The Saudi-Yemeni boundary: towards a peaceful resolution.

Al-Ghamdi, Ahmed Abdullah Saud

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The Saudi-Yemeni Boundary: Towards a Peaceful Resolution

Volume One
(of two volumes)

Ahmed Abdullah Saud Al-Ghamdi

Thesis submitted for Degree of Doctor of Philosophy
in the Faculty of Social Science, International Boundaries Research Unit,
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1996

- 8 OCT 1997
The Saudi-Yemeni Boundary: Towards a Peaceful Resolution

Ahmed Abdullah Saud Al-Ghamdi

Abstract

This thesis starts with the historical background to the Saudi-Yemeni boundary in general, a study of the Treaty of Taif (1934), and the maritime boundary between the two states. The main focus of the thesis then follows, namely an in-depth consideration of the frontier between Saudi Arabia and the Republic of Yemen to the east of the Treaty of Taif boundary, and the problems and issues surrounding its demarcation - one of the longest running of present day unresolved boundary disputes, from its origin in 1914 when the Violet line was rejected by Ibn Saud.

This thesis aims to facilitate a resolution by examining several of the factors which affect the location of a Logical Boundary. The de facto Saudi-Yemen border currently in operation provides a logical basis for settlement of the territorial dispute. This thesis describes in detail how the de facto border was identified and mapped, perhaps for the first time ever. The border conforms, at least very broadly, with a number of geographical and human divides, and can be regarded as a crucial point for a properly adjusted and negotiated boundary.

This thesis considers seven major groups of factors in testing the authority of the recommended boundary. Not all the factors carry the same weight. Some factors (geographical, historical, behavioural and administrative) will be critical in the delimitation process, and some (social, economic and tribal) will powerfully influence the acceptability of any boundary compromise. All these factors are thoroughly examined in the thesis which includes 40 maps and 16 plates. At the end of the thesis the author recommends the alignment of a Logical Boundary.

The author does not ignore the boundary negotiations which began in Geneva on 5th July 1992, and resulted in the signing of a Memorandum of Understanding on 26th February 1995. The author has used Prescott's 1987 model of boundary negotiations to predict the outcome of these negotiations.

The author recommends the use of his framework model for the Saudi-Yemeni boundary, and also as a route to the peaceful resolution of boundary disputes elsewhere, for example at some points between Morocco and Algeria.
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Declaration

In 1991 the author carried out his Master's thesis, *The Saudi-Yemeni Boundary According to the Treaty of Taif 1934: A Study in Political Geography*. This unpublished thesis (in Arabic) was submitted to the King Saud University in Saudi Arabia. The author has drawn on a limited amount of material from his Master's thesis in Chapter 2, Section 2.3, The Treaty of Taif, but has significantly expanded on it.
Statement of Copyright

The copyright of this thesis rests with the author. No quotation from it should be published without his prior written consent and information derived from it should be acknowledged.
Abbreviations

AOG  Arab Oil and Gas
BBC  British Broadcasting Corporation
EEZ  Exclusive Economic Zone
FSSPA Foreign Scouting Service Petroleum Activity
GMAQ Geologic Map of the Asir Quadrangle
      of the Kingdom of Saudi Arabia
GMSCRQ Geologic Map of the South Central Rub Al-Khali Quadrangle
      of the Kingdom of Saudi Arabia
GMSERQ Geologic Map of the Southeastern Rub Al-Khali Quadrangle
      of the Kingdom of Saudi Arabia
GMWRQ Geologic Map of the Western Rub Al-Khali Quadrangle
      of the Kingdom of Saudi Arabia
IBRU  International Boundaries Research Unit
KACST  King Abdulaziz City for Science and Technology
KSA  Kingdom of Saudi Arabia
MEED  Middle East Economic Digest
MEES  Middle East Economic Survey
MFA  Ministry of Foreign Affairs
MGS  Memorial of the Government of Saudi Arabia
MPMR Ministry of Petroleum and Mineral Resources
MSD  Military Survey Department
SAR  Syrian Arab Republic
SGB  Saudi Green Book
SPSS  Statistical Package for the Social Sciences
SR  Saudi Riyal
SWB  Summary of World Broadcasts
SYCC  Saudi-Yemen Co-ordination Council
UAE  United Arab Emirates
YAR  Yemen Arab Republic
YR  Yemeni Riyal
Acknowledgements

Firstly, I would like to thank God for enabling me to complete this thesis.

My deepest thanks go to Professor Gerald Blake, my supervisor, for his humanity, guidance, advice, comments, and his encouragement during the preparation of this thesis. My thanks are extended to the staff of the International Boundaries Research Unit for their encouragement and support during my study period.

Many people in Saudi Arabia were behind this endeavour. I would like to warmly thank the following: General Abdul Rahman Al-Awfy, General Dr Anwar Ashqy, Brigadier Adul Rahman Al-Khalifa, Colonel Saad Al-Arify, Engineer Adnan Bakash, and Engineer Ahmed Ghazawy.

I would like to also thank the following people at King Saud University: Professor Asad Abdu, Dr Taha Al-Fara, and Dr Mohammad Al-Qabany.

My thanks also go to the Commander of the Saudi Border Guard in Najran Province, the Commander of Immigration, and the Director of Customs. I am very grateful to all the guides who assisted me during my fieldwork, risking both kidnap and attacks by smugglers on the most dangerous frontier in Saudi Arabia.

I would like to express my thanks to Rebecca Ridley who painstakingly edited this thesis, and Arthur Corner and David Hume of the Drawing Office in the University of Durham Department of Geography who drafted all the figures.

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Special appreciation is also goes to my fellow research students (Abdullah Naiiimshi, Zaraq Al-Faifi, Mohammed Al-Shahrani, Tallaal Al-Azmi, Bakr Al-Shadi, Faisal Al-Ajmi, and Fahad Al-Hiabi) with whom research experiences and worries were shared and many stimulating discussions were held.

Finally, I am deeply indebted to my parents, my wife and my children for their patience, and for putting up with two years in the UK without a holiday to Saudi Arabia, and also to the other members of my family who visited me in the UK twice during that period.
Dedication

To
The Kingdom of Saudi Arabia
and
The Republic of Yemen
1.1 Introduction

Boundaries and frontiers are important features which deservedly attract a great deal of geographical study and which have the potential to create problems for all nations and states. At times, boundaries have been the cause of friction and war, and such is their direct effect on inter-state relationships, that international crises sometimes result. In 1924 Bowman wrote of international boundaries:

By reason of some of them war may come, not in a generation, but within a few years. The danger spots of the world have been greatly increased in number, the zones of friction lengthened. (Bowman, 1924: p.4 cited in Asadallah, 1971: p.2)

Since World War II the total length of boundaries has indeed increased, but the zones of friction not necessarily so, although this seems to have been the case in the inter-war period when Bowman wrote his book. Siegfried (1938: p.vii cited in Prescott, 1987: p.131) remarks:

The study of boundaries is dangerous for the scholar because it is thoroughly charged with political passions and entirely encumbered with afterthoughts. The people are too interested in the issues when they speak of boundaries to speak with detachment: the failing is permanent!

A subject of such potentially disastrous consequences occupies an important place in the thinking of statesmen and scholars, especially those who are interested in political geography and geopolitics.

There is much literature which confuses the meaning of the terms ‘boundary’ and ‘frontier’. Kristof (1959: p.269) comments:

In common speech we use the words “boundary” and “frontier” with the implication that these have not only a quite well-defined meaning but also that they are (or almost) interchangeable.
Another author, Goblet (1956), uses ‘frontiers’ for both meanings, which is linguistically correct in French. Arab-Islamic authors made use of a number of Arabic terms to designate a concept sometimes properly translated as ‘boundary’ (Brauer, 1995: pp.11-12). Ibn Manzur (1894), for example, makes no distinction between boundaries and frontiers by using term Had or Hudud.

However, a number of authors, for example Holdich (1916), Fawcett (1918), and Prescott (1987: pp.12-14) began to distinguish between the terms, with a frontier being regarded as a zone, and a boundary as a line dividing sovereignty. Prescott also regards the term ‘border’ as indicating adjacent areas which fringe the boundary (Prescott, 1987: p.12). In this thesis the author has used Prescott’s definitions as a basis for his terminology: ‘boundary’ is used for agreed and delimited lines between states (the Treaty of Taif boundary), ‘frontier’ for the zone dividing sovereignty where no boundary has been agreed (the Saudi-Yemeni frontier), and within a frontier, the margins of the area of authority of a state are described as the de facto border (Saudi de facto border, Yemeni de facto border) (see Figure 1.4 and Section 1.4).

Aside from the problems of terminology, there is also the question of boundary classification. Many previous attempts have been made to classify boundary lines, from an artificial and natural classification, to antecedent, subsequent, and relict types. The distinction between artificial and natural boundaries is deceptive as it appears to indicate that some boundaries are not man-made, which is clearly false. All boundaries are artificial lines and may divide one geographical region into two or more political units, which may thereafter give rise to claims. Boggs’s (1940) classification consisted of physical boundaries including mountains, deserts, lakes, rivers, swamps, and contours; geometrical boundaries including great circle sections parallels of latitude, rhumb lines, arcs of circles, and lines equidistant from coasts and rivers; anthropogeometric boundaries including tribal, linguistic, religious, economic, historical, and cultural boundaries; and compound boundaries adapted to a multiplicity of factors.
CHAPTER 1

European boundaries were produced as a result of wars (Gilfillan, 1924: p.484 cited in Prescott, 1987: p.191), but the absence of colonial expansion distinguishes boundaries evolved in Europe from those in other continents (Prescott, 1987: p.191). By contrast with Europe, the boundaries of the Middle East and North Africa are youthful and mainly created by colonial powers (Drysdale and Blake, 1985: p.104).

The present Middle Eastern borders and thus the whole of the modern Middle East state system are products of this mandate period. ... Many of the borders were linear, as if drawn with a ruler, determined by Europeans to further their own ends, however well-intentioned and idealistic, and to expedite mandate administration (Blake and Schofield, 1987: p.18).

The colonial powers in the Arab countries of the Middle East were the Ottoman Empire, Britain, and France, whilst Italy, France, Spain, and Britain colonised the Arab countries of North Africa (Drysdale and Blake, 1985: p.50-4). This explains why the majority of Arab nations in the Middle East and North Africa share a language and the Islamic culture whilst there are differences in ideology, political regime, military strength, and colonial history. Most of these countries also follow the Islamic faith but belong to different sects.

Table 1.1 Length of the land boundaries of south-west Asia

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Country</th>
<th>Length of Boundaries (km)</th>
<th>No. of Neighbours</th>
<th>Average Length of Sectors (km)</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Iran</td>
<td>5,440</td>
<td>7</td>
<td>777</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Saudi Arabia</td>
<td>4,532</td>
<td>7</td>
<td>647.4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Iraq</td>
<td>3,576</td>
<td>6</td>
<td>596</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Turkey</td>
<td>2,627</td>
<td>8</td>
<td>328.4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Syria</td>
<td>2,253</td>
<td>5</td>
<td>450.6</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Yemen</td>
<td>1,746</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>873</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Israel</td>
<td>1,600</td>
<td>6</td>
<td>266.7</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Jordan</td>
<td>1,586</td>
<td>5</td>
<td>317.2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Oman</td>
<td>1,374</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>458</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>UAE</td>
<td>1,016</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>508</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Kuwait</td>
<td>462</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>231</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Lebanon</td>
<td>454</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>227</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>West Bank</td>
<td>404</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>202</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Gaza Strip</td>
<td>62</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>31</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Qatar</td>
<td>60</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>60</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Source: CIA World Factobook (1992)
Figure 1.1: The status of boundaries in the Middle East and North Africa, 1996 (Boundary lengths in km.)

Source: after Drysdale and Blake, 1985: p79 with a few modifications by the author
Figure 1.1 shows the status of Middle East and North African boundaries in 1996. It is clear that the only boundary Arabian Pen. Which has yet to be allocated is that between Saudi Arabia and Yemen, with the exception of the 1934 Treaty of Taif Sector. It is this frontier which is the subject of this thesis. Table 1.1 shows the total length of boundaries of the countries of south-west Asia. The Saudi boundary (4,334km) is second in length only to the total Iranian boundary.

1.2 Delimitation of the Study Area

The area which is studied in this thesis is the frontier between Saudi Arabia and the Republic of Yemen, to the east of the 1934 Treaty of Taif boundary (Figure 1.2). The delimitation of the study area is based on various extreme Saudi, Yemeni, and British territorial claims.

Along the former Imamate of Yemen-Saudi Arabia non-Taif Treaty section (Figure 1.2) of the frontier, the study area is delimited by the line shown on the MSD-SAR, 1967 Yemen Arab Republic map (see Section 2.4.1 for more details about this line), which is the extreme Yemeni claim, and the line shown on the Saudi MPMR-KSA (1983) Arabian Peninsula map (see Section 2.4.1), which is the extreme Saudi claim in this section. The area is approximately bounded by 17°30'N and 15°30'N latitude, and 44°00'E and 46°00'E longitude (Figure 1.2).

Along the former Aden Protectorate-Saudi Arabia section of the frontier, the study area is delimited by the 1955 British Declaration line (see Section 2.4.2.6), which is the extreme British claim, and the 1955 Saudi Declaration line (see Section 2.4.2.7), which is the extreme Saudi claim in this section. The area is approximately bounded by 19°00'N and 15°30'N latitude, and 46°00'E and 52°00'E longitude (Figure 1.2).
1.3 Reasons for Choosing the Topic

There were a number of compelling reasons for choosing to study the Saudi-Yemeni frontier to the east of the 1934 Treaty of Taif boundary. Chief among these is the fact that this boundary dispute remains a serious problem which has seriously damaged relations between Saudi Arabia and Yemen for decades. The problem therefore urgently needs resolving, and a geographical study such as this may help towards a peaceful solution by adopting an approach never attempted before.

Having done a Master's thesis on the 1934 Treaty of Taif boundary (see Section 2.3 for more details) and having enjoyed boundary research, one of the most productive areas of political geography, the author wished to complete his study of the Saudi-Yemeni land boundary.

Academic theses based on geographical field surveys of the Saudi-Yemeni frontier are rare. Indeed, this is the first academic thesis to study the Saudi-Yemeni frontier beyond the Treaty of Taif boundary.

1.4 The Aim and Objectives of the Study

The aim of this thesis is to establish whether a 'Logical Boundary' can be identified between Saudi Arabia and the Republic of Yemen along the land frontier east of the 1934 Treaty of Taif boundary. The Concise Oxford Dictionary defines 'logical' as 'correctly reasoned, deducible, defensible on ground of consistency'. If such a boundary can be found, it ought to provide a sound basis for realistic discussions.

The location of the proposed Logical Boundary was reached by analysis and the examination of a number of factors which have created the *de facto* border between the two states. The *de facto* concept is explained in international law:

Recognition *de-facto* implies that there is some doubt as to the long-term viability of the government in question. Recognition *de-jure* usually follows where the recognising state accepts that the effective control displayed by the government is permanent and firmly rooted and that there are no legal reasons detracting from this,
CHAPTER 1

such as constitutional subservience to a foreign power. *De-facto* recognition involves a hesitant assessment of the situation, an attitude of wait and see, to be succeeded by *de-jure* recognition where the doubts are sufficiently overcome to extend formal acceptance. (Shaw, 1991: p.254)

Ian Brownlie (1979: p.16) defines "*de facto* frontiers":

... *'de facto' frontiers, meaning an alignment not based upon a formal agreement. The phrase ‘de facto’ suggests a lack of legal status and a provisional character.

In order to distinguish between the entire frontier zone, and the margin of the area currently under the authority of a state, the author has used the term *de facto* border to describe the latter zone (see Figure 1.4, model of *de facto* border). The factors which create the *de facto* border and which were examined are shown in the Model Framework of the thesis (Figure 1.3).

In addition to its fundamental aim, this thesis has two supporting objectives. Firstly, as stated above, the author hopes that by presenting the thesis to the Saudi and Yemeni Governments, it will assist them towards the peaceful resolution of the boundary dispute and the creation of a *de jure* boundary. Secondly, the author would like to create a model for the study of boundaries similar to the Saudi-Yemeni frontier east of the Taif Treaty boundary, which could be added to the means available for the resolution of boundary disputes in the Middle East, North Africa, or elsewhere in the world.

The hypothesis which will be tested in the course of this thesis: the Saudi-Yemeni *de facto* border in the study area is located far from the extreme claims of either state and the Logical Boundary will be largely coincident with the *de facto* border along the length of the frontier.

1.5 Sources of Information and Methodology

Four main sources of information were used in this thesis:
Figure 1.3: Model framework

**GEOGRAPHICAL**
- Geology
- Relief
- Water resources
- Climate
- Distance

**HISTORICAL & POLITICAL**
- (chapter 2)
  - Historical proposals
    - British
    - Saudi
    - Yemeni
  - Traveller's proposals
  - 1934 Treaty of Taif

**SOCIAL**
- (chapters 3, 5)
  - Population distribution
  - Borderland interactions
  - Relatives
  - Markets
  - Properties
  - Grazing & wells

**TRIBAL**
- (chapters 3, 4, 5)
  - Homelands
  - Loyalties
  - Overlapping claims

**ECONOMIC**
- (chapters 3, 4, 5)
  - Hydrocarbons
  - Commerce
  - Employment
  - Minerals

**BEHAVIOURAL**
- (chapters 3, 5)
  - Frontier perceptions
  - Frontier change
  - Border satisfaction

**ADMINISTRATION**
- (chapters 3, 4, 5)
  - Checkpoints
  - Locations
  - Transport
  - Routes
  - Facilities
  - Documents
  - Patrol roads

**DE-FACTO BORDER**
- Saudi-Yemeni

**LOGICAL BOUNDARY**
- (new boundary)

---

- Critical factors for delimitation
- Critical factors for acceptability/workability of agreed boundaries
1.5.1 DOCUMENTS AND FORMAL ARCHIVES

The researcher obtained an excellent (but expensive) collection of documents of relevance to the Saudi-Yemeni boundary. Richard Schofield (1992) Arabian Boundary Disputes (20 volumes), Schofield's (1993) Arabian Geopolitics Regional Documentary Studies: South-West Arabia (six volumes), and the Saudi Foreign Ministry's (1934) The Saudi Green Book: Relations between Saudi Arabia and the Yemen (see Section 1.8, previous studies) which cost a total of £9,190. The author decided to buy these publications as they were not available in the library, and it saved the author considerable time visiting and searching the British Government archives at the Public Record Office and the British Library (Oriental and India Office collections), both of which would have required trips to London. The publications will also be indispensable for future studies of boundaries in the Arabian Peninsula.

The Schofield and Blake (1988-91) and Schofield (1993) publications mentioned above also used the following sources:


The author found the document collections particularly useful as a source for the original texts of historical boundary proposals, and other texts relating to his argument. Most of these documents were used for Chapter 2 on the historical background of the Saudi-Yemeni boundary (see Chapter 2 for more details). The methods used to examine the documents were historical, comparative, and analytic.

1.5.2 SATELLITE IMAGES AND MAPS

The main reason for using satellite images was to clarify which geographical features lie on the *de facto* border and the Logical Boundary between Saudi Arabia and Yemen.
The satellite images used in this thesis were collected during the fieldwork period (1 June - 23 December 1994). The author explained the requirement for satellite images to staff at the King Abdulaziz City for Science and Technology (KACST) who deal with remote sensing. The staff suggested that the author should use American Landsat images at a scale of 1:1,000,000, each 10"x10" print covering an area of approximately 180km². The author also requested imagery from the French SPOT satellite, as it is available at a larger scale and shows more detail:

From the point of view of international boundaries applications, the most suitable images are those obtained by the French satellite SPOT. (Adler, 1995: p.40)

However, the author was told that SPOT images were not available and that it would take more than a year to collect the images necessary to cover the study area.

Having determined which sort of imagery to use, it was calculated that 16 images would be required to cover the study area. Two months later the author had received only four images, and these he returned to KACST for marking up with lines of longitude and latitude as these would be essential for defining the correct location of the *de facto* border and Logical Boundary. Many attempts to acquire the images failed as a result of the weather, but the author finally received all the images a week before he returned to Britain on 23 December 1994.

Before they could be used in the thesis, the images were carefully assembled to form a mosaic covering the study area, and the mosaic was reduced by 50% (to a scale of 1:2,000,000) so that it was a more convenient size to be reproduced on A3 and A4 paper.

The purpose of using maps was to show the location of relief, geology, towns and villages, roads and tracks, territorial claims, and hydrocarbon activities on the frontier. The author acquired an excellent collection of maps produced in Saudi Arabia, the Republic of Yemen, Britain, the United States, and Switzerland:
Saudi Maps


Military Survey Department [MSD-KSA] (1982) Al-Yemen. Scale 1:1,000,000

MSD-KSA (1984) Najran and Sharurah. Scale 1:500,000

MSD-KSA (1992) Republic of Yemen. Scale 1:1,000,000

Ministry of Petroleum and Mineral Resources [MPMR-KSA] (1983) Arabian Peninsula. Scale 1:2,000,000

MPMR-KSA (1985) Jizan, Chart No. NE 38-SW. Scale 1:500,000

MPMR-KSA (1990a) Tracing on MPMR-KSA (1983) Arabian Peninsula. Scale 1:2,000,000

MPMR-KSA (1990b) Tracing on British Survey (1927) Jaza'ir Farasan; Red Sea; Saudi Arabia. Scale 1:200,000

Yemeni Maps

Al-Dhamari (no date) Yemeni Arab Republic. Scale 1:300,000

Al-Dhamari (no date) Yemeni Relief Map. Scale 1:250,000

General Tourism Corporation (1980) Tourism Map of the Yemen Arab Republic. Scale 1:1,000,000

Military Survey Department, Syrian Arab Republic [MSD-SAR] (1967) Yemen Arab Republic. Scale 1:500,000

American Maps

US Geological Survey (1963a) [GMSCROJ] Geologic Map of the South Central Rub Al-Khali Quadrangle of the Kingdom of Saudi Arabia. Scale 1:500,000

US Geological Survey (1963b) [GMSERQ] Geologic Map of the Southeastern Rub Al-Khali Quadrangle of the Kingdom of Saudi Arabia. Scale 1:500,000

US Geological Survey (1963c) [GMWRQ] Geologic Map of the Western Rub Al-Khali Quadrangle of the Kingdom of Saudi Arabia. Scale 1:500,000

US Geological Survey (1979) [GMAQ] Geologic Map of the Asir Quadrangle of the Kingdom of Saudi Arabia. Scale 1:500,000

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British Maps
British Survey (1927) Jaza'ir Farasan; Red Sea; Saudi Arabia. Scale 1:200,000
Director of Military Survey (1971) Joint Operations Graphic - Ground Chart No. NE 38-10. Scale 1:250,000
Director of Military Survey (1971) Joint Operations Graphic - Ground Chart No. NE 38-13. Scale 1:250,000

Swiss Map
Foreign Scouting Service Petroleum Activity [FSSPAI] (1994) Yemen. Scale 1: 1,000,000
For more details about maps see the Bibliography, Maps section.

1.5.3 BOOKS, THESES, JOURNALS, AND NEWSPAPERS

There was material available to the author in all of the above media (see Section 1.8, Previous Studies), and the author has quoted many of these sources in this thesis. The sources used are both in Arabic and English, and have been collected from Saudi Arabia, the Republic of Yemen, Britain, and the Egyptian Arab Republic.

1.5.4 TRANSLITERATION OF ARABIC NAMES

Transliteration of Arabic authors' names was one of the problems faced. The spelling, for example, of Abu-Dawood, Al-Muwaled, and Al-Saab could not be changed as that was the form in which they were represented in the library computer, and thus featured in this way in the library bibliography. Consequently, authors' names have been accepted unchanged. A second problem arose from the interpretation of vowel sounds, particularly for tribal and place names. For example, Al-Sayar, Sei’ar, Sa’r, and Saar are all spellings used to identify one tribe; the problem arises from the different vowel sounds in use in different parts of the Arabian peninsula. The same variety occurs with place names. In this thesis the transliterations printed on the MSD-KSA (1992) Republic of Yemen map has been used both for tribes and places, on the basis that those most closely approximate to those used locally - though the map itself gives no indication of the actual transliteration system which it is following.

For the tribal genealogical trees the system recommended by Niblock and Dickins (1994, see Appendix 5) of the Centre for Middle Eastern and Islamic Studies in the University of Durham has been used, with a few minor modifications; Dr. Dickins was kind enough to check the text and has approved of the format here.

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1.5.5 FIELDWORK

The aim of this thesis, the proposal of a Logical Boundary, would have been impossible without fieldwork to determine the location of the *de facto* border between Saudi Arabia and Yemen.

The fieldwork carried out for this thesis had four objectives:

1. identifying and delimiting the *de facto* border;
2. interviews with samples of people crossing the frontier at checkpoints;
3. interviews with a number of key informants;
4. the opportunity for the author to make direct observation and take photographs.

It is important to mention that all the fieldwork took place on the Saudi side of the frontier. This is because the author thought it highly unlikely that the Yemeni Government would give him permission to carry out research of this sort on the Yemeni side, and in any case, such a venture would be hazardous. In order to redress the balance of information to some extent, the author compared the location of the *de facto* border as shown on the MPMR-KSA (1990a) Arabian Peninsula Tracing map with a sketch map drawn up using information from key Yemeni informants who were interviewed on the Saudi side of the frontier.

In June 1994 the author was granted the necessary permission from the Saudi Ministries and the relevant local government administrators to carry out fieldwork. The field survey took place between 1 July and 10 December 1994 (see the following Section 1.6 for more details). Because of the importance of the fieldwork to this thesis the author's methods are given in detail in the following section.

1.6 Fieldwork Methods

The methods used to achieve the four objectives of the fieldwork mentioned in Section 1.5.4, above will be detailed in the following sections:
CHAPTER 1

1.6.1 RECOGNISING AND DELIMITING THE DE FACTO BORDER

The recognition and delimitation of the *de facto* border (see Section 1.4 for a definition) was done by the author between 1 July and 10 December 1994 whilst travelling between the checkpoints to interview samples of people crossing the frontier and key informants. The delimitation of the *de facto* border was completed in four stages. On the Saudi side of the frontier, the border guard posts were visited and then located on a map using the names of the posts and locations marked with the same names on the MSD-KSA (1992) Republic of Yemen map. The *de facto* border was then delimited by drawing lines from one border guard post to the next (see the *de facto* border sections in Chapters 3, 4, and 5). The final stage was to compare this line with the MPMR-KSA (1990a) Arabian Peninsula Tracing map to see if there were any differences.

On the Yemeni side of the frontier, the *de facto* border was delimited using the same stages as were used for the Saudi side, with the exception of visiting guard posts. Instead of visiting the Yemeni Border Guard, the author asked key informants about the location of the Yemeni guard posts (see the *de facto* border sections in Chapters 3, 4, and 5).

Within the *de facto* border area the author also approximately delimited the no man’s land area (see the *de facto* border sections in Chapters 3, 4, and 5). This is the area between the Saudi and Yemeni *de facto* borders which is clearly not under the control of either country. No man’s land areas are described by Prescott (1987: p.60):

> The presence of no-man’s-land between states facilitated escape by individuals from financial and juridical responsibilities, and sometimes such areas became refuges for brigands. Countries often acted quickly to eliminate such inconvenient areas.

The no man’s land area is bounded by the Saudi and Yemeni *de facto* borders (see model of the *de facto* border, Figure 1.4), and its identification was the author’s final task regarding the delimitation of the *de facto* border.
Figure 1.4: Model of the de-facto border
1.6.2 CHECKPOINT SAMPLE INTERVIEWS

The ultimate aim of this research is to propose a Logical Boundary. The location of this line is affected by a number of issues, including social factors and the behaviour of the population on the frontier, as the framework model (Figure 1.3) shows. There were three objectives to the interviews with samples of individuals crossing the frontier at the checkpoints:

1. To ascertain the degree of interaction across the frontier of the local population with respect to visits to relatives, properties, markets, and grazing and wells (if any exist).

2. To assess various aspects of the behaviour of the local population towards the frontier, such as perceptions of the frontier including the features regarded as indicating its location and changes in it, and the level of satisfaction with the location of the de facto border. Where possible, the author attempted to incorporate into the proposed Logical Boundary those features perceived by the frontier tribes as indicating the frontier.

3. To discover the status of the checkpoints and the function which they perform with regard to those using them as crossing points. Also, to determine the effect which the checkpoints currently have on cross-frontier interaction, and might have on the location of the proposed Logical Boundary.

The following sections will detail the methods of sampling and interview.

1.6.2.1 The Sampling Design

The study area is the frontier between Saudi Arabia and the Republic of Yemen beyond the 1934 Treaty of Taif Sector (see Section 1.2). As has been mentioned in Section 1.5.4, the author could not carry out fieldwork on the Yemeni side of the frontier for political reasons. All fieldwork was therefore carried out on the Saudi side of the frontier.
On the Saudi side of the study area there is one formal checkpoint at Al-Khadra in the Western Study Sector (Figure 1.5(A)), where the author was able to meet people living on both the Saudi and Yemeni sides of the frontier. The other checkpoint on the Saudi side is the informal checkpoint at Al-Kharkhir in the Eastern Study Sector (Figure 1.5(A)), also visited by the author.

Formal international boundary crossing points typically have representatives of Customs, Immigration, and the Border Guard, as well as health officials. There are also, almost always, corresponding facilities on the opposite side of the frontier. Informal checkpoints, on the other hand, may have none of the above officials except the Border Guard, and there are usually no corresponding checkpoints.

Table 1.2  Sample sizes for Al-Kharkhir and Al-Khadra checkpoint interviews

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Nationality</th>
<th>Al-Khadra Checkpoint</th>
<th>Al-Kharkhir Checkpoint</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Saudi</td>
<td>6,185</td>
<td>361</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Yemeni</td>
<td>5,679</td>
<td>357</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>UAE</td>
<td>80</td>
<td>66</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Qatari</td>
<td>50</td>
<td>44</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>TOTAL</td>
<td>11,994</td>
<td>828</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Source: Author's Field Survey, July-Dec 1994. Al-Khadra data quoted from the Immigration registers and the Al-Kharkhir data estimated by the Saudi Border Guard at Al-Kharkhir checkpoint. Sample sizes derived from Table 1.3.

As Al-Khadra formal checkpoint and Al-Kharkhir informal checkpoint were the only two checkpoints on the Saudi side of the frontier in the study area, the author had no alternative locations to interview people crossing the frontier.

Table 1.2 shows the number of people crossing the frontier at Al-Kharkhir checkpoint during July, August, and September 1993, and at Al-Khadra checkpoint during October, November, and December 1993. It was during these same periods in 1994 that the author carried out the checkpoint sample interviews.
TABLE 1.3 Determining the size of a random sample

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>N</th>
<th>S</th>
<th>N</th>
<th>S</th>
<th>N</th>
<th>S</th>
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N is population size and S is sample sample size.

Figures extracted to determine size of checkpoint interview samples (Table 1.2), shown in bold.

Source: Krejcie and Morgan (1970: pp.607-10)

The sample sizes in Table 1.2 are derived from Table 1.3 which determines the scientifically acceptable size of a random sample from the population size:

The size of a probability (random) sample can be determined in two ways, ... or by using a table which, from a mathematical formula, suggests the appropriate size of a random sample for a given number of the wider population. One such example is provided by Krejcie and Morgan (1970). (Morrison, 1993: pp.116-17)

The data given in Table 1.2 for people crossing the frontier includes both departures and arrivals. The Immigration Office confirmed that the number of people departing was the same as the number of people arriving, in other words those arriving from Yemen would
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depart within a few days and vice versa. In addition, the principle reason for crossing the frontier remains the same whether those crossing are arriving or departing from Saudi Arabia, and this was the matter of most concern to the author.

The data in Table 1.2 includes men, women, and children. However, the author did not interview any women as it would have been unacceptable for him to speak with them for cultural and religious reasons, and in any event, for the same reasons women never travel alone in Saudi Arabia. Children were not interviewed for practical reasons.

1.6.2.2 Structured Interview

In locations such as the Saudi-Yemeni frontier checkpoints where it is expected that many of those crossing the frontier cannot read or write, the only suitable method for collecting data is a face to face structured interview. In fact, this type of data collection has several advantages:

... face-to-face forms of data collection ... offer the opportunity for the evaluator to gather data in detail and in depth, they build in the attraction of the respondents putting a human face on to what might otherwise be an impersonal activity (Morrison, 1993: p.62).

A structured interview requires that every question is worked out in advance and the wording and sequence of the question is the same for all the respondents.

The structured interview compiled by the author (Appendix 6) contained four parts. Part One (Questions 1 to 10) concerned the reasons for choosing the checkpoint, the distance and time taken to travel between the checkpoint and residence, the route and method of transport taken to the checkpoint, and the attitude towards the length of time spent waiting at the checkpoint, and the adequacy of the waiting places provided.

Part Two (Questions 11 to 13) and Part Three (Questions 14 to 32) concerned personal information about the respondent, such as his job, education, and income, and the respondent’s activities across the frontier with respect to relatives, properties, markets, and grazing and wells.
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Part Four (Questions 33 to 37) was concerned with behavioural aspects: physical features which the respondent perceived as indicating the frontier, the level of satisfaction with the *de facto* border, and perceptions of change of the location of the frontier.

Most of the questions in the interview were deliberately structured so as to be open ended, as this was more appropriate and interesting for purposes of this study:

if it is more fitting that a rich description be presented in the respondents own terms, then devising the instruments will consist of outlining areas of interest to the evaluator and a series of points noted - a schedule of open-ended questions or observations. (Morrison, 1993: p.64)

The author ran a series of pilot interviews before beginning the real study, and as a result one question was added to the interview and another cancelled.

1.6.2.3 Interview Procedures

Once the author had obtained permission to carry out the interviews he travelled to both checkpoints. The author stayed at Al-Kharkhir informal checkpoint between 1 July and 10 September 1994 and at Al-Khadr checkpoint between 1 October and 10 December 1994, a total of 70 days at each checkpoint.

The author began the interviews at Al-Kharkhir, the more difficult checkpoint, both in terms of accessibility and the informal status of the checkpoint. The journey to Al-Kharkhir from the town of Sharurah (Figure 5.12(A)) was approximately 500km and took 12 hours of travelling with an experienced desert driver along a sandy track and over dunes.

The interviews at both checkpoints were carried out at the checkpoint itself between the hours of 9.00am to 12 noon and again in the afternoons between 2.00pm and 4.00pm, after which time no one is allowed to cross the frontier until 9.00am the following morning. During the evenings the author met and interviewed key informants (see Section 1.6.3 on interviews with key people).

At Al-Kharkhir informal checkpoint conditions for interviewing were very difficult indeed. The number of people crossing the frontier was very irregular with, for example,
10 people crossing one day and three people crossing the next. Furthermore, the estimate of the numbers of people crossing the frontier during the July-September 1993 period, upon which the sample sizes were based (Table 1.2), were exaggerated. There was therefore no opportunity to apply the random sample accurately, as there was at Al-Khadra checkpoint. The author therefore interviewed every man passing through the checkpoint who had not been previously interviewed. No respondent was interviewed more than once during the field survey at either Al-Khadra or Al-Kharkhir checkpoints, regardless of the number of times they crossed the frontier during that period.

At Al-Khadra checkpoint the situation was easier. The interviews were conducted in the Immigration Office. Once an interviewee had been selected, between three and five people might pass through Immigration without being interviewed, and the author would then choose the next person in the Immigration queue.

During the first week each interview lasted an average of 30 minutes. Once the author became familiar with the respondents' tribes and the names of the places in which most of them lived, the interviews were completed in an average of 10 to 15 minutes. At the start of the fieldwork at Al-Khadra checkpoint, 10 people were being interviewed during the five hours a day previously mentioned. After a fortnight this had risen to between 15 and 20 people a day.

No other interviewers assisted the author in this task. This was because the author believed that the questions were sufficiently sensitive that he felt unable to entrust the task to anyone else, even if an assistant could be found. The interviews required experience, humour, and perception. On many occasions the author observed that respondents were nervous, but he tried to put people at their ease by conducting the interview in an informal and friendly way with the interviewee being given a comfortable seat and offered tea, water, and cigarettes.
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1.6.2.4 Treatment of the Data

Once the structured interviews were completed the author returned to England on 23 December 1994. The first stage of data treatment was to code the respondents’ responses numerically to prepare them for statistical processing. This stage took the author three months, from January to March 1995. A total of 1,326 interviews had been carried out and all of the responses from these interviews were coded onto greensheet forms. This was the most difficult stage of the data treatment requiring patience, concentration, and accuracy.

The second stage involved the selection of a suitable statistical package. The Statistical Package for the Social Sciences (SPSS) was chosen and the author was trained in its use by the Computer Centre at the University of Durham. Two weeks were then spent correcting the coded data before the frequency data showed without entry errors. The author had problems with the command which ‘split’ and ‘sort’ the frequency data such as nationalities (Saudi, Yemeni, UAE, and Qatari) between the two checkpoints (Al-Khadra and Al-Kharkhir).

The third stage was to select appropriate statistical tests which would enable the author to interpret the data.

The data which was being processed in this research was a mixture of nominal and ordinal data:

A nominal scale is the most elementary scale, giving categories a name or label. An ordinal scale can be used when we are able to put items in rank order or where we can say that one person or some people display a characteristic greater than or lesser than another person. (Morrison, 1993: p.130).

Where there is a mixture of nominal and ordinal data, statistics references recommend the use of non-parametric statistics:

... if data are inherently in ranks, or even if they can only be categorised as plus or minus (more of less, better or worse) they can be treated by non-parametric methods, whereas they can not be treated by parametric methods unless precarious and perhaps unrealistic assumptions are made about the underlying distributions. (Siegel, 1956: p.33)
Keith Morrison (1993: p.130) also mentions that the non-parametric method is frequently used for nominal and ordinal scales.

The statistical test which was chosen had therefore to be non-parametric, suitable for use with nominal and ordinal data, and suitable for use with four independent samples: Saudi, Yemeni, UAE, and Qatari.

The aim of using a statistical test was to see if there were any significant differences between the four nationalities regarding the main aim for crossing the frontier (visits to relatives, properties, markets, grazing and wells).

There are very few statistical tests which are capable of achieving the aim set out above with the type of data which had been collected. The test which was finally selected was the Kruskal-Wallis one-way analysis of variance:

The Kruskal-Wallis one-way analysis of variance (the non-parametric equivalent of the parametric analysis of variance) enables the evaluator to see if there are any statistically significant differences between two or more independent samples. ... the Kruskal-Wallis statistic has to be taken in conjunction with the frequencies to provide the detail about the significance of the frequencies. (Morrison, 1993: p.141)

Frequency tables were used to present the percentage distributions of respondents by nationality in relation to personal information, behavioural factors, and administrative factors at the checkpoint (see the framework model, Figure 1.3, for a complete list of variables). Cross-tabulations were used to present the percentage distributions of respondents at each checkpoint in relation to the numbers of people crossing the frontier, and were also used to show any relationship between variables.

In nearly all cases where differences exist, the difference is clear from the data without the application of a statistical test. The author has therefore only used the Kruskal-Wallis test in a small number of examples in Chapter 5 to demonstrate the application of statistics to the data.
1.6.3 INTERVIEWS WITH KEY PEOPLE

In the evenings during the checkpoint interview period (see Section 1.6.2.3, Interview Procedures) and between 20 and 30 September 1994 the author completed a schedule of interviews with key informants. These interviews were carried out in a different way to the checkpoint interviews:

Alternatively, a semi-structured interview may be more open ... wherein the evaluator has a checklist schedule of points or topics to be covered, but does not adhere to the exact, same wording or sequence for each respondent but tailors the questions and their order to individual respondents who can answer in their own words and follow up their own comments in their own ways. (Morrison, 1993: p.66)

The aim of conducting interviews with the tribal sheikhs was to discover more information about the frontier tribes including the location of the tribal boundary, the tribe's loyalty, the genealogy of the tribe, and the location of Yemeni Border Guard posts in the area. Twenty tribal sheikhs from the study area were interviewed by the author using a checklist of points to be covered which was drawn up prior to the interview.

Delimiting the tribal boundaries in the study area was completed in four stages (Figures 3.14(A), 4.8(A), and 5.15(A)). Firstly, during the interviews the tribal sheikhs were asked to describe their tribal territory and boundary using the names of towns and villages and other geographical features which the author noted down. This information was then transferred onto the MSD-KSA (1992) Republic of Yemen map. The map with the tribal boundaries marked onto it was then shown to the sheikhs, and their comments recorded. Finally, the areas of apparent overlapping tribal claims were marked on the map (see Figures 3.14(A), 4.8(A), and 5.15(A)).

The genealogical trees of the tribes, as described to the author by the sheikhs (see Appendix 2), were transliterated into English using the Niblock and Dickens system (see Appendix 5).
As one moves away from an interview schedule the interview takes on a conversational style:

... an interview which is completely informal, where the agenda of items for the interview are not fixed and where there is the minimum of control or direction from the evaluator. (Morrison, 1993: p.67)

This was the type of interview which was used with 15 checkpoint officials working both at the checkpoints themselves and in the town of Sharurah. The objective of these interviews was to pick up any useful information relating to the study area.

1.6.4  DIRECT OBSERVATION AND PHOTOGRAPHS

The author’s direct observation was extremely useful to the research, especially during the survey of the *de facto* border:

Observational data are very attractive as they afford the evaluator the chance to gather 'live' data from 'live' situations. (Morrison, 1993: p.79)

The author used a diary and field notes to write up his observations during the fieldwork phase. The author’s field observations have been used throughout the thesis where appropriate. Photographic evidence has also been used by the author in a number of cases.

1.7  Research Problems

The author faced many problems relating to the subject in general and the fieldwork in particular, the most important of which are summarized below.

The dramatic improvement of Saudi-Yemeni relations with regard to the boundary issue during the study period (October 1993 to the time of writing in 1996) has put the author under considerable time pressure. This is because the author believes that if this thesis can be presented to the Saudi and Yemeni Governments before they reach an agreement, there will be significant advantages for both countries.
During the fieldwork the author's personal safety was at risk on a number of occasions. During the survey of the de facto border the author lost his way in the desert, despite the fact that he was travelling with experienced guides. There was also a constant risk of kidnap and attack by smugglers.

Travel to the Eastern Study Sector and through it was extremely difficult (see Section 5.3.2.3). Only one type of vehicle (Toyota four-wheel drive) is able to make the journey to Al-Kharkhir informal checkpoint.

The amount of information which exists about the study area is very limited, and as with most frontier regions there is an environment of secrecy and suspicion. There are no known geographical studies of the study area based on fieldwork, and even general studies of the Saudi-Yemeni frontier are scarce.

1.8 Previous Studies

Although a considerable contribution has already been made to boundary studies in English literature, even in this language there is still a need for further case studies. A great amount of work has been carried out on boundary studies in Europe and the Americas, but only a limited amount on the boundaries of Asia and Africa. In this section the author will attempt to review the important references to boundaries that have been written during the 20th century.

1.8.1 BOUNDARY STUDIES IN POLITICAL GEOGRAPHY

In 1897 Ratzel wrote a study on the concept of boundaries, proposing a view of the state as a living organism and the boundary as the skin of the living state. Before World War I there were several contributions to the subject from Russell (1903), Curzon (1907), and Geddes (1908).

Between the wars the main interest was categorizing boundaries into 'good' and 'bad' from a military point of view. A majority of the writers were German: Siege (1925),
Vogel (1926), Haushofer (1927), Maul (1928), and Durach (1930) (all cited in Hijazi, 1980: pp.139-99).

Later, after World War II, literature was produced to study boundaries from the point of view of their classification, terminology, function, and their definition, among them Boggs (1940), Norman (1963) Douglas (1964), Kasperon and Minghi (1969), Saul (1975), and Prescott (1987).

Minghi in his paper ‘Boundary studies in political geography’ (1963) distinguished eight types of boundary study, a categorisation which still provides a helpful guide to boundary scholars. His eight categories were:

- Studies of disputed areas
- Studies of the effect of boundary changes
- Studies of the evolution of boundary changes
- Studies of boundary delimitation and demarcation
- Studies of enclaves and tiny states
- Studies of offshore boundaries
- Studies of boundaries in dispute over natural resources
- Studies of internal boundaries.

Minghi did not mention social aspects such as studies of population movement and boundary crossings by people who live on frontiers.

In recent years many studies have been done on the subject of boundaries. Most notable is Brownlie’s great work African Boundaries: a Legal and Diplomatic Encyclopedia (1979). It is the definitive reference for legal and diplomatic boundary questions for the entire continent. The distinguishing feature of other recent studies has been the identification of disputed boundaries and their study in a geopolitical context. Such studies include Allcock et al. (1992), Glassner (1993), Burdett (1995), Swietochowski (1995), and Anderson (1995). There have also been a number of books

There are also a number of articles which have considered world boundaries. Hartshorne (1938) considered the significance of sociological, economic, and political boundaries, and that geographers ought to be able to contribute to their understanding, particularly where there are problems concerning determination and demarcation. Hartshorne makes a number of crucial points, including the fact that there is no difference between artificial and natural boundaries as all are decided by people. Hartshorne also points out that as there is always the possibility, without exception, of a boundary dispute occurring at some time between neighbouring states because of the changeable nature of states and their relationships, disputes are therefore relatively frequent and risky occurrences.

Many academic journals have also been published on various aspects of boundary and frontier studies, including:

- Boundary and Security Bulletin (International Boundaries Research Unit)
- Contemporary Strategic Issues in the Arab Gulf
- Geographical Review
- Middle East Business (MEED)
- Middle East Economic Survey (MEES)
- Middle Eastern Studies
- Political Geography Quarterly
- Summary of World Broadcasts (BBC SWB)

1.8.2 BOUNDARY STUDY THESES

Relatively few theses have been written on boundaries. For example, the author obtained a list of post-graduate theses written between 1957 and 1991 held in the geography section of Durham University library. Of a total of 355 geographical theses, only five
were on land boundaries and one on maritime boundaries. This ratio is, of course, only an example of the work of British universities. Even amongst researchers interested in political geography, the subject of boundaries is not a popular one, especially where the boundary is in dispute. One of the reasons for this is that many states, and especially those in the Middle East are unwilling to give information about their boundaries for political reasons.

1.8.2.1 Theses Concerning Saudi Arabia's Land Boundaries

Of the theses concerning land boundaries which have been written in English and Arabic, a number relate to the land boundaries of Saudi Arabia. Asadallah's (1971) *Land and Maritime Boundaries of North and North Eastern Saudi Arabia* is a study in political geography. No questionnaire survey of the northern frontier tribes was used in the course of this research, and as a result his thesis is more one of general geography rather than a true boundary study. Four years later Saleh (1975) considered *The Emergence of Saudi Arabian Administrative Areas*, using historical analysis as the basis for his study. This was the first thesis to study the administrative boundaries of Saudi Arabia. Abu-Dawood's (1984) political geography thesis, *The Political Boundaries of Saudi Arabia; Their Evolution and Functions*, deals with the historical development of Saudi Arabia's boundaries, their functions, and the movement of people across them. Abu-Dawood interviewed samples of people crossing all of Saudi Arabia's boundaries to examine the boundary functions, and he used statistical methods to analyse his results. There is also a historical thesis by Al-Shamlan (1987), *The Evolution of National Boundaries in the Southeastern Arabian Peninsula; 1934-1955*. This study gives a comprehensive background to proposed boundary lines in the Arabian peninsula. In addition to the above, a number of other theses mention Saudi Arabia's land boundaries in the course of looking at other issues. These include Brian's (1971) thesis, *The Saudi-Yemeni War, 1934*, and a number of theses written in Arabic, including those by Mashary (1981), Hamadi (1981), Al-Khatrash (1983), Al-Hisamy (1983), and Al-Asiry (1988). All these
political science theses considered the relationship between Saudi Arabia and Yemen. These studies of the boundary were based on political activity between Saudi Arabia and Yemen using historical methods. Most recently, the author (Al-Ghamdi, 1991) studied *The Saudi-Yemeni boundary according to the 1934 Treaty of Taif* for his Master’s thesis (see Section 2.3 for more details).

1.8.2.2 Theses Concerning Saudi Arabia’s Maritime Boundaries


1.8.3 BOOKS CONCERNING THE SAUDI-YEMENI BOUNDARY

In addition to the theses mentioned above, there are a number of books, articles, and documents which deal with the Saudi-Yemeni boundary. The majority of these studies focus on historical background using the descriptive method. The author will only mention the books here as the articles are covered in Section 1.8.4 below.

An important source is the *Saudi Green Book*, also known as *Relations Between Saudi Arabia and the Yemen*, issued by the Saudi Foreign Ministry (1934). It contains 116 documents relating to meetings, negotiations, communications, and border incidents.
leading to the 1934 war. An annex describes the geographical and historical background of Yemen and ‘Asir.


Other items are more descriptive, being either diaries or travel journals, rather than academic works. These include Hamzah (1934), Wahbah (1950), Philby (1952), Mokhtar (1970), and Kelly (1974). Philby wrote a number of classic books about the Arabian peninsula, one of which, Arabian Highlands (Philby, 1952) contains photographs of some of the markers which were built on the boundary as a result of the 1934 Treaty of Taif. Another documentary and historical study was by Mokhtar (1970) who included in his book the gentleman’s agreements between Saud Al-Kabir and Imam Faisal Ibn Saud and the tribes of Najran, and the promise of King Abdul ‘Aziz Ibn Abdulrahman to the tribes of ‘Asir.

There are a number of mentions in the literature about the validation of the 1934 Treaty of Taif including Matwaly and Abu-Alalla (1978) and Al-Thawr (1985). Al-Thawr also considered the extreme Yemeni claim. Drysdale and Blake (1985), Blake and Schofield (1987) and Prescott (1987) are among a number of authors who briefly describe the history of the Saudi-Yemeni boundary. Al-Akiily (1984) discusses the history of Jazan and ‘Asir from the Ottoman period up to the emergence of the Kingdom of Saudi Arabia. More details on the historical background with regard to Britain’s involvement are given in Wilkinson’s 1991 work, Arabia’s Frontiers: the story of … Dresch (1989 and 1995) has studied the social anthropology of the Yemeni tribes and he covers the subject in depth in his book Tribes, Government, and History in the Yemen
Most recently, Al-\textipa{qaba'a}'s 1992 book, produced after the Gulf War, gives his opinions on the reasons for current boundary problems.

The majority of the studies mentioned above have not incorporated any fieldwork. The opinions expressed are therefore those of the authors. This author will attempt to avoid the same bias in this study. The thesis is based on fieldwork on the Saudi-Yemeni frontier. The theoretical framework for this study is based on an examination of the factors which have created the present \textit{de facto} border and which affect the location of the Logical Boundary which the author proposes.

1.8.4 \textit{Saudi-Yemeni Boundary Studies in Other Sources}

Melamid (1954, 1956, and 1957) wrote four articles concerning the boundaries of the Arabian peninsula. He looked at petroleum, the evolution of boundaries, and also suggested that the edge of the Rub' Al-Khali would make the best south-eastern boundary for Saudi Arabia. In an article published in 1977, Khalisah proposes that the boundary dispute in south-eastern Arabia only became important once oil had been discovered. Al-Faiall (1986) considered the Buraimi dispute between Saudi Arabia, the UAE, and Oman, which was resolved by a 1971 Saudi-UAE agreement and a 1974 Saudi-Omani agreement. In 1975, Abu-Alalla published an article detailing all the major aspects of the 'Asir region of south-west Saudi Arabia including the relief, climate, geology, natural resources, economic dynamics, demography, transport, and the historical development of the Saudi-Yemeni boundary. In the same year Jafar (1975) published a similar study of the Tehama region on the Yemeni side of the frontier. In 1981 an article was published by Al-Anani entitled \textit{The features of population in the Yemen Arab Republic}. As well as discussing the population which lives on the Yemeni frontier, he also mentions the difficulty there would be collecting statistics in Yemen in 1986. In his article \textit{The boundaries and boundary disputes in South Arabia}, Adawy (1990) includes a brief
history of the area, legal and non-legal claims to territory, and boundary relations between south Arabian states, the UAE, and Oman. He also mentions that he is preparing an article dealing with the boundary between Saudi Arabia and Oman.

1.9 Thesis Summary

This thesis contains six chapters. Chapter 1 includes the introduction, delimitation of the study area, reasons for choosing the study area, the aim and objectives of the study, sources of information and methodology, previous studies, and this thesis summary.

Chapter 2 discusses the historical background of the Saudi-Yemeni frontier: before the 1934 Treaty of Taif, the Treaty of Taif boundary, the frontier east of the Treaty of Taif boundary, the maritime boundary, and a conclusion.

Chapters 3, 4, and 5 concentrate on the three sectors of the study area (Western Study Sector, Central Study Sector, and Eastern Study Sector) which together form the present Saudi-Yemeni frontier to the east of the Treaty of Taif boundary. These chapters incorporate the author's original research findings and examine geographical features, cross-frontier interaction, the checkpoints, perception of the frontier, economic opportunities, the de facto border, tribal boundaries, and conclusions.

Chapter 6 deals with the author's conclusions and recommendations. The conclusions include observations on geographical features, population distribution, cross-frontier interaction, local perception of the location of the frontier, hydrocarbon and mineral potential, the de facto border, and tribal boundaries. The recommendations include the location of the proposed Logical Boundary and its advantages and disadvantages to Saudi Arabia and Yemen, and the future.
References


Al-Thawr, A. (1985) *This is Yemen*. (Arabic) Beirut, Dar Al-Awdah.

CHAPTER 1


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Mashary, M.A. (1981) 'Relations between the Kingdom of Saudi Arabia and the Kingdom of Yemen' (Arabic) (King Saud University, Riyadh Master’s thesis).


Saudi Foreign Ministry (1934) *The Saudi Green Book: Relations Between Saudi Arabia and the Yemen*. (Republished by Archive Editions, Slough, 1994.)


MAPS

Al-Dhaman, H. (no date) Yemeni Arab Republic. Scale 1:300,000. Yemen Arab Republic, Sana'a'.

Al-Dhamari, H. (no date) Yemeni Relief Map. Scale 1:250,000. Yemen Arab Republic, Sana'a'.

British Survey (1927) Jaza'ir Farasan; Red Sea; Saudi Arabia. Scale 1:200,000. U.K.


General Tourism Corporation (1980) Tourism Map of the Yemen Arab Republic. Scale 1:500,000. Yemen, Sana'a'.


CHAPTER 1


Chapter 2
The Saudi-Yemeni Boundary:
Historical Background

2.1 Introduction

From earliest times the geographical area which is now the Yemen has been a distinct cultural area and separate civilisation. The vigorous state of Sheba (Saba) is referred to both in the Bible and the Koran. Still standing are the remains of the remarkable irrigation system based on the huge dam at Ma'rib. A distinct Yemeni identity has its roots in the ancient division of the Arabs who lived in the peninsula into descendants of the 'Adnan and Qahtan tribes. This distinguishes the people of the area from their neighbours. The separation of the area into North and South Yemen stems from the imperial policies of the British and Ottoman administrations in the nineteenth and early twentieth centuries, even though the area was rarely wholly under one single administration for any length of time. (Gause, 1990 p.2)

However, the development of the area which is now Saudia was quite different. The first Saudi state was not established until 1745, that being the first occasion when the family of Saud emerged into a position of political dominance; before that the centre of the Arabian peninsula was patchily populated by various frequently warring tribes. The first Saudi state lasted until 1818; a second, established in 1840, lasted until 1891. The third, modern, state was established by 'Abdul 'Aziz (ibn Saud) in 1902 and continues to the present. (Al-Qaba'a 1992 pp.42-51)
Yemen can therefore be seen as a classic example of a state with its identity based round a concept of territory, whilst Saudi Arabia has developed a strong sense of nationality linked to the Islamic cultural traditions fostered by the family of Saud. Their very different political histories may reasonably be held to account for differing viewpoints on the boundary issue, and give rise to alternative ideological approaches. The important historical background is therefore studied in Chapter 2.

The first attempt to delimit a section of the present boundary between Saudi Arabia and Yemen was the 1934 Treaty of Taif. This treaty was the third in a series which established most of the boundaries of Saudi Arabia, as Table 2.1 shows. The boundaries total 4,334km in length and separate the state from its seven neighbours: Yemen, Iraq, Jordan, Oman, the UAE, Kuwait, and Qatar (Table 2.1 and Figure 2.1(A)).

Most of the treaties were signed by Britain, or under British supervision:

In the south (of the Middle East) most of the bilateral boundaries were negotiated between external powers or by one external and one indigenous authority. Only short sections of the boundary have been delimited through bilateral negotiations between two indigenous parties and, with the exception of the boundary between Yemen (Sana'a) and Saudi Arabia, they were all settled after World War II. (Prescott, 1987: p.269)

The Saudi boundaries with Kuwait and Iraq were negotiated and signed in 1922 under British supervision, followed by the boundary with Jordan which was signed by Britain in 1925. The boundaries with Qatar (agreed 1965), the UAE (agreed 1974), and Oman (agreed 1990) were signed by the countries themselves. In the case of the UAE and Oman boundaries, the agreements were signed after the end of the period of British supervision (1798-1971) (MFA-KSA, 1977a: pp. 1-8 and 1977b: pp.467-9; Hamzah, 1934: pp.367-400 and 1936: p.27; Al-Mangor, 1988: pp.22-37; Al-Ashal, 1978: 1-50).
Table 2.1 The Boundary Treaties of the Kingdom of Saudi Arabia and the Republic of Yemen

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Treaty</th>
<th>Date</th>
<th>Signatories</th>
<th>Countries</th>
<th>Signed At</th>
<th>Amended</th>
<th>Length of Bordera (km)</th>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td><strong>Saudi Agreements:</strong></td>
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<td>Treaty of Muhammerah:</td>
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<tr>
<td>Protocol 1</td>
<td>5 May 1922</td>
<td>Sultan of Nejd - King of Iraq</td>
<td>Nejd-Iraq</td>
<td>Uqair, KSA</td>
<td>1982</td>
<td>808</td>
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<tr>
<td></td>
<td>2 December 1922</td>
<td>Sultan of Nejd - Hakim of Kuwait</td>
<td>Nejd-Kuwait</td>
<td>Uqair, KSA</td>
<td>1969</td>
<td>222</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Treaty of Hadda</td>
<td>2 November 1925</td>
<td>Sultan of Nejd - British Government</td>
<td>Nejd-Jordan</td>
<td>Bahra, KSA</td>
<td>1965</td>
<td>742</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Treaty of Taif</td>
<td>19 May 1934</td>
<td>King of Saudi - King of Yemen</td>
<td>Saudi-Yemen</td>
<td>Taif, KSA</td>
<td>---</td>
<td>293.6b</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Treaty of Riyadh</td>
<td>4 December 1965</td>
<td>King of Saudi - Sheikh of Qatar</td>
<td>Saudi-Qatar</td>
<td>Riyadh, KSA</td>
<td>---</td>
<td>60</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Treaty of Riyadh</td>
<td>29 July 1974</td>
<td>King of Saudi - Sheikh of UAE</td>
<td>Saudi-UAE</td>
<td>Riyadh, KSA</td>
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<td>586</td>
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<tr>
<td><strong>Yemeni Agreements:</strong></td>
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<tr>
<td>Treaty of Taif</td>
<td>19 May 1934</td>
<td>King of Saudi - King of Yemen</td>
<td>Yemen-Saudi</td>
<td>Taif, KSA</td>
<td>---</td>
<td>293.6b</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Treaty of Sana'a</td>
<td>1 October 1992</td>
<td>President of Yemen - Sultan of Oman</td>
<td>Yemen-Oman</td>
<td>Sana'a, Yemen</td>
<td>---</td>
<td>288</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

a Data on the length of boundaries has been taken from CIA (1992), except for the length of the Treaty of Taif Sector of the Saudi-Yemeni frontier which has been calculated from the Treaty itself (see note (b), below).

b The present Saudi-Yemeni frontier is approximately 1,240km in length: the Treaty of Taif sector is 293.6km long (Schofield, 1992: Vol.2, pp.440-62), the former Imamate of Yemen-Saudi Arabia non-Treaty sector consists of 246.4km, and a further 700km makes up the former Aden Protectorate-Saudi Arabia sector (measured by the author's vehicle during his fieldwork between July and October 1994).  

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Table 2.1 also includes the 1990 treaty between Yemen and Oman which confirmed as the boundary an administrative line which was originally established by the British and agreed between the Sultan of Oman and the Aden Protectorate (Schofield, 1992: Vol.20, p.753; Wilkinson, 1991: p.345). The only treaty negotiated and signed by the countries concerned on their own behalf was the 1934 Treaty of Taif between Saudi Arabia and the former Imamate of Yemen (Table 2.1 and Figure 2.1(A)).

The Saudi-Yemeni frontier is approximately 1,240km in length. For the purposes of historical study in this thesis, the present Saudi-Yemeni frontier will be divided into three parts; firstly, the land boundary delimited by the 1934 Treaty of Taif, secondly, the land frontier not delimited by the Taif Treaty, and thirdly, the maritime boundary.

The boundary created by the 1934 Treaty of Taif is 293.6km in length (Figure 2.2(A)), beginning at the Red Sea shore at Duwayyimah Island and running inland to Jabal Al-Thar in the Najran area (Figure 2.2(A)) (Schofield, 1992: Vol.20, pp.648-70).

To the east of the Treaty of Taif boundary lies the remainder of the Saudi-Yemeni frontier which was not delimited by the Treaty of Taif, and which is the main focus of this thesis. It may be further divided into two sections for the purposes of historical study. The first section, which is mentioned in the Treaty of Taif, is 246.4km length (Figure 2.2(A)) and begins at Jabal Al-Thar in the Najran area from where it runs south-east until it meets the former North Yemen-South Yemen-Saudi Arabia tripoint at Radm Al-Amir (Figure 2.2(A)). The second section covers the frontier which was created by Saudi and British claims (Figure 2.2(A)) and which begins at Radm Al-Amir and runs approximately 700km east until it meets the Oman boundary.

The Saudi-Yemeni maritime boundary was not mentioned in the 1934 Treaty of Taif and has yet to be delimited. However, both countries lay claim to a number of islands that lie off their coasts.

The 1934 Treaty of Taif boundary, the frontier created by Saudi and British claims, and the maritime boundary will all be examined in this chapter from a historical
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perspective as an introduction to this thesis which then goes on to focus on that part of the land frontier not delimited by the 1934 Treaty of Taif.

2.2 Before the 1934 Treaty of Taif

The first contact between the rulers of Nejd and 'Asir was in 1921-2 when the Sultan of Nejd, King Abdul'Aziz, signed a treaty with the Imam of 'Asir, Muhammad Ibn Ali Ibn Idrisi. The treaty had two goals; firstly King Abdul'Aziz needed to win Al-Idrisi's loyalty and his collaboration on defence from any enemies; secondly it established a frontier between the territories of the two rulers based on tribal frontiers (Al-Khatrash, 1983: pp.45-6; Al-S aid, 1989: p.56; Al-Zalfah, 1991: p.73). The tribes concerned are mentioned by name in the treaty:

So the tribes of all Yam, Wada'a and those which belong to them of Beni Jama'a, Sahar, Sharif, Qahtan, Rufeyda and Ubeyda, including Beni Bishr, Beni Talq, Shahran, Beni Shehr, Gharmid, 'Asir Gharmid, and all “Qadha” (province) of Mahayel including Beni Thu’a people of Bareq and Tarqash, people of Ar-Rish and others who belong to them and all the tribes of Hali mentioned are all under the Imam 'Abdul-'Aziz. Those belonging to the Imam Muhammad Ibn Ali al-Idrisi are: Tehama except what is above mentioned, and other (belongings) in his possession. Rigal al-Ma’ of 'Asir is his own property. (Saudi Foreign Ministry, 1934: p.440)

Figure 2.1(A) shows how the region was divided, with King Abdul'Aziz controlling the areas of Surowat (the 'Asir) and Najran (the Yam) and Al-Idrisi controlling the 'Asir of Tehama. Four years later in 1926 another agreement was signed in Mecca between King Abdul'Aziz and Al-Idrisi:

When the agreement of Mecca, the holy was concluded between H.M. the King and As-Seyed al-Hasan Al-Idrisi on 14th Rabi’ ath-Thani 1348 (21st October 1926) and in accordance with which protection has been spread over the portion which the Idrisis were ruling in Tehama ...(Saudi Foreign Ministry, 1934: p.412).

Under the 1926 Mecca agreement, Tehama also came under Saudi protection and control (Figure 2.1(A)). This expansion by Ibn Saud was not to the liking of Imam Yahya of Yemen (Al-Khatrash, 1983: p.162; Al-S aid, 1989: pp.111-2; Brian, 1971: p.63).
In the years following the 1926 Mecca agreement relations between King Abdul'Aziz and the Imam of Yemen were tense in the southern 'Asir and Najran areas (Saudi Foreign Ministry, 1934: p.446; Al-Khatrash, 1983: pp.149-89). Events developed and on 5 April 1934 war broke out between Ibn Saud and Imam Yahya. The main reasons for the outbreak of war at this time were:

1. In May 1933 the forces of Emir Ahmed, son of Imam Yahya, advanced towards Najran.
2. At the same time Imam Yahya took hostages from the tribes in 'Asir and Najran which had been allocated to Ibn Saud.
3. Imam Yahya had encouraged and supported Al-Idrisi to lead a revolt against Ibn Saud in the 'Asir region in 1932. The Imam also encouraged Al-Idrisi to make problems for Ibn Saud in 'Asir from time to time (Saudi Foreign Ministry, 1934: p.446; Al-Said, 1989: pp.241-7; Al-Khatrash, 1983: pp.234-77).

2.3 The 1934 Treaty of Taif Boundary

As a result of the war which began on 5 April 1934 Saudi Arabia and Yemen wanted to cease fighting and make a comprehensive peace. The two countries reached an agreement on 6 Safar 1353 (19 May 1934) at Taif city in Saudi Arabia and the Treaty and all its appendices were ratified on 2 Ramadhan 1356 (5 December 1937) (Al-Ghamdi, 1991: p.47).

In this section the researcher will translate and expand upon sections of his 1991 Master's thesis, *The Saudi-Yemeni Boundary according to the Treaty of Taif 1934: a Study in Political Geography*, which was submitted to King Saud University (Al-Ghamdi, 1991: pp.50-100).

The most important outcomes of the 1934 Treaty of Taif were as follows:

1. The war between the Kingdom of Saudi Arabia and the Kingdom of Yemen ceased;
2. The Yemeni army withdrew from the Najran area;
3 The Saudi army withdrew from Al-Hudaydah;
4 The Yemeni Government handed Al-Idrisi over to the Saudi Government;
5 The Yemeni Government released the hostages;
6 Both countries agreed to establish a mutual boundary;
7 The beginning of a good neighbourly and Islamic relationship between the two countries (Al-Ghamdi, 1991: p.51).

2.3.1 SUMMARY OF THE TREATY

An annotated summary of the Saudi-Yemeni peace treaty concluded at Taif on 6 Safar 1353 (20 May 1934) was sent from Sir Andrew Ryan, British Minister in Jiddah, to Sir John Simon, Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs on 27 June 1934:

Article 1. State of war ends as from the date of signature of the treaty; perpetual peace and firm and everlasting Moslem Arab brotherhood. Disputes to be settled in the spirit of friendship and all relations to be governed by the spirit of the same brotherhood. God called upon to witness the good intentions of the parties. Prayer for His blessing.

Art. 2. Mutual recognition by each party of the complete independence and sovereignty of the other and his lawful successors. Abandonment of past claims by either to territory on the other side of the frontier now established.

Art. 3. Neither party to concede to the other less than he concedes to any third party. Neither bound to concede more to the other than he gets in return.

Art. 4. Description of agreed frontier [see Figure 2.2(A)].

Art. 5. No fortifications to be erected within 5 kilom. of the frontier.

Art. 6 Occupying forces of each party to be withdrawn forthwith from the territory of the other and protection to be afforded to the inhabitants and troops.

Art. 7 Each party to restrain his people from hostile action against those of the other and to prevent raiding. Captured property to be restored in accordance with legal investigation after the ratification of the treaty; legal damages to be guaranteed in cases of murder &c., and hostile acts to be punished upon proof of them. This provision to operate pending a further agreement on the mode of assessing and investigating claims.

Art. 8. Parties not to resort to force for settlement of disputes arising between them under this treaty or otherwise. Failing settlement by friendly negotiations, such disputes shall be referred to arbitrations to be conducted in accordance with the annexed agreement, which will be deemed an integral part of the treaty.
Art. 9. Each party to prevent action or preparations in his territory directed against the other party and to take actions defined in this article against their authors on receipt of a written demand.

Art. 10. Fugitives from the jurisdiction of either party not to be admitted by the other. Entrance to be prevented and persons circumventing measures to prevent it to be disarmed, arrested and surrendered; or if they cannot be arrested to be driven back to the country to which they belong.

Art. 11. Governors and officials of either party to be prevented from interfering with the subjects of the other. Measures to be taken to obviate disturbance or misunderstanding as a result of such action.

Art. 12. People of areas assigned to each party under this treaty to be the subject of that party. Neither party to accept as his subjects the subjects of the other party without the latter's consent. Subjects of either party in the territory of the other to be dealt with in accordance with the local law.

Art. 13. Amnesty to be granted by each party to the subjects of the other residing in his territory; to his own subjects who have taken refuge with or joined the other party, both as regards crimes and as regards property taken from the time of their doing so to the time of their return. In the case of doubt on the part of either party as to the fulfilment of this clause, he may call upon the other party to convocate a meeting of the representatives who have signed this treaty, failing either of whom he may be replaced by a person having stated qualifications. Their decision to be binding.

Art. 14. Property of persons benefitting by the amnesty to be restored to them on their return to their country or to their heirs. Goods of the subjects of either part not to be sequestrated by the other party.

Art. 15. Neither party to meddle with or come to any agreement with any third party, whether an individual, a group of persons or a Government in any manner prejudicial to the interests of the other party.

Art. 16. The parties, who are bound by the ties of Islamic brotherhood and Arab origin, declare that their nations are one nation, that they wish no one evil and that they will endeavour to promote the interests of their nation in tranquility and seek the good of their countries and their nation, without intending enmity to any nation whatsoever.

Art. 17. In the event of external aggression against the country of either party, the other shall,

(i) Observe complete neutrality secretly and publicly.
(ii) Practice all "possible moral and spiritual co-operation."
(iii) Negotiate with the other party with a view to discovering the means of guaranteeing the security of the country of such other party and preventing harm thereto and refraining from any action which might be interpreted as contributing assistance to the external enemy.

Art. 18. Measures to be taken by each party in the event of rebellion or internal hostilities in the country of the other.

Art. 19. Both parties to collaborate as regards postal and telegraphic communication, economic matters, &c., and to negotiate a customs agreement.
Art. 20. Representatives abroad of either party to represent the other party, if the latter so wishes. Representatives of both parties in the same place abroad to collaborate in order to secure unity of policy and promote the interests of both countries which are one nation. Neither party restricted in its freedom of action by this article.


Art. 22. Ratifications to be exchanged as soon as possible, whereupon the treaty will come into force forthwith, saving the provision in article 1 regarding the termination of the state of war. The treaty shall remain in force for twenty lunar years and may be amended or renewed during the six months preceding its expiry, failing which it shall remain in force for six months from notification of the wish of either party to alter it.

Art. 23. Treaty to be called the Treaty of Taif. Drawn up in two copies in the noble Arabic language. (Schofield, 1993: Vol.2, pp.417-9; see Appendix 1 for the full text of the treaty)

In addition, the Treaty has four appendices. The five articles of Annex 1 explain the arbitration procedure for use in the event of either party having difficulty in interpreting any of the articles of the Treaty of Taif. The selection of the arbitration committee and the chief arbitrator, and the time of arbitration are all prescribed.

Annex 2 is the most important annex of the Treaty because it consists of the border demarcation reports. Two joint committees were set up, one to demarcate the boundary in the Tehama region and the other to demarcate the boundary in the mountains and beyond. The Tehama committee prepared three reports which were signed by representatives of both parties in Ramadhan 1354 (December 1935), on 27 Shawwal 1354 (21 January 1936), and on 21 Alqida 1345 (14 February 1936). The committee demarcating the boundary in the mountains prepared one report which was signed on 21 Shawwal 1354 (15 January 1936) (Schofield, 1993: Vol.2, p.438).

Annex 3 corrected an error in one of the border marks between the two kingdoms. Finally, the 12 articles of Annex 4 are a general agreement concerning the resolution of issues which might face the people of the two kingdoms (Schofield, 1993: Vol.2, pp.428-64; MFA-KSA, 1977a: pp.161-94) (see Appendix 1 for the full text of the 1934 Treaty of Taif and its appendices).
2.3.2 EUROPEAN AND ARAB REACTION TO THE TREATY

In 1934 Britain, Italy, and France all had naval units stationed off the coast at Al-Hudaydah to enable them to monitor the war being fought on the southern Arabian Peninsula between the troops of Ibn Saud and Imam Yahya (Al-Said, 1989: p.285). When the two kingdoms reached an agreement in 1934 in the form of the Treaty of Taif many commentators wrote about the Treaty.

Sir Andrew Ryan, British Minister in Jiddah, sent an annotated summary of the Treaty to Sir John Simon, Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs on 27 June 1934. Ryan commented:

...the treaty may be regarded as a fairly workmanlike document. It is in European form and the pious formulae, which have done so much to obscure Saudi-Yemen relations in the past, have been reduced to a minimum. ...On the whole, however, it would probably have been impossible to do much better in dealing with regions of which there are no accurate maps and where tribal considerations are more important the geography. ...Great play is made with the doctrine that the people of the two “countries,” which are carefully distinguished, are one “nation,” but the word which, for want of a better equivalent, has been translated “nation” is not used so as to imply any political unity. It refers rather to that ideal unity of Moslems and Arabs which it is the present fashion to acclaim. (Schofield, 1993: Vol.2, pp.416-7).

In 1934 The Times also commented on the fact that the Treaty of Taif laid emphasis on Arab friendship and brotherhood and that European politicians should model their treaties on the Treaty of Taif. Salvador Anty writing in Italy in 1934 described the Treaty of Taif as an anthem to Arab unity (cited in Salam, 1984: p.425). Arab commentators concentrated on the fact that the Treaty provided a blueprint for Arab and Islamic relationships for the future (Al-Ahram, 1934: p.4; Al-Manar, 1934: pp.125-8).

Although the form of the Treaty of Taif had its admirers, there are also a number of problems with it. Firstly, the Treaty covered a number of subjects which should have been in separate annexes: for example, Article 4 which describes the direction of the boundary; Articles 8 and 9 which describe the security procedures for dealing with criminals between the two states; and Article 19 which discusses communications.
transportation, and economic matters. Secondly, Article 22, which requires the Treaty to be renewed every 20 years, has caused difficulties (see Section 2.3.4). Thirdly, there are a number of problems with Annex 2 which is the most important annex of the Treaty as it describes the 294 border mark locations, the distance between the border marks and the names of the local tribes. No maps accompany this annex and no latitude and longitude are given for the border marks, making it impossible to delimit the border accurately and therefore creating the opportunity for problems to arise between the two countries at a later date.

2.3.3 DEVELOPMENT STAGES OF THE TREATY BOUNDARY

The only study which examines the stages of development (as suggested by political geographers) of the Treaty of Taif boundary is the author's currently unpublished master's thesis (Al-Ghamdi, 1991).

The boundaries of a state evolve through various stages before reaching full maturity, but not every boundary necessarily passes through every stage;

S.B. Jones suggested that boundaries may pass three stages in their development; allocation, delimitation, and demarcation ... some political geographers have proposed the addition of a fourth stage called administration (Drysdale and Blake, 1985: p.77).

This section will compare these four stages of boundary evolution with the stages of evolution of the Treaty of Taif boundary.

First Stage: Allocation

Allocation represents the initial understanding between states as to their territorial claims. Lines may be crudely drawn on maps, but no accurate field survey has been attempted (Drysdale and Blake, 1985: p.77).

Article 4 of the Treaty of Taif achieved this stage in the boundary's evolution by describing the general direction of the boundary line without reference to maps or field surveys.
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Second Stage: Delimitation

When ... delimitation occurs, the boundary line is defined with precision and formally agreed to by the parties. If it is not a geometric line, field surveys will be conducted to site the boundary with reference to physical features (Drysdale and Blake, 1985: p.77).

The Treaty of Taif achieved this second stage in the evolution of the boundary by defining the border mark locations and the distance between them and naming the tribes involved.

Agreement was reached between the countries on these points:

The above-mentioned committees held several meetings until this report was prepared. The meetings were attended by the chiefs of the adjacent tribes. After investigations and with the approval of the chiefs of tribes and without any coercion the border demarcation process was carried out. The borders were determined, defined and distinguished by the famous and unchangeable names of mountains, hills and valleys (Schofield, 1993: Vol.2, pp.439-40; see Annex 2 of the Treaty, Appendix 1).

Physical features were used to define the boundary between the two countries. The shiekhs of the adjacent tribes attended the boundary committees' meetings to contribute to the establishment of the boundary. This participation by the shiekhs made the Treaty a very practical document Indeed it is the only Saudi boundary treaty in which shiekhs have had any participation.

However, the boundary committees made a grave error by not using maps and relying only on report minutes to clarify the location of the boundary marks at this stage

Third Stage: Demarcation

Boundary demarcation may be carried out, marking the boundary on the ground (Drysdale and Blake, 1985: p.70).

The Treaty of Taif achieved this third stage in the evolution of the boundary by marking the boundary on the ground, but this was only done with temporary markers (Plate 2.8):

... the two committees appointed trusted men who went to put stone marks along the border line every other kilometer [this should be translated as 'every kilometer, and others'] pending the erection of posts at a time to be specified by Their Majesties the two kings. They also will appoint the persons who would carry out the work and the expenses involved (Schofield, 1993: Vol.2, p.440; see Annex 2 of the Treaty, Appendix 1).
Unfortunately the two countries did not complete this stage and failed to build the permanent markers along the boundary, creating problems for both countries today (see Section 2.3.5.2).

Fourth Stage: Administration

At this stage the states concerned should agree about the location of checkpoints along the boundary line and define the procedures governing the movement of people, especially where population densities along the frontier are high (Drysdale and Blake, 1985: p.70; Al-Deeb, 1987: p.349).

Annex 4 of the Treaty of Taif, the ‘general agreement between the two kingdoms’, achieved this fourth stage in the evolution of the boundary. The 12 articles of the agreement outlined the manner in which damage and loss between the people of the frontier should be investigated and estimated. There was, however, no discussion about checkpoints in the Treaty.

In general terms therefore, the Treaty of Taif enabled the 293.6km of the Saudi-Yemeni boundary which it established to achieve all four stages of boundary development. However, two important procedures were omitted. The lack of use of any maps during the delimitation of the boundary was presumably because the committees concerned were unaware of the importance of using maps to help define the location of the boundary markers, or because maps were unavailable for the frontier area in 1934. The two states failed to complete the process of demarcating the boundary by replacing the stone markers (Plate 2.8) with more permanent boundary markers. This may have either been due to the fact that the states were preoccupied with internal problems, or because of financial constraints. This particular oversight has greatly complicated boundary issues in later years (see Section 2.3.5.2).
A further weakness of the Treaty of Taif was its revalidation requirement, outlined in Article 22:

It shall remain in force for a period of twenty (20) complete lunar years. It may be renewed or modified during the six months preceding its expiry. If not so renewed and modified by that date, it shall remain in force until six months after such time as one party has given notice to the other party of his desire to modify it. (Schofield, 1993: Vol.2, p.428)

This Article, requiring the Treaty to be renewed every 20 years, has proved very troublesome. Informal Yemeni comments concerning the validation of the Treaty fall into two categories. One group of commentators, among them Al-Hasamy (1983), Matwaly and Abu-Alalla (1978), and Al-Thawr (1985) regard the 1934 Treaty of Taif as invalid after 1954, after the first 20 years had elapsed, leaving the issue of the boundary pending. However, a second group, including Al-Shahary (1979) and Al-Haajari (1988) consider the Treaty as having been renewed twice, once in 1953 by Imam Ahmed of Yemen, and again twenty years later after a visit of the Prime Minister of Yemen, Abdullah Ahmed Al-Hajary to Saudi Arabia on 10 March 1973. A joint Saudi-Yemeni statement published on 17 March 1973 following the visit renewed the boundary established by Articles 2 and 4 of the Treaty of Taif (Appendix 1). However, Al-Shahary and Al-Haajari regard this statement as illegal because they consider the members of the delegation who signed the statement as unauthorized to do so.

The observation of the first group of commentators that the boundary issue is pending may be discounted in the light of the remarks of the second group regarding the Treaty’s renewal. The latter’s comments in connection with the validity of the Treaty are very important indeed. The opinion of Al-Shahary and Al-Haajari regarding the authority of Prime Minister Al-Hajary and the other members of the delegation who visited Saudi Arabia in 1973 can also be called into question.
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It is useful, in this context, to look at the positions held by the members of the delegation: they were Abdullah Al-Hajary, Prime Minister of Yemen, Ahmed Naman, Deputy Prime Minister and Minister of Foreign Affairs, Colonel Mohammed Al-Soory, Commander in Chief. Mohammed Al-Jneed, Minister of the Treasury, Abdullah Al-Saydi, Minister of Labour, Abduljabar Al-Mjahd, Minister of Agriculture, Abdul'Aziz Abdalqny, Chief of the Central Bank, Ali Al-Matiry, Manager of the Prime Minister's Office, Ghaleb Jamil, Agent of the Foreign Office, and Esmail Al-Jrrafy, Ambassador for Yemen in Saudi Arabia.

The names of all these official representatives of the Yemeni Government who comprised the delegation to Saudi Arabia appear on the statement agreeing that the Treaty of Taif should be renewed in perpetuity. Their positions in the government speak for themselves; it is clear that this was a high-ranking delegation with the necessary authority to act on behalf of the government (Al-Ghamdi, 1991: pp.59-61).

On 26 February 1995, after a further 22 years, the Saudi and Yemeni states signed a Memorandum of Understanding (Appendix 3) renewing the Treaty again. Clause 1 states:

The two sides affirm their commitment to the legitimacy and binding nature of the Taif accord signed on 6th Safar 1353 AH, corresponding to 20th May 1934; its appendices, known as the Taif accord, which will be referred to hereafter as the accord (SWB, 1995: p.15).

In the event of a final boundary agreement between the two states, the permanence of the 1934 Treaty of Taif should be made absolutely clear and Article 22, which requires the Treaty to be revalidated every 20 years, should be cancelled to prevent the problem recurring in the year 2015.

2.3.5 COMMITMENT TO THE ARTICLES OF THE TREATY

There are many cases of treaties which have annexes appended to them which are as important in law as the treaties themselves (Abu-Hiaf, 1973: p.138).
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The author has selected a number of articles from the Treaty of Taif and its four annexes which are the most important of those dealing with the people of the frontier region and the boundary marks (Al-Ghamdi, 1991: pp.62-92).

2.3.5.1 Commitment to Articles Dealing with People

In order to examine Saudi and Yemeni commitment to the Treaty of Taif articles which deal with the people of the frontier region, a comparison was made by the author between the content of a number of articles and the de facto situation in 1991. The comparison was made by interviewing key people who were working at the Saudi checkpoints of Al-Tawal, 'Alib, and Al-Khadra (Figure 2.3(A)) and comparing their information with the following articles.

Annex 4. Articles 7 and 8

Article 7

Any person who wants to cross the boundary must obtain formal documents. Any person who does not get the permission of the Emir or Governor of his area will be arrested, and he may be sent back to where he came from. The rules governing the formal documents are as follows:

(1) People who have business on the frontier such as those crossing the boundary for grazing, agriculture, and visits to markets may continue as usual until an arrangement is made in the future. In an emergency it is possible to restrict crossing by requiring formal documents.

(2) People who cross the boundary to visit the Central Government or other places far from the frontier in either country must obtain formal documents.

(3) Pilgrims, tourists, and traders who cross the boundary must obtain the formal documents or they will be arrested and sent back.

Article 8

The formal documents which are mentioned in Article 7, Clauses 2 and 3 are as follows:

(1) Valid passport from Saudi Arabia or Yemen.

(2) Document from the Emir.

(3) Identity paper from any governor stating destination.
(4) Letter of introduction from the traveller's local Emir to the Emir of the destination.

(MFA-KSA. 1977a. p.196, translated by the author)

Clauses (1) to (4) above indicate the form of identity which people should use at the checkpoints. For those who cross the boundary regularly the 'arrangement' mentioned in Article 7.1 is a document commonly known as a 'statement' (Plate 3.1). Those who cross rarely and want to visit central Government posts far from the frontier should obtain the formal documents. When these requirements are compared with the forms of identity which were being required at checkpoints in 1991, the following picture emerges.

At Al-Tawal checkpoint both Saudis and Yemenis crossing the frontier are asked to show a passport, regardless of how often they cross the frontier or what their destination is. This is in contravention of Article 7 of Annex 4 of the Treaty of Taif. However, at Allb and Al-Khadra checkpoints Yemenis who cross the frontier regularly and whose business is in the frontier area are only required to produce statements, whilst those whose destination is far from the frontier have to show passports. By comparison, Saudis crossing to the Yemeni side have to produce passports at the Yemeni checkpoints regardless of their destination (Saudi Immigration Officers statement, 1991).

Comparing Articles 7 and 8, Annex 4 of the Treaty and the *de facto* situation in 1991 it is clear that the requirement for the three documents mentioned in Clauses 8.2, 8.3, and 8.4 has been abandoned by both Saudi Arabia and Yemen. However, in general, the Saudis are committed to the spirit of this article by allowing the Yemeni tribes who cross the boundary frequently to use only statements. The exception is for those crossing at Al-Tawal checkpoint where all Yemenis are asked to show passports although the Saudi Immigration Office stated that there was no good reason for this.

The fact that at Yemeni checkpoints both Saudis and Yemenis with any destination are asked to produce passports (Saudi Immigration Officer at Al-Khadra checkpoint, 1991) indicates that the Yemenis are not committed to the content of Article 7.
In general terms, both Saudi Arabia and Yemen need to reorganize their requirements for forms of identity for those crossing the frontier to conform with Article 7. Annex 4 of the 1934 Treaty of Taif.

Annex 4. Article 10

Because the carrying of weapons in the Kingdom of Saudi Arabia is forbidden according to the Rule of Organization published on 13/7/1354 (10 October 1935), Yemenis wanting to cross the boundary must hand over their weapons, whether firearms or knives, to the customs point or the Emirs on the frontier. On returning to their country their weapons will be returned to them. When those crossing hand their weapons to the customs officials they should be given a receipt so that their weapons may be returned to them on their return ... (MFA-KSA, 1977a, p.198, translated by the author).

In Yemen people are allowed to carry weapons, but in Saudi Arabia it is forbidden. The de facto situation in 1991 was that Yemenis crossing the frontier at Al-Tawal, AlIb, and Al-Khadra checkpoints handed their weapons over to Saudi Customs (Saudi Immigration Officer at Al-Khadra checkpoint, 1991). It can be concluded therefore that both countries are committed to Article 10, Annex 4 of the Treaty of Taif.

Article 6, Annex 4

Because of the advantages of warm relations between the Emirs and Governors, which will satisfy both God and their Kings, they agree to have a meeting (according to Article 1 from the General Agreement) at least once a year (more frequently if necessary) to examine the issues and collaborate to find solutions to administrative problems as mentioned in Article 5 of this Annex. The meetings will take place alternately on the Saudi and Yemeni sides of the frontier ... (MFA-KSA, 1977a: p.196, translated by the author).

In reality the countries need to meet a minimum of once a year to look at the various issues between their peoples on the frontier. Comparing Article 6 with the de facto situation in 1991, the author found that warm relations between the two states developed over the years until the Saudi-Yemeni Co-ordination Council (SYCC) was established in 1972. This was responsible for a wide range of issues between the two states, not only matters relating to the people of the frontier. It was also established to enable Saudi Arabia to make an active contribution to the development plans of the former Yemen Arab
Republic in various aspects such as health, education, mosques, transport, and agriculture (SYCC, 1981: p.13).

The SYCC continued its meetings until Yemen took its stance during the Gulf War in 1990, at which point most Saudi-Yemeni co-operation ceased. Tension between the two states increased until a Saudi-Yemeni Memorandum of Understanding was signed on 26 February 1995, the main provisions of which were to renew the 1934 Treaty of Taif and to set up two joint committees to deal with the boundary, including re-establishing the Treaty of Taif border marks (see Appendix 3 for the full text of the Memorandum of Understanding). A spirit of cooperation and collaboration between the two states then returned.

In general, both states are committed to Article 6, Annex 4 of the 1934 Treaty of Taif.

2.3.5.2 Commitment to Articles Dealing with Boundary Marks
The author used a combination of interviews with key informants and field surveys to examine the commitment of Saudi Arabia and Yemen to the articles of the Treaty of Taif which deal with boundary marks. The important parts of the Treaty in this regard are Article 4 which describes the direction of the boundary between the two countries and Annex 2 which is the most important annex of the Treaty because it describes the position of the border marks along the Treaty boundary.

A field survey of four sections of the Treaty boundary was carried out in 1990 as a sample to compare the \textit{de facto} situation with the position of those marks as described in Annex 2. The sections surveyed were those which bordered the Emirate of Al-Tawai on the coastal plain, the Emirate of Al-Khubah in the coastal mountains, the Emirate of Zahran Al-Janub in the Surowat mountains, and the Emirate of Al-Khadra on the plateau of Najran (Figure 2.3(A)).

Experienced local guides and members of the Saudi Border Guard from each Emirate joined the author during his survey in 1990 in order to guide him to the position...
of marks which it was still possible to recognise at that time. The results of the
comparison were as follows:

**Emirate of Al-Tawal on the coastal plain**

The length of Saudi-Yemeni boundary within Al-Tawal Emirate is approximately 25km
(Figure 2.3(A)). According to Annex 2, there should therefore be 25 position marks at
1.000m intervals. However only one mark was found, that is (31) located at 'Zibarat
Alsir' as Annex 2 calls it (Appendix 1, Annex 2, First Report of the Tehama Committee).
This mark is clear in Plate 2.1. and the area is still called Zibarat Alsir as it was described
in 1934. No further marks were found along the boundary in Al-Tawal Emirate, and the
remaining marks named in the Treaty were not recognised by those interviewed.

**Emirate of Al-Khubah in the coastal mountains**

The length of Saudi-Yemeni boundary within the Emirate of Al-Khubah is
approximately 65km (Figure 2.3(A)), and there should therefore be 65 border marks at
1.000m intervals. However, the only remnant of a mark found along the boundary in this
Emirate was '(31) Ishat Sir Mijda'a' (Appendix 1, Annex 2, Second Report of the
Tehama Committee). The general location of the border mark is the village of Mijda'a,
which today covers an area greater than 5km². The mark itself used by the Treaty
committee, 'Ishat', was no longer to be found, as this translates as a 'one-roomed thatched
hut', and this had clearly disappeared in the intervening 56 years.

**Emirate of Zahran Al-Janub in the Surowat mountains**

The length of Saudi-Yemeni boundary within the Zahran Al-Janub Emirate is 50km in
length (Figure 2.3(A)), and according to Annex 2 of the Treaty there should therefore be
50 border marks within this emirate at 1.000m intervals.

During the field survey, eight marks were found and recognised as they had been
The positions of these marks were (25) Ras Alhanka, (38) Sha'ab Alqoum, (39) Ras

The border marks used in this area were mainly mountain peaks which are obviously better suited to stand the test of time than many other features.

*Emirate of Al-Khadra on the plateau of Najran*

Approximately 11km of the Saudi-Yemeni boundary lies within Al-Khadra Emirate, and there should therefore be 11 border marks within this emirate at 1,000m intervals. However, only two border mark positions named in the Treaty were found during the field survey. These were (1) Jabal Althar and (11) Ras Aqaba Nahuga. The other positions mentioned in the Treaty were not recognized (Plates 2.6 and 2.7).

The problem of the position of the Treaty of Taif border marks began when the two states failed to replace the temporary stone markers along the boundary (a sample of which are mentioned by Philby (1952: pp.513-6); see Plate 2.8) with more permanent marks like concrete pillars. By 1990 the vast majority of the stone markers had been washed or taken away, with only a few remaining such as that at Zibarat Alsir on the coastal plain (Plate 2.1).

Because of the difficulty of finding the stone markers themselves, in 1990 the author concentrated on finding the positions described in Annex 2 of the Treaty of Taif. However, the lack of maps, or longitude and latitude to locate the positions accurately, together with the fact that a number of place names have been changed by local people in the intervening 56 years, meant that there were considerable problems even with this approach to recognising the position of the boundary.

One other observation was made during the survey which may explain the lack of border marks located on the coastal plain and mountains compared to those found in the
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Surowat mountains and on the Najran plateau. This difference may be due to the fact that in the coastal locations the markers were more prone to being covered by sand than they are further inland.

By 1991, most of the boundary markers had disappeared and it was impossible to recognize the position of the markers accurately. The author therefore recommended that Saudi Arabia and Yemen should form a joint committee for redemarcating the boundary according to Annex 2 of the Treaty of Taif (Al-Ghamdi, 1991: p.353).

On 26 February 1995 the Kingdom of Saudi Arabia and the Republic of Yemen signed a Saudi-Yemeni Memorandum of Understanding. Clause 2 of the Memorandum states:

A joint committee will be set up, composed of an equal number [of people] from each side, within a period of 30 days. Its task will be to reestablish the [border] signs in accordance with the border reports appended to the accord - those [border signs] still existing and those which have fallen down - starting from the border point “Rasif al-Bahr, ... (SWB, 1995: p.15; see Appendix 3 for the full text).

At the time of writing this thesis in 1996 the Saudi-Yemeni joint committee are continuing their field survey on the Treaty boundary and have yet to publish any results.

2.4 The Frontier East of the Treaty of Taif Boundary

The frontier to the east of the boundary created by the 1934 Treaty of Taif can be divided into two sections, each with different characteristics. Firstly, there is the former Imamate of Yemen-Saudi Arabia non-Treaty section which consists of 246.4km of frontier which was mentioned in the Treaty but was not delimited. This section begins at Jabal Al-Thar on the Najran plateau and runs to the former North Yemen-South Yemen-Saudi Arabia tripoint at Radm Al-Amir (Figure 2.2(A)). This section was left undelimited in 1934 by Saudi Arabia and the Imamate of Yemen, because of a dispute between the Wa’ilah and Yamn tribes (see Section 2.4.1). Furthermore, it was not complicated by British
interference as they had no direct interest in this section. No formal proposals regarding this section of the frontier have been submitted to the Saudi Government by the Yemeni Government, or vice versa. The only evidence available concerning the territorial claims in this section are the maps published by the Saudi and Yemeni states, and personal offerings by travellers such as Philby. His 1939 line is discussed fully in Section 2.4.1.

The second part of the undelimited frontier is the former Aden Protectorate-Saudi Arabia section which runs approximately 700km from the Radm Al-Amir former tripoint to the Oman-Saudi Arabia-Yemen tripoint at 19°N, 52°E (Figure 2.2(A)). A number of proposals concerning this section of the frontier were made during the period 1914-55 by the Ottoman Government, the Saudi Government, and the British Government (on behalf of its proteges in southern and south-eastern Arabia).

It is important to examine these historical boundary proposals so that the possibility of using any of them as a basis for a future boundary between Saudi Arabia and Yemen may be considered.

There are many publications featuring the historical correspondence between Saudi Arabia and Britain concerning Arabia’s frontiers; Schofield and Blake (1988-91) Vols.1-30; Schofield (1992) Vols.6, 7, 10, 11, 16, 18, 19, and 20; and Schofield (1993) writing in Arabian Geopolitics, Schofield (1993-4) Arabian Boundaries: New Documents Vols.1-6. There are also the proceedings of the arbitration at the International Court of Justice concerning Buraimi and the common frontier between Saudi Arabia, Abu-Dhabi, and Oman (known as the Buraimi memorials) which consist of the Saudi memorial in three volumes (MSG, 1955) and the British memorial in two volumes (FCO, 1955). It is not the aim of this thesis to review the huge number of documents in this section. Rather, the historical proposals will be studied from four key aspects; the locations of the lines proposed, the basis of the proposals, the Saudi-British reaction to the proposals, and the possibility of the proposals forming the basis for a future boundary settlement.
2.4.1 FORMER IMAMATE OF YEMEN-SAUDI ARABIA NON-TREATY SECTION OF THE FRONTIER

This section of the frontier is mentioned in the Treaty of Taif 1934: Article 4 recommended the use of tribal boundaries as the basis for the boundary between Saudi Arabia and the Imamate of Yemen on their eastern frontier:

... it then bends [the boundary] eastwards until it ends, on the edge of the boundary between those of the Hamdan-bin-Zaid, Waila, &c., who are outside Yam, and Yam. (Schofield, 1993: Vol.2, p.424).

However, because of the dispute over tribal territories between the Wa’ilah and Yam the boundary remained unmarked, as the Border Demarcation Report indicates:

It was agreed to place the first border mark at Ras Jabal Althar - between the tribes of Waila and Yam. Concerning the wasteland called (Silah), and the adjacent area to the East which is under dispute between the tribes of Waila and Yam we have decided to leave it as it is without placing any marks. Should there be any dispute thereupon in the future, it should be settled in accordance with God’s Sharia and the provisions of the Taif agreement. (Schofield, 1993: Vol.2, p.439)

The provisions of the Taif agreement for the eastern frontier of the Imamate of Yemen are mentioned above; members of the Hamdan bin Zaid tribe belong to the Imamate of Yemen except the Yam sub-tribe (Figure 6.4 shows the genealogical tree of the Hamdan bin Zaid tribe), and those members of the Wa’ilah tribe living in Najran city belong to Saudi Arabia (Schofield, 1993: Vol.2, p.424). Figure 3.14(A) shows the approximate boundary between the tribes (see Section 6.2.2 for more details).

On 18 October 1955 the Saudi Government declared a new boundary which was passed to the British Government. The western section of this line shows the Saudi view of the location of its frontier with the Imamate of Yemen to the east of the Treaty of Taif boundary (Figure 2.4(A)). Details of the location of the 1955 Saudi Declaration line are contained in a Saudi memorandum to the British Embassy in Jiddah, dated 18 October 1955:

... thence it should run through the point at 16° North 46° East to the Yemen border. (Schofield, 1993: Vol.2, p.349; Figure 2.4(A))
For the full text of the 1955 Saudi Declaration line see Section 2.4.2.7. This line was supposedly drawn up on a tribal basis and was only passed to the British Embassy (Schofield, 1993: Vol.2, p.345). There was therefore no comment from the Imamate of Yemen regarding this part of the 1955 Saudi Declaration line. In fact it does not accurately follow the tribal boundary (see Section 3.6 for the distribution of tribes in this section).

Until 1983 Saudi maps customarily used this line to define the frontier east of the Treaty of Taif boundary with the former Imamate, and then North Yemen. In 1983 the Saudi Ministry of Petroleum and Mineral Resources produced a map of the Arbaian Peninsula (MPMR-KSA, 1983) on which the frontier was shown further south than the 1955 Saudi Declaration line. This new line runs north-west from the point 45°22' E 15°40'N (which was also used by the 1955 line) to the point 44°8'E 16°45'N, from where it runs to Jabal Al-Thar which was the location of the most easterly Treaty of Taif border mark (MPMR-KSA, 1983, Arabian Peninsula Map). Figure 2.4(A) shows this line. There is no accurate data about the basis on which this line was drawn up, but it is assumed that it used those areas settled by people of Saudi nationality. This line is depicted on all Saudi maps produced subsequently. The author considers the 1983 line as the extreme Saudi claim in this section.

Yemeni maps also indicate the Yemeni position concerning the frontier to the east of the Treaty boundary. In 1967 the North Yemen Government requested the Syrian Military Survey to produce a map of the Yemen Arab Republic (MSD-SAR, 1967). On that map, which clearly reflects the opinion of the North Yemen Government, the line in the section in question starts at Jabal Al-Thar from where it runs to the point 46°19'E 16°43'N, north of Jabal Al-Rayyan. From here it runs south until it reaches the 1914 Violet line at Jabal Thaniya (MSD-SAR, 1967, Yemen Arab Republic map) (see Figure 2.4(A)). This 1967 line is the one used most frequently on British maps and atlases (Schofield, 1994: p.58). The line is geometric rather than following either geographical features or tribal boundaries, and the author considers it as the extreme Yemeni claim.
The most famous line proposed by a traveller was Philby’s line described in his book *Sheba’s Daughters* in 1939. In 1994 during his field survey the author found that the majority of elderly people and sheikhs in the frontier tribes are still familiar with Philby and his proposed line. However, it proved difficult to establish their opinion as to the value of Philby’s line. The location of this line is quoted in a summary of statements about his Shabwa expedition made by Philby to Sir R. Bullard on 18 February 1937:

The boundary runs from Thar, the most easterly boundary pillar of the previously demarcated Yaman-Sa’udi frontier, to a hillock called Rumaha in Wadi ‘Atfain, passing to the west of Maihar. From Rumaha it continues to the Madrak Hill, whence it reaches the cairn at the edge of the Taiyibat Ism valley on the main camel track from Najran to Hadhramaut. This cairn, though generally spoken of as Radm al Hadd (the boundary cairn), is properly named Ghawiyat al Riba, and it was explained to me that caravans or travellers from north to south or vice-versa stop at this point pending the enlistment of the necessary escort from the tribe into whose territory they are going. In most cases, of course, the halt is merely nominal, as the escort would probably be secured before reaching the spot. The boundary line from here runs straight down the Shuqqat al Qaura corridor and veers round vaguely outside the northern fringe of Hadhba, Dhab’a etc., to the Fuhud and Qafal hillocks at the tail of Wadi Itima, and so, enclosing the Ma’u and Raiyan hills, to the cairn of Radm al Amir in the Jau Mulais plain, from which it runs to Thaniya and so, in due course, to the line or point that divides the tracts of Baihan and Harib. (Schofield, 1992: Vol.20, p.678) (See Figure 2.4(A) to see approximate position of Philby’s line.)

Philby’s line was based on tribal boundaries to the east of the Treaty boundary and it also roughly follows the south-western edge of the Rub’ Al-Khali (Schofield, 1992: Vol.20, p.xix). The Imam of Yemen was not happy with Philby’s expedition or his proposed line (Wilkinson, 1991: p.211). In fact, Philby’s line is a more logical boundary than other lines shown on Saudi and Yemeni maps as it takes into consideration an approximation of both tribal boundaries and geographical features. However, there are other factors which have an effect on the location of logical boundaries such as the population interaction along the frontier, economic opportunities, and the *de facto* border. These factors and others will be examined in the chapter on the former Imamate of Yemen-Saudi Arabia non-Treaty section (see Western Study Sector, Chapter 3).
2.4.2 ANGLO-OTTOMAN AND ANGLO-SAUDI PROPOSALS CONCERNING THE FORMER ADEN PROTECTORATE-SAUDI ARABIA SECTION OF THE FRONTIER

The majority of historical Anglo-Saudi proposals had the aim of establishing boundaries between Saudi Arabia and Qatar, the Trucial States, and Muscat and Oman all of which were protected by the British Government. The author will examine only those proposals which involved the present Saudi-Yemeni frontier. The proposals are presented below in chronological order.

2.4.2.1 The Blue and Violet Lines 1913-4

The Blue and Violet lines were designed so that they would link up with one another, but each line had a specific purpose. The Blue line which was defined on 29 July 1913 was intended to separate the spheres of influence of Britain and the Ottoman Empire. The Violet line, on the other hand, was defined on 9 March 1914 to link up the southern terminus of the Blue line with the Anglo-Ottoman boundary in south-west Arabia, delimited during 1903-5 to separate the wilayat of Yemen from the nine cantons of the loosely federated Aden Protectorate (Schofield, 1994: p.19) (Figure 2.4(A)).

For the purposes of this study the Violet line is the more important as it runs through the Saudi-Yemeni frontier region. The Violet line is described in Article Three of the 1914 Anglo-Ottoman Convention:

Point 1 of the Wadi Bana indicated on the first of the maps annexed to the present convention (Annex B), being the last point surveyed on the spot in the east, it is agreed between the authorised High Contracting parties, in conformity with the above mentioned protocol [20 April 1905] and subject to the conditions and reserves contained in it, that the boundary of Ottoman territories shall follow a straight line which will run from Lekemet ul-Choub north-eastwards to the desert of Rub' al-Khali at an angle of 45°. This line shall joint in the Rub' al-Khali, on parallel 20°, the straight line ...(Wilkinson, 1991: p.104-5; the original Convention text in French. Schofield, 1992: Vol.20, p.9) (Figure 2.4(A) shows the Blue and Violet lines).
The Violet line followed neither geographical features, nor tribal boundaries. In fact, together with the Blue line, it was the best example of a purely geometric boundary on the Arabian Peninsula (Schofield, 1994: p.19).

On 1 April 1959 the Directorate of Overseas Survey sent a letter to the Colonial Office presenting three possible interpretations of the location of the 1914 Violet line. This letter was in response to confusion over the location of the line declared by Britain in 1955 (see Section 2.4.2.6, British Declaration line 1955) (Schofield, 1993: Vol.2, p.376).

Indeed, the Blue and Violet lines were beset with legal argument. Saudi Arabia never accepted either of these lines as a definition of its boundary with its southern neighbours, and Britain had doubts about their validity (Schofield, 1994: p.20):

W.E. Beckett, Legal Adviser at the Foreign Office, admits that Britain's defence of the 'Blue' and 'Violet' lines during the Anglo-Saudi frontier negotiations will not stand up in international law, 29 August 1934 (Schofield, 1992: Vol.20, pp.111-2).

In fact, in the 1970s when Saudi Arabia and the Gulf States came to negotiate compromise boundaries they completely ignored the 1913 Blue line. As previously mentioned, the boundary with Qatar was established by the 1965 treaty, the Saudi Arabia-UAE boundary by the 1974 agreement, and the Saudi-Omani boundary by the 1990 agreement (Figure 2.1(A)).

Maps produced by the People's Democratic Republic of Yemen prior to unification with the Yemen Arab Republic in May 1990 show the north-west frontier with Saudi Arabia delimited by the 1914 Violet line (Schofield, 1994: p.24). The unification of Yemen effectively cancelled the southern part of the Violet line, but the central section of the line connects the extreme 1955 British claim with the extreme Saudi 1955 claim. Both claims are discussed in this chapter.

2.4.2.2 Fuad Hamzah Line 1935

Twenty years of tranquillity over the eastern and south-eastern Saudi frontiers followed the Blue and Violet line Conventions of 1913 and 1914. However, in 1934 the issue of
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boundaries arose once again between Saudi Arabia and Britain (acting on behalf of its protégés, Qatar, the Trucial States, Muscat and Oman, and the Aden Protectorate). The cause was a note sent on 28 April 1934 by the British Minister in Jiddah, Sir Andrew Ryan, to the Saudi Arabian Under Secretary for Foreign Affairs, Fuad Bey Hamzah:

The Saudi Arabian Government was informed that the British Government had received from the United States Government an enquiry respecting frontiers in eastern Arabia, and that in reply the British Government had furnished the United States with copies of the Anglo-Turkish Conventions of 1913 and 1914. (MGS, 1955: Vol.1, p.402).

The Saudi reaction was prompt, refuting the Anglo-Turkish Conventions of 1913 and 1914, and negotiations were resumed between Fuad Hamzah (on behalf of Saudi Arabia) and Sir Andrew Ryan (on behalf of Britain). On 3 April 1935 Fuad Hamzah presented Sir Andrew with his proposal:

The Fuad Hamzah line 1935, is setting forth a boundary line between Saudi Arabia and Qatar, and a second line between Saudi Arabia and the various shaikhdoms under British protection in eastern and southern Arabia. The two lines collectively are commonly referred to as “Fuad’s line”. (MGS, 1955: Vol.1, p.406).

In this thesis the line will be referred to as the ‘Hamzah line’ rather than the ‘Fuad Hamzah’ or ‘Fuad Bey Hamzah line’. As previously mentioned, only those parts of the line which coincide with the present Saudi-Yemeni frontier will be discussed. The second part of the Hamzah line as mentioned above, which defined the boundary between Saudi Arabia and the Trucial States, Muscat and Oman, and the Aden Protectorate, was described as follows:

The said line extends from the limits of the land of Kaffat al-Liwa to the point of intersection of longitude 56°E and latitude 22°N. It then runs along the 56th meridian to the point of its intersection with latitude 19°N. It then runs in a straight line to the point of intersection of latitude 17°N and longitude 52°E. Thence it runs west a straight line along the 17th parallel to its intersection with longitude 46°E. From this point it runs in the same direction until it intersects the line known as the Violet line (MGS, 1955: Vol.1, p.407) (Figure 2.4(A) shows the full line).

The basis of the Hamzah line was which tribes paid zakat and were obedient to the call of the Saudi Government in times of war (Jihad) (MGS, 1955: Vol.2: pp.22 and 37-8). However, geographical features were used to describe the Saudi frontier with Qatar and the Trucial States, and the remainder of the Hamzah line follows lines of longitude and
latitude until it meets the centre of the Violet line on the frontier with the Imamate of Yemen (Wilkinson, 1991: p.190).

The British Government refused to accept the Hamzah line and six days after it had been proposed, on 9 April 1935, the British made their own proposal, sometimes referred to as the ‘Green line’. Two months later in June 1935 the British made a second proposal known as the ‘Brown line’ (MGS, 1955: Vol.1, pp.407-8). Both lines lie to the east of the 1913 Blue line. They are not shown on Figure 2.4(A) because they are not relevant to the present Saudi-Yemeni frontier.

More recently as the Saudi boundaries with Qatar, the UAE, and Oman have been established, the Hamzah line has been largely ignored. The only section of the Hamzah line still in use can be seen on Saudi maps (for example, MPMR-KSA, 1983. Arabian Peninsula map; Bundagi, 1984, KSA Geographical Map) beginning at Habarout close to the Oman-Yemen boundary and running along latitude 17°N coincident with the 1955 Saudi Declaration line to the point 48°E, 17°N (Figure 2.4(A)).

The author considers the Hamzah line to be the extreme Saudi claim in this part of the present Saudi-Yemeni frontier. (Figure 2.4(A)).

2.4.2.3 The Riyadh Line 1935

Seven months after the Hamzah line proposal, on 25 November 1935, Sir Andrew Ryan presented a new British proposal which became known as ‘Ryan’s line’ or the ‘Riyadh line’ because it was presented to the Saudis in Riyadh (Schofield, 1993: Vol.2 p.148). The term ‘Riyadh line’ will be used in this thesis to avoid confusion with the 1949 Umm Al-Samim-Rayyan line.

That part of the Riyadh line which involves the present Saudi-Yemeni frontier is described in a note handed by Ryan to Fuad Bey, Acting Saudi Minister for Foreign Affairs on 25 November 1935:

5. A straight line from key-point J [the intersection of meridian 55°E and parallel 22°30’N] to the intersection of the same meridian, 55°E, with parallel 20°N (key-point G).
6. A line from key-point G to the intersection of meridian 52°E with parallel 19°N (key-point H), drawn approximately straight, but so as to leave Sabkhat Mijora to Saudi Arabia and the Ramlat Mughsin to Muscat and Oman.

7. A straight line from key-point H to the intersection of parallel 18°N with the line known as the “Violet line” (Schofield, 1993: Vol.2, p.148) (Figure 2.4(A) shows the full line).

The Riyadh line proposal represented a big concession in the British position regarding the location of the frontier, a position which they had previously held so tenaciously.

The 1935 Riyadh line, the most generous concession on the Violet line Britain ever offered officially to Saudi Arabia in the course of the inconclusive 1934-55 frontier negotiations. (Schofield, 1994: p.20)

However, there is a discrepancy between descriptions of the Riyadh line in British and Saudi texts. The difference is to be found in Clause 6 of Ryan’s note which is presented in Saudi sources as:

A line running from key point G to the intersection of longitude 53°E and latitude 19°N ... (MGS. 1955: Vol.1, p.142).

British sources quote Clause 6 as follows:

A line from key point G to the intersection of meridian 52°E, with parallel 19°N ... (Schofield, 1993: Vol.2, p.148).

The discrepancy works to the advantage of the country from which the source comes. In other words, the use of 53°E rather than 52°E as the point of intersection, as quoted in the Saudi text, places more territory on the Saudi side of the line. Figure 2.4(A) shows the difference between the position of the line using the Saudi and British sources. The author was unable to find any reason for the difference in the meridians used. This discrepancy also affects the position of the 1937 Aden Government Concession line which was based on the Riyadh line (see Section 2.4.2.4).

It is worth drawing attention to the varying levels of accuracy used by the treaties and boundary negotiators in the history of the Saudi-Yemeni dispute. Some, for example the Riyadh line and the Aden Concession Line, use only degrees of latitude and longitude (eg 19°N), most were measured to greater accuracy (eg 26°E14'), but none give seconds.
According to Adler (1995: p.20) the assumed accuracy of such figures is considerable, but rarely are their implications recognised in boundary treaties:

In geographical co-ordinates given as latitude 35°20'N and longitude 55°10'E, the implied accuracy estimate is +/-0.5' or +/-30". Remembering that 1 second of arc is equal to approximately 30m on the earth's surface, the estimated accuracy is +/-900m in each coordinate or +/-1,273m in position. (Adler, 1995: p.20)

The Saudi Government turned down the Riyadh line:

Fuad Hamzah pointed out that the British offer was unsatisfactory ... (MGS, 1955: Vol.1, p.412)

Despite this, the Riyadh line was quite helpful in the negotiation of the Saudi boundaries with Qatar, the UAE, and Oman. A section of the Riyadh line was used to link the Oman-Saudi Arabia-Yemen tripoint with the Violet line on maps produced by both the former People's Democratic Republic of Yemen and Britain to show the former south Yemen-Saudi Arabia boundary (Schofield, 1994: p.24).

The Riyadh line is a further example of the use of geometric boundaries in southern Arabia.

2.4.2.4 The Aden Government Concession Line 1937

Following Ryan's 1935 Riyadh line proposal and Saudi dissatisfaction with it, the British Government wanted to review the frontier negotiations and reach an agreement with the Saudi Government as quickly as possible. On 4 March 1937 Mr W. Ormsby-Gore of the Colonial Office wrote to the Resident in Aden:

... it is desirable that every endeavour should be made to reach agreement as quickly as possible on the question of these disputed frontiers. ... it has been suggested that the position of the frontier negotiations should be reviewed, and that consideration should be given to the question whether some further concession cannot be made towards meeting King Ibn Saud's claims both in the more northern area and in the Aden Protectorate Zone. So far as the Protectorate is concerned, I shall be obliged if you will consider whether, in the light of this dispatch, some additional concession might not be made in the area between parallels 17 and 18, particularly to the west of meridian 51. (Schofield, 1992: Vol.20: pp.151-2)

The concession line (shown in Figure 2.4(A)) was proposed in these terms:

...a 20-mile [wide] strip would be conceded to the Saudi Government running parallel to and south of the Riyadh line for 300 miles between meridian 48 and meridian 52 (Schofield, 1993: Vol.2, p.156).
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The concession covered around 6,000 square miles of desert. The British Foreign Office was convinced that Ibn Saud would not be interested in such a proposal and the subject was therefore never broached with Saudi Arabia and the official Saudi reaction therefore never discovered (Wilkinson, 1991: p.215). It is possible that the Saudis might have agreed to the Concession line and a potential opportunity was therefore lost.

The 1937 Aden Government Concession line was based on geographical features as it ran approximately along the irregular southern edge of the Rub' Al-Khali where the sand dunes give way to flat sand and gravel plain (Figure 5.3(A)). Figure 2.4(A) shows the exact position of the Concession line. It was the only British proposal which concerned the present Saudi-Yemeni frontier with no reference to the south-eastern frontiers, and as such it might be of assistance in the negotiation of a compromise Saudi-Yemeni boundary.

2.4.2.5 Umm Al-Samim-Rayyan Line 1949

In 1949 the Aden Government, backed by the Colonial Office, discussed yet another boundary proposal. This proposal became known as the Umm Al-Samim-Rayyan line as it ran south-west from the Umm Al-Samim sabkha to Jabal Al-Rayyan. It is also sometimes known as the median line, but it will be referred to as the Umm Al-Samim-Rayyan line in this thesis. The Umm Al-Samim-Rayyan line is described in a letter from the Governor of Aden to the Secretary of State for the Colonies, A. Creech Jones, dated 28 November 1949:

... the “Um as Samim - direction of Raiyan line” cuts the Violet line at about 48°E: 17°30'N; and as the pivot of the line at its western end in the vicinity of Raiyan [Jabal Al-Rayyan] ... (Schofield, 1993: Vol.2, p.235; Figure 2.4(A) shows this line).

The line delimited the Saudi frontier with western Oman and the Aden Protectorate, running from 56°E 21°30'N at the Umm Al-Samim sabkha in the north-east to Jabal Al-Rayyan which lies north of Radm Al-Amir (Figure 2.4(A)). The western part of the Umm Al-Samim-Rayyan line was based on tribal boundaries, but the eastern section follows the
edge of the Rub' Al-Khali. However, the proposal was never fully accepted by all concerned departments in the Colonial Office and was therefore never submitted to the Saudi Government (Schofield, 1992: Vol.20, p.xxi).

Although the western section of the 1949 Umm Al-Samim-Rayyan line is in the present Saudi-Yemeni frontier area, it is not helpful to negotiations regarding a compromise boundary as most of it lies further north than the extreme British claim of 1955 (see Section 2.4.2.6). Furthermore, the successful Omani-Saudi boundary negotiations of 1990 significantly ignored the Umm Al-Samim-Rayyan line.

2.4.2.6 British Declaration Line 1955

The British Declaration of 4 August 1955 was the first proposal regarding the boundary between Saudi Arabia and the Aden Protectorate to disregard the 1914 Violet line. It is known as both the 'British Declaration line' and the 'modified Riyadh (Ryan) line'. It will be referred to in this thesis as the 1955 British Declaration line to avoid confusion with the 1935 Riyadh line. Contrary to the remarks of both Schofield (1994: p.22) and Wilkinson (1991: p.320) that it was, in effect, the Riyadh line, the 1955 British Declaration line was very different from the Riyadh line, particularly along the present Saudi-Yemeni frontier which is the subject of this thesis. That part of the British Declaration line concerning the present Saudi-Yemeni frontier is quoted in a letter from the British Embassy at Jiddah to the Saudi Ministry for Foreign Affairs, dated 4 August 1955:

(b) From Umm al Zamul southwards and south-westwards the boundary of Muscat and Oman is a line joining the following points: Umm al Zamul to 22°N, 55°40'E, to 20°N, 55°E, to 19°N 52°E. At this point the line meets the boundary of the Eastern Aden Protectorate which runs from there along the southern fringe of the sand dunes on the general lines of the following co-ordinates: 18°48'N 51°03'E, 18°10'N 48°20'E. Thence it runs due south west to the boundary of Yemen. (Schofield, 1992: Vol.20, pp.206-7) (Figure 2.4(A) shows the full line).

The 1955 British Declaration line therefore defined the Aden Protectorate-Saudi Arabia frontier as starting from 19°N 52°E and running through 18°48'N 51°03'E to 18°10'N 48°20'E, from where it ran south-west to the boundary with the Imamate of Yemen (Figure 2.4(A)). By comparison, the 1935 Riyadh line defined the Aden Protectorate-
Saudi Arabia frontier as starting from the same point, 19°N 52°E, but from there running in a straight line to the intersection of latitude 18°N with the Violet line (Figure 2.4(A)).

The western part of the British Declaration line was based on perceived tribal boundaries (Wilkinson, 1991: p.320). However, because like nearly all the other proposals the British Declaration line included the Saudi south-eastern boundaries. Saudi-British argument was concentrated on the Buraimi zone. Once again the proposal was not accepted by the Saudi Government (Wilkinson, 1991: pp.320-1; Schofield, 1993: Vol.2, pp.347-9).

However, concerning negotiations with Qatar, the UAE, and Oman, the 1955 British Declaration line was the most helpful of all the proposals. The author also considers the line as representing the extreme British claim along the former Aden Protectorate-Saudi Arabia section of the frontier. In a Foreign Office memorandum dated 22 March 1961, Mr K.H. Jones confirmed that the British Declaration line, especially that part along the Aden Protectorate-Saudi Arabia frontier, was in Saudi territory:

... we could make the 'bloodless concession' to the Saudis that co-ordinate 18°10'N 48°20'E - declared to them on August 4, 1955 as the terminal point of one stretch of the Aden Protectorate boundary - is in fact well inside Saudi Arabia (Schofield, 1992: Vol.20, p.225).

Figure 2.4(A) shows the intersection 18°10'N 48°20'E which is the furthest point claimed by Britain into Saudi territory.

2.4.2.7 Saudi Declaration Line 1955

Two and a half months after the British Declaration of August 1955 the Saudi Ministry of Foreign Affairs sent a note to the British Embassy in Jiddah on 18 October 1955 with the following declaration of their own:

4. With regard to the region which lies south of latitude 19° North, His Majesty's Government and the territories of the rulers for whom the British Government are entitled to set should start at the point 19° North 56° East; the frontier should then run to the point 17° North 52° East and thence westwards along latitude 17° North until it reaches longitude 48° East; thence it should run through the point at 16° North 46° East to the Yemen border. (Schofield, 1993: Vol.2, p.349)
In fact, in the east, the 1955 Saudi Declaration line was coincident with the 1935 Hamzah line, until the point 17°N 48°E. To the west of this point the line represented a new Saudi point of view on the delimitation of the boundary between the Violet line and Jabal Al-Thar where the line met the boundary with the Imamate of Yemen (see Section 2.4.1, Former Imamate of Yemen-Saudi Arabia non-Treaty section).

The central and western parts of the Saudi Declaration are the most important Saudi proposals concerning the present Saudi-Yemeni frontier east of the Treaty of Taif boundary (Figure 2.4(A)), and the Declaration was the last proposal involving the present Saudi-Yemeni frontier until the British withdrew from Yemen in 1967.

In general the lines mentioned above are geometric boundaries, geometric lines joining either points of intersection of longitude and latitude, or natural features:

*Geometric* boundaries are usually formed by a series of straight line segments linking fixed boundary points, or, alternatively, are based squarely upon lines of longitude and latitude (Boggs, 1940: p.26).

These lines do not, however, coincide with either tribal features or natural boundaries.

The disputed area of the former Imamate of Yemen-Saudi Arabia non-Treaty section of the frontier is bounded to the north by the line shown on the MPMR-KSA (1983) Arabian Peninsula map and to the south by the line shown on the MSD-SAR (1967) Yemen Arab Republic map (Figure 2.2(A)). Along the former Aden Protectorate-Saudi Arabia frontier the disputed area is bounded to the north by the British Declaration line of 4 August 1955 and to the south by the Saudi Declaration line of 18 October 1955.

As has already been seen in this chapter, the historical development of the present Saudi-Yemeni frontier to the east of the 1934 Treaty of Taif boundary varies along its length. As this part of the frontier is the principle subject of this thesis, the author has classified it into three sectors for detailed study:
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Western Study Sector

The former Yemen Arab Republic (former Imamate of Yemen)-Saudi Arabia frontier to the east of the Treaty of Taif boundary. This is the area bounded between the line shown the MSD-SAR (1967) Yemen Arab Republic map and the line shown on the Saudi Ministry of Petroleum and Mineral Resources (1983) Arabian Peninsula map which includes part of the 1955 Saudi Declaration line (see Figure 1.5(A) and Chapter 3). The characteristics of the Western Study Sector are:

1. The 1934 Treaty of Taif mentions this sector and states that tribal boundaries should form the basis for the location of the boundary between the Kingdom of Saudi Arabia and the Yemeni Kingdom in this sector (see Section 2.4.1).

2. The two countries involved in this sector were Saudi Arabia and the former Imamate of Yemen which became the former North Yemen on 26 September 1962.

3. There are no British proposals concerned with this sector.

4. There are two formal checkpoints in the sector: a Saudi checkpoint located just to the north of the sector and a Yemeni checkpoint near the northern edge of the sector.

Central Study Sector

The western part of the former South Yemen (former Aden Protectorate)-Saudi Arabia frontier. This area falls between the western part of the 1955 British Declaration line and the 1955 Saudi Declaration line in the same section of the frontier (see Figure 1.5(A) and Chapter 4). The characteristics of the Central Study Sector are:

1. The former North Yemen-South Yemen-Saudi Arabia tripoint at Radm Al-Amir is at the western extremity of this sector.

2. The 1914 Violet line runs through this sector.

3. A number of historical Saudi and British proposals involve this sector.
4 This sector was the scene of fighting between the armies of Saudi Arabia and the former South Yemen at Al-Wadi’ah (just to the north of the sector on the Saudi side of the frontier) in 1969.

5 There are no checkpoints in this sector.

Eastern Study Sector

The eastern part of the former South Yemen (former Aden Protectorate)-Saudi Arabia frontier. The sector is bounded by those sections of the 1955 British and Saudi Declaration lines between the Central Study Sector and the Oman-Yemen boundary. (see Figure 1.5(A) and Chapter 5). The characteristics of the Eastern Study Sector are:

1 There have been more historical proposals involving this sector than any other sector of the frontier.

2 The sector includes the disputed Oman-Saudi Arabia-Yemen tripoint.

3 There is an informal Saudi checkpoint located just to the north of the sector at Al-Kharkhir.

The factors which have an effect on the location of a logical boundary, which were mentioned in Chapter 1, will be examined for each of these study sectors to assist the search for a solution to the Saudi-Yemeni boundary dispute.

2.5 The Maritime Boundary

The principle motivation for partition of the oceans is often the quest for offshore hydrocarbons. However, maritime boundary delimitation is useful for coastal states to determine the extent of their jurisdiction in their territorial waters, continental shelf, and Exclusive Economic Zone (EEZ) (Blake, 1987: p.121).

In 1996 the only agreement which had so far been concluded in the Red Sea, where there are nine states with potential maritime boundaries, was that between Sudan and Saudi Arabia in 1974 (Blake, 1987: p.124).
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As yet there is no agreement concerning the Saudi-Yemeni maritime boundary. However, the fourth clause of the Saudi-Yemeni Memorandum of Understanding states:

A joint committee will be formed which will negotiate on determining the sea border in accordance with international law, starting from the border point on the Red Sea coast mentioned in Clause 2 above (SWB, 1995: p.15).

The maritime boundary could form the topic for another thesis. As the main focus of this thesis is the Saudi-Yemeni land frontier beyond the 1934 Treaty of Taif boundary, this section will present only a summary of the Saudi-Yemeni maritime boundary by examining the main factors involved.

2.5.1 THE 1934 TREATY OF TAIF

The maritime boundary is affected by the text of the 1934 Treaty of Taif because the Treaty describes the location of the border mark on the Red Sea coast. Saudi Arabia and Yemen have different interpretations of the position of this 'Tehama border mark Number (1)' which is described in the Treaty as 'All the sea quay Ras Almiwaj of Radeef Qarad outlet' (Schofield, 1993: Vol.2, p.446). There are clearly serious problems of understanding what the original Arabic text said; the translation does not make sense. The Saudis interpret this location as the south of Duwayyimah Island, whilst the Yemenis interpret it as the north of the island (Figure 2.5(A)) (MPMR-KSA, 1990b, Tracing on Jaza'ir Farasan map).

Because of the vague description of the location of border marks in the Treaty (see Section 2.3), Saudi Arabia and Yemen disagreed on the location of the border mark on the Red Sea shore. As the maritime boundary should also start from this point on the shore, the delimitation of the maritime boundary is affected by this dispute (Figure 2.5(A)).

2.5.2 ISLANDS IN THE DISPUTED ZONE

There are a number of islands in the maritime area disputed between Saudi Arabia and Yemen (Figure 2.5(A)). The islands in question are (local names are given in brackets):
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Zahrat ‘Ashiq (Small ‘Ashiq), Al-Unsurat (As Siya), Nakal (Ruba), Zamhar (Sumary),
Barri (North), Rafa Barri (Rafa North), Duhanan, Ardyan. Fasht, Duqaylah, Buklan,
Manahis. Umm al Hummad. Tawq (or Atwaq), Rukuda (Abu-Arwr), Hashish Reef
(Dadefor), and Al-Bayda.

Al-Muwaled (1993) wrote about the delimitation of Saudi’s maritime boundaries in
his PhD thesis (see Section 1.8.2.2). However, considerable further fieldwork is needed
to study these islands from a number of aspects, particularly hydrocarbon and other
economic potential especially fisheries; population size, nationality, and interaction; and
defacto ownership.

2.5.3 YEMENI OIL CONCESSIONS IN THE DISPUTED ZONE

Yemeni oil exploration in the Red Sea is more active than that of the Saudis. Yemeni
exploration began in the area in 1953 when the West German firm Deilmann Bergbau
signed an agreement with the former North Yemen Government to carry out prospecting
work in a coastal area north of Al-Hudaydah. But the German exploration was cut short
in 1955 as a licence covering 40,000km² in almost the identical area was awarded to an
American firm, Yemen Development Corporation, which withdrew a few years later

In 1959 the American Overseas Investment Corporation was awarded a concession
of 10,000 km² on the Tehama coastal plain and in the adjacent waters, but it did not drill
any wells. In 1962 the Mecom Company was awarded the concession for the same zone
and drilled four wells at Salif, Zaidiya, and Al-Hudaydah (Figure 2.6(A)). The drilling
stopped due to the civil war in Yemen in 1962. Yemen then set up two joint ventures to
carry out oil operations; in 1964 the Yemen Fuel Company was established in partnership
with Egypt, and in 1970 Yemen joined forces with Algeria’s Sonatrach to form Yominco.
This company was dissolved in 1972 and replaced in 1973 with the Yemen Petroleum
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Following this period a number of companies were awarded exploration licences in the Red Sea, but these were relinquished when no oil or gas finds were made. In 1974 Yemen Shell Exploration was awarded a licence for a 19,000km² offshore zone between the port of Al-Hudaydah and the Saudi frontier. The licence was relinquished in 1981. In 1984 Hunt Oil signed an exploration agreement for 12,955km² in the same zone, 49% of which it farmed out to Elf Aquitaine of France in 1986. In July 1987 Elf drilled a well 6,100 feet deep, Al-Meethaq-1 (Figure 2.6(A)), but then pulled out of the zone as the well was dry. In February 1988 Hunt Oil drilled a second offshore exploration well, Al-Meethaq-2 (Figure 2.6(A)), but this was also dry and Hunt Oil also decided to relinquish the licence. In 1984 British Petroleum was awarded a 22,000km² tract on the Tehama coastal plain, but the company relinquished the licence in 1990 (AOG Directory, 1993: p.500).

All these companies, the West German firm Deilmann Bergbau (1953), Yemen Development Corporation (1955), American Overseas Investment Corporation (1959), Mecom Company (1962), Yemen Fuel Company (1964), Yominco (1970), Yemen Petroleum Company (1973), Yemen Shell Exploration (1974), Hunt Oil (1984), Elf Aquitaine (1986), and British Petroleum (1990), all relinquished their concessions on the Yemen coastal plain and in the adjacent waters primarily because of disappointing survey results and a failure to discover oil or gas (AOG Directory, 1993: p.500). All this activity was far from the disputed area and no objections were therefore raised by the Saudis.

British Petroleum returned to offshore operations in the Red Sea and became the only company to drill a well close to the disputed zone on the Saudi-Yemeni maritime frontier when it was awarded Block 23, part of which is located in the zone. The block was a 13,040km² tract around Antufash Island, 120km north of Al-Hudaydah (Figure 2.6(A)). It had been relinquished by Hunt Oil in March 1989 after they had drilled two dry wells. The concession was for a six-year period beginning in October 1990. The BP well, known as Antufash (Figure 2.6(A)) was drilled in November 1992 to a depth of
2.075m. Figure 2.6(A) shows the location of the well and that part of Block 23 which is in the disputed area. The Saudi Government sent a letter to British Petroleum during the seismic survey in March 1992 warning the company that it should cease operations as it was in the disputed zone. Operations in the area were suspended, the Antufash well was plugged and BP officially abandoned it in April 1993 (AOG Directory, 1993: p.508).

On the Saudi side there were optimistic reports long ago that oil would be found on the Farasan Islands which are located outside the disputed zone in the Red Sea. A report on the oil-bearing concessions in the Farasan Islands by Arthur Wade, dated 21 December 1912 states:

Summing up therefore, one can only say, that so far as one can tell by a surface inspection of oozing petroleum and geological indications, everything is favourable to the occurrence of commercial quantities of oil on the Farsan Islands (Schofield, 1993: Vol.6: p.399).

But over the following years the results of oil operations on the Farasan Islands have not been successful. As F.G. Starling of the Petroleum Department wrote to the Under Secretary of State for the Foreign Office on 21 June 1933:

The Farsan Islands have been investigated by the Shell Group (Red Sea Petroleum Company), who at one time obtained a concession there and superseded the Eastern and General Syndicate. The Shell Company drilled without success and abandoned operations in 1930. A reply has now been received from Shell stating that they are not interested in the matter. The Anglo-Persian Oil Company have replied that they are not interested in any concession over the Farsan Islands ... (Schofield, 1993: Vol.6, p.460).

On 10 July 1936 Saudi Arabia announced in *Umm-al-Qura* newspaper that an agreement had been signed with the representative of Petroleum Concessions Limited for oil extraction in the area:

... the area of the concession was the whole Red Sea coasts of Saudi Arabia, to a depth of 100 kilom., including the Farsan and other islands and other territorial waters, with the exception of the stretch between Rabigh and Lith (Schofield, 1993: Vol.6, pp.559-60).

Although Saudi exploratory operations over the following years have been outside the disputed zone, this does not mean that there is no hydrocarbon potential in the area. The Saudi Government has not given any concessions in the disputed area. There is no data
available on the volume of hydrocarbons in the disputed zone; even for the 1992 British Petroleum well, Antufash, which is close to the disputed zone the only available data is the depth, location, and type of well (Figure 2.6(A)). In general, however, it is possible to say that the area of the Red Sea which has been explored by Saudi Arabia and Yemen is not as rich in hydrocarbon deposits as the Arabian Gulf, as most of the companies which have had concessions have been disappointed.

The solution to the Saudi-Yemeni maritime boundary dispute lies in finding a compromise to the location of the border mark on the island of Duwayyimah (Figure 2.5(A)), followed by agreement over the ownership of the islands lying in the disputed zone. The two countries only then need to decide which method should be used to delimit the maritime boundary.

2.6 Conclusion

By signing the Saudi-Yemeni Memorandum of Understanding on 26 February 1995, both countries agreed to renew the 1934 Treaty of Taif. In Clauses 2, 3, and 4 of the Memorandum it was agreed to set up two joint committees to deal with the Saudi-Yemeni boundary including that part already delimited by the 1934 Treaty of Taif, the undelimited land frontier, and the maritime boundary (SWB, 1995: p.15).

Along the Treaty of Taif boundary the joint committee’s task will be to re-establish the border marks in accordance with the border reports appended to the Treaty. The author recommended such action in 1991 in his Master’s thesis, The Saudi-Yemeni Boundary According to the Treaty of Taif 1934. As the two countries have followed this recommendation of the 1991 study, the author hopes that further advantages will be gained by Saudi Arabia and Yemen from the present study which focuses on the undelimited frontier to the east of the Treaty of Taif boundary.
The committee which is responsible for re-establishing the Treaty of Taif border marks will also decide on the measures required to demarcate the remainder of the territorial boundary (SWB, 1995: p.15). The frontier beyond the Treaty boundary has been divided by the author into the Western Study Sector, Central Study Sector, and Eastern Study Sector as Figure 1.5(A) shows, each study sector having different characteristics as has been previously mentioned.

Some British authors have rated the chances of various historical boundary proposals being used as the basis for the Saudi-Yemeni frontier to the east of the Treaty boundary. Schofield (1994: p.25) regards the likelihood of an agreed boundary in the Southern Peninsula being based on the 1935 Hamzah line as extremely slim. Wilkinson (1991: p.364), on the other hand, mentions the use of the British Declaration line as a possible boundary.

It is, however, unrealistic to suggest the use of historical proposals without examining other factors such as the de facto border, hydrocarbon potential and other economic opportunities, tribal boundaries, the distribution of population, and population interaction between the two states. It is these factors which the author will consider in the following chapters to assist the determination of a logical Saudi-Yemeni boundary which may, or may not, coincide with historical proposals (see Chapters 3, 4, and 5).

The key to a Saudi-Yemeni maritime boundary solution is agreement on the location of the border point on the Red Sea coast. The possibility of a trade-off involving the islands should be considered, along with a Joint Development Zone in the event of hydrocarbons being discovered.
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MAPS

British Survey (1927) Jaza’ir Farasan; Red Sea; Saudi Arabia. Scale 1:200,000. U.K.


Chapter 3

The Western Study Sector

3.1 Introduction

The Western Study Sector covers the former Yemen Arab Republic (former Imamate of Yemen)-Saudi Arabia frontier to the east of the 1934 Treaty of Taif boundary. The sector is enclosed to the south by the extreme Saudi claim represented by the line shown on the MPMR-KSA (1983) Arabian Peninsula map (see Section 2.4.1) (which coincides with part of the 1955 Saudi Declaration line (see Section 2.4.2.7)), and to the north by the extreme Yemeni claim represented by the line shown on the MSD-SAR (1967) Yemen Arab Republic map (see Section 2.4.1). The sector is approximately located between 17°30'N, 15°30'N and 44°00'E, 46°30'E (Figure 3.1). There are five provinces which border the Western Study Sector: the Saudi province of Najran, and the Yemeni governorates of Marib, Sa‘dah, San‘a’, and Shubwah. Figure 3.2 shows the terms which will be used in this chapter to describe the different parts of the Western Study Sector frontier.

Several factors make this study sector of the Saudi-Yemeni frontier more important than either of the other sectors. These include the fact that it is adjacent to the eastern extremity of the 1934 Treaty of Taif boundary, the existence of oil fields in the south of the sector, a relatively large population, and a number of checkpoints. Most significantly, some people of Saudi nationality live under Yemeni control in this region.
Figure 3.1: Location of the Western Study Sector showing adjacent administrative divisions

Source: Bundagji 1984 (Saudi Map); Al-Farra 1980 (Yemeni Atlas)
Figure 3.2: Terms used to describe the frontier in the Western Study Sector

Source: Author's Field Survey October - December 1994
3.2 Geographical Features

According to Drysdale and Blake writing of the land boundaries of the Middle East and North Africa:

About 35 percent of the boundary lines in the region are physiographic, chiefly following rivers, wadis, and watersheds. (Drysdale and Blake, 1985: p.81)

The study of the geographical features in this sector is very important because here the frontier was established using geographical features. This section examines the geology, relief, water resources, and climate of the sector.

3.2.1 GEOLOGY, RELIEF, AND WATER RESOURCES

There are two principal groups of geological formations in the Western Study Sector. The first group consists of pre-Permian granite and grandiorite which are most pronounced in the west of the sector where they constitute an extension of the Sarowet Mountains (Figure 3.3(A)) (GMAQ-KSA, 1979). This granite and grandiorite has created strong relief consisting of mountains and wadis as Figure 3.3(A) shows. The maximum height of the mountains is approximately 2,000m. Jabal Barat (jabal is the Arabic term for a hill or mountain, or a range of either) is the most important of the relief features in this sector as there are several wells and cultivated wadis on its slopes in which grapes, figs, coffee beans and tobacco have been planted. These wadis are Wadi Salba, Wadi Sayh, Wadi Amlah, Wadi Al-'Atfayn, Wadi Ablaj, and Wadi Khabb. The second group of geological structures in this sector consists of Permian and pre-Permian Wajid Sandstone. In the south-east of this sector there are a number of long, nearly parallel, sharp-crested, narrow sand ridges and dune chains, separated by sandy plains (GMAQ-KSA, 1979). The major wadi in this sector is Wadi Al-Jawf which is approximately six kilometers in length and two kilometers wide. It is one of the best wadis in Yemen in agricultural terms because of an abundance of water which originates from the flood-flow of the Wadis Amran and Qamar south of Sa'dah, and the Jabal Barat (Al-Thawr, 1985: p.393; Swiss Technical
Co-operation Service, 1978: p.1/4). In the west of the Western Study Sector there are also several plains (Figure 3.3(A)), namely May'in, Al-Hazm, Al-Ham in Wadi Al-Jawf and the Khabb plain. On the Khabb and Al-Jawf plains groundwater is at a depth of about five metres (Al-Thawr, 1985: p.391).

In the Wadi Al-Jawf and Jabal Al-Rayyan areas there are also sabkhas (salt encrusted flats where evaporites are commonly found, Monkhouse and Small (1978: p.256)). In the past, sabkha was considered as evidence of the presence of hydrocarbons (Al-Thawr, 1985: p.392). Oil exploration teams also relied on other perceptible signs - such as the seepage of oil or gas - to lead them to a reservoir. However, advances in technology have since allowed exploration teams to go beyond such basic methods of exploration to enable the location of reservoirs where no obvious signs of them exist. Seismic survey currently provides the most effective method for finding and mapping underground reservoirs (Watkins, 1993: p.18).

There is a possibility of using a geographical feature in this sector, namely Jabal Barat, as a basis for delimiting the boundary. This mountain range is located in the south of the Western Study Sector, near to the extreme Saudi claim (Figure 3.3(A)).

In any discussion about the Saudi-Yemeni frontier, water resources should be second only in significance to oil.

By the [year] 2000 water not oil will be the dominant resource issue in the Middle East. (Agnew and Anderson, 1992: p.47)

It is therefore vital to examine at transboundary water resource issues in the Western Study Sector. The most significant cultivated land is Wadi Al-Jawf in the south of the sector, and a few of the wadis on Jabal Barat. In the mountains in the west of the sector there are fresh-water wells. These are dug wells, usually lined either with man-made blocks, or stones, cemented together. Most of these wells are old, some of them having been constructed over 100 years ago. On the plains in this sector there are sabkhas and wadis where the water is saline and deep wells are drilled (Al-Thawr, 1985: p.391). Table
3.1 shows some of the water wells drilled in the north beyond the sector on the Saudi side of the frontier by the Saudi Ministry of Agriculture (Figure 3.3(A)).

Table 3.1 Water wells drilled on the Saudi side adjacent to the Western Study Sector

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Location of Wells</th>
<th>Depth (m)</th>
<th>Geologic Time</th>
<th>Water Production gallons/min</th>
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</thead>
<tbody>
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<td>200</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Al-Khadra (2)</td>
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<td>420</td>
</tr>
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<td>Al-Khadra (3)</td>
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<tr>
<td>Khbash</td>
<td>79.4</td>
<td>Permian</td>
<td>185</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

*Source: Ministry of Agriculture Archive (1994)*

Such wells are the only source of drinking water on the Saudi side. The exact location of the aquifer in relation to the frontier is unknown, but the depth of water and the level of water production is good evidence of the relative accessibility of water in this area, compared to the Central Study Sector where the water table is over 1,000m deep in the vicinity of Sharurah. This will undoubtedly have an effect on the resolution of the boundary, as water resources are an important bargaining point if trade-offs are to be made and a compromise boundary agreed. For this reason it will be important to determine the exact location of the aquifer in relation to the frontier, and if necessary agree a groundwater treaty in order to avoid problems relating to water resources arising between Saudi Arabia and Yemen in the future.

3.2.2 CLIMATE

The migration of the Anaza, Rowalla and Shammar tribes in the northern borderland of Saudi Arabia is affected by the climate: they move to pasture and water during the winter and spring (Asadallah, 1971: p.17). However, on the frontier between Saudi Arabia and Yemen, especially in the Western Study Sector, the Saudi and Yemeni border guards do not allow shepherds in the frontier area for security reasons (Saudi Border Guard, 1994).
Figure 3.4: Average maximum daily temperatures at Najran meteorological station for 1992 and 1993

Source: Saudi Statistical Yearbook, 1992-3
The nearest meteorological station to the Western Study Sector is in Wadi Najran in Najran province, which borders the sector. The climate in this sector is basically a desert climate, with hot summers and cool winters. Figure 3.4 shows the average daily maximum temperatures for each month in Najran province over two years; spring and summer temperatures reach 38°C, decreasing to 23°C in the winter. The most important question with regard to frontier crossings is whether the high summer temperatures have an effect on the number of crossings made. The Saudi Immigration Office gave a clear answer to this question; the number of people crossing is only affected by the the timing of the pilgrimage (hajj) and public holidays, and the periods during which the Saudi government allows the frontier tribes certain privileges. These privileges will be discussed in the following section.

3.2.3 RIGHTS AND PRIVILEGES OF FRONTIER TRIBES

In the 1934 Treaty of Taif (Article 4), the tribes which were split by the Treaty were given certain privileges concerning freedom to cross the frontier:

... and while the Hadah and Zur Wad’a and the Wailah in Najran belong to Wailah, and except in so far as has been mentioned, do not come within the Saudi Arab Kingdom, this shall not prevent them nor their brothers of Wailah from enjoying mutual relation ... (cited in Schofield, 1992: Vol 20, p.92) [author’s emphasis]

In Arabic, the meaning of 'shall not prevent them' is stronger than in English. The Saudi government therefore gives members of the Wa’ilah tribe of both Saudi and Yemeni nationality more privileges than other tribes on the frontier. The Saudi government also gives privileges to Saudi citizens who live in Wadi Al-‘Atfayn under Yemeni control. There are approximately 5,000 Saudi citizens living in Wadi Al-‘Atfayn (Saudi Immigration Office Records, 1994). The privileges they are allowed are as follows:

a The Saudi government allows members of the Wa’ilah tribe of Yemeni nationality to cross the frontier from Yemen to enter Saudi, but only through the checkpoint in Najran province.
Members of the Wa'ilah tribe of Yemeni nationality crossing the frontier from Yemen are allowed to do so with just a ‘statement’ for identification (Plate 3.1, see Section 2.3.5.1). They are exempt from passport and visa requirements.

Saudi Customs allow members of the Wa'ilah tribe of both Saudi and Yemeni nationality to export a certain quantity of goods tax-free, and the price of the goods is always lower than the market price (see Appendix 4 showing an individual’s duty-free allowance). The duty-free allowance is permitted only every three months. The period is three months because the Saudi Privileges Office estimates three months as the minimum time for the allowance to run out (Saudi Customs, Al-Khadra checkpoint, Author’s field survey, Oct-Dec 1994).

A simple comparison of the national product per capita between Saudi Arabia and Yemen shows the considerable difference which exists between the two countries economically. In 1994 this was US$1,955 for Yemen, whilst in Saudi Arabia it was US$9,510. As an illustration of the relative stability of the two economies a comparison of the exchange rates shows that whilst in Saudi Arabia the rate is US$1:3.74 Saudi Riyals (a rate which has been fixed since 1986), in December 1994 the official Yemeni rate stood at US$1:12.00 Yemeni Riyals, and the market rate was US$1:90 Yemeni Riyals (CIA World Factbook, 1996)

3.2.4 POPULATION DISTRIBUTION

Populations of frontier regions are generally concerned about their future, and that of their property and relatives, especially in cases where a boundary is disputed. The significance of studying population distribution in the Western Study Sector is to recognise the most populous parts of the frontier zone, as the existence of settlements affects the location of the Logical Boundary.

In the absence of any reliable up-to-date population data, the author used the Final Report presented by the Swiss Technical Co-operation Service (STCS) in 1978 to study
the distribution of population on the Yemeni side of the Western Study Sector of the frontier. This report is still the most specific data currently available for the study of population distribution in the eastern region of former North Yemen. The Yemeni Ministry of Development requested a survey from the Swiss government to test the accuracy of the 1976 population census, to elaborate the approximate population figures of those districts in the eastern part of the country which were not reached by the 1976 census, to collect the names of settlements, and to determine the administrative divisions of the country (STCS, 1978: p.viii).

The Swiss team had difficulties in subdividing the population into two main groups; residents and bedouin. They found not only fully sedentary farmers (residents) and permanently migrating cattle breeders (bedouin), but all kinds of organisational forms between these two elementary life styles (STCS, 1978: p.ii-121).

However, the Swiss team decided to use two groups for population distribution in the eastern region of Yemen: residents, meaning farmers, and bedouin (including semi-bedouin).

On the Saudi side, the author used the Saudi Census 1994 together with the Najran map to determine population distribution. The Swiss team’s classification of residents and bedouin was also used.

Figure 3.5(A) shows the distribution of bedouin and residents in the frontier zone, the majority of residents being located in the west of this sector. The Saudis who live under Yemeni control are mostly found in Nahiyat Kitaf because Wadi Al-'Atfayn is located in this nahiyat (sub-governorate, Yemeni administrative area).

The Saudi territorial claim is partly based on the fact that there are people of Saudi nationality living under Yemeni control in the area claimed. In the case of the Yemeni territorial claim, the extreme part of the area claimed is uninhabited.

On the Saudi side, the author gleaned some knowledge about the lifestyle of bedouin during his field survey. In Al-Khadra Emirate the bedouin are living in tents and
follow the grazing seasonally, whilst in the Rijlah Emirate the bedouin are living in permanently-located tents. Most of the bedouin in the Rijlah Emirate are from the Wa’ilah tribe and many own properties on the Yemeni side in Wadi Al-‘Atfayn, Nahiyat Kitaf (for more information about the properties see Section 3.3.1.3). Most of the Wa’ilah tribesmen who live in the Rijlah Emirate have a second wife on the Yemeni side of the frontier in Wadi Al-‘Atfayn.

3.3 Cross-Frontier Interaction

In recent years there has been a strong tendency towards the integration of borderland populations, and much interest in the process by borderland scholars (Martinez, 1994: p.1). In Europe and North America the interaction consists of a flow of people and commerce between places, but in the Middle East the flow is powerfully influenced by political factors (Drysdale and Blake, 1985: p.21). This effect was clear during 1990-1 when, as a result of the Yemeni government’s pro-Iraqi actions and its voting pattern at the UN, Saudi Arabia cut all financial aid and withdrew the residence permits of more than 850,000 Yemeni workers (Arab News, 1992: p.4). As a result of this political action, the level of interaction along the Saudi-Yemeni frontier was greatly reduced. However, it is important to note that cross-frontier interaction of the borderland population (those able to cross the frontier using only a statement) was unaffected during this period.

This section presents the analysis of replies to the author’s structured interview made by respondents crossing the frontier in the Western Study Sector between 1 October and 10 December 1994 (see Section 1.6.2.2). The information requested included the purpose of the crossing; the experience of the checkpoints and the perception of the frontier.
Table 3.2 Nationality, tribe, and residence of respondents interviewed at Al-Khadra checkpoint

<table>
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<tr>
<th>Respondent's Province</th>
<th>Nationality</th>
<th>Settlement</th>
<th>Tribe</th>
<th>Sample Size</th>
<th>Number</th>
<th>%</th>
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(S): on the Saudi side of the frontier; (Y): on the Yemeni side of the frontier
Source: Author's Field Survey, 1 Oct-10 Dec 1994

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Table 3.2 shows that the majority of people crossing the frontier are from the Wa’ilah tribe (65.8%) and are also living in Wadi Al-'Atfayn which is not far (30-40km) from the Al-Khadra checkpoint (Figure 3.6 (A)). Wadi Al-'Atfayn includes several villages belonging to the Wa’ilah tribe. This tribe uses the checkpoint more than any of the other tribes living in the Western Study Sector. There are members of the Wa’ilah tribe of both Saudi and Yemeni nationality living in Wadi Al-'Atfayn. With regard to the crossings made by people from the United Arab Emirates and Qatar, the respondents reside approximately 1,000km from the checkpoint at Al-Khadra. The chief tribes are Al-Kurab, Briak and Al-Manasir.

3.3.1 PURPOSES OF FRONTIER CROSSINGS

Borderland populations cross boundaries for various purposes such as transboundary trade, recreation, migration and attendant social and cultural relationships. Such activities have linked regions of adjoining countries ever closer to one another (Martinez, 1994). The purposes of crossing are often very closely associated. The author noted that during his interviews on the frontier, it was very difficult to prioritise the purposes of crossing the frontier, especially for bedouin and uneducated people. However, the author tried very hard to identify the main purpose of frontier crossings in the Western Study Sector.

In comparison with other nationalities, the Saudis crossing the frontier found it very hard to separate the various purposes from one another, not least because they have relations and properties in both Saudi Arabia and Yemen, and they also make shopping trips to the Saudi side of the frontier. Because most crossings were multi-purpose, the identification of a primary purpose can only be approximate in this thesis.

Table 3.3 shows the various purposes of frontier crossings in the Western Study Sector. 89% of all crossings were for the purpose of visiting relatives. Kinship ties are thus one of the most common reasons for tribal frontier movement in the Western Study Sector (Figure 3.7). Abu-Dawood (1984) found many Yemenis crossing the Saudi
frontier to seek employment in the construction industry. This was probably true along the 1934 Treaty of Taif boundary, especially at Al-Tawal checkpoint, but not in the Western Study Sector at Al-Khadra checkpoint. The majority of Yemenis crossing the frontier have a 'statement' as their means of identification as this is one of the Saudi privileges for people living along the frontier (see Section 2.3.5.1). However, if Yemenis want to work in Saudi Arabia they must have a passport and visa.

Table 3.3  The purposes of frontier crossings of respondents questioned at Al-Khadra checkpoint, classified according to priority

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<th>Purpose of Crossing</th>
<th>Priority</th>
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<td>%</td>
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<tr>
<td>First priority</td>
<td>361</td>
<td>100</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Second priority</td>
<td>--</td>
<td>--</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Other purposes</td>
<td>--</td>
<td>--</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Total</td>
<td>361</td>
<td>100</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Markets</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>First priority</td>
<td>--</td>
<td>--</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Second priority</td>
<td>--</td>
<td>--</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Third priority</td>
<td>247</td>
<td>68.4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Other purposes</td>
<td>114</td>
<td>31.6</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Total</td>
<td>361</td>
<td>100</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Properties</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>First priority</td>
<td>--</td>
<td>--</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Second priority</td>
<td>361</td>
<td>100</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Other purposes</td>
<td>--</td>
<td>--</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Total</td>
<td>361</td>
<td>100</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Grazing and Wells</td>
<td>Other purposes</td>
<td>361</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Total</td>
<td>361</td>
<td>100</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Source: Author's Field Survey, 1 Oct-10 Dec 1994

Table 3.3 also shows the purposes of frontier crossings of the respondents questioned at Al-Khadra checkpoint, classified according to priority. The purpose most frequently stated by Saudis was visiting relatives, followed by visits to properties, and trips to markets. However, as previously mentioned, all the purposes are closely linked to one another. Many Saudi crossings are accounted for by relatives and properties on both sides of the frontier. In these cases the individuals live on both sides of the frontier, having originated from one of several villages in Wadi Al-'Atfayn. Using information from Saudi crossings at Wadi Al-'Atfayn, Saudi Immigration estimates that more than 5,000
Figure 3.7: Purposes of crossing by respondents interviewed at Al-Khadra checkpoint

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Purpose</th>
<th>Saudi</th>
<th>Yemeni</th>
<th>UAE</th>
<th>Qatari</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>RELATIVES</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>MARKETS</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>PROPERTIES</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>GRAZING &amp; WELLS</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Source: Author's Field Survey, October - December 1994
individuals are living under Yemeni control. This situation only exists on this scale on the Saudi-Yemen frontier in the Western Study Sector, although similar situations are found in many other parts of the Middle East as a result of boundary change. In the Golan Heights, for example, there is a population of 15,000 Syrians living in several villages under Israeli control (Harris, 1993: p.86). However, there the comparison ends, as Saudi citizens living in Yemen can visit their relations and property in Saudi Arabia every day if they want to. The Druze population in the Golan Heights, on the other hand, cannot cross the frontier for any purpose.

Table 3.3 also presents the reasons given by the Yemeni respondents at Al-Khadra checkpoint for their frontier crossings, classified according to priority. The most frequently stated purpose was trips to markets in Saudi Arabia, followed by visits to relatives. In the Yemeni cases it was equally difficult to identify the main purpose for crossings. Most of the people in the sample have relatives from the same tribe on the Saudi side of the frontier. In general, they go straight to their relatives for about one week, eat and sleep in the same house and purchase goods in the Najran markets.

The main purpose of frontier crossings made by people from Qatar and the UAE (Table 3.3) was visits to relatives, followed by trips to markets. All of those from Qatar and UAE crossing the frontier had Yemeni wives who lived with their husbands in Qatar or the UAE, and visiting their wives' relatives was the only reason for them to cross the frontier.

The following sections present more details about each purpose of frontier crossing.

3.3.1.1 Visits to Relatives

Alienated borderlands are those in which people are not allowed contact with their relatives on the other side of the boundary and in which the possibility of large-scale violence keeps such unstable areas sparsely populated and underdeveloped. In the past there have been many good examples of alienated borderlands:
... the Scottish-British frontier in the fifteenth and sixteenth centuries, and the USA-Mexico border during most of the nineteenth century. Currently, alienated borderlands are found in the Middle East, Africa, Asia and Eastern Europe. (Martinez, 1994: p.2)

As the boundary in the Western Study Sector is currently formally undelimitcd, the study of the relationships between the tribes on the frontier is very important. Contact between relatives should be allowed across the frontier, and such crossings should be easily facilitated.

Article Four of the 1934 Treaty of Taif states that contact between members of the Wa'ilah and Wada'a tribes on the Saudi and Yemeni sides of the frontier should not be prevented.

Table 3.4 shows more details about respondents interviewed at Al-Khadra checkpoint who were visiting relatives on both sides of the frontier. Substantial numbers of Saudis crossing the frontier have relatives in Yemen in the villages in Wadi Al-'Atfayn (93%). These people have properties (farms, houses, wells, and grazing land) in Wadis Al-Sharifah and Rijlah in Saudi Arabia, and in Wadi Al-'Atfayn under Yemeni control (Figure 3.8(A)). These Saudis cross the frontier because they wish to maintain their properites on both sides of the de facto border and take advantage of the better living conditions on the Saudi side. The majority of Saudis crossing the frontier were from the Al-Swidan, Al-Slah and Al-Qari'a branches of the Wa'ilah tribe (Author's Field Survey, 1 Oct-10 Dec 1994). Yemenis crossing the frontier often have relatives on the Saudi side in Najran province as Table 3.4 shows. These relatives are Saudis from the same branches of the Wa'ilah tribe, namely Al-Abuwjbarah and Al-Hasniyyah (Author's Field Survey, 1 Oct-10 Dec 1994).

The people from the UAE and Qatar crossing the frontier had relatives in the Al-Kurab and Al-Briak branches of the Bul-'Abeid tribe. They all had wives from Yemen who still hold Yemeni nationality (Saudi Immigration Office, 1994; Author's Field Survey, 1 Oct-10 Dec 1994).
Table 3.4  Tribe and settlement of relatives of respondents interviewed at Al-Khadra checkpoint

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Nationality</th>
<th>Province</th>
<th>Settlement</th>
<th>Tribe</th>
<th>Sample</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Saudi</td>
<td>Kitaf (Y)</td>
<td>Wadi Al-'Atfayn</td>
<td>Wa'ilah/Yam</td>
<td>336</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Najran</td>
<td>Najran</td>
<td>Wa'ilah</td>
<td>13</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Najran</td>
<td>Al-'Anisah</td>
<td>Wa'ilah</td>
<td>4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Najran</td>
<td>Al-Swg</td>
<td>Wa'ilah</td>
<td>3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Najran</td>
<td>Dhah</td>
<td>Wa'ilah</td>
<td>3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Najran</td>
<td>Al-Hasyniyah</td>
<td>Wa'ilah</td>
<td>2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Yemeni</td>
<td>Najran</td>
<td>Al-Shari'ah</td>
<td>Wa'ilah</td>
<td>92</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Najran</td>
<td>Najran</td>
<td>Wa'ilah</td>
<td>71</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Najran</td>
<td>Al-'Anisah</td>
<td>Wa'ilah</td>
<td>65</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Najran</td>
<td>Al-Jarbah</td>
<td>Wa'ilah</td>
<td>20</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Najran</td>
<td>Al-Fidh</td>
<td>Wa'ilah</td>
<td>18</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Najran</td>
<td>Al-Swg</td>
<td>Wa'ilah</td>
<td>7</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>No visit to relatives</td>
<td></td>
<td>84</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Total</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>361</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>UAE</td>
<td>Manb (Y)</td>
<td>Manb</td>
<td>Al-Manasir</td>
<td>29</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Manb</td>
<td>Wadi 'Abidh</td>
<td>Al-Kurab</td>
<td>25</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Bihan</td>
<td></td>
<td>Al-Briak</td>
<td>12</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Total</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>66</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Qatan</td>
<td>Manb</td>
<td>Manb</td>
<td>Al-Kurab</td>
<td>27</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Wadi 'Abidh</td>
<td></td>
<td>Al-Briak</td>
<td>17</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Total</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>44</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

(S) on the Saudi side of the frontier
(Y) on the Yemeni side of the frontier

Source: Author's Field Survey, 1 Oct-10Dec 1994

All the nationalities keep in touch with their relatives through overland visits, as this is the only available means of contact. Telephone, post and air travel are not used to contact relatives. Telephones are available in Najran city on the Saudi side of the frontier, but not available in Wadi Al-'Atfayn, for example. The people living in Yemen like to use friends to deliver letters and goods to their relatives on both sides of the frontier as it is regarded as safer and quicker. There are also no flights available from Najran province in Saudi Arabia to Nahiyyat Kitaf in Yemen.

Table 3.5 shows the frequency with which the respondents interviewed at Al-Khadra crossed the frontier to visit their relatives. 90% of the Saudis cross weekly
because most of them have a second wife on the Yemeni side of the frontier, whilst their children are taught in schools in Saudi Arabia. They take their children to the Saudi schools every week and bring them back to Yemen each weekend. 62.2% of Yemenis cross the frontier monthly to take advantage of government privileges, as discussed in Section 3.2.3. UAE and Qatari nationals visit their relatives on average every three to six months, but particularly during public holidays, as discussed above.

Table 3.5 Frequency of visits to relatives by respondents interviewed at Al-Khadra checkpoint

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Frequency of Visits</th>
<th>Respondent’s Nationality</th>
<th>Total</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Saudi</td>
<td>Yemen</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>---------------------</td>
<td>-------</td>
<td>-------</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Daily</td>
<td>--</td>
<td>--</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Weekly</td>
<td>325</td>
<td>90</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Monthly</td>
<td>36</td>
<td>10</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Yearly</td>
<td>--</td>
<td>--</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Other (3-6 months)</td>
<td>--</td>
<td>--</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>No visit to relatives</td>
<td>--</td>
<td>--</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Total</td>
<td>361</td>
<td>100</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Source: Author’s Field Survey, 1 Oct-10 Dec 1994

3.3.1.2 Visits to Markets

Routine visits into neighbouring countries by local people is commonplace throughout the world where a degree of goodwill and stability exists:

Interdependent borderlands are made possible by relatively stable international relations and by the existence of a favourable economic climate that permits borderlanders on both sides of the line to stimulate growth and development that are tied to foreign capital, markets, and labour. (Martinez, 1994: p.4)

The development of a cross-boundary economy probably helps to prevent the smuggling of goods across the frontier, especially when there is a weak economy on one side of the boundary and a developing economy on the other, as is the case with Yemen and Saudi Arabia.
Table 3.6 shows that the Yemen-based Saudis use the Najran markets because the goods are cheaper there than in Yemen. For example, a five kilogram box of tea costs US$15 in Yemen, but only US$7 in Saudi Arabia (Author’s Field Survey, Oct-Dec 1994). Similarly, in the mid-1980s a 30,000 litre load of petrol cost SR8,000 and sold in Yemen for YR27,000 (Dresch, 1989: p.309). The Najran markets are also more convenient (Figure 3.9(A)). The people living in Wadi Al-'Atfayn in Yemen still have Saudi nationality. Their shopping goods consist of petrol, food, and other essentials. The duty-free allowance list in Appendix 4 gives an indication of the goods regularly purchased.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Markets visited</th>
<th>Respondents’ Nationality</th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Saudi</td>
<td>Yemen</td>
<td>UAE</td>
<td>Qatar</td>
<td>Total</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>No.</td>
<td>%</td>
<td>No.</td>
<td>%</td>
<td>No.</td>
<td>%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Najran</td>
<td>231</td>
<td>64.0</td>
<td>--</td>
<td>--</td>
<td>--</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Al-Buq’a</td>
<td>16</td>
<td>4.4</td>
<td>--</td>
<td>--</td>
<td>--</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Al-'Arisah</td>
<td>--</td>
<td>--</td>
<td>62</td>
<td>17.4</td>
<td>--</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Al-Sa’id</td>
<td>--</td>
<td>--</td>
<td>295</td>
<td>82.6</td>
<td>--</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Mârib</td>
<td>--</td>
<td>--</td>
<td>9</td>
<td>13.6</td>
<td>--</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Suq Al-'Anan</td>
<td>--</td>
<td>--</td>
<td>--</td>
<td>--</td>
<td>--</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>No visit to</td>
<td>114</td>
<td>31.6</td>
<td>--</td>
<td>--</td>
<td>57</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>market</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Total</td>
<td>361</td>
<td>100</td>
<td>357</td>
<td>100</td>
<td>66</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Source: Author’s Field Survey, 1 Oct-10 Dec 1994

4.4% of Saudis crossing the frontier also go to Al-Buq’a market on the Yemeni side. It was expected to find a greater percentage of Saudis crossing the frontier to go to Al-Buq’a because Saudi tradesmen do good business there selling blankets, carpets and vehicle tyres. Such goods are clearly visible in Plates 3.2 and 3.3. This unexpectedly low figure may be explained, as the Customs Office informed the author, by the fact that some Saudi tradesmen are hiring Yemeni tradesmen to deliver their goods to Al-Buq’a market to sell them there. Many Yemeni vehicles carrying these goods are driven to Al-Buq’a market. A queue of such vehicles is shown in Plates 3.2 and 3.3.
CHAPTER 3

All the Yemenis crossing the frontier to go to markets on the Saudi side were going to the markets at Al-‘Arayisah and Al-Sa’id. There are several reasons for this:

a. The majority of Yemenis crossing the frontier have only limited permission to travel in Saudi Arabia, being confined by their ‘statements’ to Najran province. A copy of a ‘statement’ is shown in Plate 3.1.

b. The Najran markets are cheap, nearby, and easy to reach.

c. The privilege of purchasing duty-free goods every three months is limited to those goods bought in Najran province only.

Some of the Yemenis crossing northwards bring sultanas (rasiki, white and black) and coffee (husks, seeds, and ready-ground) to sell in Saudi Arabia. Most of the popular sultanas and coffee in the Najran markets come from Yemen. Of those crossing into Yemen holding UAE passports, 13.6% were visiting Ma‘rib market, and 25% of Qataris in the sample were visiting Suq Al-‘Anan (suq is Arabic for market), both groups with the intention of selling cars popular for crossing the desert (notably Toyota Pickups). The cars are bought in the UAE and Qatar and sold in Yemen at a higher price.

Table 3.7 Frequency of visits to markets by respondents interviewed at Al-Khadra checkpoint

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Frequency of Visits</th>
<th>Saudi</th>
<th>Yemeni</th>
<th>UAE</th>
<th>Qatari</th>
<th>Total</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>No.</td>
<td>%</td>
<td>No.</td>
<td>%</td>
<td>No.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Daily</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Weekly</td>
<td>201</td>
<td>55.7</td>
<td>94</td>
<td>26.3</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Monthly</td>
<td>46</td>
<td>12.7</td>
<td>220</td>
<td>61.7</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Yearly</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Other</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>43</td>
<td>12.0</td>
<td>9</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>No visit</td>
<td>114</td>
<td>31.6</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>57</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Total</td>
<td>361</td>
<td>100</td>
<td>357</td>
<td>100</td>
<td>66</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Source: Author’s Field Survey, 1 Oct-10 Dec 1994

Table 3.7 shows the frequency with which respondents interviewed at Al-Khadra checkpoint crossed the frontier to visit markets. 55.7% of Saudi crossings are weekly because they are only allowed to carry personal shopping across the frontier, in addition
to their three monthly duty-free goods allowance (see Section 3.2.3). Of the Yemenis crossing the frontier to visit markets, 61.7% cross monthly and 26.3% weekly. Unlike the Saudis, Yemenis are not allowed to cross the frontier with personal shopping bought in Saudi Arabia. Instead they sell sultanas and coffee in the Najran markets and return to the Yemeni side with their duty-free goods such as petrol, food, and furniture when their three-monthly allowance is due (see Plate 3.2). 12% of Yemenis cross the frontier at every three to six months, including some who come from great distances such as from Sana’a, Ibb and Al-Hudaydah.

Along the Saudi-Iraqi boundary bedouin sell their animals in markets on the Saudi side and buy provisions for themselves from Saudi towns or oases (Asadallah, 1971: p.72). But along the Saudi-Yemeni frontier the Saudi Customs Office do not allow animals to be imported for sale for health reasons (Saudi Customs Office, Al-Khadra checkpoint, 1994).

Table 3.7 also shows the frequency with which the UAE and Qatari respondents visit Yemeni markets. Both groups only cross every three to six months, no doubt because they come long distances (approximately 1,000km).

3.3.1.3 Visits to Properties
Properties located in close proximity to boundaries show some remarkable features. For example, the Morocco-Algeria boundary divides kinsfolk, properties, and even a cemetery. Remarkably, there is a house on the boundary line whose windows open into Algerian territory, while the house is on Moroccan land (Al-Ahmdi, 1990: p.15). Similarly, some properties exist on the Saudi-Yemeni frontier whose significance is associated with the undelimited Western Study Sector boundary. People who have properties in the frontier region should be compensated or have special access to their properties across the barrier of a boundary, once delimited.
Table 3.8  Tribes of respondents interviewed at Al-Khadra checkpoint who own property across the frontier, and location of properties

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Respondents' Nationality</th>
<th>Respondents' Tribe</th>
<th>Location of Respondents' Property</th>
<th>Sample Size</th>
<th>%</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Saudi</td>
<td>Wa'ilah</td>
<td>Al-Sharifah (S)</td>
<td>167</td>
<td>46.3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Saudi</td>
<td>Wa'ilah</td>
<td>Al-'Atfayn (Y)</td>
<td>130</td>
<td>36.0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Saudi</td>
<td>Wa'ilah &amp; Yam</td>
<td>Rijlah (S)</td>
<td>39</td>
<td>10.8</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Saudi</td>
<td>Wa'ilah</td>
<td>Najran (S)</td>
<td>13</td>
<td>3.6</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Saudi</td>
<td>Wa'ilah</td>
<td>Al-'Ansah (S)</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>1.1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Saudi</td>
<td>Wa'ilah</td>
<td>Al-Swq (S)</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>0.8</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Saudi</td>
<td>Wa'ilah</td>
<td>Dhdah (S)</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>0.8</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Saudi</td>
<td>Wa'ilah</td>
<td>Al-Hasyniyah (S)</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>0.6</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Total</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>361</td>
<td>100</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Yemeni</td>
<td>--</td>
<td>No visit to property</td>
<td>357</td>
<td>100</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>UAE</td>
<td>--</td>
<td>No visit to property</td>
<td>66</td>
<td>100</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Qatari</td>
<td>--</td>
<td>No visit to property</td>
<td>44</td>
<td>100</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

(S): on the Saudi side of the frontier; (Y): on the Yemeni side of the frontier


Table 3.8 shows the tribe of respondents interviewed at Al-Khadra checkpoint who were crossing the frontier to visit property, together with the name of the settlements in which the properties are owned. The table shows that only Saudis own properties on both sides of the frontier in the Western Study Sector. All the Saudis crossing the frontier own property on the Yemeni side in Wadi Al-'Atfayn and they also own property on the Saudi side in Al-Sharifah and Rijlah (Figure 3.10(A)). Yemeni, UAE and Qatari nationals have no properties on the Saudi side because Saudi law does not allow other nationalities to own property in Saudi Arabia.

Saudis crossing into Yemen own farms, houses, wells and grazing land, all of which are in Wadi Al-'Atfayn. The frequency with which the Saudis cross to the visit their properties is 91.7% weekly, and 8.3% monthly (Table 3.9). The weekly visits are boosted by other factors such as taking children to school, visiting relatives, and trips to markets on the Saudi side (Table 3.7).
Table 3.9 Frequency of visits to property by respondents interviewed at Al-Khadr checkpoint

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Frequency of Visits</th>
<th>Saudi</th>
<th>Yemeni</th>
<th>UAE</th>
<th>Qatari</th>
<th>Total</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>No.</td>
<td>%</td>
<td>No.</td>
<td>%</td>
<td>No.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Daily</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Weekly</td>
<td>331</td>
<td>91.7</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Monthly</td>
<td>30</td>
<td>8.3</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Yearly</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Other</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>No visit to property</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Total</td>
<td>361</td>
<td>100</td>
<td>357</td>
<td>100</td>
<td>66</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Source: Author’s Field Survey, 1 Oct-10 Dec 1994

3.3.1.4 Grazing and Wells

There is a long history of problems associated with international boundaries and access to traditional grazing land in the Middle East. On the Saudi-Jordanian boundary, for example, the Sharawrah tribe cross the boundary westwards into Jordanian territory for spring grazing (Asadallah, 1971: p.27). Grazing land and wells also exist on the Saudi-Yemeni frontier and they should therefore be a significant boundary issue. In the Western Study Sector, however, no separate figure is recorded for visits across the frontier to grazing land and wells. In fact, there are grazing areas on the Yemeni side belonging to the Wa’ilah tribe in the Wadi Amlah, Wadi Sayh and Wadi Khabb. The bedouin on the Saudi side cannot visit these grazing areas or even the spring grazing along the frontier (Figure 3.3(A)). This is because the Saudi Border Guard prevent bedouin from crossing the frontier for reasons of national security (Saudi Border Guard, Western Study Sector, 1994).

3.3.2 THE CHECKPOINTS

Travel across the boundaries of Saudi Arabia has been going on a long time for the purposes of pilgrimage, commerce and seeking water and pasture. Statistics on this
movement have only been available since 1965 (Abu-Dawood, 1984: p.119-20). According to the key informants interviewed by the author during his field survey, there were no checkpoints on the frontier between Saudi Arabia and Yemen thirty years ago, and bedouin were free to move across the frontier (Author’s Field Survey, 1994).

On 8 August 1989 the Ministers of Interior of Saudi Arabia and North Yemen agreed a statement about the location of checkpoints between the two countries. The text of the statement was as follows:

1. The westward checkpoints are Al-Tawal [on the Saudi side] and Harad [on the Yemeni side].
2. The eastward checkpoints are Al-Khadra [on the Saudi side] and Al-Buq’a [on the Yemeni side].

Both Ministers of Interior warned the citizens of their countries to only pass through the checkpoints and that offenders would be punished (Asharq Al-Awsat, 1989). In the Western Study Sector, Al-Buq’a checkpoint is on the Yemeni side and Al-Khadra checkpoint is on the Saudi side (Figure 3.11(A)). The Saudi Ministry of Interior does not use the terms ‘boundary’ or ‘frontier’ in the statement, no doubt to guard against Yemen using the statement as an indication that Saudi Arabia has abandoned its territorial claim. Al-Buq’a checkpoint falls within the Saudi claim on the Yemeni side, but Al-Khadra on the Saudi side is not within the Yemeni claim (Figure 3.11(A)). Both these checkpoints lie beyond the Treaty of Taif boundary, and they are located on the sandstone between the foothills and the sand sea. They are also located close to concentrations of population, especially of those people who use the checkpoints, such as the Wa’ilah tribe in Wadi Al-‘Atfayn on the Yemeni side, and the same tribe at Al-Sharafah and Rijlah on the Saudi side.

The Al-Khadra checkpoint on the Saudi side was chosen by the author in order to interview people crossing from both sides, and to study the functions of the checkpoint. It was impossible to interview people crossing at the Al-Buq’a checkpoint on the Yemeni side for political reasons.
The study of the current checkpoints was considered important because of the likelihood that the location of checkpoints in the Western Study Sector and other sectors may change on the delimitation of the boundary.

This section examines the function of Al-Khadra checkpoint; the time spent at the checkpoint; the reasons for choosing the checkpoint; transport and the route taken to the checkpoint; the condition of the rest area at the checkpoint; and documents used, with special reference to the question of dual nationality.

3.3.2.1 Time Spent at the Checkpoint

Table 3.10 shows the respondents' attitude towards the amount of time they had to spend completing immigration and customs procedures at Al-Khadra checkpoint. None of the Saudis crossing were satisfied with the length of time spent at the checkpoint. They complained that Saudi Immigration at the checkpoint kept them waiting a long time for permission to cross the frontier. They felt that they should not have to wait so long because they have Saudi nationality. In addition they dislike waiting in the same queue as those of Yemeni and other nationalities.

The other nationalities (Yemenis, UAE and Qatari) were satisfied with the length of time spent at Al-Khadra checkpoint. In fact, by international standards, the time spent at Al-Khadra checkpoint is very reasonable; it takes between 15 and 30 minutes for a single person, but if the traveller has family and goods, it can take between one and two hours (Saudi Immigration Office, 1994) These times seem reasonable compared with Al-Buq'a checkpoint on the Yemeni side.

Table 3.10 Respondents' attitude to the length of time spent at Al-Khadra checkpoint

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Respondents' Attitude</th>
<th>Respondents' Nationality</th>
<th>Total</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Saudi</td>
<td>Yemeni</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Reasonable</td>
<td></td>
<td>357</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Unreasonable</td>
<td>361</td>
<td>100</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Total</td>
<td>361</td>
<td>357</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Source: Author's Field Survey, 1 Oct-10 Dec 1994
Furthermore, those crossing complain that the Yemeni Government takes £7,000 sterling as a bond for each Saudi vehicle crossing the frontier at Al-Buq'a checkpoint, and that officials at Al-Buq'a checkpoint are rude and ask for bribes. The Yemeni newspaper *Al-Sahwah* published a letter on 15 June 1995 from a group of Yemeni travellers to the President of Yemen about the unprofessional behaviour of officials at the Harad checkpoint on the Treaty of Taif boundary at the Red Sea coast. The officials had asked for bribes, and had either taken goods, or delayed the travellers an excessively long time at the checkpoint if bribes had not been forthcoming (*Al-Sahwah*, 1995: p.1). This indicates that it is likely that not only Saudi nationals are affected by the behaviour of officials at Al-Buq'a checkpoint, but Yemeni citizens as well.

3.3.2.2 Reasons for Choice of Checkpoint

The normal reason for choice of a particular checkpoint is because of its proximity to the respondent's residence. Table 3.11 shows that all the Saudis and Yemenis interviewed (86.7% of the total sample) had chosen Al-Khadra checkpoint for the same strong reason: the fact that the privileges which the Saudi Government allows the frontier tribes only relate to this checkpoint.

*Table 3.11 Reasons for respondents' choice of Al-Khadra checkpoint*

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Reason for choice of checkpoint</th>
<th>Respondents' Nationality</th>
<th>Total</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Saudi</td>
<td>Yemeni</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Close to your residence</td>
<td>--</td>
<td>--</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Frontier tribe privileges</td>
<td>361</td>
<td>100</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Provides a good service</td>
<td>--</td>
<td>--</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Safe from the Yemeni side</td>
<td>--</td>
<td>--</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Safe from the Saudi side</td>
<td>--</td>
<td>--</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Good road from Saudi</td>
<td>--</td>
<td>--</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Good road from Yemen</td>
<td>--</td>
<td>--</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Other</td>
<td>--</td>
<td>--</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Total</td>
<td>361</td>
<td>100</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

*Source: Author's Field Survey, 1 Oct-10 Dec 1994*
The Saudi-Yemeni tribes along the frontier in the Western Study are allowed to buy duty-free goods every three months from Najran province, but only get the exemption from duty by crossing the frontier at Al-Khadra checkpoint. The Saudis and Yemenis using Al-Khadra checkpoint have no alternative but to choose this checkpoint if they wish to take advantage of the frontier tribes' privileges. The privileges, which are exclusively for the frontier tribes are, therefore, a more important factor than the distance between the checkpoint and residence of those crossing the frontier. By contrast, UAE and Qatari nationals had chosen Al-Khadra checkpoint because it was the most convenient on the route from the UAE and Qatar.

3.3.2.3 Transport and the Routes to the Checkpoint

Boundary disputes and functions affect transport and routes in frontier areas. The development of a road network is delayed and the people in the frontier area have to continue using primitive forms of transport. In 1990 at AlIb checkpoint in the 1934 Treaty of Taif boundary (Figure 2.3(A)), people were still using donkeys and camels as transportation because of a dispute between Saudi Arabia and Yemen about the position of markers along the boundary (Al-Ghamdi, 1991: p.185).

Table 3.12 shows the modes of transport used by the respondents interviewed at Al-Khadra checkpoint to cross the Saudi-Yemeni frontier. 55.8% of those crossing were passengers in friends' vehicles and 44.2% were using their own cars. Nearly all the vehicles used were of the same type (Toyota Pickup, Plate 3.3). Abu-Dawood (1984) indicated that four-wheel drive vehicles were used more than any other type on the Saudi-Yemeni frontier.

Figure 3.11(A) shows the roads which lead to the checkpoint; there is an asphalt road on the Saudi side of the frontier which goes all the way to the UAE and Qatar, whilst on the Yemeni side the roads are mountainous and unpaved roads. The lack of development of roads on the Yemeni side of the frontier clearly influences the type of vehicles (Toyota Pickup) which people prefer to use for the crossing.
Table 3.12 Transport taken by respondents to Al-Khadra checkpoint

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Mode of Transport</th>
<th>Respondents' Nationality</th>
<th>Total</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Saudi</td>
<td>Yemeni</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>No.</td>
<td>%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Personal vehicle</td>
<td>169</td>
<td>55.2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Friend's vehicle</td>
<td>192</td>
<td>46.8</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>On foot</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Bus</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Taxi</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Donkey</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Camel</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Other</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Total</td>
<td>361</td>
<td>100</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Source: Author's Field Survey, 1 Oct-10 Dec 1994

3.3.2.4 Facilities at the Checkpoint

Table 3.13 shows that 66.4% of those interviewed at Al-Khadra checkpoint believe that the facilities of the checkpoint are adequate. The facilities in question include car parking, shade whilst queuing, a mosque for prayers, a restaurant, toilets, a shop selling necessities such as ropes for securing goods, knives, containers, etc, and free drinking water. Although the survey showed general satisfaction, many travellers would naturally like more facilities at the checkpoint, such as a petrol station and markets at which to trade with merchants bringing goods from the Yemeni side. 72% of travellers from the UAE reported that the facilities were less than adequate because they had travelled a great distance (more than 1,000km) and therefore required more facilities.

In fact, Al-Khadra checkpoint has some of the best facilities of all the checkpoints between Saudi Arabia and the Republic of Yemen; it is an attractive modern building with most basic facilities. By comparison, Al-Buq'a checkpoint which is opposite Al-Khadra checkpoint on the Yemeni side, is less than adequate as both Yemenis and Saudis crossing the frontier have reported (Saudi Immigration Office, Al-Khadra checkpoint, 1994).
### 3.3.2.5 Documents Used at the Checkpoint

People who have to cross a boundary regularly should have their crossings facilitated. Passports are not an ideal form of identification for borderlanders, not least for reasons of cost, as the following example shows:

> I cross the boundary between Algeria and Morocco illegally, because if I cross legally with a passport, I have to renew my passport every three months or sooner, because I cross the boundary more than once a week. (Al-Ahumdi, 1990: p.15)

For this reason, identity cards which are not stamped are more suitable than passports.

On the Saudi-Yemeni frontier, Saudi Immigration uses 'statements' (Plate 3.1) as the means of identifying members of the frontier tribes. The privilege of being allowed to cross the frontier with only this statement applies only to the Saudi side of the frontier (for more about the frontier tribes' privileges, see Section 3.2.3). Table 3.14 shows that all of the Yemenis interviewed at Al-Khadra checkpoint used a statement as their means of identification for crossing the frontier. By contrast, the Saudis in the sample used passports (Table 3.14).

There is, however, a legal and practical problem with regard to those of Saudi nationality, because the majority of them live in Wadi Al-‘Atfayn under Yemeni control. If the Saudi Immigration Office were to stamp Saudi passports to enable their holders to cross to the Yemeni side, the Saudis crossing would implicitly be crossing the frontier of the Saudi state. However, Wadi Al-‘Atfayn and the surrounding area is still the subject of dispute and negotiation. The Saudi Immigration officers therefore stamp a separate piece
of paper instead of the passport itself. Yemeni Immigration, on the other hand, stamps the Saudi passports to indicate that the holders are crossing into Yemen. This is inconvenient for the Saudis crossing as their passports quickly fill up as a result of crossing the frontier weekly, and they have to be renewed more than once a year. Citizens of the UAE and Qatar also use passports at the checkpoint.

Table 3.14  Documents used by respondents to cross the frontier at Al-Khadra checkpoint

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Documents</th>
<th>Saudi</th>
<th>Yemeni</th>
<th>UAE</th>
<th>Qatari</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Passport</td>
<td>361</td>
<td>100</td>
<td>357</td>
<td>43.1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Statement</td>
<td>--</td>
<td>--</td>
<td>100</td>
<td>100</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Other</td>
<td>--</td>
<td>--</td>
<td>--</td>
<td>--</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Total</td>
<td>361</td>
<td>100</td>
<td>357</td>
<td>43.1</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Source: Author's Field Survey, 1 Oct-10 Dec 1994

3.3.2.6  Dual Nationality

Some members of frontier tribes have dual nationality in order to take advantage of the differences in economy and political regimes of two states. In the case of the Saudi-Yemeni frontier, the advantages of Saudi nationality include better employment prospects, and grants and interest-free loans for house construction and agriculture, whilst Yemeni citizens enjoy a tribal life with the right to carry arms and chew qat (a kind of dope), both of which are forbidden in Saudi Arabia. Enquiries were made about nationality in an attempt to establish the extent of dual nationality. However, Table 3.15 shows that none of the respondents interviewed at Al-Khadra checkpoint would admit to having dual nationality because applicants for Saudi nationality must abandon their previous nationality as stated in Article 11 of the Saudi Organisation of Nationality (1981: p.5):

It is not permissible for those with Saudi nationality to have foreign nationality ...
The Yemeni Constitution (1970) makes no mention of dual nationality. However, the Saudi Immigration Office at Al-Khadra checkpoint confirmed that Yemeni law does not allow its citizens to have dual nationality.

In practice, however, the Saudi Immigration Office at Al-Khadra checkpoint described to the author that there are very real possibilities of citizens holding dual nationality, in particular amongst the Saudis living in Wadi Al-'Atfayn and the Yemeni wives of UAE and Qatari nationals. One example of the way in which people can gain dual nationality by deception involves individuals going to Immigration on the Yemeni side, surrendering their Saudi passports and receiving a Yemeni identity statement. They then return to the Saudi side and go to Immigration telling them that they have lost their identity card and apply for a replacement. This is, however, only heresay and there are no statistics on the phenomenon.

Table 3.15 Nationalities held by respondents interviewed at Al-Khadra checkpoint

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Respondents' Nationality</th>
<th>Saudi Arabia</th>
<th>Yemen</th>
<th>UAE</th>
<th>Qatar</th>
<th>Total</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>No.</td>
<td>%</td>
<td>No.</td>
<td>%</td>
<td>No.</td>
<td>%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Saudi</td>
<td>361</td>
<td>100</td>
<td>--</td>
<td>--</td>
<td>--</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Yemeni</td>
<td>--</td>
<td>--</td>
<td>357</td>
<td>100</td>
<td>--</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>UAE</td>
<td>--</td>
<td>--</td>
<td>--</td>
<td>--</td>
<td>66</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Qatari</td>
<td>--</td>
<td>--</td>
<td>--</td>
<td>--</td>
<td>--</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Other</td>
<td>--</td>
<td>--</td>
<td>--</td>
<td>--</td>
<td>--</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Total</td>
<td>361</td>
<td>100</td>
<td>357</td>
<td>100</td>
<td>66</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Source: Author's Field Survey, 1 Oct-10 Dec 1994

3.3.3 PERCEPTIONS OF THE FRONTIER

By studying the interactions between borderlanders and a frontier it is possible to determine the borderlanders' perception of the location of the frontier. Political geographers cannot always determine borderlanders' perceptions of the frontier by examining the frontier itself, because the perceptions involve a special relationship between the borderlanders and the features regarded as marking the frontier. On the
Saudi-Yemeni frontier, only the Treaty of Taif boundary is currently delimited. However, those crossing the frontier from both sides use their own frontier markings. The borderlanders’ perception of the frontier, the features considered to indicate its location, and the level of satisfaction with the frontier, should all be important considerations when the remainder of the Saudi-Yemeni boundary is delimited. For this reason it was considered important to study the perceptions of the frontier of those crossing it.

The frontier is a very sensitive matter in discussions with those crossing it. The subject makes people nervous and they get upset about it. This section examines the features indicating the frontier, frontier changes, and the level of satisfaction with the frontier.

3.3.3.1 Features Indicating the Frontier

Table 3.16 lists the Saudi and Yemeni features which respondents interviewed at Al-Khadra checkpoint recognised as marking the frontier. 83% of those questioned recognise the frontier on the Saudi side by the route followed by the round-the-clock border guard patrol from Khbash guard post (see Figure 3.13(A)). The remaining 17% recognise the frontier by Al-Khadra checkpoint.

Table 3.16 Features recognised as indicating the frontier by respondents interviewed at Al-Khadra checkpoint

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Features indicating frontier</th>
<th>Saudi</th>
<th>Yemeni</th>
<th>UAE</th>
<th>Qatari</th>
<th>Total</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Saudi Side:</td>
<td>No.</td>
<td>%</td>
<td>No.</td>
<td>%</td>
<td>No.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Mountains</td>
<td>--</td>
<td>--</td>
<td>--</td>
<td>--</td>
<td>--</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Plateaux</td>
<td>--</td>
<td>--</td>
<td>--</td>
<td>--</td>
<td>--</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Wadis</td>
<td>--</td>
<td>--</td>
<td>--</td>
<td>--</td>
<td>--</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Checkpoints</td>
<td>17</td>
<td>4.7</td>
<td>14</td>
<td>3.9</td>
<td>66</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Patrol Route</td>
<td>344</td>
<td>95.3</td>
<td>343</td>
<td>96.1</td>
<td>44</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Total</td>
<td>361</td>
<td>100</td>
<td>357</td>
<td>100</td>
<td>66</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Yemeni Side:</td>
<td>No.</td>
<td>%</td>
<td>No.</td>
<td>%</td>
<td>No.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Mountains</td>
<td>128</td>
<td>35.5</td>
<td>177</td>
<td>49.6</td>
<td>--</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Plateaux</td>
<td>--</td>
<td>--</td>
<td>--</td>
<td>--</td>
<td>--</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Wadis</td>
<td>--</td>
<td>--</td>
<td>--</td>
<td>--</td>
<td>--</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Checkpoints</td>
<td>--</td>
<td>--</td>
<td>--</td>
<td>--</td>
<td>66</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Border Posts</td>
<td>233</td>
<td>64.5</td>
<td>180</td>
<td>50.4</td>
<td>4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Total</td>
<td>361</td>
<td>100</td>
<td>357</td>
<td>100</td>
<td>66</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Source: Author’s Field Survey, 1 Oct-10 Dec 1994

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Surprisingly perhaps, no markers or geographical features such as mountains or plateaux are perceived as relevant as a mark between the two countries on the Saudi side. On the other hand, on the Yemeni side, 50.4% of those crossing recognise the frontier by the 'Abasah guard post, and a further 36.8% by Mount 'Abasah (see Figure 3.13(A)).

The majority of people therefore recognise the checkpoint, border guard posts and patrols, and the mountains as the frontier markers between the two countries. If and when both countries reach an agreement delimiting the boundary, mountains are impossible to relocate, but checkpoints and border guards may be relocated with relative ease.

3.3.3.2 Frontier Changes

In 1939 the Saudi Government started a programme to settle the bedouin living in the frontier areas. Most bedouin on the Arabian Peninsula dislike conforming with the political boundaries between countries, preferring to live independently, following grazing seasonally (Al-Mangor, 1988: p.23).

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Frontier perceived as having changed</th>
<th>Respondents' Nationality</th>
<th>Total</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Saudi</td>
<td>Yemeni</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Yes</td>
<td>361</td>
<td>341</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>No</td>
<td>--</td>
<td>16</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Do not know</td>
<td>--</td>
<td>--</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Total</td>
<td>361</td>
<td>357</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

*Source: Author's Field Survey, 1 Oct-10 Dec 1994*

Table 3.17 shows that 98% of those interviewed at Al-Khadra checkpoint believe that the *de facto* border has changed over the years. This change refers to the position of the operational frontier or the checkpoints, because in this study sector the boundary between Saudi Arabia and Yemen has yet to be delimited. However, people still recognise the frontier in the Western Study Sector by the location of checkpoints, border guards, and mountains as discussed above. The respondents identified a number of changes.
Approximately 35 years ago there were no checkpoints between the two countries: bedouin were able to move their sheep and camels wherever they wished without border guards to prevent them. They were also able to travel across the desert to the other Gulf States without being stopped. But since oil companies started to compete to gain oil concessions, this competition has exacerbated boundary disputes in the Arabian Peninsula (Al-Shamlan, 1987: p.10). Oil revenues began to have a serious impact on the Arabian Peninsula after World War II (Wilkinson, 1991: p.xi). This made the states look seriously at boundary issues: they settled bedouin on the frontiers, established border guard posts and checkpoints, and sought solutions to boundary disputes.

3.3.3.3 Level of Satisfaction with the Frontier

Table 3.18 shows that 82.4% of respondents interviewed at Al-Khadra checkpoint were dissatisfied with the present operational frontier in the Western Study Sector between Saudi Arabia and the Yemen Republic. The majority of those dissatisfied were of Saudi nationality, particularly those of the Wa’ilah tribe living in Wadi Al-‘Atfayn. These people believe that the boundary should be to the south of Wadi Al-‘Atfayn.

Table 3.18 Level of satisfaction with the frontier amongst respondents interviewed at Al-Khadra checkpoint

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Level of Satisfaction</th>
<th>Respondents' Nationality</th>
<th>Total</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Saudi</td>
<td>Yemen</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Satisfied</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Dissatisfied</td>
<td>358</td>
<td>99.2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Do not know</td>
<td>--</td>
<td>--</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Total</td>
<td>361</td>
<td>100</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Source: Author's Field Survey, 1 Oct-10 Dec, 1994

On the other hand, the chiefs of the Yam tribe living in Najran maintain that the boundary should be to the south of Tabt Al-‘Ism (Radm Al-Hadd) on the Yemeni side in the Western Study Sector (see Figure 3.14(A)). Philby (1939: p.30) wrote:

... Taiyibat Ism ... known as Radm Al-Hadd and marking the tribal boundary between Yam and Dahm...
Those of Yemeni nationality would also like the Al-Khadra checkpoint to be relocated further south in the Western Study Sector, because they want their lands of Wadi Al-'Atfayn, Al-Far'a and Tabt - Ism which are currently under Yemeni control to be on the Saudi side of the boundary. No doubt this is because the Saudi side is economically and socially more developed than the Yemeni side, especially in terms of roads, schools, markets, government benefits, and personal security. With regard to the lack of personal security in Yemen, Halliday (1985: p.4) reported:

The Yemeni Government has banned tribesmen from bringing arms into the largest cities. But outside Sana and Taizz most men carry them, and the government's ability to control these areas directly remains limited. Such control as exits is mediated by tribal chiefs.

3.4 Economic Opportunities

The possibility of finding hydrocarbon and mineral resources in frontier regions makes boundary disputes very sensitive and sometimes causes wars between countries.

In the Middle East and North Africa, the possibility of finding oil, gas, or mineral resources has accelerated the quest for precisely defined national boundaries. (Drysdale and Blake, 1985: p.75)

The significance of studying economic opportunities in the Western Study Sector is to get an indication of the potential economic value of the frontier area between the extreme Saudi and Yemeni territorial claims. This section examines the economic opportunities presented by mineral and hydrocarbon potential, and commercial activity.

3.4.1 MINERALS AND HYDROCARBONS

There is currently no mining on either side of the frontier in the Western Study Sector, but there are potential sources of minerals in the sector on both sides. There are two kinds of geologic structure: granite and granodiorite in the mountains containing iron, and Wajid sandstone in the west of the sector containing salt deposits (GMAQ-KSA, 1979). With regard to hydrocarbons in the Western Study Sector, most researchers suggest that the
chief reason for the boundary dispute between Saudi Arabia and Yemen is the potential for the discovery of hydrocarbons (Schofield, 1994: pp.19-27; Pike, 1994: pp.187-98; Walker, 1994: pp.173-83). In reality, this factor may be exaggerated by researchers. Article 4 of the 1934 Treaty of Taif mentions that the boundary in the Western Study Sector was undelimited due to a tribal dispute, and this was long before oil was discovered in Saudi Arabia in commercial quantities.

The first oil was not discovered in commercial quantities anywhere in the peninsula until 1932. (Wilkinson, 1991: p.96) Wilkinson also comments that territorial claims in the Arabian Peninsula were not created by the potential of finding oil. There were, therefore, other reasons for these disputes, such as Ibn Saud’s loyalty to the tribes in the Western Study Sector, evidenced by protection agreements between Ibn Saud and the tribes in the Najran area.

**Table 3.19 Status of oil concession blocks in the Western Study Sector in 1994**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Name</th>
<th>Block No.</th>
<th>Area (km²)</th>
<th>Companies</th>
<th>Date awarded or approved</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>Yukong</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Al-Jawf</td>
<td>19</td>
<td>4,223</td>
<td>Open to bidders</td>
<td>--</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Upper Al-Jawf</td>
<td>20</td>
<td>4,222</td>
<td>Open to bidders</td>
<td>--</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Central Plateau</td>
<td>21</td>
<td>22,660</td>
<td>Open to bidders</td>
<td>--</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

*Source: AOG Directory, 1994: Figure 3.10*

There is undoubtedly some hydrocarbon potential in the Western Study Sector. Figure 3.12(A) shows the position of the extreme Saudi territorial claim together with the location of Blocks 18, 19, 20, and 21 (Table 3.19) of the licensed area under Yemeni control. Figure 3.12(A) also shows three abandoned wells within the Western Study Sector. Hunt, Exxon, and Yukon have been jointly awarded an exploration licence for Block 18 (Marib and Al-Jawf) which at 8,445km², covers most of the production area. The map shows that the majority of the oil and gas fields lie beyond the Saudi claim in the Western Study Sector. However, in March 1992 the Saudi Foreign Ministry sent warning
letters to six foreign oil companies and groups which had concessions in the disputed areas (MEES, 1992: p.A8)

On the Saudi side there is no active production of, or exploration for, hydrocarbons in the disputed area. This does not mean, however, that there is no potential for hydrocarbons on the Saudi side in the Western Study Sector.

3.4.2 COMMERCE AND EMPLOYMENT

Trade across the frontier in the Western Study Sector is chiefly from the Saudi side to the Yemeni side, but there is some trade in the opposite direction. About 7% of respondents questioned at Al-Khadra checkpoint are working as traders, but the author noted that people did not like to state that they work as traders. Many traders probably claimed to be either shepherds (59.5% of the sample) or farmers (30.8% of the sample) (Table 3.20). The reason for the high proportion of respondents claiming to be shepherds may be that the individuals hope to receive Saudi Government benefits, and subsidies for their flocks. The majority of Yemenis returning to the Yemeni side of the frontier importing consumer goods such as sugar, rice, dried milk, liquid milk, flour, maize, barley, gas, benzene, kerosene, grain, and cooking oil ('Mazola') from the Saudi side (see Plates 3.2 and 3.3) (Saudi Customs, Al-Khadra checkpoint, 1994). Many Yemenis crossing the frontier to the Saudi side carry coffee (husks, seeds, and ready-ground), sultanas (rasiki, white and black), and honey to sell in the Najran markets.

The average annual income of all the respondents interviewed at Al-Khadra checkpoint was between US$300 and US$3,000 (Author’s field survey, 1 October - 10 December 1994). The 1996 national product per capita for Saudi Arabia and Yemen was US$9,510 and US$1,955 respectively (CIA World Fact Book on the Internet, 15 July 1996). However, a similar marked difference between the countries does not appear when the average annual incomes of the Saudi respondents is compared to that of the Yemeni respondents. This may be because most of the respondents were uneducated; 84% were
illiterate and 15.5% had only learnt to read (Author's field survey, 1 October - 10 December 1994).

Table 3.20 Occupations of respondents interviewed at Al-Khadra checkpoint

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Occupation</th>
<th>Saudi No.</th>
<th>Saudi %</th>
<th>Yemeni No.</th>
<th>Yemeni %</th>
<th>UAE No.</th>
<th>UAE %</th>
<th>Qatar No.</th>
<th>Qatar %</th>
<th>Total No.</th>
<th>Total %</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Students</td>
<td>--</td>
<td>--</td>
<td>--</td>
<td>--</td>
<td>--</td>
<td>--</td>
<td>--</td>
<td>--</td>
<td>--</td>
<td>--</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Traders</td>
<td>16</td>
<td>4.4</td>
<td>41</td>
<td>11.5</td>
<td>--</td>
<td>--</td>
<td>--</td>
<td>--</td>
<td>57</td>
<td>6.9</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Farmers</td>
<td>89</td>
<td>24.7</td>
<td>150</td>
<td>42.0</td>
<td>10</td>
<td>15.2</td>
<td>6</td>
<td>13.6</td>
<td>255</td>
<td>30.8</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Officials</td>
<td>--</td>
<td>--</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>0.3</td>
<td>14</td>
<td>21.2</td>
<td>8</td>
<td>18.2</td>
<td>23</td>
<td>2.8</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Labourers</td>
<td>--</td>
<td>--</td>
<td>--</td>
<td>--</td>
<td>--</td>
<td>--</td>
<td>--</td>
<td>--</td>
<td>--</td>
<td>--</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Unemployed</td>
<td>--</td>
<td>--</td>
<td>--</td>
<td>--</td>
<td>--</td>
<td>--</td>
<td>--</td>
<td>--</td>
<td>--</td>
<td>--</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Drivers</td>
<td>--</td>
<td>--</td>
<td>--</td>
<td>--</td>
<td>--</td>
<td>--</td>
<td>--</td>
<td>--</td>
<td>--</td>
<td>--</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Shepherds</td>
<td>256</td>
<td>70.9</td>
<td>165</td>
<td>46.2</td>
<td>42</td>
<td>63.6</td>
<td>30</td>
<td>68.2</td>
<td>493</td>
<td>59.5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Other</td>
<td>--</td>
<td>--</td>
<td>--</td>
<td>--</td>
<td>--</td>
<td>--</td>
<td>--</td>
<td>--</td>
<td>--</td>
<td>--</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Total</td>
<td>361</td>
<td>100</td>
<td>357</td>
<td>100</td>
<td>66</td>
<td>100</td>
<td>44</td>
<td>100</td>
<td>828</td>
<td>100</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Source: Author's Field Survey, 1 Oct-10 Dec, 1994

3.5 The De Facto Border

The identification of the de facto border is a key objective of this thesis. The significance of examining the border is to help the researcher suggest a Logical Boundary which is the ultimate aim of this thesis (see Section 1.6.1, Recognising and delimiting the de facto border). The de facto border in the Western Study Sector is delimited by the location of the Saudi and Yemeni border guard posts (Figure 3.13(A)). In the west of the sector the Saudi Border Guard are positioned (from west to east) at Jabal Al-Thar, Jabal Silah, Tansab, Khbash, Salatah, and Al-Rwikbah. The Yemeni Border Guard locations are (from west to east) Makwa, 'Abasah, Western Al-Adhr'ain, Eastern Al-Adhr'ain, and Al-Buq'a. To the east of these positions the de facto border runs eastward through the sands until it reaches the Saudi position at Al-Hala Al-Sawda. From here it runs southwards through the Yemeni posts at Al-Bramah and Al-Mutashakkirah (Figure 3.13(A)). The positions of both the Saudi and Yemeni Border Guard are in ideal strategic locations for
controlling the frontier; they afford good views of the frontier, provide natural defence in the event of attack, and are effective positions for observation radar.

Between the Saudi and Yemeni border guard positions is an area of no man's land (see Section 1.6.1 for Prescott's (1987) description of no man's land). The width of this no man's land varies along the length of the *de facto* border, but on average it is 5-15km in the Western Study Sector. The border guards maintain a 24-hour vehicle patrol in order to control smuggling and infiltrators along the *de facto* border. Table 3.21 shows that many more items were confiscated by the Saudi Border Guard in 1994, possibly because the Yemeni civil war in May 1994 resulted in attempts to smuggle weapons which were then numerous, cheap, and legal in Yemen to the Saudi side of the frontier where they are illegal.

![Table 3.21 Reasons for arrest and items confiscated in the Western Study Sector 1992-4](image)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Infiltrator</td>
<td>16</td>
<td>39</td>
<td>34</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Smuggler</td>
<td>--</td>
<td>10</td>
<td>15</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Trip wire</td>
<td>--</td>
<td>--</td>
<td>4,863</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Wire</td>
<td>--</td>
<td>--</td>
<td>726</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Dynamite</td>
<td>--</td>
<td>--</td>
<td>48</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Weapons</td>
<td>--</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>26</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Various</td>
<td>--</td>
<td>29</td>
<td>790</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

*Source: Saudi Border Guard statistics, 1994*

### 3.6 Distribution of Tribes on the Frontier

A number of commentaries concerning the frontiers of South Arabia seek to attribute the tribes to either Saudi Arabia or Yemen for the purpose of establishing a boundary between the two countries based on tribal boundaries:

*The Dahm is a Yemeni tribe ... The Rawashid and Murra are both Saudi tribes ... (Schofield, 1993: Vol.3, pp.558, 539)*
This attribution of tribes to only one country is misleading as most of the tribes on the Arabian peninsula are descended from Yemeni tribes:

According to Arab and other historians, the present Yemeni tribes are the descendants of the Qahtan tribe, just as the present Hejazi tribes are the descendants of the Adnan tribe. But the Qahtan tribes have, over the years, scattered to all corners of the Arabian peninsula. (Schofield, 1993: p.672. See also Al-Jarafi, 1987: p.57-8; Kaml, 1968: p.143.)

A more appropriate method of attribution is the method mentioned in Article 4 of the 1934 Treaty of Taif, whereby areas and tribes which were not specifically mentioned by name remained under the control of the country (Saudi Arabia or Yemen) which controlled them prior to 1933:

... the names which are not mentioned and which were actually subject to or under the control of the Yemeni Kingdom before the year 1352 (1933), are on the Yemeni side and belong to the Yemen.

... their vicinities which have not been mentioned by name, and which were actually subject to or under the control of the Saudi Arab Kingdom before the year 1352 (1933), are on the left of the Said line and belong to the Saudi Arab Kingdom. (Schofield, 1992: p.94, see Appendix I for the full text of the Treaty)

Using the pattern of control existing during a particular period as a means of attributing the tribes on the frontier to either country is a more logical method than genealogy in the Arabian peninsula.

The method used by the author to determine the location of the tribal boundaries is mentioned in Section 1.6.3 (Interviews with key people). Figure 3.14(A) shows that there are three tribal boundaries which are close to the *de facto* border, those of the Yam, Wa’ilah, and Dahm.

As a result of examining the tribal boundaries, there is a clear difference between the territorial claims of Saudi Arabia and Yemen, and the tribal boundaries. The tribal boundary between the Yam and the other tribes, namely the Wa’ilah and Dahm, runs close to the south of the extreme Yemeni claim. There are two areas of overlapping tribal claims in the Western Study Sector: that between the Wa’ilah and Yam tribes in Wadi Al-‘Atfayn, and between the Yam and Dahm tribes at Al-Ramlat. For an analysis of the
possibility of using tribal boundaries as the boundary between Saudi Arabia and Yemen, see Chapter 6.

Table 3.22 shows the loyalties of tribes near the frontier in the Western Study Sector; the Yam tribe are under Saudi control and most of their land is on the Saudi side, except the Tabt Al-Ism area; their loyalty is thus to the Saudi Government. The Wa’ilah tribal lands are mostly under Yemeni control and the majority of the tribe has Yemeni nationality and loyalty to Yemen. However, the Wa’ilah sub-tribes Al-Slah, Al-Qri’a, and Al-Swidan have Saudi nationality. These sub-tribes are located in Wadi Al-‘Atfayn and their loyalty is to Saudi Arabia. The Dahm tribal lands are wholly under Yemeni control and their loyalty is to Yemen.

Table 3.22 Political loyalty of tribal people in the Western Study Sector

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Tribe</th>
<th>Sect</th>
<th>Political Loyalty</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Yam</td>
<td>Ismaili</td>
<td>Mainly Saudi Arabia (plus a few Sunni)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Wa’ilah</td>
<td>Zaidi</td>
<td>Mixed Saudi/Yemen</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Dahm</td>
<td>Zaidi/Shafi</td>
<td>Mainly Yemen</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Source: Interviews with Sheiks in the Western Study Sector. October 1994

As mentioned in the 1934 Treaty of Taif, tribal boundaries are the key factor to the establishment of the Saudi-Yemeni boundary in the Western Study Sector (for more information see Section 6.2.2 and Appendix 2.)

3.7 Conclusions

The central aim of this study as mentioned in Chapter 1, is to aid decision makers in Saudi Arabia and Yemen by suggesting a boundary, the location of which takes into consideration geographical features, economic opportunities, cross-frontier interactions, checkpoints, perceptions of the frontier, and the de facto border today.

There is a realistic possibility in this sector of using geographical features, namely Wadi Al-‘Atfayn, as a basis for the boundary. This wadi is in an area of overlapping tribal
claims between the Yam and Wa’ilah tribes. Water is accessible in this sector at a depth of 30-70m, compared to 1,000m in the Central Study Sector, which increases the value of land. A potential for hydrocarbons exists in the Western Study Sector; however all current operational activities are beyond the Saudi territorial claim. There is good cross-frontier interaction here, despite cold political relations between Saudi Arabia and Yemen from time to time. The frontier in this sector is inextricably linked with the tribes, especially the Wa’ilah who have relations and properties on both sides. These people should not be ignored in discussions about the boundary. The tribal boundary between the Yam, Wa’ilah, and Dahm is particularly important as the 1934 Treaty of Taif recommended that this should be the key to the boundary in this sector (see Section 6.2.2).

The privileges afforded the frontier tribes by the Saudi Government have affected the frequency of frontier crossings, and the documents used at the checkpoints. These tribes also use their own frontier markings which it might be helpful to incorporate in a boundary between the two countries.
References


Al-Thawr, A. (1985) *This is Yemen*. (Arabic) Beirut, Dar Al-Awdah.


CHAPTER 3

MAPS


4.1 Introduction

The Central Study Sector covers the western part of the former South Yemen (former Aden Protectorate)-Saudi Arabia frontier. It is enclosed to the south by the extreme Saudi claim represented by a section of the 1955 Saudi Declaration line (Section 2.4.2.7), and to the north by the extreme Yemeni claim represented by the western section of the 1955 British Declaration line (Section 2.4.2.6). It is approximately located in the area between 16°10'N and 18°00'N latitude, and 46°20'E and 48°20'E longitude. On the Saudi side the frontier is bordered by the Najran and Eastern Provinces, and Shabwah Governorate on the Yemeni side (Figure 4.1). The study of this sector is significant for a number of reasons: the Yemeni claim to territory on the Saudi side of the frontier was originally made by the British Government on behalf of the Aden Protectorate (see Section 2.4); the Yemeni side of the Central Study Sector belonged to South Yemen prior to the unification of Yemen in May 1990; there is no checkpoint in the Central Study Sector; most of the Central Study Sector is under Saudi control in contrast to the Western Study Sector where most of the area is under Yemeni control. Its importance is emphasised by the fact that in December 1969 there was fighting at Al-Wadi'ah in this sector between the Saudi and South Yemeni armies. This chapter examines the geographical features, cross-frontier interactions, economic opportunities, and the de facto border in the Central Study Sector. Figure 4.2 shows the terms which will be used in this chapter to describe the different parts of the Central Study Sector frontier.
Figure 4.1: Location of the Central Study Sector

Source: Bandagi 1984 (Saudi Map); Al-Farra 1980 (Yemeni Atlas)
Figure 4.2: Terms used to describe the frontier in the Central Study Sector

- **Saudi de-facto border**
- **Saudi side of the Frontier**
- **No man's Land**
- **Frontier Zone**
- **Sharurah**
- **Yemeni de-facto border**
- **Yemeni side of the Frontier**
- **Zamakh**
- **Al-'Abr**
- **Shabwah**

Source: Author's Field Survey, September 1994
4.2 Geographical Features

It is important to study the geographical features of the Central Study Sector for much the same reasons as those mentioned for the Western Study Sector (Chapter 3), with the exception of climate. The climate of the Central Study Sector will not be discussed as its only significance to this thesis would be its effect on the rhythm of frontier crossings. As there are no checkpoints in the Central Study Sector to allow people to cross the frontier legally, this is not relevant. The few crossings made by smugglers and infiltrators (Table 4.2) are made at all times of year and are unaffected by climate (Saudi Border Guard statement, Central Study Sector, September 1994).

4.2.1 GEOLOGY, RELIEF, AND WATER RESOURCES

There are two principal groups of geological formations in the Central Study Sector (Figure 4.3(A)). Firstly, most of the south-west of the sector is sand and gravel together with various outcrops forming a number of the sector’s chief relief features. These include the mountains of Al-Mutashakkhirah and Radm Al-Amir formed by the Precambrian Thaniya group; the gravel plains of Qarn Al-Wadi’ah and the site of Sharurah town are part of the Wasia and Biyadh formations; ‘Aywat Al-Say’ar and its wadis comprise the Paleocene Jeza formation. Secondly, there is Quaternary Eolian sand in the north-east of the sector. Most of the relief in this area consists of sand features such as ‘uruq (singular, ‘urq, long linear sand ridges) and shiqaq (singular, shiqqar, valleys or depressions between the ridges) (see Plate 4.1), for example Shiqq Al-Ma’atif and Al-Qa’amiyat, and ‘Uruq Al-Zayza (Figure 4.3(A)) (GMWRQ-KSA, 1963). The Saudi Border Guard in the Central Study Sector have selected relief features on the frontier for locating their observation posts in the same way as the border guards in the Western Study Sector have done (see Section 4.5.2).
CHAPTER 4

The water resources currently available in the Central Study Sector come from wells which the Saudi Government has drilled. The first well drilled in the sector was in Sharurah town in 1954 to a depth of 1,050m (Al-Billadi, 1982: pp.111-2). Since then the Saudi Government has drilled several further wells in Sharurah town and Al-Wadi'ah as Table 4.1 shows. Water in this sector is therefore not available at the relatively shallow depths at which it can be reached in the Western Study Sector, but only at an average depth of 1,100m. This factor should be taken into consideration when boundary issues are officially discussed between Saudi Arabia and Yemen (see Section 6.4).

Table 4.1 Water wells drilled on the Saudi side adjacent to the Central Study Sector

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Location of wells</th>
<th>Depth (m)</th>
<th>Geologic Time</th>
<th>Water Production (Gallons/min)</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Sharurah</td>
<td>1,100</td>
<td>Lower Ordovician to Cambrian</td>
<td>480</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Sharurah</td>
<td>1,123</td>
<td>&quot;</td>
<td>500</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Sharurah</td>
<td>1,150</td>
<td>&quot;</td>
<td>560</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Al-Wadi'ah</td>
<td>1,004</td>
<td>&quot;</td>
<td>530</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Source: Saudi Ministry of Agriculture Archive, 1994

4.2.2 POPULATION DISTRIBUTION

The latest population data for the Saudi side of the frontier is from the 1994 Saudi census. On the Yemeni side however, population data is not available for individual villages and cities, but for the governorate as a whole only, and the most recent census carried out in the former South Yemen was in 1988. A number of population data sources were consulted including the Socio-Demographic Profiles of Key Arab Countries (HRDbase, 1987), and The Population Situation in the ECWA Region. (United Nations Economic Commission for Western Asia, 1979). However, like the 1988 South Yemen census, both sources present the population distribution in South Yemen by governorate only. The author also attempted to estimate village populations using 1994 Landsat satellite images, but they were not clear enough for this purpose. However, the nearest
settlements on the Yemeni side of the frontier to the extreme Saudi territorial claim are Al-'Abr, Zamakh, Al-Hajar, and Raydat Al-Say'ar (Figure 4.4(A)), and all of these settlements are at least 40km from the area claimed.

The 1988 South Yemen census calculated rural and urban population distribution by governorate. Figure 4.4(A) shows that 87.5% of the population in Shabwah Governorate was rural (Ministry of Planning and Development, 1991: p.6).

This region of the Arabian peninsula is sparsely populated, particularly in the Central Study Sector itself (Figure 4.4(A)). The only concentrations of population in the sector are the Saudi and Yemeni border guard posts and small bedouin groups. The border guard posts were excluded from both the 1994 Saudi census and the 1988 Yemeni census, but, during the 1994 field survey the Saudi Border Guard estimated the population of each of the Saudi and Yemeni posts at between twenty and fifty individuals. Figure 4.4(A) also shows three locations in the Central Study Sector where Saudi bedouin are living in tents and following the grazing on the Saudi side of the frontier seasonally. By contrast, in Al-Wadi'ah on the Saudi side of the frontier close to the extreme British claim, bedouin are living in permanently-located tents.

The above factors indicate that population distribution in the Central Study Sector is hardly likely to be a major issue in discussions about the border between the two countries.

4.3 Cross-Frontier Interaction

Interaction in this sector is affected by a number of factors; there is no checkpoint in this sector; there are no Saudi citizens living under Yemeni control as there are in the Western Study Sector; the region is sparsely populated compared to the Western Study Sector (see Figure 3.5(A)); and there was previously a cold relationship between Saudi Arabia and South Yemen due to the Yemenis' adoption of a Marxist ideology (Gause, 1990: p.154).
In this sector information was collected about cross-frontier interaction by interviews with key people (primarily tribal sheikhs) on the Saudi side, in addition to the author’s field observations. The lack of a checkpoint in the Central Study Sector meant that it was not possible to question people crossing the frontier. The sheikhs interviewed were questioned about the existence of relatives, properties, and markets on the Yemeni side of the frontier, satisfaction of the people in the Central Study Sector with the present frontier, their wishes for the future border, and the tribal boundaries.

As with the Western Study Sector, illegal frontier crossings are made in this sector (see Table 4.2, Section 4.5). Unfortunately the author did not get the opportunity to meet and interview any of those apprehended during his field study, and so had to rely on the Saudi Border Guard’s statistics.

4.3.1 RELATIVES AND PROPERTY

The sheikhs interviewed indicated that some people living on the Saudi side of the Central Study Sector frontier have relatives and property on the Yemeni side. Members of Al-Say'ar tribe living in Sharurah town have relatives in Raydat Al-Say'ar, Al-'Abr, Zamakh, and Shabwah. Members of the Bul-'Abeid tribe living in Al-Wadi'ah and a few members of the Nahd tribe living in Sharurah have relatives in Ramlat Al-Sab'atayn and 'Ataq (Figure 4.5(A)). These tribes had the protection of one of the members of the Ibn Saud family after they agreed to pay zakat (tax) to him, and they were obedient to Ibn Saud’s call for assistance in times of war (jihad). An example of one such protection agreement, in this case between Emir Saud Al-Faisal and the Al-Say'ar tribe, was shown to the author during his field survey in 1994 by one of the sheikhs interviewed. The date on the document was not clear, but from further historical research the author found that Emir Saud Al-Faisal was the son of Imam Faisal Ibn Turkey who established the second Saudi state during the period 1869-74 (Fasiliif, 1995: p.229).

In 1939 Philby (p.59) wrote:

The route thus marked out for the guidance of travellers or caravans is known to this day [1939] as Darb al Amir. According to Ibn Hadban, its author, whom he remembers quite well as an old man, was Abdullah ibn Mishari ibn Qamla, a Dahmi shaikh, who explored and marked the way to Abr under the orders of Faisal Ibn Saud. Also on behalf of the Wahhabi Sultan he collected the Zakat taxes on the Saiar flocks and herds at the “Abr wells” where the little fort or Husn, now in ruins, was his handiwork. [see Figure 4.5(A) for the position of Al-‘Abr]

However, Saudi members of the Al-Say‘ar, Nahd and Bul-‘Abeid tribes who have relatives and property on the Yemeni side find it difficult to cross the frontier for a number of reasons. Not only are the routes to their relatives and properties difficult, but as a result of the former cold political relations between South Yemen and Saudi Arabia, there is no checkpoint in this sector and the Saudi Border Guard does not allow people to cross the frontier.

The author was fortunate in that during his field work in 1994 there were 6,000 refugees from the Yemeni civil war on the Saudi side of the frontier. These people when spoken to informally provided good evidence for the existence of relationships between people living on either side of the frontier, as most of the refugees were from the same tribes as those which live on the Saudi side of the frontier, namely Al-Say‘ar, Nahd, and Bul-‘Abeid. Moreover, despite the fact that the Saudi Government had established a camp for the refugees in September 1994, some Saudis broke the law by trying to help their relatives by moving them to Sharurah town.

According to the sheikhs interviewed, most of the properties owned by Saudis on the Yemeni side of the frontier are farms and houses, some of which were inherited from their relatives in the Al-Say‘ar, Nahd, and Bul-‘Abeid tribes on the Yemeni side.
4.3.2 OPINIONS OF KEY PEOPLE CONCERNING THE FRONTIER

The sheikhs interviewed by the author were not satisfied with the present frontier. They want the land traditionally occupied by their tribes which is currently under Yemeni control, namely Raydat Al-Say'ar, Al-'Abr, and Ramlat Al-Sab'atayn (Figure 4.5(A)), to belong to Saudi Arabia. In fact, these areas lie to the south of the extreme Saudi claim so this is unlikely to ever happen.

4.4 Economic Opportunities

The greatest economic potential in the Central Study Sector is in the field of hydrocarbons. There are currently active Yemeni operations in the oil concession Block 18 which is located in the south of the Western Study Sector, as mentioned in Section 3.4.1.

In this sector all the Yemeni operations are beyond the extreme Saudi claim with the exception of Block 11 as Figure 4.6(A) shows. Elfpetroland has the concession for Block 11, but in December 1992 they decided to suspend drilling operations because of the block’s location on the disputed frontier with Saudi Arabia (AOG Directory, 1993: p.504). Blocks 5, 6, and 11 are adjacent to the disputed area, but are affected by the Saudi claim:

A total of 12 blocks are affected all of which adjoin or touch the existing border with Saudi Arabia. In April 1992 the Saudi government addressed memoranda to five contractors, British Petroleum, PetroCanada, Philips, Hunt Oil and Atlantic Richfield, informing them they were operating in disputed territory and calling on them to cease their operations pending a settlement of the dispute. (AOG Directory, 1993: p.507)

Blocks 7, 8, 9, and 10 are located to the south of the Central Study Sector. Most of the activity in these blocks has resulted in abandoned wells as Figure 4.6(A) shows).

On the Saudi side of the frontier, ARAMCO’s 1959 operations were to the east of 48°E (Schofield and Blake, 1989: p.486), in other words, in the Eastern Study Sector.
(see Chapter 5). In recent years there have been no reported hydrocarbon operations in the Central Study Sector on the Saudi side of the frontier, but this does not mean that no potential exists.

An examination of hydrocarbon operations in the Central Study Sector makes it clear that the activities of exploration and production companies have affected the border dispute between Saudi Arabia and Yemen. With the expectation of a compromise in the future, it is possible to imagine joint development agreements for the oil and gas fields this sector.

4.5 The De Facto Border

The de facto border in the Central Study Sector is delimited by the location of border guard posts. On the Saudi side of the frontier the border guards in this sector are located at Al-Mahtadar, Al-Murassas, Huwaymil, Qallubah, and Al-Akhashim. On the Yemeni side the posts are at Al-Mutashakkhirah, three posts in the area of Al-'Ari'arin, and Al-Manabiz (Figure 4.7(A)). These border guard posts are located using natural features such as mountains, 'urug and shiqaq. Figure 4.7(A) also shows the distances between the border guard positions on both the Saudi and Yemeni sides of frontier. In general the distances are between 20 and 80km, and the width of the de facto border is approximately 10-20km. Where border guard positions are closer together in a situation like the Saudi-Yemeni frontier, more tension can be expected in these areas. The Saudi and Yemeni border guards patrol the de facto border around the clock and do not allow anyone to cross the frontier. Anyone caught attempting to do so is arrested as a smuggler or infiltrator.

Figure 4.7(A) shows the de facto border. Section A is coincident with part of the 1914 Violet line and the terrain mainly consists of sand dunes forming 'urug and shiqaq. Section B is coincident with part of the 1955 Saudi Declaration line and the terrain is a
mixture of gravel, sand, and mountains, as it also is in Section C which is coincident with part of the line shown on the MSD-SAR (1967) Yemen Arab Republic map.

Table 4.2 Reasons for arrest and items confiscated in the Central Study Sector, 1992-4

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Infiltrators</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>10</td>
<td>74</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Smugglers</td>
<td>54</td>
<td>47</td>
<td>240</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Items Confiscated:</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Alcohol</td>
<td>879</td>
<td>--</td>
<td>325</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Weapons</td>
<td>66</td>
<td>22</td>
<td>144</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Ammunition</td>
<td>12788</td>
<td>68</td>
<td>2640</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Boxes/sacks of food</td>
<td>229</td>
<td>495</td>
<td>--</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Various items</td>
<td>105,504</td>
<td>--</td>
<td>724,439</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Source: Saudi Border Guard statistics, 1994

Table 4.2 shows the reasons for arrest and items confiscated in the Central Study Sector between 1992-4. There were more arrests in the Central Study Sector than the Western Study Sector during this period for two reasons. Firstly, there is no checkpoint in the Central Study Sector. Secondly, the frontier in the Central Study Sector is mostly through sandy terrain. Infiltrators and smugglers prefer crossing the frontier in sandy areas as the distance between border guard posts is greater, especially in the north-east of the sector where the Saudi guard posts are between 20-90km apart, making it easier to evade the patrols (Saudi Border Guard statement, 1994) (Figure 4.7(A)). Table 4.2 also shows that there were a greater number of infiltrators and smugglers arrested in 1994 (almost an average of one a day) than either of the previous years, perhaps due to the effect of the Yemeni civil war in 1994 as has been mentioned in Section 3.5 dealing with the de facto border in the Western Study Sector.

4.6 Distribution of Tribes on the Frontier

The method used by the author to determine the tribal boundaries in the Central Study Sector was the same as that used for the Western Study Sector: interviews with sheikhs (see Section 1.6.3).
All the land in the Central Study Sector belongs to the Al-Say'ar tribe (Figure 4.8(A)). Both the extreme British claim and the extreme Saudi claim would divide the Al-Say'ar tribe in two. The Aden Protectorate claimed the Al-Say'ar tribe:

The following tribes emerged as belonging to the Aden Protectorate on the northern border from west to east: the Karab ..., the Saiar ... (Schofield, 1993: Vol.3, p.538)

The Saudi Government also claim the Al-Say'ar tribe:

The Amir Faysal was reminding the British that Al-Abr [in the south of the Al-Say'ar tribal area, Figure 4.8(A)] had once belonged to his Majesty's forefathers during the past century. (Wilkinson, 1991: p.214)

However, most of the Al-Sayar tribe and their sheikhs now live on the Saudi side of the frontier in Sharurah town and in the town of Al-Wadi'ah (see Appendix 2.4 for the genealogy of the Al-Say'ar tribe).

The sheikhs interviewed stated that those members of the Al-Say'ar tribe living on the Saudi side of the frontier are loyal to Saudi Arabia. They showed the author copies of receipts for the zakat (tax) paid by the Al-Say'ar tribe to the Saudi Government for the period 1946-72, together with a copy of the protection agreement between Saud Al-Faisal (1869-74) and the Al-Say'ar sheikh. The reason that the author was shown these documents was not that the members of the Al-Say'ar tribe wanted to prove that their tribal lands should lie on the Saudi side of the border, but to give evidence of the fact that the tribe had been loyal to Ibn Saud for a long time, despite part of their land being under Yemeni control. The most important areas of Al-Say'ar tribal land on the Yemeni side of the frontier are Al-'Abr, Al-Hajar, Raydat Al-Say'ar, Wadi Hazar, and 'Aywat Al-Say'ar (Figure 4.8(A)).

There are members of three other tribes living amongst the Al-Say'ar tribe in the Central Study Sector, but these peoples' tribal lands are beyond the extreme Saudi territorial claim. The tribes concerned are Al-Kurab and Al-Briak, both sub-tribes of Bul-'Abeid, and most of the individuals live in the town of Al-Wadi'ah.
CHAPTER 4

From the facts presented in this section, it can be seen that the distribution of tribes in the Central Study Sector does not impinge on the *de facto* border. Furthermore, it would not be possible to use tribal borders as a basis for a future compromise boundary in this sector for two reasons. Firstly, the Saudi *de facto* border is coincident with the extreme Saudi claim as Figure 4.7(A) shows and some of the Al-Say'ar tribal land lies beyond the extreme Saudi claim. Secondly, the validity of tribal claims is extremely hard to prove, here as elsewhere.

4.7 Conclusion

The most likely compromise border in the Central Study Sector would be the *de facto* border with some modification (see Chapter 6). The *de facto* border in this sector has special characteristics compared to other sectors along the Saudi-Yemeni frontier.

The frontier in the Central Study Sector prohibits interaction between the people on either side; no visits to relatives or properties can be made, and no one crosses the frontier to go to markets, with the exception of smugglers (Table 4.2). This is in marked contrast to the good level of interaction which exists across the frontier in the Western Study Sector.

The Saudi and British claims in the Central Study Sector both ignore tribal boundaries. The Al-Say'ar tribe are divided by the current frontier (Figure 4.8(A)). The chief of the Al-Say'ar tribe estimated that in 1994, 60% of the Al-Say'ar tribal land was on the Saudi side, along with 80% of the tribe, whilst 40% of their land and 20% of their tribal members were on the Yemeni side of the frontier. Those members of the Al-Say'ar tribe on the Yemeni side of the frontier are not likely in the future to find themselves on the Saudi side of an agreed boundary, as they live to the south of the extreme Saudi claim.

The other characteristic of the Central Study Sector is the number of border guard posts on both the Yemeni and Saudi sides of the frontier. There are six Saudi posts and a further six Yemeni posts at a distance of between 20-80km apart (Figure 4.7(A)). This
relatively high density of guard posts is partly explained by the tension that existed between the Saudi and South Yemen regimes prior to the unification of Yemen in May 1990, and which resulted in the Wadi’ah war in 1969 (Schofield, 1992: Vol.20, p.947). In addition, the existence of oil in the triangular area to the south of the Central Study Sector, together with the conflict between the Yemeni states in both 1972 and 1979, has contributed to the number of border guard posts on the frontier in this sector (Gause, 1990: p.148). All the Yemeni border guard posts in this sector were built by South Yemen, with the exception of Al-Bramah guard post in the west which was built by North Yemen.

For all of the above reasons it is presumed that, with a few modifications, the Logical Boundary will follow the *de facto* border in the Central Study Sector (see Section 6.2.3).
**References**


**MAPS**


Chapter 5

The Eastern Study Sector

5.1 Introduction

The Eastern Study Sector covers the eastern part of the former South Yemen (former Aden Protectorate)-Saudi Arabia frontier. This sector is enclosed to the south by the extreme Saudi claim represented by a section of the 1955 Saudi Declaration line (Section 2.4.2.7) and the extreme Yemeni claims represented by a section of the 1955 British Declaration line (Section 2.4.2.6). This area is approximately located between 17°00'N and 19°00'N latitude, and 48°20'E and 52°00'E longitude (Figure 5.1). The study of the Eastern Study Sector is significant for a number of reasons. This is the only sector of the Saudi-Yemeni frontier which has an informal checkpoint (see Section 1.6.2.1 for the difference between a formal and informal checkpoint), namely Al-Kharkhir checkpoint on the Saudi de facto border. There is also more tension in the de facto border area in this sector than either of the other sectors, particularly at Dahyah, 'Uruq Ibn Hamudah, and 'Uruq Al-Kharkhir, near the Oman-Saudi Arabia-Yemen tripoint (SWB, 1994a: p.15-6). Figure 5.2 shows the terms which will be used in this chapter to describe the different parts of the Eastern Study Sector frontier.

An agreement between the Republic of Yemen and the Sultanate of Oman signed on 1 October 1992 used the geographical point at the intersection of latitude 19°00'N and longitude 52°00'E as the terminus of the boundary between the two countries. This point is in the north-east of the Eastern Study Sector (Figure 5.1). Another agreement signed on 21 March 1990 by the Kingdom of Saudi Arabia and the Sultanate of Oman used the same geographical point (19°00'N 52°00'E) as the terminus of their mutual boundary (MEES, 1992b pp.1D-4D).
Figure 5.1: Location of the Eastern Study Sector

Source: Bandagi 1984 (Saudi Map); Al-Farra 1980 (Yemeni Atlas)
Figure 5.2: Terms used to describe the frontier in the Eastern Study Sector

- Saudi side of the Frontier
- De-Facto Border Area under Saudi Control
- De-Facto Border Area under Yemeni Control
- No man's Land
- Yemeni side of the Frontier

- Saudi border guard post
- Yemeni border guard post
- Eastern Study Sector

Source: Author's Field Survey, July - September 1994
The existence of these agreements has heightened the tension concerning the location of the Oman-Saudi Arabia-Yemen tripoint. Saudi Arabia and Yemen in principle each want to claim as much territory as possible at the junction with the Omani border. The Saudis are attempting to push the tripoint as far south as possible towards the junction of the extreme Saudi territorial claim with the Oman-Yemen border. The Yemenis, on the other hand, want the Saudi-Yemen border to be an extension of the Saudi-Oman border, which would coincide with the extreme British claim. The Yemenis’ case is strengthened by the existence of the above agreements.

Finally, in contrast to the Central Study Sector (Chapter 4) which is largely controlled by Saudi Arabia, most of the disputed Eastern Study Sector region is controlled by Yemen.

5.2 Geographical Features

The geographical features of the Eastern Study Sector are an extension of those in the Central Study Sector. This section examines the geology, relief, water resources, climate, and population distribution of the sector.

5.2.1 GEOLOGY, RELIEF, AND WATER RESOURCES

There are three principal groups of geological formation in the Eastern Study Sector. Starting in the north of the sector there are Quaternary Eolian sands with gravel, together with Tertiary sandstone and limestone forming a relief of mega-ridge dunes (‘uruq) with elevations of between 201 and 350m, and intervening valleys (shiqaq). There are also sand seas, known in Arabic as ramlat. Some of the more prominent dune features in this area are ‘Uruq Al-Maward, ‘Uruq Dahyah, ‘Uruq Ibn Hamudah, ‘Uruq Al-Kharkhir, Ramlat Umm Gharib, and Ramlat ‘Aywat, whilst Shiqaq Al-Ma’atif, Shiqqat Al-Sirdab, Al-Qa’amiyat, Al-Dikakah, and Umm Al-Malh are some of the more prominent inter-
dune valleys (Figure 5.3(A)). These features are all close to the 1955 British Declaration line which is the extreme British claim in this sector.

To the south is an area of wadis and plateaux between 351 and 450m above sea level and formed of a mixture of Tertiary and Quaternary geological formations, principally gravel and sand, the Dammam and Rus formations, and the Jeza formation. The most notable relief features are the wadis of Wadi ‘Aywat Al-Say’ar, Wadi Hazar, Wadi Qanab, Wadi Armah, Wadi ‘Arabah, and ‘Aywat Al-Manahil, whilst Khasfat Qanab is an important wadi entrance (Figure 5.3(A)).

In the south-east of the Eastern Study Sector there is the Tertiary Habshiya formation, which forms Jabal Maharat (601 to 1,000m) (GMSCRQ, 1963; GMSERQ, 1963; MSD-KSA, 1992; Republic of Yemen map).

There is a possibility of using a geographical feature in the Eastern Study Sector as the boundary between Saudi Arabia and Yemen. The feature in question is the southern edge of the Rub’ Al-Khali (Empty Quarter), where sand dunes give way to flat sand and gravel plain. This margin runs some 30 to 50km south of the 1935 Riyadh Line (Figure 5.3(A)). The possibility of using this feature to demarcate the boundary was considered by the Aden Government in March 1937, but was never formally proposed to Saudi Arabia (Schofield, 1992: Vol.20, pp.139-52; 1994: p.21; Wilkinson, 1991: pp.216-7; also see Section 2.4.2.4 for more details).

Relatively little information is available concerning water resources and the location of aquifers in relation to the frontier in the Eastern Study Sector. The water resources currently available on the Saudi side of the frontier in this sector come from wells drilled at Umm Gharib, Al-Sirdab, and Al-Kharkhir at an average depth of approximately 450m as Table 5.1 shows. There are also hand-dug wells at Wadi Dahyah and ‘Uruq Ibn Hamudah. On the Yemeni side there are a further four drilled wells at Wadi Sha’it, ‘Aywat Al-Manahil, Thamud, and Wadi Hazar as well as hand-dug wells in Wadi Hazar, Thamud, ‘Aywat Al-Manahil, Wadi Armah, Wadi ‘Arabah, and Wadi Rakhawt as Figure
CHAPTER 5

5.5(A) shows (MSD-KSA, 1992, Republic of Yemen map; MPMR-KSA, 1983, Arabian Peninsula map). Data concerning wells on the Yemeni side of the frontier is not available, but one might speculate that they are similar to those on the Saudi side.

Differences in the depth of the water table and well productivity, and the consequent variation in the availability of water, are very important and should be taken into consideration when the boundary is discussed between Saudi Arabia and Yemen.

Table 5.1 Water wells drilled near the Saudi de facto border in the Eastern Study Sector

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Location of wells</th>
<th>Depth (m)</th>
<th>Geologic Time</th>
<th>Water Production (Gallons/min)</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Umm Gharib</td>
<td>350</td>
<td>Pliocene</td>
<td>504</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Al-Sirdab</td>
<td>400</td>
<td>Pliocene</td>
<td>452</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Al-Kharkhir(1)</td>
<td>505</td>
<td>Pliocene</td>
<td>600</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Al-Kharkhir(2)</td>
<td>530</td>
<td>Pliocene</td>
<td>220</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Source: Saudi Ministry of Agriculture Survey, 1994

5.2.2 CLIMATE

As was indicated in the preceding two chapters, the climate of the area will be discussed only in so far as it affects frontier crossings.

The climatic factor most likely to affect frontier crossings in the Eastern Study Sector is rainfall which affects the availability of pasture (Saudi Border Guard statement at Al-Kharkhir, 1994). The nearest meteorological station to the Eastern Study Sector is in Sharurah town which is a considerable distance (600km) from Al-Kharkhir checkpoint. Figure 5.4 shows the monthly rainfall totals for the Sharurah meteorological station for 1992 and 1993. The total annual rainfall for these two years was 36.7mm and 49.3mm, with 17 and 23 rainy days respectively. These exceptionally low totals and number of rainy days make this region one of the driest in Saudi Arabia (Saudi Yearbook, 1992-3: pp.38-51). Due to the scarcity of rainfall along the frontier in the Eastern Study Sector the bedouin move to pasture and wells during the winter and spring. Plate 5.1 shows one of
Figure 5.4: Monthly rainfall totals at Sharurah Meteorological Station for 1992 and 1993

Source: Saudi Statistical Yearbook 1992-3
these bedouin with his herd of camels on the Saudi *de facto* border. The author visited him during his 1994 field survey. He is from the UAE and he moves his camels across the desert between pasture and water wells. The Saudi Border Guard allow the bedouin to use the pasture in the *de facto* border area under Saudi control on the condition that they obtain permission from the Border Guard at Al-Kharkhir checkpoint. As previously mentioned, in the Western and Central Study Sectors, bedouin are not allowed to cross the Saudi *de facto* border for security reasons. However, in the Eastern Study Sector the Saudi Border Guard at Al-Kharkhir checkpoint allow the bedouin to cross the *de facto* border because most of them are well known to the Border Guard due to the frequency with which they cross, and they do not cause problems like smuggling (Saudi Border Guard statement at Al-Kharkhir checkpoint, July 1994). Furthermore, some of the shiqaq and 'uruq pastures such as 'Urq Ibn Hamudah, Al-Sardab, Badi‘ Al-Ghanm, Qanab, ‘Aywat Al-Manahil, and Hazar, have been used by the bedouin for a very long time (Figure 5.5(A)). There are also a small number of bedouin from the UAE who cross the Saudi *de facto* border for pasture (see Table 5.4 in Section 5.3.1).

The 1990 Oman-Saudi Arabia and 1992 Oman-Yemen agreements stipulated the rights to pasture, movement and the use of water resources:

The organization of the border authorities as well as the right to pasture lands, movement and the use of water resources in the border areas shall be governed in accordance with the two annexes attached to this agreement (Oman-Yemen, 1992: Article 7, cited in MEES, 1992b.p.D2).

The organization of the border authorities as well as the right to pasture lands, movement and the use of water resources in the border areas shall be regulated in accordance with the two annexes appended to this agreement (Oman-Saudi Arabia, 1990: Article 7, cited in MEES, 1992b.p.D3).

Access to pasture lands and the use of water resources on the frontier, particularly in the Eastern Study Sector, should likewise be discussed and regulated in talks concerning the boundary between Saudi Arabia and Yemen. It should be possible to reach a workable and practical mechanism to allow cross-border grazing.
5.2.3 POPULATION DISTRIBUTION

The population in and around the Eastern Study Sector is sparse compared to both the Western and Central Study Sectors. On the Saudi de facto border there are 3,000 people living in the village of Al-Kharkhir which has a market, schools, a health clinic, petrol stations, and electricity. The inhabitants are bedouin who are mostly living in permanently-located tents, with a few houses built of local stone (Plate 5.2). Most of the menfolk work for Al-Kharkhir Emirate (the local governorate) or as camel herders. A few of them also have small farms in Shiqqat Al-Kharkhir (Plate 5.3). Most of the settlers are from Al-Manahil tribe.

Nearly all of the Eastern Study Sector has been under Yemeni control in recent years. The Yemeni Government divided most of the sector between the Hadhramaut and Al-Mahrah Governorates (Figure 5.6). These two governorates are the least populated of all the governorates in Yemen, especially Al-Mahrah Governorate (Ministry of Planning and Development, 1991: p.25). Figure 5.6(A) shows that the two governorates have a higher percentage of rural inhabitants than urban which is the norm for this part of the Arabian Peninsula. As was mentioned in Chapter 4 (Central Study Sector), there is no data available on population distribution for the Yemeni side of the frontier, but Figure 5.6(A) shows the villages, wadis, and wells in the Eastern Study Sector as shown on the MSD-KSA (1992) Republic of Yemen map. It can be expected that the bedouin will be settled around these areas. Most of the settlers in the Eastern Study Sector are from Al-Say'ar, Al-Manahil, and Al-Mahrah tribes. The Al-Mahrah tribe have their own language which they use in their tribal area, whilst speaking Arabic with other tribes (Al-Thawr, 1985: p.497).

An examination of the sparse population in the Eastern Study Sector indicates that it should not be a factor to obstruct a border agreement between Saudi Arabia and Yemen.
5.3 Cross-Frontier Interaction

As indicated above, the population both within and around the Eastern Study Sector is very scarce, even more so than that of the Western Study Sector. This, together with the informal nature of Al-Kharkhir checkpoint (see Section 5.3.2 on checkpoints), affects cross-frontier population interaction. Table 5.2 shows the big differences in the numbers of people crossing the Saudi *de facto* border in 1992 through Al-Khadra checkpoint in comparison to Al-Kharkhir checkpoint.

Table 5.2 Numbers and nationalities of those arriving at and departing from Al-Khadra and Al-Kharkhir checkpoints, January to December 1993

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>Nationality</th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
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<th></th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>Saudi</td>
<td>Yemen</td>
<td>UAE</td>
<td>Qatari</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Al-Khadra</td>
<td></td>
<td>Arriving</td>
<td>24,743</td>
<td>22,718</td>
<td>268</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>Departing</td>
<td>22,237</td>
<td>22,580</td>
<td>321</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>Total</td>
<td>46,980</td>
<td>45,298</td>
<td>589</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Al-Kharkhir</td>
<td></td>
<td>Arriving</td>
<td>4,700</td>
<td>1,350</td>
<td>600</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>Departing</td>
<td>4,300</td>
<td>1,280</td>
<td>416</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>Total</td>
<td>9,000</td>
<td>2,630</td>
<td>1,016</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Source: Al-Khadra data from Saudi Immigration Statistics Archive, 1993 and Al-Kharkhir data estimated by Al-Kharkhir Border Guard, 1993

The difference in the numbers of Saudis and Yemenis crossing is particularly notable. Table 5.2 also shows that more people from the UAE cross the Saudi *de facto* border at Al-Kharkhir than at Al-Khadra. This is for two reasons; members of Al-Manahil tribe living in the UAE travel to visit their relatives who live in the Eastern Study Sector (see Section 5.3.1.1 on visits to relatives); Al-Kharkhir checkpoint is also closer to the UAE than Al-Khadra.

Table 5.3 shows the residence and tribe of respondents interviewed at Al-Kharkhir checkpoint whilst crossing the Saudi *de facto* border. Most of those interviewed were members of Al-Manahil tribe which shares the Eastern Study Sector with Al-Say'ar and Al-Mahrah tribes (see Section 5.5.3 on the distribution of the tribes). All of those
questioned lived in the Eastern Study Sector with the exception of those from the UAE and Qatar. Most of the Saudis in the sample lived close to the *de facto* border, with some of them living under Yemeni control (see Section 5.5 on the *de facto* border).

Table 5.3 Nationality, tribe, and residence of respondents interviewed at Al-Kharkhir checkpoint

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Respondents' Nationality</th>
<th>Tribe</th>
<th>Settlement</th>
<th>Sample Size</th>
</tr>
</thead>
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<tr>
<td></td>
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<td>%</td>
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<td>Al-Manahil</td>
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</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Al-Mahrah</td>
<td>25</td>
<td>9.7</td>
</tr>
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<td></td>
<td>Al-Manahil</td>
<td>14</td>
<td>5.4</td>
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<td>‘Aywat Al-Manahil</td>
<td>13</td>
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<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Dahyah (S)</td>
<td>12</td>
<td>4.6</td>
</tr>
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<td></td>
<td>‘Uruq Ibn Hamudah (S)</td>
<td>10</td>
<td>3.8</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Sanaw (Y)</td>
<td>10</td>
<td>3.8</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Al-Harajah (Y)</td>
<td>9</td>
<td>3.5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Upper ‘Aywat (Y)</td>
<td>7</td>
<td>2.7</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Badi’ Al-Ghanm (S)</td>
<td>6</td>
<td>2.3</td>
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<td>Wadi Sha’it (Y)</td>
<td>4</td>
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</tr>
<tr>
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<td></td>
<td><strong>260</strong></td>
<td><strong>100</strong></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Yemeni</td>
<td>Al-Manahil</td>
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<td>38.9</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Lbnah (Y)</td>
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<td>10.2</td>
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<td>Raydat Al-Say’ar (Y)</td>
<td>11</td>
<td>10.2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Wadi Hazar (Y)</td>
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<td>9.3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Husn Al-‘Abr (Y)</td>
<td>9</td>
<td>8.3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Jabal Maharat (Y)</td>
<td>8</td>
<td>7.4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Wadi Qanab (Y)</td>
<td>8</td>
<td>7.4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Armah (Y)</td>
<td>6</td>
<td>5.6</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Wadi ‘Arabah (Y)</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>2.1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td><strong>108</strong></td>
<td><strong>100</strong></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>UAE</td>
<td>Al-Manahil</td>
<td>30</td>
<td>37.5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Al-Mahrah</td>
<td>22</td>
<td>27.5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Al-Manahil</td>
<td>15</td>
<td>18.8</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Aradah</td>
<td>10</td>
<td>12.5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Al-Manadir</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>3.1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td><strong>80</strong></td>
<td><strong>100</strong></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Qatari</td>
<td>Al-Kurab</td>
<td>20</td>
<td>40</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Al-Wakra</td>
<td>10</td>
<td>20</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Al-Raiyan</td>
<td>7</td>
<td>14</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Al-Harithy</td>
<td>7</td>
<td>14</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Badit Al-Raiyan</td>
<td>6</td>
<td>12</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td><strong>50</strong></td>
<td><strong>100</strong></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

*(S): Settlement under Saudi control
*(Y): Settlement under Yemeni control

*Source: Author's Field Survey, 1994*
Most of the Saudi respondents were living in the *de facto* border area under Saudi control, whilst some were living in the *de facto* border area under Yemeni control. The Yemeni respondents were also living either in that part of the *de facto* border area which is under Yemeni control, or on the Yemeni side of the frontier (Figure 5.7(A)).

Anyone crossing the Saudi *de facto* border in either direction must report to Al-Kharkhir checkpoint, including Saudis who are only crossing the Saudi *de facto* border to or from the *de facto* border area under Saudi control. Because there are no checkpoints to control the movement of people within the *de facto* border area between the areas under Saudi and Yemeni control, Saudi Arabia uses this system to control the movement of people from the Yemeni to the Saudi side of the frontier. If anyone attempts to cross the Saudi *de facto* border to the Saudi side of the frontier in this sector they will be arrested by the Saudi Border Guard as smugglers. However the Saudi Border Guard along the *de facto* border reported to the author in July 1994 that, in general, very few such crossings are attempted.

For the same reason as mentioned above, the Qataris and those from the UAE who wish to visit their relatives either on the Yemeni side, or even in the *de facto* border area under Saudi control must first report to Al-Kharkhir checkpoint. The settlement of Shiqqat Al-Kharkhir and its market, Al-Harah are regarded as being on the Saudi *de facto* border. This means that people visiting the settlement and market from either side, whether locally from the *de facto* border area under Saudi control, or from further afield such as anywhere in Saudi Arabia or the UAE, have to report to Al-Kharkhir checkpoint before they can begin their business in the settlement, and again, prior to leaving the area.

5.3.1 PURPOSES OF FRONTIER CROSSINGS

Table 5.4 shows reasons, in order of priority, for crossing the Saudi *de facto* border given by respondents interviewed at Al-Kharkir checkpoint. As previously mentioned, the main purpose of crossings can only be approximations because the various purposes for
the crossings were often very closely related. 44.6% of all crossings were primarily for the purpose of visiting markets, making this the most common reason for Saudi and Yemeni movement in the Eastern Study Sector (Figure 5.8). This is presumably because of the rarity of markets in the Eastern Study Sector. The market at Al-Kharkhir supplies the people of the frontier region with various goods and petrol (see Section 5.3.1.2 on visits to markets). The second most common reason for Saudi de facto border crossings in this sector amongst the Saudis and Yemenis in the sample was for visits to relatives. Most of the Saudis, Yemenis, and those from the UAE in the sample were from Al-Manahil tribe whose tribal lands cover much of the Eastern Study Sector. Amongst those interviewed from Qatar and the UAE, visits to relatives was the most common reason given for crossing the Saudi de facto border. Few of the crossings in the sample were for the purpose of visits to properties, with the exception of a number of Saudis who own property in Shiqqat Al-Kharkhir. 12.5% of crossings made by those from the UAE were for the purpose of grazing only.

Table 5.4  The purposes of Saudi de facto border crossings of respondents interviewed at Al-Kharkhir checkpoint, classified according to priority

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Purpose of Crossing</th>
<th>Priority</th>
<th>Respondents' Nationality</th>
<th>Saudi</th>
<th>Yemeni</th>
<th>UAE</th>
<th>Qatai</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>Saudi</td>
<td>%</td>
<td>Yemeni</td>
<td>%</td>
<td>UAE</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Relatives</td>
<td>First priority</td>
<td>146</td>
<td>56.2</td>
<td>59</td>
<td>54.6</td>
<td>10</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Second priority</td>
<td>114</td>
<td>43.8</td>
<td>49</td>
<td>45.4</td>
<td>10</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Other purposes</td>
<td>260</td>
<td>100</td>
<td>108</td>
<td>100</td>
<td>80</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Markets</td>
<td>First priority</td>
<td>114</td>
<td>43.8</td>
<td>108</td>
<td>100</td>
<td>--</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Second priority</td>
<td>114</td>
<td>43.8</td>
<td>108</td>
<td>100</td>
<td>--</td>
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<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Third priority</td>
<td>8</td>
<td>8</td>
<td>10</td>
<td>12.5</td>
<td>72</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Other purposes</td>
<td>146</td>
<td>56.2</td>
<td>--</td>
<td>--</td>
<td>72</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Total</td>
<td>260</td>
<td>100</td>
<td>108</td>
<td>100</td>
<td>80</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Properties</td>
<td>First priority</td>
<td>146</td>
<td>56.2</td>
<td>--</td>
<td>--</td>
<td>--</td>
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<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Second priority</td>
<td>114</td>
<td>43.8</td>
<td>108</td>
<td>100</td>
<td>--</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Other purposes</td>
<td>260</td>
<td>100</td>
<td>108</td>
<td>100</td>
<td>80</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Grazing and Wells</td>
<td>First priority</td>
<td>260</td>
<td>100</td>
<td>108</td>
<td>100</td>
<td>70</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Other purposes</td>
<td>260</td>
<td>100</td>
<td>108</td>
<td>100</td>
<td>80</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Source: Author's Field Survey, 1 Jul-10 Sept, 1994
Figure 5.8: Purposes of crossings by respondents interviewed at Al-Kharkhir checkpoint

Source: Authors Field Survey July - September 1994
5.3.1.1 Visits to Relatives

Visits to relatives are not as important a reason for Saudi de facto border crossings in the Eastern Study Sector as they are in the Western Study Sector. In the author’s field survey in the Western Study Sector most of the Saudis questioned crossing the Saudi de facto border had a second wife on the Yemeni side, but in the Eastern Study Sector this factor did not arise in the survey.

Table 5.5 Tribe and settlement of relatives of respondents interviewed at Al-Kharkhir checkpoint

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Respondents’ Nationality</th>
<th>Relatives’ Tribe</th>
<th>Relatives’ Settlement</th>
<th>Sample</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Saudi</td>
<td>Al-Manahil</td>
<td>‘Uruq Ibn Hamudah (S)</td>
<td>23</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Al-Manahil</td>
<td>‘Aywat Al-Manahil (Y)</td>
<td>16</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Al-Manahil</td>
<td>Badi’ Al-Ghanam (S)</td>
<td>15</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Al-Manahil</td>
<td>‘Uruq Al-Kharkhir (S)</td>
<td>13</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Al-Manahil</td>
<td>Al-Harajah (Y)</td>
<td>13</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Al-Manahil</td>
<td>Armah (Y)</td>
<td>12</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Al-Manahil</td>
<td>Upper ‘Aywat (Y)</td>
<td>12</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Al-Mahrah</td>
<td>Dahyah (S)</td>
<td>12</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Al-Mahrah</td>
<td>Lbnah (Y)</td>
<td>9</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Al-Manahil</td>
<td>Shiqqat Al-Kharkhir (S)</td>
<td>9</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Al-Manahil</td>
<td>Shiqqat Al-Ma’atif (S)</td>
<td>7</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Al-Manahil</td>
<td>Qanab (Y)</td>
<td>5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>No visit to relatives</td>
<td></td>
<td>114</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Total</td>
<td></td>
<td>260</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Yemeni</td>
<td>Al-Manahil</td>
<td>Shiqqat Al-Kharkhir (S)</td>
<td>59</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>No visit to relatives</td>
<td></td>
<td>49</td>
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<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Total</td>
<td></td>
<td>108</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>UAE</td>
<td>Al-Manahil</td>
<td>Armah (Y)</td>
<td>24</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Al-Manahil</td>
<td>‘Aywat Al-Manahil (Y)</td>
<td>15</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Al-Manahil</td>
<td>Shiqqat Al-Kharkhir (S)</td>
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</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Al-Manahil</td>
<td>Wadi Qanab (Y)</td>
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</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Al-Mahrah</td>
<td>Wadi Hazar (Y)</td>
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<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Al-Mahrah</td>
<td>‘Uruq Al-Kharkhir (S)</td>
<td>5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>No visit to relatives</td>
<td></td>
<td>10</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Total</td>
<td></td>
<td>80</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Qatari</td>
<td>Al-Kurab</td>
<td>Al-Hajar</td>
<td>17</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Al-Briak</td>
<td>Zamakh</td>
<td>13</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Al-Say’ar</td>
<td>Husn Al-‘Abr</td>
<td>10</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>No visit to relatives</td>
<td></td>
<td>10</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Total</td>
<td></td>
<td>50</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

(S): under Saudi control; (Y): under Yemeni control

Source: Author’s Field Survey, 1 Jul-10 Sept, 1994
Table 5.5 shows more detail about those crossing the Saudi *de facto* border in the Eastern Sector to visit relatives. Most of the relatives of the Saudis reporting to Al-Kharkhir checkpoint live in the village of Shiqqat Al-Kharkhir (Figure 5.9(A)). The distances between the Saudis’ homes and those of their relatives are mostly between 30 and 120km (Figure 5.9(A)).

Thirty percent of the Saudis visiting relatives cross the Saudi *de facto* border daily taking supplies (particularly petrol) to their relatives living south of the Saudi *de facto* border. The remainder visit their relatives either weekly or monthly (Table 5.6), especially those whose relatives live far from Shiqqat Al-Kharkhir (Figure 5.9(A)). Table 5.5 shows that 54.6% of all the Yemenis questioned reporting to Al-Kharkhir checkpoint were visiting their relatives in Shiqqat Al-Kharkhir whilst making a trip to the market there at the same time. The distance between these Yemenis’ homes and those of their relatives was, in general, greater than 100km (Figure 5.9(A)). Most of them cross the Saudi *de facto* border monthly as Table 5.6 shows. Most of the relatives on both sides of the frontier are from Al-Manahil tribe.

*Table 5.6 Frequency of visits to relatives by respondents interviewed at Al-Kharkhir checkpoint*

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Frequency of Visits</th>
<th>Respondents’ Nationality</th>
<th>Total</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Saudi</td>
<td>Yemen</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>No.</td>
<td>%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Daily</td>
<td>78</td>
<td>30.0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Weekly</td>
<td>54</td>
<td>20.8</td>
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<tr>
<td>Monthly</td>
<td>14</td>
<td>5.4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Yearly</td>
<td>--</td>
<td>--</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Other (mostly</td>
<td>--</td>
<td>--</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>3-6 months)</td>
<td>No visit to relatives</td>
<td>114</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Total</td>
<td>260</td>
<td>100</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

*Source:* Author’s Field Survey, 1 Jul-10 Sept, 1994

Of those in the sample from the UAE visiting relatives, most of the relatives lived in Shiqqat Al-Kharkhir, ‘Aywat Al-Manahil, and Armah. The distance between their homes
in the UAE and those of their relatives is more than 700km (Figure 5.7(A)). In general they cross the Saudi de facto border every three to six months (Table 5.6). All the relatives of those from the UAE were also from Al-Manahil tribe.

Figure 5.9(A) also shows that the relatives of the Qatari in the sample all live on the Yemeni side of the frontier beyond the Eastern Sector, more than 1,000km from their homes in Qatar. These Qatari are members of Al-Kurab and Al-Briak tribes which are scattered throughout Saudi Arabia, Yemen and Qatar (tribal sheikh’s statement, 1994). The Qatari also cross the frontier every three to six months.

Comparing the data on purposes for frontier crossings statistically, using the Kruskal-Wallis test (see Section 1.6.2.4), there is a highly significant difference between the four nationalities with respect to visits to relatives (chi-sq = 62.9447; degree of freedom (df) = 3; significance = 0.000). The Mean Rank of the Kruscal-Wallis test indicates that the data for those of UAE and Qatari nationality with respect to visits to relatives is significantly different from that of the other nationalities. This is because nearly all of the UAE and Qatari respondents were crossing the Saudi de facto border in order to visit relatives, and for most of them this was the main reason for the crossing. The Saudi and Yemeni respondents, on the other hand, were crossing the de facto border for a variety of purposes such as visits to markets, properties, and relatives.

5.3.1.2 Visits to Markets

The market in Shiqqat Al-Kharkhir is the only market visited by Saudis and Yemenis in the Eastern Sector, as Table 5.7 shows. The market is known as Al-Harah and most basic goods are available in addition to fuel (petrol, diesel, kerosene, and gas) which is the most required commodity. People in the Eastern Sector use the fuel to run their vehicles, cooking stoves, and lanterns. Petrol is always available in Shiqqat Al-Kharkhir and is cheaper there than on the Yemeni side of the frontier. For example, in 1994 the price of a 25\text{bbl} barrel of petrol in Al-Kharkhir market was US$3, whilst on the Yemeni side of the frontier the price was more than US$10, and the petrol was not always available
(respondent’s statement during author’s field survey, July 1994). Figure 5.10(A) shows that Al-Kharkhir market is the closest market for both Saudis and Yemenis living in the Eastern Sector and it is a considerable distance from any other major settlement on either side of the frontier. In addition, Al-Kharkhir checkpoint is an informal checkpoint with no customs. Saudis and Yemenis living along the frontier are therefore allowed to cross the Saudi de facto border with their daily requirements. The Yemenis who cross the Saudi de facto border do not import goods for trade as do the Yemenis in the Western Sector. This is presumably because of the exceptionally dry climate in the region which means that the little agriculture that exists is for subsistence purposes only and people on both sides of the frontier rely on herding livestock and employment in the Border Guard for a living (see Section 5.5 on the de facto border).

Table 5.7 Markets visited by respondents interviewed at Al-Kharkhir checkpoint

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Markets visited</th>
<th>Respondents’ Nationality</th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Saudi</td>
<td>Yemen</td>
<td>UAE</td>
<td>Qatar</td>
<td>Total</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>No.</td>
<td>%</td>
<td>No.</td>
<td>%</td>
<td>No.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Al-Harah</td>
<td>114</td>
<td>43.8</td>
<td>108</td>
<td>100</td>
<td>--</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Armah</td>
<td>--</td>
<td>--</td>
<td>--</td>
<td>--</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Qanab</td>
<td>--</td>
<td>--</td>
<td>--</td>
<td>--</td>
<td>7</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>No visit to market</td>
<td>146</td>
<td>56.2</td>
<td>--</td>
<td>--</td>
<td>72</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Total</td>
<td>260</td>
<td>100</td>
<td>108</td>
<td>100</td>
<td>80</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

*Source: Author’s Field Survey, 1 Jul-10 Sept, 1994*

Table 5.7 also shows that of those respondents from the UAE crossing the Saudi de facto border, 8.8% visited Qanab and 1.2% visited Armah market on the Yemeni de facto border. In these cases the main purpose for crossing the Saudi de facto border was to visit relatives.

Table 5.8 shows that most of the Saudis cross the Saudi de facto border either daily or weekly. Those living close to Shiqqat Al-Kharkhir cross daily, and those living in Hazar, Qanab, and ‘Aywat Al-Manahil (between 50 and 120km from Al-Kharkhir market) cross weekly. The Yemeni respondents who were crossing the Saudi de facto
border to go to market did so monthly because most of them were living a considerable distance (between 50-200km) from Al-Kharkhir market as Figure 5.10(A) shows.

Table 5.8 Frequency of visits to markets by respondents interviewed at Al-Kharkhir checkpoint

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Frequency of Visit</th>
<th>Respondents' Nationality</th>
<th>Total</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Saudi</td>
<td>Yemen</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Daily</td>
<td>46</td>
<td>17.7</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Weekly</td>
<td>46</td>
<td>17.7</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Monthly</td>
<td>22</td>
<td>8.4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Yearly</td>
<td>--</td>
<td>--</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Other</td>
<td>--</td>
<td>--</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>No visit to markets</td>
<td>146</td>
<td>56.2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Total</td>
<td>260</td>
<td>100</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Source: Author's Field Survey, 1 Jul-10 Sept, 1994

Statistically comparing the data on purposes for frontier crossings for both Al-Khadra and Al-Kharkhir checkpoints using the Kruskal-Wallis test (see Section 1.6.2.4), there is a highly significant difference between the four nationalities with respect to visits to markets.(chi-sq = 558.6169; degree of freedom (df) = 3; significance = 0.000). The Mean Rank of the Kruscal-Wallis test indicates that the data for those of Yemeni nationality with respect to visits to markets is significantly different from that of the other nationalities. There are three factors which encourage Yemenis to cross the *de facto* border to visit markets. Firstly, goods are generally cheaper on the Saudi side of the frontier. Secondly, in the Western Sector the Saudi Government allows Yemenis who are members of the frontier tribes duty-free allowances at Al-Khadra checkpoint (see Section 3.2.3 for more details), and thirdly, in the Eastern Sector Yemeni members of the frontier tribes are allowed to cross the Saudi *de facto* border through Al-Kharkhir checkpoint without paying duty on any daily requirements, including petrol.
5.3.1.3 Visits to Properties

In this sector people of Saudi nationality own properties on both sides on the frontier, as they do in the Western Sector, but in smaller numbers as the Eastern Sector is so sparsely populated. There are no known Yemeni-owned properties on the Saudi side of the frontier in the Eastern Sector, because as was mentioned in Chapter 3 (Western Sector), Saudi law does not allow other nationalities to own property in Saudi Arabia. The Yemeni constitution does not refer to the ownership of property, as this is a matter for tribal organization (Al-Sharji, 1990: p.344).

Table 5.9 shows that 56.2% of the Saudi respondents interviewed at Al-Kharkhir checkpoint were crossing the Saudi \textit{de facto} border to visit their properties. Figure 5.11(A) shows that most of the properties were permanently-located tents and wells, whilst a few of the Saudis owned Portacabins.

Table 5.9 Tribes of respondents interviewed at Al-Kharkhir checkpoint who own property across the Saudi \textit{de facto} border and location of properties

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Nationality</th>
<th>Tribe</th>
<th>Location of Properties</th>
<th>Sample Size</th>
<th>No.</th>
<th>%</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Saudi</td>
<td>Al-Manahil</td>
<td>'Uruq Ibn Hamudah (S)</td>
<td>24</td>
<td>9.2</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Al-Manahil</td>
<td>Badi' Al-Ghanam (S)</td>
<td></td>
<td>15</td>
<td>5.8</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Al-Manahil</td>
<td>Shiqqat Al-Kharkhir (S)</td>
<td></td>
<td>13</td>
<td>5.0</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Al-Manahil</td>
<td>Al-Harajah (Y)</td>
<td></td>
<td>13</td>
<td>5.0</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Al-Manahil</td>
<td>Armah (Y)</td>
<td></td>
<td>12</td>
<td>4.6</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Al-Manahil</td>
<td>Dahyah (S)</td>
<td></td>
<td>12</td>
<td>4.6</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Al-Manahil</td>
<td>'Aywat Al-Manahil (Y)</td>
<td></td>
<td>11</td>
<td>4.2</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Al-Manahil</td>
<td>Qanab (Y)</td>
<td></td>
<td>9</td>
<td>3.5</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Al-Manahil/Al-Mahrah</td>
<td>Lbnah (Y)</td>
<td></td>
<td>9</td>
<td>3.5</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Al-Manahil</td>
<td>Wadi Hazar (Y)</td>
<td></td>
<td>7</td>
<td>2.7</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Al-Manahil</td>
<td>Upper 'Aywat (Y)</td>
<td></td>
<td>7</td>
<td>2.7</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Al-Manahil</td>
<td>Shiqqat Umm Gharib (S)</td>
<td></td>
<td>5</td>
<td>1.9</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Al-Manahil</td>
<td>Shiqaq Al-Ma'atuf (S)</td>
<td></td>
<td>5</td>
<td>1.9</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Al-Manahil</td>
<td>Sanaw (Y)</td>
<td></td>
<td>4</td>
<td>1.5</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>No property visited</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>114</td>
<td>43.9</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Total 260 100

Yemen No property visited -- 108 100
UAE No property visited -- 80 100
Qatari No property visited -- 50 100

(S): settlement under Saudi control; (Y): settlement under Yemeni control

Source: Author's Field Survey, 1 Jul-10 Sept. 1994.
CHAPTER 5

Table 5.10 shows that of the Saudi respondents interviewed at Al-Kharkhir checkpoint who were crossing the Saudi de facto border to visit properties, 30.4% cross daily, chiefly those living near Al-Kharkhir checkpoint, whilst the remainder cross either weekly or monthly.

Table 5.10 Frequency of visits to property by respondents interviewed at Al-Kharkhir checkpoint

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Frequency of Visit</th>
<th>Respondents' Nationality</th>
<th>Total</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Saudi</td>
<td>Yemen</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Daily</td>
<td>79</td>
<td>30.4%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Weekly</td>
<td>56</td>
<td>21.5%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Monthly</td>
<td>11</td>
<td>4.2%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Yearly</td>
<td>--</td>
<td>--%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Other</td>
<td>--</td>
<td>--%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>No visit to</td>
<td>114</td>
<td>43.9%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>properties</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
| Total             | 260 | 100%     | 108   | 100%  | 80    | 100% | 50  | 100%  | 498  | 100%

Source: Author’s Field Survey, 1 Jul-10 Sept, 1994

Comparing the data on purposes for frontier crossings for both checkpoints statistically, using the Kruskal-Wallis test (see Section 1.6.2.4), there is a highly significant difference between the four nationalities with respect to visits to property (chi-sq = 931.1882; degree of freedom (df) = 3; significance = 0.000). The Mean Rank of the Kruscal-Wallis test indicates that the data for those of Saudi nationality with respect to visits to markets is significantly different from that of the other nationalities. This is because those respondents of Saudi nationality are the only nationality to own properties on both sides of the frontier. The first reason for this is historical. In the Western Sector, Article 4 of the 1934 Treaty of Taif placed those members of the Wa'ilah tribe who were living in Najran before 1352 (1933) under Saudi control. However these families have retained the properties which they owned in that part of the Wa'ilah tribal lands which was designated to Yemen by the Treaty. Also some of the Yam tribal land which should belong to Saudi Arabia according to the Treaty of Taif, has come under Yemeni control since 1934.
Secondly, Saudi law does not allow other nationalities to own property, as mentioned above.

5.3.1.4 Grazing and Wells

There are several areas in the Eastern Sector which have traditionally been used for grazing, and in which wells have been dug (statement by sheiks of Al-Manahil and Al-Say'ar tribes, 1994). Figure 5.5(A) shows these grazing areas and wells (MSD-KSA, 1992, Republic of Yemen map).

Table 5.4 (purposes of Saudi *de facto* border crossings of respondents interviewed at Al-Kharkhir checkpoint, classified according to priority) shows that 12.5% of respondents of UAE nationality questioned were crossing the Saudi *de facto* border solely for the purpose of taking their livestock to grazing. These bedouin were from Al-Manahil tribe. The Saudi Border Guard does not prevent the movement of bedouin across the Saudi *de facto* border in this sector as they do not cause problems such as smuggling, but they must obtain the permission of the Border Guard as previously mentioned (see Section 5.2.2). There are also bedouin from Oman, most of whom are well known to the Border Guard, who come to the Eastern Study Sector to graze their livestock (Saudi Border Guard statement, Al-Kharkhir checkpoint, July 1994).

Plate 5.1 shows one of the bedouin from the UAE grazing his camels at Ibn Hamudah on the Saudi *de facto* border. He had brought his herd of camels from Al-Dhafrah, approximately 600km away. The author asked this bedouin if he also owned sheep or goats. "Sheep and goats are for poor people, camels are for real men and indicate courage and Arabic generosity" was the unexpected answer!

The 1990 Oman-Saudi Arabia and 1992 Oman-Yemen agreements included arrangements controlling the movement of people across the boundaries and the right to pasture lands on the frontier (see Section 5.2.2). Saudi Arabia and Yemen should likewise ensure that these local matters are properly dealt with in any future boundary agreement.
5.3.2 THE CHECKPOINTS

The Al-Kharkhir checkpoint is located beyond the extreme 1955 British territorial claim. The location is significant because of its proximity to the Oman-Saudi Arabia-Yemen tripoint.

Al-Kharkhir checkpoint is an informal checkpoint by comparison to the checkpoints mentioned in the Western Study Sector. This means that unlike the formal checkpoints there are no immigration, customs, or health officials at Al-Kharkhir (see Section 1.6.2.1). The reason for Al-Kharkhir being an informal checkpoint is presumably because the Saudi authorities are unhappy about the location of the checkpoint and hope that they will be able to relocate it further south in the Eastern Study Sector in the event of a boundary agreement. In contrast, the position of Al-Khadra checkpoint in the Western Study Sector was agreed between Saudi Arabia and Yemen on 8 August 1989 (Asharq Al-Awsat. 1989: p.1).

There are no checkpoints on the Yemeni side of the frontier opposite Al-Kharkhir. This is possibly due to the lack of a market on the Yemeni side of the frontier, equivalent to that at Al-Kharkhir, which supplies the people of the frontier area with all their basic goods, including petrol. The presence of the market is therefore one of the primary reasons for crossings of the Saudi de facto border at Al-Kharkhir and the necessity for a checkpoint there. Furthermore, all the routes to Al-Kharkhir checkpoint run east-west, roughly parallel to the de facto border along shiqaq, namely Shiqqat Badi' Al-Ghanam and Shiqqat Al-Sirdab. This is in contrast to the Western Study Sector where routes to Al-Khadra checkpoint run north-south and Al-Khadra checkpoint on the Saudi side of the frontier is opposite Al-Buq'a checkpoint on the Yemeni side. Alternatively, the lack of a Yemeni checkpoint in this sector could merely be one of financial constraints. People wishing to cross the Yemeni de facto border in the Eastern Study Sector have to report to
one of the Yemeni Border Guard posts (statement by Al-Manahil and Al-Mahrah sheikhs at Al-Kharkhir, July 1994).

The author used Al-Kharkhir checkpoint as a base to interview people crossing the Saudi *de facto* border in both directions and to study the functions of the checkpoint as there is no other checkpoint in the Eastern Study Sector.

5.3.2.1 *Time Spent at the Checkpoint*

The majority of respondents interviewed crossing the Saudi *de facto* border at Al-Kharkhir checkpoint were satisfied with the amount of time they spent at the checkpoint. Table 5.11 shows the respondents' attitude to the time amount of time spent at the checkpoint completing crossing procedures. 32.7% of Saudi respondents were not satisfied, especially those who cross the Saudi *de facto* border daily. These individuals wanted more flexibility from the Saudi Border Guard. In fact the time spent at Al-Kharkhir checkpoint seems very reasonable; it takes between five and ten minutes for an individual, but if the traveller is accompanied by his family and carrying goods, it can take between 15 and 30 minutes (Author's field survey, 1 July - 10 September, 1994).

The average time spent completing formalities at Al-Kharkhir checkpoint is less than the equivalent time spent at Al-Khadra checkpoint in the Western Study Sector for two reasons. Firstly there are more people crossing the Saudi *de facto* border at Al-Khadra checkpoint (see Section 5.3, Table 5.2). Secondly, Al-Khadra checkpoint is a formal checkpoint and there are therefore more procedures to be completed there than at the informal checkpoint at Al-Kharkhir.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Attitude</th>
<th>Respondents' Nationality</th>
<th>Total</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Saudi</td>
<td>Yemen</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Reasonable</td>
<td>175</td>
<td>67.3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Unreasonable</td>
<td>85</td>
<td>32.7</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Total</td>
<td>260</td>
<td>100</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

*Source: Author's Field Survey, 1 Jul-10 Sept, 1994*
5.3.2.2 Reasons for Choice of Checkpoint

All the respondents in the sample chose Al-Kharkhir checkpoint because of its proximity to their homes and, or, those of their relatives, although of course there is no realistic alternative. Table 5.12 shows that the Saudi and Yemeni respondents interviewed at Al-Kharkhir chose the checkpoint because it was both close to their homes and those of their relatives. In fact, there is no alternative checkpoint in the Eastern Study Sector. By contrast, the choice of checkpoint of the Saudi and Yemeni respondents in the Western Study Sector was influenced by the fact that the privileges afforded the frontier tribes by the Saudi Government are only available at Al-Khadra checkpoint.

Table 5.12 also shows that the UAE and Qatari respondents chose Al-Kharkhir checkpoint because it is close to the homes of their relatives.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Reason for choice of checkpoint</th>
<th>Respondents’ Nationality</th>
<th>Total</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Saudi</td>
<td>Yemen</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Close to your residence and relatives</td>
<td>260</td>
<td>100</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Close to your relatives</td>
<td>--</td>
<td>--</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Provides a good service</td>
<td>--</td>
<td>--</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Safe from the Yemeni side</td>
<td>--</td>
<td>--</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Safe from the Saudi side</td>
<td>--</td>
<td>--</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Good road from Saudi</td>
<td>--</td>
<td>--</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Good road from Yemen</td>
<td>--</td>
<td>--</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Other</td>
<td>--</td>
<td>--</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Total</td>
<td>260</td>
<td>100</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Source: Author’s Field Survey, 1 Jul-10 Sept, 1994

5.3.2.3 Transport and Routes to the Checkpoint

The modes of transport used by the respondents interviewed at Al-Kharkhir checkpoint between 1 July and 10 September 1994 to cross the Saudi de facto border in the Eastern Study Sector are shown in Table 5.13. 61.5% of those in the sample were passengers in friends’ cars and the remaining 38.5% were using their own cars. Most of the vehicles
were four-wheel drive Toyota Pickups which are used because of their suitability for crossing the sand dunes of the Rub Al-Khali on the the Saudi Arabia-Yemen frontier.

Figure 5.12(A) shows the routes which lead to the checkpoint. All of the routes to the checkpoint are sand and gravel tracks which have been created by the passage of vehicles and on which the driving conditions are very difficult indeed (Plate 5.4).

Table 5.13  Transport taken by respondents to Al-Kharkhir checkpoint

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Mode of Transport</th>
<th>Respondents' Nationality</th>
<th>Total</th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Saudi</td>
<td>%</td>
<td>Yemen</td>
<td>%</td>
<td>UAE</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Private vehicle</td>
<td>106</td>
<td>40.8</td>
<td>44</td>
<td>40.7</td>
<td>39</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Friend's vehicle</td>
<td>154</td>
<td>59.2</td>
<td>64</td>
<td>59.3</td>
<td>41</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>On foot</td>
<td>--</td>
<td>--</td>
<td>--</td>
<td>--</td>
<td>--</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Bus</td>
<td>--</td>
<td>--</td>
<td>--</td>
<td>--</td>
<td>--</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Taxi</td>
<td>--</td>
<td>--</td>
<td>--</td>
<td>--</td>
<td>--</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Donkey</td>
<td>--</td>
<td>--</td>
<td>--</td>
<td>--</td>
<td>--</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Camel</td>
<td>--</td>
<td>--</td>
<td>--</td>
<td>--</td>
<td>--</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Other</td>
<td>--</td>
<td>--</td>
<td>--</td>
<td>--</td>
<td>--</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Total</td>
<td>260</td>
<td>100</td>
<td>108</td>
<td>100</td>
<td>80</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Source: Author's Field Survey, 1 Jul-10 Sept, 1994

The development of asphalt roads along the frontier in the Eastern Study Sector has been delayed by the problems on the frontier between Saudi Arabia and Yemen, and Saudi Arabia and Oman. However, after the agreements between Saudi Arabia and the UAE in 1974, and Saudi Arabia and Oman in 1990, the Saudi Ministry of Communications started to plan an asphalt road to run along the frontiers in the Eastern Province and around the edge of the Rub Al-Khali (Saudi Ministry of Communications Archive, 1992).

Away from the frontier, the Eastern Province (which borders the Eastern Study Sector) has an excellent asphalt road network of 3,473km (Central Department of Statistics, 1993: p.325). 987km of asphalt road have also been constructed in the Hadhramaut and Al-Mahrah Governorates which border the Eastern Study Sector on the Yemeni side of the frontier (Ministry of Planning and Development, 1991: p.108).
5.3.2.4  *Facilities at the Checkpoint*

Table 5.14 shows that 64.9% of respondents interviewed at Al-Kharkhir checkpoint believe that the facilities of the checkpoint are less than adequate. This was not an unexpected result because Al-Kharkhir, being an informal checkpoint, has no facilities for those crossing the *de facto* border. Some people have to wait as long as an hour in the sun to get permission to cross. 34.3% of all respondents believe that the facilities of the checkpoint are adequate. Some of this group are those who cross the Saudi *de facto* border either daily or weekly and who only have to wait at the checkpoint for between five and ten minutes.

*Table 5.14  Respondents’ attitude to facilities at Al-Kharkhir checkpoint*

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Attitude to Facilities</th>
<th>Respondents’ Nationality</th>
<th>Total</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Saudi</td>
<td>Yemen</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>More than adequate</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>1.5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Adequate</td>
<td>86</td>
<td>33.1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Less than adequate</td>
<td>170</td>
<td>65.4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Total</td>
<td>260</td>
<td>100</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

*Source:  Author’s Field Survey, 1 Jul-10 Sept, 1994*

Al-Kharkhir checkpoint undoubtedly needs considerably more financial investment and development to bring it up to the same standard as Al-Khadra checkpoint in the Western Study Sector.

5.3.2.5  *Documents Used at the Checkpoint*

The documents used by people crossing the Saudi *de facto* border at Al-Kharkhir checkpoint are different from those used at Al-Khadra checkpoint in the Western Study Sector. Table 5.15 shows that all the Saudis in the sample used an identity card to cross the *de facto* border in both directions. By contrast, all the Yemeni respondents had obtained a ‘guarantee’ to cross the frontier. This guarantee is different from the ‘statement’ used in the Western Study Sector. It is a document from the chief of Al-
Manahil tribe in Shiqqat Al-Kharkhir addressed to the Saudi Border Guard at Al-Kharkhir checkpoint guaranteeing that the Yemenis crossing the Saudi _de facto_ border are only travelling to Al-Kharkhir market or within the Eastern Province, and that they will return through the same checkpoint. A new guarantee is needed for each return crossing of the Saudi _de facto_ border. This bureaucratic procedure is partly a result of the fact that Al-Kharkhir is only an informal checkpoint, and partly because of the boundary dispute between Saudi Arabia and Yemen, and it limits cross-frontier interaction.

Table 5.15  Documents used by respondents to cross the Saudi _de facto_ border at Al-Kharkhir checkpoint

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Documents</th>
<th>Respondents' Nationality</th>
<th>Total</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Saudi</td>
<td>Yemen</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Passport</td>
<td>--</td>
<td>--</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Guarantee</td>
<td>--</td>
<td>108</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Identity Card</td>
<td>260</td>
<td>100</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Other</td>
<td>--</td>
<td>--</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Total</td>
<td>260</td>
<td>100</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Source: Author's Field Survey, 1 Jul-10 Sept, 1994

Table 5.15 also shows that all the respondents from the UAE and Qatar used passports at Al-Kharkhir checkpoint because they cannot cross other formal checkpoints on their travels - Salwah, between Saudi Arabia and Qatar, and Al-Batha between Saudi Arabia and the UAE - without passports (Figure 5.12(A)).

5.3.2.6  _Dual Nationality_

Dual nationality was a sensitive subject as most of the respondents interviewed knew that dual nationality is forbidden for those holding Saudi nationality (see Chapter 3, Section 3.3.2.6). Table 5.16 shows that none of the respondents in the Eastern Study Sector would admit to having dual nationality. However, the Saudi Border Guard at Al-Kharkhir checkpoint explained that, in practice, there are very real possibilities of citizens holding dual nationality, particularly amongst the Saudis living in Shiqqat Al-Kharkhir.
Furthermore, some of Al-Manahil tribe who live in Shiqqat Al-Kharkhir could hold triple nationality - Saudi, Yemeni, and UAE. This is a result of the distribution of members of Al-Manahil tribe between Saudi Arabia, Yemen, and the UAE, even though their tribal lands are divided between Saudi Arabia and Yemen only (see Section 5.6 on distribution of tribes). However, the comments of the Saudi Border Guard remain hearsay and are not supported by accurate data.

Table 5.16 Nationalites held by respondents interviewed at Al-Kharkhir checkpoint

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Respondents' Nationality</th>
<th>Saudi</th>
<th>Yemeni</th>
<th>UAE</th>
<th>Qatari</th>
<th>Total</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>No.</td>
<td>%</td>
<td>No.</td>
<td>%</td>
<td>No.</td>
<td>%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Saudi</td>
<td>260</td>
<td>100</td>
<td>--</td>
<td>--</td>
<td>--</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Yemeni</td>
<td>--</td>
<td>--</td>
<td>108</td>
<td>100</td>
<td>--</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>UAE</td>
<td>--</td>
<td>--</td>
<td>--</td>
<td>--</td>
<td>80</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Qatari</td>
<td>--</td>
<td>--</td>
<td>--</td>
<td>--</td>
<td>--</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Other</td>
<td>--</td>
<td>--</td>
<td>--</td>
<td>--</td>
<td>--</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Total</td>
<td>260</td>
<td>100</td>
<td>108</td>
<td>100</td>
<td>80</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Source: Author's Field Survey, 1 Jul-10 Sept, 1994

5.3.3 PERCEPTIONS OF THE FRONTIER

Borderlanders' perceptions of the frontier are a very important and under-rated consideration in the settlement of a boundary dispute as was mentioned in connection with the Western Study Sector. This is because of the possibility of using the features recognised by local people as indicating the position of the de facto border in the event of a future agreement on the boundary between the two countries.

5.3.3.1 Features Indicating the Frontier

Most of the relief features in the Eastern Study Sector are 'uruq and shiqaq, as mentioned above. Table 5.17 shows that all respondents recognised Shiqqat Al-Kharkhir as the Saudi de facto border when they were crossing from the Saudi side of the frontier. When crossing from the Yemeni side of the frontier they recognised the Yemeni de facto border.
by the Yemeni Border Guard positions of Al-Fuhud, Khasfat Qanab, Armah, and Al-Harajah (see Figure 5.14). Most of these border guard positions are named after the geographical features on the Yemeni *de facto* border where they are located, namely Al-Fuhud, Khasfat Qanab, and Armah. The use of these same geographical features, together with Shiqqat Al-Kharkhir, might facilitate the delimitation of the boundary when this sector is negotiated.

*Table 5.17* Features recognised as indicating the *de facto* border area by respondents interviewed at Al-Kharkhir checkpoint

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Features indicating <em>de facto</em> border</th>
<th>Respondents' Nationality</th>
<th>Total</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Saudi</td>
<td>Yemen</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Saudi Side:</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Shiqqaq</td>
<td>260</td>
<td>100</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>'Uruq</td>
<td>--</td>
<td>--</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Ramlat</td>
<td>--</td>
<td>--</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Wadis</td>
<td>--</td>
<td>--</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Other</td>
<td>--</td>
<td>--</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Total</td>
<td>260</td>
<td>100</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Yemeni Side:</td>
<td>No.</td>
<td>%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Shiqqaq</td>
<td>--</td>
<td>--</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>'Uruq</td>
<td>--</td>
<td>--</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Ramlat</td>
<td>--</td>
<td>--</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Wadis</td>
<td>--</td>
<td>--</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Border Guard Posts</td>
<td>260</td>
<td>100</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Total</td>
<td>260</td>
<td>100</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

*Source: Author’s Field Survey, 1 Jul-10 Sep, 1994*

5.3.3.2 * Frontier Changes*

Table 5.18 shows that 71.3% of respondents interviewed at Al-Kharkhir checkpoint believe that the *de facto* border area has changed in living memory. Most of the respondents in the sample said that approximately 30 years ago there were no checkpoints on the frontier. At that time there was much more freedom of movement between the two countries than there is currently. 28.7% of the respondents believed that the *de facto* border’s location has not changed over the years, but that there are now more border guard posts than there were in the past. Some evidence for this is provided by a letter
from the Governor of Aden to the Secretary of State for the Colonies, dated 30 September 1948, concerning the frontier dispute between Saudi Arabia and the Aden Protectorate, and the tribes living there:

I have the honour to refer to my despatch No.50 of the 21st June on the subject of raiding between Saudi, Yemeni and Protectorate nomadic tribes in the indeterminate areas to the north of the Hadhramaut, and to inform you that the Saudi delegates arrived at Al-Abr on the 27th August, and were met by our delegates. The Muqaddame (chief) of the Kurab, Saiar and Awamir tribes were present and a representative of the Mahras also arrives later. (cited in Schofield, 1992: Vol.20, p.167)

The frontier must have been close to its current position as the Al-Kurab, Al-Say'ar, Awamir, and Al-Mahrah tribes are all still living on the frontier, and there can have been few, if any, border guards to prevent the raiding which was taking place across the frontier. By the time the tension between Saudi Arabia and Yemen resulted in an increase in the number of border guards in the de facto border area, the frontier itself was becoming more clearly delimited than it was in 1948 (see Section 5.5 on the de facto border).

Table 5.18 Perceptions of frontier changes of respondents interviewed at Al-Kharkhir checkpoint

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Frontier perceived as having changed</th>
<th>Respondents' Nationality</th>
<th>Total</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Saudi</td>
<td>Yemeni</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>No.</td>
<td>%</td>
<td>No.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Yes</td>
<td>203</td>
<td>78.1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>No</td>
<td>57</td>
<td>21.9</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Do not know</td>
<td>--</td>
<td>--</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Total</td>
<td>260</td>
<td>100</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Source: Author’s Field Survey, 1 Jul-10 Sep, 1994

5.3.3.3 Level of Satisfaction with the Frontier

Table 5.19 shows that 51.2% of all Saudi respondents, and 26.9% of all Yemeni respondents interviewed at Al-Kharkhir checkpoint were dissatisfied with the location of the present de facto border between Saudi Arabia and the Yemen Republic in the Eastern Study Sector. These respondents were members of Al-Manahil and Al-Mahrah tribes,
members of which live on both sides of the frontier. They want all of their tribal land to be under Saudi control as Figure 5.15(A) shows. The reasons for this have already been mentioned (see Chapter 3, Section 3.3.3.3), but they may not be typical of all their tribe.

Table 5.19  Level of satisfaction with the frontier amongst respondents interviewed at Al-Kharkhir checkpoint

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Level of Satisfaction</th>
<th>Respondents' Nationality</th>
<th>Total</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Saudi</td>
<td>Yemeni</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Satisfied</td>
<td>78</td>
<td>64</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Dissatisfied</td>
<td>133</td>
<td>29</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Do not know</td>
<td>49</td>
<td>15</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Total</td>
<td>260</td>
<td>108</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Source: Author's Field Survey, 1 Jul-10 Sep, 1994

Figure 5.15(A) shows that the lands of Al-Manahil and Al-Mahrah tribes stretch from the Arabian Sea coast to the edge of the Rub' Al-Khali. It would therefore be impossible for all this land to come under Saudi control as most of it lies to the south of the extreme Saudi claim as Figure 5.15(A) also shows.

5.4 Economic Opportunities

There are a number of factors which affect the economic potential of the frontier region in the Eastern Study Sector, but this section will discuss only those factors which have an impact on boundary issues and contribute to the tension between the two states. By far the most significant factor is the potential for hydrocarbon and mineral discoveries in the area, as is the case in the Western Study Sector. The commercial activity of the frontier area will also be discussed in this section.

5.4.1 MINERALS AND HYDROCARBONS

In general, the Yemeni Government has more interest in exploring for hydrocarbons than minerals (Raswal, 1982: p.141). There is, therefore, currently no mineral activity in the
Eastern Study Sector on the Yemeni side of the frontier. This is also true on the Saudi side of the frontier, but this lack of activity does not indicate a lack of mineral potential in the area. All exploration activity in the Eastern Study Sector on both sides of the frontier is focused on hydrocarbons as Figure 5.13(A) shows.

In 1958 the American oil company Aramco surveyed two locations to the south of the extreme British claim on behalf of Saudi Arabia. This activity is mentioned in a letter dated 13 April 1959 from the Governor of Aden to the Colonial Office:

The nearest camps set up by P.C.L. [Petroleum Concessions Ltd] in the autumn and winter of 1958 were sited at 17°58'N 49°24'E, 17°45'N 48°55'E, and 17°38'N 48°25'E. All of these are of course south of the frontier declared by Her Majesty’s Government to the Saudi Arabian Government in August 1955. (Schofield and Blake, 1989: Vol.29, p.486)

Figure 5.13(A) shows the location of Aramco’s exploration camps, and of the two incomplete wells which the company attempted to drill. In 1994 the author interviewed the Head of the Survey Department in the Saudi Ministry of Petroleum about the results of the 1958 survey. It transpired that British officials had forced Aramco to withdraw from these sites on the frontier before enough data had been gathered to discover the hydrocarbon potential of the area (Head of Survey Department, Saudi Ministry of Petroleum, 1994).

The action taken by the Aden Protectorate exemplifies their concern about Aramco’s activities on the frontier, and was mentioned in a further letter, dated 4 April 1959, this time from the Colonial Office to the Governor of Aden:

I notice in paragraph 203 of the Monthly Aden Intelligence Summary No.3 for March 1959, dated April 23, a comment on the Saudi Arabian note protesting against the establishment of a camp at a site from which British officials had previously forced Aramco to withdraw. (cited in Schofield and Blake, 1989: Vol.29, p.487) (author’s emphasis).

The two wells are now abandoned in the no man’s land between the Saudi and Yemeni de facto borders, as a comparison between Figures 5.13(A) and 5.14(A) shows.

Hydrocarbon exploration is more active on the Yemeni side of the frontier. Most of the companies operating in the area have been awarded their exploration licences since the creation of the Republic of Yemen in May 1990 (AOG Directory, 1993: p.498). Table
5.20 shows the companies which have licences for blocks in the Eastern Study Sector. The blocks which lie on the frontier with Saudi Arabia, namely Blocks 11, 12, 30, and 39, have been affected by the boundary dispute (AOG Directory, 1993: pp.504-7), as the wells are now abandoned.

Table 5.20 Oil concession blocks in the Eastern Study Sector

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Name</th>
<th>Block No.</th>
<th>Area (km²)</th>
<th>Companies</th>
<th>Date awarded or approved</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Sirr Hazar</td>
<td>11</td>
<td>7,217</td>
<td>Elf Petroland</td>
<td>Nov 1988</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>North Sanau</td>
<td>12</td>
<td>15,940</td>
<td>Arco/Pecten/Pecten/Bin</td>
<td>March 1990</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>Ham/Coplex/Toweroil</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>South Sanau</td>
<td>29</td>
<td>12,634</td>
<td>Nimir Petroleum</td>
<td>Sept 1991</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Habrout</td>
<td>30</td>
<td>12,083</td>
<td>Open to bidders</td>
<td>--</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Thamud</td>
<td>36</td>
<td>10,660</td>
<td>Consolidated Colonnade</td>
<td>March 1993</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>Resources</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Source: AOG Directory, 1993; also, see Figure 5.14(A)

As Figure 5.13(A) shows, of those wells drilled by Yemen in the Eastern Study Sector, two wells in Block 29 have found oil and gas, a further well has found just oil, seven wells have been abandoned, and the results from two wells are currently unknown due to the tension on the frontier (FSSPA, 1994, Yemen map).

Figure 5.13(A) also shows that most of the significant hydrocarbon finds are in the Al-Masila Block (14) to the south of the Eastern Study Sector, far from the extreme Saudi territorial claim. Despite the competition between the international oil companies, no big new oil-rich structures are expected to be discovered in the future, and the companies now rate the country’s oil prospects as only moderate (AOG Directory, 1993: p.498).

As this section shows, the operations of oil companies in the Eastern Study Sector have been affected by the boundary dispute between Saudi Arabia and Yemen. In terms of hydrocarbon potential, this sector seems likely to be more significant than either the Western or Central Study Sectors, and this should be taken into consideration when the economic potential of the frontier region is raised in discussions about the subsequent
CHAPTER 5

management of the boundary between the two countries, following a boundary settlement.

5.4.2 COMMERCE AND EMPLOYMENT

Commercial activity in the Eastern Study Sector is principally between Al-Harah market at Shiqqat Al-Kharkhir on the Saudi de facto border and those people living in the area who cross the Saudi de facto border to visit it. There is no cross-frontier commercial activity like that of the Western Study Sector because of the absence of a Customs Office at the informal Al-Kharkhir checkpoint. This means that the only goods which may be taken across the Saudi de facto border are those for personal use only. Petrol is the commodity most commonly required by the people crossing the Saudi de facto border.

Table 5.21 shows that 56.6% of all respondents were livestock herders. They buy barley to feed their camels and other livestock from Al-Kharkhir market. In 1994 the price of 50kg of barley at Al-Kharkhir was US$4, whilst the price of the same quantity in Yemen was US$15, and it was only available in the major cities, and not in the frontier area (Al-Manahil sheikh’s statement at Al-Kharkhir market, 1994). The remaining 43.3% of respondents were officials in the Saudi, Yemeni, UAE, and Qatari Governments, the majority of them employed by the armed forces. However, of the Saudi respondents, most of the officials worked for Al-Kharkhir Emirate.

The average annual income of all the respondents interviewed at Al-Kharkhir checkpoint was between US$320 and US$3,000, the same as that of the respondents interviewed in the Western Study Sector (see Section 3.4.2). This similarity was despite the fact that 43.3% of all the respondents in the Eastern Study Sector were officials, and 45.2% were able to read, representing a more educated sample of people than the Western Study Sector respondents (Author’s field survey, 1 July - 10 September, 1994). The same, relatively low level of income perhaps reflects the fact that most of the officials were in low ranking positions, and although many were able to read, few were well
CHAPTER 5

educated. This may also be the reason why the average income for the Saudi respondents was well below the average national income per capita (see Section 3.4.2).

Table 5.21 Occupations of respondents interviewed at Al-Khairkhir checkpoint

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Occupation</th>
<th>Respondents’ Nationality</th>
<th>Total</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Saudi</td>
<td>%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Students</td>
<td>--</td>
<td>--</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Traders</td>
<td>--</td>
<td>--</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Farmers</td>
<td>--</td>
<td>--</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Officials</td>
<td>109</td>
<td>41.9</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Labourers</td>
<td>--</td>
<td>--</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Unemployed</td>
<td>--</td>
<td>--</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Drivers</td>
<td>--</td>
<td>--</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Herders</td>
<td>151</td>
<td>58.1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Other</td>
<td>--</td>
<td>--</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Total</td>
<td>260</td>
<td>100</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Source: Author’s Field Survey, 1 Jul-10 Sep, 1994

5.5 The De Facto Border Area

Defining the *de facto* border area is a key objective of this thesis as was previously mentioned. The *de facto* border area in the Eastern Study Sector is extremely significant due to its proximity to the Oman-Saudi Arabia-Yemen boundary tripoint.

A special characteristic of the Eastern Study Sector is the high number of border guard posts. There are 17 posts altogether of which eight are on the Saudi *de facto* border and nine on the Yemeni *de facto* border as Figure 5.14(A) shows.

Starting in the west of the sector between Al-Fuhud Yemeni guard post to the south and Al-Ma‘atif Saudi guard post to the north, the *de facto* border area runs eastward until it narrows near the Oman-Saudi Arabia-Yemen *de facto* tripoint (Figure 5.14(A)). Figure 5.14(A) also shows the distance between the Yemeni and Saudi border guard posts in this sector, the greatest distance being 100km between the Saudi position at Umm Al-Malh and the Yemeni position, Armah. In general, the *de facto* border area in the Eastern Study
Sector is wide, for no obvious reason. There is, however, a very clear reason for the narrowness of the *de facto* border area in the east of this sector. This is due to the very active territorial dispute over the area adjacent to the Oman boundary, and disagreement over the location of the boundary tripoint. A Saudi news agency report on 8 December 1994 stated:

The source added that concerning what the responsible official at the Yemeni Foreign Affairs Ministry mentioned about the creation of observation points (the area of Dahyah, Uruq Ibn Hamudah, Uruq Al-Kharkhayr and Dukakah in Mahrah Governorate), and the building of roads in Yemeni territories to which he referred, and despite the fact that the concerned Saudi authorities had affirmed that some constructions were inside Saudi territory... (SWB, 1994a: pp.15-6).

Where the *de facto* border is at its narrowest, the distance between the Saudi and Yemeni border guard positions is between eight and 26km as Figure 5.14(A) shows.

Figure 5.14(A) also shows that most of the *de facto* border area lies south of the extreme British claim, making it very likely that the location of the *de facto* border area will affect the outcome of discussions about the boundary in this sector.

Figure 5.14(A) shows the position of all the border guard posts in the *de facto* border area. On the Saudi side there are eight posts, all of which are located in *shiqaq* or *'urq*. On the Yemeni *de facto* border there are nine posts, most of which are located at the entrance to wadis; Al-Fuhud and Khashm Al-Jabal posts in Wadi ‘Aywat Al-Say’ar, and Jabal Al-Hwaq post in Wadi Khadrah, Khasfa post in Wadi Qanab, Armah post in Wadi ‘Aywat Al-Manahil, and Al-Harajah post in Wadi Armah. There are also three posts near the Oman-Saudi Arabia-Yemen *de facto* tripoint which are located in *shiqaq* and *'urq*.

Most of the Yemeni Border Guard posts use their geographical advantage to control the movement of people and to provide good visibility of the frontier. All of the Yemeni posts in this sector were built by the former South Yemen. Most of the guards who work in the posts are from the Yemeni sections of the local tribes of Al-Say‘ar, Al-Manahil, and Al-Mahrah (Al-Manahil sheikh’s statement at Al-Kharkhir, 1994).
A number of factors lead the author to the conclusion that a compromise boundary is likely to be based on the *de facto* border area (shown in Figure 5.14(A)) in this sector. These factors are the location of border guard posts and the difficulty that is likely to be encountered persuading either country to relocate its posts; an historical analysis of the 1958 dispute in which pressure from the British forced the Saudi-sponsored oil company Aramco to withdraw from the frontier (see Section 5.4.1 on minerals and hydrocarbons); and the tension between Saudi Arabia and Yemen over the boundary tripoint.

5.6 Distribution of Tribes on the Frontier

The method used to locate tribal boundaries in this sector was the same as that used for the Western and Central Study Sectors. Figure 5.15(A) shows the tribes of the Eastern Study Sector. Al-Manahil and Al-Mahrah tribal lands cover most of the sector, together with Al-Say'ar tribe which has land in the west. Most of the Al-Say'ar tribal lands are in the Central Study Sector: Sharurah town and the village of Al-Wadi'ah on the Saudi side of the frontier and the village of Al-'Abr, and Raydat Al-Say'ar on the Yemeni side (Central Study Sector, Figure 4.8(A)).

Figure 5.15(A) also shows the areas of apparently overlapping tribal claims between Al-Manahil tribe, and Al-Mahrah and Al-Say'ar tribes. The land of all three tribes is divided between Saudi Arabia and Yemen. Regardless of the wishes of the sheikhs, as stated to the author during his field survey in 1994, it would be impossible for all of these tribal lands to be under Saudi control as part of the area in question lies to the south of the extreme Saudi claim as Figure 5.15(A) shows. For further information about the genealogy of the tribes see Appendix 2.

There are Saudis and Yemenis from all three tribes living in the area of the Eastern Study Sector. The loyalty of the members of each tribe is divided depending on the nationality of the individual members. This is despite statements made by sheikhs of these tribes that those individuals living on the Yemeni side of the frontier would prefer to live.
under Saudi control because of the better future a wealthy country like Saudi Arabia is likely to offer them (Sheikhs' statements, Saudi side of the frontier, Author's field survey, July, 1994).

Table 5.22 Political loyalty of tribal people in the Eastern Study Sector

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Tribe</th>
<th>Sect</th>
<th>Language</th>
<th>Political Loyalty</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Al-Mahrah</td>
<td>Sunni</td>
<td>Mahriya/Arabic</td>
<td>Saudi/Yemen</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Al-Manahil</td>
<td>Sunni</td>
<td>Arabic</td>
<td>Saudi/Yemen</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Al-Sayar</td>
<td>Sunni</td>
<td>Arabic</td>
<td>Saudi/Yemen</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

*Source: Interviews with sheikhs in the Eastern Study Sector, July 1994*

In addition, Kelly (1964: p.68) indicated that Al-Manahil tribe were loyal to Ibn Saud. Philby (1939: pp.59 and 144) made the same observation of Al-Sayar tribe. However, Philby and Kelly visited Arabia many years ago and the loyalty of tribes is always changing. Moreover, it is not always easy to ascertain tribal loyalty (Walker, 1994: p.173). In the past, tribes tended to be loyal to the stronger authority who would be in a position to offer them protection. More recently, however, the tribes of the Arabian desert tend to be loyal to the state with the better economy which is able to offer its citizens a better quality of life.

From the facts presented in this section it is clear that the tribal boundaries do not coincide with the *de facto* border area, or either the Saudi or British extreme territorial claims. It would therefore not be practical to use the tribal boundaries as a basis for a future compromise boundary between Saudi Arabia and Yemen in this sector. This may create problems on the frontier, resulting in tension between the two states and damage to relations between the tribes and the states.
5.7 Conclusion

The key to a possible compromise boundary in the Eastern Study Sector is the \textit{de facto} border area and the southern margin of the Rub' Al-Khali which the British were willing to consider in March 1937 (Schofield, 1994: p.21, see Chapter 6 for more details).

There are two main reasons for the territorial dispute between Saudi Arabia and Yemen in the Eastern Study Sector. Firstly, there is the existence of the Oman-Saudi Arabia-Yemen tripoint in the sector. Secondly there is the potential for significant hydrocarbon discoveries in the frontier area; Figure 5.13(A) shows a number of abandoned wells in the \textit{de facto} border area and gas and oil on the Yemeni side of the frontier.

The continuing boundary dispute has had an impact on a number of aspects of the Eastern Study Sector. Firstly, hydrocarbon exploration activities have been impeded by the uncertainty. Some companies who have been awarded the rights to blocks in the Eastern Study Sector are offering these blocks (Nos.30, 36, and 39) to other companies as a result, as Figure 5.13(A) shows. Secondly, the unwillingness to develop checkpoint facilities which will then prove difficult to relocate has resulted in the informal nature of Al-Kharkhir checkpoint, which in itself has affected the number of people passing through the checkpoint, particularly Yemenis. Thirdly, the fact that all the routes in the area are only rough tracks as Figure 5.12(A) shows is, on the Saudi side of the frontier at least, a result of the fact that the boundary dispute has delayed the road building programme in the area (Saudi Ministry of Communications' archive, 1992).

Despite all this there is tribal movement across the frontier, especially of Al-Manahil tribe (most of the respondents interviewed at Al-Kharkhir checkpoint during the author's 1994 field survey were members of this tribe) which is spread throughout Saudi Arabia, the UAE, and Yemen. The paramount sheikh of Al-Manahil tribe lives on the Saudi side of the frontier in the Eastern Study Sector, and members of the tribe from all three
countries visit him for guidance (Al-Manahil sheikh’s statement, July 1994). Because of the active boundary dispute in this sector there are no privileges afforded the frontier tribes by the Saudi Government as there are in the Western Study Sector.

The satellite image (Figure 5.14(A)) shows that most of the Yemenis’ border guard posts are in strategic mountainous locations allowing them to monitor the movement of people and the *de facto* border area under Yemeni control. It is unlikely that they would want to give up these locations in any compromise over the location of the boundary in this sector.
References


Al-Thawr, A. (1985) *This is Yemen.* (Arabic) Beirut, Dar Al-Awdah.


CHAPTER 5

MAPS


Chapter 6

Conclusions and Recommendations

6.1 Conclusions

Figure 1.3 presents a conceptual framework for the investigations conducted for this thesis. It shows how the *de facto* Saudi-Yemeni border in operation today provides a logical basis for settlement of the territorial dispute in the region. A *de facto* border such as the Saudi Yemeni case which is the product of a long period of dispute and uncertainty represents the distillation of geographical influences. In some senses it is already a compromise because it reflects the balance of power, what the parties have found to be possible without serious conflict or outright compromise. The previous chapters have described in detail how the *de facto* border was identified and mapped, perhaps for the first time ever. That border conforms with a number of geographical and human divides at least very broadly, and can be regarded as the crucial starting point for a properly adjusted and negotiated boundary. As Figure 1.3 also shows, the thesis considers seven major groups of factors in testing the suitability of the recommended boundary. The following paragraphs briefly summarize their relevance to the delimitation of a just and rational boundary. Not all the factors carry the same weight. Thus Figure 1.3 distinguishes between those factors (geographical, historical, tribal, and administrative) which will be critical in the delimitation process and those (social, economic, and behavioural) which will powerfully influence the acceptability of any boundary compromise.

6.1.1 GEOGRAPHICAL FEATURES

Topographically, the Saudi-Yemeni frontier region consists of mountains, plateaux, wadis, and dune formations consisting of *shiqaq*, *uruq*, and *ramlat* (see Section 4.2 for
definitions), whilst the principal geological periods represented along the frontier are Permian, Quaternary, and Tertiary. The Logical Boundary uses mountains, shiqaq, and plateaux as boundary marks on the proposed boundary line (see Section 6.2, Recommendations, below)

Data on the varying depth and productivity of water wells in the frontier region was used as an indication of the relative accessibility and availability of water resources in the area. The maximum productivity of wells in each sector was as follows: 420 gal/min at a depth of 61m in the Western Study Sector, 600 gal/min at a depth of 505m in the Eastern Study Sector, and 560 gal/min at a depth of 1,105m in the Central Study Sector. Although there is relatively little difference in productivity, the depth to which wells have to be drilled to achieve these flows varies considerably between the three study sectors. In terms of accessibility of water resources, the Western Study Sector is therefore the most valuable area. Although all the available data is for the Saudi side of the frontier, the author expects the situation on the Yemeni side to be similar. This variation in the accessibility of water resources should be an important consideration if trade-offs are used to secure agreement on a compromise boundary. The exact location of the aquifer in relation to the frontier should be established, and if necessary a groundwater treaty should be agreed in order to avoid problems relating to water resources arising between Saudi Arabia and Yemen in the future.

The climate of the area has surprisingly little influence on the frontier and activity across it, except in the Eastern Study Sector where frontier crossings are affected by the occurrence and location of rainfall which results in the growth of pasture. In the Western Study Sector the timing of frontier crossings is not affected at all by summer temperatures. This is because of the overriding influence of the rights and privileges of the frontier tribes in this sector. Climate is however responsible for the sparse population in the region because of the shortage of water and opportunities for cultivation. The
shortage of population makes boundary delimitation more straightforward than in populous frontier regions.

The privileges of frontier tribes, mentioned above, are granted by the Saudi Government and apply only to those tribes living along the Saudi-Yemeni frontier in the Western Study Sector and the Treaty of Taif boundary. Members of the tribes are allowed to cross the frontier without a visa using only a statement as a means of identification, and they may export a certain quantity of goods without paying duty. The Saudi Government grants these privileges as part of its commitment to Article 4 of the Treaty of Taif (see Section 3.2.3). By contrast, the Yemeni Government grants no comparable privileges to the frontier tribes. This is a particular problem for those members of the Wa'ilah tribe who cross the frontier weekly as they have properties and relatives on both sides of the frontier. This lack of privileges may be for political reasons as the Yemeni Government is unhappy with the presence of approximately 5,000 Saudi citizens living on the Yemeni side of the frontier in Wadi Al-'Atfayn. The Yemeni Government clearly would prefer these individuals to hold Yemeni, rather than Saudi citizenship.

6.1.2 POPULATION DISTRIBUTION

The distribution of population in and close to the frontier zone has no direct effect on the location of the Logical Boundary. This is principally because the population density of the area is low. The Western Study Sector is more densely populated than either of the other sectors and here most of the population lives in, or near to the towns of Najran on the Saudi side and Sa'dah, San'a’, and Marib on the Yemeni side.

6.1.3 CROSS-FRONTIER INTERACTION

The interaction of population across the frontier zone was evaluated by analysing the responses to interviews conducted with samples of people crossing the frontier at two checkpoints. Interaction was found to be taking place primarily for four purposes: visits
to relatives, markets, and properties, and access to grazing and wells. The most important influence on frontier crossings is the existence of individuals owning property and having relatives on both sides of the frontier. Such a situation exists in the Western Study Sector where all of the 361 Saudi respondents in the author's sample, most of whom were from the Wa’ilah tribe, owned property and had relatives on both the Saudi and Yemeni sides of the frontier. Also, in the Eastern Study Sector 27.7% of the 260 Saudi respondents had properties and relatives on both sides of the frontier. All of these individuals were from Al-Manahil tribe. These two cases are taken into account in the location of the Logical Boundary (see Section 6.2, Recommendations).

No Yemeni respondents in the author’s sample admitted to owning property on the Saudi side of the frontier as Saudi law does not allow other nationalities to own property in Saudi Arabia, whilst in Yemen this is a matter for tribal administration (see Section 3.3.1.3, Visits to Properties).

Saudi-Yemeni cross-frontier interaction is therefore complicated, and perhaps not fully understood. It seems desirable to compare this pattern with models derived for other troubled or stressed boundaries. Three such models were identified. First, Soffer (1994) has built a model which attempts to explain the link between the level of interaction across hostile boundaries and the size of the minority group divided by the boundary, based on the case of the Israeli borders with Lebanon, Jordan, and Syria (Soffer, 1994: pp.182-91). Secondly, Foucher's paper presented at the 1989 International Boundary Research Unit's (IBRU) conference on 'International Boundaries and Conflict Resolution' in Durham includes a theoretical geopolitical model of cross-border interactions known as the 'Land Border Game', which demonstrates various types of situation and international land boundary problems including cross-border interaction. Foucher's work is, however, difficult to apply. Therefore, the most suitable model of borderland interaction for application to the Saudi-Yemeni frontier is that presented by Martinez (Figure 6.1) at
Figure 6.1: Models of borderlands interaction

A: ALIENATED BORDERLANDS
Tension prevails. Border is functionally closed, and cross-border interaction is totally or nearly totally absent. Residents of each country act as strangers to each other.

B: CO-EXISTENT BORDERLANDS
Stability is an on and off proposition. Border remains slightly open, allowing for the development of limited binational interaction. Residents of each country deal with each other as casual acquaintances, but borderlanders develop closer relationships.

C: INTERDEPENDENT BORDERLANDS
Stability prevails most of the time. Economic and social complementarity prompt increased cross-border interaction, leading to expansion of borderlands. Borderlanders carry on friendly and cooperative relationships.

D: INTEGRATED BORDERLANDS
Stability is strong and permanent. Economies of both countries are functionally merged and there is unrestricted movement of people and goods across the boundary. Borderlanders perceive themselves as members of one social system.

Source: Martinez 1994 p3
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6.1.3.1 Western Study Sector

Population interaction in the Western Study Sector conforms most closely to Martinez's model of 'interdependent borderlands' (Figure 6.1, Model (C)) the characteristics of which include 'Stability most of the time' (Martinez, 1994: p.3). Stability existed in the Western Study Sector even during the period of the 1990-1 Gulf War when the Yemeni Government's pro-Iraqi stand caused tension with Saudi Arabia. During this period Yemeni expatriates working in Saudi Arabia lost their special privilege of exemption from Saudi sponsorship and visa requirements, as a result of which thousands returned to Yemen (Al-Qbba, 1992: p.288-9). However, the interaction of the frontier tribes was unaffected and the rights and privileges of these tribes remained unchanged.

Model (C) also suggests 'Economic and social complementarity prompt increased cross-border interaction'. The only economic interaction between the two countries in the Western Study Sector is commercial trading from both sides. Yemenis crossing the frontier import consumer goods including coffee and honey to sell on the Saudi side. Social interaction between the tribes along the frontier is strong, especially among family members. Those living on the Saudi side of the frontier are generally more wealthy than their Yemeni relatives and are therefore able to offer them accommodation when they visit. People on either side are free to cross the frontier to visit their relatives at any time they want.

Finally, according to Martinez, in interdependent borderlands 'Borderlanders carry on friendly and cooperative relationships'. In general, friendly and co-operative relationships exist between the people on either side of the Saudi-Yemeni frontier. However, those questioned by the author crossing from the Yemeni side had experienced
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some bureaucratic difficulties crossing the frontier (see Section 3.3.2.1, Time Spent at the Checkpoint).

6.1.3.2 Eastern Study Sector

Population interaction in the Eastern Study Sector conforms quite closely to Martinez’s model of ‘coexistent borderlands’ (Figure 6.1, Model (B)), the characteristics of which include ‘Stability is an on-and-off proposition’. At times the situation in the vicinity of the Oman-Saudi Arabia-Yemen tripoint is very unstable. Tension is created by both civilian and military tribal members who work in the Saudi and Yemeni Border Guard posts in this area.

Model (B) also suggests that the ‘Border remains slightly open allowing for the development of limited binational interaction’. The status of Al-Kharkhir checkpoint in the Eastern Study Sector as an informal checkpoint affects trans-frontier population interaction. The frontier is slightly open allowing the movement of Saudis and Yemenis across the frontier to visit relatives, markets, properties, grazing and wells, but the crossing procedure is complicated, which limits interaction.

Finally, according to Martinez, ‘Residents of each country deal with each other as casual acquaintances, but borderlanders develop closer relationships’. Most of the frontier crossings in the Eastern Study Sector are made by borderlanders and they develop their relationships on both sides of the frontier. In general however, interaction in this sector is limited by the informal nature of the checkpoint, the difficulty of acquiring the documents required at the checkpoint, the lack of asphalt roads, the sparse population compared to the Western Study Sector, and the fact that the boundary has not been agreed or demarcated.

6.1.3.3 Central Study Sector

Population interaction in the Central Study Sector conforms quite closely to Martinez’s model of ‘alienated borderlands’ (Figure 6.1, Model (A)), the primary characteristic of
which is that ‘Tension prevails’. Tension prevailed in 1969 when there was fighting between Saudi Arabia and South Yemen at Al-Wadi’ah, but since 1970 the frontier has been stable in this sector.

Model (A) also suggests that the ‘Border is functionally closed, and cross border interaction is totally or nearly totally absent’. There is no cross-frontier interaction in the Central Study Sector. This is due to a number of factors: there is no checkpoint on the frontier in this sector; there are no Saudi citizens living under Yemeni control as there are in the Western Study Sector and, to a lesser extent, in the Eastern Study Sector. Also as mentioned the previously cold relationship between Saudi Arabia and the former South Yemen due to the Yemenis adoption of Soviet Marxist policies greatly inhibited interaction.

Finally, according to Martinez ‘Residents of each country act as strangers to each other’. Residents on the Saudi side of the frontier have relatives and property on the Yemeni side (see Sections 3.3.1.1 and 3.3.1.3), but because they cannot cross the frontier they are unable to develop these relationships and they therefore remain relative strangers.

In general, therefore, population interaction on the frontier between Saudi Arabia and Yemen conforms to Martinez’s models. Three of the four models are represented. Model D, ‘integrated borderlands’, is not currently represented, even when the Treaty of Taif Study Sector is taken into consideration. However, the model implies that a boundary can progress from one stage to another as relations between the neighbouring states improve or deteriorate. It can therefore be expected that in time Model D will be represented on the Saudi-Yemeni boundary once the two countries settle the boundary dispute beyond the Treaty Study Sector.
6.1.4 LOCAL PERCEPTION OF THE LOCATION OF THE FRONTIER

People living along the Saudi-Yemeni frontier use their own landmarks to indicate where they perceive the frontier to be located. These landmarks include checkpoints, border guard posts, the routes of round-the-clock border patrols, mountains, and the shiqqat, 'uruq, and ramlat dune formations. The author found that certain prominent physical features used by the local people can be incorporated into the Logical Boundary. Al-Buq'a checkpoint, Al-Rayyan mountains, Shiqqat Al-Kharkhir, and 'Uruq Ibn Hamudah are some of these features (see Section 6.2, Recommendations).

Most of the respondents in the author's sample agreed that the de facto border had begun to be established during their lifetimes. Since World War II when the oil companies began to compete to gain concessions, boundary disputes in the Arabian Peninsula began to appear.

6.1.5 HYDROCARBON POTENTIAL

Although hydrocarbon exploration is more active on the Yemeni side of the frontier, this is not indicative of a lack of hydrocarbon potential on the Saudi side. Most of the companies operating in or near the frontier zone are profoundly affected by the frontier dispute between Saudi Arabia and Yemen. However, most of the currently active oil and gas fields are beyond the extreme Saudi and Yemeni claims.

6.1.6 THE DE FACTO BORDER

Defining the location of the de facto border is an important objective of this thesis as it is the key to the location of the Logical Boundary. The location of the de facto border is affected by geographical, historical and political, social, tribal, economic, behavioural, and administrative factors.
Some parts of the defacto border overlap with historical boundary proposals such as sections of the 1914 Violet line and the 1955 Saudi Declaration line. Elsewhere it coincides with tribal boundaries and the southern edge of the Rub' Al-Khali.

6.1.7 TRIBAL BOUNDARIES

The suggested boundary line on the tribal maps (Figs. 3.14(A), 4.8(A), 5.15(A) and 6.3) is often represented by a firm line between two tribal border marks. This is to assist in the practical understanding of the logical boundary, which is represented in Fig. 6.3. On the ground, of course, no line exists; despite that, there is actually a clear understanding between the tribes as to which tribe owns which land, whether inhabited or not. These tribal lands, and their bounds, have of course changed from time to time, following conflict or development in relationships or simply a change in the balance of power. The two states must recognise this fact, inconvenient though it may be, if they are to avoid the mistakes made by the British and others in boundary demarcation in the past, which have failed to take account of tribal movements. The reality of this, and overlap between tribes, has to be acknowledged and understood, without letting that unreasonably affect the boundary line determined between the two states.

One sensible way to achieve this is to ensure that, despite the formal agreement of a precise line, movement of and interaction between people who can be shown to have well established interests on either side of the border is encouraged rather than prevented.
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The largest tribal territory on the Saudi-Yemeni frontier is that belonging to Al-Say'ar tribe which borders most of the territories belonging to the other frontier tribes. Most of the existing tribal boundaries are unsuitable as a basis for the proposed Logical Boundary, with the exception of the boundary in the Western Study Sector between the Yam and the Wa'ilah and Dahm tribes (see Figure 3.14(A)).

This conclusion will not be welcomed by the sheikhs of the local tribes who have land to the south of the southernmost extreme Saudi claim (the 1955 Saudi Declaration line) as they want all their land to be under Saudi control (Interviews with key people, Author's field survey, 1994).

A number of tribes who have territory along the frontier, such as Al-Manahil, Al-Mahrah, and Bul-'Abeid (Al-Kurab and Al-Briak), have been affected by the conflict in the area and as a result some of their members have gone to live elsewhere in Saudi Arabia and Yemen, and in some cases, as far afield as Qatar and the UAE.

6.2 Recommendations

The main aim of this thesis, as mentioned in Chapter 1, is the proposal of a new, Logical Boundary between Saudi Arabia and Yemen. This Logical Boundary is the result of the carefully reasoned analysis of all the factors which have contributed to the location of the current de facto border, and which could lead to the peaceful emergence of an internationally recognised boundary. The following section looks at the location of the Logical Boundary, the basis of the proposal, and its advantages and disadvantages for Saudi Arabia and Yemen.
6.2.1 LOCATION OF THE PROPOSED LOGICAL BOUNDARY

The location of the proposed Logical Boundary runs as follows:

6.2.1.1 Western Study Sector

A line starting from Jabal Al-Thar at the point 44°22'E 17°24'N, which was mentioned in the 1934 Treaty of Taif as Border Mark Number I between Saudi Arabia and the Imamate of Yemen in the Najran area. From here the line follows the tribal boundary between the Yam and Wa’ilah tribes running through the following points: Jabal Sanam 44°20'E 17°19'N, Harshaf 44°24'E 17°19'N, Makwa 44°30'E 17°21'N, Al-Buqa 44°38'E 17°20'N, Madrak 44°38'E 17°10'N, and Tabt Al-Ism 44°38'E 17°05'N which is the tribal boundary tripoint between the territories of the Yam, Wa’ilah, and Dahm (Figures 6.2 and 6.3).

From here the borderline continues along the tribal boundary between the Yam and Dahm tribes through the following points: Jabal Hadbah at 44°58'E 17°02'N and Jabal Al-Twilah at 45°16'E 16°50'N, from where it runs eastward through Ramlat Yam and Ramlat Dahm to Jabal Al-Rayyan at 46°20'E 16°43'N. Jabal Al-Rayyan is a well-known landmark on the tribal boundaries of four tribes: the Yam, Dahm, Al-Say’ar, and ‘Abidah (Figures 6.2 and 6.3).

Thence the line runs south in a straight line coincident with the line shown on the MSD-SAR (1967) Yemen Arab Republic map and part of Philby’s 1937 line to Radm Al-Amir at 46°21'E 16°10'N. This section of the line is also approximately coincident with the boundary between the Yam, Dahm, Al-Say’ar, and ‘Abidah tribes (Figures 6.2 and 6.3).

6.2.1.2 Central Study Sector

From Radm Al-Amir the line runs north-east to Al-Murassas at 47°18'E 16°37'N. Here the line is coincident with part of the 1955 Saudi Declaration line and the de facto border
Figure 6.2: Factors influencing the location of the Logical Boundary

Source: Historical proposals after Schofield 1994 with a few modifications by the author: Author's Field Survey, July - December 1994
Figure 6.3: Proposed resolution to the Saudi - Yemeni boundary dispute

- Saudi "gains"
- Yemeni "gains"
- Abandoned
- Oil shows
- Gas and oil shows
- Unknown

The Logical Border

- Oil field
- Gas field

Source: Author's Field Survey, July - December 1994
(Figure 6.2). Thence it runs further north-east coincident with both the 1914 Violet line and the *de facto* border to Al-Fuhud at 48°10'E 17°36'N (Figures 6.2 and 6.3).

### 6.2.1.3 Eastern Study Sector

From Al-Fuhud the line runs east-north-east in a straight line to Shiqqat Al-Kharkhir at 51°08'E 18°48'N. This sector of the line is approximately coincident with the margin between the sands of the Rub’ Al-Khali and the gravel plains to the south, upon which the 1937 Aden Government Concession line was also based. The line runs through territory that is currently no man’s land between the two countries (Figures 6.2 and 6.3).

From Shiqqat Al-Kharkhir the line runs east to the point 52°00'E 19°00'N which is the Oman-Saudi Arabia-Yemen tripoint. This sector of the line is coincident with part of the 1955 British Declaration line (Figures 6.2 and 6.3).

### 6.2.2 THE BASIS OF THE LOGICAL BOUNDARY IN THE WESTERN STUDY SECTOR AND ITS ADVANTAGES AND DISADVANTAGES FOR SAUDI ARABIA AND YEMEN

In the Western Study Sector the Logical Boundary follows the recommendation of Article 4 of the 1934 Treaty of Taif that tribal boundaries should be used as the basis of the boundary between Saudi Arabia and the Imamate of Yemen on their Eastern Frontier:

... it then bends [the borderline] eastwards until it ends, on the edge of the boundary between those of the Hamdan-bin-Zaid, Wailah, &c., who are outside Yam, and Yam. (Schofield, 1993: Vol.2, p.424) (see Section 3.5.3 for more details)

Figure 6.4 shows that many tribes are descended from Hamdan bin Zaid, but along the former Imamate of Yemen-Saudi Arabia non-Treaty section of the present Saudi-Yemeni frontier the only relevant tribal boundaries are those between the Yam, Wa’ilah, and Dahm. This section of the Treaty can therefore be interpreted as meaning the tribal boundary between the Yam on the Saudi side of the frontier and the Wa’ilah and Dahm on the Yemeni side, as shown in Figure 6.3.
Figure 6.4: The genealogical tree of Hamdaan Ibn Zaiid

Ya'rub
Ibn Qahtaan

Sabella'

Kahaan

Kinda

Taii'

Al-'Ash'ar

Al-'zd

Hamdaan Ibn Zaiid

Ilakham and Judhaam

Himiiar

Haaashid

Bakiil

Hujuur

Qadam

'Awaam

al-'Ahnuum

Sahuur

Haiiraan

'Adhar

Yaam

Hamdaan San'aa'

Waadi'a

Shabaam

Waa'ilaa

Dahm

aal-Maqaash

aal-Abuujubaara

aal-Husiin

aal-Asha'raat

Compiled from: Sharf Al-Dian (1981 pp. 35-80); Al-Maqhafi (1985 pp. 1620, 345); Al-Hamadany (1987 pp.75-80); Al Billadi (1982 pp. 120-36)
The main reason for using the tribal boundaries mentioned in Article 4 of the Treaty of Taif as a basis for compromise along this sector of the border is the commitment of both countries to the Treaty of Taif as stated in Clause 1 of the 1995 Saudi-Yemeni Memorandum of Understanding:

The two sides [Saudi Arabia and Yemen] affirm their commitment to the legitimacy and binding nature of the Ta’if accord signed on 6th Safar 1353 AH, corresponding to 20th May 1934; its appendices, known as the Ta’if accord, which will be referred to hereafter as the accord. (Text as reported by the Saudi News Agency, SWB, 1995: p.15; see Appendix 3 for the full text of the memorandum)

The author used extended interviews with tribal sheikhs to define the location of the tribal boundaries and determine in which areas tribal claims overlap, such as Ramlat Dahm, Ramlat Yam, and the end of Wadi Al-‘Atfayn which are all claimed by both the Yam and Wa’ilah tribes (see Sections 1.6.3 and 3.5.3).

Philby’s line (1937) which was also based on tribal boundaries, is the nearest historical line to the Logical Boundary in this sector, especially the part between Jabal Al-Thar and Jabal Hadbah (Figure 6.2). A number of the marks which were used by Philby were also used by the sheikhs to describe their tribal boundaries to the author, namely Jabal Al-Thar, Madrak, Tabt Al-Ism, Wadi Al-‘Atfayn, and Jabal Al-Rayyan (for the full text describing Philby’s line, see Section 2.4.1). The author used these marks to define the tribal boundary between the Yam and the Wa’ilah, and the Yam and the Dahm along this sector of the frontier (Figure 6.3).

The sector of the Logical Boundary between Jabal Al-Rayyan and Radm Al-Amir is based on three factors: first, the tribal boundaries between the Yam, Dahm, Al-Say’ar, and ‘Abidah; secondly, sections of two historically proposed lines: Philby’s line (1937) and the line shown on the MSD-SAR (1967) Yemen Arab Republic map; and thirdly, the de facto border. Jabal Al-Rayyan was also used as a tribal boundary mark by the Aden Government in the 1949 proposal which became known as the Umm Al-Samim-Rayyan line (for the full text of the Umm Al-Samim-Rayyan line, see Section 2.4.2.5; Figures 6.2 and 6.3).
6.2.2.1 Advantages for Saudi Arabia

a. Some territory which is currently in no man’s land and some under Yemeni control (approximately 3,691km²) would fall under Saudi control (Figure 6.3).

b. The value of the land to be gained is good from the point of view of water resources and agricultural potential, compared with land along the rest of the frontier (see Section 3.2.1).

c. Some members of the Wa’ilah tribe living in Wadi Al-‘Atfayn would come under Saudi control.

d. That part of the Yam tribal territory which is currently under Yemeni control (approximately 3,000km²) would fall under Saudi control (Figure 6.3). This is a long held ambition of the Yam tribe.

6.2.2.2 Disadvantages for Saudi Arabia

a. The abandonment of the claims indicated by the line shown on the MPMR-KSA (1983) Arabian Peninsula map and a section of the 1955 Saudi Declaration line (Figure 6.2).

b. Some members of the Wa’ilah tribe of Saudi nationality would be living on the Yemeni side of the boundary. These cases should be dealt with individually and the owners of property should be compensated by the Yemeni Government.

6.2.2.3 Advantages for Yemen

a. Saudi Arabia would abandon the claims indicated by the line shown on the MPMR-KSA (1983) Arabian Peninsula map and a section of the 1955 Saudi Declaration line (Figure 2).

b. The currently active oil fields would be unaffected as most hydrocarbon operations are located far from the Logical Boundary (Figure 6.3).
Oil companies would be able to explore for oil and gas on the frontier without receiving warning letters from the Saudi Government, especially in the north of the Marib field (see Section 3.4.1).

6.2.2.4 Disadvantages for Yemen

a. A number of Yemeni Border Guard posts would have to be removed, namely ‘Abasah, Eastern Al-Adhr‘ain, and Western Al-Adhra‘in which are located in the vicinity of Al-Buq’a (Yemeni) and Al-Khadra (Saudi) checkpoints, and Al-Bramah near Jabal Al-Rayyan and Al-Mutashakhkirah near Radm Al-Amir, between the Western and Central Study Sectors (Figure 6.2).

b. The abandonment of some land which is currently under Yemeni control (approximately 3,691 km²) and which has a good potential from the point of view of water resources and agriculture (Figure 6.3).

The removal of border guard posts from the de facto border is a particularly difficult issue for both Saudi Arabia and Yemen. However, the proposed compromise boundary involves a trade-off: both countries would have to abandon some established positions. In return for the Yemeni positions abandoned in the Western Study Sector, the Saudis would have to remove two border guard posts in the Eastern Study Sector (see Section 6.2.4.2 on the Logical Boundary in the Eastern Study Sector). The abandonment of these posts would not involve the loss of considerable capital outlay.

Unfortunately, the location of the proposed Logical Boundary will not satisfy the Wa’ilah tribe as both the sheikh and the respondents from this tribe want all their land to be under Saudi control. However this would not be logical as the 1934 Treaty of Taif states that the Wa’ilah tribe should be on the Yemeni side of the boundary. Both governments should help to persuade the Wa’ilah of this fact. The process should be assisted by the Saudis continuing to allow the exercise of rights and privileges for frontier tribes, and by the Yemenis introducing similar privileges.
6.2.3 THE BASIS OF THE LOGICAL BOUNDARY IN THE CENTRAL STUDY SECTOR AND ITS ADVANTAGES AND DISADVANTAGES FOR SAUDI ARABIA AND YEMEN

The location of the proposed Logical Boundary in the Central Study Sector is based on two factors: the *de facto* border and various historical proposals.

The location of the *de facto* border between Saudi Arabia and Yemen in the Central Study Sector was affected by the fighting between Saudi Arabia and the former South Yemen at Al-Wadi‘ah in 1969. It would therefore be virtually impossible to suggest that either country should retreat from their *de facto* border positions here. Fortunately, however, the *de facto* border also coincides with the location of several historical border proposals. The author therefore proposes that in the Central Study Sector the Logical Boundary follows a section of the 1955 Saudi Declaration line and a section of the 1914 Violet line (Figure 6.2).

6.2.3.1 Advantages for Saudi Arabia

a  Some of the present no man’s land area (approximately 2,111km²) would fall under Saudi control (Figures 6.2 and 6.3).

b  Part of the Saudi-Yemeni boundary would be coincident with the 1955 Saudi Declaration line (Figure 6.2).

c  Yemen would have to abandon its claim indicated by the western section of the 1955 British Declaration line (Figure 6.2).

6.2.3.2 Disadvantage for Saudi Arabia

a  The incorporation of a section of the 1914 Violet line into the Logical Boundary, when the Violet line has never been accepted by the Saudi Government. However, that section of the Violet line which is used has been incorporated into the proposal because it is effectively coincident with the *de facto* border (Figure 6.2).
6.2.3.3 Advantages for Yemen

a. Some of the present no man's land area (approximately 2,578km²) would fall under Yemeni control (Figures 6.2 and 6.3).

b. Part of the Saudi-Yemeni border would be coincident with the 1914 Violet line, far north of the corresponding section of the 1955 Saudi Declaration line (Figure 6.2).

6.2.3.4 Disadvantages for Yemen

a. Yemen would have to abandon its claim indicated by the 1955 British Declaration line in this sector.

b. Part of the Saudi-Yemeni boundary would be coincident with the 1955 Saudi Declaration line (Figure 6.2).

All things considered, the relative territorial and political advantages and disadvantages to each country of the proposed Logical Boundary in the Central Study Sector are well balanced.

There is no legal interaction between the tribes along the frontier in the Central Study Sector. This is because there are no checkpoints and the de facto border acts as a barrier to movement in this sector, even though members of the same tribes and families live on either side of the frontier. The author therefore recommends that checkpoints should be established on both sides of the frontier in the Central Study Sector with the aim of encouraging tribal interaction and improving commercial activity in the area.

Oil and gas operations on the more active Yemeni side of the frontier will not be affected by the location of the Logical Boundary, except that a small part of Block 11 of the Western Concession will fall under Saudi control (Figure 6.3). There are no wells in this area, the concession licence for which is held by Elf Aquitaine. The potential of the region is unknown.
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As in the Western Study Sector, the location of the proposed Logical Boundary cannot satisfy local tribes, in this case Al-Say'ar and Bul-'Abeid (Al-Kurab and Al-Briak sub-tribes) living on the Saudi side of the frontier as they want all of their land to be under Saudi control. This would not be logical or justified as much of their land lies beyond the 1955 Saudi Declaration line and far south of the de facto border. As in the Central Study Sector, both governments should help to persuade the tribes that it is inevitable that their land will be divided and support them by introducing similar rights and privileges to those available to the frontier tribes in the Western Study Sector.

6.2.4 THE BASIS OF THE LOGICAL BOUNDARY IN THE EASTERN STUDY SECTOR AND ITS ADVANTAGES AND DISADVANTAGES FOR SAUDI ARABIA AND YEMEN

The Logical Boundary in the Eastern Study Sector is based on three factors; the location of the no man's land between the Saudi and Yemeni de facto borders, the southern margin of the Rub' Al-Khali upon which the 1937 Aden Government Concession line was roughly based, and a section of the 1955 British Declaration line running from Shiqqat Al-Kharkhir to the Oman-Saudi Arabia-Yemen tripoint at 52°00'E 19°00'N (Figure 6.2).

6.2.4.1 Advantages for Saudi Arabia

a Land already under Saudi control (approximately 5,948km²) in practical terms, but beyond the Saudi de facto border, would officially fall under Saudi control (Figure 6.3).

b The acquisition of part of the oil concession Block 11, the licence for which is held by Elf Aquitaine Petroleum BV. There are, however, no wells in this area, and the potential of the block is unknown (Figure 6.3).

c Yemen would have to abandon its claims indicated by the 1935 Riyadh line, a section of the 1955 British Declaration line, and part of the 1914 Violet line (Figure 6.2).
6.2.4.2  Disadvantages for Saudi Arabia

a  Two incomplete oil exploration wells drilled by Aramco in 1958 would fall under Yemeni control (Figure 6.3).

b  Saudi Arabia would have to abandon the claim indicated by the 1955 Saudi Declaration line in this sector, which is coincident with the 1935 Hamzah line (Figure 6.2).

c  Two Saudi Border Guard posts at 'Uruq Ibn Hamudah and Dahyah would have to be relocated on the 1955 British Declaration line, near the Oman-Saudi Arabia-Yemen tripoint (Figure 6.3).

6.2.4.3  Advantages for Yemen

a  Land already under Yemeni control (approximately 15,000km²) in practical terms, but beyond the Yemeni de facto border, would officially fall under Yemeni control (Figure 6.3).

b  The recognition of the point 52°00'E 19°00'N on the Oman-Saudi Arabia border as the Oman-Saudi Arabia-Yemen tripoint, as this represents the extreme Yemeni claim.

c  Saudi Arabia would have to abandon the claim indicated by the 1955 Saudi Declaration line in this sector, which is coincident with the 1935 Hamzah line (Figure 6.2).

d  All the wells which have been drilled in the frontier zone, including those which Aramco attempted to drill in 1958, would be acquired by Yemen (Figure 6.3).

6.2.4.4  Disadvantages for Yemen

a  Yemen's claims represented by a section of the 1914 Violet line, parts of the 1955 British Declaration line, and the 1935 Riyadh line would have to be abandoned. These areas are already under Saudi control (Figure 6.3).
b The abandonment of part of the oil concession Block II, the licence for which is currently held by Elf Aquitaine Petroleum (Figure 6.3).

In the Eastern Study Sector the location of the proposed Logical Boundary creates more disadvantages for Saudi Arabia than advantages, especially from the point of view of hydrocarbon potential. Figure 6.3 shows that a number of wells have been drilled in the \textit{de facto} area, including those abandoned by Aramco in 1958. The location of the proposed Logical Boundary would mean that all this activity would fall on the Yemeni side of the boundary.

Yemen's potential losses in the Eastern Study Sector may be seen as a trade-off for the gains which the Saudis would make in the Western Study Sector. Conversely, Yemen stands to gain in the Eastern Study Sector but lose in the Western Study Sector. In terms of area alone, the proposed Logical Boundary represents a total gain to the Saudis of 11,750km$^2$, and 17,578km$^2$ to the Yemenis, representing a net gain of 5,828km$^2$ to Yemen. This may not satisfy all the parties concerned, but if a successful compromise on the boundary is to be achieved, it is extremely important that both states are convinced that a true trade-off is taking place. Scarcely any other proposal would bring the parties as close as this. It should be remembered that the political gains in the form of permanent peace and greater co-operation may far outweigh territorial losses.

Of the 260 Saudi respondents interviewed by the author in the Eastern Study Sector, 27.7\% who were members of the Al-Manahil tribe had properties on the Yemeni side of the frontier. The Yemeni and Saudi Governments might compensate those Saudis whose properties fall on the Yemeni side of the Logical Boundary, and which have to be abandoned following a boundary agreement.
As with the Western and Central Study Sectors, the location of the proposed Logical Boundary will not satisfy the local sheikhs, in this case of Al-Say'ar, Al-Manahil, and Al-Mahrah tribes, because they want all their land to be under Saudi control. However it is not possible to make the Logical Boundary in this sector coincide with tribal boundaries. As in the Central Study Sector, everything should be done from both sides to persuade the tribal sheikhs that it is necessary to divide their land between the two states. Some incentives might be considered and both governments should give the frontier tribes in this sector similar rights and privileges to those currently given to the tribes in the Western Study Sector by the Saudi Government.

The Eastern Study Sector also needs formal checkpoints to be established on both the Saudi and Yemeni sides of the boundary. The present informal checkpoint at Al-Kharkhir does not encourage interaction between the tribes across the frontier. The introduction of formal checkpoints is part of the fourth and final stage of the development of a boundary, the Administrative Stage (see Section 2.3.3).

Returning to the hypothesis which was mentioned in Section 1.4, the author proposed that the Saudi-Yemeni de facto border in the study area would be located far from the extreme claims of either state, and the Logical Boundary would be largely coincident with the de facto border along its length. In the course of this study, the author has concluded that the reality differs considerably from the above hypothesis. In the Western Study Sector the de facto border is close to the extreme Yemeni claim and the Logical Boundary is coincident with tribal boundaries, rather than the de facto border (Figure 6.2). In the Central Study Sector the de facto border is mostly coincident with the Saudi extreme claim and the Logical Boundary is coincident with the de facto border, which itself is coincident with part of the 1955 Saudi Declaration line and part of the 1914 Violet line (Figure 6.2). In the Eastern Study Sector the de facto border is near to the 1955 British
Declaration line, and the Logical Boundary is coincident with no man's land, the southern margin of the Rub' Al-Khali and part of the 1955 British Declaration line. In conclusion, the *de facto* border tended to be close to one or other extreme claim rather than midway between them. Furthermore, the Logical Boundary tended to coincide as much with tribal boundaries, historical boundary proposals, and geographical features as with the *de facto* border. It was not therefore possible to prove the author's original hypothesis.

The author re-emphasises that implementation of the proposed Logical Boundary would require compromise and the abandonment of territorial claims on both sides. Undoubtedly, this would not be an easy process, but the author believes that the end result would be beneficial to both countries.

In the event that Saudi Arabia or Yemen are unhappy with the proposed Logical Boundary, it is hoped that this thesis will still contribute to the peaceful resolution of the boundary dispute by providing a source of academic information concerning various aspects of the frontier such as geographical features, historical proposals, population interaction, tribal distribution, economic opportunities, perceptions of the frontier, the checkpoints, and the *de facto* border. If the proposals outlined here are rejected, the alternatives need to be seriously considered; almost any other agreement will include provisions unpopular with one or other party.

Should it in fact be difficult for the recommendations in this research to be accepted, the concept of shared or neutral zones or zones of restricted activity might provide a temporary solution for questions of economic development. Such solutions have successfully provided relief at potential flashpoints in the past, and their application in the areas under discussion perhaps deserve a more thorough evaluation than they have so far received.
Whilst such temporary measures may be feasible for economic development, having an agreed zone within which free (or freer) movement of designated people is allowed could become a permanent solution. This would not only help the few people involved, but would provide sound evidence of cooperation between the two states and should assist environmental management in the area.

In Ajman-Oman, Sharjah-Oman and Fujaiirah-Sharjah - within the United Arab Emirates - the concept of shared political space has arguably proved effective, at any rate judged by durability. This principle of shared space, which can be applied both on land and sea, could still prove to be of use in maintaining future regional peace. (Blake 1994 p.210)

Such solutions indeed have an attraction, but the author believes it is largely the superficial attraction of allowing states to appear to solve a problem without addressing the basic long term issues. As long as there are nation states with separate identities the necessity for delimited boundaries exists and will continue to do so; in essence the boundary defines the state.

The author recommends the use of his framework model as a means of studying other territorial disputes similar to that on the Saudi-Yemeni frontier, and also as a route to the peaceful resolution of boundary disputes elsewhere, for example at some points between Morocco and Algeria.

6.3 The Future

In 1987 Prescott (p.61) presented a model of the procedures of boundary negotiations and the various options open to state negotiators. Adler (1995: p.18) has also presented a schematic diagram of boundary creation in his study 'Positioning and Mapping International Boundaries'. However, the author has chosen to use Prescott's model to
attempt to forecast the outcome of the Saudi-Yemeni negotiations, as it fits better with the observed stages of negotiations (Figure 6.5).


Three important objectives concerning the boundary dispute were attained with the signing of the Memorandum:

a. Saudi Arabia and Yemen both affirmed their commitment to the 1934 Treaty of Taif.
b. It was agreed to form a joint committee to negotiate the land boundary from Jabal Al-Thar to the eastern end of the Saudi-Yemeni frontier (the stretch of frontier that is the subject of this thesis).
c. It was agreed to form a joint committee to negotiate the maritime boundary (SWB, 1995: p.15; see Appendix 3 for the full text of the 1995 Saudi-Yemeni Memorandum of Understanding).

It is the outcome of the negotiations over the Saudi-Yemeni land boundary to the east of the Treaty of Taif boundary (mentioned in (b) above) which the author will use the Prescott model to predict.

Prior to the start of negotiations in 1992, and during the period 1992-5 before the signing of the Memorandum of Understanding, each state was acting unilaterally, making claims and taking a defensive attitude, resulting in the favouring of a *de facto* border (Figure 6.5).

Following the signing of the Memorandum of Understanding in February 1995, Saudi and Yemeni actions became bilateral in nature. As Figure 6.5 shows, there are a number of potential outcomes to negotiation when countries are acting bilaterally, but the author expects the negotiations to result in a compromise boundary either directly as a result of agreement, or indirectly as a result of disagreement, followed by arbitration and acceptance (Figure 6.5).
Figure 6.5(A): Model of boundary negotiations

Source: Prescott 1987 p61
A small modification has to be made to the nature of the arbitration in Prescott's model to make it fit the circumstances of the Saudi-Yemeni negotiations. Clause 3 of the Memorandum of Understanding states:

The current committee formed by the two countries will continue its work ... including agreement on means of arbitration in the event of differences between the two countries (Text as reported by the Saudi News Agency, SWB, 1995: p.15).

The author anticipates that if the negotiations reach this stage, Saudi Arabia and Yemen will opt for Arab arbitration by Egypt and Syria. This is because both countries are acceptable to the negotiating parties as they successfully mediated during a period of tension between Saudi Arabia and Yemen prior to the signing of the Memorandum of Understanding in 1995 (Asharq Al-Awsat, 1995a: p.1 and Independent, 1995: p.11).

However, the author believes that both governments will do everything possible to avoid arbitration. Meanwhile the international community awaits a peaceful resolution to one of the world's longest disputed land boundaries with considerable interest and anxiety.
References


CHAPTER 6

MAPS


Appendix 1

1934 Treaty of Taif
1934 Treaty of Taif


Treaty of Taif

In the Name of God the Merciful, the Compassionate

Treaty of Islamic Friendship and Brotherhood, between the Saudi Arab Kingdom and the Kingdom of the Yemen.

HIS Honourable Majesty the Imam Abdul Aziz Abdurrahman-al-Feyyal-al Saud, King of the Saudi Arab Kingdom, on the one part, and His Honourable Majesty the Imam Yahya-bin-Muhammad Hamiduddin, King of the Yemen, on the other part:

Being desirous of ending the state of war unfortunately existing between them and their Governments and peoples;
And of uniting the Islamic Arab nation and raising its condition and maintaining its prestige and independence;
And in view of the necessity of establishing firm treaty relations between them and their Governments and countries on a basis of mutual advantage and reciprocal interest;
And wishing to fix the frontiers between their countries and to establish
relations of "Bois-Voisinage" and ties of Islamic friendship between them
and to strengthen the foundations of peace and tranquillity between their
countries and peoples;

And being desirous that there should be a united front against sudden
mishaps and a solid structure to preserve the safety of the Arab Peninsula,

I have resolved to conclude a treaty of Islamic friendship and Arab brotherhood
between them and for that purpose have nominated the following representatives
plenipotentiaries on their behalf:—

On behalf of His Honourable Majesty the King of the Saudi Arab Kingdom,
His Royal Highness the Amir Khalid Abdul Aziz, son of His Majesty and
Acting President of the Council of Ministers,

And on behalf of His Honourable Majesty the King of the Yemen, his

Their Majesties the two Kings have accorded to their above-mentioned
representatives full powers and absolute authority; and their above-mentioned
representatives, having perused each other's credentials and found them in proper
form, have, in the name of their Kings, agreed upon the following articles:—

ARTICLE 1.

The state of war existing between the Kingdom of the Yemen and the
Kingdom of Saudi Arabia shall be terminated as from the moment of signature
of this treaty, and there shall forthwith be established between their Majesties
the Kings and their countries and peoples a state of perpetual peace, firm
friendship, and everlasting Islamic Arab brotherhood, inviolable in whole or in part.
The two high contracting parties undertake to settle in a spirit of affection and
friendship all disputes and differences which may arise between them, and to
ensure that a spirit of Islamic Arab brotherhood shall dominate their relations
in all states and conditions. They call God to witness the goodness of their
intentions and their true desire for concord and agreement, both secretly and
openly, and they pray the Almighty to grant them and their successors and heirs
and Governments success in the continuance of this proper attitude, which is
pleasing to the Creator and honourable to their race and religion.

ARTICLE 2.

Each of the two high contracting parties recognises the full and absolute
independence of the kingdom of the other party and his sovereignty over it. His
Majesty the Imam Abdul Aziz bin-Abdurrahman-al-Faysal-al-Saud, King of the
Saudi Arab Kingdom, admits to His Majesty the Imam Yahya and his lawful
descendants the full and absolute independence of the Kingdom of the Yemen and
his sovereignty over it, and His Majesty the Imam Yahya bin-Muhammad
Hamiuddin, King of the Yemen, admits to His Majesty the Imam Abdul Aziz
and his lawful descendants the full and absolute independence of the Saudi Arab
Kingdom and his sovereignty over it. Each of them gives up any right he claimed
over any part or parts of the country of the other party beyond the frontiers fixed
and defined in the text of this treaty. His Majesty the Imam King Abdul Aziz
abandons by this treaty any right of protection or occupation, or any other right,
which he claimed in the country, which, according to this treaty, belongs to the
Yemen and which was (formerly) in the possession of the Idrisias and others. His
Majesty the Imam Yahya similarly abandons by this treaty any right he claimed
in the name of Yemeni unity or otherwise, in the country (formerly) in the
possession of the Idrisias or the Al Aidi, or in Najran, or in the Yam country,
which according to this treaty belongs to the Saudi Arab Kingdom.

ARTICLE 3.

The two high contracting parties agree to conduct their relations and
communications in such a manner as will secure the interests of both parties
and will cause no harm to either of them, provided that neither of the high

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contracting parties shall concede to the other party less than he concedes to a third party. Neither of the two parties shall be bound to concede to the other party more than he receives in return.

**ARTICLE 4.**

The frontier line which divides the countries of the two high contracting parties is explained in sufficient detail hereunder. This line is considered as a fixed dividing boundary between the territories subject to each.

The frontier line between the two kingdoms begins at a point midway between Medi and Al Musin on the coast of the Red Sea, and (runs) up to the mountains of the Tihama in an easterly direction. It then turns northwards until it ends on the north-west boundary between the Beni Jrama's and (the tribes) of the two parties, and west. It then bends on the north and west to a point between the limits of Naqa'a and Wa'ar, which belong to the Waila tribe, and the limits of the Yam. It then bends until it reaches the pass of Marwan and Aqaba Rifada. It then bends eastwards until it ends, on the east, on the northern boundary between those of the Hamdan-bin-Zaid, Waila, etc., who are outside Yam. The frontier line then divides the two high contracting parties, and everything on the left of the above-mentioned line belongs to the Saudi Arab Kingdom. On the Yemeni side are Medi, Haradh, part of the Harta tribes, Mir, the Dhahir Mountains, Shada, Dhay'a, part of the Abadil, the Abya'a, the mountains of Razih, Manub, with Arwa-al-Amshayk, all the country and the mountains of Beni Jrama's, Sahar-ash-Sham, Yahad and its neighbourhood, the Maraisagh area of the Sahar-ash-Shum, the whole of Sahar, Naqa'a, Wa'ar, the whole of Waila, and also Far with Qubab Nahum, the whole of Hamadan-bin-Zaid, which is outside Yam and Wadi Dhahiran. These mentioned, and their territories within their known limits, and all between the said directions and their vicinities, the names of which are not mentioned and which were actually subject to or under the control of the Yemeni Kingdom before the year 1352, are on the Yemeni side, and all that lies to the west and north of the same line belongs to the Waila. On the left-hand side are Musain, Wa'lan, most of the Harta, the Khub, the Jabri, most of the Abadil, all Faifa, Beni Malik, Beni Haras, the Al Ta'iiid, Qahtan, Dhahiran, Wadi'a, all the Wadi Dhahiran, together with the pass of Marwan, and Aqaba Rifada, and the area lying beyond on the east and north of Yam and Najran, that all below Arwa-Nabata, up to the limits of Yam and Waila, Yam, all the borders and territories up to the end of their limits, in all directions, belong to the Yemen. All points mentioned in this article, whether north, south, east or west, are to be considered in accordance with the general trend of the frontier line in the directions indicated; often obstacles cause it to bend into the country of one or other kingdom. As regards the determination and fixing of the said line, the separating out of the tribes and the settlement of their disputes in the best manner, these shall be effected by a committee formed of an equal number of persons from the two parties, in a friendly and brotherly way and without prejudice, according to tribal usage and custom.
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ARTICLE 5.

In view of the desire of both high contracting parties for the continuance of peace and tranquillity, and for the non-existence of anything which might disturb the thoughts of these two countries, they mutually undertake not to construct any fortified building within a distance of 5 kilo. on either side of the frontier, anywhere along the frontier line.

ARTICLE 6.

The two high contracting parties undertake immediately to withdraw their troops from the country which, by virtue of this treaty, becomes the possession of the other party, and to safeguard the inhabitants and troops.

ARTICLE 7.

The two high contracting parties each undertake to prevent their people from committing any harmful or hostile act against the people of the other kingdom, in any district or on any route; to prevent raiding between the Bedouin on both sides; to return all (property) which is established by legal investigation, after the ratification of this treaty, as having been taken; to give compensation for all damage, according as may be legally necessary, where crimes of murder or wounding have been committed; and severely to punish anyone proved to have committed any hostile act. This article shall continue operative until another agreement shall have been drawn up between the two parties as to the manner of investigating and estimating damage and loss.

ARTICLE 8.

The two high contracting parties mutually undertake to refrain from resorting to force in all difficulties between them, and to do their utmost to settle any disputes which may arise between them, whether caused by this treaty or the interpretation of all or any of its articles or resulting from any other cause, by friendly representations; in the event of inability to agree by this means each of the two parties undertakes to resort to arbitration, of which the conditions, the manner of demand, and the conduct are explained in the appendix attached to this treaty. This appendix shall have the force and authority of this treaty, and shall be considered as an integral part of it.

ARTICLE 9.

The two high contracting parties undertake, by all moral and material means at their command, to prevent the use of their territory as a base and centre for any hostile action or enterprise, or preparations therefore, against the country of the other party. They also undertake to take the following measures immediately on receipt of a written demand from the Government of the other party:—

(1) If the person endeavouring to foment insurrection is a subject of the Government which receives the application to take measures, he should, after the matter has been legally investigated and established, receive a deterrent punishment which will put an end to his actions and prevent their recurrence.

(2) If the person endeavouring to foment insurrection is a subject of the Government making the demand for measures to be taken, he should be immediately arrested by the Government applied to and handed over to the Government making the demand. The Government asked to surrender him shall have no right to excuse themselves from carrying out this demand, but shall be bound to take adequate steps to prevent the flight of the person asked for, and in the event of the person asked for being able to run away, the Government from whose territory he has fled shall undertake not to allow him to return to its territory, and if he is able so to return, shall arrest him and hand him over to his Government.

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(3) If the person endeavouring to foment insurrection is a subject of a third Government, the Government to whom the demand is made and who finds the person in its territories, shall immediately and directly after the receipt of the demand of the other Government, take steps to expel him from its country, and to consider him as undesirable and to prevent him from returning there in future.

ARTICLE 10.

The two high contracting parties agree not to receive anyone who has fled from the jurisdiction of his Government, whether he be great or small, official or non-official, an individual or a group. Each of the high contracting parties shall take adequate and effective administrative or military measures, &c., to prevent these fugitives entering within the borders of its country. If one or all of them succeeds in crossing the frontier and entering its territory, it shall be bound to disarm the refugee and to arrest him and hand him over to the Government of the country from which he fled. If the event of its being unable to arrest him, it shall take adequate steps to drive him out from the country which he has entered into the country to which he belongs.

ARTICLE 11.

The two high contracting parties undertake to prevent their Amirs, Amils and officials from interfering in any way whatsoever, either directly or indirectly, with the subjects of the other party. They undertake to take full measures to prevent the occurrence of any disturbance or misunderstanding as a result of such actions.

ARTICLE 12.

Each of the two high contracting parties recognises that the people of all areas accruing to the other party by virtue of this treaty are subjects of that party. Each of them undertakes not to accept as its subjects any person or persons who are subjects of the other party except with the consent of that party. The subjects of each of the two parties, when in the country of the other party, should be treated in accordance with local law.

ARTICLE 13.

Each of the two high contracting parties undertakes to announce a full and complete amnesty for all crimes and hostile acts which may have been committed by any person or persons who are subjects of the other party, but reside in its territory (i.e., in the territory of the party issuing the amnesty). Similarly, each of them undertakes to issue a full, general and complete amnesty to those of its subjects who may have gone, or taken refuge, or in any manner joined themselves, to the other party; for all crimes; and for the property which they may have taken from the time when they came to the other party until their return, whatever its nature and whatever its amount; and not to allow any sort of injury, punishment or constraint to be made upon them on account of their having taken refuge or joined themselves, or of the manner in which they did so. If either party has any doubt as to the occurrence of anything contrary to this undertaking, the party entertaining the doubt may apply to the other party to convene a meeting of the representatives who signed this treaty; if it is impossible for any one of them to attend, he may depute another fully authorised and empowered person, well acquainted with the localities and who is anxious to effect a settlement between the parties and to carry out the rights of both, to attend to investigate the matter, so that no injustice or dispute may arise. The decision of these representatives shall be considered as binding.

ARTICLE 14.

Each of the two high contracting parties undertakes to return the property of those of its subjects whom it pardons, and to hand it over to them or their heirs on their return to their country, in obedience to the law of their country.
high contracting parties similarly undertake not to retain any of the goods and chattels which belong to the subjects of the other party, and not to create obstacles to their free use or to the disposal of them.

**Article 15.**

Each of the two high contracting parties undertakes not to interfere [sic: treat with] with a third party, whether it be an individual, a group, or a Government, or to agree with him in any matter which may injure the interests of the other party, or which may harm its country, or which may raise problems and difficulties, or which may expose its welfare, interests or existence to danger.

**Article 16.**

The two high contracting parties, who are bound by Islamic brotherhood and Arab origin, announce that their two nations are one nation, that they do not wish any evil to anyone, and that they will do their best to promote the interest of their nation, in the shade of tranquility and quietness, and will exert their best endeavours in all ways for the good of their countries and their nation, intending no hostility to anyone.

**Article 17.**

In the event of any external aggression on the country of one of the two high contracting parties, the other party shall be bound to carry out the following undertakings:

1. To adopt complete neutrality secretly and openly.
2. To co-operate mentally and morally as far as possible.
3. To undertake negotiations with the other party to discover the best way of guaranteeing the safety of the country of that party and of preventing its being harmed, and to refrain from any act which might be interpreted as assisting that external aggressor.

**Article 18.**

In the event of insurrection or hostilities taking place within the country of one of the two high contracting parties, both of them mutually undertake as follows:

1. To take all necessary effective measures to prevent the aggressors or the rebels from making use of their territories.
2. To prevent fugitives from taking refuge in their countries, and to hand them over or expel them if they have entered, as explained in articles 9 and 10 above.
3. To prevent its subjects joining the aggressors or rebels, and to refrain from encouraging or supplying them.
4. To prevent assistance, supplies, arms and ammunition reaching the enemy or the rebels.

**Article 19.**

The two high contracting parties announce their desire to do everything possible to facilitate postal and telegraphic services, to increase the communications between the two countries, and to facilitate the exchange of commodities and agricultural and commercial products between them; to undertake detailed negotiations, in order to conclude a customs agreement to safeguard the economic interest of their two countries, by unifying customs duties throughout the two countries, or by special regulations designed to secure the advantage of the two sides. Nothing in this article shall restrict the freedom of either of the two high contracting parties in any manner until the conclusion of the agreement referred to has been accomplished.

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ARTICLE 20.

Each of the two high contracting parties declares its readiness to authorise its representatives and delegates abroad, if such there be, to represent the other party, whenever the other party desires this, in any matter or at any time. It is understood that whenever representatives of both parties are together in one place they shall collaborate in order to unify their policy to promote the interests of their two countries, which are one nation. It is understood that this article does not restrict the freedom of either side in any manner whatsoever in any of its rights. Similarly, it cannot be interpreted as limiting the freedom of either of them or of compelling either to adopt this course.

ARTICLE 21.

The contents of the agreement signed on the 5th Shaban, 1350, shall in any case be cancelled as from the date of ratification of this treaty.

ARTICLE 22.

This treaty shall be ratified and confirmed by Their Honourable Majesties the two Kings within the shortest possible time, having regard to the common interest of the two sides in this (being done). It shall come into force as from the date of the exchange of the instruments of ratification, except as regards what has been laid down in article 1, relative to the ending of the state of war immediately after its signature. It shall continue in force for a period of twenty (20) complete lunar years. It may be renewed or modified during the six months preceding its expiry. If not so renewed or modified by that date, it shall remain in force until six months after such time as one party has given notice to the other party of his desire to modify it.

ARTICLE 23.

This treaty shall be called the Treaty of Taif. It has been drawn up in two copies in the noble Arabic language, each of the two high contracting parties being in the possession of one copy.

In witness whereof each of the plenipotentiaries has affixed his signature.

Written in the city of Jeddah(*) on the sixth day of the month of Safar thirteen hundred and fifty-three.

KHALID-BIN-ABDUL AZIZ-AS-SAUD.
ABDULLAI-BIN-ALI-MED-AL-WAZIR.

(*) The treaty was signed at Taif and "Jeddah" is probably only a slip.
APPENDIX 1

1934 Treaty of Taif
Annex 1
[Author's numbering]

Arbitration Covenant between the Saudi Arab Kingdom and the Kingdom of Yemen.

Whereas their Majesties the Imams King Abdul Aziz, King of the Saudi Arab Kingdom, and King Yahya, King of the Yemen, have agreed in accordance with article 8 of the Treaty of Peace, Friendship and Good Understanding, known as the Treaty of Taif, signed on the 9th Safar, 1353, to refer to arbitration any dispute or difference which may arise out of the relations between them, their Governments and countries, when all friendly representations fail to settle it, the two high contracting parties undertake to effect arbitration in the manner shown in the following articles:

ARTICLE 1.

Each of the two high contracting parties undertakes to accept reference of the question in dispute to arbitration within one month of the date of receipt of the other party of a demand for arbitration.

ARTICLE 2.

The arbitration shall be undertaken by a committee composed of an equal number of arbitrators, half of whom shall be selected by each of the two parties. A chief arbitrator shall be selected by mutual agreement between the two high contracting parties. If they do not agree in this respect, each of them shall nominate a person, and if either party accepts the person nominated by the other party, the person in question shall become chief arbitrator. If even this cannot be agreed upon, the chief arbitrator shall be chosen by ballot, on the understanding that the ballot shall only be drawn on persons acceptable to both parties. The person chosen by ballot shall become the head of the arbitration committee, and entitled to settle the case. If, however, agreement cannot be arrived at on the persons acceptable to both parties, negotiations shall be carried on until the two parties agree on this point.

ARTICLE 3.

The selection of the arbitration committee and its chief shall be completed within one month of the date of the end of the month fixed for the reply of the party whose acceptance of arbitration was requested by the other party. The arbitration committee shall meet at a place to be agreed upon within a period not exceeding one month after the expiry of the two months provided for at the beginning of this article. The arbitration committee shall give its award within a period which, in any case, should not exceed one month as from the expiry of the period fixed for the meeting to take place. The award of the arbitration committee shall be given by a majority of votes, and shall be considered binding on the two parties. Its execution immediately after its issue and communication shall be considered obligatory. Each of the two high contracting parties may appoint a person or persons, as he desires, to defend his case before the arbitration committee and to produce the necessary evidence and arguments.

ARTICLE 4.

The charges in regard to the arbitrators of each party shall be chargeable to their respective parties. The charges of the chief arbitrator shall be chargeable to both parties equally, as well as the expenses of the other investigations.

ARTICLE 5.

This covenant shall be regarded as an integral part of the Treaty of Taif signed this day, the 9th Safar, 1353, and will remain in force during the period of the validity of the treaty. Written in Arabic, in two copies, of which each of the two high contracting parties is in possession of one.

Signed on the sixth day of Safar, thirteen hundred and fifty-three.

KHALID-BIN-ABDUL AZIZ-AS-SAUD.

ABDULLAH-BIN-AHMED-AL-WAZIR.

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In the Name of God the Merciful, the Compassionate

Annex to Taif Agreement for the demarcation of Borders between the Kingdom of Yemen and the Kingdom of Saudi Arabia.

Thanks to God who has united the muslims, and Peace and Prayers be upon our chosen Prophet Mohammed, his Family and Companions.

We Yahya Bin Hameedden King of Yemen; pursuant to the provisions of the last paragraph of Article 4 of Taif Agreement concluded between us and our brother, His Majesty King Abdul Aziz Bin Abdul Rahman Alfaifa Al Saud King of Saudi Arabia on 6th of Safar 1353 Hijri which provides for:

"The demarcation and definition of the aforesaid line, and the proper separation of tribes and definition of their homeland shall be accomplished through a committee comprising members representing the two parties equally. The committee shall carry out its business in a brotherly impartial manner in accordance with tribal practices and traditions. Two joint committees have been set up for the actual demarcation of borders between the Kingdom of Yemen and the Kingdom of Saudi Arabia, the first to demarcate borders in Tehama and the other in the mountains etc. The Tehama committee appointed by us comprised Mohammed Bin Daifulla Bin Ghathaya, Mohammed Bin Kassim Hameedden and Abdulla Bin Othman. The committee appointed by his Majesty for the demarcation of borders in Tehama comprised Mohammed Alsulaiman Bin Turki, Abdulla Kadi and Abdulla Bin Ageel. The committee appointed by us for the mountain areas comprised Abdulla Bin Maha, Ruler of Sahar, Abdulla Alaghabiri, Ismail Bin Hasan, Wali of Ramadaan and Mohammed Bin Hassan Alwadi'ee, Head of Sakeen. The committee appointed by His Majesty for the demarcation of borders in the mountains comprised Abdul Fahim Bin Mohammed Abu Kilha, Abdul Aziz Bin Abdul Rahman Althamiri, Ibrahim Bin Zain Alabedeen, Dulaim Abu La'atha, Husain Bin Mustafa and Talat Wafa. These committees agreed on the demarcation of borders. The joint committee for the demarcation of borders in the mountains prepared one report on the 21st of Shawwal 1354 signed by the representatives of both parties. The report contained individual border locations in the mountains etc beginning with Jabal Althar and ending with Jawr Alwadifa. The joint committee for the demarcation of borders in Tehama prepared three reports signed by the representatives of both parties, the first signed in Ramadaan 1354, from the Sea Quay at Ras Almiwaj to Maloos. The second report was signed on the 27th of Shawwal 1354, from Low Meer Alya Wadi sides to the bottom of Jabal Souda from the East. The third report was signed on the 21st of Alqida 1354, from Malas Souda and ending along Alwadif. The reports indicated individual Border locations for Tehama. The following is the text of the four reports:
In the Name of God the Merciful, the Compassionate.

Border Demarcation Report

Between the Kingdom of Saudi Arabia and Kingdom of Yemen

On the 25th of Sha'ban 1354 Hijri, a meeting was held in Dhahran between the two committees signing below, appointed by His Majesty Imam Abdul Aziz Al Saud, King of Saudi Arabia and by His Majesty Imam Yahya Bin Hameeddeen, King of Yemen to determine the border line between the above-mentioned Kingdoms in accordance with the provisions of Article 4 of Taif Agreement.

Demarcation began from the adjacent areas in the East to the last point in the West where the Tehama committee will accomplish its task. It was agreed to place the first border mark at Ras Jabal Althar - between the tribes of Waila and Yam. Concerning the Wasteland called (Silah) and the adjacent area to the East which is under dispute between the tribes of Waila and Yam we have decided to leave it as it is without placing any marks. Should there be any dispute thereupon in the future, it should be settled in accordance with God's Sharia and the provisions of Taif Agreement.

The areas separated from Silah to the South should be given to Waila tribe and the like and the separated areas to the North should be given to Yam tribe.

The above-mentioned committees held several meetings until this report was prepared for the above-mentioned purpose. The meetings were attended by the chiefs of the adjacent tribes. After investigations and with the approval of the chiefs of tribes and without any coercion the border demarcation process was carried out. The borders were determined, defined and distinguished by the famous and
unchangeable names of mountains, hills and valleys. These names will be mentioned in detail later on. Those names have been mentioned in minutes written at different dates and approved by both committees. Each committee kept a copy of the minutes. The two committees appointed trusted men who went to put stone marks along the border line every other kilometer pending the erection of posts at a time to be specified by Their Majesties the two Kings. They also will appoint the persons who would carry out the work and the expenses involved.

Each tribe has been given a statement approved by the two committees defining its borders with the adjacent tribe to prevent any excuse or confusion, so that every one should know his limits and adhere thereto and refrain from crossing and offending adjacent lands for the feeding of animals or otherwise. Offenders shall be punished by their respective governments as a deterrent for other offenders.

The following are the Border location list from the East to the West:
Starting of Border line between Saudi Arabia and the Kingdom of Yemen after Silah waste-land.

1 - Jabal Althar
2 - Jabal Alaseeda
3 - Ras Markoos Anban
4 - Thera'a Alsharia
5 - Qa'a Attheetha
6 - Ras Alabla
7 - Ras Alkawkab
8 - Ras Alsabr: overlooking the plain extending to Haso Jakheemi provided that the Yans should have access to the water available at Haso Jakheemi as usual.
9 - Alfuqhdain
10 - Ras Araba
11 - Ras Aqaba Mahuga
12 - Ashara
13 - Faru Nadar
14 - Jabal Thafara
15 - Yara Daghma
16 - Magbara Al Thula
17 - Magashi
18 - Rahwat Zarak
19 - Jabal Marashaha
20 - Qahr Fard
21 - Shahat Alghameera
22 - Salfa
23 - Jabal Alats
24 - Ras Jabal Hadhadh: what runs to the South for Waila, and what runs to the North for Wadia, what runs to the East for Yam. Here the limit ends between Waila and Yam.
25 - Ras Alhanka
26 - Jabal Aar
27 - Halaqat Alhamad
28 - Aljadalinya
29 - Jabal Wawa - Sukhaira shall remain unchanged, i.e. what belongs to ibn Khair shall be his, apart from that according to the traditions shall be in the possession of Tbn Khair as usual and his successors and shall pay one seventh of the output to Salim Bin Damnan and his successors.
30 - Al shu'ba
31 - Dharawiya
32 - Jabal Faredh Alraka
33 - Jabal Adhad
34 - Jabal Faredh Asar
35 - Jabal Faredh Almuhdeth
36 - Jabal Sabahatal
37 - Almusairlia: what runs to the West belongs to Sahar Alsham and what runs to the East belongs to Wadia.
38 - Sha'ab Alcous
39 - Ras Jabal Alab
40 - Alshathii: what runs to the West belongs to Al Masr of Sahar Alsham and what runs to the East and to the North belongs to Wadia.
41 - Wafaa Alhanka (i.e. Ras Bin Mualla) provided that Al Kahadh and Sanhan and Al Masr shall retain their property rights in Alrahwa village as in the past and present.
APPENDIX I

42 - Alasabsab
43 - Naleed Alkhali: The North side to Al Mahad: from Wadia and the South side to Al Nasr from Sahar Alsham.
44 - Jabal Al Mahadh: what runs to the North for Al Nasr, the other sides for Al Mahadh from Wadia and here ends the limit between Sahar Alsham and Wadia.
45 - Wadi Alrabidha in Almasna: The south side for Al Nasr from Sahar Alsham. The other sides for Sanhan from Kahtan.
46 - Khashm Alakia in Kharq: The dividing line between Al Saeed of Sanhan and Bani Jama’a after that the dividing line between Al Taleed and Bani Jama’a begins, extending from East to South-West.
47 - Taleed Kashbar: The North and West sides to Al Taleed and South and East sides to Bani Jama’a.
48 - Wadi Nujasa’a Alkardh: The North and West sides for Al Taleed and South and East sides to Bani Jama’a.
49 - Ras Alhammarra: North and west sides to Al Taleed and South and East sides to Bani Jama’a.
50 - Asg Alwakif: North and West sides to Al Taleed and South and East sides to Bani Jama’a.
51 - Ras Alshathina: North and West sides to Al Taleed and South and East sides to Bani Jama’a.
52 - Jabal Aljaish: North and West sides to Al Taleed and South and East sides to Bani Jama’a.
53 - Sall Aljawa: North and West sides to Al Taleed and South and East sides to Bani Jama’a.
54 - Kahr Naama: North and West sides to Al Taleed and South and East sides to Bani Jama’a.
55 - Jabal Shafa Alzubair: North and West sides to Al Taleed and South and East sides to Bani Jama’a.
56 - Jabal Alajrama: North and West sides to Al Taleed and South and East sides to Bani Jama’a.
57 - Jabal Arab: North and West sides to Al Taleed and South and East sides to Bani Jama’a.
58 - Need Alsheryani: North and West sides to Al Taleed and South and East sides to Bani Jama’a.
59 - Wadi Alraseefi.: North and West sides to Al Taleed and South and East sides to Bani Jama’a.
60 - Qama Maaroob: Originally Waddi Dafa, from Um Zarad to Qama Maaroob and to Alrassafi is shared between Al Taleedi, Alhabi and Altrasiti tribes.

From Wadi Dafa Northwards belongs to Al Thabit and Al Taleed, Westwards and Southwards belongs to Ahl Habs and Al Yahya of Bani Malik and Eastwards to Al Thabit. Al Thabit Al Taleed and Al Qahr have agreed that Jual Thahran belongs to them all jointly. They can use it as usual.

61 - Jabal Amkalaha: Westwards and Southwards to Al Yahya and Al Habs of Bani Malik and Eastwards to Al Thabit of Bani Jama'a.

62 - Need Jalal Westwards and Southwards to Al Yahya

63 - Need Alsahaya and Eastwards and Northwards to

64 - Need Alrafsa Al Thabit.

65 - Jabal Alareef - Extending from the North to the South from Need Alrafsa to Katfa. It is the dividing line between Al Yahya and Ahl Hanba. The western side belongs to Al Yahya and the eastern side to Ahl Hanba. Each tribe has been given a document showing its property according to the other tribe.

66 - Jabal Alseim: North side to Al Yahya of Bani Malik and South side to Ahl Ja'ha of Bani Kholi.

67 - Harf Amsheena: North side to Al Yahya of Bani Malik and South side to Ahl Ja'ha of Bani Kholi.

68 - Need Alnaikhtaf: North side to Al Yahya of Bani Malik and South side to Ahl Ja'ha of Bani Kholi.

69 - Need Alfasani: North side to Al Yahya of Bani Malik and South side to Ahl Ja'ha of Bani Kholi.

70 - Qlat Um Sahami: North side to Al Yahya of Bani Malik and South side to Ahl Ja'ha of Bani Kholi.

71 - Jabal Almijdar: North side to Al Yahya of Bani Malik and South side to Ahl Ja'ha of Bani Kholi.

72 - Saqiyaat Um Magheteet: North side to Al Yahya of Bani Malik and South side to Ahl Ja'ha of Bani Kholi.

73 - Wadi Um Sharifa: North side to Al Yahya of Bani Malik and South side to Ahl Ja'ha of Bani Kholi.

74 - Naqil Alkafa: West and North sides to Al Zaidan, South and East sides to Bani Kholi and Al Sabola shall retain their houses and properties in Jabal Shahdan as usual.
75 - Need Kharma: West and North sides to Al Zaidan of Al Yahya of Bani Malik and South and East sides to Al Jalha of Bani Kholi.
76 - Hiyad Alradha: West and North sides to Al Zaidan of Al Yahya of Bani Malik and South and East sides to Al Jalha of Bani Kholi.
77 - Bir Alsharkh: West and North sides to Al Zaidan of Al Yahya of Bani Malik and South and East sides to Al Jalha of Bani Kholi.
78 - Need Sarma: West and North sides to Al Zaidan of Al Yahya of Bani Malik and South and East sides to Al Jalha of Bani Kholi.
79 - Need Alwakar: East and South sides to Al Ayyash, North and West sides to Al Saeed of Bani Malik.
80 - Need Alfarb: But Al Saeed shall have access to Jura'a water in Need Alfarb as usual.
81 - Mu3nib Albehar: East and South sides to Al Ayyash and North and West sides to Al Khalid and Al Izzat of Bani Malik.
82 - Alshakar: South side slanting to the West to Al Khair and Al Izzat of Bani Malik.
83 - Alhankar: South side slanting to the West to Al Khair and Al Izzat of Bani Malik.
84 - Wadi Al Kharash: East and South sides to Al Allahab and Al Um Dosha, North and West to Al Khalid and Al Izzat of Bani Malik.
85 - Garn Mekhala: Al Khalid and Al Izzat of Bani Malik.
86 - Need Shoukan: Al Khalid and Al Izzat of Bani Malik.
87 - Gabbas: Al Khalid and Al Izzat of Bani Malik.
88 - Alkharq: South side slanting to the West to Al Khalid and Al Izzat of Bani Malik.
89 - Tabri Um Thamila: Bani Um Sheikh, and North and West sides to Al Khalid and Al Izzat of Bani Malik.
90 - Jour Alwadafa: to Al Khalid and Al Izzat of Bani Malik.

Here the borders between Bani Malik and Bani Jama'a and Bani Munabbih end.

These are the last borders determined by the two committees signing on this document. The areas situated on the North of this border line belong to Saudi Arabia and those on the South to the Kingdom of Yemen excluding certain border points inclined to the East and West according to the inclination of the border line direction as shown in details against each point.
To announce the above-mentioned this decision has been made and signed by the two committees. This document is written in duplicate in the venered Arabic language and a copy was handed to each committee. Written in Dhahran in the twenty first day of the month of Shawwal of the year one thousand and three hundred and fifty four, 21st Shawwal 1354 Hijri.

Border Demarcation committees between the Kingdom of Saudi Arabia and the Kingdom of Yemen.

Committee Appointed by the Kingdom of Yemen:
Ismail Bin Hasan, Wall of Hamadan, member.
Mohammed Bin Hasan Alwadi'ee, Head of Sakeen, chairman.
Abdulla Bin Mana, Ruler of Sahar, member.
Abdulla Alghabiri, member.

The committee appointed by Saudi Arabia:
Abdul Wahab Bin Mohammed Abu Milha, chairman.
Abdul Aziz Bin Abdul Rahman Althamiri, member.
Ibrahim Zain Alabedeen, member.
Dulaim Abu La'atha, member.
Husain Bin Mustafa, member.
Talat Wafa, member.
### APPENDIX 1

Beginning from the sea shore to the end of the borders of Bani Mirwan following Alharth and to the borders of Wa'alun

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>No.</th>
<th>Names of border marks locations</th>
<th>From</th>
<th>To</th>
<th>Names of tribes belonging to the government of Saudi Arabia</th>
<th>Names of tribes belonging to the government of Yemen</th>
<th>Distance in Meters</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1</td>
<td>All the sea quay Ras Almiwaj of Radeef Qarad outlet</td>
<td>from</td>
<td>to</td>
<td>Alaraibi</td>
<td>Zeela'a</td>
<td>1000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2</td>
<td>Side of Alraseeb Alshami from Alshoori</td>
<td>the West</td>
<td>the East</td>
<td>Bani</td>
<td>Bani</td>
<td>1000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>3</td>
<td>Fayli Alalam No.2 a distance of 1600 Meters</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>Mirwan</td>
<td>Mirwan</td>
<td>1000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>4</td>
<td>Fayli Alalam No. 2 joining Alraseeb Alqibli to a distance of 300 Meters.</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>300</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>5</td>
<td>Wayman Baisil to Aldangor base</td>
<td>from</td>
<td>to</td>
<td>Alaraibi</td>
<td>Zeela'a</td>
<td>1000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>6</td>
<td>connected to the right towards the East placed at Shajarat Alradeef.</td>
<td>the North</td>
<td>the South</td>
<td>Bani</td>
<td>Bani</td>
<td>1000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>7</td>
<td>placed before Katif Alhasiyah from the West</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>Mirwan</td>
<td>Mirwan</td>
<td>1000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>8</td>
<td>placed at Shami from Radeef Alqarad</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>1000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>9</td>
<td>placed over Radeef Alqarad</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>1000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Place Description</td>
<td>Distance</td>
<td>Location Details</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>----------------------------------------------------------------------------------</td>
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<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>10 placed at Alnagareed to a distance of about 1000 meters</td>
<td>1000</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>11 placed at Alnagareed</td>
<td>1000</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>12 placed at Alnagareed opposite to Alfasla</td>
<td>1000</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>13 placed at Qaza extending from Alfasla to a distance of 1000 meters</td>
<td>1000</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>14 placed at Qaza extending from Alfasla to a distance of 1000 meters.</td>
<td>1000</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>15 placed at Balasim extending from Alfasla to a distance of 1000 meters.</td>
<td>1000</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>16 placed at Balasim extending from Alfasla to a distance of 1000 meters.</td>
<td>1000</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>17 placed at Shuaib Um Diyaba to a distance of 1000 meters</td>
<td>1000</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>18 placed at Shuaib Um Diyabah to a distance of 1000 meters.</td>
<td>1000</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>19 placed at Nisha' an to a distance of 1000 meters.</td>
<td>1000</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>No.</td>
<td>Description</td>
<td>Distance (m)</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
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<tr>
<td>-----</td>
<td>-----------------------------------------------------------------------------</td>
<td>--------------</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>20</td>
<td>placed at Misha''an Had Alqayoos</td>
<td>1000</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>21</td>
<td>placed at Misha''an Had Alqayoos, from the Alqayoos to the Bani Zeela</td>
<td>1000</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>22</td>
<td>placed at Misha''an Had Alqayoos, West East Mirwan</td>
<td>1000</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
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<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>23</td>
<td>Itmam Alshaban before which it bonds between Zeela''a and Alqayoos and the distance is 640 meters</td>
<td>640</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>24</td>
<td>Itmam Mishaban Ardh Alqayoos from the Alqayoos to the Bani Bani</td>
<td>1000</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>25</td>
<td>Itmam Mishaban Ardh Ibrahim Uthman Ningara and AlHamdi</td>
<td>1000</td>
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</tr>
<tr>
<td>26</td>
<td>located at Khazn Haj Shargi from the Alqayoos to the Almighfali</td>
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<td></td>
<td></td>
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</tr>
<tr>
<td>27</td>
<td>located on the West of Al Hasheera Had Alqayoos and Almighfali</td>
<td>1000</td>
<td></td>
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</tr>
<tr>
<td>28</td>
<td>located at Khabtat Alteena Qubla Alhasheera</td>
<td>1000</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
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<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>29</td>
<td>located at Shuaib Alhizb</td>
<td>1000</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
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<td>30</td>
<td>located at Khabtat Alhizb</td>
<td>1000</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
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</tr>
<tr>
<td>31</td>
<td>located at Zibarat Alsir</td>
<td>1000</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>32</td>
<td>located at Sadadat Khabtat Alsir</td>
<td>1000</td>
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</tr>
<tr>
<td>33</td>
<td>located at Shu'bat Zammar Alsarha</td>
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<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>No.</td>
<td>Description</td>
<td>From</td>
<td>To</td>
<td>Distance</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
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<tr>
<td>-----</td>
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<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>34</td>
<td>Located between 'Um Alqami' and Mafjar Alzammar in a straight line towards the East</td>
<td>Bani Almaghfalli and Alhadadi</td>
<td>1000</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>35</td>
<td>Located between 'Um Alqami' and Algooba in a straight line</td>
<td>Bani Hamad and Alhadadi</td>
<td>1000</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>36</td>
<td>Located between Adabat Al Maraweed and the limits of Algooba in a straight line to the East</td>
<td>Bani Almaghfalli and Alhadadi</td>
<td>1000</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
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<tr>
<td>37</td>
<td>Located between Kashf Al-Maraweed and Khaznat Asala</td>
<td>Bani Hamad and Alhadadi</td>
<td>1000</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>38</td>
<td>Located within Mafjar Alhomsiy</td>
<td>Bani Almaghfalli and Alhadadi</td>
<td>1000</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
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<tr>
<td>39</td>
<td>Located within Adabat Alkhooba Alyumna towards Alqibla</td>
<td>Bani Almaghfalli and Alhadadi</td>
<td>1000</td>
<td></td>
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</tr>
<tr>
<td>40</td>
<td>Located within Yamani Sadad Alda'asiya</td>
<td>Bani Almaghfalli and Alhadadi</td>
<td>1000</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>41</td>
<td>Located within Khart Al-Hoslyuh</td>
<td>Bani Almaghfalli and Alhadadi</td>
<td>1000</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>42</td>
<td>Located within Sarhat Almaghribi between Aljadara and Bani Mazed and the line remains as it is</td>
<td>Bani Almaghfalli and Alhadadi</td>
<td>1000</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>43</td>
<td>Located within Julban's way to Haraib a distance of 160 meters</td>
<td>160</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
44 located at Alsarha on Julban's way to Haradh
45 located at Wagas Alshaoob from the Aluraf Alashra
46 located at Wagas Alshaoob the Aluraf Alashra
47 located at Almifoor on West East Wala Aluraf Alashra
Waalan's way to Haradh and Mirwan
48 located at Abu Soual to the Algayous right of Bidhira

49 Mimal Bumashini from to Aluraf Alashra
50 Khalfat Almamsha the the and Ahil Alashra
51 Small Dandeega West East Wala Aluraf Alashra
52 Shami of large Dandeega
54 Qa'at Jabal Almoha
55 Shami Aldhira over Ta'ashar from to Aluraf Hidhab
56 Alhafat Alhafat towards the Aljibal first number.
56 Mureeh Almaturayn towards the from to Hassan Hidhab
east to a distance of 360 Aljibal
metes on the bottom of the West East Faqeeb Almeer
mountain over the valley
57 placed at Khlafat Almajoob from to Hassan Hidhab
58 placed at Dhul Alhagafir the the Faqeeb jibal
59 Roos Alhagafir and Um Aljabir South North Almeer
60 (illegible) from to Hassan Hidhab 1000
61 Eshat Alsayid the the Fajeeh Jibal 1000
62 Jabal Azyadi South North Almeer 1000
63 placed at Ras Almutis from the east
64 Mejan to the east of Bani Aljarah village and their farms from to Alhakamiya Hidhab
65 Alesha between Wadi Dhabab and the the Aljibal 1000
Wadi Algamari South North
66 Bottom of Eshat Alsaareh Sham
67 Dimnat Alsayid
68 Almaloos to the North of Almifyala

The statement illustrated by these lists consists of 3 pages from No. 1 to 68 is for the demarcation of borders between the Kingdom of Saudi Arabia and the Kingdom of Motawakiliya from the sea shore to Almifyala at the end of Bani Warman borders. These border drawings were determined with the approval of the two committees appointed by the two Governments whose names are mentioned in this decision. After examination and consideration by experienced chiefs of tribes under the domination of the two Governments, it has been decided that whatever falls to the North and West of the above-mentioned drawn borders belongs to the Government of Saudi Arabia and whatever falls to the South and East of the drawn borders belongs to the Government of Motawakiliya. This document has been written in duplicate and each copy is deposited with one of the two Governments. The two copies were checked against each other and were found correct. Therefore the decision has been made and signed.

Ramadhan 1354 The Motawakiliya Committee
Mohammed Bin Kassim Najmuldeen, member
Abdul Muttalib, member
Abdulla Bin Othman, Chairman

The Saudi Arabia Committee
Mohammed Alsulaiman Bin Turki, member
Abdulla Kadhi, member
Abdulla Almohammed Bin Aqeel, chairman
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- The line bends to the way to Almugharbah land of Zumaro then returns to the North.
- The line bends to the West to include some of Al-Imam's farms then straighten to the North.
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Since the records illustrated by these lists from No. (1) to No. (64) according to the statements, beginning from Almughyala to Alsouda are the separating borders between Alharth tribe, subjects of his Majesty King Abdul Aziz Bin Saud and Alharth, Bani Dahlí and Bani Sayah, subjects of his Majesty Imam Yahya, all that is on the West and North of the line belongs to the government of His Majesty King Abdul Aziz and all that is on the East and South belongs to the Government of Imam Yahya. The villages under dispute with intermingled farms divided by the border line firstly such as Almagbadh and Almalaheedh and then between Mabrouka, Almajham and Majda'a, those farms shall belong to their villages and the Zakat Tax shall be paid to the Government of that village as well as the farm belonging to Ibn Ghashi in the village of Almuen and entered into the border of Ubad Janada village belonging to King Abdul Aziz, the Zakat Tax of those lands shall belong to Almuen. And since these drawings were drawn by the two committees and the trustees and became the separating borders between the two kingdoms under the supervision of all and after considering the borders thoroughly and after everybody listened to the answers of the tribe chiefs of the two Governments, this decision has been made and on God we depend. 27th of Shawwal 1354 Hijri.

The Kingdom of Yemen committee:
Mohammed Bin Dhaif Allah Bin Ghathaya, member
Mohammed Bin Kassim Najmuldeen, member
Abdulla Bin Othman, chairman

The Kingdom of Saudi Arabia committee
Mohammed Alsulaiman Bin Turki, member
Abdulla Kadhi, member
Abdulla Bin Aqeel, chairman
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<td>Al Masheekh</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>68</td>
<td>Wafat Alhaidur</td>
<td>West</td>
<td>1000</td>
<td>Bani Harees</td>
<td>Al Masheekh</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>69</td>
<td>Ras Alageega</td>
<td>West</td>
<td>1000</td>
<td>Bani Harees</td>
<td>Al Masheekh</td>
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<td>70</td>
<td>Aljaheera</td>
<td>West</td>
<td>1000</td>
<td>Bani Harees</td>
<td>Al Masheekh</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>71</td>
<td>Khatwat Alghafa</td>
<td>West</td>
<td>1000</td>
<td>Bani Harees</td>
<td>Al Masheekh</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>72</td>
<td>Jewar Alwadaaf</td>
<td>West</td>
<td>1000</td>
<td>Bani Harees</td>
<td>Al Masheekh</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
The borders shown above have been distinguished and drawn between the Kingdom of Saudi Arabia and the Kingdom of Yemen Motawakiliya by drawing the line in the borders of the above-mentioned tribes from No. (1) to (72), from the beginning of the borders of Abadel tribes related to the Kingdom of Saudi Arabia and Alat Wakeesh related to the Kingdom of Yemen Motawakiliya going towards Abadel tribes and those opposite also Qais and Bani Harees and those opposite such as Al Masheekh, Al Zohour and Al Ateef through the chiefs of tribes related to the two governments and the trustees accepted by all under the consideration of the border committees. The areas on the west and north belong to the Kingdom of Saudi Arabia and the areas on the south and east belong to the Kingdom of Yemen Motawakiliya. With regard to Alat Ateef tribe related to Yemen and Alat Ateef under Hamad Bin Shoga related to Saudi Arabia, whose lands are intermingled, the borders have been defined in such a manner that some of Saudi subjects became situated within the Yemen borders but they are still Saudi subjects and their names are: Ahmed Bin Shoga, Yahya Bin Shoga, Yahya Bin Ahmed Bin Shoga, Salim Shaye', Jabir Jabran and Jabran Shaye'. Likewise a number of Yemen subjects became situated within the borders of Saudi Arabia but they remain the subjects of Yemen and their names are: As'ad Bin Hasan, Jabran As'ad and Sulaiman As'ad. Every one of those persons shall retain his farmlands and their Zakat Tax shall be paid to their respective governments. Likewise the lands belonging to the tribe of Al Mohammed are intermingled. Therefore, the borderline has been drawn in such a manner that whatever falls inside Saudi Arabia belongs to them and whatever falls inside Yemen belongs to them and each of them shall retain his lands and the Zakat Tax shall be paid to their respective governments except Hasun Bin Ahmed whose falls within the Saudi Arabia borders. He shall be a subject of Yemen and shall retain his farmlands. After deliberation and interviews this decision was made with the agreement of the committees and may God guide the steps of all. 21 Alqida 1354.

The Yemen committee:
Mohammed Bin Kassim Najmuldeen, member
Abdulla Bin Othman, chairman.
Mohammed Bin Dhaifulla Ghathaya, member.

The Saudi Arabia committee:
Abdulla Kadhi, member.
Abdulla Bin Aqeel, chairman.
Mohammed Alsulaiman Bin Turki, member.
Having considered and carefully studied the aforesaid reports we have approved them and ratified them totally in all and singularly in every article and paragraph. We also approve and ratify them and make a truthful royal promise to implement their contents with the will of God and respect them faithfully and trustfully and in the name of God, we shall not allow a breach thereof in any way as long as we are able to do so and to enhance the truthfulness of whatever mentioned therein we have ordered our seals to be placed on this document and we have placed our signatures thereon and God is the Best of Witnesses.
1934 Treaty of Taif
Annex 3
[Author's numbering]

To Taif Agreement concluded
between
the Kingdom of Yemen
and the Kingdom of Saudi Arabia

Owing to an error made by the two committees, the eleventh flag
was placed upon Ras Agabat Nahouga and since Agabat Nahouga
belongs to the Yemen Matabakiliya in accordance with Article 4
of the Taif Agreement, and since the flag indicates the border
line between the two Kingdoms that flag shall be placed under
Agabat Nahouga. In order to correct the error in accordance with
the Agreement this corrigendum has been issued.
1934 Treaty of Taif
Annex 4
[Author’s numbering]

Source: Ministry of Foreign Affairs, Kingdom of Saudi Arabia
(1977a) Collection of Documents and Agreements 1922-51: pp. 193-8
(Arabic, translated by the author).

General Agreement between the Kingdom of Saudi Arabia
and the Kingdom of Yemen for a resolution of the issues
facing the people of the two kingdoms.

In the name of God the Merciful, the Compassionate.

Both Governments believe that it is beneficial to establish rules governing
the resolution of claims, problems and issues facing the people who live on the
frontier.

Furthermore Article 7 of the Treaty of Taif requires the drafting of an
agreement concerning the manner in investigating damage and loss, including murder
and injury, between tribes on the frontier.

Furthermore the text of two letters which are appended to the Treaty of Taif,
dated 6th Safar 1315 between His Majesty Prince Khalid-bin-Abdul Aziz and Seyyid
Abdullah Ahmed al-Wasir agree that rules should be established between the two
Governments concerning movements between the two Kingdoms for the Hajj
(Pilgrimage), trade, and others.

His Majesty King Abdul Aziz bin Abdurrahman al-Faysal-al-Saud, King of
the Kingdom of Saudi Arabia and His Majesty Imam Yahya bin Muhammad
Hamiduddin, King of Yemen agreed the Articles as follows:

ARTICLE 1

To facilitate procedures between the people living on either side of the
frontier the representatives of the Kingdom of Saudi Arabia will be the Emirs of
Jezan, Abha, and Najran, and on behalf of the Kingdom of Yemen, the Governors of
Al-Sham and Harath, Meedi, and Wa’ilah to address the problems and claims which
are between groups or individuals on each side of the frontier.

ARTICLE 2

In the event of a letter passing between the representatives mentioned in the
previous article, the Emir or Governor should take action as quickly as possible. If
the problem is administrative he should try to find a solution and implement it. If
the problem is legal, it should be taken to a judge and treated according to religious
law. If the problem is moral and a solution can not be found by the representatives,
the should be treated according to Article 5 below.

ARTICLE 3

If a judge has such an issue before him he should not delay it. If the case
requires witnesses he must estimate the period necessary for the witnesses to be
brought before him and he must request this from the Emir of Governor. The letter
of confirmation from the Emir or Governor is an adequate form of identity for the
witnesses if they have no formal documents. The decision of the judge will be sent
to the Emir or Governor.
ARTICLE 4

Any decision made by the religious judge is final and will not be discussed further.

ARTICLE 5

Where there is an administrative problem the Emir or Governor must try to make an objective and fair judgement and he should explain the procedure which he followed to the other Emirs and Governors. If after a lot of effort a solution has not been found the following procedure should be used:

1. A meeting between the Emir and Governor who are dealing with the issue.

2. A committee set up with an equal number of representatives from either side. The Emir and Governor and other individuals may be Chairman or members of the committee.

3. If following the above procedures a satisfactory agreement has not been reached, the arbitration should be according to the Treaty of Taif.

ARTICLE 6

Because of the advantages of warm relations between the Emirs and Governors, which will satisfy both God and their Kings, they agree to have a meeting (according to Article 1 from the General Agreement) at least once a year (more frequently if necessary) to examine the issues and collaborate to find solutions to administrative problems as mentioned in Article 5 of this Annex. The meetings will take place alternately on the Saudi and Yemeni sides of the frontier and the time of the meeting will be decided by the Emir and Governor. Decisions from the meeting will be presented to the Government for approval. Ratification of the decisions must not be delayed more than three months after the final day of the meeting. The decisions must then be implemented without delay.

ARTICLE 7

Any person who wants to cross the boundary must obtain formal documents. Any person who does not get the permission of the Emir or Governor of his area will be arrested, and he may be sent back to where he came from. The rules governing the formal documents are as follows:

1. People who have business on the frontier such as those crossing the boundary for grazing, agriculture, and visits to markets may continue as usual until an arrangement is made in the future. In an emergency it is possible to restrict crossing by requiring formal documents.

2. People who cross the boundary to visit the Central Government or other places far from the frontier in either country must obtain formal documents.

3. Pilgrims, tourists, and traders who cross the boundary must obtain the formal documents or they will be arrested and sent back.
APPENDIX 1

ARTICLE 8

The formal documents which are mentioned in Article 7, Clauses 2 and 3 are as follows:

1. Valid passport from Saudi Arabia or Yemen.
2. Document from the Emir.
3. Identity paper from any governor stating destination.
4. Letter of introduction from the travellers' local Emir to the Emir of the destination.

ARTICLE 9

Traditional rights to grazing and wells are guaranteed by the Treaty of Taif. If a dispute arises between those involved with the grazing and wells it should be brought before the Emirs. If the Emirs are unable to resolve the dispute it should be presented to the committee mentioned in Article 6.

If there is still no agreement the issue should go to arbitration according to the Treaty of Taif.

ARTICLE 10

Because the carrying of weapons in the Kingdom of Saudi Arabia is forbidden according to the Rule of Organization published on 13/7/1354 (10 October 1935), Yemenis wanting to cross the boundary must hand over their weapons, whether firearms or knives, to the customs point or the Emirs on the frontier. On returning to their country their weapons will be returned to them. When those crossing hand their weapons to the customs officials they should be given a receipt so that their weapons may be returned to them on their return. Anyone found crossing with weapons will be punished according to the Rule of Organization.

If Yemen wants to establish a similar system for weapons for those crossing from Saudi, there should be a similar procedure.

ARTICLE 11

It is forbidden to take goats across the boundary avoiding the customs point. Anyone guilty will be punished for smuggling.

ARTICLE 12

Anyone having a claim relating to the frontier must have the claim endorsed by their Emir.
Appendix 2

Tribal Genealogies
Appendix 2.1: The genealogical tree of the Yaam Tribe

APPENDIX 2

Yaam

Madhkar

Jashm

aal-Faatma

Uaam-waajid

Banii-Salmaan

Banii-Dhhal

aal-Hiitiila

aal-Suur

aal-Sidraan

aal-'Alii

aal-Mstanir

aal-Tauuq

aal-'Asuufii

aal-Maahraf

aal-Murma

aal-Mahdiy

aal-'Raziq

Baal-Haarth

aal-Abaathiin

aal-Ddaa'nn

aal-Qaarbaan

aal-Saa'ad

aal-'Abaas

 Waadi'a

Habra

aal-wa'la

aal-Saalim

aal-Saad

aal-Mahmd

aal-Sa'iid

aal-Makaahiil

aal-Zamnaan

aal-Qhuuth

aal-Qashaaniiin

aal-'Afriit

aal-Shaarba

aal-Abuughbaar

aal-Jam'al

aal-Shaarmaan

aal-Su liimaan

aal-Haamid

baaII-Fadaal

Lasiuum

WalIad

'Abdaala

aal-'Aaamir

aal-'Ahindy
Appendix 2.2: The genealogical tree of the Waa‘ila Tribe

Source: Author’s Field Survey, 1 October - 10 December 1994
Appendix 2.3: The genealogical tree of the Dahm Tribe

Source: Author's Field Survey, 1 October - 10 December 1994

Note:
Dresch 1989 and STCS 1978 has indicated to the genealogical tree of the Dahm tribe as well, but its different from the author's proposal. This may be because they used various sources.
Appendix 2.4: The genealogical tree of the al-Sai'i'ar Tribe

Source: Author's Field Survey, 1 October - 10 December 1994
Appendix 2.5: The genealogical tree of the Al-Manaahiil Tribe

Source: Author's Field Survey, 1 July - 10 September 1994
Appendix 2.6: The genealogical tree of the al-Mahara Tribe

Source: Author’s Field Survey, 1 July - 10 September 1994
Appendix 3

1995 Saudi-Yemeni Memorandum of Understanding
1995 Saudi-Yemeni Memorandum of Understanding

Source: Text as reported by the Saudi news agency SPA, Riyadh in Arabic at 0148 gmt on 26 February 1995 translated in the BBC Summary of World Broadcasts (SWB) ME/2238 MED/15 [34]

In the name of God, the Merciful, the Compassionate.

A memorandum of understanding between the governments of the Kingdom of Saudi Arabia and the Republic of Yemen.

Out of their desire firmly to entrench and bolster ties of brotherly relations between the Kingdom [of Saudi Arabia] and Yemen, the two sides have agreed on the following:

Clause 1. The two sides affirm their commitment to the legitimacy and binding nature of the Ta’if accord signed on 6th Safar 1353 AH, corresponding to 20th May 1934; its appendices, known as the Ta’if accord, which will be referred to hereafter as the accord.

Clause 2. A joint committee will be set up, composed of an equal number [of people] from each side, within a period of 30 days. Its task will be to re-establish the [border] signs in accordance with the border reports appended to the accord - those [border signs] still existing and those which have fallen down - starting from the border point “Rasif al-Bahr, precisely from Ra’s al-Mi’wajj Shami to the Radif Qarad outlet” [Arabic: rasif al-bahr tamara ra’s al-mi’wajj shami li manfadh radif qarad] between Maydi and Mawsim, to the last point previously demarcated in Jabal al-Thar. Modern scientific methods are to be used to establish the signs by agreeing with a specialist company, to be selected by the two sides, to execute the task. The company will carry out its task under the supervision of the committee.
Clause 3. The current committee formed by the two countries will continue its work to decide on the required measures and the steps leading to the demarcation of the remaining parts of the border, starting from Jabal al-Thar to the end of the two countries' border, including agreement on means of arbitration in the event of differences between the two countries.

Clause 4. A joint committee will be formed which will negotiate on determining the sea border in accordance with international law, starting from the border point on the Red Sea coast mentioned in Clause 2 above.

Clause 5. A senior military committee will be formed by the two sides to ensure the prevention of military incidents, movements or other activities on the border between the two countries.

Clause 6. A joint ministerial committee will be formed to develop economic, trade and cultural relations between the two countries, and to boost aspects of cooperation between them. This committee will start its work within 30 days from the date of signing this memorandum.

Clause 7. A joint higher committee will be appointed to work on realizing the aforementioned, facilitate the tasks of the aforementioned committees and remove any obstacles or difficulties that may obstruct their work.

Clause 8. Each of the two countries affirm its commitment not to allow itself to be used as a base and a centre for aggression on the other, or for carrying out political, military or information activities against the other.

Clause 9. In order to continue the maintenance of an amicable and appropriate climate to ensure the success of the talks, each side will undertake not to carry out any propaganda against the other.

Clause 10. There is nothing in this memorandum that includes an amendment to the Ta'if accord or its appendices, including the border reports.
Clause 11. Everything that is discussed by the aforementioned committees will be checked and recorded in minutes, which will be signed by officials from both sides.

This memorandum was signed in Mecca al-Mukarramah on Sunday 27th Ramadam 1415 AH, corresponding to 26th February 1995 AD. It will come into effect on the date of exchanging the ratification documents.


For the government of the Kingdom of Saudi Arabia: Personal Adviser to the Servant of the Two Holy Places [King Fahd] Ibrahim Abdullah al-Anqari.
Appendix 4

Frontier Tribes’ Duty-Free Allowances
Frontier Tribes’ Duty-Free Allowances

Source: Saudi Customs Office at Al-Khadra Checkpoint, 1994
(in Arabic, translated by the author)

3 sacks of sugar  every 3 months
3 sacks of rice  every 3 months
3 cartons of dried milk  every 3 months
3 cartons of liquid milk  every 3 months
6 sacks of flour  every 3 months
6 sacks of cornmeal  every 3 months
6 sacks of barley  every 3 months
6 drums of fuel  every 3 months
10 cartons of motor oil  every 3 months
3 sacks of livestock feed  every 3 months
3 cartons of cooking oil  every 3 months
Appendix 5

A Recommended English Transliteration System for Arabic
APPENDIX 5

A Recommended English Transliteration System for Arabic

Source: Niblock and Dickins (1994), Centre for Middle Eastern and Islamic Studies, University of Durham

A RECOMMENDED ENGLISH TRANSLITERATION SYSTEM FOR ARABIC

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>CONSONANTS</th>
<th>VOWELS</th>
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Appendix 6

The Structured Interview
The Structured Interview

Interview No:

Nationality:  a Saudi  [ ]  b Yemeni  [ ]  c UAE  [ ]  d Qatar  [ ]

Sector:  a Western  [ ]  b Eastern  [ ]

Checkpoint:  a Al-Khadra  [ ]  b Al-Kharkhir  [ ]

Part 1: The Checkpoints

1. Which of the following is the most important reason for you to choose this checkpoint rather than another?
   a. Close to your residence and relatives  [ ]
   b. Close to your relatives  [ ]
   c. Provides a good service  [ ]
   d. Safe from the Yemeni side  [ ]
   e. Safe from the Saudi side  [ ]
   f. Good road from the Yemeni side  [ ]
   g. Good road from the Saudi side  [ ]
   h. Other (please specify)  [ ]

2. Is this checkpoint the one that you usually use?
   Yes  [ ]  No  [ ]  If no, see question 3

3. Which other checkpoint of the following do you usually use?
   a. Al-Khadra  [ ]
   b. Al-Kharkhir  [ ]
   c. Other (please specify)  [ ]

4. Where do you live?
   a. Name of City  [ ]
   b. Name of Tribe  [ ]
   c. Name of Province  [ ]
**APPENDIX 6**

5  How far is your home from this checkpoint?

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<tr>
<td>a</td>
<td>Less than 1km</td>
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<td>j</td>
<td>25-29km</td>
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<td>b</td>
<td>1-2km</td>
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<td>30-39km</td>
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<td>c</td>
<td>3-5km</td>
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<td>40-49km</td>
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<td>d</td>
<td>6-8km</td>
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<td>n</td>
<td>60-69km</td>
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<td>f</td>
<td>12-14km</td>
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<td>o</td>
<td>70-79km</td>
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<td>g</td>
<td>15-17km</td>
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<td>p</td>
<td>80-89km</td>
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<td>h</td>
<td>18-20km</td>
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<td>q</td>
<td>90-99km</td>
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<td>i</td>
<td>21-24km</td>
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<td>Over 100km</td>
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6  How long does it take to get by car to this checkpoint from your home?

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<tr>
<td>a</td>
<td>Less than 5 minutes</td>
<td>[ ]</td>
<td>f</td>
<td>26-30 minutes</td>
<td>[ ]</td>
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<tr>
<td>b</td>
<td>6-10 minutes</td>
<td>[ ]</td>
<td>g</td>
<td>31-40 minutes</td>
<td>[ ]</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
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<tr>
<td>c</td>
<td>11-15 minutes</td>
<td>[ ]</td>
<td>h</td>
<td>41-50 minutes</td>
<td>[ ]</td>
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<tr>
<td>d</td>
<td>16-20 minutes</td>
<td>[ ]</td>
<td>i</td>
<td>51-60 minutes</td>
<td>[ ]</td>
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<tr>
<td>e</td>
<td>21-25 minutes</td>
<td>[ ]</td>
<td>j</td>
<td>More than 1 hour</td>
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7  What type of road do you use to get to this checkpoint?

|   |   |   |   |   |
|---|---|---|---|
| a | All asphalt | [ ] |
| b | Part asphalt | [ ] |
| c | Dirt road | [ ] |
| d | Other (please specify) | [ ] |

8  What type of transportation did you use to get to this checkpoint?

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<td>a</td>
<td>On foot</td>
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<td>e</td>
<td>Taxi</td>
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<tr>
<td>b</td>
<td>Private vehicle</td>
<td>[ ]</td>
<td>f</td>
<td>Donkey</td>
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<tr>
<td>c</td>
<td>Friend’s vehicle</td>
<td>[ ]</td>
<td>g</td>
<td>Camel</td>
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<tr>
<td>d</td>
<td>Bus</td>
<td>[ ]</td>
<td>h</td>
<td>Other (please specify)</td>
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9  Do you think the waiting time for getting permission from the checkpoint is:

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<tr>
<td>a</td>
<td>Reasonable</td>
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<tr>
<td>b</td>
<td>Unreasonable</td>
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If unreasonable, please explain.

10  Are the waiting place and rest area at the checkpoint adequate?

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<tr>
<td>a</td>
<td>More than adequate</td>
<td>[ ]</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>b</td>
<td>Adequate</td>
<td>[ ]</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>c</td>
<td>Less than adequate</td>
<td>[ ]</td>
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<tr>
<td>d</td>
<td>Do not know</td>
<td>[ ]</td>
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</table>
APPENDIX 6

Part 2: Social, Cultural, and Economic Standards

11 What type of job do you do?

a Student [ ]

b Trader [ ]

c Farmer [ ]

d Official [ ]

e Labourer [ ]

f Unemployed [ ]

g Driver [ ]
h Herder [ ]
i Other [ ]

12 Would you mind telling me what is your monthly household income in Saudi Riyals?

a Less than 100 [ ]

b 1,000-2,999 [ ]

c 3,000-4,999 [ ]

d 5,000-6,999 [ ]

e 7,000-8,999 [ ]

f 9,000-10,999 [ ]

g 11,000-12,999 [ ]
h 13,000-14,999 [ ]
i 15,000 or more [ ]

13 What is your educational level?

a Illiterate [ ]

b Reading only [ ]

c Completed elementary/preparatory school [ ]

d Completed middle/intermediate school [ ]

e Completed secondary school [ ]

f University degree [ ]

g Other (please specify) [ ]

Part 3 Population Interaction

14 Why are you crossing the boundary? Give reasons in order of priority.

a Visiting markets [ ] [ ] [ ]

b Visiting relatives [ ] [ ] [ ]

c Visiting your property [ ] [ ] [ ]

d Visiting grazing and wells [ ] [ ] [ ]

e Other (please specify) [ ] [ ] [ ]
VISITS TO MARKETS

15 Where do you shop?
   a Name of the markets
   b Name of the province

16 Why are you going to a market on the other side of the frontier?
   a It is cheaper
   b It is near
   c It is easy to get to
   d All of the above
   e Other (please specify)

17 What are you shopping for?
   a Petrol (please specify)
   b Food (please specify)
   c Other (please specify)

18 How often do you cross the frontier to visit a market?
   a Daily
   b Weekly
   c Monthly
   d Yearly
   e Other (please specify)

VISITS TO RELATIVES

19 Where do you have relations on the other side?
   a Name of the settlement
   b Tribe of relatives

20 Which relatives live on the other side of the frontier?
   a Blood relatives
   b Relatives by marriage
   c Both of the above
   d Other (please specify)
21 Which ways do you usually keep in touch with relatives on the other side of the frontier?

- a. By land
- b. By air
- c. By telephone
- d. By letter
- e. Other (please specify)

22 How often do you visit your relatives on the other side?

- a. Daily
- b. Weekly
- c. Monthly
- d. Yearly
- e. Other (please specify)

VISITING YOUR PROPERTIES

23 Where do you own property on the other side of the frontier?

Name of the place
Name of the tribe

24 What type of property do you own?

- a. Farm
- b. House
- c. Well
- d. Grazing
- e. All of the above
- f. Tent and grazing
- g. Other (please specify)

VISITS TO GRAZING

26 Where do you have grazing on the other side?

Name of place
Name of tribe

27 How often do you visit the grazing?

- a. Daily
- b. Weekly
- c. Monthly
- d. Yearly
- e. Other (please specify)
APPENDIX 6

30 How many nationalities do you have?

- Saudi [ ]
- Yemeni [ ]
- UAE [ ]
- Qatar [ ]
- Saudi and Yemeni [ ]
- Saudi and Yemeni and other (please specify) [ ]

31 What type of document do you use to cross the boundary to the other side?

- Passport [ ]
- Statement [ ]
- Identity card [ ]
- Other (please specify) [ ]

32 When you are crossing the boundary are you usually alone, with another individual from your family, or someone else?

- Alone [ ]
- With your family [ ]
- With a group from your tribe [ ]
- Other (please specify) [ ]

Part 4: Opinions About the Boundary

33 What kind of Saudi features do you use to recognise the boundary between Saudi Arabia and Yemen?

- Mountains [ ]
- Plateaux [ ]
- Wadis [ ]
- Checkpoints [ ]
- Shiqqat [ ]
- Uruq [ ]
- Ramlat [ ]
- Other (please name the features) [ ]

33 What kind of Yemeni features do you use to recognise the boundary between Saudi Arabia and Yemen?

- Mountains [ ]
- Plateaux [ ]
- Wadis [ ]
- Checkpoints [ ]
- Shiqqat [ ]
- Uruq [ ]
- Ramlat [ ]
- Other (please name the features) [ ]

35 Do you think that the boundary has changed over the years?

- Yes [ ]
- No [ ]

If yes, please specify:
- Type of change
- Time of change
36 What is your opinion about the present boundary?

a  Satisfied [ ]
b  Dissatisfied [ ]
c  Do not know [ ]
If dissatisfied please explain

37 Do you have any proposals concerning the boundary between Saudi Arabia and Yemen?

Yes [ ]   No [ ]
If yes, please specify

Researcher's Remarks

a

b

c
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