87, points out that Jewish Messiah, unlike Christian, was merely of human origin. Justin, \textit{Dialogue}, 49, 1.
\textsuperscript{206} Jn 1:41, 45, 49. Later this was reflected in Justin, \textit{Apology}, I, 50; \textit{Dialogue}, 196; 53.
\textsuperscript{207} Evans, \textit{Eschatology}, 8.
\textsuperscript{210} Mk 9:1/Mt 16:28, Lk 9:27/Mt 10:23 present Christ’s return before his disciples will pass away.

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In a characteristic way, the *Epistle of Barnabas* admonishes Christians to ‘hate the error of the present time, that we may set our love on the world to come’. The writer makes allusions to Daniel and perceives himself to be living in ‘these last days’ under the reign of the fourth beast/kingdom.\(^{212}\) Similarly, the Church Fathers were forced to re-interpret the identity of the Danielic stone (2:34-5) in the light of the Christ event. On the precedence of the occurrence of the term ‘stone’ in the NT,\(^ {213}\) the stone was vaguely identified as referring to the Messianic prediction concerning either the coming of Christ,\(^ {214}\) his virgin birth or the appearance of the Church.\(^ {215}\) However, Davies and Montgomery point out that there is no one unified, clear identification among the Church Fathers. Irenaeus, Hippolytus, Tertullian, Ephraem interpret the stone as referring to Christ. Yet such a broad identification can mean also referring it in a strict sense to Christ’s virgin birth (Theodoret, Gregory of Nyssa, Ephraem) rather than the whole Christ event. On the other hand, it is also possible that some of the Church Fathers equated the identity of the stone from Daniel 2 with Christ due to the common virtue of the divine origin of both: the stone and Christ. Thus, the identity of the stone with its divine origin which subsequently becomes a mountain and fills the whole earth is equated with Christ who is conceived supernaturally (virgin birth) and through his ministry constitutes the Church and the Messianic kingdom of universal proportions which is given to the ‘saints of the Most High’ in Daniel 7. Hence, there is a fusion of several ideas contributing towards such an identification.

Beale argues that Jewish tradition presented the close identification of the ‘stone’ in Daniel 2 with the ‘Son of Man’ in Daniel 7, so that ‘the two figures became one picture’.\(^ {216}\) The figure is perceived to execute the divine judgement in a certain period of history and is identified in Revelation as referring to Christ. John brings about a

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\(^{212}\) Driver, Daniel 95. *Epistle of Barnabas*, 4-5.

\(^{213}\) The ‘stone’ terminology in Mt 21:44; Lk 20:17-18; I Cor 10:4 and the background Ps 118:22.

\(^{214}\) *Constitutions of the Holy Apostles*, V, 20, go as far as to identify Christ as ‘the stone cut out of the mountain without hands, and becoming a great mountain, and filling the whole earth, dashing to pieces the many governments of the smaller countries, and the polytheism of gods, but preaching the one God, and ordaining the monarchy of the Romans’.

\(^{215}\) Davies, Daniel 13-16. Montgomery, Daniel 191-2. In the Shepherd of Hermas, Similitudes, IX, the stone refers to the Church. Cosmas Indicopleustes (SC) identifies the stone with the Roman empire. See Montgomery, Daniel 191-2.

\(^{216}\) IV Ezra, 13. See Beale, Daniel, 133, 155.
conflation of the different contexts of Daniel 7:13 and Zechariah 12:10-12, thus bringing a unified notion of the coming of Christ (Rev 1:7ff).

Furthermore, it is plausible to suggest that there seems to be in John's Revelation a typological trajectory from Daniel. Baldwin argues that the book of Daniel operates on two levels: the historical/literal level which seems to be fulfilled in the reign of Antiochus Epiphanes IV. The typological/eschatological level portrays typologically the struggle between God's people ('the saints of the most High') and the empires in the succession.217 John, in turn, took the motif of conflict from Daniel and applied it typologically to the conflict between the Church and empire. Thus, the 'saints of the most High' of Daniel (7:18, 27) constitute the Church in John's Revelation who will receive the kingdom of the entire world.218 It is possible then to argue that there seemed to be a typological trajectory of the 'embryonic' concept of the Messianic kingdom in Daniel to the Messianic kingdom inaugurated by Christ. He constituted the Church and the latter became the manifestation of the Messianic kingdom of God by becoming a New Israel, thus encapsulating and remoulding within itself ethnic as well as eschatological features of that Kingdom.

This conflation/fusion of different contexts and ideas was reflected in the interpretations of the Church Fathers concerning the book of Daniel. The speculative aspect of the apocalyptic nature of Daniel's eschatological predictions gave rise to the theological reflections of the Church Fathers as well as to the appearance of Christian historiography.219 Danielic Messianic themes and allusions gave rise to a multiplicity of meaning and identification with different historical periods and figures. Whilst generally adopting the four-fold schema from Jewish and pagan writers identifying the last empire as Roman, the Church Fathers' interpretation of world history, God's kingdom and the contemporary events seems to be slightly different. It is based upon the book of Daniel, the interpretation of Jesus' life and teaching, and upon the NT writings. The Church is

217 Baldwin, Daniel, 68.
218 Driver, Daniel, 93, points to a typological trajectory from Dan 7:26-27 to Rev 5:10b; 11:15, 12:10; 20:4, 6; 22:5 in which the saints of the most High of Daniel become the corporate community of saints – the Church of Christ who receives the eternal kingdom and reign.
219 Frend, Rise, 417.
understood to manifest eschatologically the kingdom of God\textsuperscript{220} and to exist in the period preceding the \textit{parousia} in the world, which is ageing and going towards its end.\textsuperscript{221}

Irenaeus seems to interpret the vision of the ‘stone’ which smites all the kingdoms in Daniel 2 and the one like the ‘Son of man’ as referring to Christ.\textsuperscript{222} Whilst not identifying the exact fulfilment of each of the visions in Daniel, Irenaeus nevertheless points to the ‘Son of man’ in Revelation (1:12ff) as a possible central figure of fulfilment. Thus there is a perception of the continuity between these two books and the identity of the same figure. Christ is seen as the fulfilment of the OT prophecies as well as the manifestation of God.\textsuperscript{223}

The same method of fusion is applied in relation to the Roman empire. It is perceived to be the fourth and the last kingdom.\textsuperscript{224} Irenaeus employs Daniel’s predictions concerning the period of the fourth kingdom (7:24) as a starting point and interprets them alongside John’s visions in Revelation (17:12ff.). He applies them to contemporary history - the ‘empire which now rules’ existing in the ‘last times’.\textsuperscript{225} The kings of the fourth kingdom of Daniel are placed against the Lamb in Revelation (chs. 17, 18), destroying Rome/Babylon, and putting the ‘Church to flight’.\textsuperscript{226} Subsequently, the kings are destroyed by the coming of Christ the ‘stone’ – who smites all temporal kingdoms and introduces ‘an eternal one, which is the resurrection of the just’.\textsuperscript{227} Thus, there appears the interplay of imagery between Daniel and Revelation which results in the fusion of several ideas and the equation of imagery which brings about the perception of the

\textsuperscript{220} \textit{The Epistle of Barnabas}, presents the Church as revealing the kingdom of God as a future as well as a present reality, 1.7, 6.11-13, 17-19, 14.5; 21. 1.

\textsuperscript{221} Cyprian, \textit{Ad Demetriamnum}, 3-8; \textit{De Mortalitate}, XXV-XXVI; \textit{Epistle}, 58, 2, 61, 4; 63, 16; 67, 7.

\textsuperscript{222} Irenaeus, \textit{Against Heresies}, III, 21.7; IV, 20.11; IV, 21.

\textsuperscript{223} Ibid., IV, 20.11.

\textsuperscript{224} Cyril of Jerusalem will refer later to that kind of the identification as ‘the tradition of the Church’s interpreters’. \textit{Catechetical lectures}, XV, 13.

\textsuperscript{225} Irenaeus, \textit{Heresies}, V, XXVI, 1.

\textsuperscript{226} Ibid., V, XXVI, 1.

Roman empire as the fourth kingdom. The Danielic schema is placed within the eschatological framework of the Kingdom of God and history.

Hippolytus, discussing the issue of the coming of the Antichrist in *Treatise on the Antichrist*, deals with the identification of the fourth kingdom and presents it with political overtones. It is a 'fourth beast, dreadful and terrible; it had iron teeth and claws of brass. And who are these but the Romans? which (kingdom) is meant by the iron – kingdom which is now established'. The time of the existence of the Roman empire seems to coincide with the rise of the Antichrist who is about to 'raise the kingdom of the Jews'. This kingdom, though, is destroyed by the coming of the stone which 'subverts all the kingdoms, and gives the kingdom to the saints of the Most High'. This stone is identified with Christ and His kingdom. He is represented by the 'Son who is ordained Lord of things in heaven, and things on earth, and things under the earth, and Judge of all'. Thus, Hippolytus conforms to the existing concept of the *translatio imperii* in that he shows the identity of the fourth kingdom in relation to the coming of the Antichrist in historically undefined terms. However, in the *Commentary on Daniel*, Hippolytus places the coming of the Antichrist within his historical schema. His reign and subsequently the end of the world are perceived to come at the fulfilment of the six thousand years after creation. On the basis of the

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228 It is unclear, however, whether Irenaeus differentiates between the different phases of Daniel's prophecy, namely identifying the stone with the first advent of Christ and attributing the appearance of the 'Son of man' to the Second Coming of Christ. See Heresies, IV, 21; III, 19; IV, 11; V, 34, 2. The same confusion seems to be in the writings of other Church Fathers. See Justin, Dialogue, XXXI, Apology, LI; Ignatius, Magnesians, VI; Tertullian, Against Marcion, VII, XXXIX. Rowley, Darius, 75, points out that Christian interpreters were divided in relation to the fulfilment of Daniel's prophecies of chs. 2 and 7. Whilst some saw it to be fulfilled at the birth of Christ, others referred to the Second Coming. Yet, there were also those who held that the prophecy concerning the 'stone' began to be fulfilled at Jesus' birth and that the consummation of the prophecies in its final form (Daniel 7) awaits the Second Advent. Such a view was, however opposed by Theodoret. See V. Malinin, Starets Eleazarova Monastyria Filofei i Ego Poslania, 396.

229 Malinin points out that the works of Hyppolytus were among the earliest translated in Kievan Rus', Starets, 396.

230 Frend, Rise, 418.

231 Ibid., 25.


233 Ibid., 26, 28.

234 See Daley, Hope, 38.

235 It seems that Hippolytus is following the tradition of interpreters before him like Irenaeus. Against Heresies, V, XXVIII, 3, V, XXIX. This speculative type of interpretation seems to originate in the Epistle of Barnabas, 15, and being based on Ps. 90:4; II Pet 3:8. It seems to derive from Jewish interpretation on
measurement of the tabernacle in Exodus (25:10), Hippolytus applied an allegorical interpretation. He argued that Christ was born in the middle of the last millennium of history.\textsuperscript{237} That, in turn, meant that the end was to come in five hundred years after Christ’s birth,\textsuperscript{238} being followed by a ‘Sabbath’ – the future Kingdom of the Saints on earth.\textsuperscript{239} Additionally, the weeks and days in Daniel’s prediction concerning the coming of the Messiah (9:24-27) were calculated in order to refer to the coming of Christ, thus giving the Danielic prophecies Messianic overtones.\textsuperscript{240} Such a method of calculation on the basis of Daniel\textsuperscript{241} had consequences for the perception of world history. It incorporated the notion of the \textit{translatio imperii} and gave rise to the appearance of Christian historiography.\textsuperscript{242} The latter was ‘an extension of apocalyptic, universal in scope and periodized to fit the preconceived ideas of the destiny of the world’.\textsuperscript{243}

1.6. The Church as the New Israel

Alongside the challenge of defining its attitude towards the State as a distinctive community from both Jews and pagans, early Christianity was also forced to define its own self-identity in the light of Christ’s life and resurrection. The Christian Church had to define the boundaries on theological as well as on sociological grounds.

Simon points out that the significance of the destruction of the Temple in Jerusalem in 70AD as well as the conflict with its consequences in 135AD marked an important
development in the Church’s self-identity and independence.\textsuperscript{244} Whilst the former helped the Church to gain a greater independence\textsuperscript{245} from ‘ethnic’ Israel, the latter was perceived to be a ‘confirmation of the divine verdict on Israel’\textsuperscript{246} The actual destruction of the Temple was perceived by Christians as a sign of the coming end that will lead to the establishment of the kingdom predicted by Christ.\textsuperscript{247} Thus, the events were generally interpreted in ‘a quite narrowly eschatological way’.\textsuperscript{248} They were perceived to be the development of history from the Christian perspective through the ‘lenses’ of the Christ event and the expectation of the parousia.

And we say with confidence that they [the Jews] will never be restored to their former condition. For they committed a crime of the most unhallowed kind, in conspiring against the Saviour of the human race in that city where they offered up to God a worship containing the symbols of mighty mysteries. It accordingly behoved that city where Jesus underwent these sufferings to perish utterly, and the Jewish nation to be overthrown, and the invitation to happiness offered them by God to pass to others.\textsuperscript{249}

The original covenant between God and Israel seems to be abrogated in relation to ethnic Jews and passed on to the New Israel – the Church.\textsuperscript{250} At the hands of the apostle Paul, the distinctive theology of the New Israel became complete. His use of the Jewish scriptures to justify the Christian independence from Israel as well as the inclusiveness of the Gentiles into the new community, created the precedent and the pattern for Christian apologists. His method of interpretation was used in such a way as to show the continuity between the OT, the new revelation in Christ and the fulfilment of the OT prophecies. These were used to prove the beginning of a new dispensation in which the Church was claiming ‘to continue the true Israelite line and to inherit the promises’.\textsuperscript{251}

\textsuperscript{244} Simon, Israel, 65. Cf. also Pelikan, Tradition, 20-1.
\textsuperscript{245} The independent status of Christianity seems to be realised already at the time of Trajan. Pliny, Letters, X, 97-8. This perception of differentiation between Judaism and Christianity must have begun at the time of Nero’s persecutions.
\textsuperscript{246} Simon, Israel, 65.
\textsuperscript{247} Mk 13:14-26; Mt 24:15ff; Lk 21:20ff.
\textsuperscript{248} Simon, Israel, 67.
\textsuperscript{249} Origen, Contra Celsum, IV, 22. Cf. also Tertullian, An Answer to the Jews, 13.
\textsuperscript{250} See Epistle of Barnabas, 3-5. Justin, Dialogue, 19.2.
\textsuperscript{251} Simon, Israel, 70. On the issue of continuity and discontinuity between the Church and Israel as well as the Church becoming the New Israel see P. Richardson, Israel in the Apostolic Church, Cambridge University Press, 1969.
Christian apologists, following Paul’s views concerning the law,\(^{252}\) provided the evidence that the Mosaic law was superseded by Christ.\(^{253}\) This, in turn, implied that the Jews had lost their election and their privileged status as God’s chosen race.\(^{254}\) After the Christ advent, there came into existence a new community – of the New Israel ‘whose members were drawn from outside the Jewish nation’\(^{255}\) and which replaced the ‘Israel according to the flesh’.\(^{256}\)

Further, from the middle of the second century there also happened an ‘ethnic’ shift: the Church of the first generations of Christians that was predominantly Jewish, was gradually becoming increasingly Gentile.\(^{257}\) Origen, commenting on Revelation 7:4, declared that “Those among Israel according to the flesh who have become believers are not very numerous, and one may safely say that they are not as many as 144,000”.\(^{258}\) This process of Hellenization among other factors, which affected early Christianity, brought about a certain change in the expectation of the *parousia*. This change in the outlook of the early Church presupposed a further drift from the eschatological mindset of Jewish Christianity: ‘the hope of an early return of Christ to earth in judgement and in triumph gradually dwindled’.\(^{259}\) Accordingly, a gradual replacement of the Jewish heritage of Christians by the Hellenistic took place. This subsequently brought about the assimilation of the Church, with the Roman empire giving way to a new political formation of the Mediterranean world – the Christian empire.

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\(^{256}\) This type of analysis first appears in the *Epistle of Barnabas* and is repeated throughout patristic writings. See Milburn, *Interpretations*, 24.


\(^{258}\) Origen, *Commentary in John*, 1.2.

\(^{259}\) Simon, *Israel*, 327-8. Cf. also R.L. Fox, *Pagans and Christians*, 333-4, who asserts that the expectation of the *parousia* and the end of the world was receding among many Christians by the mid-second century.
Chapter II
Constantine era and beyond

2.1. Eusebius’ vision

Gutzman pointed out that despite Eusebius’ heretical inclinations towards Arianism and his condemnation by the Seventh Ecumenical council as late as 787, his main achievement lay in the sphere of historiography.\(^{260}\) In words of G. Chesnut: ‘Eusebius broke the old moulds, biblical as well as Greco-Roman, and thereby created not only a new paradigm of historiography, the ‘ecclesiastical history’, but broadened and liberated the perspectives of succeeding generations...’\(^{261}\) It is this achievement and his ecclesiastical ‘heavy weight’ position as Metropolitan of Caesarea that warranted and ensured his ‘survival’ as a literary author, despite his doubtful scholarly integrity,\(^{262}\) and his lasting legacy for Christian historians/thinkers mainly in the sphere of Church/State relationship both in the East and West.\(^{263}\)

Eusebius represents a Christian writer who stands in the tradition of the conservative writers of the first three centuries who adapted and used contemporary literary devices in their attempt to defend and to propagate Christianity in the world of the Roman empire.\(^{264}\) Yet, unlike the earlier authors, who stood within the realm of the apostolic NT teaching on the issues of State and Church and defined the borders and the goals of each entity separately according to the contemporary historical realities,\(^{265}\) Eusebius went a step further in his method and actual content of expressing his understanding of

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\(^{263}\) Gutzman, ‘Eusebius’, 352.

history and theology. In his works he presented a worldview and an understanding of the existing reality in a new ‘innovative’ way, which went well beyond any other ecclesiastical writer of the previous generations. That ‘way’ envisaged the appearance of a Christian universal empire under the leadership of a Christian monarch and the coming of the new era and the new ‘apocalyptic kingdom ruled by a God-chosen king’. Against N.H. Baynes and others who argued that Eusebius’ understanding was formed well before Constantine’s reign and was shaped by the Scriptural teaching and interpretation of the earlier Christian writers, we intend to argue that the radical changes of the fourth century under the rule of Constantine brought about a new possibility and the re-interpretation of Scripture which took into account the radical changes of Constantine’s reign. Whilst claiming to be an original thinker venturing on an ‘untrodden path’ for the sake of posterity, Eusebius, nevertheless, selected his material from the previous generations in such a way as to present a favourable and idealistic portrait of Christianity integrated within the political structure of his day. Thus, in his desire to champion the Christian cause, he uses the available material for apologetic purposes as well as for the formulation of the imperial ideology.

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267 It is only to a certain degree that Eusebius can be regarded as an original thinker, namely that his presentation and perception of the relationship between the State and the Church is written under the influence of Constantine’s changes, which were not envisaged by earlier Church Fathers of the preceding generations. See F.E. Cranz, ‘Kingdom and Polity in Eusebius of Caesarea’, HTR, XLV, (1952), 47-69, who regards Eusebius as an original thinker. For the opposite view of Eusebius, see A. Louth (ed.), Eusebius. The History of the Church, xi-xxv; V.V. Bolotov, Lektsii po Istorii Drevnei Tserkvi, III, 6; Cochrane, Christianity, 218. Socrates, Ecclesiastical History, NPNF, I, 1, 1.
268 D. Pospielovsky, The Orthodox Church in the history of Russia, 2.
269 N.H Baynes, Constantine the Great and the Christian Church, OUP, 1972, (who gives a useful summary of Russian scholarship at the beginning of the twentieth century). Hollerich, ‘Religion’, 312, who follows T.D. Barnes, Constantine and Eusebius, 97, 102-4, 164. D.S. Wallace-Hadrill, Eusebius of Caesarea, 174-5. It is indeed difficult to appreciate their assumption that Eusebius was not influenced by Constantine’s changes. Their argument seems to be weakened by the fact that Eusebius’ writings which contain his understanding on the synchronising rise of Roman empire and Christianity date to the period which witnessed the rise of Constantine. Frend, Rise, 479, who asserts that Eusebius writes from the standpoint of the victory of Christianity. Similar point of view in G.F. Chesnut, The First Christian Histories, 101; Drake, In Praise of Constantine, 5; A. Droge, Homer or Moses? Early Christian Interpretations of the History of Culture, 170; Fox, Pagans, 608.
270 Eusebius, Historia Ecclesiastica, I, 1; VII, 26, 3, 32 (henceforth HE); VIII preface; Vita Constantini, II, 23, 2 (henceforth VC), in A. Cameron, S.G. Hall, Eusebius, Life of Constantine.
271 Setton, Christian Attitude, 40. See also F. Dvornik, Early Christian and Byzantine Political Philosophy, II, 610-850.
It seems that Baynes' assertion about Eusebius' Christianised Hellenistic theory of kingship can be modified in the light of recent research. Eusebius stands as the main proponent of the imperial ideology of a Christian empire ruled by a Christian monarch – the ideology which became prevalent throughout the history of the Byzantine state. At the outset this ideology appears to be a fusion of several modes of thought coming from the different realms of thought and traditions of Hellenism, Judaism and Christianity as well as the personal perceptions of the author. It is plausible to suggest then, that rather than identifying Hellenistic ideas of kingship as the main influence upon the Eusebian presentation of Constantine and the imperial ideology (Baynes), one ought to consider together with Hollerich the background of the theological ideas of a fourth century bishop from the direction of Judaeo-Christian tradition which also betrays the influence of Hellenistic sources.

In his writings Eusebius presented a peculiar understanding of the progress of history which was divided into definite stages, beginning with Creation and culminating in the reign of Constantine. The history was seen as being directed by God who in His

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272 Baynes, 'Constantine', 341-442; also his 'Eusebius and the Christian Empire', in Byzantine studies and other essays, 168-72.
273 The 'echoes' of the same pro-Roman understanding can be found in John Chrysostom, Gregory of Nazianzus, Prudentius, Ambrose, Ephrem Syrus, Aphraates, Jerome and Orosius. See Dvornik, Philosophy, II, 725. Markus, Saeculum: History and Society in the Theology of St Augustine, 49-50. Frend, 'Church', 48.
275 Dvornik, Philosophy, II, 611ff., traces the origins of the concept of the divine monarchy to Aristotle whose ideas were taken over by Philo of Alexandria and adapted with some modifications by Christian writers.
276 Alexander, 'Strength', 340.
277 Milburn, Christian, 54.
278 Hollerich, 'Religion', 309-25, esp. 309-13. Cf. also S.L. Greenslade, Church and State from Constantine to Theodosius, 12, 33; Chesnut, Histories, 134.
279 Alexander, 'Strength', 340.
281 It seems that the idea of progress was widely shared by other Christian apologists, the predecessors of Eusebius. See H. Chadwick, 'Justin Martyr's defence of Christianity', BJRL, (1965), 257-97. T. Mommsen, 'St. Augustus and the Christian Idea of Progress', JHI, 12, (1951), 346-74.
282 On Eusebius' dissection of history see Chesnut, Histories, 91ff; cf. also Droge, Homer, 181, on the idea of progress as a basis for the development of the concept of history.
providence orders the pattern of history.283 Within this wider perception of history Eusebius highlighted several historical figures: Abraham, Moses, Christ, Augustus and Constantine, who exercised the paramount influence upon the flow of history. Thus, he constructed a historical schema which linked these figures together and interpreted them in terms of the promise-fulfilment of Biblical categories.

Eusebius designed a simple schematisation of history in which there is ongoing conflict between the opposite powers of God and the demons.284 The demons are portrayed as the ones who led human beings astray from God the Creator.285 The departure of human beings from God the Creator led them to worship false gods and resulted in the appearance of polytheism and subsequent anarchy;286 human beings are perceived to be reduced to an animal-like existence.287 Original sin resulted in anarchy on the ‘spiritual’ as well as the ‘earthly’ level. The latter was expressed through the appearance of the multiplicity of different rulers who were ‘in opposition to each other’ and engaged in ‘warfare between nations’.288 This degrading picture of the world, however, was transformed through the appearance of uniform forms of belief and the political structure: ‘One God was preached to all men, the one empire of the Romans had extended itself all over the world; and the warlike and implacable hatred which had so long held sway among the nations came to a complete end’.289 Thus, Eusebius draws an idealistic picture of the world in which there is an ideal state of things whether it is in the realm of belief or a political structure of the world. His description of the state of affairs is dominated by the notion of universalism on both levels. On a political level, Eusebius in a Roman-like290 fashion like that of Augustus’ period, describes the universal dimensions of the Roman empire and aspires to the ideals of pax Romana.291

283 Chesnut, Histories, 67.
284 This seems to be the closest point in which Eusebius comes towards the apocalyptic perception of history. Theophany can be taken as the illustration of Eusebius’ perception of history and his theological views since it was written at the end of his life. All the references to Theophany are found in Wallace, Eusebius, (henceforth Theoph.).
285 H.E. I, 2; Theoph., I, 39; III, 2.
286 Theoph., I, 39ff.
289 Theoph., III, 2.
290 Cochrane, Christianity, 185.
291 See W.K. Medlin, Moscow and East Rome, 17.
Augustus is depicted as the one who conquers the powers of polytheism and polyarchy by bringing to an end the civil wars and creating a unified empire into which Christ is born.292 The Pax Romana with its peace and concord, at Eusebius’ hands, becomes the forerunner of a new age,293 similar in its characteristics to Roman perception of the pax Romana of the pagan ideologists of Augustus, yet distinctive from them in that it brings into it the event of the Incarnation. On a theological level, building upon the patristic294 perception that the Roman empire played a part in God’s plan of salvation for humankind, Eusebius goes even further. He asserts that the Roman empire under Augustus becomes a second instrument, equal in its significance to the event of the Incarnation and having its origin in the Providence of God: ‘two great Powers sprung fully up, as it were, out of one stream’.295 Eusebius presents a monotheistic God who achieves a complete victory over polytheism through the event of the Incarnation. Thus, there appears an essential anachronistic parallelism between the Roman empire and Christianity. The anachronism or discrepancy is in the way that Eusebius ignores the fact that Augustus’ empire is unified, yet remains polytheistic at large, thus destroying Eusebius’ basic analogy in which peace corresponds to monotheism and empire and polytheism stands for polyarchy and war. Whilst polyarchy and war, according to Eusebius, corresponded to polytheism before the era of Augustus and Christ, monotheism and peace correspond to a universal, unified monarchy of Augustus’ and the rise of Christianity.296 Accordingly, the lives of Christ and Augustus are linked in the providential plan of history.297

292 DE, VII, 139d-140c; PE, I, IV. 10c-d.
293 PE, I, IV, 12aff.
295 Theoph. III, 2. On Christ’s Sepulchre, XVI, 5-6, in Drake, Praise, (henceforth CS)
296 PE, I, 4, 10b-11b; DE, III, 7. 139d-140c; VIII, 3, 407b; IX, 17, 458d; Theoph. II, 67-68; 69; 71-72; 78. Laudibus Constantini, III, 6, (henceforth LC). Barnes, Constantine, 186, points out that theological ideas of PE and DE virtually ignore the person of the Holy Spirit and speak of ‘God the Father and God the Son in terms of the First and Second Gods of Middle Platonism’. See DE, 5, 4, 225cff.; 4, 3, 147bff.; 4, 5. 150dff.; 4, 7. 156bff.; 5, 1.215bff., (God the Father); DE, 5, 1.216bff.; PE, 7, 12. 320cfft.; 7, 15. 324dff., (God the Son).
297 PE, I, 4, 10c-11b; DE, III, 7. 139d-140c; VII, 2. 345b; Theoph, III, 1.
Yet, Eusebius still goes further in his understanding of the significance of the simultaneous appearance of Christianity as a uniform belief and a Roman unified empire. He perceives the possibility of attributing the military successes of the Roman empire to the spread of Christianity which made men to be more inclined towards peace and concord. Thus, at the hands of Eusebius, Christianity and the Roman empire are locked in an interdependent mode of existence – the appearance of one of them opens up the way for the appearance of the other. Whilst, on the one hand, it is Christianity which is instrumental in the spread of Roman empire (Theoph., III, 1; PE, I. IV, 10c-d), on the other, it is Roman political structure which paves the way for the spread of Christianity (Theoph., V, 52; DE, III, 7. 140b-c; LC, XVI, 6).

The Church and the State are integrated with one another and form a harmonious union. It appears, then, that Eusebius develops an elevated, ‘high’ view of the empire which stood for representing the indispensable tool in God’s plan of salvation. The difference between him and previous ecclesiastical as well as NT writers lies precisely in the perception of the nature of the political structures within which the Christian Church exists. Whilst the latter discusses the origin of authority as coming from God and the political structures co-existing with the Christian Church in an un-easy eschatological tension and in separate modes of existence, the former unites the two in the mutually dependent mode of existence, presenting them as indispensable tools for God’s purposes in the salvation of humankind. Where the ecclesiastical predecessors of Eusebius were inclined to downplay the significance of the political structures, or to consider them only in relation to Christian mission, Eusebius elevates the empire and gives it a sacral sense as being ordained by God, thus bringing a theoretical fusion of two separate entities into one. In Eusebius’ perception the kingdom comes close to consist of both the

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298 Some of the scholars seem to go too far in their desire to find the basis for supporting Eusebius’ pro-Roman ideology by extracting some evidence from NT writers and their attitude towards Roman empire. See A.J. Droge, ‘The Apologetic Dimensions of the Ecclesiastical History’, in H.W. Attridge, G. Hata (eds.), Eusebius, Christianity, and Judaism, 498.


300 Against I. Kirillow, Tretii Rim, 6, who advocates the coincidence view which perceives the fusion of Messianic and Roman kingdoms into a single entity. It has to be noted, however, that even in Eusebius’ ‘high’ view of the Christian kingdom under Constantine the two entities Christian ecclesia and Roman oikoumene are never depicted as one in a realised literal sense. This notion (fusion of both) seems to be in Eusebius’ view only in the embryonic sense and a future possibility.
Christian *ecclesia*\textsuperscript{301} and the Roman *oikoumene*, thus bringing about the finalisation to human history and the ideal state of existence.\textsuperscript{302} Whilst the Christian *ecclesia* grows forming a 'third race'\textsuperscript{303} in terms of a nation,\textsuperscript{304} it fills the Roman *oikoumene*. Thus, it brings the conflation of the two distinctive, yet not mutually opposed 'kingdoms' of both the Church and the Empire on to a common ground – the realisation of the Kingdom of God as the ultimate goal of Christian society.

Further, Eusebius' perception of the Roman empire as being interlocked into a significant union with Christianity in terms of Biblical categories of promise-fulfilment brought about a peculiar interpretation of the OT prophecies. He interpreted the OT Messianic prophecies as being fulfilled at the time of Christ's advent and the Roman empire of Augustus, both portrayed on the universalist scale.\textsuperscript{305}

Chesnut points out that Eusebius made use of the term *eirene* as a link between Augustus' *pax Romana* and the eschatological kingdom of peace\textsuperscript{306} prophesied by the OT prophets. 'In his days shall righteousness flourish, and abundance of peace, and they shall beat their swords into plowshares and their spears into pruning-hooks; and nation shall not take sword against nation, and they shall not learn war any more.'\textsuperscript{307} Thus, the eschatological term 'peace' from the OT prophets is projected by Eusebius on to contemporary historical conditions of the *pax Romana* and is fitted within Eusebius' historical schema, which brings about a particular interpretation of the fulfilment of the OT prophecies.\textsuperscript{308}

\textsuperscript{301} Cranz, 'Kingdom', 59. Whenever Eusebius speaks about Christianity he presents it as a society (polity) in universalistic terms inhabiting the whole world. See *DE*, I, 2.

\textsuperscript{302} W. Goffart, 'Zosimus, the first historian of Rome's Fall', *AHR*, 76, (1971), 432.


\textsuperscript{304} See A. Momigliano, *The conflict between Paganism and Christianity in the Fourth Century*, 90.

\textsuperscript{305} The prophecy of Zechariah 9:9-10, *DE*, VIII, 4, 410(b). See also the interpretation of Micah 1:2-4; 3:9-12; 4:1-4 in *DE*, VIII, 3 in which Eusebius interprets the prophecy of Micah 4:1-4 as being fulfilled through the formation of the Roman empire under Augustus, after the birth of Christ.

\textsuperscript{306} *DE*, VIII, 3, 424b-d.

\textsuperscript{307} *PE*, I, 4. 10c. Cf. also *DE*, VIII, 3, 407b. Eusebius vaguely refers to Is 2:4; Micah 4:1-4; 5:4-5a, Ps 72.

Accordingly, Danielic prophecy regarding the appearance of the fourth kingdom reveals a traditional interpretation as well as 'innovation' on the part of Eusebius. The vision of chapter 2 is described as referring to the four empires of Assyria, Persia, Macedonia and Rome. The fourth kingdom is understood to be the Roman empire309 which precedes the coming of the kingdom of God.310

It seems that in his earlier work, Eusebius follows a traditional311 Judaeo-Christian interpretation of his predecessors which defines the Roman empire as the last one which ushers in the coming of the kingdom of God. Yet, his later work seems to reveal an innovation. The appointment of Constantine’s sons as Caesars in De Laudibus Constantini is perceived to be the literal fulfilment of the prophecy of Daniel. ‘And so, by the appointment of the Caesars, He fulfils the predictions of the divine prophets, which ages and ages ago proclaimed that “the saints of the Most High shall take up the kingdom”’.312 Constantine’s sons are perceived to inherit the eschatological kingdom of peace which will last for an indefinite time. Thus, Eusebius seems to be at ease to deviate from the traditional interpretation when it suits his personal perspective on the changing historical reality. In addition, Eusebius’ distinctive method of making a fusion of different concepts from Judaeo-Christian and Hellenistic heritage proved to be the means by which he constructed his own imperial ideology. The later works such as the Vita Constantini and the De Laudibus Constantini, which were written at the end of his life, manifest the fusion of different genres of literature313 as well as different concepts from the Judaeo-Christian and Hellenistic heritage.

309 DE, XV, fragment. Cf. also DE, VIII, 3.
310 Chesnut, 'Eusebius', in Attridge, Hata, Eusebius, 693, points out that this belief, being combined with the notion of Roma Aeterna, was promulgated later by Eusebius' successors such as Socrates, Sozomen and Theodoret.
311 See chapter I, sections 1.6.3-1.6.6, pp. 20-29.
312 LC, III, 2. Dan 7:27.
313 That is certainly the case of VC which is defined by A. Cameron and S.G. Hall as a 'literary hybrid' consisting of an imperial and the parts of 'historical-hagiographic narrative'. Life, 27; Similar T.D. Barnes, 'Panegyric, history and hagiography in Eusebius' Life of Constantine', 94-123, in From Eusebius to Augustine, who perceives VC as a conventional panegyric, 116; R.M. Grant, 'Eusebius and Imperial Propaganda', in H.W. Attridge, G. Hata (eds.), Eusebius, 658. For different views concerning literary genre which gives an overview of scholarly opinion, see the section 'The Literary character of the VC', in Life, 27-34.

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VC represents the work of the author whose views matured throughout his life and reflected the victory of Christianity in the fourth century in the reign of Constantine. If in the earlier works of Demonstratio Evangelica and Praeparatio Evangelica, among others, Eusebius spells out his general view upon the history of humankind in which Christianity and the Roman empire play a major role, then, the later works such as VC and LC bring about the identification of the Empire with Christianity in more specific terms. The Roman empire, after Constantine’s conversion, becomes the Christian empire of Constantine and Eusebius is transformed into a main proponent of the imperial ideology which comes to play a vital role in a newly emerging Christian worldview.

The majority of scholars point out that one of the tools employed by Eusebius in his portrayal of Constantine was the notion of Hellenistic kingship. Baynes showed an essential analogy which existed between the notions of the Hellenistic kingship and Eusebius’ portrayal of Christian emperor Constantine and the Christianised Roman empire. Following Goodenough, Baynes asserted that Eusebius’ perception of the empire and the emperor followed closely the pattern of theory designed by Hellenistic ideologists of the period of Antiquity.

The duties of the king are threefold, military leadership, the dispensation of justice, and the cult of gods. So then he will be able to lead well in arms if he thoroughly understands the art of war; and to dispense justice and to hear out his subjects if he has studied well the nature of

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314 VC caused a controversy among scholars in relation to its authenticity, literary genre and historiographical value. See the summary of discussions in H.A. Drake, In Praise of Constantine, 8-10; A. Cameron, S.G. Hall, Life, 1-9.


justice and law; and to worship the gods in a pious and holy manner if he has reasoned out
[εἰκολογισμένον] the nature of deity and virtue. Accordingly the perfect king must be a good
commander, judge, and priest; for these are fitting and proper to the king's supremacy and
virtue alike. For the task of a pilot is to save [σώζει] the ship, of a charioteer to save the
chariot, of a physician to save those who are ill, while the task of the king and captain is to
save those who are in danger and war. 317

Diotogenes, the author of Pythagorean treatises on Holiness and Kingship, 318 fashions
the relationship between the king and the state after God and the universe. They are
presented in the analogous terms: the king relates to the state in the same way as God
relates to the world; the earthly polis is designed after the unity of the cosmos and the
king is endowed with the autocratic rulership of the state in the same way as there is one
God over the universe. Whilst God is transcendent and rules over the universe, the king
is 'himself Animate Law, and has been metamorphosed into a deity among men'. 319
Further, Pythagorean philosophers developed a concept of μίμησις. The divine realm was
perceived to consist of the first God and the second God (Logos). 320 The king, then, was
a copy and the imitator of the first God and thus performing the task of the mediator
between God and people. 321 The second God (Logos) is the image of the first God and
seems to be 'incarnate in the true King' 322. Thus, there appeared to be an essential
hierarchy of God-Logos-King which functioned in a one-dimensional way, emanating
power and authority from God to the king through the Logos.

Whilst omitting the Hellenistic notions of a king as a deity among men, who is a
dwelling place of Logos, Eusebius, nevertheless, follows broadly the philosophical path
of his Hellenistic predecessors. 323 He elevates 324 Constantine to the place occupied by

317 Goodenough, 'Philosophy', 66.
318 See Diotogenes in OCD, 355. We follow Goodenough's presentation of Diotogenes' views. Cf. also,
Dvornik, Philosophy, I, 248ff. On the wider discussion of the Hellenistic political philosophy, see Dvornik,
Philosophy, 205-77.
319 Goodenough, 'Philosophy', 68.
320 Plutarch introduces Logos terminology into Diotogenes' concept of royalty. See Goodenough,
'Philosophy', 94ff. Wallace-Hadrill, Eusebius, 128, points out that Eusebius' conception of Logos is
depicted in Neo-platonic terms. Markus, Saeculum, 77.
321 Chesnut, Histories, 100.
322 Baynes, 'Eusebius', 170.
323 Eusebius' peculiar perception of the concept of Hellenistic kingship could have been influenced by Philo
who moulded Hellenistic theory according to Hebraic mode of thought, thus making it possible to be used
by a Christian writer such as Eusebius. Cameron, Hall, Life, 193, argue that the Life of Moses by Philo was
the Hellenistic true king within the same hierarchy of power. Eusebius draws an essential parallel between the Logos and Constantine.\textsuperscript{325} He asserts that the Logos ruled eternally, likewise Constantine ‘His friend’ ‘rules on earth for long periods of years’.\textsuperscript{326} Similarly to the Logos who ordered the universe according to the Fathers’ will, Constantine brought his subjects to the ‘Only-Begotten and Saviour Logos’, making ‘them suitable for His kingdom’.\textsuperscript{327} The Logos’ divine ability to conquer the evil power is closely followed by Constantine’s ability to subdue his enemies ‘by the law of combat’\textsuperscript{328} and the comparison which contrasts his military victories with that of his predecessors.\textsuperscript{329} \textit{LC}\textsuperscript{330} presents ‘the royal Word’ acting as the ‘Regent of the Supreme Sovereign’,\textsuperscript{331} filling the earth with his doctrine and modelling the earthly kingdom into ‘a likeness of the one in heaven’.\textsuperscript{332} It seems, then, that Eusebius perceives the theoretical possibility of the equation between the realm and the reign of the Word and the realm and the reign of Roman emperor Constantine.\textsuperscript{333} This becomes possible through the means of the parallel which exists between the two and the function which is exercised by the Logos. By virtue of filling the earth with his teaching and modelling the kingdom on earth according to the heavenly one, the Logos through Constantine creates

\textsuperscript{324} Chesnut, \textit{Histories}, 153, points out that Eusebius comes close to attributing to Constantine Christ-like honours in \textit{HE}, X, 8.1 where his victory over Licinius is depicted as a ‘epiphany’ of Christ. Yet, it must be pointed that elsewhere Constantine’s depiction seems to be a ‘blend’ of a Sun-cult vocabulary (\textit{VC}, I, 43) and the Logos vocabulary of a Hellenistic terminology.

\textsuperscript{325} Drake, \textit{Praise}, 75, points out that although Eusebius established the hierarchy God-Logos-Emperor, in practice he treated Constantine and Logos-Christ as relatively equal co-ordinates. Constantine, in a similar way to Logos, communicates directly with God and receives his Sign and honours directly from the Supreme Sovereign (\textit{LC}, II, 5; III, 1, 5; V, 1; VI, 1-2, 18, 21; VII, 12; VIII, 9; X, 7). He is also given the same title as the Logos ‘prefect [\textsuperscript{327}σαρξος] of the Supreme Sovereign, (\textit{LC}, III, 7, Logos; VII, 13, Constantine). See also on this point J. Straub, ‘Constantine as ΚΟΙΝΟΣ ΕΠΙΣΚΟΠΟΣ: Tradition and Innovation in the Representation of the First Christian Emperor’s Majesty’, \textit{DOP}, 21, (1967), 39-55; Setton, \textit{Attitude}, 47.

\textsuperscript{326} \textit{LC}, II, 1. Constantine is depicted as a semi-divine figure omnipresent in this world in \textit{LC}, II, 1-5; III, 4. However, \textit{LC}, III, 6-8, depicts Logos as omnipresent and ruling the world with the heavenly host.

\textsuperscript{327} \textit{LC}, II, 2.

\textsuperscript{328} Ibid., II, 3.

\textsuperscript{329} \textit{VC}, I, 5, 8.

\textsuperscript{330} The theme of Constantine as a friend of the Logos seems to be one of the main features of \textit{LC}, 2, 1-3; 5, 1-4.

\textsuperscript{331} \textit{LC}, III, 7.

\textsuperscript{332} \textit{LC}, IV, 2.

the universal, earthly kingdom which becomes the ‘similitude’ of the heavenly kingdom. Thus, the possibility arises for the perception of the Roman empire as the Messianic kingdom that is ruled by the Roman emperor, yet inspired and filled with the values of God’s kingdom. On a theological level, the divine Logos and Constantine as the emperor represent ‘two complementary principles of a salvation economy’ which lead humanity towards its final goal. On the ideological level, the Christian ‘Autokrator’ becomes both the ‘heir of the idea of a universal Emperor’ and a representative of universal Christianity. He appears to assume the character of the Pontifex Maximus of his Roman/pagan predecessors, though in a Christian ‘garb’.

Further, Constantine is perceived to be not only the eusebes king of the Hellenistic political theory, but the ‘teacher of eusebeia’ for all nations and a living paradigm of the ‘godliness’ of the Christian monarch. He is ordained by God for the purpose of educating all mankind in laws of chastity and represents the highly elevated example of a philosopher-king and the embodiment of the supreme virtues and piety.

The power which is entrusted to Constantine, in contrast to other emperors, is given in order to ‘purify human life’. Constantine is elevated to the ‘figure of quasi-religious function’ of his predecessors and stands firmly in continuity with the Roman perception of the emperor by his subjects. The qualities φιλάνθρωπia, εὐσέβεια, which among

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334 VC, IV, 49-50. See G. Fowden on the discussion of the universalism of Constantine’s empire, Empire to Commonwealth: Consequences of Monotheism in Late Antiquity, 50-2, 80-99.
335 Kannengiesser, ‘Eusebius’, 454.
337 The persistence of this essentially pagan notion in Byzantium was acknowledged by Russian canonist M.V. Zyzykin. Its christianised version was endorsed in the seventeenth-century Russia at Nikon’s trial by Metropolitan Paisios Ligaridos. Patriarkh Nikon, 65ff.
338 VC, I, 6; cf also LC, IX, 18.
339 VC, I, 5; III, 1.
340 Ibid., I, 3.4.
341 Ibid., III, 58.2.
342 LC, V, 1-2; cf also 4-6, where Constantine is declared to be ‘the only one who is truly free’ and the lord over his human nature, being perfect in all aspects of human life. On the subject of the virtues of Roman emperors since the time of Augustus, see M.P. Charlesworth, ‘The Virtues of a Roman Emperor: Propaganda and the Creation of Belief’, Proceedings of British Academy, (1937), 105-33; R. Storch, ‘The Eusebian Constantine’, CH, 40, (1971), 153ff. C.E.V. Nixon, B.S. Rodgers, In Praise of Later Roman Emperors. The Panegyrici Latini, 21-6.
343 LC, VI, 21.
344 It seems that the accusations of caesaro-papism in the strictest form in relation to Constantine appear to be somewhat misplaced and is being made from the standpoint of the Western theological tradition.
others, were attributed by Greek and Roman philosophers and panegyrists\textsuperscript{345} to their rulers, were adopted by Eusebius in relation to the Christian monarch.\textsuperscript{346}

Yet, on the other hand, Eusebius christianises the Hellenistic concept and presents the distinctive Christian understanding of a Greek scholar.\textsuperscript{347} In his view the hierarchy is represented by the monotheistic God who operates through the Logos-Christ and Constantine, who is the image and a friend of the Logos.\textsuperscript{348} Constantine's image is presented in terms of the ideal emperor and Christian who becomes the mediator between God and men\textsuperscript{349} presiding over the universal Roman empire.\textsuperscript{350} His monarchical rule, according to Eusebius, becomes the 'icon' of God's monarchical rule\textsuperscript{351} and Constantine's conquests of his foes, which resulted in the reign over all the Roman empire, are the direct consequence of a right choice of God.\textsuperscript{352} Constantine is the result disregarding the Eastern theological and cultural milieu of the time as well as the legacy of Roman perception of the emperor and the predominant worldview of the Mediterranean basin. Constantine appears to stand within the Roman imperial tradition which defined the emperor as being the ruler over all aspects of life and being endowed with a strong, centralised authority. The royal court and rituals of Constantine's reign seem to be in conformity and continuity with his Roman imperial predecessors. His perception of the emperor as being sacrosanct and endowed with the supreme authority over all matters of life, including the religious sphere, seems to be the legacy of Roman imperial tradition as well as 'the continuation of the modus vivendi between religion and everyday life traditional up to Constantine's day'. It follows, then, that the assessment of Constantine's reign ought to be made on its own historical grounds bearing in mind the variety of different cultural, philosophical and theological aspects of that period. That can be partially deduced from Eusebius himself, who can be perceived as a typical Roman citizen who highly regards the 'long established good and wise laws of Rome'. \textit{VC}, I, 55.1. See also Parker, \textit{Christianity}, 78, 80-1, Bolotov, \textit{Lektsii}, III, 40-41, 44-52; Zernov, \textit{Christendom}, 23-7; N.H. Baynes, \textit{The Byzantine empire}, 63; Meyendorff, \textit{Unity}, 28, remarks that 'There is no doubt that this Hellenistic, essentially religious understanding of the emperor's role did not disappear overnight, but, on the contrary, was integrated into a new Christian understanding of Roman society'. Similar, Vasyliev, \textit{History}, 61-2; Ostrogorsky, \textit{History}, 30. S. Vryonis, \textit{Byzantium and Europe}, 18-19. Meyendorff, \textit{The Byzantine Legacy in the Orthodox Church}, 15, referring to the notion of 'caesaro-papism' in Byzantine history points out that 'out of 122 Patriarchs of Constantinople elected between 379 and 1451, thirty-six were forced to resign under imperial pressure'. A. Schmemann, \textit{Church, World, Mission}, 34ff., denies the caesaro-papism in Byzantium's history. Pospielovsky, on the other hand, ascribes solely 'the heresy of caesaro-papism' to Eastern Christianity since Constantine, \textit{History}, 2.

\textsuperscript{345} The best example of pagan panegyric elevating emperor's virtues and resembling Eusebius' attributes to Constantine can be a third century oration \textit{On the King}. See Dvornik, \textit{Philosophy}, II, 553-5.

\textsuperscript{346} Baynes, 'Eusebius', 172.

\textsuperscript{347} Bolotov, \textit{Lektsii}, III, 37ff, points out that at the time of Constantine the political gravitation shifted from the Latin West to the Grecian East where Hellenistic culture was predominant.

\textsuperscript{348} \textit{LC}, I, 6; III, 5.

\textsuperscript{349} \textit{LC}, IV, 2, V, 2, 4,5.

\textsuperscript{350} Frend, 'Church', 39-40, argues that as early as the account of Constantine victory over Licinius in 324 Eusebius presents it in old Roman universalistic categories. \textit{HE}, 10, 9.7.

\textsuperscript{351} \textit{VC}, I, 5; \textit{LC}, 1.

\textsuperscript{352} \textit{VC}, II, 5.
of God’s divine appointment\textsuperscript{353} per se\textsuperscript{354} and a chosen ‘instrument’ for the accomplishment of God’s will for the salvation of his people.\textsuperscript{355} Further, Eusebius creates a typological trajectory of Moses’ imagery\textsuperscript{356} and figure,\textsuperscript{357} and his actions and role, and applies them to Constantine perceiving him to be a new type of Moses\textsuperscript{358} who comes as a new deliverer\textsuperscript{359} at the appointed time in history in order to inaugurate the new Christian era. History seems to culminate in the person, the reign of Constantine displaying the signs of triumph and completion.\textsuperscript{360}

Constantine’s reign, then, appears to come close to resembling the eschatological kingdom of Christ on earth in which Constantine is surrounded by bishops.\textsuperscript{361} In a similar way to Christ’s eschatological universal kingdom, the Christian empire of Constantine is depicted in universalist terms and is perceived to last for an indefinite time. The fusion appears to be complete through Eusebius’ ‘practical realisation of the gospel event on the universal scale of the Roman Oikoumene’.\textsuperscript{362}

\begin{itemize}
\item \textsuperscript{353} HE, VIII, 13, 14; IX, 9.1, 8; VC, I, 12, 24; II, 2, 71; III, 1, IV, 14. LC, VIII, 11-12.
\item \textsuperscript{354} Eusebius goes as far as to say that ‘no mortal may boast of having contributed’ to the election of Constantine to the imperial throne. VC, I, 24.
\item \textsuperscript{355} HE, X, 8.19; VC, II, 2.
\item \textsuperscript{356} Cameron, Hall, Life, 37, point out that the imagery of Moses was widely known among pagans, Christians and Jews, thus creating an opportunity for Christian apologists to argue with their opponents on common ground. Eusebius quotes Josephus in PE, VIII, 8 and Philo in PE, VIII, 6-7. On the perception of Moses in pagan literature, see J.G. Gager, Moses in Graeco-Roman Paganism, New York, 1972; A. Droge, Homer or Moses? Early Christian Interpretations of the History of Culture, Tübingen, 1989. Alexander, ‘Strength’, 346, points out that OT’s typological applications of the figures like Moses, Elijah, David or Solomon to Byzantine emperors became a common practice in Byzantine empire.
\item \textsuperscript{358} VC, I, 12.1-2; 20. 2; 38. 2-5; II, 11.2, 12.1-2; 14.1-2. Wallace-Hadrill, Eusebius, 74ff., however, argues that Eusebius’ political perception of Constantine was based upon the broad correspondence between Abraham and Constantine through the notion of universalism, thus presenting Constantine as a second Abraham. This is the depiction of Constantine in one of the latest work Theophany. The other work of a later period such as VC depicts Constantine more as a second Moses, (I, 12.2, 19.1, 38-9; II, 12). It is possible to argue, then, that Eusebius depicted Constantine through the multiplicity of Biblical imagery as it suited him, rather than as a new figure of Moses or Abraham per se, (against Wallace).
\item \textsuperscript{359} VC, I, 12, 20, 38, HE, 9, 2-8. See Dvornik, Philosophy, II, 644, who points out the connection between Philo’s portrayal of Moses and Eusebius’ depiction of Constantine as a new Moses. Rapp, ‘Ideology’, 689-90.
\item \textsuperscript{360} VC, III, 3, also IV, 75, LC, VIII, 9, LC, XI, 3. See also Eusebius, The Life of Constantine, in A.C. McGiffert (trans.), Eusebius: Church History, Life of Constantine the Great, and Oration in Praise of Constantine, I, 1.
\item \textsuperscript{361} VC, III, 15.2.
\item \textsuperscript{362} Kannengiesser, ‘Eusebius’, 453. Cf also N. Zernov, Christendom, 56, points out that the massive conversion in the fourth century was one of the factors which brought about the conflation of the boundaries between Church and the Roman oikoumene.
\end{itemize}
However, Eusebius' harmonious portrayal of the peaceful co-existence of the State and the Church came as a result of his negative perception of the apocalyptic side of Christian teaching. In contrast to other ecclesiastical writers whose perception of the Church and the Roman empire contained some apocalyptic features that excluded the possibility of the equation between the boundaries of the Church and the Roman empire, Eusebius seems to stand on his own. Despite the fact that Eusebius incorporates some of the apocalyptic features into his worldview and the understanding of human history, his perception and method of application as well as the identification of the apocalyptic imagery reveals the influence of contemporary events. He seems to follow the shift of the theological emphasis in the Christianity of his own time. The apocalyptic and eschatological emphasis of Christian teaching with its emphasis upon Christ's \textit{parousia}, that shaped the 'otherworldly' outlook of the earlier Christians, seems to give way to a Roman-friendly perception which sought to re-evaluate the place of the Church within the Roman empire. This perception, in itself, came as a result of Constantine's reforms.

On the one hand, Eusebius feels free to discuss the book of Daniel and apply it to the course of history. Yet, on the other hand, his treatment of the book of \textit{Revelation} seems to be very selective, and reveals the method of convenience. He seems to be uneasy about it and its theological standpoint in \textit{HE}. Yet in later work such as \textit{VC}\textsuperscript{368}

363 Lactantius and Augustine can be given as examples of the contemporary writers on the other side of the spectrum whose theological standpoint betrayed the influence of the apocalyptic literature as well as different theological understanding which shaped their perception of the Roman empire. See Lactantius, \textit{Divine Institutes}, VII, 15-18, 20, 25; Frend, 'Church', 42; Fox, 	extit{Pagans}, 605; Chesnut, 'Eusebius', 696.

364 Chesnut, \textit{Histories}, 160-61, seems to exaggerate the influence of the apocalyptic ideas upon Eusebius and is in danger of imposing his own understanding upon Eusebius' apocalyptic interpretation. It seems that Eusebius appears to be more at ease whilst dealing with the notion of eschatology. \textit{DE}, I, 9. 31ff; III, 3. 106ff; IV, 1, 144bff; VI, 15. 280-81; IX, 15. 453b-c; XV, fragment 5; \textit{LC}, 12. 5; \textit{Theoph.}, IV, 29. However, it is possible also for Eusebius in a theological twist following Hebrew exegetes to perceive the Roman empire in negative terms as the 'kingdom of Gog'. \textit{DE}, VIII, 3, 424b. That interpretation could have been influenced by Tiburtine Sybil. See Alexander, 'Strength', 343-4.

365 Wallace-Hadrill, \textit{Eusebius}, 115, 189, points out that by the time of Eusebius this 'doctrine lost much of the urgency'. See H.G. Meecham, \textit{The Epistle to Diognetus}, IV, 6; V, 4, 9; VI, 8; IX, 1; X, 2,7, as an example of Christian, pre-Eusebian eschatology.


367 \textit{HE}, III, 25; VII, 25. This is also true in relation to other writings of the apocalyptic genre such as \textit{Epistle of Barnabas}. See Barnes' discussion on this subject, \textit{Constantine}, 140. Eusebius' hesitancy towards the books of the apocalyptic genre could have been influenced by his anti-millenarian views and by the fact
the imagery of the New Jerusalem from the book of Revelation is applied to the construction of the Holy Sepulchre, thus revealing the projection of the apocalyptic imagery of this book upon the contemporary historical event as it suited his own understanding of Scripture. It appears, then, that Eusebius's method of interpretation of Scripture and historical events is subject to his own desire to construct a favourable picture of the historical reality and the imperial ideology. It reflects at times the wishful imagination of the author and results in a blend of different notions from Hellenistic and Judaeo-Christian traditions. They are projected onto current historical realities of his day, thus producing a new historiographical, ideological and theological perception of the historical reality.

2.2. Imperial ideology: Further developments

Eusebius' perceptions of the divine monarchy, and of the role and the function of the emperor were further promulgated by other writers in the succeeding generations. Gregory of Nazianzus, referring to Constantius, betrays a Eusebian framework of correlation between the Empire and the Church in which the emperor is elevated above the level of human existence and described in Hellenistic terms.369

For besides all this, thinking as he did on these matters with deeper insight and loftier mind than the common herd, he clearly perceived that the state of the Christians and that of the Romans grew up simultaneously and that Roman supremacy arose with Christ's sojourn upon earth, previous to which it had not reached monarchical perfection...O most divine [theiotate] of emperors and most beloved of Christ. I am driven to expostulate with you as though you were present here and listening to my censure. Yet I know you are far above any censure, since you have been associated with God, inherited heavenly glory, and travelled so far from us as to exchange your basileia for a better one.370

Prudentius depicts the Byzantine Empire in the age of Theodosius I in terms of an integrated society which represents a Christianised Roman empire as a fully achieved

that the authenticity of some books was still in the discussion among Christian writers of his generation. HE, III, 39; VII, 24.3.

368 VC, III, 33.

369 The same can be said of other Cappadocian Fathers, Gregory of Nyssa and St. Basil, John Chrysostom, who whilst generally following the Eusebian conception, nevertheless in a distinctive way define the roles of basileia and the priesthood in terms of the defined boundaries; see DVornik, Philosophy, II, 689-99, 785.

370 Gregory of Nazianzus, Contra Julianum, 37, as found in DVornik, Philosophy, II, 684-5.
reality. His writing manifests the legacy of Roman ideologists and poets who gave the Roman empire its sense of superiority and postulated a belief in Rome’s eternity and universality.

No bounds indeed did he set, no limits of time did he lay down; unending sway he taught, so that the valour of Rome should never grow old nor the glory she had won know age... And shall we then doubt that Rome, dedicated to thee, O Christ, and placed under thy governance, with all her people and her foremost citizens, is now eagerly extending her earthly realm beyond the lofty stars of the great firmament?

His poem Against Symmachus presents all the clichés of Eusebian imperial ideology in which the classical images of Rome’s eternity found in Virgil and other pagan writers are incorporated into his vision of a Christianised Roman empire. This vision brings about the identification of the ‘pax Augusta’ with the ‘pax Christi’ within a wider framework of history in which the progress of the Christian empire takes a centre stage, being based on the providential view of the pax Romana and Rome as the focal point in the world history and used by God for the achievement of His purposes in the world.

The history is seen in terms of progress that is directed by God who gives the military triumph to Rome. Rome is perceived as ‘our purified city’ which already ‘trusts in our Christ’. The reign of Theodosius I has ‘ensured eternal youth and eternal vigour for the city’. This poem manifests the understanding of a person whose thinking is deeply embedded in Roman categories of the perception and progress of history up to his age from a distinctively Roman point of view. The population of the Roman oikoumene

373 CS, 587-90. Cf also, the theme of Rome’s supremacy and eternity in II, 640ff.
374 Frend, Rise, 707.
375 Markus, ‘Historiography’, 346. Cf also Markus, Saeculum, 28-9, on Prudentius’ perception of the reign of Theodosius I.
376 CS, II, 585-640; II, 760ff.
377 CS, I, 1, 290.
378 Ibid., I, 1, 610.
380 CS, I, 506-43.
is defined as ‘the race of Romulus’\textsuperscript{381} whose ‘commonwealth ...thrives in blessedness because righteousness is on the throne’.\textsuperscript{382}

Moreover, the age of Theodosius I brought about even further conflation of Church and State boundaries – the process which began under Constantine and was promulgated on the theoretical level by conservative ecclesiastical writers such as Eusebius. Florovskii points out that co-operation of the State with the Church was intended to produce ‘the unity of the Christian Commonwealth’.\textsuperscript{383} This theoretical as well as real union was built upon Rome’s understanding and self-perception as the ‘politico-ecclesiological institute’ which incorporated Hellenistic and Christian philosophical and theological notions.\textsuperscript{384}

Thus, at this stage one can already detect the emergence of the concept of the ‘nationalisation’ of Christianity. Citizenship and belonging to the Byzantine empire, in Florovskii’s judgement, appear to be identical with and automatically presupposed ‘compulsory’ membership in the Byzantine Church – the mutual integration which became the integrated motto of the successive Orthodox Kingdoms of Byzantium, including Russia. The underlying principle seems to be the integration of the political and ecclesiastical structures into a coherent unified entity which was characterised by the existing cultural, linguistic, religious and ethnic factors, which at the time contained both the universal and local distinctive features of the Roman oikoumene.

The age of Justinian represents the culmination of the Roman-like\textsuperscript{385} Eusebian imperial ideology\textsuperscript{386} that gave a ‘classical expression to the theory of two authorities’ – sacerdotium et imperium - which was to last throughout the existence of the Byzantine empire.\textsuperscript{387} This theory underlined the principles of ‘solidarity’ and unity which governed the relationship between the Church and the State since the period of Constantine.\textsuperscript{388}

\textsuperscript{381} CS, I, 1.5.
\textsuperscript{382} CS, I, 35.
\textsuperscript{383} Florovskii, Dogmat, 265.
\textsuperscript{384} Ibid., 265.
\textsuperscript{385} F. Dvornik, Byzantium and the Roman Primacy, 71-3.
\textsuperscript{386} The age of Justinian is dealt with here as the period which represents a significant development of the imperial ideology in the context of the Church-State relationship. For the more detailed analysis of interim between the age of Constantine and Justinian, see Dvornik, Philosophy, II, 724-815.
\textsuperscript{387} Bolotov, Lektsii, III, 87, cf. also Schmemann, Road, 145. Ostrogorsky, History, 76.
\textsuperscript{388} Bolotov, Lektsii, 88.
Justinian perceived himself 'as the heir to Rome's greatness, extending back not merely to Augustus, but to the kings Romulus and Numa Pompilius and to Aeneas himself' who believed in Roman superiority based on 'arms and laws'. Following traditional Roman universalist self-perception, the Byzantine empire was considered to 'embrace the whole world'. Yet, unlike the Roman conquests under Augustus, whose victories were attributed to the Roman gods and his genius, the military victories and the success of the Roman empire under Justinian were attributed to Christ's providence and His empowering presence which depicted Christ in terms of a divine protector and the warrior of a Christian empire.

In his views upon the divine origin of basileia and the role of the emperor, Justinian combined the Hellenistic notions of kingship and Roman obedience to the law, which came to the forefront of his imperial worldview. The basileia was perceived to be a gift from God. 'As by the will of God we govern an empire which has come to us from His Divine majesty, so we wage wars with success, maintain peace and keep the state prosperous.' The sacerdotium appeared to be another gift from God which was perceived to be on the same level as basileia and exercising the function which contributes towards the welfare of the empire.

There are two great gifts which God, in his love for man, has granted from on high: the priesthood (ερασίτεια) and the imperial dignity (βασιλεία). The first serves divine things, while the latter directs and administers human affairs; both, however, proceed from the same origin and adorn the life of mankind. Hence, nothing should be such a source of care to the emperors as the dignity of the priests, since it is for their (imperial) welfare that they constantly implore God. For, if the priesthood is in every way free from blame and possesses access to God, and if the emperors administer equitably and judiciously the state entrusted to their care, general

389 Frend, Rise, 828, citing Novel 47.
391 P.N. Ure, Justinian and His Age, 248.
392 Ibid., II, 718-19.
393 De conceptione digestorum, pref., in Dvornik, Philosophy, II, 717. Baynes, Byzantium, 272, remarks on this point: 'No matter by what means an Emperor had reached the throne, the idea that his sovereignty was derived directly from God was always preserved'.
harmony (συμφωνία τω ἀγαθῷ) will result and whatever is beneficial will be bestowed upon the human race.\(^{394}\)

Justinian betrays the ideological thinking and beliefs of his Christian predecessors in which the success and the preservation of the empire’s well-being is dependent upon the Roman legislative system and God’s favour. He perceives himself to be the representative of God on earth and ‘after God...the head of the basileia the common father of all’,\(^{395}\) whose legislative decisions are ‘irrevocable’ due to the elevated position of the emperor in which God alone was the source of the law for Justinian alone, who, in turn, is given the power by God to legislate on earth.\(^{396}\) His legislative activity, however, covers all aspects of ecclesiastical life, contradicting his theoretical distinction in relation to the ‘independent’ Church and State, thus revealing the inherent notion of the Pontifex Maximus. In the words of Zyzykin, the State appeared to ‘swallow’ the Church de facto if not de jure.\(^{397}\)

It appears, then, that in his desire to achieve the well-being and the unity of the Empire, Justinian introduced a theological cul-de-sac in his very notion of symphony. In his vision, the Church was losing its distinctive ontological character and the reality of its orientation, namely that by the virtue of manifesting the Kingdom of God, the Church could not be identified ontologically in symphony with the structures of the Byzantine society. This symphony,\(^{398}\) though theoretically recognising a distinction\(^{399}\) between imperium and sacerdotium, rather in a true Roman spirit highlighted ‘the internal cohesion of one single human society’ which was governed on earth by the emperor.\(^{400}\)

\(^{394}\) As found in Meyendorff, Unity, 209. He warns against attaching too much significance to this preamble, which according to him is more of an ‘aspiration’ than anything else. Cf. also the commentary on the text in Dvornik, Philosophy, 815-19; J. Meyendorff, ‘Emperor Justinian, the Empire and the Church’, DOP, 22, (1968), 45-60.

\(^{395}\) Dvornik, Philosophy, II, 718, points out that this was a common belief among Roman and Hellenistic thinkers.

\(^{396}\) Ibid., II, 720. On this point also Vasiliev, History, 142; S. Runciman, Byzantine Civilization, 75.

\(^{397}\) Zyzykin, Patriarkh, 72.

\(^{398}\) Pospielovsky, History, 3, described Justinian’s symphony as the ‘symphony between the secular ruler and the Church hierarchy’.

\(^{399}\) However, elsewhere Justinian does not distinguish greatly between imperium and sacerdotium. ‘The priesthood and the imperium do not differ so very much, nor are sacred things so very different from those of public and common interest’. Dvornik, Philosophy, II, 816.

\(^{400}\) Meyendorff, Byzantine Legacy, 49.
This theoretical conception,\(^401\) then, envisaged the possibility for the ‘absorption’ of the Church by the State. According to Meyendorff ‘in Justinian’s legal thinking there is actually no place at all for the Church as a society *sui generis*.\(^402\) Subsequently, the Church ‘merges’ with the State\(^403\) through the legal framework which brings about the conflation of Church law with the Roman law within the unified legal system of the Byzantine empire.\(^404\) Thus, the identification of Christianity with the Roman empire seems to be complete, resulting in the appearance of ‘Respublica Christiana’ which was to be governed theoretically by the emperor and the Patriarch on the principle of ‘one state, one law, one church’ which was confirmed and further elaborated in the legal compendium of the *Epanagoge* in the ninth century.\(^405\) The relationship between the State and the Church under Justinian manifested the end of the evolution of imperial ideology which came to be fixed within certain boundaries.\(^406\)

### 2.3. Byzantines as the successors of Israel

The transformation of the Roman empire, which took place under Constantine, with a crucial point of setting the city of Constantinople as a new capital of the Roman empire and the subsequent Christianisation of the empire, determined the future developments within the ecclesiastical and administrative spheres. These changes also affected the whole worldview of the *populus Romanus*. Constantine’s choice of founding the capital within the Greek cultural and linguistic domain set a ‘distinctive seal’ upon the whole of the outlook of this city as well as of Christianity in the Eastern part of the Roman

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\(^402\) Meyendorff, *Legacy*, 49.

\(^403\) ‘The Church sank into the civil structure, merged with it to form a Christian State’. Pospielovsky citing Zaizerskii, *History*, 3.

\(^404\) See Schmemann, *Road*, 153, on this point he is followed by Meyendorff, *Byzantine Legacy*, 49.

\(^405\) See Medlin, *Moscow*, 25ff. See the relevant passages of *Titulus*, II, 1-10; III, 1-11, in the *Epanagoge*, in Barker, *Thought*, 89-93, which defines the State and the roles of the emperor and the Patriarch in terms similar to that of man who consists of body and soul. The conception seems to unite the emperor and the Patriarch on the equal basis in the ‘agreement and concord...in all things’, (III, 8). John of Euchaita in the eleventh century declares that ‘both the emperor and Patriarch...are destined for rule by God: both are ‘Christs’ – the anointed of the Lord’. See Baynes, ‘The Byzantine State’, in *Studies*, 52. Nikolin, *Tserkov*, 41-2.

\(^406\) Baynes, *Empire*, 92, pointed out that a bishop during Justinian’s reign ‘gave classical expression to the theory of caesaro-papism in the words “Nothing should happen in the Church against the command and will of the Emperor”.

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empire. Constantinople was to become a Greek city which was firmly ‘set in Greek sphere’ incorporating the thought-world of Antiquity and different aspects of Hellenistic civilization. This heritage increasingly transformed the ‘Latin-pagan outlook’ of the Eastern part of the empire into a ‘Greek-Christian’ outlook in the following centuries having, nevertheless, the continuity with the past which was expressed in the self-definition of Byzantines as Rhomaios. Byzantine self-consciousness was increasingly defined, among other factors, by the Greek language par excellence of the civilized world. The fall of the ‘Old Rome’ in the fifth century accentuated and contributed towards the rise of Constantinople to the forefront of imperial politics and Byzantine’s distinctive perception of its place within the Roman empire as the ‘metropolis of the entire universe’. From a cultural point of view, it also contributed towards a wider divergence between the Western and Eastern parts of the empire in which Greek language and sentiment gained a momentum and increased in significance. Obolensky points out that by the ninth century, when Byzantine...
missionaries embarked on a mission beyond the boundaries of Roman oikoumene, there seemed to exist a distinctively Byzantine sentiment – the awareness that 'they represented not only Christian Church, but the prestige of Byzantine civilization and the power and majesty of the emperor of East Rome'.\textsuperscript{415} This sentiment appeared to include the amalgam of different traditions and beliefs which included Hellenistic and Judaeo-Christian elements which were adapted for the need of the Christian empire and subsequently acquired a distinctive Greek form of perception by the time of Photius. Photius, writing to Armenian catholicos Zechariah, expressed what presumably was a widely held assertion about the superiority of the Greek culture and nation as well as the divine favour upon the Byzantine empire as the successor of Israel.

We see... that the grace of God since the early times was given to Greek land, and the Holy Spirit, beginning with the very first holy teachers, rested preferably upon Greeks... When our Lord fulfilled what was pronounced to our fathers and ascended to the Father, He entrusted the prophetic tradition to the holy apostles and commanded to spread it to the Greek lands and then, with their mediation, to all gentiles as it was written: 'The Mount Zion is in the northern country – the city of the great Tsar, that after Jerusalem became Constantinople, which is the second Jerusalem that was built by David, i.e. the holy Constantine and where what was written is getting fulfilled: 'God is in their midst, he will not be shaken'... As we said earlier, the Jews were the servants of the law until our gospel came; afterwards the Israel was rejected and the Greeks became the servants of the gospel that was given by the Lord to the apostles in order to spread it among Greeks... The Lord has given the kingdom to the Greeks... And as the dominion of Israel lasted until Christ's coming, so we believe in the same way the kingdom won't be taken from us, the Greeks until the second coming of our Lord Jesus Christ.\textsuperscript{416}

Bearing in mind the fact that the time of Photius was historically close to the conversion of Rus', it would be natural to suggest together with Malinin that these ideas were passed and cultivated among the Russian recipients of Greek Orthodoxy.\textsuperscript{417}

Constantine, the contemporary of Photius and the missionary to the Slavs and Arabs, appears to construct a link between Photius' speculation concerning the Greek kingdom

\textsuperscript{415} Obolensky, Commonwealth, 73.
\textsuperscript{416} As found in Malinin, Starets, 416-19.
and nation and Daniel’s portrayal of the messianic kingdom. ‘Our empire is that of Christ, as the prophet said, ‘the God of heaven shall set up a kingdom, which shall never be destroyed; and the kingdom shall not be left to other people, but it shall break in pieces and consume all these kingdoms, and it shall stand for ever’. \(^{418}\) Thus, at the hands of Constantine, the Byzantine empire came to be identified in a peculiar manner with Daniel’s messianic kingdom which was to last forever.\(^{419}\)

Further, the Byzantine national sentiment seems to be expressed in the way in which Byzantines drew the distinction between themselves as a ‘New Israel’ and Rhomaios and other nations who were defined as ‘barbarians’.\(^{420}\) Obolensky asserts that ‘the inherent superiority of Greek over all other languages was axiomatic to most educated Byzantines’.\(^{421}\) This ancient ‘legacy’ was to clash with Christian views on dispensation and manifest itself in a double external and internal policy towards the Slavs within and outside the Byzantine oikoumene in the ninth and subsequent centuries.\(^{422}\) Thus, whilst

\(^{417}\) Whilst Malinin points out that Photius’ writing to Armenian hierarch was not known among Russian ecclesiastical writers, the ideas most probably were. He also supports his argument by the evidence from *Letopis* dating from 912. Starets, 416-20.


\(^{419}\) It seems that the theory of the *translatio imperii* is endorsed by Constantine who explicitly declares the Byzantine empire as the fulfilment of Danielic prophecy (2:31-35,45). Anastos, ‘Theory’, 17-8.

\(^{420}\) Obolensky, Commonwealth, 152, asserts that Byzantines inherited Greek ‘mental attitude’ which associated the concept of ‘barbarian’ with alien tongues being perceived as ‘evil-sounding’ and ‘incomprehensible’. Byzantine characteristic self-perception as well as the Byzantine perception of other nations can be detected in Photius’ writings. See *Homily IV*, 2, *Departure of the Russians*, in which Russians are perceived to be ‘an obscure nation, a nation of no account, a nation ranked among slaves, unknown... a nation dwelling somewhere far from our country, barbarous, nomadic, armed with arrogance, unwatched, unchallenged, leaderless.’ The Byzantines, though deserving to be punished, are nevertheless a New Israel, the society which is modelled upon Israel of old and is protected by the host of saints of whom Mary is the main patron of Constantinople. *Homily III*, 7, IV, 4-5 (the delivery is ascribed to Mary and her robe), 7. See also Baynes, ‘The Supernatural defenders of Constantinople’, in *Studies*, 248-60. Alexander, ‘Strength’, 345ff. On the theme of a divine protection over the Eastern Roman empire among the writers of the fifth century and sixth centuries, see Kaege, *Byzantium*, 190-223.

\(^{421}\) Obolensky, Commonwealth, 152.

\(^{422}\) Byzantine peculiar perception of the significance of Greek language and the double policy towards the Slavs can be detected in the tension which existed surrounding Constantine’s mission to the Slavs. He feared that he might be accused of heresy by translating the Byzantine liturgy into Slavonic. *Vita Constantini*, xiv, 11, as found in Obolensky, Commonwealth, 152. Hussey, *Church*, 100, points out that the Slavs who settled in the Peloponnese were integrated into the Greek population and not encouraged to retain their native tongue. The policy towards the Slavs within the Byzantine territory seems to have been that of Hellenization and a cultural assimilation which was propagated through the medium of Greek language and reflected ‘the superior prestige of Byzantine power and Hellenic culture’, whilst the policy towards the Slavs outside Byzantine territory seems to be that of adaptation to the local language and culture on the part of Byzantines. This double policy is also supported by C. Mango, *Byzantium*, 28, I.
in the Christian dispensation the ethnic distinction between Greek and Gentile is abolished and all ‘languages are equally acceptable in the sight of the Lord’,

423 the Greek legacy, nevertheless, gave Byzantines a sense of the superiority of the ancient civilization which was to rule the world, using Christianity as one of its main ideological ‘pillars’. The medium of the Greek language, as a part of this civilization, became the distinctive mark of Eastern Christianity. It united within itself the legacy of Antiquity and the amalgam of Christian traditions and thought, which through numerous theological controversies in the East as well as its confrontation with the West increasingly turned the Eastern Church into a distinctive Church having Greek features in its form and shape. 424

Yet, the process of a wider christianisation under Constantine and his imperial successors modified Roman notions of Rome’s eternity and universality in the light of Christian revelation. Whilst the pagan notion of Rome’s eternity could not have been accepted wholeheartedly at its face value by Christianity, the perception of a universal ‘New Rome’, nevertheless, was fitted within the Christian understanding of God’s providence, which placed the empire and Christianity at the centre of the historical process. 425 The existence of Constantinople came to be seen as indispensable for the propagation of the gospel and the actual existence of the Roman empire: ‘Constantinople is the eye of the Christian faith and an attack on it endangers the preaching of Christ’s mystery to the ends of the world’. 426 The city of Constantinople enjoyed a divine

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423 Obolensky, Commonwealth, 153.
424 Meyendorff, Unity, 125, remarks that the theological leaders of Eastern empire were Greeks who moulded theological formulas and ideas in the distinctive way of the Hellenistic thought-world.
426 Theodore Syncellus, as found in Alexander, History, 355.
The protectorate – it became a ‘god-protected’ imperial capital. The Byzantine empire appears to resemble the kingdom of Christ or is even perhaps identified with it and is bound to exist for ever, providing it adheres to Christian teaching. Thus Cosmas Indicopleustes (6C) was able to declare:

Therefore the empire of the Romans shares the dignities of the kingdom of Christ the Lord, surpassing all insofar as is possible in this world, remaining undefeated until the end. For he says, ‘It will not be destroyed forever’. And ‘forever’ applies to Christ the Lord and means endless, as Gabriel said to the Virgin: ‘And he will reign over the House of Jacob forever and there will be no end to his kingdom’. Applied to the Roman Empire, as it has risen together with Christ, this means that within time it will not be destroyed. I declare confidently that although hostile barbarians may rise briefly against the Roman Empire to correct us for our sins, yet through the strength of Him who maintains us the empire will remain undefeated – if no one hinders the expansion of Christianity.

Following the traditional Danielic interpretation in relation to the Roman empire as well as extracting the words of Gabriel to the Virgin, Cosmas perceives the essential co-relation between the empire and Christ. They are locked in a union of interdependency and co-existence: ‘this empire is the servant of the dispensation established by Christ, on which account he, who is the Lord of all, preserves it unconquered till the final consummation’.

The political rise of a ‘New Rome’ during the fourth century, which by the end of that century claimed to become equal with the ‘Old Rome’, was followed by development in the ecclesiastical sphere. The emergence of the Patriarchate of Constantinople with its privileges, rank and status among other ancient Patriarchates was justified on political grounds first by the second Ecumenical council of Constantinople (381), and was

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427 It seems that this belief existed throughout the existence of Byzantine empire despite the numerous defeats at the hands of Arabs. See the address of Constantine VII Porphyrogenitus (10C) to his son in Kaegi, Byzantium, 233-4. Cf also, Alexander, ‘Strength’, 342-3, 345.
428 As found in Kaegi, Byzantium, 211, cf also McCrindle, Topography, II, 147ff.
429 McCrindle, Topography, II, 147.
further strengthened by the Ecumenical council of Chalcedon (451). The Patriarch of Constantinople was elevated to second place after the Pope of Rome, above the other ancient ecclesiastical centres of the East.

The fathers rightly granted privileges to the throne of Old Rome, because it was the imperial city. And one hundred and fifty most religious bishops [of Constantinople, 381], actuated by the same considerations, gave equal privileges to the most holy throne of New Rome, justly judging that the city which is honoured with the presence of the emperor and the senate and enjoys equal [civil] privileges with the old imperial Rome should, in ecclesiastical matters also, be magnified as she is and rank next after her.

The perception of a Christian empire since the age of Constantine in which the imperium and sacerdotium co-exist in peaceful co-operation for the benefit of the universal empire and the humankind was further strengthened by Christian theological speculation following Eusebius’ vision and typologically transferred scriptural imagery and titles to the emperor, the capital of the empire and the nation. Whilst the Roman emperor of the Christian empire could still see himself as the heir to Rome’s greatness in terms of Roman political and religious functions, he came increasingly to be perceived more in terms of the successor to the OT royal and prophetic figures such as David, Solomon or Moses. This, in itself, was a part of the wider process of christianisation of the Roman empire in which the city of Constantinople was propelled into the Christian realm of perception of earthly reality. That perception required more emphasis upon establishing

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432 Meyendorff, Unity, 182. Vasiliev, History, 128, points out that it is only in the sixth century that the ecclesiastical ascent of Constantinople was justified on the basis of the apocryphal legend of St. Andrew. See F. Dvornik, The idea of Apostolicity in Byzantium and the Legend of the apostle Andrew, Cambridge, Mass., 1958. Dvornik, ‘The Patriarch Photius in the light of recent research’, 49, in Photian and Byzantine Ecclesiastical Studies, claims that the legend concerning ap. Andrew as a founder of Byzantium appeared only in the eighth century and was not yet officially accepted in Byzantium until the ninth century.

433 Meyendorff, Byzantine Legacy, 17-18, asserts that the ‘primacy of Constantinople was re-asserted against the power of Alexandrian Patriarchate on the basis of the initiative which came from the ‘imperial throne itself’.


435 Alexander, ‘Strength’, 346. Athanasius in reference to Constantius II, who was not yet baptized and was supporting the Arians, calls him ‘very pious’, ‘friend of truth’, ‘a worshipper of God’ in Apologia ad Constantium, 2, 3, 9, 14, and ‘a successor of David and Solomon’ in Apologia, 5, 12, 20, as found in Meyendorff, Unity, 31. Yet, it seems that emperor’s designation as the successor of the OT royal figures depended upon his adherence to Orthodoxy. The same Athanasius refers later to Constantius as ‘godless’, ‘unholy’, ‘Achab’, ‘the Pharaoh’, Unity, 36; the emperor Marcian was hailed by the ecclesiastical council as a ‘new Constantine, a new Paul, a new David, the torchlight of the Orthodox faith’, as found in Medlin,
the essential links with the past by accumulating the 'Staff of Moses, the Throne of Solomon, the Constantinian cross' as the means of connecting the Byzantine dynasties with the Israelite royal tradition, thus giving Constantinople a greater prestige and authority in the Eastern part of the empire – the process which would be repeated within the sixteenth century Muscovite Rus'. 436 The ceremony of crowning the Byzantine emperor Leo I (457-74) by the Patriarch of Constantinople added and strengthened even further the sacred notion of the emperor's figure, thus increasing the authority and position of 'God's elect'. 437

Christianisation, in relation to the city of Constantinople, meant that Christian images of the city in popular imagination and theological interpretation as the centre and the foundation of Christian faith identified the capital as a New Jerusalem. By the time of Photius, the understanding of a 'New Jerusalem' revealed the perception of 'old' Rome as well as a distinctive Byzantine understanding of Constantinople and its relation to Jerusalem: '..bewail Jerusalem with me – not the ancient one, the metropolis of one nation, which grew up from a root with twelve offshoots, but the metropolis of the entire universe'. 438 Whilst Constantinople can be described in Roman categories and compared to Jerusalem as the capital of one nation which has a limited scope and significance, the perception of a 'New Jerusalem' supersedes the former on a more universal scale.

O city reigning over nearly the whole universe, what an uncaptained army, equipped in servile fashion, is sneering at thee as at slave! O city adorned with the spoils of many nations, what a nation has bethought itself of despoiling thee! O thou who hast erected many trophies over enemies in Europe, Asia and Libya, see how a barbarous and lowly hand has thrust its spear against thee, making bold to bear in triumph victory over thee! 439

Alongside with changes in relation to the perception of the Roman emperor and the capital of the Roman empire in Byzantium, a transition occurred in 'ethnic' perception

436 See Alexander, 'Strength' 342-3. M. Whittow, The Making of Orthodox Byzantium, 600-1025, 127, remarks that by the mid-sixth century a massive gathering-in of cults and relics had taken place from all over the empire.
438 Homily III, 3, 90, also III, 1, 84.
439 Ibid., III, 3, 91.
of the \textit{populus Romanus}. It consisted of a theological re-evaluation of Christianity and the nation of Israel, and their place within God's providence in the light of the emerging socio-political formation – the Christian empire.

This transition can be seen as part of a wider process of assimilation in which the Church Fathers were forced to define Christianity apologetically in relation to the historical process. The political changes under Constantine accentuated and strengthened further the notion of Christians as being a distinctive 'race' in relation to Jews and pagans. Constantine's 'conversion' to Christianity, with a subsequent christianisation of the Roman legal code,\textsuperscript{440} put Christianity on an unequal level with either Jews or pagans,\textsuperscript{441} thus marking a shift 'to the advantage of the Christians and the detriment of the Jews'.\textsuperscript{442} That, in turn, influenced the theological perceptions of the Church Fathers and re-enforced their views concerning the place of Christianity and the nation of Israel within God's providence and the historical process. Christians, as a new and a distinctive race from the Jews, who incorporated Jews and Gentiles alike, came to be perceived as the successor of the nation of Israel. The events of the fourth century put a 'seal' upon Christianity as the successor of Israel, namely through the notion of God's election, so that the original notion of Israel as a nation chosen by God was transferred on to a multi-ethnic 'race' of Christians, who became a 'new Israel'.

Christian polemic against Jews was founded upon their interpretation of the Christ-event as well as the historical events of AD70 and AD135. St John Chrysostom's writings represent the theological views of a writer who lived and wrote in the aftermath of the Constantine era, which allowed Christian writers to present their theological views from the standpoint of the victory of Christianity. In the Christian empire as a political entity, where one could simultaneously belong to the Church and the Roman empire, the

\textsuperscript{440} See Meyendorff, \textit{Unity}, 15ff.
\textsuperscript{441} One of the first Constantine's edicts from 315AD onwards forbade conversion to Judaism on the pain of death. This prohibition was repeated by Constantine successors such as Constantius, Gratian and Valentinian. On the legislative texts of Constantine and his successors as well as the development of Christian policy in relation to Jews, see Simon, \textit{Israel}, 125-31, 291ff; J. Parkes, \textit{The Conflict of the Church and the Synagogue}, 153ff.
\textsuperscript{442} W.A. Meeks, R.L. Wilken (eds.), \textit{Jews and Christians in Antioch in the first four centuries of the common era}, 25, who remark, however, that 'harsher measures' against the Jews were not undertaken 'until the turn of the century'.
theological views of the Church Fathers came to play a significant role in the emerging Christian culture and worldview. In addition, the dominant position of Christianity, which received imperial support and was elevated to the forefront of imperial politics, resulted in the appearance of ‘anti-Semitic’ writings which both nullified the election of Jews and elevated Christianity to the rank of a chosen ‘nation’.

Simon points out that the alliance between the State and the Church in the fourth century contributed, in his opinion, towards the rise of anti-Semitism amongst the masses of the Roman empire. Constantine’s conversion to Christianity resulted subsequently in the christianisation of the legislative activity by him and his imperial successors. This legal activity was underpinned by theological views of the Church Fathers and by the Christian worldview at large. John Chrysostom, according to Simon, appears to be the main protagonist of this anti-Semitism. John Chrysostom perceives the total rejection of Israel by God on the historical as well as on a theological level. First, it was completed in the destruction of Jerusalem’s temple as the centre and the symbol of Jewish national and religious life. The historical events, in turn, had theological implications. There followed a transfer of the covenant from the Jews to the Gentiles who were elevated to the forefront of God’s providence: ‘they who were the sons called for adoption have become like dogs; and we, the dogs, are raised to the dignity of sons’. The temple of Jerusalem was replaced by the spiritual temple of Christianity which required a ‘pure sacrifice’ – the Christian Eucharist; the Jewish priesthood was abrogated and supplanted by a Christian priesthood. The place of Jewish worship became ‘a brothel, place of all evil-doing, resort of demons, devil’s citadel, ruin of souls, precipice and abyss of perdition’. The Jewish nation was portrayed as a rebellious

443 Simon, Israel, 131.
444 Simon, Israel, 217ff. However, Simon points out that John Chrysostom represents the most extreme case in this historical period, whose writings reflect the local situation of Antioch. Nevertheless, the Chrysostom-like attitude and method of interpretation of Scripture and history as well as its application to contemporary circumstances in relation to the Jewish nation were widespread among the Christian writers of that and subsequent periods in Byzantine and Russian history. See R.L. Wilken on the historical situation.
445 Homily against the Jews, 1,2; 5, 5.
446 Ibid., 1, 2.
447 Ibid., 7, 4.
448 Ibid., 6, 5.
nation of criminals and sinners ἐθνὸς πολέμωτοιόν⁴⁴⁹ as well as the ‘plague of the
world’,⁴⁵⁰ being socially and religiously dangerous to other nations. The Jewish abuse of
their own privileged position as a chosen nation brought about the moral collapse and
decay of the whole nation, thus degrading them to the level of animals.

The place where you find a harlot is called a brothel; or rather, the synagogue is not only a
brothel and a theatre but a brigands’ cave and a wild beasts’ den’.⁴⁵¹
‘They live only for their belly, their mouths always gaping; they behave no better than pigs or
goats in their gross lasciviousness and excessive gluttony. They only know one thing, namely,
how to gorge themselves and fill themselves up with drink’.⁴⁵² Like well-fed cattle incapable of
work, they are no longer fit for anything but slaughter.⁴⁵³

Jews are accused of ‘expropriation, covetousness, abandoning the poor in their need, and
profiteering’⁴⁵⁴ and one is encouraged to flee from the Jews – to shun them ‘like filth
and like a universal plague’.⁴⁵⁵ Yet to use the term ‘anti-Semitic’, as Simon does, at least
in relation to John Chrysostom, can be accepted only with certain reservations and is
certainly open to criticism. Meeks and Wilken point out that Chrysostom’s aim in his
homilies is ‘the deterrence of Christians from participating in Jewish rites’ rather than
‘an attack on the Jews as such’.⁴⁵⁶ His Homilies against the Jews represent the ‘fusion of
several elements’ of ‘popular anti-Semitism with an anti-Jewish exegetical traditions
from the Christian apologists’,⁴⁵⁷ which are closely intertwined with one another to

⁴⁴⁹ John Chrysostom, Homily against the Jews, 16, as in Simon, Israel, 209. It is echoed by Gregory of
Nyssa: ‘Murderers of the Lord, murderers of prophets, rebels and full of hatred against God, they commit
outrage against the law, resist God’s grace, repudiate the faith of their fathers. They are confederates of the
devil, offspring of vipers, scandal-mongers, slanderers, darkened in mind, leaven of Pharisees, Sanhedrin of
demons, accursed, utterly vile, quick to abuse, enemies of all that is good’. In Christi resurr. Orat., 5.
⁴⁵⁰ Simon, Israel, 211, points out that John Chrysostom utilizes the traditional pagan perception of Jews and
uses it against the Jews in his own polemic. This fact, according to Simon, manifested the takeover of pagan
anti-Semitism, at least in some of its aspects. On the continuity between Christian and pagan anti-Semitism,
202-16.
⁴⁵¹ Homily against Jews, 1. Simon remarks that Jerome comments similarly on Hos. 2:4-7 (Comm. in Os.,
1.2), and regards the synagogue as a harlot in a metaphorical sense. John Chrysostom, unlike Jerome,
perceives the synagogue as the actual place of worship and a place of abomination. Israel, n.76, 473.
⁴⁵² Homily, 1.4, also 1.6. Simon, Israel, 220. Homily, 8.1
⁴⁵³ Homily, 1. 4.
⁴⁵⁴ Homily, 1.7. This stands in sharp contrast to Jerome’s comments that Jews ‘were generous to the poor
and even to the Christian poor’. Jerome, Epistle, 52.
⁴⁵⁵ Homily, 1.
⁴⁵⁶ Meeks, Wilken, Jews, 31. See Homily, 1.5; 2.3; 6.2. All Chrysostom’s references as found in
Simon.
⁴⁵⁷ Ibid., 30. The term anti-Jewish is used by Meeks and Wilken as referring to anti-Judaizing
rather than anti-Semitic meaning.
present the Jewish race in a pejorative manner. It appears, then, that John Chrysostom used the power of rhetorical devices, the existing traditional anti-Jewish elements and the legacy of patristic exegetical traditions of Scripture in order to combat the attraction of Judaism. His polemic revealed his indebtedness to traditional patristic exegesis which perceived Christianity as the replacement of Israel 'according to the flesh' and as such was representative of a general Byzantine self-perception and their at times violent\textsuperscript{458} attitude towards the Jews.\textsuperscript{459} In this, the primary significance was attached to religious rather than ethnic characterization of the Jews. Therefore, the term anti-Judaizing rather than anti-Semitic appears to be more justified in relation to John Chrysostom's writings. Furthermore, the legitimate question arises whether John Chrysostom's anti-Judaizing polemic (religious/biblical), emotionally charged as it was, in the understanding of the popular masses acquired a different meaning and turned into anti-Semitic (ethnic/racist) attitude. Additionally, whether there was a difference in understanding of matters relating to the Jews by theologising Christian thinkers and the interpretation of their ideas with a subsequent application to contemporary life by the Byzantine population at large.\textsuperscript{460}

Nevertheless, John Chrysostom's popularity proved to be influential in ecclesiastical and imperial matters,\textsuperscript{461} contributing towards the formation of a Christian worldview and a theological understanding concerning the nation of Israel during his lifetime and later in Byzantine history and Russian Orthodoxy.\textsuperscript{462}

\subsection*{2.4. Byzantine apocalyptic a servant of the imperial ideology?}

The political changes during and after Constanine era also brought about some changes in relation to the understanding of apocalyptic literature. In contrast to the apocalyptic

\begin{footnotesize}
\begin{enumerate}
\item Simon, Israel, 224ff., points out that Christian polemic against the Jews stimulated anti-Jewish feelings which resulted in the persecution of the Jews.\textsuperscript{458}
\item Later Photius was engaged in anti-Jewish polemics echoing Chrysostom theological arguments against the Jews. See Mango, Homilies, Homily, VIII, 152-55, 158, Homily XVII, 195-99.\textsuperscript{459}
\item This, perhaps, requires a further and separate investigation of these issues.\textsuperscript{460}
\item Simon, Israel, 227-9, asserts that John Chrysostom was 'the moving spirit behind several anti-Jewish laws promulgated by Arcadius'.\textsuperscript{461}
\item That is certainly the case for the Russian attitude towards the Jews which was defined along Chrysostom's understanding, and was influenced by his writings which were translated in due course when Rus' adopted Christianity, and they proved to be popular among the clergy and laity alike.\textsuperscript{462}
\end{enumerate}
\end{footnotesize}

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writers of the pre-Constantine period,\textsuperscript{463} whose writings were historically conditioned by the existing realities, namely the Roman pagan empire \textit{versus} Christianity, the writers of the post-Constantine period had to accommodate the political changes within their theological framework and understanding of the historical process. That included the radical re-evaluation of the Roman empire in relation to the realm of apocalyptic ideas from the standpoint of the victory of Christianity, which turned the empire into an ally of the Christian Church. That, in turn, implied a change in the theological perception of the nature of the empire: instead of perceiving the empire as a demonically inspired entity, its origin and nature came to be seen as of God and within God’s providence.

The writings of Aphraates (270-345) represent the change in the perceptions which were taking place under the influence of the Constantine era. He utilised biblical material as well as the traditional scheme of the \textit{translatio imperii} in such a way as to fit and to reveal the meaning of the apocalyptic imagery of the book of Daniel in the light of historical circumstances. Writing from the Syrian frontier and on the verge of an outbreak of war between Persia and the Roman empire Aphraates expressed his views in \textit{Demonstrations of Wars}.\textsuperscript{464} The empires of Danielic prophecy were perceived to be as Media, Persia and Macedonia which are followed by the fourth kingdom/beast of ‘the children of Shem’ and the ‘children of Esau’\textsuperscript{465} - the Roman empire. Whilst the fourth kingdom was understood to be that of Roman empire, its duration was vaguely defined to last until the coming of the Son of Man who is to set up the ‘Kingdom of King Messiah’.\textsuperscript{466}

Further, alongside his discussion of the identity of the Danielic empires, Aphraates introduced the themes of the rejection of Israel\textsuperscript{467} and the emergence of the eternal kingdom. The ‘holy People’, who were perceived to be the Gentiles, replaced ‘the People’ – the Jews, - and inherited the eternal kingdom which is already in its existence.

\textsuperscript{463} See chapter I, section 1.6.2.
\textsuperscript{464} W.S. McCullough, \textit{A short history of Syriac Christianity to the rise of Islam}, 116.
\textsuperscript{465} \textit{Demonstrations}, V, 10.
\textsuperscript{466} Ibid., V, 14. Aphraates seems to be uncertain as to the duration of the fourth kingdom: - sometimes it is perceived to last ‘for ever’ (V, 10), but it also is meant to exist only until Christ’s ‘second Advent’ (V, 10; 14).
This notion was strengthened even further by the introduction of the concept of 'kingship', which was presented within the analogy of 'the sons of Jacob' and 'the sons of Esau' on two levels. On a literal level, Aphraates contrasted Jacob with Esau; authority and kingship were given to the sons of Jacob who subdued 'the children of Esau' - 'Thou shalt serve Jacob thy brother'. Later, Aphraates operated on a metaphorical level: the children of Jacob represented Jews and the children of Esau represented the Gentiles/Romans. And when again they did not prosper in the Kingdom, He took it away from the children of Jacob and gave it to the children of Esau until He should come Whose it is. The Romans were perceived to be the trustees of the kingdom which was entrusted to them by Christ and they were to keep this kingdom 'for its giver'. The kingdom itself, by virtue of belonging and originating in Christ, enjoyed a divine protection and will enjoy a certain stability:

Therefore this Kingdom of the children of Esau shall not be delivered up into the hand of the hosts that are gathered together, that desire to go up against it; because the Kingdom is being kept safe for its Giver, and He Himself will preserve it. And as to this that I wrote to thee, beloved, that the Kingdom of the children of Esau is being kept safe for its Giver, doubt not about it, that that Kingdom will not be conquered.

This interpretation, then, betrays a mixture of different elements in relation to the apocalyptic scheme of Daniel. Aphraates makes a fusion of the apocalyptic elements from Danielic prophecy with certain ideas of his day concerning the empire and its divine protection, and applies them to his historical circumstances. The Christian Roman empire is divinely protected and as such will not be conquered by Persia.

It appears that Aphraates' interpretation represents the 'blend' of Eusebian imperial ideology which is based upon the 'conservative' perception of the empire, mixed with apocalyptic elements of Danielic prophecy. In a pro-Eusebian way, he declares that the Roman empire emerged at the time of Christ's ministry: 'And furthermore at His coming

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468 Demonstrations, V, 24.
469 Gen 27:40
470 Demonstrations, V, 24.
471 Demonstrations, V, 22, 23, 24.
472 Ibid., V, 24.
He handed over the kingdom to the Romans, as the children of Esau are called. And these children of Esau will keep the kingdom for its giver.474 Aphraates’ method of scriptural fusion of different passages from the OT constructing a favourable meaning shows his indebtedness to the methodology of earlier Church Fathers. Yet, Aphraates seems to go further than earlier Church Fathers in his perception of the Roman empire as the trustee of Christ’s kingship. In his hands the Roman empire acquires a distinctively ‘sacrosanct’ sense.

We would like to suggest that Aphraates’ apocalyptic perception is influenced by the developments of the fourth century – namely the conversion of Constantine and the subsequent christianisation of the Roman empire. He comes across as a pro-Roman thinker who is aware of the changes in the Roman empire since Constantine. The depiction of Christ is also described in such a way as to highlight a positive Roman image and involvement. Christ is seen as one of the inhabitants of the Roman empire by virtue of being ‘enrolled amongst them’ by the poll-tax.

Thus, Aphraates’ apocalyptic ideas seem to be somewhat peculiar to his age. They manifest the perception of a man who lives in a historical period - the ‘time of the Evil One’,475 which would witness the end of the world after six thousand years.476 The perception of Constantine’s changes seem to affect his theological views, forcing him to re-interpret the traditional interpretation of the Danielic scheme within a Eusebian ideological framework.477 Whilst, on the one hand, he seems to have a resemblance to Hippolytus’ commentary on Daniel,478 on the other hand, Aphraates introduces a very different understanding of the Roman empire from that of Hippolytus. Aphraates,

473 However, at the end Of Wars, V, 25, Aphraates seems to be less sure about Roman victory.
474 Ibid., V, 22.
475 Ibid., V, 2.
477 Despite the fact that Aphraates didn’t know Greek and was ‘oblivious’ to the theological problems of the Greek church in his time, he seems to be familiar with the writings of Greek-speaking writers. His perception of the Roman empire seems to resemble the understanding of Eusebius and others who actually lived within Roman territory. See Meyendorff, Unity, 98. McCullough, History, 114ff.
478 The resemblance seems to be on the points of reference by Hippolytus and Aphraates to the census in Luke 2:1-2 and to the ‘sign’ which conquers death. Aphraates’ exegesis of the allegories seems to be following also Hippolytus’ tradition of interpretation. See R. Murray, Symbols of Church and Kingdom, 242.
contrary to Hippolytus and the apocalyptic tradition, perceives the earthly kingdom not in direct opposition to God or Christ, but as being 'conferred' by God for the benefit of humanity. Thus, the Roman empire, according to Aphraates, acquires a positive role and falls within the apocalyptic scenario of world history. It becomes the beneficiary of Christ’s kingship, which is entrusted to the Romans until Christ’s Second Coming. The conflation of the two kingdoms seems to be complete: Christ’s eternal kingdom seems to be in the possession of the Byzantine empire which acts as the instrument of God’s providence. Aphraates’ apocalyptic seems to resemble more that of the imperial ideology of Eusebius’ than it does Hippolytus’ apocalyptic vision.

Ephrem of Syrus (306-73), whose writings proved to be influential among Russians, presents a similar outlook to that of Aphraates. His writings point in the same direction, namely that he adapts the ideas prevalent of his time and fuses them with the apocalyptic ideas of the earlier Church Fathers. He seems to conform to Eusebius’ understanding concerning the Roman empire. Ephrem is seen as ‘the champion of the Christians against the heathen Persian army’. The apocalyptic scheme of Daniel is fitted within his understanding of history. ‘Slovo Efrema Sirina i Isidora Sevil’skogo o poslednem vremeni, ob antikhriste i kontse mira’ (The word of Ephrem of Syrus and

479 Frend, ‘Church’, 48, points out that ‘in theory there is a ‘them and us’ situation, the Romans being ‘the sons of Esau’, while the Christians were ‘the sons of Jacob’. In practice, however, unity is complete.

480 Murray, Symbols, 242-3, points out that Aphraates uses the term ‘kingdom’ – malkütä – including both: - secular sovereignty and the eschatological reign of Christ. The kingdom of Christ seems to be used in the eschatological sense. Demonstrations, V, 23.

481 Whilst it can be assumed that Ephrem ‘probably knew no Greek’ in the same way as Aphraates, he, nevertheless, seem to express some theological ideas and perceptions close to that of Eusebius and other Greek-speaking Church Fathers. It seems that Ephrem could have come across some of the Eusebius’ writings in Edessa, where he moved after 363, familiarising himself with the scheme of translatio imperii from Diodore of Tarsus and Theodore of Mopsuestia whose writings were translated into Syriac. See, Meyendorff, Unity, 98; Murray, Symbols, 31. Photius, Bibliotheca, 218b, 223, N.G. Wilson (trans.), Duckworth, 1994.

482 As found in Murray, Symbols, 245.

483 Murray asserts that Ephrem regards the Christian empire as a ‘reality’ which is ruled by Christian monarchs whom Ephrem ‘idealises... beyond recognition’, Symbols, 244-5.

Isidore of Seville about the end of the world, the end time and the Antichrist represents a blend of traditional interpretation of the Danielic scheme of translatio imperii with the ideas of the imperial ideology. Thus, the Roman empire receives a positive role and function according to the traditional interpretation of Daniel, yet it is further re-enforced by the changes of the fourth century.

The Tiburtine Sibyl is characteristic of the apocalyptic genre which represents the fusion of different ideas and traditions which were the outcome of the Constantine and post-Constantine era. Christianity adopted for its aims the Jewish prophetic utterances, the Sibyllines and fused them with their own notions of the ‘Saviour-King’, which in the fourth century came to be attached to Constantine and his successors. McGinn points out that the Tiburtine Sibyl represents the new attempt to ‘tie the events of the Christian empire to a new version of apocalyptic vision' within ‘the context of the christianisation of the imperial office’. The central point seems to be the mythological figure of the Last World Emperor who arises before the time of coming of the Antichrist. This mythological figure assumes the character and the name of ‘a king of the Greeks whose name is Constans’. The reign of this king manifests the triumphant and forceful spread of Christianity, defeating paganism and Judaism on a universal scale. The end of his reign is followed by the complete conversion of Israel to Christianity. Meanwhile, this time also reveals the coming of the Antichrist. He subverts the nations

485 Kirillov, Rim, 6, does not appear to distinguish between the different authors of this sermon, nor between the different dates of its composition. B. McGinn, Visions of the End, 60, points out that the ‘Sermon on the End of the World’ is ascribed to Isidore of Seville dating from the ninth century, and the same sermon ascribed to Ephrem from the eighth century. This sermon seems to incorporate the material from the fourth century, yet probably was composed in the sixth-seventh century. See V. Istrin, Otkrovenie Mefodii Patarskogo i apokrificheskie videniia Daniila, 11-13.
486 Kirillov, Rim, 6.
488 It must be admitted, however, that Christians adopted Jewish prophetic utterances and ideas with some modifications: - ‘instead of applying, as it had done at the beginning, to the future of the Jewish nation alone, its meaning was extended to embrace all men and, particularly, the Christians’. Mango, Byzantium, 203.
489 See N. Cohn, The Pursuit of the Millenium, 30-1.
490 McGinn, Visions, 43.
491 McGinn, Visions, 45. On the historical background of Tiburtine Sibyl, see Cohn, Pursuit, 31ff
492 McGinn, Visions, 44-5, points out that the myth of the Last Emperor as an apocalyptic figure underwent a gradual process of the development in the East and West originating possibly in the historical events of the fourth century. Cf. also Alexander, ‘Strength’, 343.
493 The Latin Tiburtine Sibyl, as found in McGinn, Visions, 49.
of the North and instigates them to wage a war against the king of the Romans who defeats them in the final battle. The victory is followed by the event in Jerusalem in which the Roman emperor surrenders\textsuperscript{494} ‘the empire of the Christians to God the Father and to Jesus Christ his Son’.\textsuperscript{495} The end of the reign of the Last Emperor signifies the end of the Roman empire and the temporary period of the reign of the Antichrist in Jerusalem.

It appears, then, that \textit{Tiburtine Sibyl} represents a Christian apocalyptic scenario from a particular historical point of view. In a way similar to Aphraates, it represents a traditional patristic notion of Christ’s kingdom being entrusted to the Romans, as based on the interpretation of Daniel’s prophecy as well as on some passages from the NT. However, it tends to go further than the patristic interpretation of Daniel, in that it puts a greater emphasis upon the Roman empire and the figure of the emperor, which are given a greater role within the divine plan of history. The Roman empire, which is ‘converted’ to Christianity, is seen at the centre of the world’s history and made to fit into the apocalyptic scheme. The apocalyptic emperor assumes the distinctive Greek character of the Eastern Roman emperor. Thus, \textit{Tiburtine Sybil} reflects the particularity of the historical circumstances and the influence of the imperial ideology which were fused in such a way as to give a favourable interpretation of world history on a universal scale from the Christian point of view of the post-Constantine era.

Furthermore, the writings of the apocalyptic genre of the seventh century reflected similar concerns. The similar motif\textsuperscript{496} of the Last World Emperor appears in the famous writings\textsuperscript{497} attributed to \textit{Pseudo-Methodius},\textsuperscript{498} writings which came to play a significant

\textsuperscript{494} Alexander, ‘Strength’, 344, asserts that the motif of the surrender of the royal rule by the last emperor derived from pagan Roman oracles which were incorporated into Christian prophecy and the imperial ideology. G.J. Reinink, however, traces this motif to the apostle Paul himself in I Cor. 15:24. See ‘Ps.-Methodius: A concept of History in response to the rise of Islam’, in A. Cameron, L.I. Conrad (eds.), The Byzantine and Early Islamic Near East, 154.

\textsuperscript{495} \textit{Sibyl}, in Visions, 50.

\textsuperscript{496} It must be pointed out that the work of \textit{Pseudo-Methodius} is not the exact copy of \textit{Tiburtine Sibyl}. On the differences between them, see Alexander, ‘Strength’, 344ff.

\textsuperscript{497} McGinn, \textit{Visions}, 70, points out that the writings of \textit{Pseudo-Methodius} were the most famous apocalyptic texts after the book of Daniel and the Revelation of John. Cf. also Reinink, ‘Concept’, 155, for the extensive bibliography.

\textsuperscript{498} On the date, historical background and the authorship of this work, see ‘Byzantium and the migration of literary works and motifs’, 54ff, and ‘Medieval apocalypses as historical sources’, 1005ff., in Alexander,
role throughout the Byzantine period and beyond in countries such as Russia. The *Apocalypse* reflected the particularity of the historical circumstances of the crisis of the Byzantine Christians who lived at the time of conquest by the Arabs. It depicts a sketch of a world history from the period of Creation to the period of these conquests. Therefore, it speaks of the period of author's own time. The author constructs his own prophetic vision of events by making a fusion of different elements, by adapting a particular interpretation of Ps 67:32 (Septuagint) and re-interpreting it in the light of contemporary history. Thus Ethiopia, which 'will stretch its hand to God', the original country of this Psalm, assumes all the characteristics of contemporary Byzantium. Byzantium becomes the country which is identified with Daniel's fourth kingdom and the force which restrains the coming of the Antichrist. It plays a major role in God's providence and endures until the end of the world. The re-interpretation of the NT passages such as II Thess. 2:1-8 and I Cor. 15:24 is introduced in order to strengthen the belief that the Byzantine empire will last until the Second Coming of Christ. The author also envisages the dynastic connections between Ethiopia and Byzantium: the rulers of Byzantium appear to have descended from the Ethiopian 'Tsar' Fol. The new 'Tsar' - the Greek-Roman emperor - assumes the paramount role of the Last World Emperor in the apocalyptic scenario of the end of the world. He is the one who conquers the enemies of the Christian Kingdom before the coming of the Antichrist and establishes the final world dominion of the Christian empire, only to surrender it later in Jerusalem to God the Father.

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We would like to suggest that the Revelation of Pseudo-Methodius betrays the ideological framework of Byzantine imperial thinking. The role of the emperor within the apocalyptic scenario conforms to the Eusebian-like understanding of the place and role of the emperor in the Byzantine worldview. He is perceived to be God's vice-regent on earth as well as the protector of the Church. Power is given to the Roman emperor by God's 'divine mandate' and as such it is handed over to God at the end of the human history. The difference between the Eusebian and Pseudo-Methodius' depictions of the emperor's role and his imperial power seems to lie in the Pseudo-Methodius' innovative use of imperial ideology within the Christian apocalyptic scenario of world history which was the outcome of the theological speculations surrounding the Danielic schema of the translatio imperii. The imperial ideology seems to influence the overall outlook of his prophecy and determine the outcome of his vision.

The Life of St Andrew the Fool is another piece of literature of legendary character, which is pre-occupied with the speculative themes of the end of the world which includes eschatological and apocalyptic elements. This work manifests a mixture of all of the Byzantine elements from the realm of theological and apocalyptic speculations combined with imperial self-perceptions. Whilst the Life of St Andrew the Fool has some common features with the work of Pseudo-Methodius, namely in reflecting similar historical circumstances and the pre-occupation with the theme of the end-times, unlike the Revelation of Pseudo-Methodius, which is pre-occupied with the future of the Roman empire, it is focused mainly on the city of Constantinople. This text puts a greater emphasis on and gives a paramount significance to the city of Constantinople - the New Jerusalem. It is entrusted to the 'Mother of God', so that it is Mary's

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504 McGinn, Visions, 66, asserts that traditional apocalyptic themes were used by Byzantines more in 'defence of the imperial office and the Byzantine state than in its condemnation'.

505 See Reinink, 'Concept', 175-6, who asserts that Pseudo-Methodius' depiction of the Last World Emperor 'represents the figure of the idealized Christian emperor in conformity with the image of Constantine, Constantius, and especially Jovian, as known from tradition'.


507 Malim, Starets, 411, suggests a link between the two compositions, especially regarding the role of Constantinople.
protection rather than the fact that the kingdom is entrusted to the Romans until the end, that becomes the guarantee for the survival and the prosperity of Constantinople and the whole of the Byzantine empire.

Tell me, please, how will the end of this world come about? By what sign will men know that the consummation is at hand? How will this city, the New Jerusalem, pass away, and what will happen to the holy churches that are here, to the crosses and the venerable icons, the books and the relics of the saints? ... Concerning our city you should know that until the end of time it shall not fear any enemy. No one shall capture it – far from it. For it has been entrusted to the Mother of God and no one shall snatch it away from her hands.

Further, there also re-appears the motif of the Last Emperor who is raised by God in order to combat the enemies of Christians. This emperor is raised by the Lord ‘in the last days’ for the purpose of fighting against the ‘sons of Hagar’ [the Arabs]. His victory over them as well as the persecutions of the Jews result in the age of peace and prosperity for the Christian inhabitants of the ‘City of the Lord’ which is cleansed of Jews and Arabs alike.

However, contrary to the Revelation of Pseudo-Methodius, who depicts the Last Emperor as the one whose reign will precede the coming of the Antichrist and will complete the existence of the Roman empire, the Life of St Andrew the Fool introduces a sequence of five emperors and events which lead to the appearance of the Antichrist and ultimately the second coming of Christ.

Thus, it appears that The Life of St Andrew the Fool betrays essentially the same outlook as other apocalyptic writings which were written in the aftermath of the Arab

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508 See Rydén, ‘Apocalypse’, 227-9, on the theme of the protection of Constantinople by the Mother of God. The evidence seems to point in the appearance of this belief in the seventh century after the Avars’ siege.
511 Ibid., 853B, 215.
513 For the detailed comparison, differences and similarities between the Revelation of Pseudo-Methodius and The Life of St Andrew the Fool, see Rydén, ‘Apocalypse’, 226ff.
invasions. It portrays the Byzantine emperor and the empire with its capital as God-protected and chosen to play a major role in the apocalyptic scenario of humankind. In its literary composition this work represents a compilation of different elements, whether they are taken from the traditional interpretation of Daniel’s prophecy, other OT and NT passages, or from the realm of the imperial ideology. They are fused and juxtaposed with one another in such a way as to provide a favourable outcome and relief for Christians living at that time of crisis.

Whittow, Making, 138, 165, asserts that this work was written in order to provide a favourable outcome in view of Arab conquests in the seventh century.
Chapter III
Muscovite Rus'

3.1. Russian Christianity: Kievan Rus'

The controversial age of Photius was also the age of Byzantine missionary expansion. In a true Byzantine sense this expansion involved a mixture of politico-religious aims according to the Byzantine concept of the Christian oikoumene. The early Russian attacks on Constantinople forced the Byzantines to apply the double effort of state diplomacy combined with missionary activity in order to 'subdue' the barbarian threat to Byzantium from the north. This policy was further promulgated by sending the first bishop to Kievan Rus' in 867.

However, the real turning point for the advance of Christianity in Kievan Rus' began with the conversion of princess Ol'ga who visited Constantinople in 957 and was subsequently baptised. Although, in a way similar to that of Bulgaria in its early stage, Kievan Christianity seemed to have been unsure about its loyalty to a particular 'mode' of Christianity, its choice came to rest with Byzantine Christianity by the time of Vladimir, Ol'ga's grandson. His conversion and baptism marked the decisive advance of Christianity in Kievan Rus'. Vladimir's conversion accorded both with Byzantine external policies in relation to the Slavic nations and Vladimir's own political aims. On the side of the Byzantine politico-ecclesiastical alliance that involved the imposition of baptism upon Vladimir and allowed him to marry a Byzantine royal bride

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515 Hussey, Church, 93.
516 Photius, Homily IV, 2, Departure of the Russians.
517 Hussey, Church, 101. Meyendorff, Rise, 4.
519 See Russian Primary Chronicle, 96ff. E. Golubinski, Istoriia Russkoi Tserkvi, 1, I, 105, regards this story as a later interpolation into the Chronicle. Similar A.P. Vlasto, The Entry of the Slavs into Christendom, 257.
520 G.G. Litavrin, A.P. Kazhdan, Z.V. Udal'tsova, 'Otnosheniia Drevnei Rusi i Vizantii v XI - pervoi polovine XIII v., in J.M. Hussey, D. Obolensky, S. Runciman (eds.), Proceedings of the XIIth International Congress of Byzantine Studies, 70. Cf. also M.V. Levchenko, Ocherki po istorii russko-vizantiumskikh otnoshenii, 353ff., Dvornik, Slavs, 204ff. For the 'First Conversion of Russia' during the course of the ninth century before Vladimir, see Vlasto, Entry, 244ff. For Vladimir's conversion, see Kartashev, Ocherki, I, 105ff.
521 W. van den Bercken, Holy Russia and Christian Europe, 38-41.
as a way of entering the Christian oikoumene. For Vladimir, in turn, the marriage with the Byzantine royal court, even by force, ‘meant the entrance into a higher civilization and receiving of the title of βασιλεύς through the subordinate association with the legitimate emperor’.\(^{522}\) This move, in turn, predetermined the cultural and historical development of Rus’ according to Byzantine politico-ecclesiastical structures\(^{523}\) and political theory.\(^{524}\) Kievan Rus’, according to the Byzantine worldview and ideology, entered into the ‘ideological jurisdiction’ of the universal empire of the New Rome.\(^{525}\)

The ecclesiastical arrangement followed political deliberations and was to imitate the Eastern principle of accommodation, in which the ecclesiastical structures were to mirror political developments in the history of Kievan as well as Muscovite Rus’. Thus, whilst Kiev was the capital of the Kievan Rus’, the ecclesiastical centre of Rus’ co-existed in close proximity to the royal court. The destruction of Kiev as a political centre by the Mongols and the shift of the political centre of gravity to the North resulted in the transfer of the ecclesiastical centre of Rus’ to Vladimir as a new political centre in 1300.\(^{526}\)

Further, the ecclesiastical policy of Byzantium towards Russian Christianity in the Kievan period followed the established tradition of the Byzantine oikoumene. The Metropolitan of Kiev was appointed by Constantinople\(^{527}\) and was expected to profess

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\(^{523}\) One has to be careful, however, not to ‘construct’ the pro-Byzantine model of politico-ecclesiastical alliance of Kievan Rus’ after Byzantium. It had its own developed structures of administration which had distinctive features of Slav administration characteristic of Kievan Rus’. See Vernadsky, *Kievan Russia*, 173ff. F. Dvornik, ‘Byzantium, Muscovite Autocracy and the Church’, in E.L.B. Fry, A.H. Armstrong (eds.), *Rediscovering Eastern Christendom*, 106-7.


\(^{525}\) See Kartashev, *Ocherki*, I, 158-9. Kartashev points to the treatment of Russian princes by Byzantine royal court throughout the twelfth-thirteenth centuries, which defined them only in terms of τραπεζιών ἐφημερίων.


\(^{527}\) A. Preobrazhensky, *The Russian Orthodox Church 10th to 20th Centuries*, 29, however, suggests the expression of the independent ecclesiastical election of Metropolitan Iliarion by Russian prince and a council of bishops in Kiev.
loyalty to the mother Church in Constantinople as well as to the Byzantine emperor. The ecclesiastical authorities were expected to be the ‘channels’ of Byzantine imperial ideology and a worldview, being led by the Metropolitans, who in the early stages of Kievan Rus’ were predominantly Greek. However, in the later period of Kievan Rus’, after the Mongol conquests, there seemed to be a change in the Byzantine ecclesiastical policy which resulted in the alternation of the Metropolitan of Kiev between Greek and Russian.

Additionally, the superiority of Byzantine civilization, which was reflected in the realm of the imperial and ecclesiastical structures, culture, language and theology, at the time of Russian entry into the Byzantine oikoumene, presupposed a degree of Russian dependency upon Byzantium. This inadequacy in the relationship between Kievan Rus’ and Byzantium defined Russians as the disciples of Greeks.

Meyendorff points to the peculiarity of Russian Christianity which was expressed in its ritualism and desire to preserve ‘the very letter of tradition received ‘from Greeks’. This preservation must have been expressed in the general adherence to Orthodoxy as the certain and the only authentic ‘mode’ of Christianity in its Greek form. Bearing in mind the existence of such a particular outlook of Russian Christianity right from its beginning, it seems that its historical choice in following the particular Eastern ‘mode’ of Christianity of Byzantium predetermined its future outlook and attitude towards the Western Church. It seems plausible to suggest that Russian Christianity inherited some of the features of Greek Christianity, namely its anti-Latin outlook, which has been passed on to Russians in the period following Photius ‘schism’.

528 Meyendorff, Rise, 17.
529 On the variety of opinions on this point, see Runciman, Schism, 70. Cf. Dvornik, Slavs, 212. Meyendorff, Rise, 19, 88-9. Pospelovskii, Tserkov’, 42. Obolensky, relying upon Nicephorus Gregoras’ Iστορία Ρωμανῆς, proposes the system of the alternation as a historical reality from the thirteenth century onwards as a necessary concession given by Byzantines to the Slavic nations; see his ‘Byzantium, Kiev and Moscow: A study in ecclesiastical relations’, in Byzantium and the Slavs: collected studies, VI, 25ff., 76ff. G. Vernadsky, Kievan Russia, 152. Golubinski, Istoriia, II, 11, goes as far as to say that there were no Russian Metropolitans in the pre-Mongolian period.
531 Meyendorff, Rise, 25.
Whilst Meyendorff admits the fact that Kievan Church was the disciple of Constantinople in a true sense, following Constantinople 'in every respect' in relation to the Church of Rome, he tends to perceive the anti-Latin stand of the Kievan Church as a later development of the eleventh and twelfth centuries.\(^{532}\) Such an understanding, however, seems to ignore the legacy of the clashes between Rome and Constantinople and the antagonism which existed by now on both sides in relation to one another. Meyendorff's assertion that the *Primary Chronicle* reflects the 'polemics between Greeks and Latins... characteristic of the eleventh century' is not entirely satisfactory and seems to be one-sided.\(^{533}\) Whilst it is possible to agree with Meyendorff that 'there is no evidence...that the Greek clergy promoted in Russia a particularly anti-Latin spirit',\(^ {534}\) it is plausible, nevertheless, to suggest that Russians were aware of conflict between Greeks and Latins in the post-Photian period. They 'inherited' the anti-Latin spirit as part of Byzantium's authentic 'mode' of Christianity, being expressed through the imperial and ecclesiastical ideology via the medium of translated literature in the post-Vladimir's period. The Greek clergy, who occupied the highest hierarchical posts in Kievan Rus', passed on to Rus' the Eastern understanding of the papacy and its dogmatic failures.\(^{535}\) It becomes obvious from reading *Kievo-Pecherskii Paterik* that an anti-Latin orientation was already firmly 'entrenched' within the Russian Christian mentality by the time of Feodosii Pecherskii (1062-1074).\(^{536}\) Building upon the Byzantine literary heritage and its own historical encounters with the West, Russian anti-Latinism was later furthered by Latin crusades against Byzantium, and the council of Florence. This logical deduction can be supported by the fact that already by the tenth century, – the period of adoption of Byzantine Christianity in Russia, there was an extensive literature translated and available in Slavic. It was either brought from

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533 Ibid., 27.
Bulgaria from the Cyrillo-Methodian mission or translated in Kiev under Vladimir and his son Yaroslav.\textsuperscript{537} This became even more pronounced in the aftermath of the ‘schism’ in 1053, with the appearance of Russian writings which condemned Latin Christianity.

### 3.2. The development of the mystical/spiritual authority of the Third Rome

#### 3.2.1. The rise of the Muscovite kingdom

The Russian scholar Sinitsyna, in her book *Tretii Rim* (Third Rome) explored the sources and the evolution of the concept ‘Moscow – the Third Rome’ as it was explicitly pronounced by the monk Filofei in the sixteenth century. Having presented the history of research on this concept, she explored the existent polarity of opinions persistent among the authors of the nineteenth and twentieth centuries in their attempts to evaluate this idea and define its actual meaning.\textsuperscript{538} The whole book is directed towards the exploration of the origins of this concept, its original meaning, historical context and the transformations\textsuperscript{539} which the concept of ‘Third Rome’ underwent since its appearance. Sinitsyna pointed out that the authors of the nineteenth and twentieth centuries distorted the original meaning of this concept by reading into it their own understanding of an ‘imperial or messianic, universal or ethnocentric, panegyrical or minor’ nature.\textsuperscript{540} The study of the concept in its original context, according to Sinitsyna, reveals a different meaning as well as the dissimilarity of thought and historical reality.


\textsuperscript{538} The history of research with Sinitsyna’s critical evaluation of each of the proposed notions occupies an impressive space in her book. See N. Sinitsyna, *Tretii Rim*, 7-57.

\textsuperscript{539} Ibid., 6.

\textsuperscript{540} Ibid., 9.
between the contemporary and medieval periods.\textsuperscript{541} Thus, her methodological approach towards the analysis of the ‘Third Rome’ idea placed it within the limited historical and literary context, evaluating it in the light of the developments in the politico-ecclesiastical sphere which took place predominantly within the fifteenth and sixteenth centuries. The main attention was paid to the exploration of factors which either directly or indirectly contributed towards the rise of the concept of the ‘Third Rome’ primarily within the boundaries of the fifteenth and sixteenth centuries.

Whilst acknowledging the appearance of the concept of the ‘Third-Rome’ as originating within ecclesiastical circles,\textsuperscript{542} she perceived the rise of this concept more as an attempt on the part of Russian thinkers to include Russia within world history, rather than a deliberate policy of expressing its messianic vocation in the aftermath of the fall of Constantinople.\textsuperscript{543} The fall of Constantinople as well as the council of Florence did not constitute for Sinitsyna any major historical developments, but were rather understood as events of a subsidiary significance which only modestly contributed towards the rise of the concept of the ‘Third Rome’. She was inclined to see the events of an ecclesiastico-political nature, mainly the division of Russian ecclesiastical territory into that of Muscovite and Kievan as well as the liberation of Muscovite Rus’ from Tartar domination as a major factor in the emergence of Russian particular self-perception.\textsuperscript{544} Sinitsyna focused upon the Russian-Lithuanian context in the sixteenth century and presented the rise of the ‘Third Rome’ concept as a direct consequence of these historical circumstances.\textsuperscript{545}

The particularity of Sinitsyna’s approach, which focused upon the historical and literary context of the fifteenth-sixteenth centuries and downgraded the significance and the magnitude of the fall of Constantinople and the aftermath of the council of Florence, resulted in a particular perception of the Muscovite politico-ecclesiastical outlook. This

\textsuperscript{541} Ibid., 9.
\textsuperscript{542} Ibid., 11.
\textsuperscript{543} Ibid., 13.
\textsuperscript{544} Ibid., 13, 89ff; 115ff.
\textsuperscript{545} Ibid., 89ff.
led Sinitsyna to propose that Russian self-perception as that of the ‘Third-Rome’ was presenting the sense of a Russian mission rather than messianism.\textsuperscript{546}

However, without disregarding the validity of Sinitsyna’s approach which placed the concept of the ‘Third Rome’ within its historical and literary context, one has also to acknowledge the historical limitations of the analysis of the ‘Third Rome’ concept within the boundaries of the fifteenth and sixteenth centuries and to look beyond these centuries in order to appreciate fully this concept. Such a limitation is in danger of affecting the perception of this theory and indeed its meaning, ignoring the continuity of the conceptual framework of the Byzantine \textit{oikoumene}, which through the medium of its politico-ecclesiastical ideology and worldview passed its main tenets to the Russian Church and society at large.\textsuperscript{547} Moreover, the primacy of Sinitsyna’s historical investigation left out altogether the investigation of the theological issues such as the idea of the divine election of Christians as opposed to Jews – an idea which had messianic overtones and made its impact upon the Byzantine\textsuperscript{548} and later Russian self-perception.\textsuperscript{549} Moreover, Sinitsyna’s approach ignored the whole aspect of the mystical/spiritual sense of the authority which was inherent in this formula with such a rich and varied symbolism.

The Tatar conquest of Kievan Rus’ brought about a profound change which made an impact upon both the political and the ecclesiastical spheres. The political centre gravitated from Kiev to Moscow, which managed to consolidate in its domain the political and ecclesiastical power by the fourteenth century.\textsuperscript{550} In contrast to their

\textsuperscript{546} Ibid., 13. On the critical evaluation of the concept of ‘Third Rome’ in the writings of Russian authors of the nineteenth and twentieth centuries, see \textit{Rim}, 7-55.

\textsuperscript{547} It appears that Sinitsyna commits a mistake by ignoring the continuity in the realm of the imperial ideology between Byzantium and Muscovite Rus’. Commenting upon the refusal of Basil I to acknowledge the Byzantine emperor in the liturgical commemorations, Sinitsyna suggests that Russian self-consciousness at this time ‘distinguished between the political and spiritual sphere, the Church and the empire’. \textit{Rim}, 62. Although contrary to Sinitsyna, Nikolin defines the fall of Constantinople and the ‘corruption’ of Greek Orthodoxy as the formative factor for the appearance of the ‘Moscow the Third Rome’ concept, he nevertheless fails to take into account the whole issue of the imperial ideology. See \textit{Tserkov’}, 74.

\textsuperscript{548} For Byzantine idea of the election of the Greeks, see section 2.3. ‘Byzantines as the successors of Israel’ in chapter II of our study.

\textsuperscript{549} See Kirillov, \textit{Rim}, 22ff.

\textsuperscript{550} For the historical background in relation to Muscovite principality in the fifteenth century, see L. Cherepnin, \textit{Obrazovanie russkogo tsentralizovannogo gosudarstva v XIV-XV vekakh}, 715ff.
Byzantine or Kievan predecessors, Muscovite princes had to employ the power of the ecclesiastical leaders more than their predecessors in order to achieve their political goals. The office of the Basileus was strong and had been in existence well before official Christianity (Byzantium), and the power-sharing political makeup of the Kievan state made up of several princes did not necessarily require the help of the Church. The rise of the powerful Muscovite princes was accompanied by the rise of the ecclesiastical office, which true to its Byzantine principle of accommodation, was located geographically in close proximity to the centre of a political power and assisted the temporal power in its striving for independence and unity. The Muscovite princes in their desire to achieve independence from Tatar domination pursued the policy of unification and subduing under their authority the regional princes of Tver’, Vladimir and Novgorod.551 This policy, willingly or unwillingly, was supported by ecclesiastical circles in Moscow, who increasingly presented the historical events and the policies of the Muscovite princes from Moscow’s point of view.552 In the words of Tal’berg: ‘That is why, when the Muscovite princes began to strive after autocracy, their desires naturally coincided with the desires of the hierarchy; it is possible to assert boldly that together with the secular, grand princes’ sword there was directed also a spiritual sword against the regional princes’.553 The Muscovite hierarchy appeared to act on the basis of the traditional Byzantine principles for the maintenance of human society, and envisaged the unified existence of one state and one Church under the patronage of


552 See Malinin, Starets, 571-6. J. Martin, Medieval Russia 980-1584, 232, points to the Trinity chronicle which typified a certain angle of understanding promulgated by the Muscovite ecclesiastical authorities. However, later, 390-3, Martin appears to be inconsistent with her earlier propositions by placing herself among scholars who were inclined to perceive the pro-Muscovite inclinations of the Russian Metropolitans as a later literary device of chroniclers depicting the symphonical co-existence of Church and State in the aftermath of the council of Florence. Such an approach, however, does not give any room for the discussion of the underlying principles of symphony which were in existence well before the fateful council of Florence. Despite the numerous indications that Kievan and Muscovite princes more than often had an ‘upper hand’ in ecclesiastical affairs, their actions, nevertheless, reflected symphonical principles which implied the co-operation of imperium and sacerdotium.

553 Tal’berg, Istoriia, I, 147. See also ‘The annexation of Novgorod According to the Moscow Nikonian Chronicle (1471-78)’, which is written by the Muscovite chronicler who presents Ivan III as ‘special agent on earth, obliged to protect the only true faith’ – Orthodoxy against the Latin faith, as found in D. Kaiser, G. Marker (eds.), Reinterpreting Russian History, 91-9. P. Miliukov, The origins of Ideology, 6.

D. Ostrowski’s dismissal of a possibility of an ‘alliance’ between the State apparatus and monks in political field seems to be an oversimplification of a complex relationship which existed between monks and Russian society and included also political aspects. See his ‘Church Polemics and Monastic Land Acquisition in Sixteenth-Century Muscovy’, SEER, 64, (1986), 375.
Moscow. These Byzantine principles, which had overtones of 'universalism',\textsuperscript{554} were maintained not only throughout the history of the Byzantine state for its \textit{internal} use but were also consistently applied in relation to the newly christianised 'barbaric' states as a convenient method of incorporating these states within the wider network of the Byzantine \textit{oikoumene}. Despite its failure of a full implementation\textsuperscript{555} throughout Kievan Rus', this principle was consistently applied in relation to Muscovite Rus'.

The political rise of an ever-increasing principality of Moscow produced a tendency on the part of the Muscovite princes to establish a certain degree of ecclesiastical independence from Constantinople. This, in itself, was symptomatic of a rise of Russian self-consciousness which was increasing throughout the fourteenth century and received a new impetus after the battle of Kulikovo in 1380.\textsuperscript{556} This temporary victory over the Tatars had a psychological effect upon Russians and contributed towards the growth of Russian self-consciousness and self-awareness as a nation. The Russian people came to be united around the Muscovite princes as a separate politico-ecclesiastical entity.\textsuperscript{557} This, coinciding with the geo-political changes, in turn, gave rise to the development of a politico-ecclesiastical ideology which was designed to explain or to propagate the claims of the rulers of the Muscovite kingdom, thus coming into confrontation with the politico-ecclesiastical policies of Constantinople. The increase of the political power in the hands of Muscovite princes, as pointed out by Miliukov,\textsuperscript{558} at the time of the decline of Byzantine empire in the fourteenth century, manifested the growth of an independent Russian outlook. The Muscovite princes began to re-assert their supremacy occasionally in both the political and ecclesiastical domains.\textsuperscript{559}

\textsuperscript{554} See J. Meyendorff, \textit{Rome, Constantinople, Moscow}, 119.
\textsuperscript{555} Byzantine principles seemed to be unfulfilled in relation to the temporal powers rather than ecclesiastical throughout the Kievan period. Whilst the ecclesiastical seat was represented by one Metropolitan, the temporal powers during the Kievan period hardly knew any period of being unified under one prince.
\textsuperscript{557} D. Obolensky, 'Byzantium and Russia', in \textit{Byzantium and the Slavs: collected studies}, 251.
\textsuperscript{558} Miliukov, \textit{Origins}, 5-7.
\textsuperscript{559} As early as in 1354 Philotheus, the Patriarch of Constantinople mentioned that the decision of the synod in Constantinople was influenced by the wishes of the 'great king' of Russia. See Obolensky, 'Byzantium', 255. G. Fedotov, \textit{Sviatoi Filip. Mitropolit Moskovskii}, 33ff. T. Ferguson, 'The Council of Ferrara-Florence and Its continued Historical Significance', \textit{SVTQ}, 43, 1, (1999), 61.
The way in which Constantinople handled the appointment of the Metropolitans Alexius, Pimen and Cyprian as well as its re-assertion of ecclesiastical power over the Muscovite princes gave rise to the expression of an independent Russian outlook under Basil I (1389-1425) which, though maintaining its unity with the Church of Constantinople, was unwilling to accept the political jurisdiction of the Byzantine emperor. It is questionable, then, whether Russian 'national self-consciousness' at this historical period was differentiating between the political and spiritual domains, making a difference between the Church and empire as Sinitsyna suggests. It seems that the Russian's opposition to Constantinople at this period seems to be better explained by their perception of Constantinople's actions, and as such appears to be a response of a temporary character rather than a consequence of a change on the theoretical level, which, as before, was essentially shaped by the Byzantine ideology. Against the Muscovite assertion that 'We have a Church, but not an emperor', the Patriarch Antony of Constantinople re-asserted Byzantine supremacy and universalism in the political and ecclesiastical spheres. Thus, before the council of Florence Muscovite self-perception was increasingly defined in terms of its own political and ecclesiastical powers. Whilst keeping the canonical dependency on the 'mother' Church of Constantinople, the increasing political power of the Muscovite kingdom was destined to re-assert its independence in the ecclesiastical and political sphere against the 'national arrogance' of the Greeks. Thus, in the words of Florovsky, there began 'a crisis of Russian Byzantinism'.

561 R. Crumney, The Formation of Muscovy 1304-1613, 47.
562 Sinitsyna, Rim, 62-3.
563 It seems that the re-assertion of Constantinople's political and ecclesiastical universalism seems to be on the increase in the fourteenth century at the time of Moscow's political rise and Byzantine's decline. The universalistic re-assertions of the Patriarch Philotheus were further promulgated by his successor Antony in relation to the Russian princes. See Meyendorff, Rome, 24, also his Rise, 115-6. Ostrogorsky, 'Order', 8-9. Ferguson, 'Council', 60ff. See the extract of Antony's letter to Basil I in E. Barker, Social and Political Thought in Byzantium, 194-6.
564 Miliukov, Origins, 16.
565 G. Florovsky, Aspects of Church History. Works, IV, 158. For the view which rejects entirely Byzantine influence upon Russian ideology see the work of the Soviet writers N. Kazakova, Ia. Lur'ie, Antifeodal'nye ereticscheskie dvizheniya na Russi, 188ff., hereafter as Afed. Their weakness, however, is similar to that of Sinitsyna who does not consider the strength and the vitality of the imperial ideology passed on by the ecclesiastical writers.
3.2.2. The aftermath of the union of Florence

The council of Florence became the major factor in the rise of a distinctive Russian self-perception which covered both the political and religious domains. It was destined to become a wider context which gave a new impetus for the development of Russian self-consciousness in relation to West and East. According to the Russian understanding, the boundaries of true Orthodoxy lay within the Greek Church, which in due time passed it on to Russians who faithfully preserved the Orthodoxy of the Christian faith since its reception by Vladimir. This understanding, however, was not static and changed alongside historical changes, which according to the Russian understanding, manifested the Greek deviance from the ancient Orthodoxy. Basil II instructing Isidore before the council of Florence pointed out: 'you are going to the Eighth Council, which should never take place according to the rules of the holy fathers; when you return from it, bring us back our ancient Orthodoxy which we have received from our ancestor Vladimir'. The very possibility of a union with Western heterodoxy seemed to represent for the Russians a deviation from the true Orthodoxy itself and the 'betrayal of the salvation of mankind.'

The pivotal role which was displayed by the Muscovite prince as a defensor fidei at this historical moment gave a further rise to Russian self-consciousness and Muscovite ideology which had far reaching consequences for the political and religious spheres. The writings of the monk Symeon in the aftermath of the council of Florence manifested a particular Muscovite perception of Orthodoxy, the role of the Muscovite prince in relation to it, and the place of the Muscovite Church among Eastern Churches.

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566 On the 'traditional' and 'moderate' assessments of Isidore's role as Byzantine's appointee in relation to Muscovite Rus' and the council of Florence, see Golubinskii, Istoriiia, 2.1, 424. Kartashev, Ocherki, 349.
568 Cherniavsky, 'Reception', 351, detects a change in the understanding of Orthodoxy by Russians: instead of identifying its Orthodoxy with that of the Greeks and Constantine, the standard of Russian Orthodoxy came to be identified in its shape and form with that of Vladimir's period, thus producing a distinctive 'Russian' Orthodoxy as opposed to a Greek Orthodoxy. See also N. Kapterev, Kharakter otnozenii Rossii k Pravoslavnomu Vostoku v 16 i 17 stoletiiakh, 384ff.
569 Pospelovskii, Tserkov', 8-9, regards Basil II's interference as a high mark of the 'caesaro-papism' which became characteristic of the Russian Tsars in relation to the Church.
In his *Povest’*, Symeon presented the tendentious \(^{571}\) accounts of the council of Florence and Moscow’s reaction to it. \(^{572}\) It was designed in such a way as to contrast ‘the apostasy at Florence of the shifty Greek Patriarch and the Emperor with the unswerving Orthodoxy of the Muscovite prince’. \(^{573}\) The act of the defence of Orthodoxy by Basil II gave the opportunity for Symeon to present him in contrast to the Byzantine emperor, who became ‘the sower of evil deeds’ and was ‘clothed in the darkness of unbelief’, whilst Basil was depicted as ‘Faithful, Christ-loving, pious and truly Orthodox Grand Prince Vasiliii Vasilievich, the white Tsar of All Russia’. \(^{574}\) In and through his action of defending Orthodoxy, the prince Basil II was elevated in his political tutelage and significance, assuming in his religious function a position similar to that of Constantine and Vladimir. \(^{575}\) Moreover, Symeon presented a traditional Byzantine perception of the Orthodox ruler whose role as the protector of faith in the Byzantine oikoumene was transferred at this historical moment to the Russian Tsar, who resembled the ‘universal’ Byzantine emperor. \(^{576}\) The Muscovite Rus’ at the hands of Symeon assumed the universalist features of the Byzantine oikoumene:

It is fitting for you to rejoice in a people truly Orthodox in the universe, lighted by the rays of the sun. You are clothed with the light of true faith, having God’s many coloured cloak of His

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\(^{571}\) Symeon seemed to employ the dubious methods in his desire to present a favourable sequence of events favouring Russian Orthodoxy and the Muscovite prince in particular. On the style of his writings, see Cherniavsky, ‘Reception’, 350ff.; Sinitsyna, *Rim*, 83ff. N. Kazakova, *Zapadnaia Evropa v Russkoi Pis’mennosti XV-XVI vekov*, 64-5. However, Ševčenko, *Repercussions*, 308, pointed out that the earliest account of Florence’s union did not contain any criticism.


\(^{573}\) Ševčenko, *Repercussions*, 308.

\(^{574}\) Cherniavsky, ‘Reception’, 352.

\(^{575}\) Ibid., 352.

\(^{576}\) Sinitsyna, *Rim*, 83, commenting upon Symeon’s use of Tsar’s title in relation to Basil II asserts that Symeon, among other Russian authors, did not accept the main component of Byzantine imperial ideology – the exclusive claims of the Byzantine emperor as the only single Christian ruler in the universe. This statement, however, is contradicted later by the admission that the monk Filofei later would call the grandson of Basil II ‘edinym tsariem khristian’. Thus, it seems that Sinitsyna commits an error by ignoring the historical context of each of the writings and the limitations at the time of each of the writings. The writing of Symeon is produced with the reference to the existent Byzantine emperor and empire, thus preventing Symeon from talking in the exclusive terms of a Byzantine ruler in relation to Russian prince. It is also worth pointing out Symeon’s goal in producing his *Povest’* and other writings was not producing a treatise on the definition of the Christian kingdom or the role of the Tsar within it. Filofei, in contrast, wrote in the aftermath of the fall of Constantinople and the Byzantine empire - the events which allowed Filofei to transfer the role and the function of the Byzantine emperor within the Christian oikoumene to the Russian Tsar.
great favour and benevolence. Rejoice in the sovereignty over you of the God-chosen, beloved-of-God, enlightened-of-God, glorified-of-God...wise-in-God seeker of the Holy Law, supreme mediator for the faith, beautified-of-God, greatly sovereign pious Grand Prince Vasilii Vasilievich, God-crowned Tsar of Orthodoxy and of all Russia.\textsuperscript{577}

Symeon's \textit{Povest'}, then, became indicative of a change in the Russian attitude towards Byzantine Orthodoxy. Whilst Greek Orthodoxy was suspect in its purity and the Byzantine emperor lost his prestige as the true Orthodox emperor, the action of the Muscovite prince produced the glorification of the Russian ruler and Russian land. The land of Muscovite Rus' was becoming a new Orthodox kingdom with the appropriate status for its ruler as the defender of a universal Orthodoxy and the universal Church. Whilst the Tsar was confined in his sovereignty to the Russian land, his defensive action of faith raised him in the confessional degree to the level of a universal Orthodoxy, thus producing the image of the 'universal' Tsar with a mission of protecting world-wide Orthodoxy whose reign extends beyond Russian boundaries.\textsuperscript{578} It seems that it is in this sense that the Russian Tsar can be perceived as a messianic figure with a mission. His 'messianism' is expressed by virtue of a religious mission on the universal level, encompassing both East and West at this historical period. Sinitsyna's argument in favour of a mission rather than Russian messianism appears to be standing on a weak ground. We want to point out that it is difficult to disentangle the sense of mission from messianism. The Byzantine sense of messianism was based upon its own self-perception, which defined it exclusively as a nation being chosen by God at a particular historical period for a specific purpose/mission. This messianism was primarily based upon theological ideas emanating from the eschatological and apocalyptic speculations being applied exclusively within a historical framework to the Byzantine empire, thus implying its messianism. The messianism of Russians can be perceived as the outcome of theological ideas emanating from the historical changes of the fifteenth century such as the council of Florence and the fall of Constantinople, which forced Russian thinkers

\textsuperscript{577} Cherniavsky, 'Reception', 353. Obolensky, 'Byzantium', 268f., points out that the author emphasises the theme of the universality of the Orthodox faith. For the author, Moscow and not Constantinople was now the providential centre of the true Christian religion. The universalist overtones of Symeon's presentation of the Russian Tsar and land are confirmed by Sinitsyna herself in the third redaction of Symeon's \textit{Povest'}. Rim, 108.

\textsuperscript{578} See Rim, 13.
to re-evaluate these changes and to draw theological conclusions on the basis of prevalent ideas related to the understanding of history and Christian revelation.  

Further, the growth of Muscovite political power dictated the approximation of the independent Church with its hierarchs being chosen by Russian rulers and the candidates from Russian ecclesiastical circles. The consequences of the council of Florence and the Greek ‘betrayal’ of Orthodoxy made the proclamation of the autocephalous status of the Russian Orthodox Church inevitable. The Russian bishop Iona, who was made the Metropolitan, designated by Basil II before the council of Florence in 1432-3, due to Constantinople’s interference and the aftermath of this council, was installed as the Metropolitan of Rus’ in 1448. Whilst the act in the direction of Russian autocephaly was not in itself the complete severance of the relationship between Moscow and Constantinople, it, nevertheless, inaugurated a new period in the development of the Muscovite kingdom and the Russian Orthodox Church. The direct impact of the Florence aftermath was echoed in Iona’s encyclical to Lithuania in 1448:

You know, my sons, how many years had the Church of God remained widowed without a Metropolitan, and how much harm and anxiety came to the Christians of our land because of

579 See N. Berdyaev, The origin of Russian communism, 10ff.
580 See N. Kapterev, Kharakter otnoshenii Rossii k Pravoslavnomu Vostoku v XVI-XVII stoletiakh, 4ff., on the post-Florence’s policies of Muscovite rulers.
581 B. Uspenskii, Tsar’ i Patriarkh, 244-5.
582 Ibid., 213, Uspenskii pointed out that the function of Basil II calling for a Russian council mirroed the role of the Byzantine emperor as the protector of the faith.
584 The issue of Russian autocephaly is dealt with by many authors with a polarity of opinions. Sinitsyna suggests a certain degree of conservatism by Russians in relation to canonical relations with the Church of Constantinople. She perceives autocephaly as a forced course of action, rather than a deliberate attempt on the part of Russians to sever their canonical links with the Church in Constantinople. This kind of perception rests upon the analysis of letters which were written to Constantinople’s Patriarch and emperor in 1441 and 1451 by Basil II. Sinitsyna tends to accept the validity of Russian arguments for the autocephaly of their Church. Yet, one has to evaluate her reasoning and the justification of Russian actions in relation to the issue of autocephaly in the light of the historical evidence, which is missing from Sinitsyna’s analysis. The Russian rulers and ecclesiastical circles did not seem to be uninformed about the state of things in Constantinople’s Church as Basil’s letters suggest. There was an extensive exchange of information and connections with Churches in the East following the council of Florence, thus informing the Muscovite ruler and Church about the changes in the Byzantine Church. This is clear from one of Iona’s letters, in which he distinguishes the main Church of Sophia from other Churches and monasteries which did not support the union of Florence. Barsov, Patriarkh, 482. On the exchange of information between Basil II and the monks of Mt Athos see, Talberg, Istoriia, I, 139. Golubinskii, Istoriia, 2 1, 455. See Sinitsyna, Rim, 63ff. A. Klibanov (ed.), Russkoie Pravoslavie: Vekhi istorii, 105-6.
it. Now, by the will of God, a holy Synod was gathered... and in accordance with the sacred canons, the old directives of the holy Emperor, the benediction of the holy oecumenical Patriarch and the wish of my lord and son, Grand Prince Vasilii Vasilievich, has elected me Metropolitan.\textsuperscript{585}

In his writing to the bishops of Novgorod, the Metropolitan Iona contrasted the fall of Constantinople with the fact that his election was conducted by the bishops of this ‘pravoslavnogo velikogo samoderzhstva’ (great Orthodox autocracy), thus laying a precedent for the creation of Russian perception of Muscovite Rus’ as a sacred kingdom as opposed to the heretical East and West.\textsuperscript{586} The fall of Constantinople re-enforced Russian opinion regarding corrupted Greek Orthodoxy\textsuperscript{587} and warranted a further step towards Russian autocephaly. Despite local ecclesiastical opposition,\textsuperscript{588} a further legitimisation of Iona’s ecclesiastical status was attempted at the Russian council in 1459, which confirmed the Metropolitan Iona as the rightful Metropolitan of Kiev and all Russia against Gregory - the nominee of Constantinople’s Patriarch Gregory Mamas. This deliberate and fateful move on the part of the Russians further estranged them from Constantinople politically and ecclesiastically. On the political level the council gave the exclusive right to the Muscovite ruler to appoint the ecclesiastical leader, thus liberating the Russian Church from the political jurisdiction of the Byzantine emperor. On the ecclesiastical level, the council’s decision promoted further

\textsuperscript{585} As found in Cherniavsky, ‘Reception’, 353. Cf also Malinin, Starets, 466-7. The justification of Iona’s election as being sanctioned by the Byzantine emperor and Constantinople’s Patriarch, however, represented an issue of controversy even among Russian ecclesiastical figures. See Kartashev, Ocherki, I, 360. Maksim Grek in the sixteenth century questioned the Russian right of election of their own Metropolitan on the basis of this permission. Tvoreniia, III, XXII, 100-2. All direct quotations or references to Maksim’s works are based on his Tvoreniia, vols. I-III, Sergievskii Posad, Sviato-Sergievskaiy lavra, 1996, repr., of 1910 edition. On the variety of Maksim’s writings and themes see A.I. Ivanov, Literaturnoe nasledstvo Maksima Greka, 39-215. See also Sinitsyna, Rim, 72-3. Uspenskii, Tsar’, 251, n. 82; Obolensky, ‘Byantium’, 54ff.

\textsuperscript{586} Sinitsyna, Rim, 100, points out that after Iona the formula of ‘sacred kingdom’ became a part of Russian self-perception and appeared in the later writings expressing the idea of Moscow – as the Third Rome.


\textsuperscript{588} Afed, 98, Kazakova, Lur’ie point out that Iona’s installation was not considered as totally legitimate by the non-Muscovite clergy of Tver throughout the 1450s and 1470s. Another example is Pafnutii of Borovsk who refused to acknowledge Iona as Metropolitan. See Otvet na poslaniia Iosifa Volotskogo Ivanu Ivanovichu Tret’iakovu, in A. Zimin, Ia. Lur’ie (eds.), Poslaniia Iosifa Volotskogo, 361-2. hereafter as PIV.
Russian ecclesiastical independence from Constantinople by making an independent decision, in spite of Constantinople's nominee, expressing its own independent ecclesiastical outlook.\textsuperscript{589}

The fall of Constantinople in 1453 re-enforced Russian self-perception and contributed towards a further re-assertion of Russian self-consciousness which covered the political and religious domains. Being in itself perceived as an event of apocalyptic nature and the punishment for Greek 'betrayal' of Orthodoxy,\textsuperscript{590} the fall of Constantinople was destined to have its impact upon the worldview of Muscovite writers.\textsuperscript{591}

3.2.3. Moscow – the Third Rome\textsuperscript{592}

Obolenskii pointed out that the rise of the concept of Moscow – as the Third Rome was mainly due to the external events outside Muscovite Rus', namely that Muscovite reaction to the historical changes of the fifteenth century gave birth to a peculiar Russian self-perception of Moscow as the 'Third Rome'.\textsuperscript{593} Whilst one can agree with Obolenskii that the rise of this concept was indeed 'conditioned' by wider historical changes, such an approach has to be taken cautiously, so as not to perceive the events in Muscovite Rus' only as a contra-reaction to the external stimulus. It seems to us that the rise of this concept was the result of the external and internal factors which reflected the peculiarity of the Russian mentality and culture in its relation to external factors.

In the aftermath of the council of Florence there appeared radical geo-political changes which brought about the demarcation between Muscovite Rus' and East and West on

\textsuperscript{589} Dvornik, Slavs, 264ff.
\textsuperscript{590} Such a view was held even by the Byzantines themselves. See George Sphrantzes, Chronicon Minus, 23,4, in M. Philippides, The Fall of Byzantine Empire, 50.
\textsuperscript{592} It must be pointed out that the term 'Moscow – the Third Rome' appears to be misleading in the sense that it designates not the city but the whole of the Muscovite kingdom in the fifteenth-sixteenth centuries, its status, role and significance in relation to other Romes. The actual term Moscow – the Third Rome appeared only in the seventeenth century and it was applied in relation to Moscow as a city. See Sinitsyna, Rim, 243.
\textsuperscript{593} Obolensky, 'Russia's Byzantine Heritage', in Byzantium and the Slavs, 88ff.
the political and religious levels. On the political level, Muscovite Rus’, in contrast to other Orthodox kingdoms which came under Turkish domination, liberated itself from the Tatars’ yoke by the end of the fifteenth century. On the religious level, Moscow felt increasingly isolated from both East and West. In relation to the East, the aftermath of the council of Florence brought about a religious distrust towards Greek Orthodoxy and Russian re-assertions of its own ecclesiastical independence and authority. In relation to the West, the division of Russian ecclesiastical territory into Muscovite and Kievan after 1458, as well as the adoption of the Latin form of Christianity by Lithuania towards the end of the fifteenth century, contributed towards a greater religious isolationism on the part of Moscow and the re-assertion of its Orthodoxy. The successor of the Metropolitan Iona, Feodosii (1461-64), became the Metropolitan of the ‘ethnic’ territory of the ‘whole Rus’, thus signifying profound changes of a politico-ecclesiastical nature.

The Russian religious mindset, which was cultivated on the Byzantine principles of politico-ecclesiastical *symphony* and the ritualistic observance of the Photian-like principle that ‘Even the smallest neglect of the traditions leads to the complete contempt for dogma’, was destined to draw out its own conclusions of a politico-ecclesiastical nature. This slow process of re-evaluation received its main impetus after the fall of Constantinople. Whilst in the immediate decades following the collapse of the Byzantine empire, Russian ecclesiastical thinkers were hesitant in drawing out any radical conclusions, towards the end of the fifteenth century some of them began formulating the idea of succession to the Byzantine empire. The medieval mind, which was greatly influenced by eschatological expectations and an apocalyptic scenario of the end of the world, was captivated by the Byzantine vision of a universal empire which

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594 On the historico-political observation relating to this period see, S. Kashtanov, *K predistorii idei Moskva-Tretii Rim*, 262-72.
597 As found in Obolensky, ‘Heritage’, 98.
598 V. Sakharov, *Eskhatologicheskie sochineniia i skazaniia v drevne-russkoi pis’mennosti i vliianie ikh na narodnye stikh*, 54ff., points out that the discussions concerning the end of the world were transferred from Byzantium to Muscovite Rus’ and were widely discussed among Russians beginning with the twelfth century among such ecclesiastical writers like Cyril of Turov (12C), Sergii Radonezhskii (1319-97), Metropolitan Cyprian (1376-1406). On the spread of the literature of the eschatological character and its
was indispensable for the salvation of humankind. The collapse of the Byzantine empire at the time of the growth of the Muscovite Orthodox kingdom implied a radical change on the part of Russian self-perception. The theological re-thinking of historical reality in the light of Christian history and revelation resulted in the formulation of a Russian ideology which was applied to the emerging politico-ecclesiastical entity of Muscovite Rus’.

Despite the fact that the Church of Constantinople abandoned its pro-Latin policy after the fall of Constantinople, the contrast between Moscow and Constantinople remained to be drawn by Russians on the basis of the existence of the Orthodox Tsar who became the safeguard of ‘universal’ Orthodoxy. The Turkish conquest of the Byzantine empire and the fact that Constantinople’s Patriarch was living under the rule of the ‘infidel Tsar’ implied the Russian re-assessment of the Patriarch’s right to appoint other ecclesiastical rulers. This in itself was the characteristic attitude of a Muscovite politico-ecclesiastical ‘alliance’ which severed temporarily its relationship with Constantinople in the aftermath of its fall and perceived its own ecclesiastical seat as independent from Constantinople. Muscovite ecclesiastical writers, then, were responding to these changes and reflected in their writings a peculiar Russian perception which was expressed through a ‘Third Rome’ concept in its confessional rather than political form.

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599 Uspenskii Tsar’, 229.
600 See Golubinskii, Istoria, II, 508ff.
601 Uspenskii, Tsar’, 230-1.
602 Uspenskii, Tsar’, 233ff, points out that the seriousness of Moscow’s perception of Constantinople can be seen in the light of the fact that throughout this period Moscow began building its relationship with the Patriarchate of Jerusalem. Similar Kartashev, Ocherki, I, 376ff.
603 See Uspenskii, Tsar’, 242, n.67.
604 Hosking, Myth, 202. It is important to point out that the chief significance of the concept of a ‘Third Rome’ lies in its confessional rather than political significance. It seems that Russian ecclesiastical writers at no point implied the political meaning in their ideas of succession. D. Likhachev, Kul’tura Rusi epokhi obrazovanija russkogo natsional’nogo gosudarstva, 32, goes as far as to say that Moscow is not mentioned as the heir of Byzantium in any of the documents dating from the fifteenth-sixteenth centuries. See M. D’iakonov, Vlast’ moskovskikh gosudarei, 64-66, though D’iakonov goes too far concerning political significance, 68. D. Stremoukhoff, ‘Moscow the Third Rome: Sources of the Doctrine’, Speculum, xxviii, (1953), 91. N. Chaev, ‘Moskva – Tretii Rim v politicheskoi praktike moskovskogo pravitel’stva XVI veka’, IZ, xvi, (1945, Moscow), 3-23. His view is that of a tendentious Soviet historian.
The writings of the Metropolitan Zosima were characteristic of a new perspective which began taking place among Russian ecclesiastical writers at the end of the fifteenth century. Zosima drew the historical parallels between the periods of Constantine and Ivan III. Writing in the aftermath of Florence and the fall of Constantinople at the time of heightened eschatological expectations, Zosima perceived the rise of a new kingdom which resembled in its outlook the Byzantine empire. Ivan III was perceived as becoming a ‘New Constantine’ who resided in a new city of Constantine – a ‘New Jerusalem’. He appeared to fulfil the role of Constantine within the ‘ecclesiastico-political’ domain and was designed after the Byzantine ideological pattern, with the Tsar having the active ‘ecclesiastical’ role of protecting the faith within the Orthodox kingdom. Zosima seemed to create a trajectory of symbolism which covered the meanings of the city and the Tsar/emperor, creating a precedent for perceiving Moscow in categories which were previously applied to Constantinople and confirming the political outlook of Ivan III. The certain degree of ambivalence which was contained in such terminology implied the lack of precise definition in relation to Moscow – the fact which seems to be largely overlooked by Sinitsyna. Whilst Moscow was not defined as the ‘Third Rome’, thus becoming the direct successor to Constantinople, the usage of the Byzantine allegorical term of a new Jerusalem, as it was applied to Constantinople – as the New Rome, was applied simultaneously to Moscow as a city and to the Muscovite Rus as a land, which was assuming the place of Constantinople and the Byzantine empire. Further, the particularity of Zosima’s perception which

605 It seems that Zosima probably utilized the expressions used in the Vita of Dmitrii Donskoi in 1454 or 1455, which described Dmitrii as ‘the most fertile branch and the most beautiful flower from the God-planted orchard of Tsar Vladimir, the New Constantine...’ As found in G. Hosking, Russia and the Russians, A History, 100.

606 Miliukov, Origins, 17, goes for the South Slavs’ origin of this perception in Bulgaria.


609 It seems that the term Moscow - New Constantinople is better justified than Moscow - Third Rome. See Uspenskii, Tsar, 257.

610 Sinitsyna’s argument against such a trajectory seems to ignore the Byzantine usage of Constantinople’s terminology as well as some aspects of the Byzantine worldview and theological interpretations. The fact that Moscow was not defined explicitly as a Third Rome by Zosima and thus was not assuming the role of Constantinople in the political and spiritual domains on the basis of the non-existence of a clear definition, (Sinitsyna, Rim, 122ff) does not negate the fact that Russians were familiar with the eschatological terminology which was applied to Constantinople and therefore were attempting, although tentatively, to re-apply the symbolism and the role of Constantinople to Moscow. Sinitsyna's conclusion in perceiving only the historical parallels between the roles of Ivan III and Constantine, Moscow and Constantinople does fly in the face of the Byzantine concept of symphony which did not make any division between the
placed the Russian Orthodox Church and the ‘confessional’ role of Ivan III within the wider history of Christianity was heightened by the significance of the last eschatological period. This period of ‘poslednia sia leta’ (these last years)\(^{611}\) in which Ivan III fulfilled his function and the Muscovite kingdom rose to its historical role seemed to represent a new perspective upon the universal role of the Russian Tsar and Church, which were elevated to fulfil a special mission. It appears, then, that Zosima drew a new conclusion in the light of the historical changes. In this new ‘Roman paradigm’, Muscovite Rus’ assumed the features of the Byzantine *oikoumene* mainly through the ‘confessional’ role of its Tsar and ‘supra-historical’ construction, which reflected Zosima’s theological perception of Christian history, revealing the providential rise of the Muscovite kingdom.\(^{612}\)

The formulation of the tentative perception of Moscow as a ‘Third Rome’ by Zosima was further promulgated and expressed in its clearest way, although in a modified form,\(^{613}\) by the monk Filofei in the sixteenth century.\(^{614}\) Filofei’s expression of this formula was expressed within the same eschatological perspective of the end of the world and God’s providence, and revealed the fusion of different themes such as the idea of the eternal Rome being closely intertwined with Scriptural interpretation and imperial ideology. Writing\(^{615}\) in the context of the polemics with the astrological ideas

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\(^{611}\) Sinitsyna, *Rim*, 123.

\(^{612}\) S. Zen’kovskii, unlike others who trace Zosima’s concept either to the Byzantine historian Manassea or to Bulgarian sources, perceives Zosima’s perception of Moscow as a mixture of Byzantine and Bulgarian interpretations which were re-applied to the contemporary historical situation in the Muscovite kingdom. ‘Russkoie messianstvo’, 5, as found on the Internet: www.rusidea.narod.ru. Zen’kovskii, ‘Messianstvo’, 5, points out that the concept of Rus’ as a successor of Byzantine’s universal role in relation to the *oikoumene* was propagated also by the adversaries of Zosima such as Joseph of Volotsk (*Prosvetitel*) and the archbishop Gennadii of Novgorod (*Povest’ o belom klobuke*). Zen’kovskii traces the origin of this *Povest* to the West of the twelfth-thirteenth and its appearance in the Muscovite Rus’ in the late fifteenth century. For the opposite view to that of Zen’kovskii, see P. Bushkovitch, ‘The Formation of a National Consciousness in Early Modern Russia’, in *HUS*, X, 3, (1986), 355–76. Bushkovitch’s weakness, however, lies in the lack of appreciation and prevalence of the imperial ideology of the Muscovite claims in that period. See J. Pelenskii, ‘The Emergence of the Muscovite Claims to the Byzantine-Kievan “Imperial Inheritance”’, *HUS*, VII, (1983), 520–31.


\(^{615}\) On the textual analysis and the problem of dating of Filofei’s epistles consult Sinitsyna, *Rim*, 131–73.
of Nikolai Bul'ev\textsuperscript{616} and his predictions regarding the end of the world, Filofei constructed his own formula in which the Muscovite Rus’ was perceived within the apocalyptic scenario of the end of the world. Yet in a new way, dissimilar to that of Zosima, Filofei based his perception of the ‘Third Rome’ mainly upon apocalyptic ideas, building up upon the historical changes of the fifteenth century by bringing the fall of Constantinople and the betrayal of Orthodoxy at Florence’s council into ‘causal relation’.\textsuperscript{617} Further, Filofei explicitly introduced the idea of the \textit{translatio imperii} with its inherent notion of the eternal Rome.\textsuperscript{618} This resulted in the appearance of a formula of a Muscovite Rus’ within the conceptual framework of the ‘Third Rome’ ideology becoming ‘nationalised’ in the form of ‘\textit{Rosiiskoie tsarstvo}’ (Russian kingdom),\textsuperscript{619} which according to Filofei, assumed the role of the spiritual, neo-messianic kingdom. Whilst one can agree with Sinitsyna that the designation of the Muscovite kingdom as ‘Third Rome’ belonged to a confessional sphere,\textsuperscript{620} the identification of this spiritual \textit{Romeiskoie tsarstvo} (Roman kingdom) with the contemporary Muscovite kingdom of Vasilii III points in the direction of the identification of the borders of the messianic/spiritual kingdom with the political/geographical entity. The conflation of two concepts – spiritual/political happened with the help of the imperial \textit{symphonical} ideology of Byzantine writers. The possibility of such a conflation seems to escape the attention of Sinitsyna, who though noticing the political overtones\textsuperscript{621} of Filofei’s interpretation of Muscovite \textit{Romeiskoie tsarstvo} (Roman kingdom) and acknowledging it as the ‘conceptual centre of Filofei’s epistle to Munechin’\textsuperscript{622} appears to be hesitant to explain author’s actual intentions and methodology at this point.

Similarly, Sinitsyna’s explanation of Filofei’s understanding concerning the position of Russian Orthodox Church at this point in the history of humankind does not do full justice to Filofei’s writing. Sinitsyna’s own acknowledgment that the ‘Third Rome’ formula in relation to the Muscovite kingdom belongs to a religious/confessional sphere

\textsuperscript{617} Ševčenko, ‘Repercussions’, 309.
\textsuperscript{618} Malinin, \textit{Starits}. 535.
\textsuperscript{619} Sinitsyna, \textit{Rim}, 14, 163.
\textsuperscript{620} Ibid, 226-35.
\textsuperscript{621} Ibid., 237-8.
\textsuperscript{622} Ibid., 237-8.
flies in the face of her own interpretation concerning the Russian Orthodox Church. Sinitsyna reaches a surprising conclusion in analysing Filofei’s text in which he presents Russian Orthodox Church as being within the domain of ‘presvetleishego i vysokostol’neishego gosudaria nashego, kotoryi iaivialiaetsia edinstvennym kristianskim tsarem vo vsei podnebesnoi’ (our most enlightened and the highest sovereign, who is the only Christian Tsar in the whole universe). Filofei also insists upon the status of the Russian Orthodox Church as that of ‘the apostolic and universal Church which is located – vmesto (instead) of Rome’s and Constantinople’s Church in the God-protected city of Moscow.’ The Russian adverb vmesto is understood as being used by Filofei not for the purpose of suggesting the idea of the replacement of Rome’s and Constantinople’s cathedra by the catholic and apostolic Church of Muscovite Rus’, but in a sense of the equality of dignity with other apostolic Churches such as that of Rome and Constantinople. Sinitsyna comes to such a conclusion on the basis of the linguistic analysis of other ecclesiastical texts which made use of this adverb as well as on the basis of her assumption that Filofei’s text allegedly fits better within the context of Rome’s authoritative advances and its undisputed right to make the ecclesiastical appointments within universal Christendom.

Sinitsyna’s interpretation raises some doubts as to the correctness of such an interpretation of Filofei’s text. If one is to follow Sinitsyna’s argument concerning the seriousness with which Filofei approaches the theme of the fall of two Romes, which for him means primarily the loss or the corruption of a true faith, the issue which he addresses within the same epistle, then the meaning of the adverb vmesto appears to assume a different meaning from that proposed by Sinitsyna. It seems that following the logical sequence and the flow of Filofei’s argument throughout this epistle one is inclined to follow Filofei himself and to bring out the meaning which was intended by the author. Thus, it appears plausible to suggest that on the basis of his own understanding of what constituted the true Church and a true kingdom, Filofei proposed precisely this idea of the location of a true Church, which in turn legitimised the last ‘messianic’ kingdom - Romeiskoe tsarstvo within the contemporary kingdom of Vasili.

623 Sinitsyna’s own representation. For the original see Prilozhenie, 1, 345.
624 Ibid., 240-1.
vmesto (instead) of either Rome or Constantinople’s Churches. 626 That it is so seems to come from the context of Filofei’s letter. The Russian Orthodox Church is clearly contrasted with other Churches and is represented as a ‘replacement’ (‘izhe vmesto’) of these two Churches. This is done by the way of negation, antithesis - this one (‘siia zhe’), and by the indication of time ‘now that of the third, new Rome’, and of scale: ‘holy catholic apostolic Church even to the ends of the earth...is shining more than a sun’. 627 The analysis of the usage of the adverb and the preposition of vmesto within this historical period also reveals that it was used with two meanings. In the first instance, it was used to designate the idea of being together. In the second instance, it was used in order to highlight the idea of replacement. 628 It seems to us that that the idea of the replacement does greater justice to the overall meaning within Filofei’s formulation. This can be supported by the fact that this concept is followed by a translatio imperii motif which presents Vasilii’s kingdom as one which incorporated all other preceding Orthodox kingdoms. The universality of this spiritual/political entity resulted in the portrayal of Vasilii as a universal Tsar of all Christians. ‘And this is your kingdom, righteous Tsar, for all of the Orthodox kingdoms of Christian faith have gathered into your one kingdom, for you are the only Tsar to all Christians under the sun’. 629 The statement concerning the place of the Russian Orthodox Church is followed by the additional ‘Third Rome’ formula: ‘For the two cities of Rome had fallen, but the third one remains, and the fourth there shall not be.’ Further, it is re-enforced by the apocalyptic imagery of a woman who runs into the wilderness ‘Great Russia’, which is called simultaneously the ‘Third Rome’.

It appears, then, that Filofei presented the Muscovite kingdom as the last of the kingdoms of the Danielic scheme. That in itself represented a peculiar Russian development of its self-perception which was based upon historical circumstances and theological constructions. Building upon the writings of Russian chroniclers 630 who

625 Ibid., 342-3.
626 For the full text of Ob obidakh Tserkvi, see Sinitsyna, Rim, 365ff.
627 Ibid., 345.
629 Sinitsyna, Rim, 345, 358-9.
630 Sinitsyna, Rim, 188ff, points to a certain degree of dependency of Filofei upon the historical construction of such a writing like Russkii kronograf (1512). St.L.B. Moss, N.H. Baynes (eds.), Byzantium, 384. Medlin, Moscow, pointed out that kronograph was patterned after the chronology of
were expressing the ‘supra-historical’ vision of the Russian kingdom as the inheritor of the *imperium Romanum*, Filofei brought about a fusion of these ideas with the apocalyptic ideas reflecting Danielic vision of a rising eschatological kingdom at the end of time. By including the existence of a true Church within the boundaries of that kingdom, Filofei presented the concept of the messianic kingdom of Daniel in similar terms to that of Byzantine speculations. By identifying the ‘messianic’ kingdom with the temporal kingdom of Muscovite Rus’, Filofei came close to resembling Eusebius’ vision of the Christian empire, and of its role within history with characteristically similar ‘messianic’ overtones. Whilst Sinitsyna rejected the messianic overtones of the ‘Third Rome’ concept she, nevertheless, came close to such an admission by asserting that in Filofei’s understanding the term ‘Romeiskoie tsarstvo’ (Roman kingdom), which became ‘Rossiiskoie tsarstvo’ (Russian kingdom), had a spiritual meaning. We agree with Sinitsyna that the term ‘Romeiskoie tsarstvo’ represents essentially the spiritual function, yet it is important to re-assert that this spiritual function was nevertheless exercised by a concrete politico-ecclesiastical formation. It expressed the vision of the messianic kingdom of an eschatological nature and was identified by Christian thinkers as that of the Roman empire. The conflation happened upon identifying the borders of the political formation such as the Byzantine empire/Muscovite kingdom with the eschatological/messianic kingdom which was expressed through the Church. Sinitsyna seems to ignore the possibility for such a conflation and this leads her to find the meaning of Filofei’s ‘Third Rome’ merely in a function which was to be exercised by Muscovite Rus’, thus disregarding the sense of messianism which was inherent in this construction.

The ‘Third Rome’ through the eyes of Filofei appeared to be eschatological in nature and was becoming the fulfilment of the ancient prophecies. In a similar way to Pahomius Logothetus which outlined the world history since the creation of the world. Similar A.A. Zimin, *Russkie letopisi i khronografi kontsa XV-XVI vv.*, 8-9. Other stories like *Skazanie o knaz’akh Vladimirskikh* also contain the ideas of succession. Kazakova, *Evropa*, 240-1.

632 See Chapter II, 32ff.
633 On the Eusebius’ vision of a ‘messianic’ kingdom see Chapter II.
634 Rim, 236-8.
635 Although it must be pointed that it is unclear which prophecies are exactly meant.
Eusebius, Filofei’s presentation of the ‘Third Rome’ is based upon the theme of universality. The theme of ‘universalism’ runs through Filofei’s presentations of the Russian Tsar and the Church. The Russian Tsar becomes in his function the Tsar of all Christians; the Russian Orthodox Church assumes the character of a ‘universal apostolic’ Church which found its final refuge at the end times in Muscovite Rus’.

Thus, Filofei envisaged the appearance of the Orthodox kingdom which became the fulfilment of scriptural prophecies. The kingdom itself assumed the characteristics of a ‘messianic’ kingdom and was perceived to last until the end of the world. In addition, the whole of the theological construction was achieved through a conflation of two separate entities: the Muscovite kingdom and a true Orthodoxy which was represented by the Russian Orthodox Church. This conflation included the understanding of the Muscovite kingdom as that of a kingdom which was inherited by a ‘chosen’ nation succeeding the nation of Israel in its vocation to the rest of the world. This understanding was propagated through the means of a particular genre of literature as Chronology which was used by Filofei in his construction.

Nastase pointed out that there was an increase of that type of genre of literature in the aftermath of the council of Florence and the fall of Constantinople. These two events gave a new impetus for the Russian theorists to formulate their own peculiar view of history in which the emergence of the Muscovite kingdom came to represent the climax of the history of humankind. The Byzantine notion of becoming a ‘chosen’ nation, replacing the nation of Israel in its vocation in relation to other nations, was incorporated into the Russian perception of history through the means of historico-theological constructions based upon Byzantine writings and their own theological observation beginning with Kievan Rus’. Further, Nastase asserted that Russian compilers of the Chronologies emphasised the notions of succession and election beginning with the Kievan period. The existence of a neighbouring Khazars’ kingdom which adopted Judaism by the eighth and the ongoing conflicts with Kievan Rus’

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638 Ibid., 257.
ensured the formulation of a particular view of history which assessed the place and the role of the nation of Israel and its religion in the light of Christian history. The ongoing political struggle of Byzantium and Kievan Rus' with the Khazars' kingdom resulted in theological evaluations of ecclesiastical writers who perceived this struggle in terms of the history of the nations of Old and New Israel. The Sermon on Law and Grace of the Metropolitan Ilarion (1049-50) appeared to postulate the ideas which were later incorporated into the chronological writings of a Muscovite period.

Ilarion's literary device of comparing the OT and NT as well as placing the reception of Christianity by Russians within the wider history of OT and NT, created the precedent for historico-theological speculation. The OT Jewish kings came to be perceived as the forerunners of the Christian emperors who were to assume the role of the rulers of a New Israel. The victories over the Khazars' kingdom throughout the reign of Sviatoslav and his successors during the eleventh century were destined to re-enforce the perception of a victory of Christianity over Judaism, resulting in the appearance of anti-Jewish sentiment which became the characteristic mark of Russian Orthodoxy for the centuries to come. This, in turn, implied the transfer of the role of a chosen nation from the nation of Old Israel to the nation of a New Israel. This transfer and its full implication and meaning, however, was propagated and fully appreciated by Russian ecclesiastical writers only in the aftermath of events such as the council of Florence and the fall of Constantinople. The magnitude of these events re-enforced the application of the theological side of the notion of succession in relation to the Muscovite kingdom with the city of Moscow appearing as a New Jerusalem. It came

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640 See Medlin, *Moscow*, 60ff.
641 It is plausible, however, that the anti-Jewish sentiment was passed on to Russian Christianity from the Byzantine empire and can be traced to 860 when Byzantium sent Constantine to the Khazars' court in response to the persecutions of Christians by the Judaistic Khazars. See Pospelovsky, *History*, 17.
644 For the idea of Moscow as a New Jerusalem, see N. Efimov, *Rus' - Novyi Izrail': Teokraticheskaiia ideologiia sovremennoi pravoslaviia v dopetrovskoi pis'mennosti*, Kazan', 1912. M.P. Kudriavtsev remarks that the architecture of Moscow was designed as that of a New Jerusalem. *Tretii Rim*, 205ff. The legends concerning the foundation of Moscow made use of different prophecies of the Danielic fourth beast/kingdom as well as the prophecy of the Metropolitan Peter who predicted the rise of Moscow as a

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to be perceived increasingly in terms resembling the Messianic kingdom consisting of
the anointed Tsar who presides over the nation of New Israel, which stands at the peak
of a history of humankind and fulfils its vocation according to the providence of God.

On the political level, the Russian theorists grounded the Muscovite political events in
the imaginary history of the distant past as well as in the actual political events of
Muscovite history. The marriage of Ivan III to the Byzantine princess Zoë Palaeologus
in 1472 contributed to the elevated perception of the Muscovite kingdom and its ruler
in particular. Through the genealogical and legendary constructions such as the
legend of Vladimir Monomach, the Muscovite ecclesiastical writers brought the
Muscovite Tsars into direct relationship with Roman political dynasties, justifying the
Tsar’s title as the Muscovite ruler, thus ‘grounding’ Muscovite rulers in the distant past
and ascribing to Muscovite Rus’ the glories of the Roman empire and the right of the
inheritance from the Byzantine empire. These legendary constructions were
incorporated into official writings, and by the time of Ivan IV the Russian ruler came to
be perceived not just as equal to the Byzantine emperor in his status and power but even
going beyond to the Roman emperor Augustus, thus representing the majesty of the
‘Third Rome’ in contrast to the fallen emperors and the empire of Byzantium. Such a
perception represented the modification of the Byzantine theory of the existence of only

second Jerusalem. See also I.P. Sbritsiolo, ‘Idea Moskvy, kak prestol’nogo grada v legendakh o iie
osnovanii’, in Rim-Konstantinop’, Moskva: Srnvatne no-Istoricheskoe isssledovanie tsentrov ideologii i
kul’tury do XVII v., 235ff. Lotman points out that Maksim Grek opposed the use of this title in relation to
istorii russkoi literatury, vol. 3, 204. See also J. Haney, From Italy to Muscovy, 77. Maksim, Tvereniiia, III,
XXIII, 102-7. For the latest treatment of the idea of Moscow as the New Jerusalem and the Muscovite
kingdom as a New Israel, see D.B. Rowland, ‘Moscow – The Third Rome or the New Israel?’, RusR, 55,

646 M.E. Bychkova, ‘Rimskaia tema v Russkikh genealogicheskikh sochineniakh XVI-XVII vv.’, in Rim,
Konstantinop’, Moskva: Srvniet’ no-Istoricheskoie isssledovanie tsentrov ideologii i kul’tury do XVII v.,
266-74.
647 Other stories like Skazannia o Vavilonskom Tsarstve, Poslaniie Spiridona-Savvy o Monomakhovom
ventse propagated the legitimisation of the Muscovite kingdom and rulers and were designed to present the
elevated perception of the Muscovite kingdom and its rulers. See Kartashev, Ocherki, I, 390. Miliukov,
648 On the Monomach’s legend see, V. Morozov, A. Chernetsov, ‘Legenda o Monomakhovykh Regaliakh
v Isskustve Moskvy XVI v., in Rim-Konstantinop’, Moskva: Srvniet’ no-Istoricheskoie isssledovanie
tsentrov ideologii i kul’tury do XVII v., 367-72.
649 See Dvornik, ‘Byzantium, Muscovite Autocracy and The Church’, in E. Fry, A. Armstrong (eds.),
Rediscovering Eastern Christendom, 115.
one full sovereign, 'the representative of God on earth – the Byzantine Emperor'. The Russian Tsar appeared to replace the Byzantine emperor in his universal vocation.

On the ecclesiastical level, the developments in the political sphere involved the re-evaluation of the status of the Russian Orthodox Church. The lack of apostolic foundation of the Russian Orthodox Church in the light of the Greek betrayal of Orthodoxy at the council of Florence required the construction of a concept which would justify the autocephalous status of Russian Orthodox Church. In order to give to Russian Orthodoxy an independent outlook and to underline its ancient origins, the ecclesiastical writers used the legendary account of the apostle Andrew visiting the land of Rus', which was used for the creation of a direct descent of Russian Christianity from the apostle Andrew, thus by-passing the Greek form of Christianity and its spiritual authority altogether. Subsequently, by the time of Ivan IV this legend became an accepted belief in Russia so that Ivan IV was able to declare:

The Greeks are not the Gospel for us. We trust in Christ and not in Greeks. We received faith at the beginning of the Christian Church, when Andrew, the brother of the apostle Peter, came to these countries in order to get to Rome. So we received a Christian faith here in Moscow at the same time as you received it in Italy and we keep it inviolably.

This independent outlook of Russian Christianity, which contained the peculiar self-perception of its own superiority as well as the assessment of Greek and Latin Christianity, was further promulgated by the events of the sixteenth century which 'sealed' and approved the independence and the national character of Russian Orthodoxy. The council of Stoglav was designed to underline the distinctiveness of Russian Orthodoxy and to promote further its autocephalous status. This council, in itself, was symptomatic of wider developments within Russian Orthodoxy which came

650 Ibid., 115.
651 Sinitsyna, Rim, 240.
653 Kartashev, Ocherki, I, 49.
654 Schmemann, Road, 319. Cf. also Moss, Baynes (eds.), Byzantium, 385-6. N. Zernov, The Russians and their Church, 58. Florovskii, Puti, 24. N. Kapterev, Patriarkh Nikon i Tsar' Aleksei Mikhailovich, 25, also
to define itself on the basis of its own national tradition and were perceived as representing the authentic form of Orthodoxy. The subsequent forceful and controversial establishment of the Patriarchate of Moscow on the basis of 'political accommodation' in 1589 became the culmination of Muscovite political and ecclesiastical ambitions, putting the seal of approval upon the concept of Moscow as the 'Third Rome'. As a result, the apocalyptic formula of Filofei, at least temporarily, was transformed into the 'state ideology' of the 'Third Rome' in the official document establishing the Patriarchate of Moscow:

Due to the fact that the ancient Rome is fallen because of the apollinarian heresy, and the second Rome, Constantinople is under the dominance of godless Turks, then your, great Russian kingdom, righteous Tsar, the Third Rome, exceeded with its righteousness all previous kingdoms; they all united in your kingdom and you are alone designated as the Christian Tsar in the whole of the universe.

The pronouncement of Moscow as the 'Third Rome' by the writers of the sixteenth century, and the propagation of such a perception on the official level was in itself the

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655 See F. Wilson, Muscovy, Russia through Foreign Eyes, 30, 57. The trustworthiness of Protestant foreigners' accounts such as those of Richard Chancellor in 1553 and Giles Fletcher in 1588-89 can be matched by that of the Greek monk Maksim Grek. See F. Giles, Of the Russe Commonwealth, 85-9. See also M. Poe, 'Ex Tempore: Muscovite Despotism', Kritika, 3, 3, (2002), 473-86.


657 This principle is clearly presented in the official charter of the second council of Eastern Patriarchs in Constantinople in 1593. See Medlin, Patrinellis, Renaissance, 37, n. 31.

658 The Muscovite ecclesiastical supremacy was manifested even through the rules of etiquette which gave the Muscovite Metropolitan precedence over Antioch's Patriarch Ioakim in 1586, and later during the ceremony of the establishment of the Patriarchate of Moscow. See Tal'berg, Istoria, I, 301ff. Kartashev, Ocherki, II, 12ff., 27, points out that the initiative concerning the establishment of the Patriarchate of Moscow seems to belong solely to the Tsar Fedor Ivanovich. Kaptelev, Nikon, 57ff.

659 Florovskii, Puti, 29. Cf. also Kartashev, Ocherki, II, 7. He asserted that the Patriarch Jeremiah was forced by Muscovite tsardom to install the Russian Patriarch against the canonical rules, Kartashev, Ocherki, II, 26-7. Bercken, Russia, 159ff.

660 Kartashev, Ocherki, II, 38. Uspenskii, Tsar', 509, n.13, remarks that the pronouncement of Moscow as the Third Rome by the Russians was missing from the Greek documents relating to the establishment of the Patriarchate of Moscow at least at this historical period. The Ulozhennia gramota itself was not even translated into Greek. S. Runciman, The Orthodox Churches and the Secular State, 51, remarks that through the establishment of the Patriarchate of Moscow, the Eastern world recognised Moscow as the Third Rome in the political rather than the ecclesiastical sphere. Zen'kovskii, 'Messianstvo', 11, however, remarks that this declaration was signed by Constantinople's Patriarch Jeremiah and as such became the de
result of a victory of the imperial ideology\textsuperscript{661} which was shaping the politico-theological speculations of Russian ecclesiastical writers. The development of the imperial ideology in the Muscovite kingdom followed Byzantine precedents. The syncretistic Eusebian ideology, which became the foundation of Byzantine imperial ideology, made an impact upon apocalyptic thought and was later manifested in the writings of Russian ecclesiastical writers who dealt with the issues of the relationship between Church and State.\textsuperscript{662} In the same way as Eusebius, who developed a ‘high’ view of Constantine’s Christian empire as an indispensable tool for God’s purpose in the salvation of humankind,\textsuperscript{663} the Muscovite ecclesiastical protagonists advanced the understanding of the Muscovite Orthodox kingdom, which was promoted by God’s providence to the forefront of human history. This resulted in a widely held perception of the ‘Third Rome’ as having a mystical/spiritual authority, thus supplanting the authority of either the first or second Romes.

3.3. The hierarchical authority

3.3.1. Orthodoxy versus heterodoxy

Another development which concerns us in this chapter is the perception of authority as it was expressed throughout the internal controversies which raged within the Russian Orthodox Church during the early Muscovite period.

The standard work of the Soviet scholars Kazakova and Lur’ie presents a detailed account of the controversies which had shaken the Russian Orthodox Church throughout the fourteenth and sixteenth centuries. They point to the scarcity of the available material which could represent adequately the views of the Strigol’niki and the Judaizers.\textsuperscript{664} In order to reconstruct the views and perceptions of both groups or any other ‘free thinkers’ within that period one is reduced to deducing and reconstructing

\textsuperscript{661} M. Cherniavsky, considers the Muscovite ideology as a mixture of Byzantine and Mongolian influences. See ‘Khan or Basileus: An aspect of Russian Medieval Political Theory’, in JHI, 20, (1959), 459-76. For a summary of the variety of opinions among Russian and foreign scholars on this issue, see Martin, Russia, 382.

\textsuperscript{662} On the influence of Hellenistic ideas, see R. Bagdasarov, Neumestnye bogi, Kul’ t Ellinskikh filosofov v Russkom pravoslavii, 216-25.

\textsuperscript{663} See chapter II, 2.1. ‘Eusebius’ vision’.

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their views from the writings of their opponents – the hierarchy of the Russian and Constantinople Church.\textsuperscript{665} The first movement of Strigol’nik, which appeared at the end of the fourteenth century\textsuperscript{666} in Novgorod and Pskov, appeared to present a threat to the authority of the Russian Orthodox Church. The geographical proximity of these two Russian outposts and the merchant orientation towards the West, as well as the political structure, contributed towards the formation of a different religio-political outlook from that of Moscow.\textsuperscript{667} This, in itself, went alongside the formation of local religious traditions which carried a peculiar local character in their rituals and practices and involved the veneration of local saints. This created a local centre endowed with a certain degree of ecclesiastical authority.\textsuperscript{668} Yet, despite the differences existing between different regional Churches, there were some practices which were common to the Russian Orthodox Church as a whole. The widespread and persistent practice of simony by the hierarchy of Russian Orthodox Church provided the basis for the Strigol’nik’s criticism. According to the Strigol’nik, the use of simony made the Russian hierarchy illegitimate. This ecclesiastical abuse, which was dealt with by a special Russian ecclesiastical Sobor in Vladimir in 1274,\textsuperscript{669} nevertheless, was a widespread reality of Russian ecclesiastical life well into the sixteenth century.\textsuperscript{670} In this, Russian Orthodoxy ‘copied’ the ecclesiastical practice of its Mother Church of Byzantium.\textsuperscript{671}

The controversies of the Strigol’nik and the Judaizers attracted significant attention from researchers who came to different conclusions as to their origins and content, ranging from the Bogomils to the Reformation and social/anti-feudal motifs.\textsuperscript{672} What,
however, seems to escape numerous discussions on this subject is the fact that one of
the underlying notions throughout these controversies was that of a perceived notion of
authority - its source, character and its implementation in the life of the Russian
Orthodox Church as a whole and in the life of the individual believer. The whole
course of the controversies can be perceived as the struggle between the perceived
hierarchical authority of the Russian Orthodox Church represented by the Muscovite
hierarchy, and the perceived authority of other regional centres such as Novgorod and
Pskov and of different believers with different perceptions/understanding of
authority.

The instances of the excessive charges and possessions acquired from Russian believers
by the hierarchy of the Russian Orthodox Church and monasteries provided a serious
basis for the Strigol'niki’s accusations. The reality of the life of the hierarchy of the
Russian Orthodox Church was perceived to contradict the moral teaching of the Gospel:
‘Their Church services are unworthy, they have a lot of possessions, taking the
households and possessions from the peasants, taking the offering for the dead and the
living’. The rejection of the efficacy or the legitimacy of the hierarchy resulted in the
rejection of the legitimacy of Orthodox worship and associated rituals. This implied the
rejection of the authority of Tradition and traditions. That allegedly included a
rejection of the authoritative character of Patristic literature and later that of monastic
institutions and the authority of Scripture, if one is to believe the trustworthiness of
Metropolitan’s Fotii epistle in 1427: ‘And what you write about this darkening,... As
they do not believe the very true evangelical good news and the traditions of the

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673 Haney, Italy, 39, seems to allocate some room to this issue.
674 See Ja.S. Lur’ie, Dve istorii Rusi XV veka: Ranniie i pozdniie, nezavisimye i ofitsial’nye letopisi ob
obrazovanii Moskovskogo gosudarstva, 123ff.
675 Afed, 239-40, also 241-2.
676 We differentiate between Tradition and traditions. Whilst the former implies the universal Tradition as
received by the Russian Orthodox Church from Byzantine Church and the continuity with it, the latter
could mean the development of the independent local traditions which could contradict or pose the
challenge to the former.
677 For different stages of Strigol’niki’s movement and variety of views between different factions, see
Afed, 62ff.
678 Afed, 251.
It seems that the Strigol'niki's rejection implied the rejection of the implicit, prescriptive authority of the Russian Orthodox Church, its clergy and rituals.

The defence of Orthodoxy against the Strigol'niki was undertaken at various stages by the hierarchy of Constantinople and by local ecclesiastical figures. It represented a traditional appeal to the authority of Tradition which contained the authoritative witness of the ecumenical councils, individual Church Fathers and the witness of Scripture. Constantinople's Patriarch Nilus, responding to the Strigol'niki's accusations of simony, rejected the existence of this practice within Eastern Orthodoxy, and by a literary twist assigned it to the Latin Church. Stefan of Perm', in refuting the Strigol'niki's rejection of the Russian hierarchy, constructed his own version of the apostolic succession, which in his view, legitimised the Russian hierarchy, clergy and the efficacy of the rituals such as the Eucharist. Stefan perceived a clear line of succession from Christ to the Patriarch:

Christ, our Saviour had chosen 12 disciples, appointing them as apostles,... the apostles, having seen the faith of Christ being spread and the teaching of the Word being grown, had chosen their own disciples and appointed some as priests, others as bishops and yet others as Patriarchs... The apostles themselves received the ordination from Christ, the Son of God and, in turn, have passed the ordination to the Patriarchs and Metropolitans and other priests.

This construction, in turn, led Stefan to provide a warrant for the legitimacy of the hierarchy and clergy of the Russian Orthodox Church who administered different rituals: 'When the priest is performing a service, then you are to have him like Christ in Zion with his disciples, who had a supper, and so worthily take from his hand the Eucharist as if from Christ's hand and without discussing and inquiring whether the priest is worthy or not.' Thus, the crucial issue appeared to be the moral failings of the hierarchy and clergy of the Russian Orthodox Church, which in the Strigol'niki's view, made them unworthy to administer the rituals and to exercise authority over Orthodox believers. This leads us to question Kazakova's/Lur'ie assertions about the

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679 Afed, 254.
680 For Metropolitan Fotii's methodology see his 4 letters written between 1416 and 1427 in Afed, 243-55.
681 Afed, 232-4. The same view was expressed by Stefan of Perm', 237.
682 Ibid., 238, translation is mine.
Strigol'nikis' motives which are perceived to be dictated by their reasoning.\textsuperscript{684} When one reads Stefan's response to the Strigol'nikis, it is difficult to appreciate the high degree of Strigol'nikis rationality propagated by Kazakova/Lur'ie. One is inclined to 'turn the argument around' and to question the scholars' own approach, as being based upon the scientific-materialism of a Soviet scholar, which influenced their conclusions. It is also legitimate to question whether one can be justified in attributing to the Strigol'nikis a high degree of rationality and critical thinking at least in this pre-Reformation period. The Strigol'nikis' rejection of the hierarchy and clergy of the Russian Orthodox Church seems to be based upon the perception of the clergy's unworthiness in Novgorod and Pskov, and represents a significant standpoint for their subsequent criticism of the Russian Orthodox Church. ‘You are saying the heretics where you can find a priest for yourself? You are also saying: the Patriarch is unworthy, the Metropolitans are unworthy and according to your opinion there is not any priest on earth who had been ordained without any payments’.\textsuperscript{685} This argument seems to be also re-enforced by Stefan's own admission of a high moral ground for the Strigol'niki as against the unworthy clergy of the Russian Orthodox Church.\textsuperscript{686}

The main tenets of the Strigol'niki movement, with its critical approach towards the contemporary Russian Orthodox Church and its authority, was continued by Judaizers,\textsuperscript{687} who in many respects were the successors\textsuperscript{688} to the Strigol'nikis' critical outlook.\textsuperscript{689} This movement appeared in Novgorod in 1470s and continued into the sixteenth century reaching the highest circles of the Muscovite nobility, including the court of Ivan III.\textsuperscript{690} This movement contained within itself similar and dissimilar 'components' to those of the Strigol'niki. Whilst the rejection of the resurrection of the dead and the accusations of simony with subsequent conclusions\textsuperscript{691} appear to exist

\textsuperscript{683} Ibid., 238.
\textsuperscript{684} Ibid., 48.
\textsuperscript{685} Ibid., 238-9. This seems to be corroborated by the Metropolitan Fotii’s letters. See Afed, 243-55.
\textsuperscript{686} Ibid., 242.
\textsuperscript{687} Afed, 75, Kazakova, Lur’ie, however, point out that this term is misleading as it was designated by a late narrator of this heresy – Joseph of Volotsk.
\textsuperscript{688} Archbishop Gennadii acknowledged the continuity between the two in his Poslanie in 1490. Afed, 380.
\textsuperscript{689} On the history of research regarding Judaizers, see Afed, 75-91.
\textsuperscript{690} Afed, 112.
\textsuperscript{691} Poslanie arkhiepiskopa Gennadiia, Afed, 380. Cf also Joseph’s Skazanie ot bozhestvennykh pisani, 340.
within both movements, the Judaizers added new themes in their arsenal against their struggle with the Russian Orthodox Church. The Judaizers’ beliefs included iconoclastic notions, a dogmatic rejection of the Trinity and blasphemy against Theotokos and Christ, thus manifesting a certain deviance from their predecessors. In dealing with the Judaizers’ movement one is confronted by the same problem of sources, especially in its Novgorod’s phase. According to Novgorod’s archbishop Gennadii, the OT represented the authoritative basis upon which the Judaizers formulated their criticism of the Russian Orthodox Church.

However, it is only when one enters the Muscovite period of the Judaizers’ movement then one is on safer ground in relation to the Judaizers’ beliefs and their sources. It is our understanding that the Judaizers’ developments at this stage ought to be perceived and analysed against the widespread expectation of the end of the world in 1492 that had an impact upon their reasoning. This expectation, which was widespread among the general population and the clergy alike, was in itself the result of an established literary tradition of Russian Letopis’ (Chronology) beginning with the Kievan Pecherskii monastery which compiled the chronology until the year 7000/1492 and resulted in a particular psychological mode of expectation. Further, the existence of literature of apocryphal genre, especially after the fall of Byzantium, such as The Revelations of Methodius of Patar, The Visions of the prophet Daniel, whether of Byzantine or South-Slav origin, which contained predictions of the imminent end as attached to the year 7000/1492 reinforced expectations and brought about a sharp

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692 For the Strigol’nikis’ period see Fotii’s letter in Afed, 251. On Judaizers’ period see Afed, Sobornyi prigovor i poucheniie protiv eretikov, 383.
696 Poslanie Arkhiepiskopa Gennadiia Novgorodskogo Episkopu Prokhoru Sarskomu, 310.
697 For the chronological development of these two movements, consult Afed, 34ff.
699 See Istrin, Otkrovenie, 233-5, 239-42.
700 Istrin, Otkrovenie, 7-8, asserts that it was regarded as a ‘sacred book’ and recommended for general reading in both East and West.
701 Sinitsyna, Rim, 183.
dispute between Orthodox and heterodox. The literary world, which did not distinguish between the canonical and the non-canonical, or authoritative and non-authoritative literature, appeared to contribute towards the general confusion. The errors which were contained within Russian translated literature led to the spread of the heretical or ‘neo-Judaizers’ views among Russian clergy. The fact of the non-fulfilment of the Second Coming in 1492 presented a challenge to the hierarchy of the Russian Orthodox Church. The Judaizers and their followers began to question the authority of the Orthodox tradition on the basis on the non-fulfilment of the end of the world. Their criticism extended even beyond Russian Orthodoxy, due to the fact that the teaching concerning the end of the world in the year 7000/1492 was passed to Russian Orthodoxy from the Byzantine Church.

The Judaizers questioned the Orthodox interpretation of this event on the basis of a different calendar from that of Russian Orthodoxy: ‘And the heretics confuse the simple people about the years that our seventh thousand years is already gone but according to other faiths the years are not gone yet.’ Feeling the legitimacy of the Judaizers’ accusations against Russian calculations and the Orthodox writers whose writings predicted the end of the world in 1492, Gennadii hesitantly proposed the equality of the Greek and Jewish calculations and that the latter were using dubious methods in order to create a different chronology: ‘but the years of all faiths came round equally, so that

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702 Kazakova/Lur’ie’s inclusion of Ehpraim’s Slovo o konchine mira among others which allegedly contained predictions which centred upon the figure 7000 appears to be misleading. Afed, 160, 412-3. For Russian text of Ephraim’s text, see Slovo na prishestviie Gospodne, na skonchaniie mira i prishestviie antikhristovo. As found on http://pravoslavie.org/biblicalstudies/Lib/Father4/Sirin4.html.

703 This factor seems to be little appreciated even by modern scholars, except Haney, who deal with this controversy. See Haney, Italy, 116-7. Arkhangel’ski, Nil, 198-201. A.I. Sobolevskii, Zapadnoe vliianie na literaturu Moskovskoi Rusi, 9ff, on Gennadii’s methods of literary struggle.

704 Even such representatives of the ‘high’ clergy like Metropolitan Makarii in the sixteenth century considered the apocryphal writing such as Kniga Enokha Pravednogo as a canonical book. See Ivanov, Nasledie, 7, n.12. Others like Nil Sorskii were aware of the distinction: ‘there are many scriptures, but not all are divine’. (As found in Afed, 207). Maksim Grek also criticised Russian use of the apocryphal literature and surrounding confusion. Tvorenia, II, 7, 9-10; III, IX, 39-52, XX, 82-98. Nevertheless it must be admitted that Maksim himself used apocryphal literature when it suited his literary aim, I, 347-76. On Maksim’s writings against Russian use of the apocryphal writings and the existence of different superstitions, see Ivanov, Nasledie, 127-33.

705 The trials over Maksim Grek could well illustrate the state of confusion which reigned among Russian hierarchy. See Haney, Italy, 64-89. Cf also Arkhangel’ski, Nil, 242-3.

706 This was later exposed by Maksim Grek, who paid dearly for his revelations and ‘insult’ to Russian sensitivities. Tvorenia, I, 28-9; III, 53-4.

707 Poslaniie neizvestnomu, Afed, 390.
the unfaithful are adding up for themselves'.

Trying to compensate for his own confusion concerning the difference between different calendars, Gennadii appealed to the authority of the Gospel's prohibition on speculating about the date of the end of the world and pointing to its validity and authority: ‘It is written in the Gospel: “Nobody knows the hour and the day”, and the current years obey the gospels, that the seventh thousand is finished, but the Gospel’s word or better Christ’s, still stands’.

Thus, Gennadii escaped from the theological cul-de-sac which was created by the Orthodox literary authors by switching onto the ‘safer’ ground of the Gospel’s definition which pointed to the uncertain date of this event.

Joseph of Volotsk’s defence of Russian Orthodoxy was similar to that of Gennadii in his appeal to the authority of Orthodox Tradition, and yet dissimilar because Joseph’s views were expressed in the aftermath of the unfulfilled Second Coming and thus were dominated by the appeal to the Scriptural prohibitions regarding this issue. Unlike Gennadii who manifested some confusion and unclarity regarding this issue, Joseph presented a robust defence against the Judaizers’ propositions. Skazania o skonchanii sed’moi tisachi (The Tales about the end of the seventh thousand) constitute Joseph’s authoritative defence of Orthodoxy and is solely devoted to the issue of the disputed date.

Joseph enlisted Patristic evidence of John Chrysostom, John Damascene, Maximus the Confessor and John Climacus who discussed the etymological meaning of the sevenfold age in order to present a consistent understanding of this issue. Further, Joseph differentiated between hidden and revealed meaning of Scripture and between personal and Patristic ‘corporate’ opinions. Whilst the Patristic concordat

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708 Afed, 390. Similar accusations were made against Jewish calculations and those of their Russian ‘followers’ in Poslanie Iosafu, 319, which was written three years earlier. Malinin points out that the difference lay in the way East and West were counting their calendar calculations – the fact about which Gennadii himself was confused, Starets, 275-82.

709 Afed, 390.

710 Gennadii’s request for some clarification concerning the date 7000 from his contemporary Greek Dmitri Trachaniot points to the same direction. See in Sinitsyna, Rim, 184-6.

711 See AFed, 394-414.

712 De fide Orthodoxa, II, 1, in NPNF, IX, 2nd series, P. Schaff, H. Wace (eds.), 18. John of Damascus probably relied upon already established tradition of interpretation which centred around the sevenfold age, with a subsequent eighth age as the ‘age to come’. See Basil of Caesarea, The Hexameron, II, 8, NPNF, VIII, 65.

carried an authoritative character and required some sort of submission to its authority, the individual’s opinion could lack this credibility and authority: ‘Because of this it is weak and not reliable’.

Similarly to Gennadii, Joseph’s writings present an appeal to the authority of the Orthodox tradition against the Judaizers’ criticism of Orthodox tradition. The Judaizers found the support for their criticism in finding the precedents of Byzantine predictions concerning 7000 years, as in the writings of the fourteenth century Constantinople Patriarch Nicephorus Xanthopoulos who tentatively attributed the end to the year 7000. For Joseph, the Judaizers’ criticism of Ephraim’s writing or questioning of its authoritativeness constituted an attack upon the authority of the Gospel and apostolic writings. In other words the Judaizers’ criticism of Ephraim’s writing was perceived to be an attack on the authority of the Orthodox tradition, in which the authoritative writings of the Church Fathers were perceived to be the extension of the authority of Scripture and the apostolic writings. Whether or not the Judaizers were rejecting the Orthodox tradition in favour of Scripture or a principle of love alone, as suggested by Kazakova/Lur’ie, remains the issue of contention. What can be asserted, however, is that the Judaizers’ alleged criticism of the Patristic and apostolic writers is solely attached to the issue of the non-fulfilment of the Second Coming in 1492 as acknowledged by Joseph himself. As to the quotation by Kazakova/Lur’ie of Ivan Chernyi’s principle to love one’s neighbour as the evidence that the Judaizers favoured this commandment above ‘Christian post-gospel tradition, i.e. all of the dogmatics, rules and statutes of the Church’, it can be attributed to Kazakova/Lur’ie’s misunderstanding of this commandment and its relation to a wider historical context – the social ills of contemporary Orthodox life. That it could have been so, can be supported by a later quotation of a ‘free thinker’, Bashkin, who condemned contemporary slavery:

714 Afed, 396-7. Such Patristic speculation was endorsed by Maksim Grek in the sixteenth century. Tyoreniia, II, 71.
715 Afed, 400-1.
716 Afed, 160, 400.
717 Afed, 161-2.
718 Afed, 470.
It is written in the Apostolic Constitutions “The whole law is contained within one commandment: love your neighbour as you love yourself”, but we own Christ’s slaves, Christ calls everybody brother but we have shackles on somebody’s feet, but I thank God that the shackles which I had, I did abolish all of them.\textsuperscript{720}

Kazakova/Lur’ie point out that there is not any mention of the criticism of the Church’s tradition and subsequent criticism of monasticism during the period up to the council in 1490 which dealt with the Judaizers in Novgorod, but only later during the Moscow phase.\textsuperscript{721} This seems to point, according to our opinion, in the direction of the aftermath of 1492. The confusion which seemed to reign concerning the usefulness and the authority of different writings, whether in origin apocryphal, apostolic, patristic or conciliar as well as the differentiation between them in terms of authority and character, as noticed by Nil Sorskii\textsuperscript{722} and Maksim Grek,\textsuperscript{723} resulted in the critical assessment of the Church’s tradition on the part of the Strigol’niki and the Judaizers. Monasticism came to be viewed by the Judaizers as a development which lacked any sanction or support by Christ himself and later by his apostles.\textsuperscript{724} That also leads us to suggest that the Moscow phase of the Judaizers’ movement stood in clear continuity with the Strigol’niki movement. Whilst during the Strigol’niki period, the issue of the criticism of monasticism was most likely to have been connected with the issue of moral failings\textsuperscript{725} and simony within the hierarchy of the Russian Orthodox Church as a whole,\textsuperscript{726} during the Moscow’s period of the Judaizers the moral elements of the Strigol’nikis’ criticism were re-enforced by the additional questioning of Church tradition in the aftermath of the non-fulfilled Second Coming in 1492, alongside the ongoing criticism on moral grounds of monasticism and the Russian Orthodox Church’s hierarchy.\textsuperscript{727}

\textsuperscript{719} Afed, 162.
\textsuperscript{720} Afed, 223-4.
\textsuperscript{721} Afed, 163.
\textsuperscript{722} Afed, 207.
\textsuperscript{723} Tvoreniia, III, 82-98.
\textsuperscript{724} See Rassuzhdenie ob inocheskom zhitel’ste, Afed, 416-19.
\textsuperscript{725} See Metropolitan Iona’s gramota to Viatka’s, Novgorod’s and Pskov’s clergy and laity in Golubinski, Istoria, 2.1, 495-8. The unsuccessful ‘reforms’ under Metropolitan Feodosii (1461-4) also demonstrated the general condition of the Russian clergy, Golubinski, Istoria, 2.1, 520-3.
\textsuperscript{726} See Maksim Grek on the state of Russian hierarchy and Orthodoxy in general. Tvoreniia, I, VIII, 111; XX, 164-74; XXV, 203-14.
\textsuperscript{727} Maksim Grek, Tvoreniia, I, I, 1-32; III, 56-75. This can be also supported by the fact that Moscow’s Sobor in 1503 was partially called to deal with the moral failures of the white and black clergy. See
Additionally, one of the issues which seems to be unresolved by scholarship in relation to these two movements is whether there was a conflict between the authority of the white and black clergy. Kazakova and Lur’ie noted that at least throughout Novgorod’s phase of the Judaizers’ movement they were led by the representatives of white clergy. If one is to assume on the basis of the evidence that the white, lower clergy were placed within the Orthodox Churches and as such, in many cases, did not have access to possessions as much as the black/monastic clergy whose life manifested frequent abuses of their positions, then there seems to appear a possibility for a tension between the two factions.

The evidence or the impression of the involvement of white clergy and conflict between them and the black/monastic clergy can be deduced from the document directed against monasticism Sochinenie protiv monashestva (The writing against monasticism) written in the fifteenth century during the period of the Novgorod-Moscow Judaizers. In that period they criticised monastic ideals of asceticism and celibacy and it seems that this document was written either by a layperson or a representative of the white clergy – a married person probably involved in the Judaizers’ movement. The document betrays an author who was familiar with the Scriptures, the writings of the Church Fathers and the canons of the Ecumenical councils. This writing criticised monastic institution along several lines:

- Monks’ celibacy, alleged abstaining from some food and drinks as well as despising of small children is perceived to be a heresy on the part of the monks.

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728 See the list of white clergy in Afed, 126, n. 87. For the social ‘make-up’ of the Strigol’niki’s leadership see pp. 55ff.

729 See Grekov, Sudebniki, 538-9.

730 Although Vassian also criticised the white clergy – the hierarchy for their possessions and moral failures. Kazakova, Vassian, 266-8. See also Arkhangel’skii, Nil, 186f., 192.

731 Afed, 304-5.

732 See Afed, 303, n. 2.

733 See the list of cited sources in this document in Afed, 299.
- Monks are perceived to interfere with and to break marriages. This is pursued by dissuading one from looking after one’s father, mother or children; monks also convince married women to abandon their husbands and to enter the monastic life.\textsuperscript{734}

- Such behaviour was condemned by the canon 10 of Gangra’s council (340AD).

- The immoral behaviour of monks was condemned by the second canon of the council of Constantinople (861AD).

The fact that the author did not reject the institute of monasticism as such is obvious from his desire to correct the moral failures of monks so that this would not lead to the distortion of the image of the monk and to the slander of Christ’s name.\textsuperscript{735} Thus, it seems that the monks’ involvement in the life of the surrounding community and the imposition of their extreme views upon it was perceived to be in direct confrontation with the accepted pattern and norm of the social life of the Orthodox community outside of the monastery. This, in itself, led to a conflict between the white clergy, the representatives of a community with the black/monastic clergy on the issue of what constituted the authoritative source for one’s living, undermining the imposed monastic authority and its set of values.\textsuperscript{736}

3.3.2. Possessors versus Non-Possessors

The Byzantine basic presuppositions of the imperial ideology in relation to Church and State were re-enforced throughout the controversy between Possessors and the Non-Possessors. The actual controversy, which was originally concerned with the issue of ecclesiastical possessions, had far reaching consequences for Russian Orthodoxy which were destined to shape the whole of its outlook in the subsequent centuries. Whilst the Non-Possessors were characterised by their monastic ideals which presupposed a certain boundary between the Church and the State, the Possessors, especially in the aftermath

\textsuperscript{734} See also Maksim Grek who exposed similar problems. Tvoreniia, 1, 147-53.
\textsuperscript{735} Afed, 305.
\textsuperscript{736} This is actually supported by S. Zen’kovskii, Russkoie staroobriadchestvo, 129.
of the conflict in 1503, advocated a closer alliance between them, with Muscovite Rus' being elevated to the 'quasi-messianic' kingdom.

The differences between the two parties were deeply rooted in their religious outlook and the subsequent ethos of their monastic ideals. Nil Sorskii, coming from the Byzantine hesychast tradition, advocated a monastic ideal which was withdrawn from social interaction with the world and focused upon the life of contemplation. His readiness to appropriate intellectual abilities in the life of the Orthodox believer allowed some room for a critical approach towards the Scriptures and its implementation in his life which occasionally led to a critical approach regarding Russian hagiographical literature which was later criticised by his opponent Joseph of Volotsk.

First I test the divine Scriptures, the commandments of the Lord and its commentaries and the apostolic traditions, also the teachings of the holy fathers, I obey them in accordance with my understanding... so that I am edified...

If I need to do something, I test the divine scriptures and if I do not find something which corresponds to my mind and to my way of doing, then I delay it until I find it.

Nil's contemplative and ascetic outlook, as well as the contemporary moral failures of monasticism, led him to advocate the virtues of poverty and simplicity as the prerequisites of successful monastic living which would be conducted in the life of the spiritual and mystical freedom: 'Clear away your cloister and the scarcity of things will teach you some abstinence'. 'We should not have any silver or gold and sacred vessels,

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737 M. Szeftel, 'Joseph Volotsky's Political Ideas in a New Historical Perspective', JGO, 13.1, (1965), 19-29, points to the evolution in Joseph's political thought which is analysed against Joseph's relationship with the Muscovite court in the aftermath of the conflict in 1503. This evolution testified to Joseph's closer perception of the alliance between the Church and the State.

738 On the differences between Possessors and Non-Possessors concerning the relationship between Church and State, see V. Zen'kovskii, Istoriia Russkoi Filosofii, I, 51ff.; Talberg, Istoriia, 1, 266ff. Runciman, Churches, 47ff. See also Malinin on the historical background of Possessors and Non-Possessors throughout Kievan period. Starets, 620ff.


740 G. Fedotov, Sviatye drevnei Rusi, 158. Although Vassian Patrikeev rejected Joseph's criticism directed against him and Nil. See Preniie s Iosifom Volotskim, in N. Kazakova, Vassian Patrikeev i jego sochineniiia, 278, 280.

741 Ibid., 157-8.

742 Ibid., 158. For the full exposition of Nil's views concerning possessions, see The tradition to the disciples, G. Fedotov, A Treasury of Russian Spirituality, 91-2, Eighth vice: Pride, 121, Of renunciation and true detachment from all care, which means dying to all things, 129.

743 Malinin, Starets, 627-8.
also anything in excess...’. Quoting St Isaac the Syrian, Nil subjected material possessions to a higher spiritual ideal: ‘Non-covetousness is above charitable gifts’. His Non-Possessors’ themes and the whole of the spiritual outlook was propagated by his most distinctive follower and the main protagonist of what came to be known as Non-Possessors, Vassian Patrikeev, and Maksim Grek in the aftermath of his death in 1508. Their critical attitude towards contemporary monastic failures warranted the quest only of some of the saints’ perceived authority. Whilst Vassian Patrikeev accepted the prescriptive authority of canonical literature acknowledged by Orthodoxy, his attitude towards hagiographical literature revealed a ‘nonconformist’ view. At his trial Vassian objected to the notion of the holiness and the prescriptive authority of some Russian saints. The accusation of Metropolitan Daniel, who propagated the concept of the authority of tradition in which the Russian saints’ alleged authority was perceived to derive directly from God and as such required one’s ‘automatic’ submission and veneration, was opposed to by Vassian. Therefore, master, God knows and you with your miracle-workers…. As for me I do not know whether Iona is a miracle-worker or not.

On the other hand, Joseph of Volotsk tended to allocate less room to one’s intellectual and critical ability and spiritual freedom and, instead, to subscribe to rigorous, autocratic discipline, order and external piety under the authority of Orthodox tradition. His perception of the monastery and its place within Russian society as that of a ‘social ministry’ presupposed a different structure of the monastic living to that of Nil, and ‘corporate’ material possessions. Such a view inevitably came into clashes with the

744 Ibid., 160. See also Ja. Lur’ie on the exposition of Nil’s views. Ideologicheskaia bor'ba v russkoi publitsistike kontsa XV-nachala XVI veka, 285-346.
745 As found in Fedotov, Treasury, 92.
746 On Vassian Patrikeev, see Kazakova, Vassian Patrikeev i iego sochineniia, Moskva-Leningrad, 1960.
747 Tvoreniia, I, 1-32; III, 56-75; V-VI, 93-7; IX, 126-35; XII, 140-5; XV, 153-4.
748 Kazakova lists at least two saints whose holiness Vassian questioned. Kazakova, Vassian, 278, 287, 297-8.
749 Ibid., 297-8.
750 See Florovskyi’s characterisation of these two monastic ideals in Puti, 17, 22.
751 Although Iosif’s attitude towards personal possessions does not seem to be static: he allowed some personal possessions in his later period after 1507. Goldfrank, Rule, 105. On the defence of a monastery’s possessions by Joseph, PIV, 187-228. Malinin, Starets, 634ff.
Muscovite program of secularisation allegedly at Sobor in 1503.\textsuperscript{752} This Sobor and his earlier involvement in the Judaizers’ controversy revealed Joseph’s understanding of monastic authority. Whilst Nil’s spiritual outlook and monastic ideal with its authority could be characterised as that of ‘a charismatic, pastoral authority’ of the starets,\textsuperscript{753} Joseph’s spiritual outlook placed his perception of the monastic authority in the midst of Russian Orthodoxy being closely linked and associated with the autocratic authority of the State. In Joseph’s view the mere survival of a Christian kingdom depended upon the survival of Orthodoxy, even if it was ‘inquisition-backed Orthodoxy’.\textsuperscript{754} As Goldfrank has pointed out, Joseph’s notion of monastic authority made him ‘more responsible than anyone else for the executions and imprisonments of 1504-5’ Sobor\textsuperscript{755} and brought about direct criticism from Vassian and other followers of Nil whose appeal to Scriptural authority resulted in a more humane attitude towards these medieval ‘free-thinkers’.\textsuperscript{756} It is important to point out at this stage that Joseph’s and Nil’s followers’ attitude towards ‘free-thinkers’ manifested the existence of two opposite views about the interplay of Church and State and the spiritual outlook. If the former can be characterised by the ‘symphonical’ co-operation between Church and State with the underlying notion of an autocratic authority including physical coercion and the stronger attachment to Russian-based ritual – tending to equate faith with ritual,\textsuperscript{757} the latter manifested a Scripturally-based NT spiritual outlook with its emphasis upon God’s

\textsuperscript{752} This Sobor represents a highly contentious issue. Scholars’ opinion is divided as to whether the issue of monastic possessions was raised on this Sobor and about the existence of two opposing parties represented by Nil and Joseph. The problem is centred around the issue of the authenticity of sources relating to this Sobor and their dating. D. Ostrowski’s work represents an attempt to break away from a traditional understanding of this issue, namely the hypothesis concerning the existence of two distinctive parties. See ‘Polemics’, 355-79. Ja. Lur’ie, whilst acknowledging the differences between the two, does not see them as a sufficient evidence for rivalry and points to their possible collaboration at least in their attitude towards Judaizers before 1503, ‘Unresolved Issues in the History of the Ideological Movements of the Late Fifteenth Century’, in MRC, XII, (1984), 163-79. The most recent work of the American scholar Goldfrank Rule, 31 only confirms the uncertainty - he follows broadly the proposals of Ostrowski. For traditional acceptance of the 1503 Sobor and Russian criticism of Ostrowski’s position see Skrynnikov, Krest, 177-200. On the disputed issues relating to this Sobor, see N. Smitsyna, ‘Spornye Voprosy istorii nestiazhatel’stva, ili o logike istoricheskogo dokazatel’stva’, in Spornye Voprosy otechestvennoi istorii XI-XVII vekov, II, (1990), 250-4.

\textsuperscript{753} We will discuss the starets’ authority in a separate section.


\textsuperscript{755} Goldfrank, Rule, 101.


\textsuperscript{757} See Arkhangel’skii, Nil, 245ff.
mercy, forgiveness and religious non-violence.\textsuperscript{758} The Non-Possessor’s view also seemed to place the Church and the State within the confines of symphony, yet giving the former a somewhat more independent spiritual authority but not the ‘broad autonomy’ suggested by Martin.\textsuperscript{759}

Corollary to their views was their perception of the political ruler. Whilst the Non-Possessors’ hesitancy to give a leading role for the Russian Tsar in ecclesiastical affairs stemmed from their monastic ideals,\textsuperscript{760} Possessors, unsurprisingly, advocated a high, sacerdotal view of the Tsar.\textsuperscript{761}

The Possessors’ perception of the Tsar seemed to reflect the main precepts of Eusebian ideology. Joseph of Volotsk became the main protagonist of a ‘state’ Orthodoxy and the ‘principal founder of the Russian system of autocracy’,\textsuperscript{762} which would subsequently evolve into a ‘national ideology’.\textsuperscript{763} His perception of the role of the Tsar reflected both the main basics of Eusebian ideology and the peculiar Russian, ambivalent innovation.\textsuperscript{764} His own views, as the study of M. Szeftel shows,\textsuperscript{765} were not separated from the historical background in which he lived. They changed in due course from the cautious/condemnatory remarks of Skazanie ot bozhestvennykh pisani (The sayings from the divine scriptures)\textsuperscript{766} to the pro-Eusebian eulogistic endorsement of the Tsar in

\textsuperscript{758} This is most clearly pronounced in Polemicheskie slovo protiv Iosifa Volotskogo attributed by Kazakova/Lur’ie to Nil’s followers. Afed, 522-3. See also Otvet Kirillovskikh startsev, Slovo ovetno, Premie s Iosifom Volotskim, in Kazakova, Vassian, 250-3; 254-71, 275-81. Similar in its outlook and criticism of Joseph’s spirituality and perception of authority is Otvet na Poslaniie Iosifa Volotskogo Ivanu Ivanovichu Tret’iakovu, in PIV, 336-66. See also Goldfrank on differences between Possessors and Non-Possessors. Rule, 104ff. Although I am aware of the danger of such a generalisation, if one is to put Maksim Grek within the ‘camp’ of Non-Possessors, then, his view on State’s coercion and the perception of the Prince/Tsar would be closer to the Possessor Joseph rather than to Nil. See I, VIII, 102-4; XXV, 187.

\textsuperscript{759} Martin, Russia, 264.

\textsuperscript{760} See Miliukov, Origins, 38.


\textsuperscript{762} V. Zen’kovskii, Istoriia Russkoi Filosofii, I, 46.

\textsuperscript{763} N. Berdiaev, The Russian idea, 8.

\textsuperscript{764} See N. Kazakova, Ocherki po istorii russkoi obshchestvennoi mysli. Pervaia tret’ XVI veka, 108ff.

\textsuperscript{765} Szeftel, ‘Joseph’, 19-29, points to the evolution in Joseph’s political thought which is analysed against Joseph’s relationship with the Muscovite court.

\textsuperscript{766} Afed, 346.
By his nature, the Tsar is like other men, but by his dignity he is equal to the Highest God. He is not merely God’s servant, but His representative, watching over the purity of the faith and over the safety of the Church. For this reason, God gave him the sword.

The personality of the Tsar, at the hands of Joseph, became that of a highly elevated being endowed with sacral power. The Tsar was perceived to be endowed by God with a right to exercise his authority and judgement as the final court of appeal in ecclesiastical and political matters. ‘mercy and judgment, ecclesiastical and monastic, and all of the Orthodox Christianity of all Russian land, the authority and care were given unto him’ – thus ecclesiastically ‘sanctioning’ the ‘caesaro-papism’ of the Russian Tsar. Further, the Tsar/Prince is depicted as God’s regent: ‘For God chose you on this earth in his place and put you on his throne and assigned to you mercy and life’. It follows, then, that Joseph’s understanding was reflecting a peculiarity of the Russian culture and mentality of a certain ecclesiastical party, which although building upon the existent Byzantine tradition concerning the relationship between the State and Church, re-applied and re-interpreted these concepts in a new way within the circumstances of the Muscovite kingdom.

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767 Afed, 518-9.
768 As found in Dvornik, Slavs, 373. This view was sanctioned by the Russian council in 1504, see Moss, Baynes (eds.), Byzantium, 384. For the Russian text see Afed, 518-9. Dvornik’s text does not correspond to Joseph’s original text where the reference to the sword is missing in both variants of Joseph’s epistle to Vasilii III. Afed, 518-20.
769 J. Meyendorff, ‘From Byzantium to the New World’, in The Legacy of St Vladimir, 10, remarks that there was a trend in the sixteenth century Muscovite Russia to ‘deify’ the function of the sovereign.
770 Although, being fair to Joseph, it has to be pointed out that he also developed the theory of ‘disobedience’ to Tsars-tyrants which was characteristic of his earlier period. See Pospelovsky, History, 61. Szeftel, ‘Perspective’, 26-7.
771 Kartashev, Ocherki, II, 393, points out that as early as 1503 the Tsar is seen as the highest court of appeal: ‘for if the Patriarch together with sobor sentence somebody unjustly, then the Tsar will pronounce a judgment according to the rules of the holy Fathers and will take revenge’.
772 As found in Kartashev, Ocherki, II, 392.
773 See Haney, Italy, 73-4, 172.
I. Ševčenko’s attributes Joseph’s political ideas to Agapetus, the sixth century Constantinople’s deacon. However, in our opinion, Ševčenko stops short of identifying the possible source of Agapetus himself. He notes Agapetus’ influence upon Russian political ideas going as far as Kievan Rus’. Whilst dealing with the Muscovite period, he exposed in detail the similarities between Joseph’s perception of the Tsar’s/prince’s place in *Prosvetitel’* (*The Enlightener*) and that of Agapetus’ writing. Yet, Agapetus’ depiction of the figure of the *basileus* as that of God’s regent, and the use of the sun analogy in relation to the Tsar/basileus had already been developed by Eusebius of Caesarea, Constantine’s imperial ideologist. As we pointed out in chapter 2 of our study, Eusebius appears to be essential for understanding the Byzantine view of the relationship of the Emperor to the Church. Bearing in mind the fact that Russian Orthodoxy was the true disciple of the Byzantine Mother Church it appears that it is this view that the Russians inherited. The similarity in Joseph’s and Agapetus’ perception of the Tsar/basileus and his role in relation to the Church appears to point in the same direction.

The ecclesiastical victory of the Josephite party over the followers of Nil Sorskii at the ecclesiastical council in 1503 resulted in the propagation of a certain set of ideas, which came to symbolise a peculiar Russian political and ecclesiastical outlook. Despite the moral and juridical right of *pechalovaniia* (interceding) on the part of Russian hierarchy and their ceremonial ‘superiority in relation to the Tsar’, the outlook came to be characterised by the ‘caesaro-papism’ of the Muscovite rulers. Their political

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774 Kapterev, *Nikon*, 76, points out that the Tsars themselves secured the right to interfere in Church matters by issuing legal decrees such as Ivan IV ‘sobornaia gramota’ in 1564. See also J. Sorokin, ‘Pravoslavnye traditsii v Russkom samoderzhavii XVI-XVII vv.’, in IE, (1997), 5-17, as found on www.omsu.omskrejz.ru.

775 *Afed*, 519.


ambitions were doomed to shape the whole outlook of Russian political and the ecclesiastical life increasingly throughout the sixteenth century. The ideological basics of Joseph’s understanding gave rise to the autocratic consciousness of Muscovite rulers. It also created the conceptual framework for the appearance and the declaration by Filofei of the formula of Moscow as the ‘Third Rome’, namely through a ‘high’ view of the Russian Tsar and the interdependence between the political state represented by the Russian Tsar and the Russian Orthodox Church – the holder of the true faith. Filofei only needed to push the basic tenets of Joseph’s doctrine to its logical conclusion, connecting Josephite ideological formulations concerning the role of the Tsar within the Orthodox kingdom with theological speculations in the apocalyptic realm. The fusion of both resulted in the appearance of the ideological concept of the Muscovite kingdom representing an eschatological/messianic kingdom of the ‘Third Rome’, thus interlocking the fate of the Muscovite kingdom and the Orthodox Church into an interconnected mode of existence. The historical move of the translatio imperii from Byzantium to Russia implied the translatio ecclesiae of a true Church finding its final refuge in the Muscovite kingdom, so that, according to Filofei, ‘Alone on earth the Orthodox, the great Russian Tsar steers the Church of Christ as Noah in the ark was saved from the flood, and he establishes the Orthodox faith’.

Subsequently, the high view of the Tsar’s role developed to its ‘natural’ conclusion through the reign of Ivan IV and Metropolitan Makarii. The latter endorsed Joseph’s idea of God’s regency and the State’s coercion in the ‘secular’ and ecclesiastical

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779 Zernov, Russians, 72, points out that the relations between the Tsar and the Patriarch were not juridically defined and were dependent upon the personal attitude of the Tsar. Thus, such a state of things opened up the way for the arbitrary use of power and manipulation on the part of the Tsar. Archbishop Serafin Sobolev seems at least naïve in asserting that the Russian Tsars never usurped their power in relation to the Church. See Russkaia ideologiia, as found on www.apocalypse.orthodoxy.ru.

780 A. Goldberg, Istoriko-politicheskii idei Russkoi knizhnosti 16-18 vv, 13ff., affirms that the idea of Moscow as the Third Rome was the outcome of the imperial Josephite ideology, resulting in the politico-ecclesiastical alliance.

781 Afed, 520.

782 Sinitsyna, Rim, 237, admits that Filofei’s definition of the ‘Roman kingdom’ as the Third Rome in the Muscovite kingdom is essentially the messianic kingdom of Daniel which was expressed by Cosmas Indicopleustes and adopted by Filofei. Mirolubov, Deiatel’nost’, 12.

783 Bercken, Russia, 147.

784 It must be pointed out, however, in Makarii’s opinion that ‘high’ view of the Tsar went alongside the demands for the Tsar’s submission to the sacerdotium of the Russian Orthodox Church. Malinin, Starets, 607-8.
spheres:785 ‘God has chosen thee, my lord, to raise upon the throne in His place, giving into thy hands the grace and the life of our great Orthodox faith’.786 The former was able to declare his absolute power: ‘The autocratic regime comes from God and the Tsar carries out God’s wishes. He wields every power over all things and it is his duty to provide for the salvation of his people which God had entrusted to his care’.787 Further, such a perception of the Muscovite ruler had a consequence for the self-perception of the Russian Orthodox Church and its relationship with other Eastern and Latin Churches. The Russian Church and moreover its Orthodoxy came to be perceived in more exclusivist788 terms as having a superior status over both East and West.789

The existence of such a peculiar self-perception made an impact upon the whole outlook of the Muscovite kingdom. On the political level, the ‘high’ view of the Russian Tsar resulted in a further move which confirmed the status of Ivan IV as the legitimate bearer of the Tsar’s tutelage. The Josephite theocratic ideas and the self-perception of Moscow as the ‘Third Rome’ provided the basis for Ivan IV’s imperial coronation in 1547790 so that he became the legitimate bearer of the title of ‘God’s anointed’,

785 Malinin, Starets, 600-1. Makarii repeated some of Joseph’s postulates verbatim. Compare Joseph’s phraseology in Afed, 519, and Makarii’s speech on Ivan IV coronation in Malinin, Starets, 607.

786 As found in S.A. Zenkovsky, ‘The ideological world of the Denisov brothers’, HSS, III, (1957), 59.

787 As found in Dvornik, ‘Byzantium’, 115. For the expressions of Ivan’s theocratic ideas see his correspondence with Kurbskii. J. Fennell, The correspondence between Prince A.M. Kurbskii and Tsar Ivan IV of Russia, especially First letter, 72-179. On the authenticity of this correspondence, see R. Skrynnikov, ‘On the authenticity of the Kurbskii-Groznyi Correspondence: A Summary of the Discussion’, SR, XXXVII, 1, (1978), 107-15. The ‘high’, sacerdotal view of the Russian Tsar was later confirmed by Constantinople’s Patriarch Ligarid at Moscow’s council in 1666-67. See Kartashev, Ocherki, vol. 2, 216.

788 Tal’berg, Istoriia, I, 235, points to the widespread belief among Russians of the sixteenth century that ‘all Russian was Orthodox, all alien was heretical’.

789 The way the Muscovite political and the ecclesiastical authorities dealt with Maksim Grek can be perceived as the result of this Russian peculiar self-perception which regarded its Orthodoxy as superior either to the Greek or Latin faith. See Kartashev, Ocherki, I, 468ff. Florovskii, Puti, 22. D. Obolensky, Italy, Mount Athos and Muscovy: the three Worlds of Maximos the Greek, Proceedings of the British Academy, 1981, 67, 160.

790 It must be pointed out, however, that despite their own self-confidence and attempts to create the elevated perception of the Russian Tsar and the Muscovite kingdom as that of a Third Rome through the various means of legendary and invented accounts, genealogies and theological speculations, the Russian theorists still felt the apparent shallowness of their arguments. This can be supported by the fact that Ivan IV demanded the confirmation and the legitimisation of his title as Tsar from Ioasaf II the Patriarch of Constantinople, who depicted him in a typical Byzantine fashion as a universal ruler: ‘as the Tsar and the lord of Orthodox Christians of the whole universe from East to west and till the ocean’. Kartashev, Ocherki, II, 440. The legitimisation of Ivan IV’s title appeared to be a controversial issue in itself. Bercken, Russia, 156, points out that Ioasaf II forged the signatures of other Eastern Patriarchs and was later removed from his ecclesiastical post as a result of his action.

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juridically and ecclesiastically acclaimed as the Russian Tsar,\textsuperscript{791} thus establishing the Russian Orthodox kingdom and its ideology, as pointed by Val'denberg, firmly upon its Byzantine heritage.\textsuperscript{792}

On the ecclesiastical level, the elevated status of the Muscovite Church, which at this historical period acquired the status of the bearer of a true Orthodoxy, required the establishment of a distinctive Russian Orthodoxy.\textsuperscript{793} This was promulgated through the numerous undertakings which were designed to highlight the special status of Russian Orthodoxy. The Metropolitan Makarii (1542-1563) was able to present the various themes of the land, the purity and the authority of Russian Orthodoxy,\textsuperscript{794} the Church and dynasty in such a way as to present the Muscovite kingdom as the culmination of human history. The appearance of the Muscovite kingdom was perceived to be the fulfilment of God’s purpose to create a Christian empire as a living organism consisting of ‘body and soul’,\textsuperscript{795} which was called upon to fulfil its duty since the time of creation.\textsuperscript{796} The gathering and compilation of these writings were of a very tendentious nature, and were dictated by the presupposed ideas of the supremacy of the ‘Third Rome’\textsuperscript{797} over the Orthodoxy of the Second Rome.\textsuperscript{798} Russian Orthodoxy was also portrayed as being elevated to the highest level through the numerous canonisations of Russian saints at the Church’s councils in 1547 and 1549.\textsuperscript{799} This, in itself, drew a contrast with the Orthodoxy of Byzantium, in which Russian Orthodoxy was perceived as succeeding spiritually the former: ‘the Russian land and the Russian Church are shining with its Orthodoxy, for in the second, reigning and great Rome the Orthodox faith became corrupted by Mohammedan heresy because of the godless Turks, but over here in the

\begin{itemize}
  \item \textsuperscript{791} Kartashev, Ocherki, II, 429.
  \item \textsuperscript{792} Val’denberg, Ucheniia, 359-360.
  \item \textsuperscript{793} Metropolitan Ioann treats the numerous compilations created during Ivan IV reign as the sign of a maturing Russian self-consciousness which realised its special calling. Samoderzhaviie, 51-2.
  \item \textsuperscript{794} Interestingly even the shaving of the beard was considered to be the act of the Latin heresy thus to go against Russian tradition. See Makarii’s letter to Sviazhsk in Malinin, Starets, 609.
  \item \textsuperscript{795} See Makarii (Bulgakov), Istoriiia Russkoi Tserkvi, vol. 1, 258-9. Cf also, Hosking, Russia, 106-7.
  \item \textsuperscript{796} B. Miller, ‘The Velikie Chetii-Minei and the Stepennaia kniga of Metropolitan Makarii and the Origins of Russian National Consciousness’, in FOG, 26, (1979), 263-382.
  \item \textsuperscript{797} Sinitsyna, Rim, 163, points out that Makarii included the main ideas of Filofei into his Velikie Mineii-Chetii.
  \item \textsuperscript{798} Florovskii, Puti, 24-5. Metropolitan Ioann, Samoderzhaviie, 52-3.
  \item \textsuperscript{799} See Moss, Baynes, Byzantium, 382. Malinin, Starets, 603.
\end{itemize}
Russian land it shone with the teaching of our holy Fathers'. This peculiar Russian self-perception was officially confirmed at the Stoglav council in 1552, which presented Russian Orthodoxy as the standard for universal Orthodoxy, now aware of its historical mission.

800 See Dvornik, ‘Byzantium’, 117ff. V. Kliuchevskii, Drevnerusskie zhitiia sviatykh kak istoricheskii istochnik, 228.
Chapter IV

The end of the Third Rome?

4.1. Nikon’s raskol

The extremity and the depth of the exclusivist self-perception of the Muscovite kingdom as a ‘Third Rome’ and its ‘exemplary’ Orthodoxy was doomed to come inevitably into confrontation with the actual legitimisation of these claims in the seventeenth century. The whole issue of Nikon’s raskol can be perceived as the struggle between the Russian self-perception which formulated the idea of the Muscovite kingdom as the ‘Third Rome’ and the reality of Russian Orthodoxy which was struggling to live out its ideals within its historical and religious isolationism.801 The evident discrepancy between what was assumed (the self-perception in terms of the ‘Third Rome’) and what was lived out (the state of Russian Orthodoxy) was realised through the differences which were discovered by Russians between Russian and Greek Orthodoxy. During the numerous encounters with Greek Orthodoxy throughout the fifteenth-sixteenth centuries the Russians, whose Orthodoxy was characterised by over-emphasis upon the external ritual, became convinced of the corruption of Greek Orthodoxy.802 The conviction was based upon Russian observations of Greek liturgical traditions and books, which at that time were printed in the West.803 However, the high self-perception of the Russians did not correspond to their own failures regarding textual corruptions and to their liturgical traditions that were criticised by Greek believers.804 This was undermining the ‘quality’ of Russian Orthodoxy and the high status of their Church.805 Thus, the political

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801 We are aware that the treatment of the highly complex issue such as Nikon’s raskol cannot be narrowed down to just one particular consideration. The objective treatment of this issue ought to consider it within the context of the relationship with both East and West alongside its own internal context.

802 See Metropolitan Ioann, Samoderzhavtie, 210.

803 Meyendorff, Reforms, 234.

804 Meyendorff, Reforms, 87, asserts that Muscovite educated monk Arsenii Sukhanov, who was commissioned by the Muscovite rulers to investigate the issue of differences with Greek Orthodoxy, reported that Greek monks burned Russian liturgical books as heretical in the seventeenth century. Interestingly enough, Arsenii’s conviction of the supremacy of Russian Orthodoxy over Greek was based upon the legendary account of Russia’s conversion and baptism through the visit of St Andrew. Arsenii denounced Greek Orthodoxy as invalid and corrupted: ‘Everything good, which was with you by Christ’s grace, passed on to us to Moscow’. So that neither Greek nor Latin Christianity represented anymore any norm or standard: ‘and the pope is not the head of the Church and the Greeks are not the source, but even if they were a source, it has dried up by now’, as found in Talberg, Istoria, I, 417. See also Kartashev, Ocherki, I, 473; II, 125ff, 131; Malinin, Starets, 491-2. Sinitsyna, Rim, 309ff.

805 Zernov, Russians, 100.
ambitions of the Muscovite rulers and the desire to eliminate corruption from Russian ecclesiastical texts on the part of the ‘Grecophile’ party required a certain degree of reform. In this, Nikon was not on his own but represented the interests of a certain party within Russian Orthodoxy, including the Tsar Aleksei, who believed that the changes regarding the popular piety were impossible without the standardization of ritual practices. This would conform Russian Orthodoxy to its high calling and its status of the leading member of the Orthodox world.

Nikon’s reforms exposed the depth of popular perception and feeling in relation to the Russian status and calling as the ‘Third Rome’. Michels’s attempt, whilst new in its approach, to demonstrate that Nikon’s reforms did not result in any widespread opposition and ultimately in the raskol, appears to underestimate the power and authority of Tradition/traditions within Russian Orthodoxy. In our opinion it is the radicalism of Nikon’s reforms that touched the devotional practices of largely uneducated laity and lower clergy, as acknowledged by Michels himself, that implicitly undermined the authority of local traditions. This resulted in the certain perception of Nikon’s reforms with subsequent opposition to the Church and the Tsar who supported Nikon’s reforms. We want also to point out that it is difficult to accept the picture which Michels draws of Nikon as that of a violent Patriarch and person whose personal actions against his fellow hierarchs rather than his reforms created an opposition.

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806 The earliest attempt to correct liturgical works in the seventeenth century in the Muscovite kingdom was done by the Abbot Dionisii in 1616 – the action which brought about his denunciation as a heretic. See J.L.H. Keep, ‘The Regime of Filaret 1619-1633’, in SEER, 38, (1959-60), 341.


808 It must be pointed out right from the outset that the term ‘Nikon’s reforms or raskol’ seem to be true only to a certain degree, namely that they happened under his overall leadership and reign. The reforms were in themselves the initiative of the Tsar Aleksei Romanov (1645-78) and other reformists priests who begun unofficial reforms before Nikon. See Dvornik, ‘Byzantium’, 117. Tal’berg, Istoria, I, 343-45. Zernov, Russians, 95ff. Florovskii, Putil, 58ff. P. Meyendorff, Reforms, 87ff. Andreieva, Religia, 116ff. Pospelovskii, Tserkov’, 86ff.

809 M. Cherniavsky, “Holy Russia”: A study in the History of an Idea, AHR, LXIII, 625, points out that by the seventeenth century, the idea of ‘Holy Russia’ became the offspring of the concept of Moscow as the ‘Third Rome’. The ‘reigning city of Moscow’, ‘the beautiful’, the ‘New Rome’ came to symbolise and to embrace ‘the land of salvation’.

810 See G.B. Michels, At War with the Church, for the condition of monks, peasants and priests, 60, 92, 110-1, 120, 124, 154-6, 164ff., 189. On Nikon’s alleged violence against fellow hierarchs and clergy see 50, 55, 80-89, 95, 219.
personal convictions and the perception of a Greek faith as the standard for Russian Orthodoxy came into a direct confrontation with the adherents of a ‘Third Rome’ ideology on a popular level, thus undermining the whole fabric of the Muscovite kingdom at large. His declaration at the Church council in 1655\textsuperscript{811} that ‘I am a Russian…but my faith and religion are Greek’, and his acts of introducing into Russian Church life the liturgical practices of the contemporary Greeks came to be perceived as a ‘foreign influence on Russian life’.\textsuperscript{812} The adherents of the ‘old’ party, who perceived Russian Orthodoxy as the ‘criterion of truth’, based upon the Russian ecclesiastical traditions and the church’s praxis,\textsuperscript{813} came into conflict with the representatives of the ‘Grecophile’ party who perceived the need for the conformity of Russian Orthodoxy to that of the Greek which, according to them, was still considered to be a norm despite its failures during the fifteenth century.\textsuperscript{814} Thus, Nikon’s reforms drew a contrast between local Russian and ‘foreign’ Greek traditions. There appeared Russian Orthodoxy, which either supplanted or replaced the authority of Greek liturgical traditions with the authority of local traditions which came to be regarded as sacrosanct, receiving authoritative approval at the Stoglav council on the basis of its own starina (age-long precedence).\textsuperscript{815} These, nevertheless, according to Nikon’s party, were ‘heretical and false’\textsuperscript{816} thus undercutting their authoritativeness and legitimacy. On the other hand, Greek traditions were perceived by Nikon and his co-thinkers to have a normative character and to carry a prescriptive authority which required obedience and some reform in relation to the liturgical practices of Russian believers.

The opinion of Russian and foreign scholars is divided about the motifs and reasons for the schism and the conflict\textsuperscript{817} which ensued from the confrontation and different problems between Nikon, Tsar Aleksei and the Old Believers.\textsuperscript{818} Whilst some scholars like Zyzykin completely disregard personal motives from Nikon’s side, and perceive his

\textsuperscript{811} V.O. Kliuchevskiy, A course in Russian history, 325.
\textsuperscript{812} Obolensky, Heritage, 40.
\textsuperscript{813} O. Ogloblin, ‘Moskovs’ka Teoriia III Rimu в XVI-XVII stol.’, in Teoriia Tret’iego Rimu, 43.
\textsuperscript{814} Tal’berg, Istorija, I, 347-8.
\textsuperscript{815} See B.D. Grekov, Sudebniki XV-XVI vekov, 182-3.
\textsuperscript{816} Florovskii, Puti, 65.
\textsuperscript{817} We differentiate between the two problems: the Schism and Patriarch’s conflict with the Tsar.
\textsuperscript{818} We use the term of ‘Old Believers’ as strictly referring to the adherents of Old Belief. See Michels, War, 13, 16-8.
actions as being strictly dictated by the Church’s canons and the pastoral needs of his flock, others, including Karamzin, Kapterev, S.M. Solov’ev, Florovskii perceive the personal character of Nikon as one of the crucial factors in one’s understanding of Nikon’s ‘papo-caesarism’ and of the whole conflict.

It has to be said that there is enough evidence to support the views of both sides, depending on the reliance of a particular scholar either upon pro-Nikon or anti-Nikon’s sources. Whilst the personal characteristics of individuals such as Nikon and Tsar Aleksei indeed played a significant role in this conflict, what should not escape the attention of a researcher is that their conflict with all its subsequent tragic results ought to be placed within a wider context in which the issue of authority played a major role. Bearing in mind the historical occurrences of Russian ‘caesaro-papism’, it is not too difficult to affirm together with Zyzykin that Nikon’s reaction against Aleksei’s ‘caesaro-papism’ was indeed partially dictated by the zeal of a Patriarch-reformer striving to conform the relationship between sacerdotium and imperium to the ideals and the canonical rules of Eastern Orthodoxy. What is more difficult to affirm, as Zyzykin does, however, is the idealistic picture of Nikon who is perceived to be fighting apocalyptic battles against the evil party of the boyars (the aristocrats), the ‘caesaro-papism’ of the Tsar and the disobedient party of the old ritualists.

It is our contention that the whole issue of the raskol can be viewed as a clash of different conceptions of power and authority in which the personal failures of each of the parties were closely intertwined and inseparable from the theological/philosophical perceptions about the authority and power. Thus, there

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819 The term ‘papo-caesarism’ is used here to characterise Nikon’s authority and his alleged attempts to encroach on the Tsar’s authority. The term is borrowed from Kliuchevsky, Course, 29ff.
821 For the sources consult Palmer’s, The Patriarch and the Tsar, 6 vols, which contain the extracts of Nikon’s own writings as well as the anti-Nikon’s writings of Nikon’s contemporaries Paul of Aleppo and Paisii Ligarid.
822 For the wider analysis of different dissidents throughout the raskol, see G.B. Michels, At War with the Church, Stanford, Stanford California Press, 1999.
happened a clash between different parties and their perceptions and the actual exercise of authority: the Patriarch versus the Tsar, the Old Believers versus the Patriarch or the Tsar, Nikon and the clergy.

The reform movement of the bogoliubtsy (the lovers of God), which was begun from ‘below’ by the representatives of the white clergy, being led by I. Neronov in 1636, contained within itself a traditional criticism and antagonism against the moral failures of the black, monastic clergy and its associated hierarchic authority. Against the ecclesiastical arrangements in which authority tended to be concentrated in the hands of the Church hierarchy, the bogoliubtsy began to advocate the corporate responsibility of the whole membership of the Church, thus essentially promulgating the principle that was in existence in the fifteenth century Novgorod. They argued for a closer involvement of the white clergy in the decision-making of the Church, particularly at its Councils, which by that time had become the prerogative of the monastic clergy – one of the contributing factors to the antagonism between the white and black clergy.

Neronov wrote to the Tsar: ‘it is not right only for the hierarchs to gather, but also the archimandrites, hiegumens, protopriests, monks and deacons who discern the Scriptures, but also the laity from different occupations, who live in the world and lead a godly and righteous life’. It seemed, then, that the bogoliubtsy began to question the ‘undisputed authority and supremacy’ of the episcopate, echoing the sentiments of their forerunners – the free thinkers of the fifteenth and sixteenth centuries. This important factor seems to be largely overlooked by the scholarship which tends to concentrate upon the context of the conflict between Nikon and the bogoliubtsy. Thus, it leaves ‘behind the curtains’ as it were the significance of the corporate responsibility and the power-sharing among the whole membership of the Church for the party of the bogoliubtsy and their different perception of authority within the Russian Church.

823 Zen'kovskii, Staroobriadchestvo, 82ff.
824 Ibid., 82ff.
827 As found in Zen'kovskii, Staroobriadchestvo, 132. The translation is mine.
828 Ibid., 132. Pospielovsky, Church, points to Sobors in 1649 and 1651 which revealed an antagonism between the white clergy and the monastic episcopate. See also Michels, War, 30ff., on the conditions of the white clergy.
Furthermore, the manner in which Nikon introduced the reforms in his circular letter, without prior discussion at the Church’s council, appears to be crucial if one is to understand the nature of his dispute with the *bogoliubtsy*, at least in its early stages. Whilst participating in the *bogoliubtsy* movement before becoming a Patriarch, Nikon appeared to carry the reforms in co-operation with other reformers, but his subsequent actions manifested a more autocratic approach which provoked a sharp reaction from the reformers and put him on a collision course with the party of the *bogoliubtsy*.\(^\text{829}\)

Potter pointed out that Nikon’s introduction of the notion of the ‘hierarchy of authority’ in the manner of the heavenly hierarchy of Pseudo-Dionysios the Areopagite in his *Sluzhebnik* and *Skrizhal’* in 1655: ‘Since the holy angels are arranged according to ranks and degrees, we humans, their imitation, have degrees, as the Great Dionysios says’.\(^\text{830}\) It was intended to strengthen hierarchy’s power and authority as well as his own.\(^\text{831}\) Neronov, contrary to Nikon’s perception of the hierarchy’s authority, asserted that the Patriarchs are

Not the heads to other bishops, but the oldest brothers each in their territory, and all have the same wisdom, and the same activity and the same honour. The hierarchs are representatives of the first twelve Apostles, the clergy and deacons are representatives of the seventy Apostles, all among themselves are brothers, slaves of one Master, who glorified them to preach the word of truth in the whole world, and none of them are more, nor less...\(^\text{832}\)

Thus, according to Zen’kovskii, Neronov and his co-reformers began from 1652-8 the fight against the autocratic authority of Nikon and the *Sobor* of the episcopate, which stood for the views and the authority of the hierarchy of the Russian Church.\(^\text{833}\) This struggle can be broadly described as the clash of two opposite principles – collegial and

\(^{829}\) Zen’kovskii, *Staroobriadchestvo*, 208-10.
\(^{831}\) Potter, ‘Politics’, 143. We totally agree with Potter’s conclusion that: ‘The elevation of the power and authority of the Patriarch and the creation of a hierarchy of authority within the Church challenged the traditional power and independence of the prelates, the monasteries, the lower clergy, and the laity’, 514.
\(^{832}\) As found in Potter, ‘Politics’, 164.
shared versus hierarchical authority. That it tended to be so can be deduced from the fact that despite Neronov's requests at the Sobor in 1666, neither the representatives of the laity nor the white clergy were invited to participate in this significant event.

Finally, the subsequent historical development of the ecclesiastical life of the Old Believers along the principle of the obshchina (congregation), testified to their perception of ecclesiastical authority. The ecclesiastical life of the Old Believers came to be centred around the obshchina, which revealed a corporate sense of shared authority and mutual interdependence between leadership and the members of the obshchina. Thus against the highly centralised hierarchic structure of the Russian Church in which authority was concentrated in the hands of the Church's monastic hierarchy, being led by the Patriarch and exercised from 'above', Old Believers constructed their own ecclesiastical structure. Their understanding either denied the hierarchic principles of authority altogether (bezpopovtsy - priestless), or acknowledged the existence of the Church hierarchy with the restoration of the episcopate in 1846, being subjected, however, to the principles of shared authority and mutual interdependence (popovtsy – congregations with priests). Moreover, the ecclesiastical life of other Old Believers revealed the charismatic authority of the individual starets. These elderly believers, who usually distinguished themselves by charismatic gifts or ascetic actions, enjoyed and exercised undisputed authority amongst their followers.

The forceful imposition of alien practices upon Russian Orthodoxy as well as Nikon's autocratic behaviour towards State officials produced a major upheaval which assumed the character of an eschatological/apocalyptic drama. The deeply held eschatological beliefs about the Muscovite kingdom as the 'Third Rome' which found its final refuge...
in the land of Rus’ became the cornerstone of the spirituality of Old Believers. They perceived the Russian Church under Nikon as falling into Greek heresy, through the actions of Nikon and the Tsar Aleksei who were ‘introducing the alien Roman abomination’. The novelty of Nikon’s reforms and the reactions which they provoked on the part of Old Believers ensured a creation of the apocalyptic perception on the part of the laity, the white and sometimes even the black clergy. This apocalyptic perception contributed and in many cases provided a theological basis for disobedience either to the authority of the Patriarch or the Tsar, which according to Kliuchevskii became a primary reason for the schism.

On the part of the Old Believers the writings of their leaders such as Neronov and protopop Avvakum, among others, reveal the existence of the apocalyptic framework, which survived from the sixteenth century and in many cases predetermined the attitude of the Old Believers towards either Nikon or the Tsar, leading in some cases to self-burning as a means of escape from the evil world. The spread of apocalyptic expectations of universal apostasy as attached to the year 1666, being re-enforced by jurodivye (fools for Christ’s sake), only increased the perceived magnitude of Nikon’s reforms and contributed towards the creation of the figure of the Antichrist. This figure, depending upon the theological standpoint of the individual or party, was assigned to different personalities and events. Whilst for Old Believers Nikon and later the Tsar Aleksei revealed the character of the Antichrist, Nikon’s perception identified Ligarid and the party of the boyars as representing the character and the actions of the

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839 On the ‘Third Rome’ concept of Old Believers, see Sinitsyna, Rim, 313ff. Kirillov, Rim, 40ff. On the schism and Old Believers’ beliefs see Crummey, Old Believers, 3ff.
841 V. V. Andreev, Raskol i ego znachenie v narodoi russkoi istorii, 68.
842 Kliuchevsky, Course, 329.
845 Ibid., 137, 152, 224, 234. See also Zen’kovskii, Staroobriadchestvo, 144-55, 239.
Antichrist. Relying upon the apocalyptic writings ascribed to Methodius of Patar, Ephraim, Andrew of Caesarea, among others, Nikon identified the activities of his adversaries as those of the Antichrist and professed the ‘Third Rome’ doctrine. The Muscovite kingdom, as a ‘Third Rome’ was identified with that of ó κατέχων the uderzhivashchii (the one who restrains) of II Thess 2:6-7. In this, Nikon relied upon a certain Patristic line of interpretation which defined and identified ó κατέχων with that of the historical entity rather than a person, that is the Roman empire which was restraining the power of the Antichrist before Christ’s Second Coming.

The raskol highlighted the extent to which the self-perception of Russian Orthodoxy as that of a universal Church and kingdom, identified and held by the Muscovite kingdom, penetrated the whole fabric of Russian society. The ecclesiastical council in 1667, which was presided over by the Eastern Patriarchs, delivered a final blow to the ‘Third Rome’ perception of the Russians. In addition to the trial over Nikon, this council denounced the very high claims that were ‘foundational’ for Russian Orthodoxy and represented its distinctive marks and historical developments during the fifteenth-sixteenth centuries. Thus, the Stoglav council, which elevated Russian Orthodoxy to a supreme level, was denounced as an act of ignorance and pride. Furthermore, the Eastern Patriarchs appeared to deliver a ‘blow’ to the autocephalous status of the Russian Church and its right to exercise authority within its jurisdiction:

We declare the Council of 1551 to be no Council at all and its decisions not binding, because the Metropolitan, Macarii, and those with him acted and made their decisions in ignorance, without reason, and quite arbitrarily, for they had not consulted the Oecumenical Patriarch.

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849 See Istrin, Otkrovenie, 244-5. The text of Otkrovenie, in different redactions in Istrin, second part, 84-100, 102-14.
850 Zyzykin, Patriarkh, II, 44. Palmer, Patriarch, I, 72-3.
852 Kartashev, Ocherki, II, 174-5.
853 As found in Zernov, Russians, 104.
As a result of these pronouncements the ‘utopian’ belief concerning the ‘Third Rome’ was doomed to be removed from the level of the official and popular ideology, yet it retained its strong eschatological appeal in the hearts of Russian Orthodox believers in the centuries to come.

Moreover, the ecclesiastical council in 1667, under the influence of the Eastern Patriarchs, reinforced the authority of the Tsar. The opinion of such scholars as Kliuchevskii\textsuperscript{854} can be disputed, that Nikon’s actions constituted ‘papo-caesarism’\textsuperscript{855} and that he introduced the ‘double-sword’ Western theory into Russian ecclesiastical practice\textsuperscript{856} which posed a ‘direct challenge to the whole past of the Russian Church’.\textsuperscript{857} When one studies Nikon’s pronouncements on the issue of the authority of the Patriarch versus that of the Tsar, it seems that such a view of Nikon’s actions cannot be substantiated and is in need of some modification.

Zyzykin pointed out that Nikon’s polemic on this issue was directed against the postulates of Paisius Ligarid and the contemporary expressions of Russian ‘caesaro-papism’.\textsuperscript{858} Zyzykin appears to be right in his assessment of Ligarid’s influence upon Tsar Aleksei concerning the propagation of the Tsar’s authority and its practical application as against Patriarchal authority.\textsuperscript{859} However, his understanding seems to disregard the weight of the ‘home-grown’ Josephite perception of the elevated authority of the Tsar, which was formulated well before Ligarid’s arrival into Muscovy and fully embraced by Aleksei’s predecessors and the Muscovite populace at large. It appears that Nikon’s actions and polemic were directed against the abuses of the Tsar’s ‘caesaro-

\textsuperscript{854} Kliuchevsky, Course, 29ff. Similar opinion by Tal’berg, Istoriia, 357-8.
\textsuperscript{855} It seems that Kliuchevsky and other scholars of a similar opinion do not take into consideration such an important factor like Nikon’s predecessor Patriarch Joseph, who was regarded as meek and a weak-willed hierarch. Nikon’s allegedly arrogant behaviour could be explained as an attempt to strengthen the authority of the patriarchal office. See the testimony of Nikon’s contemporary hieromonk S. Mikhailovskii in Palmer, IV, 189.
\textsuperscript{856} Zen’kovskii, Staroobriadchestvo, 232, ascribes the introduction of this theory to the Dominican friar Benjamin who was brought by Gennadii in 1490.
\textsuperscript{857} Kliuchevsky, Course, 325-6. Similar Kapterev, Kharakter, 5, 8-19.
\textsuperscript{858} Zyzykin, Patriarkh, I, 208ff. Cf. also Palmer, Patriarch, I, 40ff., 583, the testimony of Paul of Aleppo in II, 287-8; Appendix V in vol. II, 478; III, 51-2, 56.
\textsuperscript{859} Ibid., I, 218-23.
papism\footnote{This seems to be expressed in his famous \textit{Vozrazhenie Nikona}. For the Russian text see V.A. Tumins, G. Vernadskii (eds.), \textit{Patriarch Nikon on Church and State}, 123-30, especially 260-82, where Nikon comes close to envisaging the actions of the Antichrist in Tsar's behaviour.} and its advocates such as Ligarid and the representatives of the boyar's party who used the bureaucratic device of \textit{Monastyrskii prikaz} (Monastic department) in order to subjugate the Church and the clergy.\footnote{See M.N. Tikhomirov, P.P. Epifanov (eds.), \textit{Sobornoie ulozhenie 1649 goda}, especially chapters XIII, 170-2, XVII, 42, 210-1. See also Cherniavsky, \textit{Believers'}, 17.}

Is it good that the Tsar perfidiously appropriates the right of the priesthood?... Why is it that the Tsar is not regarded in the first place for the sake of his Tsar's authority? Everyone is supposed to know his limitation: 'Everyone ought to remain in his calling to which he is called... The Tsar is not the head or the ruler of the Church: 'where is Christ's word that the Tsar ought to have authority over the Church?'\footnote{Zyzykin, \textit{Patriarkh}, II, 16-7, 18-9, 21.}

Arguing against the 'high' view of the Tsar, Nikon criticised the contemporary perceptions of the Tsar in terms of an 'earthly god' with the authority of the king of the OT.\footnote{Ibid., II, 18-9.} The Tsar's interferences in ecclesiastical affairs were considered by Nikon to be a 'rebellion against God himself'.\footnote{Ibid., II, 79.} Thus, Nikon tended to propagate the equality and the correlation between the offices of the Patriarch and the Tsar within the concept of \textit{symphony},\footnote{His \textit{Sluzhebnik}, contains the explicit expression of the theory of \textit{symphony}. See Zyzykin, \textit{Patriarkh}, II, 97-8.} rather than intending to make 'the Church supreme over the State' as Ware and Walters, among others, suggest.\footnote{Ware, \textit{Church}, 124. P. Walters, 'The Russian Orthodox Church and Foreign Christianity', in J. Witte Jr., M. Bourdeaux (eds.), \textit{Proselytism and Orthodoxy in Russia}, 33.}

It also appears that his writings reveal less of the influence of the Western 'double-sword' theory and more of that of Church Fathers like John Chrysostom, Theodore Studite, John of Damascus and some Russian ecclesiastical writers, as Zyzykin suggests.\footnote{Zyzykin, \textit{Patriarkh}, II, 81.}

Finally, at the councils in 1666-1667, Nikon's views came into direct clash with the theory of Eastern Patriarchs who propagated and imposed, despite the resistance from Russian bishops,\footnote{This seems to be expressed in his famous \textit{Vozrazhenie Nikona}. For the Russian text see V.A. Tumins, G. Vernadskii (eds.), \textit{Patriarch Nikon on Church and State}, 123-30, especially 260-82, where Nikon comes close to envisaging the actions of the Antichrist in Tsar's behaviour.} the pro-Eusebian view of the Tsar as God's vice-regent which contained the view of the Tsar as the animate law, thus enhancing the authority of the...
Tsar even further, preparing the way for the rule of Peter the Great. Additionally, the
council of 1667 dealt also with the issues of the Patriarch’s authority and that of the
hierarchy. The Patriarch’s primacy was recognised and honoured. His authority,
however, in relation to other hierarchs and ecclesiastical affairs was limited by virtue of
the Church Council, which was supposed to convene ‘on a more regular basis’.

4.2. The aftermath of Nikon’s raskol

Hosking pointed out that Nikon’s raskol ‘opened a radical split in Russian
consciousness’, dividing Russian Christians along the ‘demarcation line’ into the
adherents of the imperial, state Church and the followers of the OB. What united
them, however, was the existence of the belief that Moscow still represented the ‘Third
Rome’ and Russia as a whole was a chosen nation, entrusted with a prophetic task in
relation to the rest of the world.

The coming of the Tsar Peter the Great (1696-1725) inaugurated a new era in the
historical development of Russia. His reign introduced both a certain degree of
continuity and discontinuity with the Muscovite Rus’, namely the ‘caesaro-papism’ of
the Russian Tsars, and the popular perception of the Russian Tsar as God’s
‘anointed’. This, nevertheless, was further promulgated in line with his personal
character, and with a new innovation in the religious sphere and a break with the past,
that of the de facto abolition of the institute of Moscow’s Patriarchate in 1700 and the
introduction of the Holy Synod. It is our understanding that it cannot be determined

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867 Hosking, Myths, 209.
871 Hosking, Myths, 209.
874 Pospelovskii, Tserkov’, 257, perceives this factor as the one which allowed Peter to carry through his
un-canonical reforms in relation to the Church’s ministerial structure.
875 Some of Peter’s policies were simply a continuation, albeit in a radical way, of policies emanating from
the period of his father Tsar Aleksei Mikhailovich. See Pospelovskii, Tserkov’, 86ff., also his History, 69.
876 The actual abolition, de jure in 1721. See Pospelovskii, History, 16.
877 It must be stressed, however, that Peter’s action in abandoning the institution of the Patriarchate and
replacing it by the Holy Synod does not seem to be radical when one reads the replies of Constantinople’s
Patriarch Jeremiah III affirming Peter’s decision in 1723 as well as the autocratic policies of the last
whether the creation of the Holy Synod by Peter was done against the background of the Patriarchal Nikon-like autocratic power and as a contra-reaction, as Zyzykin suggests. 878

Even more questionable is the notion of the contemporary Orthodox author A. Gavrilin that Peter’s Church reform was predominantly promulgated in order to ‘belittle the authority of the Church’s hierarchy’, especially by the introduction of the lower clergy into the Holy Synod. 879 What escapes Gavrilin’s attention is the fact that the Dukhovnyi Reglament (The Spiritual Regulation) seems to reflect the structure of the highest ecclesiastical organ as being based upon the collegial principle, thus laying down a ‘new’ principle for the administration of the Russian Church as against the autocratic-like rule of the Patriarchs in the preceding years. Thus, the intention appears to be to introduce the collegial principle, rather than to suppress Episcopal power, as Gavrilin asserts. 880 The authority of the Russian Church came to be perceived as residing not in the hands of the allegedly autocratic Patriarch, but in the newly formed ecclesiastical organ, the Holy Synod, whose very existence was to reflect the sobornyi (collegial) principle, i.e. a shared sense of ecclesiastical authority.

...it is known that the truth is found through the sobornoie clergy rather than in one person and an autocratic ruler; he is afraid of the wrath of the powerful of this world, and within the collegium even the president is subjected to the judgment of his colleagues... It is also great that because of the sobornyi administration our motherland will not fear any uprisings and quarrels, which come from the autocratic rule of the spiritual ruler. 881

In addition, Peter the Great re-asserted the autocephalous status of the Russian Church by negating the authority and the status of the Patriarch of Constantinople. The Holy Synod abandoned the prayers for the Ecumenical Patriarch in an historical move in 1721 on the basis that his authority was perceived to be restricted and historically unjustified:

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878 Zyzykin, Patriarkh, II, 229-30. Zyzykin’s opinion can be supported on this point by Peter’s Dukhovnyi Reglament, which had some direct references to Nikon’s ‘affair’. See Palmer, Patriarch, vol. VI, 1606, 1609-11. See also B.I. Syromiatnikov, Zakonodatel’ nye akty Petra I, 30-3, 81ff.
880 Ibid., 196.

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The ecumenical Patriarch of Constantinople does not have any authority over other autocephalous churches, and even if he is called ecumenical and Alexandria’s [Patriarch] is regarded as a universal judge, though they find different reasons for that, yet some of these reasons are false, others are not very strong and unequal in title.  

Contrary to Kartashev’s assertion concerning the demolition of ‘the monistic philosophy of the Orthodox-theocratic kingdom of Moscow’, it can be asserted that Peter the Great’s actions came as a result of the historical circumstances emanating from Nikon’s raskol and a vision which envisaged the Russian state as based upon the traditional ‘pillars’ of autocracy and the Church. It seems that Kartashev’s main mistake, among other Russian scholars, consists in treating Peter’s reign by taking it out of the historical context preceding it. Whilst no one can ignore the novelty on Peter’s side in his westernising reforms, it would be presumptuous to view Peter’s reign as detached from the reigns of his predecessors and their role in relation to the Church or to disregard completely his Orthodoxy. His reforms did not constitute either a complete break with the past or an unprecedented novelty. Neither can his reforms, in our

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881 As found in Zyzykin, Patriarkh, II, 229, my translation.
882 As found in Kapterev, Patriarkh, 473-4, my translation.
883 A. V. Kartashev, ‘Pravoslaviie i iego otnosheniie k istoricheskomu protsessu’, Tserkov’, Istoriia, Rossiia Moskva, 53. It seems that Kartashev is mistaken in his understanding that Peter the Great destroyed the monistic philosophy of the Muscovite Orthodox kingdom. Whilst it can be admitted that Peter I distorted the original understanding of the Muscovite Orthodox kingdom as being based on the principle of symphony, the monistic philosophy of the Orthodox kingdom was preserved in the form of a ‘societal monism’, albeit in ‘secularist terms’. Kartashev himself admits that even throughout Peter’s lifetime his image of the Russian Tsar was perceived from the ‘Eastern monistic point of view as the charismatic biblical Tsar, the leader of the baptized nation, the New Israel, the New Testamental Orthodox theocracy which would embrace all nations’, 54. For the opposite view of Peter’s reforms see Zen’kovskii, Staroobriadichestvo, 256, where he makes a direct link between Peter’s reforms and the changes under the Tsar Aleksei. For the concept of a ‘societal monism’ and its preservation in Russia in this period, see C. Toumanoff, ‘Moscow the Third Rome: Genesis and Significance of a Politico-Religious Idea’, CHR, XL, (1954/5), 411-47. Obolensky’s criticism of Peter’s ‘Russian totalitarianism’ seems to neglect the seriousness of Russian tradition of ‘caesaro-papism’ of the Russian Tsars, culminating during the reign of Ivan IV. See Obolensky, ‘Heritage’, 59.
884 There is a sufficient evidence to suggest that Nikon’s autocratic actions and conflicts with Peter’s predecessor, as well as the Nikon-like behaviour of Patriarch Adrian, were partially responsible for Peter’s treatment of the ecclesiastical hierarchy. See Talberg, Istoriia, II, 530ff. Wolff, ‘Romes’, 305ff. Kartashev, Ocherki, II, 323-30. Pospielovsky, History, 105.
887 See Nikolin, Tserkov’, 79-80.
foreign trips. No one should underestimate Peter’s thorough adherence to Russian Orthodoxy, which was expressed throughout his life, albeit in a peculiar way.

However, the propagation of the Western contemporary cultural values at the expense of Russian traditional mode of life gave rise to the appearance of distinctive classes of *intelligentsia* and peasantry. This, in itself, was symptomatic of changes in the religious outlook of the nation, in which the former were abandoning Byzantine traditions and the latter clung to the Russian ideal of the ‘Third Rome’. This, in turn, led to the polarisation of the society which came to be divided along the lines of those supporting Peter’s reforms and those who viewed his actions through the ‘eyes’ of a ‘Third Rome’ ideology, expressing their national feeling and defending the old traditions. This ideology, in itself, came to be perceived and interpreted in two ways. On the one hand, the political aspects of a ‘Third Rome’ ideology were advanced by Peter and his successors and re-applied in relation to a new capital of Russia, St. Petersburg, and to the foreign policy relating to the Ottoman Empire. On the other, the messianic aspects of this ideology with the perception of its spiritual authority remained among circles of the Old Believers, albeit modified alongside historical changes, and came to define Russia as a whole, its nation and its Tsar as representing the Orthodox kingdom with a universal significance. These perceptions were later expressed most clearly by the Slavophiles throughout the nineteenth century who re-introduced and popularised the

887 See Nikolin, Tserkov’, 79-80.
890 See the work of the Russian scholar, Lotman, who asserts that throughout Peter’s reign the symbolism of the ‘New Rome’ was transferred from Moscow to St. Petersburg, ‘Otvzuki’, 201ff. Lotman advocates the view that Peter the Great took over ‘imperialistic aspects’ of ‘Third Rome’ ideology leaving the religious side of it altogether. See also P.J. Stuart Duncan, ‘Russian Messianism A Historical and Political Analysis’, Ph.D. thesis, 1989, 34ff. Their arguments, however, ought to be placed against S.L. Baehr’s view who points not only to the existence of the political aspect of ‘Third Rome’ ideology in the seventeenth and eighteenth centuries, but also to the existence of Filofei-like perceptions of the apocalyptic character in the writings of the ecclesiastical writers, poets and historiographers. See ‘From History to National Myth: Translatio imperii in Eighteenth Century Russia’, RusR, 37, 1, (1978), 1-13. F.I. Uspenskii, Istoriia Vizantiiskoi Imperii XI-XV vv. Vostochnyi Vopros, 702ff., presents Peter’s policies as not being exclusively based upon political considerations. Pospielovsky, History, 72-3, relying upon Kapterev, asserts that Peter’s foreign policy in relation to the Ottoman Empire was partially dictated by the religious aspirations emanating from the ‘Third Rome’ ideology and from Peter’s predecessor Tsar Aleksei.
‘Third Rome’ concept with its notion of authority in its messianic connotations by bypassing the Petrine era and reaching back to the Muscovite period.

4.3. Slavophiles: The heralds of Russian Messianism?
The appearance of the historical genre of literature in the post-Petrine era and the works of indigenous writers like N. Karamzin (1766-1826), who reflected upon the historical meaning of Russia, creating the antithesis of ‘ancient’ and ‘modern’ Russian, ‘ancient’ and ‘modern’ Europe, as well as the historical victories over Napoleon, became the determinative factors for the Slavophile ideology. Karamzin’s historical construction represented a tendentious selection of the ‘appropriate’ periods of Russian history which identified Russia with the Russia of the Muscovite period in its glory, negating the period of St. Petersburg - a pattern which became characteristic of the Slavophile’s perception of Russia.

This ideology was centred upon Moscow as a defining factor for the Russian identity, its history and its significance in relation to the rest of the world. The Muscovite period of Russian history was singled out in such a way as to give the foundational value and principles for the contemporary Russia of Slavophiles. The historical development of Russia as a whole was perceived to be that of a continuous harmony and ‘organic life’, which flowed uninterruptedly until the time of Peter the Great, who broke this harmonious development. This development was contrasted with the development of Western civilization, which according to the Slavophile opinion, has run its course and was coming to an end.

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892 On Karamzin’s treatment of Russian history, see R. Pipes, Karamzin’s Memoir on Ancient and Modern Russia, 147-56.
894 Tsimbaev, Slavianofil’stvo, 71, perceives the victories over Napoleon as a determinative factor for the rise of Russian self-perception and the national feelings which came into a making of the Slavophile outlook.
895 See N.V. Riasanovsky, Russia and the West in the Teaching of the Slavophiles, 6-7.
897 See Riasanovsky, Russia, 78-9. A. Gleason, European and Muscovite, 168, 262-9. It appears that Slavophile treatment of the Petersburg’s period seems to be very inadequate and selective: whilst they were...
Russia is a different story; she experienced no struggle, no conquest, no eternal war, no endless treaties; she is not a creation of circumstance, but the product of a living, organic development; she has not been constructed, she grew... Not a single nation in the world is such an integral living organism, as the Russian, not a single one perhaps has been granted such a treasure of capacities, and such a power of organic, natural concretion and attraction.

Among other factors, the Slavophiles envisaged Russian autocracy and the Russian Church as the foundational principles for Russian samobytnost' (self-distinctiveness). This in our opinion was based upon the imperial ideology which was propagated in the sixteenth century by the followers of Joseph of Volotsk. Whilst not speculating upon the theory of symphony, which was characteristic of the Muscovite period, the Slavophiles nevertheless became the direct followers of the imperial ‘Third Rome’ ideology which was projected upon Russia in the nineteenth century. In a similar way to the ecclesiastical adherents of the ‘Third Rome’ of the Muscovite period, the leading Slavophile A. Khomiakov expressed in an ambivalent way anti-Byzantine feelings and elevated the Muscovite Rus’ to the forefront of world history. Khomiakov’s perception of the Orthodox Church was highly idealised and constructed in such a way as to show the superiority of an Orthodox Church of an ideal, ‘utopian’ type rather than the actual contemporary Russian Church. In his understanding, Russian Orthodoxy was entrusted with a special calling; ‘history calls Russia to lead the world’s enlightenment’. He envisaged the distinctiveness of the Russian Orthodox Church through the principle of sobornost’ which put it on a superior level to either the

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899 It seems strange that only N. Berdiaev, The Russian idea, 7ff, seems to point to the direct link between the ideology of Joseph of Volotsk and that of Slavophiles.
903 As found in Zenkovskii, Istoriia, I, 211.
Protestant or the Catholic Church, even to the point of excluding the latter altogether. In doing so, as Walker puts it, ‘Khomiakov’s ecclesiology utterly rejected the existence of an invisible ecclesia such as might reach beyond the immediate Church and incorporate any bodies other than itself’, resulting in the total exclusion of Bulgakov’s principle of ecclesia extra ecclesias.

In his overall ecclesiastical presentation the principle of sobornost’ was perceived to be of a fundamental value for the existence of the Church and human society at large as well as the means of overcoming social divisions in the West. Whilst Catholicism and Protestantism were broadly perceived to exist upon the external authority of either Pope or Scripture, and to lack either freedom (Catholic) or order/unity (Protestant), Orthodoxy was perceived to be based upon the principles of love, freedom and sobornost’ and as such constituting the true Church. The preservation of the principle of sobornost’ within the Russian Church and society at the historical period of Western collapse meant, in Khomiakov’s opinion, the projection of Russian principles such as sobornost’ on to a world stage and its application in the socio-political and philosophical realms, overcoming the social divisions and the materialistic values of the West, thus fulfilling its quasi-messianic role.

Khomiakov’s generalizations, however, very often distorted the true picture of the historical reality and resulted in different inconsistencies and anachronisms regarding the positions of the Tsar and the Church. In order to reinforce some of his points in his polemic with either Russian or foreign polemicists like Palmer, who pointed to the pre-
eminence of the Russian emperor over the Russian Church, Khomiakov introduced his own construction. The Russian emperor was perceived to be the 'head of the eparchy, who was subjected to the jurisdiction of the universal sobors', which were never held in Russian history. Writing at a time when the Russian Church, on his own admission, was subjected to the 'slavery of tsarist censorship', being ruled by the Holy Synod which became a 'kind of Ministry, which carried out the Sovereign's commands', Khomiakov still depicted the Russian Church in idealistic terms. This idealistic view of ecclesiastical life led Khomiakov to the point of envisaging it as being organised in accordance with the principle of sobornost'—a principle which was neither invented by him nor expressed explicitly in his thought. Yet, it seems that it was this principle that underlies his speculations whenever he touched upon the controversial issue of the Church hierarchy or ecclesiastical life. Khomiakov appears to allocate only a limited role, function and significance to the Church's hierarchy. Thus, he tends to put the hierarchy on the same level as the laity and appears to endanger 'the prerogatives of the episcopate' and to be 'democratising the idea of the Church' when he speaks about the teaching in the Church: 'Every person, no matter how high he is on the hierarchical ladder, or the opposite, being hidden from sight under the shadow of modest circumstance, in turns either teaches or receives some teaching because God bestows the gifts of His wisdom on whomever He desires, without looking at their status or face'. Similarly, the protection of the ritual is perceived by Khomiakov as entrusted not only to the hierarchy, 'but the whole of the Christian people, which is the body of Christ'. This ecclesiastical entirety seems to be crucial to Khomiakov in view of his negative perception of the contemporary Russian hierarchy: 'I mean by the Orthodox Church not the holy Fathers, still less the present Hierarchy with its teaching, expressed

911 Yet elsewhere Khomiakov admitted the subordinate position of Russian Church to the Russian emperor, although as 'accidental and local'. See S. Bol'shakoff, The Doctrine of the Unity of the Church in the works of Khomyakov and Moehler, 119.
912 Khomiakov's own admission. See Arsen'ev, Khomiakov, 382-3.
913 Bol'shakoff, Doctrine, 82, see also n.1, 83.
914 See Khomiakov, Sochinenia, VIII, 356-7.
915 The accusation levelled against him by some Russian and Greek scholars. See Ware, Church, 257. The Greek suspicions can be understood as the result of Greek particular view of the Church as a 'hierarchical society'. See A. Nichols, Light from the East, 114-5.
916 Khomiakov, Tserkov', 91, my translation.
917 The Archbishop of Thyateira Germanos appears to accuse Khomiakov in misunderstanding of the Synodal Encyclical which was issued in 1848. See Bolshakoff, Doctrine, ix.
in the theological works of Anthony, Macarius and others; but the Church, which acknowledges the Sacred Scriptures, the Canons of Synods, in their dogmatic definitions, and the liturgical institutions, and lives in our Church, namely, in everything permanent or everything accepted unanimously by the Hierarchy together with the people. 919

Alongside his unique view of sobornost’ as a distinctive mark of the Russian religious landscape, Khomiakov developed a unique view of the Russian Slavic nation, its historical and religious value in relation to other nations. True to his patriotic feelings Khomiakov, more than any other Slavophile, 920 highlighted the supra-historical significance of the Slavic race. In his History, Khomiakov ascribed to the Slavic race the central place in world history. The Slavic ‘linguistical, historical and ethnic’ aspects were perceived to be behind the appearance of Western civilization. 921 Within a wider Slavonic framework, Khomiakov singled out the Russian nation which occupied a special place among the Slavic nations. 922 His ‘messianic’ vision of the Russian nation was most clearly spelt out in his poems.

‘...proudly over the universe
Up to a blue sky,
The Slavic eagles fly up
On the wide and bold wing,
But bow the mighty head
Before the older-Northern eagle 923

Khomiakov’s perception of religious significance of Russia 924 and its mission was not limited by its attitude towards the Slavic nation but rather received a new impetus and

918 Ibid., 90.
919 Ibid, 258.
920 The elevation of a Slavic race at the expense of other European races was characteristic of all Slavophiles. See I. Kireevski, ‘No, on entire globe there is no nation worse, more soulless, dull, and vexing than the Germans. Bulgarian is a genius by comparison with them’, as found in Riasanovsky, Russia, 60.
921 Riasanovsky, Russia, 71, n. 25, describes Khomiakov’s History as a ‘peculiar combination of history, philology, and fantasy, but chiefly fantasy’ – the outcome of the Romantic Age. Khomiakov went as far to declare that there was a Slavic influence even upon English history. See Walicki, Controversy, 218.
922 See Khomiakov, Sochinenia, VIII, 58, 247.
923 An extract from Oda, as found in N. Berdiaev, Aleksei Stepanovich Khomiakov, 219, my translation. See A.S. Khomiakov, Stikhotvorenia, 45-6, also another poem Orel, 60.
perception in the wake of the Crimean War (1853-56), which was perceived to be a ‘holy war’, forcing Russia to exercise its mission in relation to the rest of the world.

Oh unworthy to be chosen,
Yet you were chosen. Cleanse yourself swiftly
In the waters of repentance,
Lest a twofold punishment
Should fall like a thunderbolt upon your head.

Your soul in meek obedience,
Your head covered with ashes,
Devote yourself to humble prayer
And bathe the wounds of a depraved conscience
In the holy balm of tears.

Then arise, faithful to your mission,
And hurl yourself into the thick of bloody battles!
Fight with cunning for your brethren,
Bear aloft God’s banner with firm grasp,
And smite with the sword – God’s sword. 925

The messianic assumptions of Khomiakov and to that extent of the majority of Slavophiles in relation to the religious significance of Russia within Christendom, however, did not represent a ‘copy’ of the messianic kingdom of the ‘Third Rome’ of Filofei’s messianic type. 926 Berdiaev pointed out rightly that Khomiakov’s view ‘was not a consistent, radical form of a messianic consciousness in the prophetic, Jewish, religiously-mystical sense of this word’. 927 Berdiaev perceived the whole of the

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924 See his early poem Rossii in Stikhovoreniia, 80-1.
925 As found in Walicki, Controversy, 187. See also Raskaiavesheisa Rossii, in Stikhovoreniia, 120. Rossii, in Arsen’ev, Khomiakov, 56-7.
926 Berdiaev’s assertion, however, that ‘messianic and eschatological element in Philotheus the Monk, was weakened by solicitude for the realization of an earthly Rome’ seems to be either a slight exaggeration or a misunderstanding of the idea of the messianic kingdom. It seems that Filofei’s perception of a messianic kingdom of ‘Third Rome’ stood well within traditional understanding of translatio imperii which envisaged the conflation of earthly and heavenly kingdoms within one messianic kingdom. Berdiaev, Idea, 9. See chapter II on the early Christian understanding of translatio imperii and chapter III, section 3.2.3.
Slavophile teaching as a mixture of ‘messianism’ with ‘missionism’. Whilst the former concept implied one’s messianic self-perception as a person or a nation and was supported by the prophetic claims and the appropriate interpretations, the latter presented a particular person or a nation as having a ‘particular calling’ which was supported by a ‘scientific-mystical’ claims. Khomiakov, among others, constantly mixed these two terms in one ambiguous representation. The religious ideas echoing the ‘Third Rome’ and its exclusivist claims, reminiscent of Old Believers’ assertions, and the role and significance of Muscovite Russia, were blended with the ideas of their own of a ethnographic, historical, linguistic or philosophical nature. Being influenced in their ideological and philosophical constructions by the very West which they criticised, the Slavophiles attempted to construct a ‘samobytnuiu’ ideology and the religio-mystical outlook of Russia in a utopian-like ‘colours’. They relied upon the Russian ‘messianic’ tradition coming from the ecclesiastical ideology as well as their own scientific or ‘pseudo-scientific’ observations of their time.

4.4. Panslavism

The Slavophile perception of the role of Russian Orthodoxy and its spiritual authority within Eastern Christendom gave rise to Panslavism which underlined the uniqueness of Russia and its role in relation to other Slavic nations. The Slavophile scientific observations about cultural unity among Slavs, in which Russian nation occupied the elevated status, brought about a construction of a socio-religious framework which envisaged one united Eastern Christendom with Constantinople being liberated by the Russian empire and coming under Russian sovereignty. This peculiar mixture of religious, sentimental and cultural values was brought together in order to resolve the political disputes which surrounded ‘Vostochnyi vopros’ (The Eastern issue), arising

928 Ibid., 210.
929 Ibid., 210.
930 A number of scholars pointed to the similarities on this point between Slavophiles and Old Believers. See Riasanovsky, Russia, 189ff. Berdiaev, Khomiakov, 104-5. For other works see Murvar, ‘Messianism’, 315-6.
931 Berdiaev, Idea, 39, points out that Slavophiles absorbed into their ideological and philosophical constructions the main tenets of Hegelian philosophy. Cf. also Christoff, Introduction, I, 126.
932 See the criticism of the Slavophile ideology in Andreieva, Religiia, 186.
933 D. Obolensky, ‘Modern Russian attitudes to Byzantium’, in Studies, 65, defines Panslavism as a movement which was the outcome of Slavophile teaching between 1856 and 1878. For the historical periodization of Panslavism see Walicki, Controversy, 495.
itself against the background of the Crimean War.\textsuperscript{934} The religious aspect, however, played the prevalent role and provided the ‘ammunition’ for Slavophiles and their followers. According to Khomiakov’s vision, the interests of the Russian empire, as symbolised by Muscovy, reflected the interests of the whole of humanity, having within itself the potential for the regeneration of the whole world: ‘At least the potentiality of rebirth, if not its fully formed embryo, has been preserved for humanity by the Slavs’ and ‘the interests of Muscovy coincide with the over-all interests of mankind’.\textsuperscript{935} Khomiakov spelled out his panslavic ideas in his letter ‘To the Serbians. A Message from Moscow’ in 1860.\textsuperscript{936} This appeal represented an authoritative Slavophile ‘manifesto’ and spelled out succinctly the Slavophile views on Greek Orthodoxy, Russian cultural and Serbian religious similarities and dissimilarities to Western Europe, which was represented by the non-Orthodox countries. In his poems Khomiakov directly appealed to his Slavic brothers to rise against Turkish oppressors: ‘Rise, Slavic brothers, the Bulgarian, and the Serb, and the Croatian! Quickly embrace one another, quickly draw the sword of your fathers!’\textsuperscript{937} Being stirred up by the events of the Crimean War and later by the Balkan crisis in 1875-78, Ivan Aksakov envisaged two opposite camps within a divided Europe, according to their religious stand: Orthodox versus Catholic or Protestant.

It is time to realize that we shall not purchase the favour of the West by any amount of willingness to please; it is time to understand that the hatred, not seldom instinctive, of the West towards the Orthodox Slavonic world stems from other, and deeply hidden causes; these causes are the antagonism of the two opposite spiritual principles of enlightenment, and the envy felt by the decrepit world to the new one to which the future belongs... The hatred of the West towards the East and towards Orthodoxy is a traditional, instinctive, and peculiarly spontaneous feeling and motive force in the history of the world.\textsuperscript{938}

\textsuperscript{934} The political side of ‘Vostochnyi vopros’ which included the disputes concerning religious sites and the commercial interests of Russia in relation to Turkey and the West is thoroughly researched by F.I. Uspenskii, Istoryia Vizantiiskoi Imperii, 649-823. On the historical development of Panslavism see M. Boro-Petrovich, The Emergence of Russian Panslavism, especially 26-31.
\textsuperscript{935} As found in Walicki, Controversy, 221. On similar comments concerning the Russian nation as enveloping within itself the whole of humanity by K. Aksakov, see ibid., 299, 497.
\textsuperscript{936} See full text in Christoff, Introduction, I, Appendix, 247-68.
\textsuperscript{937} As found in Riisanovsky, Russia, 200. Khomiakov, Sochinenia, vol. IV, 63.
\textsuperscript{938} K. Aksakov, Sochinenia, I, 5, 322, my translation.
Some of the Panslavists such as Danilevskii were prepared even to grant to the unified Slavic race the status of ‘a Chosen People’, thus negating the ‘messianic claims of Jews altogether’ and contributing towards the rise of popular anti-Semitism in the aftermath of the Berlin Congress in 1878. It appears, then, that political understanding of Slavophiles was ‘underpinned’ by their religious views which divided Europe into two antagonistic camps and envisaged Russia as fulfilling a universal mission and her coming on to a world stage as inaugurating a new age. These ‘messianic’ pronouncements, which in themselves only contained certain connotations of Russian ‘messianism’ were employed more forcefully by an ardent follower of the Slavophiles, F.M. Dostoevskii, as well as others, who introduced into Slavophile ‘cultural messianism’ the ‘messianism’ of a prophetic type, which, nevertheless reflected the widespread messianic consciousness and the perceived spiritual authority of Russian Orthodoxy.

4.5. Anti-Semitism

The ardent Slavophile adherence to Russian Orthodoxy and the perception of the Russian ‘messianic’ nation as the bearer of true faith of the Muscovite period carried within itself an inherent problem in relation to the Jews. It seems that Slavophiles developed their views presumably from the writings of John Chrysostom. In our view, St John Chrysostom’s writings are the most widely read by Russian Orthodox believers. It can be safely assumed that St John Chrysostom’s views on Jews, such as expressed in Shest’ slov protiv iudeiev were literally taken over by Russian ecclesiastical writers and Russian Orthodox believers at large throughout history, thus contributing towards the formation of Russian religious anti-Semitism. See A. Kuraev, ‘The Church Fathers on the Jews’, RSS, 3, 1, (1995), 39-40. For the different cause of Russian Orthodox anti-Semitism from a sociological perspective, see L. Vorontsova, S. Filatov, ‘Russian Jews and the Church: a Sociological View’, RSS, 24, 1, (1996), 63-5. On the discussion regarding the understanding of John

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940 See J.D. Klier, Imperial Russia’s Jewish Question, 1855-1881, 393ff.
941 This notion is most clearly pronounced by K. Aksakov in his article ‘On the Eastern Question’ in 1854. See Walicki, Controversy, 497.
942 In this regard the ‘cultural messianism’ of Pobedonostsev seems to follow the ‘footprints’ of Dostoevskii’s messianism. See R.F. Byrnes, Pobedonostsev, His Life and Thought, 302ff.
944 St John Chrysostom’s writings are the most widely read by Russian Orthodox believers. It can be safely assumed that St John Chrysostom’s views on Jews, such as expressed in Shest’ slov protiv iudeiev were literally taken over by Russian ecclesiastical writers and Russian Orthodox believers at large throughout history, thus contributing towards the formation of Russian religious anti-Semitism. See A. Kuraev, ‘The Church Fathers on the Jews’, RSS, 3, 1, (1995), 39-40. For the different cause of Russian Orthodox anti-Semitism from a sociological perspective, see L. Vorontsova, S. Filatov, ‘Russian Jews and the Church: a Sociological View’, RSS, 24, 1, (1996), 63-5. On the discussion regarding the understanding of John
it is the lack of the differentiation between what constituted anti-Jewish (anti-Judaizing/biblical) and anti-Semitic (ethnic) notions, and their existence or non-existence in the writings of the apostle Paul and the Church Fathers like John Chrysostom, as well as the lack of appreciation/understanding of the theological nuances in these writings, resulted in blurring of these notions and expressions of the popular feelings towards the Jews in anti-Semitic rather than anti-Jewish form. The mixture of feelings on a popular level combined with the ideology of the ‘Third Rome’, which carried inherent ‘messianic’ connotations of the Russian nation, on the official level was doomed to provoke anti-Semitism. It follows, then, that the anti-Semitism of the later individual Slavophiles was the natural outcome of a widespread feeling and understanding within Russian Orthodoxy on a popular level. These popular anti-Jewish feelings and stereotypes with anti-Semitic connotations were adopted by Russian writers and poets like Pushkin, Lermontov, Turgenev and Chekhov in the nineteenth century, and were incorporated into their literary works, thus providing legitimacy for the ‘enlightened’ perception of the Slavophiles.

In line with the traditional Russian messianism, I. Aksakov perceived the Jews as being the enemies of Russia by virtue of their inclination for universal dominance in the world. His journalistic writings manifested the mixture of a popular anti-Semitism with his own ‘enlightened’ observations from contemporary life which revealed anti-Semitic feelings on a level of popular perception as well as an attempt to evaluate the Jewish spiritual threat of a ‘Chosen People’ to Russian Orthodox society.


See our discussion of John Chrysostom’s alleged ‘anti-Semitic’ views in section 2.3, ‘Byzantines as the successors of Israel’.

On the policies and attitude during the time of Peter the Great, see Cracraft, Church, 70ff. Duncan, Messianism, 38ff., and quoted bibliography. N. Valentinov, ‘O Russkom messianizme’, in NZ, 90, (1968), 256.


See D. Goldstein, Dostoyevsky and the Jews, 4.


See Klier, Question, 445ff.

Klier, Question, 409, is careful in distinguishing between ‘home-grown’ anti-Semitism which sprang from within and that of a ‘German milieu’ which, according to him, was held by such followers of
Judaism, in our days, is not only a material force, but also a spiritual one, entering all spiritual and moral folds of the Christian existence. It rules not only the stock exchange, but also the press, for instance, in Austria, it penetrates, especially in Germany, into the fields of art, literature, science, and internal social development of European societies, carrying always and everywhere its spirit of negation with it... Jewish noxiousness is a national quality, a quality of Jews as a nation. 952

Jews 'leave a strange impression on me; I can't get out of my head that every Jew continues to crucify Christ'. 953

Whilst disapproving of the pogroms954 on humane grounds, Aksakov's pseudo-historical and religious views demanded the declaration that Jews were the ones responsible for their own persecutions. His inherent 'messianic' convictions denied the Jews any possibility of acquiring a greater freedom within Russia and taking a more pro-active part in the social and political life of Russia. Their distinctive social organization as a 'state within a state' and religious adherence constituted a 'Universal Jewish' plot which was perceived to be a direct threat to the existence of Christian Russia.

...The Jews came to the Christians, the masters of the land, as guests. The hosts can receive and even respect their guests, albeit uninvited, but they cannot install them in the masters' place and relinquish the masters' authority to those who would advocate the subversion of all proprietary order... we cannot wish for them administrative and legislative rights in Russia, a country that holds high the banner of Christianity, that was founded on and is developing according to the principles of Christian truth.955

Thus, the Slavophile anti-Semitism of I. Aksakov was a partial manifestation of the 'messianic' consciousness of popular Russian Orthodoxy which was expressed in day to day interaction with the Jews in a variety of ways, ranging from stereotypes to open

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952 As found in Riasanovsky, Russia, 116. See the references to other expressions of anti-Semitism in I. Aksakov's works, 116, n. 73, 74, 75. For the summary of I. Aksakov's views on Jewish question, see S. Dubnow, 'I. Aksakov i evreii', Voskhod, 2, (1887), 1-17, as found in Steinberg, Dostoevsky, vsky, 176, n.21. Klier, Question, 124ff.

953 As found in Klier, Question, 409.

persecution. The pogroms and the Blood libel came to be a re-occurring feature of Russian anti-Semitism, which found among its followers the highest officials of the Russian government including the Tsar.\textsuperscript{956} The representatives of the 'Church establishment'\textsuperscript{957} such as the Archbishop Nikon of Vologda, Hieromonk Iliodor, Archpriest I. Vostorgov, the famous John of Kronshtadt, N.P. Giliarov-Platonov\textsuperscript{958} and K. Pobedonostsev, who occupied the post of the Ober-prokuror of the Holy Synod, promulgated anti-Semitic ideas in the publications of the Holy Synod and the Church.\textsuperscript{959} This, in itself, became a 'logical' outcome of the movement, whose ideals were 'underpinned' by the 'ecclesiastical nationalism',\textsuperscript{960} which "equated nationality with "Russian" and religion with "Russian Orthodoxy".\textsuperscript{961} Further, the official publication of the Holy Synod, Tserkovnyi vestnik, demonstrated a close affinity to the anti-Semitic views of the 'occult Judeophobia'\textsuperscript{962} of the Slavophiles and the popular Orthodox masses at the end of the nineteenth century.

...the idea has been expressed more than once that amidst the terrible contemporary events in Western Europe and Russia, one can see a devilish design, directed by skilful hands. The question remains as to whose hands they are. In seeking a criminal, they say, it is important to seek the person who would benefit from the crime. Applying this rule we naturally come to the conclusion that the contemporary decline of Christianity, along with the entire external and internal side of Christian society, is useful to an anti-Christian power. And Jewry appears as such a force in the midst of Christianity.\textsuperscript{963}

\textsuperscript{955} See Hosking, \textit{Russia}, 341-2. Hosking defines Russian anti-Semitism as a 'kind of frustrated Slavophilism, born of the agonized realization that Russians had failed to fulfil their own nationhood', \textit{Russia}, 342.

\textsuperscript{956} Despite the subjectivity which surrounded Blood libels, including fabricated evidence, even Nicholas I held some suspicions concerning Jewish ritual murders. See Klier, \textit{Question}, 418ff.

\textsuperscript{957} See Y. Tabak, 'Relations between Russian Orthodoxy and Judaism', in J. Witte Jr., M. Bourdeaux (eds.), \textit{Proselytism and Orthodoxy in Russia}, 144.


\textsuperscript{959} See Byrnes, \textit{Pobedonostsev}, 209.


\textsuperscript{961} Klier, \textit{Question}, 415. Pobedonostsev declared that 'he who deserts Orthodoxy ceases to be Russian, not only in his thoughts and work, but also in his way of living and in his dress'. As found in Byrnes, \textit{Pobedonostsev}, 304. See also K.P. Pobedonostsev, \textit{Reflections of a Russian Statesman}, \textit{The Church}, 195-222.

\textsuperscript{962} Klier's designation who uses this term throughout his book instead of the anti-Semitism. On his use of terminology see \textit{Question}, \textit{Preface}, xix.
The more ‘civilized’ expressions of anti-Semitism found their way into the literary works of some Russian intellectuals among the Slavophiles and made an impact even upon the Russian literary ‘giants’ such as F.M. Dostoevskii, who expressed his characteristically Russian Orthodox ‘messianic’ consciousness by negating Jews as a nation and their ‘messianic’ calling.\textsuperscript{964}

\textsuperscript{963} As found in Klier, \textit{Question}, 447. This was echoed by Prince Meshcherskii in 1889 who described Jewry in satanic terms seeking to destroy the Orthodox Church and Russia. In Klier, \textit{Question}, 448.

\textsuperscript{964} The question whether F.M. Dostoevskii was an anti-Semite himself remains highly speculative and has provoked an intensive debate among the scholars and authors who present views \textit{pro} and \textit{contra}. D. Steinberg’s book written from a Jewish point of view presents very thorough research of Dostoevskii’s expressions on this subject. His treatment of Dostoevskii seems to suffer from some bias and presents Dostoevskii’s views as straightforward anti-Semitism, thus oversimplifying the complexity of Dostoevskii’s thought on this issue. We rather agree with J. Frank who tends to see Dostoevskii’s alleged anti-Semitism as manifesting an ambiguity which revealed the inner struggle within Dostoevskii between the commandments of Christ, his views concerning Russian Orthodoxy and his attitude towards Jews. This inner struggle was expressed in a variety of ways in his reactions towards external circumstances, experiences and reflections upon Jewish question. See Goldstein, \textit{Dostoyevsky}, xiv. It must be admitted, however, that Dostoevskii knew the difference between the popular offensive term \textit{Yid} which he employed throughout his writings and the accepted non-offensive literary term \textit{evrei}. Goldstein, \textit{Dostoyevsky}, 118-9.

Chapter V
Under the shadow of the hammer and sickle

5.1. Bolshevik's revolution: The end of the Imperial dream?
Pospielovsky's assertion that the Bolshevik revolution in 1917 signified the end of the 'Constantinian era of the Church-State 'symphony' ought to be modified in the light of the historical facts.\textsuperscript{965} It appears that his statement does not offer a fair description of the state of affairs which developed in the aftermath of the Bolshevik revolution. It seems, contrary to Pospielovsky, that the early policies of the Bolsheviks were not entirely inconsistent with those of their imperial predecessors – that of the Tsarist government, whose policies were grounded in the imperial ideology and derived from their historical predecessors such as Peter the Great and his forerunners – the Russian Tsars\textsuperscript{966} with their, as Bulgakov puts it, neo-Byzantine 'curious kind of caesaro-papism'.\textsuperscript{967}

By declaring a decree of the separation of the Church from the State in 1918\textsuperscript{968} Lenin, who was not unfamiliar with the Tsarist version of symphony and the teachings of the Russian Orthodox Church,\textsuperscript{969} introduced a Communist 'version of symphony' following the example of the Tsar and that of Vremennoe pravitel'stvo (Provisional government),\textsuperscript{970} in which both parties, at least juridically and ideologically, would be kept apart, yet co-exist within one political entity. However, as the later history of the relationship between the two proved, the prerogative would always belong to a Communist State which would exercise a modus operandi resembling the Russian Tsar. In that regard the whole history of the relationship between Church and State throughout

\textsuperscript{965} Pospelovskii, Tserkov', 27, cf., also his book The Orthodox Church in the history of Russia, 201.
\textsuperscript{966} See chapter III of our study. In this regard N.A. Krivova's assertion that the dependence of the Church on the State was a direct 'result of the Synodal epoch' appears to be quite erroneous. This dependency, albeit in a different form, was existent throughout the history of the Russian Orthodox Church preceding the Synodal period. N.A. Krivova, Vlast' i Tserkov' v 1922-1925 gg., 9.
\textsuperscript{967} Pain, Zernov, Anthology, 7. It is interesting to point out at this stage that contrary to the opinion of scholars either Russian or foreign, who rejected any notion of 'caesaro-papism' throughout the history of either Muscovite Rus' or imperial Russia, even Patriarch Tikhon referred in 1920 to the notion of 'caesaro-papism' – the mode of relationship which was in existence before the Bolshevik 'takeover'. See Akty Sviatoishego Tikhona Patriarkha Moskovskogo i Vseia Rossii, sost. M.E. Gubonin, Pravoslavnyi Sviato-Tikhonovskii Bogoslovskii Institut, Bratstvo vo imia Vsemilostivogo Spasa, 1994, 170.
\textsuperscript{968} See Posipelovsky, Orthodox Church, 206.
\textsuperscript{969} See B. Gontarev, 'Restoring Christianity in Russia', in S. Linzey, K. Kaisch (eds.), God in Russia, 220.
\textsuperscript{970} See M.V. Shkarovskii, Russkaia Pravoslavnaia Tserkov pri Staline i Khrushcheve, 70.
the twentieth century\textsuperscript{971} can be broadly and paradoxically qualified as \textit{symphony}, which signified the relationship between the two parties of the opposed ideology existing, nevertheless, under Communist control and within one Communist ‘kingdom’. One can even argue, albeit with some modifications, for the creation of a ‘religious synthesis’, as the contemporary representative of \textit{antisergiane} (the opponents of Sergii’s declaration) Z. Krahmal’nikova and G. Yakunin do.\textsuperscript{972} Although it has to be stressed that we are aware of the limitations of such an analogy and the dangers of stretching the parallels between the two historical periods/systems too far. There is both similarity and dissimilarity; continuity and discontinuity in the way both Tsarist and Communist systems exercised their control over the Russian Church. In the former period it was either expressed through the Tsar’s authority and interference into the Church’s matters, or through the office of \textit{ober-prokuror} and the Synod. The latter witnessed the Bolshevik interference into and the total control of the Church’s affairs during the early days of the Communist regime with a later appearance of the Committee for Religious Affairs (CRA) as ‘the eye of the State’ in 1943, to exercise a certain degree of control over the Church.\textsuperscript{973} Although both institutions fulfilled similar functions, that of exercising control \textit{over} the Church, however, their motives for such policy and the ideological orientation of each of the institutions were entirely different and irreconcilable with each other.

Nicholas II (1894-1917) remained ‘faithful’ to the imperial ideology of his royal predecessors in relation to the Church. Relying upon the ideological legacy of the former Russian Tsars/emperors and his own religious perception regarding the role of ‘God’s anointed one’\textsuperscript{974} in relation to the Church, Nicholas II exercised a firm control over the Church either personally or through the medium of the \textit{ober-prokuror}. In

\textsuperscript{971} Although we want to point out that this generalisation does not imply the static state of the affairs. Whilst the earliest period of the relationship between the Church and the State in the period between 1917-43 witnessed the zigzags of the Bolshevik policy towards the Church and could hardly be qualified as a \textit{symphony}, the post-1943 ‘settlement’ resembled tsarist-like control over the Church. In this regard we do distinguish between these two periods of Church’s co-existence with the Communist State.


response to the decision of the Russian ecclesiastical synod, which was determined to re-introduce a spirit of sobornost into the ecclesiastical life and the structure of the Church by convening the Ecumenical council and ‘resurrecting’ the office of Patriarch in 1905 and in 1907, Nicholas II nominated himself as the future Patriarch and forbade the convocation of the council. Whilst the motives for his decision remained unclear, his action, nevertheless, was in line with the ‘caesaro-papism’ of his predecessors, who attempted to exercise authority in the life and decisions of the Church. It does not come as a surprise, then, that the Holy Synod perceived at first the historical events of the abdication of Nicholas II and the revolution in 1917 as ‘the hour of general freedom for Russia’, which would release the Orthodox Church from ‘state shackles’.

It is important at this stage to point out that although many Russian historians/scholars seem to acknowledge the fateful role of the pseudo-starets G. Rasputin, the majority of scholars seem either to by-pass or to underestimate the significance of the authority which he came to exercise over the Tsar’s family and the Synod at this crucial moment of the history of Russia and the Russian Orthodox Church. The recently published book on Rasputin by the Russian writer and publicist E. Radzinskii on the basis of newly discovered documents and archival literature sheds some light upon the

974 Pospielovsky, Orthodox Church, 196-7, asserts that Nicholas II held the Byzantine doctrine of the ‘divine right’ – perceiving himself as the temporal head of the Church.
975 Nikolin, Tserkov', 135-6, points out that Nicholas II offered himself as a future Patriarch by abdicating first in favour of his son, then taking monastic vows and becoming the Patriarch. Nikolin relies upon S. Nilus’ account of meeting the Tsar in 1905.
976 On this issue, see L. Andreieva, Religija i vlast’ v Rossi, 228ff. Pospelovskii, Tserkov', 211ff, also his The Russian Church under the Soviet Regime 1917-1982, vol. 1, 23. G. Hosking, Russia and the Russians, A History, 379ff, also his Russia People and Empire 1552-1917, 244. Metropolitan Ioann, Rus’ sobornaia, 131-2.
977 Pospielovsky suggests that Nicholas II was simply afraid to lose authority over the Church by delegating it to the Patriarch, Tserkov', 212. Similarly Hosking, Russia, 244.
significance of this shadowy figure and the ‘spiritual/mystical’ authority which he came
to exercise within the ecclesiastical and political realm during the final phase of the
Russian empire. 981

Different authors, from the anonymous biographers of startsy to the famous F.
Dostoevskii, reveals to us that there appears to be a consensus as to what constituted a
genuine starets by the twentieth century. 982 Starchestvo (the ‘institution’ of the starets),
as a phenomenon within Russian Orthodoxy, originated in the monastic tradition. The
Byzantine period witnessed the exercise of the monastic authority throughout its
eventful history. The authority of the Emperor and the bishops in Byzantium, especially
throughout theological controversies was challenged by the authority of the monks. This
authority, in itself, derived from the popular perception of the monks as the guardians of
the Faith and in some cases as the holy men. In relation to the laity the monks’
pedagogical and pastoral role implied a certain degree and exercise of authority. Paisii
Velichkovskii’s publication of Slavonic version of the Philokalia was designed to
promulgate the monastic and spiritual renewal within Russian Orthodoxy which
included the ‘institution’ of starchestvo. In this, the Russian tradition of the starchestvo
was largely based upon Byzantine tradition. Paisii and the Optino elders, some of the
best representatives of Russian starchestvo, exercised their authority precisely in the
sphere of pedagogical and pastoral guidance. 983 The ministry of starets towards the laity
involved the members of the laity coming for confession, advice and spiritual guidance.
The starets was perceived as the wise/holy man who possessed to varying degrees
certain spiritual gifts such as clairvoyancy, prophecy, healing, performing supernatural

982 There is a significant amount of literature written on this topic. See J. Martin, Medieval Russia 980-
Dunlop, Staretz Amvrosy Model for Dostoevsky’s Staretz Zossima, Belmont, Massachusetts,
Nordland Publishing Company, 1972. ‘Russia’s Spiritual Traditions Live On’, in RCL, 10, 1,
(1982), 96-100. F.M. Dostoevskii, Brat’ia Karamazovi, 26-8. Monakhinia Ignatiia, Starchestvo na
daiut pechat’ antikhrista?, 271-300. Metropolit Veniamin (Fedchenkov), Vsemirnyi svetil’nik
Serafim Sarovskii, Moskva, 2000. N.V. Sakharov, I love, therefore I am. The theological legacy
of Archimandrite Sophrony, Crestwood, New York, St Vladimir’s Seminary Press, 2002. S S.
Khoruzhii, ‘Fenomen Russkogo starchestva v iego dukhovnykh i antropologicheskikh osnovaniakh’, TIV,
983 See Fr. S., Chetverikov, Starets Paisii Velichkovskii, Belmont, Massachusetts, Nordland Publishing
miracles and achieving extraordinary heights of personal theosis. The presence of these spiritual gifts in the life of the starets gave warrant and provided the basis for his sometimes unlimited charismatic authority, unregulated by the Church, which on occasions either came into conflict with or superseded the ecclesiastical hierarchical authority of the hierarchy of the Russian Orthodox Church. The relationship between the novice, spiritual daughter/son/family and the starets, as described by N. V. Sakharov, can be characterised as one of ‘an absolute trust and obedience’.

Such absolutism expresses itself in the belief that the words of the elder are tantamount to the divine word, and are to be accepted as such. The injunctions of the elder may even be on a par with the commandments of God, and the elder is to be treated as Christ himself. Thus, his advice is not subject to any criticism or analysis on the part of the novice.

In the course of the nineteenth century the authority of the starets assumed other dimensions, some of it drawn from the other forms of ‘unofficial/charismatic authority’ or being the ‘derivative’ from the starets’ gifts of clairvoyance and miracle working. In this, the emphasis upon the unquestioning obedience to the starets and his perceived authority outside of the monastery presented some dangers and challenges for the Church at large. The supernatural events and charismatic gifts in the life of the starets occasionally resulted in the creation of superstitious and pseudo-mystical perceptions on the part of the popular masses which came to be associated with the veneration of jurodivyi/starets/saint/Bozhii chelovek within Russian Orthodoxy. It is against this background and within the wider milieu of Russian Orthodoxy that the phenomenon of Rasputin can be

984 See Paisii Velichkovskii’s monastic rules in Fr. Chetverikov, Starets, 134, 136, 139.
986 Dunlop, Amvrosy, 39. Smolitch, Monashestvo, 314, asserts that even such a progressive hierarch as Filaret Metropolitan of Moscow (1782-1867) perceived starchestvo as a threat to the hierarchical structure of the Church. Cf. also on starchestvo, see pp. 322-68, Zhizn’ i uchenie startsev, in Monashestvo, 371-464.
987 Sakharov, Sophrony, 202.
988 Sakharov, Sophrony, 202. It has to be said that such a ‘high’ view of the starets’ authority has to be balanced against other views on the starets’ authority by St. Seraphim of Sarov, Cassian, John Climacus who did not endorse the ‘infallibility’ of starets’ discernment and authority and urged some discernment on the part of the novice. Sakharov, Sophrony, 205-6, 212.
989 See for example the divinisation of Ioann of Kronshnad by Ioannity. Shkarovskii, Tserkov’, 228. See also Chulos, Worlds, 19.
understood. It appears that the popular perception of the startsy as charismatic holy men and their authority, which was un-regulated by the Church, provided a context for the emergence of Rasputin, although he did not come from the monastic tradition. As such, the exercise of the charismatic authority was open to abuse. Thus, Rasputin’s appeal as a ‘holy man/starets’ to the Tsar’s family ensured his ascendancy and the usurpation of ecclesiastical authority within the Russian Orthodox Church.

Radzinskii has clearly shown that the enigma of Rasputin lay within this wider context of mysticism and reverential perception of the starets. The succession of jurodivyi, such as Mitia, Matrena-bosonozhka as well as a ‘miracle worker’ Philip from Paris at the heart of the imperial court, prepared the way for Rasputin’s ascendancy to the realm of ecclesiastical and political power. The perceived mystical powers of Rasputin, the widespread fascination with different sorts of mysticism by the Tsar and Tsaritsa, the health needs of the Tsar’s family as well as the endorsement of Rasputin’s perceived powers by the members of the ecclesiastical establishment of the Russian Orthodox Church, at least in the early stages of his ‘career’, allowed Rasputin from his introduction to the imperial family on 1 November 1905 until his death on 17 December 1916, to accumulate in his own hands power unprecedented in the history of the Russian Orthodox Church. His position as a ‘starets’ of the imperial family enabled him to influence the ecclesiastical life of the Russian Orthodox Church through the appointment of the appropriate hierarchs and to promulgate his own, peculiar views. Thus, Rasputin appeared to be against the idea, widespread by that time, concerning the need for the convocation of a Sobor: ‘it is good to be without a Sobor, there is God’s anointed one and it is enough, God is directing his heart, why do we need a Sobor!’ Rasputin was able to exercise through the Tsaritsa and the Tsar a considerable degree of influence upon the political life of Russian society at large through political appointments and promulgation of his own ‘prophetic’ views concerning current

990 Radzinskii, Rasputin, 65-7.
993 Ibid., 55-6, 80, 132-3.
994 Ibid., 144. On the interference of Rasputin into ecclesiastical affairs of the Russian Orthodox Church see also pp. 428-9, 384ff.
political affairs. Thus, he was able to bring about his personal contribution towards the downfall of the Russian empire and its monarchy as well as to discredit the Russian Orthodox Church in the eyes of the population.\(^\text{995}\) The collapse of the monarchy and its imperial ideology left the Russian Orthodox Church in a precarious state in the face of the militant Bolshevik power which had to work out the ‘rules of engagement’ with the remaining member of the former symphony.

This, in itself, was helped by the controversial election of the Patriarch Tikhon at the historical Sobor in 1917. This Sobor revealed the polarity of opinions concerning the structure of the Church and the perception of authority within the Church – the discussions which pulverised the Russian Orthodox Church throughout the nineteenth century and beginning of the twentieth century.\(^\text{996}\) Whilst in the beginning the majority of the participants including Archbishop Sergii (Stragorodskii) rejected the idea of electing the Patriarch\(^\text{997}\) and with a certain faction of the Sobor proposing a democratic system of administration reflecting the spirit of sobornost', the political upheaval in the autumn of 1917 led towards the idea of electing the Patriarch as a focal point of ecclesiastical authority, thus reverting to the traditional model of the Russian Church.\(^\text{998}\)

The election of the Patriarch enabled the Church to express its opinion concerning political changes which took place, signalling the first historical perceptions of the new and independent ecclesiastical authority at this momentous time in the history of Russia. These perceptions, however, were quickly modified in line with the changes in the attitude of the Communist State towards the Church in the aftermath of the Bolshevik

\(^{995}\) On political influence see Radzinskii, Rasputin, 155-6, 165, 236, 376ff.


\(^{998}\) On this historical council, see Walters, ‘Orthodox Church’, 68. A. Levitin-Krasnov, V. Shavrov, Ocherki po istorii Russkoi Tserkovnoi smuty, 42ff. Pospelovskii, Tserkov’, 219ff. Moss.
revolution. Thus, the persecutions and repressions of religion, and the Russian Church in particular, brought about an unprecedented perception of the role of the Church in the life of the State in which the former was forced to maintain an a-political, neutral position, especially in the face of the increasing civil conflict in 1918.\footnote{Kashevarov, Gosudarstvo, 83-5. Krivova, Vlast', 158.} This, in our opinion, happened due to clashes over perceptions of authority, in relation to which the spiritual authority of the Russian Church over its Russian flock either posed a threat or came into a direct confrontation with the perceived authority of Bolshevik ideology.\footnote{We refer to Russian Orthodoxy \textit{within} Russia. The Karlovtsy Synod became the third, most extreme and monarchist representative of Russian Orthodoxy. Its study is outside of our research and occasional references will be made insofar as they relate to the issue under our investigation. On the ideological and political outlook of Karlovtsy's Synod, see Meerson, 'Philosophy', 218. On the history of the relationship between the Moscow Patriarchate and the Russian Orthodox Abroad (hereafter ROA), see O. Antić, 'The Russian Orthodox Church Abroad', in P. Ramet (ed.), Eastern Christianity and politics in the Twentieth Century, 135-45.} The Church lost its historical role as the supporter of the autocracy/State and the reciprocal support of its status within Russian society. Thus, it was doomed to face the onslaught of the Communist system and ideology which perceived the old Tsarist system as redundant and Orthodoxy with its imperial ideology as totally alien to the worldview of the builders of the 'new world'.

It has to be said that scholarly opinion appears to be divided in its assessment of the attitude of the Russian Orthodox Church towards the Bolshevik revolution in 1917. Whilst some advocate a generally negative attitude, highlighting the condemnation of the Bolsheviks by Tikhon in 1918, others perceive it as more positive or neutral, especially in 1917.\footnote{We refer to Russian Orthodoxy \textit{within} Russia. The Karlovtsy Synod became the third, most extreme and monarchist representative of Russian Orthodoxy. Its study is outside of our research and occasional references will be made insofar as they relate to the issue under our investigation. On the ideological and political outlook of Karlovtsy's Synod, see Meerson, 'Philosophy', 218. On the history of the relationship between the Moscow Patriarchate and the Russian Orthodox Abroad (hereafter ROA), see O. Antić, 'The Russian Orthodox Church Abroad', in P. Ramet (ed.), Eastern Christianity and politics in the Twentieth Century, 135-45.} In this, it seems that the recently published \textit{Akty Sviateishego Tikhona Patriarkha Moskovskogo i Vseia Rossii} (The Acts of Tikhon, The Patriarch of Moscow and the whole Russia) could shed some light. When one examines the acts and...
the decrees of Patriarch Tikhon it seems that his statements present a 'double-edged sword'. On the one hand, especially in the face of the increasing political chaos, he admonishes the Orthodox clergy and laity not to take sides and to remain a-political. 1002 On the other, his declarations and decrees started to assume an anti-Soviet orientation by virtue of his condemnation of increasing Bolshevik anti-religious policies and persecutions after 1917. 1003 It appears that it is precisely these latter condemnations which were interpreted by the Bolsheviks according to their ideological 'theologoumena' and inevitably led to a gradual formulation of their perception of the Russian Orthodox Church and its Patriarch as a pro-imperial, 1004 anti-Soviet entity which had to be combatted and suppressed by any means. 1005

It seems that the contemporary Russian scholar Shkarovskii seems to be on a weak ground by criticising the American scholar Curtiss who advocated the view that the pro-imperial views of the clergy of Russian Church were to become one of the causes of their persecutions. 1006 Whilst one certainly ought to be careful not to exaggerate the political involvement of the Russian clergy or their 'pro-imperial' leanings, it is important to admit, nevertheless, as Shkarovskii and Krivova do, 1007 the existence of such opinions among the 'main part of the hierarchy and clergy'. 1008 Further, the negative reaction of a significant part of the Russian clergy and laity towards the publication of Lenin's decree of the separation of the Church from the State and the school from the Church and the subsequent actions of the Sobor calling the faithful to

between 'hostility and negotiation, confrontation and compromise'.

1002 Akty. 25.09(08.10). 1919, 163-4; 22.04(05.05).1922, 193-4.
1003 Akty. 01.(14).01.1918, 76-7; 14(27).01.1918, 78-9; 19.01(01.02).1918, 82-5; 02(?). 1918, 103-5; 05(18).03, 1918, 107-9; 15(28).05.1918, 130-3; 08(21).07.1918, 142-3; 25.10(07.11).1918, 149-51. N.N. Pokrovskii, S.G. Petrov (eds.), Politbiuro i Tserkov' 1922-1925, I, 267-9, II, 7-8.
1004 See Roslof, Priests, 27.
1005 The formulation of such Bolshevik misunderstanding of the Patriarch's a-political views becomes especially clear at the trial of Moskovskikh tserkovnikov in 1922 where Tikhon was interrogated as a witness and at his own trial in 1923. See Akty. 195-212, especially 197-212; 225-70. Pokrovskii, Petrov, Politbiuro, I, 256-99, 471-3, II, 145, 177-8, 185-6, 253-69, 332-40, 346-55. Tikhon explicitly declared his a-political views on the 1st of July 1923 in his letter to clergy and laity, Politbiuro, 354. For the later denunciations of his own as well as the Church's anti-Soviet activity, see 03(16).06.1923, 280-1; 15(28).06.1923, 282-3; 15(28).06.1923, 283-5; 18.06(01.07).1923, 286-7; 30.06(13.07).1923, 288; 08.1923, 296-8, especially his last declaration about the attitude towards Soviet regime before his death, 25.03(07.04). 1925, 363-1.
1006 Shkarovskii, Tserkov'. 55.
1007 Ibid., 69, 72. Krivova, Vlast', 14ff.
1008 Shkarovskii, Tserkov'. 72.
defend Orthodoxy,\textsuperscript{1009} as well as Patriarch Tikhon's denunciation of the peace treaty of Brest on March 18,\textsuperscript{1010} created the precedent for the appearance of the divergent and mutually exclusive ideologies.\textsuperscript{1011} On the one hand, there emerged the Bolshevik government with its anti-religious orientation and the policies of the abandonment of the bankrupt autocracy in favour of the new society. On the other hand, the ideological orientation of the Russian Church and its former symphonic co-existence with the Russian autocracy could not save it from the impending wrath of the new-born regime. Patriarch's Tikhon criticism of Bolshevik anti-religious policies and bloodshed as expressed shortly before his own arrest could be perceived as putting a 'seal of approval' upon himself and the Church as a whole: 'You have divided the whole nation into two hostile factions, brought about an fratricide unprecedented in its cruelty ... There is no end to the war caused by you because you are trying to propagate the triumph of the ghost of the world revolution with the hands of the workers and peasants'.\textsuperscript{1012} As it had happened before during the history of the Muscovite Rus'/Russia, the State was determined to have an 'upper hand' in its relationship with the Church and to prosecute its policies by all necessary means. In this regard Curtiss' view appears to be at least partially justified.

The re-introduction of the principle of sobornost' at the historical Sobor in 1917 carried within itself a major implication for the issue of the antagonism between black and white clergy with its underlying issue of ecclesiastical authority. As we pointed out in the earlier chapters, the domination of the black clergy within the highest echelons of ecclesiastical authority and the unequal opportunities of the administration, power-sharing and financial status of the white clergy, resulted in a centuries-long antagonism between the two groups. The unequal opportunities and the status of each of the group resulted in the formation of two distinctive groups in which one appeared to function as 'despot' and the other as 'slave'.\textsuperscript{1013} This struggle was reflected throughout Muscovite Rus' and was further deepened through the formation of yet another 'sub-division' within the monastic clergy – that of a 'class' of the educated clergy in the aftermath of

\textsuperscript{1009} Shkarovskii, Tserkov', 74-5. Krivova, Vlast', 14ff.
\textsuperscript{1010} Akty, 05.(18).03. 1918, 107-9.
\textsuperscript{1011} Shkarovskii, Tserkov', 74.
\textsuperscript{1012} Akty, 25.10.(07.11).1918, 149.
Peter’s reforms. In the words of Archpriest P. Alekseev: ‘here [in Moscow] life for the white clergy is impossible because of the monks’ avarice’. The emphasis upon education resulted in a peculiar ‘sluzhilo pedagogicheskii’ order (servant-educational order) which became a ‘clergy-in-waiting’ group for the hierarchical positions within the Russian Orthodox Church, sometimes regardless of the moral or ascetic qualities of a particular candidate, and a practice of being elected by the representatives of the same ‘order’. It is against this domination of the ‘learned order’ and the usurpation of power in their hands that the work of the mid-nineteenth century priest I.S. Belliustin can be understood:

O monks, an evil greater than any other, Pharisees and hypocrites: quousque tandem abutere with your rights? Quousque tandem will you trample law and justice? You promote and award distinctions to those who have the means to feed you, like oxen; you reward those who can pay; you persecute and destroy the poor... Quousque tandem?

Belliustin went further than some of his contemporaries in his criticism of the Church hierarchy, and even questioned the canonical right of the monastic clergy to rule the Church. In his view and on the basis of his experience of parish life, the relationship between the hierarch and the clergy was perceived to be ‘that between Negroes and plantation owners’. Limited as he was in his observations, writing from the standpoint of parish life, his criticism, nevertheless, reflected the peculiar context and conditions of the ecclesiastical life which was governed by the ‘learned order’ of the monastic hierarchs who usurped the authority and became somewhat detached from their flock.

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1013 Golubinskii, O reforme, 117.
1015 As found in G.L. Freeze, The Russian Levites, 75.
1016 Florovskii, Puti, 340.
1017 G.L. Freeze, ‘Revolt from Below: A Priest’s Manifesto on the Crisis in Russian Orthodoxy’, in R.L. Nichols, T.G. Stavrou, Russian Orthodoxy under the Old Regime, 93.
1018 Ibid., 95.
1019 Ibid., 105. See also Chulos, Worlds, 58.
1020 Florovskii’s criticism of Belliustin ‘protestant-like criticism’ of the hierarchs and monks appears to be on a weak ground, since Belliustin’s criticism and general observations concerning ecclesiastical life were supported by a credible amount of evidence and observations. See Puti, 339. Chulos, Worlds, 97ff.
Further, according to N. Struve, the appearance of the un-canonical concept of *sviashchennonachalie* (Church hierarchy) during the nineteenth century,\(^{1021}\) which designated the highest hierarchy as a type of the ‘institution’ with its presupposed ‘principle of the authority and leadership within the Church’ strengthened and bureaucratised even further the authority of the black clergy. Subsequently, the Belliusin ‘affair’ became a ‘watershed... dividing line between the Nikolaevan (I) epoch and the new era of ecclesiastical pre-revolutionary ‘Great Reforms’\(^{1022}\) which culminated with the *Sobor* in 1917-18.\(^{1023}\) Among other decisions, the *Sobor* of 1917-18 was able to introduce the elective principle for priests and bishops by parishes and by doing so ‘allowed to limit the hegemony of the black clergy, sometimes being expressed in the form of despotism, causing many complaints from the clergy and laity’.\(^{1024}\) Another ‘breakthrough’ was represented by the adoption of the ‘Temporary Statute of the Parish’. It conferred an ‘extraordinary powers on the parish, including the right to elect local clergy’ and enabled the parishioners to organise ‘the Church-parish councils and to exercise control over the Church’s affairs on the local level’.\(^{1025}\) The course was set to organise ecclesiastical life in line with the ideals of Khomiakov’s principle of *sobornost’,\(^{1026}\) which would limit the ‘vertical’ hierarchical authority of the black clergy, bringing and re-enforcing the principle of power-sharing on to a horizontal level which would involve a greater participation of the white clergy and laity in the ecclesiastical life of the Russian Orthodox Church. This ideal, the principle of *sobornost’ as later history proved, was not, however, achievable, at least within the boundaries of the Russian Orthodox Church. As a distinguished Russian theologian and philosopher S. Bulgakov wrote from his own experience of being a priest, the Russian Church suffered from ‘actual and psychological papalism’.\(^{1027}\) This problem was reflected in the ‘papalist tendencies of the episcopate’ through the system of ‘caesaro-
papism' - the "slavish" attitude of the bishops towards secular power, who in turn demanded the submission to themselves from the clerics below them'.

Further 'down, on the level of laity, the 'Church was psychologically affected by the spiritual disease of man-worship', thus undermining altogether sobornost' as its foundational principle - 'the communality of the body of the Church'.

It must be said against the defenders of Sergii's declaration and his 'Soviet-type' Russian Orthodox Church that despite the fact that Katakombnaia tserkov' (The Catacombs' Church) was subjected to the same, if not harsher conditions, it managed to preserve the sobornyi principle during 1920s-30s. Thus, according to one of the Katakombnaia tserkov' hierarchs Archbishop Andrei (Ukhtomskii):

...it is necessary that all parish priests should be elected, rather than appointed. It is necessary that all parish priests would sign up to the agreement with the parish councils that they will not do anything without consultation with the parish council. It is necessary for bishops to be elected by the people because of their righteous life and not the drunkards and khristoprodavtsy...

Further, the rise of opposition to the Moscow Patriarchate was closely linked with the issue of the locum tenens. The perceived usurpation of ecclesiastical authority by Metropolitan Sergii led to his denunciation by some of the clergy led by the Metropolitan of Leningrad Losif in the aftermath of Sergii's declaration and other decrees in 1927.

...Not through pride, Lord let it not be, but for the sake of peace of

1028 Ibid., 15.
1029 Ibid., 17.
1030 Ibid., 15.
1031 It has to be asserted that the term Katakombnaia tserkov' is used here in a broad sense - designating an underground Church movement opposing the official Russian Orthodox Church of the Moscow Patriarchate and/or the Soviet state, rather than a separate or a parallel ecclesiastical institution per se. Shkarovskii's usage of this term is varied and he uses a multiplicity of terms. Shkarovskii, Tserkov', 15-7, 217-61.
1032 See detailed analysis of the Katakombnaia tserkov' by Shkarovskii, Tserkov', 242-60. Cf also his 'The Russian Orthodox Church versus the State: The Josephite Movement, 1927-1940', SR, 54.2, (1995), 365-84.
1033 Gavrilin, 'Upravlenie?', 199.
1034 It can be asserted against the defenders of Sergii that he did actually usurp power in his hands. This is evident from the two letters of the exiled Metropolitan Peter (locum tenens) to Sergii in 1929 and 1930, 12.1929, 681-2; 13(?)(26). 02.1930, 691-2.
conscience, we disavow the person and deeds of our former protector, who immensely and illegally exceeded his rights and initiated great confusion'... This, in itself, reflected the nature of the patriarchal/locum tenens’ authority within Russian Orthodoxy – being limited, at least on a theoretical level, on the basis of the soborny principledefining his position and status as that of the first bishop among equals. This position, in relation to the issue of authority, presupposed the soborny principle of accountability and power-sharing by the episcopate of the Russian Orthodox Church.

5.2. Stalin’s era: Church & State

The oppressive policies of the Communist state were promulgated even further under the ‘wise’ leadership of the ‘Father of the nations’ I. Stalin, who assumed the leadership role from 1922. The Communist vision was that of a ‘messianic kingdom’, fulfilling the ‘eschatological’ aspirations of the Russian people, being inhabited by a homo sovieticus - a new type of humankind. The new humankind was to be based upon a scientifico-materialistic foundation which totally excluded any notion of either deity or religion, thus implying the anti-religious outlook of the new political entity.

Every religious idea, every idea of God, every flirting with the idea of God, is unutterable vileness, vileness of the most dangerous kind, ‘contagion’ of the most abominable kind. Millions of filthy deeds, acts of violence and physical contagions are far less dangerous than the subtle, spiritual idea of a God decked out in the smartest ‘ideological’ costumes.

This anti-religious outlook came into conflict with a Christian worldview which contained within itself elements and views opposed to that of a Communist state. This inevitably resulted in a confrontation during the period following the Bolshevik revolution which brought about the ‘capitulation’ of the Moscow Patriarchate before the

1036 Freeze, ‘Counter-reformation’, 373.
1037 For the detailed chronology on this part of Russian history, see Hosking, Russia, 625.
1038 A. Schmemann, Church, World, Mission, 56.
1039 V. Lenin, Works, vol. 35, 89-90, as found in C. Andrew and V. Mitrokhin, Mitrokhin’s Archive, 634. Yet, he could also write against ‘any offence of the feelings of the believers, which could only lead towards religious fanaticism’. See also Lenin, Works, vol. 12, 143, vol. 38, 118, 5th ed., Izdatel’stvo politicheskoi literatury, Moskva, 1979.
1040 On the anti-religious legislation beginning with Lenin’s decrees, see Pospelovskii, Tserkov’, 274ff
Soviet state in the form of Sergii’s declaration in 1927, among other actions,\textsuperscript{1041} which contributed towards the rise of several schisms within the Russian Church, thus bringing into existence the \textit{katakombnaia} Church.\textsuperscript{1042} The controversial expression of loyalty to the Russian ‘motherland’\textsuperscript{1043} marked out the course of the relationship between the Soviet state and the Church for the rest of the twentieth century which came to be characterised by control of the Soviet state over the Church.

The outbreak of the Second World War brought about a temporary change in the fortunes of the Russian Church. The Communist regime of I. Stalin perceived and understood the usefulness of the Church in its internal and external policies. The eventful meeting which took place between I. Stalin and the representatives of the higher clergy of the Russian Church in 1943 marked a temporary shift from the direct, confrontational mode of existence to a peaceful, yet constraining pattern of relationship in which the Church was expected to act in accordance with the wishes of the Communist leadership.\textsuperscript{1044} This relationship of the unequal parties was even further ‘cemented’ through the creation of a controversial institution, the Council of Religious Affairs (CRA), which fulfilled the role of the Tsarist \textit{ober-prokuror} and carried out the control of the Communist state during the time of the existence of the USSR. Yet,

\textsuperscript{1041} See his interviews to Soviet and foreign press in 1930 in which he categorically denied any religious persecution within the Soviet Union. \textit{Akty}, 682-9


\textsuperscript{1043} The expression of loyalty to the Russian ‘motherland’, rather than a Soviet state is taken by the defenders of Sergii’s declaration as a proof of Sergii’s non-compromise with the Communist authorities, which preserved the traditional attitude of the Russian Orthodox Church towards the State. The critics, however, perceive the whole of declaration as a ‘complete surrender’ to the Communist state and a true betrayal of Christian ideals. This declaration continues to divide Orthodox historians and believers now as it did in the aftermath of Sergii’s declaration. Sv. V. Polosin, ‘Razmyslenia o teokratii v Rossiii’, 240ff., \textit{Grani}, 157, (1990), 229-57. Pospelovskii, \textit{Tserkov’}, 263ff., appears somewhat inconsistent in his assessment of Sergii’s declaration. Whilst, first he argues that Sergii’s declaration, in fact, represented a direct continuity of Patriarch’s Tikhon policy towards the Soviet state (263ff.), later (269-70), he acknowledges that Sergii did make a major compromise with the Soviets, thus implying the deviation from Tikhon’s legacy.

despite the restrictions and limitations which were imposed upon the Russian Church by the Communist state and the hostile orientation of the Communist ideology, as well as the ambivalence in the attitude of Stalin and the Communist leadership towards the Russian Church, the Moscow Patriarchate 'resurrected' the pre-revolutionary perception of the State. This perception revealed a 'symphonical' understanding of the co-existence of Church and State; despite its anti-Christian orientation the State had to be embraced according to the Eastern principle of 'accommodation' rather than rejected or disobeyed. It enabled the Russian Church, in a similar way to the Byzantine Church, to identify politically with the contemporary state through an 'unholy alliance' and to co-exist, though, through a compromise, on the basis of the traditional principle of political accommodation. Unlike the Byzantine Church, the Russian Church had to rely upon the newly defined policy of institutional survival in the face of the anti-religious policies of the Communist state.

Further, such an understanding contained within itself the legacy of the imperial ideology. Whilst some of its elements were made redundant by the historical changes since the Bolshevik revolution and inapplicable to the Soviet state, others were re-interpreted and re-applied to the new historical situation and the socio-political formation of the Soviet Union. This understanding revealed a peculiar perception of the ruler by the hierarchs of the Moscow Patriarchate which betrayed the traditional imperial understanding of God's anointed one, which within the context of the Soviet system was transformed into a cult of Stalin. V. Moss pointed out that 'the sense of the miraculous, providential action of God during the historical process throughout Russian history, increased among the leadership of Moscow’s Patriarchate. According to their opinion a 'wise, God-anointed', 'God-given Supreme Leader (Vozhd)' was becoming God's tool in this process. The perception of Stalin resembled that of the

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1045 The compromise of the hierarchy of Moscow's Patriarchate is acknowledged even by such a supporter of the Stalinist regime as Metropolitan Ioann, see Samoderzhavie Dukha, 320, note*, 320. The extent of this compromise can be considered against the number of the Orthodox clergy who died in the penal camps between 1917 and 1940 due to their either direct or indirect opposition to the official policies of the Soviet state. See N. Struve, Christians in Contemporary Russia, London, 1967.

1046 Moss assesses the history of Russian Orthodox Church in the twentieth century from the standpoint of an adherent of the katabornaia Church living in Great Britain.

1047 Moss, Tserkov, 223-4, quoting G. Yakunin, in Pospielovsky, Regime, I, 208. See also
Orthodox Tsar despite Stalin’s hostile anti-Christian inclinations, with the Moscow Patriarchate providing the popular endorsement of his cult among the Soviet population as well as supporting Soviet policies. Patriarch Aleksii was able to perceive Stalin in a pro-Eusebian style which depicted the ruler in terms of a virtuous ‘Hellenistic king’ who ‘is the first among the fighters for peace among all the nations of the world’ ‘with an all-embracing heart which takes on itself all the pain of suffering’,\textsuperscript{1048} ‘...our leader whose charming personality disarms anyone who has met him by his kindness and attentiveness to everybody’s needs...by the power and wisdom of his speech’.\textsuperscript{1049}

5.3. The resurrection of the concept of ‘Moscow the Third Rome’?

Alongside the rapprochement between the Communist state and the Church, which sprang from Stalin’s meeting with the hierarchs of Moscow Patriarchate in 1943, there occurred the revival of the Muscovite imperial idea which placed Moscow as Third Rome at the centre of universal Orthodoxy. The intensification of these claims and perception happened to coincide with the general outlook of Stalin’s policies which were orientated towards world affairs.\textsuperscript{1050}

Shkarovskii asserts that towards the end of the Second World War Stalin envisaged using the Moscow Patriarchate for his ideological purposes in the newly liberated Europe as well as worldwide through existing Russian Orthodox missions and eparchies abroad, and to elevate the Moscow Patriarchate to the supreme level among Eastern

\textsuperscript{1048} As found in Duncan, ‘Orthodoxy’, 316. Duncan relies upon Yakunin who suggests that Alexi expected Stalin to declare the country a ‘pan-Slav Orthodox Empire’. See Yakunin, ‘Patriarkhiia’, 113.

\textsuperscript{1049} As found in Pospielovsky, Orthodox Church, 319, n. 5. See other speeches in Stalin’s honour by the hierarchy of the Moscow Patriarchate in ZhMP, 11, (1947), 4-5; 12, (1949), 7-9; 1, (1950), 11-13.

\textsuperscript{1050} It is outside of our study to investigate the motives of Stalinist regime and that of the Moscow Patriarchate in elevating the status of the Moscow Patriarchate in international affairs. For the variety of opinions, see Pospielovsky, Regime, II, 302ff. Duncan, ‘Orthodoxy’, 316ff. Dickinson, ‘Marriage of Convenience?’, 337ff. Sv. D. Dudko, ‘On byl veruiushchim’, NS, 12, (1999).
Orthodoxy, creating a 'Moscow Vatican'. Stalin's religious external policies were 'inaugurated' by the decree 'About the establishment of some measures for the improvement of a foreign work of the security organs of the USSR' in 1943. The anti-fascist appeals of the Patriarch Aleksii to the fellow Slavic Orthodox nations, promulgated by Stalin's government, resulted in a closer co-operation between the Moscow Patriarchate and other Orthodox hierarchs. This led to a local Sobor in 1945, which among other issues, resulted in a united expression of solidarity and determination to fight the main enemy, the Vatican, by the Moscow Patriarchate and eight other autocephalous Orthodox Churches. The Soviet machinery envisaged the use of the Eastern Patriarchs for its own political ends through the 'medium' of the Moscow Patriarchate. Thus Karpov, the chairman of the CRA suggested to Stalin in 1946: 'it is necessary to increase the influence upon Eastern Patriarchates, which although small, nevertheless, are regarded as influential in the Orthodox world, and to use them on our side in the future when discussing any important Church issues'. The subsequent, financially rewarding trip as a reliable tool for exercising influence upon poor Eastern Patriarchates, from Metropolitan Grigorii to the Eastern Patriarchs in Syria, Lebanon and Egypt in 1946, led to the assurances on the latter part that 'the Patriarchates and the Churches led by them will always support the Moscow Patriarchate in international ecclesiastical affairs'. The intense negotiations and financial help from the Moscow Patriarchate towards the Orthodox Churches in Eastern Europe throughout 1945-46 resulted in the overall spread of the influence of the Moscow Patriarchate over the Orthodox flock in these countries. This in itself elevated the prestige and the significance of the Moscow Patriarchate among fellow Orthodox Churches and added an additional weight to its significance on the international stage. In the eyes of the Bulgarian hierarchy, 'The Russian Orthodox Church acquired a

1051 Shkarovskii, Tserkov', 285.
1052 Ibid., 286.
1053 Ibid., 288. Cf also 309.
1054 Ibid., 288.
1055 Ibid., 288. The Antiochene Patriarchate, after receiving financial help throughout his visit to Moscow in 1954, declared that the 'Russian Orthodox Church ought to lead all other Orthodox Churches because Constantinople's Church is much weaker than the Russian and has lost its former prestige, becoming the tool of American politics', Shkarovskii, Tserkov', 310.
leading place among the big family of Slavic nations, being the eldest and most progressive among the Orthodox Churches.1056

Further, Shkarovskii asserts that the Russian Church was intended to be used by Soviet leadership in its fight against the ‘papo-caesarism’ of the Vatican.1057 According to this ‘design’, the Moscow Patriarchate was supposed to appear at the forefront of this battle and to assume the leading role through specific initiatives such as organising the first conference of the Eastern Churches in 1947, with a subsequent world conference of different Churches, led by the Moscow Patriarchate. Thus, the official journal of the Moscow Patriarchate declared in 1946 that there appeared an ‘exceptional revival in the bosom of the Orthodox Universal Catholic Church, under the actual leadership of Russian Orthodoxy: ‘Moscow – the Third Rome and the fourth shall not be’.1058 The Metropolitan Nikolai even wrote to the CRA in 1946 concerning the necessity of gathering a universal Sobor in Moscow in 1948 which was expected to decide about the necessity of attributing the title ‘universal’ to the Moscow Patriarchate.1059 However, the attempts of the Soviet regime and the Moscow Patriarchate were quashed on the basis of the canonical irregularity and the perception of its authority. The Moscow Patriarchate appeared, at least in the eyes of the Constantinople Patriarchate and hierarchy of Cyprus, to usurp the right which belonged to the Ecumenical Patriarch of Constantinople: ‘Unfortunately we do not accept the invitation to attend the all-Orthodox council because the right to convene such council belongs only to Constantinople’s Ecumenical Patriarchate’.1060 Despite this objection the pan-Orthodox conference of 1948, under the ‘watchful eye’ of the Soviet state, demonstrated the leading position of the Moscow Patriarchate, which re-asserted its position, albeit for a short period, in relation to the Constantinople Patriarchate and to the rest of the Firsttendom.

1056 Ibid., 289.
1057 Ibid., 296ff.
1058 ZhMP, 9, (1946), 56.
1059 Shkarovskii, Tserkov’, 302.
1060 Ibid., 302.
The movement towards the pre-eminence of the Moscow Patriarchate within Eastern Orthodoxy was aided by the animosity towards the Constantinople Patriarchate which re-surfaced from the 1920s regarding the controversy between the Moscow Patriarchate and the ‘Renovationist’ Church. The ambivalent attitude and the dubious behaviour of the Constantinople Ecumenical Patriarchate towards the Moscow Patriarchate and the Russian Church at large from the 1920s contributed partially towards the resurgence of the Muscovite medieval perceptions and attitudes which cast some doubt upon Constantinople’s claims to authority among Eastern Orthodoxy. The uncanonical interference of the Constantinople Patriarchs such as Grigorios VII and his successor Vasilios III in the internal affairs of the Russian Church contributed towards Moscow’s suspicions of Constantinople’s behaviour. The recommendation to retire given by Grigorios VII to the Russian Patriarch Tikhon in the midst of the ‘Renovationist’ coup in 1924 as well as his recommendation to dissolve, though temporarily, the institution of the Patriarchate, could only worsen the relationship between the two Churches.

Tikhon, in his reply to Grigorios, reiterated the position of Russian Orthodoxy in relation to the Ecumenical Patriarch. The Constantinople Patriarch was rebuked in his attempts to interfere in the affairs of the autocephalous Church. Tikhon pointed out that the Ecumenical councils only acknowledged the πατριαρχία τῆς ἁγίας εἰρήνης as a primacy of honour and not of authority. Additionally, Tikhon accused the Constantinople Patriarch of taking the side of the obnovlentsy (renovationists) and of being inconsistent with the policies of his predecessors and other Eastern Patriarchs who approved the re-establishment of the Patriarchate. This, in itself, seems to suggest that the Greeks were suspicious of Muscovite behaviour and the activities which stemmed from the establishment of the Imperial Orthodox Palestine Society in 1885. This move on the part of the Russian Church was perceived by the Greeks as a sign of Moscow’s tendency to expand its influence within Eastern Orthodoxy.


1063 Akty, 06.1924, 322.

1064 Ibid., 324.
Orthodoxy, thus undermining the exclusivity of Constantinople’s position and authority. Stalin’s move, then, of bringing the Russian Church on to a new level of significance in international affairs resulted in a renewed controversy between Moscow and Constantinople, reinforcing the antagonism and the suspicions of the latter.

The medieval Muscovite perceptions and attitudes towards Constantinople and the Greek Church at large, in turn, ‘resurrected’ in the post-war era. The re-establishment of the institution of the Patriarch within the Russian Church during the war and Stalin’s initiatives in ‘promoting’ the Russian Church brought about a certain tendency on the part of the Moscow Patriarchate. The overall authority of the Moscow Patriarchate was strengthened and consolidated in two directions. On the one hand, it was reinforced internally within the Russian Church according to a new statute issued in 1945. On the other hand, the Russian Church was elevated internationally to a new level through the effort of the Soviet state which pursued its own goals in the international arena. Archbishop Antonii (Marchenko), reflecting on the aftermath of the post-war period envisaged Russian Church, as expressing its ‘mystical role’ and leadership within the universal catholic Church:

«Moscow – Third Rome», remains a symbol of the all-gathering idea, in counterpoise to the papacy, with its ambitions to a spiritual autocracy, episcopal aristocratism and maniac dreams about earthly dominion.

...The visit to Moscow by Eastern Patriarchs, the visit to the Holy Land by the Holy Patriarch Aleksii, the arrival in Moscow of a delegation from the Czech Orthodox Church and, as a result of that, the appointment of the Russian Orthodox exarch for this Church, testify to the exceptional revival in the bosom of the Universal Orthodox Catholic Church, under the actual

1065 R.F. Byrnes, Pobedonostsev His Life and Thought, 212, asserts that Pobedonostsev sought to increase the authority of the Russian Orthodox Church as against the authority of the ecumenical Patriarchate and the power of ‘Greek prelates in Churches and lands in which the Russian Orthodox Church sought increased power’, also pp. 224ff. See also T. Stavrou, Russian Interests in Palestine, 1882-1914, especially pp. 10-17, 31-55. D. Hopwood, ‘Russia and the Arab Orthodox Community in Palestine 1882-1917’, in Sobornost, 162, (1994), 24-31.

1066 S. Gakkel’, ‘Патриархальные порядки в Русской Православной Церкви’, Vръхд, 181, III, (2000), 246, points out that this statute was formulated under the supervision of ‘Совета по делам Русской Православной Церкви’ under the supervision of KGB colonel K.A. Zaitsev.
leadership of Russian Orthodoxy: «Moscow – Third Rome, and a fourth there shall not be», as our ancestors used to say at the time of John III... 1067

The celebration of the 800th anniversary of the founding of Moscow in 1947 gave the possibility for ‘resurrecting’ the Third Rome idea, which though elevating Moscow to the level of a universal significance, received, nevertheless, a new pro-Communist garb:

Now Moscow is the centre of the social life of humanity, the centre which unites all progressive and democratic elements, and in religious life Moscow is not the centre of aristocratically despotic Catholicism or of anarchic Protestantism. Moscow is the centre of true Orthodoxy, rejecting this or that extreme.

It is not only among us Russian people that the thought of Moscow awakens the best memories of our native country, but also among the peoples of the fraternal republics, among all the Slavs, and among all the freedom-loving peoples the thought of Moscow evokes the best, bright hopes for the future...

Moscow is a beacon, a beacon not only for us Orthodox, but also for those seeking true, unclouded civil, national and religious freedom. Moscow is a beacon for all of toiling humanity, for all who seek religious and social truth. 1068

The majority of scholars perceive the intention for the convocation of the Eighth Ecumenical council in Moscow in 1948 as the attempt on the part of the Moscow Patriarchate to re-establish itself as the Third Rome and a deliberate move towards pre-eminence 1069 within the Orthodox oikoumene. 1070 Pospielovsky asserts that the celebration of the anniversary of 500 years of the autocephaly of the Russian Church combined with the ambitious 1071 convocation of the Ecumenical council was designed

1067 Archiepiskop Antonii (Marchenko), ‘Moi vpechatleniia pri vozvrashchenii na Rodinu’, ZhMP, 9, (1946), 56.
1069 The fact that the Russian Patriarch Aleksii on his trip to the Middle East in 1945 avoided visiting Constantinople can be perceived as a deliberate attempt by the Russian Orthodox Church to distance itself from Constantinople whilst maintaining a dominant relationship with other Eastern Patriarchates. See W.C. Fletcher, Religion and Soviet Foreign Policy 1945-1970, 19-20.
1071 Pospelovskii, 'Tserkov', 313, points out that the prerogative to convoke the ecumenical council belonged solely to the Patriarch of Constantinople. Fletcher, Religion, 27, asserts that Moscow Patriarchate was ‘openly usurping the authority’ of the Ecumenical Patriarch. Gakkel, ‘Poriadki’, 253, n. 21, refers to
to present Moscow as a ‘second but “Orthodox Vatican”’. The scale and the ‘grandiose’ character of this occasion were a historical reminder and exposition of themes reminiscent of the period in the aftermath of the council of Florence. On the one hand, this celebration underlined the Greek ‘apostasy’ and the ‘unfaithfulness’ of the First and Second Romes; on the other hand, it showed the Orthodoxy of the Russians and the ‘steadfastness’ of Moscow – the Third Rome which hoped to assume the status of ‘primus inter pares’ among the Churches of Eastern Orthodoxy.

The Constantinople Patriarchate and its alleged supremacy came to be openly criticised by the Metropolitan Seraphim in 1949. Writing in the context of the jurisdictional disputes between Moscow and Constantinople over Orthodox believers in Western Europe, Constantinople’s supremacy was challenged on several levels.

Firstly, Seraphim attacked the actual title of the Constantinople Patriarch on the basis of the concept of political accommodation. The disappearance of a political entity such as Byzantium, in his eyes, nullified if not the actual ecclesiastical seat, then at least the rights of the ‘Roman Pope’ and his claims of authority as an ecumenical Patriarch. Secondly, Church canons nowhere endorsed the rights or the authority of any ‘Universal Orthodox Patriarch’ and show that historically the Antiochene and the Alexandrian Patriarchs had titles ‘higher’ than Constantinople’s Patriarch. Thirdly, in response to the Greek accusation of Moscow’s hijacking of the prerogatives of the Constantinople Patriarch, Metropolitan revealed a new argument in his ‘arsenal’ against Constantinople, namely the size of the Russian Church. He declared that the Russian Church, unlike the Constantinople Church, is much bigger in size and that Moscow’s Patriarch ‘did not

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1072 Pospelovskii, Tserkov’, 313. On the proceedings of this council, see Major Portions of the Proceedings of the Conference of the Heads of the Autocephalous Orthodox Churches held in Moscow, July, 1948, YMCA Press, 1952.
1073 Slater, ‘Imagining’, 51, asserts that at the Ecumenical council in Moscow in 1948 Vatican was described as ‘the centre of international intrigues against the interests of the peoples, particularly the Slavs’.
1074 See Pospelovsky, Orthodox Church, 302-3. Cf. also his Regime, II, 309ff.
1075 Pospelovsky, Regime, II, 309
1077 Ibid., 26-7.
pretend to appropriate either the authority or honour which was not due to him'. 1079

Finally, although this argument was missing from Seraphim’s criticism, it would be
legitimate to ask whether Seraphim’s position reflected also Moscow’s view of
Constantinople’s nationalism which undermined its claims to universality. As
Meyendorff pointed out, throughout the rise of nationalisms across Europe in the
nineteenth century, Constantinople opposed and condemned other Orthodox
nationalisms, yet, at the same time identified itself with the Greek nation and became
the ‘symbol, and occasionally the tool of Greek nationalism’. 1080

Further, Vatican II presented another opportunity for Moscow’s independently minded
Patriarchate to re-assert its own agenda as against Constantinople’s ambitions within
Eastern Orthodoxy. Commenting upon the decision of the Moscow Patriarchate to send
its delegation to Vatican II, Archbishop Nikodim asserted: ‘If there are no observers of
ours at this Sobor, then “Constantinople will win because of this. It will be able to
represent the whole of Orthodoxy without any interference...Nobody will stop it, it will
never look round. The whole of the catholic world will start looking at Constantinople
as the main centre of Orthodoxy”. The presence of our observers will help to “neutralise
any attempt on Constantinople’s side to speak on behalf of Orthodoxy and to create a
closer co-operation with Rome’. 1081 Later, the historical meeting between the
Ecumenical Patriarch Athenagoras and Pope Paul VI in 1964 and the withdrawal of the
ancient anathemas revealed Moscow’s independent ecclesiastical stance. This historical
move was perceived by the Moscow Patriarchate to be limited only to the Church of
Constantinople and having only relative significance for other autocephalous Churches
such as Russia, thus manifesting Moscow’s independent ecclesiastical outlook. 1082
Later, the imperial-like behaviour of the Moscow Patriarchate came to be manifested in
relation to the autocephaly of the Russian Metropolia in America in 19701083 and in the

1079 Ibid., 28.
Orthodox World, 252-3, 225ff., 227. See also his Living Tradition, 112-4.
1081 O. Vasil’eva, ‘Russkaia pravoslavnaia Tserkov’ i II Vatikanskii sobor’, as found on
1083 See T. Ferguson, ‘The Council of Ferrara-Florence and Its continued Historical Significance’, SVTQ,
43, 1, (1999), 56ff., 76.
post-Soviet period. This, in itself, came to symbolise the self-perception of the spiritual authority of the Moscow Patriarchate in relation to the Constantinople Patriarchate.

Yet this attempt on the part of the Moscow Patriarchate to promote the status and the significance of the Russian Church among Eastern Orthodoxy was partially hampered by the anti-religious policies of the Communist state which exercised the overall control over the internal and external policies of the Church. The Church was obliged, through the hierarchy of the Moscow Patriarchate, to conform to the overall ideological ‘vision’ of the Communist ‘empire’ and to support Soviet external or internal policies, which according to Aleksii I, appeared to be ‘just’ and corresponded to the Christian ideals which the Church preached. These ideals were expressed namely through the involvement of the Moscow Patriarchate in the ‘Peace movement’ and its controversial participation in the WCC. Thus, the Russian Church found itself paradoxically in the post-war Soviet Union in a partial historical parallel to that of the Byzantine Church by being identified with the Soviet ‘empire’ externally, yet, unlike the latter, being forced into a full submission to an atheist, secular State without its right to exercise its spiritual ministry and authority. Whilst the Church was identifying itself with the Communist state in its policies, it was losing its freedom of conscience and ability to express its sobornyi conscience in this world.


1085 The extent of the collaboration between Church and State can be seen in the way the Church supported the State in such controversial Soviet moves as the interference in Hungary ZhMP, 1, (1957), 36-8; Czechoslovakia in 1968, ZhMP, 5, (1968), 32; ZhMP, 10, (1968), 2-3, and later approved the invasion of Afghanistan in 1979, ZhMP, 5, (1980), 3-6. Fletcher, Religion, 55. Ellis, Church, 273. Pospielovsky, Orthodox Church, 293.

1086 As found in Andrew, Mitrokhin, Archive, 635. See also Meerson, ‘Philosophy’, 210-27.


1088 Ellis, Church, 270ff.

1089 Y. Barabanov, the critic of the servility of the Russian Orthodox Church and of the concept of symphony, described the inability and the ‘depressed’ state of the Church as the result of a crisis in Church
However, once the ideological climate softened in the aftermath of Stalin's death and Khrushchev's reforms, there came the cultural search for the 'right' ideology and worldview. Moss pointed out that during the 1960s there arose movements which were differentiated along the lines of Westernizers and Slavophiles.\textsuperscript{1090} Whilst not clearly defined in their boundaries and overlapping,\textsuperscript{1091} these movements represented, in a similar way to the nineteenth century Westernizers and Slavophiles, the attempt of a neo-Orthodox intelligentsia to search for an alternative national consciousness and a worldview to that of a Communist ideology.\textsuperscript{1092} Among other, more liberal\textsuperscript{1093} and less extremist views of the twentieth century Slavophiles, G. Shimanov expressed a messianic view of Russia similar to that of his Slavophile predecessors of the nineteenth century. It depicted the messianism of Russia in contrast to the West in a way reminiscent to that of Dostoevskii, projecting Russia in its messianic role of overcoming the inadequacies of Western historical development.

Only one country is in a condition to do this – Russia! Only Russia! Because there is no other people in the world which has exhibited, not as a day-dream but as a fact, such an improbable range of contradictions in its spiritual and social life, always going to the brink, to the very last point, as our Russian people has done...[This] will doubtless lead it finally onto the path of salvation, and with it many, many other peoples.\textsuperscript{1094}

\textsuperscript{1090} Dunlop characterised the Slavophile movement of 60-70ies as that of neo-Slavophilism rather than Slavophilism in its 'pure' shape and form. See J.B. Dunlop, 'The Eleventh Hour', \textit{Frontier}, 18, 2, (1975), 71-82.

\textsuperscript{1091} Moss, \textit{Tserkov'}. 289, points out that ideas could overlap between the two different outlooks in the minds of such thinkers like Solzhenitsyn, whom Moss regards as Slavophile, yet Westerner due to his ecumenical inclinations.


\textsuperscript{1093} Solzhenitsyn seems to be one of the major representatives of the liberal Neo-Slavophiles. See A. Solzhenitsyn, \textit{From under the rubble}, 121-7.

\textsuperscript{1094} As found in Ellis, \textit{Church}, 343.
Shimanov’s vision, though extreme in its outlook, nevertheless, highlighted the common feature which came to dominate the literary writings of the Orthodox intelligentsia and the ecclesiastical writers alike for the rest of the twentieth century. Their attitude to the West and to the Russian Orthodox tradition came to be defined by their nationality. Symptomatic of this literary revival and the controversy concerning the formation of the new, alternative ‘vision’ was the debate between the academician A. Sakharov and A. Solzhenitsyn. The former perceived the development of Russia as consisting of ‘contradictions and cataclysms’ and criticised Solzhenitsyn’s Slavophile view of history with its associated ‘religious-patriarchal romanticism’. Further, the messianic consciousness of the Slavophile outlook was propagated by such writers as V. Gorskii who re-introduced the nineteenth century Russian Orthodox messianism in its ‘pure’ form. Gorskii’s messianism was based upon Filofei’s vision and that of his successors – Slavophiles, among whom Dostoevskii was regarded as the main figure. Russian messianism was perceived to be analogous to that of the ancient Hebrew messianism, namely that Russia became the ‘sole Orthodox kingdom in the world’, which by the nature of its calling and the characteristics of the Russian people as ‘only God-bearing people in the whole world’, was called ‘to revive and save the world’.

Similarly, there began the dissident movement among the clergy of the Moscow Patriarchate who rebelled against the ‘captivity’ of the Russian Church under the domain of the KGB and CRA. It was further strengthened after the fateful Council of

1095 Shimanov went as far as to envisage the complete harmonic synthesis of the Soviet state with the Orthodox Church completely disregarding such an important factor as Communist ideology. See Ellis, Church, 373.


1097 The main weakness of Gorskii’s ‘messianic’ doctrine lies in its historical limitation, perceiving the development of Russian messianism beginning with Filofei.


Bishops in 1961, which contributed towards the closures of the Orthodox Churches during Khrushchev’s anti-religious campaign in 1959-64. The increased servility on the part of the highest hierarchy of the Moscow Patriarchate after that council and the increasing overall control of the State over the Church via the KGB which controlled the CRA, had a suffocating effect upon the Church’s life, giving rise to the outbursts of protest and criticism against the existent Church-State relationship on the part of certain clergy within the Russian Church.

The control of the State was exposed by representatives of the clergy such as Archbishop Ermogen of Kaluga, who, among others, was determined to show the existent state of affairs and to re-assert the rightful place of the Russian Church closer to the evangelical ideals. The open letters of G. Yakunin and N. Eshliman ‘inaugurated’ a new period in the history of the relationship between Church and State. Their action was directed against both the oppressive Communist State and the subservient Church as represented by the hierarchy of the Moscow Patriarchate. The publication of letters to the Patriarch Aleksii and Podgornyi, the chairman of the Presidium of the Supreme Soviet of the USSR, and the subsequent persecution of these priests, exposed even further the control of the Soviet state and the ambivalent behaviour of the hierarchy of the Moscow Patriarchate, who supported the ‘modernised’ formula “Moscow the Third Rome” and showed open hostility toward the First and Second Romes. Although being limited in its impact, the bold action of these two priests, nevertheless,


Ellis, Church, 57ff. Interestingly enough, the period of Kruschev’s anti-religious campaign (1959-64) is notable for the virtual absence of arrests among members of the Orthodox hierarchy, whilst over a hundred dissident Baptist leaders went into labour camps during the same period. See Lane, Religion, 34.

Shkarovskii, Tserkov’, 275-7.

B. Talantov was another outstanding dissident at this early stage of the dissident movement. Shkarovskii, Tserkov’, 277.

Ellis, Church, 293-4, claimed that Metropolitan Pimen of Krutitsy and Kolomna tried to give some support to both priests. This assertion, however, could not be substantiated in the light of contradictory evidence.

The criticism of the Moscow Patriarchate behaving in the style of a ‘modernised’ Third Rome came later in Yakunin’s and Regelson’s Letter to the Nairobi assembly of WCC in 1975. See the full text of this letter in Meerson-Aksyonov, Shragin, Anthology, 569-81.
opened an unprecedented opportunity to expose the true ‘face’ of the Communist state in relation to the Church as well as to reveal the dubious behaviour of the official hierarchy of the Moscow Patriarchate to the Christian West in the years to come.\textsuperscript{1107}

Naturally, the environment which discouraged and suppressed any form of religious thinking did not stimulate any extensive theologico-philosophical speculation among the ecclesiastical writers throughout the Communist period up to the change of epochs which began with Gorbachev’s \textit{perestroika}.\textsuperscript{1108}

\section*{5.4. The apocalyptic developments throughout the twentieth century}

The magnitude of changes which happened with the fall of the Tsarist system and in the aftermath of the Bolshevik revolution with subsequent foundation of the Communist state on the basis of atheistic values, forced the Orthodox and neo-Orthodox writers alike to seek the explanations of these historical changes within the mystical or apocalyptic realm. Whether being abroad and writing from the Orthodox Diaspora outside of Communist Russia or living within it, certain themes came to dominate whenever one ventured into the field of speculation regarding the understanding of the Third Rome and its relation to contemporary Russia. The common denominator appeared to be the rejection of a contemporary Communist system and the resurrection of the old Tsarist system in which the ‘anointed one’ was perceived to lead Russia and the whole world on to a path of salvation. In this scenario the fate of Russia and that of the whole world was placed within the ‘end times’ before the coming of the Antichrist.\textsuperscript{1109}

\textsuperscript{1107} Commenting upon Patriarch Pimen’s statement given to the WCC in 1973 in which he denied any persecutions of religious believers in the USSR and the suppressed state of the Church, Schmemann declared that ‘The Patriarch’s... statement in ... Geneva that there are ‘neither poor nor rich, neither privileged nor persecuted ones’ in the USSR ... surpasses that measure of untruth after which silence becomes treason. This statement was made at the time when ... another wave of persecutions has been unleashed [in the Soviet Union] against all dissidents, against all expressions of faith, spirit and freedom’. As found in Pospielovsky, Orthodox Church, II, 447, n.110.

\textsuperscript{1108} For the general outline of changes regarding religion beginning with Gorbachev, see M. Bourdeaux, Gorbachev Glasnost & the Gospel, London, Hodder & Stoughton, 1990.

\textsuperscript{1109} It has to be stressed that it is difficult to determine how representative of Russian Orthodoxy are the views of these authors and which particular faction within Russian Orthodoxy they appeal to. The same can be said of the authors who express anti-Semitic views.
Relying upon *starets*¹¹¹⁰ prophecies the Archbishop Feofan of Poltava envisaged the rise of the Tsar, who would be able to rebuild Russia before the coming of the Antichrist. Whilst linking the fate of Russia to the end of the world, Feofan did not ascribe any messianic role to Russia within his vision, although he came close to the concept of the ‘chosen’ nation in his assessment of Russia as being saved on the basis of a ‘faithful remnant’.¹¹¹¹ This vision was ‘enveloped’ in the Third Rome terminology.

Who created the Tsar himself? The Church created him! In this there is the whole meaning of Russian history. And the Church bowed before the Tsar not just like before its patron, but also her minister, who was anointed to rule the Kingdom by Her, and who announced before Her his ‘program’, unchanging and irreversible, declaring the Creed. And before which Tsar the Church had bowed? Before the One, who carries Caesar’s sovereign obedience as a Tsar, who leads the Third Rome!¹¹¹²

Further, Zaitsev put the rebuilding of the monarchical Russia on to the central place within the history of humankind from the teleological perspective. The historical rise of Russia¹¹¹³ from under the Communist rubble is perceived to be the pre-requisite for the well-being of the world at the decisive moment of the history of humankind before the coming of the Antichrist as well as for the actual timing of the apocalyptic drama.

The reconstruction of the Russian monarchy is not a political problem... And this is not just our, Russian problem. This is a universal problem. The fate of the world or the question about the age of the world and the issue of the coming of the Eighth day depends upon the solution to this problem.¹¹¹⁴

This apocalyptic and mystical understanding of Moscow as the Third Rome received a new impetus in the aftermath of Gorbachev’s *perestroika* and *glasnost* which brought about another sequence of radical changes within Russian society. The collapse of the


¹¹¹¹ As found in Mazurkevich, *Apokalipsis*, 23.


¹¹¹³ Later, however, Zaitsev will define the Russian Orthodox kingdom in terms of a supra-historical and mystical entity. See K. Zaitsev, ‘Nastupila apostasiia, ili net?’, *PR*, 17, (1970), 2.

¹¹¹⁴ As found in Mazurkevich, *Apokalipsis*, 16.
Communist system with its prevalent ideology opened a ‘floodgate’ to the formation of a new worldview and historical perception. The writers of the post-perestroika period began building upon previously inaccessible material and, in turn, speculated upon the historical significance of Orthodoxy and Moscow as the corner stone of a new ideology. The resurgence of nationalistic feelings in the post-Soviet Russia and the need to replace the collapsed Communist ideology with the authentic Russian worldview brought about the revival of the imperial ideology which was intrinsically linked with Russian Orthodoxy.\textsuperscript{1115}

Whilst not becoming the official doctrine of the Russian Church, the doctrine of Moscow as the Third Rome found its adherents amongst the popular masses and different writers including ecclesiastical writers of the highest calibre, namely the Metropolitan Ioann of St. Petersburg and Ladoga.\textsuperscript{1116} Metropolitan Ioann can be described as the ‘spearhead’ of the popular opinion, of a certain faction within the Russian Church, expressing a very peculiar perception of Russian history and Orthodoxy, the symbolism of Moscow and its place within the history of humankind. The writings attributed to him revealed,\textsuperscript{1117} amongst other features, the influence of the imperial and nationalistic ideology intertwined with the apocalyptic ideas, which, though different, contradictory and extreme at times,\textsuperscript{1118} were, nevertheless, combined


\textsuperscript{1116} It is noteworthy to mention that whilst bann was the second highest hierarch within the hierarchy of the Moscow Patriarchate, he was, at least on the official level, more or less isolated in his views in relation to other members of the higher hierarchy within the Moscow Patriarchate. It is unclear to what extent other hierarchs, including Patriarch Aleksii, adhered to some of his views. W. Slater, ‘A Modern-Day Saint? Metropolitan Ioann and the Postsoviet Russian Orthodox Church’, RSS, 28, 4, (2000), 315ff.

\textsuperscript{1117} Some scholars doubted the authenticity of the writings attributed to him, given that he was not a very articulate man. Slater, ‘Metropolitan Ioann’, 317-8.

and moulded into one particular outlook\(^{1119}\) which became representative of the ultra-nationalist movement in Russia in the post-\textit{perestroika} period.\(^{1120}\) In order to have the maximum impact upon the popular masses Metropolitan Ioann published his articles in the pro-Communist newspapers such as \textit{Sovetskaia Rossiia}\(^{1121}\) propagating Russian ideological/political ‘messianism’ in its ‘pure’ and most extreme form.\(^{1122}\)

Similarly to the Slavophiles of the nineteenth century, Ioann perceived Muscovite history in harmonic terms. Ioann depicted Russian history as having a universal/cosmic significance from the moment of its baptism.\(^{1123}\) The Muscovite period of Russian history was understood as the fulfilment of God’s providence in relation to the history of the whole world. Later, imperial Russia became a divinely appointed entity; its enlargement and development are depicted in idealistic and harmonic terms.\(^{1124}\) Ioann’s views betrayed a simple schematisation\(^{1125}\) of history and a strong belief in a ‘messianic’ calling of Russia, which stemmed from the concept of \textit{translatio imperii}\(^{1126}\) and was interpreted in his own, peculiar way. Ioann perceived Moscow as receiving the gift of ministry of protecting ‘God’s truth’ and becoming the Third Rome, the capital of the Russian Orthodox kingdom — ‘izbrannitsa, podnozhie Prestola Tvoiego, zemne nebo, kladez’ very, vernosti i chistoi lubvi’ ('the chosen one, the footstool of His Throne, the earthly heaven, the well of faith, faithfulness and love)\(^{1127}\) The Russian nation — \textit{narod bogonosets} (god-bearer)\(^{1128}\) - was chosen to keep the truth of Orthodoxy until the

\(^{1119}\) Ioann’s perceptions, however, could be explained in the light of his own admission that his worldview was apocalyptic. See ‘Liubov’ne dolzhna byt’ slepoi’, in \textit{Odolenie}, 170.

\(^{1120}\) See Clarke, \textit{New Clothes}, 89. Pospielovsky, \textit{Orthodox Church}, 373.

\(^{1121}\) See \textit{SovR}, 12 September 1992, 3; 14 November 1992, 1-2; 8 April, 1993, 4; 17 April.

\(^{1122}\) A. Ignatov points out that political messianism came out of the ‘extreme nationalisation of Orthodoxy’. It appears that this, in itself, was the repetition of the same process which had happened in Byzantium by the time of Photius. ‘Bogoslovske argumenty v politicheskoi bor’be’, in \textit{VF}, 5, (1997), 15-30. For Byzantium’s process of nationalisation, see chapter II of our thesis, section 2.2. ‘Imperial ideology: Further developments’.


\(^{1125}\) ‘Taina’, 18-19. Cf. also his \textit{Rus’ sobornaia}, 76.

\(^{1126}\) Sometimes Ioann mentions the transfer of the deposit of faith rather than ‘messianic’ kingdom. ‘Rodit’ya russkim est’ dar sluzhenia’, in \textit{Odolenie}, 231.


\(^{1128}\) Ioann tends to employ Dostoevskii’s term throughout his writings. ‘Tvortsy kataklizmov’, in \textit{Odolenie}, 150.
‘end of times’.  

This is even further reinforced, in Ioann’s understanding, by the fact that the whole of Russian life and its meaning within history was encapsulated by the ‘prophecy’ about Moscow as the Third and the last Rome, the last stronghold of faith at the times of the universal apostasy.

The Orthodox consciousness easily passes this obstacle, explaining the peculiarity of the Russian fate exceptionally easily – by the providential appointment of Russia to become the last obstacle on the way of the universal apostasy... The whole of Russian history from the moment of its Baptism until our days fits into such an explanation, including the problem of the centuries old confrontation between the West and Russia.

This ministry presupposed a certain structure and state of mind of the Russian Church and society, which existed within autocracy, being led by God’s anointed one. The autocracy, according to Ioann, was perceived to be supported by the ‘state consciousness’ of the nation which took upon itself the voluntary apocalyptic ministry of the uderzhivaiushchii of 2 Thess. 2:7 and has brought the Russian nation into the epicentre of the apocalyptic drama. The special calling of a Russian nation as a ‘chosen one’ implied the rejection of the Jewish nation in God’s plan of salvation. The Jews became the enemies of the Church and of Russia since their rejection of Christ. That, in turn, implied the loss of a special status as ‘God’s elect’ on the part of a Jewish nation, a status, which, nevertheless, was displayed by the Jewish nation and came into conflict with Russian ‘chosenness’ beginning with the Kiev period of Russian history and up to the contemporary period.

Ioann’s view of Russian religious history revealed the repetition of clichés and of perceptions of medieval as well as Slavophile and neo-Slavophile writers. The
Catholic West fell away from God’s grace from 1054 and this resulted in a contemporary apathetic spiritual state which ‘reveals in itself a terrible spectacle of a blunt, animal indifference concerning spiritual issues’. The West was perceived as already living in a state of apostasy. Moreover, there appeared to be a historical plot against Russia and the Russian Church which was waged simultaneously by Jews and the West alike.

Yet, unlike others, Ioann brought a certain novelty to his assessment of Russian religious history. Thus, the history of the Orthodox Rus’ appeared to be the continuation of the sacred history of the NT through the figure of the ‘anointed one’, which in Russian history was represented by the Russian Tsar, and symbolised the highest, spiritual calling of Russia similar to that of Christ himself. This calling came into ‘full fruition’ under the wise leadership of Ivan IV, whose reign was perceived by Ioann to be the beginning of the fulfilment of Rus’ calling to become the Universal Orthodox kingdom. In contrast to other Russian historians like Karamzin, who were critical of the reign of Ivan IV, Ioann’s understanding of Ivan’s reign was influenced by his ‘messianic’ and mystical perceptions of Holy Rus’ in which Ivan’s reign was perceived to be that of the first Russian Tsar – the builder of Rus’ – Dom Presviatoi Bogoroditsy (Rus’ – the House of the Holy Theotokos).

Ioann’s messianic bias ascribed to Ivan IV the sacrosanct position of the ‘igumen vseia Rusi’ (the hiegumen of all Rus’), so that all subsequent actions of Ivan IV, including oprichnina, were perceived to be pregnant with the mystical meaning which was subjected to the providential course of Russian history. Later developments throughout Russian history, including the Bolshevik revolution in the twentieth century, were perceived to be the result of deviation from the ‘messianic’ calling which was bestowed upon Rus’.

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1137 ‘Bitva za Rossiiu’, in Odolenie, 64.
1138 ‘Vrazi’, 22.
1139 ‘Plach’, 97.
1140 ‘Bitva’, 64-6. See also his Rus’ sobornaia, note* on p. 71.
1142 Ioann, Samoderzhaviie, 139.
1143 Ioann, Samoderzhaviie, 140ff. On the spiritual meaning of oprichnina, see Samoderzhaviie, 151-2
Similarly to Metropolitan Ioann, a minority of Russian Orthodox contemporary writers presented their apocalyptic vision of the role of the Orthodox Rus', which was viewed through the lenses of Third Rome ideology. The central tenet of these speculations appears to be based upon the perception of Holy Rus' as that of the uderzhivaiushchii. Unlike their predecessors throughout Christian history, who placed the paramount significance upon the Danielic vision of the *translatio imperii* in relation to the messianic kingdom, Russian contemporary writers envisaged the messianic kingdom in relation to the apocalyptic/imperial interpretation of 2 Thess. 2:7. This understanding identified the figure of the *uderzhivaiushchii* with that of an historico-political entity such as the Roman empire. As such, this represents a new development within a certain faction of Russian Orthodox contemporary writers.

A. Tuskarev perceived the Orthodox kingdom of the Third Rome to be based upon the interpretation of 2 Thess. 2:7. This kingdom was led by the anointed Tsar and represented in itself the entity which prevented the appearance of evil on the world stage. Tuskarev's scheme represented a peculiar interpretation of the messianic kingdom, which resembled that of the Danielic scheme, yet, unlike the Danielic *translatio imperii*, Tuskarev's scheme was based solely upon 2 Thess. 2:7 in which the identity of the *uderzhivaiushchii* and its role as a 'messianic' kingdom was transferred from the Second Rome to the Third Rome – Moscow. This Orthodox kingdom was perceived to appear in Russia before the coming of the Antichrist.

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1145 E.N. Trubetskoi, perhaps, represents a tiny minority among the Russian Orthodox writers who critically assessed Russian messianism and Third Rome ideology as a whole. See 'Staryi i novyi messianizm', as found on [www.rchgi.spb.ru/christian/trubetskoy.html](http://www.rchgi.spb.ru/christian/trubetskoy.html). Similar, moderate view was expressed by Metropolitan Mefodii of Voronezh and Lipetsk. See his speech to the participants of the seminar 'Ot Rima k Tret'iemu Rimu' in 2000. As found on [www.vle.ru/mitropolit/work/pravoslavnye/3/17.html](http://www.vle.ru/mitropolit/work/pravoslavnye/3/17.html).


1147 A. Tuskarev, 'Tserkov' i protsess Apostasii', in Pravoslavuye, gosudarstvo, predantikhristova epokha, 2, as found on [www.aha.ru/sapfr/review/1993_1.html](http://www.aha.ru/sapfr/review/1993_1.html).

A. Mazurkevich, on the other hand, depicted the apocalyptic rise of the Orthodox kingdom before the Antichrist’s coming as being based on the identity of the woman/Church in Rev. 12: 1-6. \(^{1149}\) According to his scheme the woman from the desert represented a true Church which will rise in Russia and give birth to Dostoevskii’s ‘new Word’, thus fulfilling Russia’s ‘messianic’ vocation. \(^{1150}\) The future is perceived through the ‘messianic’ role of Russia. The role of the uderzhivaiushchii is ascribed to the last Tsar and the autocracy which will arise within the scenario of the end times. \(^{1151}\) In words of another protagonist of the messianic role of Russia, Archpriest V. Polosin: ‘The age of pure rationalism and individualism is coming to an end. Now an age of intuition and insight is approaching. And I see a Messianic role for Russia, which must become a country that will ensure this leap into the future’. \(^{1152}\)

In contrast to others, M. Nazarov postulated the identification of the ‘messianic’ kingdom with that of the identity of the uderzhivaiushchii as being based upon both the understanding of 2 Thess. 2:7 and the Danielic vision of the messianic kingdom. Following the traditional interpretation of the Church Fathers, \(^{1153}\) Nazarov, nevertheless, added some Russian colour: the existence of the Russian ‘messianic’ kingdom is perceived to be crucial to the existence of the world, for ‘if there is no Russia – there is not going to exist the rest of the world either, there will come the end of history.’ \(^{1154}\) In his perception of the ‘messianic’ kingdom Nazarov makes a historico-theological trajectory which transferred and ascribed the role of the uderzhivaiushchii to the Danielic messianic kingdom in 2:31-5. Nazarov’s interpretation seems to be based upon a particular interpretation of Filofei’s formula of the Third Rome which is understood to describe the role of the uderzhivaiushchii in 2 Thess. 2:7 and linked with the Danielic messianic kingdom, thus presenting a Russian version of the messianic kingdom.

\(^{1149}\) The work of A. Mazurkevich, ‘Apokalipsis’, www.aha.ru/~sapfir/12-1.html, represents a loose compilation of the apocalyptic writings from different historical eras, which, nevertheless, according to Mazurkevich, testify to the appearance of Russian apocalyptic, Orthodox kingdom.


Further, the assumption of this kingdom by the Russian nation is supported by their spiritual quality as the ‘narod-bogonosets’ (god-bearer) and Nazarov’s peculiar exegesis which allows him to see the transfer of the notion of ‘choseness’ from the Jews to the Russian nation which bears ‘his fruits’ Mt 21:43. However, Nazarov’s speculation concerning the Russian ‘messianic’ kingdom revealed a certain ambiguity. In order to construct a plausible ‘scenario’ for the Russian messianic kingdom on the basis of patristic as well as his own interpretations Nazarov was led to take a ‘positive’ interpretation of the spiritual/mystical significance of the Roman empire as that of the uderzhivaiushchii of 2 Thess. 2:7. On the other hand, the negative perception of the fourth beast/kingdom in Daniel 7 and Revelation 13 and 17 revealed some of the characteristics of the Antichrist. Thus, the interpretation of the identity of the beast/kingdom in Daniel and Revelation brought about a certain confusion in Nazarov’s understanding of the ‘messianic’ kingdom. This tension between the two traditional understandings of the Roman empire, positive versus negative, resulted in an unexpected scenario. According to Nazarov, the Roman empire will lose its significance and the presupposed function (2 Thess. 2:7). By doing so it will give way to the formation of two civilizations of which one is the Russian “Roman empire”, a spiritual kingdom of a positive value and function (2 Thess. 2:7), and the other Western ‘apostate’ civilization. This confusion is even further reinforced by Nazarov’s admission that the uderzhivaiushchii will be taken away before the end-times, and if one is to follow Nazarov’s speculation that the uderzhivaiushchii is expressed by the Roman-like kingdom of Russian civilization, then, it becomes unclear what is meant by the Danielic Roman empire/messianic kingdom within the Russian context, which is

1158 Ibid., 537-45.
perceived to last forever. Additional confusion seems to be created by the possibility of attributing the role of the uderzhivaiushchii to the Mother of God, who has been exercising such a role since the abdication of Nicholas II. Her role is perceived to be a temporary one, giving a period of repentance to Russia, being followed by the period of the reconstruction of the autocratic monarchy and its authority, which would assume the role of the uderzhivaiushchii.

Further, contemporary history is perceived to be the battle of the two civilizations which are broadly defined as the Orthodox uderzhivaiushchii and the Western as apostasy. Nazarov perceived the battle between these two opposing civilizations stretching all the way from medieval times up to the Crimean war and in more recent times the war in Yugoslavia in which the West was waging war against Orthodox Serbia. These anti-Western perceptions increasingly gained momentum in the post-Soviet Russia since the beginning of the 1990s. The messianic consciousness of a certain faction of Russian Orthodoxy, being underpinned by the imperial ideology, brought about a certain shift in the position of the Church within Russian society. This shift was reinforced through the juridical legislation which re-affirmed a near symphonical co-existence of Church and State in Russia. This development, however, coincided with the increasing rhetoric against and hostility towards the Catholic and Protestant Churches in Russia, whose activity came to be viewed as that of the ‘spiritual attack’ upon Holy Russia and as a part of a wider ‘plot’ against the Third Rome.

1160 Nazarov also shows elsewhere a remarkable inconsistency. Whilst in his earlier chapter “Tretii Rim – Sviataia Rus”, (pp. 483-90), the Third Rome signifies a concrete territorial entity such as the Muscovite kingdom, the later chapter “Romeiskoie tsarstvo i poslednie vremena”, (pp. 537-45), defines the Third Rome as a spiritual/mystical entity, the universal state-empire. 1161 See his chapter ‘Voina tsivilizatsii’, in Taina Rossii. For similar opinion see Protoierei A. Saltykov, ‘Pravoslavnoie mirovozzreniie i uchenie o Tret iem Rime’, in M.P. Kudriavtsev, Moskva Tretii Rim, 253-4.

1162 The ‘best’ representative of this faction within Russian Orthodoxy was Metropolitan Ioann who died in 1995. His extreme views however, were not confined to him personally, but either multiplied or echoed by other numerous Orthodox authors of a similar nationalist persuasion. For summary of Ioann’s publications and his wider circle see Slater, ‘Metropolitan Ioann’, 313-25. For further analysis consult her Ph.D. thesis, ‘Imagining Russia’, 21ff.

This anti-Western and exclusivist stance, whether in the religious or ideological sphere, became characteristic of the Russian ecclesiastical outlook of the Moscow Patriarchate towards the end of the twentieth century. This, in itself, was defined from medieval times along the divide West versus East and Moscow versus Constantinople, being underpinned by the Third Rome ideology and Russian messianic consciousness with its inherent notion of spiritual authority, which found its adherents in the highest echelons of Moscow’s hierarchy, including the Patriarch Aleksii II.\textsuperscript{1164}

5.5. Institutional authority

Institutionally the Russian Church appeared to remain static in its development. During the Soviet period, the Moscow Patriarchate was forced to consolidate its power in order to ensure its institutional survival. Its collaboration with the Communist State and servility on the part of the hierarchy of the Moscow Patriarchate resulted in institutional stagnation, which, despite the unprecedented period of \textit{perestroika} and \textit{glasnost'} within Russian society did not bring about any significant changes within the Russian Church. In spite of the decisions of the Holy Synod and \textit{Sobor} in 1905 and 1917,\textsuperscript{1165} which reintroduced and ‘sanctioned’ the principle of \textit{sobornost’} in ecclesiastical life, this principle appeared to be largely ignored by the hierarchy of the Moscow Patriarchate.\textsuperscript{1166} Thus, the first post-Soviet \textit{Sobor} of the Russian Church in 1988, which introduced a new statute concerning the administration of the Russian Church, rather than promulgating the decisions of the \textit{Sobor} in 1917 in the spirit of \textit{sobornost’}, represented a backward step and usurped authority even further in the hands of the

\textsuperscript{1164} Aleksii II repeated Dostoevskii’s messianic aspirations at the 6\textsuperscript{th} \textit{Universal Russian Sobor} in 2001. See Yakunin, ‘Podlinnyi lik Moskovskoi Patriarkhii’, on www.krotov.org.

\textsuperscript{1165} See Preobrazhensky, \textit{Church}, 186. Walters, ‘Orthodox Church’, 68.
represented a backward step and usurped authority even further in the hands of the hierarchy of the Moscow Patriarchate, thus creating a ‘quasi-papal’ institution. S. Hackel, evaluating the contemporary principles which operate within the Russian Church, pointed out that Khomiakov’s principle remains in the sphere of ‘theory, myth and idea’. The Church appears to be led by a hierarchy/oligarchy with its unchallenged and unprecedented authority concentrated in the hands of the Patriarch and the highest hierarchy. According to Metropolitan Kirill ‘authority in the Church belongs to the hierarchy’. Symptomatic of this state of affairs appears to be the removal of the article III.4 of the 1988 Statute which stated the accountability of the Arkhiereiskii Sobor (The Sobor of the hierarchy) to the Pomestnyi Sobor (The Sobor of the hierarchy and the laity). Accordingly, whilst the 1988 Statute regulated the occurrence of the Pomestnyi Sobor ‘not less than once in five years’, the 2000 Statute prescribes the need to convocate the Pomestnyi Sobor as being dependent upon the considerations of the Arkhiereiskii Sobor: ‘The dates of the Pomestnyi Sobor are decided by the Arkhiereiskii Sobor’. Thus, the accountability of the Arkhiereiskii Sobor to the Pomestnyi Sobor disappeared from the Statute 2000 in favour of a greater concentration of authority in the hands of the highest hierarchy undermining, and in fact removing from the equation, the overall principle of sobornost’. It is no surprise then, that instead of the democratic principle of sobornost’, which presupposes the participation of the laity in the process of election of the local bishop, he is, contrary to the decisions of the 1917-18th Sobor, selected and appointed by the Sviashchennyi Sinod (The Holy Synod). This is even further removed from its original meaning and assumes the character of a ‘pseudo-sobornost’ in the writings of Metropolitan Ioann and

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1168 Gakkel’, ‘Poriadki’, 244. His remarks are significant in the light of the decisions of Arkhiereiskii Sobor in 2000 which confirmed the existing pattern of the relationship between the authority of the hierarchy of Moscow Patriarchate and that of the Local Sobor. ‘Poriadki’, 250-1.
1169 Ibid., 246-7.
1170 Ibid., 251.
1171 For definitions of each of these institutions within Russian Orthodox Church, see articles II and III of the Statutes. The full text of the 1988 and the 2000 Statutes can be found on http://www.orthorus.ru/titles/history-f-ustr-docs-ust-new.html.
1172 Article II, 2, 2000.
1173 Ibid., 248.
Church life remains regulated by a statute which was created under the supervision of a secular State in 1945, thus providing a pattern of authority which suits the hierarchy of Moscow Patriarchate. Similar to the priest I.S. Belliustin in the nineteenth century, the contemporary priest P. Adel'geim has attempted to expose the present state of ecclesiastical life within the Russian Orthodox Church. Whilst there are similarities between these authors, namely the issues they address, the greatest dissimilarity lies in the fact that Belliustin described the Russian Orthodox Church as living under the 'protectorate' of the ober-prokuror and the control of the imperial system. In contrast to him, Adel'geim reflects upon the state of the Church in the post-Soviet period which presupposes a Church free and independent from the 'shackles' of the State. One of the 'features' of the contemporary life of the Russian Orthodox Church appears to be the usurpation of authority by the episcopate. Despite declarations by the Patriarch of Russia Aleksii II in the early 1990s that within the Church there is a harmony between two principles – that of sobornost' and the hierarchical - it seems that this can be asserted only on a theoretical level which does not necessarily correspond to Church praxis. Adel'geim asserted that the post-Soviet hierarchy demonstrated throughout the 90s that it 'preserved' the pre-revolutionary grasp and understanding of the 'order of sviashchennonachalie' and its authority as belonging to the episcopate alone. According to Adel'geim, contemporary ecclesiastical life within the Russian Orthodox Church reveals the 'cult of the divinisation' of the bishop. Cyprian's symbolical assertion 'The Church is in the bishop and the bishop is in the Church' is understood in a one-sided way, meaning the self-sufficiency of the bishop. The bishop is identified with the Church, he symbolises

1174 Slater draws a clear distinction between the vision of sobornost' by Khomiakov and that of Ioann and other extreme Orthodox nationalists. Whilst Khomiakov's sobornost' appears to be mystical and spiritual, the nationalists' understanding represents a general political system – an alternative to Western liberal democracy. See Slater, 'Imagining', 236ff. For Ioann's understanding of sobornost', see Rus' sobornaia, 17ff.

1175 Gakkel', 'Poriadki', 246.

1176 Aleksii II Patriarkh Moskovskii i vseia Rusi, Tserkov' i vozrozhdenie Rossii, Russkaia Pravoslavnaia Tserkva', 29.

1177 For the description of the 'class' of the pre-revolutionary episcopate, see Sv. P. Adel'geim, 'Zhizn Tserkvi v kanonakh i praktike', VPrkh, 184, II, (2002), 338. This is a partial article of Adel'geim's 'Dogmat o Tserkvi v kanonakh i praktike', see the full text on www.orthodoxia.org.
the fullness of the Church, his desires ‘express the will of The Church’.\textsuperscript{1178} The bishop’s teaching and sermons express the dogmatic, liturgical, moral and canonical self-consciousness of the Church, revealing his ‘status and authority during the service and in day-to-day life’.\textsuperscript{1179} The ‘divinisation’ of the bishop is required from the laity not on the basis of his spiritual virtues, but as a result of his ordination.\textsuperscript{1180} This leads to a distorted view of a bishop’s self-sufficiency and as a result to an unlimited authority, a direct contradiction of the principle of \textit{sobornost’}. ‘By establishing his own self-sufficiency in the Church, the bishop forces the clergy and the laity into ecclesiological emptiness. Having lost their canonical place in the Church, they vacate it for the \textit{Edinstvennyi} (the Only one) – the Essential one and the Self-sufficient’.\textsuperscript{1181}

In the sphere of the bishop’s authority within the Church Adel’geim points to an autocratic mode of authority. Thus, the bishop’s authority is exercised on the basis of his hierarchical position and formal authority. This presupposes ‘submission without the right to object and to a monologue instead of a fellowship. The hierarch suppresses everybody by his absolute will, and the church body meekly subjects itself to this violence, acknowledging the legitimacy of the authority’.\textsuperscript{1182} Such a state of affairs is contrasted by Adel’geim with the principle of \textit{sobornost’} and with the evangelical view of authority characterised and ‘regulated’ by love and freedom within the ecclesiastical body as a whole, rather than through and in the hierarch \textit{per se}.\textsuperscript{1183} Further, his authority is perceived by Adel’geim to be based upon a juridical rather than a charismatic/eucharistic basis – a historical novelty/development which was borrowed from ‘empirical life’ and introduced into ecclesiastical practice since the era of Constantine.\textsuperscript{1184} The juridical basis became the ‘corner-stone’ for the relationship between the hierarchy, clergy and laity.\textsuperscript{1185} This, in relation to the post-Soviet Russian Orthodox Church, resulted in the formulation of the bishop’s authority according to the

\begin{itemize}
\item\textsuperscript{1178} Ibid., 343.
\item\textsuperscript{1179} Ibid., 343.
\item\textsuperscript{1180} Ibid., 344.
\item\textsuperscript{1181} Ibid., 344.
\item\textsuperscript{1182} Ibid., 349.
\item\textsuperscript{1183} Ibid., 350-9. See also his P. Adel’geim, ‘Problema vlasti’, \textit{VRkhod}, 185, I, (2003), 249-53. This is a second part of Adel’geim’s ‘Dogmat o Tserkvi v kanonakh i praktike’, see the full text on www.orthodoxia.org.
\item\textsuperscript{1184} Ibid., 221.
\item\textsuperscript{1185} Ibid., 221.
\end{itemize}
statute of the Church which presupposed a sobornyi principle. In practice, however, as Adel'geim points out, ‘the bishop rules autocratically’, being supported by the Statute of the Russian Orthodox Church which gives unlimited freedom to the ‘Preosviashchennyi Administrator’ (The Right Reverend Administrator), allowing him to act in an arbitrary fashion, disregarding the opinion of ordinary believers. Finally, despite the decision of the 1917-18 Sobor concerning the elective principle in relation to the bishop’s nomination, the latest Russian Orthodox Church Statutes in 1988 and 2000 established a pre-revolutionary ‘caesaro-papistic’ practice of appointments from above: ‘The eparchy’s arkhierei is chosen by Holy Synod, receiving a notification (Ukaz) from the Patriarch of Moscow and the whole of Russia’. In addition, by comparing the Statutes of the Russian Orthodox Church throughout the twentieth century, Adel'geim came to the conclusion that by the end of the twentieth century the hierarchy of the Church totally suppressed the principle of sobornost’.

Whilst the historical Sobor of 1917-18 symbolised the age of reforms and progress, the 1990s were characterised by the usurpation of power and a total abandonment of the principle of sobornost’ in favour of hierarchical authority.

Another contemporary critic of the hierarchical authority within Russian Orthodoxy, G. Yakunin, goes even further than Adel’geim in his denunciation of the highest representative of such authority – the Moscow Patriarchate. In his article ‘Podlinnyi lik Moskovskoi Patriarkhii’, Yakunin sees the Moscow Patriarchate and its authority within Russian Orthodoxy as that of a totalitarian sect. Under Yakunin’s historical ‘microscope’ institutions, such as the Moscow Patriarchate, have an illegal and amorphous formation. The illegal status of the Moscow Patriarchate is understood by

1186 Adel'geim discusses the issue of the authority in relation to the contemporary Statute of the Russian Orthodox Church 2000.
1188 Ibid., 232.
1189 See examples of such behaviour in Adel’geim, ‘Problema’, 231-7. ‘Delo arkhimandrita Zinona s bratiei’, in ‘Dogmat o Tserkvi v kanonakh i praktike’ on www.orthodoxia.org. See Statute 2000, X, 2, 3, on the rights of the laity which are represented within parish setting through the eparkhial noie sobraniie (eparchy’s meeting) and the eparkhial nii sovet (eparchy’s council).
1191 It could be argued, however, that the twentieth-century bishops understood the principle of sobornost’ in their own, peculiar way: like that of the bishops at the end of the nineteenth century. See Freeze, ‘Handmaiden’, 100.
Yakunin to originate in Stalin’s decision to create the Moscow Patriarchate in 1943. This produced the formation of a ‘totally new tradition alien to Orthodoxy, a religious organization of a totalitarian type with new, unprecedented Church rules. The new structure of the administration was represented by the mitropolit-biuro which copied Stalin’s politbiuro and actually acquired the characteristics of a ‘totalitarian sect’ as far as the exercise of its authority is concerned. Ecclesiastical authority, administrative and charismatic, came to be concentrated in the hands of the Moscow Patriarchate – a close circle of hierarchs led by the ‘so-called Patriarch of Moscow and all the Russia’. It received an unlimited, absolute authority ‘bigger than that of the Local Sobor with the right to administer the Church in a more dictatorial way than Peter’s synod’. Subsequently, following Adel’geim, G. Yakunin pointed out that the decisions of the Arkhiereiskii Sobor in 2000 transferred ‘the fullness of authority within the Russian Orthodox Church from the Local Sobor to the Arkhiereiskii Sobor. Effectively this established a ‘Church which in its main outlook is opposed to Orthodox canons and in particular to the decrees of the Local Sobor in 1917-18’.

Whilst one ought to be cautious in taking Yakunin’s criticism at face value, it is important, nevertheless, to point out that Yakunin presents a fairly accurate, even if emotionally charged, account. The style and the mode of authority survived the collapse of the Soviet Union. Its ideology revealed itself throughout the 1990s in the ‘competition’ for supremacy between the Moscow Patriarchate, other Orthodox Churches/groups like the Russian Orthodox Church Abroad (ROCA), the newly emerging katakombnaia tserkov’, and the Catholic and Protestant Churches. Yakunin’s perceptions can be broadly supported by numerous observers/scholars/critics from within and outside of Russia and from within and outside Russian Orthodoxy. A

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1194 Ibid., 6.
1195 Ibid., 6.
1196 Ibid., 17.
discernable pattern emerges of an ecclesiastical body - the Moscow Patriarchate - which
despite official declarations of its supposed independence from the State moves closer
and closer to a position of a state Church. It demands the State’s support for its
particular outlook and vision by using all means at its disposal, including the politically
charged declarations of its hierarchy and the religious legislation of the 1997 ‘Law on
Religious freedom’. It is attempting to achieve its goal of supremacy within
contemporary Russia and its traditional authority over Russian society at large.

5.6. Anti-Semitism

Whilst one has to be cautious while speaking about anti-Semitism within Russian
Orthodoxy as a part of Orthodox official ‘doctrine’, it is nevertheless important to
emphasise that anti-Semitism, at least on the popular level, became one of the
characteristic features of Russian Orthodoxy throughout the twentieth century. It
became the ‘offshoot’ of the imperial ideology and ‘messianic’ consciousness which
was inherent in its outlook as a ‘component’ of the Muscovite religious outlook.
Any researcher who undertakes the task of understanding the phenomenon of anti-Semitism
within contemporary Russian Orthodoxy ought to consider the legacy of the nineteenth
century which provided a certain foundation for the developments throughout the
twentieth century in which the central place was occupied by the speculations
concerning a Jewish plot against Christian civilization.

The publication of spurious anti-Semitic writings such as The Protocols of the Elders
of Zion, which enjoyed a certain ‘longevity’ under the pen of numerous neo-

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1198 See Aleksii II speeches, declarations, appeals in Aleksii II, Patriarkh Moskovskii i vseia Rusi, Tserkov'
i dukhovnoie vozrozhdenie Rossii, Russkaia Pravoslavnaia Tserkov', 1999. Arkhiereiskii Sobor Russkoi
Pravoslavnoi Tserkvi, 29 Noiabria – 2 Dekabria 1994 goda, Moskva, Moskovskaia Patriarkhiia Izdatel’skii
Sv. M. Shpolianskii, ‘Tserkov’ zemnaia: razryvy i obryvy. Est’ li komu stroit’ mosty?’, FRkhd, 185, 1,
(2003), 256-97.
1199 Yet, it has to be pointed out that in such a sizeable country like Russia one can only speak more of a
regional phenomenon rather than a general characteristic of the whole of Russian Orthodoxy. See S.
Filatov, ‘Religioznaia zhizn’ Povolzh ia. Pragmatichnoie khristianstvo’, 63, in S. Filatov (ed.), Religia i
Obshchestvo, 63.
1200 J. D. Klier, Imperial Russia’s Jewish Question, 1855-1881, 123.
1201 The other piece of the anti-Semitic literature coming out of this period is, of course the influential The
Book of the Kahal by J. Braifman, the convert to Orthodoxy in 1858 whose publication contributed towards
Slavophile Orthodox writers stretching from Dostoevskii to Metropolitan Ioann, testified to the existence of the 'messianic' consciousness within a certain faction of Russian Orthodoxy. This 'messianic' consciousness contained within itself a certain element of anti-Semitism, which, though never becoming the official doctrine either of the imperial Church/State or later of the Russian Church throughout Soviet period, became nevertheless a latent force within a certain faction of Russian Orthodoxy and Russian society at large, influencing its ideology. This, in itself, was the result of a certain 'legacy' of the imperial ideology of the Muscovite state which was transferred via Russian Orthodoxy.

The mixture of popular beliefs, rather than a purely religious anti-Semitism appeared to play a role during the series of pogroms which took place in the Russian empire at the
end of the nineteenth and the beginning of twentieth centuries. This latent anti-Semitism found its way into the perceptions of Russian literary writers\textsuperscript{1207} and the members of the ‘Church establishment’, which included well-known figures like the ober-prokurator Pobedonostsev\textsuperscript{1208} and the last Russian Tsar Nicholas II.\textsuperscript{1209} This anti-Semitism, which was based upon a perceived Jewish threat, appeared to influence the Jewish policies of the imperial State in which the perceptions of the Church clergy\textsuperscript{1210} and the ‘establishment’\textsuperscript{1211} represented by Professor E. Akvilonov came to play a significant role.\textsuperscript{1212} The common denominator in all these expressions of anti-Semitism appeared to be the perceived Jewish threat to Russian Orthodox civilization.\textsuperscript{1213}

This perceived threat, despite the change in the ideological orientation of Russia after the cataclysmic events in the beginning of the twentieth century, became a significant part of the Russian Weltanschauung and was transferred into Soviet self-consciousness.

their own initiative or at the instigation of the anti-Semitic authorities. Patriarch Tikhon condemned the pogroms against the Jews on the territories controlled by the Whites. See Pospiełowski, Orthodox Church, 210-11. Yet, W. Korey, Russian Antisemitism, Pamyat, and the Demonology of Zionism, 4, asserts that religious anti-Semitism did play a major role in a massacre of Jews in the Ukraine in 1918-20.\textsuperscript{1207} See the comments of Pobedonostsev regarding Dostoevskii’s contribution to the popular anti-Semitic perceptions and theories of a Jewish plot in Löwe, Tsars, 81, n.65, also n. 66; 155.\textsuperscript{1208} See chapter V of our study, sub-section 5.5. ‘Anti-Semitism’. For Pobedonostsev’s involvement in anti-Jewish policies, see Byrnes, Pobedonostsev, 67ff.; 208-9. Baron, Jew, 50ff. Rogger, Policies, 37, 67-9.\textsuperscript{1209} Rogger, Policies, 49. Rogger 57, asserts that Alexander III and Nicholas II were ‘confirmed anti-Semites and that both of them looked upon the pogroms as ‘understandable outbursts of popular wrath against Jews’. It leads one to suggest that their role in the ‘Jewish question’ seems to be that of passive and permissive stance, allowing the government to formulate the policies as it suited the interests of a Russian nation, its worldview and religion. The same can be said of some regional governors who took a passive role in the pogroms. See Löwe, Tsars, 151ff. On this issue see also G. Freeze, ‘Subversive Piety: Religion and the Political Crisis in Late Imperial Russia’, JMH, 68, (1996), 308-50. Löwe asserts that Nicholas’ II anti-Semitism increased after 1905 due to his suspicions that the Jews represented the main force in the revolutionary movement. His anti-Semitism can be also deduced from the way the Tsar always pardoned those who were convicted of instigating pogroms, see especially n. 216, p. 244 on this point. For Nicholas’ II anti-Semitic expressions see his correspondence with his mother Maria Feodorovna in 1905-06, in ‘Perepiska Nikolaia II i Marii Fedorovny, KA, 21-23, (1927), 153-209. Rogger, Policies, 89. Consult also E.J. Bing (ed.), The letters of Tsar Nicholas and Empress Marie: being the confidential correspondence between Nicholas II, last of the tsar, and his mother, Dowager Empress Maria Feodorovna. 211ff.\textsuperscript{1210} Radzinski, Rasputin, 132.\textsuperscript{1211} Löwe, Tsars, 278, points out that radical, right anti-Semitic propaganda was even appearing in Church’s periodical such as Tserkovnii Vestnik, 3, (1912), 109-14, which supported Protocols and promulgated other anti-Semitic clichés\textsuperscript{1212} See E. Akvilonov, ‘ludeiskii vopros. O nevozmozhnosti predostavleniia polnoprawia russkim grazhdanam iz ludeiskogo naroda’, as found on http://rus-sky.com. Even such a formidable theologian as Bulgakov could not totally escape from a certain anti-Semitic inclination. See Appendix. Bulgakov and Anti-Semitism, in R. Williams (ed.), Sergii Bulgakov, 293-303.\textsuperscript{1213} It is our contention that the notion that Russian tsarist government conducted a deliberate policy of eliminating Jews from Russia, according to N. Cohn, goes too far and cannot be supported by the historical facts. For the criticism of Cohn, see Rogger, Policies, 107. For Cohn, Warrant for Genocide, 52.
on all social levels. Moreover, it was translated into concrete policies of the Soviet State, most notably by I. Stalin and his successors. Further, it was bound to ‘resurface’ in the charged atmosphere of perestroika, giving rise to neo-Slavophile movement such as Pamyat which laid a claim to Russian chosenness and proclaimed the Jews to be the main enemies of the Russian people. The writers, who turned their attention to the theme of Russian self-consciousness and its connection with Russian Orthodoxy, turned to the literary exploits of Slavophiles and other authors. They expressed their own theologico-philosophical speculations by reviving the concepts and perceptions of the literary world of the end of the nineteenth and the beginning of the twentieth century and added their own perceptions in the light of the historical changes of the twentieth century. The journals Molodaiia gvardiia, Nash sovremennik, among others, became the ‘heralds’ of a particular neo-Slavophile Weltanschuung consisting of a mixture of different elements derived from the nationalist and Russian Orthodox ideology which was combined with the ‘remnant’ of the Communist ideology after the election in 1993, thus bringing about a ‘pseudo-Orthodox’ outlook.

It is indeed difficult to know how widespread the anti-Semitism is in the Russian Church. Nevertheless, the fact remains that it finds expression among some prominent members of the hierarchy. It appears that post-Soviet authors presented a one-sided

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1214 See Korey, Antisemitism, 7-8.
1215 See Korey for the account of Soviet anti-Semitism, Antisemitism, 7ff., 12, 74ff. His main weakness seems to be in his limited understanding of Soviet anti-Semitism, which, according to him, emanated from the Protocols. He does not seem to appreciate the fact that Dostoevskii spoke about Jewish domination even before the Jewish congress in 1897, which subsequently gave rise to the appearance of anti-Semitic publications such as the Protocols. For a detailed account of Stalin’s anti-Semitism, see G. Kostyachenko, Out of the Red Shadows Anti-Semitism in Stalin’s Russia, New York, Prometheus Books, 1995. Conquest, Stalin, 290ff.
1217 See Korey, Antisemitism, 132.
1218 This was publicly declared at the public rally of the organisation ‘People’s Russian Orthodox Movement’ – the offshoot of Pamyat in 1990. Korey, Antisemitism, 144.
1219 See Moss, Tserkov’, 353, who nearly literally repeats Slavophile romantic perceptions of the Russian empire and Dostoevskii’s ‘messianic’ admonitions of the Russian nation. Moss, of course writes from the perspective of a western observer.
1220 For bibliography, see Slater, ‘Imagining’, 13ff.
1222 See Dunlop, ‘Hour’, 72ff. Hosking, Russia, 595ff.
understanding of history. One of the main themes which run through the writings of the authors who propagated the imperial ideology with associated Russian ‘messianic’ outlook appears to be the understanding of the Jewish plot against Orthodox Russia and the way this plot was realised through recent Russian history. Thus, the Bolshevik revolution appears to be the direct result of the apocalyptic scenario and the realisation of a Jewish plot. When one surveys these publications, their inherent weakness seems to be the lack of any serious attempts to understand the socio-economic reasons behind the significant number of Jews who appeared in the forefront of revolutionary forces at the end of the nineteenth century and the beginning of the twentieth century. One is to search in vain amongst these publications for objective reasoning similar to that of the Russian minister S.I. Witte in 1903 in relation to Jewish participation among revolutionary parties and movement: ‘I believe it is the fault of the government. The Jews are too much oppressed’. Instead, there was an imagined and idealised understanding of history which presents certain events from the angle which suites the ideological stance of the author. The murder of the Tsar’s family was perceived by some writers like V. Astaf’ieev to be a ritual murder committed by Zionists. V. Moss propagated the view that in the beginning, the Russian revolution was conducted mainly by the Jews who were inspired by their philosophical understanding of history. The Jewish plot succeeded in removing the last ‘uderzhivaiushchiiu situ’ (the restraining power) – the Russian Orthodox empire and opened the way for the lordship of the Jewish nation. His views were echoed by Metropolitan Ioann who became the ‘spearhead’ of the fundamentalist Orthodox-nationalist sentiment, which became

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1223 Rogger, Policies, 86. For the endorsement of such view, see S.J. Witte, ‘Evreiskii vopros i russkaia revolutsiia’, in A. Flegon, J. Naumov, Russkii antisemitizm i evreii, 35-40. See also Radzinski, Rasputin, 129.


1225 Moss, Tserkov’, 7-10.

1226 Moss, Tserkov’, 11, 17.

characteristic of some ecclesiastical circles within Russian Orthodoxy.¹²²⁸ His numerous publications expressed the typical and well established perception of a Jewish plot,¹²²⁹ in which the Jews were depicted, in the manner of John Chrysostom, as the enemies of Christ and Russian Orthodox civilization.¹²³⁰ In Ioann’s amazing construction the sufferings of Christ and of the Russian people were directly connected with a Jewish role performed throughout history:

The Lord was crucified by the Jews and endured the torments of the cross, suffering innocently for the sake of the salvation of all peoples. For decades after the victory of the God-haters the Russian people poured out their blood in agony on the cross of the repression, terror and mockery which malicious Christ-haters raised up against them.¹²³¹

The Protocols of the Elders of Zion, despite the evidence of its dubious character and origin,¹²³² perceived to be by Ioann the ‘manifesto’ of a Jewish nation, which revealed the conspiracy¹²³³ and the secret involvement of Jews throughout Russian history.¹²³⁴

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¹²²⁸ This is certainly true of the monks of the monastery of Valaam and the members of the Union of Orthodox Brotherhood. Whilst the former expressed their views in the manner of St John Chrysostom in the ‘Open letter by the monks of the monastery of Valaam to His Holiness the Patriarch of Moscow and all Russia Alexii II’, the latter were connected with Metropolitan Ioann and exercised a considerable degree of pressure upon the Moscow Patriarchate and the Moscow Spiritual seminary. See Zyablitsev, ‘Problem’, 102. Pospelovskiy, ‘Problemy’, 220ff.

¹²²⁹ Afanas’ev also points to the additional list of those who constitute the plot against Russia which consists of Protestants, Catholics, Masons and Americans. See ‘Religiiia kak ob’ekt gumanitarnykh nauk’, Report at the conference Tserkov’, natsiia i grazhdanskoie obshchestvo v Rossii i Vostochnoi Evrope, Bierremark, Denmark, 2 May, 1997. As found on www.rsuh.ru/afanasev/tom3/tom3_308.htm.

¹²³⁰ Patriarch Alexii II made a conscious effort to emphasise that Ioann’s views were of a personal character and as such did not represent the official view of Russian Orthodox Church. IN, 16,17-24 April, (1994), 21. Although in 1993 his reaction to the anti-Semitic Union of Brotherhoods seems to be somewhat more ambivalent. It is interesting also to notice that whilst in his condolences on the death of A. Men’, Alexii II pointed out that ‘his views did not necessarily reflected the official view of the Orthodox Church’, his condolences on the death of Ioann in 1995 reveal nothing but praise. See Alexii II, 329, 332-3. Cf. also Pospelovskiy, Orthodox Church, 376. The anti-Semitism of Ioann’s style was also condemned by Archbishop Pimen (Khmelevskii) in 1993. See F. Corley, ‘Unsuccessful Orthodoxy in Russian Heartlands’, RSS, 28, 1, (2000), 38.

¹²³¹ As found in J. Ellis, The Russian Orthodox Church Triumphalism and Defensiveness, 107. The same analogy between Christ’s sufferings and that of Russian people is used by Nazarov. ‘Taina Rossii’, 5.


¹²³³ The theory of the conspiracy against Russia could be traced to Archimandrite Fotii in 1824, although in his case the conspirators were perceived to be freemasons, rather than Jews. See Hosking, Russia, 254.
The twentieth century history of Russia was perceived to be the historical actualisation of that plot\textsuperscript{1235} in which the economic and moral crisis of post-Soviet Russia was perceived to be the direct result of a Jewish plot.\textsuperscript{1236}

\textsuperscript{1234} Metropolitan Ioann, `Tvortsy', 150ff. Samoderzhaviie, 256ff. Ioann even perceived the false Dimitrii during the period of Smuta to be of Jewish origin, `Tvortsy', 151. Nazarov goes even further than Ioann in his assessment of Jewish plots throughout history – tracing the historical ‘hand of Jewishdom’ all the way to the fall of Byzantium. See chapter ‘Evreii i Amerika’, in Taina Rossi, as found on www.rusidea.narod.ru.

\textsuperscript{1235} Ioann, `Bitva', 70-1.

\textsuperscript{1236} Ioann, `Bitva', 71-3. For the contemporary expressions of Russian popular anti-Semitism, see ‘Nashe Otechestvo’, especially N168. This website is filled with the anti-Semitic articles which interpret Russian contemporary reality through anti-Semitic ‘lenses’, see http://www.private.peterlink.ru/vgri. V. Belimov, ‘Golos krovi s ugolovnoi tonal’nost iu’, 19 December, 2001. The article about the distribution of anti-Semitic hatred by the Ekaterinburg diocese through the Orthodox publications Pravoslavnaiia gazeta, Pravoslavnyi vestnik, also the distribution through the Church’s kiosks of anti-Semitic books such as of S. Nilus, 'Bliz est’ pri dveriaakh', which contains the ‘Protokoly Sionskikh mudretsov’, see www.edu.nsu.ru. See also the official website of the Brotherhood of St. Joseph of Volotsk, which has numerous anti-Semitic articles, http://www.nationalism.org/bratstvo/oprichnik.
Conclusion

Bearing in mind the fact that religious authority is a relational category, I have explored both the nature and the modes of its expression within the ecclesiastical community in its distinctive Eastern Orthodox milieu. Whilst on the surface the ecclesiastical structure of the Russian church appears to be of the same ‘mould’ as that of Eastern Orthodoxy, its perception of authority manifests some distinctive features. Its understanding has been conditioned and has evolved within space, time, geography, philosophy and theology.

Within this wider framework, I have explored the historical development of the concept of authority within Russian Orthodoxy. Its practice of authority revealed a unique pattern of authority, which evolved as a result of challenges and controversies, as well as the conditions imposed by the State throughout the history of Russian Orthodoxy. Our investigation has taken us to the period of Byzantine Christianity and beyond. Through this, we have been able to establish similarities and dissimilarities between Russian perceptions of authority and that of Byzantine Christianity or indeed early Christianity.

First, we have attempted to establish the wider setting in the world of Antiquity. This revealed the existence of some ideas concerning eternal Rome, its universality and the chosenness of the Roman nation from the realm of Roman poetry and Hellenistic philosophical speculation. These were widely later adapted, albeit with some modifications by the Byzantine empire and Christian thinkers.

Within this wider setting, we have explored Jesus’ and NT’s attitude towards the authority of the State, as portrayed by the evangelists and apostles. We came to the conclusion, that, at best, what can be said of Jesus’ attitude towards earthly authority and a political system, is that nowhere does He explicitly spell out his perspective. That could be explained by the fact that his ministry had a different focus and that the issue of the perception/attitude towards earthly authority of the State was of a subsidiary significance. What can be deduced is that at worst his actions left some legacy of
ambiguity. His actions and the kerygmatic proclamation of the Kingdom of God revealed an inherent attitude towards the authority of the State. In this ‘scenario’ the political system is placed within the Kingdom of God with its two-dimensional orientation within the eschatological mode of existence. The followers of Christ are expected to live in the world but not be of the world, that is, submissive to earthly authority, yet to be ultimately loyal to the Kingdom of God and its values, which supersede but do not deny earthly authority. Such ambiguity was followed by some of the apostles. The writings of the apostles Paul and Peter tend to present the life of the newly-formed Christian community as being placed within the same two-dimensional orientation. On the horizontal level, the Christian community is encouraged to be submissive to earthly authority on the basis of the constituted social order and as a part of the divinely instituted order of Creation. On the vertical level, the level of God’s kingdom requires the ultimate loyalty of the Christian community owing to the fact that God’s kingdom ontologically goes beyond the social order and the political system.

On the other hand, following the apocalyptic perception of reality, the Revelation of John, presents the State and its authority in overwhelmingly negative terms. Yet, despite John’s depiction of two conflicting realms and the demonic nature of the earthly realm, the Christian community is not called to active rebellion. Like other NT authors, John implicitly calls believers to submit to earthly authority and to persevere to the end, maintaining witness to Christ and his overall Lordship.

The difference, however, between other NT writers and John, who proscribed a particular outlook of earthly authority and the right attitude towards it, lies in the actual presentation of the existing political system and the nature of political authority. Whilst the evangelists, Paul and Peter, in their portrayal of Jesus, limited themselves mainly to the representation of the social order and its acceptance by Christian communities, John presented the same creation order within a cosmic scale. The difference mainly lies in the fact that the Apocalypse neither completely negates, nor fully confirms, the pax Romana as other authors do, thus essentially leaving some ambiguity. Subsequently, this ambiguity was bound to be manifested later on in the writings of the post-apostolic Fathers and in the life of the early Christian church, forming two distinctive traditions of
interpretation, namely conservative versus apocalyptic. Whilst broadly conforming to John's apocalyptic portrayal of the cosmic order and Christians' response towards earthly authority, some of the apocalyptic writers of the sub-apostolic age went further than John. Unlike John, who advocated only 'eschatological withdrawal' from the world, that is, the eschatological orientation of the believers whilst living in the world, some authors suggested withdrawal in sociological terms.

As a part of the wider investigation which established the constituent themes that underpinned the spiritual/mystical perception of authority within Russian Orthodoxy, we have explored the origins and content of the theme of the *translatio imperii*. We were able to establish and to demonstrate that a certain fluidity of apocalyptic language which was expressed in terms of symbolism carried within itself an inherent problem. The interpretation of such powerful symbols/figures as the Messiah and the Messianic kingdom left a certain degree of ambiguity which, in turn, left the opportunity for different successive generations freely to apply these symbols to different historical periods. Similarly, the two-dimensional orientation of the book of Daniel, namely historical/literal and typological/eschatological, provided additional confusion and difficulty. This resulted in a variety of interpretations among the Church Fathers, who attempted to re-interpret the Danielic prophecies in the light of the Christ-event, thus essentially producing a typological trajectory from these Danielic prophecies to the Apocalypse of John. This, in itself, can be characterised as a conflation/fusion of different ideas which led to a multiplicity of interpretations and identifications concerning the Messianic kingdom and the end of the world. Subsequently, the fluidity of the apocalyptic language and the literary confusion were manifested in the writings of Russian ecclesiastical authors, who adapted the themes of the Messianic kingdom and the eternity of Rome and re-applied them in relation to Russian realities. In this regard, the apocalyptic aspirations of the minority of Russian Orthodox scholars at the end of the twentieth century represented an amalgam of different interpretations. Although, the traditional theme of the *translatio imperii* retained its evocative power for Russian scholars, nevertheless, greater emphasis was laid upon the meaning and the interpretation of the figure of the *uderzhivaiushchii*. The function of this apocalyptic figure was ascribed either to the latter-days Tsar, the autocracy or the Russian nation.
Such a perception was the result of a particular line of the interpretation of Russian history, Scriptural and Patristic evidence being underpinned by the contemporary neo-Slavophile nationalism, monarchist aspirations or Dostoevskii’s views on the spiritual qualities of Russian nation.

Finally, the process of Hellenization which took place within the early Church of pre-Constantine era revealed a cultural and theological shift in the consciousness of early Christianity, away from the mindset of predominantly Jewish Christianity. Beginning with the Apostle Paul, the Church came to perceive itself increasingly as the New Israel, which replaced the ethnic Israel in its unique degree of chosenness. Such a perception coincided with the delay in the expectation of the parousia. It became one of the factors contributing towards the emergence of the concept of Byzantium as a Messianic kingdom in the post-Constantinian settlement.

Secondly, dealing with the theme of Byzantium as a Messianic kingdom, we concentrated on the historical figure of Eusebius of Caesarea. We established that Eusebius represents a link in such an identification. The main achievement of Eusebius lay in the area of imperial ideology and a particular interpretation of the historical process, the interpretation which was taken over by subsequent interpreters. Under his pen, the existence of the Roman empire assumed the ‘high’ character of a providential kingdom. Eusebius’ ‘high’ view of the Roman emperor and the empire was underpinned by Hellenistic concepts whenever he lacked some Scriptural evidence or support. The historical changes under Constantine forced him to select different concepts and to bring about a fusion or conflation of several ideas, which resulted in the formation of the Christianised version of imperial ideology. In turn, the creation of an imperial-Christian ideology resulted in an historic political/ecclesiastical arrangement in which a political entity such as the Roman empire became aligned with the ecclesiastical entity, the Christian Church. The theoretical conflation of the two resulted in a subsequent perception of Byzantium as a Messianic kingdom with its sense of presupposed spiritual/mystical authority. Additionally, such an arrangement had some consequences in the form of the nationalisation of Christianity. The Roman empire of Constantine simultaneously became a politico-ecclesiastical institution and as a nation, the bearer of
the true faith. This, in itself, presupposed an automatic loyalty to both institutions, the Church and the State.

In this arrangement, Eusebius’ imperial ideology contributed towards the creation of the concept of *symphony* which became the hallmark of the relationship between Church and State. Both, at least on a theoretical level, were perceived to co-exist in *symphony*. Their authority was presupposed to be co-equal, corresponding to different spheres. This setting laid the foundations for the pattern of the politico-ecclesiastical relationship throughout the history of Byzantium and in Russia in the centuries to come. It must be admitted that this pattern of the relationship was not without its failures in the form of ‘caesaro-papism’ and also carried within itself mutual benefits as well as dangers for both parties. On the part of the Church, this setting gave the opportunity for it to exercise its spiritual authority, in its external orientation, and to influence the emperor and the pagan-Roman society at large affecting all spheres of life. Yet, at the same time the Church’s authority often came to compete with the ambitions of the heirs to the Roman imperial legacy, who on more than one occasion throughout Byzantine history were determined to exercise their own ultimate authority over the Church. In our view, this age by no means revealed the complete ‘surrender’ of the Church to the power of the State as some Protestant scholars would like us to believe. However, it also has to be pointed out that the denials or the minimization of the occurrences of ‘caesaro-papism’ within such politico-ecclesiastical arrangement by some Orthodox scholars ought to be regarded with a certain degree of scepticism. This relationship could be characterised as that of tension accompanied by human frailty and ambitions on both sides.

Further, we came to the conclusion that Eusebius’ imperial ideology probably had some impact upon Byzantine apocalyptic perceptions. This impact took place by virtue of an imperial ideology which placed a politico-ecclesiastical formation like Byzantium within an apocalyptic scenario of salvation/world history. In this, a political entity such as the Roman/Byzantine empire assumed the characteristics of a messianic kingdom. This further blurred any distinction between Church and State, contributing to historical identifications which would have significance for medieval Russia.
Thirdly, we suggested that Russian Orthodoxy owed its anti-Western orientation largely to the fact that it adapted the Greek form of Orthodoxy. The legacy of the ecclesiastical and political conflicts between East and West was bound to have an impact upon ascendant Russian Orthodoxy. In addition the Photian schism and the controversy in the eleventh century between East and West, the Latin crusades and the conquest of Constantinople in the thirteenth century contributed further towards a particular ecclesial and political entrenchment of Russian Orthodoxy within Eastern Orthodoxy. The Tatar conquest and three centuries of domination only strengthened such an outlook. It created an ecclesiastical isolation which further complicated the relationship not only between Russian Orthodoxy and the West, but also marked a new era in the relationship with the Patriarchate of Constantinople.

It can be firmly asserted, without referring to the issue of the legitimacy of Russian autocephalous status, that the emergence of the autonomous Russian Church at the time of Constantinople's decline contributed towards Muscovite spiritual/mystical self-perception. The rise of the formula 'Moscow the Third Rome' in the sixteenth-century Muscovite Rus' became characteristic of Russian Orthodoxy for centuries to come. Although elevated to the official level at the establishment of the Moscow Patriarchate in 1589, it became a spiritual/mystical and unattainable ideal. During the time of Nikon and the raskol, the Third Rome ideal became partially responsible for the resistance of a certain faction within Russian Orthodoxy (Old Believers), which was fighting against the perceived apostasy of the Nikonite church. In this, the Third Rome politico-ecclesiastical ideal carried within itself a greater spiritual/mystical authority than that of either Tsar or Patriarch. Later, during the Petrine era for Old Believers, for Slavophiles and the neo-Slavophiles of the nineteenth and twentieth centuries, Moscow as the Third Rome was also impregnated with a spiritual/mystical authority, which, in turn, required the return to its ideals and the re-adjustment of the whole political and ecclesiastical structure. Time and again, the Third Rome formula revealed within itself a latent Russian messianism and the anti-Semitism which was derived from the confusion of and the differentiation between anti-Jewish (anti-Judaizing/biblical) and anti-Semitic (ethnic) notions and the Third Rome ideology with its understood sense of spiritual/mystical authority. In the sphere of the relationship either towards East or
West, this formula underlined a distinctive development within Russian Orthodoxy. It came to be characterised by its sense of messianism/missionism and exclusivism in the eyes of the beholders of this formula. What can be added, however, is that our investigation did not touch upon the theme of the power of the symbolic language and symbols. In this regard, perhaps an additional investigation is needed to establish the degree of the significance and the psychological effect of such powerful symbols as Moscow the Third Rome upon the Russian national mentalité.

We have established that Russian messianism was born in the aftermath of the ‘union’ of Florence. It was born out of a sense of the Russian Tsar and Russian Orthodoxy having a mission to preserve the true faith in relation to both East and West. In this, the religious vocation of the Tsar and that of Russian Orthodoxy played a pivotal role. The actual sense of messianism came as a result of the ambiguity of language. It was employed in relation to the Tsar, historical events and their interpretations, being underpinned by apocalyptic and theological ideas relating to the understanding of the history of mankind and Christian revelation. The conflation of different ideas, namely the understanding of the apocalyptic kingdom and the interpretation of the role of the Muscovite kingdom within the history of salvation of humankind as set within the apocalyptic framework of the end times, resulted in the appearance of the motif of Moscow the Third Rome. We arrived at the conclusion that the main significance of this formula within Russian Orthodoxy lay in the sphere of authority on a spiritual/mystical level.

Fourthly, the theological controversies, which shook Muscovite Rus’ between the fourteenth and sixteenth centuries, exposed the perception of authority within Russian Orthodoxy. This struggle, among other factors, revealed the development of monastic and hierarchic authority within Russian Orthodoxy. The victory of the Josephite monastic party with a particular ideological outlook, and the subsequent election of the Russian Patriarch in 1589, resulted in a peculiar outlook in relation to the issue of authority. It came to be characterised by autocratic tendencies on the part of the highest clergy and the black monastic clergy. Authority came to be concentrated in the hands of the monastic clergy at the expense of the white clergy. The monastic clergy, whether in the monastic setting or in hierarchical positions within the Russian Orthodox Church,
by virtue of their struggle with heretics or free thinkers, came to be perceived as the guardians of Tradition. Such a concentration of authority was bound to have some serious repercussions for Russian Orthodoxy as a whole. From this period onward there ensued a constant struggle between the black monastic and white clergy. As it appeared, there was no single monolithic vision/understanding of the Church and its authority in Russian Orthodoxy. The relationship between the laity and the hierarchy, the Church hierarchy and the Tsar, as the followers of Nil of Sora, free thinkers of the sixteenth century, bogoliubtsy and the Old Believers demonstrated, was not clearly defined or dogmatically formulated. This, in turn, opened the way for some tension between the representatives/adherents of these views and parties within Russian Orthodoxy.

In our view, it is perhaps this imbalance that was partially responsible for the clashes between the forerunners of Old Believers (bogoliubtsy) and the autocratic-like Nikon, the former advocating the sobornyi principle and reinforcing it later as a major principle of the ecclesiastical structure and life among Old Believers. The reforms of Peter the Great can also, to some extent, be better understood as a counter-reaction to the prevalence of monastic and hierarchic authority. The disestablishment of the institution of the Patriarchate and the establishment of the Holy Synod, at least in its initial stage, appeared to reflect the collegial principle of the distribution of authority within the Church. A century later, Khomyakov’s principle of sobornost’ came to be hotly disputed among different parties within the Russian Orthodox Church in the last decades of the nineteenth and at the beginning of the twentieth century. The significance of the imbalance of authority was highlighted at the historical Sobor in 1917-18 which sought to redress the balance between these two parties and to introduce a greater involvement of the laity in the life of the Church.

Such a progressive outlook, however, was interrupted by the change in the political system and worldview within Russian society. The Soviet period came to be characterised by control in relation to the Church. In this ‘symphonic co-existence of the unequals’, the Russian Church was ‘assigned’ to fight for its institutional survival. Whilst within other Russian Orthodox ecclesiastical formations such as Katakombnaiata Tserkov’, the ecclesiastical arrangements revealed the existence of the principle of
sobornost’, the Russian Orthodox Church of the Moscow Patriarchate, in its restricted ecclesiastical existence, developed along autocratic lines, which went unchallenged even in the aftermath of Gorbachev’s perestroika. In this regard, the contemporary state of affairs in the Russian church at the end of the twentieth and beginning of the twenty-first century represents a departure from the decisions of the 1917-18 Sobor. Such a state of affairs allows us to raise a legitimate question: whether the contemporary Russian Church (the Moscow Patriarchate) needs to re-examine its understanding of authority in order to redress the balance and to eliminate the autocratic style of its leadership? It appears, in the light of the contemporary critics of the Moscow Patriarchate, that the autocratic style of leadership leads to ecclesiastical abuses of power and authority. The monastic hierarchy through its institutional authority appears to wield all power at the expense of both the laity and the white clergy, with a demoralising and suffocating effect upon the ecclesiastical life of Russian Orthodoxy.

Similarly, the medieval theological controversies exposed another perception - that of the authority of Tradition within Russian Orthodoxy. This, in itself, consisted of several ‘components’ such as Patristic evidence and its authoritative and prescriptive character, Scriptural authority and the authority of Ecumenical councils and their decisions. However, the employment of the authority of Tradition by the defenders of Orthodoxy throughout these struggles revealed an inherent problem. In an age when confusion reigned concerning the character of different writings and their degree of trustworthiness and usefulness, appeals to the authority of Tradition were made by both the Orthodox and heterodox parties. In this, the lack of clarification as to what constituted the authoritative Tradition, and in particular the authoritative and prescriptive Patristic evidence, undermined the authority of the hierarchy by providing the basis for the opponents of the Orthodox hierarchy to formulate and propagate their views.

Further, the development of the perception of the authority of Tradition within Russian Orthodoxy resulted in a problem on a different level. In our view, the lack of differentiation/clarification between different elements of Tradition in its universalist aspect and its authority versus local tradition(s) and their authoritative character led to conflicts within and outside Russian Orthodoxy. The perception of the authority of local
Russian traditions as against Greek traditions became one of the main reasons for the raskol under Nikon. Russian traditions assumed a prescriptive and normative character among a certain faction within Russian Orthodoxy. The endorsement of the authority of Russian traditions at the expense of the universalist aspects of ‘Greek’ tradition became the significant force during and after Nikon’s reforms. The handling of the affair of Maksim Grek by the Muscovite political and ecclesiastical authorities a century earlier can be partially explained by the same problem of reliance upon the local perception of the authority of Tradition as against Greek tradition(s).

Consequently, this raises an essential question in relation to the authority of Tradition. Which elements of Tradition carry within them universalist connotations and, therefore, are valid and prescriptive in their character, and which elements are culture-bound and time-limited? The conservative power of Tradition enabled Russian Orthodoxy to preserve intact the essential dogmas inherited from Byzantine Christianity. The inability to differentiate between different elements of Tradition/traditions or to clarify them and their authoritative/non-authoritative character resulted in violent clashes with tragic consequences. This problem still exists within contemporary Russian Orthodoxy, whether in relation to the recontextualisation of its liturgy, the use of the Old Slavonic language, or the catechumenical activities of G. Kochetkov in 1990s.

Finally, as a tributary to the internal development of authority within Russian Orthodoxy, we have established the existence of the charismatic mode of the authority of the Russian starets. It is within the context of the widespread phenomenon of the starchestvo within Russian Orthodoxy and the authority of starets in particular, that the tragic figure of G. Rasputin and the historic role which he played can be fully understood. We have attempted to demonstrate that Rasputin’s appeal lay precisely in the popular perception and the perceived authority of the starets, which he managed to usurp and to use to achieve his own goals. This has its own implications for the contemporary starchestvo within Russian Orthodoxy.

In conclusion, the attempt to re-examine the perception and the structure of authority within Russian Orthodoxy has obvious benefits. It has the potential for change both
within and outside Russian Orthodoxy. Our hope is that the unprecedented freedom which the Russian Orthodox Church has come to enjoy since the collapse of the Soviet union will become a catalyst for internal change, which will be of benefit to both clergy and laity and will open up a greater ecumenical awareness, encouraging inter-confessional relationships within Russia and beyond. S. Bulgakov’s assertion, ‘In any case, the institution should not suppress the ontology’, perhaps still waits for its fulfilment as far as authority within Russian Orthodoxy is concerned. It remains to be seen whether Bulgakov’s words will become a living reality within the life of the Russian Orthodox Church.
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